Aurotosh Mookerjee
memorial
Volume
SIR ASUTOSH MEMORIAL VOLUME

22253

PUBLISHED BY
J. N. SAMADDAR
CONVENER, SIR ASUTOSH MEMORIAL VOLUME,
"PATALIPUTRA," PATNA.
1926-1928
Part I and the Contents of Part II printed at the Arunodaya Art Press, 48 Grey Street and the rest at the Kuntaline Press at 61 Bowbazar Street, Calcutta.
Unto [Sir] Asu[tosh] offer this swift man-cheering grace of worship
That to the friends gives wings of joy.

(Rgveda 1-4-7)
Unto [Sir] Asutosh offer this swift man-cheering grace of worship
That to the friends gives wings of joy.

(Rgveda 1.4.7)
CONVENER'S APOLOGY

After a delay of more than two years, *Sir Asutosh Memorial Volume* is out. The Arunodaya Art Press which had been very strongly recommended and which had assured me both verbally and in writing that it had a full set of diacritically marked types on the lino was entrusted with the task of its printing, as early as in January, 1926. It then transpired that the Press had no proper types. However, it went on slowly with the work. But after some ten months, it returned all on a sudden, the last batch of articles and repeated reminders failed to elicit any reply. Some months after it came out that the Press had received, what appeared to it, a more lucrative work. I had then to take legal advice and had to threaten the Press with criminal and civil negligence. Fortunately for me, the more lucrative work proved a failure and what with this and what with the threat of legal proceedings, after full six months it recommenced the work. But the mischief had been done I had to go to a second Press for the rest of the articles and hence this inordinate delay in bringing out the Volume.

The Arunodaya Art Press had thus not only delayed the publication and thrown the entire financial responsibility on my poor shoulders, but the strain, worry, and disappointment had its full effects on me, with the result that since January, 1927, I have been seriously ill. *Sir Asutosh Memorial Volume* has, therefore, been produced under great difficulties and but for the willing help rendered by my son, 2nd Lieut. M. L. Samaddar B. A., of the Postgraduate Department of the Patna College who throughout this period saw the volume through the Press, it would not have seen the light.

I am grateful to the contributors for having made a ready response to my request for contributing to the Volume which is associated with the name of one who has done so much for the resuscitation of ancient Indian culture.

They have followed the poet’s lines:—

"Shall we, who served him during life,
Forsake his vision, now he’s gone?
Nay! This we vow, through storm or strife,
Unfurl his flag, and carry on."

"Pataliputra", Patna.
Sri Pañchami
(January, 26), 1928.

J. N. S.

*The dedication has been kindly suggested by Prof. S. N. Majumdar Sastri.*
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SIR ASUTOSH MOOKERJEE

(PROFESSOR JYOTIS CHANDRA BANERJEE, M. A.)

All high endowments needful for success had he,
serene as skyey dome his mind, his genius rare:
Unmatched his vast and varied lore, as all agree,—
That wisdom true he owned the Gods in Heaven are known to share.
Of men a Prince unquestioned virtues made him out,
Scarce equal’d he or in the East or in the West:
His myriad-mindedness, without a shade of doubt,
Made him of India’s modern sons the worthiest and the best.
Of his fair fame his countrymen would always sing,
If him e’er speak with love and admiration true:
Known widely he:—the different points of compass ring,
Even now, as e’er they will, with his great name the wide world through,
Receive our homage true, great soul, from lands of bliss,
Join us in fervent prayers for this our ancient land:
Ever let us strive thy cherish’d goal ne’er once to miss,
Ever bless us from above—thou comrade of th’angelic band!
SIR ASUTOSH MOOKERJEE: HIS LIFE AND WORK

(PROFESSOR JAY GOPAL BANERJEE, M.A.)

Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, Kt., C.S.I., M.A., D.L., D.Sc., Ph.D., etc., was the greatest Bengali of his age and one of the most talented sons of India. He was the admiration of all who ever came in contact with him, be it casually. He won the love and esteem of Indians and Europeans alike. A man of wide culture and liberal sympathies, he was always an inspiring and stimulating example unto others—especially to the noble youth of Bengal whose imagination and heart he particularly touched by the magic charm of his sympathetic heart and helping hand. He was remarkable for his astounding versatility, wonderful intellectual capacity, scholastic attainments, passionate love of freedom, great force of character, political sagacity and selfless devotion to learning. His death has removed from the academic life of Bengal the most prominent figure and inflicted on the Calcutta University an irreparable loss.

EARLY LIFE AND ACADEMIC DISTINCTIONS

He was born on the 29th June, 1864, in Calcutta in a respectable middle-class Brahmin family not in very affluent circumstances. His father, Doctor Gangaprosad Mookherjee, M.B., came from his ancestral home in a village in the district of Hooghly and settled at Bhawanipur, then a comparatively less important suburb of Calcutta, and set up a lucrative practice as a very successful physician and soon became an eminent citizen of Calcutta.

The boy Asutosh finished his early education (1869-1872) at the Bengali School at Chakraberia and was noted from his very boyhood as a promising child with an insatiable desire for learning and a great capacity for reading. Having finished his preliminary vernacular course he entered in 1875 the Kalighat School subsequently known as the (Bhawanipur) South Suburban School. While at this school the youth was marked as a prominent figure on account of being decidedly far in advance of his class-fellows in his studies and in his attainments, particularly in Mathematics. This,
was largely due to the regular training he received at home under the wise personal supervision of his worthy father. The far-sighted wisdom of Doctor Gangaprosad, whose intelligent watchfulness over the career of his promising son bore such magnificent fruit, led him to provide the boy with a valuable library at home and the guidance and help of distinguished tutors.

He was admitted into the Presidency College, Calcutta, after having passed his Entrance Examination in 1879 at which he stood second in order of merit. Research work, which is recognised to-day as an outstanding feature of all Indian Universities and to which Sir Asutosh Mockerjee attached so much importance in the Calcutta University which may claim to have taken the initiative in this important aspect of University activities, found in him an early advocate, who while yet a mere Matriculate gave clear evidence of his appreciation of its value by a new demonstration of a proposition in Euclid which appeared in 1881 in the Messenger of Mathematics of Cambridge. This remarkable tendency of a mere boy received encouragement from the fostering care of the brilliant mathematician Dr. W. Booth, then a Professor at the Presidency College, who intensely loved this favourite pupil of his for his wonderful mathematical abilities. Recognition of his extraordinary merit duly followed and the young Asutosh gained the singular distinction of a membership of the London Mathematical Association. His original contributions soon attracted the attention of the mathematical world and became known as "Mookerjee's Theorems" and such a great seat of Mathematical learning as the University of Cambridge did him the honour of embodying them in her curriculum. He now began to tackle successfully the hardest Cambridge Senate House problems and make original contributions of outstanding merit to mathematical journals. In the eighties of the last century no young man attracted greater attention for his talents than Asutosh whose brilliant achievements even while yet in his teens were admired with genuine love and pride by the entire body of ambitious students aspiring to academic distinction. He acquired a working knowledge of French and German with a view to becoming acquainted in the original with masterly works in his favourite subject and making his knowledge up-to-date by reading the proceedings of great Mathematical Societies published in learned journals.
After passing in 1881, the First Examination in Arts at which he secured the third place, Asutosh, strangely enough, preferred the Arts to the Science course for his B. A. Examination and offered besides his favourite subject Mathematics, Sanskrit and Philosophy, in addition, of course, to English Literature which was compulsory. A simple explanation of this, probably, is that the wonderful versatility of the young Asutosh made him as ardent a devotee of Sanskrit and Philosophy, and later on of History and Law, as of Mathematics and the Physical Sciences. He was as distinguished a figure in his College Debating Club as in his class and gave there an unmistakable and early proof of his superior debating power and skill which stood him in such good stead later in life at the Calcutta Bar, in the Senate meetings of the Calcutta University and in the Legislative Councils. His extraordinary ability as an organiser too was manifested in his undergraduate days when on the death of his revered teacher in Mathematics, Dr. MacCann, in June 1883 the young Asutosh took on himself the responsibility of starting the MacCann Memorial Committee with himself as its Secretary to perpetuate his Professor’s memory, and raised by subscription funds for a marble tablet in the Library Hall of the Presidency College. He topped the list of successful candidates at the B.A. examination of 1884 and was the Harish Chandra Prize-winner for Mathematics and obtained within six months the M.A. degree in Mathematics (in 1885) being first in the first class. He took again his M.A. in Physical Science in 1886 and won at the same time the Premchand Roychand studentship and the Mouat Medal. He was at once admitted as a Fellow of the Edinburgh Royal Society on the recommendation of Professor Arthur Cayley of the Cambridge University and subsequently enjoyed the distinction of being elected a member of the Royal Irish Academy and of the Mathematical Societies of London, Paris, Palermo and New York.

For three successive years from 1884 he was the Tagore Law Gold medalist and took his B. L. degree from the City College in 1888.

**DISTINGUISHED PROFESSIONAL CAREER**

Having completed his period of articleship under the eminently renowned lawyer Babu (afterwards Sir) Rashbehari Ghosh, he became
built up a lucrative practice till in a short time his legal learning and forensic skill brought him to the front rank of his profession. The next year he became a Fellow of the Calcutta University. The Doctorate of Law was conferred on him in 1894 and in 1898 he was appointed as Tagore Law Professor and his lectures on the Law of Perpetuities in British India were considered to be a valuable contribution to legal knowledge. In June, 1904, he was elevated to the High Court Bench and for 20 years he filled that exalted office with conspicuous ability till his retirement on the 31st of December, 1923, having in the meantime officiated as its Chief Justice.

PUBLIC LIFE

The Calcutta University elected him as its representative to the Bengal Legislative Council in 1899 where he at once made his mark by his able and vigorous criticism of the new Municipal Bill. He was re-elected in 1902 and in 1903 he took his seat in the Provincial Council as the representative of the Calcutta Corporation to which he had been nominated by the Government as soon as the new Municipal Act came into operation and he continued to serve the Corporation till his elevation to a judgeship of the High Court. That very year (1903) he was sent to the Imperial Legislative Council as the representative of the Provincial Council and early in January, 1904, he took his seat there as an Additional Member of Council with Rai Bahadur B. K. Bose, C.I.E. Dr. Asutosh Mukhopadhyaya's remarkable powers of debate became now directed chiefly against two contentious measures, viz., the Indian Official Secrets (Amendment) Bill and the Indian Universities Bill both of which by their controversial and reactionary character evoked in the whole country a furious storm of hostile criticism. In the fierce controversy over these two Bills of Lord Curzon's Government, Dr. Asutosh became with Mr. Gokhale the mouthpiece of the people of India and champion of the popular cause.

SIR ASUTOSH AND THE CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

In 1906 he was appointed as Vice-Chancellor of the Calcutta University as successor to Sir Gooroodas Banerjee Kt, M.A. D.L., the first Indian to enjoy this unique distinction since the creation of the Calcutta University. From 1906 to 1914, Sir Asutosh continued to guide the affairs of the University as its Vice-Chancellor, being
elected to that high office four times in succession. In 1907 he was elected President of the Asiatic Society of Bengal of which he remained a distinguished member for thirty years and became President four times. In 1909 he was appointed as President of the Trustees of the Indian Museum and also President of the Board of Sanskrit Examinations in Bengal. He had to be relieved of his duties in the High Court in 1908 as his services were absolutely necessary in the reorganisation of the Calcutta University undertaken by Lord Minto. The Calcutta University conferred on him *Honoris Causa* the degree of Doctor of Science in 1908 and he instituted that very year the now well-known Calcutta Mathematical Society of which the activities were ably guided by him till his death.

In 1909 followed the reorganisation of the teaching of Law as a science and he laid the foundation of the University Law College as a first step towards the reform and expansion of legal education and training which were then a crying need. He served as the Dean of the Faculty of Law in 1906 and again in 1914 and as the President and Dean of the Faculty of Arts from 1908 to 1924. He was elected President of the Council of Post-graduate Teaching in Arts as well as Science from year to year from 1917 to 1924 and was Chairman of nearly all the Boards of Higher Studies of the Postgraduate department. From 1917 to 1919 he served as a member of the Calcutta University Commission, popularly known as the Sadler Commission. In 1921 he was appointed a member of the Pope Commission of inquiry into the working of the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore. He held for the fifth and last time the Vice-Chancellorship of the Calcutta University from 1921 to 1923 at the special invitation of Lord Chelmsford, the then Chancellor and Lord Ronaldshay, the Rector. On the fateful 25th of May, 1924, while he was engaged in the famous Dumraon Raj case at the Patna High Court, the cruel hand of death suddenly removed this gifted son of Bengal from the field of his manifold activities.

**HIS GENIUS AND VARIED ACTIVITIES**

Such, in bare outline, is the story of a remarkably brilliant academic and professional career which unhappily came to an abrupt close at the comparatively early age of nearly sixty. Sir Asutosh was gifted with a towering intellect and possessed admirable
powers of a debator who though formidable was seldom unfair or ungenerous to opponents. The number of subjects he had mastered would take one's breath away. His learning was great and his scholarship broad and sound. Ample testimony is borne by his Presidential speeches in the Asiatic Society of Bengal, his famous addresses at Mysore, Lahore, Benares, Lucknow, his address to the Second Oriental Conference of 1922 at Calcutta and to the Bihar and Orissa Research Society at Patna in 1924, besides some of his illuminating Convocation speeches of the Calcutta University from 1907 to 1914, addresses to the Indian Science Congress of 1914 and the Sanskrit Convocation in 1913, 1914 and 1915. He was noted for his passion for culture and his enthusiasm for extending the bounds of knowledge. His own library is one of the best private collections of books representing all branches of learning, rich in standard works, rare publications and select editions showing how he combined a book-lover's romantic passion with a zealous reader's patient industry. His patronage of scholars and active sympathy for all engaged in the noble pursuit of knowledge heightened his fame. He had a keen eye for merit in others and with real catholicity of spirit brought together eminent scholars and efficient teachers from all parts of India to serve in the reconstructed Calcutta University. This breadth of mind made him as great a patron of Islamic as of Sanskrit studies, of Eastern literature and philosophy as of Western science. He observed in his Convocation speech of 1923: "During the last sixteen years, we have uniformly recognised the principle that the most fruitful results in the domain of higher studies could be achieved only by the assimilation of what is best in the West with what is best in the East, for the revivification of all that is most vital in our national ideals."

AS AN EDUCATIONIST AND A PATRIOT

He had a burning enthusiasm for the cultural regeneration of India and he concentrated on this one problem his wonderful intellectual powers, superhuman energy and immense industry. Never a man of mere routine or mechanical efficiency he illuminated his vision of a new India with a broad outlook. The sphere of his many-sided activities was very extensive, but his chief claim to the nation's lasting homage will surely rest on his magnificent achievements in the field of higher education. No sacrifice was considered
by him as too great for the attainment of this noble aim. He sincerely believed in education as a potent instrument of national emancipation and progress, as the sole means of elevating his own people, and as the chief source of the highest welfare of mankind. He rightly looked upon the Calcutta University which was his first love as well as his last in the light of an agency in the fashioning of modern Bengal and his genuine and lofty patriotism was determined to give a national stamp to education by a scheme suited to the special needs of Bengal and the Bengali race and that is why he so strenuously fought against odds for the principle of self-determination applied to University ideals and the unhampered freedom of education and educational institutions. This brought him into fierce conflict with the official world but with his dying breath he resisted all undue attempts at interference.

This recalls to our mind the historic controversy over University reform in the days of Lord Curzon to which we must make a brief reference. Ever since Lord Curzon’s famous Convocation speech at Calcutta in 1899 the problem of University reform and reconstruction has been up to even the present day a bone of contention. Curzon’s preliminary survey of the whole field of University education in British India made in 1899 to 1901 led, first, to the Simla Conference of September 1901 which agreed upon removal of defects in the University system and reconstruction of the Senate, and then, to a Commission of enquiry into the condition and prospects of the Indian Universities which reported upon proposals of improving their constitution and working and recommended measures to elevate the standard of teaching. In the language of Sir Gooroodas Banerjee, whose sobriety nobody can question, in his note of dissent to the Commission’s Report the recommendations “were received by a portion of the Press with a sustained chorus of disapproval.” The Senates of the three older Indian Universities were strongly opposed to the proposed changes as extremely reactionary and retrograde. The Hon’ble Mr. Raleigh, the member in charge of the Bill to amend the law relating to Indian Universities, made the mistake of expressing the Government’s grave concern caused by “the discontented B. A.” and “the great army of failed candidates.” And here was an exceptional opportunity for Dr. Asutosh, who with Mr. Gokhale represented the Indian side of the case in the Select Committee in
1903, to offer the most vigorous and able opposition to what was considered all over the country as a sinister political move to restrict the scope of higher education, to dissociate the Indian element from the control and government of the Universities, to give to European Professors overwhelming administrative supremacy by means of drastic changes in the constitution of the Senates and Syndicates, to place Indians in a hopeless minority and give a setback to indigenous enterprise and efforts and finally to officialise the Universities and reduce them to a mere department of the State. Dr. Asutosh always knew how to utilise his opportunities and the Universities Act of 1904 in its final shape is largely the result of his constructive genius. Section 25 of the Act required the framing of the Regulations within a year which, however, the Government failed to accomplish. It was reserved for the new Vice-Chancellor as the President of the Committee appointed for the purpose to prepare a new body of Regulations which Sir Asutosh did in three months' time.

From that day commenced a new era of the progressive development of real University education leading by successive steps to the creation of the Post-graduate department and its organisation as the realisation of Sir Asutosh's noble ideal of a teaching and research University. His genius converted a measure calculated to arrest the expansion of higher education into a machinery for its diffusion and transformed a stereotyped examining body into a vitalising centre of culture making fruitful the highest aspirations of the Bengali race. The Calcutta University, after its reconstitution in 1906-7 by the Government of Lord Minto and arrangements made in 1914 on a generous scale for better teaching and original investigation, and after the adoption in 1916 of Sir Asutosh's scheme of Post-graduate studies by Lord Chelmsford on the recommendation of the then Rector, Lord Carmichael, stands to-day as "the pioneer and the leader in an all-India movement, and judged by the extent and variety of the subjects comprehended in the scope of its activities and the worth and excellence of the work accomplished by many of its teachers, it is still the foremost Teaching and Research University in the vast continent of India." The Post-graduate scheme is the highest achievement of Sir Asutosh Mookerjee as an educationist and it is entirely his own creation. In his Convocation address in March 1922 Lord Ronaldshay as the Chancellor of the University
said that "the greatest landmark in the history of the University in recent years is undoubtedly the creation of the Council of Postgraduate Studies. As Rector of the University at the time, I gave the scheme my whole-hearted support. And I had visions of a modern Nalanda growing up in this the greatest and most populous city of the Indian Empire." In paying his tribute to Sir Asutosh at the special meeting of the Senate on the 15th June, 1924, Lord Lytton, as Chancellor of the University, while considering the most fitting way of marking the Senate's appreciation of his work and the most worthy manner of perpetuating his memory, said, "Let me remind you again that the greatest achievement of Sir Asutosh Mookerjee's life was the transformation of the Calcutta University into a centre of advanced instruction and research. This was the work nearest his heart, the work on which he spent his energies to the very limit of his endurance and what worthier memorial to his memory can we conceive than an endowment of that Post-graduate department which he created?" It is not possible, nor necessary, to give a detailed account of the work done or undertaken by the Post-graduate departments in Arts and Science. We only mention that no fewer than twenty-five important subjects in their higher branches are represented in the teaching scheme among which, perhaps, special notice should be taken of Pali, Tibetan and Chinese, Ancient Indian History and Culture, Buddhism, Indian Vernaculars, Comparative Philology, Islamic Studies, Anthropology, Experimental Psychology and Commerce. The impetus given to research is embodied in the numerous publications of the Calcutta University which have a recognised place in the world of scholars, in the Sir Asutosh Silver Jubilee Commemoration volumes of Arts and Letters, Sciences and Orientalia and those forming the journal of the Department of Letters, besides contributions published in the Philosophical Magazine, the Physical Review, the Journal of the Chemical Society of London and the American Chemical Society, the American Mathematical Journal, the Transactions of the Faraday Society and the Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Readerships for special courses of lectures to advanced students and Extension Lectures by eminent scholars to foster original investigation and research have attracted men like Professors Schuster, Foucher, Macdonell, Mackenzie, J. W. Garner (of Illinois) and Buck (of Nebraska) and Doctors Strauss, Jacobi, Oldenberg, Forsyth, Sylvain Lèvi and Paul Vinogradoff.
Research prizes and Travelling Fellowships have been instituted. The princely endowments of Palit and Ghosh to the College of Science and Technology are to-day a household word in every part of India and very well-known abroad. In 1921 a small nucleus of a laboratory for a University Mining School was established at Ikhra near Raneegunj in the heart of an important Bengal Coal district. Residential arrangements for an army of students belonging to different castes and creeds under proper supervision have also been provided to foster collegiate life and in 1920 a Students' Welfare Committee was started which has during these years done immense service. All this is the work of a single man who for close upon thirty-five years consecrated his life with unselfish devotion to the cause of education. He had a passion for culture and an abiding faith in it as the one thing needful for the salvation of India. To him the Calcutta University was a national institution of the first importance and so he concentrated on it the strenuous labours of an energetic life, his ardent enthusiasm, his matchless administrative skill, his uncommon resourcefulness and his wonderful powers of organisation. When the whole country was in the throes of the overwhelming non-co-operation movement which in its career of destruction threatened the very existence of the citadel of Western education in Bengal dubbed as the "Golamkhana of Calcutta," he stood with heroic courage against this terrible attack and by his commanding personality successfully met the crisis. We need not refer to the way he fought the freedom's battle for his University till he finally won.

In educational policy though always aiming at high excellence and thoroughness and efficiency he was never prepared to sacrifice the democratic needs of the many to that kind of quality which is within the means of the chosen few. He realised that in rapid expansion and diffusion of knowledge lay the only means of breaking down ignorance as the first indispensable step towards the social uplift and political progress of this vast country so miserably handicapped in the race of life. This was in essence also the Indian attitude towards Lord Curzon's new educational policy.

The Calcutta University, reformed, reconstituted and expanded as it is to-day is a monument to Sir Asutosh's constructive genius more durable than marble or brass and his sacred gift to the people of Bengal.
Behind all these glorious achievements stands the man—a unique and complex personality. A born leader of men alike in thought and action he evinced a rare tenacity of will in the pursuit of every worthy object. His was a constructive genius of a high order. He combined an idealist’s vision with practical efficiency, mastery of fundamental principles with a thorough grasp of details. He was sure to accomplish whatever he set his heart upon. He possessed quickness of understanding, the power of swift decision, administrative ability, robust common sense and sturdy independence. His love of freedom was intense and on occasions aggressive—but removed equally from the blind hysterics of the Celt and the cold, calculating selfishness of the Saxon. Fired with an ardent patriotism he was singularly free from Provincial narrowness and admirably above all communal jealousy and racial partiality or exclusiveness. Courage of conviction springing from the depth of his nature made him a staunch friend and a formidable opponent. All his life he was a strenuous fighter who never knew defeat.

The foundation of this many-sided character was laid deep in simplicity and piety. Simplicity was the most noticeable feature of his life. He was perfectly free from any form of ostentation or artificiality. Simple in dress and daily habits, in his genial and pleasing manners, frank and free in social intercourse he was an embodiment of the Hindu ideal. High official position, great honours and titles, prestige and power, boundless fame were his, yet nothing could affect this basic quality of his nature. Deep piety was another dominant trait. He was in essence a devout Hindu whose cultured liberalism reconciled the highest of Indian tradition with what is best in modern social ideals and social values. He courageously bore social odium in the discharge of his sacred duty as a father. His domestic tenderness was born of enlightened paternal affection and intense filial piety.

It is foolish to attempt to anticipate the verdict of posterity. Yet the opinion may be held that during the last 100 years, though Bengal has produced men each greater than Sir Asutosh in his own limited sphere, he stands out prominent and pre-eminent by the versatility of his talents, range of his activities and the sum-total of his achievements. Investigator of truth, scholar, lawyer, judge, debater,
legislator, educationist, patriot, nationalist, organiser, patron of learned societies, creator of a great teaching and research University—here was a versatile genius of a truly high order. His memory is justly cherished with pride in the loving hearts of all Indians.

Competent judges have sometimes compared him with Washington, Bismarck and Lord Haldane.

Assuredly Sir Asutosh Mookerjee was a Bengali of Bengalis and has made the name of Bengal an object of regard and respect everywhere.
Where man’s will is working, it is a wording will. It is so even when he is expressing himself in music or plastic form; the wording is not a spoken medium; it is another form of wording.

He may be working where he has already worded, in fields that are familiar. Here he lacks no names, either for things or ways or concepts. He may be working in new fields, where he has not yet such a wealth of names. Here as he comes to know, he seeks, he finds, he makes wording. He makes, it may be, provisional words, and these are as the stakes set up round his new claim, even as gold-seekers stake the area where they seek treasure.

Where his will is not wholly in his work, where he is not keenly interested in it, he will be no word-maker. He will fall back on old wording, even where new words are needed. Where he lives by routine, by catchwords, according to tradition, he will need few words, little more than animals need them living by instinct. Animals are not interested in three fields which stimulate wording; these are the looking at things in the whole, the looking at things in their origin and their end, the looking at things as becoming, as new. In these three fields we go out to meet the new, the not yet understood. Where in these three respects we live as intelligent beasts only, we take life as it comes, we watch and cope with the pageant of things, the changes in things, when they come and recur. We do not go out to foresee, to meet, to find them, to explain them, to change them, or change our life by better knowledge, by a better way.
Man found words for things as they came to him again and again. We read of Adam doing it. Man was slower to find terms for the hidden things, the beginnings, the new becomings, the things he did not understand. He found words for the seen, the understood, the things he was sure of.

But he was man, never merely animal. He worded also the unseen, the not-understood, in a less lively though deeply interested way. He was no less sure that the unseen, the not-understood, was also surely actual, real. He was sure also that in the unseen, the not-understood was a Warding of him, a warding that was both of his seen life and of his not yet seen life. Many things had he to fear, and his own warding against them was often weak and of little avail or none. Mightier warding lay in the unseen could he but get the will of that warding Willer or Willers on to his side.

But in that he did not understand, he was wordless to will the unseen Allies. He left the calling for them mainly to the few who had thrown their will into the work of enlisting that warding Will. These few, willing the work, had come to find wording. He called them his priests, his 'medicine-men', his celebrants, sacrificers, prophets, seers. They were his intermediaries linking him with the Warders unseen but surely there. They having worded their working and its object had found fixed forms for their calling, ritual of word and act to hand on as man succeeded man. They officiated, they chanted, they passed from earth, but the fixed forms remained from generation to generation. Around the way of the rite and the ritual men lived and changed and grew as grow man must, his wording changing, his thought changing. So at length the unchanging ritual grew hoary, the wording became as a dying thing.

And the chanters of the ritual, once the very worders to men of the things unseen, became the wordless ones, for man had got round and beyond, and his will was at work on that which had since come to be, and which he now saw as a deepened or as a new vision. Still he looked to the unseen, but he sought in it a Well and a Wording and a Way toward which he had been growing, past which he would one day grow. Here or there were men whose will had been working in those three fields of the coming-to-know, and not leaving the quest to the medicine-men.
They felt that these were come to be mere imitators, repeaters, men of ritual and routine, unable to guide the growing will, which was finding new wording or new depth in old wording.

Let us take such a crisis in the life of India. The day arose in Northern India when the family-order of intermediaries called brahmans had fallen away from being the 'live wires' they once had been. To be seekers and worders of the unseen in the now and the hereafter was still felt to be work of high worth. But no longer was a man judged to be such a seeker and worder only because he happened to be by birth and office a brahmana. A new standard of values was arising. He who in his life, his conduct, his deeds is this and not that, 'him I call brahmana'! It was not the descent, the caste, the dress, the rite that any more impressed the men of earnest will to the good; it was the life of the man.

And with the new will the wording of man's life had changed; the old wording ceased to have weight. Man's welfare, his happiness, his escape from sorrow was to be won by the worthiness of his life, not by the rite, not by the sacrifice. Sila—moral habit—was worded with an emphasis it had never had. Karman—act, phala, Vipäka—result—took on a more pregnant meaning. Märga—way—was not merely a link between village and town. It was the way of the worlds to worlds' end. No longer was life a mere routine of birth and dying; it was Mágga—a way, a means of advance, egress, access. It was a great tramping forth-faring host of living things, of many realms, many worlds, no matter what their birth, breed, station, all bent, if they willed, on progress in the Way to the Way's End. So Way, Path became a world-word of deepest meaning. Nirvāna—way's end—came into man's wording. That which was life, yet not life in the worlds, could only be worded by a 'not-word' like this, yet it came to stake the claim of the earnest willers to an unseen treasure richer than the joys of the svarga which must come to an end. All other living save this was bhava—becoming—for all men were changing, passing on. And vaguely, yet massively it was felt that only by bhāvanā—making-to-become—could bhava be brought to an end.

The more living will thus working in India prevailed for awhile till, and then because a sagacious ruler used its teaching to stabilize his new empire. Asoka was a notable opportunist, and
thus the hereditary intermediaries were for a while pushed aside from royal and public favour.

But that living will of the new spirit had not been all wise. It had called to its aid a way deemed at its birth the only wise, yet which barred its world-progress. This way was that of finding the unseen Warding more surely, more quickly by leaving, by coming forth from, the things seen. It was to leave fellowship in life and work with fellow-men, who had not come forth, while profiting by the life and work of those fellowmen to sustain life. It was, in warding of the earth-life, to become a parasite no less than king and courtier, courtezan, warrior and beggar, were parasites. Counter-service, it was claimed, was rendered by the monk no less than by these other parasites. But chiefly it was claiming for the goers-forth that they had cast off hindrances. They had not had to shoulder the extra burden of aiding many thousands to go unhindered. These could work free from care as their own intermediaries with the things unseen, needing no priest.

The mistake lay in holding that the prize of the Way's End was for those who had run ahead of their spiritually weaker fellow-men. The knowledge and wording of the newer will came to suffer thereby, as all onward moving has suffered when one section of the community and sought to raise itself with its veto on the rest, be the rest the people, or the slave, the laity or the woman. So the new will, now in its turn become wordless, melted away from India, and where it now survives, maintaining its old, uncompromising cleavage of church and laity, either nature there makes living easy, or, in the further north, the world of folk-fed monks has become, not merely the buttress of a folk-fed monarchy, but the very monarchy itself.

Yet the wording of what had once been a creative will lived on in India, as we may see in the later scriptures of the renascent world of brahman intermediaries.

To-day we are earnestly looking back on our shoulders at these old-world, and other much older-world leavings. This has its uses. But always it is levying a heavy toll on our will's creative energy in seeking and in wording the new. Because of its absorbing just those wills who are not attracted by research in the world of matter, but who are attracted by research into the world of the
man himself, his becoming and his accomplishment, the residue of will-force left to look at this latter world not over the shoulder but straight ahead is sadly to seek.

And because there is so little will-work being done, not in what man has been but in what he is and is coming to-be, we have no new or quickened wording on it. In those old-world leaving we shall win no new treasures in the claims we stake. At the worst we only come upon wardrobes of cast-off clothes; at the best we come upon some old world wording that once was new. We learn old things we did not know, and that is well so far as it goes. But by this very poring over the old our life and outlook are moulded in the limitations of the old. We live and think in a world where is enthroned the king, conqueror and little god, victim at his feet, offering held out to him, in a world with its underworld of prisoner and slave, courtier and woman; in a world where welfare is of the body or of the dominant class, where growth, success, progress is of material things, not of character, not of world-amiety; where earth is mainly a world unknown and the foreigner a barbarian, in a world where worth is rated by power, by ruthlessness, by success in war, by pleasure of sense, not by insight into life as a whole, its source, its end, its coming to be. And all, save some immortal world-words we have or should have taken up into our own lives, all else is dead, dead. The living men, the living women whose were these husks, so long ago, what of them? We are deaf, as we dig, to that old worldword that survives for evermore: Why seek ye the living among the dead?—the living men among the dead things. We say they’re all just ‘the dead.’ Of a few: ‘their name liveth for evermore’:—so we echo the word of a dead book, wording in a dead old way because we pore over dead old things.

We who would work in and word the man, the soul, we are as heirs for whom a kingdom waits, while we search the roots of the tree to make good, as it were, a claim to what is already ours. Let us enter upon our kingdom. The men of old did no less. They did not seek to recreate their past. They worded their present. They worded truly, for their present: —that was they. But their present, that is not we. We are changed. Not only is our world new; the man, the woman, the soul that we are is not persistently old. Hence is the wording we have to give no more the same. We can be
the vivid, the true words only of that which we are. We can word what the past did not know, did not want to know, was not ready to know. Even the child of Asia, even the Indian words new ideals, words his worldwords as he never did in the past. Into the bottles of ancient wisdom we pour our new wording of our new outlook, the while we say. Let that ancient teaching be our guide. Nay, all the guidance it can give us, as old wisdom, is that we can by it measure how far we have come. Herein it gives us a wording we should else be slower to come by. We can come to know the word we need by the measure of words the old world had not and was not ware that it needed.

Our chief creative energy to-day is willing work in the world of matter. There, working to come to know, we find new wording. Names of elemental substances not known before; names of elemental force not dreamt of before:—ion, proton, electron; names of new ways of man rushing to meet man, to word afar and conquer space. Here has creative energy been at work finding and naming like a very Adam. But we do not see corresponding energy at work among that world of willers who seek to know the new, the unknown, the possibly knowable, about not matter but man, about not men’s bodies but the man who uses body, about not mind so much as the wielder of mind. Such wills are either burying themselves in the past, seeking the living among the dead, or they are following too servilely the way of research in matter, seeking man in his animal body his ‘herd’-mind, or explaining him by repressed and stunted growth of will.

Nor are such wills preparing our sons to be more fruitful workers in the field of ‘the man’, and the world way of him and what he may become. Eight to twelve precious years of training we too often fill with what we frankly call ‘dead languages.’ This means first, that their young outlook is narrowed (we deem complacently it is broadened) by the leavings and the wording of an outgrown past; secondly, that they go forth among their fellowmen, no more equipped as once were cultured men with a common tongue, but crippled and dumb for want of means of access. For when they travel they are self-islanded, self-frontiered by the one and only tongue they can speak. They are as deaf-mutes. They cannot feel the pulse that throbs in the native tongue of other fellowmen; they cannot discuss together the common good, the world
outlook, they cannot be training the international will in world-
peace.

So do we hinder ourselves, where we might be moving on
together. So do we make a little world, where we might be in
a greater one. So do we harness our vision to a corner, in time
and space, of one world, when ours, as 'man', is the way of all
the worlds, of earth and the rest. We are brave workers, but we
tie our arms. We are swift to find words where will works but
we gag ourselves. When we can name, our will, as from a
springboard, bounds forward to find the new name, the 'more-
word.' Now are we wordy, not worded. Our books are very
cud-chewers. We do not know what more-wording may not come,
one our wills are set to find new pasture, once we fare forth to
word the new, and not only, and not so much, the old.
THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE ARTHAÇĀSTRA

(DR. A. B. KEITH, M.A., D.C.L.)

Since in a short article published in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* in 1916 (pp. 130 ff.) I expressed, as against Professor H. Jacobi, the view that the *Arthaçāstra* could not properly be regarded as the work of the minister of Candragupta, the question of authorship has formed the subject of prolonged debate. Of the three editors of the text, to all of whom its study owes much, Mr. R. Shama Śāstri* and Dr. T. Ganapati Śāstri† have no doubts as to the author, while Professor J. Jolly‡ is equally convinced that, if there was a minister Cāṇakya of Candragupta at all, he was not the author of the *Arthaçāstra* nor does it express his views, but is rather a product of the 4th century A.D. Professor Winternitz§ similarly rejects Cāṇakya’s authorship, and leans to the third century A.D. as the date, while Dr. Narendranath Law¶ among others has maintained firmly the authenticity of the work. Moreover the *Arthaçāstra* has been freely drawn upon by many writers as an authority for the period 300 B.C., and the question of the validity of that view is of much more than mere antiquarian interest.

In some measure, indeed, the importance of the text has been exaggerated; it is only from the narrow standpoint of interest in the details of Indian administration that it can be ranked as “the most precious work in the whole range of Sanskrit literature”. The author has indeed been compared with Machiavelli, but, save in respect of their disregard in politics for moral considerations, there is but a distant resemblance between the two. Of political philosophy the *Arthaçāstra* has little conception; its object is to give practical advice in the government of a kingdom and the means to secure the safety of the monarch from internal dissension and external attack; it expresses no new theory of the purpose of the state and

* 2nd. ed. (1919).
† *Trivandrum Sanskrit Series*, Nos 79, 80, and 82.
‡ *Punjab Sanskrit Series*, No. 4 (1923).
has no ideals. Machiavelli recommends immoral means merely as a step to the accomplishment of the ideal of a national king ruling over a centralised realm in lieu of a chaos of contending states; he stands for the ideal of the Renaissance, which has passed down to the present day, in the search for such a state organisation as shall secure universal peace, a conception wholly alien to the Arthaçastra. The method of the two writers is also wholly diverse; when the Arthaçastra seeks to deal with the relations of states, it gives us a pure formalism unillumined by the slightest reference to historic events, whereas Machiavelli's views are brought into vital connection with his experience and with the historical knowledge of his time. The intellectual power of Machiavelli is wholly lacking in the author of the Arthaçastra. Machiavelli again was a man with practical experience of affairs, a fact which it is impossible to forget in studying his work; the author of the Arthaçastra, on the other hand, impresses us with the fullness of his knowledge of all kinds of çāstras, of which he seems to have been extremely proud, but, if he really was a great statesman, he has failed most signally to leave any impress of his character on his work.*

If then it was really Cāṇakya who wrote the Arthaçastra, we must revise our conceptions of what a statesman should be, or assume that his reputation has been unfairly magnified at the expense of Candragupta, a view perfectly legitimate having regard to the fact that Megasthenes appears to have been silent regarding the minister, who, in the eyes of the India of the Purāṇas and the Mudrārakṣasa, dwarfed entirely his master by reason of his capacity and energy. But the question arises whether, even as it stands, the text really claims that Cāṇakya was the author of the book. The citation of views under the form iti Kautjilyah is prima facie wholly against this view, and no effective reply has been adduced to meet this obvious objection. We have a considerable amount of literature of the pre-Christian era in India, but it is impossible to find an author who expresses his views in this form. The Kauśitaki Brāhmaṇa, for example, cites Kauśitaki's views in

* Contrast Ghosal, Hindu Political Theories, pp. 155 ff.
this way, but no one imagines that Kauśītaki composed that text. To cite recent instances is of no value, for these can be explained naturally and simply as cases of deliberate imitation arising at a time when this form of expression was believed to come from the author himself. It is obviously a very artificial mode of procedure, and we certainly cannot accept it as valid unless there is very strong external evidence to make us do so. In the case of the Arthaçāstra all we have in this regard is the fact that at the end of i. 1; ii. 10; and xv. 1 we have statements which ascribe the āstras to Kauṭilya, specified in terms which make him clearly the minister of Candragupta. To ask us to accept these passages as conclusive is unreasonable, when the obvious explanation is possible that they were written in order to capture favour for the treatise by asserting its production by the famous minister. No one, we may believe, really now doubts that the Mānavā Dharmaçāstra is the definite production of one or more jurists, and that they gave it currency as Manu’s work to make it popular; the same thing applies to the Yaśnavalkya Smṛti and to other Smṛti texts, and it is idle to seek to make distinctions between the cases by asserting that, while it was quite possible for a jurist to ascribe his work to an ancient sage like Yaśnavalkya, he could not do so in the case of a minister of Candragupta. On the contrary, if, as was doubtless the case, the Arthaçāstra, as a distinct science evolved later than the Dharmaçāstra, it was a perfectly natural thing to ascribe a work to a famous minister, as a far better authority in such matters than a mere sage. We must disabuse our minds of any idea of forgery in the modern sense of the word: the authors of the Smṛtis who fathered them on the wise men or the gods of old cannot be treated in the same way as those ingenious persons who in the time of the Renaissance and later deliberately forged works of the great writers of the past. Moreover, the work itself bears perfectly unequivocal proof that the real author was not Kauṭilya himself. In chapter 6 of Book V we find the view of Kauṭilya criticised by Bhāradvāja and then a further doctrine of Kauṭilya is set off against this opinion of Bhāradvāja. The efforts of Professor Jacobi and of T. Gaṇapati Sastrī to defend this as a literary or logical device on the part of Kauṭilya himself appear to strain probabilities beyond all reasons. Finally we have in Book XV a very remarkable definition in the course of setting out the Tantrayuktis; Apadeça is given as one of these and is illustrated by a quotation in which are given the views of the schools of Manu,
Bṛhaspati, and Ućanas, and of Kauṭilya regarding the number of members of the council of ministers; the sense of the term according to Mr. Shama Sastri is "quotation", which would dispose of the authorship of Kauṭilya, though this fact has escaped Mr. Shama Sastri's notice. Dr. T. Gaṇapati Sāstrī has realised it, for he renders the term as indicating the adduction of another view in order to refute it. The former sense appears the more justifiable, though certainty cannot be obtained. The internal evidence, therefore, is certainly not favourable to the view that the work is that of Kauṭilya himself. A verse appended after the last colophon, and therefore not even claiming to be part of the work, asserts that Viṣṇugupta composed himself the Sūtra and Bhāṣya. The work itself never mentions the name Viṣṇugupta or Cāṇakya, and we cannot even assert that the hand which added this verse meant to assign the treatise to the minister of Candragupta. It must be remembered that Varāhamihira in his Bṛhatsamhitā and his Bṛhajñātaka cites a Viṣṇugupta, and the Bhāṭṭotpala* knows both a Cāṇakya whose other name was Viṣṇugupta and an independent Cāṇakya. But, whatever the verse was intended to mean, it is clear that, as of unknown authorship and not in any event part of the treatise, it has no authority whatever.

The text itself, therefore, does not clearly assert Kauṭilya's authorship; it is perfectly consistent with the citation of Kauṭilya's views by a follower of his doctrine, or, it must be added, with the invention of his views or, more accurately, the ascription to him of views held by some students of the science. The question then arises whether the contents support Kauṭilya's authorship. There immediately presents itself the problem why the minister of Candragupta should have confined his energies to the composition of a treatise which deals with the relations of moderate territories and ignores the essential question, from Candragupta's point of view and his own, of the acquisition and government of a great empire. Similarly we must ask why he never alludes, save in the final verse, to the empire of Candragupta, and why he preserves complete silence regarding Pāṭaliputra, the capital of that empire. Dr. T. Gaṇapati Sāstrī holds that it would have been improper for the author to deal

* On Bṛhajñātaka, xxi. 3; vii. 7. cf. Shama Sastri, ed., p. xvi.
with the imperial question, since that would have appeared to be self-praise, and that it was right that he should deal with the principles affecting the kings of old, but this contention is unsupported by analogy or probability and really condemns Kautilya as deficient in common sense. The last verse is so lacking in modesty that we cannot possibly ascribe this quality to the author of the Arthāśāstra. Nor can any tolerable explanation be offered for the omission to mention Candragupta directly in a work supposed to be written by a minister of that sovereign. Efforts to see in this signs of a refined psychology are wholly unconvincing. Dr. Radhakumud Mookerji,* much more plausibly, seeks to show that there are in the text cryptic references to the empire of Candragupta, but it is quite impossible to take the passages adduced as serious evidence: by such evidence anything could be proved, including far more plausibly a reference to the Gupta dynasty as the restorers of the Brahmanical system of which the author is the exponent. The only logical means of evading the difficulty is that of Mr. Monahan,† who feels that he cannot ask us to suppose that Cāṇakya wrote this work after the creation of the empire of Candragupta, and who, therefore, assigns it to a period before that episode. The difficulties in the way of this theory are too obvious to need exposition, and none of the other supporters of the authorship of Candragupta’s minister attempt to follow this method of evading the crux.

Further evidence against the authorship of Cāṇakya is afforded by comparison between the statements of Megasthenes and those of the Arthāśāstra.‡ This question of comparison, of course, is one which must be dealt with carefully, and those discrepancies must be discounted which can be explained in any legitimate manner. We must dismiss cases of the silence of Megasthenes, because we have not the whole of his work. We must also recognise that he may have been, and apparently was, animated by the affection of foreigners for idealising countries not their own. To this tendency, of which the Germania of Tacitus presents a classical example, we may legitimately ascribe his denial of slavery among the Indians and

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* See Narendranath Law, Studies in Ancient Hindu Polity, p. xxxiii.
† Early History of Bengal, p. 31.
‡ O Stein, Megasthenes und Kautilya.
his assertion that the agriculturists played no part as warriors and enjoyed the boon of exemption from attack or plundering by hostile armies. Similarly we may disregard his eulogy of Indian sobriety, his insistence on Indian veracity, his assertion that Indians have no suits over pledges or deposits, need no seals or witnesses, and are ignorant of usury and interest, and his insistence on Indian honesty. Again there are many matters on which Megasthenes was probably unable to obtain reliable views; his seven classes of the population need not be attributed to Egyptian influence, but may quite well represent an attempt to understand a complex system which was extremely difficult of comprehension by any person not a member of it. It is more difficult to be certain of such a discrepancy as that regarding landownership, for Megasthenes is of opinion that the land is owned by the king, while the Arthaçāstra (ii. 24) shows that only a certain portion thereof was so owned; but we may fairly refrain from arguing from such a case, since misunderstanding by Megasthenes is at least a perfectly possible explanation.

There remain, however, cases in which the discrepancies between the records of Megasthenes and the Arthaçāstra are glaring, and where it is impossible to ascribe error to Megasthenes. Those matters in which we are entitled to trust that author concern things with which he must daily have come into contact, and to know which must have been an essential part of his duties, matters concerning the capital, the conduct of its government, and the treatment accorded to foreigners in it, as well as matters regarding the armed forces of the state, details of which Seleukos must have always been anxious to have. Now Megasthenes definitely records the existence of a navy under a commander of the fleet, and this is the sort of matter which a Greek would naturally record. The Arthaçāstra has also a Nāvadhyakṣa, but the account of his duties (ii. 28) is decisive against his being a parallel to the Nauarchos of Megasthenes. His duties are fiscal and commercial, not naval. Dr. Narendranath Law,* indeed, claims that the duty of destroying pirate ships, those bound for an enemy’s country, and those that have violated port regulations imports naval activity. This, however, is clearly not the case; these

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* Calcutta Review, xiii, 235; his version 'ships of an enemy’s country illegally crossing its limits' is hardly correct.
are the duties of a port officer, and, as the text makes clear, the duty applies to the Nāvadhyakṣa in respect only of ships which touch at ports while en route. Not less fundamental is the discrepancy regarding military matters, for Megasthenes asserts the existence of six boards of five members each, charged with the care of the navy, bullock trains for transport, the foot, the horse, war chariots, and elephants. Dr. Narendranath Law, indeed, claims that there is here a striking parallel to the Arthaçāstra, but this is rather a tour de force. The facts are that the Arthaçāstra has only a Nāvadhyakṣa of the type described, not an admiral; that he does not give his Go'dhyakṣa as a military officer at all, so that Dr. Law is reduced to arguing that the bulls used were taken from the Go'dhyakṣa's department; and that there is parallelism only as regards the last four items. This parallelism in any case would be practically inevitable; the four elements making up the caturaṅgabala would normally be under distinct controls. But Dr. Law ignores the vital element of distinction even in these cases, the fact that Megasthenes records boards of five. Curiously enough Dr. Jolly* here doubts the accuracy of Megasthenes, on the ground that five commanders would be an unwise arrangement, and that the Arthaçāstra never refers to a plurality of commanders. But this is clearly a misunderstanding; we have to deal with boards comparable with the Athenian Strategoi, or the British Admiralty or War Office, charged with functions of administration as well as merely of command in war, and the Arthaçāstra in one passage (ii. 4) expressly lays down the rule that the four elements of the army should have many chiefs, in order to secure their fidelity. The real ground for the discrepancy is doubtless that Megasthenes is describing the arrangements of an empire, the Arthaçāstra those of a moderate-sized kingdom in which single superintendents were in fact employed.

The same discrepancy appears as regards the civil administration. Megasthenes definitely tells us of the existence of six boards, each of five members, who co-operate for certain purposes, while the Arthaçāstra knows only of a single Nāgaraka, subject to whom are other officers of state, independent each in his own department, a

*ed., p. 41.
distinction again natural between the management of an imperial city and that of a mere ordinary capital. Moreover it is impossible to find parallels in the Arthācāstra for certain vital details. Megasthenes expressly states that one board dealt with the care of foreigners, whose modes of life were watched, and that they saw to their escort out of the country and to the sending of their property to their relatives in the event of their death. These are matters with which Megasthenes must officially have constantly dealt, and the provision regarding the treatment of the effects of deceased foreigners reflects a more advanced state of international intercourse than the normal Indian plan of the confiscation of such property by the king. The silence of the Arthācāstra here again is explicable only if it deals with a different condition of things. The third board again of Megasthenes is engaged in the registration of births and deaths; the Arthācāstra knows nothing of anything so elaborate; though its Stānikas and Gopas are concerned with population in its fiscal aspect, they are not required either to register births or deaths, and Megasthenes is explicit that the aim of the government in this regard was to secure knowledge of these happenings among high and low alike. The function of the fifth board, the sale of new and manufactured articles, contrasts with the highly developed rules both of private and public commerce in the Arthācāstra. The sixth board, with its duty of collecting one-tenth of the price of articles sold, must have had a simpler task than the officials who had to obtain payment of the complex imposts, tolls and fares, import and export duties, of the Arthācāstra; with this too accords the fact that Megasthenes mentions few taxes in comparison with those of the Arthācāstra, reflecting perhaps a time when expedients for filling the exchequer were not so highly developed. It is significant also that the attempt to find a point of contact in detail between Megasthenes and the Arthācāstra, (Vincent Smith’s comparison of abhijñānamudrā with the duty of the fourth board to see that products are sold according to gauged weights (otherwise rendered “by public notice”), has been disproved, the Sanskrit term referring not to weights, but official marks on merchandise.

Other discrepancies are not unimportant. The king appears in Megasthenes clearly invested with judicial functions, while the Arthācāstra seems neither to assign to him duties as a judge of first instance nor to make him even a judge of appeal, but to contemplate
a separate establishment of judges,* and we can evade recognising discrepancy only by reading into the chapter on royal duties more than is said. Then we have the remarkable fact that Megasthenes records the existence of mile-stones, a fact which he must have seen with his own eyes, and which was both natural and appropriate in an empire like Candragupta’s so that the silence of the Arthaçastra is inexplicable; Dr. Jolly’s suggestion that Megasthenes may have transferred to India a Persian custom obviously has no plausibility, though it is quite likely that India borrowed the usage from Persia. Still more significant is the fact that Megasthenes records the existence at Palibothra of a wooden wall round the town and that traces of this structure seem even now to exist. The Arthaçastra, on the other hand, in its elaborate rules for fortification, mentions a wall of brick, but is silent regarding wood, surely an incredible fact if it was written under Candragupta. Yet other discrepancies might be adduced, but those mentioned are far too glaring and too important to leave any real doubt that Megasthenes and the Arthaçastra are dealing with different things.

The same impression is given when we turn to examine the extent of knowledge revealed in the Arthaçastra. The geographical outlook† is wide; it is very dubious if the term Čina could have been used before the advent to power of the T’sin dynasty and Vānāyu, probably enough Arabia, as a source of horses as well as references to Suvarṇabhūmi and Suvarṇakudya are unlikely in a work of the time of Candragupta. Nor it is reasonable to deny that the Arthaçastra presumes the existence of a very considerable technical literature on such topics as agriculture, mining, mineralogy, Čulba-dhātucastra, architecture, chemistry, veterinary science, the treatment of trees etc; the case of alchemy is particularly interesting. We are told of the conversion of base metals into gold and we find used the term rasa, mercury, which has so far not been traced further back than the Bower Manuscript of the 4th century A.D. and in the works of Caraka and Suĉruta, the text of which is far from authentic. The

† Cf. Kālidās Nāg, Théories diplomatiques, pp. 118, 133 f., who, however, is wrong as to Kambodiya.
impression of a late date thus given is confirmed by the fact that alchemy seems clearly to be an importation into India, and not of independent origin there. Accepting a Greco-Syriac source, we can hardly place derivation before the early centuries of the Christian era, and with this accords well the use of the term surāṅga or sur股权投资 in the Arthacastra in the sense of "mine," for its probable source is the Hellenistic Greek syrinx. Anvikṣāki is defined to include Sāṁkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata; this reflects a period when Sāṁkhya and Yoga were definitely developed as distinct schools, and when Lokāyata had established a place for itself, despite priestly objections to a creed which denied the rewards of action and the efficacy of sacrifice. The chapter on Tantrayuktis denotes a long refinement in methods of exposition and argument. The use of technical grammatical terms in II. 10 suggests knowledge of Pāṇini's Astūdhyayi. The author knew Arthastra and Dharmasastras, as well as treatises on Vārtā, economics, and Daṇḍamūti; his acquaintance with writing is abundantly attested by his rules regarding registration, the wording of documents including royal edicts and letters, and the use of written contracts, a point in which he differs strongly from Megas-thenes. Astrology and divination are recognised; Jupiter and Venus among the planets are known (ii. 24). It is expressly recorded (iii. 7) that the Sūta and Māgadha of the Purāṇas are not to be confused with the ordinary Sūta and Māgadha, the product of mixed marriages, and this is precisely the Purāṇa doctrine. The main story of the Mahābhāraṭa is known, the stories of Rāvana and Daṇḍakya can be traced to the Rāmāyaṇa; most of the authorities on Arthacastra cited are recorded also in the great epic, where Kaṇika appears as counsellor, of Dhṛtarāstra and is credited with sayings for which parallels may be found in the Arthacastra.

Of decisive importance, however, is the evidence of the Dharmasastras. The Rajadharma of the great epic and the Dharmasastras is much less developed than in the Arthacastra but in works like Yājñavalkya and Nārada we find passages which stand in close relation to the Arthacastra. Now the conclusion cannot be evaded that the original of these passages is not the Arthacastra, for that text presents, when there is divergence, the more refined views.* Thus

Yājñavalkya asserts that operations on boils are punishable; the Arthaçastra restricts the offence to operations on boils other than dangerous boils, when death ensures. The matter, however, requires no argument, for Dr. T. Gaṅapati Sāstrī has decisively established the priority of Yājñavalkya, refuting the suggestion of Mr. Shama Sastri to the contrary. The same thing probably applies to Nārada. Dr. T. Gaṅapati Sāstrī indeed holds that the conclusion should be that Yājñavalkya's date is before Candragupta, and he accepts identity with the Vedic sage, but this runs counter to the whole trend of the literature and the borrowing justifies us in holding that the Arthaçastra belongs to a comparatively late date, probably not before 200 A. D. at the earliest.

This conclusion is supported by the evidence of the Kāmaçāstra. The Arthaçastra does not quote any text of that name, but it enumerates one topic included in it among the Arts, and it cites two authorities, Ghoṭa(ka)mukha and Carāyana who are also given in the Kāmaçāstra. That Vātasyāyana knew the Arthaçastra is perfectly certain; more than that he must have taken its form as a model for that of his own work, which like the Arthaçastra consists of prose discussions, with occasional verses, each chapter terminating with one or more ċlokas. In both the definitions and discussions are relieved by reference to ancient tales and by the introduction of quasi-debates between ancient sages. It has indeed even been suggested by Dr. Radhakumud Mookherji* that the author of the Kāmaçāstra may have been the same as that of the Arthaçastra and even the Nyāyabhāṣya, but this is a view wholly without probability. On the other hand, there is no ground to accept Professor Jacobī's efforts† to prove that the Kāmaçāstra is much younger than the Arthaçastra. Dr. Jolly has pointed out that his arguments in this regard are untenable; if the Kāmaçāstra knows Greek astrology, the Arthaçastra mentions (ii. 24) two of the planets and disapproves (ix. 4) of the belief in the stars as influencing human destiny; if the Kāmaçāstra knows the Vaiṣeṣika philosophy, that is irrelevant in view of that fact that the Arthaçastra

* In Studies in Ancient Hindu Polity, p. xiii. Mr. Shama Sastri's ascription of this view to me is a mistake.

has no occasion to mention it, if it did not think it valuable as a study; nor does the *Arthaçāstra* (i. 3) provide Ahimsa as the obligation of Parivrājakas alone as suggested by Jacobi. Vātsyāyana's date is uncertain, but it is most improbable that he flourished before 200 A. D. at the soonest, and he may well have written considerably later.*

Further we must note that in Bhāsa are found two verses cited by the *Arthaçāstra* (x 3), and that the probability is that they are borrowed from Bhāsa, which would accord well with a date not before 300 A. D. for the *Arthaçāstra*. This result can be supported from another point of view, the absence of any recognition of Cāṇakya as a writer by early texts. The *Mahābhārata*, despite its elaboration of kingly duty, is silent regarding him; the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali, which knows well Candragupta and the Mauryas, says nothing of him. On the other hand, from about 400 A. D. onwards there is a series of evidences of the existence of the *Arthaçāstra*; it was probably known to Kālidāsa, certainly to Daṇḍin and to Bāna, and to the *Nyayabhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana, and also to many later writers such as Medhātihi, and Soma deva Śūri. Moreover the *Tantrākhyāyika* (perhaps c. 400 A. D.) clearly made use of it.

Against this conclusion has been adduced the alleged antiquity of the language. In this matter we must distinguish two quite different things, the presence in the text of a large number of unusual words and meanings, and the existence of forms which are really archaic. The former condition of things is obvious and undeniable, but it has nothing whatever to do with antiquity; every technical treatise must yield material of this kind, if it is practically unique. The existence of archaic forms is quite distinct and most dubious. Dr. T. Gaṇapati Sastri gives the following list†:—irregular

* Cf. Jolly, ed., p. 28.

† Mr. Shama Sastri (trans. p. xxiii) gives other irregular compounds, ignoring the plain use of Pāṇini in ii. 10 which disproves ignorance of his work, amitrān is not really in point; dāpayati with two accusatives appears in the epic (i. 75, 28) etc; apavyayate is in Manu viii. 332; Pratipatāyam has parallels, and pāceśaṇa is analogical. All the others can be matched with other forms found in post-Pāṇinian literature, and not one is specifically Vedic; adyaś is probably a false reading like pāraṇcika.
genders, rajjunā, arūla, amritam, sarpanirmokam; irregular formation, khādirūbhīh, anyatamasmin; pārańcikam, mārgāyuka; irregular compounds, jaradguḥ (for jaradgaut) daçatirakaśā, ubhayatorātra, varṣārātra, paçcāhna; irregularity of mood, ādeyūt, ākankeśa, rdhyaśūm; of form, apakrahāntavayam, anuvāsitaṁ, prasvāpayītvā, nistārayītvā; of use, pratipatsyāmi, apavyayate; and of syntax dūpayet with two accusatives. Now, without investigating either the correctness of reading in certain of these cases on the possibility of finding defences for some of the uses, it is sufficient to remark that the terms ārṣa applied to these irregularities is inappropriate, if it is understood to connote antiquity. The irregularities belong all to the type of careless Sanskrit, such as we find in the epic and the Purāṇas and the Smṛtis, and they give no ground whatever for asserting an early date.

On the other hand must be placed the argument from metre. It is of a double character. In the first place the cūlaka is handled with great care in order to conform to the developed rules of that metre, and is decidedly more regular than the epic cūlaka of the Mahābhārata, or that of the Brhaddevatā suggesting a later date than Candragupta’s time. In the second place we meet with seven Triṣṭubh stanzas which are either Īndravajrā or Upajīti. This is extremely significant, for, whether they are original or mere quotations, they establish the existence of this form of metre at the time when the work came into being. Now it must be clearly understood that the practice of assimilating the four verses of a Triṣṭubh stanza is a decidedly late one. Vedic texts and the early epic show that this usage had not come into force, and, when we find it, we must recognise that artistic canons had come to affect metre. This accords well with the elaborate rules given (iI. 10) regarding the preparation of edicts etc., which betray acquaintance with the principles of the Alāṃkāra-çāstra. Finally it should be noted that we find an example (iI. 12) of the Aupachandasaka metre, certainly not an early form, but found in the later epic.

Jacobi* has adduced, as a support of a conclusion formed on other grounds, confirmation from the connection of the text with

Jainism, laying stress on these parallels, and on the fact that the Nandisutra and the Anyuyogadvarasutra of the Jain canon mention the Kautzilya. This accords in his view with the fact that the redaction of the Jain canon and of the Arthaashastra fall together. Jainism fell into decline after the period of the Nandas, so that the canon must be dated in or about their time. This seems, however, quite unconvincing. The language of the Jain canon is far later than the time of the Nandas, and, if the language could be changed, then the content also was far from secure; indeed Jain tradition reveals its early losses, and we have no right to hold that the present canon in substance or detail goes back to the 4th century B. C. Jacobi's further contention that there existed only three systems of philosophy at the time of the Arthaashastra is quite unfounded; all we have is a definition of Anviksaki, without any assertion that it constituted the whole of philosophy. He is wrong also in denying that Jayanta is a Brahmanical god, as he is found in the Sutras, and there is not the slightest evidence for the theory that in the 3rd century A. D. the worship of the Aevins was antiquated.

The only conclusion, therefore, which seems compatible with the facts is that the Arthaashastra is not the work of Kautzilya, minister of Candragupta. It must remain an open question whether in the treatise are preserved any authentic remains of his views, if we accept tradition and believe that he actually existed as an important political factor. The evidence in favour of an affirmative reply in this matter are unfortunately far from strong; what does appear to be the fact is that probably especially under the Gupta dynasty with the revival of Hinduism the fame of the minister of the ancient Candragupta evoked the production of maxims ascribed to him. But at any rate the Arthaashastra should no longer be used as a prima facie authority for the period 300 B. C.

It may be added that the doubt which attaches to the Kautzilya applies equally at least to the Arthaashastras which are imputed to such authorities as Bhaspati and Vichalaks. The citations ascribed to them in Vichavopa's commentary on Yajnavalkya certainly

suggest no antiquity either in matter or language (e.g., the use of sārmya).

Finally the proposal* to read the author’s name as Kauṭalya seems unnecessary. It rests on too recent MS. evidence to claim respect on that score, and the lexicographical authority is late. It is most natural to suppose that, at some time or other, it was thought unsuitable to allow the derivation of Kauṭilya from kuṭila, and the form Kauṭalya was devised in lieu with an appropriate Kuṭala as its source. The evidence of early references to the Kauṭiliya, including those in the Jain texts is clearly decisive in favour of the spelling with i.

* T. Caṇapaṭal Sāstri., pl. i, p. 4; pl. iii, p. 4.
BĀHYAKAS

(DR. LOUIS DE LA VALLEE POUSSIN).

The Bāhyakas are the doctors and the ascetics "from outside" i.e., "non-buddhists"—"Strangers."

One point is certain, and this is that the "Strangers" cannot obtain salvation, cannot obtain Nirvāṇa. But they can be great saints, be reborn in the purified heavens of Brahmā and above, prepare themselves to acquire the buddhist truths.

1. There are two ways of knowing, jñāna or prajñā: the mundane knowledge (lauhika) and the supramundane knowledge (lokottara). The first one is impure (sāsrava) the second one is pure (anasrava): by the second one alone can an ascetic uproot the klesas, errors and passions, which are an obstacle to Nirvāṇa and prolong the transmigration. The Buddhas and the Pratyekabuddhas obtain the supramundane knowledge by their own forces; the Sāvakas, or Disciples, through the teaching of the Buddhas. But every man can obtain the mundane knowledge. That knowledge is not only the knowledge of common things; it includes also the knowledge of the general character of things; in one word, it is a view of the buddhist truths, but imperfect, impure with traces of ignorance and doubt; not only the "impermanency and sorrow" but also the "quality of the non-ego" (nairātmya = selflessness). Through the mundane knowledge, without the teaching of the Buddha, an ascetic can free himself, for a time and partially, of the belief in the "ego," in "mine" in the heterodox doctrines.

That ascetic can be reborn in the highest sphere of existence, in the bhavāgra "sphere in which there is neither idea nor absence of idea" (naivasaṃjñāna saṃjñāyatana), in which he will remain during eighty thousand Kalpas. But the mundane knowledge does not enable him to free himself of the errors and the passions infinitely reduced, which are proper to that sphere: after this quasi-eternity of half-unconsciousness he will fall back.

2. The usual doctrine is that a "Stranger" without knowing the buddhistic truths through the mundane knowledge, can free himself of the passions proper to the world here below, the kāma-
dhātu i.e., "sphere of sensual desires" and be reborn in the world of Brahmā. For that it is enough that the stranger should become disgusted with the gross objects of pleasure (enjoyment); such as all the Rishis, named Vitarāgas.

3. The "Stranger" cannot possess the discipline of Pratimokṣa; he cannot be a Bhikṣu, for the Bhikṣu takes the vows in view of the Nirvāṇa, and the "Stranger," by definition, does not pursue the Nirvāṇa but only a certain re-existence. But he is a quasi-Bhikṣu when he takes up "morality by engagement" when he renounces murder, theft etc. By this he acquires much merit.

4. The Buddhist schools are not agreed as to whether or not the "Strangers" can possess the five first Abhiṣīṇa, or "superhuman sciences": the ādhiṣṭhā (or magical power of displacement through space and the creation of magical beings), the divine eye, the divine ear, the knowledge of other people's thoughts, the remembrance of former existences.

No doubt every one admits that by the māyā, or magic, by the use of the formulæ (vidyā mantra) any man can work miracles. An ascetic by examining the skull guessed in what destiny the deceased had been reborn. There is a ākṣanikā vidyā which enables one to read the thought. But the Śūtras condemn to the worst torments these wonderworkers (men and women) who are vulgar sorcerers.

The Abhiṣīṇa is very different from these technicalities which are to be condemned. It is a science which belongs only to men who have obtained the dhyāna i.e., who have freed themselves entirely from the passions of this earth.

5. To my mind it is very remarkable that several buddhist schools should have attributed to strangers the possession of the abhiṣīṇas.

We remember that one of the Abhiṣīṇas, the remembrance of past existence, is one of the three sciences (knowledge) which the Buddha obtained on the night he became Buddha. In certain brahmanic sources, the śātismarata is inseparable from the apatarga.

We see with pleasure that the Buddhists though persuaded that they alone have the integral truth admit that the "Strangers" are not excluded from a large share in the truth,
DHARMAŚĀSTRA AND ARTHAŚĀSTRA

(PROFESSOR DR. M. WINTERNITZ.)

Much has been written during the last few years about the history of political science in India.* The Dharmaśāstras and the Rājadharmanusāsanaparvan of the Mahābhārata have been freely quoted in connection with the Kautūliya Arthasastra, in order to reconstruct this history. The authors who have written on the subject have generally taken for granted that the Kautūliya is a work of the fourth century B.C., and that the authorities quoted by Kautūliya represent the earliest stage in the development of the Arthashastra, going back to about 650 B.C. Prof. D. R. Bhandarkar has assigned to the same early period the Arthasastra material contained in the Dharmaśāstras and the Mahābhārata. Prof. U. Ghoshal treats the political, theories of the Dharmaśūtras as contemporary with the early stage of the Arthasastra, but sees in the material of the Rājadharmanusāsanaparvan a synthesis of Arthasastra and Dharmaśāstra thought.

Professor J. Jolly† has given a detailed synopsis of the legal matter contained in Books III (Dharmasthīya) and IV (Kanṭakasodhana) with the extant Dharmaśāstra texts. This synopsis has shown clearly that the Kautūliya in its legal matter agrees far more with the

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Yājñavalkya and Nārada Sātrīs than with the earlier Dharmāsāstras. Professor Jolly has concluded from this fact that the Kauṭiliya has borrowed from the later Sātrīs, while Indian scholars are inclined to believe that Yājñavalkya and Nārada have made use of the Kauṭiliya. It seems to me that there are other possibilities to which hitherto too little attention has been paid. Is it not possible that where Dharmāsāstra and Arthaśāstra agree both may go back to one and the same common source? And is it not possible that there may have been mutual influencing between the two Sāstras?

I do not wish to answer this question here. For in my opinion, a great deal of preliminary work, involving a minute and detailed investigation both of the Arthaśāstra sections in the Mahābhārata and of the references to Arthaśāstra matter in the Dharmāsāstras is necessary, before a real history of Indian political science can be written. In fact, a complete synopsis of all Dharmāsāstra and Arthaśāstra texts where they go over the same ground is required, before such a history can even be thought of. The differences between the two sets of texts are no less important than the points of agreement. It will also be necessary, in this comparative study of Dharmāsāstra and Arthaśāstra, to distinguish between the prose parts of the Kauṭiliya and the verses. Many of these verses certainly belong to the floating mass of political and ethical maxims which has also been one of the sources of the Dharmāsāstra, and which is also largely represented in the didactic portions of the Mahābhārata.

The following is intended to be only a small contribution to this preliminary work, a kind of supplement to Prof. Jolly's synopsis*. 

1. Education of Princes.

1. The K. Arthaśāstra begins with a chapter on the education of princes. It devotes four chapters (I. 1-4) to a discussion in the disciplines in which a prince is to be instructed. According to K. there are four branches of knowledge, viz., Ānvikṣiki, Trayī, Vārtā,

* The following abbreviations will be used: K. = Kauṭiliya, Kauṭiliya; G = Gautama-Dharmasūtra; Āp. = Āpastambhiya-Dharmasūtra; Baudh. = Baudhayana Dharmasūtra; Vās. = Vāsishtha-Dharmasūtra; Vi. = Vīṣṇu-Sātrak; M. = Manu-Sātrak; Yā = Yājñavalkya-Dharmasūtra; N. = Nārada-Sātrak; Kām. = Kāmandaka-Nitisāra; A. = Arthaśāstra; Dh. = Dharmasūtra.
and Daṇḍanaṭi, while other teachers quoted by K. acknowledge only three (Trāyī, Vārtā, Daṇḍanaṭi), or two (Vārtā, Daṇḍanaṭi), or even one only (Daṇḍanaṭi) as necessary for the king.

G. XI, 3 only says that the king should be instructed in Trāyī and Ānvikṣikī, thus differing both from K and his predecessors. The other Dharmasūtras have nothing about it.* Yā. I, 311 mentions, among the accomplishments required of a king, that he must be instructed in Ānvikṣikī, Daṇḍanaṭi, Vārtā and Trāyī.

K. I, 5 says that the prince should learn the Trāyī and Ānvikṣikī, from the Siṣṭas, the Vārtā from the Adhyakṣas, Daṇḍanaṭi from theoreticians and practical politicians. M. VII, 43, however, teaches that he should learn only Vārtā from practical people or professionals (lokayataḥ), while the other sciences are to be learnt from Veda-knowing Brahmans only. He says:

\[ \text{बैविवृंभ्यम् गीऽ विद्या दश्यानिति च शास्त्राम्} \\
\text{शास्त्रीर्विक्षिकी चाचविवृं वात्तर्वशाथी लीकत:} \]

Prof. G. Bühler† translated: "From those versed in the three Vedas let him learn the threefold (sacred science), the primeval science of government, the science of dialectics, and the knowledge of the (supreme) soul; from the people (the theory of) the (various) trades and professions." But the commentators differ with regard to the explanation of ātmavidyām. Medhātithi already gives two different explanations: ātmavidyā (he says) is either to be taken in the sense of adhyātmavidyā, or the two words ānvikṣikīm ātmavidyām stand in the relation of viśeṣaṇa and višeṣya, i.e. ātmavidyām is to be taken as an attribute to ānvikṣikīm. This seems to me to be the real meaning of M. who wants to say that only orthodox philosophy should be taught as Ānvikṣikī not that of Baudhāyas and other heretics. Cf. Medhātithi:

\[ \text{चाच्चनि या हितालिविकी तत्सैक्ष्या तः भिषेष्च साह दापुष्कले} \\
\text{वृषभायु यस्योपविच्छेति संखोमौषद्धाय} \\
\text{या तु वीदवायाकादितन्तिके} \\
\text{विद्या सा नानाविध कला कालिद्वयुक्तं प्रव्य तास्तिकमेत्यविद्या} \]

* This does not seem to me to be a sufficient reason for considering the sūtra G. XI, 3 a later addition, as Prof. Jacoby (Sitzungsberichte Berliner Akademie 1911, p. 740) is inclined to do.

† Sacred Books of the East, vol. 25, p. 222.
And this is the general teaching of later times, so also of Vātsyāyana in the Nyāyabhāṣya.†

2. The aim of Daṇḍaniti is according to K. 1, 4, p. 9, to acquire what has not been acquired, to protect that which has been acquired, to increase that which has been protected, and to bestow that which has been increased on worthy persons:

This is called "the fourfold pursuit with regard to human wealth" (चतुर्विधः पुरस्वार्थः प्रयोजनम्) by M. VII, 100, and M. VII, 99 teaches among the duties of the king:

This is repeated, in slightly different words, in M. VII, 101. Yā. I. 317. also says:

* Cf. also Kām. II. 2: daṇḍanitiḥ ca sāvatiḥ with M. VII, 43.

† See Jacobi. I. c. p. 734 ff. But I cannot agree with Prof. Jacobi (I. c. p. 972 note) in assuming that K., too, has orthodox philosophy in view when he says (I. 5, p. 10) that the prince should learn the Ānvikṣikī from the Siśtas. For I cannot believe that the Lokaṭyata which he includes in the term Ānvikṣikī ever was orthodox. The Siśtas are learned and educated Brahmans, versed in Logic and Dialecτics as methods of investigating. And this, not any metaphysical teaching like the Ādhyātmavidya, was meant by the term Ānvikṣikī. Cf. Ghoshal, I. c., p. 127 ff.
3. K. I, 5, p. 10, in giving rules about the daily lessons of the prince, says that he should spend the first part of the day in receiving instruction in the military arts (hastyaśvarathapraharanaṇavidyāṣu). G. X, 15 mentions, among the duties of the king, that he should learn the management of chariot and bow (caryā ca rathadhanur-bhyām).

4. K. I, 5 has a whole chapter entitled vrddhasamyogah, in which the prince is told always to keep company with those "who have grown in knowledge" (vidyāvrddha). K. I., 7, 12, says that the king should acquire wisdom by intercourse with the aged. Again, K. VIII, 3, šloka 2 (p. 330) we have: vrddhasevī jìtendriyāh.

So we have Vi. III, 77: vrddhasevī bhavet; Yā. I, 309: vrddhasevakah; and M. VII, 38:

हृदयच नित्यं संवेदन विद्याय द्विदेव: शचीन्
हृदयचे र्हि सततं रक्षोभिरिधी प्रूचयनि

5. Great importance is attached, in the education of princes, to the conquest of the senses, the indriyavijaya, to which the two chapters of K., I, 6 and 7, are devoted. This "conquest" can be made only by getting rid of the "six enemies," viz lust (kāma), anger (krodha), greed (lobha), haughtiness (māna), mad passion (mada), and wantonness (harṣa). Cf. also K. VIII, 3šlokas.

G. XI, 4 wants the king to be śucir jìtendriyāh. And M. VII, 44 says:

इन्द्रियाणि जये योगं समातिश्रवियनिष्ठम्
जितेन्द्रियो र्हि शान्तीं वणी स्वापयितुं प्रजा:

II. Duties of King, the Ideal King, Position of King.

1. One of the official spies who are to be sent out to espy public opinion regarding the king, is made to say, by K. I, 13: "Oppressed by the 'rule of the fish'(माकानयायाभिमूत्रा) i.e. by anarchy, where, the small fish are swallowed by the large fish) people made Manu Vaivasvata their King. They fixed one-sixth of the grain and one-tenth of merchandise and some gold as his share. Living on this (as their revenue), kings promote the welfare of the subjects, and take their sins upon themselves, when they do not punish
(the evildoers) and thus do not promote the welfare of the subjects. Therefore even hermits offer to the king one-sixth of their gleanings, saying 'This is the share of him who protects us.' This is why the kings being anger and grace personified, are the representatives of Indra and Yama; divine punishment also reaches those who despise the kings; they must never be despised.'

The whole of this passage certainly does not read, as if K. were propounding here a new theory of kingship, but rather as if he were referring to well-known ideas about the origin and divinity of kingship. The "rule of the fish" is alluded to by M. VII, 20. The interrelation between the paying of taxes, "one-sixth of grains," and the king's duty of protecting is pithily expressed by Baudh. I, 18, 1: वच्चाभृत्तो राजा रसेऽि प्रजाम् and it is also referred to by G. X, 24-28; Vī. I, 42 ; 44; Vi. III, 28; M. VIII, 304 f.; 307 f.; IX, 254; XI, 23; Yā. I, 335; N. XVIII, 48."

The divine origin and nature of kings is emphasized by M. VII, 3-13; IX, 303-313; N. XVIII, 25-32; 52-55. Indra and Yama, who according to K. are represented by the king, are two of seven (M), respectively five deities (N.) whose divinity is shared by the king, according to M and N.

2. The king's duty of protecting his subjects is incidentally mentioned in the passage K. I, 13 just quoted. Another incidental reference to this duty is found in K. III, 1, sloka 4:

रश्र: स्वाम्य: स्वामाय प्रजा धर्मं रत्नतु: ।

"If a king protects his people according to law, the fulfilment of his own duty leads him to heaven."

All Dharmsūtras and Dharmaśāstras agree in declaring it as the paramount duty of the king to protect the people, especially from thieves (Ap. II, 25, 15). "Protecting the creatures" or "all creatures" (rakṣanām sarvabhūtānām, pālanam bhūtānām, prajāpā-

* I read with Jolly's Lahore edition:

किक्कलस्मद्दर्णकरा चर्चन्तयोगविधिवाच्च प्रजाताम् ।

See Mahābhārata XII, 67, 12-17, and Rāmāyaṇa II, 67, 31 (Bhandarkar I, c.).
lanam) is the svadharma of the warrior caste and particularly of the
king; see G. X, 7; Väs II, 17; XIX, 1; Baudh. I, 18, 1; Vi.
III, 2; V, 196; M. VII, 2; 142-144; 302-313; Yā I, 335 f. Already
in the Rgveda (III, 43,5) the king is called "guardian of the people"
(gopā janasya). More especially it is the duty of the king to protect
the weak. Āp. II, 25, 11: "No one should despair in his realm
suffering from hunger, sickness, cold or heat." The king must
take charge of the property of minors and unprotected females.
see G. X, 48; Väs. XVI, 7 f.; Vi. III, 65; M. VIII, 27-29.

K. II, 1, p. 47 f., also teaches that the king must support infants,
the aged, the sick, the afflicted, the helpless, and unprotected
women. The village elders must take charge of the property of
infants.

3. For protecting the people, the king must make use of
punishment. Both Dh. and A. insist on the king’s duty of meting
out just punishment. K. devotes a whole chapter (I, 4) to danda
‘punishment,’ which should be neither too severe nor too mild, but
is absolutely necessary for maintaining social order: for if it is not
awarded properly, the ‘rule of the fish’ will prevail, and the
stronger will swallow the weak. Again K. III, 1, śloka 5, it is said:

‘For punishment alone protects both the other world and this world.’

M. VII, 14-31 has the well-known glorification of Danda, which
is praised as the true ruler and protector of men, for without punish-
ment ‘the stronger would roast the weak like fish on the spit.’

Compare:

K. I, 4:

चप्रीतो हि मसानाय-भगवति । अनन्तानवलन
हि यत्री दंडवधारिवे II...
चतुर्वांशिकी लोको राजा
दशङ्गे न पाति: ।
K. III, 1, śl. 5.

dhashī hi këvalī loke pār cēmā cha ṛchāti ।

M. VII, 20:

यदि न प्रत्येकाणि दंडङ्गः
दंडङ्गेप्रवत्तिनितः । शुल्ले
मसानायापक्कववः

dhashī nābhavānora II

M. VII, 18

दशङ्गः शासि प्रजा: सर्वोऽ
दशङ्ग एवाभिषृच्यति ।
G. X, 8 mentions the duty of due punishment (nyāyādānḍatvam) immediately after the first duty of protecting. Ṛp. II, 10, 6 includes dāṇḍa and yuddha (punishment and war) in the regular duties of the warrior. But punishment must be just: G. XII, 51; Vṛs. XIX, 9; Vi. III, 91; 95 f.; Yā. I, 353-360; 367.

4. It is the king’s duty to watch over the varṇāśramadharma, i.e., the social order in the sense of Brahmanism, according to which each of the four castes and the four order (āśrama) has its own peculiar duties (svadharma). Hence K. I, 3 and 4 teaches the svadharma of the castes and orders in perfect agreement with the Dharmaśāstras; and the study of the Trayī, the three Vedas, is recommended to the king, because from it is to be known the varṇāśramadharma. “On account of his watching over the manners and conduct of the people consisting of four castes and four orders, the king is the administrator of justice (K. III, 1, śloka 1) Cf. M. VII, 35 f.

5. The special duty of the warrior and of the king is to fight in battle, to protect the people by his weapons, and to live on his weapons. As. Vṛs. II, 17 says: (श्रेष्ठ च द्रव्याणां स्वयं स्त्वर्ग जीवितो) so K. I, 3 has: (चतुर्विद्या...श्रेष्ठाचारि भुत्तर्चणि च ई) All the Dharmaśūtras and Dharmaśāstras emphasize the the king’s duty of fighting bravely, not to turn back, and to gain victory by his prowess. See G. X, 13-16; Ṛp. II, 10. 6; Baudh. I, 18, 9; Vi. III. 68 f. They also promise heavenly worlds to the king and the warriors who die in battle, especially in defending the property of a Brahman. Thus Ṛp. II, 26. 2; Vi. III, 43-46; M. VII, 87-89; Yā. I, 324. K. X. 3 teaches that at the beginning of a battle the minister and the Purohita should encourage the soldiers by referring to the Vedic sayings in which heaven is promised to the brave warrior who dies on the battlefield. In the list of the accomplishments required of the king (svāmisanpat), K. VI, 1 mentions valour (sattva) and energy (utsāha, śauryam), but in the War Book (X) K., according to the character of the A., lays far more stress on diplomacy than on the personal bravery of the king.

6. Both A. and Dh. insist on the king’s performing also his religious duties according to the Brahmanical system. Study of the Vedas, sacrificing and bestowing gifts on the Brahmans (adhyayanam, yajanan, dānam) are ksatriya duties in the whole Dh. literature,
as in K. I, 3. According to K. I, 5 the Saṃskāras (caula, upanayanā, brahmacharya) are as a matter of course performed for the prince. The Saṃskāras, performed before and after the birth of a prince, are considered by K. I, 17 (p. 33) to be the best means to prevent a prince from becoming a danger to the king. The timetable of the king's daily routine, K. I, 19 (p. 37 f), includes śvādhyaṇa, sandhyā, svastītyayana, reception of the astrologer, and circumambulation of a cow with calf and bull before entering the audience hall.* Here (p. 39) it is also said that the king must personally attend to all urgent affairs, the most urgent being the affairs of deities, hermitages, heretics, śrotiyas, cattle, and sacred places. Ascetics and śrotiyas are received in the room of the sacred fires (agnyagāra). Before the king tastes his food, he makes offerings (bali) to the fire and the birds (K. I, 21, p. 43). When settling in a country, land (brahmadeya) is to be given free of taxes to the sacrificial priest, the teacher, the domestic chaplain and the learned Brahman (ṛtvigacaryapurohitāśrotīyebhyāḥ), according to K. II, 1, p. 46. Privileged land should also be given to Brahman as sacred forests for prayer and soma (brahmaseṃaranyāni) and to ascetics (tapovaṃnāni), K. II, 2, p. 49. According to K. śrotiyas are allowed to take salt for their food without toll (II, 12, p. 84), to take fruits, rice, and barley for sacrifice, from the fields, without fine (II, 24, p. 118), and to cross rivers without paying fare (II, 28, p. 127).

It seems clear that in all this the A. is based on the Dh. See G. XI, 15-18; Vi. III 78; M. VII, 79; Yā. I, 314 about the king's duty of performing religious rites and sacrifices. The duty of honouring learned Brahman by gifts of land and money is enjoined upon the king in all the Dh. over and over again. Ap. II, 26, I promises endless worlds to the king who bestows wealth and land on worthy Brahman. Śrotiyas and ascetics are exempt from taxes, see Ap. II, 26, 10 ; 14; Vās. XIX, 23 ; Vi. III, 26-28; M. VII. 133. Ascetics, hermits, and learned Brahman pay no fare at a ferry, according to M. VIII, 407; Vi., v, 132; N. XVIII, 38.

From very early Vedic times the Purohita was always considered as "a minister of public worship and confidential adviser of the

* This rite is not mentioned in the Dh.
king" who was absolutely necessary both for the material and the spiritual welfare of the king. This is the accepted view in the Dh, as well as in the A.† Compare

K. I, 9: and Yā. 313 f.

पुरोहितमुदितोदितं कुशीलं
प्रजा वेददेवी नित्यस्मेव दण्डनीया
चालन्तीतमातृं दैवमातृवै
राजभविन्धपायथं प्रतिकारं
कृष्णदीतं। तस्मात् गीत: पितरं
पुत्रो भूतं, स्वाधिनं धर्मं
वर्ततं। राजाः ननेविंचं धर्मं...

जयति*...

Vās. XIX, 3-6: गार्भस्वाधिनं
कृष्ण पुरोहितं दश्यात्। विनायकी
व्रजपुरोहितं राजकृष्णाति।

Baudh. I, 18, 7 f. सर्वनाशं दण्डित्
शिवउत्कारं तवभीतं।

Vi. III, 70: वेदेतिसामवेदासाधारं
कुलनं कुलीनस् तपस्विनं
पुरोहितं च वर्तेत।

पुरोहितं प्रकृष्णदीतं देवकु
मुदितोदितं दण्डनीया
च व्रजस्वाधिनं विद्याधिनं
तव। श्रीमात्रां क्रिक्रिया
हेतुविलुप्तं च विरलं।

G. XI, 12-14:

दुश्मनं च पुरो दश्यात
विनायकी। तत्पश्चातः
नवेद्वल्कं न्यायाचरं
तपस्विनमं। तत्प्रथमं
कमाणि कृष्णदीतं। तः
प्रस्तुतं च चतुर्मथ्यं न
अध्ययनं इति विनायकी॥

See also M. VII, 78 and


(राजा पुरोहितं धर्मर्धिञ्कुगलम्)

† Cf. O Stein, Megasthenes und Ājñatīya, Wren 1922, p. 286 ff. Ghoshal, l. c., p. 88 f., concludes from the fact that the Purohita is not found in the list of Prakrit's, that the A. "did a distinct service to the cause of political theory by ruling out the "purohita" from the list of proximate factors of government".
V. R. Ramchandra Dikshit (Report of the third Oriental Conference, Madras, p. 615 ff.) is probably right in assuming that the Purohita is included in the term 'āmaśya' among the Prakrits.
7. The *ideal King* is described by K., in the śloka quoted at the end of I, 5, as one who is trained in the sciences, rejoices in the propriety of conduct of his subjects, and finds his pleasure in the well-being of all creatures (sarbabhūtahite rataḥ). Again in a śloka quoted I, 19:

प्रजासुखी सुखं राजा: प्रजानां च स्विते जितम्   ।
नामपियं जितं राजा: प्रजानां तु पियं जितम् ॥

This is much like Vi. III, 98:

प्रजास खे सुखी राजा तहुँ खे यथू दुः खिति: ।
स कृत्यित्युको लोकभिन्नेऽथ खर्म महीयति ॥

As to the accomplishments of a king (svāminampat) compare:

K. vi. 1:  

या. I, 309—311.

8. K. VIII, 3 devotes a whole chapter to a long discussion about the vices of a king, distinguishing four *kumajavasananī,* "vices
sprung from sensual desire," viz. hunting (mrgayā), gambling (dyūtām), women (striyāh) and drinking (pānām), and three krodha-
ja(v)asanūni, 'vices sprung from anger', viz., violence in language (vākparuṣya), unjust seizure of property (arthaduṣaṇam), and violence in
deed (danḍaparasyam). The same classification is implied in Vi. III, 50-52: अम्बयास्तिपानाभिति परिहितत्। वाक्षर्थावधाण
पासी च। नायपंथम् कुर्यात्। But M. VII, 45-48 gives a list of
ten kūmaṇa and eight krodhajā vyasanāni, which is very probably
an expansion of the shorter list. Varāhamihira (Yogayātrā II, 2 f.)
agrees with M.

9. K. I, 19 gives a time-table for the king's daily routine of
life, dividing the day and the night into eight parts each by means
by nālikās, Ya. I, 327-333, without mentioning the division of time
by nālikās, describes the king's daily routine in very close, and
partly verbal agreement with K. But M. VII, 216 and 221-226 has
a similiar, but by no means identical time-table.* The other Dh. have
nothing about it.

10. K. attaches great importance to the king's duty of looking
after his own safety. In I, 17 the problem how a king should
protect himself against his own sons ('for princes, like crabs, are
inclined to eat up their begetters' is fully discussed. And K. I,
20 f. describes in great detail the precautions a king should take,
when going to his meals and to the harem, against being poisoned
or assassinated in some other way. Some such rules, but without
any verbal agreements, are found in M. VII, 217-220. Vi. III, 85;
87 f. only says:—

सर्वत्राकालान परायत्तु।...विश्वंगतसमलत्वारी च। नावोविल-
मुयुक्त्रात्। The other Dh. have nothing on this subject.

III, Villages, Towns, Forts and Palaces.

1. K. II, 1, p. 45 says that the king should settle in a village
that is 'chiefly inhabited by śudras and husbandmen' (śudrakaraṣa-
prāyam). Vi. III, 5 says that the king should settle in a country
that is 'chiefly inhabited by vaisyās and śudras' (vaisyasaśudra-
prāyam). When M. VII, 69 recommends the king to dwell in a

* For details see N. N. Law, I. c., p. 78 ff. Cf. also O. Stein, I. c., p. 78 ff.
country that is "chiefly inhabited by Āryas" (aryaprayām), this looks like an intentional rejection of the rule of K. and Vi.

K. VI, 1, p. 258, gives a very long list of the good qualities required of a country (janapadasampat). Vi. III, 4, M. VII, 69, and Yā I, 321 describe the country fit for the king only with a few epithets. It shall be lovely (ramya. M. Yā., Cf. Kānta, K.) rich in cattle (paśavya, Vi., Yā., Cf. Paśumān, K.) affording a good livelihood (svājīvyā, M., ājīvyā, Yā., svājīva, K.) and it should have subdued neighbours (ānanāsāmanta, M. Cf. śakyaśāmanta, 'having neighbours that can easily be subdued', K.). There are no other points of agreement with K., and Vi., M. and Yā agree more with one another than with K.

2. K. II, 3 describes four kinds of natural forts, viz., a water-fort (audakam), a mountain-fort (pārvatam), a desert-fort (dhānvanam), and a forest-fort (vanadurgam), there being two sub divisions of each.* The river and mountain-forts, says K., offer the best opportunity for protecting the country, while the desert and forest-forts are fit for forest inhabitants (who are appointed as frontier-guards) or can be used as a refuge in time of danger. M. VII, 70-75 gives details about six kinds of forts, viz., desert-fort (dhanvadurgam), earth-fort (mahā-durgam), water-fort (ab-durgam), tree-fort (vrksaadurgam), men-fort (nrddurgam), and mountain fort (giri-durgam). But M. emphatically declares that of all these mountain-fort has most advantages. Vi. III, 6 knows the same six kinds of forts as M., without going into detail. Yā. I, 321 only says that a king should make forts for the protection of the people of the treasury and of himself. He gives no details at all.

K. II, 4 gives a list of things and persons that should always be present in a fortress. M. VII, 75 also says that the fort must be supplied with weapons (āyudha, cf. praharaṇāvaraṇa in K.), money, grain (dhānya, also in K.), vehicles (vahana, cf. hasty-aśvaratha in K.), Brahmans, artisans, engines, fodder (yavasa, also in K.) and water. K. has many more things.

3. Only one of the old Dharmasūtras, Āp. II, 25, includes among the duties of the king also that of building a town and a palace. Here we find the rules, that the gates of town and palace

* See Binode Behari Dutt, Town Planning in Ancient India, Calcutta, 1925, p. 72 ff.
must look towards the south, that the palace shall be in the centre of the town, with a hall (āvasaṭha), called “invitation-hall” (āman-trapam) in front of the palace, where learned Brāhmans should be received as guests. To the south of the town there shall be a gambling hall (sabhā) with doors to the south and the north. In all the three buildings sacred fires must be kept and sacrifices offered. In the middle of the Sabha a play-table (adhidevana) is to be raised, dice are to be supplied, and honest and truthful Āryas are allowed to play there.

All this has nothing in common with K. II, 4, where the construction of the town and royal buildings is described, nor with K. III, 20, where gambling and the duties of the superintendent of dice (dyūtādhyakṣa) are dealt with.

IV. Prakṛitis, Mandalas, Foreign Policy.

1. The theory of the seven Prakṛitis or elements of the State (sovereign, ministers, country, fort, treasury, army and ally), and the relative importance of each of them, are discussed in detail by K. VI, 1 and VIII, 1. The list in K. is the same as in Yā. I, 353; while M. IX, 294 has a slightly different order and terminology. Compare:

K. VI. 1 स्मास्मायाजनवदुग्र्मविशदवधितवाणि प्रक्षतयः ॥

Yā. I, 353 स्मास्मायावतः दणिः दणिः श्रावत्वैः च ।

मित्रवषी ततः प्रक्षतयो राजयो समाभिषुच्यते॥

M. IX, 294 स्मास्मायालो पुः वि ब्रह्मवसी सुश्रुतयः ।

सम प्रक्षतयो श्रोतः समस्ते राजासुच्यते॥

As to the relative importance of the seven Prakṛitis, respectively the seriousness of calamities (Vyasana) befalling them, K. defends the view of those teachers who say that each former one in the list is the more important. This is also the view of M. IX, 295, though M. places the fort (puram) before the country (raṣṭram). Compare:

K. VIII, 1 स्मास्मायाजनवदुग्र्मविशदवधितवाणानि

पुः पुः गरीय इत्याचायायः ॥

M. IX, 295 समानां प्रक्षतीनां तु राजास्मां यथाक्रमम्

पुः पुः मुखलं जानीयाहासनं महत्॥
In the śloka at the end of VIII, 1 K. says: 'When one calamity threatens to destroy the rest of the Prakṛtis, then this calamity is more serious than the chief or any one of the other (calamities, that are considered most serious according to the general rule)." This is not identical with but similar to the teaching of M. IX, 296 f., where it is said that, as each of the Prakṛtis is of importance for the others, and each one serves its particular purpose, none is superior to the others. Yā says nothing about this question of superiority.

2. K. devotes the whole of Book VII to the sadgūna, the six political methods, viz. peace (sandhi), war (vīgraḥa), encamping (āsana), marching (yāna), seeking refuge (saṁśraya), and double policy (dvaidhibhāva). Yā. I, 347 and Vi. III, 39 give the same six methods, teaching that they should be employed "properly" (yathāvāt, Yā.) or "at the proper time" (yathākāsam, Vi).

M. VII, 160-180, distinguishes two kinds of each of the six methods, and gives detailed rules about the occasions, when each of these methods should be employed. But there is nothing in the whole of this long passage that would indicate any acquaintance with K.

3. According to the theory of the Mandalas, as explained by K. VI, 2, there are twelve kings (the vijigūṣu or 'he who is out for conquest', the enemy, the friend, the enemy's friend, the friend's friend, the friend of the enemy's friend, the pārśṇagraha or 'rear-enemy,' the ākṛanda or 'rear-friend', the pārśṇagrahaśāra or 'the rear-enemy's friend, the ākṛandāśāra or 'rear-friend's friend,' the madhyama or 'neighbouring neutral king', who is a neighbour of both the Vijigūṣu and the enemy and stronger than each of them, and the udāśīna or 'distant neutral king' who is stronger than both of them combined), who stand to each other in the relation of either friends, or enemies, or neutrals, and thus form the personal 'elements' (prakṛti) of inter-state relations.* Four of these, the Vījīṣu, the enemy, the Madhyama and the Udāśīna, form each the centre of a "circle" (mandala) consisting of three kings. Each of the twelve kings is provided with the five Prakṛtis: minister, country, fort, treasury, and army; this makes 60 Prakṛtis. Thus there are together with the 12 personal Prakṛtis in all 72

* Cf. Narendra Nath Law, Inter-State Relations in Ancient India, Calcutta Oriental Series, 1920
"elements of inter-state relations to which a king has to pay attention.

M. VII, 154-158, also teaches that the king should carefully reflect on the actions of the Maṇḍala, that of the Madhyama, the Vijigīṣu, the Udāśīna, and the enemy. These four Prakṛtis are said to be the foundation (mūlam) of the Maṇḍala, "and eight others are enumerated", making a total of 72 "elements." By the words "eight others are enumerated", M. refers to some in A. from which the reader is to know the "eight others."

Vi. III, 38 alludes to the Maṇḍala theory quite briefly by saying that the king should apply the four expedients of policy towards the enemy, the friend and the two kinds of neutrals (satrumitrodāsi namadhyameṣu). Yā. I, 345 has the same rule, mentioning "the enemy, the friend, the distant neutral (udāśīna), the immediate neighbour,* and each following one" as forming the Maṇḍala.

4. In the passages just quoted (Vi. III, 38, Yā. I, 345) and also in M. VII, 159, it is said that the king should employ "the four expedients, conciliation etc." (sāmādibhir upakramaṁ) in dealing with the kings of the Maṇḍala; Vi. III, 38 mentions them: sāma-bhedadānadaṇḍan yathārham yathākalam prayañjitā. Yā. I. 346 says:

उपायः साम दानः च भेददानदानञ्जन यथार्थम् यथाकलाम प्रयान्तिता।
सम्बन्धयुक्ता; सिद्धार्थोऽऽश्वगतिका गति:।

"The expedients are: conciliation, bribery, creating disunion, and force; when properly employed, they lead to success, but force should be only the last recourse, when there is no other left."

This doctrine of the four expedients or means of polity, well-known from later texts,† is found in K. II, 10 in quite a different connection, namely in the chapter on royal edicts (śāsana), where we read: उपायः सामीपदानभेदडङ्कः। अर्थात् क्षमये क्षमित्येकः। And again K. VII, 16, it is said that one who wishes to make conquests, shall subdue the weak by conciliation and bribery, the strong by creating disunion and by force: सामदानाय दुर्छ लालुपनवेत्। भेददम्ममां बलबत्।।

* The word anantarṃaḥ seems to be used here as a synonym of madhyamaḥ. The words tatparaḥparaḥ, "each following one," seem to refer to the other eight kings, who are supposed to be known from some A, as in M. VII, 156.
† See Kam. 18, 3 ff.; Tantrākhyāyika (ed. J. Hertel). I, 139 and p. 125 1, 11; Varāhamihira's Yogayātra I, 11.
K. IX, 5. also sāmādāne are recommended as means to be employed in dealing with conspirators.

5. K. VI, 2, states that both providence and human action rule the world, but in politics only the latter can be anticipated. Compare:

K. देवमानुषं हि कर्म लोकं यापयति। प्रत्यक्षकारितं देवम्।
...प्रत्यक्षकारितम् मानुषम्।...तविन्द्रम्। प्रचिन्न्यं देवमिति।

M. VII. 205. सर्वं कर्मदमाप्तं विधानं देवमानुषं।
तत्योदैवमचिन्त्यं। तु मानुषं विधायते। किष्य।

Yā, I, 349: दैवि पुष्पकारं च कर्मसिद्धिवं वसिद्यता।

V. Warefare.

M. VII, 181-204 has many details about war, but there are only very few points of agreement with what is found in K. IX, X, and XIII.

I. K. IX, 1, gives only practical reasons for choosing the time (month or season) of marching against the enemy. Though he first mentions the advantages of marching in Mārgasīrṣa or Caitra, he also mentions the advantages of marching at other times, according to circumstances. Vi III, 40 f., says that the king shall march against the enemy in Caitra or Mārgasīrṣa, or whenever the enemy is in distress. M. VII, 181-183 also gives preference to "the fine month of Mārgasīrṣa," but allows also Phālguna or Caitra, according to the strength of the king’s army, or any other time, when he is sure of victory or when the enemy is in distress.

2. M. VII, 187 f., mentions seven kinds of arrays (vyāha) of an army, viz., daṇḍa, śakaṭa, varāha, makara, sūci, garuḍa and padma. K. X, 2: 3: 6, also has the makara, śakaṭa, sūci, and daṇḍa, but many others besides, and a great number of subdivisions. In this long list the varāha, garuḍa, and padma arrays of M. are not to be found.

* This is the correct reading, given in the editions of J. Jolly and Ganapati Sastri: The latter explains:

लोकः यापयति लोकःत्रां वर्त्यति।
3. K. X, 5, teaches that the king should array his troops on that side where the enemy's army is weaker, or whence danger threatens. The latter is also mentioned by M. Compare.

K. X, 5, p. 374: and M. VII, 188:

यतं पराशापचयस्तति यतं भयमणांवते।
भृगुहेत युती वा ततो विस्तारयेलाम्॥

भयं क्षात्।

4. M. VII, 192 says that "one should fight with chariots and horses on even ground, with boats and elephants in water-bound places, with bows on ground that is covered with trees and shrubs, on a raised ground with sword, shield, and similar weapons." K. X, 4 gives many details about the favourable positions of chariots, horses, elephants, and infantry on even and uneven ground, but all this is quite different from M.

5. K. X, 3, describes in a very drastic manner how the king, assisted by priests and astrologers, should encourage the soldiers before the beginning of a battle. M. VII, 194 only says:

प्रह्वेलाम् 'Let him encourage the troops.'

6. K. XIII, 4 says: विधमक्षय मुष्टि शाय शथार्हनिधप्रसारे च "When the enemy is in an inaccessible position, one should destroy their stores of seed, crops and their provisions of grain, hay etc." M. VII, 195 may be compared:

7. K. VII, 16, p. 313, says that a conqueror "shall instal the son of a king who has died in doing his duty, in the kingdom of his father" कर्मणि सत्स पुत्रेण राज्ये क्षाप्यते। M. VII, 202 (स्त्रायेर्नतिव तदेवम्) and Vi. III, 47. (राजा परप्रावासी तु तव (तत् कृत्यन्तिमिविषये ते) have the same rule. Vi. III, 48f., however, adds: "Let him not extirpate the royal family, except a royal family of ignoble descent."

K. XIII, 5, devotes a whole long chapter to the rules about the pacification of a conquered country. Here the king is, amongst other things, told to do everything that is agreeable and salutary to the subjects, by distributing gifts and honours, and granting
remission of taxes, especially to distinguished people. M. VII, 201, 203, also recommends remission of taxes, amnesty, and honouring the conquered king, as well as distinguished persons, by great gifts. Vi. III, 42, M. VII, 203, and Yā, I, 343 teach that the king should maintain the laws of the conquered country. K. goes much farther, recommending the king, that he should adopt himself the manners and customs, dress and language of the conquered people, and show devotion to their deities and religious institutions.

8. No less important than the points of agreement between Dh. and A. are those points in which they disagree. All Dh. agree in inculcating certain humane laws of war, forbidding the use of certain cruel weapons, and mentioning the people to whom pardon must be given in battle. G. X, 17 f. says: "No sin (is committed) by injuring or slaying (foes) in battle; excepting those who have lost their horses, charioteers, or arms, those who join their hands (in supplication), those who flee with flying hair, those who sit down with averted faces, those who have climbed (in flight) on eminences or trees, messengers, and those who declare themselves to be cows or Brāhmaṇas." Ap. II, 10, 11: "The Aryas forbid the slaughter of those who have laid down their arms, of those who (beg for mercy) with flying hair or joined hands, and of fugitives." Baudh. I. 18, 10-12: "Let him not fight with those who are in fear, intoxicated, insane or out of their minds, (nor with those) who have lost their armour, (nor with) women, infants, aged men, and Brāhmaṇas, excepting assassins."* Similar rules are given by Yā. I, 326, and still more humane rules by M. VII, 90-93, who also forbids fighting with treacherous weapons (Kūṭair āudhaiḥ or such as are barbed, poisoned, or having points blazing with fire.† Yā 1,324 even says that only those warriors go to heaven who are killed when fighting with honest weapons (akūṭair āudhaiḥ).

Nothing of all that is to be found in K. It would be, too, in contradiction to the principle followed in the A, according to which

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† Agnījvalatetajanaḥ. The agnisamyoga, mentioned in K. II, 3 (end) among other weapons, may be some such weapons. Dr. Shamasāstry translates it by "explosives", J. J. Meyer by "Feuervorrichtungen" (fire-engines).
all possible means, fair or foul, should be used to conquer the enemy.

9. There is nothing in K. that is similar to what G. X. 20-23 and M. VII, 96 f. say about the distribution of booty between the king and the soldiers.

Summary and Preliminary Conclusions.

I. The subject of the Education of Princes probably belongs to the domain of the A.

1) The classification of sciences also, as found in M. and Yā., probably had its place originally in some A. But G., who only distinguishes "theology" (trayā) and "(secular)" philosophical investigation (āṅivikṣikī) may go back to some older source than K. On the other hand, M. who gives to Āṅivikṣikī a theological turn represents a later stage than K. It is possible that Yā and M are derived from K., but it is just as possible that they go back to some other A.

2) The rule about gaining, keeping, increasing, and bestowing wealth in M. and Yā. seems to belong to the Dh. canon of the duties of the king, and may be derived from the store of older ethical maxims (gnomic poetry). K. made use of it for his definition of Dāṇḍanītī.

3) The rules about instruction in military arts in G. and K. are probably not connected at all.

4, 5.) The rules about intercourse with the aged (K., Vi., M., Yā.) and about the conquest of the senses (K., G., M.) are probably derived from gnomic poetry.

II. The subject of the Duties of the King belongs so much to the domain of the Dh., that not only jurisdiction, but also such things as town planning, warfare, and politics which clearly belong to the domain of the A., find their place in the Dh. under the head of "duties of the king".

1) The theories about the origin of kingship, the Mātyagāya (K., M.), the interrelation between taxation and protection (K., G., Baudh, Vās., Vi., M., Yā, N.), and the divine nature of kingship (K., M., N.), are probably older than Dh. and A. They may have their origin in ancient gnomic poetry that may go back to Vedic times.
(2) The king's duty of protecting (K., G., A., Baudh., Vās., Vi., M., Yā.), was first taught in the Dh.

(3) The same applies to the king's duty of punishing justly (K. G., Āp., Vās., Vi., M. Yā.). K. and M. are probably derived from the same source, not one from the other.

(4) The varṇāśramadharma is, of course, a locus communis of all Dh., and K. only follows the Dh. in inculcating the duty of maintaining it, on the king.

(5) The king's duty of fighting belongs to the Dh. canon of the king's duties, and the promise of heaven held out to those who die in the battle (K., G., Āp., Baudh., Vi., M., Yā.) is as old as the Veda.

(6) Dh. and Veda are also the source for the rules about the king's duties of performing religious rites and sacrifices bestowing honours and privileges on priests etc.; (K., G., Āp., Vās., Vi., M, Yā., N.). The position of the Purohita by the side of the king (K., G., Āp., Baudh., Vās., Vi., M., Yā.) goes back to the earliest vedic times. There are some verbal agreements between K. and Yā. with regard to the qualities required of the Purohita, but they are not close enough to justify the derivation of one from the other. A common source is more probable.

(7) The sloka about the ideal king (K., Vi) belongs no doubt to gnomic poetry. The phrase that the king should behave "like a father" (K., M., Yā.) probably has the same source. The agreement between K. and Yā., as regards the accomplishments of the king is so close, that it is quite possible that one may be the source of the other.

(8) The classification of vices may belong to the domain of the A. as well as to that of the Dh. K. agrees with Vi., but not with M.

(9) The time-table for the king's daily life belongs to the A. K. and Yā. are in close agreement, while M. differs in details.

(10) The rules about the king's having to be on his guard against being poisoned etc., certainly belong to the domain of the A. But the agreements between K., Vi., M. are not close enough to derive Vi., M. from K. Some other A. may as well be the source.

III. The subject of planning and building villages, towns, forts and palaces belongs to the domain of the A.
(1) As to the qualities of a country fit for settling down (K., Vi., M., Yā.), K. and Vi. agree more closely, while M. differs in one important item. Probably not K., but some other A., is the source of Vi., M., and Yā.

(2) With regard to forts (K., Vi., M., Yā.), also Vi. and M. evidently go back to some other A., and not to K. Nothing can be said about Yā.

(3) The subject of building a town and a palace may be introduced in the Āp. on account of the rules about the reception of learned Brāhmans as guests, and about the keeping of sacred fires. Certainly there is no connection at all between Āp. and K.

IV. Foreign policy is, of course, the actual domain of the A., and it is significant that the old Dh. texts contain nothing about it. Only Vi., M., and Yā. offer parallels.

(1) The list of the seven Prakṛtis is the same in Yā., and almost the same in M., as in K. On the question of the relative importance of the Prakṛtis, there are slight differences between K. and M. As K. VIII. 1, by quoting the opinions of other teachers, shows that the theory of Prakṛtis was not invented by K., it is probable that M. goes back to some other A. Yā. may be dependent on K. or on some other A.

(2) As regards the six methods of foreign policy, M. differs from K. and probably goes back to some other A. As Vi. and Yā. give no details, their list may be derived either from K. or from some other A.

(3) The Maṇḍala theory is alluded to by Vi., Yā., and, more in agreement with K., by M. It is not certain that Vi. knew the circle of twelve kings, as he only mentions four kings besides the Vijīgīśu. Yā.'s wording which is not quite clear, may imply the circle of twelve kings. K. or some other A. may be the source of Vi., Yā., and M.

(4) The doctrine of the 'four expedients' is referred to by Vi., M., and Yā. in connection with the Maṇḍala kings, by K. in other connections. My impression is, that the "four expedients" are older than K., and older than the "six methods". They may be derived from old political wisdom, contained in gnomic poetry.

(5) Reflexions on providence and human effort are a favourite
subject of gnomic poetry. This is probably the source both of K. and of M. and Yā.

V. War may have been the subject of a special Śāstra (Dhanurveda, art of war), before it came to be included in the A.

1) As regards the time for marching, there is nothing to show that Vi. or M. depend on K.

2) M. has certainly used some other source than K. for his descriptions of the arrays of troops.

3) K. and M. seem to go back to the same source in the rule about arraying the army on that side whence danger threatens.

4) As to the grounds fit for different troops M. has used other source, not K.

5, 6.) These are only slight and quite general agreements between K. and M., from which nothing can be concluded.

7) With regard to the rule that the son of the conquered king should be installed in the conquered kingdom, there is full agreement between K., Vi. and M. But with regard to the other rules about the pacification of a conquered country, there is only a superficial similarity between K., Vi., M., and Yā. Some older A. may be the source.

8) The absence in the A. of the humane laws of war, found in the Dh., is very significant.

9) The rules about the king’s share in the booty, found in G. and M., seem to refer to more primitive conditions than those presupposed by K., who does not mention the subject.

From the fore-going summary the following preliminary conclusions may be drawn. Where the subject belongs to the domain of the Dh., we find parallel passages to K. both in the oldest Dharmasūtras and in the more modern Dh. In these cases K. has used some Dh. source, though it is not possible to point to one of our texts as his source. Often we shall have to look to the floating mass of ancient gnomic poetry as the source of both A. and Dh. Where the subject belongs to the domain of the A., we find parallels only in the more modern Dh. of Vi., M., and Yā. Generally Vi., and Yā. are nearer related to K., than M. Especially Yā. shows sometimes a very close agreement with K. But only in a few cases the agreement is close that it is possible to derive one
from the other. In most cases of parallelism it is more probable that Vi., M., and Yā. go back to some other A., and not to that of K.

These conclusions can only be preliminary, as they are based only on a part of the available evidence. To arrive at more definite conclusions, it will be necessary not only to continue and complete this comparative study of Dh. and A., but also to extend it to the whole of the A. and Dh. materials contained in the Mahābhārata.
CITRA-LAKŚANA

(DR. A. K. COOMARASWAMY)

INTRODUCTION

The editor of Śrī Kumār’s Śilparatna, Pt. I (Tiruvāram Sanskrit Series LXXV, 1922), of which the greater part of the sixty-fourth chapter, on Painting, is translated below, remarks in his Preface:

"The Silparatna was compiled from ancient Silpa and Agama works by Śrīkumāra of Kerala...The king Devanārāyaṇa referred to...is said to have ruled over a territory with his capitals at Ambalappuzha now within the State of Travancore. He was a great patron of learning...and is known to have flourished in the latter part of the 16th century A.D. It is therefore certain that the author of the Silparatna, a protegee of his, also lived in the same period".

A summary of the contents of the chapter translated below has been published by Mr. K. P. Jayaswal in the Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society, IX., 1, 1923; but as he himself admits, the treatment is inadequate. It may be useful to note the chief points requiring correction in his account:

P. 34.—The kitta-lekhani was not a brush, but a dry and comparatively hard pencil. Lost and kitta, which I have tentatively translated as 'slag' are the materials of which it was made. There is no reason to suppose that the kitta—outline was yellow.

P. 35.—The word 'dye' should not be used with reference to pigments.

P. 36.—The black outline is to be used in the case of each of the other four pigments; the instruction is general, and not connected with darkness and lightness.

P. 37:—Vajra-lépa should be translated 'adamantine medium.' v. 143 is misunderstood; see my translation and note.

P. 38.—v. 147: the text reads harmyūdibhyātādy, i.e. 'on walls and other surfaces in palaces and other places.' We cannot conclude from this that the author means to contradict
the reference to vimūnas and gopurams in v. 1, or the distinction drawn between paintings suitable respectively for sacred and profane buildings in v. 8-10. The Ajantā 'caves' are certainly not palaces. We possess abundant other evidence for painting in Buddhist, Jaina and Hindu temples (e.g. Elūrā, Madanpur, Polonnaruva). The practise was universal.

A somewhat similar, but older and longer text has been translated by Stella Kramrisch. (The Viśṇudharmottaram, Part III, Calcutta, 1924), with an Introduction, referring, amongst other topics, to our text. Here too, there are verbal errors that may lead to misunderstanding; for example, vajra-lepa is not a plaster, but a medium with which pigments are mixed when applied to a plastered surface; daroi is not a spoon, but a trowel; the phrase 'as is reflected in a mirror' (Silparatna v. 145) does not mean 'realistic', but refers to the circular frame of the picture, as the phrase nālamūkāram in the next line proves. In the translation of Viśṇudharmottaram, too, many phrases are incomprehensible; what for example, is a 'fluid made of iron leaves', and what a 'mica defile placed in iron' (p. 45)?

I cannot agree with Miss Kramrisch's translation of the first three of the four terms denoting different kinds of painting (p. 45). Without going into great detail, I suggest: satyam—'pure', i.e. representing mantra-mūrti and other subjects appropriate to temple walls; vānīka—'lyrical', equivalent to the rasa-citram of the Silparatna; and nāgaram—'secular', such as the nāgarika of the Kāma Sūtra (Bk. 1. Ch. IV.) might draw upon the painting—panel which is mentioned as a proper part of the furnishing of a gentleman's chamber. Thus understood, the classification becomes perfectly intelligible, and indeed, obvious.

In my version I have endeavoured to translate every technical term literally, at the same time always quoting the original. I have tried, too, to preserve any ambiguity which the original may seem to present: thus I have rendered syāmatā and ujjvalatā literally as 'darkness' and 'lightness', avoiding the words 'shade,' and 'light', since it is not by any means clear that anything like chiaroscuro is meant.

It is very important to observe that some words are in general and in various specific senses, and must be translated accordingly
with reference to the context. This is particularly the case with the word citra itself; and in this connection the following table will be found useful:

\[
\text{Citra} = \begin{cases}
\text{Sculpture} \\
\text{Reliefs} \\
\text{Painting}
\end{cases}
\]

1. Ordinary citrabhāsa on walls.
2. Dhūli-citra.
3. Rasa-citra.


It is of special interest to note the mention of rasa, bhāva and kriyā in connection with painting. The author of the Viṣṇudharmottaram treats of the matter at much greater length, distinguishing the rasas appropriate for paintings in temples, palaces, and private houses. Taking into consideration also the references to painting in the Kāma Śūtra and those in the various classic Sanskrit dramas* it becomes quite evident that painting was regarded, not only as a sādhanā in worship, but also as a secular and fine art, like poetry and drama; and that the theory of beauty developed by the Sanskrit rhetoricians in connection with literature and the theatre, not only might well have been, but was actually applied to painting.

Aside from these matters of importance to the special student of the history of Indian culture, the technical receipts here given, like those of the Viṣṇudharmottaram, will be of interest to all students of the technique of painting and the composition of pigments, mediums and grounds.

The following is a summary of the contents of the Silparatna, Ch. 64:

25, 28-34. Priming for application to plastered surfaces.
35-40. The dry pencil and first outline.
41-52. Preparation of yellow and black pigment.
53-58. The brushes.
59-60. Second outline in red.

60-110. The stances.
111-114. Various effects.
117-122. Shades of red.
123-130. Gilding.
131-133. Adamantine medium.
134-142. Mixed colours.
143-146. Three sorts of painting not done on walls.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PAINTING.

1. Shrines (vimânam) and gateway (gopuram) should be adorned with all manner of pleasing art (citram).

2. The representation (karaṇam) of whatsoever there may be in the Three Worlds, animate or inanimate, in accordance with its individual nature, is called art (citram).

3. This art is of three sorts, distinguished below: that is said to be Sculpture (citram) in which all the parts of the body are made visible (dīsyā-karaṇam);

4. It is called Relief (ardha-citram) when the half (of the body) is attached to the wall or other (surface);

5. And it is called Painting (citrabhāsa) by the expert masters (silpavisāradaiḥ) of old, when it is drawn (vilekhaṇa). Sculpture or Reliefs may be executed in clay or stucco,

6. or in wood, stone, or metal, in these materials, according to what has been seen or reported.

7. Walls, etc., made smooth with plaster, should be painted in suitable colours, and adorned with different colours as may be fitting and beautiful (sobha).

8. Painting, moreover, should be practised only in one way, viz. that there should be represented everywhere, inside and out, auspicious stories and sacred images, and even battle, death and pain when connected with stories of gods and demons;

9. but the doings of nude ascetics should not be represented in the houses of men—there the walls, etc., are to be painted with more attractive pictures,

10. such as edifying stories told in the eternal Vedas and Purāṇas, beautiful (ramya) in many colours, without lack or excess.
12. In either case (tatratatra) the required form is to be combined with Flavour, Mood, and Action (rasa, bhāva, kriyā). A master should always make pictures that will yield a pleasing result.

13. but one desirous of happiness in this world and the next should not draw inauspicious pictures, having contrary results.

14. There I expound the technique for the sake of the dull of wit: and first of all, how to prepare the aforesaid plaster (sudhā).

15. The wall must be plastered before the picture is painted: Lime (sudhā) is conch (śaṅkhā) roasted over a wood fire:

16. the lime is to be ground with a fourth part of extract of mung* (Phaseolus mungo), mixed with molasses, and sand added;†

17. and the prescribed portion of sand is a fourth part of the lime, and to this must be added banana paste cooked over a slow fire

18. and of that paste, as it has been taught in the eternal Vedas, the proportion is a fourth part of the lime. (Then let it dry in an earthen vessel,) and after the expiry of three months, break the pot,

19. crush (the dry product) and grind it in a handmill, mix it with molasses, and grind it until it reaches the consistency of fresh butter:

20. Then, having thoroughly cleaned the walls or other (surfaces) with a very fine whisk of well-separated cocoanut fibre,

21. apply water of molasses for a few days, and then apply the plaster paste with a trowel

* Thus, according to the reading in G. If we retain the lawali of the text, we must translate 'with mung chaff'.

† Bennett, Ceylon and its capabilities, p. 338, describes the white stucco used in Ceylon and Southern India as made of fine sand, shell lime, green cocoanut water, and coarse sugar, and adds that when laid on by experienced plasterers it displays the polish and appearance of marble. Other receipts are given in the Brhad Samhitā, Pt. II. Ch. X. See also my Mediaeval Sinhalese Art, pp. 118, 119., and Smither, J. C., Architectural Remains, Anuradhapura, London, 1894, pp. 27, 31. The application of plaster and colour to walls and sculptures has been an almost universal rule in ancient Indian temple architecture: cf. for example Foucher, A., L’Art greco-bouddhique du Gandhara, I, p. 198 and Fergusson, Tree and Serpent Worship, 2nd. ed., 1873, p. 214.
22. A broad trowel or the like, as prescribed in detail; and let it be of iron or wood, with a smooth back.

23. Distributing and smoothing it down with the back part of the trowel, apply the plaster paste slowly and regularly step by step.

24. Apply pure water with the cocoanut brush whenever it gets dry, and proceed to make the pigment (varṇa-lepam) for the painting.

25. But if you want to apply colour to a panel smoothed by a carpenter, do not use plaster.

26. Now I explain briefly the application of all the colours, and in particular their mixing and combination:

27. White (sita), yellow (pīta), red (rakta), lamp-black (kajjala), these, together with blue (śyāma) are called the pure colours.

28. To plastered wall and other (such surfaces) you should apply a white priming (dhavalam varṇam); grind conch, oyster-shell, etc., or white clay;

29. and the man of intelligence will mix it with the juice of wood-apple and nīm (Feronia elephantum and Azadiracta indica) and then spread it gently on the wall or panel, etc., as he may wish.

30. polish it well (susnigdhasaṁ ōṛtyā) with sākhoṭa bark (Trophis aspera), ketakī (Pandanus odoratissimus) or by hand, and apply the priming.

31. Or the man of wisdom may rub down dry plaster powder in the hollow of a grinding stone, grinding it thoroughly and repeatedly with the pestle,

32. wet it with juice of the Malabar bāla fruit, thoroughly mix the paste with warm water, and strain it.

33. and then apply it to the plaster as aforesaid; but this preparation cannot be used on panels (phalaka) etc., though it may be applied to (figures of) clay, etc.*

*The "etc." may refer to stucco; cf. v. 5. For figures of painted unbaked modelled earth see Spooner, Excavation at Shah-ji-ki-Dehri, Arch. Surv. India, Ann. Rep. 1908-09.
34. Having thus primed (dhavalita) the walls, panels, canvas (patā) or other (surface) so that it is just like a mirror* proceed to the drawing of the picture.

35. To draw on canvas, panels and other (surfaces) as above described, mix dry powdered cowdung with old powdered slag (loṣṭa)†,

36. work it up under a grinding stone until it becomes pasty, and then quickly make the dry slag pencil (kṛtta-lekhanī),‡

37. shaping it like the wick of a lamp, of two, three, or four inches as you may desire.

37½-39. Then, having made up your mind according to what you have heard, or seen, or imagined (manasā), comfortably seated, with your mind at rest, ever recollected, at an auspicious time, and under a fortune star, proceed to draw with the slag-pencil the (forms of gods, men, deer, elephants (nāgūn), and birds, creepers, trees, snakes (nāgūn) and waters.

40. But where the outline (lekha) has digressed (gatā), there erasing it (sammārjiya) place instead a lovely form (vāmam ākāram) with renewed purpose.

41. Now procure yellow from trees (Gambodge), (or that) produced in rivers or in mountains, etc., and grind it in pure water:

42. Then having ground it rather carefully to a soft paste, mix it with pure water in a large dish and let it stand awhile.

43. Put the upper part of the extract, which has thrown down the dirt, in a dish and treat it in this (same) way (again),

* Cf. Rajput Painting p. 51, quoting a Hindi verse inscribed on a picture representing a painter at work, the patroness says to the painter, 'I gave you clean paper, fresh and shining like glass'.

† The exact significance of loṣṭa and kṛtta is uncertain: the general meaning of the words is 'earth', 'dirt', 'secretion', 'iron rust', etc. By analogy with the receipt for a priming preparation used in Ceylon (Mediaeval Sinhalese Art, p. 64, note), I have suggested that old iron slag is what is meant. But this is subject to correction.

‡ On the use of a lekhanī see also Brown, Indian painting under the Moghals, 1924, p. 186. But our text says nothing about gairika in this connection.
44. Repeating the process until purity is attained, then gently smear the extract into a new preserve-pot (i.e. a glazed jar) and let it dry.

45. Once again the wise man who desires a pure product, should mix it with clean water and let it dry in the summer sun, as prescribed,

46. and then when purity has been attained, pour it into a copper vessel and let it dry by degrees.

47. Then take an earthen pot, oil it, raise the wick of the lamp, place it over it and light the lamp;

48. clean the belly of the pot with dried cowdung, and again hold it over the lamp and in front of it;

49. Remove the lamp-black (kaśjala) which is produced at the top of the flame, inside the pot, and spread it thinly in another earthen vessel,

50. work up the resulting collyrium with your own hand, mix it with pure water and again dry it thoroughly;

51. Having done this thrice, and efficiently, mix it with nīm juice, dry it, and afterwards grind a separate,

52. piece of the black substance as large as a barley-corn, mix it once more, with wood-apple juice, and let it dry.

53. Three kinds of brushes are known, thick, medium, and thin; and the proper measure of the handle or support should be six barley-corns, as it has been taught (smṛīam).

54. Behind the point, it should be eight-sided and eight-cornered (i.e. octagonal), or round; and having prepared the end of it, affix the point (saṅku) projecting half an inch by Sauḍa measure.

55. (To make) a thick one, tie on the stiff (hairs) from the top of a calf’s ear or from the belly of a goat, to the thickness of a barley-corn.

56. For a fine-pointed one (trṣūgrikam) use the soft hairs of a muskrat’s (ciṅkodā) tail, fastening them to the end of the handle with thread or wax

57. Thus tie your bunches, thrice three for each colour, of the three sorts, thick, medium and fine;
58. thus there will be nine for each colour; but use the thick brush for yellow.

59. Now erase (mūrjayet) with pieces of cloth what was indistinctly drawn with the slag-pencil, and again draw slag-outlines clearly*.

60. then go over it all very carefully with red paint.

Now I proceed to describe the particulars (lakṣana) of drawing the frontal (ṛju) and other stances (sthāna):

61. the front view is ṛju, the next ardha-ṛju ('half-frontal') the third sācika (askance), and the fourth is known as ardha-kṣi ('half-eye')

62. the fifth as bhittiṅka ('of the wall'), or pārśvagata ('side-long', or profile). These are the five chief stances named by the learned.

63. the front view, and the four kinds of turning. But painters also describe nine stances.†

64. I now describe their particulars (lakṣana), with reference to the brahma-sūtra; first the full view (forward part, purva-bhūga) then the rest (para-bhūga).

65. Draw the median clearly through the tip of the nose and the navel; this thread that falls from the crown (makuṭa) is called the brahma-sūtra.

(In Vv. 66-110 the author defines each stance by stating the positions occupied by various parts of the body with reference to the brahma-sūtra and other vertical axes, representing the actual plumb-lines which are suspended vertically in the case of full-round sculpture.‡ In v. 109 he mentions that there are many 'mixed position' stances in which mixed style (saṅkara paddhati), for example, the face may be frontal, the part below the neck otherwise, and the part below the waist again otherwise. Then he continues:)

* V. 59 amounts to this. 'Touch up the original sketch.'

† One set of nine and another of thirteen stances are enumerated in the Viṣṇudharmottaram.

‡ For the use of sutras in sculpture, see my Medieval Sinhalese Art, Appendix to Ch. viii; and the late T. A. G. Rao's Tālamana, Mem. A. S. I., No. 3, 1920.
110. The man of intelligence, having duly considered the stance,

111. should depict the mood and actions (bhūva and vyāpāra) which enter into the picture, applying the colours, first in one place, then in another, one by one.

112. working slowly, without mistakes, using the thick brush, and proceeding as described in detail below.

113. As for the distinctions of dark and light (syāmojjvala-tva-bhedau) rough and smooth, (pārusyamārdvān) and the various ways of disposing ornaments, these should be done so as to be generally pleasing.

114. In the application of any (tattat) colour, drakness (syāmatā) is obtained by thickness (of the paint) and lightness (uijvalatā) by thinness, and this in the case of any colour whatsoever, as it has been taught (smṛtam).

115. Where there is white (uijavalā), yellow (piṅga), blue (syāma) or red (lohitā), there the wise man draw a lamp-black outline with the thin brush.

116. With the sharp edge of a razor reduce the excess that may appear in the work, and proceed with the painting.

117. Now the combination of colours is further explained: for light red use red lead (sindūr), and for medium red use red chalk (gairika).

118. For a strong red colour the wise man will use lac juice; and as others have said of old, for yellow use realgar (mana-śśilā).

119. Pound the red chalk on a stone for a day, mix it with pure water, and grind it with a hammer or something like that.

120. Pound the red lead for half a day, and then grind it with pure water. Then the realgar is to be pounded

121. for five days, then mixing it with water, grind it carefully for a day, and keep it in a dish.

122. Mix these severally and thoroughly with extract of nim, proceed with the business of painting with a medium (lepa).

123. But to grind gold, make it into leaves as thin as possible, then break up the leaves into the tiniest possible pieces;
124. the wise man should mix it with a very little sand, in pure water, and grind it in a very smooth mortar with dust of mica (?)

125. and when the mixture becomes quite pasty, agitate it with water in a glass dish until the mud and sand have all gone over the top

126. leaving behind the resulting very bright golden dust. Then the man of intelligence will mix it with as much adamantine medium (vajra-lepa) as may be required,

127. and apply it with the proper brushes described, and when it is dry, rub it gently with a boar’s tusk

128. until it shines brightly. Or the area to be gilded may first be covered with adamantine medium (vajra-lepa)

129. and then as quickly as possible securely apply there very thin gold leaves, and then

130. rub it with a tuft of cotton to make it bright. In this way the wise men of old describe the two ways of gilding (svarṇa-lepa-vidhī)

131. Boil fresh buffalo skin in water, stirring it until it becomes like fresh butter;

132. make round balls of it, and dry it in great heat; that is the adamantine medium so useful to painters;

133. these balls should be broken up and dissolved in warm water, and mixed with the various colours, and extract of wood-apple and nim.

134. The different colours produced by various mixtures are now described: white mixed with red gives the fair complexion (gaura-cchavi);

135. white, black and yellow mixed in equal proportions give the sūra complexion (sāra-cchavi) of which painters are so fond;

136. white and black mixed in equal proportions give the elephant-colour; red and yellow mixed in equal proportions that of the bakul-fruit (Mimusops elengi),

137. and this excellent fiery colour is said to be that of flame; two parts of red with one of yellow gives strong red;
138. two of yellow with one of white is called saffron. (piṅgala) two parts of black with one of yellow is like mango;

139. black and yellow in equal proportions give the colour of men, and mixed with blue, that of a pigeon or parrot;

140. asafoetida mixed with lac-juice gives a strong red; and black with lac-juice gives the colour of rose-apple fruit (Eugenia jambolana);

141. lac-juice mixed with white is like nutmeg (jāti), an excellent colour—or the mixture may be made with asafoetida;

142. black mixed with blue gives the colour of hair; preparing these mixed colours, use them in painting.

143. But the expert painter should not put on plastered walls (the following) three kinds (of painting), viz. ‘sentiment-painting’ (rasa-citram), ‘powder-painting’ (dhūli citram) and ‘pictures’ (citram).

144. (For powder-painting) grind the colours separately, and spread the powders on a fine horizontal surface for a short time:

145. and this is called ‘powder-painting’ by the painters, of old.* That in which the likeness appears as though reflected in a mirror,

146. (because) it is of the size and shape of a gong (nāla), is called a ‘picture’ (citram). (Sentiment-painting) is where the amorous and other sentiments (sṛgūrādiraso) are illustrated (darsanādeva ganyate).†

* The art of powder painting still survives. It is done by sifting dry coloured powders through stencils (sūncā) upon a smooth prepared surface, and such ‘paintings’, as Śrī Kumāra remarks, are not intended to be permanently preserved. Examples of modern (paper) stencils are illustrated in my Raiput Painting.

† I understand this to mean ‘specifically illustrated’, as for example in Raiput Rāgamāla and Nāyaka-nāyakā-bheda pictures and book illustrations. That Śrī Kumāra remarks that these are not suitable for wall-painting he indicates that smaller pictures of this kind existed in, and probably before, his time. The special mention of rasa-citram here is evidently not meant to contradict the general instruction of v. 12 that rasa, bhāva and kriyā should appear in all paintings.
147. This art of painting (lekhaniam citram) on the walls of palaces etc., (harmyādibhittyādi) if all required particulars (laksanam) are represented (and then only), will be pleasing in the eyes of all men.

148. This first part of the Silparatna issued by Sri Deva Narāyaṇa is for the benefit of all who are dull of wit. It contains the particulars of all kinds of villages (i.e. town-planning), temples and houses. May all enlightened men be pleased by it!
YAJNOPAVITA

(BY MAHAMAHOPADHYAYA DR. GANGANATHA JHA).

(A). What is the Yajñopavita?

The earliest reference that we find is in the Taittirīyāranyaka (2. 1.) ; where it is described as consisting of the skin or the cloth worn in a certain manner. Coming to the time of Manu, however, it seems to have become a mere thread, twisted in a particular manner (Manu 2.44). This thread is to consist of three yarns twisted into a cord. The exact number of such cords to be worn seems to have been a matter of option: Medhatithi says, either one, or three or five or seven are to be worn, according to the view taken of the sacrifices at which it is to be worn; and according to him it is called 'Yajñopavita' because it is connected with sacrificial performances.

The thread primarily is to be of cotton; but there are other substitutes; such as silk, kusha, jute, tree-bark or even a piece of cloth, according to Rṣvashṛṅga. In fact Rṣvashṛṅga and other authorities seem to support the view expressed in the Taittirīya-āranyaka that it is a piece of cloth that should form the Upavīta, and the various kinds of threads are only substitutes to be employed in the absence of cloth. As regards the exact number of yarns to be twisted there is some difference of opinion.

The number of Upavītas to be worn depends upon the stage of life; for instance, according to Bhrigu there should be one upavīta for the 'student,' two for the 'householder' and 'recluse', and for the 'renunciate' only one.

(B). When is it to be worn?

We have seen that Medhatithi seems to connect the wearing of the Yajñopavīta with sacrificial sessions. The Grhya-sutras also do not seem to speak of habitual wearing. In fact Āpastamba has declared that it should be worn while saluting teachers, old men and guests, as also during Homa, Japa, meals, āchamana, and recitation of the Veda. A quotation is however made from Kātyāyana's Chhandogya-parishīṭā in support of constant wearing—
but when we read it along with the next line—

विशिष्टे क्यु प्रथित्य यत करोति न तत्कमस्—

we find that the constant wearing mentioned in the first line is meant to apply to the time during which certain religious acts are being performed. This interpretation of this text is supported by the Varāmitrodaya. Like all older writers, Medhātithi appears to be wavering: on Manu 2.44, he has spoken of the thread as to be worn during sacrificial performances; but while under 2.63 he speaks of it as to be worn at all time, later on under 2.64, he says that the thread along with the staff and other things, should continue to be taken up throughout the ‘student age’, and that the wearing of the thread forms part of the Vratas of the ‘religious student’ (Translation page 317). Devala says:—

यज्ञोपवेदि हृ घायँ त्रैति स्नाति च कर्मणि;

which also implies that it is to be worn only during religious performances. Bodhāyana (1.5-15) declares that one should not be ‘without the Yajñopavīta during the āchamanas’; so also Gautama (1.38.) —both which point to the same conclusion.

The Varāmitrodaya (Sāṃskāra, page 422) says that the wearing of the Upavīta is ‘karmaṅga’ i. e. a part of the ritualistic performance. It however goes on to quote Bhrigu to the effect that when once the Upavīta has been worn, it should never be removed; unless, of course, it breaks or becomes defiled, in which case a fresh one is to be worn.

Jaimini in his Mīmāṃsā-sūtra (3, 4, 1 to 9) describes the various methods of wearing the Upavīta. A Vedic text is quoted, describing three methods:—(1) Nivīta, where the thread hangs on the neck, both sides of it hanging over the chest up to the navel. (2) Prāchīnāvīta, where the thread hangs on the right shoulder, passing under the left arm, and (3) Upavīta, where it rests on the left shoulder passing under the right arm. The third method is to be adopted during performances in honour of the Gods, the second, during those in honour of the Pitr̥s, and the first during those in honour of human beings (guests etc.), or during one particular physical act (according
to the Parishishta quoted in Vرامित्रोदया). According to the Mimamsabhasya and other commentators the text that describes the three methods does not contain any injunction of wearing the thread at anytime except during the performance of a particular sacrifice. Even so, they describe it as mere arthavada. From this also it would appear that the only Vedic text that lends any colour to the view that the thread should be worn supports the practice of occasional, not habitual, wearing.
PRAKRITIC AND NON-ARYAN STRATA IN THE VOCABULARY OF SANSKRIT

(PRINCIPAL A. C. WOOLNER, M.A., C.I.E.)

1. Sanskrit is of course an Indo-European language belonging to the Indo-Iranian sub-family. Every tyro in comparative Philology is familiar with numerous examples, which illustrate the relationship of Sanskrit words to corresponding words in Greek, Latin, English and other languages. These examples generally belong to the most essential parts of the vocabulary e.g. names of numbers, parts of the body, members of the family, domestic animals etc. Moreover the establishment of these correspondences in the vocabularies of so many languages, with their phonetic variations, is not the most important part of this comparative study. It is rather the similarity of the structure of these languages which proves their relationship. We are concerned not so much with external resemblances as with the texture of the inner fibre, with the way in which the words are formed and their relations to each other. These are the strands which demonstrate the closely knit relationship of the Indo-European languages. From this point of view Sanskrit is beyond all doubt essentially Indo-European. Its relationship to Greek, for example, is not established merely by a large vocabulary in common, but by the identity of so much of the intimate structure of the two languages.

A comparison of the oldest recorded form of Indian language in the Rgveda, with the most ancient remnants of Iranian, in the Avestan gāthās, reveals not only a large vocabulary in common, but also such a closely similar structure in noun and verb, that attempts have been made to prove that the separation of Iranian from Indian tribes and dialects could not have taken place many centuries before Zoroaster.

2. If however we take any Sanskrit word at random and look for an equivalent, or at least a related word in any other Indo-European language, we shall very likely fail to find one. Many Sanskrit words have no obvious Indo-European relations. The number of Sanskrit words used as illustrations of Indo-European
equations is limited. Even if we include all the Sanskrit words that reputable philologists have claimed as relations of European words, the number is not so large as one might expect.

Look at the Indices of Sanskrit words quoted in Brugmann’s Magnum Opus, in Walde’s Etymological Dictionary of Latin, in Meillet’s Le Slave commun, in the Grundriss der Iranischen Philologie by Geiger and Kuhn, etc.

One finds the same examples recurring over and over again and the total number is obviously much less than the whole wealth of the Sanskrit kośas.

3. Looking through these Indices we are inevitably struck by two other facts. A large proportion of these examples are of old Indian types which Prākrit has to modify. Various conjunct consonants abound. On the other hand we note the absence of a host of words of Prākritic types, tatrāmas, that are the same in Sanskrit and Prākrit. These types have no conjunct consonants except with nasals, but abundant cerebrals and, more frequently than the obviously old Indian types, nasals preceding stops.

4. Cerebrals occur in words that are undoubtedly Aryan as also in the earliest Vedic language. They are not recorded in the Iranian languages and in Aryan words are clearly secondary in origin e.g. kṛṣna ‘black’ cf. Lith. kirsna O. Prussian kirsnan, Russian cernyi. (Meillet. Le Slave commun). kṛṇotī etc. (vide Wackernagel. Altindische Grammatik 143-150. Macdonell. Vedic Grammar§§ 42-43). Words with initial cerebrals do not occur in the Veda and there are many words with medial cerebrals for which no Aryan derivation has been found either obvious or far-fetched. e.g. āndā ‘egg’, maṇḍūka ‘frog’, caṇḍula ‘outcaste’.


5. The Vedic examples āndā, maṇḍūka suggest a long series in the later Sanskrit whose Aryan relationship is, to say the least, very doubtful.

How many of the following are Aryan not to say Indo-European? anda, caṇḍa, caṇḍāla, kaṇḍana, kaṇḍōsa, gaṇḍa, gaṇḍaka, gaṇḍi, ghanḍa, cf. ghunḍa), jhanḍu, taṇḍaka, taṇḍula, taṇḍava, danda (Greek déndron), paṇḍa, phaṇḍa, baṇḍa (vanda), baḥāṇḍa, maṇḍ,
manduka, mandapa, randa, landa, vanq (cf. vanq), tanda, sanda, handa, handa.

If one or two are Aryan, have they not been modified according to a prevailing non-Aryan type? If some of these words are late or only found in dictionaries, the question remains as to whence they came, for the authors of the kośas cannot be supposed to have invented them.

With other vowels we have similar puzzles in pinga, kunqa, munqa etc.

A phonetic derivative of ṇda was lla which also appears for dra. galla-ganda; khulla—kṣudra. What are we to make of the following? allâ, kalla, khalla, jhalla, talla, palla, ulla, culla, billa, Bhilla, cilla, jhilli, tilla, pilla.

If dhola is non-Aryan, what about ghola, cola, dolla, lolla?
And then cela, pela, velâ, nilâ; nala, bala?*

Then there are the longer words such as Alându, Urunda, kamandalu, (cf. mandala) karânda, Câmunda, cicinda, chamanda, tarânda, Nîtunda, picânda, picinda (cf. picila) pûsanda, Puranda, poganda, phurunda, bhûsundi, bhurunda (bherunda, bhûrunda) makarânda, Marunda, mûrunda, (mûra-ânda), mukhundâ (mukhundâ), mumranda (murunda), Vatanda, varanda, saranda, sikanda (sikhâ).

Other examples of this type with a nasal and stop in this position are:—Mukuntha, musunthi (=bhûsundi), kununta, kununtha;

Pulinda, alinda, Ulanda, Ulinda, Kuninda, Kalinda, kûpinda (kuvinda), Kurundi, chucchunda(ra) (cf. chucchi). Maganda, Magundi, milinda, mukunda (cf. kunda), muculinda, mucukunda; kabandha, kavandhu, Kukundha, Marundha; kutumba, (cf. kuta, kuti), kadamba, kadamba, karamba, karambha, kalamba, kurumba, Kusamba, Kausambi, kusumbha (cf. kusuma), nikuramba, vidamba, (cf. vida?) Hidimba, ulumbâ (cf. jumbi) nitamva, culumpa, Nitambhû; 

Kâlinga, kutûngaka, kurânga (kulanqa), Kururiga, tamarga, tarânga (taram-ga), mataîga ('going wilfully'), muraîgi, muraîgi,

* Note tala Lat. talea; phâla(?) Lat. spoliûm. Slav. pêla; phalla Gk. phullon.
vidänga, lāvanāga (lāv-ulu ‘cut’?), Sālaṅga, sanaṅgu (’formerly cow’! ), suraṅgā (suraṅga—Gk. syrinx): kalaṅka, karaṅka, kurakura, viṭaṅka, kalaviṅka; kalaṅja, nikuṅja (cf. kuṅja), Pharaṅja, Huriṅja; kiliṅca, ghulaṅca.

In this type may be noticed the relative frequency of k and m, while y and r are altogether absent.

Is manī really related to Latin monile ‘bracelet’ and ganā to Latin grex ‘herd’? What are the relations of kāṇa, and cana? Or of gūna, kuṇa; kuṇapa and kuṇalu?

5. Of course it is not the fault of the post, as Yāska says, if the blind man cannot see it. There is always the possibility that the Prākrit form has obscured the derivation. Also we may grant the possibility of words surviving in the Indian sub-family and disappearing from all the rest of the Indo-European languages. When however a long series of similar words resists analysis one may well suspect the presence of some other material.

Vikāta (R. V.) ‘horrible, hideous, huge’ may be explained as Prākrit for vikṛta ‘changed, distorted’ cf. utkāta, prakāta, Kāta ‘bitter’ may be related to Lith. kartu. Kāta ‘straw-mat, hip’ has been derived from *karta i.e. from krt ‘to cut.’ But for most of the words which rime with kāta, kati no such derivation is forthcoming.

So with other types. One or two words have more or less doubtful derivations, while the rest are unexplained. Danḍa ‘club, punishment’ is said to be related to Greek déndron ‘tree’. Presumably an Indo-Iranian *dandram left no trace in any Iranian language or in the Veda but has appeared in Sanskrit in a Prākritic form. We have Indra, candra; why not *dandram?

For so common a word as anda, ānda ‘egg’ there is not even that amount of support for its Indo-European origin. We have only a traditional derivation from am—samyoge!

There remains then a suspicion that there may be a considerable number of non-Aryan words absorbed into the vocabulary of Sanskrit.

* Naṭa for nṛta. bhata for bhṛta: but what are ata, khaṭa, caṭa, chaṭa, jata, ḍhaṭi, ḍhaṭa, paṭa, phata, lata, vaṭa, ḍata, sata?
6. It would be nothing extraordinary if Sanskrit should turn out to have borrowed non-Aryan words. There are only a limited number of Indo-European words that occur in all the sub-families. Each sub-family has words peculiar to itself. Such words may be Indo-European, although there are no parallel forms to prove it. But some of them are strongly suspected of having come from other languages now extinct. In the Mediterranean basin, as Professor Meillet has shown, the words for 'wine' and 'olive' do not appear to be derived from an Indo-European source, but have probably survived from ancient Mediterranean dialects which Greek and Latin superseded. *

In the Germanic area words like 'house, sea, stone, wife' have been shrewdly suspected to be remnants of some ancient language of the North. †

Armenian shows evident signs of having been enormously influenced by some language of the Caucasus type.

The Iranian languages have borrowed Semitic and later on Turkish vocables. Turkish has borrowed more largely from Persian. The modern Indo-Aryan languages have obviously borrowed largely from the languages with which they have come into contact, and certain phonetic types of words consist entirely of borrowed material.

There is no obvious reason why the old Indian dialects should not have begun the same process even in Vedic times.

A 'prākrit' word that can only be explained, if at all, as a popular form that has come into Sanskrit, so to speak, by the back-door, may be challenged with regard to its pedigree. It may be a true son of the soil, but not Aryan.

7. If a considerable number of these words we are considering are not Aryan, what can they be? Some of them may be Dravidian.

It is remarkable however that Dravidian scholars have claimed so little, though the question was opened by Dr. Caldwell so long

† E. Sapir. Language. p. 226.
ago as 1856.* Dr. Jules Bloch has recently examined the hypothesis of a Dravidian substratum in Sanskrit.† Apart from the vocabulary his conclusion is negative. Even for the few words discussed the author shows how difficult it is to determine whether Aryan borrowed from Dravidian, or vice versa or whether both have borrowed from a third source such as Mundā.‡

8. Professor J. Przyluski has made out a good case for the Austric origin of a number of words e.g. paṭa, tāmbūlam, bāna, kambala, kadali, šarkara, 'sugar', makuta, mukuta, laguda, lakuta, laṅgulam, laṅgalam, liṅga, langāla, laṅgūla, mayūra, mayūka, marūka, murla, matalīga.§

It is important to notice that the comparisons on which these conclusions are based are not merely concerned with the external resemblances of a particular Sanskrit word to some form found in Malay or Khmer, but rather on the analysis of words according to the laws of formation prevalent in the Austric languages; e.g. the use of formative prefixes like ma—, mu—, ka—, kar—, ta—, tam—, and the use of internal nasals. So that although the Sanskrit word be the oldest recorded, as of course it generally is, the fact that it can be analysed on Austric lines rather than on Aryan lines goes to prove that the Austric forms are not merely borrowed from an Aryan Sanskrit word. On the other hand the Austric Sanskrit word serves as a more archaic form to explain the series of various forms in Malay, Mon, Khmer and so on.

Following the analogy of some of Przyluski’s equations Professor Sylvain Lévi has suggested an Austric origin for several proper names such as Kosala—Tosala, Aṅga—Vaṅga, Kaliṅga—Trilīṅga, Bhuliṅga, Puṅda—Puṇḍra, Ud(r)ā—Unda, Mundā, Pulinda—Kulinda—Kuṇinda.§ The learned writer points out that similar features recur: oscillation in the spelling, apparent variation of the

* Comparative Grammar of the Dravidian Languages.
‡ The following are discussed ghotā, gardabha, matasi, godhumah, phala, mukha, tuṇḍa.
§ Bulletin de la Société Linguistique. xxii. xxv. xxvi.
initial (due in Austric languages to the formative prefix) and the nasal before a stop. It will be noted that most of these words belong to one or other of the phonetic types given above as suspect. To Āṅga, Vaṅga we may add the following words which do not seem to have a convincing derivation on the Aryan side:—Gaṅgū, caṅga, jaṅga, jaṅgala, ṭaṅga, draṅga, maṅga. These suggest other nasal types like maṅca, maṅju etc. Is Jambu an Aryan word?

Traces of the Austric family (including Munda) have survived as far north as Lahul.* Doubtless languages of this type were once spoken over a large area in India.

There remains the possibility of contact with other non-Aryan languages whether related to those now found on the frontiers such as Tibetan, Lepcha or Burushaski or related to the language as yet unknown of the Indo-Sumerian culture.

9. From all this it seems clear that the history of a large part of the vocabulary of Sanskrit has not yet been unravelled.

If a word is not Aryan it is not necessarily Dravidian. There are other possibilities. If a word should happen to be Austric its analysis has to be approached from quite a different angle to what is needed for an Aryan word.† All the doubtful material requires to be rigorously examined from both points of view.

Until this has been done it is premature to form any conclusions, but it is probably fair to say that there is a growing suspicion that the non-Aryan stratum in Sanskrit is considerable in extent and that this may indicate contact with an ancient Indian people, who were by no means such primitive savages as it has been fashionable to suppose.

* Francke. History of Western Tibet.
† On Austric lines one can put together kunda Olibanum, Viśṇu and mukunda.
CAN WE FIX THE DATE OF KALIDASA MORE ACCURATELY?

(PROF. D. R. BHANDARKAR, M.A., Ph. D. [Hony.])

The historical data furnished by the Raghuvamśa of Kālidāsa have not yet been properly considered. I do not mean that entirely new data yet remain to be found out. What is, however, still possible is that the same old data may be looked at from a new point of view. It is this new angle of vision that I want to place before the scholars for their discussion. It suggested itself to me as early as 1912 when a very interesting article of Prof. K. B. Pathak entitled, "Kālidāsa and the Hunas of the Oxus Valley" was published in the Indian Antiquary of the same year.

There are at present two different views held in regard to the date of Kālidāsa. The one is that which accepts the tradition that he was a protégé of Vikramāditya and identifies him with one or the other Gupta emperor who assumed this title. Thus Sir Ramkrishna Bhandarkar,* who first propounded this view, held that this Vikramāditya was Chandragupta II., and was followed by a good many scholars such as V. A. Smith and others. Prof. Pathak,† however, is of opinion that this Vikramāditya was no other than Skandagupta, who sometimes bears this title on his coins though generally Kramāditya is coupled with his name. According to this view, Kālidāsa cannot be placed later than 450 A.D. The other view, however, brings down the poet almost a century later, and makes him a contemporary of Yaśodharman. This view was first made known by the late Dr. Hoernle,‡ but does not appear to have been countenanced by many scholars of repute. M. M. Haraprasad Sastri, however, appears to hold precisely the same view. In his article published in the Journal of the Bihar & Orissa Res. Society in 1916, he has advanced arguments which resemble so closely those brought forward by Hoernle that an impartial and unbiassed scholar like Mr. B. C. Mazumdar§

† Ind. Ant., 1912, pp. 266-7.
‡ JRAS., 1909, p. 108 & ff.
is surprised how the Mahamahopadhyaya has not referred to the paper of Hoernle.

It is well-known that in two places in the Raghuvamśa Kalidāsa refers to the political condition of his time. The first of these is Canto IV. where Raghu’s expedition of world conquest (dig-vijaya) is described. The mention of the countries of Vaṅga, Kaliṅga, Pāṇḍya and so forth which he subjugated is of such a general character that it can scarcely be taken to denote the political condition of any period. The reference to the Pārasikas and the Hūnas, however, is of a different kind. But even here we are not on terra firma. M. M. Sastri, no doubt, emphatically says: “But Raghu did not find the Hunas to the north of Persia. He found them on the Indus, the river Sindhu. After subduing Persians and Yavanas he proceeded towards the north; there he let loose his horses on the Indus and there he found the Hunas. So the Huna settlement was then on the bank of the Indus; i.e., after their expulsion from Central India.”* But anybody who has critically studied the passage bearing on this point will note that there are two variants here about the name of the river where the Hūnas were settled. One reading has Sindhu, and the other Vamkū or Vamkshu. Prof. Pathak is aware of both these readings but accepts the latter, because Vallabha, the earliest commentator of the Raghuvamśa, gives it and because Kṣīrasvāmi, a commentator of the Amarakośa says, that Raghu encountered the Hūnas in the Vāhlīka-desa (=Bactria). Vallabha flourished in the first half of the twelfth century, and of perhaps the same period is the Nāgpur inscription where the Paramāra ruler, Lakshmādeva, is like Raghu represented as conquering the earth in all directions. Here, corresponding to the Hūnas of the Raghuvamśa we have the Turushkas, who are located similarly on the river Vaṅkshū.†

It therefore seems that Vāmkū or Vāmkshū is the correct reading. But this argument is by no means of a very convincing nature, because Kālidāsa was still separated from Vallabha by upwards of five centuries and any text or commentary on his work or any

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†E. I., II. p. 188, v. 54 and p. 194.
inscription of the 12th century or even earlier may at any time turn up with Sindhu and not Vaṅkū as its reading. As we cannot thus be positively sure of the reading, we do not know where exactly the Hūṇas were settled when Kālidāsa wrote the passage, that is, whether they were settled on the Oxus or on the Indus. We do not thus know whether the reference is to the Hūṇas before they poured into India or to them when, after the establishment of their power over Northern India, they were forced to retire before the successful resistance offered by the Indian Princes and confine themselves to Kashmir.

The case, however, seems to be different in regard to the historical data* furnished by Canto VI. of the Raghuvamśa. Here we have a description of the svagamcara of Indumati and consequently of the princes of India who had assembled as suitors for her hand. In this connection we are supplied with a brief account of each one of these princes with special reference to his country, capital and race. This information supplied by Kālidāsa in regard to the political condition of his time has no doubt been utilised by some scholars for the purpose of settling his date, but it has not been, I am afraid, as critically and fully exploited as it ought to be. Two questions arise in this connection. The first of these is: whether there was at this time any supreme power either in North or South India. If anybody carefully reads this Canto, he will find that neither North nor South India was under any paramount sovereign. M. M. Haraprasad Sastri, however, holds a different opinion. He thinks that some sort of overlordship was exercised by the 'Emperor of Magadha'. This is proved according to him not only by the place of honour accorded to the king of Magadha, but, above all, by the following stanza:

Kāmaṇṭ nipāṭ santu sahasraśo-nye
rājanvatīm-ahur-anena bhūmim!
nakshatra-tārā-graha-saṁkulā-pi
jyotismati candramas-aiva rātriḥ!!

* There can be no doubt that they portray the political condition of Kālidāsa's time. The line of kings ruling at Māhiṣmati in Anūpa is undoubtedly the Kalachuri dynasty, as has been shown below. In Vs. 45-6 of Canto VI. is mentioned the Nipa family ruling at Mathurā in the Śūrasena country. That there was a Nipa family is clearly mentioned by the Purāṇas (F. E. Pargiter's Dynasties of the Kali Age, pp. 3 & 65).
The above stanza is translated by him as follows: "Let there be thousand other kings, but the Earth is possessed of a king because of him; just as there may be thousands of stars, but the night would be called luminous only when the moon is there."

"This clearly gives the king of Magadha", says M. M. Sastri "a precedence over the rest of the kings of India". Does it? The most important word here is rājanvaṭi, which has been rendered by him as "possessed of a king." Nothing, however, can be more erroneous. If he had but consulted the commentary of Mallinātha, he would have seen the word explained by sobhana-rājavatī. Immediately after this, the commentator quotes the following from the Amarakośa in support of his position: su-rajñī deśe rājanvaṇ syāt-tato-nyatra rājavān. "(The word) rājanaṇā should be (used) to denote 'a country possessed of a good king'; but elsewhere (the word) rājavān (should be used)". If Kālidāsa had used the word rājavatī, we should have been justified in translating the verse with M. M. Sastri by "the Earth was possessed of a king because of him" and further in inferring that the Magadha king wielded some sort of supreme rule. As it is, the word actually used by the poet is rājanvaṭi, and a real Sanskritist must render the verse only by "the Earth has, in him alone, a virtuous king." What Kālidāsa means is that no other prince was so good a ruler as the king of Magadha. There is thus nothing here indicated of his overlordship or suzerainty. And if we carefully pore over the whole of Canto VI., we shall perceive that there was no single king who was a paramount sovereign but that North India at any rate was then split up into a number of tiny independent states, such as Magadha, Aṅgā, Avanti and so forth. This clearly indicates, in my opinion, that Kālidāsa did not live during the reign of either Chandragupta II. or Skandagupta, as almost the whole of India then owned the Gupta supremacy and was not divided into smaller independent states. He must therefore have flourished soon after the break-up of the imperial Gupta rule.

There are yet some other stanzas in Canto VI. which require to be considered in this connection. They relate to the king of Anūpa called Pratīpta or Pradīpta, who, it is expressly stated, belonged to the Kārtavirya lineage and had his capital at Māhiṃsati girded by the Narmadā. This is a clear reference in my opinion
to the Kalachuri dynasty which, as I have elsewhere pointed out, was ruling at Mahishmati. And it is a matter of great delight that M. M. Sastri also holds the same opinion. He did not, however, pursue the point further as he should have done. Three copper-plate grants of this family have been discovered, revealing the names of Kṛṣṇa Saṅkaragana and Buddhharāja. It seems that Kṛṣṇa was the founder. Now, the charter of his son Saṅkaragana is dated K. E. 347 = A.D. 595, and it does not seem likely that Kṛṣṇa could have seized power prior to A.D. 550. It thus appears that Kālidāsa also could not have composed Canto VI. before this date. But it may be asked what then becomes of Pratīpa? It is too well-known a thing to require any substantiation that kings of ancient India were in the habit of adopting many titles and epithets. And it is quite possible that Pratīpa may have been a title borne by Kṛṣṇa or Saṅkaragana.

It will be seen that a consideration of these stanzas from Canto VI. leads to the conclusion that Kālidāsa flourished about the middle or rather in the second and third quarters of the sixth century. This is exactly the view of the late Dr. Hoernle, though he based it upon a different line of argument. He further held that the poet was a protégé of Yaśodharman for whom we have the date VE. 589 = A.D. 532 furnished by one of his inscriptions found at Mandasaur. This is not at all impossible. It is true that from both his records he appears to have raised himself to the position of an overlord, and we have already seen that there was no overlord in North India when Kālidāsa wrote his poem. But there is nothing to preclude us from supposing that Kālidāsa survived Yaśodharman and that after the death of the latter, Ujjain ceased to be an imperial city and became the capital town of a tiny state similar to Magadha, Aṅga and such other kingdoms as are mentioned in Canto VI. Some of his works Kālidāsa may have written during the reign of his patron, but the Raghuvamśa, at least Canto VI. of it, seems to have been composed after the death of Yaśodharman.

† E. I. IX, 298.
THE LAND OF THE KHMERS: VESTIGES OF A FORGOTTEN EMPIRE

(PROF. GAURANGA NATH BANERJEE M.A., P.R.S., PH.D.)

In the epochs that are uncertain, Angkor, buried now for many centuries, was one of the glories of the world. Just as the old Nile by virtue merely of its slime, had reared in its valley a marvellous civilisation, so here the Mekong, spreading each year its waters, had deposited a richness and prepared the way for the proud Empire of the Khmers. It was probably in the time of Alexander the Macedonian, that a people emigrated from India, came and settled on the banks of this great river, after subjugating the timid natives—the worshippers of the Nāgas or Serpents. The conquerors brought with them the gods of Brahma and the beautiful legends of the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata; and as their opulence increased on this fertile soil, they built everywhere gigantic temples, carved with a thousand figures and a myriad figurines. Some centuries later—one cannot well say how many—the powerful sovereigns of Angkor saw, arriving from the East, missionaries in yellow robes, bearers of the new gospel of Ahimsā and Nirvāṇa at which the Asiatic world was wondering. Buddha had achieved the enlightenment of India and his emissaries were spreading over the east of Asia to preach there the same gospel of piety and love which the disciples of Christ had brought to Europe later on. Then the gorgeous temples of Viśṇu and Śiva were transformed into unadorned Chaityas and Vihāras; the statues of the altars changed their attitudes and lowered their eyes with gentler smiles.

It would seem that under Buddhism the town of Angkor knew the apogée of its glory. But the history of its swift and mysterious decline has never been written and the invading forests well guards its secret. The little Cambodia of to-day, the repository and preserver of complicatd rites of which the significance is no longer known, is the last remnant of the vast empire of the Khmers, which for more than 500 years now has been buried under the silence of trees and weeds.

Angkor is the Sanskrit word Nagara or capital which in the Cambodian language has been transformed into a sonorous epithet.
This word is but a symbol. An extraordinary germination of Indian religion had effectually produced from the 9th to 12th centuries after Christ, the pantheon of the Khmers and the magnificent temples which adorned the site of the old capital. Angkor, as it presents to our view to-day, has an impenetrable mystery, brilliant and gorgeous though its past history may have been. Few facts are certain about this forgotten people, different temperaments interpret at their will what they see: cruel minds see blood everywhere; poetic souls dream of languishing music and strange religious rites; lovers of luxury see pearls, diamonds, gold and silver shining in transparent shadows, deck the gowns of princes and high priests; scholars and archaeologists think of the customs and laws of the Khmers; but everyone feels mystery and gropes his way among problems recurring a hundred times, his intelligence always wide awake, never thinking of the flowing hours, a continual interest urging him to see more.

Angkor Thom—the Great Angkor, was once the capital of a mighty empire. "The outer wall," says Mouhot, "is composed of blocks of ferruginous stone, and extends right and left from the entrance. It is about twenty-four miles square (sic), three metres eighty centimetres thick, and seven metres high, and serves as a support to a glacis which rises almost from the top." An ancient road, in which though it is partly obliterated, the ruts ploughed by the heavy traffic of a bygone age are still discernible, leads to the main entrance across a wide ditch full of the debris of broken columns, portions of carved lions and elephants and fallen blocks of stone. The portal is an arch some sixty feet in height surmounted by four immense heads, described by Mouhot as being "in the Egyptian style"; these and the whole building are constructed of sandstone. At each of the four corners of the great rectangular city towers a Gate; there is a fifth one on the east side. The Great city thus possessed five main Gates; the roads passing through four of them converged towards the exact centre of the town occupied by the Chief Temple, the Bayon. We shall speak of this Bayon here after. The eastern side only had an extra Gate that faced the Imperial Palace of the Khmers. The Gates are all in a good state of preservation, but the northern alone gives the best idea of their ancient beauty and splendour. Each gate had
its distinctive appellation. The southern is called the "Gate of Lake"; the eastern are those of the "Victory" and of the "Dead"; the western, the "Gate of the Spirit Kao"; the northern, the "Gate of the Spirit Nok." Within the vast enclosure formed by the walls the forest riots wantonly—an inextricable tangle of grey-black trunks and spreading branches, of striving saplings, dense underwood, twining creepers and hanging curtains of parasitic growths, such as only the warm moist earth can produce in these prolific tropical lands. Hidden under this splendid pall of verdure, reverently concealed beneath God's green coverlet, lies the city of the dead. Here were magnificent temples—now the lairs of forest creatures, in which men of a forgotten generation put up their prayer of plaint, houses in which they were born, in which they lived and planned and loved and laboured and quarrelled and suffered and died, the great store-treasuries which held the wealth of an empire, the gorgeous palaces within which dwelt kings and potentates. Truly it echoes the quatrains of the immortal poet:

"They say the Lion and the Lizard keep
The Courts where Jamshyd glorie d and drank deep:
And Bahram, that great Hunter—the Wild Ass
Stamps o'er his Head, but cannot break his Sleep."

The romance, the wonder of the lost story of this once great city,—of the lives of the men and women who dwelt in it,—or the hopes and the ambitions, the passions and desires, of the joys and the sorrows, of the thousand trivial happenings which made up their myriad individual lives, even more than the thought of the great catastrophe which must have brought destruction upon them, grips you here "at the quiet limits of the world," as you look upon the traces they have left behind them—the silent stones, mouldering under the calm dome of the slumbering forest. With eager curiosity you grope amid the lumber of the centuris, seeking some hint that shall have the power to breathe the spark of life into this buried skeleton of majesty; but when you have learned all that is at present known the enigma remains unsolved, and the conclusions indicated are of a character little calculated to satisfy the judgment of even those who wish to know only at second-hand. Angkor Thom found in the ninth century A.D. covered an area
of some five square miles. It can be compared with no city of Europe at that time: the kingdom of Wessex had just become the kingdom of England under the half-legendary kings, Egbert, Æthelwulf, Alfred; the Franks were governed by Charlemagne; but Angkor Thom was already a mighty town of more than a million souls. In antiquity the Athens of Pericles, the Rome of Cæsar were not as big!

"The earliest known record of Angkor is found in the work of an anonymous Chinese diplomat, who in 1295 was ordered by the Emperor of China to proceed to the kingdom of Chin-La, the name by which Kambodia was then known. His book has been translated by M. Abel Rémusat, in whose Nouveaux Mélanges Asiatiques it occupied a prominent place. The author tells us that he was entrusted with the duty of promulgating certain orders of his Emperor (Kublai Khan) in Kambodia over which State, China exercised something in the nature of suzerainty; that he left Ming-Cheu in the second month of the year following the reception by him of the imperial instructions—that is to say in 1296—travelled thence to the port of Wen-Chu, whence he put out to sea on the 20th day of the same month. On the 15th day of the third moon—namely twenty-five days later—he arrived off the coast of Cochin-China, but he relates that he then encountered such adverse winds that he did not succeed in reaching his destination until the seventh moon. He returned to China, once more travelling by sea, in 1297. It is worthy of notice, in view of the hopes so persistently entertained by the French administration of Indo-China of tapping the trade of the Celestial Empire by means of the Mekong, the Red River, or some other inland route, that even when Kambodia was a flourishing and highly civilised kingdom, communication between it and China was maintained by sea, and not via the Provinces of Yun-nan or Kwang-si.

"The Chinese ambassador next gives us a detailed account of the capital of Kambodia, in which mention is made of the rectangular shape of the town, the high wall by which it is encompassed, the two gates on the eastern face, and the great Causeway of Giants which leads to the western entrance, and which, even in ruins, is remarkable a feature of Angkor. He also mentions particularly a temple without the walls, which even then was accounted very ancient, and which according to the legend current
in his day was built by one Lu-pan in the space of a single night. This would appear to be the pagoda of Mount Bakheng. On the other hand, the Chinese author speaks of two lakes, one on the east of the town about 100 li in circumference, and another, the dimensions of which are not given, some five li to the North. Only one such lake is now in existence, and this is not easily to be identified with either of those mentioned by the ambassador from China. Angkor Wat, the immense temple which from internal evidence is proved to be the most recent of the Angkor ruins, is not spoken of, and we are therefore driven to conclude either that it had not been built by the year 1296, or that a description of it was omitted by accident. (vide Hugh Clifford's Further India p. 229 et seq).

The discovery of the ruins of Angkor is stated by Christoval de Jaque, who in a book published in 1606 gives an account of travels in Indo-China undertaken by him between 1592 and 1598. "It is surrounded," he says, "by a strong wall which is four leagues in circumference, of which the battlements are carved with great care," and he gives to this place the name of Anjog, which would seem to be sufficient to identify it with Angkor even if he does not furnish recognisable descriptions of the Causeway of the Giants and other remarkable features of the ruins. He states too—a fact which deserves special attention that even in 1570 many of the inscriptions at Anjog were written in a tongue which none of the natives understood or could interpret.

In his History of the Islands of the Archipelago, published five years before de Jaque's work, Ribadeneyra also notices these ruins. He says, "There are in Cambodia the ruins of an ancient city, which some say was constructed by the Romans or by Alexander the Great. It is a marvellous fact that none of the natives can live in these ruins, which are the resort of wild beasts. These Gentiles have a tradition that the ruins will some day be restored by a foreign nation."

In 1672 there occurs another mention of Angkor in the work of a French missionary named Père Chevuel. "There is an ancient and very celebrated temple," he says, "situated at a distance of eight days from the place where I live. This temple is called Onco, and it is as famous among the Gentiles as St. Peter's
at Rome:” and he adds that in his time pilgrimages were made to it from Siam, Pegu, Laos and Tenasserim.

From these accounts of Angkor it will be seen that when the place was first discovered by Europeans in 1570 it was as ruined, as deserted, as much given over to the forest and the beasts of the jungle, as completely a monument of a prehistoric past, as it is in our own day. If then we are to accept the work of the anonymous Chinese official as an authentic account of Angkor Thom at the end of the thirteenth century, we must ask ourselves to believe that this mighty civilisation, whereof its magnificent architecture was the ripened fruit, not only declined and perished, but passed into oblivion all within a space of less than 300 years. Nay, more than this: for if the omission of any description of the temple of Angkor Vat from the account given in the Chinese manuscripts is to be taken as evidence the splendid edifice, which was of a kind little likely to escape attention, had not yet been built at the time of the ambassador’s visit, we must believe that the Khmer civilisation reached its point of culmination at some period in the fourteenth century at the earliest, and nevertheless was thereafter obliterated so effectually that in less than 200 years it had left behind it hardly so much as a tradition.

If then by the end of the thirteenth century Angkor was still great, still inhabited, but none the less was tottering to its fall, all we have to suppose is that events occurred which hastened the catastrophe and accelerated the process of decay, and here we seem to find a hint in the Chinese manuscripts of what may have been the nature of the calamity which precipitated the abandonment of the royal city. The ambassador, as already stated, makes mention of lakes in the neighbourhood of Angkor which are no longer to be located in the directions indicated by him, while another lake appears to have come into being since his time. A change such as this wrought in the natural configuration of the surrounding country could only be the result of seismic convulsions, and such an explanation would also account for the battered condition of many of the buildings and the very general dilapidation of the roofs. It is noticeable, too, that no human remains are found in large numbers in the houses of Angkor Thom, as would be the case in all probability if the town had been abandoned on account of plague or pestilence, and it would seem to be more
likely that the evacuation was due to a sudden panic. When we remember the innately superstitious character of these Oriental races, it is not difficult to conceive of the conviction that might have been bred in them by a succession of slight earth tremors that it was the will of the gods that their ancient home should be deserted, and if once such a belief spread among the populace of an Asiatic city, nothing could save it from abandonment. The faith of the Oriental, which, not content with believing in the languid European fashion, has a wonderful power of realising as an actual fact the thing proposed for its belief, would in such an event prove strong enough to overcome all attachment to home, all love of things ancient and sacred, all personal and private interests, all respect for the value of property. The will of the gods, once plainly indicated, once grasped, would be obeyed no matter what the sacrifice demanded by obedience, and something of this kind, I conceive, must be held to account for the abandonment of the noble edifices of Angkor to the encroaching jungle and to the wild creatures of the forest.

The origin of the Khmers is wrapped in obscurity, but the features of the men represented in the ancient monuments, as can be seen from the statue of the Leprous King, reproduced in the work of M. Groslier, are distinctively Hindu. The type is found to this day prevalent among the Cambodians of pure descent, and it presents a very marked contrast to the broad-faced, flat-featured Mongolian races of China and Siam. Cambodia in our time, however, is not peopled by a single nation, but rather by a very heterogeneous population. The mountains are inhabited for the most part by aboriginal tribes of a very low standard of civilisation, who from time immemorial have been pillaged and enslaved by their more advanced neighbours. The trading and energetic portion of the community is composed almost exclusively of Chinese mostly natives of Fok-Kien, for Cambodia still communicates with China by sea, and the very colonists of Malaya scattered about the country, who came there no one precisely knows how, and the Cambodians themselves have in most cases intermarried with strangers and so have lost their ancient purity of blood. In Batam-bang and Siam-Rep, the Siamese had also established a few colonies. The province of Siam-Rep is the heart of the ancient Khmer
Empire. The monarchs and nobles there lavished their wealth on monuments and made the district one of the art-centres of the world. It is crossed by a river rising in the mountains of Kulen that furnished the sandstone of the temples. Little torrents nourished by fresh springs fall from the heights and join to form the Stung-Siam-Rep, traversing for more than half its course an arid region, poor and sandy, where rise rocky hillocks covered by scanty trees; then it arrives in a rich land, chosen by the kings as their residence, passes on the skirts of Angkor-Thom, goes through the town that gave its name to the province and which was already in ancient times a flourishing commercial entrepôt and after touching in Savannahs flooded during the rainy season, it mingles with the waters of the great lake, the Tonle-Sap. The neighbourhood of this lake is richer in archæological remains than any other found in the East and the conception of the Cambodians are as admirable as their ability to turn them into realities.

Now what is the origin of Khmer art? One finds it appearing quite abruptly in the history of the Far East; it shows, while yet in its first manifestations a certain mastery, enabling it to attain, in a short enough space of time the highest summits of architectural art in some of its monuments.

The question is far from being decided as yet. The Hindu influence is undeniable; it is known that before the first centuries of the Christian era, emigrants coming from India had penetrated into Indo-China and that at a later age some conquerors of the same origin had again disembarked in the country which had come to be the land of Khmer.

In Cambodia, the religious, the moral codes and the literature are borrowed from India. We find sculptured upon the numerous Khmer temples the same divinities and legendary heroes as upon the temples of the Hindus. The text of ancient inscriptions is very often in Sanskrit. The towers in the form of a pyramid with the stages detached from each other in distinct divisions in accordance with the canons of Dravidian architecture of Southern India, are evidently congeners of Khmer towers; but if one takes note of the fact that the most ancient monuments in Pallava style goes up to the 7th century A.D., it is difficult to establish a direct affiliation of one architecture to the other.
On the other hand if Hindu art had a share in the architecture of Cambodia, and this is evident, since from Burmah and passing through Siam and Java, every part of the Far East is more or less under cultural vassalage of India, one can also recognise in Khmer Art the influence which do not manifest themselves so clearly in the countries mentioned above. [Some General observations on the Temples of Angkor by H. Marchal. (Rupam, Oct. 1922)].

That it derived its inspiration direct from India cannot be doubted—the character of the carving, the features of the statues, the practice by the Khmers of the cult of Buddha, all indicate this, while the appearance of the Cambodians of our own time seems to confirm the belief that the ancestors of these people came originally from the peninsula of Hindustan. We know that Hindu influence extended in very early times as far south as Lombok and Bâli, and it is highly probable that Cambodia may also have been peopled from India by sea.* The enormous encroachments of the land upon the ocean, caused by the immense amount of the deposits washed down by the Mekong, have added largely to the flat coast-lands of the country during historical as opposed to geological times, and a thousand years ago Angkor was certainly much less distant from the sea than it is to-day. None the less, since other seaward States in its vicinity escaped the Indian invasion, it is at least possible that the Khmers may have made their way into Indo-China by overland route, as is contended by some French writers, though the opinion is one which it is not easy to accept. M. Groslier discusses the Indian influence on the Cambodians in his Recherches sur les Cambodgiens thus:

"Qu'y avait-il donc au Nord-Ouest et à l' Ouest de l'ancien Cambodge et pour le voyageur parvenant de l' Inde du Nord par le Bengale, la Birmanie et la région de Dvārāvati? Un immense massif montagneux peu fait pour retenir des populations en marche et en outre trois grandes vallées, celles de Irrawadi, du Saluen et du Menam; vallees dirigées toutes du Nord au Sud et qui devaient conduire directement et fatalement toutes les vagues humaines qui les suivaient aux deux portes naturelles ouverts sur les plaines et

* See my book. *India as known to the Ancient World.*
la seconde. Kmères........Là, un grand movement qui civilise et répond la pensee indoue; ici une forte poussée birmanie qui par vient du Nord de l’Inde. Elle rejette vers le Sud les populations installée le long des valees, populations également indouisees."

In the whole of Cambodia there are only three temples which possess an immense series of bas-reliefs; the Bayon, Banteai China, and Angkor Vat. The first two are earlier than the third. The style of the sculpture is naturally primitive and as in all ancient arts, many conventions appear lacking scientific knowledge. Perspective also was an unknown science and the different planes are placed one above the other, usually separated by horizontal lines. Yet inspite of these naive defects, the sculptors were so scrupulous, so attentive to every detail, that they had reached an extraordinary standard of perfection. Some scenes are so life-like and so true to nature that one cannot believe that the men who used rough stools to fashion these wonders had not previously made sketches during their rambles. The carvings are most likely like "the Bible of Amiens" to be comprehended by illiterate plebeians, or even by equally ignorant nobles who desired their deeds and beliefs to be preserved from oblivion. Most of the scenes have a precious finish and one can well imagine, years ago, the Khmer sculptors, in great numbers, filling the vast cloisters with the bangs of their mallets and chisels, with the dust of scraped stones and stepping back from time to time to see the effect of their toil. Moreover, they were all, no doubt, under the supervision of a supreme architect and master who like Phidias in the Parthenon, walked everywhere and added a touch of his genius to the achievements of lesser craftsmen. The entire series, which stretches over half a mile, reveals a startling evenness of merit. (vide Jeannerat de Burski, Angkor: Ruins in Cambodia).

The Bayon has been aptly described by a witty French writer, as 'the whole Cambodian nation turned to stone'; from the summit of the central tower to the level of the ground all the qualities and vices, all the greatness and baseness which distinguished that race are disclosed. The structure is personal and the decoration explicit. We have there the religion, the monarchy of mind, the faith in their gods and kings, the blind belief they showed in their superiors; also their war-like spirit, their freedom and their charac-
ter, sweetened by the love for women and children. We see their admiration for nature and their history. Indeed the entire kingdom of Yacovarman and its inhabitants can be said to be contained in the area enclosed within the surrounding walls. Later they may have built more magnificent erections, but never the ancient Khmers, nor any other nation in any epoch have condensed once again, in a single monument, the souls and manners of an age. The Bayon is unique and worthy to rank with the proudest buildings of the world for this extraordinary particularity.

The Bayon represents the earliest conception, crude and savagely immense, of a people apart, without analogue in the world, and without neighbours; the Khmer people, probably a detached branch of the great Indo-European race, which planted itself here as if by chance, and grew and developed far from the parent stem separated from the rest of the world by immense expanses of forest and marshy land. About the ninth century some four hundred years earlier than Angkor-Vat, this sanctuary ruder and more enormous, was in the plenitude of its glory. In order to try and picture to one's self what was once its most awful magnificence, it would be necessary, first of all to clear away the forests which engulf it, to suppress the inextricable entanglement of these roots and these greenish white-spotted branches, which are so to say, the tentacles of the fig-tree of ruins; and then, no longer in this eternal green night, but in the open air, under the wide expanse of starry dome, to re-erect these quadruple-visaged towers—about fifty of them!—to replace them upright on their monstrous pedestal, which like that of Angkor-Vat was in three stages.

To ornament the walls of Bayon endless bas-reliefs and decorations of every sort have been conceived with an exuberant prodigality. Here are battles, furious conflicts, war-chariots, interminable processions of elephants and groups of Apsaras, of Devatas with pompous crowns. The workmanship is crude and more naive than at Angkor-Vat, but the inspiration revealed there is more vehement, more tumultuous. There is something disconcerting in so great a profusion. In our days of pinchbeck versatility, it is difficult to realise the perseverance, the fertility, the faith, the love of grand and eternal, which inspired these vanished people.

"This temple", says M. Pierre Loti in his well-known book on
'Siam', 'is one of the places in the world where men have heaped together the greatest mass of stones, where they have accumulated the greatest wealth of sculptures, of ornaments, of foliage, of flowers and of faces. It is not simple as are the lines of Thebes and Baalbeck. Its complexity is as bewildering even as its enormity. Monsters guard all the flights of steps, of all the entrances; the divine Apsarās, in indefinitely repeated groups, are revealed everywhere amongst the overhanging creepers. And, at a first view nothing stands out; there seem only disorder and confusion in this hill of carved stones, on the summit of which the great towers have sprouted. But, on the contrary, when one examines it a little, a perfect symmetry is manifest from top to bottom. The hill of sculptured stones forms a square pyramid of three stages, the base of which measures more than a thousand yards in circumference; and it is on the third and highest of these stages that we find that which is pre-eminently the Holy place." Within this sanctuary presides a Buddha of gigantic size, commanding and gentle, with legs crossed and downcast half-closed eyes, for so many centuries that spiders have contrived patiently to drape him with black muslins, hiding the gold with which he was adorned. But his bowed head preserved the same benevolent smile as may be found on all the representations of Him from Ceylon to Korea; the smile of the Great Peace, obtained by the Great Renunciation and the Great Piety.

Over and above the great temples which every one visits there are to be found scattered about, by the side of the rivers and swamps, a number of monuments in terra cotta of an art most singular, dating back to the fourth century and even to the earliest days of the Khmer Empire.

To sum up, all that we can really ascertain at the present time concerning the Khmer civilisation is that it flowered and came to full fruition before its subjugation by China; that the Chinese dominion ended before the conclusion of the tenth century of our era, though it had a nominal and more or less formal existence for more than three centuries later; that Angkor and the other towns of Cambodia were occupied by the natives of the country well into the fourteenth century, although by that time the civilisation of the Khmers had decayed, their arts would appear to have declined, and the number of their subjects to have dwindled. It
further seems probable that some time in the fourteenth century the ancient buildings were deserted owing, it may be surmised, to a superstitious belief that it was no longer the will of the gods that they should be occupied—a superstition which exists to the present day, and which may have originated in, or have impressed itself upon, the public mind by reason of one or more seismic convulsions. We have, it must be confessed, only a slender base upon which to build our theories, but the evidence of the Chinese ambassador, quoted in these pages, is something tangible and concrete which cannot easily be thrust aside. The desertion of Angkor at a period subsequent to his visit is at any rate a possibility, and that the condition of the ruins at the present time, and the maze of myth and legend in which the imagination of the native population has entangled them, need excite little surprise when we remember the colossal nature of the buildings on the one side, and the appeal which they would inevitably make to a marvellous, loving, superstitious, and unlettered people. When all has been said, however, the problem of the Khmer civilisation remains unsolved; for of the story of the great empire which existed before ever China effected conquests in Cambodia, we know very little. Judged by the gigantic remains which they have bequeathed to us,—the expression at once of a tremendous energy and of a passionate love of art—the Khmers must have been a wonderful people, and such a people cannot have failed to have a marvellous and inspiring history. What the story was we know not in detail, and perhaps shall never know, but we must all subscribe to Francis Garnier’s tribute to the men of this vanished race :

"Jamais nelle part peut-être une masse plus imposante de pierres n’est étée disposée avec plus d’art et de science. Si l’on admire les pyramides comme une œuvre gigantesque de la force et de la patience humaines, à une force et une patience égales il faut ajouter ici le génie!"
ZOROASTRIAN CONCEPTION OF FUTURE EXISTENCE

(Shams-ul-ulema Sardar Dr. K. A. N. Dastur, Ph.D.)

The doctrine of Future Existence has been held in some form or another by every race and tribe of men. With this tenet is often coupled belief in rewards and punishments in the next world, the state of men's spirits there depending in whole or in part upon conduct during life on earth. Some religions tell of a final conflict between good and evil and the ultimate triumph of the former. Others have no teaching to give on the subject. But all alike agree in the conviction that death does not end all and that there is an after-life. The conviction on this point appears to be so strong and for the matter of that, so universal that one is almost tempted to consider it an intuition. It is found not only among the higher classes, but quite as generally among those in the lower state of civilization, or even among savages. Dr. Tylor says in his "Primitive Culture" that it is not safe to take the doctrine of the soul's future life as one of the general and principal elements. The doctrine of the surviving soul may, however, be treated as common to all known races, though its acceptance is not unanimous. As in savage so in civilized life, dull and careless natures ignore a world to come as too far off, while sceptical intellects are apt to reject its belief as wanting proof. Savages never doubt the existence of the part which in man survives death, and they attribute souls not only to animals but even to weapons and utensils. Compte describes man's primary mental condition as constantly characterised by the free and direct exercise of our primitive tendency to conceive all external bodies, natural or artificial, as animated by a life essentially analogous to our own with mere differences of intensity. We all experience this tendency in our childhood, and it is natural to suppose that in the childhood of human race it was universal. Even now, it shows itself in fetishism, while, in classical Greece, every river, fountain, or tree was regarded as the abode of nymph or some spirit. The probable explanation of this appears to be that man's instinct makes him so certain of his own personality distinct from his material body that he cannot without any effort on his part rid himself of the idea that exterior objects are
like himself in that respect. This belief in the existence of the
soul seems to be an innate idea which may be accounted for as
the spirits of the deceased presenting themselves to their surviving
relatives' mind so clearly that they are mistaken for the relatives
themselves.

Among the Aryans in Europe and in the East, the similarity of
practices connected with the burial or burning of the dead makes
it probable that their beliefs about the state after death did not differ
widely from one another. Throughout Northern Europe, it was
the custom to bury the dead in what we call barrows. The dead body
was placed in a contracted posture within the stone chamber called
"Dolmen". Vast mounds of earth were then piled above the
tomb. In England, the custom of cremation, as history bears out
well, was first introduced during Bronze Age. Herodotus has left
us a description of the ceremonies connected with the internment
of a Scythian king. In other parts of Europe, other customs were
prevalent with some difference.

It would not be out of place, if we consider the primitive idea
of European-Aryans on the subject. As far as our knowledge of
cultural development of European-Aryans in the early days goes,
they regarded death as no better than a simple change of life.
They thought that the spirit lived under the earth. The old Roman
idea was that the Umbra or the shade flew around the Sepulchre,
that manes went to Orcus, and that the spirit ascended the stars.
This reminds us of Egyptian belief in the ba or soul, the khu or
mind, Ka or double and the Khaibit or shade. In these we find
traces of different theories amalgamated. The soul was supposed
to have a special connection with the tomb. Hence food was
brought and wine poured out on the sepulchre to satisfy the hunger
and thirst of the inhabitant. It was believed that the spiritual
essence of these things would be useful to the soul of the deceased.

In order that the soul might be at rest, it was considered nece-
sary that the body should be buried and the funeral rites duly
performed. If this were not done, the unfortunate spirit could find
no repose and hence, becoming a larva, it haunted and troubled
the living.

The Odyssey gives us rather a sad picture of the abode of the
dead and the state of its inhabitants. They dwell in murky gloom
and are spoken of as the feeble persons of the dead, inhabiting a joyless spot, grieving but telling each its own troubles and being senseless and phantoms of departed mortals. The shade of Achilles when it met Ulysses, told him that he would rather be a serf and act the hireling to another in a poor man's cottage, than reign over all dead men.

From what has been stated above, it will be seen that all nations, whether civilized or not, had a firm belief in an after-life. Yet, in spite of slight differences of opinion as to the condition of the soul in that state of existence, the general view was that such a life was far inferior to this and that it was a state more or less vague or unreal, where no progress of any kind was made, but in which the spirit existed at best in a more or less unhappy condition. The slight differences of opinion which we find entertained by different nations as to the belief in the after-life simply represent the different stages of intellectual development they attained.

We now come to the theory of the transmigration of souls as propounded by the Hindu Aryans in very early days. The theory of transmigration, be it said to the credit of its exponents, is the subtlest and the most convincing, though apparently, of the theories referred to above. This theory or rather this form of belief has been very widely spread among all classes of people of Europe and America, and Asia is no exception to this. According to this theory, the soul of a child enters the world again in the person of another child born soon after the death of the former. It is well-known how extensively Manu makes use of the theory of transmigration. It plays an important part in Buddhism and Hinduism, though it is entirely wanting in the original belief of the Aryans of both India and Persia. This idea of transmigration appears to have been left behind by the Aryans and Semites in their intellectual advance.

As we have said above, a sad picture, as drawn by Odyssey, of the abode of the dead and the state of its inhabitants, which resembles that drawn by other nations of Europe and America in very old times, does, pari passu, resemble the Hindu idea of transmigration. It must have been prevalent among the Aryans before their separation from each other. Manu bids the so-called Sraiddha offering of rice with libations of water or milk and also
with roots and fruits to be offered by a man daily to his ancestors, in order to satisfy them. The Srāddha ceremony is not one of the Hindu funeral rites, "Antayisti", but is an act of reverential homage to the deceased relatives, especially parents or ancestors. Every day, water has to be poured on the tomb, and balls of rice (Pinda) have to be offered on special occasions. The object of the ceremony is to supply nourishment to the deceased. The funeral rites proper and the first Srāddha turn the wandering ghost of the dead man into a being provided with an ethereal body. Succeeding Srāddhas strengthen this body and enable the soul thus equipped to enter Pitra Loka. In this matter, the Hindu Preta reminds us of the Latin Larva. The abode of the spirit after the proper ceremonies have been performed, is a region, the exact position of which is the subject of difference of opinion. Some locate it in the air, while others do so in the orbit of the moon. Its ruler is Yama, son of the God Surya (the Sun). An ancient hymn in the Rig-Veda, X. 14, states clearly the early belief of the Hindus on this subject as:

(1). "Worship thou with an oblation King Yama, the gatherer of the people, son of Vaivasvat, who has departed to the mighty mountain slopes, showing the way to many.

(2). "Yama was the first to find for us the way, and this pasturage is not to be taken away; whither our ancient fathers have gone, thither will their offsprings go, along their own paths.

(7). "Go thou forward, go thou forward by the ancient paths, whither our ancient fathers have gone, mayest thou see both King Yama and God Varuna, rejoicing in wonted manner.

(8). "Unite thyself with the fathers, with Yama, in the highest heaven by thy merits: Having abandoned Sin, go home again, vigourous, unite thyself to a body."

In his six systems of Indian Philosophy, Max Muller says that this hymn seems to imply that earlier ideas were nobler than later ones in connection with the state of the soul after death.

HINDU VIEW OF TRANSMIGRATION.

The doctrine of transmigration has found a most congenial home in Asia which owes it to India. The hymns in the Rig-Veda
which simply represent the best literary activity of the early Aryans do not show that it was then in a developed form. It is only in the Upanishad period that we find it in its complete development. The Buddha himself adopted it with such modifications in detail as his own system necessitated. This theory has been assumed by nearly half the human race to-day. In England, Germany and the United States, men and women are discussing it to-day. Unlike the ancient Aryans of Europe, what appears from the later Hindu literature to oppress the Hindu, is not sin, but existence and its attendant miseries. He explains away this theory as:

"We have capacity but it is foiled for want of opportunity; we have taste, but it is over-ridden by circumstances; we have ambition, but it is hindered by weakness. There are inequalities of life. Some are rich who seldom work, while others are poor who have to work ceaselessly. Crookedness sometimes prospers and honesty walks in rags."

These things are a constant puzzle to our intelligence. But the Hindu furnishes an arresting answer to this riddle. He shares the general conviction of mankind that death does not end all. He holds that the life that passes from our vision here is recommissioned for service or for suffering. Moreover, he holds that the life hereafter will be determined by the life that we live here. But if this life projects itself beyond, why may we not turn the process backward? If this life be the result of a previous life, then is the riddle solved and inequality explained. Pain must be retribution, pleasure reward and justice is for ever vindicated. If this is true, the successful man is rendered for ever indifferent to the envy of his neighbours, for has he not earned his prosperity?

The Hindu assumes three things for the support of this theory, viz... (i) Eternity behind as well as before, (ii) eternity of souls, and (iii) unrestrictedness of the soul in its embodiments.

Let us take in their natural sequence these three assumptions and see how far the answers suggested by him satisfy our reason. The first is eternity behind and before. According to this hypothesis, the sufferings or enjoyments in this life are the result of man's actions in the past life, in other words, what he suffers or enjoys in this life is the result of what he was and did in the past
life; but what he was then was necessitated by what he had been the birth before that, and so on indefinitely. Where to stop? If there is no stopping, it is committing one to an eternal series of antecedents, an endless and beginningless chain of cause and effect, each link of which hangs on the preceding and so on. Such a position, as Professor Orr has said in his book, "Christian view of God and the World", is unthinkable and affords no resting place for the reason. Even Sankaracharya, in a moment of candour, ridicules the idea of cause producing and being produced by its own effect, through an eternal series, and says that it would be like an endless chain of blind men leading other blind men (Vedanta Sutras). The second assumption is that the souls are eternal in which these un-ending causes work out their unending effects. When, therefore, a child is born, we are not to understand that a new soul is created. What has happened is that an eternal entity has just taken on a fresh embodiment. The third and the last assumption, viz., the unrestrictedness of the soul in its embodiments, may seem less credible, perhaps, if we remember how fundamentally the Hindu conception of soul differs from our own. To us the soul is the essential man, a personality that knows itself, the "I" of individual experience, that reasons, wills, loves, and hates; and that finds in the human bodily organism the only instrument through which it can properly express itself. The fact that a self-conscious intelligence is capable of uniting itself harmoniously with any other than the human type of physique, is certainly incomprehensible to human intelligence. In all countries and in all ages, the difference between the lowest human and the highest animal has been so fundamental and instinct that the ultimate commingling of the two has been regarded as one of the fixed impossibilities, of the same class as the union of fire and water or light and darkness. This appears to be due to his mistaken conception of soul, which, according to him, is not Ego, which last he grades as matter. He understands the soul to be the vital principle without thought, emotion, will, self-consciousness or any other quality, except that of extension and life. (Crozier's History of Intellectual Development). Such a principle is very elastic and may take any shape required.

The Law of Karma.

He again bases this theory on the law of Karma which is believed to determine rewards and punishments in this life as well
as in the next. He brings this law into operation to interpret the universe, in fact, he interprets all the operations of nature as being the results of the good or bad deeds of the aggregate of souls performed in their various embodiments.

The Doctrine of transmigration has another attraction. It is claimed for it that it not only rehabilitates justice but also finally enthrones hope. It is held to imply the promise that the spirit must ultimately conquer matter, and all the evil that clings to it. The journey may be long or weary, the ebbs may seem as frequent as the tides, but some where, some time, the spirit will work itself free and escape its last tenement to greet its source in eternal union.

The Hindu sometimes contrasts this with the Christian teaching of eternal sin. To him this doctrine means the defeat of God. That God should crush out of His Universe those who are finally impenitent and incorrigible and then reign for ever supreme would be intelligible but not quite reasonable. A consideration like this, while it serves the Hindu in passing argument, is strongly emphasized by many in Europe and America, and also by some Zoroastrians who have been caught into the fold of Theosophy. But we ask, what is the value of salvation procured by such a process as transmigration. The Hindu says whatever the soul’s relation to God, the process works itself through at last inevitably and the individualized spirit is merged into the Universal Being. If this be so, there is nothing worth while left for a man to do. He is simply the victim of a great cosmic process, and the destined end will come, whatever he does or does not, and whether he desires or protests.

There are many more subtle distinctions, besides, drawn by the Hindu in order to support the so-called doctrine of transmigration, but they are mere intellectual feats of the Hindu mind. A critical examination of these feats is therefore impossible, as the space allowed is but limited.

We now come to that part of theology which deals with the divine nature of Godhood, as viewed by Hindu Pantheism, and Zoroastrianism. According to Hindu Pantheism, God is world and the world is God. Neither of them has personality. Matter is only a fiction of the mind. It comes into existence in the form of body, when only we think of it. All the evils pertaining to the material
body, such as sickness, death etc. are simply a feat of imagination. It again tells us that everything visible or invisible is mind which cannot be two. Since it is one, it cannot but be God. All other material things, such as stars, trees, rivers etc. have no separate existence, but they are only the ideas of the mind. They are like visions appearing in dreams and having, as a consequence, no actual existence. What is called sickness is only a belief, which is unreal. Man has to destroy this belief. If this belief is destroyed, all sickness is destroyed. If this idea is stretched forward death also is destroyed, for it is only the fiction of the mind, as death has no existence, so far as spirit is concerned. If this idea is accepted, the belief in the existence of matter is destroyed, and the individual consciousness is ignored. To put it more clearly, the idea of a personal God and the belief of actual sin have no force. They are meaningless expressions used simply to express the ignorance of man about the divine nature of Godhood, as understood by the Hindu Scriptures.

This teaching is quite contrary to that of Zoroastrianism as well as to reason and science. The Zoroastrian idea of Godhood is based upon Ashā, Righteousness and a conviction of a Personal God. Ahura Mazda is essentially personal. Zoroaster gave to the world what is called Divine Personality, which suggests a deep insight on his part, and which does not conflict with reason or science. Unlike Hindu Pantheism, Zoroastrianism does not think that all men are one man, that all animals are one animal and that all organisms are one organism. Still less does it believe them to be God. It is absurd to believe that one and the same substance should be both rational and irrational at one and the same time.

Schopenhaur rightly says: "To call God merely the sum of all things is to attribute to Him a material personality; for matter must form a constituent element of the deity, when regarded in such a light. It is impossible to think of one God existing under such an innumerably divided form and under divergent and contradictory conditions."

From Pantheism we proceed to Positivism or Agnosticism which denies the existence of God and bids us acknowledge ourselves incapable of comprehending the super-sensible. There is another system, known as materialism, which makes us believe in matter only, encouraging atheism or denial of God.
Prof. Huxley, who is the great advocate of Darwinism tries to solve the problem of the origin of the Universe by means of the theory of "Natural Selection or the Survival of the Fittest," but with no great measure of success, since his hypothesis is based not on observation or experiment but on mere speculation. Darwin himself says that though his views explain the Universe, still the more he thinks, the more he feels the hopeless immensity of his ignorance. A German Philosopher, Kant, thinks it impossible to explain the orderly processes in the living organism without postulating supernatural final causes and says, "It is quite certain that we cannot even satisfactorily understand, much less elucidate, the nature of an organism and its internal faculty on purely mechanical, natural principles,—it is so certain, indeed, that we may confidently say that it is absurd for a man ever to conceive the idea that some day a Newton will arise who can explain the origin of a single blade of grass by natural laws uncontrolled by design."

A careful reading of the Gathic passages shows in unmistakeable terms that the Divine Being reveals Himself to us through the Universe, and that a cause for it can be no other than the Infinite, only in a State of personality. He is the Cause of this grand Universe and the Creator of the sublime worlds, both spiritual and material, and also of comfort, peace and happiness.

Before we proceed to consider the questions of Immortality and Resurrection, we propose to add a Gathic view of man as a whole. Man, as the Gathas understand him, is the combination of the spiritual and the material essence. He is not the body which is simply the outer clothing. He is the soul which is the principle of life. This principle in man is not the same as that found in other animals. It is, therefore, clear that the human soul differs from the animal soul and that it likewise differs from the body in which it dwells during its existence in the material world. In the end, the body is mingled with the dust, but not with the soul. According to Zend-Avesta, though the body ceases to exist, the soul lives unhindered. The dead are not, therefore, dead in this sense, for death is the mere transference to a superior world. God mercifully permits man to quit this earth. "May the Gathas be to us the abundant givers of rewards for our righteousness in the next world, after the separation of our consciousness from our body. (Yasna LV. 2).

When the soul enters Heaven, Ahura Mazda rejoices saying, "Wel-
come! O man, thou hast just left the decaying world and entered into the undecaying one." (Vendidad, VII.50).

Zend-Avesta understands by natural death the separation of the soul from the material body which wears, crumbles and ultimately becomes dust. There is no resurrection of the body but of the soul, which is superior to all material things, and quite independent of the body. Death is simply entering upon that unchanging lot which man has worked out for himself here below. This world, therefore, is the waiting room where man prepares for his journey to another world.

Zoroastrianism asserts that there is a moral purpose of the relations between man and the unseen, the spiritual world. The knowledge that the unseen or spiritual world is moral, must bring strength and clearness to the moral life of any human being who comprehends the truth. The doctrine of immortality is clearly stated in the Gathas, which appears to have been borrowed by the Hebrews and imported into the Old Testament. Latest researches disclose this doctrine to have been subsequently borrowed by the New Testament also from the old one inspite of the pretentions of the modern Christians to the contrary.

The Old Testament, all along, maintains silence in regard to future existence. "In death there is no remembrance of Thee: in Sheol who shall give Thee thanks". Psalm. IV. 4. There is neither comfort nor moral significance in the thought of the Hebrew Sheol, which conveys no idea to the mind except that of being a place where the departed exist, but in which the personality of the soul has been feebly left quite untouched. The Hebrew did not associate either bliss or misery, but only the thought of bare existence in the unseen world. The early Jewish writings show that the Future Life, as conceived by Zoroastrian Scriptures, was not known, or at any rate overlooked.

Like many other essential doctrines and dogmas a belief in the immortality of the soul is explicitly stated in the following passages in the Gathas. "May I take or deliver my mind and soul to Heaven, knowing the holy blessings and rewards of the good actions prescribed by Ahura Mazda." (Yasna XXVIII. 4 or 5).

"Then truly on the Lie shall come destruction of light; but they that get them good name shall be partakers in the promised reward
in the fair abode of Good Thought of Mazada, and of Right" (Yasna XXX, 10).

"These things I ask thee, Ahura, how they shall come and issue—the requitals that in accord with the records are appointed for the righteous, and those, Mazda, that belong to the liars, how these shall be when they come to the reckoning." (Yasna XXXI. 14).

"Thereby ye defrauded mankind of happy life and of immortality, by the deed which he and the Bad spirit together with Bad Thought and Bad Word taught you, ye Daevas, and the Liars, so as to ruin (Mankind)." (Yasna XXXII. 5).

"This I ask thee, tell me truly, Ahura. He that will not give that reward to him that earns it, even to the man who fulfilling his word gives him (what he undertook)—what penalty shall come to him for the same at this present? I know that which shall come to him at the last." (Yasna XLIV. 19).

"Him thou shouldst seek to exalt with prayers of Piety, him that is called Mazda Ahura for ever, for that he hath promised through his own Right and Good though that Welfare and Immortality shall be in the Dominion, strength and perpetuity in his house." (Yasna XLV. 10).

The passages quoted above clearly show how the doctrine of a future life is insisted on, sustaining the hope of an eternal life in Zoroastrian hearts. They have a real power of solid comfort and support to man.

The Zoroastrian religion is not a theory but a practice in Righteousness. Every kind of work requires a motive to keep the worker steadfast, and the hope of Future Life, Immortality and Resurrection offers such a motive which certainly is a stimulus to moral purity and an incentive to holy work.

The future state is a state of equitable retribution, so that those who do good, will rise to glory, honour and peace, and those who do evil, will sink into shame and punishment. To believe in immortality is to believe in the everlasting growth of virtue and to choose it as the supreme good under this conviction. According to Zoroastrianism man must set his heart only on personal immortality in a future life. He is not content with merely living on
that tribute of respect which humanity might pay to his memory. It is a personal immortality that he longs for and claims.

To attempt to adduce any demonstrative proof of immortality is to attempt an impossibility. Even the best of philosophers and scientists confess their inability to do so. Herbert Spencer says, "on the one hand there is no evidence supporting the belief in immortality and on the other hand there is no evidence to warrant the denial of it." The views of the world-renowned poet, Tennyson, are well worth remembering, which strengthen the idea of immortality, as inculcated in the Gathas and other Scriptural writings of the Parsis:

"Dear friend, far off, my lost desire,  
So far, so near in woe and weal,  
O loved the most, when most I feel  
There is a lower and a higher,  
Known and unknown; human and divine;  
Sweet human hand and lips and eye;  
Dear heavenly friend that canst not die,  
Mine, mine, for ever, ever mine,  
Strange friend, past, present and to be;  
Loved deepler, darklier understood;  
Behold, I dream a dream of good,  
And mingle all the world with thee."

*In Memorium.*

Mathew Arnold addresses his father in death:—

"Oh strong soul by what force  
Tarriest thou now. For that force,  
Surely has not been left in vain!  
Somewhere surely, afar,  
In the sounding labour house vast,  
Of being, is practised that strength,  
Zealous, beneficent, firm."

Carlyle in "Sartor Resartus" says that the doctrine of a future life for man has been created by the combined force of instinctive desire, analogical observation, prescriptive authority and philosophical speculation. These are the four pillars on which the soul builds the temple of its hopes; or the four glasses through which it looks to see its eternal heritage." Even a scientist like Prof. Huxley
supports this doctrine when he observes, "He who fights on the side of moral truth in a world like our will unquestionably feels himself the stronger for the conviction that some time or another his whole being will enter into possession of perfect peace and happiness."

Thus the doctrine of Future Life has been supported not only by men of Science and Philosophy, but by men of experience and common sense. To deny immortality is, therefore, to turn sceptic and cast off all that is best and noblest in human nature. The immediate result of the denial of this doctrine in the face of such overwhelming testimony is casting off those restraints which are inculcated through the faith in the unseen, loosening the bond between faith and morals and coarsening social and spiritual ideals.

Zoroastrianism tells us that when the soul is free from the body, it continues to possess the primary attribute or power, viz. personality or conscious individuality which man naturally desires his soul to possess as a means of enjoyment in a life to come. It is quite clear that all other enjoyments depend upon retention of conscious individuality. Any condition with no personality is mere annihilation. According to Zend-Avesta, personality on which man's happiness or welfare depends will ever subsist in a future life.

After the dissolution of the body, the soul becomes active and powerful, and all the acts done by it in the material as well as spiritual world either in this or in the next life are to be weighed before judgment is given. If the acts are good or in other words, if the life lived is good, the end is good. If it is bad, the end is bitter in this world and bitterer still in the next world. The fruit of sin is reaped in this material as well as in the next spiritual world. Man's life, if bad, becomes eternally miserable by communion with Angra-Mainyu. For it is well said in Yasna XXXI11. 1, that "According as it is with laws that belong to the present life, so shall the Judge act with most just deed towards the man of the Lie and the man of Right, and him whose false things and good things balance". With this idea and with his implicit faith in Ahura Mazda and his Righteous Kingdom, a devout Zoroastrian lives his life in this world, where he is sure to get welfare and immortality which are the coveted possessions of man. "By his holy Spirit and by Best Thought, Deed and Word, in accordance with Right; Ahura Mazda with Dominion and Piety shall give us Welfare and Immortality." (Yasna, XLVII. 1).
I, therefore, conclude in the following sonnet in the name of the Great and Wise Lord, Ahura Mazda, and in the interest of the pious believers in immortality and spiritual resurrection of man under the righteous Government of God.—

"Hail! Gracious Ormuzd, author of all Good,
Spirit of beauty, purity, and light!
Teach me like thee to hate dark deeds of night,
And battle ever with the hellish brood
Of Ahriman, dread prince of evil mood,
Father of lies, uncleanness, envious spite,
Thefts, Murders, Sensual sins that shun the light,
Unreason, ugliness, and fancies lewd
Grant me, bright Ormuzd, in thy ranks to stand,
A valiant soldier faithful to the end;
So when, I leave this life's familiar strand,
Bound for the great unknown, shall I commend,
My soul, if Soul survive, into thy hand,
Fearless of fate if thou thine aid will lend."

Amen!
ARYAN ORIGINS
(H. Bruce Hannah, Esq.)

One often sees the problem mooted: Where did man originate? In Asia, Africa, or what other continent? Or was it in some archipelago? Also the question: Is man descended from one primal pair, or from a multiplicity of progenitors? These conundrums are very common in popular literature; but even so-called specialists from time to time dally with them. They seem to me to be particularly futile, especially as those who propound them are generally fettered in thought by what is called "Holy Writ", or some other literary or scientific "authority". One might just as reasonably speculate as to what and how grass originated. After all, what do we mean by "origins" in this connection? Existence—that relative phenomenal world in which we jīvātmās live and move and have our being—is dependent on another world. It is based on Subsistence. As such, though subject to inevitable periodical change, Existence is essentially everlasting, or cyclical, in the sense that it has no beginning, except an arbitrary one, placeable anywhere on the cycle, and termed zero. For Subsistence is eternal, i.e. it is simply the Absolute, and has no reference to conditions of any sort, such as time, space, causation, etc. It is what the Germans call the Ding an sich—that incomprehensible reality which substands every manifest phenomenon. Even universes have no beginning. They succeed each other everlastinglly, each, after its period of cosmical development, or manvantara, falling into pralaya, or abeyance, and its successor evolving gradually out of its disintegrating and dissolving elements—though when, or where, one universe ends and its successor begins, who can say? Time itself has no beginning; at least, with our present categories of thought, we are unable to conceive of any. Hence, in some state or other, the forms and functions associative with any particular world pre-existed in the nebular blastema out of which that world emanated, and even earlier. In short, so far as we can imagine, there never was a time when they did not exist. If, then, as we are told, man developed through countless ages of volition from the lowliest beginnings, what must have happened? As our world evolved out of its prede-
cessor, those beginnings must once have been distributed all over it. There is no reason, for instance, to suppose that, till terrestrial developments had begun, they found themselves collected together in isolation in some definite and more or less limited locality—say one of the particular land masses, or other formations, which eventually developed into Asia, Africa, America, Australia, or an archipelago. But we do not need to plunge so deeply into past time when considering the subject of man’s origins. It will suffice if we begin with the Permian Era—surely a remote enough epoch! Even then we shall have to think in continents, and in terms of geological time, i.e. very indefinitely, and very much at large; for, as regards those days, all we can hope to discover or conjecture is vague and uncertain in the extreme. Geology, then, tells us that, in times as remote as the Permian Era, there were only two main land-masses in existence—one extending transversely, though not continuously, right round the Earth, displaying, of course, different conformations in the different eras that stretched between the Permian and say the Pleistocene, and known as the Great Northern Zone; the other being a vast atoll-like formation, with a huge central ocean, which practically filled up the Southern Hemisphere, and has been named “Gondwānalānd” by eminent geologists. This was the Great Southern Zone. In the extreme south it was rooted in Antarctica; and in the north it effected a junction with the Great Northern Zone at one point only, i.e. in the vicinity of what are now known as Spain and the western basin of the Mediterranean sea. As regards the upper half of this enormous land-ring, in the north (centrally) lay what afterwards developed into Africa, including the lower two-thirds of later Arabia, and also later India; the western shoulder was represented by what grew into present-day South America; and the eastern shoulder took in what is now Australia. Later, a big tract to the east of “Africa” individuated into a long bean-shaped islo-continent that geologists named Lemuria (not the Lemuria of the theosophists), and later still the southern half of this dissolved, while the northern half remained, and out of it developed not only India but much that is now north of India. Strange to say, “India” eventually evolved as an integral part of the Great Northern Zone—its fauna, flora, and the biological forms and functions which ultimately became indigenous Indian humanity, thus
transferring their aeon-long associations with Gondwānaland from the South to the North. Between these two main land-masses, or Great Zones, was a mighty world of waters, to which specialists have given the name of Tēthys. East and West, Tēthys extended from Australasia and the Pacific (as we now say) to somewhere about Sicily. Farther west, in what is now the Atlantic area, but very much less in size than the present Atlantic, was a lake-like sea, with a narrow outlet at its south west end giving into the Pacific—so separating western Gondwānaland (South America) from that western portion of the Great Northern Zone which geologists have called Eria (North America, Greenland, etc.). After countless millions of years—apparently with the advent of the Jurassic Age—Gondwānaland began to break up. Its original atoll-like formation was succeeded by a number of weirdly-shaped isolated fragments, all of which gradually underwent further transformation. At the same time (we are speaking of indefinitely long periods), the released waters of the central Gondwānaland ocean surged up northwards, so augmenting Tēthys for a time. How long these conditions lasted, nobody of course can tell; but at last Tēthys and its associated waters—which had theretofore sepulchred all the temperate regions north of the equator—began to dry up and shrink, leaving only isolated patches of water like the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Caspian, the Sea of Aral, etc. In short, another land-zone stole into being—the Great Central Zone, midway between the Great Northern and the Great Southern Zones. Each of these three land-masses—the Great Northern, the Great Southern, and now the Great Central Zones—had its own special fauna and flora, all developed in course of evolution from the lowest beginnings. Also, each had its own special stock of those biological forms and functions—similarly evolved from the lowest beginnings—which eventually resulted in man; i.e. Yellow man (Xanthoderms) in the Great Northern Zone, Black man (Melanoderms) in the Great Southern Zone, and Dark-White man (Melanoleukoderms) in the Great Central Zone. Having regard to the lowly organic forms out of which scientists tell us that man developed, and to the innumerable changing types by which he was represented in the course of evolution; also having regard to the many and vast metamorphoses undergone by the land and sea areas of Earth, era after era, throughout countless millions of years; not only is
it unreasonable to expect that a record of every successive type can be discovered, but it is impossible to say when or where man, as man, first appeared on Earth. All we can do is—judging by the vestiges of undoubtedly human life which archaeologists have discovered—to say that in such and such a place, under such and such conditions, and apparently belonging to such and such an epoch, or era, man existed. Some interpret certain vestiges which have thus come to light as showing that man was on Earth, as man, as early as the Eocene. Others refuse to date his appearance earlier than the Miocene. But of this at least we are certain—that man was on Earth in the Pleistocene. Even then we cannot date him in years; because we do not know when the Pleistocene began; nor do we know how long it lasted. We do not really know, with certainty, how many years have elapsed since that era came to an end. Now, the Pleistocene was the era in which the Northern Hemisphere was subjected to glaciations—of which there seem to have been 4 or 5, with periods of warm, even tropical, weather in between; and, judging by the available evidence, it seems reasonable to conclude that man made his début on Earth in one of the interglacial periods—probably the last. Assuming this, and recognising that, so far as Europe and Asia are concerned, the ice-cap did not come down south farther than about the latitude of London, and, in an eastwardly direction, did not extend much beyond the 60th parallel of longitude, i.e., leaving much north of the Caspian, and most of what we now call Siberia (all, except a comparatively small area in the north, free from ice, it becomes necessary to notice that, in indefinitely remote archaean times, the Siberian area just referred to had existed as a heart-shaped continent to which geologists have given the name of Angara. Moreover, for countless millions of years, it had practically been isolated from the western portion of the Great Northern Zone by an arm of the Arctic Sea, which, stretching between the 40th and 80th parallels of longitude, E., extended southwards as far as the Caspian Sea, which, indeed, is believed to be nothing more or less than a surviving remnant of it. Now, in unimaginably early days, at the junction point near Spain, there had doubtless been a good deal of overlapping, not only of the lower fauna and flora of the Great Northern Zone and those of the Great Southern Zone, but also of those biological forms and functions which eventually deve-
loped into man in each of these Zones—all, of course, modified by the developments which subsequently stole into being with the later-formed Great Central Zone—so that it is at least difficult, if not impossible, to say through what intermediate ancestry the fauna and flora of the North, and those biological forms and functions which there eventuated in man, had evolved. That is to say, they may all have developed in volution everywhere throughout the Great Northern Zone. But it is clear that, at one period, and throughout an immense stretch of time, developments in Angara must have proceeded in isolation, quite independently of those that had been going on elsewhere in the Great Northern Zone. Hence, it is not unreasonable to assume, as regards the comparatively later developments of those biological forms and functions which eventuated in man—that their special area of characterization was Angara, and that it was there that Yellow man (the Xanthoderms) came into existence, and underwent his earlier developments as man. The stage, therefore, at which our argument has at present arrived is this.

In Pleistocene times there were 3 main land-masses or Zones, and 3 main stocks of humanity, corresponding to them, i.e.—

1. The Great Northern Zone, area of characterization (specially in Angara) of Yellow man, the Xanthoderms;

2. The Great Central Zone, area of characterization of Dark-White (not yet Blond, much less Rosy-Blond) man, the Melanoleukoderms;

3. The Great Southern Zone, area of characterization of Black man, the Melanoderms.

It must have been from these 3 great fountain-heads that the leading so-called historical "races" of 'Old World' man originated. How did it happen?

Professor J. L. Myres shows how, with the advent of the glaciations, communications between the different inhabited areas must have been so affected that, while it was difficult for the denizens of Central Asia (say my Dark-Whites) to intrude into Mongolia (say Angara), it was comparatively easy for the denizens
of Angara to get out of their country and wander southwards or westwards. My suggestion is that this was done (when, it is impossible to say); and that, eventually, the Yellows of Angara found themselves in that vast stretch of wilderness-country which extends vaguely from Zagros in the west to say Lob Nor in the east. Ensued a mighty amalgamation of stocks—probably Yellow fathers and Dark-White mothers. The outcome was what used to be called the "Wolf-Race". The Dark-Whites were infinitely less ancient than the Yellows, and were probably at a very rudimentary stage of civilization. The progeny were a mixed breed, and took after their primitive mothers. Later on, the country was named after its denizens. The Babylonians called it "Nūm-Mā"; the Hittites called it "Si-Nim". Both names meant "Wolf-Lands". But how did the Hittites originate? I submit thus. South of what at one time was known as Mitanni, and also south of the region eventually called Assyria, between the Euphrates and the Tigris, there was a country styled Aram. Possibly this name was really A-i-rām, meaning, like Elām, or E-i-lam, "Uplands". Both seem to have been akin to Airyān, or Airyām (Irān, or Irām, or Erām). The inhabitants of Arām were Dark-Whites—a division, locally representative, of the Dark-White aborigines of the Great Central Zone. The ancient Egyptians, or Romū, had a name for all these Dark-Whites in that particular longitude. They called them Aamu, i.e. "Moonworshippers". Modern writers, obsessed with the conventional ideas of orthodox learning, insist on calling them Semites—though only the denizens of Western Arabia were genuine Semites, i.e., descendants of Shem or Khem—two forms of one word, dating from the days when there was no Red Sea, and N. E. Khem and W. Arabia were one undivided block of land. Be this as it may, near these Dark-Whites, or Aamu, of ancient Arām were the Kassi—a branch of the Wolf-Race, settled, or rather dwelling, in Kashashū, just north of Elām. I assume that, either as aggressive conquerors, or by way of what is called "peaceful penetration", waves of Kassi found their way into early Arām and stayed there. Followed a widespread amalgamation—the outcome being the birth of the Hittite race (Khatti in Babylonian, Kheta in Romic). But how did the so-called Aryan Race originate? According to Max Müller and all who follow him, there is not, and never has been, any such race—only a number of peoples whose
sole common characteristic is that, formally and functionally, the languages that they speak are akin to each other. But Huxley says that there certainly was a race (Rosy-Blonds, I think) who, more than any others, were associated with the speaking of the languages that we now agree to call the Aryan languages. I believe in Huxley rather than in Max Müller. My views on the subject are something like this. When the last glaciation of the Pleistocene came on, there was a great migratory drift from Palaeolithic Europe. In those days there was no Aegean Sea, possibly no Adriatic. What we now know as the mainland of Asia Minor extended westwards, at least as far as the western shores of Greece, while southwards it included Crete—perchance also Cyprus. At any rate, for the refugees from Europe, threatened by the advancing ice-sheet, there were two principal lines of retreat. One was into the unglaciated tracts north of the Caspian; and the other was into the territories at the eastern end of Mediterranean. Doubtless the refugees availed themselves of both means of escape. Orthodoxy, however, teaches that those who trekked to the regions north of the Caspian were the original Aryan stock; and that, later on, they separated—some finding their way into the far East, as the Indo-Aryans of Vedic times; some moving into the regions east of Zagros, and developing into the Iranians, of whom there were two branches, the Medes and the Persians; others becoming the Slavs, yet others the Hellenes, and so on. All this, I submit, is baseless. It may be that the division who went to the regions north of the Caspian, were Rosy-Blonds—though how they became so is a mystery. But, if so, they probably developed into the Airyānians of Airyavo-Vaējo—a country doubtless inhabited at that time by the Dahyūs, or "hill-men", and, though of Wolf Race origin, so-called because that country was a highland country. Their successors, the Rosy-Blonds, took on the name from them, but in the form of "Airyānians". The expelled Wolf-Race, though dwelling thenceforth in the surrounding wilderness-country, which does not seem to have been hilly, retained their name of "hillmen", but in the form of "Dahyūs". Really, therefore, it was unsuitable for them, but it survived to testify to their past, as showing that at one time they had been the inhabitants of uplands like Airyān. This may have happened about B.C. 4000, and perhaps accounts for the first Dasyūan burst into India. Across the Indus, i.e. amongst the later Hindūs, the
equivalent of Dahyûs was Dasyûs. In fact, the Dasyûs of remotely archaic N.W. India were merely the representatives, east of the Indus, of the diffused Dahyûs, originally the Wolf-Race of Nûm-Mâ, or Si-Nim, later (as regards a portion of them) the inhabitants of Airyân, and later still the Dahyûs of wilderness Airyo-Tûrân; and their off-shoots, the Tokhâri, etc. When they first spread east of the Indus, who can tell? Possibly about B.C. 4000. Possibly they poured into India at that time, threw off the so-called Brahûi communities, as also the ethnoi later known as the Dasyûs of Sapta-Sindhavâh, and, streaming down the western coastlands, ultimately arrived amongst, and amalgamated with, the Black (Melanodermic) aborigines of Southern India. I call them aborigines of Southern India, but really they were aborigines of that northern portion of islo-continental Lemuria out of which all India had evolved. Indeed, there is reason to believe that the present word Tamilakam, meaning “Homeland or Abode of the Tamils”, is nothing but a corruption of the original Greek (Ptolemaic) word Lemuria. Later on, when the so-called Indo-Aryâs of Northern India pushed their way into Southern India, and various ethnic and philological developments resulted, the name Drâvidians arose—it being a Sanskrit word, meaning “Southern”, and so practically connoting Indo-Aryâs who had become domiciled in Southern India amongst the Tamils or Lemurians. It is known that, between these peoples of Southern India and the inhabitants of Mesopotamia, a certain amount of commercial and perhaps other intercourse sprang up, as also between them and the later Westerns of Roman times; but it would not appear that this contributed to their origins, or affected them to any appreciable extent ethnically. As regards the so-called Indo-Aryâs of Northern India, my views are roughly these. From Romic, i.e. ancient “Egyptian”, records we learn that, about B.C. 1156, in the 8th regnal year of Pharaoh Râmèses III, a vast body of banded ethnoi, headed by the Pûra-setiû or Pula-setiu (i.e. Philistines), who had emerged from Keft, or Kilikia, in Asia Minor, poured into Northern Syria, with the supposed object of invading Khem. Râmèsès III met and defeated them by sea and land. Those of them who escaped destruction appear to have fled eastwards. To the west was the sea; and here the Romic fleet awaited them. Northwards, by the way they had come, retreat had probably been cut off. While, to the south, lay the Romic forces. Possibly, therefore, an
eastwardly flight was their only avenue of escape. Besides the Pūra-setīu, the fugitives seem to have comprised Yadai Amorites (a tall reddish-blond folk); broken Hittites, doubtless of the type depicted on the monuments; and "People of the Pillar" from On, or An—possibly Phallus-worshippers, but more probably devotees of the Solar cult. Now, curiously enough, early Indian records speak of the arrival in Sapta-Sindhavāh (which originally probably included Hapta-Hendū) of certain banded ethnoi from Western Asia, frequently styled the Pāncha-Janāḥ, or "Five Communities", and actually referred to in the Rig-Veda under the eventual names of Pūrūs, Yā- dūs, Tūrvaśas, Anūs, and Drūhyūs. The Pūrūs, I suggest, were simply the Pūra-setīu (People of Pūrū, or Pūra); the Yādūs were the Yadai Amorites; the Tūrvaśas (a name that means "Clothed like the Tūr") were the Hittites, a folk who must have been particularly liés with the Yadai Amorites, so supporting the tradition that the Yādūs and the Tūrvaśas were intimately associated with each other; while the Anūs were, of course, the "People of the Pillar" from On. As for the Drūhyūs, my suggestion is that they were a druj-folk picked up by the other communities en route, somewhere say in Gandhāra-land, and admitted to their union. Crossing the Indus, they found themselves amidst, and settled amongst, the Dasyūs of Sapta-Sindhavāh—a powerful folk dwelling in puras, or townships, and not uncivilized from a purely worldly, i.e. material and intellectual, point of view, nevertheless innately barbarians, i.e. evil at heart, and incorrigibly deceitful, tricky, and tortuous-minded. Besides these Dasyūs, there were also several varieties of aboriginal communities, or Niṣādas, both black and yellow. The Dasyūs, as descended from a remote ancestry, partly Yellow, and partly Dark-White, were Dark-Whites of a peculiar parchmenty kind of complexion—probably very similar to the complexion of the early Alpines of Neolithic Central Europe and Anato- lia. The Dasyūs were very envious, very ambitious, and very un- scrupulous. At first they tried to ingratiate themselves with the Pāncha-Janāḥ—paying special court to the strongest of them, the Pūrūs. Next they tried for equality, and actually succeeded in effecting matrimonial alliances with the Pūrūs. Then they aimed at superiority, and finally, picking a quarrel with the Pāncha-Janāḥ, with a view to capturing the hegemony, declared open war against them. They never succeeded in defeating the Pāncha-Janāḥ, but,
having combined with the Niśādas, they eventually forced the Pāncha-Janāḥ to abandon Sapta-Sindhavāḥ. The Pāncha-Janāḥ retreated eastwards, being pursued by the Bhāratās (originally a name applied to the Dasyūs and Dasyu-led Niśāda confederacy, but, in later times, to Panchālas (i.e. Pāncha-Janāḥ) as well. It seems to mean "Warriors." In this retreat the Pāncha-Janāḥ got as far as Prayāg (Allāhabād) on the Jumna. There, as it were behind their Marne defences, they dug themselves in. The Dasyūs and their Niśādan allies did likewise on the western banks of the same river. Thus there were two great encampments, facing each other. Eventually this purely military position became known traditionally as "Kūrū-Pānchāla." In "Pānchāla," of course, it is easy to detect a metamorphosis of the original name "Pāncha-Janāḥ," effected with the object of confusing actual history. But how did "Kuru" arise? In Central Asia the Dahyūs had for countless ages been a race of petty chiefs (khāns, meleks, and so forth), and the native name for this was kūrū kūrū-khū, or some such word. Now, in their great attempt to crush the Pāncha-Janāḥ by force, the Dasyūs had grievously failed. This they recognized on the Jumna; and there and then they decided to abandon force and try some other method. They now determined to be religionists, philosophers, and culturists—to found, if possible, a brand-new ethnos, a brand-new language, a brand-new religion, and brand-new civilization, over all of which, of course, they, the Dasyus, were to be the presiding geniuses. This scheme, however, required that their identity as the Dasyūs of old should be obliterated and forgotten—all trace of it destroyed. To this end, the first step taken was to adopt a new name; and the name they adopted was "Kūru"; for, though it was intimately connected with their Dahyū origin, it was so sufficiently unknown to their victims (the Pāncha-Janāḥ), and the outside world, as to serve admirably as a means of disguising themselves as a community, and of pretending to be something different from what they really were. In fact, nearly everything they did was calculated to cover up all traces of their Dahyū origin. Indeed, in that wonderful recension of jumbled tradition, legend, philosophy, and ritual, which they eventually issued under the name of the Vedas, they actually went the length of vilifying the Dasyūs of Sapta-Sindhavāḥ as barbarians and non-Aryan mlechchas.
— the argument, of course, being: How could they themselves be these very Dasyūs, when they spoke of them thus? Well, though Force had failed, the alternative succeeded. An exoteric form of the esoteric mysteries of which the royalties and military classes amongst the Pāncha-Janāḥ had been the custodians, was extracted from the latter; Brāhmaṇism and Caste were inaugurated and fastened upon the land; they themselves, the Kūrūs, became the Brāhmans; the traditions and records of the country were taken in hand, and, if not altogether destroyed, were jumbled up and rendered absolutely grotesque and useless for all practical purposes; when this had been done, a new recension of legends, philosophical and religious ideas, songs and so forth, was banao'd; the language of their cultured Rosy-Blond neighbours, the Airyānians of Airyavo-Væjo, was seized upon, polished up, and (certainly with great ability) metamorphosed into a brand-new language called Sanskrit; the traditions and legends of the Airyānians—nay, their very name—were appropriated; everything was so managed that, in course of time (for time itself helped to establish the colossal scheme), the Panchālas themselves, nay, the whole world, accepted the proposition that Kūrūs (i.e. Dasyūs) and Panchālas (i.e. the Pāncha-Janāḥ) were practically all one race—even most of the Niṣādas being eventually admitted to the fold; in short, the Indo-Aryan ethnos and Indo-Aryan culture were successfully inaugurated, and presented to an admiring and awe-struck world, with all the prestige that naturally attached to the name, the traditions, the language, the manners and customs of the age-old Rosy-Blonds of Airyavo-Væjo. One thing is certain. Whatever may be the motives and intentions, and attitude generally, towards the view regarding Indo-Aryanism that is conventionally in vogue in India, and amongst Indianists at large, the mentality and outlook of what is now becoming daily better known as the real India—as distinguished from the Dreamland-India of politically-minded and other visionaries, has no affinities or solid and permanent sympathies with a culture and institutions and a policy that are essentially Dasyūan. Indians at large are not represented by the Dasyūs, any more than they are descended from them. As for the Babylonians and their neighbours, whom conventional experts persist in styling Semites, the truth appears to be this. Originally all that part of the world—say about parallels of longitude 35-40 E., usually
referred to as Western Asia, but extensible southwards into eastern Africa and Arabia—was inhabited by the 3 main race-stocks of humanity alluded to supra. In the extreme north were representatives of the Yellows; in the centre regions and as far south as parts of eastern Africa and western Arabia, were representatives of the Aamū, or Dark-White aborigines of the Great Central Zone; and in the far south were representatives of the Blacks, or Melanoderms. This was the position up to say B.C. 9000. These dates are not given as being accurate, but merely for narrative purposes, as some epoch has to be mentioned. Well, about B.C. 9000, mighty changes took place in those territories at the eastern end of the Mediterranean into which, as alluded to supra, many of the refugees from Palaeolithic Europe had crowded during the last glaciation of the Pleistocene. Perhaps they had also crowded into the Nile-Valley region and the Euphrates-Tigris region. Nobody really knows. Since those days—perhaps in all three regions—certainly in the territories at the eastern end of the Mediterranean—they had dwelt throughout what have long been called Neolithic times, building up a civilization many vestiges of which are actually being recovered to-day. They must have been a very mixed multitude; for though many of them were of the same type as those who possibly went to the regions north of the Caspian and were therefore probably Rosy-Blonds (if so be it was in late Pleistocene times in glaciated Europe that Blond and Rosy-Blond man originated), many were also local denizens—more or less brunet representatives of those Dark-Whites, who from extreme west to extreme east, right along the line of the northern Temperate Zone, were aborigines of the Great Central Zone. Whatever they were in this respect, in B.C. 9000 they had to abandon their Mediterranean homeland, for it was breaking up. Hence the eventual name Aigaia, meaning "Remnant of the land"—Where did they go to? They migrated east, settling first amongst the Yellows in northern Mesopotamia. Followed, of course, a mighty amalgamation. Outcome the semi-Yellow semi-Rosy-Blond race known to ancient times as the far-flung Mandwā. With the migrants, of course, had gone their Mediterranean culture, their religion, their philosophy, their traditions and legends, their manners and customs. Naturally, as half breeds, the Mandwā were not a very highly developed race. But, as time went on, they improved; and eventually, as their flower
and fruit, they evolved into the ethnos known as the Mitannians. Later on, some of them proceeded farther east, and became the Airyānians of Airyavo-Vaējo.

Now just as, in the further east, the custodians and distributors of culture were these Airyānians, so, in Western Asia, the custodians and distributors of culture were the Mitannians. It was to them that, somewhere in the 5th millennium B.C., the "black-headed" Dark-Whites of early Agadé, or Akkad (a name that meant the same as Arām and Elām, i.e. "Uplands"), appealed for protection and assistance in the days of early Kassite aggression. The appeal took the form of a prayer that the Mitannians would assume possession of Akkad and administer its affairs. The Mitannians responded. There seem to have been two attempts at reform. The first was a failure; but the second succeeded. Mitannians poured into the country; there ensued a big amalgamation; and the result was the birth of the "Babylonian" ethnos—a clearly a blend of semi-Yellows and semi Rosy-Blonds with the aboriginal Dark-White Aamū of early Akkad. Thenceforward Mitanni developed imperially. Babylonians, Hittites, Amorites, doubtless the barbarians of Kassshū—even the much later Assyrians—all appear to have been her vassals. She was for ages the Suzerain Power in Western Asia. Probably the so-called Hyksōs—those mysterious folk who were for centuries Lords of Khem—were really the Imperial Mitannians. One of their mightiest rulers is said to have been Khian. That name, I submit, ought really to be Sep-Yān—not Khian at all. No wonder the Jews (identical with the old Amorites of Yadai, who again were vassals of the Mitannians), mixing up the Hyksōs with their actual progenitors, represented the latter as transcendently royal, indeed a scared, race! South of Akkad was Sūmer—a name that signified Lowlands, just as Akkad signified Uplands. In Sūmer the populace was different from, and rather more mixed than, that in Akkad. True, part of that populace was Aamū (Dark-White aborigines of the Great Central Zone). Not Semitic at all, in spite of all that conventional learning has to say! But, besides these Dark-White autochthons, there was also a community of Yellows. As a race-stock, the Yellows were immeasurably more ancient than the Dark-Whites of the Great Central Zone. Hence, the civilization of the former was probably more highly developed than that of the latter. But whether the particular re-
resentatives of the Yellows then in Sūmer had been settled there before the appearance of the Dark-Whites (who, after all, were aborigines of the land), must be left as an open question. Our data on the subject are not enough to enable us to arrive at any definite opinion. One of the cities of Sūmer was Ur—the domicile of origin of so-called Abraham. I do not believe that any such individual ever existed. Out of Ur, at some time in the remote past it is said, went forth a small community belonging to the general Dark-White, or Aamū, denizens of the country. This I am willing to accept. First they trekked north, and arriving in Mitanni, settled there for some time—in fact, made of it a new domicile of origin—apparently being more ambitious of being associated with a partially Rosy-Blond ancestry than with a Dark-White ancestry. As a matter of fact, by reason of many inter-marriages with their fair neighbours, their type became so modified as to be practically Mitannian. In the bible they are called "Syrian." Still, they appear to have retained their race-name as Aamū. Eventually journeying south, with intent to enter Canaan, they had to cross the Euphrates. Thus they acquired their name of 'Ibr-Aamū, or 'Abr-Aamū. This Ezra (or whoever or whatever that name stands for) transmuted into the name Abram—thus personifying the community. Yet another great people whose origins have been persistently misrepresented are the Assyrians. They also are continually being called Semites. Indeed, one writer actually states that they were a branch of the Babylonians, but were even more Semitic than the Babylonians. This is quite wrong. They were not Semites at all. The nucleus of the stock—before they had anything to do with Assur—was of Wolf-race origin. Hence the name Nimrod, which means Wolf-race, and obviously points to Nūm-Mā, or Si-Nīm. When Mitanni collapsed, many of its people were incorporated into the Nimrodic State, but the bulk seem to have migrated, either voluntarily or as deportees, across the Zagros. There, in the territories lying east of that range, they settled, and developed into the Medes. This was the real origin of the Medes. They were in no sense Airyanians. Several centuries after Khem had lost her northern empire in the reign of Akh-en-aten, and the Hittites had succeeded in destroying Mitanni—corresponding, apparently with a period of Babylonian weakness following upon the exploits of Tiglath-Pileser I, and also with more
than 100 years of a pralūya that seems to have overtaken the Nimrodic State—the Aramaeans of the middle Euphrates, whose capital was the city of Asshur, burst into political consciousness, and even established a State in Syria, having its capital at Damascus, and became very powerful. Specialists invariably call them Semites, and speak of them as a wave of aggression that had swept up northwards from Arabian regions. They were not aggressive intruders of this kind at all, and most assuredly they were not Semites. As already explained, they were local representatives of the great Aamū, or Dark-White, stock—aborigines since times immemorial of the Great Central Zone. Eventually, late in the 8th century B. C., Damascus was taken by Tiglath-Pileser IV—a monarch with whom the ambitions and activities of the Nimrodic State revived—its inhabitants were deported to the valley of the Tort, in the northern hills (called Kir in the Bible), and, in course of time, Arām was annexed by the Nimrodic State, which also incorporated the Aramaeans into its ethnos. It is really only from then onwards that the Nimrodic State became known as Assyria—probably from the old Aramaean capital of Asshur. Also seeing that specialists look upon the Aramaeans as Semites, it was really only from then that Assyria became what is conventionally called a Semitic country. The Persians, again—invariably represented by conventional writers as Airyanians by origin, and ethnically akin to the Medes—were neither the one nor the other. The country known as Persia was practically identical with old Elām. North of Elām were the Kassi of Kashshū, and in Elām itself, particularly in a region of it known as Anshan, or Anzan, was a rough race of hillmen, said by Herodotus to have been Kephēnians, i.e. of a race akin to the people of Kashshū. Elsewhere, apparently in the lowlands, there was quite a different kind of community. These were Aamū, or Dark-Whites, i.e. a division of the aborigines of the Great Central Zone; but whether they were pure Aamu, or some kind of modification of that stock, I do not know. Be this as it may, when Asshurbani-pāl desolated Elām about B.C. 647, these Dark-White lowlanders abandoned their homes, and settled for a time at Yezd, where they became famous as Fire-worshippers. To-day they are known as the Parsis, and are settled principally in Bombay. According to Herodotus the Kephēnian portion of the population were simply nature-worshippers. But later on, when Frāvartish of Media raided
Elām—his barbaric cupidity being apparently attracted by the helpless state of the country—he is said to have brought with him a body of barbarians, akin to the Kass of the northern Zagros, and settled them in the land. These were the Barswā, or Parswā—and it is from them that the region so-called got its later name of Persia, and the people their name of Persians. Another name by which they were commonly known in antiquity is Dahae (Latin) and Daai (Greek)—obviously Roman and Hellenic approximations to the old Airyānian Dahyū. They remained in Persia till the days of the Sacæ, Skūthai, and Sogdians (i.e. Sākhs and Descendants of the Sākhs or Sāghs). But when, c. the first century B.C., or earlier, the Sogdians abandoned Central Asia, and plunged off westwards, ultimately arriving amongst, and uniting with, the Skolotoi, or Skūthai, of European Skūthia, and, together with them, becoming known as the Āsen, “People of Ashā”—a name by which they had been famous in Central Asia (Āshāvā-Danghavō)—the Dahae of Persia followed hard after them, taking with them a form of fūthork, and doubtless other kinds of culture, which they had acquired mimetically from the Sāghs.

In conclusion, we may probably take it that the early Alpines of Central Europe and their congeners of Asia Minor, or Anatolia (Professor G. Elliot Smith’s “Armenoids”), were simply intruded Kassites from c. B.C. 14th century Western Asia—more especially, perhaps, round about Kardūnyan Babylonia—their advent (which was probably spread over a considerable time) being conterminous with the real beginnings of the Neolithic Age in Europe. In short, the metal-civilization that they brought with them appears to have been the civilization of that much misrepresented period—especially its latter years.

The fair Slāvs (Sarmatians) were simply migrated Northern Medes (Sār-Mādā); the darker Slāvs were Alpines, or had Alpine affinities. The Medes, like the Persians, always posed as Airyānians. That is how they came by their name of Slāvs, which means “Sons of Glory.” The real “Sons of Glory”, or Dēvātās, i.e. Slāvs, were, of course, these Airyānians of old Airyavō-Vaējo. The ethnoi we now call “Slāvs” are really not Slāvs at all.

From all which it would appear that a very great deal of what passes conventionally for Knowledge is extremely shaky, and will doubtless sooner or later find itself scrapped and consigned to oblivion.
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE HINDUS

(DR. R. SHAMASATRY B.A., PH.D.)

It is an evolutionary maxim of universal acceptance that adaptability to ever-changing environment ensures survival. Its validity is tested and found acceptable not merely in social and religious spheres, but also in the body politic. Neither social and religious institutions nor political, can survive a moment longer than they fail to adopt themselves to changes in the environments. In the body politic various forms of government were tried and found wanting. So long as the principles on which the forms of Government, despotic, republican or representative were based were acceptable to the people constituting the Government, they could endure. But the moment a doubt about the validity of the principles were to arise in the mind of the people due to some perceptible changes in the social, religious or economical spheres, a change in the form of Government would be unavoidable. Forms of Government have not like planetary systems their own fixed laws to govern their movements. They are human institutions ever liable to be affected by changes in the volitions, and cultural sentiments of the people.

The characteristics of humanity do not change with race or colour. Conditions being the same, the forms of institutions, whether social, religious or political will be alike among all races and nationalities. It is not true to say that though conditions are the same the institutions evolved among the Asiatics will be different from those among the Europeans. Nor is it true to say that such physiological, physical and psychological conditions as were once productive of certain political institutions in the east would remain the same for ever and that in the east neither conditions nor institutions would change. Strange to say that it is these hasty generalisations to which a number of European scholars were led from their superficial study of the East. Accordingly the remarks made by Hegal regarding the form of Government in ancient India are entirely unfounded and opposed to human nature which is everywhere the same. In his Philosophy of History (Page 161) he says,
"While we found a moral despotism in China, whatever may be called a relic of political life in India is a despotism without a principle, without any rule of morality and religion: for morality and religion (as far as the latter has a reference to human action) have as their indispensable condition and basis the freedom of the will. In India therefore the most arbitrary, wicked, degrading despotism has its full swing. The Chinese possess a most minute history of their country and the contrary is the case in India."

Nothing can be more absurd than to speak of the existence of a despotic institution without a principle, without any rule of morality and religion. Can a people live and find satisfaction under an institution based upon no principle and opposed to rule of morality and religion, i.e., freedom of the will, as Hegel puts it? Hegel is a writer of philosophical paradoxes, such as being and non-being, positive and negative, whole and part, all combining themselves in what he calls the Absolute. However confused might be his notion of the Absolute, the one thing he was fond of, as a European, is freedom of the will. In the theological writings such as the Code of Manu, the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa which he superficially studied, he could find no life-like picture of a people. The Code of Manu is merely a collection of customs partly practical and partly ideal. It is not a record of the actual life lived by a people under any form of Government in India. Nor can the Indian Epics be expected to throw vivid light on the form of Indian polity. That the Indians were moral and religious and had the freedom of the will necessary to find and propagate rational system of religion and philosophy without risking their lives like the Puritans and Protestants in Europe, is a historical fact admitted by all.

Whether the ancient Indian people were happy with freedom of will to work their own salvation under the so-called despotic form of Indian Governments is a question which can rather be answered in the light of historical facts than by a later historian basing his judgment on the study of some sectarian and mythological literary works.

The discovery of the Arthasastra of Kautilya, a treatise on the Indian art of Government, has dispelled the assumption that the art of Government is foreign to the Indian mind. No Society can
possibly exist without some form of Government to regulate its general will. It is the boast of a Vedic priest that while the people of the Bharata-land had their human king, the Brâhmans had their King in Soma, the moon. It implies that the Brâhmans could regulate the conduct of their community by the decisions of their Parîsads or learned assemblies. During the Buddhistic period the Brâhmans also had to come under the protection of a human king and had to pay taxes to the king for their protection. In the Arthasastra we find village communities endowed with the right to regulate their village affairs in harmony with a central despotic form of government under the guidance of a mantri-parisad or assembly of ministers. One of the principal functions peculiar to the government according to Kautilya is a fair distribution of wealth among the people. To attain this object there were two ways: one religious and the other political. The religious or spiritual means of bringing about a fair distribution of wealth among the people needed a high degree of religious or philosophical culture which, though open to all, was a nature's gift of a few. The example set by the few had an enormous influence not merely over the body politic, but also on economical sphere. This is what I venture to call the Hindu political philosophy, the subject of the present paper.

Before proceeding to deal with the subject, I find it necessary to say a word or two on the purely political means employed for a fair distribution of wealth. No form of government, whether republican or representative in the widest sense of the word, can be stable unless wealth and the means of acquiring wealth are fairly, if not equally, distributed. This is one of the most difficult problems which defies a satisfactory solution. The rise and fall of states and empires are mainly due to economic causes. The invasion of a state or nation by another state or nation is more often due to poverty of the invading horde. Internal rebellions in a state are also mainly caused by impoverishment of the majority against the aggrandisement of the few. To remedy this evil Kautilya makes a number of suggestions, one of them being that one-fourth of the revenue of the state should be reserved year after year to tide over the calamities of the people. A second suggestion is enhancement of taxes and levy of new taxes on the rich. A third is the confiscation of the rich of their unnecessary accumulation. A fourth is calling
for subscriptions from the rich to replenish the treasury by conferring honours on them in return. These and other expedients suggested by Kauṭilya and also practised in ancient times all over the world prove no doubt suicidal political measures in modern states and empires. Nor were ancient politicians less alive to the danger of adopting such measures to restore economic equilibrium. Hence we find ancient law-givers and politicians frequently commending spirituality and condemning materialism. It is more to cure the world of its economic evils than to secure undisturbed pleasure in the other world that Brāhmans, Jainas and Buddhists condemned materialism in one voice. That their voice was not a cry in the wilderness is clearly proved by the inscriptions of Asoka. That Asoka lived for his people and that under the influence of Brāhmans, Sramaṇas, and Buddhist ascetics he spent the whole revenue of his vast empire for the good of his people, is well known to readers of the history of Asoka and his inscriptions.

There is no doubt that the philosophic ideas expounded in the Lokāyata, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, and the Upanishads were made use of for political and economical ends. This is clear from the Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya:

"Ānvikshaki comprises" says Kauṭilya, "the philosophy of Sāṃkhya, Yoga, and Lokāyata. Righteous and unrighteous acts are learnt from the triple Vedas; wealth and non-wealth from Vārtā; the expedient and the inexpedient as well as potency and impotency from the science of government. When seen in the light of these sciences, the science of Ānvikshaki is most beneficial to the world, keeps the mind steady and firm in weal and woe alike and bestows excellence of foresight, speech, and action. Light to all kinds of knowledge, easy means to accomplish all kinds of acts and receptacle of all kinds of virtues, is the science of Ānvikshaki ever held to be."

A copper plate grant attributed to the Gangā King Mādhava I* says that he (Mādhava) was an expert among the exponents of the theory and practice of the science of polity combined with the Upanishads (Sopanishatkasya niti-sastraya vaktri prayoktrikusalah.")

*This grant will be published in the Mysore Archaeological Report for 1924-25.
The Lokâyata system is neither a theistic religion nor a philosophy of the type of Sâṅkhya, the main object of which is a description of the means to attain salvation or freedom from rebirth. The inclusion of the Lokâyata view of the world along with Sâṅkhya and Yoga in the curricula of studies necessary for the attainment of a comprehensive knowledge of the political science both in its theoretical and practical aspects is itself an indication that the study of Sâṅkhya and Yoga is meant not so much for the attainment of an unmixed pleasure in a dreamy world as for bringing about an equilibrium in the play of warring passions in the human breast in this very word. This idea is still more clearly signified by the statement made in the copper plate grant referred to above that the Gangâ King Mâdhava was an expert among the teachers of the theory and practice of the principles of Political Science along with those expounded in the Upanishads. According to Kauṭilya Ānvikshaki is a safe guide of moral activity and source of the knowledge of virtues. An attempt is made here to ascertain the particular principles which in the hands of politicians like Kauṭilya proved a safe guide of political activity.

Little or nothing is known of the Lokâyata system of philosophy. Its teaching is attributed to Brhaspati of whom nothing is known. Whether he was the head of the school which is frequently referred to by Kauṭilya by the word, Bârhaspatyas or some one else, cannot be ascertained. A few passages embodying the views of Brhaspati quoted mainly for reputation are found in the literary works of almost all the systems of Indian philosophy. A brief account of the system under the name of Chârvakadarsana is also given in the Sarvadarsana Sangraha. The one important view of the Chârvakas bearing on political ethics is stated as follows:—

Paropakârah puñyâya pâpaya pârapidanam.

Doing good to others is for merit and doing injury to others is for sin. In other words other-regarding activities are preferable to selfish proceedings. Another maxim of life attributed to Brhaspati is that it is worse than stupidity to reject the ready objective pleasure of this world with the hope of attaining subjective pleasure called Mukti after death.

From these two principles it may be inferred that the ultimate value of life is according to the teaching of the Lokâyata system an
economical and domestic well-being consistent with altruism in a society under the protection of a king, the real god on earth.

With a view to make clear the bearing of Sānkhya, Yoga, and Upanishads on politics, it is necessary to understand the end of life as expounded in those works.

The end of beings in general and of human beings in particular is in one word ‘existence.’ It is manifested wherever life is perceived. Its Sanskrit equivalent is Sattā, well-being. According to the Upanishads the idea of well-being is inseparably connected with composure and sentiency. It is termed Sachidānanda, existence, sentiency, and composure. Even the smallest creature exhibits the threefold nature of what constitutes its existence. So delicate and sharp is its sentiency that it changes its posture or position the moment it smells or comes in contact with an offensive thing. It coils its body, or flies or changes the direction of its motion. It seems to feel the arrival of something inimical to its life or existence. It is sentient as long as it exists. It (the feeling) exists as long as it is sentient. Hence sentiency is inseparable from existence and existence from sentiency. Sentient existence implies comfort or self-serenity. It follows therefore that the characteristic of life is existence, sentiency and self-serenity constituting what may be called life or self.

The same forms the characteristic of fully developed beings also. In proportion as the brain, the seat of sentiency, is developed, the desire for perpetual existence, increase of knowledge and happiness is manifested in a progressive scale. Consistent with the threefold nature of life or self, the one aim of being, whether animal or man, is to seek for what is conducive to its perpetual existence. Since existence means self-serenity, whatever is felt as inimical to existence is avoided and whatever is felt conducive to its self-serenity is assimilated or coveted. This habit of pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain becomes clearer and clearer with the growth of the organic body. This is what struggle for existence means. In this constant struggle for existence, some among the lower animals and almost all among human beings acquire the habit of accumulating what long experience has taught them to be either conducive to their pleasure or the means to avoid pain. It is in other words the cultivation of the habit of selection and rejection.
At first the work of selection and accumulation of objects conducive to pleasure or existence is individual. But in proportion as unclaimed objects of pleasure dwindle or become scarce, there ensues war between individuals for forcible possession of the accumulation, wherever it may be found. The frequency of war between individuals or bands of individuals for the possession of women, slaves, cattle, grains, fruits and other objects of pleasure gives rise to communities and societies and states, formed one after another with a view to repel individual attacks made for the objects. In the animal world there is no accumulation generally made. But with accumulation, as in the case of honey made by bees exciting the appetite of bears or men there also ensues war for misappropriation of the product of others' labour. Individuals or communities at war with each other settle their dispute, as is even now done by fishermen living on the opposite banks of a lake or river, by mutual verbal agreement. In the course of time these agreements about marriage, trade, pasturage, fishing and other varied social activities crystallise as customs. It is customs such as these that are said in the *Arthasāstra* to be taken into consideration in settling the disputes between different communities coming under the protection of a single state. Legislation by a state or a king is a modern concept. Whether legislation is a correct representation of the opinion of the people for whom it is made or whether customs are a correct copy of their opinion, is a question which need not be considered here. All that I have to point out here is that ancient kings of India did not go so far as to impose their own will or the will of their Mantri-parishad as law on their people. It may not be out of place here to consider as briefly as possible whether or not ancient Indians had more liberty than their descendants now. Their disputes were about objects of pleasure direct or indirect. The settlement of those disputes was based upon their own customs which had been the result of their own general will. Now on the other hand even in European states it is Parliament that legislates for the people. Whether the representatives of the people composing the parliament represent the views of the people, as they are, is a disputed question beyond doubt. Whether the minority may not after all be right and the majority wrong is also a question on which difference of opinion is still prevalent. It is clear therefore that the so-called liberty of the European people under their so-called self-
government is not founded on such a solid foundation as it is believed or represented to be. Besides, freedom and government are such paradoxical terms that no volume of explanation can remove the hideous contradiction of terms. Now liberty is a nature's gift and restraint is artificial and external. If man is so wise as to make use of his liberty he has inherited from nature, why should there be ship-loads of restraints which go to form what is called a government or worse still, self-government? It must follow therefore that there is something wrong with man. What is that chronic disease which is eating into the vitality of his liberty so as to call for the application of a number of restraints to keep him alive? This is the fundamental question which the authors of Sāṃkhya, Yoga, and the Upanishads seem to have put to themselves and made an earnest attempt to answer it rightly or wrongly. Whether their answer is right or wrong, we shall proceed to see.

Their answer in a nut-shell is this:

Man's nature is to be active and to be active after external or objective pleasure. It is objective pleasure which impels him to have his mouth wide open and swallow the whole world for what he considers his pleasure. He is not in need of liberty or freedom of will, of which nature or Prakṛti has endowed him with more than he may need. But he has no restraints provided for against his reckless dissipations. The one restraint in the place of numberless legal restraints is Niṣṭṛti or withdrawal from all kinds of objective pursuits except those which natural and involuntary animal appetite demands from him. Those natural animal carvings are in the words of the Upanishads thirteen in number. They are (1) seeing, (2) hearing, (3) touching, (4) smelling, (5) eating, (6) walking, (7) sleeping, (8) breathing, (9) talking, (10) excrement, (11) catching and (12) & (13) winking, i. e., closing and opening the eyelids. These are all nature's own activities. More than these are sure to lead man astray unless his activity is made with no motive or desire for any result thereof.

The Bhagavadgītā says in accordance with the Upanishads as follows:—

"He who does actions, offering to Brahma, abandoning attachment, is not tainted by sin, as a lotus leaf by water." V. 10.

Here 'the offering to Brahma' means the offering of the results
of actions to Brahma. But Brahma does not and cannot receive them. What is meant is that the results of actions are to be for the good of society. That this is the meaning is corroborated by the custom of giving gifts with the hope of pleasing God. But the Advaitins, the Sāṅkhyaśas, and the followers of Yoga-philosophy do not believe in the existence of a personal God. Therefore offering to God must necessarily mean making a gift of the results of actions for the good of people.

Such restraint is to be applied not merely against bodily actions, but also to intellectual and sensual actions also. The Bhagavadgīta says:

"By the body, by the mind, by the intellect, and by mere senses also, Yogins perform actions without attachment, for the purification of self."

Thus exclusive attachment to the fruits of bodily actions or intellectual, and sensual activities is condemned in clear terms. Is then, it may be questioned, life worth-living? Will any one engage himself in agriculture, trade or other occupations with no desire for the profits accruing from them? Why should a man marry a wife, if it were not for sensual pleasure? It must be noted in reply that action is not prohibited in its entirety. Nor is it possible, for the characteristic of nature is activity. All mental, intellectual, and sensual activities are accompanied with pleasure. But what is meant here is this: there are two kinds of pleasure, subjective and objective. Subjective pleasure is one's own nature and cannot therefore be avoided. But objective pleasure is neither permanent nor unavoidable.

In enjoying them one should not be addicted to it and to it alone. Occupations must necessarily result in good profit. But it should not be reserved for one's own selfish purpose. Whatever remains after bodily cravings are satisfied, has to be offered rather from the economical and political point of view than from spiritual standpoint. Accumulation of grains sufficient for more than three years at the most is condemned in Smṛtis. Manu says (IV. 7) as follows:

"He may either possess enough to fill a granary, or a store filling a grain-jar; or he may collect what suffices for three days or make no provision for the morrow."
In his commentary on this passage Kullūka says a store means what is sufficient to fill a granary which holds a supply for three years. According to Nārada it is what is sufficient for a year, six months or three months. When, however, a man happens to make a store of what is more than sufficient for three years, he has to perform, a Soma sacrifice to get rid of the collection.

According to some writers on Mīmāṃsā who call themselves Nimitta-vādins or expounders of the theory of desire and its cause, the scheme of costly religious rites is devised more for the purpose of getting rid of wealth than for any heavenly good. They say that desire for enjoyment arises only when one possesses the means for enjoyment. With the disappearance of the means or the cause, the effect must necessarily vanish. One of the harmless ways of getting rid of the means for enjoyment is its expenditure in religious rites. Even a poor man is permitted to beg for money for sacrificial purposes. According to the Arthaśāstra even kings may go on begging for subscriptions with a view to ward off apprehended providential calamities and replenish the treasury, the main motive of this kind of begging being distribution of surplus wealth found anywhere. In his Paramatabhanga (Page 62, Bangalore Edition) Vedāntadesākā quotes a verse from the Mahābhārata meaning that one may distribute among the good the money confiscated from the wicked. The Mahābhārata (I, 1. 301) says that motive being good, it is not a sin to pretend to be performing penance, studying the Vedas or undertaking Vedic rites or taking away money by force. These and other expedients for restoring economical equilibrium are according to the Arthaśāstra to be employed only in the case of the wicked who are dead to philosophical culture.

It is however far from truth that the main purpose of religious rites and customs was political or economical in its origin. However irrational and absurd might religious rites and customs be in their form, they originated to satisfy the natural spiritual cravings of the ignorant, though in the hands of politicians like Kaṇṭhīya and his followers they proved instrumental for the attainment of political and economic ends.

But to the followers of the teaching of the Lokāyatas, the Sāṅkhya, the Yoga and the Upanishads, idol worship, Vedic rites and even caste distinctions are not only useless practices, but
also harmful. Leaving aside the Lokâyata school which had no faith in religion, the other three schools are unanimous in declaring that the performance of idol-worship and religious rites as well as the observance of caste distinctions lead the devotee astray and strengthen the worldly bondage.

In his Vivekasāra, a treatise on the Advaita Philosophy, Sankarânanda who was the teacher of Sâyana Mâdhava says consistently with the principles of Advaita and the teaching of the Upanishads as follows:—(p II)

"He who performs religious rites with a view to attain heavenly bliss, cannot be credited even with a trace of wisdom. He who looks upon images made of mud, stone or wood as gods, cannot be credited even with a trace of wisdom."

Again on page 12a he says: "The worship of gods is for no good; nor is pilgrimage to sacred places capable of any good". On page 24 he says that "Religious rites do not deserve of performance because their results, if any, must necessarily be as perishable as the seeds of grain sown and harvested; nor can the performance of religious rites purge the mind of its impure thoughts, in as much as the performance itself is due to impure thought such as desire for some naturally perishable good". Again on page 53a-54 he says that "appearance is false. Idols are appearances like the objective world. Hence like it the worshipped idols are no reality. The various forms of worship are all likewise appearances and cannot therefore be reality. Hence the good expected to result from worship must necessarily be other than reality. No endeavour to obtain water in mirage can succeed. Similar is the endeavour to obtain good from idol-worship. Worship is an act. But no act is a means for liberation. Those who worship idols with immense faith for attaining liberation endeavour to do the impossible act of covering the sky with a mat. A man becomes what he thinks; hence he who worships can become the worshipped, i.e., another limited being. But limitation is no emancipation".

Regarding the absurdity of all distinctions and of caste distinctions in particular, he says as follows:—

"A wise man should withdraw from the world of name and form,—thee, thou and I,—this is a Brâhmana and that a Sûdra;—for such differences are real only to a fool. But a wise man should
not behave like a fool. Unity liberates a man and duality involves him in bondage."

Sankarānanda’s Advaitic Philosophy is mainly based upon the Upanishads and he makes use of the dialectic method also to prove the validity of the conclusions arrived at from the study of the Upanishads. He is an idealist like Kant and Hegel and more than they in some respects. He does not admit the thing in itself of Kant nor the individuality side by side with the Absolute of Hegel. Sankarānanda’s Absolute is pure consciousness unlimited by time, place, and causality.

He says (page 141a) that the world of objects is like the appearance of silver on a conch shell and of the blue colour of the firmament. Those who assert that the objects seen are real should be asked whether the objects appear in their own form or not. If it is asserted that they appear in their own form they should be asked as to the proof thereof. Is it perception, inference, or analogy? It is not perception, for it does not represent things as they are. It is usual for people to say that the moon is a span in diametre and that the sky is blue, which they are not. Without perception of the association of two things inference of the one from the other can not proceed. Nor can analogy be resorted to in the absence of a similar thing. The revealed texts deny the existence of the real world. Nor can appearance be trusted as in dream. Nor can serviceableness of the world be a proof of its reality; for what is even dreamt of is seen to be productive of its effect. Hence appearance is false. What underlies the varied appearances is real and absolute. It is no other than the perceiving consciousness itself. The nature of the absolute is existence, pleasure and sentiency.

Coming to the consideration of pleasure, he says that pleasure is of two kinds: subjective and objective. The former is the nature of the self and is therefore eternal. The latter is due to objective contact and is therefore momentary. It is therefore to be discarded. As to social service, it is indeed contradictory to Advaita. He who has learnt to look upon the whole world as one self with no change in itself and without a second similar or dissimilar to it can not at all consistently see another needing his service. If he sees so, he is still a dualist, and can not be in a position to realise the
serene self-pleasure. But if he is capable of being self in the
Universality with the possibility of social service also, there is nothing
to prevent him from undertaking it. But he should take care against
the risk of such a step.

As to Sāṅkhya and Yoga they are both in agreement with the
Advaitic philosophy of the Upanishads so far as Nivritti or with-
drawal from the pursuit of objective pleasure is concerned. But
with regard to the natural sociable tendency of the self, they widely
differ. The Advaitin endeavours to avoid society, in as much as
the conception of society different from self is fatal to Advaitic
conception. But the followers of Sāṅkhya and Yoga are dualists.
They say that the world is made of two principles, matter and
spirit. Spirit or consciousness is inactive and matter is active.
Mind is material, but blind, i. e., indiscreet. Just as under the
guidance of a lame man with eyes wide open and borne by a blind
man, the latter can take the former anywhere and everywhere, so
the inactive self can be led by the blind mind anywhere and every-
where. If however the self keeps away from the mind, the mis-
chief of the latter will be at an end, and the self can be emancipated
from the miseries of the objective world. To put this theory of
Sāṅkhya into practice, Patanjali expounded the principles of Yoga.
It treats of the various means to control the mind. Desirelessness,
concentration of mind on any one single subject, high thinking,
or exclusive devotion to some personal god can enable a man to
restrain the mind from its wild wanderings. As a rule abstinence
from injury to animals and men, veracity, abstinence from theft,
continence, and abstinence from avariciousness must be strictly
observed. And in observing this, one should rise above the limita-
tions of caste, locality and time. Then alone the observance of
the vow will have the desired effect. This is clearly stated in II.
30, 31.

From this it is clear that the practice of Yoga does not come
under mysticism. Nor are the Yogins required to abandon society
and live in a forest to perform their yogic practices. It is rather
under temptations and distractions that the Yogi has to learn the
way of controlling the mind. For his mind is social by nature and
cannot therefore avoid social influence anywhere. He cannot avoid
the sight of pleasing or displeasing scenes. He cannot shun hearing
the noise of revelry or of weeping. Under circumstances variously affecting his mind, he is obliged to respond to them, for response to excitement is the nature of mind. If he cannot be philanthropist he must be a misanthrope or indifferent. All that he is required to do in successfully controlling his mind under perplexing circumstances is to maintain the purity of his mind. The way of keeping the mind pure is stated as follows:—(1. 33).

"The mind becomes pure by cultivating the habit of friendliness towards those who are found in the enjoyment of pleasure, compassion towards those who are suffering from pain, complacency towards those who are suffering from pain and indifference towards those who are vicious."

Thus while the social good which an Advaitin is expected to do is rarely of a positive nature, but mostly of negative character, the follower of Sâńkhya-Yoga is required to congratulate the happy and sympathise with the suffering. The Vedântin satisfies himself with the good that can result to society from his withdrawal and from the withdrawal of his followers from the pursuit of objective pleasure. While under such theistic religions as Saivism and Vaishnavism people are asked to do good with the hope of getting rewards after death and to desist from evil in order to escape from terrible punishment inclusive of rebirth in various living forms in the next birth, the philosophers of the Sâńkhya and the Yoga, and the Upanishads declare that rebirth is the only punishment for doing evil. It cannot be denied that the excellent examples set by the Sâńkhyas in restraining the mind from its wanderings after objective pleasure coupled with the public opinion thus formed in praise of self-denial and in condemnation of self-indulgence had their desired effect on the political and economical worlds of ancient India. If the maxim that example is better than precept is accepted, then the example of self-denial set by Mahâvîra, the twenty-fourth teacher of the Jainas and the host of his followers during the reign of Srenika in Magadha, by the Buddha and his followers in Benares and other parts of Northern India immediately after Mahâvîra, by Upagupta and his followers in the empire of Asoka the great, by the Jaina ascetics in the court of Samprâti of the dynasty of the Mauryas, by Patanjali, the founder of the practical Yoga-School of the Sâńkhyas during the reign of Pushyamitra, by the Jaina
ascetic Pādalipia and the band of his disciples during the rule of the Sakas, and the Murundas, by Vasubandhu, the Buddhist teacher and his followers during the ascendency of the Guptas, by Merutunga, the Jaina ascetic, and by Bāna and Mayūra and other Brahman poet-philosophers at the imperial court of Harshavardhana, by Vidyānanda, Bhaṭṭakalanka, Jinasena and other Jaina teachers, Sankarāchārya, Sivagnāna Sambandhar, Vāgīsa, Tīrumangaiyālvār and other Brahmana philosophers expounding the principle of self-denial on the basis of Advaita, Saivism or Vaishnavism during the reign of Kubja or Saundara Pṇḍya and Srvīvallabha in the South, by Hemchandra and his colleagues at the court of Kumāra-pāla in Guzarat, by Halāyudha during the reign of the Kākatiyas in Varan-gal, and by Vidyāranya Bhārati during the commencement of the Vijayanagar empire had a far better salutary effect on the equilibrium of the political and economical forces at war with each other than any statutory legal restraints that could be devised by representative bodies in a parliament or legislative chamber. There was one favourite social service which the host of self-denying religious missionaries constantly had before their mind. It formed the object of concentration of the mind. It was the gift of food, peace, medicine and knowledge to all that needed it—āharabhaya-bhaiṣajya-sāstra-dānāni.—Every page of Indian history, however blank it might be, proclaims in unmistakable terms that these and other religious teachers and philosophers too numerous to enumerate here dedicated their lives to social service and prevailed upon wealthy merchants and kings to spend their hoards upon hoards in making the gift of food, peace, medicine and knowledge to the needy under their own supervision and guidance. It is no doubt true that lavish charity is setting a high premium on beggary and idleness. Though beggary of the teacher and their students may be excused in consideration of the services they render like government servants to society, indiscreet charity to others is, it may be urged, unpardonable injury to society itself. But it should not be forgotten that the tendency of human nature is more towards the pursuit of wealth and pleasure than towards beggary, self-denial, and charity. That inspite of the direct and indirect encouragement given to beggary and indolence by the establishment of charitable institutions in ancient India, the land had a greater reputation for its wealth than any other part of the world is fully
corroborated by history. It is equally due to human nature that
inspite of the incessant endeavour of Indian philosophers to con-
vince the people both by precept and example of the pleasures of
self-denial and of the miseries due to self-indulgence, kings and
merchants were ever on the way of aggrandising themselves at the
expense of others for the sake of self-indulgence. Those who fall
a victim to self-indulgence, whether they are individuals or com-
munities or states, have to break the restraints put upon them, no
matter what the restraints are, whether religious or legal. In ancient
times the restraints were of religious nature: Whereas now they
come under law: national or international. When individual or
communal craving for self-indulgence becomes too intense, it breaks
the national law and in the case of states, it violates international
law and makes aggression upon foreign states for its own self-
indulgence. Sometimes the aggressive community or state is in the
habit of excusing itself by asserting that its aggression is for the
good of the invaded community or state. Any how the violation
of accepted restraints is a common feature of both ancient and
modern societies alike. The difference between the forms of
ancient and modern restraints is that while the ancients appealed
to withdrawal from objective pleasure as the only restraint applic-
cable to all forms of activity, modern governments find no limit to
the multiplication of their legal restraints. Our governments have
thus become so very complex and the volumes of statutory laws
have become so many that even the greatest judge or lawyer does
not find it possible at least to be aware of all the laws. Still new
leakages in human nature are being found out and new legal
restraints are being devised to close them. But it is too leaky and
it is likely that our attempt to repair it may result in breaking it.

With the ancients, however, the only task in all spheres of
human activity, whether religious, economical or political, was con-
trol over the mind. That control was no more than withdrawal
from the pursuit of objective pleasure. The giving up of objective
pleasure is not the same as the giving up of pleasure altogether,
for according to the philosophers of India pleasure is of two kinds:
subjective and objective. Objects that appear to give pleasure
are only stimulants and only excite the pleasure which is the nature
of the self itself. This is what is stated by Sankarânanda in his
Vivekasâra. (Page 72 etc.)
Is pleasure a quality of the objects enjoyed? Or is it a mental phenomenon? Or is it a characteristic of place or time? Or is it brought about by activity or is it the quality of the sense, or is it a quality of the self? It is not a quality of the objects perceived, for the feeling of pleasure experienced at the moment of perceiving an object disappears the next moment, though there is the object still under the act of perception. If it were a property of the object perceived, the feeling of pleasure would have continued just as fragrant smell is continued to be experienced as long as the flower giving rise to the sensation of fragrance remains close by. Hence it follows it is not a property of the object enjoyed.

Nor is it a function of the mind, for in the absence of objects of enjoyment the mind does not experience the feeling of pleasure, as it would have done if it were its own function.

Nor is it the function of the association of mind with objects; for even though there is such association, the feeling of pleasure experienced in the first moment of contact disappears the next moment.

Nor is it a property of the enjoyer, for the feeling of pleasure is not constantly experienced. If it were the property of the enjoyer, there would have been no break in experiencing the enjoyer’s own property by the enjoyer.

Nor is it a characteristic of activity, for it (activity) is invariably painful. Nor is it a result of past deeds, for the body which is believed to be a result of past deeds is a victim of misery and pain.

Nor is it due to place and environment, for in the same place and under the same environments experience of pain and pleasure varies with different men.

If it were due to place and environment all men in the same place and under the same environment would have felt pleasure or pain equally.

Nor is it a property of time, for if it were so, all men would have experienced pleasure equally like heat and cold.

Nor is it a property of senses, in as much as the dumb, the deaf, the blind and the like experience pleasure not-with-standing the deformity of their senses.

Then the only remaining alternative is whether it is a property
of the self. Here there are two issues to be considered. (1) Is it a
property of the self or (2) is it the nature of the self? It cannot be
said that it is a quality of the self, for the disappearance of property
causes the disappearance of that which possesses the quality as its
constituent. But in the case of the self even in the absence of the
feeling of pleasure, there is the consciousness of selfs' existence.
Hence it cannot be said to be a quality of the self. Hence it follows
that it is the nature of self. But it may be questioned why is it not
always felt.

The question is answered as follows:—

There are two forms of pleasure, subjective pleasure and objec-
tive pleasure. The former is the nature of the self and is eternal.
The latter is momentary and is due to external objects which
are only stimulants. He who has realised self does not stand in need of stimulants to experience his own self-
pleasure.

Thus the realisation of self-pleasure with a sparing use of
objects which are its stimulants and withdrawal as much as possible
from the pursuit of objective pleasure have been the principles
constantly held before the mind by Indian politicians in their religi-
ous, economical and political activities. That such were the guid-
ing principles of their life is corroborated by the very ascetic life
they lived in the midst of luxuries in the courts of wealthy monar-
chs of ancient India. Mahâvîra, the Buddha, Upagupta, Vidyâranya,
Vyåsarâya and a host of successive ascetics were not merely
teachers of ancient kings, but also some of them were ministers in
charge of administrative work. That Vidyâranya was the minister
of Bukka, the emperor of Vijayanagar, and that Vyåsarâya played at
the request of the king himself the part of a king, are historical
facts known to historians of India. According to the Mudrârâksasa,
a drama by Vişakhadatta, Chânakya lived a strict religious life,
though engaged in serious political activities. It is this self-denying
frame of mind which enabled them to succeed in accomplishing
what otherwise would have cost their lives and imperilled the safety
of the empire itself. They were above all kinds of reproaches due
to religious or secretarian prejudices. Selfishness was unknown
to them. Their views and acts were altruistic and pleasing to all
that came in contact with them. It is to set an example to the
masses that they set themselves to worldly activity, as expounded in the Bhagavadgita (20 & 21).

"By action only, indeed, did Janaka and others try to attain perfection. With a view to lead the masses thou shouldst perform action.

Whatsoever a great man does, that alone the other men do; whatever he sets up as the standard, that the world follows."

In this work they all killed their individuality and raised themselves to the standard of the Universal soul. They were in short what they talked of.

In his notes on the Sāṅkhya Philosophy (P. 149 Hindu Philosophy, the Sankhya Karika of Isvarakrishna) John Davies says:—

The Hindu and the German philosophers alike maintain that there is no hope for the world by any process of amendment. The only sufficient and abiding cure of its vows is the annihilation of individual life.

But individuality cannot be suppressed, so long as the mind is active. According to the Sāṅkhya philosophy mind is material and possesses three aspects, satvika or calm and retiring, rājasa or assertive and imperial, and tāmasa or dull and rash. Of the three aspects, none is found to be absolutely free from the contamination of the other two aspects. In other words any one of the qualities may be found predominant with the other two qualities suppressed. It follows therefore that some men are born possessed of calm and retiring temper, while others appear to have inherited either an imperial temper or dull but rash character. The material nourishment and the spiritual training which a boy receives in his tender age may also contribute something to increase or decrease his inherited quality. Accordingly some may develop a philosophical and religious tendency. Others may show an aptitude for warlike or enterprising commercial work. A third class may be so dull and rash as to dissipate their lives and die in utter poverty and misery. It is to eradicate this inherited nature, as far as possible, religious and educational institutions are started and boys are kept under strict discipline under the supervision of teachers of approved character. Inspite of education under best teachers, inherited inequality persists in human nature. Thus the inherited inequality of temperament produces a tremendous effect
on the will power of man. No restraint either philosophical or legal can control it. Its licentious proceedings will be economical (Artha) or uneconomical (Anartha) and loyal or anarchical or tyrannical. Such minds will be impervious to the philosophical lesson that withdrawal from objective pleasures is a blessing. Persons who are under the sway of such minds and will, may happen to occupy a throne or roll in wealth and luxury without caring for suffering humanity. Fortunately for humanity the blessings of self-denial are so true and convincing and so beneficial in its application that public opinion forms itself and condemns in one voice the voluptuous proceedings of the self-indulgent. If self-indulgent man happens to be a king, he is at once dethroned; or if a wealthy aristocrat, his wealth is taken away by the application of any one of the expedients detailed in the Arthasastra (V). The expedients narrated there are so indirect in their application that the state incurs the displeasure neither of the owner nor of his followers. The wealth thus taken is distributed among the needy and economical equilibrium is restored. While doing all these apparently high-handed acts, at least the ministers of the king, if not the king also, live as ascetics to the very letter of the law of self-denial. As the expedient measures are all indirectly applied, the aggrieved man himself will rather blame his own fate than hold the king or his ministers responsible for his loss. Provided public opinion is favourable, even direct confiscation of the superfluous wealth of the rich on the part of a state in need of money, is justified. Accordingly there is an oft-quoted verse to the effect that four are the kinsmen of wealth, charity, fire, the king, and robbers, of whom the last three will be provoked, if the first is contumeliously treated.

From this it is clear that one of the politico-economical principles of the Hindu politicians is that provided the administrative body of the state inclusive of the king has strictly adopted the ascetic principle of self-denial, it is no wrong to confiscate the superfluous wealth of the rich for its redistribution to mitigate poverty or to give encouragement to art or religion or to make charity in any other way.

It is more than probable that being aware of this principle the rich in ancient India were in the habit of spending their wealth in the construction of such charitable institutions as feeding houses
for the poor, wells, tanks, groves, temples and the like. It is not likely that the countless temples, tanks, wells, reservoirs, bathing ghats, and quarters for travellers which are seen through the breadth and length of India and which are referred to in ancient inscriptions are all made at the expense of the states themselves. The philosophical law of self-denial is the basis on which all theistic and atheistic religions of India are founded. The Buddhists, the Advaitins, the Jainas, and other theistic religions such as Saivism and Vaishnavism have all adopted it and practised it. They all preached it in one voice to the people at large and especially to the rich and more particularly to kings, with the result that the superfluous wealth in the possession of the few was so diverted as to encourage art and culture and restore economical equilibrium without disturbance. Just as there were armed ascetics in ancient India, so also there were ascetic kings and ministers. The function of such armed ascetics as the Kāpālikas, Bhairavas, the Sāktas and the like was to maintain the observance of the law of self-denial and to preserve their religion. Likewise the functions of ascetic kings such as Asoka, the Parivrājaka Mahārajas, Kumārapāla and others were to set an example of self-denial to their subjects. Thus without the exercise of any despotic law the people were at no less liberty to pursue economical and sensual activities (Artha and Kāma) than to observe the ordinance of charity and salvation (Dharma and Moksha) which are not susceptible of compulsion. It is no less impossible to make a man charitable by force than to make him loyal. Still public opinion and particularly the opinion of men of exemplary character and conduct at the helm of the state can make a man both charitable and loyal more easily by example than by force.

It is also clear that in a state whose basic principle of government is the spiritual law of self-denial people have more liberty than in a representative government where under the verdict of the majority the minority cannot but patiently suffer and may even die of starvation. With liberty there comes equality in availing oneself of opportunity in making pursuit of wealth and sensual desires. Caste is no obstruction to economical pursuits. Besides the higher the caste the greater the responsibility of observing self-denial. Otherwise degradation in caste (apakāra) is a dire consequence. Elevation and degradation in caste was a custom in
ancient India. Where selfishness reigns there cannot exist frater-
nity. Fraternity is a necessary effect of self-denial. Hence it
follows that under the so-called despotic governments in ancient
Indian States, liberty, equality and fraternity seem to have been
more real than in the so-called self-governments or representative
governments. This is entirely due to the law, of self-denial of the
cultured class in ancient India. With the establishment of the
reign of the law of self-denial the same salutary effects cannot but
follow irrespective of place and time. The murder of self-denial
committed by Indians themselves is the main cause of caste and
sectarian prejudices, communal animosities antipathies and rival-
ries, and of the poverty of many against the few rich. The two
legs on which caste stands are inter-marriage and inter-dining within
itself. But this can be productive of no dire consequences of any
kind, if only the law of self-denial reigns to its true spirit everywhere.
If, as in ancient India, the fortunate few shun objective pleasures,
begin to live for others and use their talents for the good of society,
especially the low in caste and condition, internal harmony between
castes and creeds must necessarily follow; conflict between creeds
is due more to economical causes. If self-denial of one creed sees
to economical improvement either by means of open charity or by
supplying means of earning wealth to another creed, i.e., if the
idea of fraternity is translated into action by one creed with regard
to another creed, there can possibly be no conflict between creed
and creed. Likewise is the case with castes. This is what was
observed by Harṣavardhana. This was the attitude of Kumārapala
of Guzarat. This was the faith of Vidyāranya, the minister of the
Vijayanagar Emperor Bukka.

The one defect which marred this excellence of ancient states
of India together with their vitality was the neglect of the protection
of the frontier of India against external danger. The golden law
of self-denial radically cured the states of their internal disease.
But the same law could have no effect on external dangers. It was
however supposed that it could do it also. But it failed. As a
contrast to this, European governments of modern times have armed
themselves to such an extent that neither internal nor external
danger can dare to molest them. But with all this protective
organisation the natural law of animal selfishness is driving out the
law of self-denial and is rendering the people unchristian. The
golden christian law 'Do unto others what thou wouldst that they should do unto you,' which is evidently a corollary of the Universal law of self-denial, is thrown over board and pure selfish and racial antipathies are fondly cherished. Will the world awake to the divine law of self-denial and be an abode of heavenly bliss?
VIKRAMĀDITYA

(DR. S. KRISHNASWAMI AIYANGAR M.A., PH.D., [Hony.])

The third century in Indian History is a period of transition from the Andhra Empire through its stages of decay and dismemberment to the new empire that came into existence under the Guptas. All the shiftings of the powers and the arrangements of the struggling forces are far from clear. At the end of about a century of this struggle, there seem to emerge two powers, one of which was to attain ultimately the position of leadership in India.

These two powers seem to have been the Vākāṭaka and the Gupta. The Vākāṭkas were somewhere in the Vindhyan region and the Guptas in the Gaṅgetic basin. The leadership seems to have passed ultimately to the Guptas. Although the phases of the struggle that led to this dénouement are far from clear, there seems to be but little doubt that the result of it was the establishment of the Gupta Empire under Chandragupta I.

The ancestral territory of the Guptas was a comparatively small region on either bank of the Ganges, to which was added the territory of the Lichchavis by marriage, and the neighbouring regions by conquest, so that it became a compact state stretching out both ways, eastwards and westwards to keep out the enemies of the rising state. The Vākāṭakas perhaps suffered a misfortune with the death of the great Pravarasena, and that cleared the way for the ascent of the Guptas, at the supreme moment. It appears that this ascent to supreme power was marked by the Gupta era, which has hitherto been accepted as the year A.D., 319-20.

The correctness of this has been recently called into question by Dr. Shama Sastri. On the foundation that was thus laid by Chandragupta was reared a magnificent imperial structure by his son Samudragupta. The accession of this new ruler seems to have been taken advantage of by those disintegrating forces recently brought under the control of the empire. Samudragupta had to beat off the enemies that assailed him, and make sure that the states that had been brought under control were true to their allegiance, and then launch out on his scheme of expansion, which brought the
empire more or less co-extensive with that of Asoka. He succeeded in his effort partly by conquest, and partly by diplomacy, and left a compact empire to his successor, Chandragupta II.

This last is generally known to historians as the ruler who was the original of the traditional Vikramāditya of Ujjain, and his reign was otherwise remarkable in many ways. The following pages attempt to bring together facts so far known about this remarkable sovereign, and are presented as a constructive effort at the history of an important epoch.

Chandragupta was the son of Samudragupta by Dattadevi, and was probably one among many sons. Chandragupta II ascended the throne after his father Samudragupta, according to the practice of the family, "by the choice of the father". There seems to have been no opposition of any kind to his accession, and the succession therefore was a peaceful one. Such a succession gives us the indication that the empire built at such great pains and organised by two of his predecessors had got into a sufficiently settled condition to be handed on as a peaceful possession. Chandragupta's work therefore was not that of the warrior statesman, but was one of a peaceful administrator. All the frontiers appears to have remained without disturbance of any kind except along the south-west where he had to carry on a war, the only war of his reign. Chandragupta, "the sun of valour" (Vikramāditya), had comparatively speaking, the minimum of war to wage. Notwithstanding the fact that his reign was essentially one of peace he was undoubtedly a valiant man possessed of great personal courage and as such deserving of the surname. Before proceeding to consider his warlike activity or his peaceful statesmanship it would be just as well useful to take a survey of the general position of the empire. It has been already pointed out* in the description of the achievements of Samudragupta that he had brought his empire in many respects co-extensive with that of Asoka, not necessarily as a unified empire under a single ruler which obviously was impossible in the circumstances of the times, but as something like a federation of states grouped together in subordinate alliance, not without an appreciation of the common

* Article on Samudragupta, Mysore University Magazine.
interests that such a unity subserved. While the states of nearer Hindusthan formed probably an integral part of the empire the frontier states in the east and north remained practically independent, but on terms of active diplomatic relationship amounting to alliance. That seems to have been the case also in respect of the north-west frontier except in the southern end of it where the Kshatrapa revival had become sufficiently aggressive to attract his attention. The Kshatrapas along the coast and their neighbours, the Vākāṭakas, seem to have been, to a great extent, at war with each other, and it is this hostility that has to account, at any rate, partly for the decay of the power of the Kshatrapas. After the death of the great Prithvisena, the Kshatrapas appear to have recovered some portions of their lost territory and a considerable amount of their influence, so much so that they appear to have assumed the offensive and made an effort at recovering the region round Ujjain which constituted the core of their territory in the best days of the Kshatrapa power. Chandragupta seems to have proceeded with all the circumspection of a warrior-statesman in dealing with this new danger to the empire.

It has been made clear elsewhere that the Vākāṭakas had obviously been brought to a state of alliance and were content to remain as subordinate allies of Samudragupta. Chandragupta seems to have taken steps to make the assurance doubly sure on this frontier, and entered into a diplomatic marriage either with the reigning prince, or, what seems more probable, with the heir-apparent. He gave in marriage to Prince Rudrasena, son of the great Prithvisena of the Vākāṭakas, his daughter by a Nāga queen of his by name Kubhēra-Nāga. We have two grants issued by this Gupta princess, and these give us some information in regard to the actual character of this alliance. She seems to have been regent for thirteen years at least for one of her sons, Divākarasena, who must have died young, and continued to wield a considerable amount of power while the other Dāmodarasena-Pravarasena, was actually the sovereign. She describes herself as the crowned queen of Rudrasena II and as the mother of the sovereign for the time being. Besides these indications of her position in respect of the family which she entered, she seems to have felt very proud of her parentage and gives the Gupta genealogy right down to her father Chandragupta II, who is described in Vākāṭaka
records generally under the name Devagupta with the title "Mahā-rājādhirāja." It seems very probable that Chandragupta II was mainly responsible for this alliance, while it is just possible that the alliance was actually made in the reign of Samudragupta himself. Thus secure on his flank, it was possible for Chandragupta to take effective steps to get rid of the Kshatrapa trouble.

Inscriptions of dates 82 and onwards referring themselves to his reign are found in the region round Vidiṣā and Śānchī, chiefly in Udayagiri. One of them goes the length of stating broadly that Chandragupta was there in that region on a royal progress "for the conquest of the world". The obvious exaggeration of the language seems merely to imply that this was an invasion undertaken by Chandragupta with a view to rounding off his empire in this particular corner and thus making himself emperor of a vast empire such as his father had left him, with this possibility of danger removed.

That seems the significance of the expression "conquest of the world", which conveys further the impression that it involved more than one campaign and a gradual reduction of territory for final incorporation in the empire. Hence the inference seems justifiable that the war in the region of Western Malava was a protracted affair, and was not a short and sharp conflict as the numismatic inference would lead one to believe.

Malava had been for more than three centuries in the possession of a foreign dynasty, the Kshatrapas, which was founded by Chasṭāna. It is now generally agreed that Chasṭāna effected the conquest of this region which constituted in all probability a governorship under the Kushāns, very probably under Kanishka, but it may possibly be under Kadphises II. The greatest among these Kshatrapas was Rudradamana for whom we have dates in coins ranging from 52 to 78. These dates are now generally accepted as having reference to the Saka era. The last known coin date of the Kshatrapaś is 310 or 31 x, which would therefore be equivalent to about A. D. 388, the uncertainty being due to the uncertain reading of the last figure of the date. From a study of the Kshatrapa coins alone, for Kshatrapa history that is almost the only source as yet available, it is found that the dynasty of Rudradamana comes to an end for a time between A. D. 305 and A. D. 348. During this period, A. D., 305 to 348, the office of Mahākṣatrapa falls into abeyance. During
the first half of this period, A.D. 305 to 332, there were two Kshatrapas, and even this office disappears in the period 332 to 348. From an elaborate study of the coins of the Kshatrapas, Professor Rapson draws the following conclusions:—"All the evidence afforded by coins, or the absence of coins during this period—the failure of the direct line and the substitution of another family, the cessation first of the Mahākshatrapas and afterwards of both Mahākshatrapa and Kshatrapa, seems to indicate troublous times. The probability is that the dominions of the Western Kshatrapas were subjected to some foreign invasion, but the nature of this disturbing cause is at present altogether doubtful, and must remain so until more can be known about the history of the neighbouring peoples during this period". The period under consideration is the period of the rise to prominence, first of the Vākāṭakas in the region of Malava dependent upon Vidiṣā, and next of the rise to dominance of the dynasty of the Guptas under Chandragupta I. The first of these periods, that is the period of abeyance of the Kshatrapas, covers exactly the period of the dominance of the Vākāṭakas under Pravarasena I, and the greater part of the period of the rise of the Gupta Mahārājādhirāja Sri Chandragupta I. As we have already pointed out, the Puranas make the clear statement that Pravīra ruled in the region of Vidiṣā, celebrated great sacrifices and had four of his sons ruling under him. We have also pointed out† that Vindhyaśakti, the father of this Pravīra of the Puranas was no doubt Vindhyaśakti the founder of the Vākāṭakas on the ground that the great Ajanṭā inscription seems to refer to Vindhyaśakti as belonging to the family of the Vindhyaśaktis. From these statements it becomes clear that whatever was the ancestral territory to which Vindhyaśakti laid claim, the greatness of the family under Pravarasena was due to the expansion of the Vākāṭaka territory to take in eastern Malava and even parts of Bundelkhand. If, as is very probable, the homeland of the Vākāṭakas had been somewhere near Elichpur, this extension could only have been at the expense of the Kshatrapas for the time being. Therefore, as the power of the Vākāṭakas rose, the territory of the Kshatrapas must

* Annals of the Bhandarkar Institute, 1923, on the Vākāṭakas.
† Ibid.
have shrunk, and that is what perhaps is indicated in the cessation of the title Mahākṣatrapa and the existence still of the Kṣatrapas. The crushing blow to the Kṣatrapa power, however, came probably from the rising power of the Guptas. Vākāṭaka inscriptions make it clear that Pravarasena I enjoyed the imperial title "Samrāt" which is given up by his successor-grandson Rudrasena I. This could only mean that the Vākāṭaka power suffered a reverse either at the end of the reign of Pravarasena I, or, what is more probable at his death. The significant omission of this title combined with the glowing reference to the maternal grandfather of Rudrasena I, the Nāga chief of the Bharasīva family, leads to the inference that a calamity befell the dynasty of Pravarasena, and the Bharasīva chieftain exerted himself to retrieve the fortunes of this family. Even so, the restored Vākāṭaka monarchy could only sustain the inferior title of the Mahārāja, and could not maintain the claim to the higher title. The calamity could have come only from one of two rival powers at the time, or by the combined efforts of the two. The latter alternative seems impossible. The Kṣatrapas do not appear to have been sufficiently strong to have brought this calamity to the family of their former rival although they must have exerted themselves in this direction. There seems, however, no doubt about a great struggle for recovery of power and prestige by the Kṣatrapas, and they succeeded in it ultimately to a considerable extent. This recovery must have taken place later. Whatever might have been the actual cause of the calamity, Chandragupta I was ready to take advantage of it, and made use of the opportunity probably to administer a crushing defeat upon the Kṣatrapas and their allies, the Bahlikas, and that perhaps gave him the title to set up an adhirājya. A short dynasty of three Bahlikas is referred to in the Purāṇas as ruling in this region, probably the region west of Māhishmati, and the victory over the Bahlikas by marching across the seven mouths of the Indus, ascribed to the Chandra of the Meharauli pillar seems to be clearly in reference to such an achievement of Chandragupta I, and that is what gave the title to Chandragupta to set up an adhirājya which had the simultaneous consequence of reducing the Vākāṭakas from their Sāmraiya to the position of mere Mahurājas. The temporary extinction therefore of the Mahākṣatrapa and the Kṣatrapa offices seems to be due to this defeat by Chandragupta I. The recovery of the Kṣatrapas from the effects
of this crushing defeat to rebuild their power was made very difficult by the occupation of the Vākāṭaka throne by Prithvisena I in succession to his father. Prithvisena seems to have been a conquering monarch, and had not merely extended his influence over a part of the territory held by his ancestor Paravarasena I but extended it southwards to take in Kuntala also within the limits of the Vākāṭaka territory. Hence the conclusion seems warranted that the Kshatrapas could set up again only as a power, owning at least nominal subordination, to the great Vākāṭakas. That is what seems indicated by the rise of a new family of Kshatrapas and Mahākshatrapas, and what is perhaps more significant in this regard, their uniform assumption of the title "śvāmi" and the occasional creeping in of the title "Mahārāja" after date 270, or A. D. 348. Their subordination must have been real when the great Prithvisena was ruling. His death probably gave the opportunity for a more active revival of their power, and an attempt at the recovery of their lost prestige and of the territory once in their possession. It is this revived power of the new family of the Kshatrapas that must have called for the activity of Chandragupta in this region. As a counterstroke of policy Chandragupta entered into an alliance with their rival, the King of the Vākāṭakas, by giving his daughter Prabhāvatigupta in marriage to Prithvisena's son Rudrāsena II. He then set about gradually reducing and incorporating into his territory the outlying portions of Kshatrapa possessions and ultimately put an end to their power.

Such seems the trend of events that led to the great Kshatrapa war under Chandragupta II. The somewhat enigmatic statement of Bāna in the Harshacharita, and the unfortunately ambiguous note of his commentator Sankararaya both receive unlooked for illumination from a drama recently discovered by the search party of the Government Manuscripts Library at Madras. This drama is called Devi Chandraguptam, and for its subject the capture by the Sakas of the queen of Chandragupta and her romantic recovery by him, just exactly as is mentioned by Bāna in the passage referred to above. Some of the passages quoted therefrom, make it clear that Dhrudadevi, the crowned consort of Chandragupta, fell into the hands of the Kshatrapas. The Kshatrapa ruler, whoever he was, made overtures of love to the captive queen of which she managed to give information to her husband. Chandragupta proceeded to adopt a heroic-
measure for the relief of the queen who was in such imminent danger. He assumed the guise of the queen and took along with him a portion of his guard disguised as women-attendants upon the queen, and managed to effect an entry into the city where she was kept prisoner. Throwing off the disguise there they recovered the queen and returned victorious. All this is said to have taken place in a place which is written Aripura in Bâna and Alipura in the drama. The former might be taken to mean nothing more than the enemy's city, the latter probably gives the name of the capital wherever it was. If this should turn out to be the actual and proper name of the city, and if it could be located satisfactorily, we may get a little more insight into this campaign.* Having recovered the queen, Chandragupta perhaps took effective steps to wipe out a dynasty of unworthy rulers such as the later Kshatrapas had apparently become, and the result of a protracted war was the end of the Kshatrapa rule in Konkan, Gujarat and such parts of Malava as they still had possession of. The fact that the queen was actually carried off as a prisoner, and that Chandragupta had recourse to the dangerous strategem of himself going, it may be at the head of a selected body of his troops, gives a clear indication of the protracted and dangerous character of the war. It would therefore be safe to regard that the war was one in which both the Vâkâṭakas and he were alike interested, and the marriage alliance between the Guptas and the Vâkâṭakas was in the nature of a precautionary measure, and not one of a merely superfluous ratification of the treaty as a result of the war. As a result of this war the Gupta empire stretched out to the western sea, and the whole of the western trade of that region came within the sphere of the Gupta empire.

The Gupta empire of Chandragupta II must have included within it practically the whole of Hindusthan up to the frontier of the Ganges, if not the Lauhitya (Brahmaputra), beginning from the western mountains. The whole of the territory from north to south between the Himalayas and the Vindhayas was included in the empire. The great bulk of it was, perhaps, practically under the rule of the empire. The region extending southwards from the

* There is a place called Alirājapura and a district dependent thereon, but on the mere name it would be hazardous to suggest an identification.
Vindhya almost up the frontiers of Mysore was also under Gupta rule, though less directly. The bulk of this region formed part of the kingdom of the Vākāţakas. The marriage alliance seems to have brought them not only under the influence of the Guptas but seems to have resulted even in the bringing of their territory under the administrative control of the empire. Prabhāvatigupta, daughter of Chandragupta by a junior queen was married, to Rudrasena II of the Vākāţakas. It would appear as though Rudrasena’s reign was a very short one. We have records of Prabhāvatigupta as regent on behalf of one son of hers by name Divākarasena, and she carried on the regency, apparently for a long term of years, as the Poona plates of hers happen to be dated in the 13th year; it must be the 13th year of her ward Divākarasena. Apparently Divākarasena died before he attained majority. He was then succeeded by a younger brother Dāmodarasa, who became on accession, Pravarasena II. A record dated in his 19th year and another of the 21st year seem to be issued by Prabhāvatigupta herself. In his 19th and 21st years, it is very unlikely that Pravarasena could have been a minor. It seems therefore clear that this Gupta princess took an active part in the administration of her son’s territory even during the actual period of the rule of that son. That Pravarasena II was not an efficient administrator seems thus clearly indicated. This is put beyond doubt in an unlooked for source in literature.

A drama by name Kuntalesvara-dautyam ascribed to Kālidāsa has a reference which seems to bear directly on the point. The story is that Kālidāsa was sent as a Commissioner to the Kuntala country by the emperor Vikramāditya just to see for himself how exactly the administration was being actually carried on. The Commissioner returns to headquarters, and is accosted by the Emperor with the question “what does the King of Kuntala”? The answer given by the Commissioner is, “that Kuntala, having placed the burden of administration upon you, is engaged in sucking the honey from out of the lips of damsels smelling sweet liquor”.*

* asakalahasitvat kaśjitaniva kāntyā
mukulijtanayanatvād vyaktakāpōt palāni.1
pibati madhusugandhīyananāni priyāpām
tvayi vinihitabhārāb Kuntalānām adhitāb II
This verse is quoted by Rājaśekhara in his Kāvyā Mīmāṃsā to illustrate that the drift of a passage could be completely changed by very slight verbal alterations. This very same stanza is quoted in Bhoja’s Sarvasva-kanthabharana in a similar context. It is however Kshemendra’s Auchiṭya Vichāra Charcā that refers the passage to the work Kuntesa-Dautyam of Kālidāsa; but it is the unpublished work Śrīgāra Prakāsa that gives more details about the passage and makes it clear that it has reference to a Kuntaleśvara or Rāja of Kuntala. Another Sanskrit work named Bharata-Charita contains the verse* which ascribes the composition of the Prakrit Kavya Setu-bandham to a Kuntaleśa. This latter kāvyā is, as is very well-known, a work of Pravarasena. The commentary on this work called Rāmasetupradipa ascribes this work to Pravarasena, the newly installed monarch from a passage in the text itself.†

It ascribes the revision of it to Kālidāsa at the instance of Vikramāditya. We already know that Kuntala, the southern Mahratta country and the south-western portions of the Nizam’s Dominions, were incorporated in the kingdom of the Vākāṭakas under Prithvi-sena I. Under his successors Rudrasena II and his son, Kuntala probably constituted the most important part of the kingdom, and hence one could understand why Pravarasena II is called Kuntaleśa. The statement of Rāmadāsa, that at the instance of Vikramāditya, Kālidāsa revised Pravarasena’s work, coupled with the ascription of the Drama Kuntaleśvara-dautyam to Kālidāsa by Kshemendra, makes the position clear that Vikramāditya, Kālidāsa and Kuntaleśa, the author of the Setu-bandham, were contemporaries. That the Setu-bandham was a Kāvyā of Pravarasena is clear from the statement of Bāṇa contained in one of the slokas in the Harsa Charita.‡

* jádāṣayasyāntaragādhamārāga-
mahabdarandhram girī chaurya vṛtyā l
lokeśvalankāntam apūrva setum
babandha kintyā saha Kuntaleśaḥ.II

(Bharata Charita—Canto 1.)

† ahinavarāyāraddha chukkakkhaliyēṣu vihaḍīma paritāvīya
mettiva pamuhaarasiva nivvōḍum dukkasam kavvakahā
abhinavarāyārābdha chyutakkhaliyēṣu vighatīta parirthāpita
maṭtiriva pramukha raśikā nivvōḍumhavati duśkaram kāvyakatha.
‡ Kirti Pravarasenasya prayaśā kumudōjivalā
sagarasya param pāram kapisēṇeva setunā.II
From the point of view of history, the inference from these details in literature is clear that Pravarasena was an administrator who took his main business very easy, and he did so in the full confidence that, with his maternal grandfather Vikramāditya as his overlord, he need not be particularly anxious about the conduct of his government. This position is reflected in the grants of Prabhāvatigupta. So therefore Vikramāditya’s administration had actually to take the kingdom of the Vākāṭakas within the fold of the empire.

The Gupta empire under Chandragupta II may therefore be regarded as almost co-extensive with that of the empire of Asoka except along the northwest frontier. Along this frontier, it is doubtful, if the Gupta empire extended beyond the mountainous frontier of the west of the Indus. It is very likely that the region of Gandhāra and eastern Afghanistan were under petty chieftains, successors of the Kushāns under their suzerain the Kush-Newas.* This Kushān suzerain was overthrown in the first quarter of the fifth century by the irruption of the White Huns. Before this calamity befell the ruler, the Kushān state under his overlordship seems to have been a fairly compact and strong one, sometimes at war, perhaps more often in alliance, with the ruling Sassanid monarchs of Persia. The empire, therefore, was bounded on the west by mountains on this side of the Khaiber, if it went so far at all, on the north and the east by the bordering kings and kingdoms as detailed in the Praśasti of Samudragupta; and on the south it went down to the frontier of the present-day Mysore, perhaps including the northern part of it. If it is permissible to draw an inference from what may be taken as the compliment of a poet in the remark of Kālidāsa, that the young ruler of Kuntala was devoting himself to a life of enjoyment, secure under the protection of his suzerain overlord, Vikramāditya’s empire must have been a well-administered one, where even the most distant provinces felt the influence of the imperial headquarters. As was usual in the organization of Hindu empires of those days, the imperial headquarters had for its charge the internal security by

*Identified with Toramāna on certain grounds by Dr. J. J. Modi of Bombay in a paper presented to the Third Session of the All-India Oriental Conference, Madras.
putting an end to all causes of disturbance, or by an efficient method of settlement of differences. It had also to guarantee protection of the frontier. As far as we are able to see from the records of the Chinese pilgrim Fa-Hien, and comparing his account with that of the two later pilgrims Hieun-tsang and I-Tsing, the empire was traversed by roads, at any rate, so far as Hindusthan was concerned, which enjoyed almost perfect security. This comes out clearly from what Fa-Hien has to say regarding the Dakshina; "The country of Dakshina is mountainous and its roads difficult for travellers; even those who know the way, if they wish to travel, should send a present of money to the king who will thereupon depute men to escort them and pass them on from one stage to another showing them the short-cuts." This must be understood in comparison with what he has to say of northern India. It is obvious that Fa-Hien here is drawing a contrast unfavourable to the Dakshina, and this can be understood from what Kālidāsa has to say of Pravarasena's administration. In regard to the rest of Hindusthan, Fa-Hien's statements contain his actual experience and not what he gained from hearsay, as in the case of the Dakshina. Fa-Hien travelled through the whole kingdom of Gandhāra practically from north to south, and after crossing the Indus marched along the trunk road to as far as the eastern limit of Kośala, and then crossing the Ganges travelled in a triangle from Rājagriha to Gayā, thence to Benares and Allahabad, and back again to Patna. From there he went across to Tāmralipti and set sail for Ceylon. Through all this region no mishap had befallen him such as did to I-Tsing. This is clear evidence of the security of government under Chandragupta. Speaking of the kingdom of Kośala of which the headquarters was probably Srāvasti, Fa-Hien notes; "In this country, there are 96 schools of heretics, all of which recognise the present state of existence (as real, not illusory), each school has its own disciples, who also beg their food but do not carry alms-bowls. They further seek salvation by building alongside out of the way roads, houses of charity, where shelter, with beds and food and drink, is offered to travellers and wandering priests passing to and fro; but the time allowed for remaining is different in each case." The last sentence is reminiscent of the rule laid down in the Arthaśāstra, in regard to the stay of travellers in choultries like these, and the good institution of halting places seems to have continued, at any rate, from the days
of the Maurya empire down to that of the Guptas in their best
days. Describing the kingdom of Magadha, Fa-Hien makes the
following observations: "Of all the countries of Central India this
has the largest cities and towns. Its people are rich and thriving,
and emulate one another in the practice of charity of heart and duty
to one's neighbour. Regularly every year on the 8th day of the
second moon they have a procession of images. They make a
four-wheeled car of five stories by lashing together bamboos, and
these stories are supported by posts in the form of crescent-plated
halberds. The car is over 20 feet in height and forms like a pagoda,
and it is draped with a kind of white Kashmir painted in various
colours. They make images of Devas ornamented with gold, silver
and strass, and with silk banners and canopies overhead. At the
four sides they make niches each with a Buddha sitting inside and
a Bodhisatva in attendance. There may be some 20 cars, all
beautifully ornamented and different from one another. On the
above-mentioned day all the ecclesiastical and lay men in the district
assemble. They have singing and high class music and make offer-
ings of flowers and incense. The Brahmins come to invite the
Buddhas; and these enter the city in regular order and there pass
two nights while all night-long, lamps are burning, high class music
is being played and offerings are being made. Such is the custom
of all these nations." One has only to carry himself to a place
like Kumbhakonam on the day of Manka or to Tiruvindaimaru
on the day of Pushya to see in actual fact what Fa-Hien attempts
to describe in words. Describing the capital he refers to it as the
city of Pataliputra, formerly ruled by king Asoka. He then goes
on: "the king's palace and the city with its various halls, all built
by spirits who piled up stones, constructed walls and gates, carved
designs, engraved and inlaid after no human fashion, is still in exist-
ence". In the following paragraph he refers to a famous Brahman
Raivata belonging to the greater vehicle, and the habit that he was
in of washing his hands when the king touched him, as often the
latter came to consult him on matters of importance. He gives
the detail that he was over 50 years of age and that all the country
looked up to him to diffuse the faith of the Buddha. This seems
an indication that Raivata was not much anterior to Fa-Hien and
may indicate that Pātaliputra continued to be the capital under
Chandragupta II though it is not specially stated in so many words,
Notwithstanding this position, Chandragupta seems to have made Ujjain his capital also; and perhaps continued remaining in it for a number of years as the habitual royal residence. It is probable he did so in consideration of the exigencies of his administration, chiefly the war against the Sakas and the consequent organization of the newly acquired provinces in that region. In the period previous to the undated record at Udayagiri, that is, down to A. D. 400 in all probability, his capital was Pātaliputra with the alternative Vidiśā, the modern Bhīsā. Thereafter Ujjain became, in all probability, his seat of residence, and therefore came to be regarded by his successors as the capital of the empire. It is common knowledge that Kālidāsa refers to this latter city, Bhīsā, as a capital.† Further on, he refers to Ujjaini by that name in Sloka 27, and again speaks of the same city under the name Viśāla in sloka 30.‡ This presumption that Ujjaini was the capital of Chandragupta in the latter half of his reign is supported by the account that Rajsekharā speaks of assemblies (Brahmagāthās) that conferred degrees in arts and sciences in early days. One such assembly, according to him was held at Ujjain to which he refers by the alternative term Viśāla, and the poets honoured in the assembly at Ujjain were, according to him, Kālidāsa, Mentha, Amara, Rūpa, Sura, Bhāravi, Harichandra and Chandragupta.§ In the same context he refers also to a similar assembly held for examination in the Sāstras at Pātaliputra. We have shown elsewhere the evidence that Indian literary tradition offers for making Kālidāsa a contemporary of Chandragupta II, but he may have been a younger contemporary of the monarch, and if he had to undergo an examination in the Brahma-Sabhā held at Ujjain, such a Sabhā should have been held under Chandragupta II, Vikramāditya. One of the conditions for holding the Sabhā is that the Rāja holding it must be a man of learning himself. Kings unlearned should not apparently hold such assemblies. That seems clearly to be the view of Rāja-

* Rājadhaṇi in his Megha, sloka 24.
† The references are to Dr. Hultsch’s edition issued by the Royal Asiatic Society.
‡ Kāvyā Mimāṃsā, page 55.
sekhara.* Even in the matter of learning, therefore, Chandragupta must have been a worthy son of Samudragupta. We have already shown § that Pravarasena II of the Vākāṭakas was, in all probability, the author of the Prakrit Kāvya, Setubandham, and prince Pravarasena seems to have been at the court of Chandragupta, as in all likelihood he received his early education there, as he was the son of Prabhāvatigupta, the daughter of Chandragupta II himself, and as we have very good reasons for believing that she became a widow comparatively early with two young sons Divākarasena and Pravarasena, for the former of whom she was regent for at least 13 years. It is therefore very likely that the young princes were with their maternal grandfather during their period of education, while the mother carried on the administration in the name of the first son. So then Chandragupta's capital Ujjain was the real royal capital during a substantial part of his reign, and it seems very likely that Ujjain continued to be the royal capital under his successors during the strenuous times that followed.

Fa-hien has a note in regard to the general condition of what was known as the middle kingdom (Madhyadeśa of the Brahmans), which gives a general idea of the condition of administration, though imperfect in many particulars and perhaps even inaccurate in details; *"To the south of this, the country is called the Middle Kingdom (of the Brahmans). It has a temperate climate, without frost or snow; and the people are prosperous and happy, without registration or official restrictions. Only those who till the king's land have to pay so much on the profit they make. Those who want to go away, may go; those who want to stop, may stop. The king in his administration uses no corporal punishments; criminals are merely fined according to the gravity of their offences. Even for a second attempt at rebellion the punishment is only the loss of the right hand. The men of the king's bodyguard have all fixed salaries. Throughout the country no one kills any living thing, nor drinks wine, nor eats onions or garlic; but chandālas are segregated. Chandāla is their name for foul men (lepers). These live away from other people; and when they approach a city or market, they beat*

* Kāvya Mimāmañ, page 54.
† Annals of the Bhandarkar Institute, July, 1923.
a piece of wood, in order to distinguish themselves. Then people
know who they are and avoid coming into contact with them.

"In this country they do not keep pigs or fowls, there are no
dealings in cattle, no butchers' shops or distilleries in their market-
places. Only the chandâlas go hunting and deal in flesh."

The state of Buddhism and the benefactions that it received,
as well as the popularity that it enjoyed, he notes down in the
following paragraphs. In regard to this particular subject Fa-Hien's
knowledge must have been more direct and we may accept it more
or less, as a correct picture of the general condition of Buddhism
and the life of the Buddhist from what we know of the contemporary
accounts of Buddhism and Buddhist festivities in the Mahâvamsâ
of Ceylon.

"From the date of Buddha's disappearance from the world, the
kings, elders, and gentry of the countries round about, built shrines,
for making offerings to the priests, and gave them lands, houses,
gardens, with men and bullocks for cultivation. Binding title-deeds
were written out, and subsequent kings have handed these down
one to another without daring to disregard them, in unbroken suc-
cession to this day. Rooms with beds and mattresses, food and clothes,
are provided for resident and travelling priests, without fail; and
this is the same in all places. The priests occupy themselves with
benevolent ministrations, and with chanting liturgies; or they sit
in meditation. When travelling priests arrive, the old resident
priests go out to welcome them and carry for them their clothes
and alms-bowls, giving them water for washing and oil for
anointing their feet, as well as the liquid food allowed out of hours.
By and by, when the travellers have rested, the priests ask them
how long they have been priests and what is their standing; and
then each traveller is provided with a room and bedroom requisites,
in accordance with the rules of the faith.

"In places where priests reside, pagodas are built in honour of
Sâriputra, Mogalan, and Ānanda & Buddhas to come, and also in
honour of the Abhidharma, the Vinaya, and the Sûtras (divisions of
the Buddhist canon). A month after the annual retreat, the more
pious families organise a subscription to make offerings to the priests
and prepare for them the liquid food allowed out of hours. The
priests arrange a great assembly and expound the faith. When this
is over, offerings are made at the pagoda of Sāriputra of all kinds of incense and flowers, and lamps are burning all night, with a band of musicians playing. Sāriputra was originally a Brāhman. On one occasion when he visited the Buddha, he begged to enter the priesthood, as also did the great Mogalan and the great Kaśyapa.

"Nuns mostly make offerings at the pagoda of Ānanda, because it was he who urged the World-Honoured one to allow women to become nuns. Novices of both sexes chiefly make their offerings to Rāhula (son of Buddha). Teachers of the Abhidharma make their offerings in honour thereof, and teachers of the Vinaya in honour of the Vinaya: there being one such function every year, and each denomination having its own particular day. The followers of the Greater Vehicle make offerings in honour of Abstract Wisdom, of Manjusri (the God of Wisdom), of Kuan Yin (Avalokiteśvara), and others. When the priests have received their annual tithes, the elders, the gentry, Brahmans and others bring, each one, various articles of clothing and things of which Samans stand in need, and distribute them among the priests, who also make presents to one another. Ever since the Nirvāna of Buddha these regulations of dignified ceremonial or the guidance of the holy brotherhood have been handed down without interruption."

Except for the one war Chandragupta seems to have enjoyed a reign of peace. This is indicated unmistakably in what Fa-Hien has noted regarding the character of his administration. Fa-Hien’s statements in regard to the excellence of his administration are confirmed in a way by the large variety and the distinctly original character of the coin issues of Chandragupta II. Chandragupta’s vast empire, through his long reign of comparative peace, must have had a brisk commercial activity both internal and external which called for the large variety of coins that he issued. This large variety seems to be accounted for as being due to the needs of the various provinces into which the empire of Chandragupta was divided. One feature which does not appear to have received the attention of numismatists is, as is clearly indicated by his silver coinage intended for use in the territory of the Kshatrapas as well as what might be called the Kushan variety, that Chandragupta probably issued for each province a coinage similar to that with which the province was familiar. Such changes as he introduced in the coinage he did while preserving the readily visible external form of it, as far as may
be, like the coinage which was intended ultimately to supersede. This feature of his coinage would account for the long interval that elapsed between the last date on the Kshatrapa coins and the first of those of Chandragupta in the western part of his dominions. There would have been no need for a fresh issue so long as the old coinage was in circulation.

We gain an insight into Chandragupta's provincial administration from the Basarh excavations and the Damodharpur inscriptions. The former unearthed a number of clay seals. From one of these, Dhruvadevi, the queen consort of Chandragupta, seems to have had charge of perhaps the government of a province even under the emperor. Among the clay seals which were found in the excavations at Basrah (Vaisali) by Dr. Bloch, is one bearing the following inscription:—

Mahādevi Śrī Dhruvasvāmīnī, wife
of the Mahārājādhirāja Śrī Chandragupta and mother of Mahārājā Śrī Govinda Gupta."

There was a number of other seals of officers of various degrees as also of private individuals. Among them there is one of Śrī Ghatotkacha Gupta. The variety and character of the seals in this find seem to justify Professor Bhandarkar's suggestion that they were the casts preserved in the workshop of the potter who was the general manufacturer of seals for the locality. There are the seals of a number of officers—of the Yuvarāja and Bhaṭṭāraka. These seem somewhat misunderstood and slightly mis-translated as they appear in Dr. Bloch's article in the A. S. R. 1903-04 (pp. 101-120). The expression "Yuvaraja-Bhaṭṭāraka-Kumārāmātya-Adhikaraṇa," must be taken as a whole and broken up into āmātya-adhikaraṇa, chief among the ministers of the Yuvarāja and Bhaṭṭāraka-Kumāra. This Kumāra need not necessarily stand for Kumāra-Gupta, but the titles before, Yuvarāja and Bhaṭṭāraka, may seem to indicate that it did. Mahārājā Śrī Govinda Gupta, another son of Dhruvadevi, whose name appears on the seal of the queen may have been actu-

* The seals, with the inscriptions upon them, attached to the charters issued by the Queen Prabhavatigupta about the same time give clear indication of the possibility of Dhruvasvāmīnī's rule. "Jananya Yuvarājasya" in place of "Raja Pravaranasasya" or something analogous before the expression "sasanaṃ ripuśaṇam"—this is the last term in these inscriptions,
ally carrying on the administration as the deputy of his brother the heir-apparent whose province probably Tirabhukti (or Tirhut) was. The other officers that we find reference to in these seals are similar to those referred to in the Dāmodharpur inscriptions of the later Guptas, and on the whole give us some idea of the character of the official heirarchy who carried on the administration of the province under the empire. There was a governor or Viceroy who appointed the local governors and who again appointed the governors of subdivisions such as the Vishaya etc. The headquarters, staff of the Viceroy was more or less similar to that of the imperial headquarters themselves, and would seem to have continued pretty much the same from the days of Asoka, who addressed some of his edicts to the Āryaputra (prince) and the Mahāmātras (great lords). So here in the days of the Gupta empire some provinces were governed by royal princes such as Tirabhukti in this particular instance. Kumarāgupta who was probably the Viceroy must have been detained at headquarters, his brother Govindagupta carrying on the administration in his name. If Govindagupta happened to be too young for carrying on the administration himself, we could understand Dhruvasvamini being in charge of it in the name of her son. We have a parallel instance for this in the position of Prabhāvatigupta a daughter of this Chandragupta himself who carried on the administration for her son Divākarasena for 13 years as his regent, and seems to have exercised some authority up to the 19th and the 21st year of Pravarasena 11, her other son. The prince and the queen in this case must have been assisted by a board of ministers among whom there must have been a chief, and that is the Āmatya-adhikaraṇa, the chief minister for military affairs (Balādhikaraṇa), the chief commissary officer (Ranabhānda-kara-ādhikaraṇa), the chief of the Police (Dandapāsa-adhikaraṇa); there were besides the great chamberlain (Mahāpratiharā), and the chief judge (Mahādaṇḍanāyaka). The particular chamberlain Vīnahasura is given the additional title Taravara, the chief of the Tara or rank. This seems to correspond to the Tamil Perundaram who had to countersign documents issuing from headquarters along with the chief secretary, it may be to represent the chief of "the lords in council". There were besides the chief of the guild of bankers (Sreshthin), the chief of the carrying traders (sārthavāha), and the chief of the merchants (Kulika). These seem to have formed the
body of officials constituting the administration. As we find this in regard to one particular province which happened to be in a locality where there was not much likelihood of the disturbance of peace, the inference would be justifiable that this gives the normal constitution of a provincial administration. Tirabhuki was probably regarded as a palatine viceroyalty as it was the accession of that province that constituted the claim to the greatness of the Guptas under Chandragupta I. Chandragupta II probably regarded that this province required to be governed by personages of no less importance than the queen-consort or a royal prince both as a matter of dignity, and because Ujjain had become his habitual headquarters.

The earliest known date of Kumāragupta I is 96, that is A.D. 415; Chandragupta must have died then. It may be that he died a year or two earlier. In or about the year A.D. 414-415 the vast empire of Chandragupta passed peacefully on to the rule of his son Kumāragupta I by his queen-consort Dhruvadevi. Kumāragupta's was a comparatively long reign going on to the year 136 almost, thus giving him a reign of 40 years. Such materials as are accessible to us at present for the history of the Guptas give us but little information regarding Kumāragupta's reign. This silence of our sources combined with the vast and varied coinage of Kumāragupta would justify the inference that his was a reign of peace throughout.

Much of the credit for the long and peaceful reign of Kumāragupta must be ascribed to the efficient organisation of the Gupta empire under Chandragupta II. This benevolent efficiency of organisation finds indirect support in the fact, and recorded in the Mandasor inscription of Kumāragupta, that a guild of weavers belonging originally to the latter country found it necessary to migrate owing to the disorder prevailing in their native land, and settle down within the empire with a view to ply their trade of silk-weaving, and attain prosperity thereby. That a guild of weavers in the course of a generation prospered so well that a considerable section of them could give themselves up to the pursuit of such a leisurely study as astronomy, testifies to the fact that the empire offered the advantages necessary for the prosperity of trade, internal, and perhaps even over seas, in such an article of luxury as silk fabrics. It further shows that even an industrial class like that of silk-weavers could take to the pursuit of a study like that of astronomy, of course among other things. Hints such as these are undoubtedly clear in-
dications of the general condition of prosperity of the empire of Chandragupta, and go a long way to confirm the conclusions to which we are led by a study of Fa-Hien's account of his travels in the country. The Gupta empire under Chandragupta I reached, therefore, a high level of achievement and would compare to advantage with empires of contemporary and even later times. Is it of this Gupta emperor that the poet has sung:

Dattvā ruddhagatiḥ Khasādhipataye devim Dhruvasvāminīm
Yasmātkhanditasāhasō nivavṛte Śrī Sarma Gupta Nṛpah
Tasiminneva Himālaye guruguhā Kōṇakkvaṇat Kinnare
Giyante tava Kārttikeya nagara striṇam gaṇaiḥ Kīrttayah?
THE EVOLUTION OF ANCIENT INDIAN POLITICS

(Rao Bahadur Prof. K. V. Rangaswami Aiyangar, M.A., F.R. Hist. S.)

Hardly a year has passed during the last fifteen years, in which some scholarly additions have not been made to the descriptive and critical study of old Indian forms of Government. The subject has in a very special sense come to his own, during this period, mainly as the result of national feeling, and of the natural desire to seek in our past history the justification for current political reforms and ideals. Despite the numerous contributions to the literature of ancient Indian Governments made during this epoch, studies which have attempted to dispel the old illusions of the static conditions of Indian political life have been sporadic and superficial.

The classical view of oriental governments, (within which those of Ancient and Medieval India are usually brought) has been that they were normally despotic monarchies, frequently in alliance with sacerdotalism. The locus classicus of such views is a well-known passage of Sir Henry Maine's Early History of Institutions, in which he cites the military despotism of Runjeet Singh in the Punjab as typical of oriental forms of government, and affirms that "the Punjab under Runjeet Singh may be taken as the type of all oriental countries in their native state during their rare intervals of peace and order." Maine's fatal gift of epigram and picturesque phraseology has done much to impede the correct perception of historic forces and institutions. Nowhere has this been more evident than in the manner in which his teachings have paralysed the critical study of Indian political evolution. The postulates of Maine became the axioms of T. H. Green*, and the warrant for dialectics on oriental stagnation from Lord Balfour†.

In the following pages an attempt is made in the form of a critical and comparative study of three distinct and well-marked epochs of the History of Pre-Musalmān India to outline the progressive evolution of forms of Ancient Indian Government and the causes which promoted or retarded their growth.

* See his Principles of Political Obligation, para 88.
† See his Sidgwick Memorial Lecture on "Decadence" pp. 34—39.
To commence with the most ancient epoch, about the conditions of which we are able to get a coherent picture—namely, the so-called Vedic period or the age of the Mantras, the farther limit of it is not certain, while the nearer limit comes down to about the seventh century before Christ.

We gather that during, at least, the last few centuries of this epoch, monarchy was the normal, but, not the only form of Government, though the use of the synonyms "kinglessness" (arājata)* to denote "anarchy" might seem to imply more. As we should have naturally expected in such an epoch of military and colonising activity, from our knowledge of the similar conditions of early Greek and English History, we also find here that royalty was much esteemed, and royal anger spoken of as a thing to be dreaded. We hear also, with how much poetical exaggeration in the description we know not, of the state and splendour maintained by these kings. We also find, towards the end of the epoch, a vague opinion growing up that the king was the proprietor of all the land in the kingdom. On the other hand, we learn that the king was less of an autocrat than he came to be regarded in later times. For we are told that, besides his duty of propitiating the priesthood with gifts, so as to have the help of its prayers and its magic for the obtaining of victories and the retention of sovereign power, he had to undergo, on accession, if not a form of popular election, at least a kind of acceptance by the people: Strict hereditary succession had not become the rule, and a person selected from the royal family, or even from a noble family, might be crowned†: In the coronation, the officiation of the head of the village (Grāman i or Visp-at†) and court-officers like the charioteer, was so necessary as to entitle them to be spoken of as 'King-makers' (rāja-kartarah)§. Kings were occasionally expelled from their dominions. Their taxation of the people was felt to be a burden and was sometimes regarded as a

* Arājata "lack of king" means anarchy, perhaps also non-monarchic polities, Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa i. 5, 9, 1; Aitareya Brāhmaṇa i. 14, 6.
† A kingdom of ten generations is mentioned in Satapatha Brāhmaṇa xii, 9, 3, 3; and Aitareya Brahmaṇa viii, 12, 7. The succession, however, need not have been strictly hereditary but instead confined to royal house or family.
‡ Rig Veda i. 65, 4: Ait. Brāh. vii 29, viii, 12, 17; Kausāśikī Brāhmaṇa, iv, 12: Sat. Brāh. i. 8, 2, 17, iv. 2, 1, 3, 17 etc.
§ Sat. Brāh. v. 4, 4, 7.
payment for the protection given by the king. Some kinds of an assembly, (Sabhā, Samiti)* the powers of which are not quite clear, existed at the head-quarters consisting of the notables of the realm, like Brāhmans, nobles, etc. The king is stated as immune from punishment (a-dandya), and, in a metaphor, which was destined to become so potent in later political theory, to wield Danda or, the rod of chastisement.† He appears to have exercised an extensive criminal jurisdiction and the powers of an appellate judge in civil cases, being assisted in his judicial functions by his family priest (the purohita) and his court officers. It is not clear whether he selected or approved of the appointment of the village heads (Grāmani) who practically looked after the local affairs. There are obscure indications also, in early Vedic literature, of the great power of the Royal House (Rājanga) and of the nobles, and of even their having had equal rights with the king himself in times of peace (Zimmer 176-7). The sacerdotal basis of society is indicated by the sanctity ascribed to the Brāhman. The slaying of a Brāhman was regarded as a more serious crime than the murder of an ordinary person. By the same confusion between crime and sin, and by the absence of any distinction in principle between real crimes and fanciful characteristic of a primitive society, physical imperfections, or infringements of conventional practices [Macdonell and Keith. I page 391], "bodily defects, such as bad nails and discoloured teeth, marrying a younger daughter while her elder sister was unmarried, were coupled with murder though not equated with it." [Ibid. page 391 n.] The prevalence of Wehrgild (Vaira) or money-compensation for killing, shows that the State was not yet strong enough to assert itself in avenging manslaughter—a significant proof of the weakness of the king, as contrasted with his position in the succeeding age—when, as we know from the Sūtras and Buddhist literature, crimes were regarded as offences against the majesty of the State. In concluding, it should be added that the State was not based on a fixed territory and was generally of a small area, in spite of the aspirations or the compliment implied in the poetic reference to the heads of really small States as Samrāts,

* On the Vedic Sabhā and Samiti: see Cambridge History of India, Vol. I, Chapter IV, and Mr. K. P. Jayaswal’s Hindu Polity, pp. 11-21 with references in it.
† Sat. Brāh. V. 4, 4, 7.
Virāts, Swarāts and Sārvabhaumas—i.e., the titles later on reserved for emperors and kings of kings.

In regard to the polity of the next great epoch—the period lying between the seventh and fourth centuries B.C., we have fuller information. The Upanishads, the Brāhmanic, Jain and Buddhist Sūtras, the references in the extant fragments of Ktesias and Megasthenes, the Arthasastra of Chāṇakya and, above all, the Jātakas are our chief authorities.

The State, that these sources describe, marks several points of advance over the Vedic State. While a striking—almost novel—feature of the period is the existence side by side with monarchies—some of which were powerful ones too—of republics, partially or wholly independent. The Buddhist accounts testify to the existence of these republics, among the clans and the tribes in North-East India, for instance among the Videhas or Vrijjians, the Cetis and the Mallas; while the evidence of the Greeks shows their presence, again in tribal units, in the Punjab and in the North-West. In an important passage, Chāṇakya refers to a similar condition among the warlike Kṣatriya clans of the Kambhojjas (near Peshwar) and the Surashtras (Gujarat), which followed the pursuit of agriculture, cattle-rearing and trade and were apparently not even under aristocracies like the republics of the north-east.

It is a remarkable testimony to the strength and vitality and perhaps also to the number of such republics in his day, that the Indian Machiavelli should devote, as he does, an entire book (III of his Arthasastra) to the devices by which an ambitious king (like Chandragupta, we presume) might annex such republics after undermining the power of their governing bodies or executives. It should be remembered that these republics were invariably tribal, generally oligarchic, and often had sprung from more ancient monarchies, as for instance, the Vrijjian confederation in what was once the kingdom of the Videhas.* This inference is justified by the fact

* See Rhys Davids, Buddhist India p. 26.

"It is very interesting to notice that while tradition makes Videha a kingdom in earlier times, it describes it in the Buddha’s time as a republic." Its size as a separate kingdom is said to have been 300 leagues in circumference. With its capital town Mithila is associated the name of the great Epic King Janaka; Sat. Brāh, xi. 6, 2, 1; Jātakas. vi. 30-68; ibid III 365; IV 316.
that in the government of these oligarchic republics generally, as among their European contemporaries, the Bacchiads of Corinth, the royal power was put in commission and was owned jointly by all the nobles, who claimed descent from a common royal ancestor. That this was so even up to the time of Chandragupta the Maurya is evident from a famous passage in Chāṇakya,* that, as against the general rule of primogeniture the throne might occasionally belong to a whole royal family or clan. To those, again, who are conversant with the history of the prevailing forms of land-tenure in Upper India, the similar conditions in which the Bhājūchharā† system arose, will furnish a convincing analogy.

An organised territory has not yet come to be regarded at least in the earlier part of this epoch, as a requisite of a State. Only tribes and nations are spoken of.‡ This is but natural, for the time was then yet far when a powerful kingdom would arise to absorb many states and dynasties, efface old land-marks, and make it impossible to refer to itself except on a territorial basis.

Among the free clans and tribes, the Government is generally oligarchic, the executive head or heads being elected periodically at a mass meeting of the people who possessed the suffrage.§ In a similar folk moot were settled all large questions, such as those relating to foreign policy. This is very significant. Nowhere else in the history of India do we henceforth meet with the folk moot, the landesgemeinde, which was such an essential feature of Germanic,

* Kauṭiliya, I. 17.
† On Bhājūchharā, refer to B. H. Baden-Powell’s Land Systems of British India, Vol III.
‡ Cf. The lists of the sixteen great powers or the sixteen great nations in the early Buddhist canon. e.g. Anguttara I, 213; IV 252, 256, 260: Vinaya Texts II 146; referred to in Mahāvaścū II 2. 1. 15. It is interesting that the names Kāśia, Kosalas, Kambhojas are names not of countries but peoples, tribes or clans.
§ Cf. Mr. Jayaswal’s Hindu Polity, p. 84 et seq. The Hindu term for feroli-garchies would be Rājakulas or kulasaṃgha. In Kula states supreme leadership went evidently by turns to the few ruling families. Anguttara Nībāya, 58. 1. The executive authority in these Kulas seem sometimes, as with the Yaudheyas, to have vested with the Mantradharas or councillors. On procedure of deliberation in Hindu republics see Mr. Jayaswal’s Hindu Polity, pp. 103-117 and references cited therein to the Buddhist Canon.
and in a wider sense, of Aryan polity. In the Vedic age we hear of the king, and his council (Sabhā or Samiti)—as we do, in the age of Chāṇakya and subsequent periods, of the king and the cabinet of ministers—sometimes even of a large or outer cabinet, with an inner cabinet or cabal, which enjoyed the exclusive confidence of the ruler.

It was perhaps this growth of royal power and pretensions that helped to crush out of existence the remnants of free institutions like the councils of notables (Sabhā, Samiti)—our analogue to the Anglo-Saxon Witan and the folk moots. The growth in the size of the states and in the intricacy, complexity and difficulty of administrative work, as well as the absence of the representative principle in Government, would largely account for the disappearance of these institutions. I shall attempt to demonstrate later on, how an identical cause probably underlay both the growth of royal absolutism and the failure of representative institutions to germinate in our soil.

To come back to the king—we find in this epoch an increase in his authority and powers, and in the spectacular and ceremonial features of his station. Elaborate regalia, a solemn state, the practice of seclusion,—partly through policy and partly for safety—became the recognised associations of royalty. The throne was usually hereditary and went by primogeniture. The heir-apparent was treated with reserve and suspicion, was often educated outside the State—and if he completely reassured the parental suspicion and jealousy, was given a part in the administration, as a commander, or provincial Governor.* The theoretical absolutism of king was accepted, but his power was known to rest solely on his effective military strength. Gradually, both through the spread of sacerdotal and metaphysical notions the view gained ground among the common folk, that a king was not like other men, but stood apart on account of his power of association with and his influence on super-mundane forces. He was popularly credited with the power of forcing the will of the Gods so as to ensure to his country a perennial prosperity and freedom from seasonal vicissitudes.†

* Arthasastra I. 17.
† Jñānakas, II, p. 368.
Logically, the acceptance of this view reacted, in course of time, against the absolutist claims of the monarch, as it left him face to face with a popular tumult, whenever famine or other dangers threatened the land. Thus, the belief expressed in one of the Jātaka tales*—namely that "if a king be unrighteous, God sends rain out of season, and in season no rain, and fear of famine, fear of pestilence, fear of the sword—these three fears come upon men, through him"—had its constitutional value for the growth of the later Indian State into a specifically military power (witness the huge armament mentioned by the Greek writers as maintained by Indian kings, and Asoka's acknowledgement of the same fact), and therefore, a virtual tax-gathering despotism whose inclination to satisfy the populace, and the priesthood which influenced it, was only governed by its confidence in its strength to cope with "the chaotic outbreaks of the government making power"† i.e., the mob.

The administrative machinery grew in size and complexity with the increase in the royal prestige and power. While, in theory, the king, as of old, was still the chief judge of his people, in practice the administration of justice had become the work of a separate set of officers. Even the royal prerogative or obligation to preside at the chief appellate tribunal could be delegated by the king to others—such as the high priest (purohita) or the treasurer or the commander (Sainika). The increasing expenditure of the State and of the court necessitated a more elaborate system of taxation and the recourse to diverse ways of filling the treasury. It is also probable that one cause for the elaborate attention bestowed on public finance by ancient kings and ancient writers was the consciousness that, in a state which had not advanced far enough in civilisation, the happiness and the welfare of the people depended almost entirely on the revenue system and the methods of taxation. Whether we compare with one another the financial systems of the pre-Buddhist, the Buddhist, the Mauryan and the later epochs, as evidenced by contemporary literature and inscriptions, or whether we compare the treatment of public finance in the earlier with that in the later works on law and polity, we

* Jātakas trans. by Cowell and others II. p. 124.
† The phrase in Sir John Seeley, Lectures on Political Science.
cannot fail to observe that every succeeding age shows a more intricate and elaborate revenue system than the preceding ages. In this connection, it is also worthy of remark that all the principals of the prerogative constituents (i.e., the residuary rights of the king)—which we are able to gather from the references thereto scattered through the Sūtra Literature and the Jātaka, all of them, relate to finance e.g., the king’s right to treasure trove, to the produce of mines, to elephants, to the land revenue, to escheats, to wardship, to abandoned property, to a sixth of the booty of war, to milk-money on the birth of an heir, to be informed of all adoptions, and to have his property free from alienation even after any length of prescription or adverse possession. It would be well to consider this fact along with the length of the list of the sources of the king’s revenue.* Some idea of the thoroughness of the revenue administration may be gained by remembering (1) that the assessment was based on individual properties so as to ensure the demand of the maximum of revenue while in the collection of the revenue, the responsibility of the head of the village, or of the revenue circle was generally recognised along with that of the individuals assessed, and (2) that simple and inexpensive but effective contrivances were provided for audit and control of the collection. It hardly required Chāṇakya’s sage warning that—“all undertakings depend upon finance; therefore the treasury should receive the best attention of the ruler”† to make the Indian Rājas of the Buddhist and later epochs vigilant in this sphere, and readily have recourse to such methods of insuring the treasury against loss, as Chāṇakya suggested:—namely that—as “whoever lessens the revenue eats the king’s wealth, so if by neglect, he allows the revenue to diminish in amount, he should be made to yield the difference between the demand and the collection”. It is evident that one object of the Census which Chāṇakya recommends was to ensure that the State did not overlook taxable resources.

So rigorous a system of revenue collection, it is evident, should have been oppressive. The Jātakas show that there was over-taxation and this will perhaps explain the emphasis which the

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* Sukraṇīti, II. ii. 222.60.
† Kauṭilya Arthaśāstra. p. 79.
writers on Dharma and Niti lay on the unwisdom of taxing the people so as to reduce their capacity for production.*

In general administration, the king was in theory absolute, and could appoint or dismiss any officers. But, in practice, it is certain that custom favoured a hereditary succession to offices. The rational justification of this practice offered by Chāṇakya following an earlier writer named Kaunapādanta is significant as showing how even unconservative writers like him felt the need to justify what could not be altered. Thus:—"The king shall employ as ministers those whose fathers and grandfathers had been ministers before, as such persons, in virtue of their knowledge of past events and of a deep attachment to the king, will, though provoked, never desert him."†

In the light of the evidence available for this epoch, we should do well to re-consider in regard to one other important matter, the assumptions regarding the absolutism of the ancient Indian king, which are being confidently made even by eminent authorities: that is in regard to the king’s position towards law. While, no reference is made to Codes of law, in the modern sense, as in use in guiding the judges, it is hardly right to presume that there was no definite body of rules whatsoever to guide the judge, except those of common sense equity and good conscience. Writing, notwithstanding Megasthenes,‡—was in public administrative use—for do not the proclamations of Asoka, engraved a generation after Megasthenes and addressed to every section of the people, imply extended knowledge of writing? How then can we assume that there was then no body of rules available in books, written or remembered (as our Dharma sūtras are), to guide the kings in such extremely important matters as the adjudication of disputes in courts of law. One of the Jātakas has a pointed reference to a "book of judgments"§—apparently a collection of precedents by observing which suits were to be settled. Another refers to the engrossing on "a golden plate"¶, probably for future guidance. Is it likely

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* Mahābhārata XII 67, 18, 20, 21; 88, 7-8. Also Manu, vii, 129.
† Kautilya, Arthasastra I. 3.
‡ McCrindle’s Ancient India, Megasthenes, Fragment XXVII.
§ Jātakas, III. 292.
¶ Ibid V. 125.
that in an epoch when definiteness and accuracy were passionately desired in the most trifling details of ritual, when the boundaries separating the secular and religious spheres were indistinct, when the administrations were cultivating under expert advice a passion for detail in revenue and finance, that a function of so much ethical importance as publicly redressing wrong, a ceremony of such deep religious import as deciding how the divine Dānda was to be used would have been left to accident, to caprice, and to argument? Can it be claimed that the decisions, as we occasionally come upon them in our ancient literature, have always the impress of equity and logic? And, assuming that there was then no common body of written laws, how can we account for the unanimity with which the Dharmasūtras advise kings to give just decisions* without indicating some specific rules? Do not these pre-suppose that there was some well-recognised standard of what was then deemed a "just decision" in the different cases? The frequent mention in the Jātakas, of the reversal of a judicial decision by authority after authority in succession, sometimes even by learned ascetics who held no office but probably turned up as friends of the court, would surely indicate more a conflict of precedents, laws, of evidence, than a conflict of equity and logic? We have also to remember that, at this and in succeeding epochs, the trials were public,† and that "applause" by those present was allowed, and that the administration of justice, being exclusively in the hands of Brāhmans and Kṣatriyas, was less like amateurs deciding on law than a trained class of educated men exercising their learning in settling points at issue. To my mind, the position of a judge in an ancient Indian court with ascetics, Brāhmans and assessors to help him, was similar to that of a new Roman praetor deciding in the presence of senior members of the senatorial order‡ questions in the adjudication of which, they could use the same authorities as he relied on, but with

* See Manu VIII. 3.
† See Nārada, Book I. i. iii. about Courts of justice, trial, procedure and judgment.
‡ Cf. Sir Henry Summer Maine, *Ancient Law*, Chapters II and III, remarks on the bar legislating and not the bench in ancient Rome; and the restrictions imposed on a new praetor by the presence of ex-magistrates and légists in the court. Also Dr. Moyle's Introduction to his edition of the *Institutes of Justinian*. 
the precision and confidence induced by their greater knowledge and wider experience. Even the testimony of Megasthenes to the absence of written laws in India, to which exaggerated importance has often been attached in forgetfulness of his many erroneous statements (natural to one who was not a trained observer and who had only limited facilities for observation), is not against my contention. For, what should have been the conception of a written law to a Greek like Megasthenes, the idea that should be uppermost in his mind, whenever he thought of law, whether Indian or other? Would he not have regarded public exposure, tangible publication, to be the characteristic feature of laws properly so called, remembering how the laws of Draco were "shown publicly,"* those of Solon were preserved, in his own day, on rollers and triangular tablets in the Prytaneum;† and how the laws of Gortyn‡ were engraved on stone: obviously, therefore, he should have generalised from the absence of such in India. In the face of these difficulties, I feel somewhat impatient of such dogmatic statements as that the ancient Indian State did not issue laws as distinct from particular or occasional commands, that it never judicially administered autonomic law, or that there was no customary or written law in ancient India.

We now come to the third and last period in the history of the old Indian State—the period represented in its initial stages by the Mauryan empire, in its meridian by the Gupta empire, and in its later development by the Rajput States which grew up all over North India and the Deccan in the long interval between the death of Harsha of Thanesar and the Mussalman conquest. The revivals of ancient polity that were attempted in Indian soil by Shivaji§ and the survivals of the old forms of our Government in the existing Native States do not represent a new epoch, but bear reference only to the conditions of this classical epoch. In the domain of political theory, this age is associated with the speculations of Sukra, of Manu, and of the later writers on Dharma and Nūti like Yajñavalkya, Nārada and Kāmandaki. As no attempt is being made here to deal

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† Ibid. III. p. 500.
§ On Shivaji’s attempted revival of ancient Indian polity, see Ranade, Rise of the Marhatta Power. Also see Marhatta Administration.
with the mechanism of administration, in detail, it is not necessary
to do more than indicate the points of difference in the political
institutions and conditions of this period as distinguished from those
of previous epochs.

The most important feature of the political life in this age is
what may be termed the "perfection" of royal absolutism, the
apotheosis of the king. The recognition of the essentialness of the
king in administration in a specific, and of unity in the state, in a
general sense, had indeed led to the ascription of much importance
to the king even in earlier times. Thus, Āpastamba had ruled
that the death of a king interrupted Vedic study,* and according to
Vasishta all monetary transactions were legally suspended between
the death of a king and the accession of his successor.† The
sanctity of the throne was further protected by rules making attempts
against the life of the king, the corruption of his ministers, the
forging of his edicts, the seduction of his queens—crimes and
sins of the greatest turpitude.‡ His position was explained as out
of the common, and from very early times he had been viewed as
beyond the law as adandaya.§ But, gradually with the growth in
actual powers of kings, and with the evolution first of large states
on the basis of the old tribal governments and subsequently of the
first historical empire in Indian soil, the claims of royalty were
advanced beyond all previous limits.

The mania for speculation—characteristic of the age—which saw
the application of logic to fundamentals in ethics and religion, led
also to the consideration of abstract political questions. The great
extension of religious systems (Jainism, Buddhism, Brāhminism)
which sought to base all social and political order on divine sanction,
and to connect the various activities and relations of life with one
another and with supposed transmundane conditions—led to further
developments in the current theories of government. Readers of
Asoka's edicts need not be told how deeply, how intensely the great
Emperor felt his personal responsibility for the upkeep of the moral

* Āpastamba I, 4, 13; Viṣṇu XXII 45; Baudhāyana I. 11-22.
† Vasishtah II, 49-50.
‡ Manu IX 232; Ibid. IX, 275.
§ Ibid. V. 96; VII, 4-12; 17. Sat. Brāh. xiii. 6. 2. 18.
and material welfare of the world. Though not actually framed at this epoch, it is extremely probable that this was the stage at which the theories of the origin of kingship in compact and in divine sanction received their widest currency. At any rate, at no other point in the evolution of Indian polity did the theory and the practice of the State in India so nearly tend to approach to the ideals implied in those theories.

And what were the logical—the historical foundations of this exaltation of royal power, and the acceptance of these theories of the birth of political order? In Otto Gierke’s unrivalled account of the political theories of the Middle Age will be found an easy answer. There are singular resemblances, almost an identity, between the medieval European and the classical Indian conceptions of Monarchy. Both started by regarding the Universe itself as a kingdom under a supreme director, all earthly lordships as reflections of the divine lordship, and all institutions, secular or spiritual as well as every species of office of authority and position as divinely ordained. From both it followed as a natural inference from the assumption of one-Force as governing the Universe, that the rule of one-Monarch was the form of Government indicated logically as the best for men. Both saw confirmation of this in history, which related the triumph of monarchies over republics, and in experience which showed how, in their own epochs of disruptive tendencies, emanating respectively from Feudalism or from Caste and Religious rivalries, a strong kingship was the integrating force which kept society together. To both, the belief in monarchy brought two tendencies, the first to exalt the person of the sovereign, and the other to magnify his office. It was well that these two tendencies were born together; for, apart, one of them would have pulled towards absolutism and the other towards the opposite extreme of unlimited popular sovereignty. This conception of kingship as an office led to a recognition of its duties and obligations which again started enquiries regarding the philosophical basis of the king’s relations to the community. This, in turn, led to the conviction that a king bore an onerous burden, because he occupied an emi-

* Mahābhārata, Sāntiparvan LXVII 12-14; Ibid. LXVIII 15-19. Also passages in the Arthasastra of Kautilya.
nent office and was responsible for the conduct of the community according to the divine precepts, and for ensuring to its members justice, peace and happiness generally. It was then only a step further to the conclusion that kings existed for subjects and not the subjects for the kings, and to the assumptions of the theories of the social contract.

Thus, in a remarkable manner, somewhat similar conditions started, in medieval Europe and in ancient India, parallel lines of thought, with the result that in both, the epochs of royal apotheosis saw also the birth of the conflicting principle that resistance to the will of a bad ruler was justifiable, because it was monstrous to assume that Divine sanction could lie behind tyranny. A few quotations will show that this interpretation of the derivation of the political ideas of our Classical age is justified by the data available. The Rāja-dharma section of the Mahābhārata—whose didactic character and strange resemblances to Manu—convict it of being, in its present form, the product of the epoch under consideration, says, to begin with, that "the world which depends upon agriculture and trade is protected by the Vedas; and both the world and the Vedas are protected by the dutiful king".* "A sovereign", says Kāmandaki, "who discharges his duty according to Nīti secures Trivarga for himself and his subjects." Manu’s statements are more pointed.† "A king must protect the Universe; for, when living beings were scattered about, in mutual fear, in a state of kinglessness, the Lord created the king for the protection of the creation taking for the purpose the eternal principles of Indra, of Vāyu, of Yama, or Āditya, of Agni, of Varuṇa, of Chandra and of Kubera; and because he has been formed of the essence of these gods, therefore the king surpasses all created beings in lustre......The man who in his folly hates the king will surely perish......Let no man transgress the commands of the king......For the king’s sake, the supreme Being created His own Son, Danda, from Brahma’s glory,—Danda—the protector of all creatures and the incarnation of the Dharma. Through fear of him all created beings, the immovable and the movable, allow themselves to be used swerve not from their appointed functions” and,

* Mahābhārata, Rājadharma LXVIII.
† Manu, VII. 3.4.
then reversing his position, Manu continues, and makes out Danda to be the ruler defacto, the king being only an instrument, chosen as such, only if he is virtuous; for "Danda, possesses a very bright lustre, and is hard to be administered by men with unimproved minds; it strikes down the king who swerves from his duty, together with his family". The same sentiments are echoed by Sukra:—
"The king is the cause of the increase of the world. If there was no king, to lead them properly, the subjects will drift as does a rudderless ship in the ocean. Without him the people do not keep, each in his appointed sphere of duties, and, without subjects, he too does not shine on the earth."......The king who follows the "Law" (Dharma) has the divine essence in him, while if he is otherwise, he is assuredly made up of the essence of the demons. The royal obligation to protect and to be popular is implied in ingenious etymologies constructed for the words Kṣatriya—and Rājan—making them out to imply 'the healer' and 'the pleaser' respectively (vide Kālidāsa); and the opinion is definitely stated that taxes are paid in return for protection, and that unrighteousness destroys a ruler.* The proposition was thus reached that 'just ruler' and 'king' were naturally convertible terms, and that a 'bad king' was a verbal contradiction. In the province of law this ingenious conclusion was reaffirmed in the form of the celebrated identity of law and justice which we owe to the epoch of the Upaniṣads,† an identity which has persisted up to the current day in the different connotations of the term Dharma: "Law is the power of the king; therefore there is nothing higher than law. For by it the weak and the strong are equally ruled by the king. Thus whatever is law, is also truth. When a man says the truth they say he declares the law; and if he declares what is true. Thus both are the same".

It may be pertinently asked why, after the evolution of this logical justification to limit royal power, India historically persisted in a form of theoretical absolutism while Europe, apparently starting from the same point, developed institutions based on the principle

† Brhadāranyaka Upanishad, I. 4. 14.
of popular sovereignty. The question is a big one, and is not capable of a single or a simple answer. But one explanation may be offered, in the light of our present knowledge, namely, the conditions of India and Europe were not quite the same, as particularly at the period in question Europe possessed an institution which tended to foster popular rights, while in classical India there was an institution which tended precisely in the opposite direction of monarchical concentration, the two institutions being respectively Feudalism and Caste.

In regard to the manner in which an absolutism came to be transformed into a limited monarchy or even a democratic republic through the instrumentality of Feudalism, I may refer to the brilliant exposition contained in Professor G. B. Adam’s study of the "Origin of the English Constitution". From it will be seen how contractual basis of Feudalism* familiarised the people with the conception of the reciprocal duties of chief and vassal, of king and subject. If in the Feudal Law the vassal was bound to yield allegiance, his chief was equally bound to provide security and good government. Thus it followed that while in Medieval Europe the king was in one respect conceived of as being above the law, he was also viewed from another aspect as subject, equally with his lieges, to a particular body of laws. It is in this sense that Feudalism appears a kind of "legalism" or "constitutionalism". Had we in ancient India any similar condition? It is true that the subject of one of our ancient king e.g., of Asoka or of Samudragupta, for the matter of that, the king himself, would have admitted the existence of a body of rules to which he was subject just like any ordinary person. But these rules would have been those of the religious or moral code of the times. It is of course true that, being as much a creature of his surroundings as any of his subjects, the king would have shared in the belief in the binding character of these moral rules. Nevertheless, though the prevalence of this opinion must have tended largely to mitigate in practice the absolutism of the Indian ruler, yet it could not have furnished anything comparable to the systematic assertion of right against the king, which Feudal

Law gave. It is noticeable that the *historical* forms of Indian polity in which this feeling prevails that the subject has a right as against his ruler, has been commonest in states where something approaching Feudalism existed, as for instance, in the states of Rajputana. This is my justification for maintaining that. With the facilities afforded by the current political theories of the classical age, India might have developed some kind of popular rule, if our ancient Indian society had passed through some form of Feudalism.

The bearing of caste on free institutions has been more generally understood, and it is not therefore necessary here to do more than indicate the manner in which it has contributed in our country, to the concentration of monarchical power and the consequent depression of popular rights. The sacerdotal foundation of society implies a paternal government that would restrict each caste to the due performance of its appointed functions and work. As division of functions according to caste is an essential feature of this system, it followed that particular departments of activity in the state and in society became the monopoly of special castes; and jealousies were bound to arise in course of time between caste and caste by the growth of economic and political inequality and of immunities secured by influential groups from taxation, jurisdiction and forced labour. This would form a powerful disruptive force in society and necessitate the strengthening of monarchy so as to enable it not only to conduct the routine work of the administration but to be powerful enough to confine each class to its traditional position. Among such privileged castes oligarchies would not arise through the persistence of divided counsels and individual rivalries. The organisation of caste as Party is rendered impracticable by the universal nature of the distinctions of the caste system, that is, the horizontal and unvertical cleavage in society it postulates. Further, the permanent exclusion of the largest part of the population, by its status, from administrative work would deprive society as a whole of opportunities for training in collective action. In these ways, especially, as in course of time castes increased in number, forces of disintegration would gain in volume and necessitate a corresponding concentration of power in the hands of the monarch. That this was so in Ancient India is evident from the passionate denunciations of an Interregnum that we have in several parts of our classical literature.
That Ancient India inspite of these tendencies has so largely escaped the presence of such unrelieved despotisms as other countries similarly placed, is, I consider in a large measure, due to a variety of checks on absolutism which grew up side by side in our land, partly as a result of our peculiar social evolution. Among them I might mention the favourable leaning of the rulers themselves through training, through sympathy and through superstition, to acquiesce in the restraints placed on their power by the current religious and moral codes; the curbing influence of the privileged classes of the Brāhmans and the Kṣatriyas—the priests, the officials and soldiers of the day; the deep-rooted conservatism of the royal counsellors, of the civil servants and the people themselves, which made them oppose any deliberate change from the old system of benevolent paternalism; 'the right of rebellion' latent in despotisms and conceded in India by the political theory which restricted the title of King to the Just Ruler; and, above all, the small size of most of the states of the time and the weak international law of the time which would have condoned the conquest of a state in the throes of civil strife by its neighbour, the abundant testimony of the inscriptions, of the contemporary literature, the accounts of foreign observers—all combine to show that those checks were effective, and that as a result there was a large measure of good government, even according to the best modern standards, in most of the states of ancient India. And if any further proofs were wanting, in defence of this position I would refer to the remarkable manner in which loyalty to the ruler had become an instinct in India, and had been consecrated as a moral and as a political virtue, by the teachings of those who moulded for centuries the course of Indian thought and opinion.
A NEW VERSION OF THE RAMA-LEGEND

(Professor Surendra Nath Majumdar Sastri, M.A., P.R.S.)

It is known to every Hindu that the ‘passing of Sītā’ to the nether world has been narrated in the Uttarakānda of Vālmiki’s Rāmāyāṇa. But Bhavabhūti has, in his Uttarā-Rāmācharita, reunited her with Rāma. And critics have come to the conclusion that the dramatist has turned the tragic history of Rāma to a comedy as tragedies are seldom met with in Sanskrit dramatic literature.* But before accepting this theory we ought to investigate whether the ‘Re-union of Rāma and Sītā’ (after the latter’s abandonment by the former) has anywhere been described in early Sanskrit literature or not. And the result of my investigation on the subject is that Bhavabhūti borrowed it from Guṇāḍhyā whose work is now popularly familiar to us in its eleventh or twelfth century A. D. Sanskrit version—the Kathā-sarit-sāgara.

In the Alaṅkāra-vati-lambaka section of the Kathā-sarit-sāgara there is a sketch of Rāma’s career narrated by Kāñchanaprabhā, a demi-goddess of the Vidyādhari class. She came to know that Nara-vāhana-datta (the son of Udayana of Kauśāmbī by Vāsavadatta) was not able to bear the pangs of separation of her daughter, Alaṅkāra-vati, and so she narrated it to pacify the sorrows of her would-be son-in-law (Naravāhana-datta). This version of the Rāma-legend differs much from that of the Uttarakānda of Valmiki’s Rāmāyāṇa. I reproduce here a portion of that chapter with its purport in English:

किमकरार्य-विश्रवेऽव्रोधे त्यूः युवयोगिदम्।
चनिष्टतावविवः धीरः सहस्तो विचः चिरसम्।
शूयतं रामभद्रस्य सौतदिव्यास्तथा कथा॥ ५६ ॥

58. Therefore do you two (i.e. Naravāhanadatta and Alaṅkāra-vati) feel this impatience for a single-night’s separation? The firm-minded bear the pangs of separation even for an uncertain period. Do you listen to the story of Rāma-bhadra and Sītā?

* Tragedies are rare in Sanskrit. The only one of note is one of the Trivanandrum series ascribed to Bhāsa.
59-64 describe the early life of Rāma upto the death of Rāvaṇa.

65. Rāma returned from the forest. He was governing Ayodhyā. Sītā became pregnant.

66-67. Rāma was walking incognito to get first-hand information about his subjects, and saw one who was driving away his wife for her having been into somebody else's house.

68-69. She was saying that His Majesty Rāma did not drive Sītā away though she (Sītā) dwelt in the house of the Rākiṣa, but she was being driven out for having been to the house of a kinsman. Rāma became very sorry to hear it.

70. Rāma abandoned Sītā on account of the above rumour.

71. Sītā went to the hermitage of Vālmiki.
72-74. Sages dwelling in Vālmiki’s penance-grove did not approve of her living there (for they thought her not to be ‘pure’) and so they formed a plan to migrate from that grove.

75-76. After Vālmiki’s fruitless attempt to convince them of Sitā’s purity, the latter asked them to test her purity in any way they pleased.

77-80. The sages said: “Here is a sacred pond, Titibha-saras by name. It was made by the Earth and the Guardians of the quarters to test the chastity of one Titibhi, who was suspected by her husband. Let Sitā’s chastity be tested there.” Then Sitā accompanied them thither.

81-83. Sitā was tested pure by this water-ordeal, she being able to cross it safely. Then the sages believed her to be a very chaste lady and were about to curse Rāma for banishing her.
84. Sītā asked them not to curse her husband.
85. They then blessed Sītā with the boon of a son.
86. She gave birth to one child who was named "Lava."
87-89. She took her child with her one day, while she went out for a bath. But Vālmiki (who was not aware of this fact) thought the child to be eaten up by some beast of prey; and then created, through his supernatural power, another child with Kusā-grass.
90-91. Then Sītā returned and saw the child. Being pressed by her, the sage had to narrate how the child had been fashioned.
92-93. Thus Sītā got two sons—Lava and Kusā.
वाली एवं च तो दियमस्यायमवाप्यतुः।
विद्याभ सत्त्व वालीकिंस्मुः चतुरास्यकर्कः॥ ८४॥
एकदा चायस्यमुग्धं हल्ला तन्मांससमादतः।
प्रचारिणैः च वालीकिंत्वतः क्रीडङ्गिनयवक्तम्॥ ८५॥
तेन खिलो सुति: सोऽधव शोभादिवाचानानाधितः।
प्रायनि च तयोरिष्वमार्टियेष्व कुमारायो:॥ ८६॥
गला कुवेर-मर्मसः गर्भ-प्रभावयः सः॥
तदुपालानाच मन्दार-पुष्पावतानाय खुपत:॥ ८७॥
तैरिणाँ क्षात्रार्षिततः लिङ्गमचेरवासुभीः।
तैनेतयोपिं क्रामावपास्तः स्मिरिति॥ ८८॥
पत्रस्वयं शुद्धाव सा बालोपिण नवी यथो।
श्रव्यश्रोत्व कुवेराय सर्वोपि च तताः॥ ८९॥
निन्हय त्यखनानादयः प्रभावित वसुमानिचः।
अग्निक्षणुः पथिः स शाली विशाराधम तथैस्तले॥ ९०॥
तत्र ताल्रेच रामस्य नरसिवे सुहच्छामाः।
प्रत्रेतु पुष्पमार्घणाय तैन सागराय लक्षमणः॥ ९१॥
स लतः समराम्यत मौलस्त्री चोक्षस्त्री॥ ९२॥
चालवर्मण बह्वः तमोयायामानयत पुरौषभः॥ ९३॥

94. These two boys learnt the various branches of learning and the use of weapons.

95-98. Then once they killed a stag to eat meat and turned the Siva-linga of Vālmiki to a play-thing. So the sage ordered them to perform, as an expiatory rite, the worship of the linga with flowers procured from the garden of Kuvera.

99. So Lava started for Kaiśasa, got lotuses and flowers after killing Yaksha-guards; and then while he was returning to the hermitage of Vālmiki, he was taking rest under a tree.

101-102. Now Rāma was to perform the Nara-medha sacrifice; and so Lakṣmana was in search of a man (with auspicious marks) to be sacrificed in connection with the performance of that rite. The latter found Lava and brought him to Ayodhyā for that purpose after overpowering him in battle.
103-105. Vālmiki became aware of this fact, through his supernatural power, and sent Kuśa to free him with the help of divine weapons which he just then handed over to him (Kuśa).

106. Kuśa went to Ayodhya and defeated Lākṣmana. Then Rāma also attempted to overpower the child, but could not succeed in his attempt.

107-109. Then Kuśa informed Rāma that he had come to save his brother who had been brought there in chains, and that they were Lava and Kuśa by name, the sons of Rāma by Jñānakī.

110. Then Rāma embraced him saying that he was Rāma.

111-112. The citizens praised Sītā who was then brought thither from the hermitage. Now Rāma lived happily with her placing all the burdens of the kingdoms on the shoulders of his sons.
Thus the firm-minded bear the pangs of separation; so you also bear them for a night only. Saying thus Kāñchana-prabhā vanished with her daughter Alankāravatī. Naravāhan-dattā also proceeded towards Kausambi.

Kathā-sarit-sāgara, IX, 1, 58—115.

This version is unique for many reasons. Nowhere else have we heard of (i) the human sacrifice of Rāma, and of (ii) the water-ordeal of Sītā (over and above the ordeal of fire). Again, here we find (iii) Rāma re-united with Sītā whose ‘passing to the nether world’ has been described by Vālmiki. We ought to note also that (iv) Lava is described here as the only real son of Sītā; for Kuśa was produced by the supernatural power of Vālmiki. This point is well known in Bengal and North Bihar, for reciters of the Rāmāyana repeat it even now. (v) Lava and Kuśa’s fight with Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa has also been recorded in the Pudmapuranā; but there it has been located in the hermitage of Vālmiki. That (vi) this fight took place in Ayodhyā is another important point of this version.

The Rāma-saga has been preserved in various versions. The Buddhist Jātaka version describing Sītā as the sister (and wife, at the same time,) of Rāma was long known to Indologists. Sir George Grierson has drawn the attention of scholars to the Kashmirian version which makes Sītā the abandoned natural daughter of Mandodari picked up by Janaka—a version which occurs, I may be permitted to add, in the Bengali Adbhūta Rāmāyaṇa also. But nowhere else do we find some of the points of the Kathā-sarit sāgara version mentioned above.
Now the \textit{Kathá-sarit-ságara} was composed, in the eleventh or twelfth century A.D., by the great Kashmirian poet Somadeva-Bhațṭa. It is a terse translation, as the author himself has stated, of \textit{Gunádhya’s Brhat Kathá}. The latter work has been mentioned in the Kāvyādaśa of Daṇḍin and by Bānabhaṭṭa, and, as such, it was composed not after the sixth century A.D. Again, as such historical characters as Sātavāhana and Nāgārjuna have been mentioned as the central figures of many strange legends, it is to be placed at least a century after them. Hence, the work of \textit{Gunádhya} seems to have been composed in the 3rd or 4th century A.D. This old collection of Indian folk-lore composed in the Paiśāchī dialect of Prākrit is now lost. There are four abstracts of it, one in Tamil and three in Sanskrit. The oldest Sanskrit version is the \textit{Brhat-Kathá-Śloka-Sangraha} which was discovered in Nepal by M. M. Haraprasād Śāstrī and which is being edited by M. Lacote. The second in point of time is the \textit{Brhat-Kathá-Manjari} of Kṣemendra Vyāsadāsa (eleventh century A.D.) which has been published in the Kāvyamālā series. The third is the \textit{Kathá-sarit-ságara}. As only a few chapters of the first has been printed and as the second is very concise, the third is the only abstract which is generally studied. Its author, Somadeva, says:

\begin{center}
\textbf{वया मृलें तथैवैवित्तं न मनागवधित्रिक्रमः}
\textbf{वया विस्तर-संचे पपात्मं भाषा च भियति}
\end{center}

Book I, i, Sloka 10.

'As (is the) original so it (is); (there is) not the slightest deviation. Only in the hugeness (of that) and conciseness (of this) and in language is difference.' But M. Lacote has, in his Essay on \textit{Gunádhya}, pointed out that there is much difference as to the subject-matter of the above abstracts; and there seems to have existed two different recensions of the \textit{Brhat-Kathá}.

The original work of \textit{Gunádhya} is now lost; and, as such, no one is sure whether this or that tale occurred in it or not. But if there is mention of any tale in more than one of those four abstracts, then we ought to conclude that it existed in the original \textit{Brhat-Kathá}. And let us now apply this test to the above-quoted version of the Rāma-legend. It occurs neither in the printed portion of the \textit{Brhat-Kathá-śloka-sangraha}, nor in its table of contents as
detailed in Lacote’s Essay on Gunādhyāya. As for the Tamil version, we have no access to it. But we find it also in Kṛṣemendra’s Brhat-Kathā-Manjari. But as the Manjari is very concise, its Rāma-legend also is very very short. Yet we find in it the mention of the water-ordeal in the following passage:—

तिष्ठिन्द्रभित्ति जाया दध्रान्विन समागताम्।
प्रतिच्छयार्थिना भर्तृविया निविष्णुजानानसाम्॥

(Kāvyamalaś series ed., p. 516, verse 45.)

As for Rāma’s re-union with Sītā, it has been clearly stated thus:—

पुष्पो क्रम-वसन्तविषयो उल्लो वाल्लोकिना खयम्।
तै प्राय रामो दयित्यो विशालामानिनाय ताम्॥
इत्यव रावः कालाविष्णुम वैयसागमः।
संहृ चरण लमचव वं महस्व स्वप्नियागमि॥

(P. 513, verses 50-51.)

Thus it is clear that the re-union of Rāma and Sītā, or, to put it otherwise, the legend of Rāma without a tragic end was narrated, at least, in one of the two recensions of the Brhat-kathā, which was composed a few centuries before Bhavabhūti. As for the latter’s familiarity with Gunādhyāya’s work, it is clear from the fact, pointed out by Professor Levi, that the plot of Bhavabhūti’s Mālatti-Madhava was borrowed from the original of the tale of Madirāvatī in the Kathā-sarit-sāgara.
POSITION OF THE MĀNASĀRA IN LITERATURE

(PROF. P. K. ACHARYYA, M.A., PH.D., D.LIT., I.E.S.)

The treatise bearing the title Mānasāra* is the standard work on ancient Indian architecture. In seventy chapters it deals in a systematic manner with all architectural matters. In it the term architecture is taken in its broadest sense and implies what is built or constructed. Thus in the first place it connotes all kinds of buildings: religious, residential and military, and their auxiliary members and component mouldings. Secondly, it implies town-planning; laying out gardens; constructing market-places including ports and harbours; making roads, bridges, gate-ways, triumphal arches; digging wells, tanks, trenches, drains, sewers, moats; building enclosure walls, embankments, dams, railings, landing-places, flights of steps for hills and bathing ghats, and ladders. Thirdly, it denotes articles of furniture such as bedsteads, couches, tables, chairs, thrones.

* Etymologically the term Mānasāra implies 'the essence of measurement'—sāra meaning 'essence' and māna 'measurement'. In the treatise itself the term is used in different senses, namely, a generic name for the professors of architecture, a personal name of an architect, and the title of a treatise. In the Daśa-Kumāra-Charita of Danḍin, Mānasāra is the name of the king of Malwa.

In 1834 in his essay on the architecture of the Hindus, Rām Rāz referred to the first few chapters of the Mānasāra from a single fragmentary manuscript he had access to. Since then, several manuscripts have been discovered but owing to some great difficulties set forth elsewhere no body had made any attempt to deal with this huge text in any way for a period of 80 years when the present writer undertook the work in 1914. The text, as known from the eleven badly preserved manuscripts on which the first edition of the present writer is based, is written in five different scripts (Grantha, Tanil, Telugu, Malayalam, and Nāgarī), has undergone five recensions and comprises more than 10,000 lines of a language rightly branded by Dr. Bühler (and Sir R. G. Bhandarkar) as "barbarous Sanskrit" (Epigraphia Indica, Vol. I. p. 377; Indian Antiquary, Vol. XII. pp. 140, 141). Sketches or illustrations of any kind are absolutely wanting in all the available manuscripts. There are, besides, no commentaries on the texts, nor could any body make an attempt to translate any of the texts into English before the translation of the Mānasāra into English by the present writer, mainly because there had been no dictionaries, before the compilation of A Dictionary of Hindu Architecture by the present writer, dealing with the architectural terms which necessarily abound in the Mānasāra and other texts on architecture.
wardrobes, baskets, cages, nests, mills, conveyances, lamps and lamp-posts for streets. It also includes the making of dresses and ornaments such as chains, crowns and head-gears, and foot and arm wears. Architecture also includes sculpture, and deals with carving of phalli, idols of deities, statues of great personages, images of animals and birds. As preliminary matters it is also concerned with the selection of site, testing of soil, planning, designing, finding out cardinal points by means of a gnomon, dialling and astronomical calculation.

With a view to ascertaining the position of the Mānasāra in the non-architectural literature it will be necessary to discuss the points of similarity or resemblance in some details. It is, however, not possible, in an article like this, to take into consideration all the works which deal with architectural matters rather casually. For the purpose of an elaborate treatment, we propose to compare the Mānasāra with the Agni Purāṇa, the Garuḍa Purāṇa, the Matsya Purāṇa, the Bhaviṣya Purāṇa, the Bṛhat Saṃhitā, the Kāmikāgama, and the Suprabhedāgama.

It has been pointed out at the outset that architecture comprises a variety of subjects. But it can never be denied that the fundamental business of the architect is concerned with the building of houses, residential, religious and military. It appears to be a fashion among many peoples of the past as of the present to designate individual buildings by some proper names with or without a meaning.* It seems to have been a prevailing custom among the ancient Hindu architects to describe buildings under some such names. In the eight treatises we have proposed to compare in detail we find buildings bearing some proper names classified and described in the following way.

1. In the Mānasāra, the main buildings are described in some thirteen chapters†. Their common features from bottom to top are given under stories varying from one to twelve. They are also

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* Compare for instance, White Hall, Guild Hall, Mansion House, Cosy Corner, Gordon Castle, Benmore, Barnes Castle, Svāstika, Vijaya, Indra-kānta, Chaturmukha, Pāṇḍhara, Drāviḍa, Kamala-Bhavana, Chīttā-vāstrīma, Pātaliputra etc.

† Chapters XVII to XXX, see the writer's Indian Architecture, pp. 47—51.
classified under three styles—Nagara, Vesara, and Drāvida—depending chiefly on the shape of the topmost part*; three sizes†; Śuddha, Miśra, and Saṃkīrṇa depending on materials of which they are built; Jāti, Chhanda, Vikalpa, and Abhasa depending on the various lengths of the cubit with which buildings are measured§; Sthānaka, Āsana, and Śayana, which are otherwise called Saṃchita. Asamchita, and Apasaṃchita respectively¶; and under males and females depending on shapes.**

The details of the ninety-eight types of buildings described under twelve stories are given below. (The numerical figures on the left indicate the serial numbers and those on the right refer to the lines or verses of the chapter):—

(I) The eight kinds of single storied buildings with their characteristic features, chapter XIX—(1) Vaijayantika with round spire (śīraṣa), pinnacle (śīraḥ), and neck (grīva) (166); (2) Bhoga has similar ear (187); (3) Śrīvisāla has the bhadra or front tabernacle in it (168); (4) Svastibandha has octagonal finials (168); (5) Śrīkara has quadrangular sikhara or steeple (170); (6) Hosti-priṣṭha has oval steeple (171); (7) Skandatāra has hexagonal spire and neck (172); (8) Kesara has the front tabernacles in the centre of the sides, towers at the corners of the roof, and its nose, head, and neck are round or quadrangular (173-175).††

(II) The eight kinds of two storied buildings, chapter XX. The general features are same in all the eight kinds, the distinction

* For details of these styles see the writer's A Dictionary of Hindu Architecture under Nāgara.
† Large, intermediate and small.
‡ (a) Śuddha or pure, made of one material (brick, iron, or wood).
(b) Miśra or mixed, made of two materials.
(c) Saṃkīrṇa or amalgamated made of three or more materials, M. XVIII 139—142.
§ M. XIX. 2—5.
¶ Referring respectively to height, breadth, and length, ibid 7—9, 10—11. The three latter sets also refer to the postures of the idols in case of temples, namely: erect, sitting, and recumbent.
** Equiangular and rectangular respectively. But in case of temples the former contains the male deities while the latter can contain both the female and the male deities, ibid 14-17.
†† For further details see the writer's Dictionary under Ekabhūmi.
lying in the different proportions given to the component parts from above the ground floor to the top:

(9) Śrīkara (94, 2–9); (10) Vijaya (94, 10–15); (11) Siddha (94, 16–18); (12) Pauṣṭika (94, 19–25); (13) Antika (84, 25–27); (14) Adbhūta (94, 28–33); (15) Svastika (95, 34–41); and (16) Puṣkala (94, 42–43). The projection, the general features and carvings on the doors when these buildings are used as temples are given (44–93), (96–116).*

(III) The eight kinds of three-storied buildings, chapter XXI:

The general features and the characteristic marks are similar to those of the two-storied buildings; their names are as follows:

(17) Śrīkānta (2–11); (18) Asana (12–21); (19) Sukhālaya (22–30); (20) Keśara (31–32); (21) Kamalāṅga (33–38); (22) Brahmakānta (39–40); (23) Merukānta (41–49); and (24) Kailāsa.

The general features, characteristic marks and concluding details of the following kinds are similar, except the number of stories, to those of the two and three-storied buildings.

(IV) The eight kinds of four-storied buildings, chapter XXII:

(25) Visṇukānta (3–12); (26) Chaturmukha (13–24); (27) Sadāśiva (25–33); (28) Rudrakānta (34–43); (29) Iśvarakānta (44–46); (30) Mañchakānta (47–57); (31) Vedikānta (58–59); and (32) Indrakānta (60–88).*

(V) The eight kinds of the five-storied buildings, chapter XXIII:

(33) Airāvata (3–12); (34) Bhūtakānta (13–15); (35) Viśvakānta (16–18); (36) Mūrtikānta (19–24); (37) Yamakānta (25–29); (38) Gṛhakānta (30–38); (39) Yajñakānta (33–40); and (40) Brahmakānta (41–42).*

(VI) The thirteen kinds of six-storied buildings, chapter XXIV:

(41) Padmakānta (3–12); (42) Kāntāra (13–14); (43) Sundarī (15); (44) Upakānta (16); (45) Kamala (17–18); (46) Ratnakānta (19)

* For further details see the writer’s Dictionary under Dvītala, Tritala, Chatustala, and Panchatāla.
(9) Nandivardhana (v. 24).
(10) Kuśjara (v. 25).
(11) Guharāja (v. 25).
(12) Vṛṣa (v. 26).
(13) Haṃsa (v. 26).
(14) Ghaṭa (v. 26).
(15) Sarvatobhadra (v. 27).
(16) Siṃha (v. 28).
(17) Vṛitta (v. 18—28).
(18) Chatuṣkoṇa (v. 18—28).
(19) Aṣṭāśra (v. 18—28).
(20) Shodaśāśra (v. 18—28).

7. Kāmikāgama, Paṭala, LV:*

The four classes:
Jāti (verse 128), Chhanda (v. 129), Vikalpa (v. 130), and Abhāsa-
(v. 130).

Paṭala XLV:
Further classifications:
(1) Saṃchita, Apasaṃchita, and Upasaṃchita (v. 6).
(2) Nāgara (v. 6, 12, 13), Drāviḍa (v. 6, 14, 15), and Vesara-
(v. 7, 16—18).
(3) Jāti (v. 7—19), Chhanda (v. 7—20), and Vikalpa (v. 7—20).
(4) Śuddha (v. 7, 21), Miśra (v. 7, 22), and Saṃkīrtṇa (v. 7, 22).
(5) Puṃśika, or masculine, also called Saṃchita (v. 8, 9); Strīni-
nga or feminine (9, 10); and Napuṃsaka or neuter (v. 11).

This class (5) does not refer (like the Mānasāra) to the sexes
of the deities. Here they appear more like residential buildings:
their characteristic features are determined by some architectural
details.

The distinguishing marks of the divisions in other four classes
(1—4) are similar to those of the Mānasāra noticed above.

* This Paṭala (LV) refers to the description of a single building and its
component parts.

So also does the Paṭala XLV, which is named Mālikā (lakṣaṇa) and does not
mean anything but Prāṣāda: Cf. Prāṣāda-vaśa-dīrga-hochchā proktā prāṣāda-
mālikā (11, 4).
In Pātañāla XXXV, Śālās, in almost the same sense as of Prāśāda, are divided into five classes—Sarvatabhodra (v. 87, 88), Varddhamana (v. 87, 88), Svastika (v. 87, 89), Nandyāvarta (v. 87, 90), and Charuka (v. 87, 97).

Their technical names*:

(1) Sindhuka (XLV, 23–28); (2) Saṃpūrṇa (29–30); (3) Merukūta (31); (4) Kṣema (32–34); (5) Śiva (35–38); (6) Harmya (39–40); (7) Saumya (40); (8) Viśāla (41); (9) Sarvakalyaṇa (43–49); (10) Vijaya (50); (11) Bhadra (51); (12) Ranga-mukha (52); (13) Alpa (53–54); (14) Koṇa (55–58); (15) Geya (58a–59); (16) Sāra (60); (17) Puṣkara (61, 63); (18) Adbhūta (61a); (19) Saṃkīraṇa (62); and (20) Daṇḍa (64).

8. Suprabhedāgama, Pātañāla XXXI (named Prāśāda).

Three styles of temples—Nāgara, Drāvīḍa, and Vesara (verses 38–39).


The Maṇḍapas are first divided into four classes:

Deva (god)-māṇḍapa, snapana (bath)-māṇḍapa, brāha (bull, nandin)-māṇḍapa, and niṛṛta (music)-māṇḍapa (verses 96–97, 98 99); further classified under the names—Nandavṛtta, Śriyāvṛtta, Viṅśana, Jayabhadra, Nandyāvarta, Maiṇibhadra, and Viśāla (verses 100–104).

Attention of the reader is invited to the lists of buildings given in the eight works under observation.

The list in the Mānasūra contains in 12 classes (stories) 98 types of buildings; the Agni Purāṇa has under 5 classes (or divisions) 45 types; the Bhaviṣyā Purāṇa also has under the same 5 classes (or divisions) the same 45 types; the Matsya Purāṇa has in 3 divisions 20 types; the Bhaviṣyā Purāṇa has left out the broader divisions and contains 20 types; the Bṛhat Samhitā in the very same way contains 20 types; the Kālikagama has in 3 divisions (of various kinds) 20 types; and the Suprabhedāgama has left out all the minor divisions but pre-

* For further details see the writer’s Dictionary under these terms and Mālika.
(47) Vipulākānta (20) ; (48) Jyoti(ṣ)kānta (50) ; (49) Saroruha (51—52) ;
(50) ; Vipulākritika (53) ; (51) Svastikānta (53) ; (52) Nandyāvarta (54) ;
and (53) Ikṣukānta (55).*

(VII) The eight kinds of the seven-storied buildings, chapter
XXV :

(54) Puṇḍarīka (3—23) ; (55) Śrīkānta (24) ; (56) Śrībhoga (25) ;
(57) Dhāraṇa (26) ; (58) Pañjara (27) ; (59) Asramāgāra (28) ; (60)
Harmyakānta (29) ; and (61) Himakānta (30).†

(VIII) The eight kinds of eight-storied buildings, chapter
XXVI :

(62) Bhūkānta (3—21) ; (63) Bhūpakānta (22—28) ; (64) Svaṅga-
kānta (29—34) ; (65) Mahākānta (35—39) ; (66) Janakānta (40) ; (67)
Tapa(ṣ)kānta (41—42) ; (68) Satyakānta (43—45) ; and (69) Devakānta
(46—47).†

(IX) The seven kinds of the nine-storied buildings, chapter
XXVII :

(70) Saurakānta (5—9) ; (71) Raurava (10) ; (72) Chaṇḍita (11—12) ;
(73) Bhūsaṇa (13—14) ; (74) Vivṛta (20—22) ; (75) Supratikānta
(22—26) ; and (76) Viśvakānta (27—33).†

(X) The six kinds of ten-storied buildings, chapter XXVIII :

(77) Bhūkānta (6—8) ; (78) Chandrakānta (6—8) ; (79) Bhavana-
kānta (9—13) ; (80) Antarikṣakānta (14—15) ; (81) Meghakānta (16—
17) ; and (82) Abjakānta (18).†

(XI) The six kinds of eleven-storied buildings, chapter
XXIX :

(83) Śambhukānta (3—7) ; (84) Ṛṣakānta (8—0) ; (85) Chakrakānta
(10—14) ; (86) Yamakānta (15—17) ; (87) Vajrakānta (18—24) ; and
(88) Akraṇa (24—33).*

(XII) The ten kinds of twelve-storied buildings, chapter XX :

(89) Pāṇchāla (8—10) ; (90) Drāvida (8—10) ; (91) Madhyakānta

* For further details see the writer’s Dictionary under Shatātala,
† For further details, see the writer’s Dictionary under Saptātala, Aṣṭātala,
Navatāla, Daśātala, and Ekādaśātala.
(11—14); (92) Kāliṅgakānta (14—16); (93) Virāṭa (17—27); (94) Kerala (28—30); (95) Vaṃśakānta (31—32); (96) Māgadhakānta (33—34); (97) Janakānta (33—36); and (98) Sphūrjaka or Gurjaraka (7; 37—84 description of the twelfth storey).*

2. Agni Purāṇa, chapter 42, v. 1—9 (general plan), 10—25 (plan with reference to the idol), chapter 104, v. 1—11, 22—34 (further general plan), 11—21 (names, classes, shapes and features of the 45 kinds of temples).

Five divisions depending on five shapes (plans) and each including nine kinds of temples (chapter 104, V. 11—13):

(I) Vairāja—quadrangular (square)—includes (1) Meru, (2) Mandara, (3) Vīmāna, (4) Bhadra, (5) Sarvatobhadra, (6) Charuka (also in the Kāṭikāgama XXXV, 87, 91 where it is called Ruchaka), (7) Nandika, (8) Nandivardhana, and (9) Śrīvatsa (chapter 104, v. 14, 15).


* These ten kinds are named, it should be noticed, after the historic places, well marked in the ancient geography of India, which cover the whole length and breadth of the continent. The topography of these places is well known. For the architectural details of these buildings see the writer's Dictionary under these ten terms. The description of the twelfth storey is given under Dwādasatatala.

3. Garuḍa Purāṇa (chapter 47) has exactly the same general plan (v. 1–20, 32–47), five shapes, five classes (v. 21–23), and 45 kinds of buildings (v. 24–32), but the wording is not identical. The fourth class, is read Mālikā (v. 21) in the general description but the name ‘Maniṇa’ (v. 30) is given later on:

(I) Vairāja—square (v. 21–22)—includes the same nine kinds; but (7) Nandika is read as Nandana and (6) Charuka is correctly read as Ruchaka (v. 24–25).

(II) Puṣpaka—rectangular (v. 22–23)—includes nine kinds where (10) Valabhi is correctly spelt, (13) Viṣāla is read as Vimāna which is apparently a mistake in the Garuḍa Purāṇa because (3) Vimāna is a kind of building included in the square (I) Vairāja class. But the reading of class (II) seems better in the Garuḍa Purāṇa, which may be quoted: (10) Valabhi, (11) Griharāja, (12) Sālāgrha, (13) Mandira, (14) Viṣāla (also ‘Vimāna’), (15) Brahmamandira, (16) Bhavana, (17) Uttambha, and (18) Śibika veśma (v. 26–27.)

(III) Kailāsa—round (v. 21–23)—has nine kinds which also seem to have better reading: (19) V-śaya, (20) Dundubhi, (21) Padma, (22) Mahāpadma, (23) Mukulī (in place of Varuddhani), (24) Usā, (25) Saṅkha, (26) Kalaśa, and (27) Guvāvṛikṣa (v. 28–29).

(IV) Manika—oval (v. 30)—has nine kinds, of which (31), (32), (33) are read as Garuḍa, Simha, and Bhūmukha respectively (v. 29–30).

(V) Triviṣṭapa—octagonal (v. 21, 23)—has nine kinds which seems to be better read: (37) Vaira, (38) Chakra, (39) Muṣṭika (preceded by Babhru, v. 31), (40) Vakra, (41) Svastika, (42) Khadga, (43) Gadā, (44) Śrīvṛikṣa, and (45) Vijaya (v. 31–32).
4. *Matsya Purāṇa*, chapter 269:

The description of the general plan (verses 1—7)* is followed by that of some special plans (verses 8—20).

The names (v. 28—30), descriptions of architectural details (v. 31—46), measures (v. 47—51), division (v. 53—54) of twenty types of buildings:

(1) Meru has 100 cupolas (ārāṅga), 16 stories (bhūmikā), many variegated steeple (śikhara), and is 50 cubits broad (v. 28, 31, 53); (2) Mandāra has 12 stories many steeple and face, and is 45 cubits broad (v. 28, 37, 47, 53); (3) Kailāsa has 9 stories, many steeple and faces and is 40 cubits broad (v. 32, 47, 53); (4) Vimānachchhandha has 8 stories, many steeple and faces (ānana), and is 34 cubits broad (v. 25, 32, 33, 47, 53); (5) Nandivardhana has 7 stories, and is 32 cubits broad (v. 29, 33, 48, 53); (6) Nandana has 7 stories, and is furnished with horns and is 30 cubits broad (v. 29, 33, 48, 53); (7) Sarvatobhadra has 5 stories, 16 corners with various shapes, furnished with art galleries (chitrāśāla) and is 30 cubits broad (v. 29, 34, 35, 48, 53); (8) Valabhīchchhandaka has 5 stories, many steeple and

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* एवं वासुबलिनः हङ्ख्वा भजेत्, पोडगभागिर्मम्।
तस्म मध्ये चतुर्भिस्तु भागागमि तु कारयेत्। 1
भागादगकसाः तत्तुर्दृष्टिक्षयेत्।
चतुर्दिक्ष्ठ तथा चौयं निर्मिती तु ततो तुष्येत्। 2
चतुर्भिन्न भिन्नभिन्नं उच्चयः स्वात्त्र प्रमाणतः।
विगुणः सिखरेऽच्छयों भिन्न्ये चायप्रमाणतः। 3
शिखरावस्य चार्चन विवेया तु प्रदूषिता।
गभृतस्य चार्ये विस्तारे मण्डलस्य तु 4
गार्भस्य वायु विस्तारे मण्डलस्य तु। 5
प्रायतः स्वात्त्र विभिन्नभिन्नभिन्नद्रव्यतः।
पञ्चाणिनं संह्यः गभृतां विच्छयेः। 6
भागेश्वरं गङ्गेन तु प्राग्रीर्वं कक्ष्येद्।
गर्भस्य प्रभागात्यतं सुखस्स्यवः। 7
एतत् सामान्यस्सुदिह्यं प्रासाद्वक्षः च लक्षणम्।
faces, and 16 cubits broad (v. 35, 50, 53); (9) Vṛṣa should resemble the height and length of the bull, be round and without corners, there should be 5 cupolas, 2 stories and it should be 4 cubits high at the central hall (v. 30, 36, 44, 45, 53); (10) Simha resembles the lion and is 16 cubits broad, is adorned with the famous chandraśālā (gable-windows) and is 6 stories high by the width of the front neck (v. 29, 36, 40, 49, 53); (11) Gaja resembles the elephant and is 16 cubits broad, and has many gable-windows on top rooms (v. 36, 41, 49, 53), (12) Kumbha resembles the water-jar, has 9 stories, 5 cupolas (aḍhas), aṅguli-puṭa-samstāna (?), and is 16 cubits broad (v. 37, 49, 53); (13) Samudraka has 16 sides around, 2 gable-windows at the two sides, and 2 stories (v. 38, 53); (14) Padma has 3 stories,

Compare also the following:

सामान्यस्मृत गद्विवार प्राप्ति शृणुर्विजाति

ब्रम्भेन्द्राय यत्र तिमिलिते देवता: ॥ २१ ॥

रत्नाङ्कल्लित मानिन वाञ्चकार्यविनिझुति: ।

नेमियान्त्रित विस्तिर्याय प्राप्ति अभ्यं करित: ॥ २२ ॥

gambu tu vibhūn kuryaṁ tasya mane bhavedirhu ।

स एव भिसेरीस्ये विपुरेः शिक्षरे मत: ॥ २३ ॥

प्रार्थीवेच पञ्चभागिन निहकास सत्यं चोखिति ।

कार्येत सूर्येत तद्विवार प्राकार्यविभागत: ॥ २४ ॥

प्रार्थीवेच पञ्चभागिन निहकास विशिष्टवः ।

कुमाराः च पञ्चभागिन प्रार्धीवेच कण्णमुलत: ॥ २५ ॥

स्थापयेत चकणं तत्र गभरल्ले हर्षस्वलत: ।

evan tu vibhūn kuryādvevādhyānyamśyaḥ ॥ २६ ॥

लिङ्गभानानुभुत्वेच कपोलेद्विवार्य वा पुत्र: ।

एवं समासत: प्रेक्षा नामत: शृणुतामुना ॥ २७ ॥

तथा भवावद्यः सम चतुर्विंशति गुरुवन्द्वः ।

शोभकामालास्फोटी मध्यमस्य प्रकौशिता ॥५३॥

तथा हंसाद्यः पञ्च कष्टिः शिमद्रा मता: ॥५४॥
16 corners, a variegated steeple and is 20 cubits broad (v. 30, 39, 49, 53); (15) Garuḍa has gṛharāja (large house) around, 7 stories, 3 top rooms, and is 8 cubits broad, and there should be 86 compartments (bhūmikā, lit. stories, v. 42) all around the outside (v. 41, 43, 51). There is a similar Garuḍa-building with 10 stories and a second Padmaka building with 2 stories more (i.e. 12 stories, v. 43); (16) Haṃsa is 10 cubits broad (36, 51); (17) Vartula is 20 cubits broad (v. 29, 49, 53). No special description is given of the remaining: (18) Chaturaśra (four cornered, v. 28, 53); (19) Aṣṭāṣra (eight cornered) (v. 29, 53); and (20) Shodoṣāṣra (sixteen cornered, v. 29, 53).

Similar types of buildings are described almost in the same way in both the Bhaviṣya Purāṇa and the Brhat Saṃhitā.

5. Bhaviṣya Purāṇa, chapter 130, names (verses 23—26), description of the architectural details and measures (v. 27—35) of the twenty kinds of buildings (same as in the Brhat Saṃhitā, see below):

(1) Meru is 39 cubits high and 32 cubits broad, has 12 stories, various windows (kuhara) and four gateways (v. 27).
(2) Mandara is 30 cubits broad and has 10 gateways (v. 28).
(3) Kailāsa is 28 cubits broad, has steeples and 8 stories (v. 28).

The description of the following is clearer in the Brhat Saṃhitā, which is quoted below. The names are given here:

(4) Vimāna with latticed windows (v. 29).
(5) Nandana (v. 29).
(6) Samudga (v. 30), Samudra, v. 24, as in the Brhat Saṃhitā, LVI, 28, 53.
(7) Padma (v. 30).
(8) Garuḍa (v. 31).
(9) Nandi-vardhana (v. 28, Nandi v. 31).
(10) Kuṇjara (v. 32).
(11) Gṛharāja (v. 32): Brhat Saṃhitā, (LVI 25) has 'Guharājā.'
(12) Viṣa (v. 33).
(13) Haṃsa (v. 33).
(14) Ghaṭa (v. 33).
(15) Sarvatobhadra (v. 34).
(16) Siṃha (v. 35).
(17) Vṛṣṭa (as in the Brāhat Saṃhitā, LVI, 29, 49; but here (v. 33) it is read Vṛṣa like (12), which is apparently a mistake (see v. 30).

No special account is given of the remaining.

(18) Chatuskona (four-cornered, v. 25), Matsya Purāṇa (chapter 269, v. 28, 53) reads Chaturaśra; and Brāhat Saṃhitā (LVI, 28) has Chatuskona.

(19) Aštāsra (octangular, v. 25).
(20) Shodaśasra (sixteen-cornered, v. 25).

Varāhamihira seems to have taken these from a work like the Bhaviṣya Purāṇa and improved in the Brāhat Saṃhitā.

6. Brāhat Saṃhitā (LVI, 1—19);

The religious merits acquired by building temples (verses 1—2). The suitable sites—in the garden, wood, banks of rivers, seas or tanks (v. 3); ground (v. 9); general plan (v. 10); situation of the door (v. 10); comparative measures of the length, breadth, and height (v. 11), of the adytum (garbha, v. 12), of the doors and their different parts (v. 12—14); carvings on the door (v. 15); comparative measures of the idol, pedestal, and door (v. 16) and the heights of stories (v. 29—30).

This is followed by the classification (v. 17—19) and the description of the architectural details (v. 20—28) of the same twenty kinds of temples (Prāśāda) as are given in the Matsya Purāṇa and the Bhaviṣya Purāṇa. The names of these buildings are given below; their details being almost same as in the Purāṇas:

(1) Meru (v. 20).
(2) Mandara (v. 21).
(3) Kailāśa (v. 21).
(4) Vimāna-(chchhanda) (v. 17—22).
(5) Nandana (v. 22).
(6) Samudga (v. 23).
(7) Padma (v. 23).
(8) Garuḍa (v. 24).
serves the most significant one, namely, the 3 styles (Nāgara, Vesara, Drāvida), which comprise 10 types of buildings.

The various broader divisions, such as Śuddha, Saṃchita, Sthānaka, Jāti, Puṃlinga, etc., we have seen in the Mānasāra, are repeated in the same terms and same sense in the Āgamas. The most important division, viz., into the styles—the Nāgara, Vesara and Drāvida—is also preserved intact in the latter works. These are purely architectural divisions and they are not taken into consideration in the non-architectural treatises like the Purāṇa and the Bhārat Saṃhitā. Even the broadest division into stories under which the Mānasāra describes the buildings in 12 or 13 chapters has lost its prominence in the latter works.

Thus the Mānasāra has the largest number of the types, namely, 98.

The Agni Purāṇa, and the Garuḍa Purāṇa have 45 types each.

The Matsya Purāṇa, the Bhaviṣya Purāṇa, the Bhārat Saṃhitā, and the Kāṇikāgama have 20 types each.

The Suprabhedaṅgama has the smallest number of types, namely, 10.

The technical names of these types of buildings and the maximum number of their stories are, as we have seen above, common in many cases. We have also seen that in some instances the architectural details are identical. The lists of the Agni Purāṇa and the Garuḍa Purāṇa on the one hand, and the Matsya Purāṇa, the Bhaviṣya Purāṇa and the Bhārat Saṃhitā on the other, are strikingly similar. Of the works containing the lists of 20 types, the Bhārat Saṃhitā gives the most improved description. But in respect of brevity, explicitness, and precision, the Suprabhedaṅgama, which contains the smallest number of types, surpasses all.

The common names of the types, the identity of their details and the similarity in their description are not accidental. The grades of the linguistic style and the explicitness and precision of the description are not unconnected. And the variations in the number of types of buildings treated in these works cannot be meaningless. But before hazarding an opinion, it will be better to compare some of the other important points of similarity between the Mānasāra and the architectural portions of other works.
Amongst others, the three crucial features in architecture, at least so far as the ancient records are concerned, seem to be the measurements, the orders or columns, and the styles. Similarities in these respects are hardly accidental and may be ascribed to a common origin.

(i) Measurements—

(a) The linear measurement is divided into six kinds:—
1. Māna,
2. Pramāṇa,
3. Parimāṇa,
4. Lambamāṇa,
5. Unmāna, and
6. Upamāṇa. (M. LV, 3—9).

References to these measurements are met with also in non-architectural treatises, like the Matsya Purāṇa (chapter 258, verse 16), the Suprabhedāgama (Paṭala, XXXIV, 35), as well as the Bimbamāṇa (British Museum, Mss. 658, 5292, verse 9).

(b) The primary measurement (śādimāṇa) refers to comparative measures and is divided into nine kinds:—

The height of an image is determined by comparing it with the
1. breadth of the main temple,
2. height of the adytum,
3. length of the door,
4. measurement of the basement,
5. cubit,
6. tāla,
7. āṅgula,
8. height of the worshipper, and
9. height of the riding animal. (M. LV. 10—15).

* Measurement from the foot to the top of the head is Māna (which is nothing but height).

Pramāṇa is the measurement of breadth.

Parimāṇa is the measurement of width or circumference (parītaḥ).

Lambamāṇa is the measurement by the plumb lines or the lines drawn perpendicularly through different parts of the body, the māṇa or the measurement of height being taken by the surface of the body.

Unmāṇa is the measurement of thickness (nimma) or diameter.

Upamāṇa is the measurement of interspace (antara), such as that between two feet of an image.

Parimāṇa, unmāṇa and māna are also mentioned in the Sukranīti (I. 310), but their meanings are not quite clear.
Each of these measurements is again divided into nine kinds (M. LV. 22).

Under (1), (2), (3), (4), the proportions naturally vary on various occasions but the general methods are similar in these treatises; compare for instance, the *Suprabhedāgama* (XXXI. 1 15).

The aṅgula (finger breadth) and the hasta (cubit) measures, under (5) and (7), are in fact the same. The finger-breath, equivalent to \(\frac{3}{4}\) inch, is perhaps the earliest unit of measurement ever invented by human brain. Though free from being lost or changed in the course of time, it has its own defects, namely, the fingers of two persons are hardly of equal breadth, and the finger of some person is liable to change owing to various natural causes. Apparently with a view to avoiding these defects finger-breath is ascertained by the measures of certain other objects, namely, atom, car-dust, hair-end, nit, louse, and barley corn\(^*\). The largest size of finger breadth is stated to be equal to eight barley corns, the intermediate seven barley corns, and the smallest six barley corns. Again, for the same purpose, this unit of measure is divided into three kinds—mānaṅgula, mātrāṅgula, and dehalabdhaṅgula. Of these, Mānaṅgula which is equal to eight barley corns, is meant to be the unit proper: Mātrāṅgula is the measure taken by the middle finger of the master who makes an image (or a building): Dehalabdhaṅgula is the measure equal to one of the equal parts into which the whole height of a statue is divided for sculptural measurement\(^†\).

This aṅgula measure is practically of the same kind in almost all the Sanskrit works bearing upon measurement, for instance—

(1) Mānasāra (II. 40—45, 46—47, 48—52, 53—64, LXXIV, 49—53, etc).

\(^*\) 8 atoms=1 car-dust.
8 car-dusts=1 hair-end.
8 hair-ends=1 nit,
8 nits=1 louse.
8 lice=1 barley corn.
8 barley corns=1 aṅgula.

\(^†\) For further details see the writer's Dictionary under Aṅgula.
(2) Brhat-Samhita (L.VIII, 1, 2).
(3) Siddhanta Siromani (ed. Bapudeva, p. 52).
(5) Brahmanda Purana (part I, section 2, chapter VII).
(7) Vasistha-vidya (ed. Ganapati Sastri, I, 3—5).
(8) Bimba-mana (Ms. British Museum, nos. 558, 592, verse 91).
(9) Suprabhedagama (XX. 1—9, 10—16, 20—26, etc).
(10) Kautitya Arthashastra (ed. Shama Sastri, p. 106); compare also,
(11) Manu Samhita, VIII, 271.
(12) Ramayana, VI. 20, 22.
(13) Satapatha Brahmana, X, 2, 13, III. 5, 4, 5.
(14) Aitareya Brahmana, VIII 5,
(15) Chhandogya Upanisad, V, 18, 1, etc.
(16) Sulva Sutra of Baudhayana (J. R. A. S. 1912, pp. 231—233, notes 1, 2).

The Talamana (under 6) is a sculptural measure. The length of face inclusive of head is taken as the unit of measurement.* But it seems more proper to have the span or the distance between the tips of the fully stretched thumb and middle finger, which is technically called tala†, as the unit. It admits of many varieties: ten tala measures are mentioned in the Manasara‡; the Bimba-
mana has reference to twelve kinds§. Each of these ten or twelve varieties is again divided into three types, namely, uttama or large, madhyama or intermediate, and adhama or small. Thus an image is of ten (daśa) tala measure when its whole length is ten times the face inclusive of head. In the large type of the ten tala system, however, the whole length is divided into 124 equal parts which are proportionately distributed over the different parts of the body; in the intermediate type the whole length is divided into 120 equal parts, and in the smallest type into 116 equal parts. In the nine

* Matsya Purana, chapter 258, verse 19: Mukhamanena kartavyavarvavayavakalpana.
† Amssumadhbeta of Kaśyapa, fol. 251 (Ms. Egg. 3148, 3012).
‡ One to ten tala (M. LX. 6—35, etc).
§ One to twelve tala (Appendix).
(nava) tāḷa system, the whole length would be nine times the face; in the eight (aṣṭa) tāḷa eight times, and so forth.

The principle of the tāḷa measure is fundamentally the same in all the works dealing with the subject, although certain differences in matters of detail are noticed; compare, for instance—

(1) Mānasāra—LX, 6–35; LVII, LIX, 14–64; 67–100, LXVI. 0–78; LXV. 2–179.

(2) Bimbamāṇa—verses, 17–72, 91–138 and appendix X,
(4) Brhat Saṃhitā—LVIII, 4.
(5) Aṃśumadbheda of Kāśyapa (Eg. fol. 251, 3148, 3012).
(6) Brāhmaṇḍa Purāṇa—Part 1, anuṣaṅgapāda, VII. 97.
(7) Matsya Purāṇa—chapter 258, verse 19.

The details of the tāḷa measures from the following authorities are given by Mr. Rao.*

(8) Śilparatna.
(9) Aṃśumadbhedāgama.
(10) Kā(ṛ)kaṭaṇḍiṅgama.
(11) Vaikhānasāgama.
(12) Kāṃkāgama.

Another exclusively sculptural measure is that mentioned under (8), (9), namely, that the height of an image is compared with the height of the worshipper (yajamāna), and the height of the riding animal (vāhana) is compared with the height of the main idol. Each of these admits of nine kinds. The height of an image may be equal to the full height of its worshipper, and may extend up to his hair-limit on the forehead (sometimes it is stated to be the eye-line), nose-tip, chin, arm-limit (to the shoulder), breast, heart, navel, and sex organ. The height of the riding animal is in the same manner compared with the height of the main idol†.

Corresponding to the above mentioned sculptural measures there are exclusively architectural measures also.

† Mānasāra, LV, 30–33, etc.
The architectural Gaṇya-māna* or the comparative heights of the component members of a structure corresponds to the sculptural Tāla-māna or the comparative heights of the component limbs of a statue.

The Ghana-māna or the measurement by the exterior, and the Aghana-māna or the measurement by the interior of a structure is also exclusively architectural†.

In another kind of architectural measure the height of a structure is compared with its breadth. It admits of five proportions, technically called, Śāntika, Paustika, Jayada, Sarva-kāmika or Dhananda, and Adbhuta, the height being respectively equal to it, 1¼, 1½, 1¾, and twice of the breadth‡.

These latter items, highly technical and extremely minute in detail, are found in no other treatise under observation than the Mānasāra. Thus in respect of at least purely architectural and sculptural measures the Mānasāra of all these works may occupy the first place among the works under observation.

(ii) The five orders

Like the five Greco-Roman orders, Doric, Ionic, Corinthian, Tuscan, and Composite, columns, in ancient India also were divided into five main orders or classes. In the Mānasāra§ they are called Brahma Kānta, Viṣṇu Kanta, Rudra Kānta, Siva Kānta, and Skanda Kānta. These divisions are based on the general shapes of columns. With respect to demensions and ornaments they are called Chitra-

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* See the writer's Dictionary and compare the Mānasāra. XXXII. 36—40; XXIX, 35—38; XXXIII, 134—145, 216—117, 248; XLV, 86—97; LIII, 29—34; XIII, 36—40, etc.

† See the writer's Dictionary, sub. voce.

‡ See the writer's Dictionary, under Utsedha.

§ Chapter XV, 20—23, 31, 39, 40, 73, 204.

karna, Padma-kantha, Chitra-stambha, Paliika-stambha, and Kumbha-stambha. A sixth one* in the latter division is pilaster, not pillar proper, and is called Koṣtha-stambha and Kudya-stambha.

Of the Purāṇas, these details are very clear only in the Matsya Purāṇa. In this Purāṇa‡ as well as in the Brhat Samhitā, the five orders are called Ruchaka, Vajra, Dvi-vajra, Pralīnaka, and Vṛttta.

Of the Āgamas§, the Suprabhedāgama contains the essential details. The names of the five orders according to this Āgama are Śrī-kara, Chandra-kanta, Saumukhya, Priya-darśana, and Subhamkarī. The last one is stated to be the Indian composite order, being compound of Saumukhya and Priya darsana, just like the Graeco-Roman composite order which is compound of Corinthian and Ionic.

Between the European and the Indian columns, however, there is a striking point of difference. Of the Graeco-Roman orders, the five names have been left unchanged, while in India the names of the five orders have varied in various treatises referred to above. It is true, all the same, that the criteria of divisions are essentially the same in the Mānasāra, the Āgamas, the Purāṇas, and the Brhat Samhitā. We have also seen above that the Mānasāra contains two sets of names of the five orders, one set referring like the Āgamas, the Purāṇas, and the Brhat Samhitā to the shapes of the columns or more precisely the shafts, while the other refers mostly to the capitals. The works other than the Vāstu-śāstras as represented by the Mānasāra have not kept this distinction clear. What we can reasonably infer from this fact as regards the mutual relation of these treatises will be further elucidated by the consideration of the component parts of the column. The question of the variation of the names of the five orders in the Indian works can perhaps

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* Mānasāra, XV, 84.
† Matsya Purāṇa, chapter 255, 1–6.
‡ Brhat Samhitā, VIII 27–30, also J. R. A. S. (N. S.) 285, notes 1. 2.
§ See also the Kāmikāgama, Patala XXXV, 24–26. 161. LV, 203, etc.
¶ See references given above, and for further details consult the writer's Dictionary under Stambha.
be explained. While in Europe the origin of the names of the five orders is traced to historical geography*, in India they were based on the shapes of columns. And as the Indians are comparatively religious and poetical rather than historical in temperament and imagination, they chose mythological and highly poetical names according to the spirit of the times when these various works were composed. Thus in the Mānasāra, we see the orders bearing the names of mythological deities, Brahmā Viṣṇu, Rudra, Śiva, and Skanda; as well as Chitra-kānta (variegated ears), Padma-kānta (graceful like lotus), Chitra-stambha (of variegated shaft), Palīkā-stambha (edged like a measuring pot), and Kumbha-stambha (of jug-shaped capital); while in the Āgama, they are highly poetical names—Śrī-kara (beautifying), Chandra-kānta (graceful like the moon), Saumukhya (of very charming face), Priyadarśana (of pleasing sight), Śubhanākāri (auspicious). and in the Purāṇas, and the Brhat Samhitā they are called Ruchaka (beautiful or pleasing), Vajra (club, hence lasting), Dev-vajra (doubly lasting), Praśnaka (firmly attached, hence a pilaster), and Vṛttā (round, hence solid and dignified).

With regard to the names and the functions of the component parts of the column, the variation is a little less marked. But these subservient parts, called mouldings and common to all orders, vary in number. Thus in the Mānasāra which, of almost all the treatises, deals separately and exhaustively with the pedestal, the base, and the entablature, mention is made in connection with pillar, of five mouldings†, apparently of the shaft, namely, Bodhikā, Mushtibandha, Phalakā, Tātikā, and Ghaṭa. The Suprabhedāgama describes two sets of seven mouldings‡, one set referring to the column of the main building and the other to that of the pavilion—Dandā,

* Doric is derived from the species of columns first seen in the cities of Doria (Vitruvius, IV. 1). That species of which the Ionians (inhabitants of Ionia) were the inventors has received the appellation of Ironic (ibid). Callimachus constructed columns after the model of the tomb in the country about Corinth, hence this species is called Corinthian (ibid). The other two orders, Tuscan and Composite, are of Italian or Roman origin. The Tuscan order has reference to the country, formerly called Euria in Italy, and the Composite is compound of Corinthian and Ionic (Gwilt Encyclopaedia of Architecture, article 178).
† Mānasāra, XLVII 16—18.
‡ Suprabhedāgama. Paṭala, XXXI, 56—60, 107—108.
Maṇḍi, Kaṇṭha, Kumbha, Phalakā, Vīra-kaṇṭha and Potikā; and Bodhikā, Uttara, Vājana, Mūrdhikā, Tulā, Jayantī, and Tala. These mouldings have reached the significant number of eight in the Matsya Purāṇa, the Brhat Saṃhitā, and the Kirāṇa-tantra, and bear the very same eight names*, to wit, Vāhana, Ghaṭa, Padma, Uttarostha, Bāhulya, Bhāra (or Hāra), Tulā, and Upa-tulā.

The significance of the number ‘eight’ referred to above lies in the fact that the component parts of the Graeco-Roman orders also are eight in number†, and like the five orders themselves, their names are invariable ever since their introduction, though most of them have been given more than one name. They are called (1) the ovalo, echinus or quarter round; (2) the talon, ogee or reversed cyma; (3) the cyma, cyma-recta or cymatium; (4) the torus; (5) the scotia or trochilos; (6) the cavetto, mouth or hollow; (7) the astragal; and (8) the fillet, listet or annulet.

The Mānasāra refers to five mouldings; the Suprabhedagama describes seven; and the Matsya Purāṇa, the Brhat Saṃhitā, and Kirāṇa-tantra, each, makes mention of eight mouldings‡. But if the very large number of mouldings, described in the Mānasāra in connection with the pedestal, the base, and the entablature, be also taken into consideration, the Mānasāra will certainly exceed all other treatises under notice. Thus in the Mānasāra we can detect the following mouldings§—(1) abja, ambuja, padma or

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† J. R. A. S. (N.S.) 1. 285, notes 1, 2.
‡ See figures 867—874 and article 2532, Gwilt, Encyclopaedia of Architecture; Glossary of Architectural terms, Plate XXXIV.
§ There are mouldings which bear a large number of names or synonyms, e.g.

(1) Kapota, prastara, maṇḍha, prachchhādana, gopāna, vitāna, valabhī, and maṭtā-vaṇa.

(ii) Prāti, prastara, prati-vajana, anvanta, avasāna, vidhāna, and vidhānaka.

(iii) Prati-rūpa, dalakāra, vajana, vajana, kṣepana, veṭa, paṭṭa, uttara, paṭṭikā, kampa, trika, maṇḍha, and antarita.

(iv) Tulā-dāṅga, jayanthī, and phalaka.

(v) vaktra-hasta, lūpā, gopānaka, and chandra.

(vi) Saṃgraha, muṣṭi-bandha, maddala, uddhṛṭa-hasta, valabhī, and dhāraṇa.
saroruha (cyma); (2) antara, antarita, antarāla or antarika (fillet); (3) anghri; (4) amśu; (5) argala; (6) ādhāra; (7) alīnga; (8) āsana; (9) bhadrā; (10) bodhikā; (11) dala; (12) dharā-(kumbha), (13) gala; griva, kaṇṭha or kandhara (dado); (14) ghaṭa; (15) gopana (ka); (16) hāra (bead); (17) jāman (plinth); (18) kapota; * (19) kampana (fillet); (20) karna; (21) kumbha; (22) rumuda (torus or astragal); (23) kendra; (24) kṣepaṇa; (25) muṣṭi-bhandha; (26) mūla; (27) mṛṇala or mṛṇālikā; (28) naṭaka; (28) nāśi; (30) nimna (drip); (31) paṭṭa or paṭṭikā (fillet); (32) prati or pratika; (33) prati-vakra; (34) prati-vājana; (35) prati-bandha; (36) pratima; (37) pāduka; (38) prastara; (39) phalakā; (40) ratana, compound with kampa, paṭṭa, and vapra; (41) tāṭika; (42) tūṅga; (43) uttara (fillet); (44) upana (plinth); (45) vapra or vapraka; (46) valabha or valabhi; and (47) vājana (fillet).

There is a number of compound mouldings also, such as, Kampa-karna, Karna-padma, Kṣuḍra kampa, Kṣuḍra-padma, Kṣeṇaṃbuja, Mahāmbuja, Padma-kampa, Ratna-paṭṭa, Ratna-vapra, Vajra-paṭṭa, etc.


In the Suprabhedāgama, only four classes‡ of bases are mentioned, namely, Padma-bandha, Chāru-bandha, Pāda-bandha, and

(vii) Nāṭaka, anta, mṛṇalikā, vallikā, chitrāṅga, and kulikāṅgrikā.
(viii) Uttarā, vājana, ādhāra, ādheya, sāyana, udhṛṣṭita, mahā-tauli, mūrdhaka, and svavaṃsaka.

* Dovecot, also called Kapotapālī.
† Mānasāra, XIV. 11-387. See details in the writer’s Dictionary under ‘Adhiṭṭhāṇa’.
‡ Suprabhedāgama, XXXI. 17f
Pratikrama. The *Kāmikāgama* gives only the general description of the base.*

In the *Mānasāra* sixteen types of pedestals are described in detail under three classes†—Vedi-bhadra, Prati-bhadra, and Mañcha-bhadra.

Only scanty information of the pedestal is found in the *Kāmikāgama*, the *Suprabhedāgama*,§ and a Tāmil version of the *Mayamata*.¶

As regards the entablature, various mouldings and their measurements are given under eight classes in the *Mānasāra*.** The *Kāmikāgama*,†† the *Suprabhedāgama*,‡‡ and the *Vāstu-vidyā* only briefly refer to the general description of the entablature.

The comparative measurements of the column proper and the pedestal, the base, and the entablature are also given in more detail in the *Mānasāra* than in the *Āgamas* and some of the architectural treatises.§§

Thus in respect of the names of columns, the number of their subservient parts called mouldings, and also the base, the pedestal, and the entablature, as well as their comparative measurements, the *Mānasāra* can reasonably occupy the first place among all the treatises under observation. ¶¶

(iii) The three Styles

The style is also a technical and purely architectural subject. Thus it is not dealt with in the *Purāṇas*, not to speak of the epics or other poetical works where casual references to architecture and

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† Mānasāra, XII. 37—127. See details in the writer’s *Dictionary* under ‘Upa-pīṭha.’
‡ Pāṭala XXXV, 115, 122.
§ Pāṭala, XXXI, 12.
** Chapter XVI, 22—119. See details in the writer’s *Dictionary* under ‘Prastara.’
†† XXXV, 27—29 LIV. 1—4, 7—8, 9—46, 47.
‡‡ XXXI, 68—71.
¶¶ See details in the writer’s *Dictionary* under Stambha, Upa-pīṭha, Adhisaṭhāna and Prastara.
sculpture are met with. In some of the epigraphical documents and in the Bṛhat Saṃhitā mention of the style is occasionally made. The Āgamas contain a little more detail, while in the Mānasāra the subject is exhaustively treated.

The Nāgara, Vesara, and Drāviḍa are the three broad styles distinguished in the Mānasāra.* They are applied to both architecture† and sculpture.‡ With reference to the construction of cars or chariots a fourth style is mentioned.§ This is called Randhra which seems to be a corrupt form of Andhra. In an epigraphical record¶ Kaliṅga is mentioned as a distinct style of architecture. But if the identification of Vesara with Telugu or Tri-Kaliṅga be accepted, the Kaliṅga and the Andhra would be but two branches of the Vesara style. In the case of twelve-storyed buildings,** which are the most magnificent and imposing edifices, twelve special types, not necessarily the styles, of residential dwellings are also mentioned in the Mānasāra. All these names are geographical implying the twelve provinces into which the then India was divided architecturally, if not politically also. And these types are distinctly based on geographical divisions, in exactly the same way as the three styles, the Nāgara, Vesara, Drāvida, as also the two branches of the Vesara, the Kaliṅga and Andhra, are based. The Graeco-Roman orders on which the European styles of architecture are mainly based, are also but geographical names†† as stated above.

* Mānasāra, XVIII, 92—104. For details, see the writer’s Dictionary under Nāgara.
† Ibid. LIII, 53-54; XXI, 72-78; XXVI, 76; XLIII, 124-125, etc.
‡ Ibid. LII, 78, 100; LIII, 46-47, etc.
§ Ibid XLIII, 124—125.
¶ In the record itself, it is, however, stated that the Nāgara, Vesara, Drāviḍa, and Kaliṅga are four types not styles of buildings. (An inscription on the capital of a pillar in the Amrītesvara temple at Holal, Government of Madras, G. O. No. 1260, 15th August, 1915; Progress Report of the Assistant Superintendent of Epigraphy, Southern Circle, 1914-15, page 90).
** Pāñchala, Drāviḍa, Madhyakānta, Kāliṅga, Va(Vi)rāţa, Kerala, Vamśiaka, Māgadhā, Janaka and Gujārataka (Mānasāra, XXX, 5—7). We have seen above that 98 kinds of mansions are described in the Mānasāra. In the Holal inscription mentioned above a reference is made to 64 kinds of mansions.
†† See above.
In the Kāmikāgama as well as in the Suprabhedāgama, frequent references to the three broad styles, the Nāgara, Vesara, and Drāvida are made.*

The distinguishing features of these styles are practically the same in all the three works—the Mānasāra, the Kāmikāgama, and the Suprabhedāgama.† The Andhra and the Kaliṅga branches of the Vesara style are not mentioned in the Āgamas. But we have seen that the Kāmikāgama, like the Matsya Purāṇa, the Bhaviṣya Purāṇa and the Brhat Saṃhitā, describes twenty kinds of mansions, while the Suprabhedāgama has reference to ten kinds. These varieties of buildings, as also the sixty-four kinds mentioned in the Holal inscription, and the ninety-eight kinds described in the Mānasāra, do not, however, represent the styles which fall only under three broad divisions, namely, the Nāgara, Vesara and Drāvida.

In the Brhat Saṃhitā, a clear mention is made only of the Drāvida style in connection with the measurement of the face, although the other styles may be said to have been implied. It is stated that according to one’s own āṅgula (finger-breadth) the face (of an image) should be twelve āṅgulas (nine inches) broad and long; but as stated by the architect Nagnajit the face should be twelve āṅgulas long and fourteen āṅgulas broad in the Drāvida style. Obviously, therefore, the former measurement refers to other existing styles which are, however, not specified.

In regard to the styles also, then, the Mānasāra must be given pre-eminently the first place among all these works which in the present item of comparison comprise practically this work and the Āgamas.

In the light of all these facts—merely to deal with the question in its aspects as they concern the Mānasāra—I think it impossible to resist the following conclusion. There must have been a relation of indebtedness between the Mānasāra and the other works both architectural and non-architectural. Except in a few instances noted above, it is, however, difficult to state definitely that the

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*Kāmikāgama, LXV, 6—7, 12—18, etc., Suprabhedāgama, XXXI, 37—39, etc.
† For details, see the writer’s Dictionary under Nāgara.
‡ Chapter LVIII, 4.
Mānasāra is the debtor or creditor to this or that work in respect of this or that matter. Most of the difficulties, it is needless to observe, hinge upon the chronology, the irritating point in Sanskrit literature. If the chronology of the works discussed above were definitely known, it would have been easier to assume that the works earlier than the Mānasāra had been known to its author and those later than the Mānasāra had been influenced by it. Except in cases of support by archaeological records, epigraphical or non-epigraphical, the dates assigned to Sanskrit works are mostly but provisional. I have discussed elsewhere the available materials and the reasons which have induced me to provisionally place the Mānasāra somewhere in the fifth to seventh century of the Christian era. In view of the essential points of comparison and the accepted chronology of those works which have been critically studied by scholars, I would say that the Brīhat Saṃhitā and the later Agamic and Paurāṇic works, in respect of architectural and sculptural matters, as well as most of the avowedly architectural manuscripts are debtors to the Mānasāra, while it is a debtor itself in respect of the same matters to the Vedic and the early epic works as also the poli-technical treatises like the Kautiliya Arthasastra, and the Kāmamandakiya Nitiśāra, and the avowedly architectural works of the thirty-two authorities mentioned in the Mānasāra which might have existed till its own time. Besides, certain portion of it cannot but have been based on the actual observation and measurement of extant architectural and sculptural objects.

An objection may be raised. It is possible that those works which are stated here to have been debtors to the Mānasāra might have been influenced directly by those which are asserted to have been the creditors to the Mānasāra. Such an objection, however, can be easily disposed of. The Mānasāra in whichever period of history it is finally placed, has become a standard work on architecture and sculpture, because we have seen, first, it is the largest of its kind, secondly, its treatment of the subjects is most exhaustive, and thirdly, the subject-matters have been scientifically classified and systematised. And when there is a standard work it is natural and highly probable that those who treat the subject rather casually or less exhaustively should draw upon it instead of going through the original sources except for some
special reasons. For the ordinary meanings or synonyms of a word, we generally consult a standard dictionary, rather than attempt to trace the history, phonology, morphology and the semasiology, of the word. An analogical instance may perhaps make the point clearer. Pāṇini's grammar makes mention of some nineteen pre-existing grammatical works, and it has been placed by the later scholars somewhere in the fourth to third century of the pre-Christian era. Like the works on rhetoric and prosody, grammars cannot be prepared without consulting the existing literature, because the sole business of these works is to generalise certain regulating features of literature. The methods of the pioneers of law books, as well as of the grammar, the Alamkāra Śūstra, and the Silpa Śūstra, must have been inductive. Pāṇini, as he acknowledges generously, has been indebted to his predecessors; it is also clear from his work that he himself has consulted the preceding Vedic and post-Vedic literature. It is true that other grammars have been prepared after Pāṇini also. But when Pāṇini's grammar reached the status of a standard work, his rules and regulations were naturally followed in the later literature. The later grammarians also must have been influenced by Pāṇini. In the field of grammars and literature Pāṇini's grammar is, therefore, the regulating and controlling standard work. In the same sense, and more clearly and significantly, it seems to me, the Mānasāra occupies a unique position in literature, both architectural and non-architectural.
PRATIMĀ-LAKṢANĀM

(PROFESSOR PHANINDRA NATH BOSE, M.A.)

Sanskrit Texts on Pratimā are very rare. We have only a few chapters on the art of image-making in Sukraniti, Bṛhatasyāmihitā and some of the Purāṇas, namely, Matsya and Agni. The Purāṇas are encyclopaedic in character and the above two Purāṇas treat among other things the topic of Pratimā-lakṣanām. It is difficult to say from where the author of Matsyapurāṇa gathered the discourse on Pratimā. If we accept the view that the Matsyapurāṇa was composed by the sage Vyāsa, then he might be taken also as the writer of the discourse on Pratimā. There is, however, also the possibility that it was simply taken from another book and incorporated in the Matsyapurāṇa. The Pratimā-lakṣanā portion of Matsyapurāṇa quotes two authorities on the subject, namely, Brahmā and Svāyambhūva.

Though strictly speaking chapter 259 of Matsyapurāṇa is entitled Pratimā-lakṣanām, yet chapters 258, 260 and 261 also deal about Pratimās. In Ch. 258, we have the measurements of images in general and also that of images of goddesses. It also contains a description of the image of Viṣṇu. In Ch. 259, we have the description of Rudra and some general instructions as to how images should be made beautiful. In Ch. 260, we have the description of various gods such as—Ardha-nārisvara, Śiva-nārāyaṇa, Mahā-varāha, Nārasimha, Brahmā, Kārtikeya, Viṇāyaka, Katyānā and Indra. In Ch. 261, we have the description of a few goddesses, such as—Brahmānī, Māheśvari, Kaumārī, Vaiṣṇavī, Varāhi, Indrāni and Lākṣmī. Prabhākara is also described in this chapter.

Here we find that all the three gods of the Hindu Trinity described Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Rudra, as well as Brahmānī, Lākṣmī and Māheśvari come in for their shares. These gods and goddesses not only were worshipped in India, but also in such Indian colonies such as Champā, Siam and Cambodia. In Champā, Śiva-Nārāyaṇa (or Hari-Hara) figures frequently.*

* See my Indian Colony of Champā, p. 95.
Brahma, the creator, has been described thus:

Thus the creator Brahma should be represented with a kamandalu (water-pot) and should have four faces. Sometimes he should be made to sit on a hamsa (swan) and sometimes on lotus-seat. His colour should be like the inner part of a padma. He should have four hands. In his left hand, there will be kamandalu and in the right hand a sruva. In the other left hand, there will be a danda (staff) and in the right hand another sruva. On all sides, he should be praised by sages and gods and gandharvas. He should put on white cloth, deer-skin and sacrificial upaavita (sacred thread). A plate of ghee and the four vedas should be put on his sides. On his left, should stand Savitri and on his right Sarasvati.

In Indian sculpture we have many instances of Brahma. They agree in many respects with this description. We have many images of Brahma in the Indian museum. In sculpture, the fourth face is not observable. In the Mathura Museum, we have the images of Brahma and Sarasvati together. There he has a lotus-seat, a pair of geese, in his right hands a staff and a kamandalu and in his left hand a Veda.* In Southern India, we have examples of Brahma both in standing and sitting postures. The representation of Brahma at seven Pagodas and another at Kumbakonam

illustrate the standing posture. A beautiful image of Brahmā in sitting attitude is seen at Tiruvāḍi near Tanjore. Another image of Brahmā from Chidambaram represents him seated on a swan.

Let us now turn to the description of Viśṇu, as given in the Matsyapurāṇa. It says:

\[\text{शशंकक कुश्य शण्ठय गदाधरम्} \text{॥ ॥}
\[\text{कब्राकारे शिरस्तुय कथ स्थौं शुभेच्छायाम्} \text{॥ ॥}
\[\text{शुष्किवारी प्रणालोपूर्णकृत्रुक्कमम्} \text{॥ ॥}
\[\text{कवचदस्तुज्ञ वियाचारतुम्बुज्ज्वायपरम्} \text{॥}
\[\text{हिमुज्ज्वावि कर्त्तव्यो भवन्तु पूरो ध्वसा} \text{॥ ॥}

Viśṇu should hold in his hands saṃkha (conch), chakra (disc), padma (lotus) and gada (club). His head should be in the form of an umbrella, his neck like a conch, his ear like sūkti. He should have high nose and great thigh and arms.

Sometimes the image is made eight-handed, sometimes four-handed, and sometimes two-handed by the priest.

In a Nepal Ms. of Pratimā-māna-lakṣanam, of which there is a copy in the Visvabhārati Library, we find that padma, saṃkha etc. have been spoken of as auspicious signs. We read:

\[\text{“हस्तरेखां प्रज्ञास्म देवानं शुभलचणाम्} \text{॥}
\[\text{शशंकक पद्म प्रणों चक्र चक्र श्रस्तिकुर्कुर्कलो} \text{॥}
\[\text{कब्रकत्र प्रज्ञान कर्त्र ग्रेवत्साकु शमिव च} \text{॥}
\[\text{श्रीशूलस्य यवमालायं कर्त्तवित वसुव्या तथा} \text{।}

Here we find that the following marks on the hands of gods are considered auspicious, namely, the conch, lotus, flag, thunderbolt, wheel, svastika, bracelet, pitcher, moon, umbrella, sīvatsa, hook, trident, barley-garland and vasudhā.

Of these, we note that, the conch, lotus, and disc are the symbols of the god Viśṇu.

In the Matsyapurāṇa, the head of Viśṇu is said to be like an umbrella and the neck like a conch. It says:

\[\text{कब्राकारे शिरस्तुय कथ्योत्यं शुभेच्छायाम्} \text{॥}

* H. K. Sastri, South Indian Images of Gods & Goddesses, p. 11.
In the Nepal Ms. of Pratimā-mūna-lakṣaṇam, we read:—

शिरस्त्रावम कायेः धनाधान्यसम्मिद्धम्

The same Ms. in another place says:—

कम्भु शीवा भवेंद्रचा सर्वसिद्धिकारी सदा

The images of Viṣṇu are very common in Northern as well as in Southern India. They are also found in Champā, Siam and Cambodia. We have at Sāntiniketan a standing image of Viṣṇu, with two arms and two attendants.

Rudra is thus described in the Matsyapurāṇam:—

स पीङ्खुखुञ्ज स्कन्धस्त्रावमकांचनस्मारामः || ३ ॥
शक्तौऽक्रमिश्वमात्रबन्धित जडी विभुः ।
जटामुकुटधारीं च दयण्यिन्कृति च सः ॥ ४ ॥
वालं वारणास्ताभि शतंजोरीसमण्डलः ।
उष्णेकशं कस्तवेश practice दीपायतिविलोचनः ॥ ५ ॥
व्याप्रचारप्रीरोधः करिश्चर्चन्याविन्तः ।
हार्केयस्यायनी मुङ्गगामकमार्गः ॥ ६ ॥
वेदयायं वामस्त्रते तु खंप्रं चेव तु दक्षिणे ॥ ७ ॥
शल्लि दग्गं विस्तृतं दचरिणयु निवेदयेत् ।
कपालं वामपाशु तु नांगं खर्गसमे च ।
एकं वरदी शन्ततयावुचवःष्णीपारः ।
वशास्यानकं कला नृथाभिनयस्थितः ॥ १० ॥

Rudra is said to be the lord of destruction and so his representation seems to be awe-striking. Though his image is like that of a young man of sixteen, yet it rather strikes terror in the hearts of worshippers. His matted hair should be as white as the sun's rays and will have the symbol of the moon. The matted hair should be made up like a crown (jātū-mukuta). His arms should be like the trunk of an elephant, his thigh and knee should be round and eyes extended. He should put on tiger-skin and three sutras on the waist, as well as a necklace and a kṣūrya. Serpents should also be his ornaments. In
his left hand, he should have a khetaka and a sword in the right. On his right should be placed śaktī, staff and trident, on the left kapāla, nāga and khattaṅga; when dancing on the bull, one of his hands should be in the varada attitude and in the other ākṣamālā. When he would be represented dancing he should have ten hands and should put on the elephant skin.

A question may arise here: why the gods are endowed with so many hands? The earliest representation of Śiva may be found in the Kusān coins where Śiva is represented only with two hands. Even in later Kusān coins we find Śiva with four hands. What may be the reason for the multiplication of hands of these Indian gods? It may be that the artists wanted to show the supernatural power of gods by adding more hands. Man has got two hands, the gods, they argued, therefore, must have four or eight or more arms. In the early evolution of Indian images, gods had no supernatural elements. The artists made them as simple as possible. But soon, with the rise of the Pauranic Hinduism, gods began to be endowed with superhuman powers, just as in Assyria, sometimes claws or the faces of animals were added to the images of gods to show that they were more than human beings.

In the Purāṇas we find the multiplication of arms and faces of the Hindu gods. The age of the Purāṇas has been determined by Pargiter, who has placed them in the Gupta period.

It was, therefore, in the Gupta period that the Indian gods began to be endowed with four or more arms. There was another reason for the outward decoration of these gods in the later period. When the artists found that they could not make the image beautiful, they began to add outward decorations to make the image more gorgeous. As they could not make the face appear in dhyāna (meditation) attitude, they multiplied the number of faces and hands and also added many figures of decoration on the background. Instead of making the image beautiful, these outward decorations made the image rather clumsy, as evidenced in the later Brahmanic sculptures.
KHĀRAPATA AND MULADEVA

(PANDIT G. HARIHAR SASTRI)

When dealing with the implements of torture, the Arthasastra of Kauṭilya says that their details should be learnt from Kharapata. In the farce called Mattavilāsaprāhasana attributed to the Pallava King Mahendra Vikrama Varman I of the first half of the seventh century A.D., Kharapata is said to be an author of Chora-Sāstra (the science of theft). A few particulars of this interesting Sāstra can be gleaned from the famous theft scene in the third Act of the Mrchchhakatika. In it the Brahmin thief Šarvilaka describes various kinds of apertures to be made in the wall; and before undertaking the operation pays homage to Kumāra-Kārtikeya, Kanakāsakti, Bhāskara-Nandin and Yogāchārya; and the thief himself, we are told, was the first disciple of Yogāchārya who having been pleased with his disciple bestowed on him an ointment or powder (Yogarochanā) having the power of making its possessor immune from public gaze and from the wound of weapons. The thieves are said to be famed as Skandaputras, and some of the implements they carry with them are said to be mānasūtra (measuring string) and pratīpurūṣa (an effigy of a man pushed into the house to ascertain if anybody is awake). A longer list of implements is given in the second Uchchhvāsa of the Dasakumāracharita which mentions ardhoruka (a kind of petticoat), phanīmukha (a kind of spade in the shape of a snake’s head), kūhali (a musical instrument to test if a person is asleep or awake), sandamsāka (a pair of pincers), puruṣairshaka (an effigy) yogachūrṇa (a powder of miraculous powder), mānasūtra (a measuring string), kārakākaraṇajju (a rope to climb the wall with), dipabbajana (a magic lamp) and bhramarākaranṭaka (a box containing moths that put out the light). The incomplete play called Chārudatta, which is ascribed to Bhāsa and the plot of which resembles that of Mrchchhakatika in almost every respect, has also the theft scene in its third act where the thief Sajjalaka invokes the blessings of Kharapata instead of Kārtikeya. It is evident from this that, in the early centuries of the Christian era, there was prevalent a systematic treatise on theft written by Kharapata.
Later Sanskrit literature, however, confounds Kharapaṭa with Mūladeva; and the Harāvali of Puruṣottama Deva gives Karpīṣuta, Kharapaṭa, Mūladeva and Kaṭāṅkura as synonyms.

Bāna alludes to Mūladeva in his Harṣacharita. The manuscript of the work existing in the Trivandrum Palace Manuscripts Library, which contains many ancient and valuable manuscripts, reads the passage referring to the assassination of Sumitra thus:—

\[
\text{अविद्यतालाक्ष्यं च सूत्रप्राचिनस्मिर्यत्वा भृणालमिवालु नम्}
\text{विनाशकामोऽस्मि}
\]

which says that Mūladeva having been in the midst of actors, cut off the head of Sumitra, the elder brother of Agnimitra. Daṇḍin is the next author in point of age that refers to Mūladeva. In his Avantisundari-Kalhā of which a very ancient and hopelessly fragmentary palm-leaf manuscript has recently been procured for the Trivandrum Sanskrit Publication Department, Daṇḍin is found to allude to Mūladeva in more than one place. In describing his ancestry in the introduction of this work, the author tells us that his ancestors came from North-Western India and settled in Achalapura, which was set apart for his friend Achala by Mūladeva, the originator of all doctrines of gallantry. Elsewhere in the same work, when Rājahamaṇḍa is narrating to his Queen Vāsumati the history of her forefathers, there occurs the passage:—

(†) पुन: समुद्रतृण पुष्यမित्रोनाम शृंगस्यस्वेत सैनापतिस्मृतिव्यक्तिः
(भरतलेखिनाशदृश्मलो वीरभयभजनो ?) ज्ञानानविखं श्लोकः
मूलदेवं सूचिनिहत्य गद्यखं जंग्लत समा: स्वायत्ति।

This looks like a reproduction of the statement of the Purāṇic chronology and makes it clear that Puṣyamitra of Sunga family, having deposed Brhadhratha and killed Mūladeva in battle, the destroyer of the Maurya line reigned for 36 years. Puṣyamitra is said to have waited long before he could formally assume the imperial power, and the above passage of Daṇḍin brings out the new fact that Puṣyamitra had on his way to the throne an adversary in the person of Mūladeva, who had treacherously killed his son Sumitra and destroyed the Maurya line.
The author of the commentary Jayamangala on the Kāmasūtra of Vātsyāyana, when dealing with the mlechchhita-vikalpa (systems of cipher-writing) cites, by way of illustration, two systems, one founded by Kauṭilya and the other by Mūladeva. This fact that Kauṭilya and Mūladeva were the authors of systems of cipher-writing is quite in keeping with the tradition that ascribes to them mastery of all sciences and arts. The system of Mūladeva, it may be noted here, is preserved intact in Kerala along with many other ancient Indian survivals, and the sons of the land are found to make use of it on occasions of secrecy.

The Bhāṣa Padmaprabhātaka attributed to Śūdraka, which has for its plot the love between Mūladeva and Vipulā, exhibits Mūladeva as a Dhūrtachārya (a beau-ideal) and as proficient in all arts; and Mūladeva is called in it by the name of Kārṇīsuta. The Kathāsaritsāgara of Somadeva connects Mūladeva with Vikramāditya of legendary fame; and in Ksemendra’s Kalāvilāsa, Mūladeva figures as a teacher of Kālās, lecturing to sons of gentlemen and making them wealthier by his teachings.

In Bāṇa’s Kādambari the story of Kārṇīsuta is referred to as invariably associated with Vipulā, Achala, and Śaśa. The Jain Upādhyāya Subhachandra, commenting on the story of Kārṇīsuta, says that Kārṇīsuta was a Kṣatriya, had two companions named Vipulā and Achala, and a minister Śaśa; and quotes in support of his comment, a passage identifying Kārṇīsuta with Kharapata; and further tells us that the story of Kārṇīsuta is recounted in the Brhat-kathā. Another commentary named Kādambari-pādārtha-darpaṇa by an anonymous author gives out that Kārṇīsuta was a king, and Vipulā and Achala were his two wives, and that he had a minister named Śaśa. Another erudite commentary in metrical form called Āmoda by Aśṭamūrti (probably a Nambitiri Brahmin of Malabār) tells us of his having heard a story of Kārṇīsuta, in which Kārṇīsuta is represented as a Brahmin teacher of Chora-vidyā, with Vipula and Achala as his two disciples.

The love-story of Mūladeva and Devadatta is dealt with in the Kumārapāla-pratibodha of the Jain author Somaprabha, and in it Mūladeva is said to be a beautiful person, proficient in all Kalās and a fountain of all good qualities. Gambling, burglary, abduction,
illicit love and such other immoralities are included among the teachings of Karṇīsūta in the Daśa-kumāra-charita.

These are some of the notions that have gathered around the name of Kharapata, Mūladeva and Karṇīsūta, which exhibit a person, whatever his name, as the author of a treatise on theft, advocating burglary and murder, as a romantic adventurer and a cynosure of all the gay gallants, a master and teacher of all Kaḷās, possessing all good qualities, and as a daring opponent of an usurper of the imperial throne. As it is highly doubtful if one and the same person could have possessed all these attributes, the correctness of the identification of the names based on the lexicon Harāvalī has to be held under abeyance until fresh light is thrown on it by further researches. Besides, the mention of the word Kharapata in the Arthaśāstra of Kauṭīlya, which, from the weight of evidence, is now accepted to be the real work of the minister of Chandragupta Maurya, disproves the identity, inasmuch as Mūladeva is said to be a contemporary of Puṣyamitra.
SANKISĀ EXCAVATIONS*

(HIRANANDA SASTRI, M.A., M.O.L.)

Some nine years ago I was asked to excavate the ancient site at Sankisā in the Farrukhabād district of the United Provinces. At the instance of the late Dr. Venis of the Queen's College, Benares, and the Hon'ble Mr. Burn, the then Chief Secretary to the United Provinces Government, a sum of Rs. 3,000, anonymously contributed by some large-hearted members of the U. P. Historical Society which had then recently come into existence under the very sympathetic patronage of Sir James (now Lord) Meston, the then Lieutenant Governor of the United Provinces, was placed at my disposal for the purpose. In consultations with Sir John Marshall, the eminent Director-General of Archaeology in India, I spotted some portions of the very extensive site for exploration and would have examined them all but for my deputation to Kashmir in consequence of which I had to leave the work only half done.

In 1919, I drew out a detailed report of these operations to get it printed in the Journal of the above-mentioned U. P. Historical Society and sent it on together with several illustrations to the Hon. Mr. Burn but somehow its publication has been delayed. Before this report and the illustrations which accompany it are published in the Journal, it looked very desirable to place a short account of the work before scholars interested in Indian Archaeology. To do this, sanction was needed and I am very glad the U. P. Government has very kindly accorded it through the Director General of Archaeology in India, allowing me to publish a short summé in this volume. Accordingly, I am contributing the following note as a token of my respect and admiration for Sir Asutosh Mookerjee the great Indian Educationist, to whom this volume is dedicated.

Sankisā† is a small village lying about 40 miles to the north

* This note mainly deals with the excavations of 1926. For Cunningham's operations, see A. S. R. I & X1.
† Local people seem to pronounce it as Sankesā.
of Kanauj. It is situated in long. 79°30' and lat. 27°20' perched on an extensive mound which, as reported by Cunningham,* is 41 feet in height above the surrounding fields, 1,500 feet in length from east to west and 1,000 feet in breadth. The nearest approach to it is from Mota, a Railway station on the Fawakhabad Shikohabad branch of the East Indian Railway which is about five miles from it and lies on the opposite side of the Kalindri (Kasinadi), a small tributary of the Ganges.

That Sankisa represents the old Sankasya or the Sung-Kia-she of the Chinese writers, does not require much demonstration. The identity is supported not only by the similarity of the name but by the topography or relative position of the locality with regard to the places like Mathura, Kanauj or Ahichchhatra, the modern Ramanagar in the Delaware district of the United Provinces. It is true that we have the elephant and not the lion capital talked of by the Chinese pilgrims now lying at Sankisa. It is also certain that the elephant capital must have stood near the spot where it now stands during the Gupta epoch otherwise the existence of the terracotta elephant figures which I excavated during my exploration of the site cannot be explained. I doubt if it was myopia owing to which the Chinese pilgrims mistook the elephant figure for that of a lion even if we take it for granted that the trunk was cut off long before their visit. The figure is remarkably life-like and can hardly be taken for any other animal. As at Rampurva, which has two Asoka columns one surmounted by a bull and the other by a lion, there might have been two pillars at Sankisa, one with a lion and the other with an elephant capital. The former, perhaps, is still to be traced out. That the elephant capital is Asokan cannot be denied. The pilgrims did not mention the pillar with an elephant capital. That Mauryan structures must have existed here is amply borne out by the finds made and the remains which still exist on the site though at a considerable depth. No special proof is needed to show that the capital is Mauryan or that it rested on a Mauryan pillar originally. The figures of the four sacred animals, usually seen on the tops of the monolithic columns of Asoka, are believed to represent the animals who protect the four quarters of the world. So

* Archl. Sur, Vol. I., p. 274,
the elephant figure on this capital is to be taken as a symbol of the East, the elephant being the guardian of the East, the horse of the South, the bull of the West and the lion of the North. That all the four animals are represented on the Sāranāth capital would show that the "turning of the wheel" (or dharma-chakrā-pravartana) was meant for all the four quarters of the world. More than one symbol at one spot would refer to the communities residing there. Rāmpurvā, for instance, had the bull and the lion capital to mark the monasteries occupied by Western and Northern communities. That there must have been northern communities at Saṅkisā will be evidenced by the seal of the Hāmaavatas which was unearthed there. The lion-capital at Saṅkisā, might have been connected with them, while the elephant-capital was related to the special direction i.e., the East. To doubt the identity of Saṅkisā on the ground that the figure of a couchant lion was seen by Huen Tsiang or his fellow pilgrim, therefore, does not appear to be very reasonable. Here we should not forget the discrepancy in the statements of these pilgrims in regard to the capital of one of the Śrāvastī pillars which Fa-Hsian calls an ox and Huen Tsiang an elephant.

In addition to the apparent identity of the names spoken of above, I think, Huen Tsiang's calling the locality by the name of Kie-pi-tha will be a further proof. This kie-pi-tha is apparently the Kapitthika whence the Madhubana plate of Harṣa was issued—Mahā-nau-hasty-asva-jaya-skandhāvārāt Kapitthikāyāh—and very probably the Kapitthakā where Varāhamihira, the great astronomer, is said to have obtained a boon from the sun.† That Saṅkūṣyikah and Kāmpillakah are synonymous terms is evidenced by the Kāseikāūrtti on Pāṇini (IV. 2. 121). That Kāmpillaka is represented by the modern village of Kampil in the Kaimganj tahsil of the Farrukhābād district situated in 27 35'N and 79 14'E, 28 miles to the north-west of Fatehgarh does not require demonstration. According to the Mahābhārata it was the capital town of the Southern Pāñchāla which fell to the lot of Drupada when the Northern Pāñchāla with Ahichchhatra as its capital was wrested from him by mighty Droṇa to

* Cf. V. A. Smith, A History of Fine Arts in India and Ceylon, pp. 59. f.
† Brhaspadaka, 26. 1.
avenge himself on the insolent and haughty king of the whole of the Pāñchāla country. According to Mahādhara’s commentary on the Brhajītaka, the Kāpitthaka is the village of Kāmpilla, for, it says कापित्थके कापित्थाय यामि। But the commentary of Bhattotpala called Brhajjātakavivrtti, a manuscript copy of which I saw in possession of Nāthān Pandit at Srinagar in Kashmir, renders it differently, i.e., by कापित्थाय यामि। These authorities, therefore, would lead us to surmise that, provided Kāmpilla is not a mistake for Kāpittha (līla for tīha.), both these names designated the same locality. Saṅkisā and Kampil are situated in the same district of Farrukhābād or Fatehgarh and are not far distant from each other. The former lies some 23 miles and the latter 28 miles to the west and north-west of the headquarters of the district, namely, Fatehgarh. Thus, on the authorities quoted above, it seems reasonable to surmise that all the three appellations are connected with one another and were applied to, probably, different parts of one and the same tract which possibly, went by the name of Saṅkāśya, the capital of Kuśadhvaja, the brother of the Mithilā King Janaka of the epic fame. It is interesting to observe that the description of the prākāras of the capital town of Kuśadhvaja found in the Rāmāyaṇa or its commentary i.e., Tilaka† would agree fairly well with the remains of the ramparts which are still to be seen round Saṅkisā.

To Brahmanical works Saṅkāśya is chiefly known in connection with the princes of Mithilā but in Buddhist literature it is mentioned as a place of special sanctity and one of the chief sacred spots on the earth. It was at Saṅkāśya that the Buddha is said to have alighted from the Trayāstrīṃśa heaven after imparting the Dhamma to his mother who was bereft of the privilege of seeing her illustrious son attaining the Bodhi or Enlightenment and hearing the law direct from him.

* It is obviously different from the Kāpitthaka on or near the bank of the Godāvari which is mentioned in the Cambay plates of Govinda IV, the Rastrakuta king who flourished about 936 A. C.

† I. 70-2, 3. ‘वायानिलक पश्चालम् परबल वायसुतमसाधिन मवाय: प्राकार स्तत्त्वां ब्राह्मणां: यल्लक कामसुद्राकां: पश्चाल: प्रिष्णो यथा: etc.
Cunningham excavated the spot, though partially, about the year 1862 and gave an account of his operations in his Archaeological Survey Reports. Mr. Growse of the Indian Civil Service is also said to have done some spade work here, though I have not seen any account of it. Cunningham found very interesting antiques during his explorations. One of the most noteworthy finds he made is the sculptured scene in soapstone which, might be connected with the Sāṅkūśya legend. The other* noteworthy find is the goldsmith’s mould with short Kharoshthi legends which might have belonged to some goldsmiths from the North-west who settled at Sāṅkīśā during the early centuries of the Christian era.

Cunningham excavated some places at Pākna Bihār. Here he succeeded in unearthing clay seals of decidedly Buddhist origin which he has described and illustrated along with his other finds in his Survey Reports.† It is not impossible that they were connected with the great vihāra of Sāṅkūśya mentioned by the Chinese pilgrims in their itineraries.

The site near the spot where the elephant capital now stands was believed by Cunningham to be the place where the column surmounted by the capital was originally set up. To see if it was really the case, I started digging there and laid bare the brick platform which Cunningham took to have been the base of the Aśoka pillar. It lies to the north of the mound now marked by the temple of Bīsāri Devī. On examination I found that the platform was made of comparatively modern bricks, of late mediaeval origin, and could not have possibly supported the Aśoka pillar. On no account can it be ascribed to the Mauryan age. Cunningham was certainly mistaken when he connected this platform with the Aśokan pillar. Possibly it was built later on to support the capital when people began to worship it as Gaṇēśa, as they are doing now. In all probability the column must have stood not far off from this place originally, for, near the base

* For illustrations of these two finds see A. S. R., Vol. XI, plate IX, figures 2 and 6.
† Vols. I and XI.
of the mound on which the village of Saṅkisā now stands I succeeded in securing Asokan or Mauryan relics in the form of fragments of highly polished Chunār stone and in tracing the remains of a structure of Mauryan bricks at a depth of some 19 feet from the present field level. Structural remains of somewhat similar bricks were also opened at the foot of the mound on which the temple of Bisārī Devī is now standing. The Aśoka column might have been erected in or near either of these structures. In that case the remains of the great monastery with the three holy staircases should be searched for in the large mound under the village or the said temple and not at Pāknā-Bihār. Near the spot where the elephant capital lay at the time of Cunningham’s visit—now it has been shifted towards the east outside the fields—I unearthed numerous elephant figures in terra-cotta along with several clay seals of about the 4th century (A.C.) Apparently these figures are connected with the elephant capital. They were in all probability offered by the people in imitation of the elephant which surmounted the Aśoka pillar. These votive figurines would indicate that the elephant capital must have stood close by when they were offered i.e., about the Gupta period to which the seals found along with them belong. To think of the removal of the capital from a long distance after knocking down the column prior to the fourth century of the Christian era will be to expect too much from imagination. And then the existence of the remains of the Mauryan epoch will have to be accounted for. The absence of Buddhist relics in large numbers round the spot is, apparently, due to the predominance of the Brahminical cults to the existence of which the itiniraries of the Chinese pilgrims afford ample testimony.

After examining the platform thoroughly, I took several trenches round it and near the village of Saṅkisā confining the operations to the north of the mound surmounted by the temple of Bisārī Devī. Every trench showed remains of buildings. The lower-most structure whose remains I could trace under this mound is, as alluded to above, built of bricks of the Mauryan type, measuring 21½” x 11” x 4”. Besides this, I excavated here the foundations of an extensive building and opened not less than seven of its wide door-ways. The outline of another structure was also traced more or less completely. In addition to these remains I was able to open the foundations of
some other buildings.* There seems to be no necessity of describing them here.

Now I may give a brief account of the seals and other relics which I excavated at Sankisā. They consist of pottery, bricks and fragments of stones which are all deposited in the Provincial Museum at Lucknow. Of the terra-cottas the votive figures of elephants have already been spoken of. Others need not be mentioned here. The coins found were much worn out but some 40 could be identified. Of these the oldest, and perhaps unique, is the lead coin bearing the legend Gomitasa† in early Brāhmī characters of about the 2nd century B.C. The other old piece is of Haqamāsha, a satrap of Mathurā who flourished about the first century B.C. Among the rest the coin of Kadphises II, of the usual Siva and Bull type, may be noticed in passing.

The seals found number not less than 114, excluding those that were fragmentary. One of them is sectarian and decidedly Buddhist. It was found at a depth of 14 feet from the present ground level in the debris mostly consisting of ashes and charcoal which would indicate that the place must have been burnt down. It has a short but interesting legend which is written in the early Kuśāna script and reads—

\[ Aya(ā)na(nām) \quad Hēmavata(ā)na(nām) \]

meaning "of the venerable Haimavatas." The Haimavatas were the primitive Sthāviras who formed one of the early eighteen principal schools of Buddhism. According to the account given by Beal after the Chinese rendering of a treatise of Vasumitra, the Haimavata school was identical with ‘Yun-shan’ of the Chinese which is considered to be a branch of the Mahāsthāviras. Apparently, it was so called after the abode of its founder. The legend on this seal supplies, perhaps, the earliest known mention of the sect and is an indication of the existence of Northern Buddhist communities at Sanjīsā, as stated above. The

* In the debris round the temple of Mahādeva shrine I picked up a pestle-like piece of highly polished Chunar stone.
remaining seals seem to be personal. They may be classed into three groups, viz., (1), those issued in the name of Bhadrākṣa, (69 in number), (2), those having the name Ramyākṣa (4 in number) and (3), those which give the name of Śvetabhādra (40 in number). The seals of the first two groups, i.e., of Bhadrākṣa and Ramyākṣa either bear the figure of Śiva himself or his well-known emblems the bull and the trident. Both these persons, on this account, must have been Śaiva or the devotees of Śiva. The seals which bear the name of Śvetabhādra show a flying figure, probably of Garuḍa, holding a serpent in the left hand. On the reverse of some of these we see a divine figure seated on what looks more like a peacock with unfurled plumage than Garuḍa. The Garuḍa symbol would show that Śvetabhādra was a Vaisnavā. On paleo-graphic grounds the seals are ascribable to the early Gupta epoch, a surmise strengthened by the age of the bricks found with them which measure 16 1/2 inches x 10 inches x 2 1/2 inches and are certainly of the Gupta period. The persons named in these legends are not known to history or tradition, and we cannot say whether they were kings or religious teachers of that age. The name of Śvetabhādra, however, reminds us of the Bhāgabhādra mentioned in the now well-known inscription on the Besnagar pillar—rāṇa Kasiḍputasa Bhāgabhādrasā. This Bhāgabhādra, apparently, must have been a bhāgavata or devotee of Viṣṇu. He flourished about the 2nd century B.C. We have no grounds to connect him with the Śvetabhādra of these seals. The ending in the names alone is striking. As to the use of such seals much has already been said by different scholars and I need not dwell on it here.

I cannot close this account without mentioning the Mauryan relics spoken of above. Structural remains have already been alluded to. One area yielded heaps of ink-pots and pottery of sorts besides some ancient stone-seats usually called Goreyas. These objects, however, do not attract us so much as do the fragments of the well-known Chunār stone with the characteristic Mauryan or Aśokan polish which I found in the debris here at a depth of about 13 feet from the ground level towards the west of the wall. Unfortunately they are mere fragments with no carving or inscriptions. Do these fragments belong to the Aśoka column or the figure of Buddha which Fa-Hian ascribed to Aśoka?
From what has been said above I would infer that the village of Sañkisā marks the site of the old Sañkāśya the fortified town of Kuṣadhvaja and the sacred place where the Buddha is said to have alighted from the Trayastrimśa heaven after imparting the Law to his mother Māyādevī. I would further infer that the elephant-capital resting on the Asoka column originally stood not far off from the spot where Cunningham first noticed it or where it now rests either near the ruins now surmounted by the temple of Bīṣāri Devī or the mound now occupied by the village of Sañkisā.
GREAT MEN AS FACTORS IN CULTURAL EVOLUTION

(RAI BAHADUR SARAT CHANDRA ROY, M.A., B.L., M.L.C.)

The origin and process of the development of human culture is a moot question in Cultural Anthropology. About half a dozen leading theories are on the field, and each of them claims eminent advocates and adherents. One defect in almost all these theories appears to me to be this; they, more or less, ignore 'great men'—or, what great men stand for,—viz.: great ideas and ideals as factors in the development of culture.

The current leading theories of cultural evolution (or, to use a less debatable expression, the cultural process) may be very briefly indicated as follows:

There is, first, the orthodox evolutionary or psychological theory associated with the names of the distinguished pioneers of anthropological science, which seeks to reconstruct primitive social institutions through a study of the psychological factors which are discoverable in the individual human mind.

There is next the sociological theory of the French School which seeks to reach the same end through an investigation of those psychological factors which are common to every primitive group.

Then we have the geographic or environmental interpretation of human culture associated with the great name of Ratzel who would make physical environment the chief determinant of culture.

The analogous theory known as the 'Economic environment' theory represents culture as developing by a series of adaptations to an increasingly complex economic or technological environment. Each new invention, however made, creates, according to this theory, a new environment to which the 'social organism' must adapt itself by habit.

We have, next, the American school which, once adhering more or less to the psychological interpretation of cultural origins, in time came to doubt its validity, and to favour the idea of what has been
called, convergent evolution.' The leading American anthropologist Franz Boas and his school of Historical Ethnology, however, now emphasize the necessity for investigating native cultures 'in their restricted historico-geographical homes and in the perspective of their relations to physical environment, the surrounding cultures and to the many and often intricate psychological associations formed between the different aspects of culture.'

Finally, we have the historical or ethnological school developed out of Ratzel's Geographical school and associated with the distinguished name of Graebner. According to this diffusionist theory of culture, the different cultures of the world have evolved not by a process of independent or parallel evolution due to the homogeneity of the human mind but through chance contact and borrowings of cultural features or through historical blendings of cultures and races. This theory has been carried further towards its extreme logical limits by Prof. Elliot Smith in his theory of 'Culture Compounds'.

Without entering into an elaborate discussion of these theories, I may briefly point out in what respects most of them may appear to be defective.

As regards the evolutionary or psychological theory of culture, it may be said that the uniform reaction of the human mind everywhere to similar conditions cannot be an absolute truth. The reactions of different human groups to the same objects and situations are found to vary according to the different cultural ideals, traditions and social institutions they have respectively developed as the result of their past contacts with their varying surroundings, and the characteristic meanings that surrounding objects come to acquire for each different group. The rigid determinism and a too absolute classification of the earlier evolutionist school which takes little account of tribal migrations and the transmission of cultural elements from one people or area to another and the intermixture of races and cultures, is unfortunately not compatible with ascertained sociological facts. Similar cultural features do not everywhere spring from the same causes, nor have different social groups always advanced in culture in the same uniform order from one dominant cultural type to another.
The geographic or 'physical environment' theory of culture which arose on the European continent as a revolt against the orthodox evolutionary school of England would make geographic environment the creative factor in cultural evolution. Changes in the physical environment leading to man's successive adaptations to such changes by which culture develops are represented by this school as the determining factors and not merely the external stimuli of such development. Although indeed the influence of the physical environment was much more dominant in the early period of human history than now, and although even in more civilized epochs the subtle effects of those immediate circumstances may to some extent continue to work, such environmental influences, however, extend chiefly to that lower range of activities which man shares in common with the lower animal. The more a community advances in culture the less is its dependence on its physical environment. In few cases it can be said that any cultural fact must of necessity follow from any particular environmental condition. Environment far from always exerting a modifying influence on culture is indeed more often modified by it. Thus although physical environment has its share of influence—and that not a negligible one—on culture, it cannot be said to be the determining factor of culture.

The same argument applies with equal force to the 'Economic environment' theory, for man adapts himself to environment, whether geographic or economic, not by unreasoning instinct and habit like the lower animal but by virtue of a consciously reasoning mind, and neither the physical environment nor the economic environment can be said to be a dynamic factor in the development of culture.

As regards the 'convergent evolution' or 'Convergence' theory not long ago emphasised by some American anthropologists who recognised a peculiar tendency of diverse customs and beliefs to converge towards similar forms, it is now recognised that 'convergence' can by no means be a principle in itself and cannot in any sense be called a determinant of culture or even a process by which culture develops. Recent tendencies in American ethology are towards liberation from its old 'methodological bondage.' In 1917, in his essay on 'The Super-organic', Kroeber inaugurated a
trend towards cultural objectivism and stressed the determinism of historic events and almost negated the role of the individual in history. But Sapir, Haeberlin and Goldenweiser while agreeing with Kroeber in his main contention regarding cultural autonomy have taken exception to his inadequate appreciation of the cultural significance of the individual—a significance which is the main theme of the present paper.

Coming to the Historical or Ethnological theory of culture we find that, if pushed to its ultimate logical conclusion, it would lead to the search for a single centre of origin for each cultural phenomenon. The evidence of the ethnography of different countries does not however appear to lend support to such a view. Again, ethnographic observation shows that cultural contact does not affect all communities in the same or similar manner. New cultural features brought by an immigrant group to a certain area are not equally received by different communities living in that area. One community perhaps rejects the entire set of such new cultural ideas or inventions, another selects only a few of them and rejects the rest and a third perhaps makes a more liberal selection. In fact, this cultural selection and assimilation is determined, more or less, by the particular type of culture of the recepient community—its social traditions and ideals. And in the process of acculturation, the borrowed element is not unoften variously altered or modified and in some cases transformed beyond recognition so as to suit the ideal of the recepient culture. The mechanism of selection, of reception or rejection, of assimilation or transformation is the human mind, or as the sociological school would say, the social mind. Thus it is human psychology and not the history of human migrations nor the borrowing or initiative habit of man, nor his geographic or economic environment that can supply the ultimate explanation of the origin and development of culture.

Finally we come to the sociological explanation of culture. Whereas the orthodox evolutionary or psychological school tries to explain the origin and development of culture by a reference to individual psychology, the sociological school of which Emile Durkheim and Levy Bruhl are the leading exponents hold that as culture or human custom and human institutions are all social
phenomena, the development of culture has to be explained by a reference to what is called the 'social mind.' The social mind, we are told, is the key to the adaptive processes of the social life. Among the exponents of this theory of the social mind there are certain differences of opinion as to the fundamental cultural phenomenon. According to Prof. Durkheim, it is the 'social constraint' exerted upon the individual mind by the 'social mind'; according to the American Sociologist Prof. Franklin Henry Giddings, the elementary social fact on which human society, and therefore human culture, rests is the 'consciousness of kind.' The social mind is described by Giddings as 'the phenomenon of many individual minds in interaction, so playing upon one another that they simultaneously feel the same sensation or emotion, arrive at one judgment, and perhaps act in concert.' According to the French sociologist M. Gabriel Tarde, the elementary factor is imitation, and develops by imitation or the transmission of feeling and idea from one individual to another, from one group to another, and from one generation to another. According to the great psycho-analyst, Dr. Sigmund Freud, it is 'libido' or love that holds together human society, and love-relationships constitute the essence of the group mind.

One defect in all these single-key theories would appear to be that they all regard cultural facts as the result of a particular activity of the mind, 'social constraint,' 'consciousness of kind,' 'imitation,' 'libido,' or 'love' and so forth, and not, as I venture to think, what it should be, namely the conjoint activities of the mind as a whole. 'Social constraint,' or 'consciousness of kind,' or 'imitation' or 'libido' would appear to be but one out of many elements in the process of cultural development.

The cultural process itself would appear to be a complex—the result of a multiplicity of mental activities and not capable of interpretation by any one of them as the fundamental and causative element. Perhaps a more comprehensive and at the same time modified form of theory in terms of the human mind including what has been called the 'group mind' may come nearer the mark, but that does not concern us in the present paper.

As regards the question whether it is the social mind or the individual mind which is the creative agent in cultural evolution, it
seems to me that the distinction is more verbal than real. No ethnologist will deny that cultural evolution is a product of the mind of man living in more or less organised groups or societies and develops by the play of mind upon mind—the inter-communication and inter-stimulation of ideas and the inter-action of different minds held together by the bond of common interests and aims.

But what I here desire to lay special emphasis upon is that the influence of individual minds on the general mind and thus on the culture of the group counts for a good deal in the history and development of culture,—that the creativeness of the individual is as much a formative factor in culture as racial and cultural contact and racial miscegenation. Dr. Sigmund Freud in his account of the erotic origin of social groups would appear to hit the mark more closely when he says that human social groups are dominated by two libidinal or emotional ties,—on the one hand to the leader as their ideal and, on the other, to the other members of the group through the leader or ideal. In fact, what is called the "social mind" or "group mind" is ordinarily not active but reactive. New steps in cultural advance—epoch-making ideas or new inventions—first originate in some gifted individual mind within the group. True, the individual mind is more or less conditioned by the social mind or cultural setting. But although the germ of the new idea may have been already seething in the general mind of the community, it remains infructuous until a great man arises to seize the idea hitherto floating nebulously in the social atmosphere, so to say, breathes life into it and brings it to the light of day; and the idea begins to mould the age; and around it in time, 'new systems grow.' A great man feels with great intensity, grasps in its entirety and expresses with remarkable clearness some idea that may have been long vaguely struggling to take shape in the group-mind. His intense feeling clear vision, kindling thought and thrilling expression of the thought, his enthusiasm for the idea and his throbbing words electrify his group-fellows. And the idea, broad-based on common feeling—on the common mind of the group—serves to 'put lever to the heavy world,'—to push the community, country or nation up one or more steps higher in the cultural ladder.

Even primitive societies have had their Dr. Tagores and Sir Jagadishes, Sir Prafullas and Sir Asutoshes, their Tilaks and
Gandhis, leaders of thought and leaders of action,—on a much humbler scale. Every close observer of primitive societies knows that it is their 'great men'—men gifted with higher intelligence and superior individuality and broader and keener vision than their tribe-fellows,—who even in such societies rise from time to time and succeed in introducing some new idea or new social or religious idea and usages to modify, supplement or supplant older ideas or usages, and thereby help the community a little forward in the onward path of progress. Less frequently a greater man may arise perhaps to introduce a new system of ideas, belief and conduct which may help the community to take an unusually long stride in its onward march.

Thus, in primitive societies, as in civilised communities, it is their great men—or the ideas and ideals they stand for,—that are the dynamic factors in the cultural progress of a people. It is they who introduce their communities or countries to fresh lines of thought, feeling and activity, and lead them on to higher aims, ideals and powers, and thus serve as dynamic forces of culture. If we compare culture to leverage, a great man or rather some great ideal or invention of a great mind may be compared to the moving power, and the community or group-mind to the weight to be moved by the lever. The individual great man dies, but the power that he has communicated to the community or the country—the ideal and the enthusiasm for the ideal with which he has inspired them—continues to carry them forward along the way he has marshalled them, until years or decades or perhaps centuries later (when in the meanwhile the group-mind has perchance been stimulated and widened by cultural contact or racial fusion, and has otherwise gathered 'germs of a higher birth'), another great man emerges, enters upon the labours of his predecessors, makes stepping-stones of them to attain to some brighter ideal, and, with this ideal as a power 'puts fresh lever' to the culture of his people and helps to raise it to a further higher level.
INDIAN POLITICAL EVOLUTION COMPARED WITH THAT OF THE WEST

(PROFESSOR NARAYAN CHANDRA BANERJEE M.A.)

The history of India, like that of many countries of the West, affords us ample material for a comparative study of the political development of communities. Various causes and circumstances, however, prevent our realising it. The lack of a recorded history, the utter absence of a chronology, the quaint commixture of history with fable and myth—all stand in the way of our properly studying the evidences, however scanty, which are furnished by our early religious and political literature. We lose sight of real historical facts which in our eyes seem to merge in myths and these myths again pass into the domain of fable. Accustomed as we are to hear of the absence of free institutions in the East, we reconcile ourselves to our supposed inferiority in this respect and regard these as the exclusive patent of the West. We turn to Greece, to Rome, or to the countries of Northern and Western Europe for a study of free political institutions and regard our own countries as the birth-place and the peculiar habitation of despotic power.

All this, again, seems to receive ready confirmation from the evidences furnished by our later legal and religious literature. The later tendency to deify monarchy as a divine institution, the belief in kings being the mundane counterparts of the great gods, the stories of irresponsible exercise of authority by some despotic Hindu kings, described in later chronicles like that of Kashmere, the spirit of submission to authority, all go to prove the utter absence of free institutions as far as India was concerned. To all superficial observers the force of this evidence appears to be more than conclusive, and the average Indian accepts it without attempting to proceed further.

This, however, is hardly true and a careful study of the ancient Indian records places before us facts which not only prove the contrary but explain the causes of Indian political degeneration. India has passed through all trying vicissitudes of fortune. Beginning with that remote antiquity when the Indian Aryans were settled on the banks of the Indus and the Jumna, till the days when the triumphant might of conquering foreigners enslaved her people, she
underwent successive commotions and turmoils, hardly known to other lands. The free communities of the earliest period were exposed to the hostile enemy or were assailed by the ambition of powerful chiefs. Racial differences or those of classes, also had their full play, and all these brought in successive modifications and changes. In the midst of these turmoils, in the midst of the conflict of parties or principles, in the midst of commotions succeeding one after the other, her social and political institutions were shaken to their very foundations. The earlier organisations of her people were modified. Society was repeatedly remodelled, governments were repeatedly reconstructed, and the older and simpler existence passed away.

Repeated foreign incursions led to anarchy, and anarchy paved the way for new social and political reconstruction. Every time, as the Indian tried to resuscitate the social order, he took more care to strengthen the executive power, as a bulwark against anarchy and foreign domination. The desire for protection of life and property, and an eagerness to ensure the continuance of the social order made the people part with their liberty or the ancient right of self-government. Monarchy strengthened its hands. Repeated turmoils helped the princes to consolidate personal sovereignty and to subvert the ancient democracies. With the working of the process of consolidation the clans disappeared. The small states were all merged into considerable monarchies, which, on account of their size and internal diversity, became unwieldy for control by democratic popular assemblies. Social complexities and religious upheavals destroyed the homogeneity of the people, loosened the bonds of the tribe, and made the task easy for the growth of pure monarchies. Sacerdotalism, also, viewed the problem of political discipline from the standpoint of cosmic order, and extolled the rising monarchical authority.

A critical observer cannot fail to observe the working of these forces in the Madhyadeśa, even during the later Brāhmaṇa age. There, Royalty was extolled every day and in course of time came to be regarded as the true governmental system. Complexities in social and religious matters favoured its further development. Then came other changes. With the sixth century B.C., which saw the foundation of powerful empires elsewhere and which also saw social
and intellectual commotions culminating in the rise of Buddhism, Jainism and other systems, powerful forces operated in favour of centralisation and absolutism. The tide of Imperialism grew higher and higher. The working of the forces tending towards absolutism was associated with the movement for the unification of the country, and this culminated in the Great Empire of the Mauryas, which arose immediately with the Greek invasion of the Punjab. That vast edifice, which for a time stood as a bulwark against foreign aggression, was, however, short-lived and crumbled to dust with the inauguration of the theocratic propaganda of Aśoka.

India again fell a prey to foreign domination. Her fairest fields became the hunting ground of the savage races of Central Asia. The Bactrian, the Greek, the Scythian, the Parthian and the Kuśāna, successively, poured into her plains, and dominated on her people till another upheaval contributed to the rise of the Empire of the Guptas. This, after a period of three centuries, was again assailed by foreign hordes and crumbled to dust. After the defeat of the Hunnish barbarians, rival powers struggled for supremacy. The country was more or less divided into a large number of principalities, some of which remained for ever local powers, while others struggled for Imperial hegemony. The differences of localities became prominent. Dynastic wars and conquests became the order of the day. As for the people, local autonomy and communal self-government more or less ensured the continuance of their life and prosperity. The rulers everywhere became free from popular control. The only checks that operated on them, were the limited character of their authority, the privileges of the sacerdotal or the military orders, or the chances and fears of successful popular risings. Politically, the people ceased to exist, their destinies were left to be moulded by their rulers. This became the general rule. In some of the principalities, the arrogance of princes waxed higher and higher. The absence of constitutional checks to their authority enabled them to assume the role of irresponsible despots, and they often perpetrated tyrannies which disgrace the annals of any country.

From the above it would appear that India was not always the home of despotic authority. As we shall see very soon, the early Indian communities were as free and democratic as their brethren elsewhere. Then, gradually, their condition was changed. The
same forces which operated in Greece and Rome or which subverted the free Teutonic institutions and helped the rise of the divine monarchies of the Middle Age, acted in India also. As a result of these, similar changes were brought in. Democracies gradually faded into insignificance. Limited royal authority made place for irresponsibility. The people ceased to be masters of their own destinies and became slaves of their rulers. Yet the history of Indian political institutions has something to speak on behalf of the genius and temperament of her people. For though there was a change; yet, Monarchy never became so irresponsible as in Europe after the Reformation. The king was venerated—his office was highly extolled—his functions were compared to those of the rulers of the universal forces—the Devas, yet the Indian people never accepted king as the counterpart or the viceroy of the omnipotent Deity. Nor did India ever see any Cæsar cult as we find in the history of decayed Rome after the world conquest, and no prince dared to pretend to be invested with "the right divine of princes to govern wrong."

Monarchy was not the only form of government. Republics, too, existed—perhaps as numerous and as potent as in the Western world. Their history is lost to us. We have neither detailed records of the vicissitudes of party fortune—or the services of eminent popular leaders. Yet, no one can deny their continued existence for ages or the true character of their pluralistic political discipline. When their history is properly studied, it will be found that they were not a whit inferior to those of the Western world. Indeed, some of them existed for as long a period as Athens at least. In some other cases, in spite of a lack of historical details, there is evidence enough to prove their continued existence for longer periods. We need not dilate any further upon the republics. They are numerous, but we simply refer to some of these. Prominent among these were:—

(a) The Yādava confederacy.

(b) The confederation of the Licchavis who were kinsmen to the Śākyas and thus closely connected with the founder of Buddhism.

(c) The confederacy of the Brahmin oligarchs of Kerala.
Of the democratic gaṇas, we may mention the following—

1. The Yaudheyaṇas—who retained their existence for nearly 1400 years e.g. from the days of Pāṇini to the sixth or seventh century A. D.

2. The Mālavas—who retained their republican life from before the time of Alexander to the VIth cen. B. C.

3. The Audumbaras—who are mentioned by Pāṇini and Megasthenes.

4. The Kunindas.

5. The Vṛṣṇis.

6. The Sibis.

7. The Arjunāyanas.

The existence of these is borne out not only by literary evidence, but by the surer testimony of coins and inscriptions or that of foreign visitors. The Greeks of Alexander, have left us accounts of Indian border states whose republican spirit simply recalled to the minds of the decayed Hellenes, the by gone spirit of Sparta or Athens. We need not go into details about their history, for, the Greek testimony speaks but too highly of the free peoples whom they met after crossing the greater part of Western Asia.

Republics thus existed in India, and republicanism was once a potent force in the country. Mere subservience to the will of the irresponsible monarch was not the normal condition of affairs. Her people had no exclusive patent for adoration, veneration or obedience. They, too, knew how to deliberate in the assembly hall, to discuss public affairs, and to determine their own political destinies. Nor were they insignificant to be laughed at, and if we have the testimony of Phyrus as to the "gods" of the Roman Senate, we have a similar eulogy uttered by the Buddha on his kinsmen the Licchavis who appeared to him as the "gods in the Traya-triṃśa Heaven." In a later age, the statecraft of Kautilya, actuated by a desire for the unification of the country, did its best to undermine their supremacy, yet Kautilya, the master of statecraft, could not but look upon them with admiration and dread.

As time went on, the cause of monarchy was furthered by social complexities. In an age of universalism and of social federation,
the democratic city or the oligarchic confederation became an anachronism, and they passed away—some succumbed to the Imperialistic movement, while in others the ideals of their enemies acted and reacted and turned the republicans into local dynasts.

Yet the spirit and the tradition survived. The spirit of local or tribal independence had often clashed with the centralising tendencies of monarchy. The latter principle survived, but in that struggle it was modified and it changed its character. Local autonomy and respect for local laws and customs came to have recognition even with the most despotic Kings.

Nor did the republican genius die out. It manifested itself in other spheres. If there was sacerdotalism in politics, the spirit of assertion and reason asserted itself in the domain of intellect. It would be idle to dilate on this, but only this much may be pointed out, that each of the three regions remains memorable, as having produced, some of India’s foremost teachers. The region of the Kosala-Videha (Magadha) Confederacy produced Mahāvīra and Buddha, the Yādavas produced Śrīkṛṣṇa, while in the family of the Brahmin ex-oligarchs of Kerala, arose the last great teacher of India, Sri Śankarācārya.

European scholars have often harped upon the deficiency of the Indian intellect in political speculation. Many have lamented it while admitting the excellence of Hindu philosophy. Some have gone so far as to say that India had no politics and the India genius was deficient inasmuch as the Indians cared little for material advancement. Here an attempt will be made to show that they were not lacking in interest in matters relating to the affairs of the world, and devoted as much attention to the consideration of social and political matters as the Western thinkers of the Middle ages or those succeeding them. They often attempted to solve supremely important social questions or topics of politics, and speculated on the origin of sovereignty, the relation between the state and the individual, the functions of Royalty or the social aspect of political life, as intelligently as the Western thinkers. In some cases it would appear that they prove their originality or even superiority over their western brethren.

The want of a systematic history makes it difficult for us to record the activities of the earliest speculators, but when we come
to the Great Epic, the Mahābhārata, we find the names of a large number of Indian political thinkers whose opinions are cited, only through the mouth of Bhīṣma "the last of the departing race of wise ancients."

Some of these thinkers go to the very root of the question. They try to picture to themselves the state of affairs which existed prior to the evolution of social order, or the origin of sovereign authority. They discuss the "state of nature" in the same way as Hobbs, Locke and Rousseau. Some of them attempt to attribute the origin of government to contract between the ruler and the ruled, and in one case at least we find a better handling of the problem than that of the renowned Hobbs.

In the Rājadharmā chapters we find also, conflicts between separate schools of thought. Some regard monarchy as a human institution, others venerate it as something divine. The extremist champions of popular rights denounce an unrighteous king and go so far as to pronounce, their dethronement or death—some even go so far as to regard it as the duty of subjects to punish unrighteous kings.

Next to these, we have the innumerable Arthaśāstra-writers, whose names only—to our misfortune, have come down to us—only in ridiculous epithets or in nick names. They were the founders of schools of socio-ethical discipline and wrote mainly from the point of view of the rulers.

The last of these Arthaśāstra writers was Kautilya, whom Indian tradition regards as the master diplomat who single-handed overthrew the Nandas. His Arthaśāstra remains to this day a monument of Indian political genius. His keen insight into the minds of men, his handling of political problems, his theories about a paternal king, his advocacy of the active duties of the king, will ever remain something worthy of the consideration of posterity, inspite of the lapse of a score of centuries. Further more, his ideas about the requisites of an ideal state, show how clearly he anticipated the problems, which only recently, have drawn the attention of the modern thinkers of our day.

Throughout his book, he harps on the unity of interest subsisting between the ruler and the ruled, and identifies the interest of the ruler with that of his subjects. It was he, who first propounded
those ideas, which in the days of Aśoka, laid the foundations of his memorable enunciation of the fatherly duties of a prince to his subjects, as well as the moral obligation on the part of rulers to do their subjects all possible good.

To the glory of that great man, it must further be said, that he stood out as the champion of the moral and intellectual superiority of the Indians, by his strenuous attempts to put down, that revolting practice of men holding property in men—a custom which was in "vogue among the mlecchas." About the same time as he wrote, the great Greek thinker Aristotle, was trying to find an excuse and explanation for that custom and had gone so far as to justify its existence.

With Kauṭilya, ended that remarkable period of Hindu political speculation. In the hands of Aśoka, the grandson of his disciple, the state changed its character and ideals. No longer circumscribed to the duties of maintaining the protection and prosperity of the subjects, the state came to be identified, with an organisation for the universal moral propaganda—an agency not only for the preaching of universal brotherhood, but also for the mental and moral welfare of mankind—a celestial dream in which the state lost itself.

With Kauṭilya, the formative period of Hindu political genius ended. He proved to be the last of a great race of men followed only by pigmies, who could claim no originality—but submitted without reasoning or accepted without questioning. In the eyes of all subsequent thinkers—with the exception of Śukranītisāra-writeř, the State came to be associated more with a coercive authority which maintained the social order and ensured peace, rather than an organisation which tackled the problems of the man of "wants and desires" and devoted its energies to the material welfare of human-kind.

Analysis of the State Concept

Let us now proceed with the analysis of the State Concept and sum up the chief characteristics of the State as it was conceived in ancient India.

The Hindu political speculation with regard to the State was objective and a practical one. The trend of thought never
carried it to that fine idealism as we find with the Great European thinkers. The primary idea in conceiving a state was the desire to ensure the happiness of the individual and of society in general. In origin it was conceived as a voluntary association of individuals—with the express object of eliminating *violence or injustice*—those elements detrimental to man's safety and progress. Almost all Indian accounts agree in attributing the origin of sovereignty or government to contract. Man dictated by instinct or natural law, in order to ensure his personal safety, must live in society; once society is established conventions are laid down guiding the conduct of men. For the observance of these, the necessity of a coercive power is felt as being due to aberrations in human conduct, which owing to external influences of greed or error deviates from the inner reason, *e.g.*, the dictates of Dharma which is nothing but an objective reflection emanating from the Rita the primordial concept of moral order, and evolves the right line of conduct in the individual man. At one time, this Dharma guided the actions of men, but as man became influenced by greed and vice, society was on the decay. To continue the normal working of the right principle was evolved the Daṇḍanīti, the sum-total of rules which emanated from man's inner sense of right and wrong or good and evil. Later on came the machinery for enforcing its rules and thereby to regulate the conduct of all men. Daṇḍanīti or the law of punishments came to regulate human conduct by awarding punishment for violation of justice and by rewarding the virtuous. It thus became the external bond, which went to ensure the existence and progress of men in civil society. The right to award punishments was vested in the State which guided all the external relations of men.

The basic idea in the concept of Daṇḍanīti (or regulated violence) was one of order and not of freedom as with the modern Western thinkers. The working of the law meant an opportunity to each member of the State by defining and safeguarding his relation to the whole. This concept of order, moreover, had an intimate relation with man's inner ideas, and had a fine psychological basis. Man's primary ideas have always been—those relating to his life and security and perfection—his ideas of justice, of charity—ideas common to men of all grades and ages.
The realisation of the order meant that the individual must have a free scope for the fruition of his ideas. This meant that his life must be guaranteed and at the same time opportunities must be furnished, so that he can bring his life to perfection.

In the words of Fichte "to live and let live" became the motto of the State. Hence the scope of state-action became fully comprehensive, and it included all sorts of active help and encouragement to the industries and efforts of the individual by which he could maintain himself and could help himself. The regulation of the arts of life, agriculture, trade and commerce, all came within the sphere of State actions and this from a very early period. Such ideas are present even in the inaugural hymns of the Yajur-Veda and we have practical illustrations of this in the Jatakas.

The State thus became something more than mere police. Its chief aim was the realisation on the part of its members—all possible benefit as far as the material aspect of life was concerned. The normal working of the social organism came under its superintendence. Consequently, it was not confined to the bestowal of benefits on a particular class or a particular section. It came to embrace all sections of the community.

The Indian State was thus a material or economic state. It was freed from theocratic ideals, and was a means to a greater end—e.g. man's self-realisation and his attainment of salvation.

It had a wide scope of action and was far from being narrow. It could admit within its folds men of all castes and creeds irrespective of their origin, custom or religion. Foreign elements with diverse religious and social ideals came and settled in India and thus added to its strength. In the days of India's political greatness the state presented to the world this high and noble ideal.

Herein it bears a great contrast with the Greek ideal of state. The fine idealism of Greek culture confined the state within the limits of the city—nay—to the governing element of that small community. The ideal was rigid—it could not expand. Greece for ever remained divided into the narrow and isolated communities: the ideals of humanity were to her confined to the city and hardly had any room for expansion. Such an ideal continued to exist till the last days of her existence and when the genius of the semi-
barbarian Macedonian attempted the expansion of the Hellenes, the Hellenic ideal lost itself in the midst of the barbarian whom it had vanquished and felled to the ground.

The only redeeming feature of this narrow ideal was its tendency towards the strengthening of the bonds of solidarity among the members of this small community. In India, such a solidarity was indeed lacking. The widest possible divergences were allowed to exist amongst the communities; mutual hatreds, too, existed and there was hardly any attempt to bring all sections to a common standard. Rather than have unity the Indian delighted in diversity. Yet her ideals were nobler and higher. There was no lack indeed of that narrow patriotism, nor were there any germs of a narrow nationalistic ideal, which made her people often look upon outsiders with contempt and suspicion, but there ever was the presence of the human and cosmopolitan ideal, which we cannot find elsewhere—not even in civilized Europe—until we come to the middle of the last century or the dawn of the present one.

These two characteristics are worthy of note. They give us not only an insight into the Indian ideas of state, but throw some light on the chief ideals which influenced politics.

India in decay has forgotten her past. She is now the butt of ridicule with the Westerner, who denies her a place in the history of political development, mocks her pacifism and scoffs at her tenacity to the past.

Yet history will prove that in her arose those political ideals—which looked more to humanity than to the solidarity of the narrow social group. Here it was that conscience was freed from dogma. Here it was that oppressed nationalities found refuge from time immemorial. Here it was, that men could live side by side inspite of differences; here it was again, that the germs of cosmopolitan ideals first manifested themselves—ideals for which the thinkers of our own civilized modern age are sighing in vain.
SIDE-LIGHT ON SOME ASOKAN EDICTS

(PROF. SUKUMAR DUTT, M.A., B.L.)

Historical mistakes have a trick of repeating themselves, specially in ancient Indian history where the brick-making of theory goes on merrily without the necessary straw of facts. A most remarkable mistake of this kind is the popular idea regarding Asoka's relation to the Buddhist Samgha.

In his well-known monograph on Asoka, Vincent Smith says, "The imperial government (of Asoka) was an absolute autocracy in which the king's will was supreme. From about B.C. 259 Asoka applied his autocratic power to the Buddhist Church, which he ruled as its Head"* Subsequent writers on Asoka seem to have taken their cue from Vincent Smith and have described him as an ecclesiastical as well as civil ruler (Vide Radha Kumud Mookerjee's Men and Thought in Ancient India and Bhandarkar's Asoka). *This view of Asoka has been hastily gathered from three Pillar Edicts, viz., Sarnath, Sanchi and Kausambi (Allahabad). But these significant edicts require a deeper study and call for a closer interpretation than have been given to them hitherto.

For one thing, the fact has been hardly realised sufficiently that by the time of Asoka the Buddhist Samgha had developed into a highly organised corporation. It possessed a code of monastic laws in the Vinayapitaka, the existence of which as a complete code about the middle of the 4th. century, B. C. does not admit of any serious doubt. Bhandarkar however says that "the Buddhist Church probably never had the system of administration enjoyed by the Christian Church in Europe."† If the idea is that the Buddhist Samgha never possessed a sufficient body of laws and regulations for the government of its internal affairs, I might refer the reader, if permitted, to Ch. 6 (on The Internal Polity of a Buddhist Samgha) of my book on Early

* Vincent Smith's Asoka (2nd Ed.), p. 92.
† Bhandarkar's Asoka (Calcutta University 1925), p. 98.
Buddhist Monachism (Trübner's Oriental Series) for a complete refutation of it. To be the "Head" or the "Ruler" of the Buddhist Sangha would imply a certain status, and it is necessary to enquire whether such a status was open to Asoka at all.

Let us at the outset recapitulate the data from which Asoka's ecclesiastical rulership has been sought to be inferred. These are represented, as we have already said, by three Pillar Edicts. Of these, the Sarnath edict is in the best state of preservation. It consists of two parts—the first dealing with schisms in the Sangha and the second with the manner in which the edict is to be published and circulated by the Dharma-Mahāmātrás to whom it appears to be addressed. The edict is styled a Śāsana.* The operative part of the Śāsana appears also in the Sānchi edict, coupled with an expression of desire that the Sangha may remain united for ever. It recurs in the pillar edict, addressed to the Mahāmātras at Kausambi, now preserved at Allahabad. The Śāsana is to the effect that the Bhikṣu or Bhikṣuni who brings about schism(bheda) in the Sangha should be made to put on white robes (odātāni dusānī) and to live at a place outside the Āvāsa or monastic colony (anāvāsasi).† To superficial readers of these edicts, two alternatives will readily suggest themselves—that a law was promulgated by the Emperor relating to the government of the Buddhist Sangha, either in his capacity as the sovereign or as the Head of the Church. None of these alternatives, however, goes to the root of the real question at issue.

In the first place, considering the constitution of the Buddhist Sangha, as reflected in the Vinayapitaka, which must be taken to be pre-Asokan, if there is any force at all in the arguments advanced on the point by Max Müller and Rhys Davids,‡ it is impossible to posit that the Buddhist Sangha in Asoka's time could have a recognised Head competent to lay down the law for it. While Buddha was alive, he was the Saṅgha or Law-giver of the Sangha. But after his demise, there was no successor in this capacity to him. The Sangha, as Oldenberg happily puts it, passed from a "mon-

* See Hultsch's Inscriptions of Asoka (Cor. Ins. Ind.—New Ed., 1925), p. 162—"hevaṁ iyaṁ sāsane," etc.
† See Ibid. pp. 150 (Kausambi), 161 (Sānchi), 162 (Sārnath).
‡ See Oldenberg's Vinayapitakam, Intro., pp. xxxviii—xxxix, and also Vinaya Texts, S. B. E., pt. i, Intro., p. xxiii.
archical to a republican type."* A most significant passage in point will be found in the Gopaka-Moggallāna Suttanta in the Majjhima-Nikāya, where Vassakara asks Ānanda whether Gotama has marked out any particular Bhikṣu who should be the refuge of the Saṃgha after his death. Ānanda answers in the negative. Vassakara then asks, if anyone has been subsequently nominated in that behalf. Being answered in the negative, he enquires wonderingly how unity exists among the followers of Gotama. Ānanda answers. "There is no want to us of a refuge; O Brāhmaṇa, we have a refuge, the Dhamma"†. Nothing stands out more clearly in the Vinayapitaka than this republican self-government of the Buddhist Saṃgha. The transactions of a monastic community are called Saṃgha-kammās which are classified into numerous forms, described in the minutest detail. These Saṃgha-kammās are based on universal suffrage, every duly qualified member of the monastic community having an equal right of voting and participating in them. Not only is the idea of the paramount authority of a person—a recognised head, a spiritual dictator, or an abbot—foreign to the constitution of a Buddhist Saṃgha, but it is definitely excluded in a number of passages.‡ No person, however highly placed, could pretend to legislate for the Buddhist Saṃgha and set up as its ecclesiastical ruler.

The special matter of the Asokan edicts we have been considering is distinctly included in the monastic code. Schisms are dealt with in Cullavagga, iv, 14 and vii, 5. A distinction seems to be drawn there between an honest difference of opinion, not intended to bring about a permanent division, and a difference intended to cause a schism. In the first case, the ground of difference is duly placed before the entire Saṃgha and decided on by voting and after the decision, it cannot be re-opened on pain of a Pācittiya offence. But what about a difference intended to bring about a schism?

The attitude towards such a difference shows a clear development. At first such a difference seems to have entailed expulsion from the Saṃgha. In Mahāvagga, i, 67, we find the injunction: "Saṃgha-

* See Oldenberg’s Buddha (trans. by Hoey, 1882).
† Cited by Oldenberg.—See Ibid, p. 341, Footnote.
‡ See Dut’t’s Early Buddhist Monachism, pp. 143–145.
bhedaiko bhikkhave anupsampanno na upasampadetabbo. upasam-panno nasetabbo." (A schismatic, O Bhiksus, should not be given Upasampada or initiation; if already initiated, should be expelled.) This appears to have been the original attitude towards schisms. But it is modified in the Patimokṣa, in which the attempt to bring about a schism is classed among the Sāṃghādidesa offences (Sāṃgha, 10), entailing the penalties of Parivaśa and Mānatta, which consist in the imposition of certain disabilities only. In Cullavagga, vii, 5, 5, curses are invoked on the intending schismatic. But in vii, 5, 6, a distinction is implied between an honest intention to bring about a schism and a dishonest one. It is useless here to form conjectures as to the historical circumstances which might have brought about this modification of attitude towards schisms and schismatics, but there can be no manner of doubt that the Buddhist monastic code contained not only the law but the procedure also of dealing with them.

It will thus appear that Asoka's Śūsana in the Sārnath and the other edicts is not a new law imposed by a superior authority on the Buddhist Sāṃgha. It is clearly based on the original rule contained in Mahāvagga, i. 67,* it is in fact nothing more than a declaration of a law of Buddhist Vinaya which contained the original rule of dealing with schismatics. No headship of the Sāṃgha is implied in such a declaration.

But the significance of this declaration must be carefully studied. Few will contend at this hour of the day that the kings and emperors of ancient India were despots of the mid-Asian type whose personal rule was unhindered by constitutional restraints. In fact the idea of the king being the law-maker is not countenanced in Indian jurisprudence at all. The function of the king is limited to upholding the law and to punishing infringements thereof, and is not the making of the law which exists by immemorial custom, independently of him. Society was made up of autonomous units.

* The rule enjoins (i) not giving Upasampadā to an intending schismatic and (ii) expulsion of an actual schismatic. The edicts clearly set forth the second part of the injunction. But it seems to me that the first part also is declared in the Kausambi edict in the words—"Sāṅghasi no lahive" (see Inscriptions of Asoka, Cor. Ins. Ind., 1925, p. 159). The words mean—"Receive not into the Saṅgha." The edict being mutilated at this place, the object of the verb is missing.
and kingship embodied only the principle of co-ordination and protection. The edicts of Asoka have not unfortunately been studied from this point of view of Indian jurisprudence, which would probably reveal the fact that even in those edicts in which he appears to be legislating, as for example in the pillar edicts where he prohibits the slaughter of certain specified animals, Asoka was simply reviving and declaring old laws which had fallen into disuse due to curiously enough the prohibition of slaughter of specified animals is found in the Hindu Smritis as well as in Kautalya’s Arthashastra. As a constitutional sovereign, Asoka could not make a law,—neither for the Buddhist Samgha nor for any other community, secular or religious. All that it was within his competence to do was to administer the old laws.

The Sarnath edict of Asoka must be read and interpreted in the light of the juridical idea of Samaya. The word, Samaya, signifies in the Arthashastra and the Smritis conventional or customary law,—the laws of Desa, Jati, Kula and Samgha. It is laid down by Yajñavalkya that the king must save from violation the customary laws of Srenis, Naigamas, Pākhandas, and Ganas and uphold their authority.* In the Mitakṣara, Pākhandi is explained as those who do not subscribe to the authority of the Vedas, such as Nagnas, Saugatas, etc.† Nārada mentions Pākhandi, Naigama, Sreni, Pūga, Vrāta and Gana.‡ Manu mentions Graama, Desa and Samgha, § and his commentator, Medhatithi, defines Samgha as a group of persons of the same persuasion, belonging to different localities or different classes; as for instances, the Samgha of Bhikṣus, the Samgha of merchants, the Samgha of men learned in the Four Vedas.

That the pious Buddhist Emperor was keenly alive to his constitutional duty of upholding Samaya, specially that of the

* Yājñavalkya, ii, 192.
† See Nārada, Tit., x. 1–3.
‡ See Manu, viii, 219.
Pākhandis, who are expressly mentioned by Yājñavalkya, appears from his institution of a new class of officials for the purpose called Dharma-Mahāmātras. The Delhi-Topra Edict speaks of the institution of these officials of whom there is no mention either in the Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya or in the Greek accounts of Sandracottas. The Emperor specifies the different classes of Pākhandis (nānā-pāsāṁdesu), e.g., the Saṅgha, the Brāhmanas, the Ājivakas and the Nirgranthas, and is careful to add that the Dharma-Mahāmātras are to busy themselves not with these classes only, but with all other Pākhandis too.* The function of these officials with reference to the Buddhist Saṅgha would obviously be to see that the laws of Buddhist Vinaya, embodied in the Vinayapitaka, were duly observed and administered by such agencies as the laws themselves provided. Hence the pillar edicts of Sārnath, Kausambi and probably Sānchi are addressed to the Dharma-Mahāmātras. It is quite likely that the danger of schisms had become very considerable in Asoka’s time and a broadcasting of the Vinaya law of schism therefore become imperatively necessary. The Vinaya rules, as we have already seen, contained provisions for dealing with schisms, but there were at the same time certain inconsistencies. The Śāsana in the Sārnath edict set all these inconsistencies at rest by declaring the old stringent law as laid down in the Mahāvagga. At any rate, a declaration like this was within the undoubted competence of a constitutional king of ancient India.

* See Inscriptions of Asoka (Cor. Ins. Ind., 1925), p. 132—"dhamma-mahāmātā chu me etesu cheva viyāpatā savesu cha aṁnesu pāsāṁdesu."
SOME ASPECTS OF THE ŚĀMKHYA SYSTEM AS VIEWED
BY THE VEDANTIST

(DR. D. K. LADDU, M.A., Ph.D., etc.)

The Śāmkhya system has been attributed to Kapila. The only works from which we gather our knowledge of the Śāmkhya system are the Sūtras which are entitled the Śāmkhya Pravachana, and the Śāmkhya Kārikā of Isvad Kṛṣṇa. Indian commentaries have distinguished the pure Śāmkhya as Nirīśvara and the theistic Śāmkhya as Śesvara. By Nirīvara is meant that which does not acknowledge the existence of a being superior to both matter and spirit. But Kapila has not done this. He simply leaves it doubtful whether he exists or not. He treats of philosophy rather in relation to matter and man than to Spirit, granting volition to nature and defying it; but when we find him asserting the superiority of spirit even to this defied nature, we cannot accuse him of complete materialism. Lastly, he admits the existence of a Spiritual Essence or Spiritual Being from which individual souls have emanated and into which they are eventually to be re-absorbed.

The pure Śāmkhya may be said to be Nirīśvara or Atheistic, so far as it refers the creation of matter to a system of emanation, obedient to the will, not of the Puruṣa but of Prakṛti. It, however, hints at the existence of a supreme Being in ferring the emanation of individual souls to Spiritual Essence.

Kapila’s idea of philosophy was that “since heavens and deities to which we are supposed to go, are material and we are subject to the necessity of transmigration, it is a cure for the evils not only of this life but of any material existence through which we may pass. That these evils exist no man can deny. The remedies applied by men to these evils are faulty, for evils return again and again and the necessary means of cure cannot always be obtained. The reward offered is only material heaven in which even the gods themselves are liable to evils and are not immortal, and cannot, therefore, serve as an effective remedy
against the evils. The only means, according to Kapila, of overcoming evils internal, external and forms of it beyond our power to oppose or check, the superhuman, is by liberating the soul from the shackles of matter, and this is attained by perfection of knowledge. Knowledge is certainly power. Knowledge is the highest perfection of man. The superiority of one man over another, of gods over man and of the Supreme Being over Gods is according to the superiority of the knowledge which they possess. While giving superiority to knowledge, he has omitted virtue. The omission of virtue gave birth to a new system known as Theistic Sāṃkhya and necessitated the adoption of the devotional system contained in the Yoga of Patañjali. The object of this philosophy is final emancipation and consolation for the evils of this world, which it affords. The means proposed is knowledge.

It is this knowledge which explains the reasons of our existence on earth by drawing a line between matter and soul, nature and spirit and showing connection of these four with one another, the reason of their connection and their final disconnection. This knowledge, according to Kapila, is acquired by (1) Perception, (2) Inference, and (3) Testimony. Perception is the use of our senses in grasping those objects which are within their reach, such as developed matter. Inference is the use of our senses in making deduction from that which is within our reach and it is of three kinds, viz., that of effect from cause, that of cause from effect, and comparison. Testimony is of two kinds, actual revelation and tradition. Inference, the great doctrine of causality, is established, and the existence of the imperceptible is proved, as that of nature, or the material essence, from that of developed matter. When perception and inference fail, revelation and tradition are accepted, from which are received the doctrines of transmigration, and the existence of gods. Kapila has often been accused of scepticism, which is largely due to the misunderstanding of Sl. 64 of the Sāṃkhya Kārikā. We might at best say that he has accepted without murmur two important dogmas, transmigration and the existence of the Gods. The excuse for the first is that transmigration was a theory which chimed in with his own ideas, and that for the second is his distance from scepticism. The questions proposed by him to answer were not "Do I exist or does matter exist" but
"what am I and what is matter?" which generally shows the trend of his mind.

After having followed the order of the Śāmkhya Kārikā and the Kapila Sūtras, we shall try to find what the general view of the system was. The pure Śāmkhya and all the schools which follow it distinguish everything that exists into the following twenty-five categories, for a full exposition of which the reader is requested to read the Śāmkhya Kārikā and the Kapila Sūtras:—

(1). Nature.

(2). Matter.

(3). Consciousness.

(4)—(8). The five subtle elements (Tanmātras) viz., Sound, Tangibleness, Odour, Visibleness and Taste.

(9)—(13). The five grosser elements (Mahābhūtas), viz., Ether (Ākāsa), Air (Vāyu), Earth, Light and Water.

(14)—(18). The five senses (Indriyas) viz., Hearing, Touching, Smelling, Seeing and Tasting.

(19)—(23). The five organs of action (Karmendriyas) viz., the Voice, the Hands, the Feet, the Anus and the Penis.

(24). The Heart (Manas).

(25). Spirit (Ātman).

Such in short is the outline of system to which the Śāmkhya reduces all that exists. We must see what proofs are adduced to support their existence. As scepticism has no place in the philosophy of Kapila he does not apply his method rigidly to developed matter. Perception through the medium of the senses and judicious employment of our mental faculties are the proofs adduced for its existence. The existence of nature and spirit are, therefore, to be demonstrated and the means employed is inference. The existence of nature as the cause of matter is proved in five ways and the great doctrine of causality is thus established.

(1). The finite individuality of different existing things proves that they must have an external cause. If they were themselves their own cause, they could have no limits, no beginning.

(2). The likeness existing between several individual objects forming them into a class, proves a common origin.
(3). The actual activity in everything formed for action proves the existence of an enlivening principle.

(4). The complete difference between cause and effect which is perceived in every common matter, proves that matter cannot be its own cause and requires something different from matter as its cause, which is nature.

(5). The inseparable unity of the whole Universe, no part of which can exist without and independent of the rest, shows the indivisible source from which all spring.

In these arguments we find that the Sāmkhya has granted volition to nature and has made it the material and the efficient cause of creation, which makes his arguments fallacious. He denies intelligence to nature, though he asserts the destination of each material object. The great doctrine of causality on which these arguments depend is put forward as: that which does not exist cannot be the cause of any thing. Everything must be done by that which is fitted to do anything and not that which is capable of doing it.

The existence of spirit of rational being which can comprehend matter and nature, is demonstrated in five ways:

(1). The existence of matter, of the world must have some object. It cannot be useless or accidental. That object cannot be other than the soul.

(2). Everything which exists has a direct positive opposition. Nature and matter are both under the influence of the three qualities and may be considered as one. Something must, therefore, exist as their opposite which is spirit.

(3). The body moves and fulfils its functions according to the laws of nature but the variety of its actions in its relation to matter requires that there should exist that which can direct and prompt them.

(4). Matter has qualities and attributes which fit it for enjoyment. But since it is not the mere body which enjoys them, there must exist something which does so.

(5). The existence of conviction in every being of his own existence is evinced in the desire he feels to be free
from material existence and mundane regeneration and transmigration.

While proceeding to deal with spirit, we find that he has attempted to prove the plurality, individuality and personality of souls in three ways:—

(1). The birth and death of each individual taking place at different times—seems to preclude the possibility of all souls being one;

(2). The difference in the actions of the individuals proves a different impulse in each suggesting a distinct existence; for if all souls were the same, they would be prompted to the same action at the same moment.

(3). The three qualities influence individuals in different degrees.

The doctrine of the individuality of the soul deserves particular notice as it is a special feature of this school, since in the Vedas, one Universal soul is supposed to pervade all material bodies, while in other schools and even in the Bhagvad-Gītā, this doctrine is not clearly marked, though often admitted.

The soul which is shown to be individual, is distinct from the body, but it, and not the body, is sensitive, and the body, and not the soul, is active. From the union of the body with the soul, the former appears to be sensitive, while the latter is active. Action in the Sāmkhya is not mere volition or impulse but must be achieved either by the organs of action, the senses or the heart, regarded as an internal sense. To make the soul inactive is quite in keeping with his theories and in doing so, he does not deny activity to spirit.

Although the pure Sāmkhya does not make mention of a spiritual essence or Being from which the soul emanates and into which it returns, he must have known that such existed when he speaks of final emancipation as being the loss of the soul's identity. He has shown this by making the consciousness of that individuality an attribute of matter. According to Kapila, since the soul, when once liberated from matter, loses its personality and identity, consciousness can only exist while united to matter.

We shall try to show how the Vedanta is the logical outcome
of the Sāṃkhya and how it pushes its conclusions, still further. Like Sāṃkhya Cosmology the Vedānta is not satisfied with the dualism in which the former ends but it continues its search for the final unity. Here two words occur, macrocosm, external and microcosm, internal. By means of our experience, both external and internal, we arrive at truths. The truths we get from the external are physical science and those from the internal are psychology, metaphysics and religion. A real and perfect truth must be in harmony with the experience in both; that is to say, the experience gained from macrocosm must be in harmony with that gained from microcosm and vice versa. At one time, however, the internals dominated the externals, just as at present, the externals dominate the internals and have been busy putting down the claims of psychologists and metaphysicians. But a little observation will show that the claims of psychology and metaphysics are in perfect accord with those of modern physics. The word "Nature", as used by the modern scientists, is exactly what old Hindu Philosophers called by the name "Prakṛti". The more scientific name for nature as found in modern physical science is "undifferentiated" from which, they believe everything proceeds, out of which come what are called atoms and molecules, matter and force, and mind and intellect. But old Hindu Philosophers stated ages ago that mind is but matter in a finer form. We also find that the intellect comes from the same nature which is called Avyaktam "the undifferentiated."

The ancient philosophers define Avyaktam as the equilibrium of three forces, Satva, Rajas and Tamas. Tamas means a force of attraction, Rajas that of repulsion and Satva, control of these two forces. When the two forces, attraction and repulsion are controlled by Satva there is no creation, much less modification. But the moment this equilibrium is lost or disturbed, one of the two forces becomes stronger than the other. Then motion begins and evolution goes on. This state of things goes on periodically so that when these forces combine and re-combine, the Universe is projected. There is also a period when everything reverts to equilibrium and a total absence of all manifestation is reached.

Some of the old philosophers said that the Universe quiets down for a period, while others maintained that the process of quieting down applies only to systems, which means that this system, when
it quiets down, goes back to the undifferentiated state. Whichever may be the view taken by them, the principle remains the same, since we see that Prakṛti itself is progressing in successive rises and falls. Evolution and involution have been compared by theistic writers in India to the out-breathing and in-breathing of God. When the universe quiets down, it is not extinct but it exists in a finer form which is called Kāraṇa in Sanskrit. Causation, time and space are still there. This return to the undifferentiated state is what constitutes involution. The manifest part of the universe is what is called gross matter in modern language. The ancient writers called the Bhūtas, external elements. One of these elements is the cause of the rest. It is called Ākāsa which means ether in modern language. Ākāsa is the principal matter out of which proceeds every gross thing. Along with it there is something which is called Prāṇa. This Prāṇa and Ākāsa exist as long as creation lasts. They combine and recombine into gross manifestations and at last they subside and revert to the unmanifested form of Ākāsa and Prāṇa. Rgveda. Māndala 10th Sūkta 129, contains a beautiful passage which describes creation, as "when there was neither aught nor naught, when darkness was rolling over darkness, what existed?" The answer there given is, "the eternal one then existed without motion." It is, therefore, clear that Prāṇa and Ākāsa were hidden in that eternal one—though there was no phenomenal manifestation. This is what we call Ayvaktam. People who are ignorant of Sanskrit translate the elements as air, fire and so on, which old commentators did not mean. The Ākāsa by repeated blows of Prāṇa produces Vāyu which is simply a vibratory state of the Ākāsa, which in turn produces gaseous matter called Tejas. When it cools, the gaseous substance becomes Āpa and when solid, it becomes Prithvī. Then by the reverse process it goes back to the unmanifested condition. We know the same thing from modern Astronomy.

As we have seen, Prāṇa cannot work without the help of Ākāsa. Whatever movement is seen, is simply a modification of this Prāṇa and what is seen in the form of matter is no other than a modification of this Ākāsa. Force without matter and matter without force cannot exist. They are interdependent. They are what we call gross manifestations of the two. Prāṇa may be translated
as vital energy. Thus, it will be found that creation is the product of *Prāṇa* and *Ākāsa*, which has neither beginning nor end.

We shall now take the grosser elements, the Bhūtas. Old psychologists say that they are the results of five elements. Whatever is seen is a combination of five things. They are called in Sanskrit the tanmātras. For instance, the eternal wave which touches the eyes, though invisible, does exist, since it comes in contact with the optic nerves. The same is the case with smelling, hearing, etc. Old psychologists say that the cause of the Tanmātras is self-consciousness which again is the cause of these five materials and of the organs. These organs or Indriyas are, therefore, the real seats of perception. They, combined with Antahkarana, are called the finer body of man or Sūkṣma śārira. This has a form because everything material has a form. Behind the Indriyas is the Manas, the Chitta, which is the unsettled state of the mind. So when some impression comes on the Chitta, it vibrates a little. Then comes the re-action or the will, behind which there is something called Ahaṅkāra, the self-consciousness or egoism. It is this egoism which says, "I am." Behind it is Mahat, sometimes called Buddhi, intelligence, the highest form of the existence of Nature. Behind it is the true self of man, Puruṣa, the pure, the perfect, who alone is the seer and for whom exists all this change. He is never impure but by implication, adhyāsam, he appears to be so. There are many Puruṣas or selves, each of whom is pure and perfect. It is the various divisions of gross and fine matter that give them various forms or colours. These forms are given by the Prakṛti for the enjoyment and benefit of the self, so that it will realise its free nature. Kapila denies the existence of god and says that a personal god is unnecessary and that Prakṛti alone works out what is good. He repudiates the "design" theory of the Universe, but admits a peculiar kind of God. He says that man struggles to get free and when he gets freedom, he melts into Prakṛti for the time being to come out as an omniscient and omnipotent being and be the ruler of the next cycle when it begins. In this sense he can be called a temporal god but can never be an eternal god, eternally omnipotent. If there were such a God, he must be either bound or free. A God who is free would never create, for there would be no necessity for him to do so. If bound, he could
not create because of weakness. In either case, there would be no eternal ruler. So Kapila understands by gods perfected souls who have become free. The Sāṃkhya does not believe that all individuals are united in one Cosmic Being called Brahman. According to Kapila, all souls will regain their freedom and their natural rights which are omnipotence and omniscience. Then the question arises, "what is the bondage of the souls?" The Sāṃkhya says it has no beginning. If it has no beginning, it must also have no end and we shall never be free. Kapila explains this "without beginning" as meaning "not in a constant line." Prakṛti is without beginning and without end but not in the sense in which the soul or the Puruṣa is understood to be because it has no individuality. Similarly everything in the Prakṛti is constantly changing, but the soul never changes. As the Prakṛti changes, it is possible for the soul to come out of its bondage. When the microcosm evolves there must be first intelligence, then egoism, then Tanmātras, then Organs and then gross elements. The whole universe, according to him, is one body. All that we see are grosser bodies; behind them are finer bodies, behind them again a universal egoism and lastly behind it a universal intelligence. But all these are the manifestations of Prakṛti, not outside of it.

We now find that there is involution and evolution in this process. All is evolved out of that Prakṛti and again involved and finally becomes Avyaktam. It is impossible according to the Sāṃkhya for any material thing to exist, which has not consciousness as its material. Consciousness is the material out of which all manifestation is made.

**Prakṛti and Puruṣa**

Since we have started with Prakṛti which has been called by the Sāṃkhya indiscrete or inseparable and defined as perfect balance of the material in it, it naturally follows that what is in perfect balance can have no motion. What is seen, heard and felt is simply a compound of motion and matter. In the primal state where there was no motion, this Prakṛti was indestructible, because decomposition comes only with the limitation. Again according to the Sāṃkhya atoms are not the primal state. This universe does not come out of atoms. The original matter may compound into atoms which in turn compound into greater and greater things.
modern theory of ether, if we say that ether is atomic, that will not bring us to the proper solution. To make it clearer, if we suppose that air is composed of atoms, there will be still some space between two atoms. How is the space to be accounted for? If there is another ether still finer, there must also be something to fill up the space left by the atoms. That would be regressus in infinitism which will never reach a final solution. According to the Sāṃkhya, this Prakṛti as we have seen, is omnipresent and the omnipresent mass of matter in it is the cause of everything that exists. This cause is the more subtle state of the manifested state, the unmanifested one of that which becomes manifested. This means that the materials out of which a body is composed go back into their original state. Beyond this idea of dissolution, any idea such as annihilation is absurd. What was called reversion to the causal state by Kapila ages ago, can be demonstrated as dissolution according to modern physical sciences. The ancients took mind as their basis and analysed the mental part of this Universe and arrived at the same conclusions as those at which modern science has arrived after an analysis of the physical part. Both these analyses lead to the same truth.

The first manifestation of this Prakṛti in the cosmos is Mahat or intelligence according to the Sāṃkhya. Out of this Mahat comes the universal egoism and both these are material. There is no difference between matter and mind except in degree. It is the same substance in finer or grosser form, only that one changes into the other. This egoism changes into two varieties, namely organs of sensation and organs of re-action. By the former, we see, hear, smell, taste, and touch, and by the latter, our hands, feet, voice, excretion and procreation are regulated. Out of egoism comes out another finer from, called Tanmātras, five particles of matter, out of which again is manufactured the gross matter, such as air, water, earth and all the things seen and felt by us.

These are cosmic things which again change into Mahat which is intelligence in one state and egoism in another. This is the cosmic place according to the Sāṃkhyas. What is in the cosmos or microcosm must be in the individual or microcosm. Let us revert to the microcosm, man. He is built on the same plan. First, the nature is perfectly balanced, then it becomes disturbed and action
begins. The first change produced by that action is what is called Mahat or intelligence. Out of it comes self-consciousness, out of self-consciousness, sense nerves and lastly out of sense-nerves is manufactured the gross body. It must be understood that this Mahat is modified into egoism and that this Mahat or intelligence is the cause of all these changes resulting in the production of a body. This covers three states, namely sub-consciousness, consciousness and super-consciousness. The first is found in animals and is called instinct. This is almost infallible, the second is the higher state of knowledge which, though fallible and slow, still has a larger scope and is called reason, and the third is a still higher state which belongs to the Yogi. This is as infallible, as instinct in the first case and more unlimited than reason in the second case. From this it is clear that Mahat is the real cause of all the manifestations, covering the whole ground of the three states in which knowledge exists. This knowledge is finding associations or to put it in the words of an Indian philosopher, is pigeon-holing one’s experience with the fund of experience already existing. It is recognizing a new impression. Suppose we want to know what universe is. Since knowledge is, as said above, finding or recognizing new associations with old ones the universe appears to us to be unintelligible until we find its associations. We shall recognize them when we go beyond the universe and our self-consciousness. If we fail to do that, our fruitless labour will lead us to no perceptible result. This conscious plane simply gives us a partial view of the universe. All we know of God is only a partial view of Him and all the rest is cut off and covered by our human limitation. "I am the Universal, so great am I that even this Universe is a part of Me. Bhagvad-Gîtâ, x. 42. This is why we see God as imperfect. To understand Him is impossible unless we resort to a state which is beyond reason or self-consciousness. "When thou goest beyond the heard and hearing, the thought and thinking, then alone wilt thou come to truth." Bhagvad-Gîtâ, II 52. "Go thou beyond the scriptures, because they teach only upto Prakṛti, unto the three qualities of which it is composed and out of which evolves the Universe." Bhagvad-Gîtâ, II. 45.

We now understand that macrocosm and microcosm are built upon the same plan and of the latter, we know only a very small
part, because of the intermediate stage of consciousness of which we know. If a man says that he is a sinner, he is foolish, because he does not know himself. He simply knows one part of himself which may be said to be the "mind ground." The same is the case with the universe. By means of reasoning we can at best know only one part of it. It is the Prakṛti which comprises the sub-conscious, the conscious and the super-conscious, individual Mahat and the universal Mahat with their relative modifications which lie beyond the pale of reason.

We have seen up to this that everything is Prakṛti. Prakṛti itself, is Jada (insentient). Like Prakṛti, mind, intelligence and will, all are insentient. But they all reflect sentiency, the Chitta (intelligence) of some Being who is beyond all this and whom the Sāṃkhya Philosophy calls Puruṣa. This Puruṣa is the cause of all these changes in Prakṛti in the Universe, which means in other words that this Puruṣa is the God of the Universe. It is claimed that the will of this Puruṣa or God created the Universe. This Will is the third or fourth manifestation of Prakṛti. It is said that Will is a compound and that everything that is a compound is a production of Prakṛti. It covers a small portion of subconsciousness. So it is clear that it did not create the Universe. Just as Will which is part of sub-consciousness, cannot move our brain and our heart, because the action of our brain and heart cannot be stopped by us at will, so in the universe, it forms only a part and therefore cannot guide it. This Puruṣa is neither will nor intelligence, because intelligence is a compound. As it is a compound, it cannot exist without matter. This matter takes the form called brain in man. If, then, intelligence is a compound, there must be matter. If that is so, who is this Puruṣa? This Puruṣa is neither intelligence nor Buddhi (will) but it is a cause of both. It is his presence that sets them vibrating and combining. It does not mix with Prakṛti; it is not intelligence or Mahat or any one of its modifications, but the Self, the Pure, the Perfect. "I am the witness and through my witnessing, Prakṛti is producing all that is sentient and insentient." Bhagavad-Gītā, IX. 10.

This basis of this sentiency is in the Puruṣa and is the very nature of the Puruṣa. It cannot be expressed nor understood but it is the material of what we call knowledge. This Puruṣa is not
consciousness, because consciousness is a compound. Sentience is in the Puruṣa but the Puruṣa is not intelligent, not knowing. It is the very condition in which knowledge is possible. The Chitta in the Puruṣa plus Prakṛti is what we call intelligence and consciousness. All joy, happiness, and light belong to the Puruṣa, but it is a compound, because it is that Puruṣa plus Prakṛti. "Wherever there is any happiness, wherever there is any bliss, there is one spark of that immortality, which is called Puruṣa." 

_Bra_: Up. IV. iii-32. This Puruṣa is the great attraction of the Universe, untouched by, and unconnected with the Universe. "In this world of insentience, that Puruṣa alone is sentient." 

_Kaṭha_ Up. V. 13. This is what the Śaṅkhyaśis believe to be Puruṣa. It then follows that this Puruṣa must be omnipresent, because what is not omnipresent, must be limited. If the Puruṣa were limited, it would die, would not be final and would not be free. According to Kapila, there are many Puruṣas and each one is infinite running through the Universe. But we know that it is omnipresent, and that it has neither birth nor death. We also know that it is Prakṛti that casts her mantle of shadow of birth and death upon it and that it is eternal by its own nature.

We have seen that the principal idea on which Kapila works is evolution. He makes one thing evolve out of another, because his very definition of causation is: "the effect is the cause reproduced in another form," Śaṅkhya Phi. I-118, because the whole universe, so far as we see it, is progressive and evolving. The whole universe must have evolved out of Prakṛti. Therefore, Prakṛti cannot be different from its cause. It becomes limited only when it takes a form. But according to Kapila, from the undifferentiated nature, that is, Prakṛti down to the last stage of differentiation, none of these is the same as Puruṣa. The whole universe is like a lump of clay. By itself it has no light, but we find reason and intelligence in it. Therefore, there must be existence behind it and Prakṛti. This existence is what Kapila calls Puruṣa or Ātman and the Vedānta, Self. According to Kapila, the Puruṣa is a simple factor and not a compound. The Puruṣa is immaterial, while all the various manifestations are material. Because if the Puruṣa is immaterial, it follows that it must be infinite and can have no limitation. So each of such Puruṣas is omnipresent but can act only through fine and gross manifestations of matter. The mind, the self-
consciousness, the organs and the vital forces compose what is called the body. It is this body that comes to reward or punishment, that goes to different heavens, that incarnates and reincarnates, because we see from the very beginning that the going and coming of the soul (Puruṣa) is impossible. Motion means going and coming of the soul, and that which goes from one place to another cannot be omnipresent. It is the Sthūla Sarīra that comes and goes. Thus far we see from Kapila’s psychology that the soul is infinite and that it is the only principle that is not an evolution of Prakṛti. It is the only one outside Prakṛti though it has apparently been found by Prakṛti. Prakṛti surrounds the Puruṣa and so it has identified itself with Prakṛti. It thinks, “I am the Liṅga Sarīra, I am the gross matter, the gross body” and, as such, am enjoying pleasure and pain. But these do not attach to the soul. They belong to the Liṅga Sarīra and to the gross body. The soul is the eternal witness of things going on. “As the sun is the cause of sight in every eye, yet is not itself affected by the defects in the eye, such is the Puruṣa.” Katha Up. II, ii. 11. “As a piece of crystal appears red when red flowers are placed before it, so this Puruṣa appears to be affected by pleasure or pain from the reflection cast upon it by nature, but it remains ever unchanged.” Sāṅkhya Sūra, II. 35. The nearest way to describe its state is what we feel during meditation. This meditation is one in which we approach nearest to the Puruṣa. It is called the highest state by the Yogi.

Next the Sāṅkhya says that this manifestation of Prakṛti is for the soul and that all the combinations of the materials of it are for something outside it. These combinations or constant changes are for the soul and for its liberation that it may gain all this experience from the lowest to the highest. When the soul gains this experience, it finds that it never was in Prakṛti and that it neither comes nor goes. These souls, according to Kapila, are many. All this resolves itself into three propositions: (1) Intelligence does not belong to the soul, it belongs to Prakṛti, (2) there is no god, no creator of the Universe and (3) souls are many, i.e., are infinite in number.

We shall take the first proposition that intelligence entirely belongs to Prakṛti. The Vedānta says that the soul is unlimited
or Absolute: Existence—Knowledge—Bliss. We agree with the Śaṅkhyaśas when they say that intelligence is a Compound. We know that Chitta or mind-stuff is what combines all things, and upon which all these impressions are made and from which re-action comes. Let us suppose that a gentleman, quite unknown to us, is standing before us. He acts on our mind and the mind throws a wave towards the point from which the action came. It is this wave which we call a gentleman. It is clear from this that there are two elements in this, one from inside and the other from outside. The combination of these is the object before us plus mind. This is what is our external universe. All knowledge is, therefore, by re-action.

The second proposition adduced by Kapila is that there is no God. As this series of limited manifestations of Prakṛti beginning with the individual intellect and ending with the individual body, requires the Self behind as the ruler on the throne, so in the Cosmos, we must enquire what the universal intelligence, the Universal mind, the Universal fine and gross materials have as their ruler. If we deny that there is a universal ruler or governor, we must deny that there is a soul behind the lesser series, because the whole universe is a repetition of the same plan.

The third and the last proposition as laid down by Kapila is that there is a plurality of Gods. We will now show how each soul is and must be omnipresent. Everything that is limited must be limited by something else. Suppose there is a black board here. The existence of a black board is circumscribed by many things and we find that every limitation presupposes some limiting thing. If we think of space, we have to think of it as a little circle, but beyond that is more space. We cannot imagine a limited space in any other way than through the infinite. To perceive the Infinite, we must, therefore, apprehend the Infinite.

When we think of time we have to think of time beyond any particular period of time. The latter is limited and the former is unlimited. Whenever we try to perceive the finite, we find it impossible to separate it from the infinite. This, therefore, proves that this Self must be infinite, omnipresent. Then the question is whether the omnipresent, the infinite can be two. We shall suppose for argument's sake that there are two infinites A and B. The infinite A limits the infinite B. If the infinite B is not the infinite 'A,
then the infinite A is not and cannot be infinite B. Therefore, there can be but one infinite. Secondly, the infinite cannot be divided. Infinity divided into any number of parts must still be infinity, for it cannot be separated from itself.

The whole universe is one and there is one Self in the Universe, only one Existence and that one existence when it passes through the forms of time, space and causation, is called intelligence, self-consciousness, fine matter, gross matter, etc. All physical and mental forms in the Universe are that One, appearing in various ways. When a little bit gets into this net work of time, space and causation, it apparently takes forms. If the net work is removed, only that one will remain. The whole universe is, therefore, all one and is called in the Vedânta philosophy Brahman. Brahman appearing behind the Universe is all God. This Brahman appearing behind the little Universe, the Microcosm, is the Soul. This very soul, self or Ātman, therefore, is God in man. There is only one Puruṣa and He is called God. When God and man are analysed, they are one. "In all hands you work, through all mouths you eat, through all nostrils you breathe, through all minds you think." Bhagvad-Gîtā, XIII. 13.

The question now arises how has one individual, one human being, the infinite Being, become broken into parts? The answer is that all this Division is only apparent, because the infinite cannot be divided. This is the conclusion of the Advaita Philosophy or the Philosophy of the Bhagvad-Gîtā.
INTEREST AND USURY

(PRINCIPAL BALKRISHNA, M.A. PH.D., F.R.E.S.)

The Hindu society had no prejudice against interest either for consumptive or productive purposes. We nowhere read of any prohibitions of loans at interest which were so general in Medieval Europe and the Mohammedan world. In ancient Greece Aristotle was the greatest exponent of the idea that money does not breed money and hence the barrenness of money could not give birth to interest. Moses, Christ, Mohammed, the medieval church-fathers and many others condemned money-lending. No anathemas have, however, been pronounced against the taking of interest on loans in India. The Hindu law-books expound the relations of lenders and borrowers on the basis of contract and hence rigorous laws have been made for the fulfilment of the contractual bargains. The legal, moral and economic justifications of interest have been prominently brought out in the various law-books. The state has been asked to allow a very great latitude to the parties concerned in the taking and realizing of loans. State interference comes in only in extreme cases. It can be realized that the doctrine of laissez faire in cases like these must have caused untold misery to the weaker classes, but the respect for free contracts might probably have kept back the state from interfering too often and too much in loan transactions. The free spirit of loan negotiations is summed up in these lines:

"Members of all castes are at liberty to negotiate loans on terms and at rates of interest which seem most convenient to them."

(Agni Purāna, Chap. 253, p. 910—Eng. Trans.)

Then Manu (X. 115-118) and Gautama (X. 39-49) include the income accruing from lending money as among the seven lawful modes of acquiring property. Even usury has been permitted to all men in times of distress, though under ordinary circumstances neither a Brāhmaṇa nor a Kṣatriya has been allowed to have recourse to money-lending. Men of these classes must charge only nominal interest even in times of distress. Consequently, the profession of money-lending is really restricted to the Vaiśyas and Śūdras alone. (Manu. I. 90; VIII. 410.)
Manu is very emphatic on the point: "Neither a priest nor a military man though distressed, must receive interest on loans; but each of them, if he pleases, may pay the small interest permitted by law, on borrowing for some pious act to the sinful man who demands it."

The freedom of contract in money transactions and the liberty granted to bankers for making their own rules and regulations independently of the state were the chief features of the ancient Indian society. The rules in vogue in the banking circles were respected and decisions in courts were based on the authoritative declarations of the bankers.

Local customs, too, were given due weight in fixing rates of interest, in making loan-contracts and in the recovery of debts.

Bhaspati has well said:

"It is by local custom that both the loan and its recovery should be regulated." (XIV. 18).

Gautama and other jurists are also most positive in giving full authority to the bankers to frame their own rules. Cultivators, traders, herdsmen, money-lenders and artisans, have authority to lay down rules for their respective classes. Having learned the state of affairs from those who in each class have authority to speak, the king shall give the legal decision. (Gautama, XI. 21-22.)

The cultivators- artisans, artists, money-lenders, trade-corporations, dancers, religious orders and thieves are allowed to decide their own disputes, according to the rules of their own profession, because it is impossible to detect them through the help of others. (Sukra, IV. V. 18-19.)

The futility of making rigorous usury-laws has been fully recognised here. No God-given or priest-promulgated laws were forcibly imposed upon the Hindu society. Each section, group, profession, was absolutely free in regulating its internal affairs, and even in external affairs the state reduced its interference to the minimum.

Usury vs. Interest

The wealth employed for increase or growth is known as Kusida-loan or a thing lent to be repaid with interest. Its increase is called Interest on loans.
The word *Kusīda* really means that which adheres closely and cannot easily be got rid of. Bṛhaspati has given a very fanciful etymology of the word, but it brings out the distressed condition of the debtor, the strength of the creditor and the reprehensible nature of loan-bargains.

"That loan is termed *Kusīda* which is exacted by persons without any fear of law or morality, *from a distressed or wretched man*, after having been increased to four or eight times the original amount (through the interest accruing on it)." (Bṛ. XI. 2).

Bṛhaspati makes *Kusīda* synonymous with usury and discloses the various reprehensible features of that institution.

The borrowers have been described as "wretched and distressed," being in the clutches of poverty and extreme necessity. They were weak, defenceless, impecunious and had to bargain with shrewd money-lenders.

(2) At the time of the compilation of the śūtras of Bṛhaspati, every advantage was being taken by some merciless money-lending jews of the weak position of the needy borrowers to exploit them. In doing so they had no compunction, no fear of law and morality. They were neither violating the dictates of morality and precepts of religion, nor the laws of their land. In other words, law, morality and religion all sanctioned the exploitation of the poor peasants and plebians for the sake of the ideal respect for the liberty of contract.

(3) In cases when the borrowers could not pay exorbitant interest and return the principal, compulsion and force were resorted to in extorting from them.

(4) Lastly, it has been said that the original sum lent could grow to three, four or even eight times according to the usage of different countries. After that maximum only, the law intervened to protect the borrower from the extortions of money-lenders, and prohibited the exaction of any higher amount of interest. Bṛhaspati has thus vividly shown that usury was a great instrument of extortion, exploitation, misery, suffering, and ruin of the debtor class. It is too true that money-lenders "traffic in other people's misfortunes, seeking gain through their adversity: under the pretence of compassion they dig a pit for the oppressed."
On account of its reprehensible character, *Kusīda-usūry* has been clearly distinguished from *Vṛddhi* or interest. The legal and equitable rates charged on loaned sums are known as *vṛddhi*, but excesses in that profession, though legalized in several codes on account of their prevalence in the commercial circles, are against morality. These were severely condemned on ethical grounds in law-books.

**Kinds of Interest**

Four special kinds of interest beside simple interest have been declared by Manu and Nārada as follows:

1. *Periodical (Kālīka) Interest* is that which is charged by periods of one month at rates varying according to the profession of the debtor or according to the necessities of each.

2. *Stipulated (Kārita) Interest* is the one promised by the borrower himself in times of great distress and not the one thrust forcibly or artfully by a creditor upon the man in distress. (Vyav, 295 p.)

3. *Corporal (Kāyika) Interest* is taken by Nārada to mean one in which one Paṅga or quarter of a Paṅga is paid regularly *every day* without diminishing the principal, i.e., even though an exorbitant interest may have to be paid, the original capital suffers no reduction.

Bṛhaspati† and Vyāsa, however, derive the term *Kāyika* from *Kāyā*, a body, and explain that it denotes bodily labour, or the use of a pledged slave or animal. The commentators of Manu have explained the word in the sense of manual labour performed for the creditor with no idea of slavery implied in it. But the authors of the *Viṣṇuitrodaya* and *Maṇḍarataṇa* take it to mean the work done by mortgaged cows, bulls, horses, etc., and the bodily labour in serving the creditor with these means. (p. 298).

4. *Compound (Chakravṛddhi) Interest* has been defined as interest upon interest.

We are informed by Bṛhaspati‡ that some writers added one more kind, while others recognised two more sorts of interest. These extra forms are *Śikha vṛddhi* (Hair-like growing interest) and

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*Manu VIII. 153; Gautama XII. 34-35; Nārada I. 102-104; Yāj. in Cole brooke’s Dig. I. p. 51.
† Bṛh. XI. 6; Agni P., ch. 253, Eng. Trans., p. 910.
‡ XI. ii. 49.
Bhogalābha or interest by enjoyment. Gautama has described and approved these six forms of interest. (XII, 34-35).

(5) The hair-interest of Bṛhaspati is the Kāyika interest of Nārada. It is so called because it grows every day like hair and does not cease growing except on the loss of the head, that is to say, on payment of the principal. Thus the daily interest can only cease by payment of the principal sum.

(6) The Mortgage (Bhogalābha) interest is the return or profit accruing from the use of a mortgaged house, land, property or other forms of wealth.* No money-interest is paid in this case, but the use of the pawned or pledged article or the rent accruing from the pledged field or house is given to the creditor.

The corporal-interest, daily-interest, and pledge-interest or interest by enjoyment are allowed by Bṛhaspati to be continuously taken by the creditor as long as the principal remains unpaid. (Bṛh. XI. 11.)

There are, however, some palliatives. For instance, it is considered usury to use a pledge after twice the principal has been realized from the usufruct, to exact compound interest and the principal, or to charge full interest after a part of it has been liquidated. All these are reprehensible practices. These methods of exacting interest have been declared to be illegal and unjust by Bṛhaspati.

Manu's text as interpreted by Nandaṇa and Rāmchandra, declares: "None should charge interest beyond a year, neither such as is not allowed in the law-books or by the people nor compound, periodical, corporal and stipulated interests."

All the commentators are agreed that there is a positive interdiction in the code of Manu on ethical principles to charge interest in any form other than simple.

Yet scholiasts like Medhātithi and Sarvāṇa Nārāyaṇa declare that according to some law-givers the last four kinds of interest are not forbidden, while Govinda thinks that all or some of them are permissible for merchants, that is, when loans are used for productive purposes.

* Viram. takes the word in the sense of immovable property. P. 295.
† Medh. and Sarv. explain the word "Adṛṣṭa," unseen, as invisible interest which, by being taken day by day or month by month is not allowed to accumulate and thus take a tangible form. It means that Manu is prohibiting the so-called Hair-Interest.
The interpretation of Vāchaspati Misra is the most logical. It runs:

"Let no lender for a month, or for two or three months, at a certain interest, receive such interest beyond the year; nor any interest which is unapproved; nor interest upon interest by previous agreement; nor periodical interest exceeding in time the amount of the principal; nor interest exacted from a debtor as the price of the risk, when there is no public danger or distress; nor immoderate profits from a pledge to be used by way of interest."

The first part of the law is confirmed by Gautama who quotes the opinion of some law-givers to the effect that no lender should receive interest beyond a year.

If the man who has agreed to receive compound interest at a particular time and place, refuses the time, place and conditions of the agreement, he cannot claim compound interest. (Medha., Rāma., Nand., Sarv.)

The question consequently arises how much interest should be paid to the creditor in this case. The amount of interest chargeable to the debtor is then to be settled by those who are experts in maritime and internal trades and able to calculate the profits in a particular trade. According to Sarvagnā Nārāyana the interest depends upon the probable profits accruing from a particular enterprise or voyage. If on account of some accident on the sea or on the land, the borrower is not able to make any profits, he is not to pay interest, because insurance had already been considered by the lender for the risk involved in the undertaking.

**Rates of Interest**

The maximum rate of interest on secured loans authorized by almost all law-givers like Manu,* Vasiṣṭha,† Nārada,‡ Brhaspati,§ Kauṭilya,¶ Yājñavalkya,** Gautama,†† is 1¼ per cent. per month, or 15 per cent. per annum. This was the highest rate of interest recog-

* VIII. 140.
† II. 51.
‡ I. 99.
§ XI. 3.
¶ Arthaśāstra, p. 221.
** II. 37.
†† XII. 29.
nized by the law of the land. In almost all countries governments used to fix rates of interest.

Even the English Parliaments in the past have tried to fix a legal and fair rate of interest. The steps in the process were these:—

1197. All taking of interest forbidden.
1436. A similar Act implying that the forbidden thing was not extinct.
1545. Interest up to 10 per cent made legal.
1552. Interest forbidden (result of the Catholic revival during Mary I.)
1570. Legal interest reduced to 3 per cent.
1884. All restrictions removed.*

On the other hand, when we find that law-givers and scholiasts separated from each other by several millenniums, continue to lay down the same rule, the unprogressive, static, stationary or conservative condition of the Aryan society is vividly impressed upon one’s mind. That the laws regarding rates of interests everywhere vary with the changing conditions of trade and industry in a progressive society is the explicit verdict of history.

In India no change is visible in the legal rate of interest, hence society must have remained stationary or at least custom-ridden for ages together.

This maximum rate of interest does not seem to be exorbitant and extortionate when even to-day in many parts of the country, agriculturists and villagers in general are paying interest at the rate of one anna per rupee per month or 75 per cent. per annum on the security of their belongings. The maximum rate was 15 per cent. per annum on the basis of security, but when no guarantee of any sort could be given, the rate varied with different castes.

Two per cent. per mensem from men of the priestly class or Brāhmaṇas, 3 per cent. from men of the military class, 4 per cent. from persons of the trading and industrial classes, and 5 per cent. from men of agricultural and labouring classes have been declared to be legitimate rates of interest.†

Following these law-givers or the prevailing practice of his time

† Manus VIII. 142; Narada l. 100; Vīṣṇu VI, 2; Yāj. II. 37; Arthasastra, p. 221; Harita in Colebrooke’s Dig. I. p. 45.
Kauṭilya has declared the commercial interest to be five per cent. per month.

When all those who were actually engaged in the production of wealth, were saddled with such excessive rates ranging between 48 and 60 per cent, trade, industry and agriculture could not be undertaken on any extensive scale. Then, the laws of the land offered little protection or relief to the necessitous, distressed, poor or needy people, and seldom came to the assistance of the agricultural and industrial classes to any appreciable degree. The above-mentioned legal rates, according to Viṣṇu (VI. 3-4), were to be enforced by law courts for the time that had elapsed after one year of the contraction of a loan. It has been expressly laid down that debtors of the various castes may pay as much interest as has been stipulated by themselves. This proviso shows that the rates could exceed even the maxima fixed above, but these higher or lower rates promised by the debtors were to be enforced for the first year only.

Nārada exhorted creditors to be generous and virtuous and hence not to be greedy. Following the practice of the virtuous, creditors should take at the most 24 per cent. per annum. By doing so, they do not commit the crime of covetousness. We know how ethics, high moral ideals, principles and precepts are thrown to the winds in actual practice. Actuated and blinded by self-interest men pay scant regard to mere preaching and evade the laws against usury in a thousand artful ways.

Before we proceed further, we must know what kinds of securities have been recognized by Hindu law as valid in the contraction of loans. These were five of varying order of reliability:—

1) A pledge (Ādhī) of adequate value—property, land, ornaments, etc., mortgaged and pawned for the money borrowed. The use of the words “of adequate value” is obvious. The pledge should be of such a price that the debt may be discharged with interest in the event of non-payment.

According to Bṛhaspati a pledge is of four kinds—moveable, immoveable, for custody and for use. These may be explained as under:—
(a) A pledge known as Moveable or Personal, consists of horses, slaves, ornaments, chattels, etc.

(b) An Immovable or Real Pledge is made up of real estates, lands, houses, etc.

(c) A pledge for custody only is to be merely kept, because it may be injured by use, or because it can not be used. A pledge for use or employment is a thing which is not probably injured by use.

(d) (i) An Unlimited Pledge is one which is subject to redemption at pleasure, or which is not to be released before the fixed time. The payment of the debt and surrender of the pledge depend on the will of the party.

(ii) A Limited Pledge is that which can be released at a specific time only. "On payment of the principal at such a time, this pledge shall be released," in this and similar forms, a period is fixed. Loans can be secured by a written contract or with a verbal but attested agreement. If it be questioned whether this thing has been pledged to that man or not, the evidence may be a writing or a witness.

By their subdivisions and mutual differences, there are in all eight distinctions of a pledge approved by Hindu Law. These forms are, in fact, the properties of a pledge. They deal with the nature of the thing pledged, the form of hypothecation, the period of the mortgage, and the evidence of the transaction.* Nārada too is in agreement with Bhāṣpati on the distinctions of a pledge.

(2) Now the second kind of loan-security is called a binding agreement (Lagna). It means a promise by the debtor to the effect that "as long as the debt is not discharged, so long will he not alienate, either by gift, sale or mortgage or in any other like manner the house, land or other property."

Several scholiasts take Bandhan to be a pledge which can not be used, but must be merely kept by the creditor, just as gold and silver ornaments, utensils or various metals, clothes etc. Such a pledge is distinguished by the condition that the pawned article is impaired by use. It is also hypothecated that the pawn-broker can not use the article as security for a debt contracted by himself in turn.

* Colebrooke's Digest, I, pp. 140-144.
The pledge that can be used like lands, houses, cows, buffaloes, trees, elephants, horses, asses, oxen, etc. is known as Adhū. It is hereby implied that the pledged and transferred articles should be restored in an unimpaired condition.

(3) The third kind of loan-security consists of personal guarantee. This surety (Pratibhū) is said to be of three kinds:—

(a) for appearance the surety taking the responsibility to produce the borrower and bring him to the creditor or the court;

(b) for trust—that the borrower is trustworthy and if he proves untrustworthy, the surety shall pay the sum lent;

(c) of payment—that the surety shall pay the money in the default of the debtor. (Nārada, I. 117-121.)

(4) The fourth type of loan-security takes the form of Documents which are of two kinds—the one in the hand-writing of the party himself, the other in that of another person. The former is valid even without subscribing witnesses, the latter is required to be attested. We are not concerned with the specific rules on the validity and value of bonds which have been laid down in the law books. Suffice it to say that a document, if not obtained by force or fraud, was thought superior to witnesses and not vice versa.*

(5) The fifth and last kind of loan-security is of Witnesses who have been recognised to be of eleven descriptions. They were to be such who had heard or witnessed a deed with their own ears or own eyes.

Brhaspati's general rule for the guidance of the people runs thus:—"To a kinsman, relative, or friend one may lend money with pledge only; a loan to others must be guaranteed by a surety, or there must be a written contract or witnesses." (XIV. 17.)

Loans contracted on the basis of the above five kinds of security, could not bear more than 15 per cent. interest in any case. These securities have been described in the descending order of their reliability and on grounds of legal safety. Therefore, the rates of interest must have varied up to the maximum limit, ceteris paribus, in these five cases, being lowest in case of mortgage loans and highest when nothing was pawned or mortgaged, but only witnesses were accepted by the lender for the act of loaning money.

The maximum rate of 15 per cent. does not seem to be excessive when in our own days loans are generally made by pawn-brokers at the rate of 25 per cent. per annum or more in England even. Loans unsecured by any one of these five kinds of security had to pay from 24 to 60 per cent. per annum. These loans were only for those people who were the poorest of the poor, who had nothing to pawn, who had no friend to stand surety for them, who could not call even witnesses to see the transaction, and who were not willing to give any agreement or document. In such cases risks of loss cannot be adequately estimated and interest ought to have been high to cover losses. Professor Marshall* gives the instance of costermongers and cattle-dealers who have to pay 10 per cent. per day. Rightly has he told us that a farthing invested at ten per cent a day would amount to a billion pounds at the end of a year.

The Hindu laws of interest in cases of unsecured loans seem to be very mild even when judged by our present standards and the rates do not seem excessive. It will have been seen that the daily interest paid in certain transactions is one pana or a quarter of a pana per cent. The rate of interest on small and unsecured loans prevailing two thousand years back in India was about one-fortieth and at the highest one-tenth of what the costermongers have been said to pay in these days in England.

Factors of Interest

It is but proper that the rate of interest should vary with the varying degree of the security offered for the loan. Vyāsa laid down that 15 per cent. per annum may be the rate in case of debts secured by pledges, 20 per cent. p. a. if the security is offered by the surety, while if there is no security of any kind, 24 per cent. may be charged.

The second factor of interest recognised in these books is the reliability of the debtor due to his social position, profession, character, religious merit, etc. The personal security of the borrower must vary in the direct ratio of the descending scale of social and professional positions; interest must rise in the ascending order as the status of the debtor grows lower and lower. Hence the highest rate of interest allowable from men of priestly class was 2 per cent., from

the military class 3 per cent., from the Vaiśyas 4 per cent., from the Śūdras 5 per cent. per month.*

The third factor was the premium for insurance against trade-risks. Traders who could not offer security of any description and had to go to distant countries through unfrequented forests to sell cloth, etc., could be charged up to 10 per cent per month, while those who had to traverse the ocean, had to pay as much as 20 per cent per month.†

The difference in the rates of interest in various countries and in the different localities of the same country, has been recognized by all writers. Even when the customary rates are contrary to the legal rates prescribed in the law books, the former prevail and not the latter.

Lastly, the differences in the rates of interest due to busy and dull seasons have not been ignored. One scholiast adds:—""country is there a mere instance, suggesting usage founded on seasons, on difference of class, and so forth.""‡

There is a far greater risk in the maritime trade than in the inland trade, hence the price of the hire of money-capital must be higher. The French law fixes a maximum rate of 5 per cent. for all mortgage or consumption loans, but admits unlimited interest on loans of commercial character. The Hindu law fixed the maximum in productive and risky loans. The act of lending money above those rates constituted the offence of usury and was punishable with a fine of 12 to 96 paṇas. The abettors were to be fined half of the above sum.§

The profits of trade and the prices of foreign articles must have been very high, when merchants and traders had sometimes to pay 120 per cent. interest per annum, though of course, on unsecured loans only, in inland trade and twice as much for maritime commerce. No information on the profits of trade and industry earned in ancient India is available, but an idea of their magnitude can be offered by those which obtained in the first half of 17th century.¶

* Virām, p. 296.
† Yāj. II. 38; Artha, p. 221; Aprāraka, p. 643.
‡ P. 123 of Colebrooke's Digest, I.
§ Artha, p. 221.
¶ Author's Commercial Relations between India and England, pp. 170-1, 292-3.
In the Jāva Records, Vol. IV, pp. 6-11, the profits of the Manilla and Japan trades on Indian goods are shown. In the latter case they varied from 420 to 700 per cent. in 1667!

Sieg Luillier has given us an idea of the profits of various trades at the end of the seventeenth century. They can be summarised as under:

1200 per cent. profits on Japan articles.
1000 per cent. profits on China ware.
500 per cent. profits on Chinese silks.
30—40 per cent. profit on Bengal silks and rice brought to Coromandel.

These rates, however, did not hold good in case of free contracts. Any rates of interest, lower or higher, could be agreed to by lenders and borrowers without regard to their own castes according to the conditions of the market and circumstances of the case. Stipulated interests had to be paid in such cases.

Theory of Interest

No rational theory of interest has been propounded in the Hindu books, although the principal items which make up the market rates of interest have been admirably brought out. The fundamental cause of the genesis of interest is also not ignored. That interest is the reward of saving, of undergoing a great trouble in earning and a far greater hardship in maintaining the money-capital intact, and of abstaining from the use of it like a miser, has been implicitly propounded by Śukra* and others.

Thus the legitimacy of private wealth and therefore of interest on capital is proved, because it is the result of labour and of abstinence, or of postponing the present needs for the sake of future needs. Śukra holds the view that it is four times as difficult to save, preserve and maintain wealth as to earn it, because that which is disregarded even for a moment is soon destroyed. There is no greater fool than the man who knows how to earn but not to maintain what has been earned.

Maximum amount to be claimed as interest

Whatever may be the rates of interest—15, 20, 24, 36, 48, 60 per cent or even more, the total interest for any one period during

* Śukra, IV. II. 33—36.
which a particular loan remained unpaid could not exceed the principal borrowed. This rule was observed only in the Āryavarta, while in other countries interest was allowed to be accumulated till it was trebled, quadrupled or even octupled.* This rule of Nārada is confirmed by Manu, Viṣṇu and others. The interpretation, however, put upon it by scholiasts, nullifies the spirit and utility of the law. If interest is paid month by month, or day by day, the amount of interest paid by the borrower may, in their opinion, soar to any amount; but if it is paid in an accumulated form in one single payment, then alone it shall not be more than the amount of the principal.† In such a case, the law does not offer relief to debtors, because if the principal remains outstanding and the interest be paid in smaller sums than the amount of the principal there is no limit to the sum which may be received as interest. On the other hand, much latitude has been given to creditors to exploit their distressed victims and extort from them exorbitant interest. The courts could not interfere in many cases. The following laws will speak for themselves:

A creditor recovering an acknowledged debt will not be liable to the blame of the king; and if the debtor should complain to the king, he should be fined and made to pay the debt.§

A creditor recovering the sum lent by any (lawful) means shall not be reproved by the king. If the debtor, so forced to discharge the debt, complains to the king, he shall be fined in an equal sum.‡

Moreover the rule is applicable equally to cases whether the interest was paid in money or grain, or whether the debt was or was not secured by a mortgage. The interest-law does not preclude recovery of interest, even when the principal sum lent has been paid off.

* Nārada, I. 106; Viṣṇu, VI. 11–17; Manu, VIII. 151; Gautama, XII. 36; Yāj., II. 39; Brāhmapati, XI. 12.
† See text of Manu:—Interest on money received at once, not year by year, month by month, or day by day, as it ought, must never be more than enough to double the debt; that is, more the amount of the principal paid at the same time.
§ Yāj., II. 40.
‡ Viṣṇu, VI. 18–19.
Commodity-Loans

In olden days as at present various kinds of loans were practised all over the country. Money loans constitute only one form, though a most important one. The details of commodity-loan—transactions and the rates of interest paid in the same kind of equal value to lenders are not separately mentioned in Manu. The commentators have especially stated that the very silence on the rates of interest on commodity-loans implies the same rates as on money loans, i.e., 15 per cent. on pledged loans and 24 per cent. etc. on borrowings when there is neither pledge nor surety to secure the loans. The maximum amounts of commodity interest which could be legally charged when it was allowed to accumulate differed in each case. Law-givers are not unanimous on the compound interest allowed by law to be accumulated upon the loaned articles.

The following are the typical examples of commodity-loans*:

1. Gold loans signified the borrowing of gold, silver, gems, pearls, coral, shells, conches and the like, clothes made of wool and silk. Capital could be doubled in all these cases, creditors could not claim more than 100 per cent. as interest for the exceptionally long period during which the loan was not returned by the borrower. All the great jurists are unanimous on this law.

2. Metal loans.—On all kinds of base metals like copper, iron, iron-filings, bronze, tin, lead, etc. when borrowed, one had to pay on re-payment 200 per cent. at the utmost.

3. Cloth-loans have been allowed to be trebled by Bṛhaspati and Viṣṇu, but quadrupled by Yājñyavalka. On the other hand, loans of wool and hair, or of cloths made of these could be quintupled on the authority of Manu and Gautama.

4. Grain-loans taken for the purpose of food could grow to three times the original amount according to Viṣṇu, Yājñyavalkya, Vasiṣṭha and Harita, but even to four times on the authority of Bṛhaspati and to five times on that of Manu and Gautama. In our own days cultivators borrow wheat, paddy, etc., on the condition of paying twice the amount within six months.

* Bṛh. XI 13–16; Yāj. II. 57; Manu VIII. 151; Viṣṇu VI. 11–17; Nārada I. 107; Vīra. Vyāv., p. 297; Vyāv. M., p. 104 (Mandlika); Kātyāyana in Colebrooke’s Dig. I. p. 109.
(5) Vegetable-loans—Interest on all kinds of edible plants, fruits, roots etc., borrowed by a man could accumulate to 300—400 per cent. Manu and Gautama allow the interest to be accumulated to four times the principal lent.

(6) Cattle-loans—In village such loans are frequent even now. If a bull is given on a loan to be used by another person, the owner of the bull whatever interest he might have extorted to be paid him by the borrower, could not claim more than 300 per cent. on the authority of Bṛhaspati.

If a cow has been given by one person to another person, Viṣṇu allows the lender to take the offspring of the cow as interest for her use, while to-day the calf and milk of cow belong to the rearer. The same rule applies to all animals employed for transport. According to Manu, the interest with the principal can be quintupled. However long the period of debt may be, the debtor can only be liable to pay back an amount equal in value to five hundred pieces of money and no more.

(7) Slave-loans.—Howsoever strange it may appear to us to-day the custom was prevalent in ancient India to lend Dāsis—female slaves for the conjugal use of men other than the owners. In such cases the offspring was the interest accruing to the owner for the loan of the sentient property in the form of a slave.

It has now been seen that interest on commodities varies from 100 to 700 per cent, but Manu does not allow accumulation to exceed more than five times in any case. His laws on money and commodities are given in his own words:—

In money transactions interest paid at one time (not by instalments) shall never exceed the principal; on grain, fruit, or hair and beasts of burden, the interest together with the principal must not be more than five times the original amount.

Stipulated interest beyond the legal rate, being against the law can not be recovered; they call that a usurious way of lending; the lender is in no case entitled to more than five in the hundred. (VIII. 150-151.)

*Time Limit to Accumulation of Interest*

The period of time after which interest ceases on various sorts of loans is shown in the following table. Manu does not allow
compound interest, so simple interest is increasing from year to year, till it equals the principal lent. Thus a loan of Rs. 100 will be doubled in six years and eight months. Similarly, as 2 per cent. per month can at the highest be charged from a Brāhmaṇa, it means that if the principal remains with the debtor for a long time, he will pay Rs. 100 per cent. after 50 or more months. A similar calculation is to be made in other cases.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kind of Loan</th>
<th>Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pledged money loans</td>
<td>... 80 months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsecured money loans</td>
<td>as under 80 months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Brāhmaṇas</td>
<td>... 50 months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ksatriyas</td>
<td>... 33 1/3 ..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaśasyas</td>
<td>... 25 ..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śudras</td>
<td>... 20 ..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold loans</td>
<td>... Same as above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal</td>
<td>... Double the above periods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloth</td>
<td>... &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grains</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables</td>
<td>... &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle loans</td>
<td>... Treble the above periods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seed</td>
<td>... Quintuple &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous loans</td>
<td>Septuple &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Loans without Interest

Interest is forbidden in some cases, unless there has been a special agreement between the parties to the contrary. Nārada has named the following cases when no interest can be charged:—

1. Price of a commodity purchased but not received.
2. Price of a commodity sold but not delivered.
3. Wages.
4. Deposit.
5. A fine imposed by the Crown.
6. Money taken by fraud or the like and restored.
7. A thing idly promised to dancers and the like.
8. Wager-money—money won in gambling.

Samvarta has counted a few more items like these:—

9. Property of women lent to kinsmen or kept with husbands, sons or other protectors bears no interest.
(10) None on interest itself.
(11) Deposit remaining with a depository.
(12) A thing committed in trust or placed with an intermediate person.
(13) A sum which is dubious or unliquidated. It has been explained by Ratnākara to be a sum due by a surety.

Kātyāyana too has some more items on which no interest can be charged:

(14) On leather
(15) Straw
(16) Asava

\{ See Brhaspati and Viṣṇu. \}

Wager-money.
Price of commodities.
Woman's fee—money payable to a courtesan.
Money due from a surety on account of his suretiship.
Nuptial gift.

Vyāsa has enumerated the following cases:

(17) A pledge, meant to be kept only, but used without the owner's consent.
(18) A debt not accepted from a debtor tendering it and deposited with a third person.
(19) Part of a loan remaining in the hands of the creditor.
(Cf. Gautama, XII. 32-33.)
(20) A fine imposed by government, although paid after a long delay, carried no interest.

A nuptial gift which is promised to be paid.
(21) A sum only promised on a false or immoral consideration, since the donee, it is argued, has no property in a thing promised, there can be no interest.

(a) Nārada, Viṣṇu, Yājñavalkya, Vyāsa. Kātyāyana, Manu are agreed that if a pledge for custody is used by the creditor, interest on loan is forfeited.

(b) If a beneficial pledge be damaged, no interest accrued.

(c) If a pledge is lost, spoiled, altered or destroyed, it is to be made good by the creditor unless the loss is caused without his fault by the act of God or king. If he can not restore the pledge or its
price, there follows the forfeiture of the principal as well as of interest.*

In the case of a beneficial pledge when its usufruct alone has been accepted as its interest, no other interest is to be taken or given. (Manu, VIII. 143.)

Kulluka has rightly said: "If land, a cow, a slave, or the like, be delivered as a pledge to be used, the creditor shall not receive the interest already ordained on loans of money."

The debt of a surety was payable by his son without interest, but the grandson in default of the debtor, was not morally bound to pay the debt at all. (Pp. 254-5.) The son was to pay the borrowed principal for which his father stood surety, but no interest could be claimed on it. If a grandson had to pay debts contracted by his grandfather, he too had to pay the sum borrowed but not the interest on it. The money due by a surety was on no account to be paid by his grandson; it was lost to the creditor, if the debtor by that time had absconded or otherwise was unable to pay.

Restraint of Debtors

The treatment of the debtors in India was indeed very harsh when judged from modern standards of justice and morality. But it was certainly as, if not more, human than that meted out to debtors in ancient Rome or even in England in the beginning of the 19th century.

Byhaspati† has detailed five expedients to recover debt from a debtor. These have been explained by the same law-giver.

When a debtor is made to pay by the advise of friends or kinsmen, by mild remonstrance, by constant following or by the creditor starving himself to death, that mode of recovery is said to be constant to equity. When a creditor with an artful design borrows any thing from the debtor, or withholds a thing deposited by him, and thus compels payment of debt, this is called circumvention or legal deceit.

When a debtor is fettered and conducted into the creditor’s house, where he is compelled to pay the debt by beating or other forcible means, it is called violent compulsion.

* Colebrooke’s Dig. pp. 143—158.
† XI. 54—59.
When a debtor is forced to pay by confining his wife, son or cattle, and by having his door obstructed, it is termed the customary mode or the lawful confinement.

An indigent debtor may be taken to his own house by the creditor and compelled to do work there, such as distilling spirits and the like; however, a Brāhmaṇa must not be so confined but be made to pay gradually. Bhūgu ordains that a debtor may be dragged before an assemblage of people, and there restrained until he pays the debt, according to the custom of the country.

Debtors were treated with such harshness and cruelty that provisions as the following had to be made in their favour:

If one confined should need the voiding of urine or fæces, he should either be followed at a distance, or dismissed in fetters, or should be asked to furnish his son or other relatives as a hostage in lieu of himself. If he has furnished security, he should be released every day at the hour of meals and at night, and also while the hostage remains in custody. He who can not or will not tender a security for appearance, should be confined in jail or in the custody of guards.

It is evident that the restraint of the person of the debtor and even of the persons of his wife, sons and cattle is permissible.

Even blows are authorized. Threat of blows, catching the debtor by the hair, dragging him to the creditor's house, harsh reproof, and violent confinement are legal on the authority of Bīhaspati.

Kātyāyana supports the preceptor of the gods in these words* :— "A debtor, being arrested, and freely acknowledging the debt, may be openly dragged before the public assembly, and confined until he pays what is due, according to the immemorial usage of the country." Elsewhere the same author lays down that a creditor may enforce payment from his debtor by beating or by coercion. Manu too has authorized the use of violent measures for enforcing payment.

The general rule is that the harsh methods employed for recovering the debt ought to conform to the usage prevalent in a country. Much light is thrown in the commentary on this text. It is said that in some countries creditors cause their debtors to be
arrested and confined by the king's officers; in others, they themselves or their servants restrain the debtors; in others again, they confine them in fetters.

The condition of bringing before the public assembly is worth consideration. Maltreatment of the debtor could be prevented. The persons assembled served as witnesses of the acknowledged debt. It was intended to get the approbation of impartial persons for the work to be done by the debtor in conformity with the local custom.

This treatment was to vary with the nature and amount of the debt as well as with the character of the debtors and creditors. Debtors must have been harshly treated in the houses of their creditors. They could stir out in chains only for bath, meals and for calls of nature. They were kept within closed gates and given meals in their prisons.

*Moral sanction of Interest*

The moral justification of interest is shown by the severe punishments that have been threatened to fall upon the defaulter of a debt.

Kātyāyana and Bṛhaspati threaten a defaulter to be born again as a slave, servant, wife, or a beast of burden in the house of his creditor, while Nārada pronounces a still greater punishment on the head of a defaulter:—"The debt or loan which a debtor does not repay even on demand shall multiply till it reaches a thousand millions. On that amount having been reached the debtor suffering the consequences of that act shall in each successive birth be a horse, an ass, a bullock, or a slave."

Vyāsa too has something to say on the point:—

"If an ascetic or an agnihotri should die in debt, the merit of those authorities or that worship of fire will belong to the creditor."*

Nārada has beautifully summoned up the case thus:—

"If a creditor of the priestly class die, leaving issues, the king shall cause the debt to be paid to them; if he leaves no issue, to his near kinsman; if he leaves none who are near, to those who are distant, paternal or maternal. If he leaves no heirs near or distant, nor persons connected by sacred studies, the king shall bestow it on

worthy priests; but if none of these are present, let him cast it into the waters. The debts of other classes in similar circumstances, he may seize for himself.†

This injunction is based on the well-known Hindu law that the wealth of all but priests who die without heirs, goes to the king. *

State Loans

Before we leave this topic of interest, we may refer to two institutions mentioned in Hindu books on politics. State loans were raised or forcibly requisitioned from rich men in times of crises, though interest was paid on them. Śukra says.—"" The king, after giving a promise of paying a certain fixed interest, should take the wealth of the rich men in times of dangers as a loan. On the passing off of the danger, he should return the amount to them with interest."‡

Thus the floating or mobile wealth of the community could be requisitioned in times of national crises; but the borrowed money was not to be appropriated or confiscated by the state, it was to be duly returned to the Government bond-holders along with interest.

On the other hand, there was the practice of depositing state-money with rich bankers that it may serve as a national reserve for critical times.

(1) "" The king should deposit his reserves with rich bankers, in order that they may be of use in times of danger."" (Śukra, IV. II, 42-45.)

(2) Kautilya too says that "" lending the money of the treasury on periodical interest is a loan.""

(3) A king by investing his money in loans on occasions sanctioned in the scriptures or by lending money to persons who seek it, does not become amenable to censure.¶

† Colebrooke's Digest, I., p. 335.
* Vaisu. XVIII. 13—16.
‡ Śukra, IV. II. 21—22.
(4) Loans to agriculturists have been highly praised in various works. In the Sābhā Parva, it has been pointed out that when agriculturists are in want of seed, food, etc., they should be generously given loans on 25 per cent. interest.§

Laws in favour of Debtors

There are many laws to protect borrowers. Those naturally differ in different law-books. On some points there is unanimity or general concensus of opinion amongst Hindu jurists.

A synopsis of these rules will furnish at a glance their comprehensive nature:

1. Debtors were not to pay more than the maximum interest on money loans.
2. Commodity loans were legal for a specified period only.
3. Certain classes of borrowers were protected from being exploited.
4. All kinds of interest other than the simple were looked upon as reprehensible.
5. Accumulation of interest on money and commodities was limited both with regard to time and amount.
6. There were several persons from whom no interest could be charged for, and in many transactions done under vanity, passion, ignorance, etc., etc., no interest was allowed at all.
7. The loans of several commodities of a perishable nature were exempted from interest.

Synopsis of Interest Laws

Thus the usury laws of Hindu India can now be summed up thus:

1. (i) 15 per cent. per year was the maximum interest allowed on secured money loans.
   (ii) Even this rate was not to be charged for more than a year.
2. *Unsecured* loans were to pay 24 to 60 per cent. varying with the position of a borrower in the scale of castes.
3. A certain maximum was fixed beyond which accumulated interest could not be claimed. If money loans remained outstanding

§ Mr. Roy's rendering is extremely faulty: "Grantest thou with kindness loans the hundred?" p. 17.
for more than a year, the principal could be doubled, after which interest ceased. Thus no debtor was liable to pay at one time interest which exceeded the principal.

(4) Brāhmaṇas and Kṣatriyas were prohibited to practise usury even in times of extreme distress, but Vaisyās were allowed to resort to it only to get over a period of distress, so that the practice of money-lending and usury was confined to Sudras, but these on account of their poverty could not probably control much capital.

(5) On loans of commodities, interest could go up to five times, the original value lent to a borrower. So far there is perfect agreement among Manu, Gautama and many other law-givers. In other items, the disagreement between Manu and other jurists becomes sharp.

(6) Interest not approved by law-books and the people was illegal.

(7) Compound, periodical, corporal and stipulated interests beyond just limits could not be charged.

(8) A loan secured by a pledge like land, cattle, slaves, etc. that were used by the creditor, bore no interest. (Manu, VII. 143; Gautama, XII. 32; BURING, VI. 5.)

Such pledged property, howsoever long it may be in the possession of a creditor, can never be lost by being sold or alienated by creditors. Pledges other than the beneficial, i.e., those from which no income accrues, become the property of lenders when the original debt is doubled by unpaid interest. (Manu, VIII. 143-149).

(9) Various penalties are prescribed for the secret use of pledges without the permission of the owner. Similarly, forcible use of a pledge in contravention of a special prohibition was also punishable. (Manu, VIII., 150.)

(10) The state like private individuals was allowed to lend and borrow money and even requisition loans in times of national crises.

(11) Lastly, borrowers and their inheritors were looked upon as morally bound to pay up the principal and interest according to the contract which had been freely entered into by the two contracting parties. The theory of laissez faire was prevalent to an extreme in this case, so that many a time borrowers were left to the tender mercies of the merciless money-lenders. Usury laws were promulgated to save the poor and miserable, still the arm of the state was
not long enough to offer protection to the needy. Creditors had much license in extracting and exacting their money from the debtors.

A scene from the Mrchchkatika throws much light on the point.

A man has lost ten Suvarnas in gambling and has nothing to pay off the debt. He manages to abscond. The master of the gambling house finds him out and drags him hither and thither. He is asked to sell his father, mother, or himself for the payment of the debt. He finally agrees to sell himself. Therefore he walks along the road and cries, "Gentlemen, buy me of this gambling master for ten Suvarnas." But no one buys him. A quarrel ensues in which he receives such a blow that he bleeds, faint and falls to the ground. Ultimately the debt is paid by Vasantasena, the heroine of the play and the gambler is released from the clutches of his creditor.

Enslavement for debts was a very common feature of the Indian society, ancient as well mediaeval, though the treatment was not so cruel as was in ancient Greece and Rome.
THE HORSE IN INDO-EUROPEAN LANGUAGES

(PROF. I. J. S. TARAPOREWALA, B.A., Ph.D.)

Perhaps the most fascinating branch of the science of Comparative Philology is that commonly known by the German name of Urgeschichte or by the equally foreign sounding name Linguistic Paleontology. In this an attempt is made to reconstruct the prehistoric culture and civilisation of the speakers of a certain family of languages, as far as this can be traced through means of the languages themselves. As is well known, there are a large number of words which can be traced in several of the important branches of a family of languages; and if it can be proved that these various branches have been separated from each other during a considerable period, then it may reasonably be presumed that these words form, as it were, the common inheritance of all these branches from their common ancestor. A great deal of information regarding the material culture of the peoples speaking these language may be gathered from these words. A fair proportion of the words of this class are names of animals and plants, and these incidentally also supply us with important clues as to the original home of that particular family of languages.

As far as the languages of the Indo-European family are concerned the names of the various animals and plants which are common to the different branches form a fairly long list, and these include both the domesticated as well as the wild animals and plants. Some of these names, such as "elephant" and "camel," though found in all the branches of the I.-E., are not truly original I.-E. words, but are borrowed from other non-I.-E. languages and have then became universally accepted in this family. In other cases, one original name, though traceable in many branches, bears a different meaning in each; this is especially the case with the names of plants. Some animals, again, are indicated by several names in the various branches, each name being common to two or more among the branches. It then becomes an extremely fascinating task to trace out why these different branches have adopted these different
names. Some of these points may be illustrated by the names of the horse in the various language of our family.

The connection of the horse with humanity begins definitely (as far as our knowledge goes today) from the palaeolithic times. "The true men of the Palaeolithic Age, who replaced the Neanderthalers, were... hunting peoples, and some or all of them appear to have hunted the mammoth and the wild horse as well as the reindeer, the bison and the aurochs. They ate much horse. At a great open-air camp at Solutré, where they seem to have had annual gatherings for many centuries, it is estimated that there are the bones of 100,000 horses, besides reindeer, mammoth and bison bones. They probably followed herds of horses, the little bearded ponies of that age, as these moved after pasture. They hung about on the flanks of the herd, and become very wise about its habits and disposition. A large part of these men's lives must have been spent in watching animals. Whether they tamed and domesticated the horse is still an open question. Perhaps they learnt to do so by degrees as the centuries passed. At any rate we find late palaeolithic drawings of horses with marks about their heads which are strongly suggestive of bridles, and there exists a carving of a horse's head showing what is perhaps a rope of twisted skin tendon". *

It is however doubtful that the horse, even if tamed by palaeolithic man, was ever used for riding at all. The animal at that period seems to have been a small bearded pony, and so it was not capable of bearing the weight of a man and therefore was useless for riding.† Later on we find the horse completely domesticated. One of the earliest uses of the domesticated, or rather the semi-domesticated, horse was for sacrifice. A horse's skull discovered by J. A. Sjögren at Ingelstad in Schonen showing a flint knife driven right through it exactly in the centre amply corroborates this view.‡ The first use of the domestic horse was this sacrificial

† Hercdotus (v. 9), speaking of the Sigynnae, says that they possessed a breed of small shaggy horses, "not strong enough to bear men on their backs, but when yoked to chariots......among the swiftest known".
‡ Schrader, Reallexikon, ll. pp. 172 ff. A good picture of this object is given there.
use and as a natural consequence it was also used as human food. Its milk may have also been used later. *

The chief characteristic of the horse which struck the human being most was its lightning speed. And for this reason the horse in mythology represented darting light, and hence some of the lights of heaven, notably the Sun and the Morning Star. The Asvinas are twin gods of light and correspond to the two Dioscuri of Greek mythology or to the Lettic god’s two sons, gods of light in both lands. Dadhiikra also represents the Sun in the form of a steed and is another of these horse-shaped gods of light.†

Two principal species of the domesticated horse are distinguishable at a later age. One of them, the Western, is a heavier and a larger animal and is distinguished by the development of a longer muzzle and a receding brain-cavity. The other, the Eastern, is of a lighter, more delicate type, and possesses a larger brain-cavity, while its muzzle is shorter. This early distinction between the Eastern and the Western types is on the whole well marked in the various word groups of the I.-E. languages that denote this animal.

The word which is found in all the branches of the Indo-European family (except the Slavic) is the word *ékle. This gives:—

Sanskrit asva, Avesta aspa, Persian asp, Ossetic yafs, Afghan as (áspa, mare), Balochi ads, Lithuanian aszwá; Greek hippos, Latin equus, Irish ech, Gaulish epo, Old Saxon éhu, Old English eoh, Gothic aihwa (in aihwa-tundi, briers), Tokharian yuk (yákwe).

Besides these there is the Skt. háya which is cognate to the Armenian ji, and, among the European branches of the I.-E. we also find two sets of words connected with the horse, which have a fairly wide extension: (1) Greek póles, Gothic jula, Albanian pêls Irish lár (mare), English foal; and (2) Old High German stuota, Old Norse stod, Old Saxon stado, Old English stod, English stud, Lithuanian stódés, which all denote “a herd of horses.”

* To-day also in the Khirigiz Steppes, the original homeland of the horse, the main uses of the animal are for its flesh and its milk.

† This deity is celebrated in four hymns of the Rgveda—iv. 38. 40 and vii. 44. See Grassmann, Wörterbuch zum Rigveda, 574; also Macdonell, Vedic Mythology, pp. 148-49.
The only important branch of the l.-E. which has been left out of this list is the Slavic.* The word in Russian for the better class of horse (a steed) is koni,† in Czech it is komon, in Lithuanian kūme (mare). These forms are connected with the Old Russian kómoni, and, according to J. Schmidt, this last word and the word used in Old Slavic, koblya (mare), are connected with the Gallo-Latin word caballus and the Greek kabállés (a work-horse or a dray-horse). Schmidt further thinks that all these words may be traced back to a hypothetical form kob-moní, a pre-Indo-European (and also perhaps a non-Indo-European) designation for the animal. He also thinks that the first part of this hypothetical word, kob, may be compared with the Finnish hevo, hepo‡ (horse), and that the second part, moní, is to be seen in the Latin word mannus§ pony or gallic horse). This latter Latin word mannus, however, may very well have been derived by assimilation through mandus and the same word may be seen in the Albanian-més (foal of horse or ass), and in the name of the Messapian god Jupiter Menzana (to whom horses were sacrificed); and further this word may be connected with the Basque word mando¶ (horse or mule).

In this connection we may mention ancient Gallic place names like Epo-manduo-durum.** In any case from all this we may draw one conclusion certainly, viz., that the words caballus and mannus point to some non-Indo-European connections.

The existence of the words belonging to the series of the Skt. ásua makes it amply clear that the l.-E. peoples†† were acquainted

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* In the Hittite, which I regard as an l.-E. language, the word for horse is written in the cuneiform and has been consequently read like the corresponding Assyrian word; so we do not quite know how it was pronounced. Very likely it was much like the Latin equus.

† The ordinary Russian word is lóshadí which has been taken from the Turkish-Tartar alasha; see Schrader, Reallexikon, II, p. 177.

‡ Is the Eng. cob (a small stout pony) at all connected? The derivation given in Skeat's Etymological Dictionary, from O.E., copp (top or summit) is not very convincing. Can this not have been loan word?

§ It must be added that all scholars do not accept this theory of Schmidt.

¶ Walde, Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch, p. 462. The connection with the Basque here is extremely interesting and significant, but I need not digress on this point.

** The element epo here is "horse" and manduo is "foal."

†† I use this convenient phrase merely to mean "people speaking the l.-E. languages" there is no ethnological implication whatsoever.
with this animal before their separation; while the existence of cognate words corresponding to Skt: ratha and eakra in very widely separated branches of the I.-E. may lead to the conclusion that the horse was also domesticated before the separation. The development of the I.-E. word ēkho in the various branches shows the first and most fundamental sound change, the change which separates the satam from the centum languages.* This makes it pretty certain that the I.-E. people in their original home were acquainted with the horse; while the other set of names found in the European branches seems to indicate that in the course of their migrations through Europe the I.-E. peoples came across the Western variety of the animal and got its name from some of the non-Indo-European people.

From the European remains we find that by the end of the stone age the bones of the wild horse (used as food) become considerably less in quantity, and so we may conclude that by that time the animal had become a valued and permanent member of the human household. This domesticated wild horse of the stone age in Europe was the ancestor of the modern European horse.†

The Vedic Indians regarded the horse as a specially valuable and sacred animal. India is not the land of the horse and consequently the animal was specially well cared for and was stall-fed and not turned out to graze in the meadows with the other cattle. The possession of horses was regarded as a sign of rank and wealth. Warriors were often distinguished by names containing the element āśva. The gods were described as possessing glorious divine steed.‡

Indra and Soma have been termed āśva-jit.§ The gift of horses being the supreme gift we find in some places the word dāna (gift) itself being used in the sense of horse.¶ The horse was also valued

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* In other words the I.E. palatalised velar sound changes to a pure velar (k) in Greek, Latin, Keltic, Germanic, Hittite and Tokharian; while it changes to a sibilant (s or š) in Aryan (Indo-Iranian), Letto-Slavic, Armenian and Albanian. The former group is called the centum-group and the latter is called the satam-group from the type-word, the word for the numeral 100.
† Schrader, op. cit., p. 171.
‡ RV., i. 115 3, and numerous other places.
§ Ibid., ii, 21, i and ix 59.
¶ Ibid, v. 27 5, vii. 18, 22-25 and viii. 46, 24. Cf., similarly Old High German meidum (horse) and Goth. maithms (gift).
for the beauty of its colour and in the Veda are mentioned steeds of various colours: hari (fawn), rohita (bay), syūma (dark) and others. The most valued was the white or the cream-coloured horse, like the one the Aśvinas gave to Pedu.* The horse was also used in the most important of all royal ceremonies—the āsvamedha—without which no ruler could call himself chakravartin.†

Schrader seems to think that on the whole the I.-E. people were not a race of riders although they had tamed the horse pretty early and had been using it for war.‡ Not being nomads, the horse was not an animal of universal use to the I.-E. people, as to the Tartars, and hence in the earlier literatures of the I.-E. peoples the animal is mentioned much less often than the cow or the ox. They certainly did not 'grow up together with their horses and conquer or perish together with them' like the nomadic Tartars.§ But the Aryans (Indo-Iranians) in the course of their migrations from their original home lived for a good length of time in the neighbourhood of Bactria, where they came to know the animal much more intimately than their brethren could in Europe.

So we find that the use of the horse both for riding and for chariots was quite well known to the Vedic Indians. Riding is very categorically referred to in the Veda.¶ Again there are adjectives like āsvaprastha**(riding on horseback) and āsva-budhna (carried by horses)†† also which show that horses in Ancient India had other uses than merely that of adding pomp and state to the rich or of being sacrificed by kings. Chariots, too, are mentioned in RV., vii. 34. 1 and elsewhere very often. Chariots

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* Ibid., i. 116. 6 etc. The word bēta is cognate with the word wheat, hence the suggested translation, "cream-coloured". Cream-coloured horses are very highly prized: the famous set owned by King-Emperor Edward VII were highly prized and were used by him on all state occasions. Very often a light coloured horse gets pure white out of sheer old age.

† In RV., i. 162 and 163 this ceremony is described.


§ Geiger, Civilisation of the Eastern Iranians in Ancient Times, i. p. 178. The whole section in this book relating to the horse is well worth reading.

¶ Nothing can be clearer evidence of this than RV., v. 61. 23.


†† Name'y. in chariots? Ibid., ix 8. 3.
are mentioned with horses in RV., ix. 10.1, 22.1 and elsewhere; and the use of horse chariots in war is clearly mentioned in RV., vi. 75.7. The making of chariots has also been described and "the skill shown in the composition of hymns is......compared to the art of the carriage-builder".*

Herodotus comparing India and Persia says that the former had "all the four-footed beasts and birds......very much bigger than elsewhere, except only the horses," and of the latter he says that the Median horse (famed as the Nisean horse) was superior to the Indian animal.†

Horse racing is a very ancient sport. Indeed some scholars seem to think that there was a race-course at the Stonehenge.‡ At any rate it was a sport well recognised by the I.-E. peoples and the Aryans were extremely fond of it. This sport is referred to frequently, and racers have been often mentioned in the Veda. The hymn RV., vii. 69 is a prayer for victory in a chariot race. The two rushing rivers Vipās and Śutudrī are compared to two racing mares.§ There is a special name, avart, applied to the race-horse on account of his speed¶

The plateau of Iran is much better suited to be the home of the horse, and the north-eastern parts of Iran border upon the homeland of the Asiatic horse referred to above.** And consequently the Iranians were better horsemen and had better horses than their brother Aryans of India. Herodotus has in a famous passage told us that the ancient Persian were "carefully instructed, from the fifth to the twentieth...

* V.S. Ghate, Lectures on Rigveda, 191; the passages referred to are i. 61. 4, 94. 1. and iv. 16. 20.
† Herodotus, iii. 106.
‡ Schrader, Reallexikon, ii. p. 172.
§ RV., iii. 33. 1.
¶ Grassmann, Wörterbuch zum Rigveda, 116. Cf. also the Avestan word avvat which means "swift" and is applied to the horse; and the epithet avvat-aspa applied in the Avesta to the Sun.

** In the basin of the Tarim river is still found the Equus Przewalskii, who is the nearest representative of the ancient Asiatic type. This land is also the homeland of the wild ass, and hence it was known in ancient India as the kharoṣṭra land. In this connection, about the ancient homeland of the horse and its diffusion throughout the world, see Wissler, Man and Culture, pp. 111-121, especially the map given on p. 120.
year in three things alone: to ride, to draw the bow, and to speak the truth."

Horsemanship has been all through their history a strong point with the Persian people. In later ages, in the wars between Iran and Rome, it was the Iranian cavalry that proved stronger than the Roman legions, and Rome was never able to cross the Euphrates.

Horse and chariot races were the most beloved sports of the ancient Iranians, and the royal game of polo was first played among these people. The Persians loved the animal with a love that bordered upon veneration. The white horse was specially venerated, but horses of other colours were also prized. Among the colours noted in the Avesta are, besides spāda (Skt. śveta), zairi (Skt. hari), austrasha (Skt. arūsa), sāma (Skt. syāma) and several others. The steeds of the various deities are mentioned as being swifter than anything upon earth, as having the most gorgeous trappings and having their hoofs shod with gold.† The deities themselves sometimes take the shape of horses; thus Verethragna (Vṛtrahan) appears as a white horse and Tishtrya (the star Sirius) also assumes the form of a white horse, whilst his opponent Apaosha, the demon of draught, takes the shape of "a black horse, hairless on his tail, back and ears". ‡

The pious worshipper in ancient Iran also asked for the gift of good and swift steeds. The possession of horses was with the Iranians also the sign of rank and wealth; and proper names with the element aspa indicated the warrior class. Among the most famous bearers of such names were Keresāspa, the great hero of Avestan legends, the hero-minded conqueror of the horned dragon.§ Pourushaspa, the father of Zoroaster,¶ and Viśtāspa, King of Bactria, and his great minister Jamāspa the Wise, two of the earliest and among the most devoted of the disciples of the Prophet.

Warriors prayed to the deities to give strength to their horses.** In later ages ill-treating the horse, by not giving him sufficient food or by

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* i. 136; Rawlinson's translation.
† Cf. the description of the steeds of Sraosha, Yasnā lvii. 27-8.
‡ Yashīt xiv. 9 and viii. 18. For information about the horses in Iran see Geiger, op. cit., I, pp. 174-80 and also Dhalla, Zoroastrian Civilisation.
§ Yasnā ix. 11.
¶ Many of the ancestors of Zoroaster have names ending in aspa.
** Cf. among other passages Yasn. ix. 22 and lvii. 26,
keeping him in filthy surroundings was a punishable crime. Not only that, but men are warned against catching even wild horses in such a manner as to injure them.*

The veneration felt by the ancient Iranians for the horse is shown in a well-known Avesta text where the ill-used horse says to his rider, "Mayest thou never be a harnesser of horses, nor a bestrider of horses, nor a driver of horses; thou, who dost not pray for strength for me, when in the full assembly when in the course thronged with horses".† The horse was also used as an oracle in Persia. There is the well known story of how Darius got his throne because his horse was the first to neigh at dawn.‡ And in Iran the royal stable was always an inviolable sanctuary. §

It seems almost certain that the horse was the cultural gift of the Aryans to the Semitic races. The word for horse in the Ancient Egyptian is sūs, in Assyrian sīsū, in Hebrew sūs in Aramaean sūṣūjā. Attempts have been made to trace all these words to the L.-E. ḫṣḫšš (Skt. sośvah)! But this doubtful philology need not affect the historical fact that the animal was introduced to the Semites by the Aryan people. The horse in Babylon is certainly later than Hammurabi. The royal beast in ancient Babylon was the ass.¶ The Arabs knew the horse much later, but they are now among the best horsemen in the world** and are most intensely devoted to this animal, and they also breed the finest horses in the world.

* These things are mentioned at several places in the Dinkart.
† Yana xi. 2.
‡ Herodotus, iii. 85, 88. A similar practice of letting an animal choose the ruler was also followed in India. But here according to folk-tales, it was the elephant who chose the new king.
§ Modi, Education among Ancient Iranians, pp. 8-9.
¶ The Aryans "descended from the Oxus-land into Media and made their presence felt on the eastern mountain-border of the Semitic kingdom of Babylon, the realm of the great law-giver Hammurabi and his successors. They brought with them from central Asia the horse, hitherto unknown to the Babylonians, who had previously gone to war in chariots drawn by asses" (Cambridge Ancient History, i. p. 311). The Sumerians however knew the horse, and called it "the ass from the east". But the earliest mention of the horse among the Babylonians is in a tablet of the date of Hammurabi (Ibid. p. 501).
** Similarly, though the horse was first introduced into America by the Spaniards, the North-American Indian is a most accomplished horseman.
The two great branches of the I.-E. peoples, the Indians and the Iranians, though they had very intimate dealings with the horse, never degraded him to the level of a beast of burden. In India, as in Iran, the carrying of burdens, as well as the work of ploughing, was done by the ox, the ass or the mule. The horse has always remained "an aristocratic animal", and its possession has always been the sign of high lineage and honorable status. This is reflected in the fact that the ancient I.-E. name—the name by which they had called him from the remotest antiquity—is still used by them to denote the animal. The horse brings even to the meanest rider the ancient and honoured name of *aswār.*

In contrast with the condition of the horse in India and in Persia we find that in Europe the animal has been used also as a beast of burden and for agriculture as well. It has not remained "an aristocratic animal in Europe. This change has taken place during the historical period, and the varied designations of the animal among the I.-E. languages in Europe seem to have arisen on this account. The earliest set of names in Europe, however, go back to the áśva-series. And these names evidently are applied to the better class animal.

In Greece the country is very unsuited to horses. But in the northern parts of the Grecian world, in Thrace, there are broad grassy plains just suited to the horse. We find that the horse was a very valued animal in ancient Greece, in the Homeric age, of special use for riding and for chariots in times of war.† As with the Aryans so with the Greeks also the possession of horses was a sign of wealth and rank; and to have a name connected with *hippos* was sign

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* The Indian vernacular word *ghoṣa* can be traced back to the Pali-Prakrit (i.e. Middle-Indian) from *ghotka* or *ghodaka.* Sanskrit dictionaries also give the word *ghotaka* as a name of the horse. The Amarakosa also gives this word, ii. 8. 43, and the commentary of Bhanujit Diksita explains the word as from the root *ghut,* "to turn," (belonging to the bhu-class). But the word appears to be a "prakritism" and I have not been able to find the word in any work of classical Sanskrit. In the Asvadhāti, published in the Subhāṣītaretānākura (evidently a recent composition) the word is found; the passage is quoted in Apte's Sanskrit-English Dictionary.

† Iliad, x. 513 and 679: Odyssey, v. 371.
of aristocracy. In Homer there are several such names found, but only one warrior bearing such a name is eminent. He is the famous Hippothoös, the Pelasgian.

The steeds of the Greek divinities are described in much the same terms as are those of the Aryan deities, still the steeds of Greek gods are much less important than with the Aryans. In Homer's poems, the horse is necessarily mentioned many times, but we are not to judge of the position of the horse in Greek life merely from this fact. We find that in the later days of Athenian superiority only a few rich families could afford the luxury of keeping horses. And till the date of Marathon they kept them more for their Olympic sports than for war. Horses could not be used at all in Greece for any heavy work, for the country is too rocky. It was only after Alexander's time that cavalry took its place as an important unit of the Greek army. Horse sacrifice was also not known except to a few Greek tribes. But their near neighbours, the Illyrians, another I.-E. people, had a temple dedicated to Jupiter Menzana, where horses were offered as sacrifice.

The Romans were no great horsemen, and hence when they were brought face to face with the Iranian cavalry they were always unsuccessful. Italy, however, is a much better country for horse riding and for chariots than is Greece. Hence we find more among the Roman nobility using horses for riding and for driving than in Greece. In Rome also the horse was a sign of nobility. The comparative rarity of horse in Greece as compared with Rome may be judged by the number of ancient equestrian statues found in each.* There is only one Roman name which may be connected with the name of the horse and that is Marcus.† Horse sacrifice was practised by the Romans, though in a limited degree; the only god to whom the animal was offered was, quite appropriately, Mars, the god of War.

We have already considered the word caballus. It is first used in literature by Lucilius (B. C. 180-102) and originally seems to have

* Always excepting the frieze of the Parthenon. What I mean is statues of individual gods or men.
† The word is probably connected with the Kelic word mare (horse), but Walde (op. cit.) does not agree with this view.
been applied to a cart-horse. It was distinctly confined to the inferior variety of the horse, whereas the original I.-E. word equus was used for the superior animal, the horse of the aristocracy, the equus bellator. Side by side with caballus there was also another word used, paraveredus. This word was introduced during the Augustan period for indicating a "post-horse". This word is a hybrid from the Greek pará and the Gallic veredus, "a (post) chaise". This word was introduced during the Augustan period for indicating a "post-horse". It was borrowed by the Germans in the 6th or 7th century A.D., and we thus get the Old High German form pfer-frit, whence the Modern German Pferd (horse), which has almost completely replaced the native German word.

The word caballus replaced equus in Vulgar Latin, and thence it spread through all the Italic languages of modern times; thus, French cheval, Italian cavallo, Spanish caballo, Portuguese cavalo, Roumanian cal. The word has gone still further afield into Albanian kaj, and into the Keltic branch as well: Irish capall, Breton caval, Welsh cefyll. The Spaniards have another word to indicate the superior type of horse; it is the Arabic alfaraz.*

Among the Kelts and the Germans the horse was an important animal both from the economic as well as from the religious point of view. Both races regarded the white horse with veneration and the Germans also performed the horse-sacrifice. Racing and stallion-fighting were favourite pastimes with both. Among the Kelts there are several names, both of persons and of places, containing the element epo, e. g. Epona, Eporedorix.† The names like Marcorum, Marcomagus, etc., show the element which also means "horse". This word marc is also found in Germanic: Old High German marah, Old Norse marr, English mare. The Keltic word was probably also the basis of the Latin name Marcus. And this same word travelled eastwards into Slavic lands and has changed its significance to mean "cattle" generally. The Kelts were great at chariot-

* Similarly a good horse was called in Middle High German mór from Maurus, a Moor, i.e., an Arab.
† This name in Skt. would be aiva-ratha-r̥uja.
building and chariot-fighting* and they were also fine horsemen and horse-breeders. The Germans, on the other hand, possessed fewer horses in the earlier days. Both Cæsar and Tacitus mention that with the exception of a few tribes the Germans preferred to fight on foot rather than on horseback.†

The native German word for horse is Old High German hros, Modern German Ross, Old Norse hross, Old Low German härs, English horse. The word originally was used in the sense of “a war-horse”. The word is connected either with the Latin verb currere (cursere) “to run” or with Skt. kürd to leap, and the Old Norse word hress (swift) is doubtless cognate.‡ This word signifying the superior animal, has also been borrowed by other nations. French rosse and Italian rozza. In both these the animal is understood to be of a huge size,§ and of superior breed. There is another Germanic word also for horse, it is Old High German hengist, Old Norse hestr, Dano-Norwegian hest. The names of the two leaders of the Anglo-Saxons who first came to Britain were Hengist and Horsa, which probably is reminiscent of the good horsemanship of these tribes. The word hengist originally meant “a castrated horse”. The oldest use of the word is found in the Lex Salica, in the form chanzisto, where it means equus castratus. In English the word is found in the Old English period, but dies out in Middle English. In Modern German the word becomes Hengst and has acquired an extended signification of a male horse or stallion, sometimes even that of a male animal generally, whether horse or camel or ass.

Among the Slavic people (excepting the Lithuanians) we find two names generally used for the animal. Both these words are non-Indo-European. The Russian koni has already been considered,

* Cf. Cæsar, De Bello Gallico, iv. 33.
† Cæsar, op. cit., iv. 2; Tacitus, Germania, vi. Cæsar’s comparison of Gallic and German horses is interesting.
‡ Kluge, Deutsches etymologisches Wörterbuch, p. 377.
§ Roman writers also have spoken of the huge size of the German horse
and is generally used for the better kind of horse. The more
common word is loshadi and is a borrowing from the Turkish-Tartar. Evidently the animal was introduced to the Slavs by the nomadic Tartars of the Central Asian steppes. Among the older tribes of the Slavs, we find horse-sacrifice among the Old Prussians and some other tribes. The use of the horse in war among the Slavs came much later with the Slavs. Tacitus mentions that the Slavs preferred to fight on foot and usually fought thus.

Old Russian *losha*, Turkish *alasha*.

*Germania*, xlvi.
ŚAIVISM

(PROFESSOR MAHENDRA NATH SIRCAR, M.A., PH.D.)

A complete presentation of Śaivism as a system of thought requires the treatment of Śreekānta's system and the consideration of the Kasmere Śaivism. These two forms may be conveniently distinguished as the Southern and the Northern forms of Śaivism.

Śaivism is a system of philosophy that falls in with Vedāntism in being essentially idealistic. Śreekānta's system has been developed as an interpretation of the Brahma Sūtras. Though the Northern form has an independent history of its own, still we cannot help thinking that Kasmere Śaivism is another form of Vedāntic Idealism, not quite identical with it, yet not completely different from it. Difference there must be to lend unto it an individuality as a system, but the fundamental structure of thought does not much differ. Philosophically considered they belong to the same genus.

EPISTEMOLOGY

The epistemology of Southern Śaivism is more akin to Rāmānuja than to Śaṅkara. Knowledge is determinate consciousness implying a relation of subject and object. It is a dynamic dialectic stress, which, to be determinate and concrete, transcends the indeterminate being and passes on to a dialectic synthesis through thesis and antithesis. The antithesis breaks the even continuity of the indeterminate cognition, and the synthesis establishes a concrete unitive consciousness. Intuition by this effort acquires the determinate notion of self-cogniser and self-knower. Psychologically this process involves recognition. Knowledge is a cognition-recognition continuum. This recognition helps knowledge to grow out of its abstraction and indefiniteness to concreteness and definiteness.

Intuition has a projective force, and this projection creates the duality of subject and object. The self-alienation is an eccentric projection, which is soon followed by self-assimilation, the contrary
process of coming within the centre with the full consciousness of a self-cogniser. The duality of subject and object in the unity of self-consciousness is the fundamental epistemological conception of Southern Śaivism.

Though the dialectic antithesis brings out the distinction of the subject and the object to the fore, still the subsequent assimilation makes the subject the centre of synthesis, and the object is apprehended as the effect of a move in self-conscious unity and being.

This dialectic character of knowledge is true of finite and infinite consciousness. In finite consciousness knowledge has a definite character through assimilation and recognition. It has an outward reference to concrete things, which, it cannot create, but can express. Expression and creativeness are different in this case. The projective force is expressive and by its reference outward it acquires a concreteness which is not otherwise possible.

In Infinite consciousness the dialectic is at once expressive and creative. The expressive projection and its consequent centric assimilation give the dialectic process an epistemological unity. But the creative antithesis, the reference of the creative force to the centre, and the consequent subordination of the creative projection bring out the dialectic unity in being.

In this sense the cosmic revelation and creation are self-expression of the Infinite to self, for in this process the Infinite has a clear cognition of its concrete unity through a dialectic diversity. And the inward vision is no longer confined to abstract being, but is spread over the whole process of becoming and the inward reference of this becoming to the centre of life and delight. In this way the Infinite comes to recognise itself as Visva-jñātā and kartā, i.e., the cosmic knower and the cosmic builder.

Śaivism is objective idealism in as much as it recognises the reality of the Infinite, the finite being and Nature and assimilates the finite selves and Nature or Prakṛti in the Unity of Infinite Being. Finite selves and Nature are integrated in the Infinite as its predicates. Herein Śaivism accepts the adjectival theory of predication.
The epistemology of Kaśmēre Śāivism recognises an indeterminate intuition which has no character, no distinction and no specialisation. It is Chit pure and simple without any vibrative expression. It is the calmness of static consciousness beyond conceptual distinction the nameless, formless and actionless Śiva. Northern Śāivism differs from Śreekānta’s in actually accepting an indeterminate consciousness which forms the basis of subsequent development and expression in knowledge. This homogeneity of indeterminate consciousness transcends the mutuality of subject and object of determinate consciousness though it may not actually deny it. It is intuition which does not intuite, it is knowledge which does not know itself. It is transcendent intuition. The author of the Pratyabhijñā Hṛdaya expresses its essence of Śunya, the indefiniteness by characterising as the indeterminate.* It is not denied a being, it is being itself. It is denied a definite and determinate being and as such appears to be thought as non-being, for thought cannot conceive indeterminate being, accustomed as it is to think in terms of relation. The transcendent Intuition in being the highest position appears to thought as the negation in quintessence.

This intuition, though transcendent, actually does not deny expression and in this it does not change a bit from its indeterminateness. But the initiation of expression presupposes the existence in suspension of the expressiveness in the indeterminate intuition. Expression becomes expressive. This determinateness presupposes then a necessity of expressiveness in the indeterminate expression. The apparent absence of this expressiveness is what characterises Śiva (Being) in its complete transcendence. It is Chaitanya, the Parama-Śiva.

With the move of expressiveness in expression, intuition begins to intuite, though in the initial expressiveness there is nothing to express. This move of expression is initiated in the indeterminate consciousness without affecting its indeterminateness. Now this expressiveness is inherent in the expression, though there is an

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Sri parama siva Svātāṃśikyena sthitam viśvam Sādasmādyucitena rūpena avabhāsayaṁsah pūrṇaṃ cidaikyakhyatimāyānaśritā siva parjayaśūnyatīśūnyatmatāya prakāśabhṛdena prakāśasamānataya sphurāti.
occasional suspension and an occasional expression in the indeterminate Chit. When it closes itself, intuition alone exists in its evenness and indefiniteness. A dialectic move and development in knowledge and being is conceived in Śaivism, but it has been not allowed to disturb the indeterminate intuition.*

Though the intuition in its indeterminateness has in it the denial of the expressiveness and its dialectic development, still this denial does not suppose complete negation of expression and its development. This expressiveness is the beginning of experience. We use the term experience, in the sense of consciousness coming to a concreteness in cognition, though the terms of the relation may be developed from within, without supposing an external factor,—not necessarily denying mediateness.

Experience supposes expressiveness, and in the expressiveness, expression assumes a concreteness and a determinateness which were not originally in its being, or at least was not manifest in itself. This expressiveness is then an element, not different from the expression, but still not quite one with it. Experience is in expression, but is not expression. As such we can distinguish it as a distinctive element, though not different.

Up till now experience appears still to be abstract, for, though, in the being of indeterminate intuition we have a dynamic expressiveness, there is nothing concrete to express. We have the stage of indeterminate expressiveness. Knowledge still moves in the transcendent abstraction and has not taken any concrete shape.† But though experience has not the concreteness still it must be conceded that with expressiveness intuition cannot remain an abstraction. Expressiveness has a meaning in the concrete sense, for it has a reference to a locus which it informs.

Expressiveness then has a reference to the subject and the object. But this reference to both the sides is not simultaneously manifested. Śaivism refers to two stages in the process.

* Vide—Īśvarapatatāyabhijñā, page 191.
Antaraviparivartamanāṃ jñānamārāṃ kriyāvyāpadesaśunyāṃ yāt pratipaditam
Sa Śrī Sadasivabatāraṇakah kṛṣaṅaktimayasya udrekavabhase sati paramesvaram.
† Vide—Pratyabhijñā Hṛdaya.
Prakasabedena prakāśamānatayā sphurati.
Expressiveness is first related to the expressed. Here expression takes on it the concrete form of self-expression though the other side of the reference is not so clearly presented. The I-consciousness is shaped in the expression, though the not-I-consciousness is still nebulous in its formation. Consciousness is here still egocentric‡ and the formation of I is not still understood as a factor in a concrete synthesis.

This I-consciousness is called in Saivism Sāda Śiva Tattva.

A concrete vision of this I requires a clear cognition of the I-ness of consciousness as the centre of expression which expresses a definite thing or an object. The object and its expression are the clear necessaries of this stage of experience. We may go so far as to say that the reference to a definite form is so imperative that in this stage the consciousness of I dam or not-I cannot but be prominent. An eccentric projection makes the object more prominent in consciousness which begins to feel its identity as not-I.

This manifest objectification of consciousness is a stage that intervenes between the I-consciousness of the previous stage and the synthetic consciousness of the next. The expressiveness is here concrete, for it has a definiteness in reference to the object. This clear reference brings to view consciousness in its concreteness, a concreteness which was implicit in the previous stage. This explicit concreteness by reference to the subject and object consciousness makes out the third stage in the dialectic expression of being and consciousness. This stage has the technique, Īśvara tattva.

But the dialectic expression cannot be long centred in this seemingly outward reference, it comes back upon itself and soon discovers its nature as a unitive consciousness which finds its expression as 'I am this,' followed by a consciousness, 'This am I.' This stage of dialectic unity is called Sadvidyā in the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā. The author of the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā says that in the Īśvara tattva the two sides of reference, the subject and the object, are equally manifest and equally appear as belonging to the same locus or the same parts of a complete self. Here experience becomes fully concrete and completely developed, with an

‡ Ego in the sense of initial concentration in expression.
equalisation and the consequent assimilation in unitive consciousness of the experience and the experienced.*

In the Sada Śiva Tattva represented by the predominance of the I-consciousness, the equalisation and the relation of subject and object are not fully developed. Potentially they may have been there, but the relational synthesis and the relational experience emerge only when both the sides of the dialectic come into full view. Actual relation is possible between subject and object, equally prominent in being. But this prominence in the truth of subject and object does not lead to duality, either metaphysical or epistemological, for these angles of knowledge are not two ultimate realities, nor two irreconcilable aspects of the same reality. The dialectic presents to us the same reality as subject, the experiencer, and as object, the experienced. The undeniable and invariable reference to and the demand for each other are sufficient to indicate the co-reality of them in the same synthetic unity. This gives us the relation of distinction in unity.

The dialectic march, therefore, holds up before the vision a stage wherein the I-consciousness of a previous stage attains a complete synthetic unity. Epistemological dialectic proceeds from the abstract Intuition to a definite self-cogniser as a unitive consciousness through the equalisation of the experiencer and the experienced. In the unity of the all-expressive and all-integrative self-consciousness the knowledge becomes clear that I am all this, all this is in me as a part of my being.

A point to notice here is that the dialectic move and the synthesis meet at the same centre, the I-consciousness in the Absolute. The development through the reference makes out the concrete character of I-consciousness. When consciousness has passed through all these phases it becomes conscious of itself as I, as containing in it the whole of experience.

In Śaiva epistemology then, knowledge has three successive stages assimilated in the being of Identity.

These stages we may characterise as Intuition, self-intuition and self-experience. In the first the dynamic character and expressive

* Vide—Jñāna Pratyabhīṣṭa, 3, 1, 3.
Samānadhikaranyam ca Sadvidyāhamidamdhiyoḥ.
being of knowledge are not apparent, in the second Intuition becomes self-intuitive, and in the third Intuition is self-recognitive. In recognition the idea of alienation and consequent assimilation is fully expressed.

The dialectic unity and equalisation of subject and object of the fourth stage in the evolution of determinateness in knowledge in Kaśmère Śaivism corresponds to the initial stage of the dialectic in Śreekānta and Rāmānuja. To these philosophers knowledge is always concrete involving a relation between the subject and the object and knowledge never transcends, nor denies, this relation. Its life is there, and it cannot deny it in any stage. Knowledge is a source of unceasing expression. This expression is determinate as systematically demanding this relation between the self as subject and the self as object. And this mutual demand establishes their unity in the fuller life of a concrete synthesis, which does not ignore any side of the relation, nor make the one more important than the other, but embraces the subject and the object in its self. Such a position surmounts the extremes of subjective Idealism and Realism, ignoring the reality of either object or subject, and recognises their distinction and unity in the complete self of knowledge.

So far the two forms agree. But a stage higher, the difference begins. Śreekānta does not perceive any stage in knowledge and consciousness beyond this unity; Kaśmère Śaivism does. In other words in Śreekānta as well as in Rāmānuja knowledge is always an explicit notion and the immediacy of the unity of notion involves a mediate relation of subject and object. Kaśmère Śaivism recognises the immediacy of notion to be indeterminate in its initiation where the mediacy is not apparent to be assimilated in the immediacy of Unity. This immediacy of indeterminateness is the exact point whence difference between the two forms begin. And exactly at this point in Kaśmère Śaivism epistemology has an approach towards the epistemology of Śaṅkara and the Śaṅkarites.

Though the mutual reference of subject and object has been accepted in Advaitism, still this distinction is transcended in the identity of indeterminate consciousness, and this indeterminateness presents the true being of consciousness. The reciprocity of subject-object relation, though a fact in empiric intuition and a truism
so long as intuition dwells on empiric basis, is not inherent in intuition itself, but is a creation of Avidyā which presents a distinction and a division where there are none. So long as consciousness moves in the limitation put on by Avidyā, the logical ego subsists in the relation between a subject and an object. But this relation and its terms of reference have an ideality and no transcendent reality. Empiric intuition and thought-determination together make ideal constructions which have no metaphysical import or significance. The ideal construction may imply the centralisation, as it were, of the ether of consciousness into innumerable points, and the consequent differentiation, still this centralisation and the differentiation are not native to the homogeneity of the transcendent Intuition, which still remains the same and does not lose its identity in the ideal construction. No doubt, it is customary to hold that Advaitism has satisfied the demand of realistic and idealistic attitudes of Intuition and Life, in accepting the truth of the subject and the object and their relation in the formation of concrete knowledge. But closely considered, it will appear to have emphasised the ideality of the relational and determinate consciousness to be denied and not to be assimilated nor even absorbed in the Identity of Transcendent Intuition.

Though northern Śaivism in a certain stage of consciousness accepts the reality of the ideal construction of a relational consciousness, still it seeks to absorb such relational consciousness in the transcendent intuition without denying it, inasmuch as Intuition has a transcendent and absorbing phase where in the I-consciousness buds not, and the 'am-this' consciousness figures not. The dynamism of expression and the effort of ideal construction are suspended in the quietness of the Indeterminate-I and still more in the silence of the transcendent Absolute. In the nascent I-consciousness the concrete experience has not begun to form though it furnishes the basis of the determinate consciousness to come. Transcendence here is clear, for the relational consciousness is still not in sight. But this transcendence gives us the immediacy of an implicit notion and not the immediacy of Vedāntic Sākṣī.

The witness-consciousness is transcendent intuition circumscribed by the limitation of antahkaranā or Avidyā, but the upādhi is not
operative and the transcendence is apparently clear. In fact Sākṣi is a state in normal consciousness where the transcendence can be directly felt and immediately apprehended. The immediacy of Jīva-Chaitanya is the immediacy of consciousness in its dynamic aspect, for here the distinction of Intuition (static) and the dynamic Āvidyā is not in view, and as such Intuition in this stage appears as manifestly self-expressive. But the immediacy of Sākṣi is the immediacy of expression, the idea of a self as a centre of cognition is lost and is replaced by the consciousness of self as transcendent intuition. Though Sākṣi is in touch with the creative Āvidyā, still it is transcendent in the sense that Āvidyā has no longer any hold upon it and can no more focus an apparent centre in the expanse of Intuition. Sākṣi is, therefore, the indeterminate Intuition, which appears as determinate in touch with Āvidyā. Āvidyā is revealed by it and as such cannot possibly exert an influence upon it. The immediacy of Sākṣi is then the immediacy of static transcendence.

Different is the vision of immediacy of Śadā Siva-consciousness in Śaivism. Expressiveness is here manifest, and this expressiveness is centred in I-consciousness. As such the immediacy of Śāda-siva-consciousness presents itself as a dynamic effort of expression. The dynamic expression is a limitation or upādhi of Intuition or Sākṣi of Advaitism. Śaivism accepts this expression to be inherent in Chīt and expressive of its nature. In other words, the immediacy is the immediacy of a notion which soon manifests its expressiveness in a dialectic effort.

The dialectic effort in Intuition in Advaitism is psychological, in Śaivism, metaphysical. Śaṅkara cannot accept any effort in Intuition in the metaphysical sense, for, truly it has none, though as a psychological consideration the consciousness is supposed to be active in three normal states. The unity of self-consciousness is a psychological unity and not a metaphysical principle. The dynamic aspect of consciousness which constitutes a continuity and a history, however significant it may appear to be, is metaphysically non-significant, for the drama of the conscious activity becomes a meaningless exhibition when the illusion is over. Indeed Śaṅkara’s philosophy gives us a meaning of the psychological unity, which it denies in transcendent Intuition. The import
of empiric intuition and being becomes meaningless in
the real sense, for, rightly considered, the implications of the
empiric intuitions and pragmatic values are creations of a distorted
consciousness, and, however, potential and significant they may
appear to distorted vision, their values disappear with right
apperception and clear discrimination. They are constructions of
sense, aesthetic or moral, and move in false being and
divided consciousness. And the whole life which is so seriously
conceived and which freely creates and expresses itself comes to
nothing in Intuitive consciousness. The entire structure of the
formation of understanding and reason, the whole creation of will
and its value-conception, have no place in the apex of our con-
sciousness. Śaṅkara’s system is based upon psychological
revelations and in accepting them it has not metaphysically attempted
a synthesis between the two aspects of consciousness immanent and
transcendent; on the other hand it has boldly denied the immanent
in the transcendent. Though he sometimes appears to accept the
claims of both, yet this acceptance is psychological necessity, so
long as the Āvidyā is operative.

Though Śaṅkara himself in the refutation of Vijñānavāda has
accepted the reality of the objective reference in knowledge and
in this respect differs from his extreme follower Prakāśananda who
denies this reference and reduces the system to subjective Idealism
in accepting the creativeness of individual or subjective Śaṅkara,
still this objective reference, a fact and a datum of humanistic
cognition, is transcendent and becomes ideal in Jivan Mukta. The
realistic touch of the exoteric consciousness loses its significance
in the emancipated being and consciousness, wherein the outward
reference loses its objective meaning, and the naive realism of
popular consciousness is displaced by the epistemological or
empiricistic Idealism.

Freedom is initiated with the removal of realistic reference,
for this reference binds our thought to an element independent of
itself, whereas the understanding of the ideality of this reference
makes the thought and consciousness self-centred and self-directed.
Between the bondage and limited vision of common-sense con-
sciousness and the freedom and expanse of liberated consciousness
a stage intervenes, the stage of the idealistic and illusory conception
of the reference in knowledge. And since the experience of realistic consciousness is denied and sublated in transcendent Intuition of \textit{Jivan Mukta}, the former is called illusory, the latter, real. Advaitism is open to psychological conviction, and in denying the truth of realistic attitude it simply accepts a fact which unprejudiced consciousness cannot but accept. Philosophy must not dogmatise, but only rationalise human experience, and from human experience we cannot exclude the attitudes of consciousness which may not be frequent, but is none the less significant.

Kasmere \textit{Saivism} does not deny objective reference in immanent consciousness. And in transcendance this reference is completely withdrawn, but not denied. It is there, but not expressed. The \textit{Jivan Mukta} rises from the limitation of ordinary consciousness and sees the periodical expression and absorption of the universe in the basic being as a move out and a move in of the same life and consciousness. \textit{Saivism} presents the whole conscious life as a spiral enfoldment which has various linings, all beginning and ending at the same point. In the beginning the life is not rich in variety, though it is rich in fullness and integrity inasmuch as it is what it is in its wholeness. In transcendent intuition, the whole move is not denied, but momentarily held in quiet and quiescence. Conscious life is a life of stirring and expression and a life of inversion and quiet. The whole goes out, exhausts itself and recoils upon itself in the quiet of transcendance.

\textit{Saivism} draws a distinction between the common sense consciousness and the \textit{Jivan-mukta} consciousness. The prejudiced and realistic consciousness has not the transcendance and has limited vision and attraction. The knower transcends the limitation and has the vision of the play of consciousness in all the stages of experience. The stages of ordinary consciousness are not denied, nor are their truth falsified. They are apprehended in the being of Siva, the transcendent. And the \textit{Jivan-Mukta} through recognition has the complete vision of his own Sivahood: the whole universe is a rise and a fall in his being. The objective reference is not denied in the \textit{Jivan Mukta}, though it is occasionally absorbed in him. The \textit{Jivan Mukta} has in him a transcendance and indeterminateness in which the determinate immanence has occasional lapses. He is indeterminate-determinate consciousness. Determinateness is seen
not itself, as in Realism, but in its constant reference to the Indeterminate locus. The jīvan Mukta has transcended the limitation of the senses and the understanding and has penetrated into the depth of being which appears to be an indeterminate consciousness with occasional expression in determinateness.

The cognition, or more accurately the recognition, is a recognition of self of the jīvan Mukta's own being, and not a cognition of the self as centred in the Infinite. Śreekānta's thesis requires always an objective reference in knowledge, and even in the state of liberation the emancipated consciousness has this reference to Infinite consciousness, though this reference is established not through the sense data, but directly through the consciousness itself. Though this is a move in consciousness, still the sense of distinction is always alive and keeps the necessity of objective reference intact.

Such is not the thesis of Kaśmīre Śaivism. Here the emancipated consciousness has no reference to anything else than self—Knowledge, freed from the limitation of the senses and the understanding, recognises itself as both the subject and the object of the reference which in its way to indeterminateness partially, though not completely, vanishes.

In other words the subject-object reference in knowledge which is never denied in Śreekānta, is partially denied in Kaśmīre Śaivism. In the former the objective is always present, be it in normal or emancipated consciousness, in the latter the objective reference of the lower stages of expression is not always present in the higher stages. In the former the assimilation is within the Infinite, in the latter the limited consciousness, which characterises the finite, loses its limitation and recognises its limitless being. The former has an expansiveness of consciousness in the Infinite, the latter has an expansiveness of consciousness in itself.

Though Śreekānta has recognised the Brahman-likeness of being and knowledge (Brahma-Sāmyāt), of the liberated soul and in this substantially agrees with Kaśmīre Śaivism, yet he has this limitation that Brahman remains a separate being for the liberated souls. Āppayya Diksīt in his Śivārkarrarajātikā says, "the liberated souls have their Chit-SAHAṬI (consciousness) enlarged and extended on the disappearance of the Āvaraṇa, the cover consequent on the know-
ledge of Śiva or Parameśvara." Their knowledge and experience may be identical, still these experiences have different centres, and as such an individuality attached to each. However identical the experiences may be of liberated souls, still their individuality will speak for a distinction, if not a fundamental difference, in their experiences according to the presentation of the varied aspects of infinite consciousness and the concentration of the different aspect in different centres.

Kaśmēre Śaivism differs from the above. In liberated consciousness there is, in fact, no presentation which is not its own and the liberated consciousness has not the least limitation, either actual or possible. Liberation is the removal of the limitation of consciousness, a limitation which is its own and which is self-imposed in the process of self-expression. When this limitation is removed, the emancipated consciousness feels the expansiveness of being and consciousness; it recognises, as it were, its own former self and finds no distinction between itself and the Absolute. In other words, it is more correct to say that the Absolute which in the course of self-expression acquires a limited vision, transcends it in liberation. As such no distinction remains, nor can remain between the absolute and the limited consciousness. Finiteness is limitation in expression. Liberation is the transcendence over this limitation. A liberated soul is Śiva in the true sense of the word, though practically the limitation may linger on up to a certain stage of development in being and consciousness in Vijñāna kalā.

STAGES OF EXPERIENCE

Śaivism recognises seven stages of experience. Those stages correspond to the different centres of consciousness formed in the course of expression. Proceeding from Sakala, the atomic consciousness, these centres have definite experience and knowledge. Sakala is the lowest centre where knowledge is limited, in vision and indistinct. Sakalas are subject to the limitation of Māyā and its influence.

Next comes Pralayakalā. Pralayakaśas have no definite object, immersed as they are in Prakṛti. They have attained a stage of development known as Prakṛtalaya, i.e. absorption in the Prakṛti.
and as such they are no active centres of being and consciousness. Hence they are entitled Śunya Pramāṇa.

Then come Vijñānakalas. These have crossed the limitation of finite consciousness and have transcendence over Māyā, but have not the consciousness of the still higher stages. They are freed from the sense of agency. They are consciousness in quintessence, having no touch with anything else.*

Next proceed the Pramāṇas, Mantra, Mantrēsvāra, Mantra-Mahēsvāra, and Śiva stages in the subject-consciousness in transcendence corresponding to Vidyā, Isvara, Saḍa-Śiva and Śiva in transcendent being.

These stages only indicate the different stages of limitation and expansion of being and consciousness. What we cannot help noticing is that though these stages indicate a difference, still, beyond this difference, the identity is always present. And liberation is the consciousness of this identity and the passing off of the limitation and the convergence in a particular centre. The being and consciousness in each centre, be it transcendent or immanent, is the same being throughout, and when an individual has this consciousness or recognition, he is non-different from or is Śiva.

In Śrīekānta liberation always presupposes the consciousness of a relation between Paśu, the finite consciousness and the infinite Śiva. In normal consciousness this relation, though a necessary postulate of knowledge, is overshadowed by ignorance. But the cognition of this relation brings in other forms of consciousness which are not pure relational. It excites love and service consciousness, and as such with the attainment of an equality with Brahman, the inherent consciousness of its being dependent upon and embracing the infinite life in the delight and joy of fellowship is always present.

Kāśmēre Śaivism has not this relational consciousness in Liberation, for the liberated soul perceives nothing besides itself in liberation. It is a quietus in its indeterminate being. The joy here is the joy of this quietism of integral existence without an

* Vide—Pratyabhijña Hṛdaya, pages 70—72 (Kāśmēre Edition)
effort of expansion and divisoin. Liberation is the attainment of
the completeness of Being transcending all relation, fellowship or
reference.

Curiously enough, though the systems differ in epistemologi-
cal setting, they agree in conceiving Liberation as an expansive
being with unceasing delight, though such an existence may
or may not transcend the relativistic consciousness. Advaitism and
Kaśmīre Śaivism agree in the transcendence of this consciousness,
Śrīkānta and Rāmānuja accept a relativistic consciousness assimili-
ated in a unitive consciousness in transcendent being. These nice
distinctions apart, every one accepts an infinite dimension of know-
ledge and being in liberation. None deny this. Rāmānuja and
Śrīkānta, though they begin with atomic magnitude of finite selves
accept an extensive dimension for these selves, otherwise they
cannot support their thesis of Brahma-Sāmyāpatti. We should not
forget here that both teachers attribute an expansiveness to the
dynamic expression of consciousness. And this expansiveness has
its full exercise and expression when the limiting view of Avidyā
is destroyed: Śrīkānta's and Rāmānuja's acceptance of this possi-
bility has secured for them the expansive life and being of a
liberated soul.

Śaivism frankly admits this expansive being, for the limitation
is temporary in the process of expression due to Māyā. When the
philosophy of Recognition teaches the Śivahood of Paśus, it retains
no distinction between Paśu and Poti.

Śaṅkara's Vedāntism recognises also such a beautitude in the
course of an evolution of Jīva—consciousness and the attainment of
Īśvāra's being and knowledge, for, rightly understood, the distinc-
tion between Jīva and Īśvāra is no permanent and real distinction.
Jīva—consciousness is dominated by Māyā, Īśvāra—consciousness
dominates Māyā. When consciousness in Jīva through discrimina-
tion and dissociation comes to feel its being an object as well as
locus of Avidyā, it has its Śivahood displaced by Īśvarahood. And
the limitation of being and consciousness of the previous existence
is replaced by an expansion of being and knowledge. So long as
the transcendence of intuition is not in sight and is not realised by the
adept, the course of evolution will give him an extensive being of
Iśvara. In fact the Jīva dies, and Iśvara is what remains. This possibility for Jīva in the course of evolution, is still a possibility in Āvidyā, and as such the expanse is felt and enjoyed in actual realisation but when this touch is forever removed, the being is what remains. So up to a certain point the three forms of thought agree in the delight of expansive being, in the clarity of unobscured and unobstructed consciousness in emancipation. Some call it mukhya, some gauna, indirect mukti. This is the only difference. Śaivism accepts a non-qualified intuition in liberation, where the determinate being and consciousness lapse into the Indeterminate. But this is a lapse; in Saṁkara it is a dental. But in no case the further possibility of a rise exists, in as much as liberation is conceived as fullness of being and bliss. Once the limitation, the creation of Āvidyā is off, no cause exists for a further travelling in the limited life and consciousness. But we must admit that in Śaivism the possibility remains for free self expression in as much as the power of expression is inherent in a liberated self.

But this is a rare possibility in as much as being, when it has its full repose in the quietness of indeterminateness, is not disturbed by the rippling of expression, though the current if expression be not forever stopped in as much as it is a rhythm in the life of the Absolute. But though the possibility of an expression remains, still it is no expression in limited being and consciousness, it is a free move in the unlimited expanse, and with the sense of freedom the limitlessness of being is not inconsistent. Emancipation then connotes the transcendence over limitation in indeterminate being with the possibility of free expression and move. Even in the Jīvan Mukti this transcendence and free move are possible, though they are subject to the limitation of an association with a physical body. But such limitation does not work when the soul becomes disembodied. Advaita does not accept this free move in liberation. Liberation is complete transcendence in static being which is devoid of any necessity, even the necessity of expression. In other words Śaivism recognises constantly a dynamic element in being. Māyā creates a limitation in expression, but cannot deny the original move in expression. The I-ness created by Māyā is different from the consciousness of I in the stages of transcendent expression. In Advaita Vedānta, rightly understood, Intuition is an
expression without being ever expressive and as such expression froms no expressive centre, except in touch with Māyā or Avidyā.

Expressiveness is a limitation created by Avidyā, a limitation in as much it introduces a reference to a centre and an object, and as such it must be conceived as forming, but as not eternally obtaining in Indeterminateness. Both Vedānta and Advaita Śaivism perceive this, but where Advaitism conceives this formation of expressiveness to be a necessity not involved in the Intuition, Śaivism accepts it to be an inherent necessity of the indeterminate intuition, and as such the intuition has a history of self-expression in itself, a history which the Absolute of the Śamkarites cannot claim. Śaivism though it is anxious to retain the transcendent indeterminateness of Intuition, is no less anxious not to lose the history.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS

All these forms of thought draw their inspiration directly from self-consciousness. But in saying this we must not limit the term to the content of normal experience. Self-consciousness has varied meanings in different systems of thought, and in oriental philosophy it means the range of experience, not only of normal, but also of super-normal consciousness. The three normal states of consciousness, besides presenting three forms of experience, point to a fourth one where consciousness is supposed to be revealing its own self, in dissociation from the necessary limitation of operative factors of the other stages. This evidence of consciousness in transcendence has been the main stay of the systems. Advaitism accepts complete transcendence in static consciousness, Southern Śaivism in dynamic and expressive consciousness, Northern, in a dynamic equilibrium, of consciousness. This equilibrium gives it the appearance of static being, but in fact, it is a state of a dynamic being in equilibrium, for the moment appearing as a waveless calm. In such a state the expressiveness is not apparent and the experience of such an existence differs from the experience when consciousness is actively expressive unto itself dissociated from the contractive influence of Māyā or Avidyā. But as such revelation is rare and far removed from common experience, the psychological foundation is sought to be laid upon the rise and the fall in self-consciousness, especially upon its fall in susupti. Susupti is a
phenomenon within the bounds of normal experience, and an analysis of susupti has been in fact the foundation of the philosophic structure of almost all forms of Vedāntism. In susupti the conscious activity has a fall, and in waking, a rise. This rise and fall are periodical.

Advaīta Vedāntism maintains that in susupti there is an eclipse of the conscious striving of the waking and dream-consciousness, and this eclipse does not mean the holding in abeyance of the striving of conscious life, but practically a disappearance of it in its root cause, Avidyā. Such a state is not a denial, but, an absorption of the concrete unitive experience, and even of its background, the formative self. Self-consciousness has then a periodical lapse. Avidyā with its vibrative activity is revealed by transcendent intuition. Nothing is there to form a psychological unity.

Northern Śaivism recognises a fall in consciousness in susupti and a rise in waking. And this it accepts to be a fact of self-experience. The fall is really a fall in consciousness, and no activity of Avidyā, inasmuch as consciousness functions here without the senses and the manas. The absence of these functions implies the peaceful repose of the functioning-self in self. If it does not indicate the full indeterminateness of consciousness, at least it has not the definiteness of waking and dream consciousness. It indicates a state of a close or withdrawal of active consciousness. This close is the evidence of the indeterminate consciousness behind all experience.

Śrīekantā accepts the indeterminateness of susupti in the sense that there is no concrete functioning of consciousness. The functioning closes. In these respects the Schools do not differ.

That susupti is the negation of positive experience admits of no doubt. But when Advaitism denies all functioning of chit (e.g. Śureśvara) in susupti, Śaivism accepts the expressiveness ales in susupti, though this expressiveness has nothing definite to express.

* Asyam hi prasarantyām jagat unmiṣati vyavatiṣṭhate ca, nirvītra-prasarāyām ca nimiṣati iti Śvānuḥbhaveva eva itra śakṣi.
In other words, the dynamic character of consciousness is still there manifest.

Vedāntism in all its forms may be characterised as the philosophy of self-consciousness. While Śrīkeśānta with Rāmānuja holds the mutuality of subject and object in knowledge in every stage of its growth and existence, Śaṅkarites deny this reference in all stages of knowledge, and they affirm that logically we cannot determine the reference. Śaivism accepts this reference, but transcends it in certain stage of knowledge. Śrīkeśānta in denying a reference to anything but self in knowledge both as subject and object holds the position of ideal realism, for though the object has no independent existence of its own, yet it is not necessarily on that account reduced to a phantom. The object exists, the self in positing itself posits the object. Though it cannot create it, still it cannot understand the object as completely an independent existence. The object requires the subject to be known; the subject, the object, to know itself as the knower, and as such the mutuality is a constant factor in knowledge, be it finite or infinite.

Northern Śaivism in creating this reference out of consciousness has in theoretical reason the appearance of Transcendentalism and objective Idealism. The reference of the self to object in determinate consciousness and the projection of the self to re-appear as an object will lend the system the appearance of subjective Idealism. In fact by laying stress on the identity of the absolute and finite consciousness in liberation, and in allowing not the least difference between them, the system approaches subjective Idealism in as much as it recognises the only one subject, Śiva Bhattāraka, and the whole cosmos as a mere expression of this subject, though this subject is not necessarily the finite consciousness. Truly speaking, the question of finite and infinite consciousness cannot arise here at all. There is only one being and consciousness. the supposed distinction of finite and infinite is a false distinction created by the limiting agent, Māyā. As soon as this limitation is off, the distinction vanishes leaving behind the one subject, and the one consciousness, its expression and its object. The object is a self-projection. Yogarāja in his commentary on Abhinava Gupta's Paramārthaśāra says, "the same principle of consciousness (ātman)
which appears as many in the form of subject and object, realises
the identity as the all-cognising consciousness in itself." Viewed
this wise the system approaches Fichtean Idealism, though it has
the touch of Schelling in the Transcendence of Indeterminate intu-
tion. But in the limited conscious centres, the reality of object
and its reference in knowledge are not denied. A finite consciousness
in Avidyā has realistic knowledge and consciousness, a liberated
soul idealistic, and liberation connotes the assimilation of the
idealistic character of knowledge, so much so that the
object-element, before it disappears, must be thought of as the
self-projected. Liberation is, therefore, a growth in idealistic un-
derstanding and the gradual disappearance of the realism of pragmatic
and empiric consciousness. Śrīekanta cannot deny the objective
reference in knowledge even in emancipation, for the finite con-
sciousness still retains its finitude, though the reference is no longer
to an alien Prakṛti, but an expansive move in the Infinite. Know-
ledge is here expansive, being delightful, dissociated as it is from
the limitation of Avidyā but still knowledge has a reference to
something, besides itself, having its delight in a being besides self.

The epistemological dialectic throws a flood of light on the
nature of Being. Being is consciousness. The dialectic of self-
expression is also the move in self-revelation in Being.

Being has a transcendent and an immanent aspect. In its
transcendence Being is indeterminate, in its immanence Being is
determinate. The universe has its existence in the immanent aspect
of Being, and is, in fact, a manifestation of it.

In other words Being is both absolute and infinite. As an
absolute existence it is beyond the manifold in which it expresses
itself. It is beyond form, beyond name, beyond the concrete be-
coming. It is then the expanse of consciousness, and not a conscious
process. This absolute is Parama Śiva, the Transcendent Śiva.

Being becomes infinite when it is an inexhaustible source of
expression. The dynamic aspect of the being is now in sight and
the inherent Śakti or the power of self-expression and self-becoming
becomes active and presents being in its concreteness.

Śakti is the expression of Śiva. With this expression
the Absolute acquires a personality and to this personality is attribut-
ed consciousness, bliss, will. His knowledge covers all, His will controls all, His being fills all, He has no limitation, as nothing exists beyond Him.

Bliss is indicative of his complete and independent self. When He enjoys Himself without the intervention of any other means, Infinite is the Bliss. This joy of Bliss is a joy of Being-in-self.

The self now reveals itself as both the enyoyer and the enjoyed. It enjoys itself. The Bliss consciousness is also a determinate consciousness, though in this determinateness the self rests upon self. It does not move out of itself. Or, in other words Śiva enjoys Himself as Śakti. The Śakti enjoys Herself as Śiva. This constant reference of self to self and unwillingness as it were to go out of self brings out the nature of self as Bliss.

Will and its expression in activity are the Icchā and Kriyā Śakti of Śiva. Icchā is the state of poise before creative activity. Kriyā is the creative potency on the point of assuming forms. Icchā combines in it knowledge and creative activity held in suspense. The creative will is no blind will, it is knowledge and at the same time activity. The universe is the creative expression of Parama Śiva, an expression which is free and independent of the instrumentality of anything else. Śiva is the material cause and the efficient cause of the universe.

Śrēekānta also maintains the identity of the material and the efficient causes, but he introduces the additional hypothesis of Māyā, the creative principle is not inherent in Śiva of transcendent glory, but in Māyā related to Śiva as his predicate, and, therefore, represented as the creative power. And since this creative potency is blind and as such quite helpless in itself to successfully evolve out of itself the definite order and purpose as revealed in the world without the conscious guidance and intervention of Śiva. Śiva is supposed to be the Lord of creation. Though Māyā has a nature quite different from Śiva, still Māyā is dependent upon Śiva. It is subordinate to Śiva. Śrēekānta attributes to Śiva majesty, power, knowledge and intelligence. Śiva has eight designations: Bhava, Sarba, Isān, Pasupati, Rudra, Ugra, Bheema, Mahādeva.

Bhava indicates Śiva’s everpresence and immanence. Isān is Śiva, the majesty and power.
Paśupati is Śiva, the controller of finite beings.
Ugra is Śiva, the indomitable.
Bheema is Śiva, the awe-inspirer.
Mahādeva is Śiva the all-knower and the super-mystic. The other form of Śaivism (Kaśmīre) also attributes to Śiva the five-fold functions, generally called Kṛtya-paṇcakas. Śiva creates, preserves, destroys and withdraws in himself the world of becoming and bestows grace upon finite beings. In such conception of Śiva we have the theistic attitude. Southern Śaivism is completely theistic, northern Śaivism shares in some degree the implications of theism in a certain stage of knowledge.

The point that comes next for our consideration is the theory of expression. No Philosophy can be without a theory of creative evolution, for if Philosophy is the intelligent interpretation of experience, it can not neglect so momentous a question as the origin of the world and its relation to the infinite. Remarkably enough, no form of Vedāntism is without a theory of Māyā, the dynamic principle underlying creative evolution. Śaivism, northern and southern accepts the theory of expression in knowledge. As soon as they come to creative evolution the two systems differ in their explanation. Śrīkānta accepts the theory of transformation, Kaśmīre Śaivism, of expression. And naturally they should do this, for Māyā has been accepted in the one as the material cause of the cosmic evolution and in the other as the limiting principle. Māyā in Śrīkānta constitutes a category of existence by itself, different from Śiva and Paśu or Jīva. Prakṛti unfolds herself not independently of but in complete subordination to Śiva. And this evolution is an unfolding and a transformation in Prakṛti, and cannot be regarded as an expression, for expressiveness can be attributed to a conscious being, and not to an inert Prakṛti.

Transformation and Expression connote a disturbed equilibrium, but transformation connotes more, a complete change in being, which expression denies. Expression reveals but reveals without a change in being and with a change in form, transformation also reveals but reveals with a change in being and form. The former is known as Ābhāsavāda, the latter Pariṇāmavāda.

Pariṇāmavāda can be rightly attributed to an inert existence. It is the causation applied to dynamism in nature. Ābhāsavāda
can be attributed to consciousness, for it can express. Expression is not possible in inert existence. In other words, Parināmavāda is assimilated to causation in nature, Abhāṣavāda to self-expression and self-causation.

This doctrine of expression has enabled the Kaśmīre school to trace the cosmic evolution direct to Parama Śiva in his aspect of Śakti and without the hypothesis of Māyā. This conception has made the immanence of Śiva, more prominent, the cosmic evolution is an expression of his own being, nothing different from him.

An interesting question suggests itself: are there no changes in expression? This question can be answered in two ways. To divided consciousness there are changes and they are real.

To integral consciousness of Śiva, there is no complete change, in expression and it is real. The appearances are real as these are things to divided consciousness, the appearances are real to Śiva as experience. Empirically they appear real, objective to us. Metaphysically they, as the experience of Śiva, have ideality, but no reality and therefore no objectivity. To the jīvan-Mūkta, appearances have ideality, but not reality.

ŚAIVISM AND ŚĀMāKARISM

At this point a difference arises between Śaivism and Śaṅkara. Śaivism is forced to accept in the clarity of philosophic insight the ideality of the expression and this ideality serves to deny the necessity and usefulness of any other factor in creative evolution, and as shown above, rightly regarded, the whole thing is not an evolution but an expression, and for an expression, nothing besides a dynamic consciousness is our requirement. This position makes the world an ideal construction in idea-forces and puts aside the realistic construction of experience and life. In not admitting any second cause of the world, Kaśmīre Śaivism is more idealistic than Śrēekānta’s. But in accepting an ideal construction which is truly real in the Ābhāṣavāda, it differs from the Śaṅkaraśamkaram which, while accepting such a construction, calls it illusory because it is denied in transcendent Intuition. Both Ābhāṣavāda the doctrine of expression, and Vivarttavāda, the doctrine of false expression (atattvah anyathākhyāti) lend their support to construc-
tion which is ideal; but the former calls it not false, though sometimes the expression may have a fall-off in the basic support, the latter calls it false because the ideal construction, though it appears on the locus, yet it does not appear in it, nor function in it.

Abhāsavāda is an approach to the Drstisrtivāda of the later Śaṅkarites, for it accepts reality to be a projection and a creation of self. But the difference between them lies in the point that drsti-srtivāda attributes a falsity to the projection, Abhāsavāda does not attribute such a falsity. So long as the self functions in this stage, it does not understand the falsity of its creation or projection for the moment and has an ideality of the projection. In this sense no distinction remains between the ideal constructions of these stages.

Difference becomes prominent when the ideal construction is sought to be denied in the next stage. Śaivism does not accept this denial. Śaṅkarism does. As such the ideal construction in Śaivism may appear as non-existent, but really it is not so. It has a potential existence. Śaivism retains a continuity of the locus and the ideal construction, Advaitism does not. This sudden break in continuity is what constitutes the most striking feature in Śaṅkara Vedāntism, and for this Śaṅkara’s Philosophy has a double aspect and strikes self-contradictory. And for this Śaṅkara has to deny the whole of experience and institute the doctrin of Avidya. Śaṅkara’s epistemology has been conceived to fit in with the experiences of different psychological stages and he has the boldness to deny the relativity of empiric consciousness when it can no longer hold on. Śaṅkara is not anxious to have a logical continuity, when the psychological revelation demands the denial of the intuitions of sense and the constructions of understanding. His philosophy rotates on the centre of self-consciousness, which denies in transcendent consciousness the relativity of empiric intuition. Śaṅkara does not deny the duality of empiric intuition and he seems to think that philosophy should not be dogmatic with this naive affirmation of sense-consciousness and be frankly ready to accept a denial of this attitude if and when it comes. Śaṅkara sees the truth of existence in clear transcendence of the sense and thought construction. To him, philosophy is right intuition and not apperception, and so long as the reality is not face to face perceived thought can have no rest in the process of apprehending reality.
which it can never apprehend. The finality of thought-activity is reached in a negative conclusion. As such the activity of thought is confined to the sense data, and the reality it apprehends is phenomenal, though objective. This phenomenal objective continues to exist and has a meaning to empiric consciousness, be it limited in Jiva (finite), consciousness or unlimited in lâvâra-consciousness. But it is still phenomenal, not real. Šaṅkara may not go so far as to reduce all reality to subjective ideas, all knowledge to Solipsism, but certainly all experiences are denied in the Absolute. But this denial is no denial of self, but denial in the self. After all, Šaṅkara impresses and wants to forcibly impress the transcendence of self, which empirically is supposed to be caught in the snares of its own false creation and false valuation.

Because of the demand of a continuity, Kaśmīre Šaivism does not go far as to call the empiric consciousness and pragmatic realisation as completely false. It is anxious to avoid the falsity of division by pointing to the truth of transcendence of self and its expression in immanence. It has recognised the truths of the sense-experience, the construction of will and feeling but has considered them as divided aspects of reality, which, to be appreciated truly and fully must be seen in its integrity and unity. It is remarkable that Šaivism has attributed this divided consciousness to Avidyā or Māyā, but has not denied it completely. Philosophy has a demand for unity and transcendence and not transcendence apart from unity. This is the significance of Ābhāsavāda, as distinguished from Māyāvāda. Šaivism accepts two constructions—the construction of the finite self and the construction of the Infinite. The former is empiric in as much as it is a construction of the senses and the will and is a reconstruction of the construction of the Infinite.

This reconstruction sets up separate and limited experience and false valuations. Philosophy is an attempt to get over these and to deny the limitation of reference in knowledge. No attempt has been made to synthesise the finite and the original construction, on the other hand there is an apparent tendency to deny the finite creation and to get to the move of life in the Infinite. To attain to it the finite creation is not completely sublated in its material basis, but sublated in the construction and formal grouping, for this
grouping is a finite subjective construction and has a subjective value.

Śaivism recognises two stages of consciousness and self-consciousness in transcendent Intuition. But since self-consciousness has an occasional lapse in consciousness, consciousness is to be accepted as philosophically more fundamental than self-expression and self-consciousness. Though such a distinction of greater and lesser reality may be considered as out of place in the two aspects of the same reality yet we cannot help noticing that Parama Śiva is real and self-consciousness is real in a certain stage but not in the ultimate reality, otherwise indeterminate consciousness as the primal existence can have no significance.

At this point Śaivism is open to criticism. Systems of philosophy which deny in transcendent Intuition self-consciousness, have to explain their origin out if a indeterminate consciousness. Śaṅkara could not explain this. Self-consciousness is a limitation of consciousness created by Avidyā. To explain it he has to appeal to an agency which is external. Śaivism seems to synthesise the indeterminate and the determinate consciousness, but the logic is not clear. To say that indeterminateness passes into determinateness is an affirmation, but no explanation. How is the personality formed in an impersonal background is not clearly evident. It is easy to comprehend that there is a rise and a fall in the waveless indeterminate being—a dynamic equilibrium and a disturbance, but it is not so easy to explain the formation of self-conscious centres. States may come in and pass off on an impersonal back ground, but how the all-comprehensive I comes out, is not clearly explained. At least an indeterminate existence can be said to have no necessity within its own nature to form a concrete and at the same time all comprehensive self-consciousness.

And, again, what does determine the disturbance and striving of the dynamic equilibrium? How can the eternal quietness become vibrative? What is the necessity?

If the Being is indeterminate, it can have no will, far less purpose. Will and purpose are possessions of a personal being, and not of an indeterminate self. To say that will and purpose are sub-
sequently formed is to say that an indeterminate being can be made
determinate, a will-less calm can assume will any moment. The
necessity of ideal construction is hardly consistent with an indeter-
minate and impersonal existence. An impersonal being, like a mathe-
matical point, can be conceived to have an existence and nothing
more. The dynamic element in the being can be conceived to be
constructing an ideal universe, but since in the beginning the
dynamic aspect has a poise and an equilibrium and since in it no
personal will is active, the dynamic aspect cannot be conceived
logically to have sufficient basis for an ideal construction. To
say that I-consciousness is potential in the poise is to deny the
complete indeterminateness of Śiva. An ideal construction is con-
sistent with a self-conscious self which is dynamic and expressive,
but not with a motionless, purposeless, Śiva, the indeterminate.
Śānkara, with his clear vision, sees the difficulty of assimilating the
demands of a determinate self-consciousness and an indeterminate
consciousness and while accepting the aesthetic construction of a
determinate conscious activity really denies it a metaphysical being.
To Śānkara the conflict is between a metaphysical and a psycho-
logical attitude and while he acknowledges the construction of
aesthetic and moral sense, he can not reconcile it with the
motionless transcendent being. The creative element in thought
works under limitation and this limitation is not consistent with the
Absolute.

Philosophy must either deny indeterminate motionless existence
and embrace a dynamic concrete being revealing itself out in the
rhythmic expression or must deny a rhythmic being and expressive
consciousness and embrace an indeterminate chīt. To accept both
seems to be a hopeless and an impossible task. We are inclined to
think that we cannot explain the ideal construction on the ground and
with the affirmations with which it has been sought to be explained.

Even granting an ideal construction on such a ground as adduced
by Kaśmēre Śaivism, we notice in the system a contrary tendency
to this ideal creation in finite selves to attain to the conscious-
ness of an Identity in recognition. An ideal construction requires
a self-projection and self-limitation, but emancipation implies a
contrary tendency to self-assimilation and self-recognition. These
two processes are contrary, so that the tendency of a construction
is opposed by the tendency of liberation, and as such the original
tendency of construction cannot be fulfilled or can only be partially
realised.

Kaśmīre Śaivism makes every soul the fighting ground of two
tendencies, of limitation and construction, and of dissolution and
expansion. If these tendencies are native to it, and equally intensive
the one cannot ride over the other, and we have a balance and an
inactivity. Happily the tendency to construction is a tendency to
limitation and is transcended by a tendency to expansion by know-
ledge and recognition and in this way emancipation has been made
possible. In other words the tendency to liberation has been given
a greater value and intensity than the tendency to limitation.

What should be impressed is that the tendency to libera-
tion is a force against construction and destroys what is brought out
in the process. If such is the case the ideal construction can have
no real meaning and plausible value, for had it been ideal, it can
vanish, and it cannot be something undesirable to be passed over.
The ideal construction necessarily involves a limitation in being and
consciousness.

Śrīkānta is more consistent in his own way for he has no con-
flict between the Ideal construction and Emancipation, for emanci-
pation, rightly understood, is emancipation from the realistic sense
of difference and division and the emergence of the idealistic sense
and aesthetic intuition of the purpose, beauty and joy of the ideal
construction. That this meaning is not always evident is due to
the completely positivistic and realistic consciousness due to Māyā,
but philosophic comprehension removes the limitation of realistic
consciousness and finds out the expanse, joy, rhythm and harmony
of ideal construction. The unitive consciousness in liberation does
not give the indeterminate equilibrium of Kaśmīre Śaivism and
here the liberated soul has movement and enjoyment in the Infinite
with all the privileges of an expansive being, a clarified consciousness
and an unalloyed delight. The aesthetic and moral senses have their
highest gratification.

A word about Māyā. Śaivism (Southern) recognises finite
selves and Prakṛti as two other realities besides Śiva. These have
been conceived as eternally existing in subordination to Śiva. Their
subordination does not reduce them to non-existences or illusions. They are real.

Northern Śaivism accepts finite selves and Prakṛti in the list of categories of existence, but offers a theory of their origin. To realistic consciousness they are positive existences seemingly eternal. Realistic consciousness cannot transcend the positivistic outlook and get over the divided consciousness to apprehend reality as it is. The thirty six categories of existence are strictly presentations from a realistic attitude of consciousness, but do not set forth reality in its essence, otherwise how can we reconcile the evolution of these elements with the original primal substance of an indeterminate chit. Northern Śaivism claims to be an unqualified monism in as much as it does not recognise any other element besides Śiva, the Absolute. It traces the whole evolution from this original substance. In this sense the other categories are to be considered real in an idealistic back ground.

FINITE SOULS

Kāśmēre Śaivism views the finite souls from three different standpoints:—

(1) as individual entities,
(2) as parts in the whole, and
(3) as Identity-consciousness.

In the process of concentration, the egos acquire an individualistic sense, endowed as they are with Buddhī- manas limitation. The individual is the finite experiencer. Such individualism narrows the vision and limits the being and the finite souls have their history of energising on nature's plane as creative agencies. Ahamkāra functions and the individuals are stirred by the spirit of division. A pluralistic universe presents itself in consciousness. The individual egos are like Leibnitz’s monads, concrete centres. These concrete centres embrace all forms of existence from centres of pure consciousness (e.g. Vijñāna kalā) to centres of appetite.

While the Śaṃkhya in accepting the transcendence of souls from the Prakṛti retains the conception of a spiritual Pluralism, Śaivism recognises no such pluralism in transcendence. In Śaivism Puruṣa, the experiencer, so long as it is under limitation cannot have transcendence, but in transcendence, the multiplicity of souls cannot obtain, in as much as multiplicity is a creation or an expression, and is a reality only in immanent sense.
Śaivism has another phase even in immanence as much as it recognises the necessity and actuality of grace for emancipation. This at once introduces a relation between the finite souls and Śiva, the Infinite, and brings out the sense of dependence of the former upon the latter. Apart from the theistic importance and significance of these in our spiritual life, they point to a philosophic conclusion of no mean importance. Śaivism recognises the individual as a part in the whole, individual as the whole concentrated in a centre. As such the individual selves live in the whole. In a stage of spiritual experience we begin to look upon our being as a being in the Infinite, the Infinite as the concrete universal focussed in so many centres.

Such a consciousness wipes away the sense of individualism of the former stage and establishes the life of an expanse, of the life of love in the place of the limitation of an active agency of the former. From this view-point, Śaivism recognises the whole expressing itself in individuals and embracing them in love and mercy to redeem them from the sense of limitation and the pride of agency. The acceptance of grace has this meaning only in a philosophic sense. An upward urge reveals the truth of a wider being in the Infinite and the philosophic vision of the purpose and the meaning of the expressive life manifests itself. Such a construction is not out of place in Śaivism. This makes clear the assimilation of the Paśus in the unity of Śiva. Then comes the stages of identity with clear philosophic sense and recognition.

Śrīekāntagōtṛa's system fully recognises the truth and being of finite selves and though an evolution is traced in Prakṛti under the influence of Śiva, still the history of this evolution cannot be regarded as the history of self-expression of the Absolute. On the other hand the finite souls in working their destiny through Prakṛti have been considered to be erring in their pursuit, for such an attempt serves to darken their vision and make them satisfied with the limited possibilities on nature's plane. The true life and evolution is the dawning on the finite selves of the beauty and grandeur of the infinite life and its expression. Finite selves are as if put between two alternative possibilities a being in and a move in the Infinite and a move and an energising in nature. The former is a denial of the
empirical, positive and instinctive selves, inasmuch as in such a denial coupled with a complete resignation, the inward consciousness of a life in beatific vision, unceasing delight and deeper truths is revealed. The energising nature, however glorious it may be, is still a life wherein life’s attraction is directed to selfish enjoyment and base-satisfactions and life lacks the expansive move in being and consciousness. With the dawning of unitive consciousness the finite selves have a new meaning and a true vision of the possibilities and opportunities offered in nature and these possibilities are now looked upon as privileges and opportunities of serving cosmic ends of humanity, of establishing God’s order on earth, as it is in Heaven.

An opposition between finite selves and nature and the ultimate triumph of the finite selves over nature by cultivating the inward sense of the Infinite and by moving faith and will in the light of this vision are recognised in southern Saivism. This opposition is created by an element over which, we, as finite being, have no control, as the agency is surely external, and we, finite and atomic in being and power. Such a conflict is to be transcended by a fellowship with the Infinite which gives us a secure being in the expanse of the Infinite.

Śrēekānta then accepts a self-expression in the Absolute, and an evolution in nature. The former is enjoyed by those who are in tune with the infinite, the latter is a truth to those who are out of this tune. And the two cannot combine, for they are mutually exclusive. Emancipation in Śrēekānta, then, is no denial of the finite self, not quite an absorption of the finite in the infinite. It is, no doubt, a denial of a life in Prakṛti, but is a life of and with the infinite.

Kaśmere Saivism does not recognise any existence outside and independent of Śiva, the Absolute. When in the process of self-expression Śiva attains the Suddha Vidyā or stages of concreteness, it has suddenly a self-forgetfulness. This self-forgetfulness is a creation of its own Māyā, the principle of obscuration. It limits the limitless Experience, and the limitless Experiencer. Māyā is then a principle of obscuration and limitation.

Since this obscuration is caused by a power inherent in the Divine Śakti, this limitation should be regarded as self-imposed. In the process of self-expression, called Ābhasa, Māyā causes limitation
and the expression becomes also limited. Mâyā is the principle of
limitation in self-expression.

The conception of Mâyā as the obscuring power or more properly
the self-obscuring power of the primal Śakti has enabled the Kaś-
mere School to characterise the finite experience as expression, but
expression in limitation.

Since this limitation is self-imposed limitation, Mâyā cannot
create a division in the integrity, though Mâyā can create
infinite limited centres within the expanse of the All-Experience of
Sadvidyā. The expansive I of the Sadvidyā stage soon becomes so
many centers of limited experience, as it were.

By calling Mâyā the principle of self-limitation in self-expression
Kaśmere Śaivism gets over the distinction between the infinite and
the finite consciousness. The infinite appears as finite, the unlimited
as limited. With the necessity of an ideal construction and self-
expression, the absolute makes itself gradually concentrated and
without losing its absoluteness and in the process
of concentration the centres are formed which are anu, atomic, but
non-spatial, for the concentration can cause limitation but not
spatiality. This non-spatiality retains the spirituality of the being of
the finite selves. The concentration, again, cannot change its being
from an eternal and durable substance to a transient existence. It
has the limitation of being, but not transience, the finite conscious-
ness is neither spatial, nor transitory.

Mâyā in Kaśmere Śaivism is the principle of self-limitation. It
is no independent principle like Prakṛti in Śreekānta. It is in
Being, a principle by which the expression is concentrated and
limited in definite centres. Be it noted here that this principle of
individuation is related, to Suddhavidyā, the fourth hypostasis of
Being, the Para Śiva. This limitation, consistently presupposes
an obscurcation, for without an obscurcation and a falling off in con-
sciousness we cannot conceive its limitation, and individuation. An
individuation in the absence of any other principle working neces-
sarily supposes in the initiation a forgetfulness and then a differen-
tiation. Since Mâyā is a principle working in the infinite, this
forgetfulness and individuation must be a move in the infinite. The
infinite gets finitised, though this finitude it may at any moment
overcome by recognition.
Kaśmere Śaivism has thus a theory of the formation of souls and an evolution of them through Prakṛti, which comes into existence as soon as the Puruṣa or the limited egos are formed. The falling off in consciousness on the one side circumscribing it to definite centres is immediately followed by the limitation of the experienced of Sadvidyā stage into the formation of the Indefinite this, called Prakṛti. The emergence of Prakṛti into existence at the time when the All-experience has been under the sway of Māyā necessarily appears to be a spontaneous and blind activity and Prakṛti in its stage of formation and immediately after it is not clearly cognised and appears vague, indefinite and indistinct. It is not nothing, but a homogeneity which acquires a definiteness as soon as it begins to manifest the difference and the heterogeneity of the guṇas. Prakṛti emerges into existence simultaneously with Puruṣa by the same principle of limitation and attached to each Puruṣa (the finite egos) is there a Prakṛti, which it affects and which is simultaneously affected by Puruṣa.

The correlativity of the higher stages of Aham and Idam is not denied here, but only put to a limited application. Śaivism thus works out a conception of the formation of Puruṣa and Prakṛti by the principle of Māyā, the principle of limitation. In the state of homogeneity Prakṛti offers a general indefinite experience (bhoga-samānyā) but not any definite and concrete experience. The details of specific experience come out in the process of heterisation.

Such a conception Māyā differs from the Advaitists’ conception. The logic of exoteric consciousness through the casual demand attributes the world process to Māyā, the creative and the individualising capacity of Īśvāra. But with the growth of philosophic vision the demand for a causal connexion of the realistic consciousness vanishes in the idealistic construction of the world illusion. And the effects of Māyā are no longer realistic but become illusory constructions. The world is a picture drawn upon the back ground of the Absolute by the prejudiced consciousness, which is really not prejudiced.

Saṅkara’s philosophy necessarily accepts a beginningless Māyā eternally co-existing with and in the locus of Brahman, but Māyā has no relation with it, for Brahman is non-relational. Māyā has a reality in relativistic consciousness, the two are inter-
dependent. The cosmic illusion may require the position of a cosmic knower and a consciousness, but it does not essentially differ from the illusions of an individual, produced as they are with the same causes. As illusions these cannot differ, be they limited or unlimited in extent.

The moment we call the world an illusion, the creative activity of Mâyá becomes idealistic which appears to us as realistic because of the limitation of our mind working through the senses. The inevitable demand of the senses upon our minds and the natural restriction to which mind becomes subjected by the operation of the senses give a sense of reality to the objects of perception. But when the mind learns to work freed from the limitation of the senses, e.g. the dream-construction, the imaginative-creation, the creativeness of the self becomes evident. And this creativeness is spontaneous.

This spontaneity of creativeness of dream and imagination has been the main support of the Vedântists' claim of a free self-expression, which is ideal but not real. Similarly the focussing of consciousness in finite centres is an ideal construction, but a construction; because it is ideal, can be and is actually denied in the locus. Ideality takes away from it reality and since this ideality is a creation of a principle which does not obtain in the Absolute, it is denied in a certain stage when it is called illusory and not before. Logically speaking, an ideal world moves in the Absolute, but it is only ideal and not real. An ideal construction, our experience tells us, requires a basis and a formative principle, and these are supplied by the Absolute and the Mâyá. The formative principle forms and is ever forming; but the locus or the basis is not affected, nor is it conscious of this formation. Vedântism thus accepts the phenomenal reality of the cosmic experience, but not its absolute reality. Šaivism differs at this point. The creative principle is not illusory, nor the world, a dream illusion. The world then has a place in the absolute, it is conceived as a wave in the eternal calm. Šaivism in a certain stage of human knowledge insists upon the transcendence of the limitation of Mâyá and the recognition of the identity of the individual with the Absolute self and in this sees the promise of liberation. Still the potentiality of ideal construction
exists, there, for the Absolute is in no stage free from the necessity and the requisite factor of self-expression. Such a necessity is not recognised in Śaṅkara Vedāntism and as such the principle of creativeness is denied in the Absolute. In Śaiva Vedānta it is assimilated in the Absolute. Śaivism by the emphasis laid upon the identity of Śiva, and Puruṣa, the cosmic and the individual self recognises no difference between the two, and therefore, has to accept Māyā, the principle of self-imposed limitation. Liberation signifies getting over the fascination of this self-imposed forgetfulness and the realisation of the identity of being behind the cosmic expression.

This limitation of being (Puruṣa) has made the conception of liberation possible and actual for the individual souls, for limitation actually operates. But in Advaita Vedānta liberation, rightly viewed, is also a working of Māyā and an illusion, just like bondage. The soul is ever free. Create it does surely and in this creation, it undergoes no limitation, though it appears to do so. There is no action in the self, there can be none. The self is neither active nor inactive. It is static quiet.

The liberated soul in Kaśmere Śaivism is just like the Iśvara of the Advaitin, for liberation is the putting off of the limitation and the attainment of expansiveness of being, though in this expansiveness the ideal construction is present as its own being. This is exactly the conception of Iśvara, or more properly the mukhya jīva, when it is no longer under the spell of Māyā, but controls it. The only point of distinction is this that a state of apparent static calm is conceived when the effort of ideal construction is suspended, but such a state in Śaṅkara Vedāntism corresponds to the conception of cosmic absorption in Mahāpralaya in Iśvara, or the mukhya-jīva. We come to the conclusion then that liberation in Kaśmere Śaivism corresponds to the Iśvarahood of Śaṅkara Advaitism, but not to the Brahman of Vedānta.

Kaśmere Śaivism has given prominence to knowledge as the cause and the immediate cause of Liberation, like the Advaitism, for knowledge can burn out ignorance, and its limitation. The Philosophy is, therefore, entitled the philosophy of recognition, which accepts two stages of falling off from and regaining of, the Identity-
consciousness. This recognition actually re-establishes the forgotten identity. Recognition admits a forgetfulness and a re-awakening.

Śaṅkara Vedāntism in the axiom of Identity recognises the value of recognition for jiva-consciousness, so long as it is Jīva, but recognition establishes nothing, for there was no forgetfulness, no necessity of recognition. These can refer to a personal consciousness but not to the Absolute. The personal consciousness has an ideality in Śaṅkara, the personality is an external state and does not belong to the consciousness and as such when the false barrier of personality falls off, the consciousness shines in its splendour and brightness, just as it always shines.

More properly, Kaśmīre Śaivism in accepting recognition as the immediate cause of ultimate fulfilment lays emphasis upon the removal of limitation and the re-assertion of an expansive self. The functioning still exists, but is spread out in the infinite expanse and only occasionally is hushed into the calm.

Advaitism appeals to jīva-consciousness, to set up a functioning of mental consciousness in the form of Ātman, but this abstract functioning after denying the concrete functioning of the mind is in itself denied. Śaivism denies the concrete functioning in a concrete centre. It accepts expansive functioning in an expansive being and even when the functioning ceases, it is not lost but is potential in being. Advaitism denies all functioning and its potentiality in Brahman. Such is the difference between Śaivism and Advaitism in the conception of the monistic Absolute.
ADDENDA AND CORRIGENDA

Page 11 line 16. Brāhatsamhitā and Brāhajjātaka should be in italics.
.. 12 .. 6. Arthācastra read Arthacāstra.
.. 15 .. 31. Omit the bracket and add in.
.. 16 .. 6. Add after Candragupta’s.
.. 16 .. 23. Add after horses.
.. 16 .. 28. Culbadhātucāstra read culbadhātucāstra.
.. 16 F. note Instead of after 118, have a ,
.. 17 .. 3. For Greeco read Graccio.
.. 17 .. 7. For Anviksaki read Anvisiki.
.. 17 .. 28. For Dhṛtarāstra read Dhṛtarāstra.
.. 18 .. 17. For Vātasāyana read Vātsayana.
.. 19 .. 18. For Medhātithi read Medhātithi.
.. F. note 2. Paċcābna read paccaḥna.
.. 25 .. 7. Add the before Kautiliya.
.. 25 .. 14. For Inidan read Indian.
.. 25 .. 29. For in read on.
.. 27 last line for praty read praty.
.. 28 .. 6. for $ read $.
.. 28 .. 6. for व्यद्भावति read व्यद्भावति.
.. .. 18. .. चूड़ .. चूड़.
.. 28 .. 30. For Adhyātmavidyā read Adhyātmavidya.
.. 29 .. 24. For समातिष्ठ read समातिष्ठ.
.. 31 .. 31. For शान्तज्ञात्वततः read शान्तज्ञात्वततः.
.. 32 .. 8. For order read orders.
.. 32 .. 20. For भूतरुष्य read भूतरुष्य.
.. 33 .. 11. For heretics read heretics.
.. 34 .. 6. For तत्त्वनीयान read तत्त्वनीयान.
.. 34 .. 12. For विद्वानमववाय read विद्वानमववाय.
“ F. note last line read amātya forāmātya.
.. 36 .. 27. Read sātvatam for sātvatamān.
.. 37 .. 27. For āryaprayām read āryapraṇam.
.. 37 .. 23. Add the before mountain-fort.
.. 38 last line for गुप्तलं read गुप्तलं.
.. 41 For Warefare read Warfare.
.. 42 .. 6. For छैत read छैत.
.. 42 .. 19. For छ read छ
Page 47 last line add so after is.

49 16. Add e after corr.

49 20. For Kśṭa read Kśṭa.

8. Omit after Kramrisch.

50 37. Add used both after are.

51 in the table (after line 3) the bracket is to be opposite 'Printing' and 4 is to come under 3.

52 11. read gateways for gateway.


54. Footnote read Dheri for Dehri.

55. Footnote after Painting.

56 19. after separate.

56 24 read Smṛtam for Smṛiam.

56 Last but one line read brushes for burses.

56 First Footnote put a after this.

58 line 33. Add. after nim.

58 33. Add. after lepa.

59 18. Add after vidhi.

59 23. Read adamantine for admantmed.

66 5. Read magnum opus for Magnum Opus.

66 4. from bottom read umbi for jumbi.

66 4. Read nitamba for nitamva.

68 7. Read mani for mani.

70 4. from the bottom read godhūma for godduma.

116 11 from the bottom read Sacred for Scared.
SIR ASUTOSH MEMORIAL VOLUME

Sir Asutosh Mookerjee

Frontispiece, Part II.
SIR ASUTOSH MEMORIAL VOLUME

PART II
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THE MARBLE RUST OF SIR ASUOSH AT THE DARBHANGA BUILDINGS
THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE IN ANCIENT INDIAN ARTS AND INDUSTRIES

(Professor S. V. Viswanatha M.A.)

There has been considerable difference of opinion among sociologists in regard to the extent of interference that may be exercised by the modern state in the affairs of its citizens, ranging from the theory of *Laissez faire* or 'let alone' to that of the more humane socialism and anarchist bolshevism. It may interest us somewhat to note the principles of political and moral obligation which guided the relations of the state and its citizens in ancient India. I propose in this paper to present in general outline the main ideas that prevailed among the ancient Indians regarding the limits of state-interference in the social and industrial activities of the subject people.

THE SPHERE OF STATE CONTROL

The principle of *Laissez faire* which for a long time swayed the western nations in the attitude of the state to its citizens is not at all found applicable to any period of the history of Indian society. It was perhaps recognized that the application of this doctrine 'would soon fling civilization back into the brute struggle for food'. It was held that social and moral order of the state would best be secured not by a policy of individuals being let alone but by their adhering to the *Dharma* or duties of community or caste to which they belonged. The individual was bound by the rules of his class and in no case does individual freedom as it is comprehended in the principle of individualistic interference, appear to have been allowed in our country. Individualism which implied that every sane adult was the best judge of his or her own interest and that the common welfare was best attained by the intelligent pursuit by each thereof was certainly discredited in the evolution of Indian social morals. In fact, the individual was nothing; the order to which he belonged determined his position and functions, his rights and respon-

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1 H. Sidgwick, *Elements of Politics*, 'Individualism and Individualistic Minimum'.
sibilities. The greatest happiness of the greatest number which is, according to our law-givers, the end of the state was achieved by the subjects not swerving from the rules of their order and whoever uphold his duty, ever adhering to the customs of the Aryas, and following the rules of castes and divisions of religious life will surely be happy both here and hereafter. The way to happiness lies in the discharge of the duties pertaining to one's own class, even though it might entail ruin. Danger is ahead for those that trespass on others' functions, says the Lord in the Gita. That person who practises his own duty can become powerful and influential in this world, for it is the highest act of penance. When these rules are violated, the world would come to an end owing to the confusion of castes and creeds.

**GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERFERENCE**

As Herbert Spencer puts it, within its proper limits governmental action is not simply legitimate but all-important. But the interference by a state in the affairs of its citizens may be actuated by various motives. It may only use its coercive and supervising power to remove social, political and economic evils, or it may do more constructive work by promoting or fostering what many may regard as leading to the general good and happiness of the Commonwealth. For example, state interference in order to put an end to the evils of excessive drinking may be

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3 Arthashastra, p. 39 (Mysore Ed. and Trans.) "In the happiness of subjects lies a king's happiness; in their welfare his; whatever pleases himself he shall not consider as good, but whatever pleases his subjects he shall". (Trans., p. 44.)


5 Bhagavat Gita, III. 35

6 Sukraniti, (Madras Ed. and Sarkar's Trans.) I. 23 f. has been interpreted by Mr. Sarkar to mean personal religion and individual morality as against universal religion and absolute morality. This interpretation is not warranted by our scriptures. It clearly means 'the duties of one's order' in Bhagavat Gita, II. 31. It is limited and defined by IV. 15. In ancient India there was neither the idea of personal religion in the individualistic sense nor was the morality placed on the individualistic basis. Morality was held to be absolute. Dharma may be rendered as the ethical ideal to which individuals as well as nations were to conform in their private, public and corporate life.' (See my International Law in Ancient India, p 19.) Personal religion was not also comprehended in the Hindu social system as the religion for every man and woman was fixed by that of the community to which he or she belonged.

7 Arthashastra, p. 8.

8 Herbert Spencer, Essays, III. 401. Cf. also 'A king shall lawfully protect the members of the four social orders in due discharge of their duties. Those who are false to their respective duties in life get destroyed.' Gautama, XI.

9 Cunningham: Commonweal.
said to belong to the first category, while interference in the departments of industries, education and poor-relief will have to be included in the second class. In ancient India, it was recognized as the duty of the state not only to prevent harm or injury among the individuals that composed the community but to enforce discipline and punish breaches thereof, which may lead to the disturbance of the social and moral order of the society. 10

**Supervision of Industries**

Generally speaking, the state in ancient India is seen to interfere in the social and industrial pursuits of the people in order to regulate and protect them. The initiative in all activities leading to the material prosperity of the community was taken by the subject-citizens and the duty of the state was to protect them, for 'that was the very cream of kingly duties.' 11 As we read in the Arthaśāstra, the king should safeguard the interests of agriculture, free labour and revenue, for the wealth of the state is for the protection of the subjects. 12 'He shall always succour the afflicted among his people as a father his children,' 13 for the two primary functions of a king are the protection of his subjects which implied also the constant punishment of offenders. 14 This ideal is evident even in the Rig Veda where the king is styled gopatirjānasya. 15 Industrial undertakings were mostly due to private enterprise under the supervision of the state. The government played the part of the good parent and saw that its activities were regulated in such a way that posterity throwe better in body and in mind. In this capacity it interfered in order to secure uniformity of regulations in the fields of industry and commerce. As a result a large number of State-superintendents are seen appointed in charge of the various departments. 16 These were for gold, coinage, prices, wages, weights and measures, forests, agriculture, artisans, commerce, merchants, store-houses, slaughter-houses, liquor, prostitutes, poor relief and famine relief, forts, routes of traffic, ships etc.

It may be noted that these departments fell broadly into two classes:—

(a) Industrial pursuits that were the monopoly of the state, interference in which was bound to bring good to all and

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10 This fact is clear from the long list of fines prescribed in the Arthaśāstra for the various offences. Protection implies also punishment. In fact government is Dandaṁti.
11 Mahābhārata, Śānti, 58, 1.
12 Arthaśāstra, p. 48.
15 Rig. Veda, III, 43, 5.
16 Arthaśāstra, II. Sukranitī, II.
(b) those that were the results of popular enterprise but were encouraged, regulated and protected by the state. There were only a few industries coming under the first head. These were mining and coinage, manufacture of salt, forestry, arboriculture and the brewing of liquor, i.e., those industries that in modern language yield imperial revenues. The objects of interference in industries coming under the second head were prevention of fraud, illicit dealing and other economic abuses, securing uniformity in standards of weights and measures of objects, protection of artisans and wage-earners, orphans and invalids and, of course, the revenue that they yielded to the state-treasury.

PROTECTION OF AGRICULTURE

The protective principle in interference is in evidence in the great care which was bestowed on agriculture by sovereigns in ancient India. It was looked upon as the duty of the government to provide facilities for irrigation of lands as will be clear from the questions that Narada put Yudhiṣṭhira in the Mahābhārata. Are large tanks and lakes constructed in the country in suitable places and filled with water so that the thirsty fields may not be entirely dependent on the water rained by the heavens? Though, in ordinary times, the tiller of the soil made his own provision for watering the fields, it is clear that in emergencies the state stepped in to protect the agriculturists. When the harvest failed, for various causes such as pestilence, famine, fire or floods and the lot of the agricultural labourer became miserable it was recognized as a state obligation to afford him reliefs. Larger schemes of irrigation and public works were apparently undertaken by the state because they were too ambitious for individual enterprise, entailing enormous expenditure and risks, while the cultivators constructed the minor ones which they could easily manage to institute themselves.

One illustration will suffice to show that for various reasons, agriculture received the first consideration of the government in ancient India. The provincial governor of west India in the reign of Chandragupta Maurya constructed a dam at Gīrni and thus produced the lake Sudarśana from which water was conducted for irrigation of the fields in the province. We are told in the famous Gīrni inscription of Rudradāman that the dam

17 Arthādāstra, IV. The sale of bad goods was punished. cf. Sukranīti, IV. 5 318.
18 Arthādāstra, II. 19. See also Vasiṣṭha, XVII; Viṣṇu, V. 121–123. Imitations were punished. Sukranīti I. 295.
19 Sabhā Parva, V. 81.
had been broken and the lake left unused for over a century after Nandaraïa and that the prince constructed the dam, repaired the lake and made it fit for use by the agriculturists. Later, in the fifth century A.D. it is stated that the lake was again repaired by a minister of Skanda Gupta.

REGULATION OF LIQUOR-TRAFFIC

State-interference for the regulation of liquor-traffic was also actuated by the same principle of paternalistic care. It is held generally that over-indulgence in intoxicants is the cause of much suffering and crime. As Kautilya observes, the effects of drunkenness are loss of wealth, insanity, absence of consciousness, loss of knowledge, life, wealth and friends, desertion by the virtuous, suffering from pain etc. But there is apparently no general agreement that alcohol was in itself an evil. Hence legislation on the subject has been more or less experimental. The ancient Indian law-givers, both religious and secular, like the modern statesmen and legislators apparently discerned the danger that regulations to the effect of absolute and total prohibition might become futile through the impossibility of being enforced. Hence it is that we meet with statements like the following:—The man that drinks wine excessively becomes devoid of wisdom; but wine taken in moderate quantity may even increase his talent, clear up the intelligence, augment his patience and keep that mind steady, but indulgence in it is certainly pernicious. We know that dangers of drunkenness will not leave a society unless there is a concensus of opinion that drinking is in itself (moderate or excessive) an evil. But the initiative in the direction will have to be taken by the people at large, and especially by those that visit the liquor-shops.

Traffic in liquor was, no doubt, prevalent in ancient India, but the state had the responsibility to determine the time, place, quantity and quality of the trade. Besides the larger fines that were imposed on the unlicensed vendors that carried on the business, the following rules are noteworthy in the Arthaśāstra:

20 Arthaśāstra, p. 330. As Hastings Rashdall observes, "What would be the meaning of asking whether drunkenness would be wrong if it did not make a man incoherent in his talk, irrational in his judgments, unsteady in his gait and irresponsible in his behaviour? Drunkenness taken apart from all its consequences would not be drunkenness." The Theory of Good and Evil, I. 88.

21 Sūkraṇīti, I. 116. 'There is', in modern times, 'a disposition to narrow temperance to the duty of moderation in drinking.' Similar idea is witnessed in the passage cited above.

22 Arthaśāstra, II. 25.
character, lest labourers should spoil the work taken on hand, violate ideas of decency and lose their virtue, and lest vagabonds should commit indiscreet acts. That drunkards were a great scourge to the community is recognized here. Besides the safeguards mentioned above, those that indulged in liquor were compelled to drink within the shops. Drunkards that were extravagant in their expenditure were arrested and kept in custody. Spies were sent out by the government to ascertain whether the expenditure of liquor-customers was normal or beyond their means. Dealers in liquor were prevented from selling indiscreetly, and when customers under intoxication lost any of their things, the shopkeeper had to make good the loss and also pay an equivalent fine. It is clear from the above that the evil effects on the community of the drinking habit were well known and measures taken to prevent them. The author of the Arthaśāstra would have done better if he had promulgated the principle that prohibition is better than cure of the evils of the habit. But being too keen a politician, he knew that it would be impracticable, and the remedies suggested by him may have proved effective enough to prevent abuses.

**POPULATION: CENSUS**

A healthy and happy population is a necessary adjunct of a good state. A janapada should have among other features primarily a strong and healthy population of good character. That this was the ideal of ancient India is clear from the great concern which the Indian states seem to have felt for their population. It is in evidence in an institution corresponding to the 'census' of modern times in the reign of one of the most remarkable of Indian kings. The third Board of Chandragupta's administrative departments was responsible, according to Megasthenes, for the systematic registration of births and deaths. ‘Nothing in the legislation of Chandragupta is more astonishing to the observer familiar with the lack of methods of ordinary oriental governments than this registration of births and deaths’ The ordinance of Chandragupta ran to the effect that births and deaths and among both high and low should never be concealed. ‘Even the Anglo-Indian administration, with its complex organization and European notions of the value of statistical information did not attempt the collection of vital statistics until very recent times’, says the author of *Indian Constitutional Reform*, viewed in the light of history.

We are able to get a few details about the census operations of the time from the Arthaśāstra. The village accountant had to register the total number of inhabitants belonging to the various castes in the village, to keep an account of the number of cultivators, cowherds, merchants, artisans, labourers, and animals and to take note of the amount of money, free labour, tolls and fines that could be collected from each house in the village. It was his duty to keep a detailed and accurate account of the members of every one of the families in the village, their antecedents (charitra), their occupation (ajūva), income and expenditure (āya and vyaya.) Besides the Nāgarika or Town Prefect was ordered to register all cases of emigration and immigration in the city. Of the various departments of Chandragupta’s administration one was allotted to the treatment of foreigners. To these they assign lodgings, and keep watch over their modes of life by means of those persons whom they give to them for assistants. They escort them on the way when they leave the country, or in the event of their dying, forward their property to their relatives. They take care of them when they are sick, and if they die bury them. Breaches of these regulations were severely dealt with and officers were taken to task for the return of false statements.

POOR RELIEF: A STATE-DUTY

Gṛhasthas (Men in family-life) that would merely shake off the shackles of family and belongings and would assume the role of ascetics, being incapable of braving the battle of life were discredited by the state and considered to be fit subjects for severe penalties. We meet with the following wholesome rules:—When, without making provision for the maintenance of his wife and children, any person embraced asceticism, he was punished for the offence. When a capable man or woman neglected to maintain his or her child, mother, father, minor brothers, sisters and widowed girls, a fine of twelve pānas was levied. Forced asceticism of women, because they were unable to bear the burden of their family, though they may be strong and capable of earning an honest livelihood, was condemned and not only were such women fined but those that may have been responsible for their conversion to become ascetics. Rules similar in nature are found in many works of Indian literature.

26 Arthaśāstra, p. 142.
27 Megasthenes, fragment 34.
28 Arthaśāstra, p. 47.
29 ibid. 47 & 48; Sukranṭi, IV. 1. 105.
But it was recognized as a governmental obligation to provide for orphans; aged, infirm and poor, helpless, women and men.\(^{30}\) The state also found employment for the unemployed poor who would work but could not find any situation. We read that even prisoners were set to work on crown lands or in the repair of roads.\(^ {31}\) Orphans and helpless men were utilized as spies and were given maintenance in return for the service they rendered to the state.\(^ {32}\) Large industrial enterprises corresponding to modern workhouses seem also to have been started by the sovereigns, which would give work and afford relief to the able-bodied poor.\(^ {33}\) Poor-relief was thus a responsibility of the state\(^ {34}\), but those that would prefer to live on alms, though able-bodied, were certainly wicked and deserved to be expelled from the state. On this ground valiant and sturdy beggars were punished\(^ {35}\), if they would not earn their living by honest occupation.

**REGULATION OF WAGES**

The relation of the capitalist and the labourer was ordinarily allowed to be fixed by contracts and the wages were to be paid according to the agreement.\(^ {36}\) But it was accepted as a wholesome principle that the wages of the labourer should be such as would at least meet 'the compulsory charges' and enable him to lead the life of a respectable citizen. The amount of wages in any industry was low, moderate or high.\(^ {37}\) Wages were considered high, if they adequately supplied the food and clothing and, besides, allowed the labourer some comfort. They were moderate if he got only the indispensable minimum of food, clothing and shelter i.e., the necessaries for the labourer and his dependents. Low wages were deemed a curse by the state 'for people that are paid low wages are enemies by nature of the society; they live a miserable life, play into the hands of others, set to plunder others' riches and become a great plague to the community'.\(^ {38}\) The idea conveyed in the above was

\(^{30}\) *Arthaśāstra*, p. 47

\(^{31}\) *Sukraniti*, I. 268; *Arthaśāstra*, p. 115.

\(^{32}\) *Arthaśāstra*, p. 20.


\(^{34}\) *Hitopadeśa*, I. 14.

\(^{35}\) *Sukraniti*, IV. I. 105 and 107.

\(^{36}\) For the relation of labour and capital in ancient India I would refer the reader to *my Aspects of Ancient Indian Industrial Life* published in the *Volume of the Second Oriental Conference, Calcutta*. Cf. also, *Sukraniti*, II. 392.


\(^{38}\) *Ibid.*, II. 400. As Pepe Leo XIII observes in his *Rerum Novarum*, 'it is a natural law of justice that the wage should not be insufficient to keep the worker sober and honest'. The regulations regarding wages remind us of
that the labourer, not being able to meet the imperative demands of his family, had to neglect them, and in this manner stood against the realization of the happiness of his community and of the commonwealth.

**Promotion of Education and Fine Arts**

Let us now pass to show the protective nature of the interference by the state in the educational activities of its citizens. As regards elementary education the initiative lay almost with private enterprise. Education was for the edification of the citizens and it was first the duty of the latter to undertake the responsibility of elementary and primary education. According to the educational ideas of the Vedic and post-Vedic periods it was incumbent on the parents to send their children to a teacher variously styled as Āchāryya, Guru, Upādhyāya, under whom they sought instruction and had the initiation into the arts and sciences. In later times, every Indian village had its own pāthāśala maintained by the villagers for giving the instruction in the three R's. But the state always intervened to give encouragement to scholars, to foster fine arts, and help higher educational enterprise in a variety of ways, besides keeping a censorial supervision to promote, in general, the literacy among the people that it governed. The academic centres, of ancient India, Takṣaśīla, Nālandā, Kāli, Ujjain, Vikramaditya, Madura and Kaśchipura appear to have been concerns, the result of private enterprise. The state acted in all cases as the protector and stretched out the helping hand. The sovereigns patronised learning and culture with their presents to Paṇḍits and learned men and with royal endowments for the fostering of fine arts and of cultural studies. Teachers who gave instruction in the arts such as singing, playing on musical instruments like the Vīṇā, pipe and drum, acting, dancing, painting, reading and writing, divining others' thoughts, shampooing, making of scents and garlands etc., were endowed

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39 The Upaniṣads are in essence the great lessons taught by the teachers under whom students sought initiation into the mysteries of life here and hereafter. En passant, it may be noted that in the Brāhmanical scheme of education, freedom was allowed for the parents to choose the teachers for their children and sometimes, the latter were allowed to do so themselves. One outstanding feature of the educational system was that it was individual, involving individual attention paid to the Śiśya by the Guru and vice versa, and the close and intimate union of the hearts, resulting in right understanding and leading to supreme enlightenment. It was not congregational like modern university, education. In the history of Indian educational institutions the Buddhists appear to have been instrumental in introducing the congregational element in education and giving instruction to students in mass,
with maintenance by the government. Higher education was encouraged by grants of land to scholars and awards of titles and scholarships. The state honoured every year those that were proficient in the arts and sciences and took such steps as would advance them among its subjects. In fact, these formed one of the most important items of public expenditure.

**Voluntary Services of the Citizens**

The life of the state and the life of the persons that make it influence each other, and the sovereign state will be strong and effective only when the citizens are also ready to subordinate their private interests and to fall in with the general will for the common good. The citizens that participate in the life of the state have interest of two kinds—their personal interest and those of the state of which they are members. Though sometimes the two may not agree in the political organization, it is the highest duty of the citizen to do such honorary work or render such voluntary aid as should lead to the smooth and vigorous working of the body-politic.

**(a) In Normal Times**

In normal times the head of the state in ancient India had the right of taking certain revenues from his subjects for the expenditure of the realm in return for the protection he gave them. It was generally understood that the relation of the state and the citizens was of a contractual nature. We read, ‘A king should replenish his treasury with a sixth part of the yield of land, with fines and forfeitures from criminals and with fair taxes levied from merchants in accordance with the injunction of the Sūtras in return for the protection that is granted to them. Let the king protect his subjects, receiving as his return a sixth part of their income’. Even in the collection of his dues the king is advised to act in such a way that the peasant may not be destroyed. Taxes are to be levied in the manner of the weaver of garlands and

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40 *Arthaśāstra*, p. 125. These are some of the more important of the sixty four *Kalas* or arts mentioned, in e.g., *Sūkramāla*, IV. 3.

41 Sūkramāla, I. 367, 368.

42 *As* Hegel puts it, ‘it is their highest duty to participate in the life of the state’.

43 *Mahābhārata* : Sānti, 71, 10. Similar rules are found in all the *Sūtras*, conveying the idea of a sixth going to the income in return for protection granted to the subjects.

44 *Baudhāyana*, 1.19.1.
not of the coal miner. 'Just as fruits are gathered from the gardens only when they become ripe, so revenue shall be collected only when they fall due'. Collection of revenue like that of fruits when unripe should never be carried on lest their source should be injured. Private property owned by individuals was certainly recognized and the latter were allowed to enjoy the fruits of their toil. Though the state was permitted to take the property that was heirless and therefore unclaimed, it was enjoined as its duty to manage and protect the property of minor heirs and make it over as soon as the minor came of age.

On the other hand, it was the duty of the citizens to help to keep the public peace and aid the state police in clearing the roads and highways free from thieves and robbers, to pay the taxes to the state for the political and economic security that was assured them and to observe inviolate the laws and customs laid down in the holy Sāstras or proclaimed by the sovereign from time to time. The citizens were taught to keep to the primary rules of sanitation and hygiene. 'Whoever throws dirt in the street shall be fined one eighth of a pāṇa and whoever causes water or mire to collect in it, one fourth of a pāṇa. The same offence committed on the royal road entailed double the amount of fine' in the Arthāśāstra.

In judicial proceedings, it was incumbent on the subjects to give voluntary aid to help the Judiciary. 'That wretch of a person who knowing all did not give evidence was visited by the sin and the punishment of a false witness.' Though persons not formally summoned to give evidence were not bound to appear at the law court, any person who came to the court by accident and who knew about the case, if questioned by the judge was bound to give out the truth. Parties to a suit had themselves to produce witnesses to prove the validity of their cause, but witnesses who may be very far or who would not stir out shall be forced to present themselves by the order of the judges. Similarly, the penalty was very heavy for conscious dereelection of one's honorary duties. 'When a person caused a criminal to be let off or supplied him with food, dress, information or plans of escape the penalty

45 Suhkruti, IV. 2. 113.
46 Arthāśāstra p. 246.
47 Āpastamba, II. 14. 5; Vaśyata, XVI. 7-9.
48 Arthāśāstra, p. 145.
49 Yajñavalkya, II. 79.
50 Gautama, XIII. 3 ff.
51 Arthāśāstra, p. 177.
was mutilation or a fine of 900 panas. Travellers on the state roads shall catch hold of any person whom they find is suffering from a wound, is possessed of destructive weapons or is a stranger to the place or is skulkingly passing along, etc." Voluntary efforts of private citizens to keep the roads and streets clear of nuisances and make them more convenient for the travellers were encouraged by the state. "Those who with their united effort constructed on the roads inns and caravanserais of any kind were shown special favour by the government."

(6) In Grave Emergencies

Now we shall deal with the duties of the state and the citizens in times of distress. Normally, the king should never seek to increase his treasure by excessive punishments, land revenues and duties.

But on occasions of great financial difficulty the king could have recourse to extra revenues from cultivators, herdsmen and merchants. He may request wealthy men of the kingdom to part with as much as they can, but should be punctual in returning the amount taken on loan with interest as soon as the danger was past. He may purchase, if necessary, any land, offering favourable price to the owners thereof. But if a miser who had much hoarded wealth would not give any aid to his suffering fellows the government may have resort to the processes of Karshana (extortion) and visanam (forcing one to vomit).

It is, however, laid down that the king should be very careful and guarded in the application of these extreme measures. Only in times of crisis and great emergencies could these methods be employed, and "such expedients," says Kautilya, "could be resorted to only once" and should never be applied in the case of subjects that cultivate only inferior soils, those that may have been great help to the state in the construction of forts, irrigation works, routes of traffic etc., and of people that may lack the means of subsistence.

54 Arthasastra, p. 173.
55 Sukraniti, IV. 2.9.
56 Arthasastra, pp 242-246. Similarly in times of war the king may levy extra dues from his subjects. Sukraniti, IV. 210.
57 Sukraniti, IV. 2.11.
58 Arthasastra, p. 242.
If, in grave emergencies such as famine, it was the duty of the king to provide his subjects with grains and provisions and with other assistance by a variety of measures, external and internal, it was the duty of the citizen to volunteer help to elevate the position of his distressed fellows and to promote the commonweal. People who did public and philanthropic work were appreciated and awarded due honours. Those who being moved by motives of public welfare offer their wealth to the government shall be honoured with a special rank at court, a royal umbrella, a precious turban or ornaments in return for their voluntary aid. In some cases the fascination for a title may have induced the people to render such timely assistance to the state. But if the wealthy, who are not moved by such humane considerations or the prospect of reward, are so avaricious as to amass riches like the ‘Economic Man’, by selling stores of corn at high prices, then as Kalhana says, there was good justification for the use of force. Similarly, in a village where a house was on fire, any house-owner who did not run to give help to extinguish the fire was fined twelve paṇas and one who had taken a house only for rent (avakrayi) not proving to be of use in such a calamity, was to suffer the penalty. In times of danger, people who neglected opportunities for rescuing themselves being indolent and idle, were fined by the state, and thus made to realise the truth of the good and wholesome maxim ‘Self help is the best help.’

62 Arthaśāstra, p. 208f.
63 Ibid, p. 244.
64 Rājatarangini, V. 272f.
65 Arthaśāstra, p. 145.
66 In floods, ‘Persons neglecting rescue with the exception of those who for want of boats have no means of escape shall be fined twelve paṇas’ (Arthaśāstra, p. 207.)
SOME VAISNAVA SAINTS OF SOUTH INDIA
(By K. G. Seshu Ayyar Esq., B.L.)

INTRODUCTION

From the very earliest times of which Tamil literature treats, the worship of Viṣṇu has been largely prevalent in South India. Tol-Kāppiyam is regarded as the earliest Tamil work now extant; and its authorship is traditionally attributed to a direct disciple of Agastya-muni, a Rṣi called Tol-Kāppiyar, or, as the term means, the Rṣi of the ancient Kapi-Gōtra. He is said to be no other than the Purānic Rṣi, Trṇadhūmāgni, the son of the well-known Jamadagni. That work is the earliest of the Tamil works that we now have; and it supplies the basic grammar for all the works of the Sangam period in Tamil literature. In the section relating to Agattīyai or the grammar of subjective life with special reference to Love and Happiness, Tol-Kāppiyam classifies inhabited land into four varieties, viz., mullai or pastoral land, kurinci or hilly tracts, marutam or agricultural land, and neythal or sea-board land; and it gives the valuable and interesting information that Māyōn or Viṣṇu is the guardian deity of mulla-makkal or the inhabitants of pastoral lands. Pariśādai is one of the earliest Sangam works, which Mahāmahopādhyāya V. Swāminātha Aiyar, the greatest Tamil scholar now living, has saved from the ravages of white ants, as he has done several others of the Sangam Classics. It is a collection of lyrics mainly in praise of Viṣṇu, Subrahmanya and the Vaigai river. In its complete form, the work, according to an old verse, consists of eight poems in praise of Viṣṇu, thirty-one poems in praise of Subrahmanya, twenty-six in praise of the river Vaigai, four in praise of Madura and one in praise of the Sea, thus making up a total of seventy lyrics. Only 22 lyrics in full and a few fragments are published; and of these, six are devoted to the praise of Tiru-māl or Viṣṇu. One of them extols the worship of Viṣṇu in the forms of Kṛṣṇa and Bala-Dēva in the temple of Tiru-māl-irun-coāli, near Madura; while another besides describing the bāla-īlas or the juvenile doings of Śrī Kṛṣṇa, mentions definitely by their Tamil names the four Vṛūkhas of the Bhāgavatas, viz., Vānuḍēva, Sankarśāṇa, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. In Cilappatikāram, a well-known epic poem of the Sangam period, the poet tells us that when certain strange and disturbing phenomena occurred in Madura, the women of the shepherd class conducted, as a mode of propitiating Viṣṇu, dances to the accompaniment
of songs describing the juvenile feats of Śrī Kṛṣṇa. It is clear from these references that the worship of Viṣṇu was very common in the Tamil country in ancient days; and judged by the evidence of Tamil literature, there was only one other form of religion that was equally prevalent in South India in early times; and that was the worship of Subrahmaṇya. *Tol-Kappiyam* tells us that Subrahmaṇya is the presiding deity of Kurinc or hilly country; and eight long lyrics, in the published portion of *Paripāda*, and *Tīru-Murugāṟṟu-pādai* are found in Sangam literature, entirely devoted to his praise and worship. I have attempted to show elsewhere that these Sangam works cannot be posterior to the second century A.C.; and if so, we may safely accept the late Sir R. G. Bhandarkar’s statement in his *Vaiṣṇavism, Saivism and Minor Religions* that “there is nothing to show that Vaiṣṇavism had not penetrated to the Tamil country about the first century after Christ,” as not an exaggerated estimate of the antiquity of Vaiṣṇavism in South India.

**Use of Tradition**

It is not the object of this paper, to trace the early history of Vaiṣṇavism and its development in south India; indeed, for such work there is little or no material available and, besides, even if there were material, the attempt would be beyond my competency. The purpose is only to give a short account of some great men among the early Vaiṣṇavas, to whom an abiding influence has attached and from whose works a permanent beneficial result has followed. Among the civilizing agencies to the influence of which the development of the world is indebted, not the least important is the agency of great men. ‘Great men have been among us’ from the earliest time, whose influence, direct and indirect, on social life and humanity has been powerful and permanent; and among such great men are the vaiṣṇava saints or Ālvārs who occupy a prominent place in the temple of fame as religious teachers. The Ālvārs come from different castes, ranging from the Brāhmaṇa to the Panama; and they were born at different places and in different times. In the words of Guizot, the historian of *Civilization in Europe*, ‘no-one can say why a great man appears at a certain epoch; that is a secret of providence, but the fact is not therefore, less certain’. Besides their imperishable writings and the traditions that have come down to us and which have been cherished as a holy heritage by long generations of Vaiṣṇavas, there exists no other
source from which the story and the lesson of their lives can be learnt. Divya-Suri-Charita of Garudavākha, which is said to be the oldest work extant on the Śrī Vaiṣṇava hierarchy, Guru-parampara-prakāśa of Pīnbalakīya Perumāl-Jīyar and similar works from which the popular accounts of the lives of the Āḻvārs have been prepared, only concretized the floating traditions of their day, and the writers of those works do not profess to give under personal responsibility the facts and incidents which they narrate in regard to the Āḻvārs. Should the traditions then be rejected altogether in our attempt to know the story of the lives of these great personages? The conception of biography as a faithful portrait of a man’s life is entirely modern; and it will be conceded that in ancient and mediaeval times, the lives of great men were utilized by their biographers as fit themes to illustrate in a magnified form a tendency of conduct that was worthy of being followed. The object of biography was conceived to be the production of a great and striking moral effect, and consistently with that initial object, personal lives were narrated so as to serve as a solemn warning or a high example. Recognizing this defect in the accounts of personal life preserved in traditions, he will, nevertheless, not be justified in totally discrediting the biographers. Tradition, after all, is really human testimony regarding the long past, and like all human testimony it is liable to error; but on that account it should not be discarded as wholly unworthy of attention, unless indeed we believe that in ancient times people were incapable of discriminating between truth and falsehood. In the absence of trustworthy first-hand evidence, tradition which in effect is reputation arising from the concurrence of many parties who are unconnected with each other but are all interested in investigating the subject, may be accepted as the groundwork for history, especially in matters in which the probability for personal bias is little. It is in this light that the traditional accounts of the lives of the Vaiṣṇava Āḻvārs are utilized in this paper. For English readers interested in the traditions that have gathered round the Āḻvārs, there is no better or more interesting and informing book than Śrīmad Govindāchāryya Svāmin’s Holy Lives of the Āḻvārs.

THE ĀḻVĀRS

According to the Bhāgavata, Viṣṇu, the Supreme Lord, caused, for the benefit of the Kali Yuga, the incarnation of Vaiṣṇava saints in the Dravīḍa country, and that the world may become better they taught the
message of Bhakti or salvation by faith. The consecrated country lying
on the banks of the Tamraparṇi, the Kṛṣmatā or Vaigni, the Payasvini
Pāḷār, and the westword-flowing Mahāśadi or Periyār, was to be blest
with the nativity of the saints. These saints who are known as the
Ālvārs, a term which literally means those drowned (in devotion to the
love of God), are usually reckoned to be twelve in number, and they
come from both sexes and from different castes, the lowest not excluded.
Just now, when there is in our country, a powerful ferment due to the
existence of social gradations culminating at one end in unapproach-
ability and untouchability, it is pre-eminently important to remember
that the Hindus of South India, whether of the Saiva or of the
Vaiṣṇava persuasion, freely recognized that access to saint-hood or
spiritual union with God by way of faith and discipline could not be
foreclosed by reason of hereditary caste disabilities. They recognized
that the chosen instrument of God for carrying out God's purposes for
the elevation of the human soul, might appear in any grade of society,
that all saints were equally incarnations for the betterment of the
world, and there were no gradations of high and low, of first or last
among them. Tradition says that the Ālvārs are the incarnations in
human form of the emblems and insignia of Nārāyaṇa, who in his
infinite love and grace sent them to be born on earth for the salvation
of humanity through the consolations of the Vaiṣṇava faith. According
to the Guru-Paramparās, the following is the list of the Ālvārs in their
chronological order:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tamil name</th>
<th>Sanskrit name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poiyāl Ālvār</td>
<td>Sārō yogin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhūttatt Ālvār</td>
<td>Bhūta Yogin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pēy Ālvār</td>
<td>Bhānta Yogin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiru Malisai Ālvār</td>
<td>Bhaktisāra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nam Ālvār</td>
<td>Saṭha Kōpa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madhura Kavi Ālvār</td>
<td>Madhura Kavi</td>
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<td>Kulaśekhara Ālvār</td>
<td>Kulaśekhara</td>
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<tr>
<td>Periya Ālvār</td>
<td>Viṣṇu Citta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anḍāl</td>
<td>Gōḍā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiḍḍarippeći Ālvār</td>
<td>Bhaktānghirēṇu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiruppaṇ Ālvār</td>
<td>Yōgivāha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiṛu Mangai Ālvār</td>
<td>Parakāla</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The traditional and orthodox belief is that the first five are
respectively the incarnations of Saṁkha, Gadā, Nandaka, Chakra and
Visvaksêna and those that are mentioned as seventh to twelfth in the list are the embodiments respectively of Kaustubha, Garûda, Sri or Lakshmi, Vanamalî, Srîvatsa and Sàranga. According to sex, all except Åñâdål are males, and according to caste, Tiru-pañ-Alvâr was a Pañchama Nam-Älvâr and Tiru Mangai Alvâr were Sûdras, Kulašêkhara Alvâr was a Ksatriya, and the rest Brahmanaças. They came from different parts of the Drâviḍa country. Poygai Alvâr was born at Kâñchîpura, Bhûtatt Alvâr in Mahábaliapuram, and Pëyâlvar at Mylapore in Madras, and these three are said to have been contemporaries, and are regarded as the earliest Alvârs. Tirumalissai Alvâr was born at a place called Maliṣai, near Punamalai in Madras and is said to have been a younger contemporary of the first three Alvârs. He is said to have been born of Brâhmaçana parents, but was brought up by a Sûdra as his son. Nam Alvâr was born at Alvâr-tîrû-Kagari in the Tinneveli district; and though in point of date, he came long after the saints above-mentioned, he is, as his name itself indicates, the first in importance among the Alvârs. These five are said to have been born Yâgis. Madhura Kavi was born at Tiru-Kolû, and he is, according to orthodox belief, an incarnation of Kumuda-Gâneśa, a subordinate functionary under Sêneśa—a tradition invented to explain the fact that he sought and accepted Nam Alvâr as his Guru or preceptor. Kulašêkhara Alvâr was born in Tiru-Ancaï-Kalam, near Cranganore on the west coast, and was a prince of Kêrala. Periya Alvâr and his daughter Åñâdål were born in Srîvilliputtûr, in the Tinneveli District, Tûndaraṭi poçhi Alvâr at Mandamguḍi in the Chôla country, Tiru-pañ-Alvâr in Urâiyûr (a suburb of Trichinopoly) once the capital of the Chôla Kingdom and Tiru Mangai Alvâr at Tiru-Kurai-yallûr, near Shiyaḷî, also in the Chôla Kingdom. All of them belonged to the Tamil country, and they lived and worked among the Tamil people. The Nâlâyira Prabandham, which is a collection of their devotional lyrics in Tamil, is ranked by south Indian vaisnava with the Vedas and Vedângas in importance. Indeed, Tiru-Vây-Moli, the name by which Nam-Älvâr's one thousand lyrics contained in the Nâlâyira Prabandham are known, is the oldest Tamil expression to denote the Veda. Nam Älvâr's Tiru-Vây moli is said to embody the essence of the Sâma Vêda. All the lyrics contained in it are set to music, while the same saint's Tiru-Viruttam, Tiru-Åširiya, and Periya-tiru-Anâdäi, all of which form part of the Nâlâyira-Prabandham, are held to represent the Rg. the Yajus and the Atharva Veda respectively. If in popular conception, Nam-Älvâr's poems represent the Vedas, Tiru Mangai Älvâr's
Periya-Tiru-Moli and other works are held to represent the six Vedāṅgas par excellence. It is patent, therefore, what great influence the sayings and writings of the Ālvārs had in spreading and establishing Vaiṣṇavism among the Tamil people. The message they spread among the people was that of God’s grace which was to be attained by unswerving faith in Nārāyaṇa. That basic idea repeats itself in various forms in the writings of the Ālvārs, and as illustration, the following verses may be cited. Says Nam Ālvār:

I saw the lotus Feet, and straightway disappeared
The bondage of past deeds. To love the Lord Supreme
And serve Him ceaselessly, that is the way revealed
Of yore for us to follow.

Tiru vāy moli. X. 4. 9.

Again, Tiru Maḷiśai Ālvār writes:

Vouchsafe to me your grace today, and for tomorrow too!
Longer may it remain for me! Behold! I’m one with you!
Nārāyaṇa: from you apart, I’m naught! In you I live!
And of your saving grace to me, O Lord, in plenty give!

Nān-Mukan Tiru-Antādi.

The measure of their success in carrying out their high mission will be patent from a song of exultation where Nam Ālvār exclaims:

Glory! All hail! The ills of life have fled!
Naraka itself, for punishment ordained;
Hās disappeared! Henceforth the Lord of Death
His function loses here! The Kali age,
Behold! doṭh vanish! For the devotees
Of Him, the sea-complexioned Lord Supreme
In multitudes have on the earth appeared,
Singing and dancing in ecstatic joy!

Tiru-Vāy-Moli. V. 2. 1.

The First Ālvārs

Based on the chronological order accepted by Vēdānta Dēśikar and others, the Ālvārs will easily fall into three groups. Poygai Ālvār, Bhūtatt-Ālvār, Pēy Ālvār, and Tiru Maḷiśai Ālvār will form the early Ālvārs, Kulaśekhara Ālvār, Periya Ālvār and Āṇḍal will form one group; and Tondēr-adji-poṭi-Ālvār, Tiru-pān Ālvār, and Tiru Mangai Ālvār will form the last group. There can be no room for doubt that the first three Ālvārs were really contemporaries, but the traditional account of Tiru-Maḷiśa
Ālvār gives large scope for doubt whether he was a contemporary of the other three in the first group who are usually referred to as Mudal Ālvār or the first Ālvār. The Mudal Ālvār are said to have been born in the same month of the same year, the first being just a day older than the second, and the second a day older than the third. Tradition assigns to them an impossible date—4202 B.C., and though that date can be summarily dismissed, it is not easy, from the materials now available, to say when exactly they lived. From the fact that Bhūtattālvār is said to have been born in Mahābalipuram, it has been attempted to assign these saints to the 7th century A. D., because, we are told on the authority of Prof. Jouveau Dubreuil that, this town did not probably exist before the time of Narasimha Varman I. The reasoning is extremely inconclusive. Dr. S. Krishnaswāmi Aiyangar in his Early History of Vaishnavism in South India concludes that Mudal Ālvār should be placed in the second century A. D. From Tamil literature we see that a poet of the name of Poygaiyār composed a poem called Kala-Vali-Nārpatu in honour of Kō-Cenkaṇan, the well known Chōla king of the Saṅgam period, and he has also contributed two poems to the Puranānūṟu collection, an acknowledged Saṅgam work. Poygaiyār belonged to the Saṅgam period, and if Poygai Ālvār and Poygaiyār be the same, it follows that the Mudal Ālvār should be placed in or about the period of the Tamil Saṅgam. If that view of Dr. S. Krishnaswāmi Aiyangar's statement may be accepted as more or less correct, as of all the dates attempted to be assigned to the Saṅgam period in Tamil literary history, the 2nd century A. D. has always appeared to me the most probable. Tradition says that one night, the three Ālvārs happened to meet each other at Tiru-Kōvilūr. It was a night of pelting rain. Poygai Ālvār who came to the place first found shelter in a small hut where there was just enough accommodation for one to lie down. Bhūtattālvār also sought shelter from the rain in the same hut, and when he was told that there was space for only one to sleep, he replied that if one could sleep there, two could sit, and entered the hut. Shortly after Pey Ālvār came and sought admission, and on hearing there was sitting place for only two persons, he said that if so, three could stand, and entered the room. The three came to know each other. This chance meeting proved to be a turning point in their lives. The close contact of kindred souls suddenly brought them a new flood of spiritual light and they burst into praise of Viṣṇu, whose beatific vision was then vouchsafed to them. The songs that flowed from their inspired lips are said to be embodied in the section of the Nālāyira Prabandham.
known as iyarpā. Poygai Ālvār's centum begins by defining God as represented in His manifested universe, Bhūtattālvār begins his centum by regarding the Supreme as Nārāyaṇa, and Pey Ālvār by conceiving Him as associated with Śrī or Śakti. The opening verses of three Tiru-antādis tell us in what form each of the three saints obtained his vision of the Lord.

Says Poygai Ālvār:—
With the earth as the receptacle to hold the oil,
The girdling ocean as the ghī for the lamp,
And the resplendent sun as the kindled light,
I lit my lamp to see the beauteous Feet
Of Him that on the shining sea recumbent lies;
And there I placed the garland of song I wove
In glorification of the Lord,
That I from the sea of bondage might be saved.

1st Tiru Antādi.

Bhūtattālvār writes:—
With love as the receptacle, with yearning as the Ghī,
And a melting heart as the wick, in estacy
Of soul I lit the lamp of wisdom and glorified
Nārāyaṇa in Tamil verses meetly tried.

2nd Tiru Antādi—I.

Here is Pey Ālvār's account:—
Lakṣmī I saw! I saw the golden form,
The glorious hues of the effulgent sun!
I saw the mighty golden discus and the friendly conch
All this I saw in Him that bears the ocean's hue!

3rd Tiru Antādi—I.

The measure of their intense faith and illumination, as also their distinctive conception of the Deity, may be judged to some extent from the following verses taken at random from their songs.
O cease from doubt, for thou hast seen the Lord!
Know thou the solid earth, the' expansive sky,
The air, the sounding sea, the glowing fire
Are all the Lotus-eyed Lord Viṣṇu, who
Of yore the small-eyed elephant did save
When in distress it cried to Him for help.

1st Tiru Antādi—29.
The mind, from obscurcation purified which knows the truth,
Yearns for and joins with glee the saving Feet
Of Him who wears the Tulsi garland cool,
E'en as the calf seeks naturally its dam.

1st Tiru Antādi—30.

Awake I saw Nārāyaṇa by day!
In sooth I saw Him in my dream again!
At all times oft I saw the glorious form
Of Him who in His hand the gleaming discus holds,
Whose beauteous Feet with heavenly splendour shines.

2nd Tiru Antādi—31.

I care not for kingship of the earth!
Nor would I be the king of Devas in Heaven itself!
For now I have as humble devotee
Sought out the supreme Lord with Lotus-eyes,
Lord Viṣṇu, our Lord of Lords, and worshipped Him.

2nd Tiru Antādi—90.

In body and in mind I did a slave become
To Him who in the dark-blue ocean doth reside,
E'en Him who on his breast as lustrous jewels wears
Lakṣmī, the flower-born Goddess with the coral lips,
And gleaming garlands richly light with precious stones!

3rd Tiru Antādi—37.

The Way to Live I have learnt! For I have gained
The Feet of Him, our Lord, the Lotus-eyed,
Viṣṇu of dazzling splendour, on whose breast
Where Śrī resides the garland sweet descends,
Like a long-lying water-fall that runs
Adown a cleft o'er a dark mountain side.

3rd Tiru Antādi—59.

The accounts of the saints to whom has been vouchsafed the beatific experience of the vision of God are always uplifting and full of spiritual power, and the writings of the first three Ālvārs have, therefore, been justly included in the sacred literature of South Indian Vaiṣṇavas.

Tirumalaiśai Ālvār

Tirumalaiśai Ālvār is said to have been born in the family of Bhārgava Rṣi, but brought up by a Sudra, as his parents abandoned him. He is represented by tradition as having studied critically all systems of religion
and philosophy, and as the result of his study to have become convinced of the supreme efficacy of the Vaiśṇava religion. He is alleged to have spent many hundreds of years in Yōgic trance, and orthodoxy believes that in the interval between two long periods of such trance, the Alvār received a visit from the Mudāl Alvārs! The extravagant antiquity assigned by orthodox uncritical opinion to the Mudāl Alvārs necessitated the employment of this obviously unacceptable device to explain, perhaps, an ascertained fact of the proximity in date between the latter Alvār and the earlier Alvārs. To emphasize the intensity of his faith in Viṣṇu, a story is told. It is said that on one occasion the Alvār was visited by Rudra with a view to test his faith. According to Vaiśṇava belief, Rudra is the grandson of Nārāyaṇa. In his Nan-Mukhan-Tiru-Antādi, Tiru Malisai Alvār writes in the opening verse: "Nārāyaṇa created Brahma of the four faces, and Brahma Sankara". When Rudra appeared, the Alvār sat indifferent, stitching a torn cloth. Rudra began the conversation, but observing the Alvār inattentive, asked him why he was so. "What have I to gain from you?" Asked the Alvār. "I desire to confer a boon on you", replied Rudra. "Then can you grant me Mokṣha", asked the Alvār. "That is exclusively the gift of Nārāyaṇa. Ask something else" said the God. "Can you even by one day postpone the date of a man's death?" Asked the saint. "That is regulated by his Karma" said Rudra. "Then there is nothing you could give me". Rudra admired the constancy of the Saint's faith in Nārāyaṇa and bestowed on him the title of Bhaktisūra. Various other supernatural agencies are said to have attempted to tempt him out of his faith in Viṣṇu, but without any success. It is said that he visited Kāṇchi Puram for worship. The Pallava king, who had heard of the saint's supernatural power, importuned him with the request for the grant of the boon of undying youth. Much annoyed, the saint left the place, but lo! the image of Viṣṇu in the temple also vanished, to be with the Lord's devotee. The Pallava king duly apologized to the saint, who thereupon returned to Kāṇchi Puram, and the sanctity of the temple of the Pallava was restored. Unfortunately, we are not told the name of this Pallava king. The late Mr. Gopinātha Rao thinks that the first quarter of the 8th Century A. D. appears to have been a period of great Vaiśṇava activity, and that Tirumalisai Alvār may be assigned to that period. Dr. Krishṇaswāmi Aiyangār, however, thinks that the king of Kāṇchi with whom the Alvār was brought in contact is Toṇḍaimān Ilan-tiraiyan, a ruler of Kāṇchi in the Saṅgam period. There is no reason why the tradition
that Tirusami Alvar was a younger contemporary of the Mudal Alvars should be summarily rejected; and if the latter are capable of being placed in the 2nd century A.C., the suggestion of the learned Professor of Indian History in the Madras University that Tirusami Alvar was a contemporary of Topcaimin Ilam Tiraiyan may be accepted. There is internal evidence supplied by Nann-mukhan-Tiru-Antadi, that its author was posterior in date to Tiru Valluvar, the author of the Kural; for we find in stanza 23 of the former work a very close adaptation, with much verbal similarity of verse 5 of Chapter IX of the latter work. However, there seems to be some reason for doubting if the Alvar could be placed in the 2nd century, and this doubt I base on literary grounds. His Nann-mukhan-tiru-antadi, from which a verse emphasizing the need for Divine Grace has already been quoted, may be a poem of the 2nd Century; but besides that poem, he has also written Tiru-Can da-Viruttam in metrical form from which, if not also the poetical conceits and philosophical ideas in which that beautiful work abounds, would suggest a later period for the Alvar. Let me give an illustration or two.

Addressing God, the saint exclaims:

Thou art that the word seeks to discover!
Thou art the substance which the word denotes!
The self-existent Light ineffable!
At Thy mere bidding all creation sprang!
Can any creature then in words describe
E'en slightly Thy essential qualities!

_Tiru-Can da-viruttam—11._

As the vast ocean holds within itself the swelling waves
Which born in it are in it also ultimately lost,
So Thou dost from the source and art Th' abode of life!
For life from Thee is born! Likewise both in its active state
And in its passive life in Thee is lived; and in the end
To Thee doth life return, becoming one with Thee!

_Tiru-Can da-Viruttam 10._

Nam Alvar

Nam Alvar is by common consent the greatest of the Alvars. As already observed his writings are regarded by the Vaisnavas of the Tamil country as embodying the four Vedas, and one of his writings bears the hallowed name of Tiru-Vây-Moli, meaning the holy Veda. He is
the saint among saints, the others standing in relation to him only as individual limbs or organs of the body. Nam Āḻvār means ‘Our Saint’, and it is the belief of orthodoxy that the appellation was bestowed on him by lord Śrī Rāmānuṭha himself. To Śrī Vaiṣṇavas, he is Kulapati and Kūṭastha the holy head. Reference is made to his birth in Śrī Bhāgavata, Bhavishyat Purāṇa and Brahmaṇḍa-purāṇa. His father Kāriyār belonged to Tīru-Nagari in the Tāmraparṇi basin, and his mother came from Tīru-vaṇ-parisāram, a village in South Travancore, a few miles from Cape Comorin. Nam Āḻvār was a born Yogi, and it is said that even as a child he abandoned home, parents and all other earthly and domestic bondage, and went into a Yogic trance under the shade of an adjacent tamarind tree, which is even now reverentially pointed out by the villagers as Tīru-Puli-Āḻvār. When he had been in a state of Samādhi for 16 years, there came to him, beseeching initiation, Madhura Kavi Āḻvār. He was the God-ordained instrument to wake the youthful Yogi from his long trance. Madhura Kavi Āḻvār propounded a philosopical question, which in its wording was almost of the nature of a conundrum. It was: If in the womb of what is dead a subtle thing is born, what will it feed on and where abide? Forth came the Yogi’s answer: It will feed on that and abide there. ‘What is dead’ in the query refers to the body which is ‘achit’, and the ‘subtle thing’ is the soul. The sage’s answer means that the food of the soul is God, and in Him it abides. The Muni had in his silent communion with God learnt the great truth that the Heart of God is the source of all life, and all finite things have their being there and to that they must flow back. By the faculty of transcendental feeling and ecstatic vision, the sage had attained spiritual knowledge and communion with the Highest. That serene and blessed mood and experience are not easily gained, but Nam Āḻvār had gained them by discipline and by Divine Grace; and he was now ready to serve as God’s chosen instrument to guide the human soul in its progress towards God. He revealed to Madhura Kavi Āḻvār that the soul that is to all appearance born in matter has its food and life in God, and Madhura Kavi at once accepted him as his Guru or teacher. There are eleven stanzas by Madhura Kavi Āḻvār that are included in the Prabandham and in expressing the great joy of the author in having discovered his spiritual master, they emphasize that a preceptor is essential for the attainment of salvation. So complete was his realization of this central fact that Madhura Kavi Āḻvār exclaims that when with gracious eyes Nam Āḻvār regarded him, he was at once freed from the accumulated
sins of his previous lives. Nam Āḻvār realized the unitive life, in which the individual and the Supreme Soul are no longer two but one. He lived in God, and he would not exchange his bliss as a Bhagavata even for the whole of Heaven itself. He exclaims:

Who can compare in all the universe so vast
With me, to whom is given with garlands of sweet songs
To adorn the Lord Who on us as on Śrī bestows
Rich happiness, the Lord Supreme, who is adored
By mortal men and by immortal Gods alike,
The Lord whose Lotus Feet in mercy cool abounds.

_Tiru Vāy Moli_ IV. 5.8

The devotee of the Lord who by a species of ecstatic transfusion has known and experienced the Reality, easily appreciates the unity under the bewildering diversity around him. To him, as Nam Āḻvār says, the Highest exists, and the entire visible and invisible world is His form. (Tiru Vāy Moli I. 1.9.) All manifestations in the universe,—water, earth, fire, air, the sky, the sun and the moon and even Śiva and Brahma—represent Nārāyaṇa, (Tiru Vāy Moli VI. 9.1.) devotion to whom brings boundless bliss for endless time to the Bhakta who, with melting heart and tears of joy and with body quivering with emotion, dances and sings in praise of the Lord and languishes yearning for union with Him (Tiru Vāy Moli II. 4.1). Those who have had the beatific vision find the law of their life in love and service (Tiru Vāy Moli X. 4.9). Surely one living in such an atmosphere of blessedness can echo the words of Nam Āḻvār.

The earth, the sky so vast are all in Thee
But Thou hast through my ears got into me
And now in me residest! Lord! Who may
Declare if Thou or I be greater, say!

_Periyā Tiru Antādi_, 75.

As to the date of the great Āḻvār there are, as in almost all matters of ancient south Indian chronology, keen differences of opinion. In the Anaimalai Inscription of 770 A.C., the name of the minister of the Pāṇḍyan King is mentioned as Māraṇ Kārī who is described as a Madhura Kavi or sweet singer or poet. Epigraphists manufactured from this fact the information that the person there mentioned must be held to be the same as Madhura Kavi Āḻvār, the disciple of Nam Āḻvār who had also
the name of Māran! According to tradition preserved by the hagiologists, to disbelieve or reject which in this particular case no reason has been given, Tirumangai Āḻvār made arrangements for the annual recital of Nam Āḻvār’s Tiru vāy Moli in Srīrangam; and from historical references found in Tirumangai Āḻvār’s writings, Āḻvār has been assigned to the 8th century. Obviously then Nam Āḻvār must have lived some centuries before the 8th century. Among those who have written commendatory verses in honour of Nam Āḻvār and Madhura Kavi Āḻvār is Nāthamuni, the grandfather of Āḻvandār, whose younger contemporary was Rāmānuja. He would not be far from Nāthamuni’s birth if we take it to be C. 900. In order to connect him with Nam Āḻvār, so that an unbroken succession of spiritual preceptors might be constructed, Vaiṣṇava tradition stated that Nāthamuni was, antecedent to his natural birth, in a state of yogic trance before the holy tamarind tree, that he might bring back the lost Tiru Vāy Moli of the great Āḻvār, and this samādhi period extended over 350 years. If we try to interpret the tradition rationally, we may take this to mean that Nāthamuni came about 350 years after Nam Āḻvār—that is we should look for Nam Āḻvār in the 6th century. With the materials available, one cannot possibly afford to be more definite, but whatever might be his date, his position among the Āḻvārs as primus inter pares is undisputed, and is amply justified by the character of his writings in which he has given expression to his ‘inmost in the sweetest way’, to use one of Meredith’s phrases. The sweetness and value of his inmost spiritual song cannot be exaggerated. It is a song of triumph and already a verse has been cited to show his exaltation. Here is another:—

The Kali age is gone! The Gods themselves have entered
And as appropriate to the great Krita age.
May the floodgates of celestial joy be opened wide
The devotees of our Lord Whose hue is like
Unto the rain cloud and the dark blue sea,
Have in large numbers, singing paeans, appeared
On earth, and over all the land have spread.

Tiru Vāy Moli V. 2. 3.

KULASEKHARA ĀḻvāR.

Kulasekhara Āḻvār was a reigning king of Kerala or the Chera kingdom; and in time, as his lyrics show, he came to hold sway over the Pāṇḍya and Chola kingdoms also. It is not, however, as a warrior of
renown that he is remembered,—it is as a royal saint that his memory is honoured and cherished. He renounced all worldly pomp and splendour, which even in the plenitude of his regal power he realized the vanity of vanities and vexation of spirit, and he chose to walk humbly with God. Like all truly devotional and religious people, Kulaśekhara Ālvār was a mystic. It has been well said that mysticism is a temper rather than a doctrine. It is a state of feeling which shows itself in connection with human endeavour to grasp and enjoy the divine essence and actual communion with the Supreme Being. To the mystic, God is an experience, and his aim is to become like God and to attain to union with Him. Life, consequently, is to him a constant endeavour and aspiration to live in God; and such was it to Kulaśekhara Ālvār. There is a very beautiful story told about him: The Rāmāyaṇa was his favourite study and Śrī Rāma as God incarnate was the deity he adored. One day, when the court poet was reciting the portion where Rāma fights single-handed Khara and his Rākṣasa hordes, the king cried in frenzy: "My Rāma is fighting alone. Rise, my valiant soldiers and march with me, His Bhākta, to render Him assistance on the field of battle". So again, when the portion relating to the carrying away of Sītā by Rāvana was read, the king was so much beyond himself with righteous wrath that he exclaimed: "How can I rest here idle? I shall forthwith cross the ocean, slay the wicked Rāvana, and restore my mother Sītā to Śrī Rāma". Our coldly critical spirit will rail at such incidents as acts of insanity, and that is because we fail to appreciate the mystic's intensity of feeling. He has felt and he has seen and he is convinced; and to those who have not seen and felt the light as he has done, his acts and utterances may be incomprehensible and, perhaps, appear even foolish. The man of the world is a stranger to transcendental feeling; he can chop logic; but what Schelling terms intellectual intuition is unknown to him. But even to him come periods of life when in spite of his preconceived derision for spiritual experiences, the 'mystic germ' in him, as Williams James would say, asserts itself. Says that well-known philosopher: "Especially in times of moral crisis, it comes to me, as the sense of an unknown something backing me up. It is most indefinite, to be sure, and rather faint. And yet I know that if it should cease, there would be a great hush, a great void in my life." Even as material objects are apprehended by intellectual perception, spiritual things must be apprehended by the spirit. The condition of all knowledge, says Porphyry, is that the subject should become like to the object. We can, thus, know a thing spiritually only
by becoming it. Kulaśekhara Ālvār was drowned in God-love, which alone was real to him. He sings:

What makes me King?
The gaudy thing,
The diadem I wear?
Not that, indeed the Regal crown
For me whom He has made His own;
The King of Kings, whose lotus Feet
Upon my head I bear!
They form my crown, those lotus Feet!—
They make me King!

In the Perumāl Tiru Moli, as his contribution to the Nāḷayira Prabandham is called, he writes with inimitable pathos that he would value being born as a tree or a stream or a bird on Tiru-vēṅkaṭam, modern Tiru-pati, (one of the holiest of the shrines in South India dedicated to Viṣṇu,) very much higher than being the world’s absolute monarch, or the possessor of the untold riches of the celestial regions.

Kulaśekhara Ālvār was born in Tiru-ancaikalum or Tiru-Vancikulam, the ancient capital of the Cheras, and passed away at Mannārkōil, near Ambāsamudram in the Tinneveli District. The Ālvār was also known as Kulaśekhara Perumāl, a name which is even now retained by the Kings of Travancore, who are staunch devotees of Śrī Padmanābha. A temple known as Kulaśekhara Ālvār Kōil, built in honour of the Ālvār’s memory, is even now in existence at Mannārkōil and the inscriptions found in the temple show that it has been in existence from before the early years of the 11th Century. When did the Ālvār live? The earliest inscription found in the temple is of 1020 A. C. and in order to have gained the honour of having a temple dedicated to him, the fame of the saint must have, some centuries before the 11th, been established in the land. Again, an inscription of 1088 makes provision for the recital of one of the Ālvār’s poem at Srīrangam. The commendatory verse relating to Perumāl Tiru Moli is by Manakkāl Nambi, the preceptor of Ālevandār, and the disciple of Nathamuni’s disciple, and this fact would suggest that the Ālvār was considerably prior to the 10th century. The Ālvār describes himself as Kolli-Kāvalan, Kuṭal-aṅyakan and Kōṭiṭ-Kōṅ, that is the king of the Chera, Pāṇḍya and Cholā kingdoms.

It cannot be an idle boast, for the Ālvār is incapable of it. When was it possible in South Indian political history for the Chera to have gained ascendency over practically the whole of South India,' He might have
done so before the Pallavas rose to power, that is before the beginning of the 7th Century; after the Pallava ascendancy was over, the Cholas come to power, and their capital is transferred from Köli (Uraiýur) to Tanjore. It has, however, been suggested, especially with the help of a proposed emended reading of a sloka in the Āḻvār's Mukundamālā and of some Sāmskrit poem said to have been composed by a Kerala poet, Vāsudeva, that Kulaśekhara Āḻvār belonged to the beginning of the 9th century. Others again have assigned him to the middle of the 8th century on astronomical grounds, and Dr. Krishnaswāmi Aiyangār would place him in the 9th century. Tradition makes Kulaśekhara Āḻvār younger than Nam Āḻvār by 23 years. There is also a statement found in the records of the Kānchī Kāma-Koṛi-Piṭṭha that the Āḻvār was a younger contemporary of Ujvala Sāṅkara, the 14th in succession from Śrī Sāṅkara in the Kānchīpura Mutt, and the date of Ujvala Sāṅkara is there mentioned as the latter half of the 4th century.

Whatever his position chronologically may be, there is no doubt that as a devotee he stands very high among the Vaiṣṇava saints, as is shown by the fact that alone among the Āḻvārs, he bears the consecrated name of Perumal. His poems are extremely sweet and are full of the fervour and humility of true devotion. In thought, word and deed, his entire life was a dedication to Nārāyaṇa. He was drowned in God-love. The following lines, which are from his earliest poem, depict his great yearning for the Divine vision, and the company of the Lord's devotees.

When will the day arrive, when I may see
With melting heart the shining moon-like face
And lotus eyes of Him, the ocean-hued,
Who on the serpent couch in Rangam lies,
Where blossoms rich in honey shine in groves;
The shrine where Brahma, Hara, Indra, all
The other gods and heavenly maidens throng,
And sages wise, from all illusion free,
From all directions come with flowers sweet
To offer adoration to the Lord!

_Perumal Tiru-Moįį 1, 6._

When shall I see the day, when I in joy
May join the rapturous crowd of devotees
Who throng the holy court-yard of the shrine
Where Ranga facing south in grace reclines,
Lo! From His glowing navel blooms the lotus fair!
He is my Lord! For Him I languish! He has caused
My bracelets to slip off my wrists!

_Nacciyar Tiru Moli_ XI. 2.

The story says that in accordance with her earnest entreaty, Periya Āḻvār took her to Sri Rangam that she might commune with the Lord in that shrine, and behold, when she appeared before the image of the Lord, there arose a glorious light, and she became one with the Divine bride-groom whom she had so ardently sought. Her songs of love are pre-eminently mystical, and their sweetness and feeling cannot be excelled. They afford one of the best examples in Tamil literature of erotic mysticism. They are spirit-songs in which the love and attraction of the human soul for the Divine Bride-groom, the Supreme Lord of the Universe, are expressed in the language of love between man and woman. One poem of hers, in which she tells us of her dream where she was united in wed-lock to the Lord, is even now sung by Sri Vaisnavas at their marriages; and on every morning in the month of “Mārgalī” (December—January), Sri Vaisnavas recite, as part of their daily adoration of the Deity, a verse from her _Tiru-Pāvai_, a poem consisting of 30 verses or stanzas, which sings the praises of Sri Kṛṣṇa. It is a lovely poem where a maiden asks her companions to waken so that they may have the ‘Mārgalī’ bath before dawn, in accordance with approved usage.

Awake, my friends! The cock has crowed. Did you not hear
The blowing of the shining conch-shell in the fane of Gauḍa’s Lord?

Do you not hear the peal reverberant of Hari’s praise?
The saints and seers who keep Him in their hearts Him glorify,
The Lord who on the surface of the waters rests in Yogi’s slumber!
He sucked of yore the demoness’ poisoned breast!
In sport He raised His foot, kicked the false cart, and shattered it to pieces!

Have not the resounding praises of the Lord entered and rejoiced your hearts?

_Awake!_  _Tiru-Pāvai_—6.

According to tradition, Periya Āḻvār is 19 years younger than Kulasēkhara Āḻvār. Periya Āḻvār refers to one Neḍu Māran, King of Madura, who is described as devoted to Viṣṇu. It is hardly possible that this Neḍu Māran can be the Pāṇḍyan King, Ninra Sri Neḍu Māran, the Jaina King
of Madura whom Tiru Jñāna Sambandha, the well-known Saiva Saint converted to Saivism. This King became such a bigoted Saiva that he impaled for their heresy the Jains in his kingdom, and is reckoned among the 63 canonized Saiva saints. The consolations of Vaiṣṇavism could not have been acceptable to such a king. Dr. S. Krishṇaswāmi Aiyangār would identify the Neḍu Māraṇ mentioned in Periya-Ālvār-Tiru-Moli with Māra Varman Avanī Sulāmaṇi, the grandfather of the Saiva Ninra-Sīr-Neḍu Māraṇ. Others, however, have suggested that the Ālvār’s Neḍu Māraṇ should be Śri Māraṇ who died in 862 A.C., the son of Varaguṇa I and father of Varaguṇa II, and the suggestion is based on the fact that according to the Cinnannār plates this Māraṇ had an alias Śri Vallabha, and the Guruparampara tradition says that Periya Ālvār gained a Vallabha Pāṇḍya as his disciple. In the first place, this would make Periya Ālvār very much posterior to Tiru Mangai Ālvār, in utter disregard of the chronological order for which tradition vouches. Secondly, it is highly doubtful if Vallabha, son of Varaguṇa I was a Vaiṣṇava. The Pāṇḍyas generally were Saivas and supporters of Saivism, and Varaguṇa I, the father of Vallabha was a very staunch and devout Saiva, and it is not likely that his son was brought up a Vaiṣṇava. The grandson of Ninra Śri-Neḍu-Māraṇ was Māraṇ alias Rājasimha I who had died before 759 A.C. Nothing is known of his religion, but it is well known from the Madras Museum plates that his son Jātīla was a very devout Vaiṣṇava and perhaps, the father too was a Vaiṣṇava. Can he have been the Ālvār’s Neḍu Māraṇ? He was Pallava Mall’s contemporary, and if Periya Ālvār lived in his time, he would still have flourished before Tiru Mangai Ālvār. But, perhaps, Prof. Krishṇaswāmi Aiyangār’s identification fits in with tradition best.

Tondar-adi-p-podi Ālvār

Tondar-adi-p-podi Ālvār was born of a Brāhmaṇa family. His real name was Vipra Narāyaṇa, but he assumed in self-abasement the name of Tondar-adi-podi, which term means the dust of the feet of devotees. He was a bachelor, and he devoted his life to the service of Śri Ranganātha for whose adornment he used to supply flower garlands which he had himself woven. He led a retired life, away from the distractions and temptations of the world. However temptation did come to him in the form of a courtesan whom he casually met in his flower garden near his lonely residence, and as he had not sufficiently conquered the flesh in him, he fell a victim to her blandishments. By Divine Grace, however, he freed
himself from the defilement, and he purified himself against contamination by the virtue of the water with which he washed the feet of holy men in humility of spirit, and which he imbibed in penitence and in faith. He assumed the name of Tōṇḍar-adi-poḍi, and thereafter he belonged entirely to Śrī Ranganātha. His contribution to the Nālūyira Prabandham consists of Tiru Mālai (the holy garland), a poem of 45 stanzas, and Tiru-palī-elīce (the Lord’s awakening) which has ten stanzas. In his conception, the greatest treasure and the richest possession is devotion to Viṣṇu, which alone sets the mark of respectability and high status on man. He writes:

The devotees of Viṣṇu, though of lowly birth
Doing the most degrading work, are worthy yet
Of reverent obeisance. Alliances
With them to form would on us honour great bestow.
The man who with disrespect treats the devotees
Of Viṣṇu should be deemed as of the lowest caste,
E’en though he be a Brāhmaṇ born and fully versed
In all the Vedas four, and Sāstras six besides!

**Tiru Mālai 42 and 43.**

Tradition places Tōṇḍar-adi-poḍi Ālvār 100 years before Tiru Mangai Ālvār. There is reason to hold, as will be shown presently, that Tiru Mangai Ālvār was not posterior to the first quarter of the 9th century at the latest, and Tōṇḍar-adi-poḍi Ālvār may therefore be provisionally assigned to the 8th century.

**TIRU-PĀṆ ĀLVĀR**

Tiru-Pāṇ-Ālvār is said to have proceeded Tiru Mangai Ālvār by 55 years. Though born of the lowest caste, he is assigned one of the highest places among the saints. Spiritual work has never been gauged in India by the accident of birth. Every saint is conceived by us to be an incarnation of the Deity. It is God-love that leads to sainthood, and God-love does not rest on the cold reason of the philosopher or on the hard, demonstrated facts of the man of science, but upon feeling, upon intuitive and experienced conviction. Often the illumination comes suddenly, with excess of light, and the recipient is literally in ravishment when it comes. And so was it with Tiru Pāṇ-Ālvār. So great was the merit of his devotion to Śrī Ranganatha, and so complete his self-surrender to the service and glorification of the Lord, that the wondering Brāhmaṇas carried him to the Holy Presence, where it is said, he became miraculously
united with Śrī Ranganātha Himself. There is a short poem of 10 stanzas which forms his contribution to the Nālāyira Prabandham, and the following lines are from it.

The heavy Karmic load of my past lives that bound
Me to the earth removed He and made me His slave!
Not that alone! He entered me and did in me reside!
I know not what great tapas I performed to deserve this boon!
It is the gracious Heart alone of Ranganātha
Where mercy’s self eternally resides
That made my humble soul His serf.

Amalanādi-pirān. 5

TIRU MANGAI ĀLVĀR

Tiru Mangai Ālvār is the last of the Vaiṣṇava saints. He was a petty chief and latterly became a highway-man, who was dreaded by all the country round. He fell in love with a lovely maiden named Kumudavalli, but she refused to marry him as he was not a Vaiṣṇava. He got himself duly initiated, and with all the external indications of a Vaiṣṇava complete, he presented himself before her, and renewed his request. She replied that if he would have her, he should, as a condition precedent, feed, with all the due observances of humility, a certain number of Śrī Vaiṣṇavas every day for the period of a year, and receive their blessing. Faint heart never won a fair lady, and Tiru Mangai Mannan was not faint-hearted. He agreed to the test. This was the turning point of his life. From a life of sexuality and lawlessness, his pure love for a woman of his choice reclaimed him, and started him on the path of service and devotion to Nārāyaṇa and his devotees. The development of his soul grew apace. He had visions—he witnessed miracles. The Lord Himself appeared, and taught him the great, mystic mantra of the Vaiṣṇavas, Om namo Nārāyaṇaya—the holy mantra of redemption. He became transformed,—the highway robber had evolved into a saint. The change was miraculous; but such changes have occurred. Mary Magdalen was originally a courtesan, and St. Paul was at first a persecutor. The verses of the first section of the Ālvār’s Periya-Tiru-Moli contain his pathetic confession.

No sciences have I learnt! My mind I set
On pleasures low and gratified my senses five!
Alas poor me! No good thereby did I obtain!
To human life around I was a danger.
Now all is changed! Salvation's path is found!
I learnt and hold fast to the holy name Narayana!

_Periya Tiru Moli_ 1. 1. 8

How withered was my soul! My mind was filled with agony!
I flung me headlong into misery, not knowing how to escape!
How I with zest sought sexual pleasure, running after women fair!
Then saving grace was shown to me! I knew my high estate!
My search is o'er; for I have learnt the holy name Narayana!

_Periya Tiru Moli_ 1. 1.

High birth it grants and riches! Every pain
God's servants feel it utterly removes!
The boon of heaven and earth it gracious gives!
It gives us strength and everything besides!
It helps us more than e'en a mother can!
Bliss it bestows! Such power the Name I have
Discovered hath, the Name Narayana!

_Periya Tiru Moli_ 1. 1. 9

Tiru Mangai Alvar has been given the consecrated name of _Arul Mūri_—the shower of grace—to denote the shower of Divine Grace that descended on him, changing his entire being. He is said to have done a great deal for the cause of Vaishnavism. The temple at Sri Rangam owes much to his munificence. He arranged for the recitation of _Tiru-Vay Moṭi_ at Sri Rangam. He visited many holy places and repaired many shrines. His contribution to the _Nālāyira Prabandham_ consists of (1) _Periya-Tiru-Moli_, (2) _Tiru-Kurumtāṇḍagam_, (3) _Tiru-Neṭum-tāṇḍagam_ (4) _Tiru Eḻu-Kāṭṭirukkai_, (5) _Sriya-Tiru-Madāl_ and (6) _Periya-Tiru-Madāl_, which are said to represent the six _Aṅgar_ supplementing the four Vedas that Nam Alvar's four works are held to represent. The poems are extremely musical and are of the highest value as spiritual songs.

The date of Tiru-Mangai Alvar is capable of being determined with more or less definiteness. Lyrics 8 and 9 of the second section of his _Periya Tiru Moṭi_ make certain unmistakeable references to known events in Pallava history. In the former there is the mention of Vairameghan and in the latter certain battles, such as Manṭai, Nenneli and Karuvur, fought and won by the Pallavas of Kāṇchī are mentioned. Prof. Krishṇaswāmi Aiyangār holds that Vairameghan mentioned by the Alvar is Danti Durga, the Raṣṭrakūṭa King, who bore the name
Vairamegha; and he has assigned to the Ālvār the first half of the 8th century, holding him to be a contemporary of Nandi Varman Pallava Malla. Others, however, hold that Vairameghan of the Ālvār is a Pallava king of Kāṇchī bearing that name, and they attempt to identify him with Dani Varman who, they surmise, had the surname Vairamegha. Dani Varman was the grandson of Nandi Varman Pallava Malla, and he has been referred to the close of the 8th and the beginning of the 9th centuries. My own view, is that Vaira Megha like several other names ending in Megha, was a Pallava name, and it is not improbable that Nandi Varman Pallava Malla himself had that surname or title. The Ālvār mentions the tiger-faced drum of the Pallava Malla, and the battles he mentions have been attempted to be identified with the battles fought by that great Pallava. Provisionally, therefore, Tiru Mangai Ālvār may be regarded as having flourished in the latter part of the 8th century A. C.

**Conclusion**

I must now conclude this paper. I have said enough to show the supreme value the works of the Ālvārs possess in South India. Whether regarded as pure literature or as spirit songs of mystics, making touching and fervent appeals for Divine Grace, the Nālānyira Prabandha and the songs of the Saiva saints contained in the Devāram and the Tiru Vācakam are among the richest heritage of South India. Millions of people find in them satisfaction for the craving of their souls, and such works are of permanent value to humanity.
THE PROBLEM OF BHĀSA

(K. G. Sankar, B.A., B.L.)

Since the discovery and publication in 1912 of the *Svaṭṇa-Vaśavandatta* by the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Gaṇapati Śāstri, Sanskrit scholars have been discussing the authorship of the 13 plays, including the *Svaṭṇa*, which Dr. Gaṇapati Śāstri has published in the *Trivandrum Sanskrit Series* (Nos. 15 to 17, 20 to 22, 26, 39 & 42) and ascribed to the famous dramatist Bhāsa, and there seems no near prospect of their coming to an agreement. The problem involves the following issues:

1. Whether all the plays were composed by the same author;
2. Whether Bhāsa is their author, and, if so, whether the plays have come down to us intact;
3. The identity and date of Bhāsa.

The problem has been greatly complicated by not keeping these issues distinct. I shall, therefore, attempt to focus all the evidence available on each issue, and thereby enable my readers to judge for themselves, if my conclusions seem to be unsupported, wholly or in part, by the evidence adduced.

Common authorship of (1) Svaṭṇa, (2) Pratijñā, (3) Abhiṣeka, (4) Pancharātra, (5) Dūta-vākyas, (6) Bālacharita, and (7) Avimāraka may be inferred from their identical, or almost identical Bharata-vākyas, referring to a Rājasimha, who was the sole ruler of the country bounded by the Himalaya, the Vindhya, and the two seas. The Svaṭṇa (vi. 4) and the Abhiṣeka (iv. 7) moreover have in common the line शस्त्रसीति हदं परिपुरुषति से। The Pratijñā (ii. 7) and the Abhiṣeka (vi. 23) have likewise the words भर्तर्षिका तदवरं मथ in common. But for the other plays (1) Chārudatta, (2) Pratimā, (3) Madhyama, (4) Karṇabṛha, (5) Dūta-Ghaṭotkacha; and (6) Īru-bhanga, the only ground for inferring their common authorship with the Svaṭṇa is that they have certain structural features in common. They all, except the Chārudatta, open with the words ना.
followed by the *mangala-ikā*, and use the word *sthāpanā* in place of *prastāvanā*. None of them name the author or praise his work, as is usual with Sanskrit plays. They indicate the chief *dramatis personae* in the *mangala-ikā*, and they have in common the same opening speech of the *Sūtra-dhāra* (stage-manager), i.e., केवल विकल्पनाय विकल्पनाय मिलते विकल्पनाय विकल्पनाय मिलते. तच्छां प्रस्तावित. But all or some of these features are found in other dramas known to be of different authorship, e.g., the *Matta-vilāsā* (Mahendra-Vikrama Varman), the *Ātcharya-Chūdayāni* (Saktibhadra), the *Tāpati-Samvaraya* and *Subhadrā-Dhananjaya* (Kulaśekhara), the *Ubhayābhīsārikā* (Vararuchi), *Dhūrta-vīta-samvāda* (Īśāradatta), *Padma-Prabhritaka*, *Sūdraka*, and *Pada-ṭāditaka* (Śyāmilaka), and in the South Indian manuscripts of even the *Sakuntalā* and *Vikramorvāsiya* (Kālidāsa), the *Mudrā-Rabhasa* (Viśkhadatta) and the *Nāgānanda* (Śrī Harṣa). The common authorship, therefore, of the *Chārudatta* and other plays with the *Swāpna* is by no means certain; and, except the *Chārudatta*, neither are they anywhere referred to in *alankāra* works. On the other hand, Malabār stage tradition perhaps ascribe the *Vichchhinnā-bhīṣeka* (the first Act of the *Pratimā*) to the Kērala king Bhāskara Ravivarman (1073-1131 A.C.). Scholars who attempt to determine the date of the *Pratimā* from its reference to मानने तत्त्वेऽभ्रह्मवं विवेक्षामाही, मानिवं भविष्यवाद, मेधातिवेष्ये, वायादेश्वर्यां and *prāchāntā* भायित्वभायित्व have mistaken its drift altogether. The reference is not to specific treatises, but to the sciences and their mythical founders Manu (*Dharma*), Mahēśvara (*Vāga*), Brihspati (*Artha*), Medhāti-Gautama (*Nyāya*), and Prachētās (*Srāddhā Kalpa*).

Accepting the common authorship of the *Swāpna* group, the question remains as to whether they can be ascribed to Bhāsa. Rājaśekhara in Jalhana’s *Sūkti-muktāvali* (c. 1250 A.C.), refers to Bhāsa’s *Swāpna* as follows:—

आयुष्मानसंग्रहश्यप्रवचनम्।

तत्रायं वै विद्यापीतोऽवह।

This verse refers to the tradition as to a contest between Vyūsa and Bhāsa, in which the critics chose the fire-test, and threw their works into the fire. The fire left unburnt the
The Problem of Bhāsa

Bhārata, and, among Bhāsa's dramas, the Svāpna alone. The tradition has evidently no chronological significance, but only embodies the popular opinion that the Svāpna at least, among Bhāsa's works, was equal in merit to the Bhārata. The same tradition is recorded in a verse of Jayanātha also of the 12th century A.C. (Prithivirāja-charita—I, 3), which has greatly exercised the minds of the commentator Jñanarāja (15th cent. A.C.) and Dr. Gaṇapati Sāstri as to its correct interpretation. But the difficulty is due only to the faulty reading and may easily be removed by emending to Svāmānā and pārthavā to bhārata. The verse would then read मात्र वास्तव खलु विनिवर्तन सीतालानात् भारतवच्छोच and may be translated as follows:—

Even He, the spreading Fire, has from His mouth,
Like Bhārata, Bhāsa'a work, indeed, released.

Rāmachandra and Guṇachandra also of the 12th cent. A.C., in their Nāṭya darpana, refer to the Svāpna as Bhāsa's work (यथा मानक्रेन स्मरणायद्वै). The existence of several plays of the same name, even in early times, is no doubt possible, as in the case of the Kunda-māla (which, as Mr. A. R. Sarasvati points out, was the name of two different plays), and the Bāla charita (the common name, as Dr. Gaṇapati Sāstri himself points out, of two different plays, one dealing with Rāma's and the other with Krṣṇa's early life). But none of the many authors, who refer to the Svāpna, seem to be aware of a second play of the same name. Dr. Sylvain Levi, no doubt, argues from the mention of the author's name by Rāmachandra and Guṇachandra, that their intention must have been to distinguish Bhāsa's play from another of the same name. But, as the same authors refer to other works also, including the Mrchchhakatika, by their author's names, the inference is not a necessary one. We must, therefore, conclude, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that there was only one Svāpna, and unless there is something repugnant in the references mentioned, we must identify the extant Svāpna with Bhāsa's famous work, as all scholars eastern and western, the Pishāroṭis alone excepted, agree that its literary merits are fully worthy of even Bhāsa's authorship.
The *prima facie* objection to the authenticity of these plays would be that none of the ten stanzas found quoted from Bhāsa in the Sanskrit anthologies, *Subhāshītāvalī* (Nos. 1286, 1353, 1619, 1628, 1821, 1994), *Sārngadhara-paddhati* (Nos. 3292, 3330), and the *Harihārāvalī* (Peterson’s Second Report—p. 58; *J. R. A. S.* 1891 pp. 331, 332), is found in these plays. But these might have been taken from other undiscovered works of Bhāsa, or, what is more probable, the anthologists might have been mistaken in ascribing them to Bhāsa. They are, indeed, by no means renowned for their accuracy. For instance, the 7th *ūloka* of the *Matta-vilāsa* is mistakenly ascribed to Bhāsa by Somadeva in his *Yaśāstitaka*. One of the verses ascribed to Bhāsa is said to be Lakshmīdhara’s in *Kapindra-vachana-samuchchaya* (Thomas, Ed. p. 163). None of the verses ascribed to Āsvaghoṣa in the *Subhāshītāvalī* (Peterson, Ed. 8, 528, 529, 3100, 3142) is found in the *Buddha-charita*. The famous verse iscribed variously to Daṇḍin (by Pratihāra Induśa), Vikramāditya (by Vallabhadeva), jointly to Vikramāditya and Mṛṇṭha (by Sārngadharā), and to Śūdraka (by the *Kṛṣṇa-prakāśa* commentators). The force of this objection is not, therefore, sufficient to discredit Bhāsa’s authorship of these plays, all the more so because one verse from the *Avimāraka* (i, 12) is actually found quoted from memory in the *Sārngadhara-Paddhati* (st. 1805).

The references in Sanskrit literature to Bhāsa and his works may now be examined to see if they are consistent with the ascription of these plays to Bhāsa.

(1) The earliest is found in the *Mālavikāgnimitra*, where, in the prologue, Kālidāsa refers to Bhāsa as an already famous dramatist. But the reference has no bearing on the authenticity of these plays.

(2) Bāṇa (c. 620 A.C.) refers to the famous plays of Bhāsa, (i) begun by the *Sūtra dhāra*, (ii) with many roles, and (iii) including episodes (*Harṣa-charita*—introd. st. 75). These characteristics are, in common with several other Sanskrit plays, found in these plays also. For the last, the episode of Padmāvatī’s hand being solicited for Pradyota’s son (*Svapna*, ii) may be cited as an example. The humour for
which, according to Jayadēva of c. 1200 A.C. (Prasanna-Raghava), Bhasa is famed is also abundant in the Pratijñā, the Bāla-charita, and the Avīmāraka.

(3) Bhāmaha, who quotes Dharmakīrti’s Nyāya-bindu (iii. 138, 140) in connection with his definition of dushkāna and jātis (v. 28, 29), and is himself dissented from by Bhaṭṭi (xxii. 34) in regard to kāvyas which can be understood only with the aid of commentaries (ii. 20), and therefore must have lived in c. 650 A.C., illustrates nyāya virūḍha by referring in detail to the defects in the plot of the Pratijñā, though not by name (iv. 40-47), and quotes the passage चन्द्र नम्म भ्रताहिनी चन्द्र नम पिता चन्द्र नम मुली (Pratijñā with comm.-1919-p. 25), slightly adapting it however to suit the metre (iv. 44). Here, as elsewhere, I quote the Prākrit passages, for convenience, only by their Sanskrit versions.

(4) Vāmana, the mantri of Jayāpiṇa (Rāja-tarangini iv. 497), King of Kāmīr (779–813 A.C.) quotes a verse (iv. 3. 25), found in the extant Saopna (iv. 7), with only such slight variations as quoting from memory may involve, e.g., चन्द्रय for शक्ति and हर्ज for मुली.

(5) Abhinavagupta (c. 1000 A.C.), in his commentary on the Bharata-nāṭya-lāstra (i.), cites Saopna for an example of play (kṛiḍā), evidently referring to the ball-play in act ii, and in ch ix, he mentions Bhīma’s Pratijñā Chāṇakya and Saopna-Daśakī, also referred to by Rājaśekhara (c. 900 A.C.) and named evidently in imitation of Bhasa’s Pratijñā and Saopna. In the Dhanvantarī-lochana (p. 102), the same Abhinavagupta quotes from “the drama named Saopna-Vāsavadatta” a verse, which is not found in the extant Saopna. Dr. Gaṇapati Sastri contends that it can have no place either in the extant Saopna, as it refers to love at first sight, for which there is no scope in the extant Saopna, Vāsavadatta having been already married and Padmāvatī being married only for political reasons. If his view is correct, we would have to discredit Bhasa’s authorship of the extant Saopna, as it is not at all likely that such an authority on poetry and the drama as Abhinavagupta was mistaken in ascribing the verse to the Saopna. But it may well refer to the dream and its reviving Udayana’s love for Vāsavadatta, and a suitable
context is not difficult to find. In the prelude to the 6th Act, we are informed that the viṇā Ghoshavati, with which Udayana had taught Vāsavadattā is accidentally recovered and that seeing it, he laments, "Thee have I seen, but where is she to whom thou wert dear?" Then enters the king addressing the viṇā. Here I propose to insert the lost verse, as indicated by the rectangular brackets.

(ततः प्रविष्टति राजा विद्युषक)}

राजा—[ सचिवपञ्चकपां नवर्मार्ग सदयतद्वेषन्]

(बहाषा सा प्रविष्टा चूढ़ेरूपें मे भूपनण्या च)

(विशेषयं च दीपवती विशेषयका च)

प्रशस्तारुतिनिः! कर्तु न देवा: सलिनपल्लि अयन्वयां च सुमा।

विविधवत्तातिविचित्रैदम्पः प्रतिरुत्त्वमपर्यं विशालवत्तवादम्।

Translation

(Then enters the king, also the Vidūṣaka)

The king—[Bursting the door of eyelids sealed by force of her resistless form,

She has my heart’s home rushed into through portals of my eyes, my queen.

(Sighs, and gazes at Ghoshavatī)]

How didst thou, sweet-toned, who had slept on my fair lady’s lap and breasts,

Now live in wood-lands dire, thy frame fouled by the swarm of birds on wing?

It will thus be seen that the verse quoted by Abhinavagupta (and Hemachandra—1088 to 1172. A. C.—also in Kavyānusāsana p. 21) might have dropped out in copying, or, more probably, purposely omitted in deference to his criticism that packed metaphors were out of place in such a context. This reference therefore is no reason for discrediting Bhāsa’s authorship of the extant Svāpna.

vi—Bhōja

6. Bhōja (c. 1000 to 1055 A.C.) in his Sringāra-prakāśa (xii), gives in detail the plot of the 5th Act of the Svāpna, referring to it by name, and deriving its name from the dream which forms the pivot of the play. He says indeed that the king goes to Samudragrīha to see Padmāvatī, who is reported to be unwell, but, not finding her there, goes to sleep in her bed; and,
dreaming of Vāsavadattā, sees her in fact, and sleeping talks to her. Bhōja’s evidence, therefore, is entirely in favour of Bhasa’s authorship of the extant Svapna. In the same work, the Avimāraka also is mentioned.

7. Sarvananda, in his Amarakośa-ṭikāsarvasa (1159 A.C.) apparently says that the Svapna furnishes an example of kāma-śringāra, and is concerned with Vāsavadattā’s, and not, as in the extant Svapna, Padmāvatī’s, marriage (Trivandrum Ed.—p. 147). The passage runs as follows:—

But Bhōja, and, as will be seen presently, Śāradātanaya and Śāgaranandin also concur in making Padmāvatī’s marriage the theme of the Svapna. Besides, if Svapna should exemplify kāma-śringāra, no illustration would be left for artha-śringāra, though there were at least two plays that Sarvananda could have cited as examples thereof, the extant Svapna and the Tāpasa-Vatsarāja, with almost the same plot, cited in so early a work as the Lōchana of c. 1000 A.C. (p. 152). The correct reading must therefore be that śravaṇabandhī should come after viśeṣa; instead of after viśeṣa, and the mistake should have occurred in copying. The corrected text would imply that in the Svapna Udayana married Padmāvatī to enable him to recover his kingdom, and this is what we find in the extant play. But then kāma-śringāra would have no example, and the reason therefor would be that it needed no examples, being the common theme of most Sanskrit plays.

8. Śāradātanaya of the 12th cent. A.C., in his Bhaṣa- prakāśa (vi), illustrates prāśaṭānta-nāṭaka by discussing in detail the entire plot of the Svapna. Vāsavadattā was separated from the king and entrusted to Padmāvatī; the king, seeing a peculiar mark on Padmāvatī’s forehead, found that Vāsavadattā was alive, and passionately called on her by name, saying to her ēkaśvabhūṣi, k ṛṣita etc.: then, finding Ghoshavatī, he seeks for Vāsavadattā, and, addressing the viṇā, laments that its sight has revived his dormant yearning for her to whom the viṇā was dear, quoting in this connection the verse viśeṣaḥ: found in the extant Svapna (vi. 3); and the play ends without.
such words as निः ते १०४: प्रिये कुँला (what more shall I do to please thee?) It is evident that this analysis follows the extant Svapna closely; but in the extant play, the king’s discovery of Vásavadattā’s existence from the mark on Padmāvatī’s forehead is not mentioned, and the words एवः वासवदत्तेः and क वासि are not spoken by the king. Dr. Gaṇapati Sāstrī has shown that, after the verse मध्याय (v.8), we should read

किष्क, पद्मावत्या कूलं तील्य विशेषकनिमुद्धितम्

श्रीतप्तमिके चेत्त। शालमेव पुरा महा।

(Moreover, Once on Padmāvatī’s face I did a beauty mark unique observe,
And knew at once alive was she, Avanti’s princess, my beloved.)

It will be seen that only the words मूलभुगा मध्या of Saṇḍātanaya need to be changed to एव पुरा मध्या, and this change Saṇḍātanaya might have made to suit his context. The reason for the omission of this verse in the extant play seems to be that the copyist was a scholar, with a nice taste, who perhaps thought that it would be better, if the knowledge of Vāsavadattā’s existence came to Udayana with a shock for the first time in the dream scene, and that, if Udayana had already known she was alive, it was strange he should have said nothing about it even to his confidant Vasantaka, before the dream-scene confirmed his impression. Such omissions are usual in the Malabār manuscripts of even the Saṅkuntalā and the Mṛgadhūta, and for the same reasons. For instance, the verses न खमु and धर्माधीभि of the Saṅkuntalā (i) are not found in the Srīrangam edition, based on Malabār manuscripts, and the same edition of the Mṛgadhūta based on the commentary of the Malabār scholar Pṛṇa-Sarvasvati omits as many as ten verses, which formed part of the poem so early as c. 800 A. C., when Jinasēṇa wrote his Pārśvābhudhyadaya.

The words एवः वासवदत्तेः (Go, Vāsavadattā) said to have been used by the king must have existed only in Saṇḍātanaya’s bad memory, as they are quite out of place in the dream-scene, as the king would, on the contrary, want to detain Vāsavadattā, and as they conflict with the words क वासि, (where art thou going?) also said to have been used by the
king. It is only natural therefore that we do not find them in the extant play. The words क वाचि, on the other hand, find a proper place between the stage-direction निःशीलम् and the king’s speech बालबद्धे! तिन्द्र तिन्द्र (Svapna with comm. 1924. p. 111), and were probably omitted because, when Vāsavadatta was slipping out, it would be more natural for the king, who had risen in haste, to say ‘stop! stop!’ than the leisurely ‘where art thou going?’ Saradānaya’s evidence therefore shows that Bhāsa’s Svapna has come down to us substantially intact, with only such omissions as were dictated by an over-nice critical taste.

(9) Rāmachandra and Guṇachandra of the 12th century A. C. quote from the Svapna by both the author’s and the play’s names, a verse पादाकालिन not found in the extant play, but which Dr. Gaṇapati Sāstri has inserted in a suitable context (p. 76). The king says in this verse that some lady must have been sitting on the slab, but, seeing him coming, must have slipped away, because the flowers seemed trodden under-foot, and the slab was warm. This verse was probably omitted for the reason that it would be natural for the king and his friend to exchange confidences, as they do immediately, only when they are quite unsuspicous of the possible presence of a third person who might overhear their conversation.

(10) Sāgaranandin, in his Nāṭaka-lakṣaṇa-ratna-kōla, quotes the end of the prologue of the Svapna as follows:—

यथा सत्रास्वद्धे, नेप्ते मुख्येषां: उदारणी खुला पातिति चेष्वे कर्ष तपोभध्याभारणम्। विनोक्क्ष कर्ष मनो गौमस्तानांको बहुराजये राजान्याल्यां कृतुकाम: पद्मावतीविनोक्क्षमेव धति। उदारा शास्त्रीय पूर्वाक्षक्रमणयोऽृत्तत्त्वायः नाभविष्युच्य मृत्रित्तिं कष्टिं प्रवैगावातिशयः।

Now because the phrasing thereof differs materially from the corresponding passage of the extant play (p. 6), Dr. Sylvain Levi has argued that the extant play is only an adaptation of Bhāsa’s work. Dr. Gaṇapati Sāstri, on the other hand, points out that the use of the unpoeitic पद्मावतीयजन in place of the usual पद्मावतीजन indicates that Sāgaranandin was only paraphrasing in his own words and in the indirect form the poetic speech of the Sūtra-dhāra found in the extant play. This inference is confirmed by the use of the words नेप्ते उदारणी खुला and the placing of नेप्ते (behind the scenes) before
Moreover, in the passage as quoted by Sāgaraṇandin, we are directly informed, before the play begins, that Vaugandharāyaṇa is desirous of recovering Vatsarāja's kingdom for him, while in the extant play, this information is more dramatically left to be gathered by the audience from the dialogues of the first Act. Dr. Thomas notes further that the utsāraṇā (order to move on) would not be addressed specifically to one individual Vaugandharāyaṇa alone, as Sāgaraṇandin apparently states, and that the use of the word pathati (lit. repeats) for remarks is unusual. I may add that the words pathati is in dramas used only before a verse, and that therefore the remarks of the Sūtra-dhāraṇa should have been expressed only in verse, as in the extant play. We must therefore conclude that Sāgaraṇandin was only quoting from a bad memory, and not directly from the Svāpaṇa, and that therefore his evidence, so far as it goes, only confirms Bhāsa's authorship of the extant play.

(11) Lastly, Sōma-prabha, in his Prākrit Kumarāpāla-pratibodha (1185 A. C.) narrates the story of Udayana, substantially as it is found in the Pratijnā, and quotes a verse therefrom (iii-9) in the original Sanskrit.

We may therefore conclude that the literary references are, so far as they go, quite consistent with Bhāsa's authorship of the published plays, and, in some cases, they are entirely in favour of such authorship, and that therefore Bhāsa was in fact the author of these plays.

I shall now attempt to fix the date of Bhāsa. It is certain that he must have lived before c. 500 A. C. as Kālidāsa refers to him as a famous dramatist, and Kālidāsa himself lived not later than the first half of the 6th cent. A. C. Dr. Gaṇapati Sāstrī argues indeed that, from the use of the words purāṇa (old) and prathita-yāsah (far-famed) in relation to Bhāsa, we must infer that Bhāsa lived long before Kālidāsa. This is scarcely necessary, as purāṇa is only used in opposition to nava (new) and vartamāna (living), and therefore properly applies to all works which are not new, or whose authors are dead. Kālidāsa's work is moreover said to supersede (atikramya) the works of Bhāsa and others, and such works must therefore be in present possession
of the stage, instead of having been long consigned to the oblivion of the shelves. Kālidāsa indeed pleads for a trial of his nascent genius against the established fame of still living forces and not of forgotten classics. Here are his own words in their English rendering:

Not all is good that is merely old, nor poem new unfit to hear.

The wise discerning only choose, but fools by others blind are led.

The lower limit of Bhāsa’s date is therefore only c. 500 A.C. But scholars are by no means agreed as to the upper limit of Bhāsa’s date.

(1) Dr. Gaṇapati Sāstrī contends that Bhāsa’s grammar is pre-Pāṇinian and his dramaturgy pre-Bharatan, on the grounds that he does not conform to the rules of Pāṇini, and that the Bāla-charita and the Abhisheka represent a battle and a death on the stage, thereby infringing Bharata’s rules, and that therefore Bhāsa must have lived before c. 600 B.C. But it is a big assumption that all dramatists necessarily observed the rules of Pāṇini and Bharata, in preference to popular usage, and that grammar and dramaturgy never outgrew their bounds. The admittedly later Kālidāsa too likewise infringes Pāṇini’s rules (Kumāra i. 34; Megha-Pāthak Ed.-st 8, 23, 38, 51, 63, 87; Raghu ii. 33; v. 27; ix. 61; xii. 19; xiii. 36; xvi. 86), and the Bhāgas of Vararuchi and others break at least that rule of Bharata (V. 154), which requires the mention of the author’s name in the prologue. The Nāgānanda represents death, and the Viddhāsālahānijīka (c. 900 A.C.) marriage and sleep on the stage. Bhāsa’s plays moreover all refer to the closing benediction by the name of Bharata-vākyā, and the Avimāraka is aware of a Nātya-sāstra (ii). The use of the word Nātya-sāstra indeed indicates that Bhāsa refers, not to the Naṭa-sūtras, known to Pāṇini (iv. 3, 110, 111), but to Bharata. Pāṇini and Bharata therefore do not enable us to fix the limits of Bhāsa’s date.

(2) The Pratijnā (iii) mentions a Srāmaṇaka who is addressed as Bhagavan, and the Avimāraka (v) says that a Srāmaṇaka is known by his chīvara (rag) and uses Rahtāpata as a synonym for Srāmaṇaka. The word Srāmaṇa may no
doubt apply to both Hindu and Buddhist monks, but the chivara, and the titles Bhagavan and Raktapaṭa are characteristic only of Buddhist monks. Bhāsa must therefore have lived after Buddha founded his order of monks in c. 590 B.C. at the earliest.

(3) Pāpāvatī’s brother Darśaka is said in the Svāpna (p. 14) to have been the king of Rājagrha, and must therefore have been the Darśaka, son of Ajātaśatru of the Purāṇas, who ascended the throne in c. 520 B.C. at the earliest. Moreover, the Buddhist Śūta-nipāta and other early sūtras clearly make Udayana Vatsarāja and Chaṇḍa Pradyotā of Ujjain contemporaries of Buddha and of Darśaka’s father Ajātaśatru. We must, therefore infer, not that there was an earlier Darśaka, who was Pradyotā’s contemporary, but that the Purāṇas mistakenly treat the collateral Pradyotās of Ujjain and Sāśunākas of Magadha as successive dynasties of Magadha. Bhāsa therefore could not have lived before c. 520 B.C.

4. One verse नवे शरावं is common to Kauṭilya (x. 3) and the Pratijñā (iv. 3), and Dr. Gaṇapatī Sāstrī contends that Kauṭilya quotes from the Pratijñā, and that this fact is indicated by Kauṭilya’s own words चयं देवी मयेः introducing the verse. But Kauṭilya introduces his own verses also by similar words तथ एतनं भवति (vii. 6, 9), and it is as likely that the Pratijñā, in accordance with Kauṭilya’s instructions, cites this verse, supplied by Kauṭilya himself, to inspire soldiers on the eve of war with enthusiasm, as that Kauṭilya quotes the Pratijñā as his authority for the procedure he advises, because the context in both is the same. Yaugandharāyaṇa, indeed, himself admits that all his plans and courses were based on the Artha-sāstra (iv. 13). The last pada वी भूतिपिष्ठयं बने न युधे is quoted by Vāmana (v. 2.28) as an instance of faulty usage, and Dr. Gaṇapatī Sāstrī argues that it must therefore have been taken from a kāvyā. The inference is not a necessary one, but admitting it, it would only follow that Vāmana took it from the Pratijñā, and not that the Pratijñā itself was not quoting Kauṭilya. We may therefore infer that Bhāsa, in all probability, lived after Kauṭilya of c. 300 B.C. unless indeed the extant Kauṭilya is not an authentic work.
5. Patanjali (c. 150 B.C.), in his encyclopaedic Mahābhāṣya, which refers to almost everything known in his time, mentions two plays named Kamsa-vadha and Bali-bandha (iii. 1.26), and an akhyāyikā named Vāsamandattā (iv. 2.60; iv. 3.87), but finds nothing to say of Bhāsa’s plays, not even of the Svapna. Bhāsa must therefore have lived after c. 150 B.C.

6. Aśvaghōsa and Bhāsa have each one verse, not only embodying the same ideas, but almost identical in expression. The only difference is that Aśvaghōsa’s verse is free and direct, while Bhāsa’s is constrained and expressed in the passive voice, as may be seen from the verses themselves quoted below for comparison.

(Pratijñā i. 18),

Only the later author would have been forced to alter the natural construction of the verse, and therefore Bhāsa must have been the later author. This inference is perhaps confirmed by the fact that Aśvaghōsa’s Prākrit is more archaic than that of Bhāsa, but any inference from a comparison of Prākrits is vitiated by two factors: (i) the manuscripts of Aśvaghōsa’s plays are very ancient and come to us from very near his own time, while those of Bhāsa’s are quite recent, and the tendency of copyists is to modernise the Prākrit passages; (ii) but the Prākrit of Malabār manuscripts of even later plays retains archaic forms. These two factors neutralise each other somewhat, and, since Bhāsa’s plays are extant in only Malabār manuscripts, in his case an inference from a comparison of Prākrits may not be far wrong, though caution may still be needful. But, even dropping the argument from the Prākrits, we may reasonably conclude that Bhāsa was the later author. Now Aśvaghōsa was the spiritual Guru of Kaniṣka (c. 120 A.C.), according to the Samyuktā-ratna-piṭaka and Dharma-piṭaka-nidāna translated into Chinese in 472 A.C. (Bunyio Nanjio: Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka—
Bhāsa could not have therefore lived before c. 150 A.C. Thus he lived between c. 150 and c. 500 A.C.

To determine the date of Bhāsa more definitely, it is necessary to ascertain his identity. The clue to this is furnished by a comparison of the Charudatta with the Mrchchhakaṭīka. Assuming Bhāsa's authorship of the Charudatta, most scholars are of opinion that the Mrchchhakaṭīka is only an expanded version of the Charudatta. But I have shown that there is no reason to infer the common authorship of the Charudatta and the Svapna. The question of indebtedness as between the Charudatta and the Mrchchhakaṭīka has therefore to be determined independently.

In the first place, it should be noted that the extant Charudatta is incomplete.

(1) It is wanting in both the mangala-llōka and the Bharata-vākyā;

(2) The love-story of Vasantaśena makes no progress in the extant play;

(3) In the 4th Act, Vasantaśena expresses her intention of returning Charudatta's necklace, and even the title Durdina of the next Act, as it is found in Mrchchhakaṭīka (v), is indicated in her maid's penultimate speech; but in the extant play Vasantaśena's intention remains unfulfilled;

(4) Both Samvāhaka (ii) and Sajjalaka (iv. 7) desire to prove their gratitude to Vasantaśena for her timely help to them, but they are given no opportunity of doing so;

(5) Sakāra threatens Charudatta and Vasantaśena with dire consequences, the one for interfering with his intrigue, and the other for rejecting his overtures; but it is not shown what shape his mischief will assume, and how it will be counteracted;

(6) Charudatta's reflection in the 1st Act (i. 6) that even the sins of others are visited on the heads of the poor, does not become significant and prophetic in the extant play, as it does in the Mrchchhakaṭīka, where Charudatta is falsely accused of murdering Vasantaśena for the sake of her jewels;

(7) Similarly Sajjalaka's prayer (iv. 7), that the evil which the foes of Charudatta and Vasantaśena may intend them
should react on themselves, does not become prophetic of Sakāra being 'hoisted with his own petard' as in the Mr̥chhkhāṣṭika. It is therefore clear that the Chārudatta, as it is, is incomplete.

But the references to the secondary plot of Āryaka's conspiracy, found in the 2nd and 4th Acts of the Mr̥chchhāṣṭika, have no counterpart in the Chārudatta, and this secondary plot could not have therefore formed part of the intended sequel. Both the manuscripts moreover of the extant Chārudatta alike end with the 4th Act, and one of them has the colophon धर्मसत् जातदनम् (Chārudatta ended).

We must therefore conclude that, if the extant Chārudatta is incomplete, it is because the author himself left it so for some reason or other. If therefore Chārudatta was the original work, Śudraka must be credited with the original authorship of at least six Acts, and an author capable of composing the larger and more interesting portion of the Mr̥chchhāṣṭika may reasonably be credited with the authorship of the whole.

Other considerations also lead to the same conclusion.

(1) Vāmana (c. 800 A.D.) quotes the verse गाूळ विभ: (v. i. 3.) found in both the Mr̥chchhāṣṭika (i. 9) and the Chārudatta (i. 2). But his reading follows neither absolutely, but is a blend of both. For instance, he follows the Mr̥chchhāṣṭika in reading विभुमृङ्ग: and the Chārudatta in reading गाूळ विभौङ्ग: and तापवेश पुर्वबिल्निवसवाल: राजु. He seems therefore to have been aware of both the versions and to be quoting from memory. This inference is confirmed by the fact that he quotes the passage असन औ नाम सोवध्यार्वः राज्य (iv. 3. 23), which seems a misquotation of दानियः खलु नाम मनविनः: पुष्पम सोवध्याः राज्य found only in the Chārudatta (i), and also the passage दूरुः औ नाम पुष्पापास्निवसवाल राज्य (iv. 3. 23) which is found only in the Mr̥chchhāṣṭika (ii). But Vāmana evidently had a great regard for Śudraka, whose work, he says, abounds in the śīṣka guṇa (iii. 2. 4), and therefore Śudraka could not have been a mere plagiarist. In the opinion of Vāmana therefore Śudraka was the original author, and Chārudatta only an abridged version. Later authors like Dhananjaya (c. 1000 A.D.) moreover mention with respect only the Mr̥chchhāṣṭika (Dhaka-rūpaka—pp. 29, 45.)
59 and 90), and ignore the Chārūdatta altogether; and, what is more significant, Dhananjaya refers to the gamblers among the roles of the Mṛchchhākāṭika, and these have no counterpart in the Chārūdatta.

2. The humour (hāsa) for which Jayadēva says Bhāsa was famed, is found only in the Mṛchchhākāṭika (ii), as the Chārūdatta has omitted the entire scene of the gamblers’ brawl, evidently deeming it fit only to “tickle the groundlings”. One characteristic moreover of Bhāsa’s dramas, that they should include episodes, is satisfied only by the Mṛchchhākāṭika, as the Chārūdatta has wiped out all traces of Āryaka’s conspiracy. Of the two therefore, Mṛchchhākāṭika, is more likely to have been Bhāsa’s work, than the Chārūdatta.

3. The scientific thief Sarvilaka of the Mṛchchhākāṭika invokes in his labours the aid of Kārtikeya, the god of thieves, and of their masters Kanakaśakti, Dēvavrata, Bhaskaranandi and Yōgācārya (iii). But his double Sajjalaka of the Chārūdatta invokes the aid, not of these extinct fossils, but of the latest and greatest of the masters Kharapaṭa (iii). Now Kharapaṭa was one of the names of Mūladeva, as Sivarāma informs us, on the authority of a Kōla, in his commentary on Subandhu’s Vasavadatta, and Mūladeva is the hero of Sūdraka’s Padma-prabhirataka, and was a courtier of Vikramāditya, king of Ujjain (Kathāsaritsagara c. 1070 A. C. tarangas 89 & 124). Kharapaṭa is said in the Matta-vilāsa (p. 15) to have composed a śāstra on thieving. The Chārūdatta, therefore, which betrays a more up-to-date knowledge of the science of thieving must be the later and more improved version of the Mṛchchhākāṭika.

4. But the most decisive argument for this conclusion is to be found in the references to the Sākya Sramaṇakas (Buddhist monks) in the Mṛchchhākāṭika and the Chārūdatta. In the Mṛchchhākāṭika, the Samoṭhaka is said to have become a Sākya Sramaṇaka as a sign of moral reformation (ii). He later on proves the sincerity of his reformation by helping Vasantaśēna in the time of her need, and scrupulously observes Buddha’s sexual prohibitions by delicately raising her, not with his hand, but by a creeper, and gives expression to the Buddhist faith that bliss is for him alone, who is restrained
in hand, mouth and senses (viii). His good services are in
the end rewarded by his being made chief of all the vihāras (x).
It is thus clear that Buddhism was held in honour, when the
 Mukhānakāśika was composed. The Čārūdatā, on the other
hand, mentions the Buddhist monks (Sākya Śramaṇakas) only to defame them as being sleepless in the pursuit of
women (iii), and evidently thinking the life of a Buddhist
monk to be too bad a fate for a good man like the Santahaka,
makes him only a non-Buddhist pariorāt (ii). When the
 Čārūdatā was composed, therefore, Buddhism had so far
deteriorated that Buddhist monks were suspected of sensuality
and therefore despised and disliked. This change in the
popular attitude towards Buddhism was not sudden, but the
effect of centuries. Fa-hien, who visited India in 399 to
414 A. C., found Buddhism prosperous, but beginning to decline.
In the Mādhūrā-Rākṣasa, of the 6th cent. A. C. (vii. 5),
composed by a Hindu author, the conduct of Chandanaḍāsa, in
sacrificing his life for his friend Rākṣasa is said to have
transcended the nobility of even the Buddhas. The theme of
the Nāgānanda, likewise the work of a Hindu Śrī Harsha, is
the noble self-sacrifice of Jīmūtavāhana Bōdhisattva, Bāna
(c. 620 A. C.), also a Hindu, speaks in terms of praise of
Buddha, Dharma and Samgha, Buddhist teachings, rules and
philosophy, Avalokiteśvara, Raktapaṭhas (Buddhist monks),
Upāsakas, Bōdhisattva Jātakas, chaityas, śīlas, ahuṃsā, and
abstinence from meat-eating (Harsha-charita. Nirṛtaya-śūgar
Ed. pp. 236—238; Kādambā. Peterson’s Ed. p. 208); and
even at the end of the 7th cent. A. C. the Hindu Māgha says
that wise men of their own accord honour the words of
Tathāgata (Śīlapāla-vadha; kavi-vamsa-varṇana—st. 2).
But already the tide had begun to turn. Huen Tsang, who
visited India in 629 to 645 A. C. found Buddhism flourishing
only where it was supported by powerful kings. The Pailava
Mahendravarman of the same period represents Buddhism,
in his Matta-vilāsa, as an object of popular ridicule. Therein
a Kapālīsa says that Buddha was a greater authority on thieving
than Kharapaṭha himself, in that he has compiled his Tripiṭakas,
stealing ideas from the Vedānta and the Mahābhārata (p. 15).
What is worse, the Sākyabhīka, himself, an inoffensive and
kindly person, is represented to have understood Buddha's teaching so little, as to think Buddha has permitted luxurious living, meat and cool drinks, and regret that the Omniscient one, who was so gracious, should prohibit wine and women. So he reflects and begins to suspect that Buddha himself might have permitted them, but that the impotent and jealous Elders of the Buddhist Church might have tampered with the text of his teachings; he feels therefore he will be doing the Sāṅgha a good turn by discovering and publishing such suppressed passages (p. 12). But at the end of the play we are left wondering what has become of his researches in this direction. The curious reader need only turn to the Chārudatta to learn that the honest Bhikṣu's valuable researches have not been in vain, for we find that after all the Buddhist monks have either recovered the lost treasure, or resolved to have their own way, text or no text. It is no wonder therefore that we find Subandhu (c. 650 A. C.) viewing Buddhism with intense aversion, ridiculing its attempts to argue away the visible world, and rejoicing at its discomfiture at the hands of the Mīmāṃsakas (Vasavadatta, Srīrangam Ed.-pp. 175, 176, 229); and that Bhavabhūti (c. 730 A. C.) employs the Buddhist nun Kāmandakī as a go-between in a love intrigue, in his Mālatī-Mādhava, as if it were nothing out of the way.

The Chārudatta, which represents a further stage in the degradation of Buddhism, cannot therefore be dated before c. 750 A. C. nor, as it was known to Vāmana (c. 800 A. C.) much later. We may therefore safely conclude that the Chārudatta is only an abridged version of the Mṛchchhākāti and that it was compiled in c. 750 A. C. The Daridra-Chārudatta that Abhinavagupta refers to in his commentary on the Bharata-nāṭya-uśtra (on xix, 13) might have been this abridged version or, more probably still, it might have been an alternative title for the Mṛchchhākāti, of which we have perhaps an indication in the Śrīryāṭa (Śrīryāṭa-ii. 233). The rhetoricians, from Daṇḍin onwards (Kāvyādarśa-ii. 233) are very fond of quoting the verse to illustrate different alamkāras, but they do not agree as to its authorship, Vallabhādeva attributing it to Vikramāditya, Śrīngadhara to Vikramāditya and Menaṣṭha jointly, and the Kāvyā-prakāśa
commentators to Śudraka. The verse is found in both the Bāla-charita (i. 15) and the Mrchchhatakiḥ (i. 34), not to mention the Charudatta (i. 19). Now great poets like Bhāsa and Śudraka, when they borrow from others, recast the ideas in their own mould, and issue them forth instinct with the stamp of their own genius. When that is not done, but, on the other hand, not only the ideas, but the expression too is identical, the only alternative is between plagiarism and, identity of authorship. Since neither Bhāsa, nor Śudraka, could be guilty of plagiarism, we have to infer that, as already indicated by the Mrchchhatakiḥ having the same characteristic features as Bhāsa's plays, they were identical. We have therefore to examine the point still further and ascertain if the inference is confirmed independently also.

(1) To begin with, the verse already mentioned is attributed to different authors, including Śudraka, but not to Bhāsa. If Bhāsa and Śudraka had not been identical, we should expect some one or other to ascribe the verse to Bhāsa also. This fact therefore is a confirmation, however slight, of the identity.

(2) Śudraka's Padma-prabhabhitaḥ exhibits the same characteristic features as Bhāsa's plays. It too begins with the words नास्यमेव तत्: प्रविष्टिः पुञ्जाय: followed by the mangala-j NORTH, uses the word sthāpna in place of prastāvāṇā, omits all mention of the author or his work, is brimful of humour, represents a girl playing with a ball as in the Saopana, and expresses similarly graceful and elegant ideas in crystalline, felicitous and melodious diction, exhibits the same keen observation of nature and acute insight into the workings of the human heart, and in the happy phrasing of Dr. Thomas "it touches on many sides of life, and touches nothing that it does not adorn". The Mrchchhatakiḥ, in addition to the above qualities, exhibits also dramatic skill, vigorous dialogue and a noble restraint in pathos, like the Saopna. But it may be thought that the prologue of the Mrchchhatakiḥ is in a different style altogether. This is because the Mrchchhatakiḥ is a posthumous work, and its prologue was composed, not by Śudraka himself, but by some one else, shortly after his death, who prepared it for the stage, and that is why the Sūtra-dhāra's
speech opens in Sanskrit and ends in Prākrit, and the Bharatavākya refers to kings in general and not to any one king in particular. The Chārudatta evidently omits this opening speech in Sanskrit for the reasons that it would betray the real authorship and that it did not form part of the original work. It may also be objected that the Padma-prabhritaka reviles a dissolute Buddhist monk Sankhilaka, thereby throwing doubt on the identity of its author with that of the Mṛchhakatika, which betrays a more generous attitude to Buddhism. But, as may be seen from the recently published Avantisundari-kathāsāra, this Sankhilaka was a historical character, who tried to murder Śūdraka himself, and it speaks highly of Śūdraka that he did not allow Sankhilaka’s exceptional demerits to warp his general attitude towards Buddhism, for he says in this very play, as translated by Dr. Thomas, “Oh! the immaculateness of the Buddha’s teaching, befouled by such evil monks, such vain shavelings, and yet held in honour every day. However, the crow’s droppings do not defile the water of the holy place.” We should not moreover apply the same standard to a Bhāna (low comedy) as to a Prakarana (regular drama). This item of evidence also is therefore a substantial confirmation of the identity of Bhāsa and Śūdraka.

(3) The editor of the Padma-prabhritaka informs us that Śūdraka was the author of another play Vatsarāja-charita, which is an alternative title of the Pratijnā. If the Vatsarāja-charita should prove to be identical with the Pratijnā, that would be conclusive evidence for the identity of Bhāsa and Śūdraka.

(4) It is also remarkable that no early author mentions Bhāsa and Śūdraka side by side as different authors. I use the word early advisedly, as it is possible that later authors, not knowing their identity, might refer to them separately in the same context. Kālidāsa mentions Bhāsa, but not Śūdraka, as his dramatic predecessor. Bāna, who makes Śūdraka the hero of his Kādambari, omits him in his list of previous and contemporary authors, but mentions Bhāsa (Harsha-charita—intr.: pp. 1-6; 41, 42). Vāmana, as we have seen, quotes Bhāsa, but mentions only Śūdraka. Kulaśekhara-varman, in
mentioning his dramatic predecessors in the prologue to his Tapatī-samvarana, names Śūdraka, Kālidāsa, Harsha and Daṇḍin (whose dramas are mentioned nowhere else), but not the famous Bhāsa. The conclusion is therefore irresistible that Bhāsa and Śūdraka were identical.

(5) The Bharata-vākyas of Bhāsa’s dramas invariably refer to a Rājasimha, who was, or was hoped to become, sole ruler of the country bounded by the Himalaya and the Vindhyā, and extending from sea to sea, that is of Hindustān. Rājasimha was therefore the name or title of the emperor, in whose time Bhāsa’s dramas were composed. It is not unusual for dramatists to indicate the ruling king in the Bharata-vākyas, without however detracting from its general applicability, as may be seen from the Malavihāgnimitra, the Mudrā-Kāṣaṇa, and the Matta-stāla. The use of the words ‘our Rājasimha’ (म: राजसिंहः) moreover clearly indicates that the word Rājasimha was meant in particular to apply to the ruling king. The opening Benedictions again of the Svāpna and the Avimāraka, “May Balarāma protect thee,” and “May Nārāyaṇa award thee the entire earth” clearly indicate that the author himself was the ruling king, and that the benedictions were intended for himself, as the plural should have been used, if they were meant for the audience, and as the prayer that all those present should be kings would be meaningless. The royal author was evidently seated among the audience, at the first publication of his plays, and the benedictions were addressed to him. The author was therefore himself a king and sole lord of Hindustān. This fact is a strong confirmation of Bhāsa’s identity with Śūdraka. I may add that my friend Mr. G. Harihara Sāstrī, editor of the Maḍhura-vijaya, drew my attention to the peculiar nature of the benedictions in the Svāpna and the Avimāraka, but for the inference therefrom I am alone responsible.

(6) Vākpatirāja of c. 720 A.D. gives Bhāsa another name Jvalana mitra (Gaudāvalko, st. 800); and Jvalana-mitra is obviously only a metrical paryāya (synonym) of Agnimitra, like Puṣpapura and Kusumapura for Pātaliputra. Now Agnimitra is given as a synonym for Śūdraka in a Nāma-mālā cited in Kṣirasvāmi’s commentary on the Amarakūṭā (c. 1100
A. C. Oka. Ed. p. 122). This fact, taken with the other considerations mentioned above, is almost conclusive as to the identity of Bhāsa and Śūdraka, which may therefore be now accepted. It seems that Agnimitra dropped the title Bhāsa and adopted the title Sūdraka, when he became king.

This identification of Bhāsa with Sūdraka enables us to fix his date more definitely still. The *Mṛchchhākāṭika* mentions Nāṇaka (i. 23), evidently so named from the Elamite goddess Nanaia, who first appears in India on Kaniska’s coins. But this fact does not take us beyond c. 150 A. C., the upper limit already arrived at. The Kumārikā-khaṇḍa of the *Skanda-Purāṇa* places Sūdraka in Kali 3290 = 189 A. C. but, as it also dates the Nandas in Kali 3310 = 209 A. C. and Vikramaditya in Kali 4000 = 899 A. C. which we know to be absurdly mistaken, its evidence is of no value, and we are left no wiser than we were.

But the *Mṛchchhākāṭika* betrays full knowledge of planetary astrology. In the 6th Act (st. 9, 10), it refers to the malefic influence of decrepit Jupiter, Mars and comets; and of the sun in the 8th sign, the Moon in the 4th, Venus in the 6th, Mars in the 5th, Jupiter in the 6th and Saturn in the 9th signs; and in the 9th Act (st. 33), it says that Mars and Jupiter were enemies, a view mentioned by Varāhamihira only to be discredited (*Bṛhat-Jātaka* ii. 15-17), which has moreover become obsolete since his time. Sūdraka therefore lived after the Hindus had acquired full knowledge of planetary astrology, but not later than the age of Varāhamihira. This fact should enable us to fix his date definitely. For, Hindu astronomy has been studied chronologically. The *Nakṣatras* system is of purely Hindu origin, for, though attempts have not been wanting to derive it from a foreign source, the names of the *Nakṣatras* are purely Hindu, and the system has not yet been traced in the same form anywhere else. The names of the planets are likewise purely Hindu, and bear no correspondence to their foreign counterparts. The Hindus must therefore have themselves independently discovered and named the planets. The words *vāra* and *rādi* are also of Hindu origin, but the conventional order of the weekday names based on the Greek division of the
day into 24 horas and the likewise conventional pictorial representations of the solar signs including the Balance (tulā) are identical or almost identical with those of the Greeks. Independent origins are therefore impossible for the week-day names, and the solar signs, but the chronology of their use is uncertain. There can be no doubt however as to the origin of Hindu planetary astrology, for most of the indispensable technical terms of astrology are purely Greek, and have no Sanskrit equivalents. The following technical terms are purely Greek, and are used in the same senses as in Paulus Alexandrinus, 1. Hörā ; 2. Drikāya ; 3. Köṇa ; 4. Āra ; 5. Āspujit ; 6. Liptā ; 7. Kendra ; 8. Trikōṇa ; 9. Jāmitra ; (10) Anaphā ; (11) Sunaphā ; (12) Durdharā ; (13) Kamadruma ; (14) Vēli ; (15) Āpoklima ; (16) Panapharā ; (17) Hibuka ; (18) Dyutam ; (19) Meshūrana ; and (20) Harija. The work of Paulus alone contains nearly the whole of the technical terms adopted from the Greek ; and the Hindu planetary astrology is based primarily on that of Firmicus Maternus (336-354 A.C.), in whose work the astrological system of the 12 mansions occurs for the first time, and on that of Paulus Alexandrinus (378 A.C.). Hindu astrologers themselves had no hesitation in acknowledging their indebtedness to the Greeks. Varāhamihira says that the Greeks, though they were Māchchhas, were honoured like Rishis, because of their skill in astrology (Bṛhat-samhītā ii. 15) ; and he refers in particular to Pulīsa, who lived not long before his own time, (Pancha-siddhāntikā. i. 10), and whose meridian Yavanapura must, from its longitude, be Alexandria (ibid. iii. 13). The Pulīsa of Yavanapura (=Alexandria), who lived not long before Varāha, must therefore be identical with Paulus Alexandrinus of 378 A.C. It is therefore certain that the Hindus borrowed their planetary astrology from the Greeks only after 378 A.C. This year therefore is also the upper limit for Sūdraka, who betrays full knowledge of planetary astrology.

On the other hand, Varāha is said to have died in S'aka 509 = 587 A.C. (Āmarāja's comm. on Brahmagupta's Khaṇḍa-khādyā). But he himself uses S'aka 427 = 505 A.C. as the epoch of his astronomical calculations (Pancha-siddhāntikā. i. 8), and it is usual for astronomers to give the date of their
own *Siddhāntas* for such epochs. We may therefore reasonably infer that he wrote in 505 A.C. That scrupulously accurate and unusually well-informed astronomer Albərənī (1030 A.C.) also says that Varāha preceded himself by 525 years and wrote the *Pāncha-siddhāntika* in S'aka 427 = 505 A.C. (India—Eng. tr. Sachau—i. 392; ii. 7, 51, 86). It is therefore certain that Varāha wrote in 505 A.C. and he did not therefore, in all probability, die so late as 587 A.C. Sūdraka's lower limit is therefore c. 505 A.C.

Sūdraka must therefore have lived between 378 and c. 505 A.C. We learn from the *Maṭchchhakaṭika*, the *Pādmaprābhritaka*, and Bāṇa's *Kādambari*, that he was king of Mālva, with his capital at Vidiśā, the modern Bhilsā. But from 378 to 436 A.C. we know the rulers of Mālva were 1) Chandravarman; 2) his brother Naravarman; 3) the latter's son Viśvarvarman; and 4) his son Bandhuvarman (*Epi. Ind. xiii. no. 9; xii. no. 35*; Fleet: *Gupta Inscriptions*—nos. 1, 17, 18). Then the Gupta's conquered Mālva, and in 455 to 457 A.C. we find Skandagupta, west of Mālva, in Kāṭhīvāḍī, and in 473 A.C. Kumāragupta II acknowledged as suzerain over Mālva (Fleet: *Gupta Inscriptions*—nos. 14, 18). Sūdraka could not therefore have ruled over Mālva before c. 475 A.C. The limits of his date are therefore narrowed to the last quarter of the 5th century A.C. and this therefore must be his period of rule over Mālva.

I shall now sum up my conclusions,

(i) Bāṇa is the author of only 9 plays (1) *Śrāvaka*; (2) *Pratijñā*; (3) *Abhiseka*; (4) *Pancha-rātra*; (5) *Dūṭa-vākya*; (6) *Bāla-charita*; (7) *Avimāraka*; (8) *Pādmaprābhritaka* and (9) *Maṭchchhakaṭika*;

(ii) The authorship and date of (1) *Pratimā*; (2) *Dūṭa-Ghaṭṭokhaṇa*; (3) *Madhyama*; (4) *Karaṇabhāra* and (5) *Ūrubhanga* are uncertain;

(iii) *Chāruḍatta* is only an abridged version of the *Maṭchchhakaṭika* compiled in c. 750 A.C.;

(iv) Bāṇa is identical with Sūdraka, king of Mālva (c. 475 to c. 500 A.C.);

(v) Bāṇa's plays have come down to us almost intact, with some omissions.
EARLY INDIAN POETESISSES

(Prof. Haranchandra Chakladar M.A.)

Poetry was the medium through which Indian thought sought to find expression from the earliest times and Indian women, with their natural instinct for art, have contributed their quota to the poetic literature of their country, in every period of the development of its civilisation and culture. Whether as inspired seers through whom the Vedic hymns were revealed, or as singers of the sweet and tender couplets in Prakrit, the popular speech of the millions, or again, as poetesses writing in the polished and elegant, though sometimes artificial, stanzas of classical Sanskrit—in all the different phases of the development of Indian poetry, ladies in India are found to have taken no mean part. From the time of Ghoshā, the Vedic seer,—who in the early Vedic age, several millenniums ago, poured out a spontaneous offering out of the abundance of gratitude to the Aśvins, the healing gods, whose ministration did send her a man to love and adore—up to Toru Dutt, whose mightingale voice did seek utterance in a foreign tongue, in a foreign land, we can trace an unbroken series of Indian poetesses who can take no insignificant position beside the singers of the other sex.

Here we shall confine ourselves to the poetesses of the earliest period of Indian poetry, viz. that of the Rgvedic hymns. Ancient Indian works on Rgvedic literature like the Brhad devatā of S’aunaka and the several Anukramaṇīs, have recorded Indian traditions about the authorship of the hymns and in many cases these traditions are supported by the mention of the names of the authors in the hymns themselves. Though in some cases we have reasons to doubt the validity of these traditions, yet there is no question that they are in the main reliable, especially when we consider that the greatest care was taken in India in very early times to keep up the ancient national literature in its purity. These ancient records assign to female seers sometimes single verses and sometimes groups of them often running into whole hymns.

The Ārshānukramaṇī and the Brhad devatā have specially brought together a list of the female seers (brahmaṇādīnīḥ) of whom they enumerate twenty-seven, but many of them are of a mythic character and it is

1. Brhaddevatā, ii. 82-86.
with only the group of nine who, according to the \textit{Bṛhad-devatā}, “sang the praises of the deities” that we are more nearly concerned. But even here we have to dismiss at least two viz. Aditi, the mother of the gods, and Juhū, the Brahma-jayā, as having too much of a mythic character. A second group of nine in this list ‘converse with seers and deities’ and though we may claim some of them as genuine authors of hymns and verses, we are not sure if we may look upon all of them as poetsess in our sense of the term, there being several denizens of heaven included among them, such as the wife and the mother of Indra, Urvaśī—the Apsaras, Saramā—the canine messenger of the gods, the nymphs of the rivers, and so on. The remaining group of nine seers is entirely beyond our ken, they being not only the seers of their respective hymns but also the deities addressed in those hymns, so that they sang of their own thoughts and doings (\textit{Bhāva-vṛttām}), each one of them ‘praising herself as the deity’; to this last group belong Sṛi, Lākṣā, Sarpa-rājū, Vāc, Sرادdā, Medhā, Dakṣinā, Rātri, and Sūryā Sāvitrī. As we are speaking of only genuine human beings who might be held responsible for any verse or group of verses attributed to them, we leave aside the goddesses who lauded their own selves as well as most of those of the second group who held converse with seers and deities. We may also exclude from our consideration, Upaniṣad and Niṣad, seers of some verses in the \textit{khaṇḍas}, or apocryphal hymns as these do not belong to the authoritative text. Our list is thus reduced to eight female seers—Ghoshā, Godhā, Viśvavāra, Apālā, the sister of Agastya, Lopāmudrā, Saśvatī, and Romaśā—whom we may look upon as the real authors of the hymns or verses assigned to each, depending upon the statements of the works we have spoken of.

\textbf{Ghoshā}

Ghoshā, the first lady in the above list, has made the largest contribution of all. Two entire hymns (39 and 40) in the tenth \textit{Maṇḍala} of the Rgveda are attributed to her. Hers was a family of great seers: her grandfather, Dirghatamas, is the seer of many Rgvedic hymns, a singer whose praises are sung by the Rgveda itself—“the chief (Brahma) of those who seek to obtain the object of their pious works and their leader (charioteer)”; the \textit{Bṛhad-devatā} tells us how Dirghatamas was

thrown into a river by his servants and was carried down-stream to the Ahga country, when finding Ušij, a slave-girl of the king, fondly devoted to himself, he begot on her the Rishi Kakšīvat who in his turn is also a seer of numerous Rgvedic hymns. This Kakšīvat was the father of Ghoshā; but though born of such distinguished ancestors, Ghoshā unfortunately could not find a wooer who would seek her hand, as she had the curse of white leprosy and she was growing to be an old maid in the house of her father when the twin healing gods, the Aśvins, who are also sung by the name of the Nāsatyas, came to her relief and freed her from the loathsome infection. She speaks from her very soul when she sings in praise of the twin gods, "You Nāsatyas, are the good fortune of a damsel growing old in her father’s mansion; the protectors of the abject, of the blind, of the feeble, they call you the physicians of the sacrifice." And her father, Kakšīvat, sings again and again of the glories and achievements of the twin gods and is full to overflowing with thankfulness for the cure they effected of his dear daughter: "I, the son of Ušij," says Kakšīvat in a hymn of his, "address to you (Aśvins) audible praise, in like manner as Ghoshā praised you for the removal of her white-tinted (skin)," and again he refers to the same wonderful cure, "You bestowed, Aśvins, a husband upon Ghoshā, growing old, and tarrying in her father’s dwelling."

Her fore-fathers had long been singing the glories of the twin gods: Dirghatamas, her grandfather, in two hymns extols the deeds of the Aśvins who cured him of blindness and were of great help to him in his long life of a hundred years and more, and to her father’s hymns in praise of these gods we have already referred. Both the hymns of which she is the seer are addressed to the Aśvins whose great deeds in the hoary past of the Indian Aryans are extolled by her, and her son, Suhastya, too, sings to the same gods and in the same metre as his mother. Many are the achievements of the Aśvins sung in the hymns of Ghoshā and they have formed a rich store from which have been gleaned historical facts of great importance.

2. Riv. x. 39, 4.
5. Riv. x. 41.
Let Ghoshā herself tell her own story: the husband that she obtained appears, from her own words, to have lost a former wife whose loss he was bewailing when he applied for the hand of our poetess; and for him, for his health and wealth, she prays to the twin gods.

Addressing the Aśvins, she sings again with reference to herself:—

"The damsel, Aśvins, has been born; let him in search of a bride approach her; for him let shoots of corn sprout up; by virtue of your deeds of love for him let the streams flow as if down an incline, for him who shall not be liable to lose his life at the hands of any one, let there be the power towards her, let there be power to exercise the rights of a husband towards her.

"The husbands, Aśvins, that pray with tears in their eyes for the (long) life (of their wives), husbands who get for them a seat at the sacrifice, who hold them long locked up in embrace, who get the darling child for the manes (for offering them oblations), to such husbands the wives bestow happiness by embraces.

"We understand not this: do you, Aśvins explain it well, how it is that the young husband loiters in the house of the youthful bride. This is our desire, Aśvins, that we repair to the dwelling of my husband, youthful, vigorous, manly and devoted to his wife.

"Aśvins, rich in food, lords of water, twin associates, may your good will come down upon us, control you the desire in our heart: Ye have been my protectors, nay, being loved and adored, reach the habitation of my husband with joy, O Aśvins, while at the house of my man do you bestow prosperity, and a heroic son upon me who am always ready to extol your deeds; lords of the waters, do you make the fords (on the way to my husband's house) easy to get across and remove the tree that stands on the road and any evil-minded man (that may withstand us).

"Aśvins, twin gods of goodly aspect, where, in what country, among what people, are you taking your pleasure to-day? Who is it that detains you? To whose house have you repaired? Is it to that of a sage who sings your praises or to a devotee offering you sacrificial oblations?"1

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GODHĀ

The story of the next Brāhmāvadīni poetess of the Rgveda is told in a few words. Her contribution to the Veda, according to the

1. Rīv. x. 40.
Sarvānukramāṇī, consists of a verse and a half, the seventh verse together with the last hemistich of the sixth, of hymn 134 of the tenth Mandala, the rest of the hymn having been revealed to Māndhārī, the son of Yuvaṇāśva. Whether she bore any connection with Māndhārī is more than we can tell, the Vedic literature offering no light on her life or deeds. The first hemistich of which she is the speaker is addressed to Indra. “Thou dost subjugate (thy foes) under yourself, O Maghavan, as a goat with its forefoot does with a branch.” The next verse is addressed to the Viśva-devas, the all gods: “We injure you in no way, ye gods,” it goes on, “nor do we inflict any annoyance with the teaching of the Mantras. We take entire hold of you with wing and arms, as it were.”

Viśvavārā

Viśvavārā was a Brahmavadini lady of the Atri family to the members of which is attributed the authorship of the whole of the fifth maṇḍala. The family seems to have been spread over a wide area that embraced the rivers Paruṣṭī and the Yamunā in itself. The hymn of six verses attributed to her also belongs to the fifth, the family maṇḍala of the Atris. In the first verse of her hymn we find her at dawn making her approach to the sacrificial fire when it is blazing bright, with the sacrificial ladle in hand ready to offer from it to the gods. Let her speak for herself: “The full-flaming fire throws out his beams in the glowing firmament, facing the dawn he shines far and wide, chanting the glories of the gods with hymns of obeisance (namobhik) and with the ladle of butter full of oblations, Viśvavārā proceeds towards the east, to the sacred fire.” She appears to be a married wife praying for mutual concord between the pair whom the nuptial knot has tied. Again we give her words as she prays for a happy wedded life, and for riches wherewith to carry on the domestic duties and at the same time for overpowering the activities of the enemies.

3. Ṛīv. x. 134, 7.
4. Vedic Index, I. 17.
5. Ṛīv. v. 28.
7. Ṛīv. v. 28, 1.
"Agni, do thou repress our foes to ensure our great good fortune; let the riches brought by thee be of the highest and best. Make perfect, O Agni, the wedded life of the wife and husband by mutual concord and restraint and do thou overpower the strength and energies of all those who would be hostile to us." This verse of noble thought has been quoted in the Sūkla Yajurveda. This hymn of Viśavārā is of importance as showing the high position occupied by women in the R̄gvedic times. It shows her taking an equal part in the sacrifice and in her short but vigorous hymn Viśavārā reveals herself to be a lady of forceful personality, dignified and restrained, and withal she shows her woman's heart when she prays for an atmosphere of love and concord in her home.

APĀLĀ

Apālā also was a daughter of Atri to whose family, we have seen, Viśavārā belonged. She gives vent to her afflictions in impassioned utterances in the hymn she addresses to Indra, and that finds a place not in the family book of the Atris, but in the eighth mandala. It is said that with this hymn she invoked Indra to free her from her skin-disease and there are references in the hymn itself to this fact. The story of her life is given in the Bṛhaddevatā but Śāyaṇa quotes it from an earlier source, the Sātyāyana Brāhmaṇa, where it is found in greater fulness.

Apālā, a daughter of Atri, was afflicted with a skin-disease, so that hair would not grow on her skin. For this she was hated by her husband and was forced to repair to her father's residence and there she made up her mind to devote herself to Indra and win his favour. How she at last was blessed with the favour of that great god and purged of her bane is thus beautifully narrated in her own words in the hymn:

"A damsel, while going to the water to fetch it in a pitcher, found a piece of the Soma-plant in the path. While coming back to her house, she thus spoke, 'For Indra, the lord of the gods shall I press and prepare thee, for S'akra, the mighty one, shall I press thee and make thee ready for offering.' With these words Apālā threw the soma-pieces into her

1. Riv. v. 28, 3
5. Riv. viii. 91, 1.
mouth, and as she walked began to crush them between her teeth which gave out a sound as of the friction of two pieces of stone. Indra, as he heard the sound of her jaws, thought it proceeded from stones pressing soma for sacrifice and hastened to the spot, but when he saw that it was Apālā’s teeth that were producing the sound and not soma-stones, he turned his back to Apālā and was going away. Then Apālā thus called after him: “O Thou that goest from house to house, a hero, shining and resplendent in thy glory (for a drink of soma), do thou drink this soma pressed by my teeth—this soma together with fried grains of barley, with karambha, with cakes as well as with the chanting of hymns.” She added further, “We would know thee, but we know thee not (as thou comest) on the path.” With these words she addressed the soma-juice in her mouth, “O soma, flow thou forth for Indra slowly and yet more slowly, in slow drops as it were.” Then did Indra drink the soma from her lips and it is for this perhaps that the Bhādevata says that Indra had fallen in love with her when he had seen her in the lonely hermitage of her father. And now that Indra had been so propitious to her, she exclaims in triumph, “Many times let Indra grant us power, many things let Indra give us, let him repeatedly make us rich, many a time have I incurred the hatred of my husband and been forced to wander away (from him), but now may we be united to Indra.” And then asked Indra, “What would you have, Apālā, my darling?” And she prayed, “These three places, Indra, do thou make them all to grow abundantly—the bald head of my father, and his (barren) field and my body. This our field which is barren, and my body (afflicted with skin-disease) and again my father’s (bald head),—do thou make all of them full of hair.” “Make me, O S’akra, to have abundant hair, (and), to be faultless limbed (and) fair-skinned.” Hearing this Indra was mightily-pleased, and “passing her through the carriage-aperture, (between the body) of the car and the yoke, drew her forth three times. Then she became fair-skinned. And out of gratitude Apālā sang—“O S’atakratu, thou of hundred sacrifices,
three times didst thou purify Apālā, dragging her through the hole of the chariot, through the (narrower) hole of the cart and the (still narrower) aperture of the yoke; and there didst make her have a skin resplendent like the sun.”

**AGASTYA’S SISTER**

The sister of Agastya contributed a single verse to a hymn[^8] of the rest of which her sons, the Gaupāyanas, are the seers. In this verse she exorts king Asamāti, a mighty monarch of the Ikṣvāku family to come to the aid of her sons, the nephews of Agastya. It appears that one of her sons, Subandhu, lay dead or dying and her other sons seek the help of the mighty king, Asamāti, the Ikṣvāku, whom the mother also exports to hasten in his chariot to go to their aid. “Yoke the red horses to your chariot for the nephews of Agastya, and overcome, Rāja, all the niggard withholders of oblations.” In the remaining five verses her sons invoke Subandhu to life, and in the last one, all the brothers touch Subandhu whom they have resuscitated back to life. The *Bṛhaddevatā*[^1] gives the legend connected with the hymn. Four Rṣis, the sons of Agastya’s sister, had been the domestic priests, of the Ikṣvāku king, Asamāti who, however, dismissed them and appointed two crafty priests in their place. These latter fell upon one of the brothers, Subandhu, with their crafty power and their magical art, and from the pain caused by their attack Subandhu swooned and fell. The others revived him and the four were reinstated by the king in their office as domestic chaplains.

**LOPĀMUDRĀ**

Lopāmudrā the wife of Agastya, is the seer of two verses in a hymn[^4] dedicated to Rati, the Goddess of love. Lopāmudrā is a devoted wife who has served her lord faithfully and long, but her husband, the great sage, practises austerities, looks upon continence as the highest virtue and keeps away from her, lest the fickle and unsteady female should beguile the firm and resolute man[^4]. The fond wife feels sad and miserable, bereft of her beloved lord, thinks herself neglected and claims his love and

[^1]: *Riv.* viii. 91, 7.
[^2]: *Riv.* x. 60, 6.
[^3]: *B.D.* vii. 84—102.
[^4]: *Riv.* I. 179, 1—2.
company, pointing out that mighty sages of yore who talked with the very gods had not deserted their wives. Let us hear her own impassioned appeal: “For many a long year in the past, both by day and by night, as well as in the mornings, have I been wearing myself out serving thee diligently; now decay following upon advanced years impairs the beauty of my limbs. What, then, can now be done? The husbands should meet their wives.

"Those ancient sages that spread the truth far and wide, who talked of truth with the very gods, did beget children, nor did they break their penances thereby, because they found not the end. Therefore should wives—the partners at their sacrifices, be approached by their husbands.”

Agastya could no longer resist her logic and we are told in the last verse of the hymn that the venerable sage discharged both his obligations, both kāma and tapas, both his duties of domestic as well as of ascetic life, and from the gods he obtained the fulfilment of his desires.²

**Sāśvati**

Sāśvati is called in the Rgveda the Nāri, the woman, *par excellence*, and the Nāri “among women, is she who is distressed when her husband is distressed and rejoices when he rejoices,” as the *Nītiṃaṅjarī* defines her.³ She had been undergoing severe penances for long years for the recovery by her husband the Vādava Āsaṅga, the son of Playoga, of his manliness which he had lost. In the one verse⁴ with which she is credited, she bursts out with joy at the success her penances have achieved: “Joy, dear husband, now thou art capable of enjoying (life).”

**Romasā.**

If we are to believe Sāyaṇa, Romasā is a Brahmavādin of no mean parentage, being a daughter of Brhaspati himself. The single verse for which she is responsible, is an outburst of youthful joy at the first consciousness of the charms of youth, when the girl feels that she is a woman. Her husband, the king Bhāvyā Svanaya, a prince of unequalled might, who

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1. *Riv. I.* 179, 2. In the translation, the recently published German translation by Geldner has been followed.
ruled on the banks of the Indus,¹ had ridiculed her on her tender age and immaturity; on this she retorts with a childlike challenge: "Feel me closely; deem me no longer an immature girl, I am covered with down all over like a ewe of the Gandhārins."² Her husband's dominions being on the Sindhu, Romasa was naturally familiar with the ewes for which Gandhāra was famous.

This young girl Romasa is a contemporary of Ghoshā, as we find Kakśīvat, the father of the latter poetess receiving immense wealth from her husband, and the two verses giving the talk between the king and the queen is tagged on to a hymn of Kakśīvat without any connection with the main body of the poem with which they differ also in metre, the only connection being that the two verses relate to the king whose power and liberality Kakśīvat sings in the verses that precede.

¹ Riv. I 126, 1.
² Riv. I 126, 7.
SĀSANA AND JAYAPATRA

(Pandit Amareswar Thakur, M.A.)

[Lekhyas or documents are primarily divided in ancient law books into two classes: rājakīya (public) and laukika or jānapada (private). The former again has many varieties and most important of them are Sāsana and jayapatra. Some account of these two is given in the following few pages.]

SĀSANA

Sāsana in the law books means a donative grant. Yājñavalkya says: 'when a king makes any grant of land, village or garden or makes a nibandha, he should leave the terms committed to writing for the information of future kings.' The term nibandha has been explained in different ways by different commentators. Viśvarūpaṭāchārya takes it to mean permanent endowment. Devaṇabhaṭṭa and Aparāśka take it in the sense of an arrangement made through the intervention of the king for money to be given annually or monthly to a Brahmaṇa or a deity by traders or other wealthy persons. Devaṇabhaṭṭa further observes that the merit arising out of the gift accrues to the king inasmuch as he induces the actual donors to make it. Viṣṇuśesvara takes the words pratigraha and nibandha as synonymous. Pratigraha means a donation generally. Another explanation offered by him of the term seems to indicate that a document was needed when a piece of land was leased out for rent which was to be given either in cash or in kind. The lessee was to pay for instance, a certain sum for a certain amount of produce in the land taken on lease or a share in the

1. दक्ष मूर्मिलिस्य वा काल चेक तु कांतेन्। शासनार्धार्थिनिविषयान्य पार्वेद:॥ Yāj I. 318.
2. निविषयेऽविण्विषः।
3. निविषयो वाणिज्यादिविण्विषः प्रतिवेद विनिभीमयमः ब्राह्मणायामेव इत्यविषयः क्षेत्रविद्याय प्रवृत्तवादिविण्विषः। Sm. ch. p. 125.
4. शक द्वापि धनेषुत्तरः वाणिज्यादिविण्विषार्थार्थिएव निविषयेऽविण्विषः। Sm. ch. p. 125.
5. प्रतिवेद्यकृते प्रति प्रतियहि निविषः। Mitākṣarā on I. 320.
produce itself. Chaṇḍeśvara explains the term *nibandha* as assignment of what is settled with certainty such as a fixed gain from a mine or the like. We think, however, that *bhumiṇḍattvā* and *nibandham kṛtvā* refer to two distinct things, the former to secular donations i.e. grants to private individuals not in any way connected with religion and the latter to religious endowments, i.e., donations and endowments made to Brahmāṇas, Gods and religious institutions.

Both these kinds of grants are to be registered in inscriptions termed *Sāhāna*. The materials on which these inscriptions are to be recorded are mainly two, namely copper-plates and pieces of cloth according to Yājñavalkya, Brhaspati and Vyāsa. Viśvarūpāchārya comments that *bhūrijapatra* (i.e. bark of the birch tree) is never to be used for this purpose, evidently owing to its perishableness. As a matter of fact the ancient inscriptions that have come down to us recording grants and endowments are mostly written on copper-plates and many of them style themselves on this account *tāmraśādana* or copper-plate grants. We have come across no inscription written on a piece of cloth.

The most important thing in connection with royal charters is that they should be precisely dated. A precise statement of the year, the month, the fortnight and the day on which a grant is made should be recorded in the plate. We know from many inscriptions that dates could be given in words as well as in numerals. The specification of the details of the donor and the donee and of the donation forms also a very important factor in all records relating to grants. The precepts of the legal treatises are that the king should state the names of himself and his three imme-

1. बिष्यम एकस्य पाणिकरकः पद्मि पाणिनि स्वा एकस्य कस्मकाः पाणिकरकः पद्मि जनकः पाणिनि स्वायः पाणिनि मुहुर्तकाः। Mitrābhikṣarā, II. 121.

2. बिष्यम षाखरानी निरंत लघुम। Vivādaratnākara, chap II.


4. द्वैतं भूपाल्य्दिकं राजा समवेतं वधान्तं। माविष्णु कारवेतु... ... ... ... ... (Brhaspati) राजा तु राजवाहिनें: सन्तनविषयकेष्व। तान्त्रिकः-तः वापि विन्दूवीर्यावश्यम्॥

5. बहस्मासात्वत्वांहि राजसुराहिन्तं तथा etc. (Vyāsa)। Sm. ch. p. 129.

6. द्वे समासात्वत्वांहि राजसुराहिन्तं तथा etc. Sm. ch. p. 126.

7. वर्षमासादि धनाधिपतिराविनितम् etc.—Viram p. 192.
diate male ancestors.\textsuperscript{1} Viśvarūpāchārya thinks that the names of the female ancestors should also be stated.\textsuperscript{2} The name of the grantee, his father's name, his family and caste and the name of the Vedic school to which he belongs should also be mentioned in the record.\textsuperscript{3} It should also contain such particulars as the value of the donation or, in the case of bequest of land, the statement of the area and its description by boundaries.\textsuperscript{4} The document, according to the legal treatises, is to be composed by the Sandhivigrahākāri, an officer for peace and war.\textsuperscript{5} Sandhivigrahākāri is an official or military title and its synonymous title is Sandhivigrahakālaḥkaka.\textsuperscript{6} This title is signified by Sandhivigrahika in the Nīti-Vākyāṃpita and in the inscriptions. It will be interesting to note in this connection that it is distinctly mentioned in many copper-charters that they were written (lekhiṭa) by the Sandhivigrahika. The Sandhivigrahika according to the Nīti-Vākyāṃpita is to be well versed in all languages, acquainted with the rules of the different āśramas and castes and is to know all kinds of scripts. He should also be able to write well and read quickly. The words vilikhet in the injunction of Vyāsa and likhitam in the inscriptions used in respect of the Sandhivigrahika in all probability refer to the composition or drawing up of the record and not to actual writing. This conclusion seems irresistible from the high position that the Sandhivigrahika or Mahāsandhivigrahika held in the administration as well as from the nature of the qualifications which he is said to have possessed. His duty was only to compose and draft the record. The writing of it on the plate was left to the lekhaka or the professional scribe. A lekhaka is mentioned in the Arthasastra\textsuperscript{7} as a person possessed of minis-

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1. Yoś. I. 315. भारवालिधिकोपाय: पूर्वपुष्पाय (Viśvarūpa); चंद्राश्च \\ पः ताम विनाम विवाहानीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीस्वनीs
terial qualifications, acquainted with all sorts of customs, skilled in composition, a good and legible hand and an expert in reading. References to lekhaka are also found in the injunctions attributed to Vyasa and Prajapati. A distinct mention of tásana lekhaka is found in a verse occurring in the Rājanītiratnākara. It is said here that he should be intelligent enough to understand a thing though it is said only once, smart in writing, sharp in reading and versed in all the āstraś. The evidence of inscriptions also corroborates the view that the composer and the writer were generally two different persons. They are separately mentioned in the Mandasore Stone Inscriptions of Kumāragupta and Bandhu Varman as karti and lekhaka. The lekhaka is termed kanyastha in the Kapāleśvar grant of Mahābhāva Gupta. This is strictly in accordance with an injunction of Viṣṇu. It is also evident from this inscription that the lekhaka belonged to the office of the Sandhivigrahika. From the double expression racayāñcakārā and likhake used in reference to one and the same person, it is only reasonable to suppose that when the lekhaka happened to be an exceptionally brilliant man the task of composition also was left to him. The text of Vyasa which says that the Sandhivigrahakāri or the lekhaka should write (i.e. compose) the royal grant under orders of the king should be understood in this sense.

The process of engraving comes next. It is denoted in the inscriptions by the term utkirna. The engraver had under the guidance of the Sandhivigrhaika to follow the writing on the plate and impress it with his tools. In the Kapāleśvar grant of Mahābhāva Gupta referred to above the engraver and the writer are mentioned as two different persons.

Another important thing in connection with a royal charter is that it should be authenticated. The methods of giving authentication are mainly two. First it should be sealed with the royal seal and secondly

1. समन्िििव्रकारी न मवेंि व्यापिर लेखक:। Sm. ch. p. 146.
   बायच्छ यदि न महत्त विष्यंगो र कमास्मि। राजा स्थान संमुद्र लेखकाचर दर्मानु॥ Sm. ch. p. 146.

2. सङ्कुकं यद्वताभ्य हर्षस्य लिङ्गाधरं। सवशाछशमालस्वी एव राजस्म लेखक:॥ p. 21.

3. राजसीवकरसि तत्रीपुर काव्यदेहकं एति...Viṣṇu VII. 2.

4. कुड़ितं राजस्मुद्रया (Vyāsa) Sm. ch. p. 128.
   राजसमुद्राहितं स्था (Vyāsa) Sm. ch. p. 129.
it should be given the svahasta or the king's own hand, i.e. an autograph signature of the king from whom the charter emanates. From many inscriptions we know that sometimes an actual representation of a sign-manual was given and that it was occasionally represented by some marks. In plate 39 (Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum vol. III) there are some wavy lines under the words svahasta and these are evidently intended to represent some kind of sign-manual. 'The custom of attaching royal authentication to charters has given us a large and highly interesting series of ancient Indian seals, some of them presenting devices only, others only legends, and others both legends and devices and some of them being of an extremely elaborate kind'

Another essential thing in connection with a royal charter is that it should be provided with the expression rājādetena meaning 'by order of the king himself.' This expression shows that the official in charge of the drawing up of the charter could not do it without an express order from the king. This order was either given directly or communicated through an officer. When it was directly given, the custom required that the fact should be recorded as such in the charter itself. As a consequence we find such expressions as 'ājñā swayam' (the order is that of the grantor's own self) 'svamukhājānā', 'ājñāptih svamukham', (the order is that of the grantor's own mouth), 'svamukhājānā utkṛṣṭam', (engraved at the order of the grantor's own mouth) etc. mentioned in many royal grants. When the sanction to draw up the charter was not directly given, it was communicated to the office of the Śāndhivigrāhika through an officer ordinarily styled dātaka in the inscriptions. Another regular title of the officer who carried the king's sanction and order to the officer concerned was ājñā dāpaka (conveyor of orders) as is evident from the Ujjain grant of Vākpatiraja of Dhara. The same office is referred to in such expressions also as ājñāmahāmahattara' Gauri

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1. Śrīmān Śrī Vīra Virāgam (Vīra Viram) p. 194.
2. Śrīmān Śrī Vīra Virāgam (Vīra Viram) p. 193.
3. Śrīmān Śrī Vīra Virāgam (Vīra Viram) p. 319.
5. Ājñā Vaiśaṣika Śāstra p. 128.
6. Ājñā Vaiśaṣika Śāstra (Vaiśaṣika) p. 128.
7. Vaiśaṣika's injunction Śrī Vīra Śrī Vaiśaṣika Śāstra; etc. (Śrī Vaiśaṣika, p. 128) points to the same conclusion.
Sarmā (the order is conveyed by the Mahāmahātta Gaurisarmā), ‘ājñāptih Siyasarma’ and ‘ājñāptih Dama Kirtibhojakali’. Hindu law texts do not mention any such office as that of the dātaka but we find in a text attributed to Vyāsa the mention of dūtas and mahattaras as persons among others to be addressed by the king in connection with formal grants with a view to give them publicity.

It is also enjoined in a text of Vyāsa that the king should put the pramāṇa and sannīvēka with his own hand just like the svahasta. These two terms have been explained by the Mitakṣara. Pramāṇa means dimension which is to be specified in bighās or other land-measure, and sannīvēka should be taken in the sense of site, i.e. the houses or lands by which the property is bounded on all sides. Mitramiśra sees no utility in observing this rule strictly. According to him the specification of pramāṇa and sannīvēka may be put by others as well for the king.

Another legal precept in connection with a royal grant is that it should bear the words ‘this is known by me’ from the donor and that it should bear the signatures of the head of the department concerned with its drafting and delivery as well as of the writer (lekha). We have seen above that a royal grant should be sealed in order to make it authentic beyond all manner of doubt. Mitramiśra and Devaṇabhaṭṭa hold on the strength of the words dātyat and dattam used in the injunctions of Viṣṇu and other authorities relating to royal grants, that such grants should also be delivered. The actual delivery into the hands of the grantees was done not by the king himself but by the local officials who drew up and prepared the charters. We know from the Subramani

1. समिविष्णु प्रमाणण स्वरूपम् च लिखित स्वम्, Viram. p 193.
2. समिविष्णु स पूर्वि परिवर्धनमपरिष्क्रिये; समक्षनिविष्णु माणविवाहि। प्रमाणण निवर्गनादि मूर्तिसाधन। Yāj. II. 6.
3. तत्त्री राजवं शासिकानिनानिनवास, Viram p. 194.
4. चार्त मर्यति लिखिते स्त्रा, Sm. ch. p. 129.
   तदवथवचकविजितम्; Viṣṇu, VII. 2; जयवर्धसंयज्ञ (Vyasa), Sm. ch. p. 129.
   भागान मु लिखित पचातु, Sm. ch. y. 128.
5. दशा राजा प्रतिबद्धते समपन्यादि; Viram. p. 194.
   राजा दशा भागानाल्ले श्यात्;
   एत्य प्रतिबद्धते: समपन्यादि; Sm. ch. p. 128.
that these officials had to keep copies of all documents that bore the king's seal such as grants etc.¹ It is said there, 'after the lapse of time kings may entirely forget or may have a mistaken impression of what they did; so officers should keep copies of the royal writs to serve as reminders in case of doubt or forgetfulness.' These copies served also another purpose. We know from Manu that even royal grants were sometimes forged inspite of all precautions.² The Madhuvana record of A.D. 630 of Harśavardhana of Thāneswar and Kanauj bears evidence to the forgery of royal grants. A reference to forged copper-plates may also be found in another inscription recorded in the Indian Antiquary, VOL. XXX p. 21 ff. So it is just possible that whenever any doubt arose as to the genuineness of a royal grant the office copy was looked upon as the best means of verification. A text of Kātyāyana seems to imply, however, that ordinarily the authenticity of a royal charter was not to be confirmed by the usual and ordinary tests of truth. It declares that a royal charter free from the use of vulgar expressions and accompanied by 'possession' on the part of its holder, bearing the king's seal, sign-manual and other marks is to be regarded as genuine.³ According to another text a document provided with the king's svakasta and sealed with his own seal is equal to an attested document in all affairs.⁴ Evidently such documents were in ancient times judicially recognised without any question as to their genuineness. A text of Prajāpati also goes to corroborate this view. It says that royal charters are by all means to be admitted in evidence for the decision of doubtful matters; they do not require any other formal proof except the fact that they bear a seal and a sign-manual.⁵ The reasons of the extraordinary degree of confidence placed in all public documents are not far to seek. First they emanated from the highest authority in the land and secondly

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¹. राजाकार्यकीिंवालय धार्येन्त स्वतिप्रणम। कार्यैतले विस्तरित घालित: चतुर्याचे वणम् II. 226.
². IX. 232.
³. सुदागर 'मुहिष्ठ' स्वस्विकारः। राख: सभारंगिण्य 'स्वधिमायति शासनम् II Sm. ch. p. 146.
⁴. कियाषिंदसानार्थयात्रिकितस्तथा। राजकीयं स्तुति भैरवः सभारंगिण्य शाखनम्।
   Viram, p. 195.
⁵. कार्यै वर्णे न सहित विन्यासी राजामान। राख: सहिती सुदागर्षकार्यस्तिमान।
   Viram p. 199.
all possible care was taken to give them a wide publicity. We find some smṛti texts which lay down that a royal grant should contain an address made by the king to the officials, the messengers, the physicians, the mahātāras, the relatives and even the mlecchas and chandaḷas in the land to the following effect: ‘I for the increase of religious merits of my father and mother and of myself make this grant to-day to So and So, son of So and So, who belongs to the Vedic school So and So’. Other smṛti texts inform us that the king was to declare in the grant itself for the information of future kings and ministers that the grant would hold good till the sun and the moon lasted and that it was to descend by right of inheritance to the son, grandson and more remote descendants and that it was never to be reduced or repudiated and that it was entirely exempt from all bhāvyas. He was also to declare that the reward of making a gift was residence in paradise for sixty thousand years and the punishment of repudiation was condemnation to hell for the same period. We know further that the grant was to contain a request from him to all future kings for the making of gifts in the following verse:

女士多尔巴 (multiāyāsā)
कादि कालि पल्ल्यम् सविद:।
सुभवितान्त्र: भाविनः पारिवंद्रानः
सुवि मुखो याचते रासः॥

A royal charter is essential, as Devāṇābhaṭṭa observes, not to complete or validate a gift, for a gift is valid as soon as the donee approves of it. It is necessary in so far as it serves to make a gift recorded in it permanently endurable. Yājñavalkya speaks of making a royal grant perma-

1. कुटुम्बिनीयदात्रेषुक्रियायुक्तामहाशास्त्रां । भेण्यविभाषार्थविवेकायुक्ताम । सापायिनीसाधरायां पञ्चायासंकेताय ||
Parāśara p. 123.

2. चन्द्राणायश्चार्थविवेकायुक्तामहाशास्त्राः। चन्द्राणायश्चार्थविवेकायुक्तामहाशास्त्राः।
दात: पल्ल्यम् सन्नी ग्रामदीपितामहाशास्त्राः।
दात: पल्ल्यम् सन्नी ग्रामदीपितामहाशास्त्राः।
दात: पल्ल्यम् सन्नी ग्रामदीपितामहाशास्त्राः।
दात: पल्ल्यम् सन्नी ग्रामदीपितामहाशास्त्राः।
Sm. ch. p. 127. Julius Jolly accepts the reading bhāga for bhāvyā and explains it as diminution by the allotment of shares to the king’s attendants and so forth.

3. एतेऽव शास्त्रेऽम दानोद्विजायूम । तद्न प्रतियंकायेत सविद:। Sm. ch. p. 128

4. किंतु दानो यथेक्षेप्यायूम; Sm. ch. p. 128,
ment. What he means by it is, Devaṇabhāṣa points out, that the gift registered in such a grant should be made permanent. These grants were intended undoubtedly to have the effect of title and in fact copper-plate grants are themselves the actual title deeds and certificates. Viśvaṃpāchārya says that a gift of land may be made permanent by Bhūmicchidranyāsa. Bhūmicchidranyāya is the expression generally occurring in the inscriptions. This term has not been explained by any one satisfactorily. The expression Bhūmicchidra is found in Kauṭilya's Arthāṭrāṇa and it means according to Prof. Shamsastri division of land: Būhler quotes three lines from Yādava's Vaijayantī and explains that bhūmicchidra means land unfit for tillage. Bhūmicchidranyāsa as used by Viśvaṃpāchārya may be understood to mean placing holes (ditches) in the land. These holes or ditches might have served as boundary marks for the lands given.

A technical rule in connection with a royal edict is that it should be written in a refined language, i.e., Sanskrit and be free from all vulgar and ungrammatical expressions. Authorities all agree that it should never be written in a local dialect.

Jayapatra

When a person gets possession of a movable or immovable property by means of adequate proofs or when he becomes victorious in a dispute regarding partition or is acquitted from a grave accusation, then the king who might have tried the case personally or through the chief judge should give him a decree which is called jayapatra (lit. a document of success). A jayaptra should generally comprise the matter adduced...
to be proved, the answer, the judge's ruling as to on whom the burden of proof should lie and his decision. It should bear the royal seal and be signed by the chief judge and other sabhyas or members of the tribunal. Katyāyana ordains that the king as well as the sabhāsādas (the judges) should give their svakhas or sign-manuals to it in accordance with the general rules for writing documents. As to what matters should be contained in a jayapatra we should also look to a verse of Vyāsa which runs as follows:

पुष्पोऽन्नति किर्यया पादे प्रमाणं तत् परीक्षयम्
निगद्द स्वतिकारकं यदा सम्विधितत्तमः
एतत् सर्वं समासिनः अप्येकं बिलिखयेत्

Mitramśra points out that owing to the separate mention of the word pramāṇa which means proof, kriya should be taken in a different sense. It may be taken in the sense of pratyavakalita which means nothing but the deliberation of the judges as to on which party the burden of proof will lie. Nigada means the depositions of witnesses. So the verse just quoted declares that a jayapatra should contain the plaint, the answer, the deliberation of the judges as to on whom the burden of proof should lie, proofs and their examination, the depositions of witnesses and last of all the injunctions of the legal treatises as interpreted by the members of the judicial tribunal. Katyāyana has two verses on the subject. Both of them seem to suggest that there should be a definite order to be followed in putting the contents in a jayapatra. But as there is no agreement between these two verses as regards the contents, the order suggested by

1. वधिकारशास्त्रांविषयेनसंयुक्तं स्त्रीरक्षितम्। सम्रासरुपसमूहं अयपवकोशामि।। (हस्तविषय) Mit. on II. 91.
2. प्रत्यवकालितत्त्वानं सम्बन्धं राजसूयां। सिद्धेद्वाराधिनः द्यायेण्यन्ति अयपवकोशम्।। (हस्तविषय) Mit. on II. 91.
3. सम्रासरुपसंयुक्तं रत्नं महत्त्वपूर्वकः। त्यथा सम्बन्धविशिष्टं विना॥। सम्रासरुपसंयुक्तं तथा सम्बन्धविशिष्टं विना॥॥
   Sm. ch. p. 130.
5. प्रवचनं वदव यथायां किंयादेशं प्रवाकलितम्यष्ट्र्तं। सम्रासरुपसिकार्यदिच्युतं। कथा किंयावत् धातां प्रवाकलितम्यष्ट्र्तं। Mitāk, on II. 8.
6. निगद्द साधिक्षचनम्। Sm. ch. p. 130.
them is not also identical. Thus one of them says that the first thing to be placed in a jayapatra should be the plaint and the answer and then the deliberations of the chief judge and other sabhyas or members of the tribunal or the members of the corporation as the case may be; then should be put the view of the legal treatises on the subject-matter of the suit in question and last of all the concurrence of the judges. A Hindu judgment shows that this concurrence was expressed by some such expression as sammatiratra and followed by the signature of the judge giving the concurrence in his own handwriting. The other verse of Katyayana declares that the contents of a jayapatra should be the pleadings, the deposition of each and every one of the witnesses, the manner in which the suit is decided and the actual decision of the suit. All these should find place in a jayapatra one after another in the order indicated, in pursuance of the rules for writing documents in general. Raghunandana thinks that the purpose of putting all these things in a jayapatra is to show that the judgment has been thorough in all respects. The utility of some of the contents of a jayapatra is also felt, Raghunandana further thinks, when the question of retrial comes up. Thus the prayer of the defeated party for a retrial with a plea quite different from that taken by him previously as revealed by the jayapatra will not

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1. शिबिराक्किमुखानां वर्णे प्राकृतिविशेषणं।
   समानो प्राकृतिविशेषण कुलानां वा तत्रः परम्॥
   निशच्यं स्क्तिविशेषण संह तत्तत्वं विवेचयेत्। Sm. ch. p. 130.


3. मतेश्वरो तु सदेव॥ Sm. ch. p. 130.

4. चचिन्द्रां्छल्लेश्वरो नितिन्त्र। साधनाचकाच। लिङ्गमय यथा तस्य यथा चालवत्स सब्दम॥
   एतदाधारं लेखां वधायूँ निवेशित॥ Raghunandan Vyavahāratattva p. 60.
   Sm. ch. reads प्रतिप चालाबाद्धत्वं तथा...in the first line and लेखा...in the last line. p. 130.

One of the meaning of the word ṛṣa is document and hence yathā-
ṛṣaram evidently means 'according to the rules of document.'

5. तत्तथ भाषिको िश्रयः च परस्पराद्विदां निपथेय अन्वयित्रायावाचाराच। निष्णवालाबितम
   माधवार्थादिकं संहि सिद्धांय। निरूपणं समकल्पद्वारात्सम। Vyavahāratattva
   p. 60. see also Vivādaṇavāsetu (manuscript).
be entertained. To put it in a concrete form, when the jayapatra shows that he was defeated by the submission of mithyottara (plea of denial) his application for a retrial with kāraṇottaru (plea of special exception) will be disallowed. In like manner an application for a retrial is also to be rejected when it is seen from the jayapatra that the proofs proposed to be adduced are of different kinds from those by which decision was previously arrived at. Now in the absence of any mention of reply and proofs in the jayapatra it would have been impossible to ascertain what kind of reply the defendant gave on the previous occasion or what kind of proof was resorted to. The value of a jayapatra as a whole is also immense to a defendant when he takes the plea of res judicata. Because according to Brhaspati and Vyāsa it is one of the principal means by which this plea can be substantiated.

Jayapatra seems to have several varieties and one of them is mentioned in a text of Kātyāyana. This text declares that when the complainant establishes his case by adducing evidence the jayapatra given to him is called paschātkāra. We quote the text below:

निर्देश तु किष्टा वष प्रमाणेन बाधिते ।
पदात्तकारी भविषयो न स्वयम् विषयमिते ॥

Devaṉabhaṭṭa points out that the word pramāṇa in this text indicates that the term paschātkāra may be applied to a jayapatra only when the four parts of a judicial proceeding are in existence and recorded in it. When there are only two parts, that is to say, when on account of the submission of satyottara by the defendant, adducement of proof and pratyākalita (deliberation as to on whom the burden of proof will lie) become unnecessary the record of victory containing these two parts,

1. तथाहि भाषारतलिखनं ज्ञानपत्रं पुनर्वचनपत्रं यथा प्राप्तस्य स्मृतिः। न द्वितीय प्रमाणम् निर्देशीति। पदात्तकारी भविषयो न स्वयम् विषयमिते। Vyavahāratattva (p. 60.) Vivādabhāṅgārṇava (manuscript).
2. प्रमाणपत्रलिखनं पुन: प्रमाणपत्रस्य यथा प्राप्तस्य स्मृतिः। Vyavahāratattva p. 60.
3. तत्र ज्ञानपत्रं पुन: समाक्षेपवचनम्। (Brhaspati) प्राक्कालप्रत्य पावनात्मकावचनम् बाधी न प्राविचलितावर्गम्। Sm. ch. P. 119.
4. प्रमाणार्थित्वं विद्याद्धवनकारं एव पदात्तकारी न स्वयम् सहितस्य स्मृतिः। (Vyāsa), Sm. ch. p. 119.
namely the plaint and the answer should be called *jayapatra* and not *paschāthkāra.*

The term *paschāthkāra* occurs also in the *Arthasastra* of Kauṭilya in the following rule:—

> यात्रानियोगमात्रिति भवनासहारेण प्रवातकारः।

Prof. Sham Sastri has taken the term in the sense of 'sentence of punishment' and rendered the passage as follows:—

Sentence of punishment shall be passed the very day that a defendant accused of assault fails to answer the charge made against him.

We think, however, that the term *paschāthkāra* occurring in the *Arthasastra* is not far different in meaning from that of the Dharmaśāstra. For the true meaning of the rule just referred to we should look elsewhere. It is laid down in the *Yājñavalkyasyāmṛti* that in a capital offence, theft, assault and abuse, where a cow is the cause of action, in slander and aggression, in a law suit where the character of a woman is involved or where the right over a slave girl is disputed, the defendant should be made to answer the charge immediately. Kātyāyana also echoes the spirit of this rule by saying that the proceedings should be speedy and immediate in actions done very recently. If we interpret Kauṭilya's rule in the light of the texts of Yājñavalkya and Kātyāyana it would mean that judgment (*paschāthkāra*) should be passed the very day the defendant fails to answer the charge of assault against him. We fully agree on these grounds, with Prof. Jūlius Jolly that *paschāthkāra* of Kauṭilya seems to contain a reference to the *jayapatra* of the Dharmaśāstras. The real importance of the mention of *paschāthkāra* in the *Arthasastra*

1. विवादव्यवस्थांत भाषीचरितं जाधवसमीतं, प्रवातकारींति तथाावदनवदकमेत् प्रविषिवादः। तीर्थं यस्य च श्रवणम्। विवादव्यवस्थांत भाषा एव बाझीचरितं श्रवणम्।


3. साधसन्दर्शनाध्यायिकं शास्त्रवेदं ययाम्। विवादव्यवस्थांत भाषा एव बाझीचरितं श्रवणम्।

4. सयं: कर्तव्यं सयं एव विवादव्यवस्थांति। कालांतत्त्वं वा कालं द्वारा प्रवाहितं प्रमुः।

should not be lost sight of. It undoubtedly serves as an evidence of the great antiquity of Indian jayapatras.

The Mitakṣara mentions another kind of document hinapatra by name. We know from a text of Katyāyana that contradiction, hostile attitude towards the witnesses and the judges, non-appearance, silence and absolence after being summoned—these are five of the causes of non-suit.1 We know further from some legal texts that the party non-suited, though he will not forfeit his claim to the subject matter of the suit, is liable to be punished.2 Now in order to punish him on some future occasion a judgment of non-suit is to be put on record3 and such a record is called hinapatra by the Mitakṣara perhaps in contradistinction to jayapatra.

From a text of Bṛhaspati and the interpretation put on it by Devanābhaṭṭa it appears that a record of defeat was sometimes awarded to the defeated party and it was also named jayapatra.4 Asahāya more appropriately calls it parājayapatra.5

We cannot conclude this topic without a further reference to the judgment of a Hindu Court which is contained in a jayapatra edited by Mr. K. P. Jayaswal.6 This judgment besides showing how a jayapatra was generally written, what were to be its contents and how they were to be arranged amply illustrates the rules of judicial procedure as obtained in ancient India. It shows also, Mr. Jayaswal points out, 'how stiff, severe

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1. जयवादी जितयाप्यी नीपापाता निष्ठिरः। जयवादीप्यायीप्रेम कृष्ण: घपयाप: सत्वः।

2. जयवादी पदनः; तय सियापयी पदनः। नीपापाता प्रेमभिवर धृष्टेद्रव्यः।

3. जयवादी प्रेमवर्धिष्यापयी पदनः।

4. जयवादी प्रेमवर्धिष्यापयी पदनः।

5. जयवादी प्रेमवर्धिष्यापयी पदनः।

and dignified, technical, methodical and scrupulously formal a Hindu judgment used to be' and 'how the provisions of Hindu law were applied in actual administration of law.' Another remark of Mr. Jayaswal made in a separate and illuminating article on this judgment will bear repetition: 'The procedure followed in Hindu courts in respect of civil trials was as precise as is observed to day in any modern court of law in any part of the civilized world. We are apt to regard the present system of laws and its administration as a recent revelation to the new world. But the remnants of the laws and literature that have survived foreign invasions in India are progressively convincing us every day that the political and legal institutions of ancient India could by no means compare unfavourably with those that have replaced them in modern times.' The matter under the judgment is an original suit brought by one Tularam Sarman jointly with his co-sharers against Maninath Sarman for getting possession over a domestic slave girl. The defendant wins the case and the jayapatra is given to him. In it are first mentioned the names of the parties in full. Then it records the gist of the plaint and the nature of the answer given to it by the defendant. Then follow the deliberations as to on which party the burden of proof should lie. As the defendant submits a mithyottara it is ruled that the plaintiff is to be put on proof. Issues are next settled and adjournments dealt with. The plaintiff's proposal to call in a single witness is disallowed on the authority of Dharmaśāstras. Then the defendant prays for permission to resort to the proof of ordeal and this also is not granted on the authority of legal treatises. After all these the plaintiff is declared to have lost his case. A very important point of law regarding the proof of possession which we shall have occasion to refer to is also discussed. All these things are put in the jayapatra one after another. It is in the handwriting of and signed by the chief judge (prāṇivāka) and addressed to other judges who form the tribunal. They also sign it and declare their 'concurrence herein' (sammatiratram). The jayapatra is full of references to the precepts of celebrated sages, learned disquisitions and subtle arguments on many principles of Hindu law and everything done in it is in strict accordance with the directions of the Hindu law texts.


2. Here the plaintiff makes default and is non-sued; but he does not lose his claim to the subject matter of the suit. Proceedings therefore are in retrial. This is in accordance with the ruling of the Mitākṣarā.
Another *jayapatra* deserves mention in this connection. It is not in Sanskrit but in ancient Javanese. It formed the subject matter of a Dutch paper by Dr. Brandes, the substance of which is given by Prof. Jülius Jolly in an interesting article in an issue of the *Calcutta Weekly Notes.* A special importance attaches to this Javanese *jayapatra* mainly for the reason that the rules of Javanese law books, as pointed out by Dr. Brandes tend to corroborate the close relationship of Javanese law with the Dharma-sūtras of India. Thus the four parts of a judicial proceeding in Javanese law, viz, the plaint, declaration, pleadings and judgment are very similar to, if not identical with, the four parts of an Indian trial, viz, plaint, answer, examination and judgment. The rule that making default in the court causes loss of one's suit may be traced to the maxim of Nārada (1.2.32) that he who takes to flight after receiving the summons shall lose his suit. The rule regarding the *jayapatra* or document of success, which the successful party (or both parties) is to receive from the Court, whenever the sentence has been pronounced in accordance with the law book, agrees with the ruling of the *smṛtis*; e.g. where Vṛddha Vāsiṣṭha states that the successful plaintiff after having proved his cause, shall be given a *jayapatra*, and where Brhaspati ordains (VI.3), that the whole transactions in a suit shall be recorded in the document stating the success (of the claimant or defendant).

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1. Vol XXV. No. 32.
A COMPARATIVE STUDY

OF

A FEW JAIN ARDHAMĀGADHI TEXTS

WITH THE TEXTS OF THE BUDDHIST PALI CANON.

[PROF. P. V. BAPAT M. A.]

A study of the life-accounts of the two great founders of the religious sects of the Jains and the Buddhists reveals several interesting similarities. Their births in the kșatriya families, their childhood spent in great luxury, their disgust with worldly pleasures, their wandering in search of the way to salvation, their self-mortification, their attainment of omniscience, their life-pursuits as wandering preachers and their final Parinirvāṇa, offer striking similarities. In certain cases this similarity is even extended to the several minute details of their lives. Mahāvīra's conception, birth, renunciation, enlightenment and death on one and the same Nakṣatra (the Hatthuttara Nakṣatta), have their counterparts in Gotama Buddha's birth, Bodhi (enlightenment) and Parinirvāṇa on one and the same day—the full-moon day of Vaiśākha. Miracles are said to have taken place at the birth of both of them. A god or gods try to persuade both of them to preach the doctrine to the people. In the case of both of them we find that Sakka accepts their hair, when it is cut off by them. Mahāvīra's exclamation incorporating his firm determination to abstain from sins (Sabbat me aparṇijjam pāpaṃ) may be fully compared with Gotama Buddha's famous tenet, 'Sabbā pāpassa akaraṇam' [Dhp. 183].

When thus we find such striking similarities even in the lives of the founders of these two religious sects, it is no wonder if we find these similarities carried on extensively

in their teachings, or the religious practices introduced by them, the rules of guidance prescribed by them for the monks and nuns, their attitude towards women, the importance attached by them to qualities like self-control, self-contentment etc., their disregard for magic charms and incantations, their scruples for the preservation of life, their preference of internal purity to the external one, their attitude towards the doctrines of contemporary philosophers or religious sects, and their ideas of the final state of deliverance. What is more is that we find the similarities not only in thought but even in words and expressions that are used to convey those thoughts. There are hundreds of phrases and expressions which are common to both the Jain and Buddhist texts.

Let us turn, first, to passages referring to contemporary philosophical beliefs or religious practices found in both the Jain and Buddhist texts.

The views of contemporary philosophers like Pūrṇa Kassapa, Moppalā Gōsāla, Ajita Kesa Kambali and Pakudha Kaccāyana are found in almost similar words in the passages referred to below in the footnotes. Among the disputative philosophers prominently mentioned are the Kriyāvādis, Akriyāvādis, Agranāvādis, and Vainayikavādis in the Jain books. In the Mahāvagga (vi. 31) also, we find three of these mentioned, where Gotama explains away the several names of philosophical heretics which may be used with reference to himself and which may be partly justified.

Reference to Cātuyāma Saṅavara is also found in both the Jain and Buddhist texts, though the Buddhist books sometimes give a wrong interpretation to that term (cf. Dīgha I. 2. 7. I. 2. 29; M. N. 56th sutta). The explanation given of the same term in Dīgha vol. III, 25th sutta, however,
mainly agrees with the Jain idea of the four vows of Pārśva, the predecessor of Mahāvīra. The Jain doctrine of Leśyas resembles, curiously enough, the sixfold classification of mankind referred to in Buddhist books. The aseptic practices like those of abstaining from food specially prepared for them or of taking food only once in too, three, four, eight or thirty days, are met with in both kinds of texts. The practice of Uposatha on the 8th day or the last day of a fortnight is common to both the Jains and Buddhists. Some special vows (in addition to the usual ones) are to be observed on that day, which is to be spent as a holy day, both by the monks and the laity. Both the Jains and Buddhists classify their community into four main divisions—Bhikṣus, Bhikṣunis, Upāsakas and Upāsikās. Corresponding to the Jain theory of 24 Tīrthankaras, we find among the Buddhists also a theory of 24 (or according to another version, 27) predecessors of the historical figure of Gotama Buddha.

The argument about the inefficacy of baths is often tendered in both the Jaina and Buddhist texts. If purity lay in baths, then the worst criminals or sinners would be sure of reaching the state of absolution or deliverance by diving into water morning and evening. Following the same strain of argument it is further said, that if deliverance consisted in such baths, then even water-creatures like fishes, tortoises, serpents or crocodiles would attain that final state of bliss.

Just as we find references to the Jain views or Jain practices in Buddhist books, so also we find references in

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8 Ang. vol. III. p. 383 (P.T.S.); also in the comm. on the Dīgha, 2nd Sutta;
9. Sūya. I. 9.14; I. 11.14; II. 6.40; also I. 2.9; cf. Dhp. 70,
Jain books to the Buddhist views as well as views of contemporary philosophers. A Jain text ascribes to the Buddhists the view that happiness can be obtained only by leading a life of ease and comfort:—“ihamege u bhāsanti sātaṃ sātena vijjati” [Sūya I. 3. 4. 6]; a Buddhist text also refers exactly to the same charge that was levelled against the Buddhists by the Niganthas—a term used in Pali texts for the Jains.—

“Na kho āvuso Gotama sukhaṇa sukham, Dukkhena kho sukhaṃ adhigantabbaṃ.”

[M. N. 14th sutta; Para 7.]

Mention is made in both kinds of books of several philosophers sticking to their own respective views which they proclaim from the house tops, while at the same time they condemn others who hold views different from theirs. Both the extremes are to be avoided and the middle path is to be followed. Attachment for what is old or new, or what is present, is to be avoided. Belief in the doctrine of karma and that the merit or worth of a man depends not upon high or low birth but upon one’s own actions, is strongly supported in both the texts. One must keep oneself away from the doctrines of eternity or non-eternity.

There are certain miscellaneous passages where we find a good deal of similarity between the Jain and Buddhist texts; as for instance, the passage in मह इ. 1. 30th on low arts, professions which are forbidden to both the Buddhist and Jain monks, may be suitly compared with the Pali passage in the Dīgha Nikāya I. 21-27. Gandhāri vijjā referred to in the former passage is also met with in the Kevāṭṭa Sutta (Para 4) of the Dīgha. Āhavani of the Jain text corresponds to Āthabbaṇa of the Suttanipata stanza 927, which

Miscellaneous parallel passages

moreover contains some other low arts like those of interpreting dreams or cries of birds, or close proximity of certain stars or practice of medical science for gaining one's livelihood. The cattāri bīyakāya of Sūya II. 3. 43rd Sutta (Agga bīyā, Mālabīyā, Porabīya and Khandhabīyā) together with the bījabījā which the commentator ascribes to Nāgarjuniyas, correspond to the five mentioned in Diṅgha I. 1. 11 (Mojjhima Sīla). So also the passage Sūya II. 1. 9th sutra: "Ādāhāṇāḥ parehiṣṇu nijjai,..............paccāgacchanti" closely resembles that in Diṅgha 2-23. "Āsandipāṇcamā purisa..............bhavuti." Also compare Sūya. II. 1. 9th sutra: "Uddhāṁ pādālā ahekaggā nattthāyā tiriyāṁ tayapariyante jīve" with M. N. 10th Sutta, para 6, "imameva kāyaṁ uddhāṁ pādālā adho kesamattthakā taccapariyantaṁ pūram."

There are certain generalisations or universal truths found to be common in both the Jaina and Buddhist books and in not a few cases the ideas are expressed in similar words. "Dullabhe'yaṁ Samussae" [Sūya I. 15. 17]. "Mārussam khu sudullahamū" [Utta. XXX. 11] may be compared with "kiccho manussa paśilabho" [Dhp. 182]. Telling a lie even in joke is forbidden. 17 Similarly the idea that one's own relatives or possessions can afford no perfect security or cannot save us from the inevitable is common to both the Jain and Buddhist texts; 18 so also the ideas that one is the maker or master of oneself and that therefore one need not depend upon others, or that one's own self is difficult to be controlled, 19 and that if one's own self is not properly restrained it would do us more harm than what an enemy can do. 20 The company of fools is always to be avoided and that if one does not secure, as a friend, any

person superior to or at least equal to oneself, it is better to remain alone.\textsuperscript{21} Knowing that life is dear to all and comparing oneself with others, one should abstain from doing harm to any animal or living being, and should cultivate friendly feelings for all animals in all directions.\textsuperscript{22} Self-control is highly extolled in both kinds of texts.\textsuperscript{23} A man practising self-mortification, such as taking food only once a month, is not worth even the sixteenth part of him if he has not understood the law.\textsuperscript{24} No person is liable to be free from death.\textsuperscript{25}

The picture of a monk portrayed in Jain texts closely agrees with that of a Buddhist monk described in Buddhist books. Leaving behind all his relatives and possessions, a monk is to stay in forests away from the inhabited areas.\textsuperscript{26} He should be calm and quiet, bearing all the inclinations of heat or cold, or the bites of gnats and mosquitoes and should overcome all delight or disgust.\textsuperscript{27} He should cultivate forbearance, should not retaliate even when he is abused or struck by others.\textsuperscript{28} He should keep away his rod and should have none to oppose.\textsuperscript{29} He may go to towns and villages for merely securing food and while going he should be perfectly restrained with his eyes down-cast and looking only a few yards ahead.\textsuperscript{30} When he goes to inhabited areas, he has to accept food, good or bad, whatever comes to his lot,\textsuperscript{31} avoiding at the same time that which is specially prepared for him.\textsuperscript{32} He should be moderate in his food.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{21} Āyā I. 3, 2, 3. Uutta. XXV. 5; cf. Dhp. 62, 330, S. N. 47.
\textsuperscript{22} Āyā I. 2, 3, 8; cf. Dhp. 130 cf. Āyā I. 2, 3, 12, 1, 9, 3, 7, (5), cf. Śūya II. 6, 41, I. 13; Uutta VIII. 10 cf. Dhp. 142, 405. Śūya I. 14, 14 cf. S. N. 149
\textsuperscript{23} Uutta. IX. 34 cf. Dhp. 103; 24. Uutta. IX. 44 cf. Dhp. 70.
\textsuperscript{24} Āyā. I. 2, 3, 8, I. 4, 1, 4. cf. S. N. 576, 577.
\textsuperscript{25} Āyā I. 2, 6, 7; I. 5, 3, 15, I. 9, 3, 2, cf. Uutta XV. 4. S. N. 72, 338, 960, 969.
\textsuperscript{27} Uutta. II. 24, 27 cf. Dhp. 389, S. N. 932, 971.
\textsuperscript{28} Āyā I. 9, 3, 7, (5), I. 3, 3, 19, Śūya I. 13, 23, II. 6, 41. cf. Dhp. 142, 405 405, S. N. 365. 30. Āyā II. 12, 1. 6 cf. S. N. 922, 927.
\textsuperscript{29} Āyā II. 10, 9, 4 cf. S. N. 356. 32. Śūya. I. 9-14, I. 11, 14, II. 6, 40.
and should not accept delicious food unless absolutely necessary on account of sickness. He should not manifest any signs of pleasure or displeasure whether he gets food or not.

As for the clothes, a Jain monk appears to have been allowed the use of cloth, if he thinks that he cannot overcome the sense of shame of wandering naked just as a Buddhist monk is allowed the three Čivaras. He cannot, however, accept high or costly pieces of cloth. They must be of rough, coarse cloth. Even the names used for these pieces are similar—Antarijāga, cf. Pāli Antarāvasaka, Uttarājāga, cf. Uttarāsanga. Saṃghādi, cf. Saṃghāsi.

He should not keep any store of food, clothes or other things that he uses. He should take with him, as a Buddhist monk is asked to do, all his clothes when he goes on his begging round, like a bird fitting in the air with all its wings. He does not engage himself in any worldly trades, nor does he earn his livelihood by prescribing medicines or by interpreting signs, prognostications or dreams or by telling prophecies.

He abstains from attending all kinds of shows such as dances, or theatrical performances appealing to the vulgar tastes or from listening to all kinds of music—vocal or instrumental. He should not adorn himself with any kinds of ornaments or fine clothes. He should, in fact, care little for external appearance including even cleanliness. This tendency on the part of the Jains has led them, rather to an extremity—that is, to the aversion of all kinds of baths, or even washing of the teeth or mouth.

34. Āyā II. 10. 10. cf. Pāci. 39.
38. Āyā II. 14. 2. 2, Utt. VI. 16, cf. S. N. 924; Dīgha 2.66—“Seyyatā pi, mahārāja pakkhi sapuno......... Samādayeva pakkamati.”
39. Āyā I. 2. 5. 4. 13. 2. 14; Uutta. II. 33. VIII. 13. XV. 7. XX. 45; Sūya I. 12. 9-10 I. 14. 19; cf. Niss 20; S. N. 360, 927, 929; Dīgha 1. 23-25. (Sec. on ‘mahasīla’.)
40. Āyā II. 20.14 cf. naccagīta vādita visukādassanā veramaṇī.
from baths is considered as essential as abstaining from the company of women: “Virate siṅgātasu itthiyāsu (Sūya I. 7. 22).” This extreme tendency of the Jains could not but have an effect even upon the practical Buddhists. There is a rule laid down for the Buddhist monks that it would be an offence, to be dealt with according to law, to take a bath in less than a fortnight except on occasions specially mentioned.\textsuperscript{43} He should care more for the internal purity to be attained by observing rules of moral conduct. He abstains from murder, theft, falsehood and incontinence. These four rules of the Buddhist Pañcasīḷas exactly correspond to the four of the pañcamahāhavayāṣa of the Jains.

The scrupulous care observed by the Jains for the sanctity and preservation of life could not but have an effect upon the Buddhists. Here also the Jains went to an extremity while the Buddhists were guided by the practicability of the problem in fixing certain limitations. The Jains, for instance, abstain from the use of all cold water, while the practical Buddhists were content with the rule of avoiding the use of water when it is full of insects. “Yo pana bhikkhu jānaṁ sappāṇaṁ uṛḍhaṁ pariṣṭhitijñeyaṁ, Pācittiyaṁ (Pāc. 62). Even if the remains of food are to be thrown away, the Buddhist takes care to see that he throws them on the ground where there is little grass, or in water where there are few insects (appaharite vā appāṇake udeke). The origin of Vassāvāsa (staying together in one place for the rainy season) is traced in both kinds of texts—Jain and Buddhist—to the same scrupulousness for the sanctity of life.\textsuperscript{45} The Buddhist monk is forbidden to kill any animal for maintaining oneself,\textsuperscript{44} nor is he allowed to take flesh which he knows,\textsuperscript{45} hears or suspects to have been specially

\textsuperscript{41} Áyā I. 9 4. 2. (1); Uutta. II. 9, Sūya II. 1. 15; II. 4. 67th sutra.
\textsuperscript{42} Pāc. rule 57. “Yo pana bhikkhu orenaddhamāsaṁ nahayeyya aññatara samayā pācittiyaṁ.”
\textsuperscript{43} Áyā II. 12 1. 1. cf. Mahā III. 3. 1.
\textsuperscript{44} Mahā VI. 31. “Na ca mayaṁ jīvitaḥetu pi saśicca pāṇaṁ jīvitaṁ voropeyyāma.”
\textsuperscript{45} Mahā VI. 31. “Na bhikkhave jānām uddissakatam maṇsap pari

bhuṇijtabbaṁ.”
prepared for himself. It must be 'tikoṭiparisuddham'. The same regard for the sanctity of life is responsible for the rules prohibiting the Buddhist monk from digging the earth or cutting trees and other vegetation.\(^4\)\(^6\)

Abstaining from theft and falsehood is equally insisted upon.\(^4\)\(^7\) Telling a lie is not allowed even in joke.\(^4\)\(^8\) This commission of sin is represented in both kinds of texts as threefold—\(i.e.\) when one oneself does it, or causes others to do it, or when one gives consent to it when it is done by others.\(^4\)\(^9\)

Buddhism and Jainism being both of predominantly ascetic tendencies, we cannot expect them to be allowing the monks to move freely in the society of women. On the contrary, we see that both kinds of texts advise them to avoid their company and keep themselves away from their talk, laughter and music. They should not even gaze at them [No lāsu cakkhu samdhejjā (Sūya I. 4. 1. 5)]. This exactly corresponds to the advice Gotama gave, just before his Parinibbāṇa, to his favourite disciple, Ānanda, who asked for his Master's advice, as to how the Bhikkhus should behave towards women.\(^5\)\(^0\) We cannot expect from these sects a very charitable view of womankind. Women are considered as obstacles in the progress of men towards the final state of deliverance and though they are difficult to be got rid of, all the same they deserve to be cast aside as mire and dirt.\(^5\)\(^1\) A Bhikṣu as it were falls down from his holy life of celibacy, even if he listens to the talk, laughter or singing of women, sitting on the other side of a wall, partition or a curtain, or even when he remembers his past dalliance with them.\(^5\)\(^2\)

He not only abstains from committing moral sins but

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46. Pāci 10 and 11. 47. Āyā. II. 16. 1. 1; Sūya I. 3. 4. 19.
49. Āyā II. 24. 40-42. 1. 10. 22 cf. S. N. 394, 395, 397.
50. Digha II. 16. 5. 9.
His indifference to worldly honour or respect.

is also far from having any hankering after honour and respect. 53 He never allows the peace of his mind to be disturbed by profit or loss, pain or pleasure, praise or censure, fame or no fame. 54 Thus leaving behind all worldly things, he cultivates meditation in a place of retirement in the forest, without allowing himself to be cowed down by any fears, real or imaginary. 55 He is free from all ties. He has feelings of equanimity for all. He cares not either for life or death. 56 He cuts his Samsāra and is on the path towards the final state of deliverance. 57 When he has attained this final state of deliverance, he is above all description. No words are adequate to describe him. "Sabbe sarā niyāñcanti takkā jattha ṅa vijjati,

Mati tattha ṅa gāhitā oe appatitthāpasse kheyaṃne. 58"

We have seen so far from the detailed parallelisms given above, how the subject-matter in both the Jain Ardhāmāgadhī and Buddhist Pali texts is found to be similar in many respects. Now let us turn to the other aspect of the question—I mean, the form of presentation or the manner of expression.

We find that there are many similes, metaphors or illustrations which are common in both the Jain and Buddhist texts. As for instance, the simile of a mountain not being shaken by the wind, 59 that of wind not meeting with any resistance from a net, 60 that of a lake with a clean and transparent water, 61 that of a big boar being fed on food, 62 that of a Māluvā creeper entangling itself with all the

54. Utta. XIX. 90; cf. Dhp. 81; Ud. III. 3. Dhp. 83.
57. Utta. XXIX. 4.
58. With this stanza from Āyā. cf. S. N. 1074, 1076. Ud. VIII. 10.
59. Utta. XXI. 19, Sūya I. II. 23, Āyā II. 2. 5. 3. cf. Dhp. 81, Ud. II. 3-4.
60. Sūya I. 15. 8. cf. S. N. 71, 213. 61. Āyā I. 5. 5. 1, Sūya I. 2. 2. 17, cf. Dhp. 82.
branches of a tree,\textsuperscript{53} that of the Moon being the chief of all the constellations of stars,\textsuperscript{54} that of a serpent casting off its slough,\textsuperscript{55} that of a cowherd who does not become the master of the cows he is in charge of, by simply counting them,\textsuperscript{66} that of a mirage, or foam or bubbles in water with which the physical body is compared,\textsuperscript{67} that of the bright sun in the sky.\textsuperscript{68} The cutting of attachment is compared to the cutting off of a lotus growing in the \textit{Sarat} season.\textsuperscript{69} The muni or the Brähmaṇa not attached to any worldly things is compared to drops of water on a leaf or a lotus.\textsuperscript{70}

The similes of fire\textsuperscript{71} covered with ashes, or a strong elephant sixty years old,\textsuperscript{72} or a gambler and his die\textsuperscript{73} are also met with. The illustrations of a carpenter cutting off his wood for the wheel of his carriage,\textsuperscript{74} of a hero or an elephant standing at the brunt of the battle,\textsuperscript{75} or of \textit{muni} and \textit{isikā}, or asi and kosi\textsuperscript{76} are also to be found. The simile of ‘as firm as an island’ also often occurs.\textsuperscript{77}

This similarity is further extended to many phrases and expressions and in not a few cases also to words—

\begin{itemize}
\item [\textit{Veyaraniṁ }bhiduggām] \textsuperscript{[Sūya I. 5. 1. 8]} Cf. \textit{Atha} \textit{Vetaraṇim} \textit{panaduggaṁ} \textsuperscript{[S. N. 674]}
\item [\textit{Vippariyāsamuventi}] \textsuperscript{[Ayā I. 2. 6. 3]} Cf. \textit{Vipariyāsamentei}.
\item [\textit{Jassa naththi mamāyitaṁ}] \textsuperscript{[Ayā I. 2. 6. 4]} Cf. \textit{Yassa naththi mamāyitaṁ} \textsuperscript{[S. N. 950]}
\end{itemize}

\begin{itemize}
\item [\textsuperscript{63}] Sūya, I. 3. 2. 10 cf. Dhp. 162, S. N. 272.
\item [\textsuperscript{64}] Sūya I. 6. 19, Utta. XXV. 6 cf. S. N. 569.
\item [\textsuperscript{65}] Ayā, II. 25......(?) cf. Magasutta in S. N.
\item [\textsuperscript{66}] Utta. XXII. 45 cf. Dhp. 20.
\item [\textsuperscript{67}] Utta. XIX. 13. cf. Dhp. 46, 170.
\item [\textsuperscript{68}] Utta. XXI. 23 cf. Ud. I. 3.
\item [\textsuperscript{69}] Utta. X. 28 cf. Dhp. 255.
\item [\textsuperscript{70}] Utta. XXV. 26 cf. Dhp. 401, S. N. 71, 213. 811, 812.
\item [\textsuperscript{71}] Utta. XXV. 18. cf. Dhp. 71.
\item [\textsuperscript{72}] Utta. XI. 18 cf. M. N. 35th suutta, para 3.
\item [\textsuperscript{73}] Utta. V. 16. cf. Dhp. 252.
\item [\textsuperscript{74}] Sūya I. 4. 1. 9 cf. M. N. 5th suutta, para 8.
\item [\textsuperscript{75}] Ayā I. 9. 3. 8. I. 9. 3. 13, II. 25. 2 cf. Dhp. 320, M. N. 61st suutta.
\item [\textsuperscript{76}] Sūya II. 1.9th suutta cf. Digha 2:86.
\item [\textsuperscript{77}] Ayā I. 6.5.5 cf. Dhp. 25, 236, 238.
\end{itemize}
Ukkusonna\-va\-naca\-ma\-yā\-ṇiya\-di-kūṭa\-kavaṇa\-sā\-sampa\-yoga bahutā [Sūya II. 2. 29th sutra]
Cf. Ukkotana\-va\-naca\-nikati\-sāciyoga.....[Di\-gha I. 1. 10]

Puvva\-thai pacchaṇēvātī. [Āyā I. 5. 23] Pubbu\-thai pacchaṇēpātī.

Iccatthaṁ ga\-dhie loe [Āyā I. 5. 23] Ettha gattito loko.
Uḍ\-dhāṁ ahe tiriyaṁ disāsu [Āyā I. 8. 18] Cf. Uddhaṁ adho ca tiriyaṁ ca [S. N. 155]
Āhārovacayā dehā [Āyā I. 8. 3]. 5], sarīrakaṁ āhāro\-vaiyaṁ, Cf. Āhāropacito deho.

Kīvā\-naṇaṇaṁ mage [Āyā II. 10. 2. 1] Cf. kapaṇaddhiṇaṇaṁ vanīpakānaṁ.


Uccara\-pasava\-naṁ [Sūya II. 2. 29] Cf. Uccāra passāva.
Nāde\- āramaṇaṇaṁ Rm. Nātide jutā nāccāsanne.
Jahāvāṭ tathākārī Cf. Yathāvadi tathākārī.
Asaṁsatto gihatthehi Cf. Asaṁsaṭṭho gahaṭṭhehi.
Kā arati ke āṇande [Āyā I. 3. 3. 8] Cf. Ko nu hāso kimānando [Dhp. 146]

Arattaṁ virattatā maṇi\-kuṇḍalaṁ saha hiraṇṇaṁ itthiyāo pari\-gijjhā tathamhe ratta [Āyā I. 2. 3. 5]
Cf. Ārattarattā maṇi\-kuṇḍalesu puttesu dāresu ca ya apeckkāha [Dhp. 345]

Diṭṭhaṁ suyaṁ maṇaṁ vinnāyam [Āyā I. 4.14]
Cf. Diṭṭha\-suta\-muta\-viṇṇātesu. [S. N. 1086]
Adiṭṭhānaṁ asuyāṇaṁ amaṇaṇaṁ [Sūya II. 7.81st sutra]
Adiṭṭhaṁ asutaṁ mutaṁ avīṇṇātam [S. N. 1122].
Aniṭṭhe akante appie asubhe amaṇnune amaṇaṁ dukkhe ṇo suhe [Sūya II. 1. 13th sutra] may be compared and contrasted with Pāli it\-ṭṭha kantā maṇiṭṭha, piyarūpā kāmapasam-
hitā rajanīyā.

[ [M. N. 13th Suṭṭa, para 4] }
Here is a list of some of the words which have close affinity in form and meaning:—


There are certain other words which are both identical in form and meaning: bondī, āmagandho, Kali, maha (in the sense of festival), Cīvara, Gandhāri (vijjā), Santhava, āsava, bherava etc.

Some of the Buddhist technical terms are also met with in Jain Ardhamagadhi literature—Vijjā and caraṇa, aroppa, bhippu yañāṇa (like hīnayāna, mahaḥyāna, vajrayāna, bhadrayāna etc.)

Occasionally we find similarity even in the idiom of the language; for instance, Jeṇeva Bhagavaṇ Mahāvīrre teṇeva uvācagachai [Sūya II. 7. 81] may be compared with the Pali idiom in ‘Yena Bhagava tenupasaṃkami’, or in some peculiarity as the dropping of the final rasal in the genitive plural form of a substantive. We find asuṇa eṇa etc.
used for asuāṇāṃ, eṭṭāṇāṃ etc., just as we find in Pāli Buddhāna for Buddhānaṃ.

The words like 'evaṃ me sutam' which generally we have to read at the beginning of a Pāli sutta have their counterpart in 'Snaṃ me āsanaṃ' of a Jain text.

The mnemonic enumerations which are abundantly met with in Pali literature, particularly in the Anguttara nikāya and Abhidhamma Piṭaka, like three fires, four floods, five nīvaraṇas, six causes of quarrels, seven saṃbojjas, eight viṃekkhas, ten dharmas etc., have their parallels in eight madas, nine kinds of Bāmbhaguttis, ten kinds of Bhikkhuddhammas, twenty-one sabalas, twenty-two Parisēhas, twenty-five Bhāvanas etc. So also for the word 'Pe'. (Peyyālam) used to avoid the full repetition of a famous passage, or a passage that has occurred in full previously, we find the word 'Jāva' used in Ardhamāgadhi Jain texts.

Thus we have seen now that there is a close similarity observed between the Jain Ardhamāgadhī and Buddhist Pāli texts, not only in the subject-matter or thought but also in the form or manner of expression.

When we see that references in Jain books to the views of contemporary philosophical heretics agree substantially with the views expressed in Buddhist Pāli books, when several generalisations or universal truths are expressed in similar words, when the rules of conduct dictated for a Jain monk, when his outward appearance, his mental and moral equipment, his indifference towards all worldly arts which may be of use to him in securing a living, his attitude towards woman, or profit and loss, his meditation and the state of his final deliverance have a strikingly close resemblance with the rules guiding the conduct of a Buddhist monk, and with the general picture that is drawn of him in Buddhist texts, and when further we see that the similes, metaphors, and illustrations, the phrases, expressions and even words used to convey those thoughts are similar and when there is agreement even in certain peculiarities of both the literatures, what conclusion can we reasonably draw from them?
Do they not show that both Pāli and Ardhamaṇḍagadhi literatures must have originally grown together side by side in a province and must have considerably acted and reacted upon each other? We know that the founders of these two sects were contemporaries, living together and doing their life-work in the same province of the so-called middle country (maṭhāna deśa) adopting, for the propagation of their own faiths, the same peripatetic methods of preaching their doctrines and thus trying to secure followers for their own religious systems. Under these circumstances, it would really have been a wonder if they had not exercised immense influence upon each other*.

* Prof. A. Berriedale Keith in his article “Pāli, the language of the southern Buddhists” in the Sept. 1925 issue of the Indian Historical Quarterly has summarised the various views regarding the origin of Pāli. Geiger (who is in general harmony with Windisch) holds that Pāli is actually a variety of Ardhamāṇḍagadhi, while Lüders merely holds that it is a western dialect—not precisely specified—into which Ardhamāṇḍagadhi works have been translated. Prof. Keith also states that the texts in Ardhamāṇḍagadhi had an immense influence on the form of the Canon of the Buddhists.

But are we really justified to say that Ardhamāṇḍagadhi forms the basis of Pāli or that the latter is a variety of Ardhamāṇḍagadhi, or that the texts in the Ardhamāṇḍagadhi have been translated into Pāli? I believe, this is doubtful. But this is altogether a new issue which may be discussed in a separate paper.

**ABBREVIATIONS**

Ang—Anguttara Nikāya  
Āyā—Āyāranga Sutta  
Dhp—Dhammapada  
Dīgha—Dīgha Nikāya  
Jat—Jātakaṭṭhakathā (Nidānakathā)  
Mahā—Mahāvagga  
M. N.—Majjhima Nikāya  

Niss—Nissagāgga Pācittaya  
Pāci—Pācittiya  
S. N.—Suttaniyā  
Sūya—Sūyagaṭṭhanga  
Ud—Udāna  
Utta—Uttarakajhayaṇa  
V. M.—Visuddhimagga.

The references are mostly to Devanāgarī editions whenever available. In the case of Mahā, the Roman character edition and in the case of other Pāli books (not printed in Devanāgarī script) Sinhalese editions have been used, unless otherwise referred to.
THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE SĀTAVĀHANA KINGS—

The date of Gautamiputra Sātakarni and his son

(DR. R. C. MAJUMDAR M.A., P.R.S., PH. D.).

The accepted view about the date of Gautamiputra Sātakarni and his son was expressed as follows by Mr. Rapson in his Catalogue of the Andhra Coins in the year 1908.

"The last recorded date of Nahapāna is Saka 46 = 124 A.D., but there is no evidence to show how long he continued to reign after this date (P. xxvi)...Gautamiputra’s conquest of Nahapāna seems undoubtedly to have taken place in the 18th year of his reign. We therefore have the equation:

Gautamiputra’s year 18 = 124 A.D., or 124 A.D. + x." (p. xxvii)

"Gautamiputra Śrī Sātakarni (last recorded year, 24 = A.D. 130 + x) was succeeded by his son Vāsāḷiputra Śrī Puḷumāyi who is known to have reigned for at least 24 years. It is evident, then, that he must be identified with the ‘Śātakarni, Lord of the Deccan,’ whom Rudradāman (inscr. dated Saka 72 = A.D. 150) twice in fair fight completely defeated, but did not destroy on account of the nearness of their connection (p. xxxvii—xxxviii)."

This view has since been challenged in some of its essential aspects by two distinguished scholars, Prof. D. R. Bhandarkar and Mr. R. D. Banerji. I propose to show in the present paper that they have failed to invalidate the conclusions put forward by Mr. Rapson.

Mr. R. D. Banerjee has tried to show in his paper on ‘Nahapāna and the Śaka Era’ “that the dates in the inscriptions of Nahapāna’s son-in-law Ushavādana at Nasik and Karle and of his minister Ayama at Junnar, cannot be referred to the same era as that used on the inscriptions and coins of Chashṭana’s dynasty” (p. 285) and “As the era used in the coins and inscriptions of Chashṭana and his line is the Saka era of 78 A.D., therefore the era used in the records of Nahapāna’s son-in-law and minister must be some earlier one.” (p. 288).

It would, of course, necessarily follow that the dates of Gautamiputra and Puḷumāyi will also have to be pushed back to a period considerably earlier than that suggested by Mr. Rapson.

Mr. Banerji seeks to establish his proposition by showing that the accepted views produce a variety of impossible results. I shall consider these points one by one.

(1) Mr. Banerji argues: "Suppose we agree that Ṛahapāna was dethroned by Gautamīputra Sātakarṇi in the year 46 of the Śaka era, which was also the eighteenth regnal year of the Andhra king. Then we find that Gautamīputra held Nasik for six years at least, and was, to some extent, the contemporary of Rudradāman. Then Gautamīputra’s son Vāsishṭhiputra Pulumāyi held Nasik in the year 6 of his reign. Between the 6th and 19th regnal years of Pulumāyi, Rudradāman may have vanquished him once and occupied Nasik. But Nasik was regained by Pulumāyi sometime before his nineteenth regnal year, and he was certainly in possession of it in the twenty-second year of his reign. The year 22 of the reign of Vāsishṭhi-putra Śrī Pulumāyi cannot be placed earlier than Śaka 74 and that is possible only if we admit the year 24 to be the last year of Gautamīputra’s reign. But according to the Girnar inscription of Rudradāman the double defeat of Pulumāyi was accomplished before the year 73 (sic) of the Śaka era. Consequently this chronological arrangement must be regarded as faulty." (op. cit. p. 277-78)

Here Mr. Banerji has tacitly assumed that Rudradāman had twice defeated Pulumāyi, and twice occupied Nasik before the year 73 of the Śaka era. The Girnar inscription, which is our sole authority on this point, and is dated in the year 72, merely says that Rudradāman "in spite of having twice in fair fight completely defeated Sātakarṇi, the lord of Dakṣiṇāpata, on account of the nearness of their connection did not destroy him." (Ep. Ind. VIII. P. 47). There is nothing to warrant the assumption that the occupation of Nasik followed the defeat of Pulumāyi on any or both of these occasions. Indeed there is not only no evidence that Nasik was ever occupied by Rudradāman but the available evidence almost furnishes a convincing proof to the contrary. The Girnar inscription gives a long list of countries conquered by Rudradāman but the Northern Mahārāṣṭra in which Nasik is situated is not included therein. Professor Rapson, therefore, quite reasonably concluded that it remained in the possession of the Andhras and was not subdued by Rudradāman (p. xxxvi). Mr. Banerji argues that "the Girnar inscription of Rudradāman clearly states that among other countries Aparānta was acquired by that prince", but "it is hardly possible to
conquer Aparânta i.e. Northern Konkan, before subduing Northern Mahârâshtra i.e. the Nasik and Poona Districts" (p. 287). A study of the physical features of the country seems to show, however, that it is quite possible for a king of Surâshtha to conquer Konkan without the previous conquest of the Nasik and Poona Districts. The Konkan is a long narrow plain that stretches along the Arabian Sea and Gulf of Cambay, and ultimately merges into the plains of Surâshtha. It is bounded on the east by the great chain of mountains called the Sahyâdri range, and it is on the tableland formed by these mountains that the Nasik district is situated. "The highest part of the ridge is that which immediately faces the Concan" and the mountains, "except in places rendered more practicable by the British Government, can only be ascended by narrow paths and defiles, sometimes so precipitous that a led horse can with difficulty keep his footing." A king of Surâshtha can, therefore, very easily march along the plain and make himself master of the Northern Konkan without having anything to do with the mountainous tracts above. A look at the map of the Andhra countries given in Rapson's Catalogue of Andhra Coins will leave no doubt on the point. There is thus nothing to show that Rudradâman ever conquered Nasik and Mr. Banerji's argument therefore cannot be said to have carried great weight.

(2) Mr. Banerji argues: "The Gîrnâr inscription of Rudradâmâna clearly states that he himself acquired the name of Mahâkshatrapa, and that he acquired the countries mentioned in that inscription by his own prowess. As Kachcha or Cutch is one of the countries mentioned there, it must be admitted that Rudradâmâna had finished the work of conquering these provinces from the Andhra king before the year 130 A. D., which is the date of the Andhau Inscriptions" (op. cit. p. 286).

It is very difficult to follow the line of argument here. Gîrnâr inscription proves that Cutch and several other countries were conquered by Rudradâmâna sometime before the year 72 (i.e. 150 A. D.). The Andhau inscriptions merely show that one of these, Cutch, was in possession of Rudradâmâna as early as the year 52 (130 A. D.). But how does it follow that the other countries, to which not even the slightest reference is made in the Andhau Inscriptions, were also conquered at the same time? There is nothing to warrant the assumption that

all the countries mentioned in the Girnār Inscription were conquered by Rudrādāman at one and the same time. He might have conquered Cutch, which was furthest from the Mahratta countries, as early as the year 52, and the other countries during the interval between that date and the year 72 in which the Girnār Inscription was composed. The conquest of Cutch does not even show that Rudrādāman had already entered into a struggle with the Andhra kings for the reconquest of Kshatrapa territories, for Cutch is not included in the list of territories conquered by Gautamiputra Sātakarni and there is no evidence to show that he or any Andhra king did ever conquer it. For all we know, therefore, the Andhra kings might have been in possession, in the year 52, of all the territories wrested from the Kshatrapas by king Gautamiputra Sātakarni.

(3) Mr. Banerji holds that "It is certain that Puḻumāyi was the contemporary of Chaṣṭana; therefore his father Gautamiputra Sātakarni belongs to a much earlier period than Rudrādāman, the grandson of Chaṣṭana" (p. p. 287-288). The obvious implication is, of course, that the date of Gautamiputra Sātakarni must be pushed back considerably before 130 A.D., the earliest recorded date of Rudrādāman.

The thing which Mr. Banerji holds as certain is, however, far from being so. I have had occasion to refer to this point in my article on "The date of Chaṣṭana" (J. A. S. B. 1914, p. 225) but apparently it has escaped the notice of Mr. Banerji. I find no reason to alter the views I had there expressed viz. that it does not necessarily follow that the two kings whom Ptolemy mentioned, in passing, in connection with two cities were contemporaries. The only fair deduction from Ptolemy's remark would be that both of them had ruled within the memory of the generation to which Ptolemy belonged, or from which he got his latest report about India.

Another point also suggests itself to me in this connection. The actual wording used in the Cutch inscriptions of Rudrādāman are "Rājñō Chaṣṭanaṇa Ysāmotikaputraṇa Rājñō Rudrādāmasa Jayadāmaṇaputraṇa varshe dvipaṃchāse' 50. 2. ......." As has been observed by Mr. Bhandarkar and Mr. Banerji, the absence of any connecting link between the two names makes the records difficult to understand. Mr. Bhandarkar has removed the difficulty by supplying the word

(3) I adopt the final rendering of Mr. Banerji in Ep. Ind. Vol. xiv, p. 23.
‘Pautrasa’ after ‘Ysāmotikaputrasa’ and Mr. Banerji has accepted this emendation. It is, however, difficult to think that all the five inscriptions should commit a similar mistake. In any case an emendation is necessary only in those cases where the text as it actually stands offers no meaning at all. Here, however, the actual text properly means that in the year 52 both Chāṣṭhāna and Rudradāman ruled conjointly. Mr. Bhandarkar has himself adduced several arguments to show that Jaydāman did not succeed his father as a ruler. It may be supposed, therefore, that Jaydāman predeceased his father and the latter, when old and infirm, associated his grandson with himself in the sovereignty of the kingdom. In any case this is the plain inference to be derived from the inscriptions and there seems to be no reason for emending their texts unless it can be shown to be opposed to established facts. Now according to this view Puḷumāyi and Chāṣṭhāna might be contemporaries of each other either in 130 A.D. or sometime after that.\(^3\)

(4) Prof. D. R. Bhandarkar has accepted this suggestion (Ind. Ant. 1918 p. 83, fn. 78) but Mr. R. D. Banerji has severely criticised the view (Ep. Ind. Vol. xvi, p. 22). He remarks that “Apart from the possibility of such an event in India, nobody ever having thought or tried to prove conjoint reigns of two monarchs except Messrs. Bhandarkar, there is sufficient evidence in the Andhau Inscriptions themselves to prove that the Author of the record was quite ignorant as to the exact relationship between Chāṣṭhāna and Rudradāman.”

As to the first point, the cases of the joint rule of Strato I and Strato II (Cambridge History p. 553), Azes I and Azilises, Azilises and Azes II (Ibid, p. 572) Voneses and Spalaihores, Voneses and Spalagadames (Ibid p. 574) Rājendra and Rājādhīrāja Chola are enough to repudiate the dogmatic views of Mr. Banerji. It may be noted in passing that in 1908 Mr. Banerji himself tried to prove the conjoint reigns of Kanishka and Huvisika (Ind. Ant. 1908, p. 61).

The second contention of Mr. Banerji vis. that the author of the inscription did not know the exact relationship between Chāṣṭhāna and Rudradāman can hardly be taken seriously. The author of the inscription has referred to Chāṣṭhāna as the son of Ysāmotika and Rudradāman as the son of Jaydāman; so he knew the genealogy of the family from beyond Chāṣṭhāna’s time, and yet we are to suppose that he was ignorant of the relationship between Chāṣṭhāna and Rudradāman. And Mr. Banerji finds sufficient evidence thereof in the fact that the writer of the inscription simply used the title ‘Rājān’ and not ‘Rājān kshatrapa’ before Chāṣṭhāna and Rudradāman. Mr. Banerji obviously forgets that such a thing is not very unusual. Apart from the commonsense view that when a ruler has more than one title, sometimes one may be omitted, one need only refer to the case of Nahapāna who is referred to as ‘Rājān and kshatrapa’ in his inscriptions but simply as Rājān in his coins. It is needless to discuss any further the absurd position taken up by Mr. Banerji. One is tempted to repeat what Prof. Lüders wrote about certain views of Mr. Banerji, ‘Surely the pages of Epigraphia Indica are not meant for such disquisitions’.
It will thus appear that all the contentions of Mr. Banerji stand on extremely weak basis and as such he cannot be said to have been successful in invalidating the conclusions of Mr. Rapson.

I next turn to a consideration of the views put forward by Prof. Bhandarkar. The two important points on which this scholar differs from Mr. Rapson are briefly these.

1) That Gautamiputra Śātakarṇi and Puḷumāyi were reigning simultaneously, the latter as viceroy in the Deccan and the former as supreme ruler, but at his old capital Dhānyakaṭa (p. 69).8

2) The Śātakarṇi of the Gīnār Inscription who was twice defeated by Ēuddradāman cannot possibly be any other than Gautamiputra Śātakarṇi.

As regards the first, Mr. R. D. Banerji, in his paper referred to above, has adduced several cogent arguments to prove that it is impossible to maintain Mr. Bhandarkar’s views in this respect. (pp. 279 ff.). To these I may add what I think to be the real facts about the cave no. 3 at Nasik on which Prof. Bhandarkar has based his theory. It appears that the cave was constructed either in, or sometime before, the 18th year of Gautamiputra Śātakarṇi and consecrated in the joint name of the king and his mother. This clearly follows from the inscriptions nos. 4 and 5 (Ep. Ind. VIII pp 71, 73). The important portion of the inscription No. 5 is thus translated by Senart:

"Order of the king, to be made over to Śamaka, the officer at Govadhana. In the name of the king Śātakarṇī Gotamiputra and of the king’s queen-mother, whose son is living, Śamaka, the officer at Govadhana....... shall be told thus: “we have here on mount Tiraphu formerly given to the mendicant ascetics dwelling in the cave which is a pious gift of ours, a field in the village of Kakhaḍī”.

Prof. Bhandarkar remarks on this passage as follows: “what is worthy of note here is that cave no. 3 in which the inscription is engraved, is spoken of by Gautamiputra as a pious gift of his to the Buddhist mendicants”. Mr. Banerji also accepts the same view when he remarks that “from another inscription on the eastern wall of the verandah we learn that the king Gautamiputra Śātakarṇī claims this cave to be his

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8 J. B. B. R. A. S. Vol. xxiii. The pager in the text refer to this article. Prof. Bhandarkar has since elaborated his views in an article in Indian Antiquary, 1918 p. p. 69ff.

6 The italics are my own,
own religious gift." Both these distinguished scholars thus look upon the passage as denoting that the cave was a gift of Gautamiputra alone. But what is then the significance of the preamble that the royal officer was to be told so and so in the name of the king as well as that of the queen-mother. If the gift had been that of the king alone there was no necessity to introduce the name of the queen-mother. To my mind it appears quite clear from the inscription that the queen-mother had some share in the gift of the cave and this view is strengthened by the inscription no. 2 on the same cave where we are expressly told that the great queen Gotami Balasiri, "caused the cave to be made quite equal to the divine mansions." These two statements can only be reconciled either in the way I have stated i.e. by looking upon the cave as a joint gift of the king and the queen-mother or by accepting the views of Mr. Banerji that the cave was dedicated by Gautamiputra in or before the 18th year of his reign, and subsequently after his death, his mother caused the cave to be enlarged by adding chambers, which she claimed to be her own benefaction. The two views may be again reconciled by supposing that the original cave was a joint gift of the king and his mother but chambers were subsequently added to it by the mother alone.

The manner in which Prof. Bhandarkar seeks to reconcile the two is not quite clear to me. Thus he remarks: "But, as the long inscription in it informs us, the cave itself was caused to be made and dedicated

(7) op. cit. p. 282.

(8) Prof. Dr. R. Bhandarkar notes in his last article that Gautamiputra "was the donor along with his mother."

(9) Prof. Bhandarkar who has personally inspected the caves is of opinion, both from the position of the inscriptions and the engineering point of view, that it is almost impossible to believe that the different parts of the cave could have been constructed in different times. It appears, however, that the Inscriptions nos 4 and 5, which mention Gautamiputra Satakarni are incised on the east wall of the veranda, while the inscriptions nos. 2 and 3 which refer to the gift of Gautamiputra's mother and son are engraved on the back wall of the veranda above the entrance Eρ. Ind. VIII p. p. 60,65,71,73). There is nothing therefore in the position of the Inscriptions which precludes the view that the veranda was excavated during the reign of Gautamiputra and the inner chambers constructed in that of his successor. As regards the engineering point it remains to be explained by means of cogent arguments, why the simple operation of extending the cave by excavating further into the rock could not have been undertaken by the workmen of Pulumāyi. On this point see Mr. Banerji's second article in J. R. A. S. 1925, pp. 1 ff. which fully corroborates the above view.
to them by his mother Gautami in the regnal year 19 of his son, Pulumāyi. If cave no. 3, as we have thus seen, was granted in the 19th year of Pulumāyi's reign, and if in the year 24 his father Gautamiputra speaks of it as his own pious gift, is not the conclusion irresistible that Gautamiputra was living when the cave in question was made over to the Buddhist monks i.e. in Pulumāyi's 19th regnal year, and that the year 24 of the other inscription, although it records a donation of Gautamiputra, must be referred not to his, but to Pulumāyi's reign? (op. cit. p. 71).

But even if we assume that Gautamiputra was living when the cave was made over to the Buddhist monks by his mother, how does it explain the fact that both the son and the mother claim the cave to be his or her own pious gift?

It may be argued that if we look upon the cave as a joint gift of Gautamiputra and his mother both of them must have been living in the 19th regnal year of Pulumāyi when the cave is said to have been caused to be made and dedicated to the Buddhist monks according to the Ins. No. 2.10 Now this inscription records the gift of the cave to the Bhadāvanīyas and the grant of a village to the latter in the 19th year of Pulumāyi. It also mentions that the cave was caused to be made quite equal to the divine mansions, but there is nothing to show that it was so caused in the same year. Nay, we are in a position to prove definitely that it was certainly caused to be made before the 19th year of Pulumāyi, for we have an inscription (no. 4) on the wall of the same cave, dated in the year 18, and whether it refers to the reign of Gautamiputra or Pulumāyi, it is certainly earlier than the 19th year of Pulumāyi. It may be concluded, therefore, that the cave (either the whole or a part of it) was certainly excavated before the 19th year of Pulumāyi and it was possibly consecrated in the joint name of Gautamiputra and his mother. In any case Prof. Bhandarkar's argument quoted above cannot be maintained and there remain to be dealt with only the two arguments of Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar quoted with approval by Prof. Bhandarkar. (op. cit. p. 69).

Referring to the fact that 'Gotami' is spoken of as the mother of a king and the grandmother of a king, Dr. Bhandarkar argues that if the object of the writer was to represent Balaśri's special claim to honour, (10) This argument has been adduced by Prof. Bhandarkar in his last named article (p. 82).
that is better served by supposing that her son and grandson were great kings at one and the same time. Now, in the first place, there is no reason to assume that the writer of the inscription had in view any special claim to honour, far less that it was his object to represent the same, when he used the expression "the mother of a great king and the grandmother of a great king". He might have made a simple statement of facts. But can it be denied that it really was a special claim to honour that Balaśrī was mother of a great king and grandmother of a great king, though not at the same time? Almost every royal mother is of course both the one and the other but it falls to the lot of very few to see that they are such. It may very well be that the real claim to honour advanced, if at all, on behalf of Balaśrī, was, not that her son and grandson were king at the same time, but that she lived long enough to witness the glorious reigns of both. Secondly Dr. Bhandarkar argues that "If Puḷumāyī became king only after Gautamiputra" the latter must have died nineteen years before the dedication of the temple and it certainly is not what one acquainted with the manner and motive of Hindu inscription writers would expect that a king who had been dead for nineteen years should be highly extolled in the inscription and the reigning king altogether passed over in silence." It must be noticed, however, that the present case is an exceptional one, the like of which is to be hardly met with anywhere else. The inscription purports to be the sentiment of one who does not owe the same allegiance to the reigning king as an ordinary subject would, and is not therefore under a similar obligation to extol his virtues or valour. While, on the other hand, the dead king to whom no reference would ordinarily be made by any subject of his successor was her dear and beloved son, the memory of whose prowess was perhaps all that was left to console her in her old age and decrepit condition. Full nineteen summers had indeed passed by since the death of that valiant hero. But the tale of his valour and victories certainly lived in the memory of the populace no less than in the fond heart of the old mother. She was now dedicating in the holy Triraśmi mountain, the very mountain that was won back to the family by the valiant arms of her son, a cave which either wholly or in part was possibly excavated by and consecrated in the joint name of herself and her son. It was an occasion on which the memories of her son would most naturally be revived and it was a worthy place to have his career of conquest and
glories recorded in detail. And as we have said above the peculiarity of the case explains the absence of any sort of reference to the reigning king. Another explanation is afforded by a passing remark of Mr. Rapson. He says that the manner in which the conquests of Gautamiputra are narrated seems to indicate that these had recently passed away from the family. So, very likely, the inscription was written soon after Rudradāman had reconquered all those territories, and when the vanquished pride would most naturally fall back upon the memory of past glories, as the only means to soothe itself.

I have thus disposed of all the arguments advanced by Prof. Bhandarkar and there remains therefore no ground for the conclusion that Gautamiputra and Pujumāyi reigned simultaneously in different parts of the empire.

I next turn to the second proposition advanced by Prof. Bhandarkar, that the Sātakarṇi of the Girnar Inscription who was twice defeated by Rudradāman cannot possibly be any other than Gautamiputra Sātakarṇi. His argument may be stated in his own words. "It has just been shown that in 52 Rudradāman had vanquished Sātakarṇi and retaken his ancestral dominions. This Sātakarṇi must, therefore, be the one who flourished before 52" and "it was he [Gautamiputra Sātakarṇi] who was living before 52" (p. 69). It may be at once conceded that the conclusion certainly follows from the premises. It has been already shown, however, that the main premise itself is erroneous (see pp. 109-10). Prof. Bhandarkar argues: "It will thus be seen from the wording of the Cutch Inscriptions of Rudradāman quoted above (viz Rājñō Chāṣṭhānasa Ghsamotika putrasa-rājñō Rudradāmasa Jayadāmaputrasa Varshe dvi pañcāśe 50,2 phaguna bahulasā dvitiyām 15,2) that in the year 52 he was, like his grandfather, ruling over the dominions of his dynasty. Rudradāman thus must have defeated Sātakarṇi and regained his ancestral territory before 52" (op. cit. pp. 68—69).

But as I have already remarked, an inscription which merely proves that Rudradāman was ruling over Cutch in the year 52, cannot be adduced as a proof that Rudradāman had vanquished Sātakarṇi and

(11) Rapson's "Andhra Coins", p. XXXVIII.
(12) The assumption also involved some incongruities which have been pointed out by Mr. Banerji (op. cit. p. 281).
retaken his ancestral dominions before the year 52, more so as Cutch
could have been brought into subjection without any fight with the
Sātakarṇiṣṇas, there being nothing to show that it did ever belong to them.

There is thus no necessity to assume that the Andhra king defeated
by Rudradāman must have lived before 52, and as Puḷumāyi was the
Andhra king who occupied the throne during the period between c.
130 and c. 152 A. D. he may be taken as the opponent of Rudradāman
as described in his Girnār Inscription. The history of the period may
therefore be reconstructed somewhat as follows:—

Nahapāna was defeated by Gautamiputra Sātakarṇi sometime after
124 A. D., when his family probably became extinct. For a time most
of the Kṣatrapa territories passed into the hands of the conqueror who
survived his conquest for more than 6 years. A rival family of Kṣatrapas,
found by Chashṭana, however, soon rose into importance and under
its able leader Rudradāman gradually reconquered most of the lost
territories. The reconquest was probably facilitated by the fact that
the valiant Gautamiputra had died in the meantime, leaving the reins
of Government to a weak successor. The story of this renewed struggle
cannot be described in detail, but it seems certain that by the year 150
A. D. or thereabouts i.e. in less than 20 years after the death of
Gautamiputra, his successor was twice defeated by Rudradāman with the
loss of Konkan and other territories north of Nerbudda that were
conquered by his valour. There is no reason to suppose that the renewed
struggle was commenced by Rudradāman during the lifetime of
Gautamiputra, and for all we know it was probably commenced at the
time of his successor. The net result of the struggle that thus extended
over two generations was the liberation of the Northern Mahārāṣṭrask country from the yoke of the foreigners. It also appears that the two
ruling dynasties were bound by some ties of relationship though its
exact nature cannot be determined.13

(13) No hypothesis can be built upon the fragmentary Kanheri Inscription
of Sateraka, as its purport cannot be made out with any certainty.

[N.B. This paper was originally written in 1918. Mr. Banerji has since
published a second article in J. R. A. S. 1925 pp. 1 ff. But practically all
the points, excepting arguments based on palaeography, have been dealt with
in this paper. I omit these last, as it is my object to prove that Mr. Rapson's
conclusions cannot be assailed on historical grounds. The palaeographical
discussions require a separate treatment altogether. While I keep an open
mind as regards the palaeographic test I am convinced that Mr. Banerji
has failed to substantiate his position on merely historical grounds.]
THE ASOKAN LAW OF SCHISM

[Dr. Radha Kumud Mookerjee M.A., F.R.S., Ph.D.]

The Sarnath Pillar Edict and the Pillar Edicts at Kausambi and Sanchi form a group by themselves by their reference to the common subject of schism in the Samgha, and to the king's measures to prevent and punish it. In these edicts, Asoka appears in the role of the 'Head of the Church and Defender of the Faith' as it were, but it must be noted that this role was not assumed by Asoka by an autocratic exercise of his sovereign powers, but was forced on him by the injunctions of the very faith he followed. Indeed, Asoka's attitude towards schism is determined and dictated by the Buddhist canonical law on the subject. This law seems to have developed by stages which may be traced in some of the sacred texts of early Buddhism.

These texts describe different degrees in the offences leading up to schism, as well as degrees in their punishments. The Mahavagga [X. 1, 6, etc.], for instance, mentions in an ascending order differences, among the members of a Samgha as 'altercation (bhandana), contention (kalaha), discord (vigraha), quarrel (vivada), division (samgha-bhedah), disunion (samgharaji), separation (samghavattha), and schism (samghananakaranadh) or dissolution of the samgha.' Again, in Chullavagga, VII. 5, disunion (samgharaji) is distinguished from schism proper (samghabheda). Disunion can happen only in smaller sanghas of members numbering from four to nine. A schism means a break-up of a samgha of more than nine members. It is caused by a difference of opinion on 18 points concerning (a) what is or what is not Dhamma (b) what is or what is not Vinaya (c) what has or has not been (i) taught and spoken (ii) practised and (iii) ordained by the Tathagata and (d) offences and rules regarding them [Ib. VII. 5, 2; Mahav., X. 5, 4, 5]. The same points are mentioned again in Chullav., IV. 14, 2, as creating a Vivada, but a distinction is made between Vivada and samghabheda. In a Vivada, the point at issue was to be decided finally by the Samgha, and there the matter must rest. The dissenter must bow to the decision of the Samgha. But sometimes a difference of opinion may be pressed
too far, either honestly, or with an evil intention, knowing that it would in either case result in the saṅghabheda. The intention to cause a saṅghabheda is absent in a Vivāda-dhikaranā.

There were also certain legal restraints imposed upon the attempts at causing saṅghabheda. These attempts were valid only from a member of the saṅgha who was under no disability (pakataṭa), who belonged to the same community (saṁāna saṁvāsaka), and who resided within the same boundary (saṁāna sīmāyathiṭa). Next, the vivāda could not be placed before a saṅgha of less than 9 members, as already stated, i.e., the saṅgha should be large enough to admit of 4 members to each side of the dispute, and of the ninth member who was the Saṅiṣṭha-gāhāpaka. Thus to produce a schism there should be at least four regular bhikṣus to agree on the point raised, and bring it before a chapter of nine with purpose prepense to cause a division, whether knowing that the point was wrong or doubtful [Chullav. VII. 5, 5], or believing it, without due deliberation, to be right [ib. 5, 6]. It appears from Chullav., VII. 5, 6, that the latter position was not condemned. Secession from conviction or conscientious objection was not condemned. There was no embargo laid on honest differences of opinion, on freedom of thought.

Along with the offences leading towards saṅghabheda or dissolution of the saṅgha and schism, the texts contemplate different degrees and grades of penalty corresponding to such offences. The first punishment inflicted on a schismatic is that of Niṣāraṇa, or his temporary removal from the saṅgha [Mahāv. X. 5, 14], during which he was subjected to Parivāsa, or living apart, for 5 or 10 days, and Mānatta or living under restraint for 6 days, as laid down in the Pātimokkha, Saṅghādisesa, 13. His restoration, Osāraṇa, was permitted, if the accused expressed his acknowledgment of the guilt. [Mahāv. ib]

We may also note in this connection that the Pātimokkha brings the promotion of saṅghabheda under the class of saṅghādisesa offences, i.e., offences for which atonement from beginning to end can be granted only by the saṅgha. The offence, according to the same text, is defined as (a) causing division (Cheda) in the saṅgha that is at union (samagga); (b) persistently raising issues calculated to cause division. The offence may be committed by a single bhikṣu or by a number of bhikṣus, as his partisans, who would then be equally guilty with him. Thus though the offence against the saṅgha is sufficiently serious, it is not visited by the
extreme penalty of permanent expulsion in the Pātimokkha which may be taken to lay down the earlier form of the law. The Pātimokkha would reserve the extreme penalty for Pārājika sins, the offences against morality such as adultery, theft, murder, or frauds (by claiming superhuman powers).

The extreme penalty for schism is, however, laid down in Mahāvagga, I. 60, 67 and 69. It is called nāsana, which is definitive and permanent expulsion from the saṅgha, and is to be distinguished from (a) suspension or temporary excommunication, ukkhepana, for a bhikṣu refusing to admit or atone for the offence committed or to renounce a false doctrine [ib. I. 79]; and (b) temporary banishment, pabbajana, for bhikṣus guilty of causing by their conduct scandal to the saṅgha. Both (a) and (b) may however, be revoked on repentance [Ib.; Mahāv. X. 6].

It is difficult to see what kind or degree of schism or saṅgha bhedā and of the punishment of expulsion are meant by Asoka in his use of the expressions bheteve and anāvāsaśi āvāsaiye in the edicts in question. If he was for complete and irrevocable expulsion of the heretical monks, he must be understood to have taken his stand upon the three passages of the Mahāvagga cited above, together with a fourth passage, Mahāva III. 11,5, which describes as a 'grievous sin' the causing of divisions (bheda) in the saṅgha and permits the good bhikṣu to dissociate himself from the heretics who commit this sin.

Along with the deportation of the heretical monks to non-monastic residences (anāvāsa), Asoka inflicts upon them the further penalty of disrobing them, replacing their yellow, by white robes. For this punishment there is no canonical sanction, unless it is implied in the mere fact of the expulsion of the monks from the monasteries. Some of the Asokan legends, however, relate actual cases of Asoka enforcing this penal code of his Edicts against schismatics. Thus the Mahāvaṁśa (v. 270) relates how Asoka once arranged an assembly of the community of bhikṣus in its full numbers' in the Asokārāma. He then called to him in turn the bhikṣus of the several confessions and asked them: "Sir, what did the Blessed one teach?" And they each expounded their wrong doctrine. And all these adherents did the king cause to be expelled from the Order (upapabhajesi). In the Samantapāśādika, Buddhaghosa records the further fact that Asoka expelled those heretical monks after giving them white robes (setakānivalthani datva). Thus once more the legends have confirmed the inscriptions of Asoka by
their mention of practical application of the law of the Edicts against schism to concrete cases.

It is interesting to note in conclusion that this Buddhist law relating to schism has its counterpart in the Brahminical law, according to which mischief-makers who tried to create or foment dissensions in the village communities and assemblies were punished by banishment. It was the traditional duty of the king to uphold the laws, agreements and the constitution (samaya) by which the various local bodies, groups, and communities, such as Kula, Jāti, Janapada, or samgha, organised and governed themselves, and to punish those who violated them by deportation [See the smṛiti texts quoted in my *Local Government in Ancient India*, 2nd Edition, Oxford.]

Thus the spiritual sovereignty assumed and asserted in the edicts by Asoka was not something which he had arrogated to himself as an arbitrary autocrat, but had behind it the sanction of both Brahminical and Buddhist Law.
SOME THOUGHTS UPON BUDDHIST ART IN INDIA

[Prof. K. Saunders Litt. D.]

One of the greatest services which Sir Asutosh Mookherjee did to India was to set a group of her scholars free to study her great past. He realized that Indian scholarship was faced with a great task—almost neglected. And much remains to do.

The west is perhaps more awake to-day to the beauty and value of Ancient Indian Art than India herself! Many European books are being published which suggest that the period of neglect is over and that the west has overcome its first repulsion from that which was strange. In India, on the other hand, there are, I think, relatively few who know the great things of this Art from any first-hand acquaintance with them. There is, of course, the group of scholars working so ably in the Archeological Department, to whom we are all deeply indebted; and there are a few others; but the fact remains that educated India as a whole pays comparatively little attention to her ancient treasures. To take a simple example—we have recently been presented with a book which describes the journey to Ajantā as though it were a long and perilous pilgrimage. The writer, a Bengali Artist, has written with great charm, and has given us a vivid account of the hardships and dangers of his adventure. Yet one is continually meeting tourists from the west who make this trip as a matter of course; and a very simple and delightful trip it is. Ajantā is in fact accessible within fifteen hours of landing in Bombay; and if one has the necessary permission from the Nizam's Government, its splendours can be seen under ideal conditions. The Curator of the caves is an artist of no mean distinction.—Mr. Syed Ahmed; and with his enthusiasm and expert knowledge to guide, one can learn a very great deal about the nature and motives of Buddhist art, with almost no preliminary training.

No one can know India who does not study this art; and it cannot be studied merely in Museums. How little do the stones of Amrāvati in the British Museum and at Madras tell, one who has not visited some great stupa like that of Sānchi. Even the Bahrut rail in the Indian Museum at Calcutta speaks with no living voice until one has seen its Jātakas in their true setting as at Ajantā or Sānchi.
To enter the great horse-shoe-shaped valley of Ajantā, with its long circle of caves, is to have the eye of the imagination opened, and to see once more the long procession of the Brothers of The Yellow Robe, making the āradakṣina round these great chaityas; it is to hear echoes of their mournful chants resounding from these vaulted roofs: Saddā Dūkṣha; Saddā Ancicā; "all is sorrowful, for all is transiēnt." This is the lesson of these glorious frescoes. Here monks themselves, or artists at their bidding, have sought to bring home to themselves and to the masses, this, the central theme of their religion. It is the contrast between the vain show and pomp of the world and the abiding satisfactions of the spirit.

Puzzled at first at finding so much that is sensuous in these haunts of the monk, so many lovely women with their charms scarcely veiled, so joyous a panorama of nature, with its animals, trees and flowers, so frank an acceptance of the facts or legends of the early life of Sākyamuni, the mind soon comes to realize that all this is but a foil to set forth the calm repose and self-control of the central figure. It is to show us the beauty of Nirvāṇa that we are first shown the sensuous beauty of the world. That the artists enjoyed both we need not doubt. They were men leading unnatural lives, and they painted fair women with something of the same joy with which men at the North Pole discuss a good dinner; but their motive was to call men away from the lure of the senses to inner self-mastery.

And these scenes brought home to them the questions of motive. Why did the Great Hero resist such temptations to power on the one hand and to pleasure on the other? Very soon the Buddhist mind answered this question in two ways. While it was no doubt for the sake of his own salvation from Saṃsāra, it was also out of pity of mankind—Lokassa Anukāmpaya. And so they began to draw upon the Jātakā stories. From over five hundred and fifty they chose a few which embody the central theme of self-sacrifice. On three of the four gates of the chief Stupa at Sānchi we find the Chchaddanta Jātaka, the story of the six-tusked elephant who as the Buddha-to-be yielded up his tusks to the envious queen of Benares. This story appears again in a gorgeous fresco at Ajantā, now almost destroyed, and by hooliganism; and, side by side with it are to be found the Mahākapi and the Vessantara Jātakas, which teach the same lesson. These are the famous stories of the great-hearted Monkey-king who gave his life for his tribe, and of the Generous Prince
who kept nothing for himself—not even wife and children and they recur at Bārhat, Sānchi and Amrāvati. No doubt, the earliest sculptors of the Asokan period influenced the sculptures of the Andhra and Gupta periods; but, at any rate, they all understood the meaning of these noble stories, which are the living core of popular Buddhism to-day, and which might well be more widely used in the schools of Asia to bring home the great lessons of service and selflessness.

These, then, are the two central themes of early Buddhist art; the beauty of Nirvāṇa, like moonlight in contrast with the garish glare of the noon-day sun; the beauty of the life of sacrifice for the sake of others. With these great thoughts in mind, the artists set themselves to paint. And their works reveal also careful study and clear understanding of the beauty of the human form, and of Nature's loveliness. What is there more lovely in religious art than the figures of the young wife and child of Sākyamuni as they bow before the Princely Monk, in Cave I at Ajantā? They have come to ask for their rights as wife and child; they remain to worship his spiritual greatness. In the same spirit the sculptures of Amrāvati show us in an exquisite medallion the contrast between the mad elephant trampling and slaughtering his way through the city, until meeting the Master, he kneels at his feet and takes the dust off them. Such is the contrast between the whirlpool of the senses and the calm of the spirit—between the changing and the changeless! And deeper still in the philosophy of these artists is the old Indian contrast of the one behind the many. From Ajantā to Borobodur this thought shines through Buddhist no less than through Hindu art. Borobodur is perhaps the most perfect expression of it. We pass through gallery after gallery of Jātaka scenes, or of the "play-life" of the Lalita Vistara; we rise past images of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas until we come on the central platform to the one behind the many—the simple form of the historic Sākyamuni on his Diamond Throne. This is the purpose of the great Mahāyāna Scripture,—the Saddharma Pundarika—which sets forth the one way behind the many, and the one historic Buddha as the inner meaning of the many Buddhas. It was artists of this school who produced the frescoes of Ajanta. As the sun sets the Curator will guide you to the largest of the frescoes. Here the setting sun lights up the figure of the historic Sākyamuni in the inner shrine, and the two glorious forms of the Bodhisattvas—Padmapāni and Vajrapāni—lotus and vajra in hand. These superb figures serve but as door-keepers, pointing
on to the great Hero, seated on his diamond-throne. Such also is the plan of the great Buddhist temples in China and Japan; and the student will find at Horiuji in Japan echoes and influences which are unmistakeable.

All this may be obvious to the scholar; yet for too much time has been spent seeking to prove the foreign influence at work in this art; and, it has been too little emphasised that from Barhut to Borobodur and from Ajantā to Horiuji, it is essentially a national Indian art, developing by clear and recognisable stages. Even of the art of Mathurā we may say that while it is somewhat influenced by that of the Frontier, it is still more evident that it is of the same stock as that of the Asokan period, and of the later Guptas. Again if India borrowed, she also gave freely. This is clear at Borobodur and Horiuji, to say nothing of Chinese Turkestan and Cambodia. That she borrowed is evidence of vitality; that she borrowed such bad art as that of the Grecco-Roman artisans whose work is reflected in most of the Gandhāra Sculptures, is evidence of feeble vitality; she was wise in turning back to more truly native forms of art.

Having visited Ajantā the mind is prepared to receive the impressions of another supreme work of art only a night’s journey away—which like Ajantā, has been reserved for posterity by the skill of archaeologists, albeit at the eleventh hour. Sāñchi should be seen first in the opalescent light of an early spring morning; and, again at sunset with its fine sandstone aglow with rosy colour. How superb are its gateways with their solid yet airy grace, and their long Elephant processions, and their pageants of early Indian society. It is a great art and with the Curator Mr. Ghosal to guide one or with Sir John Marshall’s masterly “Guide to Sāñchi” there is nothing one can not see well in a day’s visit.

And the roots of this art always remind us of India itself: they may be traced deep down in her soil by comparing Stupa II with its flat reliefs and its awkward anatomy with the grace of the deeply incised figures of the main Stupa. Whatever foreign influences may have been at work this is “essentially a national art, having its roots in the heart and faith of the people, and giving eloquent expression to their spiritual beliefs and intuitive sympathy with nature.” So writes Sir John Marshall in his work of restoration here and his work at Taxila is beyond praise. May the torch which he and Sir Asutosh have lit be handed on till Indian scholarship shines ever more brightly.
ABOUT THE OLD POLITICAL LITERATURE OF INDIA
AND THE VARIOUS WRITERS

[Professor Dr. Julius Jolly, Ph.D., D.Litt. M.R.A.S. (Hony.)]

Since I reported at the meeting of Heidelberg, 1911, about the International Union, making comparisons between jurisprudence and political economy concerning the contents of the newly discovered old Indian book of instruction on Kautiliya's Arthashastra, quite a number of writings dealing with this work have come into existence, partly in Europe and in yet a greater extent in the land of its origin. By this keen interest in the obscure Sanskrit text, which is by no means easy to understand and which, in spite of all the learned investigations and researches, remains in many ways obscure still, as also the interest regarding the whole political literature of old India, is brought out the great importance of this literature which shows us the native culture of India in quite a new light.

Among the Indian investigators, to whose works I will confine myself in the following report, the most distinguished for bold outlines is Professor Benoy Kumar Sarkar, a Bengalee, who in his numerous works, English, German and French, draws intellectual parallels between old Indian theories and the teachings of European thinkers, with which he has made himself familiar. Sarkar's political aims are far-reaching and he upholds the idea of expelling all European nations from his Young Asia, to organize native kingdoms, no matter under what conditions and administration. The tendency to colonize and the autocracy of the white races should give way to a complete equalisation of the white and coloured races, as has already been demanded by the Japanese Consul at the Congress of Versailles. To Germany, which, through the loss of colonies, is excluded from the ranks of colonial powers, he assigns by this pan-Asiatic policy, an active part; in her predicted struggle for freedom she must unite with the nations whose aim is the same, as Egypt, Persia, Afghanistan and India. These tendencies agree with the efforts of Young Asia, according to some Chinese statesmen.¹

¹ B.K. Sarkar.
Sarkar protests rigorously against the one-sided conception to consider India as the wonderland of mysticism and proves his view by quoting the German writers of romance, who believed to have found in India their paradise, the land of their dreams. From the old political literature of India one can conjecture that it was a highly organized country, having an extensive government hierarchy with fixed salaries, an enlightened despotism, large armies, a state industry combining sea and land commerce, (economic) political and religious societies. The ancient Indians fortified the towns, and agriculture, mining and industry were highly developed. Their cotton industry was a very ancient one, since even the mummies of Egypt were swathed in Indian cottons.

About the origin of the monarchical government in the world, we learn from the ancient Indian politicians that in primitive times Matranyāya was prevalent, which permitted the strong to overpower the weak, just as the big fish devour the little ones. For this reason men chose the prime ancestor Manu as their sovereign (ruler) and in return for his protection, they gave him the sixth part of the harvest and the tenth part of the goods sold. Sarkar compares the Indian's right of fishing with the natural condition mentioned by Hobbes & Spinoza, which also consists in anarchy and in a universal warfare. According to the Indian interpretation, the kings alone had the power to inflict penalties which put an end to this state of thing, and he compares this power with the teaching of the doctors of the church, which points out that the government of kings is the consequence of the sinfulness of mankind and is to be considered as a punishment from God for the crimes of men. Taking politics in a wider sense, Indian theoreticians teach how the extention of a state (Mandala), with a conqueror in the centre, is brought about, and how the conqueror, after overcoming the neighbouring states, tries to extend and strengthen his dominions. The ruler of the frontal adjoining state is the natural enemy of the conqueror; he is followed by a friend; this one by a friend of the enemy; further by a friend's friend; and a friend's friend's enemy is ruler of the backward adjoining state. Likewise is the ruler of the backward adjoining state to be considered an enemy; he is followed by the friend behind, then the enemy's friend at the back, etc. To these is added a neutral and intermediate state, so that such a circuit of states comprises twelve countries, including the dominions of the conqueror. Sarkar tries to illustrate this somewhat schematically, but shows that even in primitive India where a petty government prevailed there was a
characteristic comprehension of the international relations, by referring to European conditions. The same Indian theory is applied by France when it supports Poland against Germany on one side, and against Russia on the other. Similarly, Italy's Hungarian sympathies are a natural consequence of Italy's enmity with Jugoslavia, which is explained by their geographical positions. These parallels were much more applicable in the Middle Ages than in modern times, as the number of states in Europe then was much greater than it is now. It is inexplicable why the learned Indian in his patriotic endeavours to bring into prominence the superiority of the political constitutions of India, denies the existence of theocratic government in India. He further might show clearly at the same time that the wide-spread Caesarism in Europe, compared with the government of India, is a purely worldly one. Consider, for example, how the Maharatta states of the present day, rose through the guidance of orthodox Brahmans, as so many other spiritual states of old India.

A patriotic tendency similar to that expressed in the writings of Sarkar, is shown by another Bengalee, Prof. U. Ghosal of Calcutta, in his treatise on the History of Hindu Political Theories, from the earliest times to the end of the first quarter of the seventeenth century after Christ. In the preface he opposes the frequently quoted remarks of Max Muller, who characterizes the Indian people as a nation of philosophers, and India as a land holding no position in the political history of the world. On the contrary, the idea of government by the Indians was highly developed, and political organization was an essential means, not only to regulate the whole life of the people, but also to offer them the possibility of existence (subsistence). The songs of Rigveda already speak of a well-organized monarchical government with the deification of kingship; in like manner, King Trasadasya identifies himself with Varuṇa and Indra, the two principal deities of Rigveda. In the Brāhmanas, the king, in his character as organizer of the great sacrifice of the state, is compared to the god Indra. Of course, besides the king, the Brahman likewise was elevated to godhood, from which follows the doctrine of the necessary amalgamation of the priests and warriors, the union of church and state. But already in the Dharmaszūtras, the oldest lawbooks, it is remarked that the king is an official (public officer) to whom his subjects give the sixth part of their earnings, in consideration of the protection they receive and this theory interwoven with the whole development of the Indian (civic rights) political law,
An unjust practice of the kingly right of government is sinful and must be atoned for by some penance. Later on, a secular political science (state-craft), the *Arthasastra*, comes into existence and draws up rules by which the administration of government by the king is regulated for the welfare of the state. The king is not obliged to observe the moral laws of the citizens (middle-class people) as is shown, for example, by the countenancing of fraudulent profits derived from the people in times of financial need; likewise by the violent removal of rules in disfavour. The enormous epic *Mahābhārata* abounds in political instructions and regulations, which contain a mixture of religious and practical principles (rules). They declare that the most sacred obligation of the king is to protect his subjects, and they advise him, moreover, to observe the mean between too great a severity and too great a leniency. According to Ghoshal, great progress in the path of democracy was made by Buddhism through the creation of the figure of a king 'mahāsīhmatā', which means "the great chosen one", so called because he was once chosen by an overwhelming multitude of the people, when the land was oppressed by thieves and robbers. This happened after the cessation of the Golden Period. He was the most beautiful, the most powerful and the most gracious man in the whole country, and as a reward for the protection of the people, he received the sixth part of the rice harvest, according to the old Brahman legend mentioned already. The analogy of the theory of agreement with the "contract social" of Rousseau is apparent with Buddhism. The legend of the elected king 'mahāsīhmatā', was transplanted to Tibet and Burma as well.

Ghosal also examined the political literature of the Jaina sect, which is applicable to Buddhism, but came to conclusion therefrom that it rested altogether on the above-mentioned doctrines (teachings) although they claim Rṣabha, the legendary king of the Jainas, to be the founder of the Indian political government. The latest law-book on politics, composed by the well-known student of law, Mitramisra, to which the author refers, belongs to the seventeenth century and contains little originality. A little older than Ghosal's book are the publications of the well-known student of Sanscrit, Jayaswal of Patna, in the journals, viz. *Calcutta Weekly Notes, Modern Review*, and *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 1913—1915*. This scholar pursues his investigations particularly with the purpose of proving the existence of old republics, as well as the existence
in India of kingdoms which were ruled by despots. Hildebrand points out (*Old Indian Polity*, 1923, 81-84) that these passages refer rather to the old aristocracies, than the actual republics. The Saṅgas of the *Arthaśāstra* also are only the associations of the military nobility. It is clear that the Indian scholar of the present time is actuated by patriotic motives to take a practical interest in proving the existence of adjustments of liberty and democratic tendencies in India long ago. The works of N. N. Law in Calcutta are distinguished by their thoroughness and originality. He has cleared up many obscurities and greatly improved upon the well-known English translation of the *Arthaśāstra* of Shamasastri. His first book, "*Studies of Ancient Hindu Polity*" (1914), based on the principles of the *Arthaśāstra*, treated of mining (metallurgy), irrigation and meteorology, cattle-raising and woodcraft, horse and elephant-breeding, the right to protection on the high road, currency, navigation and commerce, medical and hygienic arrangements (precautions), census of the people, courts of justice and legal proceedings, rights of obligation, especially legal and illegal contracts, the right of purchase and sale, loans and securities, depositions of service, and deeds of partnership. This gives one the impression of a highly developed culture, especially with regard to the early epoch about 300 B. C., to which the author of the preface of this work, R. Mookerji, would like to transfer the *Arthaśāstra*, in conjunction with European researchers. But this assumption is very uncertain, nor does it gain in certainty by the daring assertion about the alleged historic meaning of certain passages of the *Arthaśāstra*, by which Mookerji seeks to support his hypothesis. In my opinion, which I base on the work of R. Smith and my new edition of the *Arthaśāstra*, it only began in the third century after Christ, perhaps even later, according to the references contained therein regarding alchemy and gold-making. In his shorter, but significant, treatise about *Inter-state Relations in Ancient India* (Calcutta 1920), Law has minutely examined the above-mentioned theories of ancient Indian politicians, regarding the state circuit of twelve countries, translated many obscure technical terms into more accurate and correct language, and illustrated by drawing the position of the states to one another. Instead of saying "neutral state", Law calls it "superior state", because this state is described as the mightiest in the first zone, superior to the different other states and which, therefore, plays the principle role in the state system. Among the different kinds of the treaties of peace, the "golden" one is
the best, because it brings about mutual confidence, while a peace which demands war-compensations does not inspire the same confidence. (Consider, for instance, the Treaty of Versailles.) The Aspects of Indian Politics (Oxford 1921) is to be considered the author's principal work, to which Keith, the well-known Sanscritist, has added a preface, in which he emphasizes the similarity of those theories with the political endeavours of the Hindus. He also contests the alleged extreme old age of the Arthasastra, and exposes its author's practical sense, shown in his antipathy for extreme Brahmanism. Law himself treats of the political system in nine chapters: the council of state, the palace priest, the succession to the throne, the education of princes, the king's daily routine, the history of the principal civil service, (public offices), the theories for the development of the kingdom, and the religious side of Indian polity (statesmanship). Out of different hypotheses about the origin of the Indian empire, the greatest probability is accorded to the tracing back of the kings to the patriarchs of the primitive ages. Stress is also laid on the importance of the personal qualifications of the aspirants to the throne, just as in an Indian family at the present time, the eldest son is not always chosen as the head of the house, but a younger member of the family, who distinguishes himself by his good qualities, can be chosen for the position. The religious principles of the government are minutely discussed. According to the Indian conception, the government has not only to provide for the material welfare of its subjects, but it is also considered as a spiritual asylum, which leads through the attainment of man's three aims in life—duty, gain and pleasure—to salvation. The king is a great deity, who is even able to create other worlds, and to depose other deities from their positions. According to the different phases of his activity, he is considered equal to the different deities, for example, he should confer benefits on his subjects like the god Indra who caused rain to fall on the earth, or he should govern the people like the god of death.

The rights and duties of the subjects are graduated according to their ranks, the Brahmins, who represent the religious side of the state, occupying the first position. Various religious celebrations are prescribed to avert evils and afflictions which menace the state (government), and also to promote the advancement and welfare of the state. A minute description is given in the Atharvaveda. The installation of a king, emperor, crown-prince or field-marshall into their respective high
offices is connected with various religious celebrations, which can be compared with the coronation ceremonies practised by the people of the west.

Kalidas Nag, a Hindu, who lives in France, describes in French the diplomatic theories of ancient India: "Les théories diplomatiques de l'Inde ancienne at l'Arthasāstra," (Paris, 1923). It describes in four chapters the diplomacy of the Veda (the sacred book of the Hindus), the epics, the schools, and the Arthasāstra. A fifth chapter follows these, containing deductive reasonings and two appendices which deal with the occurrence of expressions relating to diplomacy, and the geographical facts in the Arthasāstra. Espionage is highly developed in the Arthasāstra, which serves not only to keep an eye on the officers of state and the criminals of its own country, but is also employed to obtain information of the neighbouring states, either hostile or neutral. Secret agents are employed in various disguises; also cryptic writings and symbolic signs are made use of. Spies are considered to be the eyes of the king, because through his spies the king's eyes are opened. The chief aim of this diplomacy is the prevention of war; likewise, according to the law books, the four diplomatic means, kindness, bribery, dissensions and force are employed; the latter may only be used in extreme cases when the other means fail. According to the Arthasāstra, the consequences of war are damage, expenses, the leaving of home (emigration), and the commission of sin. Therefore, if the advantages of war and peace balance each other, peace is preferable. When victory has been gained, the new subjects should be won by kindness and even the good qualities of the opponents should be put in the shade by a double exercise of kingly generosity and kindness towards the conquered party. At the conclusion of war, when peace is declared, hostages of high rank, especially princes, are to be kept as securities of the peace, but these princes will receive many instructions as to how they can, by the help of friends and disguises, escape from the enemy's custody. It is of importance to the commander-in-chief to have an able ally, whereas the question arises whether greater advantages are to be derived from an ally who has at his disposal many men, or one rich in gold. At first sight, the former ally seems to have the advantage, because a large army inspires fear and obtains quick results; but in reality, an ally who is rich in gold is better, because money is always useful, and can even buy an army, and everything one wishes for. The existence of hirelings is shown by the classification of the troops.
There were hereditary or inheritable troops, paid troops, army corps, auxiliary troops and aborigines (primitive tribes). The contracts need not always refer only to war and peace, or different alliances; there are also contracts about common (joint) acquisition of land, about the cultivation of uninhabited (waste) stretches of land, about joint labour, as for example, the erection of fortifications. These political negotiations (transactions) were the cause of much intrigue, whereby the more cunning tried to outwit the other party and the ally became an enemy, or reversely, the enemy changed to a friend. Regarding the chronologic question about the beginning of the existence (origin) of the Arthaśāstra, Nag takes a middle course, because he suspects a gradual completion of this law-book on politics. In the same way, the books on medicine in India were several times revised, which was necessary on account of the climate. By this repeated copying of the manuscripts some alterations and additions were unavoidable. According to Nag, who quotes here Finot and Pelliot, the geographical names in the chapter on the treasures and jewels of the king, speak most distinctly against an earlier origin of the whole treatise, although the political science, as such, is very ancient. Jurisprudence, especially, is traced back to the epoch long before Buddhism. The late discovery of the Arthaśāstra is explained by the fact that it was altogether repressed and forgotten, owing to the purer morals of a younger century, till it reappeared in a library of South India.

Prof. J. N. Samaddar of Patna has edited a series of lectures, which he had delivered in the University of Calcutta, concerning Indian Economic History under the title, "Lectures on The Economic Condition of Ancient India" (Calcutta 1922). He deals there with the beginning of economics, economic ideas in the law book of Manu, the two great epic poems taken from an economic point of view, the economic conditions of the Maurya time, e.g. the Arthaśāstra, and the economic life in the Buddhistic Jātakas. Concerning the conditions in the Vedas, the writer refers especially to Kaegi and the Vedic Index of Macdonell and Keith. For the Buddhist epoch, his writings are based on the well known economic studies of Mrs. Rhys Davids, who furnished the inspiration for his work. The opinion held that the sea was unknown to the Indians of the Rigveda is disputed and the early existence of a marine trade is tried to be proved, as also a primitive metallurgy and the use of coined money. A clear view is given of the laws of Manu and the contested question whether the entire ground and soil belongs to the king,
as held by some, or that there existed individual ownership of fields and the king was overlord of the soil. Agriculture is in both epics dealt with as the principal source of the material existence and Sūri, the heroine of the Rāmāvata is the personified furrow. A more severe tendency, however, condemned agriculture, as the iron plough hurts the soil and the living beings (creatures) that are in it. From the Arthasastra, which according to the author belongs to 300 B.C., are especially mentioned the descriptions of the royal officials and their economic doings, the census of the people and statistics, commerce, navigation and road-making. The interesting extracts from the Buddhistic fairy tales refer especially to land and sea trade, caravans, the export of peacocks to Babylon, pawned signet rings and other pledges, rich merchants, commercial roads, names of coins and the like, thus giving a picture of a high civilisation. In his new work which is at present in print, titled "The Glories of Magadhā", Samadder gives a description of the old capitals and universities of these famed lands of Buddhism.

For a broad survey as well as for a summary of the political history of India, we are indebted to C. L. Chand, a counsel and lecturer in Lahore. From the three volumes 'Introduction to the History of Government in India', only Part I., the Hindu period, is of interest. It is very readable, but offers scarcely anything new in his synopsis of the Pre-Mahomedan epoch. Also the information of Greek, Chinese and Arabian travellers about the conditions in India are largely taken into account; naturally also, detailed extracts from the Arthasastra are given, besides extracts from Sūkraniti ('Manual on Politics', translated from the Sanscrit by Sarkar). At first, the king was only the chosen leader of the people in war, not a judge or administrator, while the supreme (highest) power was in the hands of the national assembly. Only during the epic period, when larger states were formed and the general conditions were consolidated, that the kings became hereditary princes of peace, protectors of their subjects, and possessors of criminal jurisdiction, while the national assembly withdrew. Later on, a graduated hierarchy of Government officers was introduced and a responsible council of state and ministry were established. The duty of protection on the part of the king extended even to the liability to compensate for whatever thieves had stolen from his subjects, and, for this purpose, he levied certain taxes. Buddhism increased the care of Government for the welfare of the people, but weakened the military strength of the country by forcing young men,
capable of bearing arms, to enter the cloister. The history of the caste system, especially of the “Four Class” system is minutely described. Among the crimes, the most prominent are insults (libel), outrage (real injury), theft, robbery, and moral faults. The punishments are of various degrees from a mere reprimand to the most acute capital punishment. The most frequently imposed punishments consist of, fines, as stated in the Chinese Books of Travel in India. Evidences of guilt are proved either by human witnesses, producing written documents to prove the long-standing ownership of the contested property, or failing this, the case is decided by calling to aid divine intervention.

To complete the review, I mention below a few of the more recent works by Indian scholars, of which, however, I only know some quotations from “Ancient Indian Polity and Administrative Government”; R. V. R. Aiyangar, “Some Aspects of Indian Polity”, Madras 1916; P. N. Banerjea, Public Administration in Ancient India”, London, 1916; D. R. Bhandarkar, “Carmichael Lectures”, Calcutta, 1919, (a treatise on the right of fishing, the origin of the monarchy, the limits of the power of kings, organization of republics, etc.); R. C. Majumdar, “Corporate Life in Ancient India” (On Indian Republics), Calcutta, 1919; R. Shamasastri, “Evolution of Hindu Polity”, Calcutta, 1920, etc. As O. Stein correctly remarks, these works by Indian researchers are now difficult to review and still less are all of them attainable. Just at the conclusion of this article, I received from India the very extensive (540S. gr. 80), beautifully arranged work by Jayaswal, “Hindu Polity”: A Constitutional History of India in Hindu Times by K. P. Jayaswal, Calcutta, 1924. The first part deals with the republic, the second with monarchy in India, and the author, who seems very widely read, has collected the materials to prove his arguments from various sources. Any important passage in the epic Mahābhārata is given in the original and translation. The interpretation of Gaṇa as republic remains doubtful, and I once more quote Hildebrand, who refers to the families of the nobility, headed by petty (lesser) rajas of the land. Precautions should be taken to prevent their joining the enemy and they should remain faithful to their leaders. In his other works, too, Gaṇa refers to corporations not republics. Neither has the author been successful in representing the Sanghas as a republic, although his recent explanation of the difficult passage about the Sanghas in Arthasāstra XI, 1. 4, may be correct. In the part which treats of
monarchy much new material has been collected about the adjustment of estates, but the author goes too far in investing an ancient Indian parliament with most extensive powers, like the deposition and installation of kings, the right of granting or refusing taxes, the nomination of ministers, the remission (mitigation) of laws, etc. An interesting chapter deals with the influence of the hermits and begging monks, as also the opinion of the people, on the Government. The theory that all land and property belonged to the king is emphatically refuted and declared un-Indian. On the whole, this work is to be appreciated as a distinguished production.

The common characteristic tendencies, noticeable in all the preceding works, consist in the bringing into prominence the existence of the state in place of the one-sided stress laid on philosophy and religion here in India, and to draw the attention rather more to the democratic and republican forms of state and the rights and duties of corporation as in ancient India. The monarchical government appears somewhat limited, on account of the conditions imposed for the protection of the subjects and good government, as also by considering the king as a state officer paid by the people. A combination of these seemingly pure scientific tendencies with the modern spirit of liberty and self-development is unmistakable. It is to the interest of the Swarajists to call attention to similar revolutionary tendencies mentioned in the literature of their country. For this reason the majority of authors adhere to the belief in the genuineness and old age of the Arthasāstra, although the proofs are insufficient; and much as one may sympathise with the liberal tendencies of these Indian researchers, their views on history as well as their results are to be considered with care, and one cannot altogether acquit the above-mentioned authors of the blame of not demarcating History from Politics.
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