VOLUME TWO

THE HARPER
HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION

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PREFACE

The historian finds many twistings and turnings in the course of human history, but no sharp breaks. For convenience we may speak of the history of the United States, or of medieval history, or of political or economic history, but such divisions of the field are always quite arbitrary, and historians rarely agree as to exactly what should be included in each. Even the division between B.C. and A.D. seems important only to Christian peoples. Being the story of civilization itself, history is universal in its length, stretching over all the ages from the first appearance of man on our planet to the present moment; it is universal in its breadth, covering all the nations and peoples of the earth; and it is universal in its depth, including every form of human activity. All these human activities, woven together, make up one gigantic story. The story is infinitely complex, but it is one story none the less. There is no history save universal history.

Students should therefore begin by familiarizing themselves with the general outline of universal history, even though such a view must necessarily be quite superficial. Those who wish to profit most from their studies will then proceed to a more detailed examination of the history of a few selected periods and places, and if they are equipped with this preliminary view of universal history, they will see narrower fields in a truer perspective than would otherwise have been possible. Moreover, they will quickly discover that even the most detailed studies are quite superficial. No one can tell everything that happened, and no one wants to. The most that can be done is to indicate the general course of human events, to analyze the major problems men have faced at one time or another, to show how men have tried to meet them, and thus to stimulate students to think more deeply and more imaginatively about the manifold problems facing humanity today. This is the greatest benefit that may be derived from the study of history.

No one person can master the whole field of human history, however, and it is with fear and trepidation that I have written this book. I would probably not have undertaken the task, had I foreseen the labor that it
would require, and now that it is finished I am appalled at my early audacity. I certainly would never have brought this volume to completion without the encouragement and aid of many friends, most of whom must remain anonymous. Nevertheless, I wish to express my gratitude to many colleagues who have read chapters and helped me generously with their constructive criticisms. Among them I must mention President Robert G. Bone of the Illinois State Normal University, Professor Theodore S. Hame-row of the University of Wisconsin; and at the University of Illinois Pro-fessors Ernest Dawn, Frederick C. Dietz, Northam A. Graebner, Charles E. Nowell, John B. Sirich, and Raymond P. Sterns. Much of the material in the last six chapters comes from my earlier book, *Beginning the Twentieth Century*, published in 1933 by W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., to whom I am indebted for permission to use this material once more. And above all, I am indebted to my wife, Margaret Hatfield Swain, who, as always, has followed the best traditions and done all those things for which wives are usually thanked in prefaces.

*September, 1957*

*Joseph Ward Swain*
The Europe of Louis XIV

A New Age in History—
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I. A NEW AGE IN HISTORY

Had a traveler from the thirteenth century visited almost any part of western Europe about 1660, he would have found the landscape little changed. The great majority of the people were still peasants living in small villages scattered here and there over the face of the country. Each village, with a population of perhaps two hundred persons, consisted of a row of huts along a very bad road; each had a church, a mill, and perhaps a smithy; and not far away might stand a rather pretentious manor house, with large barns and granaries. Around the village for a few miles stretched fields, pastures, and forests, and then came another equally isolated village surrounded by its fields and forests. If our visitor listened to a few conversations, he would hear mention of the feudal dues and services which peasants still owed their lords. But if he studied conditions more closely, he would learn that much had changed since the Middle Ages and that at the very moment great changes were coming over the agrarian life of Europe.

The ancient nobility still held huge tracts of land, which they leased to peasants, but payments were now made in cash or produce, not in labor in the lord’s fields as formerly. In Catholic countries the church too owned huge estates, amounting in a few cases to a quarter or even a third of the land. Though a part of this land was cultivated by monks, most of it was leased to peasants. Lesser aristocrats, called “squires” in England, owned farms of a few hundred acres, which they leased to tenants or worked with hired labor. Persons still lower in the social scale, known as “yeomen” in England, owned small farms, averaging thirty acres or so, which they themselves cultivated. In one way or another, therefore, the more aggressive and capable peas-
ants were winning secure tenure of the particular fields they cultivated, and their payments were fixed amounts. As food prices were high in the mid-seventeenth century, these tenant farmers and yeomen were not badly off. But there were also large numbers of farm laborers who earned very little, and thousands of vagabonds wandered about the country, working a little, stealing a little, begging a little, and often starving to death.

Security of tenure had encouraged men to drain land and otherwise render it more fertile with expensive improvements, for they knew that the increased revenue would come to them rather than to their lords. At the same time the seventeenth century saw much experimentation in new methods of crop rotation, in growing turnips and clover to restore the soil, and in the more efficient use of manure. But in spite of increased production and the high prices paid for their products, even the prosperous peasants were not happy. Though most of the old feudal services had been replaced by cash payments, the remaining vestiges of medieval serfdom could be most burdensome at times. Crops might be severely damaged by deer or pigeons, for example, but the peasant was not allowed to kill these pests, or even to drive them away, for by so doing he would impair the lord's hunting rights. Moreover, there were no legal channels through which peasants might lay their grievances before the authorities, their needs and desires were largely ignored by the government, they were despised by those above them, and the weight of taxation fell largely upon their shoulders.

The towns too were not very different from those of the thirteenth century. Perhaps some houses were better built, but cities were more crowded and dirtier than in earlier times. In 1660 London, with a population of about 500,000, was the largest city in Europe, and the largest since Roman times. Amsterdam came second, and Paris was third, with some 400,000 inhabitants. No others approached these three in size, and most of the cities of that time would today seem quite small. The second and third towns in England, for example, were Bristol and Norwich, each with a population of about 30,000, and not a dozen towns in all England could boast a population of 10,000 persons. The same was probably true even in such densely populated districts as Belgium. Towns of 3000 to 5000 inhabitants were rather common, however, and such a town was a much livelier and more metropolitan place than is one of equal size in America today.
Even the most famous of these cities lagged far behind modern standards as regards health, sanitation, and police protection. A hostile critic once described the Middle Ages as "a thousand years without a bath." He was wrong, for it has been shown that bathing facilities in Paris were better in the days of Philip Augustus (1180–1223) than they were in the days of Louis XIV. The real "age of filth" extended from about 1400 to about 1750. In 1660 the streets of London and Paris were narrow and dirty and were lined with vermin-infested wooden houses. Every year the bubonic plague carried off hundreds of Londoners, until a great fire swept over the city in 1666 and destroyed the rats that spread the disease. Even the houses of the rich could be heated only from fireplaces and, because of poor ventilation and primitive sanitary arrangements, they reeked with unpleasant odors. About 1660 Paris and London began to light their principal streets at night with feeble lanterns, but fear of robbers made an honest man hesitate to go out alone or unarmed after dark. If he were young and strong, he might even be beaten into insensibility by a "press gang" and on regaining consciousness find himself already at sea, a colonist on his way to America or a sailor enlisted in His Majesty's Navy. By day the crowded city streets were full of pickpockets and beggars. Yet these cities contained so many attractions that they grew steadily throughout the seventeenth century. They were the centers of life and trade, where fortunes might be won and lost, and where political and social careers might be enjoyed.

Throughout Europe in the seventeenth century society was still dominated by a caste system. The clergy and the nobility were recognized as the first and second "estates" respectively, while the "third estate," or "commons," included everybody else—bankers, shipowners, wholesale merchants, shopkeepers, industrial capitalists, skilled and unskilled workers, landowning peasants, tenant farmers, farm laborers, beggars, and thieves. There was always a certain amount of flux, however. The old noble families sometimes died out, or went bankrupt, and their places were taken by rich or intelligent or lucky individuals from below, sometimes through marriage, sometimes through royal favor, and sometimes by working up to important positions in the royal bureaucracy. As might be expected, strong antagonism developed between the old nobility and the new. The first estate was similarly divided, though along other lines. The lower clergy were as poor and ignorant as the peasantry whom they served and from whom they sprang, but the lucrative sinecures at the top
The middle class

Rising population

usually fell to the younger sons of the old nobility. The more influential leaders of the clergy, on the other hand, generally rose from the third estate or the new nobility.

Such, in broad outline, were the various social classes in western Europe about 1660. The old nobility and the higher clergy might strut and swagger and live beyond their means, in the fond hope of thereby proving themselves superior to the "common people," and especially to the rich merchants and bankers, but the days of their supremacy were numbered. Aristocratic standards and ideals were gradually giving way before those of the upper middle class. Political power, which once had rested with the local aristocracy, had now passed to the king and his middle-class ministers, and the political loyalty of all classes of people went to the king, or even to such abstractions as the "crown" or the "state," rather than to the nobility as in earlier times. The rich bankers and merchants found ways to make their will prevail in public affairs, and when they failed to do so, the results were likely to be disastrous for the nation as a whole.

The most reliable estimates indicate that in 1660 almost seventy million persons inhabited western Europe—the area, that is, that lay west of Russia and Turkey. This area included the modern western nations, and Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Scandinavia, but not Hungary or the Balkan states. This same area today supports at least 325 millions, or almost five times as many persons. Nevertheless its population in 1660 was the largest that Europe had ever known. The most liberal estimates of the population of the Roman Empire, when at its height about A.D. 150, indicate a scant forty millions for the western provinces and the German and other barbarian territories beyond the frontiers. A fearful decline during the next few centuries reduced these forty millions to considerably less than twenty before the time of Charlemagne (800). Improvement began again in the eleventh century, and in the thirteenth Europe's population may have equaled that of Roman times. It may even have reached sixty million about 1340, shortly before the Hundred Years' War (1338–1453) and the Black Death (1348–1349), but these catastrophes decimated Europe once more and that figure was not surpassed until after 1600. Germany lost heavily during the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648), and the populations of Spain and Italy declined more slowly during the whole seventeenth century. On the other hand, those of France, the Netherlands (Holland and Belgium), and England were then rising rapidly, so the total reached seventy million soon after the mid-century.
In 1660 France, with about twenty million inhabitants, was the most populous country in Europe: today it has a population of forty-three millions. Italy, then torn into several fragments politically, and Germany, divided into about three hundred independent states, each had about twelve millions: today Germany and Austria have seventy-five millions and Italy has forty-seven millions. England and Wales then had a little over five millions as opposed to forty-four millions today; Spain had less than six millions as opposed to twenty-eight millions; and Belgium and Holland each had about one and one-half million inhabitants, though they support nine and ten millions respectively today. To evaluate the economic life of a country, however, we should compare population densities rather than grand totals. In 1660 France supported about 95 persons per square mile (as opposed to 202 today), Italy about 100 (showing a shockingly low standard of living, in spite of an average of 407 today), Germany about 70 (440 today), England about 85 (750), and Spain 30 (147), while Belgium had about 135 (745) and Holland 100 (as opposed to 843 today).

These figures are highly significant, for in those days the population of a country was determined largely by the amount of food it could produce. Except in America and western Europe during the last century and a half, countless persons in every country have always been living at the verge of starvation, not because they lacked the money to buy adequate food but because there simply was not food enough to go around. Enormous numbers of infants died in their first year from starvation or from diseases caused or aggravated by malnutrition. A rising population, then, indicated steady progress in agriculture, and a dense population meant high industrial development as well. Our figures therefore show that Europe was relatively prosperous in 1660, with the Netherlands and France leading the world in industrial development. The figures also show that England has since made the most remarkable industrial progress.

France was also the leading military power in Europe at that time, having recently snatched hegemony from Spain. More important still was her leadership in intellectual and cultural matters. The French language was used by polite society throughout western Europe. French books were read everywhere, French architecture was copied, and French styles and manners were imitated. Kings everywhere followed Louis's royal example, and lesser grandees imitated him as best they could. The second half of the seventeenth century is therefore
justly called "the age of Louis XIV." This grandeur of Louis XIV rested upon the solid foundation of a rich and populous nation, and it was the high point of several centuries of highly civilized life. Louis stood at the climax of a long period in history. He represented a type of civilization which dated from the Italian Renaissance, two or more centuries before his time, and which had once been gloriously expressed by the famous Medici family—whom Louis numbered among his ancestors. Louis and his associates brought this civilization to its highest perfection, but they added little that was new. The first half of Louis's long reign was the season of his glory, but it was also the Indian summer of an age that was passing away.

At this very time new ideas, new ideals, and a new way of life were arising in Europe, especially in England and Holland. Louis and those around him took a disdainful attitude toward most of the innovations, and haughtily patronized others, without ever trying to understand them. Their serenity might have been disturbed had they foreseen what lay before them, for these new ideas, which contradicted most of what Louis held dear, were destined eventually to prevail. They are the ideas which characterized the "modern world" of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, from which our "contemporary world" of the twentieth century was born.

It is our purpose in the present chapter, therefore, to give a sketch of this world of Louis XIV, to describe the rise of a very different system in England, to compare the two civilizations in a few fundamental matters—economic life, religious policy, and political theory—and to conclude with the first victories of the new way of life in the wars of Louis XIV.

FRANCE UNDER LOUIS XIV

France was at peace in 1661 when Louis XIV took the reins of government into his own hands. She had suffered cruelly during her Wars of Religion (1562-1598), and Spanish troops had occasionally invaded her northeastern provinces from the Netherlands during the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), but these ravages were now repaired. Two able cardinals, Richelieu (1624-1642) and Mazarin (1642-1661), had governed France for almost forty years, and the latter left her the strongest nation in Europe, militarily, diplomatically, financially, and in political organization. Though the popular uprising called the "Fronde" had caused a little trouble between 1648 and 1653, France
suffered no further disturbances of a serious sort for almost a century
and a half.

Mazarin died early in 1661, and on the next day young Louis an-
ounced that he would rule personally thereafter. Born in 1638, Louis
had been only five years old at the time of his father’s death, but
during the last years of Mazarin’s long rule he had been fretfully
awaiting his own coming into power. He was now twenty-three years
of age, ambitious, intelligent, good-looking, and possessed of perfect

A FAMOUS CARTOON BY THE ENGLISH NOVELIST THACKERAY, SUGGESTING THE
REAL BASIS OF LOUIS XIV’S GREATNESS.

manners. He was indeed every inch a king, and few kings in history
have approached him in his skill at bearing the outward trappings of
royalty. He had inherited and learned much from his Spanish mother,
and he modeled his court etiquette upon that of Spain; but though he
pursued his “profession of being king” assiduously, he never worked
as slavishly as had his great-grandfather, Philip II of Spain.

The new king’s scholastic education had been sadly neglected, and
in later life he sometimes complained that it was most embarrassing
not to know things that everyone else knew. Nevertheless, Louis was
able to gather a group of brilliant men around him and to encourage
them in their respective activities. He was commonly called “the Sun
King” because all else revolved around him while he shed his light
on all. It now seems most unlikely that he ever uttered the famous
phrase, L’état, c’est moi (“I am the state,” or, more forcefully though
less grammatically, "The state, that's me!"), but throughout his life he showed that these words expressed his profoundest convictions. At last, however, Louis died, on September 1, 1715, aged seventy-seven years, after an official reign of seventy-two years and a personal reign of fifty-four, each the longest in French history.

Louis was determined to rule a France in which no one could resist his will. A similar ambition had inspired nearly every king in Europe during the past two centuries, and absolutism was widely regarded as the only alternative to the frequent wars and revolutions that had devastated so much of Europe in the late Middle Ages and early modern times. Louis himself could well remember the frightening days of the Fronde and the night in 1648 when he was hurriedly carried off to St.-Germain to escape the fury of the Paris mob. But Richelieu and Mazarin had gone far in reducing the insolence and independence of the French nobility, and their task was completed in the 1660's. Thereafter France was the most highly centralized state in Europe, with all political power descending from the king and his ministers.

Jean Baptiste Colbert (1619–1683) was the ablest of these ministers. Trained by Mazarin, Colbert became minister of finance in 1665. He later assumed several other offices as well, and for almost twenty years he virtually directed the domestic government of France. Being the son of a rich merchant, he was inclined to favor his own class in society, but he was a man of wide views, and all France prospered under his guidance. His economic policies were those of mercantilism—state control of the economic life of a nation—in which he was so successful that writers now refer to mercantilism simply as "Colbertism" (see p. 20). Colbert provided the money for Louis's wars and other grandiose projects, and the great days ended with his death, after which the kingdom began to slip into bankruptcy.
Louis's minister of war was the Marquis de Louvois (1641–1691), who skillfully reorganized the French armies on the basis of the new military science developed during the Thirty Years' War and by Cromwell's "Ironsides" in England's recent Civil War. He made Louis's army the largest and best in Europe. After Colbert's death, Louvois took over many of his offices, where he again showed high ability, but his aristocratic unscrupulousness and his propensity for intrigue greatly impaired his usefulness. After Louvois's death there was no one of stature to take his place; Louis and his ministers were pushed and pulled by cabals at court; and conditions in France went from bad to worse.

The enormous palace at Versailles may be taken as the supreme monument to Louis's glory. The village of Versailles, lying on a sandy and marshy plain slightly over twelve miles southwest of Paris, had long been the site of a royal hunting lodge. Here Louis, who feared and hated the Parisians, decided to erect a palace whose grandeur would match his own. Work began in 1669, the court moved to its new home in 1682, but the palace was not completed until 1701. The huge building was the royal residence, but it also contained apartments for members of the French nobility, where they were kept out of mischief. They no longer plotted against their royal host,
and presently they no longer craved any liberty save that of living gaudily at his expense. The great halls at Versailles were the scene of countless social functions, grandiose and gay but dominated by an oppressive etiquette. In the early days life there was exciting and happy, with much wild gambling and refined debauchery. The king himself took the lead in everything, parading his mistresses before his wife and the world, and sometimes paying his friends' gambling debts out of the treasury. But in his old age Louis became devout and his guests began to grumble about being bored. Today the huge buildings, with their surrounding lawns, fountains, and parks, are a national museum, but even the overawed tourist is likely to sympathize with Louis's contemporaries, who complained that the palace was not a very comfortable place in which to live.

Classic French Literature

Glory of a very different sort redounds to Louis from his intelligent patronage of French literature. The troubled period of the Wars of Religion had produced no important literature in France, but under Richelieu and Mazarin there appeared a new creativeness that reached its full fruition in the first two or three decades of Louis's personal rule. The king was personally interested in literary men, to whom he paid subsidies and whom he occasionally invited to court. The works of these men are now regarded as the classic literature of France and are perhaps the greatest glory of the age of Louis XIV.

The most illustrious writers of this age were its dramatists. Pierre Corneille (1606-1684) was born at Rouen, in Normandy, where he received a good classical education from the Jesuits, studied law, and for many years held a government office. Not until his reputation had been made, and his best work done, did he resign his post and move to Paris (1662), where Louis paid him a pension. Corneille's early plays were light comedies of intrigue, but he presently began writing tragedies modeled on those of the Roman Seneca. His first outstanding success was Le Cid (1637), dealing with a legendary hero of the medieval wars of Spaniards against the Moors, but his other great tragedies were based on episodes in Roman history. Like nearly all the writers of this period, Corneille was dominated by the spirit of the ancient Latin writers, yet he adapted this spirit to his own time and people so successfully that he has been a French "classic" ever since.
Jean Racine (1639–1699), Corneille's admiring rival and successor, was educated by austere Jansenists in their monastery at Port-Royal, near Paris. Here he became infatuated with the Greek tragedies of Euripides and, much to the dismay of his puritanical teachers, he decided to become a poet and dramatist. He won a name for himself with a tragedy entitled *Andromaque* in 1667, and during the next ten years he produced six other masterpieces, all dealing with ancient times. Though highly honored by Louis XIV, Racine was so disgusted with the rivalries and jealousies of literary groups at court that in 1677 he returned for Port-Royal, and for ten years he wrote nothing. He finally consented, however, to produce two dramas based on Biblical themes, *Esther* (1689) and *Athalie* (1691). They are sometimes considered his greatest works. Racine's characters, like those of Corneille, often seem superhuman in their sublimity, and their long speeches contain much that we would condemn as sheer bombast, yet these tragedies portray the workings of the human heart with deep insight and sympathy. Their faults are those of their period, for their authors shared many of Louis's conceptions of grandeur. The characters parade and speak in the grand style, much as Louis paraded and spoke in his grandeur at Versailles.

The greatest of French comedians was Molière (1622–1673). The son of a tapestry worker attached to the court, Molière was educated by the Jesuits at Paris. After touring the provinces of France for fifteen years with a troupe of actors, he returned to the capital as one of the brilliant group surrounding Louis XIV. Writing to amuse the king and court, Molière made fun of many types of person—the social climber, the miser, the misanthrope, the sanctimonious hypocrite, and the pedantic ignoramus, along with many other impostors and frauds—but the characters he ridiculed are universal and his satire never was petty or vindictive. Molière was one of the great comedians of all time, and his comedies provoke as much good-natured laughter today as they did when played before Louis XIV.

Other literary men of the classic age may be mentioned just in passing. The *Fables* of La Fontaine (1621–1695) have continued to charm readers by their light verse and their delicate satire on human society. The *Letters* of Madame de Sévigné (1626–1696) give us a brilliant picture of life at Paris and Versailles, as do the *Memoirs* of the Duke de Saint-Simon (1675–1755). In 1678 Madame de La Fayette published *La Princesse de Clèves*, a precursor of the modern novel. Jacques Bénigne Bossuet (1627–1704), for many years court preacher
to Louis XIV, was learned, solid, and substantial, a writer on political theory and history, a theologian, and a Catholic apologist. In 1688 he supplemented the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685, see p. 27) with a large *History of the Variations of the Protestant Churches*, in which he argued that individual interpretation of the Bible, as practiced by Protestants, must inevitably lead to more and more sects and eventually to religious anarchy. This book is one of the most powerful attacks upon Protestantism ever written. Bossuet’s heir and rival was his pupil, the mystic François de Fénelon (1651–1715), who enjoyed great influence at court in the period after Louis became pious. In some ways Fénelon resembled the English Quakers. The ideas set forth in his book on education were long regarded as authoritative, and in *Télémaque* he pictured a Utopia that was widely admired in the eighteenth century.

All these writers were deeply influenced by the Greek and Latin classics, but as the century drew to its close a literary controversy showed that opinions about the superiority of antiquity were changing. In 1687 a minor poet named Charles Perrault (1628–1703) published a bombastic poem on “The Century of Louis the Great,” in which he ranked the French writers of his own age above the ancients. When taken sharply to task for so bold and unorthodox an utterance, Perrault devoted several years to preparing another book, entitled *Parallels of the Ancients and Moderns*, in which he undertook to prove his thesis. The ensuing controversy, known as the “quarrel of the ancients and moderns,” raged for many a year and eventually the moderns won. The ancient classics were no longer regarded as the last word in literary excellence, and foundations were thus laid for the coming doctrine of Progress in Literature.

**ENGLAND’S “GLORIOUS REVOLUTION”**

Meantime the history of England was following a very different course. Continental observers in the seventeenth century often expressed the opinion that, as a people, the English were singularly incapable of governing themselves. As a matter of fact, they were just at that time creating a political system that was soon to be admired by friends of liberty throughout the world. When Charles I (1625–1649) attempted to govern as an absolute monarch, his people rose in rebellion (1642), Oliver Cromwell’s “Ironsides” defeated the king’s armies, and Charles himself was beheaded. A makeshift republic,
called the Commonwealth (1649–1653), was succeeded by the Protectorate (1653–1659), with Cromwell virtually dictator until his death in 1658 (see Vol. One, pp. 782 ff.). During these turbulent years parliament was often praised as the guardian of English liberties, yet Cromwell paid it scant attention, and his rule was as absolute as that of Charles. When his son Richard could not continue this iron rule, parliament invited the late king’s son to return and rule England as Charles II (1660). The new king agreed to govern with the aid of parliament, and as parliament had made Charles king, Englishmen came to regard parliamentary government as natural and as the only sure foundation of freedom.

The Stuart family, of which Charles was a member, had ruled Scotland before it began ruling England in 1603. At that time there had been a little talk of amalgamating the two kingdoms, but throughout the seventeenth century they were united only by having the same man as king. During the early years of the Civil War, Scots aided the English parliamentary forces, but after the execution of Charles I they at once accepted his son as their king. Cromwell defeated them, Charles fled to Holland, and Scotland was ruled—though not harshly—from England. The Scots were therefore delighted when, in 1660, Charles returned to England and their old autonomy was restored. Relations between the two countries then became so cordial that fifty years later they united as the Kingdom of Great Britain (1707).

In Ireland, on the other hand, the seventeenth century was a tragic period. In the days of Henry II (1154–1189) English knights and freebooters had invaded the island, where they carved out huge estates for themselves. The English kings thereafter claimed a vague lordship over them and all Ireland, but as late as 1500 they rarely made good their claims outside the “Pale”—the fortified region around Dublin. The rest of the island was inhabited by tribes of quarrelsome Irishmen. Both Henry VIII (1509–1547) and Elizabeth (1558–1603) settled many English in Ireland, and under James I (1603–1625) even larger numbers of Scots moved into the northern county of Ulster. The native Irish were largely Catholics, the English in the Pale and elsewhere Anglicans, and the Scots Presbyterians. Under Elizabeth, Spanish agents sometimes fomented minor rebellions in Ireland, and during the Civil War Irish rebels again caused trouble until Cromwell pacified them with such brutality that his name is still a curse in Ireland. Neither he nor anyone else could solve the Irish problem.
When Charles II (1660–1685) mounted the English throne, after ten years of exile, he was in a chastened mood, with no desire to “resume his travels.” He therefore showed himself quite willing to share the rule with parliament, especially as that body agreed with him on most matters. The House of Lords, consisting of the hereditary peers, had been depleted during the Civil War, and Charles filled the vacancies with friends. The House of Commons, on the other hand, supposedly represented the “people” of England. Its members were elected, but as only rather well-to-do persons were allowed to vote, the Commons really represented only two classes of Englishmen—the country squires and the rich merchants of the towns. Both factions wanted to end the turmoils of civil war, and both were therefore willing to work with Charles.

The country squires formed the backbone of England. A squire probably owned several farms, some of which he leased to tenants while others became pastures for sheep. When not fox hunting or visiting with his neighbors, he busied himself with his duties as justice of the peace or with other political activities. He and his colleagues governed rural England. They usually held rather narrow views of the world, but they were attached to the king and the Anglican Church, and they were quite touchy about their personal independence. As long as the prices of grain and wool remained high, they were satisfied with Charles, but they would never tolerate royal absolutism on the French model. The townsmen were more inclined to be critical of the king, and they opposed many of the political measures favored by the squires, but peace had brought economic prosperity, and the townsmen were momentarily satisfied. Though it eventually became the custom to call the country squires Tories while their political rivals in the towns were called Whigs, the two groups were not yet organized as political parties.

Charles had spent part of his exile in France, the guest of his young cousin, Louis XIV, and there he had imbibed pro-French sympathies as well as French ideas regarding royal grandeur. He therefore attempted to glorify his court at Whitehall with something of the glamour for which Versailles became famous. For twenty years all went moderately well, until Charles forgot his earlier caution and began to imitate his cousin’s political absolutism as well as his magnificence. His last four years were a period of growing discontent in parliament and among the people, but the king died before matters reached an acute stage.
As Charles had no legitimate children, the throne passed to his brother, James II (1685–1688). The new king at once made it clear that he was determined to rule as an absolute monarch. Adversity had taught him nothing, and his efforts to establish absolutism were shortsighted in the extreme. Before a year had passed, both Whigs and Tories were thoroughly alarmed. Moreover, James was a Roman Catholic. Charles had favored the Catholic religion, but he had been discreet enough to conceal his sympathies. James, on the other hand, had publicly professed Catholicism in 1673 and had straightway taken as second wife Mary of Modena, a most zealous Catholic. When he became king, James did what he could to promote Catholicism in England. He appointed sympathizers to high positions in the government, in the Church of England, and in the universities, and without parliamentary permission he began enlarging the army and staffing it with Catholic officers. For fifteen years after her marriage, Mary had borne no children, and James’s subjects had allowed themselves to hope that, on the king’s death, the throne would revert to a Protestant. In the summer of 1688, however, the queen gave birth to a son. A thousand scandalous rumors at once filled the air, but there could be little doubt that this legal heir to the English throne would be raised a Catholic. This straw broke the camel’s back, and English political leaders of all factions agreed that the time had come for a change.

James II’s first wife had borne him two daughters, Mary and Anne, the former of whom married William III, of the Dutch house of Orange, who had ruled Holland since 1672. On his father’s side, William was the great-grandson of William the Silent (d. 1584), the founder of Dutch independence; but his mother was a daughter of Charles I of England and therefore a sister of James II. Mary was not a woman of great force of character, but her husband was most energetic. He had long looked forward to inheriting the English throne, and most Englishmen had looked forward to being ruled by William after the death of James.

Two weeks after the birth of James’s son, seven prominent English leaders wrote to William, inviting him to save England from Catholic tyranny by seizing the throne for himself, and early in November, 1688, William landed in England with a Dutch army. James marched out against him, but there was no fighting, for James fled back to London when several regiments and their commanders deserted to William. (One of the first deserters was young John Churchill, later
Duke of Marlborough, who founded the family of Sir Winston Churchill, British prime minister in our day.) Soon thereafter James and his family fled to France. Construing this flight as an abdication, parliament declared the throne vacant and named William and Mary joint sovereigns of England (January 28, 1689).

A few leaders in Scotland remained loyal to James, but after one battle they caused no serious trouble. Early in 1690 James appeared in Ireland, where thousands of Irish Catholics flocked to his banner. William easily defeated them at the battle of the Boyne, and before the end of 1691 all Ireland was once more pacified. James's spectacular poltroonery on the Boyne cost him his last English friends, and he spent the remaining ten years of his life in France, a pensioner of Louis XIV. For many years, however, a few romantics continued to dream beautiful dreams about James, his son (the "Old Pretender"), and even his grandson (the "Young Pretender," or "Bonnie Prince Charlie"). With their aid the "Old Pretender" landed in Scotland in 1715, and "Bonnie Prince Charlie" fatuously invaded England in 1745. He died in 1788, and with the death of his brother, Henry, Cardinal of York, in 1807, the house of Stuart ceased to be.

The coming of William and Mary made it abundantly clear that parliament was thereafter to have the last word in the government of England, yet the constitutional machinery for parliamentary rule was not worked out for many years to come. William was an intelligent and aggressive man who took an active part in government. At no time did parliament attempt to dictate his choice of ministers, but under the circumstances it was only natural that he should choose them from the Whig leaders who had invited him to England and who now held a majority in parliament. Only in the next century did England develop the modern idea of cabinet government, under which all ministers are responsible to parliament rather than the king and therefore must belong to the party that holds the majority there.

As soon as William and Mary became rulers of England, a general settlement was made. All public officials, clergymen, and other prominent persons were required to take an oath of allegiance to the new sovereigns: the four hundred "nonjurors" who refused lost their positions. The original offer of the crown to William had been followed at once by a long "Declaration of Rights," specifying many illegal acts allegedly committed by James II. Late in 1689 parliament passed a resolution confirming this Declaration, in slightly revised form, as the "Bill of Rights." This famous document listed among the "ancient"
rights of Englishmen that neither laws, taxes, nor armies are legal without the consent of a freely elected parliament, that subjects always have the right to petition the government, that everyone is entitled to trial by jury, and that excessive bail shall not be demanded or cruel punishments inflicted. This Bill of Rights is often ranked with Magna Carta itself as a foundation stone of British liberty. Similar bills of rights have since been enacted in the United States and other countries. A “Toleration Act” granted religious freedom to all Protestants except Unitarians. Another act provided that only a Protestant might inherit the throne and that if the king became a Catholic or married a Catholic, he must abdicate. (This law is still in force.) For more than a hundred years thereafter, most Englishmen continued to assert that this “Glorious Revolution” established liberty such as the world had never known and beyond which no sensible man would wish to go.
2. THE OLD STATESMANKHIP AND THE NEW

Charles II and James II regarded the fundamental problems of statesmanship from much the same point of view as their French cousin, Louis XIV, and had their hands been as free as his, they would undoubtedly have followed similar policies. But the English monarchs were not free. They always had to take parliament into account, and even the Tories in parliament refused to countenance the establishment of French absolutism in England. When James attempted to circumvent parliament, he lost his throne, and his successors rose to favor by professing very different views. The Revolution of 1688 was not merely a turning point in English history: it was the first major triumph of a new philosophy of government and a new way of life. Economic freedom began to replace state control of industry and commerce, religious toleration weakened the union of church and state, and, above all, parliamentary government superseded royal absolutism. It will therefore be worth our while to contrast the old system with the new in each of these three fields. Let us begin with a discussion of official economic theory and the government policies it inspired.

MERCANTILISM

Mercantilism, or "Colbertism," is the name ordinarily applied to a set of economic doctrines and practices which most statesmen held in high esteem during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These statesmen believed that governments should regulate all the economic activities of their peoples and direct them to strengthening the state. Mercantilism has been described as state-making by economic means, or it might be called the economic aspect of royal absolutism. Though
Colbert was the most distinguished, and perhaps the most successful, practitioner of such doctrines, he was by no means their inventor. The Italian city-states of the Renaissance had practiced mercantilism as best they could, and in the sixteenth century the Spaniards developed elaborate and cumbersome state machinery for the exploitation and development of their American colonies. Holland and England added new features to mercantilist doctrine, and Colbert completed their work in the 1660's and 1670's.

The mercantilists always laid great emphasis upon foreign trade, exalting it above domestic trade, and they strove constantly to maintain a "favorable balance of trade." By "favorable balance" they meant a surplus of exports over imports, which surplus would be paid for with gold. The favored country would thus increase its stock of precious metals. Today this ambition may seem rather foolish—the United States has now acquired a major part of the world's gold supply but can do nothing with it except bury it at Fort Knox—but in the seventeenth century conditions were so different that this aspect of mercantilism seemed highly important. Paper money had not yet been invented, and checks or drafts were used only rarely and for large transactions. Payments were ordinarily made in gold or silver, and consequently there was a greater demand for "hard money" then than now. Kings in particular always needed such money desperately to pay their armies of mercenaries and to meet their other obligations. At the same time economists were beginning to realize that a shortage of the precious metals caused declining prices and economic depression while a liberal supply of them brought rising prices and general prosperity.

There was therefore greater excuse then than now for thinking that a nation's wealth and power could best be measured by its gold supply, and governments devised many ways for promoting a favorable balance of trade. Sometimes they imposed tariffs to keep foreign goods out of the country; sometimes they granted subsidies or monopolies to encourage domestic manufactures and thus make imports unnecessary; sometimes they acquired colonies where the precious metals and other goods could be got free and from whose markets foreign competitors could be excluded; sometimes they built great fleets and developed a carrying trade with freights paid in gold, while navigation acts, excluding foreign ships from a nation's ports, attempted to prevent other states from doing the same. The Spaniards were especially interested in developing the colonial aspects of
mercantilism; the Dutch built the world's largest merchant marine; the English passed navigation acts in 1651 and 1663; and England, Holland, and France all chartered great trading companies to trade with India and other remote places. Perhaps Colbert's greatest contribution to mercantilist theory and practice is to be seen in his constant insistence that France's export trade could best be promoted by guaranteeing the high quality of French manufactured goods, and in his elaborate regulation of industry to insure the maintenance of such standards.

In his regulation of industry Colbert methodically began at the bottom, making great efforts to secure an adequate supply of skilled labor. He reorganized and strengthened the old craft guilds and organized new ones for industries that had grown up since the Middle Ages. Wages, hours of labor, the length of apprenticeship, and countless other matters were fixed by law. To encourage the best methods of manufacture, he imported artisans from foreign countries, notably from Italy and Flanders, who taught their trades to Frenchmen. After this system had been in operation for a few years, minute regulations specified every step in the manufacturing process. In consequence of Colbert's labors, French manufactured goods presently came to be recognized as the best in the world, and France's export trade prospered accordingly. After the rules had once been codified, however, it proved difficult, if not impossible, to change them. New and improved methods were introduced slowly, if at all, and for several generations Colbertism was a millstone around the neck of French industrialists.

Colbert also gave careful attention to the other aspects of manufacturing. He organized countless companies to develop industries in which he was especially interested—textiles, silk, iron—but he found capital hard to get. Rich Frenchmen were accustomed to invest their wealth in land and feared the risk in other enterprises. Colbert therefore used state funds for his favored projects, either making contributions to their initial cost or granting subsidies later, but in return he kept a very careful watch over the industry. A few industries, especially those creating luxuries, were owned and managed by the state, others were granted monopolies, and still others were permitted to advertise that the king himself used their products.

Colbert was less successful in his commercial and colonial undertakings. Almost as soon as he took office, he raised French tariffs, often doubling or tripling the former figure, thereby strangling trade. He
negotiated commercial treaties with various nations, promising to buy certain amounts of raw materials from them if they took French manufactured goods in exchange. The great companies he organized and subsidized to trade with various parts of the world—the East Indies, the West Indies, the Levant—accomplished little more than the ruin of private traders in those areas and they undermined private initiative. His efforts to develop the colonies were equally unfortunate. Canada offered little except to fur traders, and French peasants were unwilling to settle there because of its distance and its climate. In spite of these setbacks, Colbert accomplished a tremendous work, and when he died in 1683, he left France the richest and most prosperous country in the world. It was not long, however, before decline began.

Conditions in England offered a sharp contrast to those in France. Like everyone else, Englishmen thought in mercantilistic terms and enacted mercantilistic laws, but unlike Colbert, they set up no elaborate governmental machinery for enforcing these laws. Moreover, the fundamental purpose of the English laws was quite different. Colbert used state action to develop industry and increase exports in order that France might become stronger, but the English called for state aid in order that private industrialists, able to influence parliament, might become richer. In England the craft guilds were moribund in the seventeenth century, and no one thought of reviving them. English industry was less shackled with obsolete regulations. The laws requiring inspection of manufactured goods were badly enforced. Monopolies had often been granted before 1640, but they always were unpopular and most of them were revoked by parliament during the Civil War. The English kings had sold them when in need of cash, and the monopolists had used them as a means of gouging the public, whereas Colbert regarded them as a convenient method of regulating industry. The Navigation Acts, likewise, were merely a boon to English shipowners, not a device for building up a national merchant marine. The great English trading companies, such as the East India Company, remained free to do as they pleased and were highly prosperous, but their French competitors were so hampered by regulations from Paris that they usually went bankrupt. Perhaps the most characteristic of all the new English economic institutions was the Bank of England, a joint-stock enterprise established in 1694, which lent heavily to the government and thus acquired power over it, but which was itself quite independent of the government. French banks,
on the other hand, were regulated almost to death. In short, English industry enjoyed far greater liberty than that of France. At first Colbert’s vast organization was successful, but in the eighteenth century England’s relative liberty paid handsome dividends.

**CHURCH AND STATE**

Europe’s Wars of Religion had come to an end in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia. The Latin countries of southern Europe—Italy, Spain, Portugal—as well as several south German states, Bohemia, and Poland, were now definitely and completely Catholic. The north German states and the Scandinavian countries were similarly Protestant. But between these two solid areas lay large regions of mixed allegiance. France and Ireland were largely Catholic but with important Protestant minorities, while the reverse was true in England, Scotland, and Switzerland. The Spanish Netherlands (now Belgium) were Catholic, the United Netherlands (Holland) were Protestant. Moreover, the Protestants were divided into three major groups and many minor sects. Protestants living in Scandinavia and most of those in Germany were Lutherans, those in England and a few in Ireland were Anglicans, and the rest were Calvinists under various names. In Switzerland, in Holland, and in Germany the Calvinists called themselves the Reformed Church, in France they were Huguenots, and in England, Scotland, and north Ireland they were Presbyterians.

One consequence of the religious disturbances of the sixteenth century was the domination of the church everywhere by the secular authorities. Lutherans and Anglicans made no bones about admitting this domination, but while the Calvinists were more circumspect, they accepted the dictation of the government whenever they lived under Calvinist rulers, as in Geneva, Holland, or Scotland. Catholic rulers recognized the pope, after a fashion, but they would not hesitate to send armed forces against him if he opposed their wishes, and during the past hundred years the pope had usually been a protégé of Spain. Nearly everyone believed that a state should tolerate only one form of religion and that it should support one church with official recognition and tax money. Every state supported such an “established church.” Often it was unable to enforce conformity to that church’s doctrines and practices, yet only the members of a few
small sects, who were hopeless minorities themselves, ventured to suggest toleration of all forms of religion. Even these men would usually exclude some groups or persons from the benefits of their proposed toleration.

Many admirable manifestations of the Christian spirit appeared during the seventeenth century, making this one of the great centuries in the history of Christianity. The King James Version of the Bible (1611) gave English Protestants a splendid textbook; the religious writings of such men as John Bunyan became classics; a series of able thinkers gave Anglicanism a solid theology; and the Quakers, led by George Fox and William Penn, along with several other minor sects, added much that was new and valuable to England’s religious life. An equal number of remarkable men appeared in Catholic France, of whom two may be mentioned in passing. St. François de Sales (1567–1622) was the author of widely used books of piety and mysticism (Introduction to the Devout Life; Essay on the Love of God) and inspired many followers to devote their lives to charitable works. St. Vincent de Paul (1576–1660), who had once been captured by Moslem pirates and held as a slave in Tunis, organized a society of clergy and laymen, commonly called Lazarists, for missionary work among prisoners, galley slaves, and other unfortunates and to care for the poor and the sick. Others founded schools, hospitals, and shelters or built churches and convents.

But there was also another side to the religious life of the seventeenth century. The grossest superstition existed at every level of society. Charles II, for example, is said to have touched 100,000 persons in the hope of thus curing them of the “king’s evil” (scrofula, a form of tuberculosis)! Practically everyone shared in the witchcraft craze, which then reached its height, and countless old women were sent to horrible deaths with the active cooperation of the churches. Much has been made of the nineteen unfortunates put to death at Salem, Massachusetts, in 1692 (apparently because of the pranks and fanciful tales of three little girls), but their number is trifling when compared with the tens of thousands then being executed in Catholic and Protestant Europe. Not until the next century, when rationalism had made great inroads among educated people, did the craze subside. In England the last executions for witchcraft came in 1712, but in such backward countries as Spain and Poland they continued into the 1780’s and 1790’s.
"Gallican liberties"

France

Many difficulties arose from the absolutistic ambitions of monarchs and the close association of church and state, especially in France and England. In the former country these difficulties centered around three great issues: the power of the pope over the French church, Jansenism, and Protestantism. The quarrel with the papacy was nothing new. In 1438 the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges (see Vol. One, p. 619) had declared church councils superior to the pope and affirmed the local autonomy of the French church. The Concordat of 1516, signed by Pope Leo X and King Francis I barely a year before Martin Luther launched the Reformation, dropped the claims regarding church councils but augmented the king’s powers over the church in France. Thereafter the French spoke much of their “Gallican liberties.” In 1682 Louis XIV reopened the quarrel by summoning an assembly of the higher clergy which enthusiastically reaffirmed these liberties. It declared that kings were not subject to the pope in temporal matters and could not be deposed by him; it reaffirmed the superiority of councils over the pope; it declared that the ancient customs of the French church must not be disturbed; and it asserted that papal decisions regarding matters of faith might later be rectified unless the whole church had formally consented to them. These four articles were voted by the assembled clergy and formally promulgated by the king. A bitter quarrel with the pope followed, until Louis dropped his claims (1697), sadly admitting that he could not dominate the church as completely as he wished. Nevertheless, “Gallicanism” remained a burning issue in France—and in most other Catholic countries—until the nineteenth century.

The Jansenists were Catholics who accepted the teachings of Cornelius Jansen (1585–1638), a professor at Louvain in the Spanish Netherlands. His austere and puritanical theology somewhat resembled Calvinism, but it won wide support in Catholic France, especially among the educated upper classes. Intellectual leaders sympathizing with the new theology included the dramatist Racine (1639–1699) and the scientist Pascal (1623–1662). The Jansenist monastery at Port-Royal became a powerful force in the religious life of France, with its influence reaching far beyond the circle of convinced Jansenists. To the present day Pascal’s Provincial Letters, written with great force and wit, remain one of the most devastating attacks ever made
upon the activities and teachings of the Society of Jesus. The Jesuits were equally bitter toward the Jansenists, and Louis followed their lead, partly perhaps because Jansenist leaders had taken a conspicuous part in the Fronde and had sometimes talked too much about "liberty." Louis's lifelong efforts to suppress the Jansenists proved futile, even though he eventually induced a compliant pope to declare them heretical (1713). Persecution only aroused sympathy, and throughout the eighteenth century Jansenism continued to attract many serious-minded Catholics in France and Italy.

Most important of all was Louis's attempt to eradicate Protestantism. The Edict of Nantes (1598) had granted toleration to Protestants and even allowed them to fortify and govern a few strongholds. Cardinal Richelieu deprived them of this latter privilege, but neither he nor Mazarin limited their right to worship publicly and as they pleased. Being satisfied with this status, the Huguenots took no part in the Fronde. Ardent Catholics were not content, however, and their intolerance rose rapidly during the 1670's. Louis himself probably did not rise far above the simple thought that if Roman Catholicism was good enough for him it must be good enough for anybody, but he was constantly being prodded by the clergy and by his mistress, Madame de Maintenon. (Though born a Huguenot, she was now a fervent Catholic and wielded great power over him, even marrying him secretly after the death of the queen.) Louis therefore encouraged strenuous efforts to win the Huguenots by argument, by revivalistic appeals, and by offering pecuniary rewards to converts, but such methods never were as effective as the "dragonnades." Brutal and lawless soldiers (dragoons) would be quartered in the houses of Huguenots, and their withdrawal promised as soon as the householder and his family had been rebaptized Catholics. A gratifying flood of "conversions" invariably followed within a few hours. At last it was announced—quite falsely—that there were no more Protestants in France, and that the Edict of Nantes, having become superfluous, was revoked (1685). This frightened thousands of Huguenots into headlong flight to England, Holland, or Germany, but others stood firm, and since that time they have made up about 3 percent of the population of France. The revocation of the Edict of Nantes undeniably was popular with the great majority of Frenchmen, but it scandalized Europe, and even the pope, who already was furious with Louis because of his Gallicanism, expressed deep disapproval of the dragonnades.
England

The situation in England was quite different. The majority of the people attended the Anglican churches in the days of Charles II, but many went reluctantly, others neglected to go, and still others refused. The church was then dominated by the “High Church” faction, which favored a colorful ritual and Catholic doctrines on many points of theology. It also held “high” views regarding the divine right of kings, passive obedience, and the royal prerogative. The non-Anglican Protestants—ordinarily called “dissenters”—fell into several groups, including the Presbyterians, Independents (Congregationalists), Baptists, Quakers, and others. It is hard to estimate their numbers, for they had been driven underground, but they and their sympathizers may perhaps have included a majority of the humbler classes in the towns. Squires and successful merchants, on the other hand, were “churchmen” who supported the Established Church. Soon after the Restoration of 1660 a series of laws, known as the Clarendon Code, made it illegal for a dissenting clergymen to preach to more than five persons at a time or to live within five miles of a town. Another law, called the Test Act (1673), effectively excluded dissenters from office by requiring that all government officials, clergymen, and university students receive communion in the Anglican Church. The Revolution of 1688 brought a new spirit. The Clarendon Code was replaced by a Toleration Act granting religious freedom to all except Catholics and Unitarians, but the Test Act continued to keep dissenters out of public office.

The position of Catholics was more difficult. They were not numerous—an estimate made in the early 1690’s put their number at 30,000, or about one-half of one percent of the population—but ever since the days of Queen Elizabeth and the Spanish Armada they had been the victims of an extraordinary hatred and bigotry. In 1678 a certain Titus Oates drove many Englishmen into hysteria by his sworn accounts of popish plots to murder the king, burn London, and launch a general massacre of Protestants. Several innocent persons were executed, but fortunately the excitement soon died down and Oates was fined, flogged, and made to stand in the pillory. The follies of James II and the wars of Louis XIV revived anti-Catholic fury, however, and William III deemed it wise to grant Oates a pension! William retained the Test Act, which excluded all Catholics from office;
Catholic churches and Catholic priests were forbidden, though a few escaped detection; but Catholics were not bothered otherwise unless they made themselves conspicuous. Popular cries of "No popery" were still heard, and the Protestant clergy continued to fulminate against "Romish" errors and practices, but that was about all.

In Ireland William's religious policy was far less tolerant. An Irish parliament was set up, but as its members were subject to the Test Act, local government fell to a handful of English landlords living in Dublin. Anglicanism was "established" in Ireland, with an English clergyman assigned to each parish and paid out of local taxes, but as he often had no parishioners, he might never leave England. Catholics were not allowed to teach in schools; the intermarriage of Catholics and Protestants was punished; and if one of several sons became a Protestant he would inherit his father's entire estate. There were no dragonnades, however, and Catholic church buildings and Catholic worship were not forbidden. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the Catholic clergy became the leaders of the Irish people.

Finally, mention must be made of John Locke's *Letters on Toleration* (1689–1692). Here "the philosopher of the Whig Revolution" (see p. 32) argued eloquently for religious toleration, and the Toleration Act followed his ideas quite closely. Even Locke, however, would not extend toleration to Catholics or atheists—to the former because of their allegiance to a foreign pope, to the latter because such men, fearing no God, could not be trusted. Whatever the sordid actuality in Ireland and elsewhere may have been, Locke's book accurately expressed the religious ideals of the new age that was dawning.

**POLITICAL THEORIES**

Like all the kings of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Louis XIV claimed that he had been appointed to rule by God. Claims of this exalted sort had sometimes been put forward by rulers in the Middle Ages; they were popularized by both Catholic and Protestant kings during the Reformation; and the pretentious but pedantic James I of England even wrote a book on the subject, *The True Law of Free Monarchies* (1603). Louis XIV was not equally ambitious for literary fame, but in the middle years of his reign the court preacher, Bishop Bossuet, composed a famous statement and defense of the
divine right of kings to rule in his *Politics Drawn from the Very Words of Holy Scripture*. Here the good bishop declared that the kings of France, like those of ancient Israel, were chosen and appointed by God, that they received their power from him alone, and that to him alone were they responsible. Of course Scripture also taught that it was the king’s duty to succor and protect his people, but if he failed to do so, only God could call him to account. Subjects had no right to resist or even to protest against anything their king might do. Bossuet’s theological justification of royal absolutism became more or less official in France, and very similar doctrines were taught by the Church of England in the days of Charles II and James II. In fact, the Anglican clergy were sometimes accused of saying that the whole duty of the Christian citizen could be stated in the two words “passive obedience.” High officials in church and state zealously popularized such precepts throughout Europe.

This doctrine of the divine right of kings might be sponsored by the authorities and accepted passively by the populace, but it had long since been discarded by serious students of political science. During the Wars of Religion that followed the Reformation, protagonists of every faction had claimed that they, and they alone, were possessors of the divine truth and undertook to “prove their doctrine orthodox by apostolic blows and knocks”—as the English satirist Samuel Butler put it in his *Hudibras* (1663). Thoughtful persons were therefore left skeptical regarding all theological arguments. Writers on government and law tried to build their theories on firmer foundations, and the science of politics, divorced from theology, became a purely “secular” study. Italians of the Renaissance period had already turned to the ancients rather than the scholastics as guides in such matters, relying especially upon such writers as Cicero, Polybius, and Livy. But seventeenth-century men took a special interest in natural science (see below, p. 117), and in conformity with the new spirit political scientists preferred to deduce their social and political theories from “the great book of Nature.”

Writers on law in the seventeenth century therefore had much to say about “natural law” and “natural rights,” and they traced the origin of the state itself to “natural” causes. They were aided greatly by the lawyers of ancient Rome, who had spoken of an unwritten *ius naturale* (“natural law”) and of *iura naturalia* (“natural rights”) which supposedly sprang from the very nature of things and which therefore could not be changed—even by God himself. Writers also
invoked a *ius gentium* ("law of the peoples"), by which words they referred to general principles of law accepted by all mankind. Theoretically at least, the *ius civile* ("civil law," or the written law actually used in courts) of specific countries was based on the general precepts of the *ius naturale* and the *ius gentium*, and if it departed from them it was charged with violating men's "natural rights."

These secular writers also took over the "contract theory" to explain the origin of all government. This theory taught that the earliest men had no government and that the exigencies of life induced them to unite in states and other social groups. They therefore chose rulers, with whom they entered into contracts, agreeing to surrender their liberty—or part of it—in exchange for protection and other benefits which the rulers undertook to provide. The theory was not new, for in the sixteenth century both Calvinists and Jesuits had invoked it to justify attacks upon kings not to their liking (see Vol. One, p. 799). Scholars now gradually eliminated the theological trappings under which these earlier writers had presented the doctrine, thus making it a scientific and secular explanation of the nature and rights of kings.

The Dutch Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), famous as the "father of international law" (see Vol. One, p. 800), was an influential exponent of this new line of thought. His great book on *The Law of War and Peace* (1625) was concerned principally with the aspects of law indicated in its title, but he gave his work a broad and solid foundation by setting forth elaborate theories regarding law and government in general. He accepted the "contract theory," declaring that men made the original contracts partly because they are essentially social animals, unable to get along without each other, and partly in order to repress the violence of unruly individuals. But having once entered into this contract, both parties were morally and legally obligated to observe its terms. Grotius thus became as much a defender of royal absolutism as Bossuet himself. He admitted, however, that kings should not violate the law of nature, just as Bossuet admitted that they should not violate the law of God. Grotius also gave a new meaning to the words *ius gentium*. In the mouths of early Roman lawyers these words designated the laws used for non-Romans residing in Rome, while in imperial times and with the scholastics they referred to the general principles of law admitted by all peoples. Grotius virtually identified this latter sort of *ius gentium* with *ius naturale* and used the words *ius gentium* to indicate the generally accepted rules regarding the dealings of monarchs or states with one
another. The expression thus came to designate the “law of nations,” or what we call “international law.”

John Locke (1632–1704) developed these ideas and eventually became the most influential of the political theorists of the seventeenth century. Born to a Puritan family and educated at Oxford while his father fought in Cromwell’s army, Locke early took an interest in natural science, practiced medicine briefly, and later became secretary to a prominent Whig politician, Lord Shaftesbury. After his patron’s death, Locke spent five years as an exile in Holland, returning to England shortly after the Revolution of 1688. During the next few years he published books on a wide variety of topics—political theory, economics, education, theology, philosophy—and he has been called “the philosopher of the Whig Revolution.”

His *Two Treatises on Government* appeared in 1690. In the first essay he easily demolished a rather flimsy defense of the divine right of kings, written many years before by an Anglican bishop but first published in the last days of Charles II; and in the second he set forth his own theories regarding the state. He declared that men’s original state had been one of bliss and that they entered the cooperative commonwealth in order to advance their various interests. In Locke’s hands, the doctrine of the social contract became a revolutionary one, for he argued strongly that the contract between king and people was a mutual agreement and that, if the ruler failed to keep his side of the bargain, his people had a perfect right to depose him—just as the English had rejected James II and executed Charles I.

This political theory became standard Whig doctrine in the days of William III. Tories continued to talk about the king in other terms, but even they could no longer accept the old dogmas unless they were prepared to cast in their lot with James II or his son, the “Old Pretender.” After 1688 it was a firmly established principle in England
that political power rested with parliament and the "people" (by which was meant the articulate members of the middle and upper classes) and not with some hereditary sovereign like Louis XIV. In the eighteenth century the doctrine spread to all Europe, and when Thomas Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Independence, he was inspired by the ideas of John Locke and his theories of natural right and the contract form of government, especially in such passages as,

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed, by their Creator, with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.

THE LESSER STATES OF THE WEST

It is easy today to see that England and France represented two types of civilization that must soon come to grips, but in characteristic fashion Louis XIV, all of whose ideas typified an age that was passing, continued to regard the decaying Hapsburgs as his principal rivals. This ancient family had once been the most powerful in Europe, but long before 1660 it had fallen upon evil days. Its possessions had been divided between the Austrian and the Spanish lines of the family in 1556, and subsequent intermarriages and political alliances were not enough to hold them together. In 1660 the Austrian Hapsburgs held the archduchy of Austria (about the same as the present Austrian Republic) plus various minor Alpine duchies that reached southward to the Adriatic at Trieste. In the opposite direction they held the kingdom of Bohemia—recently devastated and subjugated during the Thirty Years' War—and, beyond Bohemia, the German duchy of Silesia extended their territories to the frontier of Poland. This branch of the family also held a strip of western Hungary, the rest of which country was then under Turkish dominion. Hapsburg territories thus consisted of a compact mass, reaching from the Oder River on the north to the Adriatic Sea on the south and forming the eastern bulwark of western Europe against Slavs and Turks. As this frontier was not an easy one to defend, it taxed the resources of the Austrian
Hapsburgs to retain what they had, and they were little inclined to aggression toward the west.

This Austrian branch of the Hapsburg family also inherited the title of "Holy Roman Emperor." Theoretically, this emperor was chosen by seven (later by nine) electors, who were supposedly the most important rulers in Germany, but since 1438 their choice had always fallen upon the head of the house of Hapsburg. Though the emperors had once vaguely claimed to be the lawful rulers of all Europe, their power and even their pretensions had been curbed, and in the mid-seventeenth century the Empire included only the lands of the Austrian Hapsburgs, most of modern Germany, all Belgium, and a few territories now part of eastern France. The power of the emperors over these regions was slight, and after the Peace of Westphalia (1648) it was virtually nil. The Empire continued a shadowy existence until 1806, but for many years before this date men had been repeating the witticism that the Holy Roman Empire was neither Holy nor Roman nor an Empire.

The Spanish Hapsburgs loomed larger in western Europe, but they too had passed the days of their greatness. They still held an enormous empire in the New World, but it no longer provided the easy wealth of former days. The vast stores of gold and silver accumulated by the Aztecs and the Incas had long since been carried off to Europe and dissipated. Even legitimate trade was seriously impeded by Dutch and British interlopers, as well as by the red tape of the Spanish bureaucracy. In 1580 Philip II of Spain had inherited the throne of Portugal along with its empire in the East Indies. Sixty years later, in 1640, the Portuguese regained their independence, but the Dutch had already seized much of this empire, and now they took the rest.

The kings of Spain still held the Spanish Netherlands (approximately the modern Belgium) as well as Franche-Comté—the eastern part, or "Free County," of the old duchy of Burgundy which lay just northwest of Switzerland. The Spanish Netherlands were no longer so important as formerly, partly because of the great material damage done during the long wars for Dutch independence (1568–1648), partly because the Dutch had closed the Scheldt River and thereby destroyed the trade of Antwerp, partly because Antwerp's former financial leadership had been snatched from her by the Dutch bankers of Amsterdam, and partly because the tyranny and religious bigotry of the Spaniards had forced tens of thousands of their most
skillful artisans to flee to Holland, Germany, or England. The Spanish Netherlands were therefore of greatly diminished value to Spain, while Franche-Comté was worth even less—and it was soon lost anyhow. The Spaniards still dominated Sicily and Italy from their two strong points at Naples and Milan. But Sicily, once the granary of the Roman Empire and later a garden under Frederick II (d. 1250), had long ago been rendered desolate by Spanish misrule, and southern Italy was no better off. Only in the Venetian territories did something of Italy’s old prosperity remain, and the Venetians vigilantly guarded their independence from Spaniard and pope alike. The pope was temporal ruler of the large Papal States in central Italy, but he nearly always was under the thumb of Spain.

In the days of their ascendancy the Spanish infantry had been the terror of Europe. During the Thirty Years’ War, however, military men learned how to use artillery effectively against solid masses of foot soldiers, and Spanish commanders never were able to adjust their tactics to the new conditions. Moreover, the Spanish armies, like those of the Austrian Hapsburgs in the Thirty Years’ War, were made up of mercenaries collected from all over Europe, and Spain was now too impoverished to afford such luxuries. When she lost her military power, she also lost her political prestige. The last of the Spanish Hapsburgs, Charles II (1665-1700), was a pathetic creature, decrepit both physically and mentally. At the time of his accession it was generally known that he could have no children and that with him the dynasty would die. As was to be expected, throughout his long reign his brother monarchs seized bits of his territory here and there, and they constantly watched him like vultures preparing to tear his carcass to pieces as soon as he was dead.

The United Netherlands, or Holland, seems quite small on a map of Europe, for its area (about twelve thousand square miles) is not much greater than that of one small American state such as Vermont or New Hampshire. Nevertheless in 1660 it was the most important commercial nation in the world, with a merchant fleet three times the size of all others combined, and with a colonial empire in the East Indies, South Africa, and America that was second in area and wealth only to that of Spain. Since the Peace of Westphalia (1648), its political independence had been formally recognized by the great powers, and in practice it had become independent of Spain fifty years earlier. Holland was a federal republic, composed of seven separate provinces, governed by a stadholder and an estates-general, or parliament.
The office of stadholder was held in succession by five members of the house of Orange. When the fourth member of this family died in 1650, his son (the future William III of England) was not yet born, and for the next twenty-two years John de Witt, the grand pensionary (governor) of one province, ably guided the republic. William III was stadholder for thirty years (1672–1702), and when he died without direct heir, another grand pensionary took over. Eventually William's cousin (of the house of Nassau) became stadholder and from him the present royal family of the Netherlands is descended.

Holland attained the height of its power—naval, financial, cultural—in the days of de Witt. A series of wars, first with England and later with France, cost it heavily, but it remained a leading commercial power notwithstanding. The country had long been famous as a haven for political or religious refugees from other countries, and at one time or another many of the most brilliant intellects in Europe enjoyed its hospitality. Dutch toleration even extended to Jews, of whom an important group resided in Amsterdam. At that time they were excluded from most western European states, though Cromwell had recently admitted a few Jews to England.

The Treaty of Westphalia left the territory now known as Germany divided into about three hundred states, which were weakly united in the moribund Holy Roman Empire. Some of these states were rather large while others seemed almost microscopic on the map, but all boasted of their freedom—the freedom of their ruler, that is, to act as he wished. The possessions of the Austrian Hapsburgs formed the largest single state in central Europe. Next came Saxony, which had been the scene of great devastation during the Thirty Years' War, when its population is said to have been reduced in a few years from three million to barely half that number. The loss to Germany was the greater because Saxony had long been a cultural center, and her dialect had been made the standard of good German by Luther's Bible. A further misfortune befell the country in 1697, when her king was offered and accepted the crown of Poland: he thus precipitated a series of bloody wars which the unhappy Saxons fought and paid for, and by becoming a Catholic (part of the bargain) he created a deep gulf between himself and his people. Catholic Bavaria had gained new territories from the war, but they profited her little, partly because their population was overwhelmingly Protestant. Prussia, in the north, was to play an important role in the eighteenth century, but in
1660 few could have foreseen the fate that awaited her. Aside from these four states, none in Germany merited more than local attention.

Switzerland, like the United Netherlands, was formally recognized as independent in 1648, but she had actually been enjoying this freedom for many years. The three central cantons had successfully maintained their independence since the beginning of the fourteenth century, and during the next two hundred years they had been joined by others, the last to enter the Confederation being Geneva (1526). Most cantons were German, but some were French, and the natives of the Ticino spoke Italian. The Swiss were able to surmount these linguistic differences, but religious differences caused bloody wars, even in the late seventeenth century. While they boasted of their independence from foreign rule, the Swiss leaders granted little liberty to the lower classes at home, which suppression sometimes led to minor rebellions. For several centuries the Swiss had provided European monarchs with excellent mercenary soldiers. Thousands of these mercenaries fought on each side during the Thirty Years' War, but thereafter they preferred other occupations.

For a brief period during the Thirty Years' War Sweden had posed as a great power, but after the death of Gustavus Adolphus (1632), her strength began to wane. There was still a remembrance of things past, however, and the great king's daughter, Queen Christina, tried in vain to revive the old glory. After her abdication (1654), two mediocre kings waged frequent but unimportant wars against their neighbors. After them came the famous Charles XII (1697-1718), who was perhaps an even greater military genius than Gustavus Adolphus. For twenty years Charles kept northern Europe in a turmoil, but at the age of thirty-five he was killed in battle. Thereafter Sweden ranked as one of the lesser powers. Denmark and Norway formed one kingdom in those days, but being poor, their kings were not of a bellicose nature.

In the days of Louis XIV eastern Europe was divided between three great peoples with widely different cultural backgrounds: the Ottoman Turks, with their oriental Moslem civilization; the Poles, who were attached to the West by their Roman Catholic religion; and the Russians, who had derived their Orthodox Christianity and much of their higher culture from the medieval or Byzantine Greeks of Constantinople but who had also been deeply influenced by the Asiatic Mongols, who ruled them during the Middle Ages. None of these peoples had close contacts with the West in 1660, however, and
our discussion of them will therefore be deferred to another chapter. We shall turn instead to the wars with which Louis XIV harassed Europe throughout his long reign.

THE WARS OF LOUIS XIV

In his last days Louis sometimes admitted that he had loved war too much, and most historians have agreed with him. His reign centered around four major wars, two of which involved practically every state in western and central Europe, and the fighting even spread to the North American colonies. In each case Louis was the aggressor, for he ardently desired military glory—and also the rich fields and cities just over the northeastern frontier of France. Colbert's mercantilistic philosophy may have taught that possession of these regions would make France stronger, but what Louis really wanted was "more"—more of anything, more of everything. His propagandists found a separate pretext for each war, but in a general way they justified them all by invoking alleged inheritance or feudal right.

The first of these wars was the War of the Devolution (1667–1668). After beclouding the issue with much legal jargon, Louis's spokesmen declared that the Spanish Netherlands had "devolved" upon, or been inherited by, the king of France through his Spanish wife. She had explicitly renounced all such claims, it is true, but Louis pronounced her formal declaration to be null and void because her promised dowry had never been paid. It happened, moreover, that France's two chief rivals, the English and the Dutch, were just then engaged in a war occasioned by England's high-handed seizure of New Amsterdam in America. Louis therefore announced that he was going on a "journey" through his possessions in the Netherlands. When his accompanying armies easily won a few victories over the Spaniards, the English and Dutch straightway made peace—with England keeping her booty, which she rechristened New York in honor of James II, then Duke of York—and both states declared war on France. Rather than fight two additional enemies, Louis canceled the remainder of his "journey" and withdrew from the Netherlands. Though he managed to retain a dozen towns, the chief of which was Lille, the Sun King was much annoyed by the impudence of the Dutch, who struck coins picturing themselves as Joshua, the man in the Old Testament who stopped the sun.
Louis then decided to punish the Dutch and destroy their merchant marine, which, in Colbert’s eyes, was a major hindrance to French expansion. After purchasing the aid of England with large but secret subsidies to Charles II—thus rendering that monarch momentarily independent of parliament—and bribing various German princes, Louis launched his second war, the Dutch War (1672–1678). Again he won the early battles, but after William III of Orange had replaced the pacific de Witt as leader in the United Netherlands (1672), the French were checked once more. Parliament compelled Charles II to remain neutral, and the Spanish and Austrian Hapsburgs came to the aid of the Dutch. When peace was signed, Louis got nothing from the Dutch, though he saved face by snatching Franche-Comté and a few Belgian cities from his Spanish brother-in-law.

During the next few years Louis proceeded more cautiously. He set up courts, called “chambers of reunion,” to examine his alleged rights to the various territories he coveted. Needless to say, these courts always declared his claims to be fully justified. Louis then adopted a policy of nibbling, seizing a bit here and a bit there, as the courts handed down their decisions, but being careful never to provoke a general European war. In this way he acquired the free imperial city of Strasbourg in 1681, and during the next few years he grabbed other valuable properties.

Meantime William III was carefully constructing an anti-French alliance, known as the League of Augsburg. In this task he was greatly aided by Louis’s revocation of the Edict of Nantes and by the Protestant refugees who filled Europe with lurid stories of the dragonnades. When the Revolution of 1688 made William king of England, that country too joined the League. James II became a protégé of Louis, which convinced countless Englishmen that if France were not defeated Louis would presently reinstate the Stuart king and that dragonnades would be the order of the day in England. The ensuing War of the League of Augsburg raged for almost nine years (1688–1697, called “King William’s War” in colonial America), but Louis gained nothing and was even forced to disgorge a few territories recently “reunited” to France.

The culminating war of Louis’s long reign, for which all the others had been mere preparation, was the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713), or “Queen Anne’s War.” For thirty-five years the near-imbecile and childless king of Spain, Charles II (1665–1700), had
given European diplomats cause for worry and intrigue as to his successor. Various heirs and various partitions of the Spanish empire were suggested, but when Charles finally died, it was learned that he had left his throne and all the Spanish possessions to Philip of Anjou, a younger grandson of Louis XIV. Though understanding perfectly that acceptance of this legacy would precipitate a general European war, Louis immediately presented his grandson at court as “King of Spain,” and the young man set off at once for Madrid, where he was accepted as Philip V. Someone allegedly remarked with joy, “The Pyrenees no longer exist!”

In the war that followed, France, Spain, and lonely Bavaria fought on one side and nearly all the rest of western Europe on the other. Most of the fighting took place in Italy, the Spanish Netherlands, or Germany, but there were minor operations in Spain and North America. France produced no outstanding general, but the allies were

BLENHEIM PALACE. This magnificent estate was given to the Duke of Marlborough by the crown as a reward for his services in the War of the Spanish Succession. It was more than a country residence for the Duke, however. It was intended as a national monument, celebrating the victory over Louis XIV. Over the main entrance is an enormous bust of Louis, which Marlborough carried off from Tournai. The palace was planned to outshine Versailles.

brilliantly led by Prince Eugene of Savoy, commander of the Austrian armies, and the English Duke of Marlborough, formerly John Churchill. These generals won a series of victories at Blenheim in Bavaria (1704), and at Ramillies (1706), Oudenarde (1708), and Malplaquet (1709) in Belgium. As this last victory was quite bloody, and the English Tories had never approved of the war anyhow, the
Whig ministry fell (1710) and Marlborough was recalled (1711). The diplomats then assembled at Utrecht and drew up a treaty of peace, which they signed in 1713.

The Treaty of Utrecht covered a wide variety of matters. In the first place, Philip V was allowed to keep Spain and the Spanish possessions in the New World, but the treaty stipulated that the crowns of France and Spain should never be united. The Pyrenees therefore continued to exist, though perhaps they had shrunk to the size of low hills. However, Spain was stripped of her European possessions. The Spanish Netherlands became the Austrian Netherlands, and the Austrian Hapsburgs further received Milan, Naples, and all southern Italy, as well as the island of Sardinia. The Duke of Savoy—ruler of a small state in the Italian Alps, bordering on France—received Sicily, which he presently exchanged for Sardinia (1720). England was allowed to keep Gibraltar and the island of Minorca, both of which she had occupied during the war, and thus she established herself as a power in the Mediterranean. She also received limited trading rights at Panama, and the asiento or privilege of supplying the Spanish colonies with four thousand Negro slaves annually. Louis agreed to recognize the Protestant kings of England and to cease supporting the "Pretender." France also ceded Newfoundland, Acadia (Nova Scotia), and the Hudson’s Bay territory to England, but she retained Quebec and her claims to the Mississippi Valley. Recognition of the rulers of Prussia (the Hohenzollerns) and Savoy as kings started them up the ladder to greatness as rulers of all Germany and all Italy respectively. The settlement thus made at Utrecht established peace between the great powers for a time, and it left England the preponderant European power.

Early in the nineteenth century, when Napoleon was overrunning Europe, the English poet Robert Southey attempted to belittle his victories—and military glory in general—with a poem entitled "The Battle of Blenheim." Here an old man tells his two grandchildren of the horrible devastation and suffering that accompanied this battle, but when they ask him what the armies fought each other for, and what good came of it at last, "‘Why, that I can not tell,’ said he, ‘But 'twas a famous victory.’" This sardonic answer might well be given to similar questions about many a battle famous in history, but if we consider Louis’s wars as a whole, it was not quite appropriate in this case. Far more was at stake in these wars than whether a Frenchman or an Austrian should sit upon the throne of Spain. Two political and
social systems had come to grips, and it was they, not France and England, that were at war. Louis represented a system which, in its essentials, had prevailed in Europe for over two hundred years but had already passed its zenith. His English enemies, on the other hand, had found a new and better way of life. In the final analysis, this new way of life won the wars. England did more than win a famous victory; she showed that there was something in the world better and more desirable than Versailles and the martial grandeur of Louis XIV.
COLONIES AND EMPIRES
THE HANOVERIANS AND LOUIS XV—
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE—
DIPLOMACY AND WAR IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
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3. THE HANOVERIANS AND LOUIS XV

The War of the Spanish Succession was terminated by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, and slightly over a year later the Stuart dynasty came to an end with the death of Queen Anne (August 1, 1714). None of Anne's seventeen children survived her, and her close Stuart relatives, all being Catholics, provided no acceptable heir to the English throne. The Electress Sophia, widow of the elector of Hanover and granddaughter of James I, was Anne's closest Protestant relative and had been named heir apparent by parliament in 1701. Sophia died a few weeks before Anne, however, and the crown passed to her son, George I (1714-1727), the founder of the Hanoverian line which ruled England until Victoria was crowned queen in 1837.

George I was fifty-four years old when he became king, he had never been in England before, he had little understanding of the English form of government, and he much preferred to live in Hanover, where he usually passed a few months every year. As he spoke no English and his ministers were equally ignorant of German, they communicated as best they could in Latin. His son and successor, George II (1727-1760), spoke English and lived in England, but he was more assiduous in attending horse races than in performing the routine chores of government. It thus came about that for almost fifty years English ministers governed without royal interference and cabinet government became firmly established in England.

The fundamental principle underlying the English system of cabinet government is that all ministers must be responsible to parliament rather than to the king, and that the king must therefore choose them from the political party that holds the majority in parliament.
This cabinet is a closely organized body, led by the prime minister, which determines all matters of policy, with the king not even present at its meetings. The king therefore has little influence over legislation, but important measures nearly always originate in the cabinet, which then presents them to parliament for approval. If any such measure is rejected, the ministers must resign at once, or else dissolve parliament and order new elections. If their party wins the election, they continue in office, but if not they must resign. The details of this system were not worked out until the early years of the nineteenth century, but its general principles were recognized early in the eighteenth. Whig ministers had been in office from 1689 to 1710, but in the latter year a Tory parliament was elected, the Whig ministers resigned, and Tories took their places. This was the first case in English history of a ministry's falling because of an adverse popular election. In order to secure a Tory majority in the House of Lords, the new ministers persuaded Anne to appoint twelve new peers, thereby establishing another precedent, though in later times the mere threat of padding the House of Lords usually brought its members to reason and made new appointments unnecessary. Thereafter English ministries were supposed to represent, or at least enjoy the confidence of, both houses of parliament.

George much preferred Whigs to Tories, for he suspected the latter of secretly sympathizing with the "Jacobites"—adherents of James II and his son, "James III." In fact, this "Old Pretender" invaded Scotland briefly in 1715, and there were Jacobite riots in London and elsewhere in England. George then appointed a Whig ministry, and new elections returned a Whig parliament, after which the Whigs governed England for many years. A short-lived invasion by the "Young Pretender" in 1745 showed the hopelessness of the Jacobite cause, brought renewed distrust of the Tories, and kept the Whigs in power until 1761.

During their long rule of forty-six years the Whigs favored the commercial classes, who prospered accordingly. Victory in war and the elimination of the Stuarts encouraged commercial and financial adventures, and the general enthusiasm led to a period of wild speculation. When a Scot named John Law organized the South Sea Company to trade with the West Indies, the financial frenzy of the times caused its stock to soar to fantastic prices, and overnight people in all walks of life made fortunes on paper. The company failed in 1720, however, and the unhappy public was rudely awakened from its
Dreams. Sir Robert Walpole then made a great reputation for himself by presiding over the liquidation of the company, saving what he could for the investors. In reward he became England’s first “prime minister,” and during his long rule (1721–1742) he kept the country on a more even course. He carefully avoided war, and he promoted trade, especially with the American colonies and India. Toward the colonies he followed a policy of “salutary neglect” which would have scandalized Colbert and the mercantilists, but in consequence of which English businessmen became rich while the colonists became self-reliant and free.

Louis XV

Meantime Louis XIV had died on September 1, 1715, after surviving both his son and his grandson. He was succeeded by his great-grandson, Louis XV (1715–1774), but as the boy was only five years old, a regency under the Duke of Orleans became necessary. The years of the regency (1715–1723), following the long wars, were a period of relaxation and social gaiety, and as England’s recent successes gave her high prestige in France, a wave of superficial Anglomania swept the country. Louis XIV’s foreign policy was reversed by an alliance with England and Holland (1717), but unfortunately the enthusiasm for all things English showed itself especially in the cordial reception granted to John Law. He secured a large grant of land in Louisiana, organized a trading company similar to the one in England, and founded a bank, supposedly resembling the Bank of England. As in England, the “Mississippi Bubble” swelled fantastically and then burst, and the bank, departing from English policy, flooded France with paper money which caused dire inflation followed by collapse. The light-hearted and joyous regency thus ended in a crash.

When the regent died in 1723, Louis was declared of age, and in 1725, though only fifteen years old, he was married to the daughter of an exiled king of Poland. Thereafter the government of France was conducted by the young king’s tutor, Cardinal Fleury (1726–1743), whose policies somewhat resembled Walpole’s. When Fleury died, Louis announced that, like Louis XIV, he would rule in person thereafter, but his lack of ability rendered him a caricature of the Sun King. He exaggerated the old king’s vices but showed none of his virtues. Though dominated by his mistresses, young Louis did
not show his ancestor’s aristocratic taste in their selection. It is true that one of them, Madame de Pompadour, was a woman of education and refinement, interested in literature, art, and ideas. She remained in favor for nineteen years (1745–1764), but her meddling in diplomacy was a disaster for France. A few years after her death she was succeeded by the Duchess du Barry, a vulgar hussy who had once been a milliner’s apprentice and who later became the chief attraction in a gambling hell. Her primary interest lay in feathering her own nest and in punishing her critics and rivals. Louis died of smallpox in 1774, and the duchess was sent to the guillotine during the French Revolution (1793).
THE FRENCH AND ENGLISH IN NORTH AMERICA

The long struggle between France and England was renewed in the eighteenth century, with colonies and trade in North America and India as the principal stakes. During the preceding century, each country had staked out vast claims to territory in North America, with the French holding a slight priority. The explorations of Jacques Cartier (1534–1541), who ascended the St. Lawrence as far as Montreal, gave them a claim to all that region. Samuel de Champlain repeated the exploit in 1603, founded Quebec in 1608, and discovered Lake Champlain in the next year. Colonists were also settled in Acadia (now Nova Scotia), and Montreal was founded in 1642, but the great explorations came under Louis XIV. A Jesuit, Father Allouez, established a mission near the western tip of Lake Superior (1665). A second Jesuit, Father Marquette, and a fur trader names Louis Joliet crossed Wisconsin from Lake Michigan to the Mississippi, which they descended to the mouth of the Arkansas before turning back (1673). A few years later La Salle crossed Illinois and descended the Mississippi to its mouth, claiming the whole valley for the king of France and naming it Louisiana (1682). When he returned to establish a colony in Louisiana, La Salle sailed through the Gulf of Mexico but missed the mouth of the Mississippi, landed in Texas, and was murdered by his men (1687). Not until 1699 did Iberville found Biloxi, which was followed by Mobile (1710) and New Orleans (1718). Meantime, the Jesuits had established a mission at Kaskaskia, on the Mississippi in Illinois (1700), and Cadillac had founded Detroit (1701). A great empire was thus staked out in the Mississippi Valley before Louis XIV died in 1715. France had also acquired Martinique, Guadeloupe, and other small islands in the West Indies, some as early as 1635.

Louis thus claimed an enormous empire in North America, including Newfoundland, Acadia or Nova Scotia, the valley of the St. Lawrence—called Canada or New France—the whole region of the Great Lakes, and the Mississippi Valley, as well as a dozen islands in the West Indies, but he could not induce many Frenchmen to settle there. Less than three thousand white men inhabited New France in 1660, and a century later, when the colony was lost, its white population was only 65,000. Since that day few Frenchmen have entered Canada, but under English rule the French popula-
tion has risen by natural increase to about three and a half million, exclusive of the many French Canadians who have emigrated to the United States.

When Champlain founded Quebec in 1608, he was careful to make friends with the Algonquin Indians of the neighborhood, but by so doing he won the enmity of their ancestral foes, the Iroquois. Forty years later, the Iroquois inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Algonquins and seized the upper St. Lawrence, and though the French under Count Frontenac presently punished them, hostilities continued throughout the remainder of French rule. Even more serious was the enmity of the English. As early as 1628 an English squadron captured Quebec, but after four years the city was returned to the French. By the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) France lost Newfoundland and Acadia, and thirty years later the remaining French population of the latter colony was deported and scattered through the English colonies—as told by Longfellow in his poem, *Evangeline*.

To defend their remaining possessions, the French governors built a chain of forts along the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes, the Ohio, and the Mississippi. Though the two countries were nominally at peace, the English made unsuccessful attempts in 1754 and again in 1755 to capture one of these forts, Fort Duquesne at the site of Pittsburgh. The first expedition was led by George Washington, the second culminated in “Braddock’s defeat.” When France and England went to war in 1756 (see p. 81), the French armies in Canada were ably commanded by the Marquis de Montcalm (1712–1759), but they went from one defeat to another. When the English commander, James Wolfe (1727–1759), met Montcalm on the Plains of Abraham, near Quebec, both generals were killed, but the English captured the city (1759) and, so far as America was concerned, the war was over. By the Peace of Paris (1763) France surrendered everything east of the Mississippi to England while her territory west of that river—including New Orleans—went to Spain.

The failure of the French in the New World was largely due to weaknesses inherent in the policies of Louis XIV and Colbert. In fact, it has been wisely remarked that if one wishes to study the merits and faults of Louis's administration one should go to Canada, where they are seen through a magnifying glass. Louis and Colbert established a modified feudal system in Canada that resembled the one then prevailing in France. Large tracts of land, called seign-
ories,” were granted to favored persons, who were to be seigniors, or “lords of the manor,” and it was expected that a considerable number of peasants would emigrate to work on these estates. The services required by the king of the seignior were scarcely greater than those rendered by his fellows in France, but every seignior exacted countless antiquated and burdensome feudal services from his peasants or “habitants.” Sometimes the seignior never reached Canada, expecting an income from his estate comparable to that enjoyed by noble absentee landlords in France. But as the seigniory was not even cleared of forest, and often had no “habitants,” the revenue was not forthcoming and the seignior presently lost interest. French peasants, on the other hand, had little incentive to exchange the
evils that they knew for others that they knew not in the snows of Canada.

As usual, the spirit of Colbertism stifled trade in the colonies with a multitude of regulations drawn up by men who had never left France. Thus the most profitable form of economic activity, fur trading with the Indians, was so hemmed about with restrictions that it prospered only when conducted illegally. Perhaps the most venturesome persons in Canada were the fur traders and trappers (coureurs de bois) who broke away from the system, went to live with the Indians, married squaws, begot half-breeds, and ranged at will over the whole region of the Great Lakes and the Mississippi Valley.

From the very first the Catholic Church was a powerful institution in New France. Jesuits and other missionaries sometimes showed great courage and perseverance in their efforts to convert the Indians, and they filled Quebec and Montreal with their monasteries. Their influence with the government, both in Quebec and in Paris, was so great that they managed to prevent Huguenots from entering the colony. To their credit it must be recorded that they tried to prevent traders from selling liquor to the natives, even though the traders forcefully argued that if the Indians could not have good French brandy to drink they would drink bad English rum instead and become not only drunkards but heretics as well. In this dispute the traders won. As a result of the labors of these priests, however, Quebec has ever since remained piously Catholic.

England's Thirteen Colonies

The English colonies in America had a very different character and a very different history. France and England had begun colonizing at almost the same time (Jamestown, 1607; Quebec, 1608), but while the French colonies languished, those of the English prospered from the first. Jamestown, in Virginia, was soon followed by Plymouth (1620) and the Massachusetts Bay colonies (1630). Connecticut and Rhode Island, which had received their first settlers from Massachusetts as early as 1636, were organized as separate colonies in 1662 and 1663 respectively, and New Hampshire followed in 1679. Meanwhile Maryland had been founded by Lord Baltimore in 1632, the Carolinas were chartered in 1663, and New York and New Jersey were taken from the Dutch in 1664. In 1681 Pennsylvania was settled
by William Penn, who acquired Delaware a year later. The last of the thirteen English colonies, Georgia, dates from 1732.

The population and strength of these colonies grew much more rapidly than those of New France. It has been estimated that in 1640 there were slightly over 30,000 Englishmen in North America (not including the West Indies), two-thirds of whom lived in New England, while there were perhaps 10,000 in Virginia and Maryland. Fifty years later at least 200,000 settlers inhabited the colonies, with about 80,000 each in New England and the South, and half that number in the Middle colonies (New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware). Thereafter immigration and natural increase were so rapid that by 1760 the population of the thirteen colonies had passed 1,600,000 (as opposed to 65,000 in New France). About 500,000 persons lived in New England, over 700,000 in the South, and perhaps 400,000 in the Middle colonies. In 1660 the population still lived near the coast or along a few large rivers, but a hundred years later most of the good land east of the Appalachians had been occupied and a few hardy pioneers and land speculators were pushing across the mountains into the rich Mississippi Valley, which was claimed, but not occupied, by the French.

Many factors contributed to the success of the English colonists. They enjoyed more propitious climate and soil than were found in Quebec, and they attracted a very different type of settler. The French admitted no Huguenots or other dissatisfied persons to New France, but a large proportion of the English colonists were religious or political refugees. In New England there were Puritans who had fled Charles I or Charles II while there were Catholics in Maryland and Quakers in Pennsylvania, with Scotch-Irish Presbyterians arriving in the eighteenth century. All these men made excellent colonists. Others, who came for strictly economic reasons, were not uniformly of the same high quality. Some were paupers, bound to work for several years in return for their passage, others were criminals, and still others had been kidnapped. The colonies also attracted many who were not English. During the wars of Louis XIV and Louis XV, Penn and others advertised America extensively in Germany, and thousands of Germans migrated to Pennsylvania. Some of these emigrants were members of such minor religious sects as the Moravians and Mennonites; others were persons whose homes had been destroyed during the wars. By 1760 there were 300,000 Scotch-Irish and 200,000 Germans in America, and a notable number of French
Huguenots had found new homes here. About 40 percent of the white population of the colonies, or 60 percent of the total, was therefore of non-English origin.

Mention must also be made of another class of immigrants, the African slaves. Negroes were first brought to this country as early as 1619, and their labor soon became an indispensable asset to the colonists. At first the Dutch monopolized the slave trade, having snatched it from the Portuguese and Spaniards, but in the eighteenth century the English managed to break in. Slavers from England or New England brought Negroes from the “Slave Coast” of Africa—lying between Gambia and Nigeria—to the West Indies, exchanged them there for molasses, took the molasses to New England to be converted into rum, and used part of the rum to buy more slaves in Africa. This infamous traffic was not the business for a man of weak stomach or delicate conscience, but those who engaged in it often became wealthy. The Quakers, and later the Methodists, denounced the slave trade in the strongest terms, but only after long years of labor did humanitarians secure its abolition. By 1760 there were nearly 400,000 Negroes in the colonies, three-quarters of them living in the South. They made up a quarter of the total population; in Virginia they were almost as numerous as the whites; and in South Carolina they outnumbered whites more than two to one.

Political conditions in the English colonies differed just as widely from those in New France. The earliest English colonies had been founded by chartered companies, but kings presently began granting large tracts of land to individual proprietors—such as Lord Baltimore or William Penn—who sent out colonists to develop them. The company (or proprietor) looked on the colony as a business venture, hoping for financial profit, and its agents assembled, transported, and later governed the colonies. When the anticipated profits failed to appear, the charters were sometimes surrendered or canceled, and the colony was ruled thereafter by a governor appointed by the king (in Virginia as early as 1624, and in seven other colonies before 1760). Elsewhere the governor was appointed by the proprietor, and in Connecticut and Rhode Island he was elected. From early times, moreover, each colony had an elected legislature, which gradually acquired considerable power, while strictly local matters were left to the citizens of each locality. The colonists thus acquired a taste for self-government and valuable experience in it.

Various systems of landholding prevailed in the English colonies.
The early companies, and especially the early proprietors, were inspired by feudal ideas and, like the French seigniors, they dreamed of making themselves feudal lords with vast estates cultivated by tenant farmers. This dream was quickly abandoned, for colonists wanted to own their farms. So much free land was available that men could be neither persuaded nor compelled to work as serf-like tenants. In the eighteenth century virtually all the farmers in New England were freeholders. Large estates were still to be found in the Middle colonies, especially along the Hudson where Dutch “patroons” had acquired them before the English conquest, but even here small freeholds prevailed, and from time to time the great landowners had to sell parts of their estates because they could find no suitable tenants. Most farms in the South were freeholds, though perhaps larger than those in New England, and the owner was often assisted by a few slaves. Rich men continued to hold semifeudal ideas, however, and thereby created considerable class antagonism; land speculators often grew rich and unpopular by acquiring and holding vast tracts of unoccupied land; but the free farmer became the backbone of colonial America.

Few merchants and artisans came to this country with the earlier colonists, for in an agricultural society there was little for such men to do. It was not long, however, before colonial economy began reaching out in new directions. Strenuous and moderately successful efforts were made to manufacture enough goods for the colonial market. Fishing attracted New Englanders from early times, and in the eighteenth century their shipping and commerce made rapid progress. Had the English navigation acts and other mercantilistic measures been strictly enforced, this economic development might have been impeded, but Walpole’s “salutary neglect” permitted the development of a sturdy American industry and commerce. When later English governments attempted to enforce the laws, the Americans replied with rebellion.

Contrary to a widespread opinion, the earliest colonists were not inspired with the ideal of religious toleration, and they did not believe in the separation of church and state. They came to America to found communities where their particular brand of Christianity would be the only religion tolerated, and where it would be supported by the state. The Anglican Church was “established” (state supported) in Virginia, the Carolinas, and New York, the Congregational in Massachusetts and Connecticut, and each continued so until
the opening years of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, a desire for religious freedom quickly arose. Roger Williams, who had been expelled from Boston in 1636 because of his heretical theology, insisted upon the complete separation of church and state in his colony of Rhode Island. When the colony received its charter in 1663, these fundamental principles were reaffirmed. Meantime Maryland had granted religious freedom to all Christians (1649), and a little later New Jersey and the Carolinas followed suit. William Penn was the most tolerant of all, and Pennsylvania was always open to any who believed in God. Before the end of the seventeenth century, therefore, most colonists enjoyed an unusual degree of religious freedom and, then as now, men might choose freely between a multiplicity of sects. This wide variety of religious belief, so characteristic of America, made it impossible for one sect to impose itself upon an entire community and did much to promote freedom and democracy in other matters as well.
Education had been a concern of many colonists from the first, and as early as 1647 Massachusetts required every town of fifty families or more to maintain a school. Other states followed this precedent, but the laws were not always enforced and the schools often were of low quality. Massachusetts also led in higher education, with Harvard College founded in 1636. Its founders were actuated in part by their fear of leaving "an illiterate ministry to the churches, when our present ministers shall lie in the dust," but from the first, Harvard also trained magistrates and other useful citizens. William and Mary, in Virginia, became America’s second college in 1693, Yale followed in 1701, and in 1776 America boasted no less than nine colleges.

Most of these colleges were under religious auspices and, as in the English universities of that day, instruction consisted largely of drill in a few Greek and Latin classics, a little mathematics, and much divinity. Before the end of the seventeenth century, however, Harvard had a professor of "natural philosophy"—or as we would say, natural science—who was especially interested in astronomy and botany. When a more secular college, now the University of Pennsylvania, was founded in 1751 at Philadelphia, Benjamin Franklin tried to introduce a few technical and scientific subjects into the curriculum, but he was rather disappointed in what was done. Young Thomas Jefferson was even less successful with his proposal, made a few years later, that at William and Mary (his alma mater) modern languages be substituted for the ancient, and law for divinity. Nevertheless, the suggestions of these two eminent Americans were highly characteristic of their time and country.

Life in the colonies might still lack some of the refinements enjoyed by the upper classes in Europe, but no one here was as badly off as the more unfortunate Europeans. The colonists were enterprising and hopeful, seeing brilliant futures before them. They were self-reliant men, impatient of arbitrary restraints, who had come seeking a new and better world. In spite of her indentured servants and her African slaves, America already beckoned to such men as a land of freedom and opportunity.

ANGLO-FRENCH RIVALRY IN INDIA

The second great theater of Anglo-French rivalry in the eighteenth century was India. The Portuguese had been the first Europeans to enter this part of the world, establishing a "factory" at Goa in 1510
and others elsewhere within a few years. (These “factories” were trading posts, fortified for the protection of traders and their warehouses.) The richest Portuguese possessions, however, were in the East Indies—a chain of islands stretching to the south and east from Ceylon, through Sumatra and Java, to the Moluccas or Spice Islands (see Vol. One, p. 723). In the seventeenth century the Dutch seized these islands and parts of India, but not Goa. Simultaneously agents of the English East India Company, founded in 1600, were pushing into India. After they had defeated a Portuguese fleet in 1612, they

were granted the right to establish a factory at Surat. In 1639 they built a fort at Madras, in 1661 they acquired Bombay from Portugal, and in 1690 they founded Calcutta. Meantime the French East India Company, organized by Colbert in 1664, had established itself at
Pondichéry in 1674. Portugal was now of little importance in the East, and even Dutch power was declining, which left France and England the chief rivals for Indian trade.

Europeans had found North America an open country, sparsely inhabited by primitive peoples, and enjoying a temperate climate similar to that of Europe. It was therefore comparatively easy to establish agricultural colonies, but trade with the natives consisted largely of bartering pots and pans, blankets, and bootleg liquor for furs. In India almost the opposite prevailed. The tropical climate was unhealthy for Europeans, and the dense native population had attained a high level of civilization. Agricultural settlements were out of the question, but trade could be made to yield handsome profits. The early Europeans therefore did not stake out vast claims to territory, as in America, but were quite content with factories in a few seaports. In the eighteenth century, when political conditions in India began to change, both the French and the English were tempted to intervene in local politics, and eventually the English emerged as rulers of all India.

India’s vast area—lying between the Himalayas and the ocean and between the delta of the Ganges and the Indus, the modern India and Pakistan—is inhabited by peoples of many races, languages, and religions. Even its apparent geographic unity is deceptive, and only rarely in history has all India been ruled by a single government. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when medieval Europe was falling to pieces, India was in an equally decadent condition, ruled by countless despots, and early in the sixteenth century, just as the Portuguese were first arriving by sea, Asiatics began invading India from the northwest. These northern invaders were the Moguls—or Mongols—whose leader, a man named Baber, was descended from the notorious Tamerlane (see Vol. One, p. 368).

This Baber (1483–1530) captured Lahore in 1525, and before his death he held most of northern India. His conquests were continued by his grandson, Akbar (1556–1605), who seized practically all of India. During the seventeenth century a series of able “Great Moguls” ruled this vast empire. They established their capital at Delhi—now the capital of the India Republic—they built extensively, and they brought much Persian culture to India. Perhaps their most famous monument is the Taj Mahal at Agra—a mausoleum built (1631–1645) by one of the emperors for his favorite wife—but there are beautiful and famous mosques at Delhi and elsewhere. The Moguls pro-
fessed the Moslem faith, but usually they tolerated Hinduism and other religions. By a curious coincidence, however, just at the time when Europe under Louis XIV was falling into a fury of religious bigotry, his Indian contemporary, Aurangzeb (1659-1707), the last important Mogul emperor, prohibited the Hindu religion, destroyed many Hindu temples, and vainly attempted to bring all India to

THE TAJ MAHAL, AGRA, INDIA. This marble mausoleum, which is counted among the most beautiful buildings in the world, shows what was being done by architects in India at the time Europeans first appeared.

Islam. His fanaticism precipitated major rebellions, and with him the decline of the Moguls began. Power presently fell to many local nawabs (viceroys), but until 1858 the Moguls at Delhi continued to reign in a vague sort of way.

The most important of these fragments of the Mogul empire was the Maratha Confederacy, which held much of the Deccan (the
central plateau of peninsular India). The rulers of the confederacy frequently made trouble for their neighbors and for the Moguls. To protect their own interests against the Marathas, the French allied themselves with these neighbors and by this roundabout way became allies of the Great Mogul himself. Such was the situation when Joseph Dupleix (1697–1763) was named governor of all the French possessions in India (1742). He had already served for eleven years as governor of Chandernagor (a French holding in the northeast, near Calcutta) and had devised a plan for a vast French empire in India. The company's interest lay in trade, however, not in empire, and it was unwilling to provide the necessary funds. Dupleix then conceived a brilliant idea for raising money. The company had about two thousand French soldiers stationed in India, whom he rented to Indian nawabs in exchange for territorial concessions. Revenues from the territories thus acquired were then used to build a larger army. Dupleix also taught European methods of warfare to native Indian troops called "sepoys." By intervening in native disputes with his sepoys and the company's troops, he could assure victory to the nawab paying him the most. For several years Dupleix's intrigues were successful, and by 1751 he controlled most of the Deccan and the Carnatic—the coastal plain southeast of the Deccan. The company's directors failed to understand his dreams, however, and in 1754 Dupleix was recalled in disgrace.

The English in India had been somewhat alarmed by Dupleix's activities, but they did not take energetic countermeasures in time to save Madras, which he captured in 1746. The diplomats presently ordered the town given back, and thereafter the English too played the French game. Their leader was a young daredevil named Robert Clive (1725–1774), who proved himself one of England's great empire builders. He began his spectacular career by capturing Arcot, capital of one of Dupleix's allies, with a force of only two hundred Englishmen and three hundred sepoys, and by holding the city when the nawab counterattacked with ten thousand men (1751). A few years later the nawab of Bengal, instigated by the French, decided to drive the English from Calcutta. Most of the English escaped before he entered the city, but 146 English prisoners were confined in a small room with almost no ventilation—the notorious "Black Hole of Calcutta"—where all but twenty-six died before morning. Clive hastened to punish this atrocity and defeated the nawab at Plassey (1757). Though three thousand English troops fought against fifty
thousand Indians and Frenchmen, the Indians quickly fell into panic, and Clive lost only twenty-two men. French prestige in India was irreparably destroyed. Clive replaced the nawab with a native protégé of his own, imposed an enormous indemnity, and became the most powerful man in India. When the Treaty of Paris was drawn up in 1763, France surrendered everything she had gained in India except five factories, which were to be used for trading purposes only. The English no longer feared any European rivals, and they allowed a hundred years to pass before they put an end to the Mogul dynasty, dissolved the East India Company, and transferred India to the British crown (1858).
4. CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

In 1713 the Austrian Hapsburgs were the strongest power in central Europe. They had largely recovered from the Thirty Years’ War and their exhausting but futile efforts to conquer and Catholicize Germany, they had taken an important part in the wars against Louis XIV, and in the War of the Spanish Succession the imperial armies, ably commanded by Prince Eugene, had coöperated closely with the English under Marlborough. As a reward for these services the Hapsburgs received the Spanish Netherlands and various Italian territories which gave them control of that peninsula (1713). During these same years they were also driving the Turks from Hungary, and occasionally they invaded the Balkans themselves. By the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699), Austria received not only Hungary and Transylvania (inhabited by Romanians) but also the provinces of Croatia and Slavonia and parts of Serbia inhabited by South Slavs and now in Yugoslavia. Though the Turks regained the Serbian territories forty years later, the treaty marks an important stage in their decline.

These territorial gains indicate a fundamental change in Hapsburg policy. Withdrawing somewhat from German and imperial affairs after 1648, the family turned to the east, thus taking the first steps toward creating the Austro-Hungarian Empire of the nineteenth century. Their new territories were almost wholly agricultural and feudal, with populations made up of noble landlords and peasant serfs, and such they remained throughout the eighteenth century. Though inhabited by a wide variety of peoples, the Danube Valley was nevertheless an economic unit, and in later times Hapsburg rule owed its remarkable vitality to this fact. The dynasty united the
diverse peoples of this region, and later it was said that "if there were no Austria-Hungary, it would be necessary to invent one."

These eastern annexations made it desirable to reorganize the government, but the Hapsburgs, thinking only in conventional feudal terms, were slow to recognize this need. They made a few efforts to Germanize and unify their empire by settling German colonists in Bohemia and Hungary, and by trying to stamp out Protestantism, but the administration of their empire was not centralized. The governments of Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary were entrusted to three distinct chancelleries, and two lesser offices were set up to govern the Belgian and Italian dependencies. The only officials with authority in all parts of the empire were the emperors and the Council of State. In 1740 this council consisted of six old men, all members of the Austrian nobility, whose combined ages are said to have totaled 410 years. Unfortunately the Hapsburg empire retained this aged and ramshackle character until its collapse in 1918.

Charles VI ruled the Hapsburg lands from 1711 to 1740, during which time his major concern was to provide himself with an heir. He had no sons or other close male relatives, and with good reason he feared that his friends and neighbors would tear the empire to pieces as soon as he was dead. He therefore drew up a document, known as the Pragmatic Sanction, which ordained that the empire must be kept intact and that, in default of a male heir, it should pass to his daughter, Maria Theresa. He first secured the assent of the Austrian nobility to this plan, then that of the powerful nobles of his other realms, and finally that of nearly all the European powers. He died in 1740, and, straightway the powers of Europe, despite their promises to Charles VI, embarked upon the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748) in the hope of dividing his possessions (see p. 79). After some delay Maria Theresa's distant cousin, Charles VIII, was elected emperor (1742-1745) and Maria married Francis, of the house of Lorraine, who later became the Emperor Francis I (1745-1765). The remaining emperors, down to 1806, and the rulers of Austria-Hungary to 1918, all belonged to this line of Hapsburg-Lorraine.

Prussia

The most significant political development in Germany during the eighteenth century was the rapid advance of Prussia under the Hohenzollern dynasty. This family had originated in Swabia (south-
west Germany), but early in the thirteenth century one of its younger sons became burgrave of Nuremberg, then an important city in central Germany. Two hundred years later, in 1415, another younger son became margrave of Brandenburg, a north German state lying between the Elbe and the Oder and centering around Berlin. The margrave was also one of the seven electors of the Holy Roman Empire. Brandenburg is a rather poor country, with sandy soil, lying on a broad plain which extends across Poland and far into Russia. The absence of natural frontiers made defense difficult while aggression was easy, and the Brandenburg Hohenzollerns were always coveting more land. Until the Thirty Years' War they gained only small bits, but in 1648 they acquired Pomerania (which extended their frontiers north to the Baltic) as well as Cleves and three other small districts in the Rhineland.

The original Prussia, on the other hand, was a district far to the northeast of Brandenburg, bordering on the Baltic, whose inhabitants were not Germans but Slavs. In the thirteenth century these Slavic Prussians were subjugated by the Teutonic Knights, a crusad-
ing order of Germans. The Knights forcibly converted the Slavs to Catholic Christianity and became a landowning aristocracy whose power reached as far north as the Gulf of Finland (see Vol. One, p. 610). The order suffered severe setbacks in the fifteenth century, however, and in 1525 its grand master, Albert of Hohenzollern, of the Nuremberg branch of the family, declared himself a Protestant, seized the order’s property, and became the secular ruler of East Prussia as a vassal of the king of Poland. When his line died out in 1618, the Brandenburg Hohenzollerns successfully claimed the inheritance, and fifty years later they induced the Polish king to renounce all claims to sovereignty over East Prussia. The head of the family at that time, Frederick William “the Great Elector” (1640–1688), even established his residence at Königsberg in East Prussia. The Hohenzollern domains then stretched across north Germany (though not continuously) from the Rhine to the Niemen, while minor branches of the family held small territories in the south and in central Germany.

These fundamental historical facts deeply influenced the Prussia of the eighteenth century and the Germany of the nineteenth. In early times Brandenburg, and later East Prussia, had been peopled by German pioneers who fought the Slavs, reduced them to serfdom, and Germanized them. They came as military conquerors, and in their breasts the military spirit remained strong. They advanced in organized groups rather than individually (as in America), which fact strengthened their cooperative spirit, gave them the habit of ordering and obeying orders, and heightened their respect for authority. It even gave them a new concept of the state. For these German pioneers the state was not a mere group to which they all belonged: it was an ideal which they served in a military spirit of unquestioning obedience. Moreover, these German pioneers were crusaders, inspired with a religious idealism which was easily transferred from Christianity to the state. And finally it was easy for the conquerors and rulers of the Slavs to think of themselves as a Herrenvolk or “master race.” But being primarily fighters, they cared little for the higher manifestations of the intellectual life, and down to the present day Prussia has produced very few of Germany’s many philosophers, musicians, poets, and scholars.

The differences thus distinguishing Prussia and other pioneer states from the rest of Germany may also be seen in their systems of landholding. The Knights converted the heathen to Christianity, to be
sure, but they also were interested in land, carving out great estates for themselves which they ruled in feudal fashion. At the very time when feudalism was breaking down in western Europe, and even in the rest of Germany, it was becoming stronger in eastern Germany. Moreover, western feudalism had been primarily defensive, created to protect Europe against the barbarian invaders of the ninth and tenth centuries (see Vol. One, p. 421), but in eastern Germany it was fundamentally aggressive, the organization of men conquering new lands. And finally, the large estates created by these pioneers persisted into the present century, distinguishing Prussia from the rest of Germany. As early as 1700, western and southern Germany were divided into small farms, and a careful study shows that in 1900 less than 10 percent of this area was held in farms as large as 250 acres. In the territory of the old Brandenburg, the figure rose to 30 or 40 percent, and in eastern Germany more than half the land was so held. The owners of these large estates were called Junkers. In many ways these men resembled the English squires, but military discipline had long since robbed them of the squire’s high regard for personal independence. The Junkers conducted the local government of eastern Germany, officered the armies, and remained the backbone of the Prussian state down into the twentieth century.

Frederick William, “the Great Elector,” is usually regarded as the man who started Brandenburg-Prussia on the road to greatness. He found the country devastated by the Thirty Years’ War, occupied by foreign armies, bankrupt, and scarcely to be taken seriously in European politics. When he died, almost fifty years later, he left it the most powerful German state except Austria, economically prosperous, and having an excellent army and an efficient bureaucracy. To encourage commerce and industry, he had given homes to thousands of Huguenot refugees from France. His son, Frederick I (1688–1713), began calling himself king of Prussia in 1701, first securing the consent of the emperor (who needed his aid in the War of the Spanish Succession) and then having the title recognized by all Europe in the Treaty of Utrecht (1713). Before his death the population of Berlin, which in 1640 numbered only 6000, had grown to 100,000. Frederick William I (1713–1740) continued this program of carefully and systematically augmenting Prussian power. He worked hard himself and expected everyone else to do so too. He was especially proud of his standing army of 87,000 men, which was supported by a population of less than three million. In this army
was a famous regiment of giants—men over six feet tall—whom he had collected at considerable expense from all over Europe. In fact, he was so fond of his army that he was unwilling to risk it in war. Scrupulous economy also enabled him to leave a full treasury to his son, Frederick II.

Frederick II (1740–1786), commonly known as Frederick the Great, was the most remarkable member of the Hohenzollern dynasty as well as the most famous, and perhaps he was the most typical ruler in eighteenth-century Europe. As a young man Frederick played the flute and wrote verses in French, thereby bringing great grief to his father—who was a good deal of a boor. All his life he retained this interest in cultural matters, but he never became the elegant trifler his father had feared. Frederick plunged into war almost as soon as he became king, quickly showing himself to be the best general in Europe as well as a master of slippery diplomacy. In time of peace he set himself up as a philosopher-king, or an “enlightened despot.”
He worked hard at his profession of king—his published correspondence, most of it in French, fills forty large volumes—and there can be little doubt that he sincerely meant it when he spoke of himself as the “first servant of the state.” This proud boast sprang from the old Prussian tradition, and the essential difference between Frederick and Louis XIV becomes clear if we compare it with the earlier king’s reputed claim, “L’état, c’est moi.”

The Eastern European Empires

In the eighteenth century eastern Europe was divided between the three great empires of the Turks, the Poles, and the Russians. The Turks had entered Europe from Asia Minor in the fourteenth century; they took Constantinople in 1453, and later they occupied the
whole Balkan Peninsula, Hungary, and southern Russia, thereby surrounding the Black Sea. Their empire also included all Asia Minor, Syria, and Iraq as far as Persia, as well as Egypt and north Africa west to Morocco. They reached the climax of their power and glory in the days of Suleiman the Magnificent (1520–1566), after which a slow decline began. As late as 1683, however, Turkish armies were able to besiege Vienna for several weeks, though they were eventually driven away by German and Polish troops. The Hapsburgs counter-attacked, drove the Turks from Hungary, and briefly invaded the Balkans. During the next hundred years Turkish possessions in Europe were whittled down by Austrians, Poles, Russians, and Venetians, until none remained outside the Balkan Peninsula. After 1683 the Turks could no longer be considered a menace to Europe, yet the Hapsburgs continued to regard themselves as the defenders of Western civilization.

The Poles were a Slavic people inhabiting the broad plains and marshes on either side of the Vistula. They had been converted to Catholic Christianity in the tenth century, and they later received their higher civilization from the West. In the sixteenth century visiting Italian architects, artists, poets, and physicians did much to raise the country’s cultural level. After a brief flirtation with Protestantism, the Polish kings decided to be Catholic—perhaps because their Prussian neighbors were Lutherans. The kingdom more than doubled its territory in 1569, when it united with the grand duchy of Lithuania, thereby reaching eastward to the Dniester and the frontiers of Russia. Conquests at the expense of the Turks then carried Polish territory almost to the Black Sea, and the Polish kings began dreaming of a vast empire, extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea, which would form the eastern bulwark of Western civilization against Russia and Asia. In the eighteenth century, however, they too had passed the peak of their power and were soon to suffer a terrible fate.

The third of the great powers of Eastern Europe was Russia. The Slavs in the vicinity of Kiev had been converted to Greek Christianity by missionaries from Constantinople about the year 1000, but two centuries later Mongol raiders from Asia, whose supreme ruler was Ogadai, son of Genghis Khan, overran Russia and Poland (1237–1241), and for more than two hundred years they ruled the greater part of Russia (see Vol. One, p. 341). The princes of Moscow gradually assumed leadership in the struggle of the Slavs against the
Mongols, and toward the middle of the fifteenth century all central Russia was in their hands. In its last years, the Mongol power broke into several minor states, some of which placed themselves under the protection of their fellow Moslems, the Turks. The Russians were thus forced to substitute a war with Turkey for the war with the Mongols, and not until the eighteenth century was Turkish power in Russia destroyed.

During this difficult period the Russians preserved their Greek Christianity and part of their Byzantine culture; they continued to honor Constantinople as the source of light and civilization; and they made much of their Byzantine inheritance. A few years after the Turkish capture of Constantinople (1453), Ivan III (1462–1505) married Sophia, the daughter of the last Byzantine emperor, thus establishing his claim to the legacy of Byzantium. He even spoke of Moscow as the “third Rome”—third, that is, after the Rome in Italy and the “new Rome,” or Constantinople. With the aid of Italian architects he built the famous palace at Moscow now known as the Kremlin. He fought successfully with the Mongols, and added territory at the expense of Lithuania. Regarded as the founder of the Russian state, he is often called “Ivan the Great.”

The next century was a difficult period for the new Russia. During much of this time the country was ruled by Ivan’s grandson, commonly known as “Ivan the Terrible” (Ivan IV, 1533–1584). He was only three years old when he inherited the throne, and he began to rule in his own name at the age of seventeen. He put down revolts of the nobility with great severity (hence his nickname) and set up an absolutism of an oriental or Mongol type that had little in common with that of Louis XIV. When he died, however, he held an enormous territory extending from the Arctic Ocean on the north and the Ural on the east to the head of the Gulf of Finland and almost to the Black Sea. In other words, except for lands taken from Poland in the west and from the Turks in the south and southeast, his empire covered approximately the same area as that of the European Russia of 1939. Ivan’s heirs were not men of his stature, and confusion culminated in the so-called “Troubles of Times” (1604–1613). Finally Michael Romanov became tsar (1613–1645), thus founding the dynasty that ruled Russia until 1917. The first members of this dynasty were concerned largely with the restoration of order, but Peter the great (born 1672, king 1689–1725) turned Russian history in new directions.
Peter, the youngest grandson of Michael Romanov, was only ten years old at the death of his eldest brother, Tsar Theodore (1676–1682), but after ruling jointly with a feeble-minded brother for seven years, he had himself declared of age and became sole tsar in 1689. Though a man of great physical strength and intellectual power, Peter’s formal education was almost negligible. He read with difficulty, he could not write Russian correctly, and he was innocent of the social amenities. He was a heavy drinker, and his violent fits of temper often made him dangerous. His innate cruelty was shown by his coarse practical jokes, by his execution of rebels with his own hand, and by his fiendish torture when punishing criminals. But there can be no doubt of his intelligence, of his perseverance and his amazing capacity for hard work, or of his fundamental simplicity of spirit and honesty.

After devoting a few years to securing his position in Russia and to wars against the Turks, Peter was ready for a great adventure in the spring of 1697. He visited Europe incognito, posing as a member of a diplomatic mission seeking allies against the Turks. In the course of the year he visited Prussia, Holland, England, and Vienna, but suddenly in the summer of 1698, just as he was preparing to proceed to Venice, he was called home by a rebellion of his palace guard. An insatiable curiosity led him to investigate all manner of things during this journey. He learned much about European ways of doing things and he came to have a high regard for European military and technical skill. The journey was of immense value to Peter, and it was a crucial event in Russian history.

As soon as the rebels had been adequately punished, Peter began the extensive reforms which have made him famous. Western writers often picture his innovations as a wholesale adoption of European institutions, and describe the process as the “Europeanization of Russia.” This it certainly was not. There were many changes, to be sure, but they were neither so sudden nor so European nor so profound as has been alleged. In the first place, Russia had not been completely cut off from western Europe. Many years before Peter, the English Muscovy Company had opened trade with Russia (1553), while Dutch and other merchants later brought European ideas as well as merchandise. Ivan the Terrible even toyed with the idea of marrying Queen Elizabeth—or perhaps one of her ladies-in-waiting—though his gallantries were not ardently reciprocated. Moreover, in the years immediately preceding Peter’s accession to power, Polish
influence had been strong in Moscow, giving highly placed Russians a familiarity with Western ideas. On the other hand, Peter's westernizing reforms were either trivial or else of a military or technical nature. His more fundamental innovations were only superficially Western, and in general they were only slight modifications of Russia's heritage from Byzantium.

Among Peter's minor reforms may be mentioned those touching manners and customs. He forbade men to wear beards or long oriental cloaks, sometimes cutting off the beards himself and trimming the cloaks at knee length, or else stationing barbers and tailors at town gates with orders to "modernize" those who passed. He also commanded women to forsake their oriental harem-like seclusion and appear with unveiled faces at court functions. These reforms affected only court circles and a few wealthy persons. More important was his founding of a new capital at St. Petersburg—now Leningrad—at the head of the Gulf of Finland (1703). The city was built in European style and at tremendous expense, both in money and in the lives of workmen. By thus turning toward the West, Peter not only approached Europe but also escaped from old Muscovite traditions and atmosphere. His new city remained Russia's capital for more than two centuries, until the Bolsheviks moved back to Moscow in order to escape the tsarist traditions and atmosphere of St. Petersburg.

Peter's most important reforms centered around the army. He inherited an oriental army of wild and undisciplined horsemen, but before he died he had created a large and well-drilled army of infantry, commanded by German-trained officers and recruited by the form of conscription then used in Prussia. Roads and other means of communication were improved in European style, primarily because of their military value. And whatever new industry Peter introduced into Russia was concerned mainly with the manufacture of cannon and other munitions of war. Peter had been forced to admit that western Europeans could kill people more scientifically than he, and in this field of activity he was determined to acquire their awe-inspiring power.

Peter's laws respecting serfdom stand high among his reforms, but they show few traces of European influence. Russian serfdom, which Peter strengthened greatly, bore little resemblance to the medieval serfdom of western Europe, which was then rapidly becoming extinct. It was more like Prussian serfdom, which remained strong for
another century or more, but here too there were wide differences. When in its prime, Western serfdom had been based on an exchange of services—agricultural labor was given by the serf in exchange for protection by the lord—but there was no such reciprocity in Prussia or Russia. The serf was forced to serve the lord in order that the lord might be free to serve the state. In spite of such similarities, however, it cannot be said that Peter simply introduced Prussian serfdom into Russia. The foundations of the Russian system had been laid long before his time, and his reforms were largely a tightening up of old laws in such a way as to provide cheap labor for the nobility. He allowed owners to sell their serfs without the land and to remove them to other estates, which had never been done in the West or even in Prussia. If Peter did not devise this refinement himself, he (or his advisers) learned it from old Byzantine laws, which had permitted such sales. In most ways Peter’s serfdom resembled the Negro slavery of the United States rather than western European serfdom. It is interesting to note that each of these institutions appeared at about the same time, that both later aroused the same sort of idealistic opposition, and that finally Tsar Alexander II abolished Russian serfdom on March 3, 1861, just one day before Abraham Lincoln became President of the United States.

Peter reformed the Russian Church with great thoroughness. This Orthodox Church had once been ruled by the patriarchs of Constantinople, but the metropolitans (archbishops) of Moscow gradually assumed great power. Though patriarchs continued to reside at Constantinople after the Turkish capture of the city (1453), Russian Church officials paid them scant attention. At last the metropolitan of Moscow was recognized as a patriarch by the other four patriarchs of the Orthodox Church (1589), which enabled him and his successors to regard themselves as the true heirs of the old patriarchs of Constantinople (just as the tsars claimed to be heirs of the emperors) and to set themselves up as the chief champions of Orthodoxy throughout the world. The tsars and metropolitan also inherited the old Byzantine policy of Caesaropapism, which demanded the complete subordination of church to state (see Vol. One, p. 300), but in the days of Michael Romanov (1613–1645) this policy was weakened because the tsar was much under the influence of his father, Philaret, who was the patriarch of Moscow (1619–1633). For a few years it seemed that the Russian Church might achieve an independent status in spite of the tsars and its legacy from Byzantium.
A great controversy split the Russian Church asunder in the days of Nikon, who was chosen patriarch of Moscow in 1652. Taking advantage of the momentary weakness of the tsar, this ambitious man tried to expand Philaret’s gains and bring greater liberty to the church, but he also tried, tactlessly and autocratically, to make much-needed reforms in the church. He thereby came to grief. He corrected various mistranslations in the Scriptures and prayer books, and he ordered Russians to follow the Greek practice of crossing themselves with three fingers, in honor of the Trinity, whereas they had formerly used only two, supposedly to remind themselves of the dual nature of Christ. Such innovations were too much for Russians of the old school, and thousands of “Old Believers” broke away from Orthodoxy. These men went about predicting the immediate end of the world, and, as they added severe criticisms of the tsar to their denunciations of Nikon, the government could not ignore them. The Old Believers were ruthlessly persecuted, but they remained strong in Russia until the twentieth century. At first the government, exasperated by Nikon’s claims to power, exiled him to a distant monastery (1660). A later tsar, wishing to use him against the Old Believers, recalled Nikon in 1681, but he died before he could resume office.

Such was the ecclesiastical situation in Russia when Peter came to the throne. Nikon’s successor had continued that patriarch’s efforts to emancipate the church, and when he died in 1700 Peter refused to permit the election of a new patriarch. After the office had lain vacant for over twenty years, Peter abolished it (1721) and substituted a council of bishops known as the “Holy Synod.” This body, whose chairman or procurator was a layman appointed by the tsar, continued to govern the Russian Church until 1917. Peter thus brought the church back into Byzantine subjection to the state. Students sometimes regard this reform as an imitation of Protestantism—or rather, of the established churches, Protestant and Catholic, of Western Europe—but such imitation is very doubtful. Religious toleration was the order of the day in the Protestant countries which Peter visited—Prussia, Holland, England—but he brought back no such ideas from the West. Peter’s ecclesiastical policies were not Protestant but Byzantine.

The crowning example of Peter’s Byzantinism may be seen in his exaltation of the autocracy. He attempted the same task as Ivan III and Ivan IV, though he approached it more intelligently than they. Local self-government was abolished in 1708, when all Russia was
divided into “governments” (gubernii), each under a governor appointed by the tsar. The boyars, or old aristocracy whose ancestors had led the wars against the Mongols, lost their last vestige of political power in 1711 when their duma, or assembly, was replaced by an advisory “senate” appointed by the tsar. A few years later Peter published a “Table of Ranks” (1722) placing his new aristocracy ahead of the boyars, who thus lost social prestige as well as political power. And finally, the central administration was reorganized, with a “collegium,” or council, appointed by the tsar, to look after each of its separate branches. The tsar thus stood at the peak of everything, governing Russia through his personal agents and giving his administration an oriental or Byzantine character. Of course Peter met strong resistance from the boyars, the church, and the peasants, and in 1718 he ordered the execution of his own son, Alexis, for taking part in their rebellions. After that terrible deed, resistance died down, and Peter’s last years were comparatively calm.

Peter’s foreign policy deserves equal attention. He was anxious to “open a window to the west,” but this was only a part of his program. Trade with Europe required a port, and when Peter came to power the only port Russia possessed was Archangel, on the White Sea, which froze over for several months every year. His first plan was to reach the west through the Black Sea. In 1696 he took Azov from the Turks, but as they still held the Straits at Constantinople, this port proved of little value, and he surrendered it again in 1711. Peter next turned to the Baltic, and after long years of war with Sweden, he eventually secured his “window” with the capture of the Baltic states and the Gulf of Finland leading up to St. Petersburg (1721).

At the same time Peter was following an aggressive eastern policy. Russians had been entering Siberia for many years, with their first explorers reaching the Pacific about 1640. Some fifty years later, in 1689, a Russian delegation to China concluded a treaty vaguely delimiting the frontiers between the two countries and securing for Russians the right to trade in Peking. Under Peter this eastward advance continued. Kamchatka was entered in 1697, a second embassy visited Peking in 1720, and in 1724 Captain Bering was sent on an exploring expedition in the course of which he discovered Bering Strait and Bering Sea, between Siberia and America. Later he explored the western coast of Alaska. At this time, too, Russian settlers were entering Siberia in considerable numbers. In 1660 there had been less than 70,000 Russians east of the Urals, but fifty years
later they numbered at least 350,000. In other words, Russians were migrating to Siberia as frequently as Englishmen were then migrating to America.

Peter was equally interested in Persia and India. Envoys were sent to Khiva and Bokhara in 1721, which so disturbed the Persian government that war broke out a year later. By occupying parts of northern Persia the Russians momentarily surrounded the Caspian Sea, though much of this territory had to be returned after Peter’s death. A few years later other Russians began the conquest of Turkestan, the vast semidesert area lying south of Siberia between the Caspian Sea, Afghanistan, and western China. Russia was already feeling that terrific urge toward territorial expansion which has ever since characterized her history.

After Peter’s death in 1725, no strong ruler appeared in Russia for many years. His wife, a grandson, a niece, and a great-nephew ruled in turn, after whom came his daughter Elizabeth (1741–1762). During the years between Peter and Elizabeth, German influence at court was strong, with thousands of Germans entering Russia and many of them occupying high posts in the government. Europeanization may have been less spectacular than under Peter, but it probably was more far-reaching. The anti-German Elizabeth, on the other hand, wished to rely upon her father’s new Russian aristocracy, but she could not persuade them to sacrifice their ease for Russia’s good. Only with the coming of Catherine II (1762–1796) did Russia again feel the spur of an energetic ruler.
5. DIPLOMACY AND WAR IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The diplomacy of the eighteenth century followed a few rather simple patterns. England and France were constant enemies because of colonial rivalry, and in the end England acquired practically all the French colonial empire. Prussia and Austria were always hostile to each other, primarily because of Frederick the Great’s lust for Austrian territory. And the Russians constantly desired more lands at the expense of the Turks. On the other hand, Louis XV maintained a “family compact” with his Spanish cousins, and France’s ancient alliances with Turkey and Sweden held firm. And finally, Poland’s ever advancing decrepitude invited attack, while the weakness of the minor German and north Italian states suggested that they be made to provide battlefields for Europe. These were the main themes in Europe’s international diplomacy, and cynical diplomats sought acclaim for themselves and glory for their sovereigns by elaborating upon them as best they could.

Their first great opportunity came with the War of the Austrian Succession. Charles VI of Austria died in October, 1740, leaving everything to his daughter Maria Theresa. Frederick the Great, who had come to the throne of Prussia only five months before, had long been covetously eyeing the Austrian province of Silesia, and within a few weeks he occupied it without bothering to declare war. The principal countries of Europe—France, Spain, Bavaria, Sweden, and Saxony, all of whom except Bavaria had signed the Pragmatic Sanction (see p. 64)—each hoped for a share of the spoils and joined Prussia. Frederick, however, deserted his new friends in 1742, kept
Silesia, and left Maria Theresa free to defeat her other enemies. This she did so effectively that Frederick became frightened and reentered the war (1744), but after a few months he again withdrew. Meanwhile England was fighting the "War of Jenkins' Ear" with Spain (1739-1748). (This war took its name from a sea captain who charged Spaniards with cutting off his ear.) Being now an ally of Austria, the English sent troops to the Austrian Netherlands, where they were promptly defeated by the French, but most of England's fighting was done on the seas or in America, where the conflict came to be called "King George's War." In 1746 the anti-Prussian Empress Elizabeth of Russia entered the war on Austria's side, and the allies, again deserted by Frederick, made peace at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748. All territories—except, of course, Silesia—went back to whatever king had ruled them before the war.

The great event of the next few years was the "Diplomatic Revolution," by which the principal contestants changed partners. Austria and France, after centuries of enmity, entered into an alliance with each other, and England presently joined Prussia. Meantime French and English troops had been fighting each other without declaring war, both in India (Arcot, 1751) and in America ("Braddock's Defeat," 1755), while Austrian and Russian statesmen were plotting to destroy Frederick. In the ensuing Seven Years' War (1756-1763), known in this country as the "French and Indian War," Prussia and England were allied against Austria, Russia, France, and later Spain. Though Frederick again won brilliant victories, notably Rossbach (1757), he was badly outnumbered, and presently he saw defeat staring him in the face. In the nick of time a new tsar (Peter III) brought Russia over to his side (1762). The British had by now won their famous victories in India (Plassey, 1757) and America (Quebec, 1759); they had taken Havana and Manila from Spain (1762); and peace was signed in 1763. Frederick retained Silesia; France transferred Canada and all her possessions east of the Mississippi to England, while the part west of that river went to Spain; she surrendered everything in India except a few trading posts; and England returned Havana and Manila to Spain in exchange for Florida.

The crowning achievement of eighteenth-century diplomacy was still to come. When the last Saxon king of Poland died in 1764, Catherine of Russia placed her former lover, Stanislas II Poniatowski, on the Polish throne. As Stanislas was not a competent ruler, his country quickly fell into anarchy, and its resulting weakness inspired
its three neighbors to join in the First Partition of Poland (1772). Frederick seized West Prussia, a territory inhabited largely by Poles but important to him because it separated East Prussia from his other possessions; Catherine took White Russia, whose population was of Orthodox religion and spoke a dialect of Russian; and Maria Theresa was "compensated" with Galicia, whose inhabitants were Slavs, either

Poles or Ukranians. This misfortune taught many Poles a lesson, and during the next twenty years they made strenuous though futile efforts to reform their government. At last a new constitution was adopted in 1791, but members of the Polish nobility, alarmed by its democratic character, insanely invited Catherine to intervene. The Second Partition followed in 1793, with Catherine taking the greater part of the old Lithuania while Frederick extended his Silesian frontier almost to Warsaw, but Austria got nothing. The next two years were filled with revolutionary activity, inspired by Thaddeus Kosciusko, a Polish patriot who had aided Washington during the American Revolution. Again the three powers intervened, and in the Third Partition (1795) they divided what was left among themselves. Having no country to rule, Stanislas resigned, and thereafter Poland had no independent government until 1919.
THE ENLIGHTENED DESPOTS

The wars had disclosed weak spots in each of the belligerent states, and the years after 1763 were a period of active reform, with each of the rulers trying to repair these faults. Like the upper classes everywhere in Europe at this time, they were proud of their "enlightenment"—we shall see more of it in the next chapter—and therefore the reforming sovereigns are usually known as the "enlightened despots." They said little of ruling by divine right, but they spoke often and eloquently of their love of the people, and they pictured themselves as high-minded humanitarians, constantly striving to promote the welfare and happiness of everyone. Nearly always, however, their actual reforms were aimed at increasing their own political or military power. Perhaps Frederick the Great of Prussia cut the most brilliant figure as an enlightened despot; Maria Theresa and her son Joseph II of Austria were inspired by reforming ideals; Joseph's brother Francis in Tuscany, and, to a lesser extent, his sister Marie Antoinette and her husband, Louis XVI of France, followed in their steps; and the most energetic of the reformers was Catherine the Great of Russia.

Catherine II ruled Russia from 1762 to 1796. The daughter of a minor German prince in the employ of Prussia, she was born in 1729, and sixteen years later she married Peter, the heir to the Russian throne. Peter's aunt, the anti-Prussian Empress Elizabeth, was then ruling Russia, and the marriage had originally been planned by Frederick as a device for keeping Russia neutral in the War of the Austrian Succession. This little scheme failed, but Catherine so ingratiated herself with the empress that the marriage took place anyhow (1745). Catherine at once learned Russian, deserted Lutheranism for Orthodoxy, and did whatever else she could to make herself into a good Russian. At last Elizabeth died, and Catherine's husband became tsar as Peter III (1762). Being weak-willed and weak-minded, he idolized Frederick the Great but was dominated by his wife. As soon as he was seated on the throne Peter abandoned his Austrian ally, withdrew from the Seven Years' War, and even sent a few troops to aid Frederick. After a reign of only six months, however, he was deposed by a group of officers and died in prison, allegedly of apoplexy, but perhaps he was assassinated with the connivance of his wife. The conspirators named Catherine tsarina, and
with their aid she began governing Russia. When it was too late, they sadly learned that they had given their country more than they had bargained for.

In spite of her efforts to make herself a Russian, Catherine employed hundreds of Germans in high positions, and during her reign the westernization of Russia proceeded apace. French styles were introduced among the aristocracy, many of whom learned to speak French as a second language. French books and French ideas circulated among these aristocrats, and for the first time Russia became a European rather than an Asiatic country, both politically and culturally. Catherine corresponded with the leaders of liberal thought in western Europe, expressing her deep sympathy with their noble ideals, but she did little to reform Russia in that direction. Early in her reign, she announced a thorough revision of the laws to bring them into harmony with the best thought of the day, and even appointed a commission to carry out the project. Catherine's instructions to this commission, couched in the most enlightened terms,
were circulated widely in Europe; the commission actually went to work; but after a short time its members were sent home and the project was forgotten. The same fate befell various other liberal and humane reforms. In fact, Catherine was in no position to inaugurate serious domestic reforms because of her constant controversies with the old nobility and her frequent wars with the Turks. The peasants, who made up nine-tenths or more of the population, were worse off under Catherine than ever before. Though they were bought and sold like slaves, she did not bother even to pretend that she was going to improve their lot. Their state presently became so bad that a peasant revolt, led by a certain Pugachev, spread over all southern Russia from the Don to the Volga. Rebellion raged for two years before Pugachev was captured and executed (1775). Catherine's real concern, like that of Peter the Great, was with extending Russian power, in which she was conspicuously successful. She completed the conquest of the Crimea and southwestern Russia from the Turks; she seized the greater part of Poland; and she even dreamed of conquering India.

Frederick the Great was more successful as an enlightened despot. His mercantilist policies did much to advance commerce and industry in Prussia; he raised the level of education in his country; and he proclaimed religious toleration, even though he sometimes oppressed the Jews. He also built up an intelligent and efficient bureaucracy, but his main interest lay in his army of 200,000 men, which was famous as the best drilled and the most effective in Europe. Like Catherine, however, he did nothing to remove the shackles of serfdom from the peasants.

Joseph II (1765–1790) became Holy Roman Emperor on the death of his father, but Maria Theresa continued to rule the Hapsburg domains jointly with her son until her death in 1780. During his last ten years Joseph was sole ruler, proving to be the most sincere and the most radical of the enlightened despots. His great hope was to unite and strengthen his inheritance by promoting equality among all his subjects. He weakened the nobility by abolishing serfdom in Austria (1781), and he offended the Catholic Church by proclaiming religious toleration, even for Jews. He expelled the Jesuits from his territories, closed more than a third of the two thousand monasteries and convents, reduced the number of monks and nuns by more than half, and established a secular state-controlled educational system which trained even the Catholic clergy. As he hoped to make the
church a national institution, he minimized the powers of the pope in Austria, even though Pius VI came to Vienna to plead with him. This "Josephism" was the greatest setback which the Catholic Church, as a political institution, had received since the Protestant Reformation, but when Joseph tried to introduce similar reforms into Hungary and Belgium, he failed completely. Revolts broke out in both provinces, and he was forced to withdraw his edicts.

The enlightened despots were much praised in their day by literary men and philosophers, but their true character is shown by their partition of Poland. This act outraged all the finer feelings of the day and it has since been denounced as the outstanding political crime of the eighteenth century. Regarding this atrocity, Frederick the Great is alleged to have remarked, with his customary cynicism, that Maria Theresa wept over the sad fate of Poland but demanded a larger share for herself—in compensation for the agonies her conscience caused her.

THE CRISIS IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE

In England things took a rather different course, for though George III (1760–1820) shared the ideas and ambitions of the enlightened despots, his plans were upset by a major crisis in the Empire. George I (1714–1727) and George II (1727–1760) had usually let their ministers govern England without royal interference, but George III was more ambitious. The grandson of George II, he had been trained to admire Frederick the Great of Prussia—his father's cousin, who had once considered marrying George's mother, while George's father had once hoped to marry Frederick's sister. Moreover, one of his father's boon companions and advisers was Lord Bolingbroke (1678–1751), leader of the Tory opposition and author of a book entitled The Patriot King (1749), in which he expressed opinions resembling those of the enlightened despots. Young George was therefore taught to hold exalted ideas of kingship; he was given The Patriot King to study carefully; and he was constantly urged by his mother "to be a king."

When George III came to the throne in 1760, England seemed ready for a change. The Whigs, who had governed England uninterruptedly for over forty years, were not a well-organized political party but a group of leaders united principally by a desire for office and patronage. There were half a dozen factions within the group,
each in bitter rivalry with all the others. The Seven Years’ War was still in progress and William Pitt (later Lord Chatham, 1708–1778), though not prime minister but only secretary of state for war (1757–1761), held the government together by his oratory, his appeals to war patriotism, his unquestioned honesty, and his success as proved by military victories. He thus became the most powerful minister England had seen for many a year.

King George could tolerate no such rival, and in 1761 he dismissed Pitt. The war ministry was replaced by a peace ministry under the king’s former tutor, the Tory Lord Bute. The peace with France was so unpopular, however, that Bute too was forced to resign (1763). For the next seven years England was ruled by a succession of weak Whig ministries, with George successfully playing off one faction against the others and skillfully using patronage and the baldest forms of bribery. He thus created a politically formidable following known as the “King’s Friends.” At last he felt strong enough to make the Tory Lord North prime minister, and North remained in office for twelve years (1770–1782). George seemed to be winning in his struggle for power.

As the war had left the English treasury depleted, heavy new taxation was imperative, and successive ministries were forced to revive old mercantilist taxes. This taxation fell heavily upon the American colonists, who hitherto had contributed little to imperial finance. Moreover, the conduct of many Americans during the war had deeply annoyed British officials. The colonists were accused of not contributing their fair share to the military effort, and smugglers had prolonged the war by selling goods to the French in Canada and the West Indies. After the peace, the British decided that the colonists should pay half the cost of the troops stationed in America to protect them either from the Indians or from the anticipated renewal of hostilities by the French. The British treasury would pay the other half, as well as the entire cost of the navy.

The various tax measures by which the British attempted to collect this money (about £150,000 annually) are well known. When they tried to enforce an earlier tax on molasses imported from the West Indies, colonists at once complained that their business was being ruined. The Stamp Act of 1765—requiring official stamps on all legal documents, newspapers, etc.—fell heavily upon lawyers, merchants, and editors, and it brought retaliation in the form of boycotts, or nonimportation agreements, under which Americans refused to buy
British goods. It also led to the famous Stamp Act Congress, held in New York in 1765, which was attended by delegates from nine of the thirteen colonies. From this congress issued the famous cry, "Taxation without representation is tyranny!" The Stamp Act was repealed, but the Townshend Acts of 1767 raised new storms of protest until they too were repealed (1770).

Taxation was not the only cause of American discontent, or even the most important one. When the English took Canada and the Mississippi Valley from the French, they had no plans for either the French Canadians or the Indians, but as pioneers from the thirteen colonies were already crossing the Appalachians, seeking new lands and frequently making trouble with the Indians, the British forbade them to enter the region until an Indian policy had been decided upon. Exasperated colonists often ignored the order and crossed this "Proclamation Line of 1763" to enter the Ohio Valley. Then came the Quebec Act of 1774, which contained many wise provisions. The French Canadians were so pleased with it that a few years later they refused to take any part in the American Revolution. But the act extended Quebec to the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, and its authors apparently planned to set up new colonies in this region though several of the old colonies claimed the territory. These colonies now protested that they were being robbed. Moreover, the act provided for the toleration of Roman Catholicism there, which many a Puritan stalwart regarded as tantamount to surrendering this fair land to Antichrist.

The fundamental causes of the growing estrangement between England and her American colonies lay still deeper. In the first place, a large proportion of the colonists had never been Englishmen. We have seen that barely half the white settlers were of Anglo-Saxon descent. The Scotch-Irish had been subjects of the British crown before migrating to America, to be sure, but the Germans, Dutch, and French Huguenots had not. Moreover, even though the Anglo-Saxons were everywhere the dominant people, their leaders were usually descended from men who had emigrated in the seventeenth century in order to escape English tyranny and who, whether Puritans in New England or Anglicans in New York and the South, had remained true to the political philosophy of John Locke. They had no sympathy with, or understanding of, the ideas proclaimed in The Patriot King. And finally, the rugged life in the colonies, supplemented by long years of "salutary neglect," had given the colonists
a spirit of self-reliance which rendered them reluctant to take orders from England or anywhere else.

The controversy raised by England’s revived royalism and mercan-

tilism was not simply a quarrel between the motherland and the
colonies. Many English Whigs resented George’s usurpations of
power, among them being such leaders as William Pitt, Edmund
Burke, and Charles James Fox. These men championed parliament
against the king in traditional English style. Moreover, parliament
represented only one segment of the English people, and the re-
mainder resented “taxation without representation” as ardently as
did the Americans. In the colonies, on the other hand, controversy
exaggerated the social and political conflicts between the rich and
the poor. In general, the first to complain against English laws were
prosperous merchants, but their agitation for “liberty” proved to be
highly infectious, and leaders of the less favored classes quickly
turned these anti-English slogans against their betters in the colo-
nies. Many a well-to-do merchant became frightened at the spirit
he had let loose and belatedly decided that taxation by George III
was preferable to domination by the small farmers of the back
country or the rabble at the other end of town.

After the repeal of the Townshend Acts in 1770, controversy en-
tered a momentary lull, but the situation remained so tense that a
minor fracas might have serious consequences. One such affair was
the Boston Massacre of 1770, when a street riot led to the death of
three persons. In 1773 Lord North decided to force the colonies into
a more co-operative spirit, which caused further rioting and led to the
famous “Boston Tea Party” (December 16, 1773). This deed of vi-
olence, during which £18,000 worth of tea was destroyed, led to re-
taliation in the form of the “Intolerable Acts,” which closed Boston
Harbor, suspended the charter of Massachusetts, ordered that ac-
cused persons be tried in England if the royal authorities believed
a fair trial impossible in America, and quartered troops on com-
nunities. At about the same time came the highly unpopular Quebec
Act.

Goaded by these laws, representatives of all the colonies except
Georgia met at Philadelphia in September, 1774, as the First Con-
tinental Congress. Here the radicals, led by Samuel Adams of Massa-
chusetts, quickly secured control and drew up a complaint known
as the “Declarations and Resolves.” They also urged a union of the
colonies and proposed new nonimportation agreements. Alarmed
English leaders, such as Pitt and Burke, eloquently urged the conciliation of the colonies, and even Lord North took a few steps in that direction. It was then too late, however, for by this time hostilities had opened.

The American Revolution

Early in 1775 dissatisfied Americans in the Boston area began organizing themselves as "minutemen," and they collected military supplies so openly that the British commander, General Gage, became seriously disturbed. When he sent a detachment to seize such supplies at Concord, some fifteen miles away, the minutemen resisted, first at Lexington and then at Concord, where they "fired the shot heard round the world" (April 19, 1775). A few weeks later Americans attempted to fortify Bunker Hill, at Charlestown across the river from Boston, but were driven away by the British (June 17). British losses were so heavy, however, that the Americans claimed a victory and presently settled down to besiege Boston. At last General Howe (who had replaced Gage) evacuated the city (March 17, 1776), taking his troops and about a thousand Tory sympathizers to Halifax. Meantime, other American forces, led by Ethan Allen of Vermont, had captured Fort Ticonderoga in upper New York (May, 1775), and late in the year two American armies invaded Canada. One captured Montreal, but the other, led by General Benedict Arnold of Connecticut, failed in its efforts to take Quebec.

The last act of the First Continental Congress, before it dissolved in October, 1774, had been to summon a second congress. Delegates appointed by the legislatures of the thirteen colonies assembled in Philadelphia on May 10, 1775. Though this Second Continental Congress enjoyed no legal status and could do little more than "advise" the various colonial legislatures, it accepted the fact of war, recruited an army, and named General Washington its commander-in-chief.

George Washington (1732–1799) was the younger son of a Virginia planter. He had gained military experience in the French and Indian War, managed estates in Virginia, and secured title to large tracts of land in the Ohio Valley. While he can scarcely be called a great general, he was thoroughly competent, and in these trying times his patience and perseverance were assets of the highest importance. His difficulties were caused less by the British than by his fellow countrymen, for he was constantly being attacked by jealous rivals, by grafting profiteers, and by narrow isolationists who could not see
beyond the limits of their own community, or at most of their own colony. Washington and his associates had the difficult task of making the disparate peoples of the thirteen colonies into one united nation, and to a surprising extent they succeeded. In the nineteenth century Washington was often pictured as an absurdly heroic figure,

GEORGE WASHINGTON. (Culver Service)

quite superhuman in his untarnished virtue, but this depressing portrait has now been rectified. Even the more extreme "debunkers," however, recognize him as a truly great man, struggling against terrific odds and finally achieving his lofty goal.

News of the bloodshed at Lexington and Concord spread rapidly. It sharpened antagonisms in America, but in England rival factions united in demanding that rebellion be suppressed before concessions were even considered. Americans opposing English policy came to be called "Patriots," while their adversaries were "Loyalists" or "Tories." It is impossible to estimate accurately the relative strengths of the factions, but the best guesses seem to indicate that active
Patriots made up not more than one-fifth to one-third of the population, that the active Loyalists were even less numerous, and that the others took little part in the controversy. At first most Patriots would probably have been satisfied with some form of “home rule” under the British king, but after hostilities opened they began urging complete independence. Their demands were greatly encouraged by the writings of Tom Paine (1737–1809), an English Quaker who had migrated to the colonies in December, 1774, and whose brilliantly written pamphlet, *Common Sense*, was published in January, 1776. Quickly thereafter radical opinion began to favor complete independence. On June 7, 1776, Richard Henry Lee of Virginia moved in congress that the colonies “are, and of right out to be, free and independent states.” After three weeks of debate every delegation except one (New York) favored the motion, and on July 4 the congress formally adopted the Declaration of Independence. This famous document, charging the English king with numerous acts of tyranny and justifying colonial independence by an appeal to the political philosophy of John Locke, had been written by Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826), a young Virginia lawyer who later became a founder of American democracy.

To subdue their rebellious colonies the British planned first to occupy the principal cities, such as New York and Philadelphia, to send a force from Canada down the Hudson, thereby separating New England from the other colonies, and then to pacify that troublesome region. After reorganizing his army at Halifax, General Howe defeated Washington at Brooklyn Heights and occupied New York in September, 1776. A few weeks later Washington avenged these defeats at Trenton and Princeton, and the British did not occupy Philadelphia until September, 1777. Meanwhile the British General Burgoyne had marched south from Canada, but as he received no reinforcements from Howe, he suffered a severe defeat at Saratoga and surrendered to the Americans (October, 1777). This American victory at Saratoga is often considered the turning point of the war, but its significance was not apparent at once, and the following winter, during which Washington and his army endured great hardships at Valley Forge, near Philadelphia, was perhaps the most discouraging of the war.

The rebellion in America at once aroused the ardor of England’s foes and rivals in Europe, but the European governments took a cautious attitude, waiting to see how the war would go and not being
overly enthusiastic about the revolutionary doctrines set forth in the Declaration of Independence. Individuals showed less restraint, however, and adventurers flocked to America, hoping to make fortunes and win glory for themselves. After several disappointments, Washington returned most of these volunteers to their homes, but a few stayed in America, where they rendered valuable services. The German von Steuben, once a Prussian officer, helped organize and drill the American army; the Frenchman de Kalb and the Pole Pulaski gave their lives; and the most conspicuous of all was the Marquis de Lafayette. Washington first planned to send this young man back to France, but when he learned that Lafayette belonged to the highest French nobility, he gave the nineteen-year-old lad a major general’s commission—which proved to be an excellent political investment. Other Frenchmen and Spaniards sent valuable supplies and even loaned money to the rebellious colonies. At the same time congress sent Benjamin Franklin to France to seek further aid. Franklin was a skillful diplomat, and after Saratoga he was able to induce the French government to recognize American independence and go to war with England (February, 1778). A year later Spain followed her Bourbon ally into the war, but she, like France, was less interested in helping America than in humbling England. In 1780, at the suggestion of Catherine of Russia, most of the other powers of Europe entered a League of Armed Neutrality to protect neutral commerce against the British efforts to blockade hostile ports. They thereby indirectly helped the Americans, and they contributed greatly to the progress of international law.

Shortly after Saratoga, but before the French alliance, Lord North had announced a new policy of conciliation, giving the Americans everything they wanted except independence. Before the offer reached this country, however, the alliance was signed and the Americans were no longer interested in conciliation. The British then devised a new military strategy. Abandoning Philadelphia, they attempted to hold only New York in the north while their main force, under Lord Cornwallis, invaded the southern colonies from Florida. At first Cornwallis was successful, but during these years (1778–1779), George Rogers Clark was capturing the former French fortresses in the West at Cahokia and Vincennes. Washington made little progress in the north, however, and the treason of Benedict Arnold in 1780 was a serious blow to the American cause. Finally the French sent a fleet and six thousand soldiers under Rochambeau, with whose aid the
Americans cornered Lord Cornwallis. His surrender at Yorktown (October, 1781) ended the serious fighting of the war.

The British were more fortunate in other theaters of war. They successfully withstood a combined Spanish and French attack upon Gibraltar, though the Spaniards occupied Minorca (in the Mediterranean) and parts of Florida. The British lost several islands in the West Indies, but in April, 1782, they badly defeated the French fleet that had helped bottle up Cornwallis. By this naval victory the British regained command of the seas. By this time, however, the English people were tired of the war, North was criticized bitterly in parliament, and in March, 1782, he resigned. A Whig ministry was formed by Rockingham, and when that minister died in July, Lord Shelburne took his place. A preliminary treaty with the Americans (November 30, 1782) was followed by a general peace signed at Paris in 1783. England recognized the independence of the thirteen colonies, with the Mississippi as their western boundary, but with badly defined frontiers at the north and south against Canada and Florida respectively. Spain kept Minorca and regained all Florida, which gave her control of the whole coast of the Gulf of Mexico. France got a British island in the West Indies (subsequently lost again) and Senegal, from which has grown her huge West African empire.

The five years following the Peace of Paris have justly been called “the critical period in American history,” for the colonists faced countless difficulties which they were ill prepared to meet. They were very conscious, however, of the fact that they were founding a new nation and establishing a new social order. Democratic enthusiasm had grown rapidly during the war, and extreme views were often expressed regarding liberty. As it was widely believed that any strong government would be dangerous to liberty, radicals sought to keep government weak. At the same time, the old rivalries of the separate colonies became more virulent than ever. As early as 1777, the Second Continental Congress had drawn up “Articles of Confederation,” by which the colonies united for war (and for a few other common purposes) as the “United States of America,” but these articles were not accepted by all the colonies until 1780. Even then the union was too weak to be effective. One of its greatest difficulties was financial. The congress had issued large amounts of paper money, which soon became almost worthless, and financial inflation, coupled with the general upheaval attendant upon the
change from war to peace and the severance of political ties with England, threw the whole economic life of the colonies into confusion.

These conditions caused far-seeing statesmen (of whom America possessed several in those days) to seek a stronger federation of the colonies. After much discussion, a Constitutional Convention met in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787, with Washington as its presiding officer. This convention devised the form of government under which we still live. As many of its leaders were conservative property owners, it was not easy to persuade the radicals to accept the form of government they proposed, but after months of intensive propaganda—of which outstanding examples are to be seen in the famous Federalist papers, written by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison—special conventions in the various states ratified the new Constitution, though often by narrow majorities. George Washington was then inaugurated as the first President of the United States on April 30, 1789.

The new Constitution described the framework of the proposed federal government and indicated, in a general way, what things this government might do and what ones should be left to the individual states. The radicals were not satisfied, however, and demanded specific guarantees of liberty. The Constitution was therefore supplemented by ten amendments—often called the “Bill of Rights”—which guaranteed such fundamental liberties as trial by jury, habeas corpus, and freedom of speech, religion, and the press. The Constitution of the United States was the supreme expression of a line of political thought that had begun in England more than a hundred years before, and just as the partitions of Poland show eighteenth-century statesmanship at its worst, the American Declaration of Independence and Constitution show it at its best.

The British Empire After 1783

By the Treaty of Paris (1783) England lost her best colonies, yet her empire remained the most important colonial empire in the world. In the Western Hemisphere she still held Canada and several islands in the West Indies, of which Jamaica was the most valuable. During and after the Revolution, some sixty thousand Loyalists fled from the American colonies to New Brunswick or Ontario, filling them with an anti-American sentiment that continued for many
years. Before long the quarrels of these newcomers with the French Canadians were to provide a new test for British statesmanship, but these disputes were eventually settled amicably. Moreover, the English soon found that all was not lost in their former thirteen colonies. Trade between the two countries revived almost at once, and the new United States was soon numbered among England’s best customers. Many former colonists continued to hate the mother country, to be sure, but it gradually became evident that, in spite of America’s political independence, the English and American peoples were still united by a common language, common political traditions, and a common culture.

At this time, too, England acquired valuable new colonies in the south Pacific. Both Australia and New Zealand had been discovered in the seventeenth century by Dutch navigators from the East Indies, one of whom gave his name to Tasmania, but as these explorers reported neither spices nor gold, the islands received little attention. Shortly before the American Revolution, however, Captain James Cook (1728–1779) was sent to the South Seas on a scientific expedition (1767–1771), in the course of which he circumnavigated New Zealand, claiming it for England, and later landed at Botany Bay, near the present Sydney in Australia. A second expedition (1772–1775) resulted in further discoveries in the south Pacific, and during his third expedition Cook was killed in Hawaii (1779). Australia was first settled by convicts transported from England (1788), but early in the next century free settlers began seeking homes in the new colony. Meantime the Dutch East India Company had gone bankrupt (1782), its possessions had been taken over by the Dutch government, and the English began seizing them. For a few years they actually held all the Dutch East Indies, though they presently restored them all except Ceylon. Under the leadership of Sir Stamford Raffles (1781–1826), another of England’s great empire builders, they added Singapore and the Malay Peninsula to their colonial empire.

The richest of England’s colonies was India. Heretofore English activity in this country had been directed by agents of the East India Company, an arrangement which now proved unsatisfactory. After his victory at Plassey (1757), Robert Clive had set up a puppet ruler in Bengal, but he virtually ruled that province himself, collecting the taxes and providing defense, paying the native ruler a fixed sum annually and allowing him to dispense justice.
Reports of his enormous financial exactions and other high-handed activities caused him to be recalled to England, where he eventually committed suicide (1774). Meantime Lord North had passed a Regulating Act (1773), which was later modified and extended by a new India Act (1784). Under these laws, the East India Company was to confine itself to trade, while political matters were directed by a governor general and council named by parliament. The first governor general, Warren Hastings, held office from 1774 to 1785. This remarkable empire builder continued the dual form of government inaugurated by Clive and fought successfully against various native rulers who attempted to drive the British from India. But he too was accused of accumulating an enormous fortune by questionable methods, for which he was tried but acquitted when he returned to England. His successor was Lord Cornwallis (1786–1793), who now redeemed his surrender at Yorktown and established his fame as a principal founder of the British Empire in India. After a brief interlude, his work was continued by the Marquis of Wellesley (1798–1805), under whom England annexed the whole eastern coast of India from Bengal south and most of the Ganges Valley as well.

The fall of Lord North’s ministry and the loss of the thirteen colonies brought an end to George III’s dreams of personal rule. During the 1760’s the parliamentary cause had been defended in England by such leaders as Pitt and Burke, but its most spectacular champion was John Wilkes, a popular but profligate man of fashion who was repeatedly elected to parliament and as often prevented by the king from taking his seat. In the next decade Charles James Fox (1749–1806) became leader of the opposition. He was cordially detested by George III, who held him responsible for the notorious debaucheries of the Prince of Wales (later George IV), but he was equally unpopular with the old Whigs. During the Revolutionary War he had criticized North most severely, but in 1783 the two men united to form the “infamous coalition,” which held office for a few months. They found little popular support, however, and they were soon succeeded by the younger William Pitt (1759–1806), son of the old minister who had become Lord Chatham. The younger Pitt had entered parliament at the age of twenty-one, and four years later he became prime minister. This office he held for almost eighteen years, 1783 to 1801, and again for two years until his death in 1806. George III had appointed him in the belief that he could manage the young man, but he was quickly undeceived. Though
Pitt consented to call himself a Tory, he remade the party and relied upon parliament rather than the king. During his early years he effected important reforms, but when he attempted to reform parliament itself, making it more representative of the people, he failed completely. Demand for reform continued, however, until the excesses of the French Revolution in the early 1790's discredited all reform movements for a full generation.

One other aspect of English history at this period must be mentioned in passing, though it will later receive more detailed attention. England had prospered economically during the greater part of the eighteenth century, and many persons had learned to risk their accumulated capital in new ventures. Innovations of many sorts were tried, and England's productive capacity increased rapidly. In the years after 1763 this industrial progress was especially noteworthy, with the introduction of new machines and the rise of the factory system. Before the end of the century, this "Industrial Revolution" had gone so far that England could become the economic backbone of Europe, financing and provisioning the armies that fought against the French Revolution and Napoleon.
THE ENLIGHTENMENT

WHAT WAS THE ENLIGHTENMENT?

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6. WHAT WAS THE ENLIGHTENMENT?

When students of Europe’s intellectual development designate the eighteenth century as the period of “The Enlightenment,” they merely repeat what men of that day believed about themselves. These men considered their century “enlightened” because of their firm conviction that they had emancipated themselves from the superstitions and prejudices of earlier times and that at last they had achieved a view of the world and of man that was in strict accordance with fact and with reason. As “enlightened” human beings they boldly criticized everything, ruthlessly discarding whatever they considered unreasonable and constructing all manner of new theories to explain heaven and earth. They thus altered men’s manner of thinking more deeply than had the Renaissance, the Protestant Reformation, and the geographical discoveries of the sixteenth century, and they ushered in a new period in the intellectual history of the Western world.

Though eminently satisfied with themselves, these enlightened thinkers and writers were highly critical of the world about them. They were constantly suggesting improvements, and the “enlightened despots” sometimes deemed it wise to display an interest in their theories. We have seen, however, that in nearly every case the reforms made by these despots were designed primarily to augment the ruler’s military and political power. Nevertheless, the leaders of the Enlightenment were not greatly disappointed, for only rarely had they put their trust in princes. They were literary men who addressed themselves to the general public or, more specifically, to the educated upper middle class. Carefully distinguishing “the people” from its rulers, they appealed especially to the former, appar-
ently believing that once the people became “enlightened” everything would straightway be righted.

Not all the leaders of the Enlightenment were cast in one mold, yet they all shared ideas and attitudes that distinguish them clearly from the thinkers of earlier or later times. Perhaps their outstanding quality was the extreme rationalism that had been popularized by the writings of the French philosopher René Descartes (1596–1650). Descartes was a mathematician whose view of the world was mathematical and rational. Because his senses had sometimes deceived him, he systematically undertook to doubt everything. He quickly perceived, however, that he could not doubt that he existed or that there was something beside himself. Building upon these two premises, he rationally reconstructed a universe, God, and an immortal soul for himself. Descartes’s universe was a mechanical one, rigidly obeying the laws of matter and motion which Galileo and others had recently proclaimed, and its workings were so simple as to be easily understood by anyone who could understand geometry. A famous passage in Descartes’s Discourse on Method (1637), telling how he constructed this rational universe in one day while secluded in a German inn, shows clearly that his ideas were not based on experience but, like spiders’ webs, were spun out of his own inner consciousness. Nevertheless, this “Cartesian” philosophy was accepted widely and almost at once. It was especially popular with the Jesuits, in whose schools most French rationalists of the eighteenth century received their formal education.

The ideas of the English philosopher Francis Bacon (1561–1626), especially as they were developed by John Locke (1632–1704, see p. 32), were equally popular in the eighteenth century. Bacon had been trained as a lawyer and for several years he sat as lord chancellor at the head of England’s judicial system. His thought patterns consequently differed widely from those of the mathematician Descartes. Like a good judge, he was primarily interested in finding out exactly what happened; he relied primarily upon the observations of witnesses; and he suspected elaborate ratiocinations as deeply as Descartes suspected the evidence of his five senses. He endeavored to learn the truth by observation and experiment, and he would have been quite contemptuous of ideas emanating from Descartes’s room in the inn. Actually, both types of mind were necessary for the advancement of science and learning. The Cartesian rationalists were devastatingly critical of accepted beliefs and prac-
tices, but the Baconian observers and experimenters provided solid knowledge and an experimental method which enabled men to learn something really new. The rationalists could then use the new knowledge as the basis of new generalizations and new beliefs. Our study of the Enlightenment must begin, however, with an account of its literary men for, as we have already remarked, its leaders were literary men addressing themselves to the general public.

**LITERATURE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY**

Many things happened during the later years of the seventeenth century to produce new forms of literature. First of all, there was a rapid extension of the reading public. Increasing numbers of the upper middle classes came to enjoy the education and leisure required to read books, and at the same time progress in the printer’s trade provided cheaper books. In the second place, the new readers had new attitudes toward life and the world, and naturally they preferred to read books written from their own point of view. Publishers, who had formerly been merely printers, sensed this change in taste and began providing the reading public with books written in the new spirit. The new readers desired information on all manner of things, creating a great market for works of reference, dictionaries, encyclopedias, and compendiums of every sort; and their enthusiasm and desire for instruction, edification, and entertainment induced a rapid development of the essay and novel.

There had been a flood of pamphlet literature in England during the Civil War, and for many years thereafter political and religious tracts continued to appear in great profusion. As the authors of these pamphlets were above all things anxious to have their works read, they made great progress in the difficult art of writing attractive and forceful prose. Newspapers and newsletters contributed to the same end. Newspapers had begun a precarious existence in England in the last years of James I, and they had become more common in the opening years of the Civil War, but under both Cromwell and Charles II they were subjected to such severe censorship that few could survive. Writers therefore found it more profitable to circulate hand-written “newsletters,” which were eagerly passed from hand to hand in coffee houses and other public places. (“Coffee houses,” which became fashionable during the Restoration, were places uniting the qualities of a modern café and a clubhouse, where men
congregated to drink coffee, converse, gamble, and hear or read the news.) If the authors of newsletters were to succeed, their letters must be newsy, gossipy, witty, well written, and must have something to say. The newsletters became a training school for journalists, and they created styles of writing that were widely imitated in the freer eighteenth century.

These various developments gave writers a new standing. In earlier times only successful dramatists had been able to earn a living by their pens. Shakespeare made a fortune from the share he owned in the theater that produced his plays, but he never bothered to have the plays printed. Some were printed by others, either legally or illegally, during his lifetime, but the first complete edition did not appear until seven years after his death. Other writers either were well-to-do men before they became authors, or else they were subsidized by rich patrons, or they had attached themselves to rich institutions such as the church or a university. In the eighteenth century, however, it became possible for writers to support themselves by
writing, and a few derived handsome incomes from their works. Milton had been paid £5 for the manuscript of *Paradise Lost*, but less than sixty years later Alexander Pope made £10,000 from his translation of Homer. This was an extreme case, of course, and even in the eighteenth century most writers had to be subsidized—like the authors of scholarly and scientific books today. Nevertheless, publishing became a profitable business and writing became a recognized profession. Literature had its successful practitioners, but it also had its poverty-stricken followers whose poems, encyclopedia articles, conventional histories, and other productions were works such as any drudge could write. In England these hangers-on to the writing profession were already called "Grub Street hacks."

After this long preparation, the opening years of the eighteenth century saw a great outburst of literary activity in England. The most brilliant writer of the period was Daniel Defoe (1659–1731). Born of Puritan parents, he unsuccessfully tried business before he found his true vocation as a pamphleteer in the days of William and Mary. Early in the days of Queen Anne, however, he overreached himself with a satire on the Anglican clergy, entitled *The Shortest Way with Dissenters*, and he was condemned to the pillory and prison. While in jail he started publishing a paper, called *The Review* (1704), which was written entirely by himself and which consisted principally of essays or editorials on public questions. After his release, *The Review* continued to appear triweekly for eight years. Defoe also continued to publish pamphlets, sometimes being paid for them by the government, and presently he began writing works of fiction as well. The most famous of the latter is *Robinson Crusoe* (1719), which has become a children’s classic. His other works include the *Journal of the Plague Year* (1721), a remarkably vivid and realistic though imaginary account of London in 1665, and two romances whose heroines were women of questionable character, *Moll Flanders* (1721) and *Roxana* (1724).

Meantime *The Review* had inspired various imitators, notably Joseph Addison (1672–1719) and Richard Steele (1672–1729), whose *Spectator* became famous. Carefully avoiding the controversial and dangerous topics beloved by Defoe, these two writers filled their paper with polite and charming essays addressed to the educated upper classes. The fourth of the great prose writers of Queen Anne’s day was Jonathan Swift (1667–1745). His satires on English society were extremely bitter, and he is best known today for *Gulliver’s*
Travels (1726), in which he makes clear his low opinion of the men of his time while describing the ridiculous strut and ceremony of the tiny Lilliputians, the disgusting grossness of the giants of Brobdingnag, and the many faults of other equally absurd creatures.

Defoe's romances were predecessors of the modern novel. The next great step was taken by Samuel Richardson (1689–1761), whose Pamela, or Virtue Rewarded (1740) tells the story of a maidservant's heroic resistance to the advances of her noble employer; Clarissa Harlowe (1748) is even more melodramatic; but Sir Charles Grandison (1753) portrays a true gentleman as conceived by persons such as those who admired Richardson's earlier works. The highly serious and maudlin character of these novels was too much for Henry Fielding (1707–1754), who began his Joseph Andrews (1742) as a parody ridiculing Pamela, but who became interested in his characters and created a famous novel. His second novel, Tom Jones (1749), is considered one of the greatest ever written. Other English novelists of this period include Laurence Sterne (1713–1768), a clergyman famous for the delightful Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy (1760–1767) and A Sentimental Journey through France and Italy (1768); Tobias Smollett (1721–1771), a physician who created Roderick Random (1748) and Humphrey Clinker (1770); and finally the novelist and playwright Oliver Goldsmith (1728–1774), best known for his Vicar of Wakefield (1766).

The intellectual atmosphere of the early eighteenth century was not conducive to the writing of great poetry. The leading English poet of the day, Alexander Pope (1688–1744), was indeed a man of poetic feeling, but the rationalistic spirit of the times turned him to didactic poems and satires. Among the former is the much quoted Essay on Man (1733), among the latter, the Dunciad (1728). Though no Greek scholar, Pope also made famous translations of Homer's Iliad (1715) and Odyssey (1725).

The French Philosophes

Similarly, the early years of the reign of Louis XV were marked by great literary activity in France. Here, as in England, newspapers, essays, and novels appeared beside works in the conventional and classic forms, and the Anglomania of the day resulted in the frequent imitation of English models and the wide acceptance of Eng-
lish ideas. As France did not then enjoy the relatively free press that prevailed across the Channel after 1688, her literary men were often in trouble with the church or the police, and at one time or another most prominent writers took refuge in England. Often their books had to be printed in Holland, whence they were smuggled into France and read with heightened enthusiasm. Literary circles therefore became highly critical of both church and censorship, which they attacked with great verve and wit. In fact, the leading lights of the French literary world were so concerned with criticizing the generally accepted order of things, and with preaching new ideas, that they came to be called *philosophes*—a word which is hardly equivalent to the English “philosophers.” “Critics” would perhaps be a better translation. Not all French writers were *philosophes*, strictly speaking, but with few exceptions those who were not *philosophes* were not good writers either.

The ideas of the *philosophes* were spread abroad partly by their writings and partly by other means, of which the literary *salon* was the most important. In the days of Louis XIV ambitious ladies had sometimes given their receptions an intellectual cast by inviting a few literary men along with their nobler guests, and under Louis XV such hostesses often owed their fame to the writers and wits who frequented their *salons*. Literary ladies who could not parade prominent *philosophes* through their parlors would often direct the conversation of their guests along intellectual lines. The *salons* thus became centers whence new ideas spread and where literary reputations were made or lost. Aware of this important fact, authors wrote their books primarily for the habitués of the *salons*, carefully avoiding any remarks that might bore their hurried hostesses or be incomprehensible to them. They cultivated a literary style that was simple, clear, and witty, but sometimes they sacrificed depth to surface brilliance.

A second and somewhat similar institution promoting the new philosophy was Freemasonry. Though masonic lodges had existed for centuries, important reforms were effected early in the eighteenth century, and thereafter masonry spread rapidly in Europe and America. While there is no necessary connection between Freemasonry and any particular line of thought, it often happened that prominent masons took an interest in the new philosophy, and that their lodges came to be as effective as the *salons* in disseminating the ideas of the Enlightenment.
The great precursor of the French *philosophes* was Pierre Bayle (1647–1706). The son of a Protestant pastor in southern France, Bayle was converted to Catholicism in 1669, but within a year, as soon as the novelty of his new religion had worn off, he reverted to Calvinism. Being a relapsed heretic, he found himself in serious trouble with the police and fled to Geneva. A few years later he turned up, under an assumed name, as a professor in the Protestant theological seminary at Sedan, and when this school was closed by the French government (1681), he fled to Rotterdam. Bayle was a man of vast erudition, and his various conversions had left him an advanced skeptic in the field of religion. He set forth skeptical views in his *Thoughts on the Comet* (1682), and he expressed them even more forcibly in an encyclopedic four-volume work entitled *A Historical and Critical Dictionary* (1695–1697), in which he deftly exploded many ancient legends dear to popular Christianity. Written with great wit as well as learning, this famous book was widely read and imitated throughout the eighteenth century.

The Baron de Montesquieu (1689–1755) belonged to a wealthy family of the French nobility, and as a young man he held a judgeship at Bordeaux. In 1721 he made his literary debut with the light and amusing *Persian Letters*, allegedly written by two Persian travelers who enjoyed satirizing the foibles of French society in the days of the Regency. His success encouraged him to forsake the law for literature. After resigning his post at Bordeaux he spent three years in travel, visiting Italy and Germany and passing about half the time in England. His second important work was the *Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and of Their Decadence* (1734), a little book with a long title which contained a thoughtful attempt to explain a great historical event by attributing the fall of Rome to her loss of civic spirit. Most important of all Montesquieu’s works, however, was his *Spirit of the Laws* (1748). This large treatise was a profound study of history and society. Its learning was alleviated by wit; it delivered many indirect attacks upon the French monarchy of the day; and it was carefully studied by several members of the American Constitutional Convention of 1787.

“Voltaire” is the pen name of François Marie Arouet (1694–1778), the most famous of the *philosophes*. The son of a successful lawyer, he received an excellent education from the Jesuits, after which he passed several rather aimless years in Paris. His witticisms at the expense of socially prominent persons caused him to be confined
for several months in the Bastille, a famous prison in Paris, and on another occasion he was severely beaten by thugs in the employ of a duke. To escape a second incarceration, Voltaire fled to England in 1726, whence he returned three years later, full of enthusiasm for the English and their freedom. This enthusiasm he expressed, along with much implied criticism of the French government, in his *Philosophical Letters on the English* (1734). When the government ordered his book burned publicly, Voltaire fled to the chateau of his mistress, the Marquise du Châtelet, where he remained until her death fifteen years later. As the chateau stood only a short distance from the border of Lorraine, he could easily escape to foreign soil in case of need. Not daring to remain in Paris after the death of his protectress (1748), he accepted an invitation to visit Frederick the Great in Prussia. Two such prima donnas found it difficult to reside in one court, however, and in 1753 they separated acrimoniously. Five years later Voltaire, now a rich man, established a residence at Ferney, near Geneva in Switzerland, and at last, in 1778, when eighty-four years old, he revisited Paris. Here he received a tumultuous welcome, and here a few weeks later he died.

Had Voltaire died at the age of sixty, he would be little known today. If remembered at all, it would be as the author of several successful tragedies, a few mediocre epic poems, and a history of the age of Louis XIV. The works that have immortalized his name appeared after his flight from Prussia, and it was then that Voltaire became Europe’s leading champion of liberty of thought and a deadly enemy of the church. He urged men to “wipe out the infamy” (écrasez l’infâme), and by “the infamy” he meant the persecuting church and state of his day, which claimed the right to control men’s minds. Voltaire had already shown himself critical of traditional religion, notably in a tragedy, *Mahomet* (1742), which strongly suggested that all priests and religious leaders are conscious impostors while their followers are simple dupes. (To avoid trouble with the censors, Voltaire ironically pretended to be defending Christianity by unmasking Moslem charlatans, and he even had the effrontery to dedicate the play to the pope!) Soon after he reached Switzerland, the earthquake of 1755 destroyed the city of Lisbon, which caused Voltaire publicly to question the ways of divine providence. Various persons rushed to the defense of providence, declaring that in the long run it would be found that all things work together for good. Voltaire then published his most famous story, the uproarious
Candide (1759), whose simple-minded hero suffers every conceivable misfortune, usually in a ridiculous fashion, but after each disaster he solemnly reflects that all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds.

The climax of Voltaire's crusade against the church came with the Calas affair of 1762. Jean Calas, a Protestant of Toulouse, had been executed on a trumped-up charge of murdering his son, whom he allegedly suspected of planning to become a Catholic. When convinced by his widow of Calas's innocence, Voltaire launched an ardent, and eventually successful, campaign to clear the old man's reputation. Other cases of extreme bigotry and cruelty, coming at just this time, added fuel to the fire, and in his Essay on Toleration (1763) Voltaire advertised these affairs as a national disgrace. A year later he published his Philosophical Dictionary (1764), a collection of short articles on a multitude of subjects, chiefly religious or literary, arranged in alphabetical order. These articles were written with far less learning, but with even greater wit, than those in Bayle's similar work, and in them, more than in any other writing, Voltaire revealed his anticlerical bias. Throughout the remainder of his life, in the relative security of his Swiss retreat, Voltaire continued to produce a steady stream of pamphlets, tracts, stories, and plays, in which he vigorously attacked persecuting orthodoxy. Voltaire is sometimes regarded as the great skeptic but, as an American historian (Carl Becker) has remarked, he was, "on the contrary, a man of faith, an apostle who fought the good fight, tireless to the end, writing seventy volumes to convey the truth that was to make us free."

The years when Voltaire reigned as the "patriarch of Ferney" also saw the appearance of the French Encyclopédie. In 1728 a Scottish publisher brought out Chambers's Cyclopaedia in two volumes. This work, unlike the "dictionaries" of Bayle and Voltaire, repre-
sented a serious attempt to summarize the knowledge of the day in an objective fashion, and its immediate success encouraged a French publisher to order a translation. For this task he selected Denis Diderot (1713–1784), who had already translated several English books, written essays on philosophical subjects, and passed a few months in prison on charges of "atheism" brought against him by a village priest. Diderot's lively imagination, fired by this new assignment, soon began dreaming of an original and far more elaborate work that would present all human knowledge from the point of view of the Enlightenment. His enthusiasm induced the publisher to undertake the larger project, and Diderot set about finding collaborators. Jean d'Alembert (1717–1783), a distinguished mathematician, was his chief assistant, but nearly every important philosophe in France made some contribution to the work. The first volume, with a remarkable introduction by d'Alembert, appeared in 1751. When Diderot completed his task, in 1765, there were seventeen volumes of text and four of plates, which were later followed by seven more volumes of plates, five supplementary volumes of text, and a two-volume index, making a total of thirty-five large volumes. Being distinctly anti-ecclesiastical in tone, as well as brilliantly written, the Encyclopédie aroused the wrath of the clergy, who finally persuaded the government to suppress it (1759). Diderot and his publisher persevered, however, and the later volumes were brought out clandestinely. The public received them eagerly, and each successive volume was an event in the intellectual history of France.

The last of the philosophes whom we can mention here is Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778). The son of a Calvinist watchmaker in Geneva, he lost his mother at birth and received little care from his father. After running away from home at the age of sixteen, he spent several years wandering about northern Italy and France,
securing a precarious living as best he could. This vagabond career filled him with a hostility toward society that oppressed him all his life, and during his last years he suffered from a “persecution mania” that was definitely psychopathic. He quarreled constantly, even with his best friends and benefactors. His first literary success came in 1749 with a prize for an essay on the effects of the progress of civilization upon morals. Rousseau maintained that civilization made men worse rather than better. When published in 1750, his essay took France by storm and started a “back to nature” fad that swept through the upper classes. Queen Marie Antoinette had her fun milking cows occasionally, but Voltaire declared sarcastically that Rousseau’s essay made him wish to “crawl on all fours.” Rousseau’s reputation was increased by further essays on *The Origin of Inequality* (1754) and *The Social Contract* (1762). More widely popular was his novel, *Julia, or the New Heloïse* (1761), the pathetic love story of a Swiss tutor and his employer’s daughter who could not marry because of their social inequality. A second novel, *Emile* (1762), criticized the old classical education and urged that children be trained “according to nature.” The last, and perhaps the most popular, of Rousseau’s writings was the *Confessions*, published after his death. Though certainly to be numbered among the *philosophes*, Rousseau differed from the others in countless ways, criticizing the “reason” which they idolized, defending the sentimentality which they ridiculed, and laying foundations for the romantic movement of the next century.

**Germany**

France and England each had produced famous writers in the days of Louis XIV and continued this brilliant tradition in the eighteenth century, but during these early years Germany had been intellectually dormant. In the two centuries between Luther’s death and the close of the Seven Years’ War (1763) she produced scarcely a writer or thinker who received or deserved serious attention from the European public. This sad state of affairs was no doubt due largely to the commercial revolution following the discovery of America, which bankrupted Germany, and to the Wars of Religion, culminating in the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648), which left her a ruined agricultural country. The first half of the reign of Frederick the Great (1740–1786), however, saw the beginning of an economic and intellectual revival. The universities began to free themselves from the dead hand
of the Protestant scholasticism that had oppressed them ever since
the post-Reformation period, and an intellectual class once more
appeared in Germany. Men read the French and English literature
of the seventeenth century, and they eagerly devoured the French
philosophes, especially Rousseau, and the English deists (see p. 126).
At first this Aufklärung (“Enlightenment”) was largely an importa-
tion from abroad, but after 1763 Germans began adding to the
French and English ideas they had imbibed, and they thus turned the
movement in new directions.

Curiously enough, the writer who played the leading part in
stimulating this intellectual revival was an art critic. Johann Joachim
Winckelmann (1717–1768), the son of a poor cobbler, after obtaining
a university education with great difficulty, was for several years an
obscure schoolteacher. In 1748, however, he found a position in
Dresden, then the art center of Germany, and began talking about
the “noble simplicity and tranquil grandeur” of ancient Greek
sculpture. Seven years later he went to Rome, which then possessed
the world’s finest art museums, and there he passed the remainder
of his life. Unfortunately, Winckelmann had developed his views on
Greek art before he saw any examples of it except a few plaster
casts in a shed at Dresden, and he learned more about the Greeks
from their literature—Homer, Sophocles, and the historians—than he
did from their art. Nevertheless, his History of Ancient Art (1764)
made his name famous throughout Europe. To be understood cor-
rectly, Winckelmann’s writings must be regarded as criticisms of
the flamboyant baroque art that had dominated Germany and Europe
for so long (see Vol. One, p. 801). He preferred more simple and
restrained forms and, after the manner of Rousseau, he preached a
“return to nature,” except that he said “return to Greece” instead.
His writing met a sympathetic response from Germans who associated
baroque art—and the Latin tradition generally—with French im-
perialism and Louis XIV. Under Winckelmann’s influence later Ger-
mans dreamed up a cultural ideal which they believed had been
realized in ancient Greece and which they presented to their fellow
countrymen for emulation. Some Germans came to consider them-
selves the Greeks of the modern world.

The first of Winckelmann’s influential disciples, and the first Ger-
man literary man of this period to receive wide acclaim, was the
dramatist Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–1781). The son of a
Lutheran pastor, he received an excellent education at Leipzig, read
widely in French and English literature, and first attracted attention with *Laokoon* (1766), a work on art in the spirit of Winckelmann. (For reasons which modern critics cannot fathom, Winckelmann selected the Laocoön group [see Vol. One, p. 145], with its tortured writhings, as the finest example of the “noble simplicity and tranquil grandeur” of Greek art.) A year later Lessing presented his first great play, a comedy entitled *Minna von Barnhelm* (1767), in which he depicted contemporary German life vividly and pleasantly. For several years thereafter he was librarian of a ducal castle at Wolfenbüttel, where he published part of a deistic work by a minor German scholar. The fragment aroused such scandal that church authorities forbade him to publish more, to which Lessing replied with *Nathan der Weise* (1779). This, the greatest of his plays, is an eloquent plea for religious toleration. The action supposedly took place at Jerusalem in the days of the Crusades, with its three leading characters being the Jew Nathan, the Moslem leader Saladin, and a Christian Knight Templar. These men came to respect and honor one another, and they learned that at bottom their three diverse religions are one and the same. When a surprised Christian monk exclaims, at the play’s climax, that the Jew’s good deeds are worthy of a Christian, Nathan replies, “What makes you a good Christian makes me a good Jew.” It is not hard to understand why German theaters were forbidden to produce this play under Hitler’s Third Reich.

Another of Germany’s new intellectual leaders was Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744–1803). He too was the son of a Lutheran pastor, born and raised in East Prussia. After completing his university course at Königsberg he served a few years as pastor of a German church in Riga (then held by Russia), traveled rather widely and read deeply in Rousseau, Winckelmann, Lessing, and the English deists. While his years in Russia had given him an outsider’s view of German culture, his reading turned him against the classic Latin tradition. He became a great admirer of Shakespeare, whose turbulent enthusiasm delighted this rebel against classicism. By encouraging young Germans to throw aside the restraints of classicism and “be themselves,” Herder became leader of a literary movement called *Sturm und Drang* (“Storm and Stress”) which discovered the beauties of primitive “folk poetry,” made heroes of strong men, especially robbers and pirates, and prepared the way for the romantics of the early nineteenth century.
These same years saw the first and most brilliant writing of the greatest of German poets, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832). He was born at Frankfort, the son of a well-to-do lawyer, studied law at Leipzig, and later was a student at Strasbourg, a thoroughly German city in those days though ruled from Paris. Here he met Herder and published his first drama, Götz von Berlichingen (1773), in which he idealized a robber baron. This play is often taken as the beginning of Sturm und Drang. Goethe’s next work was
a sentimental novel, *Die Leiden des jungen Werthers* ("Young Werther's Sorrows," 1774), written in the style of Richardson's *Pamela* and Rousseau's *New Heloïse*. It dealt with the love affair and soul struggles of a sensitive young man who liked to read Homer and who finally committed suicide. Though criticized today for being unduly "mushy," *Werther* was widely read throughout Europe in the late eighteenth century. However, Goethe wrote in this style no more. He presently fell under the influence of Winckelmann and came to share that scholar's admiration for Greek classicism. A trip to Italy in 1786-1788 strengthened these views and led Goethe to break with the *Sturm und Drang* movement. His classic drama, *Iphigenie auf Tauris* (1787), marked a new stage in his development and in the literary history of Germany. Even in these years Goethe was also at work on the greatest of his dramas, *Faust*. Though the play was not published until 1808, an early form, now called the *Ur-Faust*, was completed before the Italian journey.

A few words must also be said of Duke Charles Augustus (1757-1828) of Saxe-Weimar, and his brilliant court. Being interested in literary and cultural matters, this young man made his court the intellectual center of Germany. After 1775 Goethe resided there, and Herder after 1776. They were followed by others, and during the next few years these men created the German literature of the golden age. Because of its reputation for intellectual liberty and culture, the reformers of 1919 chose Weimar as the capital of their ill-starred German Republic.
7. SCIENCE AND RELIGION

The eighteenth century took great interest in natural science. Voltaire had witnessed the burial of Sir Isaac Newton in Westminster Abbey (1727), and in later years he did much to popularize Newton's ideas in France. Montesquieu and Diderot published papers on scientific subjects; d'Alembert was a noted physicist as well as a mathematician; and even Rousseau dabbled for a while in chemistry. Eminent scientists contributed to the Encyclopédie, striving to write in a style that everyone could understand. In fact, the philosophes made enthusiasm for natural science a characteristic feature of the intellectual life of the century. But "science," as these men understood it, was not exactly what we would consider science today. Let us see what their "science" was like.

The seventeenth century had been the heroic age of natural science, when a relatively small number of men of genius accomplished a major revolution in scientific thinking. As was seen in an earlier chapter (Vol. One, pp. 791-793), they overthrew the authority of Aristotle, who for centuries had kept scientific research in a strait jacket, and such writers as Francis Bacon laid down the rules of the experimental method. The mathematics necessary for scientific research was provided by the discovery of analytical geometry, calculus, and logarithms. Observation and measurement were aided by newly invented tools, among which were the telescope and microscope, the thermometer, the barometer, the air pump, and the pendulum clock. In this great century Kepler and Galileo completed the work of Copernicus by firmly establishing the sun as the center of the solar system. Harvey discovered the circulation of the blood (1628); Pascal and Boyle made important discoveries regarding the expansion of gases; Boyle discredited many ancient theories in his
book, *The Sceptical Chemist* (1661); with the aid of his microscope, Leeuwenhoek observed bacteria (1665); and in 1668 Francesco Redi disproved the ancient legend of the “spontaneous generation” of tiny insects, and Halley made important studies of comets, notably of the one which still bears his name.

The greatest of the seventeenth-century scientists, and one of the greatest scientists of all time, was Sir Isaac Newton (1642–1727). Newton was a mathematician of genius who, when still in his early twenties, invented the branch of mathematics that is called calculus.
In these early years he also conducted experiments in optics, studied the spectrum, and devised a new theory regarding the nature of light. His fame is primarily due, however, to his formulation of the "law of gravitation" in his book *Principia* ("Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy," 1687). We cannot say how much truth lies in the legend that his attention was first directed to gravitation by seeing an apple fall from a tree—Voltaire, who fathered the story, claimed to have learned it from Newton's niece—but we know that within two years of his graduation from Cambridge he had worked out his fundamental ideas on the subject, as well as inventing calculus! He did not publish his theories, however, until the *Principia* appeared twenty years later. In this book he made his famous statement that "every particle of matter in the universe attracts every other particle, proportionately to the product of their masses divided by the square of their distances." Profiting by the researches of Galileo and many others, he also formulated the three fundamental "laws" that govern the motion of all bodies.

Newton's achievements completed a revolution in the way educated men pictured the universe. In the Middle Ages men had accepted the "Ptolemaic" astronomy (so named after a Greek astronomer of the second century after Christ, see Vol. One, pp. 225, 558), which pictured the earth as a sphere at the center of the universe, with nine transparent spherical shells, one inside the other, revolving around it. The moon, planets, sun, and stars were fixed in these nine spheres, and outside the ninth, in which the stars were fixed, lay heaven or the "empyrean." Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, and their colleagues put an end to this antique fantasy. The nine enclosing spheres were abolished, and men came to think of space as stretching out infinitely in every direction. The stars were suns moving about in this space; around our sun—and presumably around the others—revolved planets, one of which was the earth; and around the planets moved satellites such as our moon. All these bodies moved strictly in accordance with the laws of motion and, thanks to Newton, it was possible to plot their courses as accurately as those of pool balls on a table. Since the tiniest grain of sand was as completely subject to law as the planets themselves, the whole universe took on the form of a huge machine operating under the Newtonian laws of matter and motion. This philosophical concept was Newton's greatest achievement.
The eighteenth century can show no such galaxy of geniuses as the seventeenth, yet steady progress was still made in the various sciences. The learned societies, or "academies," of the day were an important factor in this advancement of scientific knowledge. It had long been the custom for learned men and scientists to assemble informally for the purpose of discussing matters of common interest, and in Renaissance Italy societies of such men had sometimes been given official standing as well as financial subsidies by local governments. In the seventeenth century similar societies appeared in northern Europe, the two most important being the Royal Society of London, chartered by Charles II in 1662, and the French Academy of Sciences, founded four years later by Colbert. In the eighteenth century similar societies appeared in the lesser capitals of Europe and even in provincial cities. Benjamin Franklin founded the American Philosophical Society in 1743, and before 1800 sixty-four Americans (Franklin among them) had been elected "fellows" of the Royal Society of London. The members of these societies met regularly to discuss scientific subjects, they invited correspondence from associates in foreign countries, they sent out exploring expeditions (such as Captain Cook's), they financed scientific experiments, and they published papers of scientific interest.

At the same time wealthy men and governments each were spending large sums of money in maintaining botanical gardens and in gathering curious specimens for museums. Explorers brought strange plants and animals from the new world and told of the strange customs and ideas of other peoples. Countless persons busied themselves with experiments or collected scientific information which they imparted to others. Thus Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790), who shared most of the enthusiasms of his day, performed many scientific experiments, including the famous one with a kite by which he identified lightning with electricity (1752). Most eighteenth-century experimenters were not very practical-minded, usually stopping short when they had satisfied their scientific curiosity, but Franklin quickly put his new knowledge to use by inventing the lightning rod.

This widespread interest in natural science led to the accumulation of much information about hitherto unknown aspects of nature. The first task of the scientists was to arrange and classify this new information and, more especially, to devise suitable systems for classifying it. Though such labors require great care and patience, and ordinarily
do not lead directly to spectacular new discoveries or to brilliant generalizations, they are absolutely essential to the progress of science. Thus the leading botanist of the eighteenth century, the Swedish Linnaeus (1707–1778), merely classified plants and invented the method still used for naming genera and species, but

his work made possible the generalizations made by Darwin in the next century. In the field of chemistry the rather haphazard researches of Henry Cavendish (1731–1810) and Joseph Priestley (1733–1804) led to the discovery of hydrogen by the former (1766) and oxygen by the latter (1774), while the Frenchman Lavoisier (1743–1794) conceived the idea of elements which forms the basis of modern chemistry. Similarly James Hutton (1726–1797) prepared the way for modern geology by assembling the work of many predecessors in his *Theory of the Earth* (1785).
Such was the science which inspired the French philosophes. Though they talked and wrote about science frequently, they really knew very little about it, and as they were interested in theory rather than fact, they frequently rushed in where angels feared to tread, proclaiming broad generalizations with little to back them up. The Frenchman Buffon (1707–1788) considered himself a scientist, as did his friends among the philosophes, but other scientists did not so honor him. For many years he was director of the king’s botanical garden in Paris, yet his enormous Natural History set forth the generalizations of a rationalist rather than the observations of a scientist. He spoke deprecatingly of Linnaeus because he merely described and classified, but the real scientists of the day dismissed Buffon’s book as a “romance.”

The philosophes’ fondness for rationalizing and for broad general laws made Newton their favorite among scientists. They were much impressed by his formulation of the law of gravitation, which in two lines describes a force operating throughout the universe. This “law,” and Newton’s other “laws,” seemed to explain everything. As Alexander Pope declared:

Nature and Nature’s laws lay hid in night:  
God said, Let Newton be! and all was light.

Newton thus became a bridge between the fact-finding scientists of the seventeenth century and the rationalistic philosophes of the eighteenth, and enabled the latter to think that they too were scientists. Overawed by Newton’s laws and the mechanistic nature of the Newtonian universe, a French physician named La Mettrie (1709–1751) published a book with the revealing title L’Homme machine (“Man a Machine,” 1749), but he was one of the few important philosophes who can justly be called a materialistic atheist. Countless other writers, however, used Newtonianism to attack religion—though Newton was himself a most religious man, writing popular tracts and wasting his superb intellect in vainly expounding the Biblical prophecies.

Newton was equally helpful to political theorists. In fact, the universe as conceived by Newton and his followers presents a striking resemblance to the well-governed state as conceived by the Whigs of that day. Newton was an ardent Whig in politics, an intimate friend of John Locke, in trouble with James II, a member of the Convention Parliament that proclaimed William and Mary rulers
of England, and under William III he received his reward as director of the mint. The Whigs could point to Newton’s universe, acting under eternal and unchanging laws rather than royal or divine caprice, as the model from which they deduced their theories regarding political government under law. It might even be said that the whole Newtonian universe was a Whig universe.

RELIGION IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The eighteenth century was a crucial one in the history of the Christian churches, both Catholic and Protestant. The fires of fanaticism kindled by Luther, Calvin, the Jesuits, and their followers had largely burned themselves out during the Thirty Years’ War and the Puritan Revolution, and a more tolerant spirit gradually spread over Europe. The furor centering around Titus Oates in England and the dragonnades that accompanied the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in France (see pp. 27 and 28) were among the last bloody examples of Reformation bigotry. Moreover, as the censorship laws came to be relaxed or evaded, writers began to criticize the churches and their teachings, and for the first time in a dozen centuries they dared openly question the fundamental doctrines of Christianity. Conservative churchmen might wring their hands, deplore the new freedom, and sorrowfully complain that Christianity was being allowed to collapse, but more stalwart persons rose to the challenge and effected reforms in the churches that were as profound as those dating from the Protestant Reformation. The eighteenth century was creative as well as critical in religion, and today all churches and all schools of theology, liberal or conservative, “fundamentalist” or “modernist,” are far more deeply indebted to the thinkers of the eighteenth century than they are to those of the sixteenth.

The Catholic Church did not play an aggressive role in the eighteenth century. It was not led by outstanding popes, and as a political institution it exercised less power than at any period since Pope Gregory VII (1073–1085, see Vol. One, p. 437). The princes of all Catholic countries favored “Gallicanism,” which insisted upon the local “liberties” of the churches in each country. When carried to extremes, Gallicanism resulted in “Josephism”—so called from Joseph I of Austria (see p. 85)—by which the church became little more than a department of the secular government. Gallican ideas also brought about a widespread demand for the abolition of the
Jesuit order. Jesuit schools had long been recognized as the best in Europe; Jesuit missionaries were still active among the heathen. But the order had won an evil reputation by its persecution of Jansenists and other heretics, and it was opposed by Gallicans because its members were the most active and effective advocates of a strong papacy. After several Catholic kings had expelled the Jesuits from their domains, Pope Clement XIV (1769–1774) was prevailed upon to abolish the order in 1773. Catholic kings zealously enforced this decree, but the Jesuits themselves refused to disband—even though each of them had taken a special oath to obey the pope in every particular. Many took refuge in Protestant Prussia or Orthodox Russia, where they were protected until another pope re-established the order in 1814.

Conditions in England were rather different. Here men had enjoyed a wide degree of religious toleration ever since the Revolution of 1688. Roman Catholics were unpopular, and Whig politicians of the lower sort occasionally used them to frighten voters, but Catholics were rare in England, and though they were specifically excluded from the protection of the Toleration Act they were rarely bothered. On the other hand, the numerous Dissenters (Protestants not members of the Anglican Church) enjoyed legal toleration, though they might suffer a little from social discrimination, and when they prospered economically, they often found it convenient to embrace Anglicanism.

The Anglican Church itself was split into two factions, High Church and Low Church. The High Church party scrupulously retained traditional theology and ritual in religion and Tory opinions in politics, but even “higher” than they were the “Nonjurors,” who forsook the Anglican Church altogether. They refused to swear obedience to William III, and they were even more displeased than the Tories with the Hanoverian kings and the Whig religion. They remained stanchly loyal to the divine right of kings and the “Anglo-Catholicism” of Archbishop Laud and Charles I. Though never numerous, these Nonjurors influenced the subsequent religious history of England out of all proportion to their numbers. Their leader was the scholarly and saintly William Law (1686–1761), whose Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life (1728) became widely known.

The Low Churchmen undertook to steer a middle course between Catholics, Nonjurors, and High Churchmen on the one side and Dissenters and “freethinkers” on the other. As they tried to make
their program as broad as possible, they were often called “Latitudinarians.” Their Christianity was reasonable, rational, and scholarly, interested in ethics and good morals rather than theology, tolerant, sensible, not given to “enthusiasm” (fanaticism), and sometimes a little chilly. During the first half of the century Low Churchmen usually dominated the Anglican Church.

The English Dissenters had largely lost the “enthusiasm” of their Puritan forbears and, like their Low Church contemporaries, they tried to make their religion scholarly and reasonable. The same may be said of the Calvinistic churches in Scotland, Holland, Switzerland, and the New England colonies. Protestant Germany had suffered grievously during the Thirty Years’ War, and throughout the remainder of the seventeenth century its religious life, like its intellectual life, was at a very low ebb. Official Lutheranism fell into a dry scholasticism, with the rationalistic ideas and spirit of Melanchthon prevailing over the living faith of Martin Luther. At the very end of the century, however, a revival of the old spirit appeared in the movement known as “Pietism.” To this we shall return shortly.

The Jews of Europe profited greatly by the toleration of the eighteenth century and were deeply influenced by its rationalism. There were no Jews in Spain and Portugal, few in Italy or France (except in Alsace), and not many in England, but there was a considerable Jewish colony in Holland, large numbers of Jews lived in the German states and Austria, and even larger numbers dwelt in Poland and eastern Europe. As was to be expected, the Jews in eastern Europe were not much affected by Western thought and continued in their old orthodox way of life. German and Dutch Jews, on the other hand, endeavored to adjust themselves to new conditions, following the leadership of Moses Mendelssohn (1729–1786), who was the grandfather of the famous musician and was said to be the model from whom Lessing drew his hero, “Nathan the Wise.” Though trained in the Jewish philosophy of the Middle Ages, Mendelssohn carefully studied the writings of John Locke and Alexander Pope, and he made it his mission in life to release his people intellectually as well as physically from the narrowness of the medieval ghetto. He saw no reason why they should not be good Germans and good Jews at the same time. He tried to make Germans see the good qualities of the Jews, in which he had only a limited success, but his greatest achievement was making Jewish intellectuals feel at home in the new world in which they lived. Some of his
children married Christians, and some of his descendants (including the composer) became Christians themselves. As the founder of modern Judaism, Moses Mendelssohn is sometimes called “the third Moses”—third, that is, after the first lawgiver and the medieval Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides (1135–1204, see Vol. One, p. 539).

Deism

The relative freedom of the eighteenth century permitted a critical discussion of religion, and writers began to question traditional church doctrines. A part of their criticism is to be explained by the unwise efforts of ecclesiastical leaders and politicians in the preceding century to enforce theological uniformity and orthodoxy. One of the earliest outspoken critics of orthodox theology was Pierre Bayle, whose conversion to Catholicism and reconversion to Protestantism had, as we have seen, left him a thoroughgoing skeptic. Several leaders of English thought went through the same experience with similar results. More typical of the day—and more disturbing to traditional religion—was the fictitious “Vicar of Bray.” The hero, or villain, of this anonymous ballad had been a High Churchman in the days of Charles II. He turned to Catholicism under James II (only the Revolution of 1688 kept him from joining the Jesuits), swore allegiance to William III, was a Tory under Anne, and became a Whig and a Latitudinarian with George I, all because he was determined “That whatsoever king shall reign, Still I’ll be the Vicar of Bray, sir!” As countless Angelican clergymen differed from the vicar of this amusing satire only in degree, it is not surprising that their parishioners sometimes found it hard to accept their day-by-day pronouncements as eternal verities.

Critics of the church sometimes drew ammunition from the writings of seventeenth-century scientists and historians, but more commonly they appealed to the rationalistic spirit of their day, insisting that re-

1 Even in England, liberty of the press was only relative, and modern writers sometimes express surprise that it was not mentioned in the Bill of Rights of 1689. After 1695 it was no longer necessary to have a book licensed before publication, but writers might be punished afterward for libel or under the Blasphemy Act of 1698. Thus Defoe was imprisoned on the former charge in 1704, and under the latter act Thomas Woolston, a deist and a former fellow of Sidney College, Cambridge, was fined and sent to prison (where he died) for questioning the resurrection of Christ (1729). The editor and printer of a paper called The Freethinker were imprisoned under the Blasphemy Act in 1883, this being the last important case of the sort in England.
ligion be made sensible and rational. They attacked the doctrine of the Trinity, declaring it irrational; prophecy and the alleged inerrancy of the Scriptures likewise fell under their censure; miracles caused prolonged and acrimonious discussion; men questioned special revelation and Christianity’s claim to be the only true religion; they affirmed that God revealed himself through the wonders of nature as disclosed by Newton rather than the Bible; and they contrasted Christianity with a “pure” and universal religion which supposedly underlay the beliefs of all mankind. Latitudinarians and Dissenters sometimes went far along these same lines. They too proclaimed the sovereignty of reason; they sometimes approached Unitarianism in their theology, denying the Trinity and the divinity of Christ; they rejected post-Biblical miracles, they talked about the Religion of Nature, but they retained revelation and the Bible. Though Newton and Locke accepted a Unitarian view of God (as had Milton before them), both were devout men and Locke published a large book with the significant title *The Reasonableness of Christianity as delivered in the Scriptures* (1695). Alexander Pope addressed his “Universal Prayer” to the

Father of all: in every age,
   In every clime adored,
By saint, by savage, and by sage,
   Jehovah, Jove, or Lord!

And the pious Joseph Addison’s well-known “Hymn,” speaking of “the spacious firmament on high,” the heavens, the stars, and all the other marvels of nature, proclaimed that

   In Reason’s ear they all rejoice,
And utter forth a glorious voice:
   Forever singing as they shine,
   “The Hand that made us is divine!”

These writers remained in the church and defended Christianity as a revealed religion, but others, denying revelation and the special truth of Christianity, withdrew from the church and were called “deists.” This epithet, derived from the Latin *deus*, “god,” was applied to them because they insisted that they believed in a God who was Creator of the universe. They also believed in immortality, with a future state of rewards and punishments, they laid great emphasis upon ethics, and some even claimed Jesus as a deist. They were quite sure that they could prove all their beliefs by pure unaided reason,
but as they could see no need for public worship, they organized no churches.

Deism was not new in the eighteenth century. The deistic proofs of God and immortality, developed in antiquity by Plato and the Stoics, had been repeated in the Middle Ages by such scholastic philosophers as Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) and had been revived in the seventeenth century by Lord Herbert of Cherbury (1583–1648) and many others. The importance of the deists lay less in their positive constructions than in their criticisms of traditional theology. The names of a few deists and the titles of a few of their books may be listed, however, to indicate the main direction of their thinking: Charles Blount, *The Oracles of Reason* (1693); John Toland, *Christianity Not Mysterious* (1696); Anthony Collins, *Priestcraft in Perfection* (1710) and *A Discourse of Freethinking* (1713); Matthew Tindal, *Christianity as Old as Creation; or, the Gospel a Republication of the Religion of Nature* (1730); and Thomas Chubb, *The True Gospel of Jesus Christ* (1738). The philosopher David Hume (1711–1776) held many ideas shared by the deists, but with remarkable thoroughness he carried them to their logical conclusions and thereby became a skeptic, doubting even deism itself. Deism led to skepticism, and skepticism was the end of deism.

The deists made a great stir in England during the first half of the eighteenth century, and from England their ideas spread to the continent. Voltaire and most of the encyclopédistes considered themselves deists; they spread the new theology to all parts of Europe; German thinkers were deeply impressed; and even in America such important persons as Franklin and Jefferson were attracted by deistic thought. But after the middle of the century there were no new deists of importance. By that time the deists had said what they had to say.

Defenders of Christianity dealt with the deists in various ways. William Law protested that reason alone was not able to answer the questions and problems they raised. Others invoked history to show that the universal religion of humanity, of which the deists spoke so glibly, had never existed except in the imaginations of the deists. Still others tried to improve upon the deists’ own rational arguments. The most successful of the latter group was Joseph Butler (1692–1752), bishop of Durham, whose famous *Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed* (1736) argued that revealed religion harmonized with the facts of nature as well as natural religion did. Butler was thoroughly familiar with the deist arguments, he always handled them fairly, and
he put forward his own arguments quite diffidently—which, of course, added greatly to his effectiveness. Being a man of gloomy tempera-
tment, Butler thought that he was fighting a hopeless battle, and when offered the archbishopric of Canterbury he declined, saying that “it was too late for him to try to support a falling Church.” Nevertheless, his book became a theological classic, widely read for the next hundred years. But the most effective answer to deism came from the “evangelical” movement in the Anglican Church and from John Wesley, the founder of Methodism.

Pietists and Methodists

We have already noted the moribund scholasticism of the German Protestant churches in the seventeenth century. Many devout Germans deplored this situation, which they sought to remedy, but reform came only at the end of the century when Philipp Jakob Spener (1635–1705) launched the movement known as “Pietism.” Having little interest in dogmatic theology, Spener, like Luther before him, asserted that Christianity is a matter of the heart rather than of the intellect, and in his preaching and writing he urged personal piety, Bible reading, hymn singing, works of charity, and missionary activity at home and among the heathen. To train men in this kind of piety, he and his associates founded a new university at Halle in 1694, and during his last years he was highly regarded by the Prussian court at Berlin.

Spener’s work was continued by his godson, Count Nicolaus von Zinzendorf (1700–1760). At this time the Moravian Brethren, descended from radical Hussites of the fifteenth century (see Vol. One, p. 621), were being driven from their homes in Bohemia by the Emperor Charles VI, and Zinzendorf allowed a group of them to settle on his estate at Herrnhut in Saxony (1722). From this center he and they conducted an active missionary campaign which leavened the whole Lutheran Church. Presently Zinzendorf began sending Moravian colonists to America, at first to Georgia and North Carolina, and in 1741 he personally founded their main settlement at Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.

Meantime John Wesley (1703–1791) had begun spreading similar ideas in England, preparing the way for the “Evangelical Revival” that came in the second half of the century. The son of a High Church clergyman, Wesley had studied at Oxford, where he made a brilliant
record as a scholar and joined a group of devout students called "Methodists" because of their methodically austere lives. After visiting William Law, whom he admired greatly, Wesley decided to become a missionary to the Indians. His stay in Georgia was not long (1735–1738), but it was highly important, for on the ship to America he met a group of Moravian Brethren. Their calmness during a storm impressed him deeply. After his return to England he opened a correspondence with Zinzendorf and he occasionally attended a Moravian chapel in London. Here one evening he underwent the psychological experience known as "conversion" (1738).

Until this time Wesley had not been very sure of himself, but now his course was settled. He began preaching pietistic doctrines in England, and it has been calculated that during the next forty years he traveled 225,000 miles on horseback and delivered almost forty thousand sermons. When the Anglican clergy, resenting his enthusiasm and his unconventional ways, refused to let him preach in their churches, he began preaching in the fields, sometimes addressing thousands of persons in one day. His followers, who were drawn mostly from the humbler classes, had derived little help from the dry and rationalistic sermons of the Anglican clergy, but Wesley gave them living hope. Though he had no desire to withdraw from the Anglican Church, and always considered himself a clergyman of that body, circumstances forced many of his followers to secede. Those who left organized the Methodist Church, while those who remained Anglicans were called "Evangelicals." In the second half of the century the Evangelicals became the most important faction in the Church of England. Wesley's primary interest lay in saving men's souls by awakening their trust and confidence in God,
which enabled him to brush aside all theological difficulties. Though he had no doubts about theology himself, he declared himself willing to accept as a Christian anyone willing to follow the leadership of Jesus. He and his associates also participated actively in such humanitarian crusades as the one for abolishing the slave trade.

John Wesley was greatly aided by his brother Charles (1708–1788) and by George Whitefield (1714–1770). Whitefield was a powerful speaker but more given than Wesley to dramatic and revivalistic methods. When in America, however, he preached money out of the pocket of so cold-blooded an observer as Benjamin Franklin. Charles Wesley, on the other hand, was the hymn writer of Methodism. He wrote about 6500 hymns, many of which are still popular: "Hark! the herald angels sing," "Jesus, Lover of my soul," "Come, thou almighty King," "Love divine, all loves excelling," and others.

At about the same time a similar movement, called the "Great Awakening," was sweeping England's American colonies. Though Whitefield, Asbury, and other English Methodists took an active part in it, the Awakening was fundamentally American, and it showed its characteristic features best in frontier areas, where rather primitive conditions still prevailed and where the techniques of highly emotional "revivalism" were easily employed. The more settled and dignified regions along the coast were not spared, however, and one conspicuous leader in the Awakening was the highly intellectual Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758), sometimes recognized as the profoundest theologian America has ever produced. Raised a strict Calvinist, Edwards read the works of Locke and Newton while a student at Yale. In these writings he discovered new proofs of the Calvinist doctrines of predestination and man's helplessness before God, but from them he also learned to study religious phenomena scientifically. During the Great Awakening he made careful observations of the phenomena of "conversion," and afterward he published books on the psychology of religion, pioneering in that important field of study. Later generations, dismayed by his Calvinistic austerity, came to associate Edwards primarily with a sermon entitled "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God," but this shocker was by no means typical of his preaching. He ordinarily had more to say about the love of God than he did about the fires of hell. He also wrote closely reasoned books on theology. A few months after becoming president of Princeton he died as a result of an experimental inoculation against smallpox.
Rousseau's “Civil Religion”

There was little evangelical activity in eighteenth-century France, but Rousseau expounded ideas regarding religion which vaguely resembled those of the Evangelicals and which eventually bore rich fruit in Catholic France. His novel *Émile* contained a long passage known as the “Confession of Faith of a Vicar of Savoy.” Though much of the vicar’s theology was mere deism sugared with sentimentality, he finally came to the conclusion that men believe in God because they feel him in their hearts and because they want to believe in him. Copies of *Émile* were publicly burned by the authorities, both in Catholic France and in Calvinist Geneva, but Spener and Wesley might have found passages in it of which they could approve. Rousseau also dreamed of a “Civil Religion,” which he described in the concluding chapter of his *Social Contract*. Here he argued, after the manner of Calvin and others, that religion, by maintaining morality, becomes the surest foundation of a state. Governments should require all their subjects to accept a minimum of theology, including belief in God, immortality, and future rewards and punishments. Those unwilling to accept this minimum of belief should be exiled, but except for these few essential doctrines there should be complete freedom of belief or nonbelief. Thus Rousseau did not surrender completely to Voltaire’s *infâme* after all.

The German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) brought the religious and theological thinking of the eighteenth century to a close, completing the work of both deists and pietists, stating their ideas abstractly and drawing the ultimate conclusions from each. Kant was born, lived, and died in the East Prussian garrison and university town of Königsberg. He was a methodical, austere, high-minded man, raised in a strongly pietistic household, believing in liberty, having cosmopolitan sympathies, and dreaming of how world peace might be achieved by a federation of Europe. As a young man he wrote on scientific subjects, such as the origin of the solar system, and taught conventional philosophy at the university. According to his own story, Hume roused him from his “dogmatic slumbers,” and a few years later Rousseau exercised an even deeper influence upon his thinking.

Among Kant’s many large and formidable books, three stand out as especially important: *The Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), *The Metaphysic of Ethics* (1785), and *The Critique of Practical Reason* (1788). In the first, which is usually considered his weightiest work, Kant rigorously attacked the problem, What can man know? We need not summarize his elaborate arguments here, but we may remark that,
among other things, he annihilated the deistic arguments for God, freedom of the will, and immortality. In the second work he discussed reasons why men should lead moral lives. He was quite contemptuous of those who taught, "Be good and you will be happy, either in this world or the next," and he insisted that truly moral action must always be disinterested. Then why should one act morally? In answer-

![Immanuel Kant](image)

ing this question, Kant invoked what he called the "categorical imperative," given by Reason herself. His statement of this command—"act as if the principle underlying your action were, by your will, to become a universal law of nature"—was actually a rationalized version of the golden rule of the Gospels. The third of his great books
argued that, though we cannot rationally prove God, freedom, and immortality, they are necessary for a moral life, and that men must therefore believe in them. With the aid of Rousseau, Kant thus returned to the views of his pietistic youth.

In the mid-nineteenth century the German poet and satirist Heinrich Heine occasionally permitted himself a little fun at Kant’s expense, soberly telling how the burghers of Königsberg used to set their watches by him as he took his daily walk, and how he wrote the *Practical Reason* to comfort his manservant, whom he once caught weeping because his master had robbed him of God, freedom, and immortality. On another occasion Heine remarked: “The French may brag about sending Louis XVI to the guillotine, but our Immanuel Kant led the eternal God Himself to the scaffold!” This parallel between Kant and the revolutionists was not pure fantasy, but the satirist should have added that Kant, like the French revolutionists and the English of 1660, presently found it desirable, for purely practical reasons, to restore the abolished monarchy. He might also have commented that the deity whom Kant restored resembled the one whom he had led to the scaffold no more than William III resembled James II.
8. THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

While religion was a matter of deep concern to most thoughtful people in the eighteenth century, it was by no means their only preoccupation. Everywhere in Europe men were living in a rapidly changing world, to which they had to adjust themselves and their social institutions. They therefore took an active interest in various aspects of social life, studying them rationally, criticizing them severely, and devising all manner of new theories regarding them. As their criticism and their proposed reconstructions of society required great liberty of thought and expression, many Europeans were dazzled by the liberty enjoyed by the English after 1688, and the resulting “Anglomania” popularized English thinking in other fields than religion and theology. But Anglomania was by no means the whole story.

The discoveries of Columbus and his successors had deeply influenced the thinking of the physical scientists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but students of society scarcely felt the impact of the New World before 1700. Then travel books suddenly became popular, romancers liked to locate their stories in remote lands, and Europe developed a taste for the exotic. Men began to take a lively interest in non-European peoples, their institutions, and their ideas, no longer regarding them simply as heathen. Enthusiastic missionaries often pictured them as fine fellows whom a little more help would make into good Christians. Satirists, on the other hand, began to use fictitious foreigners as mouthpieces expressing their own criticisms of European society, as in Montesquieu’s *Persian Letters*, or more obliquely in Swift’s *Gulliver’s Travels*. Others idealized “the noble Red Man”—which was comparatively easy for a Rousseau, who stood in no immediate danger of being scalped by one of them—while still others discovered that there are many ways of doing things, and
that the contemporary European way was not necessarily the best. Thus the deists praised the "natural religion" of savages—of which they knew nothing—while other writers found primitive social institutions equally attractive. The eighteenth century came to love the primitive as much as it did the exotic, and writers eloquently contrasted their own supposedly effete civilization with the alleged virtues of remote and primitive peoples.

The achievements of the natural scientists exercised an equally powerful influence over eighteenth-century thought on social matters. Some men gathered and published factual information about foreign peoples, especially the Chinese and the Persians, while other more ambitious writers tried to make a "scientific" study of society in general by formulating general laws, comparable to Newton's, that would explain how it operates. An Italian philosopher, Giovanni Vico (1668-1744), published his Scienza Nuova (in full, "Principles of a New Science concerning the Nature of Nations") in 1725. Trained as a jurist and being a close student of Bacon, Vico saw many parallels between the development of the law and other aspects of social life. These phenomena convinced him that a society or "nation" is a closely knit organism, no part of which is independent of the others, and that it goes through an inevitable process of growth and decline. Vico believed that society, like the solar system, could and should be made the object of scientific study. His "new science," which was to be a combination of history and social psychology, was the beginning of modern sociology.

A second, and more important, founder of modern social science was Montesquieu, the full title of whose famous book was "The Spirit of the Laws, or the relations which laws should have with the constitution, customs, climate, religion, and commerce of a country." The opening sentence of this book declared that "Laws, in the widest sense of the term, express the necessary relations which spring from the nature of things, and, taken in this sense, every being has its laws: the Deity is subject to His laws, the material world to its laws, intelligences superior to men have their laws, beasts have theirs, and man has his laws." The remainder of the book is devoted to an attempt to explain society and human conduct, saying, "Many things determine the conduct of men: climate, religion, laws and maxims of government, the memory of past events, customs, and manners." Different conditions call forth different forms of social organization and government, different customs, different virtues and vices, different
ideas, and the whole matter is an appropriate subject for scientific study. Vico was not widely read in the eighteenth century, but in the second half of the century Montesquieu’s influence was unsurpassed.

**Political Theory**

One evening the hero of Voltaire’s novel *Candide* dined with six strangers, each of whom, it presently appeared, had once been a mighty king, ruling by divine right, but each had been dethroned by the violence of men and now lived in penury. Voltaire played a few tricks on history when he brought these six ex-kings together, but they all had been real kings and their meeting in Venice might almost have taken place. This tale had its moral. Most of the educated people in Europe had laughed over Candide’s lugubrious banquet and, no matter what they may have said on formal occasions, those who enjoyed the story so hugely can hardly have believed sincerely in the divine right of kings. As a matter of fact, the kings themselves were no longer very sure of their God-given right to rule. The English sovereigns knew perfectly well that they owed their exalted position to parliament, Frederick justified his activities by calling himself the first servant of the state, and other kings relied upon other formulas. No one in the eighteenth century took the traditional doctrine of the divine right of kings very seriously, and writers on political theory spent their time concocting new justifications of monarchy or devising new forms of government.

Montesquieu was the most intelligent and the most scientific of such writers, and his views about government were thoroughly relativistic. He denied that any one form of government was best for all countries and all peoples. A republic functions well in a small country, he declared, and a monarchy in a medium-sized one, but despotisms are necessary in large countries. Republics owe their success to the virtue (patriotism and public spirit) of their citizens, monarchies owe theirs to the honor of their nobility, but despotisms must rely upon fear among their subjects. Unfortunately, however, citizens of republics sometimes lose their patriotism, thus enabling a few to set themselves up as an aristocracy with one of their number as king, and when aristocrats lose their honor, the king is likely to become a despot. Montesquieu preferred a monarchy, but he feared that the decline of the French aristocracy—to which class he himself belonged—was rapidly changing France into a despotism. More sig-
significant still is the fact that he justified the various forms of government only on the basis of expediency and explained political evolution by natural forces, thereby withdrawing political science from the domain of theology.

A more popular theory than Montesquieu's was that of the social contract. This theory was not new, for it had been used by the English philosopher Hobbes in the defense of royal absolutism (see Vol. One, p. 799) and a few years later John Locke had invoked it to justify the English Revolution of 1688. Jefferson stated it eloquently in the opening paragraph of the Declaration of Independence. Its leading exponent in France was Rousseau, whose Social Contract exercised a tremendous influence during the French Revolution of 1789. Rousseau opened his book with the famous words, “Man was born free, yet everywhere he is in chains,” and he considered himself an out-and-out republican. Nevertheless, his views resembled those of Hobbes rather than those of Locke. In his ideal republic, all men would be “free,” but being free merely meant that they should obey the “general will,” rather than a king, and there was no place in this republic for a minority in opposition to the general will. The general will might easily become more tyrannical than any king. During the French Revolution Rousseau’s followers used his ideas to justify their Reign of Terror, and in our own day he has been called the father of the “democratic” totalitarianism of both Germany and Russia.

Most of the philosophes and their disciples prided themselves on their cosmopolitanism, and the frequent wars of the eighteenth century caused them deep dismay. They therefore turned their attention to devising schemes to prevent war. As early as 1698 William Penn, the Quaker who founded Pennsylvania, had published an Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe, in which he urged an international court of arbitration to settle disputes between nations; twenty years later the Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s Project for Perpetual Peace (1713) suggested that the great powers participate in a league of nations; and others continued the agitation. Rousseau contributed an essay in 1756, and at the very end of the century Kant returned to the idea, especially in his book On Perpetual Peace (1795).

Meantime other writers were attempting to discriminate between aggressive and defensive wars, castigating the former but justifying the latter. Thus Montesquieu was very severe with Charles XII of Sweden, whom he regarded as an aggressor. But how was one to determine whether a given war was aggressive? To answer this ques-
tion, various authors, including Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau, developed the doctrine of "natural frontiers." They held that nature had provided each country with frontiers (oceans, mountain ranges, and rivers) which were easily recognizable on the map: to defend these frontiers was right, to go beyond them wrong. In practice, however, it was not so easy to determine just what the natural frontiers of a country were. Each writer was likely to claim for his country all that it actually held and then point to a "natural" frontier that would give just a little bit more.

Closely allied with the doctrine of natural frontiers was that of nationality, which began to loom large in political thinking during the eighteenth century. In early modern times the kings of western Europe had succeeded in creating "national states" which consisted of peoples of one "nationality"—that is, of one culture or way of life, which could be recognized most easily by language. These kings certainly had not deliberately planned their conquests on the basis of nationality, and ordinarily they had justified them by invoking divine or feudal law. The fortunes of war produced national states with natural frontiers, however, because kings could keep conquered territories that were united by geography and nationality, while sooner or later they lost outlying conquests. The inhabitants of these national states had long been bragging about being Englishmen or Frenchmen or Spaniards, but in the eighteenth century nationality became something more. The theories of Montesquieu and others about the influence of climate, soil, and common traditions upon the history of a people, coupled with the idea of natural frontiers, made it easy for members of each group to believe that, for geographic and historical reasons, they were very different from (and, of course, far superior to) all other men.

In this time of rapid change countless persons had been torn from their cultural moorings, becoming spiritually displaced persons. Having no roots in the soil, so to speak, they no longer felt that they belonged anywhere. In earlier centuries such persons might have been helped by the church (see Vol. One, p. 532), but in spite of Wesley and others the churches were no longer able to fill this function adequately. The national state gradually replaced it, and men took comfort in feeling that they were Englishmen or Frenchmen, just as their ancestors had boasted of being Christians. A "nation" became something more than a state: it was a spiritual group to which all the citizens of a state belonged, of which every man was a part, which
gave him a standing in the world, and to which he rendered a truly religious devotion. Rousseau, who was very much a "displaced person" all his life, became an ardent exponent of this spiritual nationalism, and he is to be ranked among the major prophets in this new religion of nationalism. From him the path leads straight to such twentieth-century exemplars of perfervid nationalism as Hitler and Mussolini.

**Economics**

Throughout the eighteenth century the various governments of Europe remained mercantilistic in economic policy, but they met an ever swelling chorus of complaint. In earlier times, writers had often set forth their views on economic questions, but they admittedly were propagandists, writing in an exhortatory style in favor of, or against, some immediate proposal. In the eighteenth century, on the other hand, the enthusiasm of the *philosophes* for natural law, coupled with the dreams of Vico, Montesquieu, and others about a science of society, suggested a scientific study of the facts of economic life. Many writers on economic questions remained propagandists, differing from their mercantilist predecessors only in the policies they favored and in the catchwords they habitually employed, but others tried to take a more objective view of the economic phenomena of their times, making noteworthy efforts to understand them, and trying to discover the laws under which they operated. These scholars and writers founded the science of economics.

The first school of economists to achieve distinction arose in France. Here the ministers of Louis XV, in their cumbersome way, were continuing the economic policies of Colbert, aiding and regulating industry while neglecting agriculture. As France was largely an agricultural country, many persons—including the wealthy aristocrats—resented these special favors to one small group. Economists then began criticizing the whole idea of government aid to industry and urged economic freedom for everyone. They invented the phrase *laissez faire* ("let do" or, better, "let be," or "let nature take her course") to sum up their policies. They taught that everyone should be allowed to conduct his economic life as he pleased, without aid or interference from the government. Manufacturers as well as rich landowners favored such "free enterprise," and economists of this school came to be called "physiocrats" because they urged that nature (physis in Greek) be allowed to rule (kratein). The founder of the school was a
physician and *encyclopédiste* named François Quesnay (1694–1774), but his disciple Jacques Turgot (1727–1781) was a more influential person. Appointed controller-general of finance in 1774, Turgot immediately undertook important reforms in the new spirit, but by so doing he aroused such opposition at court that he was dismissed within two years. Another *philosophe* of the physiocratic school, a disciple of Quesnay and a collaborator of Turgot, was Pierre-Samuel Dupont de Nemours (1739–1817), who later emigrated to the United States and founded the famous Du Pont family of American industrialists.

Economic conditions in England were quite different. During the long period of Whig supremacy the commercial classes had enjoyed great freedom of action, and such institutions as the guilds had long since ceased to impede industry. England was prosperous economically, and men with money to invest were taking advantage of the relative economic freedom to try all sorts of innovations. Then came George III and his reactionary policies, which called forth criticism by those profiting from *laissez faire*. The most important critic of the new mercantilism was Adam Smith (1723–1790), whose *Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776) is usually honored as the first great classic in modern economic theory. A Scot who for many years was a professor of moral philosophy in the University at Glasgow, Smith dealt with all aspects of economic life in this famous book. Beginning with a description of the division of labor, he progressed through discussions of money, prices, wages, profits, rent of land, and capital, to his criticisms of mercantilism and its policies toward commerce, industry, colonies, and taxation. It is no mere coincidence that the *Wealth of Nations* appeared in the same year as the Declaration of Independence. Smith noted the rapid growth of capitalism and the factory system in his day, and
though as a moralist he did not approve of everything he saw, he strongly supported the desire of this rising class of capitalists for laissez faire or "free enterprise." In the next century Adam Smith was hailed as a major prophet of capitalism, and the Wealth of Nations was its Bible.

Historical Writing

The eighteenth century also witnessed the birth of a new type of historical writing. During the preceding hundred years there had been much scholarly publication. Erudite scholars had compiled huge volumes of historical narrative, usually written in Latin, while others published the materials from which historians could learn the history of earlier times—official documents, letters, contemporary narratives, and the like. Scholars also made great progress in learning how to criticize and evaluate these materials. The history of two great undertakings by seventeenth-century historians will illustrate the progress they were making and show how closely the studies of cloistered historians were associated with the general intellectual life of their times.

The first of these works is the enormous collection of lives of the saints known as the Acta Sanctorum. During the Middle Ages countless fabulous stories had clustered around the major and minor saints of Christendom. These tales may at first have redounded to the glory of God and of their heroes, but presently they were ridiculed by Protestants and skeptics, and in the seventeenth century they began to prove troublesome even to devout Catholics. A Belgian Jesuit named Jean de Bolland (1596–1665) then noted that, while these difficult stories of miracles were given in great detail in the writings of medieval monks, contemporary eyewitnesses often knew nothing about the alleged events. Though never doubting that miracles might happen, he became convinced that the more troublesome ones were fictitious. He therefore examined the evidence carefully to find out exactly what had happened. If the evidence seemed reliable, he accepted the miracle; if not, he rejected it. As the task soon proved too great for one man, he assembled a company of scholars to help him. These "Bollandists" have been at work ever since (except for the one break when the Jesuit order was temporarily abolished), but their critical rewriting of the lives of the saints has not yet been completed.

Pious people were distressed by the drastic pruning which the Bollandists gave old legends, and the Catholic Church quickly placed each of the early volumes of the Acta Sanctorum on its "Index of
The first of these literary historians was Voltaire himself. Even before his appointment as royal historiographer (1745), he began collecting material for his Age of Louis XIV, but not until 1751 did the book appear. Heretofore such official histories had been flamboyant panegyrics, with slight regard for truth, but Voltaire never spared his criticisms, especially of Louis’s wars, and he made serious efforts to learn the truth. Though he wrote in detail of wars and the court, he showed his originality by attributing the greatness of France in Louis’s day to her literary men and artists, her scientists, and her scholars. The same conception of the proper field of history underlay his more ambitious and more famous Essay on the Manners and Spirit of Nations (1756), in which he undertook to cover the entire world, from China to Peru, from Charlemagne to his own day. The Essay
was brilliantly written, it was widely read, and it influenced later historians profoundly, but it was not very good history. It sets forth all Voltaire’s prejudices, it abounds in snap judgments, it gladly sacrifices truth for an epigram, and its author betrays little comprehension of the varied forces at work in history. Voltaire was not a great historian, yet he wrote a most amusing and influential history.

Much better histories were then being written in England, where the so-called “triumvirate” ruled supreme. The first of these three historians was the skeptical philosopher David Hume (1711–1776, see p. 128). In his early years Hume wrote on philosophical and theological topics, and he is recognized today as one of the keenest philosophers of modern times, but he turned easily to historical studies. His skeptical criticism of the deists led him to question their theories about the “purity” of the original religion of mankind, and his Natural History of Religion (1757), showing that primitive men were far indeed from being deists, was a pioneer study of the historical development of religious ideas. Hume’s later years were devoted to a large History of England (6 vols., 1754–1761), in which, like Voltaire, he discussed much more than wars and royal genealogies. His book was marked by strong Tory prejudices, but it had great literary success. The second of the “triumvirs” was another Scot, William Robertson (1721–1793), who, though a Presbyterian clergyman, was an admirer of Voltaire and a friend of Hume. Seldom read today, his books on the Emperor Charles V and the discoveries in America (1769–1777) were widely read in their day and were based on careful original research.

The greatest historian living in the eighteenth century was Edward Gibbon (1737–1794), whose History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (6 vols., 1776–1788) remains a classic to the present day. He conceived the idea of writing this history in his youth, and he spent his life at the task. Covering some twelve centuries of history, from the “Good Emperors” of the second century after Christ down to Petrarch in the fourteenth, this great work is the story of the decline of ancient civilization, of its slumbers during the Middle Ages, and of its resurrection at the time of the Renaissance. Though influenced by the ideas of Montesquieu and Voltaire, Gibbon was a far better scholar than either of his predecessors, but his success was due to his literary powers as well as to his scholarship. He antagonized many readers, however, by his slyly critical treatment of Christianity. In addition to being a literary man and a scholar, Gibbon tried, unsuc-
cessfully, to be a man of fashion, and for several years he sat inconspicuously in parliament. What he heard there in the afternoon, and in the coffee houses in the evening, he still bore in mind as he sat writing in his study the next morning. The discriminating reader, who can read between the lines, finds that the *Decline and Fall* contains not only the story of Rome but also a summary of eighteenth-century thought and an intellectual biography of Gibbon himself.

Edward Gibbon, Esq., born the 6th May 1737.

Edward Gibbon. When Edward Gibbon became famous with the first volume of his *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, he rather characteristically embellished the second volume with his own portrait—the only illustration to be found in the six large volumes. This engraving is from a painting by Gibbon’s friend, Sir Joshua Reynolds. (From the copy of the first edition in the University of Illinois Library)
THE LEGACY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT

This brief sketch of the Enlightenment has passed over many phases of the intellectual life of the eighteenth century. Nothing has been said of music, for example, though many authorities regard this century as the classic age of modern music. Italian musicians in the days of the Counter-Reformation had invented several new forms of music, including the oratorio, the opera, and the symphony (see Vol. One, p. 807). These new forms spread through Europe in the seventeenth century and reached their full flowering in the eighteenth, especially in Germany. Here we find a series of great masters, from Johann Sebastian Bach (1685–1750) and Georg Friedrich Händel (1685–1759), through Joseph Haydn (1732–1809) and Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart (1756–1791), to Ludwig van Beethoven (1770–1827). The great days of baroque painting, on the other hand, had ended with the death of Rembrandt in 1669, and in its place came the decadent rococo of the eighteenth century. France produced only rather conventional and formal painters, such as Jean Antoine Watteau (1684–1721), known for insipid landscapes with countesses or shepherdesses, and Jacques David (1748–1825), the author of theatrical depictions of ancient heroes such as Socrates and Brutus, and later of spectacular scenes during the French Revolution. In England artists such as Thomas Gainsborough (1727–1788) and Sir Joshua Reynolds (1723–1792) painted portraits of the English aristocracy, while the engraver William Hogarth (1697–1764) satirized English society in The Harlot’s Progress (1732), The Rake’s Progress (1735), and Marriage à la Mode (1745). Europe produced little new architecture of importance at this time, partly because everyone was copying and exaggerating the weak points of Versailles and other baroque works of the age of Louis XIV. Except for the musicians, these artists exercised little lasting influence upon their successors, and the intellectual legacy of the eighteenth century must be sought elsewhere. It came primarily from the literary men and the philosophes, and it found its best expression in the two great ideas of humanity and progress.

The rationalists of the eighteenth century always professed the loftiest regard for man in the abstract. Sometimes their enthusiasm led only to vain boasting, but sometimes it bore fairer fruit. Men prided themselves on being cosmopolitans, citizens of the world; they pub-
licly paraded their humane sentiments; and they sorrowed over the sufferings of their less fortunate fellow men. They grew quite eloquent in denouncing such evils as the slave trade, the brutal treatment of convicts and paupers, and the persecution of religious minorities. They put an end to such ancient superstitions as witchcraft and
astrology. Old-fashioned Christian charity was rechristened "humanitarianism," and as such it enjoyed high literary vogue, though reformers usually were able to ease their consciences adequately by writing pamphlets against the evils that bothered them. It remained for the nineteenth century to carry out the humanitarian reforms suggested by these eighteenth-century writers.

A second word to conjure with in the eighteenth century was "progress." The rationalistic philosophes taught that all men, being rational human beings, desire to do the right thing. If individuals occasionally failed to act thus, it was because evil institutions—notably the church and bad governments—had corrupted them, or because of their ignorance and superstition. Education and reason could emancipate them from the latter bondage, and even political evils—which they attributed to a few wicked persons driven by their vices, principally their lust for power—could be cured by philosophy and enlightened rulers. These eighteenth-century thinkers believed that nature and the world, as well as mankind, are rational and fundamentally beneficent, but that unfortunately the momentary "triumph of barbarism and religion" (as the historian Gibbon phrased it) had upset this natural order of things, under which everyone was good and rational and happy. However, reason and philosophy were once more dispelling these clouds and men were rapidly regaining their true grandeur as rational beings. This return to reason and bliss was called "progress." To us such teaching may seem simply a revised version of ancient Christian doctrines about the garden of Eden, the fall of man, and his redemption (but with God left out of the picture), yet it lay behind much of what men thought in the eighteenth century.

The great theoretician of progress was the Marquis de Condorcet (1743–1794). A mathematical prodigy in his youth, he became the disciple and biographer of Voltaire, he hailed the French Revolution with delight, and he coöperated with the revolutionists in its early stages. Nevertheless, he presently fell into disfavor and was outlawed by the fanatical extremists. After passing a year in hiding, he was captured and died in prison. His best-known work is his Essay on the Progress of the Human Mind, which he wrote during the last year of his life, and which his widow published after his death. In this book Condorcet blamed priests and evil rulers for all the woes that afflict mankind, but he hopefully declared that these wicked men would soon be driven from the scene. He divided human history into ten great periods, the ninth of which was the age of the Enlightenment,
stretching from Descartes to the outbreak of the French Revolution, while the tenth and last was to be the eternal golden age which that great event was just inaugurating. This golden age would be the climax of all human progress, with perfect freedom and equality among men, and with human nature itself perfected.
REvolutionary France

The Revolution of 1789—
Europe Against the French Revolution—
The First French Republic
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9. THE REVOLUTION OF 1789

The political, economic, intellectual, and religious history of Europe in the eighteenth century is primarily the story of how an outmoded way of life was gradually superseded by something new and different. A complicated social organization—usually called "the Old Regime"—had been erected upon this outmoded way of life, but long-continued gnawing at its foundations had undermined the superstructure and a few sharp blows brought the whole stately edifice to ruin. In a general way, this Old Regime may be said to date from the late Middle Ages or the Renaissance; it achieved its finest expression in the early years of Louis XIV; and a century later it collapsed. Though it had prevailed in slightly varying forms throughout western and central Europe, its fall was most spectacular in France, and the closing episodes in its long history are therefore called "the French Revolution." No country in western Europe wholly escaped that revolution, however, and the Old Regime was destroyed wherever it had existed. The Revolution was European rather than French, but its French phase came first.

FRANCE IN 1789

Our account of the Revolution must begin with a sketch of the state of France in 1789. The frivolous Louis XV—who allegedly remarked, "After us, the deluge"—closed his long and disastrous reign in 1774, leaving to his grandson, Louis XVI (1754–1793), both throne and deluge. At first the young king was popular, and his people expected great things of him, but their enthusiasm quickly evaporated. Though his good intentions and his chaste morals stood in pleasing contrast to those of his grandfather, Louis had no capacity for leadership. His intelligence was less than mediocre, he would so tire himself while
hunting that he slept through important meetings of the council afterward, and he usually shared the opinions of the man who had spoken with him most recently. Like two other sovereigns who lost both their thrones and their lives in great revolutions—Charles I of England and Nicholas II of Russia—he was married to a strong-willed woman who was often responsible for his more reprehensible acts. Louis was in no way fitted to rule, yet his reign came at a moment when France stood in desperate need of statesmanship of the highest order.

Marie Antoinette (1755–1793), daughter of the Empress Maria Theresa of Austria, had been married to Louis in 1770 in order to insure the continuance of the Franco-Austrian friendship, but long before the outbreak of the Revolution L’Autrichienne (“that Austrian woman”) had become the most cordially hated person in France. As a child she had run wild as a tomboy, and later she found it difficult to adapt herself to the rigid formality of the court at Versailles. Though her extravagances for dress and social display can scarcely be called a serious drain on the French treasury, they were popularly advertised
as such. Far more disastrous was her frequent meddling in state affairs to secure appointments for incompetent friends. This practice became so notorious that her mother in Austria felt called upon to caution her. "You are acting like a Pompadour or a du Barry," she wrote, "rather than like a Queen of France." As she selected her close associates on the basis of their skill at amusing her, she came to be surrounded with shady characters who brought the whole court into disrepute, and when a countess at court swindled a diamond necklace from a Parisian jeweler, thousands of Frenchmen eagerly believed that the queen herself had knowingly shared in the enterprise (1786). Men even believed the famous story that once, when told that certain French peasants had no bread, the queen had light-heartedly replied, "Then let them eat cake." All France reverberated to these scandals.

French law still recognized three estates, or classes of society—the Clergy, the Aristocracy, and the Third Estate, which included everybody else—but this schematic arrangement no longer corresponded to social reality. The clergy did not constitute a firm and united caste.
The higher clergy were drawn exclusively from the ranks of the aristocracy, whose point of view they shared. Below them were the clergy serving the enlightened middle classes in the towns: they usually were well educated, they were tinctured with the ideas of the *philosophes* on social and political matters, and a few even criticized the church itself. And finally, the rural clergy had little education, but they often sympathized with the lot of the peasants. The Second Estate, or aristocracy, on the other hand, was stronger and more united than it had been in the days of Louis XIV. The high offices of the bureaucracy, which Colbert had staffed with members of the middle class, were now filled by aristocrats, as were the high offices in the church. It is to be feared, however, that neither church nor state profited greatly from this aristocratic control.

In the late Middle Ages, when the system of three estates was taking form, the Third Estate consisted of the well-to-do merchants and artisans of the towns. The serfs, being under the protection of their lords, were not assigned a place in the system. With the decline of serfdom, however, peasants and urban workers came to be associated with the Third Estate, though their interests differed widely from those of its other members. In 1789 more than three-quarters of the people of France were peasants. About one-third of them owned the land they cultivated while the remainder were sharecroppers or else they leased lands belonging to nobles, rich businessmen, or the church. Though serfdom had almost disappeared in France, there were many vexatious relics of the old system, such as the lord’s right to token payments on certain occasions. The aristocratic revival of the eighteenth century encouraged nobles to insist more vigorously on ancient rights and to demand better terms from leaseholders and sharecroppers, and the peasants naturally were much annoyed. At the same time rising prices and low wages aroused discontent among the urban workers.
Nevertheless, the leaders of the French Revolution usually spoke for other sections of the Third Estate.

The most aggressive and the most effective critics of the Old Regime were the lawyers and other professional men who served as spokesmen for the upper middle class. These rich businessmen represented the superior airs of the aristocracy and their retention of all the sinecures offered by the church, the bureaucracy, and the army. Finding their business operations cramped by outworn mercantilistic regulations, they favored economic laissez faire. They denounced the prevailing tax system, which spared aristocrats but fell heavily upon the middle class—though it fell even more heavily upon the poor. They had read the philosopbes, who easily convinced them that their lot was not as good as they deserved. They loved fine words about liberty and equality. But all these complaints, taken together, might not have produced a violent revolution had not the incompetent rulers of France driven their country into financial bankruptcy.

Bankruptcy

France’s tax system was one of the worst features of the Old Regime. The nobility and the church were largely exempt from taxation—though the latter sometimes made “free gifts” to the treasury—assessments were uneven, and collectors were dishonest. The principal tax was the taille, a tax on land, which fell heavily upon the peasants because almost a third of the land of France belonged to the exempt classes. There was also an income tax, called the vingtième (“twentieth”), from which the nobility were exempt and which therefore fell largely upon the upper middle classes. The most notorious of the indirect taxes was the gabelle, or salt tax, which varied so greatly from one part of France to another that salt cost thirty times as much in some places as it did in others only a few miles away. Naturally there was much contraband. The numerous internal tariff lines, where duties were collected on all passing goods, were a further incentive to smuggling. This chaotic and unenforceable tax system rendered it impossible for the French government to collect adequate revenue, and the national debt increased alarmingly. French intervention in the American Revolution (1778–1783) had been costly, but even more disastrous was the resurgence of the nobility, who refused to pay taxes, insisted upon holding rich sinecures, and demanded other government subsidies as well.
Soon after Louis XVI became king in 1774, he named the philosophe Turgot controller-general of finance. The new minister at once launched a program of reform and economy, along lines favored by the physiocrats (see p. 140), but his economies so antagonized Marie Antoinette and the nobility that within two years he was forced to resign. A few months later, after Turgot’s incompetent successor had died, the office went to Jacques Necker (1732–1804), a rich banker from Geneva, Switzerland, who had been residing in Paris for several years. Necker borrowed heavily from his banker friends, effected a number of excellent though inadequate reforms, and published a compte rendu, or balance sheet, showing the revenues and expenditures of the government. For the first time the French public was allowed to see such a statement. Necker falsified the figures slightly in order to exaggerate his own good work, but his report set forth in specific detail the subsidies paid to idle nobles. The furious recipients of this royal largesse caused Necker to be dismissed (1781). After two other stopgap ministries, Charles de Calonne (1734–1802) entered office (1783). He light-heartedly undertook to restore confidence by conspicuous expenditure, borrowing money right and left until he could borrow no more. He then persuaded the king to summon an “Assembly of Notables”—a group of the more important princes, nobles, and clergy of the realm—and ask them for new taxes. The Notables assembled, suggested a few minor reforms, and answered the request for taxes with an adamantine refusal (1787). Calonne was dismissed and, after a cardinal named Loménie de Brienne had proved his incompetence, the king was forced to recall Necker (August, 1788).

France had by this time reached a desperate state. While bankruptcy stared the government in the face, one economic disaster followed another. In 1786 France had entered into a commercial treaty with England—known as the Eden Treaty from the British ambassador who negotiated it—by which customs duties on English manufactured goods were lowered appreciably. Within a year or two the flood of such goods entering France had thrown thousands of French artisans out of work and seriously reduced the incomes of many others. At the same time a series of bad harvests reached its climax in 1788, with famine conditions prevailing in several provinces. The following winter was one of the coldest in memory. With people everywhere complaining bitterly, something drastic had to be done by the government at once.
Shortly before his fall from power, Brienne persuaded the king to summon the estates-general. This ancient body, somewhat resembling the English parliament, dated from the Middle Ages, but its last meeting (1614–1615) had been forcibly dissolved by Queen Marie de Médicis (see Vol. One, pp. 492 and 770). So much had happened since that time that no one knew how the estates would act. Nevertheless, early in August, 1788, the king ordered delegates to assemble at Versailles in the following May. Elections were to be held at which every adult male who paid taxes would be allowed to vote, though indirect voting in the case of the Third Estate assured the election of men of property. Delegates were ordered to bring with them lists of grievances, called cahiers, which led to a widespread discussion of possible complaints and raised high hopes of immediate improvement. Hundreds of pamphlets appeared during the next few months, discussing all manner of political questions, praising the Third Estate, and promising a rosy future under its leadership. The most famous of these tracts, written by an abbé philosophe named Sieyès and entitled What is the Third Estate?, opened with the resounding words, “What is the Third Estate? Everything. What has it been up to the present? Nothing. What does it ask? To become something!” In later pages the abbé asserted that the nobility were quite superfluous and identified the Third Estate with the French nation. Thousands of Frenchmen shared this opinion.

1789

All France was therefore in a state of nervous excitement when the deputies began arriving in Paris toward the end of April, 1789. The first meeting of the estates-general, on May 5, was largely formal, but a fundamental question was raised at once. How should the assembly sit? In three chambers, as in former times, or in one? To flatter its members, Necker had ordered the election of as many deputies from the Third Estate as from the other two combined. If each estate sat by itself, and all measures had to pass each house separately, the proposals of the Third Estate could be vetoed by either of the others, and its numerical superiority would be of no avail. But if all the deputies sat together, each having one vote, the Third Estate would equal the other two, and it would probably outvote them, for presumably it would win a few votes from the lower clergy and the liberal nobility. The king ordered the deputies to sit in three chambers, but the leaders of the Third Estate refused to obey
the order. The deadlock lasted for six weeks, until a few clergy and nobles joined the Third Estate. Then on June 20, when the deputies of the Third Estate reached their hall, soldiers prevented them from entering. Fearing that the king was planning to send them home, they repaired to a nearby building, sometimes used for indoor tennis, where amid scenes of wild excitement they swore not to dissolve until they had given France a written constitution. As the king then reversed his order, this “Tennis Court Oath” is often regarded as the first victory of the people in the French Revolution.

Paris had been the scene of great excitement and no small amount of disorder during the six-weeks deadlock, and during the next few weeks the government began assembling troops at Versailles. When there were about fifteen thousand soldiers in the neighborhood, Parisians began to fear that the king planned to use these troops to disband the estates-general, to pacify the city, and to negate whatever gains had been made against royal absolutism. A great fear descended upon all France, making everyone suspicious of the king and the court. The people of Paris began arming to defend themselves and the assembly, and bodies of militia were organized as a “national guard.”

On July 12 news reached Paris that the king had dismissed Necker. All that night and the next day street orators were busy lashing the crowd to fury, and mobs began hunting for arms. On the fourteenth one such group marched on the Bastille, an ancient fortress and prison in Paris, and its commander, after vain efforts to calm the people, ordered his troops to fire on the crowd. About one hundred of the assailants were killed. Shortly thereafter a detachment of mutinous soldiers arrived with an ancient cannon and began firing at the gates of the fortress. The commander lowered the drawbridge, thus admitting the crowd, which promptly murdered him along with several of his soldiers. Legend later recalled that the Bastille had formerly held political prisoners—Voltaire had once been incarcerated there—but not for many years had it been used for such purposes. The crowd that took the Bastille was looking for arms, not trying to liberate political or religious martyrs. Nevertheless, the fall of the Bastille became a symbol of the French Revolution and, from that day to this, July 14 has been observed as a national holiday in France.

The next day the deputies representing Paris in the estates-general took possession of the City Hall and organized a new municipal government. The first mayor of the city was a philosophe and astron-
omer named Bailly, who had already distinguished himself as a member of the estates-general. The national guard was given an official status and placed under the command of the Marquis de Lafayette, the liberal aristocrat who had fought under Washington in America. A new French flag was made by superimposing the red and blue banner of Paris upon the white flag of the Bourbons: this “tricolor” is still the flag of France. When Louis entered Paris on July 17 and consented to wear a tricolored cockade, it seemed that the Revolution was over, for the king accepted the national assembly, the national guard, and the national colors.

Such hopes were premature, however, for the forces protecting law and order had broken down, both in Paris and in the provinces. Brigands and other criminals operated more boldly than ever, spread-
ing a general panic throughout France. Crowds of peasants attacked manor houses to seize and destroy the records of their feudal dues, and sometimes they remained to loot or even to burn the chateaux. Eminent aristocrats, led by the king’s brother, the count of Artois (later King Charles X, 1824–1830), fled from France and began trying to persuade foreign rulers to intervene in behalf of the French king. And at the same time Louis XVI continued assembling troops in the neighborhood of Paris. At last, on October 5, a crowd of women marched the twelve miles to Versailles, supposedly to ask for bread. Toward midnight Lafayette arrived with a detachment of the national guard and the next morning, after some of the women had broken into the palace and almost succeeded in lynching Marie Antoinette, he persuaded the royal family to return to Paris. The women pulled them back to the city in the royal coach, accompanied by Lafayette riding a white horse. Thereafter the king was virtually the prisoner of Lafayette, if not of the Paris mob. With this “March of the Women to Versailles” the first, and most spectacular, phase of the Revolution came to an end.

The Constituent Assembly

Meantime the delegates to the estates-general had been settling down to the task of drawing up the constitution they had promised on the day of the Tennis Court Oath. At the suggestion of the Abbé Sieyès, this body changed its name to the National Assembly, but historians usually call it the National Constituent Assembly or simply the Constituent Assembly. A few days after October 6 it followed the king to Paris, and there it continued to sit, always under the watchful eyes of the Parisian populace.

During the next year or two the most prominent man in France was Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de Lafayette (1757–1834). Sprung from a family of the French nobility that dated from the Crusades, Lafayette was reputed to be the fourth richest man in France. As a romantic youth he had gone to fight against the British in America (1777), where he became a lifelong friend of Washington, Jefferson, and other eminent Americans. After returning to France he advertised himself widely as a friend of liberty, he attracted attention in Calonne’s Assembly of Notables by being the first to propose summoning the estates-general, and later he was chosen commander of the national guard. Not a deep political thinker, he talked vaguely about
a limited monarchy supported by a strong but patriotic aristocracy and a loyal people. What Jefferson once called his “canine appetite for popularity and fame” led him constantly to seek the limelight, as on October 6, but he never became a great leader. Though he won the plaudits of many, it was with sarcasm that others dubbed him “the hero of two worlds.” Undoubtedly Lafayette was an honest and high-minded patriot who sincerely desired to unite king and people, but he exercised little influence upon the course of events in France.

At this time the most important man in the Constituent Assembly was Honoré Riquetti, Comte de Mirabeau (1749–1791). The son of a rather eccentric philosophe who styled himself the “friend of man,” Mirabeau sat in the Assembly as a representative of the Third Estate. He was France’s best orator and her most far-seeing statesman. At first he criticized king and court severely, but after October 6 he defended the king against the Parisian populace. The wild debaucheries of his youth had left him with a bad reputation, however, and no one trusted him. Though he eventually accepted secret payments from the king, his opinions and his oratory never were for sale. He considered himself an unofficial minister of the king, and as such entitled to his pay, but though he gave the king much excellent advice, Louis regularly disregarded it. In April, 1791, Mirabeau was overtaken by an untimely death, and all France suffered in consequence.

Meantime the flood of political pamphlets continued to inundate France, and soon they were supplemented by newspapers appearing at regular intervals. The editors of such journals became so influential that someone nicknamed them “the Fourth Estate”—an appellation still applied to journalists. These newspapers represented all shades of opinion. The most matter-of-fact and the best-informed was the Moniteur, a daily paper founded in November, 1789, which throughout the Revolution usually set forth the views of the faction that happened to be in power at the moment. The opinions of the extreme royalists were presented in a paper ironically called the Actes des Apôtres (“Acts of the Apostles”). Mirabeau’s views appeared in the Courrier de Provence, Lafayette’s in the Ami de la Révolution (“Friend of the Revolution”), those of more radical leaders in the Révolutions de France et de Brabant and many others. Perhaps most radical of all was the Ami du Peuple (“Friend of the People”), edited by Marat, who even in 1789 began ridiculing the “divine Motier” and the “infamous Riquetti.”
Another important development in these early months of the Revolution was the growth of political clubs. Heretofore there had been so few opportunities for ordinary citizens to apply their political opinions that their discussions were academic and listless. The exciting events of 1789 brought a great change, however, and men began to debate political questions with great vigor. Political clubs, organized to discuss current issues, soon acquired power as political parties. The most prominent of these societies, officially named "The Society of the Friends of the Constitution," was ordinarily called the Jacobin Club because it met in a former Jacobin monastery near the hall where the Assembly sat. Its early members included men of different opinions, but presently the conservatives withdrew, leaving control of the club to the radicals. This club was affiliated with similar clubs throughout France and thus became a national political party. For about a year, in 1793–1794, the Jacobin leader, Maximilien Robespierre, was the most powerful man in France. Other clubs included the equally radical Cordeliers, led by Danton, and the Feuillants, who followed Lafayette. These clubs drew their membership largely from the middle class, for their admission fees and dues effectively excluded the populace. Before long, however, leaders such as Marat began appealing to the lower classes, which had provided the men who stormed the Bastille and the women who marched to Versailles. As men of this class wore trousers rather than the knee breeches (culottes) of the nobility and the middle class, they were called sans-culottes ("without breeches"), and extremists who appealed to them were accused of "sans-culottisme."

The Reorganization of France

The Constituent Assembly was by this time reorganizing France. Among its first acts was the abolition of whatever traces remained of feudalism. In a strange and excited meeting that lasted through the night of August 4–5, 1789, members of the nobility vied with one another in surrendering their feudal rights. It is only fair to add, however, that most of these rights had already been destroyed anyhow, and that peasant riots and burnings throughout France provided a lurid and significant background for this hysterical night. It has also been noted that it was a clergyman who moved the abolition of hunting rights while a nobleman retaliated by moving the abolition of the church’s tithe. After this night of excitement came the
more cold-blooded task of embodying its frenzied resolutions in legal decrees. The nobles, whose generous enthusiasm had now spent itself, insisted upon money compensation for what they surrendered. It was given them, but a few years later, before much had been paid, this clause was stricken from the law (1793), and the feudal system was simply declared abolished.

The Assembly next decided to formulate a “Bill of Rights,” comparable to the recent American and earlier English precedents, and on August 26 it adopted the “Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen.” “Men are born and remain free and equal in right,” this famous document declared, after which it proceeded to enumerate various rights, among them “liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression”; freedom of speech, thought, worship, and the press; freedom from arbitrary arrest; trial by jury; and equality before the law, especially in regard to taxation and the right to hold office. Law was to be regarded as the expression of the general will, and sovereignty was to rest with the “nation” rather than the king. Many persons regard this declaration as expressing the essence of the French Revolution.

Little had yet been done, however, to alleviate the financial distress that had brought France to the verge of bankruptcy and caused the summoning of the estates-general. The only possible course seemed to be to confiscate the church lands, which accordingly was decreed on November 2, 1789. Some of the confiscated lands were sold while others were used as security to protect new loans. Bonds, called assignats and issued in small denominations, soon began circulating as a form of paper money. When the face value of the paper in circulation surpassed that of the lands themselves, the assignats began to lose their value. Nevertheless the government kept issuing more, for only by printing new money could it meet its current expenses. All France was soon engulfed in a disastrous inflation. At the end of 1791 the assignats had lost a quarter of their value, a year later they had lost a half, at the end of 1793 they retained only a quarter of their face value, and early in 1796 they became completely worthless. Nor was inflation the only economic disaster that resulted from the confiscation of church lands. Part of the revenue from these lands had formerly been used to support schools, hospitals, and other charitable institutions. The government now had to support these institutions and pay the clergy besides, thereby increasing its budget enormously.
The confiscation of church lands also inaugurated a protracted quarrel with the Catholic Church. Many members of the Assembly were disciples of Voltaire, eager to écraser l'infâme by drastic reform of the church. A number of minor laws were followed by the comprehensive "Civil Constitution of the Clergy" (July 12, 1790). This law reduced the number of bishops from 130 to 83, fixed the salaries which the state paid to clergymen, ordered that both priests and bishops be elected by all the voters in their communities (including Protestants, Jews, and freethinkers), dissolved all monasteries and convents, and left the pope only nominal powers in France. The same regulations were applied to Protestants and Jews, but they did not object seriously, for they already elected their clergy and they were delighted to receive toleration and financial subventions from the government.

So many Catholics protested against the new law, however, that the Assembly ordered all clergymen to take oaths to support the new system. The pope then intervened, condemning not only the Civil Constitution of the Clergy but the whole Revolution as well. About half the lower clergy obeyed the Assembly's order, but among the bishops—all aristocrats—only seven consented to take the oath. The French Catholic Church was thus rent in twain, with half its clergy "jurors" and the other half "nonjurors." Those who took the oath were excommunicated by the pope, and as serious Catholics now turned to the nonjuring priests, the constitutional clergy quickly lost all influence. In the long run, this quarrel did much to kill Gallicanism in the French church, for practicing Catholics looked more and more to the pope as their ablest champion. The power and prestige of the papacy grew among Catholics everywhere, but for a hundred years the church suffered from an unenviable reputation for stiff-necked opposition to all liberty, democracy, and progress.

The Constituent Assembly and the political clubs were led by members of the Third Estate, who preached the economic doctrines of laissez faire, as set forth by the physiocrats and Adam Smith. They therefore liquidated French mercantilism as well as feudalism. The old guilds were abolished, and a man might enter whatever trade he chose to learn. When financial inflation became a serious matter in 1792 and 1793, the working classes suffered grievously. Workers secretly organized unions, which were quickly broken up in the name of "liberty." The Assembly also abolished the internal tariff lines and reorganized the tax system to lighten its burden upon the middle class. When church lands were sold, they usually went to middle-class
speculators rather than peasants. The Assembly also divided and distributed the common pastures which had belonged to the villages from time immemorial, thereby depriving the peasants of ancient rights in them. In the end, laissez faire benefited the middle classes at the expense of all others.

After two years of labor the Constituent Assembly completed its reorganization of France as a limited monarchy. As early as September, 1789, it had decided to retain the king and to grant him a "suspensive veto" on legislation—that is, he could veto laws passed by the legislature, but if the same law were passed by three consecutive legislatures, it went into force despite his veto. Legislative powers were assigned to a one-chamber legislature, elected for two years. The old provinces of France were abolished, and the whole country was divided into eighty-three "departments" with much local autonomy. Municipal government was likewise reorganized, and the cities, like the departments, were to be governed by elected officials.

With the abolition of the old nobility all Frenchmen became simply citizens, but they were divided into two classes on the basis of their property. The "active" citizens, who paid a specified amount in taxes, had the right to vote; the poor became "passive" citizens who could not vote but who enjoyed all other civil rights. Slightly more than half the adult males of France were classified as active citizens. The situation was further complicated by a system of indirect elections. Voters did not vote directly for legislators and other officials but for members of electoral colleges, and these electors then chose the officials—just as a similar college chooses the President of the United States. The law stated that these electors had to be active citizens in the highest tax group. As only fifty thousand men in all France met this requirement, the choice of officials and legislators fell to a few rich members of the middle class, and France became a bourgeois monarchy.
NEITHER the leaders of the Constituent Assembly nor the revolutionary journalists and pamphleteers of 1789 paid great attention to foreign affairs. Being good disciples of the philosophes, they liked to think of themselves as legislating for all mankind—and frequently said so in their speeches—but in the early stages of the Revolution they were so busy reforming France that they found little time for the rest of the world. Nevertheless, their activities at once attracted the attention of educated people everywhere, and they were met with both praise and denunciation. In part, but only in part, the attitude of foreign powers was determined by prerevolutionary diplomacy. The French and English, for example, had been at war with each other, off and on, for upward of a hundred years, and only recently French intervention in the American Revolution had helped lose England her best colonies. As the earlier wars had accustomed the English to victory, the humiliation of 1783 did not increase their love for France. When reports of popular demonstrations, such as the attack on the Bastille, began reaching England, many middle-class Englishmen shuddered; peasant riots in France awakened the apprehensions of English property owners; and French attacks upon the church, culminating in the confiscation of church lands, aroused countless persons against the “atheistical” French. The English public had no understanding of the background of the French Revolution, but most Englishmen opposed and feared it from the first.

A few persons of liberal mind, however, sympathized with the ideas of the French philosophes and predicted that a new and better France, or even a new and better world, would emerge from this upheaval. Joseph Priestley (1733–1804), a Unitarian clergyman and a
scientist whose contributions to chemistry have already been mentioned (p. 121), was so openly enthusiastic that in 1791 a Birmingham mob burned down his house and forced him to flee to America. Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) had studied law as a young man, and in the significant year 1776 he published his Fragment on Government, undertaking to refute the Tory views of Blackstone. The equally significant year 1789 saw the publication of his most important work, the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in which he laid down the utilitarian criterion that good morals and good legislation were those which promoted “the greatest happiness of the greatest number.” Bentham’s disciple, William Godwin (1756–1836), who published an important book on Political Justice in 1793, was another enthusiast for the Revolution, as was his wife, Mary Wollstonecraft (1759–1797), whose Vindication of the Rights of Women (1792) pioneered in the feminist cause. Still another defender of the Revolution was Arthur Young (1741–1820), a man much interested in scientific agriculture (see p. 251) who had made extensive tours of France in 1787, 1788, and 1789. His Travels in France (1792) was published to enlighten the English public upon the deplorable state of the French peasantry, and today it is invaluable to historians because of the accurate information it gives about agrarian and feudal conditions in France on the eve of the Revolution. The enthusiasm of these English radicals was shared by countless idealistic young men. The poet William Blake, in highly cryptic and symbolic poems, denounced the British government for its war with France; and many years later, after he had lost his youthful ardor, the poet William Wordsworth could nostalgically exclaim,

Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive,
But to be young was very heaven!

The political situation in England in 1789 encouraged the opponents of George III to look with sympathy upon reformers in France. From 1783 to 1801 England was governed by a ministry under the younger William Pitt (1759–1806), whose father (the Earl of Chatham, 1708–1778) had guided England through the Seven Years’ War (see p. 86). To please George III, Pitt consented to call himself a Tory, but the recent loss of the American colonies necessitated radical departures from the disastrous policies of Lord North. During his early years in office, therefore, Pitt reorganized the Tory party and effected many reforms, a few of which followed lines suggested by
Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*. The Eden Treaty of 1786, for example, encouraged exports to France by revising tariffs (see p. 158). But the prime minister still had to work with George III, who was not greatly chastened even after 1783, and Pitt's efforts to reform the House of Commons, to abolish the Test Act and the slave trade, and to mitigate other ancient abuses were in vain. He disapproved of what he saw happening in France, but in 1789 he had no thought of stopping it by military intervention.

Pitt's great rival was Charles James Fox (1749–1806), who had been openly sympathetic with the colonies during the American Revolution and who now spoke well of the French. His friend and colleague, Richard Brinsley Sheridan (1751–1816), an Anglo-Irishman who had made his first reputation as a writer of comedies (*The Rivals*, 1775; *The School for Scandal*, 1777), was also a liberal statesman and parliamentary orator. He too had criticized the American War, and as late as 1794 he scandalized Englishmen by his praise of the French Revolution. The bitter political struggle between these Whig leaders and Pitt's new Tory party reached a climax in 1787 and 1788 when Fox, Burke, Sheridan, and others successfully prosecuted Warren Hastings for misconduct in India (see p. 97). Soon after the close of this sensational trial, George III became temporarily insane and it seemed that a regency under his son (later George IV) would be necessary. The Whig leaders were jubilant, for both Fox and Sheridan were boon companions of that young man, sharing in his frequent debauches and in the bitter hatred of his father. Before a regency bill could be passed by parliament, however, George III regained his mental balance, at least nominally (February, 1789), and the Tories remained in power. The lower classes of England, both peasants and workers, were at this time in an unhappy condition, as we shall see in greater detail below (p. 264), but they had no leaders and could do nothing. The few English reformers therefore had no following, and the cause of political reform slumbered for forty years.

The position of Edmund Burke (1729–1797) was of especial importance. He had been the great light of the old Whig party, he had urged conciliation of the American colonies, he had proposed parliamentary reform even before Pitt in the early 1780's, and he had aided in the impeachment of Warren Hastings. But he was a generation older than the new Whig leaders, and he had not learned to grow old gracefully. He grumbled constantly about the way things were going, and almost as soon as the Revolution broke out in France he loosed
all his pent-up wrath against it. He denounced it even in 1789, and in November, 1790, he published his famous *Reflections on the Revolution in France*. A few months later Tom Paine—the radical Quaker who had greatly aided the American cause with his pamphlet *Common Sense* (see p. 92), and who had returned to England in 1787—replied to Burke in a pamphlet entitled *The Rights of Man* (1791), which he dedicated to George Washington with the expressed hope that he might “enjoy the happiness of seeing the New World regenerate the Old.” In a second part, published the next year, Paine openly advocated a republican government for England, which caused him to be convicted of sedition and outlawed, though he escaped to France. Paine’s tract was a brilliant piece of writing, but Burke’s *Reflections* dominated English thinking about the French Revolution.

Burke’s 250-page pamphlet was a weighty contribution to political science as well as an oratorical appeal to the emotions. Burke the orator exaggerated much, and sometimes he made charges that simply were not true. His bloodcurdling accounts of riots and massacres became classic, however, and he taught his readers to regard the Revolution as the horrible rampage of a nation betrayed into the hands of hardened criminals. At the same time, he sadly recalled that sixteen or seventeen years before he had seen the “delightful vision” of Marie Antoinette at Versailles, “glittering like the morning star, full of life, and splendor, and joy.” “Oh! what a revolution! and what a heart must I have to contemplate without emotion that elevation and that fall!”

Behind these oratorical excrescences, however, Burke the statesman introduced profound thought which was the distilled wisdom of a lifetime. With great skill and sobriety he pictured the state, or any human society, as a living organism of which living men are parts but which includes all past generations as well. Men are bound to this society by countless bonds which, though invisible, are strong as iron, and the strongest bond of all is religion. A state is created by the experience and wisdom of millions of men through many centuries, each adding a little here and a little there. From Burke’s point of view, the Abbé Sieyès must have seemed very silly indeed when he imagined that any intelligent man could frame a constitution for a great state in a few days or even a few hours. Believing in this organic growth of states, rather than in their sudden creation by rationalists like Sieyès, Burke was appalled at the light-hearted way in
which the French Assembly swept away venerable institutions that had been the foundation of France's national life for centuries, and he insisted that no sober or responsible statesman could desire such wanton destruction of the priceless legacy of the past. Yet Burke remained a good Whig, proud of the "Glorious Revolution of 1688." That great event, he maintained, was carried out within the framework of the English constitution and was the completion, not the destruction, of what had been developing in England ever since the days of Magna Carta. By publishing this little book, Burke became the intellectual leader of the antirevolutionary forces throughout Europe and the father of nineteenth-century conservatism.

Central Europe

The state of Germany in 1789 was far worse than that of England. The old Holy Roman Empire had virtually ceased to function as a unifying force, and "the Germanies" had fallen into about three hundred separate and independent states, of which the two most powerful were Hapsburg Austria and Hohenzollern Prussia. In the former, Joseph II (1765–1790) was approaching the end of his long reign as a sad and disappointed man, for his vast program of reform had largely ended in failure. The people were already grumbling, and his brother and successor, Leopold II (1790–1792), had to face open revolt by the nobles. In Prussia Frederick the Great had died in 1786, and his affable but incompetent nephew, Frederick William II (1786–1797), could not manage the bureaucratic machine that the great king had constructed. A few of the lesser states were moderately well governed, but the majority were ruled by decadent aristocrats striving to live in the style of Louis XV. During the American Revolution the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel had made an unsavory name for himself by selling his subjects to George III as mercenaries at £15 a head. Others were almost as bad. In general, these minor rulers liked to think of themselves as enlightened colleagues of Voltaire while in reality they were petty tyrants, dominated by their mistresses and concerned principally with preventing change.

As we have already seen (p. 112), the intellectual life of Germany rose rapidly after the close of the Seven Years' War, and the writings of the French philosophes were widely read. Rousseau was the especial favorite, and Montesquieu was popular, but there was not much political debate. Occasionally a bold journalist might criticize the
ruler of a neighboring principality, or a professor have a few kind words for limited monarchy in the abstract. A few enthusiasts deplored the absence of German national patriotism, but most educated people boasted of their cosmopolitanism while their less enlightened neighbors were sunk in the narrowest parochialism. George Washington and the American Revolution aroused a little enthusiasm, but there was not much liberal political agitation. Centuries of authoritarian rule had convinced most Germans that good government comes from on high and is no concern of the average citizen. There was discontent in Germany, and intelligent Germans admitted that existing conditions could not endure forever, but no one had specific reforms to propose.

Then came the great events of 1789 in France. Most German intellectuals received the news with enthusiasm, and in a few places there were political demonstrations and riots by peasants who hoped to free themselves from the shackles of serfdom. This early excitement lasted through 1790 and much of 1791, but thereafter it cooled rapidly. A significant, and in some ways a typical, case was that of Friedrich von Gentz (1764–1832). As a young official in the Prussian bureaucracy he followed events in France closely, regretted in 1789 that the scanty news available in Berlin was biased against the revolutionists, and defended the French ardently. But in 1791 his faith began to weaken, and his conversion was completed by a reading of Burke. Late in 1792 he published a German translation of the *Reflections*, which became an event in German intellectual history. In later years Gentz was one of Napoleon’s chief opponents, and still later he played an important part in the conservative reaction following Waterloo.

At first glance the situation in Italy might seem not very different. In general the peninsula was badly governed by a Bourbon king in the south and Sicily, by the pope in the center, and by the aristocratic but decrepit Venetian Republic in the northeast. The rulers of Savoy, in the northwest, were somewhat better, and Tuscany was well governed by Leopold until he became Holy Roman Emperor in 1790. The remaining states were negligible. The glories of the Renaissance had long since passed away, and while Italy was probably better off at the end of the century than she had been earlier, she was no more important economically than she was intellectually. A few educated people showed an interest in the Revolution at first, but there was little enthusiasm, and in 1791 the pope undoubtedly
expressed the opinion of the ruling classes throughout Italy when he roundly condemned the Revolution and all its works.

The situation in Spain was still worse, and even in 1789 the government coöperated with the Inquisition in its efforts to exclude all news of the happenings in France. A few Russian nobles were mildly interested in the Revolution, but the Empress Catherine was not greatly disturbed nor was she diverted from her aggression against Turkey and Poland. She expelled the French ambassador, however, and, it is interesting to note, the same man (Genêt) was later expelled from the United States because of his intrigues. Many people in this country still remembered Lafayette, and the Jeffersonians were outspoken champions of the principles proclaimed in France, but John Adams and the Federalists were highly critical of what was happening there.

In only two countries—Belgium and Poland—did the French Revolution receive the hearty sympathy of more than a few intellectuals. The Belgians had been much distressed by the efforts of Joseph II to impose his enlightened despotism. Revolution broke out in November, 1789, and the country declared itself independent of Austria. Though essentially conservative, the revolutionists were much influenced by events in France. A few weeks later Joseph died, and within a few months Leopold suppressed the rebellion. At the same time Polish patriots, inspired by French thought, were completing a constitution providing for limited monarchy (May, 1791). Opponents appealed to Catherine of Russia for aid, which she gladly provided, but she also entered into negotiations with the Prussian king, and in January, 1793, the two sovereigns shared in the Second Partition of Poland.

War

Though the rulers of Europe, and the great majority of their subjects, looked with apprehension upon the French Revolution, none of them at first intended or desired to intervene in French affairs. The French nobles fleeing from France were not warmly welcomed. In fact, their dissolute conduct and the expensive entertainment they expected from their hosts gave these émigrés a very bad name. It was said that one German princelet posted signs at his frontiers, "Émigrés and other beggars verboten!" By the summer of 1791, however, this hands-off policy was beginning to change, partly because the dis-
turberances in France were being felt throughout Europe, both politically and economically, partly because Leopold of Austria, alarmed by the Belgian revolt, was anxious to help his sister, Marie Antoinette, and partly because of Louis's ill-starred "flight to Varennes."

Ever since the "March of the Women to Versailles," the French royal family had been living in the Tuileries Palace in Paris, constantly in danger of attack by the mob. Early in 1791 Mirabeau had counseled flight, but he wisely insisted that this flight be to central France, not toward the frontiers. But Mirabeau died, and a few weeks later, when the king attempted flight, Marie Antoinette insisted upon disregarding the most important feature of the statesman's advice. On June 20, after careful arrangements had been made with Leopold, Louis and his family fled in disguise, taking the road to Belgium, where Austrian troops were ready to receive them. They were recognized at Varennes, about thirty miles from the border, and sent back to Paris amid the jeers and insults of the populace. The Constituent Assembly declared the king suspended, and members of the Cordelier Club began openly demanding a republic. More moderate counsels eventually prevailed, and when Louis agreed to accept the constitution, then nearing completion, he was recognized by the Assembly as the lawful king of France. But though Louis might reign once more in France, he was no longer respected by his people, who considered him a traitor. In Germany and Austria, on the other hand, he came to be regarded as a martyr, and foreign intervention in French affairs was appreciably closer.

At last the long-promised constitution was ready, and on September 30, 1791, the Constituent Assembly dissolved, after voting, in an excess of enthusiasm, that none of its members should be eligible for election to the new parliament. Therefore this new body, known to historians as the Legislative Assembly (1791-1792), was made up entirely of members with no parliamentary experience. They were not distinguished men, and their most important act was a declaration of war upon Austria.

Late in August, 1791, the rulers of Austria and Prussia had met at Pillnitz to discuss various political matters, and before separating they issued a statement that they were willing to intervene in France with all the other powers. As they were quite sure that England would not intervene, they regarded this promise as an empty gesture, but the open rejoicing of the émigrés led many Frenchmen to regard it as a threat. During the next few months war fever rose rapidly in Paris.
Prussia and Austria then entered into an alliance (February 7, 1792), and three weeks later Leopold II died. His son and successor, Francis II (1792–1835), was less peaceably inclined than his father, and he listened with more sympathy to the émigrés and to the German nobility who had lost properties in Alsace through France's abolition of feudalism there. At the same time, many Frenchmen desired war, though for a variety of contradictory reasons. Some believed that the gains of the Revolution could be assured only by carrying them to all Europe; others, with great generosity, planned to share these blessings with their neighbors whether the neighbors desired them or not; others thought that war would discredit the king, others that it would discredit the radicals; still others hoped that victorious Germans would reestablish the Old Regime; and Louis apparently expected that the defeat of France would discredit his enemies. Only a few extreme radicals, such as Robespierre and Marat, openly opposed war. At last, on April 20, France declared war on Austria, and the king of Prussia quickly joined his ally.

Most of the high officers of the French army, being aristocrats, had fled to Germany, and those who remained were neither skilled nor trustworthy. Of the three armies sent to seize the Austrian Netherlands, the largest was commanded by Lafayette, who was not a trained general. The soldiers showed great enthusiasm at first, but they were badly drilled, and only a few had ever been under fire. At their first sight of the enemy they fled, shouting that they had been betrayed and even murdering a general who tried to stop them. Realizing the impossibility of immediate conquests with such troops, the high command took defensive positions until new levies could be collected and trained. Meantime, the Prussian commander was arranging his armies, and in August he invaded France.

The early military reverses created panic in Paris and stimulated a hostility against the king and the émigrés which radical leaders were quick to exploit. When the Duke of Brunswick (the Prussian commander) issued an unwise Manifesto (July 25) threatening to destroy Paris, his act was a godsend to the Parisian radicals. The Legislative Assembly ordered (July 27) that the property of all émigrés be confiscated and sold. Early in August enthusiasts from all parts of France began pouring into the capital to support the Parisian extremists. One group of such men, from Marseilles, brought with them a stirring new song, now known as the *Marseillaise*, which called upon the children of *la patrie* to rise against tyranny. This
revolutionary marching song is now the French national anthem. Reinforced by these recruits, the Parisians again attacked the Tuileries on August 10. Louis and Marie Antoinette fled to the Assembly for protection, after which they were imprisoned, but about eight hundred of their Swiss guards and four hundred of the attackers were killed. A few days later Lafayette undertook to lead his troops back to Paris to liberate the royal family. When the soldiers refused, Lafayette deserted (August 19) and passed the next five years in an Austrian prison.

The events of August 10 put an end to the Legislative Assembly. The Parisian radicals who had engineered the attack on the Tuileries hastily organized a “commune,” or city government, and ordered that new elections, based on universal manhood suffrage, be held throughout France. These resolute leaders were determined to crush all opposition, and during the early days of September, while the Prussians were advancing on Paris, they arrested thousands of political enemies whom they charged with disloyalty. After perfunctory trials many of their prisoners were executed—or lynched—by panic-stricken mobs. It has been estimated that in Paris about a thousand persons lost their lives, and smaller numbers elsewhere in France. The attack upon the Tuileries and these “September massacres” are sometimes called the “Second French Revolution,” for thereafter events followed a new and much more radical course.
II. THE FIRST FRENCH REPUBLIC

As soon as the new legislature, commonly called the Convention, assembled in Paris (September 21, 1792), it declared the king deposed. Though no one formally proclaimed a change of government, the lack of a king in effect made France a republic, and for the next three years the Convention governed France. It also happened that on the very day the Convention assembled, French troops defeated and turned back the invading Prussians at Valmy, some 125 miles east of Paris. The battle was not a major one—it was largely an artillery duel in a dense fog—but it saved Paris and it launched the new republic under favorable auspices.

As the elections had taken place during the excitement following the events of August 10, no avowed monarchists were chosen, and manhood suffrage assured the election of many radicals. Nevertheless wide differences of opinion divided the Convention. As like-minded deputies took seats together, with the more conservative ones at the speaker’s right and the more radical at his left, it became customary to speak of the conservatives as “the right,” the moderates as “the center,” and the radicals as “the left.” The members at the right were also called “Girondins” because several of their leaders came from the department of the Gironde in southwestern France; the members at the left were called “the Mountain,” because their seats were higher than the others; and the members of the center were called “the Plain,” or, more disrespectfully, “the Marsh.”

The Girondins were usually well-educated men of bourgeois background; they had spoken eloquently of republics and had been the most vociferous war hawks in the Legislative Assembly; and in general they represented the provinces of France against Paris. Their
most conspicuous member was a former bureaucrat named Roland (1734–1793), a sober, intelligent, and industrious man, but one who owed his eminence largely to his brilliant wife (1754–1793). Her salon in Paris became a social center for the Girondins. Other Girondins were Condorcet (see p. 148), and the Anglo-American Tom Paine, who had been elected to the Convention after being outlawed in England. The leaders of the Mountain, on the other hand, represented the radical democracy of Paris. The most important of these leaders was Maximilien Robespierre (1756–1794), a lawyer from Arras who was a faithful disciple of Rousseau. He early attracted attention by his financial integrity (a quality sadly lacking in several of his colleagues) and by his fidelity to his convictions. “That man really believes what he says,” remarked Mirabeau one day. Robespierre has often been pictured as a bloodthirsty ogre, but in our own day radical critics have sometimes dismissed him as the incarnation of bourgeois respectability. Perhaps he was the true democrat of them all. His great rival, Danton (1759–1794), was less honest financially than Robespierre, but also less inhuman in his pursuit of Virtue. A powerful orator, he had once been a follower of Mirabeau, but on August 10 he became leader of the new Paris Commune. Jean Paul Marat (1743–1793) had been a Swiss doctor, but in the early days of the Revolution he became a popular journalist appealing to the mob. Lazare Carnot (1753–1823) also sat with the Mountain, but he took little part in politics and devoted himself instead to organizing and provisioning the French armies. He thus came to be known as “the organizer of victory”—and he survived his radical colleagues by almost thirty years.

The Convention was faced with many immediate and pressing problems, the chief of which was what to do with Louis XVI. Ever since August 10 the former king had been closely imprisoned with his family, and on September 21 he was formally deposed. Everyone knew that a final settlement must be made quickly and that unless the king were found guilty of serious misdeeds the men who arrested and deposed him would themselves be deemed guilty. The Convention debated the matter ardently during the fall; in December it formally charged Louis with treason; and after the semblance of a trial it almost unanimously voted him guilty (January 15, 1793). The next day it voted on his punishment, with 387 to 334 votes for death, but as 26 of the former group wished to postpone execution, the vote stood 361 to 360 for immediate death. On a second roll call, the
next day, the deputies voted 380 to 310 against delay, and Louis was
guillotined on January 20. A similar trial for treason led to the execu-
tion of Marie Antoinette on October 16, 1793. She undoubtedly was
guilty of treason, but other scandalous charges against her were
false. After Louis's death, the royalists (who, to the surprise of
many, had not lifted a finger to rescue their king) proclaimed his
seven-year-old son king as Louis XVII. The boy was a prisoner with
his parents, and he died in prison on June 8, 1795. The royalists then
recognized Louis XVI's brother, the Count of Provence, as Louis
XVIII. The count was an émigré, however, and did not return to
France or rule until after the defeat of Napoleon nineteen years
later.

The execution of Louis XVI was the most serious step yet taken by
the French revolutionists, and the 361 regicides were quite aware that
their own lives now depended upon the continuance of the Republic.
They therefore became hysterical against royalists, alleged traitors,
and political opponents whom they suspected or accused of weaken-
ing the Republic. The execution of the king, following the events of
August 10 and the September massacres, also sent a shudder through
Europe, appalling kings and nobles and profoundly shocking their
subjects.

England had been drifting rapidly toward war in the last months of
1792, and on January 24 Pitt severed diplomatic relations with
France. The Convention declared war on February 1, 1793. During
the next few weeks war followed with Holland, Spain, and Portugal,
and Sardinia had already entered the struggle. Pitt then united all
France's enemies in an alliance known as the First Coalition (1793),
leaving France ringed about by her enemies. Prussian and Austrian
armies continued to do most of the fighting, but England's navy was
a factor of major importance; her industries (then the most advanced
in the world) supplied her allies with munitions; and, above all, she
financed the war with heavy subsidies to the continental powers. Her
allies presently made peace with France, but England carried on the
war alone and organized new coalitions. Except for about fourteen
months in 1802-1803, England and France were continuously at
war for over twenty-two years, until the final defeat of Napoleon in
1815.

French arms prospered during the early weeks of the Republic.
The Prussian forces withdrew from France after Valmy, being closely
followed by the French, who pursued them as far as the Rhine itself
and even crossed that river to occupy Frankfort. Other French troops entered Nice and Savoy, then held by the king of Sardinia. In November, 1792, still another French army won a decisive victory at Jemappes (Belgium), after which it occupied the entire Austrian Netherlands; this victory probably was as influential in bringing England into the war as was the execution of the king, for throughout modern times the English have insisted that the Netherlands be held by a weak power. These first victories were ephemeral, however, for in the spring and summer of 1793 the allies regained what had been lost in Germany and Belgium, and prepared to invade France.

![Map of French Conquests 1792 to 1795](image_url)

from several directions simultaneously. The tide of battle soon turned again, and in 1794 the French regained the Rhine frontier and occupied Holland. The German and Belgian territories were annexed to France, but Holland was reorganized as the Batavian Republic.
and became an ally of France. In the spring of 1795 Prussia, now primarily concerned with the impending Third Partition of Poland, withdrew from the coalition and signed a separate peace at Basel. The lesser powers followed suit, until only Austria and England remained at war with France. In the course of two years France thus attained the “natural frontiers” of which the *philosophes* had written, and for the sake of which Louis XIV had bankrupted France with half a century of warfare.

Two new factors, introduced into warfare at this time by the French, help explain these brilliant victories. In the first place, the French fought with “citizen armies” while their adversaries still used professionals. After the early defeats, Carnot completely reorganized the French army, persuading the Convention to order universal military service (August, 1793), and he presently had 700,000 men under arms. These conscripts may not have been as well trained as the enemy, but they made up for it in numbers and enthusiasm. The professionals were merely doing a job, but the French were fanatical patriots fighting for their country and for the Revolution. In the second place, the French preceded the work of the soldier with that of the propagandist. As early as November, 1792, the Convention passed a decree stating that the war was a war against kings everywhere and a war for the liberty of all peoples. In the following months French agents whipped up enthusiasm in Belgium and the Rhineland by promising an end to feudalism and aristocrats. After the populace had thus been softened up, French armies met little resistance. Unfortunately, however, the Belgians and Germans had imagined that they were to govern themselves after being freed from their Austrian or other masters, and it was too late when they learned that “freedom” merely meant annexation to France.

**Civil War in France**

Meantime the French were also fighting a civil war at home. The Vendée, a district in western France, had not changed greatly in recent centuries. In the early days of the Revolution, its peasants had thrown off the last shackles of feudalism, after which they were satisfied. They took little interest in what was happening in other parts of France, and they were an easy prey to the propaganda of the old aristocracy, the nonjuring clergy, and English agents. When Paris ordered military conscription, the Vendée rose in revolt. Many
months passed, much property was destroyed, and much blood was spilled before peace could be restored. Lesser revolts caused trouble at Lyons and in other parts of France.

At the same time financial inflation was bringing great distress to Paris and other large cities. Between May and August, 1793, the value of the assignats dropped from 52 to 22: in other words, prices rose by about 135 percent in one hundred days. Nor was this all. Peasants were unwilling to exchange food for assignats that were constantly depreciating in value, and profiteers hoarded whatever they could get their hands on. Food prices in Paris and other cities therefore rose to famine heights, and as wages rose little if at all, the working classes suffered tragically. Irresponsible demagogues, sometimes called enragés, exploited this situation to the limit. Such old radicals as Marat were soon surpassed by Hébert, editor of the scurrilous Père Duchesne, and even he was surpassed by an ex-priest named Jacques Roux. With such agitators appealing to the Parisian sans-culottes, the Revolution took on the form of a class struggle.

The program of the Mountain was not very successful. Severe laws punished hoarders and profiteers, and set maximum prices for such essentials as food, but such laws could not be enforced satisfactorily. Various suggestions were made for aiding the poor—distributing the property of émigrés and suspected persons, for example—but not much was accomplished. In the final analysis, therefore, the Convention should be judged not by its constructive legislation but by its success in saving France from invasion and in preventing a restoration of the Bourbon monarchy.

France being faced with perils of such magnitude, the Convention conferred great powers upon a group of twelve men, known as the Committee of Public Safety, which might be called an executive committee of the Convention or compared to the cabinet in a parliamentary government. The committee was dominated by the Mountain—Danton at first and later Robespierre—who demanded a strongly centralized France in the place of the loosely federated France favored by the Girondins. The Convention also set up the Committee of General Security as a political police to ferret out disloyal persons, and the Revolutionary Tribunal as a court to try those charged with disloyalty. This Tribunal conducted the “Reign of Terror”—perhaps, alas, the best-known feature of the French Revolution. All in all, about forty thousand persons lost their lives, more than half of whom were Vendeans or other rebels killed in fighting, while 70 percent of those
executed were in the rebellious districts. The Revolutionary Tribunal in Paris sent 2639 persons to the guillotine.

At first terror was used only against rebels or disloyal persons, but presently the dominant Jacobins began using it against their political rivals, and eventually one faction of the Jacobins used it against the others. The first to go were the Girondins. After a demonstration by a crowd of *enragés* on May 31, 1793, thirty Girondins were arrested, and the party lost most of its power in the Convention. On July 13 Charlotte Corday, a young woman attached to the Girondin faction, murdered Marat; she was guillotined four days later. This assassination greatly angered the radicals, who now executed twenty-two of the Girondins they had arrested (October 31). Among them was Madame Roland, whose last words, it is said, were "Liberty, Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name!" Her husband committed
suicide when he learned of her death. Condorcet died in prison five months later. As soon as the remnants of the Girondin party had been finished off, the guillotine was turned against the *enragés*. Hébert and several of his followers were executed on March 24, and Danton went to the guillotine on April 6. Thereafter Robespierre was virtually dictator of France, sending many of his enemies to death. The terror he created led to his own ruin, however, for panic-stricken moderates, fearing for their lives, managed to send him to the guillotine on July 28, 1794. About ninety of his partisans were executed during the next three days, bringing the Terror to a close.

**Republican Reforms**

Because of the confusion produced by foreign war, civil war, financial inflation, factional bitterness, and the Reign of Terror, the Convention could not effect many important reforms during these years. It introduced the metric system of weights and measures which, because of its logical nature and convenience, is still used throughout western Europe and for scientific work everywhere. More revolutionary, but less successful, was the Republican calendar. In their enthusiasm for liberty, members of the Convention decided to start counting time from the birth of the Republic rather than from the birth of Christ. As royalty had been abolished in France on September 21, 1792, which happened to be the day of the autumnal equinox, this seemed the logical day for starting a new year and a new era.

The new Republican calendar was highly rational. Each year was divided into twelve months which were arranged in four groups of three, with rhyming names, to correspond with the four seasons: the one beginning on September 21 was called Vendémiaire (month of the vintage), the one beginning on December 21, Nivôse (snowy month), the one beginning March 21, Germinal (sprouting month), that beginning on July 19, Thermidor (hot month), and the others similarly. Each month had thirty days and was divided into three weeks, or "decades," of ten days each. These days were simply called by their numbers, not by separate names. The last day of each decade was to be a day of rest, and the five extra days at the end of the year were called *sans-culottides* and set aside for festivals in honor respectively of Virtue, Genius, Labor, Opinion, and Rewards; in each leap year a sixth holiday celebrated the Revolution. This calendar was
made official in October, 1793, but it never became popular, and it was discontinued in 1805. Nevertheless, many events in these twelve years are still identified by their Republican dates: Robespierre was executed on 10 Thermidor of the Year II (July 28, 1794), and Napoleon seized power on 18 Brumaire of the Year VIII (November 9, 1799).

The metric system and the calendar are excellent illustrations of the revolutionary mentality—its rationality, its lack of respect for established ways of doing things, its disregard of past experience, its enthusiasm for the liberty that supposedly had just begun. But there can be no doubt that the authors of the new calendar were also deliberately trying to dechristianize France—and the world—by making it difficult or impossible to observe Sunday or celebrate such Christian festivals as Easter, Christmas, and the saints’ days. Many other acts of the Convention bore witness to the antichristian sentiments of its members and to their desire for a new rational and republican religion. Ever since 1789 there had been public ceremonies of a semireligious sort to celebrate the Revolution and liberty. Now they were held on the tenth day of the Republican week, and revolutionary martyrs such as Marat came to be honored with a cult resembling that of Christian saints.

The most famous of these substitute religions was the festival of Reason, instituted by Hébert. The cathedral of Notre Dame in Paris was secularized and made into a “Temple of Reason,” and there, on November 10, 1793, a religious ceremony in honor of Reason and Liberty was formally attended by the entire Convention. Reason was personified by an actress installed on the high altar. During the next few weeks about 2500 Catholic churches in France were converted into “Temples of Reason,” and the rest were closed. Robespierre was much disturbed by these performances for, like Voltaire, Napoleon, and many others, he believed that a little religion was a good thing for the lower classes, as it helped to keep them in order. He therefore refused to bother peaceable priests and even tried to make peace with the church by setting up an official worship of the “Supreme Being.” On June 8, 1794, when at the height of his power, he presided over a ceremony in Paris expressing Rousseau’s ideas about civic religion coupled with the faith of the Vicar of Savoy (see p. 132). Though very effectively staged, this ceremony aroused little enthusiasm, and the whole idea was dropped after the fall of Robespierre a few weeks later.
During the summer of 1793 members of the Convention were also preparing a new constitution for France. When finished, this “Constitution of the Year I” provided for a democratic but highly centralized republic with universal manhood suffrage, a one-chamber legislature elected directly by the voters, and a ministry chosen by an electoral college. Largely the work of the Mountain, this constitution was accepted by a popular referendum, but because of the troubled times it never went into effect. It was the most democratic constitution produced during the Revolution. Other democratic reforms date from these months. Slavery was abolished in the French colonies, and the use of all titles except Citoyen and Citoyenne (“Citizen” and “Citizenship”) was abolished—just as in Russia today everyone is “Comrade.” The Convention also ordered the establishment of a nation-wide system of free and compulsory primary schools, following a plan presented by Condorcet, but of course such a system could not be set up overnight. France was not adequately supplied with school houses, school books, or qualified teachers, for education had formerly been left to the church.

The Directory

Robespierre was executed on 10 Thermidor in the Year II, and the next fifteen months saw the “Thermidorean Reaction.” France was tired of foreign wars and attempts to found a Republic of Virtue, and as the enemy had been driven from the country, it seemed a good time to discontinue the Reign of Terror. The Place de la Révolution in Paris, where the guillotine had been set up, was renamed the Place de la Concorde, which name it still bears. The Jacobin Club was closed. The laws regulating business and controlling prices were repealed, laissez faire was reëstablished, and profiteers prospered. The assignats resumed their decline, after having risen noticeably during the Reign of Terror, and soon they were worthless. The working classes therefore suffered greatly during the winter, and in the spring of 1795 they participated in serious riots. Hoodlums belonging to the upper classes, known as the jeunesse dorée (“gilded youth”), rushed about the streets in gangs, attacking persons whom they suspected of Jacobinism. These youths might be called “sans-culottes in reverse.” As a matter of fact, some of their leaders had been Republican Terrorists while Robespierre was alive and that brand of violence was profitable.
At last a new constitution—called the "Constitution of the Year III"—was ready, and on October 26, 1795, what remained of the Convention dissolved. A few days earlier (13 Vendémiaire, October 5), a Parisian mob, under royalist leadership, had attacked the Convention, but their demonstration was broken up when a young artillery officer named Napoleon Bonaparte fired on them with artillery. According to one English man of letters (Thomas Carlyle), that "whiff of grapeshot" put an end to the French Revolution.

The new government, which ruled France from October, 1795, to November, 1799, is called the Directory because its executive power was vested in five directors. These directors were chosen by a legislature of two chambers, with an upper house of 250 and a lower house of 500 members. The legislators, and most other officials, were selected by electors, who in turn were elected by the voters. All adult males who could read were allowed to vote, but the electors had to meet such high property requirements that only twenty thousand persons in all France could qualify. Power therefore rested with the well-to-do, who at this time were mostly war profiteers. The directors and legislators were ordinarily not men of high character and they have frequently been accused of flagrant dishonesty. Napoleon's grapeshot had taught them a lesson, and on several occasions they used troops to quell riots protesting against unpopular measures. At last, however, the Directory was overthrown by Napoleon, on 18 Brumaire of the Year VIII (November 9, 1799), after an inglorious career of four years.

Peace had been made with Prussia by the Treaty of Basel (March 5, 1795) and with the lesser powers a few weeks later. The third and final partition of Poland was consummated by Russia, Prussia, and Austria, on October 24, two days before the Convention dissolved. A little over a year later Catherine II of Russia died (November 10, 1796) and was succeeded by her incompetent but tyrannical son, Paul (1796–1801). Frederick William II of Prussia followed her to the grave a year later (November 16, 1797) and was succeeded by Frederick William III (1797–1840), who was almost as incompetent as his father had been. A few days earlier Austria had signed the Peace of Campo Formio with France (October 17, 1797), leaving England to fight alone. England, distracted by domestic unrest, by mutinies in the navy, and by open rebellion in Ireland, had sent peace negotiators to Lille, where they accomplished nothing. It might seem that
Europe was settling down. In reality, it was preparing for the meteoric career of Napoleon Bonaparte.

**BONAPARTE COMPLETES THE REVOLUTION**

Napoleon Bonaparte was born on the island of Corsica on August 15, 1769, second of the eight children of a Corsican lawyer. The family had migrated from Florence in the sixteenth century and it had risen into the lesser nobility in the eighteenth. As Corsica had been annexed to France in the very year of his birth, the young Napoleon grew up dreaming romantic dreams of Corsican independence. Nevertheless, he attended a French military academy for sev-
eral unhappy years, learning French (though he never spoke it without a slight Italian accent) and reading widely in the French *philosophes*. When his education was completed, he entered the French army as a lieutenant of artillery. Being predisposed to favor the French Revolution by his dreams of Corsican liberty, his dislike of his aristocratic classmates at the academy, and his reading, he joined a local Jacobin Club in 1791. Later in that same year he returned to Corsica to aid the insurgents in their struggle for freedom. Disillusioned by his fellow Corsicans, he rejoined his regiment as an enthusiast for French rather than for Corsican liberty. In August, 1793, he was stationed at Toulon, on the southern coast of France, when a royalist faction invited the commander of a British fleet to land troops and capture the city. By a skillful use of his artillery, Bonaparte drove the fleet from the harbor. As a reward, he was commissioned a brigadier general at the age of twenty-four years. Though arrested as a Jacobin after Thermidor, he was soon released, and he became a public figure by his defense of the expiring Convention against a royalist mob on 13 Vendémiaire.

General Bonaparte's progress under the Directory was rapid. He began moving in high society, where his keen mind and conversation compensated to some extent for his uncouth manners. Early in 1796 he married Josephine de Beauharnais—the widow of a republican general guillotined by Robespierre only a few days before his fall—and Josephine, who had been mistress of one of the directors, secured for him the command of a large army to be sent against the Austrians in northern Italy. The ensuing campaign was in many ways the most brilliant of his career. In the course of eighteen months he defeated his enemies on one battlefield after another, reorganized most of northern and central Italy as republics allied to France, and forced Austria to make peace at Campo Formio (October, 1797). Austria ceded Belgium to France in exchange for Venice, which Bonaparte had conquered, and she recognized the French annexation of German territory as far as the Rhine. A few weeks later one of Bonaparte's generals occupied Rome, sent the pope to France as a prisoner, and reorganized the Papal States as the Roman Republic. This Italian campaign showed Bonaparte's formidable powers as a general, a diplomat, and a leader of men, and it convinced him of his own genius. It also convinced him that the world could be his if he cared to take it.
Bonaparte was greeted with an ovation on his return to France, but he was soon busy with new plans. France was now at war only with England, which he could not successfully invade. He therefore prepared an expedition to Egypt, partly as the first step in an advance upon India, more especially because he felt a romantic urge to see the East which had been made famous by Alexander the Great and the Arabian Nights, and above all, perhaps, because he recognized the weakness of the Directory and did not wish to be buried in the ruins when it fell. The Egyptian expedition of 1798 and 1799 was less brilliant than that in Italy, but it served his purposes well. His fleet was destroyed by the British under Admiral Nelson (1758–1805), but when Bonaparte received reassuring news about the impending collapse of the Directory, he deserted his army and hurried back to
France. A month after his arrival there, he organized a coup d'état which made him supreme in France (18–19 Brumaire, November 9–10, 1799).

The events of these two days were not very complicated. Napoleon’s brother, Lucien Bonaparte, was president of the Council of Five Hundred, and with his connivance the general marched troops into the chamber, drove the deputies from the building, charged that they had been plotting to betray the country to England, and proclaimed a new government under himself as “First Consul.” A new constitution, the fifth since 1789 and known as the “Constitution of the Year VIII,” had been prepared by the Abbé Sieyès, who was a director in 1799. Late in December it was submitted to a popular referendum, and as the voters had to choose between this constitution and nothing, they accepted it by a vote of slightly over three million to 1562.

The details of the new political machinery need not detain us, for the constitution really put all power into the hands of the First Consul. Sieyès had recently devised a new formula for a perfect government—“confidence from below, authority from above”—in accordance with which the voters were allowed to designate about ten thousand men whom they considered worthy of holding office. From these “notables” the consul selected administrators, legislators, and other government officials. The First Consul appointed two other consuls, who had purely advisory powers, as well as a council that looked after the different branches of the administration. The men whom Bonaparte appointed to the various offices were moderates, showing that for him the Revolution was over. The term of the First Consul originally was ten years, but in 1802 Bonaparte became consul for life, with power to appoint his successor.

Bonaparte as First Consul

The new Consul’s first task was to restore peace. After the failure of the abortive negotiations at Lille in 1797, the English had resumed hostilities, and while Bonaparte was in Egypt, Pitt persuaded Russia, Austria, Naples, and a few lesser states to join him in the “Second Coalition.” In 1799 these allies overran most of Italy, overthrew the pro-French republics, and defeated other French armies along the Rhine, but Bonaparte quickly restored French prestige. The Russian tsar, Paul, had been antagonized by Admiral Nelson’s victories in the
eastern Mediterranean and had withdrawn from the Second Coalition (October, 1799). Russia then joined France. A little over a year later, however, Paul was murdered and his successor, Alexander I (1801–1825), resumed a pro-English policy. Meantime, early in 1800, Bonaparte once more crossed the Alps to Italy, where he won a victory at Marengo and compelled the Austrians to sign a peace treaty at Lunéville (February 9, 1801). This treaty reaffirmed the terms of Campo Formio, reëstablished the pro-French republics, and rearranged the rest of Italy.

During these years England was having many troubles. The “United Irishmen” rose in revolt, and occasionally they received aid or encouragement from France, but in 1798 their rebellion was stamped out. Pitt then drew up the Act of Union, joining the two countries as the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland (1801). When George III refused various concessions to Catholic Irishmen, Pitt resigned, one week before Austria signed the Treaty of Lunéville. His successor (Addington) was not interested in the war, and on March 27, 1802, peace with France was signed at Amiens. Bonaparte allowed the English to save face by retaining the island of Trinidad, which they had taken from neutral Spain, as well as Ceylon, snatched from their conquered ally, Holland.

Bonaparte’s second great task was to organize an efficient government in France. During the next few years he created the bureaucracy which, with minor changes, has governed the country ever since. The old Girondin dream of a loosely knit federal France had long since evaporated, for the wars had convinced Frenchmen of the necessity of a strong central authority, while Bonaparte’s military training and experience had implanted a similar conviction in his breast. His whole bureaucracy therefore centered in Paris. Each of the eighty-three departments was governed by a prefect appointed by the consul. A new and more honest system of tax collecting was made uniform throughout the country. By thus increasing his revenues, by strict economy, and by forcing occupied countries to support his armies, Bonaparte was able to balance his budget in 1802. He then bought up, at a heavy discount, the financial obligations of previous governments, and he founded the Bank of France, which thereafter had the sole right to issue such obligations or paper money. He thus avoided the runaway inflation that had caused such distress under the Republic. The early attempts of the Convention to create a national system of education were continued, with attention also
given to secondary and higher education. The "University of France," which Bonaparte founded, included the whole educational system of the country.

The many laws enacted during the preceding ten years had rendered the French legal system more chaotic than ever. Bonaparte therefore appointed committees to arrange these old and new laws in a coherent code. He took a personal interest in this work, sometimes attended meetings of the committees, and surprised the trained jurists by the skill with which he saw the heart of a question. When the Civil Code was finished (1804), it was named the Code Napoléon in his honor, and it has since been the foundation of civil law, both in France and in many other states into which he introduced it. By this famous code the civil liberties won during the French Revolution were perpetuated. A few years later the Code Napoléon was followed by a criminal code, a commercial code, and codes of civil and criminal procedure.

A final great problem concerned the Catholic Church. Bonaparte was not a religious man but, like Robespierre and many others, he realized the political importance of religion. Moreover, the French church had profited greatly from its amputations during the early years of the Revolution. The constitutional clergy had by this time virtually disappeared and the nonjurors were a group of men who took their duties very seriously. They had regained the respect of large sections of the population, and France was witnessing a strong religious revival. Being well aware of all this, Bonaparte decided to make peace with the pope. He had arrested Pius VI (1775–1799) in 1798 and sent him a prisoner to France, where he soon died. The new pope, Pius VII (1800–1823), was willing to negotiate, however, and in 1801 the two men concluded a concordat. When the pope renounced all claim to confiscated church lands and to tithes, Bonaparte agreed to pay the French clergy. The government would nominate bishops thereafter, and the pope invest them, but the bishops appointed the parish priests. Insisting upon complete religious toleration, Bonaparte refused to call France a Catholic country and merely admitted the fact that "Catholicism is the religion of the majority of Frenchmen." He granted Protestants and Jews the same legal status as Catholics, and he paid the salaries of their clergy. Bonaparte may have made peace with the church, but he was determined to dominate it. Louis XIV and Philip II had dictated to the church only in their own territories, but Bonaparte planned to use it for his pur-
poses throughout Europe. Quarrels with the pope therefore continued, but the concordat remained in force until 1905.

WHAT THE REVOLUTION ACCOMPLISHED

Never before in history had so many important events taken place in so short a time as in the years immediately following 1789. The Old Regime was destroyed in France, and no one or nothing there was ever quite the same again. The essence of this Revolution can be summed up in three words, often used at the time and invoked ever since as a motto by many: Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité. But what did these words mean?

When the French spoke of liberty, they meant primarily liberty from the restraints imposed by the Old Regime. For the serf it meant freedom from feudal dues and services; for the businessman it meant freedom from the mercantilist restrictions on trade; for the workers, freedom from guild restrictions. When they spoke of equality, they meant equality in rights and equality before the law. The old “corporate state,” made up of three separate “estates,” became a thing of the past. No longer was there one caste of priests, one of aristocrats, and one containing everybody else, each with its own rights and privileges. All men were simply citizens. When they spoke of fraternity, they usually meant national patriotism. A few idealists had thought in terms of humanity as a whole, but with most Frenchmen fraternity was limited to those of their own nationality. These men lived together, worked together, enjoyed liberty together, understood each other, and waged war together to defend their liberties against the foreign aggressors who would destroy these new liberties. The Revolution thus intensified the spirit of nationalism and developed modern ideas regarding the right of national self-determination.

The Jacobins accepted these ideas in their entirety and favored a truly democratic republic, ruled by the will of the people, but other leaders were less drastic. Almost without exception, these leaders sprang from the middle class, and naturally their conceptions of liberty, equality, and fraternity were colored by their own position in society. In economic matters, for example, their liberty was laissez faire, and they would not tolerate labor unions or anything restricting the “liberty” of the strong man to act in whatever way he deemed most profitable. While these middle-class revolutionists were always anxious to eliminate the old feudal aristocracy, they saw no objection
to a new aristocracy of wealth, with themselves as its leaders. They admitted that all men should be "citizens," but they insisted that only taxpayers might vote and that only the rich might be entrusted with important offices in the new "free" world. When the leaders of the sans-culottes denounced this great reverence for wealth, class war sometimes threatened to negate the benign influence of fraternity.

The French Revolution also brought new ideas regarding the proper relations of church and state. Ever since the Protestant Reformation these two institutions had been united in every country of western Europe, but with the union carried to its greatest extremes by such Catholic sovereigns as Philip II of Spain and Louis XIV of France. These kings, their colleagues, and their successors claimed to rule by divine right, and they usually regarded the church and its clergy as a polite adjunct to the police force. The officials of both Catholic and Protestant churches accepted this position and strongly favored the union. Only a few minor sects, especially those in England, were willing to regard churches simply as voluntary societies made up of believers which need have no official connection with their governments. The Revolution taught Europe to regard all churches as such groups of believers, and it divorced the French church completely from the French state. Many years were to pass before someone devised the motto "A free church in a free state," but the underlying idea was popularized during the Revolution. The new state was completely secular, it had no connection with any church, and it extended the same toleration to all churches. This new secular state also assumed many of the functions formerly performed by the church, the most important of which, perhaps, was the education of youth.

In the nineteenth century these various ideas regarding political and economic liberty, social equality, nationalism, the separation of church and state, and the secular state, all to be guaranteed by written constitutions, Bills of Rights, and popular sovereignty, came to be called "liberalism," and in one form or another they gradually spread to every country of Europe and America. Napoleon's armies carried liberal ideas with them wherever they went. Political agitators propagated them in every country, and sometimes revolutionists plotted to overthrow hostile and illiberal governments by force. Minor revolutions broke out in various countries during the years following Napoleon's downfall, and in 1848 nearly every country in Europe suffered such an upheaval—all as a legacy from the great
French Revolution. During the first half of the nineteenth century, moreover, profound economic changes were sweeping over western Europe, greatly strengthening the political power of the middle class and bringing further support to its political liberalism. Large political parties then adopted liberal programs, and everywhere thoughtful people favored reform in a liberal spirit. Even those who still shuddered at the thought of Robespierre and Marat began to admit the desirability of more democracy and liberalism but, after the manner of Burke, they also said, "evolution not revolution."
THE REVOLUTION IN EUROPE

THE FRENCH EMPIRE—MAKING PEACE
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12. THE FRENCH EMPIRE

When France went to war in the spring of 1792 her Revolution became aggressive. The Convention formally declared itself opposed to kings everywhere, and it promised “fraternity and aid” to all peoples who desired to “regain” their liberty. This new idealism, coupled with military victories in Belgium, inspired many Frenchmen with a new revolutionary and republican version of the old French imperialism of Louis XIV, and Napoleon Bonaparte became Louis’s great successor. He truthfully advertised himself as a “son of the Revolution,” and wherever his armies went they spread revolutionary ideas and revolutionary enthusiasm. He made the Revolution a matter of prime concern to all Europe, and for many years after his death men continued to fight for or against his ideas. The present chapter will therefore trace the steady march of revolutionary ideas through Europe with his armies (1804–1815); it will show how his wars forced his enemies to effect revolutionary reforms in their own countries (1807–1813); it will tell of his downfall (1813–1815); it will describe the efforts of the victors to reestablish the Old Regime (1815–1830); and it will close with the triumph of moderate liberalism in 1830 and 1832.

When French and English negotiators concluded the Treaty of Amiens in March, 1802, Europe found herself at peace for the first time in ten years, but as neither party was satisfied with its terms, the treaty was scrapped within fourteen months. The English resented having to surrender the colonies they had recently seized in various parts of the world, and they flatly refused to give up Malta; they feared a Belgium that was part of France and a Holland that was a French ally; and, ever mindful of Burke’s lurid warnings, they trembled at the thought of revolution. Bonaparte, on the other hand, was dreaming vast dreams of an empire in Europe and the New

A new imperialism

"Perfidious Albion"
World which, he knew, would never be realized if England could prevent it. In 1800, for example, while reshuffling Italy, he had again acquired Louisiana, ceded to Spain by France in 1763, but England's belligerent attitude caused him to sell that vast province to the United States in April, 1803. Bonaparte was already railing bitterly against "perfidious Albion," and less than a month later war between the two rivals broke out anew, with Britain's retention of Malta serving as its main pretext.

The decrepit Addington ministry continued to govern England for a few months, and when it collapsed, early in 1804, Pitt again took office as prime minister. He planned to conduct the war with a "ministry of all the talents," even granting Fox a place in his cabinet, but

George III refused categorically to listen to such a scheme. Pitt therefore struggled along with mediocre colleagues until his untimely death, early in 1806. George could resist no longer, and Fox dominated the next ministry, though serving as foreign secretary, not as
prime minister. He failed in his efforts to negotiate peace with France, and a law abolishing the English slave trade was his only achievement before death removed him, late in that same year 1806. For several years thereafter, England's war effort was directed by second-rate ministers.

The renewal of hostilities turned Bonaparte's energies in new directions. First of all, it enabled him to change his official status in France. He had long aspired to a position equal or superior to that of the kings of old, and he now realized this dream by deftly exploiting war hysteria. He first accused the Duke of Enghien, a member of the Bourbon family, of complicity in a plot, had him kidnapped from his refuge in Germany, and ordered him shot after a farcical trial (March, 1804). This lawless act aroused such indignation throughout Europe that one of Bonaparte's ministers allegedly remarked later, "It was worse than a crime, it was a blunder." So subtle a distinction mattered little for the moment, however, and the duke's death served its purpose adequately. Pretending to be thoroughly frightened by the plot, Bonaparte launched a great agitation to end Bourbon intrigue by having the French Senate declare him emperor and thus enable him to found a dynasty. Early in May, the servile Senate voted that he should be granted this title; the voters ratified the decision almost unanimously in a referendum; the pope was brought to Paris to perform the coronation; and on December 2, 1804, a magnificent ceremony was staged in the cathedral of Notre Dame at Paris, during which Bonaparte unexpectedly seized the crown and put it on his own head. France had been governed for several years by General Bonaparte, but thereafter it was ruled by Napoleon I, Emperor of the French. The new emperor at once organized a magnificent court, founded a new nobility composed of his own partisans, and inaugurated a modernized version of the authoritarian Old Regime.

Shortly after these crucial events Pitt formed his Third Coalition against France by concluding alliances with Austria and Russia, while Napoleon was crowning himself king of Italy (in imitation of Charlemagne), annexing the Ligurian Republic (Genoa) to France, appointing a relative (his stepson, Eugène de Beauharnais) viceroy of Italy, and imposing an alliance upon the Bourbon king of Spain. The large army he had assembled at Boulogne, supposedly in preparation for an invasion of England, was now sent to Germany, where it captured an Austrian army at Ulm (October 17, 1805) and won a brilliant victory over combined Austrian and Russian forces at
Austerlitz (December 2). By the ensuing Peace of Pressburg (December 26) Napoleon relieved Austria of all her Italian possessions. Meantime, however, he had suffered a disastrous naval defeat at the hands of the British under Lord Nelson at Trafalgar (October 21). The combined French and Spanish fleets were annihilated, leaving England in complete command of the seas, but Lord Nelson lost his life in the battle.

Prussia had refused to join the Third Coalition in 1805, but Napoleon’s high-handed activities caused her to declare war upon him a year later. Her armies were shattered at Jena (October 14, 1806), soon after which Napoleon entered Berlin. Russia alone of his enemies still had armies in the field, and a victory over them at Friedland in East Prussia (June 14, 1807) carried him to the Russian frontier. Here he conferred with the Tsar Alexander I on a raft in the Niemen River and arranged the Treaty of Tilsit. After recognizing each other as supreme in eastern and western Europe respectively, the two monarchs concluded an alliance and imposed crushing peace terms upon Prussia (July 7–9, 1807). Napoleon had become the undisputed dictator of all Europe west of Russia and Turkey.

Nevertheless, Napoleon still was not satisfied. He was not yet recognized as the social equal of the old royalty, and he still wished to found a dynasty. As his wife Josephine had borne him no children, he began considering a new marriage, for which an opportunity presented itself in 1809. His Bourbon allies in Spain had caused him to spend the year 1808 expelling them and establishing his brother Joseph on their throne. During his absence, the Austrians prepared new armies, and early in 1809 they launched their fourth war against France. Napoleon defeated them at Wagram (July 5–6) and made a new peace at Schönbrunn (October 14). Soon thereafter he opened negotiations for marriage with Marie Louise—a daughter of the Emperor Francis I, who was a Hapsburg and a great-niece of Marie Antoinette! Josephine was summarily divorced and the Austrian marriage was solemnized at Paris on April 2, 1810. A year later Marie Louise bore Napoleon a son, whom he promptly proclaimed King of Rome. At last Napoleon had arrived.

Napoleon’s New Europe

When Napoleon stood at the height of his power, about 1810, the states of Europe fell into three categories. First came the French
EUROPE UNDER NAPOLEON, 1810

- France in 1795
- Napoleon's Annexations
- Napoleon's Allies
- Independent of Napoleon
Empire, ruled directly by Napoleon and his French aides. It included the old realm of Louis XVI, the lands annexed by the French Republic (Belgium, the Rhine provinces, and a bit of Italy), and various areas added by Napoleon. The most important of Napoleon’s annexations were Holland, the northwestern coast of Germany as far as Denmark, western Italy as far south as Rome, and the Dalmatian coast of modern Yugoslavia. Secondly, there were various “satellite states” set up by Napoleon. At first they had been republics, but by 1810 all save one (Switzerland, or the Helvetian Republic) were monarchies ruled either by a member of his family, or by one of his generals, or by a trusted native ruler. These “satellite states” covered central Germany, Italy, and Spain. And lastly, there were Napoleon’s rather doubtful “allies”—Austria and Prussia, Russia, and the Scandinavian states. Only England, Portugal, Sicily, Sardinia, and the Ottoman Empire remained outside Napoleon’s Europe.

In the first of these regions—the lands annexed outright to France—the whole of French law was put into effect, with its abolition of feudalism, the equal status of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews, and all the other permanent gains of the French Revolution. These annexed regions were divided into “departments,” as though they were parts of France, and prefects were sent from Paris to govern them. The people did not vote like Frenchmen, but after the absurd plebiscites of 1799 and 1804, voting was of little consequence in France itself. Some people in these annexed provinces were hostile to Napoleon, but the great majority enjoyed more liberty than ever before.

The situation in the “satellite states” was more complicated. The new governments introduced countless reforms of a liberal sort, but changes varied greatly from one region to another. These reforms were especially important in central Germany—the region lying between the Rhine and Prussia-Austria—which Napoleon united loosely as the Rheinbund, or “Confederation of the Rhine” (1806). This region had formerly been ruled by almost three hundred independent princes, among whom were many Catholic ecclesiastics, but the Treaty of Campo Formio (1797) had permitted German princes whose estates west of the Rhine had been confiscated by the French to reimburse themselves by seizing these church lands. The ecclesiastical states therefore ceased to exist. The Treaty of Lunéville (1801) brought further territorial changes to Germany, after which only about twenty states remained. Six years later Napoleon created the
THE BONAPARTE FAMILY

Charles Bonaparte = Maria Letizia
1746-1785 = 1750-1836

Joseph
1768-1844
King of Naples
1806-1808
King of Spain
1808-1813

NAPOLEON I
1769-1821

Lucien
1775-1840

Elise
1777-1820
Grand Duchess of Tuscany
1809-1814

Louis
1778-1846
King of Holland
1806-1810
(= Hortense Beauharnais)

Pauline
1780-1825

Caroline
1782-1839
= Murat
King of Naples
1808-1815

Jerome
1784-1860
King of Westphalia
1807-1813

married (1) Josephine = Beauharnais
1763-1814 = 1760-1794

Eugene
1781-1824
Viceroy of Italy
1805-1814

Hortense
1783-1837

married (2) Marie Louise
1791-1847

NAPOLEON II
1811-1832
"King of Rome"

Louis Napoleon
1808-1873
Emperor as NAPOLEON III
1852-1870

= married
Kingdom of Westphalia out of territories taken from Hanover and Prussia, placing it under the rule of his brother Jerome, and united all central Germany in the Confederation of the Rhine.

After the Treaty of Tilsit Napoleon resurrected Poland, much to the distress of his ally, Alexander I. This new “Grand Duchy of Warsaw” was composed of part of the territories seized by Prussia and Austria during the recent partitions of Poland and was ruled by Napoleon’s trusted ally, the king of Saxony (1809). The old Dutch Republic had been reorganized as the Batavian Republic in 1795, but in 1806 Napoleon’s brother Louis was made king of Holland, which post he held until 1810, when Holland was annexed to France. In Italy, much of the Po Valley and parts of the Papal States were united to form the Kingdom of Italy, with Napoleon as its king. All Italy south of Rome was reorganized as the Kingdom of Naples, after its Bourbon king had fled to Sicily, and Napoleon’s brother Joseph became its ruler (1806). Two years later, when the Bourbons were expelled from Spain, Joseph was transferred to Madrid (1808), after which Naples was ruled by one of Napoleon’s generals, who was also his brother-in-law, Joachim Murat.

These political and territorial changes were accompanied by the introduction of many French reforms. In central Europe, as in France before the Revolution, the population had been divided into various legally recognized social classes, or “estates” (Stände), each having its own special rights and privileges. This hierarchy of ranks was now abolished, the nobility lost their special privileges, and all men became equal before the law. Feudalism too was abolished, but lords might keep their lands or receive compensation. In Germany the small farmers profited greatly, but in Poland and Italy the landlord replaced the feudal lord. Often the new lord was the same man as the old, but sometimes he was a rich speculator, even more heartless than his predecessor had been. The old guilds, and other medieval restrictions on economic freedom, were usually swept away. Religious toleration was proclaimed everywhere; all varieties of believers and nonbelievers enjoyed equal legal and political rights; and steps were taken toward establishing secular systems of education. New and juster forms of taxation were devised, with taxes collected more honestly and more efficiently than under the Old Regime. The Germans who thus got their first taste of liberty were often grateful to Napoleon, and in his last years thousands of German soldiers enlisted in the French armies. Many of these German recruits were merce-
naries or conscripts, it is true, but many others, like their French comrades, were fighting to prevent a restoration of the Old Regime in their own country.

The Continental System

After Tilsit (1807) and Wagram (1809), when Napoleon stood at the peak of his career, no continental power could oppose him. As long as England remained undefeated, however, her independence encouraged Europeans to fight for theirs, and Napoleon could not consider himself secure. As he had lost his navy at Trafalgar (1805) and therefore could not hope to invade England, he tried instead to wage economic warfare against her. Contemptuously deriding the English as a “nation of shopkeepers,” he declared that the best way to humble them was to destroy their trade. If the English could not sell their goods on the continent, unemployment and its consequences at home might force them to sue for peace. Napoleon therefore inaugurated what is commonly called the “continental system.” The French had excluded British goods from their country even under the Convention and the Directory, thus retaliating for the English seizure of French ships and foreign markets. By the Berlin and Milan decrees of 1806 and 1807, Napoleon ordered his satellites and allies to adopt similar measures, hoping to exclude British goods from all Europe. The British replied with “orders in council,” declaring a blockade of the continent. Everyone suffered from this new type of warfare, but in the end England won because of her command of the seas.

Napoleon’s efforts to enforce the Berlin and Milan decrees dragged him into many costly controversies. Even his brother Louis, whom he had named King of Holland in 1806, permitted so much smuggling that four years later Napoleon forced him to abdicate. Holland and the coast of northwestern Germany were then annexed to France, but Napoleon’s own prefects were no better at enforcing the decrees. The Scandinavian states likewise caused trouble, but here the situation was more complicated. The king of Denmark, who also ruled Norway, was anxious to remain neutral, but in 1807, shortly after the Treaty of Tilsit, a British fleet sailed into the harbor at Copenhagen, bombarded the city for four days, and captured the Danish navy. This piece of piracy drove Denmark and Norway into Napoleon’s willing arms. Early in 1808 Alexander of Russia seized Finland, which for cen-
turies had been Swedish territory, and Denmark attacked Sweden. When peace was restored a year later, Sweden was forced to join the continental system, and in 1810 one of Napoleon’s generals, Prince Bernadotte (1763–1844), was declared heir to the Swedish throne. Bernadotte presently turned against Napoleon, ingratiated himself with the Swedes, and eventually became their king (1818). His descendants have ruled that country ever since.

Napoleon found it even more difficult to enforce his decrees in Spain and Portugal. For several years the Spanish Bourbons had been his pawns, but the Portuguese were allied with England, and Portugal became one of the principal leaks in the dyke around Europe. Early in 1808, therefore, Napoleon expelled the Bourbon king to put his brother Joseph on the throne of Spain. Joseph presently introduced liberal reforms, abolishing serfdom and the Inquisition, confiscating church property, and establishing secular education. Though these reforms pleased many Spaniards, they aroused the resistance of devout Catholics, of whom there were many in Spain. Joseph was helpless against these rebels, for when he took strenuous measures against them, he merely made martyrs and attracted new recruits to their cause. Spain became, in Napoleon’s words, “the Spanish ulcer” which nothing could heal.

As soon as they observed Napoleon’s troubles in Spain, the British landed troops in Portugal under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley—later the Duke of Wellington and victor at Waterloo. Late in 1808 Napoleon came to his brother Joseph’s aid and drove the invaders from Spain. The British remained in Portugal, however, and two years later they resumed the offensive. After winning a major victory at Salamanca in July, 1812, they entered Madrid, and late in 1813 they crossed the Pyrenees to invade France itself. In this “Peninsular War” the British were aided greatly by Spanish guerrillas, whose raids demoralized the retreating French army.

At the same time Napoleon’s continental system was adding another important enemy to the growing list. Pope Pius VII (1800–1823) had hated Napoleon ever since the emperor had forced him to take so ridiculous a part at the coronation in 1804, and he now refused to enforce the continental system in the Papal States. Napoleon therefore sent a general to occupy Rome, and formally annexed the States to France (May, 1809). When the pope replied by excommunicating the emperor, he was arrested and held prisoner for five years. This imprisonment of course made Pius a hero in the eyes of
Catholics everywhere and proved to be another of Napoleon's major blunders.

It soon became apparent, moreover, that the continental system hurt France more than it did England, for her loss of imports was a serious matter. Such colonial products as sugar, coffee, and tobacco began to command famine prices, and the lack of raw cotton was disastrous to the whole European textile industry. When Napoleon tried to find substitutes for such products, starting a beet-sugar industry in France and urging Frenchmen to use chicory instead of coffee, he was not very successful. Moreover, Europe had become dependent upon English factories for many essentials. Napoleon himself was forced to buy overcoats in England and smuggle them into France. His costly efforts to establish new industries in France quickly taught him that Frenchmen had neither the skill nor the technical knowledge required to create an industrial system overnight, and that the new and popular ideas regarding economic laissez faire ran directly counter to his plans for state-supported industrial development. Shortages of goods therefore brought an acute economic crisis, banks began to fail, and by 1811 Napoleon was driven to extreme measures to keep his economic machine in operation. The glamour of his early victories was paling, and his new edicts brought charges of tyranny.

Other factors were rapidly disillusioning Frenchmen about Napoleon. Censorship of the press, for example, was so strict that no news of Trafalgar (1805) or the arrest of Pius VII (1809) was published in France until after Napoleon's abdication. Nevertheless, exaggerated accounts of what was happening circulated by word of mouth, or through smuggled books and pamphlets, and they won credence the more easily because of the official silence. At the same time an intellectual and literary opposition to the Empire began to appear, with Madame de Staël, daughter of the former finance minister Necker, as one of Napoleon's most effective opponents. When exiled by Napoleon, she fled to Russia (1811), and other leaders presently followed the same path. Napoleon now began to quarrel with his most trusted associates. His minister of police, Joseph Fouché (1763–1820), an accomplished intriguer who habitually played both sides, was dismissed in 1810. Still more disquieting was Napoleon's quarrel with his foreign minister, Prince Talleyrand (1754–1838). This diplomat's uncanny skill, foresight, and luck had enabled him to become a bishop under Louis XVI, to propose the confiscation of
church lands in the Constituent Assembly, to be in the United States during the Reign of Terror, to serve as foreign minister under the Directory, and to become a prince under Napoleon. His most brilliant achievements were still to come, however, and his breach with Napoleon in 1809 was highly ominous. The first and smartest rats were deserting the sinking ship.

England too was suffering from the war and the continental system. Her exports did not decline as rapidly as Napoleon had hoped, for she managed to find new markets in Latin America and the Orient, but many essential supplies were shut off. She formerly had imported grain from the Baltic states, timber and other naval stores from the same region, and food from Holland. Napoleon checked this flow of goods, thereby causing trouble, but in 1811, ironically enough, France's grain crop so far surpassed expectations that Napoleon had to sell grain in England to maintain prices at home.

Moreover, England's "orders in council" eventually brought her into the War of 1812 with the United States. Americans had greeted the French Revolution with mixed emotions, for Jefferson and his followers sympathized with the French in their struggle for liberty while John Adams and the Federalists were definitely hostile. President Jefferson, being a pacifist, was anxious to remain neutral in the war between England and Napoleon, and early in 1807 he signed an "Embargo Act" forbidding Americans to trade with either belligerent. The Federalists of New England—then the center of American shipping interests—complained so loudly that the act was repealed (1808). For the next few years American shipowners prospered, but as the enforcement of Napoleon's decrees and England's orders in council grew more effective, unpleasant incidents occurred and hotheads began demanding war. Though President Madison was a Jeffersonian Democrat, he finally yielded to their clamors. It is important to note, however, that it was not the New England shippers who demanded war. They were quite willing to take their chances as smugglers and blockade-runners, they opposed the war bitterly, and radicals among them assembled in the Hartford Convention to discuss the secession of New England from the Union. The war hawks of 1812 were mostly western expansionists who made British activities on the high seas a pretext for trying to seize Canada.

During this War of 1812 the American navy won several victories, but the army was not equally successful. British troops even entered Washington in 1814 and burned the Capitol. In fact, the only major victory of the American army was won by Andrew Jackson at New
Orleans two weeks after peace had been signed—but before the news had reached this country. In the end, the Treaty of Ghent (December 24, 1814), negotiated by John Quincy Adams of Massachusetts, merely provided for a cessation of hostilities and said nothing at all about the great issues supposedly at stake. The War of 1812 undoubtedly caused the British to have more respect for American independence, but perhaps its most important lesson was that, even in those early days, the United States could not avoid entanglement in Europe’s wars.

**EUROPE’S SELF-REFORM**

Napoleon constantly harped upon the theme that his wars were purely defensive, preserving the new liberties of Frenchmen against the machinations and intrigues of the Bourbons and the British, while his enemies insisted with equal vehemence that in their wars they were merely defending themselves against Napoleonic aggression. Each claim was in part correct. Napoleon undoubtedly entertained grandiose ambitions for himself and his family, and he dreamed of dominating all Europe, but if his enemies had won a decisive victory in the earlier years of the war, they would certainly have reinstated the Bourbons and most of the Old Regime in France. Of course Napoleon forced himself and his own personality into every discussion, but most Frenchmen really fought for their Revolution as much as they fought for him, and the monarchs of Europe detested it as bitterly and fought against it as tenaciously as they detested and fought against him. Napoleon’s military victories were not due entirely to his unquestionable military genius or even to the enthusiasm of the French people for their new liberty. The European armies were defeated because the peoples of Europe felt no enthusiasm for the Old Regime, either in France or in their own countries, and when the more intelligent of the European rulers came to recognize this fact, they set about making reforms of their own.

Though the Prussians led in these reform measures, the rulers of Russia and Austria were not uninfluenced by new ideas. Alexander I (1801–1825) of Russia had been trained by his grandmother, Catherine II, to be an enlightened despot, and his tutor—a Swiss named La Harpe, who later helped reorganize Switzerland as the Napoleonic “Helvetic Republic”—had indoctrinated him with the ideas of Rousseau and the French *philosophes*. Alexander was a religious mystic, he dreamed of world peace and international coöpera-
tion, and he wished to be remembered as a great humanitarian. During his early years as tsar he associated with other young men of liberal ideas and gained the reputation of favoring constitutional monarchy, liberalism, and reform. Many persons who had once favored the French Revolution, but who had been disillusioned by Robespierre or Napoleon, now came to look upon Alexander as the most likely savior of Europe. But Alexander was the grandson and heir of Catherine the Great, and his dreams of territorial aggrandizement enabled Napoleon to seduce him from his allies at Tilsit. In his complex character, the old Russian autocrat prevailed over the liberal cosmopolitan. He brought a few reforms into the Russian government, rendering it more efficient if not more liberal, but at that point his liberalism evaporated, and in his later years he championed the old Russian autocracy in all its brutality.

When Leopold II of Austria died in 1792, he was succeeded by his son Francis II, both as Holy Roman Emperor and as head of the Hapsburg family. This young man had been trained by his uncle Joseph II, the best of the enlightened despots. Joseph's reforms had proved their value during the wars of the 1790's, when the Austrian state proved less fragile than most observers had anticipated. Nevertheless, Napoleon's territorial readjustments in Germany forced a drastic revision of the Hapsburg position, and it became extremely doubtful whether another Hapsburg could be elected Holy Roman Emperor. Napoleon might even claim the office for himself or for his heir. Francis therefore lost interest in that venerable but empty honor and proclaimed himself Francis I, Emperor of Austria (1804). Two years later he declared the Holy Roman Empire abolished. After his defeat at Wagram (1809) Francis suffered the humiliation of seeing his daughter, Marie Louise, married to the upstart Corsican adventurer, but he continued preparations for still another war against Napoleon. In these efforts he was aided by a minister of genius.

Prince Klemens von Metternich (1773–1859) belonged to a German family that had long been in the Austrian service. As a student at Strasbourg he had observed the first phases of the French Revolution and had there acquired a lifelong distaste for all revolutionary activities. After marrying the granddaughter of Count Kaunitz—the man who arranged the Franco-Austrian alliance of 1755 and later served as adviser to Maria Theresa and Joseph II—Metternich rose rapidly in the diplomatic service, being Austrian ambassador in Ber-
lin and, from 1806 to 1809, in Paris. Here he learned to know Napoleon well. After Wagram he became Austrian minister of foreign affairs, which post he held for almost forty years. His diplomatic skill kept Austria at peace until she could recover somewhat from her repeated defeats, he had a major share in the overthrow of Napoleon, and he dominated Europe for many years thereafter.

More important than these developments in Russia and Austria was the remarkable resurgence of Prussia after her defeat at Jena (1806). The showy but brittle creation of Frederick the Great was shattered by Napoleon on that famous day. By the treaty dictated at Tilsit a few months later, Napoleon deprived Prussia of all her territories west of the Elbe and most of her share of Poland; he forced her to support a French army of occupation until a large indemnity was paid; and he limited her army to 42,000 men. Nevertheless, the Prussian government resolutely took up the tasks of reconstruction. These chores fell largely to the Prussian bureaucracy, and as the higher levels of this bureaucracy had long been attracting able men from all parts of Germany, the revival of Prussia may be viewed as a German national achievement.

Conspicuous among the leaders of reform in Prussia was the Baron vom Stein (1757–1831), who was by birth a petty aristocrat from the Rhineland. Before entering the Prussian service in 1785 he had read widely in such English writers as Adam Smith and Arthur Young (see p. 251), he had visited England, and his father-in-law (a German count) was reputed to be an illegitimate son of George II. Though rising above Burke’s hysteria, he shared the Englishman’s view of the French Revolution and his preference for gradual growth rather than artificial creation. He was therefore careful to base his reforms on existing Prussian institutions instead of importing them from abroad as was done by the rulers of Napoleon’s satellite states. When Stein became Prussian minister of the interior in October, 1807,
he gave himself energetically to domestic reform, and his success caused Napoleon to demand his resignation fourteen months later. Stein fled to Austria, and in 1812 he became a trusted counselor of the tsar.

Prince von Hardenberg (1750–1822) was a Hanoverian by birth and, like Stein, an admirer of England. He had served Prussian diplomacy for many years—he signed the Treaty of Basel (1795) for Prussia—before he became foreign minister in 1807. Napoleon forced his resignation by refusing to deal with him at Tilsit, but he became
Prussian chancellor in 1810 and continued the liberal reforms inaugurated by Stein.

The first of these Prussian reforms was the abolition of serfdom but, as the decree was published less than a week after Stein entered office, it must have been largely the work of others. By this decree serfs were freed from personal subjection and from feudal services or dues, but the lords received compensation for the latter, sometimes in cash payments and sometimes in land. Peasants were permitted to migrate to the cities and enter trades, regardless of guild regulations, but the guilds were not abolished. Four years later another law arranged for the enclosure or partition of the lands formerly held in common by villages. These laws gave the peasants greater freedom, but the Prussian Junkers were spared the fate of the French aristocrats. The more extreme Junkers accused Stein of “Jacobinism” and were glad to see him go but, in spite of the agrarian reforms, their class continued to be the backbone of the Prussian state. Other reforms coming at this time included the reorganization of municipal government, the strengthening of the bureaucracy, and the extension of primary education.

Most important of all for the struggle against Napoleon were the army reforms effected by the Hanoverian Scharnhorst (1755–1813) and by Gneisenau (1760–1831), a Saxon in Prussian service. After Frederick’s old army of professionals had been smashed at Jena, these men created a new “national army,” based on universal military service, such as the Convention had established in France. Napoleon had forbidden Prussia to maintain an army of more than 42,000 men, but these generals evaded the order by rapidly training one group of recruits after another and letting each go as soon as it was trained. Prussia never had more than 42,000 men under arms at one time, but when war was resumed in 1813, she quickly raised an army of 250,000 well-trained, well-equipped, and ardently patriotic soldiers.

These legal and administrative changes show only one side of Prussia’s regeneration after Jena. Another side is shown in the rise of national patriotism, a virtue in which the Germans had hitherto been rather conspicuously deficient. While this new patriotism came in part as an answer to the blows and humiliations inflicted by Napoleon and the French armies, its way had been prepared by the preaching of poets and philosophers. Even before 1789 German thinkers such as Herder (see p. 114) had criticized the cosmopolitan
ideals of the Enlightenment, maintaining that each Volk ("people," usually a group speaking one language) has a character of its own, which character is expressed in its literature, its art, its laws, and its way of life generally. As every man belongs to one Volk or another and is culturally inseparable from it, his primary loyalty should go to that group rather than to humanity as a whole. These fundamental ideas were developed by countless German thinkers and orators in the early years of the nineteenth century (see p. 231) and formed an intellectual foundation for the new patriotism. Perhaps the most effective of these thinkers was the philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), a professor at the University of Berlin and a convert from Kantian cosmopolitanism, whose highly nationalistic Addresses to the German People (1808) were widely circulated. Mention must also be made of "Turnvater" Jahn (1778–1852), who went about Prussia organizing gymnastic societies (Turnvereine) that rapidly became centers of nationalistic enthusiasm and propaganda.

Prussia profited especially from this emotional and intellectual revival. The French, or pro-French, rulers of the satellite states had removed the worst abuses of the Old Regime in their sections of Germany, it is true, and had driven out the worst of the decadent aristocrats, for which most Germans were devoutly thankful, but these pro-French rulers could not inspire the patriotic loyalty of their German subjects. Prussia, on the other hand, was thoroughly German, and patriots throughout Germany enthusiastically followed her leadership. By this time Germans too thought they had something worth fighting for, and when war broke out in 1813, Napoleon faced armies and peoples that were as fervently patriotic as the French armies of the Republic had been in 1793.

This reform movement penetrated even to Spain. Joseph Bonaparte's introduction of many desirable reforms had won him little gratitude from the Spanish people, who remained in a state of rebellion against him. In 1812 a "junta," or council, of leading rebels met at Cadiz, where they drew up a liberal constitution modeled on the French Constitution of 1791. During the next two years all Spain—except the parts occupied by French or British troops—recognized the government established by this document, and its authority reached even to Mexico and South America. When the victorious allies restored a Bourbon king to Spain, after the fall of Napoleon, the Constitution of 1812 was withdrawn, but only after it had inspired many to fight against Joseph and Napoleon.
NAPOLEON'S DOWNFALL

Tsar Alexander I was not pleased with the new friend he won at Tilsit. Napoleon prevented him from seizing Constantinople as he had planned; his establishment of the grand duchy of Warsaw encouraged restlessness in Russian Poland; Napoleon's marriage to an Austrian princess was taken as an insult (Alexander's sister had been available) and it made him an ally of Alexander's principal rival in the Balkans; and the continental system drew loud complaints from Russian aristocrats who missed their tobacco and other luxuries. Alexander therefore decided to break with Napoleon and in December, 1810, he announced the opening of Russian ports to neutral shipping. Such disloyalty had to be punished severely, and Napoleon prepared an enormous army for the purpose. Talleyrand and several generals advised against the project, but their advice was disregarded, and in June, 1812, Napoleon entered Russia.

The "Grand Army" with which Napoleon conducted this invasion was the largest the world had yet seen. His total forces amounted to about 700,000 men, less than half of whom were Frenchmen, almost a third were Germans, and the remainder were Poles, Italians, Swiss, and men of other nationalities. Many of these troops were occupied in Spain, however, and others were stationed in Germany and Italy, which left only 450,000 available for the war against Russia. About 150,000 reinforcements followed later. As usual, Napoleon counted on a short campaign, with one decisive victory and peace within a few weeks. The Russians refused to fight, however, and retreated far into Russia, destroying everything as they withdrew. Since Napoleon habitually supported his armies from the countryside, this general devastation was a disaster for him. At last, however, he fought a battle at Borodino, where he killed 50,000 Russians while losing only 30,000 men himself; but again the enemy retreated in good order. The French finally entered Moscow on September 14, but found the city almost empty. Within a few days, moreover, three-quarters of it lay in ashes, burned by the Russians. When the tsar refused to listen to peace proposals, Napoleon realized that he must leave Russia at once (October 18), and the ensuing retreat from Moscow was one of the most terrible episodes in military history. Supplies were abandoned in the wild rush, tens of thousands starved or froze, the pursuing Russians attacked relentlessly and cut off stragglers,
and discipline broke down so completely that the Grand Army degenerated into a frenzied mob fighting for whatever food it could find. Of the 600,000 men who entered Russia, fewer than 100,000 returned.

Early in December Napoleon deserted his army and hurried back to Paris, promising to have 300,000 more men on the Vistula in the spring. By calling the next two classes of conscripts to the colors (allegedly with the remark that boys could stop bullets as well as men) he attained this number, but he had no time to train them properly. Early in 1813 Prussia reentered the war, and she was quickly followed by other German states and Austria. Russian troops aided the Germans, and Sweden sent an army under Bernadotte. During
the summer of 1813 Napoleon managed to hold his own, but in a four-day "Battle of the Nations" at Leipzig (October 16–19) he suffered his first military defeat. He hastily withdrew his armies across the Rhine, and before the end of the year his elaborate reconstruction of Germany had collapsed. At just this juncture, too, Wellington invaded France from Spain.

Early in November, 1813, the victorious allies offered Napoleon peace, with the Rhine as his frontier, and when he haughtily refused, they prepared to invade France. Their armies crossed the Rhine shortly before the end of the year, and in February, 1814, they again offered peace, but with the French frontiers of 1792. Again Napoleon refused, and three weeks later the allies entered Paris (March 31, 1814). Seeing that resistance was hopeless, Napoleon abdicated in favor of his son, and when this did not satisfy the allies, he abdicated unconditionally (Fontainebleau, April 11). The allies granted him complete sovereignty over the tiny island of Elba (eighty-six square miles) lying in the Mediterranean between Corsica and Italy, and allowed him to continue calling himself emperor. He arrived in his new realm on May 4, 1814.

One brief act in the Napoleonic tragedy still remained to be played. The diplomats of Europe assembled at Vienna in September, 1814, to draw up a final treaty of peace, but their progress was slow and discontent had time to spread over all France. Napoleon's partisans found ways to turn this general restlessness to his advantage, and he made up his mind to try once more. Escaping from Elba, he landed in southern France, where he was received with delirious joy (March 1, 1815). Three weeks later he was in Paris. Louis XVIII, whom the allies had placed on the throne, fled headlong to Ghent, and for the next one hundred days Napoleon again ruled France. Both he and the allies hastily reassembled their armies, and on June 14 he crossed the Belgian frontier to meet his foes. Four days later he was defeated decisively at Waterloo by the British under Wellington and the Prussians under Blücher (June 18). He fled to Paris, but being no longer welcome there, he abdicated for a second time and proceeded to Rochefort, on the western coast of France, whence he hoped to escape to the United States. Finding such flight impossible, he surrendered to the captain of a British warship, the Bellerophon (July 15, 1815). Meantime the allies had again entered Paris (July 7), bringing Louis XVIII "in their baggage trains," and again they restored the Bourbon monarchy.
The English sent Napoleon to St. Helena, a rocky island (fifty square miles) in the South Atlantic, far from the African coast. Here he spent the remainder of his days, sleeping and dictating “memoirs” in which he pictured himself as a great champion of liberty, and here he died of cancer on May 5, 1821. Josephine died suddenly a few weeks after his first abdication (May 24, 1814). Marie Louise returned to Austria, was made a duchess and the ruler of two north Italian states, married twice more, and died in 1847. Napoleon’s son, called Napoleon II, the “King of Rome,” or L’Aiglon (“The Eaglet”), was taken to Vienna, became the Duke of Reichstadt, and died of tuberculosis in 1832, aged twenty-one years.
13. MAKING PEACE

It is reported that Napoleon once explained his long succession of victories by remarking that, after all, he had only coalitions to fight against. During the quarter of a century preceding Waterloo the allies had entered into five coalitions (1792–1797, 1799–1801, 1805–1806, 1812–1814, 1815), but each of the first three foundered when one of its members signed a separate peace with France. The members of the Fourth Coalition were therefore highly suspicious of each other, especially after their victory at Leipzig when Napoleon was frantically trying to seduce one ally or another. They consequently conducted no serious discussions of war aims or peace terms while hostilities were still in progress. Everyone knew that there must be a drastic reorganization of Europe, everyone looked forward to various gains for his own country, and everyone feared the ambitions of his rivals, but the allies had no common program, even as regarded the future boundaries and government of France. Should Napoleon be allowed to continue ruling France, should there be a regency for his son, or should the country be given to a member of his family or to one of his generals? Should the Bourbons be restored, or should France be allowed to become a republic once more? About such fundamental matters there was no agreement, and each new suggestion seemed to be thoroughly undesirable. Countless other dangerous questions, concerning the whole of Europe, were equally certain to arise. What should be done about Belgium? what about Germany and Italy? and what about Poland? How should Europe forestall a revival of “Jacobinism” in France? And, above all, how should Alexander I be checked if, as seemed very likely, he tried to take over the dictatorship of Europe that was being wrested from Napoleon? As these were delicate matters, any
one of which might precipitate war among the allies, no one dared discuss them.

Not until March 9, less than a month before the allies entered Paris, did they reach any agreement at all. On that day at Chaumont, a city in eastern France, representatives of the four great powers (Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Great Britain) signed a treaty by which they undertook to make no separate peace, spoke vaguely of the reestablishment of a “free” Europe, and entered into a Quadruple Alliance for twenty years, promising that if France again became aggressive, each would aid the others against her. Public opinion was by this time highly inflamed, especially in England, blaming Napoleon personally for all that had happened. The diplomats therefore decided that, whatever they might prefer in their cooler moments, the whole Napoleonic regime would have to go. No one felt great respect for Louis XVIII, but he now became the only alternative to a revived republic that might turn “Jacobin” at any moment. Louis was therefore dragged out of his refuge in England and sent to France, where he entered Paris on May 2. Four weeks later, on May 30, the allies and he signed the “First Peace of Paris.” Louis gave up all claim to Napoleon’s conquests, returned France to the frontiers of 1792, and surrendered a number of colonies to England, but he was not asked to pay an indemnity, and France was even allowed to keep the works of art that Napoleon had brought to Paris as part of his loot. The treaty also provided that the larger questions regarding the New Europe should be settled by a congress of diplomats to be held at Vienna in the fall.

The diplomats of Europe may have reached no preliminary agreement as to how they would reorganize Europe, yet each had his own ideas and his own program. They all longed for peace, they all agreed as to the desirability of continued cooperation among the great powers to preserve this peace, they all talked about the “concert of Europe,” and they all believed that peace could best be assured by a “balance of power” that no one would dare disturb. But each statesman understood the “balance of power” differently and each secretly harbored vast ambitions, territorial and otherwise.

Prince Metternich still held fast to the diplomatic methods of the eighteenth century, of which he was a supreme master. He was something of an eighteenth-century cosmopolitan, he recognized the desirability of European solidarity, and he had no very aggressive program for Austria. He was not interested in regaining the Austrian
Netherlands, which he gladly traded for territory in Italy. He feared Russia more than he had ever feared France, and he feared Jacobinism and nationalism even more, regarding them as the chief menace to world peace. He therefore became Europe's leading champion of conservatism.

Tsar Alexander was now entering upon a new phase in his strange career. In 1812 he had come to regard Napoleon as the Antichrist, whose spectacular fall had impressed him greatly, and he now found himself in a messianic state of mind, believing that he had been selected by God to redeem and restore Europe. Every day he spent long hours in Bible reading and prayer. Moreover, he still was in sympathy with the liberal ideas of the philosophes. For the last three years he had been under the influence of the liberal German minister, von Stein, and he now summoned his old tutor, the Swiss radical La Harpe, as an adviser. His greatest ambition was to reëstablish an independent Poland, thereby making amends for what he considered the crime of her partition, but this was only one part of his program for making himself the champion of liberalism in Europe.

King Frederick William III of Prussia (1797-1840) idolized Alexander but, not being a man of high intelligence or great force of character, he left his diplomacy largely in the hands of his reforming minister, Hardenberg. Prussia still was somewhat weak, but her army was strong once more, and her ambitious rulers earnestly desired a larger share of German territory. Hardenberg was therefore willing to exchange Prussia's share of Poland for the kingdom of Saxony. An adequate pretext for such a transfer was found in the fact that Saxony had been one of Napoleon's satellite states and that, although the Saxon army had changed sides during the battle of Leipzig, the king did not desert his French friend until the next day.

The English foreign secretary, and the director of England's foreign policy, was Viscount Castlereagh (1769-1822). A disciple of Pitt, he had been in office since 1812, and it was he who created and held together the Fourth Coalition against Napoleon. His program for England centered around three major points: an "independent" Holland, including Antwerp, to protect England from European invasion; the retention of most, though not necessarily all, of England's recent colonial acquisitions; and the preservation of England's "maritime rights," which included the right to search neutral vessels suspected of carrying enemy goods in time of war and to seize any such goods as might be found. As none of these matters concerned
England's allies greatly, they gave her a free hand, promising that the "freedom of the seas" would not even be brought up for discussion at Vienna. Castlereagh agreed with Metternich about the "concert of Europe" and looked on the Quadruple Alliance, formed at Chaumont, as a means of enforcing decisions reached by the great powers at conferences to be held from time to time during the next twenty years. He also joined Metternich in opposing Alexander's vast but dreamlike program.

Talleyrand had by this time become foreign minister for Louis XVIII, whom he represented at Vienna. His long experience in diplomacy now stood him in good stead. His first and greatest achievement was compelling the "Big Four," who had planned to dominate the Congress, to admit him to their private sessions as an equal member. He thus became one of the principal authors of the Treaty of Vienna, and by his ingenious maneuvers he prevented France from being punished severely for Napoleon. But Talleyrand was always the clever diplomat, not the great statesman. He had no far-seeing policy, and he created nothing important.

The Congress of Vienna

The Congress of Vienna, which assembled in October, 1814, was a brilliant affair. It was attended by eight kings, scores of high-ranking diplomats, and hundreds of persons from all parts of Europe. Social festivities were so frequent and so elaborate that someone remarked, "The Congress can dance, but it does not advance." In spite of these diversions, however, many men worked hard. Though dominated by the "Big Four"—later the "Big Five"—the hard work was done by a number of committees, which consulted with the representatives of lesser states when dealing with matters that concerned them directly. There was no meeting of the Congress as a whole,
which lent color to the later remark of Friedrich Gentz that “there never was a Congress of Vienna.”

The most troublesome problem facing the diplomats at Vienna was not France but Poland. Alexander and Hardenberg were prepared to insist upon a “free” Poland, while Metternich, Castlereagh, and Talleyrand were equally ready to resist so radical a disturbance of the European balance of power. At last, on January 3, 1815, after months of wrangling, the latter three signed a secret treaty pledging themselves to restrain Russia and Prussia by force of arms if necessary. The news soon leaked to Alexander, who straightaway modified his demands, and on February 11 a settlement was reached. Small slices of Napoleon’s grand duchy of Warsaw were returned to Prussia and Austria—but not all that they had held in 1795—while the remainder became an “independent” kingdom of Poland, to be ruled by Alexander. This new state, called “Congress Poland,” had only about one-third the area and population of Poland before the First Partition in 1772, and, as had been foreseen, the fiction of independence was maintained by Russia for only a few years. Russia also kept Finland, taken from Sweden in 1810, and Bessarabia, taken from Turkey more recently.

When redrawing the map of central Europe, the diplomats were guided in large part by the principle of “legitimacy”—a catchword which was provided by Talleyrand and supposedly indicated a return to pre-Napoleonic times—but they often supplemented it with the principle of “compensation” for lost territories or for services against Napoleon. Thus Bourbons were restored to the thrones of France, Spain, and the Two Sicilies as “legitimate” kings, the Papal States were revived for the pope, the old Swiss Confederation was reëstablished and declared neutral, and Holland was given back to the house of Orange. But Austria was compensated for her losses in Poland and the Netherlands with the provinces of Lombardy and Venetia in northern Italy as well as Dalmatia on the Illyrian coast, while Prussia was awarded about two-fifths of Saxony in addition to large areas in central and western Germany. Belgium went to Holland as compensation for various colonies (Ceylon, South Africa, and part of Guiana) seized by the British; Sweden was given Norway in exchange for Finland and as a reward for deserting Napoleon; and Denmark was compensated for Norway with Holstein. Prussia’s great gains in the west, and the union of Belgium to Holland, were also justified in part as creating strong states on the French frontier. For
the same reason the king of Sardinia was given Savoy (at the expense of France) and Genoa.

In reconstructing Germany no attempt was made to restore the pre-Napoleonic chaos. The ecclesiastical states and tiny principalities were gone forever, and many of Napoleon’s creations were allowed to stand—especially if their rulers had deserted him in time. Thirty-eight states therefore replaced almost three hundred. Baron vom Stein wished to unite them all in one strong Germany, perhaps under the king of Prussia, but Frederick William was not interested, and Metternich refused to consider so radical a proposal. A loose “German Confederation” was set up, however, in which Austria and Prussia balanced and neutralized each other. Provinces in Italy were traded about in an even more high-handed fashion, and the peninsula was left more disjointed than ever. After Lombardy and Venetia had been handed over to Austria, the remainder of Italy was divided into nine separate states, the two tiniest of which (Monaco and San Marino) are still independent. A clause vaguely forbidding the slave trade was added as a final concession to the English, after which the Treaty of Vienna was signed on June 9, 1815, and the Congress adjourned.

Meantime Napoleon had escaped from Elba and announced, immediately upon landing in France (March 1), “The Congress is dissolved.” His statement was premature, for the diplomats remained at Vienna and signed the treaty just nine days before Waterloo. Nevertheless, they were badly frightened; they hastened to declare Napoleon an outlaw; and they coöperated in his overthrow. A second conference then became necessary to make a new peace with France, and the “Second Peace of Paris” was signed on November 20, 1815. The Prussians and various others favored a harsh peace, but Metternich and Castlereagh were less vindictive. They preferred a peace of reconciliation that might endure. France therefore lost only a little territory—the chief item being the Saar Valley, which has since gained in importance because of its then unsuspected mineral wealth—and she was forced to pay a moderate indemnity, to support an army of occupation for five years (actually, three), and to return the purloined works of art. After solemnly renewing the Quadruple Alliance founded at Chaumont, the representatives of the four great allies agreed to reassemble as occasion required to discuss measures for promoting “the repose and prosperity of nations and for the maintenance of the peace of Europe.”
One other achievement of the diplomats of 1815 must be mentioned in conclusion, namely, the “Holy Alliance.” As Tsar Alexander’s interest in religion grew deeper, he became more firmly convinced that the only way to end war was to put into practice the precepts of the Gospels. In September, 1815, therefore, when the diplomats were in Paris arranging the second peace treaty, he presented them with a strange proposal. The monarchs of Europe were invited to join a “Holy Alliance” by promising to base their conduct thereafter upon “the precepts of justice, Christian charity, and peace.” The statesmen who read this document were mystified, amused, or annoyed, but they quickly noticed that signing the treaty and joining the alliance committed them to nothing specific. Moreover, it was a trifle embarrassing for a statesman to stand up in public and announce that he did not intend to follow the teachings of the Gospels. All the monarchs of Europe therefore entered the Holy Alliance—all, that is, except three, the king of England, the pope of Rome, and the sultan of Turkey.

RESTORATION AND REVOLUTION, 1815–1830

Critics have often been severe with Metternich and his colleagues at the Congress of Vienna, but in recent years historians have come to regard much of this criticism as rather unjust. The diplomats at Vienna were remarkably successful in accomplishing what they set out to do. Their primary purpose was to bring peace to a Europe that had been distracted by a quarter of a century of almost continuous warfare. In this task they succeeded, and throughout the nineteenth century Europe enjoyed peace such as it had not known since the days of the Roman Empire. There were many colonial wars along the borders of Western civilization, to be sure, but the great powers did not engage in such horrible struggles as the Wars of Religion, the Napoleonic conflicts, or the scientific slaughter of the twentieth century. For forty years after Waterloo, Europe was at peace; the next fifteen years saw various wars in the Crimea, Italy, Germany, and France; but the wars of 1870 were followed by another forty years of European peace. The amazing progress made in nearly every field of human endeavor during the nineteenth century rested upon the long peace that followed the Congress of Vienna.

The settlement made at Vienna was highly acceptable to a wide variety of persons. The old aristocrats supported it because it restored them to their old position and gave them back some of their posses-
sions; the Catholic Church supported it because it revived the Papal States and gave the church a position and political power in Catholic states such as it had not known since the Reformation; the peasants who were guaranteed ownership of the lands they had acquired—and who made up the great majority of the population—supported it; former liberals who had been disillusioned by the Reign of Terror or Napoleon supported it; and all who were tired of war accepted it gladly.

Metternich and his colleagues were convinced that the wars of the preceding twenty-five years had been caused primarily by ideas let loose during the French Revolution. They believed that, even with a balance of power and frequent conferences of diplomats, peace would be short if these foolish and dangerous ideas about liberty, parliamentary government, republicanism, constitutions, the rights of man, and, above all, national self-determination were allowed to prevail. In place of these revolutionary ideals the diplomats at Vienna restored the old “union of the throne and the altar,” for they sincerely believed that peace could be assured only by absolute monarchs, dedicated to the principles of Christianity and the Old Regime.

On the other hand, there were many people, even in 1815, who were dissatisfied with the treaty. Many middle-class liberals, especially in France, still remained true to the democratic ideals of the Revolution; merchants, manufacturers, bankers, and their lawyers desired the new laissez-faire economics; artisans resented the strangling regulations of the guilds; university professors, and especially their students, were receptive to liberal ideas; and in many cases masonic lodges kept liberal and anticlerical ideas alive. Bureaucrats in France and the former satellite states feared that the higher government offices would again be closed to them because of their humble birth, and army officers whose abilities had advanced them under Napoleon feared the new aristocratic governments for the same reason. In Germany there was a nationalistic enthusiasm for the German “people,” based on the theory that it was they, not the aristocrats, who had defeated Napoleon. And finally, many persons were disgusted by the brutal police methods employed by Metternich and his colleagues to suppress liberal ideas. These were the persons who criticized the treaty most vigorously, who attributed the whole reaction to the tsar’s innocuous “Holy Alliance,” and who denounced Europe’s new rulers as the “Unholy Alliance.”
Reaction in Europe

Metternich continued to guide Austrian foreign policy for thirty-three years after the Congress of Vienna. Though he remained the most powerful and the most highly respected diplomat in Europe, cracks began to appear in his system soon after the death of Castlereagh (1822). As long as that English minister was alive, the “Concert of Europe” functioned rather smoothly, and conferences were held from time to time at which the assembled diplomats discussed matters of common concern—at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, at Troppau in 1820, at Laibach in 1821, and at Verona in 1822. But Castlereagh’s successor, George Canning (1770–1827), opposed English intervention in European affairs, and no more conferences were held.

Metternich’s concern with international relations left him little time for Austrian domestic affairs, and such matters were handled by the Emperor Francis I (1804–1835) and his bureaucracy. Francis was even more deeply attached to the Old Regime than was Metternich, and even more afraid of nationalism. The underlying reasons for this fear are obvious. As the Hapsburgs held lands inhabited by Germans, Czechs, Magyars, Romanians, South Slavs, and Italians, acceptance of the principles of national self-determination would sound the death knell of their empire. Moreover, Francis ruled only a small portion of the Germans and Italians, and agitators for a national German or Italian state threatened to rob him of valuable provinces. Austria therefore became the mainstay of Europe’s antiliberal and antinationalistic reaction.

At one time German liberals had put their trust in Prussia, for King Frederick William III admired and aped the liberal-speaking Alexander I. It was not long, however, before the king changed his mind to become the second pillar of reaction. Hardenberg too forsook his earlier liberalism and worked with Metternich. Nevertheless, the spirit of nationalism rose rapidly in Germany, especially among university students. Shortly after Waterloo a student society dedicated to national unity was founded at Jena, and within a year or two similar Burschenschaften were to be found in most German universities. In October, 1817, a few hundred students assembled at the Wartburg, nominally to celebrate the fourth anniversary of the battle of Leipzig and the three hundredth anniversary of the Protestant Reformation. In the course of their festivities they burned several reactionary books, in imitation of Luther’s burning of the papal bull,
and Metternich and Frederick William pounced upon this celebration as a pretext for issuing the famous Carlsbad Decrees (1819). They dissolved the *Burschenschaften*, censored books, dismissed various university professors, systematically spied on others, and did all that lay within their power to suppress liberal thought and nationalistic enthusiasm. These laws only forced the *Burschenschaften* to become secret societies and give a new impetus to liberal ideas. At the same time “Turnvater” Jahn was jailed, and his gymnastic societies were abolished (see p. 218). When the liberal Baron vom Stein failed to secure a united Germany at the Congress of Vienna, he withdrew from political life and spent the remainder of his days encouraging scholarship and literature, inspiring scholars and writers with patriotic feeling. Nationalistic sentiment therefore continued to advance in Germany in spite of her rulers.

Louis XVI was fifty-nine years of age when he entered Paris (May, 1814), in what he was pleased to call the nineteenth year of his reign—the nineteenth, that is, counting from the death of his young nephew, “Louis XVII,” who had died in prison in 1795. Easygoing and tired, he had no great desires except to end his days in peace and repose. Steering a middle course with a moderate amount of tact, he was able to remain upon the throne of France until his death ten years later. A few days before Louis’s entry into Paris, Alexander had persuaded him to issue a liberal “Charter,” guaranteeing many of the gains of the Revolution—notably, peasant ownership of the lands taken from the church and the nobility, the Code Napoléon, the Concordat, religious toleration, secular education, and amnesty for the regicides of 1793. It also provided for a constitutional monarchy, somewhat resembling the British monarchy of that day, with a king, a house of peers appointed by him, and a lower chamber elected by a highly restricted electorate. Louis replaced the revolutionary and Napoleonic tricolor with the white flag of the Bourbons, but he recognized the Napoleonic nobility as equal to that of the Old Regime.

Unfortunately, many members of this old nobility were not so willing as Louis to compromise with the Revolution. These ultra-royalists, “more royalist than the king,” were popularly dubbed “Ultras,” and it was said of them that they “had learned nothing and forgotten nothing” during the past quarter of a century. For a short time thugs belonging to, or hired by, this faction conducted a “White Terror”—so called from the color of the Bourbon flag—murdering countless
republicans and Bonapartists. Before long, however, France was so peaceful that in 1818 the diplomats, assembled at Aix-la-Chapelle, decided to withdraw their armies of occupation and to remit the remainder of the indemnity.

As Louis XVIII left no children, he was succeeded by his brother, Charles X (1824–1830). This man had been one of the first aristocrats to flee France in 1789, and during the next several years he had intrigued constantly against his country. He now assumed leadership of the Ultras. Within a year he had promulgated a law indemnifying the old aristocracy for lands confiscated during the Revolution. As the treasury had no surplus funds, and France already was taxed to the limit, Charles raised the necessary money by reducing the interest on government bonds. By thus diverting it from the pockets of the rich bourgeoisie who held the bonds, Charles made many dangerous enemies for himself. His reactionary clerical policy, culminating in a law of 1826 imposing the death penalty for sacrilege, antagonized countless other Frenchmen. At first Charles tried to govern with the aid of parliament, but when he could not secure the election of a chamber that would work with him, he undertook to rule without one. In consequence he was expelled from France by the "July Revolution" of 1830.

Renewed Revolutionary Activity

After Wellington had driven the French from Spain, the throne reverted to Ferdinand VII (1814–1833), who in personal appearance, in intellect, and in character was probably the most degraded ruler of his day. He promised to rule according to the liberal Constitution of 1812 (see p. 218), but within a year he had broken his word, rejected the constitution, and instituted the most reactionary regime in Europe. Hundreds of persons were executed or imprisoned, the liberal reforms of the past few years were abolished, the aristocracy and church again received their ancient privileges and emoluments, the Inquisition was reestablished. But Ferdinand did not succeed in eradicating liberal thought from Spain. He merely embittered the liberals, and bitterness has bedeviled Spain's political life from that day to this.

The Spanish colonies in America had successfully resisted the attempts of Joseph Bonaparte to establish his power in the New World, and after the Restoration they continued their rebellions. At first
Ferdinand could not devote great attention to these distant rebels, but in 1819 he began gathering an army at Cadiz, with which he proposed to resubjugate the Americas. His troops mutinied, however, and in 1820 they forced him to swear once more that he would rule according to the Constitution of 1812. This time the king kept his oath for more than three years, but he was constantly conniving with leaders of the aristocracy for a counterrevolution and calling upon the powers of Europe for aid. At Verona in 1822 the diplomats agreed that French troops should restore autocracy in Spain. The ground had been so well prepared by conservative plotters that these troops met little organized resistance. The liberal ministers fled from Madrid to Cadiz, taking Ferdinand with them. After the French had besieged the latter city for several weeks, the liberals agreed to release the king if he would promise to establish a moderate government. As soon as the liberals had surrendered, however, Ferdinand violated this third oath, as he had the other two, and inaugurated a "White Terror" that was even more bloodthirsty and vindictive than that of 1815.

Liberalism in Spain was thus crushed, but the events of these years were of great consequence for the history of the world. The Spanish American colonies won complete independence at this time (for further details see p. 477), thus virtually terminating Spain’s career as a colonial power and completing the political separation of the New World from the Old. When the diplomats of Europe spoke of using armed force to suppress the American rebels, President Monroe proclaimed the “Monroe Doctrine” (December, 1823), which has exercised great influence upon the diplomacy of the United States and the course of colonial imperialism (see p. 459). And finally, though reaction triumphed in Spain, its methods aroused popular indignation among liberals throughout western Europe. The Congress at Verona was the last of those following Vienna, and its failure marked the collapse of the conference system devised by Castlereagh and Metternich in 1815.

The history of Portugal during these years paralleled that of Spain, yet it was rather different. This weak but strategically located country had been bullied by both France and England during the early wars of the revolutionary period; it was invaded by Spain in 1801; and in 1807 it was occupied by one of Napoleon’s generals, plundered, and forced to cooperate in the continental system. A year later the British arrived, expelled the French, and repeated many of their exploits.
The Portuguese royal family fled before the French to Brazil (1807). Here the insane queen, Maria I (1777–1816), died and her son, John VI (regent, 1792–1816; king, 1816–1826), remained until 1821. During these fourteen years Portugal was administered by an English official. Portuguese patriots collaborated with Spaniards in their struggle against Napoleon, and after 1814 many of them came to share the views of the Spanish liberals. The early successes of the Spanish rebels in 1820 encouraged the Portuguese to follow suit, expel the British, and draw up a constitution resembling the Spanish Constitution of 1812. John VI then returned to Portugal, swore to support this new constitution, promptly broke his oath, and died in 1826.

Italy too was the scene of revolutionary disturbances during the 1820's. Napoleon easily overthrew the rulers who had misgoverned the peninsula for so long, and he filled the minds of men with French ideas of liberty; but during his later years he became unpopular because of his exactions in money and men. In 1812, for example, he compelled 27,000 Italians to accompany his armies into Russia, barely three hundred of whom ever saw Italy again. After 1815, however, the restored rulers were so incredibly stupid and brutal in their efforts to restore the Old Regime that Italians quickly forgot the evils of Napoleonic rule. They continued firm in the liberalism he had taught them and in the nationalism inspired by opposition to him. Out of their dissatisfaction grew the political movement known as the Risorgimento, or "Resurrection," which led eventually to national union in the Kingdom of Italy (1870).

As no public discussion of political questions was tolerated by those in authority, liberals and patriots organized secret societies, chief of which was the Carbonari ("charcoal burners"). When news of the Spanish revolt of 1820 reached Naples, the Carbonari compelled their Bourbon king to grant a constitution and appoint a regent. The diplomats of Europe, assembled at Troppau, decided upon armed intervention, however, and within a year all the king's concessions were withdrawn and the reaction in Naples became more brutal than ever. A similar rebellion broke out in Piedmont (March, 1821), with the Carbonari hoping to replace King Victor Emmanuel I (1802–1821) with his liberal cousin, Charles Albert. The king granted a constitution, named Charles Albert regent, and abdicated, but the diplomats at Verona (1822) sent troops who replaced the old king with his brother Charles Felix (1821–1831). Charles Albert was
exiled to Florence, where he presently absorbed more conservative opinions and was therefore allowed to remain heir to the throne. As long as Pius VII (1800–1823) was pope, he followed a moderate policy in the Papal States, but his three successors, who ruled until 1846, were selected at the behest of Metternich and vied with their brother sovereigns in autocratic conservatism.

The most dramatic, and probably the most influential, revolutions of the 1820's occurred in Turkey, where various Christian peoples were struggling for national independence from their Moslem overlords. Conditions here differed widely from those in western Europe, for radical French thought had made little progress among the people, and the diplomats at Vienna had not tried to impose their authority upon them. These revolutions were merely one phase in the general collapse of the Turkish Empire, which had passed its zenith in the seventeenth century and had been losing provinces to Russia ever since. The Sultan Selim III (1789–1807) was an intelligent ruler who attempted to save his country by timely reforms, chiefly in the army, but he was opposed and eventually deposed and strangled by the Janissaries—a wild group of lawless mercenaries who dominated and terrorized the capital. Napoleon's invasion of Egypt (1798–1799) was of little consequence to Turkey, but a few years later Alexander I invaded the Balkans as far as Bulgaria (1806). Napoleon’s Russian campaign, six years later, forced the tsar to sign a hurried peace, but in 1815 Alexander prevented the Congress of Vienna from discussing Turkish affairs, and thereafter he was constantly on the watch for an opportunity to attack once more.

The first of the Balkan states to free itself from the Turkish yoke was tiny Montenegro, whose people had never bent the knee to the Turks and whose prince-bishop, Peter I (1782–1830), had been an ally of Russia. Selim recognized Montenegrin independence in 1799. Five years later a Serbian swineherd, George Petrovich (1766–1817), better known as “Karageorge,” or “Black George,” took up arms against the Turks. Quarrels among the rebels enabled the sultan to crush their revolt in 1813, and Karageorge fled to Austria. Two years later a rival leader, Milosh Obrenovich (1780–1860), launched a new rebellion, won autonomy for Serbia in 1817, and later forced the sultan to recognize her independence (1830). He celebrated his first triumph by murdering Karageorge, thereby inaugurating a dynastic feud that distracted Serbia for a full century. The territory
actually ruled by Obrenovich was only a small district around Belgrade, but it grew until today it is Yugoslavia.

So far as contemporary Europe was concerned, the revolt of the Greeks was far more important. The Turks had long since come to terms with the Greeks of Constantinople (called “Phanariots” because many of them lived in the district around the lighthouse [phanarion]) and employed them to rule Slavs and other subject peoples in the Balkans. The favored Greeks resented even the light bonds of their servitude, however, and their desire for the complete independence of Greece was encouraged by the Orthodox Church and nationalistic patriots who were beginning to predict a revival of the glories of ancient Greece, if only the country were free.

The leaders of the Greek rebellion were Alexander Ypsilanti (1792–1828), and his brother Demetrios (1793–1832), members of a prominent Phanariot family. Their grandfather had been governor of what is now a part of Romania but was executed (1807) because of the sultan’s suspicions; and their father was exiled for taking part in a conspiracy to liberate Greece. Alexander launched the great revolt in 1821, but Demetrios was the more successful fighter. Only with difficulty did Metternich restrain Tsar Alexander from intervening at once in behalf of the Greeks and from using their rebellion as a pretext for seizing Constantinople and the whole Balkan peninsula. (Greeks and Serbs might then have enjoyed a “freedom” under him comparable to that enjoyed by the Poles.) Greeks and Turks both fought with the utmost ferocity and brutality, until at last the European powers intervened. British, French, and Russian warships destroyed the Turkish navy in the battle of Navarino (1827), and two years later the armies of Tsar Nicholas entered Adrianople, less than 150 miles from Constantinople. Here peace was signed, with Russia withdrawing from the Balkans, but with Turkey recognizing Greek independence (1829). The new state was to be a republic until a suitable monarch could be found, and in 1832 a Bavarian prince became King Otto I. The European powers and Turkey also recognized the autonomy of the tiny Serbia and of parts of the modern Romania. The Greek struggle for independence excited great enthusiasm in western Europe, where idealistic young men envisioned a resurrected Athens and flocked to the rebel army. The most famous of these volunteers was Lord Byron, the English poet, who died of malaria at Missolonghi in 1824.
The Revolutions of 1830

By the end of the 1820's, aristocrats who had flourished under the Old Regime were becoming scarce, and their sons were learning to accept the new order of things. Fear of Napoleon and the memory of revolutionary excesses were growing dim. In western Europe the slogans of liberalism and nationalism became the watchwords of the new day, and Metternich's doomed regime began to collapse, first of all in France. Charles X had always been unpopular with his subjects, and this unpopularity grew as he became more and more obstinate in the face of rising liberalism. When he lost his majority in the lower house (1827), he attempted to govern without parliament, and in 1829 he named the reactionary Prince de Polignac his prime minister. As this man, a former émigré and an "ultra among the Ultras," could not command a majority in the chamber, his rule became a thinly veiled dictatorship. Polignac's efforts to achieve popularity were limited to punishing the dey (ruler) of Algiers, who three years before had struck a French diplomat with a fly swatter. The dey was dethroned and Algeria was annexed to France (June–July, 1830), but when this heroic deed failed to arouse the desired enthusiasm in France, the government was faced with a desperate situation.

On July 26 Charles issued four famous ordinances, dissolving the Chamber of Deputies, severely limiting freedom of the press, disfranchising a majority of the voters, and ordering new elections. The next day Paris rose in revolt, and after three days of desultory street fighting, Charles abdicated and fled to England. The revolution sprang up so suddenly that rebel leaders had no time to agree upon a program. The Parisian workingmen and many hot-headed enthusiasts demanded a republic and shouted for the aged Lafayette, who momentarily returned to the limelight, after thirty-seven years in dim obscurity. Other rebels preferred a limited monarchy, with only a slight revision of the Charter of 1814. These liberals rallied around Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans, and when Lafayette too accepted him, they proclaimed him king (August 7, 1830).

Louis Philippe (1773–1850) was a Bourbon, descended from a younger brother of Louis XIV and, on his mother's side, from one of that king's illegitimate children. His father had played a dark and dubious part as a republican during the French Revolution, calling
LOUIS-PHILIPPE HAILED IN PARIS, 1830. (Brown Brothers)
himself Philippe-Equality and voting for the death of Louis XVI, but being sent to the guillotine himself a few months later. In his youth Louis Philippe had been a Jacobin and had fought in the revolutionary armies at Valmy and Jemappes. During the Directory he was an exile in the United States, traveling widely and spending some time in Kentucky, where Bourbon County (the home of “Bourbon” whiskey) was named after him. Under Napoleon he made his peace with Louis XVIII, but during the Restoration he again joined the opposition. Though one of the richest men in France, he proclaimed his liberal opinions, advertised his love of the bourgeoisie, walked the streets of Paris like an ordinary citizen, and even sent his children to the public schools. In 1830 he put himself forward as a “citizen-king.” He revived the revolutionary tricolor as the national flag, and, to show that he was a popular leader rather than a monarch by divine right, he had himself proclaimed “King of the French,” not “King of France.” During the eighteen years of his reign (1830-1848) he continued to court the favor of the well-to-do members of the middle class.

The “July Days” of 1830 in France set off a series of revolutions from one end of Europe to the other. First came the revolt of the Belgians from the Dutch. The Belgians were Catholic and industrial, the Dutch Protestant and commercial; most Belgians spoke French, and the remainder spoke Flemish, a Germanic dialect quite distinct from Dutch; and both peoples were still embittered by vivid memories of the wars of the seventeenth century. Nevertheless the two countries had been united in 1815, partly to recoup the Dutch king for colonies seized by the British during the Napoleonic Wars, and partly because the British, regarding Antwerp as “a pistol pointed at the heart of England,” insisted that this Belgian city be in the hands of a weak and friendly power. Dutch rule aroused such discontent among the Belgians that news of the “July Days” was followed by rioting in Brussels. A provisional government was set up and Belgian independence was proclaimed (October 4). Louis Philippe of France, seeking glory for his new government, persuaded the Belgian rebels to select his second son as their king. When England declared this choice tantamount to the annexation of Belgium by France, war seemed likely. Louis Philippe was in no position to fight a major war, however, and hastily withdrew his son’s candidacy. Several months later the diplomats at London selected a minor Ger-
man prince, Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, who was an uncle of Victoria, later queen of England. His descendants have ruled Belgium ever since. King William of Holland finally recognized Belgian independence in 1839. As a further precaution, and to quiet English fears, the five great powers (England, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia) then signed a treaty solemnly guaranteeing the independence and perpetual neutrality of Belgium. This treaty eventually became the famous “scrap of paper” that Germany violated in 1914, at the beginning of World War I.

The fall of Charles X also inspired the Poles to revolt. As long as Tsar Alexander I was alive, he was moderately loyal in observing the constitution he had granted his Polish subjects in 1815, but Nicholas I (1825–1855) quickly antagonized Poland by his oppressive acts. Revolution broke out in November, 1830, and early in the next year the rebels declared Poland an independent state. After Russian armies had crushed the rebellion, “Congress Poland” was abolished and its territory annexed to Russia. Hundreds of Poles were sent to Siberia and other hundreds fled to western Europe.

The other revolts of 1830 were not much more successful. There was a certain amount of rioting in Germany, where three states (Saxony, Brunswick, and Hesse-Cassel) received constitutions in 1831, as did Hanover three years later. Several Swiss cities were disturbed by riots and demands for more liberal government, but no great changes came for several years. There were rebellions in Italy at Modena, Parma, and, above all, in the Papal States, but they all were put down with bloody violence. The most important event of the year, so far as Italy was concerned, was the exile of a young member of the Carbonari named Joseph Mazzini. He then organized a new society, known as “Young Italy,” which presently led all Italy in the demand for liberalism and national unity. By this time the worst of the reaction in Spain was over, and when Ferdinand VII died in 1833, he was succeeded by his infant daughter, Isabella II (1833–1868), whose mother, as regent, granted a constitution only slightly less liberal than that of 1812. The conservatives rallied around Ferdinand’s brother, Don Carlos, and civil war raged in Spain for five years before the “Carlists” were defeated. The moderately liberal Portuguese government of Maria II also came into power at this time, as did the new Christian rulers of Greece, Serbia, and Romania in the Balkans, but liberalism’s greatest victory was in England.
THE ENGLISH REFORM BILL OF 1832

There had been frequent demands for reform in England in the years immediately preceding the French Revolution (see p. 168), but the outbreak of war distracted attention from such matters. The conservative philosophy of Burke came to dominate English political life, and excitable Tories began shouting from the housetops that the slightest change would unleash a Reign of Terror. This state of mind continued throughout the war and the subsequent period known as "the Regency." (George III having become hopelessly insane, his son, later George IV [1820–1830], served as regent from 1811 to 1820.) The years of the Regency were a period of brilliant and sometimes scandalous social display by the rich, of stalwart opposition to political liberalism, and of legislation designed to maintain high prices for grain and other agricultural products. But they were also a time of great suffering among the lower classes and of renewed demands for reform.

The victory at Waterloo was followed by a severe economic depression, for the government suddenly ceased ordering munitions and at the same time it discharged 400,000 men from the armed forces. Widespread unemployment led to riots in many parts of England, and great mass meetings were held to protest against the government's policies. This agitation reached its climax in 1819. In that year a crowd of some eighty thousand persons assembled on St. Peter's Fields, near Manchester, to hear a speech proposing various political and economic reforms. Cavalry charged into the crowd, killing eleven persons and wounding over four hundred. This piece of brutality aroused great indignation throughout England and came to be known as "Peterloo"—in bitter contrast to "Waterloo." Nevertheless, the government took advantage of the occasion to force through parliament a code of repressive legislation, commonly called the Six Acts, which forbade public meetings, imposed a heavy stamp tax on newspapers, and made the laws regarding libel and sedition more stringent. As the worst of the depression was then over and English industry had readjusted itself to peacetime conditions, these Six Acts were able to crush reform agitation for several years.

The Tory prime minister at this time was the rather ineffective Lord Liverpool (1812–1827), but the formation of policy usually fell
to the foreign secretary, Lord Castlereagh. When Castlereagh died (1822), he was succeeded, both in office and in actual leadership, by George Canning (1770–1827), who was a man of less reactionary temper. His term of office marked the beginning of the end of the long Tory domination of England. The old Tories, under Lord Liverpool and the highly popular Duke of Wellington, were forced to give way gradually before the new and more moderate Tories led by Canning, Robert Peel (1788–1850), and William Huskisson (1770–1830). Though the Whigs had enjoyed power on only two brief occasions since 1763, the party still existed, and its leaders—Lord Grey (1764–1845) and Lord John Russell (1792–1878)—were more responsive than the Tories to the popular demands for reform. Most effective of all, however, were the Radicals such as William Cobbett (1763–1835) and the poet Shelley (1792–1822), whose propaganda aroused popular sentiment for reform.

At first the reformers turned their attention to economic matters under the leadership of Huskisson, who was president of the Board of Trade from 1823 until 1827. During his first year in office he amended the Navigation Acts and reduced the import duties on various raw materials and a few manufactured goods, thereby promoting economic laissez faire. A year later he secured the repeal of the Combination Acts, passed in 1800 to prevent workingmen from combining in unions or striking to secure better working conditions or higher wages, but another law in 1825 again limited the activities of their unions. Huskisson's third reform dealt with the Corn Laws. England could no longer raise enough corn (i.e., wheat) to feed her population, yet the Corn Law of 1815 had forbidden the importation of grain unless its price had risen to famine figures. Huskisson's law allowed grain to be imported at any time, but with a sliding scale of import duties which decreased as its price rose. This law slightly reduced the price of bread for the poor, but it antagonized many Tory landlords. At the same time Robert Peel was reforming England's barbarous criminal laws, which prescribed the death penalty for about two hundred crimes. By a law of 1823 Peel reduced this number by nearly one-half, and at the end of the decade only about a dozen capital offenses remained on the list.

The reformers also secured the repeal of the Test Act in 1828. This famous act, dating from 1673, made it impossible for Catholics or Dissenters (i.e., non-Anglican Protestants) to hold public office. In
the eighteenth century there had been widespread agitation for its
repeal, and though it was enforced rather strictly against Catholics, a
series of Indemnity Acts forgave all but the more extreme Dissenters.
The outbreak of the French Revolution and the popularity of Burke's
philosophy brought a closer union of throne and altar in England,
and for twenty years the Test Act was rigorously enforced against
Dissenters. In 1812 and 1813 a series of acts granted greater liberty
even to Unitarians and Quakers, but not until 1828 did Lord Russell
secure the repeal of the Test Act. As the British Tories still trembled
at the very thought of admitting Catholics to parliament, they in-
\[\text{“Rotten boroughs”}\]
sisted upon enforcing an old law requiring all members to deny trans-
substitution. Matters then reached a crisis, for a Catholic named
Daniel O'Connell, elected to represent an Irish constituency, refused
to take the oath. Excitement rose to such a pitch that Wellington,
who was now prime minister (1828–1830), feared armed rebellion in
Ireland and, to the dismay of the Anglican bishops and the more
extreme Tories, he forced the Catholic Emancipation Act through
parliament (1829). Catholics could now vote and hold office, but they
still suffered from minor disabilities—such as exclusion from the uni-
versities.

The most important of all the reforms of this period dealt with
parliament itself. The districts electing members of the House of
Commons were largely the same as in the days of Charles II, yet
during the past century and a half the centers of population in Eng-
land had shifted widely. The system of representation was therefore
quite unfair, with some members representing a mere handful of
constituents while others represented many thousands, and some-
times populous cities were not represented in parliament at all. More-
over, the right to vote was so narrowly restricted that only the well-
to-do took part in elections. The greatest scandals centered around
the so-called "rotten boroughs" and "pocket boroughs." The former
had once been populous places, but their population had declined
so greatly that it was now practicable to bribe the entire body of
voters; the latter had always been so unimportant that one lord con-
trolled the election, but they had been granted parliamentary repre-
\[\text{“Rotten boroughs”}\]
sentation as a favor to that lord's ancestor by some earlier ruler—per-
haps by Queen Elizabeth, who was quite generous in this respect.
The majority of the 658 seats in the House of Commons fell into one
class or the other, and it was asserted that 154 lords or other rich
men could choose 307 members of parliament.
A few futile attempts to reform the House of Commons had been made in the eighteenth century, but even the younger Pitt could not carry a reform bill through parliament. In the 1820’s the Whigs again took up the cause of reform. When Wellington’s ministry fell in 1830—because the duke quarreled with Huskisson—Lord Grey became prime minister and Lord Russell presented his famous reform bill. The bill failed to pass; Grey induced the king to order new elections; and the Whigs won after an exciting campaign in which parliamentary reform served as the principal issue. A second reform bill, quickly passed by the Commons, was rejected by the House of Lords. Grey then persuaded the king (William IV, 1830–1837) to promise to create enough Whig peers to carry the measure through the upper house. To forestall so dire a calamity, Wellington and about one hundred lords abstained from voting, and the Reform Bill became law in June, 1832. It deprived fifty-six boroughs of two representatives each, while thirty others lost one, and the seats thus made available were assigned to underrepresented districts—chiefly the new manufacturing cities in northern and central England. The new law also doubled the number of voters in Britain. The new voters were largely members of the moderately well-to-do middle class. Great inequalities continued to exist, especially in Ireland, but about 900,000 persons now voted in Great Britain whereas in France, with twice her population, there were only about 300,000 voters after the reforms of 1830. Both in England and in France, however, the balance of power had passed from the landed aristocracy to the leaders of the middle class.

It is of course impossible to estimate exactly what influence the “July Days” in France exercised upon the course of events in England, but no doubt it was considerable. The French had shown that political institutions could be changed without unleashing chaos and a Reign of Terror, thereby relieving many Englishmen of their paralyzing apprehensions. When new elections were held, soon after the Reform Bill went into effect, the Whigs won a large majority in the new House of Commons; and during the next few years reforms came thick and fast. England at last had freed herself from thralldom to Burke, and when young Victoria became queen in 1837, a new spirit prevailed throughout the country. Victorian England was prepared to accept the liberalism of the new day and to continue in the paths marked out by those radical reformers of an earlier generation who had hailed the French Revolution with such delight.
London Slums in Mid-Nineteenth Century (Bettmann Archive)

THE NEW INDUSTRY AND LIBERALISM

THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION—
POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW INDUSTRY
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14. THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

The political evolution that culminated in the revolutions of 1830 and the Reform Bill of 1832 raised statesmen of the liberal parties to power in France, Belgium, and England and even restrained the absolutism and autocracy with which Metternich had saddled central and southern Europe. Liberal ideas, stemming from the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, advanced steadily thereafter in almost every country of western Europe. But at the same time fundamental changes in the economic life of England were effecting an “Industrial Revolution” that eventually put a new face on Europe. At first the leaders of the new industry attached themselves to the Tory party, but many of them presently found the economic and political creed of liberalism more to their taste, and liberal statesmen profited accordingly. Before long, however, these new recruits began to read new meanings into the old liberal slogans; they launched new programs; and eventually they created a new liberalism that neither Rousseau nor Robespierre would have understood.

This Industrial Revolution was born in the second half of the eighteenth century, when English manufacturers began introducing machines to do part of the work formerly done by hand. Their successes were so great and so momentous that a hundred years later most of western Europe had passed from an economy that was primarily agricultural into one that is largely industrial; economic production had increased many fold; England had become the workshop of the world; and, in spite of a soaring population, her standards of living had risen tremendously. The high enthusiasm generated by this material progress has sometimes led historians to label the nineteenth century “the century of hope.” But at the same time the In-
Industrial Revolution was upsetting the various social relationships that were based on the old economic system. It raised countless new problems, and not everything in the new Europe was as rosy as the hopeful optimists liked to say. Before discussing these consequences of the Industrial Revolution, however, let us first examine its beginnings in eighteenth-century England.

England had been economically prosperous during most of the eighteenth century. Her particular brand of mercantilism was largely the creation of Whig parliaments in the decades following 1688, not of royal ministers like Colbert, and whereas French mercantilism was inspired primarily by a desire to make the French monarchy strong, the English variety was shaped by the demands of influential pressure groups anxious to become rich through government aid to their private enterprises. The British mercantilists’ prime purpose was to enrich members of the commercial class, in which task they were eminently successful. England’s financial power grew correspondingly, and presently it became a major factor in helping her win the wars by which she eliminated her commercial rivals and acquired a vast colonial empire in America and India. These colonies, in turn, brought further wealth, at least to certain men. Even more important than this wealth, however, was the widespread spirit of adventure and the willingness to take great risks that were aroused by England’s unbroken succession of victories over her most formidable rivals. When new inventions seemed to offer new avenues to wealth, therefore, many Englishmen were willing and able to risk much for the high stakes that lay in the offing.

England’s rising population showed that her economic prosperity and her buoyant hopes were not limited to a few rich men. The best estimates indicate that the population of England (with Wales) rose from about 5,500,000 in 1700 to slightly more than 6,500,000 in 1750, which shows an increase of about 18 percent in fifty years. During the next fifty years the population reached 9,000,000, an increase of almost 40 percent, and during the next thirty years it rose by over 56 percent, to a total of 14,000,000. The population of England had more than doubled in eighty years (1750–1830). During these same eighty years the population of France rose from about 25,000,000 to about 32,000,000, an increase of less than 30 percent, that of Spain rose at about the same rate from about 8,500,000 to 11,500,000, and while the Germanies were more prolific, their rate of increase did not equal England’s. As birth rates rose only slightly during these years,
the increase in population was due largely to a decline of the death rate, especially the death rate of infants and young children. This decline can be explained in part by an advance in sanitation and medical science, but the higher survival of children suggests that they were getting better food in quantities to nourish them more adequately. The figures indicate a higher standard of living among people of all ranks and classes, and a widespread prosperity throughout England, with both food and employment available for the larger population.

English agriculture had been rather backward at the beginning of the eighteenth century, but it advanced rapidly during the next hundred years, and it developed along lines somewhat different from those then being followed on the continent. After the Revolution of 1688, prosperous merchants began buying large estates in emulation of their aristocratic Tory rivals, but once they had acquired these properties and the social prestige that came with them, they desired to derive financial as well as social profit from their investments. They therefore utilized the capitalistic methods, which had proved so profitable in business, to increase their crops and augment the value of their lands. Their activities stimulated great interest in agricultural science and led to much fruitful experimentation. New crops were introduced, new tools and new methods of tilling the soil were invented, the use of fertilizer was greatly extended, improved breeds of sheep and cattle were developed.

Thus Jethro Tull (1674–1741) taught the advantages of deep plowing, planting in rows, and frequent hoeing; Charles Townshend (1674–1738) encouraged the planting of turnips and clover to renew the soil; Robert Bakewell (1725–1795) bred new and better varieties of sheep by scientific methods; Arthur Young (1741–1820), whom we have already met as an early defender of the French Revolution (p. 169), began in 1784 to publish *The Annals of Agriculture*, a periodical devoted to popularizing knowledge of the new agriculture; and in 1776 Thomas Coke of Holkham, Earl of Leicester (1752–1842), inherited an estate which he presently made famous as a model farm. Even George III was so interested in the new agriculture that his admirers, permitting themselves a learned pun, liked to call him “Farmer George” (*georgos* is the Greek word for “farmer”). Other men invested their capital in creating new land by draining swamps or treating barren wastes with marl–lime mixed with clay. Still others enclosed the wastelands of villages. In consequence of their activities,
England's agricultural production rose rapidly and her population followed in its wake.

"Enclosure," or the fencing off of fields formerly held by the village in common, had begun in the sixteenth century, and the process was virtually complete by the early years of the nineteenth. The earlier enclosures had been made by lords desiring large pastures for their sheep, or by peasants who traded off strips here and there in order that each might have one large field of his own (see Vol. One, p. 716). The eighteenth-century enclosures, on the other hand, were made by capitalists anxious to develop the land by new methods which the peasants were too poor or too conservative to try. Sometimes they enclosed land which had simply lain waste before, but often they acquired the small holdings of yeomen. These holdings had averaged about thirty acres each, but under the new methods of agriculture a farm of less than one hundred acres could not be operated economically. Such enclosures became common after 1760 and reached their greatest frequency during the wars with France, 1793–1815, when the high price of grain encouraged speculation in farm lands. During these years the great estates of France and western Germany were being divided among small peasant proprietors (see pp. 165 and 208), but England became a land of large farms operated by capitalistic methods.

These eighteenth-century enclosures brought with them far-reaching social changes. The small independent farmer, or yeoman, had for centuries been the backbone of rural England, but now he was gradually forced to the wall. Some former yeomen became tenants, renting and operating the farms of absentee owners, others hired themselves out as farm laborers, and still others migrated to the towns. The same fate overwhelmed men who had formerly been laborers. As there was less demand for hired workers on the new farms, unemployment forced many laborers to leave their villages. They too swarmed into the industrial towns where, having few skills and little adaptability, they led wretched lives. It was principally from this social class that factory owners recruited their unskilled labor.

New Inventions

Toward 1760, therefore, England was prepared to make great industrial progress along new lines. She had many enterprising
citizens, anxious to find new wealth and possessing ample capital which they were willing to risk in the process; she had a large labor force, not hampered by obsolete guild regulations; she had expanding markets at home, due to her growing population and their rising standards of living, while her exports were increasing because of the colonies and prestige she had won by her military victories over France; and, unlike the more important continental countries, she was well supplied by nature with such essential raw materials as coal and iron, with water power, and with raw cotton from her American colonies. A series of innovations then revolutionized British industry. Improved roads and canals made possible the economical assembling of heavy or bulky materials in one locality and the distribution of finished products to all parts of England. Machines were invented which could do many things better and more rapidly than they could be done by hand. And lastly, steam engines provided power that was cheaper and more satisfactory than any hitherto available.

Though Charles II had embarked upon a program of turnpike construction, no spectacular progress was made before the middle of the eighteenth century, and English roads were not very good until the early nineteenth, when John McAdam (1756–1836) invented the form of gravel surfacing on rock foundations that still bears his name. Nevertheless, stagecoaches ran regularly over the turnpikes, carrying passengers, letters, and small parcels. In 1749 they were able to cover the one hundred miles from London to Birmingham in three days, but in 1784, by traveling day and night, they made the 350 miles from London to Edinburgh in forty hours. Progress in canal construction was even slower until the Duke of Bridgewater built one thirty miles long from his coal mines to Manchester (1759). Skeptical observers at first called this canal “Bridgewater’s Folly,” but its profits were so great that various English companies built three thousand miles of canals during the next thirty years. Bridgewater’s canal brought coal cheaply to Manchester, making possible the industrial growth of that city, but more important was the grain and other food brought from the farms to feed the growing populations of these new industrial cities. At the same time larger and better seagoing vessels were being constructed, which provided cheaper transportation of grain from the Baltic states and cotton from America.

The iron industry was fundamental to the others and was among the first to profit by new methods. Until this time the heat for smelting iron (melting it out of the ore from the mines) had been pro-
duced by charcoal fires, intensified by bellows, but the resulting iron was so impure as to be unsatisfactory until it had been thoroughly hammered on an anvil. Toward the middle of the eighteenth century, however, men learned to bake coal into coke, which produced a much hotter fire and smelted purer iron. About 1784 Henry Cort (1740–1800) invented the process called “puddling,” which further purified the iron. Between 1720 and 1788 England’s annual production of iron rose from about 25,000 tons to 68,000, and by 1804 it had reached 250,000 tons.

A second great industry to advance rapidly at this time was textiles, and particularly the spinning and weaving of cotton cloth. Traders had brought calico from India in the seventeenth century, and American colonists had begun to raise cotton in the eighteenth, but with the rising standards of living among the poor, the spinners and weavers of this cheap but serviceable cloth could not keep up with the demand. There was therefore much experimentation, and a number of important inventions appeared in the second half of the eighteenth century. The most famous of these inventions was the “water frame,” patented by Richard Arkwright in 1769, which spun better threads and was operated by a water wheel. The “spinning jenny,” patented in 1770 by James Hargreaves, enabled one spinner to spin many threads of cotton simultaneously. It was followed by the greatly improved “mule,” invented by Samuel Crompton in 1779. As early as 1733 John Kay had devised a new loom, by which one man could do work that formerly required two, and in 1785 Edmund Cartwright patented a power loom. When improved by other inventors, this loom replaced the old hand looms, just as the jenny and mule had replaced the old-fashioned spinning wheel. A few years later the American Eli Whitney (1765–1825) invented the cotton gin (1793) for cleaning the seed from cotton by a process which greatly reduced the price.

Heretofore the poorer people of Europe had eaten from wooden platters while the middle and upper classes had used pewter plates and cups. In the seventeenth century porcelain tableware was imported from China—and therefore called “china”—and later from Delft in Holland. The rising standards of the mid-eighteenth century created a great demand for such china, and the potteries of central England made rapid progress under the able leadership of Josiah Wedgwood (1730–1795). It has been estimated that in 1762 the English pottery industry operated about 150 plants, employing some
seven thousand people, but that twenty-five years later it employed three times that many persons. In 1769 Wedgwood opened a model plant at a town he named Etruria, which is still the center of the industry. The management of his works led him to develop many side lines, such as coal mines and canals. Though much of his china was cheap enough for common use, the more expensive grades were so artistically designed that today early Wedgwood pieces are collectors’ items.

The crowning achievement of this early stage of the Industrial Revolution was the invention of the steam engine to provide a new and reliable source of power. Heretofore power had come from men and mules, supplemented at times by windmills and water wheels. The latter were rather unsatisfactory, however, for the winds are notoriously fickle, while the millponds that supplied water for the wheels were likely to freeze in winter and run dry in summer. The ancient Greeks had known the expansive force of steam, but no practical steam engine was built before the eighteenth century. Early in that century an English blacksmith named Thomas Newcomen (1663–1729) built a cumbersome and expensive engine, operated by steam power, which could be used to pump water from mines. More than fifty years later, in 1763, a Scottish instrument maker at the University of Glasgow, James Watt (1736–1819), was employed to repair one of these Newcomen engines. Noting its great waste of power, he devised a much superior mechanism, by which steam was alternately applied on each side of the piston, pushing it back and forth. Watt took out his first patent in 1769, he installed his first engine to work a pump in 1776, and in 1781 he patented a device for transferring the up-and-down motion of the piston to wheels, thus making the power available for millwork. These engines were so expensive that less than five hundred
had been built before 1800, but fifteen years later several thousand were operating in England.

*The Progress of Machine Industry*

If we are to understand why the eighteenth century was so slow in accepting power-driven machinery, we must bear in mind the difficulties faced by early inventors and machine builders. In America today almost every boy begins tinkering with machinery at an early age and thereby becomes a potential machinist. In the eighteenth century no such interest in machinery existed, skilled mechanics were almost nonexistent, and it was difficult to find the men and materials to make simple machines. James Watt bankrupted his first financial backer trying to make a cylinder into which a piston would fit snugly. Each separate machine, and each part of a machine, was laboriously made by hand, and the repair of a broken part was a long and expensive process. About 1800, however, Eli Whitney, the American inventor of the cotton gin, began manufacturing muskets whose parts were so standardized as to be interchangeable and therefore readily replaceable. Working on this principle, inventors then began designing machines with interchangeable parts. Pioneers in the new industry also faced countless social and political problems, and many adventurers fell into bankruptcy. The wars against Napoleon created a great demand for goods, however, and brought great profits to successful manufacturers. Thereafter the Industrial Revolution progressed rapidly in England.

The new industry advanced even more rapidly after Napoleon’s defeat, and after 1832 it entered many new fields. Early progress had been limited largely to the iron and textile industries, with ceramics a poor third. These industries remained basic to the British economy throughout the next century, but each made further progress through new inventions and by improved organization. Spinners and weavers gradually learned to deal with wool as well as with cotton, and by 1850 they had largely eliminated the old hand workers, even in the manufacture of the finest cloths. The iron industry received a great boost in the 1860’s and 1870’s, when the Bessemer process and the “open-hearth process” greatly facilitated the manufacture of the better grades of steel. Countless new industries began using power-driven machines of one sort or another, and the total industrial production of England rose at an amazing rate. These new
industries need not be listed in detail, but progress in transportation and communications must be mentioned because of their effects upon the lives of everybody in England—and eventually of everybody in the world.

England's system of turnpikes and canals, begun in the eighteenth century, was greatly expanded in the first thirty years of the nineteenth. During these years, too, the owners of coal mines had laid tracks of cast-iron rails, over which coal cars with flanged wheels were pulled by horses. Inventors also tried to build locomotives by putting steam engines on wheels. At first they envisioned a primitive automobile to run over the roads, but early efforts along this line were not successful. Mine operators, on the other hand, saw that steam locomotives could be used on their rails, and as early as 1803 Richard Trevithick (1771-1833) built such an engine—only to find it too heavy for the cast-iron rails. Others continued his experiments, however, making great progress during the 1820's. In 1829 a race was held in which three locomotives were entered: two broke down during the race, and the third, George Stephenson's Rocket, attained a speed of thirty miles an hour. The Liverpool and Manchester Rail-
way was opened in 1830, and during the next eight years about five hundred miles of railway were built in England. These successes encouraged wild speculation and rapid building during the 1840's. At the end of that decade England had about 6600 miles of railway in operation, including nearly all the main lines of today, and the time required for a trip from London to Edinburgh had been reduced to twelve hours.

Meantime other inventors were applying steam power to ships. As early as 1807 the American Robert Fulton (1765–1815) built the Clermont, which successfully steamed up the Hudson from New York to Albany and back. During the next thirty years many small steamers were built, both in the United States and in England, and in 1819 the Savannah, using steam as an auxiliary power, crossed the Atlantic. At first, however, ocean steamers could not compete successfully with the Yankee-built clipper ships, which reached the peak of their perfection in the 1840's. With only a small crew they could cross the Atlantic from New York to Liverpool in seventeen days. When the English Great Western went into regular transatlantic service (1838), she made the crossing in fourteen days, yet she lost money for her builder because half her cargo space was needed for coal. The development of more economical engines, the substitution of screw propellers for paddle wheels, and the building of iron ships, all of which began in the 1850's, provided better ocean steamers, but only
in the late 1860's did they definitely surpass the large sailing vessels.

Phenomenal progress was also made in communications during the middle decades of the nineteenth century. The transportation of letters was left to private enterprise until the seventeenth century, when the more important governments established public postal services that gradually expanded during the next century. In 1839 Rowland Hill (1795–1879) induced the British government to adopt the “penny post.” Heretofore postal charges had been high, they had varied according to the distance the letter traveled, and they were paid by its recipient. Hill persuaded the government to deliver a letter anywhere in England for one penny (two cents) and to allow the sender to prepay postage by affixing adhesive stamps.

Meantime various persons in England and the United States were experimenting with devices to send messages electrically. Though an American, S. F. B. Morse (1791–1872), patented such an instrument in 1837, he did not make it a commercial success until seven years later. At about the same time Charles Wheatstone (1802–1875) devised a rather similar instrument in England, and within a few years the country was covered with a network of telegraph wires. A submarine cable to France was laid in 1851, but only after two failures did a transatlantic cable connect England with America (1866).
The Industrial Revolution made little progress outside England in the eighteenth century. France, which had been the leading industrial country of Europe ever since the days of Colbert, had not made great progress since his time. Diderot and the *philosophes* had taken an intellectual interest in mechanical inventions, and the plates that accompanied the *Encyclopédie* pictured a few new machines, but they were a little too early (1763) to show the epochal English inventions. In 1789 there were a few steam engines of the Newcomen type at work in France pumping the water from mines, the ironmasters at Le Creusot had quite recently substituted coke for charcoal in their blast furnaces, and a few "spinning jennies" were in use, but most French industrialists remained bound to the old methods. They lacked the English willingness to risk their capital, and their hands were tied by guild rules and mercantilist regulations. The early reforms of the Revolution freed them from many shackles, however, and in spite of disturbed conditions, French industry at once began to expand. This progress was greatly accelerated after 1815, and under the July Monarchy (1830–1848) the country became prosperous. Nevertheless, industrial France was now so far behind England that she could not regain her former leadership.

Belgium, which had been an important industrial country before 1789, also made rapid progress after 1815. In the United States the new methods of manufacture were eagerly received, especially in New England and the Middle Atlantic states, and even in these early years Americans showed their skill in many new inventions. On the other hand, central Europe, which was rather backward industrially in the eighteenth century, did not experience the Industrial Revolution much before 1830, and her great industrial expansion came only after 1850. Though Germany passed France in coal production in the early 1840's, it was only in 1870 that she overtook France in the production of pig iron; in the latter year Germany and the United States were about equal, but twenty years later the United States produced twice as much iron as Germany and surpassed England by 10 percent. Railway construction began in the United States almost as soon as in England and proceeded more rapidly than anywhere in Europe. In 1850 there were about 9000 miles of railway in this country, as opposed to 6600 in England or 3600 in Germany, and France was just launching an elaborate program of building. Northern Italy began making industrial progress after 1830; Austria, Holland, and Switzerland followed a decade later; but as late as 1850
Spain, Scandinavia, and the countries of eastern Europe were virtually untouched by the Industrial Revolution or even by the railroad.

**SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW INDUSTRY**

These changes in industry did much more than increase the production of manufactured goods. They raised nearly everyone’s standard of living, in spite of a rapidly increasing population; they brought a still more rapid growth of population; they redistributed this population in new geographical centers; and they created two new social classes. One such class consisted of the men who somehow had acquired enough financial capital to build factories, buy machines and stocks of raw materials, and hire laborers, and who then managed the factories and marketed the finished products. These men came to be called capitalists. The other new class was made up of the men, women, and children who worked for wages in their factories.

Perhaps the most famous, and certainly one of the most typical, of the early capitalists was Richard Arkwright (1732–1792), some-

![A cotton factory about 1835. This print illustrates spinning with "mules." (Bettmann Archive)](Image)

times called “the father of the factory system.” Trained as a barber and later a dealer in hair for wigs, Arkwright was not an inventor or a machinist, but he saw the possibilities of wealth offered by the machines, and he was able to persuade a few rich men to invest in them. As early as 1769 he had patented his “water frame,” and six
years later he patented a machine for carding cotton which would have enabled him to monopolize the spinning industry if the courts had not broken his patent. By plowing most of his profits back into the business, Arkwright was able to build a considerable number of spinning factories in Lancashire and other parts of northern England during the next few years, and he died a wealthy man. In 1786 he even became Sir Richard Arkwright, the first of a long series of industrial leaders to be so honored by the crown.

The great majority of the early capitalists were men like Arkwright who started with very little but who, by hard work, frugality, and thrift, eventually saved capital enough to launch the enterprises that made them rich. Their respect for hard work was intensified by their religious training, for most of them were Calvinistic dissenters who had been taught from childhood to rank industriousness among the greatest of virtues. They worked hard themselves, and they expected equal exertions from their associates and employees. Most of them were men of limited education, knowing little outside their narrow fields and not much given to reading books or to indulging in general speculation—Wedgwood and Watt were conspicuous exceptions to this rule—yet their views on public policy coincided closely with those set forth by Adam Smith and the other economists and social philosophers who advocated laissez faire. Theirs was, however, a harder and more rough-and-tumble conception of liberty than that envisaged by the philosophers. When they spoke of liberty, they meant that they wanted no interference in their business from others—from the government, from guilds, or from anyone else. The new capitalists became enthusiastic when talking about "progress," by which they meant the increased use of mechanical inventions, a greater production of commodities of every sort, and higher standards of living for themselves—but not the intellectual and spiritual progress toward freedom that was proclaimed by such philosophes as Voltaire, Diderot, and Condorcet.

Rapidly increasing production raised difficult problems for the factory owners. As the new industry provided goods more rapidly than the old markets could absorb them, manufacturers were constantly seeking new outlets for their products. No longer satisfied, as formerly, with their local markets, they began manufacturing for the national markets now made practicable for the first time by improved transportation. At the same time raw materials had to be gathered from many places. The new capitalists thus came to adopt a
national point of view, and usually they became even more nationalistic than the old mercantilists had been. Industrial capitalists in England and the western European states, which had long been united politically, now profited greatly therefrom, and we shall presently see how the rise of modern industry was an important factor in promoting the political unification of Germany and Italy.

Even national markets were not enough, however, and British manufacturers presently began to look abroad for foreign outlets. By the Eden Treaty of 1786 (see p. 170) English manufacturers gained easier access to French markets, and after the Napoleonic Wars they were equally successful elsewhere. Proudly boasting that England was "the workshop of the world," they imported few manufactured goods, but their exports went to every country in the world. The rest of the world paid for these goods with raw materials and food. As the English manufacturers wished to buy these commodities as cheaply as possible, they came to favor free trade—both for England and for all other countries. Continental and American manufacturers, on the other hand, called upon their governments to keep out English goods by means of "protective" tariffs. In spite of these restrictions, however, the English export trade prospered. The United States remained one of England's best customers after the American Revolution, and after the War of 1812 trade between the two countries increased rapidly. Colonial markets were less valuable, but India received great quantities of English goods. By the middle of the century cloth from Manchester had found its way into every market and fair in the world. The capitalists who came into being along with the new industry then gave entirely new meanings and new support to the current ideas of nationalism and imperialism as well as to those of liberalism and progress.

The Factory Workers

The second new class in society consisted of the factory workers. There had of course been craftsmen and industrial laborers in England long before the coming of the machines, but the Industrial Revolution greatly increased their numbers and profoundly altered their manner of life. In the old days many of the more important industries, notably textiles, had been organized under the "domestic system," by which the workmen owned or rented their tools and worked in their own cottages. Their employer brought them the
necessary raw materials and later collected and marketed the finished products. Wages were calculated by the piece, and though they were so low that a man must work twelve or more hours a day to earn a living, the system enabled the worker to choose his time for work. He might permit himself an occasional period of rest, and he could supplement his scanty wages by keeping a garden and by working in the fields at harvest time. His life was a far from happy one, yet in later times sentimental writers sometimes pictured it in quite idyllic colors.

The coming of the machine changed all this. The machines were expensive and dependent upon mechanical power, and the new methods of manufacture required that the work be divided among laborers possessing several widely different skills. The work therefore had to be done in factories rather than in the workers' cottages, and the factories had to be located at places where nature provided water power and other necessities. It was not easy to find workers for these new factories, but employers were greatly aided by the new agricultural methods and the enclosures which were driving farm laborers from the villages. Another large contingent of laborers came from Ireland, where standards of living were even lower and conditions even worse than in England. Manufacturing cities such as Manchester, Birmingham, Sheffield, Leeds, and the "Five Towns" of the potteries (now united as Stoke-on-Trent), as well as the commercial city of Liverpool, grew by leaps and bounds in the years following 1760. The displaced persons who filled them were glad to find work in the factories, where in most cases they were better off than they had been. No great skill was required for their new work; wages were higher than in the villages; the work was no harder; and there seemed to be opportunity for advancement.

Much has been written about the terrible conditions existing in these early factories, and there can be little doubt that, whatever may have been the success of the abler and more intelligent workers, who may be called "the aristocracy of labor," the less competent workers suffered grievously. Perhaps the worst abuse was child labor. In the textile mills there were many operations which required little skill or physical strength, to perform which children were employed at outrageously low wages. Sometimes parents sent their children to the factories to augment the family income, but often factory owners took pauper children and pretended to train them as apprentices—though actually teaching them little more than how to tie two threads
together. In some of Arkwright’s factories more than half the workers were children between the ages of ten and fifteen years, with a few as young as six. These children ordinarily worked twelve or fourteen hours a day, and the managers of the factories sometimes displayed the hearts of slave drivers. Moreover, trade fluctuations rendered employment quite irregular. As soon as orders ceased coming in, the manager curtailed production or closed the plant. In view of the wages they received, most workers had no savings to tide them over a period of unemployment, and they had no gardens or field work to fall back on. Perhaps the most unfortunate of all were the remaining cottage workers, whose wages now became pitiful. In the course of the fifteen years between 1814 and 1829, for example, the wage paid for weaving a piece of calico by hand fell from 6s. 6d. to 1s. 2d. (from $1.60 to 30¢).

Conditions in the new towns were often as appalling as those in the early factories. These towns grew so rapidly that there always was a housing shortage. New houses were jerry-built structures, hardly fit for human habitation. They were drab and crowded closely together; streets were unpaved and undrained; sewers were nonexistent. Sanitary conditions were incredibly primitive, and the cities were swept periodically by epidemics of smallpox, typhoid, typhus, and cholera. Into these dull and dreary places thousands of displaced persons descended as total strangers, torn from their ancestral surroundings, working all day in noisy factories, and having neither relaxation nor hope except that provided by the corner saloon or the Methodist chapel.

Economists and Reformers

These changes in the economic life of England led to much speculation on the larger aspects of what was happening, and the “classical school” of writers on economics arose. The founder of this school, Adam Smith, had described the early stages of the Industrial Revolution in his Wealth of Nations (1776, see p. 141). Often disapproving of what he saw, he sometimes permitted himself a rather biting irony in his treatment of the early captains of industry. They heartily approved of his attacks upon mercantilism and monopolies, however, and they grew enthusiastic over his advocacy of laissez faire.

In later years other aspects of the new economics were developed by other writers, three of whom must be mentioned here: T. R. Malthus (1766–1834), David Ricardo (1772–1823), and John Stuart
Mill (1806–1873). Malthus was an Anglican clergyman whose primary interest lay in refuting the easy and godless optimism of William Godwin and the French *philosophes*. Being deeply impressed by the rapid growth of population, he argued that, as mouths tend to multiply more rapidly than the food supply, there will always be hungry people and even "liberty" cannot make everybody happy. In his

*Principles of Population* (1798) he declared that, since nature limits population only by war, disease, and poverty, men must use "moral restraint" and marry late in order to avoid plunging the entire human race into abject poverty. He was not sanguine, however, as to the possibilities of moral restraint, and declared poverty to be inevitable.

Malthus's ideas were carried further by the English banker and stockbroker Ricardo, whose *Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* appeared in 1817. He was famed especially for his "iron law of wages," which taught that labor is a commodity whose price (wages), like all prices, rises and falls with demand and supply, and that since, as Malthus had shown, there will always be an increasing population, with many men competing for every job, competition will keep wages at the minimum of subsistence. Should a foolish
employer pay more, he would inevitably go bankrupt. Ricardo's other theories were set forth in the same cold-blooded way.

John Stuart Mill, on the other hand, was a sensitive and humane person, the brilliant son of Jeremy Bentham's chief colleague, and like the other "utilitarians" he was sincerely anxious to promote "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" (see p. 169). But Ricardo's logic was too much for him, and in his Principles of Political Economy (1848) Mill accepted the iron law of wages. He had convinced himself of the desirability of free competition, and though urging a fairer distribution of the products of labor, he could think of no way to improve the lot of the worker without sacrificing this fundamental principle of economic freedom. Mill became one of the most highly respected spokesmen of liberalism in England, but in his later years he modified his views slightly in the direction of what he called "socialism."

Modern criticism has dealt harshly with this "classical" economics, which humanitarians sometimes called "the dismal science." Malthus failed to foresee the triumphs of scientific agriculture, the cultivation of new lands in the Americas and Australia, and the importation of
food from such remote places. These innovations brought at least temporary respite from the disasters he predicted. Moreover, the classical economists based their calculations upon an assumed "economic man"—that is, one who never acted from any motive save desire for financial gain. Of course no such creature ever existed. Even the most flint-hearted banker or factory manager had his moments of sentimentality and weakness—sometimes without going bankrupt in consequence. And while these economists sincerely believed themselves to be scientists, objectively studying the facts before them, and their generalizations to be laws of nature as truly as was Newton's law of gravitation, they really introduced much sentimentality and concealed emotion into their writings. Someone once commented that Ricardo and Karl Marx each described the same economic system, the chief difference in their respective pictures being that on every page Marx groaned, "How dreadful!" while Ricardo rubbed his hands and exclaimed, under his breath, "How splendid! In fact, I did it that way myself!" Nevertheless, these classical economists expressed, in exaggerated and abstract terms, the principles upon which many capitalists of the period acted, and they exercised a profound influence upon the history of the nineteenth century.

Fortunately, however, not everybody in England, and not even all the early industrialists, tried to live up to Ricardo's ideal of the economic man. Wedgwood was an enlightened person who spent time and money freely to make Etruria into a model village; and to a lesser extent Arkwright himself felt a responsibility for the physical welfare of his workers. Outsiders also became concerned with the hard lot of the workers and sought to improve conditions. Some tried personal charity, against which Ricardo inveighed and of which Mill disapproved. Others turned to legislation, which most early industrialists considered anathema. Still others encouraged the workers to do something for themselves through labor unions and cooperative societies.

Robert Owen (1771–1858) was born of poor parents in northern Wales, but after completing his scholastic education at the age of nine he wandered to Manchester, where he found ample opportunity to develop his talents as a machinist and manager. By the time he was twenty he was manager of a cotton mill employing five hundred persons. Ten years later he became the highly paid manager and part owner of a mill employing two thousand persons at New Lanark in Scotland (1800). His observation of deplorable conditions in his mills
caused him to speculate about their causes and to attempt remedies. Being profoundly convinced that a man’s character is determined entirely by education and environment, he put himself to great trouble and expense to improve conditions, publishing his opinions and describing his achievements in A New View of Society (1813–1814). When his employers complained of the cost of his reforms, Owen organized a new company and bought them out, his principal partners being the philosophic radical Jeremy Bentham and a philanthropic Quaker named Allen. During the next several years his experiments attracted favorable attention, and his successes were widely advertised. When he began attacking organized religion, however, he lost much of his following.

Owen then decided to try out his ideas in America. Buying a large tract of land at New Harmony, Indiana, he established there the most famous of America’s numerous “backwoods utopias” (1825). As Owen paid a fantastically high price for the land, and as he did not understand that people and conditions in America differed from those in Scotland, his project was doomed from the first. In 1828 he returned to England and, having severed his connection with New Lanark and spent most his money, began crusading for various economic, social, and educational reforms. Owen was a man of great personal charm, tremendous energy, high intellectual ability, and fertile imagination, and there is scarcely an aspect of the subsequent labor movement in England that does not owe something to him. It apparently was he, or one of his early disciples, who introduced the word socialism into the English language (1827).

Meantime others were attempting less far-reaching reforms. Private charity could accomplish little, and it was not widely invoked. As most of the workers were Methodists or other dissenters, or else Irish Catholics, the wealthy and eminently respectable Church of England took little interest in their fate, and in general the philanthropists considered it nobler to agitate for the emancipation of slaves in Jamaica—or the United States—than to relieve distress in Manchester. On the other hand, the relief afforded by the poor laws only made matters worse. Ever since Elizabethan times each parish had been required to care for its paupers, and in 1795 officials began distributing relief in cash to all those whose incomes fell below a specified minimum. Conditions eventually became worse than even Ricardo would have foreseen, for wages fell below the minimum of subsistence, and the balance required to keep the workers alive came from
poor relief. In other words, part of their wages came from the taxpayer. This antiquated Poor Law was repealed in 1834. Paupers were housed thereafter in "workhouses"—of the sort Dickens pilloried in his novel *Oliver Twist* (1837)—but underpaid workers were left to shift for themselves.

Reformers who turned to legislation fared better, and a long series of Factory Acts made England the leader in such matters. The first of these acts, dating from 1802, was the work of the elder Robert Peel (1750–1830), father of Sir Robert Peel, the Tory reformer and prime minister (see p. 272). Though the elder Peel had derived his fortune from Lancashire calico factories, in which he had employed a thousand children, he, like his friend Owen, was much distressed by conditions in these factories. His act was intended to improve the lot of "pauper apprentices" by limiting their working hours to twelve a day, by setting up minimum standards for their dormitories and clothing, and by requiring that they be instructed in religion. Unfortunately, however, the law was not well enforced, partly because England had no factory inspectors to report violations. Owen's agitation was largely responsible for a second act (1819), forbidding any employment of children less than nine years old, and in 1833 a third act reduced hours for persons between nine and eighteen years of age to nine a day. This third law also created a staff of inspectors to enforce its provisions. During the next few years a series of laws further regulated work in factories and mines, limited the hours for women and children, required sanitation and safety devices, and otherwise interfered with the liberty of the industrialists. In spite of Ricardo and his disciples, the old mercantilism was creeping back in a modernized form, and the more intelligent industrialists were learning to accept it.

Meantime the workers themselves had sometimes tried to improve their lot by coöperative effort. Unions were legalized in 1824, but a second law (1825) restricted their activities, and the early unions were not very effective. The workers were much slower than their employers in developing "class consciousness," and at first most of them were unwilling to join the unions. Other leaders, among them Robert Owen, attempted to organize the workers in great coöperative societies which would enable them to buy food and other necessities at reduced prices. These coöperatives eventually were very successful in England, but in the early years they helped only a little. And finally, some people suggested a revised Malthusianism by urging
workers to emigrate to foreign countries—especially to the United States—which supposedly would raise wages by reducing the labor supply at home. In spite of the great difficulties and cost of emigration, thousands actually departed, but their departure did little to alleviate conditions in England.
15. POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW INDUSTRY

As soon as the Reform Bill of 1832 went into effect, a general election in England returned a parliament that was strongly Whig and Radical—though not so radical and demagogic as excited Tories had predicted. The fragrance of reform filled the air, and during the next few years parliament passed an unprecedented number of bills in the new spirit. Some of its reforms were political or constitutional, others were economic, and many were humanitarian. Slavery was abolished in the West Indies (1833), the famous Factory Act was passed in spite of the opposition of the factory owners (1833), a futile attempt was made to relieve Catholic taxpayers from supporting the Anglican Church in Ireland (1833), the new Poor Law was enacted (1834), and the Municipal Reform Act modernized the government of cities (1835). But after the Whigs had been in power for nine years, and had effected most of the major reforms on their program, they lost their majority in parliament and the Tories returned to power (1841).

The younger Sir Robert Peel (1788–1850) then held office as prime minister until 1846. The son of a wealthy Manchester manufacturer and educated in the stanchest Tory traditions at Harrow and Oxford, Peel had a brilliant career in parliament, beginning at the age of twenty-one. At twenty-four he held a seat in the cabinet as secretary for Ireland. A few years later he drastically modernized the criminal law (see p. 243). As he never was blind to realities or unable to change his mind, he persuaded his followers to accept the Reform Bill and the subsequent Whig legislation, though he had opposed these measures at first. He wished to create a new Conservative party that would unite the well-to-do classes against further democratic reform, but the
Tory leaders, being country gentlemen, would not coöperate with Peel because he represented merely the British industrialists.

Meantime Victoria had become queen of England (1837–1901). George III had been succeeded by two sons in turn, George IV (1820–1830) and William IV (1830–1837), and as neither left a direct heir, William was succeeded by his niece, Victoria. As the new queen’s father, the fourth son of George III, had died when his daughter was only a year old, she was educated away from court by her German mother. Though only eighteen years of age when she came to the throne, less than five feet tall, and by no means beautiful, Victoria was serious and intelligent, and throughout her long reign she seemed the very embodiment of English middle-class respectability. These years are well called the Victorian age.

As the Hanoverian crown could not be inherited by a woman, that kingdom passed to George III’s fifth son (1837), and the personal union that had united the two kingdoms since 1714 was thus dissolved. German interests at the British court were revived three years later, however, when Victoria married Albert, of the house of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha. Until his death in 1861, the prince consort and his German adviser, Baron Stockmar, exercised a real influence at the British court, and the marriages of the nine children Victoria bore him became a factor in European diplomacy. Nevertheless, Victoria was content to entrust the government of England to her ministers. When she came to the throne in 1837, English radicals were openly demanding a republic, but she knew how to make herself so popular with all classes of society that republicanism soon ceased to exist and the English monarchy was firmly established in the hearts of the people. Today England is the only major country in the world with a monarchical form of government, but it is also one of the most democratically governed.

English workingmen had taken an enthusiastic part in the popular agitation that led up to the Reform Bill of 1832, yet it gave them no voice in the government. Five years later an economic depression brought great distress to the workers, and again they sought political reform. From their efforts arose the movement known as Chartism. This name came from the “People’s Charter,” which demanded reforms to make it possible for workingmen to be represented and to sit in parliament. The six points in this program were: universal manhood suffrage, secret ballot, no property qualifications for members of parliament, payment of members, equal electoral districts,
and annual election of members. First published in 1838, the Charter caused nation-wide excitement. When the government broke up meetings and arrested leaders, there were riots and speeches inciting to violence. After three or four years the agitation died down somewhat, but when a crop failure brought back hard times in 1848, the Charter was revived. A monster petition was prepared, which was said to carry over five million signatures. Leaders planned a huge procession of workingmen to present it to parliament, but when the government brought troops and the aged Duke of Wellington swore in many thousand special constables to prevent the procession (and nature came to his aid with a heavy rainstorm on the appointed day), the petition was presented less dramatically. It was then found to have less than half the advertised number of signatures, and many of these were fictitious. Nevertheless, twice as many persons actually signed the petition as there were voters in all England. The Chartist movement fizzled out soon thereafter, but England has since accepted all except the last of its six demands.

While labor leaders were thus seeking political reform, spokesmen for the industrialists were continuing their attacks upon the old mercantilism. Their criticism was directed primarily against the Corn Laws of 1815 and 1828, which imposed high duties on imported wheat, but it was foreseen that the repeal of these laws would bring with it the collapse of the mercantilist system. Many industrialists no doubt anticipated with pleasure that repeal would bring down the price of food and that the "iron law of wages" would then enable them to reduce wages correspondingly, but others took broader views of the matter. They envisaged a world at peace, prosperous from trade, and with world-wide freedom of trade nowhere impeded by tariff walls. The Anti-Corn Law League, organized in Manchester in 1838, was led by two very able men—Richard Cobden (1804–1865) and John Bright (1811–1889)—each of whom was a humanitarian idealist and a statesman as well as a brilliant orator and a formidable debater. Within a short time their propaganda was reaching every part of England, and its success may have contributed somewhat to the decline of Chartism in the early 1840's.

At first neither Whigs nor Tories dared favor free trade, and when Peel became prime minister in 1841 he pledged support of the Corn Laws. The depression of 1837 had upset England's finances, however, and drastic measures were required to balance the budget. In spite of the howls of the wealthy, Peel imposed an income tax of seven
pence in the pound (about 3 percent) on all incomes over £150 a year and reduced the import duties on many articles. Much to the general surprise, the income from tariffs actually rose because of the greatly increased volume of imports, which enabled British manufacturers to sell more abroad. Cobden was quick to point the moral, and Peel was gradually converted to free trade. A few years later, in 1845, a blight destroyed the potato crop in Ireland, leaving millions on the verge of starvation, and the English wheat crop fell far below normal. Great amounts of food had to be purchased abroad, and Peel took this occasion to force parliament to repeal the Corn Laws (1846).

The infuriated Tories at once overthrew Peel on another issue, and with his support the Whigs returned to power. This coalition of Whigs and Peelites created the Liberal party, which thereafter represented the manufacturing interests while the Conservatives remained the party of the country squires and the Anglican Church. The most conspicuous of those attacking Peel in 1846 was a young man named Benjamin Disraeli (1804-1881), a former Radical who presently became leader of a new Conservative party and was prime minister twice. On the other side, one of Peel's most trusted lieutenants was William Ewart Gladstone (1809-1898), who, like Peel himself, was a former Tory and a spokesman for the manufacturers, but who served four times as Liberal prime minister of England.

France

Political and economic conditions in France under the July Monarchy of Louis Philippe (1830-1848) differed widely from those in contemporaneous England. During the early years of his reign Louis Philippe was beset by many troubles, some of which were due to the manner and circumstances under which he achieved power while others were a legacy from the great French Revolution itself. Except among the old aristocrats and the clergy, few Frenchmen desired the return of Charles X or his son, but the republicans presented more formidable opposition. They had been induced to accept Louis Philippe in 1830, but they soon came to regret their compliance, and during the next few years they often instigated revolts that caused the government serious trouble. (One such revolt, in 1832, is brilliantly described by Victor Hugo in his novel Les Misérables.) The republicans, most of whom were anticlerical, became
especially indignant when the government attempted to ingratiate itself with the church by allowing the clergy to control elementary education (1833). The works of Robespierre and other revolutionary leaders were then being read widely in cheap editions, and dreamers were dreaming up utopias, whose popularity showed the widespread discontent with the July Monarchy.

Napoleon was by this time becoming a matter of legend in France. His Memoirs had established the tradition that he was a Jacobin, a republican, and a son of the Revolution, and in the days of Louis Philippe the Napoleonic legend grew rapidly. Old soldiers remembered the “Little Corporal” with affection; the common people recalled the “career open to talent” and complained of Louis Philippe's government by and for the rich; and restless romantics contrasted the “glory” of the Napoleonic period with the humdrum existences they were then forced to lead. When Napoleon's body was brought to Paris and installed in the Invalides (1840), popular enthusiasm took on alarming proportions.

The chief beneficiary of this excitement was Napoleon’s nephew, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte (1808–1873), later known as Napoleon III. His father (Napoleon’s brother, Louis) had once been king of Holland (1806–1810), but after Waterloo the boy was raised by his mother, the former Queen Hortense. The death of Napoleon’s son (1832) left Louis Napoleon as his uncle’s political heir, and he straightway began making strenuous attempts to secure his inheritance. After a rather absurd attempt to launch a rebellion in Strasbourg (1836), he took up literary propaganda and published a book entitled Napoleonic Ideas (1839). Here he pictured the great Napoleon as a proponent of republicanism, socialism, and peace, and announced his intention of continuing in that noble tradition. A year later he instigated a revolt at Boulogne, but was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment. He reached the prison on the very day that his uncle’s remains were deposited in the Invalides. During his incarceration, he corresponded with many persons and published a second volume in which he promised The Extinction of Poverty (1844) by a utopian reorganization of society along fascist lines. After six years in prison he managed to escape—explaining that he thus violated French law only because he wished to see his aged father once more before the old man died—after which he took up his residence in London. Here he had himself sworn in as one of Wellington’s special constables on the day set for the Chartist parade
in 1848. He spent most of his time watching political developments in France, however, for he knew that a man of his name, who had repeatedly promised everything to everybody, was in a position to profit by the decline of Louis Philippe, and that the king had by this time fallen into grave difficulty.

The first ten years of Louis Philippe's reign had been troubled by opposition of various sorts, but things went better after François Guizot (1787–1874) became prime minister in 1840. Guizot was a university professor of history who had translated Gibbon in his youth (1812), written a good book about Cromwell (1826), and published a *History of Civilization in Europe* (1828) which remained a "standard text" in American colleges until almost the end of the nineteenth century. In these works he expressed liberal opinions, but after achieving power Guizot governed strictly in the interest of the wealthy. It is said that on one occasion, when a delegation of workers asked him to lower the franchise requirements and allow them to vote, he replied, "Get rich, and you will be allowed to vote." This phrase, "Enrichissez-vous!" might be taken as the French national motto during the 1840's.

The Industrial Revolution did not appear in France until after the fall of Napoleon, but the foundations of a modern industrial system were laid during the Restoration (1815–1830). Under the July Monarchy progress was rapid. The production of coal, for example, increased from one million tons in 1820 to almost two million in 1830 and to four and a half million in 1850, while the production of iron was increasing at about the same rate. Guizot aided this industrial advance in many ways, but especially by his encouragement of railroad construction. A law of 1842 arranged for a railway network to be built by private companies with heavy subsidies from the government. Guizot thus started a boom in railway building that lasted for several years and eventually gave France an excellent system of transportation. But at the same time Guizot rigorously enforced a law, passed by the Constituent Assembly in 1791, that forbade strikes and labor unions. There were no factory laws, and in their squalor and their lack of sanitation many industrial cities in France resembled the English factory towns of thirty years before.

The crop failure of 1846, which wrought such havoc in Ireland and England, was equally disastrous in France. The wheat crop failed almost completely, and the distress of hundreds of thousands of
peasants brought on a major depression in 1847. Banks failed, factories closed, thousands of workers were thrown out of employment, and the government was forced to spend millions for immediate relief. Great quantities of grain were bought in Russia and shipped to Marseilles or the northern ports, but as only a few railways were in operation, it proved almost impossible to distribute this food adequately in central France. Thousands of unemployed workers were brought to the Paris area, nominally to build fortifications for the city, and here they fell prey to radical agitators denouncing Louis Philippe and his government by millionaires. Republican agitators also spread their propaganda among the domestic workers and shopkeepers of Paris. The radicals then prepared to hold a number of propaganda banquets at various places on February 22, 1848. On the twenty-first Guizot forbade such assemblies. Rioting started at once, barricades were thrown up in the principal streets, and street fighting followed. As a result of these "February Days," Louis Philippe and Guizot fled to England (February 24). The radicals at once proclaimed a republic—the "Second Republic"—set up a provisional government of ten men, and ordered the election of a Constituent Assembly by universal manhood suffrage.

The best-known member of the provisional government was the moderate republican Alphonse de Lamartine (1790–1869), an admirer of the Girondins of 1792; but the most energetic was the "socialist" Louis Blanc. He demanded the immediate establishment of a set of "national workshops," such as he had been dreaming and writing about for several years. His colleagues let him have his way, and the workshops failed completely. There had been no time for Blanc to make adequate preparations, no tools or raw materials were available, and there was nothing for the men to do. Thousands of the unemployed were put to such work as digging trenches in the parade ground on one day and filling them in again on the next, for which they were paid two francs a day. Blanc thus guaranteed to the workers their "right to work," of which he had often spoken, after which he proposed legislation limiting hours, authorizing unions, and setting minimum wages.

Blanc's activities shocked the great majority of the French people, especially those living outside Paris, and when elections to the Assembly were held (April 23), more than half the deputies elected were followers of the conservative Lamartine. The heirs of Charles X and Louis Philippe each won more voters than Blanc. The national
workshops were discontinued, and 100,000 unemployed workers were brought face to face with starvation. When rioting broke out again during the “June Days” (June 24–26), a moderate republican named General Cavaignac was appointed dictator, and Blanc’s followers were suppressed with great bloodshed. The rebels were said to have suffered ten thousand casualties during these three days. The Assembly then set to work drawing up a republican constitution for France. When elections for a president were held (December 10), four candidates appeared: Lamartine, Cavaignac, Ledru-Rollin (an associate of Blanc), and Louis Bonaparte, who had recently returned from England. About 7,500,000 votes were cast, which was thirty times as many as there had been voters under the July Monarchy. The result of such an election could not be in doubt. Bonaparte received 5,500,000 votes as opposed to 2,000,000 for all others combined. Ten days later Bonaparte was sworn in as president and, as we shall see in the next chapter, he at once began planning even greater glories for himself.

**INDUSTRY AND NATIONALISM IN CENTRAL EUROPE**

The Industrial Revolution appeared even later in central Europe than in France, and its political consequences there were quite different. Prussian industry was the most progressive in Germany, yet even there steam engines and factories were just beginning to appear in 1830. Rapid progress did not come until several years later. Austria and Italy had barely begun to modernize their industries in 1848, but while Saxony and Bohemia trailed Prussia, they were far ahead of Austria.

Germany's industrial backwardness had many causes, of which the most important perhaps were the semifeudal conditions still prevailing in many regions and the political fragmentation which prevented industrialists from manufacturing for large markets. Prussia's leadership undoubtedly was due in large part to her relative freedom from these impediments to industry and trade, while Austria's exceptional backwardness resulted from Metternich’s feudal policies. Persons interested in advancing German industry were therefore driven to promoting liberalism and nationalism. Their liberalism, however, was the anti-feudal liberalism of the French Revolution rather than the anti-mercantilist liberalism of the English. Likewise, their nationalism did not parallel English chauvinism.
As England had long been united politically, and her industries enjoyed world-wide markets, English patriots merely wished to maintain the existing situation. German patriots, on the other hand, being late comers politically and economically, hoped for many radical changes.

In an earlier chapter we saw that German patriotism was greatly intensified during the Napoleonic Wars and that Prussia profited especially from this new patriotism (see p. 218). At the Congress of Vienna the Freiherr vom Stein had vainly tried to create a united German state under the king of Prussia, and during the remaining sixteen years of his life he continued his efforts to arouse popular enthusiasm for the cause. The universities were the great centers of patriotic enthusiasm in those early days, for there students and professors assembled from all parts of Germany, and the Bursenschichten (student clubs) actively conducted nationalistic propaganda.
For several years after the Carlsbad decrees of 1819 this agitation was forced underground, but after 1830 it appeared in the open once more. Nationalistic propaganda took many forms, from ponderous but patriotic histories to stirring songs, such as *The Watch on the Rhine* (1840) and *Deutschland, Deutschland, über Alles* (1841). Germany was becoming a land of nationalistic patriots, but of patriots without a national state.

The political unification of Germany was no easy matter, however, for the most powerful people in central Europe opposed it. Metternich and his Austrian associates feared and hated German nationalism because they foresaw that it would destroy their beloved Austrian Empire, which was German only in part. The princes of Germany opposed unification, because it would rob them of their independence. Even the king of Prussia, Frederick William IV (1840–1861), showed no enthusiasm for the proposal, partly perhaps because he was a religious mystic, devoted to the divine right of kings, and partly because he obstinately opposed all change.

On the other hand, the proponents of unification could not agree among themselves as to what parts of Germany should be united or as to how union should be accomplished. One group, known as the *Grossdeutsch* ("Big German") faction, wished to include all German-speaking peoples in the new Germany; their *Kleindeutsch* ("Little German") opponents wished to exclude the Germans of Austria. The *Grossdeutsch* program started with the German *Bund*, set up in 1815, to which they would have added the Germans of Alsace (held by France since the days of Louis XIV), those of Schleswig-Holstein (held by Denmark since 1815), the Sudeten Germans of Bohemia (ruled by the Austrian emperor as king of Bohemia), and perhaps even the independent Germans in Switzerland. Their program would also compel the Austrian emperor to surrender the Austrian Germans to the new state. Obviously such changes could not be made without new wars of Napoleonic proportions. The *Kleindeutsch* program was not much better, however, for only war could exclude Austria from the *Bund*. In either case, Prussia would bring large numbers of Poles into the new state, thereby destroying its purely German character. Religious factionalism also played its part. If the Austrian Germans were admitted, the new state would contain a majority of Catholics; if not, it would be predominantly Protestant. Catholics therefore tended to be *Grossdeutsch* while Protestants were *Kleindeutsch*, and bigots in each faction.
would rather stay as they were than become a minority in the new Germany. The whole problem seemed quite insoluble.

The first important step toward the political unification of Germany was the creation of the Zollverein or "customs union" of 1833. As early as 1818 Prussia gave her tax system a complete overhauling, abolishing internal customs lines but levying duties on all goods entering Prussia from the outside. As several small German principalities were completely surrounded by Prussian territory, they were by-passed by Prussian traders and suffered greatly in consequence. During the next six years several of these tiny states agreed to collect no tariffs on goods entering their territories from Prussia, in exchange for which they would receive a percentage of Prussia's collections on all her frontiers. The larger states, on the other hand, replied to Prussia's action by forming two other unions, one of Bavaria and Württemberg, the other of several central German states (1828). After a few years of tariff war, these three unions coalesced in a German customs union that included most of Germany but not Austria (1833). Thereafter tariffs were levied only on goods entering the territory of the union from abroad.

German industrialists profited greatly from this union, which was the work of the Prussian bureaucracy, acting on its own initiative. The success of the union therefore lent support to the old Prussian tradition of state oversight and control (see p. 66), and Prussian industrialists retained a higher regard for state action than was shown by their English colleagues. The chief exponent of the fundamental theories of their "national economy"—as they often called the science which the English called "political economy" and which we call simply "economics"—was Friedrich List (1789–1846), whose book Das Nationale System der politischen Ökonomie appeared in 1841. As a young man List had been a professor of political science at Tübingen, in Württemberg, but his severe criticisms of the reactionary government then in power caused his arrest and flight to the United States (1825). Here he became acquainted with the writings of Alexander Hamilton; he sympathetically studied Henry Clay and his "American system" (see p. 441); and as early as 1827 he published an enthusiastic book about American Political Economy. Returning to Germany in 1832 as American consul at Leipzig, List was delighted with the Zollverein and energetically threw himself into advocating railway construction, preferably by the state, but if necessary by private capital with state aid. Throughout the nine-
seventeenth century Germany economists and bureaucrats held List’s ideas in the same high esteem that their English contemporaries accorded to those of Adam Smith, Ricardo, and Mill.

The status of the German peasants was changing rapidly during the 1830’s and 1840’s. Serfs retained the personal freedom granted them during the Napoleonic period, of course, but they still faced great economic difficulties. They were forced to pay exorbitant prices for their land and for the commutation of old feudal services, and a law of 1821 permitted the distribution of lands formerly held in common. Most such lands were distributed during the next thirty years, with social consequences comparable to those of the English enclosures of the eighteenth century. The poorer peasants suffered especially from these measures, and thousands were forced from their villages to the cities, where they became workers in the new industry.

These changing conditions, combined with new ideas, caused great commotion in Germany during the decade of the 1840’s. The most conspicuous and excitable agitators were those demanding national unity. This unity they usually coupled with freedom, which they wished to have guaranteed by a constitution including a declaration of the Rights of Man. The leaders of these nationalists were mostly professional men and idealistic members of the middle class. At the same time, however, industrialists were demanding a strong government whose economic reforms would assure them protection against English manufacturers; hand workers were desperately seeking protection from the new machines; peasants were being driven from their villages; and factory workers and miners were suffering the hard fate of workers elsewhere in the early stages of the Industrial Revolution. The old aristocrats, on the other hand, were thoroughly frightened, fearing armed rebellion and a return of Jacobinism. This threat was made to seem even more dreadful by the addition of such words as “communism” and “socialism” for the benefit of those middle-class citizens who were still unconvinced of the diabolical origin of the Rights of Man.

Austria and Italy

While central Europeans of German nationality were divided among thirty-eight sovereign and independent states, the ramshackle empire of the Hapsburgs united peoples of a dozen different nation-
alities. The heart of this empire lay in the German-speaking provinces which now make up the Republic of Austria, and its principal city, Vienna, was second only to Paris in fame and beauty. North of the Austrian provinces lay Bohemia, whose Czech population was Slavic while her Sudetens were German. East of Bohemia were the Polish provinces seized during the partitions in the eighteenth century, and still further east lived men of another Slavic race, the Ruthenes. The central part of the empire, called Hungary, was inhabited by Magyars, an Asiatic people not closely akin to any other in Europe. They had invaded Hungary in the tenth century, they had long lived under Turkish rule, and they had been rescued by the Hapsburgs in the seventeenth century. East of Hungary lay Transylvania, whose people spoke Romanian, a language descended from Latin, and were related to other Romanians who still groaned under the Turkish yoke. South of Austria dwelt several groups of Yugoslavs, or South Slavs, notably Slovenes and Croatians, and the Serbs of Dalmatia. And lastly, the Hapsburgs then held Lombardy and Venetia, the two largest and richest provinces of northern Italy. The Germans were the most numerous single national group, but they made up less than a quarter of the total population ruled by the Hapsburgs.

As the Hapsburgs had made few efforts to Germanize their non-German subjects, the rise of local nationalism threatened to tear their empire to pieces. In spite of Metternich’s efforts, however, nationalistic enthusiasm spread among the Czechs and Poles, the
Magyars, and the Italians. In each case the progress of nationalism was accompanied and encouraged by a literary and cultural "renaissance," and the nationalist leaders nearly always desired liberal constitutions even more than they desired national independence. Czech leaders also dreamed of a cultural, if not a political, union with other Slavs (Pan-Slavism), but their liberalism caused them to make reservations regarding Russia. Even Polish and Magyar aristocrats used liberal terminology quite freely, but in each case they desired freedom for themselves and not for their peasants or the men of minor nationalities residing within their territories. The most important of all the nationalists, however, were the Italians, most of whom were sincerely liberal.

The territory of the present Italian Republic was then divided between seven native states, while the Hapsburgs, as mentioned above, still continued to hold Lombardy and Venetia. Moreover,
the Grand Duke of Tuscany was a cousin of the Hapsburgs, the Papal States were ruled by a succession of pro-Austrian popes, and the Bourbon rulers of the Two Sicilies were thoroughly subservient to Metternich. As the three duchies of Parma, Modena, and Lucca were of slight political importance, the Kingdom of Sardinia (ruled by the house of Savoy) was the nearest approach to a free Italy that could be found. It became the nucleus around which Italy united, just as the German Empire united around Prussia. Tiny San Marino and Monte Carlo hardly counted politically.

Though Metternich had little trouble repressing the revolts of the Carbonari in 1830, patriotic agitation continued with ever-increasing vehemence and success. First of all, there was Giuseppe Mazzini (1805–1872). After being exiled to Marseilles in 1830, he organized a secret revolutionary society called “Young Italy” to spread his ideas and to work for national unity, and throughout his life he remained a resolute republican and a believer in democracy. Among his early recruits was Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807–1882), later the military leader of the revolutionists. At the same time other Italians, led by a priest named Vincenzo Gioberti (1801–1852), were agitating for a federal Italian state to be ruled by the pope. The scheme was quite fantastic, for the pope was as little likely to exchange his international position as leader of the Catholic Church for the presidency of an Italian theocracy as were the Hapsburgs to exchange their vast empire for leadership in a united Germany. A third group of Italian patriots wished to make the king of Sardinia a national leader. Still other patriots were less interested in political than in economic reform, for they realized that modern industry and railroads would unite the country more firmly than constitutions and armies could. To this group was due much of the industrial advance of Italy in the years before 1848, and wherever industry appeared, liberal nationalism came with it. The ensuing political, economic, and intellectual revival of Italy is now known as the Risorgimento.

1848 in Central Europe

Because of this liberal and nationalistic agitation against Metternich and his system, central Europe was seething with discontent long before the February Days of 1848 in Paris. Polish landlords in Austria rebelled in 1846, though it is difficult to say whether they were more interested in freeing themselves from the emperor or in reducing their own serfs to more complete bondage. They were so vigor-
ously repressed, however, that nothing more was heard from them for several years. A little later the Hungarian diet (local parliament) openly demanded constitutional reforms, praising liberalism and denouncing Germanism, and Czech leaders were equally outspoken in their demands. In 1847 the Prussian king was induced to promise mild reforms, and in Switzerland the liberal cantons went to war with the conservative ones. In October of that year the king of Sardinia was constrained to dismiss an unpopular minister, soften the censorship, and introduce mild reforms. In January, 1848, six weeks before the February Days in Paris, rebellion broke out in Sicily, and on February 10 the king issued a slightly liberal constitution. A week later a constitution was proclaimed in Tuscany, the king of Sardinia followed suit on March 4, and the pope concluded this phase of the revolution by granting the Papal States a constitution on the fourteenth.

Though it required no rebellion in Paris to launch a revolution in central Europe, the news of the February Days aroused enthusiasm everywhere. As early as March 3 a Magyar leader, Lajos Kossuth (1802–1894), delivered a fiery oration in the Hungarian diet, praising liberty, denouncing the Hapsburgs, and demanding a government responsible to the diet. Twelve days later the diet adopted the "March Laws," which declared Hungary to be a constitutional monarchy under the Hapsburg king but retaining no other connection with the empire. The emperor formally accepted these laws on March 31. Meantime street fighting had broken out in Vienna, and on the thirteenth Metternich, after hurriedly resigning, fled in disguise to England. On March 18 began the "Five Days of Milan," during which all Austrian forces were driven from the city. Venice proclaimed herself an independent republic on the twenty-second, and on that same day Charles Albert, king of Sardinia, declared war on Austria. He was quickly joined by countless other Italians anxious to drive the hated foreigners from the peninsula. On April 8 the emperor was forced to promise a constituent assembly for Bohemia, and on the twenty-fifth he issued a moderately liberal constitution for Austria. These measures were not enough, however, and on May 17 he fled with his family from Vienna to Innsbruck. It seemed that the days of the Hapsburgs were numbered.

Berlin's famous "March Days" began on March 15 with barricades and street fighting. The terrified Frederick William IV ordered a few immediate reforms, promised a constitution, undertook to lead a
united Germany, and—greatest humiliation of all—stood at salute while the crowd marched past the palace bearing the corpses of the insurgents whom his soldiers had slaughtered. During the next few days several other German princes capitulated to crowds demanding liberal reforms, and on March 24 the German duchies of Schleswig and Holstein rose against their ruler, the king of Denmark. About fifty private persons met on March 31 at Heidelberg, whence they issued orders for the election of a national parliament to draw up a constitution for a united Germany. The members of this assembly, chosen by universal manhood suffrage, came together at Frankfort on May 19, two days after the Austrian emperor’s flight from Vienna. They were filled with high hopes of creating a free and united Germany.

It was not long, however, before the liberals saw their hopes dashed to the ground. The conservative forces rallied and presently won back most of what they had lost, both in the Austrian Empire and in Germany. Many substantial people, appalled at the violence and bloodshed of the “March Days,” began to fear the collapse of all government; after the “June Days” in Paris all Europe was jittery from a “Red scare”; and, above all, the authorities had military power on their
side. The first victory of the conservative reaction came on April 29 when the pope, who had sent troops to aid Charles Albert, hurriedly withdrew them, namely explaining that he had never intended them to fight against Austrian Catholics! Soon thereafter Naples was pacified (May 15), and the Italian armies were defeated at Custozza (July 24), after which Austrians reoccupied all Lombardy. Meantime an Austrian general had bombarded Prague (June 19), where he soon established himself as dictator. A few weeks later another general led an army of Croatians into Hungary and took Budapest (January 5, 1849). When Viennese radicals rioted in protest against this attack, the pacifier of Prague bombarded Vienna (October 31).

A month later the strong man of Austria, Prince Schwarzenberg (1800–1852), forced the Emperor Ferdinand I (1835–1848) to abdicate in favor of his eighteen-year-old nephew, Francis Joseph (1848–1916), and announced that the new emperor was bound by none of his predecessor’s promises. Schwarzenberg then methodically pulled things together once more, making the empire stronger and more highly centralized than ever. Encouraged by these Austrian victories, Frederick William decided that the time had come to withdraw his promises. Therefore on December 5 he dissolved the convention that was drawing up a constitution for Prussia—nominally because it had removed the words “by the grace of God” from the royal title—and presently he promulgated a reactionary constitution of his own that remained in force until 1918.

As the liberal cause declined, radicals seized control in several places, and the first months of 1849 saw extremists in power, both in Italy and in Hungary. Italian patriots were so displeased by the pope’s neutrality that at the end of November he fled from Rome. Several weeks later, on February 9, a Roman Republic was proclaimed, having Mazzini and Garibaldi among its leaders. Before long, however, Pius IX had persuaded Louis Napoleon to intervene; French troops had besieged the city; and on July 2, 1849, Garibaldi surrendered. French troops then held Rome for more than twenty years. About a month after the proclamation of the Roman Republic, Charles Albert resumed the war with Austria and, after suffering defeat at Novara (March 23), abdicated in favor of his son, Victor Emmanuel II (1849–1878). After the Austrians captured Budapest, Magyar radicals at Debreczen proclaimed a republic (April 13, 1849), with Kossuth enjoying dictatorial powers. The Russian tsar then offered aid against these rebels, which Francis Joseph gladly accepted. Russian troops
decisively defeated the Magyars at Temesvar (August 9), and the republic vanished. Kossuth and his friends escaped to Turkey, but their political careers were ended. Last of all, Venice surrendered to the Austrians on August 28, thus ending the Revolution of 1848 in the Hapsburg lands.

Meantime the Frankfort Assembly was learning the difficulty of its task. Its members included many lawyers, professors, clergymen, and others elected largely because of their ability to talk at length, and their proceedings were therefore unnecessarily protracted. The Assembly was divided between Grossdeutsch and Kleindeutsch, with the former at first in control. When Schleswig and Holstein revolted, the Assembly called upon Frederick William to occupy the duchies in the name of the new Germany. He reluctantly consented, but a few weeks later he withdrew his troops because of the protests of England and Russia (August, 1848). Crowds of superheated patriots rioted in Frankfort, the Assembly was forced to call upon the Prussian king for protection, and its members lost some of their early enthusiasm for democracy. A few weeks later, however, the revival of Hapsburg autocracy threw the Assembly into the hands of the Kleindeutsch faction, and the constitution it eventually completed (March 27, 1849) was a rather liberal document. It provided for a federal monarchy, a responsible ministry, and a two-chamber legislature to be elected by universal manhood suffrage. The constitution never went into effect, however, for when the Assembly invited Frederick William to become "Emperor of the Germans," he replied haughtily that a king could not accept a crown from a popularly elected assembly—or "from the gutter," as he picturesquely phrased it—for royal power can only descend from God. Disappointed liberals again took to the barricades during the "May Days" of 1849, but they were quickly quieted by the army. In Germany, as in Austria, the Revolution of 1848 came to a bitter end, and it was followed by several years of oppressive reaction. Thousands of disappointed liberals fled from the country, and the United States won many valuable citizens thereby.

One further episode must be mentioned before we conclude our account of the Revolution of 1848. In February, 1848, only a few days before the uprising in Paris, two young exiles in Brussels—Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels—began circulating a pamphlet they had written under the title The Communist Manifesto. It cannot be said that this pamphlet or its authors had an appreciable effect upon the course of events in that exciting year, yet in the long run it was the
most important publication of 1848 and the one which best expressed the spirit of the new day that was dawning. The revolutionists of 1848 had been inspired largely by ideas dating from 1789 or 1793, but the Communist Manifesto sprang from the new world created by the Industrial Revolution.
NEW NATIONAL STATES,
1848-1890

THE AFTERMATH OF 1848—
GERMANY UNITED BY BISMARCK—
LIBERALISM AFTER 1870
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16. THE AFTERMATH OF 1848

The failures of 1848 were followed by a period of discouragement and disillusionment among liberals. Idealism having failed, men declared themselves done with dreams forever. They would live thereafter in the “real” world, where noble ideals were of little consequence and where brute force reigned supreme. This vogue of “realism” colored almost every aspect of human activity, but above all it dominated political life. Men began to talk about Realpolitik, by which they meant a “practical politics” which avoided all high-sounding phrases and was directed to practical ends by politicians who trusted to the force of arms rather than to the force of ideals. The Prussian statesman Otto von Bismarck, who was widely recognized as the outstanding Realpolitiker of his day, expressed the new spirit forcefully and ominously when he declared in 1862, “It is not by speeches and parliamentary resolutions that the great questions of the day are to be decided—that was the mistake of 1848 and 1849—but by blood and iron!” The decades following 1848 were indeed the age of blood and iron.

Viewed from the industrial angle, however, these decades might be called an age of steel rather than an age of iron. Although steel had been known for centuries, the cost of refining it was so high that it could be used only in limited quantities. But in 1855 an Englishman named Henry Bessemer (1813–1898) patented a process which enabled him to sell steel at considerably less than half its former price and yet enjoy a return of 600 percent a year on his investment. Ten years later came the Siemens-Martin “open-hearth” process, which eventually replaced the Bessemer process, and in 1878 Thomas and Gilchrist found a way to smelt the phosphorus-bearing iron ores that abounded on the continent. The new steel quickly became a prime asset in war as well as in peace, as was shown in the various wars...
waged in Europe and the United States between 1854 and 1871. Military success came to depend in large measure upon railways, artillery, and iron ships, and the nation with the best steel industry was the most likely to win.

Meantime the triumph of conservatism in 1848–1849 had reassured property owners, and the discoveries of gold in California (1848) and Australia (1851) had brought a period of world-wide financial inflation. Prices rose steadily, and men everywhere thought they were becoming richer day by day, even though they owned no more goods than before. They were thus encouraged to invest heavily in industrial concerns. Industrial expansion was further stimulated by new financial methods that became popular during the 1850's. Heretofore, an industrial plant had usually been a family affair, or at most the property of a few partners all of whom usually took an active share in its management and each of whom was financially liable for all its debts. Shortly after 1850, however, new laws permitted the organization of joint-stock companies whose stockholders were liable only to the extent of their investment. Individuals with relatively small incomes could therefore safely acquire part ownership in an industrial enterprise by buying a few shares of its stock, and industrialists could more easily accumulate the huge capital necessary for great railway systems and large industrial plants. As this method of financing industry also opened great possibilities for speculation on the exchange where stocks were bought and sold, the Paris bourse sometimes became the scene of feverish activity whose repercussions touched all Europe. The first great crash of the stock market came in 1857, but its consequences were not serious, and within a year Europe again was as prosperous as ever. Expansion and rising prices continued until 1873, after which a long depression lasted well into the 1890's.

Reviving prosperity was accompanied by a revival of the old enthusiasm for nationalism and liberalism which conservatives thought they had killed and buried in 1849. But the new nationalism was something different. It depended more upon railways, nation-wide markets, and armies, less upon metaphysics and song. The new liberalism was the liberalism of successful industrialists, not that of idealists inspired by airy doctrines about the Rights of Man. Banks and industrial enterprises proved themselves more effective than the barricades of the workers, both in unifying the peoples of a single nationality and in dislodging the feudal classes from their age-old control of the gov-
ernment. Economic forces and war, rather than revolutionary ardor, brought the triumph of nationalism in Germany and Italy only twenty-two years after the failures of 1848, and, as an eminent English economist once remarked, while Bismarck’s unification of Germany owed something to blood and iron, it owed much more to coal and iron.

The liberalism of 1848 was not wholly forgotten by Europe’s rulers in the new age. Constitutions were promulgated, universal manhood suffrage was granted in several states, and parliaments were recognized as spokesmen for “the people.” Yet the new statesmen did many things which the old liberals would scarcely have approved. Rejecting the doctrines of laissez faire, they believed that the state should aid its citizens in every way possible. As the new financial methods enabled governments to borrow heavily from their citizens, they could carry out extensive projects without increasing taxes: the bills were left to be paid by future generations. In these years, therefore, we can observe the first faltering steps toward the “welfare state” of the twentieth century. When devising their programs, Europe’s new leaders did not overlook even the suggestions of the socialists. Bismarck declared that regarding many matters he saw eye to eye with Louis Blanc and a German socialist named Ferdinand Lassalle (1825–1864); and Louis Napoleon, true to the spirit of the day, proclaimed himself a “Saint-Simon on horseback”—a Saint-Simon who knew how to get things done. (Henri de Saint-Simon was a romantic Utopian writer, whose New Christianity [1825] had attracted wide attention and started men thinking along socialistic lines; see p. 360.)

THE SECOND FRENCH EMPIRE

The Second French Republic (1848–1852) was fated to an early demise, for Louis Napoleon had no sooner taken his presidential oath to protect it than he began preparing to overthrow it. He made speaking tours to every part of France, always accompanied by paid enthusiasts who applauded his speeches at the right places. He became solicitous for the welfare of the Catholic Church, maintaining troops in Rome to defend the pope, restoring control of education to the clergy, and being repaid with their loyal support. His frequent quarrels with the National Assembly added to his popularity. When the Assembly, which had become quite conservative after the June
Days of 1848, disfranchised the urban workers who made up a quarter of the voters, Napoleon skillfully exploited the resulting dissatisfaction, repeated all his favorite phrases about love of “the people” and confidence in them, and loudly demanded that the iniquitous law be repealed. When the Assembly refused, he prepared a coup d’état. Troops were assembled in Paris, his leading critics were arrested in the dead of night, and the next morning (December 2, 1851) he proclaimed himself temporary dictator. The chamber was dissolved, universal manhood suffrage was restored, and the dictator asked to have his acts ratified by a plebiscite. Three weeks later, on December 21, the French people voted ten to one as he wished. Further oratory prepared the way for a second plebiscite, ordered for November, 1852, at which the French people voted even more overwhelmingly that he be allowed to assume the title of emperor. On December 2, 1852, he was solemnly proclaimed Napoleon III, Emperor of the French, and for the next eighteen years he presided over the Second French Empire.

Though the new emperor spoke often and admiringly of his famous uncle, and though he had once written a laudatory (but historically worthless) life of Julius Caesar, he resembled these two autocrats much less than he resembled such twentieth-century “Caesars” as Hitler and Mussolini. He was, in fact, the first fascist dictator, not a military man at all, but a politician skillful at making speeches. From Saint-Simon he had learned to regard himself as a “social engineer,” standing above parties and uniting all parties under himself in order to direct affairs of state for the benefit of all classes. He spoke much of social planning, and, again like a good Saint-Simonian, he declared that if the natural resources of France were properly developed and her products justly distributed, everyone would enjoy economic plenty. But he had very little to say about liberty. All things considered, he was remarkably successful, but the name Napoleon, which raised him to glory, also dashed him to ruin. A man with that name
simply could not remain long at peace. In 1852 he had assured France and the world that “The Empire means peace” (“L’empire, c’est la paix”), but before many years had passed, critics everywhere were repeating someone’s bon mot, “L’empire, c’est l’épée” (“The Empire means the sword”). His wars turned out badly, his enemies began calling him “Napoleon the Little,” and his empire, like those of the “sawdust Caesars” of our own century, was swept away in military defeat.

About six weeks after he was proclaimed emperor, Napoleon married Eugénie de Montijo (1826–1920), the beautiful and gracious daughter of a Spanish nobleman. She contributed greatly to the success of the Empire by providing her husband with an heir, the Prince Imperial (1856–1879), and by making the French court the most brilliant in Europe. But her frequent interventions in political affairs which she could not understand, especially in the later years of the Empire when Napoleon was in bad health, were as disastrous for him as they were for France. In addition to a brilliant court, Napoleon needed a brilliant capital. The narrow and crooked streets of Paris were therefore replaced by broad well-paved avenues, slums were cleared away, waterworks and sewers were installed, sumptuous public buildings such as the Opéra were erected, the Bois de Boulogne became a famous public park. In all these matters a free hand was given to Baron Haussmann (1809–1891), who made Paris the most beautiful city in the world.

Napoleon was greatly aided by the general prosperity of the times, which encouraged rapid industrial expansion. French railways more than quadrupled their mileage between 1851 and 1858; countless factories were built; new steamship lines were developed; and a French company dug the Suez Canal, from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, thereby shortening the water route to India by almost one-half (1859–1869). A bank known as the Crédit Mobilier, founded in 1852, aided this expansion by lending heavily to industrialists, while the Crédit Foncier, a state institution dating from 1854, lent money on easy terms to landowners wishing to improve their estates. For the workers Napoleon built model homes, endowed hospitals, legalized labor unions and strikes, and even inaugurated an early form of sickness and accident insurance, while his public works program provided employment for thousands. France was prosperous and the benefits of her prosperity reached every class of society. An International Exposition held in the summer of 1855 attracted tens of thousands of persons to
Paris from all parts of Europe and showed them the progress of French industry and the beauty of the capital.

The *coup d'état* of 1851 and the establishment of the Empire aroused no prolonged opposition in France. Troops easily dispersed rioters, the police deported about ten thousand malcontents to Algeria, a few eminent persons fled to England, and quiet returned to France. Nevertheless, Napoleon remained nervous, and during the first eight years of the Empire he ruled as a dictator. All Frenchmen could vote for members of the legislature, it is true, but Napoleon always recommended official candidates for every seat. Other persons might run, if they wished, but they were so handicapped that only rarely were they elected. Moreover, the legislature had only the power to accept or reject laws as they were presented to it: it could neither amend them nor initiate legislation of its own. It could accept or reject the entire budget of each governmental department, but it could not change the total amount or determine the details of how the money was to be spent. The elected deputies had no voice in determining policy and they could not even ask the emperor for explanations. They therefore found little to debate, yet their debates could not be published. Government policy was determined by ministers appointed by the emperor and responsible to him alone. There was also a Senate, whose members, appointed by the emperor, discussed proposed laws and put them in final shape before they were sent to the legislature for approval. All newspapers were strictly censored, new ones could not be started without official permission, and every editor was required to deposit a large sum of money with the government as a pledge of good behavior.

During the early years, when things were going well and everybody was prosperous, Napoleon was able to maintain this autocratic system, but after the financial crisis of 1857 and the mishaps of the Italian war of 1859 (see p. 303), criticism became more effective. When five avowed Republicans were elected to the legislature in 1858, Napoleon decided to liberalize his government. He granted amnesty to exiles and political prisoners, he accorded greater powers to the legislature, especially in regard to financial matters, and he allowed greater freedom to the press (1860). During the next ten years, however, the emperor's position steadily deteriorated. His irresolution became so great that he often antagonized both parties in a controversy, and the interference of his wife—who now began attending cabinet meetings and injecting her personal likes and dislikes into its discussions—made
matters infinitely worse. One example out of many must suffice. In 1863 Ernest Renan, a professor at the Collège de France, published a *Life of Jesus* written from a rationalistic point of view. Catholic leaders, who as always enjoyed the vigorous support of the empress, demanded that the professor be dismissed, and Napoleon complied. When French rationalists hailed Renan as a martyr to freedom of thought, the emperor offered to restore him to his old post, and Renan haughtily refused. Napoleon thus won many enemies among both Catholics and freethinkers.

In the elections of May, 1869, more than three million out of eight million votes were cast for opposition candidates and thirty Republicans were elected to the legislature. Thoroughly frightened, Napoleon announced further reforms, but this belated generosity was not enough. He then attempted to bring new luster to his name by a diplomatic triumph over Prussia, and when Prussia refused to accept humiliation for his sake, the War of 1870 destroyed the Empire.

*The Wars of Napoleon III*

Even in the days of the Second Republic, Napoleon began showing his intention of superseding the timidity of the July Monarchy with a vigorous foreign policy, and his interest in overseas possessions, to which he first turned his attention, has caused him to be called the restorer of France’s colonial empire. Though Algeria had been seized by Charles X in 1830, and had been the scene of desultory warfare throughout the reign of Louis Philippe, Napoleon completed its conquest and settled many Frenchmen in the new province. He later took steps toward establishing French power in Indochina (1858), joined England in the Second Opium War against China (1860, see p. 492), and annexed a few islands in the South Pacific. His most aggressive action, however, was in the Near East, where it culminated in the Crimean War (1854–1856).

Ever since the Crusades Frenchmen had been interested in the Near East; France had often been allied with Turkey since the sixteenth century; and the great Napoleon had campaigned there in 1798–1799. France’s commercial interests in the Near East were now greater than those of any other European country, even England; French missionaries were active in this region; and the French government had long claimed the right to “protect” all Roman Catholic missionaries and
pilgrims to the Holy Places in Palestine. On the other hand, the Russians had been at war with the Turks, off and on, ever since the days of Peter the Great, and now that Turkey was becoming the “sick man of Europe,” they were busily preparing for the distribution of his estate (see p. 399). They entertained vast territorial ambitions, but for the time being they contented themselves with claiming the right to “protect” Orthodox Christians throughout the Near East. Under this protection Orthodox monks were quietly securing control of one Holy Place after another, and as early as 1851 Napoleon III took occasion to protest at Constantinople. When the Turks made concessions, the Russians threatened dire punishment. In the summer of 1853, Russian troops crossed the frontier into what is now Romania, and after three months of negotiations and demonstrations the Turks declared war on Russia (October 2). France and England followed suit on March 28, 1854. A month later Austria and Prussia agreed that Russia must not annex territory south of the Danube.

The military operations of the war were badly prepared and badly conducted by all parties. The Turks quickly drove the Russians from Romania, after which the allies invaded the Crimea, hoping to capture the naval base at Sevastopol (September, 1854). After a year of hard fighting, the Russians evacuated the city, destroying its forts and sinking the fleet as they left. Meantime Tsar Nicholas I had died (March 2, 1855) and been succeeded by Alexander II. The new tsar was anxious to make peace (see p. 403), and after long negotiations he accepted terms suggested by Austria (February 1, 1856). The fighting in the Crimea was conducted under most difficult circumstances, with the allies short of food, adequate clothing, medical supplies, and everything else. It has been estimated that at least two-thirds of the casualties (which perhaps reached 250,000 on each side) were due to disease. Losses undoubtedly would have been much heavier had it not been for the famous nurse, Florence Nightingale, who gradually organized relief.

The war was followed by a peace conference at Paris that was a great triumph for Napoleon. Paris again seemed to be the center of the world, as in the days of Louis XIV and the great Napoleon. The Treaty of Paris (1856) was not all that he had hoped, but Turkey was saved, western Christians were safe in the Holy Places, arrangements made at Paris eventually led to a free and united Romania, and important new principles of international law were proclaimed. Above all, the treaty made it clear that Napoleon had won a war.
This success encouraged the emperor to try again, and it was not long before he decided to help the Italians free themselves from the Austrian yoke. His family was of Italian descent; as a young man he had been a member of the Carbonari; and he now needed to prove his love of liberty. Early in 1858 an Italian patriot goaded him into action by attempting to assassinate him. Six months later he secretly conferred with the Sardinian prime minister, Count Cavour (see p. 306), and the two men concocted an elaborate plan for uniting Italy after expelling the Austrians from the peninsula. In the following spring (1859) the two allies went to war with Austria, and Napoleon followed his uncle’s footsteps into Italy, where he won two indecisive battles at Magenta and Solferino.

Unfortunately for Napoleon, the situation quickly got out of hand. Enthusiastic uprisings broke out in many parts of Italy and even in Rome, where French troops were still protecting the pope. French clericals began denouncing the expedition, which caused Napoleon to make peace. Without consulting Cavour, he signed an armistice with the Austrians at Villafranca and went home, having secured Lombardy for the Italians but leaving Venetia in Austrian hands. Before handing Lombardy over to Sardinia, however, he insisted upon receiving Nice and Savoy in exchange, as promised by Cavour the year before. Italians were of course infuriated and French liberals were disgusted by this betrayal; French Catholics were angry that he had intervened at all; the emperor again lost friends everywhere.

Napoleon had not yet learned his lesson, however, and four years later he tried again to enhance his prestige by showing boldness in foreign affairs, but with the same unhappy results. When the Poles revolted against Russia in 1863 Napoleon planned intervention in their behalf, but he withdrew before Prussian threats. He thus offended bellicose patriots, liberals, and Catholics (the latter favored intervention this time, the Poles being a Catholic people), and he cut a rather ridiculous figure on the international scene.

The most elaborate and the most unfortunate of Napoleon’s schemes was his Mexican adventure. During much of her first forty years of independence Mexico was governed by conservative and clerical dictators (see p. 480), but in 1860 control of the country was seized by a full-blooded Indian named Benito Juárez (1806–1872), who was liberal and strongly anticlerical. Almost at once he repudiated the debts owed by his predecessors to various Europeans, which caused England, France, and Spain jointly to seize the customhouse at Vera
Cruz and collect the money due their citizens. England and Spain
apparently had no ulterior designs, for they presently withdrew their
troops, but Napoleon was dreaming of a vast empire in Mexico. His
Spanish wife goaded him on, partly perhaps because Mexico had once
belonged to Spain, and partly in order to repeal Juárez’s anticlerical
legislation. Napoleon also saw valuable mining and commercial con-
cessions for French businessmen and an opportunity to appease
Austria by offering the throne of his satellite empire to the Archduke
Maximilian (1832–1867), brother of the Emperor Francis Joseph.

As the United States was then deeply engaged in the Civil War, all
went well at first, and Maximilian was crowned emperor in Mexico
City (1864). Juárez continued active resistance in the north, however,
and a few months later, when the Confederacy collapsed, the United
States invoked the Monroe Doctrine and firmly demanded that Na-
poleon withdraw his troops. Running true to form, Napoleon capitulat-
ed and the troops were withdrawn (1867). Juárez straightway reoccu-
pied Mexico, shot Maximilian, canceled all French concessions,
reënacted his anticlerical legislation, and ruled the country until his
death five years later. The damage to Napoleon’s prestige was almost
irreparable.

Nevertheless, Napoleon continued in the same path and, like the
desperate gambler that he was, he frantically sought to recoup his
losses in new adventures. Bismarck had by this time become prime
minister of Prussia (1862) and had launched his program of blood
and iron for the unification of the German states (see p. 311).
After careful diplomatic preparations, and after completely befuddling
Napoleon by playing upon his greed, Bismarck went to war with
Austria in 1866, crushingly defeated her at Sadowa, and expelled her
from German affairs. Napoleon had anticipated a long war, which
would exhaust both contestants and leave him the most powerful man
in Europe. But the war was over in seven weeks, Bismarck became the
most esteemed statesman of the day, and when the heart-sick Na-
opleon brought up the matter of “compensations”—at which Bismarck
had vaguely hinted before the war—his pleas had disastrous reper-
cussions (p. 314). Even the Austrians and Italians were no longer in-
terested in any friendship Napoleon could offer.

Napoleon’s final effort, in 1870, brought him to complete ruin.
Spain had undergone a revolution in 1868, and her leaders began look-
foring for a new king. After several persons had refused the honor, the
crown was offered to Prince Leopold, a member of a minor branch
of the Hohenzollern family. When Leopold refused, Bismarck induced him to reconsider. This news caused alarm in France, and Napoleon demanded that Leopold withdraw his candidacy. Leopold again withdrew his name, which encouraged Napoleon to make his triumph complete by demanding a written promise that he would never again be a candidate for the Spanish throne. This promise the king of Prussia, as head of the Hohenzollern family, refused to give. Bismarck was quite willing to go to war, and even fanned the flames discreetly by his press releases. But it was the French who made the final decision and went to war, as they undoubtedly would have done without Bismarck's encouragement. On July 19, 1870, they declared war on Prussia. The French minister of war had fatuously announced that everything was ready, "down to the last button on the last gaiter of the last grenadier."

A few days later it appeared that in France almost nothing was ready, while everything was ready in Germany. Three Prussian armies invaded France, surrounding and defeating the main French army at Sedan on September 1. The next day Napoleon gave himself up as a prisoner of war, and on September 4 a republic was proclaimed in Paris. The troubled careers of Napoleon III and the Second French Empire thus reached their tragic end.

ITALY UNITED BY CAVOUR

The events of 1848 and 1849 left the Kingdom of Sardinia the strongest state in Italy and made its new king, Victor Emmanuel II (1849–1878), a leading champion of Italian unification. Since about the year 1000 his ancestors had ruled Savoy, a small Alpine duchy bordering on Switzerland and France; they had long ruled the whole Piedmont as well; and in 1720 they acquired the island of Sardinia, whence their kingdom took its name. But though Victor Emmanuel formally presided over his kingdom, the diplomacy leading up to the unification of Italy was conducted by his brilliant prime minister, Count Camillo di Cavour (1810–1861), who held office from 1852 to 1859 and again in 1860–1861. Though Cavour was the son of a country gentleman, he appreciated the importance of railways and industry, and even before 1848 he was urging their development in his newspaper, *Il Risorgimento*. Both as minister of agriculture and industry (1850–1852) and later as prime minister he helped make Piedmont one of the most highly industrialized parts of Italy. He had not joined the Carbonari or other secret revolutionary societies, but he ardently
believed in the union of Italy under the house of Savoy, and upon becoming prime minister he quietly established contact with Garibaldi and other revolutionists. His greatest desire, however, was to accomplish the unification of Italy by diplomacy rather than by violence.

When the Crimean War broke out in 1854, Cavour saw an opportunity to gain a place for Sardinia among the great powers. He therefore joined the allies against Russia and actually sent an army of fifteen thousand men to the Crimea. As a reward, he was allowed to attend the peace conference at Paris in 1856 as Sardinian delegate, and here he seized every occasion to gratify himself with the English and French diplomats and to inform Europe of Italy's sufferings under Austrian domination. Two years later he negotiated the famous arrangement with Napoleon III, after which he induced the Austrians to attack him, thus precipitating the War of 1859. But Napoleon's separate peace, secretly negotiated at Villafranca just as everything seemed to be going nicely, was a bitter disappointment to Cavour, who straightway resigned his premiership (July, 1859). He presently regained his composure, however, and resumed office (January, 1860). Continuing his negotiations with Napoleon, he acquired Lombardy in exchange for Nice and Savoy. Meantime revolts had occurred in many cities throughout Italy, the reactionary and pro-Austrian rulers had fled from their thrones, and in Parma, Modena, Tuscany, and the Romagna (the northern part of the Papal States) rebels began demanding union with Sardinia. These provinces too were annexed.

Garibaldi, who was less cold-blooded than Cavour, bitterly resented the surrender of his native city, Nice, to France. Organizing a group of about one thousand enthusiasts like himself—called "Red Shirts" from their simple uniform—he prepared to hold the city. Cavour was able, however, to persuade him to invade Sicily instead, and during the summer of 1860 the Red Shirts conquered the whole island. Crossing to the mainland, they entered Naples (September 7) the day after its last Bourbon king had fled, and they spent the autumn and winter reducing various strongholds. Meantime Cavour, fearing that Garibaldi might provoke French intervention by marching on Rome, or that he might even proclaim a republic, had occupied most of the Papal States with Sardinian troops. Carefully avoiding the city of Rome, Victor Emmanuel then led his army south to meet Garibaldi near Naples. A plebiscite was held by which the occupied territories voted overwhelmingly to join Sardinia. The Sardinian parliament, after being enlarged to become an Italian parliament, then voted on
February 18, 1861, that Victor Emmanuel should be king of Italy, and the formal ceremony of proclaiming the new king of this new kingdom took place on March 17. Having thus completed the unification of all Italy except Rome and Venetia, Cavour died on June 6, aged fifty-one years.

After these stirring events, it obviously was only a matter of time until Rome and Venetia would be joined to the rest of Italy. As no Italian patriot could conceive of a Kingdom of Italy with any capital save Rome, the first task was to remove the French troops from that city. Garibaldi wished to take Rome by force, which he could easily
have done, but at Turin cooler counsels prevailed. Napoleon was finally induced to promise, in 1864, that he would withdraw his troops within two years if Victor Emmanuel would allow a decent time to pass before occupying it. (This stipulation was made in order to prevent French Catholics from criticizing the emperor for betraying the pope.) Soon thereafter, however, Bismarck began preparing to eject Austria from the German Bund, and early in 1866 he concluded an alliance with Italy. War broke out a few weeks later, and Italy promptly attacked Austria. Her efforts to seize Venetia led to a serious military defeat, but Napoleon, when mediating between Prussia and Austria after Sadowa (see p. 313), persuaded the Austrians to give him Venetia, which he presented to Italy (July, 1866).

Four more years were to elapse before the “liberation” of Rome. When the French troops were withdrawn at the end of 1866, Garibaldi...
attacked at once, French clericals forced Napoleon to reoccupy the city, and the Italians again marked time. The outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War in July, 1870, forced Napoleon to withdraw all his troops from Italy once more, and the Prussian victory gave Victor Emmanuel his long-awaited opportunity. He first called upon Pius IX to surrender his temporal powers and accept Italian protection instead. When the pope replied that he would yield only to force, Italian armies closed in on Rome. On the morning of September 20, 1870, they began shelling the city, and after a token resistance of about three hours the pope ordered his Swiss mercenaries to cease fire. The victorious Italians then marched into Rome through a breach in the walls at the Porta Pia.

Most Italians were now satisfied, but a few were not, and as time passed ardent patriots sometimes remembered Italian territories that had not yet been liberated. They began talking about Italia irredenta—"unredeemed Italy." Some longed to redeem Nice and Savoy from the French, but a much larger number demanded Trent and Trieste, which had remained in Austrian hands. Not until World War I upset all Europe once more did Italy acquire the latter provinces, and Mussolini's attempts to regain the former during World War II ended in a disastrous failure.
17. GERMANY UNITED
BY BISMARCK

The failure of 1848 did not put an end to the dreams of German nationalists, even though little progress toward unification was made during the next ten years. The Prussian government drew up an elaborate scheme for a union, including all Hapsburg possessions, and felt humiliated when the Austrians refused to consider it (1850). New life was breathed into the German Bund of 1815, but during the next several years this weak confederation and the Zollverein were the only political symbols of German unity. When the Prussian king, Frederick William IV, became hopelessly insane (1858), a regency was established under his brother, William I. Three years later William became king, and during his long reign (1858–1888) German unity was achieved. The new king was already sixty-two years old when he became regent. Although strongly conservative he did not carry romantic and divine-right ideas to such insane extremes as did his brother. He was not a great king, but his common sense and his firmness of character enabled him to preside satisfactorily for many years over Prussia and Germany. A year after becoming regent he named Albrecht von Roon (1803–1879) minister of war, and Helmuth von Moltke (1800–1891) was made chief of the general staff. These two men worked together admirably, and Moltke presently proved himself the best general Europe had produced since Napoleon. Three years later they were joined by Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898) as prime minister of Prussia (1862).

Born to a family of Junkers, Bismarck was educated at Göttingen and Berlin, entered the Prussian civil service, disliked his work, and retired to manage his estates and lead the life of a country gentleman. Like his Junker neighbors, he spent much of his time in hard riding
and hard drinking, but unlike them he also found time for serious reading in history, political science, and philosophy. He later declared that when leaving the university he was "a republican and an atheist," but during his years of rustication, he outgrew these youthful enthusiasms to become a pietistic Lutheran and an extreme conservative. He reentered political life in 1847 as a member of the Prussian diet, showed his disgust with the revolutionists of the next year, and stood out as one in a minority of two that voted against a resolution thanking the king for the Prussian constitution. In 1851 he went to Frankfort as Prussian representative in the diet of the German Bund, and here he gradually decided that, if Prussia were to become strong, Austria must be excluded from that body. He expressed his anti-Austrian sentiments so heatedly that the Prussian government presently found it expedient to "put him on ice." He was therefore made ambassador to Russia, where he spent three crucial years. Having discovered that kinship of views united the Prussian Junker and the Russian landlord as well as their divine-right sovereigns, he remained a firm friend of Russia thereafter. In the summer of 1862 he was transferred to Paris, where he made a shrewd appraisal of Napoleon III, and in September of that year he returned to Berlin as Prussian prime minister.

During the 1850's political leaders of the Junker class had made great progress in Prussia and now they dominated the government more completely than ever before. Nevertheless, liberalism and nationalism were not dead, and the events of 1859-1860 in Italy awakened them once more. Liberals again began saying that Prussia could lead in the unification of Germany if she adopted a liberal program. These liberals eventually gained enough strength in the Prussian diet to prevent the passage of the military budget. At his wits' end, King William seriously considered abdication until Roon suggested that Bismarck be made prime minister. Bismarck hurried back from Paris, delivered his famous "blood and iron" speech, collected taxes without the authority of the diet, and inaugurated the iron rule that he conducted for the next twenty-eight years.

Throughout his life Bismarck was a Realpolitiker and therefore carefully avoided elaborate schemes such as those that brought Napoleon III to grief. His policies aimed at a few great goals, and behind them lay a few broad principles, but he always was ready to profit by whatever occasion might arise. He was a firm believer in the necessity of strong rule, he accepted the divine-right monarchy of the Hohenzollerns, he hoped to establish Prussian and Hohenzollern
power in all Germany, and later to establish German leadership in the world, and in seeking these ends he followed the few general guides already indicated: distrust of parliamentary liberalism, opposition to Austrian influence in the German Bund, friendship with Russia, reliance on armed force. He managed to divorce nationalism from liberalism and to make it part of the conservative program. He also took universal suffrage from the liberals, adopting it at a time (1866) when only about one-sixth of the adult males of England were allowed to vote, and when Napoleon had robbed it of all significance in France. In later years he was the first to establish large-scale programs for social insurance, such as had been attempted by Louis Blanc in 1848. But in all these matters Bismarck made it clear that the Prussian government was merely carrying out its divinely imposed duty of fostering and protecting its subjects.

During his first eight years in office Bismarck waged three foreign wars and then, having achieved his aim of uniting Germany, he spent the remaining twenty years of his political life organizing and ruling the empire he had thus created. The first of his wars, in 1864, was with Denmark over the provinces of Schleswig and Holstein. We have seen (p. 290) how in 1848 the Frankfort Assembly urged Frederick William to take them from Denmark, though war was temporarily averted by European intervention. A new Danish king (Christian IX) mounted the throne in the autumn of 1863 and at once began preparations for incorporating the two provinces more securely in his kingdom. Bismarck persuaded Austria to join him in armed intervention to prevent this step. So one-sided a war could not last long, and the Danes were quickly expelled, but Bismarck found it more difficult to settle the fate of the two provinces. He first arranged that Prussia should administer Schleswig while Austria took Holstein. As this arrangement left Holstein virtually surrounded by Prussian territory, disputes were bound to arise—as he no doubt anticipated—and during the next two years Bismarck carefully prepared for a settlement with Austria.

Bismarck's preparations were both military and diplomatic. Disregarding the Prussian diet, he collected large sums in taxation and used them to modernize the army's equipment. Moltke and his generals devoted careful study to the military operations of the American Civil War, then just drawing to its close, and from it they learned much about the new warfare, conducted by huge armies equipped with improved artillery and rapid-fire breach-loading rifles,
and aided by railways and telegraph. Bismarck’s diplomatic preparation consisted, first, of making sure of Russian friendship—he had aided Russia during the Polish rebellion in 1863 by keeping France neutral; second, of allying himself with the new Kingdom of Italy; and finally, of lulling Napoleon by vague promises. When the Austrians accused him of irregularities in the new provinces, he replied by accusing them of aggression, and occupied Holstein. The Austrians complained to the German Bund, all of whose members declared war upon Prussia. The resulting Seven Weeks’ War (1866) brought quick victory to Prussia. After Sadowa (or as German writers say, Königgrätz) Austria allowed Napoleon to mediate, and Bismarck was careful not to offend her too much. He dissolved the Ger-
man Bund, thereby robbing Austria of her foothold in Germany, but that was all. To Austria's German allies Bismarck was more severe. He annexed the kingdom of Hanover, two independent duchies, and the free city of Frankfort, and he organized the remaining German states north of the Main River as the North German Bund, in which Prussia was by far the most powerful partner. The south German states—Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, and Hesse—were not punished, but they were left to their own devices.

As it was by now perfectly clear that Napoleon would fight to prevent the final union of Germany, Bismarck next turned to preparing for a war with France. In this task he was aided by Napoleon's own activities. Soon after the close of the Seven Weeks' War, Napoleon began demanding the compensations at which Bismarck had hinted. The first suggestion was that France be given the German provinces west of the Rhine, or at least the Palatinate, which belonged to Bavaria. Bismarck replied that he could not consider surrendering territory inhabited by Germans. Napoleon then asked for Belgium, and again he was rebuffed. His next proposal was that he be allowed to buy Luxemburg, then held by the king of Holland. The king was willing to sell, but Bismarck failed to approve and Napoleon got nothing. In each case, however, Bismarck craftily persuaded the French ambassador in Berlin to put his proposal in writing. He then showed the request for the Rhine provinces to the ambassadors of the various south German states, thus convincing them of Napoleon's aggressive designs. He had little difficulty in persuading these states to join Prussia in a defensive alliance against France. Bismarck then showed the letter regarding Belgium to the English, thereby making sure of their neutrality in the impending war. As Russia and Prussia were still on the best of terms while Austria was in no condition to resume fighting and the Italians were only awaiting an opportunity to occupy Rome, France was effectively isolated. Bismarck did not have to wait long for controversy to arise over Leopold and the throne of Spain, and he was delighted when France declared war on July 19, 1870.

Moltke's armies were in the pink of condition, and they were promptly joined by the armies of the south German states. Within a month, one French army had been shut up in Metz, where it surrendered at the end of October. A second French army was surrounded and captured at Sedan on September 1, with Napoleon himself among the prisoners. The German armies then swept on to Paris,
whose siege began on September 19. The city held out for four months, in spite of furious attacks by the Germans, and when it finally surrendered (January 28, 1871), food remained for only eight days. Soon thereafter all resistance ceased, a preliminary treaty was ready at the end of February, and the final treaty of peace was signed at Frankfort on May 10, 1871. By its terms Germany received the two provinces of Alsace and Lorraine from France as well as an enormous indemnity of five billion francs (one billion dollars).

Meantime Bismarck had been completing the unification of Germany. The enthusiasm engendered by the early victories left most Germans anxious to be united with the victorious Prussians. Bismarck took advantage of the occasion to negotiate with the princes, and the king of Bavaria was persuaded to invite William I of Prussia to become German emperor. The final ceremony took place at Versailles on January 18, 1871, just ten days before the surrender of Paris. Here, in the famous Hall of Mirrors of the palace built by Louis XIV, and in the presence of all the German princes, William was formally proclaimed Deutscher Kaiser.

**Imperial Germany**

The German Empire, thus completed on the battlefields of the Franco-Prussian War, was a union of twenty-six separate states that differed widely among themselves in size, military power, and political traditions. Prussia, which made up about two-thirds of the empire in area and population, was a constitutional monarchy with conservative and militaristic traditions; its local government was aristocratic and absolute. Other states, such as Württemberg and Baden, were liberal monarchies; others were tiny principalities; the free cities, Hamburg and Bremen, were aristocratic republics; and Alsace-Lorraine, recently torn from France as a prize of war, became an "imperial territory" administered by a governor sent from Berlin. The German princes were represented in the Bundesrat, about one-third of whose members were Prussians, while the remainder came from the lesser states in numbers proportionate to the importance of the state they represented. The German people, on the other hand, were represented in the imperial Reichstag, elected by universal manhood suffrage.

The king of Prussia was kaiser, *ex officio*, but Bismarck actually conducted the imperial government as chancellor. As Bismarck had
a free hand when drawing up the constitution of the empire, he centered enormous powers in his own office. Other ministers were mere bureaucrats, responsible to him, and it was their duty to manage their respective offices, not to offer political advice. After Bismarck had decided upon his policies, he usually had little trouble persuading the kaiser, the princes, the Reichstag, the bureaucracy, and the people to accept them. As long as he remained in office this system worked rather well, but after his retirement there was no one of his stature to succeed him, and the weaknesses of his system quickly became apparent.

While the German Reichstag never enjoyed the broad powers of the British parliament, it controlled the purse strings and it was always an important part of the government. Bismarck was the most successful parliament-tamer of his generation, yet even he had to give way at times, and after his retirement in 1890 the power and standing of the Reichstag rose greatly. Bismarck's success in dominating the Reichstag was due in part to his personality and prestige and to his frequent appeals to patriotism, but also to the newness of parliamentary institutions in Germany, to the Reichstag's lack of traditions of independence, and to the multiplicity of political parties in Germany, which enabled him to play one off against the others. First among the political parties came the Conservatives, the party of the Junkers whose strength lay in the rural districts east of the Elbe. Because of their historic connection with the Prussian court and the army, they exercised an influence out of all proportion to their numbers. Next came the National Liberals, the party of the industrialists. Descended from moderate Liberals of 1848, they retained something of the old liberal spirit, though nationalism had been the major item in their program since the early 1860's. The Radicals preserved more of the old liberalism, but they had no able leaders and they were neither numerous nor effective. The Centrum, or Catholic party, recruited its supporters chiefly among the peasants of south Germany, the industrial workers of the Rhine Valley, and the Poles of eastern Prussia. The Social Democrats were not powerful at first, but later they became one of the most important parties in Germany. Besides these major groups, several "splinter parties" added to the political confusion. Bismarck was always sure of the backing of the Conservatives; during the 1870's he governed with their aid and that of the National Liberals; but in the 1880's he let the latter go and received instead the support of the Centrum.
During Bismarck’s period of power there was a great expansion of the bureaucracy that looked after the routine of government. Excellent work was done by relatively obscure men, and the details of government were better administered in Germany than in any other country. These officials managed the state-owned railways and made German cities models of sanitation and municipal enterprise. Members of this bureaucracy always avoided aligning themselves with political parties and professed allegiance only to Germany. Recruited from all classes of Germans, this bureaucracy represented the German people better than the Reichstag or the political parties did, and its achievements showed the German government at its best.

In spite of his genius, Bismarck suffered two major defeats after 1871, one at the hands of the Catholic Church, the other from the Social Democrats. The Conservatives, upon whom he relied especially, were closely allied with the Lutheran Church, but the National Liberals contained many freethinkers and anticlericals. They complained that the Catholic Church was a foreign and international institution whose pope had recently been declared infallible (1870), that the pope inveighed vehemently against liberalism, and that he often meddled in strictly German affairs. The Liberals declared that Germans must make up their minds as to what sort of civilization they preferred—nationalist and liberal, or internationalist and reactionary. Bismarck’s conflict with the church, known to historians as the *Kulturkampf* or “struggle for civilization,” began in 1872 when he persuaded the Reichstag to exclude Jesuits from Germany. Other laws enacted during the next few years decreed that all Catholic schools must be supervised by the government, that the Catholic clergy must be educated in state schools, and that bishops and priests might be appointed or dismissed by the government. Civil marriage was legalized and several religious orders were suppressed. These laws unleashed a controversy that distracted Germany for several years, but in the end Bismarck was forced to have them repealed (1880–1886). The *Kulturkampf* ruined the National Liberal party, and thereafter Bismarck was careful to avoid trouble with the church.

The *Kulturkampf* was not yet over when Bismarck decided to destroy socialism, which he pictured as a second international menace to Germany. Though a few Germans had called themselves socialists even before 1848, and though Ferdinand Lassalle had organized a Labor party shortly before his death in 1864, Marxist socialism was scarcely known in Germany until 1869, when Wilhelm Liebknecht
(1826–1900) and August Bebel (1840–1913) organized the Social Democratic party. This group absorbed Lassalle’s followers in 1875, and two years later the new party elected twelve deputies to the Reichstag, polling almost half a million votes. Two attempts to assassinate the kaiser were made in 1878, and Bismarck, who by this time was trying to divert attention from the Kulturkampf, loudly accused the socialists of this crime. He rushed through the Reichstag a set of “Exceptional Laws” designed to suppress socialism. Socialist meetings were watched and speakers arrested; socialist newspapers were censored and frequently suppressed; socialist editors were sent to jail. Nevertheless Bismarck did not even succeed in driving the party underground. It lost half its votes in 1881, but three years later it regained them and elected twenty-four deputies. The Exceptional Laws were allowed to lapse in 1890, and German socialism advanced rapidly thereafter.

Bismarck was more successful in his other plans for the German Empire. The chaotic legal conditions that had formerly prevailed in the petty states were remedied by new and modern law codes. Finances and coinage were reorganized on an imperial basis. The railway system was brought under state ownership and control—imperial ownership except in Bavaria. The old liberal policy of free trade gave way, during the 1880’s, to one of imperial protective tariffs. The war against socialism even led Bismarck to adopt some of Lassalle’s characteristic ideas. With the aid of the Centrum against the National Liberals, he established Germany’s remarkable system of social insurance. A Sickness Insurance Act was put through the Reichstag in 1883, an Accident Insurance Act followed in 1884, and an Old Age and Disability Act came in 1889. These laws provided insurance for all members of the working class, the premiums being paid jointly by employers, workers, and the state. The system worked remarkably well and presently every important industrial state began imitating it. Bismarck thus successfully substituted “state socialism” for democratic socialism.

During the thirty years of Bismarck’s chancellorship German industrialists were laying the foundations of a great industrial system. The Krupp armament works at Essen were preparing for the enormous part they were later to play in German life. These years also saw the appearance of other great steel plants, the General Electric Company, the Hamburg-American and North German Lloyd transatlantic liners, and the Deutsche Bank. In 1890 Germany was a great
industrial power, rivaled only by England and the United States. Her phenomenal success was due to many factors. Her resources in coal, iron, and the other basic materials of modern industry were excellent, and her highly developed system of rivers, harbors, canals, and railways, built at enormous cost, was the best that the world then offered. The brilliant work of German scientists—notably chemists—in the middle of the century now began to bear fruit and the Germans were the first to apply the new scientific knowledge to industry on a large scale. Skill at organization counted for much, as did the relatively successful solution of labor problems by Bismarck's social insurance.

Perhaps the greatest reason for the progress of German industry, however, was her successful organization of her whole social system for the advancement of her economic life. In Germany the age of big industry followed quickly upon an age dominated by eighteenth-century ideas of enlightened despotism and paternalism. Though there had been liberals in Germany, they left no powerful tradition behind them, and the social system created by the military leaders of Prussia became an ideal foundation upon which to build a modern industrial state. The capitalist aristocracy, filled with mercantilistic ideas, and the underlying population devoted to socialism, fitted snugly into the pattern prepared by the nobleman and his subject serfs. The Germany of coal and iron easily slipped into the place vacated by the Germany of blood and iron. Bismarck is credited with creating this new Germany, but he remained a Prussian landlord at heart, and he never understood the new world that he had ushered in.

Bismarck had deliberately chosen to use war and its resulting chauvinism ("super-patriotism") as a means of uniting the various German states, and even after 1871 he sometimes rattled the saber as an easy means of avoiding domestic difficulties. On several occasions he created minor war scares; he spoke frequently of Germany's lofty international position and the necessity of united action to preserve it; and he closed one of his last important speeches with the resounding words, "We Germans fear God and nothing else in the world." He may thus have worn down the parochialism of the tiny German states, but he created a most unfortunate impression abroad, and eventually Germany was to pay heavily for Bismarck's bombast. There is no evidence that he ever planned another war after 1870, but his speeches and his saber-rattling made him appear a bully to the rest of Europe and aroused the fears and apprehensions of his
neighbors. At the time of his retirement in 1890, however, the evil of Bismarck’s legacy was not yet apparent. Everything seemed to be going well, and a contemporary cynic was able to remark that Bismarck, like God on the sixth day of creation, saw everything that he had made and declared it good.

**THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN COMPROMISE**

During the four years following his suppression of the Revolution of 1848 in the Hapsburg lands, Prince Schwarzenberg (1800–1852) dominated the Austrian Empire and the German Bund ruthlessly but effectively. His success was such that Bismarck, in his old age, declared that he had learned the basic principles of Realpolitik from the Austrian minister. But Austria’s young and ambitious emperor, Francis Joseph (1848–1916), was anxious to be his own prime minister, and Schwarzenberg was not replaced. The actual work of government then fell largely to the minister of the interior, Baron Bach (1813–1893), originator of the “Bach system” under which Austria lived during the 1850’s. Relying less than Schwarzenberg upon sheer force, Bach attempted to unite the various nationalities by inspiring them all with an enthusiasm for Francis Joseph. He greatly extended the activities of the central government, whose agents he sent into every corner of the Empire to replace the former local officers. As most of these bureaucrats were Germans, they took belated and ineffectual steps to Germanize the Empire, but Austria’s defeats in Italy (1859) made it obvious to everyone that the Bach system had failed and that more drastic reforms had become necessary.

The first step in this direction came with the “October Diploma” of 1860, which was supplemented by the “February Patent” of 1861. These decrees granted greater autonomy to the various nationalities and established an imperial legislature (the Reichsrath), but they so arranged the franchise that the Germans remained the most powerful national group in the Empire. Agitation therefore continued, but even the least docile nationalists did not demand complete independence. They recognized that the Danube Valley was an economic unit, made up of many interdependent parts. The leader of Czech nationalism, Franz Palacky (1798–1876), once remarked that “if there were no Austrian Empire, it would be necessary to invent one.” The nationalists merely asked for a larger degree of autonomy under the emperor, with equal treatment of all nationalities in the bureaucracy.
For a while there was talk of a “pentarchy,” or rule by the five major nationalities—Germans, Czechs, Poles, Magyars, and South Slavs—each in its own domain, but with the minor nationalities left to the tender mercies of these five. The central government actually bought off the Poles by giving them the Ruthenes to oppress, and it attempted to win over the Magyars by giving them the Romanians and the Croatians. The Magyars demanded more, however, and after the Austrian defeat at Sadowa (Königgrätz), the Magyar leader Ferencz Deák (1803–1876) forced the government to accept the Ausgleich, or “Compromise,” of 1867.

This settlement provided that the empire be divided into two approximately equal parts—Austria proper and the Kingdom of Hungary—and that thereafter Francis Joseph and his successors should rule the former as Austrian emperor, the latter as king of Hungary. The whole was ordinarily called the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. Each half of the reorganized empire was to have its own constitution, parliament, responsible ministry, and bureaucracy. The two halves were to be united, under their joint sovereign, by joint ministries of foreign affairs, defense, and finance, by the delegations (representatives of the two governments who met annually to pass what little legislation was required for these joint enterprises), and by a common tariff. A year later Croatia was granted autonomy inside the Kingdom of Hungary. A settlement was also made with the Poles (1868), and negotiations were started with the Czechs, but by 1871 the emperors felt strong enough to discontinue the latter. The Austro-Hungarian Empire, thus organized, remained virtually unchanged until its collapse in 1918.

A German liberal, Prince Adolf Auersperg (1821–1885), led the Austrian half of the empire during the 1870's. He could not unite the various nationalities, as he had hoped, by preaching liberalism and progress, but his encouragement of industry made his ministry important in the economic history of Austria. He was succeeded by Count Eduard von Taaffe (1833–1895), the descendant of an Irish adventurer who had come to Austria during the Thirty Years' War. He undertook to placate the nationalities, declaring that all races were equal, that none had the right to oppress others, and that all should unite in support of the emperor. On another occasion, when in a less lofty frame of mind, Taaffe remarked that it was necessary to keep all the nationalities in a state of good-natured discontent and thus always have something to offer each. In addition to playing off
one national group against another and granting extensive privileges to each, he used bribery extensively and exploited enthusiasm for the Catholic Church. He found some way of placating nearly everyone and thus made his ministry last fourteen years (1879–1893).

Taafe once summed up his policies with the expressive word *fortwursteln*—to drag along in the same old humdrum way, with no more inspiration than is required in making *wursten* (sausages)—yet the years of his ministry were marked by great economic progress. Not wishing to antagonize the German Liberals more than necessary, he was ever on the lookout for ways of appeasing them. He therefore continued Auersperg’s economic policies. Perhaps his greatest achievement was stabilizing Austrian finances by establishing the gold standard in 1892. He also launched extensive schemes of state socialism, such as the construction of government-owned railways. It may be that in all this Taafe looked no further into the future than the voting on the day after tomorrow, yet his policies tended to unite the various peoples of Austria. Different sections of the empire became more dependent upon each other economically; financial centralization gave the advocates of political centralization a power which they had never wielded before; and a class-conscious proletariat grew up whose leaders boasted of their internationalism. Many observers therefore came to believe that if Taafe’s policy of *fortwursteln* could keep things going for a few years a new Austria would emerge from her industrial revolution, with her nationalistic disorders a thing of the past. Unfortunately things did not work out that way.

Hungary’s political and racial problems were very similar to those of Austria, but while Taafe was pursuing a policy of compromise and according great liberty of action to the leaders of the nationalities, the dominant Magyars made every effort to stamp out nationalistic dissent. It was their avowed ambition to make Hungary into a “Magyar national state.” Like the Germans of Austria, they were immensely proud of their allegedly superior culture and therefore retained a monopoly upon higher education: except in the autonomous Croatia, no universities and few high schools were allowed to use any language but Magyar, and efforts were made to reduce the number of primary schools using Slovak, Romanian, Serb, or even German. Newspapers were ruthlessly censored, and the vigilant eyes of the Magyars did not overlook such seemingly harmless manifestations of non-Magyar sentiment as amateur theatricals in minor languages,
the celebration of festivals dear to the hearts of non-Magyars, place names and even family names in the lesser languages, and the singing of popular folk songs. Relentless efforts were made to Magyarize everything that was capable of Magyarization and to stamp out the rest.
18. LIBERALISM AFTER 1870

The wars and revolutions of 1870 were waged and won by liberals, and during the remaining thirty years of the century liberalism made rapid progress in nearly every country of western Europe. At first it seemed that even Spain was about to join the ranks of liberal Europe. Ever since the days of Napoleon this unhappy country had been torn by the feuds of liberals and conservatives (see p. 233), and in the late 1860’s its political life had been made more tempestuous than ever by the scandalous conduct of Queen Isabella II. In 1868 she was driven from Spain by a liberal insurrection. The choice of a successor became a matter of European concern and, as we have seen, it was the immediate cause of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870. While this war was still in progress, the Spanish crown was offered to Amadeo, Duke of Aosta, a son of Victor Emmanuel II, who had just become the ruler of all Italy. After Amadeo had ruled Spain barely two years, he was driven out and a Spanish Republic proclaimed (February, 1873). The new rulers at once began quarreling among themselves, the Catholic Church threw its great weight against them, and at the end of 1874 a military revolt made Isabella’s son king as Alfonso XII (1874–1885). The Constitution of 1876 preserved the outward forms of moderate liberalism, but power really lay in the hands of the king and his ministers. The civil wars had been conducted with great brutality by all parties, and Spain thus received a bitter foretaste of what she was to suffer in the twentieth century, but the Constitution of 1876 was followed by several years of domestic peace. Portugal too suffered from repeated insurrections during these years, but none was so spectacular as those in Spain. Nevertheless, Spain and Portugal each made economic progress, building railways with the aid of French and British capital and engineers, and bringing new industries into
the country. At the same time literary, artistic, and intellectual life was more active than it had been for many years, and gradually liberal ideas again appeared in the peninsula.

**THE NEW ITALY**

The conquest of Rome in 1870 completed the unification of Italy under Victor Emmanuel II. The dreams of many years at last were realized, and Italian patriots were highly resolved to make this new "third" Italy a worthy successor to the Italy of Augustus and that of the Renaissance. "Italy," they said, "must again be something more than a museum and a picture gallery."

The task which these patriots set for themselves was not an easy one. Their country was now united politically, to be sure, but it was by no means united economically and emotionally. North and South differed widely in wealth, education, and political traditions, with progressive Northerners despising the backward South. For many generations the territory south of Rome, formerly the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, had been ruled by a branch of the Bourbon family, and by repute its government was the worst in Europe. It left a tragic legacy to the new Italy. Modern improvements were wholly lacking, the countryside was infested with brigands who terrorized the peasants and made travel unsafe, more than 75 percent of the population was illiterate, and everywhere there was the direst poverty. The Herculean task of bringing these regions up to the standards expected of a modern state was hampered not only by the expense involved but also by the active opposition of persons having a vested interest in their backwardness. After the expulsion of the last Bourbon in 1860, a horde of ambitious Northerners rushed to the South, where some were given important government positions while others acquired large tracts of land confiscated from the former nobility or the church. These Northerners resented paying taxes for improvements and the new rulers soon discovered, as the Bourbons had known all along, that an ignorant peasantry was less likely to cause trouble than a slightly educated one. At the same time big business concerns in the North systematically exploited the South and, short-sightedly fearing that improvement there would injure their own profits, they brought pressure upon the central government to check radical measures of amelioration. They also insisted upon huge expenditures for railways and other public works in their own part of
the country. Though great progress was made in the South during the twenty years after 1870, much still remained to be done, and the expenditures already made had bankrupted the central government.

A second source of division in Italy was the Catholic Church. The pope, whose predecessors for eleven centuries had been the temporal rulers of Rome and the Papal States, now found it difficult to surrender these last vestiges of his time-honored pretensions to world rule. Moreover, he greatly feared that the loss of the city might impair his international position as supreme pontiff of the Catholic Church. Much church property—especially land—had been confiscated by Garibaldi and his followers. And finally, like their colleagues throughout Europe, the Italian Liberals were bitterly anticlerical, especially in such matters as the control of primary education. Cavour had been an anticlerical statesman of large views, who believed in the complete separation of church and state, and who formulated his position in a slogan that became famous among liberals—“A free church in a free state”—but his less statesmanly successors often showed their pettiness in their attacks upon the church.

Pius IX therefore resisted unification to the end, and after the occupation of Rome in 1870 he made himself a voluntary prisoner in the Vatican—as did all his successors until 1929. The Italian parliament passed a “Law of Papal Guarantees” in 1871, defining the position of the pope, granting him the Vatican and certain other territories, allowing him to maintain an army of Swiss guards, assuring him of complete freedom in the appointment of bishops and priests, and promising him an annual subsidy of about $650,000. The pope was not satisfied with this generous offer. He rejected it and forbade loyal Catholics to vote or hold office under the usurper. Not many Italians heeded his order, however, and it was at most a nuisance rather than a menace to the new government.

The statesmen who guided Italy through years that would have tried the genius of a Cavour or a Bismarck were not always a lovely lot. Just as the German Empire inherited an evil legacy from Bismarck’s “blood and iron,” so the new Italy inherited a baneful tradition from its founders and their enemies. The peninsula had long been governed by foreign despots who often had recourse to the crudest intimidation and bribery in order to retain their thrones, and the men who expelled these tyrants had often been plotters in secret societies who sought to gain their ends by intrigue and violence. Unfortunately their success consecrated their methods, and when the
victors' turn for power came, their political opponents used against them the very methods which they, in their day, had used against the Bourbons and the Hapsburgs. Anarchists and socialists turned to revolutionary activity, political assassinations became alarmingly frequent (King Humbert himself was assassinated in 1900), and the methods used by political parties sometimes resembled those of a vendetta rather than those of a parliament.

In no country of western Europe were elections more corrupt than in Italy during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Bribery was practiced widely and openly, with the price of votes ranging from as much as five dollars down to as little as ten cents. When such “extensive philanthropy” on the eve of an election failed to produce the desired results, the registration lists were tampered with, and it was part of a prefect’s duty to see that as many opposition voters as possible were disfranchised. A celebrated though extreme case of this sort occurred at Catania when five thousand voters out of nine thousand, with university professors and lawyers among them, were removed at one fell swoop. Once a professor of literature found that his name had been scratched from the list of voters on the ground that he was illiterate! When such measures proved inadequate, politicians employed gangs of hoodlums, the Camorra and the Mafia, to terrorize opposition candidates and voters, following the Bourbon practice of former times.

When the ministers at Rome had secured the election of deputies friendly to themselves their task was only half done. The prime minister was certain to find that his followers needed constant attention or his majority in parliament would disintegrate. Experience also proved that it was cheaper to buy off the opposition than to fight it. Even in the 1870's Italian ministers had developed a system which they called trasformismo and which closely resembled the good old-fashioned American device known as “logrolling.” It became the practice to appoint the leaders of opposition groups to positions in the cabinet, thus freeing the ministry from virtually all criticism. The sole ambitions shared by the ministers in such composite cabinets was to remain in office as long as possible and to enjoy its more material rewards.

The men who completed the unification of Italy became Conservatives after 1870 and for the next six years they governed the new kingdom. The elections of 1876 drove them from office, however, and a coalition of leaders from the left then ruled Italy until 1914. The
most eminent of these leaders was Agostino Depretis (1813–1887), who had once been a disciple of the republican Mazzini. As he possessed an amazing skill at “preparing” elections and is regarded as the father of trasformismo, he held office as prime minister most of the time from 1876 until his death in 1887. The rule of the right closed with an outburst of popular distrust and hatred engendered by its heavy taxation, its hostility to democratic reform, and its reputed predilection for north Italians. When the left took office, therefore, it had a large program prepared. Though taxes were augmented rather than reduced, the finances of the state were so improved that paper money no longer circulated at a discount. A compulsory education act was passed in 1877, though it never went into complete operation, partly because of the lack of adequate schoolhouses and teachers. In 1882 a new franchise law raised the electorate from 600,000 to 2,000,000 voters. Other reforms followed, among them a modernization of the penal code, the abolition of capital punishment, the reorganization of local government, and laws regarding sanitation. A program of public works, including the government ownership of railways, was set on foot. The leaders of the left thus substantiated their claim to being the party of democratic progress and assured themselves of the support of all persons interested in such progress.

THE THIRD FRENCH REPUBLIC

News of the French disaster at Sedan (September 1, 1870) reached Paris the next day, and on the fourth, two republican leaders, Jules Favre (1809–1880) and Léon Gambetta (1838–1882), proclaimed the Third French Republic. Though France was finished with Napoleon III, his war continued, and the republican leaders had no thought of suing for peace. They therefore made heroic efforts to continue the war after setting up a Government of National Defense. When the German armies surrounded Paris two weeks later, Gambetta made a spectacular escape from the city by balloon and worked feverishly during the next few months to organize resistance in the French provinces. His efforts were in vain, however, for Paris fell in January, 1871. When Bismarck refused to negotiate with the provisional government, which was revolutionary and therefore without standing in his eyes, nation-wide elections were held on February 8, at which a National Assembly was elected. Meeting at Bordeaux
(February 13) this body designated Adolphe Thiers (1797–1877), once a cabinet minister of Louis Philippe, as France’s “chief executive” and sent him to negotiate peace with Germany. We have seen how his treaty, signed on May 10, ceded Alsace-Lorraine to Germany and promised an indemnity of five billion francs, with Germany keeping an army of occupation in France until this indemnity was paid in full.

After the fall of Paris, most Frenchmen were anxious to end the war, but the radical republicans of Paris were not. Other radicals, some of them Marxian socialists, thought that the time had come to establish a workers’ republic. Still other republicans were disturbed when the National Assembly moved from Bordeaux to Versailles, rather than to Paris, in which action they saw a royalist plot. Early in March these Parisian radicals seized weapons and declared the city an independent “Commune.” (These men are usually called Communards, to distinguish them from Marxian Communists: only a few Communards were Marxians.) During the next two months the region surrounding Paris was the scene of bitter fighting between the
Communards and troops sent from Versailles to quell them—with the Germans standing by and watching as neutrals. At last the Versailles troops forced their way into the city and destroyed the rebels in their barricades. The retreating Communards were guilty of savage atrocities, burning public buildings and murdering eminent hostages. Order was finally restored, but the blood-bath of May, 1871, launched the Third Republic under most inauspicious circumstances.

It next became necessary for France to replace her discarded Second Empire with a permanent government. After the fall of the Commune, few Frenchmen wished to modify the local government or the powerful bureaucracy, but wide differences of opinion prevailed regarding the highest level of the government. The seven hundred members of the National Assembly included only thirty Bonapartists, but the remaining deputies fell into three almost equal groups. One faction desired a restoration of the Bourbon monarchy under the Count of Chambord (called “Henry V”), grandson of Charles X; the second faction wanted a liberal monarchy under the Count of Paris, grandson of Louis Philippe; and the third—the smallest of the three—demanded a republic. The Bourbons, who were supported largely by the old aristocracy, rich social climbers, and the Catholic Church, planned to re-establish a divine-right monarchy with the old white flag of the Bourbons but with little popular representation; the Orleanists favored a parliamentary monarchy resembling that in England, with policy determined by a strong legislature and a ministry responsible to it, with a figurehead king who would be little more than a national symbol, and with the revolutionary tricolor as the national flag of France. The republicans differed from the Orleanists chiefly in wishing to have an elected president rather than a hereditary king as head of the state, and they were somewhat readier to admit further democratic reforms.

The two varieties of monarchists disliked and distrusted each other so cordially that each preferred a republic to the victory of the other. France therefore became a republic, but for several years most Frenchmen regarded this republic as only a temporary expedient. Little power was granted to the president, partly because Republicans wished to prevent an ambitious man from repeating the activities of President Bonaparte under the Second Republic, and partly because the Orleanists wished to make it easy for their king to take
his place. Both parties agreed that policy should be determined by the
prime minister and his cabinet. Thiers, who had been named chief
executive of the provisional government in 1871, paid off the in-
demnity during the next two years and thus secured the withdrawal
of all German troops, but when he declared that "a republic is what
divides us the least," he was forced to resign (May, 1873). His suc-
cessor, Marshal MacMahon (1803–1893), a military man with a bril-
liant record in spite of his being badly beaten at Sedan, was an avowed
Orleanist. The National Assembly then passed a series of laws regu-
lating the government, laws which remained the nearest approach
to a written constitution that the Third Republic ever had. The first
and most important of them, providing for the election of presidents,
was passed by a majority of only one vote (1875). Four years later,
MacMahon was forced to resign and was succeeded by a conservative
republican, Jules Grévy (1807–1891). When Grévy was re-elected to
a second term in 1885, it seemed that the Third Republic was firmly
established.

France had been economically prosperous under the Second Em-
pire, and many of those profiting by this prosperity had hoarded
their wealth, with traditional French frugality, in the fond hope
that they and their children might then live without further economic
effort. As they invested their savings in stocks and bonds, from which
they derived a steady income (rente), such persons were called
rentiers. This class of persons was not limited to France, of course, but
an unusually large proportion of the population there were rentiers
under the Third Republic. Patriotism led them to invest heavily in
government bonds, enabling France to pay off the indemnity in two
years—instead of ten, as Bismarck had expected. The rentiers thus
became interested in the perpetuation of the Republic whose bonds
they held, but they also acquired a heavy lien upon it. The great
Parisian bankers, through whom they made their investments and
who expressed their desires, came to dominate political life as in no
other country of the world. The rentiers also brought France many of
her most characteristic and most difficult problems. Though some
contributed signally to the literary, artistic, or scientific life of the
nation, the greater number seemed content to pass their lives with-
out engaging in any productive activity. Thousands of highly able
persons were thus withdrawn from the economic life of the nation,
and they deliberately limited their families lest the patrimony be
divided among several children and not suffice for any.
At the same time the improved status of the French peasant was leading to equally unfortunate results. A large percentage of these peasants owned their small farms, and they too limited their families for the same reason. The result was that after 1880 the population of France became almost stationary, and there was a real shortage of labor. The factories of Germany and England were manned by the surplus of their growing populations, but in France no such surplus existed, and industrialists could not find the man power to create a large industrial system. Until near the end of the century most French manufacturing was done in rather small shops by independent artisans. Certain industries, such as steel and textiles, began to develop large-scale production during the 1880’s, but managers were forced to import their labor from Belgium and Italy. France thus became the only country in Europe with a net immigration. Laborers being in a relatively strong position, they received the right to organize freely (1884), and the French labor movement made rapid progress.

The political support given to the Bourbons by prominent Catholics encouraged republican leaders to exploit the anticlerical sentiments which many middle-class Frenchmen had inherited from Voltaire and the great French Revolution. In the early days of the Republic Gambetta had exclaimed, “Clericalism is the enemy!” and MacMahon was driven from the presidency because of his alleged sympathy with the clericals. The struggle between clericals and anticlericals continued unabated until the outbreak of World War I. (“Anticlericalism,” it must be explained, was directed against the church as a political institution, not as a religious one, and masonic lodges were frequently as active politically on the liberal side as was the Catholic Church on the conservative side.) In 1880 the Jesuits were ordered to dissolve or leave France, and other monastic orders could continue their labors only with special permission. Four years later divorce was made legal, in spite of protests from the clericals. The chief contention, however, concerned state-supported schools. In the days of Napoleon III these schools had been under strong clerical influence, but republican statesmen insisted upon excluding all religious instruction. Catholics replied by organizing what they called “free” schools, which usually were taught by members of monastic orders, and which were “free” to give religious instruction. As it was difficult for the church to finance its schools, and the government
refused all aid, this controversy embittered the political life of France for many years.

Seldom in history has military defeat caused a whole people deeper humiliation than did France’s defeat in 1870, and seldom has a whole people devoted itself to regaining its lost position so ardently as did the French. The political leaders of the Republic shared this ardor with everyone else, but they knew that for the moment nothing could be done. As long as Bismarck remained in power, he prevented other nations from coming to France’s aid, and 1870 had shown that by herself France could do nothing against Germany. The day of revanche (“getting even”) was therefore postponed, but hope was not abandoned. Typical of the day was Gambetta, who advised his fellow countrymen never to speak of the lost provinces and never to forget them.

It was this idea of revanche, more than any other, which aroused the generous enthusiasm of the young men who grew up after 1870. Thus Raymond Poincaré (born in 1860; president of the Republic 1913–1920) once declared that in his youth he could discover no reason why his generation should go on living except for the hope of regaining the lost provinces. Thousands of young people decided to devote their lives to patriotic service and to bring back to France the glory that had once been hers. Some believed that they could best serve their country by raising her civilization and culture to the highest possible level, and that whatever they might do that was excellent would redound to the glory of France. The majority, however, conceived of glory in terms of the lost provinces and military victory. As these young patriots grew older, and saw their numbers augmented each year by new recruits, they became impatient with their cautious elders, and toward the end of the 1880’s they filled France with a hysterical spirit of nationalism. The poet Paul Déroulède inspired these youths with his songs and organized them in his “League of Patriots.”

As was quite appropriate, the hero of this League was a military man, General Georges Boulanger (1837–1891). Though the general at first expressed political opinions of a liberal or even radical sort, thereby winning the support of many republicans, his activities were financed by royalists. He became minister of war in 1886, but early in the next year he was sent back to his garrison. Late in 1887, by exploiting a financial scandal, he was able to force the resignation
of President Grévy. Boulanger then began demanding a revision of the constitutional laws, and in January, 1889, he was elected to the Chamber of Deputies amid scenes of riotous enthusiasm. His friends advised him to call upon the League of Patriots and the Paris mob that very night and to seize control of France by force. The general's courage failed him, however, and a few days later, believing that the government was about to arrest him, he fled to Belgium. He was convicted in absentia of plotting against the state, and the League of Patriots was ordered to dissolve. Two years later Boulanger's sorry career terminated with his suicide at the grave of his mistress in Brussels.

This Boulanger fiasco may be taken as marking the end of a period in the history of the Third Republic. Royalists and other enemies of the Republic now ceased their active opposition, and even the Catholic Church sought peace with it. In 1890 a prominent cardinal declared it to be the duty of every Catholic to support whatever form of government the majority preferred, and a little later Pope Leo XIII (1878–1903) expressed himself in similar terms. There could be little doubt thereafter that the overwhelming majority of the French people favored the Third Republic.

GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND

While the different peoples of Europe were fighting these crucial battles, most Englishmen looked on with an ill-concealed air of self-satisfaction. The repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, followed by the establishment of complete free trade a few years later, ushered in a period of economic prosperity. Enthusiastic patriots then boasted that their country was the "workshop of the world," that she ruled an empire upon which the sun never set, and that her fleets swept the seven seas. Her prestige and power were made manifest repeatedly by successful interference in continental matters, while no continental statesman dared dream of reciprocal meddling in British affairs. At the same time England was the home of a brilliant group of literary men, scientists, and thinkers, who expressed the liberal idealism of the day in an impressive manner. Even the working classes shared to some extent in the general prosperity, for wages rose though the price of food declined and the hours of labor decreased. It is true that something yet remained to be done, and that the slums of the industrial cities presented a less attractive picture, but this side of
British life was then studied only by Karl Marx and a few literary radicals. The average Englishman of the middle or upper classes regarded Victorian England as the crowning glory of human history. As England’s foreign trade increased rapidly during the twenty years after 1846, Englishmen took a renewed interest in world affairs and sometimes showed great truculence when dealing with other peoples. Typical of the day was Lord Palmerston (1784–1865), who held office as foreign secretary from 1846 to 1851 and was prime minister twice (1855–1858, 1859–1865). Like his great contemporaries on the continent, Palmerston had high respect for “blood and iron,” though he gave a rather different twist to their teachings on the subject. He always posed as a great champion of liberalism, intervening time and time again in European affairs in the name of Liberty, but in the end he usually was satisfied with commercial concessions for England. His most famous statement of policy came in 1850, “As the Roman in days of old held himself free from indignity when he could say civis Romanus sum ['I am a Roman citizen'], so also a British subject in whatever land he may be shall feel confident that the watchful eye and strong arm of England will protect him from injustice and wrong.” This doctrine was soon accepted by most of the great powers, but it was Palmerston who inaugurated the practice of sending warships to the ports of “backward” nations to enforce the doubtful claims of very shady characters. As a bully, Palmerston was second only to Bismarck.

When Palmerston died, in October, 1865, he was succeeded by a Whig whose ministry lasted only a few months, after which the Tories took over with a ministry whose most forceful member was Benjamin Disraeli (1804–1881). The grandson of a wealthy Jewish merchant, Disraeli made his first reputation as a writer of novels about smart society, though some of his later works dealt with deeper matters. Sybil (1845), for example, discussed the sad plight of factory workers. Similarly his early speeches in parliament attracted attention by their wit rather than by their profundity. As a young man he held only nebulous political views, but when he later became leader of the Conservative party, he made imperialism into a positive program.

Disraeli’s first great achievement was the Reform Bill of 1867. Thirty-five years had passed since the first Reform Bill, and no further changes had been made in the franchise laws. Only one adult male in six was allowed to vote, though universal manhood suffrage had been granted in France, in Bismarck’s North German Bund (1866),
and in Prussia. Ever since the days of the Chartists there had been agitation for franchise reform in England, and as it was now obvious that something must be done, Disraeli decided that the Conservatives might as well have the credit for it. His Reform Bill doubled the electorate, principally by giving the vote to factory workers. He had hoped that the workers would show their gratitude by voting against the Liberal candidates whom their employers supported, but in this he was disappointed. Disraeli was made prime minister a few months after the passage of his bill, but when elections were held in November, 1868, the Liberals won a sweeping victory and he was forced to resign. “Dizzy” had promised to “dish the Whigs,” but he “dished” his own party instead.

The next five years witnessed the first ministry of William Ewart Gladstone (1809–1898), who was in many ways Disraeli’s exact opposite. The son of a rich Liverpool merchant of Scottish descent, he was deeply pious and tremendously in earnest. His oratory had none of the wit and sparkle of his rival’s, but it was more convincing because of his high moral seriousness and his deep sincerity. He really meant what he said, and what he said in parliament was what he said in the bosom of his family. It is reported that Queen Victoria once complained that, while Disraeli treated her as a lady, Gladstone
always addressed her as though she were a public meeting. After a brilliant career as an undergraduate at Oxford, Gladstone entered parliament as a Tory in 1832, at the age of twenty-three, and there he remained for sixty-three years. He presently joined the Peel faction of the Tory party, however, and followed his leader into the new Liberal party during the debate on the Corn Laws. After serving as chancellor of the exchequer under Palmerston, he became prime minister late in 1868.

Gladstone had enlivened his electoral campaign of 1868 with the slogan “Peace, Retrenchment, and Reform,” and during his first ministry he set resolutely to work to bring the British government into closer harmony with the new day. Imprisonment for debt was abolished in 1869; the practice of requiring religious tests at Oxford and Cambridge was discontinued in 1871; the secret ballot was introduced in 1872; and the judicial system was overhauled in 1873. A law legalizing labor unions was enacted in 1870, but the factory owners who dominated the Liberal party made sure that this law virtually forbade strikes. Another act of 1870 provided for recruiting the bureaucracy by competitive examinations—an indication of the growing importance of government service as a career attractive to young men. The Education Act of 1870 was, in the long run, even more important: it ordered that every community in England should have a school and provide public funds for its support. Heretofore England had been shockingly backward in public education, with half the children not in school at all, and half the remainder in schools of pitifully low quality. Not until several years later was admission to schools made free or education compulsory, but progress began at this point. These various reforms were largely the work of Gladstone’s associates, while he devoted his attention largely to the problem of Ireland, to which we shall return shortly.

Gladstone’s first ministry was a period of active and beneficent reform, but he suffered the fate of many reformers: after the old abuses had ceased to exist there was nothing more to say about them. Disraeli could therefore refer to his opponents as a “range of exhausted volcanoes.” Moreover, some of Gladstone’s reforms had aroused the antagonism of powerful persons enjoying a vested interest in the old abuses, and the cost of others touched the pocketbook of every taxpayer. His pacific foreign policy seemed humiliating to patriots who had swelled with pride as Palmerston bullied all Europe. The workers were disappointed at the meagerness of their
reward for returning the Liberals to office in 1868. And in 1873 an economic depression, sweeping over all Europe, brought distress to people of every class. Gladstone’s ministry fell in January, 1874, and Disraeli resumed office.

During the six years of his second ministry (1874–1880) Disraeli continued his fruitless efforts to attach the workers to the Conservative party. A law of 1875 gave labor unions greater rights and powers, and three years later the factory laws were consolidated and extended in a code which gave British workers the protection of the most advanced labor legislation in the world at that time (1878). A beginning was made in slum clearance. At the same time Disraeli was conducting an energetic foreign policy in many parts of the world: in 1875 he bought for England a controlling interest in the Suez Canal; in 1876 he made Victoria “Empress of India”; he checked Russian expansion into the Balkans at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 and assured the cheering populace at home that he brought them “peace with honor”; but he presently stumbled into minor yet unsuccessful wars in Afghanistan and South Africa. It was at this time that the word “jingoism” was introduced into the English language, from the words of a song popular at the time of the Balkan crisis of 1878: “We don’t want to fight, but, by jingo, if we do, We’ve got the ships, we’ve got the men, we’ve got the money, too.” In spite of his jingoism, Disraeli was defeated at the polls in 1880, and a year later he died.

Gladstone and Ireland

Gladstone had fought and won his campaign of 1880 largely by attacking Disraeli’s foreign policy and imperialism, and by promising a new era of peace and reform. Nevertheless, his second ministry (1880–1885) produced only one important reform—the Reform Bill of 1884, extending the franchise to agricultural laborers, who presumably would vote against their Tory landlords. Again Gladstone’s attention was devoted almost entirely to Ireland.

This unhappy island had for centuries suffered from a wide variety of political, economic, religious, educational, and social misfortunes. During the American Revolution the Irish had risen in revolt (see p. 193), after which they received a limited autonomy (1783), but even this was taken away again in 1801. In that year Pitt’s Act of Union established the “United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ire-
land,” with one hundred Irish members admitted to the British House of Commons. Though the Protestants of Ulster easily became reconciled to this new regime, the Catholics of southern Ireland continued to agitate against the British to the best of their ability. Irish powers of resistance were temporarily weakened by the famine of 1845, when hundreds of thousands starved, and in consequence of which more than a million emigrated to America, but by 1868 Ireland again was very restless. The “Fenians” were plotting to drive out the British by force in order to establish an Irish Republic, and they were receiving encouragement and aid from Irishmen and other sympathizers in the United States. When entering upon his first ministry, therefore, Gladstone announced that it would be his task to pacify Ireland.

Gladstone’s original program for Ireland touched upon three matters—the church, the land, and education. His first step aroused little opposition, and in 1869 the Anglican Church was disestablished in Ireland. Thereafter that church could no longer force the Catholic population to contribute to its support, as it had done ever since the Reformation, but it was allowed to keep most of the property it had accumulated during these years. The land problem was more difficult, and the Act of 1870 was only a beginning. The agricultural land of Ireland was owned largely by absentee English landlords whose agents wrung exorbitant rents from the peasantry, whom they evicted if these rents were not paid promptly. Moreover, the landlords made no improvements on the land, and should an industrious peasant do so, his rent would be raised immediately. The Act of 1870 provided that if a tenant were evicted he must be paid for all the improvements he had made, and that he might collect further damages if he were evicted for any reason except the nonpayment of rent. The government would also lend money to peasants who wished to buy their farms. But Gladstone’s attempts to improve education came to naught when his bill establishing a nonsectarian Irish university was defeated in parliament.

During Disraeli’s second administration conditions in Ireland went from bad to worse, until Michael Davitt (1846–1906), a Fenian who had been imprisoned by the British for sedition, founded the Irish Land League in 1879. This League made three demands: fair rent, fixed hold, and free sale. The first of these demands of course meant lower rent; the second, that a tenant could not be evicted so long as he paid this reduced rent; and the third, that if a tenant left his
holding, he might demand compensation not only for his improvements but for his right to hold the land. Gladstone's Land Act of 1881 granted these three demands—after a fashion—but it scarcely improved conditions in Ireland. Meantime other Irishmen, led by Charles Stewart Parnell (1846–1891), were demanding that Ireland again be governed by her own parliament. Parnell was a most able parliamentarian who controlled sixty-five Irish votes in the House of Commons, and during Gladstone's second ministry his "Home Rulers" sometimes caused great annoyance. At the same time Fenians and Land Leaguers were frequently using violence, and when they murdered two high English officials in Dublin (1882), the British government retaliated by authorizing strong coercion in Ireland.

Gladstone's second ministry fell in June, 1885, and new elections left the two major parties so evenly matched in the House of Commons that the Home Rulers held the balance of power. Gladstone then decided to complete his program of Irish reform, and at the same time gain Parnell's support, by espousing Home Rule. After throwing out the Conservatives, he became prime minister for the third time in February, 1886. Two months later he presented the First Irish Home Rule Bill. It provided that an Irish parliament should have complete control of Irish affairs, but that the Irish members should be withdrawn from the British parliament, and it made no distinction between Ulster and southern Ireland. This bill precipitated the greatest political crisis since 1846 and split the Liberal party asunder. The rebels, led by Joseph Chamberlain (1836–1914), called themselves Liberal Unionists and eventually joined with the Conservatives to form the Unionist party. When the Home Rule Bill was rejected, Gladstone dissolved parliament, and in the ensuing election his party was badly defeated. He resigned in August, 1886. The old man was not yet through—he was prime minister for the fourth time, 1892–1894—but thereafter he had little to say that was new.

It was quite appropriate that the end of the mid-Victorian period should be marked by the failure of the Home Rule Bill, for this bill well summarized the spirit of nineteenth-century liberalism. In it were embodied the principles of nationality and of government resting upon the consent of the governed, of political liberty and laissez faire as a cure for the woes of mankind. Its passage would have been a fitting crown to the career of the great Liberal statesman who fathered it, and its failure inaugurated a new period in English his-
tory. Gladstone's successor summarized the Irish policy he proposed to follow in the words "twenty years of resolute rule." The new age was to preach, not laissez faire but state aid, not the independence of small nations but imperialism, not individualism but efficiency and strength. England had accepted her version of the doctrine of blood and iron.
ROMANTICS AND REALISTS

ROMANTICISM—THE NEW REALISM
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NOTE: The first half of the century also saw great creativity in music and the other arts, and much utopian speculation on social questions.
19. ROMANTICISM

Western Europe in the nineteenth century was more literate than ever before. Though a few Protestant reformers had urged that every child be taught to read the Bible, up to the end of the eighteenth century this ideal had not been widely shared, and even in advanced countries the masses remained illiterate. During the French Revolution leaders sought to remedy this situation, cogently arguing that democracy presupposes universal education and that only an educated citizenry can govern itself wisely. Condorcet drew up plans for a national system of popular education, Napoleon took the first steps toward realizing such a program, Stein and others launched similar reforms in Germany, and during the nineteenth century every country in Europe and America made marked progress in that direction. By 1870 or shortly thereafter the leading European countries had made elementary education compulsory for all children, and by 1914 illiteracy had been virtually abolished in northern and western Europe, though southern and eastern Europe remained more backward.

Improvement was not confined to elementary education, however, for secondary schools gave good liberal educations to an ever increasing number of students. In the first half of the century this education was based on a study of the Greek and Latin classics, as had been the custom ever since the fifteenth century, but presently more modern subjects were added to the curriculum, with natural science, history, modern languages, and literature gradually replacing the ancient classics. The students attending these schools seem few in number when compared with those enrolled in American high schools today, yet they provided a new clientele for the intellectual leaders of western Europe.
The greatest progress of all was made by the German universities. Throughout Europe during the eighteenth century these universities had fallen into decay, but the opening of the University of Berlin in 1809 marked the dawn of a new day. This new university was part of the program designed by Stein and Hardenberg to set Prussia on her feet once more after her defeat by Napoleon at Jena in 1806. Like other universities, it was designed primarily to train government officials, but the authorities interpreted their task in a broad way, and instruction was offered in a wide variety of subjects. Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835), a man of great learning, was largely responsible for organizing the new university, and he made it a center for scientific and scholarly research that would add to human knowledge. He assembled a remarkable faculty, and the university quickly became an intellectual power in the new Germany. Various lesser German princes followed the Prussian example, either founding new universities or reorganizing old ones. By the middle of the nineteenth century these German universities had achieved world eminence, and during the next fifty years they were eagerly frequented by students from every country of Western culture. German ideas, German science and scholarship, German philosophy, and German literature were thus disseminated over all Europe, fertilizing the intellectual life of every country. England and France also reformed their universities, but major changes did not come so soon.

The increasing number of educated persons entailed new reading habits and produced new types of reading matter. Perhaps the most influential of these innovations were the daily newspapers that published news items and editorial discussions of political and other questions. The Times of London started publication in 1785 (under another name) and its great career began early in the next century. In 1815 its circulation amounted to 5000 copies daily, which figure was doubled by 1834; ten years later it had risen to 23,000, and in 1854 it stood at 52,000. At the latter date London’s second newspaper sold less than 8000 copies daily. Weekly newspapers also began to exert great influence. They engaged in propaganda for various political causes, and the new freedom of the press enabled them to criticize their governments freely and effectively. In England the most important were the Spectator (1828) and the Saturday Review (1855), but similar publications might be found in most continental countries. Monthly and quarterly periodicals, which had reviewed books and discussed public questions in the eighteenth century, now became
commoner and more important than ever. The *Edinburgh Review* (1802) was an especially significant periodical of this sort, and the *Revue des Deux Mondes* (1827) enjoyed a similar role in France. Never before in history had it been possible for so many people to be well informed on public questions, or for a man with ideas to reach so large an audience.

Many persons were thus led to speculate on important questions, and a wide diversity of opinion followed, yet it is easy to trace a few main trends in nineteenth-century thought. In the early years of the century, thinking upon every major subject was influenced by recollections of the French Revolution. Some men, appalled at the violence and bloodshed which accompanied that great event, continued to fear and hate it. In their fear of revolution they deified legitimacy, and in their hatred of the recent past they turned to the more remote periods for their guide and inspiration. They thus became pillars of nineteenth-century conservatism. Others, inspired by the glorious deeds of the revolutionists and by the ideals of the thinkers who had preceded them, regretted that the great work had been left half done and dedicated themselves to the continuance of the revolutionary traditions of liberty, justice, democracy, and progress. They became the intellectual leaders of nineteenth-century liberalism. In spite of their deep and fundamental differences, however, both groups may justly be called sons of the French Revolution.

Moreover, liberals and conservatives were alike romantics in that they sought their ideal in a remote period—in the past, as they vaguely believed that it had been, or in the future, as they fondly hoped that it would be. The early nineteenth century was a time when exuberant imagination showed itself in every field, a time of poets and musicians, of philosophers and scholars, of scientific investigators, of political and social theorists, of historians, and of prophets. Everywhere we find the same imaginative idealism, the same enthusiasm for dreams, the same utopianism. At first the conservatives prevailed, but during the 1840's the liberals gained the upper hand, and men everywhere dreamed of republics and parliamentary government, of liberated and united nationalities, of the rights of the "people," and even of a "parliament of man." A messianic feeling spread abroad that great things were about to happen, that the dreams were about to come true, that the utopias were about to appear.
Then came the Revolution of 1848. Though hailed by many as the cataclysm that would usher in a new and better age, it was everywhere suppressed by force, the dreams failed to come true, and utopias stood discredited. Imaginative idealists lost faith in their abilities, and a spirit of skepticism, doubt, and despair spread over Europe, dominating its thought for many years to come. The new spirit was perhaps the most pronounced in Germany, where the pessimistic Schopenhauer (1788–1860) became the fashionable philosopher of the hour. He discounted all idealism and spoke much of the will. Views such as his then came to prevail throughout Europe and “realists” superseded the “romantics” of the earlier part of the century. Distrustful of all systems of thought and of all ideals, men wished to know what the world was “really” like. There had been realists before 1848, of course, and there were many romantics afterward, but at about this time the balance began to change, and the new generation grew up under influences making for “realism.” They were taught about “Nature, red in tooth and claw,” the “struggle for life,” and the “survival of the fittest,” and they became convinced that the world is ruled by force and by force alone. It therefore seemed to them that the wise man was one who sought material power, or else material rewards and pleasures, and that there was little place in the world for the scholar, the philosopher, or the dreamer.

We have seen how this new spirit prepared the way for a school of politicians who ridiculed dreams, who boasted of their “realism,” who talked about “blood and iron,” and who deified power. Europe had been relatively free from war since Waterloo, but the twenty years after 1850 were disturbed by a steady stream of conflicts, with Napoleon III, Bismarck, and Cavour each regarding war as a normal instrument of national policy. And when “realistic” statesmen took up the sword as a final and infallible arbiter in political disputes, other men sought equally certain methods for solving intellectual problems. People who had been so sadly deceived by the imaginings of the romantics, and who were now so skeptical regarding all ideas, insistently demanded a new and infallible guide to the misty maze of philosophy. But who was to be the man of blood and iron in matters intellectual? Before discussing the various answers given to this great question, we must return for a moment and see what the romantics had actually said. Only then can we understand the realists who followed them.
Romantic Poets and Novelists

Because of the manifold forms which it assumed, romanticism is not easily defined or described. Sometimes it is regarded primarily as a literary movement, which indeed it was, but it was much besides. It was a manner of thinking. The romantics built upon the thought of various eighteenth-century writers, against whom they rebelled and to whose view of the world they added much. Disturbing the excessive rationalism of the philosophes, they laid emphasis upon feeling and emotion rather than reason, they loved mystery and beauty, they preferred poetry to prose. Like Burke, they believed in gradual growth rather than sudden creation, and history became one of their favorite subjects. In their enthusiasm for faraway things and places, the romantics rejected the eighteenth century’s contempt for the Middle Ages as a period of “barbarism and religion” and praised the period as a time of beauty and wonder, or as the “age of faith.” But they retained and expanded their predecessors’ humanitarian idealism, they spoke eloquently of liberty, and they promoted countless social reforms. Reversing Voltaire’s attitude toward religion, they often became ardent advocates of Christianity. It was their buoyancy and enthusiasm, as much as the economic prosperity of the day, that made the nineteenth century “the century of hope.”

Romanticism received its first high literary expression in Germany, where the way had been prepared by poets of the Sturm und Drang period (see p. 114). The greatest of these poets was Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832, see p. 115), who during his long life led one trend after another. His Götz von Berlichingen (1773) had inaugurated the Sturm und Drang, with its romantic apotheosis of the hero, while Die Leiden des jungen Werthers (1774) was a sad and sentimental love story. Goethe presently outgrew the youthful exuberance of these early works, accepted the ancient classic writers as his masters, and later still came to share the views of the romantics. Goethe is best known, of course, for his tragedy Faust (1808). This philosophical drama, which develops the old theme of a man who sold his soul to the devil for earthly power and pleasure, is deeply imbued with the romantic spirit. When Faust makes his compact with Mephistopheles, for example, he promises that the devil may have his soul, “If ever I say to a passing moment, ‘Stay, thou art so beauti-
full!” Faust was quite sure that, like all romantics, he would always be pressing on, demanding something new and better of life in the future. At another point, Faust takes up the Gospel and reads, “In the beginning was the Word.” Disdainfully throwing the book aside, he declares, “In the beginning was the Deed!” again showing himself to be a true romantic.

Many other poets of high standing appeared in Germany during this romantic period, but only one of them can be mentioned here. Heinrich Heine (1797–1856) was a converted Jew whose sarcastic and mocking spirit made him unpopular in Germany, and who therefore passed the last twenty-five years of his life in Paris. Nevertheless, his Buch der Lieder (1827), by which he won European fame, contains several of the best-known lyrics in the German language. Among them are “The Lorelei” and “The Two Grenadiers.”

Romantic poetry took a rather different form in England. Various precursors of romanticism had appeared in eighteenth-century England, but the movement really began with Wordsworth and Coleridge, who published their Lyrical Ballads in 1798. After taking a degree at Cambridge, William Wordsworth (1770–1850) visited France, then in the throes of the Revolution, and while there he grew enthusiastic over the new liberty. Returning home, he interested himself in the ideas of William Godwin and other British radicals (see p. 169), but presently French excesses and the rise of Napoleon turned him against his early liberalism. He strongly criticized the rationalism of the eighteenth century in his “Ode on the Intimations of Immortality,” and “The World is too much with us,” whose famous lines sum up much of the romantic spirit:

Great God! I’d rather be
A Pagan suckled in a creed outworn;
So might I, standing on this pleasant lea,
Have glimpses that would make me less forlorn;
Have sight of Proteus rising from the sea;
Or hear old Triton blow his wreathed horn.

Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772–1834) was equally enthusiastic over the early French Revolution, but like Wordsworth he later became an archconservative. A visit to Germany in 1798–1799 made him acquainted with German poetry and idealistic philosophy, and he was influential in bringing these ideas to England, but today he is remembered chiefly by two poems, “Kubla Khan” and “The Ancient
Mariner.” Very different from anything written by Wordsworth, these poems show another aspect of romanticism—its interest in remote places, in the strange and the supernatural, and in the eerie, the weird, and the uncanny.

The second generation of poets of the English romantic school was distinguished especially by Byron, Shelley, and Keats. Lord Byron (1788–1824) made his name as a poet with *Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage* (1812), a long narrative poem about a disillusioned young man, but he is better known for the satirical *Don Juan* and for such lyrics as the “Maid of Athens.” The irregularities of his private life forced him to leave England forever in 1816. After various adventures in Italy, he threw himself with enthusiasm into the Greek war of independence (see p. 237), and died of malaria at Missolonghi.
Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792–1822) was expelled from Oxford for circulating a pamphlet in favor of atheism (1811), and after a brief flirtation with Irish revolutionists he joined the radicals led by William Godwin, whose daughter he married. He too spent his last years in a self-imposed exile in Italy, where he wrote some of his most famous poems, among them the lines “To a Skylark” beginning

Hail to thee, blithe spirit!
Bird thou never wert,
That, from heaven, or near it,
Pourest thy full heart
In profuse strains of unpremeditated art.

These two poets sprang from England’s well-to-do classes, but not so John Keats (1795–1821), whose parents were in humble circumstances and who was unable to complete the medical course he began in a London hospital. Over the period of a few weeks in 1819, however, he produced several of the most famous poems in the English language, including the “Ode to a Nightingale” and the “Ode on a Grecian Urn.” From the latter come the celebrated lines,

“Beauty is truth, truth beauty,”—that is all
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.

Suffering from tuberculosis, Keats went to Italy, where he died, aged twenty-five years, and where his friend Shelley mourned for him in one of his last great poems, “Adonais.”

The romantic writers were primarily poets, but many produced stories and novels as well. Romantic novels bore little resemblance to such eighteenth-century fiction as Fielding’s Tom Jones, in which one rollicking episode followed another, or to the contemporary novels of Jane Austen (1775–1817), which vividly and accurately depicted English country life at the turn of the century. Strange and fantastic adventures in remote countries were related in such romances as The Mysteries of Udolpho (1794), written by Mrs. Ann Radcliffe (1764–1823). The leading German writer of this school was E. T. W. Hoffmann (1776–1822), whose weird stories, published in the years after Waterloo, formed the basis of Offenbach’s operetta, Tales of Hoffmann. Similar stories were written in America by the romantic poet Edgar Allan Poe (1809–1849).

More important than these tales of mystery and terror were the historical novels, of which Sir Walter Scott (1771–1832) was the leading author. Scott had begun his literary career as a poet, pub-
lishing a translation of Goethe's *Götz von Berlichingen* (1799), and making a great reputation with his Scottish ballads, *The Lay of the Last Minstrel* (1805), *Marmion* (1808), and *The Lady of the Lake* (1810). The first of his historical novels, *Waverley* (1814), was followed by a score of others, often written at the rate of two a year. Covering almost the whole field of Scottish and English history, they aroused much popular interest in historical subjects, with *Ivanhoe* (1819) and *The Talisman* (1825) helping to establish a new and more sympathetic attitude toward the Middle Ages.

At about the same time an Italian writer, Alessandro Manzoni (1785–1873), published *The Betrothed* (1825–1826), which depicted the sufferings of Italy under Spanish rule in the seventeenth century. Being a covert criticism of the Austrian domination of Italy in the author's own day, the book played an important part in the Italian Risorgimento (see p. 286). A few years later Victor Hugo (1802–1885) stimulated a "Gothic revival" in France with his novel *The Hunchback of Notre Dame* (1831), while the best-known novels of Alexandre Dumas (1803–1870) dealt with the exciting days of the seventeenth century. The "Leatherstocking" series of novels by James Fenimore Cooper (1789–1851), which illustrated another aspect of romanticism with their enthusiasm for Indians, frontiersmen, and Indian-fighters, brought their author great popularity throughout Europe. Meantime Honoré de Balzac (1799–1850) was producing a long series of novels, under the general title of *La Comédie humaine*, depicting French life under the Restoration and the July Monarchy, emphasizing its more vulgar aspects. On the other hand, the romantic novels of a French woman using the pen name George Sand (1803–1876) aroused enthusiasm for the humanitarianism and socialism of the 1840's.

**Romanticism and the Study of History**

Romantic interest in the past also led to a great revival of historical studies, especially in Germany. The historians of the new school were ardent patriots as well as romantics, and they resented the scornful attitude of Voltaire and his disciples toward the Middle Ages, when the foundations of German civilization were being laid. After his retirement from public life in 1815, the Prussian statesman and reformer Freiherr vom Stein devoted himself to encouraging German science and scholarship, one result of which was the in-
auguration of the greatest historical project ever to come out of Germany. The first volume of the Monumenta Germaniae Historica ("Historical Monuments of Germany") appeared in 1826, proudly bearing on its title page the motto, Sanctus amor patriae dat animum ("Sacred love of the fatherland gives inspiration"). It was planned that these volumes should contain all the materials from which the medieval history of Germany could be learned—contemporary writers, laws, charters, letters, and everything else. Scholars are still at work on the project, adding new volumes from time to time, and similar publications have been launched in most other countries.

The German historian Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886) stood above all others of this period. In his first book Ranke ambitiously announced that he would describe the past "as it really happened," and in all his writings—which fill fifty-four large volumes—he maintained a high impartiality. Being a pietistic Lutheran and a conservative German patriot, he was especially interested in the Protestant Reformation. His reputation rests primarily upon his three-volume History of the Popes (1834–1839) and the six volumes on German History in the Period of the Reformation (1839–1847). No historian in the nineteenth century is more justly honored today than he.

Historical studies also made great progress in France and England. While still a professor at Paris, François Guizot (1787–1874) published an important History of Civilization in France (1830), and in later years, after leaving his professorship to become a statesman, he used his influence to promote historical studies like those encouraged by Stein in Germany. His fall from power in 1848 (see p. 278) turned Guizot back to historical writing and to helping young scholars. Meantime Jules Michelet (1798–1874), a truer representative of the romantic school of history, was publishing his highly emotional and none-too-accurate History of France in seventeen volumes (1833–1867).

The two most popular historians in England at this time were Thomas Babington Macaulay (1800–1859) and Thomas Carlyle (1795–1881). As a young man, Macaulay attracted attention by publishing a series of brilliant essays on historical subjects in the Edinburgh Review; after entering parliament as a Whig in 1830, he worked for the Reform Bill of 1832; he spent a few years in India, establishing a new educational system and introducing fundamental legal reforms; he later held a seat in the British cabinet; but
in 1847 he withdrew from political life and devoted himself to his five-volume *History of England* (1848–1861). After two introductory chapters came the long and brilliant third chapter on "The State of England in 1685," famous as an early attempt at social history. The remaining four and a half volumes covered a period of only sixteen years (1685–1701), setting forth the Whig version of English history and making liberty begin with the Glorious Revolution of 1688.

For many years Macaulay was primarily a politician, but Carlyle had always been a literary man. Deeply influenced by the German romantics, but at the same time an ardent lover of liberty, Carlyle made his reputation with a book on *The French Revolution* (1837). By showing that the Reign of Terror was not the whole Revolution, he broke the spell under which Burke had held English thought for so many years and thus promoted the cause of British liberalism. Carlyle’s romanticism made him a hero worshiper, however, and in later years he published laudatory biographies of Cromwell (1845) and Frederick the Great (1858–1865). This last work belongs to a new period, when Carlyle had become conservative and all Europe was turning to the idealism of "blood and iron."

The romantics did not limit their interest to the histories of states, great events, and great men. They also wrote the histories of institutions and of the achievements of common men. Thus the German Friedrich Karl von Savigny (1779–1861) founded a school of jurisprudence by writing a famous book on the historical development of Roman law (1815–1831), and Wilhelm Roscher (1817–1894) explained modern economic institutions by their history. Friedrich August Wolf (1759–1824) started the controversy over the "Homer question" (see Vol. One, p. 125) by picturing the Homeric poems as the work of the Greek people as a whole, not of some individual named Homer. And above all, Jacob Grimm (1785–1863) and his brother Wilhelm (1786–1859) showed their enthusiasm for the German people by collecting and publishing the popular legends and stories of German folklore that have since delighted millions as *Grimm’s Fairy Tales* (1812). Their nationalism also led them to study the history and development of the various Germanic languages. A few years ago an eminent German historian declared that, in his opinion, united Germany owed more to the Grimm brothers than to Bismarck: they had made the German people want to be united on the basis of their common culture.
The romantic character of the new history is also shown by its interest in early and faraway countries. It was at this time that a French scholar, J.-F. Champollion (1790–1832), succeeded in deciphering Egyptian hieroglyphics (1822), thereby opening up a new field of ancient history. Some twenty years later (1845) an Englishman, Henry Rawlinson (1810–1895), began deciphering Assyrian cuneiform inscriptions. Meantime English and German scholars were studying the ancient Sanskrit epics and the history and religion of ancient India. The history of Greece and Rome received renewed attention, with new interpretations by such men as Georg Niebuhr (1776–1831), with the beginnings of archeology, and with discoveries of ancient masterpieces of art (such as the Venus de Milo, 1820) unparalleled since the days of the Italian Renaissance.

**Romanticism and Religion**

Early in the nineteenth century romantic writers often referred to the medieval period in European history as the "age of faith," contrasting it favorably with the eighteenth century, which had so often dismissed the Middle Ages as a period of "barbarism and religion." As a matter of fact, however, these writers were greatly idealizing the Middle Ages, as they idealized everything else, and the epithet "age of faith" might be applied to their own day better than to the medieval period. In the nineteenth century men believed in all manner of things. They believed in freedom, in democracy, and in humanity; in science, in education, and in progress; in Christianity, in decency, and in God. The nineteenth century was a great century in the history of Christianity—perhaps the greatest of them all—as is shown by its many splendid expressions of the Christian spirit in social reform and missionary activity, in education, in theological study and speculation, in popular piety, and in high standards of personal conduct, both public and private. Few preceding centuries can show comparable achievements, and certainly not the thirteenth, with which the romantics were so infatuated.

This revival of religion was encouraged by the popular reaction against the excesses of the French Revolution. It became usual to attribute everything to Voltaire and the *philosophes*, who had attacked religion so unmercifully, and conservative people began to praise religion as a guardian of the social order. Moreover, the Roman Catholic Church had profited immensely from its tribulations during
the Revolution. Persecution had purged it of many unworthy officials, for opportunists and time-servers had hastened to join the "constitutional clergy" (see p. 166) and had quickly fallen into universal contempt, whereas the clergy who refused to take the oath, and suffered in consequence, gradually won the respect of serious persons. The abolition of ecclesiastical states in Germany had much the same effect, relieving the church of many bishops of the type made infamous by Talleyrand. Sensing a change in popular attitude, Napoleon signed the Concordat of 1801 with the pope, by which he recognized Catholicism as the religion of most Frenchmen, agreed to pay the salaries of the clergy, and granted the church a legal status in France.

Shortly after the signing of the Concordat there appeared a book that well expressed the new spirit. Its author, François-René de Chateaubriand (1768–1848), was a member of the minor nobility of Brittany. He had been an émigré during the greater part of the French Revolution, but he made peace with Napoleon in 1800. Four years later he went into exile again, however, and did not return to France until 1814. During the Restoration he held several high offices under the reactionary government, but the Revolution of 1830 drove him from political life. In 1801 he published Atala, a story praising the "Noble Red Man," and in the next year came René, a sentimental tale of a sad and disillusioned young man—doubtless Chateaubriand himself. His most important work, The Genius of Christianity, or the Beauties of the Christian Religion (1802), was an eloquent rather than a profound book, defending Christianity because of its services to humanity. It is not because Christianity is divine that it is excellent, he remarked, but it is divine because it is excellent. He then declared that of all the religions in the world it is the most poetic, the most humane, and the most favorable to liberty, to the arts, and to letters. Chateaubriand was a thorough reactionary, but at the same time other romanticists, such as Lamennais (see p. 361), were making serious attempts to reconcile Catholicism with democracy and progress.

The popular esteem for Catholicism was further raised by Pope Pius VII (1800–1823), who had had the honor of spending five years as Napoleon's prisoner. When he returned to Rome in 1814, Pius restored the Jesuit order (which had been dissolved in 1773), revived the Inquisition and the Index, and lent encouragement to the movement known as "ultramontanism." Literally, "ultramontanism"
is the doctrine of those seeking help from "beyond the mountains"—that is, from the pope in Italy, beyond the Alps from France or Germany—but the word is commonly applied to the program of all those who wish to exalt the power of the papacy over the Roman Catholic Church. The activities of Joseph II of Austria (see p. 85) and especially those of Napoleon had convinced many Catholics that their church could not fulfill its functions properly unless it was controlled by a strong central authority able to resist the demands of secular princes. Ultramontane views were popularized by Joseph de Maistre (1753–1821), whose book Du pape ("Concerning the Pope," 1819) started an agitation that grew steadily through the whole nineteenth century.

The Oxford Movement of the 1830's and 1840's was an equally significant manifestation of religious awakening in England. A mild toleration had become fashionable in England during the eighteenth century, but the Irish Rebellion of 1798 and the wars against Napoleon caused the Test Act to be enforced once more against Catholics. When the passions of war cooled, however, this severity declined, the Test Act was repealed (1828), and the Catholic Emancipation Act followed (1829, see p. 244). After the passage of the Reform Bill of 1832, liberals sometimes spoke of disestablishing the Anglican Church. Conservative clergymen took fright, and under the leadership of John Henry Newman (1801–1890) the Oxford reformers took up the challenge of liberalism. They said bitter things about the "Parliamentary Church," arguing that their church should not be regulated, but merely supported, by a parliament admitting Catholics and Non-conformists. They also derived aid and comfort from the romantic idealization of the medieval church. Newman himself began by idealizing the church of the fourth century, after which he endeavored to harmonize the doctrines of the Church of England with traditional Catholic theology. When the Anglican bishops con-
demned one of his tracts, he resigned his position at Oxford and presently entered the Roman Catholic Church (1845). Similar troubles arose in Scotland, where the Established Church (the "Kirk") adopted liberal policies and the conservatives seceded to form the Free Church (1843).

The Prussian king, Frederick William III (1797–1840), was a religious man whose natural piety was deepened under the influence of the mystical Alexander I of Russia. He celebrated the three hundredth anniversary of the Reformation (1817) by issuing a decree uniting the Lutheran and Calvinist churches in his realm, and during the next ten years several Protestant princes followed his example. The experiment was not a complete success, for many Lutherans withdrew from the Established Church to found Free Churches. Frederick William also dreamed, in a hazy sort of way, of uniting his new church with the Anglicans, and even with the Catholics, but his desultory efforts led to nothing. Under the influence of romantic enthusiasm for the medieval church, however, a number of German intellectuals were converted to Roman Catholicism, and Munich became an active center of Catholic thought.

More important than Frederick William's political maneuvers were the theories of the German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831), who was as important for romanticism as Immanuel Kant had been for the Enlightenment. Young Hegel had been inspired by the French Revolution, and though he presently turned against it, he continued all his life to talk about liberty. His elaborate theory as to the course and nature of the world's historical development traced the progress of liberty from the earliest times to his own day. In his opinion this progress resembled the swinging of a pendulum, first to one extreme and then to the other until it finally came to rest at the center. The tyranny of the Old Regime, for example, was followed by the tyranny of the Revolution, but eventually both made way for the middle course of the Restoration. Hegel thus reached the gratifying conclusion that true liberty was best found in the Prussian state of his day, where a strong government maintained order under law. As Hegel was a deeply religious man, brought up in the Protestant tradition and giving a religious tinge to all he said, German Protestants accepted many of his ideas. A few years later, however, Karl Marx revised these theories slightly, changed their religious emphasis, and deduced from them a materialistic interpretation of history.
Romantic Utopias

In view of the countless political problems raised and discussed during the French Revolution, and of the far-reaching social disturbances resulting from the Industrial Revolution, it is not surprising that romantically inclined persons often drew up plans for an ideal society, or that serious efforts were made to establish such societies, especially in the United States. Robert Owen’s experiment at New Harmony, Indiana (see p. 269), was followed by many others, some sponsored by native Americans and others by Europeans who had crossed the ocean expressly for the purpose. These utopias were often inspired by new religious beliefs coupled with the common ownership of property. Most of them were failures, though some were moderately successful for a time. Success or failure depended largely upon the skill and personality of the leader, who usually was a thorough dictator. Owen’s utopia at New Harmony (1825) lasted only three years; the Oneida Community, in central New York State (1848), was more permanent; and perhaps the most successful of all was Brigham Young’s Mormon colony (religious but noncommunistic) at Salt Lake City, Utah (1847).

While some utopians were thus trying to create perfect societies in backwoods America, others, especially in France, were content to set forth their ideas in books. One such writer was Henri, Comte de Saint-Simon (1760–1825). A member of the ancient nobility of France, he had fought as a young man under Washington in America, and during the French Revolution he had won and lost a fortune by speculating in confiscated church lands. Thereafter he devoted himself to meditating upon social questions. In a multitude of pamphlets and books he suggested a sweeping reorganization of society on the basis of universal philanthropy. His most important book, entitled The New Christianity (1825), proposed a “planned society,” in which the means of production would be owned by the state, the rewards of labor would be divided justly among the workers, and control would rest in the hands of a board of scientists and engineers, economists and captains of industry. Saint-Simon won a noteworthy following among intellectuals all over Europe, and during the 1850’s several former disciples rose to prominence in the political and economic life of France. Though sometimes included among the founders of socialism, he might more accurately be listed with Rousseau among the fathers of fascism.
Charles Fourier (1772–1837) was a dreamer of much the same type. As early as 1808 he published a book advocating the organization of small groups of people (about two thousand persons each) which he called “phalanxes.” All property should be held in common by these groups, with labor and rewards apportioned according to the famous formula, “From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs.” Fourier failed to make clear just who would decide as to a given individual’s abilities and needs. The individual himself, or a vote by the phalanx? Nevertheless, Fourier’s ideas were widely admired, and many attempts were made to found phalanxes. Among them was the Brook Farm, near Boston, in which several distinguished American writers participated in the 1840’s. Louis Blanc (1811–1882) was a French journalist who advocated the establishment of “social workshops” by the state to replace privately owned factories. These factories would be democratically managed by the workers, who would elect managers and share the profits. His attempts to found such workshops in 1848 have already been mentioned (p. 278).

A different line of thought was followed by Pierre Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865), whose enthusiasm for liberty was so great that he could not tolerate the controls planned for the phalanxes. Every man should be free to do as he pleased and should have whatever he produced by the sweat of his brow. Proudhon’s first book bore the striking title *What Is Property?* to which question his answer was crisp and clear: “Property is theft.” He proposed mutual societies of workers, which anyone could join or leave as he saw fit, and which would provide what little government such free men might require. Proudhon is considered the founder of modern anarchism.

These writers all were strongly anticlerical, partly perhaps because the throne and the altar lent each other such powerful support under the Restoration in France. There were other men, however, who were at once Catholics, social philosophers, and believers in democracy. One such man was the Abbé de Lamennais (1782–1854). As a young man he made a name for himself with his *Essay on Indifference regarding Religion* (1817), which was a fresh and stimulating defense of Christianity, liberty, and democracy. Soon after the July Days of 1830 he began publishing a newspaper, *L’Avenir* (“The Future”), whose motto was “God and Liberty.” Here he discussed social questions at length, urging the church to accept leadership in curbing the excesses of capitalism and in de-
fending the workers. Lamennais’s newspaper was condemned by the pope in 1832, and two years later his book, *Words of a Believer* (1834), met the same fate. The pope described this book as “small in size but immense in its perversity,” and Metternich was moved to write to his ambassador at the Vatican, “The practice of burning heretics and their books has been abandoned, which in this instance is a matter for regret.” Though Lamennais was not formally excommunicated, he withdrew from the church. He continued his writing and his political activity, however, until Napoleon III’s *coup d’état* of 1851.

At about the same time a few clergymen of the Church of England became interested in Chartism, which led them to new ideas about the proper function of the church. F. D. Maurice (1805–1872) published a book entitled *The Kingdom of Christ* (1842), in which he stressed the need for extensive social reform in England and urged that it be conducted under church auspices. He too was accused of heresy, but eventually he became a professor at Cambridge. Presently he and Charles Kingsley (1819–1875), a clergyman and the author of novels written along Chartist lines (*Alton Locke*, 1849), began calling themselves “Christian Socialists.” Like Lamennais, they were dreamers, and at first their success was slight, but before the end of the century ideas similar to theirs regarding “Social Christianity” were attracting attention throughout Europe and America.

*Romanticism and Art*

Classic ideals had dominated the arts during the period of the French Revolution and Napoleon. The numerous public buildings erected at that time usually followed the lines of Greek temples or other structures in antiquity. During the Restoration period, and especially after 1830, however, a “Gothic revival” began to make its appearance. A famous example of this revival may be seen in the completion of Cologne cathedral. The church had been started late in the thirteenth century, but the work progressed slowly after the initial enthusiasm had worn off and nothing at all was done after the Reformation. During the 1830’s, however, a group of romantic enthusiasts began agitating for its completion, and the building was finally dedicated in 1880. Meantime a Gothic parliament building had been erected in London (1840–1860), and a somewhat similar one at Budapest came a few years later. This Gothic revival was
greatly encouraged by Victor Hugo's novel *The Hunchback of Notre Dame* (1831) and by the writings of the British critic John Ruskin (1819–1900), especially his *Seven Lamps of Architecture* (1849).

The development of painting and sculpture followed similar lines. Classical ideals prevailed at the beginning of the century, but romanticism brought new feelings and new forms. The Spanish painter Francisco de Goya (1746–1828) was shaken from his classicism by the Napoleonic invasion of Spain, and his famous paintings of French atrocities helped arouse his countrymen against the invader. Romanticism came into its own, however, with the French painters Jean Baptiste Corot (1796–1875) and Jean François Millet (1814–1875). The former is famous for his dreamy and hazy landscapes, the latter for his depiction of peasant life. In the latter part of the
nineteenth century, reproductions of Millet’s “The Angelus” and “The Cleaners” decorated thousands of middle-class homes in Europe and America.

The romantics expressed themselves much more powerfully in music, where the Germans showed the way. Ludwig van Beethoven (1770–1827), though born in Germany, was of Flemish descent, and he passed the greater part of his life in Vienna. Though breaking away from the classical style in which he had been trained, he never became a true romantic, but he influenced the new school greatly. Like many young Germans of his generation, he favored the French Revolution at first, and for a while he admired Napoleon, but he was soon caught by the nationalistic enthusiasm of the liberation period. His progress in these years may be traced in his great symphonies: the Third (1804) honored Napoleon, the Fifth (1806) the wars against him, and the Seventh (1815) the Congress of Vienna and the peace. One of the greatest of musicians, Beethoven did for German music what Goethe did for German poetry. In fact, these two geniuses resembled each other in many ways, and their names are
often linked as best representing the German spirit of the age. Other German musicians, showing the romantic spirit in more fully developed form, were Franz Schubert (1797–1828) and Robert Schumann (1810–1856), famous for their songs, and Johann Strauss (1804–1849), the composer of well-known waltzes. Perhaps the most truly romantic of them all was Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy (1809–1847). At the same time Frédéric Chopin (1810–1849), half Polish and half French, was composing piano music and associating with the romantic poets and artists of the French capital.

These musicians composed chamber music, songs, and symphonies which have never been surpassed, and the romantic period also produced the opera. A few light operas had been composed by eighteenth-century masters, but only in the nineteenth century was this form perfected. A German composer, Karl Maria von Weber (1786–1826), is sometimes credited with creating the romantic opera, but it was developed principally in Italy by such masters as Gioachino Rossini (1792–1868—*The Barber of Seville*, 1816; *William
Tell, 1829), and Gaetano Donizetti (1797–1848—Lucia di Lammermoor, 1835; The Daughter of the Regiment, 1840). In the next generation light opera became grand opera in the hands of Giuseppe Verdi (1813–1901—Rigoletto, 1851; Aïda, 1871) and especially of Richard Wagner (1813–1883). In his youth Wagner had been interested in the romantics, and in 1848 he was an ardent revolutionist (as was Verdi in Italy), but as he grew older and received recognition in Germany, he became nationalistic and conservative. Early works such as Tannhäuser (1845) well express the romantic spirit; and even in later years the four great operas of the Ring of the Nibelungen (1848–1874), whose theme is derived from early Teutonic mythology, show that at heart Wagner still was a belated romantic.
20. THE NEW REALISM

After 1848 the romantic movement began to decline. Romantics and realists struggled with each other for twenty years, but by 1870 the latter had emerged victorious. In political life the men of blood and iron reigned supreme, and in intellectual matters the natural scientists carried everything before them. Victory fell to the scientists because their ideas seemed to possess a power and a certainty that were lacking to the airy dreams of the romantics. The scientific spirit was of course nothing new. Men have always possessed a little scientific knowledge, and we have already seen how the giants of the seventeenth century—Galileo, Boyle, Newton, and countless others—laid the foundations of modern science (p. 117). Their work was continued in the eighteenth century; even the French Revolution did not interrupt scientific research; and the early nineteenth century ushered in another brilliant period in the history of science.

Many of these scientists were merely continuing the work of their predecessors. Astronomers, for example, were working out details of the Newtonian astronomy. When speculating upon the origins of the solar system, they usually accepted the "nebular hypothesis," first formulated by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant about 1755 (p. 132) and perfected by the French mathematician Pierre de Laplace (1749–1827) in 1796. This theory taught that out of the primeval chaos arose an extremely hot gas which solidified as it cooled and formed the sun, the planets, and their moons. These heavenly bodies all moved in strict accordance with Newton's laws of matter and motion, as Laplace showed brilliantly in his Treatise on Celestial Mechanics (5 vols., 1799–1825). A striking proof of this contention came in 1846. Astronomers had been perplexed by the motions of the planet Uranus, the eighth and supposedly the outermost of those re-
volving around our sun. A French mathematician then suggested that these variations might be due to the gravitational pull of an unknown planet still farther from the sun. By carefully scanning the heavens at the spot indicated, a German astronomer discovered the planet which was named Neptune.

Scientists were especially active in the fields of physics and chemistry during the early years of the nineteenth century. Like the astronomers, the physicists built upon Newtonian foundations, but their studies of heat, light, gases, and especially those of electricity and magnetism, produced a wealth of new knowledge. By showing the equivalence of heat and energy, they supplemented Newton's laws of matter and motion with the "laws of thermodynamics," the first of which teaches that the total amount of energy in the universe is constant, though it changes from one form to another ("the conservation of energy"), while the second teaches that this energy is constantly diffusing itself from one body to another. Meantime chemists were studying the composition of matter, identifying new elements (by 1840 they had discovered thirty out of about one hundred), and learning to synthesize new substances in the laboratory. We need not list here the names of all the brilliant men who participated in this work, but mention must be made of John Dalton (1766–1844), an English schoolmaster who in 1808 formulated an "atomic theory" that dominated scientific thought throughout the nineteenth century. Ancient Greek philosophers had suggested that all material things—solids, liquids, gases—are made up of particles so tiny that they cannot be divided further, and Renaissance scientists had sometimes invoked this theory. Dalton gave it a new form, however, distinguishing atoms of the different chemical elements and showing that the atom of each element has a different weight. The atoms of different elements unite to form the molecules, some simple and some extremely complex, which make up all material substances. These atoms and molecules are much too small to be seen, even through the most powerful microscope, yet scientific investigators learned much about them. Only with the discovery of X-rays (1895), of radioactivity (1896), and of electrons (1897) did a fundamental revision of Dalton's theory become necessary.

Great as was the progress in physics and chemistry, that in the life sciences was greater, and these studies exerted a deeper influence upon the thought and imagination of people who were not trained scientists. When a German chemist succeeded in synthesizing a sub-
stance hitherto found only in living matter (1828), he did more than found the science of organic chemistry. He went far toward breaking down the partition supposedly separating living from lifeless matter and toward showing that living beings as well as lifeless ones are subject to the laws of nature. At the same time, other scientists were studying the physiology of plants, animals, and men, formulating the theory that all living matter is made up of tiny cells, investigating the use plants and animals make of carbon and nitrogen, and discovering the importance of microbes in causing disease. Anthropologists began a scientific study of the races of man, and in the second half of the century psychologists began probing the causes of human behavior. Most important of all, however, was the Darwinian theory of evolution, which intellectual leaders regarded as the supreme achievement of nineteenth-century science, comparable in its significance to the work of Sir Isaac Newton. We shall return to it shortly.

This great advance of natural science in the nineteenth century is to be attributed in part to the new industry, which raised new problems and called for new information. The earlier inventors had usually been craftsmen with little or no knowledge of science, but it soon became apparent that industry could put scientific knowledge to practical use, and after about 1860 a flood of inventions depending directly upon the new science introduced a new stage in the Industrial Revolution. The new knowledge of electricity was especially important. One of its early fruits was the electric telegraph, which came into wide use during the 1840's. A primitive dynamo, capable of generating electricity, was invented as early as 1831, but several years elapsed before practical models appeared. An electric motor was invented in 1860, and twenty-five years later such motors were widely used to drive machinery, streetcars, elevators, and other apparatus. Chemistry made especially valuable contributions to industry even at this time, though it really came into its own only in the twentieth century. Agriculture profited by the researches of Justus von Liebig (1803–1873) and others, who showed the possibilities of chemical fertilizers.

In no field was the progress of science more important than in medicine and public health. At the beginning of the century not much advance had been made in these areas since the late Renaissance, and today we are sometimes surprised that patients survived the treatments they received from doctors. The first important innovation
was vaccination for smallpox, introduced by Edward Jenner (1749–1823) in 1798, though he had no real understanding of how vaccination worked. In the 1840’s surgeons began using chloroform and ether as anesthetics, thus making possible more elaborate operations than a fully conscious patient could endure. But modern medicine really dates from the discovery, in the 1860’s, that many diseases are caused by microbes. Louis Pasteur (1822–1895) began his researches by studying bacteria as the cause of fermentation in wine, from which he progressed to infectious diseases. He developed ways of sterilizing wine and milk by “pasteurization,” and argued that if wounds were kept free of germs they would not fester. In 1867 an English surgeon, Joseph Lister (1827–1912), impressed by Pasteur’s findings, began using carbolic acid as a disinfectant, thereby greatly reducing the mortality that had hitherto accompanied surgery. A few years after this a German physician, Robert Koch (1843–1910), identified the bacillus of anthrax (1876) and later of several other diseases. Methods were then devised for treating them with vaccines, serums, or antitoxins. Pasteur and Koch thus placed medicine upon a solid scientific foundation.
While some enthusiasts were saying that "Science is Power," and pointing with pride to the scientists' successes in manipulating the forces of nature, others were declaring, with equal enthusiasm, that "Science is Truth." For many people, in fact, the two statements said the same thing, for to them whatever brought power was truth. Heaping scorn and ridicule upon the futile thinkers of an earlier day who had followed the "royal road of speculation," they extolled the "scientific method" and pointed to the scientists' "positive" achievements as evidence that they, and they alone, possessed the key to the truth. This high prestige of science may be explained in part, perhaps, by the mathematical certainty with which physicists and chemists seemed to invest their theories regarding the materialistic and mechanical nature of the universe. More important were their practical accomplishments, which were of a nature to impress the most superficial observer. And finally, the political events of the year 1870 were also a tremendous aid to these new evangelists. In Germany the victories of that year were followed by a great outburst of enthusiasm, in intellectual circles as everywhere else, and German victories were attributed—in part correctly—to German science. Surely a spirit that could work so mighty a miracle need show no further evidences of its power! In France, on the other hand, a leading writer (Zola) declared, "Today we need the strength of the truth, if we are to be glorious in the future as we have been in the past: it is by applying the scientific formula that our sons will some day regain Alsace and Lorraine." Science was thus proclaimed the guide of life, and the word "scientific" became synonymous with the word "true."

*Darwin and Evolution*

Though the doctrine of evolution is associated primarily with the name of Charles Darwin (1809–1882), there had been much speculation on the subject before the appearance of his *Origin of Species* in 1859. In the first half of the nineteenth century most biologists believed firmly in the immutability of species: after a species of plants or animals had once been created, it supposedly remained unchanged forever. Nevertheless, a few voices had been raised in protest against this doctrine. The French naturalist Buffon (1707–1788) had expressed his doubts; Darwin's own grandfather (Erasmus Darwin, 1731–1802) had anticipated several of his grandson's ideas; and above all, Jean Baptiste de Lamarck (1744–1829) had written at
length upon the changes undergone by plants and animals in adapting themselves to their environments. These changes, he argued, were passed on by heredity and new species were brought into being. Other biologists speculated along similar lines, and in the 1850's the idea that one species might evolve into another was, as we say, "in the air."

Scientific research in other fields was also important in preparing the way for Darwin. Curious persons had long been interested in the fossils and bones of extinct animals that were dug up from time to time, and scientists were gradually reducing them to chronological order. With the aid of these paleontologists, geologists tried to work out the history of the earth. Sir Charles Lyell (1797–1875) then published his *Principles of Geology* (1830), in which he declared that the earth's surface had undergone great changes during millions of years and that these changes had always been brought about by forces still operating upon it— the rising and sinking of land, the erosion of rivers, the eruption of volcanoes, and the like. Bringing forward great masses of evidence, Lyell convinced the scientific world of the high antiquity of the earth and thus gave the biologists ample time for the development of the countless species of animals and plants that now cover it.

Charles Darwin was born in 1809, the son of a physician, the grandson of Erasmus Darwin and, on his mother's side, of Josiah Wedgwood, the potter of Etruria (see p. 254). Only after listlessly studying medicine at Edinburgh and theology at Cambridge did he become interested in natural science. He then spent five years (1831–1836) on an exploring vessel, the *Beagle*, gathering information regarding the plants, animals, and geology of the islands of the South Pacific from South America to Australia. Returning to England, he set to work to arrange the materials he had collected, and in 1844 he wrote out (but did not publish) the main outlines of his theory of evolution. With truly laudable restraint he spent a further fifteen years criticizing his hypotheses and gathering further materials. He probable would have waited still longer had he not received the manuscript of a paper by A. R. Wallace (1823–1913) expressing similar opinions about evolution (1858). Darwin at once presented Wallace's paper and his own essay of 1844 to a learned society, and a year later he published his great book.

The full title of this book, *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or, The Preservation of Favoured Races in the*
Struggle for Life, states the essence of Darwin's theory. Even when
a naturalist aboard the Beagle, he had been impressed by the wide
variations sometimes shown by different members of the same species,
and by the geographical distribution of these variant forms, but he
made no effort to explain their origin: he merely accepted them as
a part of nature. After his return to England he read (1838) the
Essay on Population in which Thomas Malthus (see p. 265) empha-
sized the constant pressure of population upon food supply. This
book suggested to Darwin that slight variations would often give
their possessors a great advantage in the struggle for food, enabling
them to survive and propagate while their less fortunate rivals suc-
cumbed. Calling this process "natural selection," Darwin undertook
to explain the rise of new species from chance variations, the strug-
gle for life, and natural selection. He thus became convinced that
all species of living beings sprang from one original form of life. (It
is interesting to note that Wallace was independently led to the same
conclusion by reading Malthus's book.) The Origin of Species said
little that was specific about the origin of mankind, but in a later
volume, The Descent of Man (1871), Darwin carried his ideas to
their logical conclusion, clearly making man a part of the animal
world and associating our remote ancestors with those of the anthro-
poid apes.
The publication of *The Origin of Species* of course created a great commotion, and the book was soon translated into the major European languages. Competent scientists, able to follow Darwin’s arguments and judge his evidence, accepted his theories almost at once. Countless laymen were equally receptive to the new ideas, but conservative persons were greatly disturbed by the implications of the new doctrine. The next several years therefore saw much bitter controversy, with leadership in the popular defense of Darwinism falling especially to T. H. Huxley (1825–1895). An important scientist in his own right and concerning himself especially with fossils, Huxley was also a man of high literary ability and a master controversialist, as shown by the essays collected in his book *Man’s Place in Nature* (1863). Darwin’s intimate friend, the geologist Sir Charles Lyell, accepted the new doctrine in his book *The Antiquity of Man* (1863). In Germany a young biologist named Ernst Haeckel (1834–1919) took up the defense of Darwinism with equal zeal; hosts of defenders appeared in other countries; and it may be said that before the end of the nineteenth century most educated persons had accepted the new doctrine.

Nevertheless, biologists studying heredity presently began to criticize some of Darwin’s presuppositions. An Austrian monk named Gregor Mendel (1822–1884) experimented with peas, from which he deduced various conclusions known as “Mendel’s laws of inheritance.” His findings attracted no attention at the time they were published (1865), but when they were rediscovered about 1900 they forced the revision of several details in the Darwinian theory. It was shown that characteristics which individuals acquire after birth are not transmitted to their descendants and that chance variations are not so important as Darwin believed. Other biologists maintained that Darwin laid too much emphasis upon natural selection. But these were only matters of detail. No serious biologist today questions Darwin’s fundamental contention of the variation of species or doubts man’s animal ancestry.

Trained scientists accepted Darwin’s theory because of the formidable mass of evidence with which he backed it up, but laymen often accepted it for less scientific reasons. Coming after the years of doubt and pessimism that followed 1848, the new doctrine was one of cheer. Many persons considered biological evolution important largely because it provided the supreme illustration and proof of the “progress” which eighteenth-century *philosophes* had proclaimed so
enthusiastically. The English philosopher Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) developed these aspects of the doctrine, and while he can scarcely be called a deep thinker, he did much to popularize the theory of evolution. He invented the phrase “survival of the fittest,” which of course was profoundly flattering to the survivors, and, like Darwin’s phrase “the struggle for life,” it made evolution seem true to men whose political leaders were constantly invoking “blood and iron.” The new doctrine thus came to bear emotional overtones that were quite unscientific, and quite foreign to the thought of Darwin himself, but which made all those who questioned it seem to be not only ignorant enemies of the truth but perverse enemies of “progress” as well. Infallible science thus seemed to provide new and firmer foundations for a new hope and a new idealism.

**SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY**

The popular interest in natural science that spread over western Europe after 1850, and the widely held belief that the scientist held the key to the truth, inevitably exercised far-reaching effects upon the religious thought of the day. When physicists taught that the entire universe is governed by natural law, they left no place for miracles or other forms of divine intervention, and when evolutionists classified man with the lower animals, they robbed him of the unique position in the universe which he enjoyed under traditional Christian theology. Men were consequently much disturbed by the new doctrines and grimly took sides in a general “warfare of science with theology.” (This phrase is the title of a pamphlet [1870], later expanded into a two-volume book [1896], by Andrew D. White, the first president of Cornell University.) In this great controversy the scientists were often supported by anticlericals who opposed the church on political or other grounds (see p. 166), and whose intemperate aid sometimes caused the scientists no little embarrassment. It is important to note, however, that while the scientists rejected miracles and the Biblical story of creation, they rarely questioned the moral teachings of Christianity. In regard to such matters as the existence of God and the immortality of the soul they usually called themselves “agnostics,” using a word coined by Huxley to indicate that they did not know, because they lacked conclusive evidence. Herbert Spencer declared that evolution implied some sort of divine guidance, but he spoke of this guiding power as the “Unknowable.”
Other churchmen were equally disconcerted by Biblical criticism. The critics were divided into two classes, the “lower critics,” who sought to determine exactly what the Biblical writers had said (which is no easy task when dealing with writers living many centuries before the invention of printing), and the “higher critics,” who subjected the Biblical text to the routine tests that scholars apply to all historical documents, asking who the author was, where he got his information, how reliable it was, how accurately he reported it, and so forth. The lower critics occasionally caused dismay by showing that a favorite text was not found in the best manuscripts, but the higher critics became much more destructive of traditional beliefs by questioning the commonly assumed authorship of Biblical books and by showing the frailty of the evidence for many alleged events. In 1872 an English Assyriologist, George Smith (1840–1876), discovered a Babylonian version of the flood story which resembled the Biblical version so closely that there could be little doubt that the Hebrew account was based on the Babylonian myth. During the next few years many similar parallels were found to other stories in the Old Testament.

As long as the higher critics limited their attention to the Old Testament, many devout Christians were not deeply concerned, but when they turned their attention to the New Testament, and especially the Gospels, controversy at once grew hot. Perhaps the most famous of the higher critics of the mid-nineteenth century was the French scholar Ernest Renan (1823–1892). Though educated for the Catholic clergy, Renan left the church without being ordained, and presently he became professor of Hebrew at the Collège de France. Two years later he published his famous Life of Jesus (1863). His brushing aside of miracles and his calm assumption of the simple humanity of Jesus aroused such scandal that within a year the attacks, criticisms, and refutations he provoked numbered almost one hundred, not including countless articles in newspapers and magazines. The Emperor Napoleon III, when called upon to intervene, dismissed Renan from his professorship—to the emperor’s ultimate sorrow (see p. 301). Nevertheless, Renan’s book enjoyed a tremendous success, it was translated into many languages, and Renan became one of the most highly esteemed men in France.

As Europeans were by this time becoming familiar with the great religions of Asia, scholars attempted to compare these religions with Christianity in an objective way, hoping by this method to
learn exactly what religion is. A prominent writer of this sort was F. Max Müller (1823–1900). The son of a well-known poet of the German romantic movement, he studied oriental languages in Germany but settled in England, where he was employed for a time by the East India Company and later became a professor at Oxford. He is famous for his studies of the religions and mythology of India and for the Sacred Books of the East (1875 ff.), in which, in fifty-one large volumes, he and several colleagues published scholarly translations of most of the religious classics of Asia. A most stimulating thinker, Max Müller’s influence was felt over all of western Europe, and he ranks high among the founders of the modern science of comparative religion.

The scholars mentioned in the preceding paragraphs were usually devout men, little inclined to swashbuckling attacks upon Christianity.
after the manner of Voltaire or Tom Paine. They were deeply disturbed by the differences between the teachings of the natural scientists and those of the theologians, and they sincerely sought to reconcile religion with science. Other writers were less restrained, however, and held up traditional beliefs to sarcasm and ridicule. Only one such writer need be mentioned here. Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) was the son of a Lutheran pastor in Saxony, and for a few years a professor of Greek. After ill health had forced him to retire (1879), he spent ten years writing his books and fretting because they did not receive wide recognition, and after breaking down completely in 1889 he passed his last years in mental darkness.
As a young man he had been a disciple of Schopenhauer and a friend of Wagner, but after 1870 he turned to new paths, publishing vitriolic attacks upon his contemporaries in the name of the new evolution. He sneered at Spencer’s philosophy, and he called Cobden’s liberalism a traveling salesman’s conception of heaven. He denounced all efforts to alleviate the condition of the poor and unfortunate as tending to perpetuate weaklings who had been worsted in the struggle for existence. He was especially venomous in his attacks upon Christianity, and through his books there runs the refrain “God is dead.” The especial butt of his hatred was Christian morality, which, because of its “otherworldliness” and its emphasis upon such virtues as compassion and pity, he denounced as a “slave morality” unworthy of a free man.

All this was the negative side of Nietzsche’s philosophy. Though he had learned much from the realistic thinkers who preceded him, he really was one of the great romantics, and it was this romantic nature that enabled him to see new possibilities in the Darwinian theory. His contemporaries—both in Germany and elsewhere—usually were so well satisfied with themselves that they could conceive of no further progress, save perhaps in mechanical gadgets adding to their bodily comfort. Nietzsche was filled with scorn for such people, who sought only their “miserable ease”—or, as he put it in another striking passage, whose sole ambition in life was sleep. From the new doctrine of evolution he drew the conclusion that, just as men represent an evolution from “lower” forms of life, so after them there must appear a different and still “higher” form, the “superman.” The constant burden of his message was that we should make this future man truly a better one. From this idea came his hatred of the traditional beliefs and moral theories which, in his view, held men back; from it came his admiration for courage, perseverance, and strength, and for the “will to conquer,” as well as his contempt for smugness, softness, and pity; and from it came his enthusiasm for Life. In the long run, insisted Nietzsche, only those things are good which “serve Life.”

The Churches

During these years of controversy the Roman Catholic Church was ruled by two very able popes, Pius IX (1846–1878) and Leo XIII (1878–1903). When Pius entered office, he expressed a certain sym-
pathy with political liberalism, but he was thoroughly disillusioned by his harrowing experiences during the Revolution of 1848 (see p. 289). Encouraged by the ultramontanists, and especially by the Jesuits, he turned against every form of liberalism, and in 1864 he issued a "Syllabus of Errors," listing eighty doctrines which he condemned. Among them were the liberal teachings regarding religious toleration, secular education, the separation of church and state, the abrogation of the temporal power of the papacy, as well as rationalism and the denial of prophecies and miracles. The last, and possibly the gravest, of the errors listed in the Syllabus was the idea "that the Roman Pontiff can, and ought to, reconcile himself to, and agree with, progress, liberalism, and modern civilization." Not all Catholics were pleased with this pronouncement, and liberals of all faiths attacked it bitterly, but their attention was soon diverted by the far more momentous promulgation of the doctrine of papal infallibility in 1870.

Throughout the nineteenth century papal authority and prestige advanced steadily, and ultramontanists frequently urged that the pope be declared infallible. To settle the matter Pius summoned an ecumenical church council—the first and only one since the famous Council of Trent (1545–1563; see Vol. One, p. 707). The bishops assembled in December, 1869, and the important decree was passed on July 18, 1870. By it the council declared that the pope, when officially defining doctrines of faith and morals to be held by the entire church, is endowed with infallibility, and that his decisions are therefore "immutable and independent of the consent of the Church."

The popes made no use of their new power until 1950 (when Pius XII proclaimed the Assumption of the Virgin), but the decision of the council at once produced widespread consternation among both theologians and statesmen. About a quarter of the bishops attending the Vatican Council had voted against promulgation at an early session, and at the close of the council many Catholics—especially in Germany—withdraw to form a separate "Old Catholic" Church which still exists. The Austrian emperor repudiated a concordat signed with the church fifteen years before; Bismarck presently opened his Kulturkampf against the church; Gladstone saw fit to publish a pamphlet denouncing the doctrine; and French anticlericals became more aggressive than ever. It happened that the decree was voted just three days after Napoleon III declared war on Prussia, and the French
Third Republic was proclaimed six weeks later: anticlericalism then became a settled policy of the Republic. As soon as the war started, Napoleon withdrew his troops from Rome, and Garibaldi entered the city, thereby committing the new Italian state to a policy of anticlericalism. All these statesmen justified their conduct in part by attacking the pope's pretensions to infallibility. It was not mere chance, however, that led Catholics to proclaim papal infallibility in the very year that nationalists completed the unification of Germany and Italy, with statesmen everywhere proclaiming the infallibility of the sword and writers the infallibility of the scientific method. Each of these three proclamations replied in its own way to the popular longing for strength and certainty that had haunted Europe for so many years.

One other event in Pius's pontificate should be mentioned as illustrating an important aspect of the intellectual life of the day. In 1854 he proclaimed the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary, declaring that she was born without the taint of original sin. (Contrary to a common belief, this dogma has nothing to do with the virgin birth of Jesus.) This doctrine had long been taught by the Jesuits and others, and its promulgation was evidence of an increasing veneration for the Virgin that was sweeping over the church. Four years later a peasant girl at Lourdes, a small town in southern France, declared that she had seen the Virgin, who indicated to her that the waters of a spring in a small grotto possessed miraculous healing powers. Before the end of the century a shrine to the Virgin erected beside the grotto had become one of the principal centers of pilgrimage in Europe, visited annually by upward of half a million persons.

Leo XIII was in many ways a striking contrast to Pius IX, though in philosophy and in church doctrine the two men saw eye to eye, and though Leo, like Pius, remained a "prisoner in the Vatican" throughout his long pontificate. A man of broad interests, Leo was primarily a diplomat and a scholar. His skill at diplomacy enabled him to establish better relations with the various statesmen whom Pius had offended, and his intellectual tastes caused him to insist upon better theological, literary, and scientific training for the clergy. While Pius had simply condemned modern liberal ideas, Leo endeavored to provide a substitute by reviving the scholastic philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274; see Vol. One, p. 571) and "Neo-
Thomism" presently became a popular philosophy in Catholic circles. Leo was also famous for the encyclicals (letters to all the bishops, laying down policy) in which he discussed not only such narrowly religious subjects as Christian marriage, the Bible, and the unity of the church but also larger topics such as liberty, the proper constitution of states, education, and the state of the working classes.

In the Protestant churches, popular controversy over evolution and the higher criticism was more open and more widespread, perhaps because many of these churches were more flexibly organized than the Catholic Church and gave the laity a greater voice in determining creed and policy. There was also the ancient Protestant insistence that regarding such matters every Christian must make up his own mind. When a few eminent Anglican bishops, who knew little or nothing of science, publicly contradicted the scientists, or attempted to disprove evolution by ridicule, Huxley and his colleagues quickly made their folly manifest to all. Controversy raged inside the churches for many years, however, with the liberals gradually converting the conservatives in the major denominations. The line followed by many liberal Protestants at this time is well illustrated by the titles of two widely read books by a Scottish theologian, Henry Drummond (1851–1897): *Natural Law in the Spiritual World* (1883) and, more especially, *The Ascent of Man* (1894).

In spite of these bitter controversies and the open apostasy of many members, both Catholic and Protestant churches showed greater vigor than for a long time past. The nineteenth century, for example, has been called "the great century" in the history of Christian missions. The early Protestants had not concerned themselves greatly with foreign missions, and while St. Francis Xavier and many other Catholic missionaries of the Counter-Reformation period had been amazingly active and successful, this missionary ardor cooled perceptibly during the eighteenth century. At this very time, however, the English evangelicals, under the inspiration of John Wesley, were arousing a new missionary enthusiasm which bore rich fruit in the nineteenth century. Catholic zeal also revived, and thousands of missionaries, Catholic and Protestant, went out to every part of the world. The number of conversions was small when compared with the total population of Asia and Africa, but we shall presently see (p. 469) that the missionaries' influence extended far beyond the circle of their avowed converts.
THE SCIENCE OF SOCIETY

The *philosophes* of the eighteenth century had sometimes elaborated what they considered "rational" theories on how society is organized and ought to operate (see p. 135), and during and after the French Revolution romantics dreamed up beautiful utopias which they occasionally tried to establish in America (see p. 443). In the second half of the nineteenth century, however, thinkers wished to be more "scientific" in their speculations about society. They collected statistics and made rather careful studies of how societies actually operate. Their studies convinced them that men act in remarkably uniform ways, and suggested that social institutions were as much subject to natural law as were the phenomena of physics and chemistry. A society seemed to be a mechanical organism for which blueprints could be drawn. Persons interested in such studies began calling their science "sociology" ("the science of society") and they called themselves "sociologists."

The French writer Auguste Comte (1798–1857) claimed to be the inventor of sociology—or, at least, of the word. As a young man he had been an ardent disciple of Saint-Simon (see p. 360), and later he became interested in the philosophical implications of the physical sciences. He concocted an elaborate system of philosophy, which he called "positivism" and which he believed to be absolutely scientific. In his *Course of Positive Philosophy* (1830–1842) he arranged all the sciences in the form of a pyramid, placing mathematics at the bottom, and rose step by step through astronomy, physics, chemistry, and biology, until he finally reached sociology at the very top. As each science rested upon those below it, sociology was the queen of all. Comte looked forward to a time when the whole world would be ruled by an all-powerful dictator equipped with a complete knowledge of scientific sociology and a positivistic philosophy, and in his last years he fondly hoped that Napoleon III would prove to be the man whom he had been seeking. Comte also devised a universal "Religion of Humanity," which taught "scientific" ethics and natural science in the place of theological dogma but which retained much of the ritual and organization of the Catholic Church. Needless to say, this new religion did not win wide popular acceptance, even though its author expressed the aspirations of many of the intellectual leaders of his day.
Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) has already been mentioned as a popularizer of Darwinism (see p. 375). His voluminous writings also included several works in which he approached social problems from an evolutionary and scientific point of view. Being less abstract and rationalistic than Comte, Spencer brought sociology down to earth, but he made it a servant of political and economic liberalism. He became the foremost spokesman of “social Darwinism”—a doctrine declaring that since nature promoted “progress” by eliminating the weaklings and allowing only the “fittest” to survive, all laws protecting the weak at the expense of the strong are contrary to nature and will be disastrous to the human race. Such precepts were of course most gratifying to successful members of the upper classes, but, like most early sociology, Spencer’s teachings were fanciful rather than scientific.

Another attempt to invoke biological science to explain the workings of society was made by a French aristocrat, the Comte de Gobineau (1816–1882). His Essay on the Inequality of Human Races (1854) put forward elaborate arguments to prove that members of the tall, blond, blue-eyed Nordic race are vastly superior to all other men. Modern anthropologists express a low opinion of this theory (see Vol. One, p. 31), but Gobineau’s book laid the foundation for the “racist” doctrines that received such terrifying expression under Hitler’s Third Reich.

At the same time historians were making valiant efforts to explain society from history and to formulate materialistic interpretations of history. Thus Thomas Henry Buckle (1821–1862) declared that the life and culture of primitive peoples are determined wholly by such physical conditions as climate, soil, food, and the like—Montesquieu had said the same thing more than a hundred years before (see p. 136)—but that in more advanced societies they depend largely upon intellectual factors, including knowledge of natural science. His two-volume History of Civilization in England (1857–1861), curiously enough, says nothing about English history, for Buckle died after he had completed a brilliant introduction and a preliminary section in which he contrasted Spanish and Scottish history. The book was ignored or received with contempt by professional historians, but it was written in a lively and thought-provoking style, and it influenced the thinking of many people.

As was inevitable in this day of fervent nationalism, historians often wrote highly nationalistic histories to set forth the glories of
their respective peoples, but learning and literary skill sometimes raised such writers above the level of mere chauvinists. This sort of history may be seen, for example, in the twelve-volume _History of England_ (1856–1870) by James Anthony Froude (1818–1894). Froude’s brother, Hurrell Froude, had been a close associate of J. H. Newman in the Oxford Movement, and he was influenced by it himself when an undergraduate at Oxford. Newman’s conversion to Catholicism caused Froude to lose interest, however, and he withdrew from Oxford. After forming a close friendship with Carlyle, he substituted a high patriotism for his former High Anglicanism. His _History_, which deals primarily with the period of the Reformation, makes religion largely a matter of patriotism. Several years later the German historian Heinrich von Treitschke (1834–1896), author of an important _History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century_ (5 vols., 1879–1894), went even farther in his enthusiastic “idolatry of the national state.”

In spite of these extremists, the more sober historians of the day followed Ranke’s footsteps and strove to tell history “as it really happened.” Many spent their time editing ancient documents and writing learnedly on subjects which could hardly be distorted by their private prejudices. The leading historical scholar of the second half of the century was the German Theodor Mommsen (1817–1903), who during his long career produced works of both sorts. As a young romantic, his enthusiasm for the Revolution of 1848 caused him to be exiled to Switzerland, where he wrote a brilliant three-volume _History of Rome_ (1854–1856). This book was permeated with the ideas of a disillusioned “48’er,” and he hailed Caesar as the “perfect man”—the strong man who brought to pass what dreamy idealists never could have accomplished. When Mommsen outgrew his pessimism, however, he became rather ashamed of this youthful effort. He spent his time thereafter publishing Latin inscriptions and writing solid treatises on Roman legal institutions. It has been said that no one will ever write on Roman history again without being indebted to Mommsen for something.

The political controversies raging in England at this time inspired much historical writing. Historians declared that “history is past politics,” and created what has been called the “Whig school of historians.” Famous among its members were E. A. Freeman (1823–1892), the historian of the Norman Conquest; William Stubbs (1825–1901), author of a _Constitutional History of England_ (3 vols., 1874–
1878); and Lord Acton (1834-1902), intimate friend and adviser of Gladstone and professor at Cambridge. John Richard Green (1837-1883) was not so great a scholar as these others, but his Short History of the English People (1874) won wide popularity in England and America. Written in the spirit of Gladstonian liberalism, the book was a manifesto as well as a history. The significant word in its title was the last, for Green insisted that he wrote the history, not of the English kings or of the English state, but of the "people" of England.

One further effort to reduce the study of society to an exact science must be mentioned before we conclude our account of the generation that followed the Revolution of 1848. In the early months of that famous year two young Germans, Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895), were temporarily resident in Brussels, having been expelled by the police from Prussia and later from Paris. After studying history and philosophy at Berlin, Marx had become a radical journalist at Cologne. Engels was the poetic son of a rich cotton spinner owning factories at Manchester and in Germany. During their stay in Paris the two men had associated with radical thinkers, learning much from them and quarreling with most of them. Engels had also known Owenites and Chartists in England. The two young men presently came to see a glorious vision of the workers—or, as they said, the "proletarians"—suddenly arising, breaking their chains, taking over all the tools of industry, and ruling the world. This vision they set forth in a pamphlet entitled The Communist Manifesto, which they published in February, 1848, only a few days before the uprising in Paris. Its authors, who took no active part in the revolution, presently fled to England, where they spent the rest of their days as exiles. Occasionally Marx earned a little money as a journalist, but usually he and his large family lived at Engels' expense.

During his long sojourn in London Marx amplified the views summarized in the Communist Manifesto and gave them final expression in a large work entitled Das Kapital (1867). Underlying all the reasoning of the Manifesto was the principle that all history has been guided by economic forces and especially by the struggles of economic classes—of the exploited against the exploiter, slave against master, serf against lord, worker against capitalist. Marx's study of capitalism convinced him that the ownership of all capital, including the tools of production, would soon be concentrated in the hands of a few rich men, after which the workers, who would include everybody
else, could easily take over. They would then establish a “classless” society that would last forever because based on justice. Ridiculing the wishy-washy idealism of such “utopians” as Saint-Simon and Proudhon, he believed that his own views were rigidly “scientific” and that the impersonal working of economic forces would inevitably
bring his revolution. Marx went through life believing that the great revolution was just around the corner, but his only advice for the present was, "Workingmen of the world, unite!" These ideas have since become the intellectual foundation of the socialist movement, but the economic interpretation of history has been accepted as partly true by many students who reject Marx's peculiar version of it and who certainly hold no brief for communism.

REALISM IN LITERATURE

In the history of the fine arts, the second half of the nineteenth century was not a remarkable period. Though there was an enormous amount of building, architects usually followed classic or Gothic models, and only at the end of the century did they begin to realize the possibilities of steel construction or to introduce other new materials. Countless public art galleries and rich collectors created new markets for sculptors and painters, whose works have not always been regarded highly by later critics. Among the sculptors Auguste Rodin (1840–1917) stands out above the others; and among the painters there were the "impressionists" such as Edgar Degas (1834–1917) and Auguste Renoir (1841–1919), and such "postimpressionists" as Paul Cézanne (1839–1906), Paul Gauguin (1848–1903), and Vincent Van Gogh (1853–1890). In harmony with the spirit of the day, these men called themselves "realists," meaning that they rejected the idealizations of their romantic predecessors and tried to paint the world as it really was. Richard Wagner (1813–1883) still dominated the musical world with his operas, and his admirers felt that now there was nothing left for musicians to create.

The realism of the times also made poetry difficult, and except in England very little poetry of a superior sort was written. Alfred, Lord Tennyson (1809–1892) was named Wordsworth's successor as poet laureate in 1850. As a youth he had shared the romantic dreams of the day, as shown in his "Ulysses" and "Locksley Hall" (1842), but his "In Memoriam" (1850) exemplified the doubt and pessimism that were then sweeping Europe. "Our little systems have their day," he sang, "they have their day and cease to be." In "The Idylls of the King," begun in 1859 but not completed until 1885, he attempted to create a national epic based on legends of King Arthur. Better than any other writer Tennyson here set forth the finer ideals of the mid-Victorian age. Robert Browning (1812–1889) began as a romantic
admirer of Shelley, but later he became obscurely philosophical. Matthew Arnold (1822–1888) expressed the religious doubts of the mid-century, and in his essays he waged war against the “Philistines” —that is, the uneducated and boorish members of the middle class whose newly acquired wealth encouraged them to advertise their contempt for “culture.” On a less loftily intellectual plane, yet typical of this age of skepticism and materialism, was the famous Rubáiyát of the Persian poet, Omar Khayyám (c. 1125), as freely translated by Tennyson’s friend Edward FitzGerald (1809–1883). Though the translation appeared in 1859, it received little notice for a while, but when “discovered” some ten years later it won wide popularity. Its high poetic qualities, its glowing praise of wine and song, its insistence upon the transitoriness of life, and its skepticism regarding all idealistic values, awakened a lively response in the hearts of many who were by no means utter “Philistines.”

Novels were a far more popular form of literature with the great new reading public that appeared at this time. There were many kinds of novels, of course, to suit the varied tastes of the many readers. Some were “penny dreadfuls,” others were designed to entertain better-educated readers, but the authors who had the most to say were likely to be social reformers, criticizing the society in which they lived and realistically depicting its unpleasant features in order to make their points. Charles Dickens (1812–1870) was a novelist of the latter sort. Born in humble circumstance himself, he excelled in describing the life of the lower middle class in London, and his earlier novels included propaganda for reform. He thus attacked debtors’ prisons in Pickwick Papers (1837), the workhouses in Oliver Twist (1839), and the law’s delays in Bleak House (1853). William Makepeace Thackeray (1811–1863), on the other hand, belonged to the educated upper middle class, and in his novels he lightly satirized the rich society of his day, notably in Vanity Fair (1848). The third of the classic novelists of the mid-Victorian era was a woman who wrote under the pen name George Eliot (1819–1880). The daughter of a country clergyman, she remained a moralist all her life, but she shared the radical opinions of her day. Several of her novels, such as Adam Bede (1859), Silas Marner (1861), and Felix Holt the Radical (1866), give vivid pictures of how the new industry upset the life of the English countryside. The nineteenth-century vogue for “realism” showed itself more strongly in the writers of the next generation, notably in Thomas Hardy (1840–1928). His
preoccupation with the more sordid side of life led one critic to characterize him, unkindly but not unjustly, as "the village atheist shaking his head over the village idiot."

The French novelist Victor Hugo (1802–1885) began his career as a romantic (see p. 353), and in 1848 he declared himself a socialist. Exiled by Napoleon III, he fled to the island of Guernsey (a British possession off the coast of France) and there he wrote his masterpiece, *Les Misérables* (1862). This huge novel presents a panoramic picture of life in France under the Restoration and in the early days of the July Monarchy. The book made its author one of the heroes of the Third Republic, and the most popular writer in France.

The French novelists of the next generation were mostly "realists," with Gustave Flaubert (1821–1880) as their leader. *Madame Bovary* (1857), the story of a restless woman in a small provincial town, is his most realistic novel. His protégé, Guy de Maupassant (1850–1893), continued the tradition in about two hundred short stories, but Émile Zola (1840–1902) was the most realistic of them all. Starting life as an eloquent champion of science and the scientific spirit, Zola spent his middle years composing a series of some twenty novels which he called the "natural history" of a family under the Second Empire.

The outstanding dramatist of the realist school was the Norwegian Henrik Ibsen (1828–1906). His earlier poems and plays gave no evidence that Ibsen was at heart a social reformer, but in the later 1870's and the 1880's he produced a series of "social dramas" that made his name known throughout Europe. He presented no panaceas but was content with stripping away the hypocrisies of the middle-class society of his day—as in *The Pillars of Society* (1877) and *A Doll's House* (1879).
RUSSIA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

THE AUTOCRACY AND THE GREAT REFORMS—RUSSIA IN TRANSITION
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21. THE AUTOCRACY AND THE GREAT REFORMS

Though geographers label everything west of the Ural Mountains “Europe,” the historian of civilization cannot accept this classification as final. Throughout history the political and cultural life of Russia has differed profoundly from that of western Europe, and in the nineteenth century Russia was not just a “backward” European country—as many Westerners patronizingly assumed—but an entirely different one, developing her own cultural traditions along her own lines. In earlier chapters of this book we have seen that the cultural heritage of western Europe descended from Rome, Catholic Christianity, and the Germans, but that Russia inherited a very different legacy from the Slavs, the Tatars, the Greek Orthodox Church, and Byzantium (see Vol. One, p. 336). Not until the days of Peter the Great (1689–1725) did the Russians imitate western Europe extensively, and though the government and the aristocracy then adopted many Western techniques and practices, these superficial innovations did not deeply influence the traditional Russian way of life. The great mass of the Russian people knew nothing of Europe, and even the educated aristocrats and officials, who read French books and hired efficient Germans to manage their estates, continued to regard their ancestral culture as different from, and far superior to, anything that could be found in the West. They always distinguished sharply between “Russia” and “Europe.”

Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Russia’s population, like that of western Europe, was increasing rapidly, and the results were somewhat the same as in Europe. At the death of Peter the Great (1725) the total population of the country probably did not exceed 13 million persons; seventy-five years later it had risen to
about 40 million, partly because of the incorporation of newly conquered territories but to a greater extent because of natural increase; and the same territories contained almost 70 million persons in 1850, about 130 million in 1900, and nearly 200 million in 1950. The tremendous energy of the Russian people, indicated by these figures, manifested itself in other ways as well. Migration eastward across the Urals into Siberia began in a small way in the days of Peter the Great and continued at an ever accelerating rate thereafter. During the eighteenth century approximately as many persons entered Siberia from Russia as entered England’s North American colonies from the British Isles; before the end of the nineteenth century the number of Russian emigrants to Siberia amounted to more than 100,000 a year; and during the hundred years ending in 1914 some seven million Russians found new homes there. The pressure of population also forced new economic developments. In Peter’s day Russia’s economic life was almost wholly agricultural, with her agriculture still extremely primitive. During the next hundred years, however, towns grew up, trade and industry were established on firm foundations, and improved agricultural methods enabled Russia to feed this augmented population and even provided a surplus for export to Europe.

The eighteenth century also saw the beginning of that great urge toward territorial expansion which has dominated Russian foreign policy from that day to this. After his predecessors had brought most of the provinces inhabited by true Russians (not including Ukrainians and “White Russians”) under the rule of Moscow, Peter began the conquest of neighboring states. During the next hundred years the tsars drove the Turks from the northern shores of the Black Sea and acquired extensive territories at the expense of Sweden and Poland, but by 1815 this phase of their expansion was finished—at least for the time being. Russian expansionists then turned their attention to the Balkan Peninsula and Asia, where they forged ahead steadily throughout the nineteenth century.

The early tsars had inherited Byzantine conceptions of autocratic rule, which they applied with great ruthlessness. Peter’s reforms further magnified the position of the autocrat, and he extended the power of the central government by placing imperial officials in charge of many tasks formerly left to the local aristocracy. This centralizing process was continued by Peter’s successors, notably by Catherine II (1762–1796), but it aroused discontent in many parts of
Russia. From time to time peasants revolted, and disgruntled aristocrats sometimes invoked the ideas of the French *philosophes* to justify their complaints, but others sought relief by the more traditional Russo-Byzantine methods of conspiracy and assassination. At the time of Catherine’s death such a group of conspirators was plotting to replace her with her son Paul, and she in turn was planning to disinherit him. He was saved by her sudden death, but after a tyrannical reign of four and a half years (1796–1801) he was murdered by other conspirators, and his son, Alexander I (1801–1825), ascended the throne of Russia.

**STRENGTHENING THE AUTOCRACY**

Many people expected that the young Alexander would reform Russia in a new spirit, bringing it into closer harmony with liberal western European traditions. For several years he had received instructions from a Swiss republican named La Harpe, and it was commonly supposed that he had imbibed his tutor’s advanced ideas. During these same years, however, Alexander was also being trained by others in the traditions and methods of the Russian autocracy. He therefore developed a complex and enigmatic personality which historians have never understood. He freely used the catchwords with which Rousseau had endowed the European liberals of his day, but he was also a man of domineering personality, a drillmaster, and a despot. Gifted with high abilities, he thought of himself as a benevolent ruler, sincerely anxious to promote the welfare of his people, but he also insisted upon tranquillity, order, and obedience, which could be secured in the Russia of his day only by the most stringent measures. When he came to the throne, at the age of twenty-three, Alexander surrounded himself with like-minded young men from the aristocracy and began talking of extensive political reforms, but before he had made much
progress, his attention was distracted by the Napoleonic Wars. During the lull that followed the Peace of Tilsit (1807) he turned again to domestic reform, and an elaborate program was put on paper. Alexander presently lost interest in it, however, its author was exiled, and the little of it that went into operation merely gave the bureaucracy a more efficient organization. Then came the great war with Napoleon (1812), from which Alexander emerged in 1815 as a conservative religious mystic.

Historians have remarked that Alexander's liberalism touched only his non-Russian provinces. At any rate, Catholic Poland, Protestant Finland, and the Baltic provinces, where the two Western faiths prevailed, were treated much more liberally than was Orthodox Russia. As early as 1804, steps were taken toward emancipating the serfs in the Baltic provinces, where the reform was completed fifteen years later. Nearly half a million male serfs were granted their freedom, but as they were given no land of their own, their status was not greatly improved. They became tenant farmers, with their former owners now their landlords. After Finland had been occupied by Russian troops (1808), Alexander declared it an autonomous duchy, under himself as duke, and granted a constitution perpetuating the old Swedish civil and criminal codes, local self-government, religious toleration, and other fundamental rights. Finland retained this privileged position throughout the nineteenth century, even though at times the heel of the Russian autocracy rested heavily upon her. When the Congress of Vienna made Alexander king of the greater part of Poland, he inaugurated his reign by granting his new kingdom a moderately liberal constitution. Within a year or two, however, he was whittling away at these liberties, and his successor abolished them completely, along with the constitution itself (1831). In his Russian provinces, Alexander continued to use liberal phraseology at times, but whatever changes he introduced in his later years were designed primarily to strengthen the autocracy and its bureaucracy. Even the wars against Napoleon, the invasion of Russia, and the ultimate Russian victory changed Russia but little, and if a western European traveler, familiar with Russia's social and political organization at the end of Catherine's reign, had revisited the country in 1825, he would have found things much as they had been before.

Alexander died unexpectedly in December, 1825, aged forty-eight years. Since he had no legitimate children, the throne should have passed to his brother Constantine, who supposedly was a man of
liberal sympathies. Lacking the desire to rule, however, Constantine had persuaded Alexander to name their autocratic younger brother Nicholas secretly as his heir. This irregular disposition of the throne led to the “December revolt” of 1825. During the wars a number of young army officers had visited France, where they were favorably impressed by what they saw. Hoping in a dreamy sort of way to reform Russia along Western lines, they organized secret societies which professed to be both patriotic and revolutionary. Though the most important of these societies never contained more than two hundred members, their leaders hoped to seize power by violence, establish themselves as dictators (just as the Bolsheviks did almost a century later), and impose freedom upon Russia by proclaiming a constitution. When they learned of Alexander’s death and Nicholas’s inheritance, they quickly decided that the moment to strike had come. Drawing up their troops in St. Petersburg, they ordered the soldiers to shout for “Constantine and the Constitution.” It is said, however, that the ignorant soldiers, never having heard of a constitution, shouted instead for “Constantine and his wife, Constitution!” After easily dispersing the crowds with artillery, Nicholas assumed power (December 26, 1825). Over one hundred persons were punished for their share in this uprising, five by hanging and the others by exile to Siberia. These “Decembrists” were later idealized by Russian liberals, and subsequent revolutionists followed the pattern they set.

Nicholas I was twenty-nine years of age when he became tsar, and he ruled for almost thirty years (1825–1855). Born in 1796, he entered adolescence at the time of the Napoleonic Wars, and the patriotism and religious mysticism prevailing at court during those stirring days developed in him a lasting contempt for “Europe” and its institutions. As his education was almost solely military, he had neither an understanding of nor sympathy with his brother Alexander’s liberal dreams, but education and character alike fitted him to champion the traditional Russian autocracy. The Decembrist revolt frightened him, but, in addition to punishing the revolutionaries severely, he carefully studied the testimony at their trials and ordered a few minor reforms to correct abuses of which they complained. Suspicious of the nobility and fearing public opinion (which in Russia could only be the opinion of the landed aristocracy), he devoted his life to strengthening the autocracy. Political power was concentrated more than ever in the hands of his personal friends and
the bureaucrats who directed the imperial chancery. This chancery was organized in several "sections," of which the third (dating from 1826) had charge of an imperial police which covered the empire with its agents. Some of these agents were uniformed "gendarmes," who maintained order and enforced the tsar's decrees with the utmost brutality, but others belonged to the secret service which spied upon every class of society and whose fantastic activities eventually rendered it a universally feared and detested government within the government. By thus organizing a "police state," Nicholas attempted to bring the whole political, intellectual, religious, and economic life of Russia under his personal control. His program found idealistic expression in the famous formula, invented by his minister of education, "Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality," which for almost a century remained tsarist Russia's confession of faith and her answer to Europe's "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity."

Nicholas's championship of autocracy and his distrust of European liberalism showed themselves clearly in his foreign policies. Alexander had usually respected the constitution which he granted to "Congress Poland" when he became its king (1815, see p. 227), but Nicholas soon began disregarding it. Polish nationalists therefore rose in revolt during the revolutionary years 1830–1831, but they were easily defeated. The Constitution of 1815 was replaced with a statute abolishing the Polish diet and its army, and the Polish kingdom was proclaimed an integral part of the Russian Empire. Religious toleration and a few civil liberties were promised to the Poles, but even these promises were not well observed. During the next few years many Europeans, especially in France, were outspoken in their denunciations of Russia, and refugee Polish nobles intrigued against her, thereby increasing Nicholas's hostility to the West. When revolution again spread over Europe, in 1848–1849, the young Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria appealed to Nicholas for aid against his rebellious Hungarian subjects, and Russian troops were sent to pacify Hungary (see p. 289). Again western Europeans were shocked, and the English foreign secretary, Lord Palmerston, assumed a highly bellicose attitude. War did not follow, but Europe and Russia were deeply suspicious of each other thereafter.

Nicholas's most important foreign intervention was in the Balkans against Turkey. Russians and Turks had been at swords' points for centuries, and in the early 1820's many Russians openly expressed their sympathy with the Balkan peoples who were then fighting to
free themselves from the Turkish yoke. Alexander regarded these peoples as mere rebels and, true to the principles of the Holy Alliance, he refused them aid, but Nicholas quickly reversed this policy. He intervened in the Balkans and throughout his reign he gave great attention to the Turkish problem. Describing Turkey as "the sick man of Europe," he developed various plans for partitioning its territories, but the Western powers feared Russian aggressiveness and defended Turkey. This struggle eventually culminated in the Crimean War (1853–1856, see p. 302), in which France and England fought Russia to save Turkey. The Russian armies, which Nicholas had built up at enormous expense, proved unequal to those of the despised West, and his whole regime stood discredited. Nicholas died during the conflict (March, 1855), and his son Alexander II soon embarked upon a large program of reform. In the long run, however, an even more important result of the Crimean War was its intensification of the ancient political and cultural cleavage that separated Byzantine Russia from Western Europe.

Literature and Ideas

While Alexander and Nicholas were thus engaged in organizing and strengthening an autocracy which, they believed, was in conformity with Russian conditions and Russian traditions, others were giving literary and artistic expression to Russian life and culture. Until this time there had not been much important Russian literature. In the days of Catherine II educated aristocrats had read French and English books, just as they followed French styles and manners from afar, and while a few Russian writers imitated Western or classical models, none achieved literary distinction. In the nineteenth century, however, Russia suddenly produced a splendid national literature which can be compared favorably with that of France and England and which expressed the life and idealism of her people in magnificent fashion. Though this literary and intellectual flowering dated from the reign of Nicholas I, the ideas set forth were not those which prevailed at his court. The writers of this period all were interested in Russia’s social and political problems, and they turned to literature because there was no place in the government for independent thinkers. They were more successful than the tsars in understanding the character of the Russian people, they depicted it accurately and movingly, and in no country of the world has literature played a greater part in public life than it did in tsarist Russia.
A major reason for Russia’s backwardness in developing a national literature was the fact that until the nineteenth century very few Russians could read or write. Even at the beginning of the twentieth century more than three-quarters of the Russian people were illiterate, and a hundred years earlier, reading was a skill found only among the aristocratic and wealthy classes. It was said that in Catherine’s early days more than half of the nobility attending her court were unable to read and that a third of them could not even sign their names. As public schools were nonexistent, educated persons were to be found only in families rich enough to send their children to expensive private schools or to provide them with tutors. Alexander undertook to remedy this situation. As early as 1802 he set up a ministry of education, which he ordered to prepare plans for a nation-wide school system, but the project made little progress because of the lack of funds, the lack of teachers, and the indifference of the public. At the end of his reign barely one Russian out of each thousand in the population was enrolled in these schools. (In the United States, one person out of every six was attending school in 1950, one out of every sixty was in college.) Nicholas’s need for literate men in the bureaucracy caused him to encourage education of a sort, but schools remained of pitifully low quality and attendance was limited to a tiny minority. It is no wonder, therefore, that there were not many Russian authors at a time when there were so few Russian readers.

Russian authors were also greatly hampered by the relentless but unintelligent censorship to which their writings were subjected. In the early years of his reign Alexander liberalized the rules slightly, but he soon resumed the time-honored practices. Believing, as he did, that all reform should come as a free gift from the autocrat to his people, Alexander forbade public discussion of political topics, alleging that hopes might be raised prematurely and the people become restless when disappointed. Nicholas was even more severe in his censorship and promulgated a drastic new law on the subject less than six months after he entered office, but the censors did not attain the heights of absurdity until the closing years of his reign. Persons wishing to publish newspapers or books must first obtain a general permission, which might be withdrawn arbitrarily at any moment, and in addition each article or book must receive specific authorization. As the greatest confusion prevailed in the censor’s office, the author of a book or article might be punished if a censor
disapproved of it after publication, even though it had been authorized by another censor before. The authors and publishers of censored articles might be fined or jailed or exiled to Siberia, or they might simply be declared insane and locked up. One result of this censorship, of course, was the appearance of “bootleg” literature which was printed abroad and smuggled into the country. At the same time authors were learning to convey forbidden ideas in apparently innocuous statements. Both censors and readers were constantly on the lookout for such cryptic passages, and the whole literature of Russia is colored by this contest between authors and censors. Usually the authors ran a little ahead, but sometimes they paid dearly for their temerity.

In spite of these handicaps, the great age of Russian literature began under Nicholas I. The intellectual effervescence and the critical spirit of the Decembrists survived the collapse of their revolt to inspire the rising generation, and the low estate of the Russian universities caused young men with intellectual interests to study abroad, especially in the German universities, where they came in contact with the most vigorous thinkers of the day. At the same time large numbers of Western books were being translated into Russian, among them the works of Shakespeare, Voltaire, and Byron; Goethe and Schiller; Bentham, Sir Walter Scott, and many others. Russians began to read, and Russian authors began to provide them with a native literature. The most eminent Russian authors of this first generation were the poet Alexander Pushkin (1799–1837), a romantic like Lord Byron, and Alexander Griboedov (1795–1829), whose comedy The Misfortune of Being Intelligent was a mordant but extremely clever satire on the Russian bureaucracy. It has become a classic. A little later Nikolai Gogol (1809–1852) again satirized the bureaucracy in his comedy The Inspector-General (1836) and he dealt with seldom in his novel Dead Souls (1842).

Equally important with these writers were the literary men who discussed the great problems of Russian life in more abstract terms. Some professed to be critics of literature, some were historians, some were theologians, but in general they fell into two large groups, known respectively as Slavophils and Westerners. Each party was highly critical of Russia’s present status and each disapproved of Nicholas’s autocracy, though for very different reasons. The Slavophils, turning to Russia’s remote past, grew enthusiastic over the virtues of the Russian muzhik (peasant), the beauties and social
value of the Orthodox faith, and the glory of their Byzantine heritage. They regarded the old Slavic mir (a communist village) as the ideal social organization, and the artel (a group of primitive artisans) as the ideal labor union. They declared that Peter the Great and Catherine had turned Russia from her true path when they began imitating European institutions. These Slavophils showed great enthusiasm for the wonderful things that the Slavic spirit could accomplish; they prophesied that it would soon redeem decadent Europe; and, it is interesting to note, even in the 1840’s a few of them looked forward to a time when Europe would have to choose between the idealistic spirit of Russia and the materialistic spirit of America. In spite of their denunciations of Europe, however, the Slavophils were deeply indebted to the West, and especially to the German philosophers, for many of their fundamental ideas. Though their theories often seem to be merely an elaboration of the official motto, “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality,” the Slavophils were never trusted by Nicholas and his ministers. At first the Slavophils paid little attention to the non-Russian Slavs (Poles, Czechs, Serbs, etc.) but they later discovered a kinship with these peoples. They then demanded that Russia protect, or lead, or dominate, or “Russify” these lesser Slavs, and the autocracy began justifying its aggressive imperialism with arguments drawn from this “Pan-Slavic” idealism.

The “Westerners” were equally dissatisfied with Russia’s condition in the 1840’s, and equally sure that she was to have a glorious share in making a new and better world, but they said she should lead rather than dominate the world. They did not deny her special heritage from Byzantium, but they preferred to talk of future progress, which they pictured largely in Western terms. They too read German philosophy, and they devoured the writings of such French socialists as Saint-Simon, Fourier, and Proudhon. While the Slavophils were by nature political conservatives, the Westerners were radicals, and they won the allegiance of the intellectual youth of the 1840’s. In the long run, however, each faction made an important and significant contribution to the thinking of tsarist and communist Russia.

THE GREAT REFORMS

Nicholas I was succeeded as tsar by his son, Alexander II (1855–1881). Born in 1818, Alexander had been brought up to admire his
father greatly, and he would have preferred to continue the police state that Nicholas had so painstakingly constructed. He was not a forceful leader, however, and events convinced him of the necessity for change. In spite of the censorship, liberal and "Western" thought had been making steady progress among Russian intellectuals, especially since 1848; many persons were excited by rumors of impending change; during the Crimean War peasants began rioting; and military defeat was a final blow. Soon after the conclusion of peace, therefore, Alexander turned his attention to the most pressing of Russia's domestic problems, namely, serfdom.

In an earlier chapter (p. 74) we saw that Russian serfdom, as reorganized by Peter the Great, differed radically from that of medieval Europe and resembled instead the chattel slavery then existing in the United States. Medieval feudalism had been primarily a matter of safety, with serfs supplying labor to support a lord who provided them with much-needed defense; but the Russian serf, like the American slave, merely supplied the landowner with cheap labor. In Russia, as in the United States, most serfs were peasants (field hands), but some were house servants and a few were artisans. The house serfs were not grossly mistreated, as a general rule, but the peasants were usually regarded as little better than cattle to be bought and sold or arbitrarily moved from place to place by their owners. Russian serfdom reached its highest development under Catherine II (1762-1796), but even in her day a few voices were raised in protest. Criticism grew louder as the nineteenth century progressed, and though the censors forbade all discussion of serfdom in books or newspapers, powerful writers managed to express their complaints in literary descriptions of rural life—as in Gogol's Dead Souls (1842) or Turgenev's A Sportsman's Sketches (1852). Alexander I had disapproved of serfdom in an abstract way, and Nicholas vaguely admitted its evils, but they feared the consequences of emancipation and therefore did nothing. The rich landlords, on the other hand, were resolutely opposed to change. Alexander II clearly saw, however, that serfdom must go, and early in 1856 he declared before a gathering of nobles in Moscow, "It is better to abolish serfdom from above than to wait for it to be overthrown from beneath." Soon thereafter he appointed a committee to prepare plans for emancipation, and he signed the final decree on March 3, 1861.

First of all, the law of 1861 granted all serfs their personal freedom. Household serfs, and the artisans employed by their owners
in shops or factories, got nothing more, but the peasants were given certain fields as well. Under the old system, the landlord had assigned a small field to each peasant, allowing him to keep its produce, and in return the peasant worked on the lord’s fields several days a week. The peasants were now given the fields which they had formerly cultivated for themselves and which made up about half the cultivated land of Russia. The government indemnified the landlords, and the peasants were assessed to refund the money advanced for the indemnities. In order to get the money to pay these assessments, the serf had to spend much of his time working for wages on the lord’s land, and therefore his economic situation was not greatly bettered. Furthermore, the peasants did not get title to their fields individually. The land was given to the village community, or mir, which then assigned specific fields to each peasant. (In this arrangement it is possible to see the influence of Slavophil enthusiasm for the mir.) Moreover, as the fields were redistributed periodically, individuals had no incentive to improve land that would soon be given to others. And as the law gave as little land as possible to the peasants, they were soon suffering from land shortage and casting covetous eyes upon the fields retained by the nobility. The agricultural problem was not solved in 1861, and land soon replaced serfdom as the most difficult problem facing Russian statesmen.

The next few years were marked by several further reforms in Russia. In 1864 a law was promulgated creating local administrative bodies, called zemstvos, whose members were elected by the nobles and peasants of each district. These bodies looked after such matters as education, medical care, and the upkeep of roads, and they could levy taxes to finance their projects. In the opinion of many people, the establishment of these elected bodies was a breach in the power of the autocracy and the harbinger of greater democracy to come. In the same year the courts were reformed, trial by jury was introduced for the more important cases, and the press laws were slightly relaxed. In 1870 town councils, or dumas, were established, to perform much the same function in the cities that the zemstvos performed in the country, and four years later the army was drastically reorganized after the introduction of universal military service.

The emancipation of the serfs undoubtedly was Alexander’s most important reform, and the basis of his reputation as the “tsar-liberator,” but his policy toward popular education shows his character
in truer perspective. Noteworthy progress had been made by Russian schools and universities during the first half of the century, though Nicholas subjected them, like everything else, to his police system. Alexander II, on the other hand, inaugurated several progressive reforms during the early years of his reign. A law of 1863 reformed the universities, doing away with many of Nicholas's restrictions upon academic freedom, but amendments soon robbed the law of most of its merit. The secondary schools were reformed, and the elementary-school system was greatly expanded, but standards remained deplorably low. In 1866 the extremely conservative Count Dmitri Tolstoi (no connection with the novelist, Count Leo Tolstoi) became minister of public instruction, which post he held until 1880. Being at the same time procurator of the Holy Synod (i.e., head of the Orthodox Church in Russia), he tried to use the schools and universities as well as the church for indoctrinating youth with conservative political and religious ideas. The elementary schools were often taught by ignorant priests, and "unsettling" subjects were eliminated from the curricula of secondary schools. In fact, Greek and Latin grammar and mathematics were deemed the only thoroughly "safe" subjects for study. The educational level of Russia rose considerably under Alexander, but education was still limited largely to the townsmen and the aristocracy. Only rarely was a peasant able to read.

THE REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT

These reforms were regarded by the Russian government as props to the autocracy, not as modifications of it, and they are to be explained in considerable part by the rapidly increasing activity of the revolutionists. Conspiracies to seize power had long been traditional in the governing class of Russia; peasant revolts were of frequent occurrence; and the Decembrists made a deep impression upon the intellectual leaders of the next generation. Revolution had thus become a part of the Russian autocratic system as it actually functioned, and we might say that in practice the Russian government was an autocracy tempered by assassination. Alexander II was troubled throughout his reign by the revolutionists, and in the end he met death at their hands.
Serious trouble first broke out in Poland. Though united by their hatred of Russia, the Poles were by no means agreed as to their desires. Some would have been satisfied with a mere restoration of the Constitution of 1815; others demanded a liberal republic, or at least a restoration of the democratic Constitution of 1791; and still others dreamed of reviving the ancient Poland that stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea and included all Lithuania as well as much of the Ukraine. After the revolution of 1830, Nicholas governed the Poles with an iron hand, but in 1856 Alexander sent a moderate governor to rule them. Nevertheless, they remained restless and on several occasions they engaged in bloody clashes with the Russian police. When formal rebellion broke out, early in 1863, Polish exiles hurried home to command troops, and the Catholic clergy lent their support, but the Russians easily crushed the rebels. Almost every trace of autonomy was then wiped out, great efforts were made to Russianize the people, and it was decreed that thereafter Russian should be the language of all schools and courts. As Polish landlords had led the revolt, their lands were confiscated and distributed among the peasants. The Polish peasants thus fared better than their Russian counterparts, but the hatred of the upper classes in the two countries for each other was intensified by this ill-starred revolt.

Meantime impassioned leaders were fanning the flames of revolution in Russia, the most influential of them being Alexander Herzen (1812–1870). After leaving Russia in 1847, never to return, Herzen settled in London, where he set up a Russian printing press and began publishing a fortnightly journal, Kolokol ("The Bell," 1858). Copies of this journal were smuggled into Russia, were they were read enthusiastically: from time to time an unknown person at court even placed copies on the tsar's own writing desk. Herzen had been primarily interested in the emancipation of the serfs, but the law of 1861 disappointed him. In a famous editorial he declared, "The people need land and freedom," and a little later he began urging violent revolution against the autocracy. He lost much of his influence in Russia, however, when he wrote in favor of the Polish rebels in 1863. The Bell suspended publication in 1867, its circulation having dropped to five hundred copies, and Herzen died three years later, an embittered man. The other outstanding revolutionist of the day was the anarchist Michael Bakunin (1814–1876, see p. 531). He too left Russia in 1847 and spent the remainder of his life as a wandering
exile, participating in revolutions wherever he could find them. For a few years he was associated with Marx and Engels in the Communist First International, but they soon expelled him because of his extreme individualism. More radical than Herzen, Bakunin was also more impassioned in his pleas for the immediate overthrow of the Russian government—and all other existing governments as well—which he hoped to replace with coöperative societies. In such free and godless societies, he declared, all compulsion might be abolished, for everyone would freely and willingly do his share of the common work!

Inspired by such writers as these, countless young Russians took up revolutionary activity. They were extreme individualists who put their trust in science and popular education, and they counted heavily on the innate goodness of the human heart. Believing that education alone could improve the lot of the peasantry, hundreds of enthusiastic young men and women left home and family to go “to the people”—the phrase was Herzen’s—hoping to train them for a better future. This movement “to the people” reached its height in the
summer of 1874, when countless persons went about Russia preaching the new gospel. Never has the idealistic side of the Russian character been shown to better advantage than by these Narodniki, or “Populists” (narod is the Russian word for “people”), who thus became missionaries to the poor. Their successes were slight, however, for they never understood the Russian muzhiks, and the muzhiks never understood them.

Meantime secret societies were being founded in Russia by men who hoped to force reform by revolutionary and terroristic methods. The earliest and most important of these societies, dating from 1862, took its name and program from Herzen’s phrase “Land and Freedom” (Zemlia i Volia), but others preferred Bakunin’s more extreme methods. In 1866 a young man belonging to one of the latter groups fired a pistol at Alexander II (who was not hurt), and later several high officials were assassinated. The revolutionists were punished brutally, but they continued to use terroristic methods to advertise their cause. As the leaders steadily became more active and bolder, university and high-school students flocked to them in ever increasing numbers. In 1876 an agent of the secret police reported that the greater part of Russia was covered by a network of revolutionary groups, and the government, thoroughly frightened, turned to the Slavophils for aid. Partly under the prodding of his new allies, partly to stimulate patriotic and antirevolutionary enthusiasm among the people, Alexander decided to risk a foreign war. Turkish oppression of the Serbs and Bulgars provided the Pan-Slavists with an adequate pretext for war, and hostilities opened in April, 1877. The Russian armies were victorious, and within a year they dictated peace at San Stefano, a village lying only a few miles outside Constantinople (March, 1878). The European powers would not allow Russia to expand into this critical area, however, and the diplomats, assembled at the Congress of Berlin (June, 1878), restored most of Russia’s conquests to Turkey (see p. 432).

This diplomatic setback again discredited the autocracy, and the revolutionists became more active than ever. The “Land and Freedom” group was torn asunder by a controversy over terroristic methods, and the more extreme faction, called Narodnaia Volia or “People’s Freedom,” was presently joined by many disillusioned Narodniki. Its members decreed and published a death sentence upon Alexander, and after his life had been saved on half a dozen occasions by the narrowest margins, they killed him with a bomb on March 13, 1881.
THE INTELLIGENTSIA

At this time Russia was bursting with energy, intellectually as well as physically, and many members of the educated classes—whom the Russians called the "intelligentsia"—were ardently devoting themselves to creative activities. This intellectual class seemed very small when compared to the total population, and the backwardness of Russia's elementary schools made it virtually impossible for the children of peasants to receive any scholastic education at all, but higher education was available to those who could afford it. In many ways the universities of St. Petersburg and Moscow were respectable institutions in spite of the censorship, for most professors, having studied for at least a year or two in the West, tried to maintain Western standards. At this time, too, hundreds of Russian students attended the universities of Germany and Switzerland. Under the conditions then prevailing in Russia, it was inevitable that a large proportion of the intellectually inclined students should direct their thought to social problems and reform, but many took up science, literature, and the arts instead. Mere lists of names are of little interest, but we may mention a few eminent Russian scientists who got their start in the days of Alexander II and whose achievements later gave them European reputations: the chemist Dmitri Mendeleev (1834–1907), the bacteriologist Ilya Metchnikoff (1845–1916), the physiologist Ivan Pavlov (1849–1936). Belonging to this same generation was the greatest of Russian historians, V. O. Kliuchevski (1841–1911), who certainly was no Marxian but whose writings emphasized the social and economic forces operating in history at a time when Western historians rarely recognized their importance. These years also formed a highly creative period in the development of Russian music, with M. P. Moussorgski (1835–1881), Peter Tchaikovsky (1840–1893), and Nicholas Rimski-Korsakov (1844–1908) composing works that are still regarded as classics throughout the Western world. Greatest of all, however, were the Russian novelists who wrote during these brilliant years.

Ivan Sergeevich Turgenev (1818–1883) sprang from a family of the lesser nobility, but he received part of his education and passed much of his life in western Europe. In his early sketches he wrote against servdom, but after the emancipation he became critical of the revolutionary youth of the new day. In his novel Fathers and Sons (1862)
he described them with the word “nihilists,” charging somewhat unfairly that they wished to retain nothing (Latin, nihil) of the old Russian heritage and had no positive program of reform. Turgenev was himself a “Westerner,” and because of his long residence in the West, where he associated freely with the French literary men of the day, he wrote from a Western point of view. Europeans are therefore likely to find his novels easier to understand than those of other Russian writers, and he was the first of the Russian novelists to win fame in the West. His novels and stories give a fine picture of Russian life in his day, however, and critics continue to regard him as one of the great lights of Russian literature.

Feodor Mikhailovich Dostoevski (1821–1881) was a very different
sort of man. The son of a Moscow physician, he was an army officer for a few years before he decided to devote himself to writing. In 1849 he was arrested and condemned to death for belonging to a club that had read the books of the French socialist Fourier. At the last moment this sentence was changed to imprisonment, and he spent four years in Siberia, and five years more in the army. Not until 1859 did he receive amnesty from Alexander II. Though he traveled in Europe, Dostoevski disliked the West, which he considered decadent, and he abandoned his former liberal ideas to become an ardent Slavophil, developing a high regard for the Orthodox Church and believing that the world could be “saved” by adopting the Russian spirit. In his novels he endeavored to set forth his conception of the spirit of the Russian people. He made his reputation with *Crime and Punishment* (1866), dealing with a murderer who voluntarily gave himself up to the police in order to expiate his crime, being followed to Siberia by a streetwalker whom he loved and who had persuaded him that he could purify himself by suffering. The hero of *The Idiot* (1869) exemplifies Dostoevski’s theory that the truth is seen most clearly by the simple-minded; his hero in *The Possessed* (1871) is mentally ill; and the most famous of his novels, *The Brothers Karamazov* (1880), is a penetrating psychological study of four brothers after one of them has murdered their father. Perhaps the most famous passage in the latter novel is a long and eloquent defense of the Inquisition by one of the brothers. Dostoevski was gifted with an amazing ability to depict the mental processes of his characters, but these characters are scarcely typical Russians. To western Europeans they seem strange or even diseased. While Dostoevski’s books were read in the West in the early twentieth century, it was hard for Europeans to understand them, and they did much to create the widely held opinion that the Russians are a dark and incomprehensible people.

The greatest of the Russian novelists was Count Leo Tolstoi (1828–1910). Born a member of the Russian aristocracy and trained for the army, Tolstoi resigned his commission soon after the Crimean War. Ten years later he produced *War and Peace* (1866), an enormous historical novel giving a detailed picture of Russia during the Napoleonic Wars. Today it finds a place on almost every critic’s list of the world’s greatest novels. *Anna Karenina* (1875) describes the contemporary Russian scene, with its heroine killing herself after committing adultery. Shortly after finishing the second of these works,
Tolstoi underwent a deep religious conversion that changed the whole manner of his life and thought. Interpreting the Gospels in his own way, he became a pacifist preaching the brotherhood of man and non-resistance to evil. His earlier admiration for the Russian peasant was intensified, and like many Russians in his day he believed western Europe to be thoroughly decadent, but unlike Dostoevski he felt no sympathy with the Slavophils. After transferring
all his property to his wife, he began preaching semi-socialistic schemes of reform and writing simple tales for the peasants. Though he continued to write novels setting forth his new ideas, they failed to reach the artistic level of his earlier writings. But *The Kreutzer Sonata* (1889) attracted attention in spite of its sentimental moralizing, and *Resurrection* (1900) caused its author to be formally excommunicated by the Orthodox Church. Tolstoy's ideas won him many admirers, and in his last years he was a man of European reputation, visited by pilgrims from all over the world. He was extremely critical of conditions in Russia, expressing his views openly and fearlessly (as in a celebrated pamphlet *The Hanging Tsar*, 1908), but so high was his prestige throughout Russia and Europe that the tsar, though Autocrat of All the Russians, did not care to lift a finger against him.
22. RUSSIA IN TRANSITION

The assassination of Alexander II brought his son, Alexander III (1881–1894), to the throne. The new tsar was endowed with only a mediocre intellect and held a narrowly circumscribed outlook upon life, but he was a man of considerable force of character. Long before coming to power he had expressed disapproval of his father’s liberal policies, and the assassination frightened him into strengthening the autocracy in every way possible. After a reign of thirteen years Alexander was succeeded by his son, Nicholas II (1894–1917), who was deplorably deficient in intellect and will power but whose respect for his father amounted almost to idolization. He usually believed that if things had been thus and so under Alexander III, that was ample reason for their continuance. In spite of the tsars and their reactionary ministers, however, these two reigns were a period of rapid change in Russia.

Alexander III’s most distinguished and most powerful minister was Constantine Pobedonostsev (1827–1907), procurator of the Holy Synod and tutor to Nicholas II. An honest and thoughtful man, he showed the liveliest distrust of Western institutions: to him parliamentary government meant government by demagogues, jury trial meant trial by fools, and liberty of the press meant giving ignorant journalists permission to seduce the masses and defame the authorities. He was sincerely concerned over the irreligious and materialistic philosophy that was seeping into Russia from Europe, and he believed that Russia’s sole hope for the future lay in a return to the ancient Slavic religion and institutions.

Slavophil idealism may have been invoked to lend dignity to the autocracy, but the government continued to rest primarily upon the Orthodox Church, the army, and the secret police. Under Pobedonostsev the main points in church doctrine, as presented to the
peasants of Russia by the village priests, were the wickedness of revolution and the duty of subjects to their “Little Father,” the tsar. In case the exhortations and spiritual thunders of the church were not enough to keep the underlying population in order—as they frequently were not—the government had at its disposal the army, and especially the Cossacks, a wild race of nomadic horsemen who rejoiced in any excuse for shedding the blood of their fellow men. The autocracy received further support from the secret police, whose ruthless and unscrupulous methods became the scandal of Europe. Newspapers were censored, private correspondence was subjected to “perlustration,” and all Russia was overrun by police spies. The secret police habitually employed stool pigeons who wormed their way into suspected organizations to learn their secrets and organized pretended plots to lead real revolutionists into the dragnets of the police. Many agents worked with equal zeal for their employers and against them, however, as in the case of the notorious Azev: for several years during the 1890s this man held a high position in the police, but he was at the same time director of the “Fighting Organization” of the Social Revolutionary party, which planned and executed most of the important assassinations of the day. Even today, no one can say whether he was essentially a revolutionist or a supporter of the autocracy. More probably he was merely an adventurer.

Alexander’s more far-sighted ministers endeavored to strengthen the autocracy further by reestablishing it firmly on its ancient foundations, the nobility and the peasantry, and they took measures to favor these classes. In 1881 the peasants were granted a considerable reduction in the payments due for their land, and two years later the Peasants’ Bank was founded to lend money to villages that wished to buy the lands retained by the nobility in 1861. Attention was also given to the improvement of agricultural methods and to the introduction of new crops. Nevertheless, the peasant population grew so rapidly that, in spite of the government’s efforts, the lot of the Russian peasantry grew steadily worse. The government’s program was a boon to the nobles, however, for it enabled them to sell their lands at high prices, and when such sales were not enough to salvage impecunious noblemen—of whom there were many—the government lent them money to pay their debts.

The autocracy also sought to strengthen itself by borrowing large sums of money abroad. The inefficiency and corruption of the gov-
ernment, its disastrous wars, its indemnification of landlords at the
time of the emancipation, and expensive railway building had kept
Russian finances in a chronically desperate state. In 1887, therefore,
a new finance minister turned to Europe for the capital that Russia
lacked. As the French were then actively seeking an ally against
Germany, they lent Russia $100 million in 1888. This loan was used
largely to pay off old debts, but others followed during the next few
years which were used to stabilize Russian currency, to strengthen
military defense, to build railways, and to promote industry. Russian
banks and private concerns also borrowed heavily abroad, and
French companies were allowed to exploit Russia's natural resources.
In 1914 French investments in Russia amounted to nearly three bil-
lion dollars.

Industry in Russia

Two years before the death of Alexander, Sergei Witte (1849–
1915) was named minister of finance (1892). He soon proved him-
self the ablest minister produced by tsarist Russia in recent times,
but he was not born a member of the aristocracy, and his blunt and
outspoken manners caused his many enemies to denounce him as a
parvenu. He was the first important minister in Russia to indulge in
extensive publicity for himself, employing a host of journalists to
supply the newspapers and magazines of Russia and Europe with
articles designed to further his political programs. He sometimes pro-
claimed himself a champion of liberalism, and he certainly intro-
duced many liberal reforms into Russia, but his sympathies were with
the autocracy, under which he had fared so well, and his reforms
were intended to bolster it. He was one of the most intelligent and
energetic defenders of the tsar. As long as Alexander III was alive,
Witte enjoyed his full support, but Nicholas II never liked the man
and was induced to dismiss him in 1903.

Witte devoted great attention to the encouragement of industry in
Russia, which had heretofore been almost exclusively agricultural.
Serfdom had made it difficult to procure labor, and before 1861 almost
the only factories in Russia were those operated by the government
to manufacture such necessities as cannon. This situation changed
slowly after emancipation, however; privately owned factories began
to appear; and during the 1880's industrial progress was rapid. Witte
then directed his policies toward encouraging this new industry.
He stabilized the currency (fixing the value of the ruble at two-thirds of its former value, or 52½ American cents); he secured foreign loans; and he negotiated a commercial treaty with Germany that was highly favorable to Russia. Germany was to receive great quantities of Russian wheat, in payment of interest on loans, but Russia put a high tariff on all German goods except machinery and other articles which she could not produce for herself. At the same time mines were being opened, railways were being built, the growth of foreign and domestic trade was enormous, and a capitalist class arose in Russia. This new social class presently acquired great influence. The laws it favored, such as Witte’s tariffs, were quickly enacted, but very few laws of which it disapproved, such as his schemes for ameliorating the state of labor, ever found their way into the statute books.

At first glance, these economic developments seemed to strengthen Russia and the autocracy, and they clearly benefited certain classes in Russian society, but they bore heavily upon the workers and peasants, and in the end they generated the forces that destroyed the autocracy. The workers in the new factories were peasants who had left their homes to seek a livelihood in the cities, but as they still were legally tied to their villages, where they paid their taxes and remained members of their strongly organized patriarchal families, they did not readily become urbanized. They worked for a few months in the city, wandered back to their villages, and returned again to the cities. A floating population thus grew up which worked intermittently in factories but never acquired great skill at such work, and which was quite incapable of defending itself against the arbitrary practices of the factory owners. As labor legislation was virtually nonexistent, conditions soon developed in Russian factories which were more appalling than anything known to western Europe.

When the peasants first began migrating to the cities, some observers regarded such migration as a hopeful sign and suggested that the land problem might be solved by a reduction of the number of peasants and the creation of larger markets for their products. But any benefits which might thus have accrued to the peasants were more than offset by the growth of population and the indirect effects of the enormous foreign loans. The interest on these loans had to be paid with Russian exports to Europe, but almost the only commodity which Russia could export in large quantities was grain. This she exported to the value of many millions of rubles annually. Heretofore the peasants had raised only enough grain to fill their own
needs, but it now became necessary for them to produce enough food, not only to feed themselves and the inhabitants of the cities, but also to provide adequate amounts for export as well. As the government was still forcing the peasants to make money payments for the land which their fathers had received in 1861, and also levying taxes which must be paid in cash, every peasant had to sell a large part of his crop in order to get the money to pay his assessments. At just this time, however, wheat was being thrown on the world market by the farmers of the United States, Romania, and Argentina in such great quantities that its price was declining steadily. The Russian peasants therefore had to sell an ever increasing part of their scanty crops because they were competing with American farmers who cultivated much larger farms with machinery as yet unknown in Russia, and who therefore produced much larger crops per capita. Moreover, crop failures were frequent occurrences in Russia. In such years an abnormal percentage of the total crop had to be sent out of the country as interest on the foreign debt. It frequently came about, therefore, that when the peasants of a stricken region had sold so much of their grain that none remained for seed they still did not have enough cash to make their payments and were forced to sell whatever else they could. So many sold their horses that in some districts a third of the farms had none left. In good years the peasants lived at the verge of starvation; in bad years their sufferings were indescribable.

Witte and other enlightened persons recognized the gravity of the situation and devised measures to relieve the peasantry. Ever since 1861 there had been complaints that not enough land was allotted to the peasants at the time of emancipation, and rather unsuccessful efforts were now made to increase the allotments. The Peasants’ Bank was reorganized in 1895, its interest rates were reduced, and its operations were extended. State lands were sold, and nobles sometimes sold parts of their estates, but such measures brought no permanent relief. Meantime Witte had been organizing the Trans-Siberian Railway Company, and when the first sections of the railway were opened (1893) he encouraged peasants to migrate to the free lands of Siberia. He extended governmental aid to emigrants, helping them to locate farms and lending them money to cover moving expenses. More than 100,000 settlers crossed the Urals annually after 1895, and this figure reached its peak in 1908 when more than 750,000
sought new homes in Siberia. Such measures did not solve the peasants' problems, however, or alleviate the distress in the cities, and before long revolutionists were again disturbing Russia.

**Renewed Revolutionary Agitation**

After the assassination of Alexander II, hundreds of revolutionists were executed or exiled to Siberia (mostly to camps along the Lena River, well inside the Arctic Circle, not to the fertile areas then being settled by voluntary immigrants), but others found asylum in Switzerland. Here they began reading Marxian literature, and some were converted to socialism. They founded the Russian Social Democratic party in 1898, and a few years later they began propagandizing industrial workers in Russia. Their leader was Georgi Plekhanov (1857–1918), who had once favored the Narodniki but had broken with the *Narodnaia Volya* in 1879 because of his opposition to terrorism. He was therefore attracted by the Marxian idea that economic forces alone would soon bring socialism to pass, and that socialist leaders should merely prepare the workers to take over when the time came. Not all his followers were so optimistic, however, and members of the party were soon quarreling over questions of policy. Radical young men, led by one signing himself N. Lenin (1870–1924), demanded more aggressive revolutionary activity. In 1900 these radicals founded the newspaper *Iskra* ("The Spark," with the hopeful prophecy, "From the Spark, the Conflagration"), in which they wrote glowingly about the violent overthrow of the Russian autocracy and the immediate establishment of socialism under a dictatorship of the proletariat. Their more conservative rivals believed that Russia must evolve through the various stages of capitalism before it could be ready for socialism. These factions separated at a meeting of the Social Democratic party in London in 1903, with the radicals holding a slight majority. Lenin and his followers therefore took the name Bolsheviki, or Men of the Majority, while their conservative opponents were called Mensheviki, or Men of the Minority. All these Russian socialists were "Westerners" trying to import a strictly European doctrine into Russia, but the Bolshevik program for a revolution followed by a dictatorship reminds us strongly of the Decembrists. We shall presently see, moreover, that in later years the Bolsheviks inherited much else from "Holy Russia."
Many Russian revolutionists believed that Marxian dogmatism prevented these Social Democrats from understanding conditions in Russia. Marx had known almost nothing about Russia, of which he held a very low opinion and to which he devoted little attention. Nevertheless his Russian disciples, most of whom were exiles in Europe, followed him slavishly in planning to make the urban proletariat the foundation of their social system, even though Russia was overwhelmingly an agricultural country. They thus laid themselves open to attack by persons who were better acquainted with Russia. Other revolutionists, critical of Marxism and calling themselves Social Revolutionaries, held their first party congress in 1901. Their organization was not so close, nor was their program so cut and dried, as with the Social Democrats, and almost their only common aim was the destruction of the autocracy. Most Social Revolutionaries looked forward to some sort of free republic, in which there would be much voluntary coöperation; but as an immediate goal some merely asked for a constituent assembly, democratically elected, while others developed extensive programs for the nationalization of the land and other radical reforms. This party was more thoroughly Russian than its rival; it appealed to a wider variety of persons; and it attracted a much larger membership. Moreover, the Social Revolutionaries were responsible for most of the political assassinations of the next few years, for the Marxians continued to look upon such activities as superfluous.

The autocracy's efforts to Russianize the minor nationalities drove many non-Russians into revolutionary activity. Alexander III had redoubled the traditional efforts to make Russians out of the Finns, Poles, Caucasians, and others, but though he expressed himself in terms derived from Slavophil idealism, his agents relied heavily upon the knout and the pogrom in carrying out his ideas. Though only Jews were subjected to actual pogroms (lynchings), many members of the lesser nationalities sought relief through revolutionary activity. The most important of these rebellious groups were the Jewish Bund and the Polish Socialist party, each of which added socialism to nationalism. This was also the period during which young Joseph Stalin was growing up in Georgia in the Caucasus.

In the long run, however, the revolutionists found their most ardent and most valuable recruits among the university students. In spite of all that the authorities could do to suppress radical thought
in the universities—or perhaps because of it—students eagerly read forbidden books and joined forbidden societies. Before the end of the century the revolutionary agitation among them was so powerful that even those who wished to study science or literature or art could not escape the prevailing spirit and turned their attention to political and social subjects. Every year student disturbances became more frequent and were repressed with greater violence. More than thirteen thousand students took part in strikes in 1899, and in the following year student riots virtually amounted to civil war. An especially reactionary professor was murdered for political reasons in 1901, and a year later the minister of the interior was assassinated by a youth twenty-one years of age who had been actively organizing revolutionary groups of students at Kazan and Kiev.

The ultrareactionary Plehve (1846–1904), formerly director of the secret police, became this unfortunate minister’s successor and at once began attacking Witte’s liberal policies. When hard pressed by his new opponent, Witte sought the support of the liberal section of the aristocracy. He gave encouragement to their zemstvos (which he had once secretly denounced to the tsar as a menace to the autocracy), and he permitted the first congress of representatives from all the zemstvos of Russia (1902). Then came another crop failure, and in seven districts the peasants took to rioting. Plehve attributed this unrest to the agitation of the revolutionists and, running true to form, he attempted to suppress it by force. Witte, on the other hand, appointed committees from the zemstvos to investigate conditions and suggest remedies. This seeming confidence from the government encouraged many liberals to believe that mild reform and an extension of the powers of the zemstvos would solve Russia’s problems, but at the same time it caused Plehve to redouble his attacks upon his rival. Witte was relieved of his duties, his zemstvo committees were disbanded, and Plehve ruled supreme in Russia (August, 1903).

Before long Plehve was saying that “what Russia needs is a small victorious war to stem the tide of revolution.” Occasion for such a war soon presented itself in the Far East, and the Russo-Japanese War, which broke out early in 1904, had the most far-reaching consequences, both for Russia and throughout Asia (see p. 499). Plehve did not live to see the consequences of his war, however, for on July 28, 1904, he was assassinated by a tool of his infamous agent, Azev.
1905 and After

Since the autocracy never deigned to explain its actions to its subjects, many Russians had no idea why or perhaps even where the war was to be fought. Critics complained that recruits, when called to the colors, sometimes believed that they were to be sent against their ancestral enemies, the Turks. The war was therefore unpopular from the first, not only with the revolutionists but also with many persons who would ordinarily support the government. Revelations of shocking corruption and inefficiency increased popular dissatisfaction with the war, and radical agitators fomented strikes as demonstrations of protest against it. The country became so restless that when an all-Russian congress of zemstvos requested a few reforms (November, 1904), the government took fright and granted several of them, though it sternly rejected the demand for a Russian parliament.

Then came the events of “Bloody Sunday”—January 22, 1905. When unrest was already widely prevalent, and 140,000 men were out on strike in St. Petersburg alone, a priest named Gapon came forward with a petition requesting about a dozen mild reforms. On the Sunday in question he led a procession of several thousand persons to the tsar’s Winter Palace to present this document. The procession was an orderly one, singing hymns, carrying icons, crucifixes, and portraits of the imperial family, and showing no red flags or other symbols of revolt, but as it approached its destination the police opened fire with machine guns. More than five hundred persons were killed and almost three thousand were wounded.

Matters were thus brought to a crisis. As news of the massacre spread through Russia, it was greeted everywhere with strikes and bitter demonstrations. The government was in a quandary: some ministers urged further reforms, but the majority demanded that the disorders be calmed by violence, and the army was ordered to pacify St. Petersburg. The tsar weakened, however, when his uncle, the Grand Duke Sergius, was assassinated (February 17), and on March 3 he issued a decree creating an advisory parliament which would be elected on the basis of a narrow suffrage and have a share in drafting and discussing legislation—though not in enacting it.

This vague concession was too slight to calm the angry populace, and throughout the summer and fall Russia was in the throes of revo-
olution. Strikes swept the country; meetings of revolutionists were held under the very noses of the police; peasants burned the mansions and looted the granaries of the nobility; university professors refused to continue their lectures and students refused to attend class; railway workers, electricians, telephone and telegraph operators left their posts; newspapers failed to appear; hotel and restaurant waiters quit work; chorus girls refused to dance; the crew of the battleship Potemkin hoisted the red flag and cruised about the Black Sea, giving aid and comfort to the rebels and dropping a few shells into Odessa. For ten days the economic life of all Russia was almost at a standstill until, on October 30, the government capitulated. Russia was granted a constitution.

The October Manifesto, issued on that day, guaranteed the fundamental civil liberties—freedom from arbitrary arrest, and freedom of thought, press, and assembly; it promised a duma (parliament) representing all classes of society; and it announced that thereafter no law would go into effect until approved by this body. Though ministers would be responsible only to the prime minister, and he only to the tsar, not to the duma, the October Manifesto invalidated the theory of the autocracy, for thereafter the tsar shared the right of governing Russia with the popularly elected duma.

Witte was the author of the October Manifesto and he was at once named the first prime minister under Russia’s constitutional government. He had openly opposed the war but he had negotiated the peace treaty with Japan (September 5, 1905), by which he won back by diplomacy much of what Russia had lost by military defeat. Witte’s first task as prime minister was to reestablish order in Russia, for the October Manifesto had not pacified all the revolutionists. The Social Democrats of St. Petersburg organized a soviet, or “council,” of workingmen’s deputies, whose vice-president was Leon Trotsky (1877–1940). When Trotsky began arming the populace of the capital, it seemed for a moment that civil war would result, but when Witte arrested its leaders (December 16) this first soviet came to an inglorious end. A nation-wide series of pogroms was then launched, with gangs of masked hoodlums, known as the “Black Hundreds,” terrorizing the country, and with government agents frequently stirring up mobs. Witte had no sympathy with such performances and did what he could to stop them, but their leaders enjoyed the tsar’s confidence, and Witte could do nothing. Meantime Witte was courting the favor of the peasants, reducing the payments for their land
by one half in 1906 and abolishing them completely thereafter. By another decree he made suffrage for the new duma virtually universal, and he granted Finland a new and more liberal constitution. And last, but not least, he managed to borrow half a billion dollars from French and English bankers, thereby rendering the autocracy financially independent of the duma for the time being. By these measures Witte prolonged the life of the autocracy for a dozen years, but his services led to his downfall, for as soon as the immediate danger of revolution had been removed, the tsar no longer felt the need of his aid. Witte was dismissed barely six months after taking office (May 2, 1906).

Meantime elections had been held throughout Russia, and on May 10 the first meeting of the duma took place. The Social Revolutionaries and the Social Democrats had boycotted the election, and were therefore unrepresented in the duma, but various other radicals elected about one hundred deputies. The Constitutional Democrats,
or “Cadets,” elected 187 of their members, who formed the largest party and influenced enough other deputies to hold a balance of power: they were largely middle-class liberals, demanding further reforms but willing to accept the October Manifesto as a starting point. About forty deputies, called “Octobrists,” wanted no further reforms, and about seventy represented minor nationalities. The government had made an ill-advised attempt to create a Peasant party, believing that the Russian muzhik entertained the greatest love and awe for his “Little Father” and was easily led by the priests. About two hundred peasants were actually elected, but the government soon learned to its sorrow that these men held firmly to one fixed idea—that all estates belonging to the crown or the church, and perhaps those of the nobility as well, should be handed over to the peasants without compensation—and that beyond this they would discuss no measures at all. During the seventy days of its life the duma did little except demand repeatedly though in vain that Witte’s successor resign. The tsar then declared himself cruelly disappointed by the duma’s uncoöperative spirit and dissolved it. When the Cadet deputies protested against this arbitrary act, they were disfranchised for their courage, and the party lost its leaders. The Second Duma (1907) fared no better, but the Third and Fourth dumas, elected in 1907 and 1912 respectively, were allowed to fill out their terms of office. Being willing to work with the ministers and bureaucrats, they enjoyed no great power.

Witte’s immediate successor was an aged and cynical aristocrat, I. L. Goremykin (1839–1917), who held office for only a few weeks and was replaced by Peter Stolypin (1863–1911). Though a conservative aristocrat and a Slavophil, Stolypin was an extremely able man and by no means blind to conditions in Russia. He succeeded in taming the duma, but he owes his fame chiefly to his agrarian reforms. His program was based largely upon the findings of Witte’s committees of 1903, and his purpose was to win over the able and more aggressive peasants. Believing that the peasants’ backwardness resulted not only from their ignorance but also from a lack of incentive to good work, he decided that the communal mir would have to go. His agrarian law of 1906 therefore provided that the head of any peasant family might claim his share of the common land and hold it thereafter in his own name, or sell it and move away. During the next eight years—until the First World War broke out—more than a third of the peasant heads of families exercised this right, and a
large class of independent landowning farmers thus arose. Though
many peasants continued to cast covetous eyes upon the estates of
the nobility, the ambitious and energetic farmers rose to better con-
ditions than ever before. Stolypin's reforms also brought greatly im-
proved agriculture, and during the next eight years the production
of grain increased by 30 percent, that of dairy products by nearly 100
percent.

Stolypin's agrarian reforms brought other economic and social de-
velopments that were equally important for Russia. Many landlords
hastened to sell their estates, fearing that they would soon be con-
fiscated, and the capital acquired was invested in Russian industry.
The improved economic condition of many peasants enabled them to
buy more things, thus providing larger markets for new industry.
The weaker and less able peasants, on the other hand, were forced
from their villages into the cities, where they provided factory owners
with cheap labor. The years following the Revolution of 1905 were
therefore a period of economic prosperity and industrial progress,
which may be illustrated by a few figures. Foreign trade increased
75 percent between 1906 and 1913, with exports rising about 50 per-
cent and imports more than 100 percent. The former were largely
agricultural products, to be sure, but the export of manufactured
goods to Siberia and the rest of Asia was increasing rapidly. The
fundamental iron and coal industries doubled their output, bringing
Russia almost up to the level of France. Russia's railway system was
extended by 5500 miles, or 14 percent, during these years (or 100
percent since 1894), and freight shipments were more than doubled.
The number of savings banks increased by 25 percent, the number
of savings accounts by 50 percent, and the amounts on deposit by
more than 60 percent. The number of life insurance policies written
annually was multiplied by six while the amounts of insurance issued
increased fourfold.

These economic changes had great political consequences. When
the great landlords sold their estates, this ancient class of society
began to disintegrate, thus depriving the autocracy of its strongest
prop. The new industrialists were impatient with the inefficiency of
the bureaucracy and resented the airs of the aristocracy, but at the
same time they were worried by the rising tide of socialistic agita-
tion among their workers. Terroristic activity had reached its peak in
1907 (when over 2500 officials were assassinated, ranging from gen-
ers down to village policemen), after which it declined noticeably
for a few years. Many former revolutionists turned to despairing
cynicism, others to mysticism and religion. An epidemic of suicide
swept the land, with statistics showing that in Moscow more than a
third of those who did away with themselves were between fifteen
and twenty years of age. But this despair could not last forever, and
revolution presently raised its head once more. Observers have some-
times expressed the opinion that the death of Tolstoi in 1910 pre-
cipitated the revival. This venerable patriarch had raised his voice in
protest during the darkest period of the reaction, and his death sent a
shock through all Russia. Revolutionists shook themselves out of their
despondency and resumed their activities. When the duma refused to
pass one of his bills, Stolypin dissolved that body for three days and
issued the law by special decree. Though this procedure was strictly
legal, his evasion of the duma’s will was Stolypin’s death warrant, for
on September 14, 1911, he was shot, in the tsar’s presence, by the
usual police stool pigeon who was at heart a revolutionist.

RUSSIA’S TERRITORIAL EXPANSION

The strength and energy of the Russian people in the nineteenth
century is also shown by the great expansion of the Russian Empire.
At this same time many European states were expanding their
colonial empires, partly in order to find homes for their increasing
populations, partly to secure markets, raw materials, and fields for
profitable investment, partly for reasons connected with military or
naval strategy, and partly because of a chauvinistic desire for more
territory. Russia’s territorial expansion was for rather different rea-
sons. Her population was rising rapidly, it is true, and there was con-
siderable emigration from Russia, especially during the last decade
of the century, but nearly all these emigrants went to Siberia, which
had been held by the tsars ever since the sixteenth century. Russia’s
imperial expansion neither provided nor sought to provide new areas
suitable for settlement. Thanks to her economic backwardness, Rus-
sia felt no need for foreign markets or raw materials; trade with her new provinces was negligible; and instead of seeking places to invest financial capital, she was borrowing abroad so heavily as to be in danger of herself becoming a colony of French and British bankers. Military and naval defenses were likewise secondary factors in her expansion, and even Russian chauvinism differed from that of Western Europe. Russian empire builders often acted very much like their European counterparts, but here, as in so many other cases, we find on closer examination that these resemblances were only superficial.

Russia had been a conquering state ever since her people threw off the Tatar yoke at the end of the Middle Ages, and the tradition of foreign conquest was bred deep into the bones of her ruling class. Tsars were taught that their duty required them to augment their ancestral domains and thus leave more to their successors than they had themselves inherited. In early times, supposedly, the tsars took pleasure in liberating Russian Christians from the Moslem Turks, but this happy task was accomplished before the end of the eighteenth century. Russia’s expansion continued, however, with Russian imperialists justifying their activities in various ways. They continued to use Peter the Great’s phrases about warm-water ports and a “window to the West,” even when demanding Constantinople, the Persian Gulf, or Vladivostok on the Pacific. The Slavophils added other pretexts. Picturing Constantinople as the hearth from which Russia received her Orthodox faith, they spoke eloquently of the Russian mužhik’s alleged desire to worship in Santa Sophia. They recalled that Moscow had once been called the Third Rome, and they spoke of Constantinople as Tsargrad (“Tsar’s City”). They also claimed for Russia the privilege of protecting all Orthodox pilgrims to the Holy Land, and they demanded custodianship of the sacred places there—which of course would provide them with excuses for sending in large bodies of troops. Pan-Slavism was presently added to Orthodoxy as an excuse for liberating (and dominating) Serbs, Bulgars, and other peoples in the Balkan Peninsula, and much was said of the benign effects of Russian rule in civilizing conquered tribesmen.

At the same time the autocracy sometimes used foreign expansion to distract people’s attention from the revolutionists at home. Each of Russia’s three major wars in the century after Napoleon (the Crimean War of 1853-1856, the Turkish War of 1877-1878, and the Japanese War of 1904-1905) was primarily imperialistic, and each
came at a moment when the revolutionists were especially active in Russia. Many people believed that the Revolution would be overwhelmed by the enthusiasm following military victory. In each case, however, Russia lost the war, and conditions were worse afterward than before. Nevertheless, we must not regard Russia’s imperial expansion as carefully planned in advance. More often than not, the great territorial acquisitions were made by a few lusty but irresponsible adventurers, whose acts were later ratified by the autocracy.

Russian expansion in the nineteenth century took three main directions, and it may conveniently be divided into periods by the great imperialistic wars. The first and most important goal of the imperialists was the seizure of Constantinople and domination of the Balkans, but after their setbacks in 1856 and 1878 they turned their attention to Asia instead. Russian explorers and conquerors advanced in a southeasterly direction from the Caspian Sea through Turkestan toward Persia, Afghanistan, and India, thereby arousing the apprehensions of the British. Others crossed Siberia to the Pacific and entered Manchuria, where they came into conflict with Japan. Defeat in the Japanese War (1905) was followed by a diplomatic understanding with England (1907), which forced the Russians to turn their attention back to the Balkans. Once more they became extremely active in this region during the years immediately following 1905, and their activities there were a major cause of the First World War (1914). Leaving the Balkans aside for a moment, let us trace Russian progress in the two Asiatic areas.

By 1813 Russia had completed the conquest of the Caucasus, except for a few mountain areas and a part of what later became Russian Armenia. During the next forty years explorers were penetrating the Transcaucasian region south of Siberia. This district, now the Kazakh Republic in the Soviet Union, is a rather barren steppe, much of it suitable only for pasturing sheep, but the Russians had firmly established themselves there before the outbreak of the Crimean War. During the next twenty years they pushed further south into Turkestan, proclaiming protectorates over Bokhara (1868) and Khiva (1873), and annexing Samarkand (1868) and Ferghana (1876). They thus reached the frontier of Afghanistan and almost touched India. Two years later they signed a treaty of alliance with Afghanistan. After their setback following the Turkish War of 1877–1878, the Russians redoubled their efforts in Turkestan, organizing the Transcaspian Province in 1881 and thus rounding out their territories.
to the Persian frontier. They also built the Transcaspian Railway eastward from a port on the Caspian Sea, reaching Merv in 1884, the Afghanistan border barely fifty miles from Herat in 1885, Bokhara and Samarkand in 1888, and Andijan in Ferghana in 1899. A railway built across Kazakh in 1906 connected these regions directly with Russia. As such railways could not hope to become economically profitable, the English suspected (no doubt correctly) that the Russians were preparing a military attack upon India, and they replied by strengthening their Indian railway system. In fact, one Russian general boasted that he could conquer India with fifty thousand men, but cooler counsels prevailed, and Russia turned her attention to Persia. For several years England championed the integrity of Persia (and Afghanistan), but after the Russo-Japanese War the two rivals were willing to compromise. Russia was permitted to establish a “sphere of influence” over the northern third of Persia, England took over the southeastern third (including the mouth of the Persian Gulf), and the central part was left to the Persians themselves (1907).

Russian explorers crossed Siberia to the Pacific in the seventeenth century, towns sprang up along the main routes, and Peter the Great completed the process by annexing the Kamchatka peninsula in the extreme northeast (1697). During the next century Russians explored the Bering Sea and even staked out large claims in Alaska and western Canada. Not much interest was shown in these remote and inhospitable regions, however, though a Russian governor took advantage of the Anglo-French intervention in China (see p. 492) to extort two provinces from the unhappy Chinese—the Amur Province in 1858 and the neighboring Maritime Province in 1860. In the latter district he founded a city with the ambitious name Vladivostok (“Lord of the East”), but progress thereafter was slow. The imperial government was even glad to sell Alaska to the United States for $7,200,000 (1867). In the 1880’s the government began to take an interest in Siberia as a place of settlement; the Trans-Siberian Railway Company was organized in 1891; and fifteen years later the line was completed. To avoid a long and circuitous route through difficult territory, the Russians arranged to build a section of the main line across Chinese territory in northern Manchuria (1895). Russian troops were sent to guard this line, and in 1898 Russia extorted a lease on the south Manchurian city of Port Arthur. Russian advances in this region led to the Japanese War of 1904–1905 (see
Russia and the Balkans

At the beginning of the nineteenth century almost the whole Balkan Peninsula was still groaning under the rule of the Turks, as it had been for over three hundred years. The history of this corner of Europe then became the story of how Turkish power declined (see p. 69) and of how the Balkan peoples freed themselves from the Turkish yoke. The struggle was long and bitter, less because of the resistance of the Turks than because of the quarrels of the Balkan peoples among themselves and the frequent interventions of Russia and the Western powers, but with Russian aid the Balkan people eventually achieved their independence.

Nature herself seems to have decreed divisions among the Balkan peoples. The peninsula is broken into fragments by mountain ranges running in every direction, and the fact that it is crossed by the principal highway connecting Europe and Asia Minor has subjected it to repeated invasion. It has become a Babel of languages and races. The Albanian tribesmen in the west, the Greeks in the south, and the Romanians in the north claim to have occupied their respective territories since classic times; Slavic invaders occupied large areas in the sixth and seventh centuries; a little later the Asiatic Bulgars imposed their rule upon many of the Slavs but were eventually absorbed by their subjects; the Turks from Asia Minor conquered the whole peninsula in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; and peaceful invasions of Armenians, Gypsies, and Jews have complicated the tangle. Religion made confusion worse confounded, for in this part of the world religious affiliation was a matter of high importance. Though most people called themselves Orthodox, they were organized in national churches whose sentiments toward each other were not always brotherly. Economics intensified these divisions. Almost all the Slavs and Romanians were peasant farmers, but the Armenians and Jews, as well as many of the Greeks, were merchants and traders. And last of all came antipathies dating from the historic past. The long rule of the Turks had caused them to be hated by all the Christians, but it also divided the Christians among themselves. The Turks usually entrusted the government of Slavic districts to Greek administrators, with the result that, while the Turks re-
garded the Greeks as mere Christian cattle, the Slavs saw little to choose between them and the Turks, and the Greeks regarded the Slavs as their inferiors.

In the first half of the nineteenth century several independent Christian states arose in Turkish territory. The Slavs of tiny Montenegro, secure in their mountain fastnesses, had never bent the knee to the Turk, and their independence was recognized by the sultan in 1799. A Serbian swineherd, Black George or “Karageorge,” took up arms against the Turks in 1804 and for nine years maintained an independent government in Belgrade. A rival leader, named Obrenovich, launched a new revolt in 1815, murdered Karageorge, and won full autonomy for a small territory in 1830. Meantime the Greeks too had risen in revolt, and the European powers had intervened (see p. 237). The British and French destroyed the Turkish fleet at Navarino (1827), and Russian troops reached Adrianople, barely 130 miles from Constantinople. Greece was declared a republic in 1829 but in 1832 it became a constitutional monarchy under a Danish king. At the same time two Romanian provinces were granted autonomy under Russian protection. Russian troops occupied the provinces until 1836, and Russian influence remained strong after their departure. In 1861 the two provinces declared their union, and five years later Prince Carol, of the German dynasty of Hohenzollern, was made their ruler.

In spite of these rebellions, the Bulgarians continued to suffer under Turkish rule. Not until 1877 did their tribulations become intolerable to the Russian tsar, who then intervened and marched on Constantinople. A peace treaty, signed at the suburb of San Stefano, recognized Montenegro, Serbia, and Romania as completely independent; and a large Bulgaria was to have absorbed most of the sultan’s remaining possessions in Europe—except Constantinople and its immediate environs. All these states would have been virtual satellites of Russia. This arrangement was too much for England, however, and Bismarck, anxious to play the role of “honest broker,” summoned the Congress of Berlin (1878, see p. 408). Here the Treaty of San Stefano was rewritten. Hohenzollern Romania was awarded rather more territory than before; Serbia and Montenegro got less; Greece got none at all; and only about a third of Bulgaria became independent. Russia was virtually excluded from the Balkans, and within a few years Bismarck had made all the Balkan states German satellites. England took Cyprus from Turkey, and by way of
compensation Austria-Hungary was allowed to administer Bosnia and Herzegovina, two Slavic provinces in the Balkans formerly ruled by the Turks (1878).

Bismarck thus put the Balkan question "on ice," as he expressed it, and for the next twenty years Europeans were likely to regard the region as a field for romance and musical comedy. During these years the importance of the Balkans was growing, however, and in the opening decade of the next century this area became one of the most important stakes in European diplomacy, fought over principally by Austria and Russia. Balkan statesmen were ever on the lookout for European support and always ready to coöperate with the most unscrupulous European politicians. At their best they were adept at the art of fishing in troubled waters; at their worst they were the despised flunkies of European foreign offices. Four of the six rulers in 1914 were European princes, and the other two were deeply indebted to Russia. These Balkan princes took a much more active part in politics, and enjoyed much greater power, than did the royalty of western Europe. They were assisted by cabinets of their own choice, and while parliaments of a sort existed, the franchise was so narrowly restricted that the peasants, who made up most of the population, had no voice in the government of their country. The only domestic opposition came from organized camarillas which, like the governments themselves, were in the pay of foreign powers and had as chief activities the plotting of murder and revolution. During the one hundred years ending in 1914 only two Balkan princes ceased ruling in consequence of natural death—and each was overtaken by this natural death soon after he mounted the throne. The Balkan Peninsula, more than any other part of the world, was cursed in its politicians.

At the end of the century the Balkan peoples again became restless, with the Greeks unsuccessfully attempting to liberate Crete from the Turks (1897). A few years later members of the Karageorge dynasty drove the pro-Austrian Obrenovich dynasty from Serbia (1903), and with Russian encouragement they began a Pan-Serbian agitation demanding the annexation of all the South Slavs, including not only those still ruled by the Turks but also the Montenegrins, the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Croats and Slovenes in Austria-Hungary. Deeply alarmed by this agitation, the Austrians formally annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, after having administered it for thirty years. The highly incensed Serbs and Russians then redoubled their anti-Austrian propaganda. Meantime German
businessmen had been building a commercial empire in Turkey, the most spectacular symbol of which was a railway from Constantinople to Baghdad, begun in 1903 and almost finished in 1914. These rivalries made the Balkans the cockpit of Europe, and eventually they led to the outbreak of the First World War.
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A NEW NATION—AMERICA A WORLD POWER
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23. A NEW NATION

The British colonists in North America gained their political independence by the American Revolution, and with the adoption of the Constitution they established a national government, but more than a century was to pass before the United States won recognition as a world power. In fact, many early Americans had no desire for what they regarded as an empty honor. They or their ancestors had fled from Europe, or else they had been expelled, and they now wished to hear no more about their former homes. They were quite sure that in America they had found something new and different and very much better. Proclaiming it their task to cultivate liberty in the New World, they turned their backs upon Europe and set to work creating a new nation where freedom would prevail, where men could enjoy the fruits of their labor in peace, and where the age-old tyrannies and feuds of Europe would be forgotten.

When the American colonists achieved their independence in 1783, their territorial claims reached westward only to the Mississippi River, and not until seventy years later did the United States attain its present continental boundaries. The details of this territorial expansion, and the story of each individual annexation, need not delay us long. It is enough to remember that Jefferson's Louisiana Purchase (1803) added the Missouri Valley; that the northern limits of that region, setting its boundary with Canada at the forty-ninth parallel from the Lake of the Woods west to the Rocky Mountains, were determined by treaty with England in 1818; that the Florida country was taken from Spain piecemeal between 1810 and 1819; that the Republic of Texas (set up by Americans and independent of Mexico after 1836) was annexed in 1845; that the Oregon country was added in 1846, when the Canadian boundary was extended along the forty-
ninth parallel to Puget Sound, thence down its channel to the Pacific; that the territory lying between Texas and the Pacific was taken from Mexico in 1848; and that the present boundaries of continental United States were completed with the Gadsden Purchase from Mexico in 1853. The area held by the United States had grown from about 890,000 square miles to slightly over three million. Territorial expansion did not cease, however, for Alaska was purchased from Russia in 1867, and various overseas territories were annexed in the late 1890's. By that time a new America had entered the general European race for colonies.

Legal claims to territory were not so important as its actual settlement, and much of American history has been the story of how these new territories were gradually occupied, first by explorers, then by squatters, then by more permanent farmers, and finally by town and city dwellers. At the outbreak of the American Revolution, only a few colonists had crossed the Alleghenies into the Ohio Valley, but even then the attempt of the British authorities to exclude settlers from that region was a major cause of complaint. During the war, pioneers began crossing the mountains into Kentucky in considerable numbers, and in 1787 the Northwest Ordinance opened up the territory between the Ohio and the Mississippi rivers. In 1792 Kentucky, having a population of over 75,000, was deemed sufficiently settled
to justify her admission to the Union as a separate state; Tennessee gained statehood four years later; and Ohio followed in 1802. During the next eighteen years, seven more new states were created, the last of them being Missouri (1821). Except for Wisconsin and Michigan, all the original territory of the United States had now achieved statehood, while Louisiana and Missouri were parts of the Louisiana Purchase annexed only a few years before. Trail blazers continued to push westward in ever increasing numbers, but almost a century was to elapse before Arizona became the forty-eighth state (1912).

During these early years the population of the United States grew by leaps and bounds. When the first census was taken in 1790, the total population was found to be slightly under 4 million; by 1820 it had risen to almost 10 million; by 1860 it had passed 31 million; and in 1900 it stood at 76 million. During the crucial first forty years of the Republic, population increase was due almost entirely to the large families of the early settlers, for immigration from Europe was not heavy. America's fundamental political and social institutions were therefore shaped by a native-born population that was predominantly British in origin.

The number of immigrants annually entering this country reached 10,000 in 1825 and rose rapidly thereafter—from 23,000 in 1830 to 84,000 in 1840 and 370,000 in 1850, and in 1854 it reached a peak of 428,000. This number was not attained again until 1880, after which date immigration continued high until the depression of the 1930's. Six times during the ten years preceding 1914 it passed the one-million mark. At first most immigrants entering the United States came from the British Isles, with English in the majority, but the potato famine of 1845 was followed by a flood of Irish immigrants, and after 1848 Germans too began to arrive in considerable numbers. During the 1850's native Americans consequently began to resent the presence of so many "foreigners," especially as the south Irish and some Germans were Catholics. When the "Know-Nothing" party won a brief popularity by preaching pure Americanism, the newcomers replied by making haste to Americanize themselves. Though they did not greatly alter the basic patterns of American life, they made many sorely needed contributions to it.

FOUNDING A NATION

When George Washington became president of the United States, he presided over a frail union of thirteen separate and independent
states, each of which was jealous of all the others. Moreover, there were wide differences of opinion regarding policy and even regarding the fundamental nature and powers of the federal government. In general these early diversities sprang from class differences rather than from geographical sectionalism. The Federalists, under the leadership of Alexander Hamilton (1757–1804), favored the well-to-do classes; they encouraged commerce and industry; they feared and loathed the democratic ideals of their opponents (whom they often accused of Jacobinism); and they worked for a strong central government. Hamilton was a New York lawyer of humble origin, but he had married into the social and financial aristocracy of the city, and he once uttered the famous remark, “The people is a great beast!” Being a conservative and highly conscious of human imperfection, he believed in using force to restrain this human beast. Nevertheless it was he, more than any other one man except Washington, who guided the young nation through its first perilous years.

The leader of the opposite faction, Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826), stood in sharp contrast to Hamilton. Though born in easy circumstances and, on his mother’s side, related to one of the most aristocratic families of Virginia, Jefferson threw in his lot with the common man. An idealistic believer in liberty, a deist in theology, and a deeply read scholar, he shared the eighteenth century’s views regarding the perfectibility of man, and he regarded popular education as man’s chief hope of salvation. In his last days he composed an epitaph for himself which stated merely that he had been “author of the Declaration of Independence, of the statute of Virginia for religious freedom, and father of the University of Virginia.” Not one word about his having been president of the United States! Throughout his life, Jefferson remained a champion of the common man; he practiced “republican” simplicity in manners and social behavior; he hoped that America would remain a country of small independent farmers; he spoke of reducing the role of government to a minimum but did little when in office to accomplish it; he strove to keep America out of Europe’s wars; and he urged that every section of the country be accorded as much local autonomy as possible.

Washington endeavored to reconcile these two factions, making Jefferson his secretary of state while Hamilton became his secretary of the treasury, and in his Farewell Address (1796) he solemnly warned his fellow countrymen against “sectional jealousies and partisan strife.” His successor, John Adams (1797–1801), saw fit to
disregard this admonition, however, and during the next four years the Federalists took full control. They continued their centralizing policy, but they so antagonized the agrarian faction that at the next election power swung to the Republicans—as Jefferson's followers were called. The War of 1812 hastened the end of the Federalist party, which, by opposing the war, had become merely a mouthpiece of New England sectionalism. Its candidate for the presidency was badly defeated in 1816, and shortly thereafter the party silently folded its tents.

The war made the Republicans more nationalistic, however, and caused them to absorb many Federalist ideas about national unity. At the same time John Marshall (1755–1835), who had been chief justice of the Supreme Court since 1801, was handing down a series of decisions on fundamental matters of constitutional law, always interpreting the Constitution in a highly Federalist sense. Other leaders were trying to unite the nation economically as well as politically. Thus Henry Clay (1777–1852) of Kentucky, a war hawk of 1812, devised his “American system,” under which the federal government would use tariffs, road building, and other measures to promote economic cooperation between the different sections of the country and render the nation economically independent of Europe.

Nevertheless, the years following the War of 1812 saw an ominous growth of sectionalism in the United States. Though in large part economic, this new sectionalism also touched deeper emotions. New England and the Middle Atlantic states were progressing rapidly as manufacturing areas, and their industrial leaders and political spokesmen—men such as Daniel Webster (1782–1852)—demanded high protective tariffs to keep out British goods. They tended to regard the West and South as mere colonial areas to provide them with markets and raw materials, and they often looked with favor upon Clay's “American system.” The Southern states, on the other hand, remained almost wholly agricultural and depended largely upon a few staple crops—especially cotton, tobacco, rice, and sugar. Some of their surplus products were sent north to be exchanged for manufactured goods, but more went to England for the same purpose. Southerners therefore opposed the tariffs, which raised the prices of English goods and which might provoke England to retaliatory measures. (England was not yet committed to free trade.) The South's leading spokesman was John C. Calhoun (1782–1850), a wealthy South Carolina planter, endowed with a deep and powerful
intellect, who did much to develop the philosophy of sectionalism, states' rights, and the inalienable rights of all minorities.

These were the older sections of the United States, but by the 1820's the West too had begun to play an important part in American political life. A popular theory has pictured the West, with its frontier freedom, as the birthplace of nearly everything that is characteristic or worth while in American life—our democracy, our individualism, our belief in the common man, our desire for equality of opportunity, our expansionism, our unquenchable optimism and hope. Much of this romantic picture is highly exaggerated, yet the tremendous influence of the West in forming America cannot be denied. During the 1820's the whole West favored land policies to which Easterners and Southerners were usually opposed. Westerners wanted to buy government land cheaply, while the East wished the government to finance itself largely by selling these lands at high prices. But when the West demanded federal expenditures for roads, canals, and other internal improvements, it usually enjoyed the support of Eastern business interests. The Westerners led in such Jeffersonian reforms as the introduction of manhood suffrage and the complete separation of church and state, but at the same time they favored a strong central government, and they were highly nationalistic. When men migrated to the West they lost their old feeling for the state from which they came, and they usually failed to develop a new local patriotism. They therefore attached their loyalty to the United States as a whole, rather than to their particular state, and their emotional and intellectual character, being what it was, often caused them to express their patriotism in spread-eagle fashion.

Jacksonian Democracy

The spirit of this age was well expressed by Andrew Jackson (1767–1845) of Tennessee, a former Indian-fighter who became a leading figure in national politics. Though a Westerner sharing many of the qualities commonly attributed to Westerners, Jackson was not the representative of any one section of the country. He drew his followers from the newly enfranchised workers in Northern cities as well as from the frontiersmen of the West and the small cotton farmers of the South, and he always made the most of democracy and nationalism. During his eight years as president (1829–1837) he kept America in a turmoil. He abolished the Bank of the United States,
which he regarded as a monopoly having undue power over the little
man; and his exorciation of the "money power" left little for later
generations to add. His high-tariff policy alienated Calhoun and the
Old South. His "cheap money" policies and his sale of public lands at
low prices, designed to help the poor farmer, led to much wild
speculation, and eventually to the Panic of 1837, but as long as he
was in office the country was prosperous. Jackson remade Jefferson's
Republican party, which thereafter bore its present name of the
Democratic party, while his opponents in the well-to-do commercial
and aristocratic classes called themselves Whigs.

As the effects of this panic and the ensuing depression gradually
wore off, many Americans relieved their exuberant energy by de-
manding territorial expansion westward to the Pacific. Enthusiasts
loudly declared that it was the "manifest destiny" of the United
States to dominate the continent—or perhaps the entire Western
Hemisphere. Their agitation led to the annexation of Texas (1845),
to the treaty with England by which the United States secured
Oregon and Washington (1846), and to the annexation of California
and the Southwest (1848). The more aggressive expansionists had
demanded that England surrender everything west of the Rockies,
and had shouted "Fifty-four Forty or Fight." (The southern boundary
of Alaska, then held by Russia, was at 54°40' north latitude.) Cooler
counsels eventually prevailed, and the two countries divided the
disputed territory at the forty-ninth parallel. In the Southwest,
however, the Mexican War was fought in 1846–1848. In the minds of
many people America's manifest destiny required only the annexation
of everything to the Pacific, but others declared that this destiny
required the establishment of free, democratic, and equalitarian gov-
ernments not only in the new territories but in the old ones as well.
The decade of the 1840's therefore witnessed a tremendous amount of
democratic agitation in most parts of the United States.

Ever since the days of the Pilgrim Fathers, more than two hundred
years before this, America had been a land where idealistic reformers
could try out their theories: it was a land of "backwoods utopias." Such
social experiments usually had a religious as well as an economic
inspiration, and they were especially numerous in the first half of the
nineteenth century. Eminent among the experimenters of this time
was Robert Owen, whose activities at New Harmony, Indiana, be-
tween 1825 and 1828, have already been mentioned (p. 269); other
famous experiments were Brook Farm, near Boston, conducted along
Fourierist lines by a number of literary men and intellectual leaders (1841–1847), and the Oneida Community in upper New York State. The most successful of all these social and religious experiments of the 1840’s was the Mormon colony at Salt Lake City, founded by Brigham Young in 1847. Not all social planners were as thoroughgoing as these utopians, but experiments such as these attracted wide attention, advertised American liberty and equality, and helped perpetuate the old American contention that if these blessings were assured all things would be possible.

Shortly before this time a distinguished French visitor to America (Alexis de Tocqueville) declared that “the general equality of condition among the people” was the most notable feature of American life, and that “this primary fact exercises a prodigious influence upon the whole course of society, its public opinion, its laws, its governing authorities, and the habits of the governed.” The 1840’s were perhaps the period when equality was preached the most vociferously and when liberty was the most highly extolled. Refugees from Europe, such as the Hungarian Louis Kossuth (p. 290), were greeted with ovations, and thousands of Germans flocked to this country after the collapse of the Revolution of 1848. At the same time reformers were trying to bring greater liberty and equality to America and to spread their benefits among all classes of people. It was at this period, for example, that free education for all was established, with state-supported public schools, and with academies and colleges open to everyone. There was a great ferment in the churches, with countless new sects arising, and with the freer and more popular denominations making rapid progress. There were also countless humanitarian crusades, one of the most important of which demanded the abolition of slavery, but others urged prohibition, pacifism, woman suffrage, and even (in the case, at least, of Mrs. Amelia Bloomer) radical dress reform for women.

Early in the nineteenth century an English literary critic sneeringly inquired, “Who ever reads an American book?” As a matter of fact, it is hard to think of an American book then available that a professional critic should have read, but fifty years later America was no longer open to such a reproach. Soon after the War of 1812 a group of New Yorkers, including Washington Irving (1783–1859), James Fenimore Cooper (1789–1851), and William Cullen Bryant (1794–1878), published their first works, and in the 1840’s and 1850’s America began to produce an important literature. Among the younger
group of writers were the poets Edgar Allan Poe (1809–1849) and Walt Whitman (1819–1892) and the novelist Herman Melville (1819–1891), but the most famous were those living in Boston or nearby Concord. Their activities resulted in what has been called "the Flowering of New England." The roster of this group includes many famous names, the best-known of which, perhaps, are those of the essayist Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882), the novelist Nathaniel Hawthorne (1804–1864), and the poet Henry Wadsworth Longfellow (1807–1882). These writers were Americans, and they usually dealt with American themes, but most of the New England group had studied or traveled extensively in Europe as young men; they imitated European models; they eagerly craved European recognition; and they have sometimes been accused of intellectual colonialism. American literature had not yet quite come of age.

Sectionalism and the Civil War

In America, as in Europe, nationalism was a driving force in political life during the 1840’s and 1850’s, and everywhere it was fostered by economic as well as by idealistic forces. Railways were binding whole countries together, and industry made different parts of every country dependent upon each other. But the older sectionalism survived in various parts of every country, and it often was intensified by the reaction against impetuous nationalism. In Germany and Italy strong national states were achieved only after the long quarrels of the 1850’s and the bloody wars of the 1860’s and 1870; in America, national unity was preceded by equally bitter quarrels and the Civil War of 1861–1865.

The sharp division of America between the North and the South became increasingly troublesome after the days of Andrew Jackson. This sectionalism cannot be explained by any one factor—geography, climate, economics, cultural inheritances, or social organization—but all these forces played their part. We can only say that, over the years, the peoples of the two regions had developed such radically different ways of life that they could neither sympathize with nor understand each other. In the early decades of the century, before controversy became acute, the peoples of the West had faced their own special problems and had united in a national program, but presently they too were divided between North and South. Climate was partly to blame, for the "cotton belt" of the South differed both agriculturally
and socially from the "corn belt" of the North. The majority of the settlers in the Old Southwest had come from the Old South, while most of those north of the Ohio River came from New England, and each group brought with it much of the culture of its old home. By 1850 the West too was divided.

While North and South were separated by differences touching nearly every aspect of social life, slavery gradually became a symbol of their manifold divergencies. Negro slaves had been brought to America almost as soon as white men settled in the colonies, and in early times they were not confined to the South. Slavery was never very profitable in the North, however, where it had virtually ceased to exist by the time of the Revolution. In the South, on the other hand, its importance grew with the increasing importance of the cotton crop in the early decades of the nineteenth century. In fact, slavery seemed to be the only possible solution to the labor problem in the South, and it became the foundation upon which the whole social structure of the "cotton kingdom" was based.

Various religious sects, notably the Quakers and the Methodists, began preaching against slavery even in colonial times, and the humanitarian philosophy of the eighteenth century was equally critical of the institution. Many enlightened Southerners—such as Thomas Jefferson, who owned slaves himself—were disturbed in their minds by the slave system and looked forward hopefully to its gradual abolition. The importation of slaves from Africa was forbidden in 1808,
but cotton was already becoming a major crop, slaves seemed essential as cotton pickers, and abolitionist sentiment quickly vanished in the South. Northern abolitionists continued their agitation, however, and thus helped tear the nation asunder. William Lloyd Garrison (1805–1879) launched his famous antislavery journal, *The Liberator*, in Boston in 1831. Four years later his fellow Bostonians almost lynched him, but he continued his crusade with ever increasing vehemence until the end of the Civil War. A second landmark in the abolitionist movement was the publication of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s novel *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* (1852). This book gave a caricature rather than a true picture of the slave system, yet it was perhaps the most influential book ever written in America. Southerners replied to such invectives in kind, and often showed that they too could justify their ways with Biblical texts. Northerners, on the other hand, were smugly unwilling to admit even an element of truth in the Southern allegation that far more happiness existed among the slaves on a Virginia plantation than among the workers of a mill town in New England.

The abolitionists and their opponents usually regarded slavery as a moral issue, but there can be no doubt that as an economic institution slavery cost the South dearly. Slaves made wretched farm laborers for, lacking all incentive to good work, they quickly wore out the land. Long before 1860 soil exhaustion had virtually ruined large areas in Virginia and the Carolinas, after which plantation owners made their profits largely by breeding slaves to be sold in the West. Moreover, the hazards of the slave system were very great. Pestilence might destroy half the slaves on a plantation in a few weeks; the better slaves might run away; and if the price of cotton dropped, the slave owner—unlike the factory owner employing free labor—could not reduce his expenses by laying off some or all of his workers. Perhaps those who suffered most from the slave system were the poor whites who made up the bulk of the white population and who had to compete with slave labor. Nevertheless, they were the most determined defenders of the system and the ones who died in the greatest numbers during the Civil War. For them, slavery was hopelessly entangled with the race problem.

Long before 1860 it had become fairly obvious that unless large new territories were opened to slavery the social system based upon it was doomed. The annexation of Texas (1845) brought momentary relief, but gains from the Mexican War were a disappointment, and during the 1850’s a few Southerners talked of seizing Cuba. By this
time, however, the rivalry of the two social systems was so keen that it was no longer a mere matter of financial profit. Southern leaders feared that Northern abolitionists might force legislation through congress to curb slavery. This possibility they regarded as an intolerable menace to their freedom. They had no hope of maintaining the upper hand, or even equality, in the House of Representatives, but as long as slave states and free states were equal in number the Southern states could prevent the passage of such measures through the Senate. This senatorial balance, created by the Missouri Compromise of 1820, was finally upset by the admission of free states—California (1850), Minnesota (1858), and Oregon (1859)—with no compensating slave states. When other attempts at compromise proved equally unsuccessful, Southerners began talking more and more openly of secession from the Union.

For these Southerners the election of Abraham Lincoln (1809–1865) to the presidency was the last straw. A Westerner and a nationalist, Lincoln insisted that he had no intention of interfering with slavery but that he would preserve the Union at any cost. Southern extremists believed that their liberties were in danger, however, and without waiting for Lincoln to take office the state of South Carolina seceded from the Union (December 20, 1860). Within a few weeks she was followed by six others, who formed the Confederate States of America. Four more states seceded after the opening of hostilities, making a total of eleven.

The ensuing Civil War has justly been described as the first modern war. It was fought by armies of a size such as Napoleon had never hoped for; modern industry and railways became factors of prime importance; the civil population was engaged almost as deeply as the military; popular morale was maintained by widespread propaganda; and at the same time each side produced an exceptionally sorry crop of grafters and profiteers. In such a war, the North had great advantages. While its population amounted to more than twenty-two million, the Confederacy had only nine million to draw upon, and one-third of them were slaves. In the course of the war the North was able to put two and a half million men into uniform, the South barely one million. The North enjoyed twice the railway mileage of the South, it contained five times as many factories, and it possessed at least three-quarters of the nation’s wealth. Moreover, the Union navy eventually blockaded all Southern ports, thus preventing the importation of much-needed supplies from Europe. At the end of the war,
Grant's armies were well munitioned while Lee's were in need of everything. Against such odds as these, Southern courage and the military genius of General Lee were helpless, and the most that they could do was to drag the war out for four weary years.

When Lincoln delivered his Second Inaugural Address (March 4, 1865), the war was drawing to a close, and he declared his intention, "with malice toward none, with charity for all . . . to bind up the nation's wounds." Within a little over a month Lee surrendered (April 9) and, except for a few mopping-up operations, the war was over. Five days later Lincoln was murdered by a Southern fanatic who thereby brought upon his beloved Southland the greatest calamity it could then suffer. Lincoln had prepared a moderate plan for reconstructing the South, which his successor (Andrew Johnson) loyally tried to carry out. Johnson lacked Lincoln's political skill,
however, and leadership in congress was seized by the radicals, who forced through a brutal plan of military government for the South. A horde of Northern "carpetbaggers" descended upon the unfortunate South, where they joined forces with the "scalawags" (unscrupulous Southerners) and where they ruled by organizing and voting the recently emancipated and enfranchised Negroes. The shameless acts of these carpetbaggers, and Southern retaliation by "black codes" and lynchings, constitute a chapter in our history upon which Americans do not like to dwell, and even today, three-quarters of a century after the worst was over, the regrettable effects of their activities have not been obliterated from our national life.

The assassination of Lincoln also gave great impetus to the "Lincoln legend." The "Martyred President," the "Great Liberator," became the hero of American history. It was widely assumed that if only he had lived a little longer America would have been spared the worst horrors of the reconstruction period. Of course, no one knows whether or not he could have prevailed over the fanatics in congress. He was an abler man than Johnson, but we of the twentieth century have learned how hard it is to pursue a moderate and sensible policy after defeating an enemy in war.
24. AMERICA A WORLD POWER

The Civil War put an end to chattel slavery in the United States and it stopped all talk of secession, but it did much besides. It turned the nation’s history in new directions. Northern leaders during the Civil War had belonged to the new Republican party, founded as recently as 1854 by men who wished to protest against further compromise with the South and to prevent the extension of slave territory. Before they could make it a national party, however, these founders had to attract persons with other interests and add other planks to their platform. The party presently absorbed many of Henry Clay’s former Whigs, as well as “Know-Nothings,” “Free-Soilers,” and others, but until the end of the war it remained primarily a union and antislavery party. Even during the war it sponsored legislation favoring industrial capitalists and small farmers. Capitalists were aided by the National Bank Act (1863) and a series of tariff laws which almost doubled the rates prevailing in 1860; and the Homestead Act of 1862 provided free land in the West for bona fide settlers. The Union Pacific Railway, whose construction opened up large areas in the Far West to settlement, was subsidized with gifts of federal land (1862). The Morrill Land-Grant Act (1862) gave the states large tracts of land to support schools for training young men in agriculture, the mechanic arts, and military science. The colleges thus founded have since grown into state universities.

In 1864 Lincoln’s backers in all parties united to form the Union party while his numerous Northern critics voted with the Democrats. After the war the congressional radicals resurrected the Republican party—or perhaps it might better be said that they founded a new Republican party—and used it to promote their plans for reconstruct-
ing the South. By claiming that they had won the war and saved the Union and by keeping alive war hatreds—by "waving the bloody shirt," as the colorful expression of the day put it—the Republicans made sure of the soldier vote, and with its support they dominated the nation politically for many years.

**Industrial Expansion**

Behind these politicians stood the industrial leaders, who usually worked hand in glove with them. The Northeastern states had become rather highly industrialized before 1860, and a good start had been made in several states of the Old Northwest. The war of course led to great industrial expansion, not only to produce munitions of war but also to provide substitutes for the man power drawn into the army. There was a great demand for reapers and other agricultural machinery, sewing machines brought the manufacture of clothing and shoes into factories, canned foods began to appear, and Chicago meat packers established their gigantic businesses. The annual production of coal increased from 13 million tons in 1860 to 21 million in 1864, that of steel grew by 25 percent, and that of copper and lead rose correspondingly. The manufacture of consumer commodities kept pace with the production of these fundamentals. America was industrialized rapidly during the war, and when the fighting was over, the men who had accomplished this great work were determined to go still farther—and at once. During the next thirty years they put America in the first rank of the world's industrial nations.

One step in this economic revolution was the extension and consolidation of our railway systems. Building was so rapid that in 1900 the United States contained nearly half the railway mileage of the world. At first railways had been short and local affairs, but after the Civil War they were united into great systems. In 1873 Cornelius Vanderbilt (1794–1877) merged several roads to connect New York directly with Chicago, and the ensuing period of consolidation lasted into the twentieth century. When more than half the railways of the country went into bankruptcy during a financial panic in 1893, men with ready money could buy them cheaply. Groups of financiers acquired most of the important railways in America and affiliated them so closely that competition was virtually eliminated. The railways of America formed what amounted to one national system.
The same rapid growth and consolidation characterized many other branches of American industry. While manipulators were buying railways, John D. Rockefeller (1839–1937) was gaining control of the nation’s oil business. Ambitious men followed his lead and formed “trusts” in nearly every field of industry, until the year 1901 saw the creation of the largest of them all, the steel trust. Meantime the financial world was undergoing a parallel development. One of the greatest of America’s financiers was the elder J. P. Morgan (1837–1913). His father’s international banking business in London and New York enabled Morgan to raise large sums of money in England for American railways and industries. When these concerns got into financial difficulties (as they often did, thanks in part to the systematic looting to which they were often subjected), Morgan showed his genius by putting them on their feet once more. Sooner or later much of the big industry of the country entered into dealings with the house of Morgan. The United States was rapidly becoming an economic and industrial unit, and the “captain of industry” was being replaced by the giant corporation.

Although American industry developed along much the same lines as European, the condition of the American laboring classes was somewhat different. As long as there was plenty of free land, and migration was not too expensive or too difficult, many of the more ambitious and energetic workers were drawn off to the West, and though conditions in Eastern factories left much to be desired, the old American tradition of individualism retarded labor organization and strikes. The labor vote had become an important factor in elections as early as the time of Andrew Jackson, but America did not see a serious example of modern industrial warfare until the 1880’s, and there was no very successful organization of workers until the establishment of the American Federation of Labor in 1886. Even in the early twentieth century the American labor movement lagged behind the European, both in power and in radicalism.

The years following the Civil War were a period of suffering and dissatisfaction among the farmers, especially in the Middle West. A world-wide decline in agricultural prices began early in the 1870’s and continued for more than twenty years. Though America was exporting great quantities of grain and other food to Europe, and especially to England, the farmers profited little. They sometimes explained their misfortunes by accusing the railways and middlemen
of exacting undue profits, or they more vaguely laid the blame on "Wall Street," or else they demanded financial reform and the free coinage of silver to halt the decline in prices. Some merely took to heart the words of a lady in Kansas who advised them to "raise less corn and more Hell," but others organized the Populist party. These Populists developed a large program of political and economic reforms designed to help the farmers and to promote democracy. In 1892 they cast over a million votes and elected twenty-two members of the electoral college.

The election of 1896 was one of the most dramatic and bitterly fought of recent times. The Republican candidate was William McKinley (1843–1901), a rather colorless spokesman of "Big Business," whose campaign was ably managed by an astute financier. The Democrats nominated the young orator William Jennings Bryan (1860–1925), whose nomination was seconded by the Populists. McKinley's election is often taken as marking the triumph of industrial America, though he enjoyed the support of the well-to-do middle classes as well. Economic conditions began to improve soon after his election, partly perhaps because he inspired the confidence of American business leaders, and partly because gold discoveries in Alaska and South Africa raised prices throughout the world. McKinley defeated Bryan again in 1900, but in September, 1901, he was assassinated by an anarchist.
Progressivism and the New Freedom

The men who dominated American industry in the period after the Civil War were strong and rugged individualists, impatient of all restraints, unscrupulous, and little inclined to submit to government regulation. Cornelius Vanderbilt may never have uttered the famous words "The public be damned!" but he and his colleagues frequently acted upon just such principles. In their day competition was extremely bitter, methods were judged only by their success, and little sympathy was felt for those who lost in the great struggle. Shortly after the turn of the century, however, the situation changed, a new spirit arose, and people were disgusted by the activities of these industrial leaders. Popular writers exposed the lurid details of how the trusts strangled competition by illegal methods, corrupted city and state governments, bribed senators and congressmen, and induced the public to buy worthless stock or shoddy goods. Theodore Roosevelt derided such writers as "muckrakers," but they accepted the epithet, they made it honorable, and eventually they enlisted Roosevelt himself in their cause. He too began orating against "malefactors of great wealth."

The new century also brought a new variety of political reformers who called themselves Progressives. The Progressive movement was especially strong in the agrarian states of the Middle West and on the Pacific coast, but it reached almost every part of the country. Some Progressive leaders, being interested primarily in greater democracy, revived proposals made by the Populists ten or fifteen years before; some called for economic reforms designed to bring greater equality of opportunity to all; and some urged social reforms for the benefit of the workers and the poor. Though the Progressives retained traditional American conceptions of economic liberalism and individualism, they wished to regulate free enterprise in order to eliminate the abuses emphasized by the muckrakers; they found a more positive role for the state than had been customary in America, looking to it for many cooperative measures, such as municipal water systems and electric plants; and they urged labor legislation, old-age pensions, and slum clearance. Above all, however, they demanded greater honesty and efficiency in government. Muckrakers and distinguished foreign visitors had often expressed the view that municipal government showed American democracy at its worst, and the
Progressives now undertook to wipe out "the shame of the cities." In the opening decade of the twentieth century several major cities elected reform mayors who undertook to improve conditions, with smaller cities following in their train. Various states elected Progressive governors with large programs of reform, and in the days of Theodore Roosevelt (1901–1909) the Progressive movement entered national politics.

Theodore Roosevelt had been born to a wealthy and aristocratic New York family in 1858. As a young man he held political posts in his native state and associated with social reformers. He then achieved a national reputation by organizing the "Rough Riders," who took a conspicuous part in the Spanish-American War of 1898. After the war Roosevelt was elected governor of New York, and in 1900 the Republican politicians nominated him for the vice-presidency, apparently hoping that this innocuous post would terminate the political career of a dangerous young man. McKinley's assassination then made him president. Throughout his life Roosevelt was constantly preaching and practicing "the strenuous life," and not since the days of Andrew Jackson had America rejoiced in so colorful and forcible a president. He loved a fight, priding himself that he "never hit soft," and in the midst of battle he would declare, with great gusto, that he was having a "corking" or a "perfectly bully"
time. His dramatic and highly evangelical outlook upon life led him to introduce the word "moral" into every controversy, to speak of his opponents as "malefactors" or simple "crooks" and "liars," to identify his own cause with that of "righteousness," and, at the climax of his career in 1912, to use methods differing but slightly from those of the professional revivalist.

During his term of almost eight years Roosevelt did his best to keep the country in a constant state of mild excitement. Taking over much of the Progressive program, he pushed a number of Progressive measures through congress. One of them gave the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to regulate railway rates; another was designed to protect the public from impure foods and drugs; others looked to the conservation of forests and other natural resources. Though he loudly posed as a "trust buster," very few trusts suffered at his hands. But Roosevelt's importance lay less in the laws he signed than in the public spirit he aroused. He was an agitator rather than a constructive statesman, and it was as such that he left his mark upon American political history.

As the election of 1908 approached, Roosevelt announced that since he had served for almost two full terms as president he would not be a candidate for re-election, and he persuaded the Republicans to nominate William Howard Taft (1857–1930). Taft easily defeated Bryan, who was running for the third time on the Democratic ticket, and Roosevelt went off to hunt big game in Africa. Roosevelt had assured the country that Taft was another great Progressive, just like himself, and though the new president proved to be less noisy and impetuous than "Teddy," his four years as president (1909–1913) saw more progressive legislation than did Roosevelt's eight. Amendments to the Constitution provided for an income tax and the direct election of senators (both old Populist demands), and in 1911 the Supreme Court ordered the dissolution of the most notorious of the trusts—the Standard Oil Company. Nevertheless, Taft was fundamentally conservative; he favored the business interests; and he quickly lost the confidence of the Progressives. When Roosevelt returned from Africa in 1910, he expressed himself as cruelly disappointed in his old friend, and the resulting quarrel between the two men took on national proportions.

When Roosevelt found that he could not win the Republican nomination for president in 1912, he led his followers out of the party. With characteristically evangelical fervor he declared, "We stand
at Armageddon and we battle for the Lord,” and his followers sang “Onward, Christian Soldiers” as they nominated him for the presidency. The new party then published a platform which Roosevelt called his “Confession of Faith.” It opened with promises, such as Bryan himself could hardly have improved upon, of greater democracy and new political machinery to make the will of the people prevail; secondly it promised to regulate the trusts, but it also promised very clearly that “good” trusts need fear nothing; and last came promises of greater “social justice,” to be secured through social legislation. By thus splitting the Republican party in two, Roosevelt gave victory to the Democrats, whose presidential candidate was Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924).

Woodrow Wilson was the third of that remarkable trio of American statesmen who flourished in the early twentieth century, but unlike Roosevelt and Bryan, he was a latecomer in the field of practical politics. After being a professor and president of Princeton for twenty years, he held his first political office in 1910, when he was elected governor of New Jersey. Two years later he was nominated for the presidency, and after an exciting campaign, in which he opposed his “New Freedom” to Roosevelt’s “New Nationalism,” he carried forty of the forty-eight states. As a young man, Wilson had been inspired by such British liberals as Gladstone; like them, he was an intellectual aristocrat; but like them again, he romantically idealized the “plain man.” Being a somewhat aloof scholar, he believed that “the people” are always right, but when he met opposition from them he could be quite autocratic. And while he was able to arouse enthusiasm for his ideas, he rarely aroused it for himself. Roosevelt’s devoted followers would gladly have followed him to the last ditch, and thousands of Wilson’s admirers died for his ideals, but their enthusiasm for Wilson himself was never great, and he died a lonely old man.

Wilson took office in March, 1913, and during the next few months he and his friends carried through Congress a remarkable series of laws. A new tariff act was based on scientific study rather than log-rolling; the Federal Reserve Act reorganized the national banking system; the Federal Trade Commission Act and an antitrust act regulated business; and other acts established the eight-hour day for railway workers, forbade child labor, and gave aid to farmers. The outbreak of war in Europe in 1914 distracted attention from domestic reform, but when running for re-election in 1916 Wilson was able to boast that he had fulfilled the promises of the Progressives as well
as his own. In these early years, too, Wilson was developing the program for international peace that later became his chief claim to glory.

AMERICA AND THE WORLD

The American Revolution gave the thirteen colonies political independence, but for many years America retained her colonial status in economic and intellectual matters. After 1783 as before, England enjoyed the greater part of America’s foreign trade, and throughout the nineteenth century great amounts of American cotton and wheat were exchanged for goods manufactured in Britain. There were also heavy investments of British capital in the United States. Americans, on the other hand, did not always escape the colonial mentality, especially if they belonged to the educated upper classes. They read English books, lionized English visitors, and fawned upon English intellectual leaders, or else they showed their inferiority complexes by loud and vainglorious boasting. America differed from Europe in much, but her higher culture was still an imitation of England’s.

The War of 1812 may have reminded the British rather forcibly that America was an independent nation, but it did not greatly influence the wars of England and her allies against Napoleon. Likewise America’s first major effort to raise her voice in world diplomacy—the announcement of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823—exercised no profound influence at the time, for no European power was then very anxious to intervene in American affairs. During the Civil War, Europe’s aristocratic classes uniformly favored the Confederacy, partly because they felt a spiritual kinship with the Southern aristocrats, partly because they thought a victory for the South would prove that democracy could never be made to work anywhere. English textile manufacturers were dependent upon Southern cotton, and such liberals as Gladstone convinced themselves that the Southerners were men of a separate nationality, with a culture of their own, and that they therefore deserved political independence as much as Greeks or Italians. The English middle classes, on the other hand, were more sympathetic with the North, partly because of the slavery issue. At first the British government adopted a policy of “all aid short of war” to the Confederacy, slipping munitions through the blockade and allowing Confederate warships (such as the Alabama) to sail from British ports to raid Northern commerce. Napoleon III took ad-
vantage of America's preoccupation to found his ill-starred empire in Mexico. But when the Civil War was over, and the United States protested vigorously, he hurriedly withdrew his troops and England consented to pay $15,500,000 for the damage wrought by the Alabama.

The settlement of the Alabama claims (1871) is often taken as a turning point in Anglo-American relations, at least on the part of the English. Thereafter the British government seemed less inclined to regard Americans as rebellious colonists and more anxious for friendly coöperation between the two peoples on a basis of equality. Nevertheless, the Americans were rather slow to respond. Politicians had long since learned to arouse the enthusiasm of Irish voters by "twisting the British lion's tail," and other citizens sometimes expressed their patriotism in similar fashion. On the other hand, the commercial, financial, social, and intellectual bonds uniting the two countries were constantly growing stronger. During these years scions of ancient European families began marrying daughters of upstart American millionaires; German universities attracted American students, many of whom later rose to positions of importance at home as academic and intellectual leaders; and Europe's annual invasion by American tourists began. These students and travelers usually returned home more determined than before that their country should assume a place of equality among the powers of Europe.

This new insistence that America was no longer a colony of Europe presently led to the Spanish-American War of 1898. For several years American jingoes had been growing more vociferous, and their activities had caused President Cleveland to intervene boastfully but needlessly in a boundary dispute between Venezuela and the British in Guiana (1895). When various Cubans began showing their dissatisfaction with Spanish rule, Americans loudly demanded intervention in their behalf, and when the battleship Maine was mysteriously sunk in Havana harbor (February 15, 1898), the cry for war became irresistible. The United States declared war upon Spain in April, 1898, and within four months the Spaniards were ready to sue for peace. Cuba was granted her independence, but American troops continued to occupy the island for several years; Puerto Rico was annexed to the United States; and the Philippine Islands, which had been seized early in the war, were bought by the United States for $20,000,000. However, an anti-American rebellion, led by a Filipino
named Aguinaldo, kept the islands in turmoil until 1902. Hawaiʻi too was annexed by the United States in 1898.

America thus became one of the great world powers. In the twentieth century she no longer was a field for European financial investment but was herself a full-fledged imperialistic power on the latest European model. During Taft's presidency "dollar diplomacy" came to dominate American foreign policy, especially in the Caribbean area, and in 1916 Wilson was forced to military action against Mexico. In earlier times Americans had often shown themselves to be a European people, continuing the cultural traditions of Europe, and now their imperialism caused them to be recognized by Europeans as a world power.
EUROPEANIZING THE WORLD

EUROPEANS OUTSIDE EUROPE—EUROPEAN RULE IN ASIA AND AFRICA
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<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Europeans in Asia</th>
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<td>1843 Natal a colony</td>
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<td>1849 Self-gov't in Canada</td>
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<td>1852 Transvaal</td>
<td>1864– French in Suez Canal</td>
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<td>1854 Orange Free State</td>
<td>1867 Mexico</td>
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<td>1855– Self-gov't in Australia</td>
<td>1864– French in Victoria, Empress of India</td>
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<td>1872 Self-gov't in Cape Colony</td>
<td>1876– Díaz in Mexico</td>
<td>1881 French in Tunis</td>
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<td>1911</td>
<td>1877 Victoria, Empress of India</td>
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<td>1898– &quot;Old Buddha&quot; again:</td>
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<td>1893 Self-gov't in Natal</td>
<td>1889 Republic of Brazil</td>
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<td>1899– Boer War</td>
<td>1885 French in Indochina</td>
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<td>1907 Commonwealth of New Zealand</td>
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<td>1910 Union of South Africa</td>
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<td>1912 French in Morocco</td>
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<td>1931 Statute of Westminster</td>
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25. EUROPEANS OUTSIDE EUROPE

Up to this point our discussion of the nineteenth century has centered mainly around western and central Europe, with brief glances at the United States and Russia. The former of these countries was almost wholly European in population and civilization, and the latter was deeply influenced by European culture. But in thus limiting our field of study we have neglected a major aspect of an age when European civilization was permeating all the earth. Sometimes this civilization was carried abroad by Europeans migrating to distant lands in the search for new homes, and sometimes it was accepted, willingly or unwillingly, by the non-European peoples of Asia, Africa, and the Americas. The whole world fell under the spell of European civilization, and by 1900 there was scarcely a human being upon earth whose way of life had not been changed to some extent by Europe.

The nineteenth century has been called the “century of the great migrations,” for never before in history had so many persons migrated so far from their early homes in so short a time. In spite of a tremendous growth of population in Europe, millions of persons migrated to the Americas, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Siberia. The best estimates indicate that in 1650 the “white race” numbered approximately 100 million persons, practically all of whom were living in Europe. By 1800 there were 8 million Europeans overseas; fifty years later, 33 million lived abroad; more than 100 million dwelt outside Europe in 1900; and in 1950 this figure had risen to at least 225 million. Stated in another way, fully 50 million western Europeans sought new homes beyond the seas between 1815 and 1914, while about 7 million Russians then crossed the Urals into
Asiatic Siberia. Approximately two-thirds of the former group migrated to the United States, and half the remainder settled in various British colonies. Until about 1880 Great Britain (including Ireland) supplied more than half of these emigrants, Germany came second, and toward the end of the century the Scandinavian countries and Italy added their quotas; but after 1900 emigrants from southern and eastern Europe predominated.¹

While these emigrants were building new Europes overseas, the non-European peoples of the earth were changing rapidly. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries European traders had sought gold, spices, fine cloths, and furs in Asia and the Americas, but they found normal trade difficult because they produced so little that the non-European peoples desired. The Industrial Revolution reversed this situation, however, and thereafter Europeans found ready markets for their manufactured goods in the countries which they customarily called “backward” or “undeveloped.” For example, calico, which had once been imported from India (principally from Calicut, whence its name), was now made so cheaply in England that it could be sent to India and sold there at a high profit. Countless other machine-made commodities from Europe presently appeared in every market and bazaar of the world. Asia’s whole economic system was thereby thrown into confusion, and her hand workers suffered a fate even more deplorable than that of similar workers in Europe. The new factories of Europe recruited their labor force among the displaced hand workers, but in the “undeveloped” countries there were no factories to give such employment.

The American Revolution had discredited the old political imperialism, and for many years thereafter statesmen showed slight interest in colonial adventures. In the days when the ideas of Adam Smith and Richard Cobden dominated economic thought, colonies seemed to be of little economic value to a country, for trade could

¹ The following table shows the approximate numbers of the white race, the numbers and percentage of white men living outside Europe, and their percentage of the world’s population (based on A. M. Carr-Saunders, World Population [1936], p. 42, figures for 1950 added):

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>White Race</th>
<th>Whites Outside Europe</th>
<th>World Population</th>
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<td>millions</td>
<td>millions, % whites</td>
<td>millions, % whites</td>
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<td>1650</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>545, 18</td>
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<td>1800</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>8, 4</td>
<td>908, 22</td>
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<td>300</td>
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<td>1171, 26</td>
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<td>1900</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>100, 20</td>
<td>1688, 31</td>
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<td>1950</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>225, 28</td>
<td>2600, 31</td>
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always be conducted with foreign lands, regardless of who directed the local government. In fact, it was widely believed that trade would prosper best if every people on earth enjoyed complete political freedom. Traders everywhere could then do business freely with each other, and all the countries of the world would gradually become economically interdependent. Free trade would be the economic foundation of a free world, and it would eventually bring about a free union of free states and free peoples. Thus when the rather typical hero of Tennyson's poem "Locksley Hall" (1842), "dipt into the future, far as human eye could see," he foresaw "the heavens filled with commerce, argosies of magic sails," and "the war-drum throbb'd no longer and the battle-flags were furl'd In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world."

Nevertheless, the increasing sale of European manufactured goods overseas raised many new and difficult problems. In the first place, how were Europeans to be paid for the goods they sent to "backward" countries? Sometimes they were given raw materials—notably cotton—which only foreign countries could produce. Presently, however, the non-European peoples were buying more European goods than could be covered by such exchanges, and more roundabout ways of making payment had to be devised. Goods were sold on credit, and complicated international loans were made. Companies were organized in Europe to build railways or dams, open mines, or develop the resources of non-European countries, and these companies borrowed heavily from European investors and bankers. The money thus borrowed never left Europe, however, for part of it would be used to buy construction materials in Europe, while the rest went to pay European manufacturers for the cloth and other commodities they were exporting. When the cloth was sold abroad, the proceeds were used to hire native labor to build the railroad or dam. Manufacturers thus found new markets for both rails and cloth; investors owned the railway and enjoyed its profits; and the natives found employment, wore the cloth, and could use the railway. It might be said, paradoxically, that the cloth and hardware England exported to India built the railways of that country.

It has been estimated that by 1914 various European capitalists—mostly English, French, German, or Dutch—had invested upward of $30 billion outside Europe. Considerably more than half this sum came from British investors, with nearly half their loans going outside the British Empire. Over $4 billion had been lent in the United
States, almost as much in Latin America, and large amounts had gone to Russia, Turkey, Japan, and China. From the economic point of view, these supposedly free and independent countries were better and more valuable to European capitalists than most of the colonies that "belonged to" the European states.

Similar investments made in the more backward countries did not always turn out well. Sometimes the native governments of these non-European countries were so weak and so inefficient that they could not prevent native attacks upon Europeans and their property, or else they betrayed an extreme disinclination to paying their debts or to compelling their subjects to do so. Demagogues often stirred up native hostility to the white man, while corrupt officials made all business dealings difficult and expensive. European powers would then feel obligated to intervene for the protection of their citizens, and sometimes they took over the cares and responsibilities of government. As financial investments abroad became more secure and more profitable, and the competition of Europeans for markets became keener, the businessmen of each European country tried to exclude all others from their favorite fields. To this end they persuaded their governments to proclaim "spheres of interest" in such places as Africa, Persia, and China. This convenient phrase indicated that the citizens of one European power were granted a monopoly on concessions for railways, mines, and other investments in the area, and in practice they usually enjoyed a monopoly in local markets as well.

Noneconomic forces were equally powerful in promoting European imperialism. Nationalistic enthusiasm took extreme forms after 1870, and many a patriot regarded colonies primarily as a matter of prestige. Breasts swelled with pride as men noted vast territories marked with "their" color on the map. Even though these territories might be remote and uninhabitable deserts and jungles, their emotional value was enough to cover the cost of conquest and upkeep—and if a few private citizens could derive a financial profit from them, so much the better. Military and naval considerations also played their part, for all the great powers now maintained large navies that required stations all over the world at which vessels could procure coal and other supplies. Even an atoll in the Pacific, if it had a good harbor, might thus become worth much blood and treasure. Moreover, trade routes must be kept open, even in time of war, and communications had to be made secure. England's "life
line” to India required that she control the Straits of Gibraltar and
the Suez Canal, and in the twentieth century the defense of the
United States in a two-ocean war made her dependent upon the
Panama Canal. Even humanitarianism had a part in the new im-
perialism, and European governments sometimes annexed and ad-
ministered backward countries in order to suppress the slave trade
or to prevent their own unscrupulous traders from exterminating the
natives by providing them with such irresistible by-products of civi-
ilization as firearms, whiskey, and dope.

The nineteenth century also saw a great burst of missionary activ-
ity, both Protestant and Catholic, with English and Americans, French
and Belgians, each doing their share. These missionaries did much
more than preach the Gospel in foreign parts. They opened schools
where Western languages, Western technology, and the rudiments
of Western culture were taught, they built Western hospitals, and
they did what they could to impress non-Europeans with the su-
perior merits of the Western way of life. Often they were more suc-
cessful at Europeanizing—or partially Europeanizing—the heathen
than they were at Christianizing them, and businessmen were not
blind to the advantages they might reap from such conversions. Thus
it was said that one enthusiast calculated the exact amount of cloth
England could sell in Africa if only the natives of that Dark Conti-
nent could be persuaded to wear clothes—“at least on Sundays” —
and contributed to missionary societies accordingly.

Enthusiastic Europeans reached the flattering conclusion that all
men would eventually adopt Western civilization. They regarded im-
perialism as a holy crusade, and with Rudyard Kipling they spoke of
“the white man’s burden”—the duty of conferring the blessings of
Western civilization upon the more backward peoples, who were
“half-devil and half-child.” The last two decades of the nineteenth
century were the heyday of this new imperialism, but soon after the
turn of the century both Europeans and Asiatics began to question
its fundamental tenets. Before considering the complaints of these
critics, however, we must survey the extension of European civiliza-
tion to other parts of the world.

THE BRITISH DOMINIONS

While Americans were thus creating an independent nation of
European culture in the New World, and eventually gaining recog-

What is a dominion?
nition for it as a world power, the British and their colonists in other parts of the world were finding ways to secure political freedom without completely severing the political ties binding the colonies to Great Britain. They became "self-governing dominions" within the British Empire, enjoying complete independence in local matters, but at the same time profiting by whatever advantages might accrue to them from Britain's command of the seas and her international prestige. This dominion form of government developed gradually during the nineteenth century, but in 1914 four former colonies had achieved the status—Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. After the First World War, the Statute of Westminster (1931) declared these dominions to be sister nations with Great Britain in a union known as the Commonwealth of Nations. They were united to the mother country and to each other only by their common loyalty to the British crown, by their common economic and military interests, and by their common language, culture, and traditions. These first colonial members of the British Commonwealth were peopled largely by settlers of British origin, but since the Second World War the Commonwealth has admitted new members whose British population is negligible—India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and last of all, Ghana (in Africa) and Malaya. The British still rule many crown colonies that do not enjoy dominion status, but no doubt some of them eventually will become dominions. In order to learn how this unique and unprecedented system of colonial organization came into being, let us begin by sketching the history of Canada.

Canada

The British took possession of Canada after their victory in the Seven Years' War (1763), and with the Quebec Act of 1774 they reorganized the government of their new colony. This act greatly displeased the thirteen colonies to the south (see p. 88), but for the moment it was quite satisfactory to the French Canadians. It guaranteed them their language, their law, and their religion, and it extended their boundaries to the Ohio and Mississippi rivers. After the American Revolution, however, so many British immigrants and American Tories entered Canada that they began to threaten French supremacy. The British government attempted to quiet the resulting discontent by the Canada Act of 1791, which divided the valley of the St. Lawrence into two provinces: Lower Canada, which included
Quebec and Montreal, and was largely French and Catholic; and Upper Canada, including Kingston and Toronto, which was predominantly English and Protestant. British possessions in North America after 1783 included four other colonies, all now parts of Canada. Newfoundland had been taken from the French in 1713 and was given a British governor in 1728; Prince Edward Island, taken in 1763, received its first governor in 1773; and Nova Scotia, taken in 1713, was divided into two parts (1784), of which the northernmost, known thereafter as New Brunswick, was inhabited largely by refugee Tories from New England. Each of these six Canadian colonies was ruled by an English governor and a popularly elected legislature. The vast region north and west of the Great Lakes, reaching to the Rockies, was still owned by the Hudson’s Bay Company, and its few white inhabitants were trappers or fur traders.

For almost half a century the governments set up in 1791 were moderately successful. In the 1820’s, however, immigration from Great Britain to Canada began to increase, and the earlier settlers began to resent the newcomers as well as the British governors who protected them. There was even a little agitation for independence. The English then sent out a new governor, the Liberal Lord Durham (1792–1840, son-in-law of Earl Grey, the author of the Reform Bill of 1832), who was in Canada for only five months (1838) but whose Report became a major document in British imperial history. He recommended, first, that the two Canadas be reunited immediately and that preparations be made for the ultimate addition of the four Maritime Provinces to this union; and second, that Canada be granted a ministry responsible to her parliament with complete self-government as far as domestic affairs were concerned. The two Canadas were united in 1840, and self-government was completed in 1849, much to the dismay of the French Canadians, who thus became a minority.

Eighteen years later, discontent in Quebec led to the British North America Act (1867). The two Canadas were again separated as the provinces of Quebec and Ontario, but they entered a federal union with Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island to form the Dominion of Canada. Newfoundland, however, preferred to stay out of the union. The capital of the Dominion was located at Ottawa, on the river separating Quebec from Ontario. As plans for this union had been formulated in Canada during the American Civil War, its authors gave the central government of Canada much
greater powers than the government of the United States had originally enjoyed. Since that time Canada has been ruled by a prime minister and cabinet responsible to the Canadian parliament, and the British parliament has exercised no political control over Canada except in foreign affairs.

In 1869 the government bought and opened to settlement the territories held by the Hudson's Bay Company. Manitoba was admitted to the Dominion as a province in 1870, British Columbia followed in 1871, and Saskatchewan and Alberta came in 1905. Newfoundland joined the Dominion as its tenth province in 1949. The Canadian Pacific Railway, crossing Canada from the Atlantic to the Pacific, was formally opened in 1887, and a few years later it was followed by the Canadian Northern. Canada continued to receive a steady stream of immigrants, mostly from the British Isles, but many entered from the United States and lesser numbers came from Germany and Scandinavia. Though agriculture remained the chief industry, manufacturing made rapid progress in the last two decades of the nineteenth century.
As a large part of the English-speaking population in early years consisted of Tories from the United States, not much love was lost between the two countries, and the situation was not improved by American attempts to seize Canada during the War of 1812. Numerous minor controversies continued during the next several decades, until in 1866 a group of Irish Fenians (see p. 339) living in the United States foolishly attempted to invade Canada. Shortly thereafter, however, a new spirit arose. In 1871 Canada changed her system of coinage, adopting dollars and cents on the American standard in place of the English pounds, shillings, and pence. Trade with the United States was thus facilitated, and trade relations, supplemented by the immigration of many Americans, brought more friendly feelings to the two countries. But there was no noticeable desire for political union on either side of the frontier, least of all in Canada, where the people were quite satisfied with the treatment accorded them by the British.

*The Other Dominions*

The second of England’s self-governing dominions is Australia. This continent, whose area of nearly three million square miles is almost exactly that of the United States, now has a population of less than ten million persons, and since much of its interior is uninhabitable desert while most of the remainder can be used best for pasturing sheep, it seems unlikely that Australia will ever support a dense population. Though the continent was sighted by Spanish and Dutch navigators in the seventeenth century, Europeans gave it little attention until Captain Cook sailed along its eastern coast in 1770. The British presently began using Australia and Tasmania as dumping grounds for convicts, who might earlier have been sent to America. The first shipload of such criminals reached Sydney (Botany Bay) in 1788, and for fifty years the steady flow of convicts continued. Free settlers came as well, however, and by 1850 there were about 350,000 white men in Australia. The discovery of gold in 1851 caused the population to quadruple during the next ten years; there were nearly 1,700,000 white men in the colony in 1871, and by 1901 their number had passed 3,750,000. When the free settlers demanded self-government, the British set up five self-governing states (New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland, Tasmania) resembling those in Canada (1855–1859). This local self-government was extended to Western Australia in 1890. Before long many Australians
were dreaming of a larger union, closely resembling the Dominion of Canada, but not until 1901 were the six states united as the Commonwealth of Australia. The Australians had already attracted attention by their advanced legislation along democratic lines, and under the Commonwealth this new democracy progressed rapidly.

New Zealand consists of two large islands and several small ones, with a total area of a little over 100,000 square miles—slightly less than Colorado or Italy—and today its population is about two million. These islands, like Australia twelve hundred miles away, were discovered in the seventeenth century by the Dutch navigator Abel Tasman; they were explored by Captain Cook in 1769; but only a few white men settled there before 1840. Parliamentary self-government was established in 1852, and in 1907 New Zealand was granted dominion status in the British Empire. The economy of the islands, like that of Australia, is almost wholly agricultural and grazing, the chief exports being wool and mutton.

The fourth British colony to achieve dominion status was the Union of South Africa. The Cape of Good Hope had been discovered in 1488 by the Portuguese navigator Bartholomeu Dias, but not until after the middle of the seventeenth century did Europeans settle there. During the next 150 years several thousand Dutch farmers, known as Boers, found homes around Cape Town. During the Napoleonic Wars the English seized the region, which they organized as Cape Colony (1806). British settlers presently began to arrive in considerable numbers, and when Britain abolished slavery throughout her empire (1834), the Boers began “trekking” into new lands outside the colony, taking their slaves with them. Whenever wars with the native blacks (Kaffirs) caused the British to extend their claims, the Boers trekked further into the interior. The British annexed Natal in 1843, but after various controversies they recognized the independence of two Boer republics, the Transvaal (1852) and the Orange Free State (1854). Local self-government was granted to Cape Colony in 1872 and to Natal in 1893.

These arrangements did not settle matters in South Africa, however, and as time passed Boers and English each became more truculent. After their defeat of a British detachment at Majuba Hill (1881) Boer leaders began dreaming of expelling the British and establishing an empire for themselves in South Africa. At the same time imperialist enthusiasm was rising rapidly in England, thanks in part to the agitation of Disraeli, Joseph Chamberlain, and the Liberal Unionists,
to the poetry of Rudyard Kipling (1865–1936), and to the activities of one of Britain’s greatest empire builders, Cecil Rhodes (1853–1902). After settling in Natal in 1870 and accumulating a fortune in the diamond fields at Kimberley, Rhodes devoted his life to promoting the British Empire. In 1889 he organized the British South Africa Company, which acquired title to the huge district now known as Rhodesia; he dreamed of a Cape-to-Cairo railway, which was never finished; and he served Cape Colony as prime minister from 1890 to 1896.\(^2\) Unfortunately for the Boers, gold was discovered in the Transvaal (1886) and the ensuing gold rush brought thousands of English adventurers into their territory. Relations between the two peoples grew steadily worse during the 1890’s and in 1899 the Boer War broke out.

When hostilities opened, the British expected an easy victory, but it required three years to conquer the Boers. The Boers fought in unexpected ways, introducing such devices as barbed-wire entanglements and the protective coloration of uniforms, but the British eventually crushed them by a blockade of arms and by sheer weight of numbers: the British armies in South Africa eventually numbered over half a million men, or more than twice the total Boer population. The two Boer republics were annexed to the British Empire, but they too were granted self-government. The settlement was completed in 1910 when the two English and the two Boer provinces, united in the Union of South Africa, were granted dominion status in the British Empire. For almost forty years thereafter the Union was governed by a succession of Boer generals, beginning with General Botha (1910–1919), who had been commander-in-chief of the Boer armies during the war, and ending with General Jan C. Smuts (1919–1924, 1939–1948). Some Englishmen began to ask who had won the war, after all. In any case, General Smuts came to be recognized as one of the great statesmen of the twentieth century.

**LATIN AMERICA**

The early colonists in the United States and the British dominions settled in lands that resembled western Europe in soil and climate, and that had heretofore been inhabited only sparsely by peoples of

\(^2\) One of Rhodes’s schemes for promoting the British Empire was the establishment of the Rhodes scholarships, by which several hundred Americans and British colonials have been enabled to study at Oxford. It was Rhodes’s expressed desire that these young men be filled with enthusiasm for Britain while at Oxford and become propagandists for the Empire when they returned home. It has not always worked out that way.
inferior culture. The colonists drove these natives into the less desirable parts of the country, and the newcomers retained their European culture unimpaired. Rather different conditions prevailed in Latin America. Here the Aztecs and the Incas were more numerous and far more civilized than the Indians of the United States and Canada (or than the aborigines of Australia and New Zealand), and the Spaniards were more interested in exploiting them than in driving them out. Intermarriage was more common than in the Anglo-Saxon countries. As a result, the peoples south of the Rio Grande today differ markedly from those to the north, both racially and culturally, yet they too are largely European in their culture. In 1825 there were about twenty million persons in Latin America (twice as many as then inhabited the United States), of whom barely four million were white, while eight million were Indians, over five million were mestizos (mixed white and Indian), and three million were Negroes or mulattoes. In 1950 there were approximately 150 million persons in Latin America (about the same as in the United States), of whom perhaps fifty million were white. In Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, in large parts of Brazil, and in tiny Costa Rica the bulk of the population is white; in a few other countries all but 5 or 10 percent are Indian or Negro. But while European culture may be said to prevail throughout Latin America, and cities such as Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro present a thoroughly European appearance, this European culture has often been forced upon non-European peoples with ancient cultural traditions of their own.

Though Spain’s colonial policy was much more autocratic than that of the English, and though educated Spaniards in America were familiar with the writings of the French and English philosophes, there was little agitation for independence in Latin America during the eighteenth century. The most dissatisfied among the colonials were the Creoles (those born of white parents in America), who felt
themselves discriminated against because high posts in church and state always went to Peninsulares (Spaniards born in Spain). The American Revolution attracted the attention of a few Creoles, and the French Revolution again aroused their enthusiasm. Francisco Miranda (1750–1816), for example, after visiting in the United States and serving in the French revolutionary armies, vainly tried to interest British and American statesmen in liberating his country from Spain. The British victory at Trafalgar (1805) made communication between Spain and her colonies difficult, and when Joseph Bonaparte was put on the throne of Spain (1808) neither the officials nor the people of Latin America were willing to accept him. Miranda then proclaimed a revolution in Venezuela, but in 1812 he was captured and taken to Spain, where he died in prison four years later. Between 1812 and 1822, José de San Martín (1778–1850) drove all Spanish officials from Argentina and Chile, and a few years later Simón Bolivar (1783–1830), once a follower of Miranda, won the title of “The Liberator” by completing the emancipation of Spanish South America (1824).

Events in Mexico followed a somewhat different course, for here Spanish officials and the Catholic Church were more securely entrenched. A Creole priest named Miguel Hidalgo (1753–1811), being much concerned over the sorry plight of the peons (peasants), launched a revolt in 1810, but he was soon captured and shot. Mexican Creoles, pleased with the liberal Spanish Constitution of 1812, then favored the Spanish Revolution of 1820, which attempted to restore that constitution (see p. 234). The conservatives, on the other hand, led by a certain Agustín de Iturbide (1783–1824), revolted against his liberal regime in Spain (1821) and made Iturbide their emperor (1822). Within a year, however, his bloodthirsty cruelty provoked a counterrevolution, and he was exiled to Italy. When he returned to Mexico in 1824, he was promptly shot, and for several years thereafter Mexico was a liberal republic. Central America too revolted against the Spanish liberals. It joined Mexico under Iturbide, but after his fall its leaders set up a state which presently broke into several parts.

Independence came to Brazil by still another route. We have already seen (p. 235) how Napoleon drove the Portuguese royal family to Brazil in 1807. As most Brazilians were then quite loyal to the Portuguese crown, John VI (regent 1792–1816; king, 1816–1826) remained in their country until 1821, bringing to Rio de
Janeiro the prosperity and prestige that accrue to the capital of a world empire. When conditions required his return to Portugal (1821), John left his son Pedro in Brazil, and when the Portuguese parliament attempted to restore Brazil to its old dependent position of a colony, Pedro launched a revolution. He was proclaimed Emperor of Brazil (1822), which position he and his son held until 1889, when the present Republic was established.

The liberation of Latin America was virtually complete by 1825. Portugal no longer held possessions in the Western Hemisphere, and Spain retained only Cuba and Puerto Rico. The former Spanish colonies were divided among eight republics—La Plata (Argentina), Chile, Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Central America, and Mexico—while the Brazilianian Empire made a ninth independent state. Leaders such as Miranda had dreamed of one great South American republic, but such a united state never descended from the clouds. The settled areas, located on the rim of a vast uninhabited and largely uninhabitable interior, were too widely separated by geography, historical tradition, and local patriotism to unite under one central government. In fact, they could not even retain the unity they possessed in 1825. Civil wars rent several of these republics asunder, until in 1903 there were twenty independent Latin American states (including Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Cuba) in place of the original nine.

The Creoles who led the revolutions, being without political experience, found it difficult to establish orderly government in the republics they set up. They constituted only a small fraction of the total population, and they disdained the mestizos and Indians, who were ignorant, largely untouched by European civilization, and devoid of political leadership. The conquistadores had butchered the old native leaders but had trained up no new ones. The church also caused trouble by its determination to retain the vast estates and privileges it had enjoyed under the old regime, and anticlericalism grew strong in Latin America. Under the circumstances, it was inevitable that political life should be very unstable, with frequent dictatorships tempered only by revolution, and with many bloody wars.

After the overthrow of Iturbide, Mexico became a republic (1824), whose most important and colorful leader was Antonio de Santa Anna (1795–1876). For thirty years he alternated frequently between dictatorship and exile, calling himself a Liberal but creating a highly cen-
tralized and despotic government for Mexico. He had much trouble with the United States, because Texas revolted (1836), became an independent republic, and eventually was annexed by the United States (1845). During the ensuing war (1846–1848) American troops occupied Mexico City, and Mexico lost California and other states (see p. 443). Santa Anna’s rule ended in 1855, after which the Liberals continued their efforts to establish a more democratic republic and especially to reduce the enormous landholdings of the church. The radical Benito Juárez (1806–1872), a full-blooded Indian, became president in 1858 and, as we have seen (p. 303), his activities gave Napoleon III an excuse for launching his unfortunate Mexican adventure. After the withdrawal of the French and the execution of Maximilian (1867), Juárez continued to rule until his death in 1872. Four years later his successor was overthrown by Porfirio Díaz (1830–1915), who restored tranquillity and dominated Mexico until 1911. During these thirty-five years Mexico made great material progress, building railways, developing industry, opening oil wells, and attracting foreign capital, especially from the United States. But Díaz governed for the benefit of the upper classes and paid little attention to the Indians and mestizos who formed 90 percent of the population. For them material progress by the rich was not enough, and Díaz was overthrown in 1911. Mexico then entered upon a long period of revolutionary upheaval.

The South American countries too made great material progress during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Their most serious political troubles were being outgrown, and a stronger middle class brought greater stability. The three most important countries—Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, often called the “A.B.C. Powers”—had the good fortune to find goods which could be exported in large quantities to Europe in exchange for manufactured goods and much-needed capital. Argentina sent beef, Brazil sent coffee and rubber, and Chile sent nitrates. Each of these countries also received a heavy immigration from Europe—mostly Spaniards and Italians, but including many Germans and a few French. Rich South Americans began to travel in Europe, especially in France, and presently they became proud of sharing French culture. Progress was made in popular education, and even the natives were gradually Europeanized.

Early South American leaders, such as Miranda and Bolívar, had entertained the friendliest feelings for the United States, but after the first generation of revolutionists had passed away, these feelings
were gradually replaced by distrust and suspicion. The activities of irresponsible American freebooters (such as William Walker, who tried to set up an empire for himself in Nicaragua in the 1850’s) did much to intensify this resentment. The Monroe Doctrine had not attracted great attention at first, or even when it was invoked against Napoleon III in Mexico, but after the Spanish-American War (1898) South Americans came to regard it as a cloak for “Yanqui imperialism.” James G. Blaine, the American secretary of state in 1881 and again in 1889–1892, tried to foster better feeling by talking about “Pan-Americanism,” but his advances were received coldly and with suspicion, and when Theodore Roosevelt “took Panama” (as he phrased it himself) in 1903, all Latin America was aroused. Proud of their beautiful cities and their European culture, and fearing “Yanqui imperialism,” some Latin Americans even began to speak disparagingly of the “barbarians of the North.”
We have seen (p. 62) that the British expelled their last important European rivals from India in 1763 and that by 1815 the days of the great empire builders were over. Clive and Hastings, Cornwallis and Wellesley had established the power of the British East India Company over Bengal, the Ganges Valley, and the coastal regions, while nearly all the remaining native rulers were bound to the British by treaties of alliance. During the next forty years the British brought several parts of central India under their direct control, annexed the Indus Valley and the Punjab, added Kashmir by alliance, and conquered large parts of Burma to the east. The British made these acquisitions largely to protect what they already held, and by 1857 they had the whole Indian subcontinent and its approaches well in hand. Meantime Sir Stamford Raffles (1781–1826) had founded Singapore (1819), at an excellent site around which grew British Malaya; and in 1841 another British adventurer, Sir James Brooke (1803–1868), persuaded a local sultan to make him rajah of Sarawak (northern Borneo), which he and his family governed ably, under British protection, for more than a hundred years.

The British East India Company, chartered in 1600, had at first been merely a trading company, but the pressure of necessity caused it gradually to assume the burdens of government. When its powers seemed too great, the India Acts of 1774 and 1784 gave the crown the right to appoint its highest officials. Soon after the Whigs returned to power in England (1832), they undertook further reform by depriving the company of its monopoly on trade with India and China (1833). In India the British forbade (1829) the practice of
suttee (burning a widow on her husband's funeral pyre); suppressed
the gangs of professional thieves and assassins known as "Thugs";
laid the foundations for an English-language educational system,
complete with university; and began to train Hindus for government
service. They also spent large sums of money on public buildings,
roads, and irrigation canals, set up postal and telegraph systems, and
opened the first railway (1853).

By this time, however, Britain's heavy exports of cloth and other
manufactured goods to India were unsettling the economic system
of the country and bringing great distress to native workers. Religion
too was arousing nationalistic opposition to the English, and in 1857
a mutiny of the Sepoys—native mercenaries who made up more than
three-quarters of the British army in India—seriously endangered
British rule in India. After the Sepoy Mutiny had been suppressed,
the British parliament abolished the East India Company (1858),
and thereafter a viceroy appointed by the British crown ruled India
with the aid of a bureaucracy of Englishmen chosen by competitive
examination. The last of the shadowy Mogul emperors was banished
from India for his part in the mutiny, and the Mogul Empire (1526–
1858, see p. 59, and Vol. One, p. 368) came to an end. A few years
later the opening of the Suez Canal (1869) shortened the route to
India by about six thousand miles, which encouraged Disraeli to
purchase a controlling interest in the company for England (1875),
and during the resulting enthusiasm Queen Victoria was formally pro-
claimed "Empress of India" on New Year's Day, 1877.

Disraeli's imperialistic policies also intensified a long-standing ri-
vality with Russia (see p. 429). As early as 1837 the Russians had
begun intriguing against the British at the court of Afghanistan,
which led to the inconclusive First Afghan War (1839–1842). Thirty
years later, in 1868, they established a protectorate over Bokhara and
formally annexed Samarkand, which bordered Afghanistan on the
north. The British retaliated by occupying Baluchistan on her south-
ern border (1876). Russia then signed an alliance with Afghanistan
(1878), thereby precipitating the Second Afghan War (1878–1879),
by which England gained the all-important Khyber Pass into Afghan-
istan. After Russia had conquered and annexed Merv (1884), her
Transcaspian Railway was extended to Samarkand in 1888 and it
reached Andijan in 1899. These constant frontier rivalries—which
might almost be called a "cold war"—continued unabated until a
settlement was reached in 1907. Though Russia recognized England's
preponderant interest in Afghanistan, England did not annex the country to India, and the rivals temporarily buried the hatchet. In token of their new friendship, however, each allowed the other to establish a "sphere of influence" over about a third of Persia, with the remaining third left to the Persians. Meantime England was also pushing into Burma, partly in reply to French activities in Indochina. The incorporation of Burma into India was completed in 1886, but not until 1904 was the status of Siam settled by treaty with France.

During the fifty years following the reforms in 1858 India made great economic progress. The major profits went to Englishmen, it is true, but all India benefited. The standard of living of every social class in India rose noticeably during the nineteenth century, though the population increased simultaneously. In 1650 there were about 100 million people in India, and there were less than 200 million in 1850, but by 1900 the number had risen to 295 million, and in 1950 it stood above 435 million. This increase was due in part to British sanitation and to the "British peace" which prevented the bloody wars that formerly had decimated the population, but still more important was the fact that everyone got more and better food. Only a prosperous country could have supported so rapid an increase in population.

Nevertheless, many Hindus remained dissatisfied. Though the British brought material blessings to India, they were after all an alien people and their rule was quite despotic. Countless young Hindus, trained in English-speaking schools, entered the Indian bureaucracy, but they never rose above the lower levels and they were always made to feel themselves inferior to the "British raj." Moreover, these educated Hindus studied English history and government, from which they imbibed English ideas regarding liberty and self-government, and they soon wished to put these ideas into practice. As the country had been ruled by one foreign invader after another for many centuries before the coming of the British (see Vol. One, p. 368), this sudden desire for self-government was something radically new in India, and optimistic outsiders regarded it as evidence that Asia was being Europeanized. Even when judged by this frail standard, however, not many of the Hindu millions were deeply touched by European ideas.

Two other nations were likewise building valuable colonial empires in southern Asia and the nearby islands in the nineteenth century. The Dutch had reached this region a few years before the British (their first stronghold in Sumatra dated from 1596), and
during the next hundred years they took over the East Indies formerly claimed by Portugal. Though the English seized these islands during the Napoleonic Wars, they afterward returned all except Ceylon. In the nineteenth century the Dutch developed the production of coffee and spices, and the improved economy created a rising prosperity. The population of Java rose from about 4 million in 1800 to nearly 10 million in 1850 and to 29 million in 1900. Here too native unrest, instigated by somewhat Europeanized leaders, became important after 1900.

Meantime the French had become active in Indochina. Napoleon III staked out claims in this region, but not much progress was made until a war had been fought with China in 1883–1885. France and England then engaged in bitter rivalry, each preventing the other from occupying Siam until 1904, when a settlement was reached that recognized the possessions of each but preserved Siam’s independence.

As the colonial rivalry of the great powers grew hotter, and colonies became a matter of prestige as well as of economics, even the tiny islands of the Pacific began to have a value in the eyes of patriots. Their resources might be of little value, and their native populations were too primitive to make good laborers or customers, but they showed up well on the map. During the 1880’s England, France, Germany, and the United States shared in a general scramble for these remote islands, and before the end of the century every islet in the Pacific was claimed by one of the great powers. America’s share included the Midway Islands, part of the Samoan group, the Hawaiian group, the Philippines, and Guam.

THE PARTITIONING OF AFRICA

In the days of the great discoveries, Africa was principally an obstacle to be sailed around by ships bound for India. Europeans established posts at a few good harbors along the way, where ships bound for India could procure water and supplies, and where slave traders and others might engage in business, but almost nothing was known about the interior of “the Dark Continent.” In the nineteenth century Europeans began exploring the interior, and during the 1850’s the main outlines of central African geography were mapped.

The most famous of these explorers was the Scot, David Livingstone (1813–1873), who went to Africa as a medical missionary but
presently became interested in exploring the valleys of the Zambesi and the upper Congo rivers. He was the first white man to gaze upon the Victoria Falls of the Zambesi (1855), and later he explored the great lakes, Nyasa and Tanganyika. He became a public figure, and once when friends feared that he was lost, the editor of the New York Herald sent an expedition to find him (1871). The leader of this expedition, Henry M. Stanley (1841–1904), found Livingstone in the heart of the jungle—greeting him with the famous words “Dr. Livingstone, I presume?”—and later became much interested in the commercial development of central Africa. His popular books, How I Found Livingstone (1872) and Through the Dark Continent (1878), aroused the romantic enthusiasm of countless readers, and when it was disclosed that the Congo Valley was rich in rubber trees and ivory, an international struggle for Africa began.

The first of the European empire builders to develop central Africa was the king of Belgium, Leopold II (1865–1909). At heart a promoter, Leopold organized a company, eventually known as the International Association of the Congo (1876), and hired Stanley to conduct further explorations there. Leopold’s activities attracted the attention of others to Africa and whetted their appetites. Their rivalries caused Bismarck to summon the Berlin Conference (1884), at which European and American diplomats attempted to regulate African affairs. Leopold was recognized as ruler of a large territory.
known as the Congo Free State—which then had no official connection with Belgium. The claims of various other countries to slices of African territory were recognized, and rules were laid down for future acquisitions. It was agreed that territories must be effectively occupied by troops or administrators, but that stations on the coast gave a just claim to adjoining territories inland—what the Germans conveniently called the Hinterland. Later arrangements provided for the abolition of the slave trade (which still flourished inside Africa), prohibited the sale of firearms to natives, and made various other rules for their protection against white exploitation. Unfortunately these rules were not well observed, and early in the twentieth century missionaries told lurid tales of what was going on. A commission investigated, and Leopold turned the Congo Free State over to Belgium (1908). Thereafter the region was known as the Belgian Congo.

Meantime the French were putting forward claims to enormous territories, stretching westward from Senegal over the whole Sahara and the upper Niger Valley and around to the northern banks of the Congo. They also annexed the island of Madagascar (1896). Bismarck saw no need for colonies but, being unwilling to resist popular pressure, he claimed four regions, none of great value—German Southwest Africa, the Kameruns, Togoland, and German East Africa. The British claimed not only South Africa and Rhodesia but also the lower Niger Valley, the Gold Coast, and Sierra Leone in the west, and Kenya and Uganda in East Africa. The Portuguese claimed large areas in Angola and Mozambique; the Spaniards had several small posts; the Italians took Eritrea on the Red Sea and Somaliland in East Africa; and even the United States exercised a sort of protectorate over Liberia—a small republic inhabited in part by emancipated slaves sent back to Africa from America. A glance at the map suggests that both France and Germany were dreaming of acquiring broad belts across Africa from east to west, while the British dreamed of a similar belt from the Cape to Cairo. There was no great rivalry between France and Germany in Africa during the 1880’s and 1890’s, but the Germans were suspected of coveting the Belgian and Portuguese colonies, and British ambitions were plainly incompatible with those of both France and Germany.

The northern part of Africa, along the Mediterranean shore, had been a part of the Turkish Empire for three hundred years, but in the nineteenth century Turkish power was declining. Parts of this region, notably Egypt, were very fertile, and had once been the scene
of high civilizations, but they had suffered greatly under Turkish rule, and now they were in a tragic state of decrepitude. In 1805 Mehemet Ali (1769–1849), a Moslem soldier born of Albanian parents, had been appointed governor of Egypt by the Turkish sultan. Soon he was plotting against his master. By 1811 he had secured complete military control of the country, but only in 1841, after two wars with Turkey, followed by European intervention, was he recognized as
hereditary ruler (later khedive). Ali was an able man, under whose rule Egypt progressed rapidly, but his grandson, Ismail (1863–1879) was a spendthrift who borrowed heavily in Europe, avoided bankruptcy by selling his shares in the Suez Canal to Disraeli, and was finally forced from the throne. During the confusion that followed his expulsion, the French and British intervened (1882), with the English bombarding Alexandria and occupying Cairo. In spite of French protests, they then settled down to govern the country. Mehemet Ali’s descendants retained their position as khedives, but they enjoyed little power.

In 1883 England sent Lord Cromer (1841–1917) to Egypt as “consul general.” During the next twenty-four years this remarkable man governed the country with an iron hand, introduced countless improvements in taxation and agriculture, and proved himself one of England’s great colonial administrators. During these years, however, nationalism arose in Egypt and fanatical Moslems caused Cromer great trouble. As Egyptian territory extended south only to the Second Cataract of the Nile, beyond which lay the Sudan, rebels frequently established their headquarters in this southern region. A popular English general, “Chinese Gordon,” was killed there in 1885, but in 1898 Lord Kitchener conquered and annexed the country.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Algeria was ruled by a “dey” (nominally an agent of the Turkish sultan) who made a nuisance of himself by his piracies and by enslaving Christian captives. In 1830 the French undertook to conquer the region, but not until fifty years later was it sufficiently pacified to permit the establishment of civil government. Frenchmen were encouraged to settle there, especially after 1870, but the population remained overwhelmingly Moslem. In 1881 France proclaimed a “protectorate” over Tunis, including the site of ancient Carthage, but several years passed before her power was effectively established. Morocco caused even greater trouble. This region, though Moslem since the eighth century, had never been conquered by the Turks, and except for Tangiers (opposite Gibraltar) it attracted little attention from Europeans before 1881. An international conference at Madrid then attempted to settle the status of the country. Several years later, after an incompetent ruler had let the country fall into confusion, the French decided to intervene. In 1905, and again in 1911, their activities almost precipitated general European wars (see p. 553), but in 1912 a French protectorate finally was established.
The Italians, being latecomers in the race for colonies and therefore having a poor field to choose from, were greatly annoyed when France snatched Tunis from under their noses (1881). A year later they seized Assab, near the southern end of the Red Sea, from which they spread out to occupy the whole of Eritrea. Seven years later they persuaded a local ruler to give them extensive rights in the East African region called Italian Somaliland. They then tried to occupy Ethiopia, but the natives defeated them badly at Adowa (1896), and for forty years they made no further attempts in that direction. They turned their attention instead to the sandy wastes of Tripoli, lying between Egypt and Tunis. After careful diplomatic preparation they declared war on Turkey in 1911, and a year later Turkey ceded the last of her African possessions to Italy. The partitioning of Africa was virtually complete, with Ethiopia (or Abyssinia) and tiny Liberia the only parts of the Dark Continent not ruled by Europeans.

INDEPENDENT STATES

In the early years of the twentieth century European political power covered the greater part of the Eastern Hemisphere. Turkey was still nominally independent, but for many years diplomats had been referring to “the sick man” and had drawn up countless testaments disposing of his possessions. Only the rivalries of the great powers, notably Russia and England, prevented the complete dismemberment of the Turkish Empire, and when a revolution at Constantinople overthrew the sultan, Abdul Hamid (1876–1909), it seemed that Turkey’s hour had struck. The prospects for Siam were not much brighter after France and England composed their differences in 1904, and the Anglo-Russian accord of 1907 must have seemed equally ominous for Persia. If Afghanistan still retained a measure of independence, it was only because of British indulgence; and Nepal and tiny Bhutan, perched high and almost inaccessible in their Himalayan fastnesses north of India, could safely be ignored. In 1900 the only two major Asiatic states that seemed likely to survive were China and Japan.

China

China was an ancient and highly civilized country whose early history has already been sketched (see Vol. One, p. 380). Chinese writers, as we have seen, ordinarily divide this history into several
periods, each of them dominated by a "dynasty." The earliest of these
dynasties—the largely mythical Hsia—supposedly began to rule be-
fore 2000 B.C., and the last of them—the Manchu dynasty—was estab-
lished in A.D. 1644, when invaders from Manchuria overthrew the
native Ming dynasty which had ruled China since 1368. The heart
and the most populous part of their empire was the province of
China proper, which consists largely of the valleys of the Hwang
Ho (Yellow) and the Yangtze River, but the early Manchus also
ruled four other provinces adjoining China on the north and west—
Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang or Chinese Turkestan, and Tibet—
and further afield were the more loosely held Korea, Formosa, and
Indochina.

The Portuguese had established themselves at Macao in 1557, and
twenty-five years later Jesuit missionaries entered China (1582).
During the next century these missionaries met with a notable suc-
cess, but their activities alarmed many Chinese, and the last of them
were expelled in 1724. The Portuguese continued to trade at Macao,
however, and after 1715 the British East India Company regularly
sent ships to nearby Canton. At about the same time the Russians
opened trading posts along the northern borders of China. Neverthe-
less, at the beginning of the nineteenth century Europeans knew little
of the interior of China, and the Chinese were virtually untouched by
European civilization, holding themselves aloof and considering
themselves vastly more civilized than these "western barbarians."

The Manchu dynasty had held a firm hand over China throughout
the eighteenth century, but after the death of its last outstanding
emperor (1796) its power declined and the empire was shaken by
a series of serious revolts. Local officials became so corrupt and so
cumbersome that the central government could neither control
them nor collect its customary revenue through them. The threat of
bankruptcy paralyzed the state. Both imperial and local officials
agreed, however, that foreigners should be excluded from China,
and each vied with the other in making foreign trade difficult. The
British East India Company gradually learned how to do business
with these officials, but when parliament deprived it of its monopoly
on the China trade (1833), the newcomers who sought to enter the
field quickly declared conditions to be intolerable. At just this time
the Chinese emperor decided to abolish the traffic in opium, which
the British were bringing to China from India in great quantities, and
matters reached a crisis when a zealous Chinese official confiscated
and destroyed $6 million worth of the drug belonging to British traders. Warships bombarded Canton and other ports. When peace was restored, the British received complete sovereignty over the island of Hong Kong; they were granted trading privileges in five other "treaty ports"; British residents in these cities were permitted to live under their own laws, enforced by their own consuls; and the opium trade was resumed. Several other European countries and the United States then secured similar privileges, and China was effectively opened to trade with the West (1839–1842).

During the next few years economic conditions in southern China went from bad to worse, and popular distress led to the great Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864). The leader of this revolt, Hung Hsiu-ch’üan (1812–1864), was a religious mystic who had been influenced by Christian missionaries, but he was a capable general as well. His followers seized control of much of southern China, and by 1853 he had established his capital at Nanking. He promised to turn China into a utopia, with the common ownership of property, the brotherhood of man, and the equality of the sexes established by highly dictatorial methods. He also announced his intention of overthrowing the Manchu dynasty and substituting himself as head of the T’ai-p’ing Tien-kuo, or "Heavenly Kingdom of the Great Peace." When the imperial government had bankrupted itself trying to destroy him, the European powers decided to wring further concessions from the emperor (1857–1860). After French and British troops had entered Peking and burned the emperor’s palace, they forced him to open other treaty ports and to permit a great extension of missionary activity in the interior. A British soldier of fortune, the famous "Chinese Gordon" (1833–1885, see p. 489), who had taken part in the sack of Peking, then reorganized the imperial army and defeated the rebels. Hung’s rebellion cost the lives of many million Chinese, but it collapsed in 1864 when he committed suicide.

For the next several years the European governments made no further open aggression against the tottering Chinese Empire, but their position was difficult because the Chinese government was too weak to be effective. During the greater part of this period China was ruled by the empress dowager, Tz’u Hsi (1835–1908), a remarkable character who was often derisively called "the Old Buddha." She had once been merely the emperor’s concubine, but upon his death (1862) she became regent for her debauched son, and after this son’s death she became regent for her equally debauched nephew
(1875–1889). Her policies were thoroughly conservative and anti-foreign, but with the aid of a competent minister, Li Hung-chang (1823–1901), she kept China from falling to pieces.

The Opium Wars and the Taiping Rebellion showed Li and other Chinese leaders the great dangers facing their country, and in spite of "the Old Buddha," a number of reforms were effected. A few feeble efforts were made to create a modern army and navy, Chinese students began to frequent European and American universities, and statesmen reluctantly began to treat their European colleagues as equals. The way of the reformer was hard, however, for a highly developed and closely knit civilization like that of the old China does not readily accept innovations. The great majority of the Chinese people therefore continued to look with aversion upon all foreigners. The missionaries created a special problem. The Chinese had been trained for many centuries in the essentially humane and tolerant Confucian philosophy, and now they failed to understand why anyone should go halfway around the world to preach a strange new religion. Such persons must be engaged in some deep plot. It was therefore easy to work up popular feeling against the missionaries, and occasionally mobs would lynch them. When the missionaries' home governments used these demonstrations as an excuse for exacting further concessions, hostility became more rampant among the Chinese. While a few enlightened Chinese thought of saving their country by adopting a little European civilization, the great majority saw their sole salvation in remaining true to old traditions and practices.

The closing years of the century brought the struggle between East and West in China to a climax. Europe was then at the height of its imperialistic enthusiasm but, oddly enough, the crisis in the Far East was precipitated by Japanese imperialists. While the Chinese were rejecting European civilization, the Japanese had been adopting parts of it eagerly, and along with many other European novelties they took up aggressive European imperialism. In 1894, therefore, they went to war with China, and within a few weeks their modernized army had won a sweeping victory. As her reward, Japan claimed the Liaotung peninsula (in Manchuria) with its excellent harbor at Port Arthur, as well as Formosa and the Pescadores Islands, and she secured independence for Korea. When France, Germany, and Russia intervened, "advising" her not to take Liaotung, she reluctantly consented. Having thus "saved" China, the three European powers proceeded in 1898 to indemnify themselves at her expense.
Germany took a ninety-nine-year lease on Kiaochow, an excellent port on the Shantung peninsula; Russia seized Port Arthur and the whole Liaotung peninsula, recently saved from Japan, and her troops occupied much of Manchuria; France occupied Kwangchowan in the extreme south; and Britain earmarked the whole Yangtze Valley as her special sphere, after grabbing Kowloon, near Canton, and Weihaiwei, on the Shantung peninsula opposite Port Arthur. But when Italy demanded “compensations,” the Chinese found the strength and courage to refuse. In addition to these territorial grants, the European powers also extorted valuable concessions for railway building and forced China to accept huge loans from European bankers.

American merchants had begun to trade with China early in the nineteenth century, but such trade had never been important, and at this time the missionaries usually were more influential than the traders in determining American policy toward China. In 1898, however, the United States entered the western Pacific area by annexing Hawaii and the Philippines. Both missionaries and traders were by this time distressed at the prospect of an imminent dismemberment of China, and in September, 1899, the American secretary of state, John Hay, announced his famous “Open Door” policy. In essence, he demanded that China retain her independence and her territorial integrity, and that the merchants of all countries be allowed to trade in her ports on equal terms. It may be doubted whether Hay’s pronouncement had much effect upon European policy, but the great powers abstained from further partitioning of China. Critics of the Open Door policy often charged that in practice it merely meant that Americans could share in all the profits from European aggression without sharing in its expense.

Meantime Chinese indignation at the European demands of 1898 had enabled “the Old Buddha” to return to power (1898), and her encouragement led to the Boxer Rebellion. Beginning their attacks upon foreigners in the fall of 1899, the members of a Chinese secret society—the “Patriotic Order of the Fist,” popularly called “Boxers” in English—wrought great damage until the European powers sent a joint relief expedition which entered Peking in August, 1900. The German kaiser publicly exhorted his troops to show no mercy and to leave behind them a memory like that of the Huns of old, and the soldiers of each country vied with one another in following this urbane suggestion. The countryside was systematically laid waste,
hundreds of thousands of Chinese peasants were made homeless, and the scenes of horror which accompanied the entrance of the Christian armies into Peking beggar description. When peace was signed by the aged Li Hung-chang (May, 1901), the European allies extorted further concessions and an indemnity of $333 million from the Celestial Empire.

The next ten years were a period of growing confusion in China. Again many Chinese urged a return to their ancestral ways, but those who favored Europeanization became more numerous day by day. (Secretary Hay had arranged that America's share of the Boxer indemnity should be used for educating Chinese students in American universities, but the effects of this measure were not felt for several years.) The corrupt Manchu bureaucracy became more and more inefficient, and after the death of "the Old Buddha" (1908), the boy emperor (Pu-yi) was the prisoner of his court. At last revolution broke out (October, 1911), the Manchus were expelled, and a Chinese Republic was set up.

Japan

Meantime Japan was pursuing a very different course. The Japanese, like the Chinese, were an ancient people with a high civilization of which they were immensely and justifiably proud, but when the first Portuguese reached Japan in 1542 they were warmly welcomed. During the next fifty years trade prospered, especially at Nagasaki, and after the arrival of the famous Jesuit missionary Francis Xavier in 1549 several thousand Japanese were converted to Catholicism. The Japanese soon became suspicious of the Jesuits, however, and ordered them to leave the country (1587). When they failed to do so, a few were executed (1597). Eventually all Spaniards and Portuguese were expelled (1624–1638), but Dutch merchants (who first arrived in 1609) were allowed to continue their trading operations at Nagasaki.

At just this time Japanese leaders, who were developing a strong national government, adopted a policy of complete isolation for Japan. Christianity was proscribed and stamped out, leaving virtually no trace behind; foreign trade at Nagasaki languished; and Japanese were forbidden to leave the country under any pretext (1638). The Japanese successfully maintained this isolation until the early years of the nineteenth century, when Western traders again began ham-
mering at their gates. In 1854 an American naval officer, Commodore Perry, arrived in Japan and secured a treaty opening Japanese ports to American traders. Soon thereafter the same privileges were extended to other foreigners.

From hoary antiquity Japan had been ruled by a line of emperors claiming descent from various mythical characters and ultimately from the Sun Goddess herself. These emperors established their residence at the holy city, Kyoto, in A.D. 794, and the next few centuries were among the most brilliant in Japanese history (see Vol. One, p. 395). At this time Japan developed a feudal system which strongly resembled that of western Europe in the Middle Ages. The feudal lords became so powerful that in 1192 the emperor was forced to entrust the government to one of them, who bore the title shogun ("generalissimo"). Thereafter the emperors lived in seclusion at Kyoto and the shoguns ruled from other capitals and finally from Yedo (now Tokyo). The office of shogun was hereditary, but several dynasties of shoguns succeeded one another, until the last (the Tokugawa dynasty) assumed power in 1603. They were the rulers responsible for Japanese isolationism. Even before Perry’s arrival, however, the shoguns were becoming unpopular because of their misgovernment, and many Japanese were proposing that the emperor assume more active rule. Numerous national humiliations inflicted by Westerners during the years after 1854 completed the ruin of the shoguns, and the last of them resigned in 1867. Thereupon the young emperor, Mutsuhito (1852–1912), who had come to the throne only eleven months before, assumed personal control of the government (January 3, 1868). This emperor came to be known Meiji—"the Enlightened."

The forty-four years of Mutsuhito’s rule saw many profound changes in Japan. It is important to bear in mind, however, that before 1868 the emperors had been even more isolationist than the shoguns, and that the last shogun had lost prestige by his subserviency to the West. The new emperor did not now change his mind on fundamentals, but merely decided to fight the West with Western arms. Nevertheless, he effected a profound revolution. He moved his capital from Kyoto to Yedo, which he renamed Tokyo; he abolished Japanese feudalism; he organized a bureaucracy along Western lines; he introduced a parliament and other representative institutions; he ordered universal education and universal military training; he reorganized the army on Prussian lines, and with the help of Eng-
lish advisers he founded a Japanese navy. Railways were built and Western industry was introduced, primarily to manufacture arms at first, but before long it was turned to other purposes as well. All these reforms were introduced during a period of less than ten years, and the suddenness of the change caused many people to protest. The old feudal nobility raised a serious rebellion in 1877, but they were quickly crushed by the emperor’s new army. Before the end of the century, Japan had become a highly industrialized country with a secure place in the modern world.

In spite of these revolutionary changes, the Japanese people had not changed their minds or their hearts on fundamental matters. The military caste still played a predominant part in political life, personal conduct was guided and judged by the ethical standards of bushido ("the warrior’s code"); Buddhism gradually gave way before Shintoism, supposedly a revival of ancient Japanese worship but actually an exalted patriotism; and the emperor was still adored as the Son of Heaven.

The new Japan quickly adopted an expansionist policy, often imitating the practices of European imperialists—though usually without bothering to justify them with fine phrases, as the Europeans did. As early as 1871 a commercial treaty of the Western type was forced upon China, and five years later a new and much more elaborate treaty was procured by a naval demonstration off Korea. Several years of intrigue in Korea were followed by the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 (see p. 494), at the close of which Japan obtained Formosa and the Pescadores, but was forced to return the Liaotung peninsula, while China recognized Korean independence. The Japanese were extremely annoyed when the Russians seized Port Arthur two years later and connected it by railway with the Trans-Siberian line across Manchuria. After entering into an alliance with England in 1902, Japan attacked Russia in 1904 and, after brilliant military and naval victories, signed a treaty of peace at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in September, 1905. Russia transferred Liaotung and the railway to Japan, gave Japan the southern half of the large island of Sakhalin, recognized her paramount position in Korea, and returned Manchuria to China. Five years later Japan annexed Korea (1910).

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 marks a turning point in the history of European imperialism. When Russia was thus excluded from Manchuria and her warm-water port in the Far East, she turned her attention to the Balkans once more—with disastrous results. The
other powers learned that Japan must be given consideration in the Far East, and discontinued their armed attacks upon China. This war, like the Boer War and the Morocco crisis of 1905–1906, disturbed the minds of many Europeans and led to severe criticism of the whole imperialist program. And above all, for the first time in many centuries non-Europeans had defeated Europeans in a major war. A thrill of excitement spread over Asia, and Asiatics everywhere began declaring openly that the days of white supremacy were numbered. Western students of world affairs sometimes predict that future ages will regard 1904 as the most important year of the twentieth century—or, at least, as 1914’s only serious rival.
BEGINNING THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY
FOUNDATIONS OF THE NEW AGE—
THE NEW DEMOCRACY
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27. FOUNDATIONS OF THE NEW AGE

It is said that when the aging Bismarck visited Hamburg for the last time, in 1895, and observed the brisk commercial and industrial life with which the city was teeming, he sadly shook his head and remarked that this was not the Germany he had known: “This is a new age,” he commented, “a new world.” This particular story may be apocryphal, but it is certain that few persons could have visited any important city of Europe or America in the 1890’s and remained unimpressed by the material changes taking place before their eyes. Electric trolley cars were rapidly replacing the horse-drawn streetcars and buses, streets were lighted at night by electricity, and the owners of the better houses were installing electric lights in place of the old gas burners. Huge buildings were being constructed around structural steel frames. Typewriters and telephones were becoming standard equipment in modern offices. If the visitor carried his observations a little farther, he would discover that a German named Gottlieb Daimler (1834–1900) had recently invented an internal-combustion gasoline engine, that he and other inventors were already experimenting with rudimentary automobiles, and that imaginative enthusiasts were planning airships and airplanes—not just daydreaming about them. Chemists were learning to synthesize hundreds of useful materials, ranging from artificial fertilizer, coal-tar dyes, and flavoring extracts to high explosives, and manufacturers were finding large markets for these new products. The phonograph and the moving picture were passing beyond the experimental stage, though as yet their imperfections kept them from providing widely popular entertainment. These dazzling innova-
tions may have saddened Bismarck and his contemporaries, but most people took pride in them as the ultimate proof of human progress.

The world had been severely shaken by the economic, social, and intellectual developments of the late nineteenth century, and in the 1890’s young leaders were bringing new ideas to the solution of their problems. Politically as well as materially the 1890’s were a period of rapid innovation, with new faces and new ideas appearing on every side, and from the excitement of these years sprang the basic ideas which were to dominate the early twentieth century. A new age was dawning in those “gay nineties,” youth was coming into its own, and the young men who then rose to prominence continued to lead Europe until almost the end of the First World War.

William I, who had been King of Prussia since 1861 and Emperor of Germany after 1871, finally died in 1888 at the age of ninety and was succeeded by his son, Frederick III. The new emperor was already stricken with cancer, however, and within one hundred days he followed his father to the grave. William II (1858–1918), who then mounted the German throne, quickly became the most talked-about ruler of his day. Early in his reign the young and ambitious kaiser had dramatically exclaimed, “The course remains the same, full speed ahead!” but within a short time he was steering a new course. Bismarck was dismissed in 1890 and during the last ten years of the century a series of old men gracefully adorned the highest offices of the German state. But these were years of transition. When Bernhard von Bülow (1849–
became chancellor in 1900, the new kaiser began to play a leading role in Germany and in the world.

Similar changes were taking place in England. The aged Gladstone (1809–1898) resigned his fourth and last ministry in 1894, and after a brief interlude the Conservatives returned to power, with old men holding high office for a time and young men dreaming lofty dreams. In France the collapse of General Boulanger (1889) removed the last important threat to the Third Republic, whose continued existence French politicians took for granted thereafter. In Italy, the work of unification was largely completed, the heroes of 1870 were passing from the scene, and the decade of the 1890's brought different problems. A new spirit spread over Russia during this same decade, and the election of William McKinley (1843–1901), in 1896, marked a turning point in American history.

Communication and travel were now so simplified and so widespread that the various countries of Europe and America could no longer maintain their former isolation. New ideas, new practices, new mechanical inventions spread quickly from country to country, and Europe disclosed her cultural unity more clearly than ever before. In the following pages, therefore, we shall arrange our materials topically, tracing the spread of one new idea after another through western Europe and America, instead of discussing each state separately.

HUMAN FOUNDATIONS

At the beginning of the twentieth century there were more Europeans than ever before and, as was more important, these people were frequently moving from one place to another. We have already seen that during the second half of the nineteenth century the population of Europe rose by one-half, from about 265 million to about 400 million (see p. 466 n.), and that during this same period other millions of Europeans found new homes beyond the seas. During these fifty years the “white race” increased in number from 300 million to 500 million and its mobility is illustrated by the number of immigrants annually entering the United States. After reaching a peak of 789,000 in 1882, this number declined for a few years, until it stood at slightly less than 230,000 in 1898, but thereafter it rose rapidly, passing the one million mark six times in the ten years preceding 1914. Other millions of Europeans migrated to Latin America, South Africa, or Australia. In the early years of the twentieth century
there was scarcely a village in central or southern Europe which had not contributed at least one of its sons to the New World, and in many cases a considerable portion of the village population had departed. Moreover, when these emigrants prospered in their new homes—as they often did—they usually were anxious to have their old friends learn of their success. They revisited their native villages, or at the very least they sent back glowing—and no doubt exaggerated—accounts of their new lives. Strange reports therefore circulated through Europe as to what was possible in America, and the stay-at-homes sometimes began to wonder whether a better social organization might not bring similar blessings to Europe.

Migration was not always, or even usually, from one country to another. More commonly it was from the villages to nearby cities. Throughout history the cities have drawn their populations from the countryside, and in the nineteenth century this rush to the urban centers took on new magnitude. The farms and villages lost many of their energetic and ambitious inhabitants while the cities grew in size and importance. Here dwelt millions of people who had torn themselves away from their ancestral ways of life to seek a new and happier lot. Those who prospered in their new homes were delighted with the “progress” they had achieved, but countless others were lost in their new surroundings. Discontented and discouraged, they sank into the slums or roamed about from place to place, ever hoping that a new turn of events would bring them greater security and happiness.

The new mobility of the population was mental and intellectual as well as physical, for when men forsook their ancestral abodes and their ancestral ways of life they lost the stabilizing influence of ancestral ideas as well. The cities to which they flocked were filled with people of many sorts, whose social, religious, and intellectual backgrounds differed widely from those to which they had been accustomed and whose new way of life rapidly transformed their old views of the world. Men began to make it a virtue to reject old ideas, and their very novelty often made new ideas seem as wonderful and as desirable as the latest mechanical inventions. A restless desire for mere change became characteristic of the intellectual life of the early twentieth century as well as of its social and political life.

Life had always changed at a more rapid tempo in the cities than in the towns and villages, but now the pace became swifter than ever. This characteristic of the new city life was due in part to the
energy of the people who had migrated to the cities, but it was also due in part to the mechanical inventions that came into widespread use at just this time. In fact, the new cities would have been quite impossible without the new transportation that carried men to their places of work and brought them food, perhaps from thousands of miles away, while improved sanitation kept them alive and new hope made life seem worth living. In these great cities everyone seemed always to be in a hurry to get somewhere; men expected great things of the future; and the decade of the 1890’s became famous as a period of hope as well as one of thrills and excitement.

**ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS**

It might seem that this great increase in the urban population would cause a shortage of food, yet such was not the case. New and better methods of cultivation, coupled with the wider and wiser use of chemical fertilizer, greatly increased the amount of food produced per acre, even though the number of farm laborers remained almost stationary. The European peasant lacked the capital to buy expensive farm machinery, however, and after the cities had drained off the more enterprising individuals, the farms of Europe could no longer feed their cities. Salvation came from the new lands of the Americas, Australia, and Russia, whence grain and meat were cheaply shipped to western Europe. The average European therefore ate more and better food in 1900 than his ancestors had ever enjoyed. But these importations of food made western Europe dependent upon the outer world for essential supplies. In the early years of the twentieth century England annually produced only enough food to feed her population for about six weeks; Belgium and Holland were not much better off; and even Germany was beginning to import heavily from Russia. Other countries, still producing their own fundamental staples, imported such commodities as sugar and coffee which either were necessities or were popularly regarded as such. Food thus bound Europe tightly to the rest of the world.

*The New Industry*

The economic depression of the mid-1870’s continued in varying degrees of intensity for twenty years, but during the 1890’s conditions began to improve. By this time large-scale production was giv-
ing a new impetus to industry. Competition is the death of profits; efficiency requires the concentration of control; and the savings of large-scale production brought big producers many advantages over their smaller rivals. Other factors also promoted the advance of big industry in the closing years of the nineteenth century. The peasants flocking to the cities provided armies of workers; the progress of science and engineering led to new and better technology; transportation and communications were so greatly improved that raw materials could be imported cheaply from distant lands and finished products could be sold on a world market; and the large amounts of capital accumulated during the nineteenth century could be used to erect huge modern factories. The consolidation of industry in the hands of a few large-scale manufacturers began in the United States and Germany during the 1870’s and 1880’s; a few years later it appeared in England and elsewhere; and by 1900 it had reached a high stage of development in all industrial countries. The establishment of large-scale industry required the elimination of countless small competitors and was preceded by years of cutthroat competition, the struggle being especially bitter in the United States, where the Vanderbilts, the Carnegies, the Rockefellers, and the Morgans engaged in a veritable battle of the giants (see p. 452).

Large industrial organizations—commonly called “trusts” in America—took different forms in different countries and in different industries, but everywhere their characteristic features were much the same. In the United States they included everything from a “gentlemen’s agreement” among several producers against price-cutting, through the “holding company” and the “trust” literally speaking (each of which was a corporation organized to own the stock of several competing companies and operate their plants as a unit), up to the “merger,” in which the different producers united to form one enormous concern that enjoyed a practical monopoly of the industry. There were “horizontal trusts,” which sought to monopolize the manufacture of a given commodity, and there were “vertical trusts,” which took over all the different steps in working up raw materials into a given commodity or in producing various commodities from a given raw material. The fundamental industries of the modern world, such as iron and steel, railways and shipping, are among those which lend themselves most easily to such large-scale operations, and they were therefore the first to be organized by giant corporations.
The economic forces that produced the trusts also operated in the field of finance, where they brought about a corresponding concentration of capital. Banks became bigger and bigger, and fewer and fewer, until most of the nation’s credit was gathered into the hands of a rather few men. Practically all the banking in each of the European countries was done by six or eight large concerns. Since the huge industrial trusts, with their enormously expensive plants and their far-flung operations, would have been quite impossible without the large banks through which they could quickly raise millions in case of need, and since the huge banks would have been equally impossible without large industrial concerns to absorb heavy investments, the two types of organization developed simultaneously and remained closely affiliated. Through the banks all the different industries of the nation were being amalgamated, and from the economic point of view the nations themselves came to resemble enormous trusts.

New and better methods of manufacturing, the increase in the number and size of factories, and the improved organization of industry, combined with the prevailing zeal for economic activity, caused industrial production to increase prodigiously. The total annual product of the factories of Europe and the United States was more than trebled between 1870 and 1913. It soon appeared, however, that this increased production raised new problems. The factories of each of the great industrial nations produced more goods than the people of that nation could use, and new markets were constantly being sought abroad. Presently the large-scale manufacturers of each country were producing for world markets, creating a sort of international division of labor: each country, manufactured especially those things for which it was best adapted, and imported others from abroad. Early in the twentieth century Germany absorbed about a quarter of England’s exports, for which she paid with goods manufactured in German factories. The economic world was rapidly becoming a unit.

Nevertheless, the road leading to economic unification of the world was not smooth. Before the business leaders of the different nations were willing to attempt cooperation they tried to ruin each other by competition. This international competition was often bitter, with international competitors having recourse to all the fair and unfair methods which the industrialists of a given nation had used against each other before the trusts were formed. Manufacturers also tried
to exclude foreign goods from their countries by tariffs and to prevent their use by appeals to patriotism. The United States and most of the continental powers raised their tariffs sharply during the 1890's, and even England felt the beginnings of tariff agitation. Other manufacturers continued to find valuable markets in colonies (see p. 466), and during the 1890's colonial enthusiasm reached its highest pitch.

In spite of protective tariffs and patriotic appeals, trade between the great nations of Europe increased rapidly; large numbers of persons profitcd by it; banks were organized to finance it; and internationally-minded persons conducted it. These persons frequently held a low opinion of their more nationalistic competitors, whose activities restrained international trade. Their own investments were in all countries, and their banks were so intimately associated with foreign banks that a loss to any nation was a loss to all. They deplored the tariff walls which impeded their trade, and they saw clearly that colonial conflicts were endangering the peace of the world. They therefore sought means of removing these obstacles to friendly commerce. They organized international trusts (it is said that 250 such trusts were doing business in England in 1914); they cooperated with foreign bankers and traders in developing and exploiting the backward regions of the earth; and they encouraged propaganda for international conciliation and world peace.

Labor and the Middle Class

All this, however, is only one side of the economic and social revolution that was sweeping over western Europe and the United States toward the end of the nineteenth century. The new, aggressive, and powerful capitalist class, which created this new industry, was now faced by strong groups of organized labor. The economic individualists of the nineteenth century had opposed labor unions and employers' associations alike, and even after unions had been legalized (see p. 270), they did not gain large memberships at once. But in the last decade of the century the unions began to grow rapidly. English unions boasted nearly two million members in 1900, and more than three million ten years later. German unions had organized about one million workers by 1900, but in 1914 they had almost four times that many members. At the latter date there were about a million unionists in France and over half that number in
Italy. The most successful of several labor organizations in the United States was the American Federation of Labor, founded in 1886, whose membership of 500,000 in 1890 had been quadrupled by 1914.

The leaders of these labor unions turned their attention primarily to wages, hours, and working conditions, which they sought to improve through “collective bargaining” with employers. A single laborer could not negotiate effectively with the management of a giant corporation, but if all the workers in a plant cooperated, they might force it to yield by means of strikes, boycotts, or other forms of “industrial warfare.” The unions eventually achieved a fair degree of success, and early in the twentieth century most large employers of labor began to realize that the unions were there to stay. Collective bargaining came to be taken for granted. Of course employers still tried to weaken the unions, sometimes through legal interference, sometimes by propaganda in favor of the nonunionist’s “right to work,” sometimes by organizing their own “free” unions, sometimes by corrupting union leaders, and sometimes by voluntarily paying high wages and providing excellent working conditions. Nevertheless, strikes steadily became bigger and more successful. The London dock workers won a famous strike in 1889, and the next few years saw a succession of bitterly fought struggles in every industrial country of the world.

Union leaders also encouraged their followers to seek their ends by political activity. In the United States they attacked politicians of all parties who were supposedly hostile to labor and recommended others with more favorable records; in England they organized the “Labour party” (1900), which made rapid progress during the next few years; in Germany they became avowedly socialistic; and in France, Italy, and Spain they developed a rival theory known as “syndicalism” (from the French word syndicat, “labor union”) which was avowedly anarchistic. Both socialists and syndicalists denounced the capitalist system and hoped that some day the workers would take over the industries of the world, but in other matters their differences were fundamental. The socialists laid great emphasis upon the state and political activity, to which the syndicalists paid little attention. Socialists looked forward to a day when all industry would be owned and operated by a democratic and proletarian state, syndicalists to a time when their labor unions would own and manage their respective industries. The socialists hoped to gain control by elections, or else by a political coup d’État, while the syndicalists...
looked forward to a “general strike” of all workers as the easiest way of acquiring power. The syndicalists also preached “sabotage,” or the deliberate performance of bad work and injury to machinery, as preparation for the great day when they would all go out on strike. They spoke luridly of the “class war,” and their extreme statements enabled the capitalist press to make them into a fearsome hobgoblin.

Not everybody in Europe was a member of one of these two social classes—capital or labor—and not all members of these classes were strongly class-conscious. Between them stood a middle class which included the professional men and retail merchants, such salaried employees of Big Business as office workers, engineers, and scientists, the owners and managers of the many industries which could not be operated successfully on a large-scale basis, and many others who were neither capitalists nor wage laborers. One of the most important elements in this new middle class was the small investor who lived wholly or in part on the income from capital he had invested in stocks or bonds. The wide prevalence of joint-stock companies with low-priced shares enabled such persons to invest their savings easily and profitably. The great industrial concerns often sold interest-bearing bonds to pay for improvements and additions to their plants, thus providing the small investor with further openings; and as every government in Europe was deeply in debt, its bonds provided still other opportunities for relatively safe investment. The middle class was strong and prosperous in these years, and it held the balance of power between the rather evenly matched forces of labor and capital.

But though the middle class continued to prosper, its position in the modern world of trusts and labor unions was not clear. Its members did not know for certain where their interests lay in the economic struggles that disturbed Europe and America, and they were not convinced of the complete rightness of either of their rivals. Some members of the middle class sympathized sentimentally with labor and wished to see its condition improved; others admired the financial and industrial giants of the day and followed their lead in social and political matters. Men with investments in industry were of course interested in the success of the concerns whose stocks and bonds they held, but as times were generally prosperous, many felt that they could afford a little generosity. Moreover, as a result of the diffusion of higher education in the nineteenth century, the members of the new middle class were fairly well educated, and
they often based their policies upon their idealism as much as upon their supposed economic interest.

**INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS**

A large part of the popular acclaim for the technological progress made during these years went to ingenious inventors, such as the American Thomas A. Edison (1847–1931), rather than to the scientists whose laborious researches discovered the principles which the inventor applied, but science itself was rising rapidly in popular esteem. When industrial leaders learned the economic value of scientific knowledge, they began rewarding scientists, and able young men turned to scientific research as never before. At just this time, too, a number of fundamental discoveries opened up wide fields for further research, and science made rapid progress. In many cases the new discoveries were so fundamental that they upset ideas that had prevailed for many years, and sometimes new sciences were established in consequence. All thinking took on a scientific tinge, and men gladly believed that the alchemy of science would make the twentieth century a golden age.

**The New Sciences**

A number of especially significant discoveries were made in the field of physics during the 1890's. Shortly before his death, the German physicist H. R. Hertz (1857–1894) announced the discovery of a new type of electromagnetic waves. Using this information, a young Italian named Guglielmo Marconi (1874–1937) succeeded in sending a wireless message for about a mile (1895) and six years later sent a similar message across the Atlantic. The value of his invention to ships at sea was so obvious that within ten years every large ocean-going vessel in the world was equipped with a wireless apparatus. In this same year 1895 another German, W. K. Roentgen (1845–1923), discovered X-rays, which not only had high practical value, especially for physicians, but also raised fundamental questions regarding the constitution of matter. More important still was the discovery by the French scientist Henri Becquerel (1852–1908) that uranium possesses radioactive properties (1896). Two years later the French physicist Pierre Curie (1859–1906) and his Polish wife Marie Curie (1867–1934) found radium in a mineral known as
pitchblende (1898). A little later, studies of the radiation of energy led the German physicist Max Planck (1858–1947) to question the commonly accepted notion of what an atom is like (1901), and the Englishman Ernest Rutherford (1871–1937) reached similar doubts by his studies of radioactivity (1904). The Swiss Albert Einstein (1879–1955) then propounded his famous theory of relativity (1905, and in greater detail in 1915), in which he denied the universal validity of Sir Isaac Newton’s laws (see p. 119) that had remained the foundation of physical science for more than two hundred years. Man’s conception of the physical universe was being remade with a vengeance, but all this was only a beginning.

Equally important ideas were then being developed by the biologists. Darwinism and the evolution of species were now accepted by all competent scientists, but there was lively discussion among them
as to the exact manner in which species come into being. Building upon the work of Gregor Mendel (see p. 374), biologists founded the science of genetics by carefully investigating the phenomena of heredity. The German August Weismann (1834–1914) showed conclusively that “acquired characters” (i.e., the characteristics acquired by an individual after birth) are not passed on by heredity (1892); the Dutch Hugo de Vries (1848–1935) contended that species change by sudden “mutations” rather than gradually, as Darwin had believed (1900); and the American T. H. Morgan (1866–1945) made further major contributions to the theory of heredity. These same years saw tremendous progress in medical science. The researches of Pasteur and Koch in the 1870’s and 1880’s had established the germ theory of disease and the general principle of immunization by vaccination (see p. 370). During the next few years scientists identified the germs of many diseases and developed ways of destroying them or guarding against them. Malaria, tuberculosis, diphtheria, cholera, hydrophobia, bubonic plague, typhoid, yellow fever, typhus, and many other diseases which had once taken a heavy toll of human life now seemed about to disappear.

Men have always been fascinated by the workings of the human mind, and philosophers have speculated on the subject long and deeply, but only in the late nineteenth century did psychology become a recognized science. Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) founded the first psychological laboratory in 1879, and the new science may be said to have come of age with the publication of The Principles of Psychology (1890) by an American, William James (1842–1910). James followed this book with other important studies, notably The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902), in which he scientifically but sympathetically described the various mental states and acts of religious people. Meantime other psychologists were investigating mental disorders. The discoveries of Pierre Janet (1859–1947) and others regarding hysteria inspired the theories of the Austrian Sigmund Freud (1856–1939). Freud and his pupils, especially the Swiss Carl Jung (born 1875), laid great stress upon the drives which cause men to act as they do (will to live, sex, hunger, fear, etc.) and upon memories from infancy which lie deeply buried in the mind and apparently are forgotten but whose emotional power still causes seemingly irrational conduct. In his book The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) Freud declared that dreams, properly interpreted, are an excellent guide to these buried memories, and by developing the
method of psychoanalysis he succeeded in helping many patients whose minds were twisted by "repressed" desires and memories.

New social sciences also rose to prominence during the 1890's. Writers like Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer had laid the foundations of sociology during the middle years of the century (see p. 383), but under the influence of the natural sciences sociologists now began following new lines. They became less immediately interested in formulating elaborate "laws of social development" than in describing how societies actually operate. Some investigators gathered statistics on all sorts of matters, making them the backbone of their study of society; others wrote on such subjects as criminology
or crowd psychology; and still others sought the origins and traced
the historical development of such social institutions as the family
and the state, of such political and economic institutions as kingship
and private property, and of customs, folklore, ethical systems, and
religions. Anthropologists attempted to explain modern social, politi-
cal, economic, and religious ideas and institutions as evolutionary
developments springing from those found among such “primitive”
peoples as the American Indians or the Australian aborigines. Thus
Sir James G. Frazer (1859–1941), a Scottish anthropologist, wrote an
enormous and immensely learned book, The Golden Bough (1890;
second edition, in 12 vols., 1900–1915), in which he dealt with the
cults, myths, totems, and taboos of peoples all over the earth. These
fascinating volumes, brilliantly written, have often been listed, along
with Freud’s, among those exercising the greatest influence upon the
thinking of the new century.

The decade of the 1890’s was thus as productive of new ideas as
it was of new mechanical inventions. Young men found it an exciting
time in which to live, for the oncoming twentieth century seemed
to promise so much. Old ideas and old standards seemed hopelessly
out of date during this gay and brilliant fin-de-siècle (“end-of-the-
century”), when men seemed about to free themselves from the
shackles of the past. This restless spirit even invaded the field of
philosophy, where the newest and most characteristic thought of the
day was that of the “pragmatists.” These philosophers rejected the
elaborate systems of past thinkers, from Plato and Aristotle to Kant
and Hegel, and even declared that such systems could never have
more than a temporary value. One philosophy might prove useful in
one set of circumstances, but other quite different ones might be
better at other times. Men should try out their new ideas and de-
termine whether or not they are true by testing them. The “truth” is
what works. The most distinguished exponents of this line of thought
were two American professors—William James of Harvard, men-
tioned above, and John Dewey (1859–1952) of Columbia—but
analogous ideas were often expressed in Europe. At the same time the
French philosopher Henri Bergson (1859–1941) was propounding
other views highly characteristic of the new day. His most important
book was entitled Creative Evolution (1906), and while it contained
much more than those two words might suggest, it no doubt owed
much of its wide popularity to its suggestive title.
Humanitarian Idealism

The great economic and social changes of these years caused many social maladjustments. The cities were full of slums, where thousands of people lived in wretched tenements under conditions that shocked members of the more privileged classes. Women and children worked for long hours in "sweatshops," receiving pitiful pay. Everywhere extreme poverty existed side by side with extreme riches. Deeply distressed by such conditions, idealistic members of the middle class turned their attention to social reform, studying these conditions and suggesting improvements. Thus "General" William Booth (1829-1912), the English founder of the Salvation Army, wrote a widely read book, In Darkest England and the Way Out (1890), and Jacob Riis (1849-1914), a Danish immigrant to the

Reformers first tried private charity, establishing “settlement houses” in the slums to provide relief for a few of the most unfortunate. Toynbee Hall, in London (1885), was soon followed by Hull House in Chicago (1889) and by a host of others. But useful as they were, such enterprises did nothing to improve the conditions that created the slums, and people began demanding the extensive reform of society. In England the Fabian Society, founded in 1883, stimulated an interest in socialism among a considerable number of brilliant young men. The Fabians were neither very Marxian nor very radical (they were “gradualists,” taking their name from the old Roman general Quintus Fabius, who wore Hannibal down by refusing to fight a pitched battle against him), but they were highly effective propagandists. They often advocated “municipal socialism”—municipal ownership of water, gas, and electric plants, telephones, and other utilities—as a first step toward the nationalization of industry. In Germany the Verein für Sozialpolitik (“Union for Social Policy”) was urging a very similar program, while eminent Kathedersozialisten (“Socialists of the [professorial] Chair”) taught like doctrines in the German universities. Though these men all denounced Marxian socialism bitterly, they had been profoundly influenced by it, and they always insisted that “the state must turn working man’s friend.” Such doctrines were equally popular in France, and everywhere socialists and near-socialists united to make humanitarian idealism a religion for the twentieth century.

The churches could not remain untouched by the new spirit, and their leaders presently began formulating elaborate and radical programs for “Christianizing the Social Order.” Such ideas received great encouragement from Pope Leo XIII’s famous encyclical on the condition of labor (1891). The pope roundly condemned Marxian socialism, but he made many suggestions for improving social conditions, and this encyclical has caused him to be called “the workingman’s pope.” At the same time countless Protestants were expressing similar and even more radical ideas. Some supported organiza-
tions such as the Salvation Army, some called themselves "Christian Socialists," some deduced new social doctrines from the Gospels, and some even pictured Jesus as primarily a social reformer or even as a socialist agitator.

This humanitarian idealism was greatly aided by groups of young literary men who came upon the scene during the 1890's and who devoted their talents to spreading the new social gospel. Following in the footsteps of such mid-century writers as Ibsen and Tolstoi (see pp. 390 and 412), they wrote "problem plays" and "problem novels" to spread their ideas on the social questions of the day. Their leader in the 1890's was the French novelist, Emile Zola (1840–1902). He had spent the middle years of his life as a writer of realistic novels, but he now turned his attention to social and religious questions. In a series of three novels, Lourdes, Rome, and Paris (1894–1898), he told the story of a young priest who left the church, married, and became a social worker. Zola then planned four modern "gospels," dealing respectively with Fecundity, Labor, Truth, and Justice, the fourth of which was not yet written at the time of his death. The most prominent writer of the decade in Germany was Gerhart Hauptmann (1862–1946), who often wrote on social topics. His tragedy The Weavers (1892) sympathetically depicted a revolt of Silesian weavers in the 1840's. A decade later Thomas Mann (1875–1955) began publishing novels criticizing the old order in Germany: Buddenbrooks (1900) dealt with the decadence of an old merchant family in the modern world; and Royal Highness (1909) depicted the disintegration of a family of minor German princes, though in a lighter and less pessimistic strain than its predecessor.

Writers in the new spirit were especially numerous in England, but only two of them deserve special mention. The dramatist George Bernard Shaw (1856–1950) was at heart a social reformer. In his youth he wrote tracts for the Fabian Society, and in the 1890's he began producing the comedies that made him famous. These brilliant and witty plays, with their still more brilliant prefaces, were really tracts for the times, for they centered around discussions of the social problems: slums, prostitution, capital and labor, the vanity of military glory, feminism, matrimony. In England and America and on the continent of Europe, especially in Germany, Shaw's success in the opening decade of the new century was tremendous. His great rival was the novelist H. G. Wells (1866–1946), who was the Rousseau of the new age, just as Shaw was its Voltaire. As a young
man Wells had studied biology, and in the 1890's he wrote fantastic romances with a scientific tinge (The Invisible Man, 1897), but he too became interested in the Fabian Society and in social problems. His fifty volumes deal with almost everything under the sun, from the abolition of war to patent medicines, from marriage to socialism, from the reform of education to flying machines, from the history of the world to the nature of God.

Journalism too played an important part in the intellectual history of the last years of the nineteenth century, attracting able writers and expressing opinions on all manner of subjects as well as giving the news. In earlier decades The Times (London) had stood pre-eminent among newspapers, for though it had a daily circulation of
barely fifty thousand copies at the middle of the century it was read regularly and carefully by leaders in every field. Like the people to whom it catered, it always was solid, sober, and dignified—and perhaps a trifle dull. Before the end of the century, however, the advance of popular education had brought new classes of readers to the fore, and new types of newspapers arose to meet their varied tastes. The 1890's saw the heyday of the "yellow press," with the London Daily Mail claiming a circulation of a million copies a day (that of The Times had by this time risen to about 100,000), and W. R. Hearst (1863–1951) was just beginning his sensational career in America. The popular appeal of these newspapers was due in part to their lurid accounts of crimes and scandals, in part to their vociferous—and sometimes quite unscrupulous—championing of popular causes. Countless other periodicals maintained journalistic standards that lay somewhere between those of The Times and those of the Daily Mail, presenting their readers with something new to think about every day or every week or every month.

The 1890's were undoubtedly the most unlucky years of the nineteenth century in which to be born, for millions of the young men born during that exciting decade were later butchered on the plains of Flanders or Poland; but at the time everything seemed rosy. The return of economic prosperity after many years of depression, the amazing progress of science and mechanical invention, and eloquent new ideas on almost every subject under heaven created a feeling of high expectancy that began in the middle 1890's and endured until the outbreak of war in 1914. Men everywhere believed that great things were about to happen, that the Messiah was about to come, that the kingdom of heaven was at hand. They were by no means agreed as to what this kingdom of heaven would be like when it came, or as to when or how it could arrive, but of its speedy coming there seemingly could be no doubt. Some men believed that it would be brought by the inventors and the natural scientists, some looked to the social scientists, but many were convinced that it would be a democratic kingdom of heaven, established by act of parliament.
28. THE NEW DEMOCRACY

The social changes that swept over Europe during the nineteenth century, the advance of political democracy, the introduction of new forms of governmental activity, and the new humanitarian idealism all found expression in the new political parties of Europe. In the mid-nineteenth century, when governments were less complex and the franchise was narrowly restricted, political parties usually represented two major economic groups: the conservatives tended to represent the landowners of Europe, the country gentlemen, and the established churches (Anglican, Lutheran, Catholic), while the liberals spoke for the industrial capitalists. In the closing years of the century, however, this simple arrangement collapsed. Many industrialists forsook their earlier liberalism and joined forces with their former adversaries to found the new conservative parties that dominated most European countries at the turn of the century. The new conservatism was extremely nationalistic, and often it was imperialistic as well; it favored tariffs and other aids to industry; it consented to a limited amount of social legislation in behalf of the workers; it usually enjoyed the support of the state churches; and while the older aristocracy might grace the party with their names, policies were determined largely by the aggressive spokesmen of big industry.

The passing of the old liberalism opened the way for new liberal parties. These new parties drew their support mainly from the middle classes, though they might also be backed by manufacturers and bankers whose businesses were international and who consequently resented the chauvinism and tariffs of the conservatives, and they usually won the favor of the lesser religious groups—the Dissenters in England, the Protestants in France, the Catholics in Germany. These
liberals often invoked democracy, but they also favored state aid, they urged social legislation, and they did much to promote state socialism. They presently drove the conservatives from power, and in 1914 they ruled most of western Europe and America.

The most novel feature of the political life of the new day was the appearance of labor parties. Karl Marx had established the International Workingmen's Association in 1864, but this organization (later known as the "First International") collapsed during the chauvinistic excitement following 1870. Local socialist parties were then founded in most countries, and in 1889 these national parties celebrated the centennial of the French Revolution by uniting in the "Second International." They grew rapidly in numbers and in power during the 1890's, but when the possibility of immediate political action appeared, many leaders abandoned doctrinaire Marxism and drew up more moderate programs which they hoped to inaugurate at once. Men of this moderate sort were elected to political bodies on all levels, from city councils to national parliaments, and among them were some of the ablest statesmen of Europe in that day—men like August Bebel (1840–1913) in Germany, Jean Jaurès (1859–1914) in France, and Ramsay MacDonald (1866–1937) in England.

The party orators of each of these political parties professed a deep and abiding love for the people and raised a great hullabaloo about democracy, yet at this very time most governments were evolving in directions that made their rule more autocratic. As voters usually voted automatically for party candidates, political parties became more important than ever, party loyalty and discipline were emphasized, and there was little place in political life for a man without a party. Moreover, the questions coming before legislatures and parliaments were so numerous and so complex that no sensible man could pretend to discuss more than a few of them with competence. It also happened sometimes that the men who could arouse the enthusiasm of voters, and thus get themselves elected to parliament, knew very little about any of the problems that would be laid before them as legislators. When it came to voting for specific measures, they usually were glad to follow the leaders of their party. Governments were therefore directed rather firmly by the party leaders.

Yet the leaders of the political party in power, theoretically the most powerful statesmen in their respective countries, did not always determine policy as freely as was supposed. In parliamentary coun-
tries, such as England and France, the party leaders composed the cabinet, each presiding over one department of the government. But sometimes these men had little knowledge of the departments to which they were assigned, and (especially in France) they often changed from one office to another every few months. For the management of their departments, for information as to what was going on in them, for advice as to what could be done and how it could be done, these ministers relied upon their permanent undersecretaries. In other countries, such as Germany, cabinet ministers were merely the heads of departments who had worked up from one post to another. They had a personal knowledge of the workings of their departments, but they were not politicians, they carefully avoided all party affiliations, and they were responsible to the kaiser, not to the people or their elected representatives. They were the men who would have been undersecretaries in parliamentary countries. In either case, therefore, the permanent officials gradually usurped the powers of government.

In earlier times government service, except in the armed forces, had scarcely ranked among the professions, but it now took on new importance. In most countries the civil service regulations were thoroughly revised, and though many positions were still filled by appointment (thus preserving great powers of patronage for the politicians) high posts were more commonly filled on the basis of training and experience. At the end of the nineteenth century the governments of all great countries employed hundreds of thousands of persons, ranging from ambassadors and university professors to policemen and postmen, all of whom were relatively independent of the politicians. These officials were honest, intelligent, and patriotic men, and though geniuses might be rare among them, they did their work well. In theory the ministers and legislators guided these bureaucrats, and to a certain extent they actually did so, being guided themselves by their private conceptions of statesmanship, or by their interpretation of public opinion, or perhaps by pressures of some sort from the outside. In the long run, however, the legislators could do little more than encourage some bureaucrats and restrain others by increasing or reducing their budgets. Successful ministers had to be men who could persuade parliament to support their respective departments, and successful members of parliament were the ones who could persuade their colleagues and their constituents to do so.
Liberal Reforms

In spite of these difficulties, and in spite of the growing power of the bureaucracies, democratic idealism made steady progress in every country of the world. This progress took different forms in different countries, for democratic traditions among the Anglo-Saxon peoples were not the same as those prevailing among the Latins, the Germans, or the Slavs. Nevertheless, a close examination reveals fundamental similarities in the democratic movement among all these peoples. All men seemed to agree that "the people" should have a greater voice in determining government policies, even though they did not agree among themselves as to how this "people" could best express itself.

During these years the Progressive movement was at its height in the United States (see p. 455). Inheriting much from Bryan and the Populists, and influenced to some extent by British Fabians and German "Socialists of the Chair," the Progressives advocated reforms, some of which were designed to further political democracy while others were aimed at providing greater "social justice." In the early years of the century many such reforms were actually accomplished, some by individual states, others by the national government, and in the presidential campaign of 1912 both Roosevelt and Wilson eloquently urged greater democracy. Among the political reforms of these years may be mentioned the introduction of direct primary elections to nominate candidates for office (instead of leaving it to the old-fashioned "boss-ridden" party conventions), the initiative and referendum (enabling voters to approve laws that the legislators refused to pass, or to repeal ones that they did pass), the recall (voting officials out of office before the end of their terms), woman suffrage, and countless other devices for making "the will of the people" prevail.

Democracy was also a watchword at this time in England, where the Liberals had returned to power in 1905, bringing with them a large program of reform. Though they easily carried their bills through the House of Commons, some of the most important were vetoed by the hereditary peers of the House of Lords. That venerable chamber therefore incurred the Liberals' wrath, and demands arose that it be drastically reformed—or even abolished. The last straw was added when the Lords rejected the budget in 1909 (see p. 528).
Parliament was dissolved, new elections were held, and the Liberals won again, though with a reduced majority (January, 1910). The Lords then passed the budget, but the Liberal prime minister (H. H. Asquith), being determined that such a veto should never occur again, presented a bill reforming the Lords. When the Lords vetoed his bill, as he foresaw that they would, he dissolved parliament once more and ordered another election. Again the Liberals won (December, 1910), but the Lords remained obdurate until Asquith threatened to force passage of the measure by having the king create four hundred new Liberal peers. Thoroughly frightened by this threat, the Lords passed Asquith’s bill (August, 1911). It provided that thereafter the House of Lords should have no power to veto money bills, and that if any other bill were passed by the House of Commons in three consecutive sessions, over a period of at least two years, it should go to the king for his signature (which was purely automatic) in spite of adverse votes by the Lords. At most the Lords could delay a law for only two years—a privilege which they defended in democratic parlance by saying that this delay enabled “the people” to think proposed measures over more carefully! Many other democratic reforms were being urged in England. It seemed that Ireland was about to be granted Home Rule at last (see p. 536), and perhaps the noisiest of all the political reformers in 1914 were those demanding woman suffrage.

Democratic reformers were equally active in France and Italy; the small countries (Scandinavia, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland) were becoming the most democratic in Europe; and Russia was going through a period of rapid reform (see p. 422). The most interesting case of all, however, was Germany. Heretofore Germany had not been a democratic country, but during these years it steadily advanced in the direction of greater democracy under the leadership of moderate socialists. The Social Democratic party had made such progress in Germany since the fall of Bismarck that in 1903 it polled more than three million votes and elected eighty-one deputies to the Reichstag. (There were 397 deputies in all.) At the next election (1907) the alarmed authorities waged a demagogic campaign against it and succeeded in reducing its representation to forty-three. Within a few months, however, a series of scandals brought several high officials into disrepute, and late in 1908 an indiscreet act by the kaiser (who had not been touched by the earlier scandals) precipitated the “Kaiser Crisis” of 1908. William had been in the habit
of making speeches on every possible occasion—speeches which were so tactless as to be the despair of his ministers and a source of uneasiness to the rest of Europe. When a number of his extreme remarks were assembled by an English journalist and published (with his permission) as an interview in the London Daily Telegraph, they were greeted by an outburst of anger, both in England and in Germany. The German chancellor demanded that thereafter the kaiser make no public statements without prior authorization, saying that otherwise he could not accept responsibility for them. William was terrified, talked about abdicating, and finally gave the promises required of him. Thoroughly demoralized, he lost his old flamboyance, and his role in German history was almost negligible thereafter.

Other crises followed, and in the elections of 1912 the Social Democrats cast four and a quarter million votes, or 35 percent of the total, thus becoming the largest single party in Germany and winning 110 seats in the Reichstag. A year later the Reichstag, by a majority of 293 to 54, passed a vote of censure on the chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg. Though the chancellor did not resign, as he would have been forced to do in England or France, such a vote was unprecedented in Germany. Had the war not intervened, similar votes would sooner or later have forced his resignation, and Germany would have achieved a form of parliamentary government. The German Bundesrat (the upper house of the legislature) was still strongly conservative, but the bureaucracy was constantly assuming greater power in the government, and the army and landlords still held the upper hand in the German government.

These liberal leaders in Europe and America were not content merely with democratizing the processes of government. They also developed elaborate programs to provide what was called greater “social justice.” They demanded national insurance to cover sickness, accident, unemployment, and old age, the fixing of maximum hours of labor, the prohibition of child labor, the provision of free and compulsory education, the improvement of sanitary conditions in the slums, and countless similar reforms for the benefit of the poorer classes. To pay for these measures they proposed a revision of tax systems that would throw the burden on the rich, especially by means of heavily graduated income taxes.

The leader of this agitation in England was David Lloyd George (1863–1945), whose budget of 1909 had caused such commotion.
His budget was bad enough, in Tory eyes, but his words were worse. In a speech at Limehouse (a London slum) he declared that he was "waging war on poverty" and spoke vividly and at length of the duty of the state to aid the poor; he inveighed bitterly against the "very shabby rich men"; and he justified placing the burden of taxation on their broad shoulders rather than upon "the people." Not for many years had the propertied classes in England been so terrified. In America Theodore Roosevelt was perhaps somewhat less lurid in his language, but he urged much the same program, and during Woodrow Wilson's first term as president (1913–1917) a number of basic laws effected reforms of this sort. There was less fuss and feathers about social legislation in Germany, partly because the Germans had been accustomed to it ever since the days of Bismarck. In the summer of 1912 the German secretary of the interior, addressing the Reichstag, read the "social program" set forth in the platform of the American "Bull Moose" party and, after considering its demands one by one, declared that every one of them had been in operation in Germany for several years. The proposals with which Lloyd George sent shivers down the spines of middle-class Englishmen were regarded as excellent doctrine by the German bourgeoisie.¹

The 1890's had been a period of great enthusiasm for colonial expansion, with England taking the lead and with most of the great powers following in her train, but the Boer War (1899–1902) gave the English a rude shock. They suddenly discovered, to their amazed dismay, that many years of colonial aggression had left them without a single friend among the powers of Europe. Even while the war was in progress a few courageous "Little Englanders" denounced it publicly (on one occasion Lloyd George narrowly escaped being mobbed for an antiwar speech he delivered in Birmingham), and afterward many Englishmen lost their enthusiasm for colonial expansion. In

¹ Lord Haldane, a member of the British cabinet who was in Germany shortly after the election of 1912, tells the following anecdote to illustrate conditions there: "I was present at a supper party given by one of the professors in a well known German university town, in May of that year. I asked him whether the old Conservative member who had for long represented the town had been again returned. 'Returned? No!' he replied, 'it was impossible to return a man of moderate opinions. We only escaped a Social Democrat by a few votes. We managed to get enough of the popular vote to return a fairly sensible railway servant for this university town.' I inquired what party he belonged to. 'No old party,' was the answer, 'and it will interest you to know that his program was an English one: "Lloyd Georgianism."' I then inquired what was his text book. 'The Speeches of Lloyd George,' was the answer. Did it contain anything about a place called Limehouse? 'Limehouse? Ah, yes! That was a splendid speech!'"—Haldane, Before the War, p. 85.
these years, too, "dominion status" was extended to Australia (1901), New Zealand (1907), and the recently conquered South Africa (1910, see p. 475).

Other imperialistic countries were experiencing much the same change of heart at this time. American imperialism had reached a climax in the Spanish-American War of 1898, after which the United States annexed the Philippines and Puerto Rico. During the next few years American troops were landed more than once in Cuba and other Caribbean islands. Nevertheless, these troops were withdrawn in every case, much to the surprise of European and South American critics, and in 1916 congress passed a resolution promising eventual independence to the Filipinos. The states of western Europe were similarly divided regarding imperialism. Though the Germans talked much about colonies, they acquired no new ones, but France took Morocco (1911) and Italy conquered Libya (1912). In all these countries, however, the socialists denounced imperialism. In 1912 young Benito Mussolini, then a socialist, was sentenced to several months in jail for his vociferous criticism of Italian adventures in Libya. Russia’s imperialism led her into the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, but her defeat made her willing to compromise with England two years later. On the other hand, Japan’s victory gave hope to the victims of European aggression in Asia, where native unrest won the sympathies of liberals in Europe and America. In the decade before 1914, anti-colonialism made rapid progress everywhere.

Finally, mention must be made of the advance of pacifism during these years. From the earliest times men have dreamed wistfully of peace, but in the early twentieth century many such dreamers really believed that war had at last been relegated to the past. There had been no wars in western Europe since 1870, and such minor conflicts as those in South Africa and Cuba seemed rather unimportant. Every year Europe was becoming more closely united by the progress of industry, finance, science, travel, and education. International congresses brought together leaders from different countries to discuss matters of every sort. In 1899, and again in 1907, diplomats assembled at The Hague, in Holland, to discuss arbitration, disarmament, and other plans for preserving peace. An international court, sitting at The Hague, settled several international disputes. Everywhere socialists and capitalists seemed agreed as to the folly of war, but nowhere was this idealistic pacifism more widely prevalent.
than in the United States during the early years of the twentieth
century.

Revolutionists

As these liberal reformers believed whole-heartedly in democracy, they were sure that their programs could be realized by the orderly processes of law, and they therefore put their trust in education and political activity. Less confident persons insisted that only a violent revolution, after the manner of that of 1789–1799, could establish democracy and justice in the modern world. Ever since the failure of the great French Revolution to achieve its idealistic aims, and especially since the collapse of the revolutions of 1848 and of the French Commune of 1871, there had been professional revolutionists in Europe who devoted their lives to plotting the violent overthrow of all existing governments. The most famous of these revolutionists was the Russian Michael Bakunin (1814–1876, see p. 406), whose disciples were never numerous though they attracted wide attention. In the years now under discussion they assassinated King Humbert of Italy (1900), President McKinley in the United States (1901), and high officials in several other countries, notably in Russia. They did not claim that their victims were conspicuously worse than other rulers, but they professed to believe that a few examples of this sort would frighten governments into making drastic reforms for the benefit of the people. They were therefore called “terrorists.”

In the popular mind these terrorists were closely associated with the “anarchists.” Such association was unjust, however, for the anarchists were merely persons who wished to reduce the role of all governments and eventually to replace them by small and voluntary coöperative societies. They believed that in such societies every man would be free to act as he pleased, but that if he were properly educated and free from poverty and fear his natural goodness would effectively restrain him from cheating or harming his fellow men. The French philosopher Proudhon (1809–1865, see p. 361) is ordinarly hailed as the father of modern anarchism, but Peter Kropotkin (1842–1921) was its chief exponent in the late nineteenth century. A member of the high Russian aristocracy, Kropotkin became interested as a young man in the Narodniki, or “Populists” (see p. 407), was imprisoned, escaped, and fled to western Europe. Only in 1917 did he return to Russia. While sojourning in the West, he spent much
time organizing labor unions and inspiring their leaders with his social ideals, with the result that French, Italian, and Spanish unions were more hostile to government action than were those of Germany and England. His sympathetic book on *The Great French Revolution* (1908) pictured that event as a heroic popular uprising against tyranny, and his *Mutual Aid, a Factor of Evolution* (1902) criticized the Darwinian emphasis upon the “struggle for life” and “survival of the fittest,” suggesting instead that cooperation and mutual aid are the prime factors making for “progress” and even for survival among men and beasts. Prince Kropotkin was a scholarly and likable man, a high idealist and not a terrorist, and his *Memoirs of a Revolutionist* (1899) won him respect and many admirers in Europe and America.

At this time socialists too began taking a new interest in revolutionary activity. Karl Marx had often talked about revolution, but his firm conviction that socialism was inevitable kept him from being an ardent revolutionist. Unlike Bakunin, he never called out his followers to man the barricades. Even at the turn of the century most socialists, as we have seen, were reformers who hoped to achieve their aims by purely political methods. In every country, however, there were impatient agitators who realized that their radical proposals would never be accepted by the present ruling classes and who therefore urged that these classes be deposed by force and that a full-fledged socialist regime be introduced under a “dictatorship of the proletariat”—by which they meant a dictatorship of radical socialists like themselves. They had become avowed revolutionists. Until the outbreak of the First World War, moderate socialists quarreled with the radicals inside the various socialist parties, but except in Russia the two factions usually managed to maintain a united front against outsiders.

The Russian Revolution of 1905 (see p. 422) deeply influenced the revolutionary movement in western Europe. Hundreds of Russian revolutionists fled to the West after the collapse of their agitation in Russia, and European socialists studied the Russian Revolution carefully in order to learn the causes of its failure. Many became convinced that they could do better. The socialist parties of Europe therefore became more radical, and even in England a prominent labor leader, Tom Mann, scandalized the middle class by declaring publicly, “Revolution is the means of, not the alternative to, Evolution.” Everywhere there were strikes, and everywhere radicals were instigating revolutionary violence. Not all the prophets of violence
were radicals, however, and their reactionary opponents were equally far removed from the old liberal reliance upon the orderly processes of law.

NATIONALISM AND MILITARISM

In earlier chapters of this book we have traced the rise of national states in western Europe during the latter part of the Middle Ages and described the progressive intensification of nationalistic enthusiasm in modern times. Political philosophers of the eighteenth century taught that the nationality of the people should determine the boundaries of a state, and the enthusiasm generated by the French Revolution—or by opposition to Napoleon—aroused feelings of nationalism and patriotism in every corner of Europe. The mid-nineteenth-century agitation for the unification in Germany and Italy called forth further expressions of the nationalistic spirit, which often assumed the exaggerated form of super-patriotism that is called “chauvinism.” (Nicholas Chauvin was a soldier in Napoleon’s army, but even there his extreme enthusiasm for the emperor had brought him into ridicule.) Political events in the 1890’s further stimulated this spirit throughout Europe, and in the early twentieth century chauvinism rose to still loftier heights. Nineteenth-century liberals believed strongly in nationalism but we have seen that in the twentieth century liberals often turned to internationalism. Chauvinistic conservatives were thus enabled to put themselves forward as incarnating the finest type of patriotism.

This new nationalism received literary expression on many levels, from scholarly treatises to popular novels and newspaper editorials, but of all chauvinistic writers only one need be mentioned here. Maurice Barrès (1862–1923) was born in eastern France, not far from the Alsatian frontier, where he grew up under the shadow of the defeats of 1870. As a young man he had hoped to follow a political career, and for a few years he sat in the Chamber of Deputies as a follower of General Boulanger, but he won his fame as a novelist and a pamphleteer. In the early 1890’s he professed a philosophical anarchism, but presently he became convinced that individualism must be supplemented by voluntary coöperation toward some common goal. “We need an Ideal,” he wrote, and he found such an ideal in national patriotism. Thereafter he devoted his talents to propaganda for extreme nationalism. He declared that France’s former
greatness had been due to a certain traditional organization of society, and to ways of thinking and acting that had been handed down from ancient times. True progress, he insisted, must be along the lines of this ancient culture, not a departure from it, and even a slight deviation would bring disaster. Radicalism would be the ruin of France. In fact, Barrès urged that France return to monarchy and the religion of medieval times—a suggestion which, of course, was far more radical than any made by the socialists. Not all chauvinism was given so thoughtful an expression as it received from Barrès, however, and it frequently degenerated into a blatant shouting of the superiority of the author’s country over all others. Even the great Barrès was not above this sort of writing at times, and one of the most popular of his novels, *Colette Baudoche* (1909), presents such ideas in slightly refined form.

All chauvinists were convinced that their particular country surpassed all others in the noble things of life, but when asked why this was so they gave various replies. They attributed it to their distinctive way of life, their liberty, their language, or what not, and some even ascribed it to God’s deliberate plan, but there was a growing tendency to explain it by race. There thus grew up the doctrine known as “racism.” The intellectual foundations of this creed were laid by a Frenchman, the Comte Joseph de Gobineau (1816–1882), whose *Essay on the Inequality of Races* appeared in 1854. Before the end of the century writers advocating similar views were to be found everywhere, but as they differed among themselves in little save their favorite proper names, a brief description of one must serve for all. Houston Stewart Chamberlain (1855–1927), the son of a British admiral, deserted his native land to become a German citizen and to marry the daughter of the musician Richard Wagner. In his notorious book, *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* (1899), which professes to be a history of humanity, he declared that the Germans (Nordics) had always led the world in industry, art, learning, law, religion, freedom, fidelity, devotion to duty, and toleration. Among the distinguished Germans of former times whom he invoked were Homer, Alexander the Great, Caesar, Dante, and Jesus Christ! Surely a race so prolific in genius must have a marvelous future before it! It was said that Kaiser William II presented a copy of this remarkable book to every officer in the German army.
As a consequence of racist doctrine, there came a great upsurge of anti-Semitism. Jew-baiting had been a favorite sport in many parts of Europe ever since the Middle Ages, but in the 1890's it took on new importance. It played a major part in the French Dreyfus Affair (see p. 538), it often flared up in Germany, and it reached its greatest heights in Austria, Romania, and Russia. In the first decade of the new century the mayor of Vienna, leader of the "Christian Socialist" party there, was a certain Dr. Karl Lueger. A demagogue of genius, he attracted followers principally by his overpowering hatred of Jews, rich men, and Social Democrats. Among his admirers was a young man named Adolf Hitler, then a dweller in the Viennese slums, who learned the master's lessons all too well. For sheer brutality, however, the Russians surpassed all others, with government officials often instigating pogroms (lynchings) during the Revolution of 1905 in order to distract attention from their own shortcomings.

These racist theories also encouraged men to dream of the union of all members of a given race. The Pan-Slavists hoped to unite all Slavs, the Pan-Germanists wished to bring all Germans into their empire, and there was much talk of the essential unity of all Anglo-Saxons or of the Latin race. We have already seen something of the origins of Pan-Slavism (see p. 401) and of how it presently became an official doctrine of the Russian autocracy, frequently invoked to justify aggressive designs against other Slavic peoples. In the early twentieth century Pan-Slavic congresses were held every few years to whip up enthusiasm for this noble cause. Pan-Germanism was a much milder affair. The Alldeutsch Verband ("Pan-German League"), founded in 1894, apparently was noisier than it was influential, for high officials usually considered it only a nuisance; but its bellicose propaganda disturbed all Europe, and the Nazis later applied its doctrines with appalling thoroughness.

Nationalism and Violence

At a time when it was taken for granted that every state should be a national state, uniting all the peoples of one nationality, persons separated from their national groups usually regarded themselves as oppressed by alien rulers. Such persons were to be found, for example, in Alsace-Lorraine, which had been torn from France by the
Germans in 1870, and in the districts around Trent and Trieste, which had not yet been “redeemed” from the Austrians. Norway had once been a part of Denmark, but in 1815 it was handed over to the king of Sweden as payment for his services against Napoleon. The Norwegians strongly resented Swedish rule, however, and in 1905 the Swedish king, Oscar II (1872–1907), amazed the world by peacefully and voluntarily granting them complete independence. A few years later this strange Scandinavian proclivity appeared again when the Danes granted independence to Iceland (1918). Poland presented a more difficult problem. This ancient state had been partitioned by her neighbors—Russia, Prussia, and Austria—in the eighteenth century (see p. 81), but the Poles had not lost their national feeling, and in the early twentieth century their restlessness caused their rulers grave concern. The most acute cases of nationalistic discontent, however, were to be found in Ireland, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and the Balkan Peninsula.

Though the English had ruled Ireland for many centuries, the Irish had never become reconciled to their fate, and in the nineteenth century Gladstone decided that they must be granted “Home Rule” (see p. 340). His proposal split the Liberal party, and his First Home Rule Bill was defeated in the House of Commons (1886). Seven years later a second bill was rejected by the Lords after passing the Commons (1893). The Conservatives then undertook to “kill Home Rule by kindness,” remedying many ancient abuses in Ireland but failing to destroy Irish nationalism. When the Parliament Act of 1911 deprived the Lords of their veto (see p. 527), the Home Rulers again demanded action, and when the Third Home Rule Bill passed the Commons twice in 1913, pandemonium broke loose both in England and in Ireland. The northeastern counties of Ireland (Ulster) were inhabited by Protestants who refused to become part of an overwhelmingly Catholic Ireland, and Ulstermen prepared to resist Home Rule by force. The Catholic Irish, on the other hand, were ready to fight to secure Home Rule, and England itself was sharply divided. As there could be no doubt that the Commons would pass the Home Rule Bill for the third time in 1914, and that it would thus become the law of the land, many Conservatives were preparing to invoke violence to prevent it. The prime minister (Asquith) then introduced an amendment exempting Ulster from Home Rule, thereby infuriating the southern Irish. Had the First World War not intervened, Great
Britain might well have been thrown into civil war. The bill was passed in September, 1914, and signed by the king, but an amend-
ment provided that it should not go into effect until peace was re-
stored in Europe.

The situation in Austria-Hungary was even more complicated. Though this ramshackle empire contained a dozen mutually hostile nationalities, the German-speaking Austrians had dominated in the west and north since 1867, while the Magyars (Hungarians) ruled in the east (see p. 321). The Austrians were inclined to be rather easygoing, and they maintained their supremacy by playing off Czechs, Poles, Slovenes, and Italians against each other; but the Magyars, after achieving their own autonomy, were quite ruthless in attempting to Magyarize the Slovaks, Ruthenes, Romanians, Croa-
tians, and Serbs dwelling in their half of the Empire. The lesser nationalities therefore grew restless after 1890, and for the next quar-
ter of a century it seemed that the Empire was about to be torn to pieces. Nevertheless, there were powerful forces preventing collapse. In the first place, the different nationalities were so thoroughly commingled (no map can show their distribution accurately or in detail) that national states could not be created simply by drawing new frontiers: wherever the frontiers might be put, there would be large racial minorities inside each new state. Moreover, the Danube Valley was an economic unit. Industrial Austria and Bohemia needed food from agrarian Hungary, and Hungary imported manufactured goods from the West. Large-scale industry and banking united the empire, and as these forces were advancing rapidly in the 1890's many optimistic persons hoped that the nationalities would presently learn to live together. Such optimism was unjustified, and after the turn of the century the quarrels of the nationalities grew more bitter. Discouraged officials spoke of their efforts to solve the racial problem as "squaring the circle," and reluctantly began to fear that violence was inevitable.

Russia too had her troubles with minor nationalities, as we have already seen (p. 420), but the most difficult case of all concerned the confused racial situation in the Balkan Peninsula—roughly, the corner of Europe that lies south of the Danube and Sava rivers. This region was inhabited by Greeks, Albanians, Bulgars, Serbs, and Romanians, many of whom had won their independence from the Turks in the nineteenth century (see p. 432). In 1878 Balkan problems were "put
on ice" for a few years by the diplomats of Europe, with the Turks still ruling many Christian peoples. Early in the twentieth century, however, trouble broke out anew.

Patriotic Turks had long been distressed by the disasters that be-fell their country, but all attempts at reform had failed. Eventually a group of "Young Turks" deposed the old sultan, Abdul Hamid II (1876–1909), and inaugurated a series of drastic reforms (see p. 688). The ensuing confusion tempted the Balkan peoples to resume their struggles for independence, and in the First Balkan War (1912–1913) they confined the Turks to the region around Constantinople. They immediately fell to quarreling among themselves, however, and in the Second Balkan War (1913) the others robbed Bulgaria of most of her gains. Nevertheless, Balkan chauvinists were not yet satisfied. Greeks were dreaming great dreams about a revived Byzantine Empire with Constantinople as its capital; Romanians were anxious to "liberate" their numerous kinsmen in Hungary; and Serbs coveted Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia at the expense of Austria and Hungary. A year later, as everyone knows, the reckless intrigues of these Balkan chauvinists brought on the First World War.

Militarism and Violence

Though many liberal leaders in Europe and America expressed the hope that the twentieth century would be a century of peace, other men were simultaneously preaching the benefits of militarism, urging the necessity of increased defense, and launching an armament race which continued at an ever increasing tempo until 1914. Germany has usually been considered the leader in this race, and her army certainly was the best in Europe, but every country in Europe had its militarists whose activities, and especially whose propaganda, frightened its neighbors and spurred them to greater efforts. Moreover, it was in France rather than in Germany that militaristic enthusiasm was most vocal in the 1890's. Here too, however, it met its severest and most effective criticism when the struggle of the rival factions culminated in the famous Dreyfus Affair.

Captain Alfred Dreyfus (1859–1935), an army officer of Jewish descent who was attached to the French general staff, had been convicted of selling military secrets to the Germans and sentenced to life imprisonment (1894). The matter attracted little attention at the time, except from anti-Semites who cited it to prove their favorite con-
tention that all Jews are traitors. Early in 1898, however, the novelist Émile Zola published a celebrated letter, "J'accuse," in which he charged the high command of the army with forging the evidence upon which Dreyfus was convicted. The Affaire quickly became more than a question of the guilt or innocence of one man. The high command of the army itself was on trial, and it drew to its side all the militarists, jingoists, Jew-baiters, and other super-patriots in France. They accused their opponents of ruining France by their internationalism and pacifism, and they freely insinuated that Dreyfus's defenders were traitors themselves. The Dreyfusards, on the other hand, invoked all the idealism of liberalism, and in the end they won. After a certain Colonel Henry had confessed to forging some of the evidence and committed suicide, Dreyfus was granted a new trial. Again the military court found him guilty, but the president of the Republic pardoned him at once. Nearly seven years later, in 1906, the supreme court annulled the second verdict, thus completely rehabilitating Dreyfus. It must be added that Dreyfus, though always protesting his innocence, was and remained as much a militarist as any of his accusers, but his eventual vindication put French militarism under a cloud for several years.

A few years before this an American admiral, Alfred Mahan (1840–1914), had published a series of volumes under the title Sea Power in History (1890–1892), which are sometimes taken as the beginning of modern "navalism," for they were carefully studied by the founders of modern navies. Bismarck had not been interested in creating a German navy, but the young kaiser was fond of the sea, he read Mahan, and in 1897 he placed Admiral von Tirpitz (1849–1930) in charge of the German admiralty. This remarkable man at once organized the Navy League, which soon filled Germany with propaganda for a big navy. Tirpitz presented his first Navy Law in 1898, providing funds for an extensive program of shipbuilding to be completed in seven years. Two years later a second law provided for a much ampler program to be completed in sixteen years. The enthusiastic kaiser declared that "Germany's future lies upon the water" and even spoke of himself as "The Admiral of the Atlantic." Yet we may doubt whether all this proves aggressive designs on his part. He made no effort to equal the British navy, and he offered no objection when the British built two vessels for every one of his. He seems to have regarded the German navy, not as a fighting machine, but as a show-piece to augment Germany's prestige—and his own. In this he re-
sembled the less exalted personages who have felt it incumbent upon them to maintain automobiles as expensive as those owned by their neighbors, and who would resent it bitterly if these neighbors undertook to restrain them. At bottom, the kaiser was merely "keeping up with the Joneses."

The British did not regard the German navy in such a light, however, and soon they were denouncing it as a menace to the world. The head of the British navy, Sir John Fisher (1841–1920), even suggested bombastically that the new German fleet be "Copenhagened"—captured or sunk without a declaration of war, just as the British had

destroyed the Danish fleet at Copenhagen in 1807. Then, in 1906, the British launched the Dreadnought, a powerful battleship which, it was claimed, could easily sink anything afloat. But by thus relegating all existing vessels to the second line, this ship robbed England of her great lead over all rivals. As each side must now start rebuilding from scratch, the Germans passed a new Navy Law at once and embarked upon a naval race with England. The British had intended to build four dreadnoughts a year, but by 1909 they were in such a panic that they ordered eight instead. "We want eight and we won't wait!" ran the popular cry. Their fears were exaggerated, for as late as 1912 (when another Navy Law was enacted) Germany had only nine dreadnoughts to oppose England's twenty, but the excitement had the most deplorable consequences for each country. At just this time, moreover, all the other great powers, including the United States and
Japan, were rapidly enlarging their navies, and the whole world seemed hysterical over battleships.

Europe was slower in starting competitive land armament. In 1893 the Germans increased their standing army by about 60,000 men to a total of 557,000 (exclusive of officers). This step was taken largely in reply to increases in the Russian and French armies and to the closer diplomatic relations that were arising between those two countries. During the next fifteen years the Germans added little to their army—though they greatly improved what they had. For several years during and after the Dreyfus Affair the French staff, being in a chastened mood, demanded no increases—though politicians endeavored to make military service more democratic. Defeat at the hands of the Japanese in 1905 left the Russian army incapable of serious action in Europe, but after the Revolution of 1905 it was rapidly built up again with financial aid from France. By 1910 the German staff was beginning to worry. In 1911 the Reichstag refused to grant more than ten thousand additional men during the next five years, but a year later the situation changed radically and an armament race began.

A diplomatic crisis in the summer of 1911 (see p. 553) had frightened the statesmen of Europe, and the Balkan Wars (1912–1913) added to their uneasiness. In 1912, after months of quarreling, the Reichstag increased the German army by about thirty thousand men and authorized two more dreadnoughts; France augmented her army somewhat and made heavy loans to Russia for building strategic railways; Austria and Italy strengthened their forces; and even England effected reforms and began talking about conscription. All this was as nothing, however, compared to what came in 1913. The Germans increased their army by almost 150,000 men to a total of 870,000 (including officers and noncoms), while the French increased theirs to 800,000, requiring all able-bodied young men to serve with the colors for three years. As the Germans spread their increases over two years while the French made all theirs at once, the French army was almost as large as the German in the summer of 1914. Russia then lengthened her required service to three and a half years and raised her standing army to 2,750,000 men.

In order to secure the funds to pay for these armaments, the various governments of Europe were forced to launch tremendous propaganda drives, frightening their peoples into paying the necessary taxes. But when they had once conjured up the spirit of militar-
ism, it refused to subside after its work was done. Everyone in Europe was frightened, and in the spring of 1914 the atmosphere was highly charged. "Everyone's nerves are tense," reported President Wilson's confidant, Colonel House, from Germany in May, as he might have reported from any other country. "It only needs a spark to set the whole thing off." Less than two months later the spark came and war broke out. The war was not caused by this spark, however, but by the armaments and the hysteria. The only answer which statesmen could find to preparedness and the resulting hysteria was more preparedness, more nervousness, more suspicion, more fear, and more hysteria, until at last they had a war.
THE FIRST WORLD WAR
HOW THE WAR CAME—
HOW THE WAR WAS Fought—
THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES
<table>
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<th>Year(s)</th>
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<td>1913</td>
<td>Second Balkan War</td>
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<td>1914</td>
<td>Assassination of Francis</td>
<td>Ferdinand (June 28)</td>
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<td>1915</td>
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<td>1920</td>
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29. HOW THE WAR CAME

The first six months of 1914 were a period of tension and excitement in Europe, with a state of mind prevailing that was almost hysterical. People of many sorts were coming to regard violence as the most effective means of getting what they wanted. War scares followed one another in rapid succession; Russian terrorists were more active than ever; revolutionary nationalists in Austria and the Balkans were plotting the overthrow of their governments; French labor leaders were preaching direct action and the general strike; anarchistic syndicalists were throwing Italy into confusion; militant suffragettes disturbed the traditional calm of the London Sabbath by fighting with the police in Hyde Park. Parliamentary government was breaking down everywhere: the Austrian Reichsrat had been dissolved and the government was conducted as a naked absolutism; the Russian Duma had been emasculated; the German Reichstag did nothing but quarrel; the French Chamber of Deputies could not even organize itself for several weeks; and thousands of British subjects in Ireland were preparing to resist the will of parliament by force of arms. Nor was this invocation of force confined to Europe. A revolution in China was momentarily held in check by a military dictator; social unrest in Japan was being repressed by violence; nationalists were disturbing India and Egypt; a labor war had broken out in South Africa. The Revolution of 1911 in Mexico was followed by a succession of dictators, and many people in the United States urged armed intervention. Even so pacific a statesman as Woodrow Wilson ordered American warships to bombard Vera Cruz (April 21, 1914), and American troops occupied the city. Everywhere force was accepted as the final arbiter of all things. It is sometimes alleged that the First World War brought a diminished respect for
law: it would be more accurate to say that a rapidly declining respect for law heralded the war.

It was not a bolt out of the blue sky, therefore, when the heir apparent to the Austro-Hungarian throne (the Archduke Francis Ferdinand) was assassinated at Sarajevo, capital of the province of Bosnia, on June 28, 1914. Nevertheless, people everywhere quickly realized that this was no ordinary murder and that it might endanger the peace of Europe. Before tracing its consequences, however, we must see something of how diplomats worked in the early twentieth century and describe the system of alliances in which they had entangled all Europe.

THE NEW DIPLOMACY

Bismarck had been a man of the old world, completing the work of his predecessors, not a pioneer creating a new world. He was the last of the great foreign ministers whose personal policies dominated the diplomatic history of his day. In the new world of the twentieth century contacts between countries were so numerous and so complex that no individual could control them, and diplomacy necessarily became impersonal. To meet the many new problems facing them, statesmen constructed new diplomatic machinery which was so complicated that its day-to-day operation required high skill and constant attention. Ministers could no longer devise far-reaching policies such as those that made Bismarck’s fame, for diplomacy was no longer conducted by statesmen but by bureaucrats.

Under the new system, the foreign minister’s task was to watch this diplomatic machine, to discuss matters tactfully with foreign diplomats, and to address parliament effectively. As he was a member of the cabinet, he also gave constant attention to matters of domestic politics. He had no time for the details of diplomacy, and in most cases his “policy” consisted of a few very general principles, to which he clung as best he could. Next below him in rank came the ambassadors. These gentlemen represented their government abroad, acting as its mouthpiece to officials and people, maintaining friendly relations with all sorts of private individuals in the countries to which they were accredited, and keeping their own governments informed as to political and other developments there. They undertook diplomatic negotiations only on direct orders from home; they reported their every act to their foreign minister; and they received
detailed and explicit instructions from him as to what they might say. Yet these men enjoyed high prestige; they could be fairly sure that domestic politics would not drive them from office; they enjoyed greater leisure than the foreign minister for the elaboration of general policies; and they were fully as influential as he. Able and energetic men might prefer to be ambassadors rather than foreign ministers. Last of all came a large number of secretaries and experts of various sorts. Some were employed in the foreign office, others were attached to the embassies abroad. They were the men who supplied the foreign minister with detailed information, and often it was they who suggested his policies. These bureaucrats dominated the foreign office and, especially if the minister were weak or inexperienced, their power was great.

Critics have sometimes inveighed bitterly against these diplomats and their "secret diplomacy," but such charges are rather unfair. Nearly all the ministers and ambassadors of the great powers were high-minded, cultured, honorable men of the world, not inclined to make trouble, quick to appreciate the difficulties of their colleagues in other countries, and able to win and hold the respect of these foreign colleagues. Intrigue and trickery were foreign to their natures. Perhaps a few ambassadors did not live up to these standards; it is to be feared that the activities of diplomats in some places, notably the Balkans, merit severe criticism; and the bureaucrats in the foreign offices, having seen less of the world than the ambassadors, were inclined to be morbidly suspicious of foreigners. Nevertheless, a close study of diplomacy in the early years of the twentieth century leaves one with high admiration for the intelligence, skill, diligence, sense of duty, and devotion to peace which most diplomats then displayed. It was not their vices that brought their lifework to ruin.

In no country of Europe was the diplomatic corps free to do as it pleased, for it was always controlled by the politicians. In England and France the foreign minister was a politician, and sometimes he knew little of foreign countries. He depended for information upon his office staff, and especially upon the permanent undersecretary, who was a well-informed bureaucrat. In other countries the foreign minister usually was a man roughly comparable to the British undersecretary. In Germany the chancellor, a politician, performed most of the duties of the British foreign secretary; in theory the foreign ministers of Austria and Russia were responsible only to the sov-
ereign, but the politicians usually found ways to make their influence felt. Everywhere the higher politicians, whoever they might be, had the last word regarding the conduct of a country’s foreign affairs.

The democratic idealism of the day encouraged parliaments to claim a general supervision of foreign policy, but often their activities were far from helpful. Deputies often had only a superficial knowledge of diplomacy; they debated foreign affairs largely to attract votes by parading their patriotism; and they occasionally used foreign affairs to create trouble for the party in power. Opposition leaders became profuse in their charges, thus driving ministers into equally extreme countercharges, and parliamentary debates on foreign policy often ended in an orgy of chauvinism. As newspapers might make these debates the basis of sensational articles, foreign governments could not ignore them, and when cabinet members made loose and extravagant statements—as was often the case, especially during the discussion of military and naval budgets—resentment abroad was likely to rise high. If the diplomats came to dread parliamentary debates—as they admittedly did—it was not because they feared exposure of their nefarious designs but because they knew that the attendant bombast and demagoguery would arouse such suspicion and animosity abroad that normal negotiations would be difficult for weeks to come.

Foreign offices were always subject to importunities and pressures from private persons and organizations. Idealistic societies of many sorts—pacifistic, missionary, colonial, chauvinistic—were constantly memorializing them in favor of some policy or against it. If the society were large enough to be important politically, the minister might deem it wise to take action of some sort; but smaller societies were usually dismissed as unnecessary nuisances. Business concerns with interests abroad also informed foreign offices of their desires. Their petitions were more apt than those of the idealists to receive respectful attention, not because of the devious ways of wealth, but because nearly everyone considered it the duty of a government to advance the economic interests of its citizens.

The most powerful of the outside forces working upon diplomacy early in the twentieth century was the newspaper press. There were all sorts of newspapers, of course, but there can be little doubt that the activities of certain editors were calamitous. These men built up circulation by exploiting their readers’ blatant chauvinism and
suspicion of foreigners, or else by attacking their government for neglecting the national interest. As their readers were voters, such attacks were important politically, and every minister had to guard against them. Governments therefore established press bureaus or selected "semiofficial" papers to disseminate their views, but they did little to check the vilification of foreign powers by chauvinistic editors. It then became the duty of ambassadors to restrain this exuberance, usually by bribery. Not only in such backward places as the Balkans, but also in Italy and even in Paris, a considerable section of the press was subsidized by foreign governments, the payments being sometimes bribes and sometimes blackmail.

It is against this background that the diplomatic history of the time must be read. Elaborate policies being impossible, foreign ministers usually lived a hand-to-mouth existence, trying their best to settle each separate dispute as it arose. Their activities were constantly guided by political considerations and by what they believed public opinion to be. Most of their regrettable acts are to be explained by their desire to satisfy chauvinistic parliamentary criticism or to strengthen their positions in parliament or with the voters. They were not plotting to circumvent the will of the people but were courting popular applause. They had to avoid concessions that a touchy chauvinist might criticize; they had to gain something from time to time; they had to keep their own country in a "position of strength" diplomatically; and they must make sure that other countries did not combine against it to impair its freedom of action or imperil its national security.

**Alliances and Ententes**

After the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, Bismarck frequently declared that since German unification had now been achieved he no longer desired anything but peace. But German unity had been won by inflicting upon France a defeat which that proud nation could neither forgive nor forget. Bismarck had demanded that she surrender Alsace and Lorraine to Germany, thus making these provinces a memorial of German victory, but to France they became a bitter symbol of defeat. Bismarck was therefore even less able than the French to forget 1870, for he constantly feared that they would some day attempt to regain the lost provinces. Though they obviously could do nothing alone, they might resume the war if assured the
aid of allies—perhaps of Austria, who likewise had had a defeat to
redeem ever since Sadowa (1866). The result was that, as a col-
league once remarked, Bismarck was tormented by a “nightmare of
coalitions.” This fear he tried to quiet by concluding alliances him-
self with his powerful neighbors. As the alliance of Russia, Austria, and
Prussia had preserved the peace and the Treaty of Vienna for
more than a generation after 1815, he now hoped that its revival
would guarantee his new map of Europe.

Bismarck therefore opened negotiations with the two powers in
question, and in 1873 they joined him in the “Three Emperors’
League,” each promising to aid the others in case of attack. Within
a few years, however, Russia’s activities in the Balkans had brought
her into conflict with Austria, and the League foundered (1878). The
very next year, Bismarck concluded an alliance with Austria, which
remained the cornerstone of each nation’s foreign policy thereafter
until the two empires collapsed in 1918. Three years later, in 1882,
Italy joined with Germany and Austria to form the “Triple Alliance,”
which endured until 1915. Meantime Bismarck had again opened
negotiations with Russia, whom he persuaded to sign a new treaty
(1881), which came to be called the “Reinsurance Treaty.” It con-
tinued in force until William II allowed it to lapse in 1890, thereby
completing his break with Bismarck’s foreign policy. During these
same years Bismarck firmly attached Serbia and Romania to Ger-
many and was careful to maintain cordial relations with England.
He thus held France in quarantine until she should have time to
forget Alsace-Lorraine and 1870. It was with justice that he spoke
of this system of alliances as unsere Friedensliga, “our league of
peace,” for he had designed it primarily to guard the peace of Europe,
and by it he preserved that peace for many years.

When Bismarck stood at the peak of his career, about 1884, he
had successfully brought all Europe into equilibrium, but weak-
nesses soon became apparent in his elaborate diplomatic structure.
In his last years Bismarck was deeply worried, and though as late
as 1888 he closed a famous speech in the Reichstag with the resound-
ing words, “We Germans fear God and nothing else in the world!”
he really feared many things. The Balkans remained restless, Ger-
many’s colonial ambitions had antagonized England, and, above all,
the French were gradually regaining power and self-confidence as
their defeats of 1870 receded into the past. Then came the German
refusal to renew the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia in 1890 and a
"DROPPING THE PILOT." A famous cartoon of the day in Punch (London).
bitter tariff war between the two countries. The French seized their opportunity, and in 1891 they signed a treaty with Russia, by which each party vaguely promised aid in case the other became the victim of armed aggression. The French were far from satisfied, however, and early in 1894 they persuaded the Russians to enter a formal military alliance. The existence of a Franco-Russian Alliance, but not its content, was officially announced in June, 1895. This alliance, like the Triple Alliance, was designed simply to guarantee peace. The tsar promised to aid France if she were attacked by Germany but he made it quite clear that he would not help her if she attacked Germany to regain Alsace-Lorraine, and the French made it equally clear that they would not fight Austria to support Russia’s ambitions in the Balkans.

The Germans were not greatly excited by this Franco-Russian Alliance, for they too regarded it as a further guarantee of European stability and peace. They had no designs against either France or Russia, and they had no intention of letting Austria go to war in the Balkans. As a matter of fact, the German people, like those of France and Russia, at that time turned their international hatred primarily against the English, whose colonial activities were infuriating all Europe. Anglo-French colonial rivalry in Africa almost precipitated a war in 1898, and European hostility toward England reached its climax a year later when the Boer War broke out. European observers even suggested that this universal distrust of England might bring France and Germany together, enabling them to forget their differences and form an anti-British continental union.

English statesmen presently became disturbed by the numerous evidences of hostile feeling which they encountered, and while only recently they had been inclined to congratulate themselves upon their "splendid isolation," they now found that this isolation had its disadvantages. But in their search for friends they did not know which way to turn. France was still regarded as England’s traditional enemy, and such newspapers as the London Daily Mail were given to edifying the public with heroic words about “rolling France in mud and blood”; but other leaders of thought, frightened by Germany’s economic competition, were declaring that if Germany were obliterated at once, every Englishman would be made richer thereby. Late in 1899 one of England’s most influential statesmen (Joseph Chamberlain) formally proposed an alliance with Germany, but the idea found favor neither in England nor in Germany. The most that
could be done at the time was to form an alliance with Japan (1902). A few months later the Boer War came to an end, and the British government began a drastic revision of its foreign policies. It worked seriously for better relations with France, and the French were delighted. Various colonial disputes in Morocco, Egypt, and Siam were settled (see p. 485), and in 1904 the two countries came to a “friendly understanding” that was known as the Entente cordiale. A few months later England’s Conservative government fell, but the Liberals continued the same policy, and in 1907 they reached a similar “understanding” with Russia. These ententes were not formal military alliances, like the Triple Alliance and the Franco-Russian Alliance, but they quickly became something very similar.

As the Germans were more disturbed by the Entente cordiale than they had been by the Franco-Russian Alliance, and as Russia was then deeply engaged in her war with Japan, they made an ill-considered attempt to break the entente. England had agreed that the French might intervene in Morocco, but when they proceeded to do so the Germans protested vigorously, and Europe went through a severe war scare (1905). The French foreign minister (Delcassé), counting on military support from England, wished to fight, but his government refused to support him and he resigned. An international conference at Algeciras, in Spain, then closed the incident and preserved Moroccan independence (1906). Two years later a second crisis arose when Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina (1908). These two provinces, once held by Turkey, had been occupied by Austria since 1878, but their formal annexation raised the fury of Russian diplomats, who had been given nothing in compensation. When the Western powers refused to intervene, the Russian foreign minister (Izvolski) was dismissed from office. He soon became ambassador to Paris, however, where he poured forth his wrath upon Austrians and Germans, and where his intrigues had the most regrettable consequences. A third crisis broke in the spring of 1911, when the French again decided that the time had come to take Morocco. Unfortunately the Germans were just then preparing for a national election, and the government hoped that a mild war scare, followed by large compensations, would reduce the socialist vote. They therefore demanded the whole French Congo and, to show that they meant business, they sent a warship to Agadir, in Morocco, to “protect” German interests there. For a moment war seemed imminent, but the Germans drew back when
Lloyd George declared publicly that England too must be taken into consideration. France occupied all Morocco, but Germany got only a small slice of the Congo. Nevertheless, the French ministry was overthrown for having granted any compensation at all; the German socialists doubled their vote in the election; and whether she knew it or not, England was tied more closely than ever to France and Russia.

These three war scares in the course of six years frightened many people badly, but they seemingly encouraged others to greater recklessness. Italy had long coveted Tripoli, which was the only remaining Turkish possession in Africa, and the Agadir crisis offered her an opportunity to strike. After receiving assurances of good will from France and England, but without consulting her allies in the Triple Alliance, she attacked Turkey (September, 1911) and seized twelve islands in the Aegean as well as Tripoli. The Germans were furious, for they were then assiduously cultivating the friendship of Turkey, but they dared not quarrel with their Italian ally. Moreover, Italy’s success inspired the Balkan states to follow her example, and the two Balkan Wars, fought in 1912 and 1913, upset the balance of power throughout southeastern Europe. Serbia’s alienation from the Triple Alliance had been completed by the Austrian annexation of Bosnia, whose people were largely Serb in race and language. Pan-Serbian enthusiasts therefore demanded these provinces as well as Croatia and Slavonia from Austria-Hungary, and they rapturously hailed Russia as the big Slav brother by whose might they would attain their desires. Russian diplomacy also made rapid progress in Romania by hinting that Transylvania might be redeemed from Hungary. But Bulgaria, once a Russian satellite, now turned to Germany, and the Greeks remained mildly pro-German. No one knew what would happen next, but all informed persons knew that Balkan statesmen were a reckless lot and that another explosion in that area might well throw all Europe into war.

**JULY, 1914**

The Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir apparent to the Austro-Hungarian throne, was assassinated at Sarajevo, in Bosnia, by three Bosnian youths on June 28, 1914. The assassins were Austrian subjects, but they had recently returned from Serbia, where they moved in Pan-Serbian circles and where they were given arms by a high
Serbian official. The youths were arrested on the spot, and the police soon learned the source of their weapons. It is not clear how much the Serbian prime minister knew of the plot beforehand, but he certainly had some inkling of what was being planned. The Austrians were not much concerned, however, with Serbian complicity in this particular crime. They had long been convinced that the Serbs were encouraging terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and they now decided that the security of these provinces required a fundamental settlement with Serbia. If such a settlement could be obtained by a spectacular diplomatic victory, well and good, but if not, Austria must inflict a military defeat upon her neighbor.

The Austrians were quite aware that any action on their part would risk European disapproval and might lead to war. They therefore made haste to sound out their German ally. A special envoy was sent to learn the views of the kaiser and the chancellor (July 5–6), each of whom agreed that something should be done immediately but carefully abstained from giving advice as to what should be done. Austria was Germany's one reliable ally (everyone knew that Italy could not be counted on) and they dared not risk offending her in this troubled time. When assured of German support, the Austrians drew up an ultimatum demanding that the Serbian government suppress all anti-Austrian propaganda, that it dismiss certain anti-Austrian officials, that it accept Austrian collaboration in carrying out these reforms, and that it punish various persons accused of complicity in the plot. The demands were presented to the Serbian government on July 23, and a reply was required within forty-eight hours. The Serbs replied in a conciliatory tone but they refused to give the required promises. Even before delivering their reply, they called their entire army to the colors, and that evening Austria ordered eight army corps to advance toward the Serbian frontier (July 25). War was declared on Serbia three days later.

During the next week the diplomats of the great powers made countless proposals for preserving the peace—or, to speak more accurately, for preserving the peace without making any serious concessions themselves or urging their friends and allies to do so. Each wanted peace but each also wanted a diplomatic victory. The Austrians insisted that Serbia be punished, and the Germans held fast to their original position that Austria was justified in her demand. They sought to "localize" the war between Austria and Serbia. The Russians, on the other hand, demanded that Austria tone down her
ultimatum—thereby proving to the world that Russia was a true friend of the Slavs and strengthening the pro-Russian balance of power in the Balkans. The French devoted their energies to encouraging Russia to “stand firm.” The English urged the Germans to apply pressure on their ally at Vienna but would not attempt to restrain their own friends in Russia. As proposals for preserving the peace kept pouring in to the different foreign offices, the situation became very confused, and it was not easy to tell to which proposal the various telegrams referred. For a week of almost sleepless days and nights the diplomats worked feverishly, but at first none was willing to budge from the position he had taken. On July 29, however, the German chancellor (Bethmann-Hollweg) began to apply pressure at Vienna, saying “with great seriousness” that he refused to allow Germany to be drawn into a world conflagration and strongly urging the Austrians to accept an English plan for mediation between Austria and Russia—he being the only diplomat to attempt to restrain an ally during the entire crisis. But his change of heart came too late, for Austria had by this time declared war on Serbia—largely in order to present Germany and Europe with a fait accompli—and on that very day the Russians had ordered military measures that made war inevitable.

The mobilization of a large army was an intricate process of the utmost importance. Elaborate and minute plans were necessary to assemble millions of reservists from all over the country, to provide them with weapons and railway transportation, and to send them quickly to the places where they were needed. These plans were the work of months, and because of their intricacy they could not safely be changed during mobilization. All countries had plans for a general mobilization—calling all reservists to the colors and sending them to the front—but Austria and Russia also had plans for partial mobilization, calling only those divisions to the colors which would be used in a local war against Serbia or Austria. But as the Russians foresaw from the first, and as the Austrians learned to their sorrow, it was impossible to change from partial to general mobilization after the former was well under way. Likewise, mobilization could not be stopped, once it had been set in motion, for it could not be started again until everyone had been sent home. During several days or even weeks the army would be in the greatest confusion and the country undefended. Moreover, as plans for mobilization included plans for attack, troops could not merely be mobilized and mark time
at the frontier: they had to move forward to make room for others. Ordering mobilization was therefore equivalent to ordering the army to attack the enemy, and once it had started moving, nothing but military defeat or the absolute certainty of peace could stop it. And finally, speed in mobilization was a matter of the utmost importance, experts declaring that, at least between France and Germany, a difference of twenty-four hours might win or lose a war. Therefore, while the diplomats sought formulas for peace with victory, the generals were frantic with fear lest the enemy beat them to the draw. When these considerations are borne in mind, we see the importance of Russian mobilization. Because of distances, inadequate railways, and general inefficiency, Russian mobilization was much slower than that of Germany and France, and Russian generals were therefore especially anxious to get an early start on general mobilization. The Russian diplomats, on the other hand, hoping to bluff Austria by a show of force, urged mobilization against that country alone. On the afternoon of July 29 the tsar was induced to order general mobilization, but he soon changed his mind and ordered partial mobilization instead. Russian military men were thrown into a panic, and the next day they showed the tsar how precarious Russia’s position would be if the order were not changed at once to one for general mobilization. At about four o’clock on July 30 the tsar signed the new order. Austria replied the next day with general mobilization, eighteen hours after Russia’s. Austria had already ordered partial mobilization against Serbia (July 25), and her generals now discovered that locomotives and trains were already so concentrated on the Serbian frontier that the general mobilization against Russia could not be carried through on schedule. Nearly 100,000 men were caught in the meshes of the machine and could not reach the Russian front on time. Both France and Germany ordered general mobilization late in the afternoon of August 1, and that evening Germany declared war on Russia.

Knowing that in a general European war Germany would have to fight both Russia and France, the German generals prepared plans which, they hoped, would enable them to dispatch one enemy after the other without dividing their major forces between the two fronts. As it would take the Russians at least a month to concentrate their forces in Poland, while the French army would reach its maximum strength within a week, the Germans planned to send the greater part of their army against France at once and to handle Russia later.
Speed thus became a matter of prime importance in the invasion of France. In order to by-pass the strong fortifications along France’s eastern frontier, they decided to send their principal armies through Belgium, in spite of a treaty signed in 1839 by which they had promised to respect Belgium’s neutrality. Their plans called for the occupation of the Belgian fortress at Liége on the third day of mobilization (August 4). Early on the morning of August 2, therefore, they presented Belgium with a demand that she allow their troops to enter the country (nominally to protect it against an impending French attack!) but promised to withdraw after the war and to pay damages. The Belgians courageously refused and appealed to Great Britain, France, and Russia for aid. Germany then declared war on France, late in the afternoon of August 3.

England presented a special case. Ten years had passed since she entered the Entente cordiale with France, seven had passed since this “understanding” had been expanded into the Triple Entente, and since 1906 there had been intermittent “conversations” between English and French military men. British diplomats insisted, nevertheless, that their hands were free, and that they might go to war or remain neutral as their interests required. The British public was not in an especially bellicose mood in July, 1914, and after the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, British diplomats spent two or three days trying to find a formula for mediation. The French naturally did their best to drag England into the war, and the Germans made clumsy efforts to persuade her to remain neutral, but the English would make no positive statement. They could hardly have avoided entering the war sooner or later, but the German violation of Belgian neutrality supplied the emotional argument that converted hesitant members of the British cabinet. On August 4 they decided to demand that the Germans withdraw their ultimatum to Belgium, and when the Germans refused, England declared war.

A number of minor declarations of war followed during the next few days. Austria declared war on Russia, while France and England declared war on Austria, thus dividing Europe into two warring camps: the “Allies” (Russia, France, England, Belgium, Serbia) and the “Central Powers” (Germany, Austria). As the Germans had foreseen, Italy declared herself neutral (August 3) and at once began receiving bids from both sides for her active aid or her continued neutrality. The Scandinavian countries, Switzerland, and Spain remained neutral, and while Portugal confessed herself an ally of
England she took no active part in the fighting. Japan joined the Allies on August 23, and Turkey entered the war on the side of the Central Powers (October 29), but at first the other Balkan states maintained an uneasy neutrality.

While hostilities were still in progress it was popular to attribute the calamity of war to the malevolence of the enemy, whoever he might be, but the Allies usually selected the kaiser for special excoriation while the peoples of the Central Powers directed their indignation primarily against the British foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey. Such charges were absurd. In neither camp did responsible persons want war, and a careful study of the activities of the English and German diplomats shows that during the last tragic days they all were panicky with fear of a general war. At their final interviews, when declaring war, nearly all of them broke down and wept, some gibbered and talked incoherently. If one thing about the crisis of July, 1914, is definitely settled, it is this: that neither the German nor the British statesmen wanted war, and that they regarded its coming as the collapse of everything for which they had striven these many years. They did not want war, yet they were dragged into it by forces which they could not control. When once the Archduke Francis Ferdinand had been murdered, nothing could prevent war. The French seizure of Morocco, the Agadir crisis, the Turco-Italian War and the Balkan Wars, chauvinism, militarism, and preparedness, political demagogues and heroic newspaper editors had brought Europe to such a pitch of hysterical excitement that the insane act of three ill-balanced youths could set the world ablaze.
30. HOW THE WAR WAS FOUGHT

The Germans had foreseen that the French, for purposes of morale, would make every effort to open the war with a resounding victory in Alsace-Lorraine and to follow it with the military occupation of those provinces. They therefore built strong fortifications in that region but assigned to them only enough men to keep the French from breaking through. The bulk of the German army was to circle through Belgium and northeastern France, pivoting on Luxembourg, and, like a revolving door, swing upon the main French armies from the rear. According to German calculations, such an operation should require a little over a month, after which the victorious Germans would have their hands free for the Russians. This simple but brilliant plan had been worked out by Count von Schlieffen, the German chief of staff who retired in 1905, but his successor, Count von Moltke, tampered with it disastrously. Much obviously depended upon the speed and overwhelming weight of the German right wing, which must break through Belgium and northern France before the French could pull their troops out of Alsace, re-group them, and send them north. Nevertheless Moltke weakened this wing in order to strengthen his forces in Alsace and to reinforce the divisions holding back the Russians in the east. In man power the armies facing each other in the west were then about equal, but the Germans were somewhat better equipped with machine guns and artillery.

At first everything went as planned by the Germans. On the fourth day of the war the French invaded Alsace-Lorraine in strength, as had been anticipated, and were quickly brought to a halt before the German fortifications. Meantime the main German armies were rush-
ing through Belgium and, overcoming all resistance at the French frontier, they poured into France ahead of schedule. Assuming that the war was already won, the Germans began hurrahing and playing fast and loose with sound strategy. Then everything went wrong. Troops got far ahead of their horse-drawn transport, and divisions lost contact with each other; the French withdrew from Alsace more

![Map of the Western Front during World War I](https://via.placeholder.com/150)

successfully than had been expected and managed to swing their armies around; as the German armies advanced, their lines of communication grew longer and those of the French shorter, and German supplies began to run low. Presently the French artillery was firing four times for every shot fired by the Germans. On September 6 a German army reached the Marne River at a point some thirty miles east of Paris—which city they had not planned to enter. Here the Germans were stopped by the bloodiest fighting of the war, and on the ninth they began to fall back. A week later they successfully
halted their retreat along the Aisne River, in northeastern France, where they dug in and remained until the spring of 1918.

Meantime the Russians had surprised the Germans by the speed of their mobilization, and on August 17 they launched a large-scale invasion of East Prussia. The German commander fell back, and Moltke hurriedly withdrew four divisions from the western front to be rushed east. They did not arrive in time to help against the
Russians, but soon they were badly needed at the Marne. The Russian invasion lasted only long enough for the tsar’s uncle, the Grandduke Nicholas, to announce plans for his triumphant entry into Berlin, for on August 26-30 German troops under General von Hindenburg inflicted a crushing defeat upon the enemy at Tannenberg. Survivors fled pell-mell, and the Russian commander blew out his brains, sobbing that the tsar had trusted him. German soil was not invaded again during the war. The Russians were more fortunate against the Austrians, whom they greatly outnumbered and whose mobilization fell into confusion. By the end of September the Russian armies had occupied most Austrian territory north of the Carpathian Mountains. Hindenburg soon drove them back, but Austrian losses of men and matériel were enormous. Even the Serbs defeated the Austrians, driving them from Serbia with heavy casualties.

In the opening days of the war the British sent a few divisions to northern France, where they participated in the defense of the frontiers and later in the battle of the Marne. England’s greatest contribution to the war, however, was on the sea. Her navy blockaded Germany at once, and though the effects of this blockade were not immediately apparent, they eventually became a major factor in the defeat of Germany. During the first few months of the war the British navy also ran down and sank several German commerce raiders which had been on the high seas in August or had slipped through the British blockade. The British occupied most of the German colonies, but their Japanese allies took over the German concessions in Shantung, China, after brisk fighting.

The Germans managed to retain their military initiative throughout 1915 and 1916, but they could not win the war, and for two long years the slaughter dragged on. In 1915 they directed their major effort against the Russians, whom they drove from Russian Poland and the Baltic states, and they cleared nearly all of Austria, but they could not knock Russia out of the war. The British came to Russia’s aid, sending munitions by the northern route through Archangel and making a strong effort to open the Straits into the Black Sea by attacking Turkey. Their losses in the latter campaign were so heavy that they finally gave up, and not until after the war did they learn that with one more attack they would certainly have broken through, for the Turks were out of ammunition and ready to surrender. In 1916 the Germans returned to the west, attacking the French heavily in the region of Verdun. Their attacks began in February and con-
continued for five months. Casualties here were the heaviest in the war, except for the few days on the Marne, but the French held firm. In the summer of 1916 the British attacked heavily along the Somme River, in northern France, but with no greater success. The line of trenches across France, from Switzerland to the North Sea, was almost exactly where it had been in October, 1914, and the com-

TRENCH WARFARE. (United Press Photo)

batants were so exhausted that at the beginning of 1917 they could do little more than sit and glare at each other.

In July, 1914, the diplomats had failed miserably in their task of preserving the peace, and the generals took over. Thereafter the diplomats worked under new conditions, for their tasks now were to bring neutral nations into the war on their side and to prevent the enemy from attaching them to his. These ends they sought to gain by promising territorial or other compensation to everyone; by uttering the cryptic words, "no sacrifices, no gains"; by making it appear that
they were so near to winning the war that prospective allies must hurry; by the liberal use of bribery, intrigue, and violence; and by advertising their own nobility of purpose. The first victory in this new diplomatic struggle fell to the Germans, who violently dragged Turkey into the war at the end of October, 1914. During the following winter both Allies and Central Powers were active in Italy, but the Allies were able to make the better offers of territorial and financial rewards, and Italy joined them in May, 1915. The failure of the British to break through the Straits that summer convinced the Bulgars that Germany would win the war, and they joined the Central Powers (September, 1915). Austrian troops then occupied Serbia, giving the Germans secure contact with their Turkish ally. The Allies persuaded Romania to declare war on Austria in August, 1916. Greek neutrality was violated repeatedly, but that unhappy country was not dragged into the war on the Allied side until June, 1917.

The Nations in Arms

At first the civilian populations believed that they would have little to do about the war except to shout “hurrah” as the news of victories poured in. During the fall of 1914 some British firms advertised “Business as usual,” and everywhere men continued to act as though there were no national crisis. Before the end of the year, however, the situation was changing. Men were beginning to realize that the struggle would not be won by soldiers alone, and that manufacturers, financiers, merchants, farmers, scientists, journalists, and propagandists all would have their parts to play in the great conflict. The war was going to be fought, not by armies, but by entire nations, and the enlistment of the entire people in the war effort became as important and as difficult a task as organizing the armies. In view of its enduring consequences, this wartime organization of civilians was even more important than were the maneuvers of soldiers and diplomats.

This new importance of the civilian population made it a prime task of the war-waging governments to keep morale high. At first morale-building was not difficult, for everyone believed that his own country was defending itself against the outrageous attack of a cruel and bloodthirsty enemy. Nevertheless, each government thought it best to establish its innocence by publishing selections from its diplomatic correspondence of July, 1914. The official character of these
publications fortified the faith of those who believed already, but their innocuous nature is shown by the fact that, within a few weeks, translations of the entire set could be purchased for a few cents at newsstands in all the belligerent countries. A more effective form of propaganda was that which dealt with atrocities. Reports of such activities appeared as soon as fighting began and early in 1915 the

"MORNING HATE." When this cartoon appeared in Punch, early in the war, many Englishmen thought it very funny; before many months had passed, however, somewhat similar scenes were enacted regularly in all the belligerent countries.

British government published a sixty-page "Report" on alleged atrocities by the Germans in Belgium, along with 300 pages of blood-curdling testimony. Atrocity stories grew in magnitude as the war progressed, until in 1918 a British general concocted the most gruesome of them all—the story of a "corpse factory" in which the Germans boiled down the bodies of dead soldiers into fertilizer and soap! In those frenzied days nothing was incredible if it was derogatory to the enemy.

This dissemination of official and semiofficial views regarding the origin and conduct of the war was supplemented by an elaborate censorship. Though designed originally to keep information of
military value from the enemy, this censorship also served to prevent the circulation of news, true or false, which might have an undesirable effect upon morale at home. Newspaper editors were given long lists of topics upon which they might print nothing; they were told the views they were to express on various other matters; and they were supplied with articles to print. Even in September, 1914, French censors suppressed news of the German advance into northern France and distracted attention with glowing accounts of imaginary Russian victories in Germany; by similar methods the German people were kept from learning the true import of the battle of the Marne. Editors were allowed to expand upon the official news "communiqué," however, making a slight advance into a tremendous victory or presenting a setback as a "strategic retreat." Experiences during the war thus greatly increased the world’s knowledge of the technique of distorting, suppressing, and evading the truth, and of the extent to which such practices might be employed with safety. Without this new knowledge, such popular heroes of the postwar period as Hitler and Stalin would never have grown great.

These official apologists were seconded by hosts of amateurs who abandoned their customary pursuits to set forth their deeper thoughts upon the significance of the war. They gradually gave the war the character of a great crusade for righteousness, for protecting civilization from barbarism. People discussed "war aims," and although the censors forbade the public discussion of peace terms, everyone was assured that the world would be much better after the war. People in each camp had their eyes on territories to be annexed, but public discussion usually took a more idealistic turn. British liberals gradually assumed leadership in providing this idealistic justification of the war, declaring that this was a "war to end war," and that, as "Prussian militarism" had long been the sole obstacle to world peace, its elimination would usher in a glorious new day. German writers, on the other hand, expressed somewhat analogous views about "British navalism." The British version was the more effective, however, and eventually it supplied the inspiration that swept the Allies to victory.

In nearly every country a few pacifists—some of them quite eminent persons—continued firm in their opposition to all war, and their number grew as the war progressed. They made themselves highly unpopular with their fellow countrymen, and some were thrown into jail, but they did not seriously disturb the war effort. The socialist parties of Europe had denounced militarism quite vociferously on
the eve of the war, but except for the Russians they all supported the war as soon as it was declared. Socialist leaders justified this about-face by declaring that, howsoever defective their own capitalist governments might be, they were infinitely preferable to subjugation by Slavs or Germans. In 1915 a few radical socialists in Germany refused to support the war any longer, and during 1916 such persons appeared in most countries. Greater trouble was caused by the leaders of subject nationalities, especially in Austria-Hungary. The Poles required attention at once and were given flattering promises by all three of their oppressors. They were not impressed, and by 1916 nothing short of complete independence would satisfy Polish nationalists. The Czechs were equally insistent upon independence, while Romanians and South Slavs demanded political union with their kinsmen beyond the frontiers. Boers in South Africa took up arms to regain their independence; Indian and Egyptian nationalists threw bombs and were guilty of other acts of violence; and a major rebellion broke out in Ireland during Easter week of 1916. The rebels held Dublin for a few days, but even after they had been defeated the British had to keep large armies in the island.

In 1914 everyone believed that if a war should break out it would necessarily be a short one, and therefore no one had made plans for a long conflict. After the battle of the Marne and the beginning of trench warfare, however, the more clear-sighted leaders on each side saw what was in store for them and began reorganizing their economic life accordingly. The Germans were the first to take such steps, and their traditional toleration of governmental interference made it relatively easy for them to organize a Kriegssozialismus ("war socialism"). The government seized all the food in Germany, bought additional supplies in Scandinavia, Holland, and Switzerland, and attempted to make an equitable distribution of whatever was available. Unfortunately there was not quite enough food, and by 1916 everyone in Germany was undernourished. When the British blockade deprived Germany of raw materials essential to industry, available stocks were rationed, and officials soon were telling manufacturers just what they might produce. With millions of men called to the colors, the shortage of man power caused labor to be rationed as well. Then, late in 1916, the Reichstag authorized the elaborate "Hindenburg program," creating a Supreme War Office with dictatorial powers over raw materials, food supply, transportation, labor, and all the rest of the economic life of the nation. All Germany was
welded into one huge industrial machine which, though severely strained, managed to keep going until the end of the war.

The industrial development of England followed a somewhat different course. As her command of the seas enabled her to draw freely upon the markets of America and the rest of the neutral world, there was no great danger of a shortage of food or raw materials. England's chief troubles were with her own people, especially the laboring classes, many of whom took advantage of the emergency to demand high wages and to work only intermittently. In 1915 there were 672 strikes, involving half a million men and causing the loss of 3 million days' labor, which was 65 times greater than the corresponding loss in Germany and 150 times greater than that of France. Then Lloyd George became minister of munitions (May, 1915), and conditions gradually improved. The raw materials needed for making munitions were rationed, and the government presently took over the coal mines as well as rationing food and shipping. England's tradition of laissez faire remained strong, but before the end of 1916 she was firmly committed to the principles of state regulation. The economic situation in France presented no new features, but Russia suffered a complete economic breakdown (see p. 597).

The war-waging countries also faced unprecedented problems of finance. How were they to meet their enormous expenditures? Here too the Germans were the more successful at first. They floated huge loans periodically, chiefly with the big industrialists. The money was spent for munitions, and thus went back to the industrialists, who paid out part of it as wages and lent the rest back to the government. Rationing and price control kept off inflation, and thanks to the British blockade Germany had few bills to pay abroad. Dutch and Scandinavian food was paid for with coal. Germany's principal problem, therefore, was to speed up her economic system to make it produce enough to feed and munition the army. The task was difficult, but problems of finance were not crucial in so well-organized a national state.

The Allies faced a more difficult problem. They too floated huge loans periodically, and then paid back much of the money to the lenders, but they did not spend all the proceeds of their loans with their own people. Early in the war they became dependent upon the United States for an essential part of their munitions, and these munitions had to be paid for with cash. Moreover, American munition makers were unwilling to lend heavily to the Allies, who did
not seem to be winning the war. By 1916 the situation was becoming acute, with the flow of American munitions slowing down for financial reasons. Only the entry of America into the war prevented a serious crisis.

The civilians of Germany, England, and France were thus more successful than the diplomats or the soldiers: at the end of 1916 the latter had accomplished only a stalemate, but the civilians had put the peoples of their various countries into a savage fighting mood and wholly reorganized their economic life. They had created nations in arms and had shown the generals how a modern war must be waged. As statesmen of the old school could neither understand nor manage these reorganized nations, they were everywhere discarded late in 1916 or early in 1917 and replaced by men who had been virtually unknown in 1914. The war then entered a new period.

**AMERICA’S ENTRY INTO THE WAR**

One of the most popular ideals of prewar America was pacifism. Andrew Carnegie and other wealthy men gave millions of dollars to peace societies, whose membership included many of the most distinguished persons in the country. War was commonly regarded as a thing of the past, utterly impossible in the twentieth century, and when it actually broke out, bewildered Americans were inclined to exclaim, “Thank God we’re out of it! We’re civilized!” Perhaps this pacifism was in part a legacy from Puritanism, but it was also due in part to America’s remoteness from the rest of the world and to the fact that in 1914 Americans alone knew from experience what a great war is like. Europe had seen no long or destructive war during the hundred years since Napoleon (in 1870 the fighting continued barely six months), but the mature American of 1914 had grown up under the shadow of the Civil War, which lasted four years and cost a million casualties. Americans wanted no more wars.

Though Americans were pacifistic and determined to remain neutral in European controversies, many had their preferences among the European powers. Immigrants from England, Germany, and Italy usually favored the country of their birth, but the Irish abominated England and Polish Jews hated Russia. Other Americans were influenced by ideas of Anglo-Saxon solidarity, or believed that the Allies shared their own democratic ideals, or admired German achievements in music and science. Though several European coun-
tries had been subsidizing propaganda for themselves long before 1914, they redoubled their efforts as soon as the war began. The German propagandists were highly inept while the British were quite skillful, but it was primarily the violation of Belgian neutrality that convinced America of German aggressiveness. Stories of German atrocities found a ready audience, and before the end of 1914 most American leaders of thought were definitely pro-Ally. They had no desire to enter the war, however, and their sentiments were best exemplified in the Belgian Relief Commission, organized under Herbert Hoover in October, 1914, which distributed millions of dollars’ worth of food and other necessities in that stricken land. Many Americans considered such activities to be the most helpful service they could render the war-torn world, both during the conflict and afterward.

Nevertheless, America soon learned that the path of neutrality was not an easy one. The British navy at once blockaded Germany so tightly that American businessmen could no longer export munitions of war, food, or even such materials as raw cotton to that country. There was bitter dispute about the legality of this blockade, for the men who drew up international law on the subject (largely in the days of Napoleon, the Crimean War, and the Civil War) had not foreseen what a modern navy could do. American officials protested time and again, but the British refused to modify their practices. Wilson had no intention, however, of going beyond these formal protests to defend America’s right as a neutral to trade with Germany.

Controversy with Germany took on a graver aspect, especially after the Germans declared the waters surrounding the British Isles to be a “war zone” in which merchant vessels might be sunk at sight by submarines (February, 1915). They hoped by this method to prevent the importation of food into England and thus to starve that country into submission with the aid of “the same grim ally” that England had already invoked against them. As submarines had not been used as commerce raiders in earlier wars, there was no international law regarding them. The Allies loudly denounced the new form of warfare as simple piracy, but President Wilson tried to persuade the Germans to accept rules to safeguard the lives of passengers and crews on the vessels they attacked. Matters reached a crisis on May 7, when a German submarine sank the British liner *Lusitania* off the coast of Ireland, causing the death of almost twelve
hundred persons, more than a hundred of whom were Americans. This act aroused great indignation throughout America and led to a long exchange of diplomatic notes between the two countries, until at last the Germans promised not to sink merchant vessels without first making provision for their passengers and crews (May, 1916). These rules were observed for several months, and the submarine crisis died down.

During these two long years Woodrow Wilson had been thinking deeply upon the problems raised by the war. Being a convinced pacifist, he, like everybody else at first, wished America to remain neutral, and he urged his fellow countrymen to “act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned.” His great rival at this moment was Theodore Roosevelt, whom he had defeated for the presidency in 1912, and who now subjected him to ceaseless attack. Roosevelt dared not openly demand war, but he was fond of using bellicose language, and his taunts undoubtedly made Wilson more extreme than he wished to be. Roosevelt made a great uproar about strengthening the army and navy, but Wilson presently seized leadership in this “preparedness” program. Though he repeatedly declared that “the business of neutrality is over” and that “the day of isolation is gone,” he clearly was referring to future wars, not to the present one. At the same time he was developing plans for a League of Nations, which he regarded as the sole alternative to an endless series of world wars. As the presidential election of 1916 approached, Wilson’s friends constantly reminded the people that “he kept us out of war” and affirmed that a vote for the Republican candidate (C. E. Hughes) was a vote for war. When Wilson was reëlected, by a majority of about 600,000, he believed that he had been given a mandate by the American people to remain at peace.

By this time it was quite clear to Wilson, however, that he could continue to keep America out of war only by bringing the European conflict to a close. As the military situation in Europe had reached a deadlock, the moment seemed opportune for peace proposals. Moreover, his long-drawn-out controversies with the various belligerents had convinced him that the aims of the two sides were virtually identical. “He seems completely obsessed by that thought,” an intimate friend (Colonel House) wrote in his diary at the time, “and he cannot talk or write about the war without voicing it.” For him the war was thoroughly “debunked.” Wilson therefore addressed
identical notes to all the belligerents, urging them to make peace and offering his services as mediator (December 18). They all returned polite replies, but none accepted his offer. Wilson then delivered a speech to the Senate (January 22) in which he set forth his views regarding a durable peace. Such a peace, he declared, must be a "peace without victory," not a peace "imposed upon the vanquished"; it must recognize the equal rights of all nations, great and small; it must accept the principle that all government rests upon the consent of the governed; it must assure the freedom of the seas; it must provide for the limitation of armaments; and it must be guaranteed by all nations, including the United States—or, as he put it, the Monroe Doctrine must be extended to cover the whole world. Wilson thus appealed to the people of the world over the heads of their rulers, being convinced that by this method he could persuade them to force their governments to make peace.

The hopes raised by this "peace without victory" speech were soon dashed to the ground. Early in December, 1916, Lloyd George had become prime minister of England, promising to deliver a "knockout blow" to the enemy—Wilson perhaps chose the key words of his speech in reply to this phrase—and he at once intensified operations against Germany. The Germans, on their side, resumed unrestricted submarine warfare. During the long controversy following the sinking of the Lusitania Wilson had published his notes as soon as they were delivered, thus practicing "open diplomacy" and appealing to the German people, but unfortunately he thus gave German demagogues an opportunity to popularize the new form of warfare. The German government accepted Wilson’s restrictions against the popular desire, and it did so only because it believed it could win the war without the submarines. It knew, however, that it could never accept an unfavorable peace, or even a mildly victorious one, without first giving the submarine commanders a chance to force England to her knees. But Germany’s early hopes of victory on land had faded by the end of 1916, and on January 9, 1917, the German government decided that unrestricted naval warfare should be resumed on February 1. "I guarantee," declared the chief of naval staff, "that the submarine war will lead to victory."

When Wilson was notified of this decision, on January 31, he was at first dumbfounded, but three days later he severed diplomatic relations with Germany. For a short time he continued to hope that an early peace would free him from the necessity of actually entering
the war. He therefore redoubled his efforts for peace, trying in vain to persuade the Austrians to take some decisive step. Meantime submarines became active once more, American ships were sunk, and American lives were lost. At last Wilson reluctantly made up his mind that war with Germany was necessary. Calling a special meeting of congress for April 2, he addressed it with another of his eloquent speeches. "The world must be made safe for democracy," he declared, and after saying that "it is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful people into war," he urged that the United States take up the defense of democracy, and closed with a famous quotation from Martin Luther, "God helping her, she can do no other." On April 6 congress declared war on Germany, and the United States was followed by several Latin-American nations during the next few weeks or months.

VICTORY OF THE ALLIES

The entry of the United States into the war ultimately brought victory to the Allies, but in 1917 many people feared that America's aid might come too late. At the same time other events encouraged the Germans. Revolution broke out in Russia (March, 1917, see p. 598), and though the revolutionary government promised to continue fighting, the Russian army disintegrated so rapidly that serious fighting was soon out of the question. The communists under Lenin and Trotsky then seized control of the country (November 7), and a few months later they signed a peace treaty with Germany at Brest-Litovsk (March 3) surrendering all claims to Poland, the Ukraine, the Baltic States, and Finland, which became nominally independent republics but which actually were dominated by Germany. When the Germans resumed unrestricted submarine warfare, they believed that if they could sink 500,000 tons of shipping a month they could win the war in 1917, before American troops could turn the scales in France. For a few months they exceeded even this figure (840,000 tons were sunk in April), but the British developed countermeasures, sinkings fell off, and before the end of the year the Allies were building ships faster than the Germans could sink them. And finally, serious mutinies broke out in the French army, which had been exhausted by the bloody fighting at Verdun in 1916. Fortunately for France, the Germans learned nothing of these mutinies at the time and therefore did not take advantage of the enemy's weakness.
By this time all the belligerent nations were suffering from a great war-weariness, and they all were disturbed with demands for peace. The leaders of revolutionary Russia publicly used the slogan "No annexations and no indemnities," thus arousing enthusiasm in every country of Europe. In Austria-Hungary the death of the highly respected emperor, Francis Joseph (November 21, 1916), who had ruled since 1848, removed the strongest bond uniting the various nationalities. His successor was thoroughly incompetent, and before long nationalists and socialists were tearing the empire to pieces. In Germany the political system was beginning to crack under the strain of war. Socialists openly demanded peace, monster peace meetings were held in various cities, and on July 19 the Reichstag passed a resolution (214 to 116) urging peace on the Russian formula. Other Germans demanded sweeping political reforms, and in October the German chancellor was voted out of office by the Reichstag—for the first time in history. His successor publicly favored a "peace by reconciliation." The Italian people were especially sick of the war, to which their contributions had been small. France was shaken by political scandals as well as by the mutinies in her army, and in June the Chamber of Deputies passed a resolution setting forth moderate peace terms—"the liberation of invaded territories, the return of Alsace-Lorraine, reparation for damages"—but "spurning all ideas of conquest." England too had her share of pacifism and defeatism, and in November Lord Lansdowne, British foreign secretary from 1900 to 1905, infuriated chauvinists but won the support of many moderate persons by publishing a letter declaring that the war had already "lasted too long" and urging a liberal peace "in time to avoid a world-wide catastrophe."

Meantime American industrialists were producing munitions of war in unprecedented quantities, and millions of men were being drafted and whipped into shape as a new American army. The United States was preparing to take a major part in the military operations of 1918. Declining morale among the European Allies was a matter of grave concern to Wilson, who now made it one of his principal tasks to inspire the world with his own idealism regarding the war and the postwar world. Though he had led America into the conflict, his ideas regarding a just peace remained what they had been when he delivered his "peace without victory" speech. He now developed them in a number of speeches, the most important of which, delivered in January, 1918, proclaimed his famous Fourteen
Points. Based on a report drawn up by a committee of experts, the Fourteen Points gave a detailed summary of Wilson's program for peace (see p. 580). This program was advertised throughout the world, and everywhere it evoked tremendous popular enthusiasm. By turning the conflict into a crusade for peace, Wilson made his greatest contribution to the war.

The collapse of Russia's armies allowed the Germans to withdraw most of their troops from the eastern front, and in October, 1917, they tried vigorously to knock Italy out of the war. Pushing the enemy back about sixty miles, they momentarily threatened Venice, but their advance halted and the front was finally stabilized with Italy still a belligerent. The Germans then prepared their last great offensive, which they launched in northern France at the end of March, 1918. The blow fell with disconcerting suddenness. The Germans broke through the Allies' defenses on a wide front, and during the next several weeks they scored one spectacular victory after another. They were so short of man power and munitions, however, that they could not follow up these local victories. Goaded on by the realization that for them the sands were rapidly running out, they struck wildly, though savagely, and with these frantic efforts they wore out their army. By the middle of July the Allies were able to assume the offensive, and by September they had regained all that had been lost earlier in the year. Continuing their offensive through October, the Allies regained most of the French territory occupied by the Germans since 1914. German morale was shaken by these defeats, but the army held together and retreated in good order, fighting to the end.

During the spring of 1918 German diplomats had been spinning threads which they hoped would lead to a negotiated peace, but their sudden victories in France so excited German public opinion that an offer of moderate peace terms became impossible. Reverses in August convinced the high command that they could never win a military victory over the Allies, but they still believed they could hold occupied France indefinitely and thus force a negotiated peace. Even this hope evaporated during September, however, and early in October the German government notified Wilson that it was prepared to make peace on the lines laid down in his Fourteen Points. Bulgaria had already surrendered (September 30), being followed by Turkey (October 30) and Austria (November 3). Last of all came the famous scene, on the night following November 8, when German
delegates presented themselves to the commander of the Allied armies (General Foch) in his railway car near Compiègne and formally requested an armistice. The terms granted by Foch were very severe, but the Germans accepted them and the fighting ceased at 11 A.M. on the morning of November 11, 1918.

Germany's surrender was caused by military defeat, and it was followed by popular revolutions in both Germany and Austria. The blockade of central Europe and the consequent food shortage had caused widespread malnutrition, which led to irritability and despair. Wilson's Fourteen Points, which had been published in the newspapers, led people to believe that they could obtain tolerable peace terms by surrender. The propaganda of the Russian revolutionists met with wide success among German and Austrian socialists. In Austria-Hungary the situation was made much worse by the demands of the lesser nationalities for complete independence, and here revolt first broke out. The Czechs declared their independence on October 28, and within a few days most of the other nationalities had followed this example. The Austrian emperor abdicated on November 12, an Austrian Republic was proclaimed on the thirteenth, and the empire fell into chaos. In Germany various officials had been trying to effect drastic reforms, and on October 4 a new chancellor announced the inauguration of parliamentary government, hoping that by thus uniting the people behind the kaiser and the imperial government he could prevent more drastic reforms at the hands of the socialists. Such hopes were quite in vain. Sailors at Kiel revolted on November 3, and four days later radical socialists proclaimed an independent Bavarian Republic. By this time the new chancellor was frantically urging the kaiser to abdicate, but that unhappy man was a helpless prisoner in the hands of his generals at army headquarters. Two days later socialist leaders in Berlin proclaimed a German Republic, after announcing prematurely that the kaiser had abdicated (November 9). On the next day William II fled into neutral Holland, where he whiled away the remainder of his days on an estate at Doorn. Here he issued a formal abdication on November 28.
31. THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

During four years and a quarter the war had caused the death of almost ten million persons and the serious wounding of twice that number, but the end had not yet come. In many parts of eastern Europe, civil war soon supplemented or replaced international war. The armistice terms provided that the blockade of central Europe should continue until the peace treaty was signed, which caused the starvation of further thousands. Moreover, these four years had filled whole populations with fear, or raised them to unwonted heights of idealism, and the hysteria thus aroused did not subside at once. Popular demands for security and revenge balanced those calling for a new world based on justice. And everywhere there was a growing dread of Bolshevism. When the diplomats assembled at Paris to make an enduring peace they therefore faced an impossible task. It is easy to criticize their achievement, just as earlier generations criticized the Treaty of Vienna (1815), but the wonder is that, working against such such a background and after such a war, the statesmen of 1919 succeeded as well as they did.

The peace conference was attended by seventy representatives of the twenty-seven Allies. As some of the nations represented had made only nominal contributions to the war effort, and as so large a group of delegates would have engaged in endless debates, the important decisions were made by the representatives of the great powers, and especially by the "Big Four"—those representing France, Great Britain, Italy, and the United States. The leader of the French delegation, and the president of the congress, was the French prime minister, Georges Clemenceau. Though seventy-seven years old, disillusioned and cynical, the "Tiger" was a man of great ability, of tremendous energy and will power, and of vast political experience.
came to the conference with a very simple program: Germany must be reduced to such a state that she could never again be a menace to France. Putting no trust in the League of Nations or other idealistic contraptions, Clemenceau proposed to crush Germany and then rely upon military force and alliances for security. When he laid this program before the French Chamber of Deputies (December 29), that body accorded him a four-to-one vote of confidence, showing how closely his views reflected those of all France. The British delegation was led by Lloyd George. This mercurial Welshman was an able negotiator, liberal, and capable of generous impulses, but he was restrained by parliament. During the election campaign of December, 1918, he had promised to hang the kaiser and make Germany pay the entire cost of the war, and the parliament elected under such a banner was little disposed to show mercy either to Germany or to Lloyd George himself. The Italian delegate, Prime Minister Orlando, devoted his attention largely to acquiring new territories for Italy, especially at the expense of Austria-Hungary. President Wilson, on the other hand, was concerned primarily with establishing a League of Nations and introducing a new order in world affairs, "agreeably if we can, disagreeably if necessary."
was mistakenly of the opinion that he represented the common people of the world, and he failed to understand that the popular applause which greeted his great wartime speeches merely bore evidence to a defeatism that had passed with the coming of victory.

Each delegation was accompanied by a large staff of experts to assist it in whatever legal, financial, territorial, and other matters might arise. Lloyd George and Wilson were especially dependent upon these experts, for their knowledge of Europe was rather superficial, but Clemenceau was well informed and therefore much more independent. Committees containing both diplomats and experts were appointed to study the important questions and to prepare reports on them. Higher authorities sometimes brushed these reports aside for political reasons, but they never did so lightly; each report was considered carefully, and its authors were allowed to present their views in person. The separate clauses of the treaty were drawn up by these committees, but they were revised and welded into a consistent whole by the higher diplomats. Everyone worked tremendously hard for six months, eventually producing a treaty that filled a book of over two hundred pages. Unlike many peace conferences, the one at Paris was not enlivened by social diversions, for everyone was too deeply convinced of the high importance of what he was doing, and too much in deadly earnest, to permit a repetition of the Congress of Vienna, which “danced but did not advance.”

During the war the Allies had negotiated secret treaties with each other, arranging for the partition of Austra-Hungary and Turkey, the distribution of the German colonies, and even the partial dismemberment of Germany itself. They had also made various public announcements, such as those promising to create a new Poland and a Czechoslovakia, and to make Palestine a “homeland” for Zionist Jews. During the autumn of 1917 the Bolsheviks published the texts of most of the secret treaties, but the Allies did not disavow them—except as concerned promises to Russia—and, strangely enough, President Wilson paid little attention, even though they conflicted with his most cherished plans. Wilson had repeatedly set forth his own views in general terms, and in the Fourteen Points he was more specific. The first five of these points called for “open diplomacy,” freedom of the seas, the removal of economic barriers to international trade, disarmament, and an adjustment of colonial claims. The next eight points, concerned with the new map of Europe, demanded the evac-
uation of Russia, the evacuation and restoration of Belgium, the freeing of French territory as well as Alsace-Lorraine, new frontiers for Italy, autonomous states in Austria-Hungary, the evacuation of Romania and Serbia, Turkey for the Turks, and an independent Poland. The last, and in Wilson’s opinion the most important, of the Fourteen Points concerned a League of Nations to guarantee the political independence and territorial integrity of large and small states. When the Germans offered to surrender on the basis of these Fourteen Points, the British specifically refused to accept the second, which guaranteed the freedom of the seas, and the French demanded reparations for the damage done the civilian population, but they consented to the rest.

The peace conference opened on January 18, 1919, and Wilson at once insisted that the first item on its agenda be the creation of a League of Nations. He was named chairman of a committee to draw up the “Covenant” (constitution) of the League, and he drove his colleagues so hard that a first draft was ready on February 14. After numerous adjustments and amendments, the Covenant was accepted by the entire conference on April 28. Other committees had been working on territorial and colonial problems, reparations, disarmament, and other matters, and the treaty was ready to be presented to the Germans on May 7. During these weeks there had been much negotiation and wrangling between the different Allies, but the Germans had not been allowed to present their views on anything. When they finally received a copy of the completed treaty, they were dumbfounded and at once protested that its terms were not in accordance with the Fourteen Points. The Allies consented to a few minor changes, but regarding important matters they remained adamant. The Germans were forced to give in, and the treaty was signed in the famous “Hall of Mirrors” of the palace at Versailles on June 28. After the Germans had signed the Treaty of Versailles, lesser treaties were presented to the other enemy states. Austria agreed to the Treaty of St. Germain on September 10; the Bulgars signed the Treaty of Neuilly on November 27; the Hungarians accepted the Treaty of Trianon on June 4, 1920; and on August 20, 1920, Turkish delegates signed the Treaty of Sèvres. This last treaty was disavowed immediately by the Turkish nationalists who then held most of Asia Minor, however, and it never went into effect (see p. 689).
THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

At Wilson's insistence, the Covenant of the League of Nations was made an integral part of the peace settlement, forming the first twenty-six articles of the Treaty of Versailles and each of the lesser treaties. This Covenant described the League's organization. The League was to be governed by three principal bodies: an Assembly, in which each member state had one to three representatives, but only one vote; a Council, in which the five great powers (Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States) were to have permanent seats while temporary seats were assigned to four—later ten—lesser powers selected by the Assembly; and a permanent Secretariat, to look after current business and serve as a clearing house for information. The seat of the League was established at Geneva in Switzerland. The Covenant then laid down rules for preventing war. First of all, armaments should be reduced "to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations." The celebrated Article X bound the member states "to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence" of all fellow members: Wilson called this article "the heart of the Covenant." Article XI, which was Wilson's favorite, declared that any war or threat of war was the concern of the whole League, and that it was "the friendly right," of each member to bring to the League's attention any conditions which might endanger world peace. League members agreed that they would submit their differences to arbitration, for which elaborate rules were laid down. If any member then went to war in spite of its promise to arbitrate, it would be deemed to have committed acts of war against all members of the League, who would use armed force to protect the Covenant. The Covenant established a Permanent Court of International Justice—popularly known as the "World Court"—to sit at The Hague, in Holland. There was also an International Labor Organization, with an office in Geneva, whose purpose was to secure fair and humane conditions of labor throughout the world. Other clauses provided that the League should attempt to secure the just treatment of natives in the colonies, prevent traffic in opium and women, promote freedom of communications, and seek international cooperation in the prevention and control of disease. The concluding article provided for amendments to the Covenant.
Having completed the Covenant of the League, the leaders at Paris turned their attention to drawing a new map of Germany. The armistice terms had required the military evacuation of Alsace-Lorraine as though it were a part of France, and no one imagined that these provinces would be restored to Germany. The armistice also required the evacuation of all German territory west of the Rhine, and many Frenchmen now desired to keep it—thus realizing the ambitions of Louis XIV and Napoleon—or at least make it a separate state dominated by France. When they could not secure this large territory, the French held out for the Saar Basin—a small region, rich in coal and minerals, on the eastern frontier of France. The Treaty of Versailles finally placed it under League rule for fifteen years, after which the inhabitants might express their preference in an election. (When the plebiscite was held in 1935, the inhabitants voted almost unanimously in favor of reunion with Germany and the French acquiesced.) Three small districts were transferred from Germany to Belgium, and the people of Schleswig-Holstein (seized by Prussia in 1864) were to vote on returning to Denmark. Only in the extreme north did the Schleswigers vote in favor of a change. Agreeing upon an eastern frontier for the new Germany was more difficult, since extensive territories had been promised to the resurrected Poland. The inhabitants of East Prussia were overwhelmingly German, but there was a majority of Poles in West Prussia and Posen, and Wilson had promised Poland access to the sea. West Prussia therefore went to Poland and East Prussia remained a part of Germany, though completely cut off from the rest by the "Polish Corridor" of West Prussia. Two important German towns—Memel in the extreme northeast and Danzig in the Polish Corridor—were given a special status as "free cities" under the League of Nations. All in all, Germany lost approximately 27,000 square miles of territory, out of about 209,000, and almost 6 million citizens out of a total population of 67 million.

During the war all of Germany's overseas colonies had been occupied by the Allies, chiefly by the British or the Japanese. The victors had no intention of returning them, but Wilson's strictures upon colonialism made simple annexation awkward. It was therefore decided to transfer all these occupied regions to the League of Nations, which would then give "mandates" to one or another of the great powers to govern them. The former colonies were divided into three groups: Class A consisted of relatively advanced countries which
the mandatory would assist until they could stand alone; Class B was made up of less advanced countries which the mandatory would administer for the benefit of the natives; and the backward countries of Class C might be annexed. As a matter of fact, the actual classification and division were based largely on political negotiations. None of the former German colonies fell into Class A; those in central Africa were called Class B, and divided between Britain, France, and Belgium; and the various colonies of Class C were divided between South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. The Allies later decided that much of the former Turkish Empire in Asia should be divided into Class A mandates, with Syria going to France while Iraq and Palestine went to Britain. The Japanese insisted upon taking over the former German concessions in the Chinese province of Shantung (see p. 495) and though Wilson disapproved, he finally acquiesced. The Chinese delegates naturally refused to sign the treaty.

The Allies also insisted upon the disarmament of Germany and her confederates. She was to have no fortifications west of a line fifty kilometers east of the Rhine; her army was limited to 100,000 men, enlisted for long periods; there was to be no military training of the civilian population; and the military use of tanks, airplanes, and poison gas was forbidden. Only a small navy was permitted. Similar terms were forced upon the other enemy powers. Austria was allowed only 30,000 soldiers, Hungary 35,000, Bulgaria 20,000; and as they all were inland powers, none had a navy. But the treaties set no limits to the armament of the Allies.

Perhaps the knottiest problem of all was that which concerned reparations. The victors agreed that Germany should pay for the damage her armies had caused, but they quarreled among themselves as to what damages should be included in the bill. The general public demanded fantastic amounts, which sensible people knew could never be collected, while politicians wrangled over the distribution of whatever might be paid. If only physical damage to civilian property were included, most of the reparation money would go to France and Belgium; if the claims of veterans were added, Britain would get a much higher percentage. A Reparations Commission was appointed to survey the damage done, but its findings were not very helpful. Belgium, for example, claimed damages considerably in excess of the estimated value of all property in the country—real estate included—on the eve of the war. At last Clemenceau sagely
remarked that no matter what amount was mentioned in the treaty the people would consider it too small and overthrow the ministry. The Reparations Commission was therefore instructed to decide upon an exact amount later, and to collect and distribute whatever was paid. To justify their demands for reparation, the Allies inserted a clause in the treaty by which the Germans were forced to admit their guilt in starting the war. During the next several years, reparations and this “war guilt” clause were among the most potent causes of international bitterness in Europe.

It cannot be said that the diplomats at Paris dismembered Austria-Hungary, for the subject nationalities had torn that empire to pieces before the peace conference assembled. All that remained for the diplomats to do was to recognize the new states, delimit their frontiers, and transfer various provinces to neighboring states. The diplomats also had to keep economics and defense in mind, and the unsettled state of the Russian frontier caused further trouble. Nevertheless, the territory of the old Austria-Hungary was eventually divided between four new republics and three old neighbors.

The region north of the Carpathian Mountains went to the new Poland, even though it included a large minority of Ruthenians, akin to the Ukrainians of southern Russia. The Czech and Slovak provinces became the new Czechoslovakia, but along its western frontier were many Sudeten Germans who desired union with Germany. The diplomats of 1919 refused to consider adding to German territory, but the Sudetens later caused much trouble. The Magyars inhabiting the great Hungarian plain organized the Hungarian Republic, and the German-speaking peoples around Vienna established a new Austria. In the east, Transylvania was given to Romania, in spite of its large German and Magyar minorities, and in the south the Slavic provinces (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina) went to an enlarged Serbia, known thereafter as Yugoslavia. Other large districts were awarded to Italy. The old Austrian Empire was thus thoroughly dismembered, to the great loss of all concerned. The Danube Valley was an economic unit, inside which a great division of labor had developed. The citizens of the new states gained their political freedom, perhaps, but they lost their economic unity, for each new state tried to make itself self-sufficient by surrounding itself with high tariff walls. The new Austria suffered especially, for this region had formerly been the economic and financial as well as the administrative center
of the whole Empire. It could not become self-supporting now, and had it not been for American relief, thousands of Austrians would have starved.

The establishment of new frontiers for Italy proved very troublesome. The Fourteen Points promised Italy those parts of Austria which had an Italian population (Italia irredenta); the Treaty of London (1915) had promised rather more; and Italian diplomats now demanded still more. When the French and British stood by the treaty, Wilson let the Italians have the Trentino north to the Brenner Pass, though it included 250,000 Germans in a compact mass, as well as Trieste, the Austrian port on the Adriatic. The crisis came over Fiume. The Treaty of London had promised this city to Italy, but Slavs there outnumbered Italians five to one, and its harbor was the only practicable port for Yugoslavia. Feeling ran so high that Orlando almost broke up the peace conference, and the Trianon Treaty simply transferred the region to the Allies. The Italians presently occupied it by a coup d’état, but after World War II it went to Yugoslavia.

By the Treaty of Neuilly (November, 1919) Bulgaria was disarmed and slightly reduced in area, with about 300,000 Bulgars being transferred to Yugoslav or Greek rule. As mentioned above, the Treaty of Sèvres rather thoroughly dismembered Turkey, but its terms are of little consequence for they never went into effect. It was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923, see p. 689). Meanwhile the three Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) and Finland had been recognized as independent of Russia by the Bolsheviks, but the statesmen at Paris had no share in their creation. After the signing of the Treaty of Versailles (June 28, 1919) the major statesmen went home, leaving lesser officials to put the finishing touches on the minor treaties. The Paris Peace Conference thus completed its work, but it left untouched the greatest problem of all. What was to be done about Russia? To this fundamental question the statesmen at Paris had no answer.

**LIQUIDATING THE WAR**

The Treaty of Versailles did not bring peace to the war-torn world. In central and eastern Europe, and in the Near East, fighting continued for several years. These new wars may seem trivial when compared to the titanic struggles of the World War, yet the fighting
often was as bloody as any in Europe between Waterloo and the Marne. More important than this local warfare, however, was the continuation of war mentality everywhere. Five years of slaughter had raised Europe’s population to such heights of hysteria that the calm discussion of public questions became virtually impossible, and another five years was required to restore a peace mentality. And finally, it was now necessary to pay the bills, a situation complicated by a number of unforeseen events which further disturbed the peace of the world.

In the first place, the United States repudiated Wilson and disavowed the commitments he had made at Paris. There had been little criticism of his theories during the war, but in the summer of 1919 his opponents launched a large-scale attack upon the League of Nations. Wilson had been completely exhausted by his labors at Paris, and his attempt to gain popular support for the League by an extended tour of America brought on a nervous collapse (September, 1919). The Senate then refused to ratify the treaty (November, 1919), and when the Republicans won the election of 1920 by a large majority, the League’s American friends gave up hope. Moreover, Wilson had promised France a military alliance against Germany, but again the Senate refused to ratify his treaty. To the dismay of Europe, America withdrew into her former isolation.

Another stumbling block to a lasting peace was Bolshevism. During 1919 the Red armies occupied most of the old Russian Empire, except Finland, the Baltic States, and Poland, and the Bolshevik leaders loudly proclaimed their belief that the whole world would soon be communist. The diplomats at Paris had hoped that the new republics of central and eastern Europe would serve as a “sanitary cordon,” shielding western Europe from the communist contagion, but for a moment it seemed that they might succumb themselves. For several weeks in 1919 Hungary was ruled by a communist dictator, and socialist governments were set up in several other places. Moreover, these new states of eastern Europe were hostile to each other, each hoping to snatch large territories from its neighbors. Everywhere gangs of armed men roamed the countryside. Sometimes these brigands professed political ambitions of one sort or another; sometimes they had been driven by famine in the cities to seek food in the country; sometimes they were simple gangsters. Chaos descended upon eastern Europe, and the statesmen of the West could do little except wring their hands over this sad situation.
Meantime economic conditions in western Europe were going from bad to worse. Millions of discharged soldiers were suddenly thrown on the labor market at just the time when war orders were stopping and munition factories were closing down. More fundamental trouble resulted from the fact that four years of production under war conditions, and the accompanying war socialism, had taught the manufacturers to speed up production and to use new labor-saving devices, and no one now wished to return to the old system. For a few months manufacturers were busy converting their factories to peacetime purposes and restocking their countries with the things people had done without during the war, but when this process was completed a serious depression set in. Old markets were gone, new ones could not be found, and manufacturers had to abandon their dreams of war profits made permanent. The workers, in their turn, had to abandon their dreams of retaining the high wages and the high standards of living they had enjoyed during the war, and many turned to socialism or communism.

Though every country in Europe was burdened with enormous debts at the time of the armistice, more money had to be raised at once to finance reconstruction and conversion to a peacetime economy. The burden was too great for Europe's financial systems to bear. Government action had kept the heavily inflated currencies from going to pieces during the war, but with the return of peace nothing could prevent collapse. Russian money became worthless in 1921, Austrian in 1922, German in 1923; and everywhere money lost much of its former value. Governments were thus freed from their domestic debts, but at a terrific cost to their peoples: bonds, mortgages, life insurance policies, bank deposits lost all or most of their value; prices rose to fantastic heights; wages failed to keep up; and people who lived on salaries or fixed incomes of any sort were faced with ruin. This inflation was a major disaster to the middle classes of Europe—who had already suffered the most heavily from war casualties, since farmers and munition workers had been indispensable at home. As these middle classes had created and supported most of the higher civilization of Europe—its science, its literature, and its art—their bankruptcy was a severe blow to European culture; and as they had been the backbone of the liberal parties, their decline eliminated the political cushion between industrialists and workers. Postwar inflation was as great a disaster to the old Europe as the war itself had been.
When the "victors" in the war saw national bankruptcy staring them in the face, it was natural that they should make frantic efforts to collect reparations from Germany. The Treaty of Versailles had set up a commission which was to decide upon the amount and distribution of reparations by May 1, 1921. After long and acrimonious discussions, this commission set the figure at $33 billion plus the entire Belgian war debt and all the costs of the Allied armies occupying Germany. It was relatively easy to fix this high figure, but it was not so easy to collect tangible reparations. German money had no value, and if tangible goods were collected and sold in the Allied countries, native manufacturers of those articles lost their markets. Actually the principal payments were made in coal—which threw thousands of British coal miners out of work.

The Germans made no great efforts to pay, however, and early in January, 1923, the reparations commission declared them in default. French and Belgian troops crossed the Rhine to occupy the Ruhr Valley, rich in coal and site of the famous Krupp steel mills. All Germans in the area at once went on strike, and the national government undertook to pay the strikers. This tremendous expense completed the ruin of German finance, but the French got neither coal nor iron. After eight months the Germans gave in, but the French had learned their lesson and they made no further attempts to collect reparations by force. Representatives of the great powers then reorganized German finances and drew up a new and more reasonable schedule of reparation payments (called the "Dawes Plan," from the American banker who was chairman of the commission) which the Germans accepted (April, 1924). For a few years they fulfilled their side of the bargain, and a better spirit began to prevail throughout Europe. German and Allied diplomats presently met at Locarno, in Italy, where they negotiated a series of treaties mutually guaranteeing each others' frontiers and promising to arbitrate future disputes (October, 1925). A few months later Germany was admitted to the League of Nations (March, 1926), and again it seemed that at last the war was really over. Once more, however, the pause proved to be only a truce.

During these turbulent years still other forces were helping to make a return to the peaceful life of prewar times impossible. The armistice brought a general release from social as well as from economic restrictions, and all the countries of Europe were scandalized at the prevalence of dishonesty and graft. There was a great
intellectual deflation and a collapse of the idealism that had supported the peoples of the world throughout the conflict. “Debunkers” everywhere attacked the ideals of an earlier day, often with irony and sometimes with ribaldry. But these untoward manifestations need not be attributed wholly to the war. The rascally politicians, the gaudy profiteers, the cynical debunkers were signs that the world had torn loose from its moorings, but the coming of the war was itself the supreme illustration, rather than the cause, of this disturbing state of affairs. The ideals that had once guided and inspired Europe and America were no longer acceptable to men, and until new ones could be developed, there inevitably was much floundering about. Criticism and ridicule were effective against the old ideals of the nineteenth century—or “Victorianism,” as the Anglo-Saxons said—but even the most abandoned of the debunkers rarely spoke ill of social coöperation and solidarity, efficiency and planning, economic well-being for all, government aid to all sorts of enterprises, the progress of technology, medical research, and sanitation, and science, enabling men to determine their destiny. Conceived before the war, but greatly promoted by it, such ideals as these gradually came to be accepted as the foundations of a new way of life, superseding those of the Victorians. The dreams of the nineteenth century were among the casualties of the war and, reversing the oft-quoted dictum of the poet, we may say that this great century went out, not with a whimper but with a bang.
COMMUNISTS AND FASCISTS
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION—THE FASCIST STATES
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32. THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

After the Revolution of 1905 had made a breach in the bulwarks of Russia’s autocracy, this mysterious country entered upon a new period in her long and varied history. Industry and commerce began to progress as soon at Witte’s reforms could bear fruit, and Stolypin’s program seemed to be solving Russia’s agrarian problem. The resultant economic prosperity encouraged and strengthened the industrialists and bankers, who accepted the modified autocracy and hoped to keep it strong enough to suppress strikes and prevent revolution. Men of this sort were well represented in the third and fourth dumas, elected in 1907 and 1912, where they were given an opportunity to air their views and might even have a small voice in determining policy. They therefore believed that no further reforms were necessary, and in their opinion Russia was on the right road at least. “We need thirty years of peace,” declared the optimistic minister of agriculture in 1912, “and then the Russian people will be firmly established in strength and prosperity.”

But while Russia’s economic prosperity and expansion were bringing her industrialists into closer sympathy with the autocracy, they also gave the revolutionary movement new strength. Radical leaders shook themselves out of the despondency that had overwhelmed them after their failure in 1905, and as the reforms of that year had made propaganda somewhat easier, revolutionary fervor again spread through Russia. The assassination of Stolypin in 1911 was followed by many similar acts of violence. Strikes became increasingly frequent, until a general strike was called for early July, 1914, during which one out of every ten factory workers in Russia left his job. Troops were ordered to break up demonstrations; barricades were
thrown up in the streets; workers and police fired on each other; and the city bore all the aspects of impending civil war. The strike had been timed to coincide with a formal visit of President Poincaré of France, and the Russian police were forced to great lengths to prevent untoward incidents that might strain the friendly relations uniting the two allies. The tsar stood at stiff attention, hat in hand, while his band played the “Marseillaise,” the national anthem of the French Republic, but at that very moment his troops were machine-gunning other Russians for singing the same air, the battle hymn of revolutionists the world over.

Meantime Pan-Slavists and other chauvinists had become equally active and far more reckless. As soon as Russia’s disasters during the Japanese War had faded into the past, and her army had been somewhat repaired, these patriots began vociferously demanding an aggressive foreign policy. Stolypin and other responsible ministers were urging the development of Siberia as part of their agrarian program, but the Pan-Slavists turned their eyes southward to the Balkans and Constantinople. The troubled conditions prevailing in that region, especially after 1908, offered an excellent excuse for Russian intervention and, as we have already seen, they eventually led to the First World War. Long before the war began, however, highly placed Russians were expressing the dangerous opinion that an aggressive policy in the Balkans would divert men’s thoughts from revolution.

Early in 1914, therefore, Russia was being torn to pieces, and the autocracy was quite incapable of remedying the situation. Stolypin was succeeded by two aged prime ministers (Kokovtsev, 1911–February, 1914, and Goremykin, 1914–1916), neither of whom was a man of great force of character, and the imperial bureaucracy lumbered along in its habitual ignorance and sloth. Tsar Nicholas II (1894–1917) was a well-meaning but weak and unintelligent man, completely under the thumb of his German wife. (Here we can see a close parallel between Nicholas and the two modern monarchs who had lost major thrones and their heads before him: Charles I of England and Louis XVI of France.) The tsarina apparently was a shrewish termagant, with no conception of policy and utterly dominated by court reactionaries who knew how to exploit the weaker sides of her nature. Being an extremely superstitious woman, she was ever at the mercy of charlatans and wonderworkers, the most sinister of whom was an illiterate monk named Gregory Rasputin. Behind this man stood a handful of convinced partisans of the old regime, a
larger group of pro-German plotters and intriguers, and a host of corruptionists (including grand dukes and ministers of state) whose sole ambition was to fatten themselves at Russia's expense. Honest men were scandalized but helpless, for the tsarina was infatuated with the charlatan, and the tsar once remarked that he would rather face "five Rasputins than one hysterical woman." During the last tragic week of July, 1914, Rasputin was almost the only influential man in Russia who opposed going to war, and he was temporarily out of the city. He had recently been stabbed by a harlot and had not yet recovered.

The people of Russia, like those everywhere else, supported the war loyally in 1914. The strikes ceased; political refugees returned home and announced their support of the tsar; exiles enlisted in the armies of England or France. A mystical enthusiasm for the war swept Russia, with the liberals even more enthusiastic than the government and the reactionaries. They prophesied that after the war everything would be very different, and that at last people would be happy and free in Russia. Only Lenin and the Bolsheviks refused to join this chorus. Within a short time, however, much had happened to discredit the autocracy. The victories of the first few days were followed by disastrous defeats; casualties took on ghastly proportions; there were shortages of everything; and the high command was permeated with inefficiency and corruption. During the summer of 1915 the enemy drove the last Russians from Austria-Hungary and occupied Poland, but in 1916, when the Germans were deeply engaged at Verdun and on the Somme, the Russians launched another offensive which cost a million casualties but brought no important gains. By this time conditions behind the front were chaotic. The railway system had practically broken down for lack of locomotives, cars, and repairs to the roadbed. As every effort was being made to produce munitions, civilians suffered severely from shortages of clothing and other necessities. Cities were overcrowded with workers, many of whom could find neither housing nor adequate food. Life in Russia had become a veritable nightmare; war enthusiasm waned; grumbling was to be heard on every hand; and presently revolutionary agitation was resumed.

The "February Revolution"

In the fall and winter of 1916 every informed person in the country—except the tsar and tsarina—was concerned over the state of Rus-
sia. One incompetent minister followed another, until the worst of the lot (Protopopov) became minister of the interior in November. He probably was insane. For weeks he had been saying, "I know that I can save Russia and that no one else can," but though he had once been considered a liberal, he merely intrigued with the reactionaries now that he had achieved office. The prime minister (Stürmer) had sent secret peace feelers to Germany, and he was widely (though probably falsely) believed to be a pro-German traitor. Rasputin was now the most powerful man at court, and he was no longer satisfied with mere graft and honors for his protégés: cabinet ministers owed their appointments to him, and he gave advice on high politics and strategy. Finally he was murdered by a group of aristocrats (December, 1916). When liberal leaders urged the tsar to appoint a ministry responsible to the duma, the tsarina would not listen to such a proposal, and the duma was dissolved instead (March 10). Strikes and food riots had been disturbing Petrograd for several days, and on March 10 troops were ordered to fire on demonstrators. The soldiers refused to obey this order, and some threw their weapons to the crowd. The tsarist ministers became panicky, rushed into hiding, and were arrested the next day. Within a day or two most of the Petrograd garrison had "joined the people." Their unexpected and unplanned defection inaugurated the "February Revolution."¹

Meantime the duma had refused to dissolve, and when the tsar's ministers fled, its leaders hurriedly organized a provisional government for Russia (March 12). Led by a mildly liberal aristocrat, Prince Lvov, most members of this government were moderates, the only radical in the group being the minister of justice, Alexander Kerenski. The first task of the new government, of course, was to legalize its position, to which end it persuaded the tsar to abdicate in favor of his brother Michael (March 15). Michael refused to accept the crown unless it was offered by a constituent assembly and urged all Russians to rally around the provisional government until such an assembly could meet. (Nicholas was then imprisoned, and in July, 1918, he was shot, along with his wife and four children.)

¹ As Russia was still living under the Julian, or "Old Style," calendar, which lagged thirteen days behind the "New Style" calendar used in western Europe, March 10 was called February 25, and the events of that day are therefore called the "February Revolution." Similarly the Bolshevik seizure of power (November 6) is known as the "October Revolution" because it took place on October 24, Old Style. All the dates mentioned in this chapter are New Style. In 1914 the name of St. Petersburg had been given the Slavic form Petrograd; this city is now called Leningrad.
During the next few days the provisional government announced that it would continue the war against Germany; it granted autonomy to Finland, Poland, and the Baltic states; it proclaimed various civil liberties and freed political prisoners; it promised far-reaching social reforms, including an extensive redistribution of land; and it began preparing for the constituent assembly. But this provisional government, composed of lesser aristocrats and middle-class liberals, was quite unable to stem the tide of revolution, and within a few weeks leadership had passed to less moderate groups.

On the very day that the liberal leaders of the duma set up their provisional government (March 12) a group of more radical leaders, meeting in the same building, organized what came to be known as the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies. This soviet (or “council”) was modeled on the one that Trotsky had organized in 1905 (see p. 423), and it appealed to the radicals and workers against the middle-class liberals of the provisional government. Similar soviets were soon founded elsewhere. They had no legal standing, their membership included many adventurers as well as a few idealistic revolutionaries, and at first their organization was not very firm; but within a few weeks they summoned an “All-Russian Congress of Soviets.” Delegates came from all parts of the country, and at once they adopted the slogan “All power to the soviets.” A characteristic act of the Petrograd soviet was its “Order No. 1” (March 14), depriving army officers of all authority save in strategic matters. This famous order did much to demoralize the Russian army, but it won the men of the Petrograd garrison over to the soviet. Two weeks later the soviet issued a “Manifesto to the Peoples of the World,” denouncing the “imperialist war,” demanding a peace “without annexations or indemnities,” and urging revolutionists in western Europe to complete “the liberation of mankind.” Thereafter the conflict between the provisional government and the soviet became more bitter day by day, and the soviet won all down the line.

The chaotic conditions in Petrograd and throughout Russia were presently given a turn for the worse by the arrival of Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders. During the war these men had been living exiled in Switzerland, where they conducted an utterly ineffective agitation for peace. The February Revolution took them completely by surprise, but they quickly formulated plans for seizing control of Russia. The German government, hoping that they would foment civil war in Russia, passed them through Germany, and Lenin arrived
in Petrograd on April 16. To the large and excited crowd that greeted him at the Finland Station he shouted, "Long live the socialist revolution!" His announced program demanded the immediate overthrow of the provisional government, "all power to the soviets," the nationalization of all land, control of industry by the workers, and peace with Germany. Lenin's more conservative opponents declared that his long absence had left him out of touch with conditions in Russia, and denounced his program as "delirium," but his speeches attracted crowds of eager listeners, and when he promised "bread and peace," he spoke of things that every Russian understood and wanted. A few weeks later he was joined by Leon Trotsky, who arrived from New York. Trotsky had formerly been a member of the Menshevik faction of the Social Democratic party, but soon after his return to Russia he became Lenin's ablest and most successful coadjutor.

The advance of radicalism in Petrograd and elsewhere reduced the provisional government to a precarious position, and two important members resigned in May. Lvov remained prime minister, but Kerenski became minister of war, and other posts in the cabinet went to moderate socialists. Kerenski then decided to whip up patriotism by launching a military offensive against the Germans. Though England and America sent huge quantities of munitions to Archangel, the decrepit condition of the Russian railways made it almost impossible to move them to the front. Nevertheless, Kerenski went to the front himself, addressed the soldiers eloquently, and ordered the attack (June 29). The offensive was a failure from the first, and within a week it had completely collapsed. Thereafter the Russian army rapidly melted away, and the Germans could undoubtedly have entered Petrograd and Moscow had they made a serious attempt to do so. Kerenski's failure encouraged Lenin and the Bolsheviks to attempt a coup d'état in Petrograd (July 16). The uprising was badly planned; the Bolsheviks were still only a minority even in the Petrograd soviet; and the provisional government easily defeated the rebels. Trotsky and others were arrested, and Lenin fled to Finland. But Prince Lvov resigned and Kerenski became prime minister (July 20).

Kerenski had by this time decided that if he was to save the revolution from the Bolsheviks he must re-establish law and order in Russia, and that he could do so only through a military dictatorship. He therefore connived with a General Kornilov to have loyal troops sent from the front to occupy Petrograd and dispose of the Bolsheviks.
At the last minute, however, the two men quarreled over which of them was to be dictator. Kerenski dismissed Kornilov, and Kornilov marched on the capital without Kerenski's blessing (September 9). When Kerenski appealed to the radicals for aid, the Petrograd soviet sent a truckload of orators to meet the advancing troops. These orators explained the situation so eloquently that Kornilov's army evaporated without firing a shot: some of his men returned to their barracks but the others joined the revolutionists.

Kerenski's last two months in office were a pitiful period. Economic conditions rapidly went from bad to worse. The prevailing political excitement turned men's minds from work, and many persons failed to see why they should work at all, now that they were "free." There were serious shortages of food in the cities, with peasants and speculators hoarding what they had. The country was full of deserters from the army, wandering about, trying rather hopelessly to find their native villages, and looting the country they passed through. They crowded into the cities, where there was little for them to eat and nothing for them to do except listen to political speakers. The Bolsheviks made their converts among such people by promising bread, and they won many peasants by promising land. Kerenski was promising the same things, to be sure, but the Bolsheviks, being out of power, could promise more; and while Kerenski had to say "soon," they could always use the magic word "now." When Lenin decided that the time had come to strike, he returned from Finland late in October. During the night of November 6 (October 24, O.S.), troops from the Petrograd garrison occupied the important buildings of the city and arrested the leaders of the provisional government—all except Kerenski, who managed to escape. Lenin then took over. At first he ruled only Petrograd, but his associates soon seized other cities, and within a few weeks the Bolsheviks actually held most of Russia.

The Bolsheviks in Power

N. Lenin was the pseudonym assumed by Vladimir Ulyanov (1870–1924) when he began his revolutionary activities in the early 1890's, and by this name he is now known throughout the world. Born to a middle-class family, he received a good education and practiced law for a short time, but his older brother was executed in 1891 for
taking part in an attempt on the tsar's life, and the young Lenin thereupon became a dedicated revolutionist. In 1897 he was sent to Siberia, where he met and married a highly intelligent and idealistic social worker, Nadezhda Krupskaya, who remained his close associate ever after. They reached Switzerland in 1900, where Lenin became leader of the radical or Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic party (see p. 419), edited its newspaper *Iskra* ("The Spark"), studied Karl Marx, and dreamed of a world revolution. During 1916 he was profoundly depressed because his peace proposals failed to receive serious attention, but as soon as he reached Russia in 1917 he threw himself into revolutionary agitation with great energy and skill, and, as we have seen, he seized control of the Russian government on November 6. Bolshevik mythology
quickly made him into a superman of unerring foresight, powerful reasoning abilities, and irresistible will. As a matter of fact, he was an obstinate fanatic, always ready to sacrifice himself or anyone else for his purposes. But he was an able statesman—perhaps the ablest of his generation in Europe—and though relentless and often ruthless, at bottom he shared his wife’s deep humanitarianism. He was shot by a fanatical opponent in August, 1918, and though he did not die until 1924, he was an invalid thereafter, giving the party his advice but unable to play an active role. The assassin certainly did inestimable harm to Russia.

In the train that carried Lenin across Germany were several of his Bolshevik comrades, and during the next few weeks he was joined by others who returned from exile in various parts of the world. Some
of them eventually held high offices in the Russian government, but only two need be mentioned here. In the early days, Lenin's most valuable assistant was Leon Trotsky (1877–1940), who had long been associated with the socialist movement. He had been exiled to Siberia twice, but on each occasion he managed to escape; he organized the St. Petersburg soviet of 1905; and during the war he was in various European countries and the United States. In some ways Trotsky was a more brilliant thinker than Lenin, but he was erratic, a less gifted political tactician, and not well qualified for supreme command. Joseph Stalin (1879–1953) had been born in the Caucasus region and he too had been a revolutionist from his youth upward. He had never been outside Russia, though he had served more than one term in Siberia, and he was there in February, 1917. He returned at once to Petrograd, joined Lenin, and took an active part in the October Revolution, but he held no important office until later. He is often contrasted with Lenin and Trotsky as being guided largely by thirst for power, and as exemplifying the inherent brutality of Bolshevism: he later developed many of these unpleasant characteristics, it is true, but if as a youth he had always been dominated by such passions, he would doubtless have chosen to serve the autocracy rather than the revolutionists.

The tsar was always able to find congenial work for such young men. Immediately upon achieving power Lenin began issuing decrees following lines announced long before. On November 7 he abolished the private ownership of land and transferred the great estates to the local peasants' soviets. Other early decrees transferred factories to the workers' soviets, ordered an eight-hour day, nationalized all banks, repudiated the government debt, and confiscated all church property. In many cases these revolutionary decrees merely made confusion worse confounded, for the Bolsheviks did not have the power to enforce them, and private individuals often used them as an excuse for general plundering. Almost the entire bureaucracy, whether the tsar's or Kerenski's, had fled, resigned, or gone on strike, and the Bolsheviks had no trained administrators to take their places. During the next few months, therefore, Russia rapidly drifted toward anarchy. When elections for the long-awaited constituent assembly were finally held, late in November, less than a quarter of the delegates elected were Bolsheviks, and considerably more than half were anti-Bolshevik Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. When the assembly met in January, its members talked excitedly for a day and
a night, and it was then dissolved by Lenin. Six months later (July 10) he presented a constitution of his own, which was docilely accepted by the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. The Bolsheviks thus regularized the soviet system of government (see below, p. 607) and established a “dictatorship of the proletariat” under themselves and Lenin.

Russia’s Bolshevik rulers lost no time in urging peace negotiations. From the first Lenin had denounced this “imperialistic war”; the collapse of Kerenski’s offensive made it clear that the Russian armies could no longer fight; civil war was imminent; and Russia’s border provinces, notably Finland and the Ukraine, were demanding immediate independence. On November 7, therefore, Lenin again called upon all the belligerent nations to make “an honestly democratic peace, without annexations and without indemnities.” When they ignored his plea, he published tsarist Russia’s secret treaties by which she and her allies promised each other vast territories (see p. 580). Lenin then signed an armistice with the Germans, and a peace conference presently met at Brest-Litovsk, with Trotski leading the Russian delegation (December 22). Taking the Russians at their word, the Germans demanded, in the name of “self-determination,” that Finland, the Baltic States, Poland, and the Ukraine be recognized as “independent” states under German “protection.” When the Russians hesitated, German armies marched on Petrograd, and even more severe terms were accepted on March 3. Russia lost more than a million square miles of territory and a quarter of her population, but the Bolsheviks retained power over the rest.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed just in the nick of time, for civil war soon broke out between the “Reds” (Bolsheviks) and the “Whites” (anti-Bolsheviks), and during the next three years the Bolsheviks were attacked from every side by native opponents supplied with English, French, American, and Japanese arms, and even supported by foreign troops. We need not enumerate the “White” generals who enjoyed a brief day of glory, only remarking that they won no major battles. Trotski became “commissar” (minister) of war and presently organized an effective “Red Army,” which defeated all its opponents, though sometimes at great cost. The “Reds” were thus enabled to pose as the saviors of Russia and won the support of many persons who had no sympathy with communism. The Bolsheviks denounced the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk immediately after the armistice in the West, and in 1919 they reoccupied the Ukraine.
A year later the Red Army seized half of Poland, but it presently was driven out, and nominal peace was restored after Russia had recognized the independence of Poland, Finland, and the three Baltic States.

The war years effectively put an end to the "liberty" proclaimed in Russia during the rosy dawn of the Revolution. The first Bolshevik measures were a sort of "war communism." The rationing of food was of course necessary, and it was conducted with great brutality toward peasants who hid their produce. Factories, mines, and natural resources were nationalized, often over the armed resistance of former owners. All workers were compelled to join government-controlled unions, and strikes were forbidden. The press was more strictly censored than under the tsar. An iron discipline was established in the Red Army, which no longer elected its officers as in Kerenski's day. Many of the new officers had been trained in the tsar's army, and their families were now held hostage to assure their good behavior. These war measures presently led to the "Red Terror" of 1919 and 1920. Revolutionary tribunals were set up to try persons suspected of counterrevolutionary activity, and a secret police, known as the "Cheka," was organized to ferret them out. This Cheka soon adopted most of the methods that had made the tsar's secret police infamous, and it still operates, under another name. Tens of thousands of persons were executed during the Terror, but in the end it saved Bolshevism.

Lenin and his associates had foreseen that the capitalist countries would do what they could to prevent a socialist regime in Russia, and from the first their propaganda lumped all capitalist countries together. They denounced the capitalist class in general, and in 1918 and 1919 they answered European intervention in Russia by conducting a vigorous revolutionary agitation in the West. Being convinced that a world-wide revolution was inevitable, they naturally did what they could to hasten the glad day. They therefore organized the Third International early in 1919 to conduct their propaganda throughout the world. (The First International, founded by Marx in 1864, collapsed in 1876; the Second International, organized in 1889, foundered in 1914.) The Bolshevik party had by this time changed its name to the Communist party, and as it controlled the Third International, it dominated the communist movement throughout the world. There were, however, many Marxists in Europe, usually old right-wing socialists, who refused to join the Russian
comrades. They continued to call themselves socialists, and bitterness between communists and socialists has often been greater than that separating communists from capitalists.

In the summer of 1921 Russia enjoyed relative peace for the first time in seven years, but it was a peace of exhaustion. She had suffered at least twelve million casualties during the war, the Revolution, and the civil wars; she had lost several of her richest and most populous provinces; there had been terrific physical damage, especially during the civil wars; her economic life was completely disorganized; pestilence and famine had swept the country. The communist leaders then gave up hope of establishing a Marxist utopia at once, and in March, 1921, they announced a New Economic Policy which gave limited scope to individual initiative. Private trade was permitted, individuals might own small factories and operate them for profit, and peasants were allowed to lease land for their private use. It was carefully explained that all these retreats from communism were only temporary, but they helped put Russia on her feet once more. At about the same time the government signed a commercial treaty with Germany, by which Russia received much-needed machinery in exchange for grain.

Such was the situation when Lenin died on January 21, 1924. Though he had been an invalid for over five years, his prestige and skill had prevented major quarrels among his associates, but his death unloosed a mighty struggle for power between Trotsky and Stalin. Remaining firm in his old conviction that the capitalist world would never allow a single communist state to stand, Trotsky urged that redoubled efforts be made to foment a world revolution. Stalin replied that the only effective propaganda would be to make communism successful in Russia, and in the end Stalin won. Trotsky was demoted from his high offices (1926), exiled from Russia (1929), and murdered in Mexico (1940). Stalin discontinued the New Economic Policy, undertook a vast program of industrialization, purged the party of his rivals, and ruled Russia as a strong-arm dictator until his death in 1953.

**THE SOVIET SYSTEM**

The political organization of the new Russia rested, in theory at least, upon the "soviet." The Russian word soviet simply means "council," and the early soviets somewhat resembled the old-fash-
ioned American town meeting in which citizens gathered to discuss local problems. The fundamental difference lay in the fact that membership in a given soviet was determined by the citizen’s occupation, not by his place of residence: thus there was one soviet for all the peasants in a certain village, one for all the workers in a certain factory, one for all the soldiers in a certain company or regiment. Except for a few disfranchised persons (mostly capitalists and landlords, but also including lunatics and criminals) all adult persons, male or female, were assigned to a soviet, in which they might vote on matters of purely local concern. Matters of greater importance were referred to district soviets, made up of representatives elected by the local soviets, and still more important matters went to regional soviets of delegates selected by the district soviets. At the top of the pyramid was the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, whose members were named by the regional soviets. As this Congress had more than a thousand members, it was much too large for effective action, but its executive committee of about forty members supposedly exercised a general supervision over the government. It appointed a small cabinet, known as the Soviet of People’s Commissars, whose members administered the various branches of the government of what was officially called the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (R.S.F.S.R.). This rather simple arrangement had been sketched out in the Constitution of 1918, but as a result of the civil wars it was considerably altered.

The revolutionary government had at once reversed tsarist policy toward the lesser nationalities in the Russian Empire. Attempts at “Russification” were abandoned, and the nationalities were granted a large measure of autonomy, both politically and culturally. There were over a hundred different racial or linguistic minorities in Russia, several of which proclaimed their independence in 1917. During the civil wars these independent republics were occupied by the Red Army; soviet governments were established in each; and in 1923 a new constitution was proclaimed, unifying them all in the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (U.S.S.R.). By far the most important of these federated republics was the R.S.F.S.R., which included all the territory inhabited by “Great Russians,” or 80 percent of the area and 65 percent of the population of the Soviet Union. Next in importance came the Ukraine, on the northern shores of the Black Sea, and White Russia on the Polish frontier. A fourth soviet republic was set up in the Caucasus. These four republics were the original
members of the U.S.S.R.; seven other republics in Russia’s huge Asiatic domain joined the Union during the next few years; and the Soviet Union now has sixteen member states, each with a government modeled on that of the R.S.F.S.R. Some of these republics have lesser autonomous regions within their boundaries. It is noteworthy that the word “Russia” does not occur in the name of the Soviet Union, for its members supposedly are equals. As in the United States, a sharp distinction is drawn between the things which the separate republics may do and those to be done by the federal government. The highest authority in the Soviet Union is the All-Union Congress of Soviets, or Supreme Soviet, consisting of two houses: the Soviet of Nationalities, whose members are appointed by the governments of the republics or autonomous regions which they represent; and the Soviet of the Union, which since 1936 has been elected on a Union-wide basis, with one deputy for each 300,000 of the population. The Supreme Soviet has an Executive Committee, or Presidium, which watches the commissars or ministers whom it appoints.

Soviet apologists are wont to boast that their government is the most democratic on earth, but critics point out that its democracy is vitiated by the unique position of the Communist party in Russia. According to Bolshevist theory, the political parties of western Europe represent different social classes, but Lenin and his friends were planning a “classless society,” such as Marx had prophesied long before, in which all men would belong to the proletariat or working class. As they could see no need for any party except the Communist party—the party of the proletarians—they abolished all others.

Not everyone in Russia belonged to the Communist party, however, and most people would not be admitted, even if they desired to join. The “Old Bolsheviks”—those who were party members before 1917—were dedicated persons who risked prison, Siberia, or even death for their ideals, but as soon as the party was firmly established in power countless opportunists flocked to its banner. The Old Bolsheviks were much disturbed, and while they accepted the services of these Johnny-Come-Latelys, they refused them high positions in the government or the party. In fact, a candidate for party membership had to give evidence of the old enthusiasm and fanaticism before he was admitted. As late as 1940 there were less than three million party members in a total population of over 170
million. But all these party members were carefully selected persons who devoted most of their time to political activity, who formed communist "cells" in every local soviet, trade union, school, office, and other organized group. Thoroughly trained in Marxist and Leninist doctrine, willing to take orders from above and able to dominate those beneath them, and holding all the important political offices, these party members ruled Russia with an iron hand.

When elections were held in Soviet Russia, the Communist party presented a candidate for each office, and he was almost certainly elected. Persons who were not party members, and even those who were not communists, might vote, and they might even run for office and hold it if elected. Indeed, the communists were sometimes rather glad to see a mild non-communist elected to a minor office, in order to convince the people of their "freedom"; but there was little likelihood that such independents would go very far in their political careers. Having no organization to support them, they could accomplish nothing against the well-disciplined party members. Elections therefore were of little consequence, and political struggles took place within the party. Its organization, however, was so firm that differences of opinion regarding policy could hardly become important unless they reached the highest levels. Party policy was determined by the "Politburo" of about a dozen men, most of whom held high offices in the state as well. Even the Supreme Soviet did little except listen to, and approve of, speeches by these leaders. As the party dominated Russia, and the Politburo dominated the party, the man who dominated the Politburo also ruled Russia. After 1925 that man was Joseph Stalin, who was also general secretary of the Communist party, but who held no political office until after the opening of the Second World War. He owed his power to his control of the party machine and to the ruthlessness with which he eliminated rivals, especially during the great purge of 1937, but his propaganda undoubtedly made him popular with the people of Russia.

Economic Organization

The New Economic Policy saved Russia in 1921, but only necessity had induced Lenin and his associates to make this retreat from communism. They regarded it as a temporary concession, necessary to pull Russia out of her economic chaos, but something which they
would discontinue as soon as possible. Heretofore communist writers had turned their attention largely to criticism of the capitalistic economy and to elaboration of the techniques of propaganda. They were decidedly vague in their descriptions of what a communist state would be like, and they merely assured the world that under communism everyone—except the capitalists, of course, and other social parasites—would be much better off. But when they had achieved power, they discovered that such oratory was not enough. Like many other people in the opening years of the twentieth century, these communists put their trust in a “planned society,” and they were quite sure that a small group of planners could easily draw blueprints for a perfect society. Trotsky had urged that such plans be made, and after his fall from power, Stalin took up the idea. As early as 1920 a state planning commission, known as the “Gosplan,” had been organized to direct the economic life of Russia, and after the New Economic Policy was abolished (1928), an all-out drive was directed to collectivizing the agricultural and industrial life of Russia.

In an earlier chapter (p. 404) we saw that, until their emancipation in 1861, the Russian peasants had lived in village communities called mirs and had held their fields in common. Pan-Slavists were enraptured by the mir as a typically Slavic institution, but others regarded it as a primary cause of Russia’s backwardness. After 1905 Stolypin and others did what they could to enable peasants to own the land they cultivated, and in the summer of 1917 peasants often seized lands belonging to the old aristocrats. The New Economic Policy further promoted the individual ownership of land and encouraged the rather large class of landowning peasants known as “kulaks.” But Stalin and other communist leaders were much distressed by this private ownership of land and cattle, and in 1928 they decided to liquidate the kulaks as a social class. The task proved more difficult than they anticipated. The kulaks slaughtered and ate their cattle rather than surrender them, and they fought back when the government tried to evict them from their land. A state verging on civil war resulted, but in the end the kulak class was wiped out. It is estimated that several hundred thousand lost their lives, and that even larger numbers were deported as common laborers to remote parts of Siberia. By 1940 practically all the agricultural land in Russia had been seized, but as these kulaks were the ablest peasants, and as the slaughtered cattle could not be replaced for several years, Russian
agriculture suffered severely. In 1932 there were serious famines in many parts of Russia.

The communists then divided the land into large collective farms, called “kolkhozi.” Each farm had a manager, usually a party member, to whom a certain number of peasants were assigned as laborers. The manager was told what crops he must raise and how much

must be turned over to state officials at fixed prices. Should production exceed this amount, the surplus could be sold on the market by the manager and the proceeds distributed among the peasants. Great efforts were made to mechanize agriculture, but as the kolkhozi had no funds with which to buy machinery, the government established “tractor stations” which rented tractors and other machines to the farm managers in return for a share of the crop. There never were enough machines to meet the demand, however, and the government often used the tractors to insure the political reliability of the kolkhozi which were allowed to have them. The government also encouraged the use of better farming methods, trained the managers in scientific agriculture, and brought millions of acres of new land into use by vast irrigation works, especially in Siberia and Turkestan. Agricultural production therefore rose steadily.
The officials of the Gosplan were more interested in industry than in agriculture, partly because Karl Marx had based his ideal state upon an industrial proletariat, but more especially because the wars had shown that only a highly industrialized state can defend itself in modern times. They therefore decided to industrialize Russia without delay. Industrial engineers were brought from western Europe and America, and in 1928 the first “Five Year Plan” was put in operation. Great efforts were made to increase Russian production in such basic industries as coal, iron, steel, oil, electric power, and textiles. Old railways were reconditioned and new ones opened, especially in Asia. Huge factories were built to manufacture automobiles, tractors, and other machines, but little attention was given to “consumer goods”—goods for the use of private individuals. The planners believed that they must lay the foundations for a national industrial system first and provide consumer goods later. They also laid great emphasis upon speed, trying to accomplish in five or ten years what had required a century in western Europe. Planning on so vast a scale would be difficult anywhere, but in a country so backward industrially as Russia the task was almost impossible. Moreover, Russia had almost no skilled machinists, and after the factories were built, the peasants who were forced to work in them often ruined their machines within a short time. Except in a few cases, Russia did not reach the goals set by the planners, but she made remarkable industrial progress nonetheless, and the first Five Year Plan was followed by a second in 1932 and a third in 1937. By this time, however, the international situation had become so tense (see p. 676) that the planners felt forced to devote most of their attention to strengthening Russia’s war industries.

Russia thus made great economic progress during the 1930’s. Her production of steel was quadrupled, that of coal rose almost as much, and in the production of farm machinery she led Europe. Huge industrial cities suddenly appeared, especially in Siberia. Agriculture improved enough to provide the food for the millions of factory workers. But Russia paid a tremendous price for this economic progress. The standard of living of peasants and workers did not raise appreciably above that prevailing in 1914. The relative success of the Five Year Plans helped them very little, for the profits were all plowed back into the system. A terrific propaganda campaign whipped up enthusiasm and persuaded the workers to do their best, but when this failed (as it often did), more drastic
methods were used. Thousands of recalcitrant workers followed the kulaks to Siberia. Because of the inexperience of the workers, the accident rate in the new factories was appalling. The state-planned and state-controlled farms and factories were managed in the most autocratic fashion, and the workers were regimented as never before in history. When compared with Stalin, Peter the Great seems mild indeed. Communist totalitarianism in Russia was not so efficient as the National Socialist variety then prevailing in Germany, but it was even more brutal. Its successes, however, kept Russia from total defeat in 1941 and 1942.

Making Communists

In 1914 there were at most a few thousand Russian Bolseviks in the world, but three years later circumstances enabled these men to seize and establish a dictatorship over a country of more than 150 million inhabitants. They knew that such a dictatorship could not last forever, and that if they were going to succeed they must win the hearts of a large percentage of the population. They did what they could in the way of propaganda and emotional appeal, but they soon learned that such methods would never convert the great mass of the people. They would have to wait until a new generation, trained in communism from childhood, was ready to take over. The Bolsheviks therefore turned their attention to educating the youth of the nation and to making them reliable communists. Until this second generation rose to power, the “dictatorship of the proletariat” would have to be maintained by ballyhoo, censorship, the secret police, and the military might of the Red Army.

In the days of their exile the Bolshevik leaders, like many other people, had arraigned the tsarist government severely for keeping the Russian people in ignorance. Their charges were not quite just, however, for though 75 percent of the Russian people were illiterate, something was being done to remedy matters. At least half the children of school age were attending school in 1914. The first commissar of education, A. Lunacharski, was a highly idealistic “Old Bolshevik” who threw himself into his task with great energy and zeal, but he was hampered by the general confusion prevailing throughout Russia, by a lack of funds, schoolhouses, qualified teachers, and textbooks, and by the apathy and suspicion of the peasants. Not until 1931 was it possible to require every child to attend school
for four years. Only two years later this period was extended to seven years. Russia's greatest need, of course, was for elementary schools, but something was also done in the early years for high schools and universities to train engineers, scientists, doctors, and administrators. Of course these schools were expected to indoctrinate their pupils with communist ideals. All teachers, from the elementary school through the university, had to be communists, and they were carefully watched to make sure that they did not lapse into heresy or propagate ideas not in harmony with the "party line" of the moment. The "Communist Youth Organization" enlisted many thousands of young people, inspiring them to be good communists and training them to be the leaders in the new Russia.

Communist theory also taught that the entire cultural life of the nation should be motivated by a desire to make men good communists. Literature, the theater, and the cinema were encouraged for their propaganda value, but censorship was stricter and more efficient than it had been under the tsars. Much was said about a new proletarian culture, but such a culture could not be created overnight, and the early examples which reached the outside world were not very inspiring. Only convinced communists could be impressed.

Twenty years after the October Revolution, about 1937, it seemed that the Bolsheviks had been moderately successful in their attempts to establish a communist state. Not everything was as beautiful as their dreams had foretold, all Russia had suffered terribly, but communism was at least working after a fashion. The government was firmly established, the horrors of civil war were over, industrial and agricultural production were rising, the Five Year Plans were increasing the productive capital of the nation, and a new generation was coming to the fore which had grown up under communism and which might reasonably be expected to continue the new system more smoothly and more efficiently than had the first generation of revolutionary firebrands. In fact, most of the remaining "Old Bolsheviks" were rapidly being eliminated by the great purges of 1937. The new Russia was totalitarian, not democratic, but it seemed to fit the needs and desires of the Russians fairly well.

Bolshevik successes seem the more surprising when we recall that Marxism was a foreign philosophy, imported into Russia from western Europe by a group of fanatics belonging to the small educated class. Karl Marx had often expressed a low opinion of Russia, and he paid little attention to conditions there. His whole system was a
series of brilliant generalizations based on the conditions he observed in western Europe, especially England, toward the middle of the nineteenth century. Russia had little in common with this England, but Lenin and his followers successfully adapted the Marxian philosophy to conditions in Russia. In doing so, however, they sometimes violated Marx, they sometimes violated Russia, and occasionally they violated themselves. We have seen how they reshaped the mir (which they had once denounced bitterly) and made it into a kolkhoz. Russian patriotism replaced the international enthusiasm of the early communists. Russian history was rewritten, with such former villains as Peter the Great and Ivan the Terrible emerging once more as popular heroes. The old autocracy was intensified, the secret police was revived, exile to Siberia was resumed, and communism replaced Orthodoxy as the religion of the new Russia. In fact, the Stalinist autocracy could hardly have succeeded had it not retained this invaluable heritage from St. Petersburg, from the old Moscow, and from Byzantium, and had not the Russian people been inured to such rule by centuries of tsarist despotism. The old Russia's rigid theological orthodoxy (today it is a Marxian-Leninist-Stalinist orthodoxy), her brutal suppression of heretics (deviationists), her far-flung clergy (party members), her sanctification of arbitrary rule (the dictatorship of the proletariat), her insistence upon the abject subserviency of everyone, her state-supported missionary enterprises (the Communist International) were retained by communist Russia as a most useful legacy from her past. Proper names might be changed, but the spirit of the old autocracy remained the same.
33. THE FASCIST STATES

The Russian revolutions of 1917 had been made possible by the general collapse that resulted from the war. Similar breakdowns occurred throughout Europe, but their consequences varied from country to country according to their severity or because of local conditions and historic traditions. The Austro-Hungarian Empire was divided into a number of states which were taken over by men utterly inexperienced in government, and even Germany and Italy fell into deep confusion. Communists, both native and Russian, made the most of the situation, of course, and for brief periods a few German and many Italian cities, as well as all Hungary, underwent communist rule. The communists were driven out, usually with great brutality, but they soon were replaced by other dictators who paraded their hatred of Marxism but whose rule often vied in severity with that of the Russian autocrats. The exact form taken by these new autocracies varied according to local conditions, but the general pattern was much the same everywhere.

Immediately to the west of Russia lay a tier of agricultural countries, most of which now received self-government for the first time in many centuries. At the north, Finland and the Baltic States (Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania) had been taken from Russia; south of them was the revived Poland; next came the "Succession States" of Austria-Hungary (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria); and lastly there were the Balkan States, two of which (Serbia, now called Yugoslavia, and Romania) had recently expanded their territory greatly at Austro-Hungarian expense. Except for parts of western Czechoslovakia and Austria, they were almost wholly agrarian states, and their people were illiterate peasants. Everywhere the land problem was acute and, except in Hungary, the large estates were usually broken up and distributed among peasant proprietors. The share
each peasant received was small, and he always wanted more, but he would fight to defend what he had against communism. His other political interests were slight. As the old struggles for independence from Russia or Austria had left a legacy of ardent nationalism, cooperation among these new states of eastern Europe was extremely difficult. The Poles and Magyars were the worst offenders, and it was they who taught the world that the League of Nations might safely be defied. Less rabid leaders sometimes suggested a Danubian union, or a "Green International" (of the agrarian states against Russia's "Red International"), but nothing came of the idea. The peacemakers at Paris had hoped that these new states would become democratic republics, but their exotic parliamentary institutions were soon lost in the confusion, and the various countries of eastern Europe fell into the hands of dictators who lightly dispensed with all political theory, Marxist, anti-Marxist, democratic, or totalitarian. They merely masked their thirst for power behind a superlative patriotism.

MUSSOLINI'S ITALY

On the eve of the First World War Italians frequently expressed themselves as disgusted by the corruption and inefficiency of their government. The rather sorry performance of the Italian armies during the war added shame to their disgust, and when Italy failed to get all that had been hoped for at the peace conference, popular indignation knew no bounds. At the same time Italy, like all the other belligerent countries, faced serious economic problems. Armies were suddenly demobilized, and there were no jobs for discharged soldiers. During 1919 prices averaged 3.5 times the 1913 figure, and the average for 1920 was six times as high. The treasury was so empty that the promised pensions and bonuses could not be paid. Railways and factories were worn down by wartime strain and lack of repairs. Everyone was disillusioned, and everyone wanted something new and different, but no one knew exactly what he wanted.

The socialists were the first to profit by this confusion. In the elections of November, 1919, they won about a third of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies; during the next year they elected the local governments in almost a quarter of the communes; and the membership of socialist labor unions quadrupled. Socialist workers began taking over factories, until in September, 1920, they held several
hundred plants. When the workers learned to their sorrow that they could not operate these factories, they withdrew, but the middle and wealthy classes were badly frightened. Early in 1921, however, the Italian Socialist party split over the question of adhering to the Moscow-dominated Third International and thus lost all chance of establishing a socialist government in Italy.

Such were the conditions out of which Benito Mussolini rose to power. Born in 1883, the son of a blacksmith having socialistic ideas, young Mussolini was educated to be a schoolteacher, but he soon became a socialist agitator and journalist. In 1911 he served a short term in jail because of his opposition to Italy’s “imperialistic” war with Turkey, and in August, 1914, he urged complete neutrality in the First World War. Italy was then an ally of Germany, but in October he began urging that she join Germany’s foes. This change of face caused him to be expelled from the Socialist party and cost him the editorship of Avanti, the socialist newspaper of Milan, but somewhere he found the funds to start an interventionist newspaper, Il Popolo d’Italia. When Italy entered the war, he was drafted and eventually became a corporal, but in 1917 he was discharged after being injured in an accident behind the lines. He resumed the editorship of his paper and did what he could to raise the badly sagging morale of the Italian army and people.

When the war was over, Mussolini announced that Russian Bolshevism had cured him of socialism, yet he continued to urge reforms scarcely to be distinguished from those then being proposed by radical socialists. He surpassed his former comrades in demagoguery, but he differed from them largely in his praise of the recent war and his bellicose language regarding the future. At Milan he began organizing his more tumultuous followers into a “fighting unit” (fascio di combattimento), as others were already doing else-
where. At first these various fascist groups were united largely by their dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs and their fondness for violence, but most fascists were discharged soldiers, and all were nationalists who disliked socialism. Before the end of 1920 they had begun fighting with the socialists in the north Italian cities, much as the partisans of the Montagues and Capulets had fought in the Italy of Shakespeare's tragedies. Each side would hold parades, which the other would attack; there would be a great deal of noise, a certain amount of clubbing, and occasionally a little shooting. Labor halls and socialist newspaper offices would be burned, and prominent members of each party would sometimes be shot from ambush. Individual socialists were captured and dosed freely with castor oil. There are no accurate figures, but it is estimated that during 1921 and 1922 about a thousand persons thus lost their lives, two-thirds of them being socialists or innocent bystanders.

During 1921 the power of the socialists declined rapidly in Italy, and that of the fascist leaders rose in greater proportion. Mussolini organized them as a political party, and after the election of May, 1921, he led a group of thirty-five deputies in the Chamber. At first he shocked many people by the radicalism of his program, but further reflection caused him to tone down his demands. He limited himself to preaching nationalism and anti-socialism, thereby winning the financial support of wealthy people and the active support of many shopkeepers and clerical workers. When the party seemed likely to enjoy political success, it attracted countless adventurers interested only in the spoils of office. Parades, black-shirt uniforms, salutes, oaths, singing, and yelling attracted large numbers of romantic college boys and others who had formerly shown little enthusiasm for having their heads broken in street brawls. During the spring and summer of 1922 fascist gangs drove out the legally elected socialist governments of Bologna, Milan, and other north Italian cities, and in October their convention at Naples attracted almost 100,000 persons. The cry "To Rome" was raised, and though Mussolini returned to Milan, some 50,000 fascists assembled at Civitavecchia and there began their famous "March on Rome." The march was a rowdy affair, not well organized, and the marchers were not well armed, but on October 29 the panic-stricken king asked Mussolini to become prime minister. Mussolini took the next train for Rome, announcing, "Tomorrow Italy will have a government, not a ministry." Assuming of-
fice on the thirtieth, his first official act was to give his astonished lieutenants twenty-four hours to get their Black Shirts out of Rome.

When forming his cabinet, Mussolini reserved two ministries for himself (foreign affairs and the interior, which controlled the police) and he gave three others to fascist colleagues, but he distributed the ten remaining cabinet posts among members of other parties, thus creating an antisolacist coalition. His announced program was moderate, but when addressing the Chamber of Deputies he used more forceful language: he bluntly reminded the deputies that he had ample force to throw them out, but added that he had decided not to do so—just yet. The deputies showed their gratitude by voting, 306 to 116, to accept his program and to make him dictator for one year. As the king had invited Mussolini to form a ministry, and as the Chamber had given it a vote of confidence, the revolution was effected with no formal breach of legality.

As soon as the Fascist Revolution was over, Mussolini set about consolidating his position. His first care was to revise election laws and assure a fascist parliament. For many years the Italian parliamentary system had been severely criticized. As there were many political parties, no one of which could ever command a majority in the Chamber, ministries were necessarily coalitions whose members co-operated in little save dividing the rewards of office. A strong national policy was impossible. Mussolini therefore found wide popular support when he announced that this system must be revised, and a new election law was presently enacted (1923). Under this law each political party drew up a list of candidates for all the seats in the Chamber, and the voters voted for one list; the party which received the most votes—providing it received at least a quarter of all the votes cast—was entitled to two-thirds of all the seats, and the men whose names stood at the top of its list were declared elected; the remaining seats were distributed among the other parties proportionately to their total votes. Elections were then held in April, 1924. The fascists gave great care to the preparation of their national list; their energetic campaign was well financed; and they frequently used violence against their opponents. Almost five million persons voted for the fascist candidates, about one million voted for the socialists, and about one million for all others combined.

When the new parliament assembled a month later, the socialists at once became obstreperous. Their leader, Giacomo Matteotti,
openly charged the fascists with violence and graft, and on June 10 he disappeared. A few days later it was discovered that he had been kidnapped and murdered by fascist gangsters. The affair caused great scandal, and Mussolini was charged with personal complicity, but when his opponents demanded his resignation, he refused it. Thereupon, most of the nonfascist deputies withdrew from parliament, but their absence did not bother the fascists. Two years later the accused murderers were brought to trial, convicted, and given light sentences. Mussolini then expelled the dissident members of parliament, and as the Chamber was made up thereafter of his hand-picked followers, it lost most of its importance. During the next few years individual fanatics tried on several occasions to murder Mussolini, and as each attempt brought fascist reprisals, the opposition was gradually worn down. Mussolini was therefore able to turn his attention to creating a fascist state.

The Fascist System

Mussolini rose to power by denouncing Bolshevism, but in many ways his fascist system fitted the pattern already set by the Russian communists. As each government was of revolutionary origin, and therefore always fearful of counterrevolution, neither of them dared tolerate an organized opposition. The Fascist party was the only one in Italy, just as the Communist party was the only one in Russia. Mussolini was simultaneously leader (*Il Duce*) of the Fascist party and head of the government (*Capo del Governo*) of Italy, and his aggressive personality enabled him to dominate each. Moreover, the Fascist party, like the Communist party in Russia, consisted of a rather small group of ardent and thoroughly trained workers, who were rewarded for their efforts with political appointments. There were less than two million party members in all Italy, and after the fascist system had once been firmly established, almost the only way to enter the party was to graduate into it from one of the fascist youth organizations. At the top of the closely organized party, next to Mussolini himself, stood the Grand Council of Fascism, consisting of about thirty members appointed by *Il Duce*. Most of its members also held seats in the cabinet or other high political posts, and it was they who made the crucial decisions regarding party and national policy. The similarities between this Grand Council and the Russian
Politburo are obvious. At the opposite end of the political ladder were the local fasci, which somewhat resembled the communist cells in Russian villages and factories and enjoyed equally slight power.

In the early days of fascism, Mussolini and his friends were fond of talking about the "corporate state" which they were going to establish. Like the communists, they believed that a voter's economic class was more important than his place of residence, and they announced that the new social and political organization of Italy would be based on labor unions and employers' associations. As early as 1926 a law provided for the organization of thirteen "corporations"—one for employers and one for workers in each of six major lines of economic activity, and one for professional men. All, of course, were to be dominated by Fascist party members. The two corporations in each industry were to bargain collectively and draw up contracts with each other regarding wages and working conditions; special courts were established to settle disputes; strikes and lockouts were forbidden; and the whole system was put under the direction of a cabinet officer called the minister of corporations—Mussolini himself. A year later a second law granted these corporations the privilege of drawing up lists of eight hundred candidates for the Chamber of Deputies; other fascist organizations added two hundred names; and from these thousand nominees the Grand Council of Fascism selected four hundred as the official candidates of the party. During the next few years the system of corporations was much elaborated, and a National Council of Corporations, composed of representatives of the different corporations, was set up to regulate them and to guide industrial development. The system was completed in 1936, when the old Chamber of Deputies was abolished and the National Council put in its place. The economic and political phases of Italian life were thus united, and though the fiction of the private ownership of capital was scrupulously preserved, the actual situation did not differ so widely from that prevailing in Russia as fascist spokesmen liked to pretend.

Meantime the old quarrel with the Catholic Church had been composed by the Lateran Treaty of 1929. Ever since 1870 the popes had claimed that Rome had been lawlessly snatched from them, and they advertised themselves to the world as "prisoners in the Vatican." When Mussolini decided that this annoying situation must be
cleared up, he found Pope Pius XI willing to meet him halfway. The pope recognized the Italian government's legal right to Rome, and the government recognized the Vatican City as an independent and sovereign state under the pope. This tiny state of barely 100 acres includes St. Peter's church, the Vatican (the residence of the pope), and a few other buildings, but it has its own money, its own postal system, its own radio, its own police and police court, and its army of Swiss guards. Other troublesome matters, such as the appointment of bishops, the payment of the clergy, marriage laws, and religious education in the public schools, were usually settled in the pope's favor. Fascist orators continued to fulminate against the church and the clergy; Mussolini did not always keep his promises, and the pope sometimes criticized fascist policies severely; but the old quarrel of church and state became a little less vitriolic.

Since the old Italian army had not melted away so completely as had the Russian army at the end of the war—though a million Italians were listed as deserters—and since there had been no military intervention from abroad to expel the fascists, Italy needed nothing exactly comparable to the Red Army. Even before the march on Rome, however, many high officers in the Italian army had sympathized with fascism; their less ardent colleagues were gradually weeded out; and as Mussolini was lavishly generous to the army, it supported him loyally. Moreover, many of the old fascist "fighting units" were perpetuated as a fascist militia, the "Black Shirts." The fascists also developed an elaborate secret police to spy out political opponents, but after the first few years there was little serious opposition to the fascist regime until the closing years of World War II.

The fascists spared themselves neither trouble nor expense in whipping up popular enthusiasm for their cause. Parades and rallies were held at frequent intervals. From the balcony of his official residence in the Palazzo Venezia, Mussolini would harangue the huge crowds that packed the Piazza di Venezia. (It is said that the king, Victor Emmanuel III, sometimes suggested slyly to friends that this large piazza be beautified as a public park, fenced off, and filled with trees and shrubbery.) Newspapers bogged down in heavy panegyric, and editors usually filled their front pages with fulsome accounts of Mussolini's accomplishments of the day before. The press was also carefully censored to prevent the dissemination of unpleasant news. Schoolteachers were expected to indoctrinate their
pupils with the "party line," and the army performed the same function for recruits during their period of compulsory military service. Mussolini said that fascist Italy was united by a common ideal, and his critics said much the same thing in less flattering phrases.

In spite of all this noise, Mussolini's positive achievements were not great. No one can say whether his "corporate state" was a useful invention or not, for he never really gave it a chance. When the National Council of Corporations replaced the Chamber of Deputies, it was accorded no more power or respect than its predecessor had received. It provided an audience to applaud Mussolini's speeches, just as the Supreme Soviet provided one for Stalin, but its other duties were negligible. Nevertheless, Mussolini's admirers could point to a few positive achievements on his part. He succeeded in stabilizing the lira at 5.25 cents (it had been worth 19.3 cents in 1914), and as early as 1925 he was able to borrow $100 million from the Morgan bank in New York. He broke up the Mafia and Black Hand gangs that had terrorized Sicily and southern Italy for generations. He drained malaria-infested swamps. Public services were more efficiently operated than before: water, gas, and electric plants now gave dependable service, and, as Mussolini's critics jeeringly admitted, Italian railway trains ran according to schedule for the first time in history.

The fascist system carried the seeds of its own destruction. From the moment he began demanding that Italy enter the war against Germany, Mussolini thought and spoke primarily in terms of military conquest. His determination to make Italy a great military power caused him to spend huge sums on the army and navy, and especially on the air force. He urged young men and women to "live dangerously." In order that there might be more Italians to take a correspondingly larger part in world affairs, he made emigration from Italy difficult, and offered national prizes for large families. But the population rose from 35 million in 1911, and 39 million in 1921, to barely 42 million in 1931 and to less than 46 million in 1943. Nevertheless he insistently demanded additional territory for this surplus population. His bellicose shouting greatly hastened the Second World War. But when Mussolini finally got his war, his armies were badly defeated; he was overthrown, murdered, and hung up by his heels for public execration; and fascism became only an unhappy memory for most Italians. Italy had remarkably little to show for the twenty-year dictatorship of her "Sawdust Caesar."
THE GERMAN RECOVERY

Of all the peoples of Europe the Germans were the least prepared for the fate that befell them in November, 1918. At the beginning of the war the general public had confidently expected triumphs as spectacular as those of 1870. When such victories were not immediately forthcoming, people were disappointed, but during the next four years it occurred to no one that Germany might lose the war. Only firmness and endurance were needed to assure victory. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the military gains in France during the spring of 1918 aroused wild hope and enthusiasm. But four months later Germany surrendered and was given crushing armistice terms; Alsace-Lorraine was restored to France; Allied armies poured into the Rhineland unresisted; the kaiser fled and abdicated; a communist state was set up in Munich; and the Social Democrats proclaimed a Republic at Berlin. Bewildered Germans did not know what to do or what to expect, and politicians were just as confused as everyone else.

Before and during the war the Social Democrats had been the leaders of the opposition, and it was they who proclaimed the Republic on November 9. But they lacked administrative experience, for none of their leaders had ever held an important office in the government. Moreover, the party was sharply divided into two factions. The majority, made up of rather mild reformers and resting especially upon the labor unions, was led by Philip Scheidemann and Friedrich Ebert; the radical minority, favoring close collaboration with Moscow, was led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg in Berlin and Kurt Eisner in Munich. These three leaders were assassinated by monarchists early in 1919, but their followers remained active for several years, calling themselves Spartacists after the leader of a slave rebellion in ancient Rome. When elections for a constitutional convention were held in January, 1919, the Social Democrats and a few independent allies won almost half the seats; the Spartacists boycotted the election, and the Nationalists (who favored the old regime) elected barely 10 percent of the delegates; the remaining seats went either to members of the old Catholic Center party or to the new Democratic party. Sitting at Weimar, in central Germany, this assembly named Ebert president of the Republic (February 11) and drew up a constitution for a liberal democratic republic. Weimar had been selected because of its association with the
German intellectual leaders of the age of Goethe and Schiller (see p. 116), and the constitution the assembly produced was a rather idealistic and impractical document, not well suited to the turbulent times in which it appeared. Nevertheless, this Weimar Constitution was adopted (July 31), and Germany lived under it for the next fourteen years.

Germany's major troubles were economic rather than political. There had been almost no fighting on German soil, but here as everywhere else railways and factories had been worn down by continued hard usage, war industries suddenly had to be converted to peacetime needs, and discharged soldiers raised many difficult problems. Germany also had special troubles of her own. The armistice had provided that the blockade of Germany should continue unabated until the final treaty of peace was signed. Necessary raw materials and even food were thus excluded for nine months after the war was over, and the whole population was reduced to the verge of starvation. The peace terms brought other grave difficulties. As Germany's major industries were organized on a national scale, the loss of a few key territories threw the whole economic machine into confusion. The loss of the iron mines of Lorraine to France and of Teschen to Poland was a severe blow to the industry of all Germany. The policies of the victorious Allies complicated the situation further, for the French, fearing a revival of German power, seized every opportunity to make trouble. Thus in March, 1920, when Republican officials sent troops to quell a Spartacist revolt in the Ruhr, the French occupied much of that region as well as Frankfort, more than a hundred miles away. Much more serious interference came three years later. There had been frequent quarrels about German payments for reparations, until the French lost patience and decided to occupy the Ruhr again in order to collect by force. In January, 1923, their troops marched into the valley, seized its mines, and tried to operate them. The Germans replied by passive resistance, and not until September did they consent to resume reparations deliveries.

The gravest problem of all concerned finances, for during the five years following the armistice German money lost all its value. Before the war an American dollar would buy 4.2 German marks; in December, 1918, it would buy 8; a year later, 42; in December, 1920, 70; at the end of 1921, 180; and at the end of 1922 it was worth 7000 marks. When the French invaded the Ruhr, its value quickly rose to 50,000, and at the end of October, 1923, the mark vanished com-
pletely, after being quoted at one trillion to the dollar. Germans often attributed this collapse of the mark to reparations payments, but these payments were only a small part of the story. The trouble began when the imperial government, counting on victory and large indemnities from the defeated foe, failed to levy increased taxes during the war. It borrowed heavily instead, and it printed great quantities of paper money. The Republican politicians, being unable to collect enough taxes to meet their rising expenses, printed more money, prices rose accordingly, and inflation went into a soaring spiral. The final blow fell in 1923 when the government undertook to support the striking miners in the Ruhr. The consequences of this runaway inflation were disastrous to Germany as a whole. It rendered all money worthless and destroyed all “paper values”—bonds, mortgages, notes, life insurance policies, and the like—which could be paid in paper marks. Speculators sometimes became fabulously wealthy, but wages never rose as fast as prices and the workers suffered severely. Most important of all, the industrious and moderately well-to-do lost their life savings. This class has always been the backbone of stable government, and its bankruptcy opened the way for demagogues of every hue.

The financial collapse of Germany had such wide repercussions that European and American businessmen and politicians demanded drastic steps to save their own currencies. An international committee, under the chairmanship of an American banker (Charles G. Dawes), presented a plan for issuing a new German currency on a firm basis, setting reparations payments at a practicable figure, and lending Germany $200 million (April, 1924). As both Germany and France had by this time learned their lessons from the Ruhr, and as international tensions were greatly eased by the Locarno treaties (see p. 674) of October, 1925, conditions in Germany improved noticeably thereafter. With the aid of further large loans from America, German industry was set going once more. In 1928 Germany’s industrial production slightly surpassed that of 1913, her foreign trade again touched prewar figures, new German liners appeared upon the high seas, and reparations payments were made according to schedule. But in all countries these were years of economic prosperity, in which Germany shared along with her former enemies. When the great depression began, late in 1929, Germany suffered along with everybody else, political life again became turbulent, and in 1933 Hitler entered office.
Hitler's Rise to Power

At the time of its creation the Weimar Republic was sometimes pictured as a splendid fulfillment of Germany's liberal and democratic aspirations of 1848. Nothing could have been farther from the truth. There was no republican tradition in Germany, and the Weimar Constitution was accepted merely because nothing better seemed available at the moment. The kaiser's flight to Holland had discredited him and the whole Hohenzollern dynasty, and though a few upper-class families remained loyal to him, most Germans quickly forgot him. They did not forget their traditional desire for a strong national government, however, and nationalist leaders, seeing the Republic's many weaknesses, believed that they could destroy it whenever they wished. These nationalists enjoyed the support of the most powerful sections of German society—the army, the landlords of East Prussia, the powerful industrial magnates, and the veterans' organization known as the Stahlhelm ("Steel Helmet")—but for the time being they were willing to let the Republicans remain in office. They had no desire to be trampled upon themselves by the Allies' commissioners or to incur the popular odium that was sure to descend upon whatever officials accepted and carried out the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles.

From time to time, armed attacks were made upon the Weimar Republic. As early as March, 1920, a certain General Kapp marched his troops into Berlin flying the old imperial banner. The government hastily fled to Stuttgart, but the Berlin workers went on strike, and the Putsch collapsed. The Republic survived, but it had shown everyone its weakness and therefore inspired widespread contempt. When the workers saw that they had defeated Kapp unaided, they launched revolts of their own in Leipzig, Halle, and the Ruhr, which the government suppressed with great vigor, but Kapp and his fellow conspirators went unpunished. The Republican government even allowed the army to punish soldiers who had refused to join the rebellion as their officers ordered. The nationalists continued their agitation, and extremists resorted to political assassination. About four hundred persons were murdered in Bavaria alone in 1921. The most eminent victim of the assassins was Walther Rathenau, an industrialist who had helped Germany greatly during the war but who now tried to carry out the provisions of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles. Moreover, he was a Jew. Before long General Ludendorff was again showing his colossal ineptitude by plotting with the prime minister of Bavaria, Gustav von Kahr. Revolution was proclaimed in a Munich beer hall on November 9, 1923; several persons were killed in street fighting the next day; but the revolt quickly collapsed. Its importance lies principally in the fact that it first introduced to the world a young man named Adolf Hitler.

Adolf Hitler was born in a small Austrian town on April 20, 1889, the son of a petty customs official. At the age of twenty he unsuccess- fully tried to enter an art school, after which he spent four unhappy years in Vienna, earning his livelihood by doing odd jobs and learning the fundamentals of politics by watching the demagogic and Jew-baiting Christian Socialist mayor of Vienna, Dr. Karl Lueger (see p. 535). In 1912 he migrated to Munich, where he worked as a paper hanger and talked politics to anyone who would listen. He greeted the war with enthusiasm, enlisted in the German army, spent four years on the western front, and, like Mussolini, ultimately attained the rank of corporal. After the armistice he threw himself into political life as an extreme nationalist (though he did not bother to become a German citizen until 1931) and in 1920 he founded the National Socialist German Workers’ party, usually known as the “Nazi” party. This party’s “unalterable”—but quickly forgotten—program of twenty-five points showed its “nationalism” by demands for the political union of all Germans and for colonies, and by attacks upon Jews and the Treaty of Versailles, while its “socialism” led to demands for the confiscation of war profits, death for profiteers, the nationalization of trusts, and other equally radical measures. Ludendorff and other nationalists regularly used Hitler as a political spellbinder and rabble rouser, but the “Beer Hall Putsch” of 1923 brought him a jail sentence of five years. He was released, however, after nine months of enforced leisure, during which he wrote his autobiography, Mein Kampf (“My Battle”). Here Hitler developed his political views at tedious length, but this strange book later became the “Nazi Bible.”

While Hitler was in prison, President Ebert’s death was followed by elections held in March and April, 1925. In the final voting the Nationalist candidate, the aged Field Marshal von Hindenburg, received a million votes more than his nearest rival, a Centrist named Wilhelm Marx. A communist won two million votes, but Ludendorff, the Nazi candidate, polled less than 300,000. Hinden-
burg therefore became president, but during his first term of seven years he made no effort to change the republican form of government. The Nationalists were not yet ready to take over, and Hindenburg was content merely to make sure that the Republicans did not entrench themselves too firmly in power. The general prosperity of his first years in office satisfied many people, but the depression gave great opportunities to extremists of every sort. Hitler's power was achieved by exploiting this widespread discontent.

Hitler's imprisonment taught him valuable lessons which he later put to good use. He correctly sized up Ludendorff as a man "devoid of political intelligence," and he learned the futility of a Putsch. As soon as he was released, he and various friends dating from the "Beer Hall" days set to work rebuilding the Nazi party. A war aviator named Göring was second in command, leading the twelve Nazi deputies in the Reichstag after 1928; a doctor of philosophy named Goebbels took charge of party propaganda; a Nuremberg editor named Streicher lashed the mob to fury against Jews; and a former army officer named Röhm organized a Nazi strong-arm battalion known as the Sturmabteilung, "Storm Troopers," or "Brown Shirts." At first these young stalwarts merely maintained order in Nazi meetings and ejected hecklers, but presently they began to engage in street fights, to break up socialist meetings, to mob individual socialists and Jews, and on occasion to terrorize whole communities. By 1930 there were at least 400,000 Storm Troopers in Germany, organized and drilled as a private army. There was also a smaller body of specially picked troopers, known as the Schutzstaffel, commonly called the "S.S.," or "Black Shirts," who supposedly served as Hitler's personal bodyguard. Following the pattern set by communists and fascists, the Nazi party became a closely organized group of trained enthusiasts, with "cells" everywhere. Followers of Hitler were found especially among the lower middle classes, who had suffered greatly during the inflation and had not regained their former standards of living, or among university students, to whom the future then seemed very dark. At first most of them were Bavarians. About 700,000 persons voted for Nazi candidates in 1928, electing twelve deputies as opposed to fourteen elected in 1924, but even this modest success marked a revival from the low years of 1925 and 1926.

The depression aided all extremist parties, of course, for when at its worst it left six million Germans unemployed. At this time, too, the international situation was such that the Nationalists decided
the time had come for major revisions of the Treaty of Versailles. The
election of September, 1930, raised Communist representation in the
Reichstag from 54 to 77 and reduced that of the Socialists from
152 to 143; the Nationalists fell from 78 to 41; but the Nazis rose
from 12 to 107. They thus became the second largest group in the
Chamber, with the Communists third. By exploiting the “Red scare,”
Hitler had secured large contributions from industry, and during the
next few months the Nazis advanced rapidly. President Hinden-
burg’s term in office was to end in 1932, and Hitler—who had only
recently become a German citizen—announced his candidacy for
that high office. Though Hindenburg was reelected by a large major-
ity (March, 1932), the Nazis had been so sure they would win that
they had a strong detachment of Storm Troopers ready to march
on Berlin—in imitation of the fascist march on Rome. When the
results of the voting were announced, these bully boys sadly trudged
home again. Hitler went a bit too far, however, in thus preparing his
triumphant entry into Berlin, for alarmed Nationalists persuaded
Hindenburg to order the Brown Shirts and Black Shirts disbanded.

The next few months were a period of confusion and excitement
throughout Germany. Encouraged by their victory, the Nationalists
induced Hindenburg to name one of their number chancellor, though
he had only slight backing in the Reichstag. To win popular support
they once more turned to Hitler, whom they continued to regard,
quite fatuously, as a mere rabble rouser to be turned on and off
at will. The Storm Troopers were permitted to reappear, and quickly
became more riotous than ever. German industrialists contributed
heavily to Nazi propaganda, and when elections to the Reichstag
were held in July, 1932, the Nazis became the leading party, with
230 deputies, against 133 Socialists, 89 Communists, and 40 Nation-
alists. Hitler then began demanding that he be made chancellor,
which did not fit in at all with the Nationalists’ plans. They therefore
secured a new election in November, at which the Nazis lost two
million popular votes and thirty-four seats in the Reichstag. Many
observers, both in Germany and abroad, believed that Hitlerism was
doomed. Quarrels within the Nationalist party came to Hitler’s aid,
however. The Nationalist chancellor was forced from office, and his
rival (von Papen) persuaded Hindenburg to give the office to Hitler,
with von Papen himself as vice-chancellor (January 30, 1933). It
was widely assumed that von Papen (an avowed monarchist) would
soon force Hitler from office, but Hitler threw von Papen out instead
and became dictator of Germany. The Weimar Republic thus came to an inglorious end.

_The Third Reich_

On entering office Hitler dissolved the Reichstag and held new elections. A few days before voting began, the Reichstag building in Berlin was gutted by a fire, apparently of incendiary origin, for which the Nazis blamed the Communists. Though "anti-Red" hysteria swept Germany, the Nazis won only 288 seats in the new Chamber (44 percent of the total), and their Nationalist allies only 52, while 120 Socialists and 81 Communists were elected. Hitler immediately outlawed the Communists, because of the Reichstag fire, and arrested several Socialists. The obedient Reichstag then passed an "Enabling Act" (March 23) giving him dictatorial powers for four years. As these powers were regularly renewed until the fall of the Nazi regime, the Reichstag then resembled the parliaments of Russia and Italy in having nothing to do but listen to occasional speeches. A year later President Hindenburg died, at the age of eighty-six (August 2, 1934), after which 88 percent of the German people voted all executive power to Hitler. Thereafter he was called _Führer und Reichskanzler_ ("Leader and Chancellor"), in which he resembled Mussolini as _Il Duce_. Hitler commonly spoke of this new government as the Third Reich, or Empire—following the Holy Roman Empire of the Middle Ages and the Hohenzollern Empire, 1871–1918—and he fondly predicted that it would endure for a thousand years.

As long as Hitler was merely a leader of the opposition his task was relatively easy, for no one was enamored of the Weimar Republic, and he could glibly promise all things to all men. Upon becoming chancellor, however, he found it necessary to decide which promises he would keep and, when he had reached a decision, to eliminate persons favoring the programs he had discarded. Necessity thus drove him to the "blood purge" of June 30, 1934, during which about seventy-five persons were killed and many others sent to concentration camps. First came the leaders of the radical Nazis who desired extensive reforms of a socialistic sort and of whom Ernest Röhm was the most eminent. As Röhm had planned to substitute Storm Troopers for the regular army and take supreme command himself, his downfall was a victory for the old army, but the Nationalists suffered equally. Hitler's predecessor as chancellor was murdered,
along with his wife, and von Papen was arrested. Von Kahr, who had "betrayed" the Beer Hall Putsch, was dragged out of retirement and shot. Thereafter Hitler, Göring, and Goebbels were the unquestioned leaders of the Nazi party and, as in Russia and Italy, all other political parties were strictly forbidden.

Nazi propagandists far surpassed their soviet and fascist colleagues, both in imaginativeness and in effectiveness. Nazi meetings, parades, and pageants were arranged with great care and skill, becoming veritable works of art. The rousing Nazi song, the "Horst Wessel Lied" (written by this rather disreputable Storm Trooper, later killed by a Communist), was far more inspiring than anything their rivals could show. The Hitler Jugend ("Hitler Youth") indoctrinated boys and girls with Nazi ideals, just as analogous societies did in other countries, and an organization known as Kraft durch Freude ("Strength through Joy") provided cheap vacations (and indoctrination) for workingmen and their families. In case all this was not enough, the secret police, or Gestapo, was always ready to pounce upon critics of Hitlerism. It inspired terror by making sudden arrests at two or three o'clock in the morning and spiriting its victims away to concentration camps, where they might languish without trial for
months or even for years. Members of the Hitler Jugend were encouraged to collect and report casual remarks of their elders which could lead to such arrests.

After the blood purge was over, Nazi propaganda centered around three or four major ideas. First of all, the Nazis denounced the Treaty of Versailles, or the Diktat of Versailles, as Hitler called it; but everybody in Germany was denouncing the treaty, and the Nazis merely did so more vociferously than most of their rivals. The Nazis were equally eloquent against communism, but as the German Communist party had long since been disbanded and its leaders interned in concentration camps, the Nazis could do little more than fulminate against Bolshevism in general. A third point in their program was anti-Semitism, and the Nazis soon shocked the civilized world by demonstrations such as had not been seen in the West since the Middle Ages. A few Jews were beaten or lynched by mobs or Storm Troopers, but persecution more commonly took the form of a "cold pogrom" to force all Jews from German life. Their activities were strictly limited, and Jews were allowed to leave the country only if they left all their property behind. It was only during the war, however, that the Nazis conceived and attempted to carry out the appalling idea of executing all the Jews they could lay hands on. In 1943 and 1944 they butchered some six million Jews.

Like other popular demagogues, Hitler found it more profitable politically to be against things than for them, but his program had its positive side, which was nationalism. He was for Germany and for the German people. This enthusiasm for Germans inspired his attacks upon the Treaty of Versailles, his loud demands that Germany be granted equality with the other states of the world, and his plans for making her the dominant power in Europe. Long before the war, he openly promised the German people that after he had conquered Russia they all would be rolling in wealth. His enthusiasm for Germans also led him to take an interest in Germans outside the Reich—of whom he had once been one himself. It was part of his avowed program to enlarge the Third Reich to include the Germans of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Baltic States, the Balkans, and of course those of Alsace-Lorraine.

To justify all this, the Nazis put forward their ill-founded doctrines regarding race. Expanding upon the theories of various pamphleteers, Hitler and his associates (notably Alfred Rosenberg, later hanged as a war criminal) grew lyrical about the superior merits
of the Germans. They praised German folk art, folk wisdom, folk justice, and sneered at the intellectuality, rationality, and decadent civilization of other peoples. "We Germans think with our blood!" they declared. Moreover, Germans were proclaimed a "master race." They were therefore encouraged to have large families, and their children were trained for a great destiny. The educational system was radically transformed in order to give this training, and all Germans were subjected to a truly Spartan mode of life in order to toughen them for war and other great achievements. Above all, this theory of race led to the doctrine that the state, being the supreme manifestation of the life of the race, should supervise and direct every phase of activity, and that the individual should devote his life primarily to advancing the interests of his race and his country. The Nazis thus reached their conception of a "totalitarian state." The idea was not new, but they applied it with traditional German thoroughness and efficiency, and before long they had astonished and terrified the world.

Hitler's foreign policy will be discussed in the next chapter (p. 675), and not much need be said of his domestic reforms, many of which avowedly were designed only to tide things over until Germany could assume her deserved place in the world. The government became much more highly centralized than before; the federal states lost most of their autonomy; and, as in Italy and Russia, party officials often were more powerful than those of the government. The Nazis also carried the idea of a "planned economy" to extremes, and they only thinly disguised the fact that they were organizing a war economy. Painful memories of the British blockade, 1914–1919, made them anxious to be as nearly self-sufficient as possible, and they accumulated great reserves of the necessary raw materials which Germany could not produce. The whole industrial system of Germany was coördinated as never before, until the country resembled one huge factory. Labor unions were abolished, strikes were forbidden, and the Nazi "Labor Front" assigned men to their jobs. Unemployment was wiped out. The whole system was financed by forced loans. Everyone was compelled to make heavy sacrifices, but Nazi propagandists aroused such enthusiasm for their cause that there was little grumbling in Germany. As Göring declared in a widely publicized speech, the German people had made their choice, and they would rather have cannon than butter.
THE DEMOCRACIES

THE UNITED STATES—
THE EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES—
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34. THE UNITED STATES

While the states of eastern and central Europe were thus shaken to their foundations by revolutions following the First World War, the democracies of western Europe were undergoing equally important though less violent transformations. The West suffered no bloody and spectacular rebellions comparable to those in the communist and fascist countries, and little attention was given to devising new forms of government, but there were fundamental changes nonetheless. Coming gradually, they were scarcely perceptible at the time, but from the perspective of a quarter of a century we see that they were as significant as those then convulsing eastern Europe. This economic and social revolution went farthest in the United States, where the amazing changes of the prosperous 1920's were completed by a series of reforms effected during the depression years of the 1930's. These two decades saw more rapid changes in the American way of life than any equal period in our history, and they created the new America which took a leading part in the overthrow of the fascist and Nazi governments in the 1940's and became Russia's principal rival for world leadership in the 1950's. We must therefore examine this peaceful American Revolution in some detail.

During 1919 and 1920 many Americans, inspired by the idealism of Woodrow Wilson, had urged that the United States ratify the Treaty of Versailles and enter the League of Nations, but other strong factions were willing to join the League only with drastic reservations, and still others opposed entering it at all. In March, 1920, the Senate voted against entering the League, even with reservations. Wilson then planned to make the election of 1920 a “solemn referendum” on the League, but to no avail. The Republican candidate, W. G. Harding, straddled this issue (and all others) and was overwhelm-
ingly elected president. His election was taken as a victory for the “isolationists,” but it would be more accurate to say that the American people—worn down by the excitement aroused by twenty years of Progressivism, the New Freedom, interventionism, war, and internationalism—voted for what was called “normalcy.” Critics have alleged that by “normalcy” Harding meant the good old days of William McKinley, but more probably he was quite vague in his own mind as to just what that famous word did mean.

Harding was not a great president, and his two and a half years in office were a period of corruption unparalleled in American history. Though there is no evidence of gross dishonesty on Harding’s own part, he allowed himself to be surrounded by unscrupulous politicians whose misdemeanors became a national scandal. One member of his cabinet was sent to prison for accepting a bribe of $100,000; two others were forced to resign; and a number of lesser persons were convicted of graft amounting to millions of dollars. When Harding died suddenly in August, 1923, he was succeeded by the vice-president, Calvin Coolidge. The new president was an honest man who successfully cleaned up the Harding mess, but both by temperament and by political philosophy he was ill prepared to furnish leadership or guidance. As he was reelected in 1924, he occupied the White House for over five and a half years (1923–1929), during which time he simply allowed things to drift. His successor, Herbert Hoover (1929–1933), was a stronger and more energetic man, but the depression began a few months after he took office, and all his plans went wrong. The whole decade of the 1920’s was therefore a period of weak politicians, and leadership in American life fell to other stronger men.

The Triumphs of “Free Enterprise”

The United States, like the other war-waging countries, found it difficult to shift from a war to a peace economy. Prices remained at war levels for a while, but in 1920 they began to fall, bringing on the brief depression of 1921. Prosperity had returned by 1922, however, and the remainder of the decade was the most prosperous period America had ever known. The war emergency had caused American manufacturers to speed up the production of munitions, and by continuing and developing their new skills and techniques they doubled the annual output of American factories during the
1920's. Moreover, the United States differed from Russia and the central European countries in that emphasis was placed primarily on consumer goods. Such basic materials as steel or textiles accounted for a much smaller part of the increased production than did automobiles, radios, telephones, electrical equipment, washing machines, vacuum cleaners, and a thousand and one other gadgets. Great strides forward were made in housing, the erection of public buildings, and road building. Electric power was rapidly superseding steam in factories, and chemistry provided countless new products in popular demand. Manufacturers often grew fabulously rich, of course, but the general public enjoyed the products of their factories. It then became customary to attribute these blessings to the American system of "free enterprise," which has often been contrasted with the government-controlled systems of Russia and Europe.

The industrial progress of the 1920's was characterized especially by a great intensification of "mass production." The idea of using machines to manufacture standardized products in great quantities was not new, but it was now applied with a systematic thoroughness heretofore unknown. Engineers built better machines which made better products more quickly and with less human labor than formerly. When salesmen tried to dispose of these products, they found that they could do so only by developing "mass markets." They therefore set to work creating such markets by advertising on a national scale. Here again the idea was not new, but it was applied with greater skill and wider success than ever before. The arts of the advertising man made tremendous progress during the 1920's, and in later times disillusioned cynics asserted, with some exaggeration, that the prosperity of this fabulous decade rested primarily upon the huckster's ballyhoo. When skillful advertising made people want many things that they could not afford to buy, manufacturers devised and popularized the "installment plan," under which the purchaser got the goods he desired at once and settled the bill later with "a few easy payments." It thus became possible for a relatively poor man to buy a house, an automobile, expensive furniture, an electric refrigerator, an encyclopedia, and a five-foot shelf of the world's great literature, all quite painlessly—or at least, so it was made to seem.

Along with mass production and mass markets came new methods in finance. The investing public had formerly been quite small, and there had been a widespread distrust of "Wall Street," but during
the war the United States sold government bonds (called “Liberty Bonds”) to the value of $21 billion, thus teaching countless Americans a profitable way to invest their savings. After the war these persons began buying the bonds and common stock of great industrial concerns. The number of persons owning stock in the great corporations trebled or quadrupled during the 1920’s, and it has since risen even more rapidly. An average investor owned only a few shares of a company’s stock; he usually was quite content if his dividend checks arrived regularly; he was elated when the dividend rate rose, as it often did during the 1920’s; and he resented any governmental action which threatened, or was said to threaten, to reduce that dividend. The small investor became a strongly class-conscious capitalist and an enthusiastic advocate of free enterprise.

These developments led inevitably to a great concentration of control in industry. The enormous cost of new machines and of gigantic advertising campaigns could be borne only by wealthy concerns, which were likewise the only ones that could afford the scientific and engineering research that had become necessary in a rapidly expanding world. The smaller and less efficient companies were forced out of business unless they merged with larger ones. For example, at least a score of companies were manufacturing automobiles at the beginning of the decade, but before its end 90 percent of America’s cars were made by three colossal concerns—General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler—and the cigarette market was almost monopolized by three or four widely advertised brands. The financial structure of these huge companies encouraged further concentration. As the scattered stockholders, each owning one or a hundred or even a thousand shares (out of several million), could not express themselves effectively—and usually they did not wish to—the directors of the company were selected by large stockholders, who might own not more than 15 or 20 percent of the stock among them. These directors determined the company’s general policies and appointed its managers, and as the same man might be a director of several companies simultaneously, control of the nation’s industry was gradually concentrated in a few hands. The American industrial system was becoming a national system controlled by financiers, rather than by politicians and bureaucrats as in Russia.

Leaders in the new industry also developed new labor policies of major importance. Shortly before America’s entry into the war, Henry Ford began paying a minimum wage of $5 a day, which then
seemed very high. This generosity enabled him to skim off the cream of the labor market, but it also led to the important discovery that if workers had more money they would spend more—some of it for Ford cars. Industrialists were thus brought to realize that starvation wages reflected a short-sighted policy. Good wages were good business, for if industry was to dispose of its products, the purchasing public must be financially able to buy them. Industry therefore consented to higher wages, and "real wages" (wages in terms of what the money would buy) rose about 30 percent between 1919 and 1928. In addition to paying higher wages, employers also experimented with various pension and profit-sharing devices, they encouraged workers to buy stock in the company, they reduced working hours slightly, and they made their factories pleasanter and safer places in which to work. Ford and others often took a highly paternalistic attitude toward their workers, it is true, and their improvements in working conditions were usually inspired by a thirst for higher profits or by a desire to smash the labor unions. In the first of these ambitions they were eminently successful, and in the second they were moderately so. The unions lost about a quarter of their membership during the decade, and after reaching a high point in 1919 the number and importance of strikes diminished rapidly. Over four million men had participated in strikes in 1919, but less than 300,000 did so in 1929. The workers were satisfied because they had more to show for their labor than ever before, and free enterprise seemed to be solving even the labor problem.

Its Political and Social Consequences

Advocates of free enterprise maintained that the state should aid and encourage industry but not control or direct it. From their point of view, Harding and Coolidge were ideal presidents, and Hoover, who had been secretary of commerce under each before he became president, was commonly looked upon as the high priest of free enterprise. While these three presidents were in office the government did much to promote industry. The income tax was reduced, especially in its higher brackets, on the theory that if rich men were not taxed heavily they would invest their extra money in new industry and the whole nation would profit accordingly. Only slight efforts were made to enforce the antitrust laws of prewar years. The Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922 and the Smoot-Hawley Act of
1930 raised import duties to unprecedented heights, thus virtually eliminating all foreign competition. On the other hand, labor leaders and ardent nationalists secured the Immigration Quota Act of 1924, under which the flow of immigrants into the United States was sharply curtailed. By laws such as these, America’s new leaders sought to make their country wholly independent of the outside world, but they soon discovered that in the modern world economic isolationism was more difficult than they had anticipated.

Throughout the nineteenth century the United States had been a debtor nation, owing large sums to Europeans for manufactured goods imported but not yet paid for. During the early years of the war these debts were paid off with munitions, and further huge deliveries were covered by government loans to the Allies, which eventually amounted to about $10 billion. The victorious Allies had hoped at first to collect enough reparations from Germany to repair the damages wrought in their own countries and to repay the American loans besides, but after 1924 it became obvious to everyone that such payments would never be made. When Americans truculently demanded that the war debts be repaid anyhow, Europeans replied by interpreting the initials “U.S.” as “Uncle Shylock,” while Coolidge remarked, with an air of finality, “They hired the money, didn’t they?” The problem was not purely moral and financial. Exactly what were the Allies to hand over in payment for the munitions they had received during the war? They could pay only by sending goods to this country, and Americans were now doing their best to keep foreign goods out. What could be done? Nothing.

Europe’s war debts were only half the story, however. During the prosperous years of the 1920’s American manufacturers were building up a highly profitable export trade, selling their goods abroad but importing little or nothing. Important industrialists even declared that they could not make a profit unless they sold at least 10 percent of their product in foreign countries. But how were these exports to be paid for, if there were to be no imports? To solve this difficulty, American bankers persuaded European and Latin-American countries to borrow heavily in New York and then sold the bonds to American investors. With the proceeds from these sales the banker paid the manufacturer for the goods he had exported. When the foreign governments subsequently repudiated the bonds (as they sometimes did) the American investor found to his sorrow that he had really presented great quantities of American goods to foreign coun-
tries, free, gratis, and for nothing. Moreover, Germany had been an especially heavy borrower, with her total borrowings amounting to considerably more than half the amount she eventually paid in reparations; when Hitler repudiated these debts, American investors sadly discovered that it really was they who had paid Germany’s war bills. The colossal losses caused by these repudiations were, of course, a severe blow to the national economy, and they rendered many Americans more isolationist than ever.

The economic developments of the 1920’s also brought profound changes in American social life. Millions of people moved to the new industrial cities, chief of which was Detroit, while countless others flocked to New York and other metropolitan centers. When leaving their old homes on the farms, or in the small towns, these people left behind them their old ways of life, their old ideas, and perhaps some of their old prejudices. A large segment of society was thus torn from its roots, but everyone expected something new and very much better, and the big cities usually provided it. Life there might not be quite so glamorous and exciting as the advertisements pictured it, yet it had much to offer. Cinemas and radios provided entertainment to fit the tastes of anyone, whether he preferred prize fights or symphony orchestras. Athletic contests drew huge crowds to enormous stadiums, and successful athletes often became rich—for a moment. Thousands of Americans visited Europe every summer, while tens of thousands toured America in their automobiles. College registrations rose to new heights as a college degree came to be regarded as a badge of social distinction, and “college life” became a gay, colorful, and carefree affair. In every field standards of living rose rapidly, and everyone hoped for still better things to come. Eminent persons frequently assured the country that all was well, and even Hoover predicted publicly that everyone would soon be wearing silk stockings and that there would be two cars in every garage—all as the result of the American system of free enterprise.

These changes in American life were accompanied by a great burst of intellectual activity that reached into almost every field but was especially noteworthy in literature, science, and architecture. On the eve of the war American writing had been dominated by saccharine novelists who had little or nothing to say, but now there appeared a group of robust writers with much to say. In conformity with the spirit of the day, these writers often measured contemporary America against their own high standards and found it wanting. Month
after month H. L. Mencken filled the pages of his magazine, *The American Mercury*, with barbed criticisms of American life and the absurd activities of her “booboisie,” and Sinclair Lewis's novels ridiculed boosters, popular revivalists, and other blots on the American scene. Each of these satirists was a severe critic, but the new generation enjoyed them immensely. Other writers “debunked” the puritanical ideals of nineteenth-century America, amidst howls of laughter and applause. Still others attempted more serious discussions of the problems facing America in the new day, some of whom won international fame by their writings. The five Americans who have been awarded the Nobel Prize for literature (Sinclair Lewis, Eugene O’Neill, Pearl Buck, William Faulkner, Ernest Hemingway) all made their reputations during the 1920’s. American scientists too began to attract international attention at this time and to be awarded Nobel Prizes. In music, jazz well expressed one side of contemporary American life, and though not much can be said for the painting and sculpture of the period, American architects achieved remarkable successes. New York was made one of the most beautiful cities in the world, its richer citizens living in gorgeous mansions; and in every American city the better residential sections contained many houses of fine appearance that were far superior to anything heretofore known, except the palaces of the very wealthy. The new college-educated America was becoming cultured and beautiful as well as rich.

*The Depression*

Unfortunately these achievements show only one side of life in the new America, the life of those who were successful in their undertakings. There were many Americans whose lives were not so glamorous. The farmers, for example, were suffering severely from the depressed state of agriculture. They had prospered during the war, when huge amounts of food were being shipped to Europe, but in 1919 these exports ceased, the prices of farm products collapsed, and agriculture never regained its earlier prosperity. Throughout the decade of the 1920’s the American farmer’s “real income” was 10 to 20 percent lower than it had been before the war. There were many reasons for this continued decline of agricultural prices, the chief of which was overproduction. As better agricultural methods and the ever increasing use of farm machinery enabled each farmer to pro-
duce larger crops than before, the product of the nation's farms increased more rapidly than did its markets. Not much food could be exported now, partly because the European countries were making strenuous efforts to become self-sufficient, and partly because American tariff walls restricted all international trade. Moreover, as few farmers possessed the ready cash required to purchase tractors and other necessary equipment, many of them contracted debts from which they could not free themselves as long as their incomes were steadily declining. Before the end of the decade their plight had often become desperate. Moreover, bankrupt farmers dragged the small-town merchants down with them, and in agricultural regions bank failures became common occurrences, even in the "golden twenties."

Another aspect of American life was made lurid by prohibition. The prohibitionist had long been a familiar figure, and in the years just before the war he was making steady headway. National prohi-
bition was introduced as a war measure, but a constitutional amend-
ment and the Volstead Act perpetuated it throughout the "roaring
twenties." America's thirst for strong drink also continued, however,
and on every hand prominent citizens openly disregarded the law.
The bootlegger and the speak-easy became national institutions while
the police stood by, corrupt and helpless. Gangsters profited richly

SPEAK-EASY IN NEW YORK. This photograph illustrates one aspect of the "Roaring
Twenties" in America. (Culver Service)

from this state of affairs, living in gorgeous style, fighting bloody wars
with each other, and staging fantastic funerals for their fallen friends.
It would be absurd to suggest that prohibition was the prime cause
of these disorders. The bootleggers and gangsters were a sign that
the old social order had broken down before a new one was ready
to replace it, and events would have followed much the same course
had prohibition never been tried. Bootleggers were often patronized
by prominent persons whose busy and active lives made them crave
strong stimulants, but the speak-easies were crowded with obscure
persons who were simply lost in the crowd. These psychological mis-
fits resented the general trend of things in the new America, where
they could no longer feel at home, and they expressed their discon-
tent in many ways. When state legislatures prohibited the teaching
of evolution in the public schools (as was sometimes done in the 1920's); when small-town businessmen joined the Ku Klux Klan, paraded the streets wearing hoods and sheets, and ranted against Catholics, Negroes, and Jews; or when "flaming youth" ridiculed and flouted the Volstead Act, they all were frantically though futilely trying to slow down a world that was changing too rapidly for them.

Perhaps the strangest, and certainly the most disastrous, aspect of American life in this fabulous decade was the unprecedented gambling on the stock exchange. Ever since the war large numbers of people had been investing in stocks, but at first they paid cash for what they bought and looked forward only to collecting their quarterly dividends. The ever increasing demand for stocks, and the general prosperity of the mid-twenties, caused these stocks to rise steadily in price, however, and people presently began buying them as speculations, hoping to sell them soon at a profit. Dividends became a matter of secondary importance. Speculation of this sort was encouraged by the practice of buying on "margin," by which the speculator borrowed most of the money he needed, put up the stocks as security, and invested as little as possible of his own money: if the stocks rose in price, he sold them, repaid the loan, and pocketed a handsome profit, but if they went down only a little he was wiped out. This speculative mania was in full swing by 1927, and during the next two years the prices of stock rose to fantastic figures. Favorites were sold for three or four times what their earnings would justify, and thousands of people in all parts of the United States gambled on further rises. Not only individuals but even great industrial corporations invested their surplus funds in the stock market, instead of using them to expand or improve their plants. Such self-deception could not continue forever, and after very little warning the stock market collapsed (October 29, 1929). In the course of a few days the paper value of the stocks quoted on the New York exchange declined by about $30 billion, and within three years these stocks had lost almost 80 percent of their 1929 value.

This stock market crash inaugurated the worst and longest depression in American history, but at first people failed to realize what had happened. Prominent bankers and industrial leaders, as well as President Hoover and members of his cabinet, repeatedly assured the public that there was no occasion for pessimism or alarm. America still had her magnificent industrial plant, her factories were still
in operation, and happy days would soon be here again. These prophets unfortunately forgot that a prosperous economy needs markets as well as factories, and that America’s markets were rapidly deteriorating. In the days of the “Coolidge prosperity” countless persons had believed themselves wealthy and had therefore lived in a style far beyond their real means. They now found to their sorrow that they had really been eating up their capital and that, having only worthless paper to show for their hopes, they could no longer live in the style to which they had grown accustomed. The market for luxuries fell off immediately, and that for more substantial goods soon followed. Sales of automobiles declined rapidly. The building trades, which had once employed five million men, came almost to a standstill. Other industries followed these into the doldrums. Workers were laid off by the thousand, and the loss of their wages depressed the market still further. During the next three years the national income fell to less than half the figure for 1929; industrial wages fell from $11 billion to $4.6 billion; farm income fell from $12.8 billion to less than $5.6 billion; and early in 1933, when the depression was at its worst, at least fifteen million unemployed persons in the United States were looking for work.

America’s new isolationism did not prevent the depression from spreading to Europe. During the mid-twenties enormous loans had been made to foreign banks and governments, but when it became more profitable to speculate on the stock exchange these loans suddenly ceased. American industry therefore lost its foreign markets, which hastened the depression in this country. Moreover, foreigners had speculated in American stocks to an extent that seriously influenced the economic life of their own countries. The Wall Street crash therefore had profound repercussions abroad, especially in countries whose economy was already in a precarious state. Germany and central Europe suffered severely, and as early as May, 1931, a large Austrian bank, the Credit-Anstalt, was forced into bankruptcy. A few months later the Bank of England ceased paying gold for its notes—which heretofore had been regarded as the soundest money in the world. The resulting fluctuations in the value of money was disastrous to the economic life of both Europe and America. In December, 1932, several European countries failed to pay the installments due on their war debts to the United States, thus adding further to the confusion. A few weeks later the country was in a state of panic.
President Hoover's political philosophy made it difficult for him to act energetically to check the depression. Having been trained as an engineer he, like many other people in Europe and America, believed heartily in a "planned economy," but he insisted that the planning be done by industrial leaders and engineers, not by government officials. When secretary of commerce, for example, he had persuaded leading industrialists to draw up "codes of fair practice" which would check unfair competition, but as no one enforced observance of these codes, they had little practical effect. Moreover, Hoover entered the White House at the height of the boom, prepared to preside over an America that enjoyed an unprecedented prosperity: this he might have done very well, had fate been kinder to him and to America. As he believed firmly in the invincibility of free enterprise and America's "rugged individualism," he was reluctant to admit that a serious and protracted depression was possible under the American system. He therefore merely tried to keep the public from becoming panicky, he assured the world that a renewed prosperity was "just around the corner," and he optimistically hoped that the industrialists would soon have their factories in operation once more. As he urged that the armies of unemployed be cared for by private charity, which was quite impossible, the burden of supporting them fell on state and local governments, which were not prepared financially to bear it. When conditions grew more desperate, Hoover's most radical measure was to set up the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (February, 1932), which was allowed to lend $2 billion of public money to banks and railroads threatened with bankruptcy. These measures availed little. The depression continued on its course, and it reached its lowest depths during his last weeks in office.

THE NEW DEAL

Hoover had defeated his Democratic adversary in 1928 with 21 million votes to 15 million, carrying forty of the forty-eight states. The election was confused by several issues, but there can be little doubt that the American people were voting primarily for prosperity, which Hoover advertised as the product of eight years of Republican rule. Minor quarrels centered around prohibition, which Hoover called "an experiment noble in purpose," and the fact that his Democratic opponent, Alfred E. Smith, was a Roman Catholic—the first ever
to run for this high office. When the depression began, barely a year later, Hoover was haunted by his campaign oratory, and having claimed the credit for America’s prosperity he now received the blame for its disasters. The Democrats won control of congress in 1930, and two years later they elected F. D. Roosevelt by nearly 23 million votes to less than 16 million, carrying forty-two states. As Roosevelt was still a rather new figure in American politics, as yet having no large personal following, it may be assumed that several million people were voting primarily against Hoover.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt was born in 1882, to a moderately wealthy New York family. After attending the exclusive Groton School and graduating from Harvard, he studied law at Columbia and practiced for a few years in New York City. In 1905 he married a cousin, Eleanor Roosevelt, the ceremony taking place in the White House, which was then occupied by their distant cousin, Theodore Roosevelt. In 1910 he entered the New York State legislature to represent the district containing his ancestral country estate at Hyde Park. Having been one of Woodrow Wilson’s early champions, he was appointed assistant secretary of the navy in 1913—which office Theodore Roosevelt had once held—and in 1920 he again followed in the steps of his distinguished cousin by running for vice-president, though on the Democratic ticket. The Republicans won the election, of course, and a year later Roosevelt suffered an even greater misfortune. He was stricken with infantile paralysis, which deprived him of the use of both legs and thus apparently brought his political career to a close. Up to this time he had merely been an aristocratic young man anxious to make a political career for himself, but his illness gave him leisure for reading and thought, and he emerged a very different man. By 1928 he had regained his health sufficiently to reenter politics, and he was elected Al Smith’s successor as governor of New York, carrying the state by a neat majority, though Smith lost it to Hoover. During his four years as governor, Roosevelt won a solid reputation as a reformer, and his skillful handling of problems arising from the depression brought him valuable friends among liberal politicians. In 1932 he was the leading presidential candidate in the Democratic party; he was nominated and elected; and he entered office as president on March 4, 1933.

When accepting the Democratic nomination for the presidency, in July, 1932, Roosevelt pledged “a New Deal for the American people,” which phrase later was applied to all the various innovations of the
next eight years. Some parts of this “New Deal” were regarded as purely temporary measures, to set the economic machine going once more; some were largely political, designed to strengthen the Democratic party for future elections; but many were permanent reforms, looking to an extensive reorganization of society. Roosevelt’s unusual skill as a politician enabled him to assume leadership in proposals of the second sort, but the permanent reforms were more commonly devised by the corps of specialists whom he had assembled while governor of New York, and which he greatly expanded during his first months in the presidency. Many of these specialists were university professors of the social sciences, and the group as a whole came to be called the “brain trust.” At that period in our history, the term carried no opprobrium.

Roosevelt’s early policies did not always differ from Hoover’s so widely as the more ardent friends and foes of the New Deal liked to maintain, but they were conceived in quite a different spirit. Both men believed whole-heartedly in the American system of free enterprise, and each sincerely hoped that all Americans might enjoy a high standard of living, but Hoover thought that if the rich were rich enough a part of their wealth would trickle down to the poor, while Roosevelt declared himself a champion of the “forgotten man,” and four years later he deplored the fact that one-third of the nation was still “ill housed, ill clad, ill nourished.” His purpose was to promote the prosperity of all by increasing the well-being of the lower classes.

Hoover’s repeated efforts had failed to convince the American people that all was well, and the decline of the American economy continued steadily. In February, 1933, the country became panicky, runs on banks became so common that several governors closed the banks in their states, and on March 4 all the banks in the country were closed. Such was the frightening situation when Roosevelt entered office. In his inaugural address he boldly declared, however, that “the only thing we have to fear is fear itself,” and he promised that the American people would now have leadership and vigorous action. These few words so restored public confidence that within a few days most of the banks had reopened and prices on the stock exchange had risen about 15 percent. Roosevelt immediately summoned a special session of congress, to meet on March 9, and during the next one hundred days it enacted the series of important laws that later became the foundation of the New Deal.
The new congress was called upon first to deal with the banking crisis. On its very first day it passed an emergency measure, which was amplified by subsequent laws. The federal government guaranteed bank deposits up to $5000; the hoarding of gold was checked; the country was taken off the gold standard; and finally (January, 1934), the gold value of the dollar was reduced to 59 cents in an effort to raise prices. Meantime other laws were bringing relief to the unemployed. The Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) put thousands of young men to work at minor tasks. Two years later the CCC was expanded into the Works Progress Administration (WPA), which eventually employed three and a half million men and paid out over $10 billion in wages, often for economically unproductive tasks (such as raking up leaves) which came to be called "boondoggling." The Public Works Administration (PWA) subsidized the erection of public buildings, housing projects, and the like, to the extent of over $4 billion. The work of Hoover's Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) was continued and expanded, while the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA, June, 1933) attempted to revive business activity by reorganizing industry. Codes of fair practice were drawn up, resembling those made under Hoover ten years before, and the National Recovery Administration (NRA) was set up to enforce them. Another law created the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA), which sought to relieve the agricultural depression by curtailing production, granting subsidies to maintain "parity" prices (parity usually was the average of prices prevailing 1909-1914) for farm products, promoting soil conservation by further subsidies, and enabling farmers to refinance mortgages. When the NIRA and AAA were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1935 and 1936 respectively, the former was abandoned but many features of the latter were perpetuated under new laws.

These various projects were regarded as temporary measures made necessary by the crisis of March, 1933. Some of them were discontinued when conditions improved, but others eventually became permanent parts of the American system. Still other features of the New Deal were intended from the first to be permanent. Their aim was the mitigation of poverty and want—whose abolition Hoover had prematurely announced in 1928. Special attention was given to labor problems and labor unions. Workers were assured the right of collective bargaining; minimum wages were set; and working conditions were improved. The NIRA had set up a National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) with power to enforce collective bargaining, and when this act was declared unconstitutional, the Wagner Act of 1935 established a new board with greater powers. Membership in labor unions trebled during the next five years. Other legislation looked to housing. The PWA subsidized urban housing developments, the Home Owners' Loan Corporation (HOLC) lent heavily on mortgages, and the United States Housing Authority (USHA), organized in 1937, developed an extensive program for slum clearance and the construction of low-cost housing. Most important of all, however, was the Social Security Act of 1935, which provided insurance against unemployment and pensions for old people, widows, and orphans, all to be financed by taxes levied on both employers and employees.

The Tennessee Valley Act of 1933 turned the federal government toward still another form of activity. During the war the government had built a dam across the Tennessee River at Muscle Shoals, Alabama, to generate power for the manufacture of nitrates and explosives. After the war it attempted to sell these installations, but private power companies offered only ridiculously low prices. The property therefore lay idle until 1933. During the "hundred days," congress set up the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and empowered it to build and operate more dams, generate and sell electricity, improve navigation and flood control, plan reforestation, and "advance the economic and social well-being of the people." The management of the TVA was placed in remarkably competent hands, and $500 million was spent during the next few years. Tens of thousands of homes were provided with electricity for the first time, and the whole Tennessee Valley—an area of forty thousand square miles including parts of seven states—began to take on a new appearance. The TVA was bitterly attacked by the private power companies, however, on the ground that it was socialistic, while other critics demanded that the government stay out of business. Friends of TVA replied by pointing out that the private power companies had been compelled to reduce their rates when the public learned how cheaply electricity could be produced, and suggested that, in the future, TVA be used as a "yardstick" for fixing rates to prevent the private companies from gouging the public unreasonably. Some people even insinuated that the reason opponents criticized the TVA so vigorously was that they secretly hoped to buy its extensive properties from the government for a song.
From time to time President Roosevelt explained his policies to the public in "fireside chats" over the radio, and he skillfully aroused popular sympathy in countless other ways. Nevertheless he was subjected to merciless criticism. Hoover’s friends declared that America’s system of free enterprise was being undermined; taxpayers resented the heavy expenditures and were alarmed by the growing national debt; critics spoke of the perils of bureaucracy and socialism; and the more class-conscious of Roosevelt’s wealthy opponents denounced him as a traitor to his class and referred to him as “that man.” At the opposite end of the social spectrum, radical demagogues criticized Roosevelt for not going far enough. A certain Dr. Townsend, of California, won many elderly followers by demanding pensions of $200 a month for all persons over sixty years old; Senator Huey Long, of Louisiana, organized “Share-the-Wealth Clubs,” which promised to make “every man a king,” with a guaranteed family income of $5000 a year; but others limited themselves to promising everyone “Thirty dollars every Thursday” or perhaps “Forty dollars every Friday.” Critics belonging to the former class organized the Liberty League, which contained many former Democrats (including Al Smith) as well as Republicans, and those of the latter sort tried to unite their followers in a new Union party. When Roosevelt ran for a second term in 1936, he pointed to his record, while the Republican candidate proclaimed himself a champion of free enterprise. The Democrats cast almost 28 million votes, the Republicans 16.7 million, and the minor parties slightly over one million. Roosevelt carried every state in the Union except Maine and Vermont, thus establishing a new record.

Though the American people thus expressed their general satisfaction with the Roosevelt administration, the New Deal did not stop the depression. Conditions in 1936 showed a marked improvement upon those prevailing in 1932, but in the summer of 1937 a “recession” began. The symptoms of recovery that had appeared in 1936 were so encouraging that the expenditures of PWA, WPA, and similar agencies had been sharply curtailed, and in the summer of 1937 unemployment rose alarmingly. It never reached the levels of 1932, but expenditures for relief had to be increased drastically. The depression did not really come to an end until war broke out in Europe and war orders came to the aid of American industry. The short-range programs of the New Deal were then discontinued, but others became permanent features of the American economy. No serious
politician has proposed the repeal of Social Security, of the main features of the AAA, of the fundamental parts of the Wagner Act, of the insurance of bank deposits and other financial reforms, or even of the TVA. It has gradually become clear to nearly everyone that such measures strengthen rather than weaken the democratic system of free enterprise.

One further aspect of American policy during the 1930's must be mentioned briefly. At first Roosevelt devoted relatively little thought to foreign affairs. In 1920 he urged that the United States enter the League of Nations, but in March, 1933, he refused to participate in an international monetary conference which might interfere with his domestic financial policy. During his second term in the White House, however, the international situation was rapidly growing more tense and foreign policy required increasing attention. Roosevelt encouraged a "good neighbor" policy with the Latin-American nations, and he began thinking of ways to restrain "aggressors"—presumably Japan, Italy, and Germany. During these same years isolationism, which had been strong in the 1920's, made even more rapid progress in America. The depression was sometimes attributed to American intervention in Europe, and traditional American pacifism became an ally of the new isolationism. People were thoroughly disillusioned regarding America's part in the First World War, and a congressional committee tried to find out why America had intervened. It came to the conclusion—which was not very sound historically—that we were dragged into the war by American munition makers and financiers who feared they might lose the money they had lent to the Allies. On the basis of these findings congress passed a series of Neutrality Acts in 1935, 1936, and 1937, which prohibited loans or the export of munitions to belligerents and forbade American citizens to travel on belligerent ships except at their own risk. The outbreak of war in 1939 therefore found America sharply divided, with President Roosevelt and many others favoring strong action, but with isolationists in great numbers even among influential New Dealers.
35. THE EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES

When war broke out in 1914, England seemed secure in her position as the richest and most prosperous country on earth. She was no longer the "workshop of the world," perhaps, but her coal, steel, and textile industries were unsurpassed in Europe; her merchant marine was the largest in the world; and London was the world's banking center. British manufacturers soon found, however, that they could no longer compete so successfully with others in the postwar world. England's direct losses during the war had been great but not intolerable. There had been no fighting on English soil and the damage from a few Zeppelin raids was negligible; proportionately to her total population, Britain's casualties (about 900,000 men killed and 2,000,000 wounded) were far lower than those of Russia (including the civil war), France, or Germany; her war debt of £8 billion was unprecedented but manageable; and while her shipping had lost heavily to the submarines, her shipbuilders had learned to replace it rapidly. England's postwar troubles were not due to the material losses occasioned by the war but to deeper causes.

England's prewar prosperity had rested upon her world markets, many of which she had lost during the war. While the British were busy fighting, Americans had invaded and captured many of their South American markets, Japanese had done the same in China, and the rich markets of India and other parts of the British Empire suffered severely because of native unrest. The United States and most European countries raised tariff walls to prohibitive heights, thus robbing England of other outlets for her manufactured goods. When the Germans began making reparations payments to France and Belgium, most of what they actually delivered was coal, which re-
duced the market for one of England's chief items of export. Moreover, British workers, having become accustomed to high wages during the war, were reluctant to return to their old standards of living. British manufacturing costs therefore rose greatly and production was delayed by frequent strikes. For a year or two after the armistice, while England itself was being restocked, British industry was prosperous, but after 1921 it suffered from a permanent depression. Before long three million men were unemployed in Britain, and not until 1940 did their number fall below one million. When World War II broke out in 1939, there were thousands of Englishmen, already in their middle thirties, who had never held a job in their lives.

The Liberal party had come into power in England in 1905, and it continued to rule until 1916, when Lloyd George took over with a nationalistic coalition government. Soon after the armistice he ordered new elections, and as he loudly promised to hang the kaiser, to compel Germany to pay the entire cost of the war, and to make England a land fit for heroes to live in, his coalition candidates won three-quarters of the seats in the new parliament. Not until October, 1922, did the coalition collapse. The Conservative Bonar Law (1858–1923) was then prime minister for a few months, after which leadership passed to the rather Coolidge-like Stanley Baldwin (1867–1947). During these postwar years the Labour party had been making rapid
progress, largely at the expense of the Liberals, and in the parliament elected in 1923 it held more seats than they. A year later Baldwin forced another election by proposing a protective tariff. His party lost heavily in consequence, and Labour emerged as the strongest single group—though it did not hold an absolute majority in parliament. The Liberals preferred Labour to the Conservatives, however, and with their support England's first Labour government entered office (January, 1924). The new prime minister, Ramsay MacDonald (1866–1937), was a rather moderate socialist. During his first ministry, which lasted barely nine months, he devoted most of his attention to foreign affairs. For fourteen years thereafter he and Baldwin alternated in office, each holding the highest post three times. Though the Liberal party did not completely disappear, it was slowly being ground to pieces between its rivals.

British statesmen and industrialists realized that if England was to regain her former prosperity she must first regain her former markets and that, to accomplish this, she must produce goods at prices her rivals could not meet. Industrialists therefore anxiously applied the knowledge and skills they had acquired during the war to reduce costs. Small and inefficient factories were closed, equipment was modernized, and whole industries were reorganized by huge combines or corporations. This process of reducing inefficiency and waste was ordinarily called the "rationalization" of industry. English industrialists thus improved their plants and methods greatly during the 1920's, but they sadly discovered that rationalization was not enough. The old markets did not reappear and the old prosperity did not return.

When British leaders realized that they could no longer maintain their traditional trust in laissez faire, they called upon their government for aid. They demanded high tariffs to keep out foreign (mostly American) goods. Though Baldwin lost the election of 1924 on this issue, agitation continued and, as the depression became worse, a series of laws enacted in 1931 and 1932 put an end to free trade. England also went off the gold standard in 1931, reducing the value of the pound sterling from $4.87 to slightly over $3.00. Since prices, as expressed in pounds, did not rise appreciably, foreigners were able to buy cheaply in England, but before long several of England's best customers likewise devalued their currencies, thus restoring the original balance. Diplomacy was used to promote good will and increase trade with foreign countries. It was even alleged that the
Prince of Wales (later King Edward VIII, now the Duke of Windsor) was a sort of traveling salesman de luxe in his restless wanderings about the world. At times the government paid heavy subsidies to essential industries (such as coal), and it prepared elaborate plans for industrial and agricultural development. Even the most staid Conservatives went farther than Hoover in permitting the government to regulate and engage in business, and Labour leaders far surpassed the American New Dealers in preparing a planned economy.

As had so often been the case in previous periods of crisis, Ireland was extremely troublesome during the war and in the postwar years. We have seen (p. 536) that in August, 1914, the Irish Home Rule Bill was about to pass parliament for the third and final time. Ulstermen were preparing to resist the law by force and many southern Irishmen were ready to use violence to secure Home Rule. In September parliament decided to postpone final action on the bill until after the war, but radical southern Irish leaders, unwilling to wait, launched the Easter Rebellion at Dublin in April, 1916. This revolt was quickly crushed, and its leaders hanged, but Ireland remained restless. After the war the Irish radicals, organized in the Sinn Fein society, were no longer satisfied with Home Rule and demanded that the whole of Ireland be made a republic completely independent of England. In the British election of December, 1918, Sinn Feiners won all but one of the southern Irish constituencies, but they refused to take their seats in the British parliament. Assembling in Dublin instead, they declared themselves an Irish Parliament, or Dail Eireann, and proclaimed Ireland a republic. The next day they elected Eamon De Valera its first president (January 21, 1919). More than a year of bloody fighting followed, but at last, in December, 1920, the British parliament passed a Government of Ireland Act which separated Ulster from the rest of Ireland, gave each part its own parliament, and allowed each to be represented in the British parliament. Ulster was satisfied, but the Sinn Feiners rejected the law absolutely. De Valera also rejected offers of "dominion status" (see p. 469), but more moderate leaders accepted the proposal and the Irish Free State was set up in 1922. De Valera became a republican rebel, was imprisoned and released, and eventually consented to take a seat in the Dail (1927), even though this required him to take an oath of allegiance to the British crown. In 1932 he was elected president of the Free State, and six years later he negotiated a treaty with
England by which “Eire” became a completely independent republic. Ulster retained the position accorded it by the act of 1920.

Other parts of the British Empire also gave trouble in the postwar years. There was great unrest in Egypt and India, as we shall see (pp. 693 and 702, and even the self-governing dominions were demanding a new status in the Empire. These four dominions had long enjoyed self-government for domestic affairs (see p. 474), but they could exercise little direct influence in shaping imperial foreign policy. In August, 1914, for example, they simply were notified that they, along with the rest of the Empire, were at war with Germany. They energetically supported the war nonetheless, but afterward they began demanding truer equality. In 1926 an Imperial Conference at London, attended by representatives of Great Britain and all the dominions, declared that Great Britain and the dominions were equal in status, with none subordinate to others, and that they were united only by their common allegiance to the British crown. Five years later the British parliament gave these resolutions the force of law by enacting the Statute of Westminster (1931), which created the “British Commonwealth of Nations.” Each of the dominions thereby became a completely sovereign state, having its own army, navy, and diplomatic corps, and was free to negotiate treaties as it pleased with other states within or outside of the Commonwealth. The citizens of the first member states of this Commonwealth—Great Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa (the Irish Free State refused to accept membership)—were almost all of European descent, but since the Second World War five former British colonies with negligible white populations (India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Ghana, Malaya, see p. 762) have entered the Commonwealth as dominions, and the word “British” has been dropped from its official title.

FRANCE

Of all the countries of western Europe, France and Belgium suffered most from the war. Virtually the whole of Belgium and about one-tenth of France were occupied by German troops for four years. In a strip several miles wide, where the trenches were dug and where most of the fighting took place, the land itself was rendered nearly useless and all improvements were destroyed. The rest of the occupied area suffered great loss of buildings, machinery was carried off to Germany, cattle were slaughtered or driven away, roads and
bridges were destroyed, railways were stripped of their rolling stock. Reconstruction was a long and difficult task that cost billions of dollars. More disastrous than these material losses were the human losses. French casualties amounted to about 1,350,000 dead, 700,000 mutilated, and at least 3,000,000 others less seriously wounded, the majority of whom were young men between the ages of eighteen and thirty. France lost considerably more than half her male population of that age group. As these losses reached into every corner of French society, and as they could not be restored, they go far to explain the hysterical demands for security that arose during the postwar years.

Not only in eastern and central Europe but even in England and the United States the politicians who made and directed the war were soon swept aside and new men, unknown before the war, sat in positions of authority. It might almost be said, indeed, that war casualties were higher among professional politicians than in any other class of society. In France, however, this was not the case, for the men who ruled there during the 1920's were well-known figures long before 1914. They had been brought up during the tragic years following 1870; they had dedicated themselves in youth to restoring France to her old position in the world; they had fought and (as they believed) they had won a war which they attributed entirely to German aggression; and they were determined that such things should never happen to France again. They would make Germany pay the last penny in reparations, and they would make sure that she would never be in a position to resume the war. In 1920 they were already backward-looking old men, but for ten years they remained in power without facing a vigorous young opposition.

The gravest problems facing France after the war concerned reconstruction and finance. In the former field the French were remarkably successful. The occupied provinces were soon rebuilt better than they had been before. The new houses were more sturdily constructed, villages were laid out more conveniently, sanitary conditions were greatly improved, and new factories were equipped with the most modern machines. The return of Alsace-Lorraine greatly strengthened the French steel industry; the coal and chemicals of the Saar were put to good use; and reparations provided free coal, lumber, and other raw materials from Germany. French industrialists even began dreaming of a great European empire of iron and steel to replace the one formerly dominated by the German
Krupps. They invested their war profits in the steel mills of Czechoslovakia and Poland, and they received encouragement and aid from French diplomats, but their grandiose dreams collapsed with the failure of French intervention in the Ruhr. Nevertheless, France continued to be economically prosperous throughout the decade of the 1920’s, and she did not suffer seriously from the depression until 1932, three years after it had engulfed the rest of the Western world.

The French were less successful in handling their financial problems. They did not increase taxation during the war, or for a few years afterward, because they hoped to make the Germans pay for everything. Reconstruction could not wait for German reparations payments, however, and the French government was obliged to advance more than $7 billion for this purpose. The costs of war and reconstruction proved too heavy for French finances, whose state had been none too good before the war. When the invasion of the Ruhr failed to produce large reparations payments, the franc declined alarmingly. Its fall was not so catastrophic as that of the German mark, but by March, 1924, it had fallen from 19.3 cents to 3.5. A large loan from the Morgan bank in New York raised it to about 5.5, but within two years it was worth only 2 cents. Strenuous measures again “saved” the franc, and for ten years after 1926 it was quoted at about 4 cents. This loss of four-fifths of the franc’s value was a disaster to the saving and investing middle class, whose real income declined correspondingly. The rentiers had already suffered severely when the Bolsheviks repudiated tsarist bonds valued at $5 billion, which the French had bought under heavy pressure and for patriotic reasons. The financial ruin of her rentier class by the war and its aftermath was almost as great a disaster for France as the decimation of her young manhood.

France’s elder statesmen, who had ruled France for so long, were in retirement or dead by 1930, but young men of equal ability did not take their places. The old “National Union,” created during the war, was replaced by numerous splinter parties. At the far left stood the Communists, who followed Moscow’s “party line,” and next to them came the Socialists, who were moderate Marxists not in communion with Moscow. At the opposite extreme were several fascist groups, and between the two stood various middle-class parties, the strongest of which called itself the “Parti Radical Socialiste” (i.e., socialistic radicals, not radical socialists) and which often collabor-
ated with the moderate Socialists. As France sank deeper into the depression, the parties of the left attracted new recruits, and in 1936 Léon Blum (1872–1950) became her first Socialist prime minister. His supporters included the Communists, Socialists, and Radicals, united in the “Popular Front.” Blum’s program was not a radical one. Though he asked for a forty-hour week for labor, compulsory arbitration of labor disputes, the nationalization of the Bank of France and of the munitions industry, and the suppression of fascist gangs, he secured none of these measures, and his ministry was marked by great labor unrest and “sit-down strikes”—strikes in which the workers occupied the factories but refused to work. After barely a year in office he was replaced by a succession of Radicals who were not forceful statesmen. All France was tired, and, seeking peace at almost any price, she and the rest of Europe were carried rapidly into war.

France’s tragic losses in the war produced disastrous effects in other lines as well, one of which must be mentioned here by way of conclusion. French culture had enjoyed brilliant expression in the opening years of the twentieth century, and the whole Western world was stimulated by the works of French scientists, scholars, philosophers, literary men, and artists. For a moment it seemed that this high intellectual activity would continue after the war, and during the 1920’s young intellectuals from all parts of Europe and America crowded to Paris seeking and finding intellectual inspiration. It soon became apparent, however, that the intellectual leaders of the postward period were old men who had done their significant work before 1914. They did not train up worthy successors in France. A whole generation of future intellectual leaders had been lost on the Marne or at Verdun or ruined by the financial inflation that followed. The war destroyed the young intellectuals of other countries too, of course, but the decline of France was an especially grievous loss to the intellectual world which she had so recently led.

THE LESSER DEMOCRACIES

Belgium alone among the small states of western Europe was an actual belligerent during the war, and her misfortunes stemmed from the fact that she happened to lie across the easiest road from Germany to France. Most of her territory was occupied by the Germans in the opening weeks of the war, and the greater part of it was still in their hands at the time of the armistice. For four years Belgium
suffered from requisitions, forced labor, and the deportation of her man power to work in German factories. The other small states remained technically neutral, but their neutrality was often disregarded. Their coasts were blockaded; their ships were seized or sunk by mines or submarines; they were cut off from their markets, from necessary raw materials, and even from important sources of food; and the financial cost of guarding their frontiers was great. A few individuals grew rich by profiteering or by trading with the belligerents, but in general these small nations suffered lamentably from the war, and afterward they were among the staunchest supporters of the League of Nations.

Before the war these small countries had been liberal democracies, and after 1920 they advanced further along those lines. Their Social Democratic parties grew strong, and all except Switzerland were ruled by moderate socialist governments for a part of the 1920's and 1930's. These socialists believed firmly in planned economies, but usually they put their trust in coöperative societies rather than in government planning. The Scandinavian countries were especially successful in such coöperation; in the 1930's Sweden attracted wide attention by her middle course between capitalistic individualism and communism. Fascist or National Socialist parties arose in these countries, to be sure, but they found little popular favor. By forbidding party uniforms and other political emblems the governments prevented the rise of Storm Troopers or similar organizations. Nevertheless, Nazi parties continued to exist in all these small democracies, and in 1940 their members welcomed the German armies.

Mention must also be made of Czechoslovakia as the only “Succession State” of central Europe that could properly be called a democracy. The eastern, or Slovak, portion of this country was almost wholly agrarian, but the western, or Czech, part (Bohemia) was highly industrialized. The population of Bohemia was partly Czech (Slavic) and partly Sudeten (German), with the Germans predominating in the border districts and furnishing many industrial leaders, while the Czechs were more numerous in the central parts and among the industrial workers. The Bohemian people were therefore divided linguistically and culturally as well as economically. The first president of the new republic, Thomas Masaryk (1850–1937), and his close associate Eduard Beneš (1884–1948) were men of strong democratic convictions and modeled their new state upon the Third French Republic. Long before the war they had been
ardent Czech nationalists, but they hoped that an independent Czechoslovakia would serve as a bridge between eastern and western Europe. They were doomed to disappointment, for it became a battleground rather than a bridge. As had happened so often in her earlier history, Bohemia was torn asunder by factions supported from the outside, and we shall presently see that these Bohemian troubles threw all Europe into turmoil and were a major factor in bringing on the Second World War.

SPAIN

During these years Spain presented a case by herself. She had lost the last of her colonies in the New World in 1898, and most Spaniards were delighted to be free at last of an empire which had long been a burden rather than an asset. Young intellectuals, sometimes called the "Men of '98," began dreaming great dreams about a new Spain, but the monarchy went on much as before, inefficient, encumbered with nepotism and graft, and governing for the benefit of the landowners, the army, and the church. Then came the First World War, which deeply disturbed Spain in spite of her neutrality. The sudden demand for munitions, manufactured goods, and raw materials stimulated her economic life, created new industries, and attracted thousands of workers to such industrial centers as Barcelona. At the same time, war propagandists from Europe and the United States filled the country with glowing accounts of the idyllic conditions that would prevail everywhere after the war, thereby whetting the Spanish appetite for freedom. But the hysterical excitement of 1919 was followed by the postwar depression; everybody in Spain was discontented; the prime minister was assassinated (March, 1921); and when a native leader in Morocco defeated and massacred a Spanish army of twelve thousand men (July, 1921), matters reached a crisis.

The Men of '98 had been middle-class liberals, republicans, and anticlericals, but after the war persons of all classes began criticizing the government. Workers took up socialism, communism, or anarchistic syndicalism (see p. 532), and after the defeat in Morocco even the army turned against the monarchy. Alfonso XIII, a rather pathetic descendant of the decadent Spanish Bourbons, then decided that a fascist dictatorship could best preserve the monarchy. With his connivance, General Primo de Rivera (1870–1930) seized the
government on September 13, 1923, suspended the Constitution of 1876 (see p. 324), and declared himself dictator. During his early years in office Rivera showed himself to be an honest and patriotic man of high courage, and he effected many desirable reforms. The finances were thoroughly overhauled, the bureaucracy was purged of thousands of sinecures, public works were constructed, the railways were greatly improved, four thousand elementary schools were built, and the war in Morocco was brought to a victorious conclusion. During these years (1923–1927) Rivera was popular with most Spaniards, but criticism arose in 1928 and 1929, and his dictatorship became more tyrannical. Early in 1930 he resigned, sick and discouraged, and six weeks later he died.

When other dictators, sadly lacking in Rivera’s ability, attempted in vain to continue his rule, critics became more outspoken in their demands for a republic. Early in 1931 Alfonso ended the dictatorship and restored the Constitution of 1876, but it was already too late. At municipal elections, held on April 12, Republican candidates were elected in large numbers. Rebels proclaimed a republic the next day, and the king fled to France on April 14. He did not formally abdicate, but presently he was declared guilty of high treason and banished. A constituent assembly, elected early in June, was almost unanimously in favor of a republic, and before the end of the year it had completed its task of giving Spain a democratic government. The new republic had a popularly elected parliament, or Córtes, and a president chosen by indirect election; titles of nobility were abolished; freedom of press, speech, and conscience were guaranteed; the complete separation of church and state was ordered; and education was made free and secular. The republic was established peacefully and without serious bloodshed, but it soon met opposition from persons demanding greater local autonomy and from the Catholic Church.

Though the kings had ruled the whole of Spain ever since 1492, they had never succeeded in eliminating regional differences or overcoming the desire for local autonomy. This desire was especially strong in Catalonia (in the northeastern corner of Spain, around Barcelona), but it appeared in many other places as well. Even before the war, Catalans had been agitating for autonomy (though not for complete independence from Spain) and in 1930 they arranged with Spanish Republicans that the proposed republic should be a federal union. A Catalan Republic was proclaimed at Barcelona on April 13, 1931, and Catalonia was granted the widest autonomy by the Span-
ish constitution of that year. This arrangement aroused strong opposition elsewhere in Spain, however, and when similar autonomy was proposed for other minorities, the proposals were defeated in the assembly.

Problems concerning the relations of church and state were even more troublesome. For many centuries the Catholic Church had enjoyed a highly privileged position in Spain, but while a few Republican leaders were practicing Catholics, the majority were radical anticlericals. On the other hand, the higher clergy were among the first to raise their voices against the new Republic, which resulted in bloody riots as early as May, 1931. The clauses of the constitution dealing with the church were therefore debated with great bitterness and were passed by narrow majorities. All government subsidies to the church were discontinued, and complete freedom of worship and conscience was guaranteed. The Jesuits were to dissolve, and their vast properties were nationalized; other religious orders were allowed to retain only a limited amount of property, and they might not engage in industry, commerce, or education. This last clause aroused especially bitter opposition, with the new president of the Republic and several of his cabinet voting against it.

The founders of the Spanish Republic were moderate liberals, anxious to bring their country liberty and order, but they soon discovered that it is not easy for a revolution to remain liberal. Within a year they were being subjected to violent attacks from extremists at both the left and the right. Communists and syndicalists were especially numerous in Catalonia and northern Spain, and even in 1932 the former launched minor revolts, hoping to set up a communist state. Though these disturbances were easily quelled by the government, they frightened conservative people, but at the same time they caused the government to hasten its program of social and economic reform. Church lands were confiscated and an Agrarian Law, passed in 1932 but never enforced, was designed to break up the huge estates of the nobility by distributing the land among the peasants. Such laws threw the well-to-do classes into a panic. When new elections were held in 1933, the conservatives gained heavily, and a new ministry abandoned reform. During the next two years extremists on both sides were preparing for violence. Rivera's son organized the "Falange" of strong-arm men, resembling Hitler's Storm Troopers, who often took part in riots and murders. The radicals, on the other hand, ordered strikes and declaimed against
fascism. Early in 1936 the liberal Republicans united with the moderate Socialists to form a "Popular Front" against these extremists and began organizing guards for the defense of the Republic. Spain was rapidly rushing into civil war.

A conservative leader, General Sanjurjo, had visited Berlin early in 1936, seeking Hitler's aid in a proposed revolt against the Spanish Republic. Returning to Portugal, he completed his plans but was killed in an airplane accident the day before his revolt was scheduled to start. Leadership of the insurgents then fell to General Francisco Franco (born, 1892), behind whom stood the army, the Falangists, the nobility, the monarchists, the church, and such Spaniards as feared liberalism or communism. From the first Franco received invaluable aid from Italy and Germany. The Loyalists on the other hand, enjoyed the support of the great majority of the Spanish people, received aid from Russia, and were supported by bands of volunteers from the Western democracies. On July 18, 1936, Franco landed in Spain from Morocco bringing with him an army of Spanish and Moroccan troops; and other revolts, carefully planned in advance, broke out in almost every part of Spain. Franco had expected a quick and easy victory, but the Republicans found wide popular support and fought bitterly. Mussolini sent 50,000 troops to Spain while Hitler contributed over 10,000, with airplanes and tanks. Without this aid, Franco could hardly have been victorious. As it
was, the siege of Madrid lasted two years and a half, and a large part of the city was destroyed by German aviators. Other cities fared as badly or worse, and the wanton bombing of Guernica by the Germans shocked the world. When the last Loyalist strongholds, at Madrid and Valencia, surrendered in March, 1939, Franco took over an exhausted Spain. In the course of the fighting at least 700,000 men had been killed in battle; 30,000 had been executed; and 15,000 were killed in air raids. England and France recognized Franco as the lawful ruler of Spain in February; the United States followed suit on April 1; and a week later Franco announced his adherence to the German-Italian anticommunist pact. His reforms were along fascist lines, favoring the church and the nobility, and in 1941 he proclaimed himself dictator.
In conclusion we must cast a quick glance at European diplomacy in the decades separating 1919 from 1939. In each country foreign policy rested, as usual, upon domestic policy, and it therefore reflected the general conditions of the time. For the first five years of this period statesmen were excitedly concerned with postwar problems at home, with national security, and with reparations. After the failure of the French invasion of the Ruhr (1923) tension relaxed, and for the next five years it seemed that at last Europe was on the road to pacification. The depression and the advent of Hitler changed everything, however, and after half a dozen crises, each more severe than those before it, Europe plunged into the Second World War in 1939.

In the closing year of World War I millions of people had followed Woodrow Wilson in believing that a League of Nations would be the most practical means of preventing new wars. At Wilson's insistence the Covenant of the League was made an integral part of the Treaty of Versailles but, to the dismay of many Europeans, the United States refused to ratify the treaty or to join the League. European friends of the League persevered, and in due time it was ready for business at Geneva, Switzerland. Major and minor dictators disregarded it, or even flouted it openly, yet its accomplishments were impressive. It peacefully settled several disputes between small states; its Labor Office collected information and made serious efforts to improve the status of labor; other bureaus fostered international cooperation in many fields; and the World Court, sitting at The Hague, in Holland, decided questions of international law. In
1926 and 1927 it seemed that the League, if given time enough, might yet become a powerful and beneficent force in international affairs.

Clemenceau and the French had never put great trust in the League, however, and in order to make assurance doubly sure they induced Wilson and Lloyd George to promise an old-fashioned Triple Alliance against Germany. When the American Senate refused to ratify this treaty, and the English dropped the matter, the alarmed French reverted to their prewar diplomatic pattern and sought allies against Germany in eastern Europe. As early as 1921 they concluded an alliance with the new Polish Republic, and three years later they entered into a similar alliance with Czechoslovakia. The Czechs had already joined with Yugoslavia and Romania, and the two latter with each other, in the “Little Entente” (1921); and Masaryk, following his idea of making Czechoslovakia a bridge between East and West, gladly joined France (1924). Two years later France negotiated separate alliances with Romania and Yugoslavia, thus raising the number of her eastern European “satellites” to four, and when Hitler began disturbing the peace of Europe, the French and the Czechs completed the system by concluding alliances with Soviet Russia (1935). As Hitler presently allied himself with Mussolini, the diplomatic face of Europe again resembled that prevailing in the opening years of the twentieth century.

The other great problem of the postwar years concerned reparations. The English soon learned that the receipt of reparations was a dubious blessing and began favoring leniency toward Germany, but the French and Belgians insisted upon enforcing the Treaty of Versailles to the letter until their occupation of the Ruhr (1923) proved to them that violence was not the way to produce reparations. A committee of bankers, headed by the American Charles G. Dawes, then drew up an elaborate plan which was accepted in July, 1924, and went into effect two months later. This “Dawes Plan” provided for the evacuation of the Ruhr, for the reorganization of German finances, and for future payments of reparations. The total amount to be paid remained the same, but the payment for the next year was set at only $250 million, while Germany was to receive a foreign loan of $200 million. Payments were to increase year by year thereafter until they reached a maximum of $625 million after five years. The Dawes Plan was notably successful, and Germany made her payments as they fell due. In 1929 another committee, headed by an American lawyer, Owen D. Young, drew up a new plan which was
presently accepted. Germany's annual payments were reduced to $425 million, the last of which would fall due in 1988. The depression upset the "Young Plan," however, and in 1932 a conference at Lausanne reduced the total amount yet to be paid to $750 million. When Hitler took office a few months later he announced that Germany would pay no more, and at about the same time the Allies stopped payments on their war debts to the United States.

The evacuation of the Ruhr, in consequence of the Dawes Plan, awakened a more conciliatory spirit throughout Europe. By this time Ramsay MacDonald had become England's first socialist prime minister, and the French failure in the Ruhr brought about the fall of the aggressive Poincaré, who was followed by more liberal French statesmen (June, 1924). Each of these countries then recognized the Bolsheviks as the lawful rulers of Russia (1924) and began seeking a stable settlement with Germany. After months of negotiation the diplomats of seven powers assembled at the Swiss village of Locarno (October, 1925), where they signed several important treaties. A five-power treaty—signed by Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy—guaranteed the western boundaries of Germany as fixed by the Treaty of Versailles: Germany thus acquiesced in the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and demilitarization to a line fifty kilometers east of the Rhine. By other treaties with France, Belgium, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, Germany agreed to settle all disputes by arbitration: she thus agreed not to attempt to alter her eastern frontiers by force though she retained the right to do so by peaceful negotiation. France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia then guaranteed each other's frontiers with Germany. And finally, it was agreed that Germany should enter the League of Nations and receive a permanent seat in its Council as a great power. These treaties marked a new period in the postwar history of Europe. For the first time since 1914 diplomats of the enemy powers had met and negotiated as equals, and the new "spirit of Locarno" convinced many people that at last the war was over and the way prepared for peace.

This dream of a peaceful world was rudely shattered by the depression and Hitler's rise to power in Germany. The statesmen of western Europe were somewhat perturbed when a man with Hitler's record seized power, but at the moment they were so deeply engaged in combating the depression that they could do nothing. They found it difficult to believe that Hitler really meant what he was saying; they hoped that the responsibilities of office would cool his belli-
cose ardor; and as he directed most of his shouting against communists, he sometimes found a rather sympathetic audience in the democracies. Moreover, Germany had once been England’s best customer, and many Englishmen were now anxious to see her prosperous enough to resume that position. There were also many people, especially in England, who sincerely believed that Germany had been treated unfairly in 1919. They were now willing to let her hold an honorable place among the great powers once more, and even to have all Europeans of German nationality enter Hitler’s “Third Reich.” The statesmen of Europe therefore hesitated to bear down on Hitler, and for several years they followed a policy of “appeasement,” letting Hitler have whatever he demanded in the fond hope that each of his demands would be the last.

By aggressively exploiting this background Hitler soon repudiated the “spirit of Locarno.” Before he had been in office a year he withdrew Germany from the League of Nations (1933). In the following summer he made a serious effort to establish a Nazi government in Austria, but when Mussolini mobilized troops against him, he resisted. A few months later, the League conducted its promised plebiscite in the Saar Valley, and as more than 90 percent of the people voted for reunion with Germany, Hitler was allowed to annex this rich industrial region (March, 1935). Two weeks later he publicly denounced the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles and began rearming Germany, and in June of that year he announced a treaty with England permitting him to build a navy 35 percent as large as hers. In March, 1936, he formally denounced the Locarno pacts and marched troops into the demilitarized Rhine provinces. Meanwhile Mussolini’s attack upon Ethiopia (October, 1935) had caused him to be declared an aggressor by the League of Nations, and Hitler seized the opportunity to grasp his bloody hand. In October, 1936, he announced the “Rome-Berlin Axis,” and soon these two allies were joined by Japan in what purported to be an anticomunist pact. It actually was a union of the three powers most dissatisfied with the Treaty of Versailles, which they were determined to destroy.

The League of Nations attempted to restrain Mussolini during his war with Ethiopia by imposing “sanctions”—that is, by preventing him from importing arms or various raw materials—but he successfully defied it, and eventually he annexed the country (May, 1936). The lesser states favored strong action by the League, but England and France seemed to be more interested in not pushing
Mussolini too far than they were in saving Ethiopia. The League therefore stood discredited, and when civil war in Spain followed closely upon the Ethiopian affair, it again showed itself to be powerless. Germany and Italy openly aided Franco, the Russians aided the Loyalists, and France and England failed to prevent intervention. These two wars divided Europe into fascist and antifascist groups, and in each case the fascists won.

Hitler's rearmament progressed so rapidly during 1936 and 1937 that early in 1938 he was ready to risk a more important step. After Nazi agents in Austria had stirred up serious disturbances which the weak republican government was unable to quell, he suddenly presented an ultimatum to that tiny republic, demanding the immediate resignation of its chancellor (March 11). This minister (Schuschnigg) acquiesced, and was succeeded by an Austrian Nazi. German troops met no resistance when they occupied Austria the next day, and a month later the people of Austria voted almost unanimously for union with Germany. Hitler then turned his attention to Czechoslovakia, encouraging the Sudeten Germans to demand autonomy or annexation by Germany.

The annexation of Austria, followed by open threats against Czechoslovakia, aroused the Western democracies to stronger action. Czechoslovakia was the keystone of France's "Little Entente," and after the annexation of Austria, Bohemia was almost surrounded by Germany. France and England therefore protested strongly, even making a few warlike gestures, but at the same time they exerted pressure upon the Czech government to force concessions to the Sudeten leaders and to Hitler. The British prime minister (Neville Chamberlain) and the French premier (Edouard Daladier) flew to Germany twice to negotiate with Hitler, and at last a treaty was signed at Munich (September 29, 1938) granting Hitler what he demanded. Czechoslovakia lost a third of her population and territory, including all her fortifications against Germany, and other parts of her territory were given to Poland and Hungary by way of "compensation." Nevertheless, on his return to London after signing the Munich pact, Chamberlain declared to the cheering crowd, "I bring peace in our time."

This Munich pact marked the climax and the end of appeasement. Hitler had given Chamberlain to understand that, as the Sudetens were the only Germans not yet in the Reich, their annexation would complete the Nazi program of "liberation" and conclude the crises
that had been upsetting Europe for six years. Chamberlain soon learned, however, that he had been deceived. Within six months Hitler proclaimed a German protectorate over the two remaining Czech provinces and also over the "independent" Republic of Slovakia (March 16–18, 1939). Three days later he annexed Memel, an autonomous German city on the Baltic, which was Lithuania’s outlet to the sea (March 21), and he began clamoring for Danzig, a similar port which was Poland’s principal outlet to the Baltic. Disillusioned by these acts, Chamberlain announced that England and France would guarantee Poland against German attack (March 31). Mussolini took advantage of the excitement to bombard and annex Albania (April 7), and Hitler sorrowfully complained that, in spite of all his labors for peace, England and France were still trying to encircle Germany with enemies. He therefore signed a formal military alliance with Italy (May 22), after which war fever rose rapidly throughout Europe.

Hitler still had one more task to perform, however, before he could safely defy Europe. He had declared repeatedly, in Mein Kampf and elsewhere, that Germany’s great mistake in 1914 had been that she allowed herself to be dragged into a war in which she fought on two fronts simultaneously. He did not propose to repeat this error. At times, therefore, he considered joining with the Western powers in a great crusade against Russia, but Munich put such a program out of the question. On the other hand, Hitler and Stalin had long been filling the world with propaganda in which each declared himself to be humanity’s sole hope against the other’s tyranny and bestiality. Nevertheless, Stalin now sought Hitler’s friendship, and his advances were graciously received. Russia had entered into alliances with France and Czechoslovakia in 1935, and at the time of the Munich conference (to which he was not invited) Stalin expressed himself as willing to fight against Germany. The weakness and indecision of England and France frightened him, and he strongly suspected that their next step in the appeasement of Germany would be to give Hitler a free hand against Russia, if they did not actually join the anticommunist crusade. During the spring of 1939 England and France seriously tried to improve their relations with Russia, but to no avail. Stalin cautiously opened negotiations with Hitler in May, and on August 23 the two dictators astounded the world by announcing that they had signed a nonaggression pact with each other. The published version of the treaty mentioned only

The Nazi-Soviet pact
their promises not to fight each other, but the pact actually contained other major provisions. It has since been disclosed that the two powers secretly arranged to partition Poland and that Germany was to have Lithuania while Russia took Latvia, Estonia, Finland, and a large slice of Romania. As soon as his eastern front was thus assured, Hitler announced to the world that at last his patience was exhausted and that he could tolerate Polish insolence no longer. His armies entered Poland on September 1, 1939, after which England and France declared war. Before we take up the story of the fighting, however, we must turn our attention to Asia, whose history during the 1920's and 1930's is, perhaps, even more significant than that of Europe.
THE NEW ASIA

ASIA’S REACTION TO EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION—
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37. ASIA'S REACTION TO EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION

While Europe and America were thus being transformed by a new Industrial Revolution and the aftermath of the First World War, and while communists, fascists, and New Dealers were preaching their respective ideologies, Asia was undergoing changes that were even more fundamental and far more momentous. We have already traced the expansion of Europe's colonial empires over the greater part of the world, and we have seen that the different peoples of Asia stood in varying relations to European powers. At the end of the nineteenth century Japan had adopted many European ways, especially in arms and industry, she was praised for her modernism, and she was soon to be granted a place among the world's great powers. China, Siam, Afghanistan, Persia, and Turkey (as well as the tiny, remote, and valueless Nepal and Bhutan, perched high in the Himalayas) were still independent nations, but they were weak and defenseless, and their continued existence depended largely upon the rivalries of Europe: their freedom seemed unlikely to continue long into the twentieth century. The rest of Asia had fallen into the clutches of the Western powers, with England enjoying the lion's share—India, Burma, Malaya, Singapore, Hong Kong—but France had occupied Indochina, Holland held most of the Malay Archipelago, and the United States had recently acquired the Philippines. Russia was a case by herself, for her huge possessions in Siberia and Turkestan included the only parts of Asia that were open to settlement by white men: their sparse native populations were on a low level of civilization and, about 1890, thousands of Russians began migrating eastward across the Urals to settle in these new lands.
Europeans had introduced a few features of their civilization into Asia, bringing profound changes politically, socially, and intellectually, but the continent was also being shaken by forces which cannot be attributed to Europe. In the first place, the population of Asia was increasing rapidly. Reliable statistics do not exist, but the best available figures indicate that the continent had a population of roughly 330 million in 1650, of 480 million in 1750, of 750 million in 1850, and of about 1200 million in 1950. This growth was proportionately less than that of Europe during the same three centuries (100 million to 540 million), but Asia had undergone no Industrial Revolution to provide new employment for workers and she imported no food from the newly opened prairies and pampas of the Americas. Her increased population was made possible only by the slowly rising skill of her farmers and more especially by the reduction of a large part of her population to "coolie conditions."

In Asia, as in Europe, the surplus population drifted to the cities. Since village and family have always been more effective in protecting their members in Asia than in Europe or America, this uprooted proletariat was quite defenseless against unscrupulous exploiters. European capitalists sometimes built factories in Asia, hoping to profit by low wages and the absence of labor unions, but such enterprises were not conspicuously successful. The worst exploiters of oriental labor were other Orientals, some of whom had acquired a veneer of Western culture. Hard and conscienceless, these men drove their workers in ways unparalleled in England in the darkest days of the early Industrial Revolution. Some Orientals became rich in this fashions, others acquired even greater wealth through commerce, land speculation, or lucrative political positions, and Asia came to be characterized by great extremes of poverty and wealth. Standards of living probably differed more widely there than they did in contemporary Europe or America.

In the early period of European expansion, Asiatics of all sorts, being proud of their respective civilizations, haughtily believed that they had nothing to learn from "the barbarians of the West." The first to abandon this view were the Japanese, who, during the 1870's and 1880's, sent able young men to the West to ferret out the secrets of Europe's military and industrial superiority. Leaders in other countries presently followed suit, and in the opening years of the twentieth century the universities of Europe and America were widely attended by Chinese, Indian, Arab, and Turkish students. At
the same time most Asiatic countries were improving their own educational facilities and thus creating a new educated class that was familiar with the science and technology of the West. But when Asiatics learned English and other European languages, they were exposed to Western books on political, economic, and social questions; and when they looked at their own countries in the light of Western democratic idealism, they often were dissatisfied with what they saw. Asia thus developed a highly educated class of persons who were somewhat familiar with European conditions and who demanded extensive changes at home.

The impact of Western ideas upon the Orient was felt in quite different ways by less-educated persons. A larger reading public made possible cheaper and more plentiful newspapers, magazines, and books in Asiatic languages, and these publications often surpassed their Western rivals in luridness and sensationalism. Christian missionaries added to the confusion, for their schools taught Western ideas of liberty and democracy, thus tending to undermine the existing social order in Asia. Sometimes converts to Christianity became noble and high-minded idealists—the Chinese leader Sun Yat-sen may be taken as a fine example—and countless other oriental Christians became praiseworthy citizens, but some converts showed less admirable qualities. Perhaps they had been only half-converted when, finding that conversion caused them to be ostracized socially by their former friends and neighbors (as was very often the case), they abandoned their new religion as readily as they had the old, and thereafter lived as best they could by their own wits. Many a young man joyously learned from Europeans—usually at second or third hand—that the wisdom of his ancestors was just malarkey, and then rushed off to fill his empty head with new varieties of that ancient but pleasing intellectual commodity. The Taiping Rebellion in mid-century China (see p. 492) provided an early illustration of the deplorable effects of this half-conversion.

All Asia was therefore undergoing great social and intellectual upheavals in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and as these changes and the ensuing distress were most clearly visible in the cities, where European influence was most powerful and most obvious, Asiatics listened eagerly when all their woes were attributed to European colonialism. Fantastic stories were told and believed about the wealth which Europeans had wrung from long-suffering Asia. Moreover, the fundamental social and intellectual changes of
the time inevitably weakened the hold of the old religions on the people, and native religious leaders often blamed the evils of the day on irreligion and the Christian missionaries. Anti-European feeling rose rapidly, and from time to time it expressed itself in violent demonstrations, of which the bloodiest was the Boxer Rebellion in China (1900, see p. 495).

The anti-European demonstrations were repressed with such extreme vigor by the Western powers that intelligent Orientals gave up in despair. During the next twenty-five years, however, a series of spectacular events gave new hope to the Orient. In the first place, Japanese victories over the Russians in 1904–1905 destroyed the myth of European invincibility. The news quickly spread to every village in Asia that the white man had been defeated at his own game, and that the oppressed peoples everywhere might therefore take heart once more. Ten years later came the First World War, during which the Japanese drove the Germans from the Shantung peninsula in China. In the last years of the war thousands of Orientals were taken to Europe as laborers. Though they were never used as soldiers against the Germans, or even allowed near the front, they saw the weakness of Europe at first hand. Then came President Wilson’s Fourteen Points, attacking colonialism and promising a new world order. Throughout Asia men listened to these promises with rapture. And lastly the Russian communists actively spread propaganda depicting themselves as champions of the colonial peoples against their oppressors. Asia began to dream of equality with Europe, and on every hand the cry went up, “Asia for the Asiatics!” Let us now trace the course of events in the Orient during the first half of the twentieth century, beginning in Turkey and the Near East, passing thence to India, and concluding with the collapse of China and the Japanese intervention there.

THE NEAR EAST

The Near East is the region surrounding the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea. In the opening years of the twentieth century it made up the Turkish Empire, and in it were to be observed most of the forces working for and against European imperialism.¹ Here were peoples whose Moslem culture differed markedly from that

¹ For the earlier history of Turkey, see Vol. One, pp. 341–343, and above, pp. 431–434.
prevailing in Europe and who often suspected Europeans of harboring nefarious designs against them. Their fears may have been exaggerated, yet it is true that the Europeans could not leave the Near East alone. In the first place, it occupied a strategic place on the map, separating East from West. After the opening of the Suez Canal (1869), England’s “life line” to India ran through this center of the world, and as it was essential that the line be kept open, she could not disregard the Near East. Early in the twentieth century, when the Germans started developing Turkey by building a railway from Constantinople to Baghdad, Englishmen quickly saw their Indian empire endangered. At the same time, Russia continued to desire control over Constantinople and the Straits, hoping thus to secure an exit from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Secondly, the rather backward industrial state of the Near East, and its lack of financial capital, tempted Europeans to invest there, but political conditions rendered such investments hazardous and thus led to political involvements. Moreover, the Near East contained the ancient religious centers of Islam, and as England, France, and Russia each ruled millions of Moslem subjects (the English in India, the French in Algeria and Morocco), they dared not offend Moslem leaders or disregard what was happening throughout the Islamic world. The situation became even more complicated when it was discovered, early in the twentieth century, that the Near East contains some of the richest oil fields in the world. Europe could not ignore the source of the oil on which her industries and even her warmaking power might come to depend. And finally, the political collapse of the Turkish Empire, during the First World War, created a momentary state of anarchy through most of the Near East, and Europe was sucked into this “power vacuum” whether she wanted to be or not.

The Turkish Empire had attained its greatest power and size in the days of Suleiman the Magnificent (1520–1566). From his capital at Constantinople this famous sultan ruled European territories which included the whole Balkan Peninsula, most of Hungary, and southern Russia; in Asia he ruled Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, and Arabia; and in Africa he held Egypt and the whole Mediterranean coast to the Atlantic. No important additions were made to the Empire after his time, and though the Turks were able to besiege Vienna as late as 1683, their decline had already begun and their provinces soon began to melt away. Russia and Hungary were lost during the eighteenth century; the Christians of the Balkans won
their independence in the nineteenth; Egypt became a virtually independent state under an Albanian adventurer, Mehemet Ali (1805-1848), and his descendants, who were recognized as viceroys (khedives after 1867), and after 1883 it was governed by the British; north Africa fell to native rulers, and later to France; and Libya was conquered by the Italians in 1912. In 1914 the sultan ruled only a tiny corner of Europe around Constantinople and his Asiatic inheritance. For many years the diplomats had hopefully referred to Turkey as "the sick man of Europe," but as they could not agree upon a partition of the sultan's territories, they allowed him to continue ruling what was left of the once-mighty Turkish Empire.

During this long period of decline many attempts had been made to reform the Turkish system. In most cases the reforming sultans merely tried to Europeanize their armies and administrations—an enterprise in which they were not conspicuously successful—but at times they also attempted to increase their prestige throughout the Moslem world. Though their efforts in this direction bore little fruit at first, they eventually became rather significant. The ruler of Turkey was called a "sultan," or "one having authority"—a word not very different in meaning from our word "sovereign"—and there were many sultans ruling independently in different parts of the Moslem world. The sultan of Turkey also called himself "caliph," which was a religious title. Being regarded as the successors of Mohammed, the early caliphs had been the religious leaders of all Moslems, but after the death of the last Abbasid caliph (1258) the office lost most of its prestige. Moslem lawyers declared that anyone who enforced Islamic law might call himself a caliph, and that there might therefore be several caliphs at once (see Vol. One, p. 343). At first the Turkish sultans took the title in this broader sense, but later they tried to revive its old religious significance. After an unsuccessful war with Russia, the sultan was forced to surrender large territories, but the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji (1774) provided that Moslems in this region (of whom there were many) might continue to recognize him as caliph. Exercising spiritual leadership in a land where he held no political power, the sultan thus came to hold a position resembling that of the pope in Roman Catholic countries. Moslems outside the Turkish Empire (in Persia, India, Indonesia, and elsewhere) were unwilling to allow him this new standing, but the last important sultan, Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909), was still trying to have his caliphship recognized throughout the Moslem world.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Islam had fallen into a rather moribund condition, but in the nineteenth Moslems began showing new strength, both intellectually and in religion. The first spectacular triumph of this Islamic revival came when a puritanical sect from central Arabia, known as the Wahabis, captured and “purified” the Holy City of Mecca (1806). They were defeated and expelled a few years later by Mehemet Ali of Egypt (1818), but the sect continued strong in Arabia, and a general religious revival inspired all Islam. Some reformers concerned themselves with local conditions or strictly Islamic problems (denouncing the worship of Islamic saints, for example), but others could not avoid facing questions raised by the West. Some rejected all that was Western, and fanatical Moslems attempted armed resistance, as in the Sepoy rebellion in India (1857), the native revolt in Egypt (1882), and the war of the Mahdi’s followers in the Sudan (1885–1898). Others tried intellectual attacks, writing books to defend Islam or to disprove Christianity. Further evidence of the Islamic revival may be seen in the “Moslem brotherhoods” organized by zealous persons for religious purposes, and in the remarkable successes enjoyed by Moslem missionaries, especially among the pagans of central Africa.

Along with this new enthusiasm for the Islamic religion came the political movement known as Pan-Islamism, which urged the union of all Moslems against the West. Its founder and first leader was an Afghan, Jamal al-Din (1838–1897), whose ideas were widely accepted in the early years of the twentieth century by Moslems everywhere from Morocco to Java. The sultan Abdul Hamid II incorporated Pan-Islamic ideals into his political program, and English administrators in India began to worry about the strength of the new movement. Abdul Hamid was not the man to lead such a movement, however, and he could not render it politically powerful. When his successor proclaimed a “holy war” against the Allies in 1914, only a few Moslems rallied to his cause, even among his own subjects.

The New Turkey

Meantime nationalistic sentiment on the European pattern was spreading through the Orient and was especially powerful in the Turkish Empire. It appeared first among the Christian peoples of the Balkans, where several states had achieved their national inde-
pendence during the nineteenth century (see p. 432), and in the opening years of the twentieth century it won many Asiatic subjects of the sultan. In 1914 nationalism was much stronger than Pan-Islamic feeling among the Arabs; the leaders of several minorities in the Turkish Empire, such as the Armenians and the Kurds, likewise talked about national autonomy; and the new doctrine even inspired many Turks. The sultan of course opposed the nationalism that was tearing his empire to pieces, but many “Young Turks” rather inconsistently united an ardent Turkish nationalism with an equally ardent imperialism, hoping perhaps that Pan-Islamic enthusiasm would preserve, or even extend, their political power.

Leaders of the “Young Turks” included many army officers who were much distressed at the weakness and inefficiency of the Turkish army and of the Turkish government as a whole. They therefore effected a revolution in 1908. At first they demanded only a constitution and protection against the autocracy of Abdul Hamid, but a year later they deposed the sultan, substituted his spineless brother as Mohammed V, and established a dictatorship under Enver Bey. The new regime was soon overwhelmed with troubles, for its attempts to make the whole empire Turkish raised great dissatisfaction among the lesser nationalities, and both Italy and the Balkan States took advantage of the occasion to seize extensive territories. Then came the First World War, during which the Turkish Empire was destroyed.

In the early years of the war, the Allies developed large plans for partitioning the world among themselves, and one consequence of their activity was the highly secret Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916. According to this treaty the Arab portions of the Turkish Empire were to be divided between France and England, in compensation for which Russia was promised Constantinople and Armenia. A little later Italy was promised Smyrna with a large slice of southwestern Asia Minor (1917). Soon thereafter the British opened negotiations with an Arab leader, Husein ibn-Ali (1856–1931), whom the Young Turks had made shierf of Mecca (1908–1916). Encouraged by a romantic Englishman, Colonel T. E. Lawrence, whose exploits later became quite famous, Husein declared Arabian independence of Turkey (June, 1916) and was promptly recognized by the Allies as “King of Hejaz.” A few months later President Wilson declared, in one of the Fourteen Points, that the Turkish parts of the sultan’s empire must
remain in Turkish hands but that the rest would be assured autonomous development. Inspired by these promises, and aided by Allied troops, the Arabs threw off Turkish power.

The diplomats at the peace conference faced a difficult task. The Russians had lost all claim to territory by deserting their allies and making a separate peace, but the French and English insisted upon honoring the secret treaties while President Wilson was equally insistent upon his Fourteen Points. A verbal compromise was finally reached by which England and France got the territories awarded them by the Sykes-Picot agreement, but theoretically only as "mandates" from the League of Nations. Husein had by this time developed large ideas of an Arab Empire, and he therefore was deeply offended when his English friends allowed him to keep only the Hejaz. The settlement of Asia Minor was even more difficult, for the ambitions of 1916–1917 could not be realized, and in the end the Turks were allowed to keep the whole peninsula as well as Constantinople and the Straits. Greece and Italy each received a little territory; Armenians and Kurds were declared free; and the Turkish army was reduced to fifty thousand. These and other provision were duly set forth in the Treaty of Sèvres (signed by the sultan on August 20, 1920), but the treaty never went into effect, for the Turks soon had a military force able to defy it.

Seven years of disastrous warfare had left the Turkish Empire so exhausted that when an armistice was signed with the Allies (October, 1918), the Young Turk dictatorship collapsed and Enver fled to Russia. During the peace conference, Italian and French troops occupied much of southern Asia Minor, Greeks seized Smyrna, and a little later Allied troops landed in Constantinople. Conditions were such that when the Allies finally presented the sultan with the Treaty of Sèvres he had no choice but to sign. This was, however, Turkey's darkest hour. The Greeks lost the sympathy of many Europeans by their behavior at Smyrna, and though they successfully continued the war for almost three years, occupying large areas in western Asia Minor, they could not go on fighting indefinitely, and in 1922 they were expelled from the whole peninsula. After the Turks had torn up the Treaty of Sèvres, the Allies treated them much more respectfully and a new treaty was signed at Lausanne (July 24, 1923). Turkey thereby regained all the territories in Europe and Asia Minor that she had held in 1914; extraterritoriality and other galling restrictions
were removed; and there was no further talk of Armenian or Kurdish republics. The new Turkey was recognized as a free and independent state.

The leader of this remarkable Turkish revival was Mustafa Kemal, later known as Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938). He had been a general in the Turkish army during the war, and even before the Treaty of Sèvres he had organized a Nationalist government at Ankara in central Asia Minor. He commanded the armies that freed Smyrna, which gave him such prestige that when a Turkish Republic was proclaimed, soon after the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, Kemal was chosen its first president (October 29, 1923). In theory the new government was a liberal constitutional republic, but in practice it was a one-party dictatorship under Kemal, and during the remaining fifteen years of his life Kemal effected a profound revolution in Turkish life.

The general trend of Kemal's reforms was to make Turkey as much of a Western power as possible, and his first concern was to rebuild Turkish military power. He had no desire to conquer new territory or even to reconquer what had been lost, but he had ample reason to suspect that others were still hoping to profit by his weakness. An excellent Turkish army was therefore created. His strenuous efforts to improve Turkish agriculture were not equally successful, nor was the Five Year Plan for industrialization which he launched in 1933, yet in each case much was accomplished. Schools were established in every town, and by 1939 the number of illiterates had been reduced from 95 to only 75 percent of the total population, while half the children between seven and sixteen years of age were able to read. In 1928 Kemal ordered that the Turkish language be written with Roman characters, rather than with Arabic as heretofore. Western European styles of clothing were introduced, and all Turks were ordered to take last names in
the European style. Kemal led the procession himself, taking as his surname Atatürk—"First Turk."

Perhaps the most fundamental of all Kemal's reforms was his separation of church and state. The old Islamic Turkey was thereby made over into a modern secular state on the western European model. The caliphate was declared abolished (1924), all financial support to religion was suspended, and all schools were taken over by the state. The Moslem calendar was replaced by the European, the weekly day of rest was set on Sunday rather than Friday as hertofore, and so ancient an institution as polygamy was abolished. For the first time in history the Koran was read in Turkish in the mosques. And above all, new law codes, based on those of western Europe, replaced the old Sacred Law of Islam. Kemal's religious policies also brought Turkey's interest in Pan-Islamism to an end and antagonized other Islamic countries. Of course these drastic reforms aroused much opposition, especially among conservative religious leaders, and at times Kemal was quite ruthless with his opponents. His personal popularity in Turkey assured his success, however, and after his death in 1938, his policies were continued by his successors. Kemal was perhaps the least objectionable of the dictators of that dictatorial day, and in the long run he was the most successful.

The New Egypt

Egypt was a country of approximately the same population as the new Turkey (about 22 million), and it faced many of the same problems, but events there followed a very different course. Throughout the nineteenth century Egypt had been virtually independent of the Turkish Empire, being ruled by Mehemet Ali and his successors. One of these khedives, Ismail (1863–1879), introduced so many expensive material improvements that he fell deeply in debt to English and French bankers, who eventually forced him to abdicate in favor of his son. Anti-European demonstrations then provided an excuse for intervention, and in 1882 British troops occupied the country. During the next quarter of a century one of England's ablest colonial administrators, Lord Cromer (1883–1907), ruled Egypt though officially he was only British consul-general in Cairo. Soon after the outbreak of the First World War England proclaimed a "protectorate" over the country, deposed the reigning khedive, and
gave his successor the title "sultan." This new title supposedly indicated that its bearer was completely independent of the Turkish sultan, but England continued to rule with an iron hand.

Even before 1914 Egypt was seething with nationalistic discontent, and after the war agitation became even more frenzied. Serious anti-European riots then forced the British to declare their protectorate at an end (1922). Egypt was recognized as an independent state, and Faud I (who had been "sultan" since the death of his brother in 1917) was allowed to assume the title "king." Nevertheless British troops remained in Egypt; British control of the Sudan gave them great power over Egypt; and when further demonstrations occurred the British delivered severe ultimatums backed by warships. They thus kept Egypt more or less subservient for several years, but Mussolini's attack upon Ethiopia (1935) so inflamed Egyptian opinion that England was forced to negotiate a new treaty with Egypt in 1936. English troops were to be withdrawn from the country except for a few thousand men stationed along the Suez Canal; English officers were to train an Egyptian army; Egypt was to join the League of Nations; and an Anglo-Egyptian alliance was signed. The British troops were not actually withdrawn, however, until after the Second World War.

Meantime Fuad and his advisers had been trying to establish the new Egyptian state on firm foundations. A constitution, proclaimed early in 1923, provided for a legislature, most of whose members were to be elected by universal suffrage and to which the cabinet was responsible. The nationalists won a sweeping victory in the ensuing elections, and their bitter anti-English agitation, coupled with British intransigence, made orderly government virtually impossible. A new and less democratic constitution was proclaimed in 1930, but it aroused such opposition that the Constitution of 1923 was restored (1935). This reform, followed by the treaty of 1936 with England, satisfied the more moderate Egyptian nationalists, but the Second World War threw everything into confusion once more.

During the long years of their supremacy, the English had done much to westernize the country, but independent Egypt did not follow Turkey's lead in adopting European customs and culture. Her refusal may be attributed in part to her deep antagonism to England, but it was also due in part to the power of Islam with the Egyptian people. Fuad deliberately cultivated Pan-Islamic enthusiasm as a weapon against the extreme nationalists. Under his government, the Moslem brotherhoods became quite important
politically; popular education remained in the hands of the imams; and judges (kadis) enforced the Sacred Law of Islam. Egypt thus remained a strictly Islamic state, in sharp contrast to the highly secularized Turkish Republic.

The Lesser States

A third independent state to rise from the debris of the Turkish Empire was the Kingdom of Hejaz, lying in Arabia along the eastern shore of the Red Sea and including the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina. As we have seen (p. 688), Husein was recognized as king over this region in 1916, but two years later his dream of an all-embracing Arab state was disregarded by the diplomats at Paris, and in the long run Husein could not even keep the Hejaz. As early as 1919 his forces were defeated by those of another Arab leader, ibn-Saud, whose family had long been associated with the strict Wahabists of central Arabia. Ibn-Saud's military successes eventually led to Husein's resignation (1924), and after Husein's son Ali had ruled for about a year, ibn-Saud was proclaimed "King of Hejaz" early in 1926. Six years later all ibn-Saud's various territories, which included most of Arabia, were united and renamed "Saudi Arabia" (1932). Like Husein, ibn-Saud was a man of vast ambition, but he was more fortunate than his rival, for great oil deposits were found in eastern Arabia (1936). He made advantageous arrangements with American oil companies, and after the Second World War his income from oil enabled him to carry on an aggressive program looking to leadership in the Arab world. But the controversy between the partisans of Husein and those of ibn-Saud continued to disturb the whole Arab world.

The remaining Arab parts of the Turkish Empire were divided between France and England, to be governed as "mandates" from the League of Nations. France got Syria, which stretched along the northern half of the Mediterranean coast, from the Turkish frontier south to Palestine, and which included such important inland cities as Aleppo and Damascus. Iraq (Mesopotamia) and Palestine went to England. The Arabs in those regions were highly displeased with this arrangement and insisted that they were quite capable of governing themselves. The 1920's therefore saw much unrest and even bloodshed in the mandated areas. Husein's third son, Faisal, was proclaimed king of Syria in 1920, but he was speedily driven out by
French troops. Further disturbances caused the French to bombard Damascus with artillery and from the air in 1925 and again a year later. In 1928 Syrian nationalists drew up a constitution, which the French rejected, but in 1930 Syria was recognized as a republic, and in 1933 it was allowed to enter the League of Nations. The territory around Beirut, where the majority of the population were Maronite Christians, became a separate republic, called Lebanon (1936). The Syrians and Lebanese were not satisfied, however, because the French had reserved extensive powers for themselves, and violence continued to flare up periodically.

The British mandates were equally restless. There was severe fighting in Iraq in 1920, and a year later Faisal, who had recently been expelled from Syria, was allowed by the British to call himself king of Iraq. After several troubled years, England recognized Iraq’s independence (1927), and five years later Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations (1932). King Faisal died and was succeeded by his son in 1933, and by his four-year-old grandson in 1939. Meantime rich oil wells had been opened in the Mosul area, which led to bitter quarrels with the Turkish Republic, but in the end most of the disputed area went to Iraq. England found the government of her other mandate even more difficult. The region was divided into two parts, Palestine and Transjordan, the latter being the semidesert east of the Jordan River. Husein’s second son, Abdullah, was named its emir (1921). Soon after the treaty with Iraq, Transjordan was granted local autonomy with Abdullah its king, but with the British retaining financial and military control (1928). The most troublesome of all the mandates, however, was Palestine, where the situation was aggravated by the arrival of thousands of Zionist Jews.

Zionism had been born late in the nineteenth century, when the governments of central and eastern Europe began exploiting the anti-Semitism of the rabble for political purposes. By this time it had become clear that Moses Mendelssohn’s noble dream (see p. 125) of the mutual toleration and cooperation of Jews and Christians had not been realized. Various persons, both Jews and Gentiles, then suggested solving the Jewish problem by encouraging a mass migration of Jews to Palestine. A leader arose in the person of a Viennese journalist, Theodor Herzl (1860–1904), who founded the Zionist Organization in 1897. Except for extensive propaganda, not much was accomplished before 1914, but in 1917 the British foreign secretary was persuaded to issue the fundamental “Balfour Declaration”:
His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best efforts to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being distinctly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

After the First World War the British government sent Sir Herbert Samuel, a Jewish leader of the Liberal party in England, as high commissioner to administer the Palestine mandate. Tens of thousands of Jews migrated to Palestine during the early 1920's, and when the Nazis grew more aggressive in Germany, the ever increasing flood of immigrants caused many clashes between Jews and Arabs. The difficulties were primarily economic. In Palestine, as throughout the Near East, the land was owned by a few rich landlords who lived in Damascus or Aleppo or perhaps even in Paris, while the work was done by sharecroppers under the eye of a manager. If one such landlord sold an estate to another, it made little difference to his sharecroppers, who went right on cultivating the fields their ancestors had cultivated for many centuries. But in the 1920's the landlords began selling their lands to Jewish organizations, which immediately cleared off all the former sharecroppers and replaced them with Jewish immigrants. At first the evicted Arabs were able to find work in Jerusalem and other cities, but during the 1930's so many were displaced that the situation became quite tense. Arabs and Jews were virtually at war with each other, and the British could do nothing but execute a few terrorists on each side. When they limited immigration and forbade further sales of land, Jews accused them of violating Balfour's pledge, and when they proposed dividing the country, both sides were infuriated. In 1939 the problem seemed insoluble.

The Zionists had other troubles as well. Palestine is a poor country, having few resources except agriculture, and half the land is waterless desert. The early immigrants included a high proportion of religious idealists and professional men who were ill qualified for the rugged lives they were forced to lead. Nevertheless, they received financial aid from sympathizers in America and elsewhere, and they made remarkable progress. Citrus fruits were cultivated so successfully, for example, that they presently dominated the European market. (Hitler refused to admit such fruit to Germany, saying that the Master Race had no need for it, and that rhubarb—which he
called deutsche Zitrone—was just as full of vitamins anyhow.) Careful attention was given to education—culminating in a Hebrew university at Jerusalem—and to other social services. And above all, the Zionists convinced themselves that they were accomplishing great things and would soon do even better.

Though Persia had never been part of the Turkish Empire, and was not an Arab state, it faced the same fundamental problems as the rest of the Near East. In the nineteenth century it had been ruled by a decadent dynasty that lost outlying provinces to Russia; it was bankrupt; its young leaders were infected with new ideas of nationalism, European liberalism, and anti-Europeanism; it had the misfortune to lie in the path of Russia’s southeastward expansion toward India; and in 1908 rich oil fields were discovered in Persian territory. An unsuccessful Persian revolution (1905), coupled with German expansion in the Near East, induced the British and Russians to recognize each other’s “spheres of influence” in Persia while leaving a neutral zone between the two (1907). This foretaste of partition caused the Persian government to attempt extensive financial reforms, with the aid of an American adviser (1911), but its efforts were checkmated by Russia.

During the First World War Persian neutrality was violated frequently and with impunity by Russians, British, and Turks, but the various powers withdrew their troops after the war. As soon as they were gone, a Persian army officer named Riza Khan effected a coup d’état (1921) and later was proclaimed shah (1925). Like Kemal Atatürk, he inaugurated a period of extensive reform. He did not share the Turk’s secularist attitude toward Islam, but he improved the army, built a railway from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf, encouraged aviation, and introduced other modern reforms. The nationalistic character of his ambitions was dramatized when, in imitation of Atatürk, he took the surname Pahlavi (an ancient word for Persian), and even more forcibly in 1935 when he officially restored the ancient name of the country—Iran. But in 1941 Riza was forced to abdicate in favor of his son because the Russians and English suspected him of pro-Nazi sympathies.
India was the scene of equally profound changes during these restless years. Though England had completed her military conquest of the peninsula before the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, fighting continued for many years along the frontiers or in such neighboring countries as Burma and Afghanistan. After the mutiny, parliament abolished the East India Company, whose agents had conquered India and governed it for a hundred years. The government of India then devolved upon an English viceroy who was appointed by the crown and who was responsible only to the British cabinet at London. One half of India (the part known as British India) was divided into several large provinces, each ruled by an English governor under the viceroy, while the other half consisted of over six hundred “native states” of varying sizes and importance. One such, Hyderabad, was larger than Minnesota, but others covered only a few acres; some were largely independent for internal affairs; others were little more than parts of the British provinces surrounding them. The British took complete charge of the foreign affairs and military defense of each, however, and the most powerful Indian potentate had to follow the “sympathetic aid and advice” of an English “resident.” During the next fifty years the British strengthened India with many economic, financial, and sanitary reforms; they encouraged popular education and founded universities; they built railways, dams, and irrigation systems; and they introduced other modern improvements, especially in the cities. India therefore prospered during the last half of the century, and England was little troubled by native unrest. In the long run, however, these reforms brought struc-

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2 For the earlier history of India, see Vol. One, pp. 351-377 and 722-724; and above, pp. 57-62 and 482-484.

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tural changes in India’s social organization and prepared the way for the upheavals of the twentieth century.

Paradoxical as it may sound, many of England’s difficulties in India stemmed from the more idealistic parts of her program. Her promotion of education is a case in point. Soon after the enactment of the British Reform Bill of 1832, the English statesman and historian Lord Macaulay spent a few years in India. It was he who decided that thereafter Indian schools receiving government aid should teach English literature rather than the Sanskrit classics. In due time, therefore, India came to possess an educated class knowing English well and acquainted with books on English history and liberty. When the Indian universities were opened, they taught much the same subjects that were then being taught in English universities. This curriculum prepared men to be country gentlemen or clergymen, or government officials perhaps, but it did not train the engineers, doctors, scientific agriculturalists, and other technicians who were so badly needed in India. Before the end of the century, therefore, India was oversupplied with highly educated persons whose heads were full of European ideas about liberty and nationalism but who had no opportunity to participate effectively in the government of their country or even to earn a living. These frustrated intellectuals became the first Indian nationalists.

Leaders of this sort organized the Indian National Congress in 1885. They held annual meetings thereafter, at which they inveighed strongly against British rule, but their agitation scarcely became a serious matter until the early years of the twentieth century. Various events then intensified nationalist feeling and excitement. A revival of Hinduism gave Indians a stronger feeling for the past glories of their civilization. The British viceroy, Lord Curzon (1898–1905), was an energetic though rather tactless man, and his abrupt methods offended many Indians. Especially objectionable was the partition of Bengal (1905). This province had grown too large for effective administration as a unit, but as a result of its division, Moslems predominated in one half of the province. As Hindus and Moslems had long been hostile to each other in India, the Hindus rose in wrath, took to rioting, boycotted British goods, and demanded their independence from England. At just this time, too, Japanese victories over Russia greatly inflamed public opinion throughout Asia. Excited nationalists decided that they could gain their ends by
terrorism, and during the next few years they were responsible for several political assassinations.

The Liberal party being in power in England at this time, its leaders consented to a reform of the government of India. John Morley, long a champion of Home Rule for Ireland, was made secretary of state for India, and Lord Curzon was replaced by the more sympathetic Lord Minto as viceroy (1905). Since Morley knew little about Indian conditions, he was forced to depend for information upon India Office officials who opposed his reforms. He was led to sanction extreme measures for the suppression of violence, and presently he announced that, in his opinion, it would be a long time before India was ready for parliamentary government. Nevertheless, various reforms went into effect. Two Indians—one a Hindu and one a Moslem—were invited to London to participate in deliberations there; an Indian was appointed to the viceroy's executive council in India; and it was arranged that others should be elected (by a very restricted electorate) to the provincial legislative councils. Unrest continued, however, and late in 1912 the new viceroy (Lord Hardinge) was wounded by a bomb.

By this time the Moslems of India rivaled the Hindus in hostility to the British. Though invited to the National Congress, they had shown little enthusiasm at first, but in the years immediately preceding 1914 many Moslems demanded self-government—freedom, that is, both from the English and from the Hindus. To promote this program they organized the All-India Moslem League (1906). When the Minto-Morley reforms reunited Bengal to appease the Hindus, the Moslems were infuriated. Moreover, Pan-Islamic sentiment was rising among Indian Moslems, who expressed great displeasure when England allowed Italy and the Balkan States to depoloy Turkey of extensive territories in 1912 and 1913. But when the First World War broke out, and the Turks entered on the German side, Indian Moslems showed no desire to join them.

During the opening years of the First World War India remained calm. Indian princes contributed £100 million to Britain's war chest, and more than a million persons were engaged in war work overseas. Many of them were laborers, of course, but large bodies of Indian troops were used in Mesopotamia, Palestine, Gallipoli, East Africa, and elsewhere, though not against Germans on the western front. By 1917, however, the situation in India was again so tense that the
British felt it necessary to issue the Montagu-Chelmsford Declaration:

The policy of His Majesty’s Government is that of increasing the association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire.

Before these promises could be translated into legislation, the war was over and India—like the rest of the world—seethed with excitement while the members of the peace conference wrangled in Paris. When a British general ordered his troops to fire on a crowd at Amritsar (April, 1919) and over four hundred persons were killed, indignation swept India and spread over the whole world.

In December, 1919, the British parliament passed a Government of India Act which established a “dyarchy,” or double government, for local affairs in India. In each of the provinces of British India there were to be two governments. Certain matters were “reserved” to the English governor and the council he appointed: they included finance, justice, and the police. Other matters, including education, public health, and agriculture, were “transferred” to councils of Indian ministers under the English governor. Seventy percent of the members of the provincial legislatures were to be elected, but the franchise was narrowly restricted by property and educational qualifications. As the governor could always count on the 30 percent of the legislature whom he appointed, it was hard for the Indian members to unite against him. Moreover, this “dyarchy” did not rise to the imperial level, though there was an imperial legislature, 70 percent of whose members were elected by a narrow electorate. The English hoped thus to train a group of responsible Indian statesmen, but both the Indian National Congress and the Moslem League denounced the scheme as utterly inadequate.

GANDHI AND INDEPENDENCE

The history of India during the next quarter-century is inseparable from that of one great man, Mohandas K. Gandhi (1869–1948), the leader of the National Congress. Gandhi was perhaps the most remarkable man of the twentieth century, able to inspire the passion-
ate devotion and loyalty of millions of his fellow Indians and the enthusiastic admiration of many idealistic Europeans and Americans. Born to a well-to-do Hindu family of the official class and educated in the University of London, Gandhi had spent several years in South Africa. There he did what he could to alleviate the hard lot of the indentured Indian laborers who had been taken to that colony. Returning to India in 1914, he threw himself whole-heartedly into the nationalistic movement.

Though denouncing British rule in India as “satanic,” Gandhi repudiated all violence and relied solely upon passive resistance and noncoöperation with the authorities. Leading an ascetic life modeled upon that of the Indian sages of old, he ate only the simplest vegetarian food, and even on formal occasions he often wore only a loincloth of homespun. He was much distressed by the tragic fate of the millions of “untouchables” in India, and he sought to mitigate the quarrels between Hindus and Moslems. A deeply religious man, he carefully studied the New Testament as well as the Hindu classics, and on one occasion he remarked that he was really a Hindu and a Christian, a Moslem and a Jew. Though an ardent nationalist, Gandhi was no narrow chauvinist. There can be no doubt of his deep sympathy with unfortunates everywhere and of his sincere desire to mitigate human suffering. Millions of Indians came to regard him as a Mahatma, or “Man of Great Soul.” Even before his death he was regarded as a saint by his followers, and since his assassination by a Hindu fanatic in 1948 his name has been surrounded with legend.

In spite of Gandhi’s urging that only peaceful methods be used to gain Indian independence, his anti-British agitation led to violence, and in 1922 he was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. When Ramsay MacDonald ordered his release two years later, Gandhi immediately resumed his preaching. Continuing his campaign of peaceful noncoöperation, he urged the revival of home and village industry and made the spinning wheel a symbol of the nationalist movement. In 1930 he led a spectacular pilgrimage to the sea, followed by thousands of admirers, and extracted salt from sea water—in violation of the British salt monopoly. Again he was locked up. Meantime the refusal of his followers to buy British goods had reduced imports from England to less than half their former figure and had inflicted losses amounting to millions of pounds upon British manufacturers. The British government therefore decided to review its Indian policy.
At first both the National Congress and the Moslem League had refused to cooperate with the Montagu-Chelmsford councils and legislatures, and their members had declined to run for office. Presently, however, the more moderate nationalists began to take office, hoping to work for freedom from inside the government. Some of these moderates now suggested that India be accorded “dominion status” in the British Empire. At this time England was already actively debating the changes in imperial organization that were soon to be incorporated in the Statute of Westminster (1931, see p. 662), and as early as 1929 the British cabinet announced that dominion status for India was the “natural issue” of the Montagu-Chelmsford program. Indian moderates next demanded that a roundtable conference of British and Indian officials be held immediately to work out the new form of government for India. Such a conference was held in London in 1930, but as Gandhi was not among those present (he was in jail at the time), it accomplished nothing. After being released, Gandhi attended a second conference, but it too was of little avail (1931). At last parliament passed a new Government of India Act (1935), which was England’s final effort to provide India with a government. Provinces were reorganized; the provincial “dyarchy” was abolished, leaving the provincial legislatures and their ministries in complete charge of local affairs; but the “dyarchy” was raised to the imperial level, with a bicameral legislature, 70 percent of whose members were elected. The law also proposed an “All-India Federation” to include provinces and native states. The new regime went into effect in 1937, but the Federation failed to unite India because the native princes refused to cooperate.

India was much more restless during the Second World War than she had been during the First. The nationalists were more determined, better organized, and better led; the Japanese propaganda cry, “Asia for the Asiatics,” was more effective than German propaganda had been in the earlier war; and a terrible famine in 1943 cost the lives of 1,500,000 Indians. Gandhi was now devoting his attention largely to the “untouchables” and the Hindu-Moslem antagonism, and leadership in the nationalist movement passed to Jawaharlal Nehru (born, 1889). Nehru’s father, Motilal Nehru (1861–1931), had often demanded complete independence for India, yet he was the man who formulated the Indian plan for dominion status. The son, who had been educated in England at Harrow and Cambridge and who confessed to being “a queer mixture of East and West,” was a devoted
disciple of Gandhi though he rejected the master's pacifism and his opposition to industrialism. He was a more practical politician than Gandhi, and his activities led the British to promise dominion status as soon as the war was over.

While criticism of European colonialism and demands for national self-government were less spectacular in neighboring countries than in India, they eventually prevailed throughout southeastern Asia. Siam was the only country in this region to retain even nominal independence in 1914, and at times it seemed that even she was marked for early partition. In the postwar years, however, her rulers managed to free themselves from various burdensome privileges wrung from them by foreign powers, and in 1932 a constitutional government was set up. Seven years later the country was renamed Thailand, as a symbol of the new day. At the same time the British, French, and Dutch colonies in southeastern Asia and the Malay Archipelago were growing more restless, and as we shall see in greater detail below (p. 762), they and the Philippines were granted self-government or complete independence in the years immediately following the Second World War.
39. THE FAR EAST

In an earlier chapter we traced the decline of China's Manchu dynasty to the eve of its collapse in the Chinese Revolution of October 10, 1911 (see p. 491). We have also noted the advance of European imperialism, of European financial control, and of European ideas in China during these same years. At the turn of the century China seemed fated to be dismembered by the European powers and Japan. In fact, she could only stand by and watch while Russia and Japan fought a major war (1904–1905) to determine which should occupy a contested strip of Chinese territory. For a moment idealistic Americans hoped that the “Open Door” policy, proclaimed by Secretary Hay (see p. 495), would preserve China's territorial integrity, but it soon appeared that in practice this famous doctrine merely meant that American businessmen might share in whatever economic concessions Europeans might wring from China—even though these Americans had not helped tighten the thumbscrews, either by themselves or through their government. China, like Turkey, owed her continued existence as an independent state largely to the mutual fears and jealousies of the great powers.

Alarmed by this state of affairs, China's imperial government belatedly attempted reform. The old practice of recruiting the bureaucracy by competitive examinations on the Confucian classics was abolished in 1905, and young men with a more modern education were accepted. A constitutional government was promised in 1906, but when a National Assembly finally met (1910), it only succeeded in forcing the imperial government to promise a parliament and cabinet in 1913. Though army reform was attempted, it was severely hampered by lack of funds, and when the imperial government began building railways to unite the country, it was forced to borrow the money from foreign bankers. China therefore fell still more deeply
into the toils of these financiers, who now formed an international "consortium" to exploit China. In the days of President Taft, the American government encouraged American bankers to participate in this enterprise, but when President Wilson entered office (1913) he straightway withdrew official support on the ground that the consortium constituted a threat to "the administrative independence of China itself."

Political and economic pressure from foreigners was not the greatest of China's troubles, however. Her population had increased from roughly 100 million in 1644 to an estimated 300 million in 1800, to about 360 million in 1870, and to approximately 420 million in 1910. (These figures are, if anything, too low.) As the food supply had not increased at anything approaching the same rate, millions were always struggling on the brink of starvation, and even a local crop failure became a major disaster. Moreover, the attractive and comparatively safe life of the Treaty Ports (see p. 492) drew the rich to these cities, and the evils of absentee-landlordism increased correspondingly. The importation of European cloth and other machine-made articles ruined the handicraftsmen who had always been numerous. The whole of China, city and country alike, therefore teemed with poverty-stricken persons, but these unfortunates had no leaders and they knew no way to express their dissatisfaction except by occasional riots.

An unusual feature of the situation in China lay in the fact that during the nineteenth century many Chinese had migrated to other countries—Indochina, Malaya, the Philippines, Hawaii, and the United States—where they acquired new ideas and where a few of them became rich. When these emigrants returned to China, they often demanded reform. One such person was Dr. Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), the "Father of the Chinese Revolution." Born near Canton as the son of a moderately successful peasant, Sun was educated and converted to Christianity in Hawaii, where an elder brother had settled and prospered. He later studied medicine at Hong Kong, and even as a young man in the 1880's he began urging political reform. His part in a minor revolt (1895) forced him to pass the next several years in Hawaii, the United States, Europe, or Japan. Here he organized secret revolutionary societies, which he financed largely with contributions from rich Chinese abroad, and here he elaborated his program of reform. He summarized this program in the Three People's Principles—People's Rule (nationalism), People's Authority
(democracy), and People's Livelihood, by which he meant an economic policy of socialistic coöperation and social security. Sun Yat-sen was a dreamer and exhorter rather than a practical politician, but we shall see that he eventually exercised a powerful influence upon the course of events in China.

Then came an accident which set off the Revolution of October 10, 1911. Members of Sun Yat-sen's secret societies caused several minor revolts in 1910 and early in 1911 and, following the example of Russian and other revolutionists, they even tried political assassinations. A group living in the Russian concession at Hankow was making bombs, one of which attracted the attention of the police by exploding accidentally (October 10, 1911). Finding a list of the members of the society, the Chinese police arrested and executed a few leaders and thereby frightened others into immediate action. Revolutionary excitement quickly spread to many who had no connection with the societies, and within a few days several of the cities of southern China and the Yangtze Valley were in the hands of rebels. Sun Yat-sen was in the United States at the time, but he returned at once to Shanghai, where his followers named him president of the Chinese Republic (December, 1911).

Taken by surprise, the imperial government turned to Yüan Shih-k'ai (1859–1916). Yüan was an experienced general who, a few years
earlier, had attempted to reform the imperial army, but who had been dismissed from office in 1908. He was now recalled, made prime minister, and ordered to crush the rebellion with troops from northern China. Yüan decided, however, that it would be better to negotiate with the rebels than to fight them. As a result of the ensuing negotiations, he expelled the boy emperor (Hsüan T'ung, born 1906), thus overthrowing the Manchu dynasty, and in exchange Sun Yat-sen resigned the presidency of the Republic. These changes were effected in February, 1912, after which Yüan himself became president, with the support of the revolutionists. Yüan thus prevented China from falling into immediate chaos and civil war, but not for long. The more radical revolutionists were dissatisfied with his rule, and in August, 1912, some of them (not including Sun Yat-sen) organized the Kuomintang or "Nationalist party." Though Yüan sincerely desired reform in China, he was an intensely ambitious man, and he was not satisfied with being a mere president. Being popular with the troops of the northern army, he quickly made himself a military dictator and later developed plans for restoring a monarchy, with himself as emperor. Yüan had been supported by the European powers, whose agents regarded him as the only man able to preserve law and order in China (as well as to guard their own concessions and investments), but when war broke out in Europe in 1914, they were no longer in a position to help him greatly. Yüan's monarchical ambitions were too much for many of his adherents; some of his troops mutinied; and the dictator died under suspicious circumstances on June 6, 1916.

Yüan's successes showed others the path to glory, and during the next ten years China was afflicted with a plague of "war lords." Ambitious men found it easy to raise armies of peasants and workers—sometimes called "rice armies" because recruits enlisted only to get food. These armies overran the countryside, living off the land, but they received their munitions from foreigners, either individuals or governments, who hoped to get their investment back in the form of economic concessions. Though the war lords caused great suffering and damage in China, they rarely risked their armies in pitched battles, preferring to negotiate instead. They were gangsters rather than statesmen, but after the central authority had been destroyed, there was no one to stop them. They almost tore China to pieces, and they would doubtless have partitioned it, had not each of them dreamed of getting all China for himself.
Building a New China

During the years of the First World War a number of events worked together to promote Chinese nationalism. In the first place, the Japanese decided that conditions in Europe gave them a golden opportunity to advance their expansionist program in Asia. They therefore presented Yüan with a list of Twenty-one Demands which, if accepted in their entirety, would have left China virtually a Japanese protectorate. Yüan accepted some of these demands, but not all (May, 1915). When the United States entered the war, the Chinese government—or at least the war lord then holding Peking—followed suit (August, 1917), largely in the hope of having a seat as an ally at the peace conference. President Wilson’s Fourteen Points and other idealistic pronouncements were read with enthusiasm by educated Chinese. But when the peace conference met, these lofty principles were set aside. Japan was allowed to keep the German concessions, contrary to her promises, and it was with difficulty that President Wilson prevented her from annexing the whole province of Shantung. These disappointments were felt keenly by the Chinese—especially the educated businessmen and students—and caused a great resurgence of nationalism throughout China.

Meantime other, more fundamental, changes were strengthening national feeling in China. As the war had curtailed European exports, Chinese businessmen were able to improve their economic position greatly. Factories were built, partly with the aid of American engineers or of Chinese trained in America, which made Shanghai, Tientsin, and other coastal cities into important industrial centers. These successful manufacturers were highly nationalistic, hoping thereby to check or eliminate European and Japanese competition. By this time, too, many of the new Chinese railways were in operation, bringing thousands of workers from villages to the strange life of the large cities. Because of these mass migrations, the old forms of family solidarity weakened, and the whole Confucian ethic, under which China had lived for so many centuries, began to break down. These workers too became nationalistic, or at least they listened eagerly to demagogues who ranted against foreigners.

The students in China, especially the university students, were particularly susceptible to nationalistic propaganda. In the year just before the war approximately eight hundred Chinese students were attending American universities and about four hundred were
studying in Europe, but there were nearly fifteen thousand in Japan. Many of these foreign-trained students eventually became important leaders, and all were anxious to remake China along modern lines. They were especially indignant at the Treaty of Versailles, against which they staged riots in which many persons were killed. The new National University at Peking became a center of propaganda for a new China, and for several years it played a part in the life of the nation resembling that of the University of Berlin in its early days (see p. 346). Brilliant professors, led by the American-trained Hu Shih (born, 1891; Chinese ambassador to the United States, 1937–1942), proclaimed a "Chinese Renaissance," writing in the dialects of the people and hoping thus to rob the mandarin class of its ancient monopoly on learning. They also dreamed of creating a new Chinese culture which would combine modern science and the scientific method with the best elements of the Confucian tradition.

A third powerful influence in China during the 1920's was communism. Marx had attracted very little attention in China before the October Revolution, but when Russian Bolsheviks began saying that communism meant democracy and anti-colonialism, many young Chinese were eager to listen. As evidence of their good faith, the Russian communists voluntarily surrendered all the concessions and special privileges which the tsars' agents had extorted from China in earlier times. A Chinese Communist party was organized in 1921, and two years later a Russian Bolshevik, Michael Borodin, was sent from Moscow to show these Chinese communists how to effect a proletarian revolution. A considerable number of Chinese students were taken to Moscow to learn further details and to be indoctrinated with the communist philosophy.

These various forces were gradually united in the Kuomintang. Yuan had suppressed the original society, but Sun Yat-sen reorganized it in 1920, and during the remaining five years of his life he was its leader. He still dreamed of a democratic Chinese republic, socialist-inclined but not communist, and free from foreign control, whether European, Japanese, or Russian. For a while he tried to cooperate with various war lords who publicly professed somewhat similar ideals, but when he saw that he could never reach his goal by such a route, he entered into an alliance with Borodin. He publicly rejected Marxism, but during the next few years many communists came to hold high office in the Kuomintang.
Sun Yat-sen died in March, 1925, and was succeeded in leadership of the Kuomintang by Chiang Kai-shek. Born the son of a minor official in 1886, Chiang had been educated at Yüan’s military academy in Canton, after which he was sent by the imperial government to study for four years at a similar academy in Tokyo. Here he joined one of Sun’s revolutionary societies, but he played no great part in revolutionary affairs until the 1920’s. On Sun’s advice, he spent nearly a year in Moscow, and on his return he was named principal of a Chinese military academy. Here he was remarkably successful in building up the nationalist enthusiasm of his officers, and presently he had a strong army at his disposal. By a little fighting and much nationalistic propaganda he won most of south China, where revolutionary and republican fervor had always been strongest, and in 1927 he established his capital at Nanking. He next came to terms with various war lords, with whose aid he took Peking (June, 1928). The greater part of China was then in Chiang’s hands and the Second, or Nationalist, Revolution was accomplished. Nanking remained the capital of the Republic—its name means “Southern Capital”—and Peking (“Northern Capital”) was renamed Peiping (“Northern Peace”).

**China Under the Kuomintang**

Chiang Kai-shek took over a China which was financially bankrupt, which had suffered grievously from more than fifteen years of revolution and war-lordism, which was still being overrun by war lords and lesser brigands, and in which a central government no longer functioned. The next ten years he devoted to creating a national government, and under the circumstances it was perhaps inevitable that his rule should become highly autocratic. He ruled in the name of the Kuomintang, but he dominated the party and always insisted upon strict party discipline. His officials at Nanking interfered with local affairs throughout China in ways never attempted by the Manchus. Though Chiang continued to invoke the name of Sun Yat-sen, and to repeat fine phrases about democracy, his practice came to resemble that of the totalitarian dictators then ruling so much of Europe. Nevertheless China progressed rapidly under his leadership.

In his early days Chiang had made hostility to European imperialism the keynote of his propaganda. His feelings toward Europe, and especially toward Japan, did not change, but he knew that
for the moment he was helpless against the imperialists and he therefore decided to court their favor. He sent Borodin back to Russia and expelled all communists from the Kuomintang (1927); he married the daughter of a wealthy Shanghai banker; he announced his conversion to Christianity; and he agreed to pay the interest on China’s foreign debts. Reassured by these evidences of his good faith, the European powers and the United States recognized Chiang as the lawful ruler of all China (1928). Moreover, an anti-British boycott had been so successful during the past few years that English exports to China had declined alarmingly. The foreign governments therefore decided to change their tactics. In spite of Japan’s opposition, they allowed China to fix her own tariffs and they surrendered various concessions, though each foreign power retained a few special privileges until 1943.

Chiang’s government faced two other major problems, namely, defense and finance. As his alliances with the war lords were most precarious, and as Japan’s aggressive intentions were becoming more obvious day by day, Chiang devoted great attention to creating a strong army. The troops with which he had taken Nanking and Peking were dis-

3 Charles Jones Soong had come to the United States as a young man about 1880. After being converted to Christianity and graduating from Vanderbilt University, he returned to Shanghai as a Methodist missionary, but he later turned to trade and banking. He became one of the richest men in China. His son, T. V. Soong, was Chiang’s finance minister, 1928–1933, and his three daughters were married to H. H. Kung (a lineal descendant of Confucius at the seventy-fifth generation, a graduate of Oberlin and Yale, and finance minister, 1933–1938), to Sun Yat-sen, and to Chiang Kai-shek. Madame Sun became a communist, and after her husband’s death she lived for several years in Moscow. Madame Chiang, the most remarkable of the three and a graduate of Wellesley, was very effective as a propaganda agent in the United States.
tinguished by enthusiasm rather than by skill, and their successes were prepared in part by the bribery of enemy commanders—a traditional Chinese procedure which would be less effective against Japanese or Europeans. Chiang therefore invited a German general to reorganize and train his army, an Englishman to launch a Chinese navy, and an American to train a rudimentary air force. Chinese finances were in an equally troubled condition, but Chiang's brothers-in-law, T. V. Soong and H. H. Kung, managed to create a stable currency and to balance the budget. They also raised considerable sums of money through domestic loans—much to the surprise of many people. Chiang thus acquired the funds needed for the new army; he was able to build a few railways and many good motor roads; he built munition factories and encouraged other industries; and he even had money left over to promote elementary education and to found new technical schools and universities. But these financial measures tied the Kuomintang to the landed gentry and the commercial classes. Its revolutionary fervor evaporated, and its leaders became more interested in retaining power than they were in social reform. They were baffled by the problems of the land and the peasants, and they gradually lost the support of their more idealistic followers.

When Chiang Kai-shek expelled the communists from the Kuomintang in 1927, he lost the support of many radical democrats who were by no means Marxists. Some of these radicals were perhaps more faithful disciples of Sun Yat-sen than Chiang himself, and many of them joined the Chinese Communist party, which had been founded under Russian auspices in 1921. Mao Tse-tung was already a man of importance in this party. Born to a moderately prosperous peasant family in southern China in 1893, he had begun reading Marx when a student at Peking University, and he became sharply critical of the Kuomintang. He did violence to the Communist party line, however, by urging that in China the communist revolution must be accomplished by the peasants rather than the proletarians—of whom there were virtually none. In spite of this deviation from the party line, Mao remained in the good graces of Moscow, and in 1927 he led a minor peasant revolt in the mountainous region of south China. Gathering a small army of peasants and deserters from the Nationalist forces, he trained them in guerrilla tactics and was able to maintain his position for several years. In November, 1931, a tiny Chinese Soviet Republic, having Mao as its chairman, began redistributing
Land. As Chiang’s attention was just then fully occupied by Japanese activities in Manchuria and Shanghai, he could not send adequate forces against these rebels until 1934. Mao then led his men on the “Long March” west and north, avoiding the thickly populated parts of central China and eventually reaching the borders of Mongolia. They marched six thousand miles in less than a year, averaging almost twenty-five miles a day and fighting countless battles. Of the ninety thousand who started, only twenty thousand survived the rigors of the march, but these survivors became hardened veterans and their spectacular deeds attracted favorable attention throughout China. Being patriotic Chinese, the communists now offered to form a “united front” with Chiang to resist Japanese aggression (1936). Chiang refused indignantly, but when he ordered his army to destroy the communists, or at least to drive them into Siberia, his troops refused to fight other Chinese in such a time of national danger. Chiang was then dramatically kidnapped by some of his own officers and was induced to agree to the united front (December, 1936). Before arrangements could be completed, however, the Japanese had launched an undeclared war on China (July 7, 1937).

JAPAN

The “Meiji Restoration” of 1867 in Japan (see p. 497) had been accomplished by a small group of young men belonging to the samurai or warrior class. These men continued to lead the new Japan for more than forty years, and many of them lived to see their fondest dreams come true. Japan became a modern military power, with a modern industrial system to support her military machine. Her war with China in 1894–1895, and her spectacular victories over Russia ten years later, brought her recognition as one of the world’s leading military powers. The “unequal treaties” which the European powers and the United States had exacted before 1867—treaties similar to those which aroused such resentment in China and the Near East—were done away with; Japan was allowed to determine her own tariff policies; and extraterritorial rights and concessions were abrogated. When the old Emperor Mutsuhito died in 1912, thus bringing the Meiji period in Japanese history to a close, it was clear that during the forty-five years of his reign he had presided over a revolution in Japanese life such as had required three centuries in western Europe. The results of this revolution were very obvious on the surface
of Japanese life, but they had not yet penetrated to its deeper foundations, where old Japanese ideals still prevailed.

As the leaders of the Meiji Restoration had taken a broad view of their task, the new Japan was prepared to do more than drill soldiers and provide them with adequate arms and ammunition. But everything was planned by military men, and everything was regimented. Military service required that recruits have at least a minimum of education; industry needed literate workers and skilled technicians; government service and the professions called for university-trained experts. The government therefore provided schools to fit men for all these roles, but above all the schools trained pupils to be nationalist patriots, loyal to the emperor and never questioning the acts of the ministers who were his spokesmen. In the elementary schools especially there was more indoctrination than liberal education. Officials decided exactly what each sort of person ought to know and think, curricula were arranged accordingly, and even in the 1890's steps were taken to eliminate "dangerous thoughts." Everyone in the new Japan was trained for a place, and the Japanese system became totalitarian long before Europeans began talking in such terms. As in most totalitarian systems, everything went well—for a while.

When the creators of the new Japan abolished the feudal system and the samurai class from which they themselves had sprung, they let loose a flood of political and social changes. The political changes came, however, not at the demand of the citizens but at the order of the emperor. Even the Constitution of 1889, which established a parliament, was ordained from above, not forced from below. Though Japan's new statesmen acknowledged the superiority of European military science and technology, they had no desire to undermine the Japanese social system by introducing Western democracy. Nevertheless, factions arose among these statesmen, partly because of personal antagonisms and partly over matters of policy, and after 1889 organized political parties appeared. The ultimate objectives of the various leaders were much the same, but they differed regarding the best way to achieve these goals. Some leaders emphasized the supreme importance of the army, others demanded heavier support to industry. The more conservative military leaders prevailed at first, but as Japan's industry grew stronger and her industrialists grew richer, liberal statesmen found valuable support among them. Controversy between the factions became more bitter, and took many
forms. Each of Japan's early wars, for example, can be explained in part by these feuds. The liberals were forced into war when their militaristic opponents insinuated that they were unpatriotic, but afterward they were accused of not having got all that they might have for Japan.

The quarter-century beginning about 1890 was a period of rapid economic progress in Japan. The newly trained technicians and managers, being drawn mostly from the old samurai class, continued to be inspired by ancestral ideals of militarism, cooperation, and service to the state. Though the large industrial concerns were usually family affairs, many were state-owned enterprises, while still others were encouraged by the state, either by protective tariffs or by direct subsidies. Japan also had a competent labor force, willing to work for low wages and not organized for strikes. Production costs were correspondingly low, and in the opening years of the twentieth century European and American markets began to show many cheap articles of Japanese manufacture. Yet everything was not rosy in Japan. As the islands had few natural resources, such raw materials as coal, iron, and cotton had to be imported at high cost. The population was rising rapidly—from 35 million to 56 million between 1870 and 1920, and to 85 million in 1950—and the problem of food supply was pressing. Scientific agriculture considerably increased production per acre, and the Japanese became great fish-eaters, but it seemed likely that food would soon have to be imported in large quantities. Japan, like England, needed foreign markets where she could sell manufactured goods to pay for the food she was obliged to import. When war broke out in 1914, Japanese manufacturers saw a chance to acquire such markets and raw materials, both in the former German concessions in the Shantung peninsula of China and in the eastern province of Siberia, which might be taken from revolution-racked Russia. Japanese imperialists even began dreaming of the economic, and perhaps the political, leadership of the entire Far East. At the Paris Peace Conference, Japan was granted a mandate over countless small islands in the Pacific, but she was denied the most important prize of all, Shantung.

During the 1920's liberal politicians ruled Japan, being backed by the manufacturers who had prospered during the war and who now wanted to be on good terms with Europe and America. Mutsuhito was dead, his son was feeble-minded, and his young grandson, Hirohito (born in 1901, regent after 1921, emperor after 1926), was
supposed to favor liberalism. The “elder statesmen” who had made the new Japan were by this time gone, and their places had been taken by bureaucrats with no political following. Leaders therefore began to appeal to the general public with liberal programs and demands for universal suffrage. At first the right to vote had been granted only to high taxpayers, but in 1921 the franchise was extended to all except peasants and workers and in 1925 universal male suffrage more than quadrupled the number of voters. At the same time the prime ministers, though appointed by the emperor, found it desirable to pay closer attention to the will of the voters as expressed by the diet. The liberal spirit also reached into the intellectual sphere. Hundreds of European and American books of liberal tendencies were translated into Japanese, and there was even a spirited discussion of Marxian socialism, such as would not have been tolerated a few years earlier.

Japanese militarism was far from dead, however, and after the mid-1920’s it began to regain its old supremacy in the government. The militaristic leaders presented themselves as champions of the old Japan, whose virtues they extolled beyond all reason, and they criticized the new parliamentary government, which they accused of subserviency to big industry. They also proclaimed themselves the leaders of a new “restoration,” taking power away from the unscrupulous and dishonest profiteers and restoring it to the emperor, to whom it rightfully belonged. They therefore greatly exaggerated the cult of the emperor as the “Son of Heaven,” but they were careful to surround him with their own men to make sure that he heard and said only the right things. The poor man was subjected to an extremely thorough “brain washing” by the militarists at court. Moreover, the militarists were greatly aided by universal suffrage, which gave the ballot to millions of voters whose views were based largely on the militaristic indoctrination they had received at school and in the army. When the depression struck Japan, militaristic panaceas found ever wider popular support, and denunciations of the communist menace attracted still other followers. The failure of the parliamentary leaders to secure Shantung and eastern Siberia were constantly harped upon, while the exclusion of Japanese immigrants from the United States, Australia, and New Zealand was bitterly denounced as an insult to the nation and its people. More important still, the weak-kneed bureaucrats who presided over successive ministries were not the men to stand up against resolute opponents.
Political assassinations took one prime minister after another, with the
general public hailing the assassins as heroes. The authority and
power of the government were breaking down, and presently ir-
responsible fanatics were able to plunge Japan into a war with China.

Undeclared Wars in China

China had been forced in 1895 to surrender the Liaotung peninsula
(southern Manchuria) and the island of Formosa to Japan, and to
grant independence to Korea. Because of the strong protests of Rus-
sia, France, and Germany, however, Japan returned Liaotung to
China. The very next year the Russians secured the right to build
the Trans-Siberian railway across northern Manchuria to Vladivostok, and in 1898 they built a branch line south to Port Arthur,
at the southern tip of the Liaotung peninsula, over which they ac-
quired a lease and important rights. They thus took the first step
toward annexing all Manchuria. By way of “compensation” England,
France, and Germany seized various parts of China (see p. 495).
Japanese statesmen were much distressed by Russia’s action, and after
signing an alliance with England in 1902 they went to war with Rus-
sia in 1904. Their victories brought them the Russian concessions
in southern Manchuria, the branch railway (but not the main line),
and the southern half of the island of Sakhalin. Two years later
Japan proclaimed a “protectorate” over Korea, and in 1910 she for-
mally annexed the country. Korea supplied Japan with badly needed
rice and other foodstuffs, but Manchuria was the great prize. Though
they did not annex the province, the Japanese at once began showing
great energy and skill in the development of its fertile land and its
valuable mineral deposits.

Manchuria was occupied during the 1920’s by a Chinese war lord
named Chang Tso-lin (1873–1928). Starting life as a common la-
borer, Chang had advanced through brigandage to power, ruling his
province arbitrarily and with a strong arm. He presently declared
Manchuria independent of China, and for a while he even occupied
Peking. As he was constantly in trouble with the Japanese in Man-
churia, they were suspected of complicity when he was killed by
a bomb (1928). Chang’s power then passed to his son, Chang Hsieh-
liang (b. 1898), who was even more hostile to the Japanese than his
father had been, and three years later Japan launched her first un-
declared war on China.
On September 18, 1931, Japanese army officers stationed in Manchuria to protect the railway set off a bomb near Mukden and used this outrage as an excuse for occupying the city. High army officials had participated in the plot, but apparently the Japanese cabinet knew nothing of the affair beforehand. Public opinion in Japan then forced the government to support the plotters. Large bodies of troops were sent to occupy Manchuria, and in February, 1932, the Japanese announced the creation of a new government, called Man-
Chang Hsieh-liang was driven out, and the deposed Manchu emperor of China, who had been a refugee in Japan for several years, was proclaimed emperor under the name of Henry Pu-yi. He was of course a mere puppet of the Japanese militarists. The Chinese had replied to these acts by a boycott against Japanese goods which became so effective that the Japanese deemed further steps necessary. They landed troops at Shanghai (January, 1932) where, for the first time, they met Chiang Kai-shek’s new army. Though surprised at the resistance it offered, they were victorious, and in May, 1933, China was forced to recognize the loss of Manchuria.

This Manchurian affair attracted world-wide attention. Though the American secretary of state, Henry L. Stimson, announced that the United States would not recognize territorial changes exacted by armed force, this “Stimson Doctrine” found little support in Europe, and it restrained the Japanese not at all. China appealed to the League of Nations, which sent a commission to investigate, and when its report censured the Japanese mildly, Japan withdrew from the League. The Manchurian incident thus taught Hitler a valuable lesson and marked an important step along the road to the Second World War.

From this moment Japan’s aggressions in China became more vigorous. She occupied parts of the northern provinces bordering on Manchuria, and she decided that Chiang Kai-shek must go. Chiang knew that he could not fight Japan, and perhaps he was more interested in destroying the Chinese communists anyhow, but after he had been kidnapped (December, 1936), he agreed to join with them in forming a united front against Japan. Six months later Japan launched her second undeclared war against China (July 7, 1937). Japanese troops easily entered Peiping and Tientsin, and within a short time most of northeastern China was in their hands. Shanghai resisted for several weeks, but eventually the city was taken. The invaders proceeded up the Yangtze to Nanking (December, 1937), but only to find that the government had retreated to Hankow, and before they could capture Hankow (October, 1938), Chiang Kai-shek had retreated to Chungking, a virtually impregnable city far above the easily defended gorges of the Yangtze.

The Japanese had occupied the seaports and seized the railways of China, but they could not advance far into the interior, and they could not win over the Chinese people. They accomplished little with propaganda slogans, such as “Asia for the Asiatics,” and with
their eloquence about the blessings that would flow from their “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,” but the Manchurian episode had shown them that they had little cause to worry about European intervention. They therefore settled down to wait, hoping to starve Chiang into submission. By this time, however, Japan herself was beginning to feel the pinch of war, and dangerous shortages developed when the United States declared an embargo on shipments of scrap iron and oil. The Japanese government therefore looked to southeastern Asia, which could provide these necessities and which, because of the war in Europe, was weakly defended by its English, French, and Dutch masters. The Japanese were well aware, however, that advance into these areas (including the Philippines) would entail war with the United States. Moderates therefore held off as long as possible, trying to negotiate, but on October 16, 1941, a fanatical militarist, Prince Tojo, became prime minister of Japan. War began six weeks later with the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941).
WORLD WAR II AND AFTER

THE SECOND WORLD WAR—POSTWAR EUROPE—
THE HURRICANE IN ASIA—EPILOGUE
Waging War

1939  German-Russian occupation of Poland (Sept.); "phony war"
1940  German occupation of Denmark and Norway (Apr.)
       Invasion of Holland and Belgium (May)
       Churchill, Prime Minister of England (May 10)
       Italy declares war on France and England (June 10)
       France surrenders (June 22)
1940–  Battle of Britain
1941
1941  Germans invade Balkans and North Africa
       Russo-Japanese Pact (April 13)
       Germans attack Russia (June 22)
       Atlantic Charter (Aug. 14)
       Japanese attack Pearl Harbor (Dec. 7)
1942  Japanese successes in Pacific checked (June
       Russians stop Germans at Stalingrad
       British defeat Rommel in Africa
       Americans in Algeria (Nov. 8)
1943  Americans and British in Sicily (July)
       Fall of Mussolini (July 25)
       Italy surrenders (Sept. 3)
1944  Germans slowly driven from Italy
       Americans enter Rome (June 4)
       D Day: Americans land in France (June 6)
       Paris liberated (Aug. 25)
       "Battle of the Bulge" (Dec.)
1945  Allies cross Rhine (Mar.)
       Russians occupy eastern Europe (Feb.–Apr.)
       Hitler commits suicide (Apr. 30)
       V-E Day: Germany surrenders (May 8)
       American advance in Pacific (Jan.–Apr.)
       Atom bomb on Hiroshima (Aug. 6)
       V-J Day: Japan surrenders (Aug. 15)

Negotiating Peace

1943  Conference at Casablanca (Jan.)
       Conference at Teheran (Nov.)
1945  Conference at Yalta (Feb.)
       Conference at Potsdam (July)
       Charter of United Nations signed (June 26)
1947  Major European peace treaties (Feb. 10)
1951  Peace treaty with Japan (Sept. 8)
1950–  Korean War
1953
40. THE SECOND WORLD WAR

During the decade of the 1920’s European and American scholars and politicians were busy assessing responsibility and blame for the outbreak of war in 1914. While hostilities were still in progress nearly everybody in each camp believed quite sincerely that his country had been wantonly attacked by the enemy, and in the Treaty of Versailles the victorious Allies formally charged the Germans with aggression. Germans and Austrians took up the challenge and published hitherto secret records of what had happened in July, 1914, hoping to exculpate their governments thereby; Bolsheviks published Russian materials in order to discredit the tsar’s ministers; and the British and French defended themselves by publishing their secret correspondence. Eventually these disclosures covered the whole period from 1870 to 1914. Impartial scholars, especially in the United States, studied this correspondence and these recorded conversations with great care, and the “war guilt controversy” became a matter of interest to the educated public; but only after a decade of study and discussion did students of the question accept as substantially accurate the “revisionist” conclusions (summarized above, p. 554) regarding the origins and outbreak of the First World War.

No such controversy followed the Second World War. There was some debate, to be sure, about events leading up to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, but regarding the events of 1939 there has been none. In the last days of the war, American troops captured the archives of the German Foreign Office and sent them to Washington for study. These documents add many illuminating details to the wartime version of how the Second World War came, but they do not greatly change the story. In fact, they show the relentless and almost fanatical way in which Hitler pursued the policies he had outlined many years before in Mein Kampf (1925). He had promised to free
Germany from the shackles imposed upon her by the “Diktat” of Versailles, to unite all the Germans of Europe in one great Reich, and to find them additional Lebensraum (“living space”)—presumably in eastern or southeastern Europe. These were exactly the things he set out to do after he achieved power. He would of course have preferred to accomplish them without spilling precious German blood, but he made no secret of his willingness to fight if necessary, and when he found that he could not achieve his goals by peaceful means, he deliberately chose the time and place for attack. In an earlier chapter (p. 674) we traced the steps leading up to his declaration of war on Poland on September 1, 1939.

TOTAL WAR

During the troubled decade of the 1930’s the various governments of Europe had spent huge sums of money on military defense, though not always with skill and foresight. The French, being hypnotized by their successful stand against the Germans at Verdun and believing that the next war would merely be a continuation of the last one, fortified their eastern frontier with a strong and intricate system of steel and concrete defenses which was essentially an elaboration and improvement upon the trenches of the First World War. They considered this “Maginot line” impregnable, but as it extended only from Switzerland to the Belgian frontier, the Germans easily turned its flank in 1940 by advancing through Belgium. Relying upon this defense, French military men devoted relatively little thought to devising new types of warfare or to exploiting the possibilities of such new weapons as tanks and airplanes. Though the Germans paralleled the Maginot line with their rather similar “West Wall,” they did not stop there. After carefully reexamining the fundamental principles of military science in the light of what they had learned in the First World War, they set themselves to devising new tactics. General Franco graciously permitted them to practice these new devices on his fellow countrymen during the Spanish civil war, and in 1939 Germany had an army trained for warfare such as the world had never seen.

The Treaty of Versailles had limited the German army to 100,000 men, which forced the German generals to use each man to the greatest possible advantage. They therefore created an army of highly trained professional soldiers, which was much superior, man for man,
to the armies recruited by universal conscription. This small army of experts was not enough, however, since modern warfare requires large numbers of men for service behind the lines and for holding territories that the fighters have occupied. Hitler therefore reintroduced universal military service after his denunciation of the Treaty of Versailles in 1935, raised his standing army to 500,000 men, trained them for a few months, and replaced them with others. He was able in this way to call several million trained recruits to the colors in 1939. These recruits formed the bulk of the army, but critical fighting was entrusted to the hard core of seasoned professionals who made up the two most important branches of the service, namely, the armored divisions and the air force.

An ancient recipe promises victory to the general who "gets there first with the most men," and in the new warfare speed became more important than ever. In 1914 the German armies had advanced through northern France on foot, accompanied by horse-drawn artillery and supply wagons, and even in 1918 their transport was not completely motorized. In 1939 the motor truck had replaced the horse, and all large weapons were motorized. Tanks had been invented during the First World War, but the early models were cumbersome affairs, and generals did not know how to use them to the greatest advantage. In 1939, however, the Germans had a large supply of huge rapidly moving tanks, carrying large guns and so heavily armored that they could be stopped only by mines or by direct hits from enemy artillery. An attack by these monsters was almost irresistible, and after once breaking through the enemy line the tanks could advance at high speed, followed by the infantry. The resulting mobile warfare was often called Blitzkrieg or "lightning war."

The progress of air power brought a second radical change in warfare. In the war of 1914 airplanes had been used to observe troop movements and installations behind the enemy lines, or to machine-gun roads, bridges, and other small targets, but attempts to bomb enemy cities were not very encouraging. During the next twenty years the design and construction of airplanes improved so greatly that they could be used for many new purposes. Experiments made in Spain (notably at Guernica) convinced the German generals that it was possible to obliterate a large city by bombing it from the air, or at least that a few heavy bombings would so demoralize the enemy that he would sue for peace. Events proved these generals
to have been oversanguine, yet aerial bombardment became a major feature of the new warfare. Planes could also parachute bodies of armed men ("paratroopers") behind the enemy lines to occupy key points, destroy power plants, and otherwise prepare the way for a general advance. Air power thus became a major factor in fighting and winning the war.

These new methods of waging war had far-reaching consequences, sometimes raising new problems by creating new situations, and sometimes magnifying those that had arisen in the First World War. The efficient operation of a modern army requires enormous supplies of munitions, which industry must provide. If these supplies fail, the army must surrender, and generals are as anxious to destroy the enemy's industry as they are to annihilate his armies. In the years preceding 1939, planners devoted as much careful thought to industrial preparation as they did to military training. They built factories to produce war goods and arranged for the quick conversion of others to war purposes. During the war, heavy air raids were directed against important industrial cities, but as soon as the enemy raid was over, engineers began working feverishly to get their plants into operation once more as quickly as possible. As demands for industrial production brought serious shortages of raw materials and manpower, the war governments carefully rationed both, and strict limitations were placed on the production of articles not deemed essential to the war effort. The civilian population turned its energies to the production of food or munitions. Everyone took part in the war in one way or another, and the result was sometimes called "total war."

Western Europe does not produce the gasoline and oil that are required in huge quantities by a modern mechanized army, the only European oil fields of importance being in Romania and the Russian Caucasus. German chemists had devised ways of synthesizing gasoline from coal, but in the later years of the war their armies were desperate for power and lubricants. Rubber is almost as important in mechanized warfare, and most of the world's supply of this essential material came from Malaya, which the Japanese occupied in 1942. A perilous situation was averted, however, by the discovery of ways of making artificial rubber. Another essential was tin, nearly all of which came from southeastern Asia or the almost inaccessible Bolivia. To assure themselves of these indispensable raw materials, and to keep the enemy from getting them, the various belligerents
occupied the countries producing them, and the war gradually took on a global aspect. Military strategy then required further seizures. Germany overran the whole Balkan Peninsula to protect the Romanian oil wells against attack from that direction; in Norway she secured submarine bases and airfields from which to attack England; and Hitler’s long and expensive campaign in North Africa was designed to cut England’s Suez Canal route to India, to aid rebels in that country, and to force England to send her ships by the long route around South Africa. It thus became increasingly difficult for any part of the world to remain neutral.

As regards supplies, the British were in a much better position than the Germans because now, as in the First World War, their navy was able to keep most sea lanes open for shipping. Germany again tried to blockade England by submarine, but without conspicuous success. Her fleet of submarines was not strong, but the vessels were larger and better than before, and they could operate farther from base. Their most serious depredations came in the Caribbean and off the eastern coast of the United States in the early months of 1941, but newly invented devices for detecting submarines, notably radar and sonar, enabled the Allies to win this “battle of the Atlantic.” The Germans had begun to build a battle fleet in 1935, but much of it was sunk in minor engagements early in the war, and the surviving vessels stayed in port thereafter. We shall see, however, that the American and Japanese navies fought major battles in the Pacific.

With gross exaggeration Hitler often attributed Germany’s defeat in 1918 to a “stab in the back”—that is, to the collapse of civilian morale and the revolution. (The collapse really came after military defeat, and was caused by it.) He therefore devoted great care to building up a fighting spirit in Germany, and in this undertaking he was eminently successful: German morale did not collapse again until 1945, after the whole country had been occupied by enemy troops. Hitler also attempted to destroy morale in enemy countries. Long before the “shooting war” began, he was waging a “war of nerves” against his adversaries, partly by sudden annexations of neighboring lands and by other theatrical acts, and partly by vivid accounts of the terrors a modern war would bring. After shooting had started, his air raids were designed in part to demoralize the civilian population of Britain, and his early triumphs in the Blitzkrieg had the same effect. His propaganda achieved a considerable success.
in France and other countries, but it was not enough. Hitler’s activities during the “appeasement” period had convinced too many people that he was an aggressor who must be stopped at any cost, and as a morale builder Hitler was no match for Winston Churchill. In the end, Hitler lost his own morale and blew out his brains.

The technique of propaganda had changed considerably since the First World War, and the skill of propagandists had increased correspondingly. The invention and wide dissemination of radio, for example, enabled broadcasters to fill the air waves with propaganda suited to every level of intelligence, but radio was only one of the many new methods employed. Long before 1939 each rival camp had worked out the major lines of its appeal to the public, or, as they said, its “ideology.” In every country the communists organized political parties which devoted themselves actively to propaganda, always following the “party line” as laid down by Moscow. The Nazis tried the same device, but with less success in the democratic countries. Both groups also organized secret “cells,” whose members were often resolute individuals prepared to go to any lengths to make their views prevail. Such groups had been quite active in Spain during the civil war, where they were first called “fifth columns.” (Franco is alleged to have remarked on one occasion that he had four columns of troops marching on Madrid, and a “fifth column” inside the city.) In some cases the German fifth columnists caused trouble—as in Norway, where they were led by an army officer named Quisling, whose name has since been applied to all such traitors—and in the postwar years communist fifth columns were highly successful in central and eastern Europe.

**THE EARLY CAMPAIGNS**

No one can foresee the myriad ramifications of a modern war, and therefore no one can prepare for them all, but Hitler and his staff had done an amazing job in the four or five years since they began arming openly. At first the war went just as they had planned. After entering Poland on the morning of September 1, 1939, German troops gave the world its first demonstration of a modern Blitzkrieg. The Russians entered Poland from the east two weeks later, and before the end of the month the whole country had been overrun. Meantime a British expeditionary force of over 300,000 men was crossing the English Channel to northern France. The French armies
took their positions in the Maginot line, but there they sat, making no efforts to launch a general offensive. The Germans made a few exploratory probings of this line, but for eight months there was little action on the western front. While the Germans were completing their military preparations and the French were sitting quietly in their fortified positions, impatient war correspondents began complaining about the “phony war.”

Germany struck again on the morning of April 9, 1940, with the sudden seizure of half a dozen ports in Norway. As the way had been prepared by Quisling, there was little fighting; all Norway quickly fell into German hands; and the country was declared a German protectorate. Denmark was occupied without fighting. With his flank thus secure, Hitler turned to the west, and on May 10 he launched a major attack against Holland and Belgium. Here again his fifth columns had been active, and his armored divisions were preceded by bombers and paratroopers who wrought great havoc and upset plans for defense. Holland surrendered on May 14 and Belgium on the twenty-eighth. The German armies then pushed into northern France, heading for the English Channel rather than Paris. An armored division reached the coast near Abbeville on May 21, and the English expeditionary forces, as well as many French and Belgian troops, were trapped north of this line. The British managed to evacuate 335,000 men from Dunkirk during the next few days, but all equipment was lost. Turning south, the Germans entered Paris on June 14, and on the seventeenth the French sued for peace. On the twenty-first they received armistice terms from Hitler at Compiègne, in the very car in which Foch had given the Germans their terms in 1918, and the French signed them on the twenty-second. Fighting in France ceased on the twenty-fifth. The Germans occupied all northern and western France, while the rest of the country was ruled by a subservient government of French fascists at Vichy. The leader of this government was the eighty-four-year-old Marshal Pétain, who had commanded the French armies at Verdun in 1916, and its prime minister was Pierre Laval.

Hitler hoped that the fall of France would so demoralize England that she would surrender, but he was cruelly disappointed. On May 10, the day that Nazi troops entered Holland, Winston Churchill became prime minister of England, and during the next five years he presided brilliantly over the destinies of his people. He had been among the first to warn of Hitler’s aggressive intentions, and he now
maintained England’s morale in the face of tremendous odds. In so far as it is possible to say that any one man won the war, that man was Winston Churchill. In his first speech after becoming prime minister he uttered the famous words, “I have nothing to offer but blood and toil and tears and sweat.” Soon thereafter Hitler publicly threatened England with “complete annihilation” if she did not surrender at once, to which Churchill replied that England would never surrender. This attitude he maintained to the end.

Hitler had no facilities for invading England, but he attempted to beat her into submission by air raids. Beginning in the summer of 1940 he first attacked docks and arsenals, then munition plants and other industrial centers, and finally, as he grew more desperate, he bombed cities indiscriminately. His air force was the largest, but the British fighter planes were better than his, and his losses outnumbered England’s by two to one. Moreover, the British presently were making planes faster than they were losing them, while the Germans were not. Hitler could not sustain such losses, and though raids continued throughout the war, their number and intensity declined rapidly in 1941.

Mussolini had remained neutral in September, 1939, but the fall of France caused him to declare war on her (June 10, 1940). After occupying a few French villages he signed an armistice on June 24. Not content with this glorious victory, he decided to conquer Egypt as well, launching his great campaign in September. Attacking eastward from Libya (which had been an Italian colony since 1912), his troops penetrated several miles into the Egyptian desert, but by the end of the year they had been expelled, and the British under General Wavell presently drove them halfway across Libya. The Germans then sent an army of picked men—the famous Afrika Korps—under General Rommel (April, 1941), whose armies pushed into Egypt. For the next year and a half the British and German armies seesawed back and forth, but in January, 1943, the Axis forces were finally driven from Africa. At one moment (June, 1942) German success seemed so imminent that Mussolini ordered a white horse flown to Africa for his triumphant entry into Cairo, but the poor man got no chance to ride it. Mussolini also attempted an invasion of Greece from Albania, which he had seized in April, 1939. His armies entered the country clamorously on October 28, 1940, but they were expelled before the end of the year.
Meantime the Balkan States too were receiving Hitler’s attention. The government of Hungary had for years been sympathetic to Hitler’s anti-Semitic and foreign policies and had been rewarded with a slice of Slovakia at the time of the Munich crisis. Two years later the Magyars, always importunate for more, were granted Transylvania—once a part of Hungary but transferred to Romania in 1919 since most of its people were Romanians. Russia had already occupied Bessarabia, as arranged by the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939. Bulgaria then demanded and received part of the Dobruja, which she had lost to Romania in 1913. Though thus despoiled, Romania still had her oil wells, which the Germans dared not risk losing. Using intrigue and fifth-column tactics they therefore drove out the neutralist King Carol (September, 1940), whom they replaced by his son Michael. Large bodies of German troops entered the country to protect its new government (and the oil fields), and Romania dropped into the position of a German satellite. Bulgaria was easily brought into the German fold by similar methods (March, 1941), but Yugoslavia and Greece required military conquest, which came a month later. As Rommel was at this time winning his victories in Africa, and as Nazi intriguers were hard at work in Syria, Iraq, and Iran, it seemed that the whole Near East might soon fall to Hitler.

Hitler’s honeymoon with Stalin was not of long duration. As soon as Poland had been conquered in 1939, the victors partitioned it, with Hitler taking rather more than Stalin had promised him and letting Russia have Lithuania in exchange. During the next few months the Russians easily established themselves as “protectors” of the Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia), but they were less successful in Finland. The Finns resisted, and only after several months of bitter fighting did the Russians secure a “frontier rectification.” German advances in the Balkans greatly disturbed the Russians, whose ancient ambitions in that region had not been forgotten and who, as always, were anxious to acquire Constantinople and the Straits. The Germans tried in vain to placate them by offering them Persia and India, but the occupation of Bulgaria alarmed them, and the conquest of Yugoslavia infuriated them. Seeking friends elsewhere, the Russians then signed a nonaggression pact with Japan (April 13, 1941).

When Hitler found he could not vanquish England by air raids, he decided to eliminate Russia at once and finish with England later. He therefore ordered (December 18, 1940) that his generals pre-
pare for a quick campaign to occupy European Russia as far as the Volga River and Archangel. The generals then planned what they hoped would be the crowning demonstration of their irresistible prowess with the *Blitzkrieg*. But when their armies attacked Russia on June 22, suddenly and without a previous declaration of war, they were astonished at the resistance they met. They fell far behind schedule, and when winter set in they had taken neither Moscow nor Leningrad, nor had they smashed the Russian army. Not being prepared for winter campaigning, the German troops suffered cruelly during the next few months, but they resumed the struggle in the spring of 1942. They made further progress in some sectors, especially in southern Russia, but again they failed to destroy the Russian armies. The final test of strength came at Stalingrad, from September to November, 1942, where some of the bloodiest fighting of the war took place. The Germans failed to capture the city, and with this failure their military successes came to an end.

**THE TURN OF THE TIDE**

American public opinion had been sadly disillusioned by the aftermath of the First World War, and large sections of the population were determined never to enter European controversies again. During the decade of the 1930’s, while England and France were appeasing Hitler and Mussolini, these American “isolationists” secured the enactment by congress of a series of “neutralities laws,” the more important of which forbade financial loans or the sale of munitions to belligerents (see p. 657). At first President Roosevelt seemed to be in general sympathy with the isolationists; but by 1937 he was much alarmed by the aggressions of Germany, Italy, and Japan, and in an important speech in Chicago (October 5, 1937) he proposed that aggressors by “quarantined.” During the next two years he spoke frequently of helping the victims of aggression with “all aid short of war.” When war broke out in 1939, Roosevelt personally favored the Allies, intellectually as well as emotionally, but American isolationism was so strong that he could secure nothing more than a new Neutrality Act (November 4, 1939), permitting the sale of munitions to belligerents on a “cash and carry” basis. (Purchasers must pay for what they bought with their own cash—not with money borrowed in this country—and they must carry the munitions to Europe themselves.) Many Americans were disturbed by the fall of France, and their sympathies
went to Churchill and the British, but there was no appreciable demand for military intervention.

As everyone knows, when the United States finally entered the war it did so because of Japanese action in the Pacific. Japan had been fighting an undeclared war in China since 1937, or in a broader way since 1931 (see p. 714), but she had made little progress beyond seizing a few Chinese ports and railway lines. Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist government still ruled the greater part of China from his capital at Chungking. Japanese prospects were therefore rather dreary when, in the spring of 1940, the fall of France and the Netherlands presented new and easier fields for immediate conquest. Japan then concluded a tripartite pact with Germany and Italy, allowing them the right to reorganize Europe along new lines, in exchange for which they granted Japan a free hand in establishing her "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere"—that is, she might seize the French and Dutch colonies in the Far East (September 27, 1940). A few months later Japan signed a nonaggression pact with Russia, which freed her from the danger of attack from the north (April 13, 1941). Indochina was occupied by stages in 1940 and 1941, to which the United States retaliated by placing an embargo
upon the export of scrap iron to Japan and later of gasoline and oil (August 1, 1941). As the latter products were absolutely essential in the conduct of war in China, Japan was forced to desperate measures. After a few hopeless negotiations, Japanese airplanes were sent to bomb the American naval base at Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands (December 7, 1941). Japan declared war the next day, with Germany and Italy following suit on the eleventh.

In 1939 the American army had consisted of less than 200,000 men, but in 1940 Congress passed a Selective Service Act, and soon almost a million recruits were in training. Many months were to pass, however, before a large and well-drilled American army was ready for action. America was better prepared industrially. Under the stimulus of orders from England and France, munition plants had begun to expand as early as 1938, and soon after the outbreak of hostilities in Europe President Roosevelt set up boards to coördinate America’s industrial effort. These measures were bearing fruit even before Pearl Harbor, and in 1942 American industry tipped the scales of war. Thousands of tanks and airplanes were sent to Russia, where they played an important part in halting the German advance, while others helped stop Rommel in Africa. At the same time British industry was recovering rapidly from the bombings of 1940-1941. By the end of 1942 Anglo-American bombings of Germany were far more devastating than the German bombings of Britain had ever been, and they continued with increasing fury throughout the remainder of the war. But even before the heavy bombings began, British and American industry had outstripped that of Germany.

Late in 1942 the Allies were at last ready to assume the offensive, both in Russia and in Africa. In November of that year the Russians launched a great counterattack, and before the end of 1943 they had regained most of what they held before the war. England and the United States, on the other hand, decided that the year 1943 should be devoted to clearing the Mediterranean and forcing Italy out of the war. The British defeated Rommel at El Alamein in Egypt (October, 1942) and within three months they had driven him across Libya to Tunis, where his Afrika Korps of 200,000 men finally surrendered (May, 1943). Meantime American and British armies under Eisenhower had landed in Algeria and Morocco (November, 1942), where they were joined by many of the “Vichy” French. Africa was cleared of Axis forces, but the Germans retaliated by occupying “Vichy” France.
The next step came when American and British troops crossed to Sicily (July, 1943) and occupied the entire island in less than six weeks. As the Italian army was by now disintegrating, the only serious resistance met by the invaders came from Germans stationed there. On July 25 the king of Italy dismissed Mussolini, whose successor soon signed an armistice (September 3, 1943). Nevertheless the Germans still had to be driven from Italy. American troops, landing at Salerno (September 8), took Naples within three weeks, but thereafter their advance was slow. They entered Rome on June 4, 1944, but they did not reach the Po Valley until the spring of 1945. After his fall from power, Mussolini fled to the protection of the German armies in Italy, but he and his mistress were captured by antifascist Italians (April 28, 1945), who murdered them both and hung them up by their heels for public inspection.

This slowness in occupying Italy was due less to German resistance than to the fact that in 1944 France again became the major theater of action. On June 6—the famous “D Day”—General Eisenhower successfully landed large American and British armies in Normandy,
despite strong German opposition. More than a month was required to consolidate the beachhead, to occupy about half of Normandy, and to build up a well-equipped army of more than a million men there. The Americans then broke through the German lines, and an American Blitzkrieg followed. Brittany was occupied without much trouble, Paris was liberated on August 25, and Brussels was freed on September 3. Immediately after D Day the French “underground” (supposedly peaceful civilians who did what they could to sabotage German operations) went into action and greatly demoralized the enemy by their sudden small attacks. Meantime American troops were advancing northward from southern France to join the army from Normandy, and the “Free French” (who had escaped from the Germans in 1940) took their place in the line. Before the end of 1944, these various forces had driven the Germans from almost all France and Belgium.

The Russians had by this time driven the Germans from Russia, Finland, the Baltic States, and eastern Poland, leaving the battle fronts about where they had been in June, 1941. Turning south, the Russian armies then forced Romania and Bulgaria out of the war (August 23 and September 8), and the Nazis hurriedly withdrew their troops from Greece and Albania, from the greater part of Yugoslavia, and from much of Hungary. At the end of 1944 the Germans held only Norway and Denmark, parts of Poland, Holland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia, and northern Italy.

Germany was still protected by her “West Wall,” however, and late in December, 1944, the Nazis made their last furious attacks in southeastern Belgium. For a few days they enjoyed considerable success in this “battle of the bulge,” but they were soon checked, and by February, 1945, the Allies were ready to invade Germany. Within a month they had broken through the “West Wall” and occupied all Germany up to the Rhine. After crossing that river in force at the end of March, they encountered no prepared defenses, and the way to Berlin lay open before them. The German army then melted away in a manner resembling that of the French army in 1940. Meanwhile the Russians had resumed their advance, taking Budapest (February 13), Bratislava (capital of Slovakia, April 4), and Vienna (April 13). They entered Germany in March; they began shelling Berlin on April 21; Hitler committed suicide at Berlin on the thirtieth; and the Russians entered the city on May 2. The German armies in northern Italy surrendered on April 29, those in Ger-
many on May 7. The war officially came to an end at midnight on May 8, which day is now known as V-E (Victory in Europe) Day.

Japan too had opened hostilities with a Blitzkrieg. As the attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941) was a complete surprise, American losses were heavy, and neither the navy nor the air force could assume the offensive for many months thereafter. Several hours after their attack on Pearl Harbor the Japanese were equally successful in surprise attacks on the Philippines and Guam, and three days later their planes sank two British battleships off Singapore. Having thus won undisputed naval and air supremacy in the western Pacific, they made haste to occupy new territories. Siam, Burma, Malaya, and Singapore went the way of French Indochina; the Dutch East Indies and the countless small islands of Indonesia followed the Philippines; and, except for parts of New Guinea, the Japanese held everything north of Australia. This expansion was checked by American naval victories in the Coral Sea (May 7, 1942) and at Midway (June 3), and it ended when American marines firmly established themselves on Guadalcanal (August, 1942).

The Americans had neither the men or the equipment for a counter-offensive in 1943, but in 1944 an increased flow of supplies enabled them to start regaining what had been lost. In spite of furious Japanese resistance Americans took Saipan in June, Leyte in October (after another major naval battle), and the main island of the Philippines (Luzon) in January, 1945. Burma was reoccupied by the British during the winter, and after Americans had taken Iwo Jima and Okinawa, in February and April, they were within striking distance of Japan itself.

Soon thereafter American planes began a thorough bombing of Japan, which culminated in the dropping of terribly destructive atomic bombs on Hiroshima (August 6) and Nagasaki (August 9). For many weeks informed Japanese had seen defeat staring them in the face, and they now persuaded the emperor to surrender. Japan asked for an armistice on August 10. She accepted America’s terms on the fourteenth and fighting stopped on the fifteenth (V-J Day). Formal surrender took place aboard the American battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay on September 2, 1945, thus bringing the Second World War to a close just six years and one day after it had begun.
41. POSTWAR EUROPE

During the war much thought had been given to problems of peace. As early as August 14, 1941, President Roosevelt dramatically met Winston Churchill on a British battleship off Newfoundland, where the two men drew up the "Atlantic Charter." This declaration renounced territorial aggrandizement, looked forward to a free world, and promised postwar disarmament—all in terms highly reminiscent of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points. After America entered the war, this Charter was signed by the representatives of twenty-six nations (January 1, 1942), all of whom promised at the same time to fight to the end against Hitler. Twenty-one other nations later joined this group, which came to be called "the United Nations."

During the next few years the highest officials of the principal Allied powers conferred personally from time to time. Their major discussions concerned military matters, of course, but diplomacy and the postwar world also received their attention. After a conference at Casablanca in Morocco (January, 1943) it was announced that the Allies would enter into no peace negotiations with the Axis powers except on the basis of "unconditional surrender." They did not wish to have some future Hitler say that the civilian population of Germany had been blarneyed into an unnecessary surrender by the lying promises of the enemy, though the German army had never been defeated. Territorial questions were discussed at Teheran in Persia (November, 1943) and at Yalta in southern Russia (February, 1945), and in greater detail at Potsdam in Germany (July, 1945, after V-E Day), but no final agreements were reached at these conferences.

The outbreak of war in 1939 had been a deathblow to the old League of Nations, yet many people were convinced that the idea of
such a League had been a sound one and that a new League, founded
under happier auspices and having the United States as one of its
principal members, would be the most feasible way of preserving the
peace of the world. It also seemed that the best way to launch such
a world organization would be to perpetuate the “United Nations”
then allied against Germany. A statement to this effect was made at
Teheran, and in September, 1944, representatives of the United
States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China assembled at
Dumbarton Oaks (near Washington, D.C.) to draw up preliminary
plans for a new League. These plans were discussed at Yalta, and
on April 25, 1945, representatives of all the United Nations met at
San Francisco. After two months of discussion the Charter of the
United Nations was formally signed by the representatives of fifty
nations. These charter members of the United Nations were the
“peace-loving” nations that had declared war on Germany or Japan.
Several wartime neutrals, a number of the newly created states, and
some former “enemy” states have since been admitted to the organ-
ization.

Headquarters of the United Nations were established in New York,
where they are now housed in a magnificent building donated by
John D. Rockefeller, Jr. Here the Assembly, composed of repre-
sentatives from each of the member states, meets at least once every
year to discuss matters of world concern, and here the secretary-
general of the United Nations has permanent offices for his large staff.
More important is the Security Council, whose eleven members in-
clude one from each of the five great powers (the United States,
Great Britain, France, Russia, and China) and six chosen by the
Assembly from its other member states. Each of the first five enjoys
veto power over all actions of the Council, thus requiring unanimity
of the great powers before any measure can be approved. This Se-
curity Council is the body which may order active steps to preserve
peace or to resist aggression, even by force of arms. Besides the
Assembly and the Security Council, the United Nations includes a
Secretariat and also maintains an International Court of Justice.
Though created primarily to guard the peace of the world, the United
Nations has become the center of many international activities which
are concerned with such matters as finance, trade, labor, communica-
tions, aviation, and health, as well as with educational, scientific,
and cultural affairs.
The Peace Treaties

The diplomats at Yalta and Potsdam discussed many matters regarding peace and the postwar world, and their decisions were crucial for the future of Europe. At Yalta, for example, it was decided which parts of Europe each of the Allied armies might occupy, and at Potsdam these decisions were amplified or ratified. As the Americans at Yalta were extremely anxious to have Russia declare war on Japan (they had no idea how near Japan was to surrender), they were quite generous to her in eastern and central Europe as well as in Asia. It was expected, moreover, that these arrangements would be only temporary, and that a permanent settlement would follow free elections in the liberated regions. Memories of Paris in 1919 dissuaded the diplomats at Potsdam from holding a full-dress peace conference which might saddle the recently organized United Nations with quarrels such as those with which the Treaty of Versailles had weighed down the League of Nations. They therefore entrusted the drafting of peace treaties to the foreign ministers of the great powers. Meeting intermittently through 1946, these men eventually produced treaties with Italy, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland. During the fall of 1946 their drafts were discussed by a larger group, including the representatives of sixteen other nations, and the final treaties were signed at Paris on February 10, 1947.

These treaties provided for various territorial changes, reparations payments, the disarmament of the defeated states, and the dissolution of fascist organizations. The treaty with Italy required her to surrender small territories to France, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Albania; it assessed reparations amounting to $360 million; and it stripped Italy of her colonies. The Assembly of the United Nations later decided that Libya should become a constitutional monarchy under a Moslem king, Idris I; Italian Somaliland was to become an independent state after ten years under Italian trusteeship; and Eritrea was added to Ethiopia, where the British had reinstated the native king (Haile Selassie) whom Mussolini had expelled in 1936. The treaty with Romania transferred Bessarabia and part of Bukovina to Russia, and part of the Dobruja to Bulgaria, but it restored Transylvania to Romania; and Romania was assessed $300 million for reparations. Hungary was ordered to return Transylvania and the parts
of Czechoslovakia that she had seized in 1938, and to pay $300 million toward reparations. Bulgaria was allowed to keep the Dobruja (snatched from her by Romania in 1913), but she had to pay $70 million reparations. And Finland, in addition to losing territories rather larger than those taken from her by Russia in 1940, was assessed $300 million for reparations. The total reparations thus amounted to $1330 million, two-thirds of which was to go to Russia.

Peace and civilian governments also had to be established in the various countries of central Europe which the Germans had overrun. At the time of the Nazi invasions, the lawful rulers of these countries had fled, usually to England, where they passed the remainder of the war as "governments-in-exile." After the war these men wished to resume governing their native lands, but so much had happened since their departure that they were not always welcome at home. The governments of Norway and the Netherlands had no trouble, but there was controversy in Belgium, whose king had spent the war as a prisoner in Germany. In the Balkan States the situation was even more complicated. The governments of Yugoslavia and Albania had been liberated by the Russians, with the aid of "partisans" led by native communists. These communists repudiated the old governments-in-exile and began ruling their respective countries with Russian aid. Greece, on the other hand, had been liberated by the British, who restored the old government in spite of communist opposition. The three Baltic States—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania—had been occupied and annexed by the Russians in 1944, after which the diplomats forgot them. Many of their inhabitants were deported and their former governments simply disappeared.

Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Austria presented even greater difficulties. As the Polish government-in-exile was unwilling to approve Russia's seizure of Polish territory in 1939, the Russians refused to recognize that government. In its place they set up a compliant and communist-controlled government-in-exile of their own (1943). The diplomats at Yalta agreed that there should be a new Polish state, but that Russia might retain the White Russian and Ukrainian provinces which the Poles had torn from her in 1921; these provinces amounted to about half the territory Russia had seized in 1939. At Potsdam the diplomats decided, however, that the new Polish state should be compensated for this loss of Russian and Ukrainian territory at Germany's expense. The southern half of East Prussia, and all Silesia and Pomerania, were handed over to Poland, in spite of
their wholly German population, while the Russians themselves kept the northern half of East Prussia, with its capital at Königsberg (renamed Kaliningrad). Supposedly this arrangement was only temporary, but both Poles and Russians considered it permanent, and the Russian-sponsored government-in-exile began to rule the new Polish state.

As the Czechoslovak government-in-exile had signed a twenty-year alliance with Russia in 1943, it was allowed to return to Prague in 1945, but three years later it was overthrown by Czech communists who then usurped power. Austria presented a more difficult case, for there had been no independent Austrian government in 1939 and consequently there was no Austrian government-in-exile in 1945. At Teheran, however, the diplomats decided that there must be an Austria once more. A provisional republic was proclaimed shortly before the Russians entered Vienna (March, 1945), but the Allies could not agree among themselves as to what should be done. Military occupation by the four Allies continued year after year until 1955, when a peace treaty was finally drafted and signed. The tiny Austrian Republic was then freed of foreign troops and resumed its more or less independent existence.

Most difficult of all was the task of creating a new and peaceful Germany, and after ten years of wrangling among the great powers its accomplishment seemed farther away than on V-E Day. The diplomats at Yalta had decided that all Germany should be occupied by Allied troops. The country was therefore divided into four zones—one for each of the great European powers, including France. Berlin was wholly surrounded by the Russian zone, but the city itself was cut into four parts, one for each ally. The Russians held the eastern, or working-class, half of the city while the three other Allies divided its western half among themselves. It was also decided to punish various Nazi leaders as “war criminals.” Hitler, Goebbels, Himmler, and others had committed suicide in the last days of the war, but several other Nazis were tried before a military tribunal at Nuremberg in 1946. Twelve of them were condemned to death and executed, others were given prison sentences, but still others were acquitted. Germany was disarmed, and efforts were made to collect reparations. As in Austria, the Russians stripped their zone of its machinery, but the western allies were more lenient and got less. Strenuous efforts were also made to “denazify” the Germans. The Nazi party was abolished, the crimes of its leaders were broadcast from Nuremberg.
prominent Nazis were removed from government posts, schools were purged of Nazi propaganda—but with what success remains to be seen. In May, 1952, the western Allies signed a peace treaty with a government they had set up at Bonn.

Meantime Japan was being transformed by her former enemies. At the moment of Japan’s surrender a large American army was poised for an assault upon her main islands, and during the next few weeks these troops occupied the country. The old Japanese government continued to function for local affairs, but for the next several years the American commander (General Douglas MacArthur) was the real ruler of Japan. As early as 1943 the Allies had announced that Japan must surrender all her conquests of the preceding half-century, and at Yalta they promised Russia all that she had lost by the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. Russia did not declare war on Japan until August 8 (two days after Hiroshima), but she then made haste to occupy the territories awarded her. The demilitarization of Japan was completed before the end of the year, and various war criminals were tried and punished, but Russian obstruction prevented a formal
peace treaty until the United States decided to negotiate one alone. An American commission toured the Far East, drafted a tentative program, submitted it to the other powers for comment, and then drew up a treaty with Japan. Fifty nations signed the final document at San Francisco (September 8, 1951), and the treaty went into effect on April 28, 1952. By it Japan was reduced to her four major islands and a few nearby small ones; she renounced all special rights in China; and a special "security pact," signed on the same day, permitted American military occupation of the islands for an indefinite period.

The fighting may have ceased, and peace treaties may have been signed, but confusion and hysteria continued as the world sadly counted the cost of its recent war and turned to the dreary tasks of reconstruction. Even today the casualties have not all been counted, yet the best estimates indicate that at least eleven million soldiers and fourteen million civilians lost their lives, and that a far larger number were severely wounded. This is at least three times the number of soldiers killed in the First World War. The physical damage wrought by the war increased in even greater proportion, for the two most highly industrialized countries of 1914 (England and Germany) had escaped almost unscathed from the First War. It has been estimated that the Second War destroyed over a quarter of all the property in Europe. Moreover, all Europe was filled with displaced persons who had been bombed out of their homes, or deported as laborers, or who had fled before the advancing armies or as political refugees. These unfortunates had no means of livelihood and most of them no longer had homes to which they could return. Food supplies were inadequate, and their distribution at times was inequitable. And finally, after six years of war, nearly everyone in Europe was suffering from nervous exhaustion. Men's imaginations were deeply seared by the horrors they had witnessed, and neither the cause of peace nor the tranquillity of the human race was promoted by the many well-meaning but hysterical persons who spent their time screaming about the atom bomb and the impending collapse of civilization.

POSTWAR RUSSIA

When statesmen turned to the tasks of political and economic reconstruction, they found themselves greatly hampered by another
postwar development. The Russians and their Western allies had never trusted each other, and even in the darkest days of the war they had quarreled frequently. When they no longer feared the Axis powers, their quarrels took on new magnitude. The Russians firmly believed that the capitalist countries would stop at nothing in their efforts to stamp out communism, and the Western peoples were equally terrified by the specter of Russians plotting world conquest or world revolution. Europe was thus split into two hostile camps, with the dividing line running through central Germany and Austria, from the Baltic Sea near Lübeck to the Adriatic near Trieste, just where the Russian and Western armies of occupation had met. This line was strongly guarded by troops, travel across it remained difficult if not impossible, news from the other side was heavily censored, and as early as 1946 Winston Churchill called it the “Iron Curtain” separating the two halves of Europe. The rivalry of East and West came to be called the “cold war”; it presently grew into a world-wide struggle; and at times it exploded into a “shooting war.”

As the Germans wrought terrific damage in the parts of Russia that they occupied, they left behind them tremendous tasks of reconstruction. Stalin inaugurated a new Five Year Plan in 1946, and at the end of 1950 he announced that Russia’s industrial production had again reached the levels attained in 1940. This success was due in part to the fact that Russia’s great industrial centers in the Urals and Siberia had remained undamaged and had even been expanded during the war. Agricultural production likewise regained its prewar level by 1950, but with Siberia contributing a larger share than formerly. There could be little doubt that agricultural and industrial production would continue to increase rapidly for many years and that Soviet Russia would soon be one of the world’s great industrial powers.

More important than increased production was the fact that Russian society had been deeply shaken by the war and that reconstruction greatly accelerated developments which began even before 1939. The Russian Revolution was now entering a new phase. Though Stalin remained in office until his death (March 5, 1953), his successors soon thereafter announced new policies. A few even attacked his memory. These new Russian leaders had joined the Communist party as young men in 1918 or later, and they had never really known any social or political system other than communism. They therefore accepted this system as a matter of course, but while they

Reconstruction in Russia

New Russian leaders
might pay lip homage to Lenin (and curse Stalin) they did not share the expressed ideals of their predecessors. They owed their power and prestige to their control of the Communist party and to their ability to manage the economic machinery of the nation. They were successful bureaucrats, not ardent revolutionists. Living in luxury, they no longer believed in Lenin’s “classless society,” and they made it increasingly difficult for the children of peasants and workers to enter their charmed circle. The Revolution thus followed exactly the course formerly taken by the revolutions in ancient Rome under Caesar, in England under Cromwell, and in France under Robespierre and his colleagues. A new governing aristocracy had replaced the old. It is still too soon to say how this second generation of communists will direct the affairs of Russia, but their Western rivals apparently deemed it best to assume that they would continue the autocracy, the ardent nationalism, the Pan-Slavism, and the aggressive imperialism which they had inherited through Stalin from tsarist Russia.

In view of Russia’s sufferings during the German invasion of 1941–1942, it was not strange that her rulers should seek strong assurances that no more fighting would take place on Russian soil. They therefore set up communist governments wherever their armies went in central and southeastern Europe, which regions they dominated through “satellite” states. Their task was made easier by the fact that in these regions native communists had been the most active leaders of resistance to the Germans while anticommunists were usually tarred with Nazi sympathies. Economic organization had been wrecked by systematic German looting, and starving people were easily dazzled by Russian promises of a communist utopia. At Yalta and Potsdam the Russians had agreed that free elections should be held in these liberated countries, but when the time for voting came, they aided local communists in terrorizing voters and rigging elections. After the communists had once won an election, all other political parties were straightway abolished and hostile politicians were exiled, imprisoned, or executed. Communist governments were thus established in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania. By 1948 these new governments were allied with and completely subservient to Moscow, except in the case of Yugoslavia, where the communist leader (Marshal Tito) defied his masters. In the other satellite states the heel of Russia was heavy, and the workers’ paradise was slow in arriving, but for eight
years there was no open rebellion. In the fall of 1956 there were serious revolts in both Poland and Hungary, but they were suppressed with a brutality which was reminiscent of the tsars.

THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES

Though the Second World War took fewer British lives than the First (and half of these were civilians killed in air raids), the destruction of property was many times greater. The British therefore faced a serious task of reconstruction. Winston Churchill had been a magnificent and a highly respected war leader, but the election of July, 1945, was won by the Labour party, which governed England for the next six years, with Clement Attlee (born, 1883) as prime minister. The Labour party entered office with elaborate plans for what was called the “welfare state,” promising “cradle to grave” security for everyone. Its various proposals had been discussed for years, and many were already in operation in other countries—notably in the American “New Deal”—but during their six years in office (1945–1951) Attlee and his colleagues went far beyond their predecessors. The Bank of England was nationalized in 1946; the coal mines followed in 1947; and railways, aviation, the electrical industry, the steel industry, and several other industries were taken over a little later. Agriculture was not nationalized, but it was placed under government supervision, with acreage and crops regulated and prices fixed. Compulsory insurance provided benefits for unemployment, sickness, retirement, and death. The Labour government also devoted great attention to housing, town planning, and education, and in 1948 the state began providing free medical, dental, and hospital care to all who applied for it. The cost of these reforms was enormous; taxation and large loans from the United States and Canada were not enough to meet the treasury’s needs; and in 1949 the pound sterling had to be devalued from $4.04 to $2.80. In October, 1951, the Conservatives returned to office, with Winston Churchill again prime minister, but while the new leaders checked the trend to socialism, they undid very little of what had already been accomplished.

The German victories of 1940 brought an end to the Third French Republic, founded in 1870, but General Charles de Gaulle presided over a government-in-exile during the war years. When de Gaulle reentered Paris (shortly after the city’s liberation in August, 1944), the Allies recognized him as the lawful ruler of France. Slightly over a year later a Constituent Assembly was elected, but the constitution
it drafted was too radical, and a second Assembly produced a more conservative document. After being accepted by the people (October, 1946), this constitution became the fundamental law of the Fourth French Republic. Its authors, fearing a dictator, insisted upon a weak executive, but they gave great power to the popularly elected National Assembly which voted all laws. The new Assembly was hopelessly divided into a number of small groups: the Communists were the largest single party, with about a third of the popular vote; next in size came the Catholic party (Mouvement Républicain Populaire or MRP); then the Socialists, after them the middle-class party of Radicaux Socialistes, and finally, at the extreme right, the de Gaullists. There were also several "splinter parties." The result was a bewildering succession of ephemeral ministries, none of which was able to grapple effectively with the problems facing France.

During the early years of the Fourth Republic the French people seemed overcome with lethargy, but they turned with great bitterness upon the Vichy government that had collaborated with the Germans. Prime Minister Laval and several others were shot, and the aged Marshal Pétain, once victor at Verdun, ended his days in prison. The French had great trouble with their African and Asiatic colonies after the war, being forced to grant self-government in a few cases; but they attempted to retain some political connection with these emancipated colonies by organizing a "French Union" which somewhat resembled the British Commonwealth of Nations. In the early 1950's, however, conditions in France improved; the birth rate rose; industrial production increased, inflation was checked, and the French franc (worth about 4 cents in 1939) was finally stabilized at slightly more than one-quarter of a cent.

Conditions in Italy were even more troubled. For almost two years after the fall of Mussolini (July, 1943) Italy remained a battlefield, fought over by German and Allied troops, and with the liberated sections governed by Allied commissioners. Only American aid, totaling over $500 million, prevented widespread starvation during these years. King Victor Emmanuel III became highly unpopular, and after his abdication (May, 1946) his son, Humbert II, fared no better. In June, 1946, Italy voted to become a republic, and a new constitution went into effect on January 1, 1948. Italian voters were divided between three major parties, the Christian Democrats, the Socialists, and the Communists, with the former holding a slight majority over the other two parties combined. A succession of Chris-
tian Democratic prime ministers therefore governed Italy. Substantial aid from America continued, and Italy’s economic recovery was more rapid than that of France, though inflation reduced the value of the lira from 5 cents to less than one-seventh of a cent.

Germany, it will be remembered, had been divided into four zones (see p. 748). As this partitioning was disastrous to her economy, the Western Allies wished to reunite the country, but the Russians hoped to make all Germany a communist state and would consent to reunion only on terms that neither the Allies nor the west Germans would accept. In 1949, therefore, the Allies relaxed their control somewhat and allowed the west Germans to organize the German Federal Republic, whose capital was at Bonn. Its chancellor was a Catholic leader, Dr. Konrad Adenauer, but a strong Social Democratic party led the opposition. Economic revival followed rapidly. In the early 1950’s Germany’s industrial production surpassed prewar levels, and there was no serious inflation. The Russians, on the other hand, set up a communist government, called the German Democratic Republic, whose capital was in the Russian sector of Berlin. Its industrial recovery was less rapid than that of the west, partly because its rich Silesian district had been torn away and presented to Poland. Occasional rebellions in eastern Germany were crushed with extreme vigor by the communists, and thousands of dissatisfied persons found refuge in the west. Meantime a Social Democrat had become president of the Austrian Republic. Here the legislature was about evenly divided between Social Democrats and Catholics, with only a sprinkling of communists and former fascists.

President Roosevelt died of a cerebral hemorrhage on April 12, 1945, less than a month before V-E Day, and was succeeded by the vice-president, Harry S. Truman. It fell to Truman, therefore, to represent the United States at the Potsdam Conference, to make the crucial decision about using the atomic bomb against Japan, to direct foreign policy during the troubled postwar years, and to preside over reconstruction in the United States. In the latter field Truman continued Roosevelt’s New Deal policies, speaking of the “Fair Deal,” but he added few important new measures. When he was succeeded (January, 1953) by a Republican administration under General Eisenhower, the New Deal had become so integral a part of American life that no serious effort was made to repeal its major laws. In America, as in Europe, the postwar years were a period of great unrest, with strikes, financial inflation, and general political confusion.
But the early 1950’s, even more than the 1920’s, witnessed an economic prosperity that touched almost every class of society. Never before in history had a whole people enjoyed a standard of living comparable to that which prevailed in the United States. Millions of Europeans would gladly have changed places with the most unfortunate of Americans. This widespread prosperity was often attributed to the American system of “free enterprise,” as organized in the New Deal, and it was sometimes described as America’s answer to Karl Marx.

The war had drawn the United States deeply into world affairs and, after the fighting was over, Americans discovered that they could not return to their former isolation. Their wealth and their military power made them the strongest nation on earth, they took the lead in withstanding Russian aggression, and the Russians never tired of denouncing them as capitalistic warmongers. Americans then found that world leadership was a difficult role to play and that they were not well prepared to play it. Nevertheless they met with considerable success. When the “cold war” became acute, and Russia began building up alliances with her satellite states, the United States announced the policy of “containment”—that is, of preventing the further expansion of communism. To this end the “Truman Doctrine” of 1947 announced that America would assist free peoples everywhere against communist aggression. As Greece and Turkey were in the most immediate need of assistance, $400 million was devoted to their aid, and the communists failed to take over those countries. It soon became obvious, however, that Truman’s program required large subsidies to many other countries, in order to eliminate the poverty that bred communism. Under the “Marshall Plan” of 1947 (so called from the American secretary of state, George Marshall), more than $11 billion was advanced to various European democracies. When the Russians attempted to force the Western powers out of Berlin by blockading their part of the city, the Allies managed to supply it with necessities by means of an “air lift,” and after a year of controversy the Russians gave up. To defend themselves against Russian aggression, the Western Allies had meantime formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (often called NATO), whose fourteen members promised to aid each other in case of attack (1949). The various member states promised troops; the United States provided money as well; and Germany was ordered to rearm, in order to defend herself from the communists. Europe was thus divided once more into two armed camps, but for the time being the communists were checked.
The Second World War was followed by years of confusion in Europe, but in Asia it was even more destructive to the old order. Governments were overthrown; millions of people were torn from their villages, families, and homes; economic life and organization were shaken to their very foundations; and propaganda skillfully indoctrinated men everywhere with new and revolutionary ideas. All these things had happened in Europe too, but their impact was far greater in Asia, where the old order collapsed completely. Reconstruction therefore presented far more difficult problems in Asia than in Europe, and in future ages historians may possibly date a new period in world history from the events that shook Asia in the late 1940's. A few features of the new Asia are already apparent. We can say with assurance, for example, that the old colonialism is dead; that hereafter Asia will be a land to be ruled and managed by Asiatics; that fundamentally Asiatic cultures will continue to prevail throughout its length and breadth; but also that powerful European cultural influences will continue to be felt throughout Asia for many years to come. In spite of Gandhi, most Asiatics still wish to learn about science and technology from the West, even though they often express the strongest aversion to becoming like the Europeans and Americans whom they know. Moreover, the new Asia is dominated by political and social ideas, such as democracy and self-government, which are clearly of European origin. But how will European democracy, industrialism, and capitalism or communism mix with Asiatic Buddhism, Confucianism, and Mohammedanism? Who can say? Oriental leaders are now dreaming of a great future for Asia, and there can be little doubt that hereafter the Asiatic peoples will enjoy a greater importance in world affairs, but no one can predict the form their influence will take. At present we can see only the first dawn of a new day.
Late in the nineteenth century ancestral ideals of feudal and militaristic origin, fortified by Western technology, had enabled Japan to become a formidable military power, and her imperialists had tried to make themselves masters of Asia. Their "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" shared in the worst characteristics of European colonialism, however, for it rested solely upon military conquest, and it collapsed as soon as the Japanese armies suffered defeat. American leaders then undertook to reorganize Japan as a modern democratic state. The emperor was allowed to continue in office (after he had formally abjured his ancestral claims to divinity), but the central government was greatly liberalized and a new constitution, dating from 1947, strengthened parliamentary institutions. Far-reaching social reforms were likewise attempted. Large estates were broken up and the land was distributed among peasants; large industrial enterprises were decentralized; labor unions were encouraged. But these reforms did not solve Japan’s most pressing problem—overpopulation—and the loss of her Asiatic markets made it difficult for her to support her people. Japan no longer dominated eastern Asia, but neither was she out of the picture.

The destruction of the Japanese Empire left a power vacuum in eastern Asia, just as the elimination of Germany had created a similar vacuum in central and southeastern Europe. In each case the communists rushed in with their armies while the Western Allies were still talking about elections. Chiang Kai-shek, who had fought the war from his inland capital at Chungking, attempted to resume his rule of China, but he was no longer a national hero. His political party, the Kuomintang, was riddled with graft and incompetence, its policies were determined largely by a small but obstinate clique of war profiteers, and its armies were demoralized. The communist leaders, under Mao Tse-tung, had a truer understanding of the situation, they enjoyed the active support of Moscow, and their army was in far better condition. As soon as the Japanese surrendered, the struggle between the two factions in China was resumed. Though Chiang received much help from the United States, Mao’s promises of agrarian reform appealed strongly to the Chinese peasants. In 1947 runaway inflation further weakened and discredited Chiang’s government, and his armies rapidly melted away. Mao seized continental China in 1949, while Chiang Kai-shek and the remnants of his army fled to Formosa, recently liberated from Japan, where they were protected by the American navy. The communists then embarked
upon a program of economic and social reform. Accurate information regarding it has rarely reached the West, however, for the new China is surrounded by a "Bamboo Curtain" paralleling the "Iron Curtain" in Europe. This communist program is partly agrarian, but it is also industrial, and Mao apparently hopes to build China into a great industrial nation. He has received valuable aid from his Russian friends, but it is as yet impossible to say how Marxian or how Leninist the new China will become.

American interest in Japan and Formosa was not due entirely to democratic idealism. Military men had drawn up elaborate plans for the defense of the Pacific against Russia and the communists, establishing a fortified line stretching southward from Japan through Formosa to the Philippines. The Filipinos were granted their independence (1946), but their new government was thoroughly pro-American; Chiang was kept on Formosa to secure the second strong point on this line; and Japan was aided in her recovery to make sure of the third anchor. The Korean peninsula offered a serious threat to these defenses, however, for if it were occupied by strong communist forces, they might menace Japan. Before long, therefore, trouble arose over Korea. In the last years of the nineteenth century the ancient kingdom of Korea had fallen under the influence of Japan, which formally annexed it in 1910. When surrendered by the Japanese in 1945, it was occupied by American and Russian troops, with only an arbitrary line separating the two armies at the thirty-eighth parallel. The Russians presently set up a communist state in their half of the peninsula (May, 1948), and a few weeks later the Americans followed suit with the Republic of Korea in the south. The Russians withdrew their armies from the north early in 1949, and in June the last American troops left Korea.

A year later the Russian-trained North Korean army launched a drive to conquer the Republic (June 25, 1950). The United States immediately referred the matter to the United Nations, whose Security Council declared the North Koreans aggressors and called upon its members to aid the Republic of Korea. (The Russians were just then showing their displeasure over something else by boycotting the United Nations; had he been present, their representative on the Security Council would undoubtedly have vetoed these resolutions; when he returned, it was too late.) The United States provided most of the troops that fought the ensuing Korean War. During the first six weeks of hostilities the communist armies occupied nearly all
South Korea, but General MacArthur presently launched a counterof-
fensive, and by the end of October his forces had surged north to
the Manchurian border. Though Chinese communists entered the
fray, nominally as “volunteers,” the authorities at Washington did
not wish to become involved in a hopeless war with all China and
ordered MacArthur not to invade or bomb Manchuria. A massive
Chinese attack then drove the Americans back approximately to the
thirty-eighth parallel. Truce talks, begun in July, 1951, quickly fell
into a stalemate lasting two years, but a treaty was finally signed
(July 27, 1953). The frontier separating the two Koreas remained
substantially where it had been before, except that it now followed
the terrain rather than an imaginary line. The war cost the lives of
33,000 Americans and the wounding of more than 100,000 others, but
it saved the Republic of Korea. The United States concluded a de-
fense pact with the Republic (October 1, 1953) permitting American
troops to remain on its territory, and Korean reconstruction was aided
by large contributions from America.

Even before the attack on South Korea, the Chinese were infiltrat-
ing Indochina. This peninsula—lying at the southeastern corner of
Asia and including French Indochina, Thailand (Siam), Burma, and
Malaya—had been under Chinese cultural influence for many cen-
turies, and its rulers had at times admitted a vague overlordship of
the Chinese. In the nineteenth century the French established them-
selves in its eastern part; the English took Burma and Malaya; but
Siam continued to enjoy a precarious independence. Japanese troops
occupied the whole peninsula during the war, but Siam resumed its
independent existence in 1945, and nationalists forced the French to
grant a high degree of self-government to their three states (Vietnam,
Laos, Cambodia). These latter states retained a place in the “French
Union,” however, and a French high commissioner continued to reside
at Saigon. At first the communists took little or no part in these
nationalist uprisings, but by 1948 Moscow-trained Ho Chi Minh was
an important leader in Vietnam. Not content with the self-govern-
ment granted by the French, he demanded a communist state, and
during the Korean War he successfully conducted a guerrilla cam-
paign against the French. He received munitions and aid from China
and Russia, but he relied mostly upon anti-French natives who had
only the vaguest acquaintance with Marxian economics. At last the
French signed a treaty (July 21, 1954) granting him complete con-
trol of Vietnam north of the seventeenth parallel. The Vietminh (fol-
lowers of Minh) intended to make all French Indochina communist, but the French still hoped to stamp out communism in the rest of their Indochinese empire.

THE MIDDLE AND NEAR EAST

The Second World War did not bring the same material damage to India that it brought to Japan, China, the Philippines, and Indochina, but it provided Indian nationalists with an excellent opportunity to press their demands. The British were constrained to offer them self-government as a dominion inside the British Commonwealth of Nations (1942), and after the war this pledge was redeemed. It was not easy, however, to establish a workable government in so large and diverse a country as India, where religion provided a major bone of contention. The great majority of the Indians accepted Hinduism, but a strong minority was Moslem, and there were countless minor religions. When launching their fight for independence, Indian nationalists of the Congress party looked forward to a united India that would rise above these religious differences, but the Moslems feared the Hindus and refused to cooperate with them. The new India was therefore divided into two states—the Indian Union, which is largely Hindu, and Pakistan, which is largely Moslem. Each of these states might choose its form of government and enter the British Commonwealth of Nations or not as it saw fit: each eventually decided to become a republic and to retain dominion status in the Commonwealth. These matters being settled, the British withdrew, after almost two hundred years of rule in India, their flag was hauled down on August 15, 1947, and Jawaharlal Nehru became the first prime minister of India.

Independent India was faced with many difficult problems. Its division into two separate states led to much violence against religious minorities in each part of India, thousands of persons were driven from their homes, and many were butchered by mobs. Though Gandhi had always opposed division, and was horrified by the excesses of his fellow countrymen, he was murdered (January 30, 1948)

1 Before World War II the divisions of Asia were simple and clear: the Far East consisted of China and Japan; the Middle East of India, Afghanistan, and Persia; and the Near East of those countries that had once been part of the Turkish Empire: Turkey, the Arab states, and Egypt. At the beginning of the war, the British General Wavell held the British Middle East Command in India, and his authority was presently extended to include Egypt as well as Burma. The Near East thus became part of the Middle East.
by a fanatical Hindu. The case of Kashmir almost precipitated a war, for though the people of that province are largely Moslem, Nehru seized the region by force when the ruling prince expressed a wish that it remain a part of India. The Indian Union also absorbed most of the natives states, and in 1949 it was renamed the Indian Republic. Communists had never formed a major party in India, and though they were well organized, their vigorous hate-England and hate-America campaigns, conducted at Russian instigation, apparently were noisy rather than effective.

The first prime minister of Pakistan was Mohammed Ali Jinnah (1876–1948), a founder and former president of the Moslem League. The rulers of the new state faced even graver problems than did Nehru, for Pakistan had inherited the more backward parts of the old Indian Empire, and it was divided into two separate districts: Pakistan in the west includes the Indus Valley, and its capital is at Karachi, while East Pakistan, more than a thousand miles away and on the other side of the Indian Republic, includes half of the former province of Bengal but not its major city—Calcutta. The hostility of the Indian Republic and the proximity of Russia have frightened them into spending large sums for defense. Severe famines caused further trouble in the early years of independence. Nevertheless the Pakistani have been trying hard to make theirs a model state. The very name “Pakistan” is a Hindustani word meaning “Land of the Pure,” and the new leaders—all devout Moslems—are trying to show what a Moslem state should be.

The independence of India was followed by similar grants of independence in the East Indies. Ceylon became a self-governing dominion in the British Commonwealth in 1948, the Burmese set up an independent republic which retained no ties at all with Great Britain, and in 1957 Malaya became a self-governing dominion in the Commonwealth of Nations. The Dutch East Indies were occupied by the Japanese during the war, and before the Dutch returned in 1945 native leaders proclaimed a republic in Java. Several years of jungle fighting followed, but in 1949 the Netherlands finally recognized the complete independence of the Republic of Indonesia, which includes nearly all the former Dutch possessions in the East Indies. These new states are inhabited by peoples of ancient and rather high civilization, who give promise of being able to govern themselves. Great Britain still retains many valuable possessions in the East, however, including such important commercial and naval stations as
Hong Kong and Singapore, and many large islands inhabited by backward peoples—among them parts of New Guinea and Borneo, and the Fiji and Solomon Islands. The United States granted complete independence to the Philippine Republic in 1946—as provided by a law enacted as early as 1934—and the Pacific islands formerly held by Japan as mandatory of the League of Nations are now ruled by the United States as trustee for the United Nations.

In the Arab world the most important political event of the post-war period was the establishment of the Republic of Israel. Even in 1939 hostility between Jews and Arabs in Palestine ran so high that the British, who held a mandate over the country, could find no way to appease the rivals (see p. 696). After the war, they threw up their hands in despair, resigned their mandate, and tossed the whole matter into the lap of the United Nations. In 1947 strenuous efforts were made to solve the difficulties by setting up two states which would be politically autonomous though each was economically united to the other. As soon as the British laid down their mandate, however, the Israeli proclaimed an independent Republic (May 14, 1948). The United States and Soviet Russia recognized the new state at once, but its Arab neighbors undertook to destroy it by military force. When a truce was finally signed, in the spring of 1949, Israel held nearly all the fertile areas in Palestine, part of Jerusalem, and the Negeb—a strip of desert separating Egypt from Transjordan. About 900,000 Arabs had been driven from their homes in Palestine, to live in refugee camps in neighboring Arab states. Armed clashes frequently occurred along the frontiers, and in the fall of 1956 war was resumed for a short time.

The success of Israeli arms was due in part to rivalries of the Arab states among themselves. An Arab League, organized at Cairo early in 1945, included all the Arab states—Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Egypt—but from the first it was distracted by political and dynastic feuds. Iraq and Transjordan were ruled by members of the Hashimite dynasty—sons of the Husein who revolted against Turkey and became king of Hejaz (see p. 688). They were bitterly opposed by ibn-Saud of Saudi Arabia and, less vehemently, by the rulers of Egypt and Syria. In 1948 most of the fighting against Israel was done by the British-trained army of Abdullah of Transjordan, who thus acquired the Arab parts of Palestine, but who attributed his ultimate defeat to betrayal by his allies. The Russians also caused division among the Arabs. Though constantly de-
claiming against “capitalistic” colonialism, the Russians had not renounced communist colonialism. The British were therefore able to conclude alliances, called the Baghdad Pact, with the nervous Moslem states bordering on Russia—Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Iraq. Rivalry with Turkey and hatred of Britain caused Egypt to oppose these allies, and she aroused such feeling in other Arab states that Abdullah of Transjordan was assassinated in 1951 when he seemed about to join the anticommunist bloc. These rivalries rent the Arab League asunder, and its members could not join whole-heartedly in common action against Israel or in favor of anything else.

Egypt presented many special problems. Though Arabic-speaking and Moslem, its leaders were highly nationalistic and they ordinarily thought of themselves as Egyptians rather than as Arabs; and though they took a prominent part in founding the Arab League, they looked upon this organization primarily as an instrument through which they might lead or dominate the Arab world. In the Israeli War they risked neither arms nor men to win new territories for Abdullah. Moreover, they were so beset with internal difficulties that in 1952 a military revolt, led by General Mohammed Naguib, drove out King Farouk (1936–1952) and promised drastic reforms. A year later a republic was proclaimed, with Naguib as president and Colonel Nasser as prime minister. Before long, however, the prime minister overshadowed and expelled the president, forgot the promised social reforms, and set out upon a campaign of aggressive chauvinism. His hatred of England and the West led him into the dangerous game of flirting with Soviet Russia, from whose satellite Czechoslovakia he received large consignments of machinery and arms; and in 1956 he almost precipitated a war by seizing the Suez Canal. England and France landed troops in Suez, but quickly withdrew them when the United Nations intervened.

The Arab peoples of North Africa followed in Nasser’s nationalist footsteps. As soon as Libya became an independent state (1951) it joined the Arab League, and at about the same time the Arabs of Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco launched revolts which the French could not suppress. Morocco and Tunis became self-governing states in the French Union, but the French refused to discuss Algerian autonomy, insisting that this province was an integral part of France.

In spite of this orgy of oriental nationalism, a few leaders expressed wider views. Nasser talked of uniting all Arabs, or even all Islam; Nehru hoped for a federated Asia, and apparently he thought that
Asia might some day mediate in the "cold war" separating Russia and the United States. A slight step toward such Asiatic union was taken early in 1955 when the representatives of twenty-nine Asiatic and African nations—among them Nehru, Nasser, and the foreign minister of communist China—assembled at Bandung, in Java, to denounce European racism and colonialism, both capitalist and communist, and to discuss common problems. This Bandung Conference made it clear that many peoples still regarded themselves as neutral in the "cold war," but it also showed that the Asiatics were torn by too many rivalries among themselves to act effectively together. Moreover, even if united they had neither the industrial nor the military power to play a major role in modern power politics. For some time to come, therefore, Nehru's dream of an Asiatic union acting as a third great-power bloc must remain only a dream. A three-legged stool is undoubtedly more stable than a two-legged one, but to be effective the three legs must be of approximately the same length and strength.
43. EPILOGUE

At last we have completed our long journey in time from man's first appearance on our planet to the present day. It covers a long and complex story which is, in essence, the story of how men have created their civilizations. It tells how, in the earliest times, men learned to cooperate with one another and with the forces of nature; how they created languages, social institutions, and governments; and how they devised simple tools, and discovered techniques for making simple objects. They told each other stories, invented poetry and mythology, and cultivated the arts. Directing their attention to the world about them and endeavoring to understand it, they became scientists after a fashion, philosophers, and theologians; following their fundamental religious instincts, they peopled the world with spirits and gods, and found ways to worship them; and they made for themselves ideals of personal conduct and the good life. Taken together, these various creations of the human mind and spirit constitute a civilization. They are the things that distinguish man from the beasts, and human history is largely the story of their creation and elaboration.

As soon as men became men they began creating civilizations, but for many thousands of years their creations remained simple and crude. Through the ages, however, men have constantly been developing new ways of life, being driven to change and improvement by such fundamental natural forces as climate and the pressure of population on food supply, by the need for defense against enemies (both animal and human), by covetousness, greed, and lust for power or conquest, by their desire to do their work more easily and perhaps to do it better, by their wonder and curiosity, and by such idealistic forces as humanitarianism, the desire for greater justice, and religious idealism. In spite of these powerful pressures, however, the progress of civilization in early times was extremely slow. Men
carefully passed on their scanty knowledge and their primitive skills from generation to generation, often for many centuries at a time, teaching their children the arts and crafts as they had learned them from their fathers, but neither changing nor adding to this legacy from the past. With equal or greater care, they preserved their ancestral social institutions—family organization, form of government, civil and criminal law, ways of worship—for the idea of deliberately changing such things occurred to no one. Men were restrained, perhaps, by their lack of imagination and by their superstitious fear of the unknown, but they vaguely recognized the difficulty of changing a complicated social system, and they suffered from equally vague fears of losing everything unless they passed on their skills, their knowledge, and their institutions exactly as they had received them from their ancestors. Change seemed both wicked and dangerous.

In the Near East this primitive social stagnancy was deeply stirred by the invention of agriculture, somewhat before 5000 B.C. In adapting themselves to the new conditions brought about by increased food supply and the sedentary life of villages, men found new ways of living and created new social institutions. Such changes came slowly at first but, from that day to this, they have been following one another at an ever-increasing tempo, and each important change in economic life, every major innovation in technology, has had repercussions that touched every phase of social life. These various changes, which make up what we ordinarily call “progress,” have brought further improvements in technology, greater scientific knowledge, and more complex social institutions, and these in turn have brought still other cultural changes. Men have learned to use the earth’s gifts to greater advantage, and by creating their elaborate civilizations, they have brought a safer, easier, richer, happier, and more varied, but also more complicated, life to everyone.

Since the forces promoting or retarding the progress of culture are so many and so variable, it is not at all surprising that civilization has developed along very different lines in different parts of the world. These variations are passed on from generation to generation, they become the foundation upon which further developments are built, and widely varying civilizations thus arise. If physical conditions are much the same over a wide area, and the peoples inhabiting it have inherited similar cultural traditions, a single civilization may spread over the whole region, but it will always show wide local variations.
Moreover, should physical conditions be so favorable to man that a considerable number of persons can devote their thought and energy to other activities than the mere acquisition of food, these variations will be frequent and their accumulation will create a high and complex civilization covering the whole area. There are at least five great but widely differing civilizations in the world today—Western European, Eastern European, Islamic, Hindu, and Far Eastern, each having countless local variations—and there are innumerable lesser cultures, especially in the so-called “backward” regions of the earth.

Each of these civilizations is the creation of whole peoples over a period of thousands of years. In recent centuries changes have come more frequently than in earlier times, and in the twentieth century they have followed one another at an unprecedented rate. This is a phenomenon hitherto unknown to history, and even today not everything changes easily or quickly. A social organism is so extremely complex a structure, and men cling so tenaciously to their traditional ways, that very little can be changed at any one time. Social institutions, once firmly established, are extremely persistent and they never pass away completely. Our past is always with us, buried deep in the foundations of our civilization, but exercising a tremendous influence upon it. Never in all history has there been so determined, so thoroughgoing, and so ruthless an attempt to discard the legacy of the past and to create a radically new civilization as has taken place in Russia in our own day. Nevertheless, changes there have not been as fundamental or as great as their authors like to believe, and even the revolutionists themselves have deliberately perpetuated many of the most characteristic (and, in Western eyes, most odious) institutions that Imperial Russia inherited from Byzantine Orthodoxy. Russia cannot escape from her past, nor can we from ours.

The rapid improvement of communications in the present century, the increasing ease of travel, the enthusiasm of missionaries for various causes (Christianity, democracy, communism), and above all the extension of international business, international science, and international humanitarianism, have encouraged many idealistic persons to foresee a time when all men will be brought into one great world civilization. It is undeniable that in recent years great strides have been taken in this direction, but the situation is not as simple as it seems. Men of one culture or civilization have often taken institutions or ideas from others, but in so doing they invariably have twisted and warped them out of their original form, and if two cultures
borrow the same idea or institution from a third, each will warp it in its own peculiar way. Karl Marx as a young man studied the Hegelian philosophy, "stood it on its head," and applied it to the industrial system of England as it functioned about 1848. His ideas and interpretations have since exercised a tremendous influence throughout the world, but "Marxism" differs widely from country to country. It teaches one thing when expounded by British intellectuals or labor leaders steeped in their own democratic traditions; a German Social Democrat, accustomed to the activities of an all-powerful state, makes it teach something else; a Russian Communist, inheriting the traditions of Byzantine Orthodoxy, interprets it in still another way; and Chinese Communists will no doubt bring it into closer conformity with the teachings of Confucius. It is safe to predict that if communism ever prevails in India, Burma, or Syria, Marxism will undergo further transformations. Nothing can rob the past of its power or reduce the world to one pattern.

Modern industry and modern communications are constantly bringing the peoples of the world into closer contact with each other, but they also bring into sharper relief the profound differences which separate these peoples. At the present moment the "iron curtain" dividing Eastern Europe from Western Europe and America attracts world-wide attention, for many persons fear that it will cause a third world war. Communism is only part of the trouble, however, for the cleft existed long centuries before Karl Marx was born, and the accumulated antagonisms of a thousand years make communism seem of secondary importance in the long controversy. Nevertheless, the situation need not be hopeless. Europe has been oppressed by equally bitter controversies before. Four hundred years ago many people sincerely believed that all Europe must be either Catholic or Protestant, and thousands perished in the resulting wars of religion. Eventually, however, Catholics and Protestants learned that peaceful coexistence was possible. A good measure of sympathy and understanding on both sides would doubtless resolve the great modern conflict, and the mere fact that one group shows little inclination to cultivate these virtues is no reason why the others should not. The great question is whether men will learn to coexist before butchering hosts of their fellows or afterward.

Today we hear much about the need for scientists and engineers, and there can be no doubt that this need is great. These men have created the industry which is the foundation of the modern world
(and the cause of much of its present confusion), and they are needed in increasing numbers to keep the machine going. We are also painfully aware of their importance in modern warfare. But while it is indeed desirable for us to win any war in which we may become entangled, it is more desirable to prevent these wars. This is a tremendous task, and one in which the physical scientists can be of little help. Nor is it a task for statesmen and diplomats alone. In the modern democratic world all citizens must bear a grave responsibility for the policies of their country. Not everyone can be an expert in diplomacy, just as not everyone can be a nuclear physicist, but every intelligent person can try to understand the forces operating in the world today and urge policies in conformity with them. To gain such understanding he must study civilizations other than his own with sympathy and understanding. He must study them in their breadth and in their depth, and to understand what they are today he must know what they have been in the past, for the past never dies. There is no such thing as "the dead past."
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