STORY
OF
THE
NORTH
WEST
FRONTIER
PROVINCE
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The Story of the North West Frontier Province

List of Illustrations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Illustration Description</th>
<th>Facing page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Attock Fort from across the Indus</td>
<td>Frontispiece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Khyber Gorge</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Nomad Wazirs on the Tochi Road</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Looking down towards Landi Khana into Afghanistan</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. A Caravan Serai</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. A Khattak Dance</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The Copper-smiths' Bazar, Peshawar City</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Looking towards Dargai from Malakand Fort</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. The Khyber Railway—Tangi Bridge and Tunnel</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. The Jandola-Sarwakai Road near Shahur Tangi</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

List of Maps

(i) Sketch map of hills visible from Peshawar. In envelopes
(ii) General map of the North West Frontier Province. In binding.
The Story of the North West Frontier Province

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I—EARLY HISTORY.—The early invasions; Muhammadan rule; the rise and fall of the Durrani Empire; the Sikhs; the First Afghan War.

CHAPTER II—BRITISH RULE.—The Mutiny period; Frontier expeditions; the Second Afghan War; relations with Afghanistan; the "Forward Policy" in the '80's and '90's; the Durand Line; 1897.

CHAPTER III—THE NORTH WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE.—The creation of the Province; strategic re-organisation; the Mulla Powinda; expeditions of 1908; arms traffic; the outlaw question; kidnapping; crime.

CHAPTER IV—THE FRONTIER AND THE WAR.—First effects of World War; Afghan neutrality; Frontier unrest, 1914-15; Turco-German intrigue; Mahsud expedition, 1917; conditions in the closing years of the War.

CHAPTER V—THE AFTERMATH.—Position at the time of the Armistice; the Rowlatt agitation; the Third Afghan War; the collapse in Waziristan; the Waziristan campaign, 1919-21; the "Hijrat" movement; the Afghan Treaty of November 1921.

CHAPTER VI—RECONSTRUCTION.—Effects of the Treaty; new departure in Waziristan; reversion to the Punjab discussed; Ellis case; Landi Kotal case; more recent events.
CHAPTER VII—THE PROVINCE AND ITS PEOPLE.—Physical features; climate and scenery; character of the people; Pathan customs and code of honour; administrative problems; local defence; the Jirga system; system of control of tribal territory; tribal allowances; the controversy as to the future policy; Chief Commissioners.

CHAPTER VIII—DESCRIPTIVE.—Types and races; trades and industries; archaeology; the gardens of Peshawar; description of the surrounding country; the Khyber and the Malakand.

CHAPTER IX—THE LURE OF THE FRONTIER.—The keepers of the gate.
CHAPTER I

Early History

THE key to the history of the North West Frontier Province lies in recognition of the fact that it has always been more closely connected with Eastern Iran—from which sprang Afghanistan—than with India. Early history finds the Iranians dominating the whole Indus Valley, to be succeeded by the Greeks. Alexander the Great came down the valley of the Kabul River and Greek generals ruled as satraps, till they in turn gave way to the Hindu dynasties which introduced Buddhism. After the death of the Great Asoka in the year 231 B. C., the country witnessed the rise and fall of many more or less petty rulers till, early in the Christian era, the Central Asian highlands disgorged the Kushans. For some 600 years the dominion of these nomads and their successors continued and the period was one of great development in art and religion, especially in the reign of Kanishka, who extended his rule over northern
India as far as Benares. Meanwhile the Muhammadan advance from the west had been coming nearer. Kabul first felt the shock in A. D. 655, but the force of the invasion was deflected for a time towards Multan and Sindh. The establishment of the Ghaznavid dynasty at the close of the X century marks the real beginning of Muhammadan rule and early in the XI century the famous Mahmud of Ghazni held all the trans-Indus portion of the present Frontier Province in fief.

From this point on the story of the Province is one long and somewhat bewildering series of invasions and counter-attacks by the warring Muhammadan dynasties who made the history of northern India, down to the time of the Sikh Kingdom and the coming of the British. Muhammad of Ghor, Chengiz Khan, Timur, Babar and Nadir Shah, all debouched from this gateway of Central Asia on to the plains of India. All the time—and for who knows how many centuries earlier—there was a steady eastward shift of Pathan or Afghan tribes, and the present distribution and composition of population in the North West Frontier Province are directly and clearly traceable to the continuous pressure from the north and west of these tribes upon the earlier inhabitants, and, again, of still more Afghans upon the first comers.
Even at the height of Moghal power the Frontier knew no peace. Tribe warred against tribe, governor against governor; the central power intervened to establish its rights only to see fresh disturbances arise immediately. And all this time there was no frontier where “the Frontier” is now. All territory west of the Indus was part of Afghanistan, though the latter term was not then in use. The borderland was no part of India and, as India did not hold the gates, she had no protection from recurring invasion.

Before leaving the era of Muhammadan rule and describing the coming of the Sikhs it is necessary to relate in somewhat greater detail the closing phases of the former and the birth of the Afghan Kingdom as it now exists. It has been shown that the country which is now Afghanistan was an outlying province of the Moghal Empire. The decay of that empire, synchronising with the disintegration of the Saffavi dynasty in Persia, provided the opportunity in the middle of the XVIII century for a Turkoman bandit named Nadir Shah—a name which is still used on the Frontier and in the Punjab to signify any particularly outrageous act of tyranny or cruelty. Nadir Shah won the throne of Persia by driving back the Afghans and Russians who threatened the country, and then secured the services of the Afghans for the
invasion of India by allowing the Moghal Governor of Kabul to retain his position as a feudatory. Nadir Shah was assassinated while returning laden with booty from the sack of Delhi and his throne and his treasure fell to one of his generals, Ahmed Khan or Shah, the founder of the Durrani Empire. Though this empire did not long survive its founder, from it grew Afghanistan. In the height of his power Ahmed Shah ruled Sindh, the Derajat, Kashmir and the Punjab as far as Lahore, as well as Peshawar and all that is now Afghanistan, with Baluchistan and slices of Persia. But he lived too late and his successors were too inefficient to carry on the old tradition of invasion of India. The Sikh power in the Punjab was growing and, behind it, the British were beginning to take an interest in preventing aggression from the north.

Taking advantage of the chaos and misrule which followed Ahmed Shah's death, the Sikhs between 1818 and 1834 occupied Peshawar and the trans-Indus country up to the hills. Their rule over the country was that of the sword alone, but it brought the first Englishman actually to administer a portion of the Frontier, when Herbert Edwardes, in the service of the Sikh Durbar, went to Bannu in 1847. It produced other noted figures too in the persons of Hari Singh, who first took Peshawar from the
Afghans and was later defeated and killed by them near the mouth of the Khyber, and General Avitabile, the Italian, who governed Peshawar for the Sikhs from 1838 to 1842.

Side by side with the Sikh advance the interest of the East India Company's Government in frontier affairs and developments beyond the frontier had been increasing. Actually the first Englishman to meet the Afghan was Mountstuart Elphinstone, who had been sent in 1809 to Peshawar to meet Shah Shuja, then on the throne of Kabul. It was not till 1837, however, that British official relations with Afghanistan commenced. The occasion was the need of a counter-stroke to the threatening attitude of Russia in the north. Lieutenant Burnes (afterwards Sir Alexander Burnes), who had passed through Kabul five years before on a journey to Bokhara, was sent as envoy. Burnes' mission led directly to the First Afghan War. The terms on which the reigning Amir, Dost Muhammad, Barakzai, was ready to accept a British legation were rejected and the resolution was taken to replace him on the throne by Shah Shuja, the last survivor of the Saddozai branch of the Durranis, who was living as a refugee in India.

The execution of this policy began with the advance
of an army, 21,000 strong, under Sir John Keane, 
via the Bolan Pass. Shah Shuja was crowned in
Kandahar in April 1838 and, after Ghazni had been
taken by storm, Dost Muhammad fled and Kabul
was occupied in August. The bulk of the army was
then withdrawn, a force 8,000 strong being left in
Kabul to support Shah Shuja and the British Envoy,
Sir W. Macnaghten, who had Sir A. Burnes as his
colleague. For two years these conditions continued.
Dost Muhammad surrendered in November 1840
and was given honourable asylum in India. The
outward calm lulled the political authorities into
oblivion of the unpopularity of the new government
and neglect of warnings. Revolt broke out suddenly
on the 2nd November 1841, Burnes and other officers
were murdered and disaster followed disaster. The in-
capacity of the British command was only surpassed
by the treachery of the Afghans. On the 3rd Decem-
ber Sir William Macnaghten was murdered in open
council by Akbar Khan, the son of Dost Muhammad.
On the 6th January 1842, after a convention had been
signed guaranteeing safe conduct on condition of our
evacuation of the country, the force, still 4,500 strong
with 12,000 followers, set out from Kabul for Jalalabad.
The rest of the story is only too well-known. Con-
fusion, privation and massacre, culminating in the
slaughter in the Pass of Jagdalak, left no more than twenty men to muster at Gandamak on the 13th. Only one survivor, Dr. Bryden, wounded and half dead, struggled into Jalalabad to tell the tale.

Kandahar under Nott and Jalalabad under Sale still remained in British hands and, from these bases, retribution was undertaken. Pollock forced the Khyber, relieved Jalalabad and re-occupied Kabul by September 1842 and was joined there by Nott. The citadel and bazaar of Kabul were destroyed, after which Afghanistan was evacuated and Dost Muhammad returned to the throne. Though the story of the First Afghan War is a sorry one from the British point of view, there arose from it results which were to prove of far-reaching importance not many years later. Dost Muhammad had learnt in India the strength of the British power. While determined to brook no interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and refusing to allow even a British envoy at Kabul, he had fully made up his mind never again to pit his strength against Great Britain in the field.
CHAPTER II

British Rule, 1849—1901

THE coming of the Sikhs to the Frontier has been described. The succession of the British to their rule and the acceptance of their responsibilities followed naturally from the Second Sikh War. It was also natural that the British interpretation of those responsibilities should be very different from that put upon them by the Sikhs. In 1849 the country up to the foot of the Frontier hills became part of the Punjab. The five districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan were formed and were administered on the same system as the rest of the Punjab, but a special irregular military force was raised and maintained under the direct orders of the Government of the Punjab for the defence of the border. This was the famous Punjab Frontier Force—"the Piffers"—and consisted at first of the Corps of Guides, five regiments of cavalry, five battalions of infantry, three light field batteries, two garrison bat-
teries and two companies of sappers and miners. Changes of composition and constitution occurred from time to time in this force, until it was finally removed from its special rôle by Lord Kitchener in 1903 and made part of the general service Indian Army; but the records and tradition of the old Force are carried on by the famous regiments which bear the initials F. F. after their names.

The Frontier had thus experienced for a bare eight years the first beginnings of settled rule, when the Indian Mutiny burst forth and threatened to engulf far more than this outpost of the Empire's defences. The intervening years, though hardly a period of peace, had witnessed no serious rising. The "Piffers" had been "blooded" in dealing with refractory tribes on the Hazara (Black Mountain) border, with Mohmand marauders round Peshawar and in punitive operations in the Kohat Pass and on the Kohat and Derajat borders. Further we had thus early been drawn into an advance up one of the valley gateways through the mountain barrier by the attempts of the local Afghan Governor to annex the Kurram.

The highest tribute to the effect of these few years of British rule on a people whose turbulent history has been briefly sketched in the foregoing chapter
is to be found in their attitude during the Mutiny period. When news of the events at Meerut and Delhi reached Peshawar by telegram, those in charge of the situation might well have despaired. The Afghan situation was menacing. Since 1842 Dost Muhammad had been strengthening his position and extending his power. We had helped him against Persian aggression in Herat and he had finally come in person to Peshawar in 1857 and signed with Sir John Lawrence a treaty of definite alliance. But the ink of these signatures was hardly dry and none could tell whether the Amir would give way to the temptation of an opportunity, such as was never likely to recur, of regaining his lost Indus provinces and the city of Peshawar, that jewel in the crown of Ahmad Shah. It is a matter of history that not only did the Amir entertain this idea, but the ruler of the Punjab, the great Sir John Lawrence himself, seriously considered handing the Peshawar Valley over to him and withdrawing to the Indus. Fortunately Herbert Edwardes, now Commissioner of Peshawar, was able to persuade his chief. The tribes naturally had one eye on the Amir and one on the British frontier officers and military commanders. These, with such men as Edwardes and Sydney Cotton at their head, rose to the occasion. Immediate
disarmament of all disaffected or doubtful troops and the prompt despatch to Delhi of every man who could be sent was the order of the day. The Hindustanis in Dera Ismail Khan and Kohat were first disarmed without difficulty. The Guides were at once despatched on their memorable march from Mardan to Delhi—580 miles in twenty-four days at the hottest time of year. Watching their opportunity, the 55th Native Infantry rose in Nowshera and made their way to join their comrades at Mardan. This was on the 21st May. Other units stationed in Peshawar and in various places round the valley were ready to follow suit. Next day the three mutinous regiments at Peshawar were disarmed successfully and the 55th perished to a man in the ruthless pursuit led by John Nicholson or later at the hands of the men of the Hazara hills. These examples turned the scale. Help came flocking in from all sides, trans- and cis-border. Edwardes and Nicholson called on their old friends, the chiefs of the Derajat, and met with a ready response. Levies and irregular regiments of horse and foot were raised and rapidly despatched Delhi-wards with every available British soldier in the famous Flying Column under Nicholson's command. The next few months were not free from anxiety. One other native regiment had to be disarmed and one
attempted to regain its arms and was practically anni-
nihilated in consequence. Fanatical enemies tried to
raise the border tribes against us, but one salutary
lesson at Naminji, on the Buner border, sufficed to
quell such attempts. The Frontier in the Mutiny not
only filled its proper rôle as the guardian of the gate
from external aggression, but helped and helped very
materially in dealing with the internal situation. In-
stead of marking a set back or complete destruction
of the young administration, the Mutiny year is now
looked back on by officials and people as one of un-
tarnished honour, and the Pathan gentleman to-day
who cannot produce as his most cherished heirloom
a faded bit of Mutiny medal ribbon or a letter of
commendation from Edwardes or Nicholson to his
grandfather feels that there is a blank space in his
escutcheon.

The twenty years succeeding the Mutiny, though
military operations ranking as expeditions were
undertaken on eleven occasions, formed on the whole
a period of quiet development. The Black Mountain
tribes required a force of some 15,000 men to bring
them into subjection in 1868 and in 1863 the
Ambeyla campaign, on the Buner border, which had
been initiated as little more than a counter-raid,
developed, owing to unexpected opposition, into a
serious campaign which cost us over 900 casualties.

It was during the latter part of this period that recognition was first given to the principle of employing militia and levies as the first line of border defence. The Punjab Frontier Force, called upon to act in conjunction with and perform the duties of regular troops, had already lost the rough and ready character with which it originated and a more loosely constituted and local organisation was needed for the every day work of dealing with raids and petty troubles with the tribes. A further valuable object in enrolling purely local levies was—and is—the opportunity it gave of utilising in the defence of the border the custom of the country as regards local communal responsibility and of giving employment to young men of the tribe.

After this period of comparative quiet, progress was interrupted by the Second Afghan War. Amir Dost Muhammad had died in 1863 and it was not till 1868 that his son, Sher Ali, was firmly established on the throne. Though he owed much at this time to the Russians, Sher Ali feared them and turned to Great Britain for support. A variety of circumstances, however, tended to estrange relations between the two countries and the Amir leant more and more towards Russia. The final casus belli was the refusal
to accept a British mission at Kabul, after a Russian one had been received. In consequence of this Sir Donald Stewart occupied Kandahar; Sir Frederick Roberts crossed the Peiwar Kotal and the Shutargardan and menaced Kabul and another column advanced to Jalalabad. The first campaign ended in May 1879 with the flight and death of Sher Ali and the conclusion with his son, Yakub Khan, of the Treaty of Gandamak, whereby, for the first time, Afghanistan placed her foreign relations under the control of Great Britain in return for guarantees, and a British envoy was accepted at Kabul. When all seemed well, the British Envoy, Cavagnari, was murdered and his escort of "Guides" were massacred after a heroic defence. This tragedy was quickly avenged by Roberts, who won the battle of Charasia and occupied Kabul. Yakub Khan surrendered and was sent to India. Six months later Abdur Rahman, a nephew of Amir Sher Ali, returned from his retreat in Russia and gained the throne of Kabul. To all intents and purposes he ratified the Gandamak Treaty and was recognised as Amir of all Afghanistan except Herat and Kandahar. The attack on the latter city by Ayub Khan, another claimant to the Amirship, resulted in the defeat of a British force at Maiwand, in retaliation for which Roberts made his
famous forced march of 313 miles from Kabul to Kandahar. Kandahar was then handed over to Abdur Rahman and all British forces were withdrawn from Afghanistan, not to set foot in the country again for close on forty years. Abdur Rahman soon after expelled Ayub from Herat. He became the greatest of all Amirs and reigned till 1901. Throughout this time he realised his dependence on India and England and strictly observed his treaty obligations, but he jealously guarded his internal independence.

The course of events described above inevitably reacted strongly on the border tribes. Between 1877 and 1881 there were no less than twelve Frontier expeditions of a punitive nature on the borders of Peshawar, Kohat and Dera Ismail Khan. On the withdrawal of the army from Afghanistan in 1880, the Khyber was also evacuated and the militia principle was extended to the defence of this famous pass. The new force, raised locally from the Afridis and known at first as the "Jezailchis" became later the Khyber Rifles and its history is closely connected with famous names such as Warburton, Nawab Sir Aslam Khan and Roos-Keppel.

Before proceeding with the tale of the gradual development of the Frontier Administration, a glance forward will serve to explain relations with Afghan-
istan from the close of the Second Afghan War to the time when Great Britain was again forced to take up arms against her neighbour. The close of the campaign of 1878-80 found British authority extended considerably in tribal territory and Afghanistan correspondingly contracted. The permanent occupation of Quetta was recognised and the boundary advanced to the foot of the northern slopes of the Khojak range, half way on the road to Kandahar. In the north, British jurisdiction was extended to the Peiwar Kotal, at the head of the Kurram Valley, and to Landi Khana, at the eastern end of the Khyber, and the Amir renounced all claims to these areas and to the country and passes of the Mohmands. In 1893 he re-affirmed this renunciation by a treaty which fixed the "Durand Line" as the eastern limit of his influence. Once Abdur Rahman's position had been consolidated, the main pre-occupation of the student of Afghan politics was whether any possible successor could hold what he held. This question was answered by the peaceful accession in 1901 of Habibullah, the favourite son of Abdur Rahman. In 1905 the Dane Mission was received at Kabul and the terms of the treaty with Abdur Rahman were renewed. At the end of 1906 the Amir visited India, returning in March 1907. The conclusion shortly
afterwards of the Anglo-Russian agreement removed the pressure of the Russian menace. Habibullah's visit to India, like Dost Muhammad's, had far-reaching consequences. The impression he then gained of British might and British character kept him unwaveringly on our side during the Great War. On the other hand the visit itself, followed by an over-enthusiastic attempt to develop his country under the guidance of European experts and a somewhat childish addiction to anglicised habits and luxuries, which he had acquired in India, made him very unpopular with his people. Though his policy had been vindicated by the Allied victory in the War, Turco-German intrigue had worked upon private and dynastic jealousies and his general unpopularity created the atmosphere which rendered possible without resultant civil war his murder in 1919.

With Abdur Rahman's strong hand governing for the first time in history a clearly defined Afghanistan and the gates closed against aggression, the development of the Frontier proceeded normally from 1880 to 1897. With the exception of punitive expeditions on the Black Mountain in the north and against the Sheranis in the south, the fighting of this period was connected with the gradual extension of
British control over the Frontier tribes, necessitated, as ever, by the responsibility of giving security to the settled districts on the border and to India as a whole. These forward movements were as follows: In 1891 the ridge of the Samana was occupied in order to control the Orakzais and to protect the Miranzai Valley, which it flanks. In 1892 the Kurram Valley was peacefully occupied. Since the valley had been declared free of the Amir's jurisdiction, as already related, chaos had reigned and the inhabitants of the valley were alternately guilty of aggression against their Afghan neighbours and sufferers from their retaliation. Finally the suggestion of the Amir that it was the duty of the British "Raj" to control them, coupled with the Turis' own plea that the only alternative to British occupation was submission to Afghanistan, led to the setting up of the loose form of administration which has continued, to the general satisfaction of all parties, to this day. This move, incidentally, brought on to the stage of the Frontier a player who was soon to fill a star part and for many years was destined to head the bill. Roos-Keppel's name will appear again in these pages. It was as Political Officer and Commandant of the Kurram Militia that he made his debut.
Meanwhile further south the same forces had been at work and had given scope to the genius of Sir Robert Sandeman to inaugurate a similar regime in Baluchistan. This led to the opening up of connection between Baluchistan and the Punjab frontier vid the Gomal Pass in 1890 and that in turn led to another advance in the intermediate area. As we have already seen, in 1893 Sir Mortimer Durand had concluded a convention which defined the eastern boundary of Afghanistan. Under this convention the Amir renounced all claim to influence in Waziristan which lies to the east of that boundary. Demarcation, wherever possible, had been agreed upon, but when an escort went up to Wana in 1894 with the political officers sent to demarcate the Durand Line, a Mahsud lashkar brought by Mulla Powinda—of whom more later—made a fierce night attack on their camp. In consequence of this a punitive expedition overran Mahsud-Wazir country and, in the following year, an advance was made into the territory of the Darwesh Khel Wazirs and Daurs of the Tochi Valley. It was decided to take the whole of Waziristan under closer control and Political Agents were posted to Miranshah and Wana with garrisons found by the Punjab Frontier Force. Thus the Agencies of northern and southern Waziristan were con-
stituted.

Yet another advance, this time in the north, was necessitated partly by the conduct of the tribes, partly as a counter move to Russian advances in the Pamirs. Chitral had first been visited in 1885 by Sir William Lockhart and subsequently the Government of India had maintained friendly touch with the rulers of the country. From 1892 onwards a struggle for the throne had kept the country unsettled. In 1895 one of the claimants, assisted by Umra Khan, the Pathan chief of Jandul, attacked Chitral and besieged the British Agent, Major Robertson, who had come from Gilgit to report on the situation on the spot. After the relief of this siege by a force which advanced from Nowshera under Sir Robert Low and a column from Gilgit under Colonel Kelly, garrisons were stationed on the Malakand Pass and at Chakdara and Chitral and a Political Agent was appointed to conduct, directly under the orders of the Government of India, relations with Dir, Swat and Chitral.

The Frontier tribes had watched this penetration of their hitherto independent valleys with growing anxiety. The demarcation of the Durand Line, with its accompanying definition of spheres of influence; the setting up of Political Agencies and, finally, the passage of troops in all directions through their ter-
Nomad Yazis on the Zerbi Road
rity and the garrisoning of those tracts, which were not only strategically important but the most fertile portions of tribal country—all this was regarded as part of a deliberate menace to their independence. A menace indeed it was, though not deliberate. Every move had been forced upon Government either by the depredations of the tribes or their susceptibility to disruptive influences. But the menace, whether deliberate or not, inevitably aroused their suspicion and resentment, and there were not wanting those who fanned the smouldering fires of this spirit to flame by the appeal to religion. Specific grievances were played upon, all the passions of the Pathan were whetted by appropriate preaching by Mulas and intriguers, and suddenly that happened which had never happened before. In the presence of what they considered a common danger the tribes found some sort of union. Their democratic spirit could not permit, even under such conditions, any unified leadership or councils, but only a spark was needed to set the whole Frontier in a blaze.

On the 10th June 1897 the Political Officer from Miranshah with a suitable military escort visited Maizar, a Madda Khel Wazir village in the Upper Tochi Valley, to choose a site for a levy post. At first the Wazirs behaved in a friendly manner and
the visitors were hospitably received. Suddenly a treacherous and fanatical attack was made and all the British military officers were killed or wounded and numerous other casualties inflicted. In spite of these heavy initial losses, the troops under their Indian officers executed a retirement which lives in Frontier history as a magnificent example of grit and steadiness. Retribution for this occurrence was undertaken at once, but the fire had been lighted. On the 26th July the tribes of the Malakand suddenly rose, flocking to the standard of an eccentric and wildly fanatical Mulla. Early in the afternoon of that fateful day so little apprehension was there of an immediate outbreak that the officers of the Malakand garrison had gone as usual to play polo at Khar. While the game proceeded, Mulla Mastan was setting forth from Landakai, only some eight miles away, with six young boys, his pupils and devotees. Ere night fell he had a following of thousands and was severely pressing the garrisons of Malakand and Chakdara. Thus quickly can the cry of “Ghaza” be responded to. For the full story of all the gallant deeds of the following few days the reader must be referred to the numerous detailed publications on the subject. We must pass quickly to events elsewhere. By the 7th August the blaze had spread to
Mohmand country; a fortnight later Afridi and Orakzai Tirah were alight. Shabkadr was attacked; the Khyber posts fell and the pass was in the hands of our enemies; the forts of Samana had been attacked and the Kurram Valley threatened. The southward spread of the conflagration was checked by the fact that the first outbreak had occurred—prematurely from the point of view of united action by the tribes—in Northern Waziristan. Punitive operations were already well advanced there before the Afridis and Orakzais rose and the troops in the Tochi were able to interpose a fire-proof screen between Tirah and the Mahsuds, who indeed were in chastened mood after the expedition of three years before. Thus it happened that they were the only tribe of importance that did not rise in 1897.

The campaign, of which the initial stages have been briefly recorded above, abounds in incidents famous in Frontier song and story. The storming of Dargai heights is perhaps the best known incident to the world at large. The Indian Army and the Frontier official remember with even greater pride the heroic defence of the ill-built, ill-found tower of Saragarhi on the Samana for seven and a half hours against overwhelming odds by a little band of 21 men of the 36th Sikhs, who fell fighting to the
last man before they would surrender their charge, on which depended the signal communications of the ridge.

This general rising of the tribes necessitated military operations on a scale hitherto unprecedented on the Frontier. Forces under Sir Bindon Blood and General Elles traversed the whole of the Mohmand country, Bajaur, Utman Khel, Swat and Buner, and an army of 40,000 men under General Sir W. Lockhart invaded Tirah, dealing first with the Orakzais and later with the Afridis. These operations were long and difficult but eventually successful, and by March 1898 all the tribes from the Tochi northwards had submitted. The Khyber was re-occupied; the Khyber Rifles were re-established and road-making and the building of a new and more up-to-date system of forts for the safeguarding of the pass was commenced.

For some years after 1897, as always after a campaign, the tribes gave little trouble. But the developments which had led to the penetration of tribal territory, the consequent rising and the magnitude of the problems which it in turn brought about led Lord Curzon on his assumption of the Vice-royalty to approach the Frontier problem from a new angle. Momentous changes in the form of Frontier adminis-
tration were now at hand, which must be described in a separate chapter.
CHAPTER III

The North West Frontier Province

There had existed for many years a school of thought which considered that the administration of the Frontier was too important a matter to form merely a portion of the duty and responsibility of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. The latter had innumerable demands upon his attention in the increasing problems of the rapidly developing districts east of the Indus. Individual Lieutenant-Governors might or might not have experience of, and sympathy with, the special characteristics and requirements of the Frontier. At the best there must be delay, due to the many other important claims on the attention of the head of the province, in matters that brooked no delay, and a lack of decision and consistency in policy. So argued the separationists. Their opponents held that a small Frontier administration would be expensive and inefficient for lack of senior supervisors and that there would be a tendency to subordinate the rights
of the inhabitants of directly administered districts to considerations of policy as regards the tribes or Afghanistan.

Schemes had been propounded from time to time with a view to giving the central Government of India a more direct control over Frontier administration and policy and to improving the relations of the British districts with their trans-border neighbours. The most important of these schemes was that propounded in 1877, during Lord Lytton's Vice-royalty; but the Second Afghan War caused it to be shelved. The experiences of 1897 brought the subject again to the fore and in 1901, after much discussion and deliberation and in the face of considerable opposition and genuine misgiving in some quarters, Lord Curzon's scheme for the creation of the North West Frontier Province as a separate administration, under a Chief Commissioner specially selected by the Governor-General, was introduced.

In geographical outline the new Province can be readily likened to an outstretched hand,* the five settled districts of Hazara (cis-Indus), Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan lying in the palm, while the thumb and four fingers stretched out

*See the sketch map.
to occupy and close against aggression the five gateways of the Malakand (with Chitral), the Khyber, Kurram, Tochi and Gomal. Incidentally, the clenching of the hand exercises pressure upon the turbulent tribal areas lying between the fingers.

Side by side with the inauguration of the new province Lord Curzon, with the assistance of Lord Kitchener's great organising ability, remodelled the strategic control of the Frontier. As far as possible regular troops were withdrawn from the small garrisons in the districts and agencies and concentrated in the larger cantonments, their places in the outpost line being taken by an extension of the tribal levy system into militias and border military police. Simultaneously the construction of roads and railways was undertaken, to ensure that the regular troops of the Peshawar Division and the Frontier brigades could be rapidly moved to any threatened point. It was part of Lord Kitchener's general scheme of army reorganisation, that the Punjab Frontier Force lost its old corporate existence and its units took their places as part of the new model Indian Army, all portions of which were in future to take their share of service on the Frontier.

Save for the Mahsud Blockade of 1900-02 the new Province for the first seven years of its existence enjoy-
ed almost unbroken peace. This blockade was no new
departure. It was nothing but the application, on a
larger scale, of an old and oft-tried Frontier principle.
Those whose contribution towards neighbourly rela-
tions with British India is confined to plunder and
rapine are debarred from peaceful intercourse with
British India until the resultant discomfort compels re-
paration for their delinquencies. This weapon had been
used with notable success against the Mahsuds during
the Second Afghan War. But in the altered conditions
of 1900 it did not prove equally effective. So after a
year of passive blockade more active measures were
taken and Mahsud country was harried by numerous
sudden offensive raids. This inversion of accustomed
rôles speedily produced the desired settlement, and
for some years the tribe gave no serious trouble.

It is necessary now to digress to say something more
about Mulla Powinda, whom we have already seen
at work at Wana in 1894. This remarkable man first
became prominent a few years previously about the
time when the opening of the Gomal Pass first made
closer relations with the Mahsuds necessary. From the
first the efforts of our officers were naturally devoted
to supporting the maliks, the national leaders of the
tribe and thus building up a solid body of representa-
tive men, who could keep the young bloods in check
and compel reparation when they broke out. Mulla Powinda, who though illiterate had a considerable spiritual reputation, set himself at the head of the tuman or democratic element and exerted all his influence to counter such attempts. He achieved a remarkable domination over the tribe as a whole and even at one time aspired to unite the whole of Waziristan under his own leadership. In the years when the memory of the blockade had begun to die down he not only encouraged raiding, but his hand was seen in a strange series of murders of British officers by Mahsuds, and attempts at murder, which disturbed the border from 1904 to 1908. In short Mulla Powinda was a sinister combination of priest and politician of style not unknown in medieval European history, whose intrigues were at the root of most of our troubles in the southern half of the Province from 1892 to the time of his death in 1913. Indeed the evil that he did lived after him. For there is little doubt but that his secretary and his son, on whom jointly his mantle descended, in April 1914 instigated the murder of Major Dodd, "the best friend the Mahsuds ever had," and two other officers by the hand of a trusted Mahsud orderly. During his later years however the beam gradually rose against Mulla Powinda. It was in 1908 that Sir George Roos-Keppel succeeded
Sir Harold Deane as Chief Commissioner. Almost his first act was to get Mr. (now Sir) John Donald appointed to the newly-created post of Resident in Waziristan. The new Resident well seconded by Major Dodd, the Political Agent, succeeded in administering a series of checks to the Mulla's influence, as a result of which the Mahsud record steadily improved. About the same time the experiment—very successful up to a point—was tried of enlisting Mahsuds in the Army. The Mahsud is the finest fighter of all the Pathan races and did excellently on service until political and religious considerations necessitated, in the course of the Great War, the discontinuance of enlistment of trans-Frontier Pathans.

These events have diverted attention from the Peshawar border and we must hark back. The seven peaceful years with which the new administration began bore useful fruit. Though too short a period to work a complete or lasting change in the warlike habits of the people, it was long enough to dispel to some extent the suspicion of our aggressive intentions engendered by the events of the '80's and '90's. It also served to introduce the trans-border tribesman to the possibilities of hitherto undreamt of prosperity from peaceful trade, while the extension of canal irrigation from the Swat and Kabul rivers gave open-
ings to many of them to settle down as British sub-
jects to the agricultural development of land newly
made cultivable. Consequently the necessity in 1908
of military operations to punish the Zakka Khel Afri-
dis for continuous raiding on the Peshawar border,
instead of causing a sympathetic revolt of the whole
Afridi tribe, as might well have happened had not the
suspicions of 1897 been allayed, led only to what
"Punch" called a "Week-end War," the Afridis as a
whole promptly negotiating the terms of settlement
with their recalcitrant section. A month later in the
same year punitive action against the Mohmands, who
had also been guilty of serious raiding, was compli-
cated for a moment by Afghan intrigue and the partic-
pation of irresponsible Afghan tribesmen; but our re-
lations with the Amir were not seriously jeopardised
and, after their country had been traversed for two
months by two brigades, the Mohmands submitted.
The rest of the Frontier was unaffected by these two
expeditions on the Peshawar border, in spite of much
fanatical preaching.

The Frontier administration never runs short of diffi-
culties and in these same years Mulla Powinda and
these two little wars were not all that it had to think
of. There were also the rapid increase in tribal arma-
ment due to large importations of modern weapons
of precision from the Persian Gulf, a peculiarly acute phase of the perennial outlaw problem, and a marked rise in crime, especially violent crime, amongst the inhabitants of the settled districts.

The Gulf arms trade between 1907 and 1910 revolutionised the military position on the Frontier. 1907 did not mark the beginning of the change; the importation of rifles and ammunition of European manufacture had begun soon after the Frontier rising of 1897, but ten years later the re-armament of the tribes with weapons far more effective than those possessed by our own militias and military police had proceeded to an extent which could no longer be disregarded and a climax was reached when a single consignment of 30,000 Martini Henrys was run through from the Gulf to Kandahar. This particular consignment, incidentally, consisted largely of the late armament of the Australian and New Zealand forces, which had received the "303" at the time of the South African War, the old, but perfectly good Martinis being sold to enterprising dealers, who eventually obtained touch, through French and German armament firms, nondescript tramp steamer companies, owners of fast sailing dhows and other devious channels, with the equally enterprising customer from the North West Frontier. In the three years (1907-09) no
less than 90,000 rifles, including an increasingly large number of "303," were run through to the Mekran coast. Most of these reached the tribes sooner or later. When the market had become sufficiently well-known, the tribesmen—whose increased wealth during the preceding years of peace has been already referred to—sank all their capital in the organisation of gun-running caravans. More especially the Adam Khel Afriidis of the Kohat Pass, finding the value of their "home-made" rifles enormously reduced, raised every penny they could and either went themselves to the Gulf, or entrusted their money to Ghilzai caravan leaders.

Just when the Frontier had entered wholesale upon this enterprise the Government of India stepped in with the naval and military blockade, which "spoilt sport" to such an extent as nearly to bring about another Frontier war. In 1910 the Adam Khel Afriidis of the Kohat Pass were in a very embittered frame of mind owing to their financial losses from the blockade. With the ingenuousness that is a refreshing, if at times annoying, characteristic of the Pathan, they demanded that Government should compensate them. This demand, and the situation generally, was firmly dealt with and by 1911 the Gulf arms trade was to all intents and purposes
killed. The re-armament of the tribes however had been effected. The relative position of our forces and theirs could never again be the same. Where formerly a dozen partially trained border police with Martini Henrys could safely be sent out to meet a raiding gang of 30 or 40, strong detachments of 50 were now required. A re-arming of the local forces and a general reorganisation and regrouping were necessitated. Also the villagers themselves had to be given some wider means of self-protection than the Indian Arms Act's strict interpretation allowed. Between 1909 and 1913 the militias were re-armed, the border military police gave way to the better armed and better trained Frontier Constabulary and the system was inaugurated of issuing rifles to villagers for their own protection and to enable them to co-operate with the Government forces in the defence of the border.

The third great problem of these years was outlawry. It is a problem that has always been with the Frontier magistracy. For naturally when you come to the place where the hills rise up out of the plain, where British India ends, and beyond which the King's writ does not run, those whom an undue exuberance of spirits or the demands of the Pathan code of honour have brought into conflict with the law of British India
have always sought refuge in the hills beyond its limits and beyond the reach of its law. But the hills are already hungry. There is no food for idle mouths and no hearth for cats which catch no mice. Pathan ideas make the hillman loath to turn away the stranger within his gates and more than loath to give him up to a justice which seems to him perverted. Therefore the stranger must stay, if this be in any way possible, and must earn his keep. This he not uncommonly does by acting as guide to raiding parties, whom he conducts to harry his old haunts, and the peace of the border is disturbed. Where a tribe under the political control of our own officers is concerned, the evil can generally be kept within bounds. But what if the fugitive from justice seeks refuge beyond the Durand Line? This was one of the unexpected results of the demarcation of that line. From Ningrahar or Khost or some other Alsatia in the eastern province of Afghanistan the outlaw is still within striking distance of his old home, but beyond the reach even of Government's long arm. The question of mutual extradition between India and Afghanistan bristles with so many difficulties that both governments have always carefully avoided it. Control is easier than extradition, but control means co-operation. And if some Afghan Governor thought fit, posing as the champion of
Islam and denying all allegations, to extend a welcome to wandering murderers and dacoits—or if you prefer it, to take some latter-day Robin Hood and Little John under his wing—in return for a share in their takings, how was he to be brought to book? At best, after lengthy correspondence between Simla and Kabul, something might be done. But about this time, despite His Majesty the Amir's recent visit to India and the impression which it made upon his mind, in point of fact mighty little was done, and the ungodly flourished accordingly. The worst form that the evil took, and the most difficult to deal with, was the practice of kidnapping which now became hideously prevalent. A fat Hindu bania, from some village in Peshawar or Bannu, was far the most profitable form of loot. For one thing he could be made, though not very easily, to transport himself and the longer he was kept, the more his value mounted. If his relatives were slow to produce the required ransom, an ear or a finger, sent as a reminder, would generally loose the purse-strings, or if he died what was it but one idolator the less? In the end however, by one means or another, the gangs which found a home beyond the Durand Line and thence pursued this monstrous trade, were killed, captured and broken up, and it was not until the period of tribal disturbance which
followed the Third Afghan War that the evil again attained to anything like the same dimensions as in the years which preceded the Great War.

Yet another difficulty was the marked rise in crime in the districts. It was in part the outcome or the reflection of conditions across the border and in part due to other causes. It raised some discussion on the old question, not yet finally answered, as to the need of further modification of the law of British India as applied to the Frontier districts, but nothing conclusive resulted.

With all these difficulties and drawbacks the years which preceded the Great War were none the less years of progress. In no direction was this more marked than in the spread of education. The most notable step was the inauguration, under the close personal guidance of Sir George Roos-Keppel, of an Islamia College, very much on the same lines as the Gordon College at Khartum. The college buildings, erected in these years, stand on the open plain between Peshawar and Jamrud. Where all else is shuttered and barred and defended by armed men it needs no protection beyond such as a few chaukidars can afford. In it many scions of the Frontier chiefs, from both sides of the administrative border, have since received and are now receiving an education which may enable them in
the time to come to exercise a profound influence on the conditions of the Frontier.
CHAPTER IV

The Frontier and the War

On the outbreak of the War in Europe the leading men of the Province, headed by ruling chiefs like the Mehtar of Chitral and the Nawab of Amb, came forward at once with the willing offer of all their resources. Public opinion in the cis-border area, which had seen the benefits of sixty years of settled rule, was unanimous in our support. The trans-border tribes, for whom those same sixty years had had a different history, were necessarily an uncertain quantity. They looked to Kabul for a sign, and received it in the Amir's open avowal of complete neutrality. They were further influenced by the large stake they had deposited with us in the persons of thousands of their young men, serving in the Indian army and local corps. All these were at the moment thoroughly staunch and eager for a share in the fray.

It was not long, however, before disturbing factors appeared. The possibility of Turkey being drawn in
on the side of our enemies was viewed with the greatest concern even by our best friends. The shock, when it came, was weathered with surprising ease. There had been time in the intervening three months to prepare the people for the event, and the Amir’s reiterated declaration of neutrality and condemnation of the bellicose folly of the Turks was of incalculable value. Still the situation in tribal territory was anxious in the extreme. Fanatical mullas and the anti-British party in Kabul did their utmost, though without cohesion or settled plan, to stir up trouble. The first outbreak came from the Afghan province of Khost, where the tribes were defiant of the Amir and resentful of the reprisals, recently taken against their trade and intercourse with India in consequence of the outlaw trouble. Late in November 1914 our militia post at Miranshah in the Tochi was attacked from Khost. The attack was repulsed without serious difficulty, but was repeated in 1915 upon the outpost of Spina Khaisora in the Upper Tochi. Miranshah and the Tochi generally continued to be threatened by gatherings from Khost till a strong lashkar was severely defeated by a combined force of troops and militia in March 1915.

Meanwhile trouble was brewing further north. In Buner there have been settled for close on 100 years
a strange colony, half refugee and half fanatic. Their origin traces back to Syed Ahmad of Bareilly, who acquired a temporary ascendancy early in the XIX century in the plains of Yusafzai—now the Mardan sub-division of the Peshawar district—and challenged the advancing power of the Sikhs. Defeated with immense slaughter, Syed Ahmad and the remnants of his following found refuge in the hills west of the Indus. In the early days of British rule this colony was a constant storm centre, but for more than twenty years it had sunk into insignificance, though still receiving some support in money and recruits from the Wahabi Muhammadan element of Hindustan and Bengal. With the entry of Turkey into the War, the Hindustani Fanatics, as they are known, again became active. The situation of the colony made it a convenient link between the pan-Islamic and pro-Turk party, which was already beginning to raise its head in India, and the anti-British party in Kabul. "Muhajirin,"—i. e. Indian Muhammadans unwilling to live longer in a land at War with the Khalifa—fled to the colony and were thence passed on to Kabul. A use having been found for the fanatics, money in increasing quantities began to reach them from Kabul and from India.

This digression has been necessary because the
fanatics figured largely in the fighting which broke out all along the northern Peshawar border in the spring and summer of 1915, and they have remained one of the chief danger points on the Frontier ever since. In April 1915 the Mohmands, the most priest-ridden of all the tribes, started the campaign by an attack on Shabkadr. They were repulsed, but not defeated, and trouble spread. At this period the military forces in India were depleted far below the danger point, and stories of the terrific nature of the fighting in Flanders were beginning to reach the country-side through sepoys returning wounded or discharged. These circumstances led to some decline in morale and encouraged the war party in the tribal area, but did not affect the loyalty of the mass of the people. The summer of 1915 saw serious risings on the Buner border, in the Malakand and on the Mohmand line. The latter led to serious fighting and necessitated the blockade of the whole tribe. The concluding months of 1915 were the most critical of the whole War on the Frontier. The causes specified above coupled with the idea, sedulously spread by agitators and by a Turco-German mission which had arrived in Kabul, that the alliance of Germany and Turkey was a Holy War in which Persia would soon join, and that then a combined army, including
Afghanistan, would invade India, gave increased vigour to war propaganda. The Amir was very nearly driven into war, but held his own; the Afridis, the keystone of the Frontier arch, remained staunch, and the succeeding years showed a steady strengthening of our position. German and Turkish intrigue continued to the end in Kabul and in tribal territory, and Muhammadan agitation in India spread its ripples to the Frontier. By 1916, however, we were again strong in actual military resources. Masses of white tents convinced the boldest that we had more troops than we could house; the drone of aeroplanes in the sky and the hum of motor transport on the roads were an impressive novelty and, above all, the remarkable steadfastness of India’s great benefactor in the war, Amir Habibullah Khan, checkmated the efforts of those who would have made catspaws of the tribes by tales of the coming again of one of the old-time invasions from the north and west.

A punitive expedition against the Mahsuds could no longer be postponed in 1917, but this was hardly a result of the War; every effort had been made to stave off the necessity, involving as it did the employment of troops badly wanted elsewhere; but an attack on Sarwakai, resulting in the death of the Commandant of Wana Militia, precipitated matters.
The expedition was remarkable for the fact that it was carried through, under every conceivable disadvantage of terrain, communications and weather, in the height of the summer by troops unseasoned to the Frontier and was completely successful. It resulted in two years of such peace to the Derajat as had not been known for many years.

With the trans-frontier situation well in hand, though a never-ceasing source of anxiety, the settled portion of the Province weathered the concluding years of the War with astonishing tranquillity. Internal lawlessness actually decreased and manifestations of loyalty were constant, and in his last Border Administration Report Sir George Roos-Keppel was able to write "In a world at War it is curious and pleasing that the North West Frontier has no history for the year 1918-19". The Indian Army had, before the War, drawn largely on the fighting races of the Frontier. Under stress of circumstances, already related, the classes enlisted from trans-border territory had proved unreliable and had been discharged. Their fickleness was more than compensated by the steadiness of their brethren in the districts, from whom during the period of intensive recruiting in 1917-18 a higher percentage was enlisted in relation to the total male population of fighting age than was
attained by any province in India, not excepting the Punjab. This result was obtained in spite of the terrible epidemic of influenza in the autumn of 1918, which claimed 93,000 victims in two months as against a normal death-rate for a year of 60,000. Though the Province is far from being a rich one, its subscriptions to War Loans, Red Cross funds and the like represented something like ten annas a head of the population.

It would be misleading to attribute this tranquillity entirely to disinterested loyalty or exceptional political acumen. The fact is that once the nervous period of 1915 was passed, when wild rumours, agitation and religious fervour came near to causing general demoralisation, the high prices obtained for agricultural produce, high rates of labour, soldier's remittances from the field and the daily spectacle of the civil administration, though with a depleted staff of British officers, going about its ordinary business unruffled, steadied people. On the "once bitten, twice shy" principle, they listened less and less to prophets of disaster and came to regard the Turco-German Army, which was so often reported to have reached Herat, as the myth it actually was. Agitators had no real grievance to work on. Even the rapidly rising prices of food-stuffs and cloth during the closing period of
the War only accentuated the growing desire for a British victory as it was confidently expected—and by wiser heads than the Frontier Pathan—that peace would bring immediate plenty.
CHAPTER V

The Aftermath

THE diagnosis of the War spirit on the Frontier attempted at the close of the preceding chapter is of importance as a guide to subsequent events. The absence of a grievance had kept things tranquil during the War. The presence of grievances prepared a fertile soil for subsequent troubles.

The news of the armistice in November 1918 evoked demonstrations of genuine enthusiasm on all sides. The prestige of the British name was at its zenith and even the crushing defeats of the Turks in Palestine and Mesopotamia struck no jarring note in the general rejoicings. At first it seemed that expectations were going to be fulfilled. There was an immediate drop in the price of necessaries; the bestowal of rewards for War services was promptly commenced and the general sinking back from an attitude of strain was facilitated by peace in our borders and release from the influenza scourge.
Looking down towards Landi Kotal into Afghanistan
Early in 1919 the situation began to change. One hope after another proved slow of realization. The drop in prices turned out to be illusory and the cost of living rose more and more; the release of soldiers who had joined up for the war emergency only was delayed.

Meanwhile, when he had helped the British cause to an extent that cannot be over-estimated, Amir Habibullah Khan was foully murdered at Jalalabad. The event caused no great stir in Afghanistan or on the Frontier and, after an abortive attempt by his brother, Nasrullah Khan, the throne was occupied by Amanullah Khan, his third son. The new ruler found his position none too secure. The news which reached him of events in the Punjab and their echoes in Peshawar offered what he thought was a good opportunity for creating a diversion. Misled by an entirely inaccurate appreciation of the situation and with the lure before his eyes of the restoration of the pristine glories of the Durrani Empire and the capture of the riches of Peshawar, he took up a truculent attitude and sent troops to violate the Frontier at the head of the Khyber. Simultaneously, overwhelming evidence was discovered of an officially inspired plot to foment disturbance in Peshawar and elsewhere. The Third Afghan War resulted.
At first all went well. The Afghan intruders in the Khyber were evicted and our troops advanced and occupied Dakka. The fighting which occurred demonstrated the hopeless inferiority of the Amir's troops, while the tranquillity of the tribes and the inhabitants of British territory proved the worthlessness of the intelligence service on which Afghan policy had been based. Jalalabad and Kabul were bombed from the air and all was ready for an advance to the former town, when the Amir sued for an armistice. Before this could be granted, an Afghan advance in the region of Thal, ably conducted by the Afghan General in Khost, Nadir Khan, had led to our militia garrisons of the Upper Tochi and other outlying posts being withdrawn to Miranshah. This was followed by the withdrawal from Wana and the Gomal.

These events were too much for the stability of the Waziristan tribes and the trans-border elements in the militias. The Afridis of the Khyber Rifles had wavered from the start and the corps was disbanded to forestall a mutiny. In Waziristan, when the withdrawal took place, mutinies occurred at Miranshah and Wana. A large proportion of the men remained loyal, though severely shaken. Miranshah, supported by regulars, was held; Wana and the posts of the Gomal route were evacuated in face of opposition both
from mutineers and tribesmen, and the loyal portion of the Wana garrison, retreating on Zhob, was severely handled and all the seven British officers who accompanied it, save one, were killed or wounded. Wazirs and Mahsuds alike, finding the omens of victorious “Ghaza” too clear to be ignored, swarmed down into the districts to raid and flocked to any point where loot was to be expected. Jandola, the only post on the Dera Ismail Khan border held by regulars, was cut off by a Mahsud lashkar and besieged, though the attack was not pressed home. The Wana Wazirs led by deserters from the militia and with large numbers of rifles and immense quantities of ammunition in their hands busied themselves in the adjoining agency of Zhob, where in an affair at Kapip they had the best of it and captured two mountain guns. Jandola was speedily relieved. But more active measures were needed to restore the situation and for the time being more active measures could not be taken. Further south the Sheranis gave similar trouble and the troops, collected along the district border in a defensive rôle were exposed to incessant attacks, in which they sustained considerable losses. On the Peshawar side, where the state of the Afridis was much the same as that of the Wazirs, a similar situation obtained.
Meanwhile on the 8th of August a treaty of peace with the Afghan Government was concluded at Rawalpindi. But we were left with a border in a state of turmoil from the Khyber southwards and the residents of four of the five settled districts with the added grievance of insecurity from raids. The army was overdue for demobilization, and even after the most pressing claims in this direction had been met, it was comparatively untrained in mountain warfare, whereas the enemy to be dealt with was more formidable than ever before, by reason of his vastly improved armament, and the strong nucleus of militia deserters, trained by the daily practice of years in just those tactics which they were now employing against us. Fortunately the Mohmands remembered the lessons of 1915 and the northern regions of the Frontier, in spite of the most intensive hostile propaganda, remained quiet. The Afridis too, though nearly swept off their feet by the wave of lawlessness, did not as a tribe commit themselves beyond redemption. The tribal maliks had a hard task but they grappled with it manfully, and a settlement was gradually effected by political means, with little more than the threat of military force. With the Afridi settlement came into being the Khyber Khassadars—a tribal levy, un-uniformed and providing their own
arms, who have ever since satisfactorily fulfilled their duty of keeping the peace on their own tribal border.

Further south the Kohat border was gradually settled during 1920. But in Waziristan the situation amounted practically to a general rising of the tribes and there was no alternative to the thorough reconquest of the evacuated country. A start was made with the Tochi, where, after only slight opposition, terms were dictated to the Utmanzai Wazirs. The Mahsud campaign was then undertaken and resulted in "such fighting as the Frontier had never seen before"—a series of desperate battles in the wildest and most difficult country. Gradually, and with heavy losses on both sides, the advance was pushed on and Mahsud resistance broken down. The Wana Wazirs were next dealt with and Wana re-occupied. Their behaviour throughout had been worse than that of any tribe on the Frontier, showing a combination of treachery, lawlessness and fanaticism unrelieved by the fighting ability and courage of the Mahsuds. The year 1921 found us with our troops occupying Ladha in the heart of Mahsud country and passed in prolonged consideration of the future policy to be adopted in Waziristan, in negotiations which should restore the hostile elements amongst Wazirs and Mahsuds to
their proper place in the tribal framework, in settling terms and getting them complied with. The bulk of the Mahsud tribe had had its bellyful of fighting. It had submitted, and access to the markets of British India had once more been thrown open to its members. But it had not yet begun to benefit very greatly by the enormous opportunities which Government's policy of road construction was beginning to place within its reach, and its attitude was still sullen. In addition the efforts of outside mischief-makers such as Shah Daula, Haji Abdur Razzak, and Lala Pir kept the fire of active opposition alight in some of the most powerful sections. Small groups of hostiles were thus always on the prowl or for ever making guerilla attacks on the troops, wherever carelessness or inexperience or the mere accident of time and place gave them even the most desperate chance. And, as these carried with them at least the sympathy of a large proportion of their fellows, every such incident, according to the measure of its success, went near to endangering the whole settlement. Nevertheless the political situation was slowly improving.

With the setback which the progress of the civilising influences of British rule had received in 1919, the scourge of kidnapping to ransom had again raised its head and assumed almost incredible proportions.
In the year of the Afghan War no fewer than 463 British subjects were carried off. A quiet border is the first essential to the peaceful progress of the districts of the plains, and reasonable safety of person and property is the first claim to which the people of those districts have a right. It was more than ever necessary at this time to meet that claim, because upon the groundwork of grievances which has already been described had been built up, during 1919 and the following years, a structure of dangerous discontent and unrest.

While the settlement of the tribal difficulties was proceeding, a further inconclusive stage in our relations with Afghanistan had been marked by the Mussoorie Conference of 1920. Though this did something to allay the anticipation of another war, the effect was far more than counterbalanced by the Khilafat agitation and Hijrat movement.

Though hostile elements in Afghanistan were ready enough to profit by the agitation, zeal for the Khilafat did not emanate from there. In 1920 this agitation first seriously affected the Frontier Province through the raising of the cry of "Hijrat," or religious emigration from a country ruled by infidels. An intensive campaign, not unconnected with local faction-feeling, seriously affected the portions of the Hazara District
nearest to the border. Similar agitation, reinforced by the passage through the district of large bodies of emigrants, or "Muhajirin," from the Punjab and Sindh, threw Peshawar off its balance, and the infection spread southwards. During the early summer of 1920 tens of thousands of the inhabitants of the Province either performed or prepared to perform the "Hijrat" to Afghanistan, in the belief that it was their religious duty. The madness passed within a short period, sanity being restored by the Amir's announcement that his country could receive no more of these immigrants and by the return of the vast majority of the adventurers disillusioned, destitute and bearing tales of the direst suffering. The Government intervened unasked to rehabilitate many of those who were destitute and so, in the end, won more than it had lost by the movement, in widespread gratitude and the removal of distrust and sullenness.

It was not only Peshawar that was affected. In Hazara religious unrest spread to the trans-border tribes, necessitating military operations to restore order. Throughout the Province, and especially in Bannu, this agitation engendered a spirit of lawlessness and defiance of authority, which was aggravated by a continuance of bad seasons and soaring prices of the necessaries of life.
All this time and right up to the last days of 1921, relations with Afghanistan remained unsettled. If this sketch of Frontier history shows anything at all, it shows the importance of this factor. From January in that year there had been a British Mission under Sir Henry Dobbs in Kabul endeavouring, in the face of apparently unending difficulties, to reach a better understanding and negotiate a treaty satisfactory to both parties. At length success crowned these efforts and on the 21st of November a treaty was signed, of which the maintenance of good neighbourly relations was the dominant *motif*. 

CHAPTER VI

Reconstruction

THE treaty of 1921 was vastly different from the engagements into which Amirs Abdur Rahman and Habibullah Khan had entered. The kingdom of Afghanistan had now blossomed out into a fully independent and sovereign State. Gone was the control of its foreign policy; gone, the guarantee of its northern frontier and gone too the subsidy which those rulers had enjoyed. None the less it provided a sufficiently solid and satisfactory platform on which to build.

Constructive work on the Frontier resembles the erection of a lighthouse. The builders know that storms will come and that from time to time their operations will be interrupted. Meanwhile they have to get on with the job. The work is with them, as Kipling said long ago; the event with Allah.

The announcement of the ratification of this treaty in February 1922 came as a cold douche to the
mullas and other intractable elements interested in prolonging disturbance, and all their endeavours failed to revive among the border tribes the declining flame of militancy. Under these conditions rapid strides were made towards the restoration of the old relations of confidence and friendship with the tribes which existed before the War. The grant of new allowances to the Afridis in compensation for the new responsibilities placed upon them by the construction of a broad-gauge railway through the Khyber Pass and the re-opening to them, though on a much reduced scale, of enlistment in the Indian Army went far to cut the ground from under the feet of the notorious malcontent Said Akbar, and to allay the not unnatural suspicion of the tribesmen. Contracts and labour on the line brought comparatively honestly earned wealth within their reach and the tribe settled down to acquiescence in the new order of things.

In Waziristan an altogether new departure was made. With the consent of the Utmanzai Wazir tribes concerned Government's right to construct and open a road from Thal to Idak was re-affirmed and a similar right was negotiated southwards from the Tochi through the Khaisora Valley to the Razmak plateau, on the confines of Mahsud country. The Wazirs also agreed to the occupation of Razmak by
the forces of Government in such form and strength as Government thought fit to keep there. Meanwhile, by right of conquest, a road was being made from Jandola on the other side of Mahsud country, up the Takki Zam Valley towards Razmak, and from Jandola by the Shahur Valley to Sarwakai, cutting right across the raiders' route. Along these roads posts or fortified camps were erected and for the protection of the intermediate sections and other areas, in which Government was concerned to keep the peace, a locally recruited force of khassadars, like those of the Khyber, now began to come into being.

But as usual the crop of difficulties did not fail. Large military expenditure in Waziristan, the cost of watch and ward services and the sufferings which in spite of all this outlay the events of 1919-26 had entailed upon British subjects residing in the trans-Indus districts, and more especially upon the Hindu element amongst them, had engendered in the minds of Indian publicists a tendency to query the advantages of a separate Frontier administration and to advocate the reversion of the Province, or at any rate of its districts, to the Punjab, or at least the placing of its judiciary under the control of the Punjab High Court. Criticism of the Frontier administration in the Legislative Assembly led to the
appointment of a Committee of Enquiry, of which Sir Denys Bray, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, was President. The committee toured the Province in the late spring of 1923 and recorded evidence. Unfortunately the ventilation of this question tended to throw the two communities into antagonism, the Hindu minority (only 8 per cent of the population) being for, and the Muhammadans against, re-amalgamation with the Punjab. As a result of the committee's recommendations, which were not free from dissidence of opinion, the judiciary has been strengthened by the appointment of an Additional Judicial Commissioner drawn from the local Bar, but no further steps have been taken. As elsewhere, animosity between the two communities continued to grow in the Frontier Province and in the autumn of 1924 broke out into very serious inter-communal rioting at Kohat, in which the trans-border population showed a lively desire to take a hand, with considerable loss of life and great damage to property. Signs were not wanting at Dera Ismail Khan in the following year of a similar danger, but largely through the good sense of the leading men on both sides the difficulty was smoothed over.

Kohat, whose former fair fame had already been smirched in 1920 by the first raid on record in
Frontier history in which an Englishwoman had been molested, was destined in these years to make an unhappy notoriety for itself. One morning in February 1923, after a stormy night, the bell-of-arms in the Police Lines was discovered broken open and forty-three .303 rifles (each worth Rs. 1,000 in tribal territory) missing. The district authorities were soon on the track of the culprits and took strong measures. Early in March the village of a Bosti Khel Pass Afri-di named Ajab Khan, which lies in tribal territory to the west of the Kohat Pass road, within a mile or two of the fort upon the kotal, was rounded up by night by a strong force of Frontier Constabulary under Mr. Handyside and searched. Thirty-three of the missing rifles were found cleverly concealed in a cellar, together with certain articles of uniform and other property which established beyond doubt the complicity of the occupants in the earlier outrage above mentioned—the murder of Colonel and Mrs. Foulkes by a gang of raiders in the autumn of 1920. Ajab Khan was unfortunately not at home to receive his visitors and was therefore not arrested. Shortly after he returned and in April made his counter-stroke, entering Kohat Cantonment by night and carrying off Miss Ellis, after the murder of her mother, Major Ellis being absent from Kohat on duty elsewhere. The story of Miss
Ellis' rescue by Mrs. Starr (now Mrs. Underhill), Khan Bahadur Rissaldar Moghal Baz Khan and Khan Bahadur Kuli Khan is too well known to need repetition here. But this was not the end of the misdeeds of Ajab Khan and his gang. Robbed of their prey from Kohat, towards the close of the year they made a second attempt at Parachinar in the Kurram, which resulted in the murder of Captain and Mrs. Watts.

Meanwhile, one evening in April of the same year two officers, Majors Orr and Anderson, of the Seaforth Highlanders stationed at Landi Kotal, while taking an evening stroll, were waylaid and murdered. The assassins were two Afghan subjects, Sangu Khel Shinwaris; their motive, apparently, impersonal revenge for a notorious ruffian who had been executed at Peshawar many years before. The two gangs of scoundrels speedily joined forces. Hounded out of Tirah, the country of the Orakzais and Afridis, they took refuge in Afghanistan, and when, in consequence of diplomatic representations at Kabul, pressure was brought to bear by the Afghan Government on that side also, they dodged to and fro across the Durand Line, in the impenetrable country north of the Sufaid Koh. It was from here that they carried out the Parachinar outrage above described. Finally,
Ajab and two of his companions were deported by the Afghan Government to Afghan Turkestan and interned there. One of the two Shinwaris was killed by Afghan irregulars, while the other escaped northwards to Mohmand country. Since then, another member of Ajab's gang has been arrested in Peshawar and hanged. The fifth man still lives a furtive life in Afridi Tirah, where he has more than once been attacked by the party of law and order. A fine of Rs. 50,000 has also been recovered from the Pass Afridis and two khassadar posts—named the Ellis and Foulkes posts—have been erected in their limits. But the friction engendered by these incidents has more than once and in more than one place come near to producing consequences of the first magnitude.

There remains little to tell. In Waziristan the scheme of road-making has been steadily carried on. The Tochi is now linked with Jandola, vid the Khaisora, Razmak and the Takki Zam Valley and the Mahsuds can be taken in reverse as well as by frontal attack whenever operations against them may be necessary. But at present there is no sign of this. They have abandoned their sullenness and talk openly, though perhaps not altogether sincerely, of the day when they will submit to disarmament and become full-fledged British subjects. Sections amongst them have
from time to time given trouble, which has been successfully dealt with by the Royal Air Force, but troops have not moved against them for nearly eight years, and the adjoining districts meanwhile have had such peace as they never before knew.

Bannu has been linked up direct with Tank by a cis-border road, useful for defence, and yet another road from Sarwakai to Wana is under construction, which will put an end to the abhorred vacuum in which the Wana Wazirs have lived for the last ten years. The Thal-Idak road is also under construction.

The Kurram Valley has enjoyed peace and plenty and its inhabitants, the Turis, on whose hills artemisia happens to grow, have gathered wealth beyond their wildest expectations.

In Orakzai Tirah the old standing quarrel between the Sunni and the Shia sections has endangered the peace of the Kohat border, and given an opening to Afridi aggression.

In the north there has been desultory fighting amongst rulers and would-be rulers in Dir, Nawagai and Khar and a very interesting phenomenon has been witnessed in the gradual rise to power of Mian Gul Gulshahzada of Swat, a religious leader yet entirely friendly. Having made himself undisputed master of
his own country, Swat, he has now conquered Buner and extended his sway to the banks of the Indus.

It is impossible to conclude without mention of a farrago of disconnected events—some regrettable, some otherwise. The opening of the Khyber Railway in November 1925, which has since proved an unexpected commercial success; the inauguration of an extended programme of expenditure on public health and educational services, which has already given large new well equipped hospitals to Peshawar and Bannu; the question of "Reforms", and the further questions how, when, to what extent they are to be applied to the Frontier; the lamented death in April 1927 of the gallant Handyside, in the last of his many encounters with armed desperados; the beginnings of an attempt to grapple with the economic difficulty in some tribal areas; all these claim mention but cannot be dilated upon.

And now once again (February 1929) the western horizon is darkened. King Amanullah, who weathered the severe storm of the Khost rebellion in 1924, is no longer on the throne of Kabul or master in his own country, and no man can say what the morrow will bring forth. But this after all is nothing new on the Frontier.
CHAPTER VII

The Province and Its People

In surveying the early and recent history of the Frontier, some of the peculiar characteristics of the country and its inhabitants have emerged. It has been shown how the North West Frontier Province came to be created and what its chequered and stormy history has been. A few facts and figures about the Province, its constitution and its people may perhaps be of interest.

The head of the Frontier administration is Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General. As Chief Commissioner he administers that portion of the Province which falls within British India. As Agent to the Governor-General he conducts relations with Chitral, Dir, Swat and other states and with the tribal communities whose territories lie between British India and the Durand Line. The area for which he is thus in one way or another responsible extends from the Baroghil Pass, on the Hindu Kush, at the
northern extremity of Chitral territory, to the confines of Baluchistan—a distance of just over 400 miles. Its average width does not exceed 100 miles. The Province is bounded on the north and west by Afghanistan, on the south by Baluchistan and the Punjab, on the east by the Punjab and Kashmir. Its total area is about 38,000 square miles, of which only one-third is included in British India. Except the Hazara District the whole of it lies west of the Indus. Mountain and hill—varying from the eternal snows to the low, rocky hills which are the most familiar feature of every Frontier landscape—leave room only for occasional fertile valleys over the greater portion of the Province. The only considerable plains are those of Peshawar, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and a portion of the Hazara District which adjoins the Punjab. Of these plains, Peshawar is bountifully watered by five rivers and two great—and several minor—canal systems; Bannu is half intensely fertile, half dependent upon a precarious rainfall; Dera Ismail Khan, though cultivable where irrigation can be obtained, is, to a great extent, a barren waste.

As will be readily understood, the variations of climate and scenery in this comparatively small area are extreme. In winter and spring nothing can be more delightful than the climate of the plains and
lower valleys. The clear atmosphere, the crisp keenness of the snow-borne breeze, invigorate the body, as the green expanse of young wheat, barley, and gram, interspersed with patches of sugarcane or rice lands and plentiful timber delights the eye. In summer, though still verdant with the crops of the season—maize, millet and ripening rice—the valleys swell in a steamy, malarial heat which cannot be described, while the unwatered tracts and the boulder-strewn hills and torrent beds of the lower hills provide a foretaste of the regions of the damned.

The Province depends mainly upon agriculture. But Peshawar and Dera Ismail Khan are important entrepôts for Central Asian as well as local trade. The other towns are little more than bazaars, grown up round the military cantonments. The agricultural classes include, though in numbers which tend to decrease as irrigation and other causes encourage a more settled existence, a considerable proportion of nomadic or semi-nomadic graziers and the winter population is largely swelled by immigrants from Afghanistan, who deposit their families, camels and flocks in the trans-Indus districts, while their able-bodied men earn good livelihood by undertaking the heavier forms of unskilled manual labour or peddling cloth or other goods over the length and breadth of
India, till the approach of the hot weather sends them trooping back to block the passes in April and May with their teeming caravans.

Out of a population in the settled districts of 2½ millions, 92 per cent. are Muhammadans. In tribal territory, of which no regular census has ever been taken, but which is estimated to have a population of some 2½ millions, the proportion is much higher. The non-Muhammadan element in the district is composed entirely of traders, soldiers and officials. Among the Muhammadans, Pathans or speakers of the Pashtu language, largely predominate but, ethnographically, they are of very mixed origin. With Afghan, Turkish, Tartar, Persian and Indian strains intermingling, the only common bonds are religion and history. Both inculcate a spirit of fiery independence, which is fostered by surroundings and conditions of life. This spirit is the keynote to the understanding of the Pathan. It permeates his politics and his personality. Add to this the facts that the invigorating climate and life of his native haunts produce an extraordinarily high average of physique, that he habitually goes armed—except where the law forbids him to do so—and knows how to use his weapons and that, in the greater part of the Province, life is so hard that the land could not support even the
scanty population it produces but for the extraneous aids of trade, labour and military service, and the result is a man. This man may be a swash-buckling braggart, he may be cruel, treacherous, fanatical; he may have other vices, but he bows the knee to none, save to him who can uphold his right to be obeyed. To set against his vices the Pathan is brave, sober, religious according to his lights and, on the whole, clean living; he has a ready sense of humour, and great traditions of hospitality; he is a lover of sport and athletic outdoor games and, when his respect and esteem have been won, he is capable of great devotion. And, to those who can speak and understand his queer guttural language, he is amazingly good company. The enthusiasm of the country people when the Peshawar Vale Hounds run through their fields and past their villages; the excitement when a "jack" is viewed; the cheery joking crowd which comes running to help the sportsman in difficulties, suggest the west of Ireland at its best. Games like "Toda" and the wildly energetic round dances in which the Wazir and Khattak youths delight are the pastimes of athletes.

On both sides of the border the blood-feud is rife. According to the Pathan code of honour an insult, especially if it is in any way concerned with his
womenfolk, must be repaid in blood. But blood too must be paid for in blood, and so arise and continue for generation after generation the vendettas which, in tribal territory, confine a man to his tower during the hours of daylight for weeks and months at a time, and make it unsafe for him ever to venture abroad unarmed and, in the settled districts, fill the law courts, jails and hospitals with the parties to cases of murder, broken heads and bloodshed.

Enough has been written of the characteristics of the country and people to show that their administration presents problems quite different from those of the Punjab or other parts of India. First and foremost of these problems is that of assuring the safety of the settled population of the plains from aggression on the part of their turbulent neighbours of the hills, while, at the same time, preserving sufficiently friendly relations with the latter to enable military operations to be dispensed with and the civilizing influences of contact with British rule gradually to leaven the mass. It has been explained how the increase in tribal armament and the outlaw factor complicate this problem. The first of these complications admits of no cure, but has necessitated a great increase in the means of protection provided for the defence of the districts. Innate in the system of the
indigenous community is the idea of communal responsibility for defence. Present policy aims at cooperation between Government and the people to provide this, and subsidiary objects are the provision of employment for the surplus population and the strengthening of the natural and hereditary leaders of the people by helping them to organise the defence of their own boundaries. In this system Militia or Scouts, whose role it is—by incessant patrolling—to keep raiding gangs at home, and Government communications open in tribal territory in normal times; Frontier Constabulary, who are a military police force whose special task is the safeguarding of the district borders; Tribal Levies or "Khassadars" to protect a special area or perform some specific duty; and the Village "Chigha" or pursuit party, all have their share. The "chigha"—the Hue and Cry of Old England—is the raw material of the whole and it is the duty, both in custom and Frontier law, of every able-bodied man to turn out when the "chigha" drum is beaten. To enable these village pursuit parties to meet raiding gangs on something approaching equal terms, large number of rifles are issued on loan to responsible persons in villages liable to attack, or which lie upon well-known raiding routes. The outlaw problem with its accompaniment of kidnapping has been discussed
in a previous chapter. One aspect of this question is the incompatibility of British-made law and the Pathan code of honour. This is too complicated a subject to be discussed here, but many a legally proclaimed outlaw has done no more than establish himself in his own and his neighbours' eyes as a man of honour.

The existing palliative for this conflict between law and custom is the "jirga" or council of elders, which is supposed after investigating the facts, to come to a decision which shall strike a fair balance between the demands of the State and the tribal moral code. The "jirga" system is indigenous and in tribal territory is still the only means of settling disputes great or small without recourse to violence. Whatever faults or abuses in the system may manifest themselves in the settlement of cases in the districts, it has the merit of bringing a large number of men of status into direct touch with the administration to the mutual advantage of both sides. The whole subject of the legal machinery of the Province, including the "jirga" system, is one on which there has been considerable controversy, and it would be unsafe to prophesy the direction in which changes will be made.

Apart from these two special features of defence
and the working of the "jirga" system, the administration of the five settled districts does not differ materially in general outline from that of the Punjab. The charge of a Frontier district however includes the control of a varying extent of adjacent tribal territory and in this respect the duties of the district officer are those of a political agent. The Deputy Commissioner in his political capacity and the Political Agents of the five trans-border agencies control the tribes in their charges by purely executive means; no legal code is in force and the King's writ does not run. The executive means employed are based on the interests of the tribes. The object aimed at is to restrain them from lawless depredations on their more settled neighbours by the menace of the withdrawal of facilities for trade, employment, etc., by assisting them in settling their private or inter-tribal disputes according to their own customs and by paying them allowances in return for services rendered. This system of allowances is often represented as sheer blackmail. It is not so. The allowances are given in return for something definite. They may be compensation for the construction of roads through tribal country, or for the infringement, by our occupation and control, of some long-standing right or custom, or they may be rewards granted in recognition of some special
service. The Khyber Afridis afford the most striking example in illustration of this. The British Government now receives in tolls from the caravan traffic of the Khyber much more than it paid, till recently, to the tribes, who took those tolls themselves in times past. Subsequent increases to the Khyber allowances have been as rewards for the very signal service the Afridis rendered us by remaining staunch during the Great War, in spite of every inducement to turn against us, and as compensation for the land compulsorily acquired by us for roads, railways and camps. Moreover all allowances, for whatever reason they may have been given, are conditional on continued good behaviour and are liable to forfeiture in part or in whole, if offences are committed. This forfeiture is the commonest and most effective weapon of retaliation upon a lawless tribe and the value of the system of "allowances" is best shown by our comparative impotence in dealing with those tribes which are not thus subsidised.
CHAPTER VIII

Descriptive

The two things which the average visitor to the Frontier first wants to see are the Khyber Pass and Peshawar City. He probably has already some idea of the significance of the pass, strategically and as a trade route. His mental picture of the city is apt to be less definite, and vaguely suggestive of the Arabian Nights. In this respect he is not altogether wide of the mark, though he must be prepared for disappointments and surprises. Peshawar City has no great architectural or scenic beauties; its interest lies in the variety of its human types and the multitude of their pursuits. Entered by the Kabuli Gate, the Qissa Khani—the street of the Story-Tellers—raises romantic expectations. The street is a broad straight one and, except for the shops of dealers in Turkoman carpets, Bokhara silks and embroideries and the like, presents little of interest on the surface. But see it on a Friday,
with the whole roadway filled from wall to wall with a hundred different types of humanity, and it is an epitome of the Frontier and its history. The crowd comprises elements of every race from the confines of China to Samarcand, Merv and Herat—Tajiks, Kabulis, Kizilbashes, and Ghilzais, mingling with Afghans, Mohmands or Swatis from the trans-border tracts, and townspeople and villagers from Peshawar and its neighbourhood. Threading their way through the crowd, perched high upon mountainous saddles under which amble sturdy Badakhshani ponies, come half a dozen Uzbegs—Turki-speaking Mongolians from far away Kokand—bound on the long pilgrimage to Mecca; sitting round one of the many teashops with their huge brass or copper “samovars,” are a couple of Jews from Herat, comparing notes with fellow-Semites from Bokhara and discovering evidence of the wonderful organisation of the scattered Jewish race in the fact that they all have letters of introduction to the same co-religionist in Jerusalem. On the verandah of a shop may be a well-to-do merchant of Yarkand or Kashgar, just arrived after months of travel, via Chitral and the Malakand and arranging the first steps of a transaction for disposing of his silks. Further up the street the ear is assailed by the sound of a multitude of hammers tapping incessantly
upon metal. Round the corner, the noise is seen to proceed from the Coppersmiths' Bazar, where in a long row sit men and boys, master-craftsmen and apprentices in a hereditary trade for which Peshawar is famous. So in a ramble round the city are found, each guild collected in its own quarter, as in mediæval London, bird fanciers; potters with their display of glazed pipe-bowls and utensils in all variations of green, yellow and blue; silk embroiderers; wax-workers; goldsmiths; shoemakers busy cutting, hammering or sewing the handsome and much sought after Peshawari shoes and "chaplis" with their gold embroidery and gaudy silk "pom-poms." In another corner are the shops where can be bought the silk "lungis" banded in gold and silver, favoured by the man of fashion from Calcutta to Kabul; near by is the "Kulla-dož" quarter, where are made the round or peaked caps, rich in silk and gold thread, on which the "lungi" or turban is wound. Amongst and around all these craftsmen wanders the motley throng, food for many a day's interesting study, busy in the affairs, great and small, of the commerce of a continent. When the open streets and their shops have yielded up their story, there are still behind the scenes the store-rooms of the carpet-sellers; the workshops of the potters and the tanners; carpenters busy on the
local "pinjra" work—thin wooden strips held together in lattice work patterns by their own pressure on each other—and near the Bajauri Gate the caravan serais packed with the squatting forms of shaggy Central Asian camels and their loads—rugs, furs, astrakhan, silks and embroideries from Bokhara, fruits, drugs, "postins" and woollen goods from Kabul—all the varied produce that breaks bulk and is transhipped from camel-back to railway truck at Peshawar.

Anything of architectural value that ever existed in the present city of Peshawar was destroyed by the Sikhs at their coming. The only building of any antiquity that remains is the Gor Khatri, now the police headquarters, formerly the residence of Avitable, the famous Sikh Governor, who, in the intervals of hanging criminals by the dozen and gathering in revenue at the head of a brigade of Sikh soldiery, built the city wall. The Gor Khatri had once been a place of Hindu pilgrimage and is mentioned in this connection by Babar early in the XVI century, but for years it had been used as a serai. The present British fort was built by the Sikhs on the site of the Durani Bala Hissar, which they had destroyed.

The whole Peshawar Valley is, in one sense, a
mean and undistinguished structure founded on the ruins of a great civilisation. The Muhammadan invasions of the X and XI centuries literally devastated the valley and destroyed the last traces of the ancient kingdom of Gandhara. Where now are only mud villages, the mighty city of Pushkalavati and many another stone-built fort and township once stood and elicited the praise even of Chinese travellers in the V and following centuries of the Christian era. Close to the site of the present city of Peshawar was the "City of Poros," capital for long years of Gandhara and the goal of pilgrims from all the Buddhist world, on account of the huge stupa containing the sacred relics which, as the result of recent excavations, now rest in the keeping of the Buddhists of Burma at Mandalay. The Frontier, especially the Peshawar district, is rich in archaeological remains of the pre-Muhammadan era, and some of the best specimens of Graeco-Bactrian statuary are to be found in the Peshawar Museum and in the Guides' Mess at Mardan. The monasteries, mausoleums and fortifications of Takht Bahi, between Mardan and the Malakand, Jemal Garhi, Sahri Balol and the Khyber and the rock inscribed edicts of Asoka at Shahbazgarhi and Mansehra, the Akra mound near Bannu and more recently examined sites in Waziristan
and the Derajat have disclosed to explorers of recent years a wealth of sculpture, coins, inscriptions and mural decorations, which have added to the world's knowledge of the early history of India and of the Hellenistic and other influences that helped to shape it.

But, with the exception of the Gor Khatri, already mentioned, there is nothing now standing in Peshawar of greater age than the suburban villa of one of the Durrani governors, which now houses the offices of the Peshawar Brigade and was formerly the residency whence George Lawrence had to flee with his family to Kohat, when the Sikh troops rose at the beginning of the Second Sikh War. Another Durrani building is now used as the Church Missionary Society's School. The cantonments were not laid out till 1850, after the first British garrison had lived for some months in temporary quarters to the north-east of the city, the only remaining trace of which is an old British cemetery.

The life of Peshawar has one feature which is distinctive. That is its gardens. Gardening in the European style amply repays such efforts as the shifting British population of cantonments can achieve, as a drive along the roads in March or April amply testifies. The Shahi and Wazir Baghs
are fine examples of public gardens under municipal management, but it is to the miles of orchards and gardens to the north and south of the city that the population throngs for shade in summer and for pleasant recreation in the autumn and spring—sometimes too for less innocent diversions. These orchards produce most valuable crops of apples, quinces, peaches and other fruits and are interspersed with plots of cultivation, walled gardens and summer houses of the rich residents of the city.

From a point of vantage, such as the roof of the Gor Khatri, the whole valley of Peshawar and its surrounding hills can be taken in at a glance and much history can be pictured. Let us begin by looking south. That gap in the low hills marks the Kohat Pass, which really has a better claim to being a historic highway of invasion than the Khyber itself. By it, across a neck of Afridi country, runs the Frontier road to Kohat, and Bannu; to Dera Ismail Khan and Razmak. The villages of the pass are famed for a strange industry—the manufacture entirely by hand of rifles and ammunition, especially rifles, to the eye so like the products of European arsenals as to deceive all but experts. For these, since they are comparatively cheap and serviceable, there is a ready sale all along the border. The hills west of
the Kohat Pass are those of Tirah, the land of the Orakzais and Afridis, to which the Bara Valley gives access. Slightly to the north and west will be seen the prominent peak of Lakka Sar in the Tartarra range, and at its feet, on one side, to the south, the Khyber Pass, its entrance marked by the ship-like fort of Jamrud and to the north, the debouchure of the Kabul and Swat rivers and the beginning of Mohmand country. Above Abazai, where the Swat river comes out on to the plain, the wall of hills turns east and runs along the north side of the valley. Beyond, snow-covered, are the higher mountains of Bajaur, Dir and Chitral. That distant dip in the nearer ranges almost due NNE is the Malakand Pass, and to the right of it can be seen the Buner ranges, culminating in Mahaban, once believed to be the site of Alexander's Aornos, but now discredited, with the so-called Black Mountain, on the far side of the Indus, showing snow-crowned in the distance on a clear day in winter. Ringed round by these bare hills the valley blossoms like the rose wherever water has been brought upon the land. And of water there is no lack, thanks to the skill of modern engineers, and the boldness with which even the Malakand hills have been tunnelled to bring down into the plains the life-giving stream.
Of all this panorama the two most significant points—though insignificant as seen from the Gor Khatri—are the Khyber and the Malakand. The one leads over the roof of the world to Pekin and the other to Moscow via Kabul. On two days in the week the road that stretches west from Peshawar to the Khyber is thronged with camels, mules, donkeys, ponies and a medley of travellers—the weekly Khyber caravan coming to or leaving Peshawar. The Khyber of to-day is crowded not only with camels and pilgrims but with the signs of its importance as the strategic key to the Frontier. A double and, in places, treble road winds up beneath the cliffs of Rohtas, past forts and picquets to the Shahgai heights, then down to Ali Masjid; thence through frowning gorges into a more open valley dotted with the fortified villages of the Zakka Khel, till it emerges on the Loargai plateau and reaches Landi Kotal. Thence it drops over Michni Kandao to Landi Khana and the Afghan boundary whence, now no longer a road, but perhaps the bumpiest track in the world over which motors ply, it disappears round a spur towards Dacca. All the way to the Afghan frontier from Jamrud the road is flanked by the newly-opened railway, a marvellous feat of engineering.
In the other direction from Peshawar the Grand Trunk Road can be seen running away east to the cantonment of Nowshera, whence, through the cavalry station of Risalpur and Mardan, the home of the Guides, runs the road that winds up over the Malakand Pass, with its memories of 1895 and 1897 to Chakdarra Fort and thence, a fortnight's march away, to Chitral.

So, to the visitor standing in Peshawar, the Queen of the Frontier and the centre of its life, a scene is unfolded that is filled with the history of invasions, wars, attack, defence, the march of successive waves of conquerors and the efforts to build a barrier, behind which the people of the plains and the Indian Empire may work out their political and economic destiny. Westwards the index finger points up the Khyber in the direction of danger; eastwards lie other and subtler difficulties, and in both directions the future holds problems of which no man can tell the solution, but which will give the sight-seer, as he descends from the roof-top, material for many an hour's thought, hopeful or foreboding, according to his temperament.
CHAPTER IX

The Lure of the Frontier

LET the traveller not deceive himself. He may in his wanderings in or near tribal territory be in imminent danger and fancied security. But far more likely his case will be the exact opposite; and how is that security maintained? As his eyes tell him at every turn, the big military stick is there and must always be there for those concerned to see. But it is for occasional not for every day use. It is to the irregular (who of course could not and would not continue to function for ten minutes without military support) and to all the organisation behind the irregular, which an endeavour has been made to describe in these pages, that day-to-day security is due. Year in year out, in the burning heat of summer and the cold blasts of winter, picquets must be set and patrols armed to the teeth and as alert as armed, must be on the move. Scouts and Militia, Frontier Constabulary and Levies, malik, khassadar and badragga all
have their part in the scheme, and unless all parts are working smoothly together, there may be a sound of firing in the hills, which will bring yet other parts into play.

It is all very well for the winter migrant bowling briskly over smooth roads through the keen air, with novel sights and strange experiences every moment claiming his attention. Naturally he finds a visit to the Frontier an exhilarating episode in his Indian tour. But what about the men who live there—not the natives of the country, but the engineers and greasers who keep the machine running? Why do they do it? What is there about these bare brown hills, that they so catch a man's heart and make him restless and discontented until once again he can live under their shadow.

"Parching drought and raging flood,
Months of dust and days of mud,
Mixed monotony and blood—

That's Waziristan"

and not Waziristan only. It applies to the whole Frontier. Why then does any one ever go there, or having gone why does he not at once move heaven and earth to get away again? It can scarcely be a thirst for fame. Edwardes, Hodson and Nicholson are household words. Abbott, Battye, Cavagnari, Cham-
berlain, Handyside, Roos-Keppel, Warburton, and a few others make a slightly larger circle whose names are not altogether unknown. But what of the rest? Who, in England beyond their own folk, had ever heard of those many many others who have spent, or given, their lives holding the gate among these barren hills? It cannot be that.

Equally clearly it is not the pursuit of wealth. Watchmen do not make fortunes.

What then is it? Let us conclude with an exercise on psychology.

First, there is the attraction of having a real live man to deal with, even such a man as the Pathan has been portrayed in these pages.

Second, there is the appeal which difficult, dangerous and responsible jobs always have for a certain type of mind.

Third, there is no region in the world which affords sharper contrasts than the Frontier, and contrasts are the salt of life.

Lastly, and this perhaps is very near the core of the matter, the Frontier, as it stands, is perhaps the biggest political breakwater, ever made by man. Any one who has walked on pier or breakwater beside the sea on a stormy day knows what exhilaration it gives. Is not the Frontier feeling something
"A book that is shut is but a block"

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