An Epitome of Jainism
by
P. C. Nahar
and
Krishnachandra Ghosh
AN

EPITOME OF JAINISM
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Pre-Mahomedan Period.
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PREFACE.

In humbly placing the present book entitled An Epitome of Jainism on the table of the World-library, a few words of explanation by way of an apologia are, it appears, needed to justify the claims, it lays upon the valuable time of its various readers. And we may state at the outset that it is not an attempt to supersede any of the modern treatises on Jainism. Its claim to attention, if it has any, arises from the fact that it is but a compilation forming an epitome having for its basis the most orthodox principles, doctrines and tenets as found in the Jain original works of authority and high antiquity, or promulgated on the subject by Jain speculative writers and conformed to by accurate thinkers in their spiritual inquiries.

But to connect together these detached fragments of a subject never yet treated as a whole, from the real Jain point of view, in these days of transition under Western refinement; to harmonise the different portions of the seemingly discordant notes
lying scattered over the grey pages of works handed down from the spiritual sire to the spiritual son, by freeing them from errors which they have become more or less shrouded with, through the revolution of ages and empires, or through long-standing conventions which have come down to us from time immemorial, must require a power of interpretation and original speculation. To other originality than this, the volume lays no claim. For it goes without saying that in the present age of the cultivation of universal learning when the literati of both the East and the West are sedulously engaged in exploring the rich and almost inexhaustible mines of the ancient lores of India, it would indeed be very presumptuous on the part of any one to imagine even that he had contributed something new and original in the domain of ideas and ideals. But still for all that there is ample scope for thinkers to improve upon the methods of philosophising and interpreting the old ideas and ideals, tenets and doctrines in perfect keeping with the changed conditions of the times to suit newer environments without deviating in the least from the real spirit
and import which they are replete with. For it is only the form that changes and must change, spirit always remaining essentially the same all through. And if there is any deviation anywhere from the real spirit, it should be understood as due to some thing wanting in the qualification of the interpreter.

To do this we had, therefore, had to begin with the enunciation and interpretation of the Jain principles of epistemology as propounded by the omniscient sages and scholars of bye-gone days. Epistemology really supplies the key-note to the interpretation and understanding of a system of thought and culture. It gives us the standpoint to have a clear and correct vision into the metaphysics of things and thoughts. This is the reason why every system of thought and culture in India really begins with a clear exposition of the principles of its epistemology, the moment it has done with describing in the briefest manner possible, its own hypothesis, its necessity and sublimity, and finally its right to be heard.

So is the case with Jainism itself;
and having, therefore, explained all these, in brief in our Introduction and in Chapters I and II from the Jain point of view, we have begun discussing its science and philosophy from Chapter III headed as 'Knowledge and Its Forms'. But with Chapter IV on 'Epistemology and Logic' begins the real discussion which ends with Chapter VIII on 'Vaidyadha' ultimately and finally indentifying logic with ontology. A patient perusual of these chapters will clearly show the readers as to how the formal logic of the other schools of thought becomes, in the hands of the Jain sages, metamorphosed, as it were, into transcendental logic in and through the processes of the dialectical movements of thought and Being inherent in their very nature.

But however it is generally held by students of modern thought and culture that this dialectic method of reasoning identifying logic with ontology is of Hegelian origin and meaning. Indeed the word dialectic means reasoning for and against, exposing thereby fallacies and inconsistencies, and clearing them away. Socrates used this method of
reasoning in his ontological polemics with the sophists of his time, putting them between the horns of two definite alternatives. But in modern philosophy of the West, it was Kant who revived it in his exposing the contradictions involved in the fundamental assumptions of dogmatic philosophy and in the popular conceptions of Soul, World and God. But it was left to Hegel to give a new meaning to dialectic and to interpret it in a new light altogether. For with Hegel, Being contains within itself oppositions and contradictions. Every thought, every reality is but a mixture of Being and non-Being. Dialectic with Hegel, therefore, is equivalent to Self-development or unfoldment, and the world-process itself is a process of dialectic, of antithesis and synthesis, making differences serve as means to higher unities. The legitimate out-come of working out the Hegelian interpretation of the world-process as shown in his dialectic, is the pronouncement of the eternity of the world-process. And with it the soul is also declared to be in the never-ending process of higher and higher evolution without any ultimate rest or quiescent anywhere.
But those who have followed our exposition of the Jain principles of epistemology ending with Syadavāda running up to Chapter XII, will be at one with us when we state that the dialectic method of reasoning identifying logic with metaphysic was not Hegel's own making. It originated with the Jain sages and omniscient kevalins, and has been prevalent in the field of philosophy in India from a time when Greece and Rome those cradles of European civilization, were still steeped in the darkness of ignorance. It is true that with the Jains the Absolute is but an Expression of Unity in Difference as distinguished from the Absolute beyond the Relative of the Vedāntins (Vide Chapter XI), and that the world-process is also without beginning and end (Vide Chapter XII to XV); but the soul according to Jainism does not remain for ever entangled in the meshes of the dialectic process of evolution without knowing any rest or repose anywhere. The Jains, as well as every other system of Indian thought and culture, hold that the Jīva will never remain eternally caught up in the never-ending process of evolution. It
is bound to get at that state of being and beatitude which is all free and divine. For freedom is our birth-right. Every soul is constitutionally free and potentially divine. And the struggle for existence in this nether world means with the Jains not only the struggle for bare existence in this mortal coil, but for the realization as well of this Ideal Freedom and Divinity.

With this end the enquiries constituting the Right Vision—the basis of Right knowledge.

But Right Knowledge which proceeds from Right Vision by a coherent train of thought and reasoning and which can only lead to Right Conduct without which the attainment of the Goal in vision is held to be impossible, is the knowledge which embraces concisely or in details, the relations in which the constituent factors of the world stand to soul and the changes as well of these relations in the dialectic movement of thought and being. And all these, more technically speaking, begin with Chapter XVIII on the ‘Karma Phenomenology’. The readers will find much interest to enter on a new kind of
discussion on metaphysical issues of vital importance in regard to the relation in question and its changes as well. The question as to when and how the soul which is constitutionally free and potentially divine came to be entangled into the meshes of the dialectic movements of the world-process without beginning and end, and which irritates the metaphysicans and speculative writers most in these days of scientific enquiry, has been discussed and solution given once for all. Every other position being untenable, the Jains hold that both the Soul and the \textit{Karma} (i.e. the materialised units into which jivic energetics resolve themselves) stand to each other in relation of phenomenal conjunction, which reveals itself in the continuity of the display from time without beginning, neither of the two being either prior or posterior to the other in the order of time, so far the question of their metaphysical entity is concerned—\textit{unādi apaschānupurvi sanyoga sambandha pravāha}. Such is the position of the \textit{jīvas} in the ocean of \textit{samsār} whereon tumultuous waves furiously surging in various names and forms, ruffle the vast expanse. And just as the angularities of
the gravels at the bottom of the grugling stream of strong currents are rubbed off by being drifted from place to place, so the angularities of the Jiva sunk in the ocean of Samsār are also rubbed off by being driven from womb to womb, from region to region, under the strong pressure of Karma-causality. In this way with the rubbing off of the angularities and thinning out of the gross material veil and covering, when the jiva gets a comparatively improved vision into its own nature and ideal, it struggles to work out its own emancipation as a free-centre of origination. All these and such allied subjects as Rebirth and the like which are required to determine our place and function in the world, have been discussed with comparative details up till Chapter XXVI on the 'Classification of Karmas' with which end the enquiries into the constitution of Right Knowledge.

From Right knowledge of our ultimate Ideal of our place and function in the world, arises the possibilites of Right Conduct which is imperative in the attainment of the Ideal. And the enquiries into the constitution
of the Right Conduct open with Chapter XXVII 'From Metaphysics to Ethics.' No system of Indian thought and culture has such a stage-by-stage exposition in a systematic way of the ways and means to the attainment of that Goal which we all have in view. The very arrangement, it will appear on a careful perusal, is not only most psychological so far the unfoldment of knowledge itself is concerned, but appears to be modern as well when we judge it from the scientific and practical point of view. Having cleared up the Jain Conceptions of Virtue and Vice (Vide Chapter XXVIII), of their fruitions here and hereafter, the problems of evil and the like rudimentary notions of the Jain Ethics, the moral categories have been taken up one by one in consecutive order beginning with 'Influx' (Vide Chap XXXI) of the alien matter into the constitution of the soul and the consequent bondage of the same under subreption (Mithyāṭta) which is nothing else than taking a thing for something which is not that thing (asate sat buddhi). This mithyāṭvatva is the prime root of all troubles. Such being the case we have discussed
at some length, the psychology and philosophy of the matter and form of this mithyāṭva. A little reflection will be sufficient, we believe, to convince an impartial student of the history of Indian schools of thought that the theory of Māyā resolving into āvaran and vikṣepa as interpreted by Shankar and others of his line of thinking, is but a distorted shadow of the Jain theory of mithyāṭva. For, to deny Māyā, therefore, of any positive entity and to posit it at the same time as the great impediment in the way to the true self-realisation is to be guilty of substantializing the abstraction. In order to escape from this difficulty, Ramanuja, another interpreter of the Vedānta Sutras, had to draw inspirations from the teachings and writings of the Jain sages, and, in consequence, had to fall back upon the Jain doctrine of Unity in Difference or the Theory of Bhedabheda vād, the legitimate outcome of the Syadvād or the dialectic method of reasoning giving a more comprehensive view of thought and Being. It is true that Ramanuja speaks of Bodhāyana as his authority for the enunciation of the doctrine of Unity in
Difference, but nowhere in his scholium on the *Brahm Sutras* could he quote direct from the writings of Bodhāyana. What Bodhāyana taught no body knows. Had there been the existence of any commentary by him on the *Sutras* in question even at the time of Shankar, then Shankar, the upright and audacious, would never have left him unnoticed in his unrivalled commentaries and writings because he is found to freely draw upon his predecessors, friend or opponent.

Be that as it may, the Jain sages have made sifting enquiry into the nature and matter of this *mithyātva* and found possibilites of its removal through *Samvar* or Stoppage of the Influx and through *Nirjārā* or gradual dissipation of what already found its way into the soul. With the completion of this dissipation, the soul gets rid of all the veil and covering of Karma and shines in perfect freedom and omniscience enjoying bliss divine for all time to come; this is what called *Moksha* of *Nirvāṇa* or Extinction of all pain and suffering; the grand *Summum Bonum* of one and all life and living (Vide Chapters XXXII to XXXV).
But this final and ultimate state of being in bliss and beatitude cannot be attained all of a sudden. Great indeed is the vision but only the few behold. Great is the goal, but only the few attain. Great really is the struggle but only the few can withstand. For the goal in fact is gradually reached by steady and strenuous striving subjecting the self to gladly undergo a series practical disciplines in a manner and along the lines as enjoined in the Jural (Charan) and Teleological (Karan) Ethics of the Jains. And the stages which the mumukshin has to pass through, are fourteen in number and are called Gunasthānas which can be squeezed up into four stages to suit modern intellect.

We have seen that according to Jainsm, Freedom is our birth-right and that its philosophy declares this freedom to be already in us. Freedom is constitutional with man. Feel that you are great and you will be great. Feel that you are free and all quarrels will cease. With the Jains it is but a question of realization in the very heart of hearts where life throbs and the soul of religion
really dwells in. But whatever might be the merit of this philosophy, those who have studied its principles as well as the march of Western civilization, will naturally doubt as to the possibility of the growth and formation of a religion without any God-head to preside; for, there is no denying the fact that throughout the history of the Western world, we find Philosophy and Religion to be at war with each other. There religion is based on the unstable basis of Belief. And surely there is nothing strange in the fact that the corner-stone of religion there, begins to shake and give way whenever a new philosophy rises against it armed with new ideas and ideals having incontrovertible reasons behind them to support. Not only this. If a system of philosophy fails to drive Belief out of consideration and thus crush the foundation-stone into dust, it cannot be expected to thrive and drive its roots into the soil and create a school of its own. From all these it is clear that in the West, Philosophy is but a sworn enemy to Belief. But quite reverse is the case in the East. Here each school of philosophy is chiefly meant to
serve as a basis or ground-work of a particular form of Faith or Religion. For instance, the School of Jaimini stands to support the *Karma Kānda* of the Vedic Hindus. The *Nyāya* and the *Vaisheshika* have been to serve as the basis of the Dualistic forms of worship as are advocated in the Hindu *Smritis* and the *Purānas*. The *Sānkhya* and the *Yoga* philosophies which clear the ways of renunciation and moral apathy to all that is worldly, not only support other dualistic and *Tāntric* forms of worship but themselves form the science and psychology of the *Uttar Mīmāṃsā* by Vyāsa. But when we direct our attention to the West, we find Socrates, the sage, poisoned with hemlock for preaching a philosophy that went against the religion of his time and nativity. Who does not know how Christianity trembles even now to hear the names of David Hume, Mill, Comte, Kant, Fichte, Höfding or Hegel?

Now what is the lesson that we gather from a comparative study of the attitude of minds of both the East and the West? We learn that India all along enjoyed a kind of intellectual freedom and religious toleration
which is unique in the history of the world. And this is why life in India really throbs in religion, where as in the West, it has been more or less a fashion to attend the Church.

But to return to the point at issue: as in India the function of philosophy is to support a particular form of Faith, so the function of Jainism is to harmonise all the contending religions of the world. And it is here that Jainism supersedes all the other forms of faith and creed. For, it is philosophy and religion both rolled in one. A little reflection on the theory itself and its predominance from time to time, along with its growth and spread, will prove the truth and validity of our statement. Will any one tell the world what is it that so boldly declares the glorious dignity of man? Is it the civilization that creates for man new wants and desires only to bind him down more tightly to the mires of the world? Or is it that reconciles for man all the seeming differences without sacrificing anything of permanent interest, kills that egotism by virtue of which his envenomed passions howl at every disappointment, and ultimately opens out to him the way to perfection, real happiness and
eternal beatitude where all wants and cares cease for ever, and all passions as well for good, and which makes man really to be his own real self in infinite delight divine? Surely you will have to pronounce judgment in favour of the latter, and in that case we state once for all, and that without the slightest fear of contradiction, that Jainism is the means to the introduction into this mundane world a reign of peace, ordered harmony and reasonable sweetness which are most wanting in these days of rank materialism and uncompromising self-aggrandisement wherewith this blessed land of Bharat has become surcharged.

It has, therefore, become highly imperative to repress this growing ardour of our youth in poletical polemics and practical tactics that are detrimental to and destructive of the felicity of their temporal and future lives, by a revival of the humble instructions of the ancient Kevalins and peaceful preceptors of old, and reclaiming them to the simple mode of life led by their forefathers from the perverted tendencies finding a firm hold on them under the influence of Western refinement. It is this degeneracy of our
rising generation from an utter ignorance of the superiority of their own code and adoption, in consequence, of foreign ideas and ideals, habits and manners, that ought to engage the serious attention of our educated children of the soil.

Now apart from the question of any sublimity, necessity and utility of the cultivation of the Philosophy of Jainism roughly consisting as it does in outward peace (Shanti) and internal tranquillity (Chitta Prasânti) united with contentment (Santosh) and apathy (Varâgya) to the alluring pleasures of the world, a glance at the description of the Jain Church as portrayed in Chapter XXXVII, a survey of the Jain places of Pilgrimage, of Art and Architecture &c. (Chapters XXXIX &c. XLI), a study of the great and not yet fully accessible complex of writings making up the Jain Literature and recording the appearances of the Tirthankars in the era of avasarpani, and chronicling the organisation of the Sanghas, the great split in the original camp into the Swetâmbaris and the Digambaris, the consecutive succession of the achâryas and the list of gachchas which originated with them, and
finally other secular events of historical importance to a considerable extent, will make it pretty clear that Jainism is a religion that is not only born of the depths of ages but also that its Tirthankars were real historical persons who lived, moved and had their beings amongst our forefathers.

Besides, these pages contain historical statements and allusions of no mean value. What we want to point out is that apart from the question of religious merit as is manifest in the literary works of the Jains, they go to a great extent to clear up many a historical anomaly and settle dates of important historical events. For instance, it is from the perusal of these pages that we could settle the date of Mahavira's *Nirśāna* or the accession of Chandragupta. And it is from these pages we find that during the time of Rishava Deva, the systems of *Jaina*, *Shaiva* and *Sānkhyā* philosophies were extant. The *Mimāṃsā* and the *Nyāya* flourished during the period of Sitalnath whereas the *Bouddha* and the *Vaisheshika* came to prominence during the time of Parshwanath and Mahavir. This account of the chronological developments of the different Schools of Philosophy may read
very strange. But when one remembers that none of the systems of philosophy came to being all of a sudden, but they were more or less in extant in a still remoter age, and that this development into systems of philosophy means their embodiment in the forms of Sutras at different periods, things becomes easy to understand. For this is further corroborated if we interpret the religious upheaval in view of the fact that in the great religious Congress of the Indian saints and sages of yore in the *Naimishâranya*, when the authority of the Vedas were being made as binding upon the free thinkers of those days, those who left the Congress in silent protest against such actions of the *Brahman-Rishis*, were dubbed as *Nâstikas*. The word *Nâstika* (atheist) in the Indian scripture does not mean one who did not believe in the existence of God, but rather one who did not accept the infallibility and ultimate authority of the Vedas. Were it otherwise then the System of *Sânkhya* in which Kapil, like Laplace, did not care for getting in a God in the scheme of his universe, would not have been taken as one of the six theistic systems of philo-
sophy as distinguished from the six atheistic schools beginning with that of Chārvāka. Now with the settlement of the final authority of the Vedas, its ritualism became a mercilessly dominant religion for sometime, so much so that the priest-class seemed to be in the sole possession of the Key to Heaven. And in consequence sincerity which is the soul of all religiously almost disappeared from the people yielding place to downright hypocrisy and dry formalism. The Kshatriya kings and the princes could not stand to this want of sincerity in the people and to the religious monopoly in the hands of the Brâhmans. They entered a protest against the same in the form of Vedântic militarism finding expressions in such great Upani-

*shadic* declarations as, 'Brahman is Atman' 'That Thou art,' 'That I am': in reality there is no essential difference between one soul and another. All are One and the Goal of all is Freedom, which cannot be reached by the weak and the powerless. So all conventions, all privileges must go. Thus ensued an era of war between the Brâhmans and the Kshatriyas. The enmity and implacable
hatred of the two families of Vasistha and Viswamitra for generations form subjects prominent throughout the vedic antiquity. The cursing on Harish Chandra, the King of Ajodhya, by Vashistha, the leader of the priest-class, and the consequent appointment of Viswamitra by Harish Chandra as his priest is also another instance to illustrate the spirit of Vedantic militarism against Brâhmanic ritualism and monopoly. Thus the idea militant in the Upanishads became the idea triumphant in hands of the Kshatriya kings and princes. And this why we find later on that the Brâhmans are betaking themselves as pupils to the Kshatriya kings and princes in order to have the Atman expounded to them. The Brâhman Nârad receiving instructions from Sanat Kumar; Gargya Balaki from the king Ajâtsatru of Kasi. All these are further confirmed by the words of the king Pravan Jaivali to Aruni, a Brâhman pupil whom the king says—"Because, as you have told, O Goutam, the doctrine has never up to the present time been in circulation among the Brâhmans, therefore in all the worlds the Government has remained in the hands of the warrior caste".
Now this philosophy of Vedântic militarism, though it was fully developed in the Upanishadic period, could not later on adapt itself to the changing conditions and to the yet prevailing society of the time which was in and through saturated with Vedic ritualism and ceremonialism. And in the course of events things took turn in such a manner that the Brâhmans whose sole occupation was priest-craft, began to devise schemes with a view to make each caste flourish in its respective profession: so much so that they discouraged the study of the Upanishadas and the like by other castes, and the preaching as well of the philosophy of the 'One' to the mass. And thus when the gates to higher knowledge were effectively barred against the other classes by the mechanism of the Priest-class, a general degradation followed. People became degenerated, self interested and low in character. All sorts of abominable things like Tāntrikism which brought in virginity, mysticism and love to bear upon religion, began to be practised in the name of religion only. At this critical juncture Parshwanath, the 23rd Tirthankar appeared
to save the situation, and preached the Truth and the Law to one and all without disturbing the constitution of the social structure prevailing at the time. A general religious upheaval ensued; but so engrained was the soulless ritualism in the constitution of the society that two hundred years after the Nñvän of Parshwanath, Mahabir Swami appeared as the 24th Reformer, and gave a re-statement of Jainism later on taking the form of the philosophy of pragmatism, to stem the tide of degradation, and save the soul of the nation from running into narrow old grooves and gutters of ritualism and mysticism (täntricism). Goutam Buddha also followed suit from another direction. He represented the Indian school of spiritual democracy, and preached the principles of what they now call 'Romantic Improvement' in modern philosophy which resulted in the formulation of the subjective idealism, in the breaking of the social fetters, and in the curbing off the power of the Brähmans to enforce Vedic ritualism upon the people. Such is the history of the religious transition through which India had to pass up till the time of Mahavir and Goutam Buddha who are
said to represent the Indian schools of Ideal-Realism and Real Idealism respectively. And this is what we gather from the old and worn out pages of the Jain literature of high antiquity.

The above is but what we could glean from the scattered pages of the Jain literature so far the contemporary events and Religious movements in India were concerned. But there are other materials in the movements of the Jain genius such as inscriptions and epigraphs which go by the technical name of external evidences helping us a good deal in filling up the gaps and blank pages of Indian history. We get from these inscriptions various informations on the reigning sovereigns, their geneologies and dynasties, chronological list of the gacchas, and the description of the different sections into which the Jain laymen are socially divided. Now both from the external and internal evidences which have been available to us up till now for our study and examination, we can well state without the slightest fear of contradiction that the whole Jain Community is deeply indebted to the Swetâmbar Church for the pre-
servations, maintenance, and improvement of almost all their important places of pilgrimage. The inscriptions both on the pedestal of the images and foot-prints and tablets (Prashastis) commemorating the erection or the repairs of the temples at these places at different times, undoubtedly show that the whole credit belongs to our worthy and venerable Swetāmbar Achāryas under whose religious direction and advice, the Swetāmbari lay-followers did all they could to keep up their tradi­tion and guard the sanctity of these sacred places all over India, excepting the Southern countries, the homes of the Digambar School. But who cares to devote to the study of these movements of culture from a historic point of view? We have inspected and examined numbers of Digambari images still preserved and worshipped in Swetambari temples but have not seen the reverse. It is a matter of satisfaction indeed to find the Digambari temple in Mathian Mahalla in Behar, side by side with a Swetambari temple, like the twin sister churches in charge of the Swetambaris. The Digambari brothers are always welcome to every
Swetambari temple. The mere location of the Digambari images in a corner of the Swetâmbari temples, does not show that these temples belong to them also. Far from this. It rather shows the magnanimity and generosity of the high-souled Swetâmbari custodians of these temples. But this does not go to establish their managing claim over the temples which exclusively belong to the Swetambari sect. All along they were allowed the privilege of worshipping there for the simple reason that they did not cherish the idea of any selfish motive. Living in wealth and opulence in a period of peace and prosperity under the benign care of the British Government, it is indeed a matter of great regret that instead of paying attention towards the intellectual and spiritual advancement of the community, and other social reforms which have of late become imperative to adapt ourselves to the newer conditions of life and living, our Digambari brethren have now come forward to set the machinery of litigation agog to unrighteously snatch away from the Swetambaris, the founders and repairers, nay, the real owners of these places of Pilgrimage, so to speak,
all rights and privileges which so long belonged exclusively to them. Our Digambari brethren are squandering away good money in the name of religion. They are showing a great enthusiasm, at the present moment, to set up claims and run to the Courts of Law for the settlement of issues. Everywhere, whether at Sametsikhar, at Pawapuri or at Rajgir, we hear of litigations cropping up from their endeavours to get equal rights in the control and management of the sacred places which the Jain Swetambari Community have been doing since the foundation of these shrines and temples. If things really go on in this way, then the Jain Community, as a whole, will have not only to pay dearly for it; but those monumental works as well of the Jain genius in art, architecture and sculpture will shortly disappear into the surrounding ruins. And it grieves us much therefore to find that the Digambaris are quarrelling with the Swetambaris without any just cause to advocate in claiming equal share with them. In the South, the Digambaris have their well-known images at Sravana Belgola and other temples in their sole management. No
Swetambari ever thinks of interfering with the just rights of the Digambaris in those provinces. The Digambaris have got lands from the Swetambari Sangha for erection of their temples, sometimes they have also purchased land for the purpose and have built separate temples. But indeed deeply regrettable it is on their part that in spite of these stupendous facts, they have not put a stop to their policy of agression.

We, therefore, sincerely appeal to the Digambaris, at least to the sensible and educated members amongst them, to put an end to such sort of dealings and avoid litigation especially in matters of religion. Even before the Court of Justice, there is a limitation to everything. For centuries after centuries, the Swetambaris have tried their best to build, maintain and improve the sacred places. They hold Firmans, Grants, Sunnuds and Parwanas from the reigning Sovereigns of the past and have been managing the affairs generation after generation, without any co-operation from the Digambaris from time immemorial without any clamour, dissension or intervention. And it is a disgrace that they
should now come forward to disturb the working of an organisation born of the depths of ages and devise all sorts of unrighteous means to gain their objective before the Courts of Law.

In fine, however, we beg leave to apologise to our readers for the numerous errors and mistakes which have found their way into these pages through the pramād of their printer and reader.

November 1917.  }  
P. NAHAR.  
CALCUTTA.  
K. GHOSH.
Metal Image (Ardha Padmāsan) with inscription in Southern character (back).
An Epitome of Jainism.

"प्रधानं सवंध्यमाणम् जैनं जयति शासनम्।"

INTRODUCTION.

Om, Salutation to the ‘Arihantas’ or the Killers of the enemies; Salutation to the ‘Siddhas’ or the beatified Achievers of the Good; Salutation to the ‘Acharyas’ or the accomplished Masters legislating the rules of our conduct; Salutation to the ‘Upadhyayyas’ or the Teachers imparting lessons on the Siddhantas; Salutation to all the ‘Sadhus’ or the Saints of every region and clime who live, move and have their being for the good of others.

This five-fold Salutation purging out all sins, is the noblest of all propitious utterances and the choicest of all blessings and benedictions—‘Navakara.’

The Jains, the followers of the Jina or Arihanta, have been a well-known community of India. They are mostly confined to Hindusthan and are numerous particularly in the Punjab, Rajputana, Gujrat and some Southern Districts of India. They hold a
prominent place in the Empire owing to their wealth, intelligence, commercial energy and unswerving loyalty.

The Arihanta is the killer of the enemies. He is also called the Jīna or the Victor for killing or conquering all his passions, desires and appetites. A Jīna is the possessor of perfect knowledge. He is omniscient and is the revealer of true nature of things. The Jīnas or the Victors, who in every age (past, present, and future) preach truths and organise the Order, are known by the name of Tirthankars—the Founders of Tirtha, Sangha, or the Order which consists of Sadhu, Sādhvi and Shrāvaka, Shrāvikā i.e. male and female ascetics and devotees.

The Jain friars and nuns were formerly designated as Nīggaṇṭhas, lit. 'those who are freed from all bonds.' These Nīggaṇṭhas are frequently met with in ancient Buddhist works. For instance, the Mahāparinibbana Sutta, one of the earliest books on Buddhism, composed in Pali before the 5th century B.C., mentions "Nīggaṇṭha Jñātputta" as being one of the six religious teachers of the time. This last Tirthankara of the Jains is so called
on account of his being born of the *Kshatriya*
or military clan known as *Jnāt* or *Nāt*. Numerous references are also to be found inBrāhminical writings about the *Nīgganthas*and their faith.

Important mention has also been made ofthe Jain System of Philosophy in several ofthe most ancient Indian works. And so farits antiquity is concerned, it is now admittedon all hands that Jainism is not an off-shootof Buddhism. It had been in existence longbefore Buddhism was conceived. Its independentsexistence has also been conclusively traced out both by external and internal evidences from various works of high antiquityin recent years. Special mention may be made of the discovery of a *Jaina Stūpa* atMathurā which gives evidence of its existencefrom nearly two thousand years back. It isvery likely that future researches will throwaflood of light on the theory that Buddhismis rather a branch of Jainism. From a refer-ence to Jainism in the *Rīg Veda*, it has beenheld that the system in question must havebeen contemporary with the *Vedic* cultureor even earlier than the latter.
AN EPITOME OF JAINISM

After its supremacy in the East in the kingdoms of Magadha, Anga, and Koshal, Jainism flourished both in the South and in the West of India. At various epochs, it was the State Religion in different parts of the country; and the fact is fully corroborated by the old inscriptions, a few of which have only been, of late, brought to light and deciphered by the scholars and antiquarians of the modern time.

Jainism is an original system of thought and culture, quite distinct from and independent of all other Indian philosophical speculations. In the words of Dr. Jacobi, "It (the Jain Philosophy) has, truly speaking, a metaphysical basis of its own, which secured it a distinct position apart from the rival systems, both of the Brâhmins and of the Buddhists." And it now goes without saying that the Jains possess a high claim to the preservation of the ancient history of India.

According to the Jains, Truth exists from time eternal; and the world composed of the living and the non-living substances, has been in existence from all eternity, and undergoing an infinite number of variations, produced simply by the physical and superphysical
powers inherent in the substances. But variations must be variations in time. So the Jain sages divide this time according to the two great cycles, called *Avasarpini* and *Utsarpini*—Involution and Evolution. The idea is that of a serpent in infinite space coiled up, so that the tail shall touch the head. The world is now moving down this serpent from the head to the tail,—this is *Avasarpini* (Involution). When it arrives at the extremity of the tail, it cannot go on further but it must return; and its progress upwards is *Utsarpini* (Evolution). Now each of these periods is again divided into six eras,—

(i). *Sukhama Sukhma*.
(ii). *Sukhma*.
(iii). *Sukhama Dukhma*.
(iv). *Dukhama Sukhma*.
(v). *Dukhma*.
(vi). *Dukhama Dukhma*.

In every great cycle, twenty-four Tirthankars appear in the field of action. These Tirthankars are not only pure and perfect beings and attain *nirvana* as soon as they shuffle off their mortal coils, but also they lay down rules of conduct for the
purification of our hearts and minds and establish the tirtha or the order. According to the Jains, the first Tirthankara ‘Rishava Deva’ of the present era, gave to the world a systematic exposition of Truth in all its aspects, both secular and spiritual. He also laid down rules of conduct for the proper guidance of the church as well as of the laity. Rishava Deva is also mentioned in the Hindu Scripture, the ‘Srimat Bhagvat’, as the second in the list of kings, who, towards the end of his life, abandoned the world and went about as a naked ascetic and rose from manhood to divinity by meditation. ‘Pârshwanatha’, the twenty-third, and ‘Mahavira’, the twenty-fourth, were not founders but they were merely reformers like other Tirthankars in different ages. On the face of such overwhelming evidences as can be collated from pages of high antiquity, there cannot be any doubt as to the existence of Mahâvira or Pârshwatha as historical personages. M. Guerinot, in the Introduction to his learned Essay on Jain Bibliography, indicates the important points of difference between the life of Mahavira and that of Buddha.
INTRODUCTION

MAHAVIRA              BUDDHA

1. Born at Vaisāli (Kunda- 1. Born at Kapilavastu about
gram) about 599 B. C. 557 B. C.
2. His parents lived to a 2. His mother died soon after
good old age. giving his birth.
3. Assumed the ascetic life 3. Made himself a monk
with the consent of his against the wishes of his
relatives. father.
4. His preparation in the 4. Obtained illumination at
ascetic stage lasted for the end of 6 years
12 years. only.
5. Died at Pawa in 5. Died at Kusinagar about
527 B. C. 488 B. C.

Pārshwanātha was born at Benares in 877 B. C, and reached nirvāṇa in 777 B. C. on a
hill which is still known as Pareshnath Hills in Bengal. Mahāvira or Vardhamāna, the
last Tirthankara of this age, only improved upon the then existing doctrines and customs
according to the exigencies of the time, and it was he who gave Jainism its final form.
The current tenets and practices of Jainism, as embodied in the existing Sutras or
canons, are his utterances.

Mahāvira was the son of Siddhārtha, the
chief of the Nāt clan of Kundagrama near the
city of Vaisāli, who belonged to a noble
warrior race. His mother was Trishalā, sister of king Chetaka of Vaisāli. Chetaka's daughter Chelanā was married to king Shrenika or Bambhsāra who was a staunch admirer and adherent of Mahāvīra. Shortly after the death of his parents, Mahāvīra renounced the world and became an ascetic in his 31st. year. For the first 12 years, he led a life of austerities and wandered through various countries preaching the truth of Jainism. He acquired perfect knowledge in his 42nd. year and attained nirvāṇa at Pawapuri, a few miles from modern Behar, in 527 B.C. at the age of 72.

He was a senior contemporary of Gautam Buddha and the country of Magadha and those round about it, were his chief spheres of spiritual activity. It is interesting to note that both the great preachers, in spite of the fact of being contemporaneous, avoid mentioning each other in their utterances.

About two centuries after Mahāvīra's death, when Chandra Gupta was the reigning Prince, a severe famine, lasting for twelve years, visited the country of Magadha. Bhadrabāhu was then the head of the Jain church,
and in view of the gravity of the situation he led his disciples towards the south (Carnāt country), placing Stułbhadra in charge of the section that remained behind. During this long famine, the Jain monks began to forget the Siddhānta; and towards the end of the famine, while Bhadrabāhu was still absent in the South, a council assembled at Pataliputra to collect the canons or the sacred texts of the Jains. Gradually the manners and customs of the church changed and the original practice of going abroad naked was abandoned. The ascetics began to wear the 'White Robe'. On the other hand, when the emigrating party who made the rule of nakedness compulsory on all their members, returned to their country after the famine, they refused to hold fellowship with those that had remained at home, on account of their departure from the practices that were common before, or to accept the canons collected at Pataliputra, declaring that for them the canons were lost. This led to the final separation about the year 82 A. D. And thus they were divided into two branches, the original being styled as Shvetām-
barā, and the other became known as Digambara.

The Digambars believe that absolute nudity is imperative for perfectness; while the Shvetāmbaras assert that perfectness can be attained even by those who clothe themselves. The difference really speaking has its origin in the idea that a person attaining to Kevala jñān (perfect knowledge) comes no longer under the sway of appetites or passions and does not therefore require any food or clothing. According to the Shvetāmbaras, such a holy personage, although he need not wear any clothes, does not appear before society unclothed but clad in white robes, while the Digambaras hold that he does not use any clothes and appears before us all nude.

But this is not the only point of difference between the two branches. There are also other differences as regards some eighty-four minor dogmas, which resulted in the production of sectarian literature and rules of conduct for the church and the laity. One important point of disagreement to be noted, is the exclusion of women from the Order by the Digambaras. As they hold,
women cannot attain to salvation; and they are so strongly biassed in this that they take even the Virgin lady Malli Kumari, the 19th Tirthankar, not as a female but a male. But the Shvetâmbars hold that both men and women are alike entitled to and can actually attain to nirvâna.

Jainism is not a monastic religion but truly an evangelic or a missionary religion,—religion intended not for the ascetics only (male and female) but for the world at large in which the majority are lay people. Some remark that Jainism lacked in that missionary spirit which gave life and scope to early Buddhism. But this view is not based on right observation of facts and correct interpretation of the Jain religious thought and culture. For in the Jain canonical rules for the ascetics, it is distinctly enjoined that a monk, excepting the Chaturmâsya, or the period of four months during the rainy season, should generally on no account stay at a fixed place for more than one month; rather he should go on wandering from city to city, from village to village, preaching the cardinal truths of his
faith and doctrine and thus work among the laity, for their moral elevation and spiritual enlightenment. Equal consideration was given to both the church and the laity and a Sangha was accordingly organised by each Jina. The characteristic of a true Jina is most aptly expressed by Ratna Shekhara in the opening lines of his Sambodha Sattari, which reads as follows:—“No matter, whether he is a Shvetâmbara or Digambara, a Buđha or a follower of any other creed, one who has realised himself the self-sameness of the soul i. e. one who looks on all creatures alike his own self, is sure to attain salvation.”

Jainism is a religion universal—its object being to help, as it does, all beings to salvation and to open its arms to all, high or low, by revealing to them the real truth. The Highest Good is found in Moksha or Nirvâna—the Absolute Release of the soul from the fetters of births and deaths.

The attainment of Nirvâna is usually preceded by development of kevala jñān or absolute and unimpeded knowledge. This is the fifth or last kind of knowledge, the other kinds of knowledge in the order of developments
being (1) Mati, (2) Sruti, (3) Abadhi, (4) Manahparyaya.

The first is intellectual knowledge, derived from the peripheral contact of the senses with their objects or from mental illumination due to observation and inference. The second is clear knowledge derived from the study of scriptures, books or from the interpretation of symbols or signs. The third is the determinative knowledge of events and incidents taking place somewhere beyond the range of sense-perceptions. The fourth is the knowledge of others’ thoughts. The first two are natural or commonsense knowledge. The other three are super-sensuous knowledge. The third is the perception of visible objects which proceeds directly from the soul without the mediation of sense-organs. Though super-sensuous, still it cannot go beyond the limits of physical regions; while the fourth goes further beyond and can penetrate into the secrets of the heart. The last only covers everything whatsoever, present, past or future, visible or invisible. It is pure and non-determinative in its character. The possessor of this fifth form of knowledge is called a
Kevalin. When the soul of a Kevalin leaves its material frame, it passes out of this mundane world and soars up straight towards the hyper-physical region (Aloka), the Heaven of the Liberated which lies at the top of the Universe. There it continues on to shine forever in all its purity and perfection. It remains there in a state of perfect equanimity and delight infinite disturbed by nothing. And this is Nirvāna or Moksha. It is, in fact, the absolute release of the soul from all Karma-matter by the complete decay of the causes of bondage and physical existence. No soul is wholly disembodied unless it is thus liberated from the burden of Karma-matter. And this release is not the annihilation of the soul as the Buddhists hold, nor is it the merging of the Individual with the Supreme wherein it loses its own identity and individuality as Shankar, the lion of the Vedāntists, roars, but it is the Jīva's going beyond whence there is no return to Sansār again.
CHAPTER I.

JAINISM—ITS PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION.

Consideration of the term Philosophy—As they understand it in the West.—Aristotle, Spencer and Hegel—Philosophy as defined and taught by the Jinas or the Victors.—Right Knowledge. Right Vision and Right Conduct—The Triune of Jainism—Some Rudimentary Ideas and Metaphysical Notions.

We now turn to our enquiry into the Philosophy of the Jinas or the Victors—the more immediate subject-matter of the present treatise. But philosophy is one of those words which are often used rather loosely, leading to much confusion of thought with regard to its real end and import. To guard against any such misapprehension which a student of modern thought and culture might labour under, it is important that we should first discuss in brief what the West mean by philosophy and what we the Jains understand by it.

Aristotle defines philosophy to be the "science of principles" or "first beginnings." Another takes it to mean a "completely
unified knowledge”. “Philosophy” according to a third, “is the science of the Absolute,” in the sense that it takes the world of Nature not as a product of chance but of a Single Infinite Power whose activity consists in the working out of a plan or purpose in the course of which It evolves this world out of Itself. Thus has philosophy been variously defined by different thinkers of different ages and climes.

The Jains, however, teach that philosophy consists in the voluntary and consistent striving, intellectual and moral, manifest in the removal of impediments on the way to Right Vision (सम्यक् दर्शन) into the metaphysics of things and thoughts leading to Right Knowledge (सम्यक् ज्ञान) of the world as a whole, and of our own function and place—Right Conduct (सम्यक् चरित्र) therein with the express object of realizing finally the free and beatific state of our being—the ultimate end and purpose of all life and activity.

Taking philosophy, then, as an attempt to attain to a free and beatific state of being by the virtue of Right Conduct—(सम्यक् चरित्र) proceeding from Right Know-
knowledge (samyak jñāna) acquired through Right Vision (samyak darshan) into the realities of things and thoughts, we can ascertain beforehand what the principal branches and problems of our enquiry will be. We can see that there are two fundamental factors of the world: (i) Jīva, the Cogitative Substance or the Soul, including the system of finite minds either in Nigoda, fixed, fettered, or free, in the various gradations of their being; (ii) Ajīva, the Non-Cogitative Substance, the Non-living or the Non Soul, including objective things and processes and the like. Hence our enquiry into philosophy, roughly speaking, will branch out into,—

(i) The Cogitative Substance or Soul (Jīva),

(ii) The Non-Cogitative Substance or the Non-Soul (ajīva), and finally,

(iii) The End or Freedom (moksha) of the soul in relation as to how it is attained.

But from a consideration of these fundamentals, it becomes evident that we have to make a frequent use of such metaphysical ideas and notions as Dravya (substance), Guna (quality), Paryāya (modality or modi-
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fication), *Karma* (action, motion or change of relative position), *Kāraṇa* (causality) and the like; and no consistent result of our enquiry into philosophy can be expected until appropriate and complete understanding has been arrived at in regard to these fundamental ideas and notions. But an understanding of the content and origin of these ideas involves, to a great extent, analytical psychology of cognition.

Furthermore, philosophy, as we have seen above, claims to know the realities as they are, and therefore it must proceed with the justification of its rights by showing what the conditions or means (*Pramāṇas*) of attaining knowledge are, and proving as well, that knowledge of realities corresponding to the above ideas is within its power and competence. Otherwise, instead of explaining the relations which the *Jīvas* and *Ajīvas* bear to each other, it will go on only dogmatising, sometimes sinking into the lower level of scepticism and agnosticism, or at other times rising into pseudo-rationalism—only to add to the impediments of which there are plenty already to obscure
our right vision into realities of ideas and ideals and forge thereby fresh links to the chains of misery that tie us down to the mires of this suffering world. But to avoid such pitfalls and to know the realities in conformity with the rules and canons required to be observed in the acquirement of a correct knowledge, we must proceed from such and other notions and ideas as form the subject-matter of the next chapter.
CHAPTER II.

PREDICAMENTS BY PRE-EMINENCE.

Fundamental Notions.—Categories or Predicaments by pre-eminence.—Their Necessity and Origin.—How determined.—Advantages of such determination.—Dravya, Guna, Paryaya and Karma.—Papa and Punya.—Classification and description in general of the Predicaments.—Their enumeration.

We have already seen that Right Vision, Right Knowledge, and Right Conduct are the three principal departments of our philosophical enquiry.

But in dealing with these, as we have remarked, we have often to make use of such and certain fundamental ideas or notions as are not only the necessary forms according to which we ourselves must conceive things but which must also be regarded as necessary forms and relations of the things themselves. For in thinking, to be more clear, we think something about a thing and what we think about a thing is that it has powers
of producing effects (पर्यं क्रियाकारो) in other things, and stands in certain relations to them. For finite things exist and manifest their existence by acting and reacting, thereby exercising causality (कारणतः) on one another; we distinguish these powers of action and re-action by the effects which they mutually produce, and, it goes without saying that we call these powers as their qualities (गुण). But the degree of the effect which a thing produces on other things depends on certain relations in which it stands in regard to them i.e., relations of time and space (काल और विवेकाय सम्बन्ध). Then, again, we cannot think of any change or any action excepting as tending towards the realisation of some particular end or idea. It is true that some hold that all actions and changes are due to the blind operation of material forces and fortuitous concourse of atoms and molecules without any idea or end to realise; but there are also other angles of vision which find reason as underlying all phenomena. From this point of view we see
that all actions and changes are co-ordinated according to a plan made to co-operate in such a way as to realise a purpose or an end. If it is the case, it must be that the end is something good and the subordinate ends must be such as to lead towards the realisation of the Highest Good or Freedom (प्रथम निःश्रेयस, मेघ or निःब्रजा). But all this involves such questions as, What is good, virtue or merit (यश्न्त) and What is Bad, vice or demerit (पाप), and finally, How a man should regulate his life and thought i.e. What would constitute Right Conduct (सत्यं चारितं) for the realisation of the Highest Good or Freedom?

Having perceived, however, that a thing acts in a certain way upon other things, we integrate the idea of the thing by acts of judgments and thenceforth we think of them as attributes inherent in the thing; but in order to express this fact we put them into conception of the thing by an act of judgment and we call them Categories, Predicates or Predicaments by pre-eminence.

Now the thing or the subject, which the predicates are ascribed to, is styled
as and included among the fundamental \textit{predicaments} or \textit{categories} for convenience. We call it \textit{substance} or \textit{reality} by which we mean that it is \textit{Sat} i.e., it has an independent existence of its own for its characteristic indication (\textit{सत्तयास्त्रत्वात्रत्व}). \textit{Sat} is, again, defined as what persists in and through its own qualities and modifications (\textit{शौद्धत्व ख्यातीयानूः गुणप्रकृतीयानूः ब्राह्मणतिः}). It (\textit{Sat}) is further characterised as standing under, supporting and holding together as well, the attributes or qualities (\textit{गुण}) and modifications (\textit{प्रकृति}) revealed in the forms of origination or effects (\textit{उत्पत्ति}), and destruction disintegration—(\textit{विलय}) in and through which the substance asserts and maintains its own existence and continuance (\textit{प्रीत्व}) as perceived during the course of its interaction with other things (\textit{उत्पत्ति-विलय-प्रीत्व}; \textit{सत्त्र}).

Thus the characteristic indication of \textit{Substance} being as such, we may define it as the underlying \textit{entity} (\textit{रूप}) which itself, remaining essentially the same in and through all its modes of being, gives support and connection to all its qualities, modalities and the like.
Quality (गुण) of a substance is its power of producing effects of changes in other things through time and space. It is ever-present in the substance. Neither being found to be without the other, they both stand in the relation of invariable concomitance or simultaneity (योगप्रण) with one another, instead of being in relation of antecedence and consequence in time (काम-प्रीत्य सम्बन्ध).

Modality or Modification (प्रक्षेप) again, is the successive variation (प्रणमन) in the atomic arrangement and configuration which a thing undergoes in the course of time and in space.

Now Substantiality, Quality and Modality being, in short, the three characteristic indications of substance so called, quality and modality are also at times considered as substances under certain circumstances and relations when each of these three is thus characterised again with the tri-partite indications of substance. The Jain teachers, however, have come to the enumeration in general of nine categories or predicaments by pre-eminence as in the following.
PREDICAMENTS.

I. *Jiva* (जीव) — Cognitave substance, Soul, Self or Subject is that which has *Intelligence* (वैतन्त्य) for its characteristic indication. It is marked out from *Ajiva* (अजीव)—Non-cognitave substance, Non-soul, Not-self or Object by knowing consciousness (चान) which essentially belongs to the *Jiva* only. This individual *Jiva* is not all-pervading, nor is it only one in number; neither is it absolutely eternal or unchangeable; nor is it absolutely non-eternal or transitory. It is innumerable in number and is both eternal and non-eternal in accordance with the viewpoint we take to look at these.

This *Jiva* exists in the germinal state in the form of what is technically called *Nigoda* (निगोद). It contracts or expands, as the requirements may be, to fit in with the corporeal frames it takes on at different stages of its migratory existence in order to enjoy pleasures or suffer from pains. In order to reap what it sows, it migrates here, there and everywhere through the processes of repeated births, developments and deaths. On account of its ever striving to break off the fetters of...
bondage and attain to a free and beatific state of being by means of the Truine Gems (रत्नतंत्र), the Jīva is held to be constitutionally free and essentially all bliss (चानन्द). It is potentially divine in the sense that it attains to Divinity or Perfection in the end when it shines in all its glory and effulgence beyond all thought and speech near the regions of Alokā.

Now there are an infinite number of these Jīvas—filling the entire space and void of the universe and are mainly grouped into,—

(A) Freed Jīvas—are those beings who have attained to divinity and become self-conscious and self-luminous near the hyper-physical regions: and,

(B) Fettered Jīvas—are those who are still bound down with the chains of karma either on Earth, in Heaven, or in Purgatory. These fettered Jīvas are again subdivided into (i) Sthāvāra and (ii) Trās.

(i) Sthāvāra Jīvas—are those which are devoid of all power of locomotion and have only one organ of sense, viz, that of touch (स्पर्श). Earth, water, fire, air and all those that come within the
range of the vegetable kingdom, are known as \textit{Jivas} belonging to the \textit{Sth\text{\textasciitilde}v\text{\textashy}ra} class. Symptoms of life in these \textit{Sap\text{\textashy}ra \textit{Sth\text{\textasciitilde}v\text{\textashy}ra}} (सप्राण खावर) or living fixtures consist, amongst other phenomena, in \textit{responsiveness} which evidently involve memory as displayed in the mental activity of \textit{feeling, cognition} and \textit{re-cognition}.

(ii) \textit{Tras Jivas}—are those who have the power of locomotion and are grouped into four kinds according to the nature and number of the sense-organs they are possessed of. The four kinds of \textit{Tras Jivas} are:

(a) those that have the organs of \textit{touch} and \textit{taste}, (स्पर्शन्द्रय and स्वेदन्द्रय) e.g., leeches, worms, etc.

(b) those that have three organs such as \textit{touch}, \textit{taste} and \textit{smell}, (स्पर्शन्द्रय, स्वेदन्द्रय and गन्धन्द्रय) e.g., ants, lice, etc.

(c) those that have organ of sight (नवनेन्द्रय) in addition to the above three organs, e.g., bees, scorpions, etc.

(d) and, lastly, those that have all the above four organs in addition to that of the hearing (गन्धन्द्रय) This last kind of
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Jīvas includes birds, acquatics, animals and human beings and all those that people Heaven, Earth and Purgatory.

II. Ajiva (अजीव) — Non-cogitative substance, Non-soul, Not-self or the Object is all what is absolutely bereft of all intelligence, and consequently of the tripartite modes of consciousness. This Ajiva or Non-cogitative substance is of five kinds, viz. —

(i) Pudgala signifies what develops fully only to be dissolved again. — It is that kind of dead dull ponderable (रूपी) matter, which is qualified with touch, taste, smell and colour. It is found to exist generally in two modes of being: — (a) Anu (अनु) — atom, and (b) Skandha (स्कंध), — compound. When the dead and dull matter exists in the last indissoluble stage where the ingredients admit of no further analysis, it is called anu or atom. And Skandha-compound is the natural conglomeration of pudgal-atoms under chemical and physical laws. It is these Pudgala-atoms that incessantly enter and leave our bodies and are infinitely more numerous than the Jīvas. Karma is a kind of fine Pudgal-atoms.
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The Pudgala-matter is also classified in the following manner according to other modes of its being:—

(a) Sthula-Sthula (खूल-खूल) or the Grossest of the gross, as, for example, logs of wood or blocks of stone; i.e., solids which can be cut into equal parts.

(b) Sthula (खूल) or the Gross-simple, milk or water, i.e., liquids, which are restorable to their original mass-forms even after their measurable divisions.

(c) Sthula-sukshma (खूल-सुक्ष्म) or the Compound of the gross and the fine (e.g. gases which is visible in the light of the sun or the moon but cannot be caught; as for example smokes and the like)

(d) Sukshma-Sthula (सुक्ष्म-खूल) or the Compound of the fine and the gross is what is not visible to the eye but is perceptible by the auditory or olfactory nerves; as, for example, music and smell.

(e) Sukshma (सुक्ष्म) or the Fine.

(f) Sukshma-Sukshma (सुक्ष्म-सुक्ष्म) or the Finest of the fine, the ultimate atoms which admit of no further divisions. These finest of the fine, are mere simples as oppos-
ed to compounds and like points have positions but no magnitude.

(ii). *Dharma* or *Dharmastikāya* is that simple imponderable (चमुच्छ) substance by the virtue of which bodies are able to move. *Dharma* here seems to be a reality, corresponding to the *Rajas* (रजस) of the *Sāṁkhya* philosophy, helping to the mobility of material things.

(iii). *Adharma* or *Adharmastikāya* is that simple imponderable (चमुच्छ) substance by the virtue of which bodies are able to be at rest. *Adharma*, like *Dharma*, appears to be a reality corresponding to the *Tamas* (तम) of the *Sāṁkhya* philosophy tending to bring things to a rest.

(iv). *Akalāsh* or Space is the uncontained container of all that exists.

(v). *Kāl* or Time is what reveals itself in a series or succession of events or changes. It is in the course of time that things wear out, unfold themselves or undergo changes. It is this time that is conventionally divided and termed as moments, minutes, hours and the like for which reason it is technically called *Kalanatmak Kāl*.
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III. Punya or Virtue —or deeds of merit is that which helps the Jiva in his enjoyment of health, wealth and pleasures.

IV. Pāpa, or Vice or deeds of demerit is that which adds to the pain and suffering of the Jiva.

V. Asrava or Influx, infection, or transmutation of Pudgal-particles into the soul.—The Pudgal particles, which are foreign to the soul, find their way into the soul through mind, speech and other sense organs and thus cause discoloration of the latter giving rise to love, hatred, and the like.

VI. Bandha or bondage is the wrong identification of the soul with the Non-soul owing to the atomic transmutation of the latter into the former.

VII. Sambar is the gradual cessation of this influx into the soul along with the development of knowledge.

VIII. Nirjārā is the absolute purging of the soul of all matters foreign to it.

IX. Moksha is the Freedom of the soul from the fetters of the bondage due to matters alien to it.

The above is but a general statement with reference to the nine categories or
predicaments as taught by the Jain teachers. As to their details we shall see later on in their proper places. Some, however, taking Punya and Pāpa under Bandha hold that categories are only seven in number. Others again leaving aside the moral categories beginning with Pāpa and Punya opine that there are only six Padārthas or Predicaments viz: Jīva, Pudgal, Dharma, Adharma, Akāśh and Kāla. But, be that as it may the question is: what do we know of these categories? And in this is involved another question: what is knowledge? Unless we satisfy ourselves in regard to this it would be difficult for us to precisely state what we understand by these categories, a right vision into the metaphysics of which, we are told, will bring on right knowledge of the verities of thought and life helping in the right regulation of our conduct for the attainment of Freedom—the Sumnum Bonum of all life and living.
CHAPTER III.

KNOWLEDGE AND ITS FORMS.

The Correlativity of Jiva and Ajiva—Polarity of Knowledge.—Self and the Not-self—Consciousness and its Origin—Knowledge and its Growth. Definitions of Right Vision and Right Knowledge—Different forms of Knowledge and the Possibility of the Kevala Jnana.—Kevalin is the Ideal Real—Pure Intuitions—the true characteristic of Real Pratyaksha.

To begin with knowledge, therefore, we must first see as to how do we become conscious of the Self and the Not-Self; what we are and what we see, hear, taste, touch or smell.

A sifting analysis of the contents of our knowledge of the world as a whole makes it pretty clear that we can arrange our ideas relating to the same under two pairs of contrasted alternatives, Jiva and Ajiva, as complementary aspects of reality, each of which suggests the other by a dielectic necessity and combines with the other into one more complex conception. Now these two contrasted alternatives are but two conditions of thought: All thinking implies a subject which thinks—Cogitative principle or Soul. But as all
thinking is thinking of something, it means that it requires a material on which the thought-activity is exercised and a fortiori therefore, it implies an object which is discriminated and understood by thought. Thus we can neither imagine a subject or a thinking principle without an object to think upon, or a world without conceiving a cogitative principle as thinking it. And this is how we become conscious of the Self or Subject and the Not-Self or Object.

And from this it is evident that consciousness arises only from the action and inter-action of the Self and Not-Self as such; and constituted as we are, our knowledge must therefore begin with sensations from the peripheral contact of the senses with their respective objects, and consists in the interpretation of the sensations which they arouse in us; for, merely having sensations and feelings would not constitute knowledge. Therefore the knowledge of a thing is the interpretation and understanding of the sensation in such a manner as would correspond to the existing relations between the self and the Not-Self and other sur-
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rounding things, the fundamental forms of which are called categories. It is thus quite apparent that interpretation precedes knowledge and the more accurate the interpretation of the sensation, the more correct would be the knowledge thereof. When the sensations, caused in us by the powers inherent in the objects in contact with the peripheral extremities, are interpreted and understood quite in accordance with the forms and relations in which they subsist and for which they are called categories, we come to know them as objective relations. And when this is done in perfect accordance with the instructions imparted by the Teacher (गुरु), without which a correct interpretation is held to be impossible, absolute faith (श्रद्धा) in the instruction (i.e. in knowledge produced by the imparted teaching) is called ‘Right-Vision’ (सत्यक्ष दशन) —the basis of Right Knowledge. And the knowledge which embraces concisely or in details the predicaments, as they are in themselves, is called ‘Right Knowledge’ (सत्यक्ष प्राप्त), and without which Right Conduct (सत्यक्र चारित्र) is impossible.

Right Vision is the Absolute Faith—Sraddhd in the instruction of the Teacher in the interpretation.

Definition of Right Knowledge.
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Now knowledge is of five different forms, such as, (1) Mati (मति), (2) Sruti (सूति), (3) Abadhi (अबधि), (4) Manaparyaya (मनःपर्यय) and Keval (केवल). Thus,—

Mati is that form of knowledge by which a jiva (जीव) cognises an object through the operation of the sense-organs, all hindrances to the formation of such knowledge being removed.

(2) Sruti is the clear knowledge formed on some verbal testimony of the Omniscient, all obstruction to the formation of such knowledge being removed.

(3) Abadhi is the knowledge in the form of recognition of particular physical occurrences that happened in some time past, all obstruction to the way being removed;

(4) Manaparyaya is the knowledge of what is in others' thoughts, originating, as it does, from the removal of hindrances to the formation of such knowledge.

(5) Keval is the pure unimpeded knowledge—knowledge absolute, which precedes the attainment of Nirvana. It is characterised by omniscience, transcending all relativity of discursive thought involving

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the idea of succession and series. Being devoid of every sort of ratiocinative element, we may call it 'Intuition' power. By Intuitive knowledge we mean, of course, what we get by a single stroke of cognition, unadulterated by any of the processes of representation. As for us, finite beings, conditioned naturally by the relativity of thought, we cannot have this sort of cognition; because a careful analysis of the psychological processes seems to show that by virtue of the frame and constitution of our mind, in every cognition which we can have, both the presentative and the representative elements are, as it were, inseparably blended together. Indeed, some philosophers may hold the quite opposite view and affirm that we can perceive objects directly by our senses and that formation of the percept requires no help of representation. But, surely, we can meet them in the language of Kant by saying that mere sensations, unalloyed with any reactionary and representative processes, are as good as nothing, because they are no better than manifold of senses quite undifferentiated and homogeneous in character. But this—though an im
possibility for us—is nevertheless possible for an Omniscient Being (केवलिन्) who has attained to perfection and Divinity. In fact, we may go so far as to say that the opposite—a discursive knowledge—is inconceivable for Him by virtue of His very nature. Unless we deny the very existence of such a being it must necessarily follow that as perfect knowledge means infinite knowledge, his knowledge embraces the whole sphere of thought and covers the whole span of time. Being immortal and eternally present, for him the present vanishes not in the past, nor the future shoots out from the womb of futurity; but all offer themselves as Ever-present. For him everything is eternal Now. In short, He is above time, because the question of time comes in where there is a succession of events or changes. But changes are not possible to an Eternal Being; for, all changes are in Him as it were, but He is not changed. For him there is no succession, but an eternal and everlasting Present. Now this being the case what necessarily follows are the facts. The mind which is at once perfect
is not merely objective nor merely objective, but *absolute*. It is the measure of all things, the central and comprehensive reality. Such a mind, such a man, such a *Kevalin* (केवलीन), we need hardly add, is not the man in the street nor the man in the making, but the mind, the man whose cardinal characteristics are Pure Intuitions or Transcendental perceptions (*प्रत्यय ज्ञान*). Indeed such a man, such a *Kevalin* is the ideal of all aspirations, the fountain-head of truth and wisdom. In short, he is named, *God*.
CHAPTER IV.

EPISTEMOLOGY AND LOGIC.

Further consideration of the Processes of Knowledge. — Judgment and its Three Elements — Rules and Canons which a Judgment should obey. — Insufficiency of the Perceptual Source of Knowledge — Hence other Sources of Knowledge.

In the preceding pages we have discussed that Knowledge implies a Subject or a thinking principle which knows and an Object on which it exercises its knowing power. We have seen also that to know an object is to know the relations it bears to Self and other surrounding things as well. We have also seen the particular forms of knowledge which the Jain savants teach in their own peculiar way. We have seen further that the last form or the Keval jnāna is not only a form of knowledge but a source of knowledge as well, free from all mediate processes. It now behoves us to enquire as to what other possible sources of knowledge we are ordinarily aware of.

It is but a truism to say that you and I depend upon our mind to know the world.
EPISTEMOLOGY AND LOGIC.

This implies that we are dependent upon our organs of perception and upon our ability to re-organize the data of perception into the system we call Knowledge. To know, we are necessarily dependent on our sense organs; for, without them the world would be to us a perfect blank. Rob us of our eyes, of our ears, touch and the like, how little should we know of the world in which we live, move and have our being! But inspite of such a bold and an undeniable piece of evidence in this matter-of-fact world, there crops up a question as to the trustworthiness of these our evidences of the sense organs—the channels of our perception. We all know how the sages and philosophers of yore differed widely from one another in placing their reliance on these channels of perception in their quest of truth. Some went even so far as to urge all manner of evidence to bring in question the absolute trustworthiness of the senses; others held it to be the only authoritative source of knowledge. In these days of modern culture and refinement we can have indeed little patience with those who seriously urge
such evidence to be absolutely reliable. A little reflection, however, will be sufficient to convince anyone that, really speaking, we are not wholly justified in having such attitude of mind as just referred to. For in this are involved grave questions of vital issues and far-reaching consequences in all forms of philosophical speculation. If we remember aright, experience shows on many an occasion that the evidences of the senses are not wholly and entirely reliable. We have not only illusions and dreams but some of us are colour blind even. Besides, there are many things in heaven and earth which escape our visions—sense perceptions. There are many things which lie hidden from our view either by being too big or too small to come within the range of our direct perception. We have not seen the globe as a whole nor have we visualised the chemical atoms. Now if these be the things whose existence we never perceive but infer, how many—perhaps infinitely many—are there whose existences escape our notice and knowledge and thus keep clear for fresh inquiries and discoveries!
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Then, again, you and I perceive objects and so we know them. But how do we know them? Clearly because they make impressions on our brains through the senses and thus give rise to certain processes and states in our mind; and the question is whether we have only mental processes and states and not the real objects with which they do not correspond at all like an image in a mirror and the real object imaged. This world of ours gives rise to perceptions with which they cannot be identified. The image of the book is evidently not the book itself. If you shut your eyes, the image of the book vanishes, but the book existing objectively in space does not. Supposing, again, that you go away to a certain distance from where the book lies and look back from there at it, surely the image of the book will be smaller and smaller as you go away from it farther and still farther and look back at it from time to time. Clearly you see the book as it does appear to you and not the book as it really is. And thus the whole thing grows at once perplexing and irritating; and you are irresistibly led to the question—what.
would be the nature of this knowledge and how do we come to it?

It would be well to state at the very outset that this our knowledge is not perception only as such: it consists also of 'Judgment.' It is true that, speaking psychologically, knowledge exists in the form of perception and this may indeed seem to involve a contradiction. But on a little reflection it is found to involve no such thing. For, all instances of knowledge perform the same office as a Judgment does. To take, for example, the case of a baby. When the baby stretches forth its tiny arm towards some object—say, a red ball hanging at a distance before its eyes,—we have something very much akin, to be sure, to an adult's request that the given object be brought to him. Here the baby does not, by words of mouth, ask us to get it the red ball; but for its intellectual companion it has said something fully. So in fact though no request is expressed in words, still the attitude of the baby does not fail to be construed as a request, and in fact it is
so construed by its intellectual companion. In other words, we may say, as we have done before, that all knowledge would take some form of Judgment, be it expressed in words or by implication.

Thus the question as to the nature of knowledge ultimately resolves into the question with regard to the nature of Judgment, and a final answer can be given by analysing it into its component elements. By an element of Judgment is meant whatever is necessary to its being a Judgment from our point of view as an interpreter. There are three such elements in a Judgment. A Judgment to be as such must have an object to be interpreted; for, an interpretation of nothing whatsoever is no interpretation at all. So, one of the elements involved in interpretation is the object to be interpreted. This must be given to us. It must stand there revealed to us. This object of knowledge is termed as the given. The second element is the actual interpretation itself. To deny this would involve self-contradiction. Thirdly, we have, as the final element of Judgment, those laws or
canons that a Judgment must obey in order that it might be true. A good and correct Judgment has some responsibility, and this responsibility takes on the form of rules, laws and canons that a Judgment must obey, or else be an untrue or false claimant of the respective demands. To disobey these rules would, therefore, be tantamount to treason to knowledge itself.

We have already dwelt on the first two elements of Judgment. We are now to deal with the third one, or the laws and canons for the formation of correct Judgment.

Students of Indian systems of thought all know that the word pramâna (प्रमाण) originally meant an instrument of measurement—from mān-to measure and pra-forth. It may be translated as a measured, standard authority.

But the pramâna which serves as a means (साधन) of determination produces pramiti (प्रमिति) which means accurate or right knowledge, just as śādhan (means) produces siddhi (truth or certainty). This pramâna is a means of information and determination and has variously
been admitted, divided and defined from different points of view by different sages and scholars of different ages and climes to suit their respective systems of thought.

Whoever has a little acquaintance with the different Indian systems of thought knows full well that the followers of the Chārvāka School admit of but one source of knowledge, viz. Experience, i.e. sense-perception (प्रयत्न), contemptuously rejecting the other sources, viz. Inference, (प्रवृत्तमान), Testimony (शब्द), Tradition (वैतिक), Implication (वर्णपत्ति), Probability (संभव) and Non-entity (भाव), which are warranted in drawing from facts of experience. Little indeed do we know what is really taught by the Sage Brihaspati, the oldest propounder of the most uncompromising materialism and thorough going Epicuranism or whence he drew his inspiration to rely solely on sense perception or facts of actual experience and to overlook other logical inferences and the like which have been in vogue from time immemorial; for, where we perceive smoke we infer at once the fire there, or, when a reliable person informs any one that there are fruits he
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requires on the bank of the river, he runs to the place and plucks fruits. Thus, Inference and Testimony along with others have all along been held to be valid sources of knowledge. But, curiously enough, the Chârvâkas question the validity of these. And so far we could gather from the fragments of this philosophy, scattered here and there in the different systems of thought and as collated by Mâdhavâchârya in his Sarvadarshana Samgraha, he begins his enquiries into Epistemology with such startling questions as, what is the value of Inference? How can ever its conclusions be certain?

The most elementary form of conclusion must invariably have three terms—two extremes and a reason, mark or middle term (चेतु, लिङ्ग or साधना). To give a conclusion, the middle-term or mark (चेतु, लिङ्ग or साधना) must be universally and unconditionally connected with the major-Sâdhyā (वापक, साध्य) on one side i.e., according to the phraseology of European logic must be distributed, and on the other side with the minor term pâksha (पक्ष). But what evidence can we
ever have that the connection between the *major* (साध्य) and the *middle* or *sign* (आयं, हेतु or लिङ्ग) is necessary and universal? For,—

(a) Sense-perception (प्रत्येक) cannot prove it in as much as universal connection is not a fact of experience. Experience can give only one particular fact and that only of the present moment and not of the long past nor of the distant future. The eye by fact of its exercising its functional activity only in the present reveals the objectivity of a particular thing here and now. But a universal truth goes infinitely beyond what the eye can give. Hence sense-perception cannot prove any necessary connection between the *major* (साध्य) and the *minor* (प्रत्येक)—any universal proposition or *Pratijñā*—(आयं प्रतिक्रिया)!

(b) But here a *prima facie* objection might be raised to the effect that perception being both internal and external it includes intuition of reason which gives necessary and universal truth. 'Not even that,' thunders forth the thorough-going materialist; 'there is no such thing as intuition
or internal perception. For mind has no perception except through the senses and therefore external. It is interesting to compare the Chārvākas with Reid and Hamilton, who on the one hand deny the possibility of internal intuition of universal truths, and Mill and Comte on the other hand who reject all 'Introspective knowledge' as ever possible.

(c) Then again, "Inference," says the Indian materialist, "cannot give it; for Inference (अनुमान) itself always requires universal proposition affirming the connection between the major and the middle as universally true." For example when we say that a man is mortal: Socrates is a man and therefore mortal, we are assuming a necessary connection between humanity and mortality. But the possibility of such a connection, at least of our knowing such a connection, even if it existed, is just what we require to prove. Thus we can see that mere Inference cannot prove it; for it is only assumed. To say that the connection, though assumed yet makes inference possible is to argue in a circle. And hence we cannot
arrive at universal truths by means of **Inference** (अनुमान). It is important to note here that J. S. Mill bases his theory of reasoning on universal propositions. But are these axioms themselves proved? No, reasoning assumes them—they being mere generalisations from facts of experience. But this cannot yield absolute certainty.

(d) Nor **Testimony** can prove it. For the validity and truth of **Testimony** depends on **Inference**. Moreover **Testimony** itself depends on a middle term (विद्वेद्य or विद्वेद) in another sense viz. the language used; in as much as the meaning of the language used and its correspondence with reality is always uncertain. To illustrate the import, we have the communication of the old man with the child, neither understanding the other's language. Hence absolute **certainty** can never be founded on authority, we cannot accept the *ipse dixit* of Manu even. And if **Testimony** could convey universal truth, yet there could be no knowledge of universals to one who had not himself received the testimony of one already in the know of them. But where is
such a person to be found? To say that any one already knows universal truths and can bear Testimony to it, is but begging the question. Hence sense-perception (प्रायच) is the only form of valid knowledge (प्रामाण).

So argue the Chârvâkas in defiance of the usage of all, times. There was never a time when the acts of seeing and inferring etc. were not performed. The use of these acts are well known; for it is through them that we can choose one thing and reject another, and though the use of the Pramânas are well-known to all, coming as it does from time immemorial, yet it is imperative that we should make a sifting enquiry into the truth and validity of the materialistic and sensationistic arguments as put forth by such thinkers as Chârvâkas so that it might serve as an warning to the foolish people from taking false knowledge for true: for it is said;—

प्रसिद्धानं प्रमाणानं लघणोऽक्ष्योऽप्रयोजनम् ।
तद्यामोऽन्ह निवसनं: स्वालु स्यायू स्मालमन्यमिः ॥

— The Nyâya-vatâra.

Such is the trend of the Chârvâkas' argument who admit only one pramâna.
And while the Buddhists and the Vaishe-shikas admit of only two Pramanas viz. Perception and Inference (प्रत्यय and चन्द्रमान), the Sāṅkhya School acknowledges three i.e. Testimony (शब्द) in addition to the previous two. The School of the Nyāya Philosophy adds Analogy (उपमान) to the above three and thus admits of four only. The Prabhākar School accepts Implication (सम्बोधन) as an additional means and thus agrees to five Pramanas. The two Mīmāṃsakas, Purva and Uttara (पूर्व and उत्तर) grant six, adding Non-existence (प्रभाव); and finally, the Paurāṇikas taking Tradition (रेतिच्छ) and Probability (सम्भव) into consideration, acknowledge that the sources of knowledge are after all eight in number.

The scholiasts have, however, defined these means of knowledge variously. But they all agree substantially to the following:

(1) Sense-perception (प्रत्यय)—Knowledge derived directly from the peripheral contact of the sense-organs with their corresponding objects.
(2) Inference (प्रज्ञान)—Knowledge born of the apprehension of an unseen member from an invariable association (व्यापत्ति) by the perception of another known member.

(3) Analogy (वापमान)—Knowledge from the recognition of likeness based on resemblance i.e. from the detection of the points of identity and difference through the process of comparison and recognition of similarity with something well-known before.

(4) Verbal Testimony (मंडन)—Knowledge derived from the pronouncements of authoritative persons who have sensed truths as it were.

(5) Implication (चर्चापति)—Such knowledge as can be determined of a thing not itself perceived, but implied by another.

(6) Non-entity (पभाव)—Knowledge arising from the cognition of absence or Negation or Non-being as we conclude from the fact that Deva Datta is not in the house, that he must have gone out.

(7) Tradition (रैतिथ्र)—Knowledge gained from such accounts, legendary or otherwise, which have been handed down to generation to generation from time immemorial.
(8) Probability (सम्भावना)—Knowledge accruing from the perception of equivalence as in the instance of twelve pence making up a shilling.

The above are the eight classified sources of information by means of which they generally determine the accuracy of knowledge. And it is interesting to note that Jain teachers do neither admit them all, nor do they agree to these definitions. They admit of only two pramānas: one is Direct or Immediate Perception (प्रत्यक्ष ज्ञान) which has been discussed at length under Keval (केवल ज्ञान) as a form of knowledge; and the other is Indirect or Mediate Perception (परोच ज्ञान) which is generally explained by the peripheral contact of the senses with their respective objects (इन्द्रियार्थ सत्त्वकः).

The reason why knowledge born of the contact of the senses with their respective objects (इन्द्रियार्थसत्त्वकः ज्ञान) which is admitted on all hands to be derived through the Direct means (प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण) has been considered by the Jain Sages to be Indirect or Mediate (परोच) is best explained when we take into our analytic consideration of the
states and processes of the psychology of cognition of extra-mental realities.

Knowledge born of the contact of the senses with their corresponding objects (इन्द्रियार्थ सत्त्वकन्यज्ञान) is not direct. There are, remark the Jain Psychologists, five intermediatory stages from sense to thought: viz. (a) Vanjyanāvagraha (वांज्यनावग्रह), (b) Arthāvagraha (प्रथवग्रह), (c) Ikhā (इखा), (d) Avaya (अवय) and (e) Dhāranā (धारणा) as will be presently explained.
CHAPTER V.

PRATYAKSHA IS REALLY PAROKSHA.

The Jain dissension with reference to Pratyaksha Praman.—Direct Perception is really Indirect.—Analysis of the Psychological Processes of Cognition.—The Different Stages—From Sense to Thought—Proof of the Truth and Validity of the Jain Point of View.—The sensuous 'Pratyaksha' is really 'Paroksha'.

While discussing the questions of epistemology and logic in the previous chapter, we have seen how the different schools of Indian thought substantially agree as to the character of the different instruments of knowledge. And so far the characteristic indication, specially of the Direct Perception (प्रत्ययाक्ष प्रमाण), is concerned, we have seen too that almost all the schools, from the out-and-out materialist Chārvāka down to the all-believing Paurānikas, agree with one another. But the Jain savants, as we have stated already, do not fall in with this view. According to them, the so-called Pratyaksha—Direct Perception—is but an Indirect source of knowledge. The so-called Pratyaksha is really Paroksha!
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This will indeed strike curious in the face of such over whelming opinions of so many schools of thought as well as in opposition to the evidence of the everyday experience. But an analysis of the psychological processes involved in the sense-given knowledge, as the Jain savants hold, will confirm the truth and validity of their statement when they say that the so-called Pratyaksha is, to all intents and purposes, Paroksha.

To enter into details, there is no denying the fact that we think in relations. Relativity is the very soul and cement of our knowledge; for, all knowledge not only implies a Self or Subject which knows and a Not-Self or Object which is known but a relation between them as well. The Object or the external world, by acting on the peripheral ends of our sense-organs, rouse in us a certain kind of stimulus through the channels of our sensation; and this brings the Self or Subject to stand in particular relation with it, the Not-Self or the Object. This is vyanjandvagraha (अज्ञनाव्याग्र ) or the stage of acquisition of materials for knowledge.
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The relation having thus been established between the Self and the Not-Self in the processes of which stimulus is carried on from the outside to the cerebro-hemisphere where all the in-going nerves meet, there takes place an excitation in our mind where-upon it re-acts on the stimulus by way of converting it into sensation as well as of interpreting in knowing the contents of the same in and through the process of which, the mind comes to the formation of the notion of its being imposed by something other than itself from without. This notion, thus formed, of the extra-mental object, is homogeneous and indefinite in character in as much as the distinction between the Self and the Not-Self only begins to dawn on the mind in the most rudimentary forms. In our psychology it is called Arthavagraha (अर्थवग्रह) or the presentative or cognitive stage in the processes of perceptual elaboration.

Ihâ (इहा) is the third stage. The mind does not rest with the formation of the vague notion of the Not-Self, as referred to in the above. Rather it goes on with its search-

(ii) Presentative or Cognitive Stage.

(iii) Comparative Stage.
ing inquiry, initiated in the previous stage, as to the real character and contents of what is imposed on it from without through the assimilation of the present sensation and its comparison as well with the other past but similar sensations, revived in the mind according to the laws of association and concomitant detection of the points of identity and difference between present and past sensations.

Then follows the re-integration of the present sensation along with other sensations, received in some past time and now revived in our consciousness according to the law of contiguity. In this stage of avaya (अवय), the presentative element which is known as sensation is fused with other elements, represented in the consciousness; and thus there results the recognition of the object, more definitely expressed in such vocabularies as this and not that.

The last stage in the present perceptual elaboration is Dhrand (धरण) through the processes of which we are by a natural and coherent train of thought led to reflect that sensation reveals qualities of things. But sensations
must require grounds for them; for, they cannot be self-caused. The qualities also, which these sensations reveal, cannot stand by themselves: for the qualities must be qualities of something, which not only gives them support and connection, but which as well exists extra-mentally and objectively somewhere in space. Thus through the processes of objectification and localisation we are led to the knowledge of things as extra-mental realities existing objectively in space. Dhārandā (धारण), thought, is but a name for this particular phase of knowledge of the thing when it is uppermost in our mind with special reference to the intensity and duration of the knowledge as such.

Such is the analysis of the sensuous perception; and this reminds us of a tendency in the modern psychology of perception to detect whether there is any interval of time between the contact and the (formation of) concept in addition to the question raised of late by the psycho-physiologists as to whether perception does not involve inference—a subject which was long ago discussed and solved by the sages of India.
Now the above analysis of the successive stages as to how the sense-given fragments and feelings are generalised and compressed into an intimate unity—a habitual mood of mind—is sufficient to indicate that whole process from sense to thought is not only indirect but mediate through and through in the acquirement of experiential knowledge. The facts of experience, mediatelly received, are generalised through the principle of induction in the course of which the details only re-arrange themselves into a concentrated form called,—Thought. The extra-mental realities causing sensations and feelings in us from their contact with our peripheral extremities, are not only cemented together into a unity but are stripped of their sensible nature, as it were, and are reduced to their simple equivalent in terms of thought through the operation of induction. In this way from sense-fragments and feelings, an image or idea, representative of reality, being generated, there appears next the thought or notion proper which holds the facts in unity. The principle holds good in all cases of empirical knowledge, historic or other-
wise. The decadence of nations in the lengths of time and the displacement of things all around us in the breadths of space are but condensed through reading or observation and induction into a frame of thought, naturally shedding a judgment on the issues involved therein. Thus sensuous perception which enjoys the privilege of being reckoned as a direct source of knowledge is really, to all intents and purposes, an indirect or mediate means (परोच प्रमाण) to the acquisition of knowledge.

It is worthy of note here that Mati-jñāna and Sruta-jñāna come within the jurisdiction of this indirect means to the acquirement of knowledge.

This indirect means of knowledge or proof is again sub-divided for the sake of convenience into:

(1) Smrīti (श्रीति) — is the memory which reveals in the form of recollection of what was seen or heard of or experienced otherwise sometime before.

(2) Pratyābhijñāna (प्रत्याभिज्ञान) — is the knowledge derived from a semblance between things. It manifests itself in recognising a
thing from the resemblance of the same with the description of what was known from some other source.

(3) Tarka (तर्क)—is the knowledge arising from the confusion according to the canons of invariable concomitance (व्यापति).

(4) Anumān (अनुमान)—is the knowledge of something arising from the presence of the characteristic insignia (विनिः) of the same in something else.

(5) Agam (अगम)—is the verbal testimony of some Omniscient Being.
CHAPTER VI.

THE JAIN THEORY OF FORMAL LOGIC.

Meeting the Charvakas on their own grounds.—Refutation of their hypothesis and Demonstration of the legitimacy of Inferential-knowledge—The Jain Theory of Formal Logic and definitions of "Pratyaksha".—"Paroksha" includes Inference and Testimony—Definition of Inference and Forms of Syllogisms—Testimony or the Word—Definition of Praman or Valid knowledge—the World of Reals and not of Phantoms as hold the Buddhists.

So we see how in addition to Direct Perception (प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण), Inference (अनुमान) is also admissible as an Indirect means (परोच प्रमाण) according to the Jain epistemology. But then the Purva Pakshin, Chārvāk, will, indeed, remark that our classification of the means of knowledge—Pramānas and our definition and interpretation of the logical terms—Pratyaksha and Paroksha—are in clear contravention to the common acceptation and interpretation of the same and as such should be rejected; for where is the person so insane as to accept this our view, the import and uses of the logical vocabularies of which, are

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in manifest opposition to the uniformly accepted sense and signification of the terms in question? Besides, this would be construed as an abandonment on our part of the original position (प्रतिच्छा स्थान) taken up by us in the demonstration of the logical possibility and validity of inferential knowledge (परीच्छा ज्ञान) in addition to the perceptual and yielding as well to the view held by our adversary, in so far, indeed, as the epistemological side of the question is concerned, simply by a cunning display of pun upon words and terms from their etymological significations. Specially such is your position when we, Chârvâkas, do not admit of Pure Intuitions or Transcendental Perceptions which are impossible on your own statement to the ordinary mortals living, moving and having their being in the empirical world of ideas and ideals.

Indeed! we, the Jains, reply. There is much of sense in your argument. But that is only apparently in as much as they vanish altogether like cob-webs on searching analysis, as we shall see presently. True it is that our definition and interpretation of
the logical terms in question are in contra-
vention to the too common acceptation
and uses of the same. But common
is the common place and being too
common would not diminish the weight
and gravity of our philosophy. We walk
straight along the lines of Riju-sutra
(कठु सूत्र) and interpret and explain things
both as they are and appear instead of
wrangling and beating about the bush.
In our empirical life and thought, we indeed
admit Perception as the direct and Infer-
ence as the indirect means of knowledge.
But, however, to meet you on your grounds;—

First,—You hold that direct Perception
(प्रत्यय्य ) in the common acceptation of the
term is the one and only means of know-
ledge and that the so-called Inference (चर्च
मान) being not possible according to your view
is not to be recognised as valid knowledge.

Now, do you or do you not adduce any
proof in support of your contention? If you
do not, your assertions would be but ipse
dixit and none will care to listen to you. On
the other hand, if you adduce proof, yours
would be a suicidal procedure making yourself

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guilty of a crime for the abandonment of the original position (प्रतिवा भ्रमण) already taken up by you in some form or other.

Secondly,—Again when you maintain that excepting Perception all other forms of evidence are alike fallacious and as such homogeneous, you admit yourself the legitimacy of induction which is but a form of inference.

Thirdly,—Then again you reject every kind of inference; but how do you carry on your debate? Surely by means of words which are but symbols of thought: and when you attack your antagonists for their mistaken faith in inference without which you could not so much as surmise that your antagonists held erroneous opinions, such erroneous opinions being never brought into contact with your organs of sense but are only supposed to exist on the strength of inference (विचार) from the symbolic movement of thought. And,

Finally,—you can not but admit of inference being another means of knowledge as will be evident from the following. To take for example, I have been very often into
the kitchen room as well as in other places and I have invariably observed that where there was smoke there was fire. Having met with not a single exception to the rule, I become convinced of the fact that there is an universal antecedence of fire in respect of smoke. Afterwards I go to a hill for a trip. I see smoke there and I doubt somehow whether or not there is fire in the hill and the moment I observe smoke on it, I recall to my mind the invariable concomittance between fire and smoke of which I had become pretty well convinced before, and I conclude that the hill has fire in it as there is smoke on it. Surely this is a case of inference to the point and and you cannot but admit the legitimacy of the issue in question.

Having thus refuted the Chârvâka hypothesis so far their means of knowledge is concerned and having demonstrated as well the legitimate possibility of Inference (चन्तमान) beyond all shadow of doubt according to the general acceptation of the logical term in question, it is imperative that we shall, ere we enter on any other topics bearing upon
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our subject-matter, here set forth in brief,
our own view of the means of knowledge—
Pramānas (प्रमाण).

The question, therefore to begin with,
is, What is Pramāna, from our point
of view. Pramāna, we define, is the valid
knowledge which reveals itself as well as
its knowable. It is worthy of note that by
this we, first, put aside the Buddhist view
that there being nothing external, knowledge
only reveals itself and secondly, we contradict
as well the Naiyādyika and the Mīmāṃsaka
schools of thought who teach that know-
ledge does not reveal itself but reveals
external relations. We hold, however, that
just as colour reveals itself as well as the
object to which it belongs, so knowledge re-
vealing itself reveals the knowable as well.

Now such being the characteristic indi-
cation (लज्जा) of Pramāna or Valid know-
ledge as we hold it, our sages have,
(apart from Immediate Intuition or Transcen-
dental Perception which is the truest
indication of what is meant by Real Direct
Knowledge), for the sake of convenience of
the ordinary mortals breathing in the world
of relativity of thought and form, deemed it wise to classify it into two kinds, viz. (i) Direct and (ii) Indirect (प्रत्येक and परिलोचना), Inference (प्रनुमान), Testimony (प्रस्तुत्त) and the like all coming within the purview of the latter.

To take the first, the Pratyaksha or the Direct knowledge is such that it reveals the objects as lying within the range of the senses; while the other is called Paroksha or Indirect only in reference to the procedure of its revealing the objects of knowledge such as Inference (प्रनुमान) which is not object of direct perception.

Inference, again, is that kind of valid knowledge which is determinant of what is to be proved, technically called Sadhya, arising from the sign or insignia called Linga standing in the relation of invariable concommitance (आपत्ति) with the same.

Such being the characteristic indication of Inference according to our logic, we thereby set aside first the view which maintains that (i) non-perception (पनुपन्नत्त्व), (ii) Identity (सम्बन्ध) and (iii) Causality (कार्यावलि) are but grounds of inference; and secondly, also the view which declares that
effect (काय्य), cause (कारण), conjunction (संयोग), co-existence (समवाय), opposition (विरोध) or such forms of ratiocinations as are known by the names of *a-priori* (पूर्ववृत्त) or *a-posteriori* (श्रववृत्त) or analogy (सामान्यतोष्ण), as grounds of inference.

Now this Inference, we divide into two kinds, *(a)* *Svarthānumāna* (स्वार्थानुमान) i.e. Inference for one's own self and *(b)* *Parārthānumāna* (परार्थानुमान) i.e. Inference for the sake of others.

*(a)* *Svarthānumāna* (स्वार्थानुमान) or Inference for one's own self, is the valid knowledge arising in one's own mind from repeated of observations of facts as in the case of having been in the kitchen many times and having invariably seen that where there was fire there was smoke, one concludes within himself that the hill must have fire in it in as much as it has smoke on it.

It is worthy of note here that this *inference* for one's own self, corresponds *totidem verbis* to the first form of Aristotle's syllogism:—

All that smokes is fiery,
The mountain smokes;
Therefore the mountain is fiery.

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Such is the process when we reason for ourselves. But if we have to convince some body else of what we by inference know to be valid, the case is different. We then start with the assertion, the hill is fiery. We are asked, why? and we answer, because it smokes. We then give our reason or the major premise, that all that smokes is fiery as you may see, for instance, on a kitchen hearth and the like. Now you perceive the hill does smoke and hence you will admit that I was right when I said the hill is fiery. Such being the processes of reasoning we generally adopt when we try to convince any one of the truth and validity of our statement, it is called Parārthānumāṇ.

(b) Parārthānumāṇ (परार्थानुमाण) is a statement expressive of reason (इत्य) or middle term standing in relation of invariable con-commitance with what is to be proved (साध्य) or major term having been composed of the minor term (वच्च).

It is important to note that Paksha (वच्च) which corresponds with the minor term of the European logic is defined to be
that with which the reason, Hetu (हेतु) or the middle term is related and whose relation with the major term has got to be demonstrated. The major term stands for Sadhya or what is to be proved, while Hetu (हेतु), Linga (लिङ्ग) or Sadhan (साधन) can be exchanged for the middle term or reason which cannot stand without being in relation with the Sadhya or the major term.

In language a sentence must have a subject and a predicate. In a proposition (प्राविष्ट) which is but a form of sentence, the subject is the Paksha or the minor and the predicate is the Sadhya or the major term. To illustrate, let us take the proposition:—

1. The hill (minor term) is full of fire (major term).
2. Since it is full of smoke (middle term).
3. Whatever is full of smoke is full fire, just as the kitchen (example)
4. So is this hill full of smoke (application)
5. Therefore this hill is full of fire (conclusion).
Now the exposition of this form of inference for the benefit of others is more rhetorical in language, persuasive in its elaboration and more useful therefore in controversy. When this form of exposition takes on five members in which it usually expresses itself as in the above, it is called Madhyama or mediocre type and when it takes on less than five members it is called Jaghanya or the worst type. But the Uttama or the best type of exposition consists of the following ten members—Dashāvayava (1) Pratijñā (प्रतिज्ञा) or Proposition, (2) Pratijñā Suddhi (प्रतिज्ञासुधि) or Correction of the Proposition, (3) Hetu (हेतु) Reason or the middle term, (4) Hetu-suddhi (हेतुसुधि) or Correction of the reason or the middle term (5) Drishtanta (दीर्घात) or Example, (6) Drishtanta-suddhi (दीर्घातसुधि) or Correction of the example, (7) Upanaya (उपनयन) or Application (8) Upanaya-suddhi (उपनयनसुधि) or Correction of the application (9) Nigaman (निगमन) or Conclusion and (10) Nigaman-suddhi (निगमनसुधि) or Correction of the conclusion.

II. Testimony (गृद्ध) is the valid knowledge arising from words which being taken
in their proper significance and acceptance express real objects not inconsistent with what is established by perception.

This Testimony is of two kinds—(a) Loukika (लौकिक) and (b) Shastraja (शास्त्रजय).  
(a) Loukika sabda (लौकिक सब्द) is the Verbal Testimony from reliable persons having authority to speak.  
(b) Sastraja sabda (शास्त्रजय) is the Scriptural Testimony. By scripture is meant that which was invented by self-realized persons who have seen truths and whose pronouncements in consequence are not incompatible with truths derived from perception.

Now the Jain sages hold the Scriptural Knowledge to be of three different kinds, viz:—

(1) Knowledge derived from the teachings, recorded or otherwise, of ku-devas or bad spiritual teachers.

(2) Knowledge derived from the Nāya Sruta or that part of the Jain scripture which teaches us as to the ways of comprehending things and realities in one or the other of the many aspects they are possessed of.
(3) Knowledge derived from Syādvād sruta or that part of the Jain scripture which teaches us how to test and comprehend things and realities in all their aspects for which reason it is also called Anekāntavād or the doctrine of the versatality of aspects.

Of these three kinds of scriptural knowledge, we shall deal with the Nayavād and the Syādvād in the subsequent chapters and leave the first to be dealt with later on for the sake of our arrangement and convenience.
CHAPTER VII.

THE JAIN LOGIC AND THE "NAYAS."

Other lines of Logical or Ontological Inquiry—Analysis and Synthesis—the Nayás and the Saptabhāngi—the two kinds of Naya—(i) the Noumenal and (ii) the Phenomenal—Consideration of the Ten Subdivisions of the Noumenal Naya or the Analytic Method of Inquiry into the Ontology of Thought and Form.

In the foregoing discussion on the means of knowledge, we have seen how the Formal Logic of the Jain philosophers differs from the systems of Logic belonging to other schools of thought and culture. But what we have stated in brief is not all that we know of the Jain Logic. In addition to this, it has other means of logical enquiry into the ontology of things identifying thereby logic with ontology which is of vital importance to deal with in the correct estimation of thought, form and being—a general conception of which is only attained by sense perception and the like ordinary means of knowledge. But to enter into a more detailed and complete apprehension of the actual realities which we come to
conceive of through the ordinary channels in more or less indefinite forms, there are two other lines of ontological investigation which owe their origin and development to the empirical knowledge of things; and these are (1) The Nayás and (2) The Saptabhanga. The first is the analytic process of ontological enquiry and the second is the synthetic treatment of things in their versatality of aspects for which reason this latter is called the Anekāntavāda or the Doctrine (teaching) of the Versatility of Aspects. It is these two—the Nayavāda and the Anekāntavāda—which form, as it were, the very ground-work on which the whole structure of the Jain metaphysics is safely and securely built up.

To deal with Nayavāda first, Naya is the analytical process of ontological investigation helping us to dive deep into the net-work of inter-related parts of the thing known through the ordinary means of knowledge and select, as well, one or the other attribute from the innumerable attributes, the aggregate of which makes up the being and expression of the said known thing with a

\textit{Naya} is the analytic and the Saptabhanga is the synthetic method of study.
view of interpreting and understanding the selected attribute for a correct and complete conception of the ontology of the same. Thus a Naya, it is clear, predicates one of the innumerable attributes of a thing without denying the rest; for, wherever it does so involving a denial of the rest of the attributes, it is no longer a naya proper but a nayabhāsa (नयाभास) or fallacy involved in the analytical reasoning.

Now there are two kinds of this analytical reasoning. One is the Dravyārthika Naya or Noumenal Naya, and the other is the Paryāyārthika Naya or the Phenomenal Naya.

1. THE NOUMENAL NAYA.

The Dravyārthika or Noumenal Naya is that process of the analytical enquiry which has for its subject-matter the substratum or the noumenon of a thing.

But what is Dravya or Noumenon? Dravya is what persists in and through its qualities and changes (गुण and पक्ष) which are but outward appearances of the same. We can well take Dravya, therefore, for the
substantial entity or reality (सत्य), which is thus discernible by the eye of reason to exist behind its appearances or phenomena. Hence, while phenomena or paryāyas enter into experience in the form of sensation and feeling, the substantial reality (मद्दोर दृष्य) has to be filled in by rational thought, so to speak, as necessary to explain and understand them. Thus Dravya or Noumenon is the object of reason in contra-distinction with paryāyas or phenomena which are but objects of sense.

Such being the subtle difference and distinction between Dravya (Noumenon) and Paryāyas (Phenomena) according to the Jain philosophy, there are various ways of analytically enquiring into the metaphysics of a thing which have been for convenience' sake classified under ten different forms, viz,—

(i) Anvaya dravyārthika—deals directly with reference to that feature of the thing which constitutes the universal characteristic indication of the same. We cannot, for instance, know a substance without knowing its qualities or modalities at the same time; nor qualities or modalities without an underlying
view of interpreting and understanding the selected attribute for a correct and complete conception of the ontology of the same. Thus a *Naya*, it is clear, predicates one of the innumerable attributes of a thing without denying the rest: for, wherever it does so involving a denial of the rest of the attributes, it is no longer a *naya* proper but a *nayabhāsa* (नयाभास) or fallacy involved in the analytical reasoning.

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I. THE NOUMENAL *NAYA*.

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substantial entity or reality (सत्ता), which is thus discernible by the eye of reason to exist behind its appearances or phenomena. Hence, while phenomena or paryāyas enter into experience in the form of sensation and feeling, the substantial reality (सत्ता or दृष्ट्य) has to be filled in by rational thought, so to speak, as necessary to explain and understand them. Thus Dravya or Noumenon is the object of reason in contra-distinction with paryāyas or phenomena which are but objects of sense.

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substance: for a substance without quality or modality is as unthinkable as the quality or modality without a substance.

(ii) Svadrayādi grāhaka—has for its subject matter those particularising aspects of a thing in and through which it asserts its existing individuality as distinct and separate from what it is not. A particular thing does not assert itself as such simply by the virtue of its substance, the abode of its many qualities and modalities; but it asserts its own individuality as such equally through its own locality of existence, the period its of coming into existence and the mode of its existence. For instance, when we know that 'there is the jar,' we do not simply know that the jar of clay or of any other particular substance whereof it has been manufactured is there; but we know as well the particular locality (स्थिति) where the jar stands, the particular period of time (समय) when the jar is said to have come into existence and the particular mode (स्थान), capacity, colour and the like in and through which the jar has been asserting its own existence and individuality as distinct and separate from all others that
lie around it. Thus it is evident that a finite thing asserts its own individuality in and through (i) its own substance (कथी; (ii) its own period of existence in time (काल); (iii) its own locality of existence in space (स्थल); and (iv) its own mode of existence (स्मार्य). And these are the four particularising elements which the sadravyādī grāhaka naya deals with.

(iii) Paradravyādī grāhaka—is the negative method of studying the metaphysical aspect of a finite thing with the light of what is other than itself. Every finite thing, because it is finite, must stand in relation to what gives limit to it by reason of which the distinction, determination and finitude of the thing is marked out from its surroundings contributing to the individuality of the same. To amplify the import, a particular thing surely stands in relation to other things in its neighbourhood in sharp contrast to the four particularising elements of which the individuality of the thing in question is marked out. Now when the particularising elements of these others which surround the thing in question,
predominate in our minds and give tone and colouration to our consciousness, the entity as well as the individuality of the latter is lost sight of by certain psychological processes, making the same sink into subconscious regions for the time being. And it is thus clear that when we say, 'there the jar exists,' the jar, we mean to say, exists only as such in so far its own particularising elements are concerned; but it enters into a nullity, as it were, the moment our minds, by a movement of thought, become occupied with the four particularising elements of those other things which surround the jar for which reason they are said to be but negations of the jar.

(iv) *Parama bhāva grāhaka*—is the ontological enquiry taking into consideration the supremely outstanding feature of a thing which is singular and unique in its characteristic indication. For instance, consciousness is the supremely outstanding and unique quality of the soul in as much as it is not to be found in anything else but soul.

(v) *Kramopādhi nirapeksha suddha* etc. —means the consideration of a thing purely
in regard to its noumenal aspect in quite disregard of the changes and variations it undergoes by the virtue of its own \textit{karma}. From this point of view all living beings are, spiritually speaking, pure souls constitutionally free from all taint or blemishes.

(vi) \textit{Utpāda vyaya gounatve sattā grāhaka suddha} etc.—takes into consideration the persisting element of a thing. A thing undergoes a variety of changes. Ice melts down into water; water evaporates up into vapour. Nevertheless, we know that in spite of all these changes, nothing is lost. Whatever form it may take, still the substance maintains itself through and through. Thus all through these transformations there is an element which persists, and it is this persisting reality which forms the subject matter of the present form of enquiry.

(vii) \textit{Bheda kalpanā nirapeksa}—treats substance as non-different from its qualities and variations in and through which it manifests itself.

(viii) \textit{Kramopādhi sāpeksha asudha}—means taking the thing into consideration
under the immediately present external mode of its appearance as in the case of taking a redhot piece iron for fire itself; or taking a man to be insane for the temporary fit of insanity he has displayed for the moment.

(ix) Utpāda vyāya sāpeksha satā grhāka asuddha—implies taking a thing in its tripartite aspects of origination, destruction and permanence at one and the same time; as in the case of casting a gold necklace into the mould of a bracelet, the substance remaining the same substance all through the time, involving, as it does, in it the idea of the origination of the bracelet from the destruction of the necklace, gold remaining essentially the same all through.

Bheda kalpanā sāpeksha asuddha—is the consideration of the thing after resolving it through the processes of mental abstraction into substance and quality, though the two are really non-different and inseparable from each other: for instance, consciousness is the essential quality of the soul; but we often draw a line of distinction between consciousness and soul in our ordinary
parlance when we say, "the soul's consciousness," or "consciousness of the soul", though soul is non-different from consciousness or the latter from the former.

ON PARYAYAS.

Before we come to the discussion of the second class of Naya known as the Paryāyārthika, it is imperative that we must have a clear understanding of what we mean by a paryāya.

A paryāya is but a mood or state of being. Or whatever has origin and end or destruction in time is paryāya. The ripples in waters or the surging waves ruffling the vast expanse of the ocean are but typical illustrations of what is really meant by paryāya.

Such being the nature of Paryāyas, they are but phenomena or appearances and as such they must be appearances of something with which they stand in certain relations. Following up the character of these relations, the Jain sages have classified paryāyas primarily into (i) Sahabhāvi and (ii) Krama-bhābi.
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THE JAIN LOGIC AND THE NAYAS.

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Of these two kinds of paryayya, the first, Sahabhavi refers to the quality which is co-existent with what it reveals; as for example, consciousness (विष्णु) is the Sahabhabi paryayya which is co-existent with soul, and the second, Kramabhabi stands for the paryayya proper. Kramabhavi paryayas may be described as contingent in the sense that their presence depends on the variable circumstances so that they may differ in the same thing at different times just as happiness and misery or joy and grief which are not co-existent with the mind like consciousness but are moods which depend on the environment, the mind finds itself placed in by the virtue of its own karma.

It is also interesting to note, by the way, how the Jain philosophers have otherwise classified paryayyas as in the following:—

(a) Svabhava dravya vyajjana paryayya—means substantive variation in the ultimate constitution (चर्म शरीर) which a thing undergoes in the course of its adaptation to the environment as we find in the cases of siddha souls whose nature differ only
slightly from the ultimate and real nature of the soul which is essentially free and full of bliss.

(b) *Svabhāva guna vyānjana paryāya*—means variations in the natural quality of a thing as we find in the case of the finitude of vision and imperfection of the embodied soul whose real and essential quality consists in the infinitude of vision and perfection which become manifest of themselves in the pure and disembodied state of being on the attainment of Freedom.

(c) *Bibhāva dravya vyānjana paryāya*—is an accidental variation in the general constitution of a substance as is observed in the soul's transmigrations through various kinds of organic beings.

(d) *Bibhāva guna vyānjana paryāya*—means an accidental variation in the form of knowledge which is but a quality of soul, as in the case of *matijñāna* and the like as distinguished from the immediate intuitive knowledge possible to the *kevalins* only.

The above is but a kind of classification of *paryāyas* as applied to living beings. But the Jain philosophers hold that the same classi-
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fication is also applicable with equal logic to the inorganic world of *pudgal*-matter.

(a) Indivisible atoms or electrons are examples of the first kind of classifications as applied in the non-living world.

(b) Each kind of colour, smell, taste and two non-conflicting sensations of touch are but instances of the second class of variation in the non-living.

(c) The binary and tertiary compounds of the *pudgal*-matter are illustrations of the third kind of variation.

(d) Chemical compounds stand for the fourth.

In fine, it is also to be noted that *Unity* (एकता) and *Variety* (प्रक्तत्व) are but *modes* of appearance—*Paryāya*. *Unity* is complete *Identity* and *Variety* consists in *Differences* of feature. Combination (संयोग), Configuration (संख्यान), Division (विभाग), Number (संख्या). Newness and Oldness under the influence of time are but other characteristic indications of *paryāya* or phenomenon. For it is said,—

एगच्छच च पहुँचते च संख्या सांठश्चिमनब्र ।
विभागो य विभागो य एवायायां तु लुक्कयाम ॥

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SUBSTANCE AND QUALITY.

From the above classification of Paryaynas into Sahabhâvi and Kramabhâvi, we are constrained to discuss, in brief, qualities and attributes as distinguished from substances. For without having made our ideas and notions about quality and substance pretty clear, it would be difficult for us to understand and appreciate the utility and importance of Naya as applied in the study of the phenomenology of thought and being.

Substance, as we have seen, is what has some degree of independent existence of its own, preserving itself as it does by reacting on and resisting other things. This power of self-preservation constitutes the essence or reality (व्यत्ता) of the thing and manifests itself in the different effects which it produces by re-acting on other things. And the powers of re-action which thus manifest themselves in producing effects in other things are known as qualities or properties of the thing and are represented in terms of the effects they produce. To illustrate, when a thing has the powers of occasioning in us
the sensations of colour, taste, smell, weight, we say that it has the qualities of colour, smell etc., for which reason qualities are understood to be inherent in or to constitute the nature of the thing in as much as they are but different ways in which the self-preservative power which is the real essence of the thing manifests itself outwardly.

But qualities of things appear to us as being of two kinds, so different that one may be described as essential and the other as non-essential. For, some of the qualities which perception reveals appear to constitute the very essence of things—qualities without which there cannot be any conception whatsoever of things as extra-mental realities and these are called generic (सामान्य) qualities which are common to all things and beings.

The Jain sages hold that the generic qualities without which a thing becomes wholly inconcivable to us are ten in number viz;—

(1) Entity (स्तित्व)—which may be described as having the characteristics of
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reality (सत्ता) and permanence (प्राव) in and through the principle of which it manifests itself as the ground for the phenomena of both the Universal (सामान्य) and Particular (विशेष).

(2) Thinghood (वस्तु)—may be described as the property revealed in and through the relations of the universal and particular in which objects subsist (सामान्य विशेषात्मक वस्तु).

(3) Substantiality (द्रव्यता)—means the power of self-preservation constituting the essence or reality (सत्ता) which is characteristic indication of Dravya.

(4) Knowability (प्रभेदयता)—may be described as the capacity of being known or measured by the means of Valid-knowledge.

(5) Subtlety (भगुरुल्लक्ष्यता)—may be described as the capacity of being in the state of irreducible minimum with a maximum intensity (of vibration) defying thought and speech.

(6) Extension (प्रेगत्ता)—may be described as the property of occupying space.

(7) Sensibility (चेतनता)—may be described as the capacity of responding to stimuli.

(8) Insensibility (पचेतनता)—may be described as the property incapable of giving any response to a stimulus.
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(9) Ponderableness (सूचेल) — may be described as the quality of existing in some form or other.

(10) Imponderableness (भभूचेल) — may be described as the power of existing without having any particular form.

These are, then, the ten generic qualities of things or substances in general.

But there are certain other qualities which do not appear to constitute either the essence of or common to all things. Because the things may have them or be without them and yet remain essentially the same in kind for which reason these are understood to be but modifications of our consciousness and are termed as specific qualities.

(i) Consciousness (शान), (ii) Vision (दर्शन), (iii) Pleasure (सुख), (iv) Vigour (विष्णु), (v) Touch (क्षत्र), (vi) Taste (रस), (vii) Smell (गन्ध), (viii) Colour (वणा), (ix) Mobility (गतिहितूल), (x) Inertia (खिति हितुल), (xi) Volumeness (व्यगाचनहितुल), (xii) Becomingness (वर्त्तनहितुल), (xiii) Sensibility (चेतनल), (xiv) Insensibility (चचेतनल), (xv) Ponderableness (सूचेल), (xvi) Imponderableness (भभूचेल). Of these
sixteen specific properties, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 13th, and the 16th belong to the Jiva-soul; the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 14th and the 15th belong the Pudgal-atoms; the 9th, 14th and the 16th belong to the Dharmastikâya; the 10th, 14th and the 16th belong to Adharmâstiksâya; the 11th, 14th and 16th to the Akâsh and finally the 12th, 14th and the 16th to Kâla.

II. THE PHENOMENAL NAYA.

Having seen what is implied by a paryâya, it would be easy now to comprehend the process of analytical enquiry into paryâyas or Phenomena which form the subject-matter of the Paryâyarthika or Phenomenal Naya. Of these nayâs the first is,—

(a) Anâdi nitya saddha &c—is what deals with that kind of Poudgalic variations, the series of which remaining unbroken from time without beginning puts on, in consequence, the appearance of permanence, inspite of the ravages of time upon the same. As for example, the Himalayas, though time has wrought havoc on the same, yet the high mountain ranges appear ever the same from time immemorial.
(b) *Sadī nitya suddhaparyārthika &c.*—has for its subject such particular class of variations as have origination in time but undergoes no subsequent transformation: as for instance, when the embodied soul enters on a liberated state of existence, it attains to a state of variation which has, as a matter of fact, a beginning in time but knows no subsequent change; because a soul once liberated cannot enter into any bondage again.

(c) *Sattā gounatvena utpāda vyaya grāhaka nitya suddha &c.*—enquires into that kind of variations which flow in rapid successions of destruction and origination consisting as it does in the ever-changing character of the phenomena without looking into its permanent feature underlying the same.

(d) *Sattā sāpeksha nitya asuddha*—not only investigates into the origination and distraction of variations but takes also into consideration the persisting element underlying them as well. The word *paryāya*—variation—usually means variations in quality, modality and configuration, a thing undergoes without any reference to the substance itself which persists all through the changes
and which on that account is generally left out of consideration. But here, as the persisting element is taken into consideration along with the changes in its appearances, it is called asuddha i.e. improper.

(e) Kramopādhi nīrāpeksha nitya suddha etc.—deals with regard only to the essential and real nature of the noumenon irrespective of the phenomenal variations it undergoes. It consists in looking into things with reference to its real nature as apart from the temporal variations which the thing might happen to undergo.

(f) Kramopādhi sāpeksha anitya asuddha &c.—is an enquiry into the temporal and perishable aspect of variations in so far only as they are subject to causality of karma.

THE SEVEN NAYAS.

It is now clear how the two nayās, Nōmenal and Phenomenal, differ from each other. The one enquires into the very substance of a thing under consideration and the other investigates into the phenomena in and through which the substance makes its appearance to us.
A Naya, as we have seen, is the stand-point of the knower. A thing can be viewed from different stand-points. And the Jain sages are of opinion that there are as many moods of statements, so many are the nayás or view-points of the knower and there are as many nayás, so many are the number of doctrines. The Jain philosophers have thought it wise, therefore, to classify these view-points into seven kinds of which the first is,—

(i) Naigam—is the stand-point whence the knower takes the most general view of the thing under consideration without drawing any hard and fast line of distinction between the generic (मामाव्य) qualities and the specific (विशेष) qualities of the thing. To amplify the import, when by the word mangoe, we understand not only certain properties which specifically belong to that fruit only, but we understand as well the other qualities or properties which the mangoe has in common with fruits in general. The Nāya and the Vaisēshika schools of the east and the Realists of the west survey things from this Naigam stand-point.
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(2) Sangraha—is the stand-point from which only the generic qualities are taken into account. And though these are generally accompanied by specific qualities, yet the enquiry from this stand-point keeps in view the generic qualities only. As for instance, when by the term man, we understand not the human kind only but the whole range animal world. The Sāṅkhya and the Advaita schools explain things from this point of view.

(3) Vyāvahāra—is knowing things by the cash value. It is the pragmatical point of view from which only the specific qualities of a thing are taken into consideration without any reference to their generic qualities, independent of which the former cannot stand. It consists in taking cognizance of things only in their such effects as are most prominent, acute and hence pretty well-known. Thus by Vyāvahāra naya we know things only as they affect and appear to us. The Chārvākas of the east and the Positivists and the Pragmatists of the west speak from this point of view. They both measure things by their Cash Value.
(4) **Riju Sutra**—is the position taken to look straight into the thing as it is. It is important to note here that Riju-sutra does not refer to the past or future of the thing. It concerns itself only with the present state of things and affairs. As when we know a thing, we mean thereby to know it only with reference to its present substantive state (तथ्य), name (नाम), and form (or image—खापन) without concerning ourselves as to how came it to be as such or what will it be afterwards, holding these equiries to be but wild goose chase. The Buddhists of the east and Subjective Idealists of the west take this as their stand-point.

(5) **Sabda**—is the terminological stand-point whence the knower is in a position to recognise a thing simply by hearing the name of the same, though the etymological significance of the name might be in reference to something other than the thing referred to by the terminology used. For instance, Jīva, Atma, Soul, and Prani are synonymous terms and though these differ from one another in their etymological bearings, yet they all refer
to the one and the same thing conventionally. Certain Conventionalists of the grammarian school in the east and the Empiricist of the west hold their own from this stand-point.

(6) Sanbiruddha—is the position from which one is able to draw a hard and fast line of distinction between the words of synonymous character and to follow up the line of enquiry in strict conformity with the nicety of distinction thus drawn. The Sabda-vādi philosophers of the east who propound the doctrine of eternal relation (नित्य सम्बन्ध) between words and their objects and the Objective Idealists of the west study from this stand-point.

(7) Evambhuta—is the viewpoint of the knower from which one is able to designate a thing in strict conformity with the nature and quality as displayed by the thing to be designated; as in the case of calling a man by the name of 'Victor' for having qualified himself as such by conquering his enemies. The grammarians in general hold this point of view.
These are the seven famous Nayas or metaphysical view-points of looking into the nature of things. Of these, the first three, Naigam, Samgraha and Vyāvahāra have for their subject-matter dravya or substance, and the remaining four beginning with Riju-sutra have for their subject-matter Paryāyas—Phenomena. It is important to note here that like quality (गुण), mood (स्वभाव) also comes within the perview of Paryāya with this difference only that while quality inheres in substance, mood (स्वभाव) inheres in both,—substance and quality.

With Nayavāda ends the second part the Jain Logic, the Logic of Consistency being the first part.
CHAPTER VIII.
THE DOCTRINE OF SYADVAD.

Defects of the Realistic Method of Inquiry—Saptabhangi supersedes the Realistic. It is a better Organon of Knowledge—It leads to the higher Knowledge—Anekantavad and Idealism—True Glimpse of Concrete Reality—Unity and Multiplicity—Correlativity as Essential to Unity—Dialectical Vision of things as Expression of a Unity.

Preliminary.—A little reflection on what has been discussed in the foregoing sections of Nava will make it pretty clear that our ordinary thinking consists, for the most part, of generalised images or conceptions derived from the phenomenal world and so charged more or less with the inherent characteristics of their sensuous origin. Now if we carefully analyse this form of thought, it will be seen that it labours under three serious defects. First, we cannot get rid of the material or sensuous origin which consequently tend to betray the mind into illusion and error; secondly, it must fail to give the real or organic connection, to be explained hereafter, and unity to objects which it deals
with; thirdly, it is incapable of solving contradiction, or reconciling the seemingly antagonistic elements which, on close examination, all thought is found to contain.

Now when these drawbacks of the ordinary or naïve realistic method of reviewing the world are perceived and realised, men must supplement it with a newer mode of cognition in order to look upon the world in a more rationalised and synthesised way and apprehend the spiritual entities in their ideal form and which in turn gives rise to the famous Anekānta forms of cognition. This is the case everywhere and always; for philosophic speculation develops most when men, not content with the facts of experience, strive to get hold of their reasons and ultimately into their unconditioned reason i.e. their rationality or necessity. Thus we find that the ordinary way of looking at the Universe and its objects, or to term it better, as the naïve realistic method, falls far short of the standard and is quite inadequate for the apprehension of that kind of Unity which belongs to spiritual things. For the method which regards everything as self-identical,
self-subsisting individual realities, cannot by the very nature of it, take cognizance of that kind of Unity, which exists not in things juxtaposed or following in succession, but in elements which internally involve and contain one another, so that no element can be known fully in abstraction or isolation from the rest. The apprehension of such a truth then presupposes a deeper and sounder organ of knowledge, a subtler speculation, a deeper insight, a true penetration into the very heart of things. This being attained everything seems to be, though apparently divergent and often conflicting, yet bound with one tie,—an expression of one underlying principle contributing to the substantiveness of all thought and being. And this is exactly what Saptabhangi rules try to explain.

Hence it is obvious that the knowledge which Saptabhangi leads to, must be the highest ideal of knowledge—a knowledge from which the above mentioned defects have vanished altogether and in which the ideal element is grasped in its purity and entirety, in its coherence and harmony. It is the only adequate form
of knowledge so far as we are concerned; because it has the characteristics of necessity i.e. the constituent elements of it are apprehended, not as isolated or independant terms or notions but as related to or flowing out of each other so that one being given, the others must necessarily follow and the whole body of knowledge constitutes one organised system.

A penetrating insight into things will make us sure of this existing unity among the factors of the world. To the unreflective observer, the objects present themselves as separate individual realities quite simple in character. But this is not the case, for they are essentially complex. They are made up of parts which lie outside of one another in space; they do not remain absolutely the same through successive movements of time. They are continually betraying the phenomenal changes when brought into relation with other existences around them. How, then, can we think of them as individual things inspite of the changes? The answer often unhesitatingly forwarded by philosophers is that we can combine diversity with
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unity in our conception of things by thinking them as individual entities each endowed with manifold qualities. They are substances according to philosophers, which possess various properties such as extension, solidity, weight, colour etc. Or they are substances or subjects to whom belong the capacities of sensation, feeling, and perception etc. But a careful observation will show that such a device obviously fails to give us any real apprehension of existence—even though it may be the simplest individual existence; because in trying to give unity to a number of unconnected determinations by ascribing them to a common substance what we really do is to add to these determinations another determination, equally isolated and unconnected with the rest. Take away the other determinations what will be left of your substance? It is impossible to explain the known by the unknown. So to apprehend the real unity of different qualities or to put in other words, to think them as one, what mind demands is, that we should think or have a rational notion of the relation of each to each and that we should discern how the
existence of anyone involves the existence of all the rest and how all are so connected that this particular quality would not exist except in and through the whole to which it belongs. To catch hold of such substance and not *substratum* as Locke had meant, we must discern the principle from which this manifoldness of parts and properties necessarily arises and which has its very existence and being in them and linking together in thought the differences which spring out of it. Such unity of substance is really a *unity in difference* which manifests itself and realises in these differences.

In the realm of mind or in the spiritual life of conscious beings also, there are undoubtedly infinite multiplicity and diversity, but we must not overlook the fact that it is a multiplicity or diversity which is no longer of parts divided from each other but each of which exists and can be conceived of by itself in isolation or segregation from the rest or in purely external relations to them. Here on the contrary, the multiplicity or diversity is that of parts or elements, each of which exists in and through the rest and has its individual
being and significance only in its relation to the rest or each of which can be known only when it is seen, in a sense, to be the rest. You can not, for example, take the combination of two externally independent things in space and employ it as a representation of the relation of mind and its objects, for though thought be distinguishable from the object, it is not divisible from it. The thinker and the object thought of are nothing apart from each other. They are twain and yet one. The object is only object for the subject, the subject for the object. They have no meaning or existence taken individually and in their union they are not two separate things stuck together but two that have lost or dissolved their duality in a higher unity.

Now it is this characteristic of things which renders impossible the correct apprehension of them by ordinary mode of cognition; because they are only to be grasped in a thought which embraces and solves contradictory elements. The ordinary or realistic way of looking at things can express and take cognizance of the nature of those things which are subject to the conditions
of time and space and regards the world as made up of individual existences, each of which has a nature of its own, self-identical or self-complete.

But when we rise to a higher spiritual vision of things, when it becomes necessary to apprehend objects which are no longer self-identical units, but each of which is, so to speak, at once itself and other than itself, when we cannot affirm without at the same time denying or deny without affirming; thus when the seeming contradictions interpenetrate and give reality and life to each other, the resources of ordinary thought fall short of the requirement and we are to take recourse to the other mode of cognition which is more synthetical and harmonizing. For if the sphere of reality be that in which nothing exists as a self-identical entity, how is it possible that formal logic or realistic method whose fundamental principle is the law of identity should be other than baffled in the endeavour to grasp them?

The only device of the rationalising intellect which comes uppermost in the mind at first sight, for attaining unity is that of
abstraction or properly called substantialising the abstraction which proceeds by elimination rather than by the harmonizing of differences. In philosophy, for instance, it gets hold of one of the indivisible elements and rejects the other equally necessary and important element and thus gives rise to all sorts of confusion and controversy hitherto known. Either it tries to evolve dogmatically all things out of the objective element and so produces a system of materialism or sensationalism (which is its own condemnation) or insisting with one-sidedness, the subjective element, and thus gives rise to pseudo-idealism—a view which hardly can be cherished without giving up the most certain convictions of the mind.

The next question which comes uppermost in the mind is; how thought can be capable of grasping the reality in its true essence in such wise that all its constituent elements shall be seen not as isolated notions but as correlated members of an organic whole. In reply to the above, we may safely say that it can rise to a universality which is not foreign to, but the very inward nature of
things in themselves and not the universal of an abstraction from the particular and different elements but the unity which finds in them its own necessary expression; not an invention of an arbitrary mind unifying things which are essentially different but an idea which expresses the inner dialectic which exists in and constitutes the being of the objects themselves. This deeper unity, we may designate as ideal or true unity or organic Universality. This Universality or Unity is presupposed by the divergent elements through which it manifests itself as the different limbs and function of an organism are mere expressions of a living unity of the organism which we may call "life"—Jīva (जीव). They are its manifestations. Unity of life manifests itself in them and fulfils itself in their diversity and harmony; consequently any limb of the organism loses its significance for which it stands when it is severed from the organism—the expression of the living unity of life.

So in order to apprehend this unity and universality through your thought of what it is you must inseparably connect
that also with what is not. They are mere correlations. The thesis does not exist in and by itself but on the contrary in and through what is other than itself. In other words it can exist only as it denies or gives up any separate self-identical being and life, only as it finds its life in the larger life and being of the whole. Its true being is in ceasing to be and its true notion includes affirmation of its existence as well as denial of its existence. But this is not all. It involves the idea of growth or development; because denial is the life of reality. A thing stagnant altogether, not subject to changes, is no better than non-entity. Mere being in the sense of bare existence whose modifications are stagnant and not subject to phenomenal changes is a mere zero. "Pure Being" as Dr. Ward puts it "is equal to Nothing." Being to be real in any sense of the term must be becoming or changing. Its ideal nature, therefore, must be synthetical comprehending and explaining all contradictory tendencies—the sharp antithesis merging in the wide universality of the
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synthesis. But this notion of universality in particulars cannot be apprehended in this light unless we interpret it as a process involving perpetual affirmation and perpetual negation reconciled in continual re-affirmations.

This would appear quite obvious if we view the problem from another light which will clearly reveal the unity of the univese which permeates through every object in it. The world is a complicate system including innumerable factors of manifold character working in it for a certain goal. Whether this goal would be attained at all at any point of time in future is not our present consideration and should not, therefore, occupy our thought. So much is certain that the world is a system of factors co-operating for the same end. Now every factor, therefore, must be determined by all the rest in such a way that without any of them, the world-end can hardly be realised. Having this in view all philosophers of every clime and age have pronounced unanimously that every thing which is real is rational i.e. having reason behind it and this is what we
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have spoken of before. Things being so reciprocally determined what follows obviously is that every factor is real so long it stands in relation and co-operates with other factors. In fact, we may go so far as to say that in the co-operation and the mutual determination, the life of the factor consists. In fact, it owes it reality, individuality and being to this relation with other factors standing and working for the common end. Or as Lotze rightly remarks "To be is to stand in relations." Any change in the relation of any factor of the world, would then, it is quite apparent, involve a change in all the rest; because of their mutual determination and correlativity. So nothing can be truly apprehended unless we take it in the light of not only what it is but also what it is not; because this not-ness of the factors imparts individuality and reality to what it is. True being, it appears less paradoxical to assert, consists in self abnegation or denial of one's individuality, for where lies its individuality, its self-sufficiency, if it depends for its existence upon other realities co-operating for the
same end and to which it owes its existence and life? So true apprehension can only be possible if we take it in the light of not what it is only; but also what it is not as well. But this may appear paradoxical to an untrained mind because it obviously transgresses the law of contradiction. The most firm convictions which we have cherished from our cradles without the least hesitation, are backed up and supported also by the vigorous rules and canons of formal logic whose fundamental principle, as we have seen before, is the law of identity and contradiction that A is A cannot be not A. But now we come to a new vision of things in which A appears to be not merely A but not A as well; because A is real in so far it stands in relation with what is not A. The true life of A would then consist not only in A as formal logic teaches us but also in not A. The ideal nature of a thing consists, therefore, not only in assertion of its being but also at the same time in the denial of it—in that which comprehends those antagonistic elements and yet harmonises and explains them. So if there be any knowledge in the
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proper sense of the term, if there be any vision we may call spiritual and far from being naive realistic, it is undoubtedly this notion of ours in which all antagonistic and contradictory elements are reconciled and find repose in a higher universality which includes them all and yet is not aggregate of them, which explains all and yet does not merge in them. This is what the Syadvad or the Doctrine of the Assertion of Possibilities explains and emphasises.

SAPTABHANGI FORMS.

With these preliminary remarks we come straight to our subject-matter or to be more definite to the Saptabhangi or the Heptagonie forms of our ontological enquiry. We have mentioned before that Saptabhangi is the method which supersedes all other methods of cognition in matters of apprehension of the spiritual realities by virtue of its universal and synthetic character of vision. Now we shall try to explain how by the help of this heptagonie vision, Saptabhangi Naya we get, as it were, into the real coherence and harmony which permeate through the world

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revealing themselves through a system of interrelated parts.

FORM I.

"स्त्रादश्चेत्त स्त्रम्यिति सदंग कल्पणा विभजनने प्रथमोभिः" as for example—स्त्राद्व चस्त्रेव घट्: i.e.
May be, partly or in a certain sense the jar exists.

Although this form is applicable to every thing or being in affirming its existence still the ghata, the jar, is only here taken into consideration as a concrete instance for the illustration of this heptagonal principle. This is no more than affirming the existence of the jar as such and none can ordinarily deny the existence of it when clearly perceived. So this affirmation relative to the existence of the jar as such presupposes an anterior perception of the object. It may be contended, indeed, that we often rely upon the words of others and do not perceive things directly. But if we dive deep into the question, we find that everything, the existence of which we either affirm or deny, is in relation to some particular thought or perception having a finitude of expression—a fact so emphasised by the ontological argument.
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Thus we find that we can affirm the existence of the jar only when we have previously perceived it and the formation of the percept presupposes, as a careful psychological analysis reveals, comprehension of the thing in respect of the four particularising elements viz., substance dravya (द्रव्य), duration kāla (काल), locality kshetra (क्षेत्र) and attributes bhāva (भाव). There is no percept which does not involve, as we have elsewhere seen before, these elements, and unless a percept is formed we cannot be conscious of the thing at all. So the understanding of every object involves, comprehension of the object in these four aspects. We may go so far as to say that these four elements or aspects so interrelated as in this case of the jar go together to make up the identity of the jar as such. Take away or change one of these elements and the jar loses its identity. From these facts we may safely state that the identity of the jar is kept up and reveals itself through these four elements which stand mutually into peculiar relationship to one another.
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So long these four elements exist in this particular combination, the jar is said to exist there as such.

We may arrive at the same conclusion in another way. We know that there is a distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal aspects of a thing. Phenomenal aspect is that in which a thing presents itself to us or as it appears to us. Clearly then it follows that we are conscious of an object only as it appears to us. But a deeper reflection reveal to us that what we know of the thing is only knowledge of its powers and properties. What is an orange to us except a peculiar combination of different qualities viz. size, shape, colour, taste etc. These peculiar qualities in such particular combination as is found in an orange constitute what we call the knowledge of it. Of course it may be objected that these qualities cannot exist by themselves and so require a ground for their inference; so that these qualities themselves cannot make up the orange itself. But we are far from denying this as we hold the view that all that we know of the thing is merely its
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qualities or attributes which exist in such peculiar combination. What the thing or substance is apart from these modes or modifications, we don't know except this that it is a principle which manifests itself in and through these attributes linking them together and constituting what we call the knowledge of the object. Therefore we may well say that so long these qualities are intact and exist in such peculiar and particular combination the object is there.

FORM II.

स्त्राज्ञाता सम्बंधित पर्यं दास कल्पणा विभ्रमजनीन हि:तोभ प्रजः — as श्यात नास्ते ग्रंथ: i.e. May be, partly or in a certain sense the jar does not exist.

In the previous form we have taken the jar as a self-subsisting, self-complete reality as if subsisting in and by itself and possessing different attributes which go together in making up the knowledge of the object. We thought of the jar as an individual independent object as it were amidst innumerable objects of the same kind in the neighbourhood. In short, we took it in the light of a self-identical unit. But this is only a
partial and dogmatic view of the reality as it overlooks one important truth viz., the world is a system of interrelated parts in which nothing is so self-identical, self-complete as we suppose the jar to be. Every thing which is, exists only in relation to and distinction from something else. The jar exists there, not alone as a self-complete reality but exists in relation to and distinction from what is not-jar. In fact, the existence of the jar as a self-complete unity is possible only because it differentiates from what is not-jar. If, on the other hand, it looses its distinction and merges in the rest that is not-jar, then how can it present its own self-subsisting and identical character. We may, therefore, well state that because it keeps itself in distinction from what is not-jar, and yet bears at the same time essential relation to it as the principle of mutual reciprocity postulates that it can lead a life of self-completeness, self-identity. But this self-completeness cannot obviously be absolute in character simply for the reason that it has to depend for its existence upon other things from which it rigidly distinguishes itself and yet stands.
as well in essential and vital relationship. To be more clear and precise, we may say that the true life of a being consists in self-abnegation or in ceasing to be. So if in a sense we emphasise the fact that the jar is a self-complete reality amidst various factors of the world possessing numerous attributes to act and react with, we can also with equal logic and emphasis state that it does not exist in the above sense; because for its existence, it has to depend upon what is not-jar to which it must oppose itself to preserve its so-called self-subsisting aspect. Thus to sum up, we may say, the jar is a jar only in contradistinction with what is not-jar, expressing a vital relationship between the positive and negative character of it co-existing simultaneously in the same stroke of cognition of the thing in question and making way thereby for the third form which is as follows.

FORM III.

The Third Form—Some how the thing exists and does not exist as well.
the jar exist as well as in a sense it does not exist.

We may explain this from two different stand points. We will arrive at the same conclusion if we proceed from the world showing it to be a system in which everything is determined by everything else in such a way that nothing is self-identical and self-complete in the sense in which the untrained mind takes it to be. Everything being determined by other things in this system of reals, the doctrine of pluralism propagating the view of self-sufficiency of objects falls to the ground as we have discussed at length in the preliminary remarks as well as in the Form II.

Besides, we may explain the above otherwise which will, we believe, throw sufficient light on the close relationship which exists between the self and the not-self or between mind and matter. We must of course bear in mind on this occasion that though these forms apparently deal with concrete instances such as the jar, still they are no less applicable to every thing and being which this universe contains. So
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it would be convenient for us if, instead of dealing with concrete instances, we proceed and manipulate the subject in its generic aspect. In fact we will try to show that instead of 'saying the jar is and is not,' we may say more generally that in a sense matter exists and does not exist at the same time. Of course it is necessary first of all to clear up our position and to defend our cause and vindicate our themes by defining the relationship as graphically as possible which exists between self and not-self or between mind and matter.

But before stating the exact relation between them let us try to depict as clearly as possible the view cherished by the common people regarding it.

To the untrained intellect, things are before us,—rather matter and material objects exist apart in themselves just as we perceive them—as a world of realities independent of any mind to perceive them; on the other hand we, who perceive the world are here in our complete and independent existence. In short, matter is matter and mind is mind and there exists neither any
similarity nor anything commensurate between them.

Many attempts have been made to define the exact relationship. Some have uncritically asserted the hard and fast opposition between them giving rise to absolute dualism like the Śāmkhya materialist; others have again tried to solve the problem at a stroke as it were by explaining away one or the other term giving rise to materialism of the Chārvāka School or Subjective idealism of the Buddhist School. As materialism ultimately fails to evolve this world and all thought out of matter or material forces, so subjective idealism fails in showing that the whole objective world is but a phantasm of the heated brain. We won't speak of the rigid dualistic theory as it obviously fails to explain knowledge owing to its own inherent inconsistency of thought as revealed in its presupposition that the constituent elements of knowledge stand in hard opposition and cannot be reconciled. Now if we try to account for this failure in solving the problem of mind and matter, we will find no doubt that its main cause lies in
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the false presupposition that nature and mind, the world without and the world within, constitute two fixed independent realities, each by itself complete in its own self-included being.

The real solution however of the problem in question lies not in the assertion of self-individuality and self-sufficiency of objects constituting the external world, but in the surrender of this false identity and substantiality for that principle of organic unity which we have discussed at length and explained before in the preliminary remarks. Beginning with the rigid isolated existences separated by the impassable gulf of self-identity, no theory or doctrine can ever force them into a rational coherence or consistency. But when we begin to see in nature without and mind within not two independent things, one existing in isolation from the other, but two members of one organic whole having indeed each a being of its own, but a being which implies and finds itself in the living relation to the other, then and then only can we bring such two factors into a rational coherence. Nature in
its very essence is related to the mind and mind in its very essence is related to matter. For what is matter, if it is not matter in relation to thought, and what is mind if it cannot enter into relation with matter? We cannot obviously think of any matter which by its very nature cannot enter into relation with thought; because it involves a contradiction of thought. Again we cannot think of mind which is not capable of thinking about something, because in it, its essence lies. So from this standpoint whatever is, is not as a self-complete reality existing in and by itself, but as being determined by something else. So the true view of anything would be not only its being but also of its non-being to which it owes its reality and individuality. In short it is by virtue of this self-abnegation that any being can be real or can exist as such. So the true point or view of the right vision or understanding of any object would include not only a view of things in their positive aspect or in their aspect of thesis but also a view of what they are not or the aspect of antithesis, which again
ultimately lose their hard opposition in the view of things which are necessarily related and so containing and involving one another,—in short, in the view of the world as a system of reals mutually determining and co-operating for the same end.

FORM IV.

May be, partly or in a certain sense, the jar is indescribable.

There is no doubt that in a certain sense it is impossible to describe the jar. The indescribable nature of the thing is here referred to. Of course, we do not mean here that any object is absolutely indescribable, but that we cannot describe what it is and what it is not at one and the same moment. The necessity for this way of speaking is that the two natures—positive and negative—what it is and what it is not,—exist in the same thing at one and the same time. We have seen before that in a certain sense or to be more definite, while putting stress upon the positive aspect of an object as in the Form

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I., we may say that it is; while again emphasising with equal one-sidedness, on the negative aspect of the same as in Form II., we may well say as well that it is not. But a critical examination will reveal to us that both the positive and negative aspects exist in the same object simultaneously, although we cannot describe them in one moment.

Here we think it is worthy of note that only our incapacity for describing at one and the same moment both the seemingly antagonistic natures existing simultaneously is only referred to. We need not imagine, however, that our thought cannot apprehend them at one moment. On the other hand, it is thought only that by virtue of self-consciousness can transcend this duality of aspects existing in the same thing. Even, we may go so far as to say that the positive aspect, namely, what it is, can scarcely be known without the knowledge of the negative aspect namely, what it is not and vice versa. Either is known simultaneously in and through the other. We cannot question about the relative priority of the process of assimilation.
or discrimination; because none of them is possible without the other. Thus, although it is quite obvious that we can take cognizance of both these aspects—positive as well as negative—in the same stroke of cognition, yet we cannot describe this fact of experience at one moment. With this view in mind, it is held that the true nature of a thing is indescribable.

FORM V.

The Fifth Form—takes into consideration the existence and indescribable nature both at once.

The fifth way is to say what the thing is, the thing being indescribable in one moment. Although here we assert the inexpressibility at one and the same moment of what the thing is and what it is not, yet what it is i.e. its existence is taken into consideration. We have seen in the Form I., that in a certain sense, a thing may be said to exist. Of course we should bear in mind that we do not take it in the absolute
sense; because we deny the self-identical and self-complete nature of anything. In asserting existence of anything what we mean, on the other hand, is that it exists only so long it has a particular substance (त्रय), a particular locality (चेत्र), a particular period (काल), and a particular attribute (भाव) in their particular combination. So long these four elements are present in their particular combination, any object to which these elements belong may be safely said to exist. In short, the perception of these four elements in any object is quite sufficient to convince us of its relative existence—an existence illusively thought of as absolute or self-complete by the realists or the commonsense philosophers. This we have discussed at length in the Form I. So, although in the Form V, we have emphasised on the indescribable nature of any thing, Judging it from the standpoint from which all the seemingly antagonistic elements namely, positive and negative aspects of a thing (c.f. Form III.), resolve themselves into a higher concrete reality without losing their respective distinctions, yet from the practical point of view
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we may over-estimate the positive aspect only and assert its existence, the idea of which is already forced upon us, so to speak, by the undeniable presence of substance, period etc, (त्वयकालादि) inferentially or immediately cognised by the senses. Thus, although we have repeatedly described a thing to involve both the positive and the negative aspects or to put in other words, involve being and non-being as well, yet it would not be a contradiction of thought or language, if we contend being as essential, and say it exists, because we look at it now from a standpoint which is relatively much lower than the former and from which we lose sight altogether of another important correlative aspect namely, what it is not.

FORM VI.

स्त्रास्त्राव स्यादवत्ततिवित निषिद्धग्राघ्येन युग पतिविषव विधानिनिहं न यक्षाविभाजनया दशैं भाष्कः as स्त्रात्राय त्वादावजनय। May be, partly or in certain sense the jar is not and indescribable in a certain sense as well.

We have described what the thing is not, being unable to describe at one and the same moment what it is and what it
is not. As in the previous form, we have described what it is: so in this form we describe what it is not without losing sight of the indescribable nature of the thing owing to our incapacity to give expression to both the positive and the negative aspects of it at the same moment. In what sense it does not exist, we need not discuss here, because we have done so at length in the Form II., which emphasises on the negative aspect of the thing. We have seen before that we can't say 'a thing exists' as a self-identical unit; because it has to depend upon other factors to maintain its existence and to which it bears relations which are essential for the preservation of its own reality. So in this sense we may equally deny any self-existing character of anything without committing ourselves to any inconsistency in thought or language.

FORM VII.

The Seventh Form—stands as a synthesis of the V and VI Forms.

May be partly or in a certain sense
the jar is and is not and is indescribable as well in a certain sense.

In the seventh form, one speaks of what the thing is and is not and that it is impossible to express both at the same moment. In the Form III, we have seen how the true nature of a thing implies being as well as non-being or positive as well as negative aspects. The only point in which it differs from the third form is this that while agreeing with the former in every respect, it goes further and says that we cannot describe because it involves contradictory elements. This latter point we have discussed at length in the Form II. In this form we get a reconciliation of the fifth and the sixth forms already discussed.
CHAPTER IX.

SHANKAR AND SYADVAD.

Vyasa, and Shankar against the Doctrine of Syadvad.—Impossibility of the co-existence of the contradictory attributes in one—Shankara's summary of the Syadvad and its interpretation—Its critical examination by Shankar—Inconsistencies and fallacies in Syadvad.

The above, in short, is the principle and character of the Saptabhangi Naya, the grand heptangular stronghold of the Jain philosophers. It is from these angles that the Jain philosophers see into the realities of all thought and being. It is from within this heptagonal fortress that they throw off their gauntlets as a challenge to their antagonists to outwit them. Being guarded by the seven trenches of this their logical synthesis, they measure the strength of their adversaries and test the truth and validity of their knowledge and doctrines. Such being the high and prominent position ascribed to the Saptabhangi in the arena of philosophical speculation in quest of truth, many a scholar and philosopher, ancient or modern, have invariably been

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found to cannonade on this heptagonically fortified which has been from time imme-
memorial shielding the whole structure of the Jain philosophy against any attack. Many
have brought in their heavy artileries to damage one or the other angles of this
fortification and force an entrance into the same and many have been baffled in
their attempts and thus become the buttend of all ridicule before the whispering galleries of the Jain philosop-
phers and Omiscient beings. At least such has been the case with the venerable
Krishna Dwaipayan Vyāsa, the compiler of the Vedas, maker of the Brahma
Sutras and the author of the Great Epic, Mahābhārata, who flourished towards the
end of third age.

To come straight however to the point, the venerable old Vyāsa fired his first artillery
“नैकान्तिकसच्चवात्” as the thirty-third canon in the Second Section of the Second Chapter
of his Brahma Sutras. By this he wants us to understand that on account of the impossibility of co-existence of contradictory
attributes as abiding in the same substance,
the doctrine of the Jainas is not to be recognised. In his famous scholium on the
Brahma Sutras, Achârya Shankara, the ablest exponent of the Adwaita Vedânta
philosophy while commenting on the canon referred to, writes:—

The Jainas admit of seven predicaments such as (1) Jîva (2) Ajîva (3) Asrava,
(4) Sambava, (5) Nirjarâ, (6) Bandha, and
(7) Moksha. These seven they admit and
nothing beyond these.

Summarily speaking, the Jîva and
the Ajîva, are the two primary predicaments. The others are included in either
of these two. Besides they admit of
five composites or compounds from the
above two categories and are designated as
"Astitikyas" or composites such as Jivâsti-
kâya, Pudgalâstikâya, Dharmâstikâya,
Adharmâstikâya, and Akâshâstikâya. They
fancy, again, an infinite number of vari-
tions of these 'astikâyas' or composite and
to all and each of these, they apply their
so-called synthetic logic known by the name
of Saptabhangi naya in the following
manner:—
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(1) In a sense it is. (2) In a sense it is not. (3) In a sense it is and it is not.
(4) In a sense it is not predicable. (5) In a sense it is and is not predicable.
(6) In a sense it is not and is not predicable. (7) In a sense it is and is not and is not predicable.

Now this Saptabhangi form of reasoning is also directed to the determination of such notions as, unity, plurality, eternity, identity, difference and the like. In other words following up the principle of Saptabhangi naya, they hold that existence itself is a contradiction; for instance unity is not only unity but also a plurality as well. A thing is not only eternal but otherwise as well and so on.

Having thus summarised the fundamentals of the Jain philosophy, and taking his stand on the above Vyasa Sutra Shankar Swami remarks.

I. It would be contrary to reason to accept the Jain doctrine. Why?—Because of the impossibility of co-existence of contradictory attributes in one. Just as a thing cannot be hot and cold simultaneously, so...
being (प्रजित्व) and non-being (नाजित्व) cannot, at the same time, belong to one thing.

II. And to speak of the seven predicaments which have been determined to be as so many and such if they really be so many in number and such-and-such in character, then they must as the Jains teach exist in either of their modes of suchness (तच्छस्र) and unsuchness (पतच्छस्र) at one and the same point of time. If it were so, it would follow that because of the indefiniteness as desiderated to be expressed in their being as such and not-being as such at the same moment of time, the knowledge of the same would be also equally indeterminate like diffidence or doubt for which reason it cannot be held as a true criterion of right knowledge.

III. If the Jains contend here that the thing itself being instinct with multiplicity and versatility of modes or aspects (चन्द्रकान्त वभाव) is really of determinate character as such and the knowledge of the thing, therefore, both as being and non-being, cannot be non-determinate and consequently non-authoritative like that of doubtful knowledge, Shankar
rejoins, it is not right on your part to say all that; for, every thing being admitted to be instinct with a multiplicity of nature, without having any check or rest anywhere, the determination of the nature of very determination itself through the means of 'partly-is' and 'partly-is-not' being not excluded it would simply result in non-determinate knowledge. And for the very reason as well the means of knowledge (प्रमाण), objects of knowledge (प्रेमिक), the knowing subject (प्रमात्ता), and the act of knowledge (प्रमिति), all would remain themselves non-determinate. And where the determinator and the result of determination, both are thus non-determinate, how can then the teacher, who is thus of indefinite opinion himself, can give definite instructions on a doctrine the matter and the principles of the epistemology of which are themselves indeterminate in their very nature and character? Again, what would prevail upon the followers of such a doctrine to actualise in life and conduct the moral principles inculcated in the same? For, if the effects of their actualisation in life and conduct be of themselves instinct
with uncertainties, nobody would have any inclination to work for the same. Therefore the doctrine, pungently retorts Shankar, of those undecisive masters who have nothing definite to teach or preach, is not to be accepted.

IV. Then, again, applying this unsettling principle of reasoning to that portion of their doctrine which teaches that the composites (पञ्चिकाय) are five in number, one has got to understand that on the one hand they are five and on the other, they are not five i.e. from the latter point of view, they are fewer or more than five which is a ridiculous position to uphold.

V. Also you cannot logically maintain that the predicaments are indescribable. If they were so, they could on no account be described; but as a matter of fact they are described and as such you abandon your original position.

VI. If you say, on the contrary, that predicaments being so described are ascertained to be such and such; and at the same time they are not such and such;
and that the consequence of their being thus ascertained is Right Vision (सत्यक द्वार) and is not Right Vision as well at one and the same point of time; and that Un-Right Vision is and is not opposite of Right Vision at one and the same time, you will be really raving like a mad cap who is certainly not to be relied upon.

VII. If you argue further that Heaven and Freedom, are both existent and inexist-ent at once or they are both eternal and non-eternal at one and the same moment, none will be inclined to work for the same the very nature of whose existence is so uncertain and indeterminate in nature and character. And,

VIII. Finally, it having been found to follow from your doctrine that Jīva, Ajīva etc. whose nature you claim to have ascertained and which have been in existent from all eternity at once relapse into the condition of absolute indetermination, and that the being excluding the non-being and vice-versa, the non-being excluding the being, and that further more it being impossible to decide whether of one thing there is to be

On account of the impos-sibility of any definite as- certainment, the doctrine of the Syad- vāda must needs be re- jected.
predicated oneness or plurality, permanency or non-permanency, separateness or non-separateness and the like, your doctrine of *Syādvād* must needs be rejected.
CHAPTER X.

EXAMINATION OF SHANKAR.

Examination of Shankar’s animadversion and his position—Further discussion of the Principle of Syadvad and the Law of contradiction—Thought is not simply a distinction—It is a relation as well—Reply to Shankar point by point.

Such is the criticism which Shankar makes taking his stand on the Sutra “Not; because of the impossibility in one.” (“नैक्षमिकेयम्” ) of the Vedânta Sutras by Vyâsa. Or in other words, ‘it is impossible’, remarks Shankar, ‘that contradictory attributes such as being and non-being should at the same time belong to one and the same thing.’ This is the long and short of his whole argument as urged for the rejection of the doctrine of Syadvâd which forms the metaphysical basis of our religion. And it is imperative, therefore, that we should examine the above animadversion as briefly as possible and see how far his reasonings reveal his real insight into the heart of things as well as how far is Shankar correct in his understanding and
estimation of the principle of our dialectic movement as applied to thought and being—a form of reasoning which originally and exclusively belongs to the Jain philosophy.

To begin with, therefore, so far the fundamentals of our doctrine as summarised by Shankar are concerned, we must at once admit that he is not guilty of misrepresentation.

But when he starts his criticism with the startling remark that, being and non-being cannot co-exist in one and the same thing, we beg to differ from him. Shankar puts all through his arguments, a great stress on the Law of Contradiction. And as it is a law of thought which cannot be transgressed without committing ourselves to contradictions and inconsistencies as the Formal Logic teaches, any theory which does the same, he says, cannot be accepted as having any worth at all.

When the Formal Logic laid down the Law of Contradiction as the highest law of thought, what it evidently meant is simply this that distinction is necessary for thought. Unless things are definitely
what they are and are kept to their definition, thought and knowledge become impossible. For instance, if $A$ and $\text{not-}A$ be the same, it is hardly possible to find any meaning even in the simplest statements, for the nature of the thing becomes absolutely indefinite and so indeterminate. Hence Formal Logic teaches that thought is distinction and is not possible without it.

But is thought simply a distinction and nothing else? Is the distinction absolute and ultimate? We, the Jains, would undoubtedly say that it can never be absolute distinction. If thought is distinction, yet it implies at the same time relation. Everything implies something other than it; 'This' implies That; 'Now' implies 'Then' 'Here' implies 'There' and the like. Each thing, each aspect of reality, is possible only in relation to and distinct from some other aspect of reality. If so, $A$ is only possible in relation to and distinct from $\text{not-}A$. Thus, by marking one thing off from another, it, at the same time, connects one thing with another. A thing which has nothing to distinguish from, is as impossible as equally unthinkable is the thing which is
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absolutely separated from all others so as to have no community between them. An absolute distinction would be self-contradictory for it would cut off every connection or relation of the thing from which it is distinguished. The principle of absolute contradiction is suicidal; because it destroys itself. So when we, the Jains, deny the validity of the Law of Contradiction, we only dispute the claim of absolute validity. That every definite thought by the fact that it is definite, excludes other thoughts and specially the opposite thought is unquestionably true, indeed. But it is half-truth only, or one aspect of the truth and not the whole of it. The other side of the truth, or rather the complimentary side of this truth is also that every definite thought, by the very fact that it is definite, has a necessary relation to its negative and cannot be separated from it without losing its true meaning. It is definite by virtue of its opposition with what it is not. So nothing, however definite it may be, can be conceived as self-identical in the absolute sense of the term.
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To illustrate let us take the instance of the jar. I say that the jar is a finite object. Now what do we mean by finite thing is this that it is limited in extent. And the question may be raised: is the limit self-imposed or imposed from without. Or, in other words, is the limit created by the object itself or is it due to the presence of another which limits it. The answer must be that it is limited by something else. Now, may it not be said that the jar is finite only by virtue of some thing else? It is what it is only in relation with something else, without which its existence as such would be impossible. So the law of contradiction, if it speaks of absolute difference, is manifestly a suicidal principle.

Take any thought-determination and the same principle will hold good. The jar is what it is, because it serves certain purpose, has certain shape, certain colour etc. These different ideas constituting one whole is what we know as the jar. May it not be said then that this whole of the different ideas is what it is only by virtue of some thing or some other which is its negative? For
if we try to hold this *common place* whole of ideas to the exclusion of its negative, if we try to hold it to itself, it disappears.

I. We submit, therefore, that such a remark as made by Shankar is due to his gross misunderstanding of the dialectic principle of our reasoning. For, as we interpret and use the principle, it is all right. We, the Jains, hold that every thought or being *is* only in relation to the fourfold nature of *itself* but *is not* in relation to the fourfold nature of the *other* (सच्चाचायतिः श्वतथपत्र यथावपि नास्ति च): for instance, the jar when it is thought of in relation to (i) its own constituent substance,—earth; (ii) its own locality of existence in space—Calcutta; (iii) its own period of coming into existence in time—Summer and (iv) its own mode existence as revealed in its colour (red or the like) and capacity for containing and carrying such and such quantity of water, the jar *is* said to exist *i.e.*, only in relation and particular combination of the four-fold nature of itself known technically as *svachatusstaya*, the jar *is* (प्रत्येक), and has the nature and character of *being* (सत्त्वत). But when thought of in
relation and particular combination of the four-fold elements viz, constituent substance, locality, period and mode (त्र्युंच वलकालभाव) as belonging to the other, say, the picture, the jar is not (नास्थि) and is of the nature of non-being (अस्तुत्तर्य). Thus the picture is the negation of the jar and vice-versa the jar is the negation of the picture. Every-thing is in relation only to the four fold elements of itself but is not in relation only to the four-fold elements belonging to the other. If it were otherwise, were everything said to exist in either relations of itself as well as of the other, then every thought and being, making up this our universe, would have been transformed into one uniform homogeneous whole; then light and darkness, knowledge and ignorance, being and non-being, unity and plurality, eternity and non-eternity, knowledge and the means thereof, all that go in pairs of opposites, and the like must needs be one homogeneous mass, so to speak, of one uniform nature and character without any difference and distinction between one and the other or between the parts of one and the same thing. But such homogeneity
of nature and character in things all around us is contradicted by our sense perception which reveals but differences and diversities in things and realities.

And now to turn the table, when you, Shankar, say 'Being is Brahman'. You must have to admit that when Brahman is thought of in relation to what is other than Being, it is equal to Non-being (अनभ) If you don't admit this, the Non-being of Brahman as what is other than the nature of Being itself, then your Brahman would be of the nature of Non-being, say of Ne-science or illusion as well. But this would lead to the deterioration of the true nature of your Brahma which is but existence pure and simple.

II. To the second objection that the cognition of a thing in its form of suchness and unsuchness results in the generation of indefinite knowledge which is no more a true source of knowledge than doubt is, we reply:—

That the seven predicaments as they are in and by themselves i.e. so far as their own four-fold nature (कबलुटयापेश) is concerned,
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they are in fact so many in number and such and such in character; but as Other than themselves i.e. relative to the four-fold nature of the Other (परचतुष्यापेच्छा), they cannot but be otherwise. If this were not, if you Shankar do not agree to this, or when you say that ‘True knowledge infinite is Brahman’ (सत्य चानं चन्दनं त्रज्ज्ञा), if you do not thereby admit that Brahman as such has its being; but has not its being as otherwise, that is say as Ne-science which is but an opposite of what is true knowledge, then must you be implicitly identifying Brahman which is knowledge (च्छान) with Ne-science (प्रविद्या) which is non-knowledge so much so that you reduce them both to a state of unity which is devoid of all differences and distinctions in it (संगतादिमेत-विरहित). And this tantamounts to saying that Brahman is but a synonym of Ne-science which is dull (जड़) and devoid of consciousness (च्छानसत्तिल). But you, the Vedântins, hold that ‘Brahman is true knowledge infinite’. Hence we the Jains rightly hold that the knowledge of things as determined by our dielectic movement of
thought in the forms of both suchness and unsuchness (नधारुः and भतवारुः) is not invalid (प्रप्रमाणिक) like doubt or diffidence as you contend.

III. To meet the third objection in the form of your denial as to the definite character of our determination of the nature of things which are admitted to be instinct with multiplicity of character, we have to submit that our determination of the nature of things is not indefinite in itself. Why?—Because of the fact that whatever is acknowledged by us exists only in so far as its own four-fold constituent elements in their particular combination are concerned; but relative to the four-fold constituent elements as manifest in the particular combination of the Other, the former does not exist. For, as we have seen already, the jar as such i.e. in respect of the four-fold constituent elements under particular combination making up the being and individuality of the jar, there it exists only as such and does not exist as the picture. And this logic holds good with equal force in regard to the deter-
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mination of the nature of our determination itself. The determination is determination only as such; but as otherwise it is not (determination). Similarly, in respect of the determining subject and the resultant of determination being as such and such, they both have their being; but as otherwise i.e. as other than themselves, they have not their being as well. If it were not the case, then being and non-being, knowledge and Ne-science, and all that go in pairs of opposites would become merged into such a homogeneous whole of one uniform for character as is not warranted by the evidences of the senses. Hence you must have to admit that our determination of things as such and not as such being thus in and by itself definite, cannot but be a true source of knowledge and that our omniscient arhats are therefore the real teachers of right knowledge and hence there is every reason why people should flock round them and be inclined as well to act up to their instructions to lead a life of perfection and beatitude, the only end and aim of human evolution.
IV. With reference to objection regarding the composites (चर्चितकाय) being numerically five, we point out that the number five as such is really five, but as the other than five itself, i.e. relative to such numbers as four, six or seven, the five is not. Let us take otherwise—the number Five only. Here we have undoubtedly a definite concept. Now the definite concept of five by the fact that it is definite excludes other thoughts and specially the opposite thought. We, the Jains, admit this; but proceed still further and hold that every definite thought or concept by the fact that it is definite, has a necessary relation to its negative and so cannot be separated from it without losing its own meaning. Five is five as distinguished from eight, nine, ten, or not-seven and so bears essential relation with them. Hence we hold that the composites which are numerically five can thus be neither more nor fewer than five.

V. Then again the seven predicaments, they are certainly never absolutely indescribable. They are indescribable in the sense
that they cannot be described all at once and simultaneously (पव्वक्षण युगपत्येवचायाम); but surely they are describable gradually and successively (व्यक्षयमपेशचायाम).

VI. To repudiate the sixth, we submit that the knowledge accruing from the ascertainment of the predicaments both as such and not such, according to the four-fold constituent elements of themselves and as belonging to the Other than themselves and our determination as well of their existence and non-existence in like manner being Right Knowledge (सम्प्रक्षेपं न); and Un-right Knowledge (प्रसम्प्रक्षेपं न) being opposite to Right Knowledge, the Right Knowledge exists only as such i.e. in so far its own matter and form are concerned but does not exist in the matter and form of the Wrong Knowledge and vice-versa, the Wrong Knowledge exists in its own matter and form and does not exist as the matter and form of the Right Knowledge. And likewise the Heaven and Freedom, they are in their own matter and form; but they are not as the matter and form of what are known as Hell and Bondage.
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Also such is the case in respect of eternity which is real and actual only in its own matter and form as distinguished from its opposite, the matter and form of what it is not. Or in other words, the predicaments are eternal in relation to noumenon only but non-eternal in relation to paryāya—phenomenon.

And this is how to a thing, being is ascribed in relation to Its own matter and form as well as non-being in relation to the matter and form of the Other.
CHAPTER XI.

THE DOCTRINE OF UNITY IN DIFFERENCE.

The dialectic reasoning leads to the Theory of Bhedabhed i.e. of Unity in difference—Distinction presupposes Unity—The world system is an expression of thought—The Jain conception of the Absolute distinguished from the Absolute beyond the relative of the Vedantins.

Now what has been discussed in the preceding pages on *Syadvād*, it is quite apparent that the law of contradiction is the negative aspect of the law of identity. We have seen that with the Jains, everything implies 'something' opposed to it. 'This' implies 'that', 'here' implies 'there', 'now' implies 'then'. The trend of the argument is that everything is real only in relation to and distinction from every other thing. This being so, the law of contradiction is not virtually denied absolutely. What the Jain philosophers want us to understand is this that absolute distinction which the ordinary interpretation presupposes is not a correct view of things. Rather it is to be borne in mind that distinction presupposes a unity of which, the *Jiva* and *Ajiva* and the like that
go in pairs of opposites are but two expressions.

The world system is not alien to thought. Thought is not accidental to world. Thought is embodied in the world-system. Popular view is that thought is connected with man's brain and so accident to the world system. In opposition to this the Jains teach that the world system is the expression of thought. The world system is that in which thought goes out of itself. Thought is thus made the essence of the world. It is the Vedânta that somewhere teaches that Nature is the working out of the will and is real in so far the intelligence of man is concerned. But we differ from the Vedântins and hold that thought which is the essence of the world is objective, is something universal or absolute in which the particular thoughts of particular men partake.

But then there is a prima facie objection we have to meet. Some says it is impossible to take thought as the essence of the world. For it would tantamount to our ignoring the feeling or willing which is as important as thought. True, the objection
would have been valid had we conceived thought as excluding will and feeling. Thought is not one thing, and feeling another thing. Will is not apart from thought. How are we to conceive of will if it is exclusive of thought?

Again thought implies will. Dynamic thought is Will. When I identify myself with the end, I am said to will. But I cannot do so unless I am conscious of the end. So activity is impossible without thought. Thus our thought is not exclusive of will. With us thought is concrete, thought inclusive of feeling and will and is the constitutive principle of the universe.

Now therefore the Absolute is the ultimate unity of thought which expresses itself as Jiva on the one side and correlative of the subject as Ajiva on the other side. This unity is all inclusive unity which embraces everything that is real.

But this conception of the Absolute has to be distinguished from the absolute beyond the relative of the Vedântins. These philosophers hold that our intellect deals with the relative only. The world of experience
is the world relative only. So the absolute lies beyond the world of the relative—beyond the world of phenomena. Shankar thinks in this way, We hold, however, that absolute is not beyond the phenomena: rather all phenomena are but particular aspects or phases of this all inclusive unity which is Absolute.—The whole and the aspects of The whole. The whole of reality conceived as a single ultimate unity is noumenon and phenomena are but its partial phases.

But then the question is, What is a Noumenon? Is it an aggregate of phenomena. The Noumenon, we hold, is superior to phenomena; because it is all inclusive whole. Phenomena are but fragmentary aspects of Noumenon. This all inclusive whole (noumenon) cannot stand apart from those which it includes (phenomena). If it is an all inclusive unity and phenomena are fragmentary aspects of this unity, then is it an aggregate of phenomena? No. The Self is not apart from its various determinations or states of the Self. It is not something above and over the psychoses. What is the Self? It is not a mere sum of its determinations as the
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Vijnánvâdi Buddhists hold; nor is it different from the sum of its determinations as the Vedântins try to explain. It is a unity of all its determinations. It is an ideal unity which realises itself through these particular determinations.

So the partial phases of the Absolute are phenomena and these are related to the Absolute as the members of a living body are related to the body itself. The particular things of experience are aspects of the Absolute which is the all inclusive unity expressing itself through particular determinations. It is the subject; but not as correlative of the object; rather a unity implied in the correlation.

The Absolute is thus the ultimate Unity. But here again the familiar conception gives us trouble. If the Absolute is One, then the Absolute is not Many. If it is unity then it is not a Plurality. The Vedântins of the type of Shankar hold that the absolute is the Unity. It is not a plurality therefore. But Plurality is a stupendous fact which cannot be denied. So plurality, according to those Vedântins, is but an illusion—Mâyâ (माया) and not a reality.
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Plurality is a fact, although it may be another kind of experience. Anyhow to give it the name of Illusion (माया) is not to explain it. The question then turns to this. How thus Illusion comes to be reconciled with the Absolute? How is this solution possible, if the Absolute is the One without a second to stand by it (एकत्वाच्यो). And the Ultimate Reality without anything to aid or stand by it being One, what is the source of this Illusion of Plurality. Thus the whole question resolves itself into the Relation of Unity and Plurality.

If the ultimate reality be many, how can you explain a single self-existent coherent system? If there is a relationship between A. B. C. D., and so on then these are elements of a single whole and so related to each other.

If you begin with the Absolute separation between Unity and Plurality, then you must either deny Plurality like Shankar or deny Unity like Kanâd, the propounder of the Specific (Vaisheshika) school of thought. But these difficulties crop up only on the assumption that the ultimate Reality is either One or
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Many. And we, the Jains, therefore, reject this disjunction altogether. From our point of view, all differences are differences of a Unity which is expressed in the differences. One is One not apart from the Many; but One is in the Many. So Plurality must be taken as the self-expression of this unity—the Absolute. To conceive of the Absolute as the One is not to conceive the facts of experience as Illusion—Māya (माया). Or, the Many is real in as much as the Many is galvanised into life by the One; because Many is the self-expression of the One. The absolute is a Unity but the Unity which is immanent in the Many. The Many, in Jainism, do not vanish in the luminosity of the One like clouds before the rising sun as taught in the philosophy of Vyāsa and Vasistha: rather the Many is vitalised by the One and is as real as every other facts of experience. In Jainism, One is shown to come out of its own privacy as it were and appears Itself as the Many. The Many vanishes in the One (Shankar): but the One presents itself to us as the Many (the Jains). The One reveals itself in the Many and the Many is the self-

But this disjunction in the form of definite alternatives is rejected by the Jains.

All differences being differences of a unity expressed in the differences—the two aspects not excluding one another.
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expression of the ultimate Unity. In our philosophy, the ordinary disjunction of 'either-or' falls to the ground. The two aspects of one truth do not exclude each other. The concrete whole is the abstract which is One in the Many and Many as grounded in the One.

The Absolute is the Universal. This Universal is not the abstract Universal of the formal logic but the concrete Universal. The absolute expresses itself in A, but not limited to A. A is the particularisation of the Universal. Hence the Universal goes beyond A, to B, to C and so A, B, C, D are immanently and vitally connected with one another. The Universal comes out of Itself and particularises Itself in the particular objects of the world system and which, therefore, is vitally and essentially and immanently connected with one another constituting the world system. The Universal of the Jains does not fight shy of the Particulars of the world—the categories of thought and being—like the Universal of the formal logic; but reveals itself in the particulars of the world.
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Such being the Jain conception of the Absolute, the whole universe of things, we see, must needs be ordered in perfect agreement with our cognitions. We are conscious of things as different and non-different at the same time. They are non-different in their causal or universal aspect (कारणावनाऽक्षावना च भिन्नस्त) and different in so far as viewed as effects or particulars (कार्यावनाऽवक्षावना च भिन्नं).

But some hold that cognition of things as such is impossible and remark that like light and darkness, the identity and difference can not co-exist in the same thing. But we reply, the contradictoriness that exists between light and darkness is of two kinds. One is of the nature of impossibility of co-existing in one and the other of the nature of co-existing but in different things. But such contradictoriness is not perceived in the correct interpretation of the true character of the relation in which the cause and the effect or the universal and the particular mutually stand together. On the contrary we really perceive that the one and the same thing is possessed of

Everything is different and non-different at the same time.

Reply to the critiques of the above vend.
dual aspect (प्रत्युत्तर एकत्व बलविहरुप प्रतीयमि). Thus when we say 'This jar is clay'; Ram is a human being. Here in the instance of 'clay' and 'the Jar', clay is the cause and the jar is the effect thereof. The jar is but a particular state of being of the cause which is clay. Were co-existence of the cause and effect contradictory, it would never have been possible for clay to exist as in the form of the 'Jar': in the second instance 'Ram is a human being' humanity is the universal (जाति) and Ram is but a particular (व्यक्ति) expression of humanity. Were Universal and Particular contradictory, one excluding the other, then Ram could never have been a human being. Nor even any one of many experience has ever perceived anything having an absolutely uniform character absolutely devoid of all distinction and difference whatever in the same. Nor can it be upheld that just as fire consumes straw and other combustibles so non-difference (भास्मद) sets at nought the difference on the ground that Identity being unity, it is a nullity of all Difference. And therefore the admission of identity and difference as co-
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existing in the same involves a contradiction. But this, we contend, is not borne out by facts of experience; nor is there any absolute law to the effect that identity should always and everywhere be destructive of difference. On the contrary, we have things with two-fold aspects, just because it is thus that they are perceived. For, the same thing which exists as clay or gold, or man &c. at the same time exists as jar, diadem or Ram. And no man is able to distinguish in an object,—e.g. Jar or Ram,—placed before him, which part is clay and which the Jar or which part is the universal character of Ram and which the particular. Rather our thought finds its true expression in the following judgments, 'this Jar is clay' and 'Ram is a man'. Nor can it be maintained that a distinction is made between the cause and the universal as objects of the idea of persistence and the effect and the particular as objects of the notion of discontinuance—difference, in as much as, truly speaking, we have no perception of these two factors, in separation. However close we may look into a thing, we won't be able still.
to find that this is the persisting and universal element in the thing and that is the non-persisting particular aspect of the thing. Just as an effect or a particular thing gives rise to the idea of one thing, so the effect plus cause and the particular along with the universal gives rise to the idea of one thing only. And this is how we are enabled to recognise each individual thing, placed as it is amongst a multitude of things differing in place, time, capacity and substance. Each thing being thus endowed with double aspect, the theory of cause and effect or universal and particular, being absolutely distinct and different falls to ground under the weight of the overwhelming evidences of sense-perception.

It might be contended here that if on account of grammatical co-ordination and the consequent of idea oneness, the judgment ‘this Jar is clay’ is taken to mean the relation of unity in difference i.e. both difference and non-difference as well, then we are led by a coherent train of thought to infer from such judgments as ‘I am a man’ or ‘I am a god’,
that the self and the body also stand in relation of unity in difference—Bhedabheda.

But we, the Jains, hold this to be an uncritical observation in as much as it is not based on right interpretation of the true nature of co-ordination establishing the bhedabheda relation. The correct interpretation is that all reality is determined by states of consciousness not sublated by valid means of proof. The imagination however of the identity of the self and the not-self (body) is sublated by all means of proof applicable to the self: it is in fact no more valid than the imagination of the snake in the rope and does not therefore prove the identity of the two. The co-ordination, on the other hand, which is meant by the judgment ‘the cow is short horned’ is never observed to have been disproved in any way and hence establishes the doctrine of Unity in Difference (भेदभेदवाद).
CHAPTER XII.

THE UNIVERSE AS A SELF-EXISTENT UNIT.

The Self and the Not-self are but members of a complex Whole—Difficulties in the transformation of the Subject into Object and 'vice-versa' Object into Subject—Each pre-supposing the other, we have to take the Universe in the light of single unified System.

The task of philosophers is to find law, order and reason in what at first sight seems accidental, capricious and meaningless. And the arduousness of that work grows with the complexity and intricacy of the phenomena to be explained. The freer the play of difference, the harder is to find the underlying unity, the fiercer the conflict of opposites, the more difficult is it to detect the principle out of which it springs. And unless this is satisfactorily done, any theory of the Universe can hardly be attained to. Unconscious of the greatness of the work they were undertaking, the early philosophers tried to solve the whole problem of the Universe at a stroke and find some one principle or unitary method which
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would account for everything. But it soon became obvious that the principle, and the problem of universe are not so easy to be solved and the citadel of knowledge was not to be taken by storm. Thus earliest and most secure triumphs of science were won by separating off some comparatively limited sphere of reality and treating it as a world by itself. And it is just because they narrowed the problem that they succeeded in solving it. The general nature of the difficulties to be met with, is known and also the methods by which they can be overcome. The field is not, and cannot be exhausted; but such light has been thrown upon it that no room is left for fear that within that department the progress of science will ever meet with any unsurmountable obstacle. Hence the conviction that there is no sphere of existence which is exempt from the reign of law has been gaining ground with the development and progress of philosophic speculation.

Now we should attempt to investigate into the general nature of the Universe.
When we consider the general nature of the Universe or of our life as rational being, endowed with the powers of thinking and willing, we find that it is defined and, so to speak, circumscribed by three ideas which are closely and even indissolubly connected with each other. These three ideas are the ideas or the constituent elements of the universe or the factors of it which are inseparably connected with each other and so involve each other. These are (i) the idea of the Object (धर्म) or Not-self (चकृत) (ii) the idea of the Subject (भोज) or the Self (जोध) (iii) and the idea of the Unity which is presupposed in the difference of the Self and the Not-self and in and through which they act and react on each other.

To explain these terms more fully, the Object (धर्म) is the general name under which we include the external world, and all things and beings in it, all that we know and all that we act on, the whole environment which conditions the activity of the ego and furnishes the means and sphere through which it rea-
lises itself. All this we call Object (भीष्म) in
order to indicate its distinction and its rela-
tion to the Subject (भीष्म) for which it exists.
We call it by this name also to indicate
that we are obliged to think of it as
one whole, one world, all of whose parts
are embraced in one connection of space
and all whose changes take place in one
connection of time. All these elements
or parts and changes therefore make up
the elements in one whole and in one
system and modern science teaches us to
regard them all as connected together by
of links of causation. There is again only
one thing which stands over against this
complex whole of existence and refuses
to be regarded simply as a part of the
system and that is the Ego, the Subject
or the Self for which it exists: for the
primary condition of the existence of
such Subject is that it should distinguish
itself from the Object as such, from each
object and from the whole system of
objects. Hence strictly speaking there
is only one Subject and one Object for us;
for in opposition to the Subject, the totality
of objects constitute one world, and in opposition to the Object, all experiences of the Subject, all its thoughts and actions are merged in the unity of one Self. All our life, all our conscious thought then moves between these two terms which are distinct from and even opposed to each other. Yet though thus set in antagonism which can never cease, because with its ceasing the whole nature of the both would be subverted, they are also essentially related, for neither of them could be conceived to exist without the other. The consciousness of the one is, we might say, inseparably blended with the consciousness of its relation to the other. We know the object only as we bring it back to the unity of the Self and we know the Self only as we realise it in the Object.

And lastly these two ideas within the spheres of which our whole life of thought and activity is contained and from one to the other of which it is continually moving to and fro, point back to a third term which embraces them both and which in turn constitutes
their limit and ultimate condition. For where we have two terms which thus are at once essentially distinguished from and essentially related to, which are obliged to contrast and oppose to each other, seeing that they have neither of them any meaning except as opposite counterparts of the other, and which we are obliged to unite, there we are necessarily driven back to think of these terms as the manifestation or realisation of a third term which is higher than either. Recognising that the Object only exists in distinction from and relation to the Subject, we find it impossible to reduce the Subject to a mere Object among other objects as Materialism does. Recognising, again, that the Subject exists only as it returns upon itself in the Object, we find it impossible as well to reduce the Object to a mere phase of the Subject—a fallacy committed by the Buddhistic Subjective Idealism or Solipsism. But recognising them as indivisible yet necessarily related, we are forced to seek the secret of their being in a higher principle which includes and explains them both. How otherwise can
we do justice at once to their distinction and their relation, to their independence and their essential and vital connection? The two—Subject and Object—are the extreme terms. Each of them presupposes the other and therefore can neither be regarded as producing the other. Hence we are compelled to think of them both as rooted in a higher principle or to put it otherwise in the idea of an Absolute Unity which transcends all opposition of the finitude and specially the last opposition which includes all others. Hence we cannot understand the real nature of the universe unless we take it in the light of a unified system, whose constituent elements are necessarily related in the way above described.

So long we have been dealing with the nature of the universe, depicting the relation which exists between different factors of the world. But if we consider the question more fully we cannot get rid of one idea—the idea of contingency of the world. The contingent world exists or the world of our immediate experience is contingent,
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therefore absolutely necessary Being exists. It starts from the thought that the world as presented to our immediate experience has in it no substantiality or independence. Its existence cannot be explained from itself and the mind in trying to account for it is forced to fall back in something outside of it and finds rest only in the idea of a Being who is necessarily self-dependent and substantial. The movement of thought which this argument involves may be stated in various ways and under different categories. It may be put as an argument from the world viewed as an effect to the first cause or more generally from the world viewed as finite and relative to an Absolute and Infinite Being on whom it rests. But in all these and other forms, the gist of the argument is the same. If we take it, for example, in the form in which it turns on the idea of causality, it is the argument that whatever does not exist necessarily exist only through another Being as its cause and that again itself not necessary through

Certain anomalies pointing to the origin of the world at a certain point of time.

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another and as an infinite regress of of finite beings related as cause and effect is unthinkable, mind is compelled to stop short and place at the head of the series—a First Cause, a Being which is Its own cause or which exists in and by Itself unconditionally or necessarily.

This is in short the argument often forwarded to prove that the world was created at a certain point of time. But when we attempt to translate this experience into the language of formal reasoning or if we take it to be a syllogism proving the existence of God as the First Creator, our argument becomes open to serious objections. In short, we will find that this sort of argument is not at all tenable. The first objection which may be urged is that the result it gives is purely negative. You cannot in a syllogistic demonstration put more into the conclusion than what the premises contain. Beginning or assuming an Absolute or Infinite Cause you might conclude to finite effects; but you cannot revert the processes. All that from a finite or contingent effect, you can infer is a finite or contingent
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cause or at most an endless series of such causes. But if because the mind cannot rest in such infinity you try to stop short the infinite regress and assert at any point of it a cause which is not an effect, which is its own cause, infinite and unconditioned, the conclusion in this case would be purely arbitrary. To assert the existence of such a Being as the Creator of the world is simply to conceal under a phrase the breakdown of the argument.

Again the argument does not prove that which it claims to prove, for such a Being is related to the world as cause is to an effect. But the cause is as much conditioned by effect as effect is by the cause. So in this case also the supposed Being would not be Absolute as this argument tries to prove.

Again another difficulty presents us if we dive deep into the question. How can we conceive God before any such creation? Why was He so long inactive? What led Him to create this Universe at a certain point of time after such a long period of inactivity? In short innumerable difficulties.
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trouble us if we suppose that world was created at a certain point of time. This is sufficient to prove that the world exists from eternity and we cannot conceive of a time when it was not.
CHAPTER XIII.

THEORIES OF EVOLUTION.

Theories of Evolution and Creation by External Agency—Spencerian Formulation of the Principle of Evolution—Difficulties in Spencerian hypothesis.

In the preceding chapter, we have seen that from our point of view, the Universe has been in existence from all eternity. We cannot conceive of a time when it was not. But still for all that there are other hypothesis which either speak of the alternate eras of evolution and dessolution of the Universe as a whole or take it to have been created by the some all powerful external agency from the materials that lay by Him when all these abounding in names and forms were not. And ere we enter on any further details as to the phenomenal changes, transformation of the world as these present themselves to us, it is important that we should discuss in brief the different important hypothesis which are also prevalent more or less in these days of scientific culture and refinement.
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To begin with therefore, there are only three possible hypothesis which can be reasonably entertained in regard to the past history of Nature.

The First is the Theory of Self-existence which teaches that the order of Nature which now obtains has always obtained from all eternity.

The Second is the Theory of Evolution or Self-creation according to which the present order of Nature has had but a limited duration but it supposes that the present order of things proceeds by natural processes from an antecedent order and that from another antecedent order and so on thus making way for alternate eras of Evolution and dissolution. And

The Third is the Theory of Special Creation by external agency teaching that nothing comes of itself: That from dull dead matter absolutely bereft of all intelligence, this phenomenal Universe which bespeaks of subtle organisation and most wonderful design cannot spring forth without the intervention of some intelligent cause operating upon the materials whereof Nature is composed.
THEORY OF EVOLUTION.

Of these three principal hypotheses, we have already dealt with the first—the Theory of Self-existence. We are now to deal with the Theory of Evolution—the second of the three hypotheses: for some hold that the Universe cannot be conceived as Self-existent from all eternity; for ‘to conceive existence through infinite past-time’, to quote the language of Spencer, ‘implies the conception of infinite past-time which is an impossibility’.—How far this argument of Spencer against the Self-existence of the Universe from all eternity stands to reason, we shall see later on. Suffice it to say here that because of this supposed difficulty amongst the many others in the theory of Self-existence, some have been inclined to fall upon the Theory of Evolution and Mr. Spencer is the ablest exponent of this theory in modern times so far the Empirical School of European thought on the subject is concerned.

To consider, therefore, first, the theory of Evolution, we must begin with its definition. By evolution or development was meant primarily the gradual unfolding of a living germ.
from its embryonic beginning to its final and mature form. This adult form was regarded as the end aimed at through the whole process, so that the whole process was the working of an idea—entelechy or soul shaping the plastic material and directing the process of growth. Evolution, in short, implied ideal ends controlling physical means—in a word was 'teleological'. But now the term 'Evolution', though retained, is retained merely to denote the process by which the mass and energy of the Universe have passed from some assumed primeval state to that of distribution which we have at present. It is also implied that the process will last till some ultimate distribution is reached whereupon a counterprocess of dissolution will begin and from which new Evolution will proceed.

"An entire history of anything" Mr. Spencer tells us "must include its appearance out of the imperceptible and its disappearance into the imperceptible. Be it a single object or the whole Universe, any account which begins with it in a concrete form is incomplete." In these and such like instances Mr. Spencer sees the formula of evolution
and dissolution foreshadowed. He again goes on saying that "the change from a diffused imperceptible form to a perceptible concentrated state is an integration of matter and concomittant dissipation of motion and the change from a concentrated perceptible state is an absorption of motion and concomittant disintegration of matter."

Now there is one obvious and yet serious objection to this theory. It proposes to treat the Universe or in fact requires us to treat the Universe as a single object. Every single object is first evolved and then dissolved and so the Universe. The Universe also, he thinks, emerges from the imperceptible and into the imperceptible it disappears again. Surely Mr. Spencer commits here the fallacy of composition. What is predicable of the parts, he thinks, can be predicated of the whole collectively. Again, we may ask on what grounds is it assumed that the Universe was ever evolved at all? A given man, a given nation, a given continent have their general finite histories of birth and death, upheaval and subsidence. But growth and decay, rise
and fall, evolution and dissolution are everywhere contemporaneous. We have but to extend our vision to find a permanent totality made up of transient individuals in every stage of change. But so enlarging our vision we are not warranted in saying as Mr. Spencer does “there is an alteration of evolution and dissolution in totality of things.” But now what we find so far our observation and experience can carry us is that, be it small or great, once an object is dissolved in the imperceptible state in Mr. Spencer’s sense, that object never reappears. We do not find dead man alive again, effete civilisation re-juvenated, or worn out stars re-kindled as of yore. It is true of course that the history of many concrete objects is marked by periodic phases; but never by dissolution and re-evolution i.e., by the disappearance of the concrete individuals followed by the re-appearance of the same. So this form of evolution or the philosophy of evolution as formulated by Spencer is more mythological than philosophical. What we admit on the other hand and which we think almost free from every
savour of immatured reflection is that within a given totality, one individual may succeed another, but so far that totality, the Universe, is concerned it remains permanent—"One generation passeth away and another generation cometh, but the earth abideth forever."

Again, we cannot understand what led Mr. Spencer to conceive this world as finite or a single object. What Mr. Spencer calls a single object must surely have an assignable beginning and end in time and assignable bounds in space. It is precisely through such time and space-marks that the notion of singleness or identity becomes possible. The Universe then we, may safely say, not only is not, but can never be a single object in this wise. Mr. Spencer's attempt to treat it after the fashion of a single object, evinces an unexpected paucity of imagination and is philosophically unsound. Experience provides us with instances of evolution and dissolution of the most varied scales but of a single supreme evolution embracing them all we have no title to speak. On the other hand, we have no evidence to show what we call the 'Universe' is coming.
to an end, for we have no evidence to show that it is finite. If taking for granted we had any such evidence we should probably then and there conclude that we were dealing with but a part of the true Universe and not with the totality of things or Universe as a whole. Again there is no evidence either earthly or unearthly prevailing upon us to apply of such conceptions as increase and decrease, ebb and flow, or development and decay to this absolute totality or the Universe as a whole. On the other hand, we may safely say that the world, so far as we can judge from the physical constitution and our actual experience, is just what it has always been—The PERMANENT THEATRE OF PERPETUAL CHANGES.
CHAPTER XIV.

THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY.

Sankhyas principles of Evolution—Traceable in the 'Rigveda'—'Purush' and 'Prakriti'—The Three 'Gunas' in their Equilibrium form 'Prakriti' or the Root Evolvent—'Prakriti' is the first Category—The Three other Categories—Inconsistency of the Sankhya Hypothesis.

Spencer's formulation of the principles of the Evolution, however, strongly reminds us of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy as propounded by the sage Kapil in India. And there is no denying that in comparison with the Spencerian theory, Kapila's doctrine is by far more consistent and logical. According to this doctrine, the world is really a world of experience—the experience of the individual Purush or Psyché (as in the system of Fichte) caught in the snares spread out by the bewitching Prakriti evolving the twenty-four categories whereof the world system is composed for the enjoyment and beatitude of the individual Self. Thus according to Kapil, the ultimate realities are primarily two in number—Purush and Prakriti.
We think in relations. To us therefore the conception of the world-system is nothing beyond the conception of the relation between the subjective and the objective realities. Purush, Kapil says, is, the self or the spirit. Empirically it is the Subjective reality or the Experienter (भोग्य) and Prakriti or Nature is the Objective Reality or the Experienceable—(भोग्य). The whole universe where in we live, move and have our being is the outcome of the unfoldment of this relation between Purush, the Spirit or the Subject and Prakriti—the Nature or the Object.

Some Oriental scholars hold that this Dualistic hypothesis as to the past history of Natures which finds its echo in the Cartesian Theory of Dualism, was originally formulated by the sage Kapil and is of far later origin in comparison with the Vedas. But such is not the case. We are of opinion that the doctrine is as old as the Vedas themselves. And the sage drew inspirations from the Vedas and this is why the System of Sankhya Philosophy though indirectly denying the existence of God for want of evidence has
been taken by the Hindus as one of their six orthodox Systems. For even the Rigveda has in it amongst others a hymn wherein the whole doctrine as expounded by Kapil is contained in a nut-shell. We have in the Rigveda—स्त्रांतिक भूवनस्य रेतो विभोस्तिथिति प्रदिय विघ्नमिनिः—Rik. V. 2-21-164.

The hymn means to say that the mysterious conjunction between Purush and Prakriti invariably results in the evolution of the seven-fold subtler principles-tatvas beginning with Mahattatva i.e. (1) Mahattatva, (2) Ahankartatva and the five tan-mātras,—Rupa, Rasa, Sabda, Gandha and Sparsha—and though such is the consequence of the conjunction, it is worthy of note that owing to the utter and absolute indifference on the part of Purush which is above time and variability on the part of Prakriti denoting in her the equipoise of the gunas, it is She alone that conceives and yields up, in consequence, the seven-fold principles beginning with Mahat etc. making up the Universe without Purush being in the least affected by her in any way. This is the reason why the word ardhagarbha (चर्च्चगम्य)
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(lit: half-descendants) has been used in the text. The text says further that the sevenfold principles are the germinal sperms or seeds, so to speak, for the evolution of the whole universe and are contained in a portion of the Omnipresent Deity-Vishnu for which reason the phrase प्रदश विधमिणि i.e. in a portion, we find in the text.

Now Purush or the Psyché being entirely and absolutely indifferent, very little has it left with us at the present stage of enquiry to deal with. We shall therefore concern ourselves with Prakriti or Nature for the present.

PRAKRITI.

By Prakriti, Kapil wants us to understand the equipoise state which the three correlative powers or qualities have arrived at. Any differentiation being impossible in the Prakriti which is no other than the gunas in equilibrium, Prakriti is also technically termed as the Avyakta (अवयक्त)—the Undifferentiated or the Imperceptible.

GUNAS—THE CONSTITUENT OF PRAKRITI.

The three gunas, however, which in their equilibrium constitute Prakriti or the
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Evolvent are (i) Satva (सत्व) or Passivity, (ii) Rajas (रजस्त) or Activity, and (iii) Tamas (तामस्) or Inertia.

(I) Satva is the passive principle revealing itself at it does in receptivity, quickness, lightness, luminousity and transparency of things. It is by the virtue of this principle that things are capable of being worked upon or that they become intelligible or they are conducive to pleasure (सुख).

(II) Rajas is the active principle which is not only mobile by its very nature but which also galvanizes both the Satva and Tamas into functional activities of their own. Revealing itself as it does in striving, it is contributive to pain or misery (दुःख).

(III) Tamas is the principle of inertness or inertia which retards motion and growth. It is this principle of inertia that not only deludes us but obscures as well the real nature of things or adds to their weight (मोहामक गुर्द्र-प्रावरक).

CORRELATIVITY OF THE GUNAS.

Now these gunas—Satva, Rajas, and Tamas, are characterised by their essential correlativity so much so that they are
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(a) Universally Co-existent; (b) Universally Inter-dependent; (c) Universally Inter-mutative and lastly (d) Universally Inter-antagonistic. Thus,—

(a) They are Universally Co-existent, because the existence of one of the gunas requires the existence of the other two as necessary accompaniments.

(b) But from the fact that they are Universally co-existent and concommitant as they are equally fundamental, it follows that they stand to one another in relation of mutual inter-dependence so that none of them can have any functional activity of its own without the co-operation of the other two. Again,

(c) The gunas being thus mutually dependent upon one another, they are also inter-mutative so that just as heat is convertible into electricity so anyone of the gunas may become converted into one or the other of the remaining two gunas. And lastly,

(d) These gunas stand to one another in relation as well of Universal inter-antagonism. Though these are always present as
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constituent factors making up the being of a thing yet they are not present in the same degree of intensity and quantity. These gunas are always at war with one another in the course of which one or the other gets stronger and predominates over the other two in intensity giving to a particular phenomenon in which the particular guna predominates, a certain form, colour and character after its own.

Now it is these powers of Satva-Passivity, Rajas-Activity and Tamas-Inertia, reaching their equilibrium at the dissolution of the previous evolution that constitute Prakriti, or Evolvent—Nature.

CATEGORIES.

The categories of the Sankhya system are classified mainly into four groups, viz—

(a) That which is simply Prakriti or Evolvent.

(b) That which is both Prakriti-Vikriti i.e., Evolute as well as Evolvent.

(c) That which is simply Vikriti i.e., Evolute only.

(d) That which is Neither.
Of these four principal categories, the first is that which is simply Prakriti or Evolvent, denoting in itself the equilibrium of the gunas-powers or forces. Being itself not derived from anything else as its root (cause), it is called the Rootless (causeless)-Evolvent (मूला प्रकृति) of everything else, excepting the Psyché or Purush which is neither evolvent nor evolute. Moreover if we were to look again for a separate root for this Rootless-Evolvent (causeless cause) we should have, say the Sânkhyas, regressus ad infinitum unwarranted by all manner of evidence. Prakriti, therefore, is the First Category.

DEVELOPEMENT OF CATEGORIES.

Now the state of equilibrium of several forces is that state in which any one of those forces exactly neutralizes the effects of all other. And the disturbance of the same would mean that state in which some force (or forces) produces its own effects though modified to some extent by the presence of others.

But the state of equilibrium of the three gunas, the Ultimate Imperceptible Cause,
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Prakriti—in which any one of the several forces Satva, Rajas and Tamas, standing to one another in relation of equality, exactly neutralizes the effects of the other two and into which in consequence the whole universe of diverse names and forms dissolves at the end of the previous cycle,—is unstable in the sense that when the season, for the fruition of the seeds of sown by way of Jivas' deeds done in the previous period of their existence, arises, the equilibrium receives an impact as it were and gets disturbed. By this disturbance of the equilibrium of forces, the Sankhyas mean that the state in which some one force (or forces—Satva, Rajas and Tamas) predominates over the other in intensity and produces with the help of the others its own effects though modified to some extent by the presence of those which help in the production.

THE ORDER OF EVOLUTION,

This is how from a single ultimate and undifferentiated homogeneous Cause—Mula Prakriti or the Root-evolvent comes to being the Universe with all its amazing para-
phernalia of diversities and differences in names and forms according to the merits and demerits of the jīvas.

But this coming to being of the Universe, this evolution from the state of homogeniety to heterogeneity is but a process in time. Time has no absolute existence with the Sāṅkhya. It reveals itself as a series or succession; and evolution being but a process in time, it must have a certain order of succession. The successive order of evolution as held by the Sāṅkhya is as follows:

From the Root-evolvent Prakṛti, first comes to being Mahat with which begins the set which is both evolvent-and-evolute. From Mahat (महत्) appears Ahankār (अहंकार) which in turn yields up Manah (मनः), the ten Indriyas (इंद्रिय), and the five tanmātras (तन्मात्राः) with which end the series of the evolvent-and-evolute (प्रकृतिविक्रिय). The simple evolutes are but the five Bhūtas (भूता:) originating from the five tanmātras or the elemental rudiments.

But Purush, the Psychē or the soul is neither evolvent nor evolute. Being eternal it stands outside the history of development.
Admitting in it no change which is but a property of time, it is above time, whereas all development is in time. Itself being purely absolute, it really enters into no relation either with Prakṛiti, the Evolvent or with its subsequent variations—Vikṛiti.

Now, of the above series of evolvent and evolutes, the Mahat, the Aḥankār and the Manas constitute what is called Antahkāraṇa or the Internal Organ, the External organs, Bāhiḥkāraṇa, being the five organs of sense (चाराचर्य) viz., the ear, the skin, the eyes, the tongue, the nose plus the five organs of action (कराचर्य) viz. speech, hand, feet, and the organs of excretion and of generation.

But the question is, what is Mahat—the first offspring of the Root-evolvent or Prakṛiti and first item as well of the Internal Organ or Antahkāraṇa?

The word Mahat has for its synonym Buddhi-Intellect. Intellection (ध्यानस्वयम्) is the function (ध्यान) of the Intellect. But intellection is a kind of intellectual activity of determinate character and activity being identical with what is active, intellection
adhyavalṣya, hold the Sāṅkhyas, is the same with Intellect or Buddhi. The significance of certitude is its characteristic indication. It is best revealed as the decisive principle in the oughtness of a particular thought and action in the different spheres of our life.

But is intellection a purely psychical process?

'No', reply the Sāṅkhyas, 'as it is characterised by the presence of the three-fold rudimentary currents under particular combination and condition which is nothing but the integration and intellectualisation born of the disturbance of the gunas in equipoise whereas the Purush, the Psyché or the Soul being neither evolvent nor evolute, is quite opposite of them both i.e. Absolutely Simple.

Next the word Ahankār is synonymous with Abhimān, pride or conceit, bearing the sense of self-estimation or self-consciousness as conveyed in such expressions in our ordinary parlance as 'I am : and I feel all these that surround me are mine : I can use them as materials of my knowledge to answer my own purpose.' The Sāṅkhyas say that just as he who makes the jar is called Kumbhakār or
the Jar-maker: so what generates the notion of subjectivity, personality or I-ness (प्रेम्भाव) is called Ahankāra. Thus it is a principle (तत्व) of differentiation, individuation and subjectification revealed in the form of self-consciousness and is intellectual in essence proceeding as it does from intellection.

This Ahankāra, when affected by the Sattva-तत्त्व, evolves the eleven organs and when affected by the Tama guna, it evolves the five Tanmātrās. The third guna, Rajas, is manifested in the activity implied in this two-fold creation.

These are the five elemental essences viz., visibility, audibility, the capacity of producing odour, the capacity of producing taste, and tangibility. The principle which generates the notion of subjectivity (ahankāra), also generates under the influence of inertia or तमः, the five rudimentary essences or Tanmātrās.

Just as the Tanmātrās are evolved by Ahankāra under the influence of the quality of तमः, so the eleven organs are evolved by the same principle under the influence of the quality of सत्त्व (Sattva). The eleven organs
include मनस्-mind the central co-ordinating organ which corresponds to the 'central sense' or 'common sense' admitted by Aristotle in his 'De Anima'.

The five Mahābhutas or gross elements viz. earth, water, fire, air and ether, are respectively produced by the corresponding Tanmātrās or suitable essences, viz. smell, taste, form, touch and sound. The gross elements have each an organ corresponding to it. Thus, earth, water, fire, air and ether have for their organs, nose, tongue, eyes, skin and ear, respectively.

These five Mahābhutas and the eleven organs constitute what the Sāṅkhyaśras call the sixteen vikāras-variations.

The five gross elements are the ultimate outward limits of cosmic evolution just as Prakriti is the ultimate limit in the opposite direction.

Last of all, we mention, Purusha, the 25th tattva; we do so, not because Purusha is chronologically the last which it is certainly not, but because it is outside the cosmic evolution and is a distinctly separate principle by itself. It is, as the
Karika says, न प्रकृति: न बिकृति: ; i.e. neither evolvent nor evolute. This Purusha is never in bondage and is outside time. It stands absolutely apart from Prakriti and her products. Yet owing to its proximity to Buddhi (Intellect), it seems to think that it enjoys and suffers, while in reality, it is above weal or woe. It is, always, free and its apparent bondage disappears as soon as it becomes cognisant of its true nature.

THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY.

The Seshvara Sankhya or, as it is more often called the Yoga system is, in fact, the Sankhya system itself, only modified to satisfy the religious side of human nature. It develops a system of practical discipline, mainly ethical and psychological by which concentration of thought could be attained.

Kapila had declared that the existence of Ishvara God did not admit of proof. Patanjali controverts this assertion and proceeds to prove the existence of God by an argument which, as Maxmuller remarks, reminds one of the theistic argument of Eleanther and Boethin. Patanjali's argument as explained by Bhoja, is that different de-
degrees of excellences such as omniscience, greatness, smallness etc., proves the existence of a Being possessing the non plus ultra of excellence. This Being, Ishvara, was, with the yogins, originally, no other than One among many Purushas, only with this difference that Ishvara had never been implicated in metempsychosis and was supreme in every sense.

Whether this theism of Patanjali's Philosophy is consistent with its Sāṇkhya basis is often disputed. The simplest solution seems to be that Kapila was never directly hostile to theism, but was rather indifferent in his attitude towards the question and that this made it possible for Patanjali to foist his theistic yoga upon the Sāṇkhya philosophy.

In the Yoga system, however, no such importance has been accorded to God as could very well be expected, and as we find in such European systems, otherwise analogous with the yoga, as those of Martineau, Lotze and other Personal Idealists. Devotion to God, in Patanjali's system, is merely one of Kaivalya or Soleity.
which is the highest object of the Yoga system.

THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY.

Nyāya has always been translated by 'logic', and there are important considerations which partially justify such an interpretation of the system. For, here, in the Nyāya system, a greater amount of space has been allowed to logical questions than in any of the other systems of Indian Philosophy, and, the theory of inference (anumāna) is, undoubtedly the predominant feature of the system.

Nevertheless, we must not imagine that Nyāya Sutras are mere treatises on Formal Logic. Logic is not the sole nor even the chief aim of Gotama's Philosophy. Its chief end like that of all other Indian systems, is the attainment of liberation or as the Nyāya calls it, Nishshreyasa, the non plus ultra of blessedness. This liberation which the Nyāya Philosophy promises to all, is not a state of pure unmixed pleasure, as the Vedāntin affirms, but a state of pleasure which supposes pain as its pre-condition. In fact, the doctrine of a pure continuous happiness as the summum bonum of life, is, according
to the Naiyāyika, a chimera: it is a psychological fallacy to assert that any such state exists, for, pleasure is always accompanied by pain and without pain there could be no pleasure.

Liberation, thus according to the Nyāya, is a state of negative pleasure and is produced by deliverance from pain. The next question that naturally presents itself to the Naiyāyika, is 'how this deliverance is to be secured?' Liberation, says the Naiyāyika, arises from the knowledge of the truth, the knowledge of the cause of pain and of the means of its removal. Liberation, however, must not be supposed to arise immediately after the knowledge of the truth has been attained, for, the causes of pain form a series which can only be annihilated in succession, and succession is a process in time. The series of the successive causes of pain is: (1) false notions (mithyagunanam), giving rise to (2) faults (doshani) which lead to (3) activity (karma) which again is the cause of birth (janma) and birth is the cause of pain (dukkha). Hence in order to shake off pain we have to strike at the very root

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vis. Mithyagnanam, and the annihilation of Mithyagnanam will be followed by the annihilation of the entire series of causes.

The Naiyáyika proceeds to prove the existence of God by an argument which is much like what is known as the cosmological argument in the European Philosophy. Like the latter, the Naiyáyika's proof also reasons from the world as effect to God as its First Cause: 'विदग्द्धि सकद्दका कार्येर्वात्.

The four mahabhutas require, as effects, a cause.

This, however, looks, at first sight, like a petitio principii: for, to admit that a thing is an effect, is to say that it has a cause. The real difficulty lies, it will be said, not in showing that an effect must have a cause but in proving that a thing is an effect, that it has a देह or a mark possessed by the Paksha by means of which, its जन्यत्व (effect-hood) can be inferred. The Naiyáyika finds such a mark in सावयवत्त or the fact of possessing parts. Thus सावयवत्त (being possessed of parts) leads to जन्यत्व (effect-hood) and जन्यत्व to क्रियान्यत्व (the fact of being effectuated or caused by an agent).
AN EPITOME OF JAINISM.

But the Naiyāyika does not stop at the conception of a mere cause which a purely cosmological argument leads to, but shows that कार्यण्यल or कार्येल (the fact of being effectuated or produced) implies, not only an agent but an intelligent agent—रुषित कार्यण्यल'.
CHAPTER XV.

CAUSATION AND COMPOUND EVOLUTION

The world is the permutation and combination of atoms—Causes of differences—Science fails to explain—The principles of causation—Criticism of Mills conception of the law of causation—Patient and Agent—The Jain view of causation and compound evolution.

Having discussed in a previous chapter how we look upon the Universe as self-existent something having its being from all eternity, and having briefly reviewed as well the other principal systems of thought bearing mainly on cosmology, we are led to enquire into how, according to our philosophy, old things change giving place to newer combinations and forms. We have seen that the Universe taken as one undivided whole must be in-create, eternal, self-existent and ever-permanent. But viewed from the standpoint of its inter-related parts, it is transitory, phenomenal and evanescient. And it goes without saying that the assertion of self-existent is simply an indirect denial of creation.
involving as it does the idea of an existence without beginning. But this tanta-
mounts to a veritable denial of an extra-
cosmic personal God who builds the cosmos out of the chaotic matter which, according to
the creationists and other deists, lay diffused homogeneously filling up the entire space, at the dissolution of the Universe with the end of the so-called previous cycle or created it out of Himself or His own energy (at a particular point of time) through a kind of dialectic process as taught in the other theistic systems of philosophy such as the Yoga, the Nyāya or the Vedānta.

The question, therefore, is, if God is denied where are we to look for a rational solution for the various mysteries which underlie the flashes of lightning dazzling our vision, or the thundering cataracts deafening our ears? Is it that the sprouting forth of the small seed bringing into existence a big tree, the bursting of the eggshells giving birth to beautifully moving bipeds and a variety of other awe-inspiring phenomenal changes, astonishingly mysterious in character, which not only infuse in us
a feeling of wonder and admiration but morally prevail upon us to posit and believe, as it were, in an Intelligent Designer and Maker behind,—is it that all these and the like changes are but so many results of chances? Wherein lies the necessity and utility of the philosophy then, if it denies God but cannot reasonably account for the amazing occurrences in the world of phenomena?

Indeed and it is worth while to remark that a patient perusal of the preceding pages on the predicaments, their character and their developments will convince anyone in the truth of the summary statement we make here that speaking of the Universe as a whole or in part, it is but permutations and combinations of our four primary rudiments *viz.*, time, space, soul and *Pudgal* matter. These rudiments are resolvable into the minutest of their minute parts which give a limit to fresh divisions by not admitting of any further analysis.

Now a study of the nature of these ultimate ingredients reveals to us that these—each and everyone—are surcharg-
ed with innumerable powers having the potentiality of being developed in various ways and of bringing as well into existence such an infinite variety of their permutations and combinations which will account for the amazing phases and phenomena of Nature. Even modern science has had to acknowledge the truth of this. Chemistry demonstrates beyond doubt that all compound substances owe their existence to the permutations and combinations of the atoms of Hydrogen, Oxygen, Nitrogen, and Carbon etc.—Heat, light, electricity, hold Physics, are but different arrangements of molecules-in-motion constituting the same. Biology teaches that all organisms—vegetable or animal—are only composed of cells under a variety of their combinations. This is not all. Science dives deep to fathom the amazing mysteries underlying the differences between things chemical, physical or biological; and like a master-surgeon she dissects and analyses Nature and attributes the cause of the mutual differences between things to the said principle of permutation and combination.
of atoms, molecules or cells forming the structure and character of the chemical, physical or biological evolution. Thus even according to the researches of modern science, Universe is nothing more than an ever changing permutations and combinations of the atoms, molecules and cells forming the character and composition of the same.

But what are permutations and combinations which seem to play the part of unitary method as it were in explaining the differences and diversities in and through which the Universe reveals to us its being? Permutation and Combination, we know, are but processes of mathematical calculations to find order in the atomic or molecular arrangement of things having their being in time and space. We all know that in the science of mathematics, the members 1, 2, 3, 4 etc. or a, b, c, d, and the like are but so many symbols, each giving us a definite idea of something conditioned as represented by the same. And Permutation is their arrangement in a line reference being had to the order of sequence; as for
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instance, a-b and b-a are but two permutations of a and b. Similarly Combination is their arrangement in groups without reference to the order of sequence; as for example, 'a-b-c' is a combination involving a, b, and c, and 'b-a-c' is but another combination, both consisting simply of a, b, and c, grouped together. In Combination, it is worthy of note, we take notice only of the presence or absence of a certain thing and pay no regard to its place in order of time and space. There being but a, b, c, d and so on, it finds out only how many combinations could there possibly arise by taking at a time the two, three, or four of the symbols.

While investigating into the structure and composition of chemical things we substitute,—H, N, O, C as symbolic representation of Hydrogen, Nitrogen, Oxygen and Carbon, the ultimate rudiments or atoms of which are innumerable in number, in the places of a, b, c, d. Now experiment shows that it is due to the innumerable variety of atomic combinations of H, N, O and C.; that we have differences between the different
compounds. To take Carbo-hydrates and fats for examples: Analysis shows carbo-
hydrates to be a compound of C, H, O; and if we analyse fats, we get the same three
chemical elements. Therefore the question
is: What makes for the differences both in
colour, character and configuration between
the two compounds, the component parts of
a molecule of carbo-hydrate being found to
consist of $C_6H_{12}O_6$; and a molecule of
fat to consist of $C_{51}H_{98}O_6$. Then, again,
to take the cases of Strychnine, Quinine,
and Gluten: Analysis of these three shows
them to be but combinations of C,H,N,O.
And it is needless to add that the three
compounds are wholly different from one
another. Strychnine and quinine are poison-
ous whereas gluten is nutritious. A molecule
of quinine is a combination of $C_{20}H_{24}N_2$
$O_2$, whereas a molecule of strychnine is a
combination of $C_{21}H_{28}N_2$ and $O_2$.

Now from a reflective study of the results
of the above analysis, one might venture to
remark that the mutual differences existing
either between carbo-hydrate and fat or
between strychnine and quinine, are due,
it is apparent, to the numerical differences in the combination of the component atoms constituting the structure of a molecule of each of them. But is the numerical differences in the combination adequate to explain the causes of differences in question? The molecule of Ammonium of Cyanate is composed of two atoms of Nitrogen, one atom of Oxygen, one atom of Carbon, and four atoms of Hydrogen; and the molecule of Urea is composed of the same number of the same atoms. How, then, can the properties of the two molecules be different from one another? "What can that circumstance be", rightly enquires Pattison Muir in answer to the above question, "except the arrangement of the atoms that compose the molecules?"

But the answer of Pattison Muir given in the form of interrogation, will it satisfy the reflecting mind yearning for a rational solution for the differences in question in things we everyday find around us? To say that the difference is due to the difference in the arrangement of atoms forming the composition of the two molecules is to
simply state a fact. It is an attempt to explain X by Y both of which are unknown quantities. It does not clear up the mystery that underlies the real question at issue. The question is: Whence is the difference? Every other condition being the same, what is it that leads to the difference in the combination of the component parts forming the composition of the two compounds? Modern science is quite out at sea here and her helm of Reason is lost. She can explain how things happen but gets hopelessly confounded and confused to answer why they do so. And unless this 'Why' is cleared up, we cannot expect to get at the reason that lies behind the differences in the world of phenomena.

The reason why modern science cannot answer the point in question, lies simply in the fact that she takes only a partial view of things and does not look straight to the two principles of Causation. We have stated that the Universe is a system of interrelated parts and the parts, as such, are conditioned. But things conditioned, it is a truism to say, are but products, \textit{effects} of something
else which is termed as *cause*. A cause is what brings about an *effect*, the latter being what follows from the cause. Such being the definitions, in general, of the *cause* and the *effect*, many a logician have drawn a line of distinction between the circumstances and the active agents which co-operate to bring about an effect. One has been termed as the *Substantial cause* and the other as *Determining* or *Efficient cause* otherwise known as *Patient* and *Agent* in European logic. The reason why such distinction is drawn consists in this. We see the potter manufactures the jar out of clay by means of *Danda-chakra,*—the mill-stone-and-the-lever. The jar is thus the product or effect of the co-operation of clay, the lever, the mill-stone, and the potter *i.e.* the manufacturer himself. Such being the case, all these beginning with clay must have to be taken as the *cause*, the *effect* of which is the jar—the product or the output of the co-operation; for a *cause* is the aggregate of all such accidents both in the agents and the patients as concur in production of the *effect* propounded. The manufacturer, the mill-stone and the like have
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all co-operated indeed to bring about the jar; but they have got their peculiar functions of their own. So long the jar is there, clay is there too. The actual existence of the jar cannot come to be as such if you extract out clay from it. But after the production of the jar, if the manufacturer or the millstone is separated from the jar, it is not in the least affected. Again the function of the manufacturer is not the same with that of the mill-stone or the lever or clay even. It is clay that is cast into the mould and moulded into the form of the jar, and it is for this reason that clay is named as the substantial cause and that by means of which the effect already existing imperceptibly in the substantial cause is brought about or developed into a perceptible form is the efficient or determining cause. That without which nothing can there be, that which invariably precedes something else which is but an effect, is the true nature of the cause. When we see that the jar cannot come into existence either without the manufacturer or without the mill-stone, and the lever, it follows a priori therefore
that the manufacturer, the wheel, the lever are also but causes which combine in the production of the jar.

It is thus clear that every product or effect requires also a Determining cause (in addition to the Substantial one) to bring the same into actual existence. We have stated already that the primary ingredients—each and every one of these—are surcharged with infinite powers of their own having the potentiality of being developed in innumerable ways and these being but materials giving constitution and structure to all earthly existences are worked upon by the Determining cause to bring the same into varieties of combinations. And therefore it is due to the intervention of this Determining cause that we find the difference in the arrangements of atoms constituting the structure of the two molecules of Ammonium of cyanate and of Urea and it is this that accounts as well for other various differences in things in all the three worlds, chemical, physical and biological. But would not the ascription of Causality to the substance which is worked upon involve the difficulty
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of making the Patient to be the Agent?

Indeed there is a school of logic predominant in these days of scientific culture which refuses to make any distinction between the Determining cause and the Substantial cause in the law of causation. Even the most classical of the English logicians, as Mr. Mill, has taken exception to this distinction. "In most cases of causation," writes Mill, "a distinction is commonly drawn between something which acts and some other thing which is acted upon, between an agent and a patient. Both of these, it would be universally allowed, are conditions of the phenomenon; but it would be thought absurd to call the latter the cause—that title being reserved for the former."

The distinction, contends Mr. Mill in support, is a verbal one and not real, because of its vanishing on examination: for the object which is acted upon and which is considered as the scene in which the effect takes place is commonly included in the phrase by which the effect is spoken of, so that if it were also reckoned as a part of the cause, the seeming incongruity would
arise of its being supposed to cause itself. To cite an instance we have the falling of bodies. "What is the cause which makes a stone fall?" observes Mill, "and if the answer had been 'the stone itself' the expression would have been in apparent contradiction to the meaning of the word cause. The stone, therefore, is conceived as the patient and the earth (or according to the common and most unphilosophical practice, an occult quality of the earth) is represented as the agent or cause. But that there is nothing fundamental in the distinction may be seen from this that it is quite possible to conceive the stone as causing its own fall provided the language employed be such as to save the mere verbal incongruity. We might say that the stone moves towards the earth by the properties of the matter composing it, and according to this mode of presenting the phenomenon, the stone itself might without impropriety be called the agent; though to save the established doctrine of the inactivity of matter, men usually prefer here also to ascribe the effect to an occult quality and
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say that the cause is not the stone itself but the weight or gravitation of the stone."

"Those who have contended for a radical distinction between agents and patients have generally conceived the agent as that which causes some state of, or some change in the state of another object which is called the patient. But a little reflection will show that the license, we assume of speaking of phenomena as states of the various objects which take part in them (an artifice of which so much use has been made by some philosophers, Brown, in particular, for the apparent explanation of phenomena) is simply a sort of logical fiction, useful sometimes as one among several modes of expression but which should never be supposed to be the enunciation of a scientific truth. Even those attributes of an object which might seem with greatest propriety to be called states of the object itself, its sensible qualities its colour, hardness, shape and the like are in reality (as no one has painted out more clearly than Brown himself) phenomena of causation in which the substance is distinctly the agent or producing cause, the patient.
being our own organs and those of other sentient beings. What we call states of objects, are always sequences into which the objects enter generally as antecedents or causes; and things are never more active than in the production of those phenomena in which they are said to be acted upon. Thus in the example of a stone falling to the earth, according to the theory of gravitation the stone is as much an agent as the earth, which not only attracts but is itself attracted by the stone. In the case of a sensation produced in our organs, the laws of our organism and even those of our minds are as directly operative in determining the effect produced as the laws of the outward object. Though we call prussic acid the agent of a person's death, the whole of the vital and organic properties of the patient are as actively instrumental as the poison in the chain of effects which so rapidly terminates his sentient existence. In the process of education we may call the teacher the agent and the scholar only the material acted upon. Yet in truth all the facts which pre-existed in the scholar's mind exert either co-opera-
ting or counteracting agencies in relation to the teacher's efforts. It is not light alone which is the agent in vision but light coupled with the active properties of the eye and brain and with those of the visible object. The distinction between agent and patient is merely verbal: patients are always agents."

Taking stands on these and the like arguments, Hume, Whately and Mill and many other scholars of the same attitude of mind under European culture made themselves so bold as to attribute weakness to the exponents of our philosophy in regard to our drawing a sharp line of distinction as between the Determining cause and the Substantial cause. And as the Jain cosmology is based on the law of causation as stated herein before, it is imperative to enter into an examination, by the way, of Mill's doctrine on this point.

Let us begin with the remark at the outset, that the upādāna or substantial cause and patient of the European logicians are not one and the same either in meaning or in their bearing. Nowhere in our works on the subject has it been taught that the
substantial cause has not the least possible agency in any form in the causation of things. 'Karaka'—case, in our grammar, is the general term signifying agency and the nominative, objective, ablative and the like are but specific terms implying different forms of the functional activity of the cases. The nominative, objective and the like,—they all act or operate no doubt; but they never act of themselves and in the same way, form and matter. Each of the cases has to act differently and in its own way. By the term 'Kriyā'—verb, we generally understand the changes in their most gross and visible form; but in any case, we should not lose sight of the important fact that visible changes are but resultants of the co-operation of all the cases beginning with the chief agent or the nominative in bringing about a phenomenon.

Now though each of the various cases has its own agency peculiar to itself; the reason why they are not all of them attributed with the principal agency will be found in the fact that the agency of the chief or the nominative is not of the same
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type and character as that of the other cases. The chief agent or the nominative case is quite independent of the functional activities of the other cases which hold but a subordinate position in relation to the principal agent in so far its acting of its own accord is concerned. For, whatever is powerless to act of itself, must be dependant—like the ball in motion—on another for its activities. The ball has the power to roll on; heat has the power to expand bodies: but the ball would not roll or of itself, unless it is set in motion; nor heat will expand bodies, unless the two, heat and body, are bought in close relationship to each other. This is the reason why these are said to be dependant on the agency of something else which must be competent enough to set the ball in motion or to bring the two in such relation as will enable the heat to act on the body so as to expand it. But it may be contended that at times, when we say, 'The ball rolls' or 'heat expands bodies' we really ascribe in our speech independence and agency to them so much so that we have to parse the words 'ball' or 'heat' as

The agency of the Nominative is not of the same type character with the agencies of other cases.
but nominatives to the verbs 'rolls' or 'expands.' Indeed we do so in such and similar other expressions as, 'the stone is falling' or the 'sword cuts well.' And the question is, Why do we do so? What is it that prevails upon to acknowledge the independence of what we really know to be of dependant character? To all this we have but to submit in reply that such forms of expressions are indeed resorted to when the principal agent stands beyond the range of our vision or where the subordinate agents are required to show as if they were playing the role of the principal agent notwithstanding the actual presence of the latter. When the other agents stand in close proximity with the principal, it is then that the subordinate character of their position and function becomes apparent. But where the principal stands in the background there the one or the other of the subordinate agents stands out as the principal in as much as these have their agencies in their respective functional activities and this explains the ascription of primary agency to the ball, heat, or to the
sword, in the above mode of our speech. In the case of the expression 'the stone is falling to the earth', as cited by Mill, we can remark that here the principal agency of that by dint of which all bodies attract one another, whose law the stone dares not disobey, or which mysteriously abiding in the stone and the earth actuates them as it were from within, not having been desiderated to stand out, the stone though a patient (Upādān,) yet it puts on the appearances of both the patient as well as of the agent. It is but a recognised rule in our grammar that where we find a verb (kriyā) change but no nominative or agent as governing the same, there the change is presumed to be going on of itself. And this is how we meet Mill's objection to the ascription of causality to the patient—Upādān.

Now to resume the thread of our discussion as to the causes of differences in the Universe of phenomena around us with the remark that law of causation is but a law of change. Every change stands in relation of antecedent and consequent that is known to us as the relativity of the cause and
the effect. Of these two terms the second is the phenomenon of changes, the first being what brings about the change i.e. the cause. The cause as we have discussed above is divided into two kinds—the Determining and the Substantial. We have invariably seen that in every act of causation these two co-operate together to bring about a change, a phenomenon, an effect. And it having been held that every change must have an antecedent cause, it seems naturally to follow that the universe itself being but an eternal process of becoming, mutability being its very nature, it must have a cause antecedent to its becoming as such; and thus in their zealous attempt at the ascertainment as to the nature of this antecedent condition some have unfortunately stretched this principle of causation to such an extent as to reach its breaking point. They have gone so far as to posit a God, an extra-cosmic Personal Ruler of the Universe, creating, regulating and controlling the changes and affairs of the Universe from without just as a potter would do with regard to the manufacturing
of jars. But little do they think of the grave difficulties that would arise if we were to assume the existence of an extra-cosmic personal God, not Himself the Universe, one Who has created good and evil, pain and sufferings for His creatures, but He Himself stands above and unaffected by these. On no theory of Divine dispensation and intervention in the affairs of the world from without, can evil and suffering be explained. The creation of evil and suffering except by an implied manicheaism which practically annuls the Godhead in attempting to justify its ways or execute its work.

In order to avoid these difficulties some take recourse to another line of reasoning making the agent and the patient to be one and the same and have made themselves bold to declare for an Ultimate Reality whose very nature is existence, knowledge and bliss infinite; Whose consciousness is in its nature creative or rather self-expressive force capable of infinite variations in phenomena and forms, and Who is endlessly enjoying the delight of those variations, and Who, therefore, might well be regarded as evolving
the world of nature including finite minds—out of his own energy, in sport, as it were. Just as we find all things to be mutable forms of one immutable being, finite results of one infinite force, so we shall find that all ideas and ideals are but variable self-expressions of One Invariable and All-Embracing Delight of Self-existence. And this explains the causes underlying diversities and differences between all things and beings the totality of which go to make up this our phenomenal Universe.

But this theory of Cosmic origin is confronted with graver difficulties which cannot but stand for its own condemnation. The whole thing, briefly speaking, stands thus. The One Ultimate Reality which has thrown It-self out into name and form, is a truine Existence, Knowledge, Bliss—Sachidananda. Sachidānanda, it may be reasoned, is God and Who is not only a conscious Being but Who is also the Author of existence and all these. And, therefore, the question is, How could a God who is All-bliss Himself and from whom flow the dews of delight as water
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springs from a fountain, evolve a world out of Himself in which He inflicts sufferings on His creatures, sanctions pains and permits evil. If it is contended that these are but trials and ordeals, we do not solve the real problem at issue. We only mince matters and thus refuse to look straight into things. How could a God who is all Good and All-love Himself has made room for what is called as 'bad' or 'hatred' in the Universe of His own make? For One who keeps pitfalls of ignorance, allows sufferings, sanctions pains or permits rooms for evils in the scheme of His universe as trials and ordeals through which the so-called poor Jiva has to pass, stands Himself convicted of holding thought-out temptations, deliberate cruelty, and moral insensibility; and if a moral being at all, He must be to all intents and purposes—far inferior to the moral excellence of His own creatures. Again, we do not squarely face the question by the statement that they are but resultants of the Jivas' karma for which reason he or she undergoes pain and suffers misery in as much as there is the ethical problem that
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confronts us in the form—who created or why and when was evolved that moral evil which provokes the punishment of pain and suffering? One might well contend that the Self-same Ultimate Reality who is of the nature of All-knowledge-bliss-absolute being but One Existence without a second to stand by It; all that exists being but He; it having been repeatedly declared that 'That Thou Art' and 'That Am I' too—all what is said to exist as evil or suffering, it is He that must labour under the same in the creature who is no the other than He Himself. For just as a spider spins its web out of itself and nestles in or creeps on it, so it is He who throws Himself out into the world of names and forms, in sport, as it were, and it is He that crawls on them in the form of a child; it is He that enjoys the pleasures of His own make in the form of a youth and it is He that totters on the road leaning on the stick in the form of the old and worn out. Indeed when thus viewed, the whole problem shifts the ground and there cannot crop up the question as to how God came to create evil and suffering for His creature. But still
it is worth while to enquire as to how the Selfsame Reality Who is absolute Existence, Simple without a second to stand by It, Who is of the nature of True Knowledge and Delight Infinite, comes to admit in Itself what It is not? All-delight being necessarily All-good and All-love, how can evil and hateful standing in hard opposition to love and goodness and being, therefore, but a visible negation of All-delight, be said to exist in what is All-delight? How could the Absolute, in short, enter into the meshes of Relativity of subject and object?

Thus the inexorable law of Karma being irreconcilable with a Supremely Moral and Personal Deity, the pantheistic origin of the cosmos being found to involve graver ethical difficulties, the pan-entheistic conception of the Universe being concived to stop short in explaining the riddle of the Absolute entering into the meshes of Relativity, we decline to agree in the Divine dispensation and intervention in the affairs of the world, we deny the very existence of any free and all-governing personal God; for all personality we hold to be but a creation
of ignorance and subject to the laws of Karma.

What, then, is the cause of all these diversities and differences? Either in the material world, or in the vegetable or the animal—no two things are alike. Are, then, the visible differences which are evident between things or organisms—mere chance-results or fortuitous concourse of lifeless atoms? To admit them as but results of chances is to invalidate the very law of causation. The doctrine of 'the results of chance' can no more find rooms in a philosophy which seeks to arrive at a rational explanation for the changes we experience at every moment of our being. Change is the soul of all activities and stagnation is but cold death. Change, therefore, constitutes the life of all that is. The development of the seed into a tree or of an ovum into an animal is but a series of changes constituting an advance from homogeneity of structure to heterogeneity of structure. It is this series of changes gone through during the period of development and decay that makes up the life history of a plant or an animal. In
its primary stage, says the Biologist, every germ consists of a substance that is uniform throughout, both in texture and chemical composition. The first step, in the development of the germ, is the appearance of a difference between the two parts in this substance or as the phenomenon is called in physiological language—'differentiation'. And the question is, whence is the difference or this 'differentiation'? In the primary stage of the germ, it was all uniform both in texture and composition. But there appears a difference in the same afterwards. The substantial cause being the same, What is it that accounts for the difference? Reason whispers that there must be something working from within, some cause behind it. But what is it? "No thoughtful person," to speak in the language of Wallace, "can contemplate without amazement the phenomena presented by the development of animals. We see the most diverse forms—a mollusc, a frog, and a mammal—arising from apparently identical primitive cells and progressing for a time by very similar initial changes but thereafter each pursuing its
highly complex and circuitous course of development with unerring certainty by means of laws and forces of which we are totally ignorant." Here too the original substantial causes in all the three instances are, according to the investigation of Wallace, apparently identical; but what is it that determines one to be a mollusc, another a frog and the third one to be a mammal? The principle of Natural Selection can't explain this amazing phenomena; nor the law of the Struggle for Existence and the Survival of the Fittest, however ambiguously it might be twisted, can account for it. All that these can do, is to explain as to how the weakest go to the walls; but not why they should. They cannot throw any light as would explain the causes of differences which are evident in the different spheres of evolution of organisms. The theory of Special Creation, too, cannot account for the differences, for that would require the establishment of a Deity, which is, as we have seen, an impossibility. Why should one be made a king surrounded with all the pleasures the world can afford to supply with for his enjoyment.
and another a slave to starve, serve, and suffer under his tyranny all the indignities of life and living which the humanity will shudder at, to think of; nor the theory of Evolution from One Self-same Reality, Who is of the nature of pure felicity, can touch at the root cause of the present diversity, which is but a visible nullity of the pre-supposition of such an Entity beyond all duality. Such being the position and situation of the above theories and doctrines involving grave difficulties as shown up, let us turn to what our Teachers have to say on the point at issue. Our philosophy teaches at the outset that whatever is real is rational. Reality is synonymous with activity. And by this they mean persistence in existence. Wherever we turn, theresoever differences appear to our visions. And these differences are not mere appearances. In every thing, at every turn of life, we are persistently conscious of these differences. These are real differences. And whatever is real being rational, it cannot but irresistibly follow that there must be some reason behind these differences. The Jain teachers are at one
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when—they say that (i) Time (काल) (ii) External Nature (खमाच) (iii) Necessity (नियति) (iv) Activity (क्रिया) and the desire to-be-and-to-act (चक्र) these five co-operating constitute the reason which accounts for the diversities in Nature. It is these five that, by co-operating, determine the manner and form of the development of the seed or the ovum into a tree or an animal. Indeed it may ring curious to the un-acquainted ears who had not had the opportunity to peruse and ponder over the truths of these philosophical pronouncements of the Jain teachers regarding the differences and diversities in nature. But in order to be able to form a calm judgment on the point in question, it is imperative that we should try to grasp the principle inculcated in these our present philosophical pronouncements bearing on the point.

It has been said that summarily speaking the universe is compound of the four primary ingredients vis., Time, Space, Soul and Pudgal. These are resolvable into the minutest of the minute parts which do not admit of any further analysis. Now
these ultimate rudiments having nothing for their material cause Upādān, stand by themselves as unresolvable units. And a patient study of these ultimate units will make it clear that they—every one of them—are instinct, as it were, with infinite power by the virtue of which they are capable of being developed in innumerable ways through the processes of permutation and combination of these four original ingredients which form the true character, composition and make up of the Universe revealed in a diversity of names and forms. This diversity of names and forms in and through which the self-existent Universe is revealed to us owes its origin to the variety in the arrangement and combination of the ingredients composing the same. But what is it really due to? The variety in the arrangement and combination is due to (1) Kāl—Time, (2) Swabhābā—Nature i.e. favourable environment; (3) Niyati—Destiny or Necessity, (4) Karma—Action or motion and (5) Udyama—Self-assertion or Effort—the five-fold Determining Causes (निमित्त कारण) all acting in conjunction
with one another on the substance (द्रव्य) produce changes and variations in the same, regulate their manner of unfoldment and determine its growth, form and configuration as well. It is important, therefore, to dwell briefly on the characteristic indications (चर्चण) of these five-fold determining causes by virtue of which the self-existent Universe has been the permanent theatre of perpetual changes and diversities—a strange array of ever-occurring phenomena that bewilders us at every moment and turn of our life and thought.

(1) Time (काल)—to begin with—is an aggregate of one dimension; of itself and from its very nature, it flows on uniformly revealing itself as it does in relation of sequence and seasons. Succession being thus the very property of time all changes are possible in time only.

(2) Nature (स्वभाव) is the natural or External environment of a thing or organism. It consists of the soil, the air, the water, the heat and the light. The growth of a plant may be referred to the seed which is the substantial (उपादान) cause of the plant and
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to the soil, the air etc., to the circulation of the sap and to the chemical action of the heat and light—in short, to the External environment which determine the growth. This is why it is said that the life of an organism depends on the external Nature whose function is to supply the wants and demands of the living organism which happens to enter into relations, the continuous adjustment of which is called life. A living organism is a seat of chemical changes divisible into (i) Anabolic or Constructive processes in the course of which the so called non-living matter is taken in and assimilated by the organism from without and into (ii) Catabolic or Disintegrative, destructive processes during which living matter or stored-up substances are expended. Metabolism (माणघातिक्रिया) is but a name for these two processes of construction and destruction and forms the chief feature of a living organism. And the normal growth of an organism means normal metabolism requiring the supply of food quantitatively and qualitatively of the proper kind, the laying up of the food within the body
and regular chemical transformation of the tissues and the preparation of the effete products which have to be given out. It is thus clear that the External Nature \( \text{(वाच्यप्रक्रिया)} \) stands to supply the needs, demands and requirements of the organism for its proper nourishment and normal growth. If she in any way fail to supply what is demanded of her by the organism, the latter deteriorates and becomes weak to carry on the struggle, to cope with the undesirable forces and elements, or to propagate species and thus goes to the walls in the long run.

3. \( \text{Niyati (नियति)} \) means, Fate or Destiny. According to some school of thought, it means Divine Decree which must come to pass to bear its command over our thoughts and activities. Thus interpreted, it takes away from us all the moral responsibility which lies only in our option of doing a thing, and not in compulsion. But in Jain philosophy, however, the term \( \text{Niyati} \) signifying 'Necessity' is described as the concatenation of causes whence all things must necessarily follow as the four follows from two plus two or as three angles of a triangle
must be equal to two right angles clearing away everything standing in the way to offer it even the least possible resistance.

4. *Karma* (कर्म) means Action or Deed done. Revealing itself as it does in the taking of the one concomitantly with the leaving of the other, it implies a change of relations or relative positions which is nothing else than motion itself in some form or other. The cause of motion or action being the substance itself which by exertion of power produces action, operation or *Karma*, the substance or the organism itself has to bear the consequences of its own *Karma* in any stage of its existence, past, present or future. And this explains the origin of the common adage "As you sow, so you reap."

5. *Udyam* (उद्यम)—Exertion, assertion or effort which is in its simplest form is the desire to realise a particular end or idea. Sifting analysis of the affairs of the world of phenomena in question brings us to the "desire-to-be" evident in the form of exertion or assertion as the supreme reason for all existences. It is the desire-to-be, to exist distinct and separate from what
it is not, that is evidently the cause of
of the world of distinctions and forms. If
it is asked what was the root cause of the
organism coming into existence, we must
reply, "Itself." Who was the creator of
the being? 'Itself', is the ready answer
we have to make in response to the question.
'Itself' is its own object and itself alone is its
reason for existence. And, therefore, it
has been well said that all the true reasons
and transcendant motives a man can assign
for the way in which he acts can be ren-
dered into the simple formula "in that
was my pleasure." And likewise is the
case with the wherefore of the other things
and beings. The highest philosophy brings
us no other reply: beings and worlds are
because it was their pleasure-to-be. To-be
or not-to-be is but a matter of option for self-
assertion, or otherwise wherein lies deep the
primordial root of all responsibility.

Now Time (काल), the External Nature
(स्बभाव), Necessity (नियति), Action (क्रम), and
Exertion (उद्यम) whose natures have been
just discussed in brief, speak for the differ-
ences and diversities in the world of forms
and phenomena. To illustrate for a more thorough grasp of the point at issue as to how these determining causes and conditions co-operate in bringing about the countless differences and diversities in the processes of the compound evolution let us take the case of a huge tree developing from its own seed.

We have already stated that every thing in the universe is surcharged with infinite powers of developing itself after its own type. So also is the case with the seed. The seed of a particular tree is also instinct with infinite powers of developing itself so much so that the huge form of the tree together with its bark, branches, twigs, leaves, flowers and fruits in the course of time, lie hidden in a potential state of existence in the seed. The protoplasm which ultimately develops into the seed being the substantial cause, it changes and transforms itself into the seed and ultimately into the tree by the help of such causes, and conditions as time, nature and the like—which determine its manner and growth of development. On close examination of the seed we
find that the granular protoplasmic particles—the contents of the outer shell, the cuticle, which holds together the granules in a particular combination is all through uniform both in texture and chemical composition without any difference and differentiation between its parts in the primary stage of its being. If you crush the seed so instinct with the potency of development, it will not bud forth and why not? There are the component parts of the seed—the granules not an atom of which has been lost in any way. Why would it not then develop into a tree? The answer is simple enough and we need not travel far to look for it. The seed is the seed under a particular arrangement and disposition of its constituent elements and as such it is the substantial cause having the potency of developing itself into a tree of its own type, if only the determining causes conjoin with one another to help its growth. But the crushing of the seed interferes with the relative disposition and arrangement of its constituent elements and thus has rendered it impossible for the five-fold determining causes to act on the seed.
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So we see the seed has the potency to develop itself into a tree after its own type, but it has to wait for the proper time—the arrival of the season which might be the rainy one. The season is there but the seed must be planted in the soil with such other natural environment as would allow a reasonable circulation of the sap and chemical action of heat and light and would as be well able to supply the requisitions of the seed.

Again, granted that the time, the external nature, the necessity—all the three are present, the seed, if not planted by some body, does not fall on earth by the virtue of its own exertion and weight, making all the necessary transformations thereby impossible.

Then, again, though the season is there and the seed too has been planted in the desirable soil with favourable environment, yet the seed will not grow into the tree of such and such bulk and configuration for the manifestation of which it has the potency unless there be the concatenation of the causes and conditions which is but
another name for 'Necessity' that operates irresistibly.

The seed fructifies, as is often observed, but yet it may not sprout forth into a tree identical with the parent one and bearing leaves and flowers and fruits or seeds of the same size, taste, colour, beauty and grandeur of the tree whereof the seed was born. And why? Surely these are the effects of karma of the seed in one or the other periods or stages of its existence and it is due to this very karma even done in some time past, that the seed has come to be a seed of this and not of another organism.

To enter a bit more into details as to the causality of karma in bringing about the phenominal diversities and differences, the existence of various kinds of vegetable organisms all around us, is undeniable. In the organic world, it is but a truism to say that the like produces the like. The mango seed will develop into a mango tree and to nothing else. So with the other kinds of seeds. Now in the processes of metabolism every living organism grows and undergoes through the adjusting and regulating influ-
ences of the two-fold nature—Inner and Outer. (अन्तर्वाच्च) The seed is the inner nature of the tree where as the outer nature comprises the soil, the water, the heat, the light, and the air. The seed has the potency to develop into a tree and it is only the outer nature that stands as a help to the seed in the exertion of its latent powers for its proper development into a tree; but this outer nature is almost the same to all the different trees. The real difference, therefore, lies in the inner natures' of the different trees i.e. in the seeds. And the same old question comes round yet, Whence is this difference? If it is said in reply that the difference is due to the difference in the relative disposition of the particles constituting the two seeds, then the difference is only explained by another difference which tantamounts to explaining 'X' by 'Y' both of which are unknown quantities and therefore the second difference again has yet to be inquired into. Science stops short here. She does not know. The mystery, though pushed back, remains un-
altered. However may a Lamarck take recourse to the principles of conservation (Heredity) and progression (Adaptation) and touch upon the struggle of each against all; or a Darwin may twist and stretch his so-called principle of Natural Selection to show the Origin of Species and the Descent of Man or however may a Spencer write volumes on the interpretations of the Law of the Survival of the Fittest through the processes of which the weakest go to the walls, or to explain the unsurmountable gaps in the gradations of the organic beings—vegetable or animal or however may a Haeckel knock his brains out to find out the missing links in the ever-evolving chain of organic evolutions from Monera to Man, the present and the last expression of the organism of the highest type, Biology only misses the mark and beats about the bush when she says that protoplasms are alike and identical but does not assign any reason for their subsequent differentiations and variations. And years afterwards she will have to admit that there is no other alternative course
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than to take recourse to the Law of Karma to explain the causes of differentiations and differences as manifest in their combinations and subsequent variations. The granules of protoplasm were registered with impressions of the acts and deeds they have done in their past lives whereof they have developed a kind of disposition or tendency towards each other under the influences of which they have come to the existing forms of combination making up the different 'Inner Natures' in the different species of trees and other organic beings. Or what else is there to explain the diversities of Nature? They can't be explained as her mere freaks or as fortuitous concourse of what is invariably conditional—a fact which is but a visible contradiction and negation of the chance-hypothesis; nor can they come out of nothing, for, we are unable on the one hand to conceive nothing becoming something or on the other something nothing. It being thus impossible to establish in thought a relation between something and nothing, we cannot but deduce thereof the indestructibility of matter (pudgal) and conti-
nuity of motion—*karma*. Other determinant conditions being there, it is the continuity of *karma* that explains why the properties of a molecule of urea and that of cyanate of ammonia are different, though they are composed of the same number of chemical elements and it is also this continuity of *karma* that accounts for the development of the diverse forms of a mollusc, a frog and a mammal though arising from apparently identical primitive cells.
CHAPTER XVI.

GOD.

Jainism makes no room for an extra-mundane God—Laplace and Napoleon—The idea is not singular in India—Yet the Jains are not dependant on any All-mighty Ruler standing in the without—Dr. Bose and the Super-physical Power.—Spencer and Spinoza—"Tertium Quid" nature of the Power—The Coalescence these powers in different beings on the attainment of "Nirvan" is the idea of the God-head of the Jains.

In the last chapter on the compound Evolution and the Law of Universal Causation, it has been made clear as to how from the standpoint of phenomenal Nāya the universe is ever changing and transitory, and how from the standpoint of Noumenal Nāya according to which the universe is taken as one undivided whole of inter-related reals, it is self-existent and permanent. We have also seen that because it is self-existent and permanent, therefore, it is not an effect of some anterior cause working from behind the universe; and further that the diversities and differences in the world of phenomena and forms owe their existences to the operation of
the five-fold determinant causes such as Time, External Nature, and the like. Such being the trend of thought and progressive reticulation, the Jain philosophy leaves no room whatsoever for an iron-willed capricious God in the Jain scheme of the universe. The Jains hold that a correct understanding, according to the teaching of Victors, of the true principles of causality and phenomenology, dispenses with the necessity of any divine intervention in the affairs of the world. They are of opinion that the very attempt to posit an all-ruling extra-mundane God is to conceal the ignorance of the true principles of causality under a pomp of delusive reasonings—an ignorance unaware of itself.

Such a doctrine may indeed strike curious and atheistic to the adherents of the various European schools of Monotheists and to other doctors of Divinity so as to give them a rude shaking. But there is no help to it. Truth must be told. When Laplace, the world-renowned French scientist went to make a formal presentation of his famous work to the world-conquering
Emperor Napoleon, the latter remarked, "M. Laplace, they tell me, you have written this large book on the System of Universe, and you have never mentioned its Creator". Whereupon M. Laplace drew himself up and answered bluntly, "Sir I had no need of any such hypothesis." And this piece of dialogue between the two greatest minds of the Eighteenth century, does not strike singular in India, and the reason is that from the time when Greece and Rome, those cradles of western civilization, were still steeped in profound ignorance; nay, from long before the pyramids of Egypt had raised their hoary heads to have a look down upon the valleys of the Nile, such doctrines which do not find any rhyme or reason or necessity to call in the existence of the so-called Diety have been in vogue in India. The followers of the Numerical philosophy of India—The Sāmkhya School of thought—not only do not postulate any such Divine being but make a definite pronouncement to the effect that "God is not in existence; because of the want of all manner of evidence." Nor the Mimāṃsaka atheists
yield an inch in their astute denial of an omnipotent extra-mundane God. The Čār-vāka materialists openly and avowedly teach and preach that there is not only no God but there is no soul at all for the so-called redemption of which one should toil and moil all the day and night forsaking all pleasures of life and thought.

One might well venture to remark here that all these schools being more or less atheistic, are the Jains too atheists of similar type? 'No', is the emphatic answer, we have to offer to the equirers. The Jains do believe in a God after their own way of thinking—a belief which is in and through saturated with all the vigour and strength of life. It does not make us dependant on any Almighty Ruler for our being and beatitude here or hereinafter. It does not cast us into the moulds of those weaklings who love to creep with a quivering prayer on their lips to the silent doors of the Deity; nor of those who crawl, beating breast at every step before his fictitious feet or figure to adore. Rather it makes us feel that we are independent autonomous individuals.
who can curve out paths for ourselves here and herein-after both for enjoyment of pleasures and emancipation of our souls by our own will and exertion.

Here-in-before we have fairly discussed what sort of God we do not believe in; we have seen there what it is not. We shall see now what He is to us as taught by the Jain Teachers.

According to the Jain philosophy the universe is not a fortuitous concourse of dead, dull matter (*pudgal*) only; for that would mean crude materialism which Jainism does not allow. The Victors say that the series of changes as presented by the organic and inorganic worlds, show, as has been recently demonstrated by Dr. J. C. Bose, that in addition to the dead dull *pudgal*-matter, there is something *superphysical* both in the living and in the so-called non-living. When this something superphysical departs from the constitution of the living and the so-called non-living, we say it is dead by which we mean that it does not respond. Experiments have shown that like plants and animals, a piece of metal responds in a like manner,
if suitably influenced. But when "killed by poison," like the plant or animal, it does not respond. European thinkers and biologists have so far assigned the presence of a separate 'vital force' in the physical phenomenon connected with the living organism. In place of any real explanation, a hypothetical nomenclature was used either to explain away or to clothe in a greater mystery the most complex phenomena that we ever come across. From this position with its assumption of superphysical character of response, it is clear that on the discovery by Dr. J. C. Bose, the most renowned Bengalee scientist of the day, of similar effects in inorganic substances, the necessity of theoretically maintaining such Dualism in Nature, must fall to the ground. There is, therefore, not any unknown arbitrary vital force as Physiologists have taught us to suppose but a law, the working of which, knows no change, nor any deviation; but which, as the Victors hold, acts uniformly from within throughout the inorganic and the organic worlds.
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Now that (call it soul, spirit, superphysical something or by any other name you like) by the departure of which the living becomes dead is of the highest spiritual essence and is common to all. The manifestation of this divine principle may differ in different living beings but the collective idea derived from such observations as of this something inherent in the living and in the so-called non-living, is called God. According to the Jains there are energies present both in the material and dynamic worlds. Living apart the material or mental energies, the spiritual ones as a whole is God giving materiality, mentality and substantiality to all things and beings.

The Ultimate Spiritual Power, often called by Spencer, as Primal Energy, forming the last limit of the knowables, reveals itself in various forms and with varying degrees of perfection in different grades of being. The universe with all its bewildering manifestation, is nothing but the revelation of this Ultimate Power or Energy. This is by its nature a tertium quid being matter conscious only when it reveals itself through a senti-
ent organism, and remains unconscious so long its embodiment is the sentient one. This is the Primery Reality from which other realities owe their existence and this is the sap which supports every thing what we call real. The same or allied thought is expressed also by Benedict Spinoza when he says that mind and matter are but two among infinite aspects of the Ultimate Reality which can neither be designated as material or psychical in the sense of being conscious.

God is, in short, the coalescence of this spiritual principle emancipated from the bondages of matter in all its purity, perfection, freedom and blessedness. They do us wrong when they say that we are agnostics; for we worship this Supreme Essence— the Ideal of all of life and thought. We bow down to this Ideal, because we desire to realize the Ideal in every acts of our life and thought. We worship the Tirthankaras, the pure and perfect souls, merely for the sake of their purity and perfection; but not for the expectation of any reward in return. 'Lives of great men remind us that we can make
our lives sublime.' By following the foot-
prints on the sands of time of the Ideal
Tirthankaras who were real heroes, pure and
free, who attained to omniscience and quie-
tude, Nirvāṇa, by the dissipation of their
karma, we shall be able to raise ourselves
from the mires of the world and to attain
to Nirvāṇa by a like dissipation of our own
karma and by freeing ourselves from the
eighteen blemishes that inevitably lead
ultimately to omniscience, the next door to
Nirvāṇam.
CHAPTER XVII.

SOUL.

Souls and the God-head—Materialistic conception of Soul—A bye-product of matter—Eastern and Western materialism compared—Charvak and Hækel and Girardin, the socialist—Cosmological and Moral difficulties involved in Materialism—Admissions by Huxley, Spencer and Darwin—The Jain conception of Spirit and Matter—Their Correlativity—Pradeshas-Parts or Soul-units.—Conscious effulgence form the spiritual essence of the Soul.—Soul’s constitutional freedom—Its Transmigration through the grades of Sansar and Emancipation.

While dealing with our conception of God, we have seen that the individual soul, when it becomes free from all taints and blemishes, reaches perfection characterised by omniscience and realizes itself as a self-conscious spirit of the nature of all-delight, distinct and separate from other than itself, it becomes God.

But what is this soul which is thus potentially divine and attains to God-head, He being no other than the coalescence of the pure and free self-conscious spirits existing in a
higher unity without losing the traces of their individuality in the same? What is the nature of this soul-substance? Is it a spark from the anvil of the Blacksmith, a bye-product of matter of the Physicist, the nascent or the just-born of the Chemists? The Charvaka school of thought teaches that there is no plausible reason and evidence to demonstrate the existence of soul as something distinct and separate from matter and material forces; for consciousness which is a quality of the soul-substance is but the resultant of the concussion of the brain-matter. Just as liver secretes bile so brain produces consciousness. This phenomenon of matter and material powers which is characterised by consciousness in different forms in the living and the so-called non-living, is soul for which reason, we often take recourse to such forms of expressions as consist in saying in our common parlance that the plant lives, the brute lives and feels, and the man lives, feels and thinks. It is thus evident that more the subtle is the organic mechanism, by far the more clear
is the manifestation of the forms of this
bye-product of matter and material forces
revealing as these do in the phenomenon of
consciousness which is otherwise called by
the name of soul or ātman. Just as
lightning flashes across the horizon from
the action and interaction of the stored-up
energies and powers in the ethereal space
of the sky, so the consciousness flashes
across the so-called mental horizon wherein
matter and material energies are stored
up in their most subtle character.
Such being the attitude of mind of the
followers of the system of Chārvāka
philosophy towards the soul, they say
it is not the soul that is immortal; but
the deeds done by the mighty minds that
are imperishable and immortal. In the moral
as well as in physical world, the great ones
only immortalise themselves by their great
achievements, but their souls die and cease to
be with them at the death and dissolution of
the organisms wherein they appear to be
encased as it were.

This denial by the Chārvākas of the
different entity and immortality of the soul
SOUL.

seems to receive additional support from the researches in Biology by some of the master-minds of the west. In summing up his 'Last Words on Evolution, Earnst Haeckel says, "the very interesting and important phenomena of impregnation have only been known to us in details for thirty years. It has been conclusively shown after a number of detailed investigation that the individual development of the embryo from the stem-cell or fertilised ovum is controlled by the same laws in all cases. * * * One important result of these modern discoveries, was the phenomena given to one fact that the personal soul has a beginning of existence and that we can determine the precise moment in which this takes place; it is when the parent cells, the ovum and the spermatozoon, coalesce. Hence what we call the soul of man, or animal, has not presisted; but begins its career at the moment of impregnation. It is bound up with the chemical constitution of the plasm which is the vehicle of heredity in the nucleus of the maternal ovum and the
paternal spermatazoon. One cannot see how a being that has thus a beginning of existence can afterwards prove to be immortal." (The italics are ours :). Such is the idea of the soul and its immortality according to the researches of Modern science in the west; but there is nothing new in it. The idea such an origin and nature of the soul is traceable as far back as Plato's time and since 'to the pure, all things are pure', it will not be labour lost to inform our readers, by the way, that the most famous lines,' "All things by a law divine
In one another's being mingle" in Shelley's 'Love Philosophy' contain an unmistakable reference to the passage of Platoné's Symposium which Shelley himself translates as follows (see Shelley's Prose Works, Ed. R. H. Shepherd, Vo, II, p. 95):
—"The intercourse of the male and the female in generation, a divine work, through pregnancy and production, it were something immortal in mortality." Similar ideas occur also, it would be interesting to note, in the concluding portions of the 'Brihadaranyaka Upanishat' of the Hindus.
But to return to the Materialistic hypothesis of the modern scientists and biologists of the west, we can well say without the slightest fear of contradiction that it is but the revised echoe of the Chārvāka School of Indian Thought. So much so that even the very spirit of the moral doctrine which the followers of that ancient sage Chārvāka or Brihaspati openly and avowedly taught and preached for the regulation of the activities of man so far his moral nature is concerned, persists in the notable declarations which M. Emile de Girardian laid down not merely as his own creed but as that of the vast majority of his socialistic countryman. Girardian’s pointed aphorisms are;—

(i) That the world exists for itself and of itself solely.

(ii) That the man has no original sin to ransom.

(iii) That he bears about him memory and reason as flame bears in it heat and light.

(iv) That he lives again in the flesh only in the child that he begets.
(v) That he survives intellectually only in the idea or the deed by which he immor-
talises himself.

(vi) That he has no ground for expect-
ing to receive in future life a recompense or punishment for his present conduct.

(vii) That moral good and evil does not exist substantially, absolutely, inconsistently by themselves; that they exist only nomi-
nally, relatively and arbitrarily.

(viii) That in fact there only exists risks against which man obeying the law of self-preservation within him, seeks to insure himself by the means at his command.

Such has been in the main the consequen-
tial development of moral ideas of the out and out Materialistic philosophers of the past as well of the present age. And constituted as we are, it sends, as it were, a thrill of shudder to think of these ideas and ideals of the most grovelling nature curiously chalked out to pave the way for the satisfaction of the most lower instincts and brutal propensities of our life and living.

Man does not live for bread alone, not for mere animal living; nor for the satisfaction of
the lower instincts and propagation of species. Man has a moral nature and possesses a soul to save and a conscience as well by the virtue of which he is enabled often-times to subdue, nay sacrifice himself for the progress of thought, culture and humanity. If lives were but bubbles that break at every breeze, why should we not make the best use of the short span of life, we have at our disposal by drawing our sharp knives from your ear to ear for the satisfaction of our own interests and instincts. What bar is there against our doing this? But, as we often see, they do not always and invariably. They organize society and live in it for the common weal and progress. Not only they are often found to subdue their own personal or communal interests; but they sacrifice themselves at the sacred altar of humanity for progress and perfection. And these and the like ideas and ideals are not compatible with the gladiatorial theory of life and living as measured by the standard of crude materialistic hypothesis either of the Chārvāka school or of Darwinian thought and culture.
Besides the above moral difficulties, there are lots of other psychological difficulties of the gravest character involved in the very philosophy of materialism whereon these de-humanising moral codes are based. To cite only a few of them here, it is admitted on all hands that all phenomena of matter and material energies are modes of motion. But consciousness in and through which soul reveals itself is not a mode of motion, and hence consciousness cannot be a bye-product of matter and material forces. Again, the presence of consciousness does indeed make a great difference to the working of the organism. It is mind that controls the organism and life-work could not be the same if consciousness were to cease to be in it. The monumental works of a genius are produced by a hyperphysical power infinitely superior to and higher than the forces accruing from the rushings to and fro and collisions and frictions of the cells and ganglions and molecules or other matter contained in the human skull.

These and similar numberless difficulties are involved in the Materialistic concep-
tion as to the origin of consciousness for which reason Huxley aptly remarks in his 'Physical Basis of Life,' "I individually am no materealist; but on the other hand I believe materialism to involve grave philosophical errors." "Anti-materialistic", writes Spencer in his Essays, "my own view is * * * I agree entirely with Mr. Martineau in repudiating the materialistic interpretation as utterly futile." Darwin enquires, "Is there a fact or a shadow of fact supporting the belief that these elements acted on only by known forces could produce living existence? At present it is to us absolutely inconceivable."

Such and similar other passages might be gleaned in numbers from the pages of the works of other scientific minds of position and authority to show that materialism fails to dive deep into the metaphysics of things and fathom the underlying mysteries, unless it admits of the existence of a super-physical principle by the virtue of which the atoms and molecules combine and work, according to the inviolable law of *karma*, so as to present to us the bewildering phenomenal
activities of nature. And this superphysical principle is our soul-substance. But such an admission of the soul-substance as distinct and apart from dead dull pudgal involves dualism of spirit and matter —Jiva (जीव) and Ajiva (अजीव). Indeed, it does involve, for spirit is as self-existent reality as matter itself is. But the Jains say there is no hard opposition between them as would render them incapable of being united in such manner as we find in the case of milk and water. For the attributes of matter are not absolutely contradictory to the attributes of the soul. Matter is only matter in relation to what is not matter i.e., spirit and so is the ease with the spirit itself, and thus there being an organic unity between the two, they stand to each other in relation of object and subject in as much as if there were any absolute distinction between them, a distinction which by its very nature would be self-contradictory, it would cut off all connection between the things it distinguished. It would annihilate the relation implied in the distinction itself. An absolute difference, teach the Victors, is
something which cannot exist within the intelligible world and the thought which attempts to fix such a difference is unconscious of its own meaning. Thus there is no reason why these two would not enter into relation with each other. "Body and soul," to talk in the language of Young, "are like the peevish man and wife, united jars, yet loath to part." Then, again, we often find ourselves placed in so very uncongenial circumstances that do not suit our constitution at all, and from which, in consequence, we necessarily try to extricate ourselves. The sooner we do it, the better for us. So is the case with the soul. However mysteriously and inconveniently it might have got into the granules of plasms yet the fact is that it is there. We may not see it with our eyes or feel it with the other senses. But what of that? Constituted as we are, do we see force? All that we know of, is motion in and through which both matter and force reveal themselves to us. So mysteriously subtle is this soul-substance in essence, so abstrusely abstract is the idea we can have thereof that it has been taught as belonging
to the regions of the un-extended which accounts for the plurality of its existence. The conception of **pudgal**-matter is that it has weight and fills up space; but the essence of the soul is conceived in self-consciousness absolutely devoid of any tinge of materiality whatsoever. The soul being as such it is according to our philosophy a self-existent ultimate reality without beginning and end. Bereft of all colour, taste, smell and touch, it is metaphysically formless though it takes on the form of that wherein it happens to dwell by virtue of its own **Karma**. Like the vacuous space it has innumerable **pradeshas**. By **Pradeshas** are meant the minutest parts, the soul-units, which do not admit of further psychological analysis. These indivisible parts of the soul or soul-units which are infinite in number are all alike in essence for which reason the soul is said to be characterised by unity with a difference. They are essentially of the nature of conscious effulgence which seems to have been put out, as it were, by the super-imposition of the **Karma**-matter on the various parts of the soul, just as a mirror becomes clouded
with dusts falling on it and appears non-reflecting in consequence. This soul-substance of the Jains, is not a single all pervading reality without a second of its kind to stand by it. There is an infinity of these souls. And though true it is that an infinite number of these has become free from the turmoils of the world; yet there remains an infinite number struggling for freedom; for, if infinity is taken from infinity the remainder is infinity itself. It is these souls in plasms that lie scattered in every nook and corner of the universe and each is the doer of good or bad deeds to reap the consequences of which each takes to the repetition of births and deaths according to the merits of its own *karma* and thus traverses through the various grades of *Samsār*, Heaven, Hell or purgatory or ultimately releases itself from the fetters of bondage by the dissipation of its own *karma* whereupon it becomes pure and perfect and fixed as it were in the regions of *Aloke*.

Thus we see as a reality, the soul has no beginning nor end; but viewed with the light of its own states or grades of existence,
it has a beginning and an end, and herein lies the reason why the soul is stated to be both with and without form. So long it has to go round and round through the repetition of births and deaths it has a form. But viewed with the light of bliss and beatitude which it attains to by being freed from *karma*, it has no form. For, if on the one hand, the soul is to have a form by the virtue of its own, then it cannot but be dull insentient matter-\textit{pudgal} devoid of all consciousness and intelligence (ज्ञान चैतन्य or सच्चिदेश्); on the other hand, if it be absolutely formless then by the virtue of its being free from all activities too (क्रिया-राहितत्व), bondage and freedom would become incompatible with its own nature and \textit{Sansār} too would be impossible and there would, therefore, be no necessity for teachers to impart instructions on the real nature of the soul nor for scriptures enjoining duties which are required to be performed for the attainment of *Nirvāṇam Shāntam*.
CHAPTER XVIII.

THE KARMA PHENOMENOLOGY.

Constitutional Freedom and Divinity of the Soul—'Karma' and Soul—How could Soul get ensnared in the Chains of 'Karma'—Different Theories as to the Relation between Soul and 'Karma'—Law of 'Karma' and Re-birth—The Basis of the Jain Ethics—Heredity cannot explain differences between Organisms—Heredity and 'Karma'.

In the last chapter we have dwelt on soul or jiva as an eternal self-existent reality. We have seen also that soul is, the cogitative substance in the living world and that it has ever been trying to break off its adamantine chains of karma which binds it down to the mires of the world. From the fact that it has been incessantly struggling to free itself from the shackles of karma, that it has been ever striving to attain to Divinity by becoming pure and perfect through the dissipation of its own karma, we understand it to be constitutionally free and potentially divine. And here it may be question, why what is constitutionally free and potentially
pure and divine came to be chained down to the mires of the world. Soul being but a self-existent reality from all eternity must be existing from periods prior to jiva's karma. How then what is of subsequent growth can affect the soul which is constitutionally free, pure and formless?

To this the Jain Teachers say that such a question as the present one cannot even be raised. *Karma* is a phenomenon in time; but soul stands far above time and causation, and until we can logically formulate the question, we cannot reasonably look for an answer to the same. When clearly put, it stands thus,—How, what is above time and causation came down into the meshes of relativity of the cause and effect? How what is uncaused and increat came to be caused and created as it were? How what is truly pure and free became impure and fettered? How what is essentially divine forsook its very nature? Constituted as we are, we cannot answer this question. We think and we think in relations. So it is impossible for us to think of what stands above all relations or causes and conditions. Is it not absurd to enquire as to how the
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Absolute became Relative or how the Un-caused came to be caused as it were? This is why the Jain Philosophy vehemently objects to the raising of such purile questions.

But yet the fact is there and we cannot deny it. The soul lies there fettered in the *plasms* subject to causes and conditions, to the law of *karma* by the virtue of which it is forced, as it were, to travel through the various grades of *Sanskār*. And how are we to account for this? If *karma* be posterior to soul which is pure and perfect and which, in consequence, has nothing to do or perform, how would it come to perform *karma*?

Hence *karma* cannot be taken as posterior to soul. Nor can we take *karma* as something anterior to soul; for in that case it would come to be interpreted as the product of *karma*; but the characteristic indications of the soul as taught in our philosophy show nothing as such. It is not a compound of any ingredients standing for the substantial cause of the soul which is self-existent, and, as we have seen, has no beginning nor end so far it is concerned as a metaphysical entity. Then, again, the soul is formless...
and there is no functional activity of the agent in the manufacturing of what is formless. Therefore \textit{karma} cannot be anterior to soul which is but a simple and formless cogitative substance. If it is contended as a third alternative position that both the soul and \textit{karma} came into existence at one and the same time, then it would lead to the difficulty of explaining which would lead whom?—there being no subject in relation to an object. And such being the position the soul cannot suffer under the consequences of \textit{karma} which being co-eternal with the soul has, like the latter also, nothing to stand for its substantial cause. We cannot hold that their Creator stands for the \textit{substantial} cause as well as for the \textit{determinant} cause to bring about the existence of soul and \textit{karma}; for it would involve the difficulty of explaining as to where was God, the Creator, when these were not. If it is remarked that there was neither merit nor demerit in the beginning of things, save and except the soul which is of the nature of existence, consciousness and bliss, it becomes difficult again to
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explain the various diversities in the phenomenal world—the causes being absent thereof.

All these positions being thus untenable, the Jains hold that both the soul and karma stand to each other in relations of phenomenal conjunction, the continuity of which is without beginning in the sense of unbroken series or succession in time (anādi apaschānapurvi somyog apravāhasamvandha). And such is the ocean of sansār whereon tumultuous waves variously swelling in names and forms come one after the other and break off dashing against weight of the adamantine chain of the phenomenal law of karma causation. Sansār is thus subject to the laws of causes and conditions, to the laws of karma and omnipresent is the effect thereof in the phenomenal universe. It is mete here to note that suffering is not limited to the human world only, but spreads over all the abodes of existence; such, as Hell (narak), the World of the goblins (Pretaloke), Life among the brute-class (Tiryakayoni), the World of demons (Asuraloka) and the World of Gods (Devaloka).

Soul and Karma stand to each other in relation of beginning less conjunction.
It is *karma*—the abiding consequences of our own actions—which subject us to revolve round the wheel of births and deaths through all these stages of existence. Our present state of being is not an allotment of a power working upon us from without, but rather is the consequence of our own deeds done in the past, either in the present or in our previous lives or stages of existence. Whatever happens is the effect of some anterior causes and conditions and whatever one reaps, is nothing but the harvest of what one had previously sown.

This is the key-stone supporting the grand edifice our ethics which declares the dignity and equality of all souls in any form of their existences and teaches as well that every soul stands erect and independent of the so-called inscrutable will and power of any superior Being to whose silent doors we need not creep for the gratification of our desires and ambitions, nor need we crawl weeping and moaning with a view of purging our souls of sins and iniquities of our own make by His grace. The Jain ethics based as it is on this automatic law of *karma*
phenomenology, teaches that we are the makers and moulders of our own fate, and infuses life, strength and vigour by awaking in us our high sense of moral obligation and responsibility—the fountain-head of all virtuous deeds.

Now what is this *karma* on the phenomenology of which the whole of the Jain ethics is based. Etymologically it means *action* or *deed*. But as a philosophical terminology, it signifies not only—*action* but the crystalised *effect* as well of the *action* in so far it modifies the futurity of the doer even beyond death and moulding his career to a great extent in the subsequent states of his existence. A close examination, for instance, of the appearance of man, of the anthropoid ape and of the bat, from almost identical embryos, will make it clear as to what we mean and understand by the operation of the Law of *Karma* in its most general signification.

The embryos of the above named organisms are identical in structure and composition. Hence the embryo of the bat ought to develop into a man. But it does not
happen. And why? Because of the difference of 'heredity,' as they say, which is the conservative principle accounting for the comparative persistency of the type of the organism. But the validity of this principle of transmission into the offsprings, is still open to question.

Why is it that the children of the same parent show marked dissimilarities to their parents and to one another? Why do the twins develop dissimilar characters and possess irreconcilable tastes and tendencies, though coming almost at the same time, from the same stalk and nurtured and brought up with the same care and affection under similar conditions and environments? These cannot be explained away as accidents. There is nothing as such in science. Nothing in the universe of phenomena and form is exempt from the inexonerable law of the cause and effect. There must be some reason, therefore, underlying these inequalities. And what is that reason? To say that these inequalities in children are due to the parents is to admit the truth and validity of the principles of heredity.
and adaptation to the environment as working out these differences in the spheres of organic evolution. But such eminent biologists as Dr. August Weisman and a good many others of equal authority and repute deny that hereditary tendencies of the parents predominate in one; of the grand-father in another; those of the grandmother in the third and the like. Not this alone. Weisman goes further and reasons out that the acquired tendencies are never transmitted to the offsprings. He believes in the 'continuity of germ-plasm' and is of opinion that the inequalities are caused by the differences in 'germ-cells'. "I have called this substance germ-plasm", says Weisman, "and have assumed that it possesses a highly complex structure, conferring upon it the power of developing into a complex organism" (Heredity—Vol. I. p. 170). Dr. Weisman states further: "there is therefore continuity of the germ-plasm from one generation to another. One might represent the germ-plasm by the metaphor of a long creeping root-stock from which plants arise at intervals, these latter representing the
individuals of successive generations. Hence it follows that the transmission of acquired characters is an impossibility, for if the germ-plasm is not formed anew in each individual, but is derived from what preceded it, its structure, and above all, its molecular constitution can not depend upon the individual in which it happens to occur, but such an individual only forms, as it were, the nutritive soil, at the expense of which the germ-plasm grows, while the latter possessed its characteristic structure from the beginning, viz., before the commencement of growth. But the tendencies of heredity, of which the germ plasm is the bearer, depend upon this very molecular structure and hence only those characters can be transmitted through successive generations which have been previously inherited, viz., those characters which were potentially contained in the structure of the germ-plasm. It also follows that those other characters which have been acquired by the influence of special, external conditions during the life-time of the parent, cannot be transmitted at all." (vol. I. p. 273-

"But at all events," sums up Dr. Wiesman,
"we have gained this much that the only fact which appears to directly prove a transmission of acquired characters, has been refuted and that the only firm foundation on which this hypothesis had been hitherto based, has been destroyed."—(Vol. I. p. 461).

So we see how the theory of heredity and adaptation, in short, the theory of Natural Selection through the cosmic processes of which Charles Darwin and a host of others of his line of thinking attempted to show the origin of species, fails to explain the real causes and conditions for the specific differentiations in the spheres of organic evolution.

The real causes and conditions determining the origin of the different types of organisms are to be found out in the principle of metempsychoses. And if the remarks of Dr. Weisman are read between the lines, it will be quite apparent that the Dr. stands on the very threshold of a revelation. He is knocking at the gate and it will open to give him an entrance into the mysteries of Transmigration, "the undivorceable spouse of Karma"; for, according to
the Doctor's hypothesis, the characters of each of the children referred to in the above by way of concrete illustration, are not the results of hereditary transmission but are a manifestation of "those characters which were potentially contained in the structure of the germ-plasm." And the question, therefore naturally crops up in our minds, where did the potential characters and tendencies of the germ-plasm originate from? He says, "from the common stock." But what and where that common stock, we are to look for? Dr. Weisman does not inform us anything on the point, nor does he solve the real problem at issue.

Besides the physiological principle of hereditary transmission involves grave moral difficulties. It means the iniquities of the fathers visited upon the children. One commits the wrong but another receives the punishment! Can absurdity go any further? The reason why the embryo of the bat cannot develop into a man, consists in this that human organism, according to the Jain philosophy, is the product of a different set of causes and conditions; or
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to put the idea with all the Orientality we can command, because the *karma* of the human being is different. *Karma*, here, does not mean 'heredity' through the principle of which the offsprings are alleged to inherit the qualities of the fathers. In Jain philosophy, it signifies what the soul carries with itself from an anterior stage of its being by virtue of its prior deeds and desires. The idea is that every thought we think, every act we do, tells upon our souls and thereby leaves an impression upon them, as it were, which continues to exercise influence on them in their subsequent careers. And accordingly our present happiness or misery is not the award of any power existing outside ourselves but is rather the consequent of what we ourselves had done in the past either in this life or in an anterior birth. None is exempt from the operation of *karma*—Nor Krishna, nor Buddha, nor Christ Jesus. This doctrine of *karma* thus unquestionably furnishes the key to the interpretation of the phenomenal greatness in humanity. Christ Jesus of Nazareth was a Christ by the virtue of his own *karma*. So angels
become angels or they loose their angelhood by the force of their own \textit{karma}. "The experience gained in one life", to quote the language of Hartmann, the great German philosopher, "may not be remembered in their detail in the next, but the impressions which they produce will remain. Again and again man passes through the wheel of transformation, and changing his lower energies into higher ones until matter attracts him no longer and he becomes—what he is \textit{destined to be}—A GOD."
CHAPTER XIX.

CHURCHIANITY AND THE LAW OF KARMA.

Christian Criticism of 'Karma'—Empty Heart of Jainism—Examination of the Criticism—Inconsistencies and Difficulties of the Christian Theology—God and Satan—Good and Evil.—Indian Widows Christian unmarried Girls.

From what has been discussed in the preceding pages so far the inexorable Law of Karma-causality is concerned, it is perfectly clear that man is the maker of his own Destiny. This is the main principle whereon the grand edifice of the Jain ethics is securely based. But this belief in the ethical autonomy of man making him thoroughly free and independent of the iron will of any Being outside himself cannot but irritate Christian minds.

"Instead of a God delighting in mercy, who rules and judges the fair world that He has made," writes Mrs. Sinclair Stevenson in her latest contribution, 'The Heart of Jainism,' "the Jain have set in this place a horridous thing the accumulated
energy of his past actions, *Karma*, which can no more be affected by love or prayer than a run-away locomotive. On and on it goes remorselessly dealing out mutilation and suffering, till the energy it has amassed is at last exhausted and a merciful silence follows. The belief in *Karma* and transmigration kills all sympathy and human kindness for sufferers, since any pain a man endures is only the wages he has earned in a previous birth. It is this belief that is responsible among other things for the suffering of the thousands of child-widows in India who are taught they are now reaping the fruit of their own unchastity in a former life."

So writes Mrs. Sinclair in exposing the so-called 'Empty Heart of Jainism' and in vindication of her Christian creed. But alas! she can not explain the world of inequalities and diversities from the stand-point of her own Christian Theology. If an All-mercy Personal God created this universe out of nothing, could He not make all things good and beautiful and all beings happy? Why one is a born saint and another a murderer?
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Why one waddles in wealth and opulence and another starves to death? If God created one to enjoy the pleasures of life which the world can afford to supply with and another to labour life-long under the stifling, tyranny of his master, how could he be an embodiment of All-love and All-mercy? Need she be told in the language of the poet that "A God All-mercy is a God Unjust."

Christianity teaches that man has but one life on earth to live either for an eternal existence in Heaven or to be condemned into Hell according to the merits or demerits of his deeds. But this naturally encourages a man to make the most of his opportunities here. Besides an appeal for mercy at the hands of an Omnipotent God best suits him who has consciously failed in the discharge of duties. But the great disadvantage of such form of faith is that it makes some violently reckless so much so that when the poet Henri Hein was asked if he believed in Divine Grace, he replied, "God will forgive me, for that is his profession".

Mercy made for Sinners.
AN EPITOME OF JAINISM.

This dramatical piece incident reminds us of the famous lines of another poet who sang in the following strain,—

"He who does not sin, cannot hope for mercy;
Mercy was made for sinners; be not sad."

But with the Jains such conceptions do not count for anything. If the Supreme Being delighting in mercy is the Prime Author of all that is, He should have shown mercy and perfect forbearance, from the very beginning to man,—His own handi-work, instead of allowing him to fall into the pit-fall of Original Sin. Man is not omniscient, and according to the Christian theology, nor a perfect being as well, and as such he must have his shortcomings and failures; but as he was living under the protecting and paternal care of his All-mercy Maker, could he not naturally expect that if he were to commit any mistake in his movements, his Omniscient Father and Guardian who must have fore seen things long before he himself could realise, should protect his son, showing thereby, His perfection of forbearance and mercy to his creature which he is to delight in? We have
already remarked that we the Jains cannot persuade ourselves to believe in a God in the sense of an extra-mundane Creator who caused the down-fall of mankind but afterwards taking pity on them dropped down from Heaven his only Son through whose crucifixion mankind was saved.

Some Christian Divines hold, however, that the pit-fall of Original Sin which caused the down fall of the entire human race was but dug out by the Devil. They teach that God created all that is good and beautiful and it was Satan who brought in the Evil and spoiled man—the handi-work of God. But little do these Divines think that good and evil are but relative terms. Good can not be without evil and *vice versa* evil without good. There is a soul of goodness in things evil and conversely there is a soul of evil in things good. And when God created what is good he must, at the same time, have created the evil too. Similarly, when the Satan created the evil, he too must have created, at the same time, what is good. Now to view things as they stand, we cannot but logically infer that God
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and Devil worked together to create this universe of ours which is therefore but a mixture of good and evil. And to push the question still further, both of them being equally powerful and limited by each other, it follows that neither of them was omnipotent, omnipresent and omniscient. Does Mrs. Sinclair wish us to set up within the shrines of our tender hearts such a God the very conception of which is logically absurd.

Turning to the effects of *karma* on social matters it is true, indeed, that here the earth is soaked by the tears of the child-widows, but will Mrs. Sinclair inform her readers as to why the Christian world Echoes with the sighs of the unmarried? Here the Indian widows had had a chance for the husbands to love and to lose in this life as these were written in the their own *Karma* and there is every reason to hope that they would receive their beloved back more cordially in their warm embraces during the subsequent turn and term of their natural life quite in accordance with their own *Karma*. But what hope
can Christianity, believing as it does in a single term of life on earth, hold out to the thousands of unfortunate girls who never get any husband to love, while the favoured few who have once been married still have many a chance to grant favours to other men who may win the woman's heart and marry them again? Are there any reasons to assign for the poor unfortunate girls' never getting any husbands to love at all? And did not the poet sing—

"It is better to have loved and lost
Than never to have loved at all."

Besides if the fear of Hell or the hope of Heaven be a powerful incentive to good conduct in this life, the prospect of countless births and deaths, during the courses of which there are numerous chances for amendments of conduct and which repetition of births and deaths can only end with the attainment of emancipation from the thralldom of servitude must be far more so. With its firm conviction in the inexorability of the law of *Karma*-causality, Jainism regards every successive life as the moulder of the next untill through the entire and
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absolute exhaustion of the individual's Karma, liberation is surely and inevitably attained, sooner or later.

In fine Mrs. Sinclair would do well to bear in mind that the law of Karma which in the Physical world speaks of the continuity of motion and indestructibility of matter teaches in the domain of Ethics, the immortality of deeds and the inevitability of the moral responsibility in the case of an individual, family, or nation.
CHAPTER XV.

BELIEF IN RE-BIRTH.

'Karma and Rebirths. Complimentary aspects of one and the Same Law Governing the Universe—Buddhistic Nihilism—all without an Ego—Belief in the Law brings in Solace and Comfort in ones failures—Wide range of the belief in Asia and Europe—Poets Scientists and Philosophers—Transmigration has its root in reality—Karma Sarir.

While investigating into the causes and conditions for the differences and diversities in the world of names and forms, we have seen that we cannot explain the differences unless we accept the Law of Karma and of Rebirth as determining them. Karma and Rebirth which are thus, potent factors in the evolution of the world of particulars constituting Sansâr are but two complimentary aspects of one and the same Law governing everything having its being as a part, as it were, of this ocean of Sansâr. Boundless is the ocean of Sansâr with countless waves ruffling its expanse in the shape of individuals and phenomena. Sansâr
is thus a composite existence subject to the control of the Law of *Karma* and Rebirth. Almost all the ancient systems of philosophy, excepting only that of the sage *Brihaspati*, are at one here. Even Budhisism which denied the very reality of everything, could not deny the force and validity of the Law of *Karma* and Rebirth. All is impermanent, says a Budha, so that there is no eternal entity passing over to *Nirvāṇa* across the ocean of *Sansār*. All is without an *ego* so that there is no soul to survive the shocks of death and dessolution. Thus rejecting, on the one hand, the metaphysical entity of *Sansār* and immortality of soul, Budhisism, on the otherhand, teaches that it is *Karma* that sets revolving the 'Wheel of Becoming.' Or more plainly, it is our *Karma*—the abiding consequences of our actions which subject us to the repetition of births and deaths.

The belief in the law of *Karma* has been very strong in the Indian mind from time out of mind so much so that it has almost become constitutional with the Indians inhabiting this vast penen-
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sula. Not to speak of the higher philosophical treatises of the soil, even the ordinary Indian vernaculars abound in such passages and proverbs which unequivocably bespeak of their staunch faith in one's own Karma in such a manner as makes it pretty clear that the belief in question has become a source of solace and comfort in one's disappointments and failures in life. Thus lamenting over the cruelty of fortune, a melodious bird of Bengal sings—"किमोर करमे लिखि"—'Ah! my dear, what alas! was written in my karma'.

It is important to note that this belief in Karma and repetition of births is not confined within the precincts of India only. It is also prevalent in China and Japan. There is a Japanese proverb—"Resign thyself as it is the result of thine own karma."

Not the Eastern countries only: an enquiry into the literary contributions of the Christian lands unmistakeably shows how far the doctrine of Karma and metempsychoses has influenced the civilization of Egypt and Greece. Even the mighty minds of Europe and America have
been much swayed by the doctrine. To quote a few verses from the best poets of the Christian world: In the 'Night Thoughts' of Young, the poet sings,—

“Look Nature through, 'tis revolution all,
All change, no death; day follows night, and night
The dying day, stars rise and set, and set and rise.
Earth takes the example. All to refurnish fades;
As in a wheel—all sinks to re-ascend;
Emblems of man, who passes, not expires.”

In Dryden's Ovid we read,—

“Death has no power the immortal soul to slay,
That, when its present body turns to clay,
Seeks a fresh home, and with unlessoned might,
Inspires another frame with life and light.”

Shelley sings in 'Queen Mab, :

“For birth but wakes the spirit to the sense
Of outward shows, whose inexperienced shape
New modes of passion to its frame may lend,
Life is its state of action, and the store
Of all events aggregated, there
That variegate the eternal universe,
Death is a gate of dreariness and gloom,
That leads to azure isles and beaming skies
And happy regions of eternal hope.”

In his 'Intimations of Immortality',
Wordsworth informs,—
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"The soul that rises with us, our life's star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar."

In the 'Two Voices' muses Tennyson—

"Or if through lower lives I came—
Tho' all experience past became,
Consolidate in mind and frame—
I might forget my weaker lot;
For is not our first year forgot?
The haunts of memory echo not."

Walt Whitman confirms in his 'Leaves of Grass',—

"As to you, Life, I reckon you are the leavings of many deaths,
No doubt I have died myself ten thousand times before."

Such and similar other passages might be culled in numbers to show how the doctrine of metempsychoses influenced the best of the European minds in the domain of Poetry.

Again, Egyptian culture and polity was in and through saturated with the idea of metempsychoses. "The Egyptians propounded," says Herodotus, "the theory that the human soul is imperishable and that where the body of any one dies, it enters
into some other creature that may be ready to receive it”.

Pythagoras says, “All has soul; all is soul wandering in the organic world and obeying eternal will or law.” According to Maxmuller, claimed a subtle ethereal clothing for the soul apart from its grosser clothing when united with body.”

In Greece, the doctrine was held by Empedocles. The students of Plato must have noticed that the doctrine of metempsychoses forms, as it were, the key note to the principles of causation and compound evolution.

In Plato’s Phædo we find: “They (souls after death) wander about so long until through the desire of the corporeal nature that accompanies them, they are again united in a body and they are united, as is probable, to animals having the same habits as those they have given themselves up to during life or even into the same human species again.”

“The soul leaving body,” says Plotinus, “becomes that power which it has most developed. Let us fly then from here
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below and rise to the intellectual world, that we may not fall into a purely sensible life by allowing ourselves to follow sensible images etc."

Philo of Alexandria, a contemporary of Christ, says: "The company of disembodied souls is distributed in various orders. The law of some of them is to enter mortal bodies, and after certain prescribed periods (as according to our ayuk-karma) be again set free".

Besides these, copious passages could be gleaning from the philosophical writings and dissertations of such eminent men and leaders of thought as Kant, Schelling, Fichte, Schopenhauer, Goethe and the like. Even the most astute moulder of the Sensationist school of thought, Hume, the sceptic, in his Essay on the 'Immortality of Soul' had to acknowledge the truth and validity of the theory of rebirths. He says: "The metempsychoses is therefore the only system of this kind that philosophy can harken to".

Prof. Huxley of the modern scientific world somewhere remarks: "None but the
hasty thinkers will reject it. Like the doctrine of evolution itself, that of transmigration has its root in the world of reality.

Among the Christian theologians many prominent theological leaders have maintained it. Dr. Julius Muller, the eminent German theologian, supports the theory of Re-births in his work known as "The Christian Doctrine of Sin." Besides Swedenborg and Emerson believed in metempsychoses.
CHAPTER XVI.
RE-BIRTH AND KARMA-SARIRA.


In another place of his last Romanes’s Lectures, says Huxley, “Every day experience familiarises us with the facts which are grouped under the name of heredity. Every one of us bears upon him the obvious marks of his parentage, perhaps remote relationship. More particularly the sum of tendencies to act in a certain way which we call ‘character’ is often to be traced through a long series of progenitors and collaterals. So we may justly say that this ‘character’—this moral and intellectual essence of a man—does veritably pass over from one fleshly tabernacle to another and does really transmigrate from generation to generation. In the new born in-
fant the character of the stock lies latent, and the ego is a little more than a bundle of potentialities; but very early those become actualities; from childhood to age, they manifest themselves, in dullness or brightness, weakness or strength, viscousness or uprightness; and with each feature modified by confluence of another, if by nothing else, the character passes on to its incarnation in new bodies.

"The Indian philosophers called 'Character' as thus defined, 'Karma'. It is this karma which passed from life to life and linked them in chains of transmigrations and they held that it is modified in each life; not merely by confluence of parentage, but by its own acts. They were in fact strong believers in the theory, so much disputed just at present, of the hereditary transmission of acquired characters. That the manifestation of tendencies of a character may be greatly facilitated or impeded by conditions, of which self-discipline or the absence of it are among the most important, is indubitable; but that the 'character' itself is modified in this way is by no means so
certain; it is not so sure that the transmitted character of an evil-doer is worse or that of a righteous man better than that which he received. Indian philosophy, however, does not admit of any doubt on the subject; the belief in the influence of conditions, notably self-discipline, on the karmas was not merely a necessary postulate of its theory of retribution, but it presented the only way of escape from the endless of round of transmigrations."

Such is Prof. Huxley's interpretation and presentation of the law of karna and metempsychoses in Indian philosophy. But we differ from him in as much as neither the interpretation, nor the presentation, on that account, is correct. For we must have to draw a line of distinction between a man and his conditions. According to our philosophy a man may, indeed, be roughly taken as the embodiment of intellectual, spiritual and moral (रूप न रान चारित्र) essences which Huxley sums up by the word 'character.' And the man as such is not different from the sum-total of the the energies summed up by 'character' as just explained. But then there
is another inviolable physical condition in the shape of a medium for the manifestation and operation of the above energies and it is the mortal physical frame which the man takes on. And there is invariably a kind of chemical affinity under the secret influence of which the man is drawn to a particular body wherein he is to take birth. It is true that man passes from body to body through the repetition of births and deaths, and as he progresses or retrogresses quite in accordance with the good or bad deeds he performed in the past, it is evident enough that he passes out with his own self-acquired habits, qualities and desires fitly called *karma-sarira* according to our philosophical terminology. But this does not necessarily mean that the habits and qualities he acquired through the processes of natural selection or through the processes of self-discipline he might have undergone—be these for good, or for bad—are transmitted to the offsprings through the physiological principle of heredity. True it is that the offsprings display at times such habits and tendencies as can well be traced out
as if coming down from the parent or some remote ancestor. The way in which this hereditary transmission is explained by the modern physiologists cannot, as we have seen elsewhere, give us a satisfactory solution of the problem in question. The phenomenon of apparent transmission through the physiological principle of heredity as explained in our philosophy seems to clear up the difficulties involved in the question. According to our philosophy, the re-incarnating soul, bearing as it does about it the *karma-pudgal* which the *jiva* acquired by dint of its past experiences and unfulfilled desires, forming its character in the past, automatically develops with a mathematical precision, a sort of affinity or tendency of attraction, for the appropriate physiological and moral conditions wherein it may find a fit and favourable soil for moulding out of the same, a suitable body as the manifesting media for the display of its powers and qualities, either to cope with nature in the fulfilment of its unsatisfied desires and enjoyment of the pleasures of the world, or to strive for the
attainment of bliss and beatitude, as the case may be, according to its karma in a previous birth.

To enter a bit more into details: we have stated before that there is some 'super-physical' power in every living body, by the presence of which the body is enabled to respond, if suitably influenced. Responsiveness, here, forms a predominating phenomenon of life, and death of the body means the departure of the 'super-physical' power, called atman—Jiva (soul)—from the living body after which it can no longer respond to any stimulus.

At the time of death, when this soul or the 'super-physical' power shuffles off its mortal coil, it passes out assuming the form of a subtle unit of energy clothing itself, as it does, in a subtle body as its vehicle which is built out of the fine karma-matter—the crystalised particles of the soul's past experiences and unfulfilled desires etc. with which it happens to pass out. According to our philosophy, these fine karma-matters or the crystalised particles of past experiences and unfulfilled desires, embodied in which the
soul passes out leaving the body dead, form the very germ of physical life in future.

The use of the phrase "karma-pudgal"—karma-(matter) is singular in our philosophy. All karmas, the other systems of Indian Thought, accept unwaveringly the truth and validity of the doctrine of karma-causality and re-births; but with them karma is amurtâ-imponderable. None has yet been found to take the word karma in the sense and significance as we find it to have been used in our philosophy. It is true that karma of the jîva means its past activities or energies—forces of its own making that tend it to be a murderer or a saint in the next life. But the energies or forces, as they are in themselves are formless and as such they cannot act and react on any thing and produce changes in the tendency of the same. Sky, like void space, because of its being formless, cannot affect us. In order to act and re-act and thereby to produce changes in things on which they work, the energies and forces must have to be metamorphosed into forms or centres of forces. So are the cases with jîva's karma—its past-activities or energies—
forces of its own making, which become metamorphosed as it were into the form of *karma*-particles wherein remain stored up in a potential state all the experiences, desires and tendencies which Prof. Huxley sums up by the word 'Character'.

The experiences and forces of its own, metamorphosed into a material particles, which the *Jiva* carries with it at the time of its departure from the body wherein it had been encased in a previous birth, and known as the *karma*-pudgal of the *Jiva*-form, according to our sages, the physical basis of a future life. It is also technically called—*Kárman Saríra* of the *Jiva* which along with the *tejas saríra* which is also inseparable from it, clings round to the soul until it reaches final liberation. Here again we find another display of the grand truth teaching us of the indestructibility of matter and continuity of motion—*Karma*.

After shuffling off the gross mortal frame like a pair of old worn-out shoes, the individual soul, taking the form of a subtle unit of energy clothed in the *karma*-pudgal as explained, instinctively flies off to one or the other of the different grades of *sánsára* or
gati, as it is called, for which it has developed a strong affinity and where, on that account, it may find a more favourable soil for fuller expressions of the energies and forces of its own making during the course of the previous term of the physical life. It may happen to be located for some time in the regions of hell (नरक) or go to some other world. It may travel among the brutes and beasts (तियां क योत्ति) or may become a god or a demon in the world of gods and demons (देवासुर लोक). It may also by the virtue of its own karma under which it willingly laboured, run to Heaven, the region of the gods, there to enjoy the sweetest pleasures of life which he so much hankered after or be born again to such parents in the human world (मनुष्य लोक) as is consistent with its prior deeds and desires, either to waddle in wealth and prosperity, or to starve to death in poverty, or to strive after bliss and beatitude, forsaking all the pleasures of worldly life and living.

So we see that the ‘Character’ of Prof. Huxley is somewhat the same with the karma-sarira in the Jain philosophy.
philosophers also hold that the death of a living being means the departure from the same of a subtle body technically called, \textit{Linga-deha} or \textit{Sukshma sarira}.

The Hindu sages have thought it wise to analyse an organism into five sheaths or koshas. The first is the \textit{Annamaya kosh}, (ii) \textit{Pranamaya kosh}, (iii) \textit{Monomaya kosh}, (iv) \textit{Vijnanamaya kosh} and lastly (v) \textit{Anandamaya kosh}. It is in the centre of the \textit{Anandamaya kosh} or the innermost sheath that the soul is stated to reside—the outermost being the gross nutritious vesture or sheath called the \textit{Annamaya}. Excluding the outermost one, the \textit{Annamaya}—the other four, one coming consecutively within another like concentric circles taken together, constitute the \textit{Linga} or \textit{Sukshma-sarira} or subtle organism of the \textit{Jiva}. The Hindus further hold that this subtle body consists of \textit{chitta} or the mind-stuff with the organs of sense and actions there held together by the energy called \textit{Pran} playing through the medium of the organism. According to the functional activities this \textit{Pran} is further analysed into—
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(a) Prān or the inhaling power which moves the lungs.

(b) Aparān or the exhaling power manifest in throwing out foreign and effete matter from the system.

(c) Samān or the digestive and distributive energy in the system.

(d) Udān—is the power of speech. It also helps to the descent of foodstuff through the alimentary canal to the stomach. And lastly,

(e) Vyān—is the energy which sustains the body and galvanizes its parts into life and vigour thus protecting it from putrefaction.

Now these organic energies which are but functional activities of one and the same Power—called Mukhya-Prān or the Primal Physical Energy along with the five elemental rudiments of the nutritious vesture, bearing the impress of desires, experiences, and ideas formed in the past, make up the sukhshmasarīra of the Hindu philosophers that passes from body to body through the various grades of sansār according to the merits and demerits of the embodied soul.
But the kārman-sarīra in our philosophy is of different make. It is true that the Jain philosophy speaks of prānas as organic and bodily powers; but these develop only as the jīva ascends up the scale of evolution from lower to higher organisms. The highest type of organism of a jīva has ten prānas and the lowest type must have at least four. Of the ten prānas or powers which are to be found in the higher types of organism as man, five belong to the five organs of sense, viz., touch, taste, smell, sight and hearing. Add to these five, the three powers of body, mind and speech (काय मन वचन). The ninth is the power of inhalation and exhalation termed (चान पान) and the tenth is the ayu-bal—or the power whereby is determined the longivity of the jīva during which it has to keep to a certain definite configuration of the body in which, it might happen to enter in a particular stage of its existence determined by its own past karma. The Jain philosophers hold, however, that of these prānas in their abstract or etherial forms, accompany the karma-sarīra clothed in which the soul departs from an organism wherein it dwelt for a certain period
of time by the virtue of its ayu-bal, accruing from ayu-karma of which we shall have occasion to speak later on. And these abstract (bhava) prānas or powers develop only when the kārma-sarira enters a particular organism according to its own karmas. But all the types of organism do not possess the five senses; neither all can speak, nor all have the intellect to think. While dealing with the Jīva in the chapter of categories, we have seen that jīvīc organisms are classifiable according to the number of the organs of sense they possess. It is important to note by the way that each of these types of organism is again divisible into two sub-classes—known by the names of Paryāpta and Aparyāpta. The paryāptas are six in number, viz., āhār or the seed of life; sarīra, or the body; Indriya or the senses, svāshochchāsa or breathings, bhāṣā or speech, and mana or mind. The prānas and the organs develop as the jīva migrates on and on through the processes of metempsychyoses. It is impossible to exhaust in the short space at disposal, the list of the different types of organism which the kārma-sarīra takes on,
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The *jiva* migrates out with the potentialities of the organs of its future body. According to the ideas and desires registered on it. In fact, it shows to our wonder and admiration how could the Jain sages amass in that ancient time such wealth of biological informations on morphological variations of organisms.

But to return to the direct subject matter: Prior to its migrating from the *oudārika* body or the gross physical frame, the *jiva* fixes its *gati* or the particular abode, and actually migrates out with the potentialities of developing these *prānas* and the organs. But these are developed as necessity arises for the formation of the particular new organism it is going to enter into. And the developments are quite in keeping with its previous *karma* and take place subsequent to its entering into the new body as determined.

Thus we see the *karma-savira* of a *jiva*, as explained in the Jaina philosophy, is simply a kind of organism born of its own experiences i.e. energies and forces of its own making which become materialised, as it were, into *karma-pudgal* or *karma*-matter enveloped in which the individual soul, reducing itself into a unit of energy, passes out.
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Every thought we think, every word we speak, every act we do, every desire we form—becomes rarified and stored up in our Experiential body. It remains dormant there for sometime only to reappear again in the form of mental waves with all the potentialities of strong desires etc. Nothing can prevent the courses of desires. Desires must be fulfilled. This is the law of Nature. The will is equally and indistinguishably desire and thought. It is the will to be, to assert and thereby exist as a distinct and separate from all the rest, that is the root of everything we see around us in the world of particulars. It is but a truism to say that different thought-activities manifest themselves in different outward forms. The science of physiognomy and thought-reading owe their development to the study of the changes in the outward manifestation of the organism, corresponding to the changes in the mental constitution. And organisms may vary not only in respect of their structures, but in respect of their tendencies to do this or the other in all kinds of ways. The thought-currents for tasting finally results in the organic
formation of the tongue. So the ear, the nose etc, can like wise be traced to the thought-currents for hearing music, for smelling fragrance and the like respectively. Every bodily structure corresponds to each set of thought-currents called, upânga-nâma karma of the jîva to which it belongs. So is the case with the human organisms in general. Human organism, to speak more pointedly, is but the objectification in a gross form of the human action-currents of will and thought.

Kant, the great German philosopher, says of man that "his will' is his 'proper self." "The will is simply the man," says T. H. Green. "Any act of will is the expression of the man as he, at the time, is. The motive issuing in his act, the object of his will, the idea, which for the time he sets himself to realise, are but the same thing in different words. Each is the reflex of what for the time, as at once feeling, desiring and thinking the man is ......" Man is thus but a visible expression of his will which is equal to and indistinguishable from his thought-activities. But will and thought, simply as they are in themselves, are mere abstractions,
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and cannot therefore as such modify the character of our organism; for how, what is merely a pure abstraction, can affect our material constitution? but we feel that every act we do, every thought we think, and every desire we form, does actually produce changes in us and there can be no denial of it. Therefore the actions and desires to be in a position to effect any change in us must transform themselves into a medium of homogeneous nature with our physical constitution itself. But the question arises how can it be conceived? Psychology shows quite unmistakeably that no desire, no feeling, no connation passes the threshold of our mind without, in some way, modifying the neural processes. We forget what we felt or did before. But the whole system vaguely experiences a sort of diffused effect of what has been. Modern psychology would tell us that they abide in the region called, "subconscious." But our psychology teaches that just as a volume of water rushing out, leaves its traces of watery particles on the person who stands close by: so the action-currents of the human thought and will leave vestiges on its

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experiential body which brings about a new arrangement in the atomic distribution of the *karma*-pudgal composing the *karma*-sarira.

Whatever might be the mystery, it is clear and certain that human thoughts and desires are embodied in or objectified into the human *karma*-sarira. Thus the *karma*-sarira then forms the 'inner'-nature of which the visible man is but an 'outer' expression. The Inner and the Outer, according to our philosophy, are not essentially different. They are the same essentially with this difference only that one manifests through the other and stand to each other in the relation of mutual intermutation. Just as there is no essential difference between force and exertions; for force is only known in and through exertion making it to be the effect of the cause which is no other than the force itself: so what is 'inner' is but the invisible cause of what is outer which is but an effect in a visible form.
CHAPTER XXII.

KARMA-SARIRA AND OUDARIKA-SARIRA.

Relations between the 'Karma' and the 'Oudarika'—Stages of development—'Karman' produces the 'Oudarika'—'Oudarika' produces 'Karma'—Not Identical but Two distinct Entities—Co-existence Inexplicable—Then no Inter-action possible Relation of Concomitant Variation—Difficulties of Parallelism—The 'Karman' body and the 'Oudarika' stand to each other in Relation of Intermutation.

We shall now discuss the relation between the Karma body including Tejas, or the 'inner nature' and the Oudarika body or the 'outer nature' of man. And as it is a stumbling block for the beginners, it deserves a careful consideration. Without asserting any thing dogmatically, we shall only discuss every possible hypothesis which can be framed with regard to this relation and show that, for the contradictions involved therein, none of them appears to be rationally tenable save and except the position held by our sages. Our procedure here, therefore, will be more or less dialectical i.e. we should point out poverty of each

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hypothesis by bringing into light the inconsistencies involved therein.

One may suppose that the relation in question is simply that of development. The inner nature develops itself into the outer nature as the plant grows into a tree or the world develops itself into the present form from the primal state of nebulous matter. What lends plausibility to this hypothesis is the fact of the inner nature being more subtle than the outer nature which is grosser than the former. The very characteristic indication of an effect, is its grossness and the reason of it, is to be found in the fact that what remains unmanifested in the cause becomes manifested in the effect.

But unfortunately the advocates of this theory overlook the serious difficulties which lurk in it. First of all we draw attention to this that if they be the different stages of development of the same thing, then by the very nature of the case, they cannot be co-existent. Development implies change; change implies time. And 'stages' have any significance only with reference to different periods of time. As the plant
ceases to exist, when it has grown up into a tree, so the inner world would cease to have its being after its transformation into the outer world, for they belong to the same thing although at different periods of its development. The fact of co-existence being thus inexplicable, the mutual interaction between them, which cannot be denied becomes inexplicable also.

Of course if the *purvapakshin* say that the earlier state is not altogether lost in the later state of a thing *developing*, but is retained there: our obvious retort will be that if it is retained at all, it is retained in such a transformed manner that it loses its distinct existence. For what is accidental to the different stages of a *developing* thing, vanishes away with the lapse of time and what persists is the essence or the substance in abstract which reveals itself through these different stages of development.

To get over the difficulties as exposed in the above, some may erroneously hold that the inner nature produces the outer nature of a man. The relation is that of a cause and effect.
This theory also labours under serious difficulties. The first question which we put to such theorists is, how does it produce the outer nature of man? Mere being or the fact of existence of the inner nature cannot account for the origin of the outer nature. The mere being of a thing cannot explain the origin of another thing, so we are led to assert that the Kārman-sarīra transforms itself into the Oudārika sarīra. Here the same difficulties re-appear! How to explain the fact of (1) Co-existence and (2) Inter-action.

Others may think that the right theory is this: Kārman-sarīra does not produce the Oudārika sarīra, but on the contrary Oudārika produces the Kārman-sarīra.

Oudārika is the cause of the kārman-sarīra: but this theory is open to another fresh objection in addition to the previous difficulties. The activity of the Oudārika-sarīra is possible only when it is actuated by desires and will. Has any body heard of unmotived activities? And these desires and will belong to the Kārman-sarīra: so the obvious mistake is here to make the presupposition of a thing, the product of it. That without which the
activity of the Oudārika is not possible, cannot be reasonably conceived to be the product of the activity itself.

So the only way of escape from this difficulty, at first sight, seems to be this: neither of them produces the other, but both are co-existent. They have been maintaining their distinct existence from eternity so to speak.

But to say this, is also not enough. We have got to define the precise relation existing between them. It will not do to simply say that they have been eternally existing as distinct entities, for the fact of inter-action between them requires to be explained.

Now different hypothesis may be framed with regard to the precise nature of inter-action. Some may suppose that there is no interaction proper, but the relation of concomitant variation subsists between them. The changes in the one correspond to the changes in the other, though they are two distinct entities or worlds, having nothing in common.

Our reply is that it sees the half-truth only. In fact there is a relation of con-
comitant variation, for the change in one manifests itself in a corresponding change in the other. But this relation is not possible and cannot be satisfactorily explained, if they be not ultimately the same, or to put it in other words, if a common blood does not run through their veins. But this is negativized by the hypothesis, for by ex-hypothesi they have been assumed to be two distinct worlds having nothing in common.

Others, in order to escape from these difficulties, may suppose that some influence in some form or other, passes into the thing called effect and produces changes in the same. The interaction is not apparent here as in the former case, but real. The cause exerts some influence upon something else and thereby produces changes in the same which we call effect.

This at first sight seems to possess much of plausibility, though it cannot stand to a careful scrutiny of reason. The difficulty here is this: where does the influence rest before its being received by the thing for which it is meant? We cannot conceive of any influence passing out of a thing and
resting in nowhere and then entering another thing we call effect; for, the conception itself is a psychological impossibility. So here too is a big chasm in our thought. Thus we see none of these hypotheses can stand the test of reason and we are thus led by an immanent process of dialectic to our own theory, the only theory logically tenable and free from these short-comings as we shall presently see.

By Karma sarira we mean that Experiential body where the effects caused by the Oudārika are stored up as it were in a subtle form. The operation of the Oudārika or the Perceptual organism leaves a permanent vestige upon the kārman, known as karma-vestige, just as the agitation of the brain molecules in thought, leaves a permanent vestige upon the brain itself. This is what we mean by kārmic effects. These kārmic effects, again, as we shall show hereafter, determine the nature of the perceptual organism or the Oudārika body. The operation of the Oudārika body leaves this karma-vestige upon the Experiential body and thereby modifies it to a certain extent, while on the other hand,
the kārman, the organ of thought, desires and will, determines the character of the former by its preferential interest. So the relation is intermutative. And this is borne out by our analysis of the question at issue.

The relation between karma-body and the Ouddārika—this is our immediate topic. And we begin our discussion by defining the two in the clearest possible manner. By kārman-body we mean the Experiential-body where the effects caused by the Ouddārika-body are stored up, as it were, in a subtle form. The operation of the Ouddārika-body or the Perceptual organ leaves a permanent vestige upon the karma-body known as karma-vestige, just as the agitation of the brain molecules in thought, leaves a permanent vestige upon the brain itself. This is what we mean by karma-matter. This karma-matter again, we shall show hereafter, determines the nature of the perceptual organ or the Ouddārika-body. The operation of the Ouddārika-body leaves thus vestiges upon the experiential body and thereby modifies it to a certain extent, while on the other, the karma-body or the organ
of thought, desires and will, determines the character of the former by its preferential interest. So the relation, from one aspect is one of correlativity. We shall prove this in various ways.

We all know that we have both perception and conception of a thing. And we know further that perception is directly related to the object, for it follows the direct presentment of the object to the senses, whereas conception is indirectly related to the object through perception. The former, we are of opinion, belongs to the oudārika body (चौदारिक गरीर) or the perceptual organism where external objects are directly presented to and the latter namely, conception, desire, and will belong to the kārman body (कामं गरीर) for these are referred to the object only indirectly through the senses. But what is a conception? Is it not perception universalised? A conception becomes a chimera, barren and empty, if it is not capable of being fulfilled by the direct presentment of the object on the senses which constitutes perception. How are we to know otherwise which conception is
valid? Validity can well be established by the actual sensory contact of the object conceived. The conception thus becomes something general, universal in character, which differentiates itself, so to speak, without losing its unity and character, into so many individual actual objects capable of being presented to the senses. The individual objects, the subject-matter of the perceptual organ, becomes so many concrete embodiments of the conception itself which cannot be, like the former, presented to the senses. From the point of view of the perception also, it may be shown that they are unintelligible, unless they are interpreted with the light of the concept itself. An individual, or a single perception, caused by the actual contact of the object with the senses, remains unintelligible, unless it is subsumed under its respective concept which is, again, nothing but perceptions universalised. The conception we thus see, is the perception itself in its universal character and embodies itself in the actual objects forming the subject-matter of the perceptual organism (बौद्धिक गर्दर) and the perception is nothing but specific differen-
tiation and fulfilment of the conception. To say this is therefore to say that they are but two aspects of the same thing—one is universal and the other is specific in characters. And as through perception, the conception becomes fulfilled, we may call the perceptual organism (पोटारिक शरीर) to which belongs the attribute of perception, as instrumental to the fulfilment of the conceptual organism (काम्य ग शरीर) to which belong these concepts, and both of them thus stand in the relation of mutual inter-dependence.

Thus from what precedes it follows logically and necessarily, that all the varying experiences, which we get from time to time from the peripheral contact of the external objects with the senses, are contained in a nutshell, as it were, in the conception itself; for here all the various perceptions which occur from time to time are preserved, they being but specific fulfilments of the concept itself. This is then what we mean by saying that kārma matter (काम्य पुल) is being stored up in the kārman body (काम्य ग शरीर)

To discuss the question from another point of view by drawing a distinction
between the experiences of the Oudārik body (चौदारिक शरीर) and the experiences of the kārman body (काश्च्य शरीर). By oudārika (चौदारिक शरीर) we mean our neural organism which is the vehicle of the sensations, gross in form. While the experiences of the kārman body (काश्च्य शरीर) is confined within its thought, ideas, desires and will. Here there is an important matter to note. The experiences of the Oudārika body (चौदारिक शरीर) which follows on the direct presentation of the actual objects, have no interest for us unless they are owned by us i.e. referred to our own inner nature or kārman body (काश्च्य शरीर). To be conscious that I am experiencing such and such things, the whole of objective experience requires to be viewed as the experience of my inner nature or in other words the objective experience, belonging to the oudārika body (चौदारिक शरीर) must be referred back to and determined by the inner nature; otherwise the experience, being devoid of every subjective reference, will lose all interest for us, and cannot be viewed as my own experience. The outer experience, unless they are referred
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back to and determined by our inner nature stands on the same level as other phenomena occurring in Nature. But these states of changes become the source of interest for us as soon as they are viewed as experiences of the kārman body (कार्मिक शरीर) itself. So our inner experience or the experience of the kārman body is not only the outer experience merely condensed and materialised, but it is something more.

It is not another kind of experience to be set by the side of the outer experience, but one which includes the latter and goes beyond it. It is the outer experience itself focussed and referred to and determined by our inner-nature. Hence it follows that they are not two distinct worlds of experience, but ultimately the same, with this distinction only that one is devoid of every subjective reference while the other is not.

Hence (1) if the operation or the activity of the oudārika body (चौदारिक शरीर,) when not referred to and determined by the inner nature, standing on the same level as other phenomena of Nature, becomes morally blank, and assume moral quality, only on their refer-

The Outer and the Inner mutually and partly determine each other.
ence to the \textit{inner nature}, and if (2) human experience be possible only on this ascription or reference, it follows necessarily that every activity or karma leaves behind an effect either good or bad in the shape of vestiges on the \textit{kārman} body (कार्मण गरोर)---our \textit{inner nature} or the \textit{Character} of Prof. Huxley.

Having discussed the relation between the \textit{Inner-nature}, Kārman body (कामपण गरोर), and Oudārika body (पाण्डारिक गरोर), or \textit{Outer-nature} we come to the question of re-birth. So long we discussed the problem of relation in theoretical terms. But the world, we live in, is a moral world, nay, even more, a practically significant world than it is a theoretically definable world. And we may, at once, simply say that the concept of the \textit{individual} in its primary and original sense is distinctly an ethical concept and that is so whether you speak in theoretical terms or in terms of being. So from this conception of individuality we hope to see to the possibilities of rebirth, not merely as a logical necessity but as that without which the purpose of man's individuality will be altogether balked.
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As a mere theoretical thinker, we cannot get any idea of individuality, nor can we form any clear conception of it. We can prove all this by psychological analysis of the development of a child's mind. A child's first ideas are all unconsciously universal or vaguely abstract ideas. Even the child's first conscious ideas must be of what we call the universal as such. The many presentations he cannot yet know as so many individuals; for he cannot grasp single facts for their own sake. He only learns to recognise the type which persists through many presentations. He knows things by types, by universals. The one that persists through the many, he comes to recognise as the one, the universal, the type, the idea. As a mere theoretical thinker his progress has stopped and cannot go beyond it.

But observe another side of his nature. He has a doll; and say, he loves it. He breaks it. Now offer him another doll as nearly as possible like the former one. Now will the child accept this as compensation? No. And what is the reason of this? It is this that the love for this toy is in its
subjective, instinctive, pre-conscious type an exclusive love, and is such a feeling that the idea of the two objects that can be conceived as giving equally possible satisfaction of this feeling is an absurd idea. At this moment he consciously individuates the toy and this is so because he loves the toy with an exclusive love that permits no other. With such exclusive interests, one learns to love one's home, books, children etc. Hereby one becomes conscious of a thing not as an object that represents a class, for exclusive interest does not permit it, but views it as a single member of a single class. This is the point where he individuates it.

Thus we see ethical love, or organising interest is precisely that sort of interest that cannot serve two masters. It first individuates the master and then others in relation to it, that come in the way of means to it. It is this individuating interest in living one kind of life for one purpose in view that a man becomes a moral individual, self-same personality and not a totality of passing states as the Sensationist School or the Buddhists hold.
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Now to consider our own theory regarding kārman body (कार्मण शरीर): Jīva incessantly tries and struggles to get rid of the bondages of limitations, through Karma, as we have seen before. This becomes its exclusive interest. The love for particular mode of living i.e. the mode in which the liberation can easily be achieved, becomes the exclusive interest for the man and tends to individualise him. This exclusive love for this state of autonomy or self-rule, which no body can attain just in the way open to him, tends to individuate his activities and conduct, as well as the outer organism the oudarika body (औदारिक शरीर), by means of which actions conducive to the self-rule or autonomy are performed. Thus we may say that though the kārman body (कार्मण शरीर) may resemble others of the same kind in types universal in character, still, considered as individualised that is in the sense we have expounded above, they are quite distinct and separate entities. Individuals they are and must be, for all have exclusive interest for the attainment of that state of autonomy, of bliss and beatitude which is...
the real and ultimate goal of all that live, move and have their being in the different abodes of the Sansâr. Now do we not see that without immortality and re-birth of the Jîva—i.e., without the persistence and continuance of the Kârman-body through the ravages of time and the processes of metampsychosis the whole purpose of such life and individuality as manifest in the incessant struggling of the Jîva becomes absolutely meaningless!
CHAPTER XXIII.

FREE-WILL AND FATALISM.

The problem discussed: Is 'Jiva' a free centre of Origination?—Belief in the latter makes—Moral Judgment Inexplicable—Ethics lose its Injunctive Character—Leaves no room for Merit, Reward and Virtue—Examination of the Demerits' Arguments in the Light of European Ethics.

Hitherto we have been discussing the relation between the kārman body (कार्मण शरीर) and Ouddarika body (उद्यदारिक शरीर) and the transmigration of the former from body to body by means of which a Jiva attains to higher forms of evolution and state of beatitude by its own moral will and endeavour. There we took it for granted, as it were, that every Jiva has got capacity to improve itself morally and otherwise by its own effort. Whether this belief is true we did not stop there to enquire and consider. And, there may arise, indeed, a doubt as to the rationale and correctness of this belief. The Jains hold, as we shall see.
later on, that either this belief must be true or moral judgment must inevitably become impossible. Thus the question raised is a very important one; and moreover as the whole fabric of the Jain metaphysics and ethics which are but complementary parts of a singular system of thought is based on the belief in the Free-will of the Jiva who is the maker and master of his own fate, it imperatively demands of us an immediate solution. In taking up the question, therefore, we enter upon any other topics, we shall first examine the problem from the viewpoints of European Ethics,—Whether in the exercise of will, in the choices of things and alternative lines of action for a particular end which the Jiva has in view the mind is wholly determined by phenomenal antecedents and external conditions or itself also, as active subject of these objective experiences, plays the role of a determining cause? In short, whether or not, the Jiva is a free centre of origination?

This is the problem which now looms before us for solution. The two doctrines
which we shall develop presently, represent very widely divergent schemes of thought, which put a different interpretation upon every thing in nature and life of which we shall have occasion to speak later on. Those who maintain the first one of these two alternative doctrines, call themselves, 'Necessitarians'; because under the assigned conditions, the sequence of one particular volition, in their opinion, is an inevitable event which is no less than the falling of a book when blown off from the roof of a house. And those who maintain the second one of the alternatives, call themselves 'Libertarians,' because they deem it possible, inspite of the assigned condition, for the mind to will, or not to will, or to will otherwise. It is not obliged to deliver itself to a bespoke judgment or submit to the verdict of Nature. The former thinkers regard man as simply a product or an effect of cosmic evolution while the latter as an originating cause capable of determining what was indeterminate before. According to the former view man has been throughout, and has always
and invariably to be submissive to the play of given laws and forces working upon his life that move and mould him as they come and go; while according to the other he himself stands in the midst of the conflicting forces of Nature as a maker and master of his surroundings, as autonomous, as an independent centre of origination.

The problem therefore is: Is man an absolute creature of the cosmic powers that set him up? Is he simply a product of nature? We answer, "No," For, if he were simply a resultant of the cosmic processes of life and living or if he were wholly and absolutely determined in his will by other phenomenal antecedents, then what sense is there in the moral judgment which we pass upon others? Does not moral judgment take for granted that in the moment of yielding to one of the competing solicitations which is morally bad, we might have preferred the other if we really willed it? Does it not take for granted that we are not manufactured articles passable in the market of the world as good or bad from the very beginning of our mundane
existence, but to a certain extent at least authors of our own characters? If you are already determined to take up a particular line of action by phenomenal antecedents, then, what sense is there in such sayings of Ethics or Gospels, of the Great as "Do this and that and do not do other." Ethics will lose its injunctive character and will be reduced to a mere science of health. In fact the experience of contrition which follows so often on one's doing something wrong, the language of praise and blame, we so often use when admiring the moral rectitude or the quality of the sentiment of justice, the inspiring instances of forgiveness, the constant reference to higher virtue, to the mode of plain living and high thinking and all of the like character we say, rest on this belief in the freedom of man. Take away the freedom of man, the wickedness of him comes out in all nakedness and horribleness in the same category as devastations of nature. If noble minds rose upon us as necessarily as lengthening summer days, we might indeed rejoice, but cannot be
carried away by uplifting veneration. The language of ethics when translated into necessarian formulas, bids adieu to all conceptions distinctly moral and becomes simply descriptive of phenomena in natural history. It tells us what has been what is going on and what will be in the time to come; but not what ought to be. For if an inevitable and invincible necessity makes us will what we will, our will is no more responsible for its volition than the spring of a watch is responsible for its movement. From this point of view it is absurd to blame the will, which wills only in so as far as another cause distinct from it, makes it will in the manner as it wills. In short, if you take liberty away from man, you leave on the earth no vice, no virtue, no merit; rewards are absurd and punishments become unjust.

To enter therefore into an examination of the ethics of the necessarians. Some of them hold that "the universal application of the causal-connection leaves no room for caprice or freedom in the mysterious citadel of will". If everything in nature is deter-

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mined by antecedent conditions, why may not the same thing be true in the sphere of our volition.

In reply to this we say that "against the evidence offered for Determinism, there is to be set the immediate affirmation of consciousness in the moment of deliberate action." And a psychologist must accept as elementary "what introspection carefully performed declares to be so".

Moreover, as metaphysics points out, the primary idea of causality is derived from the efficiency of the will itself and a secondary account of causality as is found in nature should never be applied to the interpretation of human volition.

(2) When we fix our attention on human action we observe that a portion of it is originated by subconscious influences and the same thing may be true of our volition, specially when there is no sharp line of demarcation between such acts and volition and when the gradual transformation from one to the other is an undeniable fact.

Against this we may point out that it overlooks the fundamental characteristic of

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volition. Our exercise of will is strictly confined within the region of consciousness and a choice among such facts of clear consciousness forms the true characteristic of volition.

(3) "We always explain the voluntary acts of others on the principle of causation by character and circumstances. Indeed otherwise social life would be impossible."

In reply to this we may say that interpretation of facts by reference to the known tendencies of character illustrate but the influence of habits. But this habit is only an expression of the uniform exercise of free-will. Again, however adequate our knowledge of one’s character may be, it never enables us to predict with absolute certainty, how one should act on any future occasion.

The dictum of these philosophers in the domain of ethics, is that our volition is always determined by the strongest motive and the motive which can ever be the strongest is that of prospective pleasure. Be the motive passions many or few that are implanted in us, that which practically moves us into action is the strongest one and the strongest one among the motives
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should be recognised by its pleasure-producing capacity. This idea of prospective pleasure then becomes closely associated with the strongest solicitation which prompts us to action. Thus will of man is altogether passive here; for, it cannot but identify itself with this strongest desire.

The obvious defect of this theory is that it entirely makes the will passive. And it is due to bad psychology. A desire cannot actuate, cannot lead us to do a particular action, unless we identify ourselves with this solicitation which alone can urge us to follow a particular course of action. When we identify ourselves with one of these desires, (this act is called will), it gets into prominence over all others and thereby becomes the strongest one. This strongest one, we call motive proper. In this act of willing which consists in the conscious identification of ourselves with one of the desires which are by themselves nothing more than mere promptings, the will is wholly active and is completely free.

An objection might be taken here to the effect that even in this act of willing they will
is determined by one's character, and habit, and so cannot be reckoned as free in its operation. But to this our reply is that this character which fetters our will in its activity, is itself nothing but the product of the free operation of ourselves, the effects of which are materialised and preserved as Character or Karma-matter. For what is this Character? It is the settled disposition of the mind to operate in a particular way when opportunity comes. It is the habit which fetters us indeed only apparently to a certain extent later on, but as engendered by the free operation of ourselves. We say apparently, because the clear verdict of consciousness in every case of activity is that we might have preferred another course of action, had we but sufficient strength of will. We cannot, by any amount of effort as a clear introspection reveals, divest ourselves of this consciousness of freedom—i.e. freedom to operate otherwise if only we had sufficient stamina to do so. In the presence of this clear verdict of consciousness all the arguments arrayed by the Determinists fall to the ground and our...
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will seems to be not determined by its phenomenal antecedents as has been wrongly alleged, but is on the other hand free to all intents and purposes.

Again if our volition is completely determined by the strongest motive, and if that motive be always that of prospective pleasure, then we cannot but identify the determinists with the egoists. And we must necessarily charge him with the horrible consequences of a rule of life founded upon self-interest. His difficulty will begin when going beyond this simple psychological fact viz, that the strongest motive determines our volition, he tries to make a relative estimate of these hap-hazard impulses and find for them an ethical principle of order and to say that the altruists should have place rather than the egoists, and the sense of right than both. Besides these he overlooks the play of disinterested impulses in mind in the shape of motherly affection, devotion to right, compassion etc. If this be the doctrine of the necessarians, we may conclude by saying that it is in no way compatible with the sense of duty in men and excludes all righte-
ousness from the universe; and thus the moral faith and nobleness of the necessarian becomes an intellectual inconsequence. Nay more, it takes away from man what belongs to himself properly, his freedom which constitutes his true worth and dignity and brings him down to the level of inanimate objects of nature.
CHAPTER XXIV.

WILL AND INDIVIDUALITY.

'Karma-Sarira' and the Nature of its Migration—Water-Globule and 'Karma'-Globule—The Vegetable, Seeds and 'Karma-Sarira' in Relation to Nature—Selection and its Character—Human Evolution is Essentially Teleological—Humanity always keeps a Goal before itself.

Now it is this 'Kārman Sarira', the Character or the inner nature of the individual man that re-incarnates or expresses itself successively in various forms through the repetition of births and deaths. When a man dies, the Kārman-Sarira, his character or inner nature, is not disintegrated and dissolved with the death and dissolution of his physical mortal organism, but passes through womb to womb in an invisible form. To draw a comparison with a physical phenomenon, as a water-globule rising from the surging waves ruffling the vast expanse of the ocean passes through various stages of existence sometime in the invisible form of vapoury state in a cloud.
or changes into snow, ice or descend in
rains to mingle again with the ocean from
which it sprang: so the karma-globule, for
it is indeed as subtle as can be imagined
—springing up as it does in the beginning-
less past from the vast expanse of the etern-
al ocean of verities, persists in its career,
sometimes remaining invisible to our
mortal eyes, at other times expressing itself
through the gross material frames of living
beings and organisms, whirling through
a succession of births and deaths according
to the merits and demerits of its past
desires and deeds moulding the inner nature
in its subsequent career.

The thought, will, organic want or de-
sire moulding the inner nature or 'character'
of an organism has a power of selection;
for, thinking and willing consist in determin-
ing and selecting an alternative, and the
subtle organism determines and selects only
that alternative which is favourable to the
manifestation of its character and the
realization of its wants and desires.
The process may best be illustrated by
taking two seeds, say one of mango and.
the other of jack-fruit, as representing two different 'Characters' or Kārma-Sarīras of the two different vegetable organisms. The power of growth and development in the two seeds or their inner natures is of the same kind. And though the external Nature or the environment consisting of earth, water, air, light and so forth is common to both the seeds planted within the bounds of a selected and definite area having soils of equal fertility; yet for certain characteristic peculiarities latent in each of the stones, each determines, selects, and draws, according to its own constitutional wants, appetites, and desires, peculiar to itself, such nourishment both qualitatively and quantitatively from the common environment as would be contributive to the growth and development of the organism and to the fulfilment of its own wants and desires. This phenomenon of selection by the seed is not a blind adaptation to the environment, but selection by a conscious willing agent having a preferential interest in the thing selected from amidst an infinite diversity of materials and elements in the
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unlimited store-house of Nature. The nature and character of this conscious and deliberate selection becomes more and more clear to our vision when we divert our attention to the human evolution. Man does not live for bread alone, not for mere animal living and multiplication of species; but expressly for the attainment of some particular object, end, or idea. Human evolution differs from all other forms of evolution in this that humanity always keeps before itself a goal for the realisation of which it constantly strives and struggles. And its adaptation to the circumstances is not a blind acquiescence to the forces that be, a mere trimming of the sails and adjusting of the oars to suit every passing breeze; but a conscious choice of will exercised in the interest of the object, end or idea, it keeps always in view. If the object, end or idea—the main-spring of his thoughts and activities—is lost sight of, man then no longer remains a conscious willing agent impressing his will and individuality upon the environment, drawing nourishment from
nature and utilizing her in the fulfilment of his desires and realization of his end or Idea; but becomes a dead and passive subject to the indiscriminate operation of the forces that surround him. His destiny then no longer remains within and under his control; he becomes but a child of Nature, a creature of circumstances; and his environment becomes all-in-all and plays the role of Destiny rough-hewing and shaping him as it wills.
CHAPTER XXV.

CAUSALITY IN THE MORAL WORLD.

What does 'Responsibility' Imply—Reward or Punishment Unavoidable—Law of 'Karma'. Causality Inviolable—Prayer or Worship has no Efficacy—No Need of Extra-Mundane Moral Providence—Law of 'Karma' is more Rational Explanation—An Act of Vice is not equal to Incurring a Debt—The Theory of 'Karma'. Pudgal—the Distinction between Right and Wrong is not an Absolute Distinction.

In discussing the question of Free-will and Fatalism, we have seen that man is constitutionally free and essentially an autonomous being with all the potentialities of vision, knowledge, strength and delight infinite. And as such he is wholly and entirely responsible for all his thoughts and actions. We have seen also that responsibility for a thought or an act means the liability of the man who thinks or acts to undergo the consequences of his thought or act.

But to undergo the consequences of a thought or an act is nothing more or less than the enjoyment of a reward for entertaining a good thought or performing a
good act or suffering a punishment for giving way to bad thought or condescending to do a bad deed. And however a man might wish to taste the sweet fruits of righteous deeds without performing the same or to avoid the bitter ones for practising the vicious acts, he can never escape the firm grasp of the Law of Karma-causality which is sure to bring him round and round to undergo the consequences of his thoughts and deeds in perfect accordance with their nature and character; for the Law, so to speak, is automatic in action and works with mathematical precision. So there is not the least possibility of escape from its mechanical grip. You may offer up prayers on your knees and assure the Lord of your giving Him a feast with the best and choicest fruits, flowers and sweets or you may shave off your heads at places of pilgrimage and roll yourself on the dust and dirt around the temple; or you may knock your brains out on the threshold of the shrine of your Lord, and wash his feet by the tears of your swollen eyes; but alas! these will not save your from the iron-
grip of the great law of karma-causality which has been working out from times without beginning.

Admitting the truth and validity of Karma-causality, however, in a more or less general way, some suggest that a man will be judged by his actions and be punished and rewarded for these. But this implies evidently that as if there is a judge human or divine, as they hold, who may be prejudiced or partially informed or might be lenient in the administration of Justice in the case of one and strict and uncompromising in the case of another.

Again, to escape from the undesirable consequences of our thoughts and actions, some interprete that by doing a wrong, the man simply incurs a debt and that this debt can well be paid off by the sinner himself or by some one else for, and on his behalf. The interpretation of the law of Karma in this wise has created a much confusion of thought and anomalies in the performances of religious and social rites. The Srādh ceremony of the Hindus consisting in the offerings of pindas on the death of the father is one amongst
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many others which partly appears to be resultant of such a line of thinking and reasoning. The crucifixion of Jesus Christ whereby the entire race of sinners was saved is but another illustration of the same kind of interpretation that can only proceed from Christian bigotry.

To disown the sequence and own the antecedents is like the denial of attributes to a substance. The attributes inseparably go with the substance; so does the consequence i.e. responsibility for the thought and act inseparably goes with the thought and act themselves. Doing an act of vice is not the same as the act of borrowing money and incurring a debt which can well be cleared up, either by the debtor himself, or by another for and on his behalf. It is not like the liquidation of a debt some how or other, and shirking all responsibility thereby; for, not only the man who commits an act of vice, has to undergo the consequence of the same; but he has also to bear the burden of the *Karma-pudgal* which clinging to the soul instinctively develops a certain strength and vibratory
motion whereby his future nature and career is moulded to some extent. And examination of the natural environments wherein the man is ushered into a physical existence, a study of the development of his form and physical constitution as well as his mental inclinations, the colouration of his thoughts and activities in the different spheres of life—all tend to show how he has to still bear the burden of *Karma-pudgal* of years and ages he passed through.

But others, remark, there is no common standard whereby we are to judge between good and evil, and act accordingly. What you think to be good to A might be bad to B. What is happiness to you might be a misery to me. What is deadly poison to you might prove a saving nectar to me. Besides, we do not see the good accruing from good, and evil begetting evil, always and invariably. Very often the case appears to be reverse to what is generally interpreted according to the law of karma.

So think the impatient minds labouring under a regrettable short-sightedness to look through Nature, the permanent theater of
perpetual changes. But these people seem to have no insight into the metaphysics of things and thoughts and to forget that nothing is good in and by itself. It is the use and abuse of things and powers with us that are either good or bad. There is nothing as freaks of nature in our philosophy. What is in the root must come out in the sap. Whatever happens must have a cause and whatever is in the cause must pass into the effect. Right use must result in good effects and bad, bad.

The law of karma as we hold it, is but an all-embracing interpretation of the law of causation which must work out things inevitably and invariably. If the fall of the apple, before the eyes of Newton who deduced thereof the universal law of gravitation whereby all what is earthly is drawn towards the earth, were but a freak of nature, how things of the world would stand? Where would be the use of the fall at Niagara—if the torrents were to run down only occasionally without any invariability? Just as the use and utility of the natural laws and forces lie in their invariability.
and inexon erability of the phenomena in and through which they present themselves to us: so it is the invariability and uniformity of the operation of the law of karma-causality that makes possible the amendment of and atonement for our past and the laying down as well the lines of our action in future. Indeed there is a common adage to the effect, that what is done cannot be undone; but surely we can neutralize or turn the direction of our past action-currents by quickly setting up a set of counter action-currents. For illustration, you sent a message to B, a message the breaking of which has every likelihood of breaking his heart as well. Immediately after, when you learn that the message you despatched was a wrong one, how would you act? Surely either you would run yourself to or send one of your chosen men with definite orders either to overtake the man with the message on the way and stop him from delivering the message, or failing which to do something else that would surely neutralize the effect produced by the delivery of the wrong message. And this is how the effect of
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Past actions can be amended or neutralized by our quickly setting up currents of counter action to run as antidotes to the former. It is just like setting the ball on motion in a certain direction and stopping the same by a subsequent counter-action which would either neutralize the effects of previous action or divert the ball in motion in another direction determined by the laws of the parallelogram of forces. It is true that we cannot in fact undo what we have already done; but surely we can thus modify and improve matters to a large extent by setting up new forces to run counter to the older ones and neutralize or divert the currents of the same.

So we see the law of karma, properly understood, is not so fatalistic that it would send in us a thrill of shudder to think of the firm grasp of the hold it lays upon us. However inexonerable, however death-like might be the grip of the Law to make us undergo the consequences of our own thoughts and deeds, it is not as cruel as Destiny herself compelling us to do this and that at her own dictates and sweet will. For, just as
we know more of the laws of nature, the more intelligently we can use them to our own advantage and benefit: so the more we know of the character and working on of the Law of *karma*-causality, the more firmly we become convinced intellectually and morally that it is a law that has always been affording us ample opportunities to right the wrong, to remedy the evil, to amend the effects of the past with a view of moulding the inner nature—our character, for a higher form of evolution of a more and more perfect type of organism and for the attainment of greater perfection. And such is the teaching of our sages!

From what precedes, it seems to follow that every living being, specially the man who always keeps before himself as a goal, the realization of a particular end or idea, is free to think and act as he wills. Will, as we have remarked, consists in determining and selecting between the two or more alternatives. A man with certain object in his mind to accomplish, invariably finds on reflection that there are different alternative means by which he can
accomplish the end he has in his view. And he is free to determine and select the one or the other of the alternatives that would suit him best. When we ponder over the ways and manners in which a man thinks and acts, we find that his thoughts and activities in the different spheres of life consist in the conscious acceptance of one thing and a similar rejection of another. Of the different alternative means, we freely adopt that course of procedure which we think to be most conducive to the realization of our end, and reject others as being detrimental to the end. We do not live only for the satisfaction of the lower instincts and multiplication of species. We live for progress, for peace and happiness. The highest end of mankind is to live, move and have its being in peace and happiness. No doubt every one desires to live long and to live well also; but what to live for, if it be not for the enjoyment of autonomy, of peace and bliss? Whatever might be the nature and constitution of this Summum Bonum; however we may define it, it is ultimately for this end that
the drunkard becomes addicted to wine, the criminal becomes habituated to crime, or the devotee bends his knees in the shrine. Whatever we think and whatever we do, we think and act consciously or unconsciously for the attainment of peace and bliss or autonomy. This really constitutes the Highest End or Idea for which we all live and move and have our being in the universe. And in proportion the nature and character of this Ideal varies with the changes of the angles of vision we take, according to the principles of Naya and that from the different stages of our life, the means we employ for the realization of the ideal in view also vary as well. But in any case, there is no denial of the fact that it is we that are the free agents in the determination, selection and adoption of an alternative course which would be most conducive to the realization of the end we have in view for the time. All the aspirations of life, all our reasons for our living, all that we think, tend in reality to augment this our sense of freedom of thought and action. We can
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not possibly imagine that we are not free to think, will and act in our own ways. And with this liberty to think, will and to act in our own ways arises the question of our responsibility for the same.

Liberty and responsibility go hand in hand. And it is impossible, say the Jain thinkers, to disunite responsibility from the agent who is at liberty to think and act in whichever way he wills for the realization of his ideal. To disown liability originating from responsibility but to enjoy the privileges accruing from liberty is not only a logical absurdity, but is indicative as well of moral depravity. Riches and poverty, fame and obscurity, power and subjection, health and disease, knowledge and ignorance, toil and pleasure, feasting and hunger, are but so many varying consequences of liberty we have and had in this life and in the past.

To think is to act and to act is to resist. Resistance is action itself which produces changes not only in the thing worked upon but also in the worker as well—for work implies waste in both. Therefore, no thought, not a single deed which
a man thinks or performs can ever be disunited from its effect which in the moral world takes the form of responsibility involving the idea of liability of the thinker or the doer to undergo the consequences of his thought or deed. And as what is in the root comes out in the sap; as the cause passes into effect and the like produces the like, the consequences of a good thought or deed bears out good or bad fruits. It is clear, therefore, that responsibility carries with it the idea of enjoyment of a reward for a good act done or of suffering a punishment for a bad act committed. But so frail is human nature that it only wishes for the fruits of righteous deeds and avoid practising the same, wishes not to reap the harvest of sinful acts whereas wishes only to perpetrate sinful things—

"धर्मश्च फलं एत्थार्थम् सम्म निकृत्ति मानवः।
पृथ्वी पापश्च निकृत्ति, पापं एव चरति ते॥"

But the whole aspect of things changes if we were to consider the question, 'Is man in fact so free as to think or do whatever he pleases?' If every man were free, that
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is to say, if he could act as he pleased, history of the world would have changed into otherwise for the absence of any common bond. If one among the millions of human beings who lived and died in the infinite number of years that have rolled by, could be found capable of acting purely in conformity with his will and desires, the free movements of this man in opposition to the general scheme of the universe would be enough to annul the possibility of the historical laws for all humanity. Nor the movements of man show that he is free to live and move as he choses. Historical laws regulating the movements of man, are but visible negations to the existence of free-will in man. Far from his being an agent willing and acting freely, observation of his movements and a study of his constitution clearly confirm the belief that he is wholly a dependant being acting in due obedience to Nature and natural laws. No man has ever been found to act in utter disregard of the laws of gravitation nor the phenomena of his cerebral activity have been found wanting in regulating and controlling his will. Man is but
subject to these cosmic forces and laws and
he moves and acts with due regard and
obedience to Nature to whom he owes his
life and looks for light. For, "thus
from the war of Nature, from famine and
death, the most exalted object which we are
capable of conceiving, the production of the
higher animal follows. There is a grandeur
in this view of life, with its several powers
having been originally breathed by the
Creator into a few forms or into one; and
that whilst this planet has gone cycling on
according to the fixed law of gravity, from
so simple a beginning, endless forms, most
beautiful and most wonderful, have been, and
are being, evolved."

But this aspect of evolution which is being
worked out by Nature through her warfares,
through the principles of competition, through
adaptation to the environment and trans-
mission of acquired qualities through heredity,
makes the environment, the maker and moul-
der of the man. Man, according to this cosmic
process of evolution is no more an inde-
pendent being having any free will of his
own to think and act after his own way and
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exercise his independence in the free choice of things and impressing his individuality upon the surroundings. Nature has left man no option, no free will to act. But the circumstances play the part of Destiny as it were, rough-hewing and moulding him after their own casts. He acts and moves about indeed but only impelled by the forces of Nature. Nor man can be taken as the same individual being who has been running down from eternity through the processes of metempsychoses. It is true that Nature has been working from time without beginning, ushering into existence from the conflict of the aggregative and separative forces inherent in her, the stars and planets composing the astronomical cosmos; and as these have been going on revolving round their own orbits according to the fixed and inexonerable laws of motion, a few forms of life have sprung out into being to crawl on earth. The cosmic processes of life and living in the shape of their adaptation to the environment and transmission of the acquired characters to the off-spring at last culminated in the
transfiguration and evolution of Man—the mystery, the wonder and the climax of the cosmic evolution. Man thus is but a product of circumstances and has no free-will. Wherein lies then the possibilities of persistence and re-birth of the same individual running up and down from eternity through the processes of metempsychoses, of undergoing the consequences of his own activities and desires and of reaping the harvest of what he had previously sown?

There is a grandeur in this view of life indeed. But the charms of poetry cannot always and everywhere hide the metaphysics of ideas and ideals from the penetrating insight of the unprejudiced philosophers!

If we deny the very independent existence of man and take him as derived product of matter and material forces working in him we must say that he must have a derivative responsibility for all what he thinks and does. One may owe his existence to something else—to some Higher Power but the fact itself cannot entitle one to shake off responsibility from his shoulder: his existence
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may be derived; but with it comes his responsibility as also similarly derived. To illustrate by a concrete instance, the king delegates his certain powers to the minister for the administration of a certain province. But is not the minister responsible for uses and abuses of the power he derived from the king. The Jain view of the point in question is that in the commitment of a murder by a servant at the uncompromising order of his master in whose hand he is but a tool, not only the master alone but the servant also is liable to receive punishment. And this view of liability as involved in responsibility holds good even in matters of evolution through cosmic process. Failures of the organisms in the right adaptation to the environment cause them to be weak and supplanted by other organisms who have been successful in their adaptations. Therefore the organisms who thus become weak and go to the walls, are responsible for their movements and activities in their own spheres of life and struggle, environment being common to them all.
But to view the question from the psychological stand-point. Man is not simply a product of matter and material forces engaged in a terrible conflict in which the weakest go to the walls and the strongest survive to multiply. Man is essentially mind—a thinking being having a soul in him to save; and the soul is neither matter nor, like sparks of electricity, a product of matter and material forces. Psychologically as we have seen elsewhere, it is something super-physical. If the soul were matter or a product of matter and material forces engaged in a deadly conflict, how would we account for the psychical possibilities infinite of tripartite character viz., vision, knowledge and freedom infinite—the very esse of the soul for the unfoldment of which the mighty minds of all ages and climes have been labouring? The principles of naturalism, of aggression and self-assertion have always been in direct opposition to the teachings of the great minds whose lives have been a perpetual surrender for the good of mankind. For, side by side with this fierce movement of struggle
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for life and living in which the fittest survive and the weaker ones go to the walls calling forth fearful vengeance upon those that march trampling upon their dead skulls, there has been a parallel movement in the society of nations of all ages and climes—a blessed movement that seeks to mitigate the evil, to smooth the harshness of behaviour, to rub off the angularities of character, and to soften down the asperities and rigours of life; to introduce, in short, a reign of ordered harmony where there is discord and to bring in the messages of "peace and good will, good will and peace, peace and good-will to all mankind". If the evolution of human organism and the progress of humanity were due to the competitive movement which is called cosmic, how are we to account for the origin of this parallel movement which is not only essentially humane and ethical but works as a direct antithesis to the cosmic mode of life and living? "It repudiates the gladiatorial theory of existence. It demands each man who enters in the enjoyment of the advantages of polity, shall
be mindful of his debt to those who have laboriously constructed it and shall take heed that no act of his, weaken the fabric wherein he has been permitted to live. Laws and moral precepts are directed to the end of curbing the cosmic process and reminding the individual of his duty to the community, to the protection and influence of which he owes, if not existence itself, at least the life of something better than a brutal savage"—(Evolution and Ethics pp. 81-82).

Thus from the sharp contrast drawn between the operation of the cosmic laws and ethical laws, between natural man and moral man, it is pretty clear that whatever be the angles of our vision as to the constitution of the thoughts and activities of man, they are but determined partly by his freedom of will and partly by the operation of the laws of necessity. Liberty and necessity both co-operate harmoniously in the production of every human thought and activity. Every human life and conduct therefore is but a re-conciliation between liberty and necessity. This has been the case always and everywhere from the days without
beginning. We think and act partly of our own accord and partly our thoughts and activity are determined and regulated by the laws of *karma* in accordance with the merits and demerits of our previous instance. We know this not only by metaphysical speculations or intuitions pure and simple; but also an investigation in the lines of empirical method into the historical events and life-works of the mighty minds of yore, makes it clear that there is in fact a certain amount of liberty and a certain amount of necessity participating in every human thought and activity.

Human life being thus but a reconciliation between liberty and necessity, it behoves us to enquire by the way as to how are we to calculate and measure the parts played by each in giving shapes and forms to our life and conduct. The Jain philophers hold that greater the liberty, the lesser the necessity, and *vice-versa* lesser the necessity, the greater the liberty; or in other words necessity and liberty are inversely related to each other; and the proportion of the part played by the two in a pheno-
menon of life has to be ascertained from the different points of view we can take in our examination and estimation of human conduct, namely Drabya (व्य), (i) Bhāba (भाव) (iii) Kāla (काल) and (iv) Kshetra (क्षेत्र) and (v) Karma (कर्म) and (vi) Udyam (उद्यम) and (vii) Niyati (नियति) as already discussed in a previous chapter.

But instead of entering into the complications involved in the examination of certain phenomenon in the worlds of particulars from the above points of view, we may otherwise for convenience' sake do the same by considering the conduct of the man in the four different relations of,—

i. Kshetra—locality or surrounding circumstances in relation to which we can interpret that a man living, moving and having his being in the complexity of society or having a particular profession or calling is subject to the laws of necessity to a greater degree in proportion to the amount of liberty he is supposed to enjoy.

The more a man lives and moves in the complicated network of society, the more his movements are mechanical, artificial and
he is less free to think or act after his own accord. But the man who stands outside and above the complexity of social organism, or in other words, the more he lives in isolation, or seclusion, or wanders away from place to place without any attachment to the pleasures of the world—he is more free to act at his own will and choice without being accountable to any one save himself. But still this wandering monk is not wholly free to will or to act, if we find him speaking to any one or working at his task or breathing in the atmosphere surrounding him and basking in the sun that shines upon. Full liberty of action and will only belongs to Him who is really a Kévalin and has soared high above time, space and causality.

ii. Kāla—Time is an important factor in forming proper moral judgments, for it is very difficult to discern the motive by which an individual is actually led, just after the accomplishment of the act. A study of the historical, sociological and other antecedents and consequents is neassary to make us sure whether the individual has

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been impelled by the circumstances and other necessities, or has freely initiated the action himself to serve his own ends and the nature of the moral judgment depends considerably on such decision. Thus time is a potential element in the determination of the participation of fate and free-will in a particular conduct of man.

The devastating war between the Kurus and the Pandavas which killed the manhood of the nation, seems to have been caused by the free will of several people. The war could have been avoided.

iii. *Karma*—or the abiding consequences of deed done in the past either in this life or in prior ones, which determine the inner-nature or character of the man in a posterior incarnation.

The movements of a man who is placed in very untoward circumstances hardly able to meet his two ends in comparison with the movements of another who is rocking in lap of fortune, are more determined by necessity than the movements of the other who enjoys a more liberty of thought and action.
iv. *Niyati*—the concatenation of natural causes and conditions from which a certain effect must irresistibly follow just as the number four follows from the concatenation of two and two.

In the great battle which was waged against *Ravan*, the King of Lanka, for kidnapping the beautiful *Sitā* from the forest's solitudes, Ram Chandra's movements seem to have been determined to a greater extent by *Niyati*, because from the study of the *Rāmāyan* we find that the whole thing was due to the intrigues and instigations of *Surpanakhā*, the sister of *Rāvan*.

Thus in fine, we see no mortal man who lives, moves or has his being within the span of time, space, causation is absolutely free in his actions. His movements take directions in strict conformity with the laws of the parallelogram of forces which follow from the conflict between the constitutional freedom of his will and the determination of the same by necessity or Fate of his own make in the past. And this is the reason why, referring to the doctrine of the Fatalists in the Book I,
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Lecture 1, Chapter 2 of the Sutra-Kritāṅga we find the venerable Kevalin Mahāvira teaching, "they (the necessarians or thefatalists) have no knowledge and do not understand that things depend partly on fate and partly on human exertion."
CHAPTER XXVI.
CLASSIFICATION OF KARMAS


In our rapid survey of causation and compound evolution of Karma phenomenology and karma-causalaty as discussed in our philosophy, we have seen what important and wonderful are the parts played by the Law of Karma in the Jain scheme of universe. We have also seen how it opens up secret chambers of the universe and unravels to our vision the most inscrutable mysteries of Nature and her laws. We have also seen how it helps to amend our lives for a higher evolution of a more and more perfect order and thereby throws open to us the channels that lead to Right vision, Right
knowledge and Right conduct without which swaraj, self rule or autonomy i.e., the fulfilment of the destiny of the jíva as taught in the Jain philosophy becomes an impossibility.

Such being the high and prominent place held by the Doctrine of Karma in the evolution of humanity, we are naturally led to enquire into the classification of Karma. But the complexity of divisions and subdivisions as minutely detailed in the Jain philosophy in the most elaborate manner defy the most subtle psychological analysis. It may well be compared to the gigantic banian tree which has been growing on steadily through the revolutions of ages and empires in such a form that its original trunk now defies the research of the investigators who approach it for the first time. If any stranger who is unaccustomed to walk in the wood-way paths of dense-forest, wills to do so, he is sure to be bewildered and disheartened by the very sight of its labyrinthian complications. And therefore to make the subject more easy of approach we shall begin with the most simple and general classification in the following manner:
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*Karma*, in its philosophical sense, is motion, vibration, action or 'action-currents' as Dr. J. C. Bose puts it. But in Jain Philosophy at least the word appears to bear a double signification viz., not only vibration or 'action-current' but also the materialised effects or vestiges in so far they affect the fate of the actor, continuing even beyond death and modifying his subsequent career. The Jain philosophy recognizes two distinct kinds of *Karma* or action-currents, namely,—

A. **Ghatin Karma** or the Action-currents of Injury

B. **Aghatin Karma** or the Action-currents of Non-injury.

The reason why the former is called the action-current of injury and the latter, 'action-current' of non-injury, thanks to Dr. Bose for teaching us the terms, consists in this: the *esse* of the soul as a metaphysical reality with infinite *pradeshas* as taught in our philosophy, viewed in its tripartite aspects, is infinite vision, infinite knowledge and infinite freedom, the attainment of which is the *Summum*
Bonnum of every moral endeavour. Now in the eternal continuum of Karma wherewith the soul stands in relation of timeless conjunction (anādi apaschānupurbi samyoga sambandha pravāha) there are two sets of currents which leave vestiges of Karma on the various Pradeshas or corpuscles of the soul.

Now the one set of action-currents which thus inhibits or retards or is actually harmful to the unfoldment of the psychical tripartite possibilities infinite is called the action-current of Injury (घातिन कर्म) and the other set of similar current which in the same way determines merely the physical condition of the psyché or the soul—its body and localisation—is termed as the 'action-current of non-injury'.

A. DIVISIONS OF GHATIN KARMAS.

Ghātin karmas or the action-currents of Injury—are of four kinds, according as they retard the unfoldment of the tripartite Infinite psychical possibilities, namely, Vision Knowledge, and Freedom. Thus:

I. Darshanavaranîya or the Action-current of injury to right vision.

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II. Jnanavaraniya or the action-current of injury to knowledge.

III. Mohaniya or what is injurious to the psychical equanimity resulting in the delusion or infatuation of the mind from the want of right intuition and knowledge.

IV. Antaraya or what is injurious to the higher evolution and progress of the soul towards the perfect unfoldment of its infinite-possibilities.

B. DIVISIONS OF AGHATIN KARMAS.

The Aghatin or Non-Injurious—are also of four kinds according as they determine the duration and other physical conditions of the soul. These are:

V Ayus or what determines the longevity of soul's physical existence and the duration of its surrounding conditions.

VI Nama—or what determines the colour and configuration of the souls' physical organism,

VII Gotra or what determines the birth of the soul in a certain nationality, race and family &c.
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VIII Vedaniya—what sends in sensations of pain or pleasure.

Now the action-currents of injury and of non-injury making up the eight Karma verities which bind down the Jiva and whirl it round and round through the different grades of samsâr (Gati) are again subdivided, according to the nature of effects (प्रक्रिया) they produce, in the following manner:

I DARSHANAVARANIYA KARMAS.

(1) Darshanāvaraniya or the action-current which is detrimental to vision or perception, is subdivided into nine kinds:

(a) chakshudarshanāvaraniya—what is detrimental to sight.

(b) achakshudarshanāvaraniya—what is detrimental to the perception through the other organs of sense and mind than the eye.

(c) Avadhi darshanāvaraniya—what is detrimental to the realisation of the general use and importance of things and beings not perceived through the sense.

(d) Keval darshanāvaraniya—what is detrimental to the right Intuition.
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(e) Nidrā vedaniya—what lulls the jiva into sleepiness where by it is stripped of its consciousness of anything what goes around it.

(f) Nidrān nidrāvedaniya—what tends the jiva to sink into a deep sleep in which it forgets every thing whereby perception becomes absolutely impossible.

(g) Prachalā-vedaniya—what causes restless sleep under which condition right perception of things is impossible.

(h) Prachalāprachalāvedaniya—what causes extreme restlessness of the sleep in which the jiva does not properly respond to stimulii.

(i) Styānaradhi Vedaniya—what makes the jiva a somnambulist in which state of mind, it cannot perceive what it does or where it moves about.

Next comes jñānāvaraniya or the action-currents detrimental to the formation of knowledge.

It is important here to note, that following psychologically the order of development,
we have placed Darshanāvarana before Jnandāvarana for Darshan stands for diffusive; undifferentiated cognition which later on develops into definite, categorised, coherent conception we generally call knowledge or Jnan.

II. JNANAVARANIYA KARMAS.

Knowledge of things, we have seen, in an earlier chapter on our epistemology, is of five forms; and the action-currents which are detrimental to the unfoldment to these forms of knowledge respectively have been classed as,—

(a) Mati-Jnandāvaran—what is detrimental to the formation of the conception or defined knowledge of things through the processes of reasoning and intellection.

(b) Sruta-Jnandāvaran—what is detrimental to the formation of the conceptual knowledge of things received through the perceptual organs.

(c) Avadhi Jnandāvaran—is that kind of action-currents, the predominance of which, makes intuitive knowledge
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not dependent on any organ of sense, impossible.

(d) Manaparyaya Jñānāvvaraṇa—is the action-current which is detrimental to the reading of thoughts passing in another’s mind.

(e) Keval-Jñānāvvaraṇa—is the action-current injurious to the unfoldment of the soul’s power of pure Intuition

III. MOHANIYA KARMA.

Then comes Mohaniya karma or the action-currents which hypnotises the jīva. Moha has been stated to be what deludes the jīva from the right vision into the true principles of the jīvas and leads him away from the right path of conduct. There are twenty eight kinds of this Mohaniya karma and as these affect either the vision or the conduct, they have been grouped under two classes namely (a) Darshana Mohaniya and (b) Chāritra Mohaniya.

(a) Darshan mohaniya dividing itself into—

(1) Mithyātva mohaniya prevails upon the Jīva to take good things for bad.
(2) *Misra mohaniya* is what makes the *Jīva* oscillate between the right and the wrong and thus preventing him from coming to any particular discussion.

(3) *Samyakta mohaniya* is what makes the *Jīva* unable to devote himself to the right cause though he is morally convinced of it, there being a bit of intellectual hesitation in the matter.

(b) *Charitra mohaniya karma* divides itself into two principal branches viz. (1) *Kashāya*-Passions; (2) *Akashāya*-correlates of Passions.

(i) The *kāshayas* are four in number namely, (a) *Krodha*-anger; (b) *Mān*-pride; (c) *Māya*-deceit; (d) *Lobha*-greed.

Now each of these four major *Kashāyas* or passions is further analysed into four groups according to the intensity and protensiveness of influence as these have on human life,—

(i) A *kashāya* which is most intense and protensive in exerting a life-long influence on the mind is called *anantānuṁbandhi kashāya*.

(ii) A *kashāya* which is comparatively less intense and protensive, influencing the
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mind only for a considerable period of time, goes by the name of apratyâkshyân.

(iii) A kashâya which is of still less intense in character and less protensive in duration influencing the mind only for a shorter period of life is named as Pratyâkshyân.

(iv) A kashâya which appears only to disappear immediately after influencing the life only for the shortest period possible goes by the name of Sanjvalan.

Thus classified according to the quality and durability of each of the kashâyas, the Jain Philosophers hold kashâyas to be sixteen in number altogether, as given below:

(a-i) Krodha Anantânubandhi—is the anger of the most intense kind influencing the mind all through the life. Its currents are so furiously strong that it mars peace, roots out all feelings of amity, and causes a wide breach between friends. It is just like the deep chasm in the rock due to a rude shaking of the earth.

(a-ii) Krodha Apratyâkshyân—is an anger of less intense in quality and less
durable in period. After influencing the life for a considerable time, it disappears some how or to her. The anger of this kind is usually compared to splits on muddy fields dried up by the scorching sun, which continues to remain until these are filled up by the moistening and softening of the soil from heavy down-pour rains.

(a-iii) Krodha Pratyakshyan—is that kind of anger which influences the mind for a still lesser period and is less intense in quality from the fact of its being compared frequently to line-marks in sand-fields which disappear off and on with the fleeting movements of sands by the breeze.

(a-iv) Krodha Sanjvalan—is the anger of the shortest possible duration. It appears like a flash of lightning but gets quenched of itself immediately after, for which reason it is compared to a line drawn on the surface of water which leaves no vestige behind.
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Mān or Pride blinds vision and disables man to read things through times.

(b-i) Mān Anantānubandhi is that kind of intense pride which knows no yielding in life. It is aggressive in its attitude and stands out as a towering rock.

(b-ii) Mān Apratyākshyān is a kind of pride which makes a man almost stiff and unbending: it is of the nature of an iron rod which can be warmed into bending.

(b-iii) Mān Pratyākshyān—is that kind of pride which is characterised by still lessor constitutional stiffness. It yields just as some chips of wood yield to pressure after it has been kept under water for sometime.

(b-iv) Mān Sanjvalan—is a pride of cane-like stiffness for which reason it can be bent, as you would will, with slight effort.

(c-i) Māyā Anantānubandhi—is the deceit of the most acute and durable character. It is revealed in the natural crookedness of the mind.
which consists in deliberately doing one thing with some other ulterior motive behind. It is a kind of intrigue which for its intricacy is usually compared to the bamboo-knot.

(c-ii) *Māyā Apratyākṣhyān*—means the crookedness of the mind like that of the antelope's horns which can be straightened with difficulty.

(c-iii) *Māyā Pratyākṣhyān*—refers to that crookedness of the mind which can well be compared to the zigzag course that the current of water takes subsequent to its springing from a fountain-head.

(c-iv) *Māyā Sunjvalan*—is that attitude of mind which moves in curves that can only be stretched into straightness like the shavings of wood that are flattened by a slight pressure.

*Lobha* or Greed is the attitude of mind which makes one cleave to things worldly with a peculiar tenacity as if these were a part and parcel of its own.
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(i) Lobha Anantānubandhi—means intense attachment to a certain thing which, if taken away from its possessor, will perhaps take his life as well. It is just like the fast dye on cloths which lasts as long as the cloths endures.

(ii) Lobha Apratyakshyān—refers to the kind of attachment which is less intense in character and continues for a pretty long time, but not all through life. It is compared to the greasemarks from the cart-wheel which stick to cloth only for a certain time.

(iii) Lobha Pratyakshyān—is the attachment which can be removed with some effort as in the washing away of certain colour from a piece of cloth with soap and water.

(2) THE NINE AKASHAYAS OR CORELATES OF PASSIONS.

The Akashāyas or the Corelates of the Kashāyas or Passions, according to the Jain psychology, are nine in number as in the following:—
(1) Ḥāsyā—slevility. (ii) Rati—love; (iii) Arati—hatred (iv) Shoka—sorrow; (v) Bhaya—fear; (vi) jñagupaśā—likes-and-dislikes; (vii) Stri vedā; (viii) Purusha vedā and (ix) Nāpunsaka vedā. All these are detrimental to the right conduct of the jīva.

Of these nine necessary Corelates of Passions, the first six we need hardly deal with, they being very widely understood as common emotions. To take therefore the last three;—

(vii) Stri vedā—is that kind of karma which awakens sexual appetite in females at the sight of or in contact with males: just as the predominance of biliousness creates a desire for the sweets. The characteristic phenomenon of this erotic instinct in woman is such that a mere touch with the delicate and beautious parts which add to her personal charms quickens this lower instinct into a debasing animal propensity just as a mild fanning or blowing quickens the fire under ashes into a blaze to consume things.
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(viii) *Purusha veda*—is what awakens the same sex-passion in males at the sight of or in company with females. This erotic instinct is compared to the nature of straw-fire: for, just as the fire dies out after consuming the straws; so this *purusha veda* dies out immediately after its temporary preponderance and consummation.

(ix) *Napunsaka veda*—is what awakens the sex-passion in both the male and the female alike for a mutual embrace at the sight of each other. It is compared to the conflagration which reduces the whole town into ashes.

Thus we see that the three *Darshana-Mohaniya Karmas* and these Twentyfive *Chāritra Mohaniya Karmas* which make up altogether Twenty-eight kinds of *Mohaniya Karma,*—all act as so many hypnotising action-currents to delude the human mind from attaining to Right-knowledge through Right-vision which can only enable it to walk in the Right-path.
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IV. ANTARAYA-KARMA.

Antarāya Karma stands for that kind of invisible action-currents of injury which flowing under the surface of things secretly hinder the accomplishment of a particular end, the jīva has in view. It differs from other action-currents of injury in this that these work on the jīva in such a manner that it may not feel any inclination to gain Right-knowledge through Right-vision for the purpose of moving in the Right-path leading to the realisation of the end; but the Antarāya Kārmas do not destroy this inclination. It only works in such a manner that inspite of the earnest inclination on the part of the jīva to do a certain thing and even in spite of the necessary requisite materials being ready at the elbow, the jīva fails to accomplish the end he has in view.

Now this Antarāya karma divides itself into,—

(i) Dānāntarāya—is that invisible action-currents which works so that a man practically fails to make a gift of anything to any one inspite of his
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ardent inclination to do so and readiness of the requisite things at his elbow.

(ii) Labhantardaya—refers to the invisible action-currents which disable the jiva to practically gain any profit from what he does, inspite of his working hard in the matter with all the necessary materials and advantages about him.

(iii) Bhogantardaya—stands for the action-currents which invisibly work out; so that the jiva inspite of his earnest inclination and good health, cannot enjoy the palatable dishes and the like which can but be enjoyed once. The word bhoga connotes the sense of enjoyment but for once.

(iv) Upabhogantardaya—denotes that action-current whereby a jiva cannot enjoy the pleasure of a good bedding, woman, and the like even when these are at his disposal for pleasure and enjoyment. In the word upabhoga—the particle upa prefixed to the word bhoga has the sense of continual enjoyment; but not the
kind of enjoyment that can be had for once only as in the cases of rarely available palatable dishes and the like.

(v) *Viryāntarāya* refers to that kind of action-currents which secretly work in such a way that a man, inspite of his having a powerful will, a good moral stamina and other requisite materials and conditions conducive to the accomplishment of an end, fails to carry out his object. In the word *viryāntarāya*, the word—*virya* denotes strength, force, power or the *will* to do a thing.

Now from what precedes, it is clear that the truths underlying the *Antarāya kārma* cannot be gainsaid. Cases of failures in the performance and enjoyment of certain things and properties, other causes and conditions conducive to their accomplishments being the same, very often come into our cognisance where we fail to discover their real causes. The unreflecting minds, ignorant of the true principles of the law of *Karma*-causality, often attribute them to the
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imaginary dispensation by the Extra-Cosmic Providence.

Here ends the classification of the Ghatin Karma or the "Action-currents of Injury" comprising Forty Seven Kinds in All.

B: AGHATIN-KARMA AND ITS CLASSIFICATION.

We have seen already that the Aghatina kind of Karma or the action-currents of non-injury are those sets of vibratory currents which merely determine the shape, the size, the nature, the character, the configuration and the localisation; in short, every physical condition and environment forming a part of the manifesting media of the jiva. The vibratory action-currents are called non-injurious, because these like the Ghatin Karmas or the injurious ones, do not do any direct harm to the unfoldment of the possibilities latent in the soul; but merely serve to determine and construct as well, the character and configuration of the manifesting media through the instrumentality of which the jiva works out its higher forms of evolutions
for the unfoldment of its psychical possibilities infinite in their indications and constituting the real esse of the soul. We have seen also that karma in our philosophy means not the deeds done only; but also the energies of movement and form of the jiva’s own making which materialise into the karma-matter which cling round the soul as potential energy of the system. It is now admitted on all hands that diversities and changes in the phenomena of nature are possible only on condition that energy of motion is capable of being stored up as energy of position. For, the relatively stable forms of materialisation of Jivic energetics, chemical action and reaction, organisation of forms, the evolution of vegetal and animal organisms,—all depend upon the locking up of the kinetic action in the form of latent energy reduced into karma particles. And it is the kinetic release of this locked-up or potential energy in the form of the karman body that can account for all the possibilities of diversities and changes in the phenomena of nature.
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In the processes of integration and disintegration, of combination and decomposition, motion, by overcoming vis inertia, gives rise immediately to another kind of arrangement of the atoms of body, that is, to the production of a compound which did not before exist in it. These atoms must be previously possessed of the characteristic power of arranging themselves in a certain order; else both friction and motion would be without the slight influence and significance.

The characteristic power which the atoms are already previously possessed of, is no other than karmic forces or kinetic energies of the jiva's own making transformed into potential energy, which lies locked-up there as it were only to be released again for its kinetic manifestation in the future play of life; The chemists very often take advantage of this law of life without knowing what it really is; for instance, if you wish to form a certain compound that requires a peculiar character or the peculiar karmic-force, to make it what is required? What must you do?
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You must take steps to liberate the right kind of karmic-force at the exact instant that you wish the union to take place. You then get the chemical properties wanted; otherwise you would not. And the reason for this is that the particular karma, having a peculiar vibratory current is not common; and under other circumstances than those named, you cannot effectuate the metamorphosis.

It is thus pretty clear that atoms which differently arrange themselves and combine into new forms and compounds must be previously possessed of certain karmic forces having a peculiar tendency of distributing and arranging themselves in a definite order which gives constitution to the compound. But this distribution and arrangement of atoms is nothing more than a kind of permutation and combination speaking for the particular character and configuration of the composite body it makes. Bodies, we see, differ from one another: and the difference, it is evident also, is due, as we have seen elsewhere, to the difference in the
permutation and combination of the atoms and molecules. But what again is this difference due to? Fortuitous, surely it is not. The difference we have stated is due to the differences in karma. And we emphasize upon the same point by noting further that the difference is rather due to the peculiar nature and character (Prakriti) of the forces (Karma) under the influence of which the atoms vibrate in a certain form and combine into the making of a particular body. Vibrations of atoms differ in period and amplitude, and the changes of their mutual relations in combinations taking place, differ according to the respective parts already played by them.

Then again, apart from these varying phenomena of permutations and combinations of atoms into the formation of newer bodies as explained in our philosophy, the character of the body changes as well from compression and variation of temperature i.e., from the local and other surrounding causes and conditions called the nimittas. For instance, the capacity for
magnetism in the same body is augmented by mechanical compression and is even made to differ in different directions, according to the mode in which the compressing force is applied. When the density of the body is, by nature, different in different directions—as in crystals—its magnetic capacity is likewise different. The same view is further corroborated and confirmed by the changes of the magnetic capacity produced by changes of temperature.

To one it may seem that all these apply only to the inorganic world from which illustrations have been drawn. But for the organised bodies which appear to stand entirely in a different plane, we say that there is but little difference between the so-called inorganic and organic worlds. The difference is but a difference of degree in the manifestation. Both the worlds serve as the manifesting media for the display of the energies and powers struggling from within. Besides, physical organisms consist of solid, liquid, gaseous and etheric matter most exquisitely and delicately organised into cells and tissues. These
again build up into organs which enable the jiva to become aware of the outside world and of what is going on there. The organism thus formed is but a medium of the life-forces and therefore must be subject also to the same sets of causes and conditions which determine the character and configuration of things and bodies in Nature outside. A man’s body, consists of a combination of several systems of parts known as skeletal, muscular, nervous, digestive, circulatory, and genito-urinary. Each system is made up of a set of organs. Each organ is built up of tissues. All human tissues are born of cells. A cell in its simplest form is a minute mass of a transparent gelatinous contractible granular material, called Protoplasm.

Protoplasm thus appears to be the natural elements of life. It has been characterised with uniformity of structure, chemical composition and excitability of parts. When any part of the lump of Protoplasm is excited, the lump moves. An amœba is a single lump of protoplasm excitable and contractible in all parts of its
substance and not more so or less in one part than in another. Such being the characteristic indications of *protoplasm*, the physical basis, nay, the very *matter of life*, (for the inconceivably fine albuminous granules called *germ plasms* form the constituent elements of *protoplasm*), what is it that makes this homogeneous lump of matter pass into different forms of heterogeneity as manifest in the differentiation and transfiguration not only into the different forms of species—*jāti* of organic beings vegetable or animal, peopling the different abodes (*gati*) of *Sanskṛt*, but what is it that makes the cell which is but a structural unit of living being or to take the case of the human ovum which is but a typical cell, what makes it differentiate in the manner so that some of these differentiated parts combine into the tissues, some transform into skeletal, other evolves muscles, the third nerves, and the fourth, the organs of sense and the fifth the organs of action and the like which all compose the gross material system or the *Ouddārika sarira* of the man?
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Not only this. No two human bodies (sarira) even of the twin brothers or sisters, are alike either in character, behaviour or in configuration (Rati, Gati, Murti). Natural selection in the sense of the struggle for existence and hereditary transmission as we have already seen, cannot explain the causes and conditions as to why the human ovum should differentiate in the above manner so that certain of its differentiated parts come to be destined, as it were, to work out the skeletal, others to evolve heart, brain etc, while another set of parts gives formations to the limbs and extremities—upāṅgas, till the infant after the formation of its physical constitution or oudārīka body in this way for a certain period of time in its mother's womb comes out to see the light of the day. Then again the physical constitution of every child that is born is not sound, whole and entire. Why some are stout and healthy and proportionate in their limbs and extremities from birth, while others are lean, thin, emaciated as if they were dead already? Why some are born with defective sense-organs.
and deformed limbs and extremities and others with such and such complexion adding beauty and lustre to its constitution which is liked by all, while others are born with such physical organisms as are highly loathsome? Some are born to such and such parents in such and such family in such and such race and in such such place and walk and move with such traits and gaits in deportments and motions that all these taken together make up their respective individuality for which we are constrained to designate one as Mr. so-and-so, son of Mr. so-and-so, of such caste, family, and the like. The Naturalistic hypothesis with all its vaunted principles of adaptation to the environment and transmission of the acquired qualities to the offspring fails to explain the causes and conditions which determine the physique and physical environment which mark out a particular infant from amongst many others. But our sages explain by attributing the same to the agñātin Karma—the "action-currents of non-injury". It is these currents of action that determine the physical constitution and the environment which gives the Jiva its
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longevity and individuality by which it is conventionally singled out from the rest. Of such sets of action-currents of non-injury which individuates and singularises the Jīva for a certain definite period in some definite form comes first:—

V. THE AYUS KARMA.

The word āyus lit. duration, refers to the period of existence in a particular condition. And as the word is used generally to mean duration of life, it is known as longevity. Now the action-currents which determine the duration of existence in any of the four abodes (gati) of sansār is called —Ayuh karma. It divides itself in the following way,—

(i) Devāyuh karma—is what determines ones existence in a subtle form in the region of gods to enjoy there the sweets of life for a certain definite period of time.

(ii) Narakāyuh karma—is that set of action-currents by reason of which a jīva lives for a certain period of time in a hell which is so called because of its being devoid of all pleasures.
(iii) *Manushyāyu karma*—is that by which a *jīva* is born in the human world to live and struggle there for a certain period of time.

(iv) *Tiryanchāyu karma*—is what determines the period of existence in the world of beasts and birds.

VI. THE NAMA KARMAS.

*Nama karma*, or action-currents determinant of names, forms (*nām-rupa*) and environment which all combine to give the *jīva* its individuality and singularity. But as the causes and conditions which determine and make up the personality and individuality by means of which a particular *jīva* is singled out from amongst the many, are of various kinds. The sages have thought it wise, therefore, to classify these *karmas* into two main divisions (a) *Pinda-Prakriti* (b) *Prateyka Prakriti*.

**The Pinda Prakriti Nama Karma**

Refers to those sets of action-currents which all combine in the concretion of *Jīvīc-energetics* in such a way as to make up its physical organism after a certain type, form, colour, configuration, localisation of position in
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relation to other surrounding circumstances which make up the particularisation of the Jiva as a migrating soul. These sets of action-currents are,—

4. GATI NAMA KARMA.

1. (i) Deva Gati karma—the word gati in the phrase means abode of existence. According to the Jain sages there are four gatis, (i) Deva gati—or the abode of the gods, angels, and fairies. It might well be compared to Heaven of our Christian brethren and Svarga or Deva loka of our neighbours—the Hindus. Life is all pleasure here; and as in the midst of pleasure there is pain, it cannot be absolutely devoid of any pain. Hence there is also pain and suffering in Heaven; but these are here reduced to what we call irreducible minimum. Life in Heaven ends with the full fruition of the karma which determines the Jivas, duration and enjoyment there.

2. (ii) Narak gati karma.—The word narak is synonymous with niraya
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denoting the state of existence which bespeaks of *jiva's* unspeakable suffering and intense agony. It stands for the hell of the Christians with this difference only that according to the Christian idea, a *jiva* once condemned for an act of sin against God into any of its numerous chambers, cannot expect to return, however penitent it might be subsequent to its being condemned there. But the Jain view of the question is that by the *narak gati karma* or the set of action-currents corresponding to it, a Jiva may indeed be led to live in and suffer in this abode of tortures and torments, but with the dissipation of the particular *karma* which drifted it into an abode like this, and if there be no other determinant causes and conditions working upon the *jiva* to prolong its period of existence in this suffocating condition, it gets rid of this state of existence and retires to some other *gati*—abode,
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according to the Kârmic energies of its own making. And this might either lead to,

3. (iii) Manushya gati or the human world—the best and the only sphere of life and thought even for the gods who have to descend here to struggle for the attainment of autonomy or self-rule, or to,

4. (iv) Tiryaâk gati—the worlds of beasts and birds or vegetables and minerals.

5. JÂTI NAMA KARMA.

The word jâti here means species of living beings, and not caste into which the Indian social organism is divided. As a biological term in the Jain philosophy, it is used to denote the living organisms which are classified according to the number of sense-organs each jiva possesses: every living being does not possess all the five sense-organs. Some possess only one, viz., touch; others possess only two, viz., touch and taste, and so on. The Jain teachers hold that this variation in the number of the sense-organs as possessed by the jiva is due to a certain sets of action-
currents which work out the formation of the sense-organs. And accordingly, they teach,—

5. (i) *Ekendriya jāti karma* is that set of action-currents by the virtue of which a *jīva* has the sense of touch only.

6. (ii) *Dwindsriya jāti kārma*—is that set of action-currents by reason of which the living organism has two sense-organs,—of touch and taste.

7. (iii) *Trindriya jāti kārma*—is the set of action-currents which works towards the possession of the senses of touch, taste and smell.

8. (iv) *Chaturindriya jāti kārma*—is the set of action-currents by dint of which the *jīva* is born to those species which have the origin of sight in addition to the above three organs.

9. (v) *Panchendriya jāti karma*—is that set of action-currents which make the *jīva* to be born as one amongst those species of organisms which have also the sense of hearing in addition to the above four organs.

Now it is important to note here that Jainism recognised the sense of touch as
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the most fundamental organ of sense. All the living beings, it is true, do not possess all the organs of sense, but none is ever found to be bereft of the organ of touch. It is the sense of touch, says the Jain philosophers, that distinguishes the living from the non-living. If responsiveness, as lately demonstrated by Dr. Bose be the criterion of life, then every living being must at least be possessed of the organ of touch without which 'response' becomes impossible. The reason why any and every jīva, having its being within the relativity of causes and conditions, must at least be possessed of the sense of touch is this: a jīva cannot exist alone, aloof and by itself anywhere in the vacuous space without anything there for the jīva to come in contact with. With a jīva to be, means not only to exist somewhere but to be in contact with something else as distinct from itself; and this consciousness in the living being of being in contact with something other than itself, upon which it acts and re-acts, would be impossible, if it were devoid of the sense of
With the increase of the complexity of life, the organism grow more subtle and complex.

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touch. Jainism further holds that with the increase of the complexity of life and living, activities on the part of the jiva too grow more and more varied and complex. The pudgal particles, which cling to the soul, as consequences upon the jiva's deeds and misdeeds, in the previous cycle of existence set up types of action-currents hitherto unexperienced, and bring into play newer energetics, which, owing to the want of their proper vehicle, compel the jiva to find out a more suitable embodiment that would serve better the purpose of manifesting media for their fuller and richer display. It is also worthy of note that they develop pari passu; for the nature and form of this new vehicle are to a great extent, determined by the simplicity or complexity of the action-currents set up by the subtlety or grossness of the energetics brought into play. The readers may remember here that we have already hinted at the same truth although viewed from an altogether different standpoint while discussing the possibility of re-birth.
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5. SARIRA NAMA KARMA.

Is the set of action-currents which determine the growth and development of the body (sarira) of the jiva of those sets of action-currents determining the character of the body ;—

10. (i) Oudarika sarira karma—is that set of action currents which determine the ordinary physical body that we see, to come out actually from the mother womb. It is called oudarika because it is born of the materials in the womb (udara) of its mother.

11. (ii) Vaikriya sarira karma—is the set of fine action-currents whereby is evolved a kind of subtle-body which is variable at will. It is possessed by the devas and angels who modify it into various forms some times enlarging it into a gigantic size with four arms and the like and at others reducing it into the minutest of the minute hardly perceptible by our mortal eyes.

12. (iii) Aharak sarira karma—is the set of action currents whereby a
jiva develops the power of evolving a tiny body out of itself to be sent to distant region and clime to get news from any one else or receive instructions at the feet of the master who might be travelling at the time in some distant countries. It is the Jiva's 'double'.

13. (iv) Taijas sarira karma—is the set of action-currents where by jiva develops personal magnetism and heat through processes of which it evolves a magnetic body luminous in character and consuming in its power. A jiva who has sufficient occult power born of his Sādhanā—spiritual culture discipline—can project this luminous body out of himself and burn up things.

14. (v) Kārman sarira karma—is the fine-subtle body which is built out of the karma-pudgal of the energetics of the jiva's own making materialised into temporarily stable forms of Kārmic atoms.
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It is important to note that ordinarily all the jivas have the Oudārika, Taijās and the Kārman. Of these the latter two are inseparable from each other and must remain clothing the jiva till it attains to the state of non-chalance—Kaivalya. It is the migrating body which travels from womb to womb shaking off the Oudārika in its travels as the snake casts off its slough. Regarding the relation between the Oudārika and Kārman, the reader is referred to the previous chapter on the subject.

3. UPĀNGA NĀMA KARMA.

In Upānga nāma karma, the word upānga means limbs, extremities, lungs and others organs of action composing the body, and the sets of action-currents which evolve these component parts of the body are called upānga karma. The Upānga nāma karmas are of three kinds viz.—

15. (i) Oudārika upānga karma—means the set of action-currents which evolve the component parts of the gross physical body formed out of the materials in the mother’s womb "udara."
16. (ii) *Vaikriya upânga karma*—means the set of action-currents which work out the component parts of the *vaikriya surîra* of the gods and demi-gods.

17. (iii) *Aharaka upânga karma*—refers to the set of action-currents giving formation to the component parts of the aharaka body which the saints and sages can evolve out of themselves by the help of the powers they have acquired through severe austerities and penances they have undergone.

It is imperative to note that the other two kinds of bodies—the *Kārman* and *Taïjas*, have no limbs and organs.

15. **BANDHA NAMA KARMA.**

The word *bandhan* means binding, connecting. We have seen elsewhere that our body is composed of six parts roughly speaking *viz.* skeletal, muscular, circulatory, nervous and genito-urinary according to the modern physiologists. These parts not only stand vitally related to one another but there is an organic unity between them. They are joined together by what is called 'connecting tissues' equivelant to 'Sanyojaka tantu'
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in Sanskrit cementing up, as it were, into an organic whole. In dissecting a dead body when we sever its parts by our knives, we cannot afterwards restore them to their original position and connection: because in dissection, the connecting tissues which bind the muscles, the nerves etc. into an organic whole are also cut asunder. Now the bandhan nāma kārma means those sets of action-currents which evolve and determine as well the nature and character of these connecting (links) tissues which bind together the component parts of a body. And as bodies are stated to be of five different kinds as noted in the above under sarīra nāma kārma, so the nature and character of the connecting tissues which bind together the component parts of these bodies must also be of different nature and character as given below:

18. (i) Oudārika bandhan karma—means the set of action-currents which evolve and determine the nature and character of the 'connecting tissues' binding together the component parts of the gross physical body.
19. (ii) *Vaikriya bandhan karma*—means the set of action-currents determining the connecting links joining the component parts which make up the variable body possessed by the gods and the demi-gods.

20. (iii) *Ahraka bandhan kārma*—refers to the set of action-currents evolving and determining the connecting links joining together the parts of the tiny body which is sent out by the spiritual adepts to distant regions, as noted in the above.

21. (iv) *Tajjas bandhan karma*—is what determines the connection between the parts making up the luminous body.

22. (v) *Karman bandhan karma*—is what unites together the *karma-pudgal* or the materialised energetics of the *jiva's* own making vehicling on which the soul reducing itself to a subtle unit of energy passes out of the ouddārika body of the *jiva*.

23—32. Now the five bodies ouddārika etc., do not stand separated from one another.
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They remain intertwined with one another in two fold ways of warping and woofing by which reason we have got ten other forms of bandhan in addition to the five forms just detailed. But as the nature and character of these ten kinds of bandhan is not different from those enumerated, we do not think it our worth while to enter into their further details.

5. SANGHATAN NAMA KARMA.

The word sanghâtan means collecting and laying up of materials. Every living matter by the virtue of its own inherent power, works and collects from the outside non-living matter as its food which is annexed or assimilated by it through the processes of integration or anabolism without which the formation of the tissues and the growth of the organism become impossible. Now the set of action-currents which determines this synthetic or anabolic process in a living body is termed as the sanghâtan karma and as there are five kinds of living bodies, the sanghâtan karma must be also of five different kinds accordingly, viz.,—
33. (i) Ouddārika sanghātan karma—means the set of action-currents which determines the construction i.e. anabolic processes whereby non-living matter is collected by the gross physical organism and is assimilated through chemical transformation into tissues for its growth and development.

34. (ii) Vaikriya sanghātan karma.—is the set of action-currents which determine the processes for the variation and transformation of the variable bodies of the gods and the demi-gods.

35. (iii) Ahāraka sanghātan karma—means the action-currents set up by the spiritual adepts to collect materials from without for the construction and formation of the tiny bodies which are sent out of their gross physical frame to distant regions and climes.

36. (iv) Taijas sanghātan karma—is the set of action-currents by virtue of which heat (tejā) is absorbed by the jiva from without.
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37. (v) Kārman sanghātan karma—refers to the set of action-currents whereby the desires and energetics of the Jiva’s own making are materialised into (kārmic) atoms to adhere round to the soul as locked-up energy composing the kārman body.

6. SAMHANANA NAMA KARMA.

The word Samhanana, like bandhan, also means joining together, with this difference only that the latter bears the import of binding a thing by some thing else, just as a man is bound down by a rope; where as samhanana implies joining things by their mutual interpenetration. In the case of bandhan nāma karma the muscles, ligaments etc. surrounding the skeletal parts of the body tie them up into a particular stature and stoutness of the system as a whole; where as in this samhanana karma, the skeletal parts only are joined together by mutual interpenetration, dove-tailing, into each other as in the skull. Now the manner in which these skeletal parts are found to be joined with one another are variously determined as detailed below;—
38. (i) *Vajra rishava nārāchcha samhanana karma*—is the set of action-currents which determines bonny joints of the strongest characters. In this kind of joints, the bones are not merely joined together by mutual interpenetration but there is a bony projection (*vajra*) along the joints with a cover upon it, making these immovable; such being the case these joints are not easy of dislocation.

39. (ii) *Rishava nārāchcha samhanana karma*—means the set of action-currents determining the skeletal joints by mere interpenetration and without a *vajra* as in the ball and the socket joint of the hip.

40. (iii) *Nārāch samhanana karma*—denotes set of action-currents determining the skeletal joints in the same manner as in the previous one but without any tissue cover.

41. (iv) *Ardha nārāchcha samhanana karma*—is the set of action-currents which determines the character of the joint at one end of the bone in the manner
as in the above while the other end is simply kept in position by ligament as in the case of the thigh-bone.

42. (v) *Kilaku samhanana karma*—is the set of action-currents determining the joints of the skeletal simply by nails at the points of the joints without any pin or a tissue cover.

43. (vi) *Chhevaththu Samhanana karma*—is the set of action-currents whereby the bones are simply joined to one another, one slightly entering into the socket made in another.

6. **SAMSTHANA NAMA KARMA.**

The word *samsthana* signifies configuration of the body and the set of action-currents which tends to determine the shape, size, and character of the configuration of the body, is called *Samsthana karma.*

44. (i) *Samachaturasra samsthana karma* is the set of action-currents by reason of which the configuration of the body is kept thoroughly symmetrical.

45. (ii) *Nyagrodha samsthana karma*—is the set of action-currents which make the part of the body upward from the
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naval symmetrical but retards the growth and development of the lower part.

46. (iii) Sādi samsthāna karma—is the set of action-currents which make for the full and proper development only of the lower part of the body down from this naval leaving the upper part not properly formed to keep up the symmetry.

47. (iv) Kubja samsthāna karma—is the set of action-currents by the predominence of which only the trunk of the body gets deformed—limbs and extremities being left symmetrical—'kubja' means 'hump-backed.'

48. (v) Vāman samsthān karma—is the set of action-currents due to the influence of which the different parts of the body including the trunk do not develop into their normal size, form, and configuration as in the case of a dwarf which is equivalent to Vāman in Sanskrit.

49. (vi) Hunda samsthāna karma—is the set of action-currents by reason of
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which none of the different parts of the body are symmetrical and properly adjusted so as to make the whole configuration attractive and graceful.

It is important to note that the configurations of the ouddārika bodies that come out of the womb (udar) are more or less determined by the samsthāna nama karma; but those which have no ouddārika constitution are not subject to these action-currents determinant of the configuration under discussion.

5. VARNA NAMA KARMA.

The word varna means colour or complexion; and the set of action-currents which are determinant of this colour or complexion of the physical constitution of the jīva is called, varna karma or the set of action-currents determinant of complexion. This varna karma is again analysed into prasastha and aprasastha—i.e. pleasing and unpleasing to the eyes from the aesthetic stand point. And these are divided into five kinds as in the following.—

50. (i) Krishna varna karma—is the set of action-currents by the influence of
which the colour of the physical constitution becomes black like the Nigroes of Africa.

51. (ii) *Nila varna karma*—is set of action-currents by the reason of which the physical complexion is made blue like some of the Indian races of pre-historic time.

52. (iii) *Lohita varna karma*—is the set of action-currents which reddens the complexion like those of the Red Indians of America.

53. (iv) *Haridra varna karma*—is the set of action-currents which give yellow colour to the constitution as we find in the Yellow races of China and Japan.

54. (v) *Sveta varna karma*—is the set of action-currents which makes the body white as snow like the complexion of the White races of Europe.

*Gandha Nama Karma.*

The word *gandha* means odour. And it goes without saying that every kind of physical body has a particular smell about
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it. So is the case with the physical organism of the jiva. Now the odour which an organism emits is either fragrant (suravi) or fetor (duravi): Hence,—

55. (i) Surabhi gandha karma—is the set of action-currents which makes a body radiate a fine fragrance very pleasant to smell.

56. (ii) Duravi gandha karma—is the set of action-currents which make a body emit a bad stinking fetor very unpleasant.

5. RASA NAMA KARMA.

The word rasa means taste. As bodies have 'smells' so they have 'tastes' rasa) as well, which is discerned by the sensation which bodies awaken in us through the organ of taste (rasanendriya). But as the matter affecting the organ must be in a liquid state in order to its being felt, we have the word rasa which bears about it the sense and significance of liquidity. Tastes differ as bodies differ in constitution, and the action-currents which determine the nature and character of these tastes are named as Rasa-Karma or the action-currents deter-
minant of taste. To illustrate, the sensation of bitterness (tikta) as produced by quinine and the sensation of sweetness (madhura) as produced by sugar, are very definite and specific sensations. The Jain sages have, therefore, classified the gustatory qualities of bodies (Rasas) into five as in the following—

57. (i) Katu rasa karma—is the set of action-currents which make the body give hot or pungent sensation (katu) as in the case of pepper.

58. (ii) Tikta rasa karma—is the set of action-currents which make the body awaken the sensation of bitterness (tikta) as in the case of quinine.

59. (iii) Amla rasa karma—is the set of action-currents which determines the quality of sourness (amlā) in bodies as in the case of acids (amlā).

60. (iv) Madhura rasa karma—is the set of action-currents which determines the sweetness (madhura) of bodies as in the case of sugar.

61. (v) Kashāya rasa karma—is the set of action-currents which determines
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the saline (kashāya) quality of body as in the case of salt.

"In the ordinary course of things these sensations are excited by the contact of specific sapid substances with the mucous membrane of the mouth, the substances acting in some way or other, by virtue of their chemical constitution, on the endings of the gustatory fibres. When we taste quinine, the particles of quinine, we must suppose, set up chemical changes in the cells of the taste-buds or in the other parts of epithelium, and by means of these changes gustatory impulses are started. • • Substances which taste sweet or bitter are always found to contain certain definite groups in the molecule, especially the hydroxyle (OH) and amido (NH₂) groups. Moreover, it seems as if a certain definite balance between positive and negative radicals must exist in order that a substance shall taste sweet, for when such substance is so altered chemically that this balance is upset, the resulting derivatives are, according to circumstances, either bitter or tasteless." Does this not show what is implied in the rasa-nāma karma?
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8. SPARSHA NAMA KARMA.

The word sparsha means touch. It is by touch that we understand whether a body is heavy or light, rough or smooth, warm or cold, and the like. And the set of action-currents which determine the nature and character of the tactuo-muscular sensation which bodies awaken in us through touch is named as the sparsha karma. Tactuo-muscular sensations are of eight kinds viz—62—69. (i) Karkash—rough ; (ii) Mridu—smooth ; (iii) Guru—heavy ; (iv) Laghu—light ; (v) Shita—cold ; (vi) Ushna—warm ; (vii) snigdha—moist ; (viii) Rukshma—dry.

4. ANUPURVI NAMA KARMA.

The word anupurva means order, series or succession, i.e. the order of the succession of bodies which the jiva has to migrate through after death. And the Anupurvi ndama karma, therefore, signifies the action-currents which determine the course of movements which the jiva has to make in migrating out of the oudārika body at death: we have seen before that after death, the jiva being wrapped up in kārman body migrates to that gati which is determined by
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the *gati karma* of the *jiva's* own making during the period of its *oudārika* existence. But how would it go? the *kārman*-body clothing in which the *Jiva* at death passes out of the gross mortal coil, has neither the organs of sense, nor of action which only enable the *Jiva* in the *oudārika* body to move along certain lines in a certain direction in space in order to reach a particular destination it has in view. But the Jain philosophers hold as a solution to this doubt that as both the *Gati* and the *Yoni* whence the *Jiva* will have to take birth, become fixed and determined by the action-currents set up by the *Jiva* itself, so the direction of the *Jiva's* movements after death to reach its future destination, is also determined by its setting up of certain action-currents, called *anupurvi karma*, which determine and control the direction of the jiva's movements in space by which it is enabled to directly reach its destination: but as there are only four *gatis* or destinations for a *Sansāri jiva* to reach after it has shuffled off its *oudārika* body, this *anupurvi karma* takes four different forms,—
70. (i) Devanāpurvi Karma—means the set of action-currents which directly leads the jīva to Deva gati or the region of the gods and the demi-gods.

71. (ii) Nārakānāpurvi karma—means the set of action-currents which directly leads the jīva to the Naraka gati or hell.

72. (iii) Manushyānāpurvi karma—is the set of action-currents which leads the jīva straight to the human world.

73. (iv) Tīrtyagānāpurvi karma—is the set of action-currents leading the jīva straight to the worlds of the beasts and birds.

It is interesting to note here by the way that according to the principle of karma-causality, a jīva after death has to go straight not only to the gati or the world wherein he is destined by the action-currents of its own setting up to move about; but also straight to the very Yoni or womb through which it is destined as well, to take its rebirth immediately after the termination of its past life. The period intervening
between death and birth of the one and the same jiva is known by the name of Vigraha Kāla in Sanscrit or Vāte vahatā in Guzrati. This vigraha kāla is so infinitesimally small that it can not easily be measured, the longest being the time one takes to count from one to four. From this it becomes further evident, and it is really held by the Jains, that it is not the parental soul that is born as a child; for were it so, then the parent, remark the Jain philosophers, should have died the moment the jiva was conceived in the womb through the act of coition: nor again the newly conceived jiva can be taken as a part of the parental soul for that would imply an actual division of the soul which is constitutionally indivisible by its very nature. The Jains hold, therefore, that the jiva that is born to the parent, is not the parental soul which remained hidden as it were, either in the constitution of the father, only to be instilled by him into the womb of its mother in and through the seminal fluid at the time of impregnation, or in the constitution of the mother, in her ovum
which passes through certain stages of development while coursing downwards into the uterus (Jarāyu) where it awaits the embrace of the spermatozoa at the climax of the congress. The new being that the mother conceives, according to the Jains, is but a jīva that has just laid aside its mortal coil, the oudārika body, elsewhere, and directly comes rushing in with lightning speed to plant itself in the ovum just fertilised through the processes of coition for its reception. It is true that through the processes of impregnation and reproduction innumerable jīvas in the forms of spermatozoons in the seminal fluid meet their deaths; but none of these is born as the child conceived by the mother in the act of coition.

2. VIHAYO GATI NAM KARMA.

74-75. Vihūyo gati means gait and deportment in one's movement and the set of action currents which control this gait and deportment in the movements of the jīva, is named as vihūyo gati karma: This vihūyo gati karma is either (i) shubha (good) and (ii) ashubha (bad). It is with this vihūyo
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gati karma that ends the list of karmas (action-currents) coming under the heading of Pinda Prakriti Aghātin Karma.

THE PRATVEKA PRAKRITI KARMA

Or the action-current that runs singly without any differentiating characteristic insignia in the current. Of these Pratveka Prakriti karma comes first,—

76. Parāghāta karma—is the action-current by virtue of which the jiva becomes invincible.

77. Uutchāsa karma—is the action-current which determines the courses of inspiration and respiration.

78. Atapa karma—is the action-current which determines the light and halo of the personality of the jiva as we feel when in the presence of any high souled person, who changes the atmosphere around him by the personal magnetism it has developed.

79. Udyota karma—is the action-current determining the serenity of the influence a jiva of high merit sheds upon those who gather around him.
80. **Aguru laghu karma**—is the action-current by which the body is made neither heavy nor light.

81. **Tirthankara karma**—is the action-currents which fit the *jiva* to become a *tirthankara* in some future incarnation.

82. **Nirmān karma**—is the action-current by which the organs become properly adjusted and placed in their respective positions.

83. **Upaghāta karma**—is the action-current by dint of which the organs do not get adjusted in their respective places to allow a normal functional activity.

84. **Tras karma**—is the action-current by virtue of which the *jiva* passing out of the immoveable body like trees and plants etc. take to a moving body which can travel about.

85. **Bādara karma**—is the action-current helping the *jiva* in the metamorphosis form an invisible minute body into a big visible body.

86. The **paryāpta karma**—is the action current which enables the *jiva* to develop
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its organic parts to their full and complete development.

87. Pratyeka karma—is the action-current whereby a jiva has the privilege of having a body of its own instead of sharing a body along with other jivas. From this it is apparent that the Jain sages quite understood the biological possibilities of a great many jivas swarming together in a common home.

88. Sthira karma—is the action-current whereby a jiva has a good set of strong teeth, a good set of hard bonny skeletal and the like, adding to the strength and steadiness of the body.

89. Subha karma—is the action-current whereby the jiva enjoys a charming upper part of the body inviting the attention of other people. It differs from Nyagrodha samsthana in this that it determines the nature and character to an attractive finish of the upper part of the body, but it does not necessarily leave the lower part clumsy and defective, while the nyagrodha samsthana karma as we have already seen before, determines the symmetrical get up of the
upper part only, leaving the lower part defective and clumsy.

90. Saubhagya karma—is the action-current by reason of which a jiva becomes popular.

91. Susvara karma—is the action-current whereby a jiva has the privilege of having a sweet melodious voice which charms all who hear.

92. Adeya karma—is the action-current which adds importance, wisdom and weight to the words spoken by a jiva.

93. Yoshokirti karma—is the action-current whereby a jiva earns name and fame.

94. Sthāvara karma—is the action-current which impells a jiva to take birth in an organism of immovable nature like the trees and plants.

95. Sukshma sarira karma—is the action-current whereby a jiva has a very fine subtle body hardly perceptible by the sense-organs.

96. Aparāyāpta karma—is the set of action-current by the influence of which a jiva has to succumb before it attains to a
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complete maturity of limbs and other organs in their entirety.

97. Sādhāran karma—is the action-current whereby a jīva dwells in a body which is common to many.

98. Asthira karma—is the action-current due to the influence of which the teeth, the bones etc., not being strongly set up are unsteady and wallable.

99. Asubha karma—is the action-current due to which the upper part of the body is neither well-built nor pleasing to other eyes.

100. Durbhāgya karma—is the action-current whereby a jīva in spite of his working hard and doing many good deeds does not get any popularity in return.

101. Dushar karma—is the action-current whereby the jīva has a rough hoarse voice.

102. Anādeya karma—is the action-current due to the bad influence of which a jīva, however he may speak truth, or words of wisdom and utility, his words carry no weight, nor convince any one of the truth he speaks out.
103. _Apayasha apakirti kārma_—is the action-current whereby a _jīva_ has to labour under a bad name and disrepute.

Here ends the long list of One Hundred and Three _Nama Karmas_ determining the environment and physical condition in and through which a _jīva_ has to struggle on and on.

**VI.—GOTRA KARMA.**

We have seen before that _gotra karma_ means certain action-currents whereby is determined the family and the race in which a _jīva_ has to be born in the next incarnation. But families being either high or low in social structure, or being of high antiquity, having behind it the experience of ages, the _Gotra Karma_ divides itself into two distinct sets of action-currents, viz—

(i) _Uchcha gotra karma_—is that set of action-currents by the influence of which a _jīva_ is born to a high family with edifying surroundings.

(ii) _Nicha gotra karma_—is that set of action-currents under the influence of which a _jīva_ is made to take birth in a low family with bad en-
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vironments and grovelling people around him.

VII.—VEDANIYA KARMA.

The word vedandā is synonymous with samvedana which is equivalent to sensation as understood in modern psychology. Sensation results from the action of an external stimulus on the sensitive apparatus of our nerves. Each organ of sense produces peculiar sensations which cannot be excited by means of any other. The eye gives the sensation of light, the ear of sound, the nose of smell, the tongue of taste and the skin of touch. And the sensations not only differ from one another in kind partly with the organ of the sense excited, but they also differ partly with the nature of the stimulus employed in two ways either (i) shātā or (ii) aṣhātā.

(i) Shātā vedaniya karma—is the set of action-currents which, working on the sensitive apparatus of our nerves, gives rise to pleasurable sensations.

(ii) Aṣhātā vedaniya karma—is the set of action-currents which similarly
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occasion in us sensations of painful character.

Thus we have One Hundred and Eleven kinds of Aghâtina Karma or the "Action-currents of Non-injury" determining and evolving as well the physical conditions of the psyche or the soul—i.e., its body of action and its localisation in space which stand as the manifesting media for the play and operation of the energetics of its own making in the past.

Now to summarise the classification of Karmas—both Ghâtin and Aghâtin which together make 158 kinds of karma—we have,—

I. Jñândavaraniya karma 5 Kinds
II. Darshandâvaraniya,, 9 ,, 
III. Mohaniya ,, 28 ,, 
IV. Antarâya ,, 5 ,, 
V. Ayuh ,, 4 ,, 
VI. Nâma ,, 103 ,, 
VII. Gotra ,, 2 ,, 
VIII. Vedaniya ,, 2 ,, 

Total. 158 Kinds.
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The details of these jivic energetics which materialise themselves into relatively stable character in the form of karma-pudgal clinging round the soul can be worked out indefinitely in strict accordance with the Jain philosophical treatises. A critical study of these questions on the formation and transformation of the energetics of the jiva's own making, cannot but convince a reflective student, of the intense love of truth and freedom which prevailed upon the sages who renounced their hearths and homes to enter upon hair-splitting analysis of these phenomena, psychical or physiological, which every human being can possibly experience, so that those who have been groaning under the de-humanising effects of their impudent conduct due to wrong knowledge originating from their perverted visions into metaphysics of things and ideals, might take a note of warning before-hand, and strive to attain to a free and beatific state of being by the virtue of Right-Conduct (samyak châritra) proceeding from Right-Knowledge (samyak jñâna) acquired through Right-Vision (samyak
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darshana) into the underlying realities of ideas and ideals. But as the present treatise is but a stepping-stone to have a bit clearer vision into the metaphysics of ideas and ideals lying hidden in the rich and almost inexhaustible mines of the Jain literature and philosophy; nay as it is only an epitome faithfully and consistently giving, in the briefest manner possible, a general idea of the Jain epistemology, ontology and theology on the principles of which, the whole moral code of the Jains is formulated for our right conduct in the attainment of the true Self-Rule or Swaraj, pure and simple, we must refrain, for the present, from entering upon a more detailed enquiry into the subtlety of the still deeper truths which lie veiled under the phenomenology of the organic energetics of 158 kinds as detailed in the foregoing pages, and pass, from the natural man who has been continuously forging fresh links to the chain of bondages by yielding to the solicitations of lower nature, on to the consideration of the moral man whose life has been a constant endeavour to shake off the guilded shams of the senses,
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to break off the fetters, to tear asunder into pieces the shackles of bondages, to soar higher and higher into the regions of bliss and beatitude to shine there in all his effulgence and glory.
CHAPTER XXVII.

FROM METAPHYSICS TO ETHICS.

How does Theory determine the Practice—the Jain Ethical Speculation—How it is determined and based on their Metaphysical Speculation—A Contrast between Buddhistic and Jain Morality—the Jain Conception of the Summum Bonum.

To man, his own inner nature, like the outernature which surrounds him, is at first a chaos to be organised into cosmos. As his intellectual interest consists in subduing to the order and system of the world of verities, surrounding him, the varied mass of presentations which incessantly pour in upon him, so as a moral being, his ethical interest lies in bringing the claimant and jarring impulses, propensities and other elements in conformity with the order and system of the rational life. As the business of a theoretical thinker, confined only to his own interest, is to make the world orderly enough as to be fit for habitation, so the business of the moral man, leaving out of account the theoretical and other interests, is to establish order,
unity and coherence in human practice. But here too, as everywhere else, the head guides the hand, the intellect controls the will; for theory always determines the practice. Of course, it is needless to mention here that a clear and adequate theory comes into being, or become crystallised into a definite shape, after long crude practice, but still, it may be asserted, as a fact, incapable of being denied, that every life implies a certain plan, a certain conception, however vague and ill-defined, of what life means. And such a plan or conception, we say, is already an implicit or latent in every theory of life. The clearer and more definite the conception of the meaning of life becomes, the more of order and harmony is also introduced into human practice. This is why intellectual superficiality is so often a main source of moral evil; and folly and vice are largely synonymous. This is why the first step towards moral reformation is to arouse reflection in a man or people; for the claims of morality cannot be properly satisfied and its demands fulfilled, until and unless the rigours of these claims are properly brought clearly into view.
Every case of moral awakening is therefore also a case of intellectual awakening; for the apprehension of truth does not remain a mere matter of intellect, or job of head; but it has other far-reaching consequences as it rouses the emotions, higher or lower, and demands expression through them in conduct or in life. "The opinion we entertain as to man's life as a whole and its relation at large must influence our practice of the art of life."

If this be the relation between 'the theory of life' and 'the art of life,' and if theory moulds the practice, as is evidenced by the history of mankind, we may easily surmise the nature of the ethical discipline which will necessarily follow from the subtle and splendid metaphysical speculations of the Jains, we have discussed before. For the ethical discipline is nothing but the formulation of the principles in accordance and in conformity with the metaphysical speculation, which will bring order, coherence, and unity in our practice and thereby help us in the achievement of the Summum Bonum, we have in view. And the art of life and its principles
for the guidance of the conduct, being but means to the realisation of the Highest Good, will vary considerably with any variation in the conception of the End itself. And we shall develop this presently by bringing the Buddhistic ethics in sharp contrast with the ethics of Jainism.

The Buddhhas, rejecting the view of the soul as a persistent entity hold out that it is a *continuum* of conscious states and processes, for their metaphysics leaves no room for any abiding substance. This view of momentary existence, this denial of any persistent reality as commonly understood, was extended, to utter astonishment, to the physical world also, it being thought of as mere subjective impressions having no permanent underlying substance. It is out and out subjectivism, for here the momentary experience becomes the sole reality and the only datum of consciousness.

Now, in face of such philosophical speculations which reduce the self as well as the external world into so many momentary but continuous existences, which conceive reality in the form of an ever-flowing fluid,
the only ethical dictum which can be held out consistently is—"Guard the interest of the present and think not for the morrow."
The very fact that we are the children of every moment and not of eternity as is taught in direct opposition to our own doctrine, makes the claim of the present, even of the momentary present, imperious and supreme beyond all others. Not the calculating prudence, but a careless surrender to the present becomes the true rule of life. And it is a mood, we may say, which must recur with every moral scepticism. For whenever the meaning of life, as history reveals, is not truly realised or lost sight of altogether, or whenever that meaning is shrivelled up in the experience of the momentary present, when no abiding interest is found amidst this fleeting earthly life, when in it, is discerned no 'whence' or 'whether' but only a brief, blind, continuum of conscious states and processes and of transitory existences, then the conclusion which is inevitable to come foremost in the mind, is that the interest of the present have a paramount and supreme claim and the present
enjoyment and future unconcern is the only good of life. And we may remark that such a philosophical speculation, by the perfect frankness, with which it eulogises the life of momentary experience and under-mines the importance of calculating wisdom so essential in life, takes away from man what is of worth and dignity to him and thus bears its own condemnation.

The Jains, however, on the other hand hold out a different ideal—an ideal of freedom from bondage—which can only be attained by voluntary effort, both intellectual and moral. Here, as we have found in Buddhistic metaphysics, the soul is not reduced to a *continuum* of conscious states, to a flux of psychical impermanent and mobile units, but is viewed as a substantial unity, a true verity, which has got to undergo all the consequences of its thoughts and deeds either in this life or in life to come, till it attains to that state of freedom and beatitude which is enjoyed only by the Kevalins or the Omniscients. The man here does not escape the effects of his own deed, virtuous or vicious, shuffling off this mortal coil as
taught in Buddhistic philosophy, but on the other hand, enters again into a state of bondage, though it may be somewhat different from the present one, to feel the consequences he earns or has earned, and there is no escape from this cycle of birth and rebirth, till he is able to shake off by his own moral endeavour, the pudgal particles clinging round his soul on every occasion he acts. This bondage is also regarded as something alien to the soul, it being caused by its own misdoings and it can therefore regain its original state of liberation, by developing in full the capabilities which are now lying veiled or dormant in him. The Sumnum Bonum of life is here not the gratuitous enjoyment of the present in utter disregard of the future, as Buddhists hold; on the other hand, it is the sacrifice of the present to the future, the sacrifice of flesh to enter into a life of spirit, the annihilation of passion to enjoy a state of serene bliss, that forms the keynote of Jainism. In short, the yearning after a state of freedom from bondage,—a state of bliss and beatitude and omniscience, attainable after much moral
endevour from a pious home-sickness in the state of bondage in this earthly life is at the heart of Jainism. And consequently their ethics, is not an ethics of sensibility where man sells himself to nature, but is essentially an ethics of self-realisation in and through self-rule and self-regulation.

Such being the end and aim of Jain morality, we turn our attention to the methods which should be adopted for the realisation of this sublime ideal. Ere long, we have discussed the question regarding the possibility of such realisation and we got an emphatic affirmative answer to it, nay the question has been already decided by a single stroke so to speak with the solution of the problem of Necessity and Free-will. There we have shown clearly that man has this peculium to criticise the impulsive stream, to arrest and change its course and to subdue the lower, animal propensities leading to vicious crimes, in view of the sublime ideal. It is here that he stands on a higher level than animal, for his life, unlike the life of an animal, is not a life of blind immediacy, but a life controlled and
guided by its meaning as a whole. His life is not a life of surging passions and promptings; on the contrary, he is the critic as well as the subject of these and as such he is the maker of his own destiny. Man has to rise, in order to attain to this state of beatitude and bliss, above the impulses of the moment, and must view everything he feels or thinks or wills, in the light of the Supreme Ideal—the source of all moral obligation. He must criticise the solicitations of sense and his natural tendency to activity, judge, approve or condemn them according as they stand either conducive or detrimental to the attainment of freedom or to the interest of his self-realisation. Living as he does in this stage of bondage—a state of perpetual conflict between reason and sensibility, between ideal and actual, between natural and moral, he cannot avoid this rule of life. He cannot without ceasing to be a moral personality abjure this function of self-legislation, which is the true way for self-realisation, because he feels an incessant craving in him for a life which would be the fulfilment of his true and characteristic nature.
METAPHYSICS TO ETHICS.

Virtue is not a spontaneous natural growth, still less an original endowment of man. He has to constitute himself a moral or virtuous person and has to build up his character after a long and toilsome process of self-legislation and self-conquest. And it is the privilege and dignity to him to be the critic of his own impulses, to be the maker of his own destiny and to have in his own hands, the way to his own emancipation. No doubt this way to self-realisation is beset with many obstacles and impediments and a walk on it entails much struggle and pain-suffering; but looking to the other aspect, we also find, in the depths of a moral being, a joy which is even stronger and more steadfast than the self-imposed pain itself—we mean the joy of the conviction that the struggle is worth while, nay the only thing which has any worth at all; for the goal, he strives after, is not something transitory, fleeting or evanescent, like that of the Buddhist but is everlasting freedom, everlasting omniscience and everlasting bliss. And in the joy of anticipation of this blessed state—a state of unparallelled sponta-
niety, freedom and naturalness, all the pity of pain and sorrow, of struggle and defeat, of mortifications, and penances sinks out of heart and mind. This is the state, where in the language of a philosopher, the indefinite potentiality of either vice or virtue, has been transformed into a definite capacity for virtue, nay even more, into an incapacity for vice. Here he soars above the region of merit and demerit, of reward and punishment, of public sanction or censure, shuns off what is stiff, stereotyped and artificial, and lives a life which is "free down to its very root," And we may conclude by saying that because man is a citizen of a higher world, and is potentially free, he feels the bondage, of the lower form of life and the burden of self-realisation becomes one which he is willing and eager to bear and which becomes "the lighter, the longer, and more faithfully it is borne." For better, he feels this noble discontent than the most perfect animal contentment.
CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE CONCEPTION OF VIRTUE AND VICE.

Virtue and vice—distinctive principle between them—Human conduct is essentially Teleological—Moksha is the Highest End of life and activity—Contrast between the Eastern and Western conception of Vice and Virtue—Virtue, Vice and Karms-causality—The problem of evil.

Before giving a detailed list of the manifold virtues and vices, as has been enumerated by various Jain philosophers, we think it necessary, for a philosophical treatment, to enter into the principles on which this distinction rests or the principles from which we may logically deduce them. A mere survey of the virtues and vices as given, in the list, (vide infra) won't help us much in the way of entering into the philosophy of the thing or understanding the rationale of such distinction.

To enter into our subject-matter therefore, we first draw the attention of our readers to the fact, that in opposition to the philosophy of the West, we find even here, first, a teleo-
logical conception dominating the entire distinction; for the Jains do not believe in the intrinsic worth of any particular thought or deed which is palpable to the so-called supernatural faculty which goes by the name of Conscience or Moral Sense, as is held by the Common-Sense philosophers of the West; but on the contrary, hold that a thing or a thought has any worth only as it is conducive to the realisation of some end to which it is but a means. An objection, which may seem to have much of plausibility, at first sight, of course, might be raised to the effect, that we cannot go on ad infinitum in this progressus; so we must stop somewhere which must be the ultimate End and means to nothing; and this Ultimate End or Summum Bonum, being, by its very nature, not any means to any end, cannot, in strict conformity with the proposition already laid down, have any worth at all and so ceases to be desirable altogether. Thus Moksha or Final Liberation, which is regarded as the Ultimate Goal of every moral endeavour and as the source of all
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moral obligation, may seem to have no worth in their eyes!

The criticism, in reply, we say, is beside the mark; for the proposition is applicable to every thing except moksha itself in relation to which we judge everything else and which is regarded as the fountain of all worth. This moksha or the state of liberation, as we have discussed before, is not something alien to our nature, but is on the other hand the fullest development of the capabilities now lying veiled or dormant in us, and all the worth it possesses for us, is due to its being the fullest realisation of our own true and characteristic nature. And all the feelings, emotions and affections which gather round the apprehension of virtue and vice, which accompany the sense of duty or conviction of obligation, and the consciousness of good or ill desert, remorse and self-approval, moral hopes and fears,—all testify unanimously to his being in the state of bondage, the liberation from which is therefore the true goal of every moral progress. For whence comes the permanent uneasiness and discontent that are apt to haunt even the favoured lives? Undoubted-
ly from the constant presence of unrealised ideals—the ideal of liberation and omniscience. The sense of short-coming, of broken purposes, of blighted visions which cause many a chill on the most genial hours, admit of no other more rational explanation. And this feeling of uneasiness, this feeling of discontent—is that which saves the individual as well as the nation from every sort of moral stagnation and stationary existence.

In another respect there is also a slight difference between Jainism and Western philosophy which consists in this that here virtue does not directly refer to the excellence of character as in the West, but to the conduct conducive to the realisation of moksha. The conduct, being but a partial revelation of the character, the Jains confine the terms Papa and Punya i.e., vice and virtue, to the conduct itself, regarding the character which reveals itself through the conduct conducive to self-realisation, as simply religious; for here religion and morality, both having the common end in view, mingle together and are regarded as inseparable.
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Virtue, we thus see, is that form of conduct which furthers the self-realisation of man, helps him in the purification of the heart and the attainment of liberation and a state of beatitude and bliss. It has a good end—an end which justifies its worth—namely perfection; for perfection, it seems to us, is a worthy aim in itself and the pain we suffer from on our march towards it, therefore needs no apology. Virtue, inspite of the pain which it brings in its trail, is of incalculable use in correcting and disciplining the spirit, for it serves to soften the hard of hearts, to subdue the proud, to produce fortitude and patience, to expand the sympathies, to exercise the religious affections and lastly to refine, strengthen, nay, to elevate the entire moral disposition. It tends of its very nature to honour and life and vice to dishonour and death. And lastly it sheds upon us a deep peace, a sense of security, of resignation and hope which no sensible or earthly object can elicit. It clarifies our vision, refines our thought, purifies our heart, animates our will, and
last of all it adds we say a cubit to our moral stature.

Such being the nature of virtue, how can we expect in face of the operation of Karma-causality, other than pain and misery, when we commit vice. Surely the entail of natural evil, of pain and misery, upon moral transgression is the indispensible expression of the righteous adjustment of things by the operation of Karma-causality. Sin being there, it would be simply monstrous, in face of such inexonerable moral causality as discussed above, that there should be no suffering, no misery, and no pain, and would fully justify the despair which now raises the sickly cry of complaint against the retributory wretchedness of moral transgression. And still in utter forgetfulness of such moral causation, we, when we are haunted by the fatalism of nature on our own misdoings, cry against the sternness and rigidity of the inexonerable law, with which it marches upon us! We forget, in short, that the absence of physical evil in presence of the moral evil pleads against the operation of the law of Karma-
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causality, nay against the whole righteous adjustment of the world, and is a horrible inconsistency.

But we have not as yet got rid of another difficulty which may perplex the mind of one interested in this problem; for questions like this as "why should there be any vice at all?" cannot but disturb minds of earnest inquirers. True, they may say, there is the law of Karma-causality, the firm grip of which, no one can elude on commission of vice—truer indeed that by virtue, the torpid conscience is awakened, the close affections are opened and the slavery of selfishness can be successfully escaped—but why is this world at all tainted with vice and not a world of pure unalloyed virtue? Or, more briefly, why there is any sin at all?

The obvious reply to such enquirers is that it is due to our free-will. We are as man, the most gifted animals in the arena of the universe, and this best possible endowment, namely the power to choose between good and evil regardless of their unavoidable consequences, includes in its
very nature, the ability and possibility of its misuse. And this free-will needs no justification, for without it there might be some sort of goodness or docility, which may be properly designated as animal goodness, but no virtue in the strict sense of the term, for a virtuous being is one who chooses of its own accord to do what is right, though the heaven falls. And the notion of a moral being, without being endowed with the freedom to act of its own accord, without the concurrence and approval of its own will, is itself a down-right contradiction; for otherwise, we would be forced to think of morality in stones and trees. To take away this freedom of man is virtually to arrest the system of things to a natural order and means the reduction of human life to animal spontaneity and leaves no room for the possibility of its culmination into an ethical society.

Sin, we thus see, far from being an inevitable outcome of a determining necessity, is the result of the abuse of an orginal endowment of man—which being the ground
of his moral nature when properly used, instead of depraving morality, heightens it. And we may further say that owing to this peculiar endowment, the whole resources of men are well in hand and the creature with this controlling agency when raised to its highest pitch, displaces a thousand obstacles in the way of its self-realisation.

Thus we see that man is not moral owing to any peculiar organ, for there is no peculiar organ in virtue of which we may say he is a moral being. On the other hand, it is by the whole make and constitution of his nature, not by a particular faculty, that he is framed for morality. And as a moral being, he is placed in the perpetual conflict between the ideal and attainment, and hears incessantly the categorically imperative demand of the ideal-self. He always hears the ‘Thou shalt’ voice of the ideal to the actual man which admits of no concession or compromise. This ideal man stands out as the judge of what we do, and as such it accuses, or excuses, condemns or approves with a voice of authority, which we may, owing to our
perversity of will, disregard, but the legitimacy of which we can hardly dispute. It does not rule or pretend to rule even with an autocratic sway nor, does it give us a law of its own making. On the contrary, it claims to rule us; because it is the fulfilment of our destiny, the fullest realisation of our nature and the highest goal which mankind can keep in view. Here its authority is not coercion, for man lays the law upon himself, and it is self-imposed obligation. And because man is a citizen of a higher world, he complacently accepts and bears the burden of such obligation and feels the bondage of the lower form of life.

Let us then conclude by saying in the language of a philosopher that "in the darkest hour through which a human soul can pass, whatever else is doubtful, this at last is certain, that—if there be no god and no future state, even then it is better to be generous than selfish, better to be chaste than licentious, better to be brave than a coward. Blessed beyond all earthly blessedness, is the man, who in the tempes-
tuous darkness of the soul, has dared to hold fast to these venerable landmarks. Thrice blessed is he who, when all is drear and cheerless within and without, when his teachers terrify him and friends shrink from him, has obstinately clung to this gloom. Thrice blessed! because his night shall pass into clear day.
CHAPTER XXIV.

ON PUNYA AND ITS FRUITIONS.

Punya and Papa in relation to 'Charitra'—Analysis of Charitra or Conduct—Considerations of moral activity, Good and the Law of duty—Fundamental factors of Punya—Knowledge, Faith and Will—Punya as forms of service—Sincerity as the soul of religiousity—Sincerity and Punya—Psychical and Physical fruitions for the performances of Punya.

We have in the previous chapter discussed in brief the principle and the rationale which underlie the difference and distinction between Punya (virtue) and Papa (vice), as conceived and interpreted by the Jains in their scriptural texts and legendary accounts. We have seen there that the Jain conceptions of Punya and Papa mostly centre round the word, Charitra, which has the word 'Conduct' for its English equivalence. Conduct or Charitra is the conscious adjustment of the human activities (Karmas) for the attainment of a particular end or object. But Karmas, as we have
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seen elsewhere, are the vibratory action-currents in and through which the pudgal particles (Karmavarganda), according to the Prakriti (nature) of which a particular action-current is set up, so adjust themselves by a change of their relative positions as to directly connect the agent (Karttri) with the end, in view of which he sets up a particular set of action-currents. It is clear, therefore, that the conscious and voluntary adjustment of the extremely superfine Karmavarganda as would—if there were no antaryāya (or impediment on the way)—connect the end with the agent is what is called Chārita or conduct.

A conduct is either moral or otherwise. A moral conduct is that which has a particular moral good for its end or object, and the law which connects this activity with the object is duty usually classified into Charan (Jural) and Karana (Teleological) of which we shall have to speak later on; while the psychical disposition of the moral agent by the preponderance of which he obeys and loves to act in conformity with the law, is termed as Subjective or Bhāva-punya; and, in so far as
he, out of the love of the good, *practically* obeys the law and acts in conformity with the same is called *Objective* or *Dravya Punya*.

Thus we see *Punya* is not the knowledge of the good only; it is also a *love* of good and order at the same time, where love is not merely a condition and stimulant of *punya*; but it is one of its essential elements of no less importance than the knowledge of the good itself. But what is this *love* of the good? And speaking generally, what is love? Does love necessarily exclude knowledge? Certainly not. Love is not the blind impulse of the sense and sensibility, it is the pleasure (*ananda*), which is superadded to the idea of an object. Love is thus not only inseparable from knowledge but it is distinct from appetite as well. In true love, the idea is always mingled with delight and yielding to such a love therefore means yielding to reason and thus the agent is free.

To push the question of *Punya* further on, knowledge *jnāna* and love (*Sraddhā*) do not constitute the whole and entire of *Punya*. Its conception is not limited only to these
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two elements. Instances are not wanting to show in how many cases, the love of the good is as powerless as the knowledge thereof. Very often it happens that a man who knows good and entertains as well a love for the same, yet fails to adjust his Karma for the achievement of the same. Who has not seen how many a generous soul, though uniting wisdom and enlightenment in his being yet succumbing before temptations? Evidently, therefore, as the Jain sages hold, there must be, in addition to love and knowledge, something else in Punya as forming one of its fundamental factors. And this additional element is the supreme effort, an act of personal resolution without which a Punya cannot be practised and completed. Revealing as it does in the form of last choice, the final decree for immediate execution without further deliberation, this third element is called the Virya, the power or the will-to-do. Virya is the faculty of initiating a change which is not determined by any anterior change. Thus is Virya identical with the ultimate authority or liberty which is a
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profoundly personal thing that exists in and works from within us, and which moves without being itself moved.

So we see, in every act of Punya, Jñāna (knowledge, Sraddhā or Anurāga (love) and Virya (liberty or force) are indissolubly blended together. In a word, Punya (virtue) is the moral strength consisting in wilfully practising the good with love and intelligence. And the Jain sages teach that it is by practising the good with love and intelligence that one may become virtuous. Viewed with this light, Aristotle is right when he says that 'Virtue is habit'; for a single act of virtue will not certainly make any one virtuous (Punyavān). It is by constant repetition of virtuous acts that one may become virtuous in as much as this constant repetition transforms (Pranamātē) the soul, evolving from within it higher and more constant instincts and tendencies. It is important to note that this constant repetition of acts which goes to the formation of habit, does not mean here discharging of duties in a mere mechanical way. In the mere mechanical way of doing things, the
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soul by subjecting itself to a rigid rule of extraneous discipline, looses the consciousness of what it was doing. It is by the spirit that we must become virtuous and not merely by deeds; for we should always bear in mind the golden maxim: "The letter killeth but the spirit maketh alive."

Now Purna being thus found to consist in willfully practising the good with love and intelligence, the Jaina sages have laid down nine general ways in which it can be cultivated as in the following,—

(1) By feeding the hungry and the starving who are without means and therefore rightly deserve it. This is Annapunya.

(2) By quenching the thirst of the helpless thirsty. This is Pan-punya.

(3) By clothing the helpless nude who are destitute of all means with which to provide themselves with clothing? This is Vastra-punya.

(4) By sheltering the poor and the destitute who have no place wherein to rest their head. This is Labyan Punya.
(5) By providing the tired and the tottering with seats and beddings to take rest and compose themselves. This is Sdyan-punya.

(6) By revering the venerable worthies which is due to them. This is Mdn-punya.

(7) By duly appreciating and admiring in words the merit of the really meritorious. This Vachan-punya.

(8) By personally attending to the needs and necessities of anyone who is in real need of it.—This is Sarira punya.

(9) By respectfully bowing the notables and the elders who deserve it. This is Namaskdr punya.

These are the nine principal ways for any one to cultivate Punya-virtue. It will perhaps be remarked that these are but forms of social laws which a man as a social being ought to obey. Like the law of compromise in the severe struggle for existence, as summed up in the formula, "Live and let live," these might be taken as a few positive principles of social service formulated to guide.
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and regulate the social life of a man with a view of mutually living in peace and amity where there is discord and introduce thereby a reign of harmony in the different spheres of our life and activity. But wherein lies the religiosuit of the conduct which is presumed to purify the soul from the soins of the aboninable senses? Shortsighted and unfortunate is the man who thinks in this vein; for he forgets that it is in service that lies the soul of all religiosuit. A service rendered with sincerity not only opens the vision, enlarges the heart, and draws out the higher instincts of man in their dynamic operations in the play of life here; but also sets up such strong action-currents as would mould the environment in a way that would contribute to the higher evolution of the individual here-in-after, as we have seen while treating of Karma-phenome-
nology, "as we sow so we reap." Moreover, apart from the question of the immortality of deeds in the moral world, we can never secure from an idea that intense realization which very often comes in the wake of emotion. It is the feeling that counts with

Religiousnity of Punya in question.
service; emotion galvanizes the cold idea into life and activity. It makes it alive and dynamic. It is the feeling after truth that makes the scientists experiment with dangerous chemicals; it is the feeling with the helpless millions suffering under various organic maladies, that actuates the physician to gladly risk his life for a new discovery. The man who plunges deep into the surging waters of a gurgling rivulet to save his drowning fellow man, must have felt, nay sensed something beyond the body. From all these it is apparent that a service, whatsoever form it may take, is not born of any social ceremonialism. It is born of the internal and moral habit which is seated in the will and the heart. And herein lies the religiousity of the services we have enumerated herein before.

Now such being the psychology under lying the cultivation of Punya exhibiting itself as it does in the various forms of services rendered, as detailed in the above, with all the sincerity of the will and the heart one could command, it is natural that these virtuous acts, punya, should not only clarify
the visions, draw out higher instincts of the performer in their dynamic operations and thereby evoke admiration, benediction etc., from all humanity in its track; but should as well set up such strong action-currents that would place him here, in the present life, in a more favourable condition and environment affording greater opportunities for a larger enjoyment of peace and pleasures of life as well as would work out for him in future, a higher and more befitting form of organic evolution as its manifesting media whereby it would be enabled to utilise in a different and higher sphere, the manifold opportunities and advantages that would naturally open to him as stepping stones to rise to a higher state of being and happiness. This is how the seeds of Punya sown in one life bear fruits both in the psychical, and physical worlds, according to the law of Karma-causality for enjoyment in a subsequent life.

The action-currents set up by the nine kinds of Punya are of various pitches and types. But for convenience' sake the Jain sages have classified them into forty-two kinds in and through which a jiva
enjoys the fruits of Punya done by him in the past. As for instance the (1) the enjoyment of pleasurable things by a jiva in this life must be understood as due to the set of action-currents known by the name of Shāṭa-vedaniya, set up by him through some virtuous deeds. (2) Similarly taking birth in some higher caste, Kshatriya and the like is due to that kind of action-currents known by the name of Ucchagraṇa karmā which are set by the jiva through the performance of some virtuous deeds in the past (3) Likewise the birth of a jiva in the human world (Manushya gati) is or in the god-world Devagati is to be understood as due to setting up of such action-currents.

In the same way is to be taken the anupurvi-karmā under the influence of which a jiva in Karma-sarira is directed towards a particular gati according to his Karma in the past. If after death, the Karma sarira along with the tejas of a jiva is directed towards the human world (manushya gati) to take its birth there, or towards the god-world (Deva gati) to be born there, then it must be understood as
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due to the directive influence of the manushya or devanupurvi action-currents set up by the jiva by his virtuous actions performed in the past.

The possession of the organism with five senses (Panchendriya) is due to the action-currents known as Panchendriya jati karma. So is the case with the possession of bodies (Sariras) which are of five kinds, for instance, the having of an oudarika body or vaikriya, aharika or taisas, and karmam is due to the setting up of such action-currents which determined the growth development of these bodies from out of pudgala-materials. Certain other fruits of virtuous acts are enjoyed by the possession of a set of well proportioned limbs and extremeties (angopango) in the oudarika, vaikriya or aharaka state of being of the physical organism.

Of the Sanhananana nam karma, the setting up of action-currents making way for the firmly joined skeletal parts, as the having of the vajra-rishava narah is due to some Punya in the past; the possession of a well-proportioned body with a decent
configuration (Samachaturastra sansthān) is due to the action-currents after its names' sake set up by some virtuous performances. The having of subha rasa, subha gandha, subha varna and subha sparsha is the result in the same of way of some Punya done in the past. If one is neither fat nor lean, it is due to the aguru-laghu action currents set up by some virtuous acts. Similarly if any one is so strong and stout as to get the upper-hand over his enemy, it is due to Padrāghat nāma action-currents. The enjoyment of a full and untroubled breathing is due to Uchchāsa nāma action-currents.

In the aforesaid manner, the action-currents known as (26) Vihāyogati (27) Udyuta nāma (28) Nirmana nāma (29) Tras nāma (30) Bādarnāma (31) Paryapta nāma (32) Pratyeika nāma (33) Shīrā nāma (34) Shubha nāma (35) Subhaga nāma (36) Suswar nāma (37) Adevanāma (38) Yasha nāma (39) Tirthankar nāma (40) Tiryańcha nāma (41) Manushya āyu (42) Devāyu nāma,—all these the nature and character of which have been discussed before, in our chapter on
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Classification of *Karmas* under their respective headings are set up by virtuous acts ensuring the *jiva*, the possession of a pleasurable sentient existence along with the advantages and benefits as might accrue from them.
CHAPTER XXV.

PAPA, VICE OR SIN.

Constituent Elements of 'Papa.'—'Ananda' is the prime Good—Philosophy Passion—The doctrine of Indolentia—Eighteen Kinds of 'Papa'—Their Consequences.

Having discussed in the last chapter as to what does Punya (virtue) consist in, we are naturally led to enquire into the nature of Pâpa (vice), the second of our moral categories. Punya and Pâpa are not only relative but contrary terms as well, each presupposing the other. As the Jains hold if Punya, as we have already seen, is moral strength, Pâpa is moral weakness. (It is the preponderance of passions, of the senses and the sensibility over reason;) it is the rebellion of the lower instincts and impulses against the moral good and the law or duty. The only notable factor which is found commensurate in both Punya and Pâpa is the free-will of the agent who performs or com-
mits the same. Just as Punya is really a Punya only when it is performed willingly, so Pāpa is pāpa only when it is committed voluntarily; for at the back ground of them both stands out revealing itself as it does in the free choice between the two alternatives good and evil, in as much as liberty, so far it manifests itself in the free exercise of choice, is unstained and unstainable with anything obligatory or compulsory in its character. But viewing the thing from a different position, if samyak jñāna (wisdom) and samyak charitra (moral perfection) is characterised as being but a mode (paryāya) of liberty and Mithyātva (Subreption) and Duḥshilatva (Perversity) as state of slavery, then punya might be said to consists in being voluntarily free and pāpa to consist in being voluntarily a slave of Kashāyas i.e., of propensions and passions.

Such is, roughly speaking, the notion of vice as well as liberty of vice as conceived and interpreted by the Jains. Some thinkers, however, disagreeing with this view of the Jains hold that when the question of liberty comes in as commensurate in both Punya
and pāpa, there can be no pāpa at all that one may commit. There is punya and punya only.

To maintain this, the holders of such an opinion argue that nobody commits a sin knowing it to be as such. Man plunged as he is into this world of nature, is always found to be in want of something or other which he believes in and struggles for: This end or object of his endeavour is what is called Good in ethical language; and when he knows this object, the nature of this good, the realisation, the attainment of which he believes will satisfy his want, he pursues it choosing a particular line of action or conduct that will ultimately connect him with the good, the object of his desire and actions; and it is in this his free choice of the line of conduct that his liberty manifests itself, there being various alternative lines of conduct to select from. Where is Pāpa then?

But this is talking like the Chārvākas—the uncompromising exponent of the philosophy of pleasure in antiquity. The whole question turns upon the idea of the good, as
they have in mind. Good is that which we all seek and pursue. It is that which all would possess if they could have it; but what is good which all seek and clamour for? It is ananda—pleasure. Ananda, pleasure, is the good. The child is sensitive to ananda pleasure: and the sage who denies it does with a view of the pleasure he derives in this his very act of denial. The pleasure is the watch-world of all, down from the savage upward to the sage. Such is the idea of the good in the philosophy of pleasure which unchaining all the passions, lets loose at the same time all the appetites, opens a free path-way for the senses and thus sometimes descends to shameful excesses. It is true that in freeing the passions from restraint, it acquires a certain sort of grandeur—the fierce grandeur of nature; it has even a sort of innocence—the innocence of the blind torrent which knows not whither it rushes; and finally, by the very fact of making no distinction between passions and pleasure, it sometimes gives free play to generous instincts and attains to a nobility which is lacking in cold calculation and mercenary virtue.
But such a good as understood and conceived in terms of pleasure in the philosophy of passion, can it secure us any basis for the formation of a definite moral code? In fact, pleasure without bounds, without choice, without fore-sight; pleasure taken by chance and according to the impulse of the moment; pleasure sought and enjoyed under any form in which it may present itself; a brutal sensual pleasure preferred to any intellectual—pleasure thus understood destroys itself; for experience teaches that it is followed by pain and is transformed into pain. Such a principal therefore is self-contradictory and falls before its own consequences. And this is why we find the ancient classifying pleasure into two kinds—Nitya and Anitya. The pleasure derived from the gratification of the senses is what they term as transitory—Anitya. It is but a mingling both of joy and grief; it disturbs the soul for a moment only to add to it more grief than joy. Having thus experienced the bitter consequences of seeking temporal good as transitory pleasure, the voluptuous philosophy, however seductive it might be,
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had to seek the superior principle of the stable pleasure which they found in repose, peace or insensibility so much so that they thought paramount good to consist in "the absence of suffering" or indolentia (dukhā-bhābā).

Thus Pāpa being found to consist in Subreption (mithyatva) and perversity (duhshilatvā) as manifest in bad-will, the Jain moralists hold that liberty of vice manifests itself in and through the eighteen different forms of action as in the following.—

(1) Jīva Hinsha—this means crushing out the organic energies of an embodied soul. 'Ahimsā parama dharma'—non-killing of life is the cardinal principle of all true religiosity.' Even the Mimāṃsaka atheists teach, "mā himsyāt sarvā bhutāni" which means don't kill any life. The only difference between the Jain moralists and Mimāṃsaka sages in this respect of himsā, is that former take an uncompromising attitude in positively prohibiting the taking of any life; while the
latter only relatively prohibits the killing of any life; for on certain occasions they enjoin the same as we find in the statement, "Senena abhichāran yajeta" i.e., kill enemies by the performance of Sena yajna.

However, what is himsā from the Jain point of view? It is the crushing of the jīvic organism into two, oudārika and the karman bodies: for non can destroy the karman body clothing a soul.

It will be remarked perhaps that the sage like Jaimini could not put in such contradictory rules of conduct in his Karma Philosophy. The answer is a very simple one. The scriptural statements of interdictions and injunction are to be interpreted according to the view points from which they are made. The prohibition of 'not killing any life' is in reference to one who has conquered his Krodha (anger): while the injunction for the performance of Sena yajna for the slaying of enemies, is with reference to the man of the world who has anger and its correlates. So is the case with
Jain savants. They too have had to make a distinction between the rules of conduct both for the monks and the laity. A Jain monk should rigidly follow the principle of non-killing so much so that he is even forbidden to take the life of an organism that has but one sense. But this rigidity, relaxes when the question of the laity comes in. The ordinary folk are forbidden to take the life of any organism possessed with two or more sense-organis. It is interesting to note that this Himṣā is of two kinds—Drauvya and Bhāva i.e. Actual and Psychical. The psychical precedes the actual and is that kind of mental attitude which gives rise to the desire of taking life in one form or other, and Drauvya himṣā is the practically killing away of life somehow or other.

(2) Asatya Mrisavāda untruthfulness.—If Himṣa is one of the most heinous of sins, Asatya is also no less so. Telling lies eats into moral vitality of one who tells it and habitual liars have no chance of gaining any knowledge for moral and spiritual redemption.
(3) Adattādā or stealing—This is another kind of committing sin. It not only means taking of another's belongings but means also the appropriating or keeping of lost articles without any public declaration, accepting of bribes, cheating, smuggling and the like forms of action.

(4) Abrahmacharya or Un chastity—Chastity consists, as ordinarily conceived, in one's being true to another in body, mind and speech, when these two are related as man and wife. And with the monks who are forbidden to take to wife, it, consists in being free from any kind of erotic thouht and pleasure. Un chastity, therefore, consists in violation of these rules of conduct.

(5) Parigraha or Covetousness—This is a kind of intense attachment to one's belongings so much so that if anything is lost, he gives himself up to excessive grief. Parigraha
with a monk also consists in keeping to himself anything more than what he really and actually requires for his physical existence.

(6) **Krodha** or Anger—This is also a source of sin; for it like the preceding ones disables a man to keep the equanimity of temper which is but an imperative requisite to obtain a right vision into the metaphysics of things.

(7) **Mān** or Egotism.—This takes the form of **ahankār** or egotistic pedantry in one's movements. This sense of egotism in one, leads him astray from the right path by adding to his anger **krodha** which rudely disturbs the equanimity of temper.

(8) **Māya** or Hypocrisy—This is a kind of double-dealing revealing itself as it does in the act of simulating, or representing a thing with a motive or purpose which is very different from what is really in the heart.

(9) **Lobha**, Greed or Avarice—This is a kind of the inordinate desire of
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gaining and possessing wealth and the like. In ordinary parlance in Bengal even we have \textit{‘lobhē pāpa, pāpē mrityu’} i.e. ‘avarice begets vice and vice brings on death’.

It is important to note here by the way—that these last four viz. \textit{krodha, mān, māya} and \textit{lobha} which combine into \textit{kushāya} or the tie that binds a \textit{jīva} down to the mires of the world, have been discussed with comparative details in our Chapter on the Classification of \textit{Karmas}—(pages 400-407).

(10) \textit{Rāg, Asakti} or Attachment—This consists in one’s being in intense love with anything standing in the way of moral detachment from things worldly.

(11) \textit{Dveṣa} or Hatred—This is a form of bearing ill-will against anything. As one should not be in excessive love with anything, so he must not bear any hatred against anyone. Both love and hate are impediments in our upward march for moral perfection.
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(12) Klesh or Quarrelsomeness—It is a kind of vice which displays itself by breaking up into pieces the solidarity of family-life and national life.

(13) Abhyāksāhyāna or False Accusation—This is a kind of slandering by spreading false report against any one so as to lower him in the estimation of the public or anyone else.

(15) Paisunya or Tale-telling—This is also a kind of defamation taking the forms of caricatures which the caricaturists often take recourse to by the help of their fertile imagination.

(16) Rati and Arati or Joy and Grief—This consists in being elated with joy at success or being sunken with grief at the loss of anything. Both of these psychological attitudes are considered as vices in as much as they both tell upon the normal equanimity of temper of the soul.

(17) Māyā-Mrisā—This is one of the most acute kind of vice of doing im-
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proper things under the garb of propriety, or of ostensibly presenting a fair appearance but secretly practising vice or villany; like a courtezan who plays the dancing drum in the way of her infamous profession yet with modesty affected within her veil. The import of māyā-mṛita as interpreted by the Jains is fairly borne out by the well-known Bengali expression "Ghomtār bhitārē khemtā nācchā ite. beating a drum within a veil: Khemtā here bears the same reputation as the cancan does in France.

(18) Mittiyā darshana shalya or False perception by psychological paralogism—This is the last of the eighteen kinds of the enumerated vices. It consists in taking a thing for what it is not, or viewing a thing as that which it is really not. Mittiyā Darshan, therefore, is the error attaching to the mistaken apprehension of a thing appearing as
that which it is really not that thing. Or in other words, it is the putting of the notion of a particular thing into that which is not that thing. As for example, putting the notion of a true guru \((Sat\ guru)\) into that person who is not a true-guru, is \textit{mithyātva}. This \textit{Mithyātva} is the primary root of all evil, all our misery. All the practices of mankind, all the empiric phenomena of life and living are due to this false perception by subreption—\textit{Mithyā Darshana}.

Now this \textit{Mithyā darshan}, as classified by the Jain sages, according to the different forms of its appearance, is of various kinds which for convenience, have been mainly divided into five forms as in the following:

(i) \textit{Abhigraha Mithyātva}—is that under the influence of which a \textit{jiva} thinks that his experience of a thing and knowledge gathered thereof is all right and true, while others' experience and knowledge
of the same thing is false on that account. And this conviction is so strong that he refuses even to test and examine the truth and validity of his own experience and knowledge.

(ii) *Anabhigraha*—is that under the influence of which a *jiva* thinks that all the different systems of religion and culture, however contradictory to one another they might be, are all true and, therefore, every one of them can lead to salvation or freedom.

(iii) *Abhinibesh*—is that under the influence of which a *jiva* though morally convinced of the errors that were involved in his own judgment, will still persist in enforcing the acceptance of his own opinion. Under *Abhinibesh*, a man ‘though vanquished will argue still’.

(iv) *Samshaya*—is that detrimental influence which induces a *jiva* to entertain a doubt as to the truth, and
consistency of the teachings and principles of the faith promulgated by an Omniscient Victor—Jīna.

(v) Anābhoga—is that under the negative influence of which a jīva loses even the faculty to discriminate between dharma and its opposite and the like. A jīva with deranged organism labours under the influence of Anābhoga Mithyātva.

It is important to note here by the way that the question as involved in the principle of false vision by subreption is broad and far reaching in its consequences. Therefore, it imperatively requires a more detailed treatment at our hands. And this we propose to do when we deal with the causes of Bandha where it will suit us well according to the scheme of the development of our theme. For the present, however, we believe we have been able to make the Jain conception of Pāpa or Vice clear to our readers. According to the sages the constituent elements involved in Pāpa, are False vision by subreption, Perversity, and Liberty of Vice or Bad-will—all inseparably mingled together.
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Now these are the eighteen forms of action in and through which a jīva commits Vice-pāpa by setting up action-currents of injury and non-injury (Ghātin and Aghātin) which acting on the soul retard the unfoldment of its infinite psychical possibilities of vision (darshan), knowledge (jñāna) and the like on the one hand, and on other, determine unfavourably the character and configuration of its manifesting media, its duration of life, its localisation in a sphere and other physical conditions as consequences of its own viscous deeds of the past. These psychical and physical consequences which the jīva has to suffer under by dint of its own viscous acts are eighty two in number as in the following.

a. Darshanāvaraniya karma—or the action-currents of injury to vision which are of nine kinds viz (1) Chakshu; (2) Achakshu; (3) Avadhi; (4) Keval; (5) Nidrā; (6) Nidrā-nidrā; (7) Prachlā (8) Prachlā-prachalā; (9) Styānardhi.

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b. **Jñānāvaraniya karmas**—or the action-currents of injury to knowledge which are of five kinds viz. (1) *māti*, (2) *sruti*, (3) *abadhi* and (4) *mana-paryaya* and (5) *Keval*.

c. **Antardvya karmas**—or the action-currents detrimental to the attainment of the end in view which are of five kinds viz (1) *Dāna*, (2) *Lābha*, (3) *Bhoga*, (4) *Upabhoga*, and (5) *Virya*.

d. **Mohaniya karmas**—or the action-currents detrimental to the psychical equanimity giving rise to the delusion and infatuation of the soul which are of twenty-six kinds viz. 16 *kashāyas* such as *krodha*, *māna*, *māyā* and *lobha* together with their four sub-classification of each and the nine correlates of the *kashāyas* such as (1) *hāsya* (2) *Rati* (3) *Arati* (4) *Shoka* (5) *Bhaya* (6) *Jugupsā* (7) *Striveda* (8) *Purusaveda* and (9) *Napun- saka veda*.
e. Vedaniya karma—or action-currents sending in sensation of pain called Ashatā.

f. Ayus karma—or the action-currents determinant of the duration of life in Hell (Naraka).

g. Gotra karma or the action-currents determinant of birth in a low family (Nicha).

h. Nāma karmas—or the action-currents determinant of names and forms and other physical environments which combine to give the jīva its physical individuality and singularity. Of the nāma-karmas only 34 are set in motion by vicious deeds of the past viz.—(1) Narakagati (2) Tiryanchgati (3) Narakānupurvi (4) Tiryanchānupurvi (5) Ekendriya jāti (6) Dwendriya jāti (7) Tirendriya jāti (8) Chaturendriya jāti (9-13) five samhanan viz (a) Rishava nārāch, nārāch, ardha nārāch, kiloka and Savartu. (14-18) five sansthānas viz (a) nyāgrodha (b) sādi
Vāmana (d) Kubja (c) Hunaak
Astrasaha Varna (20)
Sukshma (27) Aparayapti
Sadhūran (29) Asthira (30) Asubha (31) Asubhaga (33)
Duswar (33) Aṇḍadeya and (34) Aparayasta kirti.

These are the eighty two ways in and through which a jiva, pays the penalty for his committing vices in the past. Thus, if a man is an idiot, he must have been then labouring under the action-currents of injury to knowledge. A short-sighted man must be under the influence of chakshu dārshand-
varaniya karma. If a man inspite of the presence of necessary requisites at his elbow and inspite of his intelligence and industry is not able to make profit from the business in which he has laid out his whole fortune, then it must be understood as due to lābhand-
tartaya action-currents set up by him through some vicious acts done in the past.
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So if a man becomes deluded and tempted into a course of action which he knows to be very far from the right conduct, he must be understood to have been labouring under the influence of Mohaniya karma. Likewise, if a man is found to be experiencing only painful or unpleasant sensation all along the time, he must be taken to be under the influence Ashätä vedaniya karma. The certain duration of life which a jiva has to pass in hell is due to Narakâyu karma. So is the case with the birth in a low family with grovelling surroundings which is due to the influence of the Nicha gotru karma. Similarly a dwarf to be taken as being under the influence of Vaman samasthân karma. If anyone has rough hoarse voice, it must be due to Duswar karma. And thus are to be accounted for all other defects, drawbacks and disadvantages which a jiva may possibly labour under.

Now such is the nature of pāpa-vice as conceived and interpreted by the Jains; but some writers being unable to see eye to eye with the Jains differ from them and interpret human actions in an altogether
different light. Of course we must agree to differ, and when we do so, we must bear and forbear. But when definite charges are laid at the door of a creed or faith, the exponents of the same ought, as in duty bound, to examine the same and see if they can explain the issues in question. In one of her latest issues *The Heart of Jainism*, Mrs. Sinclair Stevenson made out a charge that the Jain conception of *Pāpa*, though differing as it does from the western conception, is *in fact ceremonial rather than moral.* This is no doubt a very serious charge that can be levelled against any school of thought and culture which has a definite system of moral code as the legitimate outcome of the most subtle metaphysical conclusions.

The observances and ethical disciplines as enjoined in the moral code of the Jains seem to her to lack in *moral* and *religious* character. Others also think they are more externals, husks, matters of minor or no importance and as such should be stripped off, if anyone wished to get straight to the kernel. Consistently with this view, there-
fore, they cannot but apprehend, that these external practices or religious observances which have become, as they say, fossilised into dry ceremonial rites, may at some time, grow so as to choke the internal vitality of the religion itself and eat away the essence of the same.

So far the moral character of these observances is concerned, we have discussed it at length both here at the beginning of this chapter and elsewhere, and we feel no necessity of recapitulating them here over again. All that we want to show here is that the opinion as entertain'd by Mrs. Sinclair or by others in her line of thinking is the revival of the old superficial rationalism as well as of no less superficial idealism which fail to take account of history and may be taken as due to perverted vision of things, ideas and ideals. We shall prove this by entering, by way of a reply, into a study of the psychology of religion, which besides corroborating what we have stated before will throw an additional flood of light on it and bring into clear vision of Mrs. Sinclair and her readers that for
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which she was so long groping in the dark.

To begin with, therefore, by drawing attention of our readers to the fact that every religion has a subjective and an objective side—we may designate them as 'religiosity' and 'religion'. And it is only in constant action and interaction of these two elements upon each other that the true nature of religion is fully revealed. We have also seen, that since the dawn of religious consciousness in mankind, a man has ever clothed his emotions, his thoughts, his aspirations and his sentiments in conceptions and ideas and that he has always expressed them in observances and practices. Out of the former, grows a religious doctrine, which, with the progress of civilisation and culture, is committed to writing in the shape of sacred conmons and creeds; these latter gradually assume the form of common religious observances. But for the maintenance of the doctrine and for preservation of the practice in accordance with it, he allies himself with kindred spirits, consciously or unconsciously, and feels constrained to act in
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accordance with his most cherished convictions; otherwise, as psychology reveals, the emotions would only pass away, the impressions would lack in stability, the sentiments would prove to be but vague ebullitions, and thus his intellect would fail to attain to perfect clearness even to himself. Religious men, borne out by history and as thinking beings, feel the mind as possessed of some conception as to their true destiny which will satisfy the craving of their hearts, whether it is derived from others or thought out by themselves—a conception which will satisfy their thinking faculty and must necessarily flow itself in outward observances, because their hearts impel them to do so. Zealous for truth, longing for a sense of assurance and clearness of insight, they naturally translate into outward acts those feelings of which their hearts are full; for religious truth is piety manifesting itself in word and, deed, in creed and conceptions, in doctrine and observances, and in other works and other activities of life. And if this sentiment is sincere and fervent, it manifests itself in and through a man's whole conduct and
exerts a decisive influence on his whole moral nature. Of course there is no harm in admitting the fact that these observances are not a proof of religion unless genuine; for they may be mere spurious imitations. But it must be also confessed on all hands that if a man abstains from all sorts of observances, it is a decisive proof that in his case his religious need is in a dormant state, if it exists at all. We do not of course subscribe to the view that all who take part in such observances, as handed down to them by tradition or scripture, are actuated by the same heart-felt needs; for in this, as in other cases, men's motives may differ very widely, but to estimate the value of a thing, it is injudicious to confine one's attention upon these only. To do this we must take into account the psychological origin of these. And we believe that in the case of Jainism, the root of these lies deep in the fact of yearning after a state of liberation—a state of beatitude and bliss—a state of omniscience of whose sublimity one's imagination has formed a conception, and which he feels
himself inwardly capable of attaining, and for which he strives, so far as humanely possible more and more to approach. In a word, it is the longing of the finite man, who feels inwardly that he is more than finite that gives rise to these observances. It is in the striving and struggle of the individual to escape from the turmoils of earthly existence—with its petty cares anxieties and great sorrows, with its strife and discord, its complete immersion in sordid lusts of the world—in order that, he may breathe a purer and freer atmosphere, that its origin should be sought for. And when studied in this light, we shall be able to winnow from every sort of religious observance, however insignificant or formal it may appear at first sight, the pure grain of religious principle. Those who renounce religion altogether, because they have become blind to the religious element within them may look with supercilious contempt on all observances and dub them with the name of superstition or formal ceremony or whatever they like, but the truth stands out no less clear than broad day light, that a religion, sprung up from
the inmost 'yearning' of so many hearts and reared through renunciation and mortification ever fighting and struggling and ever extending her sway, cannot be regarded, without the farthest stretch of blind imagination as indulging only in meaningless rites or ceremonies.
CHAPTER XXVI.

ASRAVA OR THE INFLUX.


Now to come to the Asrava or the third of the Jain moral categories. Asrava is the influx of the karma-particles into the soul. Or it may be said as the acquisition by the soul of the finest of the fine karma-matter from without. But the soul does not always and invariably take in these karma-matter. To do it the soul must be charged with certain requisite powers by virtue of which it will draw in foreign matters into its various chambers or pradeshas. The requisite powers which galvanise the soul to draw in matters from without is (1) mithyatva (sub-reption), (2) avirat or attachment (3) Kasklya or propensions; (4) pramada or
negligence and (5) *yoga* or the functional activity of mind, speech and body. The soul being affected by these becomes transformed into a magnet as it were and attracts *karma*-matter towards it. The psychical condition which thus magnatises the soul to attract foreign elements is what is termed as *Bhāvāsrava* or the Subjective influx and the foreign matter that is actually drawn into by the soul to accumulate there in the state of *sattā*, is called *Dravyāsrava* or the Objective influx which results ultimately into the bondages (*bandhan*) of the soul. But the question is, Could there be any *āsrava* in the absence of any bondage? If bondage is held to be anterior to *āsrava*, then bondage cannot be taken as a consequent of *āsrava* which is its cause in as much as the effect which has something anterior to it as its cause cannot come to be without the cause, for it is the cause that passes into the effect.

Indeed! But there is no such contradiction as exposed in the above objection in the interpretation we put in to explain the causal relativity between *āsrava* and *bandha*. 
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Asrava and Bandha, both are mutually related to each other as cause and effect. Asrava is not only the antecedent cause of bondage but the consequent as well of a still anterior bondage: and so is the case with bondage also. And this does not amount to moving in the vicious circle of cause and effect on account of their eternal continuity like the seed and the tree.

Now the objective influx is always in proportion to the strength and intensity of the subjective influx. The stronger and more intense the subjective, the quicker is the objective inflow and consequently the heavier is the load of karma on the jiva to cast off. But the subjective condition which makes influx possible is not the same with all the souls—though all souls are essentially the same. The subjective conditions of the different souls vary with the variation in the intensity and protensiveness of mithyātva, avirāti, kashāya, pramād and yoga which the different souls become variously charged with to draw in foreign elements and thereby forge fresh links for their bondages. The intensity and protensiveness of these
beginning with mithyātva constituting the psychical condition which makes influx again possible are determined by punya and pāpa as practised by a jīva in the past; for, as we have explained already, pāpa and punya reveal themselves in and through a man's desires and deeds and a man's thoughts and desires in one life build his character, tendencies and capacities for the next. A strong desire along certain lines that remains entirely unfulfilled in one life, will produce a capacity along those lines for the next. By dwelling constantly upon a certain thought, a man sets up a particular tendency and if he fails to carry it out, he will surely do it in a subsequent life. And just as a man's desire and thoughts and the like build up his character, tendency, capacity and the like for the next: so his actions and deeds in one life will produce his surroundings and circumstances, opportunities and advantages for the next.

However, the influx (āsrava) of karma-matter into the soul has been very often compared to the flowing of waters into the pond. Just as waters flow into a pond
through various pours and channels in the earth and accumulate there; so through a variety of pours and channels in the jīvīc organism, karma flows into the soul and accumulate there to bind it down to sansār. And this explains why according to the nature and character of the various channels in the jīvīc organism, the Jain sages have classified the influx (āsraṇa) into forty-two kinds; namely, five sense-organs (Indriyas); four propensions (kāshāyas); five āvṛatas or the non-keeping of the vows, twenty-five kriyās or works and three yogas or the functional activities of mind, speech and body.

Of these forty-two ways, the easiest ones for the karma-matter to flow into the soul, are the five sense-organs viz., the ear, the eye, the nose, the taste and the touch. To take the case of the ear (kāṇa), for example, karma flows into the soul through the sense of hearing i.e., through our listening to the sonorous songs which may ultimately delude the jīva from the righteous path. How often do we find men extremely devoted to music lose all sense of
right and wrong and thus fall away from the right conduct. So is the case with the eye (chakshu) through the lust of which karma flows into the soul; for, instances are not wanting in our every-day life to show how they get themselves entangled into the snares of the world by lustfully gazing on art or young women which in the long run charm them away from the right path. Karmas also flow into the soul through the other senses in the same way by setting up vibratory action-currents running towards the soul.

Next come the four kashāyas or propensions in and through which karma also flows into the soul; namely, anger (krodha), māna (conceit), māyā (hypocrisy) and lobha (greed). Indulgence in any one of these means perverting the right vision into the metaphysics of things and thereby falling away from right conduct which can only proceed from the right knowledge of things and ideals.

Then there are the Avratas by dint of which karma flows into the soul. Avrata means non-abstention from doing prohibited
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actions. The five prohibitions which go by the name of the five great vows (pancha mohdvratas) are, (i) not to kill life (prāṇātipāt viraman vrata); (ii) not to tell lies (mrishāvada viraman vrata); (iii) not to steal and the like (adattāddān viraman vrata); (iv) not to be covetous (parigraha viraman vrata); (v) not to indulge in sexual congress (maithuna viraman vrata). These are the five great prohibitions which are enjoined on the jīva to observe for avoidance of influx of karma-matter into the soul; because so vicious, relentless and keen is the law of karma to flow into soul that the moment an inlet is created by the jīva through a single and simple act of omission in the observance of these vows, the influx of karma-matter will at once take place?

Next, in order are the kriyās (works or actions) which are five and twenty kinds through which karma also flows into the soul. These kriyās are,—

(1) Kāyika kriya—means the bodily movements through the carelessness of which an evil karma may flow into the soul.
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(2) Adhikaraniki—means the use of instruments or weapons through the careless handling of which evil karma flows in by hurting another.

(3) Pradosha—means action originating from the excessive predominance of anger and the like.

(4) Paritapaniiki—means the action done in intentionally causing grief and sorrow to another.

(5) Pranatipataki—means the action which crushes out the life-energies of an organism.

(6) Arambhaki—means the action done in tilling the ground which might injure a jiva.

(7) Paramgrahaki—means work originating from the excessive earning and hoarding of wealth; for at times enormity of oppulence leads to various evils.

(8) Maydh pratyaiaki—means work born of hypocrisy.

(9) Mithydh darshan pratyaiaki—means actions due to subreptive vision into the nature of things.
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(10) *Apratyaśkhyāniki*—means works originating from not-controlling the propensions or *kashāyays*.

(11) *Dristiki*—refers to works due to intensely gazing at *Jīva* or *Ajīva* with love or hatred.

(12) *Spristiki*—action originating from actually touching women, children &c. with attachment.

(13) *Pratityaśki*—means works originating as a consequent of the sinful desire for a *Jīva* or *Ajīva* entertained in the previous birth.

(14) *Samantopanipātika*—works originating from listening to the praise of one's son, brother, pupils or his other earthly belongings.

(15) *Naispristiki*—means the works done in compulsion or in sheer obedience to the strict order of the employer.

(16) *Svahustiki*—means the action performed by one's own hand in the execution of a particular end.

(17) *Angāpaniki*—means activities born of the metaphysical conclusions
drawn by one in ignorance of the philosophy as taught by the Arihanta.

(18) Vaidarari—means works due to defacing or breaking any image of reverence and worship.

(19) Anabhogiki—means activities born of discharging organic emissions anywhere without looking about the place thoroughly well.

(20) Anavakanksha pratyai—is the works due to the disregard to and disbelief in the effectiveness of the laws of life and conduct as promulgated by the jina.

(21) Prayoga—works born of not controlling mind, speech and bodily movements in the manner as taught in the Jain scriptures.

(22) Samuddan—works due to the opening out of all the channels of the body through which karma may flow in at a time.

(23) Prema-pratya—work due to the influence of deceit and greed as well.
(24) Dvesha-pratyayaki—works springing from the co-operation of conceit and anger.

(25) Iryāpatha—action done in walking specially in the walks of the dis-passionate and the retired.

These are the five and twenty kinds of works in and through which karma-matter may flow into the soul; besides these there are the three yogas of mind, speech and body, i.e., from the functional activities of these three, karma also flows into soul and stick to it in the state of Sattā.
CHAPTER XXVII.

BANDHA OR BONDAGE.


In the preceding pages we have seen what the Jains mean by Asrava or Influs. Influs is the flowing of the Karma-currents into the soul. And when the Karma particles which have flowed into the soul coalesce with the same, it is called Bandha or bondage. It is the interpenetration, as it were, into each other's spheres of soul and Karma-matter making both appear as self-same with each other. And like Asrava, this Bandha, which is but another name for the self-sameness of the soul and Karma-matter, is also distinguished into Bhāva (subjective) and Dravya (objective).
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The psychical condition which keeps the soul in a particular disposition so as to combine with *Karma* into a self-sameness as it were with the soul is called *Bhābbandha* or Subjective bondage and the real *Karma*-matter which flowing into the soul stands in relation of Identity (*Tadatama sambandha*) as it were with the soul is called *Dravya-bandha* or Objective bondage.

Now according to the nature and character in and through which it displays itself in the phenomena of our life and thought, this *bandha* is classified into four kinds; viz.,—

(A) *Prakriti Bandha*—The word *Prakriti* here refers to the *Karma prakritis*, of which there are in all, one hundred and fifty eight kinds. For convenience sake, these have been reduced into eight fundamental classes, four of which beginning with *Durshanāvaraniya Karma* are called *Ghātin Karma* or the Action-currents of Injury and the remaining four are *Aghātin* or the Action-currents of Non-injury. Now when on the one hand these
eight fundamental kinds of *Karmas* classified into *Ghātin* and *Aghātin* (for a detailed discussion of which the reader is referred to our chapter on the Classification of *Karmas*.) and the soul on the other interpenetrate into each others spheres appearing thereby as self-same with each other, it is called *Prakṛiti bandha*.

(B) *Sthiti Bandha*—The word *Sthiti* means here protentiveness. The sages hold that all the different kinds of *Karma* which get into the soul and remain there in relation of identity (*Tadātma sambandh*) with it, do not stand there in this relation for all time to come. They often fall away and thus break off their relationship with the soul; but they do not fall off all at a time. According to certain causes and conditions some fall off while others yet remain there standing in the same relation. And when we speak with reference to
the duration of the existence of this relation between the soul and the Karma-matter, we call it Sthiti bandha.

(C) *Anubhûga Bandha*—Anubhûga here means 'quality and intensity.' some Karmas which stick fast to the soul are sharp and acute so much so that the angularities of their character cannot be easily rubbed off. When we speak of bandha with reference to its intensity we look at it from the stand point of Anubhûga.

(D) *Pradesha Bandha*—Pradesha means parts. *Karma* is ponderable substance: so it must have parts and the minutest part which does not admit of any division is called *anu* or atom. A *Karma prakriti* consists of such innumerable atoms and when we speak of bandha with reference to the number of atoms covering the *pradeshas* of the soul, we are said to view it from the stand point of *Pradesha*
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bandha i.e., from quantitative standpoint.

Such are the four different view-points from which Bandha (bondage) can be studied. As we have just seen, Bandha, is coalescence of the soul and karma-matter, like milk and water, in which both the different elements entering into a relation of identity as it were with each other, (tadatma sambandha) seem to lose their respective differences and appear as one organic whole.

But the prima facie objection that is raised to the possibilities of the bandha of the soul as hinted at in the above is this: The soul is not karma-matter, nor karma-matter the soul: The two are radically opposed to and distinct from each other: how then could soul and matter be so fused together into an identical whole as we find in the cases of organic life? The instance of milk and water cited by way of analogy does not hold good here; for they are both paurgalic in essence and therefore chemical action and reaction is possible between them. But the soul and karma, there being nothing common
between them, how would it be possible that they should mutually enter into a relation of identity (tādāśma sambandha) which is defined to be the state Bandha?

True, reply the Jains. The Cogitative substance going by the names of soul, self &c., is the subject (Bhoktā, kartā) and the Non-cogitative substance or non-soul, not-self, is the object (Bhogya-drishya). And they being radically opposed to each other, it is impossible indeed to demonstrate the fusion not only of the subject and the object, having for their respective spheres the connotations of I or the Ego and 'Tu' or the Non-Ego but of their respective attributes as well into a kind of mutual self-sameness with each other respectively as we find in the phenomena of life and thought. But the fact of there being such a fusion cannot be denied; and it is from this fusion that there originates the tendency in our ordinary parlance to say—I am lean, this is mine and the like—a procedure of speech having for its basis a fusion due to mithyatva-subreption in the main with respect to subject and object and their respective attributes.
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One may indeed enquire as to what is this subreption (*mithyātva*) by which they not only identify soul with *karma*-matter and *vice versa* matter with soul but their respective attributes as well.

As we remarked already, it is the putting of the notion of something observed elsewhere into something else present in the vision which is not that thing. Various schools of philosophy have defined this subreption (*mithyātva*) in various ways. As for instance, the *Naiyāyikas* define it as the assumption of the possession of contrary attributes in the very thing super-imposed upon another thing. The *Pra-bhākara* school of philosophy explains it as the error (*bhrama*) attaching to mistaken apprehension of the super-imposed thing for the thing super-imposed on. According to the *Buddhist* school, it is the assumption of something else's attributes to a thing; while Shankar, the pseudo-Buddhist define, it to be the appearance of what has been seen previously in something else (elsewhere), taking the form of recollection.

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Now whatever might be the psychology and the fine rationale underlying the subtle differences and distinctions between these various definitions, all the schools agree to recognize it as the putting of the notion of something into something else before him which is not that thing and this is what we call Subreption (mithyātva) by which the body and soul are fused together into an identical whole from which we have the instinctive tendency to say 'I am tall and lean,' 'the child is mine' and the like in the movements of our empirical thought and life. Were it otherwise, it would have been impossible for us to be aggrieved at the loss of our dear ones or to be sorry in their sorrows and afflictions. And the sages hold that it is this bandha or combination of body and soul into an identical whole due to subreption (mithyātva) which is the primary and other secondary causes and conditions such as kashayas and the like that is the root of all our Sansār and miseries.

But still the possibilities of the bondage of the soul by subreption and the like is not
made clear. Indeed we understand what is meant by subreption (mithyātva). But is it possible for us to put the notions of the object and its accidents into the self which is not an object of knowledge? Object of knowledge (vishaya) and Subject (vishayee i.e., non-object) are not only two distinct substance but also the accidents of the one are radically opposed to the accidents of the other. Such being the case how are we to account for the alleged subreption of the two incommensurate entities in as much as subreption as just discussed is possible only where there is something common between the two factors under subreption. It is just because there is a kind of unity between one object and another that we put by subreption the notion of the one into another object. But between the body and the soul, there being no unity of any kind, the question of subreption of the two cannot come in at all, specially when, according to the Jain metaphysics, the soul or the self, from the transcendental point of view (nischayana) is of the nature of pure consciousness or knowledge itself (vide Atmā-pravād purva). Afortiori, therefore, the self cannot be the
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object of knowledge and hence the notion of the Not-self cannot be put into the self which is knowledge or consciousness itself. Then again it is not true that the notion of one object can always and invariably be put into another object whereever the latter might happen to be. The fact is that by subreption (mithyāṭva) we put the notion of some object already observed elsewhere into another object which is situate before us. To illustrate by example, when we put the notion of silver into the mother of pearl lying before us, we have an object into which the notion of silver is put by subreption and which has an existence quite distinct and separate from us and before us whence it follows that it is into an object situate before him that any one puts the notion of another object observed by him previously elsewhere. But in the case of bondage, how is it possible to put the notion of the body into the self filled in us from within: for this self is our inward self and how can it be said to have a separate existence situated before us: rather it transcends all the connotations of the non-ego as being not an object of knowledge.
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But all these agrumentations as urged against the possibility of the combination of the self and the other into an organic whole do not hold good here. It is true in fact that subreption consisting as it does in the putting of the notion of something already observed elsewhere into something else present in the vision, is only possible between the different objects of knowledge; but then the self is intuitively perceived as constitutional with us and as such it is the object of our introspection. And further more because the self is admitedly the object of the connotation of the I, it is also present in our vision as such. And this accounts for the combination of the self and the other by subreption into an organic whole.

Indeed as contended the self which is in reality (*nischuya naya*) of the nature of pure consciousness and luminous of itself is not an object of knowledge; and as such it is neither fettered nor tainted with any of the blemishes; neither it is in reality the agent of any deed not the enjoyer of any fruits thereof. But in such combination by subreption as of the self and the other, the same self
by reason of its manifesting itself as it does through the other, the media of the organism and the senses, becomes, as it were, the object of introspection as well as of the connotation of the I and thereby appears as the Jīva, the doer of deeds and enjoyer of the fruits of thereof. It is due to this subreption that the selfsame spirit appears both as the agent and enjoyer as well as the object of the connotation of the I. Of course to be the agent or enjoyer of something, the self must have the energy to work and enjoy, and it might be contended that it is impossible with self, because of its being of the nature of pure consciousness to be as such. True as these energies are inherent in the mind-stuff which is bereft of intelligence and intellectuality; but it must be understood that in the combination by subreption of the self and the other, into an organic whole, the selfsame spirit acquires somehow the energies to work as well as to enjoy the fruits thereof and appear as the Jīva.

But some will however remark that this is but arguing in a circle. For, to say that
the subject differentiates into object by subreption and that subreption is due to differentiation is to be guilty of moving in the vicious circle of reasoning and hence the possibility of the subreption of the self and the other combining thereby into an organic unity is inadmissible. But the Jains repudiate the charge altogether; since it involves a causal reciprocity as implied in the causality subsisting between the seed and the tree—a fact of common experience. The fallacy of the regressus ad infinitum is indeed condemnable in metaphysical speculations drawing conclusions which have no analogous cases in the field of actual experience for verification. It is a fact of common experience that from the seed sprouts forth the tree and the tree from the seed again and so on ad-infinitum. And as this does not involve the fallacy of regressus ad infinitum so no such thing is involved in the statements when we say that the combination in question is due to subreption and subreption again is due to combination and so on ad-infinitum. This is how the Jains say that mithyātva or subreption is
without beginning. And in fact it is acknowledged on all hands who has recognised the truth of the teaching that freedom consists in the realization of the self as absolutely free from what is alien to it. In other words every system of thought which finds the bondage to be due to subreption holds out the hope of liberation by the destruction of the cause of subreption by knowledge.

However it is pretty clear that each case of subreption is invariably proceeded by another subreption leaving its residuum in the form of lesyas or tints as its consequences colouring and magnetising the soul whence its follows that the self which was the object of previous subreption becomes the integrating principle in a subsequent combination by subreption; for in such a combination there is always presupposed a unifying principle which must refer to itself at each step it takes in the processes of combination, since without such a principle referring to itself there can be no synthesis at all.

And now the question is: what is this integrating principle? It is the Jiva, Jivatman
or the empirical ego revealing itself as it does in the unity of self-consciousness. The underlying unity of self-consciousness fulfils all the conditions of an integrating and discriminating agency without which we cannot conceive of any other unity as involved in the mutual relation of factors under sub-reption. For, empirically speaking, in order to be, an object must be distinguished from other objects but there can be no distinction unless the object distinguished and those from which it is distinguished are held together by a single unifying principle, the Jivatman. The various Karma bargands are so many external things existing by virtue of their mutual determinations. Now each of these must be present to an integrating principle which holds them together and opposes them to one another as we find in the case organisms. It is clear enough that this combining principle cannot be in reality any of the objects held together and distinguished from each other. That which distinguishes must be above, though implied in those things that are distinguished. In other words the combining principle, must
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transition and be equally present as well to the objects combined and it is by subreption (mithyātva) and the like causes and conditions that we lose sight of the transcendental aspect of the self, the integral nature of which is the empirical aspect of the same.
CHAPTER XXVIII.

SAMVARA OR STOPPAGE.

Samvara classified into Physical and Psychical:—
With Samvar begins the practical morality—Swaraj
the ultimate End—Fifty seven kinds of Samvar—Five
Samitis, three Guptis, Ten rules of Ascetisism,—
Twelve Bhavanhas, Twenty six Parishahas and Five
Charitras.

From what precedes it is pretty clear that all our poverty and degradation, all
our sorrows and afflictions are due to āsrava and bandha caused by subreption (mithyātva and the like). Fresh āsravas forge fresh links of bandhan of the soul which is
constitutionally free and potentially divine. We have also seen elsewhere that in order
to manifest this constitutional freedom and essential divinity of the soul, a jīva must
shake off all karma-matter which being alien to its real nature works as a veil of ignorance
to prevent the unfoldment of right vision into the verities of life and living leading to
right-knowledge without which right conduct in the empirical life and thought ultimately
crowning its efforts with a free and beatific
state of being, a swardājya, a self-rule, an autonomy, for all time to come.

But the question is, how can the soul be freed from the snares (pāshā) of karma? how can the veil of ignorance be removed? The Jain processes of purging the soul out all karma-matter, of renting the veil ofnescience and the like jñāna-darshan-dvāranādis hiding the jīva from the knowledge of its own real nature begins with what is termed as Samvara. With samvara, the fifth principle of the Jain moral categories, begins the most practical side of the Jain moral philosophy. It is true that the ultimate end of all the different systems of thought and culture on this side of the Eastern Hemisphere, is Freedom. And the nature of this freedom has been variously conceived and defined by the different schools of philosophy. But with the Jains it means Swardāj, self-rule, or autonomy pure and simple. Swardāj or self-rule in every department of life and activity is the Ideal of the Jain system of thought and culture. Subjection to anything alien being recognised as the true characteristic insignia of servitude both here and hereafter,
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the Jain sages have deemed it wise to lay down for the aspirants to Swardj and for the good of humanity in general, a few rules and canons, movements along the lines of which will surely enable the jiva to realize the Ideal by the removal of the aliens standing in the way. Of these rules of life, comes first the samvar which is nothing more than practically putting a stop to the influx of foreign elements into the constitution of the jiva.

Like Asrava and Bandha, Samvara is also analysable into Subjective (Bhava) and Objective (Dravya). By Subjective samvar, we mean the kind of conscious and voluntary striving, mental and moral, along certain lines, on the part of the jiva, to arrest the influx partially or wholly whereas Objective samvar means the actually shutting up of the channels against further influx of fresh Karma-matter into the constitution of the jiva.

Now the lines along which a jiva should strive and struggle for the gradual effectuation of samvara are of fifty-seven kinds; viz, (A) Five Samitis. (B) Three Guptis.
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(C) Ten-fold Yati-dharma. (D) Twelve Bhāvandās. (E) Twenty-six Parishahas. (F) and Five Chārātras—thus making up fifty-seven kinds in all.

(A) The five Samitis—Samiti means the voluntary movements of the jīva in perfect accordance with the Agamas—The samiti is resolvable into five-fold ways as in the following.

(i) Iryā Samiti—means cautious and careful walking, so as not to hurt anyone. But this is practically impossible. A slight movement from one side to another will surely kill many a life. Indeed! but one should be very careful to walk in a manner as would cause the least possible injury to life. Iryā samiti is imperatively enjoined on the monks who must take special care to examine the ground before he steps out anywhere. He must not plod through grassy fields; but should take himself to high-ways fully illumined by the scorching rays of the sun and
not much frequented by human beings of either sex: for in wending his way through these sun-bathed highways with careful steps, if any jiva is killed unwarily, the sin begotten in consequence thereof would not materially affect him in as much as the merit he acquires by his deliberately taking every precaution for not injuring any sentient being outweighs and counteracts thereby the demerit that accrues from the unintentional killing of the invisible germs and animalcules on the path. Such is the character of the first samiti known by the name of Iryā.

(ii) Bhāsā samiti—This means careful movements of the tongue. One should never make any foul use of the tongue as is done in the case of filthy speaking, abusing, or using harsh strong words against any one so as to wound his feeling. This is how the tongue is to be guarded.
(iii) *Esāndā samiti*—As bad-karma may flow into the constitution of the *jīva* through the kind of food one takes in, so one should be specially careful about his meals. A *Sādhu* should never take in any food that is somewhat away or other spoiled with forty-two defects.

(iv) *Adānnikshepa samiti*—This means that one should take special care in the selection of seats to sit on, or in putting on garments, or in using the utensils so that no *jīva* might be injured thereby.

(v) *Parisatapannā samiti*—This is but a precautionary measure that a *sādhu* should adopt in throwing out unhealthy organic elements from his constitution. A *sadhu* should not, for instance, spit out anywhere and everywhere in as much as it may affect other *jīvas* swarming in the place he might spit on.

These are the five *samitis* which are enjoined on the lay people in general and on the Jain monks in particular to observe in
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their daily lie. The imperative character of their importance becomes clearly evident when we direct our attention to questions of the relation of hygiene and bacillus. The modern bacillus theory of diseases which have often been declared as contagious, explain the scientific character of the above five injunctions, specially with respect to the monks who have to move about from village to village, from city to city excepting the period of Châturmâsya or the four months of the rainy season when they are forbidden to visit place after place.

(B) Now the three Guptis: Having regulated the external movements of a jiva in such a way as would help him to arrest comparatively the influx of karma, the sages have deemed it wise to lay down further rules for controlling his inner nature. Of these guptis or the processes of controlling the inner nature of a jiva we have first,

(1) Manogupti which means the controlling of the mind. If mind is not controlled and regulated at will to work in a particular direction, nothing great can be achieved. So the
first thing one should try to do is to control the mind which could be done in three ways: viz.,—

(a) *Asatkalpanāvīyogi*—which means that one should not give himself up to excessive grief and the like at the demise of anyone dear to him or at the loss of anything. One should reflect within himself that all the pleasures of life and living are only temporal: they come and go like the fleeting clouds so there is nothing permanent to be gained thereof for the well-being of the soul which must strive and struggle on and on till the Highest-Good is realised.

(b) *Samatā-bhāvini*—means continuous thinking along certain line that will bring on the equanimity (*samatā*) of the mind. He must try to realise that for a *mumukṣu jīva*, both love and hate, pain and pleasure, have no value; for both are but chains, one of gold and the
other of ore, which subject the jïva to go round and round the wheel of births and deaths. Moreover unless this equanimity of mind is attained, a jïva cannot expect to have a right vision into the metaphysics of ideas and ideals without which the veil of mithylâtva cannot be torn asunder.

(c) Atmâramâta—means ‘Introspection’ or Self-reflection. By this the mumukshu jïva draws in the powers of his mind from the extra-mental world and concentrates the same upon the soul to study the different phases it passes through. Thus it gradually creates an apathy to the things of temporal character by a comparative arrest of the influx and enhances the ardent desire for a speedy deliverance from the turmoils of the life of servitude.

(ii) Vachan-gupti—means controlling the speech which can be accomplished in two ways. vis,—
(a) By taking a vow of silence (moun-
dābalambi) for a certain period
during which the mumuksha
jiva should never open his lips.
Or by
(b) Vākniyami—regulating his tongue only
to move on imperative occasions.
(iii) Kāya-gupti—means controlling the
physical organism by the mumu-
kshu jiva in accordance with the
various rules and regulations as
laid down in the scriptures.

Now from the characteristic indications
of all the three guptis, it is apparent
that they are meant to help a jiva in
the arrest of his karmic inflow; for all
these act as an antedote to the poisons
of temptations which the world abounds
with.

(C) The Ten-fold Duties of the Monk.

A monk can well stop the influx of
karma by acting in consistent with the
ten duties enjoined on the human species
specially on monks and they are,
(i) Kshamā—Forgiveness. There is nothing
like the maxim 'forget and forgive.
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The spirit of forgiveness helps a great way to control anger which eats into the moral vitals of the mumukshin. It is by virtue of forgiveness that Christ Jesus of Nazareth was a Christ Jesus; for do we not remember the soul stirring exclamation from the cross "Father, father, forgive them for they know not what they do."

(ii) Mārdava—Humility,—There is nothing like it to subdue pride and arrogance. Arrogance deteriorates the mind and vitiates the right vision. An arrogant man cannot look into the real utility and necessity of things or discriminate between the right and the wrong whereas an humble man awakens active sympathy in those with whom he comes in contact to his own advantage and sees into the truth.

(iii) Arjava—Simplicity. The maxim Simplicity pays best yields to
none in its intrinsic merit. It serves to keep the mind free from bias without which light of truth cannot well be reflected in the heart. It adds to the courage of conviction and helps in the preservation of veracity of character.

(iv) Nirlobhata—Greedilessness. Greed begets sin and sin begets death. Greediness increases attachment, makes the jiva extremely egotistic and narrowly selfish so much so that he knows himself only and looks to his own interests whither you go to the wall or not.

(v) Tapas—Austerity. Cultivation of austerity as laid down in scriptures helps the jiva to have a control over his lower passions to chasten the mind and to soften the heart.

(vi) Samyama—Restraint of the senses, the speech and the mind, is the primary conditions for every moral growth and intellectual expansion:
(vii) **Satya or Truthfulness.** It is born of the love of truth which must be the goal of every human endeavour. Adherence to truth in every act of life and thought often helps to walk straight with head erect and steer clear of the rocks and shoals which the passage across the ocean of Samsāra abounds with.

(viii) **Saucha—Purity or Personal cleanliness.** It includes the cleanliness of both mind and body. We must not only guard our thoughts well and keep them pure but should as well keep our person clean, for mind and body act and react on each other.

(ix) **Akinchanatva—Renunciation.** Cultivation of the spirit of renunciation is a safeguard to the above moral requisites and raises a jīva from the lower level of grovelling life.

(x) **Brahmacharya—Chastity.** It means not only restraining the senses and the lower appetites but free-
ing the mind from erotic thoughts of every sort and kind.

(D) The Bhāvanā—Next comes the bhāvanā or reflection or thinking within one’s own self as to the real nature and character origin, use and utility of something else. Constant thinking of this nature, wakes up in the mind of the thinker, a knowledge of the intrinsic value of the object thought upon and helps him to avoid such things as would stand in his way to the realisation of the object or end he has in view or remove obstacles from his pathways to perfection—the be all and end all of our life and thought.

Such being the nature bhāvanā or self-reflection, the Jain sages has classified it in twelve kinds for a mumukshin soul as stepping stones to higher things and they are as in the following.—

(1) Anitya bhāvanā—Anitya means non-permanent. Anitya bhāvanā—therefore means the thinking of the non-permanent character of things. Things transitory can not have any absolute value to a
mumukshin soul whose permanent interest lies in the realisation of the self. For all the relative conditions of existence which appear to be imperative in our empirical life and thought, are but so many fleeting clouds that come and go to dazzle or darken our vision. Beginning with such reflection on the temporary and perishable character of things, a mumukshin soul comes to feel within the inmost recesses of his heart, that the real permanent good is the freedom of the soul which must be raised from the mires of this transitory world: for health, wealth, beauty, strength and the like are but gilded shams which only hypnotize the mind and tie the soul down to samsār.

(2) Asaran bhāvanā—means the reflection on the helpless condition of a jīva in this world of phenomena. Really a jīva is without any one here to push him on to moksha.
All his friends, relations and dear ones may wish him well, may pray for a long lease of his life on earth; but no body can save him from sinking deep into the bottomless ocean of Samsār which he as a muniukshin desires to get rid of. In this vein a jiva must think on and on to realise within himself the absolutely helpless condition of his own in this Sansār and therefore must strain his own nerves and thus strive to get rid of it by his own power and resolute will.

(3) Sansār bhāvand—Sansār is full of sorrows and sufferings. What we ordinarily call pleasure is only pain in another form. Miseries and afflictions permeate as it were every strata of Sansār. In this theatre of the world, we are but so many actors and actresses playing our parts only for the time being after which we shall have to bid goodbye to all we hold dear to us; so no use forming an attachment for
these transitory trivials and knowing them as such one should turn his face against them and seek for the immutable state of being and bliss.

(4) Ekatva bhāvanā—Alone I came into the world and alone I will have to depart from hence. Alone do I work and alone shall I have to reap the consequences thereof. None of my dear ones will take off or unload me of my karma and set me free or give me a short relief; nor can they save me from the consequences of my own deeds. They are but adepts in having their own desires accomplished through me and what a stupid am I to yield to their apparently wise persuasions. This wont do. I alone am the maker and moulder of my own destiny and so I must forsake all what is not-me and thus carve out a path of my own for the fulfilment of my own Good.
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(5) Anyatva bhāvānta—The Self, the I is not this body which I hold to be mine. It is but a different and distinct entity unadulterated by anything else in reality. The ordinary mode of speech—finding expression in such statements 'as I am lean', or 'my limb is broken' or 'my child is suffering' has for its basis wrong knowledge as to the real nature of our inward self which by subreption appears to be identical with our physical constitution: but the wise and the omniscient have definitely determined it to be otherwise. The Self, the I is absolutely different from the not-self in every respect. So what care I if the body which is neither me nor mine go away. What do I care if the child ceases to be here and now. Such reflections within one's own self along this particular vein and strain is called Anyatva bhāvānta.
(6) *Asuchī Bhāvanā*—This our mortal coil is of composite substance and is born of the admixture of various elements in and through the processes which are really repugnant to the right thinking. All sorts of dirt and filth are within this physical constitution. So why should I be encased in it like a bird in the cage, knowing to be a composite of dirt and filth, and originating, as it does, in moments of weakness and sin? This line of self-reflection is what is called *asuchī bhāvanā*.

(7) *Aśrava bhāvanā*—*Aśrava* or influx—means, as we have seen, flowing of *karma*-matter into the constitution of the self through the channels and loopholes in our body, speech and mind. It is taught by the wise that looking upon the sentient being in terms of equality with ourselves; revering the really qualified; dealing politely with the rude and the
rough; feeling pity for the impoverished; all these four make one acquire the forty-two kinds of Punnya, where as roudra dhyān, ārta dhyān, the five kinds of mithyātva (subreption), sixteen kashāyas, five kinds of desires, all lead a jīva to acquire eighty two kinds of Pāpa. The wise and the aspirant to freedom must know all these and reflect on the degrading tendencies they are inherent with, to work havoc on the jīva through the influx; and so a jīva should guard himself and conduct himself accordingly.

(8) Samvāra Bhāvānā—Samvāra is the stopping of the influx. This samvāra is of two kinds—relative and absolute. Relative samvāra means the partial stoppage of the influx, while Absolute samvāra means the complete stoppage of the influx. This latter kind of samvāra is only possible with the ayogi kevalins. The relative samvāra
which is possible with the mumukshin on the path-ways to bliss and beatitude, is again resolvable in dravya and bhāva. Dravya samvara means the actual shutting out of the senses and other channels against the inflow of karma-matter where as Bhāva samvara means the particular mental disposition which precedes Dravya samvara. Now constant thinking as to the ways and means of shutting up the various channels of asrava, destroying mithyātva, giving up of the ārta and roundra dhyānus, practising only of shukla dhyāna and dharma dhyāna, replacing anger by its opposite, pride by humility, hypocrisy by veracity and the like which turn our minds away from pursuing after things temporary is known by the name of samvara bhāvānā.

(9) Nirjara bhāvānā—Reflection on the ways and means of purging the soul of all impurities. Nirjarā
or purging is of the two kinds—sakāma and akāma. When a jīva intentionally conducts himself in such way as would purge his soul out of all impurities, it is called sakāma nirjāra; but when karma bargandās are left to themselves for their own falling off from the constitution of the soul in their natural course, it is called akāma nirjāra. Nirjāra bhāvanda implies, therefore, the thinking of the ways and means of voluntarily getting rid of the karma-matter infesting the soul with the express intention of attaining to beatitude.

(10) Lokaswabhāva bhāvanda—means the thinking on the symbolic conception of the universe as given in the Jain scriptures. The sun, the moon, the earth, the planets and stars; the physical sky, the hell, the heaven and the like constitute one composite universe according to the Jain system of thought. Its form and configuration is
just like a man standing erect with arms resting against his waist. Being composed of the six substantive categories of the Jain philosophy from time without begining, it is the permanent theatre of perpetual changes. All the jivas and the pudgal particles which fill up all the three regions known as urdha, adha, tiryak are not outside this Person but they are all contained in it: for outside this Universe-man is the vacuous space only going by the name of alokhākāś or hyper-physical regions which is infinite in extensiveness. In the infernal regions (adholoka) there are seven worlds one upon the other wherein are imprisoned the jivas of the hell. Somewhere there also dwells the Bhavananapati. In the third world from downwards dwell the human beings and other animal lower to them. In the celestial regions live the gods. Such,
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...roughly speaking, is the figurative conception of the universe, a conception which is also traceable in the Virât Purush or the Cosmic Person of the Hindus. Now meditation on this figurative conception of the universe as given in the Jain scripture is known as Lokaswabhâva bhâvanâ.

(11) Bodhidurlabhatva bhâvanâ—This means reflecting on the difficult path one has to travel through to attain to a state of pure intuition: for everything in this world, can be had with comparative ease save and except the three jewels, viz. the Right-vision, the Right-knowledge and the Right-conduct constituting the alpha and omega of our being. The Hindus also say, "Khurasya dhrâb nishita duratvâb durgamamayam panthâ kabayâ badanti."—The way to the goal is so very difficult to travel through; it is just like the walking on the sharp edge of
a razor. Therefore, now that we have got the human birth which rarely happens to a jīva, we must give up all to reach the goal, however difficult the path may be to travel through.

(12) Dharma bhāvā- This means constantly reflecting on the essential nature of a true religion. Religion not saturated with piety, with the spirit of innocent service to humanity and other sentient (sachit) beings is but a sham. For, it is mercy that lends colour to the soul of religion. Real mercy proceeds from right-vision, veracity and philanthropy. He who never tells a lie, sticks to truth even unto death, is indifferent to the worldly loss or gain, helps the needy and has an unwavering faith in the words of a jīva, the victor, is really a righteous man from the Jain point of view.

These are the twelve kinds of reflections which help a jīva in his efforts towards the
actualisation of *Samvara* which if not cultivated with propriety and judiciousness cannot put a stop to the incessant influx of *karma*-matter into the constitution of the *jiva*.

Next comes the *Parishahas* or endurance of hardships without which no one can expect to attain to a thing; for work implies not only waste but endurance as well. A *mumukshin* soul must ever be prepared to gladly endure all sorts of hardships as consequent on the strain and struggle he has been voluntarily undergoing for the realisation of the Highest Good. The Jain sages have classified in their own ways these various forms of hardships into twenty-two kinds, viz;—

(1) *Kshutparisaha* or endurance of hardship consequent on hunger, (2) on thirst (*trisha*), (3) cold (*shita*), (4) heat (*ushna*), (5) insect bite (*dansha mashaka*), (6) nakedness (*achela*) i.e. tattered rag, (7) on unfavourable environment (*arati*), (8) on the presence of the opposite sex, (9) on constantly shifting from place to place (*charya*); (10) on the disadvantages arising from abiding by the rules of conduct in a particular quarter.
temporarily taken as *habitat* (nīshadīḍa), (11) on uncomfortable beddings to sleep on (*shayyād*), (12) on taunts and reproaches (*akroha*), (13) on personal injury (*badha*), (14) on begging alms (*yāchnā*), (15) on disappointment in the begging (*alābha*), (16) on desease (*roga*), (17) on thorn-pricks (*trina sparsha*), (18) on physical dirt and impurities (*mala*); (19) on being indifferent to words of praise and acts of service relative to himself (*sat karma*); (20) on the avoidance of the pride of learning (*Prājnā*) (21) on the avoidance of pain due to the consciousness of his own ignorance (*agnana*), (22) on the avoidance of being cast down for not being able to acquire a right-vision into metaphysics of ideas and ideals.

Now these are the two and twenty *Parishahas* or forms of endurance which otherwise tell upon a *mumukshin jiva* so as to cast him away from the right path and conduct without which the progress towards the highest state of being and bliss is held to be impossible.

Then there are the Five-fold Conduct for further stoppage of the influx. The five-fold
conduct are but the Five Rules along the lines of which a *jiva* should move himself to stop the inflow of *karma*-matter into its constitution. They are—

(i) *Samayika Châritra*—which enjoins on the *munukshin*, the abandonment of bad companions and retirement to seclusion for meditation.

(ii) *Chedopasthâpannya Châritra*—which enjoins a full and complete confession with repentance to a *guru* of the sins and crimes done intentionally or otherwise by a *munukshin jiva* and humbly submitting to any punishment that might be inflicted on him in consequent thereof.

(iii) *Parihar Vishudha Charitra*.—It goes without saying that without the purification of the heart, right-vision into the metaphysics of things and thoughts leading to right knowledge resulting in the dieification of the inward self is impossible: we have also in the Bible. “Blessed are the pure
in heart for they shall see God." So without chittasuddhi or purification of the heart nothing is possible. Now there are various means and disciplines whereby the heart can be purified. Of these the most preleminary for a mumukshin is to serve the sadhus, the monks. The most typical of these services is the services rendered to the monk engaged in Tapa—austerity. Performance of tapas may cover the period of even eighteen months and if a mumukshin serves a monk who is thus engaged in Tapas in such a manner as to see that nothing there takes place externally as to break the Tapas of the monk, he is said to be achieving the purification of the heart to a certain extent. The psychology underlying this is too obvious to require any further elaboration.

(iv) Sukshma Samparāya.—The more the heart is purified the more the
light of truth will be reflected thereon and he will realise the temporary character of the things worldly, along which he will become less and less attached to them, with a growing spirit of renunciation born of right knowledge of the real values and functions of these. This is how should a jīva cultivate apathy and indifference to things worldly. So long a jīva living, moving and having his being in this empirical world of ours, he must have to work and the more he works out things with attatchent the more fettered does he become; but if he does his duty for duty’s sake without waiting for the result thereof, he will develope by this his mode of conduct, a spirit of renunciation which will help him to preserve the equanimity of temper in the midst of intense activity.

(v) Yathākshyata.—Having thus gradually develope the spirit of doing
things without the least attachment he will attain to such a state of being when all the fivefold rules of conduct will be observed automatically so much so that the jīva himself will be left to himself for introspection into and self-reflection upon its own nature, phases and phenomena.

Thus we see how the various ways of arresting the inflow of karma into the constitution of the jīva can be classified into fifty-seven modes or types viz., five Samity, three Gupti, ten Yati dhārma, twelve Bhāvanās, twenty two Parishahās and five-fold Conduct-Chāritra. A jīva desirous of salvation from the thraldom of the senses must make strenuous efforts to gradually stop the influx of fresh matter foreign to the soul. For as we have already seen it is these karma particles getting into the constitution of the jīva that blind its vision into the metaphysics of things and there by prevents its right knowledge without which right conduct is held to be impossible.
CHAPTER XXVIV.

NIRJARA OR DISSIPATION.

Nirjara—Its Definition—Classification of Nirjara into Sakama and Akama—The Mumukshin strives for Sakam Nirjara to expedite Liberation—Phases and Transformations of Karma—Means and Methods of Sakama Nirjara—The Primary Condition of Nirjara is Austerity—Austerity burns up the Karma seeds and sets the Jiva free—Forms of Austerities and Dhyanas which burn up the seeds of Karma before their due times.

Along with the practice, of Samvar or arresting the influx of fresh karma-pudgal as stated in the preceding chapter a mumukshin jiva is requiren to act in such a way as would help him in throwing away the already acquired dirt of karma which has been subjecting him to go round and round the wheel of births and deaths. For untill and unless a jiva's entire karma-matter clothing his soul-worked out or neutralized in a manner as would make it impossible to transform into udaya—kinetic state of its being, a jiva cannot expect to attain to freedom.—And the processes and activities whereby the karma-matter clothing the soul is worked out or
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their effects completely neutralized so much so that they would fall away from the constitution of the jiva is called Nirjara.

The Jain sages have classified this Nirjara into two kinds viz.; (i) Akâma Nirjara & (ii) Sakâma Nirjara.

To deal with Akâma Nirjara, karma-pudgals while standing in some relation with the soul assume various phases through successive processes of tansion according to laws inherent in them. This is the reason why the sages have come to another kind of classification of the karma-barganas by the names of (1) Sattâ, (2) Bandha (3) Udaya and (4) Udirnâ.

(1) By sattâ karma—The sages mean the karma-barganas which getting into the constitution of the jiva remain there merged as it were in the soul. Sattâ-karma corresponds to the Sanchita-karma of the Hindus: The whole man that still remains behind the man not yet worked out—the entire unpaid balance of the debit and credit account.
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By Bandha Karma—the Sages mean the karma-bargandas in the state of sattva enter by virtue of sub-reption of the jiva into a relation of identity with the soul whereby the jiva takes in further karma-matter in its current lease of life to mould its destiny for the future. This Bandha karma is analogous to the Kriyamān karma of the Vedanta philosophers.

By Udaya Karma—The sages mean the karma bargandas which standing simply in relation of identity with the soul for sometime develop into an energy of movement for the enjoyment of the soul at the commencement of each life. This is analogous to the Prārabdha Karma of the Hindus by which they mean the amount apportioned to the man at the beginning of his life on earth. It is important to note here that this third type, the Udaya karma, is the only destiny which can be said to exist.
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for man and this is what an astrologer might fore-tell for us, that we have apportioned to us so much good and evil fortune —so much of the good and evil actions of our past lives which will react on us in this life.

(4) By Udīrṇa Karma—The sages mean the karma bargandās which by the resolute will and exertion of the soul are worked out into the energy of movement for the enjoyment of the jīva before they are due.

Now if the jīva allows himself to be drifted from wave to wave surging in everflowing currents of karma, his destiny will no longer remains his hands but the environment will become all in all in the making and moulding of his destiny. For he will be under the complete sway of his own karma creating conditions of his being and will be reaping the consequences of his own karma without any will or individuality of his own to stem the tide of the influx. For karma-matter according to its laws and forces which it is instinct with will
continually get into the jīva to be there in the state of sattā for some time only to be awakened into kinetic energies whirling the jīva round through the different grades of sansār, while others will indeed fall off yielding places to newer ones. Therefore, instead of leaving the life to chances, the sages have devised means and methods whereby the seeds of karma could so burnt as to wholly neutralize their effects and leave the soul free and pure to soar up and up into the regions of the Siddhasila. Experience have taught us that the karmic-seeds—the root-evolvent of miseries—could be burnt up into nought in the glow of austerities—Tapas. Just as fire consumes the combustible so do the tapas-austerities burn up the karma-bija of the jīva and sets him free from the turmoils of sansāra. These austerities are of various kinds and types which for the sake of convenience, have been classified by the Jain moralists, primarily into (I) Bāhyā, exterior and (II) Antar, Interior austerities.

(I) By Bāhyā, exterior or physical austerities, our physical nature is so con-
trolled as to work out automatically towards the furtherance of the end in view whereas by the Antaranga tapas or Interior or psychical austerities mind is so controlled as to help the jīva in getting an insight into the real nature of things with a view of attaining to a right knowledge thereof and their values as well without which right conduct on the part of the jīva becomes a rarity. And mind and body being found to act and react on each other through the principle of concommittance, the relative importance of both the forms of austerities is quite evident.

Now of the two kinds of tapas, the bāhya, the exterior or the physical consists in the processes of controlling the physical nature of the jīva in six following ways.—

(1) Anashan Vrata—i.e. the vow of fasting.

Importance of fasting from time to time to give the physical system a rest goes without saying in these days of scientific culture and refinement. It is said in the scripture that fasting purifies the sense-organs and adds to their sensibility so much so that it
makes them to respond to a any fine and delicate vibration that might be set up in the outside.

(2) Unodori—Avoidance of full meals. It adds to the agility of the jiva. Full meals bring on slumber and laziness and are the causes of dyspepsia which is very difficult to get rid of.

(3) Vritti sankhepa—Dietetic restrictions which can be observed in different ways from the view-points of dravya, kshettra, kula and swabhāva. As for instance, I am in the habit of taking meals consisting of nine or ten kinds of eatables and to observe the vow of vritti sankhepa from the stand-point of dravya, I will have to reduce the number of the eatables, say, to five kinds making up the meal would take. Then again I may put in further restriction to the obtaining of the meal from certain quarter from the view-point of kshettra. Thirdly, I may put still further restriction
to the time kāt of my taking meals. I may take once a day and that again say by 3 P.M. every day; and lastly, from the view-point of bhūva, I may put still another restriction in obtaining food from people with certain peculiar mentality and position. I may take the vow of having meals only from the chaste and pure passers-by whom I may happen to meet on my to a certain destination.

(4) Rasatayāga—Renunciation of palatable articles or dainty dishes, such as a variety of sweets, milk, butter, sugar, salt and the like which may awaken in me a sense of attachment to the pleasures of life.

(5) Kṣīyakleshā—Endurance of physical troubles. A mumukṣun must ever be ready to undergo all sorts of physical discomforts without, in the least, losing the equanimity of temper. He must take both heat and cold (śīta and uṣhna) in the one and the same light.
To realize this, he may undertake to practise meditation either in the scorching rays of the sun on an elevated seat in the summer or in a cold uncovered place in the winter.

(6) Samlinatā—Turning the senses from their respective objects. This will develop the spirit of renunciation in the mumukshin ķiva and strengthen his moral rectitude in such a manner as to make one look upon things most charming to the worldly as of no use and avail to him. This is how the senses, we are told, guarded against all temptations (Indriya samlinatā). Then again the mumukshin must control the passions and their correlates, such as anger, deceit, pride and greed (kusāya samlinatā) as well as his thought, speech and body (yoga samlinata). And lastly, there is the viviktacharya which means previous ascertainment by a mu-
muksin as to whether any one of the opposite sex is there at the place of his future destination where he will be next going.

These are the six forms of exterior austerities (bāhya tapa) for regulating and controlling the physical nature of the mumukshin jīva. Besides, there are six interior austerities (antar tapa) of which the first is,—

(1) Prāyaschitta—penance and repentance for the blunders committed through pramād or negligence. It often takes the form of a moral confession to the spiritual guru, or to an other śādhu instead, of the sins and crimes one might have done through commission or omission with repentance and accept the penalty to be imposed on him by the guru and act according to the regulations as laid down in the scriptures and repeat every morning nicchami dukkadami i.e. may my sins be forgiven!

(2) Vinaya or Humility—A mumukshin soul must also cultivate humility,
for this serves to kill all pride and saturate the mind with sympathetic feelings. Of vinaya there are four kinds,—

(a) **Indana vinaya**—i.e. to be humble and respectful to all who are superior in knowledge and wisdom.

(b) **Darshan vinaya**—i.e. to be humble and respectful to those who have gained a real insight into the metaphysics of things and thoughts.

(c) **Charitra vinaya**—to be humble and polite to the men having a good moral stamina by the virtue of which he follows a right course of conduct.

(d) **Mana vinaya**—to be always in a kind of mental attitude as to pay respect to all the saints and sages of the world who live for others, and therefore, worthy of our reverence.

(3) **Vaiyāvritya**—Service to humanity. It takes a thousand and one forms in and through which the acquired dirt of karma is worked off. *Vaiyāvritya* consists chiefly
in services rendered to ascetics; feeding the poor, sheltering the helpless and the like forms of social services. In these days of flood and famine, the sadhus of the Ramakrishna Mission have been, it is important to record, seriously engaging themselves in the performance of this Viṣṇavāritya. Viṣṇuvāritya brings on chitta-suddhi or purification of the heart.

(4) Svādhyāya—means study: here it refers to the study Jain scriptures: following the rules of conduct as laid down therein for practical guidance; testing the truth and validity of the Jain metaphysical conclusions and being convinced of the same, preach them out to the world for the good of humanity in right earnest and energy. This clearly shows the evangelical spirit of Jainism.

(5) Vyutsarga—discrimination between the soul and the non-soul. It is
just like the \textit{nityānityā vastu viveka} of the Vedantists.

(6) \textit{Dhyāna}—meditation, contemplation or uniform unbroken concentration of mind upon something. To be more clear, \textit{dhyāna} is an unbroken thread of thought evoloving out of \textit{continuous} thinking on an object or an Idea. This \textit{dhyāna} has been classified into four kinds according to the object or Idea whereon a \textit{jīva} concentrates his attention; viz, (1) \textit{Arta}, (2) \textit{Roudra}, (3) \textit{Dharma} and (4) \textit{Sukla}.

To take the first, \textit{Arta Dhyāna}, it is the most intense hankering with attachement after an object of enjoyment revealing itself as it does in four forms namely,

(a) \textit{Ishta viyoga}—constantly thinking of the loss of what was \textit{dear} to him; grieving too much for the dead and the departed \textit{dear} ones or wailing and beating breast in grief for the loss sustained.

(b) \textit{Anista Samyoga}—to be constantly brooding over entering on a new
relation with something undesirable and unpleasant, and thereby gradually sinking into despondency as if no more hope were left to recast his lot.

(c) Rogā chintā—to be constantly labouring under an anxiety for some physical malady, or in other words always thinking of the physical ill-health.

(d) Agrasocha or Nidānārtha—to be occupied with the thought of the future and future only, that I will do this, then that, next the thing will as a natural consequence and I have my objective fulfilled.

It is important no note here by the way that Arta dhyāna is possible between the 1st. mithyatva and the 6th gunasthān and leads jivas to take birth in the Tiryak goti.

2. The second of the Dhyānas is Roudra dhyāna which means to be absorbed in the thought of wreaking vengeance for some loss or damage one sustained through the action of another. This thought of
wreaking vengeance (*Roudra dhyāna*) expresses itself into four forms viz,—

(a) *Hisānubandhi*, (b) *Mrishānubandhi*, (c) *Steynubandhi*, (d) *Samrakshanubandhi*

*Arta* and *Roudra Dhyānas* always lead mind to concentrate its energies on things extra-organic. These instead of dissipating the *karmic* energetics rather keep the *jiva* under such influence as to acquire *karma*-matter subjecting it to the repetition of births and deaths in the different grades *samsār*.

(3) But the third one, *Dharma dhyāna* which means constant thinking of the ways and means to and following the same in practice for the realisation of the true nature of our inward self, helps the *jiva* to work out its own *karma*. *Dharma dhyāna* has been analysed into four phases, namely—

(a) *Agnā vichaya*—to have a firm faith and sincere belief in the metaphysical conclusions as arrived at by the omniscient *kevalins* and in their teachings.

(b) *Apāya vichaya*—the belief that what is non-self is not only alin to the
real self, but constant thinking of the not-self ensetters the self.

(c) *Vipāka vichaya*—the belief that from the ontological point of view, though the self is a positive entity all pure and free, but viewed from the phenomenal stand point, it appears to be otherwise owing to the eight kinds of *karma* loaded with which the *jīva* passes through births and deaths.

(d) *Samsthān vichaya*—mental ideation or picturing in the mind of the fourteen worlds as well as the nature of the constituent elements of the same as taught in the Jain philosophy.

(4) Lastly comes the *Sukla dhyāna*. *Sukla* lit. means white which is but a symbolic representation of purity when it follows that *Sukla dhyān* is nothing else than thinking of the soul in all its purity *i.e.* to be absorbed in the meditation of the transcendental nature of our inward self as constitutionally free and potentially divine. Such being the import as understood by *Sukla dhyāna* it expresses in four forms viz:—
(a) Prativakatva Vitarka Sapravichāra—consisting as it does in the ideation of the substance as characterised with origination, dissolution, continuation (upāda vyaya dhrouva yuktam sat) as well as in the discrimination between such pair of opposites as jīva and ajīva; guna and paryāya; swabhāva and bibhāva tending to the formation of the right knowledge of the soul as it is in itself. This attitude of the mind becomes manifest when the jīva is between the 8th and 11th Gunasthān.

(b) Ekatva vitarka apravichāra.—consists in thinking of the unity in difference between the pairs of opposits and thereby to arrive at the knowledge of unity amidst the diversity of things and thoughts. It appears to develop in the Gunasthan.

(c) Sukshma kriyā Pratipati—consists in continuous thinking and striving
to resist the yogas of mind, speech and body in and through which karmic matter flow into the jīva. This dhyāna is possible to a jīva in the thirteenth gunasthān.

(d) Vicchinnā kriyā apratipāti—By this type of suklā dhyāna which is the last and final of the dhyānas, helps the mumukṣhin soul to tear assunder for good the veil and covering which so long stood in the ways of the jīva’s realization of the true nature of itself. It is a kind of mental striving which becomes more and more intense as the days go by to realize the siddhāhood of the jīva. To a jīva in the fourteenth gunasthān this dhyāna is possible.

It is important to note that Ārtā and Roudra dhyānas engage the mind of the people moving up and down between the 1st and the 3rd gunasthānas; Dharma dhyāna between 4th and 6th gunasthānas; Suklā dhyāna is possible to the jīvas entering on the 7th gunasthān and onwards.
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Besides the above way of classifying the dhyānas, The Jain sages have also otherwise classified them into (1) Padastha, (2) Pindastha, (3) Rupastha and (4) Rupātita. To take the first,

(1) Padastha dhyāna—is the continuous meditation on the nature of the Perfect souls, the kevalins or the Panch Paramesti.

(2) Pindastha dhyāna—is to think that the self within is in reality of the same essence with those of the arihantas and the like.

(3) Rupastha dhyāna—is to think or meditate in the manner that this our inward self is not of the nature of pudgal whereof our physical constitution is composed; for vision, knowledge and delight infinite constitute the very essence of our soul. Be it noted here that all these three dhyānas come within the range of Dharma dhyāna discussed herein before.

(4) Rupātita dhyāna—This is to think the
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soul within as superphysical, eternally free, pure, withouts parts and desire. Essentially it is intellectual delight revealing itself as it does in and through its four quarternary infinite technically know as the ananta chatustaya.
CHAPTER XXV.

MOKSHA OR EMANCIPATION.

Moksha or Emancipation—Moksha is the Highest Good—Conceptions of the Highest Good according to the Different Schools of Philosophy—Moksha is eternal and constitutional with the Soul—It cannot be worked out by Karma—For Moksha is not the Product of anything.

Now comes Moksha or Beatitude, the last and final of the Jain moral categories. Those who have followed our line of thought from Karma-phenomenology to the chapter proceeding this, must have understood the inner psychology of the whole trend of thought and culture, the sole objective of which is the emancipation of the soul from the miseries of the world and its attainment to a state of the highest felicity which it is the concern of every man to know and which the Sādhu takes so much pains to acquire. The Jain Sādhu, as it is now well-known, aims at nothing less than the complete deliverance of the soul from all veil and covering—Sarvāvaranavimuktānimuktih. But it is not so with the followers of the
other systems of thought and culture. They have various states of the beatitude which they aim at according to the different schools of thought to which they belong. For instance the Vedantist has two states of bliss in view viz., one inferior which is attained in this life by means of knowledge, \textit{tatrāparah jīvanmukti laksanam tatrājñānāntaraṇa}; and the other superior, obtainable after many births of gradual advancement to perfection, \textit{param niḥsreyasam kramena bhavati}.

Similarly the \textit{Charvakas} hold it to be either absolute autonomy here in this life or death that is bliss, \textit{svālantryam mrityurband mokshah}.

The \textit{Mādhyamikas} say, that it is the extinction of the self-hood that is called liberation, \textit{ātmāchheda mokshah}.

The \textit{Vijnāni} philosophers have it to be for a clear and edified understanding, \textit{nirmala jñānodayah}.

The \textit{Rāmānujaists} hold it be the knowledge of \textit{vāsudeva} as the cause of this all, \textit{Vāsudeva jñānānam}.

The \textit{Ballabhis} find it in the sporting with.
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Krishna in Heaven, Krishnena saha goloke lalānubhāva.

The Pāsupatas and the Maheswaras see it in the holding of all dignity, Paramaiswaryam.

The Kāpālikas define it to be the delight found in the sweet embrace of Hara and Parvati, Hara-Pārvatyalātinganam.

The Raseswarvādins find it in the possession of sound health and happiness by virtue of mercurry, Pāradena dehasthaिरyam.

The Vaishesikas seek it in the extinction of all kinds of pain—dukkha nivṛttiriti.

The Mimāṁsakas trace it in the enjoyment of Heavenly bliss—Swargādi sukha bhoga.

The Panini grammarians find it in the powers of speech, Brahma rupāyā bānya darshanam.

The Sankhya materialists has it in the fusion of matter and spirit—Prakritow Purushasyāvasthānam.

The Udāsina atheists trace it in the eradication of egotism, ahamkāra nivṛtti.

The Pātanjalas see it in the absolute non-chalant state of the Person originating
as it does from the utter indifference to matters worldly, Purusasya nirlepa kaivalyam.

The Pratyabhignānis interprete it as the realisation of the perfection of the soul, Purnātmā labhah.

The Sarvagnas find it in the eternal continuum of the feeling of the highest felicity—nitya niratishaya sukha bodhah.

The Māyāvādins say it to be manifest on the removal of the error of one's having a separate existence as a particle of the Supreme Being—Brahmānsika jīvasya mithyājñāna nivratti.

Such are the conceptions of the Highest Good which the different schools of thought ultimately aim at. A comparative study of the nature of these conceptions will make it clear that the Jain conception of the same gives us but a clear idea as to what a mumukshin soul really strives and struggle for. It is a kind of swaraj, self-rule, a state of autonomy, pure and simple, which every jīva instinctively aspires after to realize by tearing assunder the veil or the covering in and through the process of which the Ideal is Realised. In the
ordinary empirical state of our being the Ideal is ideal; it is far ahead of the practical. And the Jains hold that if the ideal remains an ideal, far ahead of the practical forever and evermore, it can never be made realizable. So the Jains interpret it otherwise, from their points of view, and really speaking, there are two tendencies running parallel all through the human life and culture. One is to idealize the real and the other is realize the ideal. These two tendencies are often at war with each other. One tends us to take the existing state of things and affairs as the best of their kind and so we must make the most of it. From this point of view whoever is found to go out of the way and to pull the world up to a higher level to have a so-called richer outlook of life, he is dubbed as the impatient idealist moving in eccentric orbits. But the other tendency by virtue of which they struggle to raise the world to a higher or ideal state of things, the tendency that is born of the intense dissatisfaction at the present state of things and affairs, is the tendency to realize the Ideal.
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Be that as it may, complete deliverance from the veil and covering of karma is called moksha or emancipation from the miseries and afflictions of the world. Karma, we have seen, is the cause of bondage of the soul. But the karma which whirls us round and round through the cycle of sansâr has been classified either into pâpa or punya. Punya and pâpa are the causes of all our weals and woes with this difference only that those who commit sin go down to the lower grades of sansâr, or sink into hell to suffer penalties as the natural consequences thereof whereas those who perform virtuous acts take births in the higher grades of sansâr to enjoy there the pleasures of life and achieve the objects of their desire. So pâpa and punya both have got to be worked out for the attainment of freedom—moksha.

Here one may argue that if nirjâra or purging means complete washing out the soul of all karma-matter, pâpa and punya, foreign to it, how are we then to look upon punya-karma which is enjoined on us as means to the attainment of the state of bliss and beati-
tude which is only possible when the soul has got rid of all *karma*-matter?

To this the Jains reply, it is true that *punya* ensures comfort, and happiness; but they are but comforts or pleasures of this mundane world. The eternal felicity born of the complete deliverance from all veil and covering, cannot be the consequence of *punya* however wisely and carefully may it have been discharged; for the consequences of *punya karma* are always conditioned in as much as *karma* and the consequences thereof are possible only in so far as the mundane existence is concerned, but with reference to what is devoid of all name and form, being above all causality, it is not possible. In other words, *karma* cannot evolve things of permanent character. *Karma* can produce, transform, conjoin, or re-adjust. Over nothing beyond these has *karma* any jurisdiction. Thus it is clear that *karma* is possible only in *samsār*.

Some may remark that *karma* done with judiciousness and indifference to the consequences thereof might result in the eman-
cipation of the soul. But this, the Jains hold, does not stand to reason; because moksha is not the result of anything done or performed. Moksha is the tearing assunder of the snares of karma binding the jiva under the sway of subreption to the sansâr, and, therefore, it is not the effect of anything preceding it as its cause. A karma cannot destroy karma. It changes only to re-appear in another form. Besides the effects of karma are traced in things which have origination (ulpâda) and the like. But moksha which is eternal in reality cannot be said to be the result of any work. Ordinarily karma manifests itself in the production of a thing, in joining one thing to another, in transforming one into another and the like. But speaking from the nishchaya naya, moksha has no origin. The jiva, as we have seen elsewhere, is constitutionally free and potentially divine. And it is simply due to subreption (mithyâtva) that it appears to us as otherwise.

Indeed what is contended is partially true, replies the opponent, but not wholly admissible; since the nature of the work done
without the knowledge thereof is of one kind; and different is the nature of the duty discharged with a thorough knowledge of the same and simply discharged for duty's sake with absolute indifference to the results that would accrue thereof. To show an analogous case, poison kills; but when judiciously administered by a physician efficient in the science and art of the administration of drugs, it acts like nectar. And this is what we mean when we state that *moksha* or deliverance is derived or results from the wise discharging of duties for duty's sake.

But we the Jains hold it to be altogether meaningless or misleading, since the analogy does not hold good here; nor is there any proof to verify the truth of the statement: for, it is in and through origination, conjunction, transformation or re-adjustment, that *karma* can work itself out and through nothing else beyond these four; because of the want of all manner of evidence, direct or indirect. So it cannot be maintained that *moksha* is derived from the wise discharging of duties for duty's sake.
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The opponent might remark that to say this is to deny the merit of such scriptural injunctions as laid down under the heading of Jural Seventies (Charan sittari) which have been imperatively enjoined both on the monks and the laity. Does not this denial stand as an indirect evidence to prove that moksha results from the wise discharging of duties as laid down in the Jural Ethics? Complete deliverance from the veil and covering, therefore, we hold, is the result, though not the effect, of our wisely working along the lines of Jural Ethics which is imperatively enjoined on every man. Otherwise none would have ever been inclined in any way to work along the lines of Jural Ethics.

To say this rejoind the Jains is to state that 'moksha is the result of our being true in thought and deed to the injunctions of Jural Ethics and on that account it cannot be said to be the effect of our doing something.' But what does this your statement mean? Mere euphonic difference in the words result and effect which are synonymous in sense and significance does, not always make out the difference in respect of their imports.
For, it involves a contradiction to say that though moksha is the result of our being true to the injunctions of Jural Ethics yet it is not the effect of our performing the duties as laid down therein. Of course to maintain your position you will perhaps contend that here karma takes the position of knowledge. Though moksha is not really the product of knowledge yet in common parlance we say 'deliverance is due to knowledge'! But this your contention we, the Jains, hold is of no avail; because when we say deliverance is due to knowledge, we thereby mean that the light of knowledge dispels the darkness of ignorance hindering the deliverance and it is because of the light of knowledge dispelling the hindering darkness of ignorance whereby moksha is realised, that we say 'moksha or deliverance is due to knowledge'; but karma cannot remove this dark veil of ignorance. Karma is conceived as hinderance to moksha and this hinderance cannot be removed by karma itself; because karma cannot destroy karma; rather karma generates karma and until and unless all karmic energetics are dissipated away from
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interprete ne-science either as want of knowledge, doubtful knowledge or mis-apprehension, then this ne-science can only be removed by knowledge alone and not by karma, because ne-science taken as such does not stand in opposition to karma.

So we see moksha is not the product of anything. It is the realisation of the Ideal Self in and by Itself which is possible only when all the karma-particles have fallen off from It. Jivasya krita karma kshayena yatswarupācāsthānam tanmoksha. Conventionally (Vyavahār naya) moksha is said to be a kind of paryāya of the jiva. It is important to note that soul is no airy nothing as the Intellectualist or the Buddhists hold. It is a substantiative, positive entity, and as such it must exist in a state of being called a paryāya from the phenomenal point of view (vyavahār naya). And this paryāya too cannot be wholly distinct and different from the substance itself whereof it is a paryāya; for, who has ever seen or conceived of a substance bereft of paryāya and paryāya without substance, dravyam paryāya vīyutam paryāya dravyam barjītāḥ.
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kah kada kena kim rupā drisṭā mānena kena veti.

Moksha, thus, is the emancipation of the soul from the snares of karma (karma-pāsha). Like the other moral categories the Jain sages have also resolved this moksha into bhāva and dravya. When the soul becomes free from the four Ghatiya karmas or the 'Action-currents of Injury' it is said to have bhāva moksha and when the four Aghatiya karmas or the 'Action-currents of Non-injury' disappear from the constitution of the soul, it is said to have attained dravya moksha. The psychology underlying this resolution of moksha into subjective (bhāva) and objective (dravya), is too obvious to require any detailed discussion. When the soul in and through the processes of nirjara or dissipation of karmas, gets rid of the four-fold action-currents of injury to the natural vision (darshan) knowledge (jñāna), and the like of the soul, it becomes omniscient (kevalin), because the soul is just like a mirror which becomes dim and hazy when the karma bargaṇḍas veil its surface. By nirjara, the karma-

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the body of the soul, its natural freedom cannot be made manifest. And moreover because this moksha or freedom is constitutional (swabhava) with the very soul itself, it cannot be said to be derived out of or result from anything else.

Then again it can't be maintained that karma removes ne-science (Avidya) for there is a gulf of difference in the essential nature between karma and knowledge. To make it more clear, ne-science or non-knowledge (ajñāna) is subreption as to the true nature of one's own self, while knowledge (jnāna) as opposed to ne-science is the realisation of the true nature of the same. Hence ne-science which is of the nature of the sub-reption is contradictory to knowledge which is of the nature of true realization. And in this way we may well interprete that light of knowledge dispells darkness of ne-science. Therefore karma and knowledge are altogether opposite to each other in kind. But karma does not stand in such relation of opposition to ne-science. Hence karma cannot be said to remove ne-science (ajñāna). Taking an alternative position, if we
bargands are purged from the constitution of the soul which on that account, attains to clearness and omniscience (keval jñāna). Having attained the keval jñāna, the cause of forging fresh fetters of bondage being absent by virtue of sanwar or stoppage, and nirjārd being yet in the processes of working, the jivanmukta kevalin gradually becomes free from all the residuum of Aghatiya karmas known as vedanya, āyu, nāma and gotra and thereafter attains to a state of bliss never-ending and beatitude everlasting. The realization by the jīva of this viz., his permanent state of being in knowledge and delight infinite is what is termed as Moksha, freedom or emancipation from the snares of karma for which reason we have the adage,—karma-pasha vinirmuktah mokshah. And when the soul is thus liberated it goes straight up to the Siddhasila or the Region of the Free and the Liberated at the summit of Lokākāsh. Speaking from the stand-point of noumenal naya, a siddha has no form whereof he is imperceptible by the senses, but viewed from vyāvahāra stand-point he has a shadowy form of a human
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figure which is but an embodiment of Right-vision, Right-knowledge and Right-conduct in and through which a jiva attains to a state of perfection bliss and beatitude which is otherwise known omniscience and Freedom Absolute.
CHAPTER XXXVI.

GUNASTHANAS.

The Gunasthanas or the Stepping Stones to Higher things—The Fourteen Stages Squeezed up into Four only—The First is the Life of Animality and Impulses—The Second the Life of Conscious Selection—The Third is that of Conscience and Faith—And the Fourth is that of Knowledge and Delight Infinite—Fourteen Stages leading to Omniscience—Regulation or Control does not mean Stultification as Complained of.

To anyone who knows the nature of Moksha and the means prescribed for it in the Jain scriptures, there will be no difficulty in apprehending that the realization of the self is preceded invariably by a series of conditions which must be fulfilled one after another and that perfection itself is the culmination of a graduated scale or hierarchy of moral activities, which have been classified into fourteen stages and have been called Gunasthanas by the Jainas. So long as the soul is bound by karma, it can never attain that deliverance from mundane existence which is the be-all and end-all of all that live, move and have their beings on
earth. The Jains believe that there is a ladder of fourteen steps by which a jīva may climb up to the stage called moksha. The sages have, therefore, divided the path which leads to the nirvāna into fourteen stages or stepping stones, each of which represents a particular stage of development, condition or phase of the soul, following up from the quiescence, elimination or partial quiescence or partial elimination of certain energies of karma, the final outcome of which is the manifestation of those traits and attributes so long held in check as it were by the karmic energeties.

To begin with the psychological observations which underlie the whole fabric of these gunasthanas, we may remark at the outset, that these fourteen stages may be squeezed up more generally into four only in the moral ascent of the soul. The First stage, we may roughly speak of as the stage of impulsive life, of lust and enjoyment, when the soul is quite in the dark as to its true destiny and goal, and is least removed from the animal existence; the Second is the life of conscious selection and pursuit, where the
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goal and true method of realisation are still misapprehended; the Third is the life of conscience and faith where the ends are taken not as we like, but as we aught, and the Fourth, the stage where all such conflicts disappear altogether and the soul shines forth in all its naturalness and omniscience.

Now as to the question as to why the stages should succeed one another in the order stated above, and not in any other way we remark that as soon as the self-conscious life is thrown in the front or induced by the pains and miseries of the animal life, the life of impulses, the conscious will of man wakes up and learns to remain in the ruinous spread of blind propensity and animal spontaneity. Here, by the mere shrinking from the membered misery of recklessness, some harmony is introduced and under the measured checks offered by Reason and sober thinking, a certain unity of movement is given to the activities. At the same time we should not ignore the fact that here no new force is introduced and the whole operation is rather regulative than creative and it shows its want of intensity by being swept away before
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some flood-tide of affection that bears us right away out of ourselves.

The third stage begins with the changes in the dynamical conditions otherwise present to us which are occasioned by the blind perception of the moral superiority of the higher springs of action. It is a stage of unworking faith, of implicit apprehension of the true way of realisation notwithstanding the want of a clear intellectual discernment as to the moral worth or imperativeness of the course of action adopted. Here the soul does not only exert a restraining influence, or has a mere regulative control over some of the springs of action, and other propensities, lest they might when freely indulged in, give rise to other pains and miseries incident to the first and second stages; but also itself voluntarily sides with one of the solicitations it has implicitly apprehended as the right course of action. Some sort of harmony and concord have truly been attained, some conditions have been truly worked out for the attainment of the desired End; but still this harmony is incomplete, inchoate and unstable so long Reason is called in to
decide between rival desires; in as much as this harmony is brought about and kept up untarnished, not by leaving every chord of heart to vibrate freely, but by laying the silencing hand on everything that would speak in discord, if once left alone. The constitution here is undoubtedly regulated, the passions and propensities of life have been curbed and restrained to make the achievement of the observed End possible, and some sort of harmony truly shines forth. But still it goes without saying, that the right order is purchased here by some sacrifice of force, by exertion of will, some of which is spent still only in holding down the clamouring impulses of life and consequently the constitution can hardly be said to be properly tuned.

The fourth stage of life begins when the competition of impulses cease with the absolute concurrence of the natural solicitations with what ought to be, with the harmony of the scale of intensity of the impulses of life, with the scale of their excellence and moral efficiency. This stage is made possible only after a clear intellectual discernment (jñāna) of what ought to
be and of the proper means of its realisation. Here the harmony that is introduced is not partial or unstable as in the previous stages but is complete and it effects its end and works out itself with complete naturalness and spontaniety.

Thus to generalise further we may say that of these four stages, the first is characterised by indiscrimination or caprice, freedom without restraint, the second and third by voluntary and much strained regulation at the expense of the so-called freedom, and the fourth by the coincidence of freedom and regulation. And as each person shines forth in its true light, he becomes one with itself, as he passes from the preceding stages to those succeeding, reconciling now some warring inconsistencies, satisfying some haunting claim and getting rid of some gnawing uneasiness, and thus stands forth in greater vigour, keeping clear of all enfeebling defects; because to the lower stages some hesitation and cowardice, some sort of indecision and indiscrimination forever cling.

Another thought which occupied the
minds of the Jain philosophers and which practically moulded their philosophy into its present shape is that the additional sufferings which our soul undergoes beyond the limits of animal sensibility are contributed by our own intellectual endowments. It is because we look before and after from the point where we are now standing, because our mind can well detect beforehand the actual and the possible, because the visible has no power to blot out the invisible from our thought, that with us no pain can perish in a moment, but on the contrary, leaves on us many a vestige on its departure. Memory although it seems to have the cruel property of stripping the evil of its transitoriness, has also the brighter aspects as well in as much as it sends forth a notice of the approach of the evil and betrays the secret of it and men suffer as they fail to catch these warnings. What would then be the correct view of it? Would you renounce this foresight, this reason altogether and revert to the mere animal existence to be saved from the tears? Would you forsake your many-chambered mind and shut yourself up
in a single cell and draw down its blinds so that you may feel no storm, see no lightning and know nothing till you are struck down? Certainly not, says our Jain teacher, for the expansion of your vision, your intellectual consciousness will help you in having a control over your distresses and it is the only condition of whatever control you may have over them. It is only by continuance in thought that we can distinguish their kinds, investigate into their causes and discover their remedies and it is the self-knowledge of suffering that will open up before you the way to its own remedy. Most of the misfortunes and miseries incident to our life are due to our own ignorance; to the want of our own true insight into the real nature of things and they are gradually sure to be removed with the expansion of our intellectual and moral endowment.

To understand the principle underlying the arrangement of the gunasthas, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that the attainment of every end requires Right Vision, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct. Of these three, Right Vision precedes Right
Knowledge, while Right Conduct is a characteristic of those alone who have almost perfected themselves in Vision and Wisdom. Hence, the earliest stage of the journey is necessarily that which marks the transition from the state of settled wrong convictions to the acquisition of true faith and knowledge. Thus we see that in Jain philosophy a great importance is also attached to the reflective thought or in other words to the conscious reaction of the mind upon the results of its own unconscious or obscurely conscious movements. The fourteen stages also clearly show that however slow the movement of advance may be, the time must come when reason must turn back to measure and criticise, to select and reject, to reconsider and remould by reflexion the immediate products of crude and imperfect knowledge or faith. It must also be remembered in this connection that although there is a relative opposition between the immediate, unreflective movement of man’s mind or Faith and that which is conscious and reflective, yet it is the same Reason of man that is at work in both and
all that reflection can do is to bring to light, the processes and categories which underlie the unreflective action of intelligence. We must therefore maintain that though reason may accidentally or at the first stage of life may become opposed to faith, its ultimate and healthy action must preserve for us or restore to us all that is valuable in it. Nay in the long run a living faith or immediate vision (Samyak darshan) will absorb into itself the elements of the criticism which is directed against it and it will develop pari passu with other two elements namely: Right knowledge and Conduct. And Jainism by giving equal stress on all the three elements, namely, right vision i.e. immediate perception, right knowledge i.e. intellectual discrimination, and right conduct i.e. volition may best be characterised as both intuitive and reflective, practical and speculative, conscious and self-conscious!

Let us now discuss the successive stages through which the soul passes from the darkness of ignorance to the illumination of knowledge, from the state of bondage to that of complete deliverance.
The first stage is called Mithyātva or the stage of false knowledge. It is the starting point of all spiritual evolution, the first step in the ascent of the soul, signifying only ignorance which is the normal condition of all jivas involved in the cycle of Sansāra. The soul in this stage is completely under the influence of karma as a consequence of which no true view of things is possible to the soul. When a man thoroughly dissatisfied with the actual state of things of the world, tries to get rid of this miserable condition of being, he tries to speculate upon the state of the world and his relation to it which enables him to hold down in check the three kinds of energetics of darshana mohoniya karma, namely, (1) mithyātva which invariably deludes the soul to settled wrong beliefs (2) samyag mithyātva which is characterised by a mixture of truth and falsehood and (3) Samyakta, signifying only blurred faith i.e., stinged with superstition and (4) the results of anantānubandhis type of kashāyas, namely, anger, pride, deceit and greed, producing what is known as Prathamopāsama-Samyakta—a kind of faith, which
being itself unstable and ill-grounded, subsides sooner or later with the preponderance of anyone of the anantānubandhi kashāyas mentioned above. It can safely be inferred here in this connection that the subsidence of the seven energies of karma is the primary requisite of obtaining a true insight.

There are two divisions of this stage namely, first, when other people can know that one is mistaking a false view of things for a true one, is misapprehending an object or event and secondly, where such detection is not possible although one may still continue in this state. A Jaina sloka says:

"As a man blind from birth is not able to say what is ugly and what is beautiful, so a man in the mithyātva gunasthānaka cannot determine what is real and what is false."

The second stage appears when the soul, whirling round and round in the cycle of existence, loses some of its crudeness and ignorance and rises to the state called granthībheda and learns to distinguish first between what is false and what is right, as opposed to the first stage where no such distinction is possible, being itself confined
absolutely within the limits of ignorance only. It next rises to the state called upasama samukita where, it forgets the above distinction and consequently is not able to act according to such distinctions; but later on when the soul again gets hold of such distinction and fresh remembrance of it comes back, the soul enters on another stage namely, Sasvādana gunasthanaka, which is characterised by exhausted faith.

Next the soul that rises to the third stage namely Misra gunasthānaka is so to speak in a state of tension, oscillating between the stage of knowledge and doubt. At one moment it gets hold of the truth and at the next doubts it. It is a stage of uncertainty and vacillation. But the peculiarity of this stage is that the soul cannot remain permanently in this stage but must either slide down to the second stage or must rise up to the fourth one.

The fourth stage is called Avirati—Samyagdhristi which follows as soon as the doubts of an individual have been removed either by meditation or by instruction of the guru. This stage is so named because the
person here becomes a true believer. It is called *Aviruta* because the soul here is still unable to take those vows which strengthen and protect men from the reaction of *karma*. A person at this stage can control, anger, pride, greed and three other branches of *mohaniya karma* mentioned above in as much as we can say that this stage is the result of partial or entire subsidence of the seven energies of *karma* discussed in the first stage. It should also be remembered in this connection that partial subsidence of these energies of *karma* is very dangerous, because it may cause the soul at this stage to slip back again into lower stages. The soul too at this stage gains five good things which should not also be lost sight of namely, (1) *Sama* i.e. the power of controlling anger; (2) *Samvega*, i.e., the knowledge that the world is full of evil and as the law of *karma* only works here, one should have the least affection for this world; (3) *Nirveda* i.e., the knowledge that his wife and children do not really belong to him; (4) *Anukampa* i.e., the sympathy or affection to relieve others in distress; (5) *Asthā* i.e.
a firm, unflinching faith in all the Victors or Jinas.

The next stage is known as Desavirati, otherwise called Samayatā-samyatā gunasthānaka. It is here the soul which was so long guided by the mere influence of faith, first realises the great importance of conduct and so can take the twelve vows which really enable a man to fight against the energies of karma. This stage attaches much importance to different kinds of behaviour on account of which it has been divided into three parts. First, in Jaghanya desavirati, a man takes a vow not to drink intoxicating drugs or to eat flesh. He constantly repeats the Māgadhi salutation to the Five Great Ones—"Salutation to Akiranta, salutation to Siddha, to Achārya, to Upadhaya, and to all the Sādhus of the world." The soul may still rise higher while continuing in this stage and without forsaking the previous vows may take a fresh vow to make money in righteous ways only. The person here takes a special care to observe the six rules for daily life namely, "One must worship god, serve the
guru, study the scriptures, control the senses, perform austerities and give alms." He may also rise further up and may attain to the state of Utkristo desavirati by taking up vows of eating once a day, maintaining absolute chastity, renouncing the company of the most beloved, and finally of becoming a sādhu. At this stage too, moderate anger, deceit, pride and greed are not only subdued but sometimes entirely destroyed.

The next stage is known as Pramatta Gunasthānaka which can be reached by the ascetics only. Here slight passions are either controlled or destroyed and only a few Pramādas (negligences) yet linger. These Pramādas are five in number, namely Pride, Enjoyment of Senses, Kashāyas (anger, conceit, intrigue and greed) and Sleep. According to the Jaina Scriptures, a man to rise higher than these stages must not indulge in any of these, for he may otherwise be levelled down to the mithyātva stage. As to why the Jain philosophers condemn anger so vehemently we may say, that because anger appears so evidently and displays itself with so little discrimina-
tion towards all sources of injury, real or imaginative, because it gives us so much trouble with its suggestions, at an age when better means of self-protection are at our disposal, it is so clearly the business of all reflective knowledge of evil not to indulge in it but to subdue it. Its instinctive character forces itself irresistively on our convictions. It is the sudden rising against opposition and harm of any kind, real or prospective, without originally any idea of moral injury or the reflection on the nature of the object that hurts us. Again, all those persons who attempt to put stress on the enjoyment of sense, do so obviously on the erroneous notion that the beautiful is resolvable into what is pleasing to the senses and they propose to show how a certain stock of primitive sensible pleasures spreads and ramifies by countless association and confers a factitious attraction on a thousand things in themselves indifferent. But this is absurd! For their character is changed into something odious as soon as they become self-chosen indulgents. Those who smoothly indulge in gratification of
the senses, betray their general weakness which can never be a strong proof against the fascinations of the Sense. So the Jaina philosophy enjoins that our will should always be directed not to enforce the energetics of Kashayas, but to lull them into sleep, into complete forgetfulness, to weaken them altogether, so that they may not prove even in future a menace to the abiding peace of the soul.

The seventh stage is generally known as Apramatta gunasthānaka. Anger has been here completely subdued and only greed, deceit and pride still linger in a very slight degree. The power of concentration and meditation increases here and the soul gets rid of all sorts of negligences. That which brings stupor or sleep being altogether absent here, all the active powers latent in the soul become by degrees more and more kinetic.

In the eighth stage called Aparvakaṇa, the conduct becomes perfect so far the observances of vows are concerned and man's heart becomes filled with such joy as had never been experienced before.
anger was entirely disappearing in the previous stage, so does pride here. The jiva now applies himself to holy meditation, and the fetters of karma become, as its consequence, more and more loosened. This step is often characterised as the Unique owing to its loftiness.

The next stage is known as Aniyati-bądara gunasthānaka. As in the previous stage pride disappears altogether, so does deceit here. The man practically rises above all sex-idea and devotes himself to meditation.

The tenth stage is reached by advanced ascetic only who “thereupon loses all sense of humour, all aesthetic pleasure in beauty of sound or form, and all perceptions of pain, fear, grief, disgust and smells. The ascetic gladly renounces his worldly ambition and with it all his worldly cares and anxieties disappear. Slight greed which still lingers in this stage only remains to be eradicated. This is known as Sukshma samparya Gunasthānaka.

The eleventh stage, Upasāntamoha gunasthānaka is the most critical period of life.
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If the ascetic here be able to completely subdue or destroy the lingering tinge of greed, he is safe and passes on to the twelfth stage. But if it remains only in check by utmost exertion of the soul, then in time to come, it may gather sufficient strength to overcome the controlling forces of the agent, and may cause the soul to slip back even into the lowest stage. If on the other hand he successfully combats greed, he becomes an Anuttaravātśi Deva and knows that he is destined to become a Siddha after his next birth.

In the twelfth stage, Kshinamoha gunasthānaka, the ascetic not only eludes the grasp of greed, but also becomes free from the influence of all Ghātin karma or those which prove to be impediments in way of obtaining omniscience. And although the Aghātin karma still persists, it is too weak to bring the soul under its control. The soul at this stage passing through the remaining two stages enters at once into Moksha.

The thirteenth stage is known as Sayogi-kevali Gunnsthānaka. The man who reaches
this stage shines in 'eternal wisdom, and delight infinite.' This stage is often known as that of jiban mukta; for there is an entire destruction of the four kinds of ghatin karma. There is still the operation of the aghatint prakritis in virtue of which the soul remains yet locked up as it were within the mortal coil. The man having reached this stage, forms a Tirtha or 'Order' and subsequently becomes Tirthankara or Maker of the Order. These Tirthankaras explain the truth in the "divine unakshari" manner which is garbed in popular languages by advanced disciples. These unakshari thoughts or suggestions, whatever they might be, become translated into popular speech which afterwards are designated as the Agamas, the ordinary mode of conversation being altogether impossible for the Tirthankaras owing to the organic changes brought about by the severity of their own austerities. The truths thus communicated by such Tirthankaras are generally known as Revelations and the warantee of their truth rests on the fact that they come out from men who being free from the influence of moho-
nya karma have attained omniscience and stand on a far higher platform than we do. The latter portion of this stage is occupied with Sukla dhyāna or pure contemplation which reaches its culmination or highest perfection when the body disappears like burnt comphor as will be described in the next stage. It is the man at this stage that people worship; for in the next the person adored loses all earthly interest and shuffles off his mortal coil.

The next stage begins when all influence of karma energetics has either been successfully dissipated or entirely destroyed. The man at this stage attains moksha and is called Siddha or the Self-Realized. In such stage the Siddhas do not merge themselves in an all-embracing One, but remain in the Siddhayāla or the Region of the Liberated as freed souls, enjoying perfect freedom from every sort of bondage caused by karma particles. Siddhas, being omniscient and omnipotent, must have right vision and right knowledge revealing them spontaneously in their right conduct. Such Tirthas, breaking loose from the shackles of mortal coil and
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karma and being possessed of all those divine qualities which we cannot but revere and admire most, soar high up into a kind spiritual atmosphere where everyone shines forth as an embodiment of Faith, Truth and Culture.

It is not infrequently that we meet with a few criticisms hurled against Jainism by its detractors mainly resting on the erroneous belief that Jainism, instead of helping in the development of personality, furthers its stultification and that it is a mystery how the Siddhas, after becoming free from all bondage of karma, and becoming alike in nature, do not lose their individuality and merge in an all-inclusive One. It is further contended that while Jainism silently accepts the action and influence of Siddhas in an atmosphere wholly spiritual, it excludes that from our earthly or mortal life, precisely the sphere nearest to them. Are we then to find them in a sphere which lies beyond the region of our dream even and to miss them in our thought, our duty and our love?

The evident reply of Jainism would be: "Far from it." For, although the Siddhas
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live a transcendent life still we are in communion with them. It is not they indeed that under the mask of our personality, do our thinking and pray against our temptations and wipe our tears. These are truly our own. But still they are in presence of a sympathy free to answer, spirit to spirit; neither merging in the other, although both are in the same affections and inmost preferences. Did we remove this element of transcendency of Siddhas so as to render them absolutely universal, the effect would be the reverse of objector's expectations, and instead of gaining something more noble and divine for these Siddhas, we should in reality lose all. For all transcendency would then be gone and no range would be left for the life of these Divine Siddhas; they would be all in all. But the conception of personality requires that of a personal being, living with persons and acting on grounds of reason and righteousness. In proportion as a being mechanises himself and commits all his energy to immutable methods and degrees which is inevitable if he happens to be wholly untranscendental, he abdicates
his personal prerogative and permits his will to sleep off into a continuous automatism. Without freedom to act freshly from immediate thought and affection, that is without some place unspoken by habit, character and personality can have no place whatsoever. This fatal effect of annihilation of personality ceases the moment the universality is removed. Let there be some realm of divine action of the Siddhas, some transcendent form of life in which our spirit is not found, and after learning there the living thought and love of them, we can try our best to follow their footsteps. It does not kill out the characteristics of personal existence. On the other hand, it is but the mixture indispensable to intellectual and moral perfection and from their quickening touch and converse in the spiritual walks of our experience, we can look and see without dismay in the customary ways of righteous life only a message of hope, the steadfastness of a promise and moral Ideal and not the indifference to, or the iron grip of Fate.

As regards the second objection often hurled against Jainism as to why the
Siddhas would not lose there individuality in an all, embracing Self, the retort of Jainism would of course be that if the so called Infinite Self includes us all and all our experiences,—sensations and sins as well as the rest, in the unity of one life, and if there is but one and same final Self for us and each all, then with a literalness it, indeed appalling, He is we and we are He; nay He is I and I am He. Now if we read the conception in the first way what becomes of our ethical independance?—What, of our personal reality, our righteousness and ethical responsibility? What becomes of Him? Then surely He is but another name for me or you of any of the Siddhas. And how can there be a talk of a moral order, of a moral cosmos, since there is but a single mind in this case and we cannot legitimately call that a Person! When it is made to mean absolute identity, then all the worth of true nearness is gone and with it the openness of access, the freedom of converse and the joy of true reciprocity vanish altogether. These precious things all draw their meaning from the distinct reality of
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different persons; for life is eternal and is eternally germinating the supreme consciousness of the Ideal that seats the central reality of each human being in an eternal circle of Persons, and establishes each as a free citizen in the all-founding, all-illuminating realm of spirits. But when we turn that mood into literal philosophy and cause our centre of selfhood to vanish in an all-embracing One or One's to vanish into ours, we lose the tone of religion that is true and wholesome; for true religion is built only on firm foundation of duty and responsibility, on ethical rights and righteousness; and these, again rest on the footing of freedom and Personality. A religion based on such firm foundation is truly a genuine and inspiring religion—the religion not of submission but of aspiration, not of bondage but of freedom, not of Fate but rather of Faith and Hope and Insight.
CHAPTER XXXVII.

JAIN CHURCH.

The Cycles of Abasarpini and Utsarpini—The Yugalikas and the Kalpa Tree—We get glimpses of the lives of the First Twenty two Tirthankars—Regular Historical Accounts begin with Parshvanath, the Twenty third Tirthankar and Mahavir the Twenty fourth—Rapture and Split—the Principal Subdivisions of the Swetambari and the Digambari—The List of Gacchas.

We have already seen how the Jains establish the eternal existence of the universe as a single unit and of the two great ever-recurring cycles of ages, Abasarpini and Utsarpini. The Jains believe that in each of these, there flourish twenty-four Tirthankars. During the present period of Abasarpini, Rishav Dev or Adinath as he is also called, was the first Tirthankar and the last one was Mahavira or Vardhman. It was Rishavdev, who first taught the people, men and women, the different arts and industries. But previous to his era was the period of Yugaliks, when, as the Jain tradition goes, human beings were born in pairs; they lived as husbands and wives.
and all their necessaries were supplied by Kalpa trees. The idea of Yugaliks is, peculiar to the Jains, as we have not come across any description of Yugaliks in any other work of other religionists. Gradually with the degenerating tendency of of the time, the Kalpa trees failed in yielding up the desires of mankind and the world became full of miseries so much so, that to alleviate this, Adinath introduced reforms in everything, spiritual or worldly. After his nirvan, twentyone Tirthankars followed before Parshwanath, the twenty-third, during which period many saints and heroes flourished. Detailed accounts of these heroes are lost to us. But we come across only with some important events of their lives and of the times abounding with legends and myths. They were all great personages and yet for the above reasons, their accounts throw in little light from the historic point of view.

Parshwanath was born in 877 B. C. and reached moksha in the hundredth year of his age in 777 B. C. There is a chronological list showing heads of the Church, known as
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Upakesh Gachha (see Appendix E) running down up to the present day. His first ganadhar or chief disciple was Shubha Datt, who was succeeded by Hari Datt. Then came Arya Samudra and his disciple Prava Suri. Next Keshi Kumar succeeded to the headship of the Church. Acharya Keshi Kumar was a contemporary of Mahavira. Both Keshi, the spiritual head of the Church and Gautam the chief disciple of Mahavira had interviews on spiritual reforms.

Lord Mahavira attained nirvan in 527 B.C. His prominent disciples or ganadhars were eleven viz:

1. Indrabhuti, better known as Gautam from his gotra.
2. Agnibhuti; belonging to Gautam gotra.
3. Vayubhuti, belonging to Gautam gotra.
4. Vyakta, belonging to Bhardwaja gotra.
5. Sudharma, belonging to Agniveshyan gotra.
6. Mandit, belonging to Vasista gotra.
7. Mouryaputra, belonging to Kashyap gotra.
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8. Akampit, belonging to Gautam gotra.
10. Metarya, belonging to Kodinna gotra.
11. Prabhās, also belonging to Kodinna gotra.

Except the first and the fifth, all the nine ganadhars got moksha during the life-time of their master.

In those remote ages in India, there were small kingdoms each with its own king, who from time to time was forced to acknowledge the supremacy of another or who used to throw off the allegiance according to his own convenience or power. In Jain texts we find the names of the following contemporary kings of such kingdoms during Mahavir's time. And it is important to note that all these kings were admirers of the last Tirthankar and appreciated the reforms he introduced in the Sangha and many of them were actually his followers.

1. Srenika was king of Magadha at Rajgriha.
2. Dadhibahan was king of Anga at
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Champa where Srenik’s son Konik or Asokchandra removed his capital after his father’s death.

3. Chetak was king at Vaisali near modern Bihar.

4. Malliks were reigning at Baranasi (Kashi)

5. Lachhiks or the Lachhavis were kings of Koshala (Ajodhya).

6. King Bijoya was reigning at Palashpur.

7. Sweta was king at Amalkalpa.

8. Udayan was reigning at Vitabhaya Pattan.

9. Shantanik and then his son Udayan Vatsa, a lover of music were kings of Vatsya at Kosambi near modern Allahabad.

10. King Nandivardhan was reigning at Kshatriyakund.

11. Chanda Pradyotan was king of Malwa at Ujjain.

12. Sal and Mahasal were reigning at Pristachampa.

13. Prasanna Chandra was king at Pottanpur.
14. Adinshatru was reigning at Hastishirsha.
15. Dhanabaha was reigning at Rishavpur.
16. Birkrishna Mitra was king at Birpur.
17. Vāsab Dutt was king at Bijoypur.
18. Priya Chandra was reigning at Kanakpur.
19. Mitranandi was king at Sāketpur.
20. King Apratihat was reigning at Saugandhik.
21. Arjun was king at Sughosh.
22. King Bala was reigning at Mohapur.
23. King Dasarna was reigning at Dasarnapur.

Now a rupture took place in the Jain Church about the year 300 B.C. and the final separation came about in the year 82 A.D. as stated in the Introduction. This is the beginning of the bifurcation and origin of the two great sects, the Swetambaris and the Digambaris, each of which is again subdivided into different minor sects according to the difference in acknowledging or interpreting the religious texts. These
minor sects gradually sprang up for the most part on account of different interpretations the pontiffs put on the canonical texts from time to time.

The principal divisions of the Swetambari sect are:

(a) Pujera.
(b) Dundhia or Bistola,
(c) Terapanthi.

The original stock is now known as Pujera, as its followers are thorough worshippers. The Dundhias had their origin about the year 1585 A.D. and although they recognise the images of Tirthankars, they do not indulge in worship with formal rites and formulas. The Terapanthis flourished only lately in the year 1762 A.D., or thereabout and they do not believe in images or allow its worship in any form whatever.

The Digambaris are also subdivided into several sects. The important ones are:

(a) Bispanthi, who allows worship to a certain extent.
(b) Terapanthi, who had their origin about the 17th century A.D., acknowledges
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images, but does not allow any sort of worship of the same.

(c) Samaiyapanthi, a non-idolatrous sect, entirely does away with the image or its worship, but simply acknowledges the sanctity of the sacred books which are worshipped by placing them on an altar. It is also known as Taranpanthi as it was founded by Taranswami. He was born in 1448 A. D. and died in 1515 A. D.

(d) Gumanpanthi, flourished of late in the 18th century A. D., and so called from the name of its founder Guman Ram.

(e) Totapanthi.

In the Digambari Church there also arose a number of Sanghas viz:

(1) Mul Sangha with its subsects viz.
   (a) Sinha Sangha
   (b) Nandi Sangha
   (c) Sen Sangha.

(2) Dravid Sangha
(3) Yapaniya Sangha
(4) Kastha Sangha
(5) Mathur Sangha

In the Sanghas there are Ganas and Gakhkas e.g. the Nandi Sangha has——
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Balâthkar gana, Sarasvatigachha, & Parijat gachha.

We find several lists of the teachers of these various saṅghas, ganas, and gachhas in the pattavali and inscriptions that have come to light up till now. (See Appendix) Of their Acharyas Kund-kundâ-chârya, the author of Panchastikâya and other works who flourished just before the Christian era (8 B. C.) and Umaswati, author of the famous treatise Tatwârthasutra and other Sanskrit works who flourished about the middle of the 1st century A. D., deserve special mention. Others as Amitgati, author of Dharmapariksha, Subhâsitratna Sandoha (about 993 A. D.) Akalanka Dev, Dhananjoy, the author of the well known epic Dwisandhan (827 A. D.) Harichandra, author of Dharmasharmabhudaya, Devnandi Virnandi, author of Chandraprabha Charitam, Bâdiraj, Some Dev, author of Yasastilak, were all great scholars and authors of works of high repute.

After Mahavir's nirvan a number of Gachhas (schools) also came to being in the Śvetambar Church. They originated
from the different Jain teachers, who assumed themselves as heads of their own gachhas, alleging differences in religious practices and holding different interpretations of the texts of the Sutras. These Sutras of the Jain Siddhanta of the Swetambaris were handed down orally till they were reduced to writing about 980 years after Mahavir's nirvan (453 A.D.) by Devardhigani Kshamashraman who was a pupil of Lohita Suri, in the city of Vallabhi in Gujrat, before a great Council which met for the purpose. The Swetambar Church have got lists of their gachhas and their members and these throw much light on the dark pages of Indian History. The mention of Jain hierarchs, teachers and their schools in the inscription discovered at Mathura and other places of late, is of great importance to verify the statements in Kalpa Sutra and other Jain texts of such gana or gachha (the school) the Kula (the line) and Shakha (the branch) of the main Jain Church. Its literature has preserved the list of Suris or hierarchs, noting down the important events during their time. Therein we find
that after Udyotan Suri, his eighty-four disciples started 84 gachhas (937 A. D.) as all of them were created Acharyas by him. Although many of them are extinct now, yet they are of great value and the Swetambar literature possesses complete lists of the heads of the gachhas from this Acharya.

We give below, in brief, an account of the heads of the Church from Mahavir, the last Tirthankar up to Acharya Udyotan, as far as could be gathered from the matter available to us. Further. Chronological lists are given in the Appendix and they may be useful for reference.

1. Mahavira. He belonged to Ikshwaku Kula, Kasyap gotra, was the son of King Siddhārtha of Kshatri-kund, a town in Magadh and queen Trisalā. Born in 599 B.C. on Chaitra Sukla 13. He passed 30 years as a householder, 12 years 6 months and 1 fortnight in Chhudamast State—(Intermediate state between a householder and a perfect sage) and 29 years 5 months and 15 days as a Kevali, till he attained nirvāṇa at the age of 72 in the town of Pāpā about 8 miles from modern Bihar.
on Kartic Badi 15 in 527 B.C. He had 24000 sadhus (male disciples), 36000 Sadhwis (female disciples), 1,59000 Sravaks (male followers) and 3,18000 Sravikās (female followers).

His principal disciple was Indrabhuti better known as Gautam from his gotra. He was a Brahmin by caste, son of Vasubhuti and Prithivi and was born in 607 B.C. in the village Gobbar (Gobbra or Govaraya) near Rajgriha. He was for 50 years a householder, for 30 years a Chhadamast and 12 years as Kevali and reached nirvan at the age of 92 in 515 B.C.

After Mahavira's nirvan, Sudharmā, the fifth ganadhar succeeded to the headship of the Church as Gautam, the first ganadhar became a Kevali, immediately after his Lord's moksha and Sudharmā was the only available ganadhar. Moreover the Sadhus converted by Gautam died early and other ganadharṣ yielded up their pupils to Sudharmā. The headship therefore fell upon him.

2. Sudharmā. He was born in 607 B.C. the year in which Gautam was born. He
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was the son of Dhammilla and Bhaddala of Kollág village and belonged to Agni Vesayan gotra. He lived 50 years as a householder, 42 years in Chhadamast state and 8 years as a Kevali and reached moksha in his 100th year 20 years after Mahavir's nirvan in 507 B.C.

3. Jambu. He succeeded to the headship when Sudharma became a Kevali in 515 B.C. He was a native of Rajgriha, son of a banker Rishav Dutt and Dhärini of Kāsyap gotra. He entered the order at the age of 16, passed 20 years in Chhadamast state and 44 years as a Kevali. He was the last of the Kevalins, and got nirvan at the age of 80 in 463 B.C., 64 years after Mahavira.

4. Prabhava. After Jambu, he assumed the headship. He was of Kātyāun gotra, son of king Jaisena of Jaipur near Vindhya Hills, remained 30 years as a householder, 64 (according to some 44) years in Sāmanya brata and 11 years as head of the church and died at the advanced age of 105 (according to some 85) in 452 B.C., i.e. 75 years after Mahavira.

5. Sajjambhava. He was a native of
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Rajgriha and was next appointed as the head of the church. He was of Batsya gotra and was converted by the appearance of an image of Tirthankar Shânthinâth, when celebrating a sacrifice as a Brahmin. He left home at the age of 28, passed 11 years in Sâmânya Vrata and 23 years as head of the church up to 429 B.C. He died 98 years after Mahavira at the age of 62. He was the author of the famous "Dasavaikâlika Sutra" which he composed for his son Manak.

6. Yasobhadra. He succeeded Sajjam-bhava and remained 50 years as head of the church up to 379 B.C. He belonged to Tungiyan gotra, left home at the age of 22 and passed 14 years in Sâmanya vrata and died at the age of 86 i.e. 148 years after Mahavir's nirvan.

7. Sambhuti Vijay. He was the next spiritual head and remained as such for 8 years up to 371 B.C. He was of Mathar gotra and was a householder up to the age of 42. He passed 40 years in Sâmanya vrata and died at the age of 90 i.e. 156 years after Mahavira.

8. Bhadrabahu. He succeeded Sambhuti Vijay although he was not his dis-
ciple, but a brother disciple. He represented the church for 14 years up to 357 B.C. He sprang from Prāchin gotra, an inhabitant of Pratisthanpur in the South. He was initiated at the age of 45 and remained 17 years in Sāmanya vrata before he became the head. He died at the age of 76 or about 170 years after Mahavira. He was a great scholar and commentator. His nirvuykts on Jain Siddhant are handed down to us, as living examples of his vast learning and knowledge of our Shastras. His brother according to Jain tradition was Barâhamihir, the well-known astronomer.

9. Sthulabhadra. He was a native of Pātaliputra and belonged to Gautama gotra. His parents were Sakādala and Lachhal Devi, the former was a minister of the 9th Nanda King. He lived 30 years in home, and passed 20 years in Sāmanya vrata and 49 years as head of the church up to 308 B.C. He converted several Maurya kings to Jainism and was a great scholar of the time. He breathed his last 219 years (according to some 215 years) after Mahavira in his 99th year.
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10. Arya Mahâgiri. He was of Elâpatya gotra, entered the order at the age of 30, passed 40 years in Sâmanyâ vrata and was the head of the church for 30 years up to 278 B.C. He died at the age of 100, that is 249 years after Mahavira. He had two pupils named Behula and Balissaha, the latter's pupil was the famous Umaswati Vâchaka, author of Tattwartha Sutra and other works and his pupil was Shyâmâcharya, the author of Pannavanâ Sutra.

11. Arya Suhasti. Like Bhadrabâhu, he was a brother-disciple of Mahâgiri and belonged to Vâsistha Gotra. He was a householder for 30 years and the head of the church for 46 years (16 years after Mahâgiri) up to 262 B.C. He died 265 years (according to some 291 years) after Mahavira, at the age of 100. He converted king Samprati, grandson of the great Asoka, to Jainism, who erected many temples and dedicated vast number of images throughout the length and breadth of his empire. He tried to spread Jainism even in foreign lands. He was the 17th successor of king Srenika and his reign
began from 229 B.C. Suhasti had 2 pupils, Susthita and Supratibaddha.

12. Arya Susthita. After Suhasti, Susthita succeeded as the head of the church and remained as such for 48 years up to 214 B.C. He was of Vyāgrhāpatya gotra and a resident of Kākandi. He lived 31 years as a householder before entering the order and remained 17 years in Sāmanya vrata and died at the age of 96 about 316 years after Mahavira. Previous to his period the Jain Church was known by the name of Nigrantha Gachha, but from him the name was changed to Kotika Gachha from 235 B.C. The tradition is that the origin of the name was due to his counting Surimantra for crores (koti) of times.

13. Indradinna. He belonged to Koushika gotra. We do not find accounts of both this Acharyya and his successor Dinna Suri except that they were heads of the Jain Church and that the former breathed his last 441 years after Mahavira in 86 B.C. We have seen that Arya-Susthita Suri breathed his last in 214 B.C., or according to some in 188 B.C. It may therefore be
said that there must have existed other Suris or heads of the church between Arya-Susthita (No. 12) and Arya Sinhagiri (No. 15) besides Indradinna and Dinna (Nos. 13 and 14). But unfortunately the Pattavalis, we have come across, are as well silent on the point except that during Indradinna's time the famous Kālikāchārya flourished.

14. Dinna. He belonged to Gautam gotra. His two disciples were Sānti Sen and Sinhagiri.

15. Sinhagiri. He was of Kousik gotra and assumed the headship after Dinna. During his time the great Acharya named Padalipatacharya better known as Bridhabadi Suri, flourished and his well-known pupil Siddha Sena, Divakar (Kumudchandra) a contemporary of king Vikramaditya identified by some with Kshapanaka composed the famous stotra known as Kalyanmandir. According to Jain tradition king Vikramaditya ascended the throne 470 years after Mahavira in 57 B.C. and was a believer in Jainism. Sinhagiri Suri died in 20 A.D. 547 years after Mahavira.
16. Vajra. He succeeded Sinhagiriin A.D. 21 and belonged to Gautama gotra. His parents were Dhanagiri and Sunanda who lived at Tumbaban. He was born in B.C. 31, i.e. 496 years after Mahavira and lived 8 years only as householder. He passed 44 years in Samanya vrata and remained as head of the church for 36 years up to his death at the age of 88 in 57 A.D. that is up to 584 years after Mahavir's nirvāṇa. He was the last to know the complete ten Purvas and from him arose the Vajra Shakha of the Jain Church. He is known to have converted a large number of Buddhists to Jainism.

17. Vajra Sen. He was of Utkoshik gotra and was during his time, head of his Church up to A.D. 93. The well-known separation of the Church into Swetambaris and Digambaris took place in A.D. 82 Arya Rakshit Suri was his contemporary. He lived 9 years as householder, 86 years in Samanya vrata and 36 years as the head of the church. He died at the age of 128 in the 620th year after Mahavira's nirvāṇa. He converted four brothers Nagendra, Chandra,
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Nirvitti and Vidyâdhar who after hard study became great scholars and were created Acharyas. They founded the 4 Kulas after their own names.

18. Chandra. He succeeded Vajra Sen and remained as the head of the church for 7 years, up to A. D 100. He passed his life as householder for 37 years and was 23 years in Samanya Vrata and died at the age of 67 that is, 627 years after Mahavir's nirvan. With him originated the appellation Chandra Kula.

19. Samanta bhadra. He succeeded Chandra Suri as head of the church, but there is no mention of the period of his headship. He was also known as Banbasi.

20. Deva. He is also known as Briddha Deva Suri. He is said to have attended the installation ceremony of a temple dedicated to Mahavira Swami at Satyapur (Sanchole) 670 years after Mahavir, in A. D. 143.

21. Pradyotana. He attended the installation ceremony of Adinath's temple at Ajmer.

22. Manadeva. He composed the
Jain Church.

Shanti Stotra which is still much esteemed by the Jains.

23. Māntunga—author of the popular Vaktamar Stotra and other works and was contemporary of the well-known king Bhoja. He flourished about 700 years after Mahavira.

24. Vira. He performed the consecration ceremony at Nagpur of Nemi Nath temple in 253 A. D. 770 years after Mahavira.


26. Devananda. At Devki Pattan, a city in the west, he performed the consecration ceremony of Parshwanath Temple.

27. Vikrama.


29. Samudra. During his time the famous Hari Bhadra Suri one of the greatest Jain Logicians flourished in 493 A. D.

30. Manadeva. During his time 1055 years after Mahavira in 528 A. D. Hari Bhadra Suri, the great author, breathed his last. According to some he died in 538 A. D. (S. 585.)

31. Bibudhaprava.
32. Jagananda.

33. Rabiprava. He attended the installation ceremony of a temple of Nami Nath at Nadulpur in A. D. 643.

34. Yasobhadra, also known as Yasodeva. During his time Anhilpurpatan was founded by Vanraja in 745 A. D (S. 802) about 1272 years after Mahavira.

35. Pradyumna. We do not find the name of this Acharya (35) and his successor Manadeva (36) in many of the lists, but they mention Vimalchandra (37) as succeeding to Yasobhadra (34).

36. Manadeva.

37. Vimalchandra.

38. Udyotana Suri. It was after him that the 84 gachhas had originated from his 84 pupils, each of whom was made a head of the Sadhus under him. This took place in Vikram Samvat 994 or about 1464 years after Mahavira (937 A. D.) at a place named Teli near Mount Abu. He died on his way to a pilgrimage to Mount Shatrunjaya and according to some, at a town named Dhaval near Med Pat (Merta in Marwar). He placed Sarbadeva Suri with 8 other
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Acharyas as the head of his line which is also known as "Barh Gachha" from the time, till it was changed to "Khartara gachha" from Jineswar Suri.

The following is a list of the names of the Gachhas commonly found and most of them have become now extinct.

Agama. Chitourha.
Anchal. Chitravala.
Anpuri. Dashiya.
Bagherwal. Dekacharha.
Baheerha. Dhandhusha.
Bapana. Dharmaghosha.
Barhagachha. Dobandanik.
Barodia. Dokarha.
Belia. Gachhapala.
Bharuachha. Gandhara.
Bhatnera. Gangesara.
Bhavaharsha. Ghanghodhara.
Bhawadara. Ghoghara.
Bhawara. Ghoshwala.
Bhimnala. Gubela.
Bhimnala. Guptaura.
Bhidhara. Hansaraka.
Bidyadhara. Jalori.
Bijaya. Jangarha.
Birejival. Jawaharha.
Bonesingha. Jheranta.
Brahmana. Jirawala.
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Chhapara.
Kachhela.
Kamalkalasha.
Kamboja.
Kandobia.
Kapur singha.
Kattakpur.
Kawal.
Kambhayata.
Kharatara.
Korantwala.
Koshipura.
Krishnarshi.
Kuchora.
Kutubpura.
Lumpaka.
Madhukara.
Mandalia.
Mandharana.
Mandowara.
Manghorha.
Maladhara.
Masena.
Mathura.
Muhasorarha.
Murandawala.
Nadola.
Nagadraha.
Nagarkota.
Nagarwala.
Nagendra.
Nagori.
Nagpura.
Nanawala.
Narhiya.
Jithara.
Negama.
Palanpur.
Pallikiya.
Palli wala.
Panchabahali.
Parshwachandra.
Pippal.
Purnatala.
Puruima.
Ramsena.
Rangvijaya.
Revati.
Rudrapalli.
Sagara.
Sanchora.
Sanderaka.
Sanjata.
Saraswati.
Sarawala.
Sardhapunamiya
Sewantara.
Siddhanta.
Siddhapura.
Soratha.
Surana.
Tanawala.
Tapa.
Thambhana.
Trengdia.
Tribhavia.
Upakesha.
Ustawala.
Utabiya.
CHAPTER XXXVIII.

JAIN FESTIVALS.

Of the Festivals, Pajjusan is the Greatest—Chaturmasya—The Dewali—Jnana Panchami—Merh Terash Moune Ekadashi—Pous Dasami—Chaitra Purnima—Akshaya Tritiya—Ashara Sukla Chaturdashi.

Like other communities of India, the Jains have got a number of festivals during the year. These are especially connected with the anniversaries of the births and deaths of the Tirthankars. And the greatest festival of the Jains, is Pajjusan in the month of Bhādra (August—September). Chaturmasya commences from the 15th Sukla Paksha or full moon of Asārh ending on the 15th Sukla Paksha of Kārtik and this festival is celebrated during this period from Bhādra Krishna Trayodashi lasting for 8 days till Bhādra Sukla Pauchami. Among some Guchhas of the Swetambar, Pajjusan begins from Bhādra Krishna Dwādāshi, ending with Bhādra Sukla Chaturthi.

Among the Digambaris, the festival is known as "Daslakshini" which begins on
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this latter date lasting for 70 days till the 14th Sukla Paksha of Kkrtek. The day of Bhadra Sakla Panchami is also known among the Hindus as "Rishi Panchami". Literally Pajjusan means Pari samastayena usand sevand i. e. serving with a whole-hearted devotion. This is the religious session during the rains. Formerly it was restricted to the Jain sages only; but now all of the Sangha, whether a Sadhu or a Sarvak, male or female, take part in it and thus it has become almost common with the Jains.

Among the Swetambaris, during this festival covering the periods of 8 days, the only festival in the rainy season, Kalpa Sutra is read and explained before the assembly—a group of lay devotees by yatis and ascetics. Lectures on its commentaries are delivered for the first seven days and on the last day, fasting is observed and the text of the Sutra is read out to the whole assembly of men and women who hear the same with great attention, respect and veneration. It will not be out of place here to speak a few words about the work. This Sutra principally deals with three subjects
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viz. lives of the Tirthankars, list of sages, and rules and regulations be to followed by the Jain monks. Life of the last Tirthankar Mahavira is elaborately dwelt with, while the lives of the 23rd, 22nd and first are summarily given with few touches of embellishment here and there from historical point of view and the list of the Jaina Church from the last Tirthankar.

During this festival, the annual or the great Pratikraman or confession called Sambatsari Pratikraman is performed, in order to remove all ill-feelings over all living beings and to ask pardon from all living beings for any act done knowingly or unknowingly in the course of their mutual exchange during the whole year. This is considered to be an act of great merit and as imperative on all the Jains.

Another meritorious and important religious ceremony known as Siddha Chakra worship is celebrated twice a year in the months of Aswin and Chaitra, each lasting for 9 days and called Oliji from the 7th to the 15th of the full moon. On a chauki or small table of wood or stone or on a plate of
Chaitra Purnima. The *Chaturmāsya* ends with this day, and the Jains generally visit Shatrunjaya Hills in Kathiawad to worship the deity on that day.

Another religious day of the Jains is Merh Terash on Margasirsa (Agrahayan) Badi 13 or 13th day of the dark moon of the month of Agrahayan. This is the day of Nirvan of Rishavdev, the first of the Tirthankars of the present age *Avasarpini*.

The *Mouna Ekdāsī* is celebrated on the Margasirsha Sukla 11th. This day is generally spent in fasting with a vow of silence for the whole day. They also observe *posadh* or sitting in one place for 12 or 24 hours. The day is connected with the 18th, 19th and 21st Tirthankaras.

*Pous Badi 10* is another day of celebration in connection with Parswanath, the 23rd Tirthankar as his birthday anniversary. People generally visit Pareshnath Hills on that day.

*Chaitra Purnima* is also celebrated with great *eclat* on the mount Shatrunjaya as a very auspicious day when a large
number of the Jains flock to the place to worship Adinath, the presiding God.

_Akshaya Tritiya or Baisakh Sudi_ 3 is also observed in connection with the 1st Tirthankar Adinath.

_Asharh Sukla Chaturdasi_ is considered as a day of religious merit. _Chaturmasya_ commences from this day and it is generally observed with fasting by the Jains. _Chaturmasya_ ends on the Kartick Sukla Chaturdashi after four months, as already noted.
CHAPTER XXXIX.

JAIN PLACES OF PILGRIMAGE.

Kalyanakbhumi or Places of Pilgrimage—
Shatrunjaya Hills—Pawapuri—Pareshnath Hills—
Mount Abu—Girnar Hills—Rajgir.—Beneras,—
Ayodhya,—Champapur &c.

The reader is already aware that the Jains acknowledge the Twenty-four Tirthankars, who flourished during this era in Bharat Khanda (India). Of the various events connected with the lives and careers of these Tirthankars, the Jains attach a great religious importance specially to five things which they designate by the phrase, Kalyaṅk Bhumi, and they are:

(i) the last place previous to his being conceived in the womb (chyawan)

(ii) the place of his birth (Janma)

(iii) the place where he first renounced the saṃsār and initiated into a religious life (dikṣaḥ)

(iv) the place where he first became a kevalin or achieved omniscience (Keval Jñyān)

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(v) the place where he realized emancipation (*Nirvāṇa*)

Each of these places being thus associated with the life of a Tirthankar, has not only become a place historically important but has been as well a place of pilgrimage sacred to the Jains in general, whether a Swetambari or a Digambari. From remote periods, the Jains built temples at these places which stand even to this day as monumental works of the Jain arts and architecture. These inspire the people with such spirit of awe and veneration that they worship the images installed or foot-prints inscribed therein. Besides these, there are also a good number of big temples erected at different times at enormous costs and they are also held in great esteem. The reader will find translations of some Persian Firms in the Appendix from which it would be clear that the Swetambar Jains were a powerful community. During the Mahomedan period too exercised persuasive influence over the reigning sovereigns from whom they were able to obtain grants of places of pilgrimage throughout the length and breath of India.
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THE SHATRUNJAYA HILLS.

Shatrunjaya or Siddhagiri (lit. hill of the perfected) also known as Siddhachal, is a celebrated place of pilgrimage at Palitana in Kathiawad (Bombay Presidency). A full description of this sacred place is to be found in "The Temples of Shatrunjaya" by J. Burgess and the following lines from it would be an interesting reading.

"It is truly a wonderful, a unique place, a city of temples for except a few tanks, there is nothing else within the gates. Through court beyond court, the visitor proceeds over smooth pavements of grey chunam, visiting temple after temple most of these built of stone quarried near Gopenath, but a few marble:—all elaborately sculptured and some of striking proportions and as he passes along, the glassy-eyed images of pure white marble, seem to peer out at him from hundreds of cloister cell; such a place is surely without a match in the world; and there is a cleanliness withal, about every square and passage, porch and hall, that is itself no mean source of pleasure."
JAIN PLACES OF PILGRIMAGE.

Visitors will find very picturesque scenery of large groups of the Jain temples on different Tonks or summits of the hill. The most important of these are (1) Tonk of Adishwar Bhagwan. It is Adishwar or Rishavdeva's image consecrated by his son Bāhubal that imparts its peculiar sanctity to Shatrunjaya. Although the old image is replaced, yet it is regarded as the greatest of the Tirthas by the Swetambaris as the whole hill is considered very sacred, it being the place where a large number of saints entered on Nirvan.

(2) Khartar vasi Tonk.
(3) Chhipa vasi Tonk.
(4) Bimal vasi Tonk.
(5) Choumukhji Tonk.

All of these have temples, large or small, built by the Jains of different ages and climes.

We refer to the learned article by Dr. Buhler, 'The Jain inscriptions from Shatrunjaya', published in Epigraphia Indica Vol: II p. 34-36 where a number of important inscriptions have been translated with the text and other useful historical
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Informations gathered thereof as to (1) the political history of Western India, (2) the different Schools of Jain monks, and (3) the social classification of the Jain laymen.

Pawapuri.

This is a holy place in the Sub-division of Bihar in the district of Patna about 7 miles South of Bihar. It was here that the last Tirthankar Mahavir attained nirvana. There is a tank in the place, in the midst of which stands the temple known as Jalmandir. The foot-prints of Mahavira Swami are inscribed there. It was the place of his cremation. Tradition says that countless people came to attend the funeral ceremony and the mere act of taking a pinch of ashes, from the place where the sage was cremated, created such a great hollow all round the spot, that afterwards it being filled with water, became transformed into the present tank, which is about a mile in circumference. There is also a stone bridge about 600 feet in length across the tank from the bank to the temple. The scenery around is really charming. Visitors and pilgrims who
Jalmandir at Pāwā-Puri (Behar).
from time to time go there, and at proper season of the year, the lake decked with lotuses and the picturesque temple standing in the middle with its dazzling whiteness and the hills of Rajgir at a distance as a suitable back-ground with tall Tai trees scattered here and there all over the country. There is another ancient temple known as Gaon Mandir.

It has now been ascertained from the inscription (Prashasti) that the old temple was repaired during the reign of Emperor Shah Jahan in 1641 A.D. There is another temple known as Samosaran. This word 'Samosaran' is not a corruption of 'Sravansala' as suggested by Sir A. Cunningham in his Reports Vol. XI. p. 171; but it is a noun from the verb 'Samavasarati' 'to present one's-self'. The tradition is that the place where a Tirthankar presents himself to preach his sermons, people sit in concentric circles around. It is also said that this whole arrangement is made by gods who also used to attend His lectures.
THE PARESNATH HILLS.

The Sammet Sikhar or better known as the Paresnath Hills is another important place of pilgrimage of the Jains in India. The mountain is situated in the District of Hazaribagh in Bengal or more properly now in Bihar and Orissa Presidency and is the highest one in this part of the country. Twenty Tirthankars out of twenty-four attained nirvana on the different summits of this mountain and there are as many temples built on these holy places to commemorate their memories.

The scenery of this range of hills, is very beautiful and the distance is about 12 miles from the Railway Station to the foot of the Hills known as Madhuban. There are also temples here built by both the Swetambaris and Digambaris. The whole region is shrouded with thick forest and the ascent to some of the summits is very steep. One has to travel 20 miles or thereabout to take a round to these summits from Madhuban. Streams and rivulets lie across the way through the valleys between these summits. There are only foot-prints
Ceiling Work in Dilwara Temples (Mt. Abu).
of the different Tirthankars in these temples on the hills except the one dedicated to Parshwanath, where there is installed the stone image of this 23rd Tirthankar.

MOUNT ABU.

Next we may mention the celebrated Jain Temples at Dilwara on Mount Abu in Rajputana. Col. Todd says:—"Beyond controversy this is the most superb of all the temples in India and there is not an edifice beside the Taj Mahal, that can approach it." These are built of white marble at an enormous cost by rich Jain merchants and are very widely known for delicacy of carving, beauty of details and magnificent ornamentation. The illustration is a portion of a ceiling and the reader can easily form an idea of its grandeur, which stands unrivalled as a piece of architecture. There are four temples, the principal one being dedicated to Rishavdeva, the first Tirthankar. Vimal Shah a merchant and banker of Guzrat purchased only the site from the king by covering the ground with silver coins and paying the same
as its price. It took 14 years to build and is said to have cost 18 crores of rupees besides 59 lacs in levelling the hill. There is an equestrian statue of the founder, Vardhman Suri, the head of the Swetambar Church presided at the dedication ceremony by Vimal Shah on Mount Abu in 1031 A. D. The second temple is dedicated to Neminath the 22nd Tirthankar.

Vastupal and Tejpal brother ministers of king Viradhavala of Guzrat erected the temple in 1231 A. D. in the front wall of which there are two niches ornamented with elegant and exquisite designs unequalled in India.

On another summit, a few miles above Dilwara, at Achalgarh there is a temple containing big metal images. All these temples and images have got inscriptions of great historic value and dates between 13th to 16th century A. D.

GIRNAR HILLS.

It is the place of nirvan of our 22nd Tirthankar Neminath. It is in Sourastra, modern Kathiawad in the Bombay Presidency. The hill consists of several peaks...
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on which stand numerous Jain temples. The grandeur of the scenery round about, is simply charming as will be seen from the half-tone plate of one of the peaks given herein. The famous rock inscriptions of Asoka, lie at the foot of the hill. There are other important Jain inscriptions at the place. The Hindus also visit the hill as being sacred to the memory of the anchorite Dattâtreya, the incarnation of Shiva.

RAJGIR.

Rajgir or Rajagriha is another place of pilgrimage of the Jains. It is one of the most ancient cities of India and was capital of Magadh. The kings of Magadh continued to have their seat of Government here for a long time and it played an important part during the time of Buddha. King Jarasandh, a contemporary of Krishna also flourished here. Our last Tirthântkar had also long association with this city as he passed the greatest number of Chaturmasya (14) after he became an ascetic. King Prasenjit, and his son Shrenik
who was contemporary of Mahavir, were its kings. It was his son Konik who removed the capital from Rajgir to Champa.

Dhanna, Shalibhadra, Acharya Jambu-Swami were its inhabitants. The place is sacred to the Hindus, the Mahomedans, the Buddhists and the Jains alike. There are several hot springs held sacred to the followers of Vedas known as Brahma kund, Surya kund and others, and a fair, melu is held covering the period of one month about these springs, every third year when flocks of pilgrims crowd the place. The spring water is excellent and has got mineral properties. Some Mahomedan saints breathed their last in the place. There are shown a number of caves and other favourite places of Buddha. The Jains hold it sacred and as a place of pilgrimage on account of the Jana, Diksha and Keval Jnan of the 20th Tirthankar Muni Suvarat, a contemporary of the King Ram Chandra, an incarnation of Vishnu of the Hindus.

The five hills are known as:—(1) Vipulgiri (2) Ratnagiri (3) Udaigiri (4) Swarnagiri
and (5) Vaibhargiri. On every one of these there are Jain Swetambar temples.

Benares, Ajodhya, Champapur (Bhagalpur) are also regarded as holy places to the Jains as being *Kalyanak bhumis* of different Tirthankars and contain temples and Dharamsalas.
CHAPTER XL.

JAIN LITERATURE.

Jain Literature forms one of the oldest literary records in the world—The Purvas—The Angas—The Purvas have been lost—we find mention of their names only—Siddhantas and their origin—The Jain Scholiasts, Commentators and Authors.

The Jain Literature is one of the oldest literature of India. According to the Jains the last Prophet Mahavira Swami taught the "Purvas" to his disciples who afterwards composed, the Angas, The "Purvas" literally means "Earlier" and they were so called because they existed prior to the composition of 'Angas.' They were also known as Drishtibad. The date of the original composition of these Angas which are in popular dialects, has been placed towards the end of the 4th and the beginning of the 3rd century B.C., by the Western Scholars. But it is not proved that these Angas did not exist previous to this date. We only find mention made of the fact that the earliest collection of these sacred texts or the Agams took place at Pataliputra and belonged to
the Swetambari sect who are still in possession the oldest of the Jain literature. This collection consisted of fourteen Purvas and eleven Angas, and though the text, of these Purvas have been entirely lost but their names and conspectus have been handed down to us, as in the following:


Gradually the Jain canons fell into disorder as they were not then systematically reduced to writing. In order to save them from becoming extinct altogether, another Council was held in Vallabhi (Guzrat) under the presidency of Devardhi-gani Kshama-shraman, when it was decided to collect all the existing texts and to preserve the same in writing. This great personage, not only collected the vast sacred literature, then available, but revised and arranged the whole of them, writing them down from memory. This redaction took place about the year
466 A. D. This collection is the origin of the present Jain canons. Another redaction was made by Skandilacharya at Mathura, which is known as “Mathuri Vāchana” or Mathura reading.

About these sacred books of the Jains Dr. Jacobi says “Regarding their antiquity many of these books can vie. with the oldest books of the Northern Buddhists”. These sacred texts or Agams are collectively called “Siddhānta”. They are 45 in number and are divided under following heads:—

Eleven Angas
Twelve Upāngas
Four Mul Sutras
Six Chhed Sutras
Ten Pāyannas
Two Chulikas.

There are also the Jain Nīgams or Upanishads which are 36 in number. (See Appendix)

The Siddhantas or more properly the Jain Sutras have four-fold commentary under the names of Tikā, Niryukti, Churni and Bhāsyā and with the original texts which are in Prakrit, they constitute the five-fold Pantāngi Siddhantas. The
Hierarch Abhaideva Suri was one of the great commentators of these canons. Haribhadra Suri was also a well-known author of some of these commentaries. As the Jain literature developed very rapidly throughout the length and breadth of India, we find a large number of Jain scholars, authors, commentators and poets cropping up in almost every age up to the present time. The texts or original canons are in Prakrit or Magadhi or more properly speaking Ardha-Magadhi, the popular dialect as we have already stated, and the commentaries are embodied in Sanskrit.

Bhadrabahu, who was a very distinguished Jain ascetic and scholar of the age, was the head of the Church, when the Sangha met at Pataliputra to collect the canonical texts: He composed the Kalpa Sutra, which is one of the nine divisions of Chapter VIII on the discourse on Pratyakhyana of a great work known as Dasashruta Skanda. It is held in high estimation as already stated and is annually read during the Pujusam festival in Chaturmasya with great veneration and eclat.
It is beyond doubt that the Jain writers hold a prominent position in literary activity of the country. Besides the Jain Siddhanta and its commentaries, there are a great number of other works both in Prakrit and Sanskrit on Philosophy, Logic, Astronomy, Grammar, Rhetoric, Lives of Saints etc., both in prose and poetry. Some of these poems are in epic style full of poetic imagery which can fully cope with the best existing literature of the Hindus. We further possess a number of Kāvyas both in Prakrit and Sanskrit, which for the most part describe the lives of Tirthankars and Achārjyas and other great personages and are generally known as Charitras. They generally add to the knowledge of our ancient literature of India. As to the time their composition dates back as early as the first century of the Christian era. Of the Prakrit Kāvyas, many of them are now lost to us. Among the existing ones, the Paum Charitum (Padma Charita) is worthy of mention, as one of the oldest Prakrit epics. The "Vasudeva Hindi" is also a voluminous work in Prakrit in three parts
containing in a fluent style, narrations of a great many legendary stories and accounts. The "Samaraicha Kaha" and the "Mahipal Charium" are also old and important works in Prakrit. In short the Jain literature comprising as it does, all the branches of ancient Indian literature, holds no insignificant a niche in the gallery of that literature and as is truly said by Prof. Hertal "with respect to its narrative part, it holds a prominent position not only in the Indian literature but in the literature of mankind"

The Jains, specially their monks, were never behind in literary activity. Besides Bhadrabahu, Devardigani, Abhaideva Suri, Haribhadra Suri, as already noticed, we find a great many Jain scholars and philosophers composing works on different subjects over and above their treatises on religion and ethics. Shaktayana, known as one of the eight principal grammarians, was a Jain. He was much earlier to Panini and Patanjali as they repeatedly mentioned him in their works. Siddhasena Divakar, a contemporary of king Vikramaditya, was the author of many philosophical works.
Malayagiri was also a well-known author. Devendra Suri, Shanti Suri, and Dharma Sagar also composed many important works. Among the later authors Acharjya Hemchandra is well-known in the literary circle and he contributed greatly towards the preservation of the history of our sect. His dictionary and other works besides the life of King Kumarpala, a prince of Guzrat, and his chief disciple, have made him immortal and proclaim the wealth and richness of Jain literature.

The Jains have got a rich store of old and valuable Palm-leaf manuscripts still preserved with care in various Bhandars in the West and South. The reader will find specimens of an illustrated palm-leaf manuscript written in the 12th century A. D. and preserved in the Patan Bhandar. The Jain library in Jesalmir is far famed as containing a large number of ancient manuscripts both on palm and paper leaves. The various Jain libraries of Patan, Ahmedabad, Cambay, Bhavnagar and Bikanir are also well-known. These are consequences of a customery practice with the Jains which find
in starting a Bhandar or library in connection with temples, *Upasaras* or *Poshālās*. This is the reason why we find Jain libraries in almost every big city of Rajputana, Malwa, Guzrat and Kathiawad, attached to some temple or *upasara*, established at different periods for the use of the *Sangha*. Dr. Buhler mentions a Mss. of the Avasyak Sutra, which bears date A. D. 1132 and is declared to be the oldest extant Sanskrit manuscript on paper, The oldest classical literature of both the Kanarese and Tamil are composed by the Jains. Further to quote the words of Dr. Barnett "Some day, when the whole of the Jain Scriptures will have been critically edited and their contents lexically tabulated, together with their ancient glosses, they will throw many lights on the dark places of ancient and modern Indian languages and literature."

The latter Jain works abound in Sanskrit and Vernacular pieces. We find extensive Vernacular literature among the Jains from the 14th or 15th century till the present day. These deal mostly with lives and biographies of famous Jain Saints and
Srāvakas, their followers. There are also a large number of pieces replete with masterly literary, moral precepts and rules and lessons on the technics of the Jain philosophy. They are composed in melodious verses and in different popular metres and tunes and known as Choupai, Choudhalia, Rāsa, Sijhyaya, etc. The Jain Acharyas, Sadhus, Munis etc. seem to be very active in this period in composing these poems in Vernacular which must have been in very popular use both in Guzrat and Rajputana and they are still read by thousands of the Jains in their leisure hours. The names of Yasavijoyji, Anandghanji, Samyasundarji, Devchandji, Lalvijoyji, Jin Harkha Suriji are worthy of mention in this connection.
CHAPTER XLI.

JAIN ART AND ARCHITECTURE.

Jain Symbolism—Arts and Architecture—Stages of Development along its own lines—Difference between the Jain and Buddhist Arts—Jain Paintings—Its Place in the Ancient Art Gallery of India and Influence over the Community.

Alike its philosophy Jain symbolism has its own peculiarities. A translation, of ideas on some visible substance with the object of permanency is the first principle of all arts and architecture. Mr. Balabhai truly says in his article on Jain Architecture "that Architecture is nothing but a kind of history; that it is a standing and living record and it supplies us a more vivid and lasting picture of a nation than History does." In a chapter on "Jain Architecture and Literature" of a recently published book "The Heart of Jainism", the author says "The earliest Jain Architects seem to have used wood as their chief building material". We think this theory is not based on facts and cannot be maintained
AN EPITOME OF JAINISM.

In the first place as far as we can gather from the existing materials, this religion took its hold among the middle class; and its followers, the Sravakas, were mostly engaged in trade and higher callings. The architects for the most part, came from lower classes, and were only engaged by the Jains. In order to give permanency to their objects of worship, they invariably used stone and metal. The discovery in recent years of the ruins of many Jain temples built centuries before the Christian era, also confirms the fact that the earliest Jain Architecture was not only limited to wood.

Much has been written in recent years about Indian Art and Architecture and to some extent this is applicable to Jain Art. Mr. V. A. Smith in his "History of Fine Arts in India and Ceylon" says, "Hindu Art including Jain and Buddhist in the comprehensive term, is the real Indian Art." The special feature of Jain Art lies in the fact that it shows the relative position of natural objects with great fineness. It is sometimes accused of Conventionalism, but this is true of all arts devoted to religions subjects."
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In the opinion of Col. Tod. "Their (Jains) arts like their religion, were of a character quite distinct from those of Shiva. The temple of Mahavira at Nadole, (Marwar) the last of their twenty-four apostles, is a very fine piece of Architecture. Its vaulted roof is a perfect model of the most ancient style of dome in the East, probably invented anterior to the Romans." The famous Jain temples on Mount Abu are triumphs of Architecture; the delicacy and richness of their carvings are unsurpassed in the whole world. As for the antiquity of Jain architecture, the excavation of Kankali Tilla near Mathura, establishes it without any doubt that the erection of the Stupas must have taken place several centuries before the Christian Era and according to Western Scholars, these are perhaps the oldest buildings in India. Formerly the Jains used to build Stupas as imitated by the Buddhists and their ancient relief sculptures are also well-known. They were the greatest temple-builders in Western India. The great Jain Temple on the Shatrunjoy Hills near Palitana in Kathiawar as already
noted, are all imposing edifices. The whole hill appears like one mass of temples and the grouping of buildings in a limited area is another peculiarity of the Jain Art. There exist several Jain columns in Southern India and they are described as specimens of "a remarkably pleasing design. They are a wonder of light, elegant, highly decorated stone work and nothing can surpass the stately grace of these beautiful pillars whose proportions and adaptations to surrounding scenery are always perfect and whose richness of decoration never offends. In the whole range of Indian Art, there is nothing perhaps equal to the Kanara Jain pillars for good taste."

Numerous Jain cave temples have been discovered in different parts of India in the West and South. The Jain caves at Elura form a series by themselves and contain very elaborate and superior Architectural works. Mr. Griffiths says in the 'Introduction' of his well-known work 'Ajanta'. 'The Jains excavated some five or six extensive works which form a very important group of caves, one of the largest
and most elaborate, the Indra Sabha being about 90 feet deep and 80 feet wide and 14 feet high. There are a number of ancient Jain caves in Orissa on hills known as Khandagiri, Udaigiri and Nilgiri, dating as far back as 2nd century B.C.

The ideas of Jain and Buddhist sculptures are almost alike and the images of Jain Tirthankars and Buddhas are often mistaken one for another. In the common posture of padmasan they look similar except for the symbols cognisant of the Tirthankaras and signs of garment or thread over the neck and body of the Buddhas. We have seen some Buddhist images being worshipped by the Jains as their own. The images of Jain Tirthankars are generally sitting in Padmasan and sometimes in standing Kayotsarga posture, and some time Ardha padmasan style. One of the illustrations of the book is a half-tone print of a very old metal image from the South. Among the Swetambaris there are also metal images known as “Panchtirthis” or images of the Five Tirthankars in one piece. The middle image is one of any of the 24 Tirthankars in
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*padmāsan*, two standing, *Kayotsarga* ones, one on each side of the middle one and two *padmāsan* images on both sides on the top of the standing figures. We moreover find other figures of gods and goddesses as musicians and votaries some worshipping and some waving *chamars*, some in prayers kneeling or standing with folded hands &c. We also find figures of elephants carrying water or water-pots with their trunks pouring over the head of the Tirthankars on both sides.

The statues at Sravana Belgola (Mysore) of Digambaris and Karkala and Yemur in South Canara are well-known, gigantic and perhaps the largest free-standing statues in Asia. The biggest one is about 57 feet in height and is cut out of one solid block of stone.

The place of Jain paintings among the Indian Fine Arts is also of importance. A special feature of Jain painting lies in the drift and quality of its line. Line is the chief thing which shows the difference of objects. This line is so finely drawn in the Jain School of Painting that there is no school of Art
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which bears a comparison with it. Chinese Art is famous for its powerful lines. The excellence of this painting lies in the fact of its being obtained by the application of line. It has been demonstrated that this art was borrowed from India. Time may prove that the Chinese might have learnt the skill from the Jains. Like the ancient Hindu and Buddhistic paintings, the Jain ones, too were restricted to pictures of unseen subjects depicting important events of history, the deeds of saints and heroes. These paintings were confined to religious subjects and as they had a sanctity of their own, they were generally preserved both in temples and homes with great veneration. The Jains were also fond of illustrating their religious texts with paintings.

Dr. Coomarswami in his Notes on the Jain Art says, "The Jain paintings are not only very important for the students of Jain Iconography, Archeology and as illustrating costumes, manners and customs, but are of equal or greater interest as being oldest known Indian paintings on paper." The reader will find two plates prepared from the
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paintings in the Nahar Family collection in manuscripts of *Kalpa Sutra* by Bhadrabahu (about 356 B. C.) where he deals with the lives of the Jains. They are on the same subject from the life of Parswanath, the 23rd Tirthankar and give excellent points for comparison. In one of these pictures will be found the very sharp-hooked nose and large eyes with no less aesthetic value of early Indian paintings. In the second one we find much developed ideas under the influence of the Mahomedan period. The interesting changes in drapery, posture, colouring and everything else, is very striking.

Another plate (through the courtesy of J. S. Conference, Bombay,) contains portraits of the Jain Acharya Hem Chandra and King Kumarpal from a palm-leaf manuscript written in the year 1237 A. D. and preserved in the Bhandar at Patan. These pictures show the peculiar style and serve as specimens of early Jain paintings. The Mahomedan period entirely changed the idea. It is only in the later period that we find paintings of buildings, scenery and portraits throughout the country.

FINIS.
APPENDIX A.

Date of King Chandra Gupta.

Much has been written by various scholars European, Indian and others, quoting various authorities in support of their researches into the date of this great king. I do not, therefore, discuss the subject at any length but considering that the following note may be of some help to the students of antiquity, I quote a few extracts from our ancient Jain works. The generally accepted date of his reign according to European Scholars, is from 321 or 322 B.C. to 296 or 298 B.C. i.e. about 24 or 25 years. It is already mentioned in the Introduction that Mahavira attained nirvana in 527. B.C. or 470 years before the Vikram Era Samvat). The period of 470 years covers therefore the time from 527 B.C. to 57 B.C. and it is clear therefore that Chandra Gupta must have flourished during the time. According to the Ceylonese account Chandra Gupta ruled for
28 years. In Jain works, we find a number of dynasties of Kings to reign during the aforesaid period.

To cite authority in support of the point in question reference is made to the following extracts from Tithoogdliya Payanna:

"अं रविणं सिद्दिग्धं घरं निर्मकरं महावरोः।
तं रविणंविवर्ति चरितिसति पालवरं राया॥
पालवरों सही परं पणं परं सतिविलासं नंदाणं॥
मुहत्वं चद्वस्यं तोहसं पूजा पूवं मित्वाणं॥
विुभित्त मातुमित्ता सदीवस्यां हृदं नरसीणे।
गाईभ सयनों पुणं पडिवतीतो सहो राया॥
Pचयमासा पचय वासा कसे वह्रंति वाससं।
परि जन्वयं चरखों उपनी सगो राया॥"

We find almost the same version in the "Tirthoddhara Prakirnaka:"

"अं रविणं काबस्थं भिरं निर्मकरं महावरोः।
तं रविणं चवितवरं चरितिसति पालवरं राया॥
सही पालवरं रनीं पणं परं सतिविलासं हृदं नंदाणं॥
चद्वस्यं सुरियाणं तीसं विशं पुरस्मतिस्तह॥
विुभित्त मातुमित्ता सदीवस्याणि चत्त नरवं।
तह गाईभ चं तेस सरसा समसं चत॥"

[Substance:—In the same night in which Tirthankar Mahavira attained nirvana, King Paluka of Avanti was installed. He reigned for 60 years. Then came the 9 Nanda kings who successively reigned for 155 years. Then Mourya]
kings reigned for 108 years. After that Puspamitra ruled for 30 years. Then came Balamitra and Bhanumitra, whose reign lasted for 60 years. Nalavahan or Navabahan (another reading is नह वह्रण i.e. नभो वाहण) succeeded them as a king and ruled for 40 years. He was followed by Gardhavilla, who again reigned for 13 years and then came king Shaka for 4 years.]

According to these authorities the dates are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mahavira’s nirvāṇa</td>
<td>527 B.C.</td>
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<tr>
<td>King Paluka</td>
<td>527–467 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanda Kings</td>
<td>467–312 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mourya Kings</td>
<td>312–204 B.C.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pushpa Mitra</td>
<td>204–174 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balamitra &amp; Bhanumitra</td>
<td>174–114 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nalavahana &amp; Navavahana</td>
<td>114–74 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gardhavilla</td>
<td>74–61 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaka Kings</td>
<td>61–57 B.C.</td>
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Hem Chandra gives the date of Chandra Gupta in his Parishishta Parvas as,—

“एवं च श्रीमहावीरे मुक्ती वर्ष शते गते।
पंच पंचाष्टिके च चन्द्रगुप्तभवन्तु।”

i.e. 155 years after Mahavira’s nirvāṇa or 372 B.C.
Chandra Gupta is said to be contemporary of Bhadrabahu whose date 371–357 B.C. does not also appear to be correct.

It is therefore difficult to reconcile the difference of 60 years (372–312), although we find this last date viz, 312 B.C. referred to in other Jain works of high antiquity, as the date of this king. Moreover there is only difference of 9 or 10 years in this date of the great king and the one, generally acknowledged by the Western Orientalists. Hema Chandra must have omitted by oversight, to count the period of 60 years of King Paluka after Mahavira.

It appears from the Jain records that the king Srenika, son of the king Prasenajit, known otherwise as Bimbisara or Bambhasara, was reigning at Rajgriha and was a contemporary of Mahavira. He was succeeded by his son Asoka Chandra or Kunika who removed his capital from Rajgriha to Champā and was followed by his son Udayee. It was he who founded Pātaliputra and removed his capital from Champā to the new city and died without any issue. Then came the 9 Nanda kings followed up by Mourya kings beginning with Chandra Gupta.
We may reasonably refer this gap of a few years between Mahavira's nirvan and the accession to the throne by the first Nanda king, to Kunika and Udayee as they were reigning in the interim. This ascription of sixty years to these two kings does not at all appear to be inconsiderable.

Chandra Gupta was succeeded by his son Bindusara and then came his grandson the great Asoka, King Priyadarshhi of the inscriptions. Asoka was succeeded by his grandson Samprati, as his son Kunala was blind. Samprati was a great Jain monarch and a staunch supporter of the faith. He erected thousands of temples throughout the length and breadth of his vast empire and consecrated large number of images. I have not come across any inscription of his time although I have seen a considerable number of images which are said to have been consecrated by this king. The peculiarity of these images lies in the fact that all the images have got marks of pillow under the elbow. He is stated further to have sent Jain missionaries and ascetics abroad to preach Jainism in the distant countries and to spread the faith amongst people there.
APPENDIX B.

Firmans and Sunnuds.

(a)

[Firman of Emperor Akbar dated 1592 A.D. in the 37th year of his reign. In Ain Akbar (Gladwin's translation Vol. I, p. 538) in the list of the learned men of his time, Heer Vijoy Suri, is mentioned as Hariji Sur (No. 16.).]  

Firman of Jelaluddin Mahomed Akbar Badsha, the Victorious.

GOD IS GREAT.

Glory of religion and world. Jelaluddin Akbar Badsha, the son of Humayaon Badsha, the son of Babar Badsha, the son of Shaik Omer Mirza, the son of Sultan Aboo Syud, the son of Sultan Mahomed Mirza the son of Meerum Shah, the son of Amir Tymoor, the Lord of happy conjunction (Jupiter and Venus).—Seal.

Know! ye officers of the present and future times, and the Governors, Tax-collectors and the Jagirdars of the subas of Malwa (torn) of Akbarabad, the seat of Callips of Lahore, the Metropolis of Mooltan and Ahmedabad, the places of safety of Ajmer, the place of blessedness of Meerut, Gujrat and the Sooba of Bengal and of other territories under our Government.
Whereas the whole of our noble thought and attention is directed to attend to the wishes and seek the pleasures of subjects, and the sole aim of our mind which wishes well of all, is to secure love and affection of the people and the ryots who are the noblest trust (committed to our charge) of the Lord, the great bestower of bounties, and whereas our mind is specially occupied in searching for the men of pure hearts, and those that are devotional, therefore whenever tidings of any person or persons of any religion and creed passing his valuable time solely in contemplation of God comes to our ear, we become extremely desirous of ascertaining his virtues and intrinsic merits, without any regard to his religion, faith or creed, and by laudable means and in honorable manner we bring him from afar, admit him into our presence, and enjoy the pleasure of his company.

As many a time the accounts of the godliness and austere devotion of Hur Bejoy Soor, an Acharja (preceptor) of the Jain Sitambari sect and those of his disciples and followers who live at the ports of Gujrat, had come to noble ear, we sent for and called him after the interview which made us very glad, was over, he intended to take leave in order to return to
his beloved and native country. He therefore requested that by way of extreme kindness and favour a Royal Mandate, which is obeyed by all the world, be issued to the effect that the heaven-reaching mountains of Siddhachalji Girnarji, Tarungaji, Kessurianathji and Abooji situate in the country of Gujrat, and all the five mountains of Rajgirji, and the mountain of Somed Sekhurji alias Paresnathji, situate in the country of Bengal, and all the cotees and all temples below the mountains, and all the places of worship and pilgrimage of (followers of) the Jain Sitambari religion throughout our empire. Wherever they may be, be in his possession; and that no one can slaughter any animal on those mountains and in the temples or below or about them. As he had come from a long distance and in truth his request was just and proper, and appeared not to be repugnant to the Mohamedan Law; it being the rule of the religious sages to respect and preserve all religions; and as it become evident upon our enquiry and after thorough investigation that all those mountains and places of worship really belong to the (followers of the) Jain Sitambari religions from a long space of time, therefore we comply with his request and grant to, and bestow upon, Hur
Bejoy Soor Acharj of the Jain Sitambari religion the mountain of Siddhachal, the mountain of Girnar, the mountain of Tarunga, the mountain of Kesuria Nath, and the mountain of Abbo lying in the country of Gujrat, and the five mountains of Rajgiree, and the mountain of Somed Sekhur alias Pareshnath, situate in the country of Bengal, and all the places of worship and pilgrimage below the mountains and wherever these may be, any places of worship appertaining to the Jain Sitambari religion throughout our empire. It is proper that he should perform his devotion with the ease of mind.

Be it known that although these mountains and places of worship and pilgrimage, the seats of the Jain Sitambari religion, have been given to Hur Bejoy Soor Acharj, yet in reality they all belong to the followers of the Jain Sitambari religion.

Let the orders of this everlasting Firman shine like the sun and the moon amongst the followers of the Jain Sitambari religion, so long as the sun, the illumination of the universe, continues to impart light and brightness to the day, and the moon remains to give splendour and beauty to the night. Let no one offer any
opposition or raise any objection to the same, and let no body slaughter any animal, on, below or about the mountains and in the places of worship and pilgrimage. Let the orders of this Firman be obeyed by all the world, be acted upon and carried out, and let none depart from the same or demand a new Sanad. Dated the 7th of the month Urdu Bihisht, corresponding with the month Rabeoolawwal of the thirty-seventh year of the auspicious reign."

Translated by me
(Sd.) Md. Abdulla Munshi
Rajkoomar College, Rajkote.

11-11-75.
[Firman of Emperor Jehangir dated 1608. A. D. in the 2nd year of his reign.]

A Firman of the Victorious King Noroodin Mohammad Jahangir Badshah Gazi.

GOD IS GREAT.

Noroodin Mohammad Jahangir Badshah Gazi. The son of Akbar Badshah, the son of Hoomayoon Badshah, the son of Babar Badshah, the son of Omar the son of Sooltan Aboo Syed, the son of Sooltan Mohammad Mirza Shah, the son of Miran Sahab, the son of Amir Timoor Saheb Kiran. —Seal.

May it be known to the noble Governors and the Officers (who by thriftiness (bring about) prosperity and the Jagirdar and tax-gatherers and the accountants connected with the important affairs and all (those) having to do with the protected territories especially of the Soobah of Gujarat that:—Whereas, the heart of him, who knows his duty (and is) truly a well wisher of the creatures of God namely of every section and community is occupied with and takes an interest in the prosperity of all creatures, therefore at present Bekah Harakh Parmananda Jati
having presented himself in the presence of the protector of creatures, made a representation to those who were standing at the foot of the throne as follows:—(That as) Baji Sen Soor and Baji Dev Soor and Khoosh Faham Nand. Baji Paran have temples and Dharamshalas in every place and every town and are engaged in (the practice of) austerity and devotion and seeking after God. And whereas the circumstances relative to the devotional exercises and meditating on God of the abovementioned Bekah Harakh Paramanand Jati became known (to us) thereupon the order of the king of the world (and) the nations was issued as follows:—"No one shall put up in the temples and Dharamshalas of that community and no one shall enter into them without permission. And should they wish to rebuild them, no one shall oppose them. And no one shall alight at the houses of their disciples. And should (they go) to the holy place (Tirat of) Satrunja in the country Sorat for the purpose of worshipping, no one shall ask and demand from them (anything)." And further in accordance with the representation and request of that man, (His Majestys’) exalted order was issued that on Sunday and Thursday in every week and the day of new moon of every
month and the days of feasts and every new year's day and in the month of Navroj and one day in the month of Yar Mah on which blessed (day) we were weighed for governing the permanent Kingdom shall be observed year after year as long as the years of our permanent Kingdom shall pass on. On one day there shall be no killing of animals in (our) protected kingdom; and no one on that day shall hunt and catch and kill birds and fish and such like. It is necessary that paying attention to the above-mentioned order they shall not deviate and go astray; in respect of its being carried out and becoming permanent. This shall be considered as (their) duty. Dated the month of Yar in the year 3.

High Court, Bombay. (A true translation)
26th June, 1875. (Sd.) Goolam Mohaideen
Translator.
[Firman of Emperor Shahjahan dated 1629 A.D., Second year of his reign]

A Firman of the Victorious King Shahboodin Mohammad Saheb Kiran Sani Shah Jahan Badshah Gazi.

The Victorious King Shahboodin Mohammad Saheb Kiran Sani Shah Jahan Badshah Gazi, the son of Jahangir Badsdah, the son Akbar Badshah, the son of Humayun Badshah, the son of Babar Badshah, the son of Shekh Oomar Mirza, the son of Sooltan Aboo Sayed, the son of Sultan Mohammad Mirza, the son of Miran Shah, the son of Amir Timoor Saheb Kiran—Seal.

GOD IS GREAT.

Whereas His Majesty has received a representation as follows:—The temples of Chintaman and Satronja and Sankesar and Kesari existed from the ancient time before the fortunate accession of (His Majesty) to the throne and there are three Posals at Ahmedabad and four others at Khambait (Cambay) and one at Sorat and one at Radhanpur in the possession of Satidas. The gracious and noble command
of (His Majesty) whom the world obeys who is as exalted as are the heavens has issued to the effect that no person shall put up at the above-mentioned places and spots, and no one shall approach them, for they have been granted to them. And the Sevras may read aloud &c the books of Sagar and Sarookan, may live in the Soobah of Goojrat, and shall not quarrel, among themselves, and shall not (do anything) against orders; and they shall employ themselves in praying for the permanency of the Kingdom. It is necessary that the Governors and officers of those places in accordance herewith, knowing (this) to be settled, shall not allow any person to transgress (this) Written on the twenty first of the month of Azarma Ilahi in the year 2.

High Court, Bombay. (A true translation,)
26th June 1865. Sd. Goolam Mohaideen,
Translator,
[Firman of Emperor Shah Jahan dated 1657 A.D. 31st year of his reign.]

**GOD IS GREAT.**

*A Firman of the victorious king Mohammed Shah Saheb Kiran Sani Badshah Gazi.*

Mohammad Saheb Kiran Sani Badshah Gazi, the son of Jahangir Badshah, the son of Akbar Badshah, the son of Humayun...the son of Amir Timor Kiran Saheb.—Seal.

At this time the exalted and auspicious Firman of His Majesty is issued and published as follows:—The parganah of Palitanā (is) situated within the jurisdiction of Sorat a dependency of the Soobah of Ahmedabad that is called Satranja and was given as a Jagir to (my) fortunate son the object most charming to the sight of the state (who is as) a white mark on the forehead (of a horse) auguring the prosperity (of the state who is as) a flourishing plant of the garden of monarchy, a seedling of the orchard of the kingdom, the light of the pupil of grandeur, the fruit of the garden of greatness, the noble, the dignified prince Mohammad Moorad Baksh. The revenue thereof being two lacs of money, the same has
been given as Inam as above-mentioned to Sati-das, the jeweller by way of an Altamga (grant) from the beginning of the harvest time, (i.e., month of) Takhakavil. It is necessary that the noble, the dignified children and the exalted Amirs and Vazirs who are thrifty and the future accountants, employed in the civil department and the Governors and Officers and Jagirdars and tax gatherers shall exert (themselves) to carry out and uphold this sacred order of His Majesty and let the above-mentioned Parganah remain in the possession of the above-named (person) and his children, generation after generation; and shall consider as abolished (the levying) of all monies and dues and taxes and all (other) revenues; and with regard to this matter they shall not demand every year, a new order and a Sanad, and they shall not swerve from what is (here) commanded. Dated the 19th, of the auspicious month of Ramzan in the 31st, of the auspicious reign corresponding with the Hijra year 1067 (A.D., 1657).

26th June 1875. (A true translation)
Bombay High Court Sd, Goolam Mohaideen.
Translator.
[Sunnud from Prince Moorad as *Suba* of Guzrat, dated 1657 A.D., in the 30th year of Emperor Shah Jahan's reign. He was son of Shahjahan and Viceroy of Guzrat.]

**In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful.**

Moorad Baksh, the son of Shahaboodin Mohamed Saheb Kiran Sani, Saheb Jahan the Victorious, Emperor, 1049 Seal.

The present and future accounts of the Sarkar (i.e. district) of Sorath (who) have become exalted by the Royal favour and hopeful (of distinction) are to know that whereas at this time the best of the grandees (namely) Satidas the Jeweller, has represented amongst those standing [before us] in the place of the assembly which resembles paradise, that in the village of Palitana (which is one) of the Dependancies of the above mentioned Sarkar, there is a place of worship belonging to the Hindoos, that is called Satranja, and that the people of the surrounding districts come there on a pilgrimage. The order of the highly dignified, the possessor of exalted rank, has been graciously issued to the effect that the above mentioned Village has
been granted from the beginning of the season of Kharif Nijuit (i.e. harvest time) as an *Inam* to the above mentioned person, the best of the grandees. It is therefore necessary that considering the above mentioned Village as an *Inam* (i.e. grant) to him, you shall not interfere (with it) in any way, in order that the people of the neighbouring districts and localities may come on a pilgrimage to that place with (their) minds at ease. In this matter, regarding (this) as a complete injunction, you are not to swerve (herefrom). Written on the 29th day of the holy month of Mohurrum in the 30th of our auspicious reign:

The handwriting of the humble servant Ali Nakhi.

The 4th of Safar in the thirtieth year of the reign Presented to the Hoozoor.

The 4th of Safar in the thirtieth year. A copy was taken in the Divans (i.e. prime minister's) office.

The 4th of Safar in the thirtieth year received.

The 4th of Safar

A true translation

(Sd.) Goolam Mohaideen

Translator.
Confirmation of Sunnud (e) by Emperor Moorad Bux dated 1658 A.D., in the first year of his reign. As soon as he came to the throne he was murdered.

Padsha Moorad Bux A. H. 1068. Seal

This high command is now issued, declaring that as the Purgunnah of Palitana under the Sirkar of Soruth, a dependency, on the Subah of Ahmedabad and which Perguna is also called Istrinja is by former Sunnud conferred on Satidas Jwahuree as an Inam or Gift, the said Satidas has presented a petition praying that in this manner a new high command should be given. This world binding mandate is therefore now issued declaring that we confirm to the said Satidas and to his descendants the Inam or Gift he held by former Sunnud and a Royal patent, and it behooves the Dewans and Vuzeers and Mootusudees present and the future and the Jageerdars and Kuroorees of that District to respect the said Gift according to the above order, and not to molest or hinder him under pretence of expenses and taxes etc., but they must act so that this order may continue and
abide, knowing this order to be peremptory, no opposition shall be made. Dated 29th Ramzan first year of his reign.

Recorder's Court.  
Translator's Office  
30th June 1820.

Sd. J. Taylor  
Translator.
Sunnud from Emperor Aurungzeb dated 1658 A.D.

In the name of God, the Compassionate the Merciful.

God the victorious Mohammad Aurungzeb Sha Bahadoor, the son of Saheb Kiran Sani 1068.–Seal.

Whereas at this time, the beginning of which is auspicious (and) the end of which will be happy, Satidas, the Jeweller has represented to the noble, most holy, exalted (and) elevated presence through persons who constitute the holy assembly of the Court, that whereas according to a Firman of His Majesty, the exalted (and) as dignified as Soloman, the protector of the office of the successors (of Mohammad) the shadow of God, dated the nineteenth of the holy month of Ramzan, in the year thirty one, the district of Palitana, which is called Satranja in the Jurisdiction of the Sorath Sarkar, a dependency of the Suba of Ahmedabad (and) the revenue of which is two lacs of Dâms has been settled as a perpetual Inam on the slave (the petitioner) (and) that
he ( the petitioner ) therefore hopes that a glorious edict may also be granted by our Court; Therefore in the same manner as before we have granted ( to the petitioner ) the above mentioned district as a perpetual Inam. It is therefore incumbent in the present and future managers of the Suba and the above mentioned Sarkar, to exert themselves for the continual and permanent observance of this hallowed ordinance ( and ) to permit the above mentioned district to remain in the possession of the above mentioned person and of his descendants in lineal succession from generation to generation and to consider him exempted from all demands and taxes and all other dues ( and ) not to demand from him in respect hereof a new sunnud every year ( and ) they shall not swerve from this order. Written on the 9th of the month of Telkand in the Hijra year 1068.

( On back )

A mandate of the Nawab, the possessor of holy titles, the fruit of the garden, a worthy successor, the fruit of the tree of greatness, a lamp of the noble family. a light of the great house, the pupil of the eye of grandeur and fortune, the pride of greatness and glory, of noble birth, the exalted, the praised one by the
tongue of the slave and free, the famous (and) victorious prince Mohammad Sultan Bahadoor,

32. Mohammad Sultan Bahadoor the son of the Victorious. Mohammad Ourungzeb Sha Bahadoor 1068—seal

Translated by me
Sd. Goolam Mohaideen.
Translator.
(h)


In the name of the Purest, Highest in Station.

Seal

Be it known to the Officers and Managers of the present and future affairs of the Province of Bengal and the other Provinces under dominion, that Jugut Sett Mahtaub Roy represented to us the high in dignity that mountain Paresnathjee, situate in the country of Bengal, the place of worship according to the Jain Setamburee religion also the Cotee at station Mudhoobun, on a rent-free lakheraj ground, butted and bounded by four boundaries belong (to the followers of) the Jain Setamburee religion and that he, the devoted supplicant is a follower of the Jain Setamburee religion, he therefore, is hopeful of the Royal bounty that the mountain and the Cotee aforesaid, be bestowed by the resplendent Huzoor on that obedient supplicant, so that, composed in mind, he may devote himself to pray according to that religion. Whereas
the person aforesaid deserves Royal favour and bounty, also as it appears that the property he asks for has a particular connection with him, and (as) it appeared on inquiry instituted by this High in Dignity that mountain Paresnath and the Cotee aforesaid have from a long time appertained to the (followers of the) Jain Setamburee religion, therefore the whole of the mountain and the Cotee at Mudhoobun butted and bounded by four boundaries, are bestowed by the Royal Court on the aforesaid person. It is required that he should always devote to pray himself for the welfare and prosperity of the State; and no one should offer opposition respecting the mountain Paresnath and the Cotee at Mudhoobun.

Knowing this to be a very urgent matter, let them act as directed. Finis.

The whole of mountain Paresnath situate in the country of Bengal,

Three hundred and one Beeghas of Lakhraj land of Mudhoobun, situate in the country of Bengal, butted and bounded by four boundaries specified below.

On the West—the water course, of Joyporiah, alias Jaynugger.

On the East—the old water-course. (nala)
On the North—the koon or reservoir (called) Julhurrey prepared by the (followers of the) Jain Setambaree religion.

On the South—the base of Mountain Paresnath.

Written on the 27th day of the month of Jemadeeoolawal, the fifth year of the King’s reign. (On the back) The Khan of Khans Kumirooddeen Khan Bahadur, Victorious in War, The Vizier of Territories, Managers of affairs, Noblest of Nobles, the Head of the country, Commander in-Chief, a faithful friend and servant of the King Ahmud Shah, the Hero.

A true translation of the annexed Persian Document for Baboo Pooran Chund.

(Sd) Shamachurn Sircar
Chief Interpreter and Translator
High Court, Original Jurisdiction,
The 19th March 1868.
[Sunnud of Aboo Ali Khan Bahadur, dated the third year of reign.]

Aboo Ali Khan Bahadur Emperor
and Champion of Faith—Seal.

To

The Motsuddees of the present time and of future of Pergunnah Bissoonpore Pachrookhy in the province of Behar.

Take notice that

Since Mouzah Palgunge in the aforesaid Purgunnah has been as heretofore exempted from all liabilities in the name of Raja Padman Singh as a charitable endowment to all the temples of Pareshnath made by Juggut Sett, the same is therefore upheld and confirmed in the year 1169 Fusli. (1755 A.D.) You shall raise no objection and offer no opposition in any way whatever in respect of the said Mouzah and shall release and leave it to the use and possession of the above named Rajah so that he may apply the profits thereof to necessary purposes and continue to pray for the welfare of the empire to last for ever. Written on the 27th day of Jamadi-us-sani in the third year of reign.

True translation

21-1-89
(Sd.) Iswaree Persad
[Parwana, of Jaggat Sett Khushal Chand, dated 1775 A.D.]

Jaggat Sett Khoshull Chund 1187—Seal.

High in dignity Baboo Sookhul Chand Sahoo and Boola Sahoo, Managers of the temples of Jain Situmbury, i.e. on the hills of Pareshnathjee alias Somed Shekhurjee, be of good cheer.

A long time ago since the reigns of the Emperors, the hills of Pareshnathjee, being considered the holy place of the persons of Jain Situmbury religion, were made over to my father, because we were also of the religion of Jain Situmbury. But owing to my having been charged with various affairs, and the said holy place being situate at a great distance I could not manage the affairs thereof. I therefore having appointed you as the manager of the affairs write to you that you should most carefully manage all affairs so that the pilgrims might with perfect ease travel there and return therefrom. This hill and the holy place have been in the possession of the persons of Jain Situmbury. No other persons has any thing to do
with it. Therefore this Perwanah or order is written to you that you should act accordingly. If any of the authorities or landholders set up opposition in any way you should produce this Perwanah. Dated the 16th of the month of Zakund 1189 Hedgree.

True translation,
(Sd.) Jadub Chunder Mitter.
APPENDIX C.

List of Jain Agams and Nigams

[The reader will find a valuable and excellent account in detail of these sacred canons by Dr. Weber in Indische Studien Vols XVI—XVII; translated by Dr. Smyth and published in Indian Antiquary Vols. XVII to XXI.]

A. Jain Agams

These are 45 in numbers and are divided into I. Angas II. Upāngas III. Mula Sutras IV. Chheda Sutras, V. Payannās VI. Chulikās.

I. Angas

Anga Sutras are eleven in number,

1. AYARANGA SUTTAM (Skr. Acharanga Sutra) It deals with Jain Philosophy and rules of conduct for members of the order. (Translated in the Sacred book of the East Vol. XXII.)

2. SUYAGADANGAM SUTTAM (Skr. Sutrakritangan-gam Sutra) It deals with the doctrines of the 363 different heretical sects (Translated in the Sacred Book of the East Vol. XLV.)

3. THANANGAM SUTTAM (Skr. Sthanangam Sutra). It deals with an exposition of
'Sthans' (points of view) of one to ten elements of the universe according to the Jain system,

4. **Samavayangam Suttam** (Skr. Samavayanga-gam Sutra). It deals with the nature of one to innumerable matters of the universe.

5. **Vivahapannatti** or commonly known as **Bhagavati Suttam** (Skr. Vyakhya prajnapati Sutra). This is a most important work in the list of the Jain canons, dealing with 36,000 queries and their answers between Mahavira and Goutama.

6. **Nayadhammaka Suttam** (Skr. Jnata dharma katha Sutra). It contains stories and parables of religious personages and also exposition of elements.

7. **Uvasagadasao Suttam** (Skr. Upasakadasha Sutra). It deals with the lives of the ten principle lay-disciples of Mahavira and sets out rules of conduct for lay-men. (Published in the Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta.)

8. **Antagadadasao Suttam** (Skr. Antakritada sha Sutra). It deals with the history of the 90 personages who attained moksha (Translated in the Oriental Translation Fund Vol. XVII.)


II. Upangas.

Upanga Sutras are twelve in number.

1. Uvavayi Suttam (Skr. Aupapatika Sutra) It contains lectures on the birth of 22 different kinds of souls and other religious subjects.

2. Raipaseni Suttam (Skr. Rajprashniya Sutra.) It contains discourse of Keshi Ganadhahar with King Pradeshi, an unbeliever.


5. **Jambudeep Pannatti Suttam** (Skr. Jambudwipa Prajnapti Sutra.) It contains description of Jambudwipa including accounts of its mountains, rivers &c.

6. **Chandapannatti Suttam** (Skr. Chandra Prajnapati Sutra).

7. **Surya Pannatti Suttam** (Skr. Surya Prajnapti Sutra.) These two canons (Nos. 6 and 7) contain description of sun and moon and other celestial spheres.

8. **Kappiya Suttam** including Niriyavali Suttam (Skr. Kalpika Sutra including Nirya vali Sutra).

9. **Kappaodosia Suttam** (Skr. Kalpavatanshika Sutra.)

10. **Puppiya Suttam** (Skr. Pushpika Sutra.)

11. **Puppachuliva Suttam** (Skr. Pushpachoolika Sutra.)

12. **Banhidasa Suttam** (Skr. Banhidasha Sutra.)

These series of canons from Nos. 8 to 12 contain description of heaven and hell, battles of kings &c.
III. Mul Sutras.

These are four in number.

1. Avasyaka Sutra including Vishesavasyaka and Pakshika Sutras. These deal with higher Jain principles and philosophy, logic and history.

2. Dasavaikalika Sutra. It contains rules of conduct for the ascetics.

3. Pindanirvyukti and Oghnirvyukti Sutras. These contain rules of begging and collecting alms and food by the ascetics.

4. Uttaradhyayan Sutra. It contains 36 lectures on various interesting subjects (Translated in the Sacred Book of the East Vol XLV.)

IV. Chheda Sutras.

Chheda Sutras are six in number and they contain rules of penance and other regulations of the church.

1. Vyabahardasakalpa Sutra.

2. Vrihatkalpa Sutra.

3. Dashashrutaskandha Sutra.


5. Mahanishitha Sutra.

6. Panchakalpa Sutra (now extinct) and Jitkalpa Sutra.
V Payennas (Skr. Prajnapana)

These are ten in number. They deal mostly with ethical rules and other regulations both for the church and the laity.

1. Chousaran PAVENNA SUTTAM (Skr. Chatuhsharan prajnyapana Sutra.)
2. Santhar PAVENNA SUTTAM (Skr. Sansthara raka prajnyapana Sutra.)
3. Tandul PAVENNA SUTTAM (Skr. Tandul prajnyapana Sutra.)
4. Chandavijjaga SUTTAM (Skr. Chandra vedhyak Sutra.)
5. Gainvijjiva SUTTAM. (Skr. Gainvidya Sutra.)
6. Aupachchakhana SUTTAM (Skr. Aur pratyakhyan Sutra.)
7. Virtubho or Devindatthava SUTTAM. (Skr. Virastaba or Devendrastaba Sutram.)
8. Mahapachchakhana SUTTAM (Skr. Maha pratyakhyan Sutra.)
9. Gachchhachhar SUTTAM (Skr. GACHCHHA chara Sutra.)
10. Jotisikkandara SUTTAM (Skr. Jyotisk karanda Sutra.)

In the places of 9 and 10 some hold Bhattapachchakhana and Samadhimarana Sutra as the 9th and 10th Chheda Sutras.
VI Chulika Sutras.

Chulika Sutras are two in number. They contain discourse on five kinds of knowledge and other subjects.

1. **Anuyogadwar Sutra**.
2. **Nandi Sutra**.

**B. Jain Nigams or Upanishads.**

These are 36 in number.

1. Uttaranyaka.
2. Panchadhyaya.
4. Vijnanaghanarnava.
5. Vijnaneshwar.
6. Vijnanagunarnava.
7. Navatatwa nidanarnava.
8. Tatwartha Nidhiratnakar.
10. Arhadharmagamanirnaya.
11. Utsargapavadava-chananakanta.
12. Astinasti viveka nigama nirnaya.
15. Siddahagama sanke-tastavaka.
17. Ragijananirvedajananaka.
18. Strimuktidanirnaya.
20. Sakalaprapanchaphalidana.
21. Shraddhadharma
    sadhyapavarga.
22. Saptnayanidana.
23. Vandhamokshapaga-
    gama.
24. Ishtakamaniyasiddhi.
25. Bramhakamaniyasid-
    dhi.
27. Chaturvarga
    chintamani.
28. Panchajnyanaswar-
    upavedana.
29. Panchadarshana
    swaruparahasya.
30. Panchcharitraswa
    ruparahasya.
31. Nigamagamavakya
    vivaran.
32. Vyavaharsadhyapa-
    pavarga.
33. Nishchayaika
    sadhyapavarya.
34. Prayashchitthaik
    sadhyapavarga.
35. Darshanaikasaddhyapavarga.
36. Viratavirasamana-
    pavarga.
APPENDIX D.

The Tirthankars of the Present Era.

1. Adinatha better known as Rishava Deva, belonged to Ikshaku race and was the son of King Nabhi and Queen Marudevi. His place of birth was Vinita (Ajodhya), in the country of Koshala, but according to some in the north of Kashmir. He was born towards the end of the period of Yugaliks. According to the custom of the time, he was married to his own twin sister Sumangala and another Sunanda whose brother died in childhood. Sumangala's issues were Bharat and Bramhi (the twin) and 98 other twin sons and by Sunanda he had Bahubal and Sundari. From the descendants of Bharat and Bahubali the Surja and Chandra dynasties were respectively originated, and the country was named Bharat after the eldest prince. He resigned his empire to his sons and laid foundation of the Jain Church in this era. He was initiated at the city of Vinita and attained nirvana, on Astapada mountain. He is represented as of golden complexion and having a bull (हरम) for his cognizance.
2. Ajitanatha belonged to the same race and was son of King Jitashatru and Queen Bijoya. He was born in Ajodhya and was initiated at the same place and reached nirvana on Samet Sikhar mountain or better known as Pareshnath Hill in Bengal. He was also of golden complexion and had an elephant (चित्त) as his cognizance. King Sagar flourished during his time.

3. Sambhavanatha was son of King Jitari and Queen Sena and belonged to the same race. He was born at Sāwathi (Srāwasthi)—modern "Setmet kā kilā", near Balarampur U. P. and was initiated at the same city and attained nirvana on mount Samet Sikhar. His complexion was of golden colour and his cognizance was horse (रघु).

4. Abhinandana was born of King Sambara and Queen Siddhartha belonging to the Ikshaku race. He was of golden complexion and had monkey (रघु) as his cognizance. He was born at Ajodhya and was initiated at the same place and his nirvana took place on Mount Samet Sikhar.

5. Sumatinatha was the son of King Megha by Queen Mangala at Ajodhya belonging to the Ikshaku race and was initiated at the same
city and his nirvāna also occurred at Mount Samet Sikhar. He was also of golden complexion and had a curlew (कींच) for his cognizance. According to the Digambaris, it was red goose (चक्रवंट).

6. Padmaprava was the son of King Sreedhar by Queen Sushima. He belonged to the Ikshaku race and was born in Koshambi—receiving initiation at the same place and attaining nirvāna at Mount Samet Sikhar. His cognizance was lotus (पद्म) and his complexion was of red colour.

7. Suparswanatha was the son of King Pratista and his mother was Prithivi and belonged to the Ikshaku race. He was born at Benaras and was initiated at the same city. Attained nirvāna on Mount Samet Sikhar. He was of golden, but according to Digambaris, green complexion. His cognizance was the figure, Swastika (स्वस्तिक).

8. Chandraprava belonged to the Ikshaku race and was the son of King Mahasena by Lakshmana and was born at Chandrapura and was initiated at the same city and attained Moksha on Samet Sikhar. He is described as of white complexion and had moon (चन्द्र) as his cognizance.

9. Subidhinatha was the son of King Sugriva and Queen Rama belonging to the
Ikshaku race. He was born in the city of Kâkandi and was initiated there attaining nirvân on Mount Samet Sikhar. He was of white complexion and had Makara (मकर) a fabulous aquatic animal as his cognizance. He is also known as Pushpadanta.

10. Shitalanatha belonging to the Ikshaku race, was the son of King Drirharatha and Queen Susnandana. His birth-place was the city of Bhadilpur where he took his initiation and reached nirvân on Mount Samet Sikhar. His complexion was golden and his cognizance was the figure Sreevatsa (श्रीवास), Digambaris say Kalpa tree (कल्पबुध) and it was in his time that the famous Harivansa took its origin.

11. Shreanshanatha also belonged to the Ikshaku race and his parents were King Vishnu and Queen Vishna. He was born at Sinhapur near Benares and took his initiation at the same city and reached nirvân on Mount Samet Sikhar. He was of golden complexion and his cognizance was rhinoceros (छोट) while Digambaris say, it was bird Garura (गरुड) .

12. Vasupuja came of the same Ikshaku race and was son of King Vashupujya by Queen Jayâ. His birth place was at the city of Champâ modern Nathnagar, near Bhagalpur where he
took his initiation as well as reached nirvān. He was of red complexion and his cognizance was buffalo (मछिय).

13. VIMALANATHA was the son of King Kritavarma by Queen Shyama belonging to the Ikshaku race. He was born at the city of Kampilpur where he took initiation and reached Moksha on Mount Samet Sikhar. His complexion was of golden colour and his cognizance was boar (वराह).

14. ANANTANATHA belonged to the Ikshaku race and was the son of King Sinhasena by Queen Sujasa. His place of birth was Ajodhya where he was initiated and reached nirvān on Mount Samet Sikhar. He was of golden complexion and his cognizance was falcon (खेन) while according to the Digambaris his symbol was a bear (मवृक).

15. DHARMANATHA was the son of King Bhanu and Queen Suhrita belonging to the Ikshaku race. His birth place was the city of Ratnapuri near Ajodhya where he was initiated and reached Moksha on Mount Samet Sikhar. His complexion was of golden colour and his cognizance was a thunderbolt (बल).

16. SHANTINATHA belonged to the Ikshaku race and was the son of King Vishwa Sena by Queen Achira. He was born in the city of Hastina-
pura also known as Gajapura near Meerut where he took his initiation reaching nirvāna on Mount Samet Sikhar. He is described as of yellow colour and his cognizance was an antelope (सूण).

17. Kunthanatha was the son of King Sura by Sree belonging to the Ikshaku race. His birth place was the city of Hastinapura, and he took his initiation at the same place and attained moksha on Mount Samet Sikhar. His complexion was of yellow colour and his cognizance was a goat (कृम).

18. Aranatha was born in the same city of Hastinapura and his parents were King Sudarshana and Queen Devi belonging to the Ikshaku race. His place of initiation was Gajpura and reached nirvāna on Mount Samet Sikhar. His complexion was golden and his cognizance was a figure (नक्षावलि) diagram and according to the Digambaris his symbol was a fish (मीन). Parashurama, a Hindu Avatara, flourished in his time.

19. Mallinatha belonged to the Ikshaku race and was the daughter (according to Digambaris, who do not admit of moksha for the women, she was a son) of King Kumbha by Parvabati. His place of birth was Mathura where he was initiated and reached nirvāna on mount Samet Sikhar. His complexion was of blue colour and his cognizance was a water-jug (कुक्क).
20. **Muni Subrata** belonged to the race known as Harivansa and was the son of king Sumitra by Padmabati of the city of Rajgir where he was initiated and reached *nirvāṇa* on mount Samet Sikhar. He was of dark complexion and his cognizance was a tortoise (*कुँभ*). Dasaratha and Ram Chandra were his contemporaries.

21. **Naminatha** belonged to the Ikshaku race and was the son of King Bijoya and Queen Bipra. He was born in the city of Mathura where he was initiated and attained *moksha* on mount Samet Sikhar. His complexion was of yellow colour and his cognizance was a blue lotus. (*नीलोत्पल*) According to the Digambars he was of green colour.

22. **Neminatha** also known as Arista Nemi belonged to the Harivansa. He was the son of Samudra Vijaya by Shiva. His place of birth was Souripur where he was initiated and attained *nirvāṇa* on mount Girnar and was of black complexion with a conch (*गंधर्व*) as his symbol. He was related to the Hindu Avatar, Krishna, whose father Vasudeva, was a brother of Samudra Vijoy. It was arranged that he should marry Rajamati, daughter of Ugrasena king of Jirnadurga or Junagad. On hearing the piteous cries of birds and beasts which were collected for the marriage
feast, he refused to marry and went out to mount Girnar. In the Hindu Vedas and Purans, we find mention of Arista Nemi or Nemi Nath Kurus and Pandavas flourished during his time.

23. Parshwanatha belonged to the Ikshaku race and was the son of King Ashwa Sen by Bama Devi. He was born in 877 B.C. and his birth place was Benares where he was initiated and attained nirvana on mount Samet Sikhar. He was of blue complexion and his cognizance was a serpent (मणि). Parshwanatha attained nirvan in his hundredth year, some 250 years before the nirvana of Mahavira i.e. about 770 B.C.

24. Mahavira or Vardhmana also known as Natputta, the last Tirthankar, belonged to the Ikshaku race and was the son of King Siddharatha by Queen Trisala. His place of birth was Kshatriya-kund-gram where he was initiated and reached nirvana in the town of Pawapuri. He was of yellow complexion and had a lion (विघ्र) as his cognizance. The date of his nirvana is 527 B.C.
APPENDIX E.

Chronological List of the Gachchha-heads.

I. SWETAMBAR SCHOOL.

(a) Upakesh Gachchha.

[The 'Gachchha' traces its origin from Parshwanatha, the 23rd. Tirthankar. His chief disciples or Ganadharas were (i) Subhadatta (ii) Aryaghsa (iii) Vishista (iv) Bramhadhari (v) Soma (vi) Sivadhara (vii) Vira Bhadra (viii) Yashaswi. Shubhadatta, being the eldest, became the head of the church after the Lord. The title 'Suri' or Acharya of the pontiffs is indiscriminately used in this 'Gachchha' e. g. Siddhā Suri or Siddhācharya ; Kakka Suri or Kakkāchārya or Kakudācharya. Vide Heornle's list published in Indian Antiquary, vol XIX pp. 233-252.]

1. Tirthankara Parshwanatha,
2. Shubhadatta.
3. Hari datta.
4. Arya Sumudra.
5. Keshi (contemporary of Mahavira ; some place 'Prabha' between 4 & 5.)
7. Ratnaprabha I (457 B.C.)
8. Yaksadeva I, 9. Kakka I,
10. Devagupta I.
11. Siddha I. 12. Ratnaprabha II.
15. Devagupta II. 16. Siddha II.
17. Ratnaprabha III.
18. Yaksha III.
19. Kakka III. (By oversight Dr. Heornle has put No. 19 instead of No 18.)
20. Devagupta III.
21. Siddha II. 22. Ratnaprabha IV.
23. Yaksha IV. 24. Kakka IV (63 A.D.)
25. Devagupta IV (13 A.D.)
26. Siddha IV.
27. Ratnaprabha V (18 A.D.)
28. Yaksha V. (85 A.D. Converted king Chitrangada of Kanouj)
29. Kakka V. 30. Devagupta V.
31. Siddha V. 32. Ratnaprabha VI.
33. Yaksha VI.
34. Kakka VI. (had extra-ordinary powers; pursuant to the remonstrations of goddess 'Sachchika', the two names i. Ratnaprabha and ii. Yaksha were removed from the Gachchha.)
35. Devagupta VI 36. Siddha VI.
37. Kakka VII. 38. Devagupta VII.
39. Siddha VII. 40. Kakka VIII.
41. Devagupta VIII (938 A.D.)
42. Siddha VIII.
43. Kakka IX (Author of 'Pancha Pramâna')
44. Devagupta IX. (do. of 'Navatatwa Prakaran' 1015 A.D.)
45. Siddha IX. 46. Kakka X.
47. Devagupta X. 48. Siddha X.
49. Kakka XI.
50. Devagupta XI [Dr. Heornle's Mss. gives s. 1108 (1051 A.D.) My Mss. has s. 1105 (1048 A.D.)]
51. Siddha XI.
52. Kakka XII. (s. 1154 = 1097 A.D.)
53. Devagupta XII. 54. Siddha XII.
55. Kakka XIII. (s. 1252 = 1195 A.D.)
56. Devagupta XIII.
57. Siddha XIII. 58. Kakka XIV.
59. Devagupta XIV. 60. Siddha XIV.
61. Kakka XV. 62. Devagupta XV.
63. Siddha XV. 64. Kakka XVI.
65. Devagupta XVI.
66. Siddha XVI. (s. 1330 = 1273 A.D.)
67. Kakka XVII. (s. 1371 = 1314 A.D., Author of 'Gachcha Prabandha')
68. Devagupta XVII. (s. 1409 = 1352 A.D.)
69. Siddha XVII. (s. 1475 = 1418 A. D.)
70. Kakka XVII. (s. 1428 = 1441 A. D.)
71. Devagupta XVIII. (s. 1528 = 1471 A. D.)
72. Siddha XVIII. (s. 1565 = 1508 A. D.)
73. Kakka, XIX. (s. 1505 = 1553 A. D.)
74. Devagupta XIX. (s. 1631 = 1574 A. D.)
75. Siddha XIX. (s. 1652 = 1598 A. D.)

(Dr Heornele's list closes here)

76. Kakka XX. (Installed at Bikanir s. 1689 = 1632 A. D.)
77. Devagupta XX. (s. 1727 = 1670 A. D.)
78. Siddha XX. (s. 1767 = 1710 A. D.)
79. Kakka XXI. (s. 1107 = 1750 A. D.)
80. Devagupta XXI. (s. 1807 = 1750 A. D.)
81. Siddha XXI. (s. 1848 = 1790 A. D.)
82. Kakka XXII. (s. 1891 = 1934 A. D.)
83. Devagupta XXII.
84. Siddha XXII.
85. Kakka Suri XXIII.
(b) BARHA OR KHARATARA GACHCHHA.

[ Branches (i) Madhukara (ii) Rudrapalli (iii) Laghu (iv) Begarh (v) Pinpalid (vi) Barha Acharya (vii) Bhavaharsha (viii) Laghu Acharya (ix) Rangvijay (x) Mandoria. ]

38. Udyotana Suri, up to 937 A.D. (S.994).

32. Vardhamana Suri, up to 1031 A.D. (S. 1088) confirmed by Abu inscriptions. He created his pupil Jineshwara an Acharya in 1022 A.D. (S. 1079). Afterwards he performed the installation ceremony of the temple on Mt. Abu known as Vimal Vasi in S. 1088, the year in which he reached heaven.

40. Jineshwara Suri I. In 1023 A.D. (S. 1080) in a debate before king Durlabha of Anhillapura (Gujrat) he was victorious and got the biruda (title) of Kharatara which is borne by this gachchha up to the present moment.

c.f. "यद्योतनो युक्तमाहिकुंदो यदोधे
परिस्थितिः समर्निगमिः वस्मामान: ॥१२॥
तदतु सुवनालोकत्वं ख्यातावदत् ख्यातिरहः
स्ववरण रसा भूरि सुरविभूष जनिनेश्वः
‘खरतर’ श्रीत्वं ख्यातिं यशादवापगणीयम् ॥

[from Rajgriha Prashastti, dated s. 1355 = 1412 A.D.]

"संवतः दश चक्कितं नुपदारः
तास सीस जिनमांगः बिचारः ॥
41. Jina Chandra Suri I.

( It was he who foretold to Moujdn that he would become Sultan and on his ascending the throne, the Acharya was invited with great pomp to his capital Delhi where he resided for sometime and composed the work 'Sambegarangshala. He was succeeded by his brother disciple Abhai-deva and from him we find every fourth Acharya, of the gachchha named as Jina Chandra Suri )

42. Abhai-deva Suri, the great commentator.

43. Jina Ballava Suri. He survived only for two months after he became an Acharya and died in 1110 A.D. (S. 1167)—the first branch Madhukara started from 1110 A.D.

44. Jina Datta Suri. 1110 A.D.—1154 A.D. (S. 1167—1211.)—the second branch 'Rudrapali' started from 1147 A.D.


46. Jina Pati Suri. 1166—1220 A.D. (S. 1223—1277)

47. Jineshwar Suri II. 1221—1274 A.D. (S. 1278—1301)—the third branch 'Laghu Khara-
tara started from 1274 A.D. (S. 1331) and it was during his headship in 1248 A.D. (S. 1285) that the 'Chitrawal' gachchha was named "Tapa"-gachchha from Jagata Chandra Suri.


49. Jina Chandra Suri III, 1383—1312 A.D. (S. 1341—1376)


51. Jina Padma Suri, 1332—1343 A.D. (S. 1389—1400)

52. Jina Labdhi Suri, 1343—1349 A.D. (S. 1400—1406)

53. Jina Chandra Suri IV, 1349—1358 A.D. (S. 1406—1415)

54. Jinodaya Suri, 1358—1377 A.D. (S. 8415—1432)—the fourth branch 'Begarh' started during his headship.

55. Jina Raja Suri I, 1375—1404 A.D. (S. 1432—1461)

55A. Jina Vardhan Suri, 1404—1418 A.D. (S. 1461—1475)—the fifth branch 'Pipalia' started from S. 1474 (1417 A.D.)—this Acharya was expelled from the church in 1418 A.D. (S. 1475) and so not counted in the list.
56. Jina Bhadra Suri. 1418—1457 A.D. (S. 1475—1514)
57. Jina Chandra Suri V. 1457—1473 A.D. (S. 1504—1530)
58. Jina Samudra Suri. 1470—1418 A.D. (S. 1530—1555)
59. Jina Hansa Suri I. 1498—1525 A.D. (S. 1555—1582)—sixth branch Barha Acharya started from S. 1564 (1507 A.D.) Karuâmâti gachchha started from S. 1570 (1513 A.D.)
60. Jina Manikya Suri. 1525—1555 A.D. (S. 1582—1612)
63. Jina Râja Suri II. 1618—1642 A.D. (S. 1674—1699)—eighth branch Laghu Acharya started from S. 1616 (1622 A.D.)
64. Jina Ratna Suri. 1642—1654 A.D. (S. 1699—1711)—ninth branch Ranga Vijaya started from S. 1700 (1643 A.D.)
65. Jina Chandra Suri VII. 1654—1709 A.D. (S. 1711—1763)


68. Jina Labha Suri. 1747—1777 A.D. (S. 1804—1834)

69. Jina Chandra Suri. VIII. 1777—1799 A.D. (S. 1134—1156)


71. Jina Soukhyia Suri. IX. 1835—1861 A.D. (S. 1892—1917)


75. Jina Charitra Suri. 1911 A.D. (S. 1167)—the present head of the gachchha.

[Dr. Heornle adds to Dr. Klatt's list No. 71. Jina Mahendra (S. 1892—1914) and 72, Jina Mukti; but these pontiffs belong to another branch of the gachchha.]
(b-1) RANGA VIJYA SAKHA.

[It is the 9th branch of 'Kharatara gachcha' in whose list (b) we find Jina Raja Suri as No. 63. Both his disciples Jina Ratna and Jina Ranga assumed headship, the former of the main line as No. 64 and the other Jina Ranga also as No. 64 of this branch which got its name as 'Ranga Vijaya', from this Suri and has been known so up to the present time.]

64. Jina Ranga Suri. (died in S. 1711 = 1654 A.D.)

65. Jina Chandra VII.
68. Jina Akshaya.
69. Jina Chandra VIII.
70. Jina Nandivardhana.
71. Jina Jayashekhara.
72. Jina Kalyâna.
73. Jina Chandra IX. (died in S. 1941 = 1884 A.D.)

74. Jina Ratna Suri (succeeded in 1884 A.D. and is the present head of this branch).
(e) **TAPA GACHCHHA.**

[The list of this Gachchha does not count No. 1, Mahavira, and includes No. 7 in No. 6 and No. 10 in No. 9: So the number of Udyotana Suri comes to 35 instead of 38. Dr. Klatt published the list in Indian Antiquary Vol. XI P 253. The Gachchha was named as 'Tapa' from S. 1285 (1211 A.D.) during the headship of No. 44 Jagatchandra Suri.]

35. Udyotana / 36. Sarvadeva I.
37. Deva. 38. Sarvadeva II.
39. Yashobhadra and Nemichandra. (brother disciples.)
40. Munichandra (contemporary of Hema-chandra).
41. Ajitadeva. 42. Bijoyasinha.
43. Somaprabha I and Maniratna.
44. Jagatchandra. (S. 1285 = 1228 A. D.)
45. Devendra (author of Karma grantha, died S. 1327 = 1270 A. D.)
46. Dharmaghosha (died S. 1357 = 1300 A.D.)
47. Somaprabha II, died S. 1373 = 1316 A.D.)
48. Somatilaka, (died S. 1424 = 1367 A.D.)
49. Devasundara.
50. Somesundara, (died S. 1499 = 1442 A.D.)
51. Munisundara (died S. 1503 = 1446 A. D.)
52. Ratnashekhara (died S. 1517 = 1460 A.D.)
53. Lakshmisagara.
54. Sumatisadhu.
55. Hemavimala. (during his time 'Karuamati started from S. 1562 = 1505 A.D. and 'Parshwachandra', started from S. 1572 = 1515 A.D.)
56. Anandavimala. (died S. 1596 = 1539 A.D.)
57. Vijayadana (died S. 1622 = 1565. A.D.)
58. Heeravijaya. (contemporary of Akbar, died S. 1652 = 1595. A.D.)
59. Vijayasena. (died S. 1671 = 1614. A.D.)
60. Vijayadeva. (died S. 1713 = 1656. A.D.)
61. Vijayaprabha.
   (Dr. Klatt's list closes here.)
62. Vijayaratna.
63. Vijayakshema.
64. Vijayadayya.
65. Vijayadharma I.
66. Vijayajinendra.
67. Vijayadhanshwar.
68. Vijayadevendra.
69. Vijayadharma II.
(c-1) PAYACHAND OR PARSHWACHANDRA GACHCHHA.

[The list of the Gachchha counts from Goutama, the first 'ganadhara' of Mahavira, instead of beginning from Mahavira or Sudharma as in (b) or (c). It is a branch of the 'Tapa' and so we find, up to No. 40 Munichandra, similarity in names with slight difference. Unlike Tapa it does not include Nos. 7 and 10 in Nos. 6 and 9 respectively. It excludes Dinna Suri (No. 14) from the list. The number, therefore, of Udyotana Suri comes to 37. Dr. Klatt does not explain this (Indian Antiquary Vol. XXIII p. 181). The Mss. give the date of Indradinna (No. 13) as 74 B.C.]

37. Udyotana.
38. Sarvadeva I. presentin S. 1010 (953 A.D.)
39. Deva I. 40. Sarvadeva II.
41. Yashobhadra. 42. Nemichandra.
43. Munichandra.
44. Deva II. brother pupil with Ajitadeva No. 41. of (c); (died in S. 1226 = 1169 A.D.)
45. Padmaprabha 46. Prasannachandra.
47. Gunasamudra, Dr. Klatt mentions Jayashekhara as 47 and again as 49. My Mss. has only one 'Jayashekhara 48; possibly it may be a mistake of Dr. Klatt's Mss.)
48. Jayasekhara (S. 1301 = 1244, A.D.)
49. Vayarasena or Vajrasena (converted many families in S. 1342 = 1285 A.D.)
50. Hematilaka (S. 1362 = 1305 A.D.)
51. Ratnashekhara (S. 1399 = 1342 A.D.)
52. Hemachandra.
53. Purnachandra (S. 1424 = 1367 A.D.)
54. Hemahansa (S. 1453 = 1396 A.D.)
55. Lakshminivas Panyas.
56. Punyaratna Panyas.
57. Sadhuratna Panyas.
58. Parshwachandra Suri (S. 1565 = 1508 A.D. founded the Gachchha; died S. 1612 = 1555 A.D.)
59. Samarachandra (S. 1626 = 1569 A.D.)
60. Rayachandra (S. 1669 = 1672 A.D.)
61. Vimalachandra (S. 1674 = 1617 A.D.)
62. Jayachandra (S. 1698 = 1641, A.D.)
63. Padmachandra (S. 1744 = 1687 A.D.)
64. Munichandra (S. 1750 = 1693 A.D.)
65. Nemichandra (S. 1797 = 1740 A.D.)
66. Kanakachandra (S. 1810 = 1753 A.D.)
67. Sivachandra (S. 1833 = 1777 A.D.)
68. Bhanuchandra (S. 1837 = 1780 A.D.)
69. Vivekachandra. 70. Labdhichandra.
73. Bharaticchandra and Devachandra,
(e-2) TAPA GACHCHHA-VIJAYA SAKHA.

Nos. 1 to 60 the same as (c)

60. Vijayadeva Suri.
61. Vijayasinha Suri.
62. Satyavijaya Gani.
63. Kapuravijaya Gani.
64. Kshamavijaya Gani.
65. Jinvijaya Gani.
66. Uttamavijaya Gani.
67. Padmavijaya Gani.
68. Rupavijaya Gani.
69. Kirtivijaya Gani.
70. Kasturavijaya Gani.
71. Manivijaya Gani.
72. Buddhivijaya Gani.
73. Ananadvijaya Suri.
74. Kamalavijaya Acharya, the present pontiff.

(d) LUMPAKA GACHCHHA.

The tradition is that the Gachchha took its rise from Lunkaji, who flourished in S. 1508 = 1451 A. D. But the first sadhu who occupied the pontifical chair of the new line was Bhana Rishi. He was a native of Arhot-
wada, belonged to Porwad caste and was self-initiated in Ahmedabad in S. 1524 = 1467 A. D. In some Mss. the date is S. 1528 = 1471 A. D.; but in Jain Tatwadarsha, by Atmaramji the date is S. 1533 = 1476 A. D. Another Mss. give S. 1531 = 1474 A. D. The Gachcha's principal branches are: (i) Gujrati, (ii) Nagori (iii) Utradhi. In the list of the heads of the Gachchhas, which begins with Mahavira, as usual, the names are the same up to Arya Mahagiri, No 10. The dates in my Mss. are in regular order up to 453 A. D., when the Jain canons were reduced to writing. The dates, against the names of each, denote the year of their demise.]

10. Mahagiri, 282 B. C.
11. Balasinha, 247 B. C.
12. Shanta, 195 B. C.
13. Shyama, 154 B. C.
14. Sandila, 121 B. C.
15. Jitadharma, 73 B. C.
16. Samudra, 19 B. C.
17. Nandila, 64 A. D.
18. Nagahasti, 117 A. D.
19. Revati, 191 A. D.
20. Skhandil, 267 A. D.
21. Sinha, 287 A. D.
22. Samita, 321 A. D.
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<th>No.</th>
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<th>Year</th>
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<td>23</td>
<td>Nāgārjun</td>
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<td>Bhutadin</td>
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<td>Lohitashpa</td>
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<td>Dusha</td>
<td>448 A.D.</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>Devardhi</td>
<td>453 A.D.</td>
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<td>Virabhadra I</td>
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<td>Variesa Sena</td>
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<td>Harsha Sena</td>
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<td>Bhāna Rishi</td>
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<td>Bheeda, (S. 1540 = 1493, A.D.)</td>
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<td>Noona (S. 1556 = 1499 A.D.)</td>
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<td>Bhima</td>
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</table>
68. Sorbo.  
69. Roopa. (S. 1566 = 1509 A.D.)  
70. Jiva. (Nāgori Branch took its rise from this Acharaya).  
71. Vara Sinha. (Mss. closes here.)

Atmaramji's list gives as follows:—

63. Bhana (S. 1533 = 1476 A.D.)
64. Roopa (S. 1568 = 1511 A.D.)
65. Jiva (S. 1578 = 1521 A.D.)
66. Vara Sinha, Senior (S. 1587 = 1530 A.D.)
67. Vara Sinha (S. 1606 = 1549 A.D.)
68. Jashwanta (S. 1649 = 1592 A.D.)

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(d-1) LUMPAKA GACHCHHA.
(Gujrati—Dhanrajpaskha Branch.)

1. Roopsingji.  
2. Jivarajaji.  
3. Varasingji (Barh).  
4. Varasingji (Laghu).  
5. Jashwantasingji.  
6. Roopsingji II.  
7. Damodarsingji.  
8. Dhanrajji.  
11. Dharmasingji.  
15. Akshayarajaji.  
17. Amararajaji.  
18. Kshemarajaji.
(e) ANCHAL GACHCHHA.

[The Gachha is also known as 'Vidhipaksha and started from S. 1214 = 1157 A.D.

Its Pattavali was published by Dr. Klatt in 'Indian Antiquary Vol XXIII p. 174, cf. Dr. Buhler's list in Epigraphia Indica Vol. II, p 39.]

35. Udyotana. 36. Sarvadeva.
41. Suvinayachandra. 42. Gunasamudra.
43. Vijayaprabha. 44. Narachandra.
45. Virachandra. 46. Jayasinha.
47. Aryarakshita.

(S. 1202—12236 = 1145—1179 A. D.)

(S. 1236—1258 = 1179—1201 A. D.)
49. Dharmaghosha.

(S. 1258—1268 = 1201—1210 A. D.)
50. Mahendrasinha.

(S. 1269—1309 = 1212—1252 A. D.)
51. Sinhaprabhu.

(S. 1309—1313 = 1252—1256 A. D.)
52. Ajitasinha.

(S. 1314—1339 = 1257—1282 A. D.)
53. Devendrasinha.

(S. 1339—1371 = 1282—1313 A. D.)
54. Dharmaprabha.
   (S. 1391—1393 = 1313—1336 A. D.)
55. Sinhatilaka.
   (S. 1393—1395 = 1336—1338 A. D.)
56. Mahendra.
   (S. 1395—1444 = 1338—1387 A. D.)
57. Merutunga.
   (S. 1446—1471 = 1389—1414 A. D.)
58. Jayakirti
   (S. 1473—1500 = 1416—1443 A. D.)
59. Jayakeshari.
   (S. 1501—1542 = 1444—1485 A. D.)
60. Siddhantasagara.
   (S. 1542—1560 = 1485—1503 A. D.)
61. Bhavaşågar.
   (S. 1560—1583 = 1503—1526 A. D.)
62. Gunanidhåna.
   (S. 1584—1602 = 1527—1545 A. D.)
63. Dharmamurti.
   (S. 1602—1673 = 1545—1613 A. D.)
64. Kalyånasågara.
   (S. 1670—1718 = 1613—1661 A. D.)
65. Amarasågara.
   (S. 1718—1762 = 1661—1705 A. D.)
66. Vidyåsågara.
   (S. 1762—1797 = 1705—1740 A. D.)
67. Udayasāgara.
   (S. 1797—1826 = 1740—1769 A. D.)
68. Kirtisāgara.
   (S. 1826—1843 = 1769—1786 A. D.)
69. Punyasāgara.
   (S. 1843—1860 = 1786—1803 A. D.)
70. Muktisāgara.
   (S. 1860—1892 = 1803—1835 A. D.)
71. Rajendrasagara.
   (S. 1892—1914 = 1835—1857 A. D.)
72. Ratnasagara.
   (S. 1914—1928 = 1857—1871 A. D.)
73. Vivekasāgara, from S. 1928 = 1877 A.D.

(f) KARUMANATI GACHCHHA.
1. Mahan Karhua.
   (S. 1524—1564 = 1467—1507 A. D.)
2. M. Khima.
   (S. 1564—1571 = 1507—1514 A. D.)
3. M. Beera.
   (S. 1571—1601 = 1514—1544 A. D.)
   (S. 1601—1644 = 1544—1587 A. D.)
5. M. Tejapal I.
   (S. 1644—1646 = 1587—1589 A. D.)
   (S. 1646—1661 = 1589—1604 A. D.)

7. M. Jinadas.
   (S. 1661—1670 = 1674—1513 A. D.)

8. M. Tejapala II (S. 1670—1684 = 1613—1627 A. D. He was present in 1627 A.D.)
   with his chief disciple Kalyana and others,
   when the MSS. was written.

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(g) THERAPANTHIS.

Bhikhamjoe Swami. (S. 1817 = 1761 A.D.)
Bharamdjee Swami. (S. 1860 = 1803 A.D.)
Raichandjee Swami. (S. 1878 = 1821 A.D.)
Jitmaljoe Swami. (S. 1908 = 1851 A. D.)
Maghrajjoe Swami. (S. 1938 = 1881 A. D.)
Manakklajoe Swami. (S. 1949 = 1892 A. D.)
Dalchandjee Swami. (S. 1954 = 1897 A.D.)
Kaluramajoe Swami. (S. 1966 = 1909 A.D.)
   —the present pontiff.
B. DIGAMBARA SCHOOL OR MULA SANGHA.

(a) Nandi Sangha. Chitor Sakha.

[This Nandi Sangha was founded by Meghanandin, a disciple of Guptigupta or Arhadbali and is also known as Saraswati Gachchha and Balatkara Gana. The following list is based upon the Pattavali as lately published in the Jain Siddhanta Bhaskara, a Digambar Journal and by Dr. Hoernle in "Indian Antiquary" Vols. XX, pp. 341—361 and XXI, pp. 57—84. The pontiffs of the Gachchha generally use the four surnames viz. Nandin, Chandra, Kirti and Bhushana. The table begins from Gautama the first Gunadhara or disciple of Mahavira who is known as the founder of the Mula Sangha by the Digambaris. The dates against the names indicate the year of their succession.]

1. Gotama up to 515 B.C. 2. Sudharama 503 B.C.
5. Nandi 435 B.C. 6. Aparajita 413 B.C.
17. Buddhilinga 212 B.C. 18. Deva I 198 B.C.
23. Dhruva Sena 93 B.C. 24. Kansa 61 B.C.
27. Bhadrabahu II 16 B.C.

(Other dates are 31, 33 and 53 B.C. See notes by Dr. Hoernle, Indian Antiquary Vol. XX pp. 341 and 357—360).

32. Umāșvāmin 85 A.D. 33. Lohacharya 96 A.D.
34. Yasahkirti 154 A.D. 35. Yasonandin 201 A.D.
36. Devanandin I 37. Jayanandin
251 A.D. 296 A.D.
38. Gunanandin 39. Vajranandin
307 A.D. 329 A.D.
40. Kumarnandin 41. Lokachandra
360 A.D. 396 A.D.
42. Prabhachandra 43. Nemichandra
421 A.D. 430 A.D.
44. Bhanunandin 45. Nayanananandin
451 A.D. 468 A.D.
46. Vasunandin 47. Viranandin
474 A.D. 504 A.D.
48. Ratnanandin 49. Manikyanandin
528 A.D. 544 A.D.
50. Meghchandra 51. Shantikirti I
560 A.D. 585 A.D.
52. Merukirti 629 A. D.
53. Mahikirti 647 A. D.
54. Vishnunandin 669 A. D.
55. Shribhushana I 678 A. D.
56. Shricandhra 692 A. D.
57. Shrinandin 708 A. D.
58. Desabhushana 708 A. D.
59. Anantakirti 728 A. D.
60. Dharmanandin 751 A. D.
61. Vidyánandi 783 A. D.
62. Ramachandra 790 A. D.
63. Rāma kirti 821 A. D.
64. Abhayachandra 840 A. D.
65. Navachandra 859 A. D.
66. Nagachandra 882 A. D.
67. Harinandi 891 A. D.
68. Harichandra 917 A. D.
69. Mahichandra I 933 A. D.
70. Maghachandra I 966 A. D.
71. Lakshmichandra 970 A. D.
72. Gunakirti 991 A. D.
73. Gunachandra 1009 A. D.
74. Lokachandra 1022 A. D.
75. Shrutakirti 1037 A. D.
76. Bhāvachandra 1058 A. D.
77. Mahichandra II 1083 A. D.
78. Māghachandra II
    1087 A.D.
79. Brahmanandin
    1091 A.D.
80. Devanandin II
    1098 A.D.
81. Visvachandra
    1099 A.D.
82. Harinandin
    1103 A.D.
83. Bhavanandin
    1110 A.D.
84. Devanandin III
    1113 A.D.
85. Vidyachandra
    1119 A.D.
86. Surachandra
    1127 A.D.
87. Maghnandin II
    1131 A.D.
88. Jnananandanin
    1142 A.D.
89. Gangākirti
    1149 A.D.
90. Simhakirti
    1152 A.D.
91. Hemakirtti
    1159 A.D.
92. Charunandin
    1166 A.D.
93. Neminandin II
    1173 A.D.
94. Nābhikirti
    1175 A.D.
95. Narendra kirti
    1184 A.D.
96. Shrichandra II
    1191 A.D.
97. Padmakirti
    1196 A.D.
98. Vardhamāna
    1199 A.D.
99. Akalankachandra
    1200 A.D.
100. Lalitakirti
    1204 A.D.
101. Kesavachandra
    1205 A.D.
102. Chārūkirti
    1207 A.D.
103. Abhayakirti
    1207 A.D.
104. Vasantakirti 1209 A. D.
106. Vishalakirti 1214 A. D.
108. Ratnakirti II. 1253 A. D.
110. Padmanandin 1393 A. D.
112. Prabhachandra III. 1514 A. D.
114. Dharamachandra II. 1546 A. D.
116. Chandrakirti 1605 A. D.
118. Narendrakirti 1665 A. D.
120. Jagatakirti 1713 A. D.
122. Mahendrakirti I. 1758 A. D.
124. Surendrakirti 1795 A. D.
126. Nainakirti 1826 A. D.
128. Mahendrakirti 1881 A. D.
105. Prakshantikirti 1211 A. D.
107. Dharmachandra 1239 A. D.
109. Prabhâchandra 1328 A. D.
111. Subhachandra 1440 A. D.
113. Jînachandra II. 1524 A. D.
115. Lalitakirti 1565 A. D.
117. Devendrakirti 1634 A. D.
119. Surendrakirti 1676 A. D.
121. Devendrakirti II. 1735 A. D.
123. Khemendrakirti 1765 A. D.
125. Sukhendrakirti 1822 A. D.
127. Devendrakirti III. 1881 A. D.
(a-1) NAGOR SAKHA.

[After Jina Chandra II (No. 113) we find two lines, as one section removed to Nagor and the other continued to reside in Chitor.]

113. Jinachandra II, up to 1524 A.D.
114. Ratnakirti III, 1529 A.D.
115. Bhuvanakirti, 1533 A.D.
116. Dharmakirti, 1544 A.D.
117. Vishalakirti, from 1544 A.D.; there is a break down in the list up to 1740 A.D. when Bhuvanabhushana (120) succeeded.
120. Bhuvanabhushana up to 1745 A.D.
121. Vijayakirti 1773 A.D.
122. Lokendrakirti 1783 A.D.
123. Bhuvanakirti II from 1793 A.D.

(a-2) SUBHA CHANDRA SHAKHA.

[The line starts from Acharya Shubha Chandra No. 116 author of Pandava Purana. In the list the names differ from Vishalakirti No. 106. as below.]

110. Prabhachandra. 111. Padmanandini.
116. Shubhachandra. 117. Sumatikirti
120. Ramakirti. 121. Yashakirti.
128. Chandrakirti

SENA GANA.

[ The list is given from the Jaina Siddhanta Bhaskara. Up to Bhadrabahu II (No. 28) there is little difference. Next comes Lohacharya, a disciple of Bhadrabahu II and the ‘Gana’ was founded by his disciple Jina Sena I, from whom the name is derived. ]

1. Lohâcharya I. 2. Jina Sena I.
25. Lohacharya II.
27. Sura Sena.
29. Devendra.
19. Durlava Sena.
33. Sree Sena.
35. Some Sena I.
37. Dhara Sena III.
39. Soma Sena II.
41. Deva Sena II.
41. Vira.
45. Guna Sena II.
47. Soma Sena III.
49. Gunabhadra III.
51. Jina Sena II.
53. Chhatra Sena II.

32. Dhara Sena II.
34. Laksmi Sena I.
36. Shrutavira.
48. Deva Sena I.
40. Gunabhadra II.
42. Vira Sena II.
44. Manikya Sena I.
46. Laksmi Sena II.
48. Manikya Sena II.
50: Soma Sena IV.
52: Samantabhadra II.
(b) KASHTHA SANGHA.

[ The list is taken from 'Jaina Siddhanta Bhaskara ]

1. Mahavira
2. Goutama.
3. Sudharmā.
5. Vishnu.
7. Aparājita
8. Govardhana.
9. Bhadrabahu I.
10. Vishākhā.
11. Prosthila.
14. Jayasena I.
15. Dhritisena.
16. Vijay.
17. Gangadeva
18. Dharmasena.
22. Dhruvasena.
23. Kansa.
25. Yashobhadra.
26. Bhadrabāhu II.
27. Lohācharya.
29. Virasena.
30. Bramhasena.
31. Rudrasena.
32. Bhadrasena.
33. Kirtisena.
34. Jayakirti.
35. Vishvakirti.
36. Abhayasena.
37. Bhutasena.
38. Bhavakirti.
39. Vishvachandra.
40. Abhayachandra.
41. Māghachandra.
42. Nemichandra.
43. Vinayachandra.
44. Bālachandra.
45. Tribhuvanachandra I.
46. Rāmachandra.
47. Vijayachandra.
48. Yashakitri I.
49. Abhayakirti.  
50. Mahāsena.
51. Kundakirti.  
52. Tribhubanachandra II.
53. Rāmasena.  
54. Harshasena.
55. Guna Sena.  
56. Kumārsena I.
57. Pratāpsena.  
58. Māhavasena.
59. Vijayasena.  
60. Nayanasaena.
61. Shreyānsasena.  
62. Anantakirti.
63. Kamalakirti I.  
64. Kshemakirti I.
65. Hemakirti.  
66. Kamalakirti.
67. Kumārsena II.  
68. Hemachandra.
69. Padmanandni.  
70. Yashahkirti.
71. Kshemakirti.  
72. Tribhuvanakirti.
73. Sahasrakirti.  
74. Mahichandra.
75. Devendrakirti.  
76. Jagatakirti.
77. Lalitakirti.  
78. Rajendrakirti.
79. Munindrakirti.