FOREWORD.

Except for a few brief and sketchy accounts of Śaiva Siddhānta, there have been no comprehensive treatises in English expounding the doctrines of this ancient and influential school of thought. Fewer still are expositions of special aspects of this philosophy. There has been great need of books of this type dealing in a systematic manner with different aspects of Śaiva Siddhānta. Dr. V. Ponniah has done well in choosing the epistemology of this school for special treatment; because no system of Indian Philosophy set out to investigate its proper subject matter until it has given a critique of knowledge and considered how we come by truth. In conformity with this wise old practice, the Śaiva Siddhānta has given us an account of the pramāṇas which it has accepted and described the nature and the conditions of truth. Dr. V. Ponniah is well qualified to expound the epistemological doctrines of the Śaiva Siddhānta to the English reader, since he has made a deep study of the Tamil philosophical literature of the School. Dr. V. Ponniah expounds the doctrines with sympathetic understanding. I do not think this is any disadvantage; for this system has suffered from expositions by its opponents. Dr. Ponniah has given a lucid presentation of the central problems of epistemology and shown how these have been tackled by the Śaiva Siddhānta. He has compared the views of the Siddhāntin with those of other Indian Darśanas and Western systems of philosophy. There has been great need of such a book. It will help the reader struggling to get his mind clear about the diverse solutions of the problem of the nature, the means and the criteria of Truth.

Annamalainagar, 11th August 1952.

R. RAMANUJACHARI
PREFACE

This book is the thesis submitted by the author for the Ph. D., degree of the University of Annamalai, with certain improvements made in the light of suggestions given to him by the University.

An attempt is made in this book to present the Saiva Siddhānta Theory of Knowledge with special reference to Sivajñāna Bhāsyam. No student of Tamil literature can be unfamiliar with the Bhāsyakāra by name Sivajñāna Yogi, who is a grammarian, a poet and a philosopher all combined. It is Sivajñāna Yogi’s interpretation of the philosophy of Saiva Siddhānta, that is generally accepted by the Tamil-reading public as the one way leading to truth. Saiva Siddhānta owes a great deal to him for its development and exposition. But the cause of Saiva Siddhānta has suffered considerably in the post-Sivajñāna Yogi period for lack of men who had adequate knowledge of both Tamil and Sanskrit to understand Siddhānta literatures. The English-reading public of South India and Ceylon too are unable to have any consistent view of the philosophy of Saiva Siddhānta for want of proper books in English on the subject. Except for the works of Mr. J. M. Nallaswamy Pillai and Rev. H. R. Hoisington and the two books on Saiva Siddhānta—one by Dr. Violet Paranjoti and the other by Mr. S Siva-pathasundaram, there are practically no books in English on the Siddhānta. The works of the first two men are mostly in the form of translations, which are not very satisfactory. Dr. Violet Paranjoti who professes the Christian faith gives in her book merely a bird’s eye view of the Siddhānta and its evaluation from the idealist’s point of view. Consequently it cannot claim to preach Suddha Siddhānta, which is a
realistic system of philosophy. Mr. Sivapathasundaram's 'The Saiva School of Hinduism' does not even feign to treat the Siddhānta Theory of knowledge. It is concerned solely with the ethical part of the Siddhānta. The writer of this thesis has betaken upon himself the task of presenting Saiva Siddhānta in its true light and to evaluate it from a realistic standpoint. This latter aspect together with the critical considerations and comparisons of the views of some alien schools of thought on most of the topics treated constitutes the original contribution of this thesis. Besides, the method adopted is claimed to be new in respect of the presentation of the system of Saiva Siddhānta, though it cannot be said to be so as regards the other schools of thought.

The author expresses his gratitude to Professor A. Chidambarama Chettiar, Head of the Department of Tamil in the University of Annamalai for the suggestions and encouragements that he gave him during his period of Research. Indebtedness is also due to the University of Annamalai for the suggestions given to the author to improve his thesis and to the Government of Ceylon, for granting him a Research Studentship in Tamil for two years to write this thesis.

V. PONNIAH.
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Saiva Siddhānta Literature</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) The Sanskrit Literature of the Saiva Siddhānta</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) The Tamil Literature of the Saiva Siddhānta</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Philosophical Literature</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Devotional Literature</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Nature of Knowledge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) General</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Nature of Jñānam or Knowledge according to Saiva Siddhānta</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) The Arhats’ view of Knowledge</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv) The view of Knowledge of the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(v) The Pāñcarātra view of Knowledge</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(vi) The Sāṅkhya view of Knowledge</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(vii) The view of Knowledge of the Mādhyamikas</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(viii) The views of Knowledge of the Sautrāntikas and the Vaibāsikas</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ix) The Lokāyata view of Knowledge</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(x) The views of Knowledge of the Indriya ātma vādins, Sūkṣma Deha atmavādins and the Prāṇa atmavādins</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(xi) The Activity Theory of Knowledge 69  
(xii) The Relation Theory of Knowledge 69  
(xiii) The Self-subsistencia Theory of Knowledge of the Yogācāras 70  
(xiv) The Self-subsistence Theory of Knowledge of the Advaita Vedāntins 71  

4. Forms of Knowledge  
(1) Svarūpa lakṣāna and Tatastha lakṣāna 73  
(2) Classification of Jñānam or Knowledge 74  
   (i) Anubhava or immediate Experiential Knowledge 76  
   (ii) Smṛti and Memory 80  
   (iii) Dream-cognition 83  
   (iv) Samsaya or Doubt 86  
   (v) Viparyaya or Erroneous Knowledge 94  
   (vi) Nirvikalpa and Savikalpa jñānams 98  
   (vii) Sivānubhava jñānam or Immediate Experiential Knowledge of Siva 113  

5. Factors of valid Knowledge  
   (i) Sādhāraṇa and Asādhāraṇa lakṣaṇas 119  
   (ii) Pramāṇa and Prameyam 123  
   (iii) Pramāṇa and Pramiti or Pramā 130  
   (iv) Vvañjakas or Manifestors of Knowledge  
       (a) Pāsa-jñānams 153  
       (b) Siva-jñānam 156  

6. Theory of Perception  
   (i) Nature of sense-data 157  
   (ii) Meaning of the term ‘Perceive’ 159
(iii) Sensing and Perception ... 160
(iv) Sense-data and matter ... 164
   (a) Nature of Form and Size of bodies viewed from various points ... 166
   (b) Illusory objects ... 167
   (c) Double vision and complete hallucination ... 168
(v) Definition of Perception ... 169
(vi) Classification of Perception ... 188
(vii) Abhāva ... 197

7. Theory of Inference
(i) Reasoning in general ... 202
(ii) The Indian Syllogistic form of reasoning ... 207
(iii) Definition of Anumāna or Inference ... 221
(iv) The Grounds of Inference ... 225
(v) Classification of Inference
   (a) Svārtha and Parārtha ... 238
   (b) Anvaya and Vyatireki ... 239
(vi) Other manifestors of knowledge that can be included under Anumāna ... 241

8. Theory of Verbal Testimony
(i) Kāraka Sakti (productive potency) ... 244
(ii) Jñāpaka Sakti (informative potency) 249
(iii) Nature of Āgama Pramāṇa (verbal testimony) ... 257
(iv) Classification of Āgama Pramāṇa ... 261
(v) Signification of a word ... 263
(vi) Signification of a sentence ... 270
(vii) Aitiṣṭya (tradition) ... 275

9. Fallacies
(i) General ... 276
(ii) The Fallacies of Inference
(a) Pakṣābhāsa or Fallacy of the Minor Term ... ... 277
(b) Hetvābhāsa or Fallacy of the Reason
   (1) Varieties of Asiddha or Unproved Assumption ... ... 278
   (2) Kinds of Viruddha or Contradictory Reason ... ... 281
(c) Drṣṭāntabhāsa or Fallacy of Example
   (1) Anvayi or Affirmative Forms of Drṣṭāntabhāsa ... ... 285
   (2) Vyatireki or Negative Forms of Drṣṭāntabhāsa ... ... 288
(iii) Nigrahasthāna or Grounds of Defeat or Clinchers ... ... 293

10. Truth and Error
   (i) Validity of Knowledge ... ... 301
   (ii) Theories of Error
       (1) Asat-khyāti ... ... 309
       (2) Anirvacaniya-khyāti ... ... 311
       (3) Sat-khyāti ... ... 313
           Ātma-khyāti ... ... 316
           Ākhyāti ... ... 318
           Anyathā-khyāti ... ... 320
   (iii) Ātma-jñānam or True Knowledge ... ... 322
   (iv) Conclusion
       (1) Rationalism ... ... 326
       (2) Sensationalism or Sensism ... ... 327
       (3) Innatism ... ... 329
       (4) Intuitionism ... ... 330
       (5) Pragmatism ... ... 332
       (6) Realism ... ... 333

Index ... ... 337
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

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C.R.  Critical Realism by G. Dawes Hicks (Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1938)

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Error</th>
<th>Correction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>If</td>
<td>if</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>The etymology</td>
<td>the etymology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Sveātsvetara</td>
<td>Svetāsvetara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>aspects</td>
<td>aspect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>requires</td>
<td>require</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Tiruvāatus</td>
<td>Tiruvāvaṭu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>authors</td>
<td>author</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>detail</td>
<td>detailed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Darśna</td>
<td>Darśana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>eighth</td>
<td>eighth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>nineth</td>
<td>ninth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>the contribution</td>
<td>their contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>work</td>
<td>works</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>treat</td>
<td>treats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>according</td>
<td>according to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Dr. More</td>
<td>Dr. Moore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>logical</td>
<td>logically</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>madhavites</td>
<td>Madhvites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>athūla</td>
<td>sthūla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>of</td>
<td>or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Prauśkara</td>
<td>Pauśkara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>146</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Buddhas</td>
<td>Bauddhas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>157</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>G. E. More</td>
<td>G. E. Moore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>158</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>use</td>
<td>use it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>macroscopic</td>
<td>microscopic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>182</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>genius</td>
<td>genus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Line</td>
<td>Error</td>
<td>Correction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>183</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>genius</td>
<td>genus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>187</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Varadavisṇu miśra</td>
<td>Garaḍavisṇu miśra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>196</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ākhāsa</td>
<td>ākāsa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>232</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>vyāpti</td>
<td>vyakti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>285</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>of the</td>
<td>or the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>292</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>heterogue</td>
<td>heterologue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>305</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>in</td>
<td>is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>307</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>extrinsic</td>
<td>extrinsic to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>317</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>ojects</td>
<td>objects</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCTION

The Saiva Siddhānta school of philosophy is, unlike those of the Naiyāyikās and the Vaiśeṣikās, a living philosophy. It is the one that is current in the whole of the Tamil land. A study of a system of philosophy without a historical background will prove to be a futile abstraction; so an attempt is made in the following pages in the way of an introduction to trace the origin and early history of the Saiva Siddhānta. To begin with, we are confronted with an insuperable difficulty; if we note the fact that the ancient Tamils, as a race, were no lovers of history, we are in a pitiful plight when we attempt to trace the development of the inner workings of their minds; the historical method was not known to them; but yet they have given us such fine literature in the form of myths, legends, dogmas and cults that we stand indebted to them for life; they have evolved systems of philosophy and religion, which stand comparison with the latest products of European speculation and belief; their poetry, both secular and religious is soul-stirring and soul-moving; with such scanty material as their works in the forms of original compositions and commentaries and the few records that they have left us in the way of inscriptions, together with the few references found in contemporaneous literature, we have to construct a history of the Saiva Siddhānta; there is tradition too, handed down from generation to generation; but this is not trust-worthy, since it has much material whimsical and fantastical more to be rejected than to be accepted.

1 In the work, called Iraiyanār Akapporul the commentator Nakkirar who is said to be a member of the

1 I.A. pp. 6.
Third Sangam, speaks of God (Siva) with matted hair who burnt to ashes the three Cities, as sitting in deliberations with the other members of the First Sangam. Even if the account given in this commentary be not believed, one point is quite clear, that the conception of God Siva as a deity and perhaps as the Supreme One is prior to its adoption and absorption in Sanskrit literature. For nowhere in the Sanskrit literature of the period can be seen the mention at least of the word Siva as referring to the name of a deity. The Rigveda and the Yajur Veda, the oldest known Sanskrit literary compositions contain a good number of references to the deities Varuna, Usas, Mitra etc., but do not refer to Siva as a deity. The Vedic period, at least the early part, is a polytheistic one and we need not trouble our heads over the apparent inconsistencies therein, when we take into consideration the facts that each of the Vedas is a compendium of many authors of widely different periods. It is said that the Vedic period (1500 B.C. to 600 B.C.) among the Aryans is non-sectarian in character. The views put forward in this age are not philosophical in the technical sense of the term. It is the Epic period (600 B.C. - 200 A.D.) that led to the development of the Upanishads and the formulation of the different Darsanas or systems of philosophy. The early part of this period gave rise to the Chândogya, Taittirîya, Aîyārīya, Kausitaki and parts of Kena and Bṛhadāranya Upanishads, which are all non-sectarian in their teachings. The second part of this period is computed to be responsible for the production of most of the verse Upanishads, viz., Īśa, Māndukya and parts of Kena and Bṛhadāranya Upanishads. The sectarian view did not stretch out its arms here too; the third part of this period is post-Buddhistic and is responsible for the composition of all the later Upanishads, viz., 1. I.P. vol 1 pps 63, 121 and 123.
Svetāsvetara, Kaṭha, Maitreyani etc., all of which are sectarian and show acquaintances with the orthodox systems; and in this period only, it is contended, that the Tamilian sectarian conception of God Siva must have found its way into the Aryan mind.

Tolkāppiyam, the oldest of the extant Tamil compositions, which is essentially a treatise on grammar does not speak of God Siva, though it has conceptions of the Deities Māyōn, Cēyōn Vēntan, Varuṇan and Korravai. The deity Māyōn is said to preside over forests, the deity Cēyōn over tracts of hilly districts, and the deities Vēntan and Varuṇan over tracts of pasture lands and of sea shores respectively; The deity Korravai seems to be a female deity, who controls the destinies of war-fare. Naccinārkkkiniyar, the famous commentator of ancient Tamil literary works identifies Korravai with Vana-Durga (female deity of the forest) a product of later Sanskrit literature. It is regretted that the celebrated commentator has not given us any clue how he was able to make such an identification which is on the very face of it absurd and not true to facts. Now we have no evidence of any collisions among the deities; there is no relative superiority of one deity to the other; and we are not in a position to say conclusively on the scanty evidence of a work on grammar whether the ancient Tamils had a conception of absolute God, who is far superior to every one of the five Deities given above. The God with matted hair, who burnt to ashes the three

1. T.P.N. Sutra 5 “Māyōn mēya kaṭurai yulakamun
Cēyōn mēya maivaraı yulakamum
Vēntan mēya timpuna lulakamum
Varuṇan mēya perumana lulakamum”

2. Ibid pp.193; P.P. Tirumurukāṟṟuppaṭai. line 258.
cities, is identified with Siva of the later Sanskrit works, Mayōn with Viṣṇu, Cēyōn with Skanda and Vēntan with Indra. There are two schools of thought as to the etymology of the word Varuṇan; some contend that it is purely a Sanskrit word, since it is found in the Rigveda; and others insist that it is a corrupt form of the Tamil word Vaṇṇan, which is one of the few words that have found their entrance even into the Rigveda. Preference is given to the latter view in this thesis for reasons adduced in the sequel.

To the Aryan, Varuṇa is the God of the sky, Viṣṇu the supporter of all the worlds and Indra the God of the atmospheric phenomena; to the Tamilian Varuṇan is the presiding deity of the sea shores, Viṣṇu identified with Mayōn is that of forest tracts, and Indra or Vēntan that of pasture lands. If it is held that the four deities Visnu, Skanda, Indra and Varuna of the Aryans were absorbed into Tolkappiyam, we would be in a fix to account for the fact that the deities Visnu and Skanda of the puranic period have found their way into the body of Tolkappiyam, which belongs rather to an early period. Certainly Indra was not known to the Aryans as a deity before they entered into India. Furthermore why should Varuna and Indra only of the Vedic Gods have a place in Tolkappiyam? What about the other Vedic deities, namely Maruts, Savtr, Sūrya, Pūṇan, the Aśvins, Soma etc.?

Moreover Tolkappiyanār, who is said to be well-versed in Sanskrit grammar cannot and would not make a mistake in the etymology of the word Varuṇan; If it

1. I.P. vol 1 pps 77 and 81.
2. T.N. pp. 1 - “Malkunir varaiπi naintira nirainta Tolkāp piyanenat tanpeyar tōrrip”
were a Sanskrit word, he would not have taken the mere form of the word and left the meaning out; therefore it is urged that the deities Mayōn, Cēyōn, Vēntaṅ, Varuṇaṅ and Koṟṇavaī are Tamilian in character and the confusion in identification with the later Aryan deities is due to the mischievous propagandists of Sanskrit literature and their ready supporters.

There is evidence in Tolkāppiyam itself of the impact and thrust of Aryan culture on the Tamilian; but there are stronger evidences in it for the persistence and purity of the Tamilian culture in spite of many influences to the contrary. There is a view that the Aryans never spoke the Sanskrit language and that they spoke different dialects of Prākrit. According to this view, Sanskrit is merely a written language and was specially made by the learned to preserve rare treatises on literature and philosophy for posterity; it was the lingua franca of the different tribes of the Aryans; The etymology of the word ‘Sanskrit’ meaning ‘that which is well made or refined’ is favourable to this view. If we accept this view - and it is felt we ought to - we shall be in a position to explain the paucity of Saiva Siddhānta literature in the Tamil language during the Saṅgam periods. When the Aryans invaded the territories of the Tamils and subjugated them, the Tamils too, it is presumed, adopted Sanskrit as the lingua franca. To the detriment of the growth of Tamilian spiritual culture, the learned among the Tamils began to write treatises on philosophy, religion etc., not in the Tamil language but in Sanskrit. Thus the early Saiva Siddhānta works called the Āgamas appeared only in the Sanskrit language. Some of the Āgamas, it is contended, are as early as the Vedas if not earlier, while others are as late as the latest Upanishad. The early Siddhāntins though Tamilian in
nationality were moved to write in the Sanskrit language not on account of any lack of love for Tamil, but because they loved truth and its propagation among the different nationalities much more.

Some hold the opinion that the Vedas and the Ágamas belonged rather to Tamil literature and that the Aryans on conquering the Tamils had them translated into their tongue. The protagonists of this view opine that a big deluge, which destroyed the major part of the Tamil land beyond Cape Comorin has submerged within its depths the Tamilian Vedas and Ágamas so much so mere translations in course of time have gained the status of original compositions. No lover of truth can subscribe to this view on the meagre evidence put forward by the promoters of this theory; yet there is some sense in what they say, if we take into consideration the light brought to evidence by the recent excavations in the Sind valley referring to Dravidian culture and the relative insignificance of that of the Aryan brethren in India and elsewhere in pre-historic times. However, today, we find Saiva Siddhānta philosophy abounding in technical terms all of Sanskrit origin. The Tamilian must needs not be abashed on this account; for we are living in a period when the Sanskrit and the Tamilian cultures have blended into one; on the other hand, let him feel proud that the philosophy of the religion of Saiva Siddhānta is practically a product of the Tamilian intellect and he shall not gripe over the invasion into the Tamil language of thousands of Sanskrit words; for the growth of the Tamil language — nay that of every language — depends on the rapid but cautious advance, that it makes towards meeting foreign thoughts and ideas by incorporating alien words and their meanings into itself. Moreover, the etymology of the word Ágama meaning 'that
which has come from' suggests the possibility that the body of doctrines in the Āgamas have come down from another nationality, probably from the Tamils; or it may mean that the Āgamas are translations into Sanskrit from another language very possibly from Tamil. Further the Sanskrit word 'Tantra' which comes from tantu-thread, meaning 'a work or a composition' seems to be the literal translation of the Tamil word 'nūl' meaning thread, used invariably for a work or a composition. The etymology of these two words indicates to an extent a basis for the one or the other of the two theories mentioned above.

However, it is urged, for reasons adduced in this introduction, that the Saiva Āgamas at least were written in Sanskrit by the Tamils, for the benefit of all nationalities including Tamils who inhabited India.

An interesting line of argument, based on the terminology adopted for the Tamil alphabets is brought out by some promoters of the Saiva Siddhānta, to prove that the ancient Tamils too had a conception of the Trinity of Ultimate Principles, viz., Pati (God), Pasu (soul) and Pāsam (fetter). The argument is based on the fact that the conceptions of Uyir (soul) and Mey (body) are respectively applied to vowels and consonants; it is also maintained that the conception of God, the subtle one - the one existent - is transferred to the letter Āy̱tam meaning subtle and called also as taṇiṇilai (that which stands alone). Thus the entire terminology of the Tamil alphabets is figurative; and the transference of these figures, it is presumed, presupposes an acquaintance on the part of the early Tamils with a system of speculative science in which soul, matter and God are the First Principles; it may be added that the last figure 'Taṇiṇilai' further suggests the familiarity of the
ancient Tamils with the Theories of Pralaya and Kalpa or periodical flux, when the entire universe gets dissolved and obscurated in God who alone remains. The whole argument is highly illuminating and pre-eminently instructive.

Again there is an attempt to prove that the Tamilian conception of God as revealed in Tolkāppiyam is far superior to that of the Aryans of the same period as Tolkāppiyam; the word 'Kaṭavuḷ', which is used to signify God in the text of Tolkāppiyam and other ancient Tamil literary works, is split up into 'Kaṭa' and 'uḷ' and the two meanings viz., (1) that which is beyond everything or transcendent and (2) that which is immanent in everything, are derived from it; thus the fact that the ancient Tamils were familiar with the conception of God as a Principle or a Being which is immanent in everything and transcendent over them cannot be doubted; it is urged that the Aryans of that period used for God the words Brāhma (one that grows large), Viṣṇu (one that extends or pervades) and Īśa (one that rules), all of which fall far below the word 'Kaṭavuḷ' both in content and significance.

The etymological proof herein advanced for the supremacy of the spiritual and religious culture of the ancient Tamils over that of the contemporaneous Aryans cannot be lightly treated; for in the usage of the Aryans we merely see the symbol of spatial height and the symbol of the idea of Ruler or King at work to characterize Divinity, where – as the conception involved in the term 'Kaṭavuḷ' shows a distinct advance, on the part of the ancient Tamils, from Symbolism to the very limits of thought. Does not this

1 T.S.S. pps 75 - 78.
show that the ancient Tamils had at least a higher conception of God? Can it be that the Tamils had not a system of metaphysics quite in conformity with their theory of God? In fact they seem to have had a system of cosmology as well; for there is evidence in Tolkāppiyam itself that they conceived of the universe as the product of the five elements, viz., Earth, Fire, Water, Air and Ether.

Even Naccinārkkīnīyar, the celebrated commentator of ancient Tamil classics, seems to be of opinion that the ancient Tamils had a noble conception of the Deity. For in his commentary of Tolkāppiyam, he explains the term 'Kantājī' as a Being absolute, independent, impersonal and transcendental. This notion of God too is a noble one and indicates a high degree of conception.

The worthy Marai-malai-aṭikal, a reputed Tamil scholar and philosopher corroborates Naccinārkkīnīyar in his interpretation of 'Kantājī', and identifies the denotation of the term with that of Siva who is evidently not an Aryan deity. Even Doctor Gilbert Slater, an eminent orientalist, is forced to admit that the Siva Cult is a Dravidian one: perhaps the worthy aṭikal is not wrong in his presumption that the terms 'Kantājī' and 'Siva' refer to the same God. Again Naccinārkkīnīyar's interpretation of the aphorism "Vēntiya kalvi yāntumūn riravātu" in Tolkāppiyam is significant; there he presumes that the ancient Tamils had a conception of the Doctrine of Tripūṭi or the theory of the Identification of the knower, knowledge and the known; he makes us to believe that they

1. T.P.P. sutra 644 'Nilantī nirvali vicumpō taintuni Kalanta mayakka mulaka mātalini'
2. T.P.N. Sutra 88 pp 335
3. T.T.A. pp 31
4. T.P.N. Sutra 188.
had taken the last step in the field of thought, showing a transition from psychology to the very end of thought. One cannot help endorsing this view of Naccinārkkiniyar, since a people who have developed a system of psychology thoroughly scientific and unfolding the very depths of psychic phenomena as evidenced in the Meyppāṭṭiyal of Tolkāppiyam cannot rest content without reaching the natural consequence, the completion of thought and thought-processes.

The ancient Tamils do not lack in ethical thought either; they have evolved a psychology of ethics with its cognitive, emotive and conative elements. The whole of Kalāvīyal, Karpīyal, Purulīyal and Purattinaiyiyal of Tolkāppiyam bear testimony to their knowledge of the cognitive and conative aspects and the Meyppāṭṭiyal to that of the emotive. It is a pity that they did not separate the science of ethics from the metaphysics of ethics; the one is found involved in the other; it is an admitted fact that the theme of Purulatīkāram in Tolkāppiyam is characteristically Tamilian; and especially the ethics of love developed therein is unique. Tiruvalluvar the greatest moralist of the Tamil Nāṭu in his book ‘Kurāl’ has merely adopted this ethics of love and illustrated it in beautiful poems replete with similes and metaphors, fascinating and thought-provoking. Nobody can gainsay the fact that this ethics of love is foreign to the Aryan nature or mentality. 'Albert Schweitzer, a German scholar, in his book called ‘Indian thought and its development’ is able to draw up a distinction between the Aryan mind and the Tamilian when he says the Indian Aryans show an inclination to world and life negation, where as in the Kurāl, world and life negation is only like a

1 I.T.D. pp 3
2 I.T.D. pp 201
distant cloud in the sky. Furtheron when the learned scholar makes the statement 'maxims about joy in activity, such as one would not expect from Indian lips, bear witness to the strength of the world - and - life affirmation present in the Kural. It will be a matter of pride to the Tamilian though disagreeable and astounding to the 'Sanskritists' - for this is the term that I would like to use to call such people who claim everything of spiritual value to have come down from the Aryans. Some of these 'Sanskritists' though Tamils by nationality seem to have lost all sense of proportion, when they attempt to deny any sense of originality to the genius of the Tamils by drawing hurried and improper parallels to the thoughts of Kural from Sanskrit literary works such as the Upanishads, the Gita and the Artha-sastras. One thing seems to be clear in the case of these Sanskritists, that they are proficient in both the literatures viz., Sanskrit and Tamil; but it is very doubtful whether they have understood or grasped the inner spirit underlying each; they must note the fact that the attitude of the Indian Aryans is essentially ascetic in character and their ethics is one of inwardness; and they should not forget that the ancient Tamils had, in addition to the ethics of inwardness, the living ethics of love. It is this ethics of love, it is believed, that is responsible for the Bhakti cult with its Agamic rites of the Siddhantin. It must be borne in mind that the Vedic rituals are propitiatory and sacrificial, whereas the Agamic rituals consist in devout worship of and personal communion with God.

The recent times have ushered in another class of 'Sanskritists', who in the early years of their lives get steeped in Sanskrit literature and grammar and then in
their later lives begin the study of Tamil literature and grammar. These 'Sanskritists' approach the subject of Tamil grammar with a pre-possessed mind, interpret it in the light of Sanskrit grammar and deny any sense of originality to the Tamilian genius in the field of grammar too. It is highly regrettable that they forget the fact that Tamil is Tamil and Sanskrit is essentially Sanskrit. The Tamil world has simply an object of laughter in them.

It is shown in the preceding pages that the ancient Tamils must have had a system of metaphysics with its cosmological and ethical sides, the former possibly Siddhāntic and the latter characteristically Tamilian; further an etymological proof is advanced to establish the fact that the Āgamas—at least the Saiva Āgamas—are not original compositions of the Aryans. Bearing in mind that the contents of the Āgamas with their ethics of love is preeminently Tamilian, one would be tempted to assert that the Āgamas are compositions of the Tamils, if not translations from the works in Tamil. On account of the want of evidence of the one time existence of the Tamil Āgamas, the existing Āgamas cannot be called Sanskrit translations of Tamil works. Since there is a lack of philosophic works in the Tamil literature of the period in question, it is felt that it will not be far wrong if it is presumed or asserted that the Tamils are responsible for the composition of the Saiva Āgamas.

The worthy Mārai-malai-āṭikaḷ is of opinion that the Upanishads too are works of the Tamils. It is regretted that his statement cannot be accepted in toto; for we are able to see in them—at least in the earliest of them—the very evolution of Vedic thought in its simplicity and purity. The Upanishads of the later period,
however, show an admixture of the Aryan and the Tamilian thoughts; they are products of a period when the two cultures—Aryan and Tamilian—have run into each other and coalesced. The assertion that one set of Upanishads is the work of the Tamils and another the work of the Aryans rests on mere fancy and not on any historical evidence; and the statement that the whole of the Upanishadic literature is purely Tamilian in origin is funny and preposterous; no slur is made on the character of Marai-malai-atika for his unscientific statement that the Upanishads are Tamilian in origin, if it is said that he is herein carried more by his zeal for Tamil literature than by the love of truth; but it must be admitted that the worthy Atika is consistent in his views that the Upanishads have a Tamilian origin, since he makes the same claim as regards the Vedas too; thus it has come to pass that the early Saiva Siddhanta has a literature—Agamic and Upanishadic—in the Sanskrit language and not in Tamil.

CHAPTER 2.

Saiva Siddhanta Literature.

(1) THE SANSKRIT LITERATURES OF THE SAIVA SIDDHANTA.

There are three groups of Agamas, viz., Sakta, Pancharatra and Saiva giving rise to the three religious systems—Saktism, Vaisnavism and Saivism respectively.

The early Saiva Siddhantin takes his stand principally on the following twenty-eight Agamas or Tantras:


 bhuva (Bimba) 24. Santana

But Tirumūlar points out the following nine Āgamas
only as of consequence to the Siddhāntin on the ground
that they have been revealed by Siva to various Deities.

2. Kāmika 5. Vatula 8. Supra

Tirumūlar further says that there are many more
Āgamas, which do not count much for the Siddhānta.
The early Saiva Siddhāntin treats the Vedas, viz., the
Rigveda, the Yajurveda, the Sāmaveda and the
Atharvaveda, also as authentic. According to him
the contents of the Vedas are general and apt to be
misunderstood while those of the Āgamas are special
and explicatory: if the vedic doctrines are interpreted
in the light of Āgamic principles the Siddhāntin
presumes that there is no opposition between the two
literatures—Vedic and Āgamic.

1. T.M.P. Tirumantram S-T. 63
2. Ibid Tirumantram st. 58
3. S.S.S, sutra 8 st 15 Āraṇanūl potucaivam arunjirapp-
S.B. pp 7 (punūlām Vētam potunūlenavum
Ākamani çirappunūl evavun围棋ppaṭṭaṇa.
This is what Tirumūlar means when he says that the Vedas and the Āgamas do not teach different doctrines. We see herein in Tirumūlar a spirit of reconciliation between two rival theories, which must have waged war with each other in his time; for some of the Āgamas show a clear antagonism to the Vedanta; others there are such as the Suprabheda and the Makuṭa which seem to show Vedic influence either Brahmanic or Upanishadic. Perhaps these three Āgamas and such others like them are the products of the period when the Aryan and the Tamilian cultures had blended together into one. It is a noteworthy fact that we are unable to fix the exact date of composition of each of the Āgamas. What little information we have access to is merely legendary in character; and the legend tells us that the Vedas and the Āgamas are born of Siva. This story of the legend seems to be fictitious and leads us nowhere. But Sūta Samhita, a Sanskrit work of the sixth century A.D. refers to the existence of Āgamas; this enables us to fix the period of the Agamas as somewhere before the sixth century A.D.; again the epic poem Mahābhārata has references to certain Āgamas. This takes us to a period before the sixth century B.C. as the age of the Āgamas. Further recent excavations in the Punjab and Sind show that the temple was a familiar institution in the third millennium before Christ and we know as a matter of fact that the temples and the Āgamas are invariably connected together; and therefore one is tempted to suggest that the Āgamas are as old as the temples; it cannot be thought that one is presuming much if he betakes himself to the opinion that some of the Āgamas at least are as old as the Vedas if not older.

1. S.A.S. pp 3
2. E.O.T. pp 44
Even among the Āgamas themselves there does not seem to be one opinion on the number of the ultimate principles.

The Āgamas fall under five groups on the basis of the number of categories which they postulate. The first group posits seven categories, the second six, the third five, the fourth four, and the fifth three only. The Svayambhuva Āgama belongs to the first group and posits the seven categories, viz., Siva (God unconditioned) Pati (God Selfconditioned), Pasu (mala-fettered soul), Suddhamāyā (pure cosmic principle), Asuddha Māyā (impure cosmic principle), Karma (action) and Ānava (Root-evil). The Pauskara and Madanīya Āgamas which belong to the second group include Siva under Pati and assert that the categories are six only. The third group contains within its fold the Pārākṣya Āgama which puts Siva under Pati, sees no distinctions in Māyā and posits the five categories Pati, Pasu, Māyā, Karma and Ānava. The fourth group has its typical example in the Sarva Jñānottara Āgama, which seeing a fundamental identity of properties subsisting between Māyā, Karma and Ānava, brings them under one term 'Pāsam' and posits the four categories - Siva, Pati, Pasu and Pāsam. On the other hand the Raurava and the Mṛgendra Āgamas, which belong to the last group demur at the distinctions made between Siva and Pati and speak of only three categories viz., Pati, Pasu, and Pāsam. Thus the Āgamas appear to differ from each other with regard to the conception of the very fundamentals i.e. the First Principles of the universe of mind and matter. This apparent opposition is professed to be got over by the Siddhānta by asserting that the entities are three only - Pati, Pasu, and Pāsam - and by subsuming the rest of the Principles under these three.

1. S.B. pp 6 and 318.
The Āgamas do not run smooth in other aspects of the problems of philosophy either. ¹Sivajñāna Yogi seems to have discerned it, when he wants us to interpret all the Āgamas in terms of the Principles of the Sarvajñānottara and Devihālottara Āgamas. ²The doctrine of the other Āgamas refer to the Petta-nilai i.e. the state of bondage of the soul in its phenomenal life, whereas the Sarvajñānottara Āgama treats of the Mukti Nilai i.e. the released state of the soul when its essential properties are manifested. Moreover, the term ‘Sarvajñānottara’ meaning ‘the accomplished end of all the Āgamas, signifies the importance of this Āgama. Very possibly this Āgama, as its name tells us is a later composition; yet it is this Āgama that is all important to Sivajñāna Yogi; ³but as regards the number of entities, Sivajñāna Yogi seems to have leanings towards the Raurava and Mrgendra Āgamas; herein he is interpreting Sarvajñānottara Āgama in terms of the conception of the Raurava and Mrgendra Āgamas and not vice versa as he wants us to do; and thus he seems to contradict himself. One must not make much of this inconsistency of Sivajñāna Yogi; for the contradiction is merely in number; and numbers as such have not much to do in philosophy if they do not refer to distincts. ⁴Sivajñāna Yogi further contends that the Sarvajñānottara and Devikālottara Āgamas are taught to deities and preach Suddha Siddhānta, whereas the other Āgamas are revealed to human beings and have come into being more to criticise alien systems of philosophy such as the Lokāyata, the Pāncarātra, the Pāṣupata etc. than to

1. S.A. Introd. pp 3
2. S.B. pp 6
3. S.B. pp 15
4. Ibid pps. 5, 15, 61.
establish directly the specific doctrines of the Saiva Siddhānta. Surely those that are taught to deities should have higher truths than those given to men; again since the themes of these latter Āgamas consist in merely refuting the doctrines of alien schools of thought, the Siddhānta principles which we find in them are only side-issues and as such cannot form a system by themselves. It is but natural that we have to look elsewhere to comprehend and understand the true significance of these principles. Sivajñāna Yogi seems to be so far correct in his contention; but when an objection is raised that Sīva, who is the genuine author of the Āgamas debases Himself by criticising man-made systems of philosophy such as the Lokāyata etc., Sivajñāna Yogi is ready with his answer. He says that these systems as well have their origin in Sīva; this statement of Sivajñāna Yogi lands us into another difficulty. Why did Sīva preach doctrines all opposed to each other? Does not Sīva turn out to be a fraud when he tries to establish false doctrines in one or other of the different systems?

Sivajñāna Yogi anticipates these questions and tries to argue against this pollution of Sīva: for, he says, Sīva adopts it as a matter of expediency to suit the state of development of each of the individual souls so that he might lead them towards truth step by step. Since expediency contains an element of untruth in it, this argument of Sivajñāna Yogi does not absolve Sīva of his contamination with untruth. Sivajñāna Yogi seems to be aware of this flaw in his argument when he claims eternity for the Āgamas and the Vedas, both of which according to the Siddhānta are vṛttis i.e. emanations or developments of Suddha Māyā (pure cosmic

1. S.B. pp 15.
2. Ibid pps. 5, 15, 61.
principle) in the form of Sabda prapañcam (world of sound). The principles of the Āgamās as also those of the different Vedic and other non-vedic systems are eternal as forms of Pāsam; and Siva's work in his self-conditioned form as Saguṇa Brahmaṇ is to set in motion the Prapañcam (universe) both Cetana and Acetana (soul and matter) at the beginning of every Kalpa or world-cycle. The Āgamās and all other doctrines as forms of Acetana Prapañcam exist from eternity and can never be anihilated, though they might pass over into their Sūkṣma (subtle) state during the periods of Pralaya i.e. the ends of every world-cycle. Thus Siva is no more responsible for false doctrines than for true doctrines, which all exist from eternity.

The modern Saiva Siddhāntin believes that the Āgamās contain the essence of spiritual experience of our fore-fathers and explain the apparent oppositions in them by the fact that these authors are human beings, who have interpreted their revelations, trances etc., variously on the back grounds of their individual experiences characteristic of the time and place of their existence. It must not be passed by without raising a note of protest against those who suggest that the word Āgama meaning 'that which has come down' refers to its production from Siva. This suggestion, though able does not carry conviction home.

The Upanishads too are authentic for the Saiva Siddhāntins of the type of Sivajñāna Yogi. They form the concluding portions of the Vedas and contain the quintessence of Aryan speculation and the earlier portions are concerned with the religion and practice of the Aryans. The term Upanishad comes from 'Upa' near and 'sad' to sit on or destroy. Thus it means either (1) that which is got at by sitting near a teacher i.e. a secret doctrine or (2) that which enables us to
destroy error or illusion. 1 The Upanishads do not constitute a systematic philosophy. They are neither the productions of a single author nor of the same age; naturally one should expect in them much that is inconsistent and unscientific; yet they are useful to us since they reveal to us the wealth of the reflective religious mind of the times.

Sivajñāna Yogi classifies the Upanishads into three groups on the basis of their subject matter. In the first group he places the Atharvasrika, the Atharvasira, Svetatsvetara, and the Kaivalya Upanishads, all of which preach doctrines referring to the true nature of the soul which is exhibited only when it is in communion with Siva; Hence these Upanishads, according to Sivajñāna Yogi contain the special principles of the Saiva Siddhānta. The Jubala and such other Upanishads belong to the second group and treat of the accidental attributes of Pati, Pasu and Pāsam. Sivajñāna Yogi sees conflicts and inconsistencies even among the Upanishads. For he wants us to interpret the second and third sets of the Upanishads in terms of the truths of the first set and not vice versa. But according to Sivajñāna Yogi the oppositions herein too are superficial only and not real; if one adopts the method advised by him, the apparent inconsistencies vanish; for these Upanishads as also the Āgamas are the works of Siva. Of course, Sivajñāna Yogi is well aware of the fact that Siva is not the actual author of the Upanishads, nay, even of the Āgamas; all of them exist from eternity; Siva's role consists in merely manifesting them periodically; it is only in a figurative sense that Siva is spoken of as the author of

the Upanishadic and non-Upanishadic doctrines; but yet to speak of God Siva as being responsible for diverse doctrines such as the Siddhānta and the Lokāyata even figuratively would be making Siva guilty of fraud and inconsistency; it is regretted that Sivajñāna Yogi has thought it worth while to stoop to a position totally unbecoming of him; it is his eagerness to posit divine origin to everything, that carried him astray from truth; it is felt that the Saiva Siddhānta can very well afford to stand its ground, as it has so far stood, without accepting the doctrine of the divine origin of true and false Principles.

Sivajñāna Yogi recognizes both the epic poem Mahābhārata and the Purānic literature as containing the truths of the Saiva Siddhānta. The word Purāṇa means old and the Purāṇas should therefore contain records of old traditions and stories; according to the Amarakosa, A Purāṇa has five characteristics, viz., Sarga (Primary creation), Pratisarga (secondary creation), Vamsa (geneology), Manvantra (period of time) and Vamsānucaritam (history of the geneology). The following eighteen Purāṇas are said to contain in full the above five characteristics:

(1) Viṣṇu  (7) Brahma  (13) Liṅga
(2) Nārada  (8) Brahmāṇḍa  (14) Siva
(3) Garuḍa  (9) Brahma Kaivarta  (15) Agni
(4) Bhāgavata  (10) Mārkaṇḍeya  (16) Skanda
(5) Pāda  (11) Bhaviṣya  (17) Kūrma
(6) Varāha  (12) Vāmana  (18) Matsya

The first six Purāṇas give an exalted place to Viṣṇu and subordinate positions to Brahma and Siva; the second six give supremacy to Brahma and the last six to Siva. Sivajñāna Yogi is unable to see any real oppo-
sitions in the doctrines of these Purāṇas as well, since all these are sprung from God Siva; the seeming oppositions are explained and reconciled in various ways. The arguments adopted by Siva Jñāna Yogi are all mythological and do not deserve our notice here. It is the Purānic Age that is responsible for the schism between Saivism and Vaiṣṇavism. Since one and the same author Vedavyāsa is according to tradition responsible for the production of the Purāṇas, each of the two great religions of India—Saivism and Vaiṣṇavism—claims all the eighteen Purāṇas as the depositaries of its own doctrines; Siva Jñāna Yogi holds the view that the Saiva Purāṇas are more in consonance with the Vedic teachings and hence are authentic; he further asks us to find out ways and means to see that the other Purāṇas do not contradict these. In truth he is suggesting some methods when he wants us to consider the terms 'Brahma', 'Nārāyaṇa' etc. as connoting Siva; if we are justified in treating Brahma Nārāyaṇa and Siva as synonymous terms, the supremacy of Brahma or Nārāyaṇa to Siva would turn out to be the supremacy of the creative or protective aspects of Siva to his destructive aspect. It must be remembered that the Purāṇas constitute an essential factor in the religious lives of the people of India; for it is through them that simple dogmas and abstract truths are brought home to the masses. They are all concerned with conditioned Brahma or Personal God, though occasionally they may refer to the unconditioned Impersonal One. From the styles of writing found in them and their various subject matters, we can see the hands of many authors in them. The Purānic authors just as much as the Vedic and Āgamic writers deserve our applause in that they did not care for self-advertisement; but all the more it is a fact that they have done a disservice to us since they have in their
spirit of self-negation forgotten to give us a history of their thoughts; and thoughts without any history look like photos without any background. It is the background that gives life to the photo and history is sure to enliven thought. The learned too would do well to read Purānic literature with a view to writing Purānas with modern backgrounds so as to instruct their unlucky brethren who are denied spiritual education for want of means and leisure. Saiva Siddhānta will not fail to recognize such Purānas as possessed of authenticity, provided they do not run counter to its conception of the trinity of ultimate principles, viz., Pati, Pasu, and Pāsam.

(2) The Tamil Literature of the Saiva Siddhānta

(a) PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURES.

The Saiva Siddhānta, as it appears to be, is solely a product of the evolution of thought of the Tamils. It is a well-known fact that the Āgamic principles and the religion that is associated with them are intrinsically different from the Vedic thought and practices so much so the two cannot be conceived to belong to the same nationality. If the latter belongs to the Aryans, the former falls to the lot of the Dravidians; for these are the two communities that were and are responsible for building up the spiritual life of the Indians; of the Dravidians too, the Tamils only seem to have had a culture which extends backwards even before the Vedic period. Therefore the presumption that the Tamils are responsible for the production of the Saiva Agamas is not without force, and this presumption leads us to the logical conclusion that Saiva Siddhānta belongs to the Tamils. Again the evolutionary character of the Siddhānta may be questioned. Siva Jñāna Yogi regards it as a revelation rather than as a product of evolution. The trouble
about Siva Jñāna Yogi is that he seems to have implicit confidence in legends; for the legend has it that it is a revelation; yet we see the scientist in Siva Jñāna Yogi, when he himself traces out the evolution of the Āgamas in the number of categories being narrowed down gradually one at a time from seven in the Svayambhuva Āgama to three in the Raurava and Mrgendra Āgamas. It is a pity that Siva Jñāna Yogi has a double character, the character of a mystic and that of a scientist or logician; yet the importance of revelation in Saiva Siddhānta cannot be denied, though the view is taken that Saiva Siddhānta is a system of thought evolved by the Tamils to explain psychic phenomena such as revelation and trances.

Since Saiva Siddhānta is believed to be a system built up by the Tamils, one would expect a host of Tamil literature on the subject. Disappointment will be staring in the face if anyone looks for early Tamil works on philosophy and religion. For political and socialistic reasons mentioned in a previous page of this thesis, the learned among the ancient Tamils of the historical period did not choose to write philosophic and religious treatises in Tamil. It was only in the thirteenth century A.D., when there was a social upheaval and religious turmoil in the Tamil Nāṭu that Meykanṭa Tēvar broke off all traditions and appeared with his Siva Jñāna Bōdham in Tamil, indicating among other things the culmination of the Tamilian genius in speculative philosophy; for before his time it was the fashion of the Tamils except for two minor works (Tiruvuntiyār and Tirukkāḷiruppaṭiyār) to write philosophic and religious works in the Sanskrit language. Some people contend that the Tamil Siva Jñāna Bōdham of Meykanṭa Tēvar is a
mere translation of the twelve aphorisms of the Sanskrit Siva Jñāna Bōdham, which forms a part of the Raurava Āgama; it cannot be denied that it is a translation; but exception is taken to the use of the word ‘mere’ and it is asserted that it is more than a translation. If any translator possesses an insight superior to that of the author of the work he translates that Meykaṇṭa Tēvar has; for the Tamil Siva Jñāna Bōdham excels its Sanskrit original both in its conception of thought and depth of meaning. The Tamil literature on Saiva Siddhānta is said to really start with the Siva Jñāna Bōdham of Meykaṇṭa Tēvar who is followed by his disciple Aruṇanti Sivācāriyar, with his Siva Jñāna Siddhiyār, which is the most exhaustive treatise on the Siddhānta in verse in the Tamil language. There are other philosophic treatises of a less important character and we have today a compendium of fourteen Saiva Siddhānta works, which are collectively called ‘Meykaṇṭa Sāstram’. A list of the books comprising the Meykaṇṭa Sāstram with the names of authors and their probable dates of composition are given below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names of Books</th>
<th>Names of Authors</th>
<th>Probable Dates of composition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Tiruvuntiyār</td>
<td>Uyyavanta Tēvanāyanaṇar</td>
<td>1148 A.D.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Tirukkaliruppaṭiyār</td>
<td>Uyyavanta Tēvanāyanaṇar</td>
<td>1178 A.D.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>of Tirukkaṭavūr</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Siva Jñāna Bōdham</td>
<td>Meykaṇṭa Tēvar</td>
<td>1221 A.D.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Siva Jñāna Siddhiyār</td>
<td>Aruṇanti Sivācāriyar</td>
<td>1253 A.D.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Irupāvirupāṭhū</td>
<td></td>
<td>1254 A.D.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Uṇmai Vilakkam</td>
<td>Maṇavācakakam-Kaṭantār</td>
<td>1255 A.D.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Sivapprakāsam</td>
<td>Umāpati Sivācāriyar</td>
<td>1306 A.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Tiruvaruṭpayaṇ</td>
<td>Umāpati Sivācāriyar</td>
<td>1307 A.D.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
A glance at the names of the authors of the above books will convince anyone that it is chiefly a group of four writers that are responsible for the composition of the various books included in Meykantha Sastram. This group of four writers is held in high esteem and veneration as saints, seers and philosophers by the Siddhantu, who calls them Santana Kuravar (Spiritual preceptors). Even though the authors of the fourteen books mentioned above lived as late as the thirteenth or fourteenth century A.D., their lives have assumed a legendary character and requires a scientific examination for the approval of the reading public. It is not proposed to start on an inquiry into their lives in this thesis; for it is beyond the scope of the subject taken in hand; though an inclusion of the lives of these saints and philosophers is useful, it is not done so for fear it will make the thesis too bulky. Some notes at least indicating the scope and contents of each of the books constituting the compendium called Meykantha Sastram may be of value and therefore are given below.

1. Tiruvuntiyar is a poem of forty five verses by Uyyavanta Teva Nayanar, who is said to have come down from North India to redeem from bondage A[u]taiya Teva Nayanar of Tiruvisalur and others of the
South. There is another poem going by the same name by Mānikkavāsakar who is one of the four Samaya Kuravar (religious preceptors); the latter poem consists of devotional songs referring to the triumphs of Siva in mythological stories which have allegorical meanings. But the former poem by Uyyavanta Tēva Nāyaṉār is more or less a spiritual message and contains instructions as to the attitude one must adopt to get at communion with God. The term ‘Tiru’ means holy or beautiful, and the term ‘Unti’ is said to signify a kind of game, where something is thrown up and played, so that the word ‘Tiruvuntiyār’ refers to a poem which is a call and an advice of the poet to his brethren at play in the holy game of Samsāra to look up to the one way of attaining salvation. The poem is not direct and explicit in all its verses; and the commentaries on it—one old commentary whose author is not yet identified and another by Siva Prakāsaṉār of Tiruvāṭus Turai Āṭinam—are both instructive. There is a natural grace about the poem and the style is unaffected. The poetry of Uyyavanta Tēva Nāyaṉār will be remembered by the Siddhāntin not for the philosophic system developed therein, which is practically nil, but for the sympathy that the poet has shown to humanity by laying bare in his poems his innermost mind, which is centred in religion.

2. Tirukkalirruppatiṉār is a poem of one hundred verses in the Venpā Metre by Uyyavanta Tēva Nāyaṉār of Tirukkaṭavūr, who is said to be a disciple of Āluṭaiya Tēva Nāyaṉār of Tiruvirasūr. The subject matter of this work is the same as that of Tiruvuntiyār; but the exposition is more in detail and unambiguous; the commentator too seems to be the same old commentator as of the former poem and has done his part well. The author is reported to have composed his
poem and placed it on the beautiful or holy seat of a sculptural work of an elephant in front of the image of Naṭarāja at Chidambaram; and the legend narrates that the sculpture raised its trunk, took the work and placed it at the feet of Naṭarāja, showing its approval of the intrinsic merit of the poem to those that stood by; thus the name Tirukkalīṟṟuppatiyār, meaning that which was placed on the beautiful or holy seat of a sculptural work of an elephant, has come to mean the poem in question. It is felt that the legend is a pure invention by some admirer of the author since it involves a miracle wherein Siva all of a sudden makes a stone act with human consciousness.

This poem is noteworthy not because it has a legend about it but on account of legends in it. It seeks to justify under certain conditions Patricide, Infanticide, etc., and deserves special analysis in the ethical part of the Siddhānta. The author of this work has not the grace of diction and neatness of style of Pukāḷēntippulavar who is a master of the Venpā Metre. This book is useful as containing a daring conception of a standard of morality in its solution of the problem of existence.

3. The work Siva Jñāna Bōdham of Meykaṇṭa Tēvar is, to all seeming purposes, a Tamil translation of the twelve aphorisms of its Sanskrit original Siva Jñāna Bodha, which is a part of the Raurava Āgama. There are in this work eighty-one verses given as Udāharana Ceyyul illustrating the aphorisms, together with a short commentary called Vārtika, the authorship of both of which is generally ascribed by tradition to Meykaṇṭa Tēvar. There is a commentary called Pāṇṭipperumal Vṛtti on this book by Pāṇṭipperumāl. It presents an easy reading and is useful for the beginner as well. There is another commentary called
Siva Jñāna Bodha Cirṛurai by Siva Jñāna Yogi on the same book. It is tense and requires a patient study. A third commentary on it by name Siva Jñāna Bhāṣya by Siva Jñāna Yogi justly deserves the approbation of the Tamil-reading public; for it is unique in Tamil Literature; for herein Siva Jñāna Yogi is in his spirits displaying multifarious developments—his theological, metaphysical, psychological, ethical and religious knowledge—often intermixed with his knowledge of grammar, both Tamil and Sanskrit. It is Siva Jñāna Yogi by virtue of his commentary Siva Jñāna Bhāṣya, who has enhanced the name of Meykanṭa Tēvar as a sage, saint and genius. The term Siva Jñāna Bōdham signifies that which specifies and evaluates the truth of the doctrines and dogmas of the Saiva Āgamas. The fact that the book well deserves its name will be apparent to anyone who makes a perusal of its contents. According to Siva Jñāna Yogi, the first six Sutras or aphorisms of the work Siva Jñāna Bōdham form the first chapter, which is general and theoretical and the last six constitute the second chapter, which is special and practical; the first chapter generally treats about the accidental attributes of Pati, Pasu, and Pāsam, while the second chapter deals with their essential attributes; there are two sections in the first chapter; the first three aphorisms constituting the Pramāṇaviyāl (section on means of knowledge) form the first section and the other three aphorisms treating about the Lakṣaṇaviyāl (section on the characteristics of the ultimate principles) constitute the second section. The second chapter too includes two sections viz., the Sādānvīyāl (section on means of release) and the Payāniyāl (section on fruits of release) with three aphorisms to the credit of each of the two sections. Thus the twelve aphorisms, divided into four
sections of three aphorisms each together make up the work called Siva Jñāna Bōdham. Now Siva Jñāna Yogi in his Siva Jñāna Bhāṣya divides each aphorism into separate Adhikaranas or themes ranging from two to seven in number and comments on them exhaustively. His commentary is expected to stand to eternity as the pillar-stone of the Saiva Siddhānta.

4. Siva Jñāna Siddhiyar by Aruṇanti Sivācāriyar is a work of two parts. The first part known as Para- pakṣam is controversial and contains merely refutations of fourteen alien schools of thought. The systems criticized are:—Lokāyata, the four schools of Buddhism the Madhyamika, the Yogacara, the Sautrantika, and the Vaiibhāsika), the Nigand Vāda, the Ājīvaka, the Bhattācārya, the Prabhākara, the Sabda-Brahma-Vāda, the Māyā-Vāda, the Parināmavāda, the Saṅkhya and the Pāñcarātra. There is a commentary to this part by Tattva-Prakāsa-Tambiran Swami. One can have only a bird's eye view of the systems tackled by reading this part and its commentary. A studied commentary with relevant quotations from the original treatises of the schools of thought treated in this part is a long felt need.

The second part of this book is called Supakṣam and contains the essence of Saiva Siddhānta in all its details in three-hundred and twenty-eight verses in the Vṛttta Metre. Herein the author follows closely on the heels of his master Meykanṭa Tēvar and distributes his poems under the twelve Sutras of Siva Jñāna Bōdham. The importance of this work can be gauged by the fact that there are six old commentaries on it and two new ones. The old commentaries are as follows:—

(1) Commentary by Marai Jñāna Dēsikar
(2) Sivāgra Yōgi
(3) Commentary by Nirambavājakīyar
(4) " Siva Jñāna Yogi
(5) " Subrahmanya Dēsikar
(6) " Jñāna Prakāsar.

Of these commentaries, that of Jñāna Prakāsar is set aside by the Siddhāntin on the ground that the doctrines supported therein is Siva-Sama-Vāda and not Saiva Siddhānta. Siva Jñāna Yogi merely gives a summary with a few explication notes here and there of each of the verses of this book with appropriate headings. The commentary by Subrahmanya Dēsikar is lucid, illuminating and worth reading, while those of the rest are full of technical terms and require a knowledge of Sanskrit for a clear understanding. Sivāgra Yogi is attractive in his commentary with his quotations from the Āgamas, though he occasionally departs from the Siddhāntic point of view. The two new commentaries one by T. Muttaiyapillai and the other by M. Thiruvilankam, though simple do not seem to be scholarly and lack the vim and vigour of the old ones.

The book Siva Jñāna Siddhiyār, on the whole, is as much a literary work as it is a philosophical treatise; for its author Aruṇanti Sivācāriyar is both a poet and a philosopher, though the legend will have him as a sage and a seer as well. This work will be remembered as the most exhaustive treatise in verse on philosophy in the Tamil language; and the author is a master of his language and profuse in his analogies; besides he has developed a sense of melody which runs through his verses with a majestic flow; his poems will be found ringing in the ears of every Siddhāntin. The Tamil world regrets that he did not turn his hands to secular literature.
5. Irupāvirupāhētu is, as its name implies, a poem of twenty verses the odd numbers being in the metre of Venpā and the even ones in that of Āciriyappā. The author of this book Arunānti Sivācāriyar has composed the verses in the form of questions addressed to his Guru (Spiritual guide) Meykaṇṭa Tēvar, who is for all practical purposes treated as Siva. The problems raised in this book are in reference to the characteristics and mutual relations of Pati, Pasu and Pāsam. Arunānti Sivācāriyar wants his Guru to account for the presence of delusion in him, even after undergoing Jñāna Dikṣā (initiation into True Knowledge); the author further wants to know why he is afraid of ajñāna (ignorance), since he is no more responsible for obtaining Jñānam (true knowledge) than for being deluded by ajñānam; for he gets the one or the other only when illumined or obscured by Siva in the form of Meykaṇṭa Tēvar; the idea of the association of good and bad Karma (action) with his soul, which does not seem to have any independence of movement in thought and knowledge is baffling to him; why some souls are given deliverance from bondage, while others are to get liberation is the next problem that requires solution; if Siva is the one that sets free the souls, it goes against His very nature as a Perfect Being to be partial towards some; finally the author concludes his poem with praises of his Guru for having absolved him from the bondage of Pāsam and shown him the way of redemption. The commentators Namaccivāya Tambirān of Tiruvāvaṭu Turai Ātīnam and Tattvanātar of Cikāli have given fairly satisfactory answers to most of the questions raised. The poem itself is the work of a master-hand; for its diction and style are good and the melody is pleasing. Arunānti Sivācāriyar has shown in this poem his skill in handling Venpā metre as well,
6. Unmai-vilakkam is a poem of fifty-three or fifty-four verses in the Venpā-metre in the form of a dialogue between the authors Manavācakam Kaṭantar and his Guru Meykanṭa Tēvar. The title of the work Unmai Vilakkam meaning (exposition of the truth) gives us an indication of the contents of the book. The author starts with a brief exposition of the thirty-six tattvas and specifies the nature of the two forms of Mala, viz., the Ānava and the Karma. Then he discusses questions relating to the soul and God. The Lord’s sacred dance is the next topic taken up. The importance of the Pancākṣarās (five letters) as a means to obtain grace of God is also dealt with in detail. Then the relation between the soul and Siva in the state of Mukti (release) is compared to that obtaining between (1) a fruit and its juice (2) a flower and its fragrance and (3) fire and its heat. The last subject taken up is the doctrine of Guru, Liṅga and Saṅgama. The author’s view of the contribution of this doctrine as a means to obtain release is noteworthy. The poem is concluded with an expression of the author’s indebtedness to his Guru for the spiritual help rendered to him.

This book has two commentaries, which are nothing extra-ordinary; one is in the form of a summary of each of the verses of the book and the other gives merely a word-for-word meaning; and the names of the commentators are not known; anyhow the poem is simple and self-explanatory and needs no detail exposition; the verses have a rustic grace about them and the poem has its value as an out-pouring of the heart of a devoted spirit yearning for liberation.

7. Siva Prakāsam is a book of one-hundred verses by Umāpati Sivācāriyar. The author’s Guru or spiritual guide is said to be Marai-Jñāna Sambantar, who is a disciple of Aruṇanti Sivācāriyar; the legend
that our author was responsible for the Mukti (release from bondage) of an untouchable Perṇān Sāmpan by name is interesting; when charged for homicide, he is said to have given proof of his spiritual powers by doing the same to a shrub Mūlicaṭṭi; if the legend has any significance, it must be possible to explain in conformity with the principles of the Siddhānta how a plant even can get at salvation. The Siddhāntins believe in such super-phenomena as plants and animals getting redemption and a critical exposition of their arguments may be found in the ethical part of the Siddhānta.

Now the author in spite of all his spiritual powers, had so much of worldly concern for the people among whom he lived that he wrote six Prabandams, viz., Koipurāṇam, Tiruttoṭṭar Purāṇacāram, Tirumurai-kanta Purāṇam, Cēkkilār Purāṇam, Tiruppatikkoīvai and Tiruppatikaikkōvai; he is also responsible for the composition of six minor works on philosophy. The popularity of this book Siva Prakāsām can be seen by the fact that it has four commentaries, viz., one by Siva Prakāsar another by Sithambaranātha Muṇivar, a third called Cintaṇai Urai by an unidentified commentator and a fourth by Tiruvilaṅkam. The first three commentaries are learned and the last is noted for its simplicity.

Umāpati Sivācāriyar in this book appears to adopt the same theme as that of Siva Jñāna Bōdham and gives in a concise but lucid form the essentials of the Saiva Siddhānta; in some details he differs from Aruṇantī Sivācāriyar showing thereby an originality of disposition towards independent thinking; yet he

1. 'It is not finally established that Umāpathi is the author of the Pauśkara Bhāṣya' see the article 'Salvism and Tamil Genius' by Mr. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri in Dr. S. Krishnaswami Aiyan-gar's commemoration Volume (1936).
seems to be influenced by the tenets of Pauśkara Agama, on which he is said to have written a commentary in Sanskrit. In spite of the unwieldly lengths of the first fifty verses, our author, the born poet that he is, was able to keep up the strain of the poem which has a melodious flow in it. It is only a few people who could make poetry out of their philosophy and Umāpati Sivācāriyar is not second to any one of them, though he appears to be better fitted for Mythological and devotional poems.

8. Tiruvaruṭpayañ is a book of ten chapters with ten verses for each chapter. The word Tiruvaruṭpayañ is formed by the three terms, viz., Tiru (holy), Arul (grace) and Payañ (fruit) and therefore stands for that which deals with the fruits of the grace of God. It is said that this work is intended by its author Umāpati Sivācāriyar as a hand-book for very earnest students. The topics dealt with in different chapters are:—the essential characteristics of the Supreme Being, the ways of the plurality of souls, Ānava as the cause of ignorance, the nature of grace, the spiritual preceptor as Knowledge Incarnate, the way of knowing reality, the manifestation of the essential nature of the soul, methods of obtaining bliss, the significance of the five sacred letters and the nature of Jīvan Muktas. The author has selected the Kuṟal—Venpā metre for his poem and seems to be quite at home in it; the fact that this work is only inferior to Tirukkural and Muttollāyiram in form does not bring discredit to its author, but rather adds to his reputation as a poet; for these two works are the products of master-architects of Tamil Literature; the verses in this book called Tiruvaruṭpayañ are neatly drawn and Umāpati Sivācāriyar shows himself as an adept in the use of soft consonants, which use adds a divine grace to his poems; there is also a sense of constraint and artificia-
lity about the book; for the author has taken upon himself the task of expounding each subject selected in ten stanzas, however vast the scope may be. There are three commentaries to this book—one giving merely a word-for-word meaning for each verse, possibly written by Velappa Pantharam, another giving a summary of each of the verses with explanatory verses by the Commentator Nirambavalakiyar and a third called Cintañai Urai by an un-identified person. None of the commentaries are exhaustive enough, though they are all noted for their correct presentation of the Saiva Siddhânta.

9. Vinâ Venpâ is a poem of thirteen verses by Umâpati Sivâcâriyar. It is, as its name indicates, a book of questions, containing poems in the Venpâ meter, addressed to his Guru, who is considered to be no other than Siva in human form. The Problems raised are some of the fundamental principles of the Saiva Siddhânta and require elucidation. A beginner in philosophy will find in this book problems based on a number of pre-suppositions, with which he may not be familiar. Umâpati Sivâcâriyar does not intend this work for such people; this poem does not seem to be meant for the advanced students of the Saiva Siddhânta either; for it will be too elementary for them; on the other hand it appears to have been composed for the sake of those students, who have studied such books as Sivajñâna Bödham, Sivajñâna Siddhiyär and Siva Prakâsam etc, and yet have not grasped the truth of the Siddhânta; it serves as a means for such students to fix them in the Saiva Siddhântic principles by making them re-study the works referred to and clear their doubts if any; it has thus a method in it; and the psychological insight of the author is praiseworthy; for he has picked up the crucial points of the Saiva Siddhânta, co-ordinated them into a whole and
presented them in the form of a catechism of questions; the commentator Namaccivāya Tambirān has done useful service by referring to the appropriate poems in the advanced text-books on the Siddhānta for solutions of the problems raised.

The subject matter of this poem is essentially thought and our poet is noted more as a poet of feeling than as a poet of thought; he with a great genius has converted what should be properly a poetry of thought into one of feeling, in which he is a success. We can see in this work his mastery of metre, language and imagery.

10. Pōṟṟippahroṭai is a devotional poem of one hundred and ninety five lines by Umāpati Sivacāriyar. Its central idea is ethical and relates to the purposive activity of Siva to bring about the final release of all souls, though questions pertaining to cosmology, eschatology and ontology are also mentioned. Praises are showered on the divinity as being responsible for the law and order of the universe. In this work the author seems to be optimistic, since he regards both pain and suffering as conducive to the general well-being of all creatures. Siva is represented as associating every soul with such opposites as pain and pleasure, birth and death etc., to have them purified; this act of Siva is held to be symptomatic of his benevolent nature; for Siva is conceived to have the care of a father towards his children; a father punishes his child for correction and improvement; even so God in his infinite grace makes every soul to go through these pairs of opposites to have them redeemed from bondage. The figure of the father adopted here as extended to God is a special feature of the Samaya Kuravar (religious preceptors) of the Saiva Siddhānta; and Umāpati Sivacāriyar has utilised this figure to its best advantage; for
God is regarded as fatherly and personal always looking to the welfare of his children. The Poet ends his poem with an expression of gratitude to Siva in the form of his Guru for having taught him the way of emancipation. There is an old but brief and lucid commentary to this book and the name of the commentator is not known.

Now Umāpati Sivacāriyar is more a poet of feeling than a poet of thought. In this work which is a poem of feeling, he has shown great talents; for we cannot fail to see in it his mastery over metre, language and imagery each in its own perfection.

11. Koṭikkavi is a short poem of four verses only by Umāpati Sivacāriyar. The work is, as its name indicates, a poem sung while hoisting a flag. The provocation for these verses, as given in the legend, has no historical value, since the story brings down divinity to contradict physical laws, which are but the expressions of God; and an examination into the circumstances in which this poem was composed may not be fruitful; for the whole legend may be safely dismissed as a work of a fertile imagination and another story true to life may be substituted in its stead; or the legend may be shorn of its element of miracle as worked by divinity and the rest of the story with a little modification to gain consistency may be believed. In this work the poet, while the flag was raised, yearns for the removal of the veil of Ānava from his soul and complains that he could not find any one to illumine him on the natures of and the mutual relations of God, Sakti, soul and ajñānam so that by a knowledge of them he might secure inseparable communion with God; he gives a method too to become one with the infinite, who is beyond speech and mind; according to him the meditation on the Pañcākṣarās (five letters)
will raise any one to perfection. The commentary to this book is an old and exhaustive one and contains enough of matter for thought; but it is regretted that the commentator has not yet been identified.

12. Ne ś i cu- vi tu- tū tu is a devotional poem in the form of Kali-veṇpā, where the poet Umāpati Si vā- cāriyar sends his heart with a message to his Guru, Marai-Jñāna-Sambanther, who is identified with Siva. The poet at first acquaints his heart with the infinite, eternal and transcendental nature of God and draws a vivid comparison between him and his own self, which though eternal as God goes through cycles of births and deaths; then he laments over his self as seeking mere empty sensual pleasures of life, and addresses his heart to set itself on the right course when the soul can stand in its true nature. Again he speaks of Siva as being immanent in and transcendental over the evolutes of Māyā and wants his heart to listen to his words of praises of God; further the heart is requested to take refuge at the feet of his Guru, who having got beyond the five avasthas (states) of the soul, has become one with God; then a description of the way in which his Guru got rid of the effects of the thirty six tattvas or evolutes of Māyā and how he initiated our poet into the truth of the Siddhānta are given; but the heart is warned not to set its foot at the doors of the Materialist, the Māyāvādin, the Sāṅkhya etc. On the other hand it is advised to fall at the feet of his Guru, worship him and beg him on his behalf for the touch of his flower-like feet. The book has an old but learned commentary the author of which is not known.

The Poet Umāpati Sivācāriyar is in his true elements here. The whole poem is an overflow of his heart; it is one strain and one melody; the language of the poem simply rolls and is a mere tool at the hands of the poet who is a singer, singing with a passion.
13. Unmai-neari-vilakkam is a poem of six verses by Tattvamātar of Cikāli; it is, as its name indicates, 'an exposition of the true path' towards mukti. The various stages of the soul in its path towards liberation are given in this book. At first the soul is said to distinguish the thirty six tattvas or evolutes of Māyā in the form of the human body, the antahkaranas etc., and the worlds as distinct from the self. This discrimi-
native knowledge of the soul is labelled as Tattva rūpa. The knowledge of the evolutes of māyā, which are impure and inert as known by and present in the self conciousness is called Tattva Darśana. The soul is said to undergo Tattva suddhi (purification from association with the evolutes of māyā) when it gets above the hold of this material Tattvas with the help of the grace of God. Ātmarūpa is the name given to the knowledge of the soul, when it overcomes the ānava mala and sees its own knowledge as being due to the illumination of Sivajñāna, which is immanent in the conciousness of the self. The loosening of the grip of the feelings of 'I' and 'Mine' in the soul due to limited and imperfect knowledge gives rise to Ātma Darśana. When the soul merges its independence of action and thought in that of Siva and completely identifies itself with Siva, it is reckoned to go through Ātma suddhi. Siva rūpa is the result of the unambiguos knowledge of the soul that Siva, who has assumed all forms including that of sakti and who brings about the cycles of the three cosmic processes on account of its infinite concern for the souls, is immanent in the self. If the Ātman or the soul advances enough to get itself steeped in Siva so that it loses all its idea of itself as a separate entity it is said to have Siva Darśana. The Ātman or the soul can have its highest experience called Siva bhoga, if it has a true knowledge of the nature and relations of pati, pasu and pāsam;
and then it will be able to break up the apparent dualism between god and soul.

This book has two commentaries the authors of which are not yet ascertained. The exposition of the first commentary is good and the second commentary, known as 'cintanai urai' is worthy of its name, meaning 'commentary of thought'. The poem too, though short, contains much that is useful; and the poet seems to be one of poetic temperament rather than one of poetic powers. There is fluency but no sweetness in his verses.

14. Saṅkarpanirakaraṇam is a book of twenty poems in the akaval metre by Umāpati Sivacāriyar. The title of the work meaning "exposition and refutation of the different schools of philosophy" gives us an idea of its contents. In this book the poet presents and criticises the following nine schools of thought, viz., the Māyāvāda, the Aikyavāda, the Pāśāṇavāda, the bhedavāda, the Sivasamavāda, the Saṅkrāntavāda, the Īsvaravikāravāda the Nimittakaraṇavāda Pariṇāmavāda and the Sivavāda. At first the author expounds what he calls the philosophy of Māyāvāda, which is examined in the light of aikyavāda, which is the second system propounded; this again is made the target of the pāśāṇavādin, whose system is the third one presented; and thus the chain of presenting one system and refuting it from the standpoint of another is continued till the Saivavāda. There are two commentaries to this book, one an old one, whose author has not been identified and another by Jñānaprakāsa Dēsikar. The commentators do not seem to have studied the systems criticised from the originals and are not free from prepossessions; it would be well if some student well versed in the different systems tackled in this work
writes a commentary to this book so that it might not have the colour and tone of a prejudiced mind.

Umāpati Sivācāriyar is more a poet of feeling than of thought; and we should expect him not to do well as a poet in this work, which is a poetry of thought; on the contrary he is a success here though not to a very considerable extent; for we see him attempting to sing; and there is music in his verses, though his language presents a jarring note here and there on account of the technical terms he uses. Besides, the metre adopted is quite germane to his talents; yet the poet is in sad plights for lack of imagery of which he is a master; for the subject-matter and form of his composition left him no scope for imagery.

(b) DEVOTIONAL LITERATURE.

In addition to the works already examined there is another class of literature of a devotional kind, which are as important for the Saiva Siddhānta as the philosophic books reviewed above. These books form what are called 'the Twelve Tirumurai', the first seven of which go by the name of ataṅkaṇ murai, which consists of Tēvārams of Sanbanthar, Appar and Sundarar. The Tēvārams of Sambanthar go up to make the first three Tirumurai, those of Appar the next three Tirumurai, while those of Sundarar the seventh one. The Tiruvācakam of Māṇikkavācakar is referred to as the eighth Tirumurai. The nineth one is a collection of poems called the Tiruvicaippā by the nine poets, viz., Tirumālikattēvar, Čēntanār, Karuvūrttēvar, Pūnturtti, Nampikāṭanampy, Kantar Āttitar, Vēṇāṭṭāṭikal, Tiruvaḷiyamutanār, Puruṭōttamanampy and Cetirāyēr together with another poem by name Tiruppallāntu by the poet Čēntanār. Tirumular's Tirumantram is put in as the tenth Tirumurai. The eleventh one is made
up of the poems of the twelve poets, viz., Tiruvālavaṉu-ṭaiyār, Kāraikkāl Ammaitār, Aiyaṭikāl, Kāṭavarkōn Nāyanār, Cēramān Perumān Nāyanār, Nakkīra Tēva Nāyanār, Kallāṭa Tēva Nāyanār, Kapila Tēva Nāyanār, Pāṣāṇa Tēva Nāyanār, Ilamperumān Aṭikal, Atiravaṭikal, Paṭṭinattuppiḷḷaiyār and Nampiyāntār Nampī. The Periyapurāṇam of Cēkkilār is called the twelfth Tirumūṟai. It is said that Nampiyāntār Nampī is responsible for the compilation of the first eleven Tirumūṟai, and we are unable to find out how Cēkkilār's Periya Purāṇam has come down to be known as the twelfth Tirumūṟai.

Of the twenty-seven poets, who are the authors of the body of works called Tirumūṟai, four are held in high esteem by the Siddhāntin. They are Tirujñāna Sambanthar, commonly called as Sambanthar, Tirunāvukkarasu, who is also known as Appar, Sundaramūrti or Sundaraar and Māṇikka Vācakar; these four poets are collectively called 'Samayakuravar (religious preceptors); the hymns and songs of the first three poets are called Tēvāram, while those of the fourth are known as Tiruvācakam. The works of these poets are also referred to as the Tamil Vedas; for they resemble the Vedic hymns being but praises and prayers offered to the Deity. The popularity of these poems can be gauged by the fact that they are an essential feature of most of the religious or ceremonial occasions of the Hindus in the Tamil land; in consideration of the importance of the Tirumūṟai to the Saiva Siddhānta it is felt necessary to give at least a brief criticism of some of the most important works included under it and of their authors.

Tirujñāna Sambanthar, the author of the first three Tirumūṟai, which consists of three hundred and eighty
four patikams of eleven verses each for every patikam, is said to have lived in the seventh century A.D., during the period of Narasinha Pallavan the First. The poet as found in his work, not necessarily from the legend, is a wandering minstrel visiting the shrines of South India singing out the glories of Siva. His hymns are the exuberance of love and joy and show the reflections of his innermost mind. The poet's sympathy with nature permeates his lyrics, which are characterised by a warmth of feeling and a grandeur unequalled by any poet in contemporaneous literature. His sense of beauty is cultivated to its highest degree; no town or village that the poet visited escapes his description. He has a command of a refined and cultured language and his imagery is powerful; his songs are melodious and of an elevated spirit. His love of God is likened to that of a son towards his father; for he is said to follow the Satputtra Marga (the way in which a good son loves his father). That is why we do not see in his poems a complete self-surrender or an utter self-denial; the former may be expected of one's servant and the latter of one's friend. Rather we find in our poet a spirit of self-assertion; for at the end of every patikam he promises either a better world or freedom from bondage to everyone who makes it a habit to recite the patikam that he has sung or composed. His faith in God is supreme and he is sure that the Father will stand by His son's words. The spirit of toleration and good will for alien religions especially Jainism is entirely lacking in his songs; for he denounces these faiths wholesale; scarcely a patikam may be found without any explicit reference to the utter uselessness of these creeds; some persons find fault with Tiruvijaya Sambanthar for the hatred shown in his poems. These men forget that the poet is born of the age. Tiruvijaya
Sambanthar could not have been the poet that he is, if he were not moved by the sight of his countrymen following a false religion. By the beginning of the Seventh Century A.D., the Tamil land was under the firm grip of Jainism and our poet as a Saivite was touched to the quick and there was an outburst of his heart and poetry was the natural result. It is Tirujīnāna Sambanthar along with Tirunāvukkarasu who was at the bottom of the overthrow of the Jainistic religion that clouded the minds of the Tamilians of the Seventh Century.

The life of Tirujīnāna Sambanthar as a poet, as depicted in the book called Periya Purāṇam is full of miracles, starting with a miracle and also ending with a miracle. Hence the account of his life as given in Periya Purāṇam is said to lose much of its character as a true record of historical facts, though it contains matter in the way of myths and legends of literary and religious values; it is regretted that there are people who distrust a story because it involves miracles; and a miracle is a phenomenon which cannot be accounted for by the known scientific laws; but it is a fact that no science is complete and perfect; for the laws that are yet to be known are many and may far exceed those that are already discovered. What is considered as a miracle today may turn out on the discovery of the appropriate laws, to be a commonplace tomorrow; hence it is evident that the accounts given in the Periya Purāṇam cannot be dismissed as worthless on account of the miracles in them; besides there are corroborative evidences in the poems themselves for most of the miracles mentioned in his life as described in Periya Purāṇam.

Tirunāvukkarasu is the author of the fourth, fifth and the sixth Tirumūṟai which contain altogether three
hundred and twelve Patikams of about ten verses each for every patikam. He is a contemporary of Tirujñāna Sambanthar and lived in the Seventh Century A.D., during the reigns of Mahendra Varman the First and Narasinha Pallavan the First; Periya Purāṇam tells us that he was a Saivite by birth and that he became a Jain by choice; later he became proficient in Jainistic literature and was ordained a priest; an event in his life i.e., an attack of Cūlainōy which is pronounced to be an incurable disease brought him to his senses. Then he repaired himself to his only sister, who was a devotee of Śiva; on her advice he sang songs in praise of Śiva who relieved him of his illness. The news got abroad that Thirunāvukkarasu had denounced Jainism and adopted Saivism; and the Jains who got irritated persuaded their king to persecute and punish their religious apostate Thirunāvukkarasu; then our poet, as it appears from both the legends and his poems, was subjected to a series of the most inhuman atrocities and indignities; he survived them all to the complete irradiation of Jainism from the Tamil land.

Thirunāvukkarasu's poetry is one of feeling which is at its highest in his hours of trial; he sings with a passion and his poems bear the stamp of his persecuted but peaceful, cheerful and equanimous life within. His poems are noted for their simplicity, freshness and spontaneity. He is also alive to form, colour and music; especially his Tiruttāṇṭakams are melodious and full of deep rich harmonies. His life was one of service and he consecrated every one of his belongings even his own self at the feet of his lord and master Śiva. He is said to have followed the path of the Dāsa Mārga (the way in which a servant loves his master); he is not a servant for hire, but a servant by choice. He roamed about the land of South India visiting the
shrines of his Lord Siva, sang his glories and made complaints to Him of the pangs of separation. We can hardly find anywhere in the world such an instance of self-denial carried to a point of total identification of one's own interest with that of the object of love as in the life of Tirunāvukkarasu.

Sundaramūrthi, the author of the poems known as the seventh Tirumūrai, which contains one hundred patikams is said to have lived in the latter part of the seventh and the early part of the eighth centuries during the reign of Narasinha Pallavan the Second. The path adopted by him is termed as the Sakha Mārga (the way in which one loves his friend). True to the path he followed, he felt no compunction to ask Siva to do him service on many an occasion; and the Supreme One being the servant of servants, appeared to readily respond to his requests. Unlike the other Samaya Kuravar, Sundaramūrthi seems to have had a household life; his conjugal life was divided between two wives, namely Paravaiyār and Saṅkiliyār. Nevertheless he never forgot that he was a servant of his Lord Siva, who is ever ready to give him a friend's hand in times of difficulties.

Our poet has neither the spirit of resignation of Tirunāvukkarasu nor the total innocence of Tirujñāna Sambanthar; he felt joy in life and life's oscillations; however he is unequal to Mānikkavācakar in imaginative insight, Tirujñāna Sambanthar in lyrical quality and Tirunāvukkarasu in sweetness and floridity. He is a master spirit of tenderness and is no reviler of alien religions; though wedded to family life he was not bound by it. His spirit hovered above worldly concerns and desires and made an angel of him; He was in the world but not of the world; yet he had psychological
insight into human nature of a kind rarely to be excelled by the other Samaya kuravar. Our poet is not lacking in self-assertion; for at the end of a good number of his patikams he promises either a noble life or a better hereafter for everyone who recites his patikam. He appears to be confident that his Lord will stand by his friend's words. The importance of Sundaramūrthī for the Saivities lies in his emphasis on the Āntan atimai valakku (the way in which a servant serves his master), which is the basic principle of the practice and religion of the Saivites.

Mānīkkavācakar, the author of the eighth Tirumūrai called by the name of Tiruvācakam, appears to have lived in the ninth century A.D., during the period of Varaguṇa Pāndiyan the First. His is spoken of as having followed what is known as the Sanmārga (the true path). No reason however can be adduced why his Mārga in particular should be referred to as Sanmārga; for the other Samaya Kuravar as well seem to have stood in the same Mārga. His poetry is the quintessence of religious feelings, expressed in the most simple unaffected language; and the simplicity and melody of his expression are of one accord with his inner spirit; he has a wonderful command of metre and there is music in his expressions. He is given up to introspection and self-searching; his verses are full of thought and reach the very limits of imagination. He is equal to the best of the saṅgām poets in imaginative quality; there is too a note of melancholy in some of his poems; for he feels himself a fish out of water on account of his long standing separation from the object of his love, Siva.

Now and then he feels the touch of the Grace of Siva and gives vent to an expression of blissful joy in the finest language possible; however his poetry is not
free from all blemishes; for there are a number of mannerisms in it, which he along with the other Samaya Kuravar appear to have intentionally committed; for example his repeated references, often in the same pattu, to the same mythological stories would never fail to tire an intellectualist who happens to read his book; but Mānikkavācakar, it must be remembered, never composed his poems for others, much less to an intellectualist; his verses are mere outbursts from his heart; and the repetitions referred to above rather add to the value of his work as a bhakti nūl (book of devotional poems); for it is in the nature of worship and meditation to repeat in thought and words the praises and glories of God to get into an ecstatic rapture of religious feelings.

There is another work, known as Tirukkōvaiyār by the same author. It was composed by him in honour of Siva and its subject matter is Akapporul. Though Nampiyāntār Nampi has excluded it from the Tirumūrai perhaps on the ground that it treats of erotics, it has somehow come to be included under the eighth Tirumūrai. This book shows among other things, the proficiency and skill of our poet in ancient Tamil literature and grammar as well.

The collection of works going by the name of the ninth Tirumūrai are the compositions of nine minor poets who are followers if not imitators of the Samaya Kuravar; these poets belong to the tenth and eleventh centuries A. D., though some of them exhibit sparks of intelligence and originality in a few poems; it is thought that they are not noted enough as poets to deserve a critical exposition here in this thesis; moreover the contribution to the religion of Saivism is not much when compared to that of the Samaya Kuravar.
Tirumūlar's Tirumantram recognised as the tenth Tirumurai deserves our special attention. It is important not because it has a high literary merit, which it never pretends to have, but since it contains a record of the spiritual experiences of a seer and a saint; it has puzzled and is puzzling many an intelligent reader; for it is full of riddles and the author tries to solve for us the riddle of existence by means of riddles.

The poet seems to be of opinion that the principles of the Siddhānta should not be laid open to every Jack and John to be scorned and scoffed at; on the other hand he wants such students as are earnest to approach a proper Guru for the correct elucidation of the meaning of the stanzas of his book; for the Siddhānta in its true setting, according to him, cannot be known except at the hands of a Jñāna Guru. There is no consensus of opinion among Tamil scholars as to the date of our poet Tirumūlar; the view that he belongs to the early part of the fifth century A.D., seems to be sensible.

The eleventh Tirumurai comprises the works of twelve authors all of whom with one exception (Siva) belong to various periods ranging from the fifth century A.D., to the eleventh century A.D. One of them is a poetess, another is Siva himself and the rest are all men. None of the poems of these authors including the so-called verse of Siva can equal the lyrics of the Samaya Kuravar in point of excellence as exquisite fine poetry. Paṭṭinattuppillaiyar is the most popular of these poets; his poems make us to realise the worthlessness of mundane life and force us to look up to ascetic life as the one way to obtain salvation. He possesses an extraordinary insight into human nature and his verses are of a poetic diction of a superior kind.

Cēkkilār, the author of the twelfth Tirumurai called Periya Purāṇam belongs to the middle of the
twelve century A.D.; he it is that has built up the stories of the sixty three Nāyaṇārs (devotees of Siva) together with those of a few others around the nucleus handed him by Nampiyānṭār Nampi; he seems to have relied both on tradition and on the meagre references in the Tēvārams for the make-up of the stories. It was at a time when even the Saivites looked up to Jivaka Cintāmani and such other works for literary inspiration that Cēkkilār appeared with his Periya Purāṇam; these works no doubt have a literary value; but yet they indirectly preach alien schools of religious thought; hence Periya Purāṇam arose more as a check and a challenge to the other religious systems than as a book directly preaching Saivism; it has more than accomplished the purpose of the author, for the Saivism as inculcated in Periya Purāṇam has been made a living faith. Cēkkilār has given a personal touch to God and has brought Him home to every true Saivite. Cēkkilār’s God is not the impersonal and transcendental one that is outside the reach of even a true devotee; his God is within the grasp of the faithful and the righteous and is personal; yet he is not blind to the doctrines of the Saiva Siddhānta; by making God personal he did not forget the fact that the essential nature of God is Sat (Being), Cit (intelligence) and Ānanda (bliss); his skill in making the impersonal God to pass over imperceptibly into the personal is marvellous.

The cultural value of the book called Periya Purāṇam has recently been questioned and a controversy has risen among the educated classes of the Tamils; the point of conflict is on moral issues; for in this work Cēkkilār has apparently sacrificed moral principles and has depicted his Nāyaṇārs (devotees of Siva) as having committed the vilest of crimes such as murder, theft etc.
Are these devotees of Siva Saints in spite of these crimes or on account of them? Or rather are these alternatives beside the mark and irrelevant? The answers to these questions will be found in the ethical part of Saiva Siddhānta.

From a literary point of view Cēkkilār’s poetry stands unmatched for its purity of style, sound and diction; his verses are of the essence of love and infuse love and sympathy into the reader’s heart. From beginning to end his poem is one melody or one stream which is a divine flow, soothing the mind and enrapturing the heart. It is a glaring fact that there is practically no plot in the lives of most of the saints, about whom our poet choose to write; each one of the Nāyaṇārs appears to have elected to lead a one-principled life; and our poet, being a man of talents and a poetic genius, had succeeded not to allow this shortcoming of the plot to have any prominence whatsoever as a genuine discrepancy; rather he drives it home to us that the one-principled life is the Summum Bonum of existence; his contribution to the religious aspects of the Saiva Siddhānta is great and cannot be lightly spoken of; and the work Periya Purāṇam occupies an enviable position along with the first eight Tirumūṟai in the private libraries of almost all Saivites who possess a religious library in the Tamil Nāṭu (land). Besides the Tirumūṟai there are other compositions of a devotional kind most of which can compare well with those works of the Tirumūṟai other than Tēvāram and Tiruvācakam. The Tiruppukal of Aruṇagirināṭar, the poems of Tāyumaṇavar and Kumara Guru Para Śvāmikāl, and the Arūṭpā of Rāmalinga Śvāmikāl can be cited as examples. Mention also must be made of the work Saiva Viṇā-Viṭai of Ārumuga Navalar of
Jaffna, who is a theologian, grammarian and above all a preacher and a reformer and who has done immense service to the cause of the Saiva Religion, when it was groaning under the proselytising weight of Christian Missionaries. He is said to be the father of modern prose in Tamil and has given us the stories of Periya Purāṇam in an elegant but majestic prose.

The reasons why the work 'Jñānāmṛta' of Vāgīsa Muni and the treatises Saiva Samaya Neri and Sivadharmottara of Maraijñāna Sambanther are not included in the Meykanṭha Sāstra are to be sought.

Recently there has grown a mushroom of Tamil literature in prose on the Saiva Siddhānta; some of them are coloured by the authors' whims and fancies and give a highly distorted view of the Siddhānta; there are others which fall far below the standard of the classical work reviewed; hence there is a dearth of a genuine prose work in Tamil on the Saiva Siddhānta, which should treat the Siddhānta in all its aspects; it is high time that some good scholar well versed in Tamil and Sanskrit takes up the subject and treat it in all its details.

CHAPTER 3.
Nature of Knowledge.

(1) GENERAL

The modern psychologists distinguish between four kinds of conscious processes such as willing, knowing, striving and feeling. They say that these processes are respectively due to the volitional, cognitive, conative and affective faculties of the mind or the soul. But the Saiva Siddhāntin regards these processes as due to the inherent potencies of the ātman or the soul,
which go by the names of icchā śakti, jñāna śakti and the kriyā śakti; according to Saiva Siddhānta every ātman or soul, going through its experience of life, has at first its kriyā śakti manifested; then it is said to acquire its characteristics of a kartta or one that is ready to act; soon its jñāna śakti gets illumined and it is in a position to know a thing. As anubhava or experience cannot be had without a will to know, the icchā śakti becomes active. It is this group of the three saktis or potencies in the ātman or the soul that is held to be responsible for all the joys and sorrows of life including bliss and bondage; it must not be understood that these saktis are something different from the cit-śakti of the ātman; the ātman’s cit-śakti which bears the relation of guṇa-guṇi-bhāva to the ātman of which it is a śakti is known as the icchā śakti, the jñāna śakti or the kriyā śakti according as its function is one of wishing, knowing or acting. The affective elements, such as pleasure and pain, are held to be bhogyarūpa (forms of enjoyments and suffering), whereas the icchā śakti and the kriyā śakti are kāryarūpa, and the cit-śakti is kāraṇarūpa. The Siddhāntin, holds the view that when a śakti gets manifested as an effect it becomes so only at a spot; for if it were fully converted, it would become non-eternal; and this is a thing which he does not desire; this is why Saiva Siddhānta stresses the fact that māyā, when it gets evolved into the universe does so only by a part; even so the cit-śakti which is co-pervasive with the ātman of which it is a guṇa when it gets manifested as the one, or the other, does not do so in its entirety.

The past few years have ushered in a class of intelligentsia who are actively engaged in the detailed study of the volitional, cognitive and the conative
powers of the soul together with its affective side. Modern psychology owes its development to these men, for psychology is that branch of philosophy which is interested in the study of soul and all its states. But epistemology too has got to do something with the cognitive character of the soul; psychology assumes among other things that cognition is a fact; it does not question the origin, possibility and validity of knowledge as epistemology does. The epistemological problem forces itself to the front only when man begins to reflect on knowledge; at first, a man looks outwards towards objectives which he seeks to understand; for his knowledge is no problem; its validity is not questioned but taken for granted. When later on difficulties cross his path it is only then the problem of knowledge raises its head: when the fruits of his reflections on the knowledge problem are coordinated into a coherent system, epistemology emerges out as a separate branch of philosophy.

The problem of knowledge has long engaged the attention of epistemologists who may be divided into two classes, viz., Dogmatists and Sceptics, according as they hold the opinion that the problem of knowledge can be solved or not. The system of the Saiva Siddhānta theory of knowledge takes the view that the knowledge-problem is capable of being solved. Anyhow it does not summarily dismiss the tenets of the sceptics; it examines the arguments put forward by them to denounce the validity of the worth of knowledge, criticises them, and throws them overboard. It is not based on any pre-suppositions which are above the necessity of philosophical examination. It is the fruition and culmination of the speculative thought and religious practices of the ancient seers who revealed the truths of the Saiva Āgamas. As the validity or worth
of knowledge can be considered only after a study of
the nature, forms, factors and instruments of know-
ledge, the Siddhāntin’s conception of the nature of
knowledge and criticism of the views of some alien
schools are taken up in this chapter.

(ii) Nature of Jñānam or Knowledge according to
Saiva Siddhānta.

Knowledge has been variously viewed either as a
quality, or as an activity, or as a relation, or as self
subsistent by the different metaphysicians of the west
and the east: 1 and Saiva Siddhānta adopts the quality
theory of knowledge. An analysis of the factors of
knowledge will help the readers to form an estimate of
the Siddhānta theory. In the proposition ‘I see a book’
there are three facts involved: first there is the Jñātā
or the knower in the form of ‘I’; secondly there is
Jñānam or knowledge which is considered to be mine;
and lastly there is the Jñēyam the object which is the
book. If the object known and the self that knows it,
are sharply separated from each other, consciousness
will become, as Descartes and Kant thought, the result
of the causal action of the object known on the self
that is aware of it, and will reduce itself to a subjective
state of the knowing person. If the object known is a
physical thing, or its quality, or action existing in-
dependently of the subject, there will be a wide gulf
between the events of the world of the object known
which is objective and the knowledge of the object

1. S.B. P. 263: “Yān kutattaiyarintēn ennum anu-
pavam avvāṇmaviṅkannē nikaltal kāti-
yalavaiyāṇe ariyappaṭutaliṇ aḥtaritar-
kuṇamuṭaitteṇpatu peramppatṭatu.”
Ibid, P. 267: “Ānumā ariṭarakuṇamuṭaitteṇpatu mēr-
kāṭṭinām.”
which is purely subjective. The problem of building a bridge to connect them both will turn out to be a Herculean task. The Saiva Siddhānta proposes to fill up the gap in its own way.

The proposition 'I see a book' can be thrown into the logical form 'I am one who sees a book'. Here the grammatical subject and the logical subject coincide with each other; but their predicates differ, the grammatical predicate being the verb 'see' while the logical one being the expression 'one who sees a book'. The same proposition in its epistemological form would run as 'a book is in my consciousness'. Here the epistemological subject is 'a book'; the predicate gives me an idea how I get to know the book: the book may be taken to be pervaded by consciousness and the consciousness is mine as a quality of the self. Saiva Siddhānta regards jñānam or knowledge as an essential quality of the ātman or the self which is pervasive, and holds the view that consciousness is as much pervasive neither more nor less, as the ātman or the soul of which it is a quality; the ātman or the soul, according to Saiva Siddhānta, in cognizing an object physical or psychical, gets illumined by Siva śakti, assumes the character of the object that is pervaded by its consciousness, identifies itself with the object and thus becomes aware of it. The Siddhāntin believes in and posits the existence of an infinite number of ātmans or souls all of which are held to be eternal and pervasive as also their consciousness. The soul and their qualities of consciousness are not material things, and therefore the pervasiveness of the one does not interfere with that of the other. The Siddhāntin further holds the view that a real universe which is extended exists apart from the souls, though not separable from
them. Since one and the same object can be an object of thought for many, an object in one's sphere of consciousness can be as much an object in another's, for the two spheres are interpenetrative, and may coincide with each other partially or wholly. In the proposition 'I see a book', I have an idea of the book, which is psychic, corresponding to the material object 'book'. The correspondence of the book to its idea can be judged only by consciousness; the judgment cannot be made unless consciousness includes within its field both the object and its idea. Saiva Siddhānta is successful in bridging the gulf between the psychic event and the physical object by including both the idea and the object within the sphere of consciousness which is pervasive.

(iii) Criticism of the Arhats' view of knowledge.

The Arhats posit that, since the cognition of a physical or psychical object arises in the body, the ātman (soul) is of the same dimensions as the body it inhabits. According to them, the ātman expands and contracts along with the body. It starts in the womb with a small size, expands by and by as the body grows in it, and after birth continues the expansion with the growth of the body through childhood, boyhood and manhood. Then with age, it begins to contract as the body shrinks. According to Saiva Siddhānta, the hypothesis of the existence of the ātman with self-same dimensions as the body cannot be maintained; for Sivajñāna Yogi objects that, even as the soul becomes small or large according as it occupies a small or large frame, so its consciousness should become correspondingly small or large. He adds we have instances of small-made men evincing perfect knowledge, and of

1. S.B. pp. 264
big-made imperfect knowledge. Again he urges that if it were possible for knowledge to expand and contract, it should be divisible into parts; if so, it is liable to be destroyed, for what has parts is apt to be dissolved. He contends also that cognitions of objects outside the body is not possible if the sphere of consciousness is limited to the extent of the body alone.

There is much force in the last two arguments of Sivajñāna Yogi; for the Arhata system recognises the self and the non-self as distinct entities, and is unable to break the duality underlying them. The Self's consciousness is psychic, whereas the non-self is physical. The Arhata system does not say how the Self's consciousness limited by its body-covering is able to extend beyond the body to know an object that is physical. The Arhat merely gives an analogy to meet these charges of Sivajñāna Yogi; as a lamp illuminates the whole space of a large room or a tiny pot according to its placing, so the soul expands or contracts with its consciousness according to the size of the body it occupies. The analogy cited, when pushed to its logical conclusion, gives us the fact that what is lost in extension is gained in intension. A soul in a small frame may possess perfect knowledge, and the same in a larger one imperfect knowledge. This runs counter to Sivajñāna Yogi's first argument. Thus the first objection raised by him is not genuine, and is due to his ingenuity in the play of words—cirṛarīvū and pēraṛivū. These words do not mean, as they should in the trend of his argument, consciousness limited to a small space and a large space respectively; but they stand for imperfect knowledge and perfect knowledge. However, the Arhats are unable to explain satisfactorily
the points raised in the last two arguments of the Yogi. Hence his objections therein stand firm and unrefuted.

(iv) Criticism of the views of knowledge of the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas.

The Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas regard knowledge as a guṇa or quality of the ātman (soul). They opine that knowledge is produced when the indriyas or senses contact objects. They refuse to accept the conception of the Siddhāntin that the indriyas (senses) are merely accessories for the manifestation of the icchā, jñāna and the kriyā saktis of the ātman (soul). Sivajñāna Yogi finds fault with these systems that they regard guṇa (quality) as separable from its guṇi or the object in which the guṇa inheres. A guṇa, according to Sivajñāna Yogi, is invariably present in a guṇi and is inseparable. The annihilation of the one means the annihilation of the other. A guṇa cannot be produced anew. It belongs to a guṇi, and cannot exist independently of the object of which it is a guṇa. Further the Yogi cannot conceive of knowledge as coming out of nothing, because it is against the cardinal tenets of Saiva Siddhānta which up-holds sat-kārya-vāda. The fundamental mistake in these systems lies in their mechanical view of the ātman, in that they do not consider knowledge as an intrinsic quality of the ātman. They believe in the existence of an infinite number of ātmanas, and also in a world distinct from the ātmanas. They hold the view that the world reacts upon the ātmanas causally to produce knowledge. These systems too are as open to the charge of dualism of the psychic and physical phenomena as the Arhata system is.

2. S.B., pp 182, 265.
(v) Criticism of the Pāñcarātra view of knowledge.

The Pāñcarātras embrace the doctrine of the guṇa-guṇi-bhāva of the soul and its consciousness. They cite the Vedas in testimony to the atomic nature of the infinite number of souls each of which possesses the guṇa or attribute of consciousness which is pervasive both within the body where the soul dwells and without. To them both the object and the idea of the object are within the sphere of consciousness of each of the souls. Thus the rift of dualism between mind and matter appears bridged; but Sivajñāna Yogi cannot put up with the view that the guṇa or attribute of an object is more pervasive than the guṇi. He merely derides the Pāñcarātras for their lamentable ignorance of the principle of guṇa-guṇi-bhāva, which says that the guṇa and its guṇi are inseparable and co-extensive. He states also that the soul in its pettanilai (embodied state) assumes the character of the sūkṣma sarīra (subtle body) which is of the size of an atom and identifies itself with it. Hence it has come to be referred to as atomic in form in the Vedas and the Āgamas. The atomic form is never its natural and intrinsic character but only an acquired and conventional one. The soul whose intrinsic nature is one of pervasiveness is able to envelop and penetrate even distant objects in its consciousness to get cognition of them. It can never be of the size of an atom limited and confined to a place. The Pāñcarātrās advance the analogy of the lamp and its light to show that consciousness is more pervasive than the soul of which it is a quality. Sivajñāna Yogi questions the appropriateness of this analogy. He says that light is no quality of the lamp save a substance made up of innumerable particles each of which may be considered a lamp in its

1. S.B. pp 182.
T.B.A. pp3: "na guṇa guṇinoḥ samānakālinām janma; kintu dravyam nirguṇameva prathmamutpadyate pascāt tatsamaveta guṇa utpadyante."
2. S.B. pps 264, 265.
sūkṣma (subtle) state. The objection of Sivajñāna Yogi is in consonance with science. The pāncarātrās fare ill for lack of an apt analogy.

(vi) Criticism of the Sāṅkhya view of knowledge.

The Sāṅkhyaśas are of the view that the Puruṣa or the self is a seer, who is inactive and who has the attributes of isolation and neutrality; it is only a sentient being that can be a seer. Sivajñāna Yogi is therefore right when he says that the Sāṅkhyaśas admit that the Puruṣa possesses jñāna śakti and the kriyā śakti. Activity is attributed by the Sāṅkhyaśas to the body when the Puruṣa is in proximity to it, standing as a spectator without any volition on its part. Sivajñāna Yogi argues that the Puruṣa is pervasive according to the Sāṅkhyaśa and therefore is present everywhere as a witness. Hence there is the contingency of the simultaneous manifestation of activity in pots and like things; but no such activity is observable in this world of ours. Besides, the Sāṅkhyaśas do not posit any factor to prevent or control the manifestation of activity. So he rightly concludes that it is the Puruṣa that possesses both the Jñāna and the kriyā śaktis, and that buddhi is useful as an instrument for the illumination of the attributes of knowledge and activity of the soul.

Cognition is held by the Sāṅkhyaśas to arise in the buddhi with the Puruṣa in proximity to it as a witness. Sivajñāna Yogi criticises this view saying that the buddhi, being an inert material substance, cannot know

1. T.K. Karik 19: "Tasmāc ca viparyāsātsiddham
dhāraṇikāmāsya puruṣasya
Sākṣitvamasya puruṣasya
Kaivalyammādhyasthithyam,"

2. S.B. pp. 182.
3. S.B. pp. 263.
a thing. Again the Sāṅkhya theory that there is a reflection of the buddhi that makes the latter conscious is also, according to the Yogi, not feasible. The eye that cognizes an object through a mirror is said to see the object. None would urge that the Mirror cognizes or sees; even so the Puruṣa that is reflected in the buddhi can have cognition, and never can the buddhi be said to have cognition. Further, as the fragrance of a flower if passed on to another object deprives the flower of it fragrance, so too if the cognition of the Puruṣa (self) is transferred to the buddhi, the Puruṣa becomes devoid of its qualities of knowledge, and gets turned into inert matter as it were. Moreover the Adhyāsa Vāda—the doctrine of the possibility of the transference of the qualities of one object to another—is condemned by all religious thinkers. On these grounds Sivajñāna Yogi dismisses the Sāṅkhya theory of knowledge as worthless. Even granting that it is possible for the buddhi to get the character of knowing things, the subject—object relation of knowledge stands in need of solution because the buddhi, according to the Sankhyas, is non-pervasive. If knowledge be a guṇa or quality of the buddhi, it will inhere in the buddhi and not extend beyond it to reach the object which is evidently outside the subject. The mechanism of knowledge stands as yet an insoluble problem for the Sāṅkhyaś. The metaphors of proximity and reflection brought forward by the Sāṅkhyaś advance us not a whit towards understanding the nature of knowledge.

(vii) Criticism of the view of knowledge of the Mādhyamikās.

There are four chief schools of Buddhism: (1) That of the Mādhyamikās or Nihilists, (2) That of the Yogācārās or Subjective Idealists, (3) That of the Sautrāntikās or Representationists and (4) that of the
Vaibāsikās or Presentationists. The Mādhyamikās support the act theory of knowledge. They hold the view that consciousness is a process and is kṣaṇīka or momentary. Even the external world is considered by them to be momentary. Life is a continuous flux—a becoming—as it were. In European philosophy we have M. Bergson advocating a similar view. With Bergson, the world is governed by no law and order; there is complete anarchy in the world. But the Mādhyamikās believe in the law of causation which has a permanent existence. It is the pivot on which revolve the worlds of thought and objects. They do not recognise as the Naiyāyikās do, the law of external causation, for a thing cannot, in the very nature of the thing that it is, become another. They adopt the law of transitive causation. Causal relation is of the type of the seed growing into a tree. The duality between soul and body is fully accepted. But the soul is no more permanent than the body is. The soul and the body are two aspects of existence which is a continuous flow or a becoming. To deny the existence of a permanent soul residing in the body they put forward the argument that the soul is neither the body, nor the senses, nor the objects of the senses, nor even a combination of them all. There is nothing outside them that can be called a soul. The soul is a mere empty sound. It is only a void, and has no existence.

1Sivajñāna Yogi does not see any life in the above argument of the Mādhyamikās. He appeals to their good sense to reflect upon and infer the existence of the soul from their very denials. There must be somebody persisting to deny the existence of the soul. The theory that there is no knower who can know a thing is as

1. S.B. pps 236 and 237.
foolish as the statement 'my mother is a barren lady'. My mother can never be barren, so long as she has given birth to my self. Motherhood and barrenness are opposed to each other and cannot go together. Even so if the knower does not exist, there cannot be any knowing. If knowledge is a phenomenon, there must be a knower. Sivajñāna Yogi has thus reasoned out and shown the untenability of the positions of the Mādhya-mikās who cannot be said to have any genuine theory of knowledge. Even their so-called theory of knowledge, according to their tenets, should be fleeting and momentary, and hence cannot be of value for the purpose of speculation.

(viii) Criticism of the Views of Knowledge of the Sautrāntikās and the Vaibāṣikās.

The Sautrāntikās and Vaibāṣikās admit the existence of an extra-mental world. The Sautrāntikās deny, as Locke denies, that we can have immediate knowledge of the extra-mental world. When we perceive an object we have an idea or a presentation which refers to an external thing. The idea is the medium through which we can know an object. There are no other ways of perceiving a thing. The Vaibāṣikās are presentationists, and do not accept the view of the Sautrāntikās who are representationists. They say that it is possible to have direct perception of an object. Yet both the schools adopt the doctrine that the outer objects are momentary. Since the absence of any one skandha does not give rise to a being that can be said to be aware of things, they urge that the soul is an aggregate of the skandhās.

1 Sivajñāna Yogi argues that the skandhās are evolutes of the inert primordial matter called māyā

1. S. B. pps 247 and 248.
and therefore cannot singly or even as an aggregate constitute the ātman or the soul. Knowledge according to these two schools of thought will be a process or function of the aggregate of the skandhās which are material things. The Vaibāṣikās with their dualistic metaphysics of soul and matter look upon knowledge as a direct awareness of objects which are external to consciousness. The Sautrāntikās on the other hand raise a screen between soul and matter by interposing between them ideas as the media through which objects are seen. Neither the Vaibāṣikās nor the Sautrāntikās can be said to possess a theory of knowledge where the duality of mind and matter is successfully got over.

(ix) Criticism of the Lokāyata view of knowledge.

The Lokāyatās contend that the soul is no other than the body and that knowledge is a particular kind of bodily activity. When the four elements Earth, Water, Fire, and Air which are all inert and material combine to form the body, intelligence is produced just as the red colour is formed when betel, arecanut, and lime are made to combine together. Since knowledge is not found anywhere else than in the body, it must be a function of the body. Further—more in daily life too we use such expression as ‘I have grown’, ‘I have become lean’, ‘I am a man’ etc. Do not these facts show that the body is the soul, and that knowledge is a bodily behaviour?

1 Sivajñāna Yogi refuses to see any sense in the above argument of the Lokāyatās and tries to prove that the body is no soul by drawing instances from practical life itself. He invites us to think of the very frequent usage which we are wont to make when we express statements such as ‘my body’. Does not this

1. S. B. pp 238.
presuppose that there is a something existing other than the body which we refer to as 'I' and to which the body belongs? Sivajñāna Yogi tries to explain the meanings of the expressions 'I have grown' etc. by reference to the apparent identity subsisting between the soul in its empirical state and the body. The 'I' actually refers to the ātman (soul), but is transferred by convention to the body on account of the soul's acquiring identity with the body brought about by its association with āṇava (root-evil). Sivajñāna Yogi further states that the soul can never be the body since we don't use such expressions as 'I am the body', 'I am the hands', 'I am the legs' etc.

The argument advanced by the Lokāyatās to establish the doctrine that the body is the soul is commonplace and smacks of puerile imagination. Common expressions current in daily speech and writing have no thought behind them, and are not worthy of scientific and philosophic basis. Sivajñāna Yogi has merely adopted the uṣṭralagudānıyāya — literally, 'the illustration of the camel and the stick' — equivalent to 'hoist with his own petard' — in using similar argument to refute the position of the Lokāyatās. These latter along with their counter-parts in the West — the American behaviourists — are pure objectivists. Their view of life is mechanical. They do not believe in psychic processes as intrinsically different from the physical. The psychic process to them is a phase of the physical. Their theory of knowledge is one-sided and has all the faults of objectivism. Their chief mistake lies in their failure to understand that behaviour cannot by itself explain knowledge, but does presuppose knowledge to be understood. It is true that they are able to escape the dualism of mind and matter. But the escape is made at a tremendous loss — of the mind, the thinker.
(x) Criticism of the Views of Knowledge of the Indriya Ātma Vādins

Sūkṣma Deha Ātma Vādins and Prāṇa Ātma Vādins.

The Indriya Ātma Vādins support the act theory of knowledge. According to them the senses constitute the soul and knowledge is an activity of the senses. The Saiva Siddhāntin points out that since what one sense knows is not cognised by the other senses, there must exist at the helm of all a soul which uses these senses as mere instruments to reveal objects for it to cognize.

The Sūkṣma Deha Ātma Vādins are of opinion that the Sūkṣma Deha (subtle body) is identical with the soul that is characterised by its act of cognition. The Siddhāntin raises an objection to this view that if knowledge were an activity of the Sūkṣma Deha which is responsible for the dream-state, then there would be no reason for our having erroneous knowledge of the objects of dream in the waking state. The Prāṇa Ātma Vādins posit that knowledge is an activity of the Prāṇās; for when the Prāṇās function we usually have knowledge. When they cease knowledge also ceases. So the natural conclusion is the statement that the Prāṇās constitute the soul. The objection that there is no consciousness in dreamless sleep, even while the Prāṇās function, is not sound; because the Prāṇās to know a thing require the senses as instruments. The latter are inactive in dreamless sleep. Therefore the Prāṇās, though they function, cannot become aware of objects in sleep. The Siddhāntin shows that knowledge cannot be accounted for by the Prāṇa Ātma Vādin when he states that the Prāṇās are found only in the body, and hence cannot extend beyond to cognize objects.

1. S.B. pps 239 and 244.
(xi) Criticism of the Activity Theory of Knowledge.

The act-theory of knowledge has many adherents in European philosophy. With the Pragmatists, knowledge is a response of a living mental being to its environment. Bergson speaks of consciousness as a ceaseless creative activity. Reid holds that knowledge is an act of mind. Alexander appears to accept the Act Theory of Knowledge when he says 'cognition' is not a separate kind of action from conation. Dr. Dawes Hicks too speaks of the act of knowledge.

The Saiva Siddhānta school of philosophy rejects in toto the act theory of knowledge. Knowledge cannot be an act since an act is as much an object of knowledge as anything else is. If knowledge were an act it should affect the object on which it acts, and also itself, for an act is aggressive. Experience tells us that knowledge of a thing neither modifies nor in any way affects the thing. Further, in knowing an object we are not aware of any reaction or modification in knowledge itself. So knowledge cannot be an act. It is a quality, an intrinsic character of the soul which manifests everything that is included in its sphere.

(xii) Criticism of the Relation Theory of Knowledge.

Recently there has sprung up a theory in the West as to the nature of knowledge, that it is a relation of certain entities. According to the critical realists, knowledge of the extra-mental reality is a three-term relation: the Mind, the Object, and the Datum or Content or Essence. Dr. More, however reduces cognition to the holding of a relation between a sense - Datum and a character. Russell in his 'Our Knowledge of the External World' abandons the act theory of knowledge, and speaks of knowledge as a relation between a knowing subject and an object known. With the Neo-Realists, 'the knowledge of an object is simply a
new and external, but temporary relation into which the object has entered.' James is of opinion that knowledge is a relation of two modes of the same entity 'Pure Experience'. One mode is 'The Knower' and the other 'the object known.'

The relation theory of knowledge cannot stand criticism. Knowledge cannot be a relation: because a relation itself can become an object of knowledge. The relation of subject and object enters into the dominion of knowledge and cannot be identical with knowledge. Relations are properties of things, and have no independent existence of their own. The object as related to the subject is said to hold the Viṣaya-Viṣayī-Bhāva Sambandha (object-subject relation). According to the Saiva Siddhānta when the object stands to the subject in the relation of Viṣaya-Viṣayī-Bhāva, knowledge which is the intrinsic quality of the subject gets manifested. The Siddhāntin does not accept the view that knowledge is a synthetic construction of the mind, but adopts the manifestation theory of knowledge. It is objected that a quality inheres in and hangs on a thing and hence cannot extend beyond the thing of which it is a quality. Therefore knowledge being an attribute of the subject cannot reach the object. Saiva Siddhānta meets the objection by positing pervasiveness to the attribute of consciousness of the soul so as to include the object within its fold.


1 The Yogācārās are Nirālambana Vādins holding the view that consciousness is self-subsistent. They are supporters of the theory of Vijñāna Vāda (subjectivism). They deny the real existence of all but Vijñāna

1. I.P. Vol.I. pp. 628
or consciousness. The subject that cognizes and the object cognized are only modes of the ālaya which is a flux or continuously changing stream of consciousness. The ālaya vijñāna is the whole containing within itself the knower and the known.

1 Sivajñāna Yogi seems to think, when he questions the character of ālaya vijñāna as explaining knowledge, that a permanent principle which does not change is necessary to account for knowledge. Since with the Yogācāras the self is a mere transitory state of consciousness, the permanence and unity of experience cannot on this view be explained. Moreover, in treating the knower and the object known as modes of consciousness, the Yogācāras deny the objectivity of the external world and fall into the errors of the subjective idealists. Their theory regarding the nature of knowledge as a self-subsistent entity fails to co-ordinate the factors of knowledge, and cannot hence be accepted by any sensible modern metaphysician.


The Advaita Vedāntins of the school of Saṅkara too believe in the self-subsistent theory of (absolute) consciousness. For Saṅkara, Brahma or Ātman is of the nature of Reality, consciousness and bliss. It is the only reality. Everything else is a mere appearance. Saṅkara regards the world as an effect in the form of a vivarta (transmigration of appearance) of Brahma. The cause Brahma herein undergoes no change in producing the effect, the world. The material cause of the world however is Māyā which is neither real nor unreal but indefinable. Therefore, the world to Saṅkara is unreal, and is said to exist somehow. Its relation to

1 S.B. pp 263.
Brahman too is indefinable. But a relation connects two distincts. However, Saṅkara holds the view that the world is no other than Brahman. With him Brahman and the world are one; and they exist as Reality and appearance. Just as a shell appears as silver, or a mirage as water, or a rope as a snake, all due to defective senses, Brahman appears as the world on account of the presence of Avidyā or nescience in us.

Saṅkara upholds the Adhyāsa Vāda according to which the world of subjects and objects is super-imposed on Brahman. The Adhyāsa or super-imposition is due to the beginningless association of Avidyā (nescience) with the self which is held to be the ultimate consciousness as qualified by the internal organs. Thus the world and the Self are ultimately spirit, and the duality between mind and matter does not exist. In the empirical usage however, the duality persists. Therefore empirical knowledge is held to be inadequate, and must be supplanted by real knowledge when the knower, the object known, and the means of cognition all vanish. Saṅkara is a metaphysical idealist; he escapes pure subjectivism by positing the world not as a mental construction of the individual Self but as the contents of the Divine Consciousness.

The Siddhāntin accepts that the Advaitins are able to get over the dualism between mind and matter but fails to see how consciousness which is a quality can exist without a substrate to inhere. If consciousness were not a quality, it cannot be an activity as well for a similar reason. An activity too requires a substrate. Brahman or consciousness cannot be held to be a substance by the Advaitin. Because it is silly to hold
consciousness as such; so, according to the Advaitin, Brahmān should be something other than the known categories of the empirical world, such as substance, quality and activity. It is only a void that is neither a substance, nor a quality, nor an activity. Therefore the Brahmān or the absolute consciousness of the Advaitins turns out to be a mere void and therefore unreal. Thus the self-subsistency theory of knowledge of the Advaitins cannot stand its ground against criticism. In fact consciousness is the essential quality of the Ātman (soul), and cannot stand apart from the object of which it is an attribute.

CHAPTER 4.
Forms of Knowledge
1. Svarūpa Lakṣaṇa and Tatāstha Lakṣaṇa

A thing, be it a subject or an object of knowledge, may be known in one of two ways. One way is to define it in terms of its svarūpa lakṣaṇa or essential nature, and thereby get to know of it. The other way is to distinguish it from the other objects by knowing its tatāstha lakṣaṇa or accidental attributes. When a person, who is unable to find out his friend’s house out of a number of houses which he sees before him, inquires another who stands by for the house, the latter may state the svarūpa lakṣaṇa or essential nature of the house, such as its form, location etc., and thereby make it possible for the former to identify it. Instead a tatāstha lakṣaṇa, such as the fact of a crow perching on the top of the roof of the house may be given to the enquirer to distinguish the house of his friend from all other houses.

It must be noted that both the svarūpa lakṣaṇa and the tatāstha lakṣaṇa are useful for man to know an
object. 1 Whereas the svarūpa lakṣaṇa of a thing inheres in the thing itself and is not different from it, the tatastha lakṣaṇa may be an inseparable accident, but should explicitly belong to the thing of which it is an attribute only for a time. The Saiva Siddhānta epistemology deals both with the svarūpa lakṣaṇa and with the tatastha lakṣaṇa of the three entities:—Pati (God), Pasu (Soul) and Pāsam (fetters).

2. Classification of Jñānam or Knowledge.

The word Jñānam (knowledge) has for the Siddhāntin four different senses. Primarily it means the svarūpa lakṣaṇa or the essential quality of the Ātman (Soul). Very often it is meant to signify the process or method of knowing. There are cases where it stands for the product of thought as well. Sometimes it indicates a particular kind of worship. The exact meaning of the word Jñānam used in treatises on the Saiva Siddhānta can be determined only by reference to context. In this section, the word Jñānam is treated in the sense of a quality unless otherwise stated.

Now Jñānam or knowledge is of two kinds, namely, (1) Anubhava (immediate experiential knowledge), and (2) Smṛti (memory). Anubhava gives rise to ayathārtha anubhava (immediate experiential knowledge which is not valid), and yathārtha anubhava (immediate experiential knowledge which is valid). Smṛti is also divided into ayathārtha smṛti (false memory), and yathārtha smṛti (true memory). Ayathārtha Anubhava includes in its division only samśaya (doubt) and viparyaya (error). Yathārtha Anubhava is of the form of nirvikalpa jñānam (indeterminate knowledge), or savikalpa jñānam (determinate knowledge) or Sivanubhava jñānam (immediate experiential knowledge of Siva).

1. S.B. pp 5, 335.
The Saiva Siddhāntin's classification of jñānam (knowledge) is better presented in the following table.

- **Jñānam (Knowledge)**
  - **Anubhava (immediate experience)**
    - **Ayathārtha (non-valid form)**
      - Samśaya (Doubt)
      - Nirvikalpa (Indeterminate knowledge)
    - Viparyaya (Error)
      - Savikalpa (Determinate knowledge)
  - **Yathārtha (valid form)**
    - Smṛti (Memory)
      - **Ayathārtha (non-valid form)**
      - **Yathārtha (valid form)**
        - Sivanubhava (Experiential knowledge of Siva.)
1. Anubhava or Immediate Experiential Knowledge.

1 In cognizing an object the Ātman (soul), according to Saiva Siddhānta, imbibes the character of the thing presented and then becomes aware of it. The experience herein is direct and immediate. It is presentative in character and is called Anubhava. The object cognised in Anubhava may be a substance, a quality, or an action. The subject that cognizes should necessarily be the Ātman, and not God. Siva cannot be said to have anubhava, since he does not assume the character of the thing presented. Thus Siva’s cognition is not anubhava, and is different from that of the Ātman. Anubhava is a form of immediate experience, and is original in character. It is not a representative cognition. It is not a reproduction of previous experience of subjects. It is not even a sensation though all sensations can be included under it; for the experience of anubhava it is not enough if the subject that cognizes and the object cognized are together. The Ātman must will to cognize. Then only it can have anubhava.

According to the Siddhāntin, the Ātman is pervasive, as also its essential quality of consciousness. Therefore it would appear that the Ātman should have Anubhava jñānam of an object whether it wishes to cognize or not. For the object is pervaded by the Ātman’s consciousness; but it must be noted that mere inclusion of the object within the field of consciousness is not sufficient for anubhava to take place. There can be anubhava if only the object of cognition is presented to the Ātman’s consciousness. It is left to the icchā


pp 331: “Atuvatuvāy aluntinī raṅīmālī anupavam enappatūmākālīn”
śakti (wishing potency) of the Atman to present the object to the Atman’s consciousness. So if the Atman is to have anubhava it is essential that it should will to cognize. If willing were not necessary, the Atman would have simultaneous cognition of all the objects of the world, for these latter lie in its consciousness. But it does not cognize everything together. So willing is a necessary and essential condition for the Atman to have Anubhava jñānam. Supposing the Atman wills to have anubhava of all the objects of the world together, let us examine whether it can succeed. Evidently it cannot, because its field or sphere of anubhava is limited by the particular jñānendriyās or senses with which it attempts to cognize objects.

Now the senses would seem to be necessary accessories for a person to have anubhava jñānam of an object, a quality, or an activity. Certainly they are essential but not for all cases of anubhava; for the soul in its mukti nilai (state of release) is, according to the Saiva Siddhāntin, devoid of all material accessories of knowledge including the senses, and yet can have anubhava or direct experience of Siva. It might be objected that it is impossible for the Atman to cognize without accessories, and that hence it cannot have anubhava or direct and immediate experience of Siva who is above all relational knowledge. The objection is not a serious one; for the Atman in its state of release transcends all relational knowledge, assumes the character of Siva, and cognizes him. Thus it is said to have anubhava or immediate experience of Siva. To the soul an object cognized is the same experienced, because anubhava goes hand in hand with cognition, always and inevitably following it. The relation of the cognition of the Atman to its anubhava is one of avinābhāva (invariable concomitance). There can be no
anubhava without cognition and vice versa. Pure
cognition as such has no objective reality to man. It is
a mere abstract conception useful only for metaphysical
analysis. Siva only can have pure cognition. To the
Siddhāntin knowledge in the form of Anubhava is an
essential character of the soul. The act of experiencing
is due to certain potencies inherent in the soul.

With the Naiyāyikās too anubhava or direct experi-
ence is a character of the soul, but is not inherent in it. It
is originated by the soul—sense—object contact. In the
absence of such contact the soul has not the character of
experiencing; it then becomes inert as it were. The
Naiyāyikās thereby commit the mistake of making the
soul an inert material substance. The Prabhākara
School of Mīmāṃsā also falls into the same error when it
states that the soul exists as a mere ‘esse’ after libera-
tion, though it appears as the cognizer, and has ex-
perience in every act of cognition in its worldly
existence. The Sāṅkhyaśas hold the view that experience
arises when the Buddhi contacts the objects with the
Puruṣa (soul) as the on-looker. In as much as the
Puruṣa is to the Sāṅkhyaśas an inactive seer, experience
can neither be a quality, nor an act of the Puruṣa. It
cannot be an intrinsic quality or even an activity of the
Buddhi too. For Buddhi is to them an inert material
substance which acquires consciousness by the reflection
of Puruṣa in it; further experience is no-where spoken
of as a substance. So the presumption is that it should
be an appearance, a non-entity with the Sāṅkhyās.
Thus the problem of knowledge and experience remain
unexplained and unsolved with the Sāṅkhyās.

According to the Advaitins, the self is of the nature
of experience. There is no difference between the two.
If the self be different from experience, the Advaitin
questions whether the self alone is the light of intelligence, or experience alone, or both together. If the first alternative be accepted, experience would be reduced to the position of an inert light manifesting the world of objects but not manifesting itself in the same way as the sense of sight does. The latter—sense of sight—generates experience other than itself while experience cannot. Hence experience which itself being unmanifest cannot manifest the universe. According to the second alternative, experience which should itself be manifest will have to illumine objects in the same way as a candle light does. Experience would then possess the characteristic of the light of intelligence, and as such would be identical with the self. Evidently the third alternative is inadmissible. For the self and experience would then be independent of each other; and the relation between them cannot be known. So the Advaitin concludes that the self and experience are not different.

Saiva Siddhāntin agrees with the Advaitin that the self is non-different from experience, but not in the sense of sameness as the Advaitin professes to hold. With the Siddhāntin, the relation of Guṇa-Guṇi-Bhāva (attribute—substance relation) holds between anubhava jñānam (immediate experiential knowledge) and the self. The Guṇa inheres in the Guṇi, and is non-different from the Guṇi. Anubhava Jñānam (immediate experiential knowledge) is an essential quality of the soul. It is non-different from the soul of which it is an attribute. Even as the wood is non-different from the trees that make it, or the ocean from the water in it, or the pot from the earth of which it is an effect, or the universal from the particulars that are pervaded by it, so is the Guṇi non-different from its Guṇa. Thus with
the Siddhāntin, the soul and its experiential knowledge are non-different, but not identical. Just as there is no wood without trees, no ocean without water, no pot without earth, no universal without particulars, so is there no Guṇī without Guṇās. The Guṇī is inseparable from its Guṇās. Therefore anubhava jñānam can have no existence, independent of the Ātman of which it is an attribute. The Ātman is no inert matter to which the quality of anubhava jñānam adheres and hangs on. If the Ātman were inert, it should be known as something apart from its character of experiencing. It is never known as such. Therefore it is not inert. The quality of anubhava jñānam is not extrinsic to the Ātman. It is rather intrinsic, and consequently not separable, though spoken of as a thing separate for purposes of metaphysical analysis. The Ātma cit-śakti (the cognitive potency of the soul) which is of the nature of anubhava jñānam cannot, according to Sivajñāna Yogi, be an object of immediate experience, for the self of which it is a cit-śakti or even for other selves. It cannot be a pramātā (Experient) even. It is only an instrument of knowledge which the Ātman uses to have experiential knowledge. It may be a species of jñeyam (object known) like the object of true memory.

(ii) Smṛti or Memory

Smṛti or memory is, according to Sivāgra Yogi, knowledge born of previous experience. The object of memory, as Alexander holds, is directly apprehended as not only past, but belongs to a past in which the experient contemplates himself as having been existent and also as related to the object. Thus memory has, for

Sivāgra Yogi a presentative character. In this error arises from reading into the experience what is more than there. The images in memory are appearances of things. In part they are veridical, and in part illusory. It would be very difficult to find out cases of memory free from illusion. So Sivāgra Yogi concludes that memory is a kind of false perception. But Sivajñāna Yogi seems to think along with the Naiyāyikas that it is a representative cognition of past experiences due to the impressions produced by them in the internal organs. In memory there is revival of old experiences. If the revival corresponds exactly to the previous experience, and is not associated with any extraneous matter due to imagination or fancy, we have true memory. If foreign elements intrude, there will be false memory. Even true memory, for Sivajñāna Yogi, cannot be a method of valid knowledge. It can only be a constituent of a method of valid knowledge. For it enters in the form of a vyāpti jñānam (knowledge of universal concommitance) between the major and middle terms of a syllogism in syllogistic inference. Further with the Siddhāntins, a method of valid knowledge should give some form of new knowledge, and there is nothing new in true memory. True memory, the Siddhāntin contends, cannot be a method of valid knowledge.

However, it is urged by some thinkers that in memory we know an object as that which is past and that therein a knowledge of a new element, namely, the 'thatness' or the 'pastness' of an object is given us. Thus memory is, according to them, an independent source of knowledge. A close scrutiny into, or analysis of, the question will reveal to us that in memory we have cognition of the same content with the same qualities as in direct perception. The new element of
'thatness' or 'pastness' as qualifying the object of memory is merely another name for the 'thisness' or the 'presentness' of the past time. Thus in true memory there is no new element cognized. Therefore the Siddhāntin is right in regarding true memory as a form of valid knowledge, and not as a method of valid knowledge.

The Naiyāyikās, on the other hand, deny validity to all memory on the ground that it is not anubhava (presentative knowledge) and the Prabhākarās do so on the pretext that it is not anubhūti (apprehension). The object as remembered is, the Naiyāyikas argue, different from the presented object and therefore there cannot be a correspondence between memory and its object. This argument of the Naiyāyikas is evidently wrong. For there can be a true correspondence between the image which is the object of memory and the real object of which it is the image. According to the Prabhākaras, memory cannot be valid as it stands in need of a previous cognition. If the previous cognition is valid, the Siddhāntin sees no reason why memory which depends on it should not be valid. There are some forms of memory which, though real, are intrinsically false. They are imagination and fancy. In them we select certain elements of the physical world and reconstitute them at our pleasure into new combinations. They are aesthetically useful to man, though false. There is one form of knowledge called pratyabhijñā (recognition) which can be classified neither under anubhava nor under smṛti. It is of the form of 'this is the same as that' and involves elements of both anubhava and smṛti. The factor 'this' refers to an

1. P.V. pp 24 'smṛtistu paricchita pūrvabuddhyapeyksaiveti na pramāṇam.'
object directly given and the factor 'that' belongs to the realm of memory. Therefore recognition will turn out to be valid or invalid according as the factor 'that' is a true or false representation of the object of previous experience. It can at the most be a form of valid knowledge and never a method of valid knowledge, as there is no new element about it. Some persons contend that smṛti being a janya jñānam (produced knowledge) of anubhava is itself a form of anubhava. The contention is not sound on the very face of it. For if anubhava is direct, what is born of anubhava - that is smṛti - will be indirect. Hence smṛti or memory cannot be brought under the same class or category as anubhava. Besides, smṛti is genetically different from anubhava. For it is a function of the buddhi (intellect) whereas anubhava jñānam is an essential and intrinsic quality of the Ātman.

(iii) Dream - Cognition.

Dream-cognition is a form of knowledge of the type of memory or imagination. The impressions formed in the internal organ manas (mind) by objectives in waking experience get stimulated in sleep and give rise to dream-cognition of the type of memory; unfulfilled desires subsisting as impulses in the manas or mind complete themselves in dreams producing dream-cognitions of the type of imagination. Dream-cognition is neither memory, nor imagination, nor a species of either. For it is an experience of the dream-world, whereas memory and imagination are experience of the objective world. Further, the dream-imageries appear to have a presentative character, but the imageries of memory and imagination are representative. In truth, the dream-imageries are as representative as those of memory and imagination. Their apparent presentative
character is due to the effects of sleep. In dreams there is no conscious control of the objects of cognition by the Ātman. But in the case of memory the control is definite while it is not very prominent in imagination. Unlike as in memory where the manas (mind) is concerned with the past and the distant only, in dreams as well as in imagination, the manas by virtue of its revelatory activity can discern into the past, present and future, into the distant, and into the near. If the experient's grip of ānava (root—evil) is thinned off and thereby rendered ineffective, dream-cognition will be true, however remote in time (backwards or forwards) or place the objects of such cognitions may be. If on the other hand the grip is strong the cognitions will be untrue. This explains why all dreams of some persons, and some dreams of many, turn out true.

With the Siddhāntin, the mind is no spirit as with the Westerners. It is an evolute of māyā (primordial matter), and a very subtle substance used by the Ātman (soul) as an accessory to manifest objects for it to cognize. Its revelatory function is arrested by ānava (root—evil) which comes associated with each Ātman from eternity. It is not a tabula rasa, a passive thing. It is active and can, under proper conditions, discern the past, present and future. According to the Saiva Siddhānta, the dream experiences are as real as the waking ones, and are both due to karma (actions). Even as the sthūla śāriṣa (gross body) is the abode of waking experiences, the sūkṣma śāriṣa (subtle body) of which manas or mind is a constituent is the locus of dreams and yogic experiences.

The Naiyāyikas hold the view that dream-cognitions are intrinsically false; for they urge that they are
all memory cognitions which are untrue in character. The Nyāya theory of dreams is defective, as it has no explanations to give for the predictory and foreboding characters of some dreams at least. The Prabhākarās and the Bhāṭṭās believe in the self validity of cognitions, and assert that dream-cognitions are wrong cognitions; for they are of opinion that things are only remembered in dream-cognitions and not directly perceived, but appear in consciousness through the effects of sleep as actually apprehended at the time. The wrongness of a dream-cognition is due to its being essentially a memory cognition where invalidity is imposed upon from without. The Advaita Vedāntins of the school of Saṅkara admit that dream-cognitions are memory-cognitions; and memory is, according to them, not right knowledge. For it lacks the feature of novelty which is an essential characteristic of valid knowledge. Thus dream-cognition is not recognised as valid knowledge by the Advaitins. Further, according to Saṅkara, the empirical world can be logical established, but not so the dream-world. For the objects of dream do not confirm to the tests of logical reality such as the fulfillment of the conditions of place, time, cause and non-contradiction. Saṅkara however agrees with the Siddhāntin when he admits that even dreams excite joy and sorrow in accordance with one's good and evil. But what Sivajñāna Yogi cannot tolerate in the Advaitin's view is the fact that the Advaitin compares the objective view with the dream world, thereby implying that both the worlds are illusory. To the Siddhāntin who is a realist, dreams are as real as waking experiences, but to the Advaitin who is an idealist, the dream-world is not real in the sense as the waking one is.
It may be of advantage to know the opinions of some of the Western scholars on dreams. 'It has long been recognized,' writes Dr. Dawes Hicks, 'that at least a very large number of dreams originate in consequence of actual perception on the part of the individual.' Wundt is of opinion that the majority of dream-presentations are not pure hallucinations, but in reality illusions, in as much as they are engendered by the slight sensory impressions which are never extinguished in sleep. Weygandt takes a similar view. According to Freud dreams are a means by which repressed wishes are fulfilled. Tissie declares that dreams are not purely psychic in their origin. Bergson agrees in part at least with Tissie when he asserts that the dream is fabricated out of real sensations. Thus these Western scholars seem to agree more with the Siddhāntin than with the Advaitin in considering dream experiences to be real as they have their origin in previous perceptions. The Advaitin cannot claim them on his side, because they do not, as he does, bring in terms such as 'less real' and 'more real' in their explanations of the dream-world and the objective-world. What is real is real, and there cannot be degrees of realities, such as 'less real' and 'more real'.

(iv) Samśaya or Doubt.

Samśaya or doubtful cognition is a form of Aya-thārtha anubhava, and its essential nature as such can be determined only when we consider how it is produced. An attempt is made in the following pages to give a genesis of it and to evaluate it as a form of knowledge.

1. C.R. pp 110.
When an object is presented to the senses, at first the Ātman or soul cognizes the mere being of the object without any association of mnemic elements, such as its name, generic character, etc. This cognition of the Ātman is non-discriminatory, and is called nirvikalpa jñānam. Then certain characteristics of the objects are observed, and with the help of ideational factors diverse sañkalpas or conjectures of the forms 'this may be a pot', 'this may be a piece of cloth' arise in the manas or mind; for the observed characteristics may belong both to a pot and to a piece of cloth. These conjectures are followed by a searching inquiry into the nature of the object for any specific character or characters by virtue of which the decision may be made in favour of the pot or the piece of cloth. The failure of the Ātman to discover such character or characters gives rise to doubtful cognition. Samśaya or doubtful cognition is, according to the Siddhāntin, a cognition in which the Ātman (soul) cognizes certain characteristics common to two or more objects, but is unable to arrive at a definite conclusion in favour of one or the other of the two or more objects for lack of observation of specific characters. The state of doubt of the Ātman brings in its train a definite cognition of the object as such and such. The cognition herein is either savikalpa jñānam (determinate knowledge) or viparyaya (error) according as the specific ideational factor or factors observed by virtue of which there is a definite cognition does or does not belong to the object cognised. Thus according to the Siddhāntin, samsaya or doubtful cognition stands genetically midway between nirvikalpa jñānam and savikalpa jñānam which are both valid forms of knowledge, and therefore would seem to be itself valid. Again doubtful cognition is also an antecedent phenomenon to viparyaya (error) which is false perception.
On this account it would appear to be false. Sivajñāna Yogi however does not include doubtful cognition either under valid knowledge or under false perception, since it is not a definite cognition at all. It is a cognition representing a state of suspension of judgment—enduring for a period in certain cases—before it passes on to either savikalpa jñānam or viparyaya.

But Sivāgra Yogi seems to think that samśaya (doubt) along with viparyaya (error) and smṛti (memory) are false perceptions. Evidently his attitude is untenable; for samśaya, as shown above, is neither true nor false. Further he is of opinion that doubt may arise, either from the cognition of a character common to two objects present in the object perceived or from the cognition of a single character presenting itself in two objects. Though he gives two sources of doubt, he seems to hold the view that doubt is only of one kind. For with him, as with Sivajñāna Yogi, doubt arises from the cognition of common qualities unattended by that of specific qualities.

The Naiyāyikas agree with Sivajñāna Yogi, and not with Sivāgra Yogi, in regarding doubtful cognition as neither true nor false. According to Vatsyāyana, the Bhāṣyakāra of the Nyāya Sūtras, doubt is a wavering judgment where characters common to many objects are discerned but not specific characters belonging to any one of them. But the Vṛttikāra is of opinion that doubt is a knowledge of the presence or absence of

1. S.S.A. pp 125
2. N.S.G. pp 45 — ‘Samānadharmādhigamātsamānadharmopapṭterviśeṣasmrtyapekṣo vimarśa’
3. Ibid pp 43 — ‘Tenaikadharmiṇi virodhena bhāvabhāvaprakārakam jñānam Samśayaḥ’
contrary characters in one and the same object. On the other hand, Kaṇāda the author of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras says that doubt arises from the perception of properties common to many objects and the remembrance of the specific properties of objects along with the non-perception of those properties in the objects perceived. According to the Pauṣkara Āgama, doubt is a knowledge involving two alternatives arising from cognition of properties common to two objects. In view of the apparent conflicting opinions on doubt as described above an analysis of doubtful cognition is deemed to be useful to determine the right view.

In doubtful cognitions of the form 'is the object seen a man or a log of wood?' at first certain characters such as form, length, etc. are observed. Then we recall from memory such objects that have the particular forms, lengths etc. sensed. Finding from memory or previous experiential knowledge that a man and a log of wood only possess those characters, we form a saṅkalpa or conjecture that the object seen may be a man or a log of wood. Afterwards we appeal again to memory and look for specific characters as belonging to a man or a log of wood. If no such characters are found, we arrive at the doubtful cognition that the object seen is either a man or a log of wood. From the foregoing analysis it would seem that Kaṇāda's view of doubt is the right one. It does not necessarily mean that the other views are wrong. For Vatsyāyana too means the same thing as Kaṇāda even though he does not bring in an explicit reference to the factor memory in his definition of doubt. When he says that there is in doubtful cognition an absence

1. P.B.U. pp. 75 - 'Sāmānyapratyakṣādviśesapratyakṣādviśesasmṛtesca Samśayah'.
of cognition of specific characters, he really means that specific characters as brought to the mind by memory are not found in the objects sensed. Now the view propounded in the Pauśkara Āgama needs explication: for there is neither any reference to specific characters, nor any mention made of smṛti or memory. Yet the view of doubt as given in it is not different from that of Vatsyāyana or Kaṇāda. For according to the Āgama, doubt is essentially a knowledge involving two alternatives; and a knowledge of two alternatives depends as well upon a cognition of the absence of specific characters brought forth by memory. Thus the Pauśkara Āgama has the right view of doubtful cognition. The view of the Vṛttikāra of the Nyāya Sūtras however reduces doubtful cognition to one of error. If two contrary properties, such as the character of a man and that of a log of wood, are discerned in the object presented, the object apprehended is neither a man nor a log of wood, but something other than either. But the character of a man belongs to a man and to none else, while that of a log of wood to a log of wood only. If both the characters are cognized in the self same object, it is one of error and not one of doubtful cognition. Annam Bhaṭṭa too makes the same mistake as the Vṛttikāra when he says 'that doubt is the knowledge of contrary properties in one and the same object.

According to Vatsyāyana, doubt is of five kinds arising either (1) from apprehension of properties common to many objects in which the cognition of the

1. I.P.B. pp 516 Dvyālambasamsāyobuddhiḥ samānākāradarśanāt.
   T.S.A. pp 69 'Ekasmindharmini viruddhanādharmavaisistyaajñānam samāsayaḥ'.
specific properties of any one object is lacking, as in the case of the doubt whether the object seen is a man or a post, or (2) from apprehension of properties not common to any one of the objects, as in the cognition of sound having the character of being produced by disjunction giving rise to the doubt whether sound is a substance, a quality, or an action, or (3) from conflicting opinions as when one system of philosophy denies the existence of the soul, and another affirms it, there is doubt as to whether sound exists or not, or (4) from irregularity of perception illustrated by the doubt in the form of whether the water perceived in a mirage really exists or not, or (5) From irregularity of non-perception as is the doubt whether the water in the roots and branches of trees though not perceived is really existent or non-existent. But according to Uddyotakāra, the author of Nyāya Vārtika, doubt is of the first three kinds only. To the Siddhāntin however doubt is of the first kind only.  The Siddhāntin has a supporter in the person of Saṅkara Misra who in his commentary on the Vaiśeṣika Śūtrās of Kaṇāda opines that doubt is neither five-fold nor three-fold but is of one kind only. An analysis of Vatsyāyana’s five kinds of doubt, it is believed, will justify the stand taken up by the Siddhāntin.

The Saiva Siddhāntin cannot consider Vatsyāyana’s second kind of doubt as doubt at all. If the character of being produced by disjunction belongs only to sound and not to a substance, a quality or an action, there cannot be a doubt as to whether sound is a substance, or a quality, or an action. It is only a prepossessed mind which believes in the totality of only three entities, such as substance, quality, and action that is capable of doubting whether the entity sound is one or

1. P.B.U. pp 76.
the other of the three entities. Even here the cognition of the presence of the common character entity which it shares with the three entities along with that of the absence of their specific characters contributes towards the doubtful cognition. Thus Vatsyāyana has no case for his second kind of doubt. Again the doubtful cognition of the form whether the soul exists or not can be shown to be the same as the first kind. For the common character entity belongs both to existents and to non-existents which together exhaust the universe of discourse; and the soul as an entity is to be classified either under existents or under non-existents. The inability to find in the soul any specific character, either of existents or non-existents, together with the cognition that the soul shares in the character of an entity with the existents as well as with the non-existents are responsible for the doubtful cognition in question. Thus the third kind of doubt of Vatsyāyana is nothing different from the first. A similar argument can be adduced as regards the fourth and fifth kinds of doubt of Vatsyāyana. Hence it may be safely concluded that the Siddhāntin is correct when he speaks of one kind of doubt only.

1 The Sāṅkhya too exclude doubtful cognition from valid knowledge on the ground that it is an aniscita rūpatva jñānam (uncertain knowledge). With the Jainās, doubtful cognition is neither true nor false, since it is partly expressed and partly unexpressed. The Viśiṣṭādvaitins on the other hand appear to make the same mistake as Annam Bhaṭṭa and the Vṛttikārā of the Nyāya Sūtrās when they speak of doubt 'as the

1. S.P.B. pp 46 'Samśayavyāvartanāva tvavadharāṇa-miti'
   T.K. pp 10
2. G.J.K. pp 135,
apperception of mutually contradictory attributes in a thing (dharma) to be apprehended'. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, the founder of the Bhāṭṭa School of Mīmāṃsā, includes doubtful cognition under non-authoritative cognition, though he admits that it is a positive entity due to defection in its cause of production. With him however doubtful cognition is valid as cognition; for when we doubt as to whether a long object seen to be lying at a distance is a man or a log of wood there is the apprehension of length together with the rememberances of two objects which are both long. According to Kumārila, validity is an inherent property of knowledge. It does not matter whether there is or is not coherency with other knowledges. Not only doubtful cognition but also erroneous cognition as cognition is valid to him. The Siddhāntin however rejects the view of Kumārila that doubtful cognition is valid as cognition. For it being not a definite and positive knowledge cannot be tested either by coherence or by correspondence.

Doubt as a method of arriving at truth has long been recognised in the Indian schools of philosophy; and Saiva Siddhānta is a system of philosophy built on methodic doubt. Such judgments as are believed to be true are methodically doubted to see if they stand the test of critical reflection. Yet it is regretted that the Saiva Siddhānta School of Philosophy is defective as every other Indian school of philosophy is in this respect that all spontaneous convictions, such as 'two and two are four' are not put to the test. The utility of this method of methodic doubt has been questioned. There is a tendency among modern writers on Indian Philosophy to drop off the method altogether from philosophical inquiries. In the west this method was introduced by Rene Descartes and is no longer adopted.
Viparyaya or Erroneous Knowledge

Viparyaya or erroneous knowledge is according to Sivajña Yogi the Jñāna Śakti (Cognitive potency) of the Ātman or the soul which gets deluded and cognizes one object as another similar to the object cognised. Sivajña Yogi seems to distinguish between two kinds of error, namely the perceptual error or illusion and the error of conception. As an instance of perceptual error, he cites the case where a rope is apprehended as a snake. According to him the perceptual error made in this cognition, or rather misapprehension, is due to a faulty eye. The example given for erroneous conception is the judgment that the body is the soul. The error herein he says, is the work of the ānava mala (root—evil) which is in conjunction with the Ātman (soul) from eternity. No matter whether it is illusion or error of conception the position of Sivajña Yogi is that error is based, as Vacaspati mīśra thinks, on some veri-similitude between the object and its false appearance. When in darkness a person mistakes a rope for a snake and exclaims "It lies" the content of "it" is the rope while the sensation is that of the snake. The rope is the percept and the snake is a mere idea. In valid perception a rope is

1. S.S.S. pp 8 'Aṇañai atañoṭoppumaiyitaiya Virupulāka mayaṅki nīccayikkmāṇaṅcaṅti tirivenappaṭum'.
2. S.B. pp 266 'Kaiyarī aravēṅakkānum pirānti kān- niṅkāν yātānumoru kūṟramilvali nikalāmaiyiṅ.
3. Ibid pp 266 'Tēkemē āṃmavēṅra roṭakkattup pirāntīṅnaṅam Āṃmāṅṅkan orukuṟram- amilvali nikalāmaiyiṅ akkuṟram- ākiya cakacamalam pirāntīṅṅattin vērāyunṭeṅpatuṣṭuparappatūm.'
the cause of the sensation of a rope and not that of a snake; but in the illusion in question what causes the sensation of a snake is not the normal cause of the sensation. Sivajnāna Yogi urges that it is due to defective sense of sight that the rope is apprehended as a snake. The darkness intervening between the eye and the object of perception obscures the eye, and only certain characteristics, such as bent form, length, etc., which are common only to a rope and a snake strike the mind of the percipient who at first doubts as to whether the object presented is a rope or a snake. Then the percipient sees, on account of defective eyes, certain specific characteristics of a snake, such as motion, etc., in the object sensed, and has a positive and certain but false knowledge that the object perceived is a snake. Here the snake is only an idea, and is subjective in its origin; yet it is not a mental construction. It is in fact non-mental, and is due to the selection by the mind of appropriate perspectives of the real world. It is true that there is no snake presented to the eye for perception. Yet the snake apprehended is as much real and valid as the rope presented. What is non-valid in this apprehension is the appearance of the rope as the snake. For a similar reason it may be urged that the mirage presented to the eye as water in the pālai nilam (desert tract) due to the mingling of the rays of sun with the heat rays radiated from the surface of the earth is as real as is the water apprehended. The invalidity consists in the mistaken apprehension of the mirage as water.

1. S.B. pps 341 and 304 - ‘peyttērai nirenakkāntan-māttiraiye poyyāvananrippēyttēr poyyanrenpatu kankanṭākavariyappatu.’
It is now proposed to examine the view how similarity can be the basis for the formation of the erroneous conception that the body is the soul. The body is jaḍa or inert while the soul is cit or intelligent. There cannot be any community of character between the two—the inert and the intelligent. Therefore it would seem that there is no possibility of existence for the judgment that the body is the soul. But Saiva Siddhānta does admit, as the materialist and the behaviourist do, the existence of such judgments. With the Siddhāntin however it is an erroneous conception, though the other two schools of thought mentioned above consider it a true one. The Siddhāntin traces the error to the presence in the Ātman (soul) in union with it from eternity, of ānava mala (root-evil) which clouds the soul and makes it jaḍa-like. Thus there is similarity between the body and the soul in its Malafetterd condition. According to the Saiva Siddhānta system, both the cognitions—that of the body, and that of the soul—are equally valid; but the cognition of the body as the soul is false.

The existential judgment 'the soul does not exist' presents a difficulty to be explained in the light of Sivajñāna Yogi’s definition of error; for herein there are no two things which are similar to each other to mistake the one for the other. However, it is not a difficulty which is insurmountable. It can be got over thus: the soul as an existent shares with the non-existent the common character of entity which are both objects of knowledge. It is this common character between the existent and the non-existent that first begets the doubt whether the object—the soul—is an existent or a non-existent. Then on account of the delusive nature of ānava (root-evil) that is in conjunction with the soul as if it were a covering to it the
specific characteristics of the nonexistent, such as the
absence of qualities and activities, are discerned in the
soul giving rise to the erroneous judgment 'the soul
does not exist'.

The error made when one perceives the earth as a
flat body is an error of perception, and not a conceptual
error. Here a curved surface is mistaken for a plane
surface. Now curved and plane surfaces have the
common character 'surface' which at first produces
the doubt whether the surface of the earth is curved or
plane. Then certain special features of the plane
surface, such as flatness, etc., are perceived by the
faulty eye to belong to the earth. Hence there is the
mistaken perception that the earth is flat.

The error lurking in the comparative judgment
'the sun is smaller than the earth' needs explication.
Here a size bigger than the earth is perceived as one
smaller than the earth. These two characters have
between them the common element 'size' which at
first produces in the mind of the percipient the doubt in
the form of whether the object perceived - the sun - is
characterised by a size smaller than the earth or by
one bigger than the earth. The defective eye which is
unable to get over the illusion of distance decides in
favour of the first alternative; and thus there is an
error of perception.

The Saiva Siddhāntin's conception of the causes of
erroneous judgments is of course a metaphysical one. It
is not anyhow opposed to scientific conception; for science
is concerned with immediate causes of error, whereas
metaphysics deals with ultimate and final causes.
Again it is to be noted that Sivajñāna Yogi identifies
both valid and erroneous knowledge with the Jñānaśakti
(cognitive potency) of the ātman (soul). According to the Siddhānta, knowledge, whether valid or invalid, is an accidental attribute of the ātman. But true knowledge is the Svarūpa lakṣaṇa or essential attribute of the ātman (soul), and there is an unimpeded manifestation of it when the ātman is in its mukti nilai (state of release). However valid knowledge of the three entities -Pati, Pasu and Pāsam- is important for the Siddhāntin, as it is the only one that can lead him to True knowledge.

(vi) Nirvikalpa and Savikalpa Jñānams.

Yathārtha anubhava, according to Saiva Siddhānta, is due to the three kinds of knowledge, namely; (1) the Nirvikalpa Jñānam (indeterminate knowledge), (2) The Savikalpa jñānam (determinate knowledge), and (3) Sivānubhava jñānam (direct experiential knowledge of Siva). An attempt is made in this section to present the Siddhāntin's conception of the first two forms of knowledge, and to criticize the views on them of some of the other schools of Indian thought.

It is a well-known fact that when an object is presented to the senses, at first the special characteristics of the object do not strike the mind of the percipient. There is a general awareness of the being of the object. The Apprehension is pure and simple, and is called nirvikalpa jñānam which is an indeterminate form of knowledge. Here the object of perception is not known as a specific individual possessing a name; it is not explicitly cognized as belonging to a class even; its quality and activity also are not disconcerned. The nirvikalpa knowledge of an object cannot be expressed in judgments of the form of substantive – adjective
relation. For in nirvikalpa jñānam we have knowledge which exhibits or manifests the mere essence of an object, and not as related to another object, or quality, or activity. It is the first step in the conceptual cognition of a thing, and always precedes even doubtful cognition; according to Saiva Siddhānta, the Jīvan mukta's knowledge of objects is of the type of nirvikalpa jñānam.

In savikalpa jñānam (determinate knowledge), on the other hand, the object of perception appears with its name, the class to which it belongs, its quality and its activity. The name is a distinguishing mark, and presupposes, on the part of the experient, a knowledge of other things which are different from it. Again the object apprehended in this type of knowledge is not merely an individual but an individual belonging to a class. This too involves a knowledge of things having common qualities. Hence it is evident Savikalpa jñānam is not simple and pure. Since what is immediately apprehended in nirvikalpa jñānam is a mere individual and not as one belonging to a class, some thing else—an other—must enter into consciousness to make the object of perception as belonging to a class. This 'other' is memory. Thus the validity of Savikalpa jñānam or determinate knowledge depends on that of memory. The Saiva Siddhāntin recognises true memory only and not false memory as a constituent of savikalpa jñānam, and holds the view that both

1. S. S. S. stanza 3 pp 8 - Porulunuṁmaimātrattin viṇṭalillā variśvākum Viṅkaṅpamillākkāṭciye.
   S. S. S. pp 163 - Etirē tōnuṟuvātōr viṭāyattir potu-
   vakiyaiyhițőrporulēṇṟu aritā̱lākiya niruvi-
   kaṅpakkāṭci muṟpaṭa nikaiumāne.

2. S. S. S. stanza 3 pp 8 - 'Peyarcați kuṇamēkaṇnum
   porulēṇāvain tuṅcaviṅkaṟpa vuṇarviṇukku'.
nirvikalpa jñānam and savikalpa jñānam are equally valid.

The Māyāvādin however holds the view that nirvikalpa jñānam is the knowledge of Pure Being; and as such it is valid. But Savikalpa Jñānam, he says, gives us a knowledge of distinctions of objects. And the view that the world is composed of a plurality of objects is opposed to scriptural evidence. Even perception does not sanction plurality. For in the judgment 'this is different from that' even those who regard savikalpa jñānam as a valid form of knowledge will have to admit that the apprehension of difference does follow that of non-difference. Further, they will have to accept non-difference as true. If they do, difference being the contradictory of non-difference cannot be true. Thus the world of difference is, the Māyā Vādin argues, a mere appearance, due to illusion on the part of the experient. Now Savikalpa jñānam (determinate knowledge) being a knowledge of appearance is, according to the Māyā Vādin, not valid. Further, inference as well cannot, the Māyā Vādin urges, give us a world of difference. For it involves an element of perception in the form of a vyāpti jñānam (knowledge of universal concomitance) where difference subsists, and perception does not give us such a jñānam. So the Māyā Vādin concludes that savikalpa jñānam cannot be proved to be valid by any known method of knowledge. Even if we accept the existence of a world of differences, what relation holds, the Māyā Vādin questions, between the object known and the knowledge derived from it? Is it one of tādātmiya (identity) or one of kāraṇa kārya bhāva (relation of cause and effect), or saiyoga (conjunction) or samavāya (inference) or something

1. S.B. pps 130 - 133.
other than these? If tādātmya were the relation subsisting between the knowledge of a pot and the pot itself, then the pot should have its existence in the mind of the knower as is the knowledge of the pot. But it is a fact accepted by all that the pot has an objective existence as apart from the knowledge of the pot which is subjective. So tādātmya cannot be the relation between a pot and the knowledge of it. The relation cannot be one of cause and effect too. For the cause and effect are inseparably connected with each other so that the one cannot exist without the other. In the dream-world we have a knowledge of a pot, without a corresponding objective—a pot in it. The relation cannot evidently be one of saiyoga or samavāya even. If it is urged that the relation is unique of its kind and is merely the relation between the object known and knowledge itself, it is pointed out that the object of cognition cannot be specifically known, and that no relation can exist between the psychic element 'knowledge of a pot' and the physical object 'the pot'. Moreover the world of difference is never manifested by valid knowledge. Further, the objective world is unreal, and its cause Māyā is indescribable. Thus savikalpa jñānam being essentially a knowledge of appearances is, according to the Māyā Vādin, not valid.

Sivajñāna Yogi, in criticising the Māyā Vādin, throws his gauntlet to the Advaitins as well when he affirms that the world with all its differences is real. Perception itself, he says, gives us the world of differences. The cognition of a rope as a snake is contradicted by faultless apprehension which is perception itself. The world does not become something else in faultless apprehension or perception. Further, what is seen to be true in the present is true for all time,
Though difference may not directly be seen in nirvikalpa jñānam, yet the seed of difference is present over there. What is implicit in nirvikalpa jñānam becomes explicit in savikalpa. The name, class etc. with which savikalpa jñānam is associated exist in nirvikalpa too in a sūkṣma (subtle) state. For on the direct perception of an object, though we are unable to cognize the existence of difference in nirvikalpa jñānam by the positive method, yet after the doubt arising in the form of whether the object apprehended is a man or a log of wood, it is a fact that we arrive at the cognition that it is a log of wood and not a man by the method of negation. Thus difference is perceptible in the form of non-man in nirvikalpa jñānam. Further in error a rope may appear as a snake to one person at one time, and as a garland to the same person at another time, or to a different person at the same time. On the other hand, the pot remains a pot in faultlessness apprehension to all persons at all times. Thus the world of difference consisting of pots etc., is real, and is not the product of illusion. Besides, the rope shares with the snake certain common characteristics. The apprehension of these common qualities and the non-apprehension of the specific qualities of the rope are, among other factors, together responsible for the mistaking of the rope for a snake; but there are no common characteristics between the pot which is inert and Brahma which is cit (intelligent). So it is unthinkable, as it were, to imagine that one can commit the error of apprehending Brahma as a pot. Since nirvikalpa jñānam is the cause of savikalpa jñānam, difference which persists in the latter must be contained in the former though in an implicit way. Again, unless one has a cognition of difference, he cannot have one of non-difference. Thus perception of non-difference is dependent upon that of difference,
Neither the Advaitin nor the Māyā Vādin can contend that the apprehension of non-difference alone is valid, simply because it occurs first. Now the perception of difference in the form of 'the piece of cloth is different from the pot' persists for all time, whereas the apprehension of non-difference in the form of 'the piece of cloth is non-different from the pot' is liable to be sublated in the future; and that which persists for all time belongs to the realm of true knowledge. Thus perception tells us that the world of difference is real. Even anumāna (inference) which the Advaitin makes use of to prove that the world is non-different from Brahma cannot be of any avail to him. For Sivajñāna Yogi presses the view that anumāna, in the hands of the Advaitin, who is desirous of fetching a piece of cloth, will make it possible for him to return with the pot instead. It is regretted that Sivajñāna Yogi seems to presume that the Advaitin will reason as follows, and that the reason is valid.

The pot is non-different from Brahma.
The piece of cloth is non-different from Brahma.

:: The piece of cloth is the pot.

The same reasoning when put in the syllogistic form is as follows:

The pot is that which is non-different from Brahma.
The piece of cloth is that which is non-different from Brahma.

:: The piece of cloth is the pot.

The above syllogism, when expressed symbolically, will be of the following form:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
P \\
M \\
S \\
M \\
A \\
S \\
A \\
M \\
A \\
S \\
A \\
\end{array}
\]

:: SAP
Sivajñāna Yogi seems to be apparently unaware of the fallacy of undistributed middle lurking in the above reasoning. In fact the Advaitin is sensible enough not to commit this fallacy though he regards the phenomenal world of difference as unreal and due to avidya (nescience). Yet Sivajñāna Yogi agrees with the modern trend of European speculation and appears to score a point over the Advaitin in regarding the empirical world as real and savikalpa jñānam which recognises the world of difference as a valid form of knowledge.

It must be noted that the Siddhāntin posits that the relation between an object and the knowledge of it is unique of its kind, and sees no reason why it cannot be so. If no relation holds between an object and the knowledge of it, Sivajñāna Yogi contends that the Advaitin's cognition of the world as illusory will have no object of which it is a knowledge. Therefore the cognition that the world is illusory will be non-valid. Thus the Advaitins will be reduced quite unwittingly to the position of regarding the world as non-illusory. In truth the world is real; and the knowledge of the world as real is due to savikalpa jñānam which is, according to the Siddhāntin, a valid form of knowledge. Sivajñāna Yogi does not seem to notice the flaw in the above argument of him. If there is no object related to cognition of which there is a cognition, one can predicate neither illusoriness nor non-illusoriness of the object. So Sivajñāna Yogi's presumption that the Advaitin will be forced to accept the non-illusoriness of the world on the above grounds is unwarranted,
According to the Buddhists, nirvikalpa jñānam is the only form of valid perception. It is pure sense perception of svalakṣaṇās (particulars) shorn of all its mnemonic or ideational elements. Strictly speaking it is not sense-perception even. Rather it is pure sensation. Ordinarily when we sense an object, at first we are only aware of the object as a bare ‘that’ and nothing more. Then there is productive imagination and we construct its image, associate it with a name, bring it under a class, and attribute to it certain qualities, activities and relations. The first phase of perception when the object is merely sensed without associating it with a class, quality, activity, or relation is called nirvikalpa jñānam which is an unverbalised form of experience. In the second phase however the mind of the experient is active, and invests the object with a class concept, qualities, activities and relations. Herein the perception is said to be savikalpa jñānam which is a verbalised form of experience. Thus, according to the Buddhists, nirvikalpa jñānam being the knowledge of an object as a mere particular is valid, though it is indeterminate and non-conceptual in form. But savikalpa jñānam being essentially a product of mental construction of the experient is false though it is a determinate and conceptual form of knowledge.

The Siddhāntin agrees with the Buddhists in his conception of nirvikalpa jñānam as a valid form of

1. V.L. vol. 1 pp 149.
T.B. pp 7 'Tatra pratyaksam kalpanāpodhama-bhrāntam'
P.S. pp 8 'Pratyakṣam kalpanāpodham nāmajātya-dyasammyutam'
ibid pp 6 'Svalakṣaṇaṇaviṣayakam pratyakṣaśevasa'
N.B. pp 11 'Tatra kalpanāpodhamabhrāntam pratyakṣam'.
knowledge, but cannot as a realist bring himself in line
with them in considering savikalpa jñānam as false on
the ground that it is a conceptual form of knowledge.
The attitude of the Buddhists with regard to savikalpa
jñānam is untenable, and can be easily refuted thus;
the Buddhists have a conception of nirvikalpa jñānam
as distinct from savikalpa jñānam. No Buddhists will
deny the truth of the above statement. Now this con-
ception of nirvikalpa jñānam must necessarily be false;
for it is a conceptual form of knowledge; and all
conceptual forms of knowledge are according to them
false. Then the Buddhists will have to either revise
their conception of nirvikalpa jñānam, or abandon the
position that conceptual forms of knowledge are false.
They cannot do the former. For however much they
revise, they cannot succeed in getting at a true concep-
tion of nirvikalpa jñānam, since all conceptual forms of
knowledge are, according to them, false. If they want
to have a true conception of nirvikalpa jñānam, they
will be forced, much against their wish, to accept the
validity of conceptual knowledge or savikalpa jñānam.
If on the other hand the Buddhists elect to hold the
view that nirvikalpa jñānam is equally false as
savikalpa jñānam, no knowledge will be possible; and
Buddhism will become a species of scepticism.
Buddhism is no scepticism not even a form of it. The
Buddhists accept nirvikalpa jñānam as a valid form of
knowledge. On account of reasons stated above, the
Buddhists for sheer consistency will have to accept the
view of the Siddhāntin that savikalpa jñānam too is a
valid form of knowledge.

1 According to the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta of Rāmā-
nuja, there is no perception which does not involve the

rupa or form of the object perceived. Even the most initial perception of an object reveals some form or other which in its extension is no other than jati (generic character). Even if perception lasts only for an instant, both the generic and specific characters of an object are perceived together in the self-same instant. The perception may be either vague, indefinite, and only partially determined giving rise to nirvikalpa jnanam or clear, definite and fully determined producing savikalpa jnanam. Ramanuja does not believe, as the Siddhantin does, in any absolutely indeterminate form of knowledge. For he says, 'indeterminate perception is the cognition of an object shorn of certain forms of difference but not of all difference'. Thus with the Viisthadvaitins, nirvikalpa and savikalpa jnanams are respectively indeterminate and determinate forms of knowledge in the sense that the objects of perception are less definitely defined by form, colour, etc. in the former and more definitely in the latter.

The Saiva Siddhantin has no reason to grumble against the Viishadvaitin when he says both nirvikalpa and savikalpa jnanams are valid. The problem for the Viishadvaitin, is the point at which nirvikalpa jnanam passes into savikalpa jnanam. The Saiva Siddhantin feels that it is an unnecessary classification in the senses in which the Viishadvaitin uses the terms, and sees only an anxiety on the part of the latter to introduce the term nirvikalpa into his system. The etymology of the words 'nirvikalpa jnanam' meaning 'knowledge without discriminative activities such as comparison, inference, etc.' must preclude the Viishad-

1. S. B. R. vol. 1 pps 6 and 27.

Nirvikalpam nama kenacidviseseena viyuktasya grahanam, na sarvavisesarahitasya.
vaitin from the use of the term. For he does not believe in the possibility of such knowledge which, according to him, will reduce sensation to an almost non-cognitive state. In reality the Viśiṣṭādvaitin has no conception of nirvikalpa jñānam, and it would be better that he owns it. He does not do so, for sruti has it; and he has a great respect for sruti. The Saiva Siddhāntin feels that the Viśiṣṭādvaitin’s blind love for Sruti makes him give an improper meaning to nirvikalpa jñānam (knowledge without definiteness) which meaning too does not properly fit in with his system.

It must be borne in mind that Rāmānuja is not the first to deny indeterminate knowledge in the sense in which it is used by the Siddhāntin. For the Sābdikās (grammarians) have asserted that there is no such thing as nirvikalpa (unqualified perception). According to them, words and thoughts are inseparable. 'There is no thought known to experience which is without correspondence with the word; the whole knowledge is as it were pierced and threaded with words.' The Mādhvites too agree with Rāmānuja in their denial of non-relational indeterminate forms of knowledge. The Siddhāntin feels that the Sābdikās, along with the Viśiṣṭādvaitins and the Mādhavites, are ignorant of the fact that relational knowledge presupposes a knowledge of objects out of relations and that nirvikalpa jñānam is the knowledge of the mere ‘esse’ of an object without relating it to its generic character, qualities and actions.

The Sānkhyās, on the other hand, believe in the validity of both nirvikalpa and savikalpa jñānams. According to them, nirvikalpa jñānam is the know-

1. V.P.B. sutra 124 pp 49
   'Na so sasti prayayo loke yah sabdānugamadṛte
   anuridhamiva jñānam sarvasabdena bhāsate.'
2. P.P. pp 27.
ledge of an object as an object only without relating it to any additional element; and savikalpa jñānam is clear perception of the object with its name, genus, etc., brought about by memory either by the awakening of the previous impressions left in the inner organs or by the likeness of the object apprehended to an object perceived previously. The term 'savikalpa' indicates that there is in savikalpa jñānam something more than in nirvikalpa jñānam. This extra element is not, as the Yogācārās urge, a fanciful construction of the mind of the experient. For, fancy is not governed by any law, and differs with different individuals. But there is in savikalpa jñānam a uniformity of apprehension of the name, genius, etc., of an object by various cognisers. There is an objection that savikalpa jñānam is not valid as it is associated with memory. 'The Sāṅkhyaṣ admit the part played by memory in savikalpa jñānam, but raise the problem 'how an accompanying cause – as true memory is such – can ever deprive a means of right cognition of its power; for this is unconcerned in the perception and is unable to veil the essence of the thing which bears the name'. Thus the attitude adopted by the Sāṅkhyas towards nirvikalpa and savikalpa jñānams completely tallies with that of the Saiva Siddhāntins, and seems to be the right one even from a common sense point of view.

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakās too accept the validity of nirvikalpa and savikalpa jñānams. 'With the Bhāṭṭas

1. A. C. pp 51.
2. M. S. V. pp 168 – 'asti hyālocanā jñānam prathamam nirvikalpakambalamukadivijñāna-sadṛṣam suddhavastujam'.
Ibid pp 169 – 'Viśeṣastu pratiyante savikalpakabuddhibhiḥ.'
S. D. pp 37–43.
M. N. pp 17.
nirvikalpa jñānam is a mere alochana or simple apprehension like that of a new born babe. Neither the class character nor the specific individuality of the object is presented to the senses in it. What the atman cognizes is the object itself wherein these two subsist. But savikalpa jñānam, according to the Bhāṭṭās, is a conceptual form of knowledge in which there is a perception of an object with its name, class character and qualities. What is apprehended in nirvikalpa jñānam is a vague and indistinct sort of something, and the cognition there is a confused knowledge (sammugdha jñānam). But the object apprehended in savikalpa jñānam is a definite thing with its own specific characteristics. The Saiva Siddhāntin fully endorses the view of the Bhāṭṭās regarding savikalpa jñānam. But he cannot agree with them in their conception that nirvikalpa jñānam is a vague and indistinct but confused knowledge. It is true that the object apprehended by a new-born child is vague and indistinct; but its cognition is savikalpa jñānam, for the infant cognizes at least the form of the object presented along with the object. Thus the Bhāṭṭās are reduced to the position of regarding nirvikalpa jñānam as resembling a type of savikalpa jñānam. The Siddhāntin feels that the Bhāṭṭās are not serious in their analogy. In their anxiety to give a practical illustration they have drawn in the cognition of a new-born child as an approximation to the form of knowledge called nirvikalpa jñānam.

The Prabhākarās are of the view that nirvikalpa jñānam constitutes the cognition of both the generic character and the specific individuality of the object presented to the senses. They also admit that what is apprehended in nirvikalpa jñānam is not an individual as belonging to a definite class. For an object can be
apprehended as an individual or as one belonging to a class, only in its relation to other objects, which are however not presented to consciousness. So the cognition remains as nirvikalpa or non-conceptual till some other objects also enter into consciousness. Even though what is apprehended in nirvikalpa jñānam is an individual belonging to a class, there is no full comprehension of the object in it until other things also enter into consciousness till which time the cognition is called nirvikalpa jñānam. With respect to savikalpa jñānam (conceptual knowledge) the Prabhākarās say that there is a definite and determinate cognition of the object with its generic and specific characters. With the Prabhākarās as with the Siddhāntin nirvikalpa jñānam (non-conceptual knowledge) is valid. But the Siddhāntin denies that the generic character and the specific individuality of an object are both apprehended together in non-conceptual knowledge. He however admits that they are present over there and yet not discerned. Further he cannot conceive how the Prabhākarās claim validity to savikalpa jñānam in accordance with their views. On the one hand they admit the presence in Savikalpa jñānam of the element of memory which is non-valid with them, and on the other attribute validity to it of which memory is a constituent. When the Siddhāntin questions the validity of savikalpa jñānam on account of its association with memory they reply that the element of memory involved in savikalpa jñānam actually appertains to the other objects in relation to which the concept is formed but does not in fact belong to the object itself about which there is a cognition, and that it does not vitiate the validity of savikalpa jñānam. The Siddhāntin is not satisfied with this seeming explanation of the Prabhākarās. He contends that so long
as savikalpa jñānam is a conceptual knowledge not merely of the object presented but of the object in its relation to other objects, the validity of savikalpa jñānam is seriously endangered by the invalidity which attaches itself to the knowledge of other objects brought in my memory. Thus the Prabhākarās do not seem to be consistent in their views that memory is not valid and that savikalpa jñānam is valid.

The Nyāya-Vaišegika schools of thought too are in substantial agreement with the Prabhākarās in their views of Nirvikalpa and savikalpa jñānams. According to them, nirvikalpa jñānam is a cognition of an object and of its generic and specific properties without in anyway relating by the substantive-adjective relation the properties to the object. Both the object and its properties are here apprehended as unrelated units. But in savikalpa jñānam there is cognition of the object as related to its generic and specific qualities. It is admitted by these two schools that memory it is that relates the name and class character to the object; And memory is according to the Naiyāyikās, not considered as a valid form of knowledge as it is not presentative. So savikalpa jñānam which involves an element of memory should be non-valid with the Naiyāyikas who however hold the view that both nirvikalpa jñānam and savikalpa jñānam are equally valid. The Saiva Siddhāntin feels that the Naiyāyikās are not in the right when they posit non-validity to memory and claim validity at the same time to savikalpa jñānam of which memory is an essential constituent. But the Siddhāntin has no cause to

1. T.B.K. pp 27 - 'Yojanāhinam sambandhānavagāhi nirvikalpakam Yojanātmakam sambandhāvagāhi Savikalpakam'.

N.T.K. pps 218 - 221.
demur with the Vaiśeṣikās who claim validity to both nirvikalpa jñānam and savikalpa jñānam.¹ For Sankara Misra in his Upaskara to the Vaiśeṣika sūtras includes memory too under valid knowledge. In fact the Siddhāntin in this respect is of one mind with the Vaiśeṣikās though he cannot agree with them in their contention that in nirvikalpa jñānam we have a knowledge of an object and of its properties without in any way relating the latter to the former.

(vii) Sivānubhava Jñānam or Immediate Experiential Knowledge of Siva.

The ātman, according to the Siddhāntin, makes use of the evolutes of Māyā, such as the Indriyās (senses) and the antahkaraṇās (internal sense organs) for the cognition of objects in its petta nilai (embodied state). In the mukti nilai (released state) however it is bereft of all bodies including the indriyās and the antahkaraṇās; yet it can have direct experiential knowledge of Siva.

² Just as a crystal in the proximity of a flower acquires the nature of the flower, specially its colour, so the ātman (soul), by virtue of its Svarūpa lakṣaṇa (essential nature) of imbibing the character of the object of cognition, attains in the cognition of Siva. His eight qualities such as omniscience, omnipresence, etc. The manifestation of these qualities in the ātman constitute what is called 'Sivānanda', and the ātman is said to have Sivānanda anubhava (experience of the bliss of Siva).

2. S.B. pps 324 and 331; S.A. pp 7.
In the mukti nilai the ātman’s svarūpa laksana of non-relational or transcendental knowledge is manifest, and its taṭastha laksana (accidental attribute) of relational knowledge is pushed to the background and is unmanifest. This is why the Siddhāntin holds the view that Siva who can be an object of direct experiential knowledge of the ātman is beyond the reach of vāk (speech) and manas (mind).

The Mayā Vādin agrees with the Siddhāntin that Brahman or Siva is beyond the pale of description and imagination, but differs with him when he denies that Brahman can be an object of experiential knowledge of the ātman. According to Mayā Vāda, Brahman as limited by the different inner organs born of Āvidyā (nescience) gets divided into jñāta (knower) jñānam (knowledge) and jñeyam (object of knowledge) and becomes known as such by sravana (hearing the scripture), Manana (reflection), and nididhyāsana (contemplation). When avidyā is replaced by vidyā (right knowledge) the division of jñāta, jñānam and jñeyam disappears; and Brahman does not become a jñeyam in the form of either Sat (existent) or Asat (non-existent); it is pure jñānam or consciousness not limited by any adjuncts.

The Siddhāntin questions the Mayā Vādins as to the nature of the pramāṇa (instrument of cognition) by virtue of which Brahman’s essential nature is got at as neither sat nor asat. If they deny that there is any pramāṇa at all fearing it would make Brahman a

1. Ibid pp 338 – ‘Ānmayukku civaattaiic cārntu cutti-rantārivatākiya taniyalpu vilan kinaviṭattuc cuttiyārivatākiya potuviyalpu vilakkamiṇī nirralān ......’

2. Ibid pps 306 and 307.
prameyam (an object of experiential knowledge) and a jneyam as well the Siddhāntin points out that one who is familiar with the true nature of sat knows that all those things that are established by perception, inference, etc., together with sūnya (void) which has no pramāṇa are really asat. Hence Brahmān according to the Māyāvāda has to be considered as asat. This contradicts the sruti reading that Brahmān is sat. This is why the Siddhāntin postulates that Brahmān who is no other than Siva can be the object of experiential knowledge of the atman in its mukti nilai.

'But the Naiyāyikās accept the statement of the Siddhāntin that Siva or Brahmān can be the content of experiential knowledge of the atman (soul), but do not countenance the view that He is beyond the realm of vāk (speech) and manas (mind). It is a fact, they say, that Brahmān is svayam prakāsa (self manifest). If one is to cognize it in some other way, it has to be made manifest by this new method, for there is no restrictive rule that what is self-manifest needs no manifestation. Further, when the atman does not contact the manas (mind) knowledge does not arise. Therefore anything outside the range of vāk and manas can never be the content of cognition. Thus the Naiyāyikās contend that Siva or Brahmān can be known by the atman only when it is in conjunction with the antahkaranās, such as manas etc. They object also that even if the atman as deprived of its antahkaranas were to cognize Siva, it could do so only as something extrinsic to Siva.

The Siddhāntin replies that the atman has the essential attribute of intelligence; and the antahkaranas are merely accessories of knowledge, which manifest the attribute of knowledge of the atman, but

1. S.B. pps. 307 and 308.
do not create knowledge. In the cognition of Siva it needs no antahkaraṇās; its consciousness gets merged in Siva when it gets the character of Siva. Being then illumined by Sivajnanam it has experiential knowledge of Siva. It does not cognize Siva as one extrinsic to him in the manner it has cognition of worldly objects that are all external to it. The ātman's cognition of Siva which is Sat is essentially different from that of Asat. The ātman requires contact with the antahkaraṇās for the knowledge of Asat, but is not in need of them for Sivānubhaya. In as much as neither the senses nor the antahkaraṇās are instruments to the ātman to cognize Siva, the Siddhāntin is of opinion that Siva who is beyond the sphere of vāk and manas is the object of experiential knowledge of the ātman.

The Pātañjalās find fault with the Siddhāntin when he states that the ātman can cognize Brahm with the aid of Brahman. They urge the point that one needs a knowledge of a thing before it could be used as a means to know an object. The Siddhāntin commits, according to them the fallacy of ātmāsraya doṣa (fallacy of self-dependence) in that he requires a knowledge of Brahman before the latter could be used as a means or instrument to cognize it. The Pātañjalās also state that their conception that Brahm who is beyond the range of vāk and manas can become the content of dhyāna (contemplation) and bhāvana (reflection) is the proper one. The Siddhāntin wants to be illumined on the nature of the bhāvana which has Brahman as its content. Surely Brahm cannot be the content of the bhāvana of the ātman while in conjunction with manas in the same way as other objects are. For if it were so, it would become a content of relational knowledge. And

1. S.B. pps. 308 and 309.
as such it would be asat. It cannot be the content of the bhāvana of the ātman free from the antahkaranās as well, since the ātman would then be in a kevala state (inert state) when it cannot cognize anything. If the bhāvana were something other than these two, rather anirvacaniya (something indescribable) then Brahmān which should be the content of the bhāvana would be sūnya (void). Further the bhāvana cannot be of the type belonging to a hungry person who imagines that he has appeased his hunger. Such a bhāvana remains a mere bhāvana, and is futile as it has no ethical value. Thus the Siddhāntin denies that Brahmān is the content of the bhāvanas as described in the Yoga Sāstras by refuting all the four alternative methods of bhāvana which the Patañjalis give. If Brahmān cannot be the content of any kind of bhāvana, it would become sūnya. That is why the Siddhāntin says that Brahmān is to be contemplated not by the effort of the ātman when the ānava mala is active but by the ātman induced and illumined by Siva Śakti when it will be the content of such a bhāvana. There is no ātmāsraya doṣa in the view of the Siddhāntin since he says that Siva is to be known by means of Siva Śakti which is considered to be non-different from Siva.

1. The Siva Sama Vādins too accept the view of the Saiva Siddhāntin that Siva-sat (the Being called Siva) can neither be the content of pasu Jñānam (knowledge of the ātman when in conjunction with ānava), nor that of pāsa jñānam (knowledge of the ātman as manifested through the evolutes of māyā). They also hold the view, as the Siddhāntin does with a reservation, that the ātman in its mukti nilai (state of release) when it is free from its upadhi (limitation) of pasutvam (state of being a pasu) is in possession of the eight qualities, such

1. S.B. pps. 309 and 310.
as omniscience etc., even as Siva has. Then the ātma-jñānam, they urge, will be of the same type as Siva-jñānam and cannot be treated as pasu-jñānam. Therefore it would be proper to hold the view that Siva is the content of ātma-jñānam. There is no necessity to posit a Siva-sakti (grace of Siva) as enlightening the ātman in its bhāvana to cognize Siva.

The Siddhāntin adduces three reasons why the ātman cannot cognize Siva purely by its own jñānam. First, if Siva is to be known by ātma-jñānam, the ātman should have an epistemic existence apart from Siva. But it is non-different from Siva for purposes of knowledge. Secondly, Siva is not on an equal footing with the ātman. He is immanent in and transcendental over it. The ātman is athūla or gross in comparison to Siva who is suktama or subtle so much so He can never be the content of mere ātma-jñānam. Thirdly, Siva is the soul of the souls, illuminating the ātman as a vyañjaka (manifestor); the ātma-jñānam is intrinsically incapable of making Him a content of knowledge and to show Him to its guṇi, the ātman, in the same way as the light of the eye which has a non-different epistemic existence with the ātman, cannot cognize the ātman which illumines it from within. Thus the Siddhāntin establishes his contention that Siva cannot be the content of mere ātma-jñānam.

The Sivādvaita Saivas hold that the ātman in the mukti nilai becomes one with Siva, and has no metaphysical existence as an entity different from Siva. There cannot therefore be such a division as jñātā (knower), and jñeyam (object known) over there. Hence they are opposed to the view of the Siddhāntin that the ātman in its state of release

1. S.B. pps. 310 and 311.
gets illumined by Siva-jñānam, and then cognizes Siva. The Siddhāntin questions them: How do two things opposed to each other by their very natures become one ultimately? He points out further that Siva-sat which is a jñeyam and a viśiṣṭam (that which is qualified) on the admission of Sivādvaitins cannot be the sūnya of the Māyā Vādins who describe it as anirvacaniya and as unqualified. Since Siva exists as a jñeyam in the mukti nilai there must be a jñātā also to cognize Him as something beyond the sphere of vak or manas. When objected that there will be no non-difference between the ātman and Siva in the mukti nilai, since there is a jñeyam and the jñātā even over there, the Siddhāntin, replies that Siva is not there as an object of relational knowledge where the jñātā and the jñeyam are external to each other, and that any object of relational knowledge has a distinct metaphysical existence different from the jñātā (cognizer); But in the mukti nilai the ātman being illumined by Siva jñānam cognizes Siva who is immanent in it as a being non-different from itself. Thus the Siddhāntin is able to establish his view of Sivānubhava jñānam.

CHAPTER 5
Factors of Valid Knowledge.

(1) Sādhāraṇa and Asādhāraṇa Laksanās.

An object of valid experiential knowledge has the two characteristics, namely, the asādhāraṇa laksana or specific attribute and the sādhāraṇa laksana or generic attribute. The asādhāraṇa laksana of an object is,

1. S.B. pp. 305—"Vēraranīrūnarrum anupavañāna mātiraiyin vilānki kōcarippatāyum niṣra enṟavāru"
2. S. S. S. stanza 5.
according to the Siddhāntin, that quality of the object which is found neither in other objects belonging to the same jāti or genus to which the object belongs, nor in objects included under any other jāti or genus. The sādhrāṇa laksanā of an object appertains as well to all other objects of the same jāti or genus as the object is, but not to any object of a different jāti or class.

The 'Asādhrāṇa laksanā' of the Siddhāntin should not be confused with the 'Differentia' of Western logic. According to the European system the differentia of a species is neither a proprium nor an accidens but is one which belongs to the species and which at the same time is denied of both the co-ordinate species and the genus. As an example, 'rationality' is given to be the differentia of man. Rationality belongs to man and man alone. It is possessed neither by any one of the co-ordinate species, such as beasts, birds, etc., nor by the genus animal which includes all the coordinate species. It is a fact that what is true of a genus is equally true of every one of its species; what is denied of any one of the species is equally denied of the genus. If the differentia of man - rationality - does not belong to the coordinate species - beasts, birds, etc., there is no necessity to deny it of the genus animal. For it automatically gets denied of it. Hence the differentia of a species may be defined as something other than its proprium or accidens, which belongs to the species and is yet not found in any of the co-ordinate species. The differentia is only an attribute of the species, and may belong as such to some species of a different class as well. Thus the knowledge of the differentia of the species may not lead one to identify the species.

On the other hand the asādhrāṇa laksanā (specific attribute) of an object, no matter it is an individual object,
or a species, belongs to the object itself and to none else. As such the knowledge of it helps us to identify the object. According to Saiva Siddhānta, one can have experiential knowledge of an object by means of the pramāṇas, namely, Perception, Inference and Verbal Testimony, on the cognition of one or the other of these attributes, called asādhāraṇa laksana and sādhāraṇa laksana. The instrument of cognition that takes part in the cognition of an object through these attributes is pramāṇyam (valid), whereas that which is used to cognize an object by virtue of attributes other than these two kinds is apramāṇyam (non-valid). Jñāna Prakāsar who is a Siva Sama Vādin in his commentary on Sivajñāna Siddhiyār illustrates exhaustively the two attributes, the asādhāraṇa laksana and sādhāraṇa laksana, with examples taken from the Siddhānta epistemology. A few of his examples are:

(1) Of the objects of knowledge going under the class Pati (God), the character of Anātimukta Siva belongs to Anāti mukta Siva only and holds good neither for Ātimukta Siva nor for Āpara mukta Siva. The same character does not belong to any object of the other classes such as Pasu and Pasam. Therefore the said character is an asādhāraṇa laksana of Anāti mukta Siva.

1. S.S.S. pp 9 – ‘kāṭcimutaliya piramāṇañīkālār
piramēyapporuḷkalai yariyalurumiṭṭatē
avaiyellām ivvirāṇṭiyalpinul
ouruparri ariyappatunupatam.’
‘IVvirāṇṭiu vērākiya vērīyalpuparri ariyappatunyp
avvaripupiramāṇiyamaṭrāyp
pomeupapatāyirru.’
2. S.S.A. pps 139 – 141.
(2) Of the objects of knowledge included under the class Pasu (soul), the character of Sakalar (those with three malas) distinguishes them not only from Pralayākalar (those with two malas) and Vijñānakalar (those with one mala), both of whom belong to the same class as Sakalar, but also from objects of the other classes such as Pati and Pāsam. On this ground it may be urged that the character of Sakalar is the asādhāraṇa lakṣaṇa of Sakalar.

(3) With respect to the Ānava mala (root-evil) its own character is said to be its asādhāraṇa lakṣaṇa. For the said character can be attributed neither to the other members of the same class Pāsam as Karma and Māyā, nor to any member of the other classes Pati and Pasu.

A determination of the asādhāraṇa and the sādhāraṇa lakṣaṇas of an object is important for the Siddhāntin; for these are the two characteristics by means of which one can have pramiti of valid experiential knowledge of an object. Now pramiti implies an object which is experienced, a subject which experiences it and an instrument of cognition. The object of experience may be sat (that which persists in its form for all time) or asat (that which does not persist in its form for all times).

1. According to the Saiva Siddhāntin, all objects of cognition, both sat and asat, are included in the


S.B.V. pp 109 'Cattum acattum piramēyam; avvira- ranṭaiyum ariyum cattacaṭṭākiyā ānumā piramātā; ānumāvin ariyākiyā circattiyā piramāṇam avarivin nikaloci piramiti'.
denotation of the term prameyam (object of true experiential knowledge). The ātman is the pramātā. The ātma cit-sakti is the pramāṇa. The experiential knowledge manifested by the pramāṇa is the pramiti. The Siddhāntin holds a brief for the doctrine that the two entities Pati and Pāsam can become prameyams for the ātman which is the pramātā. But the ātma cit-sakti can become a prameyam neither to the ātman of which it is a cit-sakti nor to any other ātman, nor even to the Supreme God, Siva. Pasu (soul) is always a pramātā which is in need of pramāṇas to have pramitis of prameyams which are known by means of their asādharana and sādharana laksanās.

(ii) Pramātā and Prameyam

The Siddhāntin holds the view that Pāsam is asat and is the object of relational knowledge. According to him, Siva only is sat and is the object of non-relational or transcendental knowledge of the ātman. Pāsam which is asat cannot manifest itself in the presence of Siva who is by nature sat. Therefore Siva-sat cannot have relational knowledges of the forms 'This is a pot', 'This is a piece of cloth' etc. Further pāsam, which is asat and inert at the same time, cannot be said to know a thing. Thus we get at the truths that neither sat can experience the asat nor the latter the former. Just as the sun that illumines an object and the object that is illumined by it cannot experience each other but an eye alone can experience both the sun and the object,

1. S.B. pp 346; 'Irutirānakīya cattum acattumenaṇpaṭṭaṇa vellām Pirameyam'.
2. Ibid pp 330; 'Piramānaṇarupamakīya anumacircatti cīvanukkāka taṇakkāka taṇottta pira anūmakkalukkāka pirameyamātalillai.'
3. Ibid pp 342.
so is an agent needed, for purposes of experiential knowledge, who is neither sat nor asat but one of the nature of both sat and asat. Such a one is the ātman which is satasat by nature. Thus the ātman alone can be the pramātā or experient. Its svarūpa lakṣaṇa (essential nature) is given as cit (intelligence) of a kind, which is dependent on Siva-sakti for its manifestation, and which, when it has experiential knowledge of a thing, takes on the character of the thing it cognizes. When Pāsam is brought to bear on it, it assumes the character of Pāsam, and is said to have relational knowledge which is an accidental attribute of it. Its svarūpa lakṣaṇa, though inhering in it, is not then manifested. But when the ātman has Siva as prameyam in its mukti nilai it gets the character of Siva, and its svarūpa lakṣaṇa (essential nature of non-relational or transcendental knowledge) is fully manifest while its taṭastha lakṣaṇa (accidental attribute of relational knowledge) is relegated to the background, and remains in an unmanifest condition.

1 The Sivādvaita Saivas hold the same views as the Siddhāntin about the natures of Pati, Pasu, and Pāsam. They agree with the Siddhāntin in many other respects but do not believe that the entities of Pati, Pasu, and Pāsam are distinct. According to them, Pasu and Pāsam are pervaded by Pati, and the difference between the three is an internal one in the way that a guṇa is different from its guṇi. Even as the vyāpyams of a tree such as a branch and the fork of a branch are themselves called trees, so all that go by the names of satasat and asat are really sat. With the Sivādvaitins, the pramātā is Pati Himself who is sat, and who being immanent in the soul cognizes things for them. The

1. S.B. pp 337.
Pasu (soul) has not the capacity to know a thing except on account of the character of Pati which it imbibes for its knowledge of objects. Intelligence is not an essential attribute of Pasu. For were it so, Pasu would be a distinct entity having an independent existence of its own. When it is pointed out that if everything were sat there would be no object apart from the sat that could be known, the Sivādvaitins state that though there is no object outside sat different from it, there is the asat, pāsam, which is within the sat but different from it. And this asat, they say, can become the object of cognition. The objection that the asat will merely become a sūnya (void) in the presence of sat is met by them by way of quoting scriptural evidence to the contrary. They bring forward sruti passages to prove that the asat and the sat can be co-present. The portions of sruti quoted by them are:

'They (suddha māyā and asuddha māyā) will produce their effects in the presence of Siva.'

'He (God) in conjunction with the lustrous suddha māyā and with asuddha māyā.'

'He (God) becoming of the forms of the terrestrial and celestial worlds of the form of Fire and of the form of Water.'

Further, they protest against the doctrine that the asat will turn out to be sūnya in front of the sat and urge that the doctrine, if accepted, will lead one to the tenets of the Māyāvāda.

The Siddhāntin however, feels no compunction to adopt to his advantage both the views, (a) 'that the asat is compresent with the sat', and (b) 'that the asat is sūnya in the presence of the sat.' The position of the Siddhāntin is tenable since he uses the word ‘sūnya’ in the sense ‘unmanifest’, while the Sivādvaitins and the
Mayāvādins use it to mean 'void'. Further, the Siddhāntin cannot agree with the Sīvādvaitin in his view that Siva-sat can have relational knowledge of the forms, 'This is a pot', 'That is a piece of cloth', and so on. Yet the Sīvādvaitin sees eye to eye with the Siddhāntin when he admits that the ātman has no relational knowledge in its mukti nilai when its svarūpa lakṣaṇa only is manifest. The Siddhāntin questions the Sīvādvaitin how he comes by the statement that the ātman is devoid of its relational knowledge in its mukti nilai.

1 It is the nature of the ātman to acquire the character of what it cognizes. Hence the non-apprehension of relational knowledge in mukti nilai, the Siddhāntin urges, must necessarily come from Siva Sat which the ātman cognizes. So Siva must be one who does not possess relational knowledge; as such he cannot be a pramāta. Thus the Sīvādvaitin's doctrine that Siva is the pramāta is refuted by the Siddhāntin who asserts that the ātman alone can be the pramāta.

2 As regards the Siva Saṅkrānta Vādins, however it is a principle with them that the sat cannot know the asat. According to them, as with the Saṅkhyaś, the ātman is of the nature of intelligence, and is like a light illuminating both itself and other objects, undergoing no modification on its part. When the body is active in the presence of the ātman, the internal organs acquire the intelligence of the ātman, as do pieces of soft iron become magnetised in the presence of a lodestone. It is the configuration of the internal organs with their acquired intelligence that constitute the pramāta. The Saṅkrānta vādins and the Saṅkhyaś alike are unable to

1. S.B. pp 338: 'Inṭuc cūṇiyam enṟatu viḷaṅkāmaip-poruṭṭenpar'
2. Ibid pp 340.
explain how the ātman innately intelligent is unable
to know a thing, while the internal organs with their
acquired intelligence are able to cognize. The Siddhāntin
deplores that these two schools of philosophy, (a) the
Saṅkrānta Vāda, and (b) the Saṅkhya, are the upshot
of confusion owing to a literal interpretation of what is
figuratively said in sruti passages such as "The
buddhi knows."

1 For the Sama Vāda Saivās, the Isvara Vikāra
Vāda Saivās, the Aikya Vāda Saivās, and others of
similar tenets, the atman is the pramātā; but it does
not require to be illumined by Siva Śakti to know a
thing. The Siddhāntin pities that these Vādins have
not grasped the essential nature of the ātman. If the
ātman has the capacity to know a thing by itself, it
must be able to know everything. But in reality it does
not cognize everything. Therefore these Vādins are forced
to posit something obstructing the ātman from gaining
knowledge of all objects. These impediments to
knowledge cannot be of the nature of cit (intelligence);
they should be jaḍa (inert). In the cognition of an
object the ātman requires removal of these impediments.
When once removed, being jaḍa, the impediments
cannot of their own accord move and cloud the ātman
again. But it is a fact that objects once known by the
ātman are forgotten afterwards. This could be
explained only by positing an intelligent being like
Siva (God) at the helm of affairs of the ātman as
responsible for the clearance of the factors that stand
in the way of knowledge, and for illuminining the ātman.

The Siddhāntin illustrates his position by means of
an analogy. 2 Just as the ātman illumines the senses

1. S.B. pp 343.
2. Ibid pp 289
which cannot by themselves know an object, so Siva Śakti illumines the ātman which cannot by itself become aware of an object to gain cognition of it. The Īsvara Vikāra Vādins and others argue that, since the senses are dependent on the ātman for its knowledge, and the ātman on Siva Sakti, the latter would need another for its illumination, and so on giving rise to an infinite regress. The Siddhāntin meets this argument by saying that there is no being higher than Siva to illumine Him. Moreover, the senses cannot cognize themselves; and the ātman too cannot of its own accord cognize either Siva or any object. The ātman can have cognition only when illuminated by Siva Śakti.

A problem is raised whether the ātman becomes aware of objects as one in union with Siva or as one separate from Him. The Siddhāntin solves it by means of an analogy. 1 Just as the stars merge their rays in day times with those of the sun and do not show themselves out as separate entities, so the ātman neither manifests itself as something different from Siva nor loses its independence entirely in getting immersed in Siva. This analogy drives home to us that the ātman is able to cognize objects—both sat and asat—as if it were something other than one in union with or different from Siva.

2 But the Pāśāṇa Vāda Saivās, and the Bheda Vāda Saivās deny that the ātman’s knowledge contacts the sat. The Siddhāntin wonders how an object which cannot become the content of knowledge can have any metaphysical value. Its treatment in any system of philosophy is tantamount to a wild goose chase and

1 S. B. pp 291: 'Veyyō noliyī loṭuūki vilanākātū veyyōnai yākātā miṇpōla.'

2. Ibid. pp 343.
may end in complete scepticism. The Suddha Saivās on the other hand press their view that the ātman in cognizing the sat does not experience it, but becomes one with it. The Siddhāntin questions how it is possible for the ātman which is different from the sat to become one with the sat in the mere cognition of it. The true nature of the ātman is not as manifest as those of the sat and asat. Yet it is not sūnya which is never manifest. Just as the scent of a flower has its nature manifested as having no character but that of the flower to which it belongs, the ātman in conjunction with either the asat or the sat presents respectively the character of the asat or the sat. Hence it is that the Saiva Siddhāntin is of opinion that the ātman cannot know itself in the same way as it cognizes either the sat or the asat. It is only a true knowledge of the sat and the asat that will lead the ātman to cognize itself as a subject of experiential knowledge.

According to the Saiva Siddhāntin the ātman requires always a vyañjaka (manifestor) to illumine objects for it to cognize. In the petta nilai (embodied state) the means of cognition—pratyakṣa (perception) anumāna (inference), and sabda (verbal testimony)—which are all extrinsic to the ātman, are the vyañjakas. In the mukti nilai the vyañjaka is Siva Jñānam which is immanent in and transcendental over the ātman. The absence of a proper vyañjaka begets in the ātman confusion and non-discrimination of one object from another. But the presence of a proper vyañjaka, though able to dispel confusion in the manner of food appeasing hunger, can produce at the most cognition of objects one after

1. S. B. pp 343: 'cattinoṭu kūṭiyavali ouṟṟayppōṭalo-
     yaṟṟi ataṇṭal uḷatāmāṟillai.'

another only. Hence the ātman has not the character of the sat which has simultaneous cognition of all objects as of one nature. It has not the character of asat too; for it experiences objects of which it had previous cognition, whereas the asat does not cognize. Yet in the ātman there is the nature of the sat, since it cognizes objects when there are vyañjakās. It has also the nature of the asat as it cannot have cognition when there are no vyañjakās. So apparently the character of the ātman is neither sat nor asat, but something other than sat or asat, which is called satasat in Siddhānta Epistemology. The Siddhāntin is a realist, and does not believe in the total annihilation of anything. For him the ātman (soul) is as real as Brahman, and is sat ontologically.

(iii) Pramāṇa and Pramiti or Pramā.

Pramāṇa is the means or instrument of valid cognition. It is that which is instrumental in bringing out a right knowledge of a prameyam or object of true experiential knowledge. So it cannot be a prameyam. For if it were one, the classification of the factors of valid experiential knowledge as prameyam, pramātā and pramāṇa would serve no purpose. According to the Siddhāntin, the ātma cit-śakti which is free from doubt, error and remembrance constitutes the pramāṇa. For in the cognition of an object the cit-śakti is the only factor that is free from the fault of ativyāpti (over-pervasion), avyāpti (non-pervasion), and asambhāva (impossibility). The ātma cit-śakti can never be a prameyam. It can however be considered to be a species of jñeyam (object of pure knowledge) as is the object of true memory. *The Pauṣkara Āgama is quite definite in its views when it says 'the ātman is the pramātā; the ātma cit-śakti which is manifested by the vyañ-

jakās is the pramāṇa; the valid experiential knowledge obtained is the pramiti; and the rest are all prameyams.

The same Āgama further reiterates 'In no case can the pramāṇa be considered as a prameyam; nor can the latter ever become the former'. The senses, visual organ and the rest, can never be considered as pramāṇās on the pretext that they are essential to the right cognition of an object. A similar reason can be adduced for the view that lamp-lights are pramāṇas. In fact both the senses and the lamp-lights are prameyams. They are useful as vyañjakas (Manifestors) for the ātma cit-śakti which alone constitutes the pramāṇa. The expression 'I see objects with my eyes' is as metaphorical as the one 'I see objects with the help of a light'. Moreover, the visual organ cannot be a pramāṇa; for there is the fault of avyāpti (non-pervasion) since it cannot cognize sound. Nor can the auditory organ be a pramāṇa, for there is the same fault that it cannot be aware of forms. For a similar reason none of the remaining senses can be shown to be pramāṇās. Therefore it is evident there must be something other than the senses, that brings about a right cognition of objects, and that can be called a pramāṇa. Since the buddhi can have cognition of objects, it might appear that it may be considered a pramāṇa. The Siddhāntin contends that even buddhi cannot be reckoned a pramāṇa, for it is as much an evolute of māyā as are the senses. Buddhi is really a prameyam in the form of its psychosis as sukha (pleasure) and duhkha (pain) for the ātma cit-śakti which alone can be the pramāṇa. Moreover, there is the fault of avyāpti in buddhi which cannot cognize


Siva. Further the buddhi is jāda (inert), and cannot be a pramāṇa. A pramāṇa should be cit or intelligent. Hence the view that buddhi is the pramāṇa makes one commit the fault of asambhava as well.

Now the Pāśa-jñānams (knowledge manifested through pāsam) going by the names of pratyakṣa (perception), anumāna (inference), and āgama (verbal testimony) are asat, and are usually spoken of as pramāṇas by the different schools of Indian philosophy. The Siddhāntin's conception of ātmā cit-śakti alone as the pramāṇa seems to contradict the view given above. The position is cleared by the Siddhāntin when he states that these three forms of valid knowledge—pratyakṣa, anumāna, and āgama—are really vyañjakās (manifestors of knowledge) for the ātmā cit-śakti when the ātmā is in its petta nilai (embodied state). They are referred to as pramāṇas figuratively only. When the ātmā is in its mukti nilai (state of release) the vyañjaka is Siva jñānam not Pasu jñānams which are unmanifest over there. The Pasu jñānam and Siva jñānam are mere vyañjakās and are called pramāṇas only figuratively. But the Tārākikas and some others hold the opinion that vyañjakās constitute the pramāṇas; their views cannot be acceptable.

1. According to Vātsyāyana, the Bhāsyakara of the Nyāya Sūtras, a pramāṇa is 'upalabdi sādhanam' or a means of bringing about an apprehension; rather it is a means or instrument by which a person knows an object. There is an ambiguity in this definition, since it merely gives the psychological sense without the necessary logical implication involved in any definition.

2. N.S.B. pp 97: 'upalabdi sādhanam pramāṇam.'
3. Ibid pp 2: 'Sāyena ṛtham praminotit tatpramāṇam.'
'Sankara Misra, in his *Upaskara* to the *Vaiśesika Sūtras* seems to be less ambiguous when he asserts that a pramāṇa is a 'pramā karanaṇam' or what produces true knowledge which is in accordance with reality. 'Mādhava gives a fuller definition when he says that a pramāṇa is what is always accompanied by right knowledge, not disjoined at the same time from the proper instruments (as the eye and the rest) and from the site of knowledge, the soul. In truth nothing can be known or experienced except through an instrument of cognition. Every case of a pramiti (valid knowledge) presupposes a pramāṇa as its cause. There may be a pramāta and a prameyam, without the appearance of a pramiti; but when a pramāṇa is operative, there should necessarily by a pramiti. Thus there is agreement in presence and absence between the cause 'pramāṇa', and its effect 'pramiti'.

The Tārkikas do not believe in a set division of things as pramāta, pramiti, prameyam and pramāṇa. 'According to Gautama, the author of the *Nyāya Sūtras*, an object can be called a pramāṇa under one set of conditions, and a prameyam under another set. The weighing balance is a pramāṇa when it is used to ascertain the weight of things. It becomes a prameyam when its own accuracy is tested. There is no such rule that a pramāṇa should always remain as pramāṇa, and a prameyam a prameyam. Just as the ātman is reckoned a pramāta at one moment, and a prameyam at another, so an object can be a pramāṇa, or a

1. P.B.U. pp 224: 'lingavidhāya pramākaranamāmit-yarthah.'
2. S.D.S. pp 162.
3. N.S.G. pp 98: 'prameyatā ca tulāprāmāgyayavat.'
prameyam, according to circumstances. Vātsyāyana points out that buddhi is a pramāṇa when it cognizes things; it becomes a prameyam when it is the object of cognition; it is also a pramiti when it is neither a means of cognition nor the object cognized. According to Gautama again, the set of instruments of cognition, such as perception etc., do not require another set other than these for their cognition. For the apprehension of the instruments of cognition is similar to that of a lamp-light. The latter is a pramāṇa as it aids the perception of an object. Yet it is a prameyam for another perception. There is an objection that if one perception be apprehended by another perception, the latter would require a third, and so on, giving rise to an infinite regress. Vātsyāyana does not at all seem to be perturbed at this criticism. He says that the instruments of cognition, perception etc., are apprehended in certain cases as pramāṇas, and in others as prameyams. So long as this distinction is useful for the purpose of attaining prosperity, happiness and final release, there is nothing to be accomplished by the infinite regress.

Vātsyāyana seems to be scientific when he makes the statement that "in as much as the presence or absence of seeing is in accordance with the presence or absence of the lamp-light, the latter is inferred as the cause of the former" - the seeing both of itself and of the other objects as well. The Syncretist School differs from the older school in defining the term pramāṇa as

1. N.S.G. pp 98: ‘buddhirūpalabdhisadhanatvatpramanam upalabdhivisaayatvat prameyan Ubayabbhāvattu pramitiḥ’
2. G.N.S. pp 133.
3. N.T.K. pp 59; N.M. pp 12; ‘bodbhodhasvabhāva samagri pramanam,’
pramā-sāmagrīṣ (things or materials needed for valid cognition) other than the pramāta and the prameyam. According to this school, it is the totality of the conditions both physical and psychical other than the subject that cognizes and the object cognized, that makes up the cause of perception &c., and constitutes the pramāṇa. In the perception of an object in bright day-light, besides the two factors of perception (a) the pramāta, and (b) the prameyam, there are others as the sunlight, the eye, the contact of the visual organ with the object, etc., all of which go by the name ‘pramāṇa’. The collocation of the conditions of perception of an object, of which lamp-light is one condition is different from that necessary to perceive the lamp-light. The causes being different, the perception of an object through the instrumentality of lamp-light is one, while perception of the lamp-light itself is another. Therefore the lamp-light is no more a pramāṇa for the cognition of an object than for the perception of itself. Yet it is a fact that a lamp-light which aids us to perceive objects is itself cognized without the aid of another light. Thus it will be seen that the example cited, that of the lamp-light, does not in any way commit the Tārkikas to support the theory of self-illumination of Pramāṇas as advocated by the Advaitins and the Mīmāṃsakas.

The Siddhāntin, as one who believes in the hard and fast division of things into prameyam, pramāta, pramāna, and pramiti, cannot reconcile himself with the fleeting and ephemeral conceptions of Gautama and his Bhāṣyakāra Vātsyāyana regarding valid knowledge and its factors. Because, according to these two savants, what is a prameyam at one moment is a pramāṇa at another. The factors pramāṇa, prameyam, and so on are mere mental constructions or abstractions that have no objective counter-parts in the real world.
The Siddhāntin is a realist, and is therefore no believer in a purely subjective order of things. Further, the conception of the Tārkikas that pramāṇa sāmagrīs other than pramāṇa and prameyam together constitute pramāṇa is not acceptable to the Saiva Siddhāntin. First in the perception of a lamp-light, the latter is a prameyam since it is the object of perception. It is also one of the conditions that make up the pramāṇa which is instrumental in bringing out a cognition of an object. The Siddhāntin objects that this double nature of an object behaving at one time as a prameyam, and at another as a condition of a pramāṇa, renders the division of the factors of valid knowledge futile. Again, the objection that there would be an infinite regress if one perception be cognized by another, which in turn requires a third and so on, is not satisfactorily answered by Vātsyāyana. Practical utility or efficiency which he gives as a test of validity of perceptions &c., is only an expedient and a temporary measure to get at a desired object, but cannot be a factor determining truth.

'The Prabhākarās use the word pramāṇa in the sense of valid cognition, the etymology of the word being explained by ' pramīyate yāt.' They argue that anubhūti is pramāṇa. Now anubhūti to them is a means of cognition depending on itself for its validity; and the self-validity of apprehension is due to the fact that it involves no knowledge of previous experience. Thus anubhūti means all experiences other than śmṛti

1. P.M. pps.79—89.
2. P.V. pp. 24: 'Anubhūtiḥ pramāṇam;
kācānubhūtiḥ;
svatantraparicchittih; kimitam
svatantrayam nāma ...'
(memory). Memory is knowledge born of past impressions only. The Prabhākarās do not accept memory as a pramāṇa, since it is dependent on a previous cognition for its validity. They hold the view that pratyabhijñā (recollection) is valid on the ground that it is not born of past impressions only. Though dream-objects are purely revivals of impressions of the waking state, the dream-experience so far as its svarūpa (form) and kartā (agent) are concerned is anubhūti, and is therefore valid. Even wrong cognitions are valid as cognitions. Because when one mistakes a shell for silver, there is non-discrimination between the shell presented and silver in general which is merely recollected. Both the shell and silver are distinct and real, though not apprehended as such. What enters into consciousness is silver, not the shell. In fact the shell is not cognized at all and there is apprehension of silver which is valid.

Sivāgra Yogi contends that the Prabhākarās are inconsistent in their view of pramāṇa. He says they claim on the one hand validity to all apprehensions other than memory, and urge on the other that Veda vākyārtha jñānam (knowledge of the meaning of sentences in the Vedas) preceded by remembrances of the meanings of words is pramāṇa. It is regretted that Sivāgra Yogi fares ill in this criticism against the Prabhākarās. It is pure memory only that is rejected as non-valid by the Prabhākarās. In as much as Veda vākyārtha jñānam involving memory of the meanings of words is not pure memory, the Prabhākarās do not seem to be at all inconsistent.

1. S.D. pp 45: 'Smṛtisca samskāramāṭrajam jñānamabhīthi⁴yate,'
2. S.S.A. pp 106.
But the Bhaṭṭās appear to be in order when they raise an objection against the definition of pramāṇa as given by the Prabhakarās. For according to the definition of pramāṇa given by the latter, anuvādās (restatements) and laukika vākyās (non-scriptural statements) will get raised much against their wish to the level of pramāṇas, since they are not purely revivals of memory.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, the founder of the Bhaṭṭa School of Mīmāṃsa, does not seem to be particular as to the means of cognition and its resultant. For he says one may choose the means and fruit of cognition as he pleases. If in any perception the vague indeterminate cognition is regarded as the means of cognition, the definite cognition which follows it on its heels is the resultant. If on the other hand the definite cognition is taken as the means, the idea of accepting or rejecting the thing cognized should be considered as the resultant.

The Bhaṭṭās are phala-pramāṇa vādins; they hold the view that every cognition is a means of valid knowledge consisting in its manifestedness. According to them a pramāṇa should be (1) kāraṇadosarāhita or free from defects in the source, (2) bādhaka-jñāna-rahita or free from contradictory knowledge and (3) grhīta-grāhi-jñānam or knowledge of an unknown object. In short a pramāṇa is a means or an instrument of cognition of an unknown object which is not liable to be sublated by subsequent experience. The Bhaṭṭās reject smṛti

1. S.D.P. 45.
2. M.N. pps 5, 6.
3. S.D. pp 45: ‘etacca viśeṣanatrayamupādādānena sūtrakāreṇa kāraṇa doṣabādhakajñāna-rahitagrhitagrāhi jñānam pramāṇamīti pramāṇalakṣaṇam sūcitam,’
(memory) and anuvāda (restatement) as non-pramāṇās since they are about known objects. Bhrama (error) and samsaya (doubtful cognition) are kept out since they are not real, and are liable to be sublated by subsequent experience. It is significant that the Bhāṭṭās too support the doctrine of self-validity of cognitions. According to them, in the mistaken apprehension of a shell as silver, the cognition of silver as cognition is valid. The invalidity belongs not to the cognition but to the presence of defects in its source. Even in dreams external objects as perceived elsewhere are experienced as if existent in one's presence, and the cognition qua cognition is valid so far as the dream objects are concerned. The invalidity consists in regarding what is merely remembered as one that is apprehended in one's face, the apprehension being due to the effects of sleep. Thus the invalidity does not belong to the cognition but to the accessory details. 1Sivāgra Yogi and the author of the Pauśkara Bhāṣyam object that the definition of pramāṇa as given by the Bhāṭṭās is too narrow. For in dhāravāhika jñānam (continuous stream of cognition) of the forms of 'this is a post', 'this is a pot' the cognitions that are subsequent to the first being mere anuvādas (restatements) contain no new elements of knowledge, and hence would become aprāmāṇya (non-valid). But the Bhāṭṭās say that every restatement contains an unknown element of time in the form of 'this', which is not contained in each of the immediately preceding cognitions so much so there is prāmāṇya (validity) for all the cognitions. The objection raised by Sivāgra Yogi seems to be based on the view that kāla (time) is one. This view really belongs to the Naiyāyikas, and

is not acceptable to the Saiva Siddhāntin who observes that kāla is many, limited to a sphere, and non-eternal. So the validity of dhāravāhika jñānam seems established beyond doubt by the Bhāṭṭās. Sivāgra Yogi further points out that the Bhāṭṭās’ definition of prāmāṇa is too general as there will be prāmāṇya (validity) for the deceptive eye etc., and for words of lunatics and jesters as well. If, as Sivāgra Yogi and the commentator of Prauṣkara Āgama think, the Bhāṭṭās claim anadhi-gatārthakatvam (knowledge of an unknown object) as the only condition for valid knowledge, the latter cannot escape the criticism levelled against them. But two other conditions also are given by the Bhāṭṭās as essential constituents of a prāmāṇa. One is that a cognition should be free from defects in its source before it could be accepted as a prāmāṇa. The deceptive eye, which at one time posits the existence of an object and at another denies it, is not free from defects in its source. Hence it is not considered a prāmāṇa. The words of lunatics and jesters violate the second condition of a prāmāṇa as they are not free from contradictory knowledge. Thus according to the Bhāṭṭās neither the faulty eye nor the words of madmen and jesters can have prāmāṇya (validity) since they are liable to be sublated by subsequent experience; and the Bhāṭṭās never claim validity for them. Their definition of prāmāṇa too does not warrant validity for them. Yet it is a fact that they are the target of criticism not only of Sivāgra Yogi but also of the author of the Pauṣkara Bhāṣya. Their criticisms at the most betray their want of acquaintance with the original works of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and his followers.

1. S.B. pps 147, 148: ‘palavāy ekatecamāy anittamā-yullatu kālam.’
The Siddhāntin who believes in the ātma cit-śakti alone as the pramāṇa does not accept the theories of pramāṇa as advanced by the two schools of Mīmāṃsā referred to above. Anubhūti can never be a pramāṇa. It can only be a pramāṇitī. Again the view of the Bhāṭṭās that one cognition can be the means of cognizing another when pushed to its logical conclusion, will lead one to the fault of infinite regress. The theory of self-validity of cognitions advanced by both the schools to counteract infinite regress has to be established before it could be used to absolve the Mīmāṃsakas of their faults. For commonsense tells us that the conditions of a cognition, and the conditions of the cognition of this cognition, are different. Therefore cognition cannot be self-valid. Further, the Siddhāntin objects that the means of cognition — perception, inference, etc., of which the Prabhākarās admit five only, and the Bhāṭṭās six, do not function in the cognition of Śiva by the ātman, and hence cannot be pramāṇas. They are only vyañjakās (manifestors of knowledge) useful to the ātman in its pettanilai (embodied state) to have empirical knowledge.

The Madhvites define pramāṇa as yathārtha or that which truly corresponds to the nature of the object cognized. For them a pramāṇa is none other than what brings a jñeyam (object cognized) in the form in which it actually exists into the content of cognition. The above definition of pramāṇa, they urge, includes both the cognitive process which yields valid knowledge and its resulting cognition.

2. P.P. pp 8: 'Yathāvasthitameva jñeyamyatviṣayi-karotenanyathāt pramāṇamityarthāh
The cognitive process which is the sādhana (instrument of cognition) of an object as it actually exists is called anupramāṇa. The resulting cognition too apprehends the object in the form in which it really exists, and is termed kevalapramāṇa. Thus the anupramāṇa is the conditioning process which yields knowledge depending on itself for its validity and kevalapramāṇa is pramāṇa (valid knowledge) itself regarded as being its own pramāṇa. The Anupramāṇās are held to be of the three kinds (1) Pratyakṣa (perception), (2) Anumāṇa (inference) and (3) Āgama (verbal testimony), whereas the kevala pramāṇās are distinguished into (1) Īsvara Jñāna (Lord's knowledge), (2) Laksmy Jñāna (consort's knowledge), (3) Yogi Jñāna (seer's knowledge) and (4) Ayogi Jñāna (non-seer's knowledge).

The Madhvites in proceeding to test the correctness of their definition of pramāṇa raise the problem whether the pramāṭā (knower) and the prameyam (object known) can be pramāṇās. It is true they are jñāna karanās (producers of knowledge), and persist in the form in which they actually exist throughout the process of cognition. Yet they are not pramāṇās since they are neither jñānams (knowledges) themselves nor jñāna sādhanās (instruments of right cognition). A karaṇa is different from a sādhana in that the former being present may or may not produce an effect, whereas the latter’s presence or absence necessitates respectively the presence or absence of the effect. The pramāṭā and the prameyam may be present without giving forth a pramāṇa (valid knowledge). Therefore they cannot be pramāṇās. For a pramāṇa, when it

1. P. P. pp 20: 'yathārthā jñānasādhanamanupramāṇam.'
2. P. P. pp 15: 'yathārthajñānam kevalapramāṇam.'
operates, gives rise to a pramāṇa. According to the Madhvites, doubt and error are not pramāṇas, since they do not agree with the nature of the object cognized. True memory on the other hand is held to be a kind of perception and hence considered valid as it is conducive to the knowledge of an object as it actually exists.

The definition of pramāṇa as yathārtha is too wide since it is applicable to substances well. For there is no term in the definition indicating whether pramāṇa is a substance, or a quality, or an activity. But the classification of pramāṇas by the Madhvites into kevala pramāṇa and anupramāṇa, and the definitions of these two terms, clearly point out that a pramāṇa is either a quality or an activity. The Madhvites have merely given the sādhāraṇa lakṣaṇa (generic character) of a pramāṇa without stating its asādhāraṇa lakṣaṇa (specific character). An object can be known definitely by reference to its asādhāraṇa lakṣaṇa only. Instead of defining pramāṇa the Madhvites have merely described it. The view of the Madhvites that pramāṇa is a quality or an activity requires that the quality or activity should have a substrate to inhere. The substrate, according to the Siddhāntin, is the ātman only, not God as well, as the Madhvites hold. For a pramāṇa gives a pramiti; and the ātman it is that is in need of such knowledge. The Absolute does not require any pramāṇas at all. For it is not in its nature to have experiential knowledge. It merely cognizes objects, being immanent in and transcendental over them.

1. According to the Vīśiṣṭādvaitins, pramāṇa is pramāṇa-karaṇa (producer of pramāṇa); and karaṇa is

1. P. P. pp 9: 'yathārthagrahaṇena samśayavipar-yaya tatsādhanānāmnirāsah.'

2. Y.M.D. pps 8 - 10.
held to be the best instrument of knowledge. So pramāṇa is that instrument of knowledge that has none better than itself to produce pramāṇa; and pramāṇa is yathāvasthitavyavahārānuguṇam jñānam (knowledge that is in consonance with experience). Thus pramāṇa is the best instrument of knowledge yielding knowledge that is in agreement with experience. Doubt and error are held to be apramāṇa (non-valid) since they vitiate the definition of pramāṇa in that they do not conform to experience. Though smṛti (memory) satisfies all the conditions of the given definition, it is not held to be a distinct means of cognition. Because, it is urged, that smṛti, being due to samskāra or residue left of previous experience dependent on sense perception, is included in pratyakṣa (perception), and hence does not require to be constituted into a separate means of cognition. Pratīyabhijñā (recollection) too is brought under pratyakṣa.

The Viṣistadvaitins' definition of pramāṇa in fact recognizes validity to memory as well, and the Viṣistadvaitins themselves readily admit it. What the Siddhāntins objects to is the fact that they include memory under Pratyakṣa. Now pratyakṣa to them is sākṣātkāripramāṇa (directly presented valid knowledge); and smṛti is essentially indirect, being samskāra or residue left of previous experience. No strain of thought, however, can make an indirect knowledge a species of direct knowledge. Thus memory can never be included in pratyakṣa. Again there is no term in the definition indicating the nature of pramāṇa,

1. N. P. pp 22: 'yathāvasthitavyavahārānuguṇam jñānam pramīti.'
2. Y. M. D. pp 14, 15.
3. N. P. pp 303: 'samskāramātrajam jñānam smṛtih iti tallakṣaṇam.'
whether it is a substance, a quality, or an activity. If it is a quality such as the consciousness of the ātman, the Saiva Siddhāntin has no objection to such a view. But the Viśiṣṭādhyāyins seem to think that the guṇa (quality) of consciousness is more pervasive than the ātman whose attribute it is. The Saiva Siddhāntin is unable to accept this idea of the Viśiṣṭādhyāyins.

The Buddhists regard pramāṇa (source of knowledge) as samyag-jñāna which has a new content. Samyag-jñāna is free from the faults of doubt and error, and arises on the operation of a means of cognition. In ordinary life we speak of samyag-jñāna as avisamvādakam jñānam (uncontradicted experience). A man is said to speak truth if his words are not subsequently falsified. Even so a knowledge is valid if it is characterized by arthakriyāsthiti (practical efficacy). Thus pramāṇa is efficacious knowledge, and is the cause of successful purposive action. It is not a kāraka hetu (productive cause). For it does not move any one to the object of cognition to reach it. On the other hand, it is a jñāpaka hetu (informative cause) since it merely draws our attention to an object as amenable to a possible purposive action. When a pramāṇa is in action, there is apūrva jñānam (new knowledge). So pratyabhijñā (recollection) is held to be not valid as it is a repeated cognition containing no new element; memory too is not regarded as a

1. T.B.M. pp 1: ‘pramāṇam samyagjñānam apurvavagocaram.’
2. Ibid: ‘Visamvādakam jñānam loke samyagjñānamucyate.’
pramāṇa since it is about objects already cognized. The Buddhists do not accept the idea of the Mīmāṃsakas that all cognitions are valid. They argue that if every cognition were regarded as a pramāṇa there would be no end of pramāṇās. That is why they hold the view that the cognition at the first flash of knowledge alone is valid. The subsequent cognitions contain ideational elements, and are not valid.

The definition of pramāṇa as given by the Buddhists is, according to Sivāgra Yogi and the commentator of the Pauṣkara Āgama too narrow in that it will exclude inference of objects related to past or future events. For there cannot be a possibility of purposive actions with reference to such events. Further, it is pointed out that the given definition is too wide since it will include savikalpa jñānam (determinate knowledge) as well under valid knowledge. But this is a fact which the Buddhists do not desire; for according to them savikalpa jñānam is non-valid as it is essentially knowledge synthetically constructed by the mind. Sivāgra Yogi objects that the Buddhās by denying validity to Āgama pramāṇa have no way to be aware of the existence of the celestial and infernal worlds.

The objection that inference will become non-valid is met by the Buddhists who posit two realities — one an ultimate or pure reality, and the other a Phenomenal or empirical reality. The means of Cognition used to cognize these two realities have also a dual character. A source of knowledge, according to the Buddhists is direct or indirect according as it is used to cognize either the Ultimate Reality, or the phenomenal Reality.

1. S.S.A. pps 105, 106; P.B. pp. 527.
The two sources of knowledge, perception and inference being uncontradicted experiences having an indirect connection with Reality, are the only means of cognition. From the Buddhist’s point of view, even a correct inference is an illusion, though correct. Anyhow in the conditioned world anumāṇa is a true source of knowledge. The criticism that anumāṇa will turn out to be non-valid with respect to past or future events seems to be due to the confusion of jñāpaka hetu with kāraka hētu. The Buddhists cannot be unaware of the fact that a pramāṇa has not the power to forcibly incite a man to action. It is only a kāraka hetu that incites. In fact a pramāṇa is not a kāraka hetu with the Buddhists; it is a jñāpaka hetu (informative cause). As such it can very well point out a past or future object or event as an aim of a possible purposive action. Thus the definition given by the Buddhists does not suffer from the fault of avyāpti (non-pervasion) in the case of the inference of past or future events. The other objections however stand as they are.

According to Advaita Vedānta, pramāṇa is pramaṇā-karaṇa (distinctive cause of valid knowledge); and pramāṇa is valid knowledge other than memory. A cognition must satisfy two conditions before it can be deemed a pramāṇa. One condition is that it should be an anadhi-gatārthaviśayaka jñānam; that is, it must be a cognition whose content has an entity which is not already known. The other condition is that it must be an abādhitārthaviśayaka jñānam; in other words it

2. V. P. D. pp 3: ‘tatra pramākaraṇam pramāṇam; tatra smṛti vyāvṛttam pramātvan anadhi-gatābādhitārthaviśayakajñāna- natvam; smṛtisādhāraṇam tu abādhitārthaviśayaka jñāna- natvam.’
should be a cognition having for content an entity which cannot be subsequently sublated. Now memory, though it may be true, is not a pramāṇa, as it fails to satisfy the first requirement of a pramāṇa. For it is merely concerned with objects already cognized. The validity of dhāravāhika jñānam (continuous stream of consciousness) of the form ‘this is a post’, ‘this is a pot’ etc., is, according to the Advaitins never vitiated by the given definition of pramāṇa. For the time elements in the successive cognitions are all different, and therefore every cognition of the series is as valid as the first. The Advaitins give a psychological explanation as well for maintaining the validity of dhāravāhika jñānam. ¹ In their Siddhānta (final view), they say there is no difference of successive cognitions in the series in question. So long as the object presented is one, in this case a pot, there is a single psychosis of the antahkaranaś (internal organs) in the form of a pot. The cognition of a pot which is of the nature of consciousness reflected in that psychosis is one only, though lasting for a period of time. So what is apparently a series of cognitions is one cognition only. Hence it is, the Advaitins urge that the validity of dhāravāhika jñānam is not vitiated, by the given definition on the empty ground that it is a series of repeated cognitions containing no new element. Yet it is admitted by them that the cognition of the pot etc., gets sublated as illusory in their final view. But, when an objection is raised that dhāravāhika jñānam would then be non-valid ¹ the Advaitins reply that the given definition of a pramāṇa is meant only for the state of samsāra (bondage) and that it is

1. V. P. D. pp 4: ‘Kim tu sidhhānte dhāravāhika-buddhishthale na jñānabhedah.’
2. Ibid. pp 5.
inapplicable in the absolute world where there is pure consciousness only without any differentiation into pramātā, prameyam, and pramā. It is only when consciousness gets apparently differentiated into cognizer, cognitum and cognition, that a pramāṇa is required to enable a cognizer to know the cognitum. Since there is no such differentiation in the absolute consciousness, pramāṇas have no scope over there and are inoperative.

The Saiva Siddhāntī wonders how a unity-consciousness is such—apparently differentiates itself into two opposites, namely, the subject and the object of cognition. If the apparent differentiation had a beginning there must be sufficient reason for it. The Advaitins will have to be at their wits' end to find a cause for such differentiation. If there is no beginning, the apparent differentiation must exist from eternity. The subject and the object into which consciousness apparently gets differentiated together with the pramāṇa that knits the subject with the object by the cognitive relation, must as well exist from eternity. If it is granted that pramāṇas exist from eternity, they can never annihilate or evaporate themselves into nothing. They must persist to eternity. Thus the Advaitins' conception that pramāṇas have no scope with reference to Absolute Reality is not based on a right view. Hence their definition of the term pramāṇa has the fault of avyāpti (non-pervasion), since it is not applicable, as they themselves admit, to Absolute Reality.

With the Sāṅkhya, a pramāṇa is pramāsādhaka- katamam (that which is most conducive to valid cogni-

1. S.S.V. pp 46: 'dvay-or ekatarasya vā' py asamni- kṛṣṭārtha paricchith prama; tat sādhakatamam yat trividham pramā-ṇam.'
tion); 1 Pramā (valid cognition) is a definite knowledge produced by the conjunction of the buddhi and the Puruṣa or by either of them of an unknown object where there is a true correspondence of the context of knowledge with the object of cognition. Memory is not regarded by them as valid knowledge, since it is of a known object. Bhrama (illusion) is rejected as there is no correspondence of the content of knowledge with the object cognized. Doubt is set aside on the ground that it is not a definite cognition. 2 Vijñana Bhikṣu thinks that whenever the Puruṣa (soul) is spoken of as having valid cognition, the modification of the buddhi is the pramāṇa. But when the buddhi is referred to as one that cognizes, it is the sense-object contact etc., that constitute the pramāṇa. 3 The Puruṣa (soul) is a mere pramā sākṣi (witness of valid cognition). It is never the pramātā (subject) that cognizes. 4 But according to Vacaspati Misra, pramāṇa is pramā-karana or the operative cause of valid cognition, and pramā is knowledge of an unknown truth, and is the cause of the Puruṣa's activity. Whereas Vijñana Bhikṣu holds that pramāṇa is either the manifestation of the buddhi, or the sense-object contact etc., 5 Vacaspati Misra is defi-

1. S.P.B. pp 43.
2. Ibid pp 43: Atra yadi pramarūpam phalam puruṣaniṣṭha-mātram ucyate, tadā buddhi vṛtireva pramanam; yadi ca buddhi-miṣṭha-mātram ucyate, tadeṃdiyasamnikarṣādir eva pramanam.  
3. S.P.B. pp 43: puruṣas tu prama-sākṣi eva, na prama te tu,  
5. T.K. pps 8: Vyavaharāhetaḥ pramaḥ; tatkarāṇam pramanam. taccasamdigdhaviparītanadhigatāviśayacittavṛttih.
nite that it is a modification of the citta, having a content free from all that are doubtful, erroneous and unknown.

The Siddhāntin deplores the view of the Sāṅkhyaśas who regard cognition as a function of the internal organ which is really unconscious. The internal organ, whether it is the buddhi or citta, is non-intelligent and is as much material as the eye that aids perception. Moreover, the buddhi undergoes psychosis in the forms of pleasure and pain, and becomes a prameyam. A prameyam cannot be a pramāṇa as well in any particular act of cognition. Thus the view of the Sāṅkhyaśas that the internal organ is the pramāṇa is not tenable. The Siddhāntin feels that his definition of pramāṇa is free from all the faults shown above. For with him it is the cit-śakti of the ātman which is intelligent that is the pramāṇa. The buddhi, citta and the eye are accessories to empirical knowledge, and do not singly or jointly constitute the pramāṇa. Besides, the definition of pramāṇa as given by the Sāṅkhyaśas, is seriously handicapped by their theory of knowledge which is mechanical. Their view of the Puruṣa as an inactive seer having the property of isolation, and their notion of prakṛti as a material substance possessed of activity, are purely metaphysical abstractions that do not take into consideration the concrete facts of experience. The lack of harmony between the Puruṣa and prakṛti as unrelated units of reality fails to bind them both by the cognitive relation, be it material or otherwise. As a consequence, their definition of pramāṇa too falls flat.

The Jains are not at all agreed on the nature of pramāṇa. 3 According to Umāswami, "Pramāṇa"

1. P.B. pps 525, 526.
stands in one place for the meaning of valid knowledge, and in another for the means of valid knowledge. But Siddhasena is of opinion that pramāṇa is self-luminous and other—illumining without any obstruction. With Māṇikya Nandi, pramāṇa is valid knowledge which specifies the nature of an object of which one is uncertain. Just as a lamp illuminates itself as well as other objects in its neighbourhood, so does a pramāṇa manifests the cognizer as well as the object cognized. According to Deva Suri, a pramāṇa is valid knowledge which reveals itself and other things. With him indriyārthaśannikarṣa (sense-object contact), though it can ascertain the nature of objects other than itself, is not a pramāṇa. For it cannot cognize its own nature as it has no consciousness. But Bhāskara Nandi holds the view that pramāṇa is either the agent of valid cognition, or the means of valid cognition, or valid cognition itself. The sense in which the term pramāṇa is used is said to depend on the point of view adopted. From the standpoint of self-illuminating, the kaṛta (agent) may be spoken of as pramāṇa. On the view of other-illuminating, pramāṇa may be taken to stand for the means of cognition. As valid cognition, it is used for knowledge going by the names of mati, etc., which are all pervaded by their own meanings, yielding samyag jñānam (clear knowledge). Bhāskara Nandi further states that substances, the senses, lamp-light and sun-light are spoken of as pramāṇas only figuratively.

The Siddhāntin sees, in the definitions of pramāṇas, as given by the Jains—specially in that given by

2. Ibid pp 189.
3. Ibid. pp 200.
Bhāskara Nandi—a subjectivistic trend, a confusion of distincts and an indeterminateness of specification. So long as what is pramāṇa depends upon the initial attitude of the philosopher, the definition of pramāṇa cannot escape the subjectivistic element of the philosophizing subject. The confusion of distincts lies in the identification of pramāṇa with either the pramātā or the pramiti. The factors of valid knowledge, namely, pramātā, prameyam, pramāṇa and pramiti—are distincts knit together by the cognitive relation and the Jains appear to commit the mistake of reducing the four-term relation into a three-term one. The vagueness in specification consists in their lack of ascertaining the nature of pramāṇa as a means of cognition.

(iv) Vyañjakās or the Manifestors of knowledge.

(a) Pāsa Jñānams.

It has already been shown that the cit-śakti of the ātman is the only pramāṇa (instrument of knowledge) recognised by the Siddhāntin. Now the ātman is mala-fettered. The cit-śakti which holds the guṇa-guṇi-bhāva sambandha (attribute-substance relation) with the ātman is also mala-fettered. Hence the activities of the cit-śakti are restricted to a locus where there are accessories for it to work with. Out of an infinite number of the evolutes of māyā (primordial matter) which are all accessories of knowledge to the ātman, the cit-śakti selects some of them according to the nature of the objects to be cognised and makes a conjunction of itself with them and then cognizes. The Pasu-jñānam (the knowledge of the ātman in its mala-fettered state) thus obtained by any one cognition, if free from the faults of doubt, error and remembrance, is valid

1. S.A. pp 39—'pācam vāyilāka ānmāviṅkaṇ nikālum ūnānam pācañānām.'
cognition, and is called 'pāsa-jñānam'. Pāsa-jñānam is a mere vyañjaka (manifestor of knowledge) to the ātman in its petta nilai (embodied state). The ātman cognizes objects as made clear by the vyañjakas by means of its cit-śakti. The vyañjakas are extrinsic to the ātman, and are but accidental to it. They exist but do not persist in a manifested condition for all time. For in the mukti nilai (released state) since the ātman is not mala-fettered it does not require any conjunction of itself with the evolutes of māyā. So the Pāsa-jñānams are all unmanifest over there. They are not any-how annihilated. As they are species of jñānams, they are qualities, and should therefore inhere in some substance. The substance whose qualities they are should be either the ātman, or the evolutes of māyā. The pāsa-jñānams, being different kinds of knowledges, cannot be considered qualities of the evolutes of Māyā which are all inert and unconscious. The only course left is to consider them as guṇās or qualities of the ātman. There is a difficulty here. For according to Saiva Siddhānta, the relation between a guṇa and its guṇi is one of tādātmya sambandha (relation of intrinsic inherence or identity.)

1 A Guṇi is a unity of guṇās (qualities) collectively viewed, and is called a dravya (substance); a guṇa is the same unity individually viewed. With the Siddhāntins, the guṇās are not insubstantial accidental attributes of a substance. They are intrinsic to the guṇi; as a whole they constitute the being of the guṇi. Now the pāsa- jñānams are not guṇas of the ātman, in the sense that they are intrinsic to the ātman. They are guṇās inhereing in the ātman in an extrinsic way.

1. S.B. pps 185 and 186.
The Siddhāntin distinguishes between the three forms of pāsa-jñānams, namely - pratyakṣa, anumāna and āgama. With him, they are only vyañjakas; and he calls them pramāṇas only figuratively. But the Tārkikas and others consider them as genuine pramāṇas. This is a point where the Saiva Siddhāntin differs from the other schools of Indian philosophy. There is disagreement even on the number of independent means of knowledge. The Lokāyatas accept pratyakṣa only as a valid means of knowledge. The Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas claim validity to pratyakṣa and anumāna as well. The Sāṅkhyaśas admit that pratyakṣa, anumāna and āgama are the only pramāṇas that are distinct means of knowledge. The Naiyāyikas give an independent status to upamāna (comparison), and recognise the four pramāṇas - pratyakṣa, anumāna, āgama and upamāna. The Arhats and the Prabhākaras add arthāpatti (presumption) to the list of the Naiyāyikas, making a total of five. The Bhāṭṭas and Advaita Vedāntins see in abhāva (non-perception) an independent means of knowledge, and believe in the following six pramāṇas:

1. Pratyakṣa - Perception.
2. Anumāna - Inference.
3. Āgama - Verbal testimony.
4. Upamāna - Comparison.
5. Arthāpatti - Presumption.

The Paurāṇikas, on the other hand, add four more to the above number, making a total of ten. The extra pramāṇas recognized by them are as follows:

7. Pārīṣeṣa - Inference by elimination.
8. Sambhava - Probability.

10. Svabhāva linga - Natural inference.
   It is said that there are others who even believe in more than ten pramāṇas.

   The Saiva Siddhāntin first rejects the view that these are pramāṇas and then claims them to be merely vyañjakas, which are not at all independent of each other. With him they are all factors of valid knowledge in that they make the pramāṇa i.e., the Ātman's cit-śakti operative. He professes to reduce the Vyañjakas to the following three only.
   1. Pratyakṣa - perception.
   3. Āgama - verbal testimony.

   He includes abhava under pratyakṣa, aitiḥyam under Āgama and the remaining under anumāṇa.

   (b) Sivajñānam

   'The ātman or the soul is always in need of a vyañjaka (manifestor of knowledge) to know a thing. The object cognized may be either asat or sat. In the cognition of the asat, which it has in its petta-nilai (embodied state) the vyañjakas are the pāśa-juñānams, namely, perception, inference and verbal testimony which are all extrinsic to it; but in its mukti nilai (state of release) when it has cognition of Sivasat the vyañjaka is its ādhāra, Sivajñānam which is intrinsic to it. Sivajñānam is no other than the cit-śakti of Siva and is non-different from Him. Just as the pāśa-juñānams - perception, inference and verbal testimony - are figuratively spoken of as pramāṇas, Sivajñānam too is referred to as a pramāṇa. The real pramāṇa is the cit-śakti of the ātman. The pāśa-juñānams are accidental to the ātman and remain unmanifest in the ātman's mukti

1. S.B. pp 347
nilai; but Siva-jñānam endures for ever. The ātma-jñānam is, according to the Siddhāntin, pervasive and the pāsa-jñānams are limited in range; hence the former is called perfect knowledge with reference to the latter, which is imperfect knowledge. Yet ātma-jñānam has to do with Siva and Siva alone. But Siva-jñānam has its scope over all objects. It is Siva’s knowledge of everything together. So ātma-jñānam is imperfect with respect to Siva-jñānam which is perfect.

CHAPTER 6
Theory of Perception.

(i) Nature of sense-data.

When one is in the perceptual situation which is described as saying something, touching something, or hearing something etc., a colour patch, or resistance or sound, is felt to exist at that moment. The acquaintance with these existents is called sensing; and the existents themselves are differently called by various philosophers. The Schoolmen called them sensible species. Locke and Berkely would have them as ideas of sensations. With the 19th century philosophers they went by the name sensations. But Dr. C. D. Broad and his followers elect to term them sensa. Whatever the name adopted for these existents every one of them betrays a partiality for a particular view of the theory of perception. The ‘sensible species’ of the School-men make what are sensed as physical, whereas the terms ‘ideas’, ‘impressions’ and ‘sensations’ commit us to the view that what we sense are mental events. Even the term ‘sensum’ is not free from all bias. It is generally used to mean a kind of entity which is neither mental nor physical. Professor G. E. More and Mr. Bertrand
Russell would like to call these existents 'sense-data.' It is claimed that this term does not commit us to any specific theory of perception. But Dr. Dawes Hicks doubts very much whether the term is free from all implications as is claimed. The very meaning of the term 'something given' to the senses, not something found, commits us to a particular theory. Dr. Dawes Hicks, however, admits that the long usage of a term with a specified meaning can make a term neutral. But he objects that no such usage can be claimed for in this instance. What he means is that we should wait for a time till the term 'sense-data' completely loses all its implications to particular theories when we may freely use it without any fear of being committed to a specific theory. Mr. H. H. Price is of opinion that the admission that there are sense-data commits us to very little. Sense-data, according to him, do exist but need not persist throughout the interval when they are not being sensed. By accepting that there are sense-data there is no necessity for one to believe that several persons can be acquainted with the same sense-data. We have merely to admit that we can have some sense-data on every occasion of sensing. When we speak of sense-data we are not at all committed to any view either of character or about their origin; they may be substances, qualities, activities or relations with other entities. They may originate as the result of physical processes, or of mental processes, or of both. If what Mr. Price says is taken to be the primary meaning of the term, the word 'sense-data' deserves well its adoption in epistemological inquiries.

The character of sense-data as the link connecting the perciipient with the object perceived has been of late very much discussed in philosophical treatises. The naive realists would have them as physical. According
to them, they are either substances or phases of objects perceived by means of them. The Idealists call them mental as being phases of the percipient’s mind. Whereas, the physiologists and the behaviourists consider them cerebral on the ground that they are phases of the percipient’s brain.

(ii) Meaning of the term ‘Perceive’.

It is true that our beliefs about the material world depend upon sensing ‘sense-data’. Yet sensing is not a sufficient, though necessary, condition for holding such beliefs. Some further mental process is felt to be required. On any theory of material objects this further mental process is often called PERCEPTION. Thus it may be said that we sense some sense-data, such as colour-patches, resistances, sounds, etc, and that we perceive oranges, mountains, tables etc. But this usage of the term ‘perceive’ is ambiguous. For in any illusion of sense, such as seeing double, all philosophers are agreed that two sense-data are sensed, though they may not all admit that two candles are perceived. A majority of psychologists and philosophers use the word ‘perceive’ in the sense that it is possible to perceive not only what exists but also what does not exist. It is necessary on the part of these men to distinguish between true and false perception. In another sense of the term perceive, it is not possible to perceive what does not exist, and hence the distinction between true and false perception does not arise in this view. The Saiva Siddhāntin follows the majority of philosophers in using the term ‘perceive’ in the first sense. Yet two problems confront him when he attempts to give a theory of perception. First, the nature of perception and its relations to sensing has to be explained. Secondly, the relation between a sense
datum and a material thing (if any) of which it is a sense-datum to a perciipient is to be made clear.

(iii) Sensing and perception.

When I look at an object, say a door, my sense-data are actually constituents of its front surface. Yet at the first instance I am not aware of the fact that they belong to the door any more than to its front surface. I am said to be, in the words of Russell, just acquainted with the sense-data. This form of acquaintance with, or awareness of, the sense-data is called sensing. It must be noted that the acquaintance with the sense-data does not imply knowledge about the object to which the sense-data belong. To know that two colour-patches are different is knowledge about them. But acquaintance with them does not necessarily mean that there is knowledge that they are different. For Russell says there are no degrees of acquaintance. There is merely acquaintance and non-acquaintance. I am said to be better acquainted with a thing, when I am acquainted with more parts of the thing. But the acquaintance with each part is either complete or non-existent. Thus sensing is a mere direct acquaintance with the sense-data that belong to an object. In pure sensing, the subject is directly aware of the object itself. Yet the cognitive relation holding between the subject and the object is not the sort of relation that constitutes judgment.

Perception on the other hand is something more than sensing. It is a product of manipulations of, and operations on, the sense data. The relation between the perciipient and the object perceived is one of judgments of all degrees of definiteness varying from less determinate to more determinate forms. When an object is brought before the eyes, we sense the sense-data
belonging to its front surface. But we are said to perceive the whole object, not merely its front surface. Sensing by means of the visual organ is concerned with the front surface only, whereas perception has to do with the whole object made up of the sides, back and inside as well. The sense-data of the back side and the inside are not given to the eye, and hence are not sensed. Only those of the front surface are given, and they are sensed. It cannot be asserted that the unsensed sense-data or sensibilia (as Russell calls them) of the backside and inside yield perception of the backside and inside. Perception is of the object as a whole, not of parts. If perception is directed to parts of an object, it would be of each part as a whole, not of its further divisions.

The unsensed sense-data or sensibilia of the inside and backside of an object or part of an object seems to do nothing with perception. From the mere sensing of the sense-data of the front surface of an object we pass on to the process of perceiving the whole object. The passage from sensing to perceiving appears to be mysterious; all philosophers are not agreed on this point. The Rationalistic Idealists say that the back-side and the inside of an object are inferred from the front surface. The Associationists say that the present sense-data of the front surface, associated with the past sense-data of the back surface and the inside, give perception of the complete object. There are others, notably H.H. Price, who think that perception involves neither inference nor an association of a present sense-datum with the past one. According to these men, perception has a pseudo-intuitive character, and stimulates sensing. 'In perception, the thing, be it real or unreal, just comes along with the sense-datum; it just dawns upon us of itself.'
The Saiva Siddhāntin is not against this totalistic view of perception. But he cannot agree that there is no process involved in passing from sensing to perceiving. He sees three distinct intermediate processes. Even in sensing, according to him, the sense-data are not given to the senses individually, but are presented as a whole. The given sense-data are a complex containing constituents, though not discerned as such in sensing. No distinction is made among the primary qualities, such as its shape, motion, etc., nor among its secondary qualities, such as its colour, taste, etc.

Both the primary and secondary qualities are sensed together forming one sense-data. Sensing, according to the Siddhāntin, is purely a work of the senses, and gives us a vague, indeterminate and non-conceptual form of knowledge. We have herein a knowledge of the mere being of the sense-data. What is given by the senses is taken up by the cittā, one of the four internal organs, which splits up the sense-data presented as a whole progressively into their constituents. At any point when the cittā is active certain constituents are brought before it, while the rest remain as an indeterminate complex. The constituents that are presented to it being insufficient to decide in favour of one among many objects to which they might equally belong the cittā is in an attitude of reflection with a view to know to what object the given sense-data belong. From memory it finds that such and such sense-data belong to such and such objects. Thus the cittā is in a state of conjecture making guesses of the form that the thing presented may be a pot, a piece of cloth, etc. Then

1. S.B. pps 171, 172 and 255 - 'Aimporikalarin-taviṣṭayattaiṁ cittam cintittāriyum'.
2. Ibid pps 171 - 174 and 255 - 'maṇaṁ atanaic caṅkarpaṅkarpaṁcēytaṁ'.

there is the processes of doubt of the manas, — another of the four internal organs — in the form that the presented object is either a pot, or a piece of cloth. 'This is followed up by the attitude of perceptual disposition of ahankāra, — the third of the four internal organs, which rises, as it were, to make assurance of the presented object. At last, the fourth internal organ, buddhi, functions. 'The Buddhi is responsible for the completion of the perceptual process. It has discriminatory powers, and breaks asunder the remaining indeterminate mass of presented sense-data, and makes full assurance of the object presented. The difference between perceptual disposition and perceptual assurance lies in the fact that the subject enters as a predominating constituent in the former, while the object is the important factor in the latter. One is said to perceive an object if he makes an assurance of the object presented. The buddhi which makes perceptual assurance completes the perceptual process. Thus according to the Saiva Siddhāntin, the three processes of conjecture, doubt and perceptual disposition lie between pure sensing and determinate perception.

In the case of perception of distant objects in bright sunlight and of near objects in dim light, all these five processes are perceptibly distinct. But ordinarily when attention is directed to a well-illuminated near-object, we are aware of one process only, that is, the process of perception. For as soon as the sense-data are presented as a whole, we have simply the process of perceptual consciousness. The intermediate processes — conjecture, doubt and perceptual disposition — together with the initial process of

1. S.B. pps 170 and 255 - 'ahāṅkāram oruppaṭ-teluntaṇaṇiyum'.
2. Ibid pps 162 - 164 and 255 - 'putti nićcayuttaṇiyum'.
sensing do not seem to take place. But, according to
the Siddhāntin, each of these processes is distinct, and
contributes its own share towards the perception of an
object. The reason why they are not perceptibly clear
is the fact that their times of duration are not great
enough. Thus the passage from sensing sense-data
to perception is by way of the three intermediate
processes. The perceptual act is above conjecture and
doubt. As such it is an unquestioning and undoubting
act, even as sensing is. Just as sensing is effortless, so
is perception of well-illuminated near objects effortless;
for the intermediate processes are of very short duration
so much so they appear to be non-existent.

(iv) Sense-data and Matter.

The next problem to be considered is the relation of
sense-data to the material thing whose data they are.
It is a fact that what we directly observe is none other
than sense-data, such as colour-patches, resistance
sounds, tastes and smells. But the supposed contents
of the material world are different from these. It is
said to consist of material objects constituted of atoms
or electrons, neither of which seem to have colour
resistance, taste, or smell. How then is knowledge of
such objects obtained?

Evidently these objects must have some kind of
correlation with sense-data, and knowledge can be had
only through this correlation. But a correlation can be
ascertained when the correlated objects are constantly
found together. In the present case, one term of the
correlation—sense-data—is the only one held by all
philosophers alike to be always found. Neither the
second term of correlation, nor the relation of correlation
itself seems to be found. Thus there is a difficulty
remaining to be solved. The solution is simple. It is
agreed by all philosophers that our knowledge of the material world is entirely based upon our observation of macroscopic objects—tables, apples, books etc.—and their sense-data. It is a fact that our knowledge of macroscopic objects are inferred therefrom. Now macroscopic objects can be found; and the correlation between them and their sense-data can be ascertained. But what is the nature of macroscopic objects? Are they physical or mental? Philosophers differ among themselves as to their view of macroscopic objects. The idealists urge that they are mental? The naive realists regard them as physical. The Siddhāntin agrees with the naive realists in considering them physical. Then the problem comes to the fore as to the kind of correlation between the object of perception and its sense-data. The Siddhāntin holds the view that every material object is wholly composed of sensibilia.

According to the Siddhāntin, the sense-data have the relation of tādātmya (identity) to the material objects whose data they are. Colour-patches, resistances, sounds, tastes and smells are as much material as the material object to which they belong. The material object is no substrate of qualities which are insubstantial but is constituted of qualities that are as substantial as the object itself. The relation between the sensibilia and the material object which is made up of them is known as the guṇa—guṇi—bhāva sambandha. There is no guṇi without guṇās. The guṇās or sensibilia viewed collectively is the material object. When sensed individually they remain merely as guṇās or sensibilia. The Siddhāntin’s thesis that every material object—guṇi—is wholly composed of sensibilia—guṇās—deserves to be examined with reference to (a) Variations in Form and Size of the same object looked at from points equidistant, or at various distances from the object. (b) Illusory
objects, and (c) Double Vision and complete Hallucination.

(a) Nature of Form and Size of objects viewed from various points.

It is a well known fact that a rupee coin, when looked at perpendicularly to its plane surface, presents the appearance of a circle. When the same coin is looked at from points equidistant from the centre of the coin, we get elliptical forms of various degrees. All these forms are sense-data. To the Siddhāntin, who is a realist, they must all belong to the object, the rupee-coin, as members to group. Again the circular form presented does not maintain a fixed radius. It appears to diminish in size as the point from which the object is viewed is increased. The rupee coin seems to possess an infinite number of sizes as well at one and the same time. Thus the Siddhāntin has to admit that a material object is constituted of contrary sensibilia—different forms and sizes. This admission, if made, will seriously impair his reputation as a philosopher, for it is against common-sense to attribute more than one form and one size to an object at a time. After all a system of philosophy is not worth a straw if men of common-sense, one and all refuse to endorse it. But yet serious reflection will make it clear that the Siddhāntin’s doctrine of an object having multi-forms and multi-sizes, at one and the same time is not opposed to common sense. The Siddhāntin believes in Sva-rūpa-lakṣaṇās (essential characteristics) and taṭastha lakṣaṇās (accidental characteristics) as belonging to objects. One form and one size only can belong to an object intrinsically at a time. These and these only can enter into the svarūpa lakṣaṇa of the object. The other forms and sizes of the objects are extrinsic, and form its taṭastha lakṣaṇa. Thus it would seem that
every object has, as Prof. A. N. Whitehead holds, two characteristics. The one is what characterizes it simpliciter, and forms a part of its svarūpa lakṣaṇa; the other is what characterizes it from a place being its taṭastha lakṣaṇa. The form and size that characterize an object simpliciter is taken to be the standard form and size of the object. The other forms and sizes are all characteristics that qualify the object from various places and equally belong to the object. The sensing of these latter forms and sizes as well can never be wrong. But yet the perception of the circular rupee coin as elliptical is a case of error. Here the error is due to the faulty eye which presents a characteristic that qualifies an object from a place as that which qualifies it simpliciter. In the case of the appearance of convergence of parallel rails too, the breadth between the rails appear to decrease as the distance from which the rails are seen increases. This too is due to the faulty eye which is unable to discriminate between what qualifies an object from a place from what qualifies it simpliciter.

(b) Illusory Objects

Illusory objects present a difficulty of no mean order to the Siddhāntin. When one mistakes a rope for a snake, the sense-data presented are those of the rope, and yet what is perceived is the snake. How can the sense-data of the rope give a perception of a snake? Even if the sense-data presented be common both to a rope and to a snake, there cannot be a perception of a snake. At the utmost, there will be a doubt as to whether the object perceived is a rope or a snake. This difficulty can be got over thus: Certain characteristics, such as bent form, length, etc., which are common both to a rope and to a snake are some of the sense-data presented. In addition to these the specific character
of motion which qualifies the snake simpliciter is perceived in dim light as a characteristic that qualifies the object presented—the rope. The faulty eye loses sight of the fact that the character of motion does not qualify the object presented—the rope—simpliciter, but only from a place; hence there is the illusion. Thus the sense-data sensed are real; so are the rope presented and the snake perceived. The illusion consists in regarding the rope as a snake.

(c) Double Vision and Complete Hallucination.

In the case of double vision, such as the one obtained when one presses his eye-ball, the presented object is one only—the candle—but what are perceived are two candles. Evidently there are two groups of sense-data. One group can be said to actually belong to the candle simpliciter in the relation of member to group; the other group cannot belong to the candle in the same sense; for it appears to belong to a second candle which, however, disappears when the pressure to which the eye-ball is subjected is released. Thus the phenomenon of double vision leads the Siddhāntin into difficulties.

A careful examination of the problem will prove to us that even double vision does not belie the Siddhāntin. Both the groups of sense-data actually belong to the real candle which is the one presented in the relation of members to group. The first set enters into the svārūpa laksṇa of the candle, and characterizes its simpliciter giving us the perception of the real candle. The second set forms the taṭastha laksṇa of the candle, and characterizes it from a place. The eye that is pressed dislocates the second group of sense-data, and sees it as though it were characterizing a second candle simpliciter. Thus the faulty eye by way of the first group of
sense-data, perceives the candle where it is, and by way of the second group sees a candle where it is not. Yet in as much as both the real candle and the apparent candle are groups of sensibilities which are real, there is no reason to doubt the reality of either candle. It is true that the apparent candle does not persist when the cause of its appearance—the pressure of the eye-ball—is removed. Yet it is not a mental construction, made up of the stuff of the mind. It is as much material as the real candle; yet the error is due to the mistaken apprehension that the objects presented are two, and it is the faulty eye that is responsible for such an apprehension. In complete hallucination also, as in the case of the apparent candle, we see an object where it is not. The visionary object is all the same as real as the wild sense-data that make up its being; the error of hallucination is due to the faulty eye which, after dislocating the sense-data belonging to various real objects, perceives them as belonging to a single coherent thing, the visionary object. Thus it will be seen that the Siddhântin’s theory that every material object is wholly composed of sensibilities is adequate enough to explain the phenomena of multi-forms and multi-sizes of an object, illusion and complete hallucination.

(v) Definition of Perception.

Perception is, according to Sivajñâna Yogi, the jñâna sakti of the âtman which has a doubt free, errorless knowledge other than doubt, error and memory, but always preceded by Nirvikalpa jñânam and followed

1. S.S.S. pp 8—'nirvikarpavunanvait tanakku munañ-kakkonê aiyavanurvum viparitavanur-vumiri vitaiyankalai neroiyarivata-kiya anmâvinatu nanacatti kátiyali-
avaiyenappatum,'
by an inquiry after the manner of savikalpa. 1 According to the Pauskara Agama, perception is the atma cit-sakti which contacts objects through its senses. Both Sivajnana Yogi and the author of the Pauskara Agama agree that perception is the jnana Sakti of the atman as conditioned by certain factors. 2 But Sivagra Yogi, in identifying perception with valid knowledge as well as with the instrument of obtaining valid knowledge, appears to differ with both. The difference is not real as he does not mean a different thing. According to Saiva Siddhanta the sakti and its atman hold the relation of guna-guni-bhava. Knowledge being a quality of the atman, there is no difference of opinion in holding the view that perception is some form of knowledge. Hence it can be concluded that Sivagra Yogi does not materially differ with either. Now if what is stated about perception in the Pauskara Agama be taken to be the definition of perception, there would be no way of excluding doubt, error, memory and even inference and verbal testimony from perception. For all these can be identified with the jnana sakti of the atman which contacts objects through the senses.

1. P.B. pp 528 ‘Cicchakterarthasamyoga tyakksamindri yamargatah’.
3. P.B. pps 510 and 526.
Āgama seems to be correct as far as perception is spoken of as a pramāṇa and is identified with the ātma cit-śakti which contacts objects through the senses. Yet when treated as the definition of perception there is the fault of the definition being too wide, as it includes inference and verbal testimony as well. In these circumstances it behoves us to take what is said of perception in the Pauṣkara Āgama as a mere description, not as a definition.

Further, it would appear from the so-called definition that sense-object contact is essential for perception. *But the author of the Pauṣkara Agama, in his classification of Perception into three kinds, speaks of indriyāntahkaraṇa nirapekṣa pratyakṣa which functions without the antahkaranās (senses). Thus it would appear that sense object contact is not at all necessary for all kinds of perception, at least for indriyāntahkaraṇa nirapekṣa pratyakṣa which is a kind of transcendental perception corresponding to the alaukika pratyakṣa of the Naiyāyikās. The other two kinds of Pratyakṣas treated on in the Pauṣkara Āgama, namely, the indriyasāpekṣa pratyakṣa and the antahkaraṇa sāpekṣa pratyakṣa, remind us of the laukika pratyakṣa of the Naiyāyikas. For the one the sense-object contact is very essential; the other requires the functioning of the antahkaraṇās without the senses. Therefore when the author of the Pauṣkara Agama speaks of perception as the ātma cit-śakti which contacts objects through the senses, we have to take it that he is defining indriya pratyakṣa (sense perception), not perception in general. It cannot be said that he is unaware of the nature of perception, for he hits the right mark when he says that contact of the cit-śakti is an essential condition for perception. Even in sense-perception the importance*

1. P.B. pps 531 and 532.
of the contact of the cit-śakti is tacitly admitted by him when he says that the sense-object contact is necessary, but is not the sole condition for it.

'Now the character of immediacy of perception is well brought out in the definition of perception by Sivajñāna Yogi in his commentary to the Sivajñāna Siddhiyār, and by Sivāgra Yogi in his Sivāgra Bhāṣyam. But the author of the Pauṣkara Āgama has gravely omitted it. Yet Sivāgra Yogi is not above blame in his definition of perception. 'For in his commentary to the Sivajñāna Siddhiyār he speaks of perception as a doubt-free, errorless knowledge other than doubt, error and memory, but always preceded by nirvikalapa jñānam, and followed by an inquiry in the savikalpa way. This definition, if accepted as true, will be too wide, since inference and verbal testimony too will have to be included in perception. So Sivāgra Yogi appears to be wrong, and may be blamed for giving such a definition. Yet there seems an escape for him in that he is but interpreting Aruṇandī Sivācāriyar as a commentator. But the fact is that Sivajñāna Yogi too is an interpreter of Aruṇandī Sivācāriyar. If it were possible for Sivajñāna Yogi to interpret Aruṇandī Sivācāriyar true to facts, why did not Sivāgra Yogi too do the same? If the relevant lines in Aruṇandī's poem did not admit of a correct interpretation, why did not the latter point it out in his commentary? Yet we know for certain that Sivāgra Yogi is fully acquainted with the import-

1. s.s.s. pp 8. s.b.s. pp 108.
2. s.s.s. pp 119 – Kuṟṟamaṟṟa prayakṣamāvatu cantē-kam ouṟṟai marṟonṟaṅgaṅaṅaṁ kāḷpaṅ putṟu purnaṅaṅaṁ yaugṛi nirvikarpatari-saṅāṁnaṁ savikarpamāṅka vicāittu muṇcoonna samsaṅgaṅi tōsaṅkaḷiṅṅik kāḷpaṅaṁ.
ance of the character of immediacy of perception as is evidenced in his Sivāgra Bhāṣyam. It is difficult to reconcile the inconsistencies and contradictions in the two works. It may be that Sivāgra Yogi, as a commentator of Sivajñāna Siddhiyār, is not a clear thinker. His powers seem fully developed when he wrote Sivāgra Bhāṣyam. Further, it may be of interest to know that Aruṇandi Sivācāriyar brings out the character of immediacy as an essential feature of inference. Naturally Sivajñāna Yogi reads into the lines on perception the character of immediacy—a character opposed to immediacy—as an essential element of perception. Aruṇandi Sivācāriyar cannot be found fault with for not having expressly stated this character. For it is in the way of a poet to be terse and brief; and Aruṇandi, as a poet, has done his part. It is the commentator that has to interpret him correctly. The credit of correct interpretation falls on the shoulders of Sivajñāna Yogi of multifarious talents. Both Sivāgra Yogi and the author of Pauṣkara Āgama seem to have been influenced by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrines.

1. According to Gautama, the author of the Nyāya Sūtras, the knowledge produced by the sense-object contact, when not subject to error when not expressible by words, and when definite, is called perception.

2. Vātsyāyana analyses the causes of perception in detail. He says that in every perceptual situation the self unites with the mind, the mind with the sense, and the sense with the object. According to him, the sense-object contact is not the only cause of perception. There are others as well, namely, the self-mind contact and

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2. Ibid pps 16 - 19.
the mind-sense contact. Yet Gautama speaks of the sense-object contact only. Vātsyāyana does not find fault with the author of the Nyāya Sūtrās for giving only one cause of perception. On the other hand, he compliments him for having brought out the idea of sense-object contact in his definition. Whereas the self-mind contact is common to perception, inference, etc. he urges that the mind-sense contact, and the sense-object contact are peculiar characteristics of perception. Yet in the definition we have only the sense-object contact, not the mind-sense contact. A partiality for the sense-object contact is explained away by the fact that a definition need not contain mention of all the distinctive features of the thing defined. The mention of any one character that serves to distinguish a thing from others would suffice. The sense-object contact is as good a distinctive mark as the mind-sense contact, and the inclusion of this feature in the definition is said to enhance the value of the definition. Again, Vātsyāyana regards the apprehension by the soul of pleasure, pain etc., as cases of perception. It is a fact that there is no sense-object contact in such apprehensions. Hence the definition of perception by Gautama needs to be revised to include these as well. Vātsyāyana seems to be against such a revision, and teaches us a doctrine foreign to Gautama. The mind is regarded by him as a sense organ, though it differs from the other sense-organs in that it is immaterial, devoid of any qualities, and operates on all objects without being constrained to specific ones. Thus according to Vātsyāyana, the sense-object contact is a necessary condition for all kinds of perception including the apprehension by the soul of pleasure, pain, etc.

1. P.B.Ü. pp 94 — 'Tatrabakṣamakṣam pratyotpadayate iti pratyakṣam akṣanindriyāṇi ghrānarasanačaकṣustvakhotramanāmi sat'.


produced by the sense-object contact. According to him, there are six sense-organs, namely— the eye, the ear, the nose, the mouth, the skin and the mind. Pleasure, pain, etc., are perceived by the contact of the self with the mind which is regarded as a sense-organ. Thus both Vātsyāyana and Prasastapāda have emphasised upon the importance of the factors of sense-object contact in perception. The Syncretist school, however, appears to be nearer the truth regarding the phenomenon of perception. ¹ Annam Bhaṭṭa, in defining perception as the knowledge produced by the sense-object contact, does not go beyond Gautama. ² Visvanātha Pañcānana speaks of perception as knowledge which is born of the senses, and whose immediate cause is sense-object contact. ³ With Kesava Misra perception is the instrument of direct right knowledge. According to him, a cognition is direct if it is produced by the agency of the sense organs. ⁴ Gāṅgesa appears to see the flaws in the definition of perception of Gautama and Prasastapāda, and defines perception as direct apprehension. It is further stated that perception is knowledge whose instrumental cause is not knowledge. Whereas inference, verbal testimony and comparison involve respectively previous knowledges of premises, consistency and similarity, perception is produced by a sense-organ which is not knowledge.

The Siddhāntin fully agrees with Gāṅgesa in regarding perception as direct apprehension, but cannot accept the view that it is produced by the sense-object.

1. T.S.A. pp 45—‘evam samnikarṣajanyam jñānam pratyakṣam’.
2. K.S.M. pp 27—’Indriyajam jñānam pratyakṣam’.
contact. The Syncretist school, together with the ancient and modern Naiyāyikās and Vaiśeṣikas, makes the fundamental mistake of thinking that knowledge can be produced by the sense-object contact. How can the contact of two material things, such as the sense and the object, produce knowledge which is immaterial. According to the Siddhāntin, the cognition termed as perception is a character of the ātman, manifested under certain conditions, such as sense-object contact etc. The Siddhāntin's doctrine is in consonance with the common-sense view, and is to be preferred as it does not coerce us to conceive of immaterial things as being born of material objects.

The SāṅkhyaŚs too define perception in terms of sense-object contact. According to the Sāṅkhya Karika, perception is definite cognition through that which bears upon each particular object. Vācaspati Misra thinks that the sense in contact with the object is that which bears upon particular objects. Thus with him, perception is a modification of the mind which gives definite cognition of objects effected by the sense-object contact. According to the Sāṅkhya Sūtras, perception is that cognition which results from the connexion with objects and which gives us their forms. Aniruddha opines that the above definition of perception may be treated either as applying to external perception only, or as including as well the non-external perception of the Yogin who is able to see objects remote in time and place from him. The Yogin who has attained supernatural powers can

1. T.K. Karika 5 pp 9 – 'Prativisayadhyavasayo drṣṭam'.
2. Ibid pp 9 & 10
3. S.P.B. Sutra 89 – 'Yat sambaddham sat tadākaroleki vijñānam tat pratyakṣam'.

have immediate connection with things in the form of their causes. 'Vijñāna Bhikṣu too agrees with Aniruddha in his interpretation of the definition of perception in the Śaṅkhyā Sūtrās. The Yoga system as well holds a similar view of perception. 'For Vyāsa thinks that perception is a modification of the mind which cognizes mainly by means of sense impressions the particularity of an object which is of the nature of both generic and specific qualities.

A modification of the mind which is material will itself be material. Since perception is accepted by the Śaṅkhyā and Yoga systems as a modification of the mind, they cannot escape from the fault of regarding it as material. No stretch of imagination can compel us to consider perception as material or physical. Even the Adhyāśa Vāda which they bring forward to explain the phenomenon is out of date, and is unsatisfactory. Perception is rather psychical, and belongs to the spirit. The Siddhāntin is right in holding the view that it belongs to the spirit and spirit alone, and that it is manifested only under suitable conditions.

The Mīmāṁsakas put forward the view that perception is born of the buddhi on the contact of the senses of man with existent objects. The Naiyāyikās object to the above statement as a definition on the ground that it is over-pervasive, since it will include erroneous knowledge as well within its compass. For even in error, they point out there is contact of the sense-organs with existent objects. In the case of a mistaken apprehension of a rope for a snake, the snake, though not present before one's eyes, is as much existent as the rope is.

1. S. F. B. pps 49 and 50.
2. P.Y.S. pp 11.
3. S.D. pps 35 36.
The Bhāṭṭa School, as represented by Pārtha Sārathi Misra, is of opinion that the Naiyāyikās are unjust in their criticism. For what is stated about perception is a mere statement of fact, which informs us that perception is not conducive as a means to ascertain dharma; it was never meant to be a definition. The Naiyāyikās, according to him, have no reason to tear out a statement of fact from its context and find fault with it as if it were meant to be a definition. The Bhāṭṭās however hold the view that perception has to do with present objects. 'It is valid knowledge produced by the sense-object contact.

The 'Prabhākarās insist that perception is direct apprehension; and direct apprehension is manifestation of an object in its own form; The form of an object is its specific individuality. Thus according to the Prabhākarās, if an object is known by means of its specific individuality, the apprehension is direct, and is called perception. 'The Bhāṭṭās observe that the Prabhākarās cannot maintain, in the light of their definition of perception, that determinate cognition of an object is direct. For even as in inference, from the probans such as snake etc., the probandun fire etc., are cognized only in their relation to something else such as their classes, names etc. It is admitted by the Prabhākarās themselves that inference is indirect. So determinate cognitions too will become non-direct. The Bhāṭṭās further urge that the Prabhākarās cannot bring

1. M.N. pp 8: 'Tatra indriyasannikarṣajam pramāṇam pratyakṣam.'
2. P.B. pp 26: 'Sāksāt pratitiḥ pratyakṣam; sāksāt pratitiḥ Svarūpa pratitiḥ; svasyaiva rūpaṃ svarūpañ
Asādhāraṇarūpamityarthāh.'
forward the argument that in a determinate cognition there is the cognition of an object in its own form (specific individuality), besides its manifestations as related to something else (generic characteristic); for the same thing can be said of inference as well. Therefore if the determinate cognition of an object is held to be direct, there is no reason to regard inference as non-direct. The Prabhākaras do not seem to have any adequate answer to the above criticism.

Both the Bhāṭṭas and the Prabhākaras admit that knowledge is a characteristic of the ātman, manifested under certain conditions. They do not err, like the Naiyāyikas, by making knowledge—a psychic phenomenon—an effect of contact of two physical things, as the sense and the object. With them, mind is also a sense. They accept the view that pleasure, pain, etc., are also perceptible, the sense involved being the mind. Yet the Siddhāntin is not satisfied with the definition of perception as advanced by them, for they have not brought out in their definitions the fact that perception is a characteristic of the ātman. Further, according to the Siddhāntin, both the definitions apparently suffer from a confusion of thought regarding the distinctive factors of valid experiential knowledge. The Bhāṭṭas and the Prabhākaras alike are making what they style pramāṇa do duty for pramā or pramiti. With the Siddhāntin, however, perception is only a vyañjaka, not a pramāṇa. Yet it is called a pramāṇa figuratively only. Credit is due to the Siddhāntin who does not identify even an apparent pramāṇa with what he terms pramiti. Though the Siddhāntin is opposed to the Mīmāṃsakas in their definition of perception, he sees certain elements of truth in them. For the importance of the sense-object contact in perception is no less seen by him than by the
Bhāttās. The Prabhākaras too have something to thank the Siddhāntin when he says that there is direct apprehension in the perceptual act.

The early Arhats are opposed to the Prabhākaras, the latter Arhats and the Siddhāntin in regarding sense-perception as indirect apprehension. Even Umasvāti, the author of Tattvārthādhigama Sūtrās, does not seem to hold a different view. According to him, pramāṇa is of two kinds — parokṣa and pratyakṣa. Sense-perception comes under parokṣa which is indirect knowledge acquired by the soul, not by itself but through external agencies such as the senses and the mind. Even anumāṇa (inference), upamāṇa (comparison), āgama (verbal testimony), arthāpatti (presumption), sambhava (probability) and abhāva (non-existence), are not held to be separate sources of knowledge, but are included under parokṣa. Umasvāti recognizes only two forms of parokṣa — Mati and Sruta. Mati is knowledge of existing things, obtained through the senses and the mind. Sruta is knowledge of the things of the past, present and future, acquired through reasoning and study. It is interesting to note the fact that the term pratyakṣa is defined by Umasvāti as direct knowledge acquired by the soul by itself, that is, without the help of external agencies such as the senses. Three species of pratyakṣa are given. The first is Avadhi or knowledge of objects beyond the sphere of perception. Manahparyāya or the knowledge of another's thoughts is the second. The third is Kevala or pure unalloyed absolute knowledge.

1. Siddhasāṇa, the Jaina pioneer on systematic logic, representing the views of the Svetambaras includes

2. Ibid pps 174, 175.
sense-perception in pratyakṣa. According to him, pramāṇa is of two kinds—pratyakṣa (direct valid knowledge) and parokṣa (indirect valid knowledge). Pratyakṣa is classified into vyavahārika (practical direct knowledge) and paramārthika (transcendental knowledge). Parokṣa too is of two kinds—anumāna (inference) and sabda (verbal testimony). Sense-perception is held to be identical with vyavakārika—pratyakṣa or knowledge obtained through the senses and the mind. Paramārthika—pratyakṣa is called kevala jñānam or absolute knowledge which arises on the perfect enlightenment of the soul. Neither the mind nor the senses take part in it. 1Māṇikya Nandi of the Digambara sect also classifies pramāṇa into pratyakṣa and parokṣa and includes sense-perception under pratyakṣa. 2Deva Sūri, who professes the Svetambara sect, divides vyavahārika—pratyakṣa into two classes—indriya-nibandhana (what is produced through sense-organs) and anindriya—nibandhana (what does not arise through the sense-organs, but arises through the mind). The paramārthika—pratyakṣa is held to be two fold—vikala (defective) and sakala (perfect). The vikala includes avadhi jñānam (limited knowledge) that is, knowledge of special objects which are not differentiated, and manaḥparyāya or definite and clear knowledge of another’s thought. Deva Sūri differs with Siddhasēna in including smarana (recollection), pratyabhijñā (recognition) and tarka (argumentation) as well under parokṣa. Hemachandra seems to agree wholly with Deva Sūri on the classification of vyavahārika—pratyakṣa, but not on that of paramārthika—pratyakṣa.

The Siddhāntin regrets that both the earlier and the latter Arhats are confusing what should properly be

2. Ibid pp 201.
called vyañjakas (manifestors) with pramāṇās. The Arhats admit that vyavahārika-pratyakṣa, be it indriya-nibandhana or anindriya-nibandhana, together with parokṣa jñānam do not function in mokṣa (state of release). It is also a fact that paramārthika-pratyakṣa is not obtained in the state of bondage of the Jīva. Thus both vyavahārika-pratyakṣa and paramārthika-pratyakṣa as well as parokṣa jñānam are asat; and what is an asat cannot be a pramāṇa or means of cognition. Further, the Arhats posit sentiency to the Jīva (soul), and state that the latter acquires omniscience when all impediments to knowledge are removed. Therefore it is all the more necessary for them to consider that all the different forms of pratyakṣa and parokṣa jñānam which are all asat are only vyañjakas and not pramāṇās. Again the contention of Umāsvāti that sense-perception is an indirect form of knowledge does not really deserve any criticism as the Arhats themselves have abandoned it.

The Buddhists object that the usual definition of pratyakṣa (perception) as knowledge produced by the sense-object contact is defective and unsatisfactory in many respects. In the first place, the definition lacks the essential feature of every cognition— even a perceptive cognition—in being a new cognition, not as recognition. Only the first moment of every cognition can be new. Hence perception by the senses can be had at the first moment only. In the succeeding moments, ideational elements such as name, genius etc., enter into the field, and deprive sense-perception of its purity. It is then no longer the knowledge of the svalaksāna or bare particular. According to the Buddhists, the character of cognition is such that one of the causes that produces it is the object of cognition; and the

1. B.L. pp148, 149.
function of pratyakṣa or sense-perception stops with the mere noting of the presence of the bare particular. To construct the image of the object, to associate the object with the name, to subsume it under a genius, etc., are other functions, which follow sense-perception in its track.

'This is why Ācārya Dignāga describes pratyakṣa (sense-perception) as free from mental construction and as not connected with such characteristics as name, genus etc. However, he does not give a full definition of pratyakṣa. But Dharmakīrti, the author of Nyāya Bindu, defines pratyakṣa as a valid means of knowledge which is non-illusive, and at the same time free from mental constructions. Dharmottara, the commentator of Nyāya Bindu, reasons out that the use of the term abhrānta (meaning illusive in the definition) becomes a superfluity if it refers to pratibhāsiki bhrānti (empirical illusion), since the idea of non-illusiveness in this sense is already contained in the conception of pratyakṣa as a pramāṇa (means of valid knowledge). He is however of opinion that the use of the term can be reconciled if what is meant by Dharmakīrti is mukhya-vibhrama (transcendental illusion). Thus Dharmakīrti, in the view of Dharmottara, seems to hold that pratyakṣa or pure sense-perception has to do with the Ultimate Reality or the uncognizable thing - in - itself.

The Siddhāntin feels that the Buddhists have reduced Pratyakṣa (perception) to the level of a pure sensation, devoid of any meaning. The importance of the element of meaning in perception has been

1. P.S. pp.: 'pratyakṣam kalpanāpodham
   nāmajātyādīyasamyutam.'
2. N.B. pp 11: 'Tatra kalpanāpodham abhrāntam
   pratyakṣam.'
recognized by a majority of thinkers, both Western and Eastern; and yet Buddhism denies even the presence of this element. A perception or a sensation containing no elements of meaning is a pure abstraction which has no counterpart in the objective world. Further, perception is a process of cognition. Its object should be a cognizable thing. Therefore it is self-contradictory to assert that perception which is a knowing process has as its object of cognition an uncognizable thing-in-itself. Thus the Buddhist theory of perception does not stand to reason.

The Advaita Vedāntins define pratyakṣa (perception) as that which is the distinctive cause of valid perceptual knowledge; and valid perceptual knowledge is, they urge, nothing but consciousness. When a problem is raised that consciousness which has no beginning cannot be produced, and hence can have no distinctive cause, they say that though consciousness has no beginning, what manifests it, i.e., the psychosis of the internal organ has a beginning; and the psychosis being a determinant of knowledge is figuratively called by them knowledge. According to Advaita there are three kinds of consciousness - Viśaya caitanya (content consciousness), Pramāṇa caitanya (cognitive consciousness) and pramāṭr caitanya (cognizer-consciousness). Of these, the first is defined by the object of perception, the second by the psychosis of the internal organ and the third by the internal organ itself. The Advaitins see perceptual nature both in the object cognized and in the cognition itself. The perceptual character of a cognition with respect to any aspect of it is characterised by the

1. V.P.D. pp 7 – ṭatra pratyakṣapramākāraṇam pratyakṣa-pramāṇam.
2. Ibid pp 12.
non-difference of the psychosis-defined-consciousness with the consciousness defined by the object, which is present and competent for the sense through which the perception is made. But the perceptuality present in the content consists in the non-difference of the content-consciousness with the cognizer-consciousness. To the objection that there cannot be non-difference of the content-consciousness with the cognizer-consciousness in the case of perceptions of the form 'I see a pot', etc., on the ground that there is an experience of difference in the cognition, the Advaitins say that by non-difference they do not mean oneness; but what they assert is the fact that the content has no reality over and above that of the content-defined consciousness which is one with the cognizer-defined consciousness in perception. This is why they urge that the perceptibility of a content consists in its sense-competence when it has no reality other than that of the cognizer-defined-consciousness qualified by a psychosis of the internal organ getting a form of the content itself. The above statement is true as regards the perceptibility of the content of both valid and invalid perceptual knowledges. To confine its applicability to valid perceptual knowledge only the Advaitins qualify the word 'content' by the word 'unsublated'. In this sense, the knowledge of Brahman only can be valid with the Advaitins as the empirical world gets sublated by the cognition of Brahman. But yet empirical knowledge is held to be valid within its own universe of thought as it is not sublated therein.

The Siddhāntin is not convinced of the Advaitin's theory of perception which advocates a doctrine of psychological realism combined with metaphysical idealism. It is a fact that the Advaitins accept the
objectivity of reference in perception. What the Siddhāntin cannot understand is how an appearance—such is the universe of mind and matter with the Advaitins—gets objectified. The explanation that the empirical world is a subjective creation of Isvara Sākṣi who is no other than Brahman or pure consciousness as qualified per accidens by māyā is highly unsatisfactory and is not convincing. Further, the Siddhāntin feels that the distinction made between valid perceptual knowledge and delusive knowledge on the basis of the workability of each is more pragmatic and less epistemological. For the intrinsic natures of truth and error lie not in the fact that one is workable and the other non-workable any more than that one is palatable and the other unpalatable. Often truth is found to be irksome and unpalatable to many; and what is workable may not contain the essence of truth. The Corpuscular Theory of light that was once workable has had its day and is no longer held to be true. What is true is true for ever, and cannot become an error later. What gives us truth is valid knowledge and not what is workable. If unsublatedness be taken to be the characteristics of valid knowledge, truth will depend for its truth more on the capacity of the percipient’s genius for exhausting all possibilities of the means of sublation than on its own nature. The pragmatic trend of the definition of valid perception of the Advaitin shows his helpless position of his metaphysical idealism as combined with his psychological realism.

The Viśiṣṭādvaitins use the words pratyakṣa anumāṇa and āgama both in the sense of a pramāṇa (means of valid cognition) and in the sense of pramāṇa (valid cognition). Nigamanta Mahā Desika in his Nyāya parisuddhi uses the word pratyakṣa in the second sense when he says that pratyakṣa is directly
apprehended valid knowledge. So, as a means of cognition pratyakṣa is, according to him, what generates directly apprehended valid knowledge; and valid knowledge is knowledge as is consonant with actual experience. Sṛṅivāsa, the author of Yatindramata Dipikā, is also of the same view as Nigamantha Mahā Desika. Now the definition given of perception appears to have the fault of ativyāpti (over-pervasion). For smṛṭi (memory) too generates directly apprehended knowledge. Sṛṅivāsa appears to be aware of this flaw in his definition when he proceeds to justify his definition on the ground that smṛṭi being dependent on samskāra (residue left of previous experience) is involved in perception, and does not constitute a direct means of cognition. The author of Prameya Saṅgraha is of opinion that pratyakṣa is immediate experience. Now immediate experience can be had of delusive perception as well. Therefore, the Siddhāntin feels that the author of Prameya Saṅgraha has merely given the generic nature of pratyakṣa and not its specific character. Garadaviśṇu Misra speaks of pratyakṣa as valid knowledge of objects not remote in time or place to the percipient. The atom in front of us is not remote in time or place and we can have valid knowledge of it. Yet it is not perception but inference that yields us cognition of it. Varadaviśṇu Misra seems to be aware of this fact when he further qualifies his statement by adding that what he means by the phrase 'objects not remote in time or place' is that there should be a clear manifestation of the object. There is ambiguity in the use of the word 'clear'. There is no scientific precision in its meaning. So the meaning is specified by the explanation that clearness consists in the illumination of an object in its specific form.
The Siddhāntin questions the Viśiṣṭādvaitins, what is it that generates directly apprehended valid knowledge. It must be either a substance, or a quality, or an action. To the Siddhāntin, a quality or an action is a phase of substance and is non-different from it. The Siddhāntin therefore holds the view that pratyakṣa as a means of cognition is none other than the jñāna sakti of the ātman working with the evolutes of māyā as its accessories of knowledge. He cannot any-how agree with the Viśiṣṭādvaitins that the ātman can have pratyakṣa in its mukti nilai (liberated state); for, according to the Saiva Siddhāntin, pratyakṣa, anumāna and āgama are the three forms of pāsa jñānam which have their domain in the petta nilai (state of bondage) of the ātman. In the mukti nilai, however, they remain unmanifest.

(vi) Classification of Perception.

The Saiva Siddhāntin classifies Perception into the following four classes - Indriya Pratyakṣa, Mānasa Pratyakṣa, Svavedanā Pratyakṣa and Yogi Pratyakṣa. Of these, the nature of indriya pratyakṣa is considered first. According to the Siddhāntin, the ātman's essential nature lies in the cognition of itself. When it tries to perceive objects of the empirical world, the cit-śakti which has the relation of tādātmya (identity) with the ātman, and which is of the form of knowledge of objects, is disturbed at a point and exerts through that point an intelligent control over (1) The Jñānendriyās (senses), (2) The Bhūtās (gross elements) such as fire, etc., which in association with the senses are useful to them as manifestors of objects, and (3) the Taumātras

(rudimentary elements) such as rūpa, rasa, etc., which have the relation of avinābhāva (universal concomitance) with the bhūtas being their material causes. It then makes use of these three namely, the jñānendriyas, the bhūtas and the tanmātras as accessaries of knowledge, and has direct apprehension of the five objects of perception, viz., sabda, sparsa, rūpa, rasa and gandha. If such an apprehension is free from doubt and error and is not associated with the factors name, generic nature etc., we have what is called indriya pratyakṣa. In this type of pratyakṣa we merely apprehend the being of the objects of perception, sabda etc. in a nirvikalpa (indeterminate) way. Herein the guṇas (qualities) manifested by the various senses are perceived without any comparison or correlation among them. We merely apprehend them in an unrelated manner. We do not see them as related to an object any more than as related to each other. The Buddha which distinguishes the one from the other does not function; and hence memory is not called to the aid.

Sivajñāna Yogi seems to think that there are four sources of error in this form of pratyakṣa; first, there are the errors due to defective senses such as colour blindness and seeing double; secondly, there are those due to the bhūtas such as want of proper illumination, etc.; thirdly, errors may be due to the intermingling of the tanmātras; fourthly, we have the errors due to the intermingling of the guṇas perceived, for these are usually mixed up and form a complex whole and may not always present themselves as distincts. The presence of one or more of these sources of error either prevents the generation of indriya pratyakṣa, or give us doubtful or erroneous cognition. That is why the Siddhāntin defines indriya pratyakṣa as the jñāna sakti of the ātman which has a doubt-free, and errorless but direct
apprehension in a nirvikalpa way of the five objects of perception - sabda, sparsa, rupa, rasa and gandha. According to the Siddhāntin, the contact of the jñānendriyās (senses) with the objects of perception is essential for indriya pratyakṣa. In the case of perception by the eye, light rays of the eye are said to travel and contact the object which is illuminated by the sun's rays. In the case of the other indriyas, however, the objects of perception have to contact them which do not move away from their respective organs in which they reside.

'After the ātman has had its cognition of objects by means of indriya pratyakṣa, the manas takes up what is given by the senses, and the citta reflects on it so as not to lose grasp of anything presented to the ātman thereby giving a more or less permanent tone of assurance to the knowledge obtained through indriya pratyakṣa. Then the Buddhī is set in motion, undergoes a psychosis, and the object of perception is reflected therein. As a consequence of this, there is a determinate perception of the object with its name, generic nature etc.; this perception if free from doubt and error, is in the savikalpa way; and the means of cognition used is called mānasa pratyakṣa. The name mānasa pratyakṣa is apt to confuse. It is given to this form of pratyakṣa merely because the perception starts with the function of manas. But Sivāgra Yogi thinks that when the mānasa pratyakṣa functions it is the manas that reflects on what is brought by the senses and has determinate cognition of the objects of perception. Sivajñāna Yogi brings arguments to prove that men like Sivāgra Yogi do not know the nature of the tattvas.

2. S.S.A. pp 149.
Consequent to mānasa pratyakṣa the puruṣa which is the ātman in conjunction with the five evolutes of asuddha māyā — kala vidyā, rāga, kāla, and niyati — has cognitions of pleasure, pain etc. which are of the forms of the preponderance of sattva — attribute etc., brought to bear on the puruṣa by the evolutes of asuddha māyā. The jñāna sakti of the ātman which is the means of cognition in the above case is called svavedanā pratyakṣa. To effect a cognition by means of this form of pratyakṣa, the kalā tattva which is an evolute of asuddha māyā (impure primordial matter) manifests the kriyā sakti of the ātman, while the vidyā tattva which is born of kalā illumines the jñāna sakti; and the rāga tattva which arises from vidyā clears the icchā sakti of its mala. When these three tattvās function, the atman is ready to become a bhoikta (experient). Then two other tattvas — kāla and niyati — having their sources in asuddha māyā begin to play their parts. The one determines the karma to each ātman and the other specifies to each ātman its own karma. Afterwards the buddhi which has mānasa pratyakṣa undergoes a psychosis of the form of pleasure or pain, gets associated with the above five tattvās, whereupon the ātman has cognitions of the forms 'this is pleasing', 'this is sorrowful', 'this is deluding.' At the same time it has feelings of the forms 'I am pleased, 'I am sorrow striken', and 'I am deluded'. These are examples of svavedanā pratyakṣa.

Unlike the above forms of pratyakṣa, which all can have, Yogi pratyakṣa, is given to a jñāni (seer) who is a master of aṣṭāṅga yoga by which the jñāni destroys the grip of mala sakti that prevents the manifestation of cognitions by the ātman. In this form of

1. S.S.S. pp 11.
2. Ibid. pp 11.
pratyakṣa the Yogi though belonging to a particular space-time, is able to perceive things or events of this world and the other worlds as well as those of the past, present and future. Hence yogi pratyakṣa may be defined as the jñāna śakti of the ātman which has a doubt-free, error-less but direct apprehension of the objects of perception of the same space-time as the perceiver is or of other space-times. The existence of other space-times is admitted by Sivajñāna Yogi when he speaks of suddha kāla etc., as being evolutes of suddha māyā (pure primordial matter).

The author of Pauṣkara Āgama, however, classifies pratyakṣa into nirvikalpa pratyakṣa and savikalpa pratyakṣa. He defines nirvikalpa pratyakṣa as one that gives us merely the form of the object. Savikalpa pratyakṣa yields knowledge of an object as associated with its name, generic nature, etc. Aruṇandi Sivācārīyar and Sivajñāna Yogi are evidently opposed to this kind of classification; for there is apt to be a confusion between the two; savikalpa as a species of perception and savikalpa as a mere form of jñānam. Further the definition given of nirvikalpa jñānam in the Pauṣkara Āgama smacks of alien influence, specially that of the Naiyāyikās, and does not in any way represent the view of the true Siddhāntin to whom nirvikalpa jñānam is the cognition of the mere being of the object.

Again, the Pauṣkara Āgama gives a second kind of classification of pratyakṣa. According to the Āgama pratyakṣa may be classified into indriya-sāpeksa-pratyakṣa, antahkarana-sāpeksa-pratyakṣa

1. P.B. pp 529 'vastusvarūpāmadārasya grahanannirvikalpakam.'
2. Ibid pp 529 'Nāmajātyādisambandha sahitam savikalpakam.'
3. Ibid. pps 531 and 532.
and Indriya-antahkaraṇa-nirapekṣa-pratyakṣa. Of these indriya-sāpekṣa-pratyakṣa is given to be the cit-śakti of the ātman that makes use of Indriyās for valid apprehensions of objects; the antahkaraṇa-sāpekṣa-pratyakṣa is the cit-śakti of the ātman that reflects on the cognitions brought forth by the bāhya indriyās (external organs of sense). The commentator of the Pauśkara Āgama and Sivāgra Yogi divide this form of pratyakṣa into Yogi-pratyakṣa (perception of the seer), and Sukhādi-pratyakṣa (perception of pleasure, etc.) Indriya-antahkaraṇa-nirapekṣa-pratyakṣa, however, is given to be the direct experience by the ātman of Sivānanda with the help of Siva-Śakti which is by nature mala-free. This form of pratyakṣa is dependent neither on the indriyas nor on the antahkaranas.

Sivāgra Yogi seems to think that the indriya sāpekṣa pratyakṣa mentioned in the Pauśkara Āgama is the same thing as the indriya pratyakṣa given in Sivajñāna Siddhiyār. He defines indriya-sāpekṣa-pratyakṣa as the knowledge obtained through the antahkaraṇas (internal organs) and the jñānendriyās (external organs), when the ānava or root-evil that clouds the ātman is thinned off a little by the kāla tattva. On the other hand, he speaks of indriya pratyakṣa as the cit-śakti of the ātman which in conjunction with the prāṇa and the manas has cognitions of objects such as rūpa, etc., as qualified by their names, generic nature etc., through bāhya indriyās (external organs) such cognition in each case being free from doubt, error and memory. As is evident from the definitions given, both indriya-sāpekṣa-pratyakṣa and indriya-pratyakṣa mean the same thing, and give us perceptions of objects in the savikalpa way. The

S.B.S. pp 111.
commentator of the Pauṣkara Āgama too seems to agree with Sivāgra Yogi in viewing the indriya-sāpekṣa pratyakṣa as savikalpa. If the interpretations of these two scholars are deemed to be correct the classification of pratyakṣa in the Pauṣkara Āgama into indriya-sāpekṣa-pratyakṣa, etc., would be either incomplete having no place for nirvikalpa pratyakṣa or would make nirvikalpa pratyakṣa to function only in the direct experiential knowledge of Sivānanda. Neither the one nor the other of these alternatives is accepted by the Siddhāntin who says that nirvikalpa pratyakṣa belongs to the empirical world only. Further, the mention of the term indriya-antahkarana-nirapekṣa-pratyakṣa implying cognition of Siva is foreign to the Siddhānta Epistemology. For Sivajñāna Yogi clearly points out that pratyakṣa of whatever kind, anumāna and āgama are really vyañj-akās for the ātman in its petta nilai and not in its mukti nilai; But the author of the Pauṣkara Āgama has made pratyakṣa to reign supreme in the ātman’s mukti nilai. Here too the Pauṣkara Āgama is preaching an alien doctrine.

The Pauṣkara Āgama further gives us to understand that the sense-object contact involved in the indriya-sāpekṣa-pratyakṣa is of six kinds: it is

Either 1. Samyoga (conjunction),

or 2. Samyukta-samavāya (inheritence in the conjoined),

or 3. Samyukta-samaveta-samavāya (inheritence in what is inherent in the conjoined),

or 4. Samaveta (inheritence),

or 5. Samaveta-samavāya (inheritence in what is inherent),

or 6. Viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyātā (relation of qualifying and qualified).
Illustrations are also given for each type of contact. Samyoga is said to be the kind of contact had in the perception of a pot by the eye. Herein light rays of the eye are believed to come into direct conjunction with the pot. But in the visual perception of a guṇa (quality) of the pot, such as its colour, it is said there is samyukta-samavāya, for the reason given is the fact that colour is inherent in the pot which is conjoined to the eye. On the other hand, in the perception of the generic nature of a quality, such as that of colour, samyukta-samaveta-samavāya is given to be the name of the contact made; for the generic nature of colour is said to be inherent in the colour that is itself inherent in the pot that is conjoined to the eye. The contact of samaveta, which is another name for samavaya, is said to occur in the auditory perception of sound as there is a relation of inherence between sound, a quality and srotra, the ear which is the object having that quality. But when the generic nature of sound is perceived by the ear, we are said to have an instance of samaveta-samavāya; for the generic nature of sound, it is urged, inheres in sound which is inherent in the srotra. The contact viśeṣaṇa-visesyatā is illustrated in the āgama as one that is got in the perception of the absence of a pot in a place; here the eye is said to be conjoined to the place characterised by the absence of the pot.

'Sivajñāna Yogi raises a protest against this kind of classification of sense-object contact. He feels that the doctrines taught herein are opposed to the principles of Saiva Siddhānta, and that they merely betray the leaning of the author of the Pauṣkara Āgama towards the Nyāya school of Philosophy. Surely the statement that there is a relation of samavāya (inherence) holding between srotra, an evolute of ahaṅkāra (I-principle),

1 S.B. pp 319.
and sound, a quality of ākhāsa (ether) can never be made by a Saiva Siddhāntin. According to Saiva Siddhānta, the guṇa and its guṇi are non-different from each other. So are jāti (generic nature) and vyakti (individuality). But in the Pauṣkara Agama, a guṇa is held to be different from its guṇi; and a jāti is considered as something other than vyakti. That is why the Pauṣkara Agama speaks of the contact made in the visual perception of the colour of the pot as samyukta-samavāya, and in that of the generic nature of the colour of the pot as samyukta-samaveta-samavāya. Sivajñāna Yogi points out further that the relation of Samavāya connotes the same thing as tādātmya (identity). For he says there is no pramāṇa for the sense of inherence in which the word Samavāya is used by the Naiyāyikas and others such as the author of the Pauṣkara Agama. According to him the relation holding between a guṇa and its guṇi and that between a jāti and its vyakti is one of tādātmya. It is regretted that Marajñāna Desikar and Sivāgra Yogi – two well-known commentators of Sivajñāna Siddhiyār – have blindly accepted this kind of classification of sense-object contact of the Pauṣkara Agama, thereby exposing themselves to the charge of sowing Naiyāyika doctrines.

Should the term 'pratyakṣa' be translated as observation or perception? If pratyakṣa be classified into either (1) nirvikalpa perception and savikalpa perception, or (2) perception dependent on external senses, perception dependent on the internal senses, and perception derived through association with

Siva, there is all the more reason for rendering pratyakṣa as perception, and not as observation. Therefore the attempt to translate pratyakṣa as observation is to be condemned as self-contradictory and inconsistent, unless the two terms—observation and perception—mean the same thing.

(vii) Abhāva

What is abhāva? How is it cognized? These are two questions that have elicited different answers from various philosophers. The Bhāṭṭās and the Advaitins think that abhāva is the non-existence of an object in a specific locus and that it requires an independent means of cognition called anupalabdhi (non-cognition) for its cognition. The Naiyāyikas and the Prabhakaras hold the same view as regards the meaning of abhāva; but they feel that abhāva can be cognized by perception. On the contrary the Siddhāntin holds that abhāva and bhāva are two states of an object. According to him, ‘bhāva’ means manifestedness to the senses, and ‘abhāva’ unmanifestedness.

It is an accepted fact by the Siddhāntin that all objects of this world assume from time to time the form of an indistinguishable mass of the three attributes—sattva, rajas and tamas. The bhāva or manifestedness of an object is had when there is a preponderance of the rajas attribute over the other two, whereas the abhāva or unmanifestedness of the object is due to the preponderance in it of the tamas attribute. When an object is in the state of bhāva, it is in the form of an effect.

2. Ibid Page 187—‘ulakattup porulellām mukkunam mayam ākaliṅ.’
which is sthūla (gross) and hence perceptible. If it casts off its sthūla state and enters into the sūkṣma (subtle) state of a kāraṇa (cause) in the form of a sakti (potency) which is imperceptible, we have the state of abhāva or unmanifestedness of the object. The cause of this transformation from the sthūla to the sūkṣma state is the preponderance of the tamas attribute. If it again abandons its state of existence of a kāraṇa in the form of a sakti and transforms itself on account of the preponderance of the rajas attribute, into the vyakti (particular) of an effect which is gross, there is the state of bhāva or manifestedness of the object. Hence in the view of the Siddhāntin a pot made out of earth when broken is said to exist in the earth in its state of abhāva or unmanifestedness.

When a person possessed of keen eye-sight sits in a well-lighted room, looks all round and cries out 'there are no pots in the room', we have to find out what means of cognition he uses in forming such a judgment. The Siddhāntin who believes in the adjectival theory of judgments says that it is a case of perception. 'For according to him the negative judgment 'there are no pots in the room' has the same import as the judgment 'Pots that are in a manifest state as in conjunction with a particular place are herein in an unmanifest state qualifying the room'. In other words the judgment implies that the room is characterised by pots in their states of abhāva or unmanifestedness. Since an object and its qualities can be reckoned to be perceptible, there

1. S.B. pp 187 'Kuṭamuṭaintatenpatarkkup porul ...'
2. Ibid pp 187 Īṇṭuk kuṭamillaiyenpatarkup porul āṇṭuc caiyökak kilamaiyār kāṭcippullanātalaiyutaiya kuṭam īṇṭu vičēṭanavičēṭiyamātař kilamaiyār pulanākāmaiyaiyutaittenpatām.
is no difficulty in considering that the room and its character of being qualified by pots in their states of abhāva are perceptible.

If a person seeing a hare makes a judgment 'the hare has no horns', there is some difficulty in taking it as a case of perceptual judgment. The hare is perceptible but not the horns. The Siddhāntin solves the problem for us. His adjectival theory runs to his rescue. For him the judgment 'the hare has no horns' does not carry a different import from the judgment 'horns that are in a manifest state holding the relation of samavāya (inherence) with a cow are herein in an unmanifest state qualifying the hare. To put it briefly it means that the hare is characterised by horns in their state of abhāva. Even as the hare is perceptible its quality of being characterised by horns in their state of abhāva is also perceptible. The Naiyāyikas too hold the adjectival theory of predication. What the Siddhāntin cannot agree in with them is their conception of abhāva. Abhāva is for the Siddhāntin unmanifestedness. It is not non-existence as the Naiyāyikas think. A non-existent thing is a contradiction. So long as it is a thing it exists and should exist for ever though in a subtle state. Further, abhāva cannot be the cause of the imperceptibility of a thing. It is the object that is in the state of abhāva that is the cause of its imperceptibility.

The Prabhākarās and the Sāmkhyās hold that it is the perception of the bare room that gives us the cognition that there are no pots in the room. For them the absence of pots in a room is identical with the bare room. The Siddhāntin objects to this conception of

1. S.B. pp 187 'muyārkoṭīllaiyenpatarakkupp porul ...'
2. S.W.K. pp 157 and 158.
identity. If the absence of pots in a room is identical with the bare room we should perceive the absence of pots in a room even when there are pots in it. Further, since there may be simultaneous absence of many things in the bare room, we should perceive all of them every time we perceive the bare room. This is never the case. So the theory of the Prabhākarās and the Sāmkhyās cannot be deemed to be correct.

The Bhāṭṭās and the Advaitins believe that every object has double aspects, namely, existence and non-existence. When a pot has existence in a room, it can be cognized by means of perception or by some other means of knowledge to be existing there. When no such means yield any such knowledge of the object though it is capable of being known under these conditions, the object is judged by the very absence of knowledge to be non-existent in that place. This form of knowledge is an independent means of cognition and is called anupalabdhi or non-cognition. The Siddhāntin takes exception to the meanings of the terms 'abhāva' and 'anupalabdhi' as given by the Bhāṭṭās and the Advaitins. Abhāva is not non-existence but unmanifestedness; and anupalabdhi can never be called a form of knowledge if it signifies absence of knowledge. It is really the knowledge of an object in its unmanifest state as qualifying a place. Such a knowledge is perceptual. Hence anupalabdhi or abhāva cannot be considered as an independent means of cognition.

The Naiyāyikas classify abhāva into the four varieties, viz., prāg-abhāva, prādhvamsā-bhāva, atyanta-bhāva and anyonyā-‘bhāva. The Siddhāntin too

1. S.W.K. pps 162 and 163.
accepts this classification but with the reservation that abhāva means the state of an object by virtue of which it is unmanifest to the senses. According to Saiva Siddhānta prāg-abhāva is prior non-manifestedness. The pot before it is produced is said to be in a state of prāg-abhāva or prior non-manifestedness. Production consists in converting an object from its sūkṣma (subtle) state of non-manifestedness to its sthūla (gross) state of manifestedness. The reserve process is called destruction. The prāg-abhāva of an object is beginningless; but it is destroyed at the production of the object. Hence an object such as a pot can be said to be produced if its prag-abhāva is destroyed. The jñānābhāva of the ātman is of this kind. Yet it cannot be destroyed as the cause of destruction is lacking. Pradhvamsābhāva is posterior non-manifestedness. A particular pot on its destruction gets into the state of pradhvamsābhāva. This state of abhāva when destroyed results in the re-emergence of the pot. The world of he, she and it on its destruction exists in its state of pradhvamsābhāva in its cause māya supported by Siva-śakti. In creation its pradhvamsābhāva gets destroyed and it re-emerges in its original form. If a sacrificial rite prescribed to be performed at a particular time is not done at that time, the non-observance of the rite is said to exist as pāpah (de-merit or sin) in a sūkṣma (subtle) form in its state of pradhvamsābhāva, which could be destroyed. So pradhvamsābhāva according to the Siddhāntin, has both a beginning and an end. Atyantābhāva is absolute non-manifestedness. All evolutes of māya such as kāla, niyati, avyakta, which remain eternally unmanifest to the senses are said to be in the state of atyantābhāva in their respective causes or loci. The atyantābhāva of a thing has neither a beginning nor

an end. Anyonyā-'bhāva is mutual non-manifestedness. It is the cause of all bheda or difference that we see in this world. A pot exists in a state of anyonyā-bhāva in a cloth and the cloth too may be said to exist in this state in the pot. Anyonyā-'bhāva has both a beginning and an end. For it begins with the production of its locus and ends with its destruction. The Siddhāntin does not speak of anyonyā-'bhāva with respect to the eternals pati, pasu and pāsam; for these eternals are according to him imperceptible.

CHAPTER 7.

Theory of inference

(i) Reasoning in general

The subject of reasoning has engaged the attention of most of the philosophers of the West and the East, and there is generally a conflict of views among them. Yet there is some consensus of opinion in two respects. In the first place all are agreed that reasoning is not a direct process as perception. In perception things are presented to us bodily, whereas in reasoning or inference they are not so; a perceptual judgment is not dependent for its truth on any other judgment, either perceptual or inferential; but an inferential judgment is based on other judgments either perceptual or inferential. In perception truth dawns upon us and is directly perceived without the help of other judgments. Whereas in inference, truth is perceived indirectly. For it is dependent on the assertion of other judgments. No doubt, perception is as much mental as inference; yet there is a difference in obtaining truths from either. An illustration will make the position clear. When I
see a particular object for the first time and assert 'this is a pot', I am said to perceive and my mental process is called perception; but when I come across it for a second time, and if I then assert 'this is the same as that', the mental process is called recognition. Here the relation asserted is the one subsisting between the perceptual element characterised by the term 'this' with the ideational element referred to by the term 'that'. But when I further bring in another fact to corroborate my assertion by the statement 'because it possesses such and such a mark', the process involved is no longer called recognition but is known as inference. Thus it is seen that the truth of an inferential judgment is dependent on the truth of others. It would appear from the instance cited that inference is a process of transition of thought from one judgment to another. A careful analysis would show that it is not so. Even the conclusion 'this is the same as that' can be shown to be dependent for its truth on the two judgments, viz., 'whatever possesses such and such a mark is that' and 'this possesses such and such a mark'. The first is implicit and the second is given in an explicit form. These two judgments together form the premisses of inference, the former being called the major premiss and the latter the minor premiss. There are different views as to how the truth of the major premiss is got at; but all philosophers are agreed that the minor premiss is a matter of perception. Thus we see that the perceptual judgment is not dependent on other judgments for its assertion, and that the inferential judgment involves the assertion of at least two other judgments. Hence it is seen that inference is not direct but mediate and is something more than perception.

The second point on which all philosophers agree is the fact that in the process of reasoning, we pass from
truths given to us to further truths. The truths given to us are expressed in two or more judgments, which are the premisses of inference. The truth obtained is necessarily revealed to us in the form of one judgment, which is the conclusion of inference. The premisses and the conclusion constitute respectively the ground and product of inference. It is not necessary that the truth of the conclusion should be entirely unknown to us. In fact we may be familiar with it long before we reasoned in one particular way or other. What the inferential judgment reveals to us is the fact that the truths of the premisses imply the truth of the conclusion. There is an inner unity running through both the premisses and the conclusion, so much so, if we grant the validity of the premisses, the validity of the conclusion automatically follows. The premisses by themselves assert relations of the form, 'If A then B, if B then C, if C then D'. Here the relations between A and B, B and C, and C and D, are given; and the relation between A and D is the further truth obtained. This truth is new in the sense that it is not given in the one or the other of the premisses asserted. It is revealed only when all the premisses are considered together. So the element of novelty in the truth of the conclusion consists rather in its source and not in its intrinsic character as truth. An inference which has not these characteristics of mediacy and novelty cannot be worthy of the name of inference and will not be treated as such in the sequel. It is proposed to apply these two crucial tests of inferences to some of the so-called inferences usually treated in text books of Western logic before the next topic is taken up.

The ordinary text-books on Western logic mostly divide inference into immediate and mediate inferences; there is a further classification of mediate inference into
deductive or syllogistic and inductive inferences. But according to the Indian systems, inference is only of the syllogistic form of a peculiar type. The Indian Syllogism is, unlike the Aristotelian one, of a combined deductive-inductive form. It would appear that anumāna or inference in the Indian system has no reference at all to 'immediate inferences'. Objections have been raised on this point and the term 'anumāna' has been translated into English as 'mediate inference' thereby implying that the Indian systems are defective in their doctrine of inference as they have no place for 'immediate inferences'. The objections will hold good if only there exist any inferences which can go by the name of 'immediate inferences'. The Indian schools do not at all countenance the actual existences of such inferences. Even Bradley supports them when he says, 'doubt extends not only to their nature and principles of their procedure, but even attaches itself to their actual existence'. The so-called immediate inferences are derived from certain categorical statements by conversion, obversion, contraposition, inversion etc. In converting an assertorical judgment of the form 'all A is B', we are said to infer the judgment 'some B is A'. If we take the denotative view of judgments, the judgment 'all A is B' reduces to either 'all A is all B' or 'all A is some B'. If we convert these, we shall be having the judgments 'all B is all A', and 'some B is all A'. The inferred judgments do not at all give any new relations except a grammatical re-arrangement of subject and predicate. Suppose we take the predicative view of judgments. Then the judgment 'all A is B' will be interpreted as 'all the A's have a quality B'; if we convert this, we shall be getting the judgment 'some things which have a quality B are all the A's'. Here too there is no new relation obtained. In the
conversion of particular affirmative and universal negative judgments we fare no better. Thus the so-called inference by conversion, no matter whether the view taken of judgments is denotative or predicative, fails to stand the test of the essential characteristic of inference and hence cannot be regarded as inference.

Again the obverse of a given judgment 'A is B' is said to be 'A is not non-B'; here the inferred judgment can be proved to be not merely dependent on the given judgment but is as well based on the principle of contradiction which is implicitly assumed. If the judgments are read in extension, the judgment 'A is B means 'B is there including A'; and the principle of contradiction says 'where B is, there non-B is not'. Hence we have the inferred judgment 'non-B cannot be there including A'; that is 'A is not included under non-B,' or is not non-B. Here the process of thought from the judgment 'A is B to the judgment 'A is not non-B' is not got direct, but mediated by a knowledge of the principle of contradiction. Again if the judgments are read in intension, the judgment 'A is B' means that 'the attribute B is in A'; the principle of contradiction gives us the fact 'where the attribute B is, there the attribute non-B cannot be.' Hence we conclude that the attribute non-B cannot be in A; that is A is not non-B; here too the conclusion is not derived solely from the given premiss; it depends also on another premiss which is implied. Thus the so-called immediate inference by obversion is never obtained from a single premiss alone, and hence is not direct or immediate. It is based on another premiss as well, which is implicitly assumed. If conversion and obversion cannot give us immediate inferences, there is all the more no reason for us to
expect to get at immediate inferences by contraposition and inversion. There are a few others which commonly go by the name of 'immediate inferences' such as immediate inference by change of relation, that by added determinants that by complex enumeration, that by converse relation, etc. All these will be found to be no inferences at all, or at least not immediate inferences. Thus the existence of immediate inference cannot be vouchsafed. So it is not proper to charge the Indian systems of a deficiency. In truth inference is mediate; the expression 'mediate inference' is a tautology. Therefore 'anumāna' should be rendered into English as inference, and not as mediate inference.

(ii) The Indian Syllogistic form of reasoning

The Indian syllogism is, unlike the Aristotelian one, a combined deductive-inductive form of reasoning. It has all the merits of the Aristotelian syllogism and the four methods of induction deplete of their short-comings. A short sketch of the Aristotelian syllogism together with its defects and the faults of the four canons of induction are given first as a preliminary to the better understanding of the Indian syllogistic form of reasoning.

The Aristotelian syllogism is a form of reasoning constituted of three categorical prepositions, one of which is the conclusion and the remaining two are the premisses on which the conclusion is drawn. Each of these prepositions is a statement of relations between two of the three terms, viz., the major, the minor, and middle terms. The subject and predicate of the conclusion are respectively called the minor and the major terms; and the term which occurs in both the premisses but not in the conclusion is termed as the middle term; the premiss which contains the major term is known as
the major premiss and the other which has the minor term the minor premiss. In the stock-example given in text books of logic,

'All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
Therefore Socrates is mortal'

the terms 'Socrates' and 'mortal' being the subject and the predicate of the conclusion 'Socrates is mortal' are called the minor and the major terms respectively. The term 'man' which occurs in both the premisses is known as the middle term; the proposition 'All men are mortal', as it contains the major term 'mortal', goes by the name of 'major premiss'; the proposition 'Socrates is a man', having the minor term 'Socrates' becomes the minor premiss.

Now the utility of the Aristotelian syllogism in giving us true judgments has been questioned; for it is concerned with mere formal validity and not with truth. Given the truths of the premisses, the conclusion is deemed to be true; even this claim of formal logic has been disputed; for in the syllogism,

'All men are rational.
Jack is a man.
Therefore Jack is rational'

the two premisses 'All men are rational' and 'Jack is a man' can be held to be true to facts; but yet the conclusion 'Jack is rational' is liable to be refuted as untrue if Jack is found to be mental deranged. Again in the stock-example given previously, the major premiss contains an indeterminate term 'mortal', which must mean 'liable to die', 'doomed to die' and 'dead'. Any attempt to fix the connotation of the term to a single meaning exposes the invalidity of the argument.
In the minor premiss the word 'man' plainly stands for 'dead man'; for it is a fact that Socrates is a dead man. Then the conclusion proves that the dead man Socrates is mortal in the sense of dead; in other words we have the conclusion that a dead man is dead. Surely this cannot be treated as inference.

Even if we assume that a true conclusion can be obtained by the assertion of two premisses, formal logic fares no better. For if the validity of any one premiss is doubted, another syllogism has to be constructed, based on the assertion of two other premisses, to assert the truth of the premiss in question. Again if any one questions the truth of the premisses of the latter syllogism, a further pair of syllogisms, each based on the assertion of two other premisses are to be formed to guarantee their truths. Thus for every doubt raised, a syllogism based on two premisses is required to clear the doubt. Then there will be no end of assertions of premisses and constructions of syllogisms; there is involved the fault of infinite regress which is difficult to avoid. Aristotle himself seems to have discerned this fault, when he proposed to remedy this defect by assuming that the truths of the premisses doubted can be made to depend upon certain ultimate principles which are self-evident. The remedy proposed favours the intuitional theory of truth, which is not generally accepted by the majority of thinkers. It is on account of such short-comings as given above that formal logic has been condemned by F. C. S. Schiller as containing a system of fictions, which are false, needless and harmful.

Again the four inductive methods advocated by J. S. Mill are doubted as to their soundness and efficacy in giving us universal truths from particular facts.
The Canons of Mill have been shown by Bradley to be invalid and as presupposing universal truths; even if valid, they are proved to be not inductive at all in the sense of generalizing from particulars. Thus the purely deductive form of reasoning of the traditional syllogism together with the reasoning based on the inductive canons are failures as processes of reasoning giving us truths.

But the Indian Syllogism, on the other hand can be charged neither as a system of fictions nor as one presupposing some universal truths to infer other universal truths from particular facts. At every step of the processes of reasoning involved in the Indian Syllogism, there is a reference to reality in the way of an appeal to facts. The Indian syllogism is not concerned with mere empty forms. No doubt it has a form but not one that can dispense with matter. The reasoning involved is both formal and material. Its merits lie in its combined character comprising both the deductive and inductive processes. A clear understanding of the Indian syllogistic form of reasoning can be had by a proper study of the constituents of the Indian syllogism.

The Indian syllogistic form of reasoning contains statements of relations involving the three terms, viz., pakṣa, sādhyā and hetu, corresponding respectively to the minor, major and middle terms of the Aristotelian syllogism. The pakṣa is the locus of the object, whose presence in it is first suspected and then asserted. It is that about which we desire to establish something by way of predicking of it some attribute believed to belong to it, but not definitely known to be such. When
a person, who perceives a hill with smoke in it, infers that 'the hill is fiery,' basing his inference on the two judgments 'the hill is smoky' and 'whatever is smoky is fiery,' the hill is said to be the pakṣa. For the perception of smoke in the hill first begets a doubt in him of the form that the hill may or may not be fiery. Then the recollection of the truth of the judgment 'whatever is smoky is fiery' dispels his doubt and makes him positively certain that the hill is fiery. The hill being the locus of the object fire whose presence in it is proved after doubting is the pakṣa. The Indian syllogism is intrinsically different from that of the Aristotelian. It is difficult to find exact parallels in the two systems. Yet the pakṣa may be taken to correspond to the minor term of the Aristotelian syllogism.

Related to the pakṣa are the sapakṣa (homologue) and the vipakṣa (heterologue). 'The sapakṣa in any inference is the locus wherein the object whose relationship with the pakṣa is to be established is definitely known to be present; and the vipakṣa is that wherein that object is inherently incapable of being present. In the process of reasoning,

'the hill is fiery
for it is smoky

and whatever is smoky is fiery as is the kitchen', the 'kitchen is' the sapakṣa. For the inferable character of fieriness which is asserted of the pakṣa, the hill, only after suspicion of its presence in the hill, is assuredly and undoubtedly

1. s.s.s. pp 12-Atarketuttukkaṭṭappatuvatāȳ tuṇīyappāṭṭa poruṭrakkumītim sapakka-menappatūm'.

2. Ibid pp 12 'apporulillātaviṭam vipakkāmenappatūm'.
known to belong to the kitchen. Again, in the argument,

'the hill is fiery
for it is smoky

and whatever is non-fiery is non-smoky, as is the lake', the 'lake' is the vipakṣa, for the character of fieriness which is asserted of the pakṣa is intrinsically incapable of being predicated of the lake. The sapakṣa in so far as it is definitely known to possess the character inferable of the pakṣa is a homologue to it; and the vipakṣa as long as it is characterised by the absence of the inferable character is a heterologue to it.

The Śādhyā, which may be taken to correspond to the major term of the Aristotelian syllogism, is the object whose presence in the pakṣa is to be established by the process of inference. It is not apprehended directly, and has to be proved to belong to the pakṣa, not by direct observation but indirectly. If an inference is made that a hill is fiery as it is smoky, the śādhyā is the fire; for it is this that is sought to be proved to belong to the pakṣa, the hill. All schools of Indian philosophy do not think alike on the subject of the śādhyā. The Advaitins agree with the Siddhāntin in holding the view that in the form of reasoning given above, 'fire' is the śādhyā. But the Mīmāṃsakas and the Buddhists say that what is inferred is 'the hill as related to the fire.' The Naiyāyikas, however, are of opinion that the śādhyā may be according to occasion one or the other of the following three, viz. — 'the hill as related to fire', 'the fire as related to the hill' or 'smoke as related to fire'. The Mīmāṃsakās and the Buddhists see in the śādhyā nothing but the pakṣa
in a new relation. But the Advaitins and the Siddhāntins hold that the sādhya is an attribute which is to be predicated of the pakṣa. So long as anumāna or inference is held to be an indirect process, the sādhya cannot be one that is perceptible. The pakṣa is perceptible, and so the sādhya cannot be the pakṣa even with the new relation. Therefore the view that what is inferred is ‘the hill as related to the fire’ cannot be maintained. This view gives undue emphasis to the aspect of the pakṣa. If the sādhya be taken to be an attribute, which is to be predicated of the pakṣa, there does not appear any flaw. Thus the Siddhāntin, as supported by the Advaitins, can be said to have the right conception of the term ‘sādhya’. The Naiyāyika view is more or less teleological and not metaphysical and does not deserve a criticism in this thesis.

The hetu is the link between the pakṣa and the sādhya. It corresponds to the middle term of an Aristotelian syllogism and has relations both with the pakṣa and the sādhya. If the Indian syllogism be thrown into the form of the Aristotelian one, the pakṣa will be the minor term the sādhya the major term and the hetu the middle term. It is difficult to convert the Indian syllogism into the Aristotelian one without shaking the very foundations on which the Indian syllogism is built. Yet for purposes of terminology, the term pakṣa will be translated as minor term, the sādhya as major term, and hetu as a middle term. Now the Hetu or middle term has a relation of universal concomitance with the sādhya or major term and also abides in the pakṣa or minor term. It is this character of the hetu or middle term, which makes it possible to connect the sādhya or major term with the pakṣa or minor term,
According to Sivāgra Yogi, as with the Naiyāyikas, the hetu or middle term has the five characteristics, viz.-paksadharmatā, sapaksasatva, vipaksasatva, abādhitaviśayatvā, and asatpratipaksatva. Of these a hetu is said to possess the characteristic of paksadharmatā, if it abides in the pakṣa or minor term. In the reasoning,

"The hill is fiery;
for it is smoky

and whatever is smoky is fiery, as is the kitchen' the hetu smoke has this characteristic as it abides in the pakṣa, the hill. A hetu has the characteristic of sapaksasatva if it abides in the sapaksas or homologues, wherein the sādhya or major term too exists. In the above form of reasoning the hetu smoke has this characteristic as well; for it abides in the sapakṣa the kitchen, wherein the sādhya fire too is found to be present. A hetu possesses the characteristic of vipaksasatvā, if it does not abide in the vipakṣas or heterologues, wherein the sādhya or major term is absent. In the argument,

"The hill is fiery;
For it is smoky

and whatever is non-fiery is non-smoky as is the lake'.

The hetu smoke has this characteristic as it does not abide in the vipakṣa the lake, where the major term fire is invariably absent. Abādhitaviśayatvā is said to be a characteristic of the hetu or middle term if the presence of the hetu in the pakṣa is not incompatible. In the two examples given above, the hetu has this characteristic also; for there is no incompatibility for the hetu, the smoke to abide in the pakṣa the hill. Asatpratipakṣatva belongs to the hetu or middle term, which is characterised by an absence of counteracting
reason. The hetu, smoke in so far as it is used to prove the presence of fire in a hill has this characteristic of asatpratipakṣatva as there is nothing to counteract it. If a śādhyā is to be predicated of a pakṣa both by means of positive and negative examples as in the two instances given above, it is very essential that the hetu should possess all these five characteristics; if anyone or more of these characteristics are lacking to the hetu, the argument would be fallacious. But in the case of an exclusively affirmative inference, the hetu cannot have the characteristic of vipakṣasatva, though it should possess the remaining four characteristics; and in the case of an exclusively negative inference, the characteristic of sapakṣasatva does not belong to the hetu, which should have the other four characteristics.

Every reasoning requires a form; and the Indian syllogism is the form of reasoning adopted by the Indian thinkers; it consists of the five members, viz., pratijñā, hetu, udāśaraṇa, upanaya and nigamana containing statements of relations principally of the three terms – pakṣa, sādhyā and hetu. The Siddhāntin’s views of the members of the syllogism are set forth as follows:

(1) The pratijñā or proposition is the first member of the syllogism. It is a tentative statement of relation either affirmative or negative between the pakṣa or minor term and the śādhyā or major term. It merely gives one’s position with respect to an inference which has yet to be made. The thought of the conclusion is entertained in it without giving any grounds to justify it. It has got to be asserted as true only by the other members of the syllogism; it does not by itself assert anything. It tells us at the most what the locus
of inference is and what we want to infer with respect to it.

(2) The hetu or reason is the second member of the syllogism. It gives us the reason for the assertion of the truth of the statement tentatively held as the pratijñā; for it asserts a relation either affirmative or negative between the middle term and the minor term, implying by this assertion, that the major term is related to the minor term either affirmatively or negatively. It also necessitates the mention of the third member of the syllogism, udāharāṇa, which contains the other ground of inference which is implicit in it though not expressed explicitly. If one who desires to infer that a hill is fiery advances as his reason the statement 'for it is smoky', we have an instance of a hetu in the statement 'for it is smoky'. If on the other hand, someone gives as his reason the statement 'the hill is non-fiery' to infer the fact that it is non-smoky, the former statement constitutes the hetu.

(3) The Udāharāṇa or example is the third member of the syllogism. It gives a universal relation of concomitance of either the presence of the hetu (middle term) with that of the sādhya (major term) or the absence of the sādhya (major term) with that of the hetu (middle term), supported in each case by an apposite instance. If the relation is one of agreement in presence between the hetu (middle term) and the sādhya (major term) the instance cited is a homologue; but if the sādhya (major term) and the hetu (middle term) agree in their absence, we have a case of a heterologue. While the hetu or reason states that the middle term abides in the pākṣa or the minor, with the implication that there is either an agreement in presence between the hetu or middle term and the
sādhya or major term, or an agreement in absence between the sādhya or major term and the hetu or middle term, the udāharaṇa explicitly brings out these implications with reference to apposite instances. If a conclusion is drawn that a hill is fiery on the ground that it is smoky, the latter statement constitutes the hetu or reason for the inference made. The reason is incomplete if not for one or the other of the implied universal judgments 'whatever is smoky is fiery' and 'whatever is non-fiery is non-smoky'. The first of these general statements is illustrated by the kitchen, where smoke is invariably found to be associated with fire, while the second by the lake, where there is absence of fire in association with absence of smoke. If these implied judgments are stated explicitly each with its own instance as when we say 'whatever is smoky is fiery as is the kitchen' or 'whatever is non-fiery is non-smoky as is the lake' we have cases of udāharaṇas or examples. If the hetu or reason corresponds to the minor premiss of an Aristotelian syllogism of the first figure, the udāharaṇa or example corresponds to the major premiss. The truths of these general statements that are comprised under the udāharaṇa or example are got at by inductive inference based on observed facts of positive and negative instances. It is this characteristic of the udāharaṇa that makes the Indian syllogism a combined deductive-inductive form of reasoning, giving an inference which is formally valid and materially true.

(4) The upanaya or application is the fourth member of the syllogism. It tells us that the pakṣa or minor term can be brought under the universal principle with its apposite instance as given in the udāharaṇa. In other words, it gives us to understand that the universal principle with its instance is applicable to the
case of the pakṣa or minor term in question. When the udāharana asserts that there is a universal relation of agreement in presence between the hetu or middle term and the sādhya or major term as is illustrated in a positive instance, the upanaya states that the hetu or middle term abides in the pakṣa or minor term, just in the same way as the hetu or middle term as pervaded by the sādhya or major term abides in a sapakṣa or homologue. Thus if the first three members of the syllogism are as follows:— Pratijñā the hill is fiery
Hetu for it is smoky
Udāharana whatever is smoky is fiery, as is the kitchen, the upanaya will be of the form 'so, like the kitchen the hill is smoky'. But if the udāharana gives a universal relation of agreement in absence between the sādhya or major term and the hetu or middle term with respect to a negative instance, the upanaya denies the absence of the hetu or the middle term in the pakṣa or minor term, unlike as in the vipakṣa or heterologue where the absence of the hetu or middle term is found to be invariably consequent to the absence of the sādhya or major term. In a syllogism where the first three members are as follows:—
Pratijñā the hill is fiery
Hetu for it is smoky
Udāharana whatever is non-fiery is non-smoky as is the lake, the upanaya turns out to be 'unlike the lake, the hill is not non-smoky'. It must be understood that the upanaya or application is not a mere repetition of the hetu or reason. There is a difference between the two; whereas the latter simply gives a relation affirmative or negative between the hetu or middle term and the pakṣa or minor term, the former strengthens the relation with reference to an apposite instance.
(5) The Nigamana or conclusion is the fifth member of the syllogism. It definitely asserts the relation between the pakṣa or minor term and the sādhyā or major term. It differs from the pratiṇā or proposition in that it has a conclusive assertion, whereas the latter has only a tentative one. Its states with reference to a positive instance that the sādhyā or major term, which is pervasive of the hetu or middle term (as is illustrated in a sapakṣa or homologue) is related to the pakṣa or minor term. But in the case of a negative instance it asserts that the sādhyā or major term which has a relation of agreement in absence with the hetu or middle term as is found in a vipakṣa or heterologue, can be predicated of the pakṣa or the minor term. It is the last member of the syllogism. It completes the process of inference which is begun in the pratiṇā. Its importance can be seen only with reference to the other members of the syllogism. So two examples of syllogisms, one with a positive instance and the other with a negative instance are given below.

(a) A syllogism with a positive instance.

Pratiṇā The hill is fiery
Hetu For it is smoky
Udāharaṇa Whatever is smoky is fiery as is the kitchen.
Upanaya So like the kitchen the hill is smoky
Nigamana Therefore like the kitchen the hill is fiery.

(b) A syllogism with a negative instance.

Pratiṇā The hill is fiery
Hetu For it is smoky
Udāharaṇa Whatever is non-fiery is non-smoky as is the lake
Upanaya So unlike the lake, the hill is not non-smoky.
Nīgamaṇa Therefore unlike the lake the hill is not non-fiery, i.e., the hill is fiery.

The different schools of Indian philosophy are not all agreed on the number of members of a syllogism. While the Naiyāyikas support the five-membered syllogism, the Bhāṭṭās and the Advaitins believe in a three-membered syllogism consisting of either the first three members or the last three. But the Buddhists reduce the syllogism to the two members, namely – the Udāharaṇa and the Upanaya. Arunandi Sivacāriyar, the author of Sivajñāna Siddhiyār seems to think that the five-membered syllogism is out of date and holds the view that the first three members are sufficient to construct a syllogism. Sivajñāna Yogi in interpreting him supports his statement when he says that the five-membered syllogism is adopted by the Tarkikās etc.

But Sivāgra Yogi and Maraijñāna Desikar, who are both commentators of Sivajñāna Siddhiyār, hold the view that the three-membered syllogism as well as the five-membered one are both acceptable to the Saivās. It is a pity that these commentators are too conservative in not rejecting the five-membered syllogism even after it has been found not to represent the true process of reasoning.

It is usually supposed that actual reasoning proceeds on from the thoughts of given premisses to the thought of the conclusion. But the fact is, as Johnson holds, the reverse in most cases. For we first entertain the thought contained in the conclusion and then proceed to find out grounds to justify it. The Siddhāntin, who believes in first giving the pratijñā or proposition and then bringing in sufficient grounds to assert the truth of the proposition in the form of the judgments given by the hetu or reason and the 1. S.S.A. pp 190 and 195.
udāharaṇa or example, is tacitly following the natural order of thought-processes. Further the thoughts of the upanaya and nigamana are included under the udāharaṇa in its full form. Hence it may be concluded that the Siddhāntin’s conception of the syllogism as a three-membered one and not as a five-membered one is in keeping with the common-sense point of view.

(iii) Definition of Anumāna or inference

Anumāna or inference is, according to Sivajñāna Yogi, the jñāna śakti of the ātman, which has a doubt-free but errorless cognition of an object hidden to view, not by direct observation, but by means of a knowledge of the hetu or probans, which has an avinabhāva sambandha (relation of universal concomitance) with the object. The Pauśkara Āgama speaks of anumāna or inference as avabhadakam or cognition of objects, which are parokṣa or remote in time or place to the cognizer, with the help of a knowledge of drṣṭa-vyāpti or universal and indubitable concomitance between the hetu or probans and the sādhya or probandum. The commentator gives us to understand that this statement is never meant to be a definition of anumāna or inference. It gives us merely its upakāraka laksana or auxiliary mark. Its mukhya laksana or essential characteristic consists in its being the cit-śakti, which in association with the psychosis of the buddhi has

1. s.s.s. pp 8 - ‘aṇṇīṇam nērēyāriyappātuvaṭanṛc cāttityup peṇar pālatay marainṭunīrṇa porulai atanai viṭṭunīkātu yanṭumuṭanāy nīkalum etuvaikkonṭu avvāruṇṇavatākiya aṇmāvinatū āṇacatti karutalalāvaiyenappatuṃ’

2. P.B. pp 537 ‘Anumānamdṛṭavyāptya parokṣarthavabhodakam’

3. Ibid pp 537.
cognition of objects. The commentator proceeds to examine the statement about anumāṇa given in the Pauṣkara Āgama before he himself gives a definition. The use of the term ‘parokṣa’ in the statement, he says, will bring in the fault of ativyāpti or over-pervasion as it will include sabda or verbal testimony as well within its scope. For sabda or verbal testimony too is a means of cognition used for cognizing objects, which are parokṣa or remote in time or place to the cognizer. The expression ‘dṛṭavyāpti’ however, it is asserted, precludes the application of the statement to sabda or verbal testimony. Further the use of the term ‘parokṣa’, he urges, sets aside the fault of ativyāpti or over-pervasion with respect to perception preceded by doubt, as perception is of objects which are here and now. Moreover if it is said that there is a fault of avyāpti or non-pervasion since the statement is not applicable in the case of inference by one desiring to infer something which is perceived directly, he denies that the fault of avyāpti has any scope over there as inference is only concerned with such objects as are not here and now. Further-on he says that the statement about inference in the Pauṣkara Āgama merely gives the sāmānyā lakṣaṇa or the generic character common both to bhrama (error) and pramā (truth). The specific nature of anumāṇa can be had only if the word ‘avabhedakām’ in the statement is qualified by the word ‘yathārthatvam’ meaning ‘state of being as they really are’. Thus the cognition of objects as they really are (the objects being parokṣa or remote in time or place to the cognizer) with the help of a knowledge of dṛṭa-vyāpti or relation of concomitance between the probans and the probandum constitutes the upakāraka or auxiliary but specific characteristic of anumāṇa. Yet according to the commentator of the Pauṣkara Āgama, the true definition of anumāṇa consists in its being the cit-śakti, which
gives a doubt-free but errorless inferential cognition of the form of pakṣa-dharmatājñānam, knowledge of the abidance of the hetu or middle term in the pakṣa or the minor term as associated with a vyāpti jñānam (knowledge of the universal and indubitable concomitance of the hetu or middle term with the sādhya or major term.) The inferential cognition is the doubt-free errorless knowledge of the abidance of the hetu or middle term as pervaded by the sādhya or major term in the pakṣa or minor term.

1 According to Sivāgra Yogi, anumāna or inference is a knowledge of a thing as it really is,—such knowledge being accidentally qualified as inferential cognition. He says that anumāna or inference may be defined as knowledge obtained by vyāpti jñānam (knowledge of universal concomitance between the hetu or middle term and the sādhya or major term) of an object, remote in time or place to the cognizer, in its true nature. Both the definitions of anumāna or inference, given by Sivāgra Yogi, are in terms of the upakāraka lakṣaṇa of anumāna. It is not that he is not familiar with the mukhya lakṣaṇa or essential nature of anumāna. 2 For in other places he refers to pratyakṣa, anumāna and sabda as the cit-śakti in association with certain groups of the evolutes of māyā or primordial matter,—each group being different for each pramāṇa. So he does not seem to materially differ with either Sivajñāna Yogi or the commentator of the Pauṣkara Āgama in his conception of anumāna.

All systems of Indian philosophy agree with the Saiva Siddhāntin that an inferential cognition is never got at by direct observation, but is the result of a

vyāptijñānam (knowledge of universal concomitance). Vatsyāyana, the Bhāṣyakāra of the Nyāya sūtras states that anumāna or inference is the consequential cognition of an object, the probandum by means of the cognition of a probans. Gāṅgesa, the father of the modern Nyāya school of philosophy, defines anumāna as the knowledge that the middle term, which is invariable concomitance with the major term abides in the minor term. Prasastapāda, the Bhāṣyakāra of the Vaiśeṣika sūtras regards anumāna or inference as that which arises from the perception of the linga or probans. The Śāṅkhyās state that the generic nature of anumāna or inference consists in its being knowledge of the presence of the middle term as pervaded by the major term abiding in the minor term. The Mīmāṃsakās say that inference is the cognition of a non-proximate object by the perception of one factor of a well-recognized relationship. The Jains hold the view that anumāna is valid knowledge of the sādhya or major term consequent on a perception of the hetu or middle term and the recollection of the relation of invariable concomitance between the hetu or middle term and the sādhya or major term. The Buddhists define anumāna as knowledge obtained through the hetu or probans possessing its three characteristics, viz., its abidance in the pakṣa or minor term, its presence in the sapaksās or homologues, and its absence in the vipaksās or heterologues.

Thus we see that all the Indian schools of philosophy are more or less agreed that an inferential cognition is dependent on two or more previous cognitions for its validity. But whereas the other systems regard inference as merely a means of giving inferential cognition, the Saiva Siddhāntin goes further and speaks of
inference as the cit-śakti, which in association with certain evolutes of māyā serves as a means of obtaining empirical knowledge of the inferential type. According to the Siddhāntin, inference is an accidental but inseparable character of the ātman; it is manifested, as are pratyakṣa and sabda, only in the petta nilai (state of bondage) of the ātman and remains unmanifest in its mukti nilai (state of release).

(iv) The grounds of inference

Vyāpti and paksadharmatā are, according to the Siddhāntin, the two grounds on which an inference can be made. Of them vyāpti is considered first as it is a much discussed subject in the different Indian systems of philosophy. It is held to be the foundation stone of all inferences. If not for the relation of vyāpti existing between terms, no inference can be made. The logical ground of all inferences revolves on the pivot of vyāpti. What is vyāpti? How is it known? The Siddhāntin’s answers to these questions are treated below.

When one object or event is indissolubly connected with another object or event in such a way that the presence of the former or the absence of the latter is always and invariably attended respectively by the presence of the latter or the absence of the former, the former object or event is said to have vyāpti or pervasion with the latter; the former is called the vyāpya (pervaded) in relation to the latter which is the vyāpaka (pervader). It is a fact that smoke has an indissoluble connection with fire; for whatever is smoky is fiery and whatever is non-fiery is non-smoky. Therefore smoke is said to possess vyāpti or pervasion with respect to fire. It is a vyāpya (pervaded) in relation to fire, which is its vyāpaka (pervader). Another term for the relation of vyāpti is avinābhāva-sambandha or the
relation of universal concomittance. There is vyāpti or avinābhāva between smoke and fire, but not between fire and smoke. For the statement 'whatever is smoky is fiery' is true; but the statement 'whatever is fiery is smoky' cannot be maintained to be true; for fire can exist without being attended by smoke. If of two objects which have the relation of vyāpti or avinābhāva sambandha, one is directly apprehended in a certain locus while the other is not, the latter is inferred to be present in the same locus by virtue of the relation of vyāpti or avinābhāva sambandha which the former has with respect to the latter. It is the relation of vyāpti holding between the hetu or middle term and the sādhya or major term, that enables us to infer that the sādhya or major term is related to the pākṣa or minor term. In the case of a hill that is smoky, if one wants to infer that it is fiery it is essential that he should have knowledge of the relation of vyāpti that holds between the hetu, smoke, and the sādhya, fire. Thus vyāpti is a logical ground of all inferences.

The Siddhāntin distinguishes between two kinds of vyāpti; one is the anvāvavyāpti or the relation of positive concomittance and the other is the vyatireki vyāpti or the relation of negative concomittance. An example for the anvāvavyāpti is illustrated by the statement 'whatever is smoky is fiery'. Herein the idea is that there is an indissoluble connection between smoke and fire, such that the presence of the former is always attended by the presence of the latter. There is agreement in presence between smoke and fire; that is, there should be no cases of the appearance of the former without the latter also accompanying it. Vyatireki vyāpti, on the other hand, is had when we say 'whatever is non-fiery is non-smoky'. Here too the connection
between smoke and fire is indissoluble in the sense that the absence of the latter is always and inevitably followed by the absence of the former. There is agreement in absence between fire and smoke; in other words there are no cases of the absence of fire not being followed by the absence of smoke.

1 Arunādhī Sivācāriyar seems to see three further different types of vyāpti, when he classifies the hetu or middle term into the three kinds, viz., svabhāva hetu, kāryahetu and anupalabdhi hetu. His basis of classification is the relation which the hetu or middle term holds with the sādhya or major term. A consideration of the natures of each of these kinds of hetu or middle term will reveal to us the characters of each of the types of vyāpti involved. To begin with, the words 'mā' etc. by virtue of their own natures, without depending on extraneous causes, are said to possess śakti (potencies) signifying things called tree etc. The śakti possessed by the word 'mā' meaning 'mango tree' in so far as it signifies a thing called tree is known as svabhāva hetu or sakasahetu (co-existent middle term); there is concomitance between the two co-existents, the hetu which is the mango tree and the sādhya which is the tree. Since the 'mā' is identical with the tree, the relation of co-existence in this case is one of tādātmya or identity; for tādātmya is given to be the relation holding between two things, which are essentially abheda or non-different from each other in spite of some difference. The 'mā' because it is a tree is identical with the tree though it has a difference with the tree in that it signifies a mango tree. Again kārya hetu is said to be had when an effect such as smoke is used to infer its cause such as fire. The vyāpti between the hetu smoke

1. S.S.S. pp 12.
and the sādhya fire is based on the principle that an effect and its cause are indissolubly connected together such that the presence of the former always indicates the presence of the latter. Further the fact that the absence of coolness of the atmosphere indicates the absence of dew is given as an instance of anupalabdhi hetu. It is an admitted fact that coolness of the atmosphere is the cause of the formation of dew. Therefore vyāpti in the instance given has its basis on the principle that the absence of a cause is always a mark of the absence of its effect. So according to Aruṇandi Sivācāriyar, vyāpti may be either anvaya (affirmative) or vyatireki (negative). The anvaya vyāpti may be one of co-existence between the hetu and the sādhya or one based on the principle that the presence of an effect indicates the presence of a cause. But the vyatireki vyāpti is dependent on the principle that an absence of a cause is always a mark of the absence of its effect.

1Sivajñāna Yogi with his characteristic grammatical skill interprets Aruṇandi Sivācāriyar in his own way. He speaks of anupalabdhi hetu as one that is used to infer both (1) the absence of an effect from the absence of its cause and (2) the absence of a cause from the absence of its effect. Further he gives us to understand that there is as well a kāraṇa hetu which makes it possible to infer an effect from its cause. As it is a well-known fact that a cause can be there without producing its effect, the inference of the absence of a cause from the absence of its effect and that of the presence of an effect from the presence of a cause cannot be treated as correct. They are only of a probative value. So Sivajñāna Yogi cannot be taken as serious in his interpretation. Perhaps what he means is the

fact that the effect pre-exists in the cause in a subtle state even before it is manifested in a gross form. Subramanya Desikar seems to be blindly adopting Sivajñāna Yogi's interpretation. Sivāgra Yogi and Jñāna Prakāśar cannot however be accused of wrong interpretations. But Niramba Ajākiyar and Maraijñāna Desikar do not seem to be above blame. It must be understood that the Siddhāntin is a sat-kārya vādin, who believes in the pre-existence of effects in their respective causes. Sivajñāna Yogi cannot be held to be wrong in his interpretation in the light of his vāda (tenet); for it is quite possible to infer the absence of a cause from the absence of its effect, provided the effect is denied to exist even in a sūkṣma or subtle state. Again it is also possible to infer the presence of an effect at least in a subtle form from the presence of its cause. Thus Sivajñāna Yogi and others do not seem to be wrong provided they are interpreted with reference to their doctrine of satkāryavāda.

If smoke is considered as a true effect of the cause fire, the vyāpti involved in the following statements must hold good on the basis of satkāryavāda.

(1) Whatever is smoky is fiery,
(2) Whatever is fiery is smoky,
(3) Whatever is non-smoky is non-fiery,
(4) Whatever is non-fiery is non-smoky.

But Sivajñāna Yogi shows a partiality for the principles underlying the first and the fourth statements only when he speaks of anvayavyāpti and vyatireki vyāpti. Evidently these are the two statements holding true of the gross objects, smoke and fire. The principles contained in the second and third statements can apply to gross objects provided that fire is one that is produced from wet fuel. The exclusive uses of the first and fourth statements only on the part of Sivajñāna Yogi
indicates that he is referring to gross objects only and not to subtle ones as well. If he refers to gross objects only his interpretation of anupalabdhi hetu cannot be maintained to be correct. If objects in their subtle states are also included, then the statements illustrating vyatireki vyāpti must be revised adding proper determinants to the one or the other of the two terms, hetu and sādhya, making the one as the true cause of the other so that the denial of either might lead us inevitably to the denial of the other. But Sivajñāna Yogi has not done this either. For in illustration of anupalabdhi hetu he gives us examples drawn from common experience, where the hetu and the sādhya given are not such that one is a true cause of the other. According to him feeling of coldness is an effect of the presence of dew, so that the absence of the feeling of coldness leads us to infer the absence of dew. But he does not want us to infer the absence of fire from the absence of smoke. It is difficult to reconcile the contradiction involved in these statements. It is believed that there are omissions of certain relevant statements, which if present would not only acquit him of his contradictions but also raise him to the status of a true exponent of the Saiva Siddhānta principles.

Now the problem of the means of knowing vyāpti forces itself to the front. How do we pass from observed facts of concomitance of smoke and fire in the kitchen etc., to the universal relation of concomitance between smoke and fire generally? A few particular cases of concomitance only are all that is observed. But the general statement contains much more information than are contained in the observed facts. There is a leap from the knowledge of particulars to that of the unknown universal comprising elements both of
the past, present and future as well as the near and the remote. What is the guarantee that the leap is not into the dark? Above all what is it by means of which the universal relation of vyāpti is ascertained? Is it known by perception or by inference, or by verbal testimony? The Cārvākās would have us believe that it does not fall within the scope of perception, be it external or internal. They say that external perception is possible only if there be sense-object contact and that in the case of universals, which comprise elements of the past, future and the remote, there cannot be such contacts. Internal perception too, they say, cannot apprehend the universals as the mind which is the organ concerned in this type of perception cannot act independently of the senses. Further another inference as well cannot give us a knowledge of vyāpti. If it does, that will be dependent on a third, which would require a fourth and so on; the process of dependence of one inference on another will have no end, leading up to an infinite regress, which cannot be avoided. Again vyāpti cannot be known even by verbal testimony. For it may be urged as with the Vaiśeṣikās that verbal testimony is not an independent means of cognition but is included under inference; and vyāpti which can be established by inference can never be obtained from verbal testimony which is a species of inference; or else the reason may be advanced that the knowledge of the vyāpti being dependent on the recognition of a mark or sign in the form of the language used involves inference which leads us nowhere. Thus according to the Cārvākās, vyāpti cannot be known by any means of cognition.

1 As against the Cārvākās, the Siddhāntin contends that vyāpti can be known by inductive inference based

1. S.S.S. pp 12 - 'avināpāvamārītarkan aiyamāruttarpurūtuc capakkamvi-pakkamiraṅtum veṅṭappatumena par ... ...'
on observation of positive and negative inferences. If perception alone can be relied as a valid means of cognition the position of the Cārvākās in rejecting the doctrines of the other schools will be ridiculous; for it is not by perception but by inference that the Cārvākās can know that the alien schools are wrong; and this inference will be found to involve some kind of vyāpti, which they have to admit. The Siddhāntin presses the view that the Cārvākās have to admit validity to inference merely because purposive activity on the part of an adherent of the Cārvākas doctrines will have to cease as he cannot be sure that he will live for the succeeding moment to enjoy the fruits of his exertion. It is by inference that the Cārvākās, too, know that they will survive for the succeeding movements. If once they admit inference to be valid, they will have to accept the fact that vyāpti can be known.

The Naiyāyikas say that vyāpti can be known by means of sāmānya laksāna pratyakṣa. In kitchens etc. where particular smokes are found in concomitance with particular fires, the jāti or class smoke is also perceived with the jāti or class, fire as co-existent. In some cases where particular fires are seen without smoke, the jāti fire is not found in concomitance with the jāti smoke. Thus perception by way of jāti or class gives us the vyāpti between smoke and fire; and it is perception that denies vyāpti between fire and smoke. Sivajñāna Yogi does not deny that there is concomitance between the jāti smoke and the jāti fire, which are both apprehended as related to particulars. The jāti or class is, according to the Siddhāntin, non-different from the vyāpti or particular. They have the relation of tādātmya

1. S.B. pp 60.
2. Ibid. pp 173.
or identity between them. But yet there is a passage from the knowledge of the relations of the two jātis to the predication of the concomitance of fire with respect to each and every case of smoke. The jāti is abstract whereas each and every case of smoke is concrete. If as the Naiyāyikas say that the predication of the relation of concomitance of fire with respect to each case of smoke is got at by perception, Sivajñāna Yogi argues that mankind will be omniscient. For if it is perception that gives us the vyāpti involved in the statement 'all smoky objects are fiery', one should perceive all smokes – past, present and future, near as well as remote. This view makes man omniscient and is not acceptable to the Siddhāntin, nay even to the Naiyāyikās. So the Naiyāyikas cannot maintain their position that it is the sāmānya laksāna pratyakṣa that gives us vyāpti. Further the view of the Naiyāyikas that the passage from particular observed facts to universals is made through the perception of jāti is repugnant to the common sense point of view as well.

When I see a particular case of smoke, the truth of the vyāpti in the statement 'all smoky objects are fiery' simply dawns upon me with lightning speed. I perceive the jāti smoke only after deliberation, which takes time. Surely such a thing which takes time as is the perception of the jāti smoke cannot be said to intervene between two occurrences between which there is not an appreciable interval of time.

'The Advaitins hold the view that vyāpti is apprehended by perception of concomitance between the sādhana or probans and the sādhya or probandum when there is no cognition of inconsistency. It does not matter whether the concomitance is observed in a

1. V. P. pp 55 – 'Vyāptisca aśeṣasādhanāsrayāśrita sādhyasāmānādhi karanyarupee.'
single perception or in a number of perceptions. What is important is only the perception of the concomitance. The idea underlying the Advaitins view is that it is useless to call for repeated observances as evidence for determining vyāpti merely because a genuine exception may throw overboard a generalization obtained after making a host of repeated observations. In fact a single observation may give us a true vyāpti-jñānam. The Advaitins do not believe in vyatireki vyāpti or negative concomitance as a ground for an inferential cognition.

The Siddhāntin feels that the knowledge of vyāpti as advocated by the Advaitin cannot be held to be certain; for the vyāpti is based only on positive concomitance between the sādhana or probans and the sādhya or probandum so long as it is not contradicted by experience. Since negative concomitance is not sought for, the joint method of agreement in presence and absence, which has been found to be very useful in scientific inquiries cannot be applied. The Advaitins seem to rely on induction by simple enumeration in their search for vyāpti. This method is fraught with dangers and has its own limitations; and the Advaitin's knowledge of vyāpti too is conditioned by it.

The Buddhists classify the hetu or middle term on the basis of the vyāpti, which it has with the sādhya or major term into the three kinds, viz., svabhāva hetu, kārya hetu and anupalabdhi hetu. Of them svabhāva hetu is said to be based on the principle of tādātmya or identity between the hetu and the sādhya. It means that the hetu or middle term contains in itself the sādhya or major term because the major term is an inherent property (svabhāva) of the minor or because

the middle term is the essence (svabhāva) of the major. The kārya hetu and the anupalabdhi hetu are given to be grounded on the principles of causation. The former gives us concomitance of the effect with its cause and not vice versa. The latter states the fact that there is agreement in absence between the cause and its effect. The Buddhists maintain that the vyāpti based on the principle of identity is ascertained by direct observation by a person who notes the fact that an absurdity attaches itself to a contrary opinion. There is a relation of identity between a simsapa tree and a tree. But we cannot imagine a simsapa tree losing its arborescence without losing its own self. Again the vyāpti which has its basis on the principle of causation involves a knowledge of the relation of cause and effect. This knowledge is said to be ascertained by the test of pañcakāraṇi or the five indications, viz. (1) that an effect is not perceived prior to its production that (2) when the cause is cognized (3) the effect appears in immediate succession and that (4) the effect is not cognized when (5) the cause is not apprehended. The Buddhists find fault with the Naiyāyikas saying that vyāpti as between an effect and its cause cannot be determined by observation of affirmative and negative concomitances. For they say it is not possible to eliminate doubt with regard to instances past and future, and present but unperceived. When pointed out that uncertainty in regard to such instances is equally inevitable in their own system as well, they reply that in as much as they are guided by practical efficiency, there cannot be any doubt for them with regard to these instances if they do not implicate them in practical absurdity. Hence they say that vyāpti determined by the test of pañcakāraṇi as conforming to practical efficiency is above doubt,
The Buddhists' classification of the hetu or middle term into svabhāva hetu, kārya hetu and anupalabdhi hetu is apparently the same as that of Aruṇandi Sivācāriyar; but yet the agreement is only in terminology: for there is a difference in the basis of classification. While the Buddhists have as their basis the principles of identity and causation, the Siddhāntin recognizes only one principle namely, the principle of tādātmya or identity. It is not that the Siddhāntin has nothing to do with causation in his classification of hetu. According to the Siddhāntin the causal relation is a species of tādātmya or identity. The Saiva Siddhāntin asserts that the relation of tādātmya or identity holds between (1) an avayava and its avayava (whole and its part), (2) a guṇi and its guṇa (substance and its material quality) (3) a jāti and its vyakti (class and its member) and (4) a saktimān and its sakti (an object and its potency). The Siddhāntin is a satkārya vādin, who believes in the pre-existence of an effect in its cause. But with the Buddhists who are asatkārya vādins, the cause and its effect are two consecutive states of a series, which gives the appearance of a persisting thing. The effect merely follows upon the cause but is not produced by it. It springs up as it were out of nothing, because a simultaneous existence of a cause and its effect is impossible. The Buddhists say that we can infer a cause from its effect but not vice versa. That is why they have not included the kāraṇa hetu in their classification. But the Siddhāntin's tenets allow him to infer both a cause from its effect as well as an effect from his cause. Yet Aruṇandi Sivācāriyar has omitted to include the kāraṇa hetu in his classification perhaps apparently presuming with the Buddhists that an effect cannot be inferred from a cause. It cannot be thought that Aruṇandi Sivācāriyar the direct disciple of Meykānta Dēvar, who is the father of the modern Saiva
Siddhānta would have gone against the basic principles on which the philosophy of Saiva Siddhānta is built. It is believed that he is using the word 'kārya' or effect in its popular sense of manifested state and not in its scientific sense. Sivajñāna Yogi seems to have discovered this discrepancy in Aruṇandī Sivācāriyar's classification of hetu and has added therein the kāraṇa hetu as well.

The Buddhist method of determining vyāpti between an effect and its cause resembles Mill's method of difference in its double application. The Buddhists themselves seem to admit the short-comings of their method when they resort to the aid of arthaśāriyākāritvam or practical efficiency to remove any further doubt that may occur. The Saiva Siddhāntin proposes to assert that his method of determining vyāpti by an examination of anvaya or positive cases of vyāpti supplemented by a knowledge of relevant vyatireki or negative cases removes doubt once and for all. The Buddhist thesis that practical efficiency clears doubt is futile and cannot be maintained. For often a wrong knowledge may accidentally lead us to truth.

The second ground of inference is the pakṣa-dharma. It gives us the knowledge that the hetu or middle term abides in the pakṣa or minor term. No inference can be made by a mere knowledge of vyāpti between the hetu or middle term and the sādhya or major term. This knowledge of vyāpti or universal concomitance considered in relation to the knowledge that the hetu or the middle term abides in the pakṣa or minor term makes it possible for us to draw a conclusion that the major term is related to the minor. The knowledge of the statement 'whatever is smoky is fiery' does

1. S.S.S. pp 192.
not by itself give any inference. A further knowledge that a hill is smoky is necessary to make the inference that the hill is fiery. Hence inference involves the two grounds, viz., vyāpti and pakṣa-dharmatā.

(v) Classification of inference.

(a) Svārtha and parārtha

Inference has been classified by the Siddhāntin into svārtha and parārtha, according as it is intended for use for one's own self or for another's. This classification is not logical but rather psychological and is based on the intent or purpose for which an inference serves. Sivajñāna Yogi defines svārthānumāna as the knowledge arising from the consideration by way of vyāpti or universal concomitance whether the sādhyā or major term, having one of the three hetus, namely—svabhāva, kārya and anupalabdhi— is related affirmatively or negatively to the pakṣa, the sapakṣas and the vipakṣas. When a person who has a knowledge of vyāpti between smoke and fire, by observation of either positive cases such as the kitchen etc., or negative ones such as the lake etc., sees or hears that there is smoke in a hill, he immediately infers for himself that the hill is fiery. His conclusion which is a judgment is based on either the two judgments 'whatever is smoky is fiery as is the kitchen' and 'the hill is smoky' or the two judgments 'whatever is non-fiery is non-smoky as is the lake' and 'the hill is smoky'. But to prove the fact that the hill is fiery to another person, these judgments should be expressed in words in the form of propositions. Then only one can communicate his thoughts to another. That is why the Siddhāntin holds the view that svārthānumāna always precedes parārthānumāna. The latter cannot appear without the former. For it is true that no one

can prove to another a certain fact which he has not proved for himself. So long as svārthaṇumāṇa has to do only with judgment, it will not be of much use to the advancement of knowledge. For if it be the only kind of inference that we can make use of, we shall be deprived of the opportunity of contacting the thoughts of the ancients, which are kept for us in the form of propositions. Poetry, Science and Philosophy would have been greatly handicapped. It is only parārthaṇumāṇa which is concerned with propositions that provides us with materials both of the present as well as of the past as premisses for making inferences. This fact has been well noted by the Siddhāntin who proceeds to divide parārthaṇumāṇa into anvaya or affirmative and vyatireki or negative inferences.

(b) Anvaya and Vyatireki

The classification of parārthaṇumāṇa into anvaya and vyatireki is logical and is based on the principle of vyāpti. An inference is said to be anvaya or affirmative if one of its grounds is the proposition stating the fact that there is a relation of universal agreement in presence between the hetu or middle term and the sādhya or major term. An anvayānumāṇa is illustrated as follows:

Pratijñā  The hill is fiery
Hetu     For it is smoky
Udāharāṇa Whatever is smoky is fiery
       as is the kitchen.

A vyatireki anumāṇa is one in which one of its grounds is a proposition giving a relation of universal agreement in absence between the sādya or major term and the hetu or middle term. An instance of it is as follows:

Pratijñā  The hill is fiery
Hetu For it is smoky
Udāharana Whatever is non-fiery is non-smoky, as is the lake. It will be seen from the above examples that the same conclusion 'the hill is fiery' can be arrived at both by an anvayānumāna and a vyatirekānumāna. Yet there are certain propositions which can be established only by an anvayānumāna and there are others which require the exclusive use of vyatirekānumāna only. Examples of these are as follows:—

1 (1) A case of an exclusively anvayānumāna.
Pratijña The world is subject to the processes of origin, subsistence and dissolution;
Hetu Because it has parts which are specifically demonstrable as he, she and it.
Udaharana Whatever has parts which are specifically demonstrable is subject to the processes of origin, subsistence and dissolution as is a pot.

2 (2) A case of an exclusively vyatirekānumāna.
Pratijña This body possesses an ātman or soul, which is different from such things as sūnya (void) etc;
Hetu Because it has cognition of objects.
Udaharana Whatever possesses no ātman or soul has no cognition of objects, as is a pot.

It is an undeniable fact that the conclusion of the first syllogism that 'the world is subject to the processes of origin, subsistence and dissolution' cannot be established by a vyatirekānumāna; for to prove it

2. Ibid pp 236.
by such a kind of anumāna, we are in need of a knowledge of vyāpti of the form 'whatever is not subject to the processes of origin, subsistence and dissolution has no parts that are specifically demonstrable' as supported by an apposite negative instance or heterologue. But we have no such instances in the empirical world. Hence it follows that the conclusion in question can be got at by an anvayānumāna only. Again the conclusion of the second syllogism, which runs as 'this body possesses an ātman or soul, which is different from such things as sūnya (void) etc., cannot be arrived at by an anvayānumāna; for such an inference requires a knowledge of vyāpti of the form whatever has cognition of objects possesses an ātman or soul, which is different from such things as sūnya (void) etc., as exemplified by apposite positive instances or homologues; but the lack of homologues and the presence of heterologues only in the empirical world force us to look to vyatirekānumāna alone for proving the conclusion. Thus it is seen that the conclusion of the second syllogism can be proved by a vyatirekānumāna only.

(vi) Other manifestors of Knowledge that can be included under anumāna.

The Saiva Siddhāntin recognizes, as is said in a previous chapter, three independent means of cognition, namely - pratyakṣa, anumāna and āgama. He claims to reduce the means of cognition called arthāpatti, upamāna, pārīṣeṣa, sambhava and svabhāva-linga into cases of anumāna. The soundness of his claim in each case is examined briefly as follows:-(1) Arthāpatti or presumption is had when a known fact such as the fatness of a man who does not eat by day cannot be

1. S.S.A. pps 112 and 113.
accounted for without assuming another such as the fact that he eats by night. The Bhāṭṭās and Advaitins think that the fact that the man eats by night is got at neither by perception nor by inference and so on. It is arthāpatti or presumption that gives us such a cognition. So according to them arthāpatti is an independent source of cognition. The Siddhāntin feels that the fact that the man eats by night can be arrived at by means of a Kevala Vyatireki anumāna as follows:—

Pratijñā The non-eater in day-times eats in night times.

Hetu Because he is fat.

Udāharaṇa If any non-eater in day times does not eat in night times, he cannot be fat, as is Devatta.

The Bhāṭṭās and the Advaitins have no answer to give except to question the efficiency of a kevala vyatireki anumāna, which they do not recognize.

(2) Upamāna or comparison is the means of cognition used to cognize a previously unknown object such as a gavaya (vos gaveus) through its similarity to a known object such as a cow. Suppose a man who has never seen a gavaya inquires from a forester for its characteristics. Being informed by him that it is like a cow, he goes to a forest and perceives an animal similar to a cow. He reflects upon the words of the forester and arrives at the judgment 'the animal in front of me is a gavaya'. This knowledge is said to be the result of comparison. The Siddhāntin urges that if comparison be the name of the method used to obtain the judgment in question, it is no other than a mere inference. The syllogism that gives us the judgment is as follows:—

Pratijñā That animal in front of me is a gavaya,
Hetu. For it is like a cow.
Udaharana. Whatever is not a gavaya is not like a cow, as is a goat.

Thus it is seen that comparison does not constitute an independent source of knowledge. Yet the Naiyāyikas, the Mīmāṃsakas and the Advaitins consider it a distinct means of cognition. Of these philosophers, the Advaitins urge that the method used in passing from the judgment 'the gavaya is like a cow' to the judgment 'the cow is like a gavaya' constitutes comparison. The Siddhāntin does not see any element of novelty which is essential for any pramāṇa in the passage from the one judgment to the other, except a grammatical rearrangement of subject and predicate.

(3) Pārīṣeṣa or inference by elimination is had when one event is asserted to have happened in a certain way on the ground that the number of ways that event may happen is definitely known and that all but the one way are known to have not functioned. It is clear that this source of knowledge is a case of inference. The Paurāṇikās are alone in giving an independent status to this source of knowledge.

(4) Sambhava or probability is the cognition of one thing from that of another in which it is included. In other words it is a cognition of a part from that of a whole. We have a case of probability, when we have the knowledge of the number hundred from the knowledge of the number thousand. As the number hundred, which is a part is invariably connected with its whole thousand, there is vyāpti (universal concomitance) between them. So sambhava is a case of inference and cannot be regarded as an independent source of knowledge. It is only the Paurāṇikās who speak of it as a distinct method of knowledge.

1. P.A. pps 37 and 38.
(5) Svabhāva-liṅga or natural inference is had when we argue that the simsupa is a tree on the ground that it has the characteristics of a simsupa. There is vyāpti in the form of 'whatever is not a tree has not the characteristics of a simsupa, as is a stone.' So svabhāva liṅga is a mere inference and cannot constitute, as the Paurāṇikas think, a separate source of knowledge.

Arunandi Sivācāriyar gives a three-fold division of anumāna (as is agreed by all commentators) to include all the above means of cognition. His divisions are dṛṣṭa — 'numāna, anumāna — 'numāna and āgamā — 'numāna. Of them dṛṣṭā — 'numana is had when you infer the presence of a flower from the perception of its smell.

Anumāna — 'numāna is an inference drawn as to the wisdom of a man on the basis of the judgments he makes. The process of reasoning used in the passage from what are stated in the srutis to what is not stated there — in is called āgamā — 'numāna.

CHAPTER 8

Theory of Verbal Testimony

(i) Kāraka śakti (productive potency)

In the case of a bracelet made out of gold a question naturally arises whether there is anything besides gold in the bracelet. Common sense tells us that there is nothing but gold in the bracelet. Taking due consideration of only the material substance involved, we see that the bracelet and gold are the same. But yet gold is no bracelet. There is a difference in the two.

1. S.S.A. pps 200, 206.
The bracelet is gold with a particular form. Even the piece of gold out of which the bracelet is made has also a particular form. The form of the bracelet is something other than that of the piece of gold. The bracelet and the piece of gold appear to differ only in their forms. Now what is the form of a piece of gold? Is the form extrinsic or intrinsic to the piece of gold? Metaphysicians are not all agreed on the answers to these two questions. The Saiva Siddhāntin's answers are delineated herein. On account of its importance the second question is taken up first.

Were the form extrinsic to the piece of gold, it would be possible to divest a body of its form. But no substance can be seen or imagined without a form. Hence the form must be intrinsic to the piece of gold. If it is so, it will not be possible to change the form of the piece of gold. But it is a fact that we can mould a piece of gold into any form we like. So it would appear that the form of a body is neither extrinsic nor intrinsic to the body. But the form belongs to a body. Therefore it cannot but be either extrinsic or intrinsic to the body. The fact is, it is intrinsic to the body. The contradiction involved in thinking that a piece of gold can have many forms can be got over by considering the fact that 'a piece of gold' herein stands for the material substance of the piece of gold and not for a particular piece of gold. A particular piece of gold has a particular form. So if the forms are different, the pieces of gold that have the different forms are also different.

Now the first question as to the nature of the form of a piece of gold is considered. The Saiva Siddhāntin does not believe in any immaterial imponderable quality apart from matter. To him the form is as much a
material substance as the body to which it is a form. The form of a body and the body are related by way of guṇa-guṇi-bhāva sambanda. There is the relation of tādātmya (identity) between the guṇās and their guṇi. The guṇās collectively viewed is the guṇi. Therefore the form is one of the constituents that constitute the being of the body.

According to Saiva Siddhānta all objects bound by space such as the earth, the mountain, fire, water etc., are pervasive each of its own effect. As the pervasion itself cannot be known by any other means, it is presumed that every-one of these objects has two characteristics; one is that each object exists as a kāraṇa (cause) which could pervade its kārya (effect); the other is that each object can exist in its own nature. There is a relation of tādātmya (identity) holding between an object and its characteristic that exists in the form of a kāraṇa (cause). This characteristic of the object is called its kāraka sakti (productive potency). But this thesis of the Siddhāntin runs counter to the view of the Naiyāyikas and others who deny the existence of such saktis. The sakti of fire is, the Siddhāntin says, compresent with fire and is non-different from it. Of course it cannot be perceived as a distinct thing in the same manner as we do in the case of fire. Yet by presumption it can be distinguished as a distinct; so it would be clear that each object has its own sakti or potency. The presence of a sakti in every object can be shown thus by presumption: if one person puts his finger into fire, we see that it gets burnt. But if another repeats certain mantras or incantations, while the finger is placed into fire, we see that it does not get burnt. Yet on both the occasions fire is of its own nature and does not become something else. So we

1. B.B. pps 225, 226.
are forced to presume that fire has a sakti or potency, which is obscured by the sakti or potency of mantras and which gets manifested in the absence of the recital of mantras. This sakti of fire which is the kàraṇa or cause of burning one's finger is something other than the fire of which it is a sakti.

It might be objected that the absence of obscuring mantras too may be a cause of burning the finger. Even if there be the presence of all the causes such as fire etc., there cannot be the burning of the fingers unless it be preceded by the absence of obscuring mantras. It might also be pointed out that the positing of the absence of obscuring mantras as one of the conditions that make up the cause of burning one's finger is better than positing different saktis to various objects and at the same time presuming the origin and destruction of such saktis. Evidently the positing of a negative factor such as the absence of obscuring mantras as a cause for a positive occurrent which is an effect cannot be of any metaphysical value. If it were of value, the presence of a positive effect must always and inevitably be preceded by a negative cause. In the case in question the presence of an obscuring mantra with that of a de-obscuring one produces the effect of burning. Thus the view that the absence of obscuring mantras is the cause of burning one's finger is not tenable.

If it is urged that the absence of the recital of an obscuring mantra that is not recited along with a de-obscuring one is the cause, it is answered that it cannot be so. For the effect can be as well produced in the absence of the recital of an obscuring mantra that is in association with a de-obscuring one. Again it might be urged that the absence of the recital of an obscuring mantra if only it is not attended by a de-obscuring one is the cause. Even this does not carry
us any further and lands us into the doctrine of the plurality of causes, which is repugnant even to the Naiyāyikas who bring in such arguments. Hence the Naiyāyikas cannot with consistency posit ābhāva or non-existence as the cause of a positive effect. They will be forced to posit a sakti as the cause.

Further it is a fact worth noting that the recital of an obscurating mantra does not, on the recital of a de-obscurating mantra, obscure the appearance of the effect. Then what is it that is responsible for the non-appearance of the effect due to the obscurating mantra? Since there is the recital of the obscurating mantra along with that of the de-obscurating one, it cannot be said that the latter mantra has prevented the former from taking effect. Nor it can be said that the latter has annihilated the former or that it did nothing. It is easily seen that on the advent of a de-obscurating mantra the effect due to the obscurating mantra is not formed. Otherwise there is the formation of the effect. Thus there is the relation of avinābhāva (concomitance) between the recital of the de-obscurating mantra and the non-appearance of the effect due to the obscurating mantra. In the example given it is the de-obscurating mantra that is responsible for the prevention of the taking effect of the obscurating mantra, which obscurates the heat of fire. Now it is a rule that a deficiency in an effect cannot appear without a corresponding deficiency in its cause. Now there is no deficiency in the cause — the obscurating mantra. Then there must be some cause apart from the obscurating mantra present in the mantra itself, which is with a deficiency. This is called its sakti (potency) and we come to know it by presumption. Thus sakti is posited of the obscurating mantra.
as its effect can be prevented from its formation by the de-obscuring mantra. In a similar manner sakti can be posited of the de-obscuring mantra as well. The character of a cause lies in its possession of a sakti or potency which is implicit in it and that of an effect consists in the explicit appearance of the sakti in the form of a vyakti (individual). The cause and effect are identical and are the implicit and explicit states of the same substance. The tenets of the Naiyāyikas that the cause is always anterior to its effect and that the effect is always posterior to its cause cannot be maintained.

(ii) Jñāpaka Śakti (informative potency).

1 According to Saiva Siddhānta, Nāda (sound essence) which has its origin in Suddha māyā (pure primordial cosmic principle) has an infinite number of jñāpaka saktis (informative potencies). The presence of these jñāpaka saktis is known by presumption through the help of words composed of varnās or sounds of letters.

2 There is a difference between dhvani (sound) which is a quality of ākāsa (ether) and varnās (sounds of letters). The former is a product of asuddha māyā (impure cosmic principle); but the latter are evolutes of suddhamāyā (pure cosmic principle). Ākāsa is the cause of dhvani (sound) which manifests varnās (sounds of letters). It is never the cause of varnās (sounds of letters) that are revealed by it. The relation between dhvani (sound) and varnās (sound of letters) as between light and form of a body is one of manifestor and manifested. Varnās (sounds of letters) are generated by the internal functions of the body, whereas dhvani (sound) by external functions. The Saiva Siddhāntin holds the view that Vāk or speech is no other than varnās which are of five different forms, viz., Sūkṣma, Pasyanti, Madhyama, Sūkṣma Vaikhari and Sthula Vaikhari.

2. Ibid pp 134, 135.
Of these Śūkṣma takes its rise from Bindu by the operations of Prāṇa (internal air) residing in Mūlādhāra. Pasyanti is the form of Vāk which gets more and more manifested by the Prāṇa (internal air) passing through the naval region. Madhyama is had when Prāṇa comes up to the heart. Śūkṣma Vaikhari is the form of Vāk when the Prāṇa reaches the throat. It is audible to one's self. But Sthūla Vaikhari is the Vāk which is revealed by the Prāṇa passing through the mouth. It is audible to both one's self and to others.

It may be questioned how Vāk in the form of varṇās, which are products of suddha māyā turn out to be the objects of direct apprehension by the ear. The reason is not far to see. 'For Vāk exists in a śūkṣma (subtle) state in the evolutes of suddha māyā as it is devoid of any upādhis (qualifications per accidens) over there; But in the evolutes of asuddha māyā it is associated with upādhis such as dhvani etc., and occurs in a sthūla (gross) state. It is on account of its upādhi of dhvani that it is audible to us.

It is contended by some metaphysicists that either letters, or words made up of letters, or sentences composed of a collection of words having mutual proximity, expectancy and competency signify objects. The reason given by them is that there are no pramāṇas to establish the fact that there are saktis apart from letters to signify objects. Let us see whether the contention is sound. When a word say 'man' is uttered, we hear the sounds of the letters M, A and N, but do not cognize the word 'man' as something different from its constituent letters. Similarly when somebody says 'man is rational', we see that this vākya or sentence is constituted of words which gain their significance by the
letters that compose them. Thus it is seen that neither a sentence nor a word has any signification but for the letters that are involved in them. But then it would appear that we shall have to say with the Naiyāyikās that the letters 'M', 'A' and 'N' give us the idea of man. If so the question is whether the letters express the meaning when taken together or individually. The first alternative is not feasible for there is no togetherness of the letters 'M', 'A' and 'N'. Each of these letters has a beginning and an end of its own. When 'M' is pronounced, there is neither 'A' nor 'N' present to consciousness. When we pronounce 'A', 'M' has ceased to be heard and 'N' has not begun. And when we come up to 'N' both 'M' and 'A' have disappeared. There is no point of time or place when all the three letters are heard together. Even the Naiyāyikās admit that sound, knowledge and activity have their existence only for three points of time. The letters, each of which appearing one after another at the disappearance of its previous one or ones cannot be sensed together. In fact they are not presented to consciousness together at any moment. So they cannot together signify an object. The second alternative that the letters individually express the meaning of the whole word will drive us into a ridiculous position. Suppose it is possible for each letter to signify an object. Then the letter 'M' must give us the idea of man. But it does not do so. Even if we assume that it does, the two letters 'A' and 'N' would be superfluous. So the theory that the letters of a word or sentence individually express the meaning of the word is to be abandoned. The right conclusion is that there are šaktis 'potencies' apart from letters to signify objects.

The Naiyāyikās say that the isolated letters of a word cannot individually signify an object. They can
do so only collectively. As each letter appears in consciousness at the disappearance of the previous one, the Naiyāyikas admit they cannot be perceived together as one whole. But it is a fact that each letter on its disappearance leaves its impression in the mind. When we come to the last letter of a word, the apprehension of this letter aided by the impressions of the previous letters, they urge, gives rise to the meaning of the word.

Sivajñāna Yogi is not satisfied with this theory of the Naiyāyikas. He raises serious objections against it. Many letters that have been pronounced on previous occasions would have left their impressions in the mind. The last letter of the word 'man' when pronounced is in association with the impression of all the letters pronounced earlier in one's life-time. Hence the sound of 'N' must present to consciousness all objects whose names end in 'N'. But it is not so. Hence it is but right to hold the view that the theory of the Naiyāyikas is not based on truth.

Again if it is held that the sound of the last letter aided by memory that is awakened by the impressions of the past letters presents the object, Sivajñāna Yogi argues that it cannot be so. For even memory lasts for three points of time. The Naiyāyikās themselves admit it. Therefore there cannot be a 'togetherness' of the letters, even of impressions of letters roused in memory. This explanation too fails. Further memory cannot have a material object as its object of cognition. For what is roused in memory by previous impressions in this case are sounds of letters and none else. Hence we arrive at the fact that neither a sentence, nor the words of the sentence, nor the letters contained therein, nor their impressions in the mind, nor memory itself can
signify objects. It is therefore clear, says Sivajñāna Yogi, that there are jñāpaka śaktis signifying objects and that these Śaktis are different from sentences, words and letters but are revealed by them. The jñāpaka śaktis—each sakti signifying one object—all belong to Nāda, which is an evolute of Buddha māyā.

Some philosophers might raise an objection that, if as the Siddhāntin says varnās reveal nāda which signifies all objects, then it would be possible for us to apprehend all objects together by the mere utterance of a single letter. The objection is met by Sivajñāna Yogi who says that though nāda is one there is in it an infinite number of śaktis, each of which signifies one object and one only and that each śakti is revealed by the sounds of letters pronounced in a specific order. In the case of fire it is impossible to prevent the function of the heat-manifesting śakti by the recital of the heat-obscurating mantra and the function of the heat-obscurating śakti by the recital of the heat-manifesting mantra. The heat-manifesting śakti requires the recital of the heat-manifesting mantra and the heat-obscurating śakti functions on the recital of the heat-obscurating mantra. In a similar manner the letters of a word or sentence pronounced in a definite order reveal a particular śakti of nāda signifying a specific object.

Now words of the type ‘ā’ and ‘āntu’, each of which has more than one meaning are to be explained in the light of the Siddhāntin’s theory. The word ‘ā’ means a cow, a species of trees etc., and the word ‘āntu’ has the meanings ‘there’ ‘year’, etc. In each of these words, the specific order of the letters is the same for the different meanings. So the pronunciation of each of these words would manifest more than one śakti.
This would make the theory of the Śiddhāntin a false presumption. Śivajñāna Yogi professes to give an explanation when he says that there are some who hold the view that the words ā, āntu etc., have different vyañjakas or manifestors for their various meanings. The dhvani which really manifests the sakti of the word ‘ā’ signifying a cow is different from what manifests the sakti of ‘ā’ that signifies a species of tree. Even as the manifestors are different the manifested also are different. The words that are invariably associated with their meanings should be different. That is, the word ‘ā’ meaning a cow is different from the word ‘ā’ which means a species of tree. The truth is, Śivajñāna Yogi explains that the letter ‘ā’ that gives us the meaning of cow is actually different from the letter ‘ā’ that is responsible for the meaning ‘a species of tree’. This difference is presumed to exist on account of the difference of saktis that signify each object. Yet the letter ‘ā’ is considered as one in spite of the various meanings that it can give from the class-theory point of view. According to this view letters or words are denotative of class.

The word ‘ā’ is a noun when it means a cow, is a particle when it symbolizes sorrow, is a verb when it expresses an order and is an attribute when it stands for a displacement. Owing to a similarity in letter it is called a single word with a plurality of meanings only in a figurative sense. In reality each word is different as it has a distinct signification. Further the word ‘ā’ meaning a cow when combined with the word kōtu ‘horn’ becomes ankōtu. The particle ‘in’ intervenes between ‘ā’ and ‘kōtu’. But no particle comes between the word ‘ā’ meaning a species of tree and the word kōtu meaning a branch. A soft consonant appears between the two words giving us the form
āṅkōṭu. Thus the difference in the word-combinations indicates that the word 'ā' meaning a cow is different from the word 'ā' signifying a species of tree. We are unable to establish the fact that the different words formed of the letter 'ā' are different from each other either by virtue of their forms, or on account of the order of letters, or by any thing else. So it is presumed that there are for each letter 'ā' a different cause in the form of a śakti present in nāda.

It may be argued that words are different as long as they have different significations. But this is no argument to prove that letters are different. Sivajñāna Yogi thinks that letters too are different. According to him words are different not merely because they signify different objects. If so, in the sentences 'kaṅkaiyīṅ maccam' (a fish in the Ganges) and 'kaṅkaiyīl iṭaiċcēri' (a village of herdsman by the Ganges), the word 'kaṅkai' in both the sentences will have to be considered as different and there will be no place for metonymy in Tamil Grammar. Therefore it is but proper to accept the fact that a difference in the letters constitutes a difference in the words formed from them.

An argument may be advanced that the word 'kaṅkai' when it stands for the bank of the river Ganges has such a meaning by virtue of its śakti and that there is no point in taking it as a case of metonymy which presumes that there is a relation holding between the primary meaning of a word and the meaning indicated. Sivajñāna Yogi ably refutes the argument in the following manner. In the sentence 'kaṅkaiyīl iṭaiċcēri' by the word 'kaṅkai' we are first made to think of the river Ganges before we find it to signify its bank. But by the word 'ā' signifying a species
of tree, we are not made to think of a cow as there is no inherent relation between the two meanings. Further the expression 'āviṇaippār' will be ambiguous. For the imperative verb pār (see) can be used with reference to 'ā' meaning 'cow' and 'ā' meaning 'a species of tree'. But the expression 'kaṅkaiyaippār' will not be ambiguous. For it is clear that the word 'kaṅkai' herein denotes the river and not its bank. Hence we have to conclude that the use of the word 'kaṅkai' when it signifies the bank of the river Ganges is a case of metonymy, where there is a relation existing between the primary and the indicative meanings. It does not signify a bank by virtue of its šakti in the manner of the word 'ā' giving different significations having no relation among themselves.

The view may be urged that the šakti that is manifested by varṇās is nāda. Then the doctrine what possesses the šakti is the saktimān nāda would not be proper. Sivajñāna Yogi shows the appropriateness of the doctrine when he says that the šaktis are dependent on the saktimān, which is no other than the šaktis collectively viewed. The saktimān nāda by virtue of the relation of tādātmya (identity) which it has with its šaktis is different from them.

It is true that an effect is always in the form of a vyakti (individual) of what was earlier in the form of a šakti (potency). Hence when the šakti of nāda becomes converted into an effect in the form of the vyakti of vaikhari, it cannot exist in the form of a šakti. Then the doctrines that the šakti is manifested by its effect as existing apart from the saktimān and that it signifies an object appear to be incorrect. Sivajñāna Yogi feels that the doctrines are not incorrect. For each of the šaktis gets only partially converted
into vyaktīs. They do not get wholly modified into vyaktīs, so that there is always the presence of the sakti though partially along with its vyakti. If the sakti were not considered to be present with its vyakti at least partially, the two ultimate principles - asuddha māyā and suddha māyā - would become non-eternal. But the Siddhāntin cannot conceive of these principles being non-eternal. Reasoning in a similar manner we get at the fact that the saktīs of Vāk do not get wholly modified into the form of vaikhari, but remain partially at least in isolation and signify objects. Thus the presence of jñāpaka saktīs belonging to nāda is finally established. According to Sivajñāna Yogi a jñāpaka sakti and sphaṭa mean the same thing.

(iii) Nature of Āgama Pramāṇa (verbal testimony)

Of the three manifestors of empirical knowledge, the Saiva Siddhāntin attaches great importance to verbal testimony. Its importance lies in its usefulness in manifesting objects that do not fall within the sphere of either pratyakṣa (perception) or anumāna (inference). Are there objects beyond the reach of pratyakṣa and anumāṇa? The Lokāyatās and the Buddhists deny that there are any such objects. But the Siddhāntin says that there are and cites the existences of a Para-loka (celestial world) and a Pātāla-loka (nether world) as examples. It is true that perception does not warrant us to believe in either. Nor does inference. Yet the Siddhāntin is positive in his belief about the existences of both the worlds. What is the pramāṇa by which he arrives at these truths? The pramāṇa must be an independent source of knowledge. It must be something other than pratyakṣa and anumāṇa. Such a one is āgama or verbal
testimony. According to Arunundi Sivacarriyar, Agama or verbal testimony is the atma cit-askti, which has on the assertion of a trust-worthy authority, a doubt-free but errorless cognition always preceded by nirvikalpa jñānam (indeterminate knowledge) of an object that is incapable of being cognized either by perception or by inference.

Since verbal testimony is dependent on the reliability of the statement of a trust-worthy authority, the Vaiśeṣikas, the Jains and the Buddhists reject it as a source of knowledge. They argue that the reliability of the statements can be ascertained only by inference; hence verbal testimony can be made to depend ultimately on inference. At its most it can be regarded as a species of inference. Anyhow it cannot be considered as an independent source of knowledge. The argument advanced to disprove the character of the independence of verbal testimony lacks imagination. Often it is the case that the information derived from perception is mistaken. Hence we resort to inference to validate our perceptual knowledge. We should not on this account bring in perception under inference. The object of perception is some new information; but the object of the inference is the establishment of the validity or invalidity of the information. So long as perception gives us an information that cannot be obtained by any other means, it is a distinct method of knowledge. Reasoning in a similar manner, we get the fact that verbal testimony which yields us information beyond the provinces of pratyakṣa and anumāna is an independent means of cognition. Inference may be used to validate or invalidate the information obtained. But this cannot militate against the recognition of verbal testimony as an independent pramāṇa.

1. S.S.A. pp 118.
According to Arunandi Sivacariyar, verbal testimony has nothing to do with objects within the purview of perception and inference. 'Sivajnahana Yogi too seems to accept this view in his commentary to Sivajnahana Siddhiyar when he says that it is artha vada (explanatory passage) that gives us, on the assertion of a trust-worthy authority, a valid knowledge of an object that falls within the spheres of perception and inference. 'But in his Sivajnahana Bhasya when he speaks of the realities of pati, pasu and pasam, he says that even though they can be established by Agama pramana it is thought beneficial to the dull to give the anumana pramana as well; herein he presumes that verbal testimony has scope over objects that can be established by inference. The apparent inconsistency between the two statements of Sivajnahana Yogi can be explained only by taking the meaning of the term agama used in his statement in Sivajnahana Bhasya in a loose sense. The expression 'agama pramana' should really refer to such sruti passages as give us new information that cannot be derived through perception and inference. In the statement in Sivajnahana Bhasya the expression should be construed to signify arthavada and not verbal testimony. Otherwise there is no way of reconciling the two statements of Sivajnahana Yogi. To the Saiva Siddhantin some of the passages in the srutis such as the Vedas, Agamas etc. carry new information not derivable either through perception or inference; as such they constitute the agama pramana. The rest of the passages are explanatory

1. S.S.A. pp 121 - Immannaattatankakitum porulaiyum apta vakkiyaankontariyatu arutta vatham

2. S.B. pp 248.
and the method used to cognize objects through them is called arthavāda.

The Siddhāntin has a lure for sruti as it contains passages illustrating the Āgama pramāna. Now and then he uses the words 'sruti' and 'āgama' as synonymous terms. To him sruti is supreme. It is superior in validity to the other pramānās as it embodies the spiritual experiences of seers and saints. If there appears any conflict among srutis the Siddhāntin feels that the oppositions are only apparent and not real. Reconciliation should be made determining which of the srutis is concerned with mukhyārtha (essential significations) and which with tatparyārtha (purportful signification) and interpreting the latter in terms of the former. As an illustration Sivajñāna Yogi gives the case of a passage in the Taitriya upanishad apparently opposing the doctrines of the Agamas. The Taitriya upanishad says that ākāsa (ether) is born of the ātman, vāyu (air) of ākāsa, agni (fire) of vāyu, āp (water) of agni and pṛthvi (earth) of āp. But the āgamas speak of the evolution of pṛthvi, āp, teyu (fire) vāyu and ākāsa from their corresponding tanmātrās (rudimentary organs of sense) namely ghanda, rasa, rūpa, sparsa and sabda. According to Sivajñāna Yogi, the Taitriya upanishad merely gives the tatparyārtha, which should be construed in terms of the doctrine of the Āgamas which contain the Mukhyārtha. The passage in the Taitriya upanishad which refers to the origin of ākāsa from the ātman or Brahman can be taken to mean that ākāsa is born of the tanmātra, sabda. The use of the word Brahman in the place of the term sabda is a case of metonomy as Brahman in the form of Sadasiva is presiding over

1. S.B. pps 191 & 192.
sabda. In metonomy the presiding deity may stand for the thing over which it presides. In the expression 'Vāyu is born of ākāsa', the word ākāsa is a case of metonomical use for the tanmātra sparsa. Similar explanations are given by Sivajñāna Yogi for the other expressions. The srutis cannot oppose each other. The seeker after truth must try to harmonize all the doctrines preached therein.

(iv) Classification of Agama pramāṇa

The Vedas and the Agamas revealed by Siva consists of three parts, namely:—karma kānda (ritual portion), upāsanā kānda (portion dealing with worship) and jñāna kānda (portion treating about cultivation of true knowledge.) The initial, middle and concluding passages of karma kānda appear to be full of contradictions. Besides there would seem to be present the fault of split of sentence. 1 To avoid these faults and to bring about a harmony of the different passages of Sruti referring to any particular kriyā (rite) one has to adopt the device of determining the import of one passage by sabda sāmārthya (expressive power of a word), a second by artha sāmārthya (indication of meaning) and the third by vastu śakti (potency of matter). The ātma cit-sakti, which after a right understanding of the harmony of the various Sruti passages of the karma kānda has cognition of the method of adopting itself to the ways of the karma kānda, is called tantra āgama pramāṇa.

The upāsanā kānda treats about the worship of deities. 2 Any person worshiping a particular deity should know the details connected with the worship,

1. S.S.A. pp 228.
2. Ibid pp 228.
namely, its nyāsa (mental assignment), ṛṣi (particular sacrifice), chandrās (sacred text), atidevatā (presiding deity), bija (mystical letter) and śakti (potency). It is not possible to worship a deity without controlling the antāḥkaraṇās (internal organs). Mantras (sacred letter) too are necessary for the worship. ¹So the mantra āgama pramāṇa is, according to Sivajñāna Yogi, the ātma cit-śakti which acting in accordance with the sruti passages of the upāsanā kānda in the way of controlling the antāḥkaraṇās etc., has right cognition of the method of worship of the deity. Sivajñāna Yogi thinks that mantra āgama pramāṇa consists in the bhāvanā (meditation) of identification of the worshipper with the worshipped. In this view upāsanā kānda is taken to be merely concerned with the methods of bridging the rift of dualism between the knower and the known.

The jñāna kānda gives the essential characteristics of pati (God), pasu (soul) and pāsam (fetters). True knowledge consists in distinguishing the essential characteristics of these entities from the accidental ones. The ātma cit-śakti which has such a knowledge is called upadesa āgama pramāṇa. ²Sivajñāna Yogi defines upadesa āgama pramāṇa as the ātma cit-śakti which has, by the study of jñāna kānda, cognition of the fact that God, who has neither a beginning nor an end, is a Being possessed of (1) eight qualities which are all non-different from Him and (2) the two entities pasu and pāsam which are different from Him. ³According to Sivāgra Yogi upadesa āgama pramāṇa is that which enlightens us as to the nature of (1) the beginningless and endless Siva-Svarūpa which is of the

1. S.S.A. pp 228.
2. Ibid pp 208.
3. Ibid pp 209.
form of jñānarūpa (2) the ātman that has a bodily covering subject to origin and dissolution and (3) the ānava mala etc., that are the causes for the embodiment of the ātman, with their mutual states of vyāpti (per-vadedness) and vyāpaka (pervasiveness). Sivāgra Yogi's definition is complete while that of Sivajñāna Yogi seems to be too narrow. As the knowledge that Siva is possessed of eight qualities that are non-different from Him and of the entities pasu and pāsam that are different from Him cannot be obtained without a proper understanding of the essential characters of pati, pasu and pāsam, it is believed that Sivajñāna Yogi's definition is not defective.

There are some who hold a different opinion on the classification of the āgama pramāṇa. According to them tantra āgama pramāṇa is the cognition after elimination of all contradictions of the āgama passages that refer to the pramāṇas and laksana of pati, pasu and pāsam. The cognition after the control of the antahkaranas of the āgama passages that refer to those accessories of the sādhanas of truth whereby God is worshipped is termed mantra āgama pramāṇa. Upadesa āgama pramāṇa is the cognition of the āgama passages, which give the characteristics of the niṣṭha (meditation) that manifests the beginninglessness and endlessness of God. The classification of āgama pramāṇa is, according to Sivajñāna Yogi, too narrow as it divides jñāna kānda only into three varieties. According to this division both karma kānda and upāsanā kānda will be apramāṇās (non-valid).

(v) Signification of a word.

The association of a sense with word is a subject of controversy among the Indian schools of philosophy.

The Vaiśeṣikās are at one accord with the Naiyāyikas in denying any relation whether samyoga (conjunction) or samavāya (inherence) existing between a word and its meaning. It is argued by the Vaiśeṣikās that sabda, as it is a quality of ākāśa (ether), cannot have conjunction – which is itself a quality – with the object denoted; for it is admitted by all that a quality cannot possess another quality. The proper substrate for qualities is substance. Nor can samavāya (inherence) be the relation between a word and its meaning for the simple reason that we do not find both appearing at one and the same time and place. For one and the same word is used in different languages to signify different things. This is not possible if there is an inherent relation between a word and its signification. So the word and object denoted by it seem to be unrelated. If there be no relation, any word may signify anything. In practice we find that the sense is connected with every word. The connection is due to samketa (convention). The Naiyāyikas too hold a similar view. But they differ with the Vaiśeṣikās in that they recognise the independence of sabda as a pramāṇa whereas the Vaiśeṣikās include it under anumāṇa (inference).

It is argued by the Naiyāyikas that perceptual knowledge is produced by the contact of an object with the sense organs. Inferential knowledge is dependent on vyāpti jñānam (knowledge of universal concomitance,) which is the result of previous experience; but in the case of sabda jñānam, there is neither sense-object-contact nor vyāpti jñānam. For when we hear someone uttering the expression ‘grass is green’, no matter whether the object grass is in front of us or not we have a cognition which is directly obtained

1 L.S.H. pps 141 – 145,
from the words 'grass' and 'green' having mutual expectancy, proximity and compatibility. This knowledge is different from both perceptual and inferential knowledges. It is an independent source of knowledge and is called Sabda pramāna.

1 As against the Naiyāyikas, Sivajñāna Yogi contends that knowledge derived from words is inferential knowledge. Were it not so, the cognitions of the absence of cold, the absence of dew etc. would make anupalabdhi (non-cognition) - the way in which these cognitions are made - a separate source of knowledge. If, as is done by the Naiyāyikas, anupalabdhi can be included under perception etc., sabda-jñānam can very well come under inference. Further Sivajñāna Yogi questions the conventional character of the relation posited between sabda and its meaning by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools. With him the relation is natural and eternal.

2 The Mīmāṃsakās too hold a similar tenet when they say that sound and its relation with sense are both eternal. According to them sound is not produced by the vocal organs and is not liable to be destroyed after its utterance. The function of the vocal organs consists in mere manifestation of sound and its relation to sense, which are both ever existent. 3 The Grammarian school goes a step further when it says that words, their meanings and the relations between them are all eternal. The word bears to its meaning the relation of denotative to denotated. It is finally stated that words and their meanings are inseparable, as they represent the external and internal aspect of one and the same thing caṭānyam (Consciousness).

2. L S H. 145
3. Ibid pps 146 and 147.
The Siddhāntin differs from both the Mīmāṃsakās and the Grammarian school in considering sabda prapañcam (world of names) as subject to origin, sustenance and dissolution; for it is an effect of suddha māyā (pure cosmic principle); all the signs of an effect are present in it, as it has constituent members, is inert, plural and an object of relational knowledge. It cannot exist independently of artha prapañcam which it signifies. The relation between sabda prapañcam and arthapraapañcam is one of manifestor and manifested. They being both in the form of effects pre-exist in their causes even before they are manifested. There is a relation of universal concomitance, that is natural and eternal, between the two. Sabda prapañcam has no meaning if not for the arthapraapañcam which it signifies. Sabda or word being an effect of suddha māyā, which is beyond the reach of the senses must remain necessarily unapprehended. Yet it becomes audible to us as it is associated with the upādhi of dhvani which is a quality of ākāsa (ether). The Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikās seem to confuse sabda with dhvani.

What does a word signify, a vyakti (particular), or an ākṛti (generic form) or a jāti (universal). The Sāmkhyas hold the view that a word means a particular. The Jainas insist that it is ākṛti that is primarily indicated by a word. The Mīmāṃsakās, the Advaitins and the Grammarians of the older school favour the view that a word stands for its jāti. With the Naiyāyikas of the old school a word means all the three-vyakti, ākṛti and jāti. The later Naiyāyikas however urge that a word refers to a particular characterised by a universal. It is

2. Ibid pp 136.
3. Ibid pp 135.
proposed to examine the different views before the Siddhāntin's theory of the signification of the word is given.

It is the view of the Śāmkhyās that a word signifies a particular. In ordinary speech when we make a statement 'the cow is white', we do actually refer to a particular cow and not to the class of cows; for it is silly to attribute whiteness to the whole class of cows. Again the use of the singular and proper terms such as sun, moon, Ganges etc., is amenable to this view that it is the vyakti that is signified by a word, as there is no other object to which the same term can be applied. But in the expression 'man is rational', the word 'man' clearly refers to the whole class of men and not to a particular individual; for rationality can be attributed to every individual. Therefore the theory of the Śāmkhyās that a word means a particular cannot be held to be correct.

As against the view of the Śāmkhyās we have the theory of the Jainas that a word primarily signifies an ākṛti. When we say 'the cow is white', we have in mind the generic form of a cow and we attribute whiteness to the object having that form. As a form is not known apart from the object of which it is a form, the particular too is brought before the mind though in an indirect way. In the statement 'man is rational' the word 'man' can be said to refer primarily to the generic form of man. But its secondary significance seems to be vague and indefinite as it does not refer to a specific individual. Yet the ākṛti theory of significance of a word can be taken to steer through here too. But in the case of words referring to mental phenomena, the theory completely collapses for the mere fact that such phenomena have no forms whether generic or specific. Besides, the ākṛti of an object
changes according to time and place. There cannot be
two objects having the same ākṛti. At least the space-
time elements of the ākṛtis will be different. Further
the ākṛti of a cow while grazing is not the same as the
cow running. Therefore if a cow while grazing is
called a cow the same cow running shall have to be
called by a different name as its ākṛti is different. So
the ākṛti view of the significance of words does not lead
us to truth.

The Mīmāṃsakās and the Advaitins together with
the Grammarians of the old school seem to stand on
better ground when they say that a word signifies its
jāti (universal) primarily and a vyakti (particular)
secondarily. This theory is plausible when we consider
the statement ‘man is rational’. The word ‘man’
refers to a universal; for rationality can be predicated
of the whole class called man. In the case of the
expression ‘the cow is white’, the word ‘cow’ cannot
refer to the class ‘cow’, as whiteness cannot be
attributed to every cow. It might be pointed out
that the word ‘cow’ means the universal attribute
‘cowness’ and that the demonstrative adjective ‘the’
restricts the application of the term to a particular. If
the word ‘cow’ means, as the Advaitins urge, ‘cowness’
then for a similar reason the term ‘cowness’ should
signify ‘cownessness’ and the term ‘cownessness’
should refer to ‘cownessnessness’ and so on giving rise
to the fault of infinite regress. So the jāti view of the
signification of a word does not seem to be satisfactory.

The ancient Naiyāyikas—Gautama and Vatsyāyana
—seem to have realised the unsatisfactory natures of
each of the three views of signification when each is
considered as the only theory capable of explaining the
signification of words. According to these men, a word
means all the three—vyakti, ākṛti and jāti. In one sentence the vyakti view of signification is predominant, in a second the ākṛti view and in a third the jāti view according to context. This theory seems to be animated by a spirit of reconciliation and compromise on the part of its discoverer and does not deserve a place in any philosophic treatise.

The later Naiyāyikas (especially Jagadīsa) have abandoned the unphilosophic view of the signification of words of their predecessors and have urged that it is the jāti-viśiṣṭa-vyakti (universalized particular) that is signified by a word. According to this theory a word signifies neither a bare particular nor a pure universal. It is the particular as related to a universal that is comprehended as the meaning of a word. Objections have been raised against this theory on the ground that it fails in the case of isolated words. What is the meaning of the word 'cow' by knowing which we can apply the term to different particulars? Surely it cannot be itself particular. When a number of differently coloured animals each having a dewlap, two horns etc., are brought in front of us, we call them cows not on account of the particularizing colours white, red etc., which are different for each animal. It is by virtue of the universal attribute of 'cowness' that is found to be present in all the cows that we call them cows. So it would appear that a word connotes its jāti or class and not a particular whether universalized or not. But the objections against the jāti view of signification hold good still.

The Siddhāntin's view of the signification of a word is free from all objections. ¹ According to him a word signifies a jāti (universal) which is non-different ¹. S.B. pp 319.
from its vyaktis (particulars). When he says that there is in nāda, an infinite number of jñāpaka śaktis each signifying a definite particular, he seems to favour the view that a word means a vyakti. But when he speaks of the ultimate principles as pati, pasu and pāsam, he seems to have the class view of signification of the terms pasu and pāsam. It is said that it is unphilosophical to hold both the views. Yet the Siddhāntin adheres to his view remaining quite philosophical all the time. With him jāti is non-different from vyakti. A vyakti, be it a book or a cow, is the sum total of specific and generic qualities which are all material substances; and a jāti consists of generic qualities alone considered in abstraction; the objective reference of a jāti is always its vyaktis. So the meaning of the word 'cow' refers to the generic quality of 'cowness' as realised objectively in the vyaktis. The objection that 'cowness' would then mean 'cownessness' and so on leading up to an infinite regress is met by the Siddhāntin who says that a quality cannot possess another quality. No quality can be the substrate of another quality. It is only a substance that can be said to possess a quality. A cow is so called not because all its specific and generic qualities that constitute the entire being of the cow are apprehended. The apprehension of generic qualities with or without any specific qualities are amply sufficient to call the substrate of these qualities, a cow. So a word must be taken to signify a jāti that is non-different from its vyaktis.

(vi) Signification of a sentence.

1 It is the view of the Siddhāntin that neither a sentence nor the words of a sentence nor the letters

1. S.B. pp 228.
that constitute the words of a sentence have any
signification whatsoever. A word is only figuratively
spoken of as possessing signification as its constituent
members (i.e., sounds of letters) that are audible by
virtue of their upādhi (accidental association) with
dhvani manifest a śakti of nāda that signifies an object.
Nāda which is an evolute of Buddhā Māyā (pure cosmic
principle) is presumed to possess an infinite number of
śaktis each signifying an individual object. It is the
śaktis of nāda that are really possessed of signification.
Words are manifestors of these śaktis. Yet we speak
of words as having meaning in a figurative sense only
as they are instrumental in bringing about the mani-
festation of these śaktis that have signification. A
sentence too can be referred to in the same sense as possess-
sing signification. Consequently with the Siddhāntin
neither a word nor a sentence has anything to do with
direct signification. A problem crops up whether the
meaning of a sentence is got at through the meanings
of words or through words without involving their
meanings. The answer to this problem commits us to
one of two views known as the anvitābhidhāna-vāda
and abhihitānvaya-vāda respectively.

1 The Prabhākarās hold the anvitābhidhāna-vāda,
which literally means 'the theory of expression of the
correlated'. According to this vāda the words of a
sentence have the double function of giving their
individual meanings and also their construed meanings.
The abhihitānvaya-vāda, which literally means 'the
theory of correlation of the expressed' is urged by the
Bhāttās. According to this theory the words of a
sentence merely signify universals and the sense of the
sentence is derived through the meanings of the words

1. S.W.K. pps 289 - 299.
by the processes of particularization and synthesizing. The Siddhāntin may be said to accept in principle the Bhāṭṭa theory of the signification of a sentence with the reservation that a sentence has signification in a figurative sense only.

According to the Prabhākarās what is central in a sentence is the verb; and all other words in the sentence are held together through their references to the verb by way of expressing relationships such as an agent of an action, the object of an action etc. The words retain their general references to the verb even when they are afterwards generalized to signify universals. It is on account of this retention of property of reference to verbs that words readily combine to yield the meaning of the sentence. Consequently the words of a sentence can be said to possess the double function of signifying universals and presenting the meaning of the sentence. Objections have been raised against this theory on the ground that there are words in a sentence that are not related to the verb. In the expression 'bring the white horse' no stretch of imagination can connect the word 'white' with the verb 'bring'. But then the original position may be abandoned and it may be held that the words of a sentence must have reference to some word not necessarily a verb. In this modified form of the theory the word 'white' in the statement 'white horse' would also mean 'white as related to horse' even before the whole statement is uttered. Even if it is granted that it is so, it cannot be maintained that the word 'square' in the statement 'square circle' means also square as related to a circle.' So the theory needs further modification. It may be urged that a word, if it is to have meaning as related to another, must not only be grammatically suitable but also logically compatible. The word 'square' excludes any reference to circle as
their meanings are logically incompatible with each other. Hence the anvitābhidhāna-vāda in its most modified form says that the words of a sentence signify not only universals but also individual meanings as related to some word in the sentence with which they are logically compatible.

The Siddhāntin may be said to follow the Bhāṭṭās in raising an objection, against this most modified form of the anvitābhidhāna-vāda. The word 'white' ordinarily means a universal as realised in suitable particulars such as a dog, cat, horse etc. Until the word 'horse' is uttered it cannot be particularised to mean 'white' as realised in a horse. In the expression 'white horse' even the word horse, which means a universal as realised in particulars such as a red horse, black horse etc., is particularised to mean white horse. It is clear that the construed meaning of the statement is the result of particularisation and synthesis, both of which are processes that are subsequent to the utterance of the statement. Consequently the theory that the meaning of a sentence is obtained though the meanings of the words in the sentence appears to be in the main correct.

Since a sentence depends for its meaning on a correlation of the meanings of the words in it, it must be understood that no arbitrary collocation of words can form a sentence. Neither a combination of verbal forms such as pacati (he cooks) and gacchati (he goes) nor that of the nominal forms such as ghaṭāḥ (pot) and paṭāḥ (cloth) can constitute a sentence, as such combinations yield us no consistent ideas. A sentence is a significant combination of words producing a coherent idea. Its meaning is the result of correlation of meanings of its constituent members, - words. 1Four conditions are

1. P.B. pps 551 - 553.
held to be necessary to correlate the meanings of words to form a sentence; they are ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā, āsatti and tātparya. Of them ākāṅkṣā or expectancy is that requirement of a word or words, which if not satisfied would destroy the unity of a sentence. The word Rāma when uttered arouses an expectancy that requires to be satisfied by such a term as 'goes' to complete the meaning of the statement 'Rama goes'. But such an expectancy is never felt when we try to combine the words pen, hand, sky etc., which together convey no sense. Yogyatā or compatibility is the requirement by virtue of which the ākāṅkṣā of a word or a group of words to complete the sense of a sentence is fulfilled. The words in the statement 'moisten with fire' is in want of yogyatā, as there is incompatibility between the idea of moistening and the idea of fire. Āsatti or proximity is what makes it possible to relate the words to a sentence as members to a whole. No sense will be conveyed by uttering the word 'bring' now and the word 'cow' after the lapse of an hour or two. The words must be pronounced together if they are to form a sentence. Tātparya or import of a sentence is what is determined with reference to context. When the expression 'saindhavam ānaya' is uttered by one who is taking his meals, it should not be meant that the speaker requires a horse to be brought in. It is salt that is wanted by him. It is true that the word saindhava can stand for both salt and a horse. But the context precludes the meaning of horse to the word 'saindhava'. When all these four conditions are satisfied we have what is called as vākya-bhodah; yet āgama pramāṇa or verbal testimony is not vākya-bhodah. It is not had when the ātman is in its mukti nilai (state of release). Consequently it is held to be asat (unreal) by the Siddhāntin.
It is only a vyānjaka (manifestor of knowledge) to the ātman in its petta nilai (embodied state).

(vii) Aitihya (tradition).

The Paurāṇikas give an independence status to the means of cognition called aitihya or tradition. According to them, aitihya is valid assertion that is handed down from generation to generation without any indication of the source from which such assertion has originated. If aitihya refers to objects of the celestial and infernal worlds which can neither be perceived nor be inferred, the Siddhāntin feels it but proper to include it under āgama pramāṇa or verbal testimony. 1 Maraijñāna Desikar, a well known commentator of Sivajñāna Siddhiyar classifies aitihya into valid and invalid ones. As an example of an invalid aitihya he gives the case of a traditional account current among the common masses in the form of the statement, 'this tree is infested with ghosts'. Valid aitihya is illustrated by the statement going through the mouths of sages in the form, 'this lake is full of goblins'. It is difficult to know how the sages come by such a statement. If they arrive at it by way of perception or inference, aitihya has no place as an independent means of cognition. If they obtain the information from śrutis it is only an instance of āgama pramāṇa. In any case aitihya—even if it be valid—cannot be maintained to be an independent means of cognition.

CHAPTER 9

Fallacies.

(i) General.

In Saiva Siddhānta, as in the other systems of Indian philosophy, the fallacies are mostly of inference, and are all material. An inference, according to Saiva Siddhānta, consists of three propositions (1) pratiṃjña (thesis), (2) hetu (reason or probans) and (3) udāharaṇa (example). The validity or invalidity of an inferential process is dependent on the validity or invalidity of these three members. Hence the fallacies of inference are also limited to these three. The invalidity of pratiṃjña gives rise to the fallacy known as pakṣābhāsa (fallacy of the minor term), while that of hetu and udāharaṇa to fallacies by name hetvābhāsa (fallacy of the reason), and dṛṣṭāntabhāsa (fallacy of the example) respectively. The Saiva Siddhāntin sees four forms of pakṣābhāsa, twenty-one of hetvābhāsa, and eighteen of dṛṣṭāntabhāsa. Besides these 43 fallacies of inference, twenty-two other fallacies which are either semilogical or non-logical, are also recognized. The latter are technically called nigrāhasthāna (points of defeat or clinchers). The Saiva Siddhāntin points out that there are 65 fallacies in all; he contends that any more fallacies that are in vogue in the world can be brought under one or the other of these 65 fallacies. The Tārkikas, on the contrary, speak of the fallacies of pakṣābhāsa and dṛṣṭāntabhāsa as falling under hetvābhāsa. Sivajñāna Yogi pleads that once we know the true natures of pakṣa and dṛṣṭānta, we shall never be able to bring pakṣābhāsa and dṛṣṭāntabhāsa under hetvābhāsa. They will

1. s.s.a. Pages 232 - 287.
 remain as paksabhāsa and drṣṭāntabhāsa only. An attempt is made in the following pages to give the true natures of these fallacies, and to illustrate them with appropriate examples.

(ii) The Fallacies of Inference

(a) Pakṣabhāsa or Fallacy of the Minor Term

"If out of the anumāna-sāmagris (totality of conditions generating inferential knowledge) the pakṣa (minor term), whose sādhyā (major term) is or is to be predicated, is short of its characteristics and appears as a mere semblance of a pakṣa, we commit the fallacy of the minor term technically called the paksabhāsa. It is of four kinds.

(1) pratyakṣabhāsa, (2) anumānabhāsa, (3) prati-jñābhāsa and (4) vacanābhāsa.

1. Pratyakṣabhāsa:—The fallacy of pratyakṣabhāsa is made when the sādhyā or major term that is to be predicated of the pakṣa or minor term is opposed to perception, as when we say, "Fire is cooling".

2. Anumānabhāsa:—The fallacy of anumānabhāsa arises when the sādhyā or major term that is to be predicated of the pakṣa or minor term is opposed to inference, as when we say, "Sound is non- eternal".

3. Prati-jñābhāsa:—The fallacy of prati-jñābhāsa occurs when a sādhyā or major term that is to be attributed to the pakṣa or minor term is incapable of being proved, as when we mistake a shell for silver and exclaim, "It is silver".

4. Vacanābhāsa:—The fallacy of vacanābhāsa is produced when the sādhyā or major term that is to be
attributed to the pakṣa or minor term is incongruous with one's own statement as when we assert the statement, "Liquor is taken by Brahmins".

(b) Hetvābhāsa or fallacy of the Reason.

1 If out of the anumāna-sāmagrīs the hetu or middle term which abides in the minor term, is short of its characteristics and appears as a semblance of the hetu, there arises the fallacy of the reason technically called hetvābhāsa. It is broadly classified into three types (1) asiddha (unproved assumption), (2) viruddha (contradictory reason), and (3) anaikāntika (uncertain middle). Of these asiddha has twelve varieties, viruddha two, and anaikāntika seven.

1. Asiddha:—The Asiddha or unproved assumption is the hetu or reason whose connection with the pakṣa or minor term is not ascertained with certainty.

2. Viruddha:—The viruddha or contradictory reason is the hetu or reason which is concomitant with the pakṣa or minor term as well as its opposite.

3. Anaikāntika:—The anaikāntika or uncertain middle is the hetu or reason which is doubtful by virtue of the fact that the reason abides in a part of the whole of the pakṣa and in some or all the sapakṣās (homologues) and vipakṣās (heterologues).

(1) Varieties of asiddha or Unproved Assumption.

The Saiva Siddhāntin's twelve kinds of asiddha are as follows:—

1. Svarūpāsiddha is the hetu or reason which is asiddha or unproved by virtue of its nature, e.g.

   "Sound is non-eternal, because it is perceptible to the eye."

1. S.S.A. Page 376.
The inference is invalid, for sound is by nature never visible to the eye.

2. Vyadhikaraṇāsiddha is the hetu or reason which is asiddha or unproved as it is found in a different locus. e.g.

"Sound is a product,
for a cloth is a product."

Here too the inference is not valid, for the hetu has a different locus other than the pakṣa or subject about which there is a predication.

3. Viśeṣyāsiddha is the hetu or reason which is asiddha or unproved with respect to a substantive qualified by an adjective. e.g.

"Sound is non-eternal,
for being possessed of generic nature it is visible to the eye."

The Saiva Siddhāntin admits that sound has the generic characteristic of soundness but denies that it is visible to the eye.

4. Viśeṣaṇāsiddha is the hetu or reason which is asiddha or unproved with respect to an adjective qualifying a substantive. e.g.

"Sound is non-eternal,
for it possesses a generic nature which is visible to the eye."

Here the viśeṣaṇa of generic nature, i.e. soundness is not visible.

5. Bhāgāsiddha is the hetu or reason which is asiddha or unproved in respect of a part, e.g.

'The jīva and the body are non-eternal,
for they are effects produced by certain causes.'

It is true that the body is an effect, but not the jīva (soul).
6. Āsrayaśiddha is the hetu or reason which is asiddha or unproved regarding its substrate, e.g. when the Sāṅkhyaśas say

'The prakṛti (primordial matter) exists for it evolves into the universe',

the Naiyāyikās will accuse the Sāṅkhyaśas of fallacious reasoning as they do not believe in primordial matter giving rise to the universe.

7. Āsrayaikadesāsiddha is the hetu or reason which is asiddha or unproved as regards a part of its substrate e.g. when the Sāṅkhyaśas make the statement

'Prakṛti or primordial matter, the ātman or soul and Isvara or God are all eternal, for none of them are produced by any causes',

the Naiyāyikas will impute fallacious reasoning to the Sāṅkhyaśas on the ground that there is nothing to warrant the belief in the existence of prakṛti.

8. Vyarthaviśeṣyāsiddha is the hetu or reason which is asiddha or unproved on account of the use of a superfluous substantive which is qualified by an adjective, e.g.,

'Sound is non-eternal, for it has a generic nature which is an effect'.

The statement that the generic nature of soundness is an effect is useless for the purpose of the inference.

9. Vyarthaviśeṣaṇāsiddha is the hetu or reason which is asiddha or unproved on account of the use of a superfluous adjective qualifying a substantive, e.g.

'Soundness is non-eternal, for it is a product possessing a generic attribute'
The viśeṣaṇa implied in the phrase 'possessing a generic attribute' is besides the mark, and is useless.

10. Samdigdhāsiddha is the hetu or reason which is asiddha or unproved as the hetu or reason imputed is of a doubtful nature, e.g. when one has not ascertained what he sees in the hill before him is smoke, or a mist says,

'This hill is fiery,
for there is smoke in it',

he commits this fallacy.

11. Samdigdhaviśeṣyāsiddha is the hetu or reason which is asiddha or unproved by virtue of the use of a doubtful substantive, e.g.

'Kapila is even now full of passions,
for true knowledge has not dawned on him who is a man'.

It is doubtful whether Kapila is still devoid of true knowledge.

12. Samdhigdhaviśeṣaṇāsiddha is the hetu or reason which is asiddha or unproved on account of the use of a doubtful adjective, e.g.

'Kapila is even now full of passions,
for he is one who is always in want of true knowledge.'

The viśeṣaṇa implied in the phrase 'who is always in want of true knowledge' is doubtful.

(2) Kinds of Viruddha or Contradictory Reason.

The two forms of viruddha accepted by the Saiva Siddhāntin are as follows:—

1. Pakṣa-vipakṣa-vyāpaka-viruddha is the hetu or reason which is contradictory by virtue of the
reason abiding in both the pākṣa or minor term and the vipakṣa or its heterologue, e.g.

'Sound is eternal,
for it is an effect like its homologues ether etc.
and its heterologues the pot etc.'

2. Pākṣa-vipakṣaikadesa-viruddha is the hetu or reason which is contradictory on account of the reason abiding in only a part of one, and the whole or part of the other of the two terms, the pākṣa and the vipakṣa, e.g.,

'Sound is eternal,
for it is produced by an effort'.

Here too the inference is not valid since the reason that it is produced by an effort is not found to abide in a part of the pākṣa, sound, as well as in a part of the vipakṣa grass.

(3) Kinds of Anaikāntika or Uncertain Middle.

The seven kinds of anaikāntika of the Saiva Siddhāntin are as follows:—

1. Pākṣa-traya-vyāpaka-anaikāntika is the hetu or reason which is doubtful by virtue of the reason abiding in the pākṣa, the sapakṣa or its homologue, and the vipakṣa or its heterologue, e.g.,

'Sound is non-eternal,
for it is an object of cognition'.

Here the reason that it is an object of cognition abides in the pākṣa sound, the sapakṣa the pot, and the vipakṣa ether.

2. Pākṣa-vyāpaka-sapakṣa-vipakṣaikadesa-vṛtti is the hetu or reason which is doubtful, as the reason
given abides in the whole of the pakṣa, but not in all the sapakṣās (its homologues) or the vipakṣās (its heterologues) e.g.,

'Sound is non-eternal, for it is perceptible'.

Here the reason that sound is perceptible is pervasive of the whole of the pakṣa sound. Though the reason holds good with respect to some sapakṣās as the pot, and some vipakṣās as generic nature, it does not abide in some sapakṣās as atoms, and some vipakṣās as ether.

3. Pakṣa-sapakṣa-vyāpaka-vipakṣaikadesa-vṛttī is the hetu or reason which is doubtful by virtue of the reason abiding in both the pakṣa or minor term and the sapakṣas or its homologues but only in some of the vipakṣās, (heterologues) e.g.

'This is a cow, for it has horns'.

It is a fact that horns are found in this cow or its homologues as other cows, and in some heterologues as buffaloes, but not in all the heterologues as horse, elephant &c.

4. Pakṣa-vipakṣa-vyāpaka-sapakṣaikadesa-vṛttī, is the hetu or reason which is doubtful as the reason abides in the pakṣa and its heterologues, and in some of the homologues only, e.g.

'This is not a cow, for it has horns'.

Horns abide in the animal seen and in all its heterologues like cows, and in some of the homologues like buffaloes, but not in other homologues like horses etc.
5. Pakṣa-trayaikadesa-vṛtti is the hetu or reason which is doubtful by virtue of the fact that the middle term has the relation of concomitance with only a part of the pakṣa, a part of the sapakṣas and a part of the vipakṣas, e.g.,

'The universe is eternal, for it is an object of perception.'

The reason that it is perceptible can be predicated of a part of the universe only, of some of the sapakṣas like the pot, of some of the vipakṣas like generic nature, but not of the sapakṣas atoms etc., nor of the vipakṣas ether etc.

6. Pakṣa-sapakṣaikadesa-vṛtti-vipakṣa-vyāpaka is the hetu or reason which is doubtful on account of the fact that the middle term has the relation of concomitance with only a part of the pakṣa, with some of the sapakṣas, and with all the vipakṣas, e.g.,

'Space, Time and Mind are all dravyas (substances), for they are incorporeal.'

The reason of incorporeality abides in only a part of the pakṣa - in space and in time - but not in the mind which belongs equally to the pakṣa. It is also found in some of the sapakṣas like the soul, and in all the vipakṣas like generic nature, but not in the sapakṣas earth, water &c.

7. Pakṣa-vipakṣaikadesa-vṛtti-sapakṣa-vyāpaka is the hetu or reason which is doubtful on the ground that the middle term is pervasive of only a part of the pakṣa, some of the vipakṣas, and of all the sapakṣas, e.g.,

'Space, and Time are not dravyas, for they are corporeal.'
Here it is true that corporeality can be attributed to a part of the pākṣa the mind, to some of the vipakṣās like the soul, but not to parts of the pākṣa—space and time—nor to the vipakṣās like generic nature etc.

(c) Drstāntābhāsa of the Fallacy of Example

If out of the anumāna-sāmagris the udāharaṇa (example) appears as a mere semblance of it on account of the fact that the relation of concomitance between either the middle and major terms or the contradictories of the major and middle terms is not ascertained with certainty we are said to commit the fallacy of drstāntābhāsa.

Drstāntābhāsa is of two kinds, according as the ground of inference is, (1) anvayi (affirmative), or (2) vyatireki (negative). Each of these two kinds is further divided into nine forms.

(1) Anvayi or Affirmative Forms of Drstāntābhāsa

1. Sādhya-vikala or the fallacy of the excluded major of a homologue is the udāharaṇa (example) which has an instance not pervaded by the major term, e.g.

'Sound is eternal,
for it is incorporeal like an activity.'

Here the sādhya of eternality is, according to the Buddhists, not concomitant with the instance "activity". Hence the reasoning is fallacious because of a faulty example.

2. Samdīgdha-sādhya or the fallacy of the uncertain excluded major of a homologue is the
udāharana which has an instance wherein the pervasion of the major term is of a doubtful nature, e.g.

"This man is subject to passions, or he has the power of speech like a man in the street."

"Like a man in the street" cannot serve as an instance, for it is doubtful.

3. Sādhana-vikala or the fallacy of the excluded middle of a homologue is the udāharana or example having an instance not pervaded by the middle term, e.g.

'Mind is non-eternal, for it is corporeal like activity'.

Here the sādhana of corporeality does not pervade the instance 'activity'.

4. Samdīgdha-sādhana or the fallacy of the uncertain excluded middle of a homologue is the udāharana or example with an instance wherein the pervasion of the middle term is of a doubtful character, e.g.

'This man is mortal,' for he is subject to passions like a man in [the Street."

It is uncertain whether the "man in the street" is really "subject to passions", though his mortality is certain.

5. Udbhaya-Vikala or the fallacy of the excluded major and middle terms of a homologue is the udāharana or example which has an instance pervaded neither by the major term nor by the middle, e.g.

'The mind is non-eternal, for it is corporeal like ether.'
Here neither the sādhya of non-eternity, nor the sādhana of corporeality can be predicated of the instance "ether".

6. Samdīgdhohbha−vikāla or the fallacy of the uncertain excluded major and middle terms of a homologue is the udāharana or example with an instance wherein the pervasions of both the major term and the middle term are uncertain, e.g.

'He is not omniscient,
for he is subject to passions like a man in
[the street].

It is uncertain whether the "man in the street" is subject to passions, and whether he is not omniscient.

7. Ananvaya or the fallacy of deficient concomitance between the middle and major terms of homologue is the udāharana or example wherein there is no inseparable connection between the middle and major terms, e.g.

'This person is subject to passions,
for he is a speaker.
and whoever speaks is subject to passions
[like so and so].

Though the power of speech, and a passionate nature, may both be present in Mr. So and So, yet there is no necessary and universal concomitance between the two.

8. Apradarsitānvaya or the fallacy of unshown concomitance between the middle and major terms of a homologue is the udāharana or example wherein the connection between the middle and major terms is not shown, e.g.

'Sound is non-eternal,
for it is a product like a jar'.
Here it is true that a jar has the two attributes of being a product, and being non-eternal. The example merely proves that the two attributes, are co-existent, and not necessarily and universally concomitant. If it is known with certainty that everything produced is non-eternal it should have been stated so. An apposite instance which illustrates the universal concomitance should be given.

9 Viparītānvaya or fallacy of the inverted relation of concomitance between the middle and major terms is shown in an inverted order, e.g.

'Sound is non-eternal,
for it is a product',
and whatever is non-eternal is a product
as a jar'.

The instance cited has two attributes (i) that it is a product, and (ii) the fact of its being non-eternal. Yet the interdependence of the two attributes is given in an inverted order. The example should read 'Whatever is produced is non-eternal, like a jar'. We must be able to deduce the fact of a body being non-eternal from the assertion that it is a product; instead, the reverse has been done in this case; we are asked to infer the fact of a body being a product on the ground that it is non-eternal.

(2) Vyatireki or Negative Forms of Drṣṭāntābhāsa

1. Sādhyavyatireki or the fallacy of the included major of a heterologue is the udāharaṇa (example) which has an instance wherein the major term does not get excluded in its being predicated of it, e.g., When the Mīmāṃsakās argue,
'Sound is eternal, for it is incorporeal, and what is non-eternal is non-corporeal like an atom.'

The Vaiśeṣikās will raise the objection that the negative instance the "atom" is not exclusive of the major term, for according to the Vaiśeṣikās atoms are eternal.

2. Samāgīda-sādhya-vyātireki or fallacy of the uncertain included major of a heterologue is the udāharaṇa or example which has an instance wherein the invariable and necessary absence of the major term is uncertain, e.g.

'This man will be a sovereign ruler, for he is of the Lunar Race, and whoever is not a sovereign ruler is not of the Lunar Race, like prince so & so.'

Here the negative instance "prince so & so" is not characterised by a necessary and invariable absence of the attribute of becoming a sovereign ruler. He may be a sovereign ruler though not of the lunar race. The attributes of "sovereign ruler" belonging to him is uncertain.

3. Sādhanā-vyātireki or fallacy of the included middle of a heterologue is the udāharaṇa or example which has an instance wherein the middle term does not get excluded in its being attributed to it, e.g.

'Sound is eternal, for it is incorporeal, and whatever is non-eternal is not incorporeal, like motion.'
Here the middle term incorporeality is not excluded of its being attributed to the negative instance "motion".

4. Samdigdha-Sādhana-vyatireki or the fallacy of the uncertain included middle of a heterologue is the udāharaṇa or example which has an instance with which the absence of the necessary and invariable concomitance of the middle term is uncertain, e.g.

'This man is not omniscient, for he is full of passions, and whoever is not non-omniscient is not full of passions, like one well versed in the Sāstrās.'

There is no proof to deny passionate nature of one who is well versed in all the Sāstrās; therefore the absence of connection of the middle term with the instance is uncertain.

Udbhaya-vyatireki or the fallacy of the included major and middle terms of a heterologue is the udāharaṇa or example which has an instance wherein neither the major term nor the middle term gets excluded in being predicated of it, e.g. When the Mīmāṃsakās say

'Sound is eternal, for it is incorporeal, and whatever is not eternal is not incorporeal, like ether'.

the Vaiśeṣikās will object that neither the middle term incorporeality nor the major term eternality can be excluded of its being attributed to the negative instance "ether". For, according
to the Vaiśeṣikās, ether is both eternal and incorporeal.

6. Samdīgdhobhaya-vyatireki or the fallacy of the uncertain included major and middle terms of a heterologue is the udāharaṇa or example which has an instance with which the absence of the concomitance of both the major and middle terms is uncertain, e.g.

'Kapila is not devoid of passions, for he is subject to avarice, and whoever is not non-devoid of passions is [not subject to avarice like Rṣabha and others].'

It is very doubtful whether "Rṣabha and others" are really free from both passions and avarice.

7. A vyatireki or the fallacy of the absence of non-concomitance between the middle and major terms of a heterologue is the udāharaṇa or example which shows an absence of disconnection between the middle and major terms, e.g.

'This person is subject to passions, for he has the faculty of speech, and whoever is not subject to passions has not [the faculty of speech, like a piece of stone].'

Although the instance "the stone" has not the two attributes of passionate nature and power of speech, it does not prove the necessary absence of non-concomitance between the two attributes.

8. Apradarsita-vyatireki or the fallacy of the unknown relation of absence of non-concomitance between the middle and major terms of a heterologue is the udāharaṇa or example in which the
absence of disconnection between the middle and major terms is not expressed, e.g.

'Sound is non-eternal,
for it is a product, like ether'.

Here "ether" is a negative instance. The attributes of being a "product", and being "non-eternal", are, according to the Vaiśeṣikās, absent in "ether". The general proposition showing the absence of non-concomitance between the two attributes is not expressed, but left to be understood. It should have been fully given. It would then read

'Whatever is not a product is eternal like

ether.'

2. Viparīta-vyatireki or the fallacy of the inverted negation of a heterogue is the udāharaṇa or example in which the relation of absence of non-concomitance between the middle and major terms is given in an inverted order, e.g.

'Sound is non-eternal,
for it is a product,
and whatever is not a product is not non-eternal like ether'.

Here the negation of the middle term is invariably associated with the negation of the major term. And the possibility of denying the major term of the middle term is not excluded. Therefore the invariable concomitance of the middle term with the major term will not be a necessary relation. Hence the reasoning is fallacious. The proper form of the udāharaṇa should be

'Whatever is eternal is not a product, like

ether.'
(iii) Nigrahasthāna or Grounds of Defeat or Clinchers

In a Tarka-vāda (disputation) a clincher-nigrahasthāna arises when a disputant is unable to convince his opponents either on account of his lack of understanding the point at issue, or on account of his misunderstanding the subject. The Saiva Siddhāntin sees twenty two kinds of nigrahasthāna which are all semilogical or illogical. They are as follows:

1. Pratijñāhāni or the clincher of hurting the proposition arises when one fails to establish completely one's proposition, but argues in a manner running counter to its truth, e.g.

   When a disputant who asserts that sound is non-eternal on the ground that it is perceptible by the senses like a pot, is confronted by his opponent who urges that the given reason of perceptibility pervades eternals such as jāti (class) also, if he admits the force of the argument of the opponent and argues in the same line as the opponent, he commits this fallacy. He is then forced to abandon his initial proposition that 'sound is non-eternal', and admit that sound may be eternal or non-eternal.

2. Pratijñāntara or the clincher of shifting the proposition arises when one, on being pointed the flaws in his propositions, proceeds to correct himself by adding a qualification to his original proposition e.g. When a disputant argues

   'Letters are non-eternal, for they are perceptible by the ear, like the [jāti of sound.]

1. S.S.A. pp 255.
and if his opponent objects pointing out the fault of vyabhicāra (irregularity) on account of the invariable concomitance of them with sounds, he changes from his initial unqualified proposition to a qualified one as,

'The letters with their corresponding sounds [are non-eternal].'

In the change the disputant has committed this point of defeat.

3. Pratijñāvirodha or the clincher of contradictory proposition arises when one gives a reason which is opposed to his own proposition, e.g.

'Substance is distinct from quality, for it is perceived to be non-different from [its colour].

In this argument, the reason that substance is non-different from its colour which constitutes the quality of the substance contradicts the proposition 'substance is distinct from quality'.

4. Pratijñā-samnyāsa or the clincher of renouncing the proposition occurs if one gives up his proposition when opposed, e.g. When one who asserts that,

'Sound is eternal, for it is produced by an effort, like ether,' is questioned for the wisdom of the view 'what is produced by an effort is eternal', and if he retracts from his initial assertion and cries out 'Who says that sound is eternal?', than he is guilty of the above fallacy.

5. Hetvāntara or the clincher of shifting the reason occurs when one, on being shown the flaws in his
reason, attempts to validate it by adding to it a qualification, e.g. Suppose when a disputant asserts that

'Sound is eternal,
for it is perceptible by the senses',

his opponent refutes that the reason 'perceptibility' is not a sufficient ground to establish that sound is non-eternal, for there is universal concomitance between perceptibility and the jāti sound which is eternal; if the disputant then revises the argument with a qualified reason thus,

'Sound is non-eternal,
for it is a genus and is perceptible by the senses',

he commits this fallacy.

6. Arthāntara or the clincher of shifting the topic occurs when one in order to shield his defeat in argument sets aside the actual topic and brings instead an irrelevant one, e.g. When a disputant puts forward the argument that

'Sound is non-eternal,
for it is perceptible by the senses'

and is opposed on the ground that 'perceptibility is not a sufficient ground to prove that sound is non-eternal, as it is also found with eternals, such as the genus of sound', and if the disputant then begins to argue thus

'Sound is a quality of ether,
there is the relation of inherence between sound and ether,
and this relation of inherence too is non-eternal.'

he is irrelevant, and hence guilty of this fallacy.

7. Nirarthaka or the clincher of senseless argument is one that contains statements which convey no
meaning. One who desires to prove that a 'pot is non-eternal' argues thus:

'A pot is eternal,
for the sounds of the forms A, K, Y, R cannot
denote the sounds that are their causes.'

In the above argument there is the presumption
that the sounds of the forms of 'A, K, Y, R' can
denote something, though not the sounds which are
their causes. The presumption is ill-founded, for
sounds have no denotation. Hence the argument
is meaningless.

8. Avijnātārtha or the clincher of the unintelligible
argument is one that contains words not clear in
meaning, e.g. When a disputant who is cornered
by his opponent in argument resorts to absolute
and ambiguous words in order to baffle the
opponent and the listeners, he is said to commit
this fallacy.

9. Aparthaka or the clincher of the incoherent
argument is one that has words and sentences of
no connected meaning for lack of expectancy,
consistency and contiguity among themselves, e.g.
If a disputant who is unable to stand the argument
of his opponent utters '10 pomegranates, 6 cakes, a
hole in the ground, goatskin, a lump of flesh, etc.'
he is charged with the above fallacy, for the
expressions given vent to do not convey a coherent
meaning when pieced together.

10. Aprāpta-kāla or the clincher of the inconsequential
argument is one whose members of the process of
reasoning are not in the generally accepted order,
e.g.
When a disputant who wants to establish that the hill he sees before him is fiery proceeds to argue thus:

Pratijñā  The hill is fiery.
Udāharana  What is smoky is fiery, like the kitchen,
Hetu  Because the hill is smoky
Nigamana  The hill is fiery,
Upanaya  the hill is smoky
he is said to commit this fallacy.

In any process of reasoning the order in which the members should be arranged is of vital importance to facilitate the determination of the exact meaning of the argument. In the above reasoning the usual order – pratijñā, hetu, udāharana, upanaya and nigamana – is so badly violated that the trend of the thought of the argument is not kept up in its continuity; as a result the argument itself falls flat and is of no consequence.

11. Nyūna or the clincher of the incomplete argument is one where all the members of the process of reasoning are not given, e.g.

A disputant reasons as follows:—

‘The hill is fiery,
for it is smoky,
whatever is smoky is fiery, like the kitchen’.

An advocate of the five membered form of reasoning will contest this argument as it lacks two members – upanaya and nigamana. To him the argument is Nyūna or incomplete. But to the Siddhāntin who believes in a three-membered form, the argument is proper and is correct in form. On the contrary if some one contends ‘the hill is fiery’ on the only ground that it is smoky, the Siddhāntin
will charge him of the fallacy of nyūna for omission of the udāharana (example).

12. Adhika or the clincher of superfluous members of an argument is one that has more than one reason or example, e.g. In the argument

'The hill is fiery,
for it is smoky and luminous, like the [kitchen and a
smithy] we have an instance of adhika. The second reason, luminous nature and the second instance 'smithy' are unnecessary for affirming the proposition, the hill is fiery.

13. Sabda-punarukta or the clincher of the repetition of a word in an argument is one in which there is repetition of words, e.g.

'Sound is non-eternal,
Sound is non-eternal.'

Here a complete sentence has been repeated. To do so is to commit this fallacy.

14. Artha-punarukta or the clincher of the repetition of an idea is an argument where there is repetition of an idea, e.g.

'Sound is non-eternal and
Echo is liable to be destroyed.'

The idea of 'sound' has been repeated by another word 'echo' which conveys the same idea. Echo is but a species of sound. Again, in the term 'non-eternal' the idea is the same as in the phrase 'liable to be destroyed'.

15. Ananubhāsana or clincher of non-reproduction of an argument occurs when a disputant is unable to reproduce what has been clearly stated by his opponent and duly understood by the spectators of the
disputation (vāda). It is necessary that a disputant should restate what his opponent says before he starts to meet his argument. In this case he fails to understand the import of his opponent's statements. Yet he does not admit it. If he does, it will be a case of ajñāna (incomprehension). Nor does he evade disputation. If he does so, it will be an instance of vikṣepa (evasion). He simply remains silent as it were.

16. Ajñāna or the clincher of incomprehension of an argument occurs when a disputant who has fully understood the implication of his opponent's argument pretends incomprehension and questions his opponent as if to elucidate certain points.

Although his opponent has clearly stated his arguments which are fully understood by the disputant and by the spectators or listeners, the disputant who sees no way of meeting the argument of the opponent gains time only by pretending incomprehension of the course of the argument. If the disputant persists in his attitude beyond a reasonable limit, it is a ground of defeat for him.

17. Apratibhā or the clincher of embarrassment in an argument arises when a disputant who is unable to give a fitting reply to his opponent looks inattentive consequent on embarrassment. If a disputant who understands the full import of his opponent's argument is unable to proceed with the discussion for want of ingenuity he is caught in an embarrassing situation. He is seemingly inattentive and does not openly own defeat. This is a ground of defeat.

18. Vīkṣepa or the clincher of evasion in an argument occurs when a disputant evades a full discussion on
the topic in question by willfully occupying the time in digression. When a disputant who has opened up a discussion finds, in the midst of a disputation, that he could not establish his position however long he might continue, he resorts to the device of evasion. Instead of proceeding with the discussion to the end, he takes up the time by indulging in irrelevant talks, and leaves the hall on the pretext of urgent business elsewhere.

Evasion is also the device adopted by a disputant who realises in the midst of his disputation that he would have to meet with sure defeat, if the disputation were carried through.

19. Matanujñā or the clincher of admission of a contrary opinion in one's argument consists in charging the opponent with the same faults as thrown against one's self without vitiating the charges of the opponent, and also removing flaws from his own arguments. If a disputant is charged with fallacious reasoning by his opponent, it behoves the former to remove the charges brought against him by the latter. Instead, if he points out to his opponent that the same fallacy is found in his argument as well, he will be gravely committing himself to his opponent's charges; for in charging him in this manner, the disputant is tacitly admitting the said faults in his own argument.

20. Paryānuyojjāpekṣaṇa or the clincher of overlooking the censurable in an argument consists in failing to censure a person who is known to be defeated in arguments.

When one is defeated in arguments, it is but proper for his opponent to openly charge him of fallacious reasoning. If the latter does not bring
home this fact to the former, he himself is liable to be charged by the audience of this clincher.

21. Niranuyojānuyoga or the clincher of censuring the uncensurable in an argument consists in censuring a person who is not defeated in arguments. Even when one does not actually get defeated in arguments, he is liable to be charged by another as having subjected himself to a clincher. The latter who charges the former does so for lack of understanding the true character of the clincher in question, and is censured on that score as defeated.

22. A pasiddhānta or the clincher of deviating from one's tenet in a disputation consists in establishing one's side with the help of tenets contrary to his own.

In the case of a Buddhist who carries on a discussion with a Saiva Siddhāntin in consonance with the tenets of Buddhism saying

'What exists can cease to exist, and what does not exist can come into existence' is opposed by the Siddhāntin urging that there is nothing to prevent the coming into being of non-existent things as horns in horses, skylotuses, and if the Buddhist sets aside his own tenets and bases his argument on that of the Siddhāntin and argues what is cannot cease to be, and what is not cannot come to be, he is said to be inconsistent, and is said to commit this clincher.
CHAPTER 10

Truth and Error

(1) Validity of Knowledge.

As regards the validity or invalidity of cognitions the Indian schools of philosophy hold two different theories. The first is the svatastva-vāda. According to this vāda the validity or invalidity of cognitions is intrinsic or self-evident. In other words the very conditions that bring forth valid or invalid knowledge make known, as the case may be, the validity or invalidity of that knowledge. The second is the paratastva-vāda, which says that the validity or invalidity of cognitions is not self-evident but is extrinsic. According to this vāda the sum-total of conditions that produces knowledge, whether valid or invalid, does not manifest the validity or invalidity of that knowledge.

The Siddhāntin along with the Mīmāṃsakās and the Advaitins hold the svatastva-vāda with respect to valid cognitions and the paratastva-vāda as regards invalid cognitions. For with him validity is inherent in cognitions and is self-evident; and invalidity is something extrinsic to cognitions and is but accidental to them. The Buddhists hold an opposite view. They are upholders of the theory of paratastva with regard to validity of cognitions and svatastva as regards invalidity. With them invalidity is an intrinsic character of all cognitions; but validity is something brought to bear on some cognitions from without. It is not self-manifest but is other-dependent for its ascertainment. The Sāṅkhyaas maintain and support the theory of svatastva with respect to both valid and invalid cognitions. They say that validity and invalidity are inherent in cognitions and are intrinsic. They are manifested by the same

1. S.B.S. pps 100 - 104.
causal conditions that produce the cognitions. As against the Sāṅkhyaśas, the Naiyāyikas believe in the theory of parastastva as regards both valid and invalid cognitions.

If validity be, as the Siddhāntin says, intrinsic to all cognitions, how can we account for wrong cognitions? What is the criterion by which we can distinguish a valid cognition from a wrong one? The Siddhāntin answers that both valid and invalid cognitions will be valid as cognitions. When the jñāna sāmugrīs (totality of conditions necessary to generate knowledge) free from doubt and error function, there arises a cognition attended by a belief in the object made known. The very conditions that generate the cognition produce as well the cognition of its validity. No extraneous causes are required to cognise its validity. If however the totality of conditions necessary for the generation of the cognition is defective, no such cognition arises as the grounds for doubt and error are not eliminated. Even in the case of a delusive cognition made by one who mistakes a rope for a snake exclaims 'this is a snake', the totality of conditions that are responsible for the cognition of the snake is the same as what gives the cognition of its validity qua cognition. A subsequent investigation may dispel the delusion and the 'this' element may then be identified with a rope and not with a snake. Yet the cognitions of both the snake and the rope are valid as cognitions; their validity too are guaranteed by the very conditions that generate the cognitions in each case. The conditions that produce the cognition of the snake is something other than what generates the cognition of the rope. Consequently the

1. S.B. pps 341 and 304.
Siddhāntin holds that the invalidity of the cognition in which a rope is apprehended as a snake, is something brought from without. It is extrinsic to the cognition of the snake. Yet all cognitions as cognitions are characterised by intrinsic validity. In the case of wrong cognitions, however, the invalidity attaches itself to them from without, brought forth by extraneous causes.

Of the Mīmāṃsakās the Prabhākaraṇas are supporters of the doctrine known as tripuṭi samvit. According to this doctrine there is in every act of cognition a presentation and an apprehension of the knower, the known and knowledge. The knower and knowledge are both apprehended by the same causal conditions that manifest the known; and the validity of the cognition too is apprehended along with the cognition itself and is self-manifest. Murāri Misra holds the view that in every case of cognition there is an apprehension of an after-cognition that gives the validity of the cognition. But the Bhāṭṭās differ from Murāri Misra in holding the view that the after-cognition that gives the validity of the cognition is inferred. Yet both Murāri Misra and the Bhāṭṭa school believe in the self-validity of cognitions. For according to both, validity is ascertained — perceptually in the one case and inferentially in the other — by the same causal conditions that generate the cognition. The Siddhāntin seems to favour the school of the Bhāṭṭās. For he says that the ātman cannot be cognized in the way in which either the sat or the asat is cognized. It is known to exist by virtue of its cognition of the sat and the asat.

2. S.B. pp 344.
3. S.B. pp 263.
from the ātman in both svayam-prakāsa (self-manifest) and paraprakāsa (other-manifest). The causal conditions that manifest the pot, which is the known, manifest at the same time knowledge, which is non-different from the knower. The validity of the knowledge which is inherent in it, is inferred from the same causal conditions that manifest the knowledge.

The Baudhāyas hold the theory of extrinsic validity of knowledge. According to them knowledge is intrinsically invalid. It becomes valid when it stands the test of arthakriyākāritvam (practical efficiency). A pot perceptually present is vivid, clear and definite and the knowledge of it is valid. But a pot imagined is neither vivid nor clear. It is indefinite and the knowledge of it is invalid, as it fails to fulfil any practical need. An analysis of the process of knowledge will show the inherent invalidity of knowledge. Knowledge starts with perceptual presentations followed up by memory-revivals and ends with synthetic constructions of the elements of presentation and memory. What are presented to the senses are the sensuous which are objective; but the elements of memory are non-sensuous and subjective. Knowledge arises when the non-sensuous elements are integrated with the sensuous. But the non-sensuous such as class-concept etc. have no objective counterparts; they are mere mental creations or figments of the mind. Consequently knowledge which involves such non-sensuous elements are intrinsically invalid. Yet in the empirical world though not in the transcendental world, particular cases of knowledge can be said to be valid if they have the character of workability. Tests for the workability or practical efficiency of a particular cognition are extraneous to the causal conditions that give rise to knowledge.

1. S.P.D. pps 88-93.
Thus the Buddhists establish their theory of parastastva with respect to the validity of cognitions.

The Siddhāntin at first is unable to accept the theory of the Buddhists that knowledge which is determinate is intrinsically invalid. Determinate knowledge is conceptual knowledge. If conceptual knowledge were invalid by its very nature, it cannot be made valid by extraneous conditions, whatever the number of conditions may be. Again workability cannot be the cause of validity. It is true a knowledge is workable because it is valid. There are cases of valid knowledge relating to past and future events, to heaven, hell etc., that are not workable. They would become non-valid in the view of the Buddhists. Consequently the Buddhists will be debarred from claiming validity to inferential knowledge and knowledge obtained through verbal testimony of the kinds mentioned above. They will be left with perception of svalakṣaṇās (particulars) which alone will be valid with them. Their theory of knowledge too, as it involves conceptual forms of knowledge will be invalid. Thus the Buddhists if they want to have a consistent theory of knowledge would do well by abandoning their position of intrinsic invalidity of knowledge and their parastastva-vāda of validity.

The Śāmkhyās believe in the theory of svastastva of both the pramāṇās and the apramāṇās. Validity and invalidity are both inherent in knowledge. The puruṣa (self) is an inactive seer and knowledge is the result of reflection of consciousness in a modification of Buddhi. Valid knowledge consists in cognizing things as they really are and invalid knowledge is the result of cognition of objects not in their true nature. True to their doctrine of Satkārasya-vāda, the Śāmkhyās insist that
whatever appears exists. The validity and invalidity of knowledge that are manifested as belonging to knowledge pre-exist in knowledge in a sukṣma (subtle) state. They are not things brought to bear on knowledge from without.

The Siddhāntin objects to the Sāṅkhya conception of the inherent natures of validity and invalidity of knowledge. If knowledge were inherently both valid and invalid, then the causal conditions that manifest knowledge would have to reveal together both validity and invalidity that are inherent in it. Consequently no knowledge can be termed as either valid or invalid; and knowledge will be both valid and invalid at the same time. This would land the Sāṅkhyas into a ridiculous position. If the Sāṅkhyas hold the view that the same set of causal conditions that manifest knowledge reveals also one of the two, the validity or invalidity which is inherent in it and that the other is manifested by a different set, they will have to admit with the Siddhāntin that invalidity is extrinsic cognitions.

1 The Naiyāyikās are supporters of the theory of parastavā of both validity and invalidity of knowledge. The causal conditions that produce knowledge guarantee neither the validity nor the invalidity of knowledge. Knowledge is produced by the sense-object contact. Such of them in which there is a correspondence of ideas with objects constitute valid knowledge. The cases where ideas do not tally with objects give rise to invalid knowledge. The presence or absence of correspondence of ideas with objects is determined by the successful activity test. If a particular knowledge is valid there will be a correspondence of ideas with

1. H.I.L. pps 408 and 409.
objects and such knowledge will lead the knower to successful action. In invalid knowledge there is no such correspondence and the knower will not be led to successful action. Hence it is the Naiyāyikas hold that the validity or invalidity of a cognition is inferred from the success or the failure of the attempt on the part of the knower. The causal aggregate that establishes either the validity or the invalidity of a cognition is something other than what produces the cognition. Thus neither the validity of a cognition nor its invalidity is self-manifest.

The Siddhāntin finds fault with the Naiyāyikas for their view of extrinsic validity of cognitions, though he fully agrees with them that invalidity is extrinsic to all cognitions. Validity cannot but be intrinsic to all cognitions. If it were a fact that the validity of a cognition is to be inferred from conditions other than those that produce the cognition, the conditions themselves would have to be proved valid. This would mean that the validity of each of these conditions involves another inference requiring another set of conditions which in turn requires a third set and so on leading up to an infinite regress. The Siddhāntin believes that his theory of self-validity of cognitions is free from the fault of infinite regress and consequently is the right view.

(ii) Theories of error.

Any system of philosophy, to be worthy of the name of philosophy must have a view of error as distinguished from truth; the various schools of Indian philosophy have taken this fact into consideration and have formulated different theories of error. The Siddhāntin too has given a theory of his own known as the anyathākhyāti; the merits of his theory
over the others can be gauged only by an examination of the rival theories. Hence it is proposed to consider the latter theories first, before the Siddhāntin's theory is finally established.

The theories of the different schools can be, broadly speaking, grouped into the three classes viz., (1) the asat-khyāti (2) the anirvacaniya-khyāti and (3) the sat-khyāti. Of these the asat-khyāti view is propounded by the Mādhyamikās. According to this view error consists in the cognition of the asat as real. The anirvacaniya-khyāti view belongs to the Advaitins. In this view there is error if we consider a thing presented as real or unreal. It is really anirvacaniya or indeterminable. The sat-khyāti view is adopted by the Viśiṣṭādvaitins and most of the remaining Indian schools of thought. This view stresses the fact that it is the sat or the real that is cognized in error. It has three subdivisions viz., (a) the ātma-khyāti, (b) the ākhyāti and (c) the anyathā-khyāti. Of these the ātma-khyāti view is held by the Yogācāras who are subjectivists. According to this view error consists in mistaking the ātman or the self which is no other than a series of cognitions that are all real as external objects. The ākhyāti view is countenanced by the Prabhākaras. In this view error is due to the want of discrimination between the thing presented and the thing cognized. The anyathākhyāti view has its protagonists in the Naïyāyikas, the Jainas, the Bhāṭṭās and the Siddhāntin. In this view error lies in the cognition of a thing as anyathā or otherwise than it really is.

(i) Asat-khyāti.

The view of error as countenanced by the Mādhyamikās, is called the asat-khyāti. In this view error

1. I.I.P. pps 165, 166
   H.I.L. pp 139.
consists in mistaking the non-real as real. According to the Mādhyamikās there is nothing in this phenomenal world that can be called real. In the delusive cognition of a shell as a piece of silver neither the shell nor the piece of silver is real. Were silver real the sublating cognition cannot sublate it. But it is a fact that silver is sublated at the destruction of the delusion. So it cannot be real. Further sublation cannot destroy what is real. It can only destroy or annihilate what is unreal. So silver in the delusive cognition is unreal. Again the shell too is unreal. For the shell is but one factor of the sublating cognition of which silver and the connection between shell and silver are the other factors. If one or more of these factors are unreal it will ensue that all are unreal. The Mādhyamikās believe in an ultimate principle which is a void emancipated from four alternatives, viz., from reality, from unreality, from both (reality and unreality) and from neither (reality nor unreality). According to them real existence cannot be the nature of a thing such as the pot and the like, as it would make the activity of the potter a superfluity. Non-existence too cannot be its nature. For no potter is efficacious enough to produce a non-existent effect, the pot. The two remaining alternatives are inadmissible as they are self-contradictory. It has accordingly been said in the Lankāvatāra Sūtrās

'O things discriminated by intellect, no nature is ascertained'.

'those things are therefore shown to be inexplicable and natureless'.

'This matter perforce results, which the wise declare, no sooner are objects thought than they are dissipated.'

1. S.D.S. pp 23
L.I.P. pp 166.
That is to say none of the four alternatives can determine an object. Things have an apparent existence; real nature is indeterminable. They cannot be determined as either real or unreal, or both real and unreal, or neither real nor unreal. Sūnyatā or voidness is the name given for this indeterminate real nature of things. In delusion error consists in the cognition of the void as of the form of the real.

The Saiva Siddhāntin is not satisfied with the theory of error as countenanced by the Mādhyāmikās. If everything be void, how does the void appear in valid cognition as shell and in invalid cognition as silver? The Mādhyāmikās do not appear to have a satisfactory answer to the above question. If the shell nature be natural to the void and the silver-nature adventitious to it, it would be improper to call the void as characterless and indescribable. If both were adventitious it would have to be admitted that the shell and silver present elsewhere appear adventitiously in the void. But this is against the view of the Mādhyāmikās that the void alone is the real. Further it cannot be said that the shell-nature is adventitious to the void and silver-nature natural to it. Consequently the Mādhyāmikās cannot be said to have a satisfactory theory of error.

(2) Anirvacaniyakhyāti.

'The Advaitin's theory of error is known as anirvacaniyakhyāti. In this view there is error if what is presented is treated as either real or unreal. In the delusive cognition of a shell as silver neither the shell nor the silver can be ascertained to be either real or unreal. Were silver real its cognition can never be
sublated; for the real can have no sublation. But the
sublating cognition 'this is not silver' denies the pre-
sence of silver in all the three times in the locus where
it appears or appears to exist. So silver cannot be real.
Were it unreal, it cannot be cognised. Nor can it be
real and unreal at the same time, as it is a contradiction
to say so. It is really anivacaniya or indeterminate.
The shell too can neither be real nor unreal. If it were
real, there cannot be any delusion. Were it unreal, it
cannot be a content of the cognition after sublation.
It cannot be said to be both real and unreal; for two
contradictory attributes cannot belong to the same
object. Thus the shell too is anivacaniya or indeter-
minable. Yet there is a difference in the cognitions of
shell and silver. Though from the ultimate stand-point
Brahman alone can be said to be real as everything else
can be sublated, yet the shell apprehended on the de-
struction of the illusion has an empirical reality as it can
stand a pragmatist test. But the silver of the delusive
cognition cannot satisfy any demand of practical life
and hence cannot claim to have empirical reality.
Further the delusive cognition is a unification of presen-
tative and representative elements. The shell is the thing
presented, but the representative element silver, which
is super-imposed on the shell is similar to but not the
same as the silver given by memory-revivals; it has its
origin in avidyā or nescience that is agitated by a
defect in the sense-organs. Since the silver apprehended
in a delusive cognition is neither real nor unreal nor
real and unreal at the same time but anivacaniya, its
material cause avidyā (nescience) too should be anivac-
caniya. If avidyā were real, its effect silver cannot
but be real. If it were unreal, the effect too would be
unreal. But it has been shown already that the silver
apprehended in delusion is neither real nor unreal but
anirvacaniya. Consequently avidyā, which is the material cause of the object of delusion must itself be regarded as anirvacaniya. Thus error, according to the Advaitin, is indescribable. It is anirvacaniya or indeterminable.

The Siddhāntin at first runs a tirade against the adhyāsa vāda (theory of super-imposition) of the Advaitins. According to him the theory of super-imposition is scorned and abandoned by all philosophers alike as it is a weapon of the helpless. Further he points out that it is not true that if silver were real, its cognition cannot be sublated. For the real may exist in a sūkṣma state or in a sthūla state; and the sublating cognition merely sublates the existence of the real in a sthūla state. Again it cannot be said that the unreal cannot be cognized. Unreality does not mean bare non-existence as is the case of a sky-lotus or the son of a barren woman. It signifies an object that does not persist for all the three times in a manifest condition. The empirical world is constituted of unreal objects, which sooner or later at least at the time of dissolution pass into their sūkṣma (subtle) state. Consequently it is evident that the unreal can be cognized. The view of the Advaitins that error is inexplicable or indeterminable shows their helpless position in the field of speculation. In error it is real shell that is cognized as real silver owing to a defective sense. It is untrue that the indeterminable shell is cognized as the indeterminable silver.

(3) Satkhyāti

The Satkhyātivada is the view of error accepted by Rāmānuja. According to this view, it is the
real that is cognized in error. There can be no knowledge without a corresponding object of which it is a knowledge. Even the so-called appearances forming objects of knowledge are objectively valid entities. Knowledge divorced from objective implication is an impossibility. All knowledges whether true or false are valid as cognitions referring to real objectives. In the delusive cognition of silver for shell, the object cognised, silver, is a part and partial of the object presented though only to a very limited extent. The question arises that if the element of silver in the object presented is too little, how is it that there is a cognition of silver in preference to the preponderating substance, the shell in it. Rāmānuja answers that it is due to omissions and not commissions that the shell is apprehended as silver. But omissions seem to hold their sway even in valid cognitions; for the whole of what is given is never cognized. There is much left quite unapprehended; for example the inside and back-side of the object perceived are not cognized. In the delusive cognition there is omission of the shell-element though it is the preponderant part of the object presented. The silver element present therein to a small extent is the one cognized giving rise to an erroneous cognition. If valid and invalid cognitions are both of the real how is it possible to distinguish the one from the other? Rāmānuja says that the difference between the two can be ascertained by the pragmatic test. A valid cognition is not only yathārtha (agreeing with external objects) but also vyavaharānuguna (conforming to practical needs.) As the silver of the delusive cognition and objects of dream do not conform to vyavahāra or practical needs, they are held to be invalid cognitions. Rāmānuja has a difficulty in proving objective reality for dream-objects. In dreams, to all seeming purposes, we have experience
without any corresponding objects present over there. Rāmānuja proposes to remedy this defect in his theory by citing scriptural evidence to prove that there are in dream-cognitions special objects of unique existences created by Divinity in accordance with one's merits and demerits to correspond to every such cognition. Consequently even dream-cognitions are not mere subjective phenomena but have objective reference.

The Saiva Siddhāntin admits with Rāmānuja that it is the real that is apprehended both in error and in dream-cognitions. But he cannot bring himself to believe that in the delusive cognition of silver for shell there is silver element present in a small extent in the object presented. Even if it were granted that there is silver-element, it is difficult to understand how it is overlooked in ordinary perception. It is still more difficult to explain how it becomes cognized in erroneous cognitions. If Rāmānuja were to say that there is silver in the object presented in a sūkṣma (subtle) state, the Saiva Siddhāntin has no cause to differ with him. But then the silver existing in a sūkṣma state cannot be an object of perception. So the theory of the existence of silver in a sūkṣma state is of no use to Rāmānuja to explain error. According to the Siddhāntin, the silver cognized in delusion is real silver as apprehended at another time and place. On account of its similarity in lustre, this silver is falsely attributed by the defective sense to the object presented the shell. Rāmānuja's dream-objects which are unique creations by Divinity for particular individuals for the time being are mysterious and inexplicable. His theory of error too is not above mystification.
Atma-Khyāti.

Atma-khyāti is the theory of error held by the Yogācārās who are vijñāna-vādins. According to them, there is nothing external to vijñāna or consciousness, which is a continual flux. The external world is but a series of cognitions - which are all real but momentary. There is no justification what-so-ever for positing a world of objects external to consciousness. In the cognitive act, it is the vijñāna or consciousness that differentiates itself owing to a beginningless desire in it into the knower, knowledge and known. If a cognition be different from its object, it must arise either before the object or after it or simultaneously with it. Evidently a cognition cannot precede its object. Nor can it be after the object. For the object of the cognition disappears at the instant when the cognition arises leaving no object to be cognized. If a cognition and its object are simultaneous there should be non-difference between the two. Were they different, the object cannot be manifest in the cognition. But it is a fact that we have cognitions of objects. So it is inferred that a cognition is not different from its objects.

Further an extra-mental reality cannot be established either by perception or by inference. If it be held that perception gives us an external world of objects, we would be led into a blind alley. For perception cannot be of atoms which are partless, as atoms are too small to be perceived. Nor can it be of a composite object which is constituted of parts, since the sides, the inside and the back-side of the object cannot be simultaneously perceived. Consequently the phenomenon of

   S.D. pps 53 & 54.
2. S.D.S. pps 24 & 25.
perception cannot be explained on the admission of an external world. If the world of objects be considered as non-different from consciousness, no such difficulty is experienced in explaining perception; for the question of parts and whole is not applicable in the case of consciousness. Even inference which depends on a knowledge of vyāpti (universal concomitance) between the middle and major terms of a syllogistic form of reasoning is of no avail to posit an external world. Therefore it has been said —

'There is naught to be objectified by intellect; there is no cognition ulterior thereto'

'There being no distinction between percept and percipient, intellect shines forth of itself alone'.

Again it cannot be maintained that consciousness requires something external to it for purposes of cognition. For in dream-cognitions and illusion, there is nothing but consciousness. Yet we are said to have cognitions. Consequently it cannot be held to be incorrect to say that the world of objects is nothing different from ālaya-vijñāna or consciousness, which alone is real though a momentary flux. Empirical knowledge and illusion are mere forms of consciousness. There is a difference between the two. The former satisfies a practical need, whereas the latter does not do so. In the mistaken apprehension of a shell as silver, both the shell and silver are real as forms or modifications of consciousness. But what is unreal is the externality of silver.

'Sivajñāna Yogi questions the vijñāna-vādins what is the nature of ālaya-vijñāna or consciousness, that can exist without an object to be cognized. He is

1. S.B. p. 263,
unable to accept the view that external objects are forms of consciousness. With him every object of cognition is something other than consciousness. A cognition and the object of the cognition are two different things, the former having an inward reference while the latter an outward one. In the erroneous perception of a shell as silver, the very denial of externality to silver by the Yogācārās presupposes the existence of something external to consciousness. Hence the Yogācārās cannot be said to be consistent in their views that ālaya-vijñāna alone exists and that error consists in the affirmation of externality to the objects of cognition.

Akhyāti

The theory of error held by the Prabhākarās is known as ākhyāti-vāda. According to this vāda, error is due to the want of discrimination between two cognitions. When a person looks at a piece of shell lying in front of him and gives vent to the judgment 'this is silver,' neither the cognition of the 'this' element nor that of the 'silver' element is erroneous. What is presented to the senses is the shell. There is contact of the senses with the shell. But no such contact can be claimed in respect of silver, which is a mere idea or a representative cognition. Even as the cognition of the 'this' element is valid, the cognition of 'silver' too is valid as cognition. The shell by virtue of its lustre which it has in common with silver revives in the case of persons of defective senses the memory of silver as seen before. Owing to smṛti-pramosa (obscuration of memory), the representative character of the silver cognition is lost sight of and the 'silver' element attains, as it were, a character as pre-

sentative as the 'this' element apparently giving rise to a synthesised unit of knowledge 'this is silver'. In fact there is absence of relation between the presentative element 'this' and the representative element 'silver'. The two elements cannot be synthesised. The failure on the part of a person to cognise this absence of relation between the two cognitions of shell and silver which are both valid gives rise to error. Truth and error are distinguished from each other by the test of practical efficiency. Every cognition incites us to activity. Such of them that answer the fruitful activity test are true; and others that fail to satisfy the test are erroneous. The sublating cognition 'this is not silver' does not negate the earlier cognition 'this is silver'. What is sublated is the desire and the activity consequent thereon.

The Siddhāntin feels that the ākhyāti view of error does not give a satisfactory explanation of delusion. If delusion were a succession of two cognitions mistaken as one, the activity to which it incites cannot be intelligibly explained. In the shell-silver cognition mere want of discrimination between the two cognitions cannot be the real cause of an error. The want of discrimination is due to the apprehension of some generic character which is common to both the cognitions. This want must necessarily result in a doubtful cognition of the form 'this is either a shell or silver'. It is really the apprehension of some character common to both shell and silver together with that of some specific character of silver that is responsible for the erroneous cognition. In other words some specific character of silver is believed to be seen in the shell by the defective eye. Herein the shell appears as if it were silver, which it is really not. As the shell is cognized as something
else, it is a case of anyathā-khyāti. The ākhyāti-vāda is an erroneous theory as the result of a condition is mistaken therein for the cause which is a sum-total of conditions. Nor can the ākhyāti-vāda give us a clear explanation of sublation. If the sublating cognition 'this is not silver' be held not to negate the earlier cognition 'this is silver', the two cognitions which are of two contradictories would both be valid; and there will be no scope for delusion. Further if it be said that the failure of the ātman to apprehend silver as a representative element is the cause of delusion, it would be a case of anyathā-khyāti and not ākhyāti. For the remembered element silver appears as anyathā (otherwise) i.e., as if it were a presented one.

Anyathā-khyāti

Anyathā-khyāti is the view of error in which one thing is apprehended as anyathā or otherwise than it really is. In the shell-silver cognition, the cognition of silver is due to the fact that the lustre of the shell, on account of its similarity to the lustre of silver excites in the mind of the percipient the samskāra or residual impressions of silver. The revival of these impressions gives us the perception of silver in the way in which an apprehension of the qualities of an object gives rise to the perception of the object that is invariably associated with the qualities. There is sense-object contact in the case of the shell. In other words the shell is presented to the senses. But silver cannot be said to be so. Yet it is an object of knowledge of the self connected with the mind and the senses. The shell and silver are both realities presented to the self, the former existing in front of the percipient and the latter having its being elsewhere. It is only the relation of tādātmya or identity between them that is false. The mistaken
identity is due to some doṣa or defect in the senses. The sublating cognition 'this is not silver' merely negates this relation of identity between the 'this' element i.e. the shell and the 'silver' element. Sublation neither destroys nor annihilates silver altogether. It simply denies the existence of silver in the shell. 'According to the Bhāṭṭās, the relata—the shell and silver—are both presentations but not the relation. With the Bāṣyakāra of the Pauṣkara āgama and the Naiyāyikās, however, the relation too is a presentation. 'These latter differ with the former in advancing the theory of jñāna-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa—some knowledge doing the duty of sense contact to explain the perception of illusory objects. According to this theory when a person who has a previous perceptive knowledge that a peculiar lustre belongs to silver sees a similar lustre presented by a shell, this previous knowledge officiates for sense-object contact causing the illusory perception of silver.

The Naiyāyikās see a second type of jñāna lakṣaṇa in such cases as their so-called perception of fragrance in a distant flower. It is a fact that the sight of a flower at a distance often prompts one to say 'There is a fragrant flower' even though he does not smell the fragrance. There is no contact between the senses and fragrance to account for the immediacy of the cognition. Yet it is supposed that his knowledge that 'flowers are fragrant' functions in the place of sense-object contact for the presentation of fragrance.

The Siddhāntin admits with the Naiyāyikas that the theory of jñāna lakṣaṇa explains illusion. He says

1. S.D, pps. 58 and 59.
2. P.B. pp. 519 'Jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣasya dosavīśeṣarūpa sannikarṣasya vā kalpanāt.'
that the immediacy of illusory cognition may also be explained as due to doṣa-viśesarūpapasannikarṣa. Yet he cannot agree to the second type of jñāna-lakṣaṇa advanced by the Naiyāyikas. It is really a species of inference-drṣṭā-'numāṇa. In judging the fragrance of a distant flower we are really inferring it from the fact that it is invariably associated with flowers. If the perception of a flower and the previous knowledge that flowers are fragrant can be thought of as yielding perceptive knowledge of the unsensed fragrance, there is nothing to deter us in claiming the same with respect to the inferential knowledge of fire based on the perception of smoke and on the previous knowledge that smoke is invariably associated with fire. Then there will be no place left for inference as an independent means of cognition. The Naiyāyikas themselves recognize anumāṇa or inference as an independent source of knowledge. Consequently the theory of jñāna lakṣaṇa can be considered as useless and unsatisfactory for explaining the cognition of the unsensed fragrance of a distant flower as a case of perception. The Bhāsyakāra of the Pauṣkara āgama too seems to admit this when he says that in the cognition 'the hill is fiery', the applicability of the doctrine of jñāna-lakṣaṇa is to be rejected as of the two sāmagrīs viz., anumita-sāmagrī and alaukikasāmagrī, the former is the more cogent.

(iii) Ātma-jñānam or True knowledge

The term jñānam or knowledge is used in text-books dealing with the Indian schools of philosophy to stand for all kinds of cognition irrespective of truth or falsehood. If true knowledge consists in knowing a thing as it really is, it can never be had in the empirical world. For ordinarily when I say I have cognition of an object, say a book, I do not see the whole of the
book. If it is a case of perception, I merely apprehend
the front surface and some of the sides. The inside,
the backside and the remaining sides are left unsensed.
Were the cognition inferential, I am said to have
knowledge of the book either by one or both of its
tatāstha and svarūpa lakṣaṇas. The remaining charac-
ters go unapprehended. It is immaterial whether the
object is cognized in a perceptual way or by an
inferential method, the whole of the object can never be
known. The knowledge obtained by verbal testimony
too is limited to what is given in the āgamaṁ. Conse-
quently it is inferred that all knowledge that we can
have in the empirical world is imperfect.

The Siddhāntin takes things as they are and believes
in an infinity of ātmanās (souls) each of which possesses
the quality of jñānam (knowledge). If every ātman has
the character of jñānam, there is no reason for it to know
a thing imperfectly. Besides why should it once having
known a thing forget it? The solutions of these problems
make the Siddhāntin to recognise the two fetters,
namely - ānava and māyā. The Siddhāntin posits the
existence of ānava mala (root-evil) possessing an infinite
number of saktīs, each of which is believed to cloud one
ātman from eternity rendering its icchā, jñāna and
kriyā saktīs in-operative. To have knowledge, however
imperfect it may be, the jñāna sakti of the ātman must
be manifested. So it is presumed that the ātman is in
beginningless association with the evolutes of māyā
(primordial matter) which it makes use of as accessories
of knowledge. It is the conjunction of the ātman with
the evolutes of māyā that is responsible for the imperfect
knowledge which it has of the objects of the empirical

1. S.B. pp 86.
2. Ibid pp 116.
world. The pāsa, jñānams – perception, inference and verbal testimony – are all forms of imperfect knowledge.

Again knowledge is the fore-runner of activities. So the Siddhāntin believes in a third fetter called karma (action in the form of either merit or demerit), which too is said to be in association with each ātman from eternity. The three fetters, namely – ānava, karma and māyā – are upādhis to the ātman and are together responsible for the empirical life of the atman. It is on account of these upādhis that the ātman knows a thing at one time and forgets it at another. As the fetters are jaḍa (inert) they cannot by themselves disentangle their grip on each ātman; nor can the ātman liberate itself from their hold, as it is in association with them from eternity. Consequently a Supreme Being, Siva who is of the nature of sat (reality), cit (intelligence) and ānanda (bliss) is posited to control the destinies and destinations of each ātman. Though the ātman has the potency to know a thing it cannot have cognition of any object unless illumined by Siva-ṣakti. It is paratantra (other dependent) with respect to Siva, who is svatantra (self-dependent). Yet it has a free will since it is free to know act and earn its deserts according to its merits and demerits. It is svatantra (self-dependent) in its own field of knowledge and activities. In its petta-nilai (embodied state) it is given up to empirical knowledge which is relational and imperfect. But Siva has no empirical knowledge. It is not a doṣa (fault) for Siva who is omniscient not to have relational knowledge which is imperfect. In truth it raises Him aloft as a Supreme Being.

2. Ibid pp 112.
In the mukti nilai, the åtman's empirical knowledge due to its accidental association with the evolutes of māyā remains unmanifest; and it is said to have transcendental knowledge of Siva who is of the nature of cit (intelligence). Thus the åtman appears to have two qualities—one in its petta nilai in the form of relational knowledge, and another in the form of transcendental knowledge in its mukti nilai. This is faulty as it is against the doctrine of guṇa-guṇī-bhāva (attribute-substance relation), which states that the guṇa is inseparable from its guṇī. The Siddhāntin escapes from this fault by positing the character of the atman (soul) to be of such a nature that when illumined by Siva-śakti it has cognition of an object by itself acquiring the character of the object of cognition. This is true of the åtman both in its petta nilai (embodied state) and in its mukti-nilai (state of release). Though the åtman has in its mukti-nilai perfect knowledge of Siva, it is considered imperfect in respect of the immanent cognition of objects by Siva who cognizes all objects including Himself in a general way. It is only in its mukti nilai when the åtman is free from fetters that åtma-jñānam dawns upon the åtman (soul). It is perfect knowledge. It is what is called true knowledge as it lasts for ever to eternity. Relational knowledge is held to be false as it is an accidental characteristic of the åtman in its petta nilai. It is limited knowledge that is not manifest in the mukti nilai of the åtman. Once the cause of limitation—the fetters—are removed åtma-jñānam or true knowledge shines by itself. Knowledge obtained by the methods of perception, inference and verbal testimony are essentially false. Yet they are useful to the seeker after truth as leading him towards true knowledge.
What is the epistemological position of the Saiva Siddhānta? What bearing has it to the modern schools of European thought? In considering these questions we must note the fact that the epistemological position of any school of philosophy depends to a very great extent upon what view it has about the origin of knowledge. These views according to European philosophy fall into six main groups, namely—rationalism, sensationalism, innatism, intuitionism, pragmatism and realism. Each of these theories may be examined in turn with a view to assign a proper place for the Saiva Siddhānta.

1. Rationalism

Rationalism is the doctrine that reason is the source of all true knowledge. Anything that goes counter to reason, the highest faculty in man, is false knowledge. Even revelation and sense-perception cannot have validity unless they harmonize with the principles of rational thought which is autonomous and self-sufficient. Thought can by its own strength discover a system of eternal truths. It requires no support from a supernatural revelation. It need not call for an appeal to sense-perception either. Among the early Greeks, Plato may be cited as a good example of a rationalist. He drew a sharp opposition between sense and reason. According to him, sense-perception is deceptive; for it deals with the changing and the illusory. But reason is trustworthy, since it leads up to the real and permanent. Coming down to modern philosophers, we find Descartes' philosophy as a typical example of rationalism. By an appeal to reason he arrived at certain fundamental principles which he was unable to doubt. With these principles as basis he proceeded to deduce
his conclusions by the geometrical method. Descartes was not alone in professing rationalism. Almost all the thinkers of the mainland of Europe, such as Leibniz and Spinoza were rationalists, while the British philosophers such as Locke, Berkeley and Hume were sensationalists.

If rationalism is examined from the stand-point of modern logic, we cannot fail to notice that the mistake of rationalism lies in isolating reason from the sensuous conditions on which its applicability depends. The rationalists have failed to understand that all human concepts grow out of the level of perception and that reason is only an abstraction. If empiricism has erred by overlooking the intellectual factor, rationalism can be said to have done so in over-estimating the factor. Sensation cannot be dismissed as worthless knowledge on the ground that it contains a few illusions; and reason itself is not a sure guide. The student of philosophy must bear in mind that the two, if free from error etc., are means of valid knowledge.

2. Sensationalism or Sensism

Sensationalism is the system of thought, which holds that all knowledge is derived from sense-experience. As a doctrine accounting for the origin and growth of knowledge it is called associationism. When it explains the nature of reality saying that nothing can exist except what appear to the senses, it is known as positivism. If it asserts that the sensible alone can be known it merges with phenomenalism. When it attempts to account for the validity of our knowledge by an appeal to sense-experience it is called empiricism. Francis Bacon is the typical example of sensationalism. James Mill of associationism, and Auguste Comte of positivism. Immanuel Kant is a phenomenolist when he says that we can never know the noumena behind
the phenomena, which alone we can cognize. Locke and Hume are known as empiricists.

The main point on which all the sensationalists agree is that all our convictions arise from sense-experience. There is no source of knowledge higher than the senses.

Our convictions retain their sensile character even when we deal with abstract objects. The sensationalists are opposed to the theory of rationalism which holds that besides sense-perception, there is a non-sensory source of knowledge called reason which reveals much more than what sense-perception does. The sensistic theory is also at variance with innatism and intuitionism and holds that the mind is originally an absolute blank on which sense-impressions are as it were recorded, without any action on the part of the mind. Recurrences of similar events give rise to the conception of laws which are merely statements of experience gathered together by association. Strictly speaking there cannot be any causation according to this theory. One thing may be observed to follow another but cannot be said to be the cause of the other; for observations do not assert that the latter is caused by the former. The idea of necessary connection between the two things is purely mental and observations of empirical data take no part therein.

The fundamental objection to sensationalism is that it fails to give an adequate explanation of experience. We have experience not only of individual concrete objects but also of concepts which are abstract. Again the sensationalist theory that mental activity consists in mere receptivity of sense-impressions cannot be vouchsafed to be consonant with experience, since we
know for certain that in forming a coherent body of knowledge out of individual sense-impressions which are momentary, there is a mental activity which is quite distinct from mere receptivity. Further it may be pointed out that sensationalism on account of its mechanical view of knowledge fails to impress us as a system worthy of adoption.

3. Innatism

Innatism is the theory which holds that we are ushered into the world with pre-formed convictions. According to this view the process of learning by which we come across new truths and beliefs is not one of accretion but one of explicitation. Whatever is implicit in the mind becomes explicit by this process. Plato and Leibniz are good examples of innatism. With Plato "Our birth was but a sleep and a forgetting of the ideas we had in a former period of our existence." Leibniz took to this doctrine of innatism as he with his theory of windowless monads, was unable to concede that the world could act on the mind and arouse representations of itself therein.

The theory of innatism is charged by the modern European thinkers that it is an unnecessary and gratuitous assumption on the ground that it has no empirical basis. No proof can be adduced, they say, that we have ready-made concepts at our birth. According to them, the joint functioning of the senses and the intellect can suffice to account for all knowledge. If we can have a really scientific view of things, we can see that the objections raised by the modern thinkers against innatism are not sound. If knowledge is not assumed to be inhering in the mind as a quality or activity which gets manifested under appropriate conditions, we have to adopt the position that it is
produced anew out of nothing. This is against science which upholds the theory of conservation of things. Instead of getting trapped into a pitfall of unscientific attitude is it not safe to take up the attitude of innatism and get over the difficulty? It may be really safe to do so. But this might land us into another difficulty more insurmountable than the former. If knowledge consists in the manifestation of the known only, then there will be no new knowledge. This difficulty is got over by the Siddhāntin, who is the Asiatic counterpart of the European innatist by postulating that the newness of a knowledge consists in the newness of manifestation or explicitation of what was implicit in the mind or the soul. According to the Siddhāntin each soul is characterized by the qualities of knowledge of objects both concrete and abstract which are all implicit in the soul from eternity. In the act of knowing a thing concrete or abstract, what was implicit in the soul as a quality becomes explicit. The Siddhāntin is, however, at variance with Plato who opines that "our birth was but a sleep and a forgetting of the ideas we had in the past". He feels that Plato herein confuses recollection with knowing. Thus the theory of innatism with the particular interpretation which the Siddhāntin gives, may be expected to appeal to the future generation of philosophers both Western & Eastern.

4. Intuitionism

The word intuitionism has no fixed connotation in European philosophy. All philosophers are agreed that it is a kind of direct or immediate apprehension and that it excludes inference and discursive reasoning which are all indirect. Some such as Berkeley would restrict the use of the term to sense-intuition only, thereby making it equivalent to perception. Some such as Descartes would include under intuition both
sense-intuition and thought-intuition. There are others such as Plotinus and St. Theresa who have taken the stand-point of intuitionism as regards the knowledge of God. Spinoza who holds the view that knowledge is a continuum which could be considered as constituted of the three stages—the empirical, the scientific and the intuitional—gives the highest place to intuitive knowledge as it gives an immediate insight into reality. According to him empirical knowledge is the lowest stage of knowledge and does not go beyond sense-perception of particulars. The next stage is scientific knowledge, which is no longer confined to particulars but comprises the laws connecting them. The highest stage is intuitive knowledge of the whole universe as one inter-connected self-dependent system. This stage of knowledge though higher than both empirical and scientific knowledges, grows out of them and is their culmination point. Bergson too asserts that the knowledge of the universe obtained through intuition is far superior to that got through the intellect. According to him the intellect by its very constitution is unsuited to comprehend reality as a whole. It can at its very best isolate parts of reality and know them. As a knowledge of individual parts does not constitute a comprehension of reality as a whole, the intellect may be said to distort or falsify reality. Further it misrepresents reality which is dynamic as static and motion which is a continuous flow as a succession of points. It gives a false picture of reality which is a constant flow by reading in it the notions of cause and substance. Reality is neither cause nor substance. Thus the intellect can in no way give us an adequate knowledge of reality. Therefore Bergson argues against the use of the intellect for understanding reality and urges that intuition alone can give us a true knowledge of reality.
The chief objection that can be raised by the Saiva Siddhāntin against intuitionism is that it is not an infallible source of knowledge. It may not be quite liable to error in practical life. But in the case of philosophical questions it can never claim to be a sure guide to truth. If it could claim so, we would not have contrary opinions on the same questions by the different philosophers who all claim intuition as the source of their opinions. But we have not only contrary but contradictory opinions as well. So intuition can never be accepted as a source of truth unless it can stand successfully the tests of intellectual scrutiny. Again Bergson's disparagement of the validity of intellectual thought undermines his very system of philosophy. If the intellect is not trustworthy, how can Bergson's philosophy which is a product of the intellect be true?

5. Pragmatism

Pragmatism is not a definitely articulated system of philosophy. Rather it is a philosophic attitude which arose partly as a protest against the intellectual speculations of some schools of modern philosophy. The pragmatists hold the view that the traditional epistemology must be revised in the light of modern researches in the fields of psychology and biology. With them knowledge is the experience of a mental being which reacts to its environment. The mind with its experience can control and dominate its environment. They opine that all truths are human and relative. There is no such thing as absolute truth. The test of a truth is determined by the value of its practical consequences. What tallies with the purpose that demanded it is true and what thwarts that purpose is false. C.S. Pierce and William James are the chief exponents of pragmatism. John Dewey's philosophy of instrumentalism too
has a pragmatic trend. According to him, knowledge is an instrument to be used essentially in the control and domination of our environment. F. C. S. Schiller as well follows the pragmatic lines of thought in his philosophy of humanism. He asserts that it is our interests that govern our convictions. We do not sense objects other than what are conducive to our welfare. As our knowledge of the world is arrived at through the medium of our human interests, our world is 'humanized' as it were. In spite of minor divergences all the pragmatists are of opinion that knowledge is not an end in itself. It exists because it is useful to man leading him to practical results.

The pragmatists fare ill in their doctrine of knowledge as it cannot stand criticism. Knowledge is not a mere means to an end. It can be an end in itself. It is not wholly practical. It is contemplative as well. For it cannot be denied that we have positive enjoyment that enriches our lives in contemplative thinking. The pragmatists fare no better in their view of truth. What is held as truth today will, according to them, turn out to be untruth tomorrow in the light of further researches. Thus truths will be continually made and remade. There will be no end to such fleeting truths. The pragmatists would do better if only they had an idea of an absolute truth, which the Siddhāntin has. In insisting upon the teleological character of experience the pragmatists deserve applause from the Siddhāntin. But what the Siddhāntin cannot tolerate in the school of pragmatism is its narrow view of teleology.

6. Realism

Realism in ancient philosophy stands for the scholastic doctrine that universals are more real than
individual things. In this sense it is opposed to nominalism which denies the existence of universals beyond the individuals which make up them. For the extreme nominalists of the type of Roscellinus, the universal is nothing but a name that can be applied to a number of individual things. The Saiva Siddhāntin is no realist in this sense. He is no nominalist either. For him the universal or class is as real as the individuals which constitute the class and is non-different from them. The class-name according to him stands for the essential attributes and the individual name for both the essential and accidental attributes. An object is really constituted of attributes, which are as material as the object itself and not as science would have it, immaterial imponderable appendages of the object. The attributes collectively viewed go as the object, individually viewed remain as attributes. Coming down to modern philosophy we find that the word realism is applied to the doctrine that there exists a reality independent of the thinking mind. In this sense realism is opposed to idealism which affirms that everything known is mental and denies that anything exists which is not experienced by some mind. The Saiva Siddhāntin is a realist opposed to idealism both subjective and objective. Strict subjective idealism asserts that reality is mental and is not different from the thinker's own consciousness. Even other thinkers are objects of his thought and have no existence apart from his consciousness. If what are known exist only in the consciousness of the thinker, it follows that the thinker can know only the contents of his own consciousness. This is pure solipsism. No men of thought would subscribe to this view, the least among them being the Siddhāntin. The less logical forms of subjective idealism merely deny the existence of a physical world outside the consciousness.
The Saiva Siddhāntin feels that subjective idealism in any form is dogmatic in character and is inadequate to explain the facts of experience. Objective idealism is the doctrine that asserts that reality is consciousness itself without giving an indication as to who possesses this consciousness. According to the objective idealists the world we know is one and we are its parts. The Saiva Siddhāntin sees in objective idealism a mere compromise between realism and subjective idealism, which are doctrines opposed to each other.

Even in realism itself many different forms have sprung up in recent times. We have to classify them and assign a suitable position to the Saiva Siddhāntin. The classification is not easy and rendered more difficult on account of the various views of knowledge entertained. However all of them may be grouped under the two types, namely – presentative realism and representative realism. Of these presentative realism is the doctrine that the knower has a direct apprehension of the object known, which is independent of the thinking mind. Representative realism is the view that knowledge is an indirect apprehension of reality by means of concepts which are but signs or symbols of reality. This is a copy view of knowledge championed by Locke. The chief exponents of presentative realism are Reid and Hamilton. According to these thinkers knowledge is a perception of an extra-mental reality conditioned by the interaction of the knower and the known. Bertrand Russell and, G. E. Moore adopted this attitude of presentative realism even to objects other than those of sense-perception. According to them we can have immediate apprehension of conceptual objects, which are independent of the thinking mind. A similar view is held by the
American New Realists. These thinkers have adopted a form of presentative realism, while the Critical Realists a form of representative realism.

The Saiva Siddhāntin is a presentative realist of the type of Bertrand Russell. According to him we can directly apprehend not only physical objects but also conceptual objects. He cannot accept the copy view of representative realism that a concept which is the mental object can be a representative of a physical object which is non-mental.

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INDEX

A
Abādhita ārthavāsāyaka jñānam, 147
Abāhita viṣayatva 214
Abhāva, 155, 156, 180, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 248
Abhedā, 227
Abhihitānvaya vāda, 271
Abhrānta, 183
Acetanā prapañcam, 19
Accidens, 120, 186
Ādāra, 156
Adhika, 298
Adhikaraṇa, 30
Adhyāsa vāda, 63, 72, 177, 313
Āgama, 5-7, 12-20, 61, 259-261, 263, 323
Āgamānumāna, 244
Āgama pramāṇa. 132, 142, 146, 155, 156, 180, 188, 194, 241, 257-259, 261, 263, 274, 275. See also Verbal Testimony
Āgneya Āgama, 14
Āgni, 260
Āgni purāṇa, 21
Ahaṅkāra, 163, 195
Aikyavāda, 41
Āikya Vāda Saivas, 127
Āitereya upanishad, 2
Āitihya, 155, 156, 275
Ājīta Āgama, 13
Ājīvaka, 30
Ājñāna, 299
Ākāṁśa, 274
Ākāsa, 19, 249, 260, 261, 264, 266
Ākhyāti, 309, 318-320
Ākṛti, 266-269
Alaukikā pratyakṣa, 171
Alaukikā sāmagrais, 322
Ālaya, 71
Ālaya vijñāna, 71, 317, 318
Alexander, 69, 80
Ālochana, 110
Aluṭaiya Dēva Nāyānār, 26, Amarakosa, 21 [27
Amsūnān Āgama, 13
Anadhyatārthakatvam, 140
Anadhyatārthā viṣayakam jñānam, 147
Anākāntika, 278, 282
Ānanda, 51, 324
Ānanubhāṣana, 298
Ananvaya, 287
Anātimitkā Siva, 121
Āṇava mala, 16, 33, 35, 67, 84, 94, 96, 117, 122, 193, 263, 323, 324
Anindriya nibandhana,
181, 182
Aniruddha, 176, 177
Anirvacaniya, 117, 119, 309, 312, 313
Anirvacaniyakhyāti,
309, 311
Aniścitā rūpatva jñānam, 92
Annam Bhaṭṭa, 90, 92, 175
Antahkarāṇas, 113, 115, 148, 171, 193, 262, 263
Antahkarāṇa sapakṣa pratyakṣa, 171, 192, 193
Antān atimai vaṭakkku, 48
Anubhava, 54, 74-79, 82
Anubhava, Ayathārtha, 74, 75, 86
Anubhava, Yathārtha, 75, 98
Anubhūti, 82, 136, 137, 141
Ātmaraṇa, 40
Ātmāśraya dūṣa, 116, 117
Ātmasuddhi, 40
Atyantābhāva, 200, 201
Avabhidakam, 221, 222
Avadhi, 180, 181
Avastas, 39
Avayava, 236
Avayavin, 236
Avidyā, 72, 104, 114, 312.

Avijñātārtha, 296.
Avinābhāva, 77, 189, 221, 225, 226, 248
Avisamvādakam jñānam

Avyakta, 201
Avyāpti, 130, 131, 147, 149, 222, 223

Avyātireki, 291
Ayogi jñāna, 142
Āyātam, 7

B.
Bacon, Francis, 327
Bādhagajñāna-rahita, 138
Bāhyā Indriyas, 193
 Behaviourists, American, 67, 159
Bergson, M, 64, 69, 86, 331, 332
Berkeley, 157, 327, 330
 Bhāgāsiddha, 279
Bhāgavata purāṇa, 21
Bhakti, 11
Bhakti-nūl, 49
Bhāskara Nandi, 152, 153
Bhāva, 197, 198
Bhāvana, 116, 117, 262
Bhaviśya purāṇa, 21
Bheda, 202
Bhedavāda, 41
Bhedā Vāda Saivas, 128
Bhogyarūpa, 54
Bhoktā, 191
Bhramā, 139, 150, 222
Bhūtas, 188, 189
Bīja, 262
Bimba Āgama, 14
Bradley, 205, 210
Brahma, 21, 22
Brahman, 8, 71–73, 102, 103, 114, 116, 130, 185, 186, 260, 312
Brahmāṇḍa purāṇa, 21
Brahma kaivarta purāṇa, 21
Brahma purāṇa, 21
Bṛhadāraṇyaka upanishad, 2
Broad, Dr. C. D., 157
Buddhi, 62, 63, 78, 131, 132, 134, 150, 151, 163, 177, 189, 191, 221, 306
Buddhism, 30, 184, 301

C
Caitanyam, 265
Candrajñāna Āgama, 14
Carvākas, 231, 232
Causation, External, 64
Causation, The Law of Transitive, 64
Cekkī[r]ār, 43, 50, 51
Cetana prapañcam, 19
Ceyōn, 3, 4, 5
Chāndogya upanishad, 2
Cintya Āgama, 13
Ciṛṛarivu, 59
Epic period, 2
Epistemology, 5
Error of Conception, 94, 97
Error, Perceptual, 94, 97
Example, Fallacy of, 285
Experient, 80, 99, 100, 105

F
Fallacies, 276
First Saṅgam, 2
Forms of Knowledge, 73
Freud, 36

G
Gandha, 189, 190, 260
Gāngesa, 175, 224
Ganges, 255, 267
Garadaviṣṇu Miśra, 187
Garuda purāṇa, 21
Gautama, 133-135, 173-175, 268
Gita, 11
Grammarians or The Grammarnian School, 265, 266, 268
Grhya-grāhi-jñānam, 138
Gṛṇa, 60, 61, 63, 79, 124, 145, 154, 165, 189, 195, 196, 236, 246, 325
Gṛṇa-guṇi-bhāva, 54, 60, 61, 79, 153, 165, 170, 246, 325
Gṛṇi, 60, 61, 79, 118, 124, 154, 165, 196, 236, 246, 325
Guru, 33, 36, 39, 50

H
Hallucination, Complete, 166, 168, 169
Hamilton, 335
Hemachandra, 181
Hetu, Anupalabdhi, 227, 228, 230, 234-236, 238
Hetu, Kārana, 228, 236, 237
Hetu, Kārya, 227, 234-236, 238
Hetu, Svabhāva, 227, 234, 236, 238
Hetvābhāsa, 276, 278
Hetvāntara, 294
Hicks, Daves, 69, 86, 158
Humanism, 333, 336
Hume, 327, 328

I

Icchā sakti, 54, 60, 76, 191, 323
Idealism, 334
Idealism, Metaphysical, 185, 186
Idealism, Objective, 334, 335
Idealism, Subjective, 334, 335
Ideals, Rationalistic, 161
Idealists, Subjective, 63, 71
Illusion, 94, 95, 168, 169, 317, 321
Indian Syllogism, 205, 207, 210, 213, 215, 217, 219
Indra, 4
Indriyas, 113, 193
Indriyāntahkarana-nirapekṣa-pratyakṣa, 170, 193, 194
Indriyāntahkarana-sapekṣa-pratyakṣa, 171, 193
Indriya Atmavādins, 68
Indriya nibandhana, 181, 182
Indriya-pratyakṣa, 171, 188-190, 193
Indriyartha sannikarṣa, 152
Indriya-sapekṣa-pratyakṣa, 192-194

Inference, 146, 147, 170-173, 175, 178, 179, 202-204, 211, 216, 217, 221, 223-225, 228, 231, 232, 238, 242, 258, 259, 275-277, 282, 308, 316, 317, 322, 324, 325. See also Anumāna

Innatism, 326, 328, 329
Instrumentalism, 332, 336
Intuitionism, 326, 328, 330-332
Irāiyāṅar Akapporul, 1
Irupāvirupapaṭu, 25, 32
Isa, 8
Isa Upanishad, 2
Isvara, 280
Isvara-jñāna, 142
Isvara-Sākṣi, 186
Isvaravikāraṇāda, 41
Isvara Vikāra Vāda Saiva, 127, 128

J

Jāda, 96, 127, 132, 324
Jagadisa, 269
Jains or Jainas, 92, 151-153, 224, 258, 266, 267, 309
James, William, 70
Janya jñānam, 83
Jāti, 107, 120, 196, 232, 233, 236, 266, 268-270, 293, 295
Jāti-visiṣṭa-vyakti, 269
Jīva, 182, 279
Jīvaka Cintāmani, 51
Jīvan-mukta, 35, 98
Jñāna-‘bhāva, 201
Jñāna-dīkṣa, 32
Jñāna-kāṇḍa, 261-263
Jñāna-karāṇas, 142
Jñāna-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa, 321
Jñānam, 56, 75, 114, 142, 192, 322, 323
Jñānamṛta, 53
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Page Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jñānarūpa</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jñāna-sādhanas</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jñāna-sakti</td>
<td>54, 60, 62, 94, 97, 169, 170, 188, 189, 191, 192, 221, 323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jñāna-sāmagrīs</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jñānendriyas</td>
<td>77, 188, 189, 190, 193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jñāni</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jñāpaka hetu</td>
<td>145, 147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jñāpakasakti</td>
<td>249, 253, 257, 270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jñāta</td>
<td>56, 114, 118, 119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jñeyam</td>
<td>56, 80, 114, 118, 119, 130, 141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jūbāla upanishad</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaivalya upanishad</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalā-tattva</td>
<td>191, 193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kāla-tattva</td>
<td>139, 140, 191, 201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalaviyal</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kālotiara Āgama</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalpa</td>
<td>8, 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kāmika Āgama</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanāda</td>
<td>89, 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kant, Immanuel</td>
<td>56, 327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kantāji</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapila</td>
<td>281, 291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kāraka hetu</td>
<td>145, 147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kāraka sakti</td>
<td>244, 246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kāraṇa</td>
<td>142, 143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kāraṇa</td>
<td>198, 246, 247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kāraṇā Āgama</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kāraṇadosarabita</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kāraṇa-kārya-bhāva</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kāraṇaruṇa</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karma</td>
<td>16, 32, 33, 84, 122, 191, 324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karmakānda</td>
<td>261, 263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karpiyal</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karttā</td>
<td>54, 137, 152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kārya</td>
<td>237, 246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kārya-rūpa</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaṭavul</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaṭha upanishad</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kauśitaki upanishad</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kena upanishad</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kesava Miśra</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kevala</td>
<td>117, 180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kevala pramāṇa</td>
<td>142, 143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kevala Vyātireki anumāna</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirāṇa Āgama</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korraivai</td>
<td>3, 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koṭikkavi</td>
<td>26, 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kriyā</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kriyā-sakti</td>
<td>54, 60, 62, 191, 323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kṣaṇika</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumara Guru Para Swāmi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumārila Bhaṭṭa</td>
<td>93, 138, 140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kural</td>
<td>10, 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kūrma purāṇa</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakṣaṇa</td>
<td>119, 263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakṣaṇaviyal</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakṣmi-jñāna</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lalita Āgama</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lankavatāra Śūtras</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laukika Pratyakṣa</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laukika Vākyas</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leibniz</td>
<td>327, 329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liṅga</td>
<td>33, 224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liṅga purāṇa</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locke</td>
<td>65, 157, 327, 328, 335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lokāyata</td>
<td>17, 21, 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lokāyatās</td>
<td>66, 155, 257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madaṅga Āgama</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mādhava</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madhvā</td>
<td>108, 141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Madhvites, 108, 141, 142, 143
Madhyama Vāk, 249, 250
Madhyamikas, 30, 63-65, 309-311
Mahābhārata, 15, 21
Maitreyani, 3
Maitreyani upanishad, 3
Makuṭa Āgama, 14, 15
Mala, 33, 191
Manahparyāya, 180, 181
Manana, 114
Manas, 114, 115, 163, 190, 193
Mānas Pratyakṣa, 188, 190, 191
Manavācakam Kaṭantār, 25
Māndūkya upanishad, 2
Māṇikya Nandi, 152, 181
Māṇikkavāsagar, 27, 42, 47-49
Mantra, 246-249, 253, 262
Mantra āgama pramaṇa, 262, 263
Manvantra, 21
Marai Jñāna Desikar, 30, 196, 220, 229, 275
Marai Jñāna Sambandar, 33
Marai malai atikal, 9, 12, 13
Mārkandeya purāṇa, 21
Maruts, 4
Matanujña, 300
Materialist, 39
Mati, 152, 180, 184
Matsya purāṇa, 21
Māyā, Asuddha, 16, 125, 191, 249, 250, 257
Māyā, Suddra, 16, 18, 125, 192, 249, 250, 253, 257, 266, 271
Māyā-vāda, 30, 41, 125
Māyāvādin, 39, 100, 101, 103, 114, 119, 126
Māyōn, 3, 4, 5
Mey, 7
Meykanṭa Sāstram, 25, 26
Meykanṭa Tēvar, 24, 25, 28, 30, 33, 236
Meyppāṭṭiyal, 10
Mill, James, 327
Mill, John Stuart, 209, 210, 237
Mimāmsa, 78
Mimāmsakas, 141, 146, 177, 179, 212, 224, 243, 265, 266, 268, 288, 290, 302, 304
Mitra, 2
Mokṣa, 182
Moore, G. E., 69, 157, 335
Mṛgendra Āgama, 16, 17, 24
Mukhabimba Āgama, 14
Mukhya Lakṣaṇa, 221, 223
Mukhyaṁtha, 260
Mukhya-vibhrama, 183
Mukti-nilai, 17, 77, 98, 113, 114, 117-119, 124, 126, 129, 154, 156, 188, 194, 225, 274, 325
Mūlādhāra, 250
Murāri Mišra, 304
Mūttayapillai, T., 31

N
Naccinārkkiniyar, 3, 9, 10
Nāda, 249, 253, 255-257, 270, 271
Nakkirar, 1
Namaccivāya Tambirān, 37
Pradhvamsābhāva 200, 201
Prāgabhāva, 200, 201
Pragmatism, 326, 332, 336
Pragmatist, 69
Prākṛt, 5
Prakṛti, 151, 280
Pralaya, 8, 19
Pralayākalas, 122
Pramā, 142, 143, 147, 149, 150, 179, 186, 222
Pramā karaṇa, 133, 143, 147
Pramāṇa caitanya, 184
Prāmāṇya, 121, 139, 140
Prāmāśādhatamāna, 149
Prāmāśākṣi, 150
Pramā śāmgaris, 135, 136
Pramāta, 80, 123, 124, 126, 127, 130, 133, 135, 136, 142, 149, 153
Pramatr caitanya, 184
Pramevam, 115, 123, 124, 130, 131, 133-136, 142, 149, 151
Prameya Śaṅgraha, 187
Pramiti, 122, 123, 130, 133-135, 143, 153, 179
Prāṇa, 130, 147, 193
Prāṇa ātmavādins 68
Prapañcam, 19
Prasastapāda, 174, 175, 224, 239, 240, 242, 276, 297
Pratiṣṭhā, 277
Pratiṣṭhāna, 293
Pratijñāntara, 293
Pratijñā-śamvāsā, 294
Pratijñā-virodha, 294
Pratisarga, 21

Pāśaṇavāda, 41
Pāśaṇavāda Saivas, 128
Pasu, 7, 16, 20, 23, 29, 32, 74, 98, 121-125, 202, 259, 262, 263, 270
Pasu-jñānam, 117, 118, 132
Pāsūpata, 17
Pāsūtvam, 117
Pasyanti Vāk, 249, 250
Pātāla loka, 257
Patañjalas, 116
Pati, 7, 16, 20, 23, 29, 32, 74, 98, 122-125, 202, 259, 262, 270
Pātikam, 44
Pattison, Pringle, 336
Paurāṇikas, 155, 243, 244, 275
Pauṣkara Āgama, 16, 35, 39, 90, 130, 140, 146, 170, 171, 192-196, 221-223, 321, 322
Payanīyal, 29
Pēraṇivu, 59
Perceptual assurance, 163
Perceptual disposition, 163
Periyapurāṇam, 43, 51-53
Perrān Sāmpan, 34
Pētta nilai, 17, 61, 113, 114, 129, 132, 141, 154, 156, 188, 194, 225, 275, 324, 325
Phala-pramāṇa vādins, 138
Plato, 326, 329, 330
Pōrrippahrotaī, 26, 37
Porulatikāram, 10
Poruliyal, 10
Prabhākaras, 30, 78, 82, 84, 85, 110-112, 136-138, 141, 155, 177-180, 197, 199, 200, 271, 272, 304, 309, 318
Pratyabhijña, 82, 137, 144, 145, 181
Pratyakṣa, 129, 132, 142, 144, 155, 156, 180–184, 186 –194, 196, 197, 223, 225, 241, 257. See also Perception
Pratyakṣābhāsa, 277
Presentationists, 64, 65
Presumption, 170
Price, H. H., 158, 161
Probandum, 178, 221, 222, 224, 233, 234
Probans, 178, 221, 222, 224, 233, 234, 276
Prodgita Āgama, 14
Proprium, 120
Prthvi, 260
Pukaḷentippulavara, 28
Purāṇas, 21, 22
Purattinaiyiyal, 10
Puruṣa, 62, 63, 78, 150, 191, 306
Pūsan, 4
Qualities, Primary, 162
Qualities, Secondary 162
Rāga tattva, 191
Rajas, 197, 198
Rāmalinga Swāmikal, 52
Rāmānuja, 106–108, 313–315
Rasa, 189, 190, 260
Rationalism, 326, 327
Raurava Āgama, 14, 16, 17, 24, 25, 28
Realism, 326, 327, 333–335
Realism, Critical, 336
Realism, New, 336
Realism, Representative, 335, 336
Realists, Critical, 69
Realists, Naive, 158, 165
Reid, 69, 335
Representationists, 63, 65
Reproduction, 76
Revelation, 23, 24, 326
Rigveda, 2, 4, 14
Roscellinus, 334
Ṛṣi, 262
Ṛūpa, 107, 189, 190, 193, 260, Russell, Bertrand, 69, 158, 160, 161, 335, 336
S
Sābdha, 129, 189, 190, 222, 223, 225, 260, 261, 263–266
Sābdha–Brahma–Vāda, 30
Sābdha prapañcam, 19, 264, 266
Sābdha punarukta, 298
Sābdha sāmārthya 261
Sābdikas, 108
Sādhana 142, 233, 234, 263, 286, 287
Sādhana vikala, 286
Sādhanaviyal, 29
Sādhanavyatireki, 289
Sādharaṇa Lakṣaṇa, 119, 120, 121, 123, 142
Sādhya Vikala, 285
Saguṇa Brahman, 19
Sahaja Āgama, 13
Sahaja hetu, 227
Saiva Āgamās, 13, 23, 55
Saiva purāṇas, 22
Saiva Siddhānta, 1, 5, 6, 7, 13, 14, 16, 18, 20, 21, 23–25, 28, 34, 37, 39, 43, 51–55, 57, 60, 69, 99, 121, 154, 170, 195, 196, 201, 237, 246, 249, 276, 326
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page Numbers</th>
<th>Entries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Samketa, 264</td>
<td>Sammugdha jñānam, 110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samsāya, 74, 75, 86, 139</td>
<td>Samsāra, 27, 148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samskāra, 144, 187, 320</td>
<td>Samyag jñāna, 145, 152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samyoga, 145, 152, 194, 195, 264</td>
<td>Samyukta-samāvāya, 194-196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saṅgama, 5</td>
<td>Saṅkalpa, 87, 89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saṅkara, 71, 72, 82</td>
<td>Saṅkarpanirākaraṇam, 26, 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saṅkhya Kārika, 176</td>
<td>Saṅkhya Sūtras, 176, 177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saṅkrānta vāda, 41</td>
<td>Saṅkrāntavādin, 126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saṃmārga, 48</td>
<td>Santāna Kuravara, 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sapakṣa, 211, 212, 214, 218, 219, 224, 238, 278, 282-284</td>
<td>Sapakṣasatva, 214, 215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarga, 21</td>
<td>Samavāya, 100, 101, 195, 196, 199, 264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sāma Veda, 14</td>
<td>Sāma Veda, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sāmavēta, 194, 195</td>
<td>Sāmavēta-samavāya, 195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sāmaya Kuravar, 27, 37, 43, 48, 49</td>
<td>Sambhandhar, 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sambhava, 155, 180, 241, 243</td>
<td>Samīdghobhaya vikāla, 287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samīdghobhaya-vyāti-reki, 290</td>
<td>Samīdgha-sādhana-vyāti-reki, 289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samīdgha-sādhana, 285</td>
<td>Samīdgha-sādhana-vyāti-reki, 289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samīdgha viśeṣyāṇa siddha, 281</td>
<td>Samīdgha viśeṣyāsiddha, 281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samīdghobhaya-vyāti-reki, 291</td>
<td>Saṅkhya, 281</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Smarana, 181
Smrti, 74, 80, 88, 90, 136, 138, 144, 187
Smrti, Ayatharta and Yatharta, 74, 75
Smrti pramosa, 318
Solipsism, 334
Soma, 4
Sparsha, 189, 190, 260, 261
Sphota, 257
Spinoza, 327, 331
Sravana, 114
Srinivasa, 187
Srotra, 195
Sruta, 180
Sruti, 108, 115, 125, 127, 244; 259, 260-262, 275
Sthula, 118, 198, 201, 250, 313
Sthula sarira, 84
Sthula Vaikhari Vak, 249, 250
Subramaanya Desikar, 31, 229
Suddha kala, 192
Suddha Saivas, 129
Suddha Siddhanta, 17
Sukha, 131
Sukhadi pratyaksa, 193
Suksmama, 19, 62, 102, 118, 198, 201, 229, 250, 307, 313, 315
Suksmama Agama, 13
Suksmama deha, 68
Suksmama-deha-atmavadin, 68
Suksmama sarira, 61, 84
Suksmama Vaikhari Vak, 249, 250
Suksmama Vak, 249, 250
Sundaramurthy or Sundarar, 42, 43, 47
Sunya, 4, 115, 119, 125, 129, 240, 241
Sunya, 311
Supaksha, 30
Supra Agama, 14
Suprabheda Agama, 13, 15
Surya, 4
Suta Samhita, 15
Svabhava-linga, 156, 241
Svalaskanias, 105, 182, 306
Svarupa laksana, 73, 74, 98, 113, 114, 126, 166-168, 323
Svarupasiddha, 278
Svatantra, 324
Svastavya veda, 302, 306
Svedanah Pratyaksa, 188, 191
Svayam-prakasa, 115, 305
Svayambhuva Agama 13, 16, 24
Svetambaras, 180
Svetasvetara upanishad, 3, 20
Symbolism, 8
Syncretists or The Syncretist School, 134, 175, 176
Tadatmya, 100, 101, 154, 165, 188, 196, 227, 232, 234, 236, 246, 256, 320
Taittiriya upanishad, 2, 260
Tamas, 197, 198
Tamil Vedas, 43
Taninilai, 7
Tanmatras, 188, 189, 260, 261
Tantra, 7, 13
Tantra-agama-pramana, 261, 263
Tarka, 181
Tarka-vada, 293
Tarkikas, 132, 133, 136, 155, 220, 276
Tatastha Laksana, 73, 114, 124, 166, 323
Tatparya, 274
Vātseyāvana, 88, 90, 92, 132, 134, 136, 173–175, 224, 268
Vātula Āgama, 14
Vāyu, 260, 261
Veda, 2, 5, 6, 13–15, 18, 19, 61, 259, 261
Vedānta, 15
Veda-vākyārtha-jñānam. 137
Vēntan, 3–5
Verbal Testimony, 171, 172, 175, 222, 231, 244, 257–259, 274, 275, 323–325. See also Āgama Prāmāṇa
Vidyā Tattva, 114, 191
Vijava Āgama, 13
Vijñāna, 70, 316
Vijñāna Bhikṣu, 150, 177
Vijñānakālak, 122
Vijñānavāda, 70, 71
Vijñānavādīn, 316, 317
Vikala, 181
Vikṣepa, 299
Vimala Āgama, 14
Vina Venpā, 26, 36
Vipakṣa, 211, 212, 214, 218, 219, 224, 238, 278, 282–285
Vipakṣa-satva, 214, 215
Viparita, 388
Viparīta-vyatireki, 292
Viparyaya, 74, 75, 87, 88
Vīra Āgama, 14 [94
Virūḍha, 278, 281
Viṣaya Caitanya, 184
Viṣaya-visavyā-bhāva, 70
Viśeṣaṇa, 279, 281
Viśeṣanāsiddha, 279
Viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyatā, 194,
Viśeṣyāsiddha, 279 [195
Viśistān, 119
Viśistādvaitins, 92, 106, 107, 143–145, 186, 188, 309
Viṣṇu, 4, 8, 21
Viṣṇu purāṇa, 21
Vṛttī, 18
Vyabhicāra, 294
Vyakti, 196, 198, 232, 236, 249, 256, 257, 266–270
Vyāmala Āgama, 14
Vyājāta, 118, 129, 130
132, 141, 153–156, 179, 182, 194, 254, 275
Vyāpaka, 225, 263
Vyāpti, 81, 100, 223–229
231–235, 237–239, 241, 243, 244, 263, 264, 317
Vyāpti, Anvaya, 226, 228, 229, 239, 240
Vyāpti, Vyatiśreki, 226, 228
Vyāpya 124, 225 [229
Vyarthaviśeṣanāśiddha, 280
Vyāśa, Veda, 22
Vyadhikaranāśiddha, 279
Vyatiśreki anumāna, 239–241
Vyavahāra, 314
Vyavahārāṇuguna, 314
Vyavahārika, 181, 182
Vyavahārika Pratyakṣa, 181

W
Weygandt, 86
Whitehead, A. N. 167
Wundt, 86

Y
Yajur Veda, 2, 14
Yathārtha, 74, 75, 141, 143, 222, 314
Yathārthatvam, 222
Yathāvasthitā-vyavahārāṇugunamjñānam, 144
Yatīndramata Dipika, 187
Yogācāra, 30, 63, 70, 309, 316, 318
Yogāja Āgama, 13
Yogi-jñāna, 142
Yogi-pratyakṣa, 188, 191,
Yogyatā, 274 [192
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