SIR ASUTOSH MOOKERJEE
SILVER JUBILEE
VOLUMES.

VOL. I.
ARTS AND LETTERS.

22281

'Αναφαίρετον κτήμε' εστί παιδεία βροτοί—Menander.
(Education is a possession that none can take away.)

Quod enim munera reipublicae asserere majus, meliusve possimus, quam si docemus, atque erudimus juvenitem—Cicero.
(What greater gift or better can we offer to the state than if we teach and train up youth?)

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TO THE HONOURABLE SIR ASUTOSH MOOKERJEE, KT., C.S.I.,
ON THE OCCASION OF THE SILVER JUBILEE OF HIS ATTAINING THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF LAWS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA,
THIS VOLUME OF ESSAYS CONTRIBUTED BY HIS FRIENDS AND
ADMIRERS IN INDIA AND ABROAD IS INSCRIBED WITH
AFFECTION, RESPECT AND GRATITUDE FOR HIS
SPLENDID SERVICES TO THE CAUSE OF
THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.
1894—1919.
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A NARRATIVE OF BENGAL TRANSACTIONS.

J. N. Das Gupta, M.A., I.E.S.

INTRODUCTORY.

In 1788, Francis Gladwin published an English translation of a Persian Manuscript, which he dedicated to George Vansittart, brother of Governor Vansittart. In his dedicatory epistle Gladwin says, "The Persian Manuscript of which the following sheets are a translation, was presented to your deceased brother, at the time he governed these provinces with so much honour to himself and glory to the British nation; and his late worthy son gave me a copy of it." In reference to the nature of the information supplied by the Persian Manuscript and the historical interest which in consequence attaches to it, the Translator remarks, "The author, whose name is unknown, appears, in general, to be well-acquainted with his subject, and conveys much curious information on the state of the government, and of the revenues of Bengal, during a very interesting part of Asiatic history." The Manuscript under reference, though not altogether satisfying to the demands of modern critical historical students, thus forms an exception to the vast majority of historical manuscripts pertaining to Mediaeval India, in regard to which Major Stewart, the historian of Bengal, pertinently observes, "It is to be regretted that in the details of the transactions of the Mussalman kings or governors the narration is seldom varied, by any account of the state of civilization or of the progress of the arts and sciences; but in a despotic government where the tyrant was everything, * and the people of no political consequence, and in a state where every individual was a soldier, and educated from his childhood in military habits, it is not to be expected that the historians, generally pensioners of the monarch, should adorn their pages with a detail of circumstances not suited to the taste of their readers."

Here it may not be out of place to refer to the following dictum of Keene, who, in his lifetime, had the handling of many an Indian Chronicle.

* In absolute governments, the Despot is everything, and the people nothing. He is the only object of attention; and when he sits in the midst of tranquility, the page of the historian languishes in the detail of unimportant events.—Dow's History of Hindoostan.
"It is as well to state, once for all, that the native chroniclers seldom present anything like complete materials for history. A credulous and uncritical record of gossip combined with a very scanty analysis of character and motive, characterizes their works, which are rather a set of highly coloured pictures, without proportion or perspective, than those orderly annals from which history elsewhere has chiefly been compiled."

It is, therefore, interesting to note that the Manuscript which Gladwin translates gives us a continuous narrative of "Transactions" in Bengal from the days of the armed revolt of "Sowbha Singh, the Zemindar of Chitwah Burdah in the province of Burdwan" who was joined in his rebellion by Raheem Khan, the Afghan Chief. It gives us a glimpse of Bengal under the administration of Ibrahim Khan, and we have to remember that it was during the period that Afzal Khan governed Behar and Ibrahim Khan, Bengal, that the English were first permitted to form a settlement at Chutanottie. It carries us through the Soobahdaries of Azeemussahan, Jaffar Khan, Shuja Khan, Sirafraz Khan and Aliverdy Khan, and thus brings us to the eve of Clive’s fateful victory at Plassey. It is further interesting to note that here is one of the sources and authorities on which Major Stewart, as he himself tells us, mainly relies for the corresponding section of his work, and in the concluding portion of the narrative contained in the Manuscript, historical students have the added opportunity of comparing the version of the Mussalman chronicler with the account to be found in the pages of Holwell's "Interesting historical events relative to the Provinces of Bengal." For, as is well known, Holwell also gives us a highly interesting account of the usurpation of Aliverdy Khan together with a detailed narrative of his duel with the Mahrattas.

The modern historical student would therefore feel a special delight in comparing the narrative * as presented in Gladwin's translation with that in Stewart's pages. Indeed, Stewart follows Gladwin closely, and the two narratives are, in all essential particulars, exactly identical. Before, however, coming to the narrative itself, let us listen to what the Mahomedan Chronicler has to say about the attractions of the climate

* "The greater part of it has been inserted in the Ryazi-Asulateen, and some extracts from it are given in the Araishi Muhafl, a late Hindustani work." The author, although anonymous, is allowed by the Mahomedans to have written with truth and impartiality."—Stewart.
of Lower Bengal, and generally of service in Bengal. We read, "In former reigns the climate of Bengal, on account of the badness of the air and of the water was deemed inimical to the constitutions of Moguls and other foreigners; and only those officers who laboured under the royal displeasure were stationed here; so that this fertile soil, which enjoys a perpetual spring, was considered as a gloomy prison, the land of spectres, the seat of disease, and the mansion of death. The ministers of state and the dewans appropriated the greatest part of these valuable lands to tinkaws for the Jageer of the Munsebdars, so that the amount collected in the Khalsah, was so inconsiderable, as to be inadequate to the demands of the Nizamut troops; which deficiency was supplied from the treasury of Delhi, and by tinkas on other soobahs." *

I now come to the story, as it is presented in Gladwin's Persian Manuscript, of the rebellion of Sobha Singh in which he was joined by Raheem Khan, the Afghan Chief, and of the troublous times in Bengal which followed till the dizzy career of Raheem Khan came to an end in his defeat and ultimate death. I subjoin a summarised account, and would invite a comparison between this and the narration to be found in Stewart's History of Bengal. Historical students will note for themselves how these occurrences enabled the three European powers—the Dutch, the French, and the English—to strengthen their position in these provinces,† and how Divine Providence through this chain of events paved the way for the coming of the present times.

* During the superintendence of former Dewans, the greater part of Bengal had, from the idea of its being an unhealthy and unproductive country, been made over to military jagirdars; and only a small proportion of it remained under the immediate control of the exchequer; its revenue, therefore, had not even sufficed to pay the Nazim, and military and civil establishments: in consequence of which, money was frequently drawn from the other Soubahs, to liquidate the debts of Bengal. The first act of Moorshed Cooly's authority was to request the Emperor to cancel all the jagiers of Bengal; and to assign to the officers lands in Orissa and other districts, where the hand of authority, aided by private influence and superintendence, was required to enforce the collections.—Stewart.

† On the breaking out of the rebellion, the three European settlements, viz., the Dutch at Chinsura, the French at Chandernagore, and the English at Sutanutty, hired a number of the native soldiery to guard their property; and, professing themselves the avowed friends of government, requested permission from the Nawab to put their factories into a state of defence against an enemy whose resentment they must incur by their adherence to him. The Nawab ordered them, in general terms, to defend themselves; and they, taking for granted what was not positively forbidden, with great diligence raised walls with bastions round their factories.

Such was the origin of the three European forts, or towns, of Chinsura, Chandernagore and Calcutta; and they were the first which the Mogul government suffered foreigners to
As we read in the pages of Auber's History of the Rise and Progress of British Power in India, "At the conclusion of the 17th Century, the English in Bengal were settled at Calcutta, the French at Chandernagore and the Dutch at Chinsurah, all situated on the river Hooghly.

"The Rajahs of the country surrounding these settlements, having revolted against the Mogul Government, and plundered several towns belonging to the Nabob of Bengal, the three European nations, for their own defence, immediately fortified their settlements. Aurangzebe, then Emperor, sent out one of his grandsons to suppress the rebellion and to superintend the Provinces of Bengal, Behar and Orissa, through whom the English obtained permission, in 1698, to purchase from the Indian proprietors, the villages of Soota Nutty, Calcutta and Govindapore, on which ground the city of Calcutta now stands. A fort was ordered to be built, and in compliment to His Majesty, King William III, it was denominated Fort William."

I.

As already indicated, when Sobha Singh, the Hindu Zemindar of Chitwah Burdah (according to some authority a variation of Chitore Burdah) in the province of Burdwan, rose in armed revolt against the Mogul administration of his day and was joined by Rahim Khan, the Afghan chief, Ibrahim Khan was the Subedar at Dacca and the great Emperor Aurangzeb was in the Deccan, busy in the prosecution of his war-like operations and diplomatic projects. We are thus brought into the thick of events and introduced to those stirring times which preceded the decadence of Mogul power in India, and which in truth in some measure help us to understand the forces in operation which brought about that decadence.

Almost unconscious of the real import of his words, the Mahomedan Chronicler of the Bengal insurrection tells us in his introductory remarks:

"Alumgeer began his reign with gaining the hearts of his subjects, and arranging the grand affairs of religion and of the state; he next possessed himself of every part of the empire, and settled the revenues; after which he turned his ambitious thoughts on conquest, and resolved to subdue the Dekhan, which, in extent of territory, in the grandeur of build in any part of their empire; for neither the territories of Madras nor Bombay had been subdued by the Moguls previous to these places having been ceded to the English. —Stewart."
its cities and in the number of its inhabitants, is only exceeded by Hindustan.

"This expedition engaged him twelve years, at the end of which time he possessed himself of the important fortress of Golconda and took prisoner, Abul Hasan Tannah Shah, together with Sewa and Sumbhu, the two Marhatta chiefs of Sattarahgurh, and annexed their dominions to the empire." And then, the unknown author of the manuscript adds, with an irony almost akin to the irony of Sophocles in its subconscious suggestion, "Whilst the Emperor was engaged in the Dekhan, insurrections took place in different parts of the empire. The Soobahs of Kandahar and Bedakshan absolutely shook off the yoke, and were both irrecoverably lost." Thus we are in effect told that the expedition to the Dekhan was the Moscow expedition of "his angelic Majesty, the monarch of the land and of the sea, the reviver of religion, the ornament of the throne, the conqueror of the world, the victorious Emperor"—Alumgeer.

Furthermore, here we get a glimpse of the mechanism, the inner working of the Mogul administrative system in its palmy days. For Ibrahim Khan was the Subedar in Bengal, the Governor, as there were separate Governors in his time for Behar and Orissa respectively. As to the powers which were delegated to these Subadars by the Emperor and which they were legally authorised to exercise, we have an interesting sample of a Firman granted to a Subadar in Dow's History of Hindustan. The particular Firman which Dow reproduces is one granted to a Subadar, "Commander and governor of the Province of Allahabad." We are told that "he must watch over the safety and happiness of that country, taking particular care that the weak shall not be oppressed by the strong, nor in any manner dispossessed of those tenements which have been long occupied by themselves and their progenitors.

"He shall make the usages of the country, and the rights of the subject his study, and shall be accountable for the revenues to commissaries of the royal exchequer, after a deduction of the necessary expenses of the province, and what shall be received by the agents of Jagueerdars.

"He shall punish such as refuse to pay the usual duties and stipulated rents, as an example to others; and he shall, from time to time, and repeatedly, transmit an account of all his transactions to the presence."
administration of the state; the supreme jurisdiction in criminal matters; and the exclusive superintendence of the public police. In the fiscal department he had no share, excepting indeed, as some affirm, with regard to the revenue of the lands immediately appropriated to the support of the Nizamut. To the Dewan were committed the management of the public revenues, and the distribution of civil justice. By the theory of the constitution, a balance of power subsisted between these officers, and, under monarchs of wisdom and vigour, such a balance was actually maintained; but, in weak reigns, its efficiency fluctuated entirely according to the comparative degrees of interest which the Nazim and the Dewan could respectively command at Delhi. When, however, the supremacy of the Imperial Court became altogether titular, the possession of the sword at once determined the point in favour of the Nazim. The dewan sank into dependence; and was generally some Hindu of subtility and intrigue, the mere creature of the viceroys, and probably the convenient instrument of his avarice or tyranny.

"By the usage of the empire, two or three provinces were sometimes consolidated together under the denomination of a Subah, and, while individually governed by Nazims, were collectively ruled by a Subahdar. This arrangement only inserted between the Court and the provincial rulers an intermediate superior, of whom those rulers held as, in some sort, feudatories; but it did not affect the mutual relations of the provincial government and the people. The provinces of Bengal, however, though properly speaking, they constituted a subah, were governed immediately by a viceroy of imperial appointment, who was indifferently styled Nabob and Subahdar."

We thus realise, in some measure, what was actually involved in the grant of the Dewany to the East India Company by the Mogul Emperor in 1765, and are enabled to look into the nature of the complications which were sure to arise out of what is called Lord Clive’s System of Double Government.*

It is, perhaps, not generally known that the Dewany was once

* After the grant of the Diwani in 1765 by which the Company assumed the revenue administration of Bengal, Behar and Orissa, Warren Hastings, then Governor of Bengal, set up courts and offices for the disposal of revenue and judicial business, in virtue not of any powers derived from Parliament, but of the authority which had been delegated to the Company by the Moghul Government. Indeed, it was not till 1861, that the last traces of the dual system of courts was swept away.—Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms.
before offered to the East India Company in 1761, when it was declined, and it was only after deep deliberation and purely in the interest of good government that the authorities concerned consented to the arrangement. This will appear from the following extract from the letter of the Select Committee to the Court, dated the 30th September, 1765:—"The perpetual struggles for superiority between the Nabobs and your agents, together with the recent proofs before us of notorious and avowed corruption, have rendered us unanimously of opinion, after the most mature deliberation, that no other method * could be suggested of laying the axe to the root of all these evils, than that of obtaining the Dewany of Bengal, Behar and Orissa for the Company."

I place here another extract from a letter of the Court of Directors to Bengal, dated the 17th May, 1766, which is of more than ordinary interest in this connection, inasmuch as the letter sets forth clearly what was the conception of the Home authorities regarding the scope and responsibilities of the office of the Dewany.

"We come now to consider the great and important affair of the Dewany. When we consider that the barrier of the country government was entirely broken down, and every Englishman throughout the country armed with an authority that owned no superior, and exercising his power to the oppression of the helpless native, who knew not whom to obey, at such a crisis, we cannot hesitate to approve your obtaining the Dewany for the Company.

"We must now turn our attention to render our acquisitions as permanent as human wisdom can make them. This permanency, we apprehend, can be found only in the simplicity of the execution. We observe the account you give of the office and power of the King's Dewan in former times was the collecting of all the revenues, and after defraying the expenses of the army, and allowing a sufficient fund for the support of the Nizamut, to remit the remainder to Delhi. This description of it is not the office we wish to execute; the experience we have already had, in the province of Burdwan, convinces us how unfit an Englishman is to conduct the collection of the revenues, and follow the subtle native through all his arts to conceal the real value of his country, to perplex and to elude the payments. We therefore entirely approve

* "If we think at all, we must now be convinced there is no medium or alternative but this; that can be adopted with any appearance of security or permanence, aut subah, aut nullus must now be our motto."—Holowell's Interesting Historical Events.
of your preserving the ancient form of government, in the upholding of
the dignity of the soubah.

"We conceive the office of Dewan should be exercised only in
superintending the collection and disposal of the revenues, which office,
though vested in the Company, should officially be executed by our
resident at the durbar, under the control of the Governor and Select
Committee, the ordinary bounds of which control should extend to
nothing beyond the superintending of the collection of the revenues and
the receiving of the money from the Nabob's treasury to that of the
Dewannah, or the Company." *

As already stated, Aurangzeb was busy in the Deccan when this
insurrection broke out in Bengal, and the "first intelligence he received
of these events was through the newspaper"; as our Manuscript puts
it, by means of the imperial intelligencers. Here again we get an
interesting glimpse of the administrative arrangements of the Mogul
Empire. For what is this Newspaper and who are the imperial intelli-
gencers?

In this connection, we may note what the author of the Seir-
Mutagherin tells us—

"The vacca-nuviss or Remembrancer or Gazetteer and the Sevana-
uviss or Historiographer and the Harcara or spy were appointed for
writing down the events that might happen in the respective provinces,
territories and districts of their residence. Their duty was to inhabit such
cities and towns as were the seats of command and Government, to
the end that they might have it in their power to write down at day-
break such events as should have happened the whole day and night
before, and to send the paper to the Emperor. There were posts
established that carried the dispatches, with all speed and in all weathers
to court, where a Daroga or Inspector examined the same: after which
he reduced to concise exposition the substance of such as deserved the
Imperial notice, presenting at the same time, the whole detail as
forwarded by the provincial intelligencers. Nevertheless whatever
amongst these papers was addressed personally to the Emperor was
sacred, and would not be set upon by any other hand than his own.
It was perused by the monarch himself who alone could break the

* The Nabob was to continue Subadar, the Company was to be his colleague for pur-
poses of civil and fiscal administration, they were to support the Nabob's (Nizamut
expenses, and to pay the tribute (Nuzaran) in his name.—Keene's Mogul Empire.
seal, and he alone ordered what he thought proper about the contents."

Indeed, what may be designated the Intelligence Department of the Mogul administrative arrangements must have been a conspicuous feature of the Mogul system, and it did not fail to attract the notice of some of our Seventeenth Century European travellers in India. Thevenot, for example, who visited India in 1666 and, who in some of his references to the public officials at Surat, brings us face to face with the practical working of the administrative machinery throughout the Mogul Empire, observes:—

"The Great Mogul entertains a great officer there whom the Franks call Secretary of State and whose duty much resembles that of the Intendant of a Province in France. He is called Vaca Nevis, that is, who writes and keeps a Register of all that happens within the extent of the country where he is placed. The king keeps one in every government, to give him notice of all that occurs, and he depends on no minister of state, but only on his Majesty."

II.

"Ibrahim Khan, son of the celebrated Persian nobleman, Aly Mardan Khan, who delivered up the fortress of Candehar to the Emperor Shah Jehan, was in character the very reverse of his father."

"He administered justice with strict impartiality, and encouraged agriculture and commerce; but was totally deficient of all military abilities."

This is the general estimate of the character of Ibrahim Khan* which contemporary writers have handed down to posterity. The attitude of the Subedar towards the insurrection in Bengal, even when things were taking a really serious turn and district after district was passing into the hands of the rebels, would lend support to this view. When day after day news was brought to the Governor of the alarming progress of the rebels, he is said to have replied to the remonstrances of his son and counsellors, "that a civil war was a dreadful evil, in which the lives of God's creatures were wantonly expended; that the rebels, if let alone, would shortly disperse of themselves; and the only

* Ibrahim Khan was appointed to succeed Shaistah Khan to the soobahdaree of Bengal. He was a man of a kind and gentle disposition, but greatly wanting in energy and activity. His first act on assuming the government was to release the English agents whom he found in confinement.—Broome's History of the Bengal Army.
consequence would be, the loss of a small portion of his Majesty's revenue." The speech, if not apocryphal, would afford further evidence in justification of the popular estimate.

The first to fall a victim to Sobha Singh was Kissen Ram, the Hindu Zemindar of Burdwan. He underrated the strength of the rebel organisation, and carelessly attacking Sobha Singh with a small force, which we may presume was neither well-disciplined nor well-equipped, was himself defeated and slain. All his treasures and family members fell into the hands of the rebels. His son, Jagat Roy, however, was able to make good his escape. He fled to Jahengeernagar, Dacca, which was the seat of the Provincial Government at the time, and where the Subedar resided, and informed the Subedar of the occurrences in the neighbourhood of Burdwan.

The neighbourhood of Burdwan must have presented a tempting object of sack and plunder to the freebooters of the day. For that region was a rich and flourishing trading centre during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, and there is no question about the prosperity which Burdwan enjoyed in consequence. Writing in 1765, Holwell gives us the following highly interesting statistical account of this part of the province of Bengal:

"North-west of Fort William, and about three days and-a-half distant, lie the lands of Rojah Tilluck Chund, extending twelve days' travel. The stipulated rents of these lands are thirty-two lac per annum; but their real produce and value, from eighty lac to one khorore. This is the principal of the three districts, ceded in perpetuity to the Company; by the treaty with Cossim Ali Khan, in the year 1760.

"The principal towns of this district are Burdwan, Kirpy, Radhanagore, Dewangunge and Ballikissagur; these supply the East India Companies with the following sortments of piece-goods, viz. doorcas, terrandams, cuttanies, soosies, soot romaals, gurras, sestersoys, santon coupees, cherriderries, chilys, custas and doofoota's. The capital Burdwan, may be properly called the centre of the trade of the provinces. In tranquil times, this place afforded an annual large vend for the valuable staples of lead, copper, broad cloth, tin, pepper and tootanague. The Puggiah merchants from Delhy and Agra, resorted yearly to this great mart; and would again, if peace was established in the country: .........they purchased the above staples, either with money; or in barter for opium, tincal, saltpetre and horses.
“This district produces raw-silk and coposs, sufficient only for manufacturing their soosies, cuttanees and gurras. The lesser towns manufacture other inferior sortments of cloth, as seerbunds, gollabunds, etc. . . . . . . . it produces grain, equal to the consumption of the people only.

“Burdumaan (the proper name of the district) is high; better peopled, and better cultivated than any part of the three provinces. Blessings that caused it every year, more particularly, to become a prey to the Maharattors; as before recited.

“The family of this Rajah farmed lands to the amount of four lac per annum; contiguous to the bounds of Calcutta; and had a palace at Beallah, about seven miles south of it—the Fort of Buzbudjee, on the Ganges, was also their property.”

At this stage, departing from the strictly chronological order of events, we may briefly refer to a striking episode, an act of self-destruction on the part of the daughter of Kissen Ram in defence of honour and chastity: one of those deeds of desperation which the chivalric annals of Rajasthan have made an undying memory in India. Kissen Ram’s daughter, a spotless maiden, dowered with the fatal gift of beauty, was kept a close prisoner by Sobha Singh ever since the defeat and death of her father. Sobha Singh had for long harboured evil designs against her. At last when he felt that his political power was laid on a secure foundation, he determined to lay violent hands on her. The Princess always carried a sharp knife with her, secreted within the folds of her dress. When the monster approached her, like the Roman Tarquin of old, in the hushed silence of night, she ripped his belly open with the knife and then stabbed herself to death. What comments can historians offer on incidents like these which strike us dumb with their tragic pathos, and which appeal to our pity and admiration almost with a compelling force? What brutality is man capable of, and what strength resides in woman’s weak breast?

III.

At this juncture, Nourullah Khan was the Foujdar of Jessore Hooghly, Burdwan, Midnapore and Hijeeley. The task of suppressing the rebels was, therefore, entrusted to him by the peace-loving Subedar Ibrahim Khan. Our Manuscript speaks of this Foujdar as “a Munsubdar of three thousand who was a merchant of large property.”
Unfortunately, the merchant-trader had got the better of the Munsubdar in him, and soon after marching out from Jessore to oppose the rebels, he was intimidated by their growing strength and did not venture to proceed beyond Hooghly. There he shut himself up with his riches and his dependants, and applied for help to the Dutch who had a settlement at Chinsurah. In the meantime, the rebels, encouraged by the disgraceful cowardice of the Foujdar, and excited by exaggerated reports of his wealth, laid siege to the fort of Hooghly and reduced him to such straits that Nourullah Khan was feign to fly with a few followers leaving behind all his treasures at Hooghly. The fort was captured by the rebels and the principal inhabitants and merchants of the district with their families took refuge in Chinsurah. The Dutch embarked some European soldiers on two of their ships and came up close to the walls of the fort at Hooghly. They battered the walls of the fort with their cannon, and killing a considerable number of the rebels made themselves masters of the place.

Sobha Singh, finding himself no match for the Dutch, fled to Satgong. Thence he himself retreated to Burdwan, and giving the command of the army to Rahim Khan sent the Afghan to Mukhsusabad by the way of Nuddea.

It was after this that Sobha Singh made his infamous attempt on the honour of the daughter of Kissen Ram and was, by her, stabbed to death. He was succeeded by his brother, Himmut Singh, who is justly represented by our Mahomedan Chronicler as a monster resembling Sobha Singh in all his vices and continuing his depredations upon the royal (Mogul) dominions.

Raheem Khan was the stronger partner of the two. Thus the leadership of the rebels inevitably passes into his hands, and henceforward Himmut Singh falls into the background. The Afghan arrogantly assumed the title of Shah, and his strength went on increasing as bands of desperate adventurers and vagabonds swelled the ranks of his adherents till he was virtually master of nearly half the subah of Bengal.

In the suburbs of Mukhsusabad, dwelt Niamut Khan with his nephew, Tehkewar Khan and some others who were loyal to the royal interest, and refused to join Raheem Khan. The Afghan thereupon ordered one of his dependants to bring him the head of Niamut Khan. What follows I narrate in the words of Gladwin, as the bald narration in the
chronicle—like the baldness of a mountain—has a peculiar grandeur about it.

"Tehhewar Khan, a youth eminent for his military prowess, mounted his horse, and heading a few troops, at the first attack put the enemy to flight with great slaughter. But he was soon surrounded by the whole army, and, together with his party, cut to pieces.

"Niamut Khan, on receiving news of the death of his nephew, did not wait to put on armour, but taking his sword, mounted his horse in the same dress in which he had come from the bath.

"Unsupported, he pushed through the outposts, and coming up to Raheem Khan, who was also on horseback, made a stroke at his head, but Niamut Khan's sword was broken in two by the resistance of the helmet. Not in the least dismayed at the accident, he flung the hilt at his adversary; and seizing him by the waist, pulled him from his horse; then jumped upon his breast, and drawing out of the scabbard Raheem's own knife, which he wore in his girdle, attempted to cut off his head, but found it impracticable on account of the gorget.

"Raheem Khan was instantly rescued by his people; and Niamut Khan, covered with wounds, was carried to the tent of his adversary. He presently afterwards opened his eyes, and called for water, which being brought, he expired drinking.

"The news of Niamut Khan's unhappy end was conveyed by the zamindars to the Nazim, Ibrahim Khan, at Jehangeernagur. Ill-provided with troops, and himself no soldier, he was afraid to oppose such powerful rebels; and accordingly applied to the Emperor for succour."

Now it was that the Emperor came to hear of the atrocious conduct of the rebels and the pussillanimous conduct of the royal officials in Bengal through the agency of his Intelligence Department, even before the Subahdar's letter had reached him. He desired to know to what tribe Raheem Khan belonged, and on being informed that the rebel leader was an Afghan, said that "a single hiss will drive away a hundred crows."

In the present case, the Emperor's single hiss consisted of a three-fold mandate. In the first place, he immediately conferred the command of the Bengal army on Zubberdust Khan, the son of Ibrahim Khan, whom our manuscript describes as "a valiant and experienced officer," a description amply justified by subsequent events—whose martial ardour thus presented a strange contrast to the unwarlike temper of the
father. In the next place, he ordered the Nazims of Oudh, Allahabad and Behar to seize the families of Raheem Khan and of his adherents wherever found—an order which had a most salutary effect inasmuch as many of the rebels thereupon quitted Raheem Khan and quietly went back to their wives and children. Finally, to give greater weight to these operations against the rebels, the Emperor appointed his grandson, Azeem-us-shan, Subadar of Bengal and Behar, and the Prince, without loss of time, began his march at the head of twelve thousand cavalry.

In my foregoing remarks, I have made an attempt to elucidate the special bearings of this insurrection in Bengal, in the first place as a commentary on the practical working of the Mogul administrative system. But attention has also been drawn to the light which it throws on the nature of the forces in actual operation at the time which ultimately brought about the disintegration of the Mogul Empire.* Finally, we see how the progress of events enabled the three European powers to strengthen their position in Bengal and to add to their political influence in the Province. If any proof were needed of the real importance which attaches to the study of this apparently insignificant chapter of provincial history it would be found in the large space devoted to this insurrection in the writings of all our standard and accepted authorities on Indian topics, such as Orme and Broome. Herein also is to be found my justification for inviting the attention of modern historical students in India to this episode at the present juncture in the history of India. For what more acceptable service can our present-day historians render than to bring history into touch with the life of the people? †

* "As the history of states is generally written, the greatest and most momentous revolutions seem to come upon them like supernatural inflictions, without warning or cause. But the fact is, that such revolutions are almost always the consequences of moral changes, which have gradually passed on the mass of the community, and which originally proceed far before their progress is indicated by any public measure. An intimate knowledge of the domestic history of nations is therefore absolutely necessary to the prognosis of political events. A narrative, defective in this respect, is as useless as a medical treatise which should pass by all the symptoms attendant on the early stage of a disease and mention only what occurs when the patient is beyond the reach of remedies."—Macaulay.

† They brought history into touch with the nation's life, and gave it an influence it had never possessed out of France; and won for themselves the making of opinion, mightier than laws.—Acton.
THE ROMANTIC ELEMENT IN THE MODERN PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS.

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The present age is witnessing a great revival of the romantic movement. People seem to be tired of the rigid formalism of the classicist and seek everywhere a more elastic view of the universe. This spirit has pervaded even mathematics, the strongest arsenal of rigid logic. The philosophy of mathematics has undergone in recent years a great change. To exhibit this change in the standpoint of mathematical philosophy as the result of the growth of the romantic element is the purpose of this short essay.

The instrument which mathematical philosophy makes use of to carry on its speculations is Symbolic Logic. This logic has made very great progress during the last fifty years, and in the hands of such masters as Peano, Couturat and Russell, it has become a most effective organ of research. The object of Symbolic Logic is to carry further the formal principles of deductive logic, and give them a more precise and correct expression than the older logicians did. It was felt by the mathematicians of the early Victorian period that formal logic was a very useful instrument for mathematical investigation, but it was felt also that until it was reclaimed from the coarse and primitive condition in which it then existed, there was not much hope of its general adoption as a vehicle for mathematical thought. This was the psychological origin of Symbolic Logic.

It will be quite out of place here to enter into a detailed examination of the methods and results of Symbolic Logic. Only a brief survey of its most important features will be attempted. "Symbolic or formal logic," says Russell, "is the study of the various general types of deduction. The word symbolic designates the subject by an accidental characteristic, for the employment of mathematical symbols here, as elsewhere, is merely a theoretical convenience." It investigates the general rules by which inferences are made and it deals with the funda-
mental notions governing such rules. These notions are logical constants, or the ultimate indefinables of logic. According to Russell, the number of logical constants is only eight or nine. As examples of these constants, may be mentioned formal implication and the notions of class and relation.

Symbolic Logic has three divisions: the calculus of propositions, the calculus of classes, and the calculus of relations. There is a good deal of interconnexion between the first two, and it has long been a moot point among mathematical logicians whether the first or the second is the more fundamental of the two. Russell, however, is inclined to think with McColl and others that the calculus of propositions is more fundamental than that of classes. Regarding propositions, a good deal of confusion still exists. Thus, McColl, who believes the logic of propositions to be more essential than the logic of classes, speaks of propositions being sometimes true and sometimes false. A genuine proposition can never be so; it is either always true or always false. The mistake lies in thinking that "x is a man" is a proposition, whereas in reality it is only a propositional function, a schematic form standing for a whole class of propositions. The true proposition is of the form "x is a man implies x is a mortal, for all values of x." There is no real variable in it, the variable disappearing, just as it does in a definite integral. There is another matter regarding propositions which has also caused some confusion. Propositions assert both a formal and a material implication and the distinction between the two is often a source of great confusion. Formal implication is, however, what symbolic logic is concerned with. The difference between them may be illustrated by the relation between the fourth and the fifth proposition of Euclid. This relation is one of material implication, for their connexion with each other does not depend upon the assigning of any particular value to any variable involved. Each of the propositions, however, states a formal implication. The fourth proposition states that if x and y be triangles they fulfil certain other conditions. The fifth proposition states that if x is an isosceles triangle, x has the angles at the base equal.

If all propositions were of the above form, then formal implication would be the only kind of implication. But Russell has to admit that there may be propositions of a more simple type, such as "Socrates is a man." Here there is absolutely no variable, and consequently, the
implication not a formal one. Is it because of this that he has to recognize material implication? The truth is, the difference between formal and material implication, as Russell views it, appertains not so much to the implication as to the proposition. Thus, the difference between a proposition of the form "S is a Euclidean space" and one of the form "x is an isosceles triangle implies x having base angles equal," is more fundamental than a difference of implication seems to suggest. The difference lies not only in the nature of the implications but in the nature of the terms between which the implications hold. In the first, the implication holds between two terms; in the second, between two propositional functions. Whether formal implication holds between any terms which are not propositional functions, Russell does not say. All the examples of formal implication which he has given are those in which propositional functions alone are concerned.

There are certain fundamental propositions or axioms in the Propositional Calculus. Russell enumerates ten such propositions. The Law of Contradiction, curiously enough, is not one of them, but is derived from certain more elementary propositions, in accordance with Russell’s definition of negation, namely, that not \(-p\) is equivalent to the assertion that \(p\) implies all propositions, i.e., that "\(r\) implies \(r\)" implies "\(p\) implies \(r\)," whatever \(r\) may be. This, as well as his derivation of the Law of Excluded Middle from his so-called principle of reduction, seems somewhat artificial.

After the calculus of propositions comes the calculus of classes. Russell accepts with Peano the notion of class as fundamental, but he accepts two other notions as equally fundamental, namely, the notion of a propositional function and that of such that. As regards the notion of class proper, two kinds may be distinguished. We may have the relation of an individual to a class, distinguished by Peano and Russell by the letter \(\epsilon\), or we may have the relation of one class to another. The notion of propositional function we have already discussed. There remains the notion of such that which is peculiar to Russell’s view of class-logic. This notion is, indeed, the most fundamental in Russell’s system, for the notion of class may be derived from it. Russell thus defines this notion: "The values of \(x\) which render a propositional function \(\phi(x)\) true are like the roots of an equation—indeed, the latter are a particular case of the former—and we may consider all the values of \(x\) which are such that \(\phi(x)\) is true. In general, these values form a class and
in fact a class may be defined as all the terms satisfying some proposi-
tional function." The notion of class is thus made subordinate to
that of such that. Herein Russell deviates most from Peano, in whose
system class forms a perfectly independent notion. But it is very
doubtful whether the unity of a class is preserved in the mathemati-
cal form which gives it merely the character of the roots of an equa-
tion. Perhaps Russell is led to this equational form of a class by the
case with which it can represent the case where a class is composed
of a single individual, for we have then only to make $\phi(x)$ a linear equa-
tion. The difficulty, however, is not insurmountable in Peano's sys-
tem, for when a class is reduced to an individual, $\epsilon$ becomes unity.
There is another reason why Russell adopts this peculiar way of defining
a class. This is, as he says in Chapter VI of his Principles of Mathe-
matics, to get rid of the notion and. Every class, he says, is an in-
dependent unit and is in no way derived from other classes with the help
of the notion of 'and.' This independence of classes is fully preserved
when they are looked upon as roots of the equation $\phi(x) = 0$, for one set
of values which satisfies this equation for a particular form of the func-
tion $\phi$ is absolutely independent of another set which satisfies it for
another form of the function. But it is not quite apparent what is
gained by this independence. What harm would there be if the class 2
were derived from the class 1, the class 3 from the class 2, and so on?
Rather, the system of natural numbers would gain in unity and cohe-
rence. Moreover, is it quite evident that one can preserve the independ-
ence of classes in this way? If the notion of number is derived from
the notion of class and this again from that of the roots of the equation
$\phi(x) = 0$, how is one to know how many roots this equation has?

Russell's defects, in fact, are the defects of the extreme cardinal
view of numbers. If all question of order were eliminated from the
notion of number, then no idea of the dependence of one number upon
another could be entertained and thus we should have Russell's view
of the independence of classes. This view is opposed to that of Dede-
kind who defines numbers as simple ordinals which become possessed of
their cardinal meaning when they are applied to the enumeration of
classes.

We now pass to the calculus of relations. "A relation between two
terms," says Russell, "is a concept which occurs in a proposition in which
there are two terms not occurring as concepts and in which the inter-
change of the two terms gives a different proposition." This definition is intended to denote that a relation between \( a \) and \( b \) is different from one between \( b \) and \( a \). This irreversibility is, indeed, the essence of the notion of relation and is the source of order and series. It is, however, an equally essential characteristic of the notion of relation that when some relation exists between \( a \) and \( b \), there must hold some relation also between \( b \) and \( a \). The latter relation is called the converse of the former.

The relation of a term to itself gives us the concept of identity. The fundamental proposition of identity is "Unity has unity": This is the form in which Russell enunciates the Principle of Identity. The thing, however, is that unity itself is presupposed in the Principle of Identity and that consequently, Russell's statement is less general than the ordinary statement of this principle.

The conception of order follows naturally from that of relation. The irreversibility which is the essence of relation is also a fundamental feature of the notion of order. Order, in fact, is one of the most fundamental relations in mathematics. The distinguishing mark of order is the notion of 'between.' This notion may be characterised in the language of Russell, as a relation of one term \( y \) to two others \( x \) and \( z \), which holds whenever \( x \) has to \( y \), and \( y \) has to \( z \), some relation which \( y \) does not have to \( x \), nor \( z \) to \( y \), nor \( z \) to \( x \). Thus, "\( y \) is between \( x \) and \( z \)" means that there is a relation \( R \) which holds between \( x \) and \( y \) and \( y \) and \( z \), but not between \( y \) and \( x \) or \( z \) and \( y \). There are two self-evident propositions concerning the relation of 'between.' These are:

1. if \( y \) be between \( x \) and \( z \), and \( z \) between \( y \) and \( w \), then \( y \) is between \( x \) and \( w \);
2. if \( y \) be between \( x \) and \( z \), and \( w \) between \( x \) and \( y \), then \( y \) is between \( w \) and \( z \).

The relation of 'between' leads directly to the generation of a series. If we have a collection of terms, finite or infinite, such that every term has to one and only one term of the collection a certain relation and every term has to one and only one other term of the collection a relation which is the converse of the former one, then every term of the collection except the two end terms, has one relation to a second term and the converse relation to a third. Thus, the given term is between the second and third terms. The term with which a given term has the first of the relations above considered is called next before the given term, the term with which it has the converse relation is called next
after the given term. Two terms between which the relations in question hold are consecutive terms. Terms arranged in this way form a series.

The notion of series leads to that of a continuum. Continuum, in fact, is the necessary condition that terms may be arranged in a series. It is the general name for the possibility of a one-to-one relation, and consequently, for that of all order, all series. Continuum was formerly supposed to have relation to space and time but the modern tendency is to define it by means of pure relations of order. As Russell says, what is called the arithmetisation of mathematics has shown that all the problems presented in this respect by space and time are already present in pure arithmetic. The ordinary definition of continuity is that in a continuous series there is a term between any two terms of the series. This is also the provisional definition of continuity given by Russell in the earlier portions of his *Principles of Mathematics*. But, says Russell, the inadequacy of this definition was proved conclusively by Cantor and even before his time, it was found inadequate to express such continuity as that of space. Cantor gives two definitions of continuity, of which the first, divested of all technicalities, runs thus:—

In order that a series should be continuous, it must have two characteristics: It must be *perfect* and *cohesive*. This is thus explained by Russell (vide *Principles of Mathematics*, p. 288):—

"Speaking popularly, a series is cohesive, or has cohesion, where it contains no finite gaps. The precise definition, as given by Cantor, is as follows: "We call $T$ a cohesive collection of points, if for any two points $t$ and $t'$ of $T$, for a number $\epsilon$ given in advance and as small as we please, there are always, in several ways, a finite number of points $t_1, t_2, t_3, \ldots, t_\epsilon$, belonging to $T$, such that the distances $tt_1, tt_2, tt_3, \ldots, tt_\epsilon$ are all less than $\epsilon$." This condition, it will be seen, has essential reference to distance. It is not necessary that the collection considered should consist of numbers, nor that $\epsilon$ should be a number. All that is necessary is, that the collection should be a series in which there are distances obeying the axiom of Archimedes (the axiom of Archimedes asserts that, given any two magnitudes of a kind, some finite multiple of the lesser exceeds the greater) and having no minimum, and that $\epsilon$ should be an arbitrary distance of the kind presented by the series" .........................

"To explain what is meant by a *perfect* series is more difficult. A
series is perfect when it coincides with its first derivative. To explain this definition, we must examine the notion of the derivatives of a series and this demands an explanation of a limiting-point of a series. Speaking generally, the terms of a series are of two kinds, those which Cantor calls isolated points, and those which he calls limiting-points. A finite series has only isolated points; an infinite series must define at least one limiting-point, though this need not belong to the series. A limiting-point of a series is defined by Cantor to be a term such that, in any interval containing the term, there are an infinite number of terms of the series. The definition is given in terms of the points on a line, but it has no essential reference to space. The limiting point may or may not be a term of the original series. The assemblage of all limiting-points is called the first derivative of the series ...... A series, then, is perfect, when it consists of exactly the same terms as its first derivative, i.e., when all its points are limiting-points and all its limiting-points belong to it."

The defect of this definition is that it contains both cardinal and ordinal factors. A definition containing only ordinal terms is also given by Cantor. To understand this definition, it is necessary to know certain technical terms which are thus explained by Russell (vide Principles, pp. 296-97): We start with the series of rational numbers, the characteristics of which are these: (1) it is denumerable, that is, by taking its terms in a suitable order (which, however, must be different from that in which they are given), we can give them a one-to-one correspondence with the finite integers; (2) it has no first or last term; (3) there is a term between any two, i.e. the series is compact (überall dicht); (4) it is a fundamental series or a progression. We next explain what is meant by calling two fundamental series coherent, and we give an ordinal definition of the limit of a fundamental series, namely, that the limit of a progression comes after the whole progression, but every term before the limit comes before some term of the progression, with a corresponding definition for regression. "Any term of M which is the limit of some fundamental series in M is called a principal term of M. If all the terms of M are principal terms, M is called condensed in itself. If every fundamental series in M has a limit in M, M is called closed (abgeschlossen). If M is both closed and condensed in

* A more simple definition of this is given by Russell at p. 277.
itself, then it is *perfect.*" (Principles of Mathematics, p. 297). It will now be possible to understand Cantor's second definition which runs thus:—

A one-dimensional continuum $M$ is a series which (1) is perfect, (2) contains within itself a denumerable series $S$ of which there are terms between any two terms of $M$.

This, then, is the final definition of continuity in purely ordinal terms. Whitehead has given a definition which is much more simple, but which yet contains all the essential features of the above definition. According to Whitehead, a series is continuous when (1) every segment, upper or lower, has a limit, and the series has a first and a last term; (2) a denumerable compact series is contained in it in such a way that there are terms of this latter series between any two terms of the original series. (A lower segment is a class $v$ of terms contained in $u$, not null, and not co-extensive with $u$, and such that $v$ has no last term, and every term preceding a $v$ is a $v$. If, again, $v$ has no first term and every term following a $v$ is a $v$, $v$ is called an upper segment).

We have thus the general definition of continuity in which no appeal is made to what Russell is pleased to call "the mass of unanalysed prejudice which Kantians call intuition." It is extremely doubtful, however, whether this definition will be intelligible to any person who has not known continuity by the despised way of intuition and has not devoted a great portion of his life to discovering the best way in which to give a logical form to a thing which he has come to know through intuition. The extremely complex notions of perfect series, compact series, denumerable series, etc., with the help of which the notion of continuity is sought to be defined, are themselves unintelligible without the idea of continuity. Continuity, in fact, is a very simple notion derived ultimately from an observation of our sensations. The fundamental continuous series is the series of sensations. Both the temporal and the spatial series are derived from it. But it may be said that the psychological origin of a notion is one thing and its logical definition another. A logical definition, however, must take account of what is most easily intelligible and express what is complex in terms of what is simple. If the simplest form in which a notion can be expressed contains some psychological factor, that factor must find a place in its definition. Continuity is essentially unbroken flow, such as is witnessed in the uninterrupted movement of personality. Personality which
knows no hiatus, no break, but is ever drifting onwards, is the type of continuity. Continuity, then, is linked up with our psychical life, with our existence as conscious, thinking beings.

Continuity introduces us to the idea of infinity. A continuous series is an infinite series.

The notion of infinite requires, according to Russell and Cantor, no revision of the ideas of class and number. It is true that it is not evident at first sight how infinite numbers can have any kinship with finite numbers or finite classes. Indeed, if numbers are defined by means of the generating relation of differing by one, then, it must be confessed, the finite numbers form a complete set and there is no possibility of adding to their number. But if we view them as arising from the fundamental relation of classes, namely, that of whole and part, then it is clear that their number can be extended, so as to include the infinite numbers. This is the great advantage which Russell and Cantor’s theory of classes has over the theory which looks upon classes as formed by enumeration. The latter theory is evidently only applicable to finite classes and cannot be applied to infinite ones. Infinite numbers differ from finite ones in the fact that the relation of whole and part does not hold good of them as it does in the case of the finite numbers. Thus, since every number can be doubled, the number of even numbers is the same as the number of numbers. Infinite numbers are not subject to the axiom of Archimedes which states that if \( p \) and \( q \) be any finite numbers then a finite number \( n \) can be found, such that \( np > q \). Cantor distinguishes three kinds of infinities *:

1. The proper infinite which as such allows no kind of determination, which not only goes beyond everything finitely determinate but also everything definitely infinite.

2. The improper, potential or syncategorematic infinite which is variable, which goes beyond all finite limits or falls lower than all finite limits.

3. The actual but not absolutely infinite or transfinite which represents a quantum which is determinate and constant, but goes beyond all finite quanta. It is distinguished from the Absolute Infinite, in so far as it represents an infinite that can be increased, whereas the latter is not capable of

increase and is altogether incapable of being determined mathematically.

The first of these, says Cantor, is the infinite of the metaphysician, the second is the infinite which is the subject-matter of the Infinitesimal Calculus, and the third the real infinite which is the basis of the mathematical theory of numbers.

Cantor’s second conception of infinity leads to that of the infinitesimal: In the case of all finite numbers, the axiom of Archimedes, namely, that if $P$ and $Q$ be both finite numbers, then a finite number $n$ can be found such that $nP$ is greater than $Q$, holds. This axiom fails in the case of infinite numbers. That is to say, if $Q$ be an infinite number, then it is impossible to find any finite number $n$, such that $nP$ exceeds $Q$. Now, if $Q$ be finite and if it is still impossible to find any number $n$ such that $nP$ exceeds $Q$, then $P$ is called an infinitesimal.

The infinitesimal, however, is no longer regarded as of fundamental importance in mathematical analysis. The modern tendency is to look upon the doctrine of limits and not the infinitesimal as the basis of the Differential and Integral Calculus. The derived function $\frac{dy}{dx}$ is no longer regarded as a ratio of the two infinitesimals $dy$ and $dx$, for such a ratio, as Russell says, has no meaning, but as the limit of the fraction $(f(x+\delta) - f(x))/\delta$, when $\delta$ approaches the value zero. So, too, the definite integral is now viewed as the limit of a sum and not as actually a sum. All the terms which occur in the sum whose limit is the definite integral are finite. The definite integral is not the sum of an infinite number of infinitesimals, but the limit to which the sum of a finite series tends when the number of its terms becomes infinite. To make this clear, suppose $f(x)$ to be a function which is finite in the interval $a$ to $\beta$ (both inclusive) and imagine a curve to be drawn to represent $y=f(x)$
Let the interval be divided into \( n \) segments by means of the \( n - 1 \) points \( x_1, x_2, x_3 \ldots x_{n-1} \) and at each of these points draw \( x_1 y_1, x_2 y_2, x_3 y_3, \ldots \), parallel to the axis of \( y \) cutting the curve at \( y_1, y_2, y_3, \ldots \). Denote by \( \delta_1, \delta_2, \delta_3, \ldots, \delta_n \) the intervals \( x_2 x_3, x_3 x_4, \ldots, \beta x_{n-1} \). At each of the points \( x_1, x_2, x_3, \ldots \) take the corresponding values of the ordinates \( y_1, y_2, y_3, \ldots \). Then if \( y_1, \) or \( f(x) \), be the value of the ordinate corresponding to the point \( x_i \), the product \( f(x_i) \delta_i \) is finite. The sum of all products of this form, i.e. \( \sum f(x_i) \delta_i \) is always finite. If, now, as \( n \) increases, this sum tends to one definite limit, however large \( n \) may be and however the intervals may be chosen (provided only that all the intervals are less than any assigned number for sufficiently great values of \( n \)), then this limit is called the definite integral of \( f(x) \) from \( a \) to \( \beta \) and is indicated by the symbol \( \int_a^\beta f(x)dx \).

If the limit is supposed to be actually attained, the number of intervals, it is true, will be infinite and the magnitude of each, infinitesimal, but in this case the sum has no meaning. In the definite integral, therefore, as in all series in general, the limit does not belong to the series which it limits. Russell, therefore, concludes: "The so-called infinitesimal calculus has nothing to do with the infinitesimal and has indirectly to do with the infinite—its connexion with the infinite being that it involves limits and only infinite series have limits."

Thus, the doctrine of limits is the basis of all higher analysis. This doctrine is understood by Cantor in an arithmetical sense and this has given rise to the modern theories of irrational numbers. The theory of irrational numbers in fact is a vital part of his theory of the infinite. Indeed, Cantor says that his theory of the infinite stands or falls with his theory of irrational numbers.† The arithmetical sense of the doctrine of limits is thus indicated by Dedekind: "Corresponding to any given rational number there exists a section which divides the aggregate of rational numbers into two classes, such that all the numbers of the first class are less than all those of the second class, and such that either in the first class there is no greatest number, or else in the second class there is no least number." This section is called a limit (Vide Hobson's Theory of Functions of a Real Variable, p. 22, and Russell's Principles

† Vide Natorp: Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften, p. 172.
of Mathematics, p. 279). But sections of rational numbers do exist which are different in character from the above sections. Thus, if all the rational numbers are divided into two classes, those whose squares are less than 2 and those whose squares are greater than 2, then the first class contains no greatest term nor the second class any least term. In this case, therefore, there is properly no limit. A limit, however, may be conceived with the help of the notion of the irrational number. When Dedekind says,* that if the class of rational numbers \( R \) is divided into two sections \( R_1 \) and \( R_2 \) such that "neither \( R_1 \) contains a number which is ordinarily greater than all the others in \( R_1 \) nor \( R_2 \) contains a number which is ordinarily less than all the others in \( R_2 \), the real number corresponding to the section is said to be an irrational number," what he means is that the irrational number is in this case a limit. Indeed, it is for the sake of establishing the continuity of numbers that irrational numbers are assumed. Russell, however, is right in saying that the existence of a limit is not proved in this case. But this only serves to show that the continuity of numbers does not rest upon an arithmetical view of them but has its roots much deeper.

In Cantor's view of real numbers as capable of a symbolic representation by means of a convergent sequence of rational numbers, we have the same arithmetical view of limits used as a basis for a theory of numbers. Just as in Dedekind's theory, so here, the irrational number is conceived only to define a limit which would not otherwise have existed. Thus, Hobson says, "Strictly speaking, if a convergent sequence of rational numbers has a limit, that limit is also a rational number, but from the existence of convergent sequences of rational numbers which have no limit, there arises the necessity for the extension of the domain of number, so that in the extended domain every convergent sequence may have a limit; this extension has been carried out by substituting Real Number for Rational Number. However, although a convergent sequence of rational numbers which has no rational limit, has in this strict sense no limit at all, by reason of the convergent sequence of those real numbers which correspond to the rational numbers having an irrational number as limit, and since, as has been seen above, these real numbers are for practical purposes not distinguished from the rational numbers to which they correspond, it is usual to con-

* Vide Hobson's Theory of Functions of a Real Variable, p. 23.
sider this irrational number to be the limit of the sequence of rational
numbers."* This view is thus also open to the same criticism, name-
ly, that it cannot prove the existence of a limit. Indeed, as Hobson
shows, Dedekind's theory agrees in all essentials with Cantor's. For
every convergent sequence of rational numbers defines uniquely a sec-
tion of the rational numbers in Dedekind's sense, and conversely, any
number defined by a section can be represented by a convergent
sequence of rational numbers (for proofs of these propositions, see Hob-

We thus see that the modern theories of continuity, limit, etc., rest
upon a purely arithmetical view of these entities. But not only these,
but even the concept of space has been based upon an arithmetical
theory of numbers. The space relations have been all brought under the
relational forms of numbers. Various theories of space have in recent
years been propounded and various mathematical systems have been
based upon these, but they all agree in thinking that space has more than
one dimension. As both series and dimension are capable of expres-
sion in arithmetical terms, space itself can be expressed in these terms. Di-
mension is only another name for a complex series. If $u_1$ be a series,
every term of which is a relation $P$ which generates a series, then if a
series $u_2$ is formed containing the field of all the relations $P$, it will be a
two-dimensional series. The series will be a three-dimensional one, if
$u_3$ itself consists of series. Proceeding in this way, we get the definition
of $n$ dimensions which is stated thus by Russell: "Let $U_n$ be a class of
terms, any one of which, $x_n$ say, belongs to the field of some serial rela-
tion, $x^{n-1}$ say, which itself belongs to a definite class $u_{n-1}$ of serial rela-
tions. Let each term $x_n$ in general belong to the field of only one serial
relation $x_{n-1}$. Let $u_{n-1}$ lead to a new class $u_{n-2}$ of serial relations, in
exactly the same way in which $u_n$ led to $u_{n-1}$. Let this proceed until
we reach a class $u_1$, and let $u_1$ be a simple series. Then $u_n$ is a series of
$n$ dimensions."

A multi-dimensional series defines a complex number. The com-
plex number owes its origin to the view that every algebraical equation
must have a root or roots. Where no real number can be found which
satisfies an equation, a new class of numbers has to be assumed for
this purpose. The class of numbers defined in this way is the class of

* Hobson: Theory of Functions of a Real Variable, p. 36.
complex numbers. The attempt to solve such an equation, for example, as \(x^2 + 1 = 0\), demands a new class of numbers, since no real number can be found to satisfy it. If, therefore, all equations are supposed to have roots, the roots of such an equation must be complex numbers. But this algebraical generalisation does not prove that there are such entities as complex numbers. "There is no law of nature to the effect that every equation must have a root."

A much better view of complex numbers is to treat them as constituents of multi-dimensional series. The algebraical view indicated above does not state what sort of entities the complex numbers are. Moreover, this view makes a complex number consist in part of a real number and in part of an imaginary number, so that if the imaginary portion vanishes, the complex number becomes real. Complex numbers however, are in no sense real numbers, but are components of multiple series. These multiple series are formed by the combination of real numbers \(a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n\) with certain entities \(e_1, e_2, \ldots, e_n\). If we put \(a = a_1 e_1 + a_2 e_2 + \ldots + a_n e_n\), then \(a\) is said to be a complex number of the order \(n\). This definition, indeed, makes complex numbers a quite distinct class from real numbers but is open to the objection made by Russell that it leaves complex numbers indeterminate, for the \(e\)'s are variables. His suggested amendment, however, does not improve matters much, for his attempt to render the \(e\)'s determinate by regarding them as at finite distances from a determinate collection of points only shifts the difficulty one step further back and in no way removes it. For what are these points, in relation to which the \(e\)'s are defined? Why cannot they be expressed in terms of real numbers? Are they not quite as indeterminate, as mysterious, as the elements \(e\) which they are supposed to render definite and precise? Nothing is said about these points except that they are somewhere in space. If they are to be made definite, then, it is to be done by means of the space in which they occur. But space itself has become in Russell's system a dimensional phantom. Here we find the inner dialectic of the arithmetical view of Space leading to a higher conception of it. Space as a dimensional aggregate is an untenable hypothesis, as the contradiction involved in Russell's view only too clearly shows.

Here, however, lies precisely the romantic element in Russell's system. His rejection of the ordinary metrical view of Geometry and his conception of space as an abstract order of multi-dimensional series,
and finally, his reduction of this notion to that of complex numbers, show that arch-rationalist as he is, he, too, has felt the Unendlichkeitsdrang. Hastings Berkeley in his "Mysticism in Modern Mathematics" has made use of the idea of complex numbers as illustrating his proposition that there is an under-current of mysticism running through the whole of mathematics. But the sort of mysticism that we notice in Bertrand Russell is much deeper than that noticed by Berkeley. For while Hastings Berkeley is content with pointing out the mysticism that underlies such questions as, "What is an imaginary point? What are imaginary geometrical elements? What is imaginary space or the locus in quo of imaginary points, lines and figures?", Bertrand Russell's mysticism is the deeper one which results after all attempts from the side of rationalism have succeeded only in discovering a region which is not accessible to logical analysis.

Not that Russell is conscious of this. In fact, his object in writing *The Principles of Mathematics* is to prove that mathematics is an affair of pure logic. It is only when his methods strike us as somewhat artificial, and especially when, as in the present case, they lead to an inner contradiction, that we begin to suspect that he, too, has felt the attraction of the *blaue Blume* and that in his attempt to hide this feeling gets somewhat confused, as do all men when they have a suspicion that their inner feelings, which they have tried their best to hide from the world, are about to become public property. We have already noticed the extremely artificial nature of Russell's treatment of the notion of class. We have also found how the Cantorian conception of continuity creates extraordinary and unnecessary logical difficulties. And now we find a similar state of things with regard to the notion of dimension and complex numbers. All this points unmistakably to the presence, it may be, the unconscious presence, of a romantic element in the rigidly formal logical structure of such a severe mathematical rationalist as Bertrand Russell.

Poincaré in his famous essay on *Mathematical Discovery* thus notices the presence of an element of beauty and harmony in mathematical reasoning:

"It may appear strange to see sensibility invoked with regard to mathematical demonstrations which it seems can only interest intelligence. This would be to forget the sentiment of mathematical beauty, of the harmony of numbers and forms, of geometrical elegance. It is a
real aesthetic sentiment which all true mathematicians know. And this is sensibility.” *

The efforts of the new school of mathematical logicians have been to bring into greater prominence this aesthetic element in mathematics. The reduction of numbers and also space to types of ordered series makes the rhythm of symbols more complete than before. The gradual elimination of all extraneous matter, such as, the intuition of space or number, has resulted in a corresponding increase in the domain where rule the symmetrical mathematical forms.

* Science et Méthode, p. 57.
CHARACTERISTICS OF ANCIENT INDIAN TRADE.

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The student of the principles and phenomena of modern trade often finds it interesting to look back and to contemplate the very different conditions of commerce prevailing in the ancient world. It is proposed in this essay to study some of the leading characteristics of ancient trade with special reference to the conditions existing in ancient India. The principles discussed will, consequently, be illustrated mainly, though not exclusively, from the history of the early commerce of India. For furnishing illustrations and suggestions on these lines the condition of ancient India are peculiarly favourable. Geographically India was situated nearly in the centre of the ancient world of commerce while her products were coveted by the most remotely situated nations. Hence in connection with her wares the phenomenon of the multiplicity of middlemen (which was a characteristic of all ancient foreign trade) is particularly noticeable. This multiplicity of middlemen was due to the habitual suspicion of the foreigner, the poor communications, the numerous racial divisions and to the state of war which prevailed throughout the ancient world. It is only in our days that entrepot trade has lost its importance while direct trade has largely increased. In the second place the dangers and expense of opening and carrying on foreign trade were such that only the hopes of the profits of a monopoly could induce men to engage in it. Hence the history of ancient trade contains a very large element of monopoly. In addition, the ancient world can show interesting varieties of monopoly of which our age knows nothing—royal monopolies, tribal monopolies and monopolies based on inter-tribal or inter-racial understandings. After dealing with these matters we shall come to consider why some nations of the old world (e.g. the Phoenicians, the Arabs, the Greeks, and the Aramaeans) developed a preponderantly active trade, while other great nations like India, Egypt and Babylonia showed in the main a trade of the passive type. Having examined some features of this
passive trade we shall, so far as space permits, discuss the sudden and abrupt alterations of trade routes which the ancient world so often witnessed; and finally some attention might be devoted to the methods of regulation of trade by the state in those times.

The Multiplicity of Middlemen.

This was a leading feature not only of the ancient trade of India but of all ancient trade. As the historians of commerce have observed, all ancient trade was carried on from tribe to tribe; though with the formation of powerful states efforts were occasionally made, as we shall see, to open up a direct trade with distant kingdoms. The causes of this inter-tribal condition of ancient trade are not far to seek. In those days "states lived in a condition of perpetual vendetta." A striking example of the suspicion with which the foreigners were regarded and of the poor welcome which he received abroad is to be found in the fate of the caravans of traders which tried to open up a direct trade between China and Parthia about 114 B.C. In spite of the best intentions of the Parthian and Chinese Emperors these attempts failed. There were also to be taken into account the poor communications and the linguistic and political difficulties which we have scarcely been able to overcome in our own days. Finally the rulers of intervening countries were ever ready to use their political powers to prevent direct trade between distant lands, and to divert to their own subjects the profits of an entrepot trade.

Before discussing the phenomenon of the multiplicity of middlemen we might glance at similar conditions elsewhere. In the old records of Egypt we find complaints of "the many payments which had to be made for goods which "were brought from one to another"—a very good old paraphrase of our expression of the multiplicity of middlemen. Egypt had to pay for the services of such middlemen not only in the south (in its dealings with the incense-countries), but in the north where the Phoenicians found the carrying trade with Egypt so profitable that they offered tributes to consolidate that empire. As with Egypt so in the case of Babylonia and Assyria. In old Babylonian times the North Mesopotemians of Harran, the Syrians, the Khatti and the Cypriotes were the intermediaries of the trade of Mesopotamia with the West. In later Assyrian days the Aramaeans too pushed their way into the position of such intermediaries, and it is to this trade that
the great cities of this nation—Karkhemish—and Hamath owed their importance and glory. The trade between Egypt and Babylon passed for centuries through the hands of a long chain of intermediaries before the two empires thought of a direct trade. Going still further west we find complaints in Athens about the Ionian middlemen; it was only fairly lately that Athens could secure the transmission of the produce of Asia direct to the Piraeus and break down the entrepot trade of Miletus and Samos. From these examples we can see the justice of Zimmern’s remark that “the more primitive trade is, the greater the hold of the distributor over the producer in dealing with distant markets.”

But if a multiplicity of middlemen was the characteristic of all ancient trade, India was in a special position to attract the attentions of this class of men. The wealth of products which India could offer, its geographical position in the centre of the ancient commercial world, its peninsular shape reaching far out into the Indian Ocean, its sides studded with convenient harbours, drew to it foreign merchants who were compelled to her shores “as by a law of nature.” The long list of the intermediaries of Indian trade opens with the Phoenicians and closes with the leading European nations of our day. Next to the Phoenicians came the Arabs who forced themselves into the current of Indian trade by forbidding Indian shippers to trade beyond the Gulf of Aden. At least by the third century before Christ, both shores of the Gulf of Aden were enriched by the carrying trade in Indian and Ethiopian goods. It was this trade which procured to successive tribes the hegemony of Arabia, and enabled them to extend their sway to the north. The Egyptian did not relish but had to acquiesce in this appropriation of the carrying trade of the East by the Arabs; and though the Lagidae coveted the Indian trade all that they could do was to establish a line of seaports on the Red Sea inviting the Indian trade; and even when thus renovated the Egyptian trade never went beyond the coasts of Somaliland and Southern Arabia. In later times the Arab possession of the carrying trade of India was attacked at once by Rome and by Parthia. The Parthians reached the Euphrates and intercepted the trade passing from Arabia to Asia Minor and Syria; they thus diverted to themselves part of the profits of this particular line of Indian trade. In a similar spirit they had intercepted the trade between China and Rome. On the other hand, the Romans attacked the Arab carrying trade both by land and by sea—by conquering Northern Arabia as well as by open-
ing a direct sea trade with India. Thus, for some centuries (till the advent of Islam) the Arabs lost both the land route and the sea route of Indian trades. On the land route Rome and Persia struggled for mastery until, in the sixth century, the Persians triumphed and made the Persian Gulf the entrepot of the trade of the East. Later still, the decline of Rome and of Persia threw the carrying trade of India once more into Arab hands where it remained until the arrival of the Portuguese. In all for about fifteen centuries the Arabs retained the mastery of the carrying trade of India.

In the North, India had to reckon with another set of middlemen. The Bactrians were the intermediaries of the Indian trade with China and the West. As we trace the northern line of India's commerce further, we find the Parthians as another link in the chain of middlemen. This of course implies no disbelief in statements like those of Pliny that occasionally Indians settled for trade purposes as far north as in Pontus.

**Efforts to Open up Direct Trade.**

Generally the burden of many middlemen is sure to provoke an economic revolt. Even in our own days there are complaints of too many intermediaries in trade, and efforts are made to escape the burden by using the resource of integration in some cases, of co-operation in others. In ancient times however political action was the sole defence of the consumer. While Egypt failed to open a direct trade to India, Rome succeeded better, being perhaps compelled to seek a direct sea route to India by the closing of the land route by the Parthians. If that was the case, the exploit was paralleled fifteen centuries later by the Portuguese who sought and found a sea route to India because the Turks had closed the access to India by land. In any case the Indian welcomed the advent of Rome and the extension of the Pax Romana to the Indian Ocean, and at least four embassies from India have been recorded as having been sent with presents to the Roman Emperors Augustus, Claudius, Heliogabalus, and Julian. We can understand at least partly the reason why these embassies were sent. After the battle of Actium, Augustus was the sole master of Rome and had been so impressed by the wealth obtained by Arabia from its trade with India that he made great efforts to transfer that trade to Roman hands. Claudius sent troops to check the Arab tribes of the Red Sea who were disturbing the trade between India and Rome. The Roman
Characteristics of Ancient Indian Trade.

Empire which had had ample experience in putting down piracies in the Mediterranean proceeded to benefit Indian trade by suppressing Arab piracy in the Red Sea and in the Indian Ocean.

As in the West so in the East. For centuries the Chinese had traded with India through the Bactrians and other intervening tribes. The power of China, however, increased in the second century before Christ, and the Emperor Wu-ti attempted to open a direct trade with India. He failed to achieve any immediate success, and it was much later and after numerous words that the Chinese reached India. The great and prolonged efforts which China had to make in opening up direct trade with India and Parthia show the great difficulty of such an enterprise in those days.

The Monopolistic Element in Indian Trade.

Adam Smith and other economists of the eighteenth century commented adversely on the institution of monopolistic corporations for conducting foreign trade; but in fact, it was impossible to induce any one to face the difficulties of opening trade in old days without granting him the hopes of monopolistic profits. England herself took her first steps in foreign trade by the institution of monopolistic bodies like Merchant Adventurers and Staplers. In the history of ancient trade we encounter monopoly at every step and in every shape. There were royal monopolies and tribal monopolies, monopolies of carriage and even of commercial knowledge—the best example of tribal or racial monopoly in history is the Arab monopoly of the carrying trade of India. The Arabs systematically kept out Indian shipping from this business and the profits of the monopoly were so large that they were the cause of many and bitter wars between Arabian and Ethiopian tribes. Of the monopoly based on inter-racial understandings an example is given by Schoff which is quite unique in commercial history. "So strong was the age-long understanding between Arab and Hindu, that cinnamon, which had made the fortune of traders to Egypt, in earlier times, was still found by Romans only at Guardafui and was scrupulously kept from their knowledge in the markets of India, where it was gathered and distributed, while the leaf of the same tree producing that precious bark was freely offered to the Roman merchants throughout the Malabar Coast." It took the Portuguese a century of fierce fighting to dissolve that understanding.
The traditions of monopoly continued to work far into the modern times and died away only in the nineteenth century. Indeed, as the middle ages advanced there arose causes reinforcing the old tendency towards monopoly—the decay of the navies of India under the maritime attacks of the Arabs, religious animosities, the Papal division of the world between the Spaniards and the Portuguese and the monopolistic notions which prevailed in Europe.

While royal monopolies were not unknown in Europe under the Byzantine Empire, in India too, as Kautilya tells us, there was a very old tradition of royal monopoly of and participation in trade. The "Superintendent of Commerce" is instructed to centralise the merchandise of the king, and to raise the price higher as experience warranted. The same official was also to distribute in several markets the imported merchandise. Kings appear also to have exported their merchandise to foreign countries for sale; and if the royal agent cannot manage to sell the goods he was instructed to barter them for foreign articles. This practice of royal trade prevailed long in India; thus, when the Portuguese arrived in India they found the queen of Quilon and other princes dealing in pepper and spices, and the early English voyagers found a similar state of things to exist in Sumatra.

On their side the Portuguese conducted business on the basis of a strict royal monopoly. The reason was obvious; there was no chance for open trade in those days. The Moors regarded the Arabian Sea as their private preserve and they were accustomed to baffle rivals and to influence the policy of Indian princes by acting in concert with each other. The understanding between the Arabs and the Indian merchants was also an important factor in the situation, and the Portuguese could only meet and break up this kind of bilateral monopoly by establishing a monopoly of their own which was "restricted to the sole benefit of the sovereign as far as his authority could grasp it."

**Small Size of the Markets.**

In connection with the above discussion of monopolistic conditions in the Indian trade we might consider the small size of the markets and the facility with which they could be glutted. Owing to the poor state of communications, imports could be only distributed very slowly from the seaports. The author of the Periplus notes how the wares of commerce were brought "by wagons and through great tracts without
roads”; and in many places in his works he warned his readers against large importations of certain articles in the Indian ports. Even in the sixteenth century and in a great centre of trade like Surat, which was “well nigh as big as the city of London,” an English factor notes that the prices of goods fell abruptly on the arrival of ships from Europe. “Quicksilver at our arrival on worth 350 Mamoodies the Maund, but presently fell to 260, whereupon thought better to keep than sell at that rate, hoping after the departure of the ships it would again rise.” About the same time the English agent at Ahmadabad, finding that prices fell at once on the announcement of the arrival of English ships at Surat, declared for some time that no quicksilver had been sent from England that year; he also advised the factors at the port to conceal their consignments until the stock on hand had been disposed of. We also read how the simultaneous arrival of the ships of English and Dutch origin in various eastern ports made business unprofitable for both. This smallness of the size of the markets greatly embittered the rivalries of the nations trading with India and increased their desire for establishing monopolies in the trade with India.

**Active** or **Passive** Trade.

In general it might be ascertained that in ancient times the trading nations were divided sharply into those with an active trade and those with a passive trade. The circumstances which contributed to give a position of active trade to a nation, might be thus enumerated:—

1. A central geographical position was one important factor in the matter. Thus the Phoenicians and the Greeks were situated advantageously for carrying on an active trade between Asia and Europe. Similarly the Arabs were well placed for an active trade between Asia and Africa, while the Bactrians had a similarly favourable situation in the centre of Asia.

2. The “wanderlust” which characterised the Phoenicians, the Arab, and the Aramaeans was another important factor in securing an active trade.

3. A combination of military and commercial faculties was found in many cases necessary for carrying on an active trade. Of the Phoenicians, Professor Maspero observes, “it is hard to say whether they were as much merchants as pirates, and indeed they hardly knew themselves.”
A great controversy had raged since Lassen’s time round the question whether the trade of India in ancient time was of an active or of a passive nature. In his history of ancient India Lefmann expresses the view that Indians themselves carried the wares of India to the coasts of Arabia and to the nations dwelling near the mouths of the Euphrates. He states further that the Atharva-Veda shows the existence of a knowledge of sea trade and he asserts that Indian voyagers carried Indian exports to Babylonia and Arabia. His conclusion is that “not the early voyages of Indian Aryan, but only the time of their occurrence can be questioned.” Lassen bases his similar statements about the voyages of Indians in Epic times on the Mahābhārata and about later voyages on the old Buddhist writings as well as on the Hitopadesa and Nearchus. Further he relies for the support of his theory on the accounts of Indian settlements in Sokotra, “Nagara” and Eudaemon Arabia of the Periplus. He also argues from the existence of Indian place-names in the Malay Archipelago, in Siam and Cambodia that the Indian carried on an active trade in those parts. Finally, Lassen in his third volume relies on a statement of Pliny that Indians were found to be living in Pontus to show that Indian trade with the western countries as well as with Persia and Bactria was of an active nature.

These views have been controverted by other scholars. Thus Heeren doubts whether Indians were ever a nation of voyagers; though he would allow that individual Indians went as merchants beyond the sea, settled in foreign lands and enriched themselves by trade. Speck also tries to disprove the assertions and views of Lassen. He relies, in the first place, on the psychology of the Indian Aryans who were, according to him, a home-keeping people reluctant to leave their native land and who preferred the work of the plough and the weaving-bench to foreign enterprise and who regarded trade in the light of a bet or a gamble. In Epic times, according to Speck, the trading activities were relegated to the Śūdra-like tribes of the Indus, who conducted commerce with the West, while the Māgadhhas constituted in the East the best known element of Indian traders. He even disputes the fact that Sokotra was anything like a trading colony of Indians, especially as the Periplus shows that the inhabitants of Sokotra were “a mixture of Arabs and Indian and Greeks.” He argues that the Arabian town of Nagara mentioned by Lassen could not have been an Indian colony since it
was situated in the interior of the country, and before we can admit the existence of Indian colonies in the interior of Arabia we must have some evidence of Indian settlements on the coast of that country. Speck admits the existence of an active Indian trade with the West; but that trade was a later development and was carried on not with Egypt or Arabia but with East Africa. The same authority would not allow that the embassies of Indian princes to the Emperor Augustus and his successor argue the existence of an active Indian trade with Rome; rather, according to him, the embassies of these princes indicate the desire that Roman merchants should come to India with gold and silver from the West to be exchanged against the wares of India. Nor would Speck admit on the authority of Pausanias that Indians had a direct trade with Greece; for he argues that as there was no active trade of India with Egypt a fortiori there could not have been one with Greece.

It remains for us to draw our conclusions from these conflicting arguments supplemented by more recent researches. That Indians carried on a certain amount of active trade with foreign countries in olden times seems to be incontestable. The view that Indians carried on an active trade with East Africa is corroborated satisfactorily by the traces of the influence exerted by Buddhist architecture and that of Abyssinia. As Schoff says, "Ujjeini and Bharukacha, Axum and Alexandria were in close connection during the first and second Christian centuries." The same authority has corroborated the antiquity of Indian trade in East Africa by the fact that "the Puranas described the mountains of the Moon and the Nyanza lakes, and mentioned the source of the Nile, the 'country of Amara' which is the native name of the district north of Victoria Nyanza." Schoff further shows how "Indian ships from the Gulf of Cambay sailed to Cape Guardafui" and how "between India and Cape Guardafui they apparently enjoyed the bulk of the trade, shared to some extent by Arabian shipping." The direct trade of Indians with East Africa has been maintained through all the succeeding centuries, and it is worth noting that it was an Indian who piloted the Portuguese ships of Vasco de Gama across the Indian Ocean.

It was not the fault of the Indians that they did not develop their active trade towards the Red Sea; for it was the Arabs who forbade them to trade even in the Gulf of Aden. As Zimmern says, "commerce
and seapower go naturally together” and India was not a militant sea-power in the same sense as Phoenicia or Arabia. The Arabs were a fighting race while the Indian traders must have belonged to the peaceful castes. The Indians were, however, superior in capital and skill. Hence the alliances and understandings which the Hindu traders entered into with the Arabs which allowed the former if not an active trade with Egypt and Arabia, at least some of the advantages of such a trade. It is also to be noted that the maritime and commercial strength of India on the west was also weakened by the “shoaling of the harbours in the Cutch region.” Nevertheless we find that as soon as the Romans had broken the Arab power at sea the Indians showed themselves in no way backward in taking advantage of the Pax Romana and availed themselves of it as they are availing themselves at the present day of the Pax Britannica. Hence in the Periplus we find that large Indian vessels went regularly from Barygaza to Ommana, that Indians had settled in Sokotra, and that Indian ships also visited Opone south of Cape Guardafui.

On the eastern side India was more free to develop an active trade, and we have therefore a much larger number of Indian settlements and colonies in the Archipelago and Siam that in the west. In the absence of statistics we might safely take the number of trade settlements established abroad as the true index of its active trade. Judged by this standard, while India carried on a large active trade in the East such trade was much restricted in the West. As the Portuguese annals show, however, India continued to carry on a fair amount of active trade with the Red Sea, and it was only with the growth of Portuguese power at sea that Indian trade in that direction entered upon an intensified stage of passivity.

This comparatively lesser development of active trade was shared by India with other great ancient countries. The trade of old Egypt seems to have been even more passive than that of India, the active trade being left to the Greeks on one side and to the Arabs and Carthaginians on the other. Though in the hey-day of its prosperity Egypt drove an active trade with Asia yet, in general, the Egyptians enriched by abundant harvests could leave to their neighbours a monopoly of trade and transport. The trade of Assyria and Babylon, at least towards the West, was also a passive one. Attention has also been drawn to the fact that the trade of Ceylon was of a passive kind, and that the
Singalese allowed the Persians, the Homerites and the Chinese to trade with them in an "active" way.

We might now advert to some of the economic consequences of active and passive trade. It has too often been assumed that the traders of the "active" country have an opportunity for special gain. It is assumed that the prices of the articles which the foreigner buys as an active trader would not rise, and that the prices of those articles which he sells will not fall as a result of the continuation of such trade. In fact, customary prices are supposed to rule in "passive" country. Such an assumption, though backed up by high economic authority, cannot be maintained. Those who made it forgot that in the case of ancient trade the markets were small and isolated. As we have seen above, the advent of a few ship-loads of foreign merchandise sufficed in most cases to glut the small local markets and to lower the local prices very greatly. In the same way the demand of the foreigner could very easily put up the prices of local articles greatly against him. Consequently there are many deductions to be made from the large and hypothetical gains of an active trade in ancient times. Indeed, such profits had to be largely supplemented by the profits of a monopolistic kind in order to make them sufficiently attractive.

**Abrupt and Frequent Fluctuations of Trade-Routes.**

The nature of the Indian trade with the West accounts for the numerous fluctuations in the routes which it traversed. It was a trade coveted by many powerful states who were not indisposed to apply political pressure to alter its course; it was a trade to a great extent in luxuries and was therefore peculiarly affected by the rise or fall of capitals and large cities as well as by the growth or decline of luxury and civilisation in distant countries. It was also seriously affected by migration of nations and transfer of political power. Thus, the migration of Phoenicians from the shores of the Persian Gulf must have unsettled the course of trade in very old times. Later came the turn of Arabia, which as Lieblein shows was in the old days the middle point and chief staple place for Indian, Ethiopian, Egyptian, Arabian and Phoenician trade. But in Arabia itself tribe succeeded tribe in the control of the trade monopoly, and the route and the entrepot of trade must have been modified with each tribal revolution within Arabia as well as through the later competition of the Arab and Abyssinian states. The
march of Rome to the East modified the trade routes of Indian commerce in two ways. In the first place Roman conquests in Syria and North Arabia weakened the Arab states which had ruled the land routes of the Eastern trade. In the second place, the discovery of trade winds by Hippalus opened a new way to the East, which made a direct trade with India possible; it was then no longer necessary for the ships to hug the coast of Arabia.

The decline of Rome and the rise of the Persian power introduced new elements into the old problem of Indian trade routes. The rise of Constantinople must have changed the lines of commerce already as the supplies of Indian goods had to be directed partly to the old and partly to the new capital of the Roman Empire. With the fall of the Western Roman Empire before the barbarians the former of the two routes ceased to be important; but the trade in luxuries with Constantinople did not in any way decline, as the Imperial race at Constantinople increased its consumption of luxuries as it declined in power. The shifting of the centre of gravity in the Roman Empire, however, caused another change in the direction of commerce. The old passage by the Red Sea which had been the more important for the transmission of Indian goods declined, while the route via the Persian Gulf and then overland to Constantinople became the principal one for Indian goods meant for European markets. Soon after, the growing power of the Sassanides blocked the latter road, while the conquest of Yemen by the Persians in 601 A.D. gave to Persia the mastery of both the old and the new road as well as the entire profits of the Indian trade. The Persians were, however, in their turn overthrown by the Arabs who secured the more eastern route by the foundation of Basra and then proceeded to achieve a more complete mastery of the Indian trade by the occupation of the lands at the mouth of the Indus. During the Arab domination and even under the Turkish supremacy the trade of India passed to Europe either through the Mediterranean or by the route through Trebizond. The discovery of the Cape of Good Hope by the Portuguese, however, produced another catastrophic change in the direction of the Indian trade.

State Policy in the Sphere of Foreign Trade.

Although the ancient states did not hesitate to adopt any means to secure monopolistic gains or other advantages for their general sub-
jects in matters of trade, yet it might be asserted that in general the ancient world knew little of Mercantilism or of Protection proper. Historians of commerce have indeed often assured their readers that free trade prevailed widely in those days. That is not to say that the state did not interfere in the sphere of commerce. Sometimes indeed the intervention was of a very drastic nature, thus it is believed that traces of reprisal tariffs might be found in the case of states like Egypt, Assyria, Babylonia, and the Mitanni. Maspero also informs us of the "jealous watch which the sovereigns exercised lest any individual connected with corporations of workmen should leave the kingdom and establish himself in another country." In the case of one thus guilty of transferring national industries to other lands, no punishment was deemed too severe; the property of the culprit was confiscated, his house was razed to the ground, and even his family were treated as involved in his guilt.

We hear of prohibitions of exports in ancient times. Thus Athens often prohibited exports of corn and Macedonia sometimes took similar steps about her timber. Prohibitions on imports were much rarer at least in times of peace. In general, political and economic reasons (other than mercantilistic ones) suffice to account for such prohibitions. Thus it is on political grounds that we can explain the prohibition of export of grain from Egypt to any part of the Roman Empire except Rome and Italy. Similar rules prevailed in other provinces as regards the export of food-stuffs and iron. Rome even attempted to reduce the export of gold and silver to the East by means which have some remote analogy to those employed later by the mercantilists. However, as said above, political reasons fully account for these measures, while compared to the traffics of our old days the old Roman tariffs were not only very moderate but were of a purely fiscal nature. It is true that the authority of Mommsen can be quoted for the view that Rome killed out Indian and Arabian trade with Egypt by means of differential duties. But this view is not supported by any other authority or by what we know of the fiscal policy of the time.

In India too the available sources do not show the existence of mercantilist ideas. Of course, it might be suggested that India had the less need of broaching such theories when its ample range of monopolistic productions for which there was a world-wide demand, and the frugal habits of its people, combined to achieve such a drain on the
stock of precious metals of the West that the Roman Emperors had to devise means to try and check it. Moreover mercantilism implies the existence of a system of regular nations and permanent states. In spite of these considerations when we look into an old economist or rather a Kameralist like Kautšilya, we find a very creditable state of theory, and a full recognition of the fact that foreign trade is a barter of commodities. In ancient India imports were welcomed and favoured instead of being restricted. Thus, as Kautšilya informs us, "the Superintendent of the Boundary increases commercial traffic by welcoming the arrival of merchandise... Foreigners importing merchandise shall be exempted from being sued for debts." The benefits of obtaining gold from foreign countries are recognized, but placed second to those of securing raw materials. The import dues of India were not unreasonable (being placed by Kautšilya at 20 per cent) though they were very likely higher than those imposed by the Roman Empire.

Trade was in many ways encouraged by Indian kings, and market towns (pāṇyapattanas) were provided to help to develop it. In this direction Indian princes were following the general policy of those times when the Ptolemies opened up a chain of ports in Egypt to court the Indian trade, and when the Roman Emperors opened up market towns on the conquest of new provinces or at the termination of wars. Similarly, in the Periplus we read of market towns of Persia called Apologus and Ommana. In India the Periplus mentions a great number of market towns beginning with Barbaricum, Barygaza, and Calliena. No less than seven other market towns are described as lying in the regions of Guzrat and Maharashtra, while others are mentioned as situated further south on the West coast. The author of the Periplus also furnishes us with an example of the attempts of one Indian state seeking by main force to transfer trade to its own ports from the market town of a rival. Thus, owing to the rivalry of native dynasties, the port of Calliena was "much obstructed and Greek ships landing there may chance to be taken to Barygaza under guard." This account reminds one of the curious species of mutual rivalry and hostility shown by several ports of India in the Middle Ages. Abderrazzak, the messenger of the Emperor Shah Rukh who visited India in 1442-43 A.D., tells us that whenever a ship bound for one port in India was driven by stress of weather or other similar course into another port, the custom was to plunder it. The one exception to this rule, according to him, was the port of Calicut,
the kings of which favoured foreign trade and did their best to promote it. There was such security and justice in Calicut that the richest merchants from foreign countries used to heap up their cargoes carelessly in markets and bazars without thinking of counting or of watching them. The Superintendent of Custom had to guard the goods and for that purpose patrolled the markets day and night. This wise commercial policy of Calicut made it a great centre of trade and might be supposed to represent the ancient tradition of India—a supposition which is corroborated by the fact that no Greek or Roman authority complains of the ill-treatment of foreign traders in India.

The relativity of economic theory is admirably illustrated in the history of ancient commerce. Our modern theory of international values could not have applied to ancient trade especially as that theory rests on comparative cost of production and assumes competitive conditions, while in ancient trade one encounters at every step either monopoly or some manifestation of the power of the state. The economic concepts which would best apply to those ancient conditions would be the ideas of reciprocal demand and of non-competing groups. The place of money in international trade must have been very different from what it is in our days. In the first place, there could hardly exist definite national levels of prices which by natural action could regulate the distribution of precious metals. Rather, as we have seen, the markets were small and confined to individual ports or districts in which prices could move up and down independently and abruptly. In the second place, bullion imported into the East was looked upon more in the light of a commodity than of a medium of exchange. Hence, in many cases the imported foreign coins were not melted to provide local coinage, and this circumstance might have facilitated that foisting on the East of many Greek and Roman coins of doubtful composition and weight which economic historians have noticed. The gains of foreign trade must have been distributed not according to competitive condition but according to the monopolistic and political powers of the trading parties, while the incidence of duties must also have been fixed by the same conditions. It would take up too much space to enumerate fully the numerous points of contrast between the theories and facts of ancient and modern trade; but the suggestions made in this essay will, it is hoped, prove the great interest of such study to students of economic history and theory, and it will also show the value of a study of the characteristics of ancient Indian trade in that connection.
THE SURVIVAL OF OLD HINDU INSTITUTIONS IN
MAHĀRĀṢṬRA.

SURENDRA NATH SEN, M.A., P.R.S.

Before the formidable onslaught of Islam the old Hindu monarchies of Northern India disappeared one after another; but the new rulers did not interfere much with the administrative institutions of Hindustan. The Arab rulers had formerly employed Christians and Jews for revenue work in Syria and Palestine, the Iranians in Persia had been employed for similar work by their Muslim conquerors, after the fall of their national monarchy, and Muhammad bin Kasim, the first and the only Arab conqueror of an Indian province, not only employed Brāhman officers for revenue collection in Sind, but allowed Brāhman scholars and Brāhman priests to enjoy without bar or hindrance the rent-free lands granted by their former Hindu rulers, and to continue their ancient form of worship in their sacred temples. The Muhammadan conquerors who followed him were not of Arab extraction, but they inherited from the Arabs their traditional policy and culture along with their faith. Moreover their number did not allow them to dispense with the services of the natives of the land, and while the Hindu monarchies disappeared the Hindu institutions survived.

A century passed, ere a Muhammadan general led his conquering forces across the Vindhyaas, but neither he nor his immediate successors could establish their permanent sway over the Deccan. The simultaneous establishment of a Muhammadan monarchical that depended not a little on the loyalty of its Hindu subjects, against the hostility of the Muhammadan emperors of Delhi, and the Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagar, contributed largely to the vitality of the indigenous institutions and they were allowed to flourish undisturbed not only in the autonomous village republics but also in the courts of independent or semi-independent Hindu chiefs who found a safe retreat in the impregnable hill forts of their native land. The old institutions therefore continued to exist under the Muhammadan rulers, and so powerfully did they influence the administrative policy of Muslim kings that even the
most careless comparison will be enough to establish beyond doubt the
close affinity between the Revenue Regulations of Tipu Sultan of
Mysore, a zealous follower of the Prophet of Mecca, and those of the
Peshwas, the Brāhman defenders of the Hindu faith. This was no
mere accident, for if we compare the regulations set forth in the Hukum-
nāmās of Coorg with the regulations of Tipu, the same resemblance
will be evident. Our western critics will perhaps discover in this only
another instance of the immobility of the unchanging East. But in
which country civilized or uncivilized have old institutions completely
died out? The national system of administration in every land has
its root in the distant past, and it will be my task to show in the
following pages that such was also the case with the administrative
institutions of the Peshwās. They have not been however mere blind
imitators, they did not surrender their right of criticism when they
turned for guidance to the old Śāstric works, but theirs was a work of
reform as well as of conservation. Few rulers of course could, like Śivājī
and Thorle Mādhava Rāv, shake off the superstitious veneration of
their times and abolish the time-honoured customs that were either unjust
or oppressive. But such reforms were from time to time effected and the
Hindu system of government continued in the Bombay Presidency till
the British conquest in 1818. Before the Marāṭhās succumbed to
their western rival, we find in their empire, the same judicial system
still in existence that prevailed in the days of Manu and Yājñavalkya,
Nārada and Brhaspati, Viṣṇu and Śukrāchārya, the same principle of
revenue administration still in operation that had been advocated by
the celebrated Kauṭilya three hundred years before Christ, the same
village communities still flourishing that existed in the days of the
Great Buddha.

Before the foundation of the national monarchy, or as Sabbāsad
styles it, a Hindu Pādshāhī, Mahārāṣṭra had been conquered by the
Muhammadans. When Śivājī was enthroned at Rāyagaḍ, with all the
pomp of a Hindu Abhiṣeka, he positively committed himself not only
to the policy of conservation of all the Hindu institutions that might
still be in existence, but also to a policy of revival. The immediate
result was the reorganization of his cabinet or council, well known as
the Rājamaṇḍala or the Aṣṭa Pradhān Council; and there is a tradition
that he was guided in this work by the old Śāstras in general and the
Śukra Nitisāra or the polity of Śukrāchārya in particular. But
Sukra was not the only Indian Political Philosopher to advocate the appointment of a council. The step has been commended by all political thinkers of old, though they were not quite unanimous about the number of councillors. Kauṭilya says, “according to the school of Manu the assembly of ministers shall be made to consist of twelve members; the school of Brhaspati say that it shall consist of sixteen members; the school of Uṣanas say that it shall consist of twenty members.” But Kauṭilya himself recommends that the number should be regulated by the needs of the State (Kauṭilya's Arthaśāstra, pp. 32 and 33). Bhīṣma (Mahābhārata, Śānti Parva, ch. 85) held that the king should always consult eight principal ministers, four of whom should be Brāhmans, three Kṣatriyas and one Sūta. In the preceding chapter of the Mahābhārata, he is made to say that the king should appoint at least three ministers. According to Manu there should be “seven or eight ministers, whose ancestors have been royal servants who are versed in the sciences, heroes skilled in the use of weapons and descended from noble families and who have been tried” (Manu VII, 54; S.B.E., p. 224). But although we get the number eight in the Mahābhārata and Manu Śamhitā there is very good reason to believe that the tradition we have already referred to was not altogether without a basis. The author of Śukra Nīti, it is true, recommends that there should be nine councillors in all (Śukra Nīti; S.B.H., pp. 68–71) (viz. the Purodhā or priest, Pratinidhi or viceroy, Pradhāna, Sachiva, Mantri, Paṇḍit, Prādvivāka or Chief Justice, Amātya and Sumantra), but as Kauṭilya suggested there was perhaps no hard and fast rule about it. If we exclude the Pratinidhi and the Paṇḍit from the Śukra Nīti list and include in it the Commander-in-Chief we get the Aṣṭa Pradhān Council of Śivājī that consisted of the Mukhya Pradhāna or the prime minister, the Amātya, the Mantri, the Sumanta, the Sachiva, the Paṇḍit-Rāv or Royal Priest, the Senāpati or Commander-in-Chief and the Nyāyādhiṣṭa or the Chief Justice. The post of Pratinidhi was subsequently created by the second son of Śivājī and that minister had also a seat in the council and the council of eight was thus transformed into a council of nine within a few years of Śivājī’s death. This similarity in the number and designation of councillors is however by no means the only evidence in favour of the tradition. In a Kānu Jābtā drawn up in the year one of the Rājyābhiseka era (published by Rao Bahadur Kāśināth Nārāyan Sāne) we find that on every paper, letter or sanad issued
from a state department, these eight Pradhāns had to put their signature to indicate their approval, and compare this regulation with the following in Śukra Niti, “the Mantri, Chief Justice, learned adviser as well as the ambassador should write: ‘This document has been written with my consent’; the Amātya should write: ‘Well written is this’; the Sumantra then should write: ‘Well considered’; the Pradhāna should write: ‘True’; the Pratinidhi is to write: ‘It can now be approved’; the Crown-Prince should write: ‘It should be accepted’; and the Priest is to write: ‘Approved.’ (Śukra Niti; S.B.H., p. 97).” We have very little doubt that for this particular regulation at least Śivāji was indebted to the sage of Śukra Nitisāra. But it will be a mistake to suppose that Śivāji’s Aṣṭa Pradhān Council was nothing but an imitation of Śukrāchārya’s institution. According to Śukra Niti, “the priest is superior to all others—the mainstay of King and Kingdom, the viceroy comes next, next the premier, then the Sachiva, then the Minister, next the Justice, then the scholar, next comes Sumantra, then the Amātya, lastly the spy.” (Śukra Niti; S.B.H., pp. 68–69). Nor was he by any means the only political thinker to allot the first place in the State to the priest, the author of the Mahābhārata also upholds the same view and (Śānti Parva, Chs. 73 and 74) in support relates the story of King Muchukunda who inflicted a defeat on Kubera, the semi-divine King of the Yakṣas, mainly by the magical powers of his family priest the sage Vaśiṣṭha. But in Śivāji’s Council the Priest was relegated to the last place save one, while to the Prime minister and the Senāpati were allotted the first seats on the right and the left of their sovereign. Nor was this the only difference. Although the same designations were retained by Śivāji, the duties assigned to his ministers were by no means identical with those appertaining to those very offices according to the Śukra Niti. The Pradhān, or Prime Minister, had indeed like the Peshwā, a general supervision of all state affairs, but the Sachiva of Śukra Niti was the War Secretary, while the Sachiva of Śivāji was in charge of royal correspondence. Similarly the Amātya of Śivāji was his finance minister while his namesake in Śukrāchārya’s time had the charge of Land Revenue. Śivāji’s Sumantra held the portfolio of foreign affairs, while the old Sumantra was at the head of the Finance Department. Śivāji had not therefore revived the Mantri Pariṣad or cabinet of the Hindu Political Philosophers in all its details. The tradition of such coun-
cils had perhaps survived in the courts of the semi-independent Marāṭhā chiefs, for Mahārāṣṭra had never been thoroughly conquered by the Muhammadans. Or perhaps the institutions still existed in the neighbouring kingdom of Bednūr, where the powerful Keladi dynasty still held their sway. What we regard as a revival might have been really a case of slow evolution for aught we know. The process came to a sudden stop when the East was brought into forced contact with the West.

Every ruler needs reliable Private Secretaries and confidential clerks. Śivājī’s Chiṇṇīs, Bāḷājī Avjī, was however more than a mere scribe. His counsel was sought on every question of weight and Malhār Rām Rāv tells us that Śivājī had offered him a seat in his council. Bāḷa Prabhu was however not the only Lekhaka: there was another, his brother Niḷo Prabhu. Expediency alone might have demanded the creation of these posts, but it is interesting to note that Malhār Rāv should speak about the nature of their official duties almost in the same strain as Kaustilya did in the 4th century B.C., while describing the work of the Lekhaka of his time. It is also worth noticing that Kaustilya should deem it necessary for the Lekhaka to possess ministerial qualifications. Says the great Mauryan Statesman: “One who is possessed of ministerial qualifications, acquainted with all kinds of customs, smart in composition, good in legible writing, and sharp in reading shall be appointed as a writer (Lekhaka), such a writer, having attentively listened to the King’s order and having well thought out the matter under consideration, shall reduce the order to writing (Kaustilya, p. 80).” Do we not hear an echo of the above when Malhār Rām Rāv Chiṇṇīs tells us: “The Chiṇṇīs Patra Lekhaka should write all royal correspondence and diplomatic notes. He should divine what is there in the King’s mind and in various ways should cleverly put it into writing at once. (चिन्हस पत्रलिखक याणी सर्व राजपत्रे ल्याणातील, व राजकारण पत्रे ल्याणातील। राजफे छूळत जाणण तत्काल नानाप्रकारे काही काही चतुर्पश्च लेखन करते || Chiṇṇīs, p. 168).”

Let us now turn to the eighteen Karkhānās and twelve Mahāls, which Śivājī found it necessary to organize for administrative purposes. These were (Sabhāsad, pp. 94–95):—

The eighteen Karkhānās.

(1) Khajinā .. Cash.
(2) Jawahir Khānā .. Jewellery.
(3) Ambār Khānā .... Elephant trappings.
(4) Śarbat Khānā .... Medicines.
(5) Toph Khānā .... Artillery Stores.
(6) Daphtar Khānā .... Record Departments.
(7) Jāmdār Khānā .... Public Treasury.
(8) Jirāt Khānā .... Agriculture.
(9) Mudbakha Khānā .... Kitchen.
(10) Uṣṭar Khānā .... Camels and their trappings.
(11) Nagār Khānā .... Band and music.
(12) Talīm Khānā .... Gymnasium.
(13) Pilkhānā .... Elephant sheds, etc.
(14) Farās Khānā .... Carpets and accessories.
(15) Ābdārkhanā .... Liquor.
(16) Šikār Khānā .... Game, aviary, chase and allied materials.
(17) Daru Khānā .... Magazine.
(18) Šahat Khānā .... Conservancy Department.

The twelve Mahāls.

(1) Pote .... The Treasury.
(2) Saudāgīr .... Merchandise.
(3) Pālkī .... Palanquin.
(4) Koṭhi .... Store-house.
(5) Imārat .... Building.
(6) Bahili .... Chariots.
(7) Pāgā .... Stables.
(8) Serī .... Comforts.
(9) Darūnī .... The Zenana.
(10) Thatṭī .... Cowsheds.
(11) Taṅkasāl .... Mints.
(12) Sabīnā .... Guards.

Some of these departments were doubtless unknown to the old Hindus. Artillery had not yet come into existence in Kauṭilya’s time and he could not therefore think of a Superintendent of Tophkhānā or a Superintendent of Dārūkhānā. But many of the other departments were well known in India before the Muhammadan conquest or as a matter of that before the birth of Christ. The Śukra Niti recommends
that the king should appoint separately the heads of elephants, horses, chariots, infantry, cattle, camels, deer, birds, gold, jewels, silver, clothes. The chief of treasure, the chief of grains, and the Superintendent of cooking, the Superintendent of parks, and the head of buildings and palaces, separately, as also always the Superintendent of the necessaries and contingencies, the officer in charge of the religious establishments and the Superintendent of charities (Śukra Nīti; S.B.H., p. 75). The compiler of the present text of Śukra Nīti however was acquainted with firearms (Nālika), and it may be objected therefore that it is a comparatively recent work. But nobody has hitherto denied or even expressed any doubt about the antiquity of Kauṭilya's Arthaśāstra, and Kauṭilya has recounted the duties of superintendents of no less than twenty departments at least ten of which survived till Śivāji's time, while others left undeniable marks in the institutions of the Peshwā period. Kauṭilya has laid down rules for examination of gems that are to be entered into the treasury; the treasury contemplated by him therefore corresponded to Śivāji's Jawahir Khānā. Kauṭilya recounts the duties of the Superintendents of Store-house, Commerce, Armoury, Agriculture, Liquor, Cows, Horses, Elephants and Chariots, and we find these departments also in the list quoted above from Sabhāsad. These departments however did not form the only link with the past.

Let us turn to Śivāji's capital. His Abhiṣek or coronation was celebrated in an impregnable hill-fort, where he could with impunity defy his enemies to do their worst, for aircraft was still undreamt of in Aurangzib's time except in nursery tales, and contemporary European writers tell us that the defenders of Rāyagad could easily repulse their assailants by rolling down huge pieces of stone alone. It was in such an impregnable fort, well protected by a strong wall, ditch and arms, that the sage of the Mahābhārata advised the king to establish his capital (Śānti Parva, ch. 86). Manu has also counselled that the king should build his capital town, "making for his safety a fortress, protected by desert, or a fortress built of (stone and) earth, or one protected by water or trees, or one (formed by an encampment of armed) men or a hill-fort." (Manu, VII, 70, S.B.E., p. 227). We need not however lay too much emphasis on this coincidence. It was a matter of common prudence, and one so able and shrewd as Śivāji did not want the injunctions of the Mahābhārata, or the Manu Samhitā, to
see that his capital was well fortified, well protected, well provisioned and favourably situated on an inaccessible rock, within a convenient distance from the sea. But the buildings and quarters of his newly founded metropolis were not unconnected with the past and will well repay our attention. We can profitably turn to his son’s court historian, Krṣṇāji Ananta Sabhāsad, for necessary information on this head. According to him Śivāji had built in the fortress of Rāiri not only palaces for his queens, separate quarters for the Sarkārkuns and Commanders of five thousand and men of note, council buildings and a market, but also stables for elephants, horses and camels, sheds for palanquins, chariots, and cattle and a store-house. “The palace is to be in the midst of the Council buildings,” Śukrāchārya tells us, and it “must have stables for elephants, horses and cattle.” (Śukra Nīti; S.B.H., p.29.) He further recommends that “dwelling houses for ministers, clerks, and members of council and officers should be built separately to the north and east.” “The wise king should provide for the houses of the people in order of wealth and birth near his palace in all directions (Śukra Nīti; S.B.H., p. 33). It is remarkable that, while recounting the buildings to be constructed within a fort, Kauṭilya mentions, among others, the royal kitchen, elephant stables, the store-house, the treasury, the accountants’ office, the store-house for forest produce, the arsenal, stables for ass and camels, stables for conveyances and chariots, shops and hospitals, stables for cows and horses, and quarters for the superintendents of the city, of commerce, of manufactories, and of the army. But this was not all. Rāyagaḍ will bear a detailed comparison with the ideal fort of Kauṭilya and the ideal metropolis of Śukra Nīti. Rāyagaḍ was capital of the Marāṭhā kingdom for sixteen years only and had to stand a siege of eleven days in 1818, when many of the houses and public buildings were sadly damaged. Since then it has been suffered to fall into ruins and to-day it is deemed quite uninhabitable. But still there is no scarcity of ponds and cisterns in the ruined city, two of which, the Gaṅgā Sāgar and the Kuśāvarta tank, are fairly large. This naturally reminds one of Śukrāchārya’s injunction that the capital “must ever be provided with wells, tanks and pools.” (Śukra Nīti; S.B.H., p. 29.) It is not easy to establish the identity of all the ruined buildings, but in the map in the Bombay Gazetteer (Vol. XI, p. 357) we find that the ministers’ quarters and the bazar were situated to the north-east, there were two-store houses to the south and the south-east, and the Mahā-
deva temple stood far to the north of the palace and around the temple were the dancing girls’ quarters. Within 200 yards of the Rang Mahāl or palace of pleasure, to the north of it, stood the citadel, and the powder magazines were built near the Śrīgondā point to the east. To the north-west of the palace were the elephant-stables. Let us now turn to Śukra Nīti and Kauṭilya’s Arthaśāstra. According to Śukra, “houses should be built towards the west for cows, deer, camels, elephants and other animals” (S.B.H., p. 30). “Dwelling houses for ministers, clerks, members of councils and officers should be built separately to the north or east. Leaving a space of 100 cubits towards the north and 200 cubits towards the east of the palace, military cantonments are to be laid out.” (Śukra Nīti; S.B.H., p. 33.) Kauṭilya observes that “royal teachers, priests, sacrificial place, water reservoir and ministers shall occupy sites east by north to the palace; to the north by west shops and hospitals; to the north the royal tutelary deity of the city.”* (Kauṭilya, Arthaśāstra, p. 61.) It is not easy to dismiss this resemblance as a chance coincidence. The more logical inference is that these conventional rules of town planning have been transmitted from generation to generation, and the plan of Rāyagaḍ had been evolved from one that was in fashion in Northern India more than three centuries before Christ.

Thus it is clear that not only was his cabinet modelled on the Mantri Pariṣads of old, but his secretaries, his eighteen kārkhanās, and twelve mahāls, and even the palaces, council halls, the officers’ quarters, and other buildings of Śivāji’s capital formed a link between the Mahārāṣṭra of the 17th century A.D. and Āryāvarta of the 4th century B.C. But these were by no means the only old institutions, others could boast of an antiquity equally remote and could tell a story of slow evolution and gradual adaptation that would interest all students of Comparative Politics.

In Śivāji’s time, as well as under the Peshwās, the villages of Mahārāṣṭra were so many autonomous republics, self-contained and isolated. The head of the state was however a despot, helped, but by no means controlled, by a council. The republics at the base were linked by a chain of royal officers with the supreme government. Such

* It may be incidentally noted that according to Kauṭilya elephant-stables should be situated on sites east by south. Śivāji had therefore more closely followed the plan described in the Śukra Nīti than that of any other work on polity.
had also been the case in the past. We read in the Viṣṇu Samhitā that the king should ‘‘appoint chiefs in every village; also lords of every ten villages; and lords of every hundred villages; and lords of a whole district’’ (Viṣṇu, S.B.E., Vol. VII, pp. 15–17). The Mahābhārata mentions, lords of a single village, lords of ten villages, lords of twenty villages, lords of hundred villages and lords of thousand villages (Śānti Parva, chap. 81). We find the same division in Manu also: ‘‘Let him (the king) appoint a lord over (each) village, as well as lords of ten villages, lords of twenty, lords of a hundred, and lords of a thousand.’’ (Manu VII, 115; S.B.E., p. 234). This division however no longer prevailed in Śivāji’s time; it had been replaced long before him by one more simple and convenient. Single villages still formed the administrative unit, but divisions of ten or hundred did not exist. A taraf did not necessarily consist of ten villages, nor did ten, twenty or hundred tarafs make a prānt. It is not however improbable that Śivāji’s division was the natural evolution of the one that existed when Manu’s codes had been compiled, the connecting link between the two systems being supplied by Viṣṇu who still retained the unit of the single village, with the lordship of ten villages. His district perhaps corresponded to Śivāji’s prānt. Another link with the past is supplied by the appellation of the officer in charge of a taraf. He was in rare instances still called Pāripatyagār when Śivāji ruled, and from some papers published by Mr. V. K. Rājwāde it appears that he had to perform the duties of a Police Magistrate. This leads me to believe that he was the lineal successor of Daṇḍa-nāyaka and Daṇḍ-nātha of the old inscriptions. For the word daṇḍa has often been used in old works on Hindu law as well as in the Mahābhārata (Śānti Parva) in the sense of punishment and can therefore be regarded as synonymous with the Marāṭhi term pāripatyā. Sir R. G. Bhandarkar no doubt holds that the Daṇḍa-nāyaka was a minister of war (Early Hist. of the Dekkan, 2nd edition, p. 90) and Dr. Fleet was of opinion that the terms Daṇḍa-nāyaka and Chamunāth were synonymous (J.B. Br. R.A.S., XVI, p. 2), but there are instances of its being used in the other sense as well. Mr. R. Shama Shastri has translated Daṇḍadharā as a Magistrate (Kauṭilya, Arthaśastra, p. 10). It will not therefore be unreasonable to suggest that the term Pāripatyagār was really a relic of the past; and it still survives in the Paripothaygārs of Coorg.

The antiquity of the Indian village communities has now been
established beyond doubt. References to their constitution, regulations and bye-laws have been made by Kautilya, Manu, Viṣṇu, Brhaspati and Nārada, and other Indian lawgivers of old. Village affairs have not unfrequently been described in Buddhist Jātaka stories. The subject however has been very ably and exhaustively treated by Dr. R. C. Majumdar, and all that I should do here is to refer my readers to his "Corporate Life in Ancient India," and confine myself to an enquiry about the antiquity of the rights and perquisites of village officers as well as their duties.

The village headman in Mahārāṣṭra is called Pāṭil. It is evident that the word has been derived from Paṭṭakila of the inscriptions. The second officer was Kulakarnī, occasionally styled in very old records as the Grāma-lekhaka. Kulakarnī most probably is a compound of the words kula and karaṇī and originally meant an officer in charge of accounts relating to village land. kula occurs in Manu VII. 119, and according to Dr. Bühler it denotes as much land as suffices for one family; "kulam", says he, "is really a technical term which Medhātithi explains by ghanṭa, a term known in some districts. Govindarāja, Kulluka, Nārāyaṇa and Rāghavānanda state that it is the double of a 'middling plough', i.e. as much as can be cultivated with twelve oxen, while Nandana interprets it as the share of one cultivator" (S.B.E., XXV, p. 235). It is not however impossible that the term kurā known in some of our Bengal districts has been derived from kula of Manu. The word kuṭi, indicating a measure of land, also occurs in the following sentence in a Kanarese inscription of Śīṅghanadeva: "Also the fixed contribution that was allotted, free from all opposing claims, on the betel plantation measuring five hundred kuṭis which was to the south of (the temple of) the god" (Fleet, J.B. Br. R.A.S. XII, pp. 22ff.). Kulāṁ therefore, as Manu understood it, was not unknown in Southern India. The word karaṇa according to Dr. Bhagavānālā Indraji means a department; and Pāṭal Karnī the functionary in charge of the Pāṭal Department (Ind. Ant., XII, p. 122). Karnīka has been translated by Dr. Kielhorn as a writer of legal documents (Harṣa Inscription, Ep. Ind., Vol. II, p. 129ff., Siyāḍonī Inscription, Ep. Ind., Vol. I, p. 166); Karnīka according to Mr. R. Shama Shastri was a Superintendent of Accounts (Kaṭṭilya, Arthaśāstra, p. 71). That officers in charge of a Kāraṇ had also perhaps something to do with the State records will be seen in the following extract from Sir R. G. Bhan-
darkar’s Early History of the Dekkan. “In the introduction to his works on Dharmaśāstras he (Hemādri) is called Mahādeva’s Śrī Karaṇa-dhipa or Śrī Karaṇaprabh. In the Ṭhāṇā copper-plate of 1194 Śaka also, he is said to have taken upon himself the ādhipatya or controllership of all Karaṇa. This office seems to have been that of chief secretary or one who wrote and issued all orders on behalf of his masters and kept the State Record” (Early History of the Dekkan, 2nd ed., p. 116). The Kuḷkarṇī also wrote all accounts and legal documents, as well as orders (emanating from the Pāṭil), and was in charge of the village records. The words Karaṇ and Karṇīka as interpreted above by these celebrated scholars, include all these different functions. My suggestion that Kuḷkarṇī is a compound of kula and karṇī meaning an officer in charge of the karaṇa of kulas or village lands is not therefore altogether untenable.

Let us now turn to our main enquiry, the antiquity of the official duties as well as the rights and perquisites of these village officers. The Pāṭil, in the Marāṭhā days, was the revenue officer, the chief Police Magistrate, and he united in himself the functions of the chief judicial officer as well. Dr. Majumdar says (Corporate Life in Ancient India, p. 57), “Thus we learn from Kharassara Jātaka (No. 79, 1. 354) that it was the duty of the headman (Gāmabhojaka) to collect revenue, and with the help of the local men to secure the village against the inroads of robbers.” The Pāṭil had also inherited his judicial authority from his predecessor of the ancient Indian villages. “The judicial powers of the headman of a village (Gāmabhojaka),” says Dr. Majumdar, “are referred to in the Jātaka stories. . . . . There is no express mention in the Jātaka stories that he exercised them in conjunction with the villagers. The Kūḷavaka Jātaka however seems to show that such was the case at least in some villages” (Corporate Life in Ancient India, p. 62). The old Hindu lawgivers are not altogether silent about this important function of the village headman. Viṣṇu certainly refers to his judicial authority when he says, “If any offence has been committed in a village, let the lord of that village suppress the evil, and give redress to those that have been wronged” (S.B.E., Vol. VII, p. 15). The Pāṭil under the Marāṭhās was responsible for the discovery and restoration of all stolen properties within his jurisdiction, failing which he had to make adequate compensation for the loss. He could however escape this by tracing the thief to the next village when the responsi-
bility was transferred to the headman and the inhabitants of that village. In Āpastamba's time (4th or 5th century B.C.) village officers appointed by the king were charged with similar duties. "They must protect a town from thieves in every direction to the distance of one krosa from each village. (They must protect the country to the distance of one krosa from each village.) They must be made to repay what is stolen within these (boundaries)" (S.B.E., Vol. II, p. 162). When Kauṭilya wrote (4th century B.C.), vendors of wine were charged with similar responsibility with regard to the property of their drunken customers. "When customers under intoxication lose any of their things, the merchants of the shop," says Kauṭilya, "shall not only make good the loss, but also pay an equivalent fine" (Kauṭilya, Arthaśāstra, p. 148). Similarly the Superintendent of Tolls had to make good whatever had been lost by merchants in the part of the country under his charge (Kauṭilya, Arthaśāstra, p. 138). Kauṭilya however is not silent about a similar responsibility of the village headman. "Having made the value etc. of their merchandise known (to the headman of the village), traders shall halt in some part of a village. When any part of their merchandise which has not been truly sent out of the village during the night has been stolen or lost, the headman of the village shall make good the loss." Kauṭilya further lays down that "whatever of their merchandise is stolen or lost in the intervening places between two villages the Superintendent of pasture-lands shall make good. If there are no pasture lands in such places, the officer called Corarajjuka shall make good the loss. If the loss of merchandise occurs in such parts of the country as are not provided even with such security (a corarajjuka), the people in the boundaries of the place shall contribute to make up the loss. If there are no people in the boundaries, the people of five or ten villages of the neighbourhood shall make up the loss" (Kauṭilya, Arthaśāstra, p. 293). Under the Mauryas, therefore, not only the village headman, but in certain cases the villages had to compensate for any property stolen or lost in their neighbourhood. When the Viṣṇu Saṁhitā was compiled (not earlier than the 3rd century A.D.) the duty of compensating persons who had been robbed devolved on the king. "Having recovered goods stolen by thieves let him restore them entire to their owners, to whatever caste they may belong. If he has been unable to recover them, he must pay (their value) out of his own treasury" (S.B.E., Vol. VII, p. 20). Nārada,
who possibly wrote in the sixth century A.D., however, lays down that "he on whose ground a robbery has been committed must trace the thieves to the best of his power, or else he must make good what has been stolen, unless the foot-marks can be traced from that ground (into another man's ground). When the foot-marks, after leaving that ground, are lost and cannot be traced any further, the neighbours, inspectors of the road, and governors of that region, shall be made responsible for the loss" (S.B.E., Vol. XXXIII, p. 225). This certainly offers the closest approximation to the Mahārāṣṭra system, which can be very well illustrated by a comparison with an old Marāṭhī paper in which a similar process has been described. (See Rājwāde Marāṭhyāmca Itihāsāmci Sādhaneām, Vol. X, p. 116). The Pāṭīl as the Police Magistrate of the village naturally became responsible for the recovery of all stolen property, but the real work of tracing out the thieves fell upon the Rāmośiśa, a criminal tribe, charged with the police work of the village. The compensation-money paid to the party robbed, was generally raised by levying a fine on the Rāmośis.

From the Jātaka stories, referred to by Dr. R. C. Majumdar, as well as the Mahābhārata, the Manu Saṃhitā and the Viṣṇu Smṛti, it appears that the village headman was appointed by the king. From the story of the Niśāda Kāyavya (Mahābhārata, Šānti Parva, ch. 135) however it appears that the Grāmaṇi or the village headman was sometimes elected by the villagers. The Mahārāṣṭra Pāṭīl was neither elected by his co-villagers nor appointed by the State. He was a hereditary officer, with hereditary rights which he could transfer by sale. According to Dr. Majumdar, one of the Mathurā Jaina image inscriptions which "refers to a lady who was the first wife of the village headman and daughter-in-law of the village headman, would seem to imply that the post of village headman was hereditary in the family " (Corporate Life in Ancient India, pp. 61–62). Thus it appears that even in very early times the office has acquired a hereditary character. The process of transformation is not very hard to guess, and in Mahārāṣṭra days, elected or appointed Pāṭīl or Kulkarnī were altogether unknown.

While discussing the etymology of the word Kuḷkarnī we have discussed the duties of that officer. It will suffice here to note that his duties were somewhat analogous to those of the Gopa and the Sthānika of the Mauryan towns. "A Gopa", says Kauṭilya, "shall keep the accounts of ten households, twenty households, or forty households. He shall not
only know the caste, gotra, the name, and occupation of both men and women in those households, but also ascertain their income and expenditure. Likewise, the officer known as Sthānīka shall attend to the accounts of the four quarters of the capital” (Kauṭilya, Arthaśāstra, p. 181).

The origin of another Marāṭha village officer, viz. the Potdār, can be traced to the Maurya days. The Potdār was a Sonār or goldsmith by caste and his duty was to assay coins. Kauṭilya mentions an examiner of coins (Kauṭilya, Arthaśāstra, pp. 65, 79, 98), and lays down that no gold coin should be accepted by the treasury officer unless its purity has been attested to by the examiner of coins (or Rūpadarśaka) (p. 64). It was his duty to regulate currency both as a medium of exchange and as legal tender admissible into the treasury (p. 98). Whether Kauṭilya's Rūpadarśaka was like the Marāṭha Potdār a goldsmith by caste or profession we do not know, but it may be noticed here that the officer in charge of the Maurya mint was, as in Marāṭha days, a goldsmith. While in Śivāji’s time and under the Peshwa regime the goldsmiths obtained license, on the payment of a premium, for opening and working mints under certain stipulations and reservations, the Maurya kings had mints of their own, and these were worked under the supervision of the State goldsmith.

Let us now turn to the perquisites of the Pāṭil’s office and try to find out how many of them had the sanction of the Hindu lawgivers of old. It appears from a Marāṭhi deed of sale that the following were among others the dues that it was customary for the Pāṭil to receive from his co-villagers.

1. A bundle of fuel.
2. 1½ maunds per boat-load of grain.
3. Twenty-five bundles of jawār-sticks from each cultivator.
4. Five seers of cotton from each field.
5. One bundle of jawār from each cultivator.
6. Two pairs of shoes per year from the shoemaker.
7. One bundle of green fodder from each cultivator.
8. Nine tāks of oil from each oil-mill.
9. Thirteen leaves per day from each seller of betel leaves.
10. One lump of molasses, one bundle of sugar-cane and one tin of juice from each farmgrowing sugar-cane, excepting that belonging to the Jośi.
11. One goat from each herd on the Daśerā day.
12. One piece of cloth per loom per year from all classes of weavers.
13. One piece of cloth per year from the loom of a Dhāngar.
15. Vegetables from vegetables growers.
16. All produce, except corn, on one wafa from each farm.
17. Customary share from each seller in the market.
18. Customary rent from each Bāniā’s stall.
19. ½ seer per bag of grocery from a grocer’s shop.
20. The customary amount of salt and chaff per bag.
21. One nut per day from each grocer’s shop.
22. Water to be supplied by the Koḷī.

The Pāṭil perhaps owed these dues to a law of Manu which says, "Those (articles) which the villagers ought to furnish daily to the king such as food, drink, and fuel, the lord of one village shall obtain. The ruler of ten (villages) shall enjoy one kula (as much land as suffice for one family), the ruler of twenty-five kulas, the Superintendent of a hundred villages (the revenues of) one village, the lord of a thousand (the revenues of) a town" (S.B.E., Vol. XXV, pp. 234–235). The Pāṭilship corresponded to the lordship of one village. According to Manu he was not entitled to any rent-free land, but the Marāṭhā Pāṭil in addition to food, drink and fuel, as enumerated in the above list, enjoyed some rent-free inām land as well. As Manu allots to the Pāṭil all that "the villagers ought to furnish daily to the King," let us see what the king could expect from a village according to other Hindu jurists. The king, according to Kauṭilya, could "exercise his right of ownership with regard to fishing, ferrying and trading in vegetables (haritpanya) in reservoirs or lakes" (Kauṭilya, Arthasastra, p. 53). From villages of different descriptions, he could expect taxes in the form of grains, cattle, gold or raw material, free labour and dairy produce (Kauṭilya, Arthasastra, p. 178). Viṣṇu allows the king to take from his subjects as taxes a sixth part every year of the grain; and a sixth part of all other seeds; two in the hundred, of cattle, gold and clothes; a sixth part of flesh, honey, clarified butter, herbs, perfumes, flowers, roots, fruits, liquids and condiments, wood, leaves (of the palmyra tree and others), skins, earthen pots, stone vessels, and anything
made of split bamboo. (S.B.E., Vol. VII, p. 16). We shall deal elsewhere with the different items of royal revenue more minutely. Here we shall confine ourselves only to some of these with special reference to the Pāṭil’s dues. It is necessary to note here that the list quoted above is by no means exhaustive and the document from which we have quoted it does not give a complete list of all the rights and perquisites of the Pāṭil’s office. These varied in different parts of Mahārāṣṭra, as the king’s demands must have varied in different parts of India at different times. A comparison between our list of the Pāṭil’s dues and those supplied by Kauṭilya and Viṣṇu however leaves little doubt as to the antiquity of the different items. The village Māli on festive occasion had to supply flowers for the Pāṭil’s house. He was entitled to the free labour of the Koḷi and the Mahār who had to supply him with water and fuel respectively. The Mahār could not take the skin of his dead cattle, and the shoemaker, the oil man, the weaver had to give him shoes, oil and cloth. He was entitled to a share of the vegetables, or haritpanya of Kauṭilya, and herbs sold in the village. He got one goat from each herd on the Daśerā day which corresponded to “a sixth part of flesh, which, according to Viṣṇu, the king could take. “The customary rent for each Bāṇia’s stall” is no less old than Śukra Niti, where we read that the king should have “land tax from shopkeepers.”

The old legal works form by no means the only evidence in favour of the antiquity of these dues. Some of them have been mentioned in old inscriptions as well. The Marāṭhā Pāṭils were entitled to a small tax in money on the occasion of each marriage and widow-remarriage (Lagna Paṭṭi and Paṭdām) in the village. Reference is made to such a tax in a Kanarese inscription of Yādava Siṅghana Deva (Fleet, J.B. Br. R.A.S., XII, pp. 22ff.). “And whenever those same Ugrāra three hundred and the five hundred and four”, so runs the inscription, “asked with importunity they gave one coin such as is given on marriage occasions.” The same inscription mentions an impost of betel-leaves on betel-leaf sellers and a measure of oil on each oil mill. “Harikekul and the contribution on the profits,” we read in this interesting document, “was the impost of betel-leaves levied on the road; and (there was allotted) to the same god one visa on each load of a beast of burden of betel leaves. Two solasages of oil were given on each oil mill, to provide for the ceremony of averting the effects of the evil eye, which was...
held on Mondays at the Singvaṭṭī of that locality. And one oil mill was set apart for the god. Sixty cultivators gave a kāṇḍage of dried fruits, grains, etc. And the reapers of the betel-plants will give (a contribution) when they reap, and the consumers of betel-leaves will willingly give (a contribution). The ministers of the king shall recognize these imposts. And the sellers of betel leaves and areca-nuts inside the village will give a (contribution) when they realize in cash the price that they obtain.”

This grant was made by Daṇḍanāyaka Purusottama, an officer of the Yādava King Śiṅghanadeva, to a temple at Munoli in the Belgaum district, and the date of the inscription is 1145 of the Śaka era. This clearly shows how these imposts were common in Southern India in the 13th century of the Christian era.

These imposts were not however peculiar to South India alone: they are mentioned along with “the rent of a Bāniā’s stall” in an earlier North Indian Inscription, viz. the famous temple inscription of Siyaḍonī, which can be ascribed to the 10th century A.D., according to Prof. Kielhorn. Among other donations recorded in this huge inscription, the following will be of special interest to us.

[26–27] (Samvat 994, Vaisākha vadi 5, Saṅkrāntau. The sellers of betel, Śavara, son of Keśava, and Mādhava, son of Icēū, gave an endowment realizing the payment of a vigrahasādramnāmavisovaka on every pālikā of leaves to the god (Viṣṇu), set up by Caṇḍuka.

[27–28] Nāgāka gave a pālikā of oil from every oil mill of the oil makers (?).

[30–31] Saṁvat 1008, Māgha śudi 11. Keśava, Durgāditya and other oil makers, gave a pālikā of oil from every oil mill to Śrī Cakra-svāmideva, set up by Purandara in the temple of Viṣṇu erected by Caṇḍu.


I do not contend that the imposts mentioned in the Munoli temple inscription and the voluntary gifts enumerated in the Siyaḍonī inscription were in all respects identical with the dues of the Pāṭil. According to Manu the village officer was entitled to all that the king could expect from a village. Kauṭīlya says that in lieu of a tax in cash some
villages were allowed to pay the royal tax in the shape of grains, dairy products, labour, military service, etc. In the above two inscriptions we find that imposts of betel-leaves, and a certain measure of oil from each oil mill, were made in favour of a god. Is it quite unreasonable to suppose that the betel-leaf seller, the oilman, the shoemaker, the areca-nut seller (grocer) had similarly offered to give the Pāṭil a share of their produce, to which he was entitled according to the laws of Manu, and the existing imposts in favour of the village headman had led to similar imposition in favour of the village god?

The Balutās or village artisans played an important part in Marāṭhā villages. They enjoyed hereditary monopoly of their trade within the village, and in the harvest time got a share of grains from each cultivator. Reference to the perquisites of the artisans (काष्ठकाइमारिति) is made in a Yādava inscription dated 1175 of the Śaka era. (Fleet, J.B.Br. R.A.S., XII, p. 49). The Balutās were termed as Kārū in the Peshwā days also. It is not therefore unreasonable to suppose that these existed in the Marāṭhā villages in the 13th century A.D. also when Mahārāṣtra was still under the Hindu Yādava kings.

From the village let us turn to the city. The officer in charge of a Marāṭhā town was the Kotwāl and the officer in charge of a Mauryan city was styled as we learn from Kauṭilya as Nāgaraka. The Kotwāl was a Police Magistrate and at the head of the city police. He had to dispose of all important disputes. He had to regulate prices. He had to take the census and keep a record of all persons coming into and leaving the city. He had to dispose of all disputes relating to roads, lanes and houses, and finally he had to furnish monthly accounts to the government (Peshwās' Diaries, Mādhava Rāv I, Vol. II, pp. 234–236) It is evident that the Marāṭhā Kotwāl had inherited some of his duties from the Mauryan Nāgaraka who also had "to look to the affairs of his city"—whose assistants, the Gopas and the Sthānikas, kept accounts and also took the census (what else can Kauṭilya mean when he says of the Gopa: "he shall not only know the caste, gotra, the name and occupation of both men and women in those households, but also ascertain their income and expenditure")?. He also kept himself informed of all new arrivals, through the Gopa and the Sthānika. The Nāgaraka enforced regulations regarding houses and streets as well as sanitary regulations. He had to arrest thieves and to search for bad characters with the help of the spies, and the city police (Kauṭilya, Arthaśāstra,
pp. 180–185 and p. 273). This is not all. We learn from Tone that at Puna, under the regime of Baji Ravi II, no person could appear in the streets without being arrested, after the firing of the gun which took place at 10 at night. The prisoner was detained till morning when he was dismissed by the Kotwâl. "So strict is the discipline," Tone tells us, "that the Peshwâ himself had been kept prisoner a whole night for being out at improper hours." This regulation is, we find to our surprise, at least as old as Kauṭilya's Arthaśāstra. While recounting the duties of the Nāgaraka the Mauryan statesman writes: "The interval between six nālikas (2½ hours) after the fall of night and six nālikas before the dawn shall be the period when a trumpet shall be sounded prohibiting the movement of the people. The trumpet having been sounded, whoever moves in the vicinity of the royal buildings during the first or the last yâma (3 hours?) of the period shall be punished with a fine of one pana and a quarter, and during the middle most yâmas with double the above fine, and whoever moves outside (the royal buildings or the fort) shall be punished with four times the above fine. (Kauṭilya, Arthaśāstra, p. 184.)

Thus we find that the administrative divisions of Maharâṣṭra, the organization of the village communities, the organization of the city government were all based on the old Hindu system. The old Hindu institutions in most cases not only survived but largely contributed to the development of the Marâṭhâ administrative system. And if we examine the Marâṭhâ revenue and judicial systems, we will get further convincing proofs of the survival of the old Hindu institutions in Maharâṣṭra. Even the Marâṭhî grant deeds and judgments will yield fresh evidence of this process of slow evolution of Marâṭhâ institutions from the earlier Hindu institutions through successive stages.
MEGIDDO: A STUDY IN MILITARY HISTORY.

E. F. OATEN, M.A., LL.B., I.E.S.

It was with a fine sense of the continuity of history that the latter-day conqueror of the near East, the successor of Thutmose III, Pompey, and Selim I, decided to name his title of viscount from the long-dead village of Megiddo. Whether he was equally happily inspired when he united with it the name of the sleepy little watering place of Felixstowe may be doubted, though it was a natural addition, since there is no pleasure more keen than that derived from honour brought to or conferred by one's native town. However that may be, there is no doubt that the title which he assumed, that of Viscount Allenby of Megiddo and Felixstowe, is of profound historical interest, carrying us back as it does in memory to the very dawn of history. For Megiddo as the name of a place has ceased to exist for centuries, and only in the records of history can the explanation of the title be found.

For Megiddo, which occupied the site marked in modern maps as Khan el Lejjun (from the Latin Legio, the site of a Roman cantonment), commanded, in the dawn of history, as it commanded in 1918 A.D., the route between the two Lebanons from Egypt to the Euphrates. And in the month of May, 1479 B.C., nearly three and a half millenia ago, the army of Syria stood around Megiddo, on the northern slopes of the Ridge of Carmel, awaiting the attack of the army of Egypt.* Thutmose III had marched from his base in Egypt, and had reached Gaza by April 28th, 1479 B.C. Marching north through the Shephelah and the sea-plain, he crossed the plain of Sharon, and turning eastward, reached by May 10th the town of Yehem, the modern site of which is unknown. It was somewhere on the southern slopes of the Carmel range. The army of Syria was commanded by the King of Kadesh. It had occupied Megiddo, a strong fort, in the plain of Esdraelon or Jezreel, on the brook Kina, where it flows down the northern slopes of the Carmel ridge.

* See Breasted's "A History of Egypt," Chap. XVI.
The problem which faced Thutmose III was that of how to burst through the barrier of the Samaria hills into the plain of Esdraelon or Jezreel beyond. This was, though on a much larger scale, exactly the problem which faced General Allenby in 1918 A.D. Three possible routes existed for Thutmose III. One ran directly via Aruna through the pass of Megiddo. This involved the danger that as the pass was narrow, the army could only move on a narrow front, and might be destroyed in detail as it emerged from the pass. "Will not horse come behind horse," said his advisers, "and man behind man likewise? Shall our advance guard be fighting while our rearguard is yet standing in Aruna?"* Another route led southward via Taanach, five miles south-east of Megiddo; the third went also by Aruna, like the first, but then swerved to the left northward through Zefti, by using which road the Egyptians would debouch on the north-west side of Megiddo.

The king, against the advice of his generals, chose the direct route through the pass. On the 13th of May, he advanced to Aruna, moving at the head of his army. The night was passed there. By one o'clock on the 14th the army had emerged from the hills, and halted south of Megiddo, on the banks of the brook Kina. The Syrians appear to have anticipated that Thutmose III would march by Taanach, and to have concentrated their army too far south. Thus the Egyptian passage of the pass, dangerous operation though it was, seems to have been unopposed. Thutmose III then pushed out his left wing to the west and north-west of the city, thereby threatening to cut off the enemy from retreat northward. General Allenby, once again on a vastly larger scale, did, as we shall see, exactly the same thing with his own left wing, and with correspondingly vaster results.

In the ensuing battle the army of Egypt was completely victorious. The enemy "fled headlong to Megiddo in fear, abandoning their horses and their chariots of gold and silver, and the people hauled them up, pulling them by their clothing into this city; the people of this city having closed it against them and lowered clothing to pull them up into this city."†

After a siege the city surrendered. The King of Kadesh had however escaped.

Among the spoil of the battle and the city were 924 chariots, 2238

* Breasted's "Ancient Records of Egypt," II, 421.
† Breasted's "Ancient Records of Egypt," II, 430.
BATTLE OF MEGIDDO: 1479 B.C.

Scale: 4 1/2 Miles to the Inch.

Adapted from Breasted's "History of Egypt." P. 286
horses, 200 suits of armour, 2000 large cattle and 22,500 smaller beasts together with 113,000 bushels of corn, reaped in the plain of Esdraelon around Megiddo.

Such was this first battle of history of which any detailed record survives. It was fought on the 15th of May, 1479 B.C., and resulted in the utter defeat of the army of Syria by the army of Egypt.

The question now arises: "Why did General Allenby, whose operations in Turkish Syria and Palestine ranged over the whole of the country, take his title from this obscure battle of old-world time, nearly three thousand five hundred years ago? Lord Allenby of Jerusalem was perhaps barred as a title, because no man can be great enough to take his title from that sacred city. But why not Lord Allenby of Damascus, of Aleppo, of Nablus, of Jericho? Why Lord Allenby of Megiddo, a place where no fighting on any large scale took place in his operations, and which, by that name at least, is not mentioned in his despatch of 31st October, 1918, which described the overthrow of the Turkish army of Syria? For the fact that a great battle took place over three thousand years ago somewhere in his theatre of operations is no justification for naming his title from that battle. We should smile at Earl Haig of Creçy, or Baron Marshall of Arbela, or Viscount Jellicoe of Trafalgar.

Let us see first what the despatch says about Megiddo, or rather its modern representative, El Lejjun.

"Thanks to the rapidity with which the infantry broke through both Turkish systems of defence, the cavalry obtained a good start. By noon the leading troops of the Desert Mounted Corps had reached Jelameh, Tell el Druh, and Hudeira, eighteen miles north of the original front line. After a brief rest the advance was continued. The 5th Cavalry Division moved north to Ez Zerghaniyeh. It then turned north-east, and, riding through the hills of Samaria past Jarak, descended into the plain of Esdraelon at Abu Shusheh. The 13th Cavalry Brigade was then directed on Nazareth, the 14th on El Afule.

The 4th Cavalry Division turned north-east at Kh. es Sumrah, and followed the valley of the Wadi Arah into the hills. The valley gradually narrows as the pass at Musmus is reached.

The enemy had sent a battalion from El Afule to hold this pass, but only its advanced guard arrived in time. Overcoming its resistance, the cavalry encountered the remainder of the battalion at El
Lejjun. The 2nd Lancers charged, killing 46 with the lance, and captured the remainder, some 470 in number.

The 4th Cavalry Division then marched to El Afule, which it reached at 08.00, half an hour after its capture by the 14th Cavalry Brigade.

In the meantime the 13th Cavalry Brigade of the 5th Cavalry Division, riding across the plain of Esdraelon, had reached Nazareth, the site of the Yilderim General Headquarters, at 05.30. Fighting took place in the streets, some 2000 prisoners being captured. Liman von Sanders had already made good his escape, but his papers and some of his staff were taken. The Brigade then marched to El Afule; arriving there as the 4th Cavalry Division rode down the Plain of Jezreel to Beisan, which it reached at 16.30, having covered some eighty miles in thirty-four hours. The 4th Cavalry Division detached a regiment to seize the railway bridge over the Jordan at Jisr Mejamie.

The Australian Mounted Division, which had followed the 4th Cavalry Division into the Plain of Esdraelon, was directed on Jenin, where the road from Messudie to El Afule leaves the hills. Jenin was reached at 17.30, and was captured after a sharp fight, a large number of prisoners being taken.

Thus within 36 hours of the commencement of the battle, all the main outlets of escape remaining to the Turkish VIIth and VIIIth armies had been closed. They could only avoid capture by using the tracks which run south-east from the vicinity of Nablus to the crossings over the Jordan at Jisr el Damieh. These were being rapidly denied to them."

So General Allenby in his own words tells the story of the cavalry dash in Syria of the 19th and 20th of September, 1918, from a small operation in which he derives his title of Megiddo. Thus we see that his title derives from a small skirmish, in which a regiment of cavalry, the 2nd Lancers, after brushing aside the advanced guard of a Turkish regiment which tried to hold the pass through which Thutmose III passed in 1479 B.C., marched on, exactly as did the Egyptian king, to Megiddo or El Lejjun, and charged the rest of the regiment there, killing 46 and capturing all the rest, about 470. It was a brilliant little victory, but after all only a little one. Just as the Syrians of three thousand years ago contributed to their own defeat by not meeting

Thutmose III in the pass, so the Turks, who had meant to place a whole battalion to hold the pass, could only get a part, its advanced guard, there in time. So this important point was lost with scarcely a struggle, and the defeat of the regiment in the plain beyond at Megiddo naturally followed, in the case of the Turks as in the case of the ancient Syrians. But whereas the ancient battle of Megiddo was a very considerable fight, this modern one of Lord Allenby's was a mere skirmish. So again we ask, "Why Lord Allenby of Megiddo?"

The fact is that that little skirmish at Megiddo was, from some points of view, the decisive event in the decisive operations which led up to the Turkish debacle of October, 1918.

To understand this statement it is necessary to examine the military situation which existed on the 18th of September, 1918, in Palestine and Syria.*

In September of that year the German General Liman von Sanders and his Turkish army held a front which ran from the coast north of Jaffa through the hills of Ephraim to a point half-way between Nablus and Jerusalem, and thence to the Jordan and down its eastern bank to the Dead Sea. On their left flank, but a good distance to the southeast the Arabs of Sherif Feisal threatened them near Maan. Against this menace the Turks had their IVth Army, under Kutchuk Jemal Pasha, east of the Jordan and Dead Sea. West of the Jordan, facing the British army, were posted on a straight front from east to west, from Jisr ed Damieh to just north of Jaffa, the VIIth Army, under Fevsi Pasha, and the VIIIth Army, under Jevad Pasha. The total strength in line, excluding the garrisons of Maan and the Hedjaz Railway posts, was 32,000 rifles, 4000 sabres, and 400 guns. In reserve at Tiberias, Nazareth, and Haifa, were 3000 rifles and 30 guns.

Such was the army of Syria which now again, as so often in history, was destined to be overthrown by the army of Egypt. But never before had the army of Egypt assumed so strange a mien. For among these modern Egyptians were Mahometans from India, Arabia, and Algeria, Sikhs, Rajputs, Gurkhas, and Hindus of a hundred castes, companies of Jews, coal-black negroes from the Dark Continent, Armenians,

* Pending the publication of official accounts of the battle, John Buchan's "A History of the War", XXIII, Chapter CLXII, read with the despatch, is perhaps the best available narrative. Major H. O. Lock's "With the British Army in the Holy Land" reached India too late for me to use it in this paper.
Australians and New Zealanders from the other end of the world, men from the British West Indies and from the Cape, French, Italians, and few in numbers, but the heart and soul of all, Britons from England. In all, excluding Feisal’s troops, there were 57,000 rifles, 12,000 sabres, and 540 guns. Thus Lord Allenby had that superiority which a general most desires, superiority of numbers. He had also a superiority in all else, in morale, in equipment, and above all, he could see while his enemy was blind, since he was crushingly superior in the air.

The communications of the enemy’s VIIIth and VIIIth armies were, from a military standpoint, poor, since they both ran through Beisan to Damascus. The VIIIth army’s communications owing to the nature of the ground took a sweep round by El Afule to Beisan, running thence either by road west of the Sea of Galilee or else crossing the Jordan north of Beisan and in common with the communications of the other two Turkish armies, joining the Hedjaz Railway to Damascus at Deraa. It is clear that if General Allenby could seize El Afule, Beisan, and Deraa, he would have the enemy in a huge trap from which there would be no escape. This was the task which General Allenby set himself.

It is obvious that his only possible chance of reaching the vital points before the enemy could get back to them was to pierce the enemy front at one point and pour through the gap some force which could move more rapidly than the enemy could retreat, i.e. cavalry. Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Bulfin, commanding the 21st Corps, which included the Lahore and Meerut Divisions, attacked the Turkish VIIIth army at 4.30 A.M. on Thursday, the 19th of September, in the plain of Sharon and in the hills to its right. Having broken through the enemy’s line, the 21st Corps wheeled to the right, after reaching the Nahr Falik, so as to leave the road along the coast free for the cavalry, which now poured through the gap in the enemy’s line, in order to make their dash for El Afule, Beisan, and Deraa. Meantime the 20th Corps under Lieutenant-General Chetwode pressed north against Fevsi Pasha’s VIIth army. Soon, on this 19th September, was seen the spectacle of two Turkish armies, the VIIth and the VIIIth, pouring northward in retreat, and hotly pressed by the pursuing infantry of the two British Corps. The VIIIth army was utterly routed, and fled along the roads leading to Nablus and Messudie. The VIIth army fought better, but by the evening of the 20th our line had been pushed north to a front which ran south-east from Bakka through Attara and Messudie to
the Jordan at a point south of the crossing at Jisr ed Damieh. The country was hilly, and the Turks were resisting strongly along this line.

But already on that 20th of September their fate had been sealed. The operations described in the despatch, part of which has been quoted above, had taken place, and the jaws of the trap had closed. By midday on the 19th the cavalry had completed twenty miles of their lightning dash northward through the gap in the enemy’s right, which Lieutenant-General Bulfin had made. That afternoon they penetrated the hills of Samaria; by 8 A.M. on the 20th, the 4th Cavalry Division had reached Megiddo (El Lejjun), where the brilliant little action of the 2nd Lancers took place, and passed on to El Afule, which it reached half an hour after its capture by the 14th Brigade; the 13th Cavalry Brigade of the 5th Cavalry Division, operating more to the left, had meantime reached Nazareth by 5.20 A.M. on the 20th, whence it turned south to El Afule to block the enemy’s retreat. By the night of the 20th the 4th Cavalry Division reached Beisan, having marched eighty miles in 34 hours. The railway bridge over the Jordan near by was at once seized. Meantime the last possible hole in the toils on the northward side, the road due north through Jenin, was closed by the capture of that place by the Australian Mounted Division. The jaws of the trap had snapped. Of what value was it that the VIIth and portions of the VIIIth Turkish armies were resisting with customary Turkish tenacity as the infantry of Bulfin and Chetwode’s Corps pressed them north? If they held their ground, no food or ammunition or reinforcements could reach them. If they retreated, they could but retreat into the arms of the hostile cavalry established at Beisan, El Afule, Jisr el Mujamia and Jenin in their rear.

One possible way of escape remained. Could the beaten armies cross the Jordan, at Jisr ed Damieh, which they still held, and join Jemal Pasha’s IVth Turkish army? At 1.30 A.M. on the 22nd that hope failed, when the crossing was seized by West Indians and New Zealanders. The latter pressed on via Es Salt to Amman, joined Feisal, and his Arabs, and drove the IVth Turkish army north along the Hedjaz railway, along which it retreated only to find that Feisal’s right wing had wheeled round and gaining touch with part of the 4th Cavalry Division at Er Remte had entrenched themselves north of Deraa across the IVth Turkish army’s communications with Damascus. The
4th Cavalry Division had moved out of Beisan on the 25th Sept. *en route* to Damascus. The Turkish IVth army ceased to exist, and any remnants that escaped north of Deraa found further retreat useless, through the fall of Damascus, which Feisal and the British forces entered on October 1st. Meantime on the west of the Jordan the VIIth and VIIIth Turkish armies had likewise ceased to exist, operations subsequent to the 20th September consisting chiefly of the rounding up of bodies of bewildered men anxious to surrender. In twelve days three Turkish armies had ceased to exist, while 60,000 prisoners and nearly 400 guns had been captured. Nothing but a broken mob now lay between General Allenby and Aleppo, and if necessary, Constantinople.

And all this bewildering success took place because the cavalry of the 4th and 5th Divisions carried out the work allotted to them without a hitch and to perfection. Had the cavalry been held up at the Megiddo pass, had even a temporary delay been enforced by the Turks upon the horsemen in their passage of the Carmel Ridge, the success could not have been so overwhelming, since time in an operation of this sort is all important, and the two Turkish armies west of Jordan might have had time to cross the river at Jisr el Mujamia. Whether any better defence of the Carmel Ridge and of the Megiddo pass in particular was feasible for the Turks in the existing situation is doubtful. Actually the defensive capabilities of the Carmel Ridge imposed no delay upon the advancing cavalry; and the complete little victory of the 2nd Lancers, where a whole regiment was killed or captured without any appreciable delay being entailed in the advance, mere skirmish though it was compared to the great battles of this and other campaigns of the Great War, so typified in itself the military perfection of the strategy and the execution of General Allenby’s plans in this marvellous victory, that, combined with the fact that it ensured the success of these plans, it was fitting that the site of the fight should give its name to the victor of the whole campaign. But the deciding factor in General Allenby’s choice was doubtless the historical associations of the site of the modern village of El Lejjun, reminding us by its very name of the Roman legions which once held the pass for the City of the Seven Hills, but reminding us most of all in its ancient name of Megiddo that the site of a decisive operation in this the latest battle of Syrian history was also the site of the first.
Adapted from Buchan's "History of the War" XXIII. P.139.
ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE.

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The origin of human speech has been traced to what is called roots by grammarians and philologists have accepted this view. The present essay is an attempt to go behind the roots in search of an explanation for them.

Human speech is the outcome of thought and is produced with the help of certain organs of the human body. Its origin therefore must have a psychological as well as an evolutionary history. These may be grouped together and called biological history of the origin of human speech. And this history from the nature of things must be prehistoric. The origin of speech in man like many other things relating to him may be best learnt under modern conditions from infants. It is wonderful how babies learn to speak and understand a language fairly well within the short space of about a year and a half without much tutorial aid. Babies have no national language. They can learn any language they hear spoken before them. Inasmuch as they are human they have inherited certain feelings and capacities from the lower animals and start life with them. When they hear people speak the sound is carried by the auditory nerve to the appropriate centre of the brain which receives and retains the ‘impression. Thus is developed what is called the auditory word centre. At this stage the baby cannot utter what he hears. He merely goes on receiving and retaining the impressions. The next step is to gradually get accustomed to the movements of his own vocal organs in the utterance of his own inarticulate sounds and also to observe how the people around him speak. In this way certain impressions are also carried to the appropriate centre of his brain. This centre is known as the glossokinaesthetic word centre* which receives and retains the impressions of the aforesaid movements. After these different impressions are registered in the brain the baby begins to try to utter the sounds he has heard. He makes

repeated attempts to utter them and ultimately succeeds in reproducing the easy ones. It is not to be supposed that the two processes, one through the ear and the other through the eye, follow each other successively. They go on simultaneously. As soon as the ear hears the sounds, the eye observes the movements which accompany their utterance; and thus association is formed between the impressions of the aforesaid centres. When this goes on for some time, the baby begins to reproduce the sounds and eventually succeeds in reproducing them; but at this stage he does not understand the meaning of the words which those sounds represent. This comes later on. First comes the physiological excitement of the brain centre, then follows the understanding of its meaning. The baby may repeat the sound mà several times, yet he does not know who is meant by that word. Even when he comes to know that it means an individual, he may not know whom it refers to, for he calls almost everybody by that name.

The figure in the margin shows the left lobe of the brain. The auditory word centre and the glossokinaesthetic word centre are situated in this side of the lobe, except in the case of left-handed persons in whom they are situated on the right side. For the mere utterance of word-sounds the excitement of these two centres marked a and g is sufficient; but for understanding their meaning a further centre must be developed which may be called the intellectual word-centre. This is shown above the other two and marked i. Some physiologists believe that the auditory word centre is developed in the posterior third of the third (or inferior) left frontal convolution in all right-handed men, who form the vast bulk of mankind.

Without noticing the conflicting theories as to the centres and their inter-connection it may be safely said that man's language does not exist as a "perfected faculty," * but depends upon the development of a number of special centres in the brain. These centres do not or may not be developed together. In aphasia some patients cannot utter words distinctly but can understand them; other patients may utter them but have forgotten their meaning. It is clear that the speech or the understanding is affected according as the one centre or

the other is affected pathologically. Human speech, therefore, is not an entire or perfected faculty but developed step by step and gradually as the different centres of the brain develop. But it should be remembered that speech and brain react upon each other. As speech depends upon the development of the brain centres, so the brain centres in their turn are developed by the improvement of the speech or culture of language.

All human language is made up of words. They are the products of thought and are uttered with the help of the vocal organs. These latter are the vocal chords, the larynx, the palate, the tongue, the cavity of the mouth and the lips. It is clear, therefore, that any animal that has got these vocal organs or their substitutes and has got the necessary development of the brain, specially of the grey matter in the cerebrum, may form a language similar to man. But those that are defective in any one respect cannot be expected to form it. Some birds can utter words used by man because they possess the vocal organ analogous to man and have some fair development of the vocal and auditory word-centres. But their cerebrum not being so much developed as in man they have not been able to appropriately develop the intellectual centres and therefore are incapable of forming anything like even an approach to human language. But this does not signify that they have no speech or language appropriate to them and their needs. For we know most animals do communicate their thoughts to each other in their own way.

This brings us to certain feelings which we have in common with the lower animals. Hunger, pain, pleasure, fear, the sexual feelings, etc., are to be found in the lower animals also. These have their appropriate expressions. Certain sounds are naturally connected with them. Whenever any such feeling is experienced and appropriate sounds are emitted, they get themselves registered in the brain or what is its forerunner in the lower animals. When the registration takes place in the brain or in the ganglionic cells of several individuals of the same species or varieties, the sounds emitted by one individual are understood by the others who may respond to such calls. As soon as this stage is reached, the animals have passed the mere individualistic stage and enter into the gregarious or social stage of various degrees of development. The understanding of sounds due to any particular feeling raises these to the dignity of what may be called their words, behind
which lie the concepts associated with that feeling. The different feelings mentioned above thus come to give rise to different concepts through the medium of such sounds as are understood by others and so can be regarded as words from the point of view of the animals who utter or understand them. The stages are sounds, words, concepts. It should further be noted here that certain feelings are naturally expressed by gestures even by the animals, which may or may not be accompanied by sounds. If they are so accompanied then the sounds emitted may, in the course of time, be understood by others; and these sounds may also be spoken of as *words* used by those animals to express certain feelings which readily find an interpretation with others of the same community.

These really are not words in our sense of the term; but we may look upon them as raw materials for the formation of our words. In short, when in the course of evolution man is reached, these sounds or cries or calls having a meaning among the lower animals may be looked upon as the roots, originally expressive of such concepts as the sounds imply. Conceptual word-sounds represent such concepts as the sounds express to the other individuals, both among the lower animals and among men.

It will easily appear after this that lower animals will after a certain stage of evolution come to possess a fund of what they may call their *words*, which are understood by others of their community as appropriate to each different feeling of which they are an expression. Now, as in the course of evolution man must have inherited such feelings and such or similar modes of expression, he must by the very law of descent or heredity have started with a fund of hereditary concepts expressive of his different feelings or perceptions which would, if nothing adverse happened, in due course naturally lead him to form words which others of his community would understand in the same sense. But prehistoric man could not have had a language as developed as our own, nor approaching it. It has been doubted if he had anything like a spoken language. Some philologists, as Darwin has noted, "have inferred that when man first became widely diffused he was not a speaking animal." But this view seems no longer tenable. Man's erect position certainly gave him a superiority over the anthropomorphous apes in the command of the action of respiration, which greatly facilitated the formation of words. It is more probable that he could utter significant sounds from the time when he first rose to form a distinct
species, for even the chimpanzee and the orangutan can do so; but these could hardly be called speech or language in the present sense of the term. As we have seen, formation of words and sentences presupposed the necessary amount of development in the different brain centres. From the skull-capacity of prehistoric man, this amount of development does not seem likely to have been reached. The proportion between the weight of the body and that of the brain gives a fair idea of intellectual development. This proportion in the case of orangutan is \( \frac{1}{3} \), in the case of *Pithecanthropus erectus* (as the half-ape, half-man sort of animal has been called) is \( \frac{3}{4} \), and in the case of man \( \frac{1}{3} \) approximately. In the years 1891-1892, Prof. Doubois discovered in Java the upper part of a skull, part of a lower jaw, three teeth and a left-thigh bone. These were believed to belong to a man-like creature of the Pliocene age, representing a form which could hardly be called human and yet was more highly developed than the simian. Dr. Duckworth calls him a "Caliban, a missing link", something between the human and the simian. This creature had been named *Pithecanthropus erectus*. The weight of the thigh bone gives an approximate idea of the weight of the body, and the capacity of the skull gives an idea of the weight of the brain matter enclosed in it. We thus arrive at a conclusion about the proportion between the two; and the figures given above approximately show it. From these it will be seen that the position of this Caliban is intermediate between the undoubted man and the undoubted ape. Its brain weight was little more than half that of an average civilized man. In still higher developments of the "link", which have since been traced,\(^*\) it is believed that speech of a rudimentary kind existed. Here we reach Proto-man.

From these considerations, it may appear clear that neither *Pithecanthropus erectus* nor Proto-man could have had what we call speech or language; for their thoughts must have been few and nearly as low as in the anthropomorphous apes. The possession of vocal organs capable of uttering human words does not necessarily imply capacity to form language in our sense of the term.

But animals very low in the scale of evolution utter sounds quite

\(^*\) The skeleton discovered in 1895 known as the Galley Hill skeleton, though small in stature, does not seem to differ from modern human beings in the great majority of its characters. It is of all finds the nearest approach to man and has hence been called *Homo fossilis*.
distinct and audible, oftentimes abrupt, sharp or even deep. Words have been traced to roots and they are almost always sharp, abrupt sounds, sometimes deep also. Taking the sounds produced by the lower animals into consideration, the first thing that strikes us is the fact that these sounds are not always uttered by the mouth. Various parts of the body, such as legs, abdomen, back, wings, etc., are brought into requisition for the purpose of producing sounds. Rubbing the legs, abdomen or back, striking or flapping the wings are common methods of producing sounds among insects, spiders, fishes, amphibians or birds. These sounds are produced by insects not always, but under the excitement of various emotions mentioned above, specially under the excitement of the breeding season. Some insects rub their legs and produce sounds in that season. All the rest of the year they do not emit sounds at all. Such is the case, as has often been observed, with spiders also. Animals so highly developed as some fishes, which are ordinarily mute, have sometimes been known to produce sounds in the breeding season. Frogs among the amphibians are most vocal during this season, which is the rainy season. At this time their sounds become deep, loud and sonorous. They are almost mute during the other seasons. Most of the snakes are generally mute, but during the breeding season they utter clear, sharp, hissing sounds. Among the mammalia, the cow, the ass, the buffalo, the cat and even some monkeys utter deep loud sounds at the time of sexual disturbance. This sound is generally uttered by their females, but sometimes also by the male, as in the case of the ram and the bull. Most of these animals have no special breeding seasons for the male; but the females have their rutting season periodically, and it is just at this time that they utter the peculiar deep and loud sounds so well known to breeders. The case of birds requires special mention. They are the most vocal of all lower animals. At the breeding season, they, and specially the males, strut and dance and utter very loud and musical sounds in the presence of the female. These sounds are harmonious and sweet even to the human ear. "Their whole life is saturated with love."

Thus the butterflies, spiders, amphibians, fishes, birds and even some mammalia exhibit physiological disturbance at the breeding season. Their blood circulation is quicker, their temperature higher, their external colour brighter or more flushed at this season than at any other. The sounds that even the lowest among them (the insects) utter eventu-
ally relieve them of this disturbance, and the more developed among
the lower animals soon discover the efficacy of this mode of relief. It
is in this way when they have often derived benefit from involuntary
emission of sounds that they begin to use them as calls to the opposite
sex. The other feelings mentioned above also lead to some physio-
logical disturbance and consequent emission of involuntary sounds, but
I believe it is the sexual feeling which agitates them most and therefore
contributes most to the eventual formation of language. The sounds
produced by this disturbance make greater impression on the brain (or
what is its the equivalent) as well as increase the benefit derived. These in
course of time get connected together by association, through the fibres
connecting the appropriate neurons or nerve centres, giving rise to
what is known as association of ideas. Thus what was originally a
physiological disturbance gradually becomes a psychological impression;
and when this rises to the level of concepts, these latter form the basis
of language. The opposite sex finds no difficulty in understanding the
meaning of these sounds or calls and thenceforth they become
symbols or sounds with meaning, which the opposite sex understands.
The next step is that of concepts. Thenceforth the appropriate concep-
tual sounds may be looked upon as the words of the animals who utter
the sounds and understand them. They may in the course of evolution
form and in all probability have actually formed roots of human language;
but for the animals themselves they are as good as words for the inter-
change of thought.

If we consider man himself, it is seen that even he is oftentimes
relieved by uttering sharp, deep and abrupt sounds when physiologi-
cally much disturbed, as by anger, fear, pleasure, pain, love and such
other emotions. Both the lower animals and man feel relieved from
high nervous disturbance by uttering these sounds. It is wonderful
how even after human language has so far advanced, man often
unconsciously utters these sounds and feels relieved, and have, therefore,
included them as words in his vocabulary.

Human language has a sentimental as well as an intellectual side.
So it has been from the beginning even in the case of the lower animals
from whom man has inherited this double aspect and subsequently
improved upon the latter. The sentimental side of language has, it
seems, received its highest development among birds, whose whole life
is love and who can utter sounds of all descriptions, whereas the
intellectual side of language has received its highest development in man who is most intellectual of all animals.

From what has been said above, it is clear that the progress from mere sounds to concepts, that is to say, from the physical to the psychological plane, is essential to form language.

If, then, we take the lower animals again, we are confronted with the question: "What is it which has thus raised sounds into concepts and thus into words in the present sense of the terms?" The answer must be that each and every variety of excitement due to the different feelings has made its own contribution to the result. But I lay the greatest stress on the contribution made by the sexual feeling at the breeding season. The reason will appear presently. Hunger, fear, pain, pleasure, and anger do not regard another individual to the same extent as the sexual feeling; nor do they, I believe, contribute to the process of evolution as much as the latter. Hunger in the lower animals is a self-regarding feeling, except in the case of gregarious or social animals. The hungry animal has to find its own food. Pain, pleasure, fear and anger may not be entirely self-regarding; but all of them, except pleasure, result in fighting or struggle. These latter have not been able to retain the importance assigned to them by Darwin, Wallace or Huxley in the work of evolution. Sympathy and co-operation are more essential for evolution of species than struggle or fight. If this is so, the other feelings enumerated above must yield place to the sexual feeling. From the nature of things, this feeling could not have been self-regarding from the very beginning, but must have required association with another individual for its satisfaction. The sounds resulting from sexual disturbance were soon understood by the opposite sex and led to union of the one individual with the other. From this arose offspring, which in the course of evolution was the centre of many higher and nobler feelings in the community. With the increase of offspring all animals, including man, spread over the surface of the earth and formed different units of varying degrees of cohesion in different centres of aggregation. All the higher and nobler feelings and thoughts owe their origin to the formation of society, and the improvement of the language is also due to the same circumstance. We may, therefore, say that the sexual feeling not only played the most important part in the origin of language but also in its im-
provements. Adirasa (व्यादिर्स) from this point of view rightly deserves its name.*

The Ratnakosa mentions nine rasas of which the sexual † is placed first in the enumeration. Namanidhanam adds one more rasa (the vatsalyam) to this, but at the same time gives to the sexual rasa the first place. Mukuta considers vatsalyam (affection towards children) as a derivative of the sexual rasa, almost in the sense we have spoken‡ above, as children are the outcome of this rasa. It is clear therefore, why of all the feelings the sexual has been called the adirasa, as adi according to Amara means the first or foremost, and this rasa is the most important of all the mental conditions. As mental conditions have played the most important part in the origin of language and in its improvement, the first or foremost of them (the adirasa) must be considered to have made the most important contribution to the result. Hence, as has been said above, adirasa fully deserves its name.

* This view, I believe, essentially agrees with the view taken by the Sanskrit authorities; for they almost invariably give the first place to the sexual feeling in their enumeration of the different rasas.

† यथार ो रति
‡ वत्सल्यं पुजारिष्येक्ष्यात् रतिभंद एव ॥
SOME FEATURES OF BANKING IN INDIA.

RAMACHANDRA RAU BASAVARSU, M.A., L.T., F.R.E.S.

The first striking feature of the Indian money market is the smallness of the banking capital or loanable money. A notable demonstration of this fact is visible every year in the rise of the Bank rate during the busy season. As J. M. Keynes has said, "the average Bank rate in India is not high but the maximum figure to which it rises is a high one"; and this is no doubt a common feature of all countries which finance their trade requirements with borrowed capital obtained from elsewhere notably from the London money market. More than one financial authority has commented on this shortage of trade capital in India. Financial facilities are an important desideratum at the present time in our country because a new economic era is setting in. Capital is required for the financing of new Railways, developing forests, and constructing public works of a reproductive character. The economic development of our country would be seriously hampered if sufficient capital is not available and the clock of industrial progress would receive a check and be impeded for a time. The extension and development of the existing industries alone, not to speak of the other immense industrial potentialities that exist now in India, require a huge amount of capital. In the past decade, there was an appreciable widening of industrial activity in India and such works as the Tata Iron and Steel Works at Jamshedpur, the starting of Cement Works, the working of the hydro-electric machinery in Mysore, Kashmir and Western Ghats afford an ample demonstration of a new-born industrial activity. Many other projects were under construction and would have been undertaken, but the war arrested the industrial movement in our country. The capitalists felt nervous about the future of these new industries and to add to this it was difficult to obtain the skilled and expert mechanics and the needed machinery and plant from Europe. Fortunately for India, and for the British Empire, an era of peace has set in. Our minds will now be turned towards industrial development. Already a host of companies have been started in such great
profusion that all sober-minded economists are inclined to sound a note of warning at the feverish rate of growth of new companies. They fear that this boom would end in a catastrophe similar to that which we experienced when the "Swadeshi" wave swept over the whole country. The bitter experience of those times is fraught with lessons and the entrepreneurs are expected to be more careful of the results. Besides, conditions have much improved since then and there need be no unnecessary apprehension and unwise expectation that our new-born companies are foredoomed to failure. The war has revealed to us our own industrial possibilities and the activities of the Munitions Board have revealed to us various sources on which capital can be profitably utilised. A number of new schemes to harness the waterfalls of the Western Ghats are bound to come, and it is contemplated that fresh capital would be attracted to extend the steel works. The smelting of zinc and copper, and the production of sulphuric acid on a commercial scale, the treatment of coke by-products and the production of "heavy" chemicals and aniline dyes on a commercial scale, the manufacture of textile machinery and mill accessories, the building of steam and oil engines, are some of the numerous industrial activities that are contemplated by organisers of India's industrial development. To perform these feats successfully capital is needed. It has been an oft-quoted remark that many of the joint-stock companies failed for want of capital at the nick of the time. Thus capital has always been, and will be, an important consideration for some time to come. The amount of loanable capital that lies at the disposal of our Banks, the Presidency Banks, the Exchange Banks, and the Indian Joint-stock Banks put together falls short of fifty crores. There is on the other hand a growing and expanding population which now numbers 312 millions. The amount of our exports and imports, foreign and internal trade included, has reached the record figure of 1,000 crores, but during the period of the war export figure has reached quite a phenomenal figure. For the months of June and July 1919 the exports have approximately amounted to 250 millions and it would be very difficult, nay impossible, to finance this huge export trade without increase in our trade capital. It is a well-known fact that many metropolitan banks of London possess more capital than all the Indian banks put together. A comparison of the English with the Indian banking is shown in the following table:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>India (£ million)</th>
<th>The United Kingdom (£ million)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital and Reserve</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deposits</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>1,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private deposits per 1,000 people</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>36,657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The deposits of £1,000 of trade</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>1,015</td>
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So the outstanding fact is the smallness of capital and the size of our Banks. A signal proof of this phenomenon has been demonstrated recently in connection with the proposal for amalgamation of a Metropolitan Bank of London, namely, the Lloyds' Bank, with an Exchange Bank of India, namely, the National Bank of India. The Secretary of State for India viewed the proposal with serious apprehension and declined to permit it to obtain a footing in the Indian Money-market. His main fear was that the existing Presidency Banks would be reduced to second-rate pawn shops when compared with the mammoth size of the proposed giant amalgamation. Sir Noreot Warren while placing the scheme of amalgamation of the Presidency Banks before the shareholders of the Bank of Bengal has openly confessed the weakness of our banking system. The proposed amalgamation, he says, means "added strength", and, I would add, "more capital" to our Banking system. Sir Noreot need not have added the mild, suave and gentle threat to the shareholders that if they fail to close in with the proposed offer, i.e., the proposed amalgamation of the Presidency Banks, the State would step in and form a separate Bank of its own and that such a step would spell ruin to the Presidency Banks. The Shareholders are already aware of the immense advantages of a policy of co-ordination and co-operation and they will not fail to profit by the opportunity. Many of them realise that there is a "tide in the affairs of men, which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune, omitted, all the voyage of their life is bound in shallows and in miseries." What is wanted is that more loanable money should be at the disposal of the Banks. Many an authority has harped on this point and they want that there should be more banking facilities and the indefatigable Mr. Webb of Karachi has truly voiced the situation when he said that "India needs more banks, manned by Indian men and furnished with Indian capital."

The second noticeable feature is that Indians have not as yet acquired the "banking habit." The Indian people require education in
the economical use of the gold they possess. They should realise that the melting of sovereigns and converting them into ornaments make capital unproductive. They should feel that hoarded wealth does not increase their economic well-being. They should be aware of the fact that hoarded wealth is not capital at all. One of the chief causes hindering the growth of capital in India has been said to be the hoarding habit that prevails among the majority of the people. One school of thought points out that India can never accumulate an appreciable amount of capital because of her hoarding habit. India has been designated by some historians as the land of 'fabulous hoards.' One economist calls India 'a sink of precious metals.' There are others who speak of vast hoards which exist in India. Mr. H. D. MacLeod was the first economist who started the theory of hoards and ever since that time the problem of hoarding in India has become almost classical. MacLeod estimates the amount of hoards in India at £300 millions. Lord Curzon in his speech at the Bengal Chamber of Commerce Jubilee in the year 1903, stated that he had seen calculations to the effect that "the whole hoarded wealth of India amounted to over 825 crores of Rupees." He remarked that these figures approximated to the truth. "Think of all this money lying idle or at most put out for usury or relatively unproductive forms of investment. It makes one almost shudder to think that the opportunity is lost for investment." Mr. Arnold Wright writing in the Financial Review of Reviews (Dec. 1916) estimates the amount of hoards as £700 millions. Opposed to this school of thought there is the popular school which attributes the shortage of capital to the annual drain of money by way of Home charges, interest, profits on borrowed capital and pensions. This school emphatically denies that these annual drains leave capital to accumulate in India. As Dr. Marshall would say, capital can grow from the surplus of national income over national expenditure, or in other words national dividend. Any untoward cause which decreases the national income contributes towards the decrease of the national dividend. The annual drain reduces the national income considerably and hence the national dividend is correspondingly reduced. There is no legitimate ground for grievance so far as the Home charges are direct payments for services rendered to India. But an appreciable amount goes away from our country as profits of industries financed and managed by Europeans. Here is the legitimate ground for com-
plaint. The first and foremost duty is to stop this invisible drain or "invisible export" as it is styled, by ensuring a rapid growth of capital in India and it is the paramount duty of every man in India who can save from his income to rid her of the domination of foreign capital. It is his sacred duty to relieve her from her unfortunate economic bondage and gradually obtain control of all the vital industries in our country. He should realise the truth of Lord Curzon's statement that "a country is in the strongest position whose capital is self-generated and self-employed." Coming to the question of our hoards it is hard to reconcile certain economic facts with the statement that India has fabulous hoards. The first statement which gives lie to the theory of hoards is the extreme poverty of the people and the very low standard of living that is implied by it. There is no appreciable margin in the income of the people to allow them to accumulate these huge hoards. It may be true, that small amounts may be saved but these small amounts can never be styled "fabulous hoards." The frequent occurrence of famines dissipates these small amounts into thin air and it is really as a sort of protection against these famines and pestilences that these people do lay by something. The second fact that demolishes the theory of hoards is the appalling indebtedness of our peasantry which has been estimated at £250 millions. Such a vast amount of rural indebtedness can hardly be squared with the theory of huge hoards.

That there is a considerable accumulation of precious metals in the shape of ornaments is an undoubted fact and every year there is fresh accretion to it. It is a well-known fact that during the war many people have prospered and the present company promotion in such a reckless fashion would not have taken place if capital had not accumulated in the past. The agriculturists who have made profits are not likely to invest them in industries. Banking facilities do not exist at all for these people and the co-operative credit movement is still in its infancy. Although the Savings Bank department of the Post Office exists in small places, it is resorted to by the middle-class people. A close scrutiny of the list of depositors reveals to us that hardly ten per cent of them are agriculturists and it is a pity that the Indian peasant does not understand the way in which he has to deal with the bank. His illiteracy stands in his way and diminishes the popularity of the pass-book. Education alone is the true remedy. Again neither the small traders of the town nor the agriculturists come up frequently
to the bank to carry on their transactions. Both the small traders and the agriculturists do not possess confidence in the financial stability of the banking institutions and when once they have witnessed the "mushroom banks" disappearing as fast as they have sprung up, they are all the more reluctant to trust them. Thus capital in the mofussil is totally unorganised and the transfer of money is purely a personal transaction between the payer and the recipient. In Europe branches of banks are established in small places and the branch bank is made to open its door once or twice a week in order to transact business. But such is not the case with our Indian Banks.

Again the habit of hoarding is said to have been revived at the outbreak of the war. The tremendous rush of depositors on the Postal Savings Banks early in the beginning of the Great War and the alternately swaying fortunes of the belligerents on the battlefield have only confirmed this sad tendency on the part of the people. To add to this, the official restrictions impeding the free importation of precious metals on behalf of private people into India have had something to do with this, and in fact have gone a great way to encourage the people to hoard their slender stock of precious metals. The wealthy people prefer investments which pay much more than the Banks can hope to pay. Investments in land by purchase or mortgage still appeal to the majority of the people who can afford them, and the investment of money in Government paper exercises a strange fascination on the minds of various classes of people. As yet the "banking habit" has not been deeply implanted in the minds of people and until the people realise the importance of this habit the day of our economic salvation is far off. It is highly imperative on the part of the Indian people to realise the fact that the Bank is not a mere ordinary joint-stock company to obtain profits, but it has to perform the supreme duty of "trusteeship of the Nation's material future" and that in its hands lies "the fate of the industrial organisation of the country." It is not only the people that will have to realise this fact, but the existing Banks themselves must feel the weight of this heavy responsibility and conduct the banking business on safe and sound lines and afford the needed accommodation to our rising industries. They must get over the belief that they are mere dividend-paying machines. It must be instilled into their minds that they are the mainspring of the country's monetary mechanism.

Coming to the third feature of Indian Banking, we are surprised at the
paucity of the Banking institutions when compared with the extent of territory and the total population to whose needs they minister. The three Presidency Banks have sixty-two branch offices. There are about ten Exchange Banks with forty-five branch offices. The Indian Joint-Stock Banks number about 492 as the Registrar of Joint-Stock Companies announces, but 363 of them are small money-lending institutions and of the remaining 130 only 68 Banks furnish complete returns to the department of Statistics. Their branches number about 160. Thus there are 81 Head Offices and there are 207 branches. Some companies like Messrs. Thacker Spink & Co. attract deposits. The indigenous bankers carry on a lot of business but no statistical information can be obtained as to the number of their agencies and branches. Making allowance for all these one does not find that branch-banking has progressed very favourably in India. It has been estimated that no less than 9,500 banking offices exist in Great Britain, and, compared with this, India is seriously undermanned in this respect. In Scotland, it has been said that "every village has its own bank." Happy would be the day when each Indian village would be in a position to boast of its own humble banking establishment. At present many a town with a population of 20,000 to 40,000 people goes without even a branch-bank; whereas it has been remarked that in Scotland "each town with a population of 20,000 has been overbanked," and in many places the starting of a branch bank is viewed with apprehension and every attempt on their part to tout for business is deprecated. Unfortunately the case is not so with India. In the first place, there are not many strong banks doing banking business on sound and conservative lines. The Presidency Banks and the Exchange Banks excepted, the rest of the banks with the notable exception of the Allahabad Bank and the Alliance Bank of Simla are all new-born institutions, and the banking crisis of 1913-1915 has undoubtedly weeded away the speculative and the less stable of the Indian Joint-Stock Banks. The rest of the banks are labouring under the difficult and slow process of building up their business, but it is manifest that the existing number of banking offices are totally inadequate to meet our growing needs.

The branch-bank system should have a firm footing in our country. The starting of new local banks is a difficult affair and whatever might be said in favour of independent local banks the verdict of experience specially in the United Kingdom, Canada and Scotland has gone against it and the branch bank system has come into vogue. Quite a large
number of writers on the topic of banking have written on the advantages of the branch-bank system. The opening of branch banks in India will afford facilities for transmission of money from one district to another. These branches will conduce to a proper distribution of capital from one place to another according to the relative needs of these different sections of the community. The small trader might be educated as to the advantages of having a banking account. The branches will afford the best possible professional training ground for young people desirous of a new career. Expenses of management can be economised. The branches all over the country will lead to lowering of the rate of interest and steadies it to a great extent. It will lead to an increase of loanable funds. The various branches will give ample facilities for gaining information of the state of customers and as to the nature of their work. The branch-bank system may be extended to places too small to support a regular bank which requires a full complement of officers and reserve of coin. But the system is not without some disadvantages. Each branch is a source of weakness, and loss at one branch may lead to a run on the whole establishment of which the branch is only a part. The branches may tend to rival the older establishments of the place and this rivalry may lead to the lowering of the banking standards. There may be a falling-off in the nature of securities against which banking accommodation is sought and overbranching may lead to overbanking and the extreme rigour of modern competition will force the numerous branches to tout for unsafe and risky business. An undue and disproportionate multiplicity of banks will be co-existent with a tendency to indifferent banking finance. The disappearance of the local independent bank means the elimination of the personal element in bank credit and this may mean great inconvenience to some of the traders. Too many branches, and all of them working under rule of-thumb methods, tend to stifle intelligence and the branch-bank system might tend to remove superfluous capital from provinces into the metropolis and thus the provinces might view the draining away of money with disfavour. Many of these disadvantages are not inherent in the branch-bank system nor are they its inevitable concomitants. Most of them can be eliminated by instituting a system of effective audit and insisting upon weekly reports of business from the branch managers and there should be an efficient peripatetic supervision by the manager of the head-office.
Some of the directors should make unexpected visits at the branch offices to see the way the business is conducted; and rivalry with the existing banks in cutting down the rates to absorb the customers of the older banks of the place would tend to attract bad and doubtful accounts in the first place, and the branch would be a refuge for the destitute. But almost all the above precautions can be easily taken and many of the disadvantages can be eliminated and the advantages far outweigh the disadvantages. A new branch may mean extension of business and the establishment of several such branches in the interior of the country means an increase in the deposits and an appreciable diminution in the monetary circulation of the country. Alexander Hamilton has been credited with the honour of being the father of this branch system. Canada took it up and in Scotland there is a highly developed system of branch banking. The evolutional development of international banking and the branch system will gradually do away with the services of the intermediaries and will make for greater and all-round financial strength, efficiency and responsibility. India ought to learn and profit by the examples set by the other countries. All the sound banks which have been doing business on conservative lines should be made to extend their branches into the interior and they should establish a net-work of banking establishments which should serve as connecting links between the various parts of the country. But Sir Bernard Hunter, the Secretary of the Presidency Bank of Madras, has said that the opening of branches in India means an expensive affair and that the business is all onesided. For customers unfortunately come in not to deposit their savings but for loans, and each new branch means more business for the bank. Thus the branches are not a source of strength to the banks obtaining deposits from the interior but they strain the resources of the head-office in trying to make loans to customers and so it is alleged the business is all onesided. As for the question of expense, it is true a new branch takes some time to pay its way but a Presidency Bank should not murmur on this score—because the expense would be quite insignificant when compared with the profits they can make with the Government deposits that will come into their vaults. So an extension of branches of these banks would be paying and it has already been announced that 100 new branches would be created if the Presidency Banks were to be amalgamated into an Imperial Bank and this would mean much convenience to
the Government and the branches. But a far greater number than this are required. They are the only sound banks that have been doing business for a long time and they have gathered much experience in the course of their business and it is safer to trust them to educate the people in banking habits than other banks. It has oft been said that new banks should be started but there is a real difficulty. New banks, if they are established, should be made to do business on orthodox lines, and it is true that the state of the Indian money market is not overcrowded with banking institutions and hence a few more new banking concerns can safely be launched. But when we consider the lack of trained bank managers in India it would be difficult to obtain suitable men to work the several banks. Unfortunately for India, there are not too many Pochkhanawalas but only a single individual. India has already learnt a severe lesson by entrusting its banking business to men of mediocre capacity, and the banking crisis of 1913-1915 may prevent a repetition of such sad experiments.

In short, the crux of the situation lies in the attraction of more capital to the vaults of the banks. This the existing banks can do by increasing the authorised capital by legislation. Banking business is purely a business of confidence, it is easier to put more trust in therefore into the banks already trusted and any expansion on the part of the old and well-tried banks should be a more welcome feature rather than the starting of entirely new banks which have to go through the laborious process of building up business and gaining public confidence. A branch of an existing institution would do the same thing for the community so far as the business of tapping capitalists for deposits is concerned. It is safer and more conservative than any new banks whose soundness has yet to be proved, whose stability has not been put to the test and whose solidity is still a matter of question.

The next phase of development in the banking business in our country would be the opening up of the country by means of a well-devised system of branches strategically situated so as to tap the deposits of the people and minister to the economic needs of the community wisely and beneficially. It is true that there is a lot of untrodden territory for these new banks to explore. There is a vast area of virgin soil for these new branches to occupy and to till. The banking crop has not been gathered as yet in India and it would pay handsome dividends to the pioneers of banking enterprise in the interior of the
country where towns are slowly springing up. It would not be out of place here to repeat once more that this business should be taken up by the old existing banks. The old banks have grown grey in the service of the country and they have come out unscathed from many a crisis. They have come out purified and strengthened by the ordeal and it is these banks, that have stood the vicissitudes of time, that should be encouraged to start new branches rather than starting new institutions which have to gain their footing. They will be subject to all the ills of infant banking, and India can ill afford to lose the little capital she possesses. The crisis of 1913-15 has cost India 30% of her Banking capital and it would be folly to tread the old path again by creating new banks entrusting our capital to untried hands. To sum up, what is wanted is an extension of old and well-tried banking institutions in our country but not new companies which sail well on smooth waters but sink on a stormy day.

Another noticeable feature of Indian banking is the one already incidentally mentioned. It is the lack of trained banking managers. The failure of the many Indian Joint-Stock Banks was solely due to the lack of these trained people and no competent managers having complete knowledge of banking theory and an adequate amount of practical experience were forthcoming, and even now there are but few educated men who have been trained specially for the banking work. The Indian Industrial Commission observes that “there is a lack of trained bank employees owing to the absence in the past of facilities for commercial education and of any regular system of training Indians in banking work, while the country folk are not alive as to the advantages of organized banking.” The growth of banking business in the mofussil has been impeded by the paucity of such men.

The Lahore Committee appointed to enquire into the causes of bank failures in the Punjab by the Punjab Provincial Advisory Committee to the Indian Industrial Commission says that there is a strong need of promoting a knowledge of banking systems among the people, and it emphasizes the necessity of training people in banking work.

Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya says that the Government of India should take definite steps to impart the best instruction to young Indians in banking through the best teachers it can appoint. Again while arguing for a State Bank he said that one of the advantages of a State Bank would be the providing of facilities for train-
ing Indians in banking work. The Tata Industrial Bank is trying to solve this question by employing intelligent and capable apprentices, and if every important bank imitated the Tata Bank it would do infinite benefit to the Indian community. There is no reason why the Presidency Banks should not take up seriously the question of training apprentices, while the Government is helping them with the free deposit of its funds, it should insist on them to take up the question.

Pandit Malaviya instances the history of Japanese banking and points out that the marvellous development of banking in Japan was due to the training of its people in the banking business. He writes that "at the time of Restoration in 1868 there was complete ignorance of the methods of foreign finance, or of banking or of joint-stock companies." There was some kind of financial machinery, but "national economy and finance were both in a perilous condition," and Prince Ito was sent to America to study the working of their financial institutions. On his recommendation National Banks were organized, and the Imperial Bank of Japan was next established as a Central Bank, and at the present day there are separate banking institutions to deal with Home Trade, Foreign Trade, Industry and Commerce, Agriculture and Colonization, each specialising in its own line of business. The following passage is worthy of quotation. Baron Shibusawa, the President of the First National Bank, writes in the conclusion on the chapter on banking in Japan as follows:—

"Before concluding this essay the writer cannot refrain from expressing his profound satisfaction at the fact that the small spring of banking business, which had been so insignificant at the time of the Restoration, has, by a gradual process of accretion, become a broad, navigable river, as it is now, and his conviction that this is the result of having followed the European and American Nations, to which the Japanese are much indebted. Again the Japanese are very grateful for the valuable services of Mr. Alexander Allan Shand, now a Director of the Paris Bank, London, who came to Japan at the invitation of the Issue Department in 1872, acted as Adviser in Banking to that department, wrote valuable books on banking, instructed young Japanese in that line and thus paved the way for the development of banking business in the country."

Thus the prime requisite for possessing a good banking system is to have a number of persons who have had a good grounding in the theory of banking, with a fair amount of practical knowledge in some of the different systems of banking in foreign countries.

The next point that strikes us is the lack of a Bankers' Association. There is no common platform or meeting ground for all the bankers, the old and the new, the foreign and the swadeshi, the expert and the amateur, to come into contact with one another. The Exchange Banks have one association to discuss problems affecting their common interests and they seldom fail to make use of their combined strength whenever opportunity affords itself. The Presidency Banks act as the clearing-house banker and they keep the bankers' balances. Though they have become "the residuary Trustees" of our banking system, yet they do not acknowledge the responsibility, nor are they strong enough to support the whole burden. The amalgamation of the three Presidency Banks would improve the situation to a great extent, but what is wanted is that there should be a special bank which should act as the Central Bank keeping our National Reserve and guarding it carefully. It should also lend a helping hand to struggling banks now and then, provided they are doing sound business. The banking crisis of 1913-1915 has revealed to us the deplorable condition to which sound banks like the Punjab National Bank and People's Bank, Lahore, were reduced, on account of lack of re-discount facilities. They committed the fault of locking up the money on long-dated securities and were unable to meet the claims of their depositors; and even when the Government securities were offered, the Presidency Bank of Bengal ignored the recommendations of its Lahore branch, and this precipitated the failure. Thus the lack of an institution which is the acknowledged head of the banking system, has led to serious difficulty in the past. This has to be removed as early as possible. The cardinal fact that the aforesaid Lahore Committee brings forth regarding the failure of banks in the Punjab is "that there has been no association of bankers to look after the general policy of banking development as a whole, nor to instruct the banks in the proper path" just as the Bankers' Institute in England or the Bankers' Associations in London. Both these associations publish admirable magazines on banking topics. The first-mentioned Association holds periodical examinations enabling young men to qualify as bank clerks.
and its certificate is considered as a necessary passport for higher appointments in banking institutions. It need not be said that such a responsible body does not exist in India. It is true the various Chambers of Commerce hold examinations in Banking, and the Commercial College diplomas are the only existing passports to enter any banking offices. But the young men who wish to take up banking as their career should be taught in regular colleges where experts in practical banking and in the theory of banking should teach, and it is these graduates of Commercial Colleges that should be sent to foreign countries for the purpose of further training and observation of foreign banking methods.

Again the Clearing House that exists in India does business on the model of the English Clearing Houses. It has not copied the American model. The English Clearing House may be defined as a device to amplify and facilitate the daily exchanges of items and settlements of balances among the banks. The Clearing House in America not only performs these functions, but also acts as a medium for united action upon all questions affecting their mutual welfare. In America, some of the following important functions are performed by Clearing Houses: They take up the question of extending loans to Government and they fix the minimum rates of interest on deposit. They fix uniform rates of exchange and charges of collections. They issue loan certificates to those banks which do sound business on good assets, and on the strength of these Clearing House loan certificates the banks can borrow. It was by means of the Clearing House device that the American National Banking system tried to remedy the defects that were created by the absence of a Central Bank. The Federal Reserve system now has been introduced and the Federal Reserve Banks now take up the important duty of acting as pilots and on them falls the task of steering clear of all difficulties, and the successful way in which they checked the speculative orgy in last November in Wall Street is a convincing proof that they realise their onerous duties. On the European Continent, the Clearing House system has been recently imported, and it does not play such an all-important part because all the countries possess a centralised banking system. The Central Banks do a large business in current accounts and the transfers and remittances of funds are accomplished largely by cancellations through book-entry.

Unfortunately for us, we have neither a responsible Central Bank
nor an efficient, enterprising and go-ahead Clearing House system as they have in America. Even the amalgamation of the three Presidency Banks would do very little to alleviate such a distressing situation as the crisis of 1913-1915, unless and until they openly acknowledge and shoulder the responsibility of coming to the aid of their helpless brethren in case of need. They should throw open the re-discount facilities to all the important banks, and the privilege of being on the re-discount list would be almost as much coveted as the privilege of being a member of the Clearing House, and the proposed Imperial Bank should scrutinise the position of all the members on the re-discount list now and again and weed out all unsound concerns from its list. This itself acts as a most salutary check for the ordinary Joint-Stock Banks to conduct their discount business on scrupulously clean lines and helps to improve the standard of banking in our country. Such an extension of privileges would lead to closer co-operation between the Indian Joint-Stock Banks and the Presidency Banks, and when once they reap the fruits of a policy of co-operation and co-ordination they would never give it up. It would be an admirable instance of the well-known adage "united we stand, divided we fall." Again the re-discount facilities not only tend to improve the banking standard, but only by the extension of this privilege can the proposed Imperial Bank extend accommodation to the growing needs of traders in India. A trader's bill bearing only one signature, or a "single-name paper" as it is called, is never discounted by the Central Banks. The Bank of France often requires "three names" and the Indian Bank Charter Act of 1876, which still governs the business of the three Presidency Banks, requires "a double-name paper." Hence there should be an intermediary to enable the trader to obtain the needed accommodation and there would be no greater and more secure intermediary than a bank and so the ordinary Joint-stock Banks can act as the best intermediaries for the purpose of discounting and it is only through these banks that these facilities will reach the great mass of traders.

Another noticeable feature of our banking system is the divorce of the note-issuing function from the banking function. It is true that in many countries the "banks of deposit" do not issue notes. But the Central Bank is both "a bank of issue" and "a bank of deposit." Thus all banks of issue happen to be banks of deposit but not all banks of deposit had the coveted privilege of issuing notes before the year
1861, when the Government of India took the note-issue into its own hands. When the banks had the privilege of circulating notes they did not succeed in issuing a considerable amount of notes to the people. The restricted circulation was solely attributable to the following facts. These notes were not legal tender. The public had no faith in the financial stability of these banking institutions. Naturally the people were chary of reposing confidence in the surviving institutions. Again the habit of the people was to circulate metallic coins, and they had a passionate liking for the metallic ringing of these coins and hence the notes could make no headway against the current of popular disfavour. Besides these difficulties the Banks were hedged in by legal restrictions: the notes could not be issued beyond an amount which is three or four times its cash reserve. Labouring under these difficulties, the early note-circulation was not an appreciable one, and there is no wonder that they failed to win popularity as a medium of exchange. James Wilson, who was brought out to organise the finances of India which fell into disorder on account of the Mutiny of 1857, recognized these difficulties and at once planned a scheme for the substitution of Government notes in place of the Bank notes. The year 1861 inaugurated the new era of Government convertible notes or "paper currency" as it has been styled, but a fatal mistake was committed in accepting the Bank Charter Act of England of 1844 as the only sound principle for regulating note-issue, and this was done in spite of the vehement remonstrances of the worthy originator of the scheme, James Wilson. From the year 1861, the Government Notes have come from the Paper Currency Department and all the banks including the Presidency Banks have been forbidden to issue notes. Thus in India we find all the banks are "banks of deposit" only. In England, we find all the banks which existed before 1844 were given the right of issuing notes up to a certain limit; but as a matter of practice these banks do not make full use of this privilege and the Bank of England is given the sole right of issuing it in England, but the issuing department has been separated from the banking department and similar results have been reaped in both cases. The currency system was rendered inelastic and whenever more currency is wanted in times of "moving" the crops or during the abnormal times of a crisis, the currency pinch is acutely felt. The Bank of England supplies "emergency currency" by expanding its book entries for other banks, and these, which treat "cash
in the Bank of England as equivalent to Cash Reserves”, supply the needed accommodation as soon as their “cash at the Bank of England”, increases, but during abnormal times the suspension of Bank Charter Act has been unavoidable. It would have been removed out of the Statute Book long ago, had not the English nation happily hit upon the admirable cheque system, which has bestowed the needed elasticity to her currency system. Unfortunately for India, the inelasticity of her currency system became a permanent feature and no such palliative as an efficient cheque currency has become popular, and to add to this the Independent Treasury system aggravates the whole situation. The Government sweeps away millions of rupees in the busy season into its own coffers, just at a time when they are sorely needed by a stringent money market, and to add to this “the Government maintains a policy of traditional aloofness from the money market.” All these causes have intensified the need for securing more cash during the busy season and various remedies have been proposed. The issuing of inconvertible notes during the busy season, the giving out of loans from the Government balances or the Paper Currency Department, or the privilege of access to the London money market to enable our Presidency Banks to obtain more funds, or the increase of working capital of the banks, have been severally proposed, but has been discussed already as these are mere palliatives and not permanent remedies. The first thing required is that the banking function should be co-ordinated with the note-issuing function just as one finds in France. It should be entrusted to a State Bank, but as this question has been definitely negativised in favour of an amalgamation of three Presidency Banks into an Imperial Bank arising out of their combination, the issuing of notes will not be entrusted to such a private body. Again the placing of note-issue now in the hands of the Imperial Bank is impossible on account of the present inflated state of paper currency. But as time progresses the Imperial Bank should arrive at a definite understanding with the Government as to the duties it has to perform and the note-issue should be handed over to it and it should be regulated according to rules laid down by legislation. Until the Imperial Bank has full power to expand its note-issue in response to trade requirements, the problem of shortage of trade capital during the busy seasons will not be successfully solved. Now it has been proposed that the present amalgamation of the Presidency Banks into an Imperial Bank for India, and the handing
over of the Reserve Treasuries to it, would release more funds for trade purposes and thus the money market would become easy. Again it has been proposed to grant to the Imperial Bank the cherished and long-desired privilege of access to London money market. By these two means and by a third, namely, the increase of working capital, it is confidently hoped that the problem of shortage of trade capital would be solved. But it must be borne in mind that the trade requirements of India are growing every year and the funds of the Government Reserve Treasuries are too slender to meet the actual trade requirements of India and access to the London money market would in pre-war circumstances have been an effective weapon, but now the wastages of war have to be repaired and the little capital that will be available will go to the stabilising of the industrial machine whose gear has gone out of order, and the London money market can ill-spare her funds to meet the requirements of the Indian money market. So dependence on outside factors should be out of the question and so long as the American exchanges are against Great Britain, their first attempt would be diverted to home production and the export of materials so as to correct the unfavourable turn of exchange. It is hopeless under these circumstances to expect any relief from this source. The placing of Treasury balances in the hands of the proposed Imperial Bank and the access to London money market might act as mere lubricants in the present situation. They can never be permanent and radical remedies for the shortage of trade capital. More capital has to be got out from the pockets of the people. The banking habit has to be inculcated. The people should be educated in the economical use of the gold and silver they possess. More of India's raw materials should be converted into finished products, and not only should her idle hoards of millions worth of gold (if they exist) be utilised, but the hoarding of her talents, her intellect, her economic opportunities, and her unlimited resources should be discontinued. No doubt the state issuing of notes has led to their popularity and wide acceptance, but the note-issuing function is a part and parcel of the banking function and as such it ought to be entrusted to a Central Bank responsible to the Government for sound and successful management. All authors of the numerous proposals for a State Bank for India unanimously agree on this point. It is only through the agency of the banks that a note circulation can ever attain thorough development throughout India.
Another noticeable feature is the lack of concentration of reserves. There are two reserves, so to speak, in India. The various banks have their own reserves, and the Government maintains the Independent Treasury System. It has its own reserves and it has to perform various duties. It maintains the cash balances in order to do its round of governmental functions. It maintains the Paper Currency Reserve in order to ensure convertibility of her paper currency. It maintains the Gold Standard Reserve in order to support the gold exchange standard system. But as the Chamberlain Commission has suggested, the paramount duty of the Government is to support the exchange at all times, they conserve all their available portions of stock in order to support the exchange. They have bound themselves definitely to maintain the value of the silver rupee between certain points and prevent all possible fluctuations beyond these points. When the Rupee’s value was fixed at 1s. 4d., the upper and lower limit were fixed at 1s. 4\frac{1}{4}d. and 1s. 3\frac{3}{4}d. respectively, and up till 1917 they have successfully maintained it. On account of rise in the gold value of silver the exchange price of the rupee has been fixed at 2s. 4d. and with every variation in the gold value of silver the exchange price of the rupee is bound to fluctuate, and in fact it has thus altered in the past. But the Government is prepared to maintain the value of the rupee at this point, that is, they are prepared to give gold when it is wanted for the liquidation of an unfavourable trade balance. They are bound on the other hand to supply silver rupees to satisfy the trade requirements of the people. The rise in the price of silver has forced the government to revise the rate from 1s. 4d. to 2s. 4d. but they have not abandoned the Gold Exchange Standard System. They wish to stabilise the system and fix a permanent exchange value of the rupee which will have no connection with the gold value of the silver. Thus the Government has a set duty to perform, and although the banks may be requiring money sorely they would not be in a position to render any great amount of help, for it may jeopardise their own position, besides they will have to perform the various duties that have been mentioned. The placing of the Reserve Treasuries in the hands of the Imperial Bank is contemplated and this would relieve the monetary stringency to a great extent. The handing over of the note-issue (if it is to be done) would lead to the placing of the Paper Currency Reserve in its hands, but this takes some
more time; and the Gold Standard Reserve, it has been said, should not be handed over to the State Bank or to the Imperial Bank. J. M. Keynes has argued that the stability of the Gold-Exchange Standard system would be endangered by such a step, namely, the handing over of the Gold Standard Reserve to the State Bank that would be created. His argument is that the Gold Exchange Standard depends on the strength of the reserve and any unwise dissipation of it by the State Bank would lead to the ruin of the systems itself. But there has been a change of opinion since that time. There is no harm in giving full discretion to the State Bank to use the Gold Standard Reserve provided the Government carefully supervises the work of the said State Bank. Not only will a sound use be made of the Gold Standard Reserve but there is the other advantage that the composition of the Gold Standard Reserve will follow safer and sounder lines than it does now when it is in the hands of the Secretary of the State for India. Again official interference with trade should be discontinued but the Government would have to perform the important duty of carefully and judiciously supervising the State Bank. Everything depends on careful supervision. So there is no necessity for the dissipation of our reserves in so many directions; and for the performance of the various duties a State Bank or for that matter even the coming Imperial Bank can safely be trusted, and the handing over of all the reserves, the Gold Standard Reserve, the Paper Currency Reserve, and the Government cash balances would not be rash or unwise, provided the State Bank or the coming Imperial Bank is under responsible supervision. The handling of such huge sums would be a heavy task but hands would be forthcoming to do this work and "great men will be produced by great times" alone. There is no harm in entrusting these banks with these duties. Only efficient and careful supervision is needed and there is no reason to fear that these funds would be mismanaged. Unless indeed that day arrives, when all the funds are entrusted into the hands of a responsible person, the problem of the shortage of our trade capital will not be successfully solved. It only remains to add that that day is far off and it has taken three quarters of a century roughly to realise the advantages of a Central Bank. Similarly it will take some more years to make this purely private body more or less a quasi-public institution like the Bank of England,
But the Government must not forget its obligation of careful super-
vision.

One more important feature of the Banking system in India, is that the cheque system is not greatly in vogue. It has already been said that the use of the cheque system makes the currency elastic and that it was by the development of cheque currency, or "deposit currency" as it is styled, that the inelasticity of the English system has been remedied. It is true that an increasingly large number of cheques are passing through the Clearing House daily and the educated Indian has now acquired the habit of drawing cheques for large payments. But as in England, the cheques should be drawn for small amounts. Before the war, the cheques in England were always drawn for high figures say £2, £3 or £5, the lowest denomination being £1. When the scarcity of silver sent up its price to an unexpected figure and when the shilling has become actually higher in value as bullion rather than coin, we find that increasing use of paper currency is made even for such low denominations as crowns, and half-crowns. But no such adaptability is to be noticed in our habits, and although the rupee has become very costly to be supplied, the people have not given up embarrassing the Government by its demand for the favourite circulating medium. The demand for rupees has gone on increasing, and so long as the price of silver is prohibitively high and increasing, and so long as the export trade of India is overwhelmingly in her favour, there is no adequate solution to the Government trouble and if the people persist unwisely in demanding coin the Government cannot postpone the minting of rupees. Our people should realise the advan-
tage of cheque currency, the cheapness, ease and economy that arise out of its increasing use. But there is one fact that diminishes the popularity of the cheques. They have to be drawn up in a set form and a single erasure or mistake would lead to its refusal. Again many of the Banks insist that the ten rupees limit should be adhered to, that is, cheques below ten rupees cannot be drawn, and that figure is too high for many of the Indian people whose standard of living is very low. The characteristic of the Indian people, which has distinguished them from times immemorial, is plain living and high thinking, and so long as the standard of living is low, the payments that are to be made, though they be many, do seldom come up to the ten-rupee limit and therefore cheques are not increasingly made use of even by the
educated men. Again they are to be written in English, and as it is an infinitesimally small part of the population that are in a position to draw it up in the English language, the use of the vernacular in the body of the cheque might lead to its greater use. But the cardinal fact that we have to bear in mind is, that India is a land of men of small means and of small transactions and we should not expect that too much work can be done by the nimble cheque.

Another feature common to many of the banking institutions in India is that they have not as yet realised the tremendous advantages that would accrue to them by the light of publicity being thrown on their affairs. If only they parade the facts and figures concerning their rapid growth and institute a comparison of one year's work with the previous year's work, much can be done to attract the deposits of the people. As a matter of fact the balance-sheet of a bank is scarcely intelligible to the ordinary trader. It is clothed in the usual and time-honoured form. It is high time indeed that all the banks gave up this balance-sheet which tells the people next to nothing. They should adopt a "telling" balance-sheet, the figures of which are replete with information and it should be intelligible to every reader. The progress of the bank should be illustrated by facts and figures and unless something tangible like this can be done, the outsider will not be attracted to the bank, much less will he care to deposit his savings therein. The balance-sheet of some of the Indian Joint-Stock Banks like the Central Bank of India is up to the mark in this respect and all the other banks should follow its steps.

Another feature worthy of comment is that the deposit rate is high in India. Many people have been deluded on account of this and some have come to the startling conclusion that "capital is more productive in India than elsewhere," as evidenced by the rate of interest it elicits from borrowers. Nothing is farther from the truth than this statement. The banks are forced to pay high rates in order to attract deposits, and the very fact that even on current accounts of traders these rates are paid, provided that they never fall below a stipulated minimum limit (which is 200 or 300 Rs. in some banks), is an evidence of the keen desire of the banker to attract capital. The starting working capital of many of the banks is very low and they are forced to rely on the deposits and hence they are bound to pay high rates. This fact reacts viciously on their banking standard, because the banks in
order to earn this high rate are forced to take up business which is out of their line and many tempting offers yielding high returns are accepted and this leads to unsound business and so the practice of paying high rates for deposit is to be condemned. A high rate for deposit will lead to bankering after profits while safety is endangered and hence this should be discontinued. The "commercial deposits", the deposits of traders, are practically payable at call and such deposits should not be paid for. In England the deposit rate is always linked with the bank rate and is always 1½% lower than the latter. The country deposit rate seldom exceeds 4% and usually ranges between 2 and 3% and commercial deposits are seldom paid for. The Bank of England does not pay even on fixed deposits but still it is able to attract the deposits of the banks, of the Government, and of all the bigger people. It is the custodian of the Nation's Reserve. The absence of such a dignified bank in India, which possesses as it were a kind of commercial coat of arms, is a deplorable want and all the banks scramble as it were for the deposits. There should be a uniform rate of deposits, and just as the American banks are trying to abolish the deposit rate for "commercial deposits" the Indian banks should also try to follow suit. But the apparent danger, it might be said, is that the depositors would not be encouraged to deposit money. But the commercial class as a whole cannot dispense with their banking account and therefore the fear that commercial deposits would disappear need not to be entertained. Of course a united action on the part of all bankers is what is wanted and the great advantage of such a step is that those Indian Joint-Stock Banks which are forced to pay interest for these deposits need not tout for unsafe business or take up risky ventures to have a rapid turn-over on their capital in order to be in a position to pay these high rates of interest. This might seem a heroic remedy indeed but it is worth trying.

Lastly, the banking crisis of 1913-1915 has taught us that our banking system was deplorably lacking in stability, adaptability and initiative, which are the essential requisites of a sound system. Many of the swadeshi banks have gone down and the remaining have been given such rude shocks as to shake them to their very foundations. The system of rules governing the Presidency Banks, although they have become antiquated, and are more honoured in their breach than observance, have been still retained, and these have contributed much
to the rigidity of the present system. They have hampered the freedom of the Presidency Banks and even though they might entertain a pious wish to render help to trade, yet they are bound down to their routine. The other banks which are doing business have taken the Presidency Banks as their model and banking business now is the same as it was several years back. It has already been remarked that the Clearing House system failed to rise equal to the trying situation of 1913, 1914 and 1915 and everybody tried to take care of himself and no aid was given even to the deserving banks. Little did they dream that such a course of action would involve them all in a common ruin.

In order that India might be proud of her banking system, the Indian Joint-Stock Banks would have to perform in future a straightforward, upright and legitimate banking business. They should bid good-bye to speculation. Not only should they abstain from such a dangerous policy but they should check speculation on the part of the public with the help of bankers' money. They should have a genuine desire to help the public. They should always encourage legitimate business and prudent enterprise. They should be wise in spreading their investments over a large clientele and should never commit the fatal mistake of putting all their eggs in one basket. They should never concentrate their resources into a few concerns. This close identification of their interests with others would lead to their ultimate financial ruin. They should adopt a liberal policy of affording accommodation to the really needy and deserving tradesmen. They should always insist on their customers being treated with utmost courtesy and politeness. They should have polished manners and they should acquire courtesy, grace, politeness, and mild yet firm opinions, in short all those traits of character and behaviour which the westerners style "banking manners." The banks should ultimately realise that their prosperity is the bankers' gain and they should always be acting firmly when the customers expect undue facilities at their hands. The banks should take care to weed out numerous weak clients and refuse to run any risk with those who fail to provide additional satisfactory securities when they require additional accommodation. The banks should rigidly follow the "no risks" system. Over and above all this, the banks should realise that they are not mere dividend-paying machines. This is but to take a base and mundane view of their function. They should realise the lofty mission they have to perform.
They should be alive to the fact that it is they that shape the industrial destiny of the nation. They should be conscious of the fact that they make or mar the material future of their nation. They should not forget Conant’s dictum that they are the "arbiters of the fate of nations." Unless and until the Indian Joint-Stock Banks fully realise this loftier, nobler, and higher conception of banking business, these banks would not be in a position to fulfil their mission and duty to our country.

Lastly some of our banks must be international banks thoroughly organised and do business of an unimpeachable type. Their first duty should be to help their customers to "get a footing" in the foreign markets. Secondly, they have to gather trade information of a highly practical order to be distributed among their customers. Thirdly, they should link their domestic with their foreign customers and thus serve to expand India’s growing export trade and seek a place for marketing her manufactures. They should take up the financing of the domestic traders’ foreign business, i.e. the financing of foreign drafts for the exporters at all times. It is true that the exchange banks are now doing this business but there should be a systematic policy on the part of these banks to help the domestic trader to get into living touch with the foreign market.

It is high time that our banks should learn and imitate the tactics of the German banks. They followed deliberately a "policy of peaceful penetration," and by granting "long credits" to merchants succeeded in thrusting heavy stocks of goods upon the foreigner. It was by this means that they succeeded in expanding German industries. The policy of granting "long credits" might be questioned and it might be true that many of the German banks might have attempted what the English bankers have called "adventuresome banking" but they have succeeded in introducing their home manufactures in many foreign countries which would not have been the case but for their daring policy. But now America even has deliberately undertaken such a policy. The National City Bank of New York has forty-five branch banks in its foreign system and is contemplating an extension of its business in new fields. They have a number of "foreign trade experts" whose sole business is to furnish the domestic exporter with the requisite information of the state of foreign customers, the nature, extent, and volume of their business, and lastly the bank finances the foreign drafts
of the American exporter. The American exporter opens a current account with the bank and turns over all his foreign drafts to this bank for collection by its foreign branches, and this sum is credited to the customer’s account. The customer makes an agreement that the bank should “accept” all the “clean” drafts drawn upon the bank itself up to a certain limit which is determined by the volume of his export trade and thus the domestic trader finances himself for a short period in the most economical manner. This policy has been named the “refinancing by acceptance” and it is by this means the bank encourages the foreign trade business. Our big Joint-Stock Banks should take this policy into consideration and systematically encourage our foreign trade business. The proposed Imperial Bank will be given the privilege of having a branch in London and its customers would derive a lot of convenience by such a step. But it should open its branches in New York and other great foreign financial centres and bring about new banking relationships with these countries. Until then our domestic traders will have no fair chance to push themselves into the foreign trade areas. The financing of our foreign trade and the systematic encouragement of our export business should not be left in the hands of foreign banks (the Exchange Banks) as is the case now. There is no reason why the Indian Joint-Stock Banks should not take up exchange business and finance the domestic trader’s foreign drafts.
PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA, AN ITALIAN NEO-PLATONIST.

Mohini Mohan Bhattacharje, M.A., B.L., P.R.S.

There is in the Uffizi Gallery of Florence a painting by Botticelli representing the birth of Venus. The landscape is the seashore with promontories sloping down to the water's edge. The sea moves in thin lines of foam, curling and white, "sucking in one by one the falling roses." A winged couple symbolizing the sea-breeze hovers above with its hair and the fringes of its dress fluttering gaily. In the fore-ground standing on a dainty white floating shell is the beautiful figure of Venus. The shell is blown away by the emblematic figure, and in the cold light of the sunless dawn and in the quietness of the morning air there is noticeable in the face of the goddess of pleasure a tinge of sorrow "at the thought of the whole long day of love yet to come." A sentiment of melancholy "the wistfulness of exiles" has here been strikingly manifested on the canvas.* This longing for the unattainable, this desire for communion with some mysterious reality is typical of the productions of Botticelli, and this feature of the artist has been attributed to the Revival of Platonism and Neo-Platonism in Italy.

Giovanni Pico della Mirandola was one of the most renowned exponents of this Italian Neo-Platonism. He was a most romantic figure in Italy in the 15th century, and embodied fully the spirit of the Revival of Learning. An uncommon zeal for knowledge furnished the mainspring of his inner life and his dream was to form a synthesis of all learning. He drank deep at the fountains of scholasticism, Neo-Platonism and the Jewish Cabbalism, and once attempted to reconcile Aristotle and Plato. We are here concerned only with his Neo-Platonism and from our point of view his most important production is a treatise called "A Platonic Discourse upon Love."

This Neo-Platonism has to be distinguished from the Christianised Neo-Platonism promulgated by the so-called Dionysius the Areopagite

in his *Celestial Hierarchy* and popularised by Joannes Scotus (Erigena) in the 9th century.* The latter cult blossomed forth into the poetry of Dante, and into the Beatific Vision of the Paradiso. It inspired the *Glorias* and the Dreams of the Saints of the Mediaeval church. But Neo-Platonism which inspired the art of Botticelli and the poetry of Benivieni had a different source and a different history. The Italian Renaissance which implanted it in Italy was nourished by the study of Plato and Plotinus in the original, and Italian Neo-Platonism of the 15th century may be said to have been born in the Medicean palace at Florence.

In 1438 an octogenarian Greek named Georgius Gemistus came to Ferrara on an ecclesiastical mission. He was a student of Zoroastrianism, Neo-Platonism and other systems of ancient Philosophy. He appeared in Florence next year and there at the request of Cosimo de' Medici wrote a treatise contrasting the rival systems of Plato and Aristotle. True to the spirit of the coming Age, and of the great movement that was soon to sweep over Europe, but against the whole trend of contemporary opinion, he gave preference to Plato over the Stagirite. This heterodoxy roused a prolonged controversy among the scholars in Italy, but the seeds which Gemistus had sown bore fruit in the mind of Cosimo de' Medici, the man who paved the way for Platonic studies in Italy during the Renaissance, and to whom the Revival of Learning owed much of its force and success. He conceived the grand idea of making Florence the centre of Platonic studies, and created the Platonic Academy of Florence on the model of that which had existed in Athens,† The services of one of the most reputed scholars of the Age were available to him, and he employed Marsilio Ficinus to produce, on behalf of the Academy, a complete Latin translation of Plato's Dialogues—the first step towards popularising the Attic Moses to Europe after the Dark Ages. The translation of Plato was finished in 1479, when Ficinus undertook the translation of Plotinus. But Ficinus was not simply the translator—he was the interpreter and commentator as well. The title of his version of the Symposium (*Commentarium in Convivium*) indicates the nature of the work he did. Ficinus' work was long recognized as the handbook of Platonism in Europe and his elucidations of Plato and Plotinus as the most authoritative exposition of their philosophy. In fact, to the literate people of the Renaissance epoch Ficinus was the

* Cambridge History of English Literature, Vol III.
† Gardner, Introduction to Pico.
only source of information about these philosophers who were seldom read in the original, and Platonism meant only the glosses on their works by Ficinus. Thus was brought about the Revival of Platonism in Italy and in Europe which, till then, knew nothing of Plato except his name (only a Latin translation of the Timaeus was known to some people of the Dark Ages) and which had enthroned Aristotle as its master.

The Platonism of Ficinus, however, was not the pure, unalloyed creed of the Greek philosopher as found in his Dialogues and in the Republic. It was largely mixed up with other fanciful pseudo-philosophical ideas, mystic dogmas taken from the Jewish lore and with the Neo-Platonism of Plotinus. Throughout, however, Ficinus aimed at showing that Platonism or Neo-Platonism was consistent with the Christian doctrine. The three entities of Plotinus were identified with the Christian Trinity * and the mystic communion with the One or Good was explained as the Beatific Vision. It was of this revived Neo-Platonism, which was raised to the dignity of a Religion in Italy in the 15th century, that Pico was to be a distinguished Apostle.

Pico early came in touch with the Academy of Florence of which Ficinus was an ornament. He was first in Florence in 1479 when Ficinus had just finished his translation of Plato. The varied learning, the high intellectual aspirations and the romantic disposition of this young man attracted the attention of Lorenzo de' Medici, and opened to him the gateway to the highly cultured society of Florence. He aroused the admiration of men like Machiavelli, Poliziano and Savonarola. In Florence he imbibed fully the spirit of Neo-Platonism and other systems of mystic philosophy, and it was at a social gathering at the Medicean palace that he contracted the friendship of Girolamo Benivieni, which led in a few years to the production of his Neo-Platonic treatise on Love. When Pico wrote, the Neo-Platonism of Ficinus had gained wide currency in Italy and his theories of Beauty and Love had become the common talk in its polished circles. Benivieni whose sonnet furnished Pico with the occasion of writing his treatise, stated explicitly that it was "an attempt to sum up in a few verses what Marsilio Ficinus had described at length in his commentary upon the Symposium of Plato". † It is therefore natural to suppose that Pico had only

* Ficinus, Commentary on the Enneads. † Gardner, Introduction.
drawn upon Ficinus' commentaries. But Pico never mentions Ficinus in his Discourse, though allusions to Proclus, Porphyrius, Plotinus and other philosophers are common. The resemblance between Pico and Ficinus, however, is obvious, and whether Pico borrowed directly from Ficinus' pages or not, he must have become familiar with his theories in the learned circles and social gatherings of Florence, especially in the Academy. There is clearly a difference between Pico and Ficinus in their manner of handling their subject. The latter, as noted above, wrote as an annotator; he commented on the Symposium, passage by passage, and his method with regard to the other dialogues of Plato and the Enneads was the same. His remarks though illuminating at times and very likely to gain wide circulation as catchwords show little attempt at any systematic arrangement. Pico on the other hand set himself to the task of formulating a consistent philosophy of Love and Beauty, tracing its creeds as far back as Plato and Plotinus.

A brief survey of Pico's treatise on Love will reveal the trend of his ideas, his mysticism and his debt to Plato and Plotinus. As is well known, Plotinus divided existence into three principles—Soul, Intellect or Nous, and the One or Good. The soul is generated from, or exists by reason of, the Intellect and the Intellect is similarly is related to the One. "The Soul is the reason of the intellect and a certain energy of it, just as intellect of that first God who is beyond intellect. But the reason of soul is indeed obscure. For as it is the image of intellect, on this account it is necessary that it should look to intellect. After the same manner also, it is necessary that intellect should look to the highest God, in order that it may be intellect." *

This trichotomy is to be observed in Pico also, though in a different garb. According to him every thing has a threefold being,—Causal, Formal, and Participated. "In the sun there is no heat, that being but an elementary quality, not of celestial nature. Yet is the sun the cause and fountain of all heat. Fire is hot by nature and its proper form: Wood is not hot of itself, yet is capable of receiving that quality by Fire. Thus hath heat its causal being in the Sun, its formal in the Fire, its participated in the Fuel." On this principle divine excellence or spirit or Divinity has also a threefold being, i.e., it has three different sorts of existence under three different conditions. "Above...is God

* Plotinus, Enneades, V. i, trans. by Taylor.
himself. . . . in whom Divinity hath a causal being from whom proceeding to Angels it hath a formal being, and thence is derived into the rational soul by participation of their lustre: below which no nature can assume the title of Divine.” * ‘Ideas have their causal being in God, their formal in the first Mind, their participated in the rational soul. In God they are not, but produced by him in the Angelick nature, through this communicated to the soul.’ The soul has two functions—sensitive and rational, as it is itself composed of sense and reason. Intellect as symbolised by the Mind or Angel is purely rational without any taint of sense, while divinity in God transcends even Reason. The soul is in man the battle-ground of appetitive and rational faculties, and the former very often overcome the latter whose function is thereon suspended. But the Intellect or the Mind is above appointment and always contemplates the affluence of Divinity on itself.

The origin of Beauty is God who imparts it to other creatures: The first Mind or the Angelic Nature receives its beauty from God and in its turn communicates it to soul which again communicates it to material objects or body. Beauty, therefore, is but another name of, or is identical with, the Idea or Divinity, which issuing out of its primal source informs everything else.

Again, Beauty, according to Pico, is also a species of good and desire is an inclination to real or apparent good. “As there are diverse kinds of goods, so of desire.” The highest good which is at the root of other kinds of good is Divine Beauty, the next is the beauty of Intellect and the last in the scale is physical beauty. All creatures want to participate in divinity and they “have a particular perfection by participation of the divine goodness. This is their end, including that degree of felicity whereof they are capable; to which centre they tend. This desire we call natural: a great testimony of divine Providence, by which they are unwittingly directed to their mark. With this all creatures desire God, as being the original good imprinted and participated in every particular. This is in every Nature, as more or less capable, addressed to ends more or less noble: yet is the ultimate end of all the same, to enjoy God, as far as they may.” † Similarly Plotinus says, “Everything desires its generator. This also it loves, and especially when that which is generated and the generator are alone.” ‡

* Pico, Platonic Discourse upon Love, Bk. I, Sec. ii.
† Pico, Bk. II. Sec. i.  ‡ Enneads, V. i.
The desire of Beauty or Good is Love, and as there are various grades of Beauty so there are various kinds of Love. "As from God Ideas descend into the Angelick Minde, by which the love of Intellectual Beauty is begot in her, called Divine Love, so the same ideas descend from the Angelick Minde into the rational soul so much the more imperfect in her, as she wants of Angelical Perfection. From these springs Humane Love." But there is a lower type of love called Vulgar love which is attached to gross matter and merely desires contact with it. It is characteristic of beasts or "souls immerst in matter, and overcome by it or at least hindered by perturbations and passions." Human love in Pico has two types. It loves not matter but sensible beauty separated from it; it is also capable of rising superior to the impressions of sense altogether, and then human love is gradually transformed into Celestial Love. The soul is changed into the Intellect, and is finally merged in its primal source, God. This last stage is called Ecstasy of which Plotinus is said to have had personal experience. "As when the Ideas descend into the Minde, there ariseth a desire of enjoying that from whence this Ideal Beauty comes, so when the species of sensible beauty flow into the eye, there springs a twofold Appetite of union with that whence this Beauty is derived, one sensual, the other rational; the Principles of Bestial and Human Love. If we follow sense, we judge the Body wherein we behold this Beauty to be its fountain.... This is the love of irrational creatures. But Reason knows that the body is so far from being its original, that it is destructive to it, and the more it is severed from the Body, the more it enjoys its own Nature and Dignity; we must not fix with the species of sense, in the body, but refine that species from all relics of corporeal infection. And because man may be understood by the Rational soul, either considered apart, or in its union to the body; in the first sense, Humane Love is the image of the celestial; in the second, Desire of sensible Beauty; this being by the soul abstracted from matter, and made intellectual. The greater part of men reach no higher than this: others more perfect, remembering that more perfect beauty which the soul beheld, are inflamed with an incredible desire of reviewing it, in pursuit whereof they separate themselves as much as possible from the body, of which the Soul (returning to its first Dignity) becomes absolute mistress. This is the image of Celestial Love by which man ariseth from one perfection to another till his soul (wholly united to the Intellect) is made an
Angel. Purged from material dross and transformed into spiritual flame by this Divine Power, he mounts up to the intelligible Heaven, and happily rests in his Father's bosom." *

This theory of Love which sublimates the earthly passion into a desire for immersion in the Primal Being, which regards mortal love as but a stepping stone to divine Love, is peculiar to Platonic and Neo-Platonic systems of Philosophy. The impulse to ascent from the lower to the higher stage is furnished by a dim apprehension of the superior charm and felicity of the latter. This dim apprehension is like the momentary glimpse of the "vague brightness" of the beauty of the beloved—it is like a feeble echo of her sweet voice borne on a fragrant breeze from a distance. It kindles an insatiable desire of close communion,—of complete realization of Divine Love. But this is attended with melancholy and despair at the thought of the long interval that has to elapse, the toil that has to be undergone, the painful preparation that has to be made before the consummation is reached. This sentiment, complex yet beautiful, is finely expressed in Benivieni's sonnet and it is this which furnished the inspiration to Botticelli when he painted the rise of Venus from the sea.

It has been mentioned that beauty like love has more than one type in Pico—the lowest type being sensible beauty and the highest the beauty of God. This classification is very common in ancient Philosophy and is to be met with even in Plato. But at the same time attempts have always been made to secure a gradual approach to the Ideal, and a progressive ascent to the highest and most refined plane of Beauty through distinct and successive steps has been recommended by many. Diotima in a well-known passage in the Symposium explains how the soul rises from an apprehension of the lowest form of Beauty to the highest through successive stages. Benivieni's Hymn, too, describes the upward journey of the soul through different stages; but Pico's commentary on stanzas 6, 7 and 8 of Benivieni's Hymn definitely enumerates these stages as six, and rigidly defines the nature and character of each of them. He shows how each is finer and more spiritual than the one just below it, and says:—

"From Material Beauty we ascend to the first Fountain by Six Degrees: the Soul through the sight represents to herself the Beauty of

* Pico, Bk. II, Sec. xx.
some particular Person, inclines to it, is pleased with it, and while she rests here, is in the first, the most imperfect material degree. 2. She reforms by her imagination the Image she hath received, making it more perfect as more spiritual; and separating it from Matter, brings it a little nearer Ideal Beauty. 3. By the light of the agent Intellect abstracting this Form from all singularity, she considers the Universal Nature of Corporeal Beauty by itself: this is the highest degree the Soul can reach whilst she goes no further than Sense. 4. Reflecting upon her own Operation, the knowledge of Universal Beauty, and considering that everything founded in Matter is particular, she concludes this universality proceeds not from the outward Object, but her Intrinsecal Power: and reasons thus: If in the dimme Glasse of Material Phantasmes this Beauty is represented by virtue of my Light, it follows that, beholding it in the clear Mirrour of my substance devested of those clouds, it will appear more perspicuous: thus turning into her self, she findes the Image of Ideal Beauty communicated to her by the Intellect, the Object of Celestiall Love. 5. She ascends from this Idea in her self, to the place where Celestial Venus is, in her proper form: Who in fullness of her Beauty not being comprehensible, by any particular Intellect, she, as much as in her lies, endeavours to be united to the first Minde, the chiefest of Creatures, and general Habitation of Ideal Beauty. Obtaining this, she terminates, and fixeth her journey; this is the Sixth and last degree."* Beauty of one woman, idealised beauty of the same, beauty of womankind or womanly charm in general, beauty as part of one's own mind, universal intellectual beauty and beauty of God—these are the six stages of Pico. A similar gradation of beauty is to be noticed in Castiglione who flourished in Italy just after Pico.

Definition and analysis of Beauty occupy a good deal of space in Pico and exercise his ingenuity considerably. Like Plotinus and Ficinus he propounds a system of Æsthetics in support of his theory of Love. Pico says that beauty depends not only on form and symmetry but on an inexplicable element which he terms gracefulness. "Corporeal beauty implies first the material disposition of the Body, consisting of quantity in the proportion and distance of parts, of quality in figure and colour: secondly a certain quality which cannot be exprest by any

* Pico, *Platonic Discourse upon Love*, Bk. III.
term better than Gracefulness, shining in all that is fair. That is properly Venus, Beauty which kindles the fire of Love in Mankinde: they who affirm it results from the disposition of the Body, the sight, figure and colour of features, are easily confuted by experience. We see many persons exact, and unaccusable in every part, destitute of this grace, and comeliness; others lesse perfect in those particular conditions, excellently graceful, and comely; thus Catullus,

Many think Quintia beauteous, fair and tall.
And strait she is, a part I grant her all,
But altogether beauteous I deny;
For not one grace doth that large shape supply.

He grants her perfection of quality, figure, and quantity, yet not allows her handsome, as wanting this grace. This then must by consequence be ascribed to the soul; which when perfect and lucid, transfuseth even into the Body some beams of its splendour." Thus beauty is proved to be a quality of the soul which imparts it to the body.

Pico explains at length the process by which Beauty is imparted to human body. According to him God scatters souls on the planets, "some in the moon, others in other planets and stars." The nature of the soul varies according to the planet on which it is cast. Says Pico, "Platonists affirm some souls are of the nature of Saturn, others of Jupiter or some other planet; meaning, one soul hath more conformity in its Nature with the soul of the Heaven of Saturn than with that of Jupiter and so on the contrary." The souls come down from the planets and are linked to matter to which they impart their own beauty as well as their nature. From the look of a man it is thus possible to determine his temper and his morals. "Many imagine the rational soul descending from her star, in her "Vehiculum coeleste" of herself from the Body, to which by that Medium she is united. Our Author upon these grounds supposeth, that into the 'Vehiculum' of the soul, by her endued with Power to form the Body, is infused from her star a particular formative virtue, distinct according to that star; thus the aspect of one is saturnine, of another jovial, etc. In their books we reade the nature of their souls."*

The soul being the cause of physical beauty, the question arises why ugly persons are good at heart, why good and beautiful souls are lodged in loathsome bodies. Pico's reply is that matter is not always

* Pico, Commentary on Stanzas vi, vii, viii.
subject to the plastic influence of spirit. When the souls coming down in their *vehiculum coeleste* are linked to material bodies, they try to fashion them in their own way and impart to them commensurate forms. Where the formative action of the souls is baffled by the extreme grossness of matter, we find deformed creatures, but similar souls if fortune smiles on them, may be clothed in beautiful forms. Pico says on this point: "Because inferior matter is not ever obedient to the stamp, the virtue of the soul is not always equally exprest in the visible effigies; hence it happens that two of the same nature are unlike; the matter whereof the one consists, being less disposed to receive that figure than the other; what in that is compleat is in this imperfect." Souls that descend in a *vehiculum coeleste* from the same planet have the same nature, saturnine, jovial or of any other kind. Hence though their physical frames may look totally different, their spiritual kinship furnishes a bond of attraction. True love is possible between such souls only. Pico says, "It happens that two of the same nature are unlike; the matter whereof the one consists, being lesse disposed to receive that figure than the other, what in that is compleat is in this imperfect; our Author infers that the figures of the two bodies being formed by virtue of the same star, this conformity begets Love."

Quaint and fanciful as the ideas of Pico may now appear to be, they appealed strongly to the Renaissance minds and furnished suggestions and inspiration to the most cultured spirits of the day. The Cortegian, sometimes called the Bible of the Renaissance courtier, is manifestly indebted to the ideas on Love and Beauty as found in Pico. The orations and discussions on Love in Italian Courtesy-books like Bembo's *Gli Asolani*, Guazzo's *Civil Conversation*, Annibale Romei's *Discorsi*, reflect the same conceptions.* The Neo-Platonism of Pico can be traced in men so different in their temperament, outlook and intellectual activity as the sage, contemplative, dreamy English poet Spenser and the fiery, iconoclastic Nolan Philosopher Giordano Bruno who was burnt at the stake.†

* *Modern Language Review*, Vol. V.  
† O. Elton, *Modern Studies.*
CUSTOMS AND TRANSIT DUTIES IN THE MADRAS PRESIDENCY DURING EARLY BRITISH RULE.

JITENDRA PROSAD NIYOGI, M.A.

The earliest record in the Madras Custom House relating to the collection of sea customs dates from 1786 although such duties began to be collected there more than 140 years before (Manual of the Administration of the Madras Presidency, Vol. I, p. 261). In fact this right of levying sea customs first accrued to the East India Company, when Francis Day sailed down the Coromandel coast from Armagon and obtained in 1639 from the Naik Dāmarla Venkatadri Naidoo, the ruler of the Coromandel coast from Pulicut to San Thomé, the grant of the town of Madraspatam together with several other privileges.

This grant which secured to the English their first territorial possession in India, allowed the Company to levy import and export duties on all goods brought into the town of Madras, the Naik receiving half the amount of such duties as were paid by the non-residents of Madras. On goods bought or sold in the Naik’s territories the Company had to pay half the rates of duty charged to other merchants. The Company’s imports and exports at Madras, as well as the provisions bought in the Naik’s territories for their fort and ships, were entirely duty free.

The English were not slow to devise measures for obtaining an extension of their privileges. In 1642 they entertained the Naik on board one of their ships, loaded him with pishcāsh (presents), as a result of which the Naik exempted them from paying any duty at all in his country (Love-Vestiges of Old Madras, Vol. I, p. 17, Letter to Bantam despatched by Cogan, Greenhill and Browne, p. 42). These privileges were confirmed by Sri Ranga Rayal, the then Raja of Chandragiri who as the representative of the ancient house of Vijayanagar, claimed sovereignty over all the local naiks, and when the house of Vijayanagar was succeeded by that of Golconda, the latter confirmed the Company in their rights and privileges. In 1658 the Nabob of Golconda transferred his interest in the town and his share of half its customs revenue
for a fixed sum of 380 pagodas (pagoda valued at 9 shillings), which came to be known as the Town Rent. The Nabob four years later refused to accept the sum as he considered it quite inadequate and insisted on his right to post a Havildar at Madras to check the customs receipts. This claim was strenuously resisted by successive Agents, and as a result was finally abandoned by him in 1672. It was, however, stipulated at the time that the Town Rent payable to the Nabob should be raised to 1,200 pagodas per annum. In return for this increased payment he confirmed the old privileges enjoyed by the Company and assured them that the said town should "remain wholly rented for ever under the English, so long that the Sun and Moon endureth, and so they shall perpetually enjoy it." In one respect the Nabob extended their privileges, for a clause was inserted in the coule (grant) similar to the Most Favoured Nation clause of modern commercial treaties. This clause promised to extend to the English, "who have always been so good and peaceable a nation," whatever privileges the Nabob might confer on other nations.

This arrangement with the Nabob regarding the payment of a fixed sum in lieu of his half-share in the customs of the town of Madras was satisfactory to both parties. To the Nabob it secured a fixed revenue, whilst the English were freed from the vexatious interferences which the posting of the Nabob’s Havildar would have meant (Bruce’s Annals, Vol. II, p. 307).

But while the Company was engaged in placing their acquired privileges on a firm footing, their trading activities were hampered by the predominant naval power of the Dutch, the war between Vijapur and Golconda, and the depredations committed by the local chiefs. All these made it difficult for them to sell European goods as also to provide for the requisite amount of cotton cloth required for their annual investment. Even when the goods were procured, their transit to Madras became hazardous. The privileges confirmed by the Nabob of Golconda were set at defiance by the local chiefs, and when Sir Edward Winter, the Agent (1662-1665), remonstrated with one of the local chiefs against the levy of arbitrary transit duties, the latter is said to have replied that "when the English teeth and horn grew, he would then free them from the duty" (Bruce, Vol. II, p. 150). To crown all even the Nabob refused in 1676 to observe the old coule unless he was "pishcashed" with 1,000 yards of broadcloth. In alarm the author-
ities at Fort St. George held a consultation and passed the following resolution: "We having wrote up about and yet got no remedy and still in danger to have all trading for calicoes, etc. interdicted, as well as corn and paddy which hath now been stopped these several months, and what other prejudice or extremity they can bethink themselves of, and we having long considered the same and finding no other remedy the Hon. Company orders no making war with them, nor indeed having no force wherewith all but requiring the things, etc., . . . . we enorder our said Bramany to do what he can to content His Highness as far as 600 yards of Broadcloth and what needful gratuities to the great people about him." (Diary and Consultation Book, 1672-78). This present seems to have settled the matter.

In 1675 Streynsham Master was sent out to India as Agent, but to act as supervisor of the Company's affairs on the Coromandel coast and the Bay of Bengal and Second in Council at Fort St. George until the expiration of the term of office of Sir William Langhorn, the then Agent. The commissions and instructions issued to him at the time of his appointment are interesting as throwing a light on the views of the Directors as regards the levy of customs duties. Among other things he was instructed

(1) "to countenance and encourage all merchants that shall come there to trade from other parts of India by permitting them a free markeft and a civil treatment, they paying the customes and dutyes established";

(2) "to consider whether the trade of our said town may not be further advanced by Lesning the customs and yet the revenue maintayned and encreased by Laying some small or moderate imposition of (sic) Liquors, Tobacco or other commoditys on the Consumption or otherwaies so as may not be burdensome to the People" (Streynsham Master's Diaries, 1675-80).

Thus it would appear that at this time the duties were pure revenue duties, and it was with the object of increasing the revenue that Indian merchants were encouraged to settle in Madras by duties of a low and non-discriminatory character (Diary and Consultation Book, Consulation, 9th July, 1688). This would be further apparent on a reference to the instructions issued to the Governor of Madras on several other occasions. Thus in 1680 Gyfford was sent with instructions from England to increase the revenue by lowering customs (Bruce, Vol. II,
Again in 1687 the court issued instructions to defray the charges by a tax on the inhabitants and a 5 p.c. customs duty.

In obedience to the instructions of the Directors, Master set to work to reorganize the Company’s affairs, but it is doubtful whether he complied with the instruction regarding the lowering of customs, for we find the Indian merchants complaining to his successor that Mr. Master had “imposed a tax on Arrack and upon Paddy and causing us to pay for cleansing streets, also increasing the Choultry custom on goods imported and exported” (Talboys Wheeler, Early Records of British India, p. 76 et seq.). It is however probable that the state of the finance did not permit of any such reduction being made, for even his successor had to take recourse to new taxes.

The Company’s chief merchant who provided all the cloth for the home investment and who engaged to take a portion of the European imports, enjoyed from the very beginning the privilege of paying half the customs on all imports and exports. This privilege, small though it was, was a source of great annoyance to the Directors. In one of their despatches to Fort St. George they observe: “As to the customs you do not answer us as you ought, but only plead for Verona (the chief merchant). Could you make it appear that we have any advantage by his paying less customs than others do, you had said something, but the truth is you are so much concerned to defend and maintain his interest that you neglect to give us the satisfaction that we require” (Despatches from England 1670-77). The merchant, it seems, had discontinued the payment of even this half customs on imports and exports by sea, and had for some time paid his share of customs on imports by land only. It appears from the Consultations of the 27th November, 1678, that from that time onward “he voluntarily offered to pay to the Company” the usual half customs on all imports and exports whether by sea or land. (Notes and Extracts from Govt. Records, 1670-79). A reference to Streynsham Master’s Diaries of the same time would, however, show that this agreement was not so voluntary as the Consultations suggest. Streynsham Master observes: “I brought Verona to pay half custome outward and to pay as much custome for what he brought in by land (which heretofore but paid half so much) as by the account appears which as Verona says 1,000 pagodas per annum to his loss and the Company’s gain. Verona and his partners submitted to the said Regulation and
Reproofe ... They were presented with a horse and 9 guns fired." (Streynsham Master's Diaries, pp. 73-74). On a subsequent occasion a difference having arisen between the merchant and Streynsham Master, the privilege of paying half customs was taken away. Master's successor Gyfford, however, argued that if the merchants paid whole customs "they must make the Company pay so much more for their cloth or bring it worse than muster (sample)." He therefore restored to the merchant the old privilege. (D. and C. B. 1682, p. 2).

In 1678 Fort St. George which was the only territorial possession of the Company at the time yielded a total revenue of 7,200 pagodas. Sea and land customs contributed 2,300 pagodas besides a small sum of 34 pagodas contributed by what was called "Petty Land Customs." (Notes and Extracts from Gouv. Records, 1670-79). These "Petty Land Customs on all grains and other goods that are not imported or exported by sea" were farmed out in June 1680 to Mr. Ralph Ord, the schoolmaster at Fort St. George, the man who finding "teaching of children much prejudicial to his health" subsequently entered the Company's civil service. (Streynsham Master's Diaries, Vol. II, p. 196).* It is not evident from the records wherein the "Petty Land Customs" differed from "Land Customs," but this at any rate is clear, that the two heads of revenue were different as the following extract from the Book of Accounts for January 1681 submitted by Mr. Bigrig, the Customer, would show:—

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<td>Amount of Sea and Land Customs ... 44</td>
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<td>Farm of Petty Land Customs to Ralph Ord and Clemt. King at pgs.</td>
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<td>600 p. an ½ now due</td>
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(D. and C. B. Cons., 23rd February, 1681).

The charges of Fort St. George were nearly double the revenues of the time (Notes and Extracts, 1670-79). The Directors in England naturally became anxious to make the settlement a self-sufficing one and accordingly issued instructions in 1682 and 1683 to impose local taxes for the purpose of raising a revenue sufficient to meet the entire

* It was stipulated at the time that should the yield be less than 600 pagodas per annum, the sum for which the revenues were farmed out, the Agent and Council would compensate the school-master.
"constant charge of the place" and "full charge of all repairs and fortifications" (Talboys Wheeler, *Early Records*, p. 26).

When the Agent tried to impose local taxes in accordance with these instructions the people of Madras objected to be taxed any further on the ground that they paid customs besides several other taxes. The Directors, however, dismissed this objection as frivolous on the ground that the payment of customs related only to the security enjoyed by the inhabitants under the guns of the fort and did not exempt them from the payment of taxes on consumption, "specially when they lived easier under the English Government than under any government in the known part of the world." (Talboys Wheeler, *Early Records*).

In 1649 the duty on goods imported and exported by sea and land was 4½ p.c. It was lowered in 1684 to 3 p.c. Besides this duty importers and exporters had to pay small fees for the maintenance of the Peddanaik (chief watchman) and the Kanakapillai (the accountant), two functionaries whose offices were hereditary and whom the Company had recognised since their first establishment at Fort St. George (*Love-Vestiges of Old Madras*, Vol. I, p. 417). These fees were at the rate of ⅕ p.c. on Christians, and ¼ p.c. on Hindus and Mahommedans payable on all imports and exports by sea. On imports and exports by land the rates were two fanams and one fanam per pagoda, the former payable by Hindus and Mahommedans, the latter by Christians. The chief watchman received another allowance which was paid in kind, on every occasion when grain was brought into the Paddy Banksall (from Tamil pandakasali = a storehouse. *Love-Vestiges*, Vol. I, p. 141, note 9). The allowance was at the following rate, viz. "for every oxload of paddy ¼ measure, for small oxload ⅛ measure." *(D. and C. B.,* 1672, 13th August).

The tariff was revised in 1688 by Mr. Elihu Yale (1687-92) who laid down elaborate rules for the payment of the sea and land customs. The English were to pay 4 p.c. on the value of all goods imported and exported (jewellery and treasure excepted) whilst all other merchants inclusive of the French, the Dutch, the Portugese and the Indians were to pay 6 p.c. Goods which once paid the above duties were free to be sent up the country if despatched within a year, with this reservation however, that if an English merchant sold his wares to any foreign merchant in Madras, the latter must pay an additional land customs of 2 p.c. before he was allowed to send out his goods *(D. and C. B.,* Cons.,
5th April, 1688). The Directors strongly disapproved of the policy of discrimination and "notwithstanding the considerations of their great charge of fortifying, maintaining and defending the garrison place and privileges" ordered that as a mark of "tender affection and generous indulgence to all their inhabitants" a uniform rate of 5 p.c. to be paid by all "for the further encouragement of the people and trade" (D. and C. B., Cons., 12th June, 1688). Besides the customs duty importers had to pay fees to customs house officers, the warehouse keeper and an anchorage duty. The latter was levied on all vessels and boats according to the following scale:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pagodas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All English ships of 200 tons or upwards</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto under 200 tons</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Country ships of 100 tons upwards</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto under 100 tons</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sloops and Ketches</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All great boats</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All small boats</td>
<td>½</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Any wilful design to defraud the Company of their customs was punished by the seizure and confiscation of the goods, which were divided equally among the Company, the searcher and "the poor and discoverers of such fraud", the last obviously a periphrasis for informers.

A duty was also levied on the export of slaves. Some idea of the yield from customs duty on slaves may be had from the Sea Customs Account for May 1688:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pags.</th>
<th>F.</th>
<th>C.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sea customs for goods</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slaves</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anchorage</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

etc., etc.

This practice of exporting slaves was prohibited in 1688 "the custome by the exportation of slaves here being now of little advantage to the Rt. Hon. Company by their scarcity and having brought great complaints from the country government for the loss of their servants spirited and stolen from them" (D. and C. B., 14th May, 1688).

During Mr. Yale’s governorship (1687-92) the light of the house of Golconda was finally extinguished by the Moghuls. The only way in which this transference of sovereignty affected the Company was that the
Town Rent of 1,200 pagodas was now paid to the Moguls and when the Deccan became practically independent under Chinkleech Khan Nizam-ul-Mulk the rent continued to be paid to the ruler of the Carnatic. And although the Court of Directors had instructed their servants in India that “Madras should assume the rank of an independent power” and cease paying the town rent if the Nabob of Golconda refused to comply with certain requests, it was not before the middle of the 18th century that the Company got rid of this last vestige of dependence on the Indian powers. (Bruce, Vol. II, p. 589).

It was also during Mr. Yale’s tenure of office that the Company obtained Fort St. David, their second territorial possession in the present Madras Presidency. This place produced “large quantities of longcloth white, blue or dyed”, also “ginghams, succatoons and steal”; and so highly important was the place as a trading centre that Hamilton declared that but for it Ft. St. George would make but a small figure in trade (Hamilton, A New Account of the East Indies, p. 353). Soon after its acquisition Sir John Goldesborough, Commissary General for the East India Company, visited it and placed its finance on a satisfactory basis. The duties on imports and exports by sea and land were fixed at the rates existing in Madras. The right to retail tobacco and betel leaf was farmed out just as it had already been done at Madras.*

These farms yielded a considerable revenue at the time. In Madras it yielded about 8,000 pags in 1711, and at Fort St. David the yield was 1,200 pags in 1741. In the latter settlement the practice of farming out these commodities was temporarily discontinued as an experiment with the object of cheapening them and encouraging weavers to settle there, but as the abolition did not have the desired effect, the old system was re-established in 1741. (Fort St. David Consultations, 20th October, 1741.

Throughout the greater part of the 18th century the rate of duty remained practically unchanged, being 5 p.c. on imports by sea and

* Mr. Love however points out (Vestiges of Old Madras, Vol. II, p. 42) that the cultivation of betel, tobacco and ganja remained in the hands of the Company until 1700 when the sole right was leased to a syndicate of natives for 8,000 pags per annum. This view cannot be reconciled with the contents of a letter from the Braminy at Golconda to Fort St. George, dated the 21st June, 1680:—“Futty Khan hath of late wrote from thence (Ft. St. George) to H.E. the Sharlaskar (the Governor of the Golconda Coast) that Chinnapatam is not now as formerly but is mightily increased and that the English have farmed Bettle and Tobacoo and that they were increasing the Fort.” See Bowrey, Countries Round the Bay of Bengal, p. 167.
2½ p.c. on imports by land. (Lockyer, *Account of the Trade in India*, 1711, p. 9; *Fourth Report of the Secret Committee to Enquire into the Causes of the War in the Carnatic*, 1782). The revenue from these duties in the first decade of the 18th century amounted roughly to 34,000 pagodas per annum as against the insignificant total of 2,300 pagodas in 1678. Comparing these two years we can form some estimate of the remarkable increase of trade which took place within the space of a little over 30 years. The disturbed state of the country that followed the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, and the constant rivalry amongst the claimants to the throne, necessarily meant a general weakening of the control exercised in the outlying parts of the Empire. The Company’s trade was prejudicially affected and in 1712 the Governor and Council wrote to England: "Merchants are discouraged from coming down with their money and diamonds to buy up and carry away our Europe and other goods as formerly, and we cannot see any likelihood of better times till the government is well settled, and some active man employed on the government of these parts." (Letter to the Court of Directors quoted in Talboys Wheeler, *Early Records*).

The trade of private persons must also have been similarly affected. The revenue from customs began to show signs of decay and it was feared that the diminution of trade of which this decline in the revenue was an index, if allowed to continue unchecked would prejudicially affect the other branches as well of the Company’s revenues. Other causes besides this general insecurity were at work which brought about this decline in trade. French, Armenian and Mahommedan merchants who had hitherto traded in English bottoms in Madras, now began to resort in increasing numbers to other settlements where the duties payable were less. Besides this, English merchants, Commanders and Supra-cargo-s raised money from the inhabitants of Madras on what were known as Respondentia Bonds (money raised on the security of ship’s cargo), proceeded to Bengal where they further increased their commitments from persons who were ignorant of their liabilities in Madras. The effect of these operations on the trade of Madras is thus described by the Board of Trade in 1725: "By thrusting into their private adventures greater quantities of goods than the markets where they are bound can possibly consume, they are forced to be in those ports two seasons to dispose of their private effects to the great prejudice of those concerned in the stock and puts a stop to their quick circulation."
order to prevent what the Ft. St. George authorities called these 'clandestine practices' it was resolved to register all transactions in Respondentia Bonds so that people in Bengal might know what were the previous liabilities of persons who proceed there. To induce people to register their transactions it was decreed that all bonds so registered should be given priority over unregistered ones in cases of insolvency (Consultations of 27th January, 1726, in Talboys Wheeler, 'Madras in Olden Times'). In 1737 the trade seems to have recovered from the depression which had set in. Out of a total revenue of 77,000 pagodas of Madras, sea and land customs accounted for more than 53,000 pagodas.

Hostilities between England and France which commenced in 1740 extended to their respective possessions in India, and from this time forward till the final overthrow of the French power in India, the importance of commercial operations is altogether overshadowed by events of a political character. Peace was restored in 1748, but as supporters of the rival claimants to the throne of the Carnatic they again came into collision with each other. As a result of this struggle Muhammad Ali, the English nominee, was placed on throne of the Carnatic with English help. In return for these services, in 1752 the Nabob remitted the town rent of 1200 pagodas which the English had paid for nearly a century as representing the suzerain's share of half the customs revenue of Madras. A peace was patched up in December 1754 between the English and the French. Trade was declared free throughout the Carnatic and in the countries to the northward of the Coromandel coast, the parties obtaining the right to fetch their merchandise from the dependencies of each other and transporting them freely through their jaghirs and territories (art. 8; Aitchison, Vol. X). But hostilities were renewed in 1756 and in the course of the war that followed the French were driven out of the Northern Circirs, this acquisition being confirmed by a farman from Delhi in 1765, at the time when Clive obtained the Dewani of Bengal, Behar and Orissa.

Almost simultaneously with the acquisition of this new territory the Company obtained several trading privileges in the Malabar. By the middle of the 18th century they had obtained the sole monopoly of the pepper trade from the local rajahs, the Kurangot Nayar, the Rajahs of Kadattanad and Kotayam. This right was confirmed and several other commercial privileges were obtained in the same province by a
series of engagements entered into during the years 1758-1761. Thus
the treaty with the Raja of Bednore allowed the English to build a
factory at Onore and to import goods on payment of a duty of 1½ p.c.
(art. 3). All broadcloth, velvet, and silk goods carried inland as far as
Madura paid 2 pagodas customs "for as much as one man could carry."
The Raja of Bringah also granted the monopoly of pepper trade whilst
the Raja of Kadattanad those of pepper, sandalwood, and cardamom
(art. 1). Whilst Malabar was incorporated with the dominions of
Hyder Ally of Mysore he confirmed these privileges by a treaty and a
grant in 1763 and 1766 respectively. The general rate of duty payable
by the English under these conventions, on goods imported at Onore and
Mirjee, was 1½ p.c. except on certain enumerated articles, e.g. horses,
wet and dry dates, sugar, tobacco, on which they paid the prevailing rate
of duty. The Company obtained the right to export annually 300 corge
of rice for use at Tellicherry (in North Malabar) free of the duty called
Adlamy (art. 3). Goods re-exported from Mysore were duty free (art. 5
of the grant, 1766). This friendly intercourse did not last long. A short
and sharp conflict in 1769 was followed by the re-establishment of the
old commercial privileges in 1770 and their confirmation in 1784 after
the conclusion of the Second Mysore War, but from this time onward
the trade relations between the parties ceased entirely and the treaty
regarding the continuance of the old commercial privileges seems to
have been a mere paper transaction. The Committee appointed to take
into consideration the export trade from Great Britain observed in 1792:
"Little sagacity is wanting to discover the impracticability of a com-
mercial intercourse with the Mysore country. The views of an Indian
despot are altogether political, and such has been the extreme jealousy
of the English nation entertained by Tipoo Sultan that during the interval
between the two wars he not only prohibited the introduction of British
manufactures but forbade his subjects to sell us the produce of his own
country." It was not till the establishment of the Hindu Raja in
Mysore in 1799 that commercial relation was resumed with the British
territories. By article 13 of the subsidiary treaty with the Raja of
Mysore the parties "agreed to take into their early consideration the
best means of establishing such a commercial intercourse between their
respective territories as shall be mutually beneficial to subjects of both
governments and to conclude a commercial treaty with as little delay as
possible."
Attempts were similarly made to establish commercial relations with other states, for the purpose of pushing the sale of English goods, especially of metal and woollen goods. The latter commodity was an object of particular solicitude on the part of the Court of Directors. Again and again instructions were issued to the three Presidencies in India to use their utmost endeavours to promote their vent even by selling cheap. (Despatches from England 1670-75. Letters dated the 24th December, 1675 and 12th December, 1677).

In 1786 the Court sent "strong recommendations to all the Presidencies to use every possible endeavour in promoting and extending the manufactures and produce of Great Britain "to call for the best information and assistance that could be obtained and to acquaint the Court of Directors of the result of their endeavours." (Report of the Select Committee appointed, to take into consideration the export trade from Great Britain). But the authorities at Fort St. George could hold out no hopes of any great increase in their sale. The dress of the natives, they declared, was so simple and so little subject to change that no great room existed for pushing the sale of European cloth. The trade with Mysore was stopped in 1792 after the Third Mysore War, so that the Company was obliged to ship the greater part of the woollen goods from India to China. Nor was the prospect of increasing their sale by treaty obligations encouraging. The Board of Trade at Madras with the object of introducing European goods endeavoured to induce the Nizam of Hyderabad to accept them in part payment of the subsidy to which he was entitled under the terms of the treaty of 1768. But as the chances of his acceding to the proposal were very remote, the letter containing the request was not delivered to the Nizam at all. (Letter from Sir John Kennaway at Hyderabad, dated 24th February, 1791, appendix to the Select Committee of the Court of Directors appointed to take into consideration the export trade from Great Britain). It was not before 1802 that a commercial treaty was entered into with the Nizam which secured the transit of the goods of each of the contracting parties on payment of a duty on each side of 5 p.c. The Raja of Travancore by an agreement, dated the 28th January, 1793, agreed to deliver to the Company annually 3,000 candies of pepper at a stipulated price and to receive in part payment the following European goods supplied by the Company:—
2000 stand of arms complete.
100 candies of lead.
300 yards of scarlet broadcloth, superfine.
1,500 yards of ditto, fine.
27,500 ,, , red purpit.
2,000 ,, , blue ,, 
200 ,, , yellow ,, 
500 ,, , green ,, 

The condition of the Company's newly acquired territories was anything but satisfactory. Masulipatam, the most important port of the Northern Circiers and the seat of the first factory of the English on the Coromandel Coast, was a fairly flourishing trade centre in the middle of the 17th century. The place furnished at that time different varieties of longcloth, fine and coarse named sallampores (half pieces of longcloth; see Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai, Vol. VI, p. 167 footnote), betee- laes (veiling), morees, gingham, percollaes, allejae, etc. (Streynsham Master's Diaries II, p. 114). Another author writing about the same time observed: "Metchlepataf affordeth many very good and fine commodities, viz, all sorts of fine collicoes plaine and coloured, more especially fine pallampores (chintz bed covers), quilts, divers sort of chintz curiously flowered which doth much represent flowered satin of curious lively colours" (Bowrey, The Countries Round the Bay of Bengal, 1669-1679). Towards the end of the 18th century the decline which had set in earlier became very pronounced, and it would be no exaggeration to attribute this decline, partly at any rate, to the most oppressive system of levying tolls and duties which prevailed in those parts. The zemin- dars, or their agents, levied in addition to the assessment on land, a duty called the sayer, which was a tax on the transit of every variety of commodity including the necessaries of life. Collected by corrupt and extortionate agents who were guided by no definite principles, these duties proved to be one of the most serious obstacles to trade, there being no limit to the number of chowkis or custom houses which they were entitled to establish. Even the East India Company long before their acquisition of the Northern Circiers had fallen a prey to the prevailing vice. In the Fifth Report on the Select Committee on East Indian affairs it is observed: "The consuming system of oppression had in some instances been aggravated by the Company's government, which when possessed of a few factories with a small extent of territory around them
adopted the measure of placing chowkis or custom stations in the vicinity of each for the purpose of ascertaining the trade within their own limits as well as to afford them a source of revenue." After their acquisition of the Northern Circiers, the Company farmed out the sayer revenue in the Havelli or the demesne or household lands which devolved on them directly as the successors in interest of the Indian administrators. The farm was generally taken by those who rented the lands or by other persons under separate leases.

This practice of farming must have aggravated the defects of the system for it is evident that the larger the number of intermediaries, the larger must have been the collections from the ryots. The farming system was in some cases extended to the import and export duties, but as a general rule the sea customs in the Havelli lands were retained under the direct management of the Company (Fifth Report, Vol. II, pp. 152-153). In the non-Havelli lands the zemindars were left to themselves, and continued their collections as their fancy or their needs dictated, without any attempt at supervision or regulation on the part of the Company.

In a minute of 1793 Mr. White, a member of the Board of Revenue at Fort St. George, noted: "I would wish to appeal to the records which must likewise show that after 25 years' possession undisturbed by any foreign enemy the Company's authority is incompletely established—that no regulation has been introduced for the security of the inhabitants against oppression and not a single improvement proposed worthy of notice." (Fifth Report, Appendix 14.) When a famine broke out in the Northern Circiers in 1790 the zemindars went on with their usual collections even on grain, which the Company imported for the preservation of the lives of the people (Mr. White's minute, Proceedings of the Board of Revenue at Fort St. George, dated the 25th March, 1793, in the Fifth Report). The effect which this system of transit duties produced on the internal and external trade of the Northern Circiers was disastrous. Cotton in particular was heavily taxed, with the natural result of enhancing the price of cotton manufactures which formed the principal branch of the Company's investment. It is no wonder that towards the end of the 18th century Mr. Grant spoke of the muslins of Chicha-cole as rather objects of curiosity...'than considerable in quantity or benefit' (Grant's 'Political Survey of the Northern Circiers', Fifth Report, Vol. III, Appendix 13). As if this iniquitous system of transit duties was
not enough, the zemindars often granted to individuals the exclusive privilege of selling cotton. The weavers had to purchase their raw material at enhanced prices, the cotton manufactures languished, and the internal trade in this branch of the country’s produce was nearly abandoned. (Proceedings of the Board of Revenue at Fort St. George, dated the 28th March, 1793, Mr. White’s minute).

The same state of affairs which the Company had witnessed on their entry into the Northern Circars prevailed in a more or less exaggerated form in the districts ceded by Tipoo Sultan in 1792. Inland chowkis or tolls existed in almost all villages in the province of Malabar, and the poor merchant was not infrequently forced to avoid the direct road and to take to the by-ways to avoid the toll gates (Imperial Gazetteer, Malabar and Ajengo Districts, by Innes and Evans, 1908, p. 360). The Bombay Government which administered the province till its transference to the Madras Presidency in July 1800 entered into a series of engagements with the local Rajahs in 1792, which provided for the abolition of inferior chowkis for the collection of Soonghum or duties and tolls on merchandise carried inland. The only duties which were retained were on the exports by sea or land to or imports from the countries beyond the province of Malabar from Cavay to Cochin, regulated by the Company (see the agreements with the Raja of Kadattanad, Aceen of Palghat, the Nair of Manoor, Raja of Beypoor, the Zamorin of Calicut, Aitchison, Vol. X).

In the Baramahal trade was at a standstill. Tipoo’s possessions in Coimbatore prevented all commercial intercourse with the Malabar country. Trade with Mysore was out of the question whilst that with the Carnatic was prevented by the oppressive system of road duties. It was calculated that at that time tolls were levied in as many as 16 places in the road between Baramahal and Madras. The following tables will give some idea of the burdensome nature of these road duties levied on the different kinds of merchandise in the course of their transit. (Calcutta Review, Vol. XVII, p. 334).
The revenue from these sources described in the records as land customs was farmed out by the Company in the Baramahal and yielded a sum of fifty thousand pagodas out of a total revenue of the district amounting to 511,000 pagodas (The Baramahal Records, Sec. I, Management, Cap. Read’s Report to the Board of Revenue, Fort St. George, dated 10th August 1794). This entire yield of 50,000 pagodas must not however be attributed to the transit duties alone, for the ‘Land Customs’ in the Baramahal included “road duties, taxes on ploughs and horses, and on particular castes.” Regarding these taxes Captain Munro observed—“the last has been in part abolished and ought to be wholly so as well as the first with the exception of one or two which affect our manufactures, but all duties ought wholly to have been taken off cotton” (Letter from Capt. Munro to Capt. Allen, dated 8th June,

* The value of a Pagoda varied between 32 and 35 fanams; Cash was a small coin of account.
1794, *Calcutta Review*, Vol. XVII). It appears that before any action was taken under the regulations passed in 1803 to organize the levy of inland customs in general, those on raw cotton and thread were abolished throughout the Company’s territories in the Madras Presidency (*Extracts of Advises to and from India relative to the cause and progress and successful termination of the war with Tipoo Sultan*, 1800, Capt. MacLeod’s Account, dated the 12th July, 1799).

The condition of the province of Canara which came under British occupation in 1799 was on a par with the rest of the Company’s newly acquired territories. The Principal Collector of Canara observed in 1800: “Honawer once the second town in trade after Mangalore has not a single house and Mangalore itself is greatly decayed” (*Fifth Report*, Vol. III, p. 309). The decay is ascribed to various causes, e.g. successive wars with Mysore, the destruction of towns by Tippo, his prohibition of foreign trade, and lastly his excessive increase of land rent. Immediately after their entry the Company as a preliminary measure reduced the export duty on rice and abolished the inland duties on grain, cattle and sheep, etc., reserving for future action all further regulation of the levy of these duties (Report of the Principal Collector of Canara, dated the 9th November, 1800, *Fifth Report*, Vol. III, p. 315). Bellary, Cuddapa, Anantpur, and Kurnool, the districts ceded in 1800, as also the dominions of the Nabab of Arcot from Nellore to Tinnevelly ceded in 1801, all revealed the same multiplicity of chowkis levied all along the main trade routes at intervals of a few miles with no control either over the rates or over the persons who levied them.

In Tanjore during the early years of British occupation the Sayer revenue was farmed out and fetched in 1800-01 the sum of Rs. 1,86,461. Next year the duty on grain was abolished and this was followed in 1802-3 by the abolition of the whole sayer revenue. But it was revived in 1803-4 in the form of a Town Duty. (*Manual of the Tanjore District*, 1883, by T. Venkataswamy Rao.)

Thus it appears that with the exception of the Malabar, the inland duties by whatever name called, sayer, soongum or chungam, rahadary duties were retained in all the districts as they came under British occupation. In some districts they continued to be collected by the zemindars, in the rest they were farmed out to the highest bidder by the Company.

At one time the Company seriously thought of farming out the sea
customs as well. It was argued that it would check that tendency towards diminution in the revenue which became noticeable about 1776-1777. This decline will be evident from the following table of customs receipts at Fort St. George and its subordinate ports.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sea and River Customs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pagodas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1767-68</td>
<td>40,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1768-69</td>
<td>59,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1769-70</td>
<td>49,769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1770-71</td>
<td>53,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1771-72</td>
<td>57,949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1772-73</td>
<td>59,326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1773-74</td>
<td>50,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1774-75</td>
<td>65,247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1775-76</td>
<td>58,582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1776-77</td>
<td>40,417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1777-78</td>
<td>44,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1778-79</td>
<td>35,592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1779-80</td>
<td>35,336</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In February 1779 the Company issued advertisements for the purpose of farming out the revenue for five years. But the merchants opposed the scheme, nor did the Court of Directors think any change in the method of collection necessary at the time. (Fourth Report from the Committee of Secrecy appointed to enquire into the Causes of the War in the Carnatic, 1782.)

In 1786 the duty on imports by sea at Madras was 5 p.c., levied on the market price of the commodities. But 10 p.c. was deducted from the value of goods imported by Christian merchants, and 20 p.c. from those imported by merchants of any other sect on consideration of their paying small fees to the Peddanaik and the town Kanakpillai and some charitable institutions. In 1789 the duty was reduced as a result of a petition from the merchants who prayed for the reestablishment of the low rate of duties which existed "when they were rented." No records exist enabling us to determine the time when such farming took place. It is only possible to hazard the opinion that it must have been after the year 1782 and before 1786, for it has been already noted that the
Committee which was appointed to enquire into the causes of the war in the Carnatic and which published its report in 1782 did not find the farming system prevalent at the time, nor was it prevalent in 1786.

In 1795 a regulation was passed for the collection of duties at Madras and at all the subordinate ports except Nagore where the duty was fixed at 1 p.c. The rate of duty on imports and exports by sea was $2\frac{1}{2}$ p.c., to be levied in the case of imports from Europe on ships under foreign colours, by adding 60 p.c. to the prime cost, and in the case of China goods by adding 30 p.c. Goods imported from Bengal under certificate were duty free (Colebrook, Supp. Regulation, published on the 12th August, 1791), whilst the produce or manufactures of the Company's possession in the Madras Presidency paid only 1 p.c. Sugar, indigo, raw silk exported on Company's ships, grain of all sorts, brass and copper utensils, iron, lead and salt were exempt from the export duty. In 1800 an additional duty of 1 p.c. was levied on the imports and exports of the Madras Presidency for the purpose of putting its marine establishment on a satisfactory footing. More extensive changes were introduced in 1803 when by a series of regulations the tariff on imports and exports by sea was revised, and what was more important the sayer and inland collections were substituted by a frontier and a Town Duty.

As regards the sea customs, the regulations IX, X and XI of 1803 drew a series of distinctions between (a) the imports at Madras and those at the subordinate ports, (b) exports from Madras and those from the subordinate ports, and (c) transportation in British, Asiatic and American bottoms and that in foreign (other than American) bottoms. Thus goods imported in Madras in British, Asiatic or American vessels paid 6 p.c., while those in foreign vessels paid 8 p.c. The imports in the subordinate ports were exempt unless in foreign bottoms when they paid 8 p.c. As regards exports from Madras in British bottoms all duties were withdrawn, while under similar circumstances those from the subordinate ports were charged with a duty of 6 p.c. Goods exported on foreign bottoms from Madras paid 2 p.c., from the subordinate ports 8 p.c. (see First Report of the Commissioners relative to the Customs and Post Office system of India). It is impossible to discover any motive behind this discrimination as between different places except a desire to encourage the import trade of the subordinate ports and the export trade of Madras.
The question of the collection of sayer had engaged the attention in 1799 of the then Governor-General. In that year in a letter to the Governor in Council at Fort St. George he discussed the expediency or otherwise of abolishing those duties and came to the conclusion that the same arguments which were used in Bengal relative to their resumption and ultimate abolition applied with equal force in the Madras Presidency. In particular he referred to the famine which broke out in the Northern Circir in 1790, and which was aggravated by the existing obstruction to the free transit of grain, and pointed out that the benefits accruing from a settled government and an improved system of land tenure would be but partial if unaccompanied by a removal of these impediments. He accordingly conveyed his sanction to their abolition and asked the Governor of Madras to use his influence to enter into negotiations with the Rajas of Mysore and Tanjore and the Nabab of the Carnatic with a view to their abolition in their respective territories. (Letter from the Governor-General in Council at Bengal dated the 31st December, 1799. See Appendix to the Second Report from the Select Committee on East Indian Affairs, 1811).

Action was taken by the Government in 1803 in accordance with these instructions. The duties were not abolished, but frontier and town duties were substituted in place of the numerous collections under the old system. The frontier duty was a tax on all goods (with the exception of the Company's goods, cotton and cotton thread and several articles of minor importance) imported or exported across the frontier of the Madras territories. The town duty was payable on the same goods imported into Madras or some specified provincial towns or produced or manufactured within their limits. Both the duties were now fixed at 6 p.c. Goods might thus be charged with three separate duties of 6 p.c. each, viz. a frontier duty, a town duty, and an export duty. The theory underlying the imposition of this town duty was that "it would have the effect of bringing the merchants together and establishing regular markets" (Bellarly Dt. Gazetteer, p. 181). But this pious expectation was falsified. The general security of the country rendered it unnecessary for the merchants to resort to towns and incur thereby the additional expense of this town duty. The effect therefore was that merchants and manufacturers avoided the towns and resorted to the villages so that not only were new markets not established, but old ones were deserted. The revenue from this source began to fall off as will
be evident from the table of sea and land customs revenue given below (Second Report from the Select Committee on the Affairs of the East India Company, 1811):—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>£</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1802-3</td>
<td>102,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1803-4</td>
<td>146,932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1804-5</td>
<td>158,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1805-6</td>
<td>133,008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1806-7</td>
<td>131,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1807-8</td>
<td>114,314</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In view of their admitted defects and their unproductive character the inland duties were discontinued in 1806 though not formally abolished. Revived in 1808 it was not before 1844 that they disappeared from the Madras Presidency, the last abode of a system which her sister Presidencies Bengal and Bombay had already discarded in 1836 and 1838 respectively.
POLITICS IN ISLAM.*


I.—The Patriarchal Epoch.

Mohamed not only founded a new religion but established a new polity. By converting his countrymen to the faith in one God he destroyed the old constitution of his native town and in place of the old aristocratic tribal constitution, which meant conduct of public affairs by the ruling families, set up an out-and-out theocratic constitution, at the head of which he stood as the representative of God on earth. Even before his death almost the whole of Arabia—Arabia, which had never bent its neck to a prince or a ruler—lay, all of a sudden, at his feet, as a national unit, paying homage to the will of an absolute master. Out of a hundred struggling, warring tribes Mohamed created a nation. The idea of a common religion, with a common High Priest, welded the different tribes into one political organism which, with a marvellous rapidity, shaped its own peculiar form and system. Only a powerful idea could have attained this end. The tribe—the dominating factor of Arab heathenism—had to give way to the newly-born sense of religious unity. The great work had succeeded, and at the death of the Prophet, over by far the greatest part of Arabia reigned a peace and quiet such as the blood-thirsty, vengeance-seeking tribes had never known before. Religion hushed their disputes into silence and effected a reconciliation. And yet (as we shall learn in the sequel), though repressed by religion, and turned, for a time, into other channels, the old tribal and clannish spirit never actually and completely perished among them. In fact the subsequent history of the Arabs is the history of the collision and conflict of this very spirit which entirely swayed the Arab mind.

At the time of Mohamed’s ministry the population of Arabia was composed of two distinct elements: namely, the North Arabs, Ishmaelites, also called after their mythical ancestor Adnan, Adnanites, and South Arabs, Yuktanides. While the latter, the Yuktanides, had

* Alfred von Kremor, Geschichte der herrschenden Ideen des Islams, pp. 309 et sqq.
attained, even in the remotest antiquity, a high stage of culture, the North Arabian tribes, living in Hejaz, Najd and Central Arabia, and gradually moving more and more towards south and south-east, lived completely in the primitive conditions of patriarchal times. The descendants of one common ancestor, together with their families, slaves and clients, constituted a clan, a self-sufficing little community independent of the rest of the world. At the head of each such group stood the most senior in age of the first and foremost family among them. But he exercised no other power than that which his word could command or enforce. His judicial pronouncements were respected, and at the deliberations of the tribal elders he held the chair. In war and predatory expeditions he took the lead. To him also fell the fourth of the booty; a practice which Mohamed, with a slight modification, incorporated into his law. (Mohamed claimed the fifth for the State.) As regards the headship there was no settled rule of succession. In the choice, seniority in age and popular esteem turned the scale. If a tribe became too large and unwieldy it was split up into several divisions; each carrying on under the common tribal name its own separate existence. The only tie that held them together—these smaller groups—was the tie of common descent. In case of common danger they united, and not infrequently they did so for a large campaign. Every such division, in process of time, split up into yet smaller groups and families, every one of which was a miniature of the tribe.

Though separate and isolated, the tribes nevertheless came frequently into contact with each other, through campaigns and predatory expeditions; through vengeance for bloodshed (blood-revenge), an institution of immemorial antiquity among them; and through the diversity and variety of tribal gods. Thus the tribes of Arabia offered a true picture of the first and the earliest human society.

While in the south great political communities came into existence under monarchical constitution; in the north there existed only independent tribes under the guidance of their ephemeral chiefs.

And yet even in very early times we catch a glimpse of permanent settlements. Thus Medina became the seat of a numerous Jewish colony; and Mekka itself, whose earliest history is wrapped in obscurity, became, possibly under the influence of foreigners, especially the Jewish immigrants, a meeting-place and a sanctuary for the nomad tribes.
residing in the neighbourhood. At Dumat-ul-Juudal the South Arabian colonists established a settlement which soon, by its position, acquired great importance. In this way may have risen Hail in Yemama. Khaibar was a Jewish colony. Taif was an important seat of the tribe of Takyf. The need for exchange of goods and caravan-traffic promoted the growth of towns. Thus arose the annual market of Okaz, the market-place of the tribes, known under the common name of Kais Ailan and Takyf; Magannah in the neighbourhood of Mekka; Magaz in the land of the tribe of Hudail.* Hajar in Bahrain, and Oman in the district bearing the same name, were the chief centres of concourse in the East of the Arabian Peninsula. Among all the settlements in North Arabia Mekka and Medina held, undoubtedly, the most conspicuous place. Both of these towns lay on the great caravan-route which led from south Arabia to the north; on the one hand to Syria, across Hijr, the old rocky town of the Tamudites, to Tabuk and Ma'an; on the other to the north-west across Bada, an old Tamudite town, and Mijan to Ailah (the modern Akaba), whence the caravan started for Egypt and the shores of the Mediterranean.

An aristocracy of merchants, well cultivated and cultured by constant contact with Syria and Egypt, ruled Mekka—the tribe of Quraish predominating. The entire town lived upon caravan-trade and the income of the national sanctuary of the North Arabian tribes, the Ka'aba. This national sanctuary was under the care and supervision of the most respected Mekkan families. It secured for them great religious and political influence among the Beduin tribes of the surrounding country. In Medina lived the Aus and Khazraj; and a good many industrious and diligent Jews who gradually extended their colony into the neighbourhood. Here, among the Aus and Khazraj, Mohamed first found support and encouragement. Here he first won his easy victory over the rich but disunited and hence politically powerless Jews. We are not concerned at present with the history of the Prophet's successes. Suffice it to state that in the eighth year of the Hijra he victoriously entered Mekka at the head of an army of 10,000 men consisting mostly of the Beduin converts. Such a success Arabia had never seen. He crushed some of the opposing tribes, but the rest hastened to make their submission. To the most distant parts of the Peninsula, to Hadramaut and

Oman, the Prophet sent his vicegerents, calling upon the people to accept Islam and pay the poor-tax. This consisted in the payment of a tenth of the produce of the land. In many cases it was only half of the tenth.* This poor-tax, which was mostly paid in camels and sheep, along with the legal fifth of the war-booty, enabled the Prophet to pay the army, to help the poor, and to win over, by rich presents, the affection and loyalty of the influential chiefs. Thus, in his last years, Mohamed ruled over almost the whole of Arabia. There was, however, a difference in the political conditions of the different provinces. According to Sprenger we can divide these into two classes: direct provinces, and protectorates. In the first the Prophet caused the poor-tax to be collected by officers appointed by him; distributing a portion of the tax so collected among the poor of the province. The greater part, of course, made its way to Medina. In the latter—namely, lands under suzerainty, such as Yamamah, Oman, Yaman—the old princes of the land retained, by treaty, the right of collecting the tenth themselves. Only a portion of Yamamah, devoted to the false prophet, Maslamah, maintained its independence, and declined to acknowledge the Prophet until his death. Thus, in a few years, Mohamed settled the framework of the State machinery for the whole of Arabia. But at the root of the new political fabric lay the tie of common religion; the absolute cessation of hostilities among Muslims; in other words, the eternal Peace of God. This led gradually to the disappearance of blood-feud and the union of the tribes into one large body of Muslims.†

Before Islam every tribe had its own idols, its own sanctuary; and stood severely apart from the others, whom it looked upon as strangers and enemies. Once and for all Islam overthrew these artificial barriers by giving one and the same religion to all, and by bringing all under one and the same divine law. From the very first Mohamed recognized the importance of welding the tribes into one compact whole; and even if his success was not absolute, none can deny that in the face of that genuine Semitic tenacity with which the Arabs clung to their old traditions and practices he achieved marvellous results. He announced to his followers that Islam abrogated the obligations and duties of heathen days.‡ But quite as much as his preachings, if not

† Sprenger, III, 357.
‡ Ibn Khaldun, Prolég., 412. The Prophet said, "The tie of blood and the number of
more, his extraordinary successes, the eagerness for booty of the tribes who hastened to his banner from one expedition to another, the surest security offered by Islam against the operation of the principle of blood-revenge, still dominant among their heathen country folks, contributed to the triumph of the Prophet and his cause. * Such was the position of affairs when an event, never seriously considered by Muslims, occurred. On the 8th of June 632 A.D. the Prophet passed away, and Islam was bereft of its chief. Mohamed left no son, nor made any arrangements regarding his successor, but the most distinguished companions of the Prophet agreed upon the necessity of electing one. The nearest relatives of the Prophet were his father-in-law, Abu Bakr, two years younger than the Prophet; Othman, his son-in-law, five to ten years younger; Ali, his second son-in-law, about thirty years younger; Omar, the father-in-law of the Prophet, his trusted friend and counsellor, eighteen years younger. † We have purposely referred to these differences in age, for they were decisive in the choice of the first Caliphs. In the leadership of the tribe there was never acknowledged among the Beduin tribes a fixed order of hereditary succession. It was regarded as something extraordinary if the leadership of a tribe continued in one and the same family for four generations. ‡ Seniority in age and popular esteem were the only determining factors in the choice of the tribal chief. Hence the term Shaikh, i.e. the aged one, was the term always applied to the head of the tribe. These were the determining considerations in the election of Abu Bakr for he undoubtedly was the most senior in age and the most respected of the family of the Prophet.

Omar succeeded Abu Bakr by virtue of an express arrangement made by the latter; an arrangement subsequently approved and confirmed by the community. Omar was the father-in-law of the Prophet; and, among his nearest relatives, he was, indeed, the oldest and the most

children will not avail you (on the Day of Judgment). He also declared that there was no right of inheritance between believers and unbelievers. Bukhari, 2206 (3).

* Bukhari 2212 (2). The Arabs made acceptance of Islam conditional on its success, and said: "Let him (Mohamed) come out successful and we will regard him as a true Prophet." When Mekka was taken all the tribes hastened to accept Islam.

† Mohamed's third son-in-law, Abul-Asi, was a heathen, and accepted Islam later. Sprenger, I, 201.

esteemed one. In the midst of his great organising activity he fell by
the dagger of an assassin. To the last he retained consciousness. He
knew Othman, and he knew Ali. He knew, too, that according to
seniority it was their turn one after the other, but he considered them
both equally unfit for the Caliphate. If the information handed down
to us is correct he expressed himself about Ali as one who, though
entitled by right to the Caliphate, was still too weak and unstable in
character, and was liable to be easily led.* Of Othman he observed
that he would, to be sure, favour his tribesmen above the others.
He reckoned Talha, Zubair and Sa‘ad equally unsuitable. On his
death-bed (excluding his son) he appointed a Council of Regency
consisting of six of the most esteemed and oldest of the compa-
nions of the Prophet. They were Ali, Othman, Talha, Zubair,
Abdur Rahman Ibn Auf, Sa‘ad Ibn Abi Waqqas. They were the
earliest converts to Islam, and by their age and wealth held a dis-
tinguished position in Muslim society. The old Arab idea of a tri-
bal chief asserted itself over the personal vanity of the members
of the regency, and, after a series of party intrigues, the choice fell
upon Othman. The idea of seniority doubtless contributed much to
this result, and especially to it must be assigned the submissive atti-
dude of Ali, who, apart from it, could have put forward the stron-
est claim to the Caliphate. As against the considerably older Othman
Ali withdrew, in the hope that his turn would come next. But
during the reign of Othman events happened which made this im-
possible, and Ali’s effort, in spite of his good claim, called forth a fierce
civil war which filled the Islamic countries with blood and horror and
exercised a decisive influence on the Islamic civilisation for evermore.
For, out of the path into which the Muslim mind then drifted, there was
no turning back possible. But before we enquire into the intellectual
basis of this movement we must needs have a clear and correct idea of
the ways and means adopted by Abu Bakr and Omar in the fulfilment
of their mission, and the principles which dominated their system of
government. We must especially consider the fundamental ideas under-
lying their politics; how, on the one hand, these ideas were translated
into fact, and what impression, on the other, they made on the great
masses of the Muslims.

* Mawardi (Enger’s ed.), p. 45. Compare the masterly sketch of Ali’s character.
II.—The first two Caliphs.

When Abu Bakr became Caliph, he was chosen as the representative of the deceased Prophet, whom he had often, in his lifetime, represented as the leader of the public prayer.* This is the significance of the word "Calipha" which corresponds to the title "representative of God and Christ" which the XVIth council of Toledo gave to the kings of Spain.†

The most striking feature in the character of the Arabs is their nervous excitability; and the Arab character, accordingly, may be divided into two classes. In one the wild, unrestrained Beduin disposition shows itself. Its characteristics are greed, fondness for plunder, exceeding sensuality and an unrefined pride. In the more enlightened natures where these wild impulses were suppressed or controlled by a more highly-developed sense of morality, one finds a deep pervading melancholy, insensibly passing into religious fervour and ecstasy. This explains the character of people such as these: Naufal Ibn Waraqah, Omayyah Ibn Abi Salt, Zaid Ibn Amr, Othman Ibn Huwairith, who, even prior to Mohamed, meditated upon monotheism.‡ And even the personality of the Prophet and his entire mental attitude were the outcome of this very disposition § which, to this day, is the distinctive peculiarity of the Arabs. We notice the two aspects of the Arab character in the companions of the Prophet; just as we notice in the Prophet himself the dominant psychological characteristics of his countrymen. The majority of the companions fall under the first heading: gold and property were all in all to them. The most distinguished companions of the Prophet, especially those that were nominated by Omar to the Council of Regency, acquired immense wealth. Zubair left behind property worth 50 million Dirhams.|| Abdur Rahman Ibn Auf owned, when he died, 1,000 camels and so much in cash that every one of his four widows (according to another report, three), after the deduction of the share of the children, obtained 80 to 100,000 Dirhams. Sa'ad Ibn Abi Waqqas had a beautiful palace in the neighbourhood of Medina where he lived in comfort and peace. Talha left behind on his death 2,200,000 Dirhams and 200,000 Dinars in cash. His capital and landed properties were valued at 30 million Dirhams.¶

§ Burton, Pilgrimage to El-Medinah and Mekkah, II, 49, Note. || Bukhari.
But very different, indeed, was the character of Abu Bakr and Omar. Both were of a melancholy turn of mind, and, after the Prophet’s death, tended and nursed Islam as before, with an unswerving love and loyalty. Of both might it be truly said that without them Islam would have perished with the Prophet. Not after worldly gain did they aspire. Religion was their absorbing passion, and the glory of Islam their one and only aim. Their life was exceedingly simple, and however much the anecdotes relating to them were coloured by imagination, they do prove beyond doubt that even in the first centuries of the Hijra their character was regarded in that light, and that the picture painted was not far removed from truth. There is no reason for assuming that their wealth and riches, if they had any, should remain unreported, while those of the other companions of the Prophet (mentioned above) should be made the subject of a detailed recital. We have, therefore, every reason to suppose that the account of the simple life of the first two Caliphs is historically sound and genuine.

Scarcely was Abu Bakr acknowledged Caliph in Medina when almost all the Arabian tribes rose, shaking off the yoke of Islam, to win back their earlier independence. Even in Medina an insurrection threatened to break out, but the activity of some of the noble Mekkans succeeded in checking the movement in its inception. Taif, the capital of the Hawazin tribes and the seat of the Takifites, remained loyal to the Caliph. But from all other parts of Arabia the missionaries or the tax-gatherers of the Prophet were expelled, and those adherents of the new religion who refused to renounce their faith fell victims to popular fury. Some tribes wavered and hesitated, and declared their readiness to keep to Islam, provided they had no poor-tax (Zakat) to pay. Medina itself was threatened by the Beduin hordes, at the head of which stood the powerful tribe of Ghatafan. In this highly perilous position Abu Bakr behaved in a manner which leaves us in no doubt of his character. He acted not as a circumspect statesman or a shrewd general would act; but his conduct was that of a devoted worshipper of the Prophet who, relying upon the supernatural power of Islam and the protection of God, despised all danger, and who, clinging with fanatical conviction to his principles, achieved extraordinary results.*

* Bukhari, 882.
Shortly before his death Mohamed had arranged for an expedition to the north. In spite of the threatened insurrections on all sides; in spite of the objections of the most influential Muslims, Abu Bakr insisted upon sending this expedition, for, said he, a command issued by the Prophet must be unconditionally carried out. Abu Bakr succeeded in winning some advantages over the undisciplined hordes. Reinforcements arrived both from Mekka and from the loyal Hejaz Beduins who stood too much under the influence of Mekka and Medina to carry on an independent political existence.* Even the troops sent to the north returned with large booty and without meeting any serious resistance.

From this moment the game was won; and, as great men are never wanting in great times, so Abu Bakr found a man whom he appointed as the leader of the troops against the insurgent tribes in the interior of Arabia; a man who, undoubtedly, must be reckoned as the greatest Arab general of all times. This was Khalid Ibn Walid. Before his conversion to Islam he was the leader of the Quraishite Cavalry and took part in all the wars against the Prophet. He accepted Islam and distinguished himself by his courage and military talents. He was at once brave and cruel, cautious and faithless, rapacious and voluptuous. He always remained a Muslim to outward seeming, but his deeds point to his fond devotion to the old inherited notions of Arab heathenism—to blood-revenge, to greed for booty, to the Arab method of warfare. Khalid conquered the apostate tribes; but Arabia, which had never up to now known anything except tribal feuds, he overwhelmed with a deluge of blood. Entire tribes were wiped out of existence; others were sold as slaves, or were robbed of their possessions. Flourishing provinces were laid waste. Never had Arabia seen such devastation. Islam was everywhere triumphant. To Medina the caravans wended their way loaded with booty of war, or with money paid in as taxes, or money paid in as tributes. Great enough were the direct successes of Islam, but greater still were the indirect ones. Apart from the extraordinary progress of the new religion which convinced the rude sons of the desert, more than anything else, of its truth, the religious war at home led to a complete transformation of the entire social conditions.

Great armies had never passed through the interior of Arabia, but

* These were the tribes of Muzainah, Ghifar, Juhainah, etc. Caussin de Perceval, *Essai sur l'histoire des Arabes*, III, 352.
often, under Khalid's banner, 10,000 Muslims fought. Of many of the Beduin tribes the only worldly possessions consisted of camels, horses, and sheep, and these fell as booty to the conquerors. Under these conditions the agricultural population suffered no less, and it can easily be shown that entire tribes were reduced to utter penury and privation. In the days of heathenism these would have repaired their fortune by predatory expeditions against the neighbouring tribes, but this was no longer possible, for Islam had spread the Peace of God among all its believers. To escape privation and misery no other alternative, then, was left to them than to emigrate to the north, where the rich and fertile frontiers of the Persian and Greek Empires offered an alluring prospect, or to enter the army of the Caliph and receive a regular pay from the State treasury.

The interior of Arabia, as the travels of Palgrave and Guarmani have shown, is anything but a desert. While the Nefud, like a broad stream of drift-sand, encircles Central Arabia, separating it from the Syrio-Mesopotamian desert; the desert of Dahana awaits the traveller towards the east in the direction of the Persian Gulf. But once these obstacles are overcome, there succeeds a fertile plateau in places thickly populated, which in antiquity was the seat of a far more numerous population than is the case at present. Here, in the heart of Arabia, there was always a thick population which, rolling over its frontier, poured into the neighbouring low-land like a devastating flood. Such a scene Europe witnessed last century in the conquering campaigns of the Wahabis; a thousand years ago a similar rôle was played by the Carmathians, and precisely the same thing happened in the beginning of Islam. Disturbed out of their wonted ways, and robbed of their belongings by the Islamic wars under Abu Bakr, the tribes of Central Arabia were set in motion. The rich and fertile frontiers of the Persian empire, lying this side of the Euphrates, attracted these hungry hordes separated from their home only by a desert. The one man who clearly read the signs of the times and who knew how to turn them to his own uses was the great Khalid—as eager, perhaps more than they, for booty. Thus was the first inroad of the Arab hordes effected in the country along the Euphrates, and it proved absolutely irresistible. A similar movement was launched from Arabia against Syria under the supervision of the Caliph Abu Bakr. Arabia, where Islam, establishing a religious brotherhood, had
put an end to strife and plunder, became too narrow for its population, and the Arabs therefore burst forth in all directions.

The expedition against Syria was organized at Medina. While the Yamamah tribes supplied the largest portion of the troops advancing towards the Euphrates. Yaman furnished the largest contingent for the Syrian army.* Not merely warriors composed the expedition. Entire tribes joined, with their women and children. It was, indeed, not a campaign but a *Völkerwanderung.*

The two empires with which the Arabs came into collision had long passed their bloom. They no longer possessed sufficient power of resistance. Both had forfeited the love, loyalty and support of their subjects. Ecclesiastical disputes and controversies had shaken and enfeebled the Byzantine Empire. And court intrigues, disputed successions and insurrections, on the other hand, were painfully frequent in the Sassanide Empire. Thus the mighty flood that surged forth from Arabia could not be stemmed either by the Persian Chosroes or the Byzantine Caesar. Caravans laden with gold, silver, valuable utensils, troops of prisoners of war, droves of camels and horses, wended their way to Medina, either as the private property of the soldiers or as the fifth of the booty legally falling to the State. While, on the one hand, this encouraged increasing emigration to the North, and emigration meant reinforcement of the Arab army in Syria and Babylonia; on the other it enabled the State treasury in Medina to carry out the system of State annuity—foreshadowed by Mohamed—to the entire Muslim community. From the very beginning of his Caliphate Abu Bakr divided the State revenue among Muslims, following, doubtless, the example of the Prophet. Every Muslim received his share. True, in the beginning it was very small, for the progress of the Muslim arms was checked by troubles at home. In the first year to every Muslim fell 10; in the second 20 Dirhams. Men, women, children, even slaves, received a like share.† No difference was made between those who accepted Islam before or after the taking of Mekka. Omar, on the other hand, showed preference to those who accepted Islam prior to the

* Abu Ismail Azdi (ed. Nassau Lees), 112. The tribes of Rabiyah, Tamim and Asad proceeded to Iraq. To Syria chiefly the South Arabian tribes advanced.
† Abu Ismail Azdi, pp. 7, 20. The information of Azdi comes from the best source, as a comparison with Ibn Asakir clearly proves. The common source of both these authors is Saif Ibn Omar's work Kitabul Futuh.
taking of Mekka. He placed them first. Then followed those who accepted Islam after the taking of Mekka. Then came the general Muslim population. The latter obtained an annuity varying from 3 to 400 Dirhams. Sucklings, at first, were not given an annuity until weaned, when they got 100 Dirhams each. Later Omar altered this arrangement, allowing to all children the same amount. According to another report he is said to have allowed to every child two jaribs (a certain measure of corn) of wheat, two kists of oil, one kist of vinegar, per month, in addition to the annual grant of 100 Dirhams. *

To introduce order and method in the distribution of the annuity Omar had a list of recipients prepared and kept in one of his offices (Diwan). For distinguished persons special arrangements were made. Thus the widows of the Prophet received an annuity of 12,000 Dirhams, and so did others who were closely associated with the Prophet. He divided the rest of the Muslims, as already mentioned, into three classes, which, according to Sprenger, were: †

(1) Veterans who had fought in the battle of Badr, annuity 5,000 Dirhams.

(2) Fugitives (Muhajir) and Ansar (helpers) who had accepted Islam before the battle of Badr but had not taken part in the battle, annuity 4,000. (Sons of fugitives and helpers received 2,000 Dirhams. The inhabitants of Mekka and some others received 800 each.)

(3) The rest of the Muslims received an annuity ranging from 600 to 400, or 300 to 200 Dirhams. ‡

Omar wanted the entire Muslim population to receive the State annuity; but this, as Sprenger justly remarks, never really happened. The inhabitants of the two holy cities and the warriors absorbed the whole State revenue.

Next to the diffusion and propagation of Islam, which was the propelling force of the whole movement, was the idea of the Arab body-politic, as a vast Muslim brotherhood participating and sharing in the State revenue. It was conceived, so to speak, as a guild for organized robbery and plunder against people of other faiths; the consideration being the division of the proceeds among the members

of the guild, and, indeed, something else besides, namely, the sure prospect of admission into paradise and enjoyment of eternal bliss. Some were induced by the former, some by the latter consideration: but, true enough, every one found what he wished for most. The balance of the first year shows the successful issue of these plunderings, and explains the rapid progress of Islam in such an incredibly short time. The Arab tribes soon discovered that it was far more profitable to present a united front against the common enemy, the foreigners, than to carry on an internecine feud in which they could not possibly hope to secure anything more valuable than camels, horses and sheep. They saw, on the other side of the desert, the rich and luxurious countries: Syria, Egypt and Babylon. They saw the treasures of the Byzantine Caesars and the Persian Chosroes lying temptingly before them.

Next to the system of annuity (Ata)—the development, if not the origin, of which is to be ascribed to Omar—he took an important step forward towards the establishment of a fixed system of administration, by introducing a methodical principle of taxation, and by assigning fixed salaries to government officers. Omar thus introduced the first element of order and method into the system of administration.* About this time arose the system of military stations, which gradually led to the formation of the standing army. The tribes which conquered Iraq and Syria formed military camps (Amsar) which in Syria were christened as Jund and in Iraq as Askar. Here lived the soldiers divided into regiments, or to be absolutely precise, into clans. They renounced their earlier occupation of agriculture and cattle-breeding, and exchanged it, only too willingly, for the military profession. They were religious soldiers. The State paid them a monthly salary, and the subject race supplied them with provisions. Thus arose

* Ibn Asakir in the Tarikh Dimishq, fol. 88, says: Omar, when he came to Syria, organised military stations and established permanent military cantonments. Cf. Proleg. of Ibn Khaldun, I, 273, where these Syrian cantonments are mentioned, namely, Damascus, Kinnisrin and Awasim. According to Abu Ismail-al-Azdi, p. 219, there were only four military stations in the beginning: Emessa, Damascus, Urdun, Filistin. Later a fifth one was added, namely Kinnisrin. The division of Syria into five military districts was probably in the mind of Ibn Wardy who in his book Kharidat-ul-Ajaib, drawn from older sources, says that Syria was divided into 5 districts: I, Ghaza, Ramla, Filistin, Ascalon, Jerusalem. II, Urdun, Tiberius, Ghur, Yarmuk, Baisan. III, Ghutah, Damascus along with the sea coast. IV, Emessa, Hamah, Kaartab, Kinnesrin, Aleppo. V. Antioch, Awasim, Masyas, Tarsus: Kharidat-ul-Ajaib (Cairo ed.), p. 38.
in Iraq the military stations of Kufa and Basra, and in Syria those of Kinnisrin, Damascus, Urdun, Filistin.

The view has gained ground that even the first Caliphs granted lands to soldiers when they settled down, and established a sort of military colonies. This, undoubtedly, was so later. Under the first two Caliphs the very opposite was the case. Neither the soldier nor the private citizen was allowed to acquire land in conquered countries. Strange as this statement may seem, it comes from an incontestable source. But the question naturally suggests itself—what did the Muslims do with the immense territories which fell to them in the conquered countries? An enquiry into this subject—hitherto neglected—is all the more necessary for a complete understanding of the social conditions under the Caliphate. The lands in the conquered countries may be divided into two classes: (a) those whose inhabitants concluded a capitulation with Muslims and peacefully submitted to them; (b) those whose inhabitants were conquered by force of arms. As regards lands won by capitulation, these remained in the possession of the earlier proprietors who paid the capitulation tax (Jaziya) and the land-tax (Khiraj). They had, moreover, to supply provisions free to Muslim soldiers; to maintain every Muslim for three days, and to provide a fixed quantity of linen for the use of the soldiery.* As against the fulfilment of these conditions, they remained in possession of their land. They were forbidden to alienate lands to Muslims. The land-tax, payable by them, was fixed once for all, no matter whether the actual produce of the land increased or decreased.

The second class of lands, namely, those that were conquered by force of arms, passed into the possession of the exchequer, and was administered for the common benefit of the Muslims. But political and economic conditions induced Omar not rigorously to enforce this rule in all cases. He therefore allowed the old proprietors to remain, wherever necessary, in possession of their lands. Thus did Omar deal with Sawad, which he declared to be crown-lands. That dealing was made into a precedent, often quoted by Arab jurists. Being crown-lands they could not be disposed of, for the simple reason that they were inalienable. In the conquered countries, therefore, there was not an inch of land, as a matter of fact, owned by Muslims. The whole belonged to all, but to no one in particular. They allowed the old

* Ibn Asakir, fol. 89.
inhabitants and the subject population peacefully to cultivate the land, but these had to pay heavy taxes, and were overburdened with payments in kind.

The State revenue went into the common chest of the Muslims—the Bait-ul-mal, the State treasury—and out of it was paid the State expenses, costs of the wars, pay of officers and annuity to Muslims. In contrast to the Muslims the native population were a sort of helots, whose chief function appears to have been to swell the treasury and maintain the Muslims. Their lands were expressly forbidden to be sold to the latter. In the event of any violation of this rule the land sold was returned to its owner, but the purchase-money was forfeited to the State. The reason for this rule, which both Abu Bakr and Omar so rigorously enforced, is obvious. The object was to hold together the Muslim troops, consisting as they did of different tribes, and to prevent them from drifting apart and degenerating into effeminate ways. Nothing could have more surely and swiftly contributed to these results than possession of landed properties. Hence the prohibition. Furthermore, this policy was best calculated to check the gradual emigration of Christian population. By declaring landed property inalienable the owners could not realize any money in case of sale, and had therefore no alternative left but to continue in possession of their lands.* This policy further saved agriculture from neglect and wreckage, and the need of agriculture was great for the maintenance of the troops. The original inhabitants devoted themselves to cultivation. Cases of extortion undoubtedly there were, for Omar issued a warning, and recommended kinder treatment of non-Muslims.†

The Muslim State of the first century was a purely military State, not unlike the old Sparta—only Islam recognised no aristocracy. The Muslims were a race of warriors to be maintained at the cost of the subject races.‡

* To this very policy Omar adhered in other conquered countries, especially in Egypt. When Amr built a house in Fustat, Omar administered a reprimand to him. Weil, Gesch. d. Chalif., I, 117. Weil has not quite caught the point; cf. Weil, I, 76, note. Omar did not allow Muslims to permanently settle in Egypt. Weil, I, 118. Ibn Asakir mentions a tradition which runs thus: Omar and the companions of the Prophet did not consider it permissible for a Muslim to purchase land from a Ra'ayyah, because it would interfere with his military duties.

† Tradition of Ibn Adi in Ibn Asakir, fol. 69. As regards the Ra'ayyah Omar wrote to the governors recommending remission of taxes to those who were unable to pay.

‡ Sprenger, D.L.M., III, 164.
From what has been said, it is apparent that the dominating idea of Omar’s government was the promotion of the military-religious development of Islam at the expense of the subject races. For this reason precisely he issued strict rules prohibiting Christians and people of other faith from having anything in common with the ruling race; for this reason precisely he decided to clear Arabia of the infidel, and gave Arabs the choice between Islam and expulsion from their native land. The prosperous and hard-working inhabitants of Najran who continued loyal to Christianity had, in consequence of this measure, to migrate to the country along the Euphrates.* He likewise expelled the Jews from Khaibar.† He governed the Muslim community with a firm and masterful hand. Under him was completed the conquest of Syria, Iraq and Persia up to the Oxus, and the frontiers of Hindustan were brought under Muslim sway. In the west Egypt rendered him homage, and his troops penetrated along the coast of North Africa as far as Tripoli. Everywhere he governed the subject races upon one and the same principle; everywhere he sought to keep the Arabs apart from the native population, and to maintain them as a military caste, and everywhere he forbade them from making a settlement or acquiring landed property. He kept his rapacious governors under strict control, and he himself, as the administrator of the common treasury of the Muslims, displayed spotless purity and irreproachable integrity. He confiscated half the wealth of Amr Ibn Asi, the conqueror of Egypt, and Khalid, the hero of Muta and the conqueror of Iraq and Syria, was similarly dealt with. He had to make over to the treasury a considerable portion of his wealth, acquired by plunder.‡

It is doubtful whether Omar could have long kept his system of government intact. Had all the Arabs been as unselfish as he, had all been fired by the same religious fervour as he, he might possibly have succeeded. But he did not reckon with one of the most powerful springs of human action—personal interest. True, the Arabs fought in honour of God and for Islam, but they had not thereby surrendered their greed for gold. They wanted wealth and riches. Omar’s com-

* Sprenger, III, 504.
† Those that were expelled appear to have received compensation. According to Kodamah, cited in Sprenger, III, 277, they paid to the inhabitants of Fadak, who emigrated to Syria, half of the value of their immovable property.
‡ Weil, I, 127; Khuda Bukhsh, Islamic Peoples, pp. 57 et sqq.
munistic system of government, according to which all belonged to the State, did not quite suit them. Everyone sought to acquire and retain for himself. For this reason, indeed, as might have been anticipated, the exclusion of Muslims from landed properties in conquered countries could not long be maintained. It is equally clear that he failed to take into account another factor which thwarted his scheme. The people of other faiths in conquered countries were, as we have seen, reduced to the position of helots. They lived under fearful oppression. It might have been expected that this would lead, some time or other, to fierce collision and conflict. For the non-Muslims there were only two ways of escape from their rôle of slavery: conversion to Islam, or rebellion against Islamic rule. The road to conversion was made hard by the fact that the Christian who accepted Islam (receiving, indeed, equal civil rights with Muslims), had to give up his landed property, which immediately passed into the hands of his former co-religionists, who continued to pay the Khiraj (land-tax) on it as before. The numerous insurrections against the Muslim rule, even in the first years, prove that they looked upon armed rising against foreign rule as not altogether hopeless, and that so long as the memory of their former independence had not completely faded out of mind, the subject races found their lot intolerable. Oppressed nations often avenge themselves, when insurrections and rebellions fail, by attempts on the lives of those whom they look upon as their oppressors. To such an act of despair did Omar fall a victim. Feruz, a Persian, stabbed the Caliph when he, as was his practice, was about to lead the prayer at the mosque.

III.—*The Anti-Islamic Reaction or the Civil War.*

With the death of Omar ends the first and the most singular phase of the development of the Islamic State which we may describe as the Patriarchal phase. Two equally powerful motives, so long as they were operative, kept the balance even. One rested on the highest and noblest; the other on the lowest and vilest side of human nature. On the one hand were religious fervour and enthusiasm for the realisation of a great idea; namely, the union of the entire Arabs in complete equality before God, and the establishment of a religio-military community; and on the other, were the greed for plunder and lust of conquest, immeasurably heightened by unheard-of successes.
An Abdashamshite by family, Othman belonged to the old and proud aristocracy of Mekka. But, though powerful his connexion and noble his descent, he never gave any proof of courage or wisdom. In fact he was and remained to the last weak, vain, fond of money and splendour, and, what was worse still, entirely in the hands of his Mekkan kinsmen—the majority of whom were never really Muslims at heart, but were secret followers of the traditions and the ideals of the old Arab heathenism.* During his weak and inefficient administration the political institutions, laboriously built up by Omar, gradually fell to pieces. He could not restrain the rapacity of the governors, nor did he maintain intact that most important measure of the Caliph Omar, namely, the exclusion of Muslims from acquiring or owning landed property in conquered countries. In fact it soon became a dead letter. Muawiah, the governor of Syria and a cousin of Othman, to whom Omar refused such permission, coaxed the Caliph into granting his request. It happened thus. Muawiah wrote to Othman that his pay was not sufficient to meet the expenses of the numerous military officers and Greek envoys that were frequently at his court. He therefore begged the Caliph to grant ownerless lands (Almazari Assafiyah) to him to enable him to meet the calls upon his purse. In Syria there were many such lands; for the Greek patricians to whom they belonged had either been slain in battle or had abandoned them. These ownerless lands were considered as crown-lands (Safiyah) belonging to the entire Muslim community. They were leased out by the governor, and their rent was paid into the treasury.† For the grant of these lands Muawiah asked the Caliph and the Caliph consented.‡ And precisely in the same manner did Othman act in other provinces. Thus, in the Caliphate of Omar, Talha had purchased the estate of Nashtasag in Kufa. Omar had annulled the transaction, but Othman sanctioned it.§ Thus the Caliph lightly and carelessly dealt with lands

‡ Ibn Asakir, fol. 97.
§ Murasid sub voce: Nashtasag on the authority of Waqidi. Talha, like Zubair, built a palace at Basra. From his landed property Talha drew a daily income of 1,000 Dinlars. Masudi, IV, 253, 254.
which Muslims had been taught by Omar to regard as their common property. Othman, similarly, made a present of the estate of Fadak, State-property to Hakam Ibn Abi-l-Asi, a kinsman, who only under compulsion had accepted Islam and who, for betraying the Prophet, had been banished to Taif.* He likewise gave away the most important offices to his relatives, the Omayyads.† But what was especially offensive to Ali was the grant of enormous annuities to his kinsmen.‡

Thus all the favourites of the Caliph belonged to the Omayyad family. Between this family and the family to which the Prophet belonged, the Hashimite, there had been even in the days of Paganism, many disagreements and discords. When Mohamed began his mission, the hostility was deepened and intensified, and between them the most violent collisions took place. When, however, after the conquest of Mekka, the Omayyads accepted Islam their conversion was not genuine or sincere. They remained at heart true and loyal to the ideas of the old Arab heathenism. When, with the accession of Othman, they came to power and influence, they never made a secret of this fact. Walid Ibn Uqbah appeared drunk at the mosque. Another governor distinguished himself by wholesale extortion and embezzlement.§ Othman himself revived some of the heathen practices at the pilgrim ceremony at Mekka.|| But what seems to have aroused and embittered the genuine Muslims most against him was the unseemly levity with which he carried out the official redaction of the Qur'an, and the destruction of all copies differing from it.¶ Thus the Ansar, the old companions of Mohamed, who, in the lifetime of the Prophet, and still more so under Abu Bakr and Omar, had formed, so to speak, a hierarchichal aristocracy, found themselves suddenly supplanted by the Mekkan party who had joined Islam as a last resource, and, then only outwardly. Personal interest and religious zeal enkindled and fanned their wrath and bitterness more and more. The democra-to-communistic principles which Omar had fashioned and championed were still full of life and

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* Weil, I, 165, according to the Kitabul Aghani.
† Weil, I, 156, 157, 172.
‡ Maqrizi, Khittat, II, 335.
§ Weil, I, 165, 171.
|| Weil, 167, Vol. I. Othman loved finery and even in the pilgrim's dress he could not do without it, though all finery was severely forbidden. We find in Muatta a reliable tradition which says: I saw Othman in Arg (a village three posts from Medina) on a hot summer day; he had his face covered in a purple burnoose.
¶ He entrusted the redaction of the Qur'an to Zaid Ibn Thabit and others devoted to him to the exclusion of the old companions of the Prophet such as Ibn Masud.
force, and the people therefore were not inclined to accept or to submit to the autocratic assertion of power with which Othman dealt with that which was regarded as Public Property. The gift to his cousin and to others set the people afame.

Abu Darr Ghifari, one of the most pious Muslims of his time, urged upon the governor of Syria the view that the rich should be compelled to give a fraction of their wealth for the benefit of the poor. On this question a violent dispute arose between him and Muawiah, with the result that Muawiah sent him to the Caliph as a fomenter of discord and strife, and the Caliph banished him to the little village of Rabadah.*

Enthusiasts like Abu Darr were many in the days of early Islam. Thus the party of the discontented grew more and more. Ali, the most distinguished living member of the family, joined them, and with him went many of the war companions of the Prophet, such as Talha, Zubair, Ammar Ibn Yasir, and Abu Musa Ashari.†

Thus, while Islam was extending beyond the borders of Arabia, and was conquering fresh countries year by year, within its bosom sprang up the germs of eternal discord. Insurrection broke out almost simultaneously at the two opposite ends of the vast empire. In Kufa and Basra people rose against the governors appointed by Othman. In Egypt the same thing occurred. By timely concessions Othman quietened the rebels; but the discontent, tended and nursed by the distinguished companions of the Prophet, notably by Ali, Talha, Zubair (every one of whom was silently aiming at the Caliphate), increased in volume and intensity, and soon led to the catastrophe which resulted in the murder of the Caliph. From Egypt, where Ali had the largest following, came the chief impetus. Egypt formed the base of operation. From there the emissaries carried on their secret propaganda. In this Abdullah Ibn Saba, the Jew, distinguished himself most. He preached that every Prophet had a representative, and Ali was the legitimate representative of Mohamed, and that Othman had wrongly and unrighteously taken possession of the Caliphate.‡

* Weil, I, 170. In the Tazkirah of Hamdun the following is related about Abu Darr: "When Muawiah built his green palace at Damascus he asked Abu Darr what he thought of it." He replied, "If thou hast built it with public money thou art a traitor, if with thy own thou art a squanderer. Tazkirah, I, fol. 21.

† For further information I must refer the reader to my translation of Weil’s Islamische Völker published by the Calcutta University under the title of Islamic Peoples.

‡ Maqrizi, Khittat, II, 334; Weil, I, 259, note (1).
of Ali, he went even still further, and making use of the Jewish idea of Messiah, asserted that Ali would some time in future return to the earth as Redeemer and fill it with justice. With this doctrine he, for the first time, introduced into Islam the idea of the Mahdi, the future Messiah.*

A distinguished Amir, placing himself at the head of the movement and driving away the governor of the Caliph, soon set insurrection on foot in Egypt. A body of 600 Egyptians, pure volunteers, started for Medina. On the way they were joined by the mutineers of Kufa and Basra. After a long negotiation with the Caliph (who was abandoned by his friends and shamefully betrayed by the Ansar and the hierarchichal coterie of Medina), the rebels stormed his house and killed the aged Caliph, who knew, if not how to live, at least, how to die with honour and dignity. With truth and justice the poet Hasan Ibn Thabit thus sang of Othman:—

The Ansar left him in the lurch when death appeared on the scene, though the Ansar had the power (to help him if they would). Who would acquit Talha and Zubair of complicity in this tragic affair? Mohamed, the son of Abu Bakr, appeared to be the ring-leader, and behind him stood Ammar Ibn Yasir.†

The old Arab clannish and tribal instinct completely swayed the government of Othman. As chief of the Omayyads he felt himself bound to lead his tribesmen to power and renown, and to make his family the ruling family in the land; and this, indeed, above everything else.

But this idea brought the Caliph not only into collision with the idea of equality and brotherhood of all Muslims, which developing under Omar's fostering care, had found wide acceptance among the masses of the Muslims, but also into collision with the Muhajirin and Ansar, who felt deeply and sorely aggrieved and injured by it. The Muhajirin and Ansar had fought the battles of Islam; they had shared the joys and sorrows of the Prophet—in fact, with their blood had Islam been securely and surely established. Now they had to retire into the background, and to see the Mekkans come to the fore-front—the very Mekkans who only under compulsion had acknowledged the Qur'an, and upon many of whom had rested the curses of the Prophet. Thus

* Shahrastani, I, 200; Ibn Qutaibah, 300. † Masudi, IV. 284.
the hierarchichal clique of Medina came into fierce conflict with the aristocratic party of Mekka. This Medinite clique possessed immense wealth, and had the confidence of the masses, who were deeply imbued with religious ardour. At the head of this clique stood Ali. Hence the fall of Othman as soon as the latter withdrew his support from him.*

Thus was a long war begun between the ruling families, not only for religious leadership, but more so still for temporal power—for the Caliphate.

To judge accurately the reason for the stubbornness and tenacity with which this war was fought; for its long duration and the greatness of the sacrifice in men and money which it involved—we must try to form a correct idea of the great Arab families of the time.

IV.—The Family and Tribe in Arab Antiquity.

We notice in the first years of Islam a similar development of the tribal system as we find among the Romans, of whom we read that the Gens Claudia reckoned a thousand heads and the Gens Fabia supplied eight hundred fighting men. Oyainah Ibn Hisn, the chief of the Fazara-rah tribe, commanded over 10,000 lancers† and the chief of a Himyara-rite tribe, Dhul-Kala, who was one of the first to join the Syrian campaign, owned one thousand slaves‡.

The oldest forms of human association are the family and the tribe. In the earliest times every family existed for itself, and constituted a community closed to the outside world. But when the family grew, it was split up again into different branches. The older and the younger branches, owning one common tribal ancestor, felt bound by the common tie of descent. Such a union of several families made up a tribe which, as it grew, was again split up into various smaller units, sub-tribes or clans consisting of a larger or smaller number of individual families.§ The

* Cf. the interesting letters that passed between Ali and Muawiah in Kamil (Wright's ed.), pp. 184, 186. They are perhaps genuine.
† Muatta, IV. 89.
‡ Masudi, IV. 178.
§ A tribe was, says Robertson Smith, but a large family, the tribal name was the name or nickname of the common ancestor. In process of time it broke up into two or more tribes, each embracing the descendants of one of the great ancestor's sons and taking its name from him. These tribes were again divided and sub-divided on the same principle and so at length that extreme state of division was reached which we found in the peninsula at the time of the Prophet. Between a nation, a tribe, a sept or sub-tribe, and a family there is no difference, on this theory, except in size and distance from the common ancestor. As time rolls on the sons of a household become heads of separate
word "family" (bait, i.e. house, tent), in its widest sense, included a whole tribe; in its limited sense only the members of a family; that is to say, father, mother, sons, daughters, grandchildren and the nearest blood relations.

Every tribe, every sub-tribe, says Ibn Khaldun, formed a self-sufficient community, since all its members were the descendants of the same ancestor.* But, at the same time, within it were individual groups more closely bound to each other than the larger group constituting the tribe. The narrower group meant the actual family circle—closest blood relations. Bound by the tie of common descent, they could always count upon the help and protection of the tribe, but the help and protection received from the tribe was never so effective as the help and protection received from direct blood relations.†

But wherein resided the power, the strength? The wealth of the Arab chief lay in the number of sons, slaves, freedmen, droves of camels and horses; but the strength and power of the tribe depended upon the number of men capable of bearing arms. Polygamy, which prevailed among the Arabs, did not always quickly multiply a family and thereby bring it to or maintain it in importance. They had therefore to resort to an institution whose origin dates back to remote antiquity, and which aimed at rapidly swelling the tribe or the ruling family with free men capable of bearing arms. This was the institution of clientship.‡ We do not know how this institution came into existence in the Arab heathenism, but from the rules of Muslim law relating to the clients—rules, like so many others, resting on the customs current in Heathen days—we can form a fairly accurate idea of this institution, so exceedingly important for the social and political conditions of the East. There were different ways in which a slave could be manumitted.

families, the families grow into septs, and finally the septs become great tribes or even nations embracing several tribes; Robertson Smith, Kinship and Marriage (1907), p. 4.

* The real meaning of ahl is tent. It was applied to those who lived under one common tent. In Hebrew the word has preserved its original meaning which it has lost in Arabic. The abbreviation of ahl is al which also means a family.

† Ibn Khaldun, Proleg., I. 276.

‡ See Coulanges, Ancient City (translated by W. Small), p. 151. "Clientship is an institution of the domestic law, and existed in families before there were cities." The permanent and hereditary dependents of a tribe other than slaves may be roughly classified as (a) freedmen, (b) refugees outlawed from their own tribe, (c) groups like the Jews at Medina who were not strong enough to stand by themselves. Robertson Smith, Kinship and Marriage, p. 51.
By manumission he obtained freedom to this extent that he became master of his affairs and was allowed to acquire and bequeath property. Such a manumitted slave was called *atiq*, a freedman. Apparently the Arabs always deemed it a generous and meritorious act to grant freedom to slaves. But with freedom the bond between the manumitted slave and his master was not absolutely dissolved. The master—despite the manumission—continued to be his protector and defender; nay, indeed, his patron. As against protection and help, and especially the defence of his life and property, he was permanently bound to his *quondam* master and his family, and he was thenceforward known as the client of N.N or of the tribe of N.N. As such he participated in all the rights and duties of the tribe. If the client died without heirs his patron succeeded to his property. The status of a patron was a hereditary status. It descended to the children of the patron.* Patronage was an inalienable right. It could not be got rid of, either by gift or by sale.† Between the patron and the client there subsisted an indissoluble tie, which has been described with justice by Muslim jurists as a strong and powerful kinship.‡ Along with simple manumission there were other ways by which the slave became free. The most usual was self-redemption. The slave acquired his freedom by paying a fixed sum to his master within a fixed period.§ But as soon as he became free he entered into the relation of a client to his master. In the choice of his patron he had not the slightest freedom. He could become the client of no other than his old master. Another way in which a slave became free was, when he was promised freedom in the event of his master's death.|| Finally the heir often used to grant freedom to some of the slaves of the deceased for the salvation of his soul.\

There was, however, one kind of manumission by which the client became absolutely free, with power of choosing his patron at will. It was when a slave was set free as *saibah*. This appears to have been a relic of heathenism, and early fell into disuse.**

The old Arab tribe, in its original composition, consisted of all the

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* Muatta, III, 263, 273. † *Ibid.*, p 262. ‡ Ibn Adhari, I, 39, 40. § The jurists called this compact of self-redemption *mukatabah*. || *Tadhir*; such a slave was called *mudabbar*: Muatta, III, 277. *Ibid.*, III, 255. ** Malik says that he questioned Ibn Shihab as regards *saibah*. He replied: He as *saibah* may choose as his patron any one he pleases. But if he has no patron his inheritance,
families connected by common descent, the freedmen and the descendants of such freedmen, and finally the slaves. Besides these there were others—not connected by blood—who were admitted into the tribe. They were called mulsaq or laziq (adscripti), also halif. The rights of such strangers, received into the tribe, were perhaps not very different from those of the clients.

"The adoption of individual protégés to full tribesmanship must in later times have been very common, for hilf and dai, sworn ally and adopted son, are often taken as synonymous terms. (Nawawi; see also Goldziher, *Muk. Stud.*, I, 134-137). When a whole group was taken into dependent alliance the terms of alliance would naturally be governed by circumstances, and complete fusion would not be so easy, especially if there were religious differences, such as separated the worshippers of Al-Lat and Manat in Medina, the Aus Manat and the Taim al-Lat, from their Jewish holafa. Nevertheless the obligations that united protector and protected were not much less stringent, at least as regarded the duty of help against outsiders, than those which united full tribesmen. The Jews of Medina are said to be "between the backs" of the protecting clans, that is, could not be reached by a foe except over the bodies of their supporters. Protector and protected shared the risks and benefits of the blood-feud; the protector was bound to avenge his halif’s blood, and he himself or any of his people was liable to be slain in the halif’s quarrel, as the latter was in the quarrel of his protector (Ibn Hisham, p. 543). The only difference was that the blood-money for the death of a dependent was not so high as for a sarih. Further, in Medina, at least, the sworn ally had a claim on the inheritance of the protector. According to the commentators on Sura 4, 37, a man’s holafa took one-sixth of his estate. The covenant of alliance and protection was based upon an oath.

Such was the line along which the Arab tribal system had developed for ages. History but partially lifts the veil. Its beginning goes back to remotest antiquity, indeed, to prehistoric times.

About the time when the Prophet was born this social system had

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* Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage*, pp. 54-56.
reached the highest stage of development of which it was capable. The tribe, which began in families, had grown into large communities, which, along with their entire suite of clients and slaves, numbered many thousands.

In consequence of the gradual increase of population, of lively commercial intercourse, of growing prosperity, the general * conditions of life had considerably changed, and the desire for association and cooperation began to grow, to deepen and to widen among the Arabs. Even before the Prophet instances are not wanting of tribes entering into offensive and defensive alliances. This desire, shall we say, this need for association, made Mekka the common sanctuary of the Beduin tribes of Hejaz. Similarly other tribes too had their sacred places. Thus several of the South Arabian tribes made a pilgrimage to their common sanctuary, Khalasah.†

From what we have said it is apparent that the old tribal system, in the then existing conditions of Arabian civilisation, was becoming more and more unsuited and out of place, and the need for a greater union made itself keenly and insistently felt. It is a phenomenon which frequently occurs in the life of nations, that, as soon as a nation is ready for a great social, political and religious revolution, men and means, necessary for carrying it through, never fail. Then the entire scaffolding upon which the old structure rested, gives way and a new one rises out of its ruins. A superficial view might suggest that national progress and development are by fits and starts; but it is an error, a grievous error. National development extends over a long period of time. It proceeds slowly and silently— one event connects with another; one chain links with another until the time is ripe and the moment opportune for revolution. It is prepared by years, even ages, of intellectual ferment. Then suddenly it bursts forth, not as the result of chance or accident, but of deep-laid causes and well-calculated reasons.

* Freytag: Einleitung, pp. 24, 25; Caussin de Perceval, I, 330; Sprenger, Life of Mohamed, p. 8. "Sharastani informs us that the Banu Katham and Daws formed, as late as 571 A.D., so powerful a state."

† Freytag: Einleitung, p. 365. "We should be under a great mistake, were we blindly to believe Mohammadan writers," says Sprenger, "who state that not only all the Arabs, but even the Persians performed pilgrimages to Mekka. Ibn Ishaq allows that there were several Taghuts (temples) in Arabia which were as sacred as the Ka'aba. Shahrastani informs us that the Banu Katham and Daws did not perform pilgrimages to the Ka'aba. They had a Taghut of their own": Sprenger, Life of Mohamed, p. 8.
Such was the position of the ancient world when the Sublime Teacher of Nazareth delivered His noble message unto mankind; a message which completely transformed the political and religious conditions of the world. Similar was the condition of Arabia when the Prophet Mohamed appeared on the scene. The dormant idea of the homogeneity of all tribes and of one supreme God—common to all mankind—found shape and expression in him; an idea which united the scattered Arabian tribes, ever at war with each other, into one vast and all-embracing brotherhood. In antiquity common worship always forgave the strongest tie of love and mutual protection. Thus, in the sphere of religio-politics, Mohamed became the Cavour of Arabia. However momentary the success of the Prophet in reuniting the Arab tribes, through one common religion, into one compact whole, it was a great moral advance compared to the earlier Arab heathenism. It was, of course, too much to expect that the Prophet would, at one stroke, destroy the Arab tribal system root and branch. In fact he adopted most of the tribal institutions current among them; especially those relating to clientship and patronage. In fact, he most effectively encouraged the institution of clientship by declaring emancipation of slaves a pious and God-pleasing act; nay, even as expiation of many kinds of sin.*

The conquests of Abu Bakr and Omar brought in their train large crowds of captives to Arabia who were sold as slaves. The companions of the Prophet (of whom many, as already noticed, had amassed great wealth) and the rich Mekkans purchased thousands of such slaves. The majority of these, doubtless, were gradually emancipated and became clients. Thus the chiefs of the distinguished Mekkan and Medinate families were surrounded by a retinue of clients who numbered thousands.† But when the influence and importance of a family depends upon its numerical strength it is obvious that intelligent self-interest would at once lengthen out the chain and keep the feeling of kinship keenly alive. Of this the Arabic language offers the best and clearest proof, for it contains terms, to indicate different grades of kinship, which are not to be found in other languages; indeed, not even in

† Musa Ibn Nusair, the conqueror of Africa, himself a freedman, mentions the number of his clients to be several thousands. Tarik Ibn Ziyad, the conqueror of Spain, was one of his clients. Ibn Adhari, II, 17, 18, 19.
other Semitic dialects. The Aryans, including Greeks and Romans, originally acknowledged only *agnatio*, relationship on the paternal side; not *cognatio*, that on the mother’s side. The Arabs, on the contrary, held both of them in esteem and honour; but the former more than the latter.* Thus there are special terms in Arabic for uncles and aunts on the paternal and on the maternal side; for relations by marriage on the husband’s and on the wife’s side, for grandsons by sons, and those by daughters, and so on. Many later fell into disuse. They were not satisfied with kinship carried to its farthest point, but they even had recourse to fictitious ties. In this connexion the most remarkable is what the Arab jurists describe as *kinship by milk* or *milk-kinship*. It appears to have been a heathen custom which soon disappeared in Islam. To admit a stranger into the family circle they made him suck a few drops of milk at the breast of the lady of the house, or one of her sisters, or one of her nearest † female relatives, and with the milk thus drawn, the stranger became a member of the family‡. The result was so effective that a husband who had inadvertently drawn some drops of milk from the breast of his nursing wife, felt doubts about the validity of the marriage on the ground of near kinship and consulted Abu Musa Ashari, the governor of Kufa, on the subject. He told him that by reason of the kinship effected by *milk* it was not permissible for him to cohabit with his wife. Abdullah Ibn Masud took a contrary view. This incident related by Malik in his Muatta shows how widely-

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† Ibn Adhari, I, 21. We find among the Arabs a feeling about milk-kinship so well established that Mohamed’s law of forbidden degrees gives it all the effects of blood-relationship as a bar to marriage, p. 176. The commingling of blood by which two men became brothers or two kins allies, and the fiction of adoption by which a new tribesman was feigned to be the veritable son of a member of the tribe, are both evidences of the highest value that the Arabs were incapable of conceiving any absolute social obligation or social unity which was not based on kinship. To us, who live under quite modern circumstances and have lost the tribal idea altogether, kinship is always a variable and measurable quantity. We have a strong sense of kindred duty towards parents or children, not quite so strong a one towards brothers, and a sense much less strong towards first cousins; while in the remoter degrees kinship has hardly any practical significance for us. Something of this sort, though not nearly so developed, is occasionally found in Arabia before Mohamed, when beyond question family feeling was getting the upper hand of tribal feeling (*The influence of the law of blood revenge in the disintegration of the Arab society*, pp. 62-63). See the observation of Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage*, pp. 63, 64, 65. Compare the observations of Ibn Khaldun quoted above.
‡ This practice still exists among the Barbers. Ibn Adhari, I, 21. It is not altogether unknown in India. I have personally witnessed one instance of this practice.
diffused and how powerfully effective was the idea of *kinship by milk* among the Arabs. Using this idea of kinship by milk Ayasha, the wife of the Prophet, admitted those into her presence whom she wanted to receive in her house. Thus she caused milk to be given to them by her sister, Umm Kulthum, or by the daughters of her brother, Abdur Rahman, and received them without the veil. *

Finally there was yet another way of establishing kinship; namely, by adoption†. It was common in the days of Arab heathenism, and Mohamed had confirmed it by adopting Zaid Ibn Harith. The adopted, by adoption, entered into all the rights and duties of a real son (Muatta, III, 91).

These observations suffice to show what a great Arab family of Mekka and Medina was like in the first years of Islam. It was a community by itself, an *imperium in imperio*, consisting of hundreds of near and distant relatives, of thousands of clients and slaves. All

* Muatta, III, 92; Bukhari, 70, where a marriage, at the command of the Prophet, was declared illegal by reason of milk relationship. Even for the different grades of milk-relationship they had different names. The Prophet himself decided that a marriage was dissolved on the ground of milk-relationship. Ayasha relates, "Affah begged me to receive him. When I hesitated he sent word to me, How is it that you appear veiled in my presence, for, to be sure, am I not your uncle?" When Ayasha took exception to this, he answered that the wife of his brother was Ayasha's nurse. Thereupon Ayasha questioned the Prophet and he said: "Affah is right, receive him." Bukhari.

† Freedmen were often adopted by their patrons. The commonest case was no doubt that of which the poet Antara furnishes an illustration. Antara was the son of a black slave girl, and therefore, by the old law, was born a slave. But when he gave proof of prowess his father recognised him as his son and then he became a full tribesman. The right of adoption, however, was not limited to the legitimation of the offspring of a free tribesman by a slave girl. Mohamed, for example, adopted his freedman, Zaid, a lad of pure Arab blood who had become a slave through the fortune of war. Here, then, a man is incorporated by adoption into a group of alien blood; but we learn that to preserve the doctrine of tribal homogeneity it was feigned that the adopted son was veritably, and to all effects, of the blood of his new father. For when Mohamed married Zainab who had been Zaid's wife, it was objected, that by the Prophet's own law, laid down in the Quran; it was incest for a father to marry a woman who had been his son's wife, and a special revelation was required to explain that in Islam the Dâi or adopted son was no longer, as he had been in old Arabia, to be regarded as a son proper. As there was no difference between an adopted and real son before Islam, emancipated slaves appear in the genealogical lists without any note of explanation, just as if they had been pure Arabs. Dhakwan, for example, who is entered as son of Omayya, and whom the Omayyads themselves always called the son of Omayya, in spite of M.'s new law, was really, as the genealogist Dagbfal reminded the Caliph Muawiya, the slave who used to lead Omayya by the hand in his blind old age. In like manner refugees were frequently admitted to the tribe of their protector by adoption. The relation of protector and protected was constituted by a solemn engagement and oath. Robertson Smith, pp. 52, 53.
these stood under the direct influence and command of the then head of the family, ready, at all times, to gather round him for purposes offensive and defensive.

V.—The Civil War.

Under Omar the very same spirit of complete equality and brotherhood prevailed among the faithful as it did under Abu Bakr, who would not deviate by a hair's breadth from the orders of the Prophet, and who, in spite of all the objections of the Ansar and Muhajirin, sent Osama Ibn Zaid, though a freedman, in command of a division of troops, because the Prophet had so arranged. Religious enthusiasm was still very active and keen, under Omar, and it succeeded, for a time, in checking tribal jealousies and family rivalries. But with Othman the Caliphate assumed a worldly tone and colour. The element of kingship supplanted the religious element in the Caliphate. Othman outrageously favoured his tribesmen, the Omayyads, and the Mekkan aristocracy connected by marriage with him, and thus he revived the old tribal spirit—by no means quite extinct among the Arabs. The distinguished men, specially Ali, Talha, Zubair, Amr Ibn Asi, Mohamed, son of Abu Bakr, who stood at the head of the great association of Arab families, fashioned in the old Arabian sense, would not tolerate the supremacy of the Omayyads, who still, in many of their ways, fondly clung to the ideas of the Arab heathenism. They silently encouraged the rebellion which ended in the murder of the Caliph. Ali had his supporters mostly in Egypt, Talha and Zubair in Kufa and Basra,* where, through relations and clients, they exercised great influence. In Syria, on the contrary, the Omayyads predominated. The Governor of the Province was Muawiah, an Omayyad, who was confirmed in his post by Othman, and was granted large landed properties. Omar was wont to banish to Syria all those with whom he was displeased. This information, proceeding as it does from a reliable source, leads us to the inference that Syria was the home of a large number of exiles who were not very well-disposed towards the Caliph †. Also some influential men, following the example of

* We know that Talha had a house in Basra. Wüstenfeld, Register, p. 439. Zubair had a house in Kufa, two in Basra, eleven in Medina, one in old Cairo. His property was worth more than 50 million Dirham. Wüstenfeld, Register, 475.
Muawiah, and possibly encouraged and helped by him, had settled down there and had acquired landed property, in violation of the law laid down by Omar, that no Muslim was permitted to acquire landed property in conquered countries *. Nor must we forget that on the conquest of Syria the Arabs found there a large number of Arab tribes who were apparently Christians, but who readily accepted Islam, and who substantially contributed to the cause of Arab nationality and to the consolidation of the Muslim rule †.

Of this rich and fertile province the shrewd, ambitious, enterprising Muawiah was in possession. It stands to reason that he would use for his own benefit the events that were happening in Medina. There, at Medina, homage was done to Ali, undoubtedly the best and the rightful claimant to the Caliphate. But Talha and Zubair had only consented under threat and duress. They therefore left Medina at the earliest opportunity, hastened to Makka, and there declared the election of Ali invalid and illegal.

Without delay, Muawiah, in Syria, took up quite an independent attitude.‡ Directly after the murder of Othman, and even before the elevation of Ali to the Caliphate, many Omayyads left Medina. Some set out for Mekka and some for Syria to Muawiah who, on the death of Othman, stood at the head of the Association of the Omayyad families numbering many thousands, and at whose disposal lay the entire resources of a vast province.

Between these four men: Ali, Talha, Zubair and Muawiah, there now began the fight for the Caliphate. As the favourite and the son-in-law of the Prophet, Ali had the highest claim. Talha relied upon his position as one of the oldest and the most esteemed companions of the Prophet; upon his kinship with Abu Bakr who, like himself, belonged to the family of the Taimites §, upon his immense wealth, and upon the influence he wielded over his tribesmen.‖ Zubair put forward his

* Amr Ibn Asi had a country estate at Sabo in Palestine. Wüstenfeld, Register, p. 72.
† The Arab tribes of Lakham, Judam, Kuda’ah, Tawy, etc., had emigrated to Syria before the Prophet and belonged to the sect of the Hanifs. Among them, in all probability, the names Muslim and Islam were used before the Prophet. We find these appellations even before the Arab conquest among the Arab tribes settled down in Syria. Thus the Syrian Arabs are called in Abu Ismail Al Azdi: Masalimat-al-Sham (ed. Lees, Calcutta (1854), p. 25).
‡ Dozy, Spanish Islam, pp. 27 et sq.
§ Masudi, IV, 323.
relationship with the Prophet in support of his candidature. His mother Safiyyah was an aunt of the Prophet (daughter of Abdul Muttalib). He, himself, was the son-in-law of Abu Bakr, and was immensely wealthy *. Muawiah, too, rested his claim on his relationship with the Prophet. His sister, Umm Habibah, was married to the Prophet, and he himself was a kinsman of Othman †. He further relied upon his political power and upon his tribesmen, the Omayyads, incontestably the strongest in numerical strength among the great Arab families. And armed with all these, as he was, he awakened an idea, always most tremendously effective with the Arabs; namely, vengeance for Othman. He set the idea afloat. Round it rallied Talha and Zubair, and to them came Ayasha, the mother of the Faithful. Thus was quickly fulfilled the threat of the poet, Hasan Ibn Thabit, who, reproaching the Ansar for the betrayal of Othman, said:—

They murdered Othman on whose brow shone the fear of God, who spent the night saying prayers and singing hymns. Soon wilt thou hear in thy own country the call: God is great! Vengeance for Othman.

The superior military talent and courage of Ali soon succeeded in vanquishing Talha and Zubair. In the “Battle of the Camel” where 20,000 fell, he rid himself of his rivals. Talha was mortally wounded; Zubair was assassinated; Ayasha besought and obtained pardon ‡. As against Muawiah he was not so successful. This was a far-sighted politician and a shrewd diplomat. Ali was merely a general and a brave soldier. The Civil War, in spite of the “Battle of the Camel”, continued with unabated fury until Ali fell victim to the dagger of a fanatic §. The bitterness with which the Arab tribes fought surpassed all bounds. At Siffin 70,000 fell on the battle-field. Masudi relates the following characteristic story.

After the “Battle of the Camel” a man who was examining the corpses of the soldiers, fallen on the battle-field, found a severely wounded soldier reciting the following verses in low whispers:—

“Death has led us to the longed-for spring; well-sated with

* It is not quite clear whether he was related to Khadijah, the first wife of the Prophet.
‡ Dozy (Eng. Tr.), p. 34, “Battle of the Camel” fought near Basra A.D. 656, so called from Ayasha’s camel, which was a rallying-point.
§ Dozy, p. 39.
drink we return home. We have obeyed the Taimites because of the follies of our ancestors but what are the Banu Taim but slaves and servants?"*

He went near the wounded man and spoke to him. But the latter begged him to stoop down and to repeat the Muslim Article of Faith. Scarcely had he stooped when the dying man, with great effort, raised himself and bit off his ear, saying: If thy mother asks thee where hast thou left thy ear; say unto her, with Omair Ibn Ahlab of the tribe of Dabbah, the dupe of a woman (i.e. Ayasha) who coveted the Caliphate". Very soon, indeed, the war assumed the character of a war of extermination†.

The longer it lasted the more victims it claimed and the clearer it became to the tribes, ranged in hostile camps and under opposite banners, that there was no longer any religious question or any question of tribal supremacy involved, but merely inordinate ambition, absorbing passion for power, fond longing for sovereign authority—these were the motives of the contending claimants; these the real causes of the bloody war. Thus the verses are handed down in which after the Battle of Siffin, where she lost her son, a mother bewailed his death:—

"O! My eyes shed streams of tears for the youths reckoned as the noblest of the Arabs. It would not matter a straw, if they did not lose their lives, what Amir eventually won the victory."

Such were the ideas which paved the way for the conspiracy that sought to destroy three lives at one and the same time. Three fanatics swore they would kill on the appointed day Ali at Kufa; Muawiah at Damascus; Amr Ibn Asi at Old Cairo. They proceeded with their design, but only Ali was mortally wounded and died. Thus Muawiah became the undisputed ruler of the Muslim world. Before we deal with the further consequences of this fateful event we must closely examine those movements which the Civil War called into existence and which have ever since powerfully affected and influenced Muslim thought.

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* Masudi, IV, 333. The tribe, to which Abu Bakr and his daughter belonged, was called Taim. The latter was the prime-mover of the events which led to the murderous "Battle of the Camel."

† Masudi, IV, 340.
VI.—Rise of the Politico-Religious Parties.

It were completely to misunderstand human nature did we set down selfishness as the mainspring of action. It undoubtedly has a very important bearing and will always exercise a powerful influence on human conduct; but there are nobler sides of human nature, too, which, though rarely in evidence, yet, when they do come into play, achieve great and noble results. We have already seen that many of those who took active part in the foundation and building-up of the political fabric of Islam, were decidedly dominated by greed of gold, ambition, love of war, tribal spirit and family rivalry; and similarly our enquiry has shown that at least the first campaigns of the Muslims were prompted more by zeal for plunder than ardour for Islam. But it would be an absolute error to suppose that, later, other motives, equally powerful and of a wholly different character, were not effectively at work. Ibn Khaldun justly observes that in countries where wealth and prosperity prevail sense of piety and tendency to religious enthusiasm always and invariably weaken and vanish. Precisely for this reason we find in large towns religious feelings in a very attenuated form. Luxurious life, distractions, sumptuous fare, make men indifferent or insensible to the promptings of faith. Hence the general indifference. In country places, in the desert, on the other hand, the very opposite is the case. There, humanity, by simple fare, by laborious living, by hunger and privation, awake to religious feelings, and turn to a contemplative life.*

A deep truth underlies these words of the great Arab thinker and statesman, and the history of Islam is an eloquent commentary upon them.

Early, indeed, a powerful religious feeling permeated and pervaded the masses, and the greater the outward successes of Islam the more this feeling gained in depth and intensity. It is true that religious ideas made slow progress among the Beduins; but no less true is it, that once these ideas arose, they powerfully laid hold of the

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*Ibn Khaldun, Proleg., I, 180. All that Ibn Khaldun has said about the influence of food and climate upon civilization has been worked out, from the modern point of view, by Buckle in his History of Civilization. What the Arab thinker has divined, the British publicist has proved. Between them, however, there is a gap of five hundred years. One wrote in the metropolis of the modern world on the Thames; the other in North Africa, in an old castle (Kalat Ibn Salamah) the ruins of which are still to be seen in the Province of Oran (Algeria) on the left bank of Mina.
Beduin mind. Superstitious—for superstition is dominant among
the half-wild tribes, and renders them highly amenable to spiritual
sensibilities—these tribes, once touched by spiritual emotion, became
the most powerful instruments for the dissemination of religious
ideas. The Patriarchal government of Omar; the continued and unin-
terrupted successes of the Arab arms; the conversion, in masses,
of the subject races, especially in the Provinces of the Persian Empire,
tended to the growth and extension of Islam, with the result that
the new religion made in silence as great a conquest of the mind and
heart as did the army of the Caliph win visible triumphs on the
battle-field.

With this steady growth of Islam the degeneration of the ruling
classes under Othman, and the bloody civil war consequent upon his
death, did not in the least interfere. The spiritual seed germinated
and grew silently, developing and extending its roots and branches
on all sides. And yet the violent convulsions of the long-drawn civil
war led to greater and greater embitterment of mind, and facilitated the
gradual formation of parties.

On the plain of Siffin, on the western bank of the Euphrates, a
succession of fierce fights ended in a three days' battle. A portion of
the army of Ali rebelled and compelled him to accept the arbitration
offered by Muawiah. The troops were weary of massacre, and were no
longer inclined to fight for the ambition of their chiefs. About 12,000
men left Ali's camp, dissociated themselves from him, and retired to
Harura, where they encamped.* They received the appellation of
Khariji. They were composed of different elements.† Religious fanac-
tics formed the nucleus. As Shahristani excellently puts it, they
were people of prayer and fast. The democracy set up by Omar,
harmonising with the Arab temperament, found in these heroic
champions. Thoroughly sick of the rivalry and jealousy of the
aristocratic party of Mekka and the hierarchichal clique of Medina,
they were anxious to go back to the ways of Omar. Their principles,

* On the Kharijites: see the admirable monograph of Brümnow, Die Charidschiten,
Brill 1884; Z.D.M.G., Vol. XIII, p. 605; Browne, Lit. Hist. of Persia, I, 220 et seq.;
Goldziher, M.S., I, 133; also Goldziher's Mohammed and Islam, Chapter V; Von
Kremer, Kulturgeschichte des Orients, Chapter VI (my translation of this work published
under the title of Orient under the Caliphs, pp. 258 et seq.).
† Weil, I, 332.
then, were decidedly democratic. They declared both Ali and Muawiah unjust autocrats. They held it a duty to renounce allegiance to a ruler who violated the laws of religion. They rejected the exclusive claim of the Quraishite relatives of the Prophet to the Caliphate as utterly unfounded and without substance, and put forward the view that the Imam (Head of the State) should be elected by the people, and the choice need not be restricted to an Arab. It might fall upon a non-Arab, even upon a slave. Some even questioned the necessity for a Head of the State at all, and maintained that an unjust or an irreligious ruler might be deposed or killed.* In a certain sense the Kharijites were the Puritans of Islam; fanatical in religion, democratic in politics. The majority of the Kharijites were Arab Nationalists. They belonged chiefly to Iraq, Bahrain and Central Arabia.

Another politico-religious party, in clear contrast to these, came into being about this time. It was the party of the supporters of Ali (Shi'at Ali). They stood unconditionally by him, looked upon him as the legitimate successor of the Prophet, clung to him with enthusiastic devotion, and declared themselves ready to lay down their lives for him. When, at the battle of Siffin, the award went against Ali, 60,000 men are said to have declared themselves ready to sacrifice their lives for him.† We have already spoken of the Jew, Abdullah Ibn Saba, who actively worked in Egypt on behalf of Ali, and who, even in his lifetime, gave currency to extravagant doctrines about him. For instance, he proclaimed him to be a Prophet; nay, an incarnation of Divinity.‡ At the beginning of the civil war he made his appearance in Iraq, where he worked in the interest of the Alides. But in his partisanship he went much further than Ali quite liked, and therefore Ali banished him to Medina. It is, however, beyond doubt, that even in the lifetime of Ali a party was formed in Iraq, consisting mostly of new converts, the old native population, who, in spite of Islam, which they professed, fastened upon Ali the ancient Asiatic ideas — their immemorial inheritance — ideas relating to hereditary succession and divine right of Princes.

† Abul Faraj, p. 190.
‡ Weil, I, 209. See Prof. Friedlander's Heterodoxies of the Shiites in the Presentation of Ibn Hazm, p. 66.
This party consisted of his Arab troops, his clients, his tribesmen, a considerable number of pietists, and the ever-growing circle of the new converts.

Tragic as was the death of Ali — the persecution of his adherents which the Omayyads ruthlessly indulged in and the hideous catastrophe in Kerbala awoke a deep feeling of vengeance, and fostered the growth of the sect of the Shiites.

In the Eastern lands of the Caliphate, especially among the Persians, the tenets of this party found ready and wide acceptance and impressed upon Islam a peculiar stamp of its own. It soon developed a personal cult of Ali and his descendants. While the Shiite ideas, paving the way to Absolutism in religion and politics, rapidly spread in the West and attained a decisive preponderance; in the East, no less, the ideas of the Kharijites obtained an unmistakable ascendancy. Both these phenomena can be explained by the local conditions and the peculiar genius of the people concerned. The inhabitants of old Babylonia, an Aramaic race, in consequence of the nature of the country, which is a richly watered and fertile plain, have been from time immemorial engaged in agriculture, and have suffered the usual fate of agricultural nations; namely, a despotic government. They were accustomed to look upon their princes, not as human beings, but as divinities; and the idea, therefore, of electing or deposing them would appear profoundly sacrilegious to them. From the remotest antiquity* they have been accustomed to monarchical despotism, which degrades its subjects to a will-less instrument of the all-powerful ruler. The character of the people there was, and had ever been, slavishly servile. In fact servility was congenital with them; and it was the one quality which found favour in the eyes of their mighty rulers. Accordingly, the Shiite doctrine of fixed hereditary succession and the worship of the descendants of Ali, in the nature of things, appealed to such a degenerate race.

Quite different was the position of affairs in the West — by which we mean to convey what the Arabs understood by that term; namely, the entire North African coast-land lying beyond Egypt. With the exception of a few Greek and Roman Colonists† settled in towns and fortified places, and a small remnant of the Vandal invasion, the popu-

† It was specially reported of the inhabitants of Kastyliyyah and Bildeduljerid, as
lation consisted of tribesmen whom the Arabs call Berbers, and who had a strong affinity with the Arab tribes in their tribal constitution, in their mode of living, in their entire mentality.* These Berber tribes, whose† military skill and talents the Romans had learnt to know in their war with Jugurtha, had lived most simply, from time immemorial, under their native tribal chief. Cattle-breeding was their main occupation.

It can easily be imagined that among such people no despotic monarchy, in the old Asiatic sense, could find acceptance. A keen sense of freedom and independence has ever existed among tribes living in mountainous and inaccessible regions, or carrying on cattle-breeding and leading a wandering life. The agriculturist is rooted to the soil. The Beduin in his desert, the mountaineer in his fastnesses, laughs every pursuit to scorn. The Berbers do not seem to have possessed a national religion. Hence their readiness to accept foreign faiths. Thus we find Christianity in some, and Judaism in others, as the faith of the tribe.‡ Among such people Islam, which originally preached brotherhood and equality, and, in addition, assured a good deal of booty, was sure to find a quick response.§ When the politico-religious party arose in Islam the doctrines of the Kharijites spread as rapidly among them as did the Shiite doctrines among the Persians.||

VII.—The Kharijites.

The twelve thousand men who rebelled at Siffin dissociated themselves from Ali and took up their position at Harura, in the neighbourhood of Kufa. Some months passed in futile negotiations, and finally Ali found himself constrained to take up arms against them. Adopting as their war-cry the words La hukma illa li'llah ( Arbiter-

also of the town of Tuzar, that they were the descendants of the Roman Colonists. Cf. A. de Kremer, Description de l’Afrique, 42.

* Weil, I, 544; Dozy, Musulmans d’Espagne, I, 228.
‡ Barth, Reisen und Entdeckungen, I, 53, 244.
§ The Berbers had a strong tendency to superstition. Even long after their conversion to Islam they worshipped the many Roman sepulchres in their country. They offered prayers and sacrifices there. Barth, I, 39; Notices et extraits de la Bibliothèque du Roi, Vol. XII, 458.
|| Later at the end of the third century A.H. the Shiite doctrine obtained a footing in Africa. The result of this was the rise of the dynasty of the Ubaidites, who subdued and ruled Egypt for a long time.
ment belongs to none save God), they advanced towards Madain (Ctesiphon) with the intention of occupying it and establishing a "Council of Representatives" which should serve as "a model to the ungodly cities all around." Foiled in this endeavour by the foresight of the governor, they continued their march to Nahruwan,* near the Persian frontier. They also nominated a Caliph of their own — Abdullah b. Wahb, of the tribe of Rasib — on 22nd March, 658 A.D., and proceeded to slay as unbelievers Muslims who did not share their views or recognize their Caliph and refused to curse Othman and Ali.† When Ali's army advanced against them, most of the rebels dispersed, but a band of 15 to 18,000 unflinching fanatics held their ground. They were hewn down, if we credit the Arab version, with the exception of a very few. But such movements never perish in streams of blood. The Kharijites silently worked for their cause, and won so large a following that within a short time of Ali's death they could muster strong in the province of Khuzistan. Ahwaz, the capital of this province, is three days' march from the Tigris. Preaching sedition, they traversed the entire country between Khuzistan and Mosul. The Governor of the province needed one full year to effect even a temporary submission of the Kharijites.

After the town of Harura these earliest Kharijites were called Harurites. The little that we know of their views and beliefs leads us to conclude that they were fierce fanatics in whom the fear of Hell worked most effectively. They even thought that mere belief in Eternal Punishment would not save, and looked upon every Muslim who had committed a heinous sin as a heathen, and maintained that true faith rested not in lip service, but in the absolute avoidance of every sin. They stand, as Maqrizi excellently puts it, in complete contrast to the religious views of the Murjiya.‡ Both in Iraq and in the Persian

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* Between Wasit and Bagdad. Both these towns, as is well known, were built later.
‡ Khuda Bukhsh, *Islamic Civilisation*, pp. 58 et seq.; Goldziher, M.S., I, 91; Von Kremer, *Herrsch. Ideen*, p. 26. "The Murjiya (so called from the root arja'a, 'he postponed'), because they postpone or defer judgment against sinful Muslims till the Day of Resurrection, and refuse to assert that any true believer, no matter what sins he may have committed, is certainly damned) were essentially that body of Muslims who, unlike the Shiites and Kharijites, acquiesced in the Omayyad rule. In doctrine they otherwise agreed in the main with the orthodox party, though, as Von Kremer thinks, they greatly softened and mitigated the terrible features, holding 'that no believing
provinces adjoining Iraq, these religious fanatics multiplied so rapidly that the Caliphs of Damascus had to send their most energetic general there to maintain mere order and peace. Basra was entirely under the influence of the Kharijites. In other towns, too, they were in large numbers; in fact, everywhere they had friends and supporters. The Iraqians were not favourably inclined towards the Omayyads, and were in sympathy partly with the Alides and partly with the rival Caliph, Abdullah Ibn Zubair. More than once, indeed, that one common purpose, namely, the overthrow of the Omayyad yoke, united the Kharijites and the Shiites, divided though they were in their belief by a sundering gulf. In Kufa the entire population was for the Alides, and held by the Shiite belief. In Basra, on the other hand, the Kharijites predominated. The inhabitants of both these towns, almost simultaneously, expelled the Omayyad Governors.* In Mukhtar the Shiites of Kufa found a competent leader. This unwearied agitator made common cause now with one and now with the other party, but always with an eye to business.

The Kharijites, on the other hand, developing along independent lines of their own, led by a chief elected by them, repeatedly lost and retook the town of Kufa from the troops of the rival Caliph at Mekka, Abdullah Ibn Zubair. When finally driven away, they withdrew under their chief, Nafi Ibn Azraq (called Azraqites after him), to the province of Khuzistan, which like Fars and Kirman they reduced to submission. Nafi fell in battle, but they elected another in his place. Commander of the Faithful was the title they gave to their elected chief. They possessed an army of 30,000 horsemen, and constantly put large hosts to flight. Their last chief, Katari, one of the most chivalrous figures, holds a distinguished position in the history of this

Muslim would remain eternally in hell,' and in general, setting faith above works. Their views were so evidently adapted to the environment of the Omayyad court, with which no sincere Shiite or Kharijite could have established any modus vivendi, though Christians and other non-Muslims stood in high favour there, and held important offices, that it is hard to regard them otherwise than as time-servers of the Vicar of Bray type. With the fall of the Omayyads their raison d'être ended, and they ceased to exist as an independent party, though from their ranks arose the celebrated Abu Hanifa, the founder of one of the four orthodox schools of the Sunnis which endure to the present day.” (Browne, I, 280).

* Weil, I, 353. Weil does not distinguish between the Shiites and the Kharijites and hence his account in many places is not quite clear.
epoch.* Some fragments of his military poems have come down to us. The Kharijites rose in Bahrain as they had done in Khuzistan, and only after bitter fights were they vanquished.†

Not until Abdul Malik had conquered the rival Caliph of Mekka; subdued the whole of Iraq (71 A.H., i.e. 690 A.D.), brought the holy towns of Mekka and Medina under his control (73 A.H., i.e. 692 A.D.), was he able to use his whole strength against the Kharijites. In 75 A.H. (694 A.D.) Hajjaj was appointed Governor of Iraq. The rare energy and statesmanship of Hajjaj, reinforced by the tact and military talents of Muhallab, succeeded in uprooting the Kharijites. Katari, their last chief, was slain in battle. They proceeded with terrible severity against the Kharijites; thousands were sent to the gallows. Hajjaj is said to have condemned 120,000 of them to death. Such is the report of the Iraqians, who represent Hajjaj as a monster of iniquities. According to other reports he was as unselfish as he was an excellent administrator, and hence the esteem and honour in which the Syrians held him.‡ Against the Shiites he adopted no less severe and repressive measures than he did against the Kharijites; for both these sects, though differing widely in their aims and objects, were in complete accord in one thing, their hatred of the existing government. But, as is always the case with persecutions, fanaticism augments in proportion to the severity used.

A fresh revolt of the Kharijites was not long in coming. Saleh Ibn Misrah and Shabib Ibn Yazid headed the movement.§ They gathered around them a small but heroic band who knew how to die for their cause. Their views were in agreement with the general views of the Kharijites. They described both Ali and Othman as unjust Caliphs, and declared war against the tyranny of the Omayyads as a holy war in honour of God. They pointed to this life as fleeting and worthless, and relied upon the reward in heaven as sure and eternal. A deeper sense of justice, a humaner spirit, a more chivalrous tone and temper characterised this movement. A series of fights against con-

* Hamasaah, pp. 4, 44, 60, 331; Von Kremer, Kultur geschichte, II, 360-2; Brünnow, 26; Browne, Lit. Hist. of Persia, I, 221.
† Weil, I, 413; Ibn Khallikan, Vita, No. 555. Abu Fudaik was the leader of the Kharijites of Bahrain.
‡ Zamakhshari’s Rabi-ul-Abrar in Ibn Kasim, p. 33; Weil, I, 551; Ibn Khaldun, Proleg., I, 312; Ibn Asakir, fol. 15; Khuda Buksh, Orient under the Caliphs, 201-204.
§ Weil, I, 434.
siderably superior numbers of the troops of the Caliphs took place. Saleh fell in one of these many conflicts, and Shabib succeeded him as the Commander of the Faithful. Round him tradition has woven a chaplet of romance. With his brave band he was everywhere and nowhere. Now he made his appearance in the neighbourhood of Madain; now in Adherbajian; now in the territory of Mosul. In all his campaigns his mother and his beautiful wife, Ghazalah, accompanied him. To please Ghazalah he once made a daring attack upon Kufa (though Hajjaj with his troops was in occupation of the Government Palace) and actually took it, and this because Ghazalah had made a vow to perform a short prayer and to recite the two largest chapters of the Qur’an in the mosque of Kufa.* He even managed to attack Kufa a second time, but fortune had deserted him. Larger and larger numbers of troops were sent against him. His mother and his wife fell in battle.† The Omayyad general overtook him at Ahwaz. Shabib, to whom a small number of troops remained loyal, retreated. While riding over a bridge on the little Tigris (Dujail) his horse took fright, and fell with him into the water.‡ The heavy steel coat-of-mail dragged him down in the river, but before he was drowned he is said to have called out to his loyal companions: “God, the all-Powerful, fulfils our destiny.” (Weil, I, 434, note 5).

A series of such insurrections, now of the Shiites and now of the Kharijites, followed at varying intervals. The Omayyads, in the meantime, were fast on the decline. Risings, on all sides, followed one another in swift succession, and family dissensions grew more and more bitter and paralysing. Scarcely had Merwan, the last of the Omayyads, seized the reins of government, when a Shiite insurrection broke out in Kufa. Simultaneously a far greater danger threatened from the north. Dahhaq Ibn Qais Shaibani, a Kharijite chief, collected an army of 3000 men in Mesopotamia; destroyed at one stroke the Shiite troops in Kufa, took possession of the town, and soon became

† We read with reference to Ghazalah that the sect of Shabibiyyah (the supporters of Shabib) declared the Imamat of a woman permissible.
‡ The Dujail (little Tigris) is a large river in the province of Al-Ahwaz, having a number of towns and villages on its banks. It takes its rise near Isphahan, and its bed was dug by Ardashir Ibn Babak. It must not be confounded with the Dujail of Baghdad, which branches off the Tigris opposite to Al-Kadisiya, on the west side of the river, between Tikrit and Baghdad, and waters an extensive country; Ibn Khall, I, 619.
master of the whole of Iraq. With an army of 12,000 men he advanced towards the Euphrates near Rakkah, with the obvious intention of attacking Syria. The Caliph personally took the field against him, and Dahhaq fell in the battle and his troops suffered a complete defeat (128 A.H., i.e. 745-6 A.D.).† Though order was restored here, the Kharijites secured entire possession of Adherbaijan, from which they drove out the imperial troops. A Kharijite flying-corps even managed to obtain temporary possession of Medina.‡

In Persia the Alides took up a strong position, and visibly grew in power and influence. While the rise of hostile parties, all over, threatened to wreck the Empire; a movement, which had for long been maturing, suddenly burst into light. The Alides and the Abbasids, for some time, had been conspiring against the Omayyads, each hoping to set up his own nominee to the Caliphate. A coalition seems at last to have been effected between the two main branches of the great Quraishite family; namely, the Alides and the Abbasids. They combined against their common enemy, and overthrew Merwan II, the last of the Omayyads, a prince, surely, worthy of a better fate.

Here we shall pause to cast a glance at the extension of the Kharijite ideas in Africa, and to estimate its influence on the political history of that country. Hunted down in the East, dispersed and scattered, many of the Kharijites found asylum in Africa. There they found shelter and protection among the different Berber tribes, and there they propagated their doctrines with unexampled success. The majority of the Kharijites who emigrated to Africa belonged to the two sects of the Sufrites and the Ibadites. On this subject our information is meagre and insufficient. It seems that their doctrines were not so rigid and unbending as those of the Harurites, but their political principles were distinctly democratic. These two sects secured a large following among the Berbers.§

* Weil, I, 689 et seq. † Muir, Caliphate, pp. 147 et seq. ‡ Weil, I, 693.
§ Ibn Adhari, I, 39, 40, 41. "The Berbers' faith was the stern and passionate religion preached to them by the Kharijites. Nowhere had these zealous and convinced teachers found their tenets so fervently embraced; the Calvinists of Islam had at last found their Scotland. The Arabs had rejected their doctrines, not through any repugnance to their political principles—which, on the contrary, accorded well with the republican instincts of the race—but because they would neither take their religion seriously, nor accept the intolerant Puritanism by which these sectaries were distinguished. On the other hand the inmates of squalid African huts accepted their teachings with indescribable enthusiasm. . . . It would be unprofitable to enquire what particular sect they gave a preference to—whether they were Harurites, or Sofrites, or Ibadites—for the
By reason of the oppression of the Arab governors who mercilessly sucked the land and drained the resources of the country to enrich themselves and the Court of Damascus—the Berber population was driven to rebellion, which broke out almost simultaneously with the most violent political upheaval in Iraq (122 A.H., i.e. 740 A.D.). A great number of the Berber tribes rejected Islam, expelled their Muslim chiefs, and elected in their places chiefs of their own tribe. The insurrection became so extensive that it seemed that it would end in the complete extirpation of the Arab invaders.* A Berber called Maisarah placed himself at the head of the rebels. His countrymen chose him as their Caliph and the Kharijites (the Sufrites) appointed him their chief. But soon his troops put him to death, and elected in his place Khalid Ibn Hamid, of the great Berber tribe of Zanatah, who had inflicted several crushing defeats on the Arabs.† In the battle of Wadi Sabu (where along with 20,000 Arabs there were 10,000 members of the Omayyad family) the Arab army was completely put to flight. The town of Kairwan was attacked by the Kharijites and thirty thousand Berbers, but the inhabitants repulsed the attack. After this unsuccessful attack one of the generals, Tarif, settled down among the Berbers in Tamesna, and founded the dynasty of the Barghawatah.‡ After a great deal of bloodshed the government succeeded in suppressing the Berber revolt (155 A.H., i.e. 772 A.D.). But insurrections, great and small, uninterruptedly continued, proving how deeply the people resented the foreign yoke. The doctrines of the Kharijites had taken deep root in different tribes. Such was the case with the powerful Zanatah tribe and the Hawwarar tribe. A colony of the Kharijites (Ibadiyyah) founded the town of Taihort, and the fight between the native tribes and the Arab settlers never really ceased at any time. The governors of the Caliph had a difficult position to keep, but that did not prevent them from striving after greater and greater independence from the Central Government at Baghdad. They gradually secured allies among the Berber tribes, and, by identifying chroniclers are not agreed upon this matter. At any rate they understood enough of the Kharijites' doctrines to assimilate their revolutionary and democratic principles, to share the fanciful hopes of universal levelling which their teachers aroused, and to be convinced that their oppressors were reprobates whose destiny was hell-fire." Dozy, Spanish Islam, pp. 130-131.

† Ibn Adhari (Doxy's edition), I, 40 et seq.
‡ Ibn Adhari, I, 44.
themselves with their interests, they strengthened their position and consolidated their power.

It is not difficult to see that these repeated wars of the Berbers against the Arabs were really nothing more nor less than the assertion and manifestation of the Spirit of Nationality against a foreign rule. The Kharijite ideas found so swift a response among them shearly because its democratic spirit completely harmonised with their own sense of liberty and freedom. These wars, therefore, like most of the insurrections in Iraq, were far more political than religious in their spirit and significance.

**VIII.—The Shiites.**

The change of dynasty which had taken place in the East and which had transferred the Caliphate from the family of the Omayyads to that of the Abbasids was a change completely disappointing to those who had done most for it; namely, to the Alides and the Shiites. By the overthrow of the Omayyads they had cherished the hope of setting up a descendant of Ali on the throne — instead of that the descendants of Abbas, the uncle of the Prophet, obtained possession of the Caliphate. Against the new dynasty, therefore, rebellious movements were not wanting and the first Abbasids treated the Alides with as great harshness and severity as they did the Omayyads. The Shiites, as might be expected, with a small exception, who went over unconditionally to the Abbasids, clung to the Alides and shared their fate.

Fortune smiled upon them but for a while. In the fratricidal war between the two sons of Harun, Mamun relied on the Persians, who were steeped through and through in Shiite ideas; while his brother relied on the Arabs. Mamun won, and with him began not only a period of great religious toleration, but also open patronage of the Shiites. Under the influence of his Alide counsellors, especially his Wazir Fadhl Ibn Sahl, he went the length of marrying one of his daughters to a great-grandson of Ali, and even declared him as his successor. He ordered coins to be struck in his name, and changed the black flag of the Abbasids for the green of the Alides.* Against this act of the Caliph a popular anti-Shiite reaction set in. Iraq and other Provinces were not only not inclined to tolerate the tutelage of the Persian courtiers of the Caliph, but felt apprehensive of falling under the sway of the Shiite

* Weil, II, 217.
religious ideas through the influence of the Alide Crown Prince—a prospect not very cheering to the Arabs. The Shiites had made themselves thoroughly disliked by their repeated fanatical excesses, and by their wild intolerance towards the rest of the Muslims. Mamun was forced to change his policy. He had his wazir murdered in the bath, and his son-in-law poisoned (203 A.H., 818—19 A.D.). The religious faith of the Shiites had developed early, and in quite an original way. The idolatrous worship of Ali and his descendants lies at the root of the entire system. Even in the first century they made pilgrimage to the grave of Husain, where they sobbed and sighed and wept. Later this developed into an annual function (celebrated on the 10th of Moharrum), which has been most effective in keeping alive the Shiite fanaticism.

In the year 62 A.H. (681—2 A.D.) a Shiite army was passing by the sepulchre of Husain in Kerbala. As soon as it came within sight of the sepulchre the men dismounted, tore off their dresses, flung dust on their heads and raised a woeful cry. Stridently vocal was their commander in prayer: "Peace be on thee, son of the daughter of our Prophet! Martyr, son of a martyr! Truth-lover, son of a truth-lover!

* "It is an erroneous view," says Goldziher in his *Mohammed and Islam* (pp. 255-256), "which traces the origin and development of Shi'ism to the modifications of the ideas in Islam, brought about by the conquest and spread among Iranian nations." This widespread view is based on a historical misunderstanding, which Wellhausen has overthrown conclusively in his essay on the *Religiöse-politischen Oppositionsparteien im alten Islam*. The Alide movement started on genuine Arab soil. It was not till the uprising of Mukhtar that it spread among the non-Semitic element of Islam. The origins of the Imam theory, involving the theocratic opposition against the worldly conception of the State; the doctrine of the Messiah into which the Imam theory merges; and the belief in the Parousia in which it finds an expression, can be traced back to Judaico-Christian influences. Even the exaggerated deification of Ali was first proclaimed by Abdullah Ibn Saba before there could possibly have been a question of the influence of such ideas from Aryan circles, and Arabs joined this movement in great numbers. Even the most marked consequences of the anthropomorphic doctrine of incarnation (see Goldziher, p. 233) owe their origin in part to those who are of indisputable Arabic descent. Shiism as a sectarian doctrine was seized upon as eagerly by orthodox and theocratically-minded Arabs as by Iranians. To be sure, the Shiite form of opposition was decidedly welcome to the latter, and they readily identified themselves with this form of Muslim thought, on whose further development their old inherited ideas of a divine kingship exercised a direct influence. But the primary origins of these ideas within Islam do not depend on such influence; Shiism is, in its roots, as genuinely Arabic as Islam itself.

† Shiism was a fertile soil for fostering absurdities calculated to bring about the total disentegration of the God-idea in Islam. See Goldziher, *Mohammed and Islam*, p. 234. Also pp. 232-233.

‡ Weil, I, 359, according to Tabari. See Wüstenfeld, Der Tod des Hussein und die Rache.
Imam, son of an Imam! How unjust and violent was thy death! what noble bodies were trodden under the horses’ hoofs! what a head pierced by an enemy lance! we have blackened our faces, and with blackened faces we appear before thee to seek thy forgiveness! we are sinners. Thy blood is on our neck. We have vowed to avenge thee with our very lives, so that the Almighty may forgive us and the Prophet may not withdraw his intercession from us!’” Animated by such ideas the Shiites still visit the sepulchre of Husain, and, in the very same spirit as their forefathers, celebrate the anniversary of his death.*

At first the oldest Shiites regarded Husain and Hasan as Imams. After their death opinion was divided. Some maintained that the Imamat continued in their descendants (the holders of this view are the Imamiyya and the Zaidiyya); others held that the Imamat after the death of Husain was transferred to Ali’s son, Mohammed Ibn-Al-Hanafiyya, whom, henceforward, they considered their rightful Imam. Mohammed Ibn-Al-Hanafiyya died in A.H. 81 (A.D. 700) at Taif at the age of 65.† After his death extravagant stories about him were put in circulation by a freedman of Ali, called Kaisan. Some fanatics asserted that Ibn-Al-Hanafiyya was not dead but had disappeared, and that he was actually living in concealment; that he would return at a stated time, and fill the Earth with justice and righteousness.‡

† Ibn Kutaiba, p. 111.
‡ Shahristani, I, 168. The well-known poet Saiid Himyari believed in this. He died in A.H. 171 or 179 A.H. (A.D. 786). Hammer-Purgstall, *Lit. Gesch. d. Araber*, III, 548; Kharidat-ul-Ajaib, p. 153. “Even in the earliest days of the development of the Imam theory there was no agreement among the Shiite community as to the personalities of the Imam. One of the earliest manifestations of the Shiite idea, as we have seen (p. 224), appeared in connexion with an Imam who did not trace his descent from the Fatimide line of Ali. And even within the Fatimide descendants various groups of Ali adherents have set up quite distinct lines of Imams—a divergence due to the numerous ramifications of the Ali family. After the death of the Imam Abu Muhammed Al-Askari, the Shiites were already split up into about fourteen divisions, each claiming the privilege of direct descent from Ali. The series of Imams most widely recognised at the present time among the Shiites is that set up by the sect of the so-called ‘Twelvers’ (or Imamiite). According to them Ali’s rank as Imam was directly inherited by ‘visible’ Imams, up to the eleventh, whose son Muhammed Abul Kasim (born in Baghdad, 872) was removed from the Earth when scarcely eight years old, and since then lives hidden from the sight of men, in order to appear at the end of time as the Imam Mahdi, the Saviour, to free the world from injustice, and to set up the kingdom of Peace and Justice. This is the so-called ‘hidden Imam’ who has lived on ever since his disappearance, and whose re-appearance is daily awaited by the faithful
The idea of a "hidden Imam" who, at a certain point of time, would come out of his concealment to rule the world and to usher in a golden age, made its appearance very early, and has played an important rôle in later Islam. In fact it is not without influence even now (Ibn Athir, VIII, 21 et seq.). We might divide the Shiites into two main classes: those who acknowledge the transmission of the Imamat to the descendents of Ali's wife, Fatima, only (Imamiyya, Isna-Ashaziyya, Zaidiyya), the severe, uncompromising legitimists; and those who make the Imamat hereditary in the line of Mohammed Ibn-Al-Hanafiyya (Kaisaniyya, Hashimiyya, etc.). A portion of the latter went over to the Abbasids and acknowledged the Imamat of the first Abbasid and his successors. By this, of course, they ceased to be Shiites.* Apart from the cleavage due to the question of succession, there is a yet wider fissure, traversing the whole of their religious system, according as the latter deviated more or less in the matter of dogmatic questions from general orthodox Islam. We must, therefore, follow the Arab authorities, and divide them into moderate and ultra-Shiites.

The (oft-mentioned) South Arabian Jew, Abdullah Ibn Saba, championed the view that the spirit of God had descended on Ali, and that he would, at some future time, return and fill the Earth with righteousness.† This idea steadily gained ground among the ultra-Shiites, especially among the Persians, who incorporated into Islam the old Indian idea of the divine incarnation in man. They looked upon the Imam as one directly appointed by God. He was sinless and infallible; a continuing manifestation of Godhead in human form, whose soul, when dead, passed into the body of his successor.‡

Shiite. This belief in a hidden Imam is to be found in all branches of Shiism. Each one of the parties believe in the continued existence and ultimate appearance of that Imam who in the special order of Imams is regarded as the last. . . . The 'Return' is, therefore, one of the decisive factors in the Imam theory of all sub-divisions of the Shiites; they differ only in regard to the person and order of the hidden and returning Imam. . . . The next person to be regarded as a vanishing Imam who would some day return, was Ali's son, Mohammed Ibn-Al-Hanafiyya, whose adherents were convinced of his continued existence and his re-appearance. The idea of the 'Return' is not of itself an original doctrine. Probably this belief came over to Islam through Judaeo-Christian influences". Goldziher, pp. 240-242.

* Shahristani, I, 169, 170.
† The sect of Ibiyyah regarded Ali as God. Others associated Mohamed with him in his divinity, and some thought that God was a mystical three, consisting of Mohamed, Ali, Fatima, Hasan, and Husain. Shahristani, I, 202; Mawakif, 346.
‡ Ibn Khaldun, Prolég., I, 404; Shahristani, I, 170.
He was the very embodiment of religion and morality; and, therefore, to him was due blind, unquestioning obedience. They went, in the end, even to the extent of regarding the Imam as God in human shape.* The Alides, exposed as they were to constant persecutions, set up the doctrine of the hidden Imam, and this for the obvious reason that it was not safe for the Imam publicly to appear and declare himself as such.† Mohammed Ibn-Al-Hanafiyya was worshipped as such by a sect. The Isna-Ashariyya held a similar belief. They maintained that their last Imam, Hasan Askari, whom they also call Mahdi, had disappeared in a subterranean passage, and would return at the end of time, as Messiah, to rule the world. This doctrine of the “hidden Imam” led to further deviations. The idea that God manifested himself in the family of Ali was extended, enlarged, amplified. It came to be believed that other men, too, might be ordained by God as Imams, and thus become his Representative on Earth, exercising supreme authority in matters spiritual and temporal. In the first century such ideas got abroad and laid hold of the popular mind—calling forth a great many popular risings. A long series of fanatics and impostors put themselves forward as the expected Imam (the Mahdi), and the instance of the Bab clearly points to the conclusion that this tendency has not yet wholly died out from the East.‡

Under the strong and stern government of the first Abbasids these politico-religious parties, in spite of repeated insurrections and fierce fights, could not make much headway. The hand of an all-powerful government kept them under control, and even if, perchance, an individual ruler felt favourably inclined towards the Shiites, he could not, with any safety to himself, abandon the path of orthodoxy—

* The Sect of Bazighiyaa looked upon Jafar Ibn Mohamad, an Alide, as an incarnation of God. Khittat, II, 352. Others worshipped Jafar Sadiq as God. At Kunash in Kufa they erected a hut, where they met and worshipped.
† Sunni Islam, says Goldziher, emphatically rejects the Shiite form of this belief. It ridicules the long-lived hidden Imam, p. 246. Even during his bodily absence the hidden Imam is the genuine “leader of the time” and not without the power to manifest his will to believers, p. 247. Goldziher, on p. 247, cites a remarkable proof of the active force of this belief in modern Persia. “The doctrine of the Imam, accordingly, maintains its active force. It has attained a dogmatic significance of fundamental importance, and is an active, essential element of the religious and political system.”
‡ Even under the Omayyads one Bonan Ibn Sinan gave himself out as an incarnation of God. Shahrastani, I, 172. He was killed. Mukanna played a similar role, and so did Abu Mansur Ijii and Abul Khattab. Hallaj and Shalmaghani died for this idea, and many other enthusiasts sacrificed their lives for it.
for the great mass of Muslim population in Syria, Egypt and Arabia were decidedly orthodox. In Iraq itself, where formerly the Kharijite and the Shiite ideas flourished, a change manifested itself when, after the fall of the Omayyads, the Abbasid Caliphs went into residence at Baghdad. The orthodox party, henceforward, gained and managed to retain the upper hand here, and the masses, especially in the Capital, were distinctly and positively hostile to the Shiites, as the frequently recurring street riots only too clearly prove. Later, these riots between the Orthodox and the Shiites became an annual institution, so to speak, both at Baghdad and in other large towns. Circumstanced as they were, the Shiites resorted to a method which oppressed political parties have adopted at all times and in all ages. They worked in the dark, formed secret societies, sent emissaries to outlying provinces. From the centre of the Caliphate they transferred their activity to its periphery. Thus they succeeded in founding small independent principalities and dynasties. Thus arose, in the extreme west of Africa (in the modern Morocco), the dynasty of the Idrisides. Under the Caliph Hadi (169–70 A.H., 785–86 A.D.) an insurrection of the Alides took place in Mekka and Medina which was quelled with streams of blood. One of the Alides, a great-grandson of Ali, called Idris, saved himself by flight. He settled down in the west in the neighbourhood of Walylly,* where he was welcomed by the Berbers, and where he laid the foundation of the Idriside dynasty.† He was poisoned at the instance of the Caliph Harun, but his dynasty continued through his son (187–312 A.H.; 808–924 A.D.)‡

A Shiite emissary, himself a descendant of Ali, succeeded in Tabaristan, in the north of Persia, in inducing the inhabitants to accept the Shiite faith and the Alide rule.§ Some time later an Alide, called Nasir Otrush, came to Dailam, and successfully proclaimed himself as Imam ||.

During the great Alide insurrection under Mamun (195 A.H., 814–5 A.D.), when Ibn Tabataba, being proclaimed Imam, occupied Kufa and Basra, and managed to hold out some time, Yaman, the

* Walylly is the Berber name for the town of Tangier. Cf. Dozy, Ibn Adhari, I, 73.  
† Muir, Caliphate, p. 470. Lane-Poole, Moh. Dynasties, p. 35.  
‡ Ibn Adhari, Dozy’s Ed., I, 218.  
§ Weil, II, 391; Hamza Ispahanensis, 232.  
inhabitants of which were for the most part Shiites of the Zaidiyya sect, declared for him and accepted his governor.*

In Yaman, where the largest portion of the inhabitants were Zaidites, small Alide princes maintained themselves, assuming the title of Imam, which is still borne by the rulers of San’a.† Thus grew up within the Caliphate more or less independent Alide dynasties. Most of these were short-lived, and were without any influence on the course of Islamic history. Far greater, however, were the successes which the Shiites achieved in Africa. There, in the second half of the third century, Shiite emissaries had already secured power and influence among the great Berber tribe of Katamah. A certain Abu Abdullah, belonging to San’a, succeeded in winning over and obtaining the leadership of this tribe, along with most of the allied tribes.‡ He preached to them the doctrine of an infallible hidden Imam of the family of Ali who would shortly reveal himself and assume, as Mahdi, the reins of spiritual and temporal sovereignty. He cursed the first two Caliphs as usurpers, and accused the Companions of the Prophet of apostacy. Those who held beliefs similar to his own he called “Faithful” — all others he set down as infidels and outlaws.§ He soon felt himself strong enough to cross swords with the Aghlabides — the then ruling dynasty in Africa. The first military successes nerved the booty-loving Berber tribes to greater exertions. The last of the Aghlabides was soon compelled to abandon his residence, Rakkadah, and to fly with all his treasures to Egypt.|| In the meantime a scion of the family of Ali, with his son, was discovered in the prison at Sigilmasa. He was called Ubaidullah, and Abu Abdullah regarded him as the infallible, sinless Imam. He liberated him (296 A.H., 908 A.D.) and proclaimed him the Mahdi, the Imam, who had come out of concealment, and to whom blind, unhesitating obedience was due.

Ubaidullah was not slow in claiming his privileges, and soon, as infallible sinless Mahdi, he demanded complete obedience to his will, and carried out the principles of the Shiite belief to all their extreme consequences. In outer seeming Islam was retained, and Ubaidullah

* Weil, II, 205.
‡ Ibn Athir, VIII, 23.
§ Ibn Adhari, I, 132.
|| Ibn Adhari, I, 143.
on every occasion strengthened himself by citing suitable verses from the Qur'an: but, in the place of Islam, a complete enslavement of the mind, and a deification of the person of the prince, were really introduced and established.

Mahdiyya, the new residence built by him (308 A.H., 920 A.D.), was regarded as a national sanctuary by the followers of Ubaidullah, and instead of turning, at prayers, to Mekka, they turned towards Mahdiyya, as they had formerly done towards Rabbadah, when the Imam was in residence there. One of the confidants of Ubaidullah used often to say to him: “Ascend to heaven! how long wilt thou tarry on earth and move about among mankind?”

Everywhere an anti-Islamic spirit manifested and asserted itself. They preached community of wives; they publicly renounced the Fast of Ramadhan; they altered the usual form and number of prayers, and everywhere they fiercely persecuted the orthodox school. But in this general wreck of the old order there were symptoms which caused uneasiness to the infallible Imam and movements which needed no little effort to check and to completely crush. In the neighbourhood of Tetuan lies a mountainous district—the Ryf—which is inhabited by the Berber tribe of Ghomarah. This tract of land, rich in fertile plains and smiling cornfields, was intersected all over by rivulets and mountain streams. This, for obvious reasons, was always the seat of a thick population. Its length may be computed at six days', its breadth three days' journey. The inhabitants, the Ghomorah tribe, were always noted for their freedom and independence. Shortly after Ubaidullah had settled down at Mahdiyya, an alleged Prophet called Hamim, son of the Merciful God, made his appearance among them. A great many of his Berber fellow-citizens joined him, and he taught those that did not—like the Masmudah tribe in the coast land of Tangier. He set up for his followers a religious system different from but far more comfortable than Islam. Instead of five he enjoined two daily prayers morning and evening. On Wednesday he enjoined

* Ibn Adhari, I, 190.
† Ibid., 190, 191.
‡ The Ghomarah are one of the three chief tribes of the great Masmudah family which resides on the western part of the Maghrib, the western chain of Atlas and the Ryf.
‖ Ibn Adhari, I, 198.
a half-day's, on Thursday a full day's fast. For failing to fast he imposed the penalty of five cows to the Prophet. In the month of Ramadhan* only three days' fast were sanctioned. He declared the pilgrimage to Mekka, ablution and purification unnecessary. He even allowed pork, but absolutely forbade eggs. He announced a revelation in the Berber tongue, and called it his Qur'an. The following is a verse from it: "Save me from my sins! O thou, that hast granted me sight to see the world. Save me from my sins, O thou that leddest Moses out of the sea." Hamim levied the tenth for his own use from his community.† He was finally killed by the Masmudah tribe in the coast land of Tangier;‡ The rising of the numerous Berber tribes, which took place shortly after under Abu Yazid, calls for serious attention. It was less religious than political in its bearing, and aimed at the overthrow of the Shiite government. The innate sense of liberty and freedom of the Berbers would not long endure the despotism of the Ubaidites. Shortly after the death of the Imam Ubaidullah (322 A.H., 934 A.D.) and during the reign of his son Abul Kasim, a man, called Abu Yazid Makhdad, of the tribe of Zanatah, revolted. In the valleys of Mount Atlas he found his first supporters, but later many Berbers gathered round his standard. His teachings were distinctly democratic, and hence the Arab authors call him Kharijite (Ibady). With his troops he overran the whole of Africa and conquered Kairowan. All the orthodox, dissatisfied with the Shiite rule, cheerfully joined him. But Makhdad, like a true Berber, abandoned Kairowan with absolute unconcern for his Arab allies; with the result that the Shiite troops retook it and committed a fearful massacre of the orthodox population of the town.§ These fights of the Berbers with the Ubaidites continued with varying results until Makhdad, by arraying himself in princely splendour, offended the democratic susceptibilities of the Berbers, suffered a great defeat, and, though successful in escaping from the field of battle in the Katamah hill-tracts, was at last, after desperate resistance, taken captive and cruelly executed (336 A.H., 947–8 A.D.).||

* According to the author of Tarikh-ul-Juman (fol. 136) he fixed 10 days' fast in the month of Ramadhan. According to the same author the Spanish Caliph Nasir sent troops against this false Prophet, who killed him in 310 A.H., 922 A.D.
† Kremer, Description de l'Afrique, pp. 79, 80.
‡ Dozy, Ibn Adhari, I, 198. § Ibid., I, 226.
|| According to Ibn Athir he died of his wounds, VIII, 332.
Unopposed, the rule of the Ubaidites now extended over Africa. Egypt was conquered by them, and Cairo founded by their general Moizz.* Thereto they transferred the seat of government, and appointed governors to administer the Western Province. But soon these governors managed to make themselves independent and to restore the glory of orthodox Islam.† The Shiite faith reached its farthest point of development under the Caliph Hakim, the sixth of the Fatimides, who declared himself an incarnation of God. In the recesses of Lebanon, among a simple unsophisticated people, his supporters found a congenial soil and a large following. The Druses worshipped and still worship him as God, who was naught but a wild, insensate tyrant. With the death of Hakim and the fall of the Fatimides, who were supplanted in Egypt by the Ayyubides, the Shiite movement ‡ ended in the west.

Henceforward the rule of orthodox Islam continued undisputed, but the Berber insurrections did not cease. Under the cloak of religion the Almoravides took up the cause of the Berber nation against the foreign rule of the Arabs. These, in turn, succumbed to the Almohades. However great the success of the Shiites may appear in the west, the importance and significance of the Shiites really belongs to the religious and political history of the eastern lands of the Caliphate.

We have already described the fearful insurrection of the Zenj, which broke out in Bahrain in the second half of the third century, precisely at the time when the Shiite missionaries were most active in Africa. Suppressed for a while, it broke out again in Basra, and continued for fourteen years, devastating Iraq and the adjoining provinces (up to 270 A.H.; 803–4 A.D.).§

In this the Shiites ideas were used as a mere pretence, for the entire movement was pre-eminently a democratic movement, that is, of Kharijite colour and complexion. It was supported by the lowest strata of society, especially the slaves. The wars of the Zenj ran a wild and bloody course.

A still more violent upheaval directly followed the rise of the

* Prof. Margoliouth's Damascus, Cairo and Jerusalem.
† On the Ziyarides; cf. Ibn Adhari, I, 237, 305, 307. Party spirit broke out among the Berber tribes themselves. Thus the Sarhagah tribe remained loyal to the Ubaidites; while the Zanatah tribe sympathised with the Spanish Omayyads. Dozy, I, 282.
‡ A great persecution and massacre of the Shiites took place in Africa in 407 A.H., 1016 A.D.
§ Muir, 541.
Zenj; namely, the Karmathian outbreak (281 A.H., 894 A.D.).* They established their power in Bahrain, and, using Bahrain as the base of their operations, they overran Iraq, Mesopotamia, Arabia, Egypt, plundering, burning and murdering wherever they went. Even Baghdad, the residence of the Caliph, fell into their possession, though only for a short time. They captured Mekka, plundered the Holy City, and carried away the Black Stone from the Ka‘aba, which, however, they restored twenty-two years after at the command of the fourth Fatimide Caliph.† It took almost a century to repress these fearful hordes, but their power was never completely broken up. They still continue in Bahrain, where their influence appears to be powerful up to the present day. The striking similarity in many respects of the Wahabite Movement with that of the Karmathians cannot be put down to a mere accident.

The developments which the Shiite doctrines showed among the Ubaidites and the Karmathians clearly prove how completely they had drifted away from the Islam of the Prophet.

One other sect of the Shiites which distinguished itself by its political activities in Eastern history appeared on the scene under the name of the Assassins. Its founder, Hasan Ibn Sabbah, lived at Rayy in the fifth century of the Hijra. His father was a zealous Shiite, and belonged to the sect of the "Twelvers", then largely diffused in Persia. He sent his son Hasan to Nishapur, then the most famous orthodox university of Persia. There he made the acquaintance of the Shiite emissaries, who persuaded him to go to Cairo, where ruled the Fatimide Caliph, the spiritual chief of the African Shiites.‡ In Cairo he was admitted into the secret order, where Islam probably was regarded as no more than an outward formality. After a residence of almost twenty years Hasan left Cairo. The Egyptian Caliph provided him with money and recommendations, and commissioned him to launch on foot a propaganda on behalf of the Fatimides. In the year 1090 he succeeded in taking the castle of Alamut in the district of

* Wood’s History of the Assassins, pp. 29 et seq.
† Weil, II, 611, 612; Dozy, Islamisme, p. 186; Ibn Athir, VIII, 365.
‡ The ultra-Shiite sect of the Batinites, who later merged into that of the Ishmaelites, existed in Persia before Hasan, owned many castles, and were specially numerous in Isphahan, where a certain Abdul Malik Ibn Attash was honoured by them as their king. Hasan professed to be the follower of Abdul Malik. It is therefore an error to call Hasan founder of the Assassins. Cf. Ibn Athir, X, 216, 299.
Rudbar, north of Kazwin. Here he organised his religio-political order, at the head of which he presided, as its great master, after the death of Ibn Attash, who held the castle of Ispahan and was worshipped by his sect, as their King.* To all the provinces he sent his missionaries to enlist supporters or assassins (Fida’ii); fanatics, whom he secured so completely under his influence that they only too cheerfully sacrificed their lives for him. With such instruments as these, the order grew into power and prominence. It obtained a firm footing not only in Persia but also later in Syria†, and thus, in process of time, the Assassins became a tremendous political force.‡ A succession of great masters followed Hasan. For some time this order was in close and intimate touch with the Fatimide Caliphs of Egypt, in whose interest and on whose behalf it worked; but later it completely shook itself free from Islam. Not until Halaku, the Mongolian conqueror, was its power broken: for he captured and destroyed the fort of Alamut.

Though shorn of political power, the Ishmaelites as a sect still exist both in Persia and Syria.§ The moderate Shiites would have nothing to do with this extreme sect. They stood by Islam, and differed from the Orthodox mainly on the question of succession, which they deemed to be exclusively in the descendants of Ali. The moderate sect of the “Twelvers” (Isna-Ashariyya, also Imamiyya) found the largest diffusion among the Shiite sects; especially in the Persian countries.|| There were Shiites also in Iraq, Syria and Egypt; but they were constantly exposed to persecutions, from the side of the orthodox government as well as from the populace. Their own fanaticism, as also their obstinacy with which they celebrated, even when in the minority, the anniversary of the tragedy of Kerbala, contributed largely towards these ever-recurring persecutions. This was the occasion, almost every year, of great fights at Baghdad culminating in murder and plunder.¶

* Ibn Athir, X, 299.
† Ibn Athir, IX, 358; X, 161, 216.
‡ In Lebanon, on the way from Hamah to Tripoli, there are ruins of the castles of Kadmus and Masjat which belonged to the Assassins. Ibn Athir, X, 461; XI, 452.
§ Goldziher, Mohammed and Islam, pp. 265 et seq.
|| Browne, pp. 229, 239.
Political considerations at first induced the Buwayhids, who ruled the Persian Iraq, to favour the Shiites. As the latter did not acknowledge the Caliphs as their legitimate rulers, they were well in harmony with the politics of the Buwayhids, who were only too anxious to make themselves independent of the Caliphs, and that as quickly as possible. They continued to favour the Shiites until they got the Caliph well in hand (334 A.H.; 945–6 A.D.). For this very reason Mahmud Ibn Subuktagan, the opponent of the Buwayhids, persecuted them.† Henceforward the fate of the Shiites depended, for the most part, on political conditions. The dynasties that gradually arose and obtained more and more independence in Persia were oftener favourable than otherwise to the Shiites. In Baghdad, on the other hand, with the weakness of the Caliphs, orthodox fanaticism gained the ascendancy.‡ When, after a violent street fight between the Shiites and the Sunnis, in the suburb of Karkh, inhabited by the Shiites, a son of the Caliph sided with the Sunnis and most mercilessly persecuted the Shiites, the latter applied to Halaku (who had just smashed the Assassins) for protection. To this step of the Shiites is ascribed Halaku’s march upon Baghdad, and its conquest by him (658 A.H., 1258 A.D. Weil, III, 471; Hammer, Gesch. d. Ilchane, I, 141). Under the Mongolian dynasty better days dawned upon the Shiites; for the Mongolians were ever tolerant in matters religious. The Alides rose into favour, and the Mongolian prince Khudabanda, the twelfth ruler of this dynasty in Persia, not only accepted Islam but is said to have professed the Shiite faith, though only for a time, for he soon again became a Sunni. But two centuries later, when the dynasty of the Safawis ascended the throne, the Shiite faith with Shah Ismail became the State religion of Persia (Isna-Ashariyya). This change was marked by a horrible persecution of the Sunnis all over the kingdom. The Ottoman Sultan Salim, who professed the Sunni faith, returned the compliment by massacring the Shiite residents of the Ottoman Empire (1514 A.D.). About 40,000 Shiites are said to have been massacred.

* Ibn Athir, VIII, 339, 372, 403, 407. The Buwayhids later took up a mediatory attitude between the Shiites and the Sunnites. Ibn Athir, IX, 126, 184, 217. Finally they made enemies of the Shiites, who received the Seljuk, Toghrul Beg, the destroyer of the Buwayhid dynasty, with open arms. Ibn Athir, IX, 420.

† Ayun-ul-Tawarikh, XII, fol. 85. Hammer, Gemäldeaal, IV, 82; Ibn Athir, X, 440.

‡ Hammer, Gesch. d. Ilchane, I, 125, 126.
With this the deep rent, which from the very beginning divided the Muslims into two hostile camps, was fixed for all time. The Turks became the ruling nation in the west, the Persians in the east. The Turks represented the Sunnis; the Persians the Shiites. It must be apparent from the foregoing pages, how deeply and how widely they had diverged from the original ideals of Islam. In the intellectual and spiritual life of humanity there is always an ebb and flow. It is never stagnant or stationary. New ideas come to life; new spiritual veins open up: even religions, which, by virtue of their inherent force and inner stability, are said to remain unaffected amid the storms that at intervals sweep over the world, do, as a matter of fact, suffer from change and decay, and are liable to transformation, or even to complete subversion. As the centuries with their noiseless feet go by, we find either fresh transformations in religions, more consonant with the spirit of the age, or, where transformation is impossible, complete breakdown and overthrow of the original system in favour of a more robust, vigorous, life-giving and life-sustaining one. What is to be the eventual lot of Islam no human foresight, at this stage and in the present condition of things, can divine: but signs of timely reform augur a future bright and hopeful!

IX.—Chilafat and Imamat.

With the accession of Muawiah an exceedingly important epoch for the inner development of the Caliphate sets in. The Chilafat, which, under the first two Caliphs was purely patriarchal (the religious aspect being more obtrusively prominent), suffered under Othman a transformation which led to a great civil war. Muawiah, indeed, triumphed over his rivals, and the Chilafat gradually assumed a worldly character. During the weary struggle for sovereignty Muawiah found unwavering support in the Syrians. Accordingly after his victory, in loyalty to them, he made Damascus the Capital of the Islamic Empire. With this change Medina, which had hitherto been the metropolis of Islam, sank into an insignificant provincial town. The new Caliph set himself up as the spiritual and temporal chief of Islam. Like his predecessors, as the chief judge, he decided religious and secular disputes. Like them too he preached at the mosque, and presided over the divine service: but in all other respects he acted as a temporal sovereign. He concluded a humiliating peace
— a thing unheard of in Islam— with the Byzantine Caesar, as against the payment of a tribute—and this, with a view to having a free hand at home to use the whole weight of his power against Ali.* He is reported to have said, "I am the first king in Islam."† Muawiah disposed of the State revenue at will. He made a gift of the entire revenue of Egypt to Amr Ibn Asi.‡ He was the first to assail the rule introduced and rigorously adhered to by Omar; namely, that no Muslim should acquire landed property in conquered countries. Not only did he personally appropriate large landed properties in Syria, but he made lavish presents of them to his friends and tribesmen. And this, of course, at the sacrifice of the State, or as the Arabs would say, from the common property of the Muslims.§

But nothing was more calculated to change social conditions than these dispositions of landed properties. With the first step the rest followed of itself.|| Muawiah disposed of the ownerless lands with which Othman had invested him thus: he made them into an endowment in favour of the members of his family and of Muslims generally—the endowment coming into force on his death. But his adherents, who also had been invested with lands, kept these to themselves, making no such arrangement as Muawiah had done. When all ownerless lands were disposed of, they sought other resources and devised other means. The Caliph Abdul Malik allowed such lands as were in possession of subject races, but whose owners and possessors had died out, to be given away to Muslims. But the result of this policy was that these lands ceased to pay the land-tax—the Muslim landowners being liable for the tenth only. When these lands were exhausted the government went still further in granting concessions. Both Abdul Malik and Walid permitted Muslims to purchase lands from the subject races. The purchase-money went into the treasury in payment of the arrears of the land-tax. The land-tax, henceforward, disappeared, and in its place the tenth was substituted.

* Masudi, IV, 350. Abul Faraj, Hist. Dynast., on p. 194 says: "He preached before prayer for fear that people might disperse before he had said what he intended to say."
† Muatta, II, 106.
‡ Maqrizi, Khittat, II, 337. Out of it he had to maintain the administration and pay the salary of the soldiers.
§ Ibn Asakir, Fol. 97.
|| Hitti, Origins of the Islamic State, p. 431. (This is an English translation of Beladhuri).
Thus a great deal of land came into Muslim possession. The Caliph Omar Ibn Abdul-Aziz made a futile attempt to prevent lands passing out of the hands of the subject races and falling into the possession of Muslims.* He cancelled all sales concluded without sanction of the Government, and issued an edict declaring sales of all land, after the year 100 A.H., invalid. But the edict was fruitless. Thus, ever since the Caliphate of Muawiah, a fateful social transformation was at work within the bosom of the Caliphate. The Arab conquerors were gradually transformed into owners and cultivators of land. At first they constituted a warrior-caste, for whom the subject races worked and tilled and toiled. Now, partially at least, they were rooted in the land, and the floating Arab population, available for military service, declined in exactly the same proportion as the acquisition of land spread among them. This explains the policy of the various administrators who sought to check as much as possible the transfer of landed properties from the subject races to Muslim hands. Nor were financial reasons absent from this policy. While the subject races paid the land-tax, the revenue was far more considerable than the tenth levied upon landed property in Muslim possession.†

Another important measure dates from the time of the Omayyads; namely, grant of the revenue of certain districts to entire Arab tribes. This was a continuation of the system of military stations begun under Omar. The Arab army was not divided into regiments, but according to tribes who received fixed pay from the treasury along with a share of the booty. As soon as the system of granting lands in fiefs made its way under the Omayyads, the tribes, distributed in various military cantonments, were invested with the lands where they were stationed. The arrangement arrived at was that, instead of pay from the treasury, they would levy for themselves the land-tax from the lands cultivated by subject races, and also receive from them provisions for themselves and fodder for their beasts of burden. They, on the contrary, were always to hold themselves in readiness for military service at the command of the Caliph. This Syrian

* Khuda Bukhsh, Orient under the Caliphs, pp. 208 et seq. (This is an English translation of Von Kremer's Culturgeschichte des Orients).
† See Aghnides, Mohammedan Theories of Finance, p. 374 et seq. For Khiraj or Land-tax, see Chap. VI of this book.
system was adopted in its entirety by the Omayyads in Spain, when, after the battle of Saba, they repaired to Spain, and founded later an Omayyad dynasty there. We possess reliable information here, and with the help of what we know regarding the military organisation in Spain, we can offer a pretty accurate account of the Arab military system in Syria. According to the Syrian model the Omayyad troops in Spain were divided into four legions (Jund), named after the military districts to which their forefathers belonged; Legion of Damascus (Jund Dimishq), Legion of Emessa (Jund Hims), Legion of Chalcis (Jund Kinnesrin), and Legion of Palestine (Jund Filistin). The first had their lands in the district of Elvira; the second in the district of Seville; the third in the district of Jaen, and the fourth in the district of Sidonia.* For a long time this arrangement remained in force in Spain. Sultan Mansur Ibn Abi Amir, for the first time, strove to effect a change in the system, but unsuccessfully.†

On this subject a Spanish savant has handed down ‡ to us some very instructive information: 'I was informed,' says he, 'by several Spanish shaikh, some of whom actually belonged to the Jund, that Muslims remained victorious so long as land was distributed among the legions; for the troops cultivated the land and took care of the peasants, in whose welfare they were as much interested as the slave-dealers were in the health of their slaves. Thus land, receiving proper care and attention, yielded a rich harvest. The legions had everything in abundance: both arms and beasts of burden. And so it continued until Mansur, who towards the close of his reign, again assigned to the troops, as had been the practice earlier, a fixed pay, and collected taxes from the peasants direct through his tax-collectors, who exhausted the tax-payers and embezzled the revenue. So great was the extortion that a portion of the population sought safety in emigration. Thus agriculture declined, and with agriculture the revenue too, and the legions lost their earlier strength and valour. The enemy grew more and more daring, and won back many of the lands of Islam. Thus things continued until the

Al-Moravides conquered Spain and restored the old system of granting land in fiefs.” Out of the system of granting the income of certain districts to particular regiments, arose early in Syria proper military colonies. Such especially was the case in the districts on the northern frontier, which were constantly exposed to the attacks of the Greeks. They therefore posted at important points divisions of troops, whose duty it was to guard the frontier against hostile attacks or incursions of the enemy*. For this purpose they even took to establishing colonies of foreign peoples. Thus it is pretty certain that the last Omayyad Caliph settled Slav races on the northern frontier of Syria—a piece of information which is confirmed by the Byzantine chronicles.† According to Beladhuri the Caliph Mutasim transferred a colony of Zotts—an Indian race who had taken possession of the marshy lands of Basra—to Masisah in Asia Minor: and Harun even earlier planted colonists from Khorasan at Anazarba, and established a military colony at Hadith, and also built the hill fort of Haruniyya.‡ The second Abbaside Caliph established a military colony of 4,000 men at Malatia, and built the fort of Klaudiyya (Claudia: Abul Faraj, Hist. Dyn., p. 217). Thus did several Caliphs provide for the defence and safety of the northern frontier of Syria; and these facts clearly indicate a great change of conditions. After their immense conquests the Arabs had reached the limit beyond which, for the time being, they could not go. They then began to think of the defence of their conquered countries. The tribes who had constituted the Muslim soldiery, and who had overflooded the whole of Syria, Egypt, Iraq and Persia, had gradually settled down in the luxurious

* Thus according to Beladhuri in Kuris (Cyrus) at Antioch; Kremer, Beiträge zur Geographie des nördlichen Syriens, p. 12. “Kurus was for Antioch the seat of a garrison that kept watch on the enemy. To it came every year a detachment from the Antioch army to act as garrison. Later, one of the four divisions into which the army of Antioch was divided was moved to it; and the periodical detachments were no more sent there.” Hitti, p. 230. Thus Muawiah stationed a division of troops at Marash (Beiträge, p. 21) and another at Malatia.

† Beiträge, p. 12. For further information see Orient under the Caliphs, pp. 334 et seq.

‡ Beladhuri (in Hitti’s translation, p. 264) says, “In the year 180 Ar-Rashid ordered that the city of Ain-Zarbah should be built and fortified. He summoned to it a regiment from Khorasan and others, to whom he gave houses as fiefs. In the year 183 he ordered Al-Haruniyyah to be built. It was accordingly built and manned with a garrison and with volunteers that emigrated to it. The city was named after him. Others say that Harun started its erection in the Caliphate of Al-Mahdi, but completed it in his own Caliphate.” Regarding the Zotts, see Hitti, p. 250.
landed estates of conquered provinces, or peopled large towns; and, spreading as they did far and wide over the vast empire, had considerably lost their martial valour and military aptitudes. By contact with the inhabitants of conquered countries they lost their original purity of race and the force of the old Arab tribal spirit.* The Arab manhood was, moreover, exhausted in the early Muslim wars, and well-nigh two centuries were needed before it could again furnish proof, as it did in the Karmathian movement, essentially an east Arabian movement, that the vitality of Arab national life was not completely extinct. During the first Muslim wars a mere summons to arms sufficed to bring together an army of requisite strength; but witness the altered conditions even at the time of Hajjaj, who could not get the inhabitants of Kufa to do military service except under threat of death.† With the fall of the Omayyads these unfortunate conditions did not end, but rather steadily grew worse. The Abbasids mainly relied upon the people and troops of Khorasan, who had been won over for them by their great general Abu Muslim, and thus with the ascendency of the Abbasids the Persian element got the upper hand of the Arab. This state of affairs comes clearly to light under Mamun. Under his successors the troops of foreign mercenaries (mostly of Turkish origin) who henceforward surround the Caliphs, gain greater and greater influence. The military spirit of the Arabs (both in town and country) had almost disappeared, and the Beduins were no longer animated by those ideas which had characterised them in days of yore. Henceforward, like most oriental rulers, the Caliphs relied mainly upon foreign mercenaries. From their midst came the Pretorian Guards, who reduced the Caliphs to a shadow. The religious enthusiasm of the first century, which welded the Arab tribes into one great family, soon waned and wore away, and the more the circle of foreign converts enlarged the more the Caliphate lost its Arab character. Foreigners, widely apart in ideas and traditions, found themselves united in the bosom of Islam. Among them naturally flourished the spirit of faction and rivalry, born of the feeling of differing nationalities. Thus the idea of nationality, once fully awakened to life, led to most fateful results. It proved stronger than the tie of religion, and made the first breach in the proud edifice of the Caliphate. In the east

* Ibn Khaldun, Prolog., I, 272, 273. See the monograph of Bouvat on Les Bermécides.
† Weil, Gesch. d. Chal. I, 432; Kamil, ed. Wright, 216.
the Persians; in the west the Berbers strove to shake off the Arab yoke, and did in fact succeed in establishing fairly independent dynasties under the shadowy suzerainty * of the Abbasids.

The strength of the Caliphate rested on the national sentiment of the Arabs; but when its original force was weakened and lost, and the Caliphs had to rely for protection upon foreign mercenaries, the glory of the Caliphate rapidly declined and departed. †

Relying upon and making use of the Beduins’ greed for conquest and love of booty, the first Caliphs succeeded within a few years in founding their colossal Empire. But they did something more—with the aid of the new religion they brought these rude tribes under one supreme spiritual control. The great civil war, in which the tribes fought each other until they were sick of fighting any more, struck the first and the most decisive blow at this unity and cohesion of the Arabs. In the meantime, with the advancing civilisation and growing political organisation under the Caliphate, fresh conditions came into life, which were not very pleasing to Beduin mentality. Permanent military stations were established, and many tribes settled down in large towns, or conquered provinces, with the result that the

* "When the Persians restored to Mamun the insignia of empire their influence with him was very great, and they became contemptuous of the Abbasid power. After Mutasim’s time the Turks obtained control over the Caliphs, tied their hands and enfeebled their power, in which operations the Persians had a considerable share. When, however, they found their influence at the court departed, they endeavoured to substitute for it independence in their principalities. The captains and governors who acquired independence continued to acknowledge the spiritual sovereignty of the Abbasids, and desired independence under their suzerainty. The Abbasid empire thus split into a number of independent principalities, increasing by some law of progression. The following is a list of the Persian dynasties according to the order in which they became independent, with the names of the founders:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dynasty</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Founder</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tahirides</td>
<td>Khorasan</td>
<td>205-239</td>
<td>Tahir Ibn al-Hussain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saffarides</td>
<td>Fars</td>
<td>254-290</td>
<td>Yakub Ibn al-Laith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samanides</td>
<td>Transoxania</td>
<td>261-389</td>
<td>Nasr Ibn Ahmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sajides</td>
<td>Adherbaijan</td>
<td>286-318</td>
<td>Abul Saj</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ziyarides</td>
<td>Jurjan</td>
<td>316-434</td>
<td>Mardawij Ibn Ziyar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We thus see how Persia became divided into a number of Persian principalities. The Alid faction revived, and realized to some extent the original object of their efforts in behalf of the family of Ali, viz. the restoration of the mighty power of Persia as it had existed before Islam. These principalities were, as appears from the table, of no long duration, and presently there arose the Buyid dynasty, the greatest Persian and Shiite dynasty which arose in the east under Abbasid suzerainty." Zydan, *Unayyads and Abbasids*, pp. 239-40. For the Buyid dynasty, Zaydan, pp. 240-242; for Turkish Dynasties under the suzerainty of the Abbasids, *ib.*, p. 242.

settled Arab population became more and more estranged from Beduin life. The Government, further, relied upon the standing army and the townspeople, with the result that the Beduins ceased to be the ruling element of the Empire. There was no longer any prospect of booty, for there were no more Persian and Roman provinces to conquer and to exploit. Such being the position of affairs, the old Arab independence of the Beduin tribes once more asserted itself, bursting all the trammels of convention. They gradually withdrew to the solitude of their desert, and reverted to their old, bad ways. Once again they went back to the life that they had led before the Prophet, the pastoral life alternating with the life of plunder, common to all nomads. We may thus divide the Arab nation into two parts; one which lived in towns, cultivated lands and served in the army of the Caliph; and the other which retired to the desert, and worried no more about the Caliph or Islam. Often, indeed, did the latter burst into civilised countries, plundering and devastating, now fighting on the side of the Caliph, and now against him. Their oft-recurring predatory expeditions contributed more than anything else to the decline of civilisation and the fall of the Caliphate.

Thus, from the tribes of the desert the Karmathians pre-eminently received help and support.* One of the most powerful insurrections against the Caliph Quthiq was the insurrection of the Beduin tribes of Najd and Central Arabia (about 230 A.H., 844-45 A.D.). At the head of the rebels stood the two old Arab tribes of Sulaim and Fazarah. To these repaired many other North Arabian tribes. They plundered the villages round about Medina, even pressed forward into the town, and only after several years of warfare were they reduced to submission.† In the region to the north of the Euphrates‡ the Anazah tribe lived in complete independence. Then, as now, they made predatory raids into civilised lands. South of the Euphrates and along the richly-watered banks of the Tigris lived then, as now, the powerful Muntafq tribe, who plundered Basra under the Caliph Mustashid.§

* Well, II, 509, 527. † Cf. Ibn Athir, VII, pp. 8, 12, 18; also Muir, p. 516.
‡ Athwart the plain, from Aleppo to Babylon, runs the Euphrates, while the far east is bounded by the Tigris, flowing under the mountain range that separates Iraq-Araby from Persia. Between the two rivers lies Mesopotamia, full of patriarchal memories. Muir, Caliphate, p. 50.
§ On the predatory expeditions of the Beduins, see Ibn Athir, X, 121, 147, 288; XI, 182; XII, 52.
In the fifth century after the Prophet a far more fateful Beduin movement took place from Egypt in a westerly direction, laying Africa, hitherto one of the most prosperous countries, in ruins. In the eastern desert, bordering on the rich region watered by the Nile, which the isthmus of Suez connects with the Arab motherland, lived since the earliest times, and especially since the Arab conquest of Egypt, a considerable multitude of Arab nomads. Attracted by the luxurious and charming regions of the Nile, their numbers steadily augmented. They lived chiefly by cattle-breeding and by caravan trade, but partly also by agriculture, and yet they never really renounced their Beduin ways, as may be observed to this day among the Beduin tribes settled in Egypt. The Egyptian Government never allowed any settlements on the western side of the Nile. But under the Fatimid Caliph Mustansir these Egypto-Arab Beduins crossed the river and advanced westward.* This movement, which soon assumed the character of a Völkerverwanderung, is said to have been encouraged by the then Egyptian Government, as their African governors had got out of hand and refused obedience.† As has always been the case, the Beduin hordes poured like torrents into the rich and fertile coast-lands of North Africa. They destroyed the troops of the native princes sent to oppose their onward march—especially the troops of the ruler of Kairowan, Moiz Ibn Badys.‡ Immense booty fell into the hands of the conquerors, who overran the entire country, plundering and pillaging. As Leo Africanus informs us, they conquered Tripoli and cruelly plundered it. Then they took Kabis, and finally Kairowan (449 A.H., 1057 A.D.), and drove away a portion of the inhabitants to the south.§ Thus the most beautiful and the most fertile districts of Africa passed into the hands of the Arab hordes, who henceforward exercised a decisive influence on the political conditions of this country, for they now sided with one and now with some other of the smaller dynasties there. With justice the great Arab historian observes: "But now, I mean at the end of the eighth century A.H., the condition of Africa, as we see it, is completely changed. The Berbers, who have inhabited the country from the most ancient times, are supplanted by the Arab Beduins, who flooded the land in the fifth century of the A.H. and subjugated the native population by their

* According to Ibn Athir (IX, 387), in the year 442 A.H. (1050 A.D.).
† Dozy, Ibn Adhari, I, 300.
§ Barth : Wanderung und Entdeckungen, I, 245.
number and their strength, took away from them a large portion of their landed properties, and shared with them the enjoyment of those lands that they were allowed to hold. Moreover, in the middle of the eighth century (A.H.) a fearful pestilence desolated the eastern and the western lands, swept away a great part of the population, and destroyed culture and civilisation.' The devastations of the Beduins, which Ibn Khaldun had before his eyes, filled him with grief: and in a genuine philosophic spirit, relying upon his experiences, he fashioned his theory that the nomad element, wherever it appears, works destructively, destroying governments and wrecking civilisation. With the deep earnestness of a Tacitus he draws a picture of the universal decline and decay of the Islamic countries.

"Consider", says he, "all the countries which the Arab Beduins have conquered since the earliest times. Civilisation and population have disappeared therefrom; even the very land seems to have changed its character. In Yaman, with the exception of some towns, all the great meeting-places of the people have become dreary and desolate. Previously the same thing happened in Iraq Arabi. All the beautiful buildings, with which the Persians had adorned it, disappeared. In our own time Syria has been ruined. Africa and the west are still suffering from the devastations of the Beduins. In the fifth century A.H. the nomad tribes of Hilal and Sulaim made their appearance in the country; and ever since, for three centuries, they have done their work of horror and devastation, and lo! you see nothing but waste and ruin. Before their appearance the entire country from Nigritia to the Mediterranean was richly populated: and proof of this you find in the remains of the old civilisation, in the ruins of numerous towns, hamlets, monuments and buildings." In the eastern parts of the Islamic Empire we find a similar painful picture. Following a law of nature, frequently repeating itself in history, the northern peoples pressed south. The old wars of Iran and Turan were due to the descent of the Tatar races of High Asia upon the Persian and Indian frontiers. The very same process is repeating itself in the slow but steady advance of the Russians from Central Asia to the south. Thus, between the middle of the fourth and the beginning of the fifth century A.H., a movement of the Turkish tribes took place. Towards the end of the ninth century A.D. the Ghuzz advanced to the west, and conquered the Turkish tribes of Kipdshak who inhabited the country between the Volga and the
Dnieper.* About 960 A.D. a Turkish chief called Tschanak, or Kara-Khan, with two thousand families, accepted Islam, advanced towards the west, and settled down on the eastern bank of the Caspian Sea. Individual tribes even went further, and settled in Adherbaijan, Armenia, and Asia Minor, where they received the name of Turkomans.† Other tribes of Ghuzz showed themselves in Khorasan. There they split up into different branches and made their way into Muslim lands as far as Ispahan, Maraghad, Mosul.‡ In consequence of a dispute with the Chinese authorities, almost contemporaneously with Kara Khan, another Turkish tribe, which later became famous under the name of the Seljuks, emigrated from Eastern Turkistan, and settled down in the region of Bukhara. Within a hundred years they moved on to Khorasan and conquered it. Togrul, a grandson of Seljuk, took possession of the towns of Nishapur and Merv, and scarcely had he secured a footing there when he advanced, making conquests in Persia, Asia Minor, and Iraq, overthrew the Buwayhids, the protectors of the Caliphs, and got himself appointed Amir-ul-Omara by them.§ These emigrations of the Turkish tribes and their unceasing wars and marauding expeditions played havoc with the eastern lands of the Caliphate. To these were added continued incursions of the Greeks and Armenians into the Syrian and Mesopotamian frontier-districts, as well as predatory expeditions of the rude but warlike inhabitants of the Caucasus region—namely, the Georgians, Khazars and Kipchaks.|| The countries under the Caliphs resounded with the horse-hoofs of these roaming bands, who spread in Persia, in Asia Minor, in northern Mesopotamia and in Syria, but who nevertheless bowed in superstitious reverence before the Caliphs, surrounded as they were by the nimbus of religion.¶

But the Arabs, in whose midst grew and matured the institution of the Chilafat, now retired more and more into the background, leav

* Ibn Athir, IX, 68, 209, 266 et seq., 365.  
† Hammer, Gesch. d. oman. Reiche, I, 37, 38; see also, Gemäldesaal, V, 2, 3. A further inroad of the Turkish tribe took place in the year 1153 A.D. (548 A.H.) when Sultan Sanjar was taken prisoner, and the Ghuzz for four years devastated Khorasan. Hammer, Gemäldesaal, V, 117, 118.  
‡ Abul Faraj, Hist. Dynast., 337.  
¶ See Macdonald, Muslim Theology, chapter III.
ing the Caliphs no alternative but to come to terms with these bold adventurers. Along with this great historical process which was gradually undermining the Chilafat, other reasons too contributed to its fall. Among these we must first of all mention want of a fixed rule of succession, and the uncertainty of public opinion regarding constitutional questions of vital importance. On the subject of succession, from the very beginning they adhered to the idea that none but a member of the ruling family could ascend the throne. But the old Arab idea of seniority constantly conflicted with the direct transmission from father to son, naturally most frequently striven for.* The former was the idea that dominated in the first century of the Caliphate; the latter came to a head later. Of this the following table offers ample proof:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME OF THE CALIPHS</th>
<th>SUCCESSOR.</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Abu Bakr</td>
<td>Son.</td>
<td>Brother or other relative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Omar</td>
<td></td>
<td>Omar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Othman</td>
<td></td>
<td>Othman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Muawiah</td>
<td>Yazid</td>
<td>Ali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Yazid</td>
<td>Muawiah II</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Muawiah II</td>
<td>Abdul Malik</td>
<td>Merwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Merwan</td>
<td>Walid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Abdul Malik</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sulaiman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Walid</td>
<td></td>
<td>Omar Ibn Abd ul Aziz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Sulaiman</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yazid II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Omar Ibn Abd ul Aziz</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hisham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Yazid II</td>
<td></td>
<td>Walid II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Hisham</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yazid III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Walid II</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ibrahim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Yazid III</td>
<td></td>
<td>Merwan II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Ibrahim</td>
<td></td>
<td>Saffah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Merwan II</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mansur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Saffah</td>
<td>Mahdi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Mansur</td>
<td>Hadi</td>
<td>Harun-ul-Rashid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Mahdi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Hadi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Von Kremer has more thoroughly discussed this subject in his Culturgeschichte. See the Eng. transl., Khuda Bukhsh, Orient under the Caliphs, pp. 244 et seq.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the Caliphs</th>
<th>Successor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Son</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Harun-ul-Rashid</td>
<td>Amin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Amin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Mamun</td>
<td>Wathiq</td>
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<tr>
<td>25. Mutasim</td>
<td>Muntasir</td>
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<td>26. Vathiq</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>27. Mutawakkil</td>
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<td>28. Muntasir</td>
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<tr>
<td>29. Musta’in</td>
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<tr>
<td>30. Mutazz</td>
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<tr>
<td>31. Muhtadi</td>
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<tr>
<td>32. Mutamid</td>
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<tr>
<td>33. Mutadid</td>
<td>Muktafi</td>
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<tr>
<td>34. Muktafi</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>35. Muqtadir</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>36. Qahir</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>37. Radhi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. Muttaqi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. Mustakfi</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>40. Muti</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. Tai</td>
<td>Kaim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. Kadir</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>43. Kaim</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44. Muktadí</td>
<td>Mustazhir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45. Mustazhir</td>
<td>Mustarshid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46. Mustarshid</td>
<td>Rashid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47. Rashid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48. Muktafi II</td>
<td>Mustanjid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49. Mustanjid</td>
<td>Mustadi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50. Mustadi</td>
<td>Nasir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51. Nasir</td>
<td>Zahir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52. Zahir</td>
<td>Mustansir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53. Mustansir</td>
<td>Mustasim</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We see from this that in the first two columns of Caliphs—consisting of 18 rulers—only four bequeathed the throne to their sons. Among
the Abbasids the position seems more favourable, although of the first twenty-four Caliphs only six had their sons as successors. No less was succession to the throne influenced by another idea which may be traced back to the beginning of Islam, and which seems to be deeply rooted in the old Arab idea of freedom. Hereditary descent was never, among the Arabs, a recognized title for spiritual or temporal sovereignty. Free election and acknowledgment by the entire people were deemed indispensably necessary for succession to the throne.

Thus with legitimate right to succession by inheritance was coupled a democratic element; namely, election by the people. A long series of civil wars, popular insurrections, family disputes, and fearful conspiracies were the result of the fundamentally divergent elements regulating succession to the throne. To this may be referred an unbroken chain of wars which, throughout the Caliphate, make the pages of history crimson. In Turkey—the modern counterpart of the old Arab Chilafat—some of these ideas are still operative. Thus, according to the idea of seniority, which in Turkey has become an express rule of succession, the legitimate successor is not the son but the brother of the ruling Sultan.* It was indeed reserved for our age to see the extinction of this old Asiatic idea. Sultan Abdul Aziz sanctioned direct succession in Egypt. He even thought of securing the succession in his own line as soon as that could be safely done.†

Election by the people goes back to the old Arab custom, according to which the chief of the tribe was elected by the free choice of the members of the tribe. Immediately after the death of the Prophet election of a successor took place, and was accompanied, as always, by party disputes. This was the election of Abu Bakr. Medina was then the centre and metropolis of Islam, and in Medina lived the ruling families who determined the election. There was, of course, no such thing as representation of the people in the modern sense. Election consisted in tendering the oath of allegiance to the Caliph-elect. This, in Arabic, was called *Baiah*, and was reckoned of such vital importance that even those Caliphs who appointed their sons as successors in their lifetime never omitted to have homage done to them, for only by *Baiah*

* Under the first Ottoman Sultans direct succession obtained. In fact fratricide was even sanctioned by the law of the realm. *Hammer, Gesch. d. osman. Reichs*, I, 582.
† Even the oldest Hungarian rule of succession was oriental. It preferred the brother to the son. Among the Berbers the dignity of the chief passed to the sister’s son. *Barth’s Reisen und Entdeckungen*, I, 374.
did the succession receive its legal force and validity. This ceremony, in the earliest times, was of a purely patriarchal character: the electors offered their hand, and thereby vowed loyalty and obedience to the Caliph. *Baia* could also be rendered in writing. Thus a copy has come down to us of the letter in which Abdullah, the son of the Caliph Omar, did homage to the fifth Omayyad Caliph, Abdul Malik. It runs thus: "In the name of God, the Merciful and Compassionate, to the Servant of God, Abdul Malik—Prince of the Faithful. Peace be on thee! I praise Allah before thee, and I offer my submission and obedience to thee, according to the precept of God and his Prophet, in all that I do."

Later, the election and homage degenerated into a pure court ceremony—especially among the Sultans. Already, Ibn Khaldun observes, homage was becoming more and more what it was at the court of the old Persian Kings of Kings (Shah-an-Shah); namely, the courtiers kissed the ground before the new Sultan, and his hand and his foot.

Like the later Roman Emperors, whose election for the most part depended upon the Pretorian guards, the Caliphs had on these occasions to make lavish gifts of gold to their troops. Thus long as Medina was the seat of the Caliphathe and the residence of the influential families, the election of the Caliph passed off, if not without violent party strife, still without any serious convulsions, until the election of Ali, which evoked a bloody war. Things, however, shaped themselves differently when the Caliphathe was removed to Damascus, then on to Kufa, Anbar and Baghdad. The inhabitants of Mekka and Medina always claimed for themselves the right of choosing the Caliph according to their judgment, and disregarded the election effected at the residence of the Caliph hundreds of miles away from them. For this presumption the two holy towns paid heavily. Military measures of extreme severity soon compelled them to obedience, and proved to them that might was often more effective than right. But the unrest occasioned by the election of the Caliph, and its ruthless suppression, brought one lesson clearly home to the people; namely, that the inhabitants of the

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* Muatta, IV, 220. The address in the text, "Servant of God, son of Abdul Malik," is obviously wrong. The formula of homage, as it obtained among the later Caliphs, has been preserved by Ibn Hamdun, in his Tazkirah, and Ibn Hamdun, as State Secretary at the Court of Baghdad, must have been quite familiar with it.

† Ibn Khaldun, Proleg., I, 425.

‡ Thus the Caliph Kaim, at his election, made a gift of three million dinars to his Turkish body-guard. Uyun-ul-Tawarikh, XIII, fol. 104.
provinces were bound to accept the election effected at the residence of the Caliph, and to recognise it as legally binding.

A learned Muslim jurist, Mawardi, who wrote in the first half of the fifth century after the Prophet, makes the following observation:—

"The following qualifications are necessary for the electors: (a) spotless purity, (b) capacity for judging the qualifications for leadership of the State, (c) insight and judgment to decide which of the candidates is most suited to conduct the government and to assume the charge of affairs. In this the inhabitants of the capital had no pre-eminence over the rest of the people; but practice, not legal theory, settled that, since the inhabitants of the capital would be informed of the death of the Caliph sooner than the others, they could forthwith proceed with the election. Further, the persons likely to succeed mostly reside there".*

It is apparent from this that the old Arab franchise, which was a universal franchise, soon disappeared, and the right to elect the sovereign fell into the hands of the soldiery and the inhabitants of the capital. That portion of the Arab people who would not acquiesce in this state of affairs, passed over to the Kharijite camp, where the old democratic ideas prevailed, and where even the necessity for and usefulness of a head of the State was called into question and denied,† or where the election of the sovereign was held to be wholly unfettered by any consideration of hereditary succession or family connexion; for they maintained that even a slave or a peasant, if just and pious, was eligible for sovereignty (Goldziher, Muh. Studien, Vol. I, pp. 138 et seq.; Khuda Bukhsh, Islamic Civilisation, pp. 122 et seq.).

The Shiites, the legitimists of Islam, stood in opposition to these views. Between the two, namely, the Shiites and the Kharijites, steered the great orthodox party of Islam. They represented the staunch monarchical idea of the East. Different parties—each in its own way—supported this position. Thus the Mutazalites and the Zaidites (these are moderate Shiites) sought, on rational principles, to establish the necessity for monarchy. Mankind, they contended, needed a guide, a prince, to end injustice, to decide disputes. Without such a one there would be disorder, chaos, anarchy. Others proved from the Qur'an the

* Mawardi, ed. Enger, p. 4; Shahrastani, i, 138; Abul Faraj, p. 170; D'Oehsson, Eng. Tr., p. 150; Khuda Bukhsh, Orient under the Caliphs, p. 253. Al Ashari holds one conditionally by elective franchise.

† Mawalif, pp. 297, 301; Ibn Khaldun, Proleg., i, 389; Shahrastani, i, 138; Abul Faraj, p. 170.
necessity for monarchy, and looked upon the monarch, from a religious point of view, as the custodian and defender of religion, as its high-priest*. On one point there was complete unanimity among the orthodox; namely, that the Caliph or Imam should belong to the family of Quraish, and to none else.†

The relation of the sovereign to the people was regarded in the light of a bilateral compact (Akld), which only subsisted so long as there was mutual observance of the terms, but not otherwise.‡ These were the duties of the sovereign:

(a) to maintain religion in its original purity, to suppress heresies, etc.,
(b) to lay down the law and to decide disputes,
(c) to keep the peace,
(d) to punish transgressions, offences and crimes,
(e) to defend the frontiers,
(f) to fight those who refused to accept Islam,
(g) to collect and administer war-booty and poor-tax,
(h) to distribute rewards to soldiers, and to make other payments from the treasury sparingly and conscientiously,
(i) to appoint efficient and trustworthy officers,
(j) to personally take part in the affairs of the State, and to work diligently and carefully.§

To the Prince of the Faithful who duly discharged these duties the people were bound to render ready obedience and ungrudging support. But if he neglected them, or from some other untoward circumstances, such as blindness, chronic disease, mutilation, etc., was unable to carry on his duties, his right and title to Imamat ceased.||

Along with the elective sovereignty Muslim jurisprudence recognises a mode of transmission of sovereignty in direct opposition to elective sovereignty; namely, transmission by will. Of that nature was the appointment of Omar by the Caliph Abu Bakr, and such also was the procedure adopted by Omar when he left the choice of his successor to a Council of Regency.¶

* Mawardi, p. 4.
† Kadih Abu Bakr Bakillani differed from this view and held that a non-Quraishite could become Imam. On the orthodox view. Mawardi, p. 5; Ihya I, 147; D’Ohsson, I, 153; Mawakif, p. 302; Ibn Khaldun, Proleg., I, 396. The Shiiites acknowledge only the right of the Hashimite branch to the Imamat, Mawakif.
Later, when the Caliphs were pressed on all sides by supercilious vassals who gradually became independent rulers and sought to ignore the Caliphs both in matters temporal and spiritual, Islamic jurisprudence learnt to recognise a new mode of acquiring sovereignty, which consisted in the acknowledgment of accomplished facts. This was acquisition of sovereignty by force. It was stated to be the last alternative on which a Government could be founded. Ibn Jama'ah, an Egyptian writer, makes the following observation, "Force is the last alternative on which a Government may be founded. When there is no legitimate Imam present, or when none capable or competent to assume the leadership seek the Imamat, and some one takes possession of the government by force, and even though there has been no election nor transmission of sovereignty to him (by any of the recognised methods), he is to be acknowledged as ruler and is entitled to obedience; and this, indeed, to keep Muslims together and to avoid growth of parties. It matters not if the ruler is ignorant or godless. But if one has seized the government by force, and another rises against him and conquers him, the conqueror is to be acknowledged as the rightful Imam; and this for the reasons already given." *

A further result of this opportunist theory was that in complete opposition to the old Arab ideas which dominated in the beginning of the Caliphate, they declared it permissible for two Islamic sovereigns (Imams) to rule simultaneously. The oldest Islam knew only of one ruler of the Islamic Empire, the Caliph. But soon they saw several rival Caliphs claiming to rule simultaneously, and the nearer the Caliphate approached its fall the larger grew the number of the independent rulers. Thus they came to hold that the co-existence of two (or even several) Imams was legally permissible if they did not rule in the same but in different and distant countries.† Another result of the gradual transformation of the political conditions was that the old Arab theory, according to which the Prince forfeited the throne by reason of irreligion and godlessness, was insensibly shelved, and the very opposite view asserted itself, which found a staunch champion in Nasafy, who expressly stated that neither vice nor unrighteousness

* Ibn Jama'ah, Kitab Tahrir-ul-Ahkam; ms. fol. 7.
† Mawakif, p. 306; Ibn Khaldun, Proleg., I, 391; Ibn Jama’ah finds fault with this view and adheres to the old principle that there can be only one legitimate Imam at a time. He looks upon the Imam in the sense of the "head of the religion."
would justify the deposition of the Imam.* In full possession of their temporal power the earlier Caliphs rarely relied upon the spiritual aspect of their dignity, and liked to act like temporal potentates; but the later ones, the more they lost their political power, the more they sought to encircle themselves with the halo of an inviolable religious sanctity. And thus we see that at the time when the political authority of the Caliph hardly extended beyond the walls of Baghdad, those very princes who had torn from him his fairest provinces only felt secure in the possession of their power when the Caliph invested them with those lands and granted them his sign-manual warrant and conferred upon them high-sounding titles such as: Baha-ud-Dawlah; Adad-ud-Dawlah; Jalal-ul-Mulk; Rukn-ud-Din, etc.† We can only explain this phenomenon by the increasing ignorance and growing superstition of the times. Under the Caliph Kadir the Buwayhid princes ruled Iraq and Fars under the title of Amir-ul-Omara. And yet every one of them sought and obtained solemn investiture from the Caliph. It consisted in the Caliph summoning the officials to his palace, receiving the new Amir in solemn audience in their midst, attiring him with seven robes of honour, a black turban, and presenting him with two arm-buckles and a gold chain. Then he made over to him two banners which he with his own hand fastened to the spear-staff, and finally got his courtiers to engirdle him with a sword.‡ The union of the spiritual and temporal power in the person of the ruler—though it prolonged the life of the Caliphate—was not without disadvantage. In the earliest days of Islam they could not conceive of the separation of the spiritual from the temporal power. In fact the governors

* D'Ohsen, I, 163, 164, § 37.
† The last title was the subject of a long diplomatic negotiation between the Caliph Kadir and the King Abu Kaligar. (Weil, III, 54). In this negotiation Mawardi acted as the ambassador of the Caliph. The King wished for nothing less than the title of "Sultan-ul-Muazzam Malik-ul-umam" but Mawardi peremptorily refused, on the ground that only the Caliph was the great Sultan and the ruler of nations. At last he consented to the title of Malik-ud-Dawlah and sent rich presents to the Caliph through Mawardi-Weil, III, 78, Ibn Athir, IX, 313.
‡ Uyun-ul-Tawarikh, XIII, Fol. I. The hanging of sword and attiring with fur is, to this day, the usual form of investiture of the vassal-princes in Constantinople. The diadem and the arm-buckles are the exclusive tokens of royal dignity. Abul Faraj, p. 374. The decorations conferred by the Abbasid Caliphs consisted of black banners, robes of honour, a golden chain and a diadem. Cf. Ibn Adhari, I, 169. Ibn Athir, VIII, 315. Compare the investiture of Toghrul in Hammer, Gesch. d. osman. Reichs, I, 39; Gemäldestaal, V, 24, on investiture: see also Hammer, Gesch. d. Ilchane, I, 139.
appointed in their provinces, were not only at the head of the administration (military, financial and judicial), but were also the representatives of the Spiritual Chief of Islam in all matters religious and ecclesiastical. They preached every Friday at divine service in the mosque, presided at the prayers, and were not only governors but also the legates of the High-Priest of Religion. It is not difficult to see how wide and extensive their powers were, for they ruled over the conscience of their subjects. But, as Ibn Khaldun truly observes, just as there is a constant tendency in an oriental monarchy towards absolutism, towards unlimited power, so undoubtedly the effort of the oriental governors was always in the direction of greater and greater independence of the central authority. This the Caliphs soon perceived and sought to check, by the introduction of posts and postmasters, who continually kept sending in reports and informing the Caliphs of all that was going on in the provinces; not omitting to mention the conduct of their governors.* But this was of little avail. The governors became more and more independent in their provinces. They even converted them into hereditary governorships—transmitting the dignity to their descendants—and soon became absolute independent princes who, in conformity with the spirit of the age, duly acknowledged the Caliph as the Spiritual Chief of Islam. From the theoretical views which the earliest Arab jurist, the oft-mentioned Mawardi, has set forth, we see at once that the idea of a strong central government never obtained in the Caliphate. Like the Wizarat, governorship too was divided into limited and unlimited functions. According to Mawardi the governor with unlimited powers, was appointed directly by the Caliph, and in his province was all in all. He stood at the head of the army, he decided disputes, appointed judges, collected taxes and poor-tax, applied the revenue to government expenses, maintained religion intact, punished religious offences, and held the position of the Commander-in-Chief when at war †. This unlimited governorship at the time of Mawardi was nothing more nor less than kingship. It prevailed throughout the Empire. In Iraq, nay, even in Baghdad itself, the Buwayhids ruled under the title of Amirs, but really as independent princes.

The limited governorship fairly corresponded to the governorship as it existed in the best days of the Caliphate, when the Caliphs could

* Cf. Sprenger, *Die Post und Reiserouten des Orients*, p. 1 et seq.
† Mawardi, pp. 47, 48, also 51-53.
keep the governors under control. The limited governor was entrusted with the command of the troops and the administration of the province, but he neither exercised judicial functions, nor had he anything to do with the taxes, nor indeed did he represent the Caliph in matters religious.

On the other hand, governorship by usurpation, referred to by Mawardi, gives us a correct picture of the then conditions of the Caliphate which was hastening to its fall. Discussing the views of the Islamic jurists on sovereignty and their opportunistic theory of acknowledging the rule of might, we have already seen that they accepted accomplished facts. Mawardi's theory of governorship by usurpation rests upon the very same principle, namely, acceptance of the inevitable. By governorship by usurpation he understands the governorship which a rebel acquires by force of arms, and in which he is confirmed by the Caliph. The conditions necessary for such confirmation are too significant to be passed over in silence. They are: (1) the usurper must acknowledge the sovereignty of the Caliph, and his authority as religious head; (2) in matters religious he must submit to the authority of the Caliph and promise obedience to him; (3) he must promise friendship and assistance to the Muslims; (4) he must permit the bestowal of religious ranks (through the Caliph), and recognise as lawful the resulting decisions and orders; (5) the legal dues must be adjusted according to law, so that the giver may fulfil his duty, and both the giver and the receiver may feel that they are just and fair; (6) the legal enactments must be observed and applied with firmness.

It is not possible to cite a clearer proof than this passage of the effort of the Caliphs to preserve the nimbus of religious sovereignty, and to maintain the spiritual dignity in its absolute entirety, as their last sheet-anchor, in the growing decay of their political power. They willingly acknowledged a bold adventurer, who took possession of a province, by transforming him through their consecration from a rebel into a legitimate ruler. They recognised his new position, with unlimited powers, provided he acknowledged unconditionally the religious supremacy of the High Priest of all Muslims enthroned at Baghdad. Very great was the respect and veneration in which the Caliphs were held as the Spiritual Chiefs of Islam. And this indeed conferred upon them a

* Mawardi, pp. 55, 56.
political power at the time when they possessed no army, and had even in their own capital to submit to the tutelage of the Seljuks. I will here mention a fact characteristic of what has been said. When the powerful Seljukian Sultan, Malik Shah, received the investiture from the Caliph at Baghdad, he wanted at the conclusion of the ceremony to kiss the hand of the Caliph, but this the Caliph refused, and offered him his signet to kiss. *

Thus nominally the Caliph still remained the spiritual and temporal head of the largest portion of the Islamic world. In fact, from Muktafi II (d. 555 A.H., 1160 A.D.) onward, they even managed to acquire great political independence, and to step into light once again as powerful temporal rulers. But the Moguls made an end of their temporal power. They took Baghdad, and killed the Caliph, his two sons and many kinsmen (656 A.H., 1258 A.D.). The importance which the religious element conferred upon the Caliphs shows itself at best in the fact that, though their temporal power perished, their religious dignity continued unimpaired.

A son of the last Caliph but two continued the Caliphate in Egypt under the protection of the Ayyubides, the rulers there. But a great change had taken place. In Cairo the Abbasid Caliphs ruled merely as the religious chiefs of orthodox Islam. They exercised no temporal power of any kind, except that they conferred investiture, now reduced to a mere formality, upon the Sultans, who, for reasons religious or political, sought it from the Caliphs. †

Thus was completed the separation of the spiritual from the temporal power of the Caliph. The Caliph was the spiritual head—the Sultan, the temporal ruler of Islam. Until the conquest of Egypt by the Ottoman Salim, this Spiritual Chief of Islam resided at Cairo under the almost meaningless title of the Caliph, or the Commander of the Faithful, and, under the protection of the temporal sovereign, led a precarious existence. The last of these is said to have resigned his claim in favour of the Turkish conqueror. Upon this the Ottoman Sultans rest their claim to the spiritual and temporal sovereignty of Islam. ‡

* Ibn Athir, X, 104.
† Like Firuz Tuglak, the third ruler of the dynasty of Tuglak Shah at Delhi. Hammer, Gemäldezaal, IV, p. 233. Gesch. der Achnen, I, 214.
‡ D’Ohsson I, 154. Hammer in his Gesch. d. osman. Reichs does not speak of any direct transfer of the Caliphate, but only emphasises the homage of the Sheriffs of
Thus vanished one of the most powerful ideas, the old Asiatic conception of theocracy, which made everything subordinate to religion, and which looked upon the prince more as a High Priest than a temporal ruler.

X.—The Sultanat.

With the extinction of the Caliphate the Church of Islam lost its Spiritual Chief. The common tie which united all Muslims into one religious community, irrespective of race and language, was rent asunder. In the following pages we propose to deal with the further developments which took place in the bosom of Islam: showing how the old Arab ideas of Church and State were gradually transformed, nay, displaced by fresh ones, and how, even in the woeful tumults of the Mogul invasion and the devastating incursions of the Turkish hordes, signs of progress were not wanting which heralded a better and brighter future for the East.

All this demonstrates how little the human mind can be constrained in rigid forms, and how, under new and altered conditions, it will strive to bring itself into line with the culture and civilisation of the times. It further demonstrates how the ideas of a vanished age live and linger, long after they have spent their force and served their purpose. They persist, indeed, amidst the assault of newer forces, until they are completely worn away.

Though ruled by independent governors, the individual provinces of the Caliphate were yet part and parcel of one empire; and this, by reason of the spiritual authority of the Caliph, which was, so to speak, the unifying tie. But, with the altered conditions, they became absolute independent States. Geographical position and the dawning sense of nationality determined their growth and defined their boundary.

Thus in his own dominion every Sultan was an unlimited ruler in matters both spiritual and temporal. Not only was he the head of the State, but also the high-priest of Religion.* Thus it was in Spain and Africa; and thus in Arabia and India. In Persia, where the Mogul dynasty of the family of Chengiz Khan had founded a vast empire

Mekka in consequence of which Salim, as servant of the two holy cities (a title which Ottoman Sultans still bear) is said to have become the Protector and the Suzerain of the Egyptian Sultans and Caliphs. Hammer, I, 791. See Snouck Hurgronje, Mohammedanism, Chapter III; and Marriott, Eastern Question, Chapter III.

* Thus the Arab rulers of Spain appointed Christian bishops and summoned Councils. Dozy, Musul. d’Espagne, II, 47, 149.
extending from the Indus to the Euphrates, and even for a time including Syria, the first rulers were heathens and Buddhists. They were doubtless partial to the Christians and Jews; but, in matters religious, on the whole they adopted an attitude of indifference, nay, almost of contemptuous tolerance. And yet they kept the supreme spiritual power well in their hands, and personally appointed high ecclesiastical dignitaries.*

Only in Egypt did the Caliphate continue; but more in name than in reality. Thus, in Islamic lands, with the different independent Sultanats different independent Churches grew up. But, be it noted, the temporal and spiritual power remained completely in the hands of one man—the Sultan. The vital principle of Islam, the indissoluble union of the spiritual and temporal power, one of the oldest and the most powerful of Semitic ideas, wherein lay the greatest strength of the Caliphate, continued unaffected. But while of yore the temporal power had been lodged in the person of the Spiritual Chief, now, in the altered state of affairs—though the spiritual and temporal power remained in the hands of one and the same person—it was lodged no longer, as in days gone by, in the High-priest of Islam, but in an avowedly temporal ruler—the Sultan. However outward this subordination of Religion to State—it marks an important stage in the history of Islamic civilisation.

This explains the theories of the later jurists, theories completely foreign to the original spirit of Islam, which regarded descent from the family of Quraish as no longer indispensable for the Imamat, and which permitted every bold adventurer who made good his claim to be treated as the legitimate head of the State. They no longer held, as before, that there could only be one head of Islam, but they conceded that several Imams might rule different countries at one and the same time. Finally they treated the Imamat no longer as a spiritual but as a temporal institution.†


It would be an error to suppose that, with the gradual transformation of ideas relating to spiritual and temporal sovereignty, there was a corresponding change in the spirit and method of administration, or that the government itself became more tolerant or less susceptible to religious influences. In this respect, indeed, the Sultanate made no change at all. Such a change was only effected in the course of centuries, and was felt comparatively late.

The transition from the Caliphate to the Sultanate, attended as it was by violent convulsions, put back the hour-hand of progress.

The partition of the Caliphate into a number of almost independent dynasties (already an accomplished fact long before the Mogul invasion) had dealt a fatal blow at the moral and material conditions of the Muslim empire. Prosperity had declined, and with prosperity civilisation had sensibly and seriously suffered.

In the East the Turkish adventurers, in the West the Berber chiefs, as the supercilious vassals of the Caliph, had divided amongst themselves the richest and fairest lands of the Caliphate. Everywhere the Arab element receded into the background, and not until the foreign conquerors were arabicised and thereby civilised, did they offer a helping hand to letters.

When, with the conquest of Baghdad by the Moguls, and the disappearance of the last Abbasid Caliph, the small vassal princes were bereft of their feudal chief, their position became so insecure that they needed something else besides military force to render themselves safe. They therefore sought the help of that most influential class of the community—the theologians—who gave ungrudging support only to those who followed their lead and governed according to their views.

In the opinion of the Muslims Religion and Kingship are the two ideas which mutually complete themselves.* Just as men, says Ghazzali, must needs have a prince to rule them, so the Prince must needs have a law (kanun) to rule by. The theologian (fakih) knows this law, and he knows how to apply it when men come into collision with each other in matters of right. He, therefore, is the instructor and the guide of the Prince. According to an Arab proverb: Religion and Kingship are twinborn.† Ibn Khaldun himself emphasises the distinctive

* Ihya, I, 21.
† Rabi-ul-Abrar, p. 33.
feature of the Islamic State by saying that the spiritual and temporal powers in that State are one and indivisible; while among other people the king is only a temporal ruler.* He only is a true prince who is at once the spiritual and temporal chief of his people.† Even as early as Bukhari the ulemas were regarded as the heirs of the Prophet;‡, and a tradition (which obviously is a forgery, but which goes back to an early age) tells us that the ink of the ulema, on the Day of Judgment, will be of much greater worth and value than the blood of the martyrs.§ The need for reading the Qur’an, and reading it aright, and the need for learning the traditions of the Prophet, called forth in the first century a class of teachers who were held in high esteem; and this, indeed, for the simple and obvious reason that the instruction they imparted stood in intimate relation to religion. Thousands of students flocked to the lectures of pious and renowned Shaikhs, and some of these savants, like the jurist Malik Ibn Anas, enjoyed almost a princely status.|| In Islam law and administration of law were inseparable from religion. Thus the administration of justice passed entirely into the hands of the ulemas, who with it acquired immense influence and immense wealth. True, the Caliph Omar appointed judges who were paid by the State, but it must be remembered that along with their fixed pay they received fees (e.g. for delivering Fatwas) which far exceeded their emolument.¶ In the increasing degeneration of the Muslim empire the office of the judge was later sold to the highest bidder.**

There was therefore no more brilliant career for a promising youth than the study of law and theology.†† Soon the number of theologians was legion. In the 9th century A.D., in the southern suburb of the town of Cordova alone, there were no less than 4,000 theologians and students of theology. The lectures of the pious Abu Darda (d. 32 A.H.; 652—3 A.D.), the first Kadhi of Damascus, were attended by 1,600 students (Ibn Asakir, fol. 4). Bukhari’s lectures at Baghdad

* Proleg., I, 409. † 1, 1, 319. †† Bukhari, 54. § Rabi-ul-Abrar, p. 15. || He lived at Medina which was the cradle of learning of the earliest Islam. Bukhari, 21-49. ¶ The income of a judge of Aleppo amounted to 100,000 Dirhams. Haneberg: Schul und Lehrweisen der Araber, p. 27. A kadhi of Seville possessed a third of the landed properties of this town. Dozy, Musul. d’Espagne, IV, 8, 9. ** Von Kremer, Aegypten, II, 72. †† Dozy, Musul. d’Espagne, III, 110, says of the studies at the mosque of Cordova. Thus the students who studied numbered thousands. The majority of them studied fiqh, i.e. theology and law, because this learning then led to most lucrative offices.
attracted an audience of 20,000 men. Even if this number be an exaggeration, it undoubtedly gives an idea of the number of the theologians and students of theology who in the golden period of Islam congregated in large towns such as Mekka, Damascus, Baghdad, Medina, Nishapur, Cordova, Seville, Kairowan, etc., etc. The great mosque of Azhar counts even now more than a thousand students. How imposing must have been their number during the period when the number of the inhabitants exceeded half a million!

One common purpose united the members of this great guild, and welded them into a vast brotherhood fired by one common party fervour. Their common course of study; their faith in the sacredness of their calling, and the sanctity of their order; the superstitious veneration accorded to them by the ignorant masses—all these inspired the theological guild, diffused as it was throughout the length and breadth of the Muslim empire, with the self-same thought of their dignity, and the self-same thought of their indispensability. Add to this the fact that, the theologians soon acquired immense incomes and extensive landed properties.

Even in the early days of Islam the practice of dedicating landed properties to religious uses had come into existence, and had crystallised into an institution. The income of the properties so dedicated was employed according to the direction of the founder.* In this institution the strong religious sense of the Arabs finds beautiful expression. Often, perhaps, fear of death and remorse of conscience, induced them, in the last hour of their existence, to give away a portion of their ill-gotten gains for religious uses; partly to atone for the past, partly to obtain admission into paradise. But often a much loftier motive called forth these endowments. Very many were such institutions in the first century of Islam, but information fails us.†

The Spanish Caliph Hakam III (350–366 A.H., 961–976 A.D.) deserves mention as one of the noblest benefactors of humanity of all times. After he had completed the construction of the great mosque of Cordova (which later he considerably extended), he endowed it with a fourth of the landed property which he had inherited from

* Bukhari: The Prophet said to Omar: "Divide the income without selling the property endowed."
† Already Muawiah made an endowment in favour of his kinmen and all poor Muslims.
his father, with a direction that its annual income should be divided among the poor of Spain.* One other institution of this Prince calls for notice here. In his time primary schools were good and numerous in Muslim Spain. In Andalusia nearly every one could read and write, while in Christian Europe persons in most exalted positions—unless they belonged to the clergy—remained illiterate. Hakam, however, believed that instruction was not yet as widely diffused as it ought to be, and in his tender solicitude for the poorer classes he founded in the capital twenty-seven Seminaries, in which children of poor parents were educated gratuitously, the teachers being paid out of the Caliph’s privy purse.†

Under the Fatimide Caliph Moizz (359 A.H., 969–970 A.D.) the great mosque of Cairo, Al-Azhar, was built and endowed. The endowment was considerably enlarged by his grandson, Hakim, the sixth Fatimide ruler of Egypt. He not only richly endowed the mosque of Al-Azhar with landed properties, but also three other mosques and the Academy of Learning founded by him. Out of the income of the endowed lands the mosques were maintained, and numerous theologians provided with stipends.‡ By reason of such endowments and legacies to pious uses the ulemas (into whose hands, as might have been expected, their administration passed) acquired immense landed properties and an immense income. Only a portion (as is the case to this day) was used for the purposes indicated by the founder; the bulk passing into the pockets of the Inspectors, Administrators, etc. (Najir, Mutawalli). And this notwithstanding the efforts of the Government. In this connexion the Diwan-ul-Awkaf should be mentioned. It is an office still to be found both in Turkey and Egypt, and it existed under the Mogul rule in Persia, where the famous astronomer Nasiruddin Tusi (d. 675 A.H.; 1276–7 A.D.) held the post of the Inspector-General of Waqfs—an honourable and lucrative post.§

The Turkish Sultans entrusted the supervision of the pious endowments made by them to their great Wazirs, or Muftis, or to their Kapu

* Adhari, II, 250. Dozy’s ed.
† Dozy, Spanish Islam, p. 455. See also Ibn Adhari, II, 256, about the University of Cordova. For further information, see Von Schack’s Poesie und Kunst der Araber in Spanien und Sicilien, Vol. I, pp. 50 et seq.; Ibn Khal., Vol. I, 210-212.
‡ Hammer, Gemäldesaal, III, 218.
Aghasi, or Kizlar Aghasi.* But private individuals preferred to entrust the administration to learned men (Ulemas), such as the Mufti, the two Kadhi Askar, the Kadhi of Constantinople or to the Mulas, Kadhis, or other ecclesiastics of the town where the waqf property happened to be.†

A cursory glance at oriental history shows how tremendously grew the tendency to make pious bequests, and this tendency was further fostered and encouraged by the fashion which arose in the fifth century of the Hijra; namely, to build and endow madrassahs, i.e. colleges, learned academies.

Such institutions soon spread over the entire Muslim world. Princes and Amirs, rich merchants, noble ladies and well-to-do savants vied with each other in founding madrassahs and thereby perpetuating their own memory. By their endowment with landed properties a sure and certain income was secured for these institutions. Out of it the professors were paid, even the students were maintained, and not infrequently a considerable amount was spent on books.‡

This tendency called into being a vast succession of endowments in favour of institutions for the study of the Qur'an and Hadith; for the establishment of cloisters (Ribat); place of shelter (Khanqah); hospitals; eating houses and fountains for public use.

The large incomes bequeathed for the maintenance of these institutions stood, as has been stated above, mostly under the administration of the Muslim priests, who were anything but scrupulous in the discharge of their duties. This suffices to prove how immense was the income which the Ulemas, standing at the head of the mosques and the madrassahs, had at their disposal—apart from the income that they made from such splendid offices as those of the judge (kadhi) and mufti. This makes it quite clear why all young people devoted

* Kapu Aghasi is the Head of the Palace Officials and Kizlar Aghasi is the Chief of the Eunuchs of the Seraglio.
† In Egypt to this day waqf properties are mostly under the control of the influential Ulemas. The jurist Kashaf, in his work on waqfs (Kitab-ul-Awkaf, Ma.; Vienna Library, p. 14), says: some old jurists maintained that it was best that the Kadhi should appoint the Mutawalli, but in later times when men came to know how the Kadhis longed for the income of the waqf properties, they differed from this view, and asserted that it was best to let the officials of the mosque appoint the Mutawalli by common consent.
themselves to the study of theology, to the exclusion of all other learning—a fact which called forth bitter regrets from Ghazzali.*

In no other sphere of intellectual activity, indeed, could one reach so quickly the goal which the majority of men strive after—wealth and esteem. In the history of Islam, we have instances, only in the most recent times, of rulers laying their hands on the property of the Muslim clergy.† The body of the Ulema, forming a graded and rigidly confined hierarchy, was thus the dominating class of society from the moment when, under the Caliph Mutawakkil, the orthodox party succeeded in destroying the influence of the Mutazzalites and reconstructing Islam on its old, dogmatic foundation. Contemporaneously with this event took place the development of that pietistic mode of thought which, right up to modern times, became more and more the directing power of intellectual life permeating the entire culture of the Muslim world.

By pietism we do not here mean the genuine and spontaneous expression of religious feelings and sentiments, but outward religious practices—intended merely for show—without any inward importance and significance, which, we may notice, at all times and in every religion discrediting and destroying the true spirit of religion. It was pietism in this sense that henceforward began to play an exceedingly large and truly damaging rôle in the intellectual and spiritual history of Islam. Many things, to be sure, Islam did contain which encouraged this form of mentality. The rules of divine service, the most precise directions regarding the movements of the body at such service, and the general formality of the religious system of Islam—these could not but lead to far-reaching consequences.

The ascetic movement owed its origin to the union of religious enthusiasm with the fear of eternal punishment. But these very causes gave birth to asceticism on the one hand; to pietism on the other. Genuine religious men, always in a minority, fondly took to asceticism, but the great majority of those who thirsted for honours and wealth and sought the sweetest fruits of life, strove by mere outward conformity to the current standard of religion and morality, to pass for the devout and the religious. In no religion, indeed, has hypocrisy assumed so colossal a

* Ihya, I, 26.
† The only instance in earlier Islam, when the property of the church was confiscated, is mentioned by Dozy. See Eng. Tr., p. 567.
shape as it has assumed in Islam. Judaism, by its formalism and outward ceremonials, would have been led similarly astray; but it was early chastened by repressions and persecutions. Victorious Islam, however, soon slackened in its precepts—hypocrisy and pietism robbing it of the only true foundation of every religion—purity of heart. Morbid sentiments (rapture and ecstasy which had already become widely diffused at the time of Ghazzali) were the unfailing results. To pass for religious has always been in Islam the surest road to honour and dignity. It was essential, therefore, that one should act, or affect to act, and appear, what he was not.*

When Sufism called forth a reaction against the rule of the degenerate hierarchy, religious hypocrisy took possession of this field.

A time came—it was in the 5th or the 6th century of the Hijra—when it became a fashion to profess Sufism. These pretenders imitated the Sufis in their dress and in their demeanour. They gave up their silver and gold-embroidered dresses, and clothed themselves in patched garments and carried about their prayer-rugs with them. These people, Ghazzali exclaims, pretended to be Sufis.†

These words of Ghazzali very clearly indicate how very general was the tendency in those days to swim with the religious sentiments of the day. But even in the preceding century the very same ideas predominated. An eye-witness, the Spanish savant Tartushi, who travelled through Iraq in the second half of the fifth century A.H. (476 A.H.), and who for a long time resided in Baghdad and Basra, eloquently describes the services which the great Nizam-ul-Mulk rendered to religion. He devoted his fullest attention, we are told, to the votaries of religion. He built educational institutions (Dar-ul-Ilm) for theologians, Madrassahs for ulamas, founded cloisters (Ribat) for penitents and ascetics, for the pious and for fakirs; assigned them salaries, and gave them food and raiment, provided students with ink and paper, and even allowed them stipends. His beneficence extended over the whole empire, from Jerusalem to the borders of Syria, to Diarbekr, Iraq, Khorasan, and Samarqand which lies on the other side of the Oxus. In this whole empire—a hundred days' journey—there was no savant, no student, no devotee, no ascetic in his tent, who did not enjoy Nizam's benefaction. The amount annually spent by him on this account amounted to 600,000 Dinars.‡

† Ihya, III, 492.
‡ Seraj-ul-Muluk, fol. 127.
To secure the support of the ulemas and the orthodox party, Adud-daulah, a hundred years before, assigned to the clergy a fixed pay and rebuilt several mosques.* Extremely powerful always was the influence of the Ulema and faqahâ in the countries of Islam, and if they formed a party against the ruler, popular insurrection was absolutely inevitable. The dominant traits of this class were fanaticism and greed. Seeking their support the Sultan had to make terms with them, but it was by no means easy to do so, as they were always extravagant in their demands. True, this party could often secure peace at home, but against enemies abroad it was entirely helpless. In that case the military order was the only protection available. Indeed, soldiers were but too often necessary for the maintenance of peace at home. For in the disorganised condition of the Muslim States; in the constant appearance of pretenders to the throne, and religious enthusiasts and other agitators; an efficient army was indispensable. The Caliphate, by reason of the religious influence which it exercised, held together most of the Muslim dynasties under its spiritual sway, and gave to them the appearance of religious solidarity. With the fall of the Caliphate this was no longer possible. Now nothing existed but the rule of might—softened, no doubt, by the sense of common descent—most of the rulers then being of Turkish nationality.

In the Caliphate the foreign soldiery had already become a great power. The Abbasids obtained the throne with the aid of the Persian troops, mostly recruited from Khorasan. The practice soon grew up among the Abbasids of surrounding themselves with several thousands of strong body-guards, consisting mostly of purchased slaves, imported from the countries of Central Asia inhabited by the Turkomans. Relying upon the old Arab idea of the relation of patron and client, the Caliphs presented freedom to these slaves. Their number grew. They were given fiefs. They attained wealth and influence, and the Caliphs were lulled into the belief that they were surrounded by men, true and loyal to them. But the idea of the relation between patron and client, a purely Arab idea, was completely foreign to the Turkish slaves. As soon as prosperity had destroyed their original simplicity of life, they became rude and defiant. Every new Caliph, on his accession, had to secure their favour and support by lavish presents, by increase of salary, by

* Abul Faraj, p. 319.
grant of rich fiefs. Withal there always was the risk of losing life and throne.

In Spain the Mamluks, and later the Berbers, played precisely the same rôle as did the Turks in the East.* The Almohad Sultans, who chose their troops chiefly from the Berber tribe of Zanatah and the Arab Beduins, shared later the very same fate. (Ibn Khaldun, I, 346.)

The leaders of these foreign troops, who were everywhere given large landed properties, gradually became a kind of feudal nobility, a military aristocracy; and the more their power grew the less they obeyed the Sultan.† Already in the 3rd century A.H. there had arisen in Persia the dynasties of the Tahirides, the Saffarides, and the Samanides. And immediately before the first crusade almost the entire Caliphate was in the hands of vassal princelots of Turkish origin.

The Seljuks, and after them the Khwarizm Shah, ruled the eastern lands.‡ Aleppo, Emessa, Damascus, Antioch, Samosata, Saruj, Harran, Mosul, Mardin, Tikrit, Sunjar, etc., were in possession of the Turkish amirs. In Asia Minor, the Seljukian dynasty maintained itself until overthrown by the Mogul rulers of Persia. The Turkish princes, standing in the relation of vassals partly to the Sultan of Iraq and partly to the Fatimide Caliph residing at Cairo, ruled Syria. But they were constantly at war with each other.§

Such was the position of affairs in the Caliphate when, at the end of the 11th century, the army of the crusaders marched through Asia Minor to Syria. The disunion of the Muslim princes made the conquest of Jerusalem easy. And thus, on the 15th of July, 1099 A.D., Jerusalem was conquered. While unbroken warfare was going on between Cross and Crescent for nearly two centuries, a tremendous danger had arisen in the East.

Chengiz Khan, the great Mogul prince, burst from Turkistan into the Muslim countries, destroying and flooding them with crimson streams (1218). His son Halaku continued the conquests, and with the capture

* Under Abdur Rahman III the number of slaves, who were partly soldiers and partly courtiers, was between 6 to 12,000. Dozy, III, 60, 61. Even many negroes were in the body-guard of the Spanish Caliphs. Ibid., II, 68.
‡ Lane-Poole, Moh. Dynasties, pp. 176-178. "At one time the rule of the Khwarizm Shah was almost conterminous with the Seljuk empire, but this period of widest extent scarcely lasted a dozen years." For the Ilkhan of Persia, see Lane-Poole, p. 217.
§ Kremer, Mittelasien und Damascus, p. 42.
of Baghdad and the execution of the Caliph extinguished the Caliphate. Islam seemed lost: pressed on the one hand by the army of the crusaders, filled with religious fervour; and on the other by the wild plundering, ever-advancing cavalry of the Moguls. But Islam did not perish. In Syria it steadily supplanted the Franks: and in Persia, where a powerful Mogul dynasty had established a vast empire under the name of Il-Khan, the religion of the Prophet won a dazzling victory when Ghazan, the seventh ruler, accepted Islam and entered into friendly relations with the rest of the Muslim princes. Not by arms but by religious ideas did Islam vanquish the northern Conquerors. There must, indeed, be some tremendous power in these Semitic religions which enables them not only to weather world-shattering storms but to emerge out of them firmer, stronger, more vigorous than ever. In the war with the Franks, extending over more than a century, Islam passed through a tempering process. The rift that had opened, closed in fire and blood. Islam shook off its lethargy and gathered fresh strength. The Arab nation, which had long ceased to champion the religious ideas had that arisen and grown into maturity in their midst, now retired into the background, handing over the torch to a nation ruder but more powerful, whose empire soon embraced the entire Orient, and whose political power the older Caliphate never attained or equalled.

Almost about the time of the conversion of Ghazan the Franks lost Acre, their last stronghold in the Holy Land (1291). Then followed the fall of Sidon and Beyrut (1291).* Here, in Syria, Islam conquered by the sword; there, in Persia, by the Qur’an.

In Egypt and Syria ruled the first Mamluk Sultans. They were Turkish and Circassian slaves, and had their origin in the purchased body-guard of the Ayyubide Sultan Salih Ayyub.† The first of their line was a woman, Queen Shajar-al-Durz, widow of Salih; but a representative of the Ayyubide family (Musa) was accorded the nominal dignity of joint sovereignty for a few years. Then followed a succession of slave-kings, divided into two dynasties, the Bahri (of the River) and the Burji (of the Fort), who ruled Egypt and Syria down to the beginning of the 16th century.‡ In Persia the empire founded by Chengiz and Halaku soon fell to pieces, and was lost in small dynas-

† Stanley Lane-Poole, Moh. Dyn., pp. 80-83.
‡ Von Kremer, Mittelsyrien und Damascus, pp. 75-91.
ties.* Asia Minor was split up into a number of Turkish principalities. Ten States soon divided the Seljuk kingdom of Rum amongst themselves. The Karasi dynasty occupied Mysia; the families of Saru Khan and Aydin, Lydia; the Mantasha princes, Caria; those of Takka, Lycia and Pamphylia; Hamid, Pisidia and Isauria; Karaman, Lycaonia; Karmiyen, Phrygia; Kizil Ahmadli, Paphlagonia; whilst the house of Othman held Phrygia Epictetus. All these dynasties were gradually absorbed by the rising power of the Othmanlis, once the least among them. Karasi was annexed in 737 (1336); Hamid was purchased as a marriage dower in 783 (1382); and in 792 (1390) Bayazid (Bajazet I) annexed Karmiyen, Takka, Saru Khan, Aydin and Mantasha, in a single campaign, and completed his conquest by adding Karaman and Kizil Ahmadli in 794–5 (1392–3). Thus at the end of the 14th century, not a hundred years after the assumption of independence by Othman I, the arms of his great-grandson had swept away the nine rival dynasties.†

A Christian kingdom enjoyed a more or less precarious existence in Armenia until overthrown by the Egyptian Mamluks. In Africa, where the Almohadi dynasty had continued for a century and half, a similar process was repeated as in the East. Smaller dynasties arose out of the general ruin. These were the Banu Marin in Morocco; the Banu Zijan in the province known to-day as Algeria; and the Banu Hafs in Tunis. In Spain, with the fall of Granada, vanished the last trace of Muslim rule.

In India Kutbuddin Aybak founded the first Muslim dynasty which ruled exclusively in India; for up till then Muslim India had been an outlying province of the kingdom of Ghazna.‡

With the exception of the African coast beyond Egypt, the entire Orient was in the hands of numerous dynasties of Turkish and Mongolian origin, who, according to their old traditional ways, were always at war with each other.

But a still more devastating inroad of the Central Asiatic hordes was yet to take place in the Eastern countries. About the time when the Turkish tribe which later under the name of Othmanlis rose to such great distinction, was securing and consolidating its power in Asia

* Hammer, Gesch. d. Ilchane, II, 335; Lane-Poole, Moh. Dynasties, pp. 123 et seq.  
† Lane Poole, p. 184.  
‡ Lane-Poole, p. 295.
Minor; nay, even extending it towards the south-east of Europe; countless hordes under Timur burst into the north-eastern provinces and thence proceeded in two directions: to India, where they overthrew the Pathan dynasty of Delhi, and to Iraq and Asia Minor, where they came into collision with the Othmanlis, and in the bloody battle of Angora destroyed the Ottoman army and took the Sultan Bajazet prisoner (1402). But with the death of Timur (1405) the vast empire founded by him in fire and blood went to pieces. A large number of Timuride dynasties came into existence—the last of which survived right up to modern times.*

But in the rise of Timur there is one distinctive feature. His was not an Anti-Islamic movement like the first inroad of the Moguls. Timur was simply a conqueror, but not in the Anti-Islamic sense. True, he inflicted upon the Islamic countries the most hideous barbarities, but he showed respect for religion and its exponents, the uleamas. Humanity has nothing to thank him for. Civilisation grievously suffered by his desolating wars, but Islam ran no risks. The Muslim theologians readily paid homage to their new sovereign, who in no way threatened their privileges or affected their position. Indeed Timur inclined to the Shiite faith, then predominant in Persia.

This is not the place to discuss the history of the numerous dynasties that sprang up after every fresh political revolution. The Timurides ruled Persia, Iraq, Adherbajjan and the eastern parts of Asia Minor† until the Safawis in Persia and the Ottomans elsewhere put an end to their power. Only in India did the Mogul dynasty founded by Baber continue, until overthrown by the English in modern times.

The development and gradual transformation of the dominant ideas of Islam under the influence of the Sultanate stand in too intimate a connexion with the history of the civilisation of the individual Islamic States and the manifold local causes and forces at work there.

How differently religious ideas shaped themselves in the extreme west, in Africa and Morocco, and, in the remote east, in India! We shall therefore confine ourselves here to the intellectual and spiritual forces which have exercised a decisive influence on the Ottoman power,

* The present Khan of Bukhara—over whose history Prof. Vambrey has thrown light—traces his descent from Timur. The last rulers of Delhi were Timurides.
and, with them, conclude the history of the dominant ideas of Islam.

The Turkish empire has undoubtedly, up till very recent times, been the most powerful expression of the later Islamic civilisation. True, Persia, India, Turkistan and Africa have each developed along their own intellectual line: still, from the standpoint of world-history not one of them can challenge comparison or enter into competition with Turkish Islam. They stand, indeed, very far behind Turkey. Since the fall of the world-dominion of Islam each individual nation has pursued its own particular way. Sufism, degenerating in the west, ended in a rude cult of saint-worship, and spread extensively in Persia and India. Holding a middle course between the two extremes, the Ottoman empire, embracing almost the whole of further Asia and a considerable portion of Europe and Africa, sought to revive afresh the glory of the old Caliphate. But the spirit moving and animating it was essentially different from that of the old Islam.

Asia Minor, the home of the Ottoman power, was occupied in the last period of the Caliphate by Turkish nomadic hordes. They were the individual streams of the great flood of the Turkish race-migration which in the 4th and 5th centuries of the Hijra had poured out of upper Asia into the culture-lands.

Whilst the family of the Seljuks settled down in Adherbaijan and Iraq and overthrew the Buwayhids and in their place stepped into the guardianship of the Caliphs, a Seljuk dynasty established itself in Asia Minor and named itself after its capital, Iconium—the Sultanate of Iconium.* At the very time when this dynasty had reached its highest splendour, namely, under its ninth ruler, Ala'uddin Kaikobad (d. 634 A.H., 1236–7 A.D.), the inroad of the Moguls took place in Persia. It ended the powerful empire of the Khwarizm Shah, which included the whole of Persia and the largest part of Iraq.

Shortly before this event that particular kind of poetry had come into existence in Persia which is indissolubly connected with Sufism, and which, under the name of mystic poetry, has preserved and immortalised one of the most alluring and charming sides of Persian culture. Then lived the great Farid-ud-din Attar † (b. 613 A.H., 1216 A.D.; d.

* They ruled from 480-700 A.H. 1087-8 to 1300-1 A.D. See Freeman’s *Ottoman Power in Europe*, Chapter IV.
about 719 or 732 A.H.), and the inspired singer of poetical pantheism Jalal-ud-din Rumi (d. 661 A.H., 1262–3 A.D.), and the world-renowned and world-pleasing Sadi (d. 691 A.H., 1292 A.D.).

These poets brought Sufism into prominence in Persia and with Sufism grew the various orders of dervishes.* From its peaceful meditation Persia was suddenly awakened by the tumult of on-rushing, devastating Mogul armies. Contemporaries have left us an account of the horror and alarm which the terrible news of cruelties in Balkh and Bukhara aroused among the people. Many managed to save themselves, but many more shared the fate of Farid-ud-din Attar, and fell by the Mogul sword. The fugitives spread all over the western lands of Islam. There were two courts especially where poets and savants were sure of a generous welcome: in Shiraz at the court of the Atabeks, and in Iconium at the court of the Seljukian Sultan, Alauddin Kaikobad. At the court of the latter a large circle of poets and savants assembled, and in his capital Persian literature found a congenial soil. Here Jalal-ud-din and his father received princely hospitality, and here rest the remains of the great Persian mystic, his father’s and his beloved master’s, Shamsh-ud-din Tabriz,—a spot that is the place of pilgrimage of his order of dervishes.† In the different towns of his kingdom, in Sivas, Iconium, Amasia, he built mosques, cloisters, madrassahs, caravansarais—so many seats of culture and exchange of ideas.‡ The influence that the dervish orders wielded on the populace is best shown by a dervish insurrection which took place under Al-

* By dervishes are meant, says Goldziher, those who follow the sufi manner of life. They cannot, however, all be classed under one head. We must distinguish between the earnest representatives of the love of God and ecstatic exaltation, who endeavour to perfect their souls by a life of self-denial and meditation, and the vagabond dervishes who in an independent dissolute beggar’s life use sufism to cloak their idleness and to delude the masses; or the cloister brothers who, shrinking from work, use the exterior forms of the sufi life to obtain a care-free and independent existence. They too are full of the love of God, and pretend to be “walking on the way.” But earnest sufis would hardly care to be identified with them; Goldziher, Mohammed and Islam, pp. 180 et seq. The sufis are opposed to the usual theological book-learning. They have no sympathy with the Ulema and the Hadith searchers. These, so they say, simply perplex our times; Goldziher, p. 185. It was to be expected that the theologians by profession were not favourably disposed towards the sufis; Goldziher, p. 186. See also p. 187 for the relation between sufism and official Islam, also Goldziher, Muh. Stud. II, pp. 394 et seq.

† Ibn Batutah has very interesting observations on this subject, II, 282, 283.

‡ Hammer, I, 53. See also his Gesch. d. schönen Redekünste in Persien, p. 139.
uddin's son and successor, at the head of which stood a dervish called Elyas Baba.*

Another dervish, Nur Sufi, managed to gather so large a following that he actually took possession of a fort in Cilicia; whereupon the Sultan of Iconium made terms with the dervish's son and granted the neighbouring country to him in fief. This dervish's son soon became the founder of a small dynasty, which gave much trouble to the Ottoman Sultans.†

In this respect nothing changed when the Persian princes of the family of Chengiz put an end to the kingdom of the Seljuks of Iconium and brought the country under Mogul rule. The influence of Sufism and of the dervishes, towards whom the Mogul princes were not unfavourably inclined, continued; nay, developed still more powerfully. That this was really so, is shown by the famous traveller Ibn Batuta, who, in the year 733 A.H. (1333 A.D.), travelled through Asia Minor. He found a network of religious brotherhood spread throughout the country. This brotherhood was composed of men of all classes of society, and its members called themselves Akhy (brothers). They established chapels and inns for dervishes all over the kingdom, where even strangers received a friendly and generous hospitality. The Arab traveller had a warm reception in more than twenty inns of this brotherhood. The description which he gives of these Akhy in their long kaoatan, in their high, white felt hat, and of their religious practices, accompanied by songs and dances, leaves no doubt that these Akhy were no other than the predecessors of the Mewleys and Nakhsbandi of modern Turkey.

About forty years before Ibn Batuta's travels in Asia Minor—in the last decade of the thirteenth century A.D.—the chief of a Turkoman horde, the intrepid Erteghril, was rewarded by the Seljukian Sultan, Alauddin, with fiefs for his military service, and was presented with robes of honour. This Turkoman chief‡ was given the province known as Phrygia Epictetus (henceforward called Sultan-oni, the centre of the Ottoman power) on the borders of Byzantine Bithynia, with

* Hammer, I, 55, Abul Faraj, 479, on the influence of the dervish under the Seljuks. Hammer, I, 49. Even later the influence of the dervish order was decisive on the question of succession to the throne. Hammer, I, 601.
† Hammer, I, 143, 149, 167. Ibn Batuta gives us an account of the third ruler of this House. He describes his residence Alaya and his country. II, 258.
‡ Lane-Poole, Moh. Dyn. 186.
the town of Sugut (Thebasion) as headquarters. Ertoghril’s son, Ottoman, waged successful war and extended his power in the bordering Byzantine lands. But he owed his success just as much to his army as to the religious ideas of his contemporaries. He married—so runs the popular legend—the charming Malkhatun, the daughter of a pious hermit, Sheikh Adab Ali, honoured throughout the country. When we recall to mind how, shortly before, the dervishes had stirred up a dangerous rebellion against Sultan Alaeddin; how, by their support, the Karamayyan dynasty had come into existence; and what the great Arab traveller says about the extraordinary influence and power of the Akhy-order—no room is left for doubt that Ottoman owed his success not merely to his arms but also to the support of the religious order—a support which would readily be given to him, to the fullest extent, as the son in-law of Shaikh Adab Ali.

True, that schism had not then come to light in Asia Minor, which later so often drove the orthodox party to the persecution of the sufis and the dervishes. Islam was still young there, and the Turkomans, its champions, were a rude and simple people who had no idea of the gulf that divided orthodox Islam from the ecstatic enthusiasm of the Persian sufis. Their clergy, mostly of Turkoman nationality, were not very learned, and therefore not very contentious. They were of easy-going temperament, of the type of village and country priests, who were quite content with the charity of the princes and populace, and who felt no need or inclination to pursue or punish heretics. Everywhere in his rambles Ibn Batutah found mosques, madrassahs, inns, chapels. He observes with pleasure the expressive manner in which children recited the Qur’an. He notes with satisfaction the pious and religious tendencies of the various Sultans who ruled the land; their regard for theologians who were given precedence at Court over the Amirs. On the occasion of the festival of Kurban-Bairam lawyers, ulemas, members of the then Akhy order—all dined at one table at the Court.† We are further told that many a professor of a well-endowed academy lived in princely luxury, surrounded by numerous slaves and servants.‡ The Qur’an readers were never absent from the Court.§ After this account we need not be surprised if we read in the oldest Ottoman histories that Ottoman built inns for dervishes and

* Lane-Poole, Moh. Dyn. 185.
† Ibn Batutah, II, 277.
‡ Ibid., 296, 297.
§ Ibid., II, 304, 307, 341.
established mosques; while his successor Orkhan founded in Brusa, the spot selected for the capital, chapels and cloisters for dervishes. Here, under the second ruler of the house of Ottoman, in continuation of the pious policy of Ottoman, rose similar institutions and establish-
ments founded by the rich and influential officers of the Court.

When we consider these circumstances in their entirety, we are confirmed in the view set forth earlier in a general way, namely, that in the beginning the Sultanate rested mainly on two parties: the clergy and the army. To the interplay of these two powerful factors the Ottoman empire owed its exceedingly rapid growth and its later glorious political development.

These nevertheless carried within them the germs of decay and dissolution; for, on the one hand, as soon as political conditions settled down, the split between the orthodox party and sufism came glaringly to light, and, on the other, the army, invested as it was with large fiefs, was soon demoralised, and the Sultan's body-guard, the Janisaries, began to exercise a fateful influence over the Ottoman empire.

In fact the State more and more assumed a military character. The position of the ulemas continued to be one of respect and in-
fluence. They held judicial and educational offices. They commanded large incomes; but, in spite of this, they ceased to occupy the most powerful position, because secular interests prevailed.

Thus the old Arab hierarchical system was exchanged for an out-
and-out military system, and under Mohamed II, the conqueror of Constantinople, the State was pre-eminently a military State. Uninter-
rupted wars maintained this system intact till the beginning of the XIXth century.

By the destruction of the Janisaries, which preceded the re-organi-
sation of the army according to European pattern, the military tenden-
cies acquired yet greater strength. But the various other reforms of Sultan Mahmud furnished proof that in accordance with the tendencies of modern times, even the Ottoman government subordinated the hierarchy to the State. In Egypt a much more far-reaching change took place. Similar tendencies manifested themselves in Persia, where, after the death of Fateh Ali Shah, and at the commencement of the reign of Mohamed Mirza (1250 A.H., 1834–5 A.D.), an attempt was made to set a limit to the encroachments of the Ulemas in the adminis-
tration of justice by establishing a Supreme Court of Justice (Diwan-i-Adalat).*

Thus, everywhere in the Orient, the edifice of the State, built on the foundation of the old Arab theocratic idea, crumbled down, and out of its ruins, under the influence of more modern ideals, arose younger creations, whose growth and development will be witnessed by future generations; for the periods of time within which great changes are wrought cannot be measured by a single lifetime.

But, from the short span of years within our own personal experience, we may draw one conclusion, namely, that humanity will steadily progress in the direction of spiritual perfection, according to the eternal laws which lie at the very root of life and are of its very essence.

HISTORY OF INDIAN COMMERCE.
1765-1813.
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1. RIVALS OF THE ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY IN INDIAN TRADE.

During the first half of the eighteenth century, the Dutch were the most important commercial rivals of the English in their trade with the East. In 1759, the Dutch challenged the political supremacy of the English in Bengal, but they were defeated in their attempt and their dream of founding a Dutch Empire in India came to an end. Their trade naturally declined with the loss of their political power, and this decline was accelerated by the corruption of the Dutch officials.

The principal articles exported and imported by the Dutch were to a great extent similar to those which figured prominently in the trade returns of the English East India Company. The chief imports from Holland were silver, woollen goods and cutlery. The bulk of the exports to Holland were cotton goods, raw silk and saltpetre.*

During the seven years from 1785 to 1791, the average export of Indian goods to Holland amounted to £1,162,526 per annum, as shown in the Dutch East India Company’s sales.

The chief exports to Java from India were cotton goods, opium and saltpetre, the greater part of the last article being re-exported to Holland. The main imports from Java to India were spices and bars of Japan copper. According to the Report of the Commissioners appointed in 1795 to inquire into the state of the Dutch Company’s affairs, copper and camphor were the only important Japanese articles which the Dutch supplied, for a long series of years, to their settlements in India. Of these, the average amount of the former

during the years 1784 to 1795 was about **442** tons per annum. But the war between England and Holland from 1781 to 1811 caused considerable interruption to the Dutch commerce with India.

The French trade with India, too, received a fatal blow during the Seven Years' War (1756–1763), and though it revived after the conclusion of peace in 1763, 'the French Company's concerns were rapidly declining.' Louis XV, therefore, suspended in 1769 the exclusive privileges of the French East India Company. From the year 1771, private French merchants kept up a fitful commerce with India. During the period 1771–1778, the average annual import to France from India was only **10,231,773** million livres per annum as against **37,000,000** million livres in 1769.* But the outbreak of a war between England and France in 1781–83 gave a severe shock even to this small trade.

This decline of commerce was sought to be remedied by Louis XVI by the formation of a new Company of the Indies with exclusive privileges of trade. But the French Revolution swept away almost all the institutions created by the Monarchy and the new company was abolished in 1790. The state of France was however so unsettled that this freedom of trade could not improve French commerce with India. Cotton goods formed the most important Indian export to France at this time, but French commerce naturally suffered on account of the war with England from 1793 to 1815.

The Danes had never any considerable amount of trade with India. But when England was at war with Holland and France during the War of American Independence, Danish trade was very prosperous and the English sent home their goods in Danish ships to escape the men-of-war of France and Holland. But in 1801 hostilities having begun between England and Denmark, the Danish trade was interrupted. From the next year, however, Danish trade continued to flourish. During the period 1795 to 1806 the imports of merchandise from Denmark to British India, which consisted chiefly of various kinds of wine, cordage, canvas, iron and steel, amounted to **£632,128**, while the net import of treasure from Denmark to British India during the same period amounted to **£375,306**. The

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exports of merchandise to Denmark from British India during the corresponding period, consisting mainly of piecegoods, amounted to £1,145,679.* In 1808, war was again declared by England against Denmark, and from that time the Danes never regained their old trade.

During the war with France from 1793 to 1815, American trade with India increased rapidly. The vessels of the U.S.A. first appeared in the Indian waters about the year 1785. The Bengal Government thought it wise to allow the American ships to enter their own ports instead of compelling them to carry on their trade with other European settlements in India. This ‘gratuitous licence revokable at pleasure’ was confirmed by a treaty in 1794 which granted to the Americans the right to direct trade with British India. In 1797, the privilege of free ingress to the British Indian ports was granted to all friendly nations. But during the course of the long war with France, the Indian settlements of the French as well as of the Dutch and the Danes, who had fallen under French influence, were successively captured by the English. The Portuguese and the Americans were then the only neutral nations, who could carry on any considerable amount of trade with India.†

During the period 1795 to 1806, the chief items of merchandise imported into British India from Portugal, were wine and paper. The total value of the merchandises and treasure imported from Portugal during the same period amounted respectively to £511,101 and £2,838,973. The value of exports during the same period from British India to Portugal, of which the main item were piecegoods, cotton and indigo, amounted to about £34,284,36.‡

But the French conquest of Portugal left the neutral trade mainly in the hands of the Americans, who began to supply Europe as well as the U.S.A., the British West Indies and Spanish America with Indian goods. The chief articles of export and import of the Indo-American

* Appendix 47—Supplement to the Fourth Report, 1812, p. 144. In the above account of the Danish trade, the value of exports and imports has been converted into sterling at the rate of 2s. 6d. per sicca rupee.
† Report from the Committee of Correspondence on Trade with East Indies and China, 1812-13 and the evidence of John Bainbridge before the Select Committee on the Affairs of the E.I. Company (1813), p. 569 et seq.
trade were similar to those of Portuguese commerce. The chief articles imported to India by the Americans were treasure, wines, woollen goods and metals. The chief articles exported by them from India were piece-goods, sugar, indigo and cotton. During the period 1802 to 1806, the merchandise imported by the Americans to the British settlement in India amounted to £617,120 and their net import of treasure to British India during the same period, was about £3,905,417. During the same period, the merchandise exported by them from British India amounted to £4,212,950. But the war between England and the United States (1812–1815) put a sudden stop to this trade.

2. Trade of the English East India Company.

From what has been written above, it will appear that during the period 1765 to 1813, the greater part of the foreign trade of India passed into the hands of the English East India Company. Turning to the imports of the Company to India during this period, we find that bullion formed a less important item of import than it did in previous periods. Thus in fifty years from 1712 to 1761, the E.I. Company imported to India merchandise of the value of £8,375,052 and bullion of the value of £20,607,275. During the next fifty years from 1762 to 1811, the import of merchandise amounted to £26,606,385 and of bullion to £7,678,098.* This decline in the import of bullion to India is chiefly accounted for by the fact that after the Company had secured the control of the revenues of Bengal, their investments in India were partly secured from the surplus of territorial revenues in India † and partly from the funds of Englishmen in India who transmitted some of their fortunes by means of bills‡ drawn on the Directors. Naturally there was no import of bullion by the E.I. Company to Bengal during the period 1757 to 1797 and the import of bullion by the Company to Madras and Bombay during the same period was also insignificant.

But the import of merchandise to India increased considerably during the period 1765 to 1813. In the early years of the eighteenth

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* Macgregor, Commercial Tariffs, pp. 119-121.
century the average import of merchandise to India amounted to about £100,000 per annum. It rose to about £350,000 per annum between 1765 and 1793. Though the imports of merchandise to India increased considerably both in amount and in value since the grant of the Dewani, the import trade was still far from profitable. According to the Report of the Select Committee of 1793, the greater part of the Company's imports to India at that time consisted of woollen goods, metals and military and naval stores. But the net loss of the Company on woollen goods imported to the three Presidencies of Bengal, Madras and Bombay in six years from 1783—4 to 1788—9 was £37,790 and the net profit on metals imported to the three Presidencies during the corresponding period was £9,875. Therefore the net loss on woollens and metals, the chief articles of import, in six years was £27,915. From the evidence of Mr. John Bebb, a Director of the East India Company, before the Committee on the East India Affairs in 1809, it is seen that even at that period the import of woollens to India was generally a losing trade.

The chief metals imported to India at this time were lead, iron, steel, tin and copper. Lead was used generally for making bullets as well as for preparing 'red oxide for decorative purposes.' Lead was therefore in constant demand in all parts of India. In the good old days the Indians surpassed the Europeans in the manufacture of the finest quality of steel. The materials for the famous Damascus blades of the Middle Ages came from the kingdom of Golconda. But the Indian iron and steel industry was 'practically stamped out by cheap, imported' metals. During the period 1708 to 1720, the value of iron sent by the Company to India amounted to £53,977. In 1791 to 1800 it reached £223,111 and during the period 1801 to 1811 it rose to £568,593.* This rapid increase in the import of iron to India was due to the progress of the English iron industry during the period of the Industrial Revolution.

Tin was sometimes imported to India by the English East India Company, but it was always exposed to competition from the tin of the Malay Peninsula, of Sumatra and of the island of Bornea. During the

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* Macgregor, p. 125.
years 1708 to 1720, the value of tin imported by the Company amounted to £32,806. During the next decade it dropped to £3,596. Then, for the next fifty years there was no import of tin to India by the Company. But during the decade 1781 to 1790, tin again began to appear as an article of import, and during the period 1801 to 1811 the value of English tin imported to India amounted to £420,345. With regard to copper also, India was by no means dependent on England for her supply. The Dutch E.I. Company imported a considerable quantity of copper to India from Japan every year. During the seventeenth century, the English E.I. Company sometimes imported copper to India but the import was found unprofitable and discontinued. The first import of British copper to India practically began in 1731. During the next forty years, the quantity imported increased gradually from about 100 tons to 800 tons and the prices remained fairly steady at about £100 to £110 per ton. From 1773 to 1787, the increased production of copper in England was followed by lower prices. During this period the imports of the Company were about 1,500 tons per annum and the price gradually fell to £70 per ton. In 1788, there was such a large supply of copper in England that the Company were prevailed upon to import, during the next two years, 5,200 tons to India. This produced a glut of copper in the Indian markets.*

The Company’s imports of merchandise to India, which remained, on the whole, stationary during the period 1765 to 1793, began to show a steady rise from the year 1795. The average for the decade 1791 to 1800 was £664,057 per annum and for the next decade £817,791 per annum.† During these two decades, British cotton manufactures began to figure in the import trade to India. In 1791 the import of cotton manufactures to the East Indies amounted to £150 only. In 1800 it reached £21,200, and in 1810 it rose to £114,849.‡

The Company’s exports from India increased rapidly during the period 1765 to 1813. The value of the sales of East India goods, including exports from China, was £21,630,835 during the period 1747 to 1756.

* Observations on Evidence relating to Private Trade with India, Appendix 47—Supplement to Fourth Report, 1812.
† Macgregor, pp. 120-121; Hamilton, Trade Relations, p. 174 and p. 259.
‡ Macgregor, p. 146.
But omitting tea, which formed the chief export from China, the total value of the sales during the same period amounted to £15,444,438.*
But in the ten years from 1798-9 to 1807-8, the sales of Indian goods alone reached £26,841,286.† For making a fair comparison, we should however deduct from the total value of the sales during the period 1747 to 1756 the value of the exports from China and the proceeds of the duties which, up to the passing of the Warehouse Act of 1799, were included in the sale prices of the Company's goods.

Turning now to the chief articles of export from India, we find that cotton goods, and specially those of Bengal, formed one of the main constituents of the cargoes sent to England. For some time after the grant of the Dewani, the cotton industry of Bengal was not in a very flourishing condition. As a result of the oppression under the dadan system,‡ many weavers gave up their profession and took to other occupations, specially agriculture. Verelst in his letter to the Court of Directors, dated March 17th, 1767, complained of the uncommon scarcity of weavers and referred to the fact that "a great number of manufacturers in cloth have deserted their professions to seek subsistence from a less precarious calling." Even before the beginning of the British rule, the muslin industry of Bengal was not in a very flourishing condition. It was during the reigns of Jahangir, Shah Jahan and Aurangzib that this industry reached the zenith of its prosperity. The famous Dacca muslins then found a large sale in the Imperial and the different Viceregal Courts. But the general insecurity of the country, during the rule of Aurangzib’s feeble successors, restricted these profitable markets to the weavers of Bengal. The great famine of 1770 also swept away a considerable number of weavers. But from 1771, the export of Indian cotton goods to England remained fairly steady for some time down to 1778, in which year 1,162,477 pieces were disposed of at the Company’s sales.§ In 1779, there was a heavy fall in the amount of exports, the number of pieces sold at the Company’s sales being 444,666 only, and during the next five years the quantity exported did not rise much above this level. This fall in exports was chiefly due

to the declaration of war by France, Spain and Holland against England during the War of American Independence.

From 1785, the export of Indian cotton goods to England began to increase steadily, and after the passing of the Charter Act of 1793, the export of cotton goods in privilege trade increased the total exports to England considerably. This larger volume of exports was maintained until 1806. The value of the Indian cotton goods sold at the Company’s sales for the Company and private traders reached the record figure of £3,245,745* in 1798–1799. The value of the exports of Indian cotton goods averaged £2,282,419 per annum during the next seven years. But from the year 1806–7, there was a sudden decline in the value of exports. The number of pieces of Indian cotton goods, sold at the Company’s sales as has already been mentioned, began to decline also from the year 1806.†

This decline both in the value and amount of Indian cotton goods exported to England was partly due to the Continental System of Napoleon and the issue of Orders in Council by England, which practically closed the Continental markets, to which almost the entire amount of the Indian cotton goods was re-exported at this time. As early as 1787, ⅓ths of the Indian calicoes and ⅔ths of the muslins brought to England, were re-exported to the Continent.‡ Mr. Cartwright, the Accountant-General of the E.I. Company, in his evidence before the Select Committee of 1813, remarked, “As to calicoes there are very few for home consumption, the duties being so high; muslins there may be some, but not above one-tenth part of the whole; the British manufactures have driven them out of the market nearly.”

From the very beginning of the eighteenth century, the persistent policy of the British Parliament had been to shut out Indian cotton goods from the English market by a series of heavy and often prohibitive duties, which in 1813 amounted to 44 per cent. on muslins and 82 per cent. on calicoes §, if they were for home consumption. The object of this tariff policy was mainly realised by the progress of cotton manu-

factures in England during the latter half of the eighteenth century ‘under the magic influence of steam and machines,’ which gave the final blow to the Indian cotton industry.

A similar policy of prohibition was adopted towards Indian silk manufactures from the beginning of the eighteenth century. In 1700, it was enacted by the British Parliament ‘that from and after the 29th day of September 1701, all wrought silks, Bengals, and stuffs mixed with silk or herba, of the manufacture of Persia, China or the East Indies; and all calicoes, painted, dyed, printed or stained there, which are or shall be imported into this kingdom, shall not be worn or otherwise used in Great Britain; all goods imported after that day, shall be warehoused and exported again.’ The prohibition against Indian silk manufactures lasted in England till 1826 when an ad valorem duty of thirty per cent. was substituted for absolute prohibition.

From the very beginning of the English E.I. Company’s trade with India, indigo became one of the chief articles of export to England, and this trade in Indian indigo was carried on for more than a century with considerable success. But the British colonists in the West Indies and America succeeded in producing considerable quantities of indigo of a very good quality. As early as 1675, ‘the Company wrote out to their Agents in India that Lahore indigo was being unsold in London by West Indian.’* Accordingly from 1724 the E.I. Company omitted indigo from the annual list of exports from India. In the early records of the Company there is no mention of Bengal indigo, the Company’s supply being obtained chiefly from Agra, Lahore and Ahmadabad. Tavernier was perhaps the first important European writer to refer to the indigo industry of Bengal. About the middle of the eighteenth century, the cultivation of indigo was abandoned in most of the West India islands on account of the higher profits yielded by coffee and sugar cultivation. The British dyers had therefore to depend on the French, American and Spanish colonists of America for their supplies of indigo. But these sources of supply were stopped by the War of American Independence.

Accordingly the demand for Indian indigo revived, and the Company entered in 1779 ‘‘into a contract with an enterprising indivi-

dual, then resident in Calcutta, at most encouraging prices, which led others to embark in the cultivation, from whom the Company also made purchases. In support of this commodity, the Company lost on the sale of their purchases, upwards of £80,000” but the Company succeeded in establishing an indigo industry in Bengal which soon proved sufficient to meet the entire demand of the United Kingdom. In the eight years from 1803 to 1810, the sale value of indigo, exported from Bengal by the Company and private individuals, averaged £1,200,158 per annum. The establishment of the trade in Bengal indigo, not only restricted the production of indigo in other parts of India but also gave the last effective blow to the already declining indigo industry of the West Indies. Thus, out of about six million pounds of indigo imported into Great Britain in 1810, more than five million pounds came from Bengal and only about 165,500 lb. from the West Indies.*

During the period (1765–1813) the export of Indian raw silk increased considerably. This was mainly due to the improvements introduced in the silk industry of Bengal by the E.I. Company. In 1768 the Court of Directors advised their Government in Bengal “that it was to the increase in raw silk that they looked chiefly for the means of bringing home their surplus revenue.”† But the ‘country-wound’ Bengal silk found little favour in England, as it was suited only to a few articles of English manufacture. From 1765, however, the export of Bengal raw silk increased steadily. The average export to England during the period 1767 to 1771 was 327,630 lb. per annum.‡ Between 1770 and 1775 the Italian method of reeling, introduced in the Company’s factories, improved considerably the quality of Bengal silk. Accordingly, its average annual export to England during the decade 1776 to 1785 was 560,283 lb. while that from Italy, Turkey and other countries was only 282,304 lb. But as a commercial enterprise, the export of Bengal raw silk to England proved unprofitable and during the period 1776 to 1785, the

‡ Milburn, II, p. 292.
Company lost £884,744 on their sales of Bengal silk. From 1786, however, the Company's trade in Bengal raw silk was in general profitable but the average annual export during the seven years from 1786 to 1792 fell to 319,832 lb. This fall in exports was mainly due to the progress of cotton manufactures in England "which almost entirely banished silk from the dress of British ladies."

The war between England and France, which began in 1793, put a severe check to the silk trade of England and the Continent and the E.I. Company was compelled to dispose of a large quantity of silk at such reduced prices that the loss of the Company on its investments of raw silk in 1793 amounted to £53,224. To guard against future losses the Company resolved "that the surplus quantity of silk beyond what the markets could take in its raw state, was to be thrown into organdize in England." This experiment succeeded so well that Bengal silk began to be used for the manufacture of various articles, and in spite of the effects of the war with France the import of Bengal raw silk into England increased in comparison with the exports from other countries. Thus in 1801, of the total quantity of raw silk imported into England, Bengal supplied 444,862 lb.,* China 131,335 lb., Italy and Turkey 62,264 lb. and other parts 193,503 lb. During the next ten years, the quantity of Bengal raw silk exported to England fluctuated considerably from year to year but the average annual export did not exceed 400,000 lb.†

Raw cotton or cotton wool was another item of the Company's exports to England. Raw cotton figured "at the Company's sales as early as November 1621, but it was merely 'packing wool' which had apparently been brought home wrapped round the bales of piece-goods." The Company attached little importance to cotton wool as an article of commerce up to the close of the 18th century. Thus in 1783, of the total imports of raw cotton into Great Britain only 114,133 lb. came from the East Indies, 9,621,530 lb. being imported from other countries. In 1800 the import of raw

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* This amount includes also the exports in private and privilege trade; see Supplement to the Fourth Report, 1812, p. 218, and Milburn II, p. 295.
† Macgregor, p. 134; but Macgregor's figures differ to some extent from those given in the Report on Raw Silk, pp. 3-4.
cotton from the East Indies amounted to 6,629,822 lb., and in 1810 it reached 27,783,700 lb. This increase was mainly due to the effects of the American embargo in 1808. But as the Directors of the E.I. Company observed in 1810, Indian cotton was subject to considerable variations both in its cost price as well as in its selling price, and naturally the trade in this article fluctuated very much from year to year. Thus in 1812, the import of East Indian cotton to England dropped to 915,950 lb. and in 1813 to 497,350 lb.*

The most formidable rival of Indian cotton in the English market at this time was American cotton. Indian cotton usually sold at two-thirds the price of the American cotton in the Liverpool market. Thus in 1813 the price of 'United States Uplands' was 25½d. per pound while that of 'East Indian Surat' was 17½d. per pound.† In spite of its higher price, American cotton was preferred in England because it was cleaner and longer stapled than Indian cotton. The chief market for Indian cotton at this time was China.‡ According to the evidence of Mr. Fawcett in May 1809, about 90,000 bales of cotton (1 bale = 3½ cwt.) were exported every year from Bombay and they went chiefly to China.

For many years after the foundation of the English East India Company, "pepper formed the staple article of their imports. The supply of Europe was at that time chiefly in the hands of the English and the Dutch, of which each nation furnished about an equal amount." But the increased power of the Dutch in the Indian Archipelago compelled the English to depend more and more on Indian pepper and naturally the English trade in pepper declined in comparison with that of the Dutch who could procure their supply from the Dutch Indies at smaller cost. Towards the close of the seventeenth century, the average annual export of pepper by the English East India Company was about 1,150,000 lb. only. But during the eighteenth century, the Company's export of pepper increased considerably. Thus from 1736 to 1792 the average annual export was about 2,400,000 lb. § The average quantity

‡ H.C. Report from Select Committee on the Affairs of E.I. Co., 1832, Finance and Accounts, Part II, p. 858 et seq. See also Macgregor, pp. 463-64.
§ Appendix 47—Supplement to the Fourth Report, 1812, p. 220.
sold per annum at the Company’s sales during the two years 1793 and 1794 rose to about four million pounds. This increase was mainly due to the acquisition of the pepper-bearing tracts of Malabar, after the Third Mysore War. During the twelve years from 1795 to 1806, the average quantity sold annually at the Company’s sales exceeded five million pounds. From 1803, however, the trade in pepper began to decline and in 1809 the total quantity sold on account of the Company and individuals was only 1,268,469 lb. At this time the Company’s trade in pepper was generally unprofitable.

Saltpetre was another important article of export to England. The chief centre of the saltpetre trade was Patna. As Raynal writes: “the refined saltpetre of Patna, is infinitely superior to any that is found elsewhere. The Europeans export about ten million pounds for the use of their settlements in Asia or for home consumption in their respective countries.” But during the war with France, Bengal saltpetre was, for political reasons, prohibited to foreigners and exported exclusively in the ships of the Company. It was also sold in England under special restrictions. By Act 31 Geo. III, Cap. 42 the Company were required to put up their saltpetre to sale at the price of 31s. per hundredweight in time of peace and 40s. per hundredweight in time of war, and they were further required to deliver to His Majesty’s Stores 500 tons of saltpetre every year at certain average prices. Saltpetre being one of the main ingredients of gunpowder, its demand and selling price were to a great extent regulated by the course of political events. The profits of the trade in saltpetre therefore fluctuated very much in different years. But apart from all considerations of profit, saltpetre was very useful as ballast in the export trade to England because piecegoods and raw silk which in point of value formed at this period the greater part of each cargo, occupied only a very small portion of the tonnage.*

Sugar was ‘a commodity also of dead weight’ which the Company occasionally exported more with a view to fill up the spare tonnage of their shipping, than with any definite expectation of profit. From

* It is interesting to note here that only a few years ago, English coal sometimes came to Bombay as ballast in the out-going ships from England because manufactured goods which now form the greater part of our imports, carry greater value in smaller bulk than agricultural goods and raw materials which form at present our main items of exports.
the beginning of their trade, Indian sugar was sent to England but the Company did not attach much importance to this article. This was possibly on account of the cost of conveyance from so great a distance. Later on, the progress of sugar production in the West Indies caused a decline in the trade in Indian sugar which was also handicapped by specially heavy duties. By 1790 the price of sugar rose very high in England in consequence of the smaller import from St. Domingo and the increased demand for sugar, caused by the fall in the price of tea. The English public therefore looked to India for an adequate supply of sugar. Accordingly, the Court of Proprietors of the East India Stock requested the Lords of the Treasury in 1792, to equalise the duties on West India and East India sugar. But their request was not granted. The East India Company, however, exported to England in the years 1791 to 1799, 29,807 tons of Bengal raw sugar. The trade in Indian sugar was subject to great fluctuations and till 1820 the export of Indian sugar to England was trifling, compared with the exports from other countries.

Of the remaining commodities exported by the Company, opium and *sunn* deserve a passing mention. In 1682, the Company first ordered opium to be sent from Bengal to England, but up to 1786 the importation amounted only to about 750 lb. a year, being about one-tenth of the quantity received into England from countries other than India. During the three following years there was no import of Bengal opium; but in 1790, 1,500 lb. of opium was imported into England from Bengal. This trade was subject to considerable fluctuations; in some years, e.g. in 1791, 1794 and 1795, there was no import at all. In 1801 the import of Bengal opium amounted to 14,951 lb., but in 1809 only 1,991 lb. was sold in the Company's sales. The greater part of the opium exported from Bengal at this period went to China and the Malay Archipelago.*

*Sunn*, a species of hemp, figured as a new article of export by the Company from 1796 but it did not prove profitable. The Company, however, persevered to bring it into use till they had lost £45,000 on its trade. But in 1800 when difficulties arose with Russia, the British

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Government ordered the Company to import *sunn* from India, and in 1809 the Company’s offer to import *sunn* at cost price was gladly accepted by the British Government.

In the above enumeration of exports we miss several articles, e.g. hide, jute, food-grains and tea which now figure prominently in India’s export trade. The first three articles could not bear the long voyage to England by the Cape of Good Hope route. It was the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 which made possible any trade in these goods. Tea of course appeared as an article of the Company’s import into England as early as 1669 but this was Chinese tea which was received at Bantam. From this time up to 1833, the East India Company carried on a profitable trade in Chinese tea which on some occasions was re-exported from India. At this time no tea was produced in India. The Indian tea cultivation was started during the administration of Lord William Bentinck and the first sample of Indian tea was sent to England in 1838.

Thus, the important characteristics of Indian trade during the period 1765–1813, which became more prominent in its subsequent history, were that bullion became a less important element of import while manufactured goods began to appear as articles of import to India. On the other hand, the export of raw materials from India began to increase while manufactured exports (e.g. Indian cotton goods) began to decline. In spite of the many wars between England and other European countries, the commerce of the English East India Company increased considerably during this period, but at the same time new commercial rivals acquired sufficient strength to break the Company’s monopoly of trade.

3. **English Private and Privilege Trade.**

Private English merchants were the new rivals of the Company. From its foundation, the East India Company enjoyed monopoly of trade, and up to the passing of the Act of 1793 no British subject could take part in the trade between England and India except with the express permission of the Company. The commanders and officers of the ships employed in the Company’s service were however allowed to
occupy a certain portion of tonnage, the only restriction on their exports from England being that they were not allowed to export military stores, woollen goods, and copper. This was a long-standing practice. Thus, the Royal Proclamation of February 19, 1632, referred "to the feet and inches of chests which commanders and factors were allowed to ship on their own account and specified every commodity with which they might trade." The average annual value of imports to India by the commanders and officers of ships during the period 1784 to 1791 exceeded £125,000, against the average annual sale value of £500,000, exported by them during the period 1785–6 to 1792–3.

By the Act of 1793 (33 George III, Cap. 52) it was laid down that the Company should provide at least 3,000 tons of shipping every year in their export and import trade for private traders. Any of His Majesty’s subjects residing in any part of His European dominions, was permitted to import to India any produce of British European dominions except military and naval stores and copper, and in like manner the Company’s civil servants and the free merchants in India under the Company’s protection were allowed to ship in the Company’s ships all kinds of Indian goods, except calicoes, muslins and other piecegoods, which could be shipped only under a licence from the Company.

Though this Act extended the privileges of trade to a large body of persons, it did not for some time affect the private trade of the commanders and officers of the Company. The annual value of the goods exported by them from India during the period 1793–94 to 1811–12 remained on the whole fairly constant. In 1793–94, the value of the exports in private trade from India was £441,929, and in 1811–12 it was £309,555 and the total value of the exports in private trade during the period 1793–4 to 1811–12 was £8,543,027,* i.e. an average of £449,633 per annum.

Some idea of the imports to India in the private trade of the commanders and officers may be formed from the evidence of Mr. Morris before the Select Committee on the Affairs of the East India Company in 1813, that these officers at that time used a tonnage of about 4,000 tons in the importation of European goods to India. But this trade,

* Report from the Committee of Correspondence, 1813, p. 21.
after 1806, was not profitable, and on many occasions European goods in private trade sold below their cost prices.*

The privilege trade of private individuals, however, increased considerably after the passing of the Act of 1793. In 1793–94 the sale value of goods exported from India in privilege trade amounted to £181,170, in 1810–11 it reached £2,199,322, and in 1811–12 it dropped to £1,169,023. The total value of the exports from India in privilege trade during the period 1793–4 to 1811–12 was £24,585,673, i.e. an average of £1,293,983 per annum.

It will appear that the total amount exported from India in private and privilege trade during the period 1793–4 to 1811–12 was £33,128,700. Indigo and cotton wool formed a very large proportion of these exports. The remaining exports consisted mainly of piecegoods, raw silk, sugar, saltpetre, pepper, and drugs.

The progress of the privilege trade strengthened the case of the private English merchants who demanded the abolition of the Company’s monopoly of trade when their charter terminated in 1813. The Company could not make out a strong case for the continuance of their monopoly. Accordingly, after the 10th of April, 1814, “the trade to India was opened under certain conditions, to all private traders, with the limitation that private individuals should trade, directly only with the presidencies of Calcutta, Madras, Bombay and Penang; that vessels fitted out by them should not be under 350 tons burthen, that they should abstain, unless allowed by the Company or the Board of Control, from engaging in the coasting trade of India and China.”

The Act of 1813 thus forms an important landmark in the history of Indian commerce. Parliamentary returns show that the quantity of merchandise imported to India by the Company in 1829 increased but little in comparison with the imports of 1814, while the quantity imported by private merchants increased seven-fold. The exports from India increased also during the same period, but there the rate of increase in private trade was not so striking as in the export trade from England. The Act of

* Evidence of Mr. Graham, a member of the Council of Cornwallis and Wellesley before the Committee of the Whole House (1813), p. 39.
1813 marks also the beginning of a new era in the history of the political administration of British India. "No two characters," said Adam Smith, "seem more inconsistent than those of trader and sovereign." A "divi-hunting" policy was often responsible for the maladministration of a mighty empire, which a band of English merchants then happened to rule. But from 1814, the East India Company became administrators first, and traders afterwards. The commercial residencies were gradually abolished, and within a few years after the passing of the Charter Act of 1833, the last vestiges of the commercial character of the Company passed away.
THE GUILD IN MODERN INDIA: ITS CONSTITUTION AND EXPANSION.

DR. RADHAKAMAL MOOKERJEE, M.A., PH.D.

It is impossible to enter into a detailed treatment of guilds in a short compass, but as almost nothing has been placed on record regarding them, we only note a few of the more distinctive guilds in modern India and their general features of organisation. In Western India, what a Patel is to a village, a Shetya is to a Lingayet peth or ward of a town. The meetings of the Shetya, the Mathapati and the castemen deal with caste as well as trade disputes and have not declined in importance. Cloth and turban weavers, oil-extracters, bangle-makers, potters, carpenters, goldsmiths, barbers, washermen, tailors, dyers have caste organizations which to some extent take the place of craft-guilds, each caste having a number of leading men, Mahajans, subordinated to a head leader, Chaudhury Mahajan. The humbler artisans form the Panch and here the guild is almost conterminous with the caste. The guild of merchants, bankers and large dealers is also usually called the Mahajan and meant as a defence of trading interests, a board of trade as it were against the union of the different city craftsmen’s guilds. The Vanias, the Lohanas and the Bhatias form the Mahajan to which all trade guilds are subordinate. The authority of a trade guild extends over those who belong to that particular guild, while the authority of a Mahajan extends over all trade guilds. It is the highest authority in matters of trade, and as far as Hindu traders are concerned, in matters of caste. This authority is always exercised democratically: besides the Sheth, there is the Gumastha or clerk, who calls meetings; election and decision by the majority are well known among the traders as well as the craftsmen’s guilds. Though the Brahman and lower castes are usually included in the Mahajan, they are all guided by the orders passed by it. All trade guilds or caste panchayets are subordinate to the Mahajan. The Sheths and Patels of all the different occupational castes in a city or town are its members. Theoretically all the occupational castes ought to be represented on the Mahajan, but in practice the lower castes such
as Luhars, Sutars, Golas, Ghanchis, etc., do not come in because they represent only the simpler handicrafts. The Mahajan or town council has jurisdiction not only over the Hindu castes, but also over Mussalmans and other communities doing business within the town. A person dissatisfied with the order of his caste, may appeal against it to the Mahajan, and the decision of the Mahajan becomes law both to him and to his caste panchayat. Usually the Vania's voice is supreme, and he is generally the president, called Nagarsheth or city mayor, which office, though now has only a religious and social importance, still represents the dignity and power of the commercial community. Till recently he exercised great influence in state matters. Even now he carries much influence in the native states. Orders for Nagar Ujani or feast in the whole town, for strikes, for closing shops on the death of a member of the ruling house or some great man are given by the Nagarsheth. The traders' and merchants' guilds fix the rates of exchange and discount and levy fees on certain transactions, spending the proceeds on humane and religious objects. The Gujarati and Cutch Mahajans exercise important rights and privileges and hold an important and influential position with regard to the market; they settle social and trade disputes, levy fines, ordain public holidays, settle monetary claims in cases of insolvency, and even fix on insurance questions the amount to be paid for damage to the ship or cargo.

Characteristic also are the formation of new craft and trade guilds as well as the process of adaptation of the old guilds to the expanding needs of modern industry and commerce as seen in such developments as the Saurashtra Sabha among far-famed Madura weavers and silver merchants, or the Desi Beopar Mandal, the Indian Chamber of Commerce at Lahore, which deal with very large and general questions relating to trade and industry. In old cities like Delhi or Amritsar, Benares or Lucknow, Bankipore or Ghazipur, Amraoti or Bijapur, Haiderabad or Madura, there are indigenous banking associations or panchayets with their bills of exchange and clearing houses and their particular circles of guild jurisdiction, embracing all the merchants and bankers of the region. Like the merchants' guilds of China these have contributed towards a high degree of mutual trust amongst these classes, and the promotion of industrial peace and the prevention of commercial crises.

Organised charity is well known among the Marwaris and Vanis of the north, the Lingayets of the west, and the Komatis and the
Nattukottai Chettis of the south. In addition to fines imposed for breaches of guild rules and fees on ceremonial occasions, these guilds levy many petty imposts such as tax on the import and export of the principal articles of trade, on sales and mortgages of houses and on profits beyond a certain amount, etc. A considerable income is also derived from the auction sale of the right to keep shops open and do business on holidays. The amounts thus collected are deposited with the Gumasthas, Kotwals, or Karnams, clerks of the guilds, and spent on noble and philanthropic objects. The caste or guild contributions of the Indian traders and merchants indeed form a distinct type of public financing in communal bodies and associations which collect cesses and rateable subscriptions through an extensive and all-embracing machinery for works of general religious merit and public service as well as for caste maintenance and conservation. The Mahamai guild funds in the south and the Britti in the north have indeed kept alive the perennial stream of charity of the great trading classes of India in support of all kinds of works of general public utility, temples, water-sheds, guest-houses, bridges, etc.

To understand the elaborate socio-juridical organization of some of the merchant classes, we can here only refer to the fact that the Nattukottai Chettis are distributed among 96 towns and 9 temples, in each of which there are two forms of panchayet, called Madaththvasal Mariyal, and Kovilvasal Mariyal, collecting fees on all their auspicious and inauspicious occasions, fines for the deviation of caste-rules, or Mahamai contributions for choultries, feeding houses, temples, for Vedic, and recently also, Sastraic pathshalas or schools as well as settling disputes dealing with monetary claims. In the case of the Lingayet, disputes are settled by a panchayet, headed by one of the community called Ejaman or Sethi assisted by the Reddi or headman called Banakara. Appeals from the decisions of the panchayet lie to the mutt to which the village is subordinate. In Bellary appeals go to Ujjaini. The orders of the mutt are final. The following would show the order of precedence: (1) Maladaya, (2) Matapati, (3) Ganachari, (4) Shavaria or Gunari, (5) Setti, (6) Palna Setti, (7) Kori Setti, (8) Wali Setti. This reminds us of the Goloke math in mediaeval India which had under its jurisdiction three lacs of villages.

Not merely among the old industrial and manufacturing cities but also in less stable seacoast settlements and villages as among the Paravans, traders, boat-owners and pearl-divers in the Tuticorin tract there is
a compact guild organisation for the management of common affairs. The Jatitalavaimore, whose office is hereditary, is the secular headman of the community; he enjoys the dignity of a specially distinctive dress, and commands respect. The viceroy of Goa formerly gave him the distinguished address of Don, which he still prefixes to his name, and is also apparently the honorific suffix of his title. Under the Dutch, succession to the post required the ratification of the Government, a practice which in early days the English Government continued; at the present time the appointment is left entirely to the community to settle, official recognition limiting itself to the understanding that the duly constituted headman undertakes the privileges and responsibilities connected with the pearl-fishery. In 1891, the Government last ratified the custom by which the Jatitalaivaimore or headman of the Paravans was allowed on the occasion of every fishery a small number of boats fixed in proportion to the number of boats employed by Government. In almost all the Paravan settlements the authority of the Jatitalaivaimore is accepted without question. His deputies who are known as Adappans with their assistants Sittattis or Pattangattis are found in every village; they are the nominees of the Jatitalaivaimore, and perform the duties of settling social and trade disputes and collecting Kanikkai or contributions for their common funds and their masters' fees.

The efficiency of the guild system and its developments in the direction of a larger union or federation can be best understood by a detailed study of the organisation at Madura which space cannot permit. The federated guild assembly at Madura is called the Pancha-Brahma-Sabba, presided over by the chief headman of all "the seven tribes and five (artisans') castes" called Jati-periadanakaran. He is elected by all the adult members of the guild. The Nattamai or headman of each of the artisans' castes is the executive officer who is elected by the Jati-periadankaran and the other natamais voting by ballot. The other officers of the guilds are the Karriasthans, secondary in dignity, and the Jatipillais who is to notify the time and objects of the guild meeting. There may also be the Kanaka or accountant, and the Thandal or bill-collector. I found also a woman Jati-pillai. A guild assembly is called the Sabha while the general meeting of all the industrial castes is called the Mahasabba, which meets under the presidency of the chief headman at the Kamakshi
temple during the Dasera. The craft guilds, the guilds of the shepherds and the butchers determine trade regulations, the prices of gold and silver, the conditions of apprenticeship, etc. The guild of the Kasukara Chettys decides the prices of gold and of sovereigns from day to day. Among the Vaisya Komulis there is an agreement in writing that the foodstuffs they deal in should not be weighed falsely: fines are levied; trade disputes are settled among themselves; mahamais are collected and the Kanaka or Periadanakaran of each branch of the trade look after all matters pertaining to corporate interests. Among the Nadars also there is a similar written agreement. Their Nattamai supervises over the collection of the barthanai and maha-mai. Among the Muhammadan blacksmiths the guild has the following officers—the Perianatamadar, the Chinna natamadar, the Peria-kuddithan karar (crier), senior and junior headmen, and the modiar of the mosque who exercise the functions of the jati-pillai. All these organisations have their extending circles of authority till they are encompassed by the federated assembly, the maha-sabha. In conjunction with the Karyasthan and the local heads, the Jati-periadanakaran appoints Nattamais and Karyasthans to particular places and delegates his powers to them. This is done in places where the artisans are represented in considerable number as at Sholavandan and Vallalagunda in Madura district. Even the Pallans in villages of Madura and Tinnevelly district are called together and embraced within the fold of the guild organisation. As in the case of the expanded and heterogeneous village community, local government here is based in the main not on tribal or family but on neighbourhood groups. Here we find a gradual substitution of territorial for caste organisation, of economic interest for kinship as the bond of social co-operation.

The interest in the Madura guilds further heightens as we find in the inscription C. P. No. 65-A of Mr. Sewell’s list, a record of an agreement drawn up by eight men who represented the eight communities of bankers, Nattamais, Komatis, Muhammadans, Kavundas, weavers, Nadars, Vaniaris of the village near Madura in 1719 promising to give a share of their grains annually to support the ritual of the village temple. The shares are enumerated and of an interesting kind. The grant is stated to have been executed with the consent of the sabha. The ritual obviously refers to the annual festival still conducted by these artisans at the temple of Kamakshi at the close of Dasera.
KANT'S ETHICAL THEORY.

HIRALAL HALDAR, M.A., PH.D.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the unity of the world as an unconditioned totality remains for Kant a mere ideal. Reason is guided by this ideal in linking phenomena to each other in accordance with the principles of the understanding, but, for theoretical reason, it remains a regulative ideal only. It gives a definite aim to and controls the processes of the understanding, but its validity as a constitutive principle cannot be established. But practical reason succeeds where theoretical reason fails. In our consciousness of ourselves as moral and, consequently, as free beings, we have the direct assurance of the reality of a power which determines, but is not determined by, phenomena. I do not know myself as an object, because it is the presupposition of the existence of an object, but in my practical activities I become conscious of a power which can freely initiate actions and control, modify and systematise them. If, in so far as I am a cognitive being, I can only try to find an ultimate unity in the world of experience which permanently eludes my grasp, as a moral being, I feel that I am above the series of phenomena and that it is for me to introduce unity and system into life and nature. No knowledge is possible of myself as a noumenal object, but the actions performed by me bear witness to my reality as a free being. In short, man as an active being would not be possible unless he were a free being. And as a free being, it is the nature of man to assert his superiority over the world by bringing its phenomena under the subordination of his will. The nonconformity of the objects of consciousness to the unity of the self implied in their existence gives rise to an ideal which stimulates the understanding in its determination of things, but which it is unable to attain. But practical consciousness directly reveals to us a power which is not subordinate to anything and to which therefore there is no limit. The ideal object which for the theoretic consciousness is only an object of *thought* is for the practical consciousness the principle to which I seek to bring the world into conformity. In other
words, it becomes for me an end to realise by means of my own free activity. The ideal in fact is one with my self-consciousness and is the full actuality of what I am in possibility and my effort to mould and fashion the world in conformity with the ideal is, from another point of view, the ceaseless endeavour on my part to actually be what I potentially am. That I can realise the ideal in the world is possible because it is the ultimate truth of the world itself.

That the self is a free cause is directly involved in the moral consciousness. As a natural being, the actions of man are as strictly determined by their motives as the phenomena of the outer world determine each other in accordance with the law of causality. But the moral consciousness reveals to him that he is more than the series of inner states and has the power of self-determination. The moral law peremptorily orders me to rise above the chain of phenomena and to be determined in all my actions by the idea of the world as fully conformed to the consciousness of self. To act according to the moral law, then, is to try to make the self the determining principle of the world, to establish its ascendancy over nature and to make nature the instrument of its self-realisation. To conquer nature both within and without is the absolute requirement of practical reason, and the moral law formulates this requirement.

In order fully to understand the meaning of all this, it is necessary to recall the distinction which Kant makes between the empirical and the intelligible character of a thing. The changing states of an object related to each other as cause and effect are the phenomenal expression of its intelligible essence which is their determining ground. The free causality of the noumenon accounts for its expression in the time series and is not to be confounded with the law of causality which binds together phenomena. This distinction, which in the Critique of Pure Reason remains a merely problematical concept, is proved to be valid by the consciousness which man has as a moral being that his vocation is to make the self the ruling principle of the world and not to be determined by the objects which surround him as they are determined by each other. That for which a possibility was left open in the Critique of Pure Reason is, through the moral consciousness, established as an undeniable truth in the Critique of Practical Reason. If we attribute our actions to ourselves, it is because we, as noumenal beings, belong to the intelligible world of which the phenomenal world is the outer expression.
The moral law expresses the requirement of reason that the phenomenal self should be subordinated to and determined by the noumenal self. As empirical beings, we are conscious of the moral law as absolutely binding on us, but it is the law which emanates from our own real self and as such is self-imposed. It is the law of the autonomy of the Homo noumenon and we become conscious of it as binding on us when we contemplate it from the point of view of the Homo phenomenon. The demand of reason that all our actions as phenomenal beings must conform to the autonomy of the pure self is the categorical imperative.

"Every rational being," says Kant, "reckons himself qua intelligence as belonging to the world of understanding and it is simply as efficient cause belonging to that world that he calls his causality a will. On the other side he is also conscious of himself as a part of the world of sense in which his actions which are mere appearances of that causality are displayed; we cannot, however, discern how they are possible from this causality which we do not know; but instead of that these actions as belonging to the sensible world must be viewed as determined by other phenomena, namely, desires and inclinations. If, therefore, I were only a member of the world of understanding, then all my actions would perfectly conform to the principle of autonomy of the pure will, if I were only a part of the world of sense they would necessarily be assumed to conform wholly to the natural law of desires and inclinations, in other words, to the heteronomy of nature (the former would rest on morality as the supreme principle, the latter on happiness). Since however the world of understanding contains the foundation of the world of sense, consequently of its laws also, and accordingly gives the law to my will (which belongs wholly to the world of understanding) directly, and must be conceived as doing so, it follows that, although on the one side I must regard myself as a being belonging to the world of sense, yet on the other side I must recognise myself as subject as an intelligence to the law of the world of understanding, i.e. to reason, which contains this law in the idea of freedom, and therefore as subject to the autonomy of the will; consequently I must regard the laws of the world of understanding as imperatives for me, and the actions which conform to them as duties" (Kant's Theory of Ethics, Abbott's Trans., p. 73).

Man, as a part of nature, stands in a relation of reciprocity with other finite objects. He acts upon them and is acted upon by
them in return. Desires and impulses are awakened in the mind by external objects which issue in actions directed towards the objects for the gratification of them. Such actions Kant calls heteronomous, because they are caused by desires and impulses exactly as an external event is caused by another and cannot, therefore, be referred to the self as noumenon. The motive of such actions is pleasure. But, in virtue of his intelligible character, man stands above the series of natural phenomena and belongs to the supersensible world. The acts performed by him as an intelligible being are therefore independent of particular motives arising from his sensuous nature. They are due to the self-determination of the will and are consequently free. In the fact that man is an animal and a rational being at one and the same time, we find the true explanation of moral obligation. Our animal nature constantly drags us down from the lofty ground which we ought to occupy as rational beings, but reason never ceases to remind us of our high position and calling and to demand from us that in all that we do, we should be guided by its pure light and not influenced by sense. Hence the conflict in our nature of which the categorical imperative is the expression. If we were pure rational beings, our will would be determined by nothing but itself and would therefore be perfectly holy will and if we were mere animals we would not be capable of morality at all. "What makes categorical imperatives possible," says Kant, "is this, that the idea of freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world, in consequence of which if I were nothing else all my actions would always conform to the autonomy of the will; but as I at the same time intuite myself as a member of the world of sense, they ought so to conform, and this categorical "ought" implies a synthetic a priori proposition, inasmuch as besides my will as affected by sensible desires there is added further the idea of the same will but as belonging to the world of the understanding pure and practical of itself, which contains the supreme condition according to Reason of the former will" (op. cit., pp. 73–74). The distinction between the Homo noumenon and the Homo phenomenon explains for Kant the possibility of man's freedom, in spite of his being a part of nature, and of the categorical imperative.

Freedom, we thus see, involves two things. Negatively, it consists in resisting the solicitations of sense and, positively, in the will willing itself. In so far as we succeed in over-riding passion and in being
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guided by the idea of the pure self as end, we are free. The moral law rests upon freedom or rather is the expression of freedom, for, to be moral is to be absolutely self-determined. The validity of the idea of freedom, however, is for us proved by the categorical imperative, though, logically, the former is not posterior to the latter. From the categorical imperative I learn that I am free. If I feel that I ought to do a thing, it necessarily follows that I have the power to do it. "Thou oughtest therefore thou canst." Though the idea of freedom is inseparably bound up with the moral law, Kant tells us that we are unable to give any positive account of it, or to say in what it consists. To explain a thing is to refer it to the cause which determines it in the context of experience and such an explanation is obviously impossible of the principle which lies beyond the mundus sensibilis and to which the category of causality is inapplicable. "Reason would overstep all its bounds if it undertook to explain how freedom is possible. For we can explain nothing but that which we can reduce to laws, the object of which can be given in some possible experience. But freedom is a mere idea, the objective reality of which can in no wise be shown according to laws of nature, and consequently not in any possible experience; and for this reason it can never be comprehended or understood, because we cannot support it by any example or analogy. Where determination according to laws of nature ceases, there all explanation ceases also" (op. cit., p. 79). But though explanation of freedom is impossible, the defence of it is possible. Those who discover contradiction in the idea of freedom persist in considering man as appearance only and do not perceive that "behind the appearances there must also lie at their root (although hidden) the things-in-themselves, and that we cannot expect the laws of these to be the same as those that govern their appearances" (op. cit., p. 80).

We are now prepared to understand the meaning of Kant's dictum that the only thing absolutely good is the good will. By "good will" we are to understand the will which wills itself and is not influenced by anything extraneous to itself. Will is with Kant reason in its practical aspect and the good will, therefore, is only another name for the free causality of reason, the activity of reason which is determined only by reason. Opposed to such autonomous action is the heteronomous action which is determined by extraneous motives which, according to Kant, all fall under the principles of self-love. An action is moral only
in so far as it is autonomous or determined by the idea of self as end. We do not call a man good because he, by his actions, produces consequences beneficial to himself or to others, because he possesses various advantages with which fortune has favoured him or because he possesses such desirable qualities as firmness of purpose, moderation or self-control. It is possible to have all these and yet to be a bad man, for they can all be used for evil ends. A man is good simply because his will is good, no matter whether owing to unfavourable external circumstances or other causes the good will produces any result or not.

If we ask in what the essence of the good will consists, Kant’s answer is that it is will determined solely by respect for the moral law or the law which calls upon us to be self-determined in all our actions. Any act, in short, which is done not from duty but out of regard for other considerations, whatever the value of these may be, is not good. If, for example, overpowered by the feeling of compassion I save the life of a drowning man, I, no doubt, act in a very praiseworthy manner, but my action is not moral. The same act done from duty, without, it may be, a trace of the compassionate feeling, would be moral. Duty must be done for duty’s sake. Judged by this criterion, we can easily see that those actions, which really conform to duty but to which men have no direct inclination and are done from a selfish motive, are not moral. We do not call a trader good, because in conformity with the maxim “honesty is the best policy” he does not cheat his customers. It is more difficult to determine the moral quality of those actions in which duty and inclination go together. For example, “it is a duty to maintain one’s life, and in addition every one has a direct inclination to do so. But on this account the often anxious care which most men take for it has no intrinsic worth, and their maxim has no moral support. They preserve their life as duty requires, no doubt, but not because duty requires. On the other hand, if adversity and helpless sorrow have completely taken away the relish for life, if the unfortunate one, strong in mind, indignant at his fate rather than desponding or dejected, wishes for death, and yet preserves his life without loving it, not from inclination or fear, but from duty, then his maxim has moral worth” (op. cit., p. 14).

An action, then, in order to have moral worth, must be done from duty. That worth does not lie in the purpose which is to be attained by it, but in the maxim by which it is determined. The results
of actions cannot give to them any moral value whatever. "In what then," asks Kant, "can their worth lie, if it is not to consist in the will and in reference to its expected effect?" "It," he answers, "cannot lie anywhere but in the principle of the will without regard to the ends which can be attained by the action. For the will stands between its a priori principle, which is formal, and its a posteriori spring, which is material, as between two roads, and as it must be determined by something it follows that it must be determined by the formal principle of volition when an action is done from duty, in which case every material principle has been withdrawn from it" (op. cit., p. 16).

What is the formal principle by which an action, in order to be moral, must be determined? Kant's answer is that it is that "I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law." If, in so far as an action is good, it cannot be determined by any particular motive, the only test of its morality must be its consistency with itself when universalised. "Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation." Judging an action by this criterion, we can easily see whether it is morally good or not. Place yourself in the position of an impartial observer and ask whether an act which you are inclined to do can be done by everybody in similar circumstances. A man, for example, is so overwhelmed with misfortunes that he becomes weary of life and feels inclined to commit suicide. If every one tormented by the blows and buffets of fortune were to put an end to his own life, the very instinct of self-preservation would be the means of self-destruction and this is a contradiction. Another finds himself compelled by circumstances to borrow money. He knows that he cannot get the money he wants unless he stoutly promises to repay it within a fixed period and he also sees that it is altogether beyond his power to do so. Is he, for his own advantage, to make the promise? Let him ask how it would be if all men, under similar circumstances, acted similarly and he will see that promise itself would be impossible if every one made it with the intention of not keeping it. We thus see that principles of action which contradict themselves when universalised are inconsistent with the moral law. But, besides such principles, there are others which can conceivably be universal laws of nature, though no rational being can will that they should be so. For instance, a man
finds that he has talents which might make him useful in many respects if only he took pains to cultivate them. He asks whether it is consistent with duty to neglect his natural capacities and to devote himself to pleasure. "He sees then that a system of nature could indeed subsist with such a universal law although men (like the South Sea islanders) should let their talents rust, and resolve to devote their lives merely to idleness, amusement and propagation of their species, in a word, to enjoyment, but he cannot possibly will that this should be a universal law of nature or be implanted in us as such by a natural instinct. For, as a rational being, he necessarily wills that his faculties be developed, since they serve him, and have been given him for all sorts of possible purposes." The duties, the universal non-performance of which results in contradiction, Kant calls duties of perfect obligation; while those the performance of which all rational beings must will, but the neglect of which might be universal, he calls duties of imperfect obligation.

The formula that we should so act that the maxim of our will may become a universal law does not express the full meaning of Kant, though it furnishes us with a criterion by which we can judge our actions. For, in Kant's view, the essence of moral actions is that by means of them the self is realised as an end in itself. The ultimate unity of all things, which theoretical reason seeks but does not attain, becomes the end at the attainment of which practical reason directly aims. In other words, the world conformed to the unity of self-consciousness, or self-consciousness realised in the differences of the world, is the ideal by which moral actions are determined. The activities which, so to speak, do not radiate from the centre of our being in order to bring all things within the circle of its influence are heteronomous and are the very reverse of moral. The moral law, therefore, is not adequately formulated unless it brings out that a moral action is not merely that which does not contradict itself if it is universalised, but that which is consistent with the end of self-realisation. Hence it is that Kant finds it necessary to lay down the second formula for the moral law which is as follows:—"So act as to treat humanity whether in your own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only." This formula substitutes consistency with self for self-consistency as the moral standard, and such a standard is the standard of the end and not of mere law. The law, that is to say, is
subordinated to the end. This end is the self, not the individual self but the universal self of humanity of which all particular individuals are organic elements. In all our acts, in so far as we are moral beings, we are to endeavour to further the interests of humanity as an end in itself and never to treat any man as mere means to an end which is not proximately or ultimately his own end. In the common end of humanity every individual participates and to act in conformity with the second formula is, therefore, to impose principles of action upon oneself which are of universal validity. If my end as a rational being is the common end of all rational beings, then whatever principles of action are obligatory on me as necessary to the attainment of this end are obligatory on them also. And such principles of action are not only obligatory on me but are my own principles of action, because the end is my end, and in being my principles of action, they are equally the principles of action of my fellow-beings, for what is my end is also their end. This idea finds expression in Kant's third formula for the moral law. It is as follows:—"Act in conformity with the idea that the will of every rational being is a universally legislative will." In it he rises to the conception of what he calls the kingdom of ends, a community of rational beings working out their common destiny in mutual service and fellowship with each other. "The conception of every rational being as one which must consider itself as giving in all the maxims of its will universal laws, so as to judge itself and its actions from this point of view—this conception leads to another which depends on it and is very fruitful, namely, that of a kingdom of ends." "By a kingdom," Kant explains, "I understand the union of different rational beings in a system by common laws."

The kingdom of ends is a union of rational beings held together by universal laws of which their rational nature is the source. So to act as to realise this kingdom or, in more homely language, to try to realise the kingdom of God on earth, is the true ethical end and it is this end which Kant really has in view in spite of the formal definition he gives of the moral law. He does not, of course, realise the full significance of his conception of the kingdom of ends and makes it practically meaningless by declaring that it is only a regulative ideal and is not capable of being represented by us except on the inadequate analogy of a kingdom of nature governed by universal laws. Nevertheless, he distinctly suggests that man is a moral being only as he is a
member of the kingdom of ends and contributes to its realisation by means of his actions. "A rational being belongs as a member to the kingdom of ends when, although giving universal laws in it, he is also himself subject to these laws. He belongs to it as sovereign when, while giving laws, he is not subject to the will of any other. A rational being must always regard himself as giving laws either as member or as sovereign in the kingdom of ends which is rendered possible by the freedom of will. Morality consists in the reference of all action to the legislation which alone can render a kingdom of ends possible" (op. cit., p. 52).

A prominent feature of Kant's ethical theory, as we have already seen, is his conception of man as at once autonomous and subject to the law of causality. Our particular desires determine our relations as objects to other objects in the experienced world, but as subjects of knowledge, we are self-determining beings and, as such, seek to bring the sensible world into conformity with reason. Hence, the moral end is self-realisation or the realisation of a world fully conforming to the self. In the effort to realise this end, however, we cannot go beyond ourselves and must make the moral law the sole motive of action. Reason must will reason, self-activity must be independent of particular motives and yet by this means, without going out of itself, the self must be regarded as capable of bringing all things into harmony with itself. How is this possible? How can it be conceived? How can nature remain nature and yet be the revelation of spirit? Kant's solution of the problem is that though the realisation of the moral law means the conformity of nature with it, such conformity is to us unintelligible. If the natural world were also the intelligible world, the difficulty would vanish and we should see how nature is in harmony with spirit. But, according to Kant, nature ruled by necessity, is the very opposite of spirit whose essence is freedom. Nevertheless, the demand of reason is that through its own activity nature should be brought into conformity with it. But can we seek to attain an end which we are unable even to represent? Kant's answer is that though no schema of the world conformed to the moral law is possible, we can nevertheless regard nature governed by universal laws as a type of the realised moral law. The only legitimate motive of action for rational beings is the moral law, but to realise the moral law is to make the world conform to the kingdom of ends. We cannot, indeed, represent the world
in time and space as determined in accordance with the ideal, but in order to assist practical reason, it is "allowable to use the system of the world of sense as the type of a supersensible system of things."

Can the natural desires of man, essentially at variance with reason, be perfectly subordinated to and reconciled with it? The categorical imperative implies the possibility of our being able to attain perfect virtue and yet it would seem that the law of reason cannot be the sole motive of sensuous beings like us. We cannot relax the severity of the moral law and suppose that our duty is to try to conform to it only to the extent to which it is possible to do so in a world like this. On the other hand, it does not seem that absolute holiness is an attainable ideal in this life. In Kant's view, the solution of the antinomy is that we can only gradually approximate to the conformity of our sensuous nature with the moral law for which endless time is necessary. "The perfect accordance of will with the moral law is holiness, a perfection of which no rational being of the sensible world is capable at any moment of his existence. Since nevertheless it is required as practically necessary it can only be found in a progressus in infinitum towards that perfect accordance, and on the principles of pure practical reason it is necessary to assume such a practical progress as the real object of our will. Now this endless progress is only possible on the supposition of an endless duration of the existence and personality of the same rational being (which is called the immortality of the soul)" (op. cit., p. 218). For beings like us, the possibility of the attainment of holiness or of perfectly realising the moral law rests upon the postulate of the immortality of the soul.

To be perfectly autonomous in our actions, to will nothing but the realisation of the moral law out of respect for that law is, no doubt, the chief good, but it is not the complete good. The sumrum bonum or the perfect good implies the addition of happiness to goodness. This means the conformity of the whole course of nature to the realisation of the self as end. The moral law, as we have seen, requires us by our own free activity to make the world conform to the self or rather to the kingdom of ends, but as the laws of nature are opposed to the law of freedom, the attainment of this end does not depend on us. Our part ends with our willing the good. But if the good will is not to be fruitless, if the conformity of nature with the moral law is not to be an idle dream, we must postulate that there is a power not ourselves that
makes for the combination of happiness with virtue, the agreement of
nature with the moral will. The idea of goodness neither contains nor
is contained in the idea of happiness. The good man is he who is free
and self-determined and does not allow passion to influence his actions.
But such a man is not necessarily happy. For "happiness is the con-
dition of a rational being in the world with whom everything goes accord-
ing to his wish and will; it rests, therefore, on the harmony of physical
nature with his whole end, and likewise with the essential determining
principle of his will." Virtue and happiness are not capable of being
derived from each other. To reduce the former to the latter was the
error of the Epicureans and to reduce the latter to the former that of
the Stoics. But, nevertheless, in the *sumnum bonum*, happiness must
be combined with virtue. For, the moral law which commands us to
mould and fashion nature according to reason becomes meaningless
unless we have a guarantee that with virtue, the will to realise the
kingdom of ends, which alone is in our power, will be joined happiness
or the conformity of nature to the moral will. Such a guarantee we
have in "the existence of a cause of all nature, distinct from nature
itself and containing the principle of the exact harmony of happiness
with morality." In short, the postulate of the possibility of the realisa-
tion of the *sumnum bonum* is the existence of God, who in the long run
makes men happy according to their deserts. Men must do duty for
duty's sake and not desire happiness, but there is a God who never
fails, if not in this world, in the eternal world, to make his dutiful
children happy. "Morality is not properly the doctrine how we should
make ourselves happy, but how we should become worthy of happiness.
It is only when religion is added that there also comes in the hope of
participating some day in happiness in proportion as we have endeav-
oured to be not unworthy of it" (op. cit., p. 227).

Kant is careful to tell us that belief in the existence of God, which
is a requirement of the moral consciousness, is not itself a duty. Nor
is the existence of God the ground of moral obligation. Nothing but
the moral law itself can be the basis of obligation. To make the exist-
ence of God the justification of the moral life is to destroy the purity of
the moral motive.

The fundamental error of Kant to which his difficulties and incon-
sequences are all traceable is the sharp line of division which he draws
between nature and spirit. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he solves
the third and fourth antinomies by distinguishing the free causality of the self from the necessity of nature, the phenomena of which are connected with each other in accordance with the principles of causality and reciprocity. He argues that the active subject which is not itself a phenomenon and, therefore, not subject to the law of causality may nevertheless be the source of phenomena subject to unvarying natural laws, but he does not perceive that the necessity which finds its ultimate explanation in freedom cannot be necessity pure and simple, but must be reinterpreted by the freedom in which it is grounded. Nature, as a connected system of things, is possible only in relation to the unity of the self. This Kant clearly sees and inculcates. But he conceives of the relation between the self and nature as a purely negative relation and does not realise that the negative relation is only a phase of a deeper relation which is positive. If nature and spirit have meaning in and through their opposition to each other, it is because they are the correlated factors of a unity which comprehends and transcends them. The natural order is related to the self because it is the expression of the self. Sensible objects, indissolubly linked with each other, presuppose a spiritual unity revealed in them, and if we view the necessary order of nature in the light of its inner principle, we shall see that necessity is only the mask of freedom or, to put the matter otherwise, the truth of necessity is freedom. When from an incomplete view of a thing we pass on to a more adequate conception of it, the new insight gained is not simply added to the old idea but transforms and reconstitutes the latter. When reason forces us to go beyond nature to its indwelling principle, spirit, we must perceive, if we are not to stultify ourselves, that nature is only an element in the life of spirit and not an independent reality existing side by side with it. In the world of time and space it is spirit that is revealed and the laws of nature, so inexorable, so inviolable, are only the modes of activity of a self-determining spirit.

The distinction which Kant makes between the noumenal self and the phenomenal self is only a special application of his general principle criticised above. The self, he regards as pure reason to which all sensuous element is foreign, and the free activity of reason, therefore, can in no way be influenced by passion. In so far as man possesses a sensuous nature, he is a mere animal and a part of the physical world, and it is in virtue of his rationality that he is a free being and capable
of rising above the limitations of his finitude. It is true that man is both finite and infinite, rational and irrational, but it does not follow from this that he is a composite being one half of whom is pure reason and the other half mere animal. He is not like the monsters of Greek mythology, a grotesque combination of incompatible elements. Reason in him includes within itself all the sensuous elements of his nature, transmutes them and makes them the means of its own expression. Passions and feelings cannot come into contact with reason without being transformed by it. They, as component elements of our self-conscious nature, are not alien to it, but contribute to its life as the means of its self-expression. Just as in the order of nature spirit is revealed, so in our actions determined by particular motives, the self is realised. The noumenal self of Kant, divorced from desires and feelings, is only an abstract universal and therefore unreal. The universal, in order to be real, must be expressed in the particular and the self which does not find expression in the particular contents of consciousness is a meaningless abstraction. To be determined by particular motives in our actions is, therefore, not to lose freedom. In each motive the universality of the self is particularised and it is only as thus particularised that the self is an individual. The universal self is expressed in each determination of it by an object, but is not exhausted in it. It, therefore, goes beyond it to other determinations in which it is equally manifested. It is in the systematic totality of the particular contents of consciousness referred to their objects that the self is revealed. The more integrated and organised the contents of the mind are, the more complete is the self that is realised in them. What the unified system of the external world is to the spirit immanent in it, that the varied contents of the mind organised into a whole are to the self which underlies them and is their principle of unity. In the particular motives by which actions are determined, it is the self that is expressed and in being determined by them it is determined by itself. Freedom, therefore, does not consist, as Kant supposes, in annulling passion and in will willing itself. It does not mean absence of determination, but self-determination. Will willing itself is an absurdity. Unless something particular is willed nothing is willed at all. The false separation of the universal will from particular motives gives rise to the dilemma in which the alternatives are the liberty of indifference or empty freedom on the one side and the fatal
determination of the will by subjective inclinations on the other. But the antinomy is solved when it is perceived that the universality of the self-conscious will has meaning only as it is specified in its determinations, namely, the particular desires and their objects. The self moved to action by particular objects of desire is indeed determined but is self-determined.

Self-realisation, we thus see, does not consist in the attainment of a life of pure reason from which passion is excluded, but in the establishment of the supremacy of the self over nature or in bringing nature into conformity with the self, which is possible only by means of actions determined by definite ends. But the self which we thus seek to realise is not the individual self, or, to be more accurate, the realisation of the individual self is rendered possible by a universal principle which is manifested in the life of the individual and which brings it into organic connection with other individuals and determines its relations to them. In the individual the universal is particularised. A mere individual is as much an abstraction as the abstract universal. The true universal is the organic unity of the individuals through whose mutually complementary aptitudes, capacities and activities it is realised. As the actions of the individual are reduced to a system through their reference to the common self, so the individuals themselves are gathered up into the collective unity of society to the life of which they contribute by their separate and distinctive activities and from which they derive all the reality and worth they possess. As the cells have no being apart from the organs of which they are the constituent elements, so the individuals have no existence apart from the social union of which they are members. The end of the individual is not different from the common end of society any more than the vitality of a limb is different from the vitality of the body to which it belongs. For the individual to seek to attain his end is, therefore, to seek to realise the common end of humanity. This is the idea which underlies Kant's conception of the kingdom of ends. The kingdom of ends is simply the organic unity of rational beings and to realise it is the true ethical end. Kant's formula, "so act as to treat humanity whether in your own person or in that of any other in every case as an end, never as means only," virtually amounts to an admission of this truth. But, unfortunately, he regards the idea of the kingdom of ends as a regulative idea only incapable of being represented by us. This is due to his pre-
ception of the negative relation of the universal to the particulars and the consequent isolation of the individuals from each other. But the true universal, as we have seen, is not independent of the particulars. It manifests itself in the particulars and so connects them with each other as to constitute an organic whole. Starting with the idea of the opposition of the universal to the particular, Kant nevertheless manages to rise to the conception of the kingdom of ends. But as such a conception is incompatible with the negative relation of the universal to the particular, he is forced to say that it is only a regulative idea. The real solution of the difficulty is to be serious with the idea of the kingdom of ends and to give up the false theory of the abstract universal. So far from the kingdom of ends being incapable of being represented by us, we have it actually before us in the social union of men. Society is precisely "the union of different rational beings in a system by common laws," which, according to Kant, the kingdom of ends is. Man is a moral being only as he is a member of a community in the life of which he participates and to which he is subordinated.

Now the conception of man as a constituent element of the social organism, apart from which he has no existence as a rational being, necessitates the rejection of the view which opposes the universal law of morality to the various particular laws that define the relations of the individuals to each other in a community. The particular laws are specifications of the universal law and are the contents of which the latter is the form. In an organic whole, the relation of a part to the whole is inconceivable apart from the relations of the parts to each other and the relations of the parts to each other are unthinkable apart from their relation to the whole. So the definite duties of men, which the laws of society and the state formulate, flow from the moral law which expresses the relation of man as a particular being to his universal nature and that universal nature is an empty abstraction unless it is concretely embodied in the laws, institutions, customs and usages of society. As a social being man is not isolated from his fellows, alone with the moral law, but realises the moral law in discharging the duties of his station. The subjective law of morality, in short, is the soul of which the outer organisation of society is the body. As subject of knowledge, I am universal and one with the spiritual principle, presupposed in the existence of the world and there is nothing which can limit me or is external to me, but the other side of this very universal-
ity of my self is that I am a particular being standing in definite relations to other particular beings. I am universal only by being particular or, what is the same thing, in my individuality the universal and the particular meet. The laws and institutions which limit me as a particular being are the expression of my universal self and when I rise to the standpoint of the universal, I perceive that "they are more truly me than my private self." The outer law has its source and justification in the inner law and the inner law finds its content in the outer law. Kant's failure to perceive this truth necessarily leads him to set up a dualism between the moral law and the particular laws and the consequence is that the moral law becomes an empty universal from which it is impossible to deduce anything particular. When we ask what we, as finite beings placed in the circumstances in which we find ourselves, must do in order to be moral, Kant is unable to give us any help except pointing to the abstract moral law, but out of a merely formal law nothing particular can be derived. We reach the abstract universal by negating everything particular and to try to get the particular out of it is to reverse the process by which it is reached, which is absurd. Unless you reduce the particular law to an element of the total system of life in which the universal law of morality is realised, you can only alternate between the universal and the particular, reaching the former by denying the latter and reinstating the latter by setting aside the former. Failing to get particular principles of action out of an abstract law, all that Kant is able to do is to provide us with the means of testing them. That is wrong the maxim of which cannot be universalised without contradiction. But, as Hegel urges with great force, the contradiction has in all cases a presupposition. An immoral act is contradictory because it is inconsistent with the maintenance of the order on which social life rests. Universal lying, universal stealing, universal suicide etc., are contradictory to the necessary conditions of the social existence of human beings. Would universal stealing be self-contradictory without the rights of property which it denies or universal lying without the maintenance of truth which our relations with our fellow-beings require? To make non-contradiction the test of moral actions is to affirm indirectly the social character of the moral life.

A consequence which follows from Kant's first formula for the moral law is that while some maxims of action are rejected as in-
consistent with it, others in their naked particularity are raised to the dignity of an absolute principle. But how can there be several rules of action each absolute? The plurality of the particular moral laws is inconsistent with their claim to universal validity. No single law can be of universal application, for it has no meaning without the special conditions and circumstances on which it depends. Particular moral laws necessarily come into conflict with each other, if they are regarded as unconditionally valid. To treat particular commandments as universal and without exception is to make the special ends of life to which they relate co-extensive with life itself. The universal principle of morality must no doubt particularise itself and thereby give rise to many special laws of action, but no such law can be elevated into the rank of the universal principle itself. Unless we refer to the social organism, all maxims of action can without contradiction be universalised. On the other hand, viewed as a mode of realisation of the ethico-social life, no special moral law is capable of taking the place of the universal law. In the conception of the kingdom of ends held together by a system of common laws, Kant, as we have seen, provides us with the means of escape from the awkward consequences of his first formula, but he does not understand the full significance of his own fruitful conception. The kingdom of ends is the social organisation and in the laws which define the rights and duties of its constituent individuals, the universal principle of morality is embodied. Of course, the kingdom of ends is only an ideal, in the sense that no actual social organisation really is what it ought to be. But this does not justify us in supposing that the kingdom of ends is something other than human society. Just as an organism, be it never so unhealthy, is still an organism, so a community of men, in spite of its defects and shortcomings, is a kingdom of ends.

The discrepancy between what is and what ought to be, between the actual constitution of society and its ideal order is the source of moral obligation. It is the consciousness which the individual has of his subordination to his own higher self as embodied in the social organism and of the impulse to rise above the present level of achievements. Social order is never possible without social progress. As an organism must live in order to grow and must grow in order to live, so society, for the sake of order itself, must constantly change for the better. It cannot stand still but must either recede or advance, tend
towards disintegration or higher integration and evolution. The tendency to progress which a healthy society is never without is represented by the sense of obligation of the individual. Of course, the ideal of progress may be mistaken, but the desire for higher achievement and progress is of the very essence of obligation. There are people, no doubt, whose sense of obligation to maintain the existing order is very keen and who have scarcely any zeal for progress. But a partial justification of such an attitude is possible only because order is the basis of progress and to work for the maintenance of order is to contribute to a necessary element of progress. There can be no such thing as obligation to remain exactly as we are except to counteract deterioration and this, relatively to deterioration, is progress. Obligation, in short, is another name for the necessity of progress. It has no meaning either for a perfect being for whom there is no progress, or for the beast incapable of it. Man, so far as we know, is the only being upon whom the burden is laid of ever progressing towards the far-off goal of perfection and it is so because he is both animal and rational, finite and infinite. The ideal self constantly demands realisation, but it is never fully realised. This is why duty or the categorical imperative is the characteristic mark of human life. To seek to rise above duty, as Kant truly says, is moral fanaticism. His mistake is not to insist upon its paramount significance for us, but to suppose that it arises from the opposition of abstract reason to passion. Duty, no doubt, involves the opposition of the ideal and the real, but it is the opposition of whole to whole and not of a mere part to another part. Human life, however imperfect it may be, is always a complete whole. The difference between the more perfect and the less perfect stages of its development is like the difference between the seed and the plant. The seed is a whole quite as much as the plant. So human life, as life, is always a whole, though progress means its movement towards a richer and a more harmonious whole. The error of Kant is that he doubly disintegrates man, first by isolating him from society and then by dividing him into sense and reason and conceives of duty as arising from the opposition of the rational self to the animal self. This mistake is rectified when we perceive that human life is a whole, a unity which is manifested in the differences of its sensuous nature and in the activities determined by particular ends and forms an element of a larger whole, namely, the social organism, and that moral
obligation is the call which the individual feels of raising the society to which he belongs, and as a part of it himself, to a higher plane. This he can do by contributing by means of his activities to its order and progress. Duty is founded not upon the opposition of one element of life to another, but on the opposition of the higher ideal of social life to the actually existing form of it.

The progress of society is ordinarily a silent and imperceptible process and does not imply sudden and sweeping changes. As the growth of a living body is furthered by the normal and never-ceasing functional activities of its members, so social development is effected through the individuals faithfully performing the duties of their stations. But in the evolution of society there occur times when important transformations of its ideal and organisation, characterised more or less by unrest and disturbances, take place exactly as certain periods of physical growth are marked by symptoms of ill-health. These are ages when old traditions and customs lose their binding force and individuals seek to emancipate themselves from the social yoke and strike out new paths for themselves. Men begin to regard themselves as self-subsistent and independent of the ties which hold them together. The social bonds appear to be purely arbitrary restraints on the liberty of the individual and to reduce them to a minimum comes to be regarded as the aim which the best of men ought to set before themselves. Such individualism flourishes when the old ideal fails to satisfy the human mind and society has not yet been fashioned in accordance with the new ideas which are in the air. It is the lever that raises society from a lower to a higher plane. It is this individualistic spirit that finds expression in the ethical view that man is a law and an end to himself. When the laws and institutions of society tend to be stereotyped and cease to adequately embody the ever-growing moral ideal, the choicest spirits of the time, for whom the ideal is not an empty vision, withdraw into themselves and seek to regulate their lives by an inner law to which the outer law does not correspond. The ethical theory of Kant represents an attitude of this kind. It emphasises the opposition of the inner spirit to the outer law. But true morality cannot be merely subjective. It must be both subjective and objective. It consists in the regulation of life by a social standard, because in the customs and ordinations of society the inner law is concretely realised. It is possible, however, to forget the inner spring of customary morality and to make the outer
laws the chains of the spirit. Against this bondage of the mind, the Kantian ethics rightly enters an emphatic protest. But it errs in ignoring the objective side of mortality. If conforming to merely external law is slavery of the spirit, determination by an inner law which has no objective content is a perfectly empty freedom. Kant's ethical theory is founded upon the individualistic spirit which arises from time to time in the history of the world when existing social forms become insufficient and helps the transition towards the development of the higher social consciousness.

In his moral proof of the existence of God, founded upon the necessity of the synthesis of happiness with virtue, Kant, in effect, overcomes the dualism of nature and spirit which is so prominent a feature of the Critique of Practical Reason. The *summum bonum* involves the combination of virtue with happiness, but inasmuch as virtue consists in the determination of will by pure reason and happiness in the conformity of the course of the world to the will, it follows that the synthesis of virtue and happiness means the agreement of nature with reason. According to Kant, such a synthesis must be external, for there is no natural and necessary connection between happiness and virtue, and he attributes it to God as a *Deus ex machina*. It is true that virtue and happiness are not capable of being reduced to each other, but it does not follow from this that they are externally combined. We can conceive of them as correlated elements of the *summum bonum* which mutually imply each other and this is the conclusion to which Kant's own reasoning leads. If God combines happiness in due proportion with virtue, it is because he so regulates nature as to make it conform to the rational will and to say this is to affirm that nature is in perfect harmony with the Divine Will or, what comes to the same thing, is the expression of that will. In other words, in the unity of the Divine self, we have the principle to which the differences of nature are reduced or, in God, the *summum bonum* is actually realised. What, from our point of view, is an ideal to be attained is a reality eternally complete. This is the real truth of the Kantian doctrine. God is the guarantee of the possibility of realising the *summum bonum*, not because he externally combines happiness with virtue, but because He is the *summum bonum* to the realisation of which in our lives our ethical will is directed. In so far as we will to bring nature into harmony with the kingdom of ends or to realise the kingdom of ends in the world, our will is the revelation
in us of the Divine Will and the course of the world, however much it may seem to be at variance with it, cannot ultimately resist it. The very antagonism of the natural world to the rational will is the means through which the ultimate triumph of the latter is secured. The ideal can be realised because it is the ultimate reality. The consciousness of self under the moral law involves the consciousness of God, for what the moral law commands us to do is to effect a perfect reconciliation of nature with spirit, and such a reconciliation we have in God. The forces of nature that appear to hinder the realisation of the moral will must ultimately be subordinated to it, because we are members of a world which, rightly interpreted, is seen to be the manifestation of reason. In a world which has its being in reason, nothing can finally resist the realisation of a life determined by reason.

In this conviction we find the proof, if proof of it can be found at all, of immortality. We, in so far as we are moral beings, seek to realise the kingdom of God on earth, but at every step we are thwarted and discomfited and even the best of us may sometimes doubt whether the task we have undertaken is capable of achievement. The virtuous do not always prosper and the wicked often flourish like the green bay tree. The noblest ideals fail and the most ignoble schemes succeed. But if we are right in believing that nothing can ultimately resist the moral will, because morality is the nature of things, the tragic failures of good men and the slowness of the world to move towards truth and righteousness are surely good reasons for hoping that behind the veil the picture is different and the problem of Job solved. The reasons, however, on which Kant bases his faith in immortality do not really justify it. If reason is fundamentally opposed to passion, it is difficult to see how the latter can be brought into harmony with the former and how eternity itself can be sufficient for the successful accomplishment of an impossible task which cannot even begin. There is no reason to believe that what cannot be done in this life will be done in another life.

In his classification of duties and virtues, Kant adopts the usual distinction of duties to self and duties to others. Duties to God are excluded because our relation to God is not analogous to the relation of one man to another. All duties are duties to God, for the will of God is one with the moral law. The duties to self and to others all follow from the two ends which every one ought to have. These are one’s own
perfection and the happiness of others. We cannot make our own happiness and the perfection of others our duties. It is the natural inclination of man to seek for happiness and what is done under the prompting of nature cannot be a duty. Nor it is possible for us to try to make others perfect, for perfection consists in men choosing and carrying out their ends for themselves and this is obviously a task in the performance of which they must rely on themselves.

Kant divides the duties to self into duties to ourselves as having an animal nature and duties to ourselves as rational beings. Each of these is further sub-divided into negative and positive duties. The negative duties to ourselves as animals who are also rational beings are to avoid the vices of suicide, unnatural sensual indulgence and immoderate fondness for the pleasures of the table. These duties arise from the necessity of man’s preserving his physical existence as a means to his existence as a moral being. Kant admits that though to make ourselves happy is not a duty still it may be necessary to do something to further our own happiness, becomes without a certain amount of well-being we are not able to do our duty. The negative duties to self as a rational being are to abstain from the vices of lying, avarice and false humility. The man who lies is utterly wanting in dignity and has even less worth than a mere thing. Avarice is the subjection of ourselves to worldly goods and is the enslavement of the soul, while false humility consists in forgetting that however humble a man may be, he, as a person, is of priceless worth. No man, therefore, ought to cringe before his fellows, as if he were a mere instrument to carry out their purposes and did not possess an independent life of his own. “He who makes himself a worm ought not to complain, if he is trampled upon.” The positive duties of man to himself are to develop his physical powers and to cultivate his intellectual and moral faculties.

As regards duties to others, Kant divides them into those which are accompanied by love and those which are accompanied by respect. The former have for their maxim benevolence and consist in well doing. Their different forms are beneficence, gratitude and sympathy. The performance of these duties gives rise to an obligation on the part of others. In endeavouring to promote the happiness of others, however, what we must consider is not so much their own conception of happiness, which may be mistaken, but their real well-being. Respect for others is the duty of limiting our self-estimation by regard to the dig-
nity of humanity in their persons. Pride, evil-speaking and willingness to mock and insult are the vices opposed to respect for humanity.

The only criticism which need be made on Kant's classification of duties is that it rests on an individualistic conception of life which is not tenable in view of the organic relation of man to society. We can no more separate an individual from his fellows than we can isolate a limb from the body to which it belongs. The self-consciousness of the individual, as a moral being, is mediated by the consciousness of his membership of a community and to cut him off from his social relations is to make him lose the essential elements of his manhood. In the ethical relations of life, a universal principle is manifested, a principle which holds together the particular individuals, allots to each of them his special sphere of rights and duties and thereby makes them the means of its own realisation. The self-surrender of the individual is not to other individuals, but to the universal of which the social organism is the expression. The essence of the moral life is that it consists in the surrender on the part of man of his natural self and in his winning by this means a larger self which is universal. True self-sacrifice is the surrender of all to the universal life of society which gives back to each his individual life, sanctified, and changed into an organ of itself. As sharers in the social life, men are permeated and possessed by a universal spirit which makes use of the special aptitudes and talents of each for the purpose of realising some particular function necessary to the completeness of the social organism. In the phenomenon of social life, we see a universal principle that realises itself by going out of itself to the particular lives of the individuals and by bringing them back to its own unity. Society is not a collection of individuals: it is the substance, the presupposition of them.

If all this is true, it is impossible to draw a line between duties to self and duties to others. All duties are duties to society; but as society is not an abstraction but an organic unity of individuals, duties to it are at once, from different points of view, duties to self and duties to others. In serving society I serve myself, for the life of society is my own higher life and to carry out the purposes of society is also to render service to others, for apart from society they have no being and whatever contributes to its order and progress contributes to their true well-being. And, finally, duties to society are duties to God if they are done with the consciousness that, as a member of the universal organism,
I, by my moral deeds, take part in the realisation of God's purpose in the world. If morality touched with emotion is not religion, it is certainly morality transfigured by the consciousness that even I, a mere speck in the universe, am indispensable in God's world and that through my duties and virtues God works out His own inscrutable plan.
LAND TRANSPORT IN MEDIAEVAL INDIA.

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The railroad and the steamship have of late greatly bridged the enormous distances between the different parts of the world, and have made possible the cheap, easy, and quick transmission of goods and intelligence from one part to the other. London—and even New York—may probably be sooner reached from Calcutta now than Benares in the pre-railroad epoch. The facilities of modern transport and communication are so great and have become so indispensable that one could not be rightly blamed if one should think that the distant parts of such a vast country as India—not to speak of the whole world—were entirely isolated, having little or no intercourse with one another, either in the material or in the cultural arts of life, before the era of the steamship and the railway. But it is now a commonplace of history that, from time immemorial, India carried on a continuous and extensive commercial (and even colonial) intercourse with China and Japan on one side, and Western Asia, Africa, and Europe on the other. In order to send out vessels fully laden with cargoes, the celebrated ports of ancient and mediaeval India had necessarily to depend chiefly on inland stations for valuable merchandise; and it would not be wrong to suppose that the facilities of internal transport and communication must, therefore, have been, at least, as adequate—according to the prevailing notions and practices of those times—as to give vent to a continuous stream of goods from the important centres of trade and industry to the sea-port towns and keep up that flourishing state of international traffic, which was at once a source of immense wealth to her, and an object of wonder to the outside world. It is the object of this paper briefly to enquire into the nature and extent of the system of land transport and the methods of travel, in vogue in Mediaeval India, roughly from the 11th to the 18th century A.D.*

* The subject of transport by water, though so important in connection with a country like India, is outside the scope of this paper and will be treated at length on another occasion.
Of the chief essentials to land transport are:—(1) suitable roads and bridges; (2) suitable carts and other means of conveyance; and (3) animal carriers (before the era of steam power). Of these the second and the third are of comparatively little importance in that they have not been serious obstacles to the development of transport and have not greatly taxed human ingenuity and endeavour in any part of the world. The animals were Nature’s gift, and man’s skill was exercised only so far as to break them to his use. The difficulty of locomotive wagons was overcome once for all as soon as the wheeled carriage was invented. The greatest difficulty lay, however, with the roads and bridges, which were no man’s property and therefore perhaps often received less attention. They required a great deal of technical knowledge for construction, a constant supervision for maintenance, and a considerably large amount of capital outlay for their building as well as upkeep. These technical and financial difficulties were indeed almost insuperable, until a wealthy individual, or a corporate organisation, private or public, shouldered the financial burden and knowledge was sufficiently developed to grapple with the problems of civil engineering.

_Carts and Coaches._

From time immemorial to the commencement of the railways, carts and pack-animals were the principal means of land transport in all parts of India. These carts were the forerunners of the modern bullock-carts, and were suitable mainly for goods transport. Some improvements and inventions in carts and coaches are said to have been made by Akbar, who, according to Abul Fazl, “invented an extraordinary carriage, which has proved a source of much comfort for various people. When this carriage is used for travelling, or for carrying loads, it may be employed for grinding corn. His Majesty also invented a large cart, which is drawn by one elephant. It is made sufficiently large so as to hold several bath-rooms, and thus serves as a travelling bath. It is also easily drawn by cattle.” There were also “finely built carriages,” according to Abul Fazl, which were called _bahals_, and could carry several people. These were of two kinds:—(1) _chatridar_, or covered carriages, having four or more poles to support the _chattar_, or umbrella. They were probably the precursors of the modern _ekka_ and the _tonga_, to be found in such large numbers in the upper Provinces, and (2) those without a covering. These car-
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Carriages, like the carts, were usually drawn by oxen. There were also carriages, that were drawn by horses, and were known as *ghurba hal.*

English coaches were introduced into India by Sir Thomas Roe in the early part of the 17th century. Amongst his presents to the Emperor Jahangir one was a coach, the cost of which in England was what was then £151.11s. Although the coach was scorned by the "grand Mogul" as "little and poor," not befitting the present from a monarch, and was not used till it was so reconstructed and transformed with rich gold and silk stuff that Roe "knew it not but by the cover," it "gave much content for the form and for a model"; and several others were made like it, there being "amongst them (Indians) most curious artificers, who are the best apes for imitation in the world, and will make any new thing by a pattern."† These coaches do not appear, however, to have come into general use.‡

Animal Carriers.

The ox, the buffalo, and the camel were the usual beasts of burden, and the drawers of vehicles in the mediaeval period. Horses were rare, and were scarcely used either for riding or for carriage. These were chiefly imported in large numbers from Arabia, Persia and Tartary, and many of these perished on their way. They were necessarily very dear and were therefore meant only for the wealthy. The Venetian traveller Marco Polo, who visited India about the year 1290 A.D., while speaking about the considerable amount of horse trade on the Malabar Coast, observes: "Here are no horses bred," and that they are imported from Arabia and Persia in large numbers. Some of them cost more than 100 marks of silver, a mark being equal to £2.4s. of modern English money; they cost more than £220, or Rs. 3,300.§ The Russian traveller Nikitin (1470 A.D.) says: "Horses are not born in

* Ains-Akbari (Blochmann and Jarrett's translation), vol. I, pp. 150 and 275. The *chatridar* was the Indian Coach so often alluded to by European travellers. It had only two wheels. "They have also, for travelling, small, very light carriages, which can contain two persons; but usually one travels alone, in order to be more comfortable."—Tavernier (ed. Ball), I, 44. See also P. Della Valle, I, 21; Peter Mundy, II, 189; illustration No. 12, Fryer, III, 157—58.
‡ "Four-wheeled coaches," says Fryer, "here are none, unless some few the Europe merchants have"—East India and Persia, ed. Crooke, III, 138. See also Tavernier, I, 44.
that country (India), but oxen and buffaloes; and these are used for riding, conveying goods, and every other purpose." * In his description of the return of the Mogul army from Burhanpur to Agra in 1632, which consisted of a great number of elephants, camels, carts, coaches dolis, palkis, etc., Peter Mundy notices only two of the king's 20 coaches being drawn by Kechees or Kachis—horses from Cutch being known by that name—the rest being drawn by oxen.† The celebrated French traveller Tavernier (1640–67 A.D.) also did not find horses employed in caravans or journeys, "all being carried there on oxen or by waggon...... If any merchant takes a horse from Persia he only does it for show, and to have him led by hand, or in order to sell him advantageously to some noble." The Great Mogul's horses cost, in Tavernier's estimation, from Rs. 6,000 to Rs. 20,000.‡ The horse was mainly used, it seems, for military purposes, i.e. for the cavalry. Dr. Fryer (1672–81) also refers to the very high price of horses, the best Arab or Persian horse costing from £100 to over £2,000, and the absence of pack-horses in India, so that even the Bombay Governor's coach was drawn by oxen.§ The very high price of the horse and the considerable profits that were being made by the horse dealers led to the careful breeding of horses in several parts of India; and Emperor Akbar, in consideration of their "great importance in the three branches of the government," took special care to improve the native breeds in his dominion. He also strictly prohibited the exportation of horses from Hindustan; and, on account of the large profits of the horse dealers, levied a tax, varying from Rs. 2 to Rs. 3, on each horse imported from abroad. The country-bred horses, however, generally, fell short in strength and size, as well as in their performance. The best horses were bred in Cutch, "being equal to Arabs." In Akbar's time, the price of the horse varied "from 500 mohurs to 2 Rupees."|| Very fine Arab horses were also bred in the Bari Doab, between the Beas and the Ravee, in the 17th century; but their price was very high, some of them coming up to Rs. 10,000 or Rs. 15,000.¶ Thus notwithstanding the considerable import of horses from abroad and

* India in the Fifteenth Century (Hak. Soc. Publ.), p. 10.
† Travels of Peter Mundy, vol. II, p. 193.
‡ Tavernier, I, 39, 385.
§ Fryer, I, 178, 295.
|| Ain, I, 132 ff., 215, 234. 1 mohur = Rs. 10, Ain, I, 32.
the extensive breeding at home, horse transport was almost entirely absent in medieval India.

The ox, the buffalo, and the camel were thus the only important carriers. Buffaloes and oxen were used in all parts; camels, generally in Rajputana, Sind and the Punjab. Camels were besides the only beasts of burden that were employed in the caravan trade to Western and Central Asia. All these animals not only drew carts and coaches and carried goods on their backs, but also often formed the principal means of conveyance for the general mass of the people. We have already referred to the testimony of Nikitin to this effect. A few more evidences may be quoted here. According to the Sukraniti (composed between the 10th and the 14th centuries A.D.), "the price of the bull . . . with sufficient strength, which can carry burdens and can walk fast . . . , is 60 palas or Rs.480." Referring to the high esteem in which the ox is held by the Hindus, Nicolo de Conti, the Venetian traveller, who visited India in the year 1420 A.D., says: "The Indians use the ox as a beast of burthen . . . which they consider a great crime to kill or eat, as being of all the most useful to man." Caesar Frederick, another Italian traveller, who visited India during A.D. 1563–69, says: "To go from Vijaynagar to Goa, a distance of eight days' journey in summer, I bought me two bullocks, one of them to ride on, and the other to carry my victuals and provision, for in that country men ride on bullocks." According to the English merchant Edward Terry (1615 A.D.), only "The inferior sorts of people ride on oxen, horses, mules, camels or dromedaries." Bullock-riding may have been usual with the poorer classes of the people, as it sometimes is even down to the present day in some remote parts of the country; but it is difficult to understand how the inferior sorts of people could ride on horses, when they were so scarce, and why horse riding should have been considered disreputable among the upper classes. It is probable, if we should accept Terry's view as correct, that horse riding, not being very popular with the Indians—as it is not to the present day—was, in Terry's time, an object of despise among the more well-to-do when they could travel in the more com-

* Sukraniti, Prof. Benoy Kumar Sarkar's translation, p. 145.
† India in the Fifteenth Century, p. 25.
§ Ibid., Vol. IX, p. 33.
fortable and convenient ‘Sukhāsan’ or the palanquin, of which we shall speak later.

Abul Fazl gives the following interesting information about the ox and the cow: "Throughout the happy regions of Hindustan, the cow is considered auspicious, and held in great veneration; for by means of this animal, tillage is carried on, the sustenance of life is rendered possible, and the table of the inhabitant is filled with milk, butter-milk, and butter. It is capable of carrying burdens and drawing wheeled carriages... Though every part of the empire produces cattle of various kinds, those of Gujrat are the best. Sometimes a pair of them are sold at 100 mohurs. They will travel 80 kos [120 miles] in 24 hours, and surpass even swift horses... The usual price is 20 and 10 mohurs... The cows give upwards of half a man of milk... His Majesty once bought a pair of cows for two lacs of dāms [5,000 Rupees].*

Regarding the speed of the oxen, we further find in Pietro della Valle, the Italian traveller (1623 A.D.), that they "run and gallop, like horses," and while drawing carts and coaches, being "beset with many tufts, or tassels, and abundance of bells at their necks... when they run or gallop, through the streets, they are heard at a sufficient distance, and make a brave show." † Tavernier also observes that in India, "oxen take the place of horses... These oxen allow themselves to be driven like our horses." For a pair of oxen to draw his carriage, Tavernier paid "very nearly 600 Rupees. The reader need not be astonished at this price, for there are some of them which are strong, and make journeys lasting 60 days, at 12 or 15 leagues a day and always at the trot." ‡ Fryer (1672–81) observes: "These [bullocks] not only pluck up their heels apace, but are taught to amble, they often riding on them." § According to the Khulasat (1695 A.D.), the oxen of Cutch were famous for their graceful motion and swift pace. In half a day they could travel 50 kos; and a pair of these beautiful oxen cost more than 500 Rupees.||

Camels were also in great abundance in India, specially in Rajputana, Gujrat and Sind, where they were chiefly bred. According to the Sukraniti, the good camel can go 30 yojanas (150 miles) in one

* Ain, I. 148-49. † P. Della Valle, i, 21. ‡ Tavernier, i, 43-44. § Fryer, iii, 158. || Khulasat; India of Aurangzeb, p. 68.
day; and its price is 100 silver palas or Rs. 800—the price of the ordinary camels being that of the buffalo, i.e., Rs. 56 or 64.* From the Ayeen Akbery we learn that “From the encouragement given by His Majesty, there are now bred in Hindustan camels that excel those of Turan and Iran,” that though they are bred in many places, “near the province of Cutch, are great numbers, and very fine. But in Sind is the greatest abundance; in so much that many an inhabitant of those parts is master of 10,000 camels and upwards”; that the price of the camel ranged from 2 to 12 mohurs according to its quality; and finally that it could carry a load of as much as 10 maunds without much difficulty.†

Roads, Bridges, and Rest-houses.

Roads.

The importance of inland communication was early recognised by the Hindus, and special provision was made, at least as early as the Maurya period, for the construction and maintenance of the highways.‡ One of the principal duties of a prince, according to the Sukraniti, was to see that proper facilities were maintained for land as well as water transport. This is sufficiently suggested in the following advice: “Bridges should be constructed over rivers. There should also be boats and water conveyances for crossing the rivers. Roads are to be provided with bridges.”§ The Sukraniti further lays down some very important rules and regulations regarding the construction and maintenance of the highway, which clearly indicate that the principles of road-making were fairly well understood in the days of the Sukra authors, and that due regard was had to matters of sanitation and the comforts and conveniences of travel. After enjoining the construction of rājamārgas (15 to 30 cubits wide) and mārgas (10 cubits wide), with pādyas or “foot-paths” (3 cubits wide), in the town and the country, the Sukraniti observes: “The roads are to be made like the back of a tortoise (i.e. high in the middle) and provided with bridges. And the road should be provided with drains on both sides for the passage of water... The Kings should have the roads repaired every year with

* Sukraniti, p. 146. See also Mundy (II, 190), who says that the camels “will travel by report 70 ordinary course a day.”
‡ See Vincent Smith, Early History of India (3rd ed.), p. 135.
§ Sukraniti, pp. 106, 35.
gravels by men who have been sued against or imprisoned.

With the advent of the Muhammadans and the foundation of a Muhammadan Empire in Northern India, roads began to be laid in the different parts of the country connecting the principal cities with one another chiefly for military purposes. In Southern India, where river communication could be little developed, internal trade was always mostly carried on by land. It was this land transport which furnished the sea-ports with the principal articles of merchandise, which were sent out in fleets of merchant vessels to the different parts of the world, and enabled them to attain that state of splendour and prosperity which has been attested to by the numerous foreign travellers who visited S. India during the mediaeval period. The remarks of the African traveller, Ibn Batuta (1341 A.D.), and the Venetian, Nicolo de Conti (1420 A.D.), regarding the wealth of the southern parts deserve in this connection special mention. Of Calicut, 'a noble emporium for all India,' says Ibn Batuta, that among others, very large Chinese junks, which employed as many as 1,000 men, visited this maritime city, and that the merchants were so very wealthy that 'one of them can purchase the whole freightage of such vessels as put in here, and fit out others like them.' Of South India in general observes Conti: 'The inhabitants have most sumptuous buildings, elegant habitations, and handsome furniture .... The men are extremely humane, and the merchants very rich, so much so that some will carry on their business in forty of their own ships, each of which is valued at fifty thousand gold pieces.'

Though India had made considerable progress in architectural engineering and the various chemical and industrial arts in the past, the principles of scientific road-making seem to have been little known in the country—save perhaps what has already been said about the Sukra authors—as in other parts of the world during the mediaeval period, before the work of MacAdam in England in the early years of the 19th century. It was not however along the ordinary village tracts that land communication between the distant parts of the country was generally carried on. That high roads were constructed and maintained between the Imperial and Provincial cities, which served the means not only of military but also of economic transport, is sufficiently clear.

* Sukraniti, pp. 34-35.  
† Ibn Batuta, Lee's translation, p. 172.  
‡ India in the Fifteenth Century, p. 21.
from the work of the Indian rulers of the period under review. Sher Shah is rightly considered, as will be shown later, to be the greatest builder of highways and the promulgator of numerous beneficent laws for the welfare of both his Hindu and Muhammadan subjects; but he was not indeed the earliest in the field so far as at least the question of land routes is concerned. Ghyasuddin Balban (1266-87), the most energetic and capable ruler of the Slave Dynasty, is said to have cleared the jungles and forests over a large tract of the country, built roads and fortresses, and suppressed brigandage.* Ibn Batuta, in 1341 A.D., found the highways shaded by trees, with resting houses and wells at regular intervals along a great part of the coast of Malabar, then under the Hindus.† And the great Chola Emperors of the South were reputed, long before the time of the African traveller, to have taken considerable interest in the matter of inland communication, and spent large sums of money on roads and irrigation channels. Regarding the roads in the Chola Empire (900-1300 A.D.), which extended, at the height of its glory, along the entire coast of the Coromandel, observes Krishnaswamy Aiyangar:—"We have ample evidence of the country's having been traversed by grand trunk roads. That armies could march to Kottaru near Cape Comorin at the one end, and the banks of the Mahanadi, if not the Ganges, at the other end of the peninsula, and that trade was carried on largely by means of 'vessels' and 'vehicles' are enough to prove their existence. If more proof be needed we have it in the fact that Kulottunga planted agricultural colonies 'along the road to Kottaru'; and in the references in some of the inscriptions to roads of sixty-four spans, etc."‡ The Emperor Firoz Tughlak (1351-88) also was a great builder of works of public utility. "His reign," says Elphinstone, "though not brilliant in other respects, was distinguished for the enlightened spirit of his regulations, and the extent and utility of his public works." He was the builder of the famous Jumna Canal. He is further credited with the following public works, for the maintenance of which lands were assigned:—50 dams across rivers, to promote irrigation; 40 mosques, 30 colleges, 100 caravanserais, 30 reservoirs for irrigation, 100 hospitals, 100 public baths, 150 bridges — besides many other edifices for pleasure or orna-

† Ibid., p. 479.
‡ K. Aiyangar, Ancient India, pp. 188-89.
ment.* But the greatest Muhammadan ruler in India since Muhammad Ghorı conquered the country was Sher Shah (1540-45), who, amidst his constant activity in the field, during his short reign, brought his territories into the highest order, and laid the foundations of those beneficent laws, which found their way into the enlightened administrative measures of Akbar, and still form the fundamental bases of the principles of the Indian Government. The 'benign' Emperor is said to have established horse-posts, and constructed high roads, throughout the land, planted with trees, and provided with wells, and sarais at every two kos — the most important of which were: the one from Sunargaon in Bengal to Rhotas in the Punjab — known as the 'Badshahi Road' and the precursor of the modern great Trunk Road —, the other from Agra to Burhanpur, and the third from Agra to Jodhpur and Chitor.† In Akbar's reign, we are told by Abul Fazl, the Khaibar Pass was "made easily practicable for wheeled conveyance" by the Emperor's command.‡ Besides these imperial highways, roads were also constructed in the provinces, connecting the principal cities with one another, as for instance, in Bengal, the great Trunk Road from Chittagong to Mymensing via Noakhali, Comilla and Dacca, and the one from Rajshahi to Rungpur via Bogra, and extending to the south probably as far as the Sunderbuns by way of Malda and Murshimabad.§ Centuries before the advent of the Muhammadans into their territories, the native rulers of Assam had maintained extensive roads throughout the length and breadth of their kingdom, as for instance, the Kāmāli Allī, running 350 miles between Cooch Behar and Naranpur, and the Tengrai Raj Allī, running over 400 miles between Rungpur and Namrup, some of which are still in use in parts.|| In the South, Tipu Sultan is considered to have been the greatest of the road-builders in the 18th century. In this connection observes the Salem District Gazetteer: "The British were not the first road-makers in India. Tipu's road-engineering was of no mean order." The Sultan built many roads throughout his dominions, the most notable of them being — (1) That from the left bank of the Cavery to Hosur and Dharmapurī Taluks, a portion of which "would even now be fit for a carriage

* Elphinstone, p. 403. Firishta credits Firoz with no less than 845 public works.
† Tarikh-i-Sher Shahi, ed. Elliot, IV. 417-18.
‡ Ain, II, 401.
§ Bengal District Gazetteer.
|| Shakespear, L. W., History of Upper Assam, etc., pp. 1-3.
road”; and (2) The Dandu Oni or the ‘Army Road,’ from Krishnagiri to Budi-Kota. *

The principal highways were also measured and marked with kos posts to indicate the distance and point out the different roads. During the reign of Emperor Babar, the Agra-Kabul road was measured, and towers were erected ‘at every ninth Kuroh (cir. 18 m.).’ † Akbar erected stone pillars ‘at every case end’ from Agra to Ajmere, which was his favourite abode, being a charming place of residence, and a convenient centre for operations in Rajputana. ‡ The great road from Bengal to the Punjab was also thus marked with kos posts. §

Great care seems to have been taken for the maintenance of the Badshahi Road and its long avenue of trees, which was fairly well preserved down to the close of the seventeenth century. It excited the admiration and attracted the special notice of most of the European travellers who visited India during the period. Sir Thos. Roe observes regarding a part of the road, from Agra to Lahore: ‘It is all a plain and the highway planted on both sides with trees like a delicate walk; it is one of the great works and wonders of the world.’ || Peter Mundy observes in 1631: ‘The trees are distant one from the other about eight or nine ordinary steps, and the ranks from side to side about forty. It is generally known that from Agra there are such ranks of trees which reach as far as Lahore . . . and they say this doth to Patna, done by Jahangir . . . for the ease of travellers and for shade in hot weather.’ ‖ Tavernier describes this continuous avenue of trees as ‘very pleasant to the view,’ and further states that ‘throughout India the greater part of the roads are like avenues of trees, and those which have not trees planted, have at every 500 paces small pieces of stone which the inhabitants of the nearest villages are bound to whiten from time to time, so that the letter carriers can distinguish the road on dark and rainy nights.’ **

The highways as well as the city streets were in the main ‘kuccha,’ i.e., they were not paved either with bricks or stones, although there

† Memoirs of Babur, Section III, p. 629.
‡ Finch—Purchas, iv, 41. See also Ain, I, 289 n. 3.
§ Bernier, 284; Manucci I, 164.
|| Roe, II, 537. ‖ Mundy, II, 83-84.
** Tavernier, i, 96, 292. See also De Laet, W. Lethbridge, pp. 10-11; Bernier, 284; Manucci, I, 164.

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are a few scattered evidences that there were some which were well-paved.* Pietro della Valle evinced great disgust that the streets of such a ‘goodly and great a city’ as Ahmadabad, although large, fair, and straight, were not well-paved, and were “so dusty that there is almost no going a foot, because the foot sinks very deep in the ground with great defilement; and the going on horse-back, or in a coach is likewise very troublesome in regard of the dust.”† The rich and beautiful city of Golconda is, according to Tavernier, “well built and well opened out, and there are many large fine streets in it, but not being paved — any more than are those of all the other towns of Persia and India — they are full of sand and dust.”‡ The roads were at places so bad and worn out that four ‘peons’ or ‘soldiers’ were often employed by owners of valuable merchandise to accompany a cart and keep it from overturning by means of ropes in bad places. The process is thus described by Tavernier: “Two of them walk on each side of the waggon, over which there are two cords passed, and the four ends are held by the soldiers so that if the waggon threatens to upset in a bad place, the two soldiers who are on the opposite side hold the cords tight, and prevent it turning over.”§ During the rains the condition of the roads was necessarily still worse, as they became in many parts full of mire and rendered cart traffic well-nigh impracticable. In the days of Peter Mundy’s travel, the long road from Agra to Patna seems, however, to have been preserved in a fairly satisfactory state of repair, as in his land journey between the two towns during the period of the monsoons (Aug. 1632) he mentions only a few places where he experienced difficulty in passing with his laden waggons. It was only near Rampur Aphi and Baraut, within about fifty miles of Allahabad, that he had any considerable difficulty due to deep mire so that “ever and anon one cart or other would be fast,” and the carmen would be

* The city streets seem to have been generally fair and clean. Cambay had “very good streets and squares,” according to Barbosa (p. 64). The streets of Martaban, Pegu, are “the fairest that I have seen,” Frederick—Purchas, X, 21. The Kingdom of Golconda is “blessed with good and clean roads,” a matter of great relief for all travellers who ought to give it honour and praise, being what is its desert; Bowrey, 117. Lahore has streets “fair and well paved,” Finch—Purchas, iv. Benares has “paved streets, but narrow and crooked,” Mundy, II, 122. “Their streets are paved,” i.e., of Goa, Fryer, ii, 26. The highway for a league or two near Rajmahal is “paved with brick to the town,” Bowrey, 143 n. 2.
† Della Valle, I, 95.
‡ Tavernier, I, 152.
§ Ibid., I, 43. See also Thevenot, W. Lowell, p. 53.
employed "in saving some carts from overturning and hauling others out of some hole where they stuck fast."* On the whole, as observes Elphinstone,† "from the earliest Hindu times to the decline of the Mogul empire, the great roads were the objects of much attention to the government," and it may be fairly presumed that not merely pack animals but bullock carts were in common use for the transport of goods and merchandise over a great part of the country.

**Bridges.**

For a continuous and through land communication it is essential that rivers and streams should be spanned with bridges. We have already seen how for the removal of these natural barriers to land traffic, the authors of the Sukra cycle enjoined on the kings the duty of constructing and maintaining bridges over rivers, in the interests of the state’s commerce. We shall here bring together a few evidences which go to indicate that the Indians, who had, as early as the days of Asoka, attained a considerable amount of knowledge and technical skill in architectural engineering, were not slow to apply their experience for the purposes of bridge construction to facilitate communication by land.

In the eleventh century, a massive stone bridge of eighteen arches, over 290 feet of waterway, was built near Cuttack by Matsya Kesari (1034–50 A.D.), of the famous Kesari or Lion Dynasty of Orissa.‡ In his expedition from Gaur to Tibet (cir. 1200 A.D.), Bukhtiyar Khilji marched to "a place where from old times a bridge had stood over the water having about twenty arches of stone."§ This great stone bridge which was on the Brahmaputra near Gauhaty was built in the Brahmanical times, i.e. before the ninth century A.D., and was found to be "in a good state of preservation" by Major Hannay in the middle of the nineteenth century.|| Remains of an interesting stone bridge have also been found in the Sila Sindurighopa mauza, "said to have been constructed by Bukhtiyar Khilji when he invaded Assam at the beginning of the thirteenth century."¶ There is mention in the *Tabakat-i-Nasiri* (cir. 1250 A.D.) of a great Pul or Embankment lying between Lakhnanti and Lakhnaur (†), a distance of ten days’

* Mundy, II, 95, 111.
‡ History of India (9th ed.), p. 186.
§ Elliot, *History of India*, II, 300.
¶ Imperial Gazetteer, Vol. VI, p. 36.
journey, to make the roads passable during the rains when the country is inundated.* As has been already observed, Emperor Firoz Tughlak (1351–88) is said to have built 150 bridges. The Gambhir river is crossed at Chitor by a "solid bridge of grey limestone with ten arches, said to have been built in the fourteenth century."† The Imperial Gazetteer mentions two old stone bridges in the South, one at Mudbidri, South Canara, and the other at Bhatkal, once a flourishing centre of trade in North Canara, said to have been built by the Jain princess Channubhaira Devi (cir. 1450 A.D.).‡ Ruins of an old stone bridge have been found near Vijaynagar, the famous capital of the ancient Hindu kingdom of the same name.§ At Jaunpur, the Gumti is crossed by a "magnificent" stone bridge, 654 feet long, built by Munim Khan, governor of Akbar, at the end of the sixteenth century, said to have been "completed in three years, at an expense of thirty lacs of rupees."‖ At Chaparghata, the Sengur is spanned by a fine stone bridge of five arches.¶ A little below, the river Rind was crossed by a "considerable" bridge of stone at Kora Khas.** The Ahom prince Pratap Singh (1603–41 A.D.) built a stone bridge over the Darika river, and many other wooden bridges throughout his kingdom.†† Masonry bridges were also constructed by Rudra Singh (1696–1714) over the Namdang and Dimau rivers. He is also said to have constructed many roads and established an extensive trade with Tibet.‡‡ Emperor Jahangir (1605–27) crossed the Mahi river in Malwa by a bridge, "prepared in only three days." About the construction and strength of this bridge, Waki'at-i Jahangiri gives the following interesting information:— "Although in this river there were no boats fit for building bridges, and the water was very deep and flowed forcibly, yet through the good management of Abul Hasan Mir Bakhshi, a very strong bridge of 140 yards in length and four yards in breadth was prepared in only three days. By way of testing its strength I ordered one of my largest elephants with three other female elephants to be taken over it. The

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* Elliot, ii, 319. Stewart identifies Lakhnaur with Naghore in Birbhum, History of Bengal, p. 56.
‡ Imperial Gazetteer, VIII, 90, XVIII, 10.
‖ Imperial Gazetteer, XII, 385; XIV, 83. See also Stewart, History of Bengal, p. 162; and Travels of Lord Valentia (1802–06 A.D.), Vol. I, p. 124.
¶ Mundy, ii, 89; N.W.P. Gazetteer, VI, 206.
** Ibid., ii, 91. †† Gait, History of Assam, p. 117. ‡‡ Ibid., p. 175.
bridge was so strong that the weight of the mountain-like elephants did not shake it in the least."* Finch speaks of a stone bridge of eleven arches, a short way from Delhi, now known as the "Bara Pul" or the "Great Bridge," built about 1612 A.D.† In the city of Ahmedabad, Della Valle (1623 A.D.) saw "a handsome bridge of many arches very well built; upon which . . . two Indian coaches may go abreast."‡ In Kashmir, boat bridges were in use from very early times — the first "Great Bridge" on the Vitasta being built by Pravarasena II in the second century A.D.§ The construction of these boat bridges is thus described by Bernier, who accompanied the camp of Aurangzeb in its journey to Kashmir: "The army crossed them [the rivers] by means of two bridges of boats, constructed with tolerable skill, and placed between two or three hundred paces apart. Earth and straw mingled together are thrown upon the planking forming the footway to prevent the cattle from slipping." Over these bridges crossed, in Bernier's estimation, between three and four hundred thousand persons, besides some two hundred and fifty thousand animals, comprising horses, mules, elephants, camels and oxen, with goods and baggage.|| Kashmir had also numerous permanent wooden bridges, "whose peculiar construction has attracted the notice of all modern travellers," none of which may however be traced to a date earlier than the Zainda Kadal, one of the seven bridges in Srinagar, built in the fifteenth century A.D.¶ Bernier notices two wooden bridges on the Jhelum in Srinagar.** There were several bridges at or near Dacca built in the time of the Muhammadans. Of these the Pagla Pul, "a fine brick bridge," built by Mir Jumla over the Pagla river (cir. 1660 A.D.), the brick bridge half a kos below on the Cadamtali, and the Tungy Bridge, "a solid structure of masonry and stone work" over the Balu creek were the principal, "especially the first of these, which is much admired as a ruin."†† There are two great bridges over the Sindh river at Narwar, once a flourishing city near Gwalior, each of

* Elliot, vi, 363.
‡ P. Della Valle, i, 102.
¶ Stein, i, 103 n.
** Bernier, p. 398.
which originally had some twenty-two arches and 1,000 feet of roadway. These were built about 1660 A.D. At Mania, near Dholpur, Tavernier saw a "very long bridge built of cut stone," over the Jajou, known as the Jajou ka Pul. Tavernier also notices on the Musi river, at Bhagnagar or Golconda, "a grand stone bridge which is scarcely less beautiful than the Pont Neuf at Paris." Fryer refers to two long wooden bridges at Masulipatam. These were built over a sandy marsh — one a mile long, and the other half a mile long, at the charge of the king of Golconda. Each of these had a gate-house, and a strong watch at the beginning, next the town. Fryer also alludes to a bridge of thirty-six arches of stone at Goa. During the latter part of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, several bridges were also constructed by the English East India Company in and around Madras. There was also a "fine stone bridge" built, at Mohan town in the modern United Provinces, by Maharaja Nawal Rai, Minister of the Nawab Safdar Jang, in the eighteenth century.

The foregoing references to bridges in the various parts of the country throughout the mediaeval period are sufficient to indicate that the people of Mediaeval India were not unmindful of the advantages of easy communication; and it may not probably be wrong to suppose that, wherever practicable and necessary, they directed their attention to removing the difficulties in land transport. The undertaking of such costly enterprises, no doubt, depended, in a great measure, where military considerations were not paramount, on the volume of traffic. And though we have not sufficient data on the nature and amount of the bridge tolls in the different localities, the opinion may perhaps be hazarded that bridges were usually constructed at convenient centres of heavy traffic, to facilitate the exchange of commodities. Or, might it have been merely to further the general interests of the realm? In places where bridges did not exist boats were generally used for crossing the rivers; and these were available in sufficient numbers in almost all the important ghats or river stations.

* Arch. Surv. Ind. II, 325-27.
† Tavernier, I, 65.
‡ Ibid., I, 151.
§ Fryer, I, 81. See also Bowrey, p. 62.
|| Ibid., II, 9.
Rest Houses.

Sarais or inns were also one of the necessary pre-requisites of inland travel in the mediaeval days, when several weeks were occupied in covering a distance of only a few hundred miles. Necessary as abodes of shelter and rest at convenient distances, where merchants and travellers could break their journeys, they were made indispensable by the comparative insecurity of the times as fortified places of refuge. And in India, from very early times, princes as well as private individuals built sarais or chowtries throughout the land to meet the needs of the travelling public. The building of these rest-houses, like the excavation of tanks and wells, and the erection of hospitals, was considered to be an act of religious duty among the Hindus; and it is interesting to observe in this connection that a large number of sarais were built in those days by the munificence of the predecessors of the present Marwari community who have now been rightly famed for their generous benefactions toward the establishment of dharmasalas in almost all the important centres of religious sanctity. The names of sarais, like Sarai Ajitmal, Sarai Jagadis, Sarai Mulchand, Mulukhand, Badridas, etc.—as noticed by European travellers and by the author of Chahar Gulshan (cir. 1720 A.D.)—clearly point to their Jain origin.

The necessity for the maintenance of sarais or rest-houses at convenient distances for the convenience and safety of travellers seems to have been clearly recognised at least as early as the days of the Sukraniti, if not earlier. Regarding the construction of sarais and the principles of their administration, the Sukraniti observes: "The sarais or rest-houses for travellers are to be built strong and provided with tanks. Between every two gramas a sarai is to be built. It is to be daily cleared and well-governed by the rulers of gramas. The master of the sarai is to ask the following questions of the travellers coming to it:—Whence are you coming, and why? Whither are you going? Speak truly. Are you or are you not with attendants? Have you any arms in your possession and have you any conveyances with you? What is your caste? What are your family and name? Where is your permanent residence? After asking these questions the master of the rest-house should note them down and in the evening, having taken away the traveller's arms, should advise him—"Take sleep carefully." Having counted the number of men in the house and shut its gate, he should have it watched by the guards working for three hours each, and
awaken the men in the morning. He should give back the arms, count the men and then let them off by opening the gate and accompany them up to the boundary line." They give us some idea about the general conditions of the times, and the necessity of taking due precautions for the safety of the travellers, as well as of the general public against undesirable new-comers.

The first interesting reference to sarais during the period under review, as has been already observed, is in connection with the public works of Firoz Tughlak, who is said, among other, works of public utility, to have constructed some 100 sarais in the different parts of his empire. About hundred years later (cir. 1470 A.D.), the Russian traveller Nikitin observes: "In the land of India it is the custom for foreign traders to stop at inns."† In fact, this was the custom with native traders as well, which Nikitin probably omits to mention. Coming to cir. 1540 A.D., about Sher Shah, the greatest of the Pathan rulers, we are told by Abbas Khan, the historian, that "Altogether he built 1,700 sarais on various roads; and in every sarai he built separate lodgings, both for Hindus and Musulmans . . . and it was a rule in these sarais, that whoever entered them received provision suitable to his rank, and food and litter for his cattle from Government . . . In every sarai two horses were kept, that they might quickly carry news."‡ Akbar, Jahangir, and the other Mogul Emperors are also said to have built sarais for the comfort and safety of travellers and merchants throughout their dominions.§

Sarais or chowltries, though perhaps not so numerous as in the north, were not uncommon in the South. They were specially prominent in the important centres of trade activity. Pyrard de Laval speaks of inns at Calicut, where "food and lodging have their price."|| Tavernier mentions several beautiful sarais at Aurangabat, Golconda, and Tenara, "having two storeys, where there are large halls and chambers, which are cool." "There are small chambers destined for poor travellers, and every day towards evening they receive a dole of bread, rice or vegetables already cooked; and to the idolaters, who eat nothing which has been prepared by others, they give flour to make

* Sukraniti, pp. 34-36. See also p. 29.
† India in the Fifteenth Century, p. 10.
‡ Tarikh-i-Sher Shahi; Elliot, IV, 417-18.
§ Ain, i, 222—Elliot, VI, 284.
|| Pyrard, I, 41.
bread and a little butter."* Bowrey also speaks of the great relief and convenience which all travellers had in the Kingdom of Golconda, which maintained, at the King's expense, small houses at every four or five miles to serve milk or congy (water boiled with rice) to thirsty travellers, and sarais at every twelve miles "for the convenience of lodgings, for any comers or goers, the first come first served, without any respect of persons."†

That sarais were also plentiful and well maintained in Northern India at least to the close of the 17th century is sufficiently clear from the accounts of contemporary European travellers, like Finch, Mundy, Bernier, Manucci, and others. Manucci, who spent over half a century in India (1655 to 1717 A.D.), says that on every route throughout the Mogul Kingdom there were sarais which were like fortified places, and each of which might hold from 800 to 1,000 persons with their horses, camels, and carts; and that the routes specially between Agra and Dacca were much frequented, and were full of villages and sarais, food being good and cheap.‡ Some of these sarais were very beautiful and strong. Of the sarai at Chaparghata, an important commercial mart in Upper India in those days, says Finch: "Here is one of the fairest sarais in India, like a goodly castle than an inn to lodge strangers... able to lodge a thousand men."§ Mundy says that this "fairest" of the sarais that he had yet seen "had four fair towers at the four corners, and two stately gates at coming in and going out, with a very high wall round about, full of battlements."|| The Nur Mahal Sarai at Agra, observes Mundy, "is a very fair one, built by the old Queen Nur Mahal for the accommodation of travellers, in which may stand 500 horse, and there may conveniently lye two or 3,000 people; all of stone, not one piece of timber in it, the rooms all arched, each with a several copula."|| Mundy further alludes to another very beautiful sarai at Patna, "the fairest sarai that I have yet seen, or I think is in India... It hath two fair courts, each having warehouses round

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* Tavernier, I, 146, 152, 173. Of these sarais, a large one of which he found in ruins at Futtehpur in Upper India, observes Héber: "These sarais are generally noble monuments of individual bounty, and some were in ancient times liberally endowed, and furnished supplies of grain, milk, and grass gratis to the traveller, as well as shelter." Journey in India (1824-25), Vol. II, pp. 26-27.
† Bowrey, p. 117.
‡ Manucci, ed. Irvine, I, 68; II, 96.
§ Purchas, IV, 68. || Mundy, II, 89.
* Ibid., p. 78.
about beneath, and rooms with galleries to lodge in aloft, a very stately entrance, lying by the river . . . These are usually in great cities, but the other sort of sarais are in all places."* Bernier, who has little praise† for the eastern caravansarais, observes, in connection with the Begum Sarai at Delhi, built by Shah Jahan’s eldest daughter: "The Karuansara is in the form of a large square with arcades, like our Place Royale . . . Above the arcades runs a gallery all round the building into which open the same number of chambers as there are below. This place is the rendezvous of the rich Persian, Usbek, and other foreign merchants, who in general may be accommodated with empty chambers, in which they remain with perfect security, the gate being closed at night. If in Paris we had a score of similar structures, distributed in different parts of the city, strangers on their first arrival would be less embarrassed than at present to find a safe and reasonable lodging . . . Such places would become warehouses for all kinds of merchandise, and the general resort of foreign merchants."‡ The Begum Sarai was no doubt one of the richest sarais in all India, which could thus elicit the unstinted admiration from the celebrated French traveller. The generality of the sarais could not indeed be so rich and comfortable. They appear, however, to have been on the whole fairly safe and commodious as places of shelter and refuge to the weary traveller and merchant. The following description from a very rare work, entitled An East-India Collation, by Christopher Farewell, an English factor who came out to India in 1614, gives probably a fair estimate of the ordinary Indian sarai:—It is "a spacious place made of purpose for all travellers, natives as else (for they have not the use of inns as in Christendom), with commodious warehouses round about, of one story, four square, in the manner of galleries; and under them dry walks and places to feed their coach-oxen, camels, elephants and horses, but in the middle all open, like our Exchange; it being supposed that every merchant, gentleman or nobleman hath his tent or coach to sleep in; if neither, they make the best shift they can; and for their provision they bring it with them, or buy it in the town."§

* Mundy, II, 159.
† See his Travels, p. 233.
‡ Bernier, p. 281.
§ Roe, I, 90, note 2. See also Della Valle, I, 95, 100.
Nature and Extent of Land Transport.

The bullock-carts and the pack-animals, principally the ox and the camel, were the chief means of land carriage in India before the days of mechanical transport. These traversed long distances in large companies. Sometimes Caifilas or caravans of as many as 10,000 and 20,000 animals were seen passing from Bengal to Agra, and from Agra to Surat, led by a specialised class of carriers known as the Banjaras.* These Banjaras were a nomadic tribe of public carriers, continually moving from place to place with their women and children and household goods. They had their own oxen, some of them possessing as many as 100, while others had even more or fewer; and they all had a chief who acted as their prince.† They not only supplied the needs of the civil population; but were often employed to supply provisions to large armies in the field.‡ Some of them again were independent merchants who made their profits by buying in the cheap and selling in the dear market. They thus constituted an important element in the social organisation of India before the era of the railroad, and were in many parts indispensable for purposes of land transport. The following interesting description regarding the Banjaras is given by Mundy:—"These Banjaras carry all their household along with them, as wives and children ... continually driving from place to place. Their oxen are their own. They are sometimes hired by merchants, but most commonly they are the merchants themselves, buying of grain where it is cheap to be had, and carrying it to places where it is dearer, and from thence again relade themselves with any thing that will yield benefit in other places, as salt, sugar, butter, etc."§ Of these Banjaras or 'Brinjarries,' who were not ousted from their hereditary occupation till long after the introduction of the railways, observes Malcolm||:—"They live in tents ... every place where they pitch is their home, and that of their families. They come

* "Their name is derived from the Sanskrit Vanijya or Vanijya-kara, 'a merchant.'" —Crock, Tribes and Castes of N.W.P. and Oudh, Vol. I, p. 149.
† Tavernier, I, 40.
‡ Their first mention in Muhammadan history in serving armies is in connection with Secunder Lodi's campaign against Gwalior (1505 A.D.)—Elliot, V, 100. It was these Banjaras again who afforded such assistance to Lord Cornwallis in his war with Tipu Sultan in 1791 A.D.—See Mill's History of British India, Vol. V, ch. IV.
§ Mundy, ii, 95–96. See also Tavernier, I, 40.
and go to different countries, as their services are required to supply armies and to carry on commerce. Their number in any one province rises or falls like an article in trade, according to the demand."

Some idea regarding the nature and extent of animal and cart transport in Mediaeval India may be obtained from the following consilience of testimony:—Observes Roe—"I met in one day 10,000 bullocks in one troupe laden with corn, and most days others, but less," near Burhanpur.* From Surat to Cambay, Della Valle travelled with a Cafila which was "so great and the coaches so many, that in certain narrow places we were fain to stay a good while before we could go forwards, just as it happens in the streets of Naples and Rome at solemn pomps."† Near Rampur Aphoi on the Ganges, Mundy speaks of having met a Tanda or Camp of oxen, "in number 14,000, all laden with grain, as wheat, rice, etc." As each ox carried four great maunds, each maund being equivalent to sixteen gallons, the total quantity carried was 112,000 bushels London measure. And many others were coming from the eastern parts, "all going for Agra, from whence it [the grain] is again carried to other places."‡ Two days later, near Shahazadpur, Mundy met another Tanda of oxen; "in number 20,000 (as themselves said), laden with sugar, of which there could not be less than 50,000 English hundred weight, at 2½ hundred weight to each ox."§ Mundy also notices a peculiar contrivance, familiar to us down to the present day, the bamboo banque, "more steady than any other kind of invention that I know," in which the Kabars carried China and other brittle ware and water, travelling at the rate of twenty-five or thirty miles a day.|| Regarding the transport by oxen, Tavernier remarks:—"They give an ox a load weighing 300 or 350 livres, and it is an astonishing sight to behold caravans numbering 10,000 or 12,000 oxen together, for the transport of rice, corn, and salt... carrying rice to where corn only grows, and corn to where rice only grows, and salt to the places where there is none."¶ Thevenot also speaks of having met with caravans of above 1,000 oxen near Aurangabad coming from Agra laden with cloth.**

* Roe, I, 88.
† Della Valle, I, 63. In some narrow roads one is obliged to wait two or three days till all [caravans] have passed.—Tavernier, I, 40.
‡ Mundy, II, 95.
§ Ibid., p. 98.
¶ Tavernier, I, 39.
|| Mundy, II, 115.
** Thevenot, p. 73.
Camels were used as means of transport principally in Rajputana and in the caravan trade with Central and Western Asia. For internal transport they do not appear, however, to have been as prominent as oxen. Tavernier says that camels were used by the Banjaras in caravans but rarely, they being "specially reserved to carry the baggage of the nobles."* They were also mostly used for purposes of military transport.

 Merchants from the furthest parts of India, even from Bengal, carried on caravan trade with Boghar, the great mart of trade in Bactria, where they took all kinds of cloth and brought wrought silks, red hides, slaves and horses.† Roe notices caravans yearly passing from Agra to Cambalu (Peking).‡ According to Richard Steel (1615 A.D.), "twelve or fourteen thousand camels lading" generally passed through Kandahar for Persia.§ As observed by Bernier, caravans also passed to Tibet and China from Kashmir as well as Patna, importing chiefly musk, China wood, rhubarb, crystal, jade, wool, etc.|| According to the Khulasat, a large amount of traffic was carried on at Bahraich, a large town on the Saraju, where "from the northern mountains are brought many articles loaded on the backs of men, goats, and hill ponies . . . and at times there is a great and ceaseless crowd; merchants from all sides come here, make purchases, and gain profit."¶

In caravans, which often consisted of both animals and carts, the carts did not ordinarily consist of more than one hundred or two hundred at the most.** In 1595, the Third Jesuit Mission went from Surat to Lahore with a large caravan comprising 400 camels, 100 horses, and 100 wagons, besides a large number of poor people on foot.†† 268 camels and 109 carts formed Mundy's caravan in his journey from Agra to Surat for carrying indigo and saltpetre.‡‡ Carts were usually drawn by two oxen. But heavy wagons were drawn by teams of oxen, "yok'd eight, sometimes a dozen or sixteen times double."§§ Regarding caravan transport in India, Fryer ob-

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* Tavernier, I, 40.
† Jenkinson (1558 A.D.)—Hakluya, ii, 472.
¶ India of Aurangzeb, p. 32. See also Ain, II, 172.
** Tavernier, I, 42. †† Vincent Smith, Akbar, p. 413.
‡‡ Mundy, II, 277, n. 1.
§§ Fryer, III, 156. See also Tavernier, i, 42.
serves:—"Contrary to whatever we found in any place of Persia, where are neither carts, coaches, or wains: There we seldom meet any to turn us out of our way; here the roads are pestered with caphales of oxen, camels, and buffaloes, with heavy wagons drawn by teams of oxen... bringing and carrying goods of all sorts."

The Banjaras as well as the cafilas or caravans were usually armed—sometimes special guards were provided—as the roads were often pestered with thieves and robbers.† 'Peons' or 'soldiers' were always available to accompany caravans on payment of a small remuneration—about rupees four or five a month. The insecurity of the way was, in certain places, so great that notwithstanding a great deal of vigilance and special watch, theft and robbery was often committed on the highways, and was thus a great hindrance to easy communication between the different parts of the land. There was besides a great handicap to inland traffic on account of the tolls and customs, levied at various centres in the different parts of the country. The abolition of the tamgha (inland tolls) and the jaziyah (poll-tax on the Hindus) by Akbar in 1562 A.D. probably gave some impetus to inland traffic; but, on the whole, the customs barrier between the different parts of the country seems to have prevailed throughout the mediaeval period.‡

From the accounts of some of the European travellers we may gather the following interesting information regarding the cost and duration of land travel between certain parts of India during the 17th century. Between Agra and Surat, the principal outlet for the goods of the Mogul Empire, there were two main roads, the eastern by way of Gwalior, Sironj, and Burhanpur, and the western by way of Ajmere, Pali (the chief commercial mart of Western Rajputana), and Ahmadabad. In Bernier's time, the Surat-Ahmadabad-Agra road was better than the direct road by Burhanpur and Gwalior; but it was more perilous on account of dangerous raids by outlaws.§ In 1631, Mundy travelled from Surat to Agra via Burhanpur, a distance of about 396 kos or 551½ miles in 53 days, spending a considerable

* Fryer, III, 156.
† They were usually armed with matchlocks, bows, arrows, swords and shields "as a protection against petty thieves. From the sovereigns and armies of Hindusthan they have no apprehensions. Even contending armies allow them to pass and repass safely," a practice in great advance of the piratical system of warfare in Europe. *Heber's Journey*, II, 444, 561. See also Mundy, II, 262.
‡ Ain, I, 189; Dow, Hindustan, lxxix.
§ Bernier, p. 292.
amount of time in observing things of note on the way.* When the journey was continuous, without much intermission on the way, the distance could probably be covered in about 40 days. Bernier notes that wine was carried from Surat to Delhi in 46 days.† According to Tavernier, one could travel from Surat to Agra in a carriage in about 35 or 40 days.‡ It took from 30 to 40 days to travel between Agra and Patna, a distance of about 550 miles.§ From the first English commercial mission from Agra to Patna under Hughes and Parker (1620–21 A.D.), we learn that the normal cost of land transport between the two places including the ordinary trade risks from robbery and damage by rain was from Rs. 1½ to Rs. 2½ per maund of 62½ lb.||

The facilities of internal transport and communication in mediaeval India thus appear to have been, on the whole, fairly adequate, according to the necessities of the age, so that even the inland mart of Delhi could always remain full of provisions and other valuable articles of merchandise from various parts of the world. Regarding the bustle of commercial life and trade activity in the great bazar at Delhi, we have the following interesting remarks in the Khulasatu-t-Tawarikh (1695 A.D.):—"In this bazar,—where all precious and rare things of every country, port and city and all wonderful articles can be had,—are brought and sold at one place, the rubies of Badakhshan and sparkling pearls and sapphires, lustrous pearls of Oman, bright pearls, corals, and other lustrous jewels of sea and mine; at another place various kinds of cloth, merchandise, weapons, foodstuffs and drink, perfumes, and other articles which men require. At another place, many kinds of dry and fresh fruits of every country. . . . Elsewhere elephants of renown, wind-paced horses, and swift sumpter camels, and other animals in thousands and thousands. . . . Every day the bustle of the buying and selling of all commodities is great, and the crowd of buyers and sellers is beyond limit or calculation; so much so, that you may here collect in one day all the royal articles suitable for the requirements of a kingdom; and the necessary outfit of a thousand soldiers can be got together in one hour, without the delay of preparation."||

* Mundy, II, Relation, VI.
† Bernier, p. 253.
‡ Tavernier, I, 45.
§ Mundy, II, App. D.
|| Ibid.
¶ India of Aurangzeb, pp. 5–6.
Means of Travel and the Manner of Travelling.

Nearly half a century back there was little occasion for distant travel in India except on religious pilgrimage. People generally stayed near their own homes, living on the products of agriculture or some other minor handicrafts. Travel for service or employment was almost unknown. Whenever one wanted to move from one place to another, one either walked on foot, or rode on oxen, or travelled in carts and carriages in the absence of facilities for water communication, when almost invariably boats were used. Various kinds of litters, doolies, chowdoolies and palkis, etc., were also used for land travel.

The Indian carriages, the precursors of the modern ekka and the tonga, as we have already seen, were drawn by oxen, which could run and gallop like horses, travelling at the rate of 12 or 15 leagues a day. There was "an abundance of coaches" in India, observes Della Valle; and "with these... they not only go in cities, but also for the most part travel in the country." * A coach with two oxen could be hired, as Tavernier informs us, for about a rupee a day; so that the whole journey from Surat to Agra which occupied from 35 to 40 days cost about Rs. 40 or 45. "From Surat to Golconda," further remarks Tavernier "it is nearly the same distance and the same price, and it is in the same proportion throughout the whole of India." † We also learn from Thevenot that the hire of an Indian coach was about 25d. or half a crown a day ‡; and this amounted to about a rupee in those times.

Palanquins, dolis, and other kinds of litters were also much used for travel, not only in cities, but for distant journeys. "This mode of carriage," remarks Pietro della Valle, "is very usual in India, not only in cities, but also in journeys which are of sufficient length." § The palanchino or palanquin of the European travellers is probably the the same as Abul Fazl’s sūkhāsan, which was "conveniently adapted for sitting in, lying at full length or sleeping during travel." || It was not like the palanquin of to-day, but something similar to the modern tanjam, or to the litter known as the muncheel (manchāl) in the Madras Presi-

* Della Valle, I, 21. Also Tavernier, I, 44.
† Tavernier, I, 45.
‡ Thevenot, p. 53.
§ Della Valle, I, 183–84; also p. 31.
|| Ain, II, 122. They were "the most convenient and honourable carriages" in those days, according to Pietro della Valle—I, 183.
dency.* It was usually carried by four men, but for distant journeys eight or twelve men were employed for relieving one another. Then, as now, the *Kahars* carried the palanquin; and they walked "so evenly that the man inside is not inconvenienced by any jolting."† As observes Tavernier, "they travel in this way faster than our chairmen in Paris, and with an easier pace, being trained to the trade from an early age"; and they could thus travel up to 13 or 14 leagues a day.‡ The pay of the palanquin bearer was Rs. 4 a month 'for everything', up to Rs. 5, when the journey was long lasting for more than sixty days.§ Palanquin travel, though more comfortable, was thus more expensive than travel by the carriage; and it was generally resorted to only by the wealthier members of society. The *palki* and the *chaudol* were also the principal means of conveyance for the great ladies of the court, who sometimes also travelled in the *mikdember*, a kind of comfortable litter, on the elephant's back. Elephants with mikdembers or *hauses*, similar to the modern *howdahs*, were also used for distant travels by kings and princes. The Great Mogul, according to Bernier, most commonly travelled in the *takht-i-rawan*, or *singhásan*, which was carried on men's shoulders.||

In Rajputana people rode on camels, which went a great pace, 70 ordinary kos a day.¶ Horses, as has been mentioned above, seem to have been scarcely used either for riding or for drawing carriages. Tavernier however remarks that in the territories lying between Golconda and Cape Comorin there were no wagons, and that only oxen and pack-horses were used for the conveyance of men, and for the transport of goods and merchandise. He further observes that in the absence of carriages, one has, in those parts, the convenience of much larger palanquins than in the rest of India; for one is carried much more easily, more quickly, and at less cost.**

Such were the methods of land travel in mediaeval India, and

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* Bowrey, p. 86; illustration; Mundy, ii, illustration, No. 12.
† *Ain*, I, 254.
‡ Tavernier, i, 46. Also Bowrey:—They "will carry one 40 miles per diem with no great difficulty," p. 87.
§ Tavernier, I, 46. "Common bearers get from 120 to 160d." per month, i.e. Rs. 3 or 4; *Ain*, I, 254. They are "satisfied with a very small reward"; Della Valle, I, 185.
|| Mundy, ii, Relation XIII; pp. 239-40; Bernier, pp. 369-74; *Ain*, I, 131: "They also put comfortable turrets on the backs of swift-paced elephants, which serve as a travelling sleeping apartment."
¶ Mundy, II, 190, 245, 255.
** Tavernier, I, 175.
they were probably as good as any that could appropriately be devised in that age. It may be interesting to observe in this connection that the manner of travelling in India during that period was considered by the great French traveller, Tavernier, to be "not less convenient than all that they have been able to invent in order that one may be carried in comfort either in France or in Italy," the most civilized countries of Europe in those days. *

The distant pilgrimages that have been from time immemorial one of the common religious practices of the Hindus were made in these mediaeval conveyances in the pre-railroad period. It may be interesting at the present day, to learn how hundreds, and even thousands of men, women, and children travelled in large companies in those times, to the numerous holy places scattered throughout the length and breadth of India. "These pilgrimages," remarks Tavernier, "are not made, as in Europe, one by one, or two by two, but the population of a town or of several villages assemble in order to travel together in company . . . Each one travels according to his station and means, some in palanquins or litters, others in carriages; and the poor, some on foot and others on oxen, the mother carrying her child, and the father the cooking utensils." † We may here briefly note some of the great pilgrimages referred to by Mundy and Tavernier during the 17th century. In his return journey from Patna to Agra in 1631, Peter Mundy found near Rampur Aphoi a 'Zung' (Sâng) of pilgrims, about 2,000 in number, going to Triveni and Kasi. They were coming from Kathiwar in the modern Bombay Presidency. The next day Mundy refers to another similar Zung at Hathgaon. Since his departure from Patna, Mundy speaks of having met no less than 100,000 people going on pilgrimage to Triveni and Kasi from the various parts of the country. ‡ In the year 1652, Tavernier speaks of having met near Emelipata (Vamulaipetta) in the modern Madras Presidency, "more than 4,000 persons, both men and women, and more than twenty palanquins, each of which contained an idol," going on a pilgrimage from Burhanpur and its neighbourhood to visit the great Ram Ram at Tirupati, in the District of North Arcot. § The next year he describes meeting at Daulatabad a similar procession of more than 2,000 persons, including men, women, and children, on their

* Tavernier, I, 39. † Tavernier, II, 244-45. ‡ Mundy, II, 182-83. § Tavernier, I, 296.
way to Tripatty pagoda from Thatta in Sind.* These evidences of long pilgrimages by large numbers of the Hindu population are instructive as showing that, despite the great extent of the country and the absence of the modern improved facilities of transport, distant journeys were not uncommon in mediaeval India, amongst others, for religious purposes.

Internal Security.

Security of life and property is one of the essential conditions for the successful prosecution of industry and commerce. The farmer will hardly grow corn, and the manufacturer, finished articles, unless they can feel a reasonable amount of certainty that they will not be robbed of the fruits of their toil; and commerce will hardly thrive unless the main routes of traffic are well protected. A flourishing state of trade and industry in a country can thus be taken to be a fair index to the maintenance of internal law and order, without which the peaceful operations of life would indeed stand paralysed. No one could however expect to find in the mediaeval days, whether in India or in any other part of the world, the elaborate police regulations of modern times, or the amount of security that we now enjoy. The physical difficulty of enforcing law and order, in spite of the best wishes of the Government, were then, indeed, almost insuperable, specially in a vast country like India, which was filled with impene-trable hills and forests over a considerable portion of her extensive area. Besides, the means of communication and the manner of transmitting intelligence were not, in those times, all that could be desired, from the modern standpoint, for a quick and effective method of dealing with the problem of internal disorder. We have thus to bear in mind the shortcomings of the period for a judicious appreciation of the nature and extent of security that prevailed in mediaeval India.

The prosperous state of India, with its numerous thriving centres of trade and industry and seaport towns, before the predominance of the English East India Company in the land, leads us to think that, in normal times, there was reasonable security for life and property throughout the country. The duty of maintaining internal peace and order rested mainly with the watchmen and the heads of villages, the mukaddams, or the zemindars. "The head of the village," we find in

* Tavernier, II, 246.
Sukraniti, "like the father and the mother, protects the people from aggressors, thieves and also from officers." * The Hindu Kingdom of Vijaynagar in the South (1336-1565 A.D.) had developed a 'remarkably good' system of administration, and afforded adequate security to life and property, so that it could become one of the wealthiest kingdoms in mediaeval India. In this connection, Abd-er-Razzak, the ambassador from Shah Rokh to the Court of Vijaynagar (1442 A.D.), observes: "Security and justice are so firmly established in this city that the most wealthy merchants bring thither from maritime countries considerable cargoes, which they unload, and unhesitatingly send into the markets and the bazaars, without thinking in the meantime of any necessity of checking the account or of keeping watch over the goods." † The Bolognese traveller Varthema (cir. 1505 A.D.) also testifies to the great security and justice that prevailed in Vijaynagar, and her consequent prosperity. "In this kingdom," says he, "you can go everywhere in safety." ‡ The just and efficient system of administration in Vijaynagar seems to have been well maintained long after the downfall of the Hindu Power in 1565 A.D. § Under its native rulers, the Kingdom of Gujrat, as it appears from the testimony of Barbosa (cir. 1515 A.D.), maintained adequate security and order within its boundaries. "The people of this country," observes Barbosa, "are kept in very good order, and governed with much justice and good treatment." || Bowrey is full of praise for the great safety of travel in Golconda, and its good and clean roads. There was little theft and robbery in the kingdom; and if any one was robbed, "a thing less common in this kingdom than any other," he was compensated for the loss by the Government.¶

Of the state of internal security in Northern India, we know very little till we come to the Mogul period. During Pathan rule, Ghyasuddin Balban (1266-87 A.D.), one of the ablest of the Pathan rulers, is said to have cleared many jungles and suppressed brigand-

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* Sukraniti, p. 81.
† India in the Fifteenth Century, p. 14.
‡ Varthema, pp. 130, 147. "The administration of justice in India has been the theme of general admiration from the earliest times... El-Edrisi [12th century] says: Justice is a natural instinct among the natives of India... It is moreover on this account that visitors to their country have increased, that the country flourishes, and that the people thrive in plenty and in peace."—Badger, Varthema, p. 148 note.
§ Pyrrad, I, 400-407.
|| Barbosa, p. 61.
¶ Bowrey, 117-18.
age.* In 1341, Ibn Batuta speaks of travelling being unsafe in India.† A beneficent administrator in a great many ways, Sher Shah (1540–45) was probably the first Muhammadan ruler in Hindustan to afford adequate security to life and property. He secured the country from outlaws by enforcing village responsibility, and making the village headmen, mukaddams, answerable for all thefts and robberies that were committed within their jurisdiction. The mukaddam must find the offender or compensate the loss. The system is said to have worked well, and led to the disappearance of theft and robbery from the kingdom; so that travelling was safe, and “such a shadow spread over the world, that a decrepit person feared not a Rustam.”‡ The roads were also fairly secure during the reign of Akbar, who “encouraged trade by an exemption from duties through the interior provinces, and by the invariable protection given to merchants of all nations.” Reasonable security was also maintained by the other Mogul emperors, who were “invariably the protectors of the merchants,” so that through the “uncommon abilities of most of the princes,” Hindustan became “the most flourishing empire in the world during two complete centuries.”§ In the 25th year of the reign of Akbar (1581 A.D.), a general census was taken of the whole empire with the object, among other things, of promoting internal security. One of its important recommendations, in the words of Abul Fazl, runs as follows:—“The officers were not to allow any one to reside, who was not engaged in some business or occupation, and they were to inquire into the arrival and departure of clever men, and ascertain whether their designs were good or evil, so that in a short time the true characters of the outwardly respectable and inwardly malicious might be brought to the test. This regulation was the means of establishing tranquillity, and of providing security for the broad expanse of Hindustan.”|| The maintenance of law and order rested in the town with the Kotwal and his police force, and in the country, with the Faujdar, the mukaddam, and the village watchmen or chaukidars. Throughout the Mogul period, the Kotwal,
the Faujdar, and the village headmen appear to have been held responsible for any loss from theft or robbery in the town and the country. As says Abul Fazl, the Kotwal "shall discover the thief and the stolen goods, or be himself answerable for the loss."

* During the second half of the 17th century, Thevenot and Manucci also noticed that the Kotwal and the Faujdar were responsible for securing the town and the country, and, that in the event of theft and robbery, they were either to find the offender or restitute the loss.† It is difficult to know how far these principles were carried into actual practice, and how far the officers evaded payment by cunning, which they could often do by throwing the burden of responsibility on the people. The system had however the effect of making the whole body of citizens wary and vigilant, and this led to a great decrease of crimes. Thevenot remarks that the Kotwal almost always evaded payment for compensation by artful means; and he records an interesting case, in which the Faujdar was obliged to compensate the loss of Rs. 15,000, suffered by one Mr. Beber, in the service of the French East India Company.‡

Notwithstanding the best efforts of the Government, highway robberies were not uncommon in the land, specially in the out-of-the-way places. And merchants could hardly travel over distant parts without sufficient guards, and would scarcely undertake the risks of a long journey, except in company of a large caravan. The insecurity of the roads was specially great in the hilly and jungle tracts of Central India and Malwa, through which lay the main route of traffic to the western seaports. These forest tracts were the refuge of professional robbers, like the Bhils, the Gonds, the Moghees and others, who would, at every possible opportunity, set forth from their hiding places and steal away goods even from a large caravan. It is but rarely however that they had the hardihood and daring to openly attack a well-guarded caravan. Hawkins' (1608-11) denunciation of the state of internal security in the country, that it is "full of outlaws and thieves, that almost a man cannot stir out of doors, throughout all his [Jahangir's] dominions, without great forces,"§ seems to be too severe in the light of what we know about it during

* Ayeen, W. Gladwin, I, 301.
† Thevenot, p. 20; Manucci, II, 451.
‡ Thevenot, pp. 20, 35.
§ Hawkins' Voyages, p. 434.
the same period. Sir T. Roe (1615–19) and Terry (1615 A.D.) could hardly have travelled through Rajputana, probably the most perilous part of the country in those days, if the roads were so impassable to traffic. The English ambassador, however, travelled from Surat by Burhanpur and Chitor to Ajmir, at a time of political turmoil; yet he met with little obstruction or alarm, except occasionally from the mountain tribes.* And this was equally true of Terry, who travelled 'very safely' nearly four hundred miles from Surat to Mandu, with only a small company, and was attacked only once near Baroda.† And Banjaras and cañilas were constantly passing and repassing through the same regions without, as it is apparent, of ever thinking of abandoning their hereditary profession.

One of the ordinary ways of dealing with the robbers and suppressing brigandage during the Mogul period seems to have been the wholesale slaughter of the outlaws, and the erection of towers bedecked with their heads, as a terror to the race of miscreants and law-breakers. Roe remarks that at Ramsor, 20 miles south-east of Ajmir, "the King had left the bodies of 100 naked men slain in the fields for robbery." ‡ About fifteen years later in 1631, Peter Mundy found at Agra several "munaries" [minars] or little turrets, with the heads of many thieves, that were lately taken and some of whom were roasted alive." "Their bodies were hung up by the heels in a grove of mango trees." About the town, many of their bodies were also placed on stakes.§ The next year Mundy met with more than 200 munaries from Bakewar to Chaparghata, a distance of from 50 to 60 miles, on the Ganges valley. "The way was so pestered with rebels and thieves, that there was no passing; so that the King sent Abdulla Khan, with 12,000 horse and 20,000 foot to suppress them, who destroyed all their towns, took all their goods, etc."|| This was evidently an expedition against certain tracts which had recently broken out into open rebellion. In 1665, Tavernier noticed towers of heads near Kalabagh in Rajputana. As it appears from Tavernier's remarks, the Hindu Prince of Kalabagh and his subjects were thus punished by Aurangzeb for their undue and for-cible exactions from the merchants that passed on that way.¶

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* Roe, I, 86-105. † V. Smith, Akbar, p. 413. ‡ Roe, II, 360. § Mundy, II, 72-73. See illustration No. 6. See also the Archaeological Survey of India (XX, 149-150) on the "Chor-minār" or "Thieves' Pillar" at Delhi. || Mundy, II, 90. ¶ Tavernier, I, 58.
In Malwa and Gujrat the travellers had often a special class of guards for their safe conduct, the "Tcherons" or Charuns, the well-known bards and priests of Rajputana. Regarding these "tcherons," observes Thevenot (1666 A.D.): "If one have any of these with him he thinks himself safe, because the man acquaints the robbers they meet, that the traveller is under his guard . . . they compound with the robbers for a certain sum which the traveller gives them . . . The Banians make use of these people."* As late as 1825, Heber observes: "A few years back it was usual for merchants and travellers going through Malwa and Guzerat to hire a Charun to protect them, and the sanctity of his name was generally sufficient, etc."†

Since the closing years of the 17th century, the forces of disruption of the Mogul Empire were at work and the country gradually became divided into numerous small independent principalities and warring camps. During this period of disturbance and turmoil, when Northern India was in a veritable state of chaos and anarchy, there seems to have disappeared what law and order there was in the land during nearly the first two centuries of Mogul rule. The times were now propitious for the plundering raids and depredations of free-booting classes, like the Thugs and the Pindaris, and nationalities, like the Jats and the Mahrattas, which probably hoped to consolidate their power and found a kingdom or an empire with the rich spoils of plunder. Even during the lifetime of Aurangzeb, the Jats, under their Chieftain Churaman, carried their plundering raids in the neighbourhood of Agra and Fathpur Sikri, and the Mahrattas as far as Ujjain and Sironj. And by the middle of the 18th century, the Mahrattas carried their depredations as far as Bengal, and became a terror to her peaceful citizens. Besides their periodical ravages, the Mahrattas also levied heavy tolls on passing traffic as the price of security from plunder.‡ Security also disappeared during this later period from the Indus delta, where robberies were committed, notwithstanding powerful guards, between Tatta and Larribundar. In this connection, A. Hamilton records a case of organised robbery, which is as follows: "In anno 1699, a pretty rich caffilla was robbed by a band of four and five thousand villains: the guard consisting of 250 horse were entirely cut off, and above 500

* Thevenot, pp. 13–14.
† Heber, II, 454. See also Malcolm, Central India, II, 131–35.
‡ Elliot, VII, 248, 374 ff. 531–33. See also pp. 410–12.
of the merchants and carriers, which struck a terror on all that had commerce at Tatta.

The following remarks of the Imperial Gazetteer with regard to the safety of inland travel and transport in mediaeval India, until probably to the closing decades of the reign of Emperor Aurangzeb, may form a fitting close to this section. The Gazetteer says: "The necessity of maintaining a right-of-way and providing security to life and property on frequented routes was never lost sight of; and the Mughal emperors, in particular, concerned themselves to mark out and guard the routes most used by the caravans which carried traders and goods from one end of India to another. . . . The roads were generally guarded at intervals by posts (chaukis); between the chaukis the tracks were marked out by stones, pillars, or avenues of trees. The zamindars through whose lands the roads ran provided watchmen (chaukidārs) and were allowed to levy a small toll on the passing traffic. The amalguzārs, or magistrates, were responsible for all goods stolen within their jurisdiction. The security thus given was probably fairly efficient."

Conclusion.

Having regard to the almost self-sufficing character of the different parts of the country, the small development of territorial division of labour and the little interdependence between one part and another, and the comparative absence of traffic in such bulky articles as coal and iron, hide and jute, etc., the means of communication and the facilities for transport in mediaeval India may thus be considered to have been fairly adequate to meet the needs of the times. India's commercial prosperity in the past rested, in no small measure, on the facilities of internal transport, and the maintenance of law, order and good government throughout the land. As we have seen above, the mediaeval Indian rulers were not, as is often alleged, unmindful of the general interests of their respective territories, and the common welfare of their people; and they were not a little instrumental in bringing about this happy consummation.

SANKARA AND PROF. JAMES WARD.

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The old adage that "Great minds think alike," receives repeated illustration; and I propose, in this short paper, to draw attention to certain parallels which seem to present themselves, over a gap of a thousand years, between the great religious metaphysician of India and one of the foremost psychologists of the present day in the West. The comparison will be restricted to the doctrine of the Self, as held by the two philosophers, and as set forth in the recently published "Psychological Principles" of Dr. Ward and in Śaṅkara's Commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras. Some striking similarities appear, and the placing of the two conceptions side by side may be illuminating in regard to the difficulties of both. But can a useful comparison be instituted between a metaphysician and a psychologist? Notwithstanding Dr. Ward's continual protest against confusion between Epistemology (which may be taken to constitute a part of Metaphysics) and Psychology, we think that such a comparison is possible, especially if, as in this case, the psychologist is a good deal of a metaphysician and the metaphysician a good deal of a psychologist. Moreover, the problem of the Self is just one of those problems which are on the borderline between psychology and metaphysics, and in regard to which no clear and definite line of separation can be drawn. The psychological analysis of the Self must ultimately lead to metaphysics, and Dr. Ward's treatment is no exception to this general statement.

By "self-consciousness" Dr. Ward means, "not the consciousness that we attribute to every self, but the consciousness of this consciousness," a consciousness attained only gradually and by a limited number of experiments. He distinguishes between the self-known, which he calls the empirical Ego or the Me, and the self-knowing, which he calls the pure Ego or the I, and he proposes a threefold line of inquiry, with two phases of which we are mainly concerned. In
these he sets forth on the one hand "the content and gradual elaboration of the presentation of self as experience develops," and, on the other hand, "the meaning and justification of the existential proposition "I am" that in the light of it all seems to become explicit." The close union of psychology and metaphysics in such an inquiry is obvious.

But, first of all, let us dwell for a little on the distinction between the psychological and epistemological points of view from which Dr. Ward starts in his argument. He joins issue at once with those who hold that because the conception of the pure Ego is fundamental and therefore underivable, it is psychologically a simple presentation. He sees in this a relic of the old "substance" theory, according to which it might be suggested that the self could exist without acting, and he would have agreed with Hume in his scepticism, provided Hume had restricted that scepticism to the self as a datum of sense, and had not proceeded to apply it to the absolute existence of the self. He regards Berkeley's use of the term "notion" as also an attempt to emphasise the idea that the self is not given as a datum of sense, though he might object to certain implications of the term "notion" as used by Berkeley.

Now, in this protest of Dr. Ward's against confusion between the empirical Me and the pure Ego, and against the resulting attempt to treat the pure Ego as an object, presentational or conceptual, there seems to be an interesting parallel with Śaṅkara's warning against transferring the qualities of the subject to the object, and of the object to the subject. According to him the two are opposed as darkness and light; they are the sphere of the real and the unreal respectively. Confusion between them is both the result and the producer of false knowledge. The attempt to treat the pure Ego as an object, as a datum of sense, as a substance, as a concept amongst other concepts, binds us more firmly in the chains of ignorance. We shall never reach the ultimate nature of the Self, if we superimpose upon it the qualities of the object. It is indeed a natural error of the human soul. We are constantly transferring the qualities of outer things to the self, we are clothing it in the data of our ordinary experience. Śaṅkara himself gives copious illustrations of the process in the opening paragraphs of his Commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras. "Extra-personal attributes are superimposed on the Self, if a man considers himself sound and entire, or the
contrary, as long as his wife, children and so on are sound or entire or not. Attributes of the body are superimposed on the Self, if a man thinks of himself as stout, lean, fair, as standing, walking or jumping. . . In this way there goes on this natural beginning — and endless superimposition, which appears in the form of wrong conception, is the cause of individual souls appearing as agents and enjoyers, and is observed by every one” (Dr. Thibaut’s translation of Śaṅkara’s Commentary, p. 8). Yet, however natural the confusion may be, detection and correction of it is absolutely necessary, if we are to reach a true understanding of the self. The motive in Dr. Ward’s case may be the completion of psychological investigation, and in Śaṅkara’s case the penetration of metaphysical reality, but their attitude to this great question seems to be wonderfully similar. They are both impressed at the outset by the impossibility of treating the pure Ego as an object amongst other objects. They differ however in the consistency and rigour with which they apply this indispensable condition of true knowledge, and in the conclusions regarding the reality of the pure Ego of the individual which they respectively draw from the premises in which they agree.

But before we go on to these deeper questions we may note certain surface similarities between the Vedantic teaching and the teaching of Dr. Ward upon the development of the conception of the empirical Me. The western psychologist traces the development through three stages. There is first of all the sensitive and appetitive self, in the construction of which the body is the fundamental element. The body may be distinguished in the field of space from other bodies. The action of other bodies upon it is accompanied by pleasure or pain, and the reactions of the feelings set the body in motion. It, therefore, gives us the primary basis of the individuality and permanence which we attribute to the self. On the second level, memories and hopes play a larger part. As the imagining and desiring self we occupy a smaller zone within the self of the body. We are made up of desires and emotions. We live in a “pictorial world of things past and things possible,” but at the same time we have not left behind us organic perturbations and motor presentations. These are sufficient to give a sort of inner body or vestment of the self, as Dr. Ward would put it.

On the third level — the intellectual level — we reach the conception of the self as a person who determines or controls his appetites
and desires, his hopes and his fears. To this conception of the self we are largely helped by intersubjective intercourse. We interpret ourselves on the analogy of others. According to Adam Smith conscience is a social product, and according to Dr. Ward consciousness of the self is the product of the same kind of process. As we are spectators of others so we become spectators of ourselves. "It is through the 'us' that we learn of the 'me.'" We become conscious of ourselves as persons, forming a more or less self-contained unity, capable of thinking and of acting, retaining some traces of emotional resonance and bodily affection, sufficient at least to afford a basis for the regarding of ourselves as objects — objects of the pure Ego which still eludes our efforts after presentation.

Now, certain minor similarities may be noticed between this teaching and Vedantic teaching. The second level is compared to the dream world in both systems. When the senses are drawn inwards, when we become independent of impressions from the external world, we live in the world, as it were, of dreams. The very language of Dr. Ward strengthens the force of the comparison. "At the ideational level," he says, "where coming events seem to cast shadows before them because past events have left traces behind, a new environment — a pictorial world of things past and things possible — allures the self to withdraw into it from the actual and there to ruminate, day-dream, and desire" (Psychological Principles, p. 376). But what I wish to draw special attention to is the emphasis upon the continuity of the various levels, which is mediated throughout by some sort of reference to bodily connections. We wonder if it is fanciful to see a rough parallel to the Vedantic conceptions of the Manas in conjunction with the Indriyas, the Mukhya Prāṇa and the Sūkshma Śarīra. The similarity in the first case is fairly obvious — the self of the perceptual level is easily identified with the activity of the sense organs as these are centralised in a unity of external experience, i.e. through the Manas. But is it also possible to regard the Vedantic term Mukhya Prāṇa as an attempt to indicate the vaguer bodily resonance which Dr. Ward associates with the ideational activity of the self? The Mukhya Prāṇa has been described as "the hypostasis of empirical life." May it not indicate the bodily envelope of our thought-life in its activity and its receptivity, its "exhalation" and its "inhalation," its persistent somatic dependence, its indebtedness to physical pro-
cesses, and its biological teleology? Indications of all these aspects would seem to be yielded by an analysis of the Vedantic phrase, and they are not without deep psychological significance. They afford at least that concreteness which enables us to regard the self on the ideational level as still an object amongst objects. Finally, may not the conception of the "subtle body" of the Vedantists represent an effort to supply a refined form of concreteness, which stiffens for us, as it were, our conception of ourselves as persons, and enables us, even on the intellectual level, to stand outside ourselves and regard our personal- ities as objects, we ourselves looking on as passive spectators, and pure Egos, upon this highest presentation of the empirical "Me"? These comparisons may appear fanciful, but they are at least worthy of investigation.

We have been tracing the development of the empirical self upon the various levels, but throughout we have been eluded by the pure Ego. The I that thinks these various conceptions, that develops its knowledge of the empirical self, has never itself been an object of knowledge. The process has exemplified the truth of Śaṅkara’s dictum that we cannot apply objective qualities to the subject. As soon as it acquired content the I has been transferred to the Me. We have attempted to increase our knowledge of the self, but as soon as we formulate our knowledge another self appears which alone can carry through that formulation. And as we turn our psychological inquiry upon it, it again eludes us. The eternal distinction between subject and object has not been transcended and never can be transcended. The question remains — and it is the crux of the whole inquiry — whether this Ego can ever be known. Dr. Ward gives the answer that it cannot be known, but can be experienced. Śaṅkara would agree with him to a certain extent, but would take a different view of the particular character of the experience.

Dr. Ward is aware of the danger that this pure Ego which he has found at the centre of the different zones of experience — sensory, ideational, and personal — may turn out to be, in the phrase of Kant, a mere focus imaginarius, but he would rather run this risk than adopt false methods of investigation. He would rather have no knowledge at all than a knowledge which is not based on experience. He would rather be a sceptic with Hume than a dogmatist with more cheerful philosophers. But he thinks that scepticism is unnecessary, if certain
cautions are observed. In the first place we must, from the point of view of knowledge, regard the conception of the pure Ego as a "limiting conception." When we attempt to fix it, it eludes us — and points the way to further knowledge, while itself remaining unknown. The meaning of this will become clearer if we consider Dr. Ward's symbolism. The fundamental formula for him is the Subject perceiving the Object, or, $S p O$. The development of our knowledge of the empirical self yields a fairly complete idea of the relation of the empirical self, which may be symbolised as $M$, to its objects. The formula for the *psychologist* will then be $S p (M p O)$; $S$ typifying the pure Ego, which as soon as and as often as it becomes known, passes over into $M$, i.e. becomes part of the Object. When, in other words, we have the most comprehensive knowledge of $S$, it ceases to be anything at all, it becomes a pure abstraction. It acquires content, only to surrender it again. It enters into knowledge only as it ceases to be what we want to know. It can never be known, if by knowledge we indicate an object of knowledge. Are we, then, entirely ignorant of it? Is it a 'will o' the wisp' of whose reality we can never be sure?

Dr. Ward would answer this question in the negative, and here he brings in a second caution. Experience is not co-extensive with knowledge. We experience far more than we know. Our experience is based upon the fundamental relationship of Subject and Object. Both of these enter into our experience, but only one of them can be known, because knowledge applies only to objects, and that which is eternally a subject can never become an Object. It may seem as if this would land us in the impossible position of knowing one term of a relationship without knowing the other, but to an objection of this kind Dr. Ward would reply that we are not dealing with two terms in a proposition both of which are objective to us, but with an entirely unique case of relationship—with the subject of all our experience in relation to its object or objects. The subject is that through or by means of which we know everything, and cannot be its own object, any more than the eye by which we see physical objects can itself be an object at the time we are visually perceiving anything.

Nevertheless, we are sure of this pure Ego, just because of its persistent activity. It enters into all our constructions as their fundamental condition. It is reflected in them — in our sensitive, our ideational, our personal self—as well as in all the other objects of our
experience. If we are sure of any thing, we are sure of this Ego, not as a sense datum, not as a substance, not as an object of any sort, not as a concept, but as a subject, persistently active so long as we have experience. The self cannot be known, but can be experienced directly, and as the basis of all other experience. We cannot ascribe objective qualities to the subject, and make it an object of knowledge, but nevertheless it is the basis of all our experience, knowledge included.

Our contention then is that Dr. Ward has paid most rigorous attention to the warning against ascribing objective qualities to the subject, which Śaṅkara has placed at the beginning of his Commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras. We venture to suggest, in conclusion, that he has paid more careful heed to this warning than Śaṅkara himself has done, and that it is because of the latter's insufficient attention to his own principles that the Self in his system loses unnecessarily its reality, and fades away into the paleness of pantheistic absorption. The essential point of difference between the two philosophers is that Dr. Ward emphasises the activity of the self, whereas Śaṅkara refuses to allow that the Self is an agent. In his Commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras II. 3. 40 he says, "The Self's being an agent cannot be founded on its real nature, because (if it were so) the impossibility of final release would follow. For if being an agent belongs to the soul's nature, it can never free itself from it — no more than fire can divest itself of heat — and, as long as man has not freed himself from activity, he cannot obtain his highest end, since activity is essentially painful." And again, "The result of all this is that the agentship of the Self is due to its limiting adjuncts only." The activity of the Self does not really belong to it, and, if we could only realise this, we should at once gain a true conception of the individual Self and of its essential identity with the Divine or universal Self.

Now our suggestion is that Śaṅkara has reached this position, not so much because he is carried away by his main purpose of establishing the central Vedāntic metaphysical position regarding the identity between the human soul and the divine soul, as because he is still attempting, in contravention of his own rule, to treat the self as an object. He sees as clearly as does Dr. Ward, that no content can be ascribed to the Self, as we can ascribe content to the other objects of our knowledge, and he is fully aware of the futility of the philosophy which analyses the self as if it were given to us through the senses of
our body or the concepts of our mind, but he draws illegitimate conclusions from these thoroughly satisfactory premisses. He admits that the Self cannot be known, but because it cannot be known he treats it as an altogether abstract conception. He regards the Self still as knowledge, as pure intelligence. But the idea of intelligence dissociated from the idea of activity, is an idea which passes from the subjective order to the objective order, and in the objective sphere it becomes a concept without character or content, pure because it is an abstraction. It is without form or definiteness, and therefore the Self so conceived merges necessarily in the universal. The identification aimed at by the Vedânta is complete, because it has ceased to treat the Self as Subject and has again treated it as Object — unknowable and indefinable. The Self which is really transcendental, is regarded as transcendent, and so it disappears into the pantheistic void. It becomes a negative rather than a positive reality, because Šaṅkara has applied his own rule rigorously, but not rigorously enough. He has applied it so as to deprive himself of all popular and anthropomorphic aids to the conceiving of the Self and of God, but not so rigorously as to save himself from passing again from the subjective to the objective. Had he observed throughout the rule that God and the Self are to be conceived as subjects and never as objects, he would have preserved the reality of both the Divine and the human activity and would have laid the basis of a religion of communion and of service rather than of identity and acquiescence. Accordingly his own teaching, "the object and the subject cannot be identified," and yet we feel that to deny activity to God is to treat him as an object and not as a subject. Dr. Ward has laid a more secure foundation, even if he has not raised upon it any very lofty religious superstructure.
KNOWLEDGE AND POWER.

Capt. J. W. Petavel, Late R.E., Principal, Maharajah Cossimbazar's Polytechnic Institute, Calcutta.

We hear a great deal nowadays about the wonderful things that the study of nature and natural forces has enabled us to do, of how it has allowed us to bring every part of the world in close touch with every other, allowing people, even from remote villages, to flash their thoughts in an instant to the other end of the earth, or to travel to almost any part of it in a comparatively small number of days; and most sensational of all, of course, has been the latest victory, travel by air; we hear also of how science has enabled us to make artificially a number of things for which previously we were dependent upon nature; but all these wonders, and others as striking, are as nothing, either in themselves, or from the point of view of real utility, compared with those that the study of laws of economics will open up to us.

Let us first consider what knowledge of the economic power that progress has given us, show us we can do for education in the fullest and most complete sense of the word, including the development of character, physique and general efficiency.

It is now a well-established and generally known fact, that the young human being, up to the age of nearly twenty, is, to use the words of the Royal Commission on Physical Deterioration, plastic and capable of being formed in every respect by proper training and care. By suitable training, the normal child can be at least strongly impressed with the ideas and habits that are conducive to morality, rendered energetic in character, wide-awake, athletic in body and practical in application to work.

All will agree that if we were able to do as we should desire, we should apply ourselves, whilst the children are young, and capable of being formed, to giving them vitality and moral strength, by system-
atically employing them in such a way as to make them as keen and to give them the highest idea of duty, and as healthy as possible. We can learn during the whole of our lives if we have the energy. The important thing, during the rapidly passing years of plasticity, is to make the children morally strong and energetic.

But, for that, a great deal more is needed than mere schooling, even in the fullest and best sense in which we understand the word. The moral training must be given by service, by the children co-operating together to do work for their common good. Keenness must be induced by different forms of sport, using the term in the widest sense, to cover all occupations in which the child finds the most intense interest and delight and is led to the fullest, most joyful and most spontaneous exercise of its faculties; joyful and spontaneous exertion are to the young human being what sunshine and showers are to the growing plant, and can be induced only by giving each child the chance to follow keenly some natural bent it has.

We should have a long day in the school with a very varied programme, and a short time only at each item of it, and the greatest possible inducements and opportunities for spontaneous exertion.

All true educationalists know quite well that if only they were able to make so much as a good attempt at carrying out such a programme as that, the result would very likely be no less than to make the future generation like a different race from the past ones. But they will ask how it could be done, specially in poor countries, where children would have, in a good many cases, to be fed at school, to enable them to go through such a training and benefit by it.

Those who understand modern economics can tell them. But they need to be well up in the facts, because the field of practical economics is one in which there are many pitfalls, and many things to obscure a clear vision. Moreover people are utterly disinclined to believe the wonderful changes that progress of the last decades have rendered possible. We have, in fact, in this connection a position similar to that which existed when the early pioneers of the railway began their propaganda. They had demonstrated the feasibility of railway traction, they knew what its cost was, its advantages, and everything about it, but people were unable to conceive of such a thing as travelling at the speed and at the cost they stated to be possible, and simply would not believe demonstration. This revolution we have now to bring about in
the domain of education will be quite as astonishing and as fundamental as that which the railway brought about in the domain of transport, and very much the same spirit of obstinate incredulity will have to be encountered in connection with it. Knowledge will have to take the place of ignorance before we realise our power.

A plain straightforward explanation of how all that has been mentioned above could be done is a matter of simple arithmetic. It is certain that, within the last century, industrial progress has at least quadrupled the productive power of organised labour; as a matter of fact most would say it has done more.

It follows, then, as a matter of simple arithmetic, that, as the worker of a century ago was able to provide necessaries for his family by working say ten or twelve hours a day, two and a half to three hours' work are enough in a modern organisation, and a quarter of that time, considerably less than an hour's work, would suffice to produce enough for one youth.

Now progress has also, to an enormous extent, done away with the need of experienced workers in connection with the production of the ordinary necessaries of life. In agriculture, for instance, the reaper, sower, mower, have been replaced by the reaping machine, the drilling machine and the mowing machine, and the latest development is mechanical milking on a commercial scale, whilst hedging and ditching, and stack-thatching, that used to require skilled workers, have been replaced by fencing and galvanised iron. What is true of agriculture is true to a still greater extent of other production of necessaries. The result is that in a modern organisation youths and maidens who had received a good practical training would, by when they were fifteen or sixteen, have practically the industrial value of adults, working with a proper proportion of adults as leading hands and doing the work needing experience. Without keeping to the four times which gives us a margin enormously wider than we need, we are at all events quite safe in saying that, by one year's labour after training, the youths would be able to produce what a child uses and consumes in half a dozen years, which is far on the side of safety.

It follows then that, by working a couple of years after they had been trained, they would, whilst producing enough for their maintenance, which is all that can be reasonably expected of a youth leaving school, be able to pay back for the whole maintenance they had received
arguments mainly on the extraordinary failure of our individualistic system to give the workers the benefit of the increased productive power of labour.

It is sufficient, however, for our purpose, that, in an organisation of this kind, the advantages of modern progress would be realised at least to a very appreciable degree for the workers themselves, and we have no need whatever to go into any argument as to whether the result would be to enable them to produce sufficient necessaries for a family by a quarter, or a half of a day's work, the latter assumption being quite enough for our purpose.

For our present purpose, merely to understand what we are discussing here, namely, how we might give every child a perfectly good training, it is sufficient for us to consider some simple facts in connection with our exchange system. We are safe in saying that, on a general average, the purchase price of articles represents double what it cost to produce them under good conditions, and that, therefore, speaking generally and approximately a whole day's wage would buy the produce of a half a day's labour, so a boy taking his wage in kind from the organisation would have to work only about half a day to earn it.

Very soon he would be producing as much as a man, and we might safely calculate that he would not have to work more than a quarter of the day to produce his fair contribution to his home in kind, perhaps up to seventeen or eighteen.

At all events the only question is how long he would have to work in the organisation to repay the cost of his education; if he could not do it by sixteen then he would have to remain till he was seventeen, but, once more, it really would not matter, because he would be bringing home his proper contribution, and the longer he was working in an organisation, where special care would be taken about his intellectual and moral welfare, the better it would be for him.

It must be carefully noted that we are not assuming any special efficiency, but only that these boys would do what any others would with the advantage of being brought up in the organisation, and acquainted from their early years with its work. There is no doubt, however, that after this training they would have more than the average value; neither is there any doubt that they would begin to have appreciable industrial value in their school years; the couple of hours' work a day they might
do for training during those years might be a factor of no mean importance; but we have no need to reckon upon it.

It follows also from the above that by prolonging the period of work in such an organisation, any youth would be able to get any kind of training or education he wanted, whilst continuing to pay his contribution to his home. But the fact of primary interest and importance is not the education but the training, the fact that every child could then be kept during the whole of its "plastic" years under the conditions conducive to development of strength of character and of body, and receive the necessary training of the mind.

Fortunately in this respect though unfortunately in others the need of craftsmanship has been much diminished, and the youths between fifteen and twenty trained in such an organisation would very easily indeed produce everything that was being consumed by the boys under training, and used in connection with their training, so that the system would be possible even in the poorest countries.

But now we shall be met with another question: namely, that an enormous amount of money would be required to equip such an organisation as this, that would not only have to produce articles to supply the wants of its numerous instructors and workers, and the boys' salaries in kind, but that if it had to be self-supporting, would have to produce something commercially, or else for the State, to have the purchasing power to obtain raw materials and many other things from outside, and to pay the portion of the salaries of its staff that did not come back to it in exchange for produce.

I shall not answer this question of capital separately, but in connection with another great question we shall now turn to: namely, how we could use our immense power to put an end to unmerited poverty, a proposition which will be as startling to conservative folk, but nevertheless a thing that can be done with modern methods, and must be done.

The kind of industrial organisation we have just been considering would differ from the ordinary one in respect to the fact that it would produce articles mainly for its own workers and for itself. It is evident that it might produce something also for the people who had supplied the capital.

Modern conditions tend entirely to favour such industries as these which should be extremely paying in the sense that they would enable
their promoters to obtain a great many of the necessaries of life at cost price.

It will be immediately recognised by those who have studied co-operation, that these industries would exemplify the co-operative system of working with all its well-recognised strength, combined with the individualistic management with its strength. In a paper I read to the Thirteenth Indian Industrial Conference, I maintained that it is the industrial system for India, to which this system of the West, already discredited in the West, is singularly unsuited.

Once started, they would be able to extend as long as there were workers wanting good well-remunerated employment. We might compare their economics rather usefully to that of the beehive, and doing so we see that at once. A person keeping bees provides them with everything that is favourable to their producing honey abundantly, so that even if they are allowed to live on their own honey there will remain a surplus for his benefit, owing to the favourable conditions provided. In the same way the people financing these industries would organise and equip the workers to produce necessaries for themselves under favourable conditions, so that there would be a surplus for the promoters. The number of workers who can be employed in an ordinary industrial organisation is, of course, always limited. Given confidence, however, there would be no limit to the number of people who could be employed in such industries as these, independent of good or bad trade. Of course they would have to earn some money income to purchase what they themselves could not produce, including not only raw materials but inevitably also a number of manufactured things; they would also have to pay their workers a proportion of their pay in cash. As, however, they would produce everything people use and consume in the greatest quantities, their own promoters would be able easily to make enough purchases from them without their having to go into the ordinary market.

Financing these industries would be more comparable to putting up labour-saving machinery in one's own house than to financing commercial concerns. If a householder calculating the cost to him of petroleum lighting, in labour, breakages and various inconveniences, decides to put in a well-known electric lighting system, he may by taking the trouble to ascertain the experience of other people who
have used the same apparatus, know quite well what sort of an investment it will be. These industries in a different way would be doing household work for their promoters. They would differ however from the example given, in that they would be working for a number of households instead of one.

It would be a matter only of time and of gaining experience in managing, and success should be certain. An industry doing domestic work producing necessaries for a group of people is, in every way, in a different position from one that is working for trade. It would have to produce fixed quantities of things, all its working would be regular. As there would be nothing of trading, the most difficult part of manufacturing business would be eliminated. The promoters would have no interest whatever in hiding anything from each other but every interest, on the contrary, in making everything known. In connection with them everything would be, so to speak, measured and tabulated. Any dishonest and incompetent management would be immediately detected. Establishing them would be like setting up an engine of a certain pattern and size, that must develop a certain horse-power, and if it does not one must simply look and find out whether the stoker, the engineer or the fuel are at fault.

But, of course, the experience must be gained, and a system of management standardised before people will venture, and that is the difficulty; and we shall deal with it presently, but meanwhile let us consider and be quite clear about the question of capitalising. To sum up, then, capitalising these industries would be quite a different thing from capitalising the ordinary one. Only a fortunate few can spare the money to buy shares in concerns producing articles for sale, because the very great majority require their whole income to meet their yearly expenses. But such industries as these, until they had brought about a fundamental change in our system — mostly by increasing the rate of wages — would be very paying indeed, because of the great difference between the purchase price of articles and their cost of production, so financing them would be simply paying in advance for a great variety of useful produce at exceedingly advantageous rates, and a large number of people would be able to do that.

But now the question is how we are to start; admittedly the difficult thing. We must make the start with educational organisations. They would have every advantage as pioneers. Everybody would be
willing to help them. Business men would give their advice. A large public would easily be found ready even to help them over the initial difficulties by making purchase of them at advantageous rates. Finally, if, at first, they fell short of economic success, their educational work would remain to the good. The experiments could be made with them, therefore, and when they had been successful, and had been made self-supporting, they would extend rapidly and solve, first the problem of popular education in the best possible way, and then the whole problem of unmerited poverty, making poverty a thing of the past, as it should be with the enormous productive power we now possess.

But the great spade-work to be done is to make the facts known. At the outset it all seems incredible. People are asked to believe in an industrial organisation that would enable youths working in it, first, to earn their contribution in kind to their homes, secondly, to earn enough to pay interest in kind to those financing the institution — for otherwise it would be impossible to get the enormous amount of money needed —, thirdly, to pay the establishment, in kind, for the training they had received in their early youth, fourthly, to pay for their further education and training during their earning period. At the outset it looks fantastic. Contrasting it with the results actually attained in our industrial world it looks like a widely Utopian dream and nothing else.

We must, however, understand all the economic facts and see how it can be done. More important still, we must show people how it can be done step by step. We can begin without doing all, but part of it at first, and in that way can get some to believe and make a start. The start once made we should be able to go on and do more and more.

General ignorance still exists, however, about the economic facts and, therefore, no step by step advance even is being made. This is exceedingly discreditable to economic science, and it should hasten to remove the grave reproach that it incurs of showing itself inert where it ought to be of the very greatest utility, and zealously working to bring about perhaps the greatest good that has ever been done to mankind because it would be moral as well as material.

We have, in India, particularly good opportunities for a start, and we have the great problem of middle-class unemployment to solve. There is no doubt that in a well-equipped modern agricultural establish-
ment near the towns, middle-class men going daily for a few hours to do some suitable kind of work, could bring home with them daily, produce to the value of thirty or forty rupees a month. They would bring immediate relief to their families, and be learning mechanical work and qualifying themselves later to earn well in that connection, so it would be a training establishment and not a refuge for failures.

Even with modern methods there is a certain amount of manual toil, but, as I pointed out in my report to the University Commission,* we have a very simple way of getting over that difficulty, by receiving illiterate boys of the peasant class, in the establishments, who would do the rougher work, and in exchange be given some elementary education, by the young men of the middle-classes.

In that way even those who lack the qualifications to make them useful in the commercial world, would have a honourable career as members of a staff of an establishment training boys of the working classes and giving them some education. This is an obvious first step and one that could be easily taken.

But the first need is to have schools which will make our young men hardy and practical instead of mere bookworms. It is economically possible, and it would be of immense benefit to take them to schools on the outskirts of the towns, where they would have ample room, not only for games, but to grow some produce to be used in their homes, bringing it home daily. Here also a good deal of the heavier labour could be very well done by labouring men or boys, but all would do a proper and suitable part, and the senior boys supervise. This is probably one of the simplest and most direct ways in which self-supporting education might be started. At the same time it would be a system of education under which boys would be hardened and given an all-round development, so that they would be fit to take advantage of the great industrial opportunities of the day. By the generosity of the Maharajah of Cossimbazar a start has been made in this direction.

THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA AND THE RESULTS OF MODERN SCIENCE.

HARI MOHAN BHATTACHARYYA, M.A., KĀVYATĪRTHA.

The Doctrine of Māyā, which, in its germinal stage, can be traced to the hymns of the Rgveda (RV., I. 164. 46: ekam sat viprā bahudhī vadanti), and which was further outlined in the dialectic of Yājnavalkya and Maitreyi in the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, systematised and perfected by the genius of Bādarāyaṇa and Śankara, and, though modified, yet kept in its integrity as regards its essentials in the later Upaniṣads, has admittedly, and not unjustifiably, occupied the supreme place in the system of Hindu thought. And taking into consideration the still later literature which has grown round about this nucleus of thought one can fully appraise the high intellectual vein of the mind of the Māyāvādin at its proper worth. One who has taken pains to enter into its logical and epistemological problems, specially into the problems of arthāpatti, which consists in the supposition of the premises, reason or cause, from the conclusion, consequence or effect, and which therefore answers to the hypothetical method of modern European Logic, and of anupalabdhi which has the exclusive privilege of cognising the abhāva or non-existence of a thing, the object of cognisance being not of course the absent thing, but the absence itself and which therefore affords a new dimension of perception, would, without the least hesitation, acknowledge the stupendous height of logical and epistemological speculation it has attained. And on its ethical side, suffice it to say that the world at large stands in awe and admiration before its sublime conception of morality which manifests itself in the quiescent, self-abnegating life of the Jīvanmukta.

A misconception however prevails, based no doubt on plausible grounds, about its metaphysics, that it reduces the entire world of ours to Māyā or illusion—that the infinite variety of its contents living and non-living, that "the whole choir of heaven and furniture of earth"
are swept into non-entity before the sole reality of Brahman which it upholds. In this way, it is further held, it offends against common sense and ordinary experience, which are loath to disbelieve in the stern reality of the world round about us, as it brushes away, instead of explaining it, and finally it contradicts the results of modern scientific researches which are based on the irresistible theory of Natural Realism. It is therefore the Vedantic metaphysics, in particular, that has furnished object of criticism, not only for some of the other schools of classical Hindu Philosophy, nor again for one of the ramifications of the Vedantic School itself, viz. the system of Râmânuja; but also, curiously enough, for many of those modern dabbler in philosophy who have little or no pretension to independent lucubrations, but only allow themselves to be sophisticated by the cheap rationalism of the Hegelian type, and show a readiness to shrug their shoulders in contempt whenever they find any very great height or depth in Eastern speculation and to pronounce it immediately as hypersubtile or mystical.

Now the primary end of the present article is to counteract and dispel this baseless misconception of Vedantic Realism on the part of these last-mentioned modern philosophy-mongers by showing that contradiction to European common sense, and scientific thought, if there be any, is rather apparent than real; and that the Vedantic metaphysical standpoint, if rightly understood, will not be found to suffer from bad logic any more than the "scientific" thought of the present day. All this has been attempted in this essay not with the polemic of a dogmatic apologist but with the perfect open-minded impartiality of a truth-seeking free-thinker. The aim of this article thus being circumscribed to an examination of the allegation against Vedantic Metaphysics in the light of modern scientific thought, be it said at the outset, that it does not of course claim completeness as an elaborate treatment of the Vedantic theory as a whole which is more than what our space permits.

Now what is to be understood by this principle of Mâyâ? We cognize something and ipso facto cannot take it as unreal, we give ourselves to the belief in its reality. Then we bring our powers of reflection to bear upon this naive belief and find that after all we cannot reconcile ourselves to it. Thus what was regarded as real from one standpoint melts into unreality from another. And all this is due to what the Vedantist understands by his principle of Mâyâ.
The juggler produces in the twinkling of an eye a full-grown mango-tree out of a mango-seed before an astounded audience. They cannot deny the apparent reality of the full-grown mango-tree which they see with their own eyes, nor again can they affirm it when they reflect on the inconceivably short time within which it is made to grow into foliage, flowers and fruit. They would assign it to Māyā or illusion.

The principle of Māyā is then what makes a thing to appear as real from one stand-point, but reduces it to be unreal from another, what, in other words, gives an air of reality to what is really unreal, makes one and the same object to be both sat, real, as well as asat, unreal. Māyā is thus otherwise described as sadasadbhyām anirvāchya—an inexplicable enigma of Being and Non-Being, of the Real and the Unreal.

This enigma of the apparent reality of a thing is created by the double function of the principle of Māyā. In the first instance it operates in the form of āvarana sakti or the function of what may be somehow expressed by the term "sub-jection" which "throws under" or covers or conceals the actual nature of the thing; and then it works in the shape of vikṣepa sakti or the function of what may be called "projection" which projects, or creates, or imposes on the already concealed, thing the new sensory elements of what is unreal, the cumulative effect of this double function of Māyā being the illusory perception of a thing, the nacre for example being mistaken for silver. The modus operandi of the principle of Māyā, therefore, is that first of all it covers the real and then discovers the unreal, the result of all this being that it shuts one out from the knowledge of a thing. Hence Māyā is Avidyā or Nescience.

The nature of Māyā becomes further illumined from a consideration of the Vedantic theory of causality. Vedanta affirms that the cause is not absolutely homogeneous with, nor again absolutely heterogeneous to the effect. For, had the cause been absolutely heterogeneous to the effect, then the effect would have no connection with the cause, any effect whatsoever could have been produced out of any cause whatsoever—to quote the classical example, oil could have been produced, not only out of oil-seeds, but also out of grains of sand. And again were it possible to suppose that the effect is absolutely homogeneous or identical with the cause then the usual and practical distinctions between one thing and another would become altogether meaningless; the
lump of clay could have been used in place of an earthen pot, an earthen jar would have served the purpose of an earthen bowl, which however can never be the case. The effect is thus neither totally homogeneous with nor again absolutely heterogeneous to the cause. It is thus the same as, yet different from the cause. The earthen jar is the clay and yet is not the clay, the jar qua jar is sat or real and yet the jar as clay is asat or unreal. Are we not then tempted to say that the phenomena of cause and effect are products of illusion whose nature it is to make one believe in that which is not really itself? The illusion under which one finds oneself in the understanding of cause and effect differs from that in the case where nacre is mistaken for silver only in degree and not in kind. The illusion in our mistake of nacre for silver is comparatively short-lived, whereas that in our attempt to understand the world of our experience, which is bound by a network of causes and effects, persists until the attainment of the monistic knowledge (advaitajñāna), which is Brahman.

The above consideration of the Vedantic doctrine of causality reveals to us the further fact that Māyā is the root of all difference and individuation. The earthen jar is regarded as such and is differentiated from the earthen bowl in so far as we allow ourselves to be illusionised as regards their common cause, viz. clay (yathā, saumya, ekena mṛtvindeṇa sarvam-mṛtyumayam vijnātam syād, vācārmbhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttikā ityeva satyaḥ)—Chhāndogya VI. i. 1.). Thus the “names” and “forms” of “jar” and “bowl” which constitute the individuality and difference of these objects are mere empty husks of reality and not the reality itself; they are, in the language of Plato, the “imperfect adumbrations of the Ideas.” The principle of Māyā, “the matrix of all ‘names’ and ‘forms’”, thus furnishes the principium individuationis as well as the principium divisionis of the entire system of things.

Māyā is, to recapitulate, that principle of ignorance which makes us think of things both as sat or real, and as asat or unreal; which, in other words, unifies contradictories, and which constitutes individuality and diversity of things which are but “names” and “forms” hypostatized. And the world of our experience which teems with individualities and differences, spatial, temporal, or constitutional, and which harbours contradictories of the real and the unreal is thus reduced to Māyā or illusion.

Can there be any other conclusion than the above which is more
shocking to the imagination of one who is accustomed to the realistic grooves of thinking? Indeed the Realist will startle back when he will be asked to accept the entire fabric of his real world as a will-o'-the-wisp! But the advaitavādin clearly and distinctly points out the three different strata of existence: (i) the prātibhāṣika-stratum in which the existence of an illusory object is but momentary, as that of silver in the case of the ordinary illusory perception of nacre, for the silver disappears as soon as it is pointed out that what one takes for silver is not silver but nacre; (ii) the vyāvahārika-stratum in which the system of things is practically real or empirically certain so as to render possible the ordinary affairs of the work-a-day world; to this belongs the system of scientific truths; and (iii) the pāramārtika-stratum, in which nothing but the absolute homogeneous unity of Brahman is real and existent, and every thing else which harbours difference is unreal.

The first-mentioned stratum is not very important for our present purpose. If we take the distinction between the vyāvahārika and the pāramārtika strata in a little wider sense we may very well maintain that the distinction is only a general hint as to the relativity of apprehension. What is real or existent from the vyāvahārika stand-point, that is from the stand-point of a particular inquirer with a special interest and a particular type of intellectual capacity, proves unreal or non-existent from a higher point of view, where the interest is wider and the powers of apprehension keener and more penetrative. And the same stand-point which is pāramārtika or higher is itself found to be lower or vyāvahārika by an inquirer of higher intellectual powers. Thus the distinction between the two strata is entirely relative and also truth is relative to the inquirer, and the relation between the system of empirical truths on the one hand and capacity of apprehension on the other, may be said to be one of inverse variation. The wider one’s outlook — the more analytic one’s apprehension — the less and less real do the objects with their individualities and differences begin to appear — they seem to dismantle themselves of their cloaks of false realities one after another as one’s capacity of apprehension gains in depth and minuteness of analysis, until finally, the absolutely pāramārtika or real stage is reached where there is no further vyāvahārika stratum possibly thinkable, and in which the absolute reality of Brahman in its indeterminate homogeneous eternity is realised. Now this absolute reality of Brahman is identical with Knowledge and Existence, Thought and Being.
We can very well understand how this is so, when we sublimate the knowledge of objects of the empirical world, one after another as unreal in our vyāvahārika stages, and find that it is knowledge again, though of a higher order, which is sublating that of the lower order. Proceeding in this way it is possible to reach the highest or the absolutely pāramārthika stage where there is no dvaita or difference but pure monistic knowledge (ādvaitajñāna) in which all distinction of subject and object and even the activity—or in the language of Plotinus—voēc, voṣṭrā and vōṣṭras, merges into one homogeneous whole, and that is Brahman.

It is worth while to note that the relativity of apprehension which is the fundamental principle of all attempt to know the world and which, as we have seen, follows from the Vedantic conceptions of the pāramārthika and vyāvahārika strata of knowledge is not the same as the Pre-Ranae Protagorean Subjectivism or what is otherwise known as Homo Mensura doctrine, that all knowledge is a matter of individual standpoint and that the individual is the standard of every thing that is true and good. So long as men are within the charmed circle of Māyā things will appear in their differences and individualities and will be taken in the same light and in the same sense, thus making universal standard possible within that circle. The Lilliputian must have his Lilliputian standard. There are indeed planes or zones of certitude corresponding to the degrees of apprehensive powers. What is real or true to the popular mind is certainly not so to the scientific mind and what is real or true to the scientific mind may not be so to the philosophic mind which moves in another and higher plane. But as soon as the magical wand is touched and the cup broken, the magical reality of the empirical world with its “names” and “forms,” its infinite conditions of individuality and difference, shrivels into non-entity. The firm grasp of the quiescent unity of Brahman dissipates all difference (dvaita). Here we have an important distinction between the Vedantic and Hegelian conception of the Law of Contradiction. In Vedanta unity or identity is the truth, and difference is illusory, and even the negation of the difference through which the identity is affirmed is illusory. Hegel on the other hand points out that it is not the undifferenced unity, but unity-in-difference that constitutes the truth which is thus the home of contradictories. Advaitism, however, does not altogether deny the importance of difference and individuality which co-exist with unity but
only relegated them to a lower or inferior plane. The world of our experience which manifests unity-in-difference is regarded as real from the vyāvahāric stand-point or from the stand-point of practical or empirical truth, and not from the point of view of monistic consciousness (advaitajñāna), and here it is worth while to remember Herbart’s criticism of Hegel that the union of contradictories is only an empiricism.

The relativity of apprehension, which, we have seen, is the natural outcome of the Vedantic distinction between the three strata of existence, appears to be the greatest logical and epistemological lesson for science and philosophy. It is the basic principle of the supposition of rival hypotheses and shows that any attempt to apprehend the world, however sound, is only a working hypothesis standing every moment in danger of being superseded by a better one.

Beginning from our ordinary practical life we find that what appears true, real and important from one stand-point is far from being so from a higher or more comprehensive stand-point. To the man who is thirsty and feels a longing for a glass of cold water, the water is as real as any thing could be, but the chemist whose stand-point and interest are different from those of the thirsty man will take water to be unreal, what is real and true to him is the H₂O. Again from the point of view of the physicist the H₂O is as unreal as the water and what is real and true is the energy or force to which he will reduce every thing and in terms of which he will explain every thing. May it not be further asked if the true nature of this physical energy has yet been determined? All this therefore points to the conclusion that every object of this empirical world may be regarded as both real and unreal, existent and not existent. The line of argument adopted by advaitism, therefore, far from contradicting European common sense and scientific spirit, is in perfect conformity with it and reveals the further fact that this highest specimen of philosophical speculation was discovered by the Indian sages in a remote age when the modern European scientific spirit was scarcely born. Therefore the unreality of the empirical world on which the advaitavādin insists is not of the type of the will-o’-the-wisp but indirectly reveals the relative incompetency of human apprehension consequent upon man’s finitude and imperfection (satyasya tattvam nihitam guhāyām).

This important lesson of the Vedanta may be very well brought home to our minds when we take into consideration the results of
scientific researches of modern times. Ptolemaic astronomy regarded
the earth to be an immobile central body round about which the other
members of the system moved; Copernicus demonstrated that this was
illusory, a Maya;—the earth was not the immobile central body but
it is one of the many moving bodies revolving round about the
sun which lies at the centre of the system and which is relatively
stationary.

The ancient Greek atomist Democritus maintained that the ul-
timate constituents of our world were atoms which were inert, indivisible
minute bodies — each being a plenum or portion of space entirely filled
and therefore impenetrable. This statical theory of atoms, however,
falling to account for motion was regarded as illusory or unreal, and
had to make room for the dynamical hypotheses of Faraday and Lord
Kelvin. Faraday demonstrated that the atoms were not inert as
Democritus supposed, but that they were elastic and compressible so
much so that they render possible the interaction of things. And Lord
Kelvin supposed the atoms to be like "vortex rings" or whirlpools
in the perfect fluid known as the ether of space and the properties
of such vortices were demonstrated mathematically by Helmholtz to
possess self-sufficiency and durability required of the ultimate units of
matter.

Later researches, however, tend to show that the so-called atom
which was regarded as the simplest possible constituent of matter is
really far more complex than Faraday's "centres of forces" and than
Lord Kelvin's "vortex rings" — a reservoir of forces in moving equi-
librium, of unthinkable complexity, capable of liberated and of passing
over into free force of motion again — "a solar system in miniature"
— but possibly immensely more complex than the solar system of the
sun, planets and moons we are acquainted with. The atom is thus
thought to be composed of many minuter units revolving round one
another and about a common centre with inconceivable rapidity and
holding one another together in moving equilibrium rendered stable by
the excessive velocity of the revolving units. But though compara-
tively stable, its equilibrium is extremely sensitive and constantly being
modified by external influences and capable of being partly or wholly
disintegrated — the constituent units being thereby liberated and left
to move with inconceivable rapidity through space. These minuter
units are called ions or electrons. They form the atoms by their equi-
liberated revolutions and are themselves possibly whirlpools of the luminiferous ether.

From this it also follows that the atoms are not indestructible. They are produced by the integration of finer elements into equilibrated systems and can be destroyed by the disruption of these electrons; and this would appear to be the case from the phenomena of radio-activity which are due to the spontaneous disruption of the atoms.

Now does not the above examination of the Atomic theory of the universe and its replacement by the Electron-theory, not excluding the possibility that the latter again would make room for quite another and a better one in future, confirm our belief in the position of the Māyāvādin that the apparently real world in which we live and move is scarcely more reliable than the magician’s jugglery. Interpret and understand the world in any way you like, but the next moment you will be in a difficulty to reconcile yourself to what you believed with regard to it. You were at perfect liberty to suppose that the ultimate constituents of the material world were the atoms or indestructible and indivisible centres of energy, and you are now disillusionised to find that they are neither indivisible, being made up of electrons, nor are indestructible, disruptions and reintegrations of the constituent elements giving rise to destruction and reconstruction of fresh atoms.

Again let us consider the fate of the old Ether-theory. Lord Kelvin writes in his Popular Lectures and Addresses: “You can imagine particles of some thing, the thing whose motion constitutes light. This thing you call luminiferous ether. This is the only substance we are confident of in dynamics. One thing we are sure of and that is the reality and substantiality of the luminiferous ether.” Indeed unless a material medium for its propagation is either assumed or found, the phenomenon of light cannot be mechanically described, nor again other forms of variation, as well as electricity and magnetism. And the additional advantage of this hypothesis is that it affords the ground for unity among the variety of physical facts.

Now the hypothesis of an imponderable inert luminiferous ether as something having “reality and substantiality” has been resorted to by scientists like Lord Kelvin, because they assume covertly or overtly, the a priori necessity of the mechanical theory of the universe. Here their argument seems to involve the following steps. Grant first, that the world must be intelligible, grant secondly, that to be intelligible it
must be mechanical, and grant finally, that to be mechanical there
must be an ether or ethers whose motions constitute light, electro-
magnetism, etc., grant all this and then we might say that the exis-
tence of ether is indirectly proved. The first two steps in this argument,
it will be observed, are quite philosophical, but the second, however, is
very disputable philosophy. Science, however, has no right to build
on philosophical premises and is forward always to disown all such a
priori methods. Leave aside then any presuppositions of this kind
and ether remains but a mechanical hypothesis. No doubt its value as
a descriptive hypothesis has been greatly enhanced by the labours of
Maxwell and Hertz. But as to the worth of their results, one may
suppose, Poincaré’s remark upon it is not too cautious: “There still
remains much to be done; the identity of light and electricity is from
to-day something more than a seducing hypothesis; it is a probable
truth, but it is not yet a proved truth.”*

The scientific world has been enjoying for some time the benefit
of the investigations of Maxwell and Hertz until recently Einstein, in
his Theory of Relativity, and Hooper, the Fellow of the Royal Astro-
nomical Society, who had in reality anticipated Einstein, have revolu-
tionised the entire scientific world. Hooper is declaring at the present
day, in the Royal Astronomical Society, and before the whole scientific
world, that the old theory of an imponderable fixed ether is inadequate
to solve many a problem of etherial physics such, for example, as that
of the continued rotation of planets on their axes, or of the alteration
of the inclination of the earth’s axis to the magnetic equator. Experi-
ments performed by Michelson and Morley, of America, have proved
beyond doubt that the old theory of inert ether is entirely wrong,
while Fitzgerald’s photographs of the advancing wave of light prove
that the wave-front, instead of being homogeneous, is broken up into
thousands of points. And Hooper concludes that ether is the primary
form of matter and possesses all the properties of matter. It is atomic,
possesses elasticity because it is atomic, possesses density and different
degrees of density in space, and also possesses inertia. The ether-atoms
are subject to the law of gravity just like any other form of matter and
this is in conformity with the results of Planck and it satisfies all the
rules of Newtonian Philosophy. This new theory of an ether subject

to gravity will compel us to alter all our preconceived ideas of space and especially of ether-atoms in relation to solar and planetary bodies.

So far matters are clear. But can all this be more than a mere hypothesis? Can it claim to have reached the final solution of the protean complexity of the entire system of the solar universe? Can we not as well expect that just as Maxwell and Hertz have been superseded at the present day by Einstein and Hooper, even so the day shall come when Einstein and Hooper will also be superseded in their turn by successors of greater scientific acumen?

Does not all this confirm once more the vedantic view-point that what appears to be 'real' and 'substantial' from a particular angle of vision is proved merely illusory, unreal or unreliable from a more comprehensive stand-point? Trace the whole history of human attempts to understand the nature and the system of things from the so-called scientific or philosophic point of view either in its outline or in its details, what do we find, but an alternation of truth and untruth, of reality and unreality; and the conclusion with which one is to remain satisfied is, therefore, that truth or reality is only relative to the knower, or that truth eludes further and further as the inquirer approaches. This puts one in mind of what the poet said,—

"I am a part of all that I have met;
Yet all experience is an arch where thro' Gleams that untravelled world whose margin fades For ever and for ever when I move."

We are reminded here also of Kant’s discussion of the cosmological antinomies, that the world of empirical reality is not the true essence of things — it is merely an unreality, an appearance and not the thing in itself. And we are glad to find the same conception of the world confirmed by so eminent a scientific thinker as Herbert Spencer, who describes “science as a gradually increasing sphere,” such that, “every addition to its surface does but bring it into wider contact with surrounding nescience.” Our knowledge is not only bounded by an ocean of ignorance, but intersected and cut up as it were by straits and seas of ignorance; the orbis scientiarum, in fact, if we could but map out our ignorance as we map out our knowledge, would be little better than an archipelago, and would show much more an unexplored sea than land.
And this is what the Māyāvādin insists on when he presses forward the point that the whole vyāvahārīka or empirical world is a huge illusion. And all science and philosophy, however much they might boast of their achievements, point to the irresistible conclusion that truth is relative to the apprehensive power of the inquirer — and that it recedes as the latter advances — and that the root principle of the universe is never to be discovered, and that the many theories that have been propounded about this root principle are only relatively true. This is the most valuable lesson that the Māyāvāda teaches in the celebrated verse of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka,—yasyāmatam tasya matam, matam yasya na āya veda saḥ — “those who pretend to know, really know nothing but those who say that they do not know are the real knowers.” And the same truth flashed upon the great ancient Greek Vedantin, Socrates, the father of European philosophy in the true sense of the term and he declared that “he knew that he did not know.” Māyāvāda is thus not the ordinary Illusionism by which name it is often stigmatised, nor will it be properly characterised if one calls it Agnosticism, as it never shuts out all knowledge; but it is rather Relativism, pointing always to the relative or tentative character of the knowledge of the world of things in which we live and move, and insisting on the constant revision of one’s standpoint, on the “transvaluation of all values,” — an intellectual attitude quite in keeping with the testimony of Modern Science and Philosophy.
A PLEA FOR AN INDIVIDUALISATION OF PUNISHMENT.

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In order to appreciate the plea for an individualisation one must clearly realise the object of punishment. Our ideas about crime and punishment have changed and advanced a great deal since Manu and Moses, Justinian and Alfred gave their laws to the world. We have outlived the days when no distinction was recognised between the criminum and the delictum and when punishments were regulated by ideas of private revenge and with reference to the social position and status of the injured parties. Our recognition of the cultural value of the system of criminal law is tardy, but all the same we are beginning to realise that criminal law is to be raised to the status of a science if it is to accomplish its object, namely, the preservation of the society. A thorough and scientific study of the nature and determinants of criminality is engaging the attention of some of the best scientists and jurists of the day and it is being gradually realised that the treatment of crimes and criminals can be no more machine-like and indiscriminate than the treatment of a disease by a doctor of medicine.* Absolute repression is no longer regarded as the sole and self-sufficient remedy in the treatment of crimes, just as calomel and blood-letting are no longer considered by the medical science as being effective in all diseases (as they were considered only two centuries ago). Elsewhere † I have insisted upon the criminal’s point of view, which has been hitherto systematically ignored, being taken into account in the matter of awarding punishment. It must be borne in mind that a criminal is as much a unit of the society as the judge or the legislator. He cannot

* Dr. Healy, “Present-day aims and methods in studying the offender”, Journal of Criminology, Vol. IV, p. 204.
and indeed must not be treated as a moral leper or a pariah who is cast away beyond the pale of civil society, if we do not want to have the foundation of our society sapped and undermined. The classical system, as it is called, has been given a fair trial for several centuries and has been found hopelessly wanting. I have shown elsewhere* that not only the number of criminals, but what is more to be dreaded and regretted, the number of recidivists also are ever on the increase in Europe as well as in India, and the question which Baron Garofalo propounded a few years ago, viz. of the principle on which the legislator bases his penal system, still remains unanswered by the representatives of the classical school. I do not say, of course, that the classical system alone is responsible for the increase in crimes and in recidivation; there have been other and potent factors at work beside, viz. the economic distress of the lower strata of the society and the political upheavals of nations. But the main factor, to my mind, is the indiscriminate and mechanical treatment of criminals by the classical method. How does the classical jurist know, for instance, that six months or a year in jail is a sufficient and effective punishment in all cases of thefts and seven years in all cases of arsons and rapes? As Baron Garofalo so forcibly asks, "where has he (the classical jurist) found his criterion, his thread of guidance in this labyrinth?"† We are forced to say that the classical system is based upon no principle whatever and the punishments meted out to offenders are mostly arbitrary and fanciful and sometimes guided by unregulated national sentiment, thus, for instance, German law imposes a heavier penalty for deceitful offences than for violent ones‡ without assigning any reason therefore. The classical jurists have really never formed any clear ideas as to the object of punishment and consequently their penal system is most often only a form of the theory of private revenge or kin-revenge as it is generally called in a more presentable garb. The ordinary and the orthodox classification of the theories on the subject, as Dr. Holmes points out, is into (i) the retributive theory, (ii) the preventive theory, and (iii) the reformatory theory. It must be pointed out, however, that the latter two views have not found much favour with the ordinary run of European jurists, saturated as they have been with Kantian and Hegelian Absolutism.

† Criminology, Introduction, p. xxxii.
‡ Kohler, Philosophy of Law, p. 290.
These jurists seem to think that the relation between crime and punishment is absolute and automatic and that punishments, on that account, should always be proportionate to the objective gravity of crimes.† Hegel expresses this idea in his well-known quasi-mathematical formula, that wrong, being the negation of right, punishment is the negation of that negation, or retribution, while Kant imports his Categorical Imperative into his theory of punishment and denies the propriety of punishment for any ulterior object except punishment itself,‡ because a man should be treated not as a means to an end but as an end in himself. I have shown elsewhere that the difference between the Kantian and the Hegalian school, which I call the Subjective school and the Objective school as represented by Bentham, Sir James Fitz-James Stephen and Dr. Holmes, is merely a verbal one. In order to be able to supply a practical criterion for the kind and degree of punishment, Kant’s theory of “blameworthiness” will have to fall back upon the objective gravity of crimes—the criterion for the measure of punishment proposed by the Objective school. The basic principle of the Objective school appears to be that since desire for vengeance is innate and inborn in human nature and that no legislation is possible upon an ideal and imaginary state of things, the law not only wisely does, but that it ought to make the gratification of revenge an object. Sir James Stephen puts this idea in his usual direct and forcible manner thus, “the Criminal Law stands to the passion of revenge in much the same relation as marriage to sexual appetite.” §

I do not propose to enter into a detailed examination of the views set forth above. I shall only indicate my objection in broad outlines. The first and the most fundamental objection against the doctrine of the classical school is that it ignores altogether the subjective personality of the criminal and takes into account only the objective fact of the crime.|| The distinguished Italian jurist, Beccaria, writing in 1764,

* It is refreshing, however, to find so close and so distinguished a follower of Hegel as Dr. Kohler, dissenting from the absolutistic position. See his Philosophy of Law, p. 290.

† These various points of view are dealt with by Mr. Courtney Keany in the January number of Law Quarterly Review, 1918.

‡ Kant’s Philosophy of Law (translated by Hastie), pp. 195-196.


|| It is refreshing to note, however, that in America at the present day there are judges who award punishment by reference to the physical organisation and the mentality
urged that no punishment should be greater than what the crime warrants and that all men should be equal in the eyes of the law. Punishment should be determined entirely with reference to the character of the crime committed regardless of the personality of the criminal. The position, it would appear at the first blush, is extremely logical, but as I shall point out, it is logical with a vengeance. It seems to regard human beings as mere algebraic units and their highly complex actions as mere abstractions. It is very easy, of course, on this supposition, to be able to furnish a system of penal treatment but the inevitable result will be, as it has proved to be, a complete failure. Even as a system professing to be able to afford relief to the aggrieved party—be it an individual or the society—it cannot succeed for this reason that the aggrieved party is generally apt to look upon his injury as much more serious than what the judge thinks of it. I do not underestimate the value of an equality of treatment in the matter of awarding punishment but what I do say is that in the name of an unreal equality you must not perpetrate a gross injustice. Beccaria’s most forcible objection against a differential treatment is that it would lead to the infliction of different punishment in similar crimes. To that my answer is that Beccaria looks at the matter from an altogether wrong point of view. We can never separate a crime from the criminal and we are sitting in judgment not upon the crime per se but upon the particular crime committed by the particular criminal. It must be remembered that an act, as such, has no meaning except what it gets from the personality of the agent. The inconsistency and the illogicality of the classical point of view is well-illustrated in the fact that it looks upon the acts, for instance, of a lunatic or of an infant in one manner and upon the acts of all other persons in quite another manner. Indeed, in order to be logical, the classical system ruthlessly tramples upon obvious and self-evident psychological facts. You really cannot judge and punish an abstraction! In our every-day experience, we come across cases of thefts but is not one case of theft as different from another as Liebnitz’s monads differ from each other? Let us take the well-known case of Jean Valjean, for instance. Was it not an error to treat his case like that of an ordinary thief? Was not the punishment meted out to him responsible for turning a really honest man into a hardened

of offenders. See Welty vs. State, 100 N.E., p. 73. We might also note the observations of Lord Watson in Queen vs. Henderson, (1898) A.C. in this connection.
criminal—a criminal who did not even scruple to rob his benefactor? It has been suggested that Victor Hugo's Jean Valjean is not a 'real' figure. Even conceding that it is not, the argument advanced here will not lose much of its force.

Furthermore, the jurists of the classical school in devising the system of penal treatment, have altogether ignored the criminal's point of view. Without entering into a detailed discussion into the State's right to punish a criminal* it may be, without fear of contradiction, premised here that the right to punish is based upon its duty to protect the individual and surely, it would be the height of inequity to insist upon the right without fulfilling the duty. The delinquent, it must be remembered, is a unit of the social group and he is entitled to be treated as such. From the criminal's point of view it may be demanded that society should give him a chance and try to reform him. He might have committed a crime but at the same time he may not have been a bad man, and given proper facilities and opportunities, he might have lived his life over again as a useful member of the society. But this demand of the criminal has gone unheeded and the soulless system of Law has been allowed to go on with dire results which are so pointedly brought out by the available statistics. In the year 1900, as Garofalo points out† the recidivists in the Italian penitentiaries constituted 55% of the total number of inmates, "proving that the number of recidivations, which has long been the subject of serious concern, still continues to grow larger from year to year." In France, before 1885, the situation was the same. I take the following from Cazot's statistics as quoted by Garofalo, "the number of the recidivists twice convicted in course of one year increased from 6,851 in 1878 to 7,556 in 1879, the number of those convicted at least three times from 2,045 to 2,237 during the same period. "In Belgium, from 1851 to 1860, the proportion of recidivists in the penitentiaries was 70%. In Sweden, in the year 1868 the percentage of recidivation reached the remarkable figure of 75%. Since the year 1899 crime is ever on the increase in England and in the United States of America.‡ In the Report on the Police Administration in the Presidency of Bengal in India for the

* See an interesting article by Dr. Höffding in the Journal of Criminology, Vol. II, p. 691.
† Criminology, pp. 210, 211.
year 1915, in statement L, page xxxii, it will be seen that out of 11,807 persons convicted during the year, 1,724 persons were judicially found to have been previously convicted (i.e. 14.3%), while out of these recidivists there were 943 persons against whom one previous conviction was proved, two convictions against 328, three against 204, four against 111, five against 67, and more than five against 71. In the Report for 1916, out of 11,222 persons convicted, we find 1,709 (i.e. 15.2%) recidivists, while the number of persons having one previous conviction and the number of persons having more than five previous convictions reach the rather high figures of 957 and 77 respectively. In the year 1914, the percentage of recidivations was higher still, viz. 16%. In the same Report, in Statement I, one finds that almost all the crimes are practically on the increase; beginning with 294 cases of murder in 1911, the figure rises to 440 in 1916, cases of theft in 1911 were 18,976 while they rose to 25,833 in 1916. It is unnecessary to comment on the facts and figures given above; they speak for themselves and form an indictment against the system of remedial and penal measures as adopted by the classical school.

From the facts and figures quoted above, it is clearly established that the classical system, in so far as it professes to prevent crimes and reform criminals, has been an utter failure, and the irresistible conclusion that forces itself on our mind is that this impersonal, abstract and empirical system has got to be replaced by a more rational method, if the system of Criminal Law is to accomplish its end, namely, the defence and preservation of society.

I do not want to ignore that the jurists of the classical school, in spite of their professed prejudice against any so-called inequality of penal treatment, were often forced to admit the necessity of, what we call, an individualisation of punishment—an individualisation based upon the gravity and the material setting of the crime. We have seen before that apart from certain ecclesiastical jurisdictions, the prevalent conception of punishment was that of setting an example; the end was not the reform of the individual but general intimidation. Hence the punishment became the reaction—the recoil of the act as realised in its setting and the judge exercising almost an unbounded freedom and practically untrammeled by the law, proportioned the punishment in each case to the requirements of the policy to be furthered. The gravity of the crime, again, was measured from two points of view—
(i) the responsibility of the criminal and (ii) the material setting of the crime itself. The responsibility was not determined in accordance with any recognised psychological standard, but merely in accordance with the arbitrary ethico-theological dogma of the freedom of will and it should, therefore, on no account be confused with the modern subjective stand-point. But the latter form of individualisation was the more common of the two, being easier to understand and follow. Then, for example, it could be easily understood that one murder was not exactly like another in view of the facts of premeditation, the end in view for which the crime was committed, and the greater or less atrocity attending the commission of the crime. It was according to those details of circumstance that the punishment was determined and adjusted. In the French Code of 1810, and earlier still, we find such individualisation admitted and practised. Such was also the case in the Common Law of England. In ancient law, we do not find the system of penal treatment as we find in modern law, that is to say, punishments were not specified by law for particular crimes. Ancient law was unaware of the principle *nulla poena, nullum crimen sine lege*. Thus, there was not one form of punishment for murder and another for theft and arson.* We need hardly say, of course, that there were some traditional forms of punishment sanctioned by custom and usage from amongst which the judge had absolute discretion to chose to suit the individual crime he was punishing. It was found, however, in course of time, that it was not safe to leave such unbounded powers in the hands of the judge and gradually the system of legal punishments came into vogue. By this, it should not be understood, that the discretionary power of the judges was altogether taken away. Thus, for instance, we find in an edict of Louis XIV† the laying down of a definite punishment for a definite crime, e.g. poisoning. Even in such cases the judge was not bound by the letter of the law. He could increase it and thus exceed the punishment specified by law; if the punishment prescribed was that of death, he could impose a cruel torture to bring about that death.

In India, the main substantive penal law is to be found in the Indian Penal Code and the procedural law is to be found in the Criminal Procedure Code. In both the codes we find some attempts at individualisation. Thus, in the former, we find a flexible system (within

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* This, however, is not true of ancient Hindu Law.
certain well-specified limits) of punishment for each individual offence and some consideration is given to the mental state of the delinquent, while in the latter, the attempt at individualisation is made through the discretion left to the jury in the trial of certain cases. Let me examine, however, what this individualisation amounts to, with reference to some of the offences defined and punishments prescribed in the Penal Code. Section 378 of the code defines a theft and section 379 prescribes the punishment therefor. The gist of the offence of theft appears to be a dishonest intention to take movable property belonging to another without the consent of that person. These elements being present, the offence is complete and the judge is bound to convict the offender unless, of course, he thinks fit to apply the maxim de minimis non curat lex to the case before him, and unless the offender comes within certain well-known grounds of exception, such as insanity, minority, etc. So far as conviction goes, therefore, there is no individualisation, for which, we have to fall back upon the penal section. The punishment, we find, may go up to three years' imprisonment or fine or both and the judge is entitled, according to the circumstances of the case, to use his discretion as to what amount of punishment should be awarded. The code does not furnish us with any rules as to how this discretion should be used but it is tacitly assumed that the discretion must be judicial discretion, that is to say, it must be reasonable and according to law. But as a matter of fact, we know that the discretion is used solely with reference to the objective gravity of the offence. No attempt whatever is made in distinguishing between one thief and another in reference to their subjective or social personality.

We turn next to the Code of Criminal Procedure. In certain specified cases the trial is to be by the aid of a jury and the duty of the jury is defined in section 299. Practically, the sole duty that the jury is called upon to perform, is to decide which view of the facts, disclosed at the trial, is true and then to return the verdict "which under such view ought, according to the discretion of the judge, to be returned." Thus, if the question is, in a particular case, whether a person entertained a reasonable belief on a particular point or not, the jury is to decide. It would be out of place to discuss here the utility or otherwise of a trial by jury. It has undoubtedly the sanction of sentiment behind it and it, often times, acts as a check to the absurd vagaries of particular judges. But beyond that it serves very little useful purpose.
The class of people from whom the jurors are generally recruited are not exactly trained either by habit or by education to sift the complicated mass of evidence which trained lawyers even sometimes find it difficult to unravel. As to the power of individualising of punishments, we find that they possess none except perhaps the power of recommending an offender to the mercy of the court—a recommendation which is generally based not upon utility or public policy but upon sentiment and which the court is not bound to accept.

We will take another example from the Indian Penal Code, viz. section 124A which specifies punishment for sedition. Courts of justice in Bengal have been, unfortunately, for the last few years, kept busy for the trial of political offenders. These offenders come mostly from the respectable middle-class of the population. In the Report submitted by the Rowlatt Committee we find, in Annexure 2, that almost all the offenders (about 91%) have been men of education, belonging to the three highest castes of Bengal, and we further find that the bulk of them (over 80%) were young men, their ages varying from 16 to 30. Now, what were the punishments meted out to these unfortunate and misguided young men? Exactly similar punishments as are awarded to the common rogues and felons. There was absolutely no attempt at discrimination or individualisation and possibly in the present state of the law there could not be any. The apparent result of this penal treatment was, of course, that in course of a few years, the crimes have practically disappeared. But it yet remains to be seen whether these misguided young men will ever come back to the folds of decent society and will ever become useful members thereof.

We see, then, that the attempt at individualisation by the classical (the existing) school of law is really based upon an objective view of crime and has practically nothing to do with the criminal himself. The attempt at suiting each individual criminal with one or the other of the three or four standardised forms of punishment is really like trying to put things of all shapes into a round hole. We have also seen that the result of this soulless and impersonal system of law is highly unsatisfactory and criminality is on the increase everywhere. This cannot be treated as an accident, as the system has been given a fair trial for several centuries. The small amount of individualisation that it attempts is unreal and illusory inasmuch as the criminal’s point of view is altogether ignored and no attempt is made at studying the
nature and character of the criminal. The present-day judges—hide-bound lawyers as they are—are really like quack physicians who prescribe medicines not according to the true character of the disease but according to outward symptoms: what is wanted, therefore, is a scientific study of the criminals and of the causes of criminality in order to arrive at a scientific classification of crimes and of criminals. The classical school has never attempted a scientific classification of criminals, because it has never studied the determinants of criminality. I have shown elsewhere* that "the causation of crime is like the causation of any other natural (or psychic) phenomenon. There is no special set of laws governing it. Generally speaking, a particular crime is caused by one or sometimes more than one of the conditions discussed above—namely, the biological, the social and the physical, but it by no means follows, as Ferri suggests, that in every crime all these three factors must be invariably present." We have got to classify the criminals, therefore, according to the conditions of their criminality. Broadly speaking we have then three classes of criminals—(i) criminals from biologic (or rather pathologic) causes, (ii) criminals from sociologic causes, and (iii) criminals from physical causes. With regard to the last group, it is hardly necessary to point out that the influence of physical conditions (such as climatic, meteorological and geographical) upon criminality is, at least, an indirect one and I am certainly not prepared to agree with Professor Enrico Ferri when he says that "ten degrees less of heat, or a few millimetres more of barometric pressure on the particular day might perhaps have prevented the murder."† Without going into unnecessary details, it should be pointed out that the first category of criminals includes (i) insane criminals, (ii) epileptic criminals, (iii) born criminals and (iv) criminals from any other pathologic condition, such as neurasthenia, defective nutrition, passions, etc. The second category would mainly comprise (i) criminals from necessity, (ii) criminals by opportunity and (iii) other occasional criminals. It would be readily admitted, of course, that this classification does not satisfy the strict and abstract rules of logical classification and I may point out that it would be idle to expect such a classification from the very nature of the case. Thus, we can easily imagine an offender who would fall under two or possibly more

† Criminal Sociology, p. 116.
than two categories at the same time, or who would come under what Mandslay calls "the intermediate zone." Professor Ferri in his *Criminal Sociology* classifies criminals into five classes, viz. criminal-insane, criminal-born, habitual criminal, occasional criminal and criminal from passion. Ferri's classification, it will be seen, is a classification based upon the predominant trait in each particular class of criminal as observed by the Professor himself. In the case of the born-criminal, the hereditary constitution of the individual or the "criminal neurosis," is the predominant factor. In the case of the insane criminal, the predominant factor is mental disease. In the case of the criminal by passion, it is a certain innate emotional tendency, while in the habitual and occasional criminals the influence of the environment predominates. In connection with Ferri's classification all that I want to point out is that it is more or less an empirical classification and is based upon no definite psychological principle. Furthermore, it may not always furnish us with a safe criterion for individualisation of punishment. Professor Ellwood of Missouri* seems to think that the simplest and the best *fundamentum divisionis* would be furnished by the simple psychological *principle of habit* and he would classify criminals into three classes, viz. (i) *defective* criminals, i.e. those whose crimes are due to inborn mental or nervous defects, (ii) *habitual* criminals, i.e. those who have acquired criminal habits from their environment and (iii) *occasional* criminals who form no criminal habit but who commit single or occasional offences through slight defect in character. The classification has certainly the merit of simplicity but I fail to understand how the *fundamentum divisionis* applies to the first category of criminals, unless we use the word "habit" in a sense which it does not bear in psychology (i.e. as covering "instincts"). It should be also pointed out that if we are to make "habit" the criterion of criminality, the occasional criminals or criminals from passion cannot be called criminals at all. It is a matter almost of common experience that different men under the same circumstances and acting from the same passion, would act quite differently. All men would not, acting under the influence of a strong passion of jealousy, for instance, act as Othello did. There is something, then,

apart from this stimulus of passion, which determines a person’s course of conduct and whatever that something may be, that is not habit. A person may be a true criminal, so far as criminal propensity goes, without ever committing a single crime. In any case, by a rigorous application of the fundamentum divisionis we get only two classes of criminals, viz. habitual and occasional and the classification, therefore, is incomplete. Where, for instance, shall we place such an important class of delinquents as political offenders? Furthermore, in such a scheme of classification, we shall have to say with Joly that insane criminals cannot be regarded as criminals at all. In spite of the apparent simplicity of the scheme, therefore, we cannot accept it for penological practice because it is incomplete and inadequate.

It is unnecessary here to discuss the views of the social and the sociological school of criminologists, such as Tarde, Colajamis, Bonger, Karl Marx and others. Their diagnosis of the case is certainly incomplete and I have tried to demonstrate elsewhere that social and economic causes alone cannot explain the phenomenon of criminality.* Social and economic conditions, to my mind, do not so much cause criminality as give a particular shape or form to it. To take such social factors as education or wealth: it cannot be asserted that either of these is an absolute antidote to crime, because we find that both education and wealth are favourable to, if not the direct causes of certain specific forms of crime. The modern system of non-moral education by raising false hopes which can never be fulfilled and by putting false values upon things, directly breeds discontent, and discontent, as we know, is the father of criminality. There are crimes, again, peculiar to illiterate persons. The same thing may be said of wealth, civilisation, religion and other social factors.† It must not be forgotten, however, that there are some social factors, such as density and congestion of population, industrialism, extreme forms of capitalism, some specific trades and professions ‡ which seem to furnish a very congenial atmosphere in which criminality thrives and, for the purpose of individualising punishment, it is necessary to study the specific effects of each one of those factors in detail.

† Dr. Lombrosi comes practically to the same conclusion. See Crime—its causes and remedies, pp. 111-132.
‡ See Tarde’s Penal Philosophy on the effects of trade and profession.
From the foregoing considerations, it is clear, therefore, that in order to achieve the end of penal law, individualisation of punishment is absolutely necessary and that, further, the rational basis of this individualisation is the biology, the psychology and the social environment of the delinquent. It will be readily seen, therefore, that the existing three or four stereotyped and standardised forms of punishment will not serve the purpose of individualisation and that we shall have to discover rational modes of reformation, repression and prevention. Professor Ferri in his Criminal Sociology has emphasised the fundamental importance of prevention and has elaborately discussed the preventive measures which he calls the "penal substitutes," and he thinks that educational, industrial and moral reforms can easily take the place of the repressive and retributory measures which were formerly the main weapons which society used in dealing with crimes. Another noted criminologist, Baron Garofalo, suggests remedies based upon elimination, reparation, intimidation and selection. It will not be within the scope of this paper to discuss these proposed measures in details. I shall only note here that the following rational modes of prevention and repression may be tried according to the nature of the delinquent under trial.

I. Preventive measures:—

(a) Asylums for abandoned children on the lines of Dr. Barnardo’s homes and on the lines of the works of the Salvation Army in England and in India,

(b) Temperance Societies,

(c) Drunkards’ asylums,

(d) Technical and Industrial Institutions.

II. Repressive and reparative measures:—

(a) The death penalty,

(b) The cellular system of imprisonment,

(c) Confinement or internment at home,

(d) Farm-labour for convicts in agricultural countries,

(e) Indemnity or reparation and fine,

(f) Security for good behaviour,

(g) Conditional and indeterminate sentences,

(h) Reformatory on the line of that in Elmira,

(i) Asylums for lunatics.
It will be observed that the scheme is pretty comprehensive and that it would furnish us with remedial measures for all kinds of delinquency—pathological, psychological and social. Furthermore, it would enable us, to a great extent, to prevent crimes by a judicious application of the preventive measures to drunkards and cast-away children from whom the bulk of the criminal class are recruited. I need hardly point out, in this connection, that in order to successfully work out this penological scheme we must have judges and magistrates of a type fundamentally different from what we have now.
ON THE NATURE OF IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE
IN THE LIGHT OF CONTEMPORARY
EPSTEMOLOGICAL DISCUSSIONS.

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1. It is apparent to all students of Epistemology that 'immediate experience,' taken in the widest significance, has gained in influence in the present-day Philosophic forum. The principal reason for this change of attitude lies in the undervaluation of intellect as a cognitive function. Masters of philosophy, ancient and modern, have contended that all the wealth and warmth of experience that lie open to mind may assume a form that is found in the kind of knowledge, in its various orders, called intellectual, rational or logical. Attempts have often been made, well known to the historian of philosophy, to point out types of experience that refuse to yield to the intellectual mould, and consequently, new categories of cognition have frequently been pushed forward to take their place with intellect, nay, even at times to oust it from its position. Such attempts have usually assumed three principal forms. First, it has often been pointed out that intellect is limited at one end by the immediacy of sensation and at the other end by the immediacy of intuitive knowledge. As a function, intellect is but elaborative in nature and presupposes the material yielded by the two modes of immediate experience. Its content, value and also validity are determined by them. Secondly, intellect is looked upon not as a co-ordinate but as a derivative function of immediate experience. It develops either from sensation or from intuition, which bring home to us the warmth and intimacy of reality; and intellect is merely a bad substitute for these. Its function lies in referring us back to the immediate. Thirdly, intellect is conceived as being in some way opposed to the immediate knowledge. The content that yields to the grasp of immediacy eludes intellect which, then, merely serves to falsify the real. Immediatism, the name given by Prof. Perry to such valuation of the immediate experience, is then a form of the wider epistemological movement of anti-intellectualism. The factors that have given birth to
the latter are also responsible for the former. Hence any study of immediatism as divorced from its natural context must have its obvious short-comings.

I propose in this paper to attempt at a definition of 'immediate experience' in the light of the present-day discussions in Epistemology. The task may conveniently be divided into four parts. In the first part I shall try to determine the precise application of the adjective 'immediate' to the substantive which it qualifies. In the second part, I shall analyse the conditions under which an experience is said to appear in consciousness 'immediately.' The third section will be devoted to the examination of the constitution of the typical forms of immediate experience with a view to arrive at a definition. Lastly, the notion of truth and error in its application to immediacy will be briefly considered.

2. We are all familiar with the view that the cognitive process can be split up into two phases—of content and of act, of Inhalt and of Tätigkeit. Brentano, Witasek, Meinong, Lipps—all subscribe to this view. Russell, however, substitutes 'relation' for the term 'act,' but he agrees so far as the distinction is concerned. There are others who distinguish not between act and content, or relation and content, but between the content and the subject. All these, in spite of the difference in their forms, are alike in their bearing upon the question of immediate knowledge. For, if the distinction holds good, immediate experience may signify either the immediacy of the act or of the content. And the very analysis which we have proposed for our task would bear very different consequences.

But the distinction mentioned above appears to be impermissible upon three considerations. (i) In the first place, the separation of cognition into the two phases is not consistent with the fact known as self-consciousness. The old argument of infinite regress vitiates the analysis. Attempt has been made by Brentano, as well as by Russell—though in very different ways—to obviate the difficulty. Brentano argues that the consciousness of a colour, involving an act and a content, and the consciousness of that consciousness, are all given in an eigen-tümliche Verwebung. Thus, however complex the process of regression may be, we are sure to have it given in a single moment of consciousness. (Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte, 167). Russell, on the other hand, admits the logical possibility of regress but denies
it as a fact: consciousness of consciousness may, as a matter of Logic, proceed ad infinitum; in any particular case, however, we do not experience more than a finite number of such processes. (Russell, On the Nature of Acquaintance.)

The justification, however, appears to me to fall short on the following grounds. Let us assume that the knowledge of any moment of consciousness is analysed into \( x \), the content, and \( c \), the knowing activity or relation (and \( c_1, c_2, \text{ etc.} \), the different orders of \( c \)). According to the foregoing views, we may have not only \( c - x \) but also \( c_1 \cdot (c - x), c_2 \cdot \{c_1 \cdot (c - x)\}, \text{ etc.} \) But \( x \) lies in the focus of attention with reference to \( c \), and likewise \( c - x, c_1 \cdot (c - x), \text{ etc.} \) must also be in the focus of attention with reference to their respective \( c \)'s. But, psychologically, \( x, c - x, c_1 \cdot (c - x), \text{ etc.} \), are entirely different contents, just as the consciousness of the table, of the leg of the table and of the screw in the table, are distinct from one another. Also, we know that in any one system of consciousness there could but be one field of attention; or, what amounts to the same thing, a system of consciousness could be defined as a single field of attention. It follows, therefore, that there should be in the case of regression of self-consciousness a multiple system of consciousness without any common content or focus. Also it follows that these distinct systems of consciousness being mutually exclusive are also mutually ignorant of one another. Thus, there would be no conceivable manner of understanding how the various \( c \)'s could at all be said to know one another so far as they are regarded as acts and not as contents; in other words, how there could be any self-consciousness. For the self-consciousness must be the consciousness of consciousness. But when the different \( c \)'s constitute different systems, there is no such thing as a consciousness of consciousness. Nor is there, consequently, any possibility of eigentümliche Verwebung. Again, there is no form of actual consciousness in which you have an \( x \) or content given as an absolute ultimate. Even the \( x \) could be analysed into a \( c - x \) complex of some order;—we shall then have \( c^1 \cdot x_1, c^2 \cdot (c^1 \cdot x_1) \) etc. The given fact \( x \) thus generates a number of systems as follows:

\[
c_2 \cdot \{c_1 \cdot (c - x)\}, c_1 \cdot (c - x), c^1 \cdot x_1, c^2 \cdot (c^1 \cdot x_1), \text{ etc.}
\]

It will be seen that there is no possibility of bringing these distinct systems of consciousness back to the form \( c - x \): for, they all form
distinct foci. Thus, as a consequence of the splitting, the fact to be explained is explained away.

(2) We shall proceed to consider another phase of the question. The \( c \) term as defined above, if it be known at all to a \( c \) of a higher order, must be cognised as a content or as an \( x \) (as defined above). The distinction between \( c \) and \( x \) therefore depends on the context formed by another \( C \) or another relatum. The radical separation between the content and the act, as insisted upon by the thinkers mentioned above, thus disappears. If the question be viewed in this light, it is immaterial whether we call the content or the act as constituting the basis of cognition, and hence serving as the substantive to the qualifying adjective immediate.

(3) Thirdly, the existence of a conscious activity, consciousness as separable and distinct from the content, has been denied upon introspective ground and also on account of the fact that the distinction is not significant. Consciousness, as distinct from the content, says Moore "can be distinguished if we look attentively enough and know that there is something to look for." (G. E. Moore, *Mind*, 1903, p. 150) "Nous entendons", says Fouille, "une conscience de sentir ou d'agir primitive et spontanée, une translucidité de soi-même à soi-même" (Fouillé, *La pensée et les nouvelles écoles anti-intellectualistes*, p. 1). But there are certain mental states, those of emotion and of feeling, in which no content can be separated from the act. If there be an act, it is inseparably given in the content. It cannot be analysed out of the total 'psychic whole.' (Titchener, *Exp. Psychology of the Thought Processes*, pp. 41–75). In the second place, the analysis of certain phases of cognition is found beset with perplexing problems. The fact of colour-contrast is a well known one in psychology. The contrasted colours are sensed together as constituting a total psychic phenomenon and at the same time are perceived as being different. A difficulty arises if we try to impose upon the phenomenon our notion of act. As a total phenomenon, there should be one act standing in some kind of relation to the content: at the same time, since the colours are sensed as being different, there should be different acts constituting the phases of the different colours. A like problem arises in the case of every form of discriminative consciousness. Each distinct content, as such, may be separately thought of, and hence must have an aspect of 'act,' at the same time; the total psychic whole too must have an act.
These two acts cannot exist within the same span of consciousness. But since the contents must necessarily be interwoven, it seems reasonable that we should rather forego our theory than try to bring them together in terms of some complex and round-about hypothesis.

This conclusion would appear more plausible if we consider the function of the activity. It means for Natorp the fact that a content appears in consciousness—merely its ‘knownness’; it is merely the Bewusstsein überhaupt. (Natorp, Philosophie, ihr Problem und ihre Probleme, pp. 162–169). To analyse out, then, the ‘knownness’ from the known appears to be a procedure at once impossible and fantastic, inasmuch as the former merely signifies that a fact appears in consciousness. James in view of this denies even on the introspective ground that the consciousness is ever distinguishable from the content. (James, Radical Empiricism, pp. 1–38). Nietzsche attributes it to false introspection (Will to Power, Aph. 478); and the view is sound at its basis.

It follows from what has been said above that the adjective ‘immediate’ cannot qualify any mental act or relation as contrasted with the content. It must appertain to the total psychic whole which may with greater reason be termed the content.

3. The content as defined above, then, is the substantive to which belongs the adjective “immediate.” It is for us now to examine the significance of the qualification.

The term ‘immediate’ may be understood as referring to the condition under which a content appears in consciousness. In the first place, the immediate knowledge has been by several thinkers identified with the primitive form of experience. It is said to constitute the ground of all other types of knowledge both in the temporal and in the logical order. “Pure experience”, says James, “is the name which I give to the immediate flux of life which furnishes the material to our later reflections with its conceptual categories.” (A Pluralistic Universe, p. 348).

James insists upon the temporal priority of the immediate consciousness more than upon its logical precedence. There is a stage of life in which the pure experience and sense-immediacy suffice for the adequate adaptation of the organism; but gradually the environmental situation attains a greater degree of complexity and other forms of knowledge are called forth in order to meet the situation (Problems
of Philosophy, p. 79). Bradley, however, lays greater emphasis upon
the logical, and I am tempted to add, the metaphysical priority of
the immediate (Essays on Truth and Reality, pp. 159-161). The im-
mediate experience represents the mode of knowledge in which the
reality reveals itself to the individual mind, though it may be in a
fragmentary form. It stimulates the dialectic of intelligence which
ends in the transmutation of the finite in the absolute and in the com-
plete harmony and systematisation of the fragmentary bits of know-
ledge. Immediacy therefore constitutes a specific order of experience,
not merely a transient phase. It serves as the background from which
arise and into which may disappear all the other forms of knowledge.
Thus, according to Bradley, experience taken in its logical and meta-
physical significance must have a determinate place in it for immediacy.

I consider this definition insufficient, inasmuch as all forms of
immediate experience cannot be regarded as 'prior' to other forms of
knowledge in either of the meanings indicated above. Bradley himself
speaks of a state of higher immediacy in which the thought consum-
mates and attains the absolute. (Bradley, Appearance and Reality,
pp. 80-81). This obviously is not prior to intellectual knowledge either
logically or temporally. For, the harmony and coherence can be
attained only as the dialectic progresses; and this stage must bring
into synthesis, in this must be aufgehen, all intellectual knowledge.
Thus, we cannot think of it as the primitive knowledge in either of the
senses.

We come to the same conclusion if we follow James's view. James
speaks of immediacy as a stage which exists only in the newborn babe
(Radical Empiricism, p. 93). But he also says that the immediate
experience reveals to us the inner nature of personality (Problems of
Philosophy, p. 87). Now, this second form of the immediate obviously
is not on a par with the first. If personality is ever given to us in
intuition, it is given only when we have faced the 'Stürm und drang' of
life, when our mind has attained a sufficient degree of complexity.
Moreover, if we turn from Bradley and James to the time-honoured
doctrine of mysticism, we find that the 'unitive' state, in which God
reveals himself directly to the devotee, follows upon a long course of
mental preparation and development. But it might be said that, to the
mystic as well as to the absolutist, the Absolute is in some sense the
animating spirit of the dialectic; it leads the thought just as the
universal preconditions its own discovery through the particular. But we must not identify the order of knowledge with the order of reality, though at its basis there may be no difference between knowledge and reality. I should therefore urge that the definition of the immediate as the primitive is only an incomplete definition; it does not cover all the cases.

The reason why primitivity is regarded as an essential feature of immediacy is that the primitive experience stands alone and possesses no community of nature with other phases of knowledge. It appears in the mind by itself and possesses some kind of internal unity in which its components are held together (Bradley, Essays, p. 182). Looked at in this way, we should employ the conception of unrelatedness rather than that of primitivity. For, that which is prior to every other kind of knowledge logically or temporally must necessarily be devoid of all kinds of external determination (save that of priority). It would be a state of self-contained unity. Thus, we conclude that the primitive is immediate in so far as it is unrelated to other forms of knowledge, or 'irrelative' as James chooses to call it.

A second way of defining immediacy is through another temporal determination, namely, through the conception of suddenness. It is the definition that the layman frequently employs in defining the immediate experience. But even a superficial analysis would show that suddenness really signifies absence of external determinations. For, the content B can be said to be 'sudden' only when the content A, an existing state of consciousness, does not presage the arrival of, or imply the content B.

Another way of defining immediacy is through the conception of 'directness.' But this too appears to me to lead to the same conclusion. 'Directness' may either be but a synonym for immediacy and so far this is no definition, or it may signify the absence of any intermediary. To say, however, that there is no intermediary is to admit the conception of unrelatedness.

The term 'unrelatedness' however may be understood in two different ways. In the first place, when we say that the experience A is not related to the system of knowledge signified by the term B we may mean that B does not imply the content of A. In other words, we may so conceive the meaning of B that there is no logical transition from it to A. Secondly, we might say that A as a psychic fact does
not cause B. Here both A and B are looked upon as natural objects and we deny the causal nexus between the two. Both of these views have been advanced by the mystics of all ages as well as by some of the thinkers of to-day.

Eucken speaks of an independent spiritual life which man does not originate but merely participates in and which does not appear as a special manifestation, as a special aspect of life, but as self-contained life itself giving rise to reality (Eucken, Main Currents of Modern Thought, p. 60). Thus this higher life, as revealed to man, is not determined in either of the senses by the actual contents of consciousness. It is in this meaning that the spiritual life is regarded as immediate. Bradley supports the same view from the angle of Logic. "We cannot speak of a relation between immediate experience and that which transcends it except by a license. A relation exists only between terms, and those terms, to be known as such, must be objects. Hence immediate experience, taken as a term of a relation, becomes so far a partial object and ceases so far to keep its nature as a felt totality" (Essays, pp. 176–177). The immediate, therefore, according to Bradley, is that which does not stand in relation with other forms of cognitive experience. We find the same attitude pervading Bergson’s Philosophy. Intuition that leads mind back to life has no community of nature (save perhaps as regards its constitution) with intellect. It is a unique process and as such defies all relation (Creative Evolution). In the experience of the mystics of all ages, the intuition that reveals the absolute to the finite has always been regarded as an illumination descending upon man from beyond—as the "flowing light of the Godhead" in the words of Mechthild of Magdeburg (Underhill, Mysticism, pp. 279–318).

These mystic experiences, then, represent a break from the usual tenor of mind. As revelations of the divine, they are not in any sense implied by the ordinary processes of knowledge, nor are they caused by them, inasmuch as, according to Delacroix, the mystic experience suppresses the ordinary self and gives rise to a new personality whose states are “distinguished by certain specific features and which constitute a special psychological system.” (Delacroix, Études sur le mysticisme, p. 197). The immediate therefore marks an order of experience standing by itself and not in any sense implied by the antecedent processes of knowledge.

If we turn for a moment to another type of experience we find
that the same principle holds true. Sensation is undoubtedly a form of immediate experience and its immediacy has been denied but by few. A sensation, however, can never be implied by what precedes in consciousness. We might be thinking of Socrates and the content of the following sensory experience may be green cheese. No one would contend that the thought of Socrates in any way implies green cheese. Again, it is obvious that the sensation breaks upon mental processes with which it has no causal relation. Any thought is likely to be interrupted by the roar of thunder and flash of lightning. It is for the justification of an implicative relation that the rationalists conceive sensations as being ‘full of works of thought.’ Apart from such a hypothesis sensation as an immediate experience appears to stand alone in consciousness unrelated as all forms of immediate experience are.

We cannot, however, hold both of these conceptions of ‘unrelatedness’ to be equally valid. It is true, as a matter of fact, that the immediate experience is not implied by its antecedent cognitive processes; it is also true, as a matter of logic, that the immediate cannot be implied by the antecedents. For, in order that the implicative relation may occur, the immediate will have to be turned into a logical proposition. And it cannot be so transformed without giving up its immediacy (Bradley, Essays, p. 177). But we are not so sure of the notion that ‘unrelated’ means ‘uncaused.’ For, in the first place, as a psychical occurrence, the immediate experience must constitute one of the terms of the total psychic series. But the psychic series is a determinate one, so that each term may be represented as a certain function of the others. Hence, we cannot, from the point of view of psychology, admit that any mental occurrence is uncaused. The notion of cause can be understood only in the context of a determinate psychological system. It might be urged that my argument merely affirms what the immediatist denies, it is therefore no argument. I should in that case urge the following fact for consideration. Every mystic admits that a long preparation is necessary for the reception of the supreme illumination and that the impurity of mind disturbs and deviates the course of the spiritual impulse. A certain condition of the normal mental states, therefore, is a sine qua non of all mystic experience. And to that extent we must urge that intuition is not altogether an uncaused process.

If we turn to other conceptions of immediacy our conclusion would
principally be the same. The appearance of a sensation as well as the
clearness, vividness, intensity and duration of a sensation, are determined
by the attentional process. This is a fact well known to the psychologist
and can even in some instances be experimentally demonstrated. To
that extent then a certain preparation and general distribution of mental
processes are favourable for sensory consciousness. We cannot, there-
fore, look upon sense 'immediacy,' so far as we appreciate the above
fact, as undetermined in the casual sense. Hence we conclude that the
immediate can be defined with reference to its antecedent psychic
processes as that which is not logically implied by the latter is logically
unrelated. We cannot, however, regard the immediate experience as
wholly undetermined by the pre-existing mental processes.

4. Our study so far has yielded the conclusion that the im-
mediate is not related in the logical sense to anything outside itself.
We shall now proceed to consider its own content with a view to deter-
mine its nature.

In the first place, we shall examine the various mental processes
as regards their claim to be regarded as immediate experience:

Sensation. James urges that sensation is an immediate experi-
ence. "The nearer the object cognised," he says, "comes to being
a simple quality like 'hot', 'cold', 'red', 'noise', 'pain', appre-
hended irrelatively to other things, the more the state of mind
approaches pure sensation. The fuller of relations the object is on the
contrary, the more it is something classed, located, measured, compared,
assigned to a function, etc., the more do we call the state of mind a
perception. Its function is that of mere acquaintance with a fact.
Perception's function, on the other hand, is knowledge about a fact."
(Principles of Psychology, Vol. II, pp. 1–2). But sensation in its purity
is said to be rare in adult life, it can "only be realised in the earliest
days of life." Yet it is "the stable rock, a terminus a quo and the
terminus ad quem of thought" (op. cit., p. 7). The obvious difficulty
in such a conception is that simple content given in sensation fails to
account for the richness and variety of thought in an adequate manner.
Moreover, the rarely occurring sensation cannot in any way constitute
a permanent background of other forms of cognition. This difficulty
is met by James by conceiving sensation as a postulated content
(op. cit., p. 4). Yet, it seems that this way of looking at the matter
cuts the ground underneath; the postulating consciousness, and not
sensation, then forms the groundwork of cognition. If, again, we regard sensation as the mother-earth of knowledge, it must admit of a complexity of content.* James felt this difficulty and has sought to meet it in three different ways, at three different periods of thought. In his earliest statement in his *Principles of Psychology*, he qualifies the above citations with the remark that the simplicity need not be absolute but only relative (about 1882). In another essay (1885), he substitutes the word "percept" for the term "sensation" and makes the former the basis of all knowledge (*Meaning of Truth*, p. 39). In the last stage, he gives up the concepts of sensation and perception and adopts the term "pure experience" signifying thereby an immediate sensory manifold (*Radical Empiricism*, 1905, p. 92). The inner character of this manifold is (1) that it is a unity in spite of its manifoldness; (2) that it is non-relational, a "that which is ready to be all sorts of *whats*" (3) and that it contains in it all terms, relations and universals (op. cit., pp. 93–94). The experience conceived in this fashion is the same that Bradley calls 'feeling.' Feeling, he urges, need not be simple and probably never is simple. It is an awareness that "though non-relational may comprise simply in itself an indefinite amount of difference. There are no distinctions in the proper sense and yet there is a many felt in one" (*Essays*, p. 174). This is a conception of immediate experience that must necessarily follow from the rôle assigned to it. All cognitive experiences must take their rise from the immediate; and hence the latter must be a manifold in some sense in order to account for the richness of thought. It must be a unity inasmuch as we could not otherwise speak of a manifoldness. In the third place it must be non-relational; for if it were relational it would be the same as thought. Thus, considered structurally, the immediate experience must be defined as a non-relational identity in difference.

Russell and Hobhouse, however, insist that the sense-datum given in immediacy is simple and not a non-relational manifold of the nature we have discussed above. Let us consider Russell's view as representing this form of the doctrine inasmuch as it has additional features not shared by others.

Russell puts forward three immediates as constituting the basis of

* In justice to Prof. James it might be said that he always thought of the primitive experience as a "blooming, buzzing confusion." Only he did not introduce the idea in his epistemological system until later.
all complex types of cognition—the particular, the perceptual complex and the universal. Sensations are the psychical states that give particulars, and perceptions are those that give facts (Monist, 1914, p. 44). A particular can be indicated by such terms as 'this,' 'now,' 'here,' etc. Since it is set over against the datum of perception, which is complex, it is but fair to assume that the particular is simple; if not, the distinction between the two disappears. The particular is a 'hard' datum; it stops all discussions and is the final court of appeal. It is also said to be unique and therefore indefinable. Its existence is momentary and its content private. Unlike the particular, the fact is a public datum and is constituted of terms in relation. The knowledge about the particular is given in descriptions; the facts are asserted in propositions. But both of these, description and proposition, are inadequate for the purpose; they cannot give us the intimacy of sensation or perception. Hence both of them are called by Russell incomplete symbols. Besides these, there is the universal, given to us by an immediate process of consciousness, called conceiving. The distinctive feature of conceiving consists in the fact that it is occasioned by a knowledge of the particular; but that, however, does not make it any less immediate. All these three modes of immediacy, sensation, perception and conception, are forms of one general process called acquaintance. (Proceedings of the Arist. Soc., 1910-11, pp. 111 ff.)

This conception of the immediate experience is not amenable to the definition we have arrived at. But it is not the definition we wish to defend; it is rather for us to see how far contents mentioned above can be regarded as immediate. Let us examine them one by one.

(i) The particular sensation, as James says, rarely occurs in its purity in adult life. The conception that the psychologist uses is arrived at rather through analytic attention than through introspection. Thus in any moment of introspective cross-section, we discover a manifold of conscious phenomena; nothing but a preparation of attention can lead to the focalisation of one of the constituents and to the inhibition of the others. Even in an isolated quality of sensation it is easy to notice variations and fluctuations from moment to moment. The idea that consciousness is a flux, directly leads us to that conclusion, for, in a flux, the components too are ever-changing and ever-developing. The notion that we have fixed units of sensory
qualities arises from our judgmental mode of knowledge—from the application of universals to particulars. The patch of blue assumes a constant psychic value only when it is recognised as a case of the universal blue. Thus, apart from the use of universals, the sensory quality must be regarded as a manifold, in spite of Russell’s opinion.

(ii) The ‘fact,’ as Russell uses the term, is a relational complex. It is of propositional form and ‘gives knowledge of truth’ (Mysticism and Logic, p. 147). But whatever possesses the truth-value must be regarded as a mediate type of knowledge. For truth and error are essential properties of mediate knowledge, as we shall later see.

Viewed from the angle of Psychology, perception and apperception are regarded in general as being two phases of the same process, yet all kinds of mediate knowledge are subsumed under apperception. Hence we are surely right in regarding ‘the fact’ in Mr. Russell’s sense as being of the same nature as the recognisedly intellectual processes.

(iii) For similar reasons the universal cannot be regarded as an immediate content. The universal, according to Russell, is known by comparing a number of particulars (Problems of Philosophy, ch. x). Yet Mr. Russell appears to imply that they can be known apart from the particulars. When a series of particulars has been given, the knowledge of the immediate flashes directly into our mind. This doctrine, however, appears to be untenable. The universal somehow must be related to the particulars which it subsumes; otherwise any set of particulars could give rise to a universal. If this definite relation is admitted, we must admit that we are aware of it in the process of the discovery of the immediate. Thus, the process is one of comparing and relating and, as such, judgmental in its nature. This surely cannot be looked upon as immediate.

We conclude, therefore, that perception and conception are outcomes of comparison, discrimination, etc. Sensation, so far as it is not subsumed under a universal, is a manifold; and when so subsumed it becomes relational and thus intellectual. It follows, therefore, that non-relational manifoldness and unrelatedness or simplicity characterise immediate experience. Russell’s view stands as long as we fail to notice the obvious psychological facts and neglect the similarity that the contents of ‘acquaintance’ bear to mediate knowledge. To use Fouillée’s words, the content of acquaintance is “un résidu dernier de l’analyse, un reste des retranchements successifs opérés par la pensée.”
Another doctrine of immediacy remains to be considered—that of Intuition. The principal features of the content of intuition are (i) that the object and the subject are inherent in each other; (ii) consequently, the content is a manifold; (iii) and it carries a sense of conviction, or negatively put, it is not amenable to the criticism of discursive thought. The specific nature of the content has been viewed differently in different systems and ages of Philosophy. Fouillé distinguishes four general types that have appeared in the history of philosophy.* Intuition for Aristotle reveals an act of consciousness in its purity. The act and the object of the act are one and the same. It signifies not movement nor change but only pure unimpeded action reaching its consummation without any intermediary. Schelling, however, thinks of intuition as a state in which we withdraw from time and space and experience the eternal in the intimacy of our innermost self. Ravaission, following Schelling, regards intuition as the revelation of the eternal life. But the thinkers of our day have lost touch with eternity and intuition brings home to them a ceaseless heterogeneity in which the diverse moments melt together to constitute the flux. Yet it will be a mistake to stop here. Intuition as creative imagination, the significance that obtains with the poets and artists, appears in philosophy too. It is in this sense that we are said to have insight of personalities, of purposes and of inwardness of phenomena, in an immediate manner. But in whichever of these senses we may take it, intuition is characterised by manifoldness and by the inherence of the subjective and the objective in the ordinary acceptance of the terms.

Let us consider Bergson’s view in this connection. There are three distinct meanings in which Bergson uses the term ‘intuition’ in his work. In the first place, it signifies a process akin to what has been called above the creative imagination. “Intuition is that kind of intellectual sympathy”, says Bergson, “by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and therefore inexpressible.” † (*Int. to Metaphysics*, p. 6.) It is a type of insight analogous to what is called by Royce ‘appreciation’ and by

† “For the correct interpretation of this passage,” says Le Roy, “it must not be forgotten that before ‘Creative Evolution’ M. Bergson employed the word ‘intelligence’ in a wider acceptation more akin to that commonly received.” (*The New Philosophy of Henri Bergson*, p. 160.)
Münsterberg 'purposive' knowledge. It involves implicitly an 'act' by which the mind transposes itself. Yet on the side of content the knowledge certainly involves manifoldness and the act is inseparably interwoven in the complex factors. At the same time, the complexity must be regarded as non-relational; as otherwise it would be transformed into purely intellectual knowledge or descriptive knowledge. Intuition, secondly, connotes a mode of mental illumination, dependant upon the operation of instinct, that seizes upon the mysterious and the indefinite and gives us clue to the vital operations (Creative Evolution, p. 176). Here too it reveals a content which must of necessity be complex and on the ground of its indefiniteness, non-relational (op. cit.). But this view, as also the preceding one, implies that there should be a conviction of reality attached to the content. We shall consider this question a little later. In the third place, by 'intuition' Bergson means a form of amalgamation of all the factors of consciousness resulting in a content identical with the vital processes. "The line of evolution that ends in man," says Bergson, "is not the only one. On other paths divergent from it, other forms of consciousness have been developed which have not been able to free themselves from the external constraints or to regain control over themselves as human intellect has done but which none the less express some thing which is immanent in evolutionary movement. Suppose those other forms of consciousness brought together amalgamated with intellect, would not the result be a consciousness as wide as life?" (op. cit., p. xii.) Here obviously, the content is both manifold and non-relational, for such is the Bergsonian conception of the vital processes. Thus we conclude that intuitive knowledge as represented in Bergson's Philosophy conforms to the character of non-relational manifoldness.

To sum up: the structural analysis of the content of immediacy reveals to us one general criterion, namely, that the immediate is a non-relational manifold. We have seen that the immediate content is not a simple inasmuch as the simple is but an outcome of analysis. Moreover, we hardly ever experience the simple in psychologic introspection which, if anything, is the attitude for the reception of the immediate experience. There is another feature of immediacy which ought to be pointed out in this connection. Ordinarily we distinguish between the subjective and the objective and epistemologically between the subject and the object. In immediacy, as the consensus of the
views runs, there is subject-object identity. It is true that Russell and others insist upon the distinction between the subject and the object even in acquaintance, but the view appears to me to be untenable. In the first place, I have stated my objections against the separation of act from the content: the same objection applies to the discrimination between the subject and the object, especially in immediacy. In the second place, according to Mr. Russell, if I do not misunderstand him, the subject is always known as the constituent of a complex and never in acquaintance (Mysticism and Logic, p. 211). Thus, the subject is really known through logical analysis. And, as such, the distinction between the subject and the content in immediacy is inadmissible. Thus we conclude that the immediate is a non-relational manifold in which there is a coincidence of the subjective and the objective.

5. We have tried to define immediacy in terms of the conditions under which it appears in consciousness. We have also attempted to arrive at a definition through the analysis of the structure of the immediate experience. Another question remains yet to be discussed—that of truth-value of immediate experience.

There are many who think that the immediate is absolutely true. It carries in it a conviction of its absolute validity—a conviction that brooks no questioning. There are at the same time others who consider the content of immediacy as indifferent to the questions of truth and falsehood. The content simply is and cannot be treated discursively. The issue of validity applies only to the judgmental type of knowledge. I consider the latter point of view to be correct and shall state my reasons briefly.

The mystics and those impregnated with the spirit of mysticism claim that the datum of immediate experience is absolutely valid, meaning thereby the absolute reality of the experience. There appears to be two principal reasons for this belief. In the first place, for many of the mystics, intuition is a pure ‘act’ of the soul, a free creation of the spirit. The spirit being the absolute reality, its expression must necessarily be real; or, to put it otherwise, it is in the expression that the spirit makes itself real. Hence, the intuition as the act must necessarily be absolutely real and therefore must carry the conviction of truth. In the second place, with many of the mystics, the object and the subject are blended into one in the process of intuition. The possi-
bility of error arises only when the subject stands aloof from the object and gropes for it, as it were. In such cases there is always analysis and discrimination and, therefore, judgment. Thus while the mediate is liable to both truth and error, the immediate is absolutely true.

Now, in the first place, the certainty that attaches to the mystic experiences is akin to a moral conviction. The response to it is not cognitive but volitional. Thus it is in the nature of an imperative to which there is obedience or disobedience but about which no question of truth or error arises. Secondly, the mystic intuition reveals a unique content in each case. To call a number of unique experiences true would be to class them together and therefore to deny their uniqueness. In the third place, if the content in question possessed any truth-value, it would be unlike all finite instances of truth. For the finite truth is definable and discursive. It follows then, that the content of intuition cannot be regarded as being true or false in any intelligible sense. It must be looked upon, from the finite point of view, as neither true nor false.

This ought to set at rest the question whether intellectual propositions could be regarded as intuitionally given. For, such an issue is raised only because certain judgments carry with them certainty and conviction. But the conviction is different from truth as we have seen above. Sometimes, however, these are looked upon as intuitive on account of a certainty as to their absolute validity. In such cases, it will be found on analysis, the indubitableness rests upon some such ground as the inconceivability of the opposite—a principle which, according to Nietzsche, ought to serve as the 'inscription over the porch of a modern lunatic asylum.'

6. Let us pass in review the principal results thus far obtained. Our purpose has been to define the nature of immediate experience in the light of contemporary thought in Epistemology. Our first attempt was to define it in terms of the active consciousness or the conscious quality that attaches to immediate experience. But such a definition was found to be impossible. We then sought a definition in the conditions under which a content appearing in consciousness could be regarded as immediate. We found that the principal condition was the absence of any relation to other terms of consciousness, or, in brief, unrelatedness. In the third place, we examined the constitution of the experience in the search of an adequate earmark of immediacy. We came to two conclusions; (i) that the immediate is a non-relational
manifold, (ii) that it involves the identity of the subject and the object. In the last place, we tried to define the immediate with the help of the notion of validity. Our conclusion has been that the conception of truth and error are inapplicable to the experience.

The question of the relation of the immediate to other forms of experience has cropped up almost with every issue. But my attempt has always been to leave it alone inasmuch as it is a topic by itself and would enlarge our discussions beyond the limits we set before us.
THE CHAIT SING TRAGEDY.

A critical study of the relations of Governor-General Warren Hastings with Raja Chait Sing of Benares.

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"We declare in the most solemn manner to all the Rajas, Zemin-dars, Landholders and others dependent upon authority that we shall never sheath the sword until justice is done to the honour of Company and that of all England, attacked in the person of their Governor-General."

(Proclamation by the Bengal Government, dated the 18th October, 1781.)

"Hastings was determined to plunder Cheyt Sing and for that end to fasten a quarrel on him. Accordingly the Raja was required to keep a body of Cavalry for the service of Government."

(Lord Macaulay's Essay on Warren Hastings.)

Introduction.

Of the various charges levelled against Warren Hastings, the great Governor-General of India, the Rohilla War and the Nandakumar affair have been thoroughly discussed by competent scholars like Strachey, Beverley and Sir FitzJames Stephen. The bitter attacks of Mill, Burke and Macaulay—the formidable triumvirate against Hastings—have not yet been critically reviewed with regard to his relations with Raja Chait Sing of Benares, and with the Begums of Oudh. We take up one of these topics upon which a critical study of the State Papers* published by G. W. Forrest will throw much light.

There are, however, two obstacles in our way. Every student of

* Selections from State Papers preserved in the Foreign Department, 1772-1785, 3 Vols.
history who attempts a serious study of these controversial topics must have an open mind and a judicial temper. But the unsparing criticisms of the English Demosthenes, repeated in brilliant style by Mill and Macaulay, have unfortunately produced an atmosphere of prejudice against the great Governor-General of India. The first duty of a seeker after historical truth is to ignore all presumptions either way and to test the accuracy of every statement made on either side.

The second difficulty is the absence of a properly digested and authentic narrative of this period. Students and researchers of the ancient period of Indian history are handicapped by lack of materials. A critical historian of the British period, on the other hand, feels embarrassed by the infinite mass of contemporary papers—most of which remains unused. The rich field has as yet been but lightly scratched by the plough of investigation. This difficulty is best appreciated by a teacher who has to lecture to his class on this subject. Our task is, therefore, to handle properly this vast material and to co-ordinate the facts thus ascertained so as to satisfy the ideals of an impartial historian and the requirements of skilled critics.

*Short history of the relations of the Company with Raja Chait Sing.*

The relations of the Benares Raj with the English were satisfactory from the very beginning and Mill traces the history of their alliances at length.* The Raja of Benares was a vassal under the nominal subjection of the Subadar of Oudh but enjoyed full sovereign rights of government except those of coining money and administering criminal justice. Balawant Sing, the Raja of Benares, helped the English against the Subadar of Oudh in 1764. The Court of Directors recognised the signal services of the Raja in the strongest terms.† After the war was over the Raja was spared any punishment from the Subadar through the good offices of the English. A special clause was inserted in the treaty of Allahabad to this effect and the Company undertook to stand as guarantee for the same.

On the death of Balawant Sing in 1770, the Nawab-Vizier wanted to divest the family of the district and to take it in his own hands. The English interfered and secured the succession to Chait Sing,

* Mill, History of British India, Book V, ch. 7.
† In their Bengal Letter, dated the 26th May, 1768.
Balawant's son, on the old terms except a small rise in the annual tribute. In 1773 this agreement was renewed and confirmed by Hastings.

In 1775 Suja-ud-daula, the Nawab-Vizier, died and Asaf-ud-daula succeeded him. By a new treaty the interest of the Nawab-Vizier in the district of Benares was transferred to the English. The territory still remained with Raja Chait Sing under no condition but the payment of a fixed and invariable tribute.

The Raja regularly paid the fixed amount of annual tribute—in the words of Mill "with an exactness rarely exemplified in the history of the tributary princes of Hindusthan."* But Hastings, pressed for money, demanded an extraordinary contribution of 5 lacs in 1778. The Raja paid the contribution—which was contrary to the stipulation—on the understanding that it would not be demanded again.†

The contribution was again demanded in 1779 and was exacted by threat of military coercion.‡ In 1780 the demand was again made. The Raja wanted to be excused and paid the Governor-General a bribe of 2 lacs of rupees. Hastings accepted the money but the demand was not withheld.§ "He certainly concealed the transaction for a time, both from the Council in Bengal and from the Directors at home; nor did he ever give any satisfactory reason for the concealment. Public spirit, or fear of detection, at last determined him to withstand the temptation."|| He paid over the money to the Company's treasury and insisted that the Raja should instantly comply with the demands of the English government. The whole contribution with a fine of one lac of rupees for delay was exacted.

In 1780 the Raja was further required to supply a body of cavalry for the service of the Company. The Raja was in great difficulty. He offered 20 lacs to propitiate Hastings. Hastings demanded 50 lacs. He was now planning the sale of Benares to the Nawab of Oudh and thus to punish Chait Sing.¶

Hastings then visited Benares. The Raja recieved the Governor-

† Ibid., pp. 368-9.
‡ Ibid., pp. 371-2.
§ Ibid., p. 372.
|| Macaulay, _Essay on Warren Hastings._
¶ (i) Burke, _Articles of charge against Warren Hastings_, Part II, Art. 16 (Bohn's British Classics, Vol. IV, p. 253); (ii) Mill, _History of British India_, Book V, Ch. 7, p. 375; (iii) Macaulay, _Essay on Warren Hastings_.
General with every mark of reverence and expressed his deep concern at the displeasure of the English government. Hastings behaved with cold and repulsive severity. He then sent a letter to the Raja explaining in detail the charges against him.* The Raja in reply attempted to clear himself of the accusations levelled against him.† This upset Hastings, who instantly ordered Mr. Markham, the Resident, to arrest the Raja and keep him in custody.‡ The Raja submitted quietly to the arrest and offered to give up his zemindary in lieu of a subsistence allowance.§

Shortly after the Raja was placed under arrest a large body of armed men crossed the river from Ramnagar, slaughtered the troops and released the Raja from custody. Hastings escaped for personal safety to Chunar.

The whole district of Benares took up arms for their popular and insulted Raja. Chait Sing was ultimately deposed. His nephew was installed in his place and the tribute of Benares was doubled.

By this revolution an addition of about 20 lacs a year was made to the Company's revenues. But the treasure laid up by Chait Sing which had been popularly estimated at a million sterling turned out to be only a fourth part of that sum. This, however, did not enrich the English Company. It had been seized by the army as prize-money and the army refused to give it up.||

The Status of Chait Sing.

There has been warm and acute controversy between the advocates and adversaries of Hastings regarding the exact status of Chait Sing. Burke laboured at length to prove that he was a “sovereign prince, though a subordinate sovereign”¶ and that he was made independent of the English government in every respect except that of paying an annual tribute of 23 lacs of rupees. Mill also argues that he was a Prince.** The Second Report of the Select Committee described him as “a Raja of the highest rank.”†† Hastings, on the other hand, said

¶ Mill, History of British India, Book V, Ch. 7, Wilson's ed., p. 403; also Vincent Smith, Oxford History of India, p. 537.
†† Ibid., p. 361.
in his defence at the bar of the House of Commons that "he was neither more nor less than a Zemindar." There cannot be the least doubt that he was not an independent sovereign prince. According to Wilson Benares was under foreign rule from the middle of the 11th century. The Raja was, therefore, as pointed out by Forrest, "a dependent on Sujah-Dowlah and afterwards on the British Government."* An independent prince never pays any fixed tribute to another government, never allows his destiny to be transferred from the hands of one power to those of another and neither receives a Sanad fixing the demand of an annual tribute nor executes an agreement promising the faithful payment of the same. Wilson quotes the Sanad of 1776, and justly remarks that "all these terms imply delegated and subordinate offices, and recognise in him nothing more than receiver of the rents, and civil and commercial Judge."†

The Cowlnama and the Patta given by Nawab Suja-ud-daula to Raja Chait Sing on the 6th September, 1773, granted the "Zemindary and Sircar of Benares," etc. on condition of the regular payment of a fixed tribute. The Sanad ‡ granted by the Company to the Raja on the 15th April, 1776, and the Cabuliat § executed by him confirmed his status. These documents, therefore, establish the fact that he was all along a vassal both under the Vizier and under the Company.

**The Legality of the Governor-General's Action.**

We should, however, discuss this question from only one point of view—viz., whether Chait Sing was under any obligation to pay to his sovereign power more than his stipulated annual tribute. As Wilson observes "the only material point at issue" is whether the Raja was exempted from all further demands.||

Our answer to this question is in the negative and the published State Papers clearly establish the fact that Chait Sing was not liable to pay more than his stipulated tribute.

The first document which throws light on the status of Chait Sing

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§ Ibid, p. 515.
is the Cowlnama or agreement given by Nawab Suja-ud-daula to Chait Sing executed in the presence of Hastings and attested by him.* It explicitly declares "exclusive of the jumma specified in the Cabooleat, no increase shall ever hereafter be demanded."

The history of this agreement is interesting and clearly brings out the honest opinion of Hastings. When the Governor-General first visited Nawab Suja-ud-daula at Benares in 1773, there was some negotiation with regard to the Raja of Benares. In his short letter to the Select Committee from Benares Hastings wrote "I have obtained a renewal and formal confirmation of his (Nawab’s) former engagements with Raja Chait Sing."† In his long report of the negotiations at Benares which he submitted on the 4th of October, 1773,‡ Hastings gave fuller details. "The cowlnama was executed in my presence and attested by me. . . . He (the Vizier) seemed to think his former act of so little validity that he pressed me in every earnest terms for my consent that he should dispossess the Raja of the forts of Luttefgur and Bidgygur, and take from him 10 lacs of rupees over and above the stipulated rents, and he seemed greatly dissatisfied at my refusal. He argued that the treaty of Allahabad related to Bulwand Sing solely and was never meant to extend to his posterity. I confess the letter of the treaty expresses no more, yet I cannot conceive that either the Raja or Lord Clive, when the Treaty was made, could have intended it in that sense. It has certainly been differently understood both by the Company and by this Administration, and the Vizier had before put it out of all dispute by the solemn Act passed in the Raja’s favour on his succession to the Zemindary. I am well convinced that the Raja’s inheritance, and perhaps his life, are no longer safe than while he enjoys the Company’s protection, which is his due by the ties of justice, and the obligations of public faith, and which policy enjoins us to afford him evermost effectually." It is quite clear that Hastings insisted upon all the rights and advantages enjoyed by Balawant Sing, being secured to Chait Sing. This report further proves that in the opinion of Hastings the British Government had for ever guaranteed the rights and privileges of Chait Sing and could not tolerate any violation of them. It was

† Ibid, p. 44.
‡ Ibid, p. 50-51.
accordingly stipulated in the *Cowlnama* that "no increase of revenues shall ever hereafter be demanded."*

The rights of the Company over Benares could not, unless distinctly stated, exceed those of the Vizier from whom they derived their rights by virtue of a treaty. The Raja practically held Benares under the terms prescribed by his former suzerain. A reference to the public proclamation issued by the Board on the 8th October, 1781, removes all doubts on this point. The 8th paragraph of the proclamation states "the rights held under the Nabob, his former sovereign, by the Raja, were continued to him by the Governor-General, under the Government of the Company."†

That the Company could not exact demands other than the annual revenue is also clear from the proceedings of the council. Immediately before Benares was ceded to the Company by the Vizier it was resolved on the 3rd March, 1775, by the majority of the Council—including Hastings and Barwell—"that Raja Cheyt Sing shall exercise a free and independent authority in his own dominions, subject only to the payment of his tribute."‡ Francis in assenting to this resolution clearly expressed his views in a separate minute as follows: "The Zemindary may be perpetuated in his *family on fixed and unalterable conditions."§

As soon as Benares was transferred to the Company the Board met on 12th June, 1775, to determine in what manner the right should be exercised. The Board unanimously accepted the proposal of Hastings that so long as the Raja would continue faithful to his engagements, and punctual in his payments of the monthly instalment of the annual revenue, "*no demands shall be made upon him by the Hon'ble Company, of any kind, or on any pretence whatsoever,* nor shall any person be allowed to interfere with his authority, or to disturb the peace of his country."|| It is interesting to find that Hastings himself explained in his minute what he meant by the "authority" of the Raja—"*a complete and uncontrolled authority* over his Zemindary under the acknowledged sovereignty of the Hon'ble Company in the government of

§ Ibid., p. 266.
|| Ibid., p. 402.

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the country dependent on him in the collection of the revenues, and in
the administration of justice.''

The Sanad granted by the Company merely fixed the annual
tribute at 23 lacs and nothing more on either side. The Cabuliat exe-
cuted by Chait Sing promised the punctual payment of revenue and
thus concluded: "After payment of the same and observing the condi-
tions agreed upon, I shall receive a release or discharge in full, where-
fore I have written this agreement to be adhered to accordingly.''

Arguments of Wilson and Forrest.

The conclusion we have arrived at is exactly opposed to the views
expressed by Wilson and Forrest. Both attempted to prove that the
Company could legally demand the extra contribution from Chait Sing
over and above his stipulated annual tribute and that the Raja was
always liable to pay the same. As we shall presently see Wilson
laboured under a misapprehension and was not cognisant of an impor-
tant state paper since published, whereas Forrest's argument is prima
facie fallacious and can be refuted easily.

Forrest quotes a part of a sentence from the Cabuliat or agreement
executed by Chait Sing—"It shall be my duty to do everything that
may be needful and usual for the interest and security of the country.''

He then argues "The interest and security of the country demanded
that he should contribute money and troops for its defence . . . . The
conduct of Chait Sing, in hesitating to afford the necessary aid to his
suzerain at a time of great danger was contumacious and refractory and
deserving of punishment.'" Taking it for granted that Chait Sing did
hesitate to afford the aid legitimately demanded of him, the argument
of Forrest still betrays a fallacy. The rest of the sentence quoted by
Forrest made it incumbent upon Chait Sing "to provide for the welfare
of the inhabitants, to be attentive to the increase of cultivation and
improvement of the revenues", etc.|| It is clear the word 'country,'
as used in the Cabuliat, meant the province of Benares as Chait Sing
could not possibly undertake to provide for the welfare of the inhab-
nants of other parts of British India. But the same word has been

* Ibid.  
† Ibid., Vol. II, p. 515.  
‡ Ibid., p. 515.  
§ Administration of Warren Hastings, p. 209.  
differently interpreted by Forrest—as if it meant the whole of British India. His defence, therefore, falls to the ground.

Wilson argued that the Sanad of 1773 was cancelled by that of 1776, and hence the Raja could not claim exemption as there was no provision to that effect in the latter Sanad.* He is, however, wrong and all his arguments are vitiated by this wrong assumption. As we have already said the Bengal Government prepared a Sanad and a Patta to be given to Chait Sing in 1775.† In the meeting of the Council of the 21st June, 1776, a letter from Mr. Fowke, the Resident at Benares, was read.‡ The Raja objected to the ‘Muchulka’ article occurring in the Sanad and the Patta, inasmuch as the Board had excused him the execution of any ‘Muchulka.’ The Bengal Government thereupon authorised Mr. Fowke “to erase this word where it has been mentioned in the Sanad and Patta.”§ The Raja still declined to accept the Sanad and Patta on the following grounds:—

(1) “that any erasure in a Sanad or public deed is totally unprecedented in the usages of this country,” and

(2) “that the clause in the Sanad by which the former Sanads are declared to be null is likewise contrary to custom and practice.” Vide Mr. Fowke’s letter of the 17th July.||

The Bengal Government thereupon ordered “that the Secretary prepare a new Sanad and Patta, omitting the word ‘Muchulka’ and the sentence declaring the former Sanads to be null, and that these be transmitted to Mr. Fowke with directions to receive back the temporary Patta and grant which are first allowed him.”¶ Wilson contends that the new Sanad was never drawn up and, hence, the privilege of exemption under the old Sanad could no longer be claimed. He observes bluntly “whatever might at one time have been the disposition of the Council to accede to the Raja’s wishes, it does not appear that any actual measure ensued.”** We now know that it did ensue. The fact that a new Sanad was prepared on the lines suggested by the Raja and was actually handed over to him is indubitably proved by

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‡ Ibid., p. 544. § Ibid., p. 545. ¶ Ibid., p. 549.
Mr. Fowke’s letter to the Board, dated the 25th September, 1776.* The Resident informed the Board “I likewise delivered to him the Sanads transmitted to me by Mr. Secretary Aurial under date the 4th September, 1776, and received back from him the former Sanads which I herewith enclose.” This is quite sufficient to prove the misapprehension under which Wilson was labouring.

We come to the conclusion from the State Papers noted above that the Company had no legal right to demand anything more than the stipulated annual tribute “on any pretence whatsoever” and that the exaction of such demands constituted a clear violation of their solemn agreements.

† Ibid., 9th July, 1778; State Papers, II, p. 639.
‡ Ibid., 17 Aug., 1778; State Papers, II, p. 656-7.
The Raja paid the contribution on condition that it would not be demanded again.

The year for which the Raja had paid the contribution would have expired on the 17th of August, 1779. On the 19th of July, 1779, Hastings proposed to renew the demand upon the Raja for another year and the Board wrote to the Resident directing him to ask the Raja to pay the sum.* The Raja expressed his inability to pay the same and hoped to be excused.† On the Governor-General’s motion the majority of the Board resolved to employ military coercion and ordered Major Camac to march with two battalions of sepoys to Benares on the requisition of the Resident.‡ The Resident wisely refrained from taking such extreme measure. The apprehension of military pressure compelled the Raja to agree to the payment and he prayed for four months’ time in his letter to the Resident, dated the 17th September, 1779.§ The time demanded was not unreasonable for the collection of such a large sum—and more so when the treasury was already impoverished by the extra payment of the previous year. Hastings was, however, impatient, accused the Resident of violating the spirit of his orders and took an outrageous step. Orders were issued to Major Camac to march to Benares with two battalions of sepoys until the Resident, on full receipt of the subsidy, would inform him that there was no necessity of proceeding any further. The Raja paid the full amount by the 22nd of October, 1779,|| technically a delay of two months as the first year ended on the 17th August, 1779. But the Raja had also to pay Rs. 20,000 as expenses of the detachment—employed to coerce him—from the date of its march until the realisation of the whole amount of the subsidy.

The demand upon the Raja was again renewed in 1780.¶ The Raja in order to propitiate Hastings paid him a bribe of two lacs of rupees, which, as we have already noticed, was readily accepted. But the payment of the contribution was insisted upon. The Raja paid the first lac on the 5th August, 1780—at least twelve clear days before the expiry of the second year and the whole payment was made

† Ibid., 26 Aug., 1779; State Papers, p. 684.
¶ Ibid., 22nd June, 1780; State Papers, Vol. II, p. 695.
good by the 18th October, 1780—at the most a technical delay of one month. But "the remonstrances of the Raja, and his renewed endeavours to gain a little time, were treated as renewed delinquency," and a fine of one lac of rupees was exacted. The exaction of this fine is sometimes doubted, but Mill observes "as it is passed without mention in the Answer (to the Impeachment charges), the silence must, in this, as in other cases, be taken for confession."*

An additional burden was imposed upon the Raja. Besides his fixed tribute of 23 lacs and annual contribution of 5 lacs the Raja was required to furnish a body of 2,000 horse. The Raja represented in December, 1780, that he had only 1,300 in his service and that all except 250 were absolutely necessary for collecting the revenue. The Governor-General reduced his demand first to 1,500 and at last to 1,000. Hastings accused the Raja of non-compliance with this demand.† But the Raja wrote in his reply to Hastings—and this stands uncontradicted—that he had kept ready 500 horse and 500 burcandazes as a substitute for the remainder and had informed Mr. Markham about it and that he had not obtained any answer.‡

The Raja was afraid of the hostile attitude of Hastings against him and offered the Governor-General 20 lacs of rupees for the public service. But the Governor-General had other intentions and demanded 50 lacs. As we have noticed before, he was planning the sale of Benares to the Nawab.

On the 21st of May, 1781, Hastings proposed to the Board to visit Oudh and Benares.§ The Council was then composed of two members—the Governor-General himself and Wheler. Of course, the Governor-General had a casting vote. Hastings formally procured for himself credentials with regard to his negotiations with the Raja. On the 3rd July, 1781, an arrangement was made between the two members—which has been described by Burke as "a compact of iniquity between these two duumvirs." Wheler was given full powers of the Governor-General and Council during this period and Hastings invested himself "with full power and authority to form such arrangements with the Raja of Benares for the better government of his zemindary and to

‡ Ibid., p. 784.
perform such acts for the improvement of the interest which the Hon’ble Company possesses in it, as he shall think fit, and conso-
nant to the mutual relation and actual engagement subsisting between the Company and the Raja." All these *prima facie* import nothing beyond an amicable adjustment with the Raja.

**The Charges against the Raja.**

On his arrival at Benares on the 14th August, 1781, the Governor-
General wrote a letter to the Raja explaining in detail the charges against him.†

Firstly, the Raja had failed to make good his promise of payment of the subsidy of 1780 without delay. Hastings gave the details of the facts upon which he held the Raja guilty. Relying on the Raja’s promise he had ordered the Resident to remit the money to Colonel Camac for the pay of the army marching to Malwa and had made no other arrangement for the same. But the Raja deceived him. The Raja paid only a small sum and then by shifts and pretexts withheld the remainder until the army for whose use it was intended was reduced to much distress.

Secondly, the Raja had returned evasive answers to and did not comply with the demand for 1,000 horse.

Thirdly, the Raja tried to excite disorders in the Government through his secret agents.

Fourthly, the Raja was guilty of neglect of duty by allowing the daily perpetration of robberies and murders even in the very streets of Benares.

**The Raja’s Reply.**

The Raja sent a prompt reply ‡ explaining these charges.

As regards the first charge, the Raja said that he had sent first one lac with an answer to the Governor-General’s letter. He then paid Rs. 1,70,000 to the Resident and prayed for time. To this he received no reply. The Raja, however, paid the remaining part of the sum as soon as his Buxey arrived. He submitted, "The remitting of this to the army did not depend upon me; if any delay happened on this head I could not help it. If besides the payment of the money the remit-

tance of it also to the army had rested with me, a delay of this kind should not have happened."

As regards the second charge, the Raja replied that in compliance with the orders of the Governor-General he had collected 500 horses and 500 burcandazes as substitute for the remainder and had told Mr. Markham that they were ready to go to whatever place they should be sent. The Raja stated, "No answer, however, came from you on this head, and I remained astonished at the cause of it. Repeatedly I asked Mr. Markham about an answer to my letter about the horse, but he told me that he did not know the reason of no answer having been sent; I remained astonished."

On the third charge, the Raja denied having sent any man to Calcutta except Abdulla Beg who remained with Hastings and his attendants. He submitted that his enemies had made these false representations.

As regard the last charge, the Raja said that he had tried his best to suppress robberies, etc., and had always been careful to punish the culprits.

*Forrest’s Criticism.*

Forrest makes a sweeping remark regarding the Raja’s letter. He observes, "the answer was false in all its parts."* But he cannot produce substantial evidence to justify his remark and makes but a feeble attempt to prove the Raja’s guilt on the first charge. He notes that the Raja paid the first lakh on the 5th August, 1780, though the demand was made in the end of June. But as we have observed, no contribution could be legally demanded from the Raja before the 18th of August, 1780, at the earliest—when his second year would have expired. Moreover this delay of one month was not unreasonable for the payment of five lacs after the exhaustion of the state exchequer by the payment of the two previous sums of ten lacs to the Company and two lacs to the Governor-General.

None but biographers and apologists can agree with Forrest’s remark† that "the answer of Cheyt Sing well deserves the description given of it by Hastings; it was "not only unsatisfactory in substance but offensive in style."‡ Hastings considered this "as a strong in-

The Chait Sing Tragedy.

...dication of that spirit of independency which the Raja has for some years past assumed.'

The Arrest.

"Under these alarming appearances of the Raja's conduct and disposition," wrote Hastings to the Board, "I conceived myself indispensably obliged to form some immediate and decisive plan for obviating their consequences and for the preservation of the Company's rights and interests in this Zemindary." Hastings argued that justice and prudence demanded a limitation of his powers "which he had notoriously abused, and which it was to be apprehended he would employ to the most dangerous purposes." But he did not want to be so severe as "to divest him entirely of his Zemindary, though justifiable on the grounds stated above." After weighing these conflicting considerations, the generous nature of Hastings impelled him to order the Resident to put Chait Sing under arrest. On the morning of the 16th of August, 1781, the Raja was imprisoned in his own house and a military guard was posted outside.

The Resident thus reported to the Governor-General, "The Raja submitted quietly to the arrest, and assured me that whatever were your orders he was ready implicitly to obey; he hoped that you would allow him a subsistence, but as for his Zemindary, his forts, and treasure he was ready to lay them at your feet, and his life, if required." This is the point where we should pause to examine the conduct of both the parties as none of them can be justly held responsible for the subsequent events over which they had no control:—"since to this time their actions were the offspring of choice; afterwards they became more the result of necessity on both sides."

The Act of Hastings, Cruel and Impolitic.

The Company had no legal right according to their solemn agreements to demand any extra payments but their inherent right of a sovereign power to levy extra contribution in times of distress was not exercised with justice and moderation. The demand was too heavy and was realised with unnecessary rigour. The Raja used to pay his stipulated annual tribute with regularity. He was a faithful vassal of the English and Hastings himself described Chait Sing in 1773 as "a

† Ibid., p. 786.
sure ally” upon whom the English could depend whenever they might stand in need of his services.* Even if the extra demands are considered just and the Raja is held guilty of procrastination and attempt at evasion of payment, the conduct of Hastings in ordering military coercion and personal insult was “harsh, precipitate and cruel.”† The arrest of the Raja for the delay of a few months in paying the extraordinary contribution — in his own Capital and in his own palace — humiliated and disgraced him before the eyes of his subjects. And this can only be described in the language of the Court of Directors as “improper,” “impolitic” and “unwarrantable”‡—when we remember that the demand was unjust, that some of Hastings’s own colleagues disputed the right of the government to enforce any such demand, and that Hastings himself dared not decide this point but reserved it for the decision of his superiors.§

The Raja’s Guilt.

What then is the real complaint against the unfortunate Raja? What took place between 1773 and 1778 which explains, if not, justifies the inhuman conduct—condemned by Pitt as “cruel, unjust and oppressive” — of Hastings towards Chait Sing? We know the real cause of the trouble. It is not the traitorous design of the Raja against the British Government nor the evasion of extra payments nor the unsatisfactory police system of Benares. It is due to the fact that the Raja sent a man in June 1777 to congratulate General Claveron on his reported succession to Hastings as Governor-General. As Burke pointed out, “this fact, if it had been true, was in no sort criminal or offensive to the Company’s government; but was nothing more than a proper mark of duty and respect to the supposed succession of office.” (Articles of charge against Warren Hastings, Part II, Art. 1.) That was, however, the Raja’s folly and he dearly paid for it. Hastings could not forget or forgive it and utilised every opportunity to ruin the man he disliked. “It is a fact,” Hastings himself says, “that when the unhappy divisions of our government had proceeded to an extremity bordering on civil violence, by the attempt to wrest from me my

authority, in the month of June 1777, he had deputed a man named Sumboonath, with an express commission to my opponent; and the man had proceeded so far as Moorshedabad, when, hearing of the change of affairs, he stopped and the Raja recalled him."

* The Charge of Disloyalty refuted, Sedition a Camouflage.

The above incident furnishes the answer to our query and was magnified into a charge of treachery and hostility against the English. The Raja in his reply to Hastings completely vindicated himself.† Burke argued before the British Parliament that the chances of probability were quite against such a supposition.‡ How could Chait Sing—described by Hastings as a timid, weak and irresolute man—in his small district possibly have formed such hostile designs and have ventured to make war with the colossal power of the Company? But the best defence is that "it was contradicted, by his own actions,—a better testimony than his words."§ That the Raja submitted quietly to the arrest proved the absence of any such designs. The so-called rebellion of the people of Benares took place after the arrest and was a spontaneous rising on behalf of their outraged overlord.

Justification on Financial Grounds.

But the best—and perhaps the only—way in which the outrageous action of Hastings can be defended is that the pressure for money led the Governor-General to resort to these measures which may never be justified according to the standard of constitutional morality obtaining in the 20th century. But it is not fair to review the public acts of Warren Hastings in the latter part of the 18th century according to the standard of justice and legality of the 20th century. Nor is it fair to forget that Hastings was a statesman who was placed in very difficult circumstances—who had to find money for maintaining the Empire in India and for satisfying the greedy shareholders of the Company in England. The Court of Directors criticised his actions when they did not satisfy their conscientious scruples. As Macaulay observes, "to enjoin honesty, and to insist on having what could not be honestly got,

was then the constant practice of the Company." They always demanded money from India and made Hastings resort to various measures the justice or propriety of which should be impeached. "Whatever we may think of the morality of Hastings," Macaulay candidly admits in connection with the Rohilla war, "it cannot be denied that the financial results of his policy did honour to his talents." In reviewing the conditions before 1778, Macaulay observes, "The financial embarrassment was extreme. Hastings had to find the means not only of carrying on the Government of Bengal, but of maintaining a most costly war against both Indian and European enemies in the Carnatic, and of making remittances to England."*

Hastings also attempted to defend himself on the ground of financial expediency. While leaving for Benares Hastings informed Wheler, his colleague, that he was going to fine Chait Sing 50 lacs of rupees. He said, "I was resolved to draw from his guilt the means of relief to the Company's distresses. In a word, I have determined to make him pay largely for his pardon, or exact a severe vengeance for his past delinquency."† The guilt consisted in reluctance to submit to the illegal exactions and the delinquency was, of course, intimacy with the political opponents of the Governor-General. Hastings repeated the same argument in the Parliament: "I will suppose for a moment, that I have erred, that I have acted with an unwarranted rigour towards Cheyt Sing, and even with injustice. *Let my motive be consulted*: I left Calcutta impressed with the belief, that extraordinary means, and those exerted with a strong hand, were necessary to preserve the Company's interests from sinking under the accumulated weight which oppressed them. I saw a political necessity for curbing the overgrown power of a great member of their dominion, and to make it contribute to the relief of their pressing exigencies. If I erred, my error was prompted by an excess of zeal for their interests, operating with too strong a bias on my judgment."‡

In this *prima facie* frank confession some portion of the truth comes out. The Company was in utmost distress for want of money. The Raja was supposed to possess it and Hastings resolved to take it

† Governor-General's Narrative.
from him against his will. The pretence that his power was 'overgrown' was utterly groundless. In 1773 he was a 'sure ally', * and during the short period of five years his power did not increase so as to endanger the safety of British rule. By a small number of troops hastily collected and wretchedly provided both with provisions and pay the whole 'overgrown' power of the Raja was destroyed in a few days.

The real motive, Revenge.

The real motive of Hastings was not exactly what he stated in the above passage. Hastings cherished a feeling of resentment and his exactions from the Raja were not merely the result of financial distress but of personal malice. If Hastings was seriously after Chait Sing's treasure to relieve financial embarrassment, he would not have tolerated the plunder of 23 laes being appropriated by the army as 'prize-money.' Hastings himself made an unconscious confession: "So long as I conceived Cheyt Sing's misconduct and contumacy to have me, rather than the Company, for its object, I looked upon a considerable fine as sufficient, both for his immediate punishment and for binding him to future good behaviour."

Burke says that here the secret comes out. † It was not for rebellion or a suspicion of rebellion against the English Company that Hastings resolved to take from the Raja the sum of 50 laes but for his intimacy with the other members of the Government. The method of punishment was really peculiar. The exaction of fine presupposes enquiry, charge, defence and judgment. Hastings did nothing of the kind. He declared himself the person injured, stood forward as the accuser, assumed the office of judge, and proceeded to judgment without the party before him, without trial, without examination and without proof. The real motive was not the realisation of fine from a recalcitrant vassal to provide money for the public exchequer but the accomplishment of his destruction. Hastings "picked a quarrel with the Raja" ‡ — prompted by purely personal feeling of malice towards him. Despite his best efforts to justify Hastings, Vincent Smith admits, "Probably the excessive severity practised and intended by Hastings was partly due to his personal

† Speech on the Impeachment of Hastings (Bohn's Standard Library), Vol. VIII, p. 16.
‡ Wyatt Tilby, The English People Overseas, Vol. II.
resentment against the Raja for having sought to curry favours with the hostile members of the Council while they were in power." * This is the story of the terrible revenge — the tragic episode — which is one of the darkest chapters in the chequered history of India.

COLERIDGE AS A THINKER.

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Coleridge, writing in 1817, complains that certain officious and ill-informed persons had tried to make the public believe that he had "dreamt away his life to no purpose." In self-defence he reviews the literary work which he had accomplished down to that time; and shows that it had not been insignificant—neither in quantity nor in labour of thought. In early life he had published some collections of poems. These had been admitted to contain "buds of hope and promises of better work to come," and the promise had not been altogether unfulfilled. They had at the same time been, he admits, criticised adversely for their "excess of ornament" and their "laborious and florid diction," the fashionable style of contemporary poetry. But his friend, Wordsworth, had condemned "poetic diction," and shown the superiority of "an austerer and more natural style." Yet he refuses to accept, Wordsworth's theory in full, and still claims some merit for the conventional diction of his own early poems. As he claims to have had the "dynamical" philosophy in his mind before he had heard of Schelling, so he had understood and appreciated at its true worth the Wordsworthian style before Wordsworth, but had never accepted it as of universal application. His scattered prose writings had been charged also with obscurity and love of paradox, with making simple things to appear complex, attaching exaggerated importance to petty things, and oppressing readers with prolix and ponderous discussions which led only to trifling results. Yet he can claim that he had never offered anything to the public that was not the product of his own thought, and had never written in an hour what he had not studied for a month. Yet, "considering the fewness, unimportance and limited circulation of his writings," he is surprised that they have attracted so much attention as they have done; and points out that "the true criterion of a scholar's merit is not the bulk of his printed words, but the number and value of the truths which he has been the means of throwing into the general circulation," "the number
and importance of the minds which, by his conversation and writings, he has excited into activity and supplied with the germs of their aftergrowth.” Judged, then, by this standard it is safe to say that few English men of letters have accomplished a better life’s work than Coleridge.

We may ask, then, what fundamental truths or ideas he has “thrown into the general circulation.” These will be the measure of his importance as a thinker. Evidently the fundamental idea underlying what is most original in the work of Coleridge is the idea of organic evolution. He was the first to introduce that idea into English literature, and he made it to be at least an undercurrent in English thought. To be sure, the evolution which was always present in his mind was not that of plant and animal organisms, with which the idea is most commonly associated, and which had already been suggested by Erasmus Darwin in his own country, and was being worked out in his own time by Lamarck in France. And he did not think of it as a mechanical moulding and shaping of things from the outside by physical forces as it has been commonly understood in physical science, but as the self-unfolding in all things of purpose from within. He thought of the world as a whole, and of life and mind, and of the works of mind in art and literature, religion and political, and social institutions as produced by the differentiating and co-ordinating power of immanent life. To him nothing is made; everything grows. A real poem is not produced by applying rules and models, and putting together pieces from different sources, as a work of mechanism is constructed; but grows and branches out in the mind of the poet by the expansive force of his own mental life, working through one “germinal” idea, as the life power of nature expands the germ into a spreading tree. With this conception in his mind he was able to rise above the “mechanical-corporeal” thought of his century, with its conception of poetry as contemplation and imitation of the outside of things and of the superficial and artificial aspects of life; and was able to vindicate the theory of Wordsworth that poetry at its highest is the spiritual interpretation of nature, and comes as an inspiration from the life of nature itself; and was thereby able to teach a new way of understanding and criticising poetry and art in general. The mechanical philosophy of 18th century had, on the contrary, led to the view that poetry is an art, and that poems can be made by dexterous application of rules and models and are best judged by comparison with the originals imitated. But
Coleridge's conception of the organic unity, correlation and growth of things led him to an organic theory of life, art, religion and social and political development. And, apart, it may be, from occasional units by other writers (as by Burke in politics) he was the first to give these ideas currency in English thought.

This way of thinking was probably natural to him and present to his mind from early days, as he himself claims. It was impressed on him more deeply, by the Neo-Platonic thinkers into whose works he had plunged even when a boy at school. It was strengthened by long and anxious study of many modern thinkers of different countries; and finally confirmed by studying the early works of his contemporary Schelling. From that modern Plato, he has been accused of translating many pages without acknowledgment, but what he says in his own justification is doubtless true—that he was only expressing his own thoughts in the words of Schelling: Wordsworth had expressed the same theory of a living world before either he or Coleridge knew anything of German thought. And it was by introducing this conception of the self-expansion of immanent life in nature, thought, art and poetry, in religion, and in social and political institutions, that he has so deeply influenced subsequent English philosophy, theology and criticism.

From very early days, he tells us, his thought had turned mainly on three subjects, viz., philosophy, religion (the philosophical grounds of religious ideas) and poetry. Even while a boy at school he had begun "to delve into the unwholesome quicksilver mines of metaphysic depths," in the hope of reaching the foundations of religious ideas, and the springs of poetic feeling and power. What attracted him to Greek literature was not its poetry but the philosophy of Plato, and especially that of the later thinkers called Neo-Platonic, who tried to give logical connection to the ideas of the ancient master, and to apply them to life. Such studies received but little encouragement in English schools; and it was for this reason, perhaps, that he never felt himself at home either at school or at university. But for long, as might be expected, his metaphysical studies continued to be unprofitable; he could find no solid ground on which to rest his feet. Therefore at times he tried to turn his attention away from that subject and fix it on what was to him the counter-attraction, namely, poetry. But he found little to satisfy him in the English poetry of his time. For over a hundred years English poetry had become so contracted in its range, so re-
stricted to a narrow circle of subjects and to a conventional lan-
guage and style, that it had come to be little more, he thought, than a
monotonous repetition of the same ideas and even of the same words
and phrases. The true spirit of poetry he thought was lost, and
what was accepted as poetry had come to consist largely of "prose
ideas translated into the language of poetry," or what was thought to
be such. He felt towards it in much the same way as Blake was feeling
about the same time, when he complained thus to the Muses,

How have you left the ancient love
That bards of old enjoyed in you!
The languid strings do scarcely move,
The sound is forced, the notes are few!

He seems to have been unacquainted at that time with Blake, Burns
and Cowper; and the fashionable poetry of his time—such work as
the Botanic Garden—was to him like "the painted mists which rise
from the marshes at the foot of Parnassus." Hence in the absence of
anything better he was delighted to hail even the sonnets of Bowles as
something new, and as opening up to him the possibility of a new kind
of poetry.

But the metaphysical craving—the natural tendency of his mind
to inquire into the innermost reasons of things—adhered to him even in
his poetical readings. Why should people write and enjoy poetry?
What is the ultimate source and meaning of poetical inspiration and
enjoyment? Such questions, always rising anew, brought him back again
always to psychology and metaphysic. He felt that the explanation
he wanted could be found only in the innermost nature of mind, and that
again had its source in the nature of things out of which humanity
springs. And in seeking the deepest sources of poetical thought and
feeling in metaphysic, he came into contact again with the sources of
religious thought and feeling. For poetry in its deepest sense, he be-
gan to think with Wordsworth, attempts to bring within the range of
human thought and feeling those very fundamental truths out of which
the thoughts and feelings of religion rise. The revelation which poetry
seeks to attain of the wonders and mysteries of nature and life, is a
revelation also of that same evolving power which is the object of reli-
gious awe and of theological research. Thus to him, poetry and reli-
gion seemed to grow out of the same ultimate root, and that common
root was at the same time the deepest object of philosophy. Political
thought, again, was forced upon him by the events of his time; and in the history and growth of nations he saw the expansion of the same spiritual force which he saw evolving itself in nature and in poetry and religion. Hence his thought, he tells us, turn came to mainly on these subjects: philosophy, politics, religion, and poetry. But an understanding of politics, religion, and poetry depended on fundamental principles of philosophy. Therefore the latter subject lay at root of all his studies.

Yet his scrappy and fragmentary writings, contain profound suggestions rather than full expositions of any of these subjects; and the reader has to work them out further in his own thought before they give him much light on anything. He tells us that the purpose of his *Literary Biography* was to give an introductory statement of "his principles in politics, religion and philosophy" and "to apply rules deduced from philosophical principles to poetry and criticism." Yet even this rather chaotic work leaves the most important questions only half answered. For a fuller account of his conclusions, he refers the reader, again and again, to a future work on philosophy which was to embody the whole result of his life's thought, but which was never even begun. It is made sufficiently clear, however, that his theory of poetry and criticism was to be a deduction from his philosophy, and the *Biographia* contains enough to show us how the deduction was to be drawn.

The last decade of the eighteenth century was a time of expectation and hopefulness; old things seemed passing away, and a new world seemed opening up to humanity, which had suffered and lingered in darkness so long. "Joy, it was to be alive and to be young was very heaven." Coleridge long shared in its hopefulness, and pursued his studies in the happy assurance that new light was dawning on him, and that new regions of thought and discovery were opening up before him. But to him as to many others, and more than to most others, there came a period of disillusion, disappointment and discouragement. There came a time when his enthusiasms and convictions began to melt away from him, and he fell into a state of doubt and despondency not unlike that of his successor of like mind, Carlyle. And when this period of storm and stress had passed, a considerable change had come over his mind in many things, especially in religious and political thought.
I.

Thus from early days he had been deeply interested in religion, or rather, perhaps, in theology or philosophy of religion, and had been given to thinking out the deepest theological problems; and he had for long been an adherent and teacher of unitarian theology, at that time more widely accepted than now. For the mathematical science of the eighteenth century favoured individualistic and atomistic notions in all things—not only in regard to the material world, but to the world of minds also. It tended to make atoms and molecules to be the types of reality, and made it difficult to conceive any real thing that was not sharply bounded and divided off from other things. It seemed, therefore, that every reality must be a unit, excluding and preserving itself against all other realities, after the analogy of a material atom. Therefore God had to be conceived as an individual in interaction with other individuals—an atom excluding all other atoms—a *primus inter pares*. Therefore the divine Three in One could be nothing but three individual gods, each impenetrable to the others like human individuals. But this, he now began to think, would lead to a too anthropomorphic conception of deity. Besides, if every unit of reality were thus complete in itself, and impervious to every other, there could be no development, neither within the individual nor in the world as a whole. And if each was thus closed against the influence of every other, there could be no fellow-feeling, and therefore no morality. Thus even the idea of God tended to pass away from him, the more he tried to think of it closely.

His ideas on social and political matters underwent a still more radical "clearing up." In his early enthusiasm he had agreed too readily with the French prophets of humanity. He had thought with them that the evils of human life were due to men's being misled and deceived by selfish teachers, exploited by rulers, and terrorised into being passive instruments by despots; and that if the powers of misrule were to be removed, and the power of rational judgment and mutual affection and sympathy which had been implanted in men by nature, were to be allowed free play, then men would soon shake off the habits of slavishness and brutality that had grown upon them through ages of degradation; and the evils of society would vanish away like the wracks of a dissolving dream. Indeed the methods of the Revolution had seemed too slow to satisfy his enthusiasm for humanity. He and
his friends thought they could anticipate the world-revolution, and show by demonstration what emancipated humanity could do. They would found a new society according to principles of reason in some as yet unoccupied part of the earth, and prove by example that external law and government are not necessary to men when left free to regulate their actions by the reason and instincts given them by nature; that priests, judges, magistrates were useless encumbrances to natural society; and even distinctions of property were unnecessary. But Pantisocracy, in which people would rule themselves and all would have equal power, soon proved an impracticable dream. And he began to feel disillusioned with regard to revolution in France. He had expected to see the French people emerge regenerated and glorified from the storms of the revolution, and see them helping other nations in the struggle for liberty. But instead of this he saw them applying their own new found liberty to destroy the liberty of other peoples weaker than themselves,

``To mix with kings in the low lust of sway,
Yell in the hunt and share the murdered prey'';

and he saw that, to render themselves more efficient in plundering others, they were preparing for themselves a new despotism which would be harder than the one they had cast off.

The sensual and the dark rebel in vain,
Slaves by their own compulsion.

Thus his belief in the essential goodness of human nature, and in the good to be derived from political revolutions and reforms, gave way; and along with that apparently even his faith in divine providence for a time. Consequently he fell into that state of melancholy described in the poem called Dejection. For a time he wavered in that faith in the immanence of life in nature which made Wordsworth happy all his days in the contemplation of natural phenomena, as when he declares

``O Lady! We receive but what we give,
And in our life alone does nature live.''

And for a time, he tells us "he wandered through the wilderness of doubt," and "skirted, if he did not enter on, the sandy deserts of utter unbelief" in human nature and God and the attainableness of truth. And this, he assures us, was no merely conventional "poetic" affection of melancholy, but was a real and deep despondency, and from it he could find for a time no means of escape. What his mariner tells the wedding guest was true metaphorically of himself;
O wedding guest! this soul hath been
Alone on a wide, wide sea:
So lonely 'twas, that God Himself
Scarce seemed there to be.

II.

From "the sandy desert of unbelief" in the sphere of religion, he seems to have made his escape at first through the semi-agnostic pragmatism of Kant. He tells us how carefully he studied the works of that thinker (which probably no other Englishman understood at that time), and how deeply they impressed his mind. Kant drew his attention to the ever afterwards popular distinction between what is contrary to reason, and what is above reason without being contrary to it—between what is provable and what is neither provable nor disprovable but yet possible and believable. What is inde-monstrable but nevertheless free from contradiction may be believed, if there are grounds for the belief other than demonstration; reasons and causes, he began to think, are not its only legitimate grounds of belief. Now Kant had shown that demonstration and logical certa-inty are possible only with regard to the world of things in space and time, which is open to sense experience. But space and time do not apply to reality as it is in itself; they are not things, but forms which reality is compelled to assume in entering into the consciousness of finite minds, and in making itself to be symbolically understood by them. Behind the things that appear to us under the forms of space and time, there is the world of reality which, not being subject to space and time, is therefore beyond the range of human conception and of logical proof and disproof. What is affirmed of this reality, therefore, will be above reason, but not necessarily contrary to reason. Now all the beliefs of religion centre round the idea of God, and God is the centre of that unknowable world of reality. Therefore the highest beliefs of God's religion will be above reason and therefore, from the nature of the case, indemonstrable. But they contain nothing contrary to reason, and therefore they cannot be disproved. Yet, we cannot believe them without having some reason for doing so, and for rejecting the contrary tenets of atheism and pantheism, which relate to the same sphere of the absolute. Such reasons for belief are to be found in what is now called pragmatic grounds. Beliefs which cannot be demonstrated may yet be found to be the most beneficial for practical purposes. Now
belief in the ideas of religion regarding God, are of the greatest utility, being the main support of peace, order and the moral life. Therefore, though we cannot prove them we must will to believe them because they are practically more "workable" than the other forms of belief. *Expedit esse deos, et ut expedit esse putemus.*

But such a makeshift as the pragmatic sanction, though it might lull a troubled mind to rest for a time, could not long satisfy such an active and inquiring mind as that of Coleridge. He continued his studies and became acquainted with the new works of Schelling (*Nature-Philosophy, Transcendental Idealism*, 1800). These broke down the barrier which Kant had set up between appearances and reality. To Schelling the absolute was life, and life was activity; but the activity which constitutes life was not meaningless force, but the energy of an end and good, unfolding itself into concrete existence. The history of the world, therefore, is a process of evolution; and finite things and processes, including nature, organization, mind and works of mind, are not appearances merely, but essential realities, viz., as phases and means in and through which the universal fulfils the ends of life. The world, therefore, is not the vast system of machinery which eighteenth century philosophy made it to be. It is a living organism of many organs, working out one idea of many ideas, in which nothing is made, but everything grows by life-force working and realising itself from within. And the rational life which evolves the world wells up individually in the human mind, making it possible for finite thought to understand the life and reason embodied in nature, and to reproduce theoretically in science, and practically in art, the work of nature, being itself a factor or finite reproduction of that same creative power and "being in itself" which is at the heart of all things.

Coleridge found in Schelling, therefore, a brother of like mind, who was now saying clearly what he himself had been thinking dimly all his life, but could not make sufficiently clear to himself nor express to others. And to this conception of an evolution of all things by an immanent life-power, making mechanism and organization to be successive stages through which it raises itself into being self-conscious spirit, he adhered all his life. And with this conviction he could rise above all the doubts that had troubled him regarding the foundations of spiritual religion, and that spiritual interpretation of nature which
Wordsworth had already made to be the essence of his poetry; and could see new fields of thought and poetry opening up, far beyond the barren formalism of his own time.

He gives us to understand, to be sure, that he had found and been attracted by similar ideas in the Neo-platonic writers even when he was a schoolboy in the eighties. These ideas attracted him even then because they were in harmony with the natural tendency of his own thought. And now they were confirmed, clarified and strengthened by the study of these new works of Schelling who, if not the originator, was certainly the populariser of the idea of evolution. Thus in the light derived from Schelling, he interprets some passages from the Neo-platonic writers which had specially attracted him when at school, particularly a passage from the hymns of Synesius which, he tells us, he had copied and translated in his 15th year— that Synesius who had, somewhat against his inclination, been made a bishop of the Christian Church and had proved a good one, but had been described in his own time, and has been since, as only a half-Christian; and had made the rather sophistical distinction between "philosophizing" at home and "mythologizing" in public. In his commentary on some lines of Synesius we find perhaps the most explicit statement (esoteric perhaps) that Coleridge has given of his own way of thinking regarding God. Expanded it amounts to this:

(a) God may be regarded as the absolute one, and the one may be regarded as containing the infinite many in itself in such a way as not to interfere with its unity. This, Coleridge thinks, is identical with the view held more recently by Spinoza—tending to obliterate the many in the one.

(b) He may be regarded as a unitary effect rising out of the world of things and processes, as their resultant or product (as the human soul may be supposed to be the resultant of the physical processes of the body). In this case, God will be only an anima mundi, or soul of the world.

(c) He may be conceived as a One which is absolutely antecedent to, and independent of the plurality of things, in such a way that the latter is contingent and non-essential to the life of the One. This is the view implied, he thinks, in what he calls the "mechanical theism" of the eighteenth century, and therefore accepted by himself in the unitarian phase of his thought.
(d) But these and all the other isms are only particular aspects of reality, abstracted from reality itself and from its other aspects. Actual concrete reality manifests itself in all these ways, but is more than them all. God as fundamental reality is at once the One by which all things are; the One which is in and gives co-ordination to all other things; and the One which results from the co-ordinated activities of all things. In other words God is before the world as absolute ground; in the world as universal life and energy; and (logically) after the world of things, as conscious spirit which turns back upon and embraces within itself both the ground and the life — three in one — "the first and the last and the living God."

This Coleridge holds to be the true conception of God, and to be the one underlying the Christian system of thought. And here we find a different conception of unity from that of the eighteenth century and of his own unitarian period. The type of unity and reality is no longer the atom of Democritus—a thing complete in itself and therefore simple, unchangeable, passive and dead for all eternity. It is rather the rational self or soul, which makes itself to be one by making itself to be many, and is in every individual idea and feeling and at the same time is one above them all.

But this 'dynamical' conception of reality as perpetually making itself to be real—a potentiality raising itself into actuality by a perpetual work of creation—causa sui and effectus sui both at the same time—was unintelligible, or perhaps impious to his contemporaries. They were accustomed to the static conceptions of the 18th cent., which made God to be exhaustively complete in Himself from all eternity, and therefore, naturally motiveless and inert as atoms were thought to be; and one to whom activity and creation were only contingent if they had any ground at all. They had not begun to ask what life and eternal life must mean. Creation was taken for granted, but no attempt was made to determine its ground and purpose. Hence some have doubted the sincerity of Coleridge in his outward adherence to traditional doctrine. Some have thought of him, as was thought of his first master, Synesius,—that he was after all only a half-Christian—with an esoteric and an a exoteric, a private and a public way of thinking—philosophizing at home and mythologizing abroad like Synesius; and the
criticism might be justified if a point of metaphysical theory were to be the only criterion of religious faith.

And, like Wordsworth, he looked forward hopefully to a time when this theory of the immanence of God in nature would be confirmed by science itself. Physical science he hoped, would soon be able to dispense with its doctrine of forces as acting on things from the outside mechanically by impact; and would resolve them into laws. But laws are only the ways in which things uniformly behave in relation to one another; they do nothing themselves. It will follow then that things regulate their own behaviour in virtue of life-forces, entelechies, ideas, immanent in themselves, as factors of one living whole, like the organs of an organism. Thus the world will prove to be a system of idea-forces or purposes, realising themselves in and through things, and therefore to be functions of one universal spiritual power.

Thus Wordsworth’s theory of poetry as the spiritual interpretation of nature, and power of seeing by spiritual intention and sympathetic clairvoyance what science discovers by experiment and inference, will be justified. And the heavens will not merely “declare the glory of God” (as from a distance), but will manifest God’s presence in themselves. We have indeed an instinctive tendency to think in this way for “we are all born idealists and therefore at the same time realists.” Common sense is on the side of Schelling, and equally against Hobbes’ materialism and Kant’s agnosticism.

Henceforth the great theological question to Coleridge came to be: how, and how far the traditional ideas regarding divine things are to be reconciled with these new ideas of evolution within a unitary world—and above all, what is the bearing of such a philosophy on the idea of God? How was he to avoid the pantheism which now threatened to take the place of the anthropomorphic unitarianism of his earlier time. How is this dynamical conception of deity as eternal life realising its own concrete reality in the activity of creating and controlling worlds from all eternity, to be reconciled with the statical conception of deity as complete in itself and at rest from all eternity and to whom the work of creation was only an accident. And how could this one universal evolving power be reconciled with the absolute independence of the individual claimed by religion.

Schelling himself felt this difficulty, and subsequently, we know,
modified his system in the hope of overcoming it; and passed his philosophy through what has been called its positivistic and theosophical phases. His earliest works, he then said, were philosophy in its rational form merely; that is, they showed what the world would be if only a rational power were concerned in its evolution. But experience shows, he came to think, that there is also an irrational or anti-rational power or powers at work. In God himself there must be something which is not God, and which must be overcome and reconciled with true reason which is God himself. In the origin and history of the world such non-rational work cannot be understood nor explained—it can only be observed and recorded. Therefore rationalistic philosophy must be supplemented by experiential or positivistic philosophy. But, this being granted, it became difficult to explain the relation between the rational and non-rational powers—God and blind force. This led Schelling to further speculations commonly called theosophical, which excited the ironical comments of his more scientifically minded disciple, Hegel. It is not clear what Coleridge thought of these later phases of Schelling, or whether he was acquainted with them. He would probably have preferred to think as before, that "the world is the Lord's and the fulness thereof," whatever difficulties may seem to lie in the way. He seems to have thought that the danger would be removed if it could be proved that the Logos, or creative reason of the Platonists and Schelling, is a personal power intervening between the ultimate ground and the world of created things. And he held out the promise of a great work to be called Logosophia or science of the Logos, which was to be the great and final work of his life. It was to include as one of its parts his 'dynamical philosophy'—apparently a philosophy of rational evolution on the lines of Schelling's earlier work. Unfortunately this promised work was never really begun, and his theory of the Logos and its relation to the ultimate, by which, apparently, he was to reconcile his philosophy with the traditional theology, remains obscure to us.

With regard to the doubts that have been expressed as to whether Coleridge was sincere in his outward adherence to the traditional forms of the church, the key to his position is to be found doubtless in the few sentences which he has left regarding symbolism in theology and metaphysics. The relations between the absolute reality, and finite things cannot be expressible in the same terms as relations
between finite things among themselves. Therefore if God be absolute (and not merely a finite *primus inter pares*), relations between God and men cannot be expressed in the same terms as those between one man and another man. But theology has always expressed and, to a certain extent at least, cannot help expressing, divine things in terms of the relations which prevail among finite beings themselves. The language of theology therefore cannot be a literal and mathematical expression of the nature of God and his relations with men. It cannot be other than symbolical, pragmatic, practical—adapted to practical purposes,—it cannot be metaphysically adequate. This was, no doubt, Coleridge's own view; and this, together with his view of the scriptures as, in the first place, natural developments of Israelitish thought, makes him to be the founder of the modern Broad Theology, which is essentially a protest against exaggerated anthropomorphism as to the relations between God and men.

III.

Thus one purpose of Coleridge's long voyage of discovery in philosophy was to find a true and solid ground for religious belief. The other main purpose was to find the ultimate ground out of which poetry springs; and to be able thereby to explain what poetry is; and, from the nature of poetry, to deduce canons by which poetry may be judged and criticised. For the want of any clear understanding of what poetry really is, was the cause of the hopeless decline into which poetical literature had fallen, and the contradictions and absurdities of which contemporary criticism had been guilty.

The rapid production of original literature, at that time, especially of poetry, had led to the rise of an almost new form of literature, namely criticism (represented especially by the great reviews then springing up, such as the *Edinburgh* and the *Quarterly*). This new form of literature, though it might be considered parasitical rather than original—writing about writing, making books about books—was nevertheless necessary for the guidance of the constantly growing reading public. But the criticism which the reviews offered was untrustworthy, and misleading. Critics pronounced new works to be bad or good with irresponsible dogmatism; but could give no reason for their judgments; and often had no other reason than subjective passion and caprice founded on interest, ignorance and prejudice. They "steal
the deforming passions of the world into the sanctuary of the muses; offer abominations on their altar and conjure up lying and profane spirits within the sacred pale."

Indeed critics, he thought, were mostly men who had failed in their profession—who had courted recognition as original authors, and, having failed, had taken to depreciating those who had been more successful than themselves. "Till reviews are conducted on other principles and with far other motives; till in the place of arbitrary dictation and petulant sneers, the reviews support their decisions by reference to fixed canons of criticism previously established and deduced from the nature of man, reflecting minds will pronounce it arrogance in them to announce themselves as guides of taste and judgment." The great literary need of the time therefore was a reasoned standard of criticism, such a standard must be deduced from the nature of poetry itself. And to reach the ultimate nature and necessity of poetry it was necessary to go back into psychology to seek for the poetic impulse among the other natural springs of human action and feeling. And to find the deepest sources of these, it was necessary to "delve" deeper still into "the mines of metaphysic depths," to reach the very beginnings and reasons of things. Half a century later, Matthew Arnold, we know, revived this demand for an art of criticism as the greatest need of his own time; but instead of attempting any deep research into the principles underlying the subject, he thought it enough to cite a few examples of what he thought to be the "grand style," and to call on poets to imitate these. This however, was a return to the "subjective" method of judgment, and to the method of composing poems by imitation of models, against which Coleridge and his friend revolted. And Wordsworth had shown that the power of poetical production has two branches, namely Fancy and Imagination. He had pointed out the difference between them, and had exemplified in his own work these different kinds of poetry; but had not traced them to their common source in the fundamental poetical impulse, nor shown why the productive activity must branch out into these two forms, and produce work of such different kinds. This is what Coleridge attempts—to find the "seminal principle" of all poetry, and the reason why its productive activity branches out in these two directions.

This question led him to study first the psychologists of his own country—Hobbes, Hume, Hartley, Mackintosh—to find what they
could teach him about the productive powers of the mind, and this is essentially what he found. These thinkers had been greatly influenced by the physical philosophy of their period. Their time had been the great period of mathematical discovery, and of the application of mathematics to the physical processes of nature. The triumphs of Descartes, Leibnitz, Newton and Laplace seemed to lead to the conclusion that all the processes of the world were subject to mathematical calculation, and could be reduced to mathematical formulæ. And mathematics supposes substance to be divisible into units, excluding and resisting one another, and changing their relations with various degrees of impetus, and with such universal uniformity that, supposing one set of relations to be known, all future relations could be predicted with absolute certainty to the end of time. Therefore the convenience of mathematical calculation was best served by introducing the Greek theory of atoms as particles with definite boundaries, impenetrable and indestructible, moving and colliding with different degrees of force, and subject to uniform and necessary laws. It seemed to follow that the world as a whole was a system of mechanism. Life itself could not be an exception; the cry of the tortured animal, some concluded, could be nothing but the creaking of strained machinery; man himself could be nothing but a "machine."

And the mechanical theory, once applied to the living organism, could not long be kept back from mind itself. If mental science was possible at all, it could so only be by the application of the same methods which had been so successful in physical science. This task of applying physical methods to mind had been undertaken, in different ways, by Hartley and Hume. Hartley had attempted to do it by practically identifying the processes of mind with those of body, already proved mechanical. Hume had refused to identify mind with body, but had introduced into mind a system of atomism analogous to that of the material world. He had sought to establish an atomic theory of mind. External things by force of impact make impressions on the system, and these enter into consciousness as sensations. Sensations maintain their place in the system as ideas. Ideas maintain their separate existence in mind as isolated units somewhat as atoms do in the physical world. This is one step. But in the physical world we find one universal law, over-ruling all other laws, namely the law of gravitation. Therefore if the analogy
between physical and mental forces is to hold good, we should be able to find a corresponding mental law over-ruling all the operations of mind in an analogous way. Such a law was found in the law of the "Association of Ideas," which makes ideas repel and attract one another and form themselves into clusters and series, as physical bodies are drawn together or repelled from one another by physical forces according to uniform laws of nature. This is because connections in nature between things experienced, cause corresponding connections between the ideas of them impressed in mind; so that ideas tend to draw together and form groups and series corresponding to those experienced. And as only one idea or group of ideas can be in consciousness at once, there is a continual contention going on between them for possession of the field; and the idea in possession tends to raise into consciousness the other ideas with which it is most strongly associated. Thus ideas are raised into and pass through consciousness in groups and trains, the order of which is determined by the strength of their associations. Thus mind is a moving equilibrium of ideas and idea-complexes, raising, resisting and suppressing one another according to a mechanism of associations, just as the living body is a moving equilibrium of atoms and molecules working according to the physical mechanism of gravitation and chemical attractions. Connections in nature between the things experienced produce corresponding connections between the ideas of the things. And new impressions are constantly introducing new ideas, and new forces of association which strengthen or break up groups already formed; as new physical forces are always entering into chemical compounds, breaking them up, and forming new combinations. It would follow that mental processes are subject to exact mathematical formulation, but this was not attempted until a generation later, by Herbart.

Thus English psychologists of the 18th century had attempted to explain all the processes of the mind—intellectual, emotional and moral—by the mechanism of associations. And the theory of Association was elaborately applied by Alison (in his Theory of Taste) and by Coleridge's rival in criticism, Jeffrey (in his Essays and Theory of the Beautiful) to explain the nature of poetry, and to supply a criterion of value by which poetry might be criticised.

Therefore the "mechanical" philosophy of the 18th century seemed to deprive even the mind itself of all spontaneity and spiritual freedom,
reducing it to psychological machinery subject to calculation. And it seemed to take away all life, and thereby all wonder and mystery, and all deep interest, from the world of nature. It seemed to narrow the interest of the external world to that of physical machinery; and that of life itself, to utility and physical pleasure. It was, as has often been said, the age of reason and prose, of calculation, utilitarianism and practical common sense. But its theories of nature and life tended to dry up the springs of poetry. It produced, to be sure, abundance of what has been called "nature poetry," perhaps more poetry of the descriptive kind than any other period. But its description was generally little more than an enumeration of things and of the appearances which they present outwardly to the senses, without the consciousness of any deeper meaning. The power of seeing in things the reflection of ideas and feelings and deep truths of nature and life, was wanting. Indeed as for nature, there was nothing in it to be seen, beyond the outward forms of things and laws of physics and mathematics. Newton had said that space is the sensorium of the Deity, but there was nothing in space for even the Deity to be "sensitive" of but the mechanical play of atoms. Lessing, with the nature-poets of the time before him, had come to the conclusion that descriptive poetry can never be real poetry—that it can never be anything better than an endless cataloguing of things and their parts. When it attempted to be more than this, as towards the end of the country, poetry had sunk more and more (Coleridge thought) into turgid generalities and platitudes expressed in artificial diction, much of it only "prose thoughts translated into (what was thought to be) the language of poetry."

Thus the materialising spirit of the 18th century thought—"the mechanical philosophy," Coleridge called it—tended to take away from the world all those spiritual possibilities, meanings, and suggestions in which poetry of the deepest kind lives and has its being. It made poetry shrink back into the practical interests of life, as into satire, description and didacticism, and into stylistic correctness of a formal kind. It restricted the range of imagination, and "clipt the wings of poetry." Timidity took the place of the boldness of the older poets; and a copying of models and following of rules, and repetition of the same subjects, forms and phrases, took the place of inspiration. Poetry itself was becoming more and more a mechanical exercise. The movement in which Wordsworth by his poetry, and Coleridge by his
criticism took the leading parts, was essentially a reaction against the "soulless" world and the literary conventions of the mechanical period, and a return to a more spiritual interpretation of nature, and a deeper conception of the meaning of life, and therewith a deeper insight into the meaning and function of poetry. They felt that, with the general acceptance of the mechanical theory of nature and mind,

"There had passed away a glory from the earth."

Scott had escaped from the monotony so long imposed on literature by the prevailing way of thinking, by falling back on the wonders, adventures and variety of the romantic period. Keats said, "there was an awful rainbow once in heaven," but now that we think we know "its woof and texture," and think that it is only an illusion produced by a mechanical play of sunbeams on molecules of water it is awful no longer, but sinks into "the dull monotony of common things"; and he sought relief by reviving in fancy "the fair humanities of old religion." Shelley went back for deeper truth to Plato, and saw everywhere, instead of the grinding of molecules, the self-realisation of immanent ideas. Campbell complained mournfully,

"What lovely visions yield their place
To cold material laws,"

but seems to see no way of escape, agreeing apparently with Hazlitt, in the spirit of the 18th century, that "knowledge and refinement tend to circumscribe the limits of imagination and clip the wings of poetry," and with Macaulay afterwards when he said that as civilisation advances poetry almost necessarily declines. But Wordsworth in his Preface and Shelley in his Defence had seen deeper than this. The realities which they conceived to exist behind appearances, and which they raised into clear conception by power of imagination, were not a dream-world. Wordsworth was not a dreamer. He looked forward (as Coleridge did) to a clearing up and transformation of science by an idealistic philosophy; and pronounced poetry to be "the breath and finer spirit of all science," and to be "the impassioned expression which is on the face of all knowledge." And the perfected science which he anticipated would be very different from the soulless machinery of the 18th century mathematician, which made him feel as if alone in a dead world, and made him burst forth—
"Great God, I'd rather be
A pagan suckled in a creed outworn,
So might I, resting on this pleasant lea,
Have visions that would make me less forlorn,
Have view of Proteus rising from the sea,
Or hear old Triton blow his wreathed horn."

IV.

One main purpose therefore of Coleridge's long voyage of discovery in philosophy had been to find the root in human nature of the poetic impulse, and thereby the real nature and function of poetry. But he had found that a true theory of poetry was rendered impossible by such a theory of the world as that then prevalent. Poetry could not be understood as merely a record of atomic transformations governed by mathematical laws. It is essentially a spiritual interpretation of the universe and if the universe is not spiritual at the heart, poetry is illusion. If poetry can no longer find life, thought and feeling everywhere in the world, then there can be no more poetry. But Wordsworth had seen by a poet's instinct and intuition (as Carlyle and Ruskin did afterwards) that the mathematical theory gives only the outer surface of things; and Coleridge had been led to the same result by his studies of Plato, Plotinus and Schelling. The conflict between the mechanistic and spiritualistic views of the world—that of blind force and that of evolving idea—has continued and become more explicit in its terms since Coleridge's time; but there can be no doubt that Coleridge's criticism and Wordsworth's poetry affected deeply the thought of the new century; and have tended towards a spiritualistic view of the world, and a higher conception of poetry and towards the conception of world-evolution in the idealistic sense. His principal rival in criticism was Francis Jeffrey, and his position as a critic of poetry and theorist on the subject is best understood by comparing it with that of Jeffrey.

He accused critics of having no principle of criticism. But Jeffrey, as appears from his later essays and his treatise On the Beautiful, had a clear enough theory of the subject. His judgments were not subjective and capricious. His theory explains one aspect of poetry sufficiently well, though it is not the highest; and the contribution of Wordsworth and Coleridge to poetical criticism consists in this that they opened up a deeper view of the nature of poetry, and aspects of poetry which were
beyond the appreciation and even conception of Jeffrey. Hence their theory and their criticism are best understood by contrast with that of their rival. Hazlitt, in a theoretical chapter, repeats Coleridge's theory, but in his treatment of particular poets he follows in the main the same methods as Jeffrey.

Jeffrey's theory was essentially an 18th century one, being founded on the prevailing theory of the association of ideas, and the hedonistic theory of life as then understood. The highest good of life was held to be happiness, and the purpose of poetry was to make men happier by giving pleasure. The pleasure which poetry gives differs from other kinds in this, that it rises out of thinking merely. Business and science, to be sure, consist of thinking, but the pleasure which they give rises out of the practical results attained, and not out of the thinking itself. But the pleasure of poetry lies in the thinking itself and for its own sake.

What thinking is it then that gives pleasure for its own sake? Thinking cannot make anything out of nothing. Therefore the only pleasure that it can give must consist in reproducing, in an ideal form, the actual pleasures of past life. The pleasure of poetry is not pleasure of touch, sound, taste, smell, vision, nor movement, as they originally enter into experience as sensations; but the pleasure of contemplating them when reproduced in idea. The pleasurable experiences of past life are treasured in memory, and afterwards raised up into consciousness again in the form of ideas by the forces of association. The pleasures of the past thus reproduced in their original order and connection give the pleasures of Memory. When built up into new combinations different from any actually experienced in the past, they give the pleasures of Imagination (or more correctly of Fancy)—and this is the function of poetry. Though mind cannot create anything new it can revive, combine and recombine in idea, materials originally supplied by experience and preserved by memory. The power which reproduces and recombines is not power of will, but the forces of association, working spontaneously with effects proportionate to their strength. Thus, as no effort of will is needed, the mind is at rest comparatively; and views clusters and trains of pleasurable experiences rising and passing before it in idea without any effort of its own. All that it has to do is to contemplate the ideal pictures presented, and feel the feelings suggested, and thus live in a shadowy world of thought, in which what is most
pleasing in the real world is reproduced, and what is hardest is softened by distance and reconciled.

This then is poetry: enjoying life over again in thought, but life made richer and more pleasing by the reconstructive power of Fancy. Thus the purpose of poetry is to give pleasure, and there is nothing mysterious nor unique in the pleasure given; it is strictly in conformity with the maxim of the school: *nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*; it is the pleasure actually experienced in past life, experienced over again in the form of ideas, recombined and heightened by power of Fancy.

Thus a poet is merely (a) one in whose mind the experiences of life are retained and revived in ideas of unusual vividness, and the associations between ideas are unusually numerous and strong, so that, at any impulse from without, they rise and form themselves into new combinations in his mind with unusual facility and variety; and (b) who has the power, by means of language, of raising the same ideas and setting the same associative forces working, thereby producing the same pleasure in the minds of others. For mind in the waking state can never be altogether inactive, and when not engrossed in practical work, it is thrown back on its own contents, thinking its own experiences over again or fancying new ones. And here the poet comes to his assistance, and by means of harmonious sounds makes trains of agreeable ideas, and feelings pass through the mind with no other effort than that of contemplating them as they pass before it in automatic procession;

*As gay castles in the clouds that pass*
*For ever flashing round a summer sky.*

And the best poetry will be that which fills the restful mind with the greatest number of agreeable ideas and feelings, with the least labour to itself, and the least interruption from disagreeable associations. The poet is to be judged, therefore, by his power of reviving ideas, of building them up into new and agreeable combinations, and of transferring his constructions to other minds by picturesque and harmonious language.

This then is essentially Jeffrey's standard of criticism. To him poetry was essentially the work of Fancy, or playing with ideas for the amusement which mental play can give; and so far as this aspect of poetry is concerned, his criticism is good and suggestive and may rank with the best. But his mind could not rise so high as Imagination in
Wordsworth's sense of the word. On some points he was in harmony with the new school. Thus he evidently attached more importance to spontaneity in poetical composition than to art. He could speak, at times, as strongly as Wordsworth himself against the conventional poetic diction of the 18th century; "that tawdry encumbrance of poetic diction which had nearly reduced the poetic art to the skilful collocation of a set of conventional phrases," and "for nearly a century had weakened the force of original genius"; yet he had so much lingering sympathy with the old school that he could, at times, express his preference as strongly as Johnson could have done, "for an elegant and poetical style" and "magnificence and splendour of diction," as contrasted with "language tame and vulgar." And as might be expected from his theory, his liking was mainly for poetry of the descriptive and picturesque kind. The rushing narrative of Scott and the pictorial suggestiveness of Keats, greatly appealed to him, and the glimpses of landscape and natural objects which open up so frequently in Shakespeare. He delights in metaphors and similes as affording the poet an opportunity of painting pictures to the mind, and in flashes of description scattered over pages of slow reflections, as from Crabbe:

"Where poppies nodding mock the hopes of toil,
And the blue bugloss marks the sterile soil,"

Or,

"Where the lamb browses by the linnet's bed."

But, as was to be expected from his theory, he was unable to appreciate, or perhaps even conceive, anything that required the mind to rise above materials derivable from sense experience. "A light that never was on sea or land" was darkness to him. "A primrose by a river's brim" was, we can suppose, a very pleasing object to him, but what pleased him about it would have been merely the combination of colours and forms in leaves, petals and anthers, and the background of green grass and flowing water, suggesting perhaps vague memories of early days. But how such a common thing could suggest glimpses into the deep mysteries of nature and "thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears," was altogether incomprehensible to him.

Hence we can understand his criticism of Wordsworth. The suggestions of supersensible realities, the "thoughts beyond the reaches of our souls" with which nature and even incidents of common life filled the mind of the latter, were impossible to his philosophy. Words
drawn from the homely speech of common people, and incidents from common life, introduced, he thought, low and disagreeable associations which interrupted the flow of pleasant pictures. And "the magnificence and splendour of diction" for which he still retained some of the fondness characteristic of the 18th century, was repudiated altogether by Wordsworth as camouflage to conceal poverty of thought, and impose upon the reader. Judged by Jeffrey’s standard, therefore, Wordsworth could not be other than a mediocre poet, and could be saved from utter badness only by a few lively descriptive passages and suggestive similes.

Thus the Association theory practically identified poetry with Fancy, and Fancy was merely the play of the mind. A similar theory of poetry and art in general has been advanced more recently by thinkers of the same school. Thus life, they say, is activity; great part of life’s activity is used up in the practical work of self-preservation, but a surplus remains over; this surplus must find an outlet in play; play is of two kinds, physical and mental; mental play is fine art, and especially poetry. And not very different in result, though very different in its philosophical ground, was the explanation given by the German romanticists of Coleridge’s own time, to whom poetry was the pleasure which one had in creating, like a little god, little worlds of one’s own and pulling them to pieces again, thus finding pleasure in playing ironically with one’s own creations.

V.

Wordsworth himself recognised Fancy as a legitimate department of poetry; “Here let me sit and play with similes”; and classifies certain of his own poems as poems of Fancy. But the highest kind of poetry is that of Imagination. And Coleridge’s main purpose was to determine philosophically the nature of Imagination. And the result at which he arrived was that Imagination is not mere play of the mind, but rests on a deep insight into the nature of things, and is a power by which the mind translates the deepest truths of nature and life into concrete imagery, and that it is in this translation of the abstract truth into concrete imagery by power of imagination that poetry essentially consists.

He found that the aggregation theory of mind and the theory of association founded on it were superficial. He learnt from Aristotle
that mind is not a conglomeration of units or mental atoms, but an active principle. He came to understand from Spinoza the distinction between \textit{natura naturans} and \textit{natura naturata} — between what produces and what is produced — and to see that mind belongs to the former, not to the latter; that it is a producing principle, and not a passive product; and that thought is not a passive contemplation of what is impressed on it from the outside, but an active principle whose essence consists in doing something — in perceiving, elaborating, constructing. Kant convinced him that the mechanical philosophy regarded only the outside of things, and opened up to him many possibilities; but, with regard to the fundamental realities which interested him most, gave him only pragmatic faith. At last he became acquainted with the new works of the young Schelling, and here at last, after his long and weird voyage, like his own mariner, he saw the harbour lights and the solid land.

Schelling rejected the world of atoms, and undertook to show that the world is the self-evolution of a spiritual power. By spirit he understood that in which subject and object, thinker and what is thought, are initially and logically identical as one and the same self-sufficient reality. But so long as it continues to be such abstract identity, it is only power to be, or potentiality. The history of the world is the process by which the absolute unity of power makes itself to be concrete reality by evolving a world of subjects which themselves produce, think, and act, and of things which are produced, thought, and acted on; and in so doing becomes conscious of itself as the self-realising and co-ordinating unity of the whole — the subject of all subjects — the one in the many — the good which is fulfilling itself at every moment, and yet never exhausted — a living whole of being within which every finite subject has its own place and function, and its own good, in relation to the life of the whole. Thus considered the world is not a fortuitous conglomeration of units (as according to the mechanical system), nor an empty abstraction (as according to Kant) but an organic whole, full of life; and the individual soul exists not as an impenetrable self-sufficient atom, indifferent to all other atoms, but as an organ, living by, and contributing to the life of the whole organism, and thereby to the life of God and lives, moves and has its own being in God. The \textit{Nature-philosophy} (1799) shows how the evolving power must pass through and rise successively above the different phases seen in nature.
before it can become aware of itself in finite minds, and, through these, in a universal mind of all minds. The Transcendental Idealism (1800) showed through what phases finite minds must pass in order to be conscious of things and of themselves, and of supreme mind: and what a supreme mind must be, in order that it may include all finite things and minds under it, and thus be concrete spirit, i.e. unity of subject and object, not as abstract potentiality but as reality concrete and real, and therefore conscious of itself. The atomic individualism of the 18th century would have made impossible any theory of "one in many," and any understanding of the unity of the cosmos, whether physical or moral. The new theory gave life, meaning and interest to nature, and community and fellowship to men.

Thus Schelling set aside the mechanical philosophy of the 18th century against which Wordsworth and the new school of poetry were already rising in revolt. The world is not machinery but living organism. Its ultimate moving force is not gravitation but life, and life means purpose and feeling—

"A motion and a spirit which impels
All thinking things and objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things."

Poetry will no longer be a descriptive catalogue of things as they impress themselves on the senses from the outside, but an expression and interpretation of a life and reason working immanently in all things, and the poet may still feel that

The being that is in the clouds and air,
That is in the green leaves among the groves,
Maintains a deep and reverential care
For the unoffending creatures whom he loves.

We can understand therefore what a great impression Schelling's transformation of the world from matter to spirit made on the minds of his contemporaries, especially poets. Indeed the founder of the spiritualistic system was regarded by the young poets of the time very much as the founder of the ancient materialistic system had been regarded, for an opposite reason, by the poet of materialism. From the beginning of the world the demon of spiritualistic superstition had seemed to look down frowning from the sky, and kept humanity in a state of fear and horror; Epicurus had been the first that dared to lift his head against him, and had proved him to be but a phantom
produced by ignorance and fear, and in his pursuit of the real cause of things had

"Passed beyond the flaming bounds of place and time,"

and found no devouring demons, nor malignant spiritual powers jealous of humanity, but only vortices of atoms rushing together, and bursting asunder again, and "ruining along the illimitable inane," and had established the materialist system to the relief of trembling humanity, leaving nothing for men to fear, other than the dangers imposed on them by atomic laws which they could learn to calculate and avoid. But Schelling had searched deeper than Epicurus, and had plunged, as one of them said,

Herab von Saum des Welten Blumenrandes
In das geheimnissvolle Wie der Dinge,

and had found that the mysterious Why of things was not to be found in whirlpools of atoms, or in any devouring Moloch of superstition, but in Good working out its own realisation; and had established the possibility of a new spiritualism which would not be a source of perpetual horror to mankind, like the old; but would open up the springs of life and happiness.

Yet this system was not altogether new to Coleridge; it merely deepened and confirmed what had already been in his own mind for many years. But it gave a fresh impulse to his thinking, and he thought that he could deduce from this system the real nature of poetry and poetical inspiration. If the human mind is not a passive product of nature, but akin to, and in communion with the creative life of nature, then it will be itself a creating and evolving power. And if the powers working in nature are rational like itself, its highest privilege will be, by sympathy, to see into the forces and reasons working in nature, and to reproduce them ideally, and make them evolve themselves into ideal creations within the mind, analogous to, and perhaps more perfect, and nearer to the highest idea of all, than the actual works of nature itself. Nature is the greatest artist (a great poet had said long before), but works with "an unsteady hand." This power of seeing into the deep truths of nature and life, grasping them in ideas at first necessarily general and abstract, and then giving them embodiment in concrete imagery, is what Wordsworth had understood by Imagination as opposed to Fancy. The latter meant merely playing with ideas of memory, and its constructions were built up of things as they appeared or might appear to the senses and nothing more.
Imagination is (a) Insight; the true poet is a seer, who, "in hours of visitation from the most high God," can cast off the limitations of bodily life, and "become a living soul,

And, with an eye made quiet by the power
Of harmony and the deep sense of joy,
Can see into the life of things,"

and can grasp in his own mind the laws and purposes of things, and the ways in which their laws work themselves out in nature and life: and it is (b) creation; he can make the truth which he sees evolve, and embody itself in a system of concrete imagery in which truths, in themselves abstract, are made visible to the mind's eye, and comprehended without effort of abstract thought—which is poetry as contrasted with science. The great dramatist sees into the deepest springs of action in human nature, and sees how they will naturally express themselves in conduct, and thus makes nature reproduce itself within his own mind. This power is "the vision and the faculty divine,"—the power of seeing deep and remote truth and presenting it to the mind in concrete thought. It is not copying nature from the outside, but laying hold of the immanent forces of nature, and making them do their work over again under new circumstances. It sees how, in nature, the one unfolds itself into many and at the same time makes the many to be the embodiment and expression of the one meaning and purpose, and thereby makes the many to combine with itself to form one concrete whole; and makes this process of creation repeat itself in the individual mind,

Hence the beautiful in poetry is not merely what produces pleasing impressions on the passively dreaming mind, as assumed in Jeffrey's theory. On the contrary the essential element in it is a consciousness of doing something—a feeling of successfully attaining an end with the least possible effort—of doing over again the creative work of nature. The original artist or poet in his process of creation feels it most; but one who really comprehends the poem or work of art, has the feeling in a fainter form of creating the work over again in his own mind. Comprehending a poem is not a passive impression, but a state of mental activity by which the work of the poet is done over again in the reader's mind. The pleasure of the beautiful, therefore, does not rise out of passive contemplation of what is presented, but out of a feeling and sympathetic reproduction of the power and activity by which the object is produced.
He turns to the attempts at logical analysis of the Beautiful made by ancient writers, and puts new life into them by applying the dynamical principle of Schelling. He expresses his result in several different forms. Thus the Beautiful may be defined as "that in which the many, while still seen as many, become one"; and again more fully, "the sense of beauty subsists in simultaneous intuition of the relation of parts to each other, and of all to a whole", adding from Kant, "exciting an immediate and absolute complacency without the intervention of any interest sensuous or intellectual." But the definition is insufficient thus far, because it seems to leave the mind in what would be merely a state of agreeable passivity, such as might be produced by a geometrical arrangement of parts. He adds, therefore, from certain ancient thinkers "the beautiful is the reduction of many to one." This implies a mental process, but has this defect that it supposes the many to be present before the mental activity begins. And from another he cites, "it is something indivisible which reflects itself, through many divisibles," i.e. one germinal thought or meaning shining through the many auxiliary ideas in which it expresses itself. This is the best definition thus far. But it fails to account for the subordinate ideas themselves in which the fundamental meaning expresses itself. We have therefore to supplement and complete this definition by introducing from Schelling the element of creative activity. What is most essential in the feeling of the beautiful is the feeling that the one evolves the many as the means of expressing itself, and at the same time makes the many to be one, that is, to be the full expression of its own unity. The one makes the many and reduces the many to unity again with itself.

Therefore, to feel a poem or product of art to be beautiful, is to see in it, and feel by sympathy, the process of self-developing life by which one germinal idea evolves and embodies itself in the many auxiliary ideas, and at the same time makes the many to be the organism of its own expression. In feeling the beauty of a poem we are conscious of the fundamental idea unfolding itself into many subordinate ideas and making all to be means of expressing itself. The feeling includes therefore an active element—a feeling of the vital process by which the generic idea unfolds itself into many branches and makes them to be one living organism. And to be able to find beauty in nature is to be able to discern, by power of sympathy, the same creative process of life
at work in nature which we are conscious of in our own life and work, and see in the work of the poet and artist.

As the reader enters into and lives over again the lives of the great characters of drama, so he enters into and repeats over again in his own mind, however faintly, the evolution of a great work of art or of nature; and it is in this consciousness of productive power that the pleasure consists.

Indeed Coleridge does not hesitate to adopt the high-flown language of Schelling. "The primary imagination I hold to be a repetition in the finite mind, of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I am"—as God creates the great world of the universe, so the poet re-creates a little world of ideas in his own mind. The primary creative impulse comes not from the individual will of the poet but from nature—it is the creative force of nature rising into, and working through, the individual mind. This is primary imagination—essentially inspiration. The highest poetry and works of art are not literally made by the poet and artist, but grow up in his mind by a rational force deeper than his own will, as plants grow in the soil by the life-producing power of nature. But the individual will reacts upon the forces of inspiration, and gives them form and expression in keeping with its own circumstances and purposes. This is secondary imagination, the element of art proper, which enters into artistic production.

Thus good poetry is not produced by blind impulse working automatically and thought to be inspiration (the charge so often made against the romantic school of which Coleridge may be held a representative). The inspiring power of nature, if it works at all, lays hold of and works in the rational power of the poet's own individual mind, and they work each in the other, the universal in the individual—inspiration and art—as one creative power; and neither can produce anything of value when working by itself alone.

Bad poetry is produced in three ways. The writer may be carried away by blind impulse and caprice without real inspiration (which is the besetting danger of the romantic school); or may possess genuine thought and feeling, but be without that power of secondary imagination which is necessary to give them logical and artistic expression; or he may think that he can make poetry by copying models and applying rules, repeating the phraseology of former poets, and using a conventional style of diction thought to be poetical in itself (the be-
setting sins of the so-called classical school, exposed by Wordsworth).

It is of interest to compare this conception of the Beautiful in poetry differs from that of Jeffrey. The feeling of the beautiful does not consist in a passive contemplation of past and possible enjoyments, made to pass before the mind's eye by the mechanical working of associative forces as Jeffrey and his school thought. Everything beautiful is the embodiment of one idea, purpose, or thought, which strives, by the life which is in it, to give full expression to itself, and in order to do so expands itself into many auxiliary ideas, and attains its full expression and presentation in the unity of the whole—as the life and purpose of the plant working through its germ fulfills itself in the plurality and unity of many cells, branches and organs. And the aesthetic enjoyment does not consist in the passive contemplation of this as in a picture, but in seeing and feeling sympathetically,—to some extent reproducing—the life process by which the one thus evolves the many, and makes the many to be one; which is a repetition of the life work of nature itself—a secondary creation. And this is why the poem, when fully understood, impresses the mind not as a lifeless product mechanically put together but as an activity of self-realisation felt most fully by the poet in the act of creation, but reproduced, though more faintly in the mind of the understanding reader. And it is for this reason that the beautiful is, as Kant showed, satisfying in itself, and not subordinate as a means to anything else. Life is enough; and the consciousness of self-realisation and expression in creation is the highest enjoyment of life. The feeling therefore is not a mainly passive impression like a sensation; its pleasurableness rises out of the consciousness of productive activity.

This theory runs contrary also to those who are inclined to identify the pleasure of poetry with that of music—the dreamy, passive, reposeful satisfaction which is felt in listening to the concordance of sweet sounds. The music of words is an important factor in poetry, but only as a means to an end, and not as itself an end—as a means of expressing more fully the thought and feeling which is the real ground of interest. Mind is not passive in the best poetry but intensely active and creative.

Therefore it is opposed also to the view of the pessimistic writers who explain aesthetic feeling as a purely passive state of conscious-
ness, resulting from the gradual cessation of all activity, and felt for a moment just as activity is fading away into passive repose — anticipating the final rest in which all activity and striving, and thereby all life and feeling, will be at an end — a view itself suggested by music as the most passive of artistic享受ments. According to Schelling and Coleridge on the contrary, it is activity and life and not the gradual cessation of them, that is the source of satisfaction; and artistic creation is the highest and most perfect form of life.

Thus the growth of a poem in the mind of the poet is analogous to the growth of a living organism in nature. It is not made by a fortuitous aggregation of parts; rather it unfolds itself into its many parts, and makes all the parts to be one by the life which is in it. The life concerned, we consider to be the poet’s own life working through the generative idea of the poem, and raising the idea from the region of generalities and abstractions into the world of concrete and visible things. But according to Schelling and Coleridge, in so far as the imagination at work is primary, the poet’s life is thus far identical with the life of nature entering into it and inspiring it.

Nor is there an essential difference between the feeling of what is beautiful in nature, and that of what is beautiful in art. In contemplating the beauty of a rose, there is the same consciousness of the evolution of many in one, of the one life unfolding itself into the many parts and making them all to be expressions of itself. One cannot really feel the beauty of a rose without a sympathetic feeling, wherever vague, of the power, wonder and mystery of the life-forces embodied in the rose — that feeling towards the works of nature which is expressed so fully in the poetry of Wordsworth. In short, in the truly beautiful there is always a consciousness of the producing life-power manifested in it — whether in works of men or works of nature.

From this we can understand also what Wordsworth teaches about the relation between poetry and science. Both deal with reality. But their thought proceeds in opposite directions, and reaches truth by different means. Science begins from the world of concrete things as they appear to the senses, and proceeds backwards and analytically, to discover the laws according to which the forces of nature operate, and to express them in abstract formulæ which will be of universal application. But poet is a seer, and his spirit

"Can shoot its being through earth and air and sea"
and perceive intuitively, by sympathy, deep truths of nature and life; but, instead of reducing them to abstract formulæ, he shows them working themselves out in the products of nature and actions of men, and presents the abstract embodied and reflected in concrete imagery. Therefore poetry has more in common with deductive science and philosophy which follows the life-processes of nature, than with analytical science which "murders to dissect." Hence Wordsworth approved of Aristotle's statement that "poetry is more philosophical than history" (descriptive science), because the latter only enumerates, and describes the outside of things as they appear; whereas the poet sees shining through things, the meanings and powers which underlie things, and can reproduce within his own mind the processes by which nature produces things.

VI.

Coleridge tells us that he had intended to deduce from his philosophical principles, canons for the criticism of poetry, to supersede the reckless impressionism of the critics of his time. It cannot be said, however, that this purpose was fulfilled literally; anything that he gives in the form of canons is quite commonplace, and has no connection with the elaborate philosophical preparation. Indeed rules and standards were altogether inconsistent with the spirit of the new school, which called for originality and inspiration. What he did was better than founding a new classical school of rules and models. He showed what poetry is, and how it is composed, and showed the critic and reader what to look for in good poetry.

He showed that the qualifications of a great poet are these: He must possess power of deep insight into nature and life, and power of original thought. Coleridge went so far as to say: "no man was ever yet a great poet without being at the same time a great philosopher, for poetry is the blossom and fragrance of all human knowledge." Wordsworth, however, had distinguished the poet and the philosopher more fully. The poet is a seer; he does not analyse and reason like the scientist. The phenomena of nature and life are presented to him, and he intuitively sees the great truths and meanings embodied in them, as we "see the soul's construction in the face." Science does not see truths in things directly, but takes them to pieces and reasons from part to part, and thereby loses much of the life and meaning contained in them; it "murders to dissect," and deals only with the
dead remains. The poet sees things as they really are and full of life, and thereby sees deeper than science and comprehends truths which escape the analysis of science. But the truths which the poet sees may be general and abstract, like the results of science, and the most characteristic endowment of the poet is the power of expressing abstract truth in concrete pictures. He puts his life into the truth which he sees, and makes it give expression to itself by unfolding itself into a whole organism of ideas and words, in which the fundamental idea is as soul in body, and in which we see it reflected as we see "thought and feeling expressed in the living face." He makes us see the meaning shining through its embodiment, as he himself sees it in the phenomena of nature or the events of life. Every great poem is founded on some truth which the poet sees, and he makes that truth embody and reveal itself as in a living body — without the dissection, analysis or reasoning which is characteristic of science. And not only has he this power of making the one reveal itself in the many, but he has the power of making things far removed in time of and space reveal themselves in a one present picture, — making all the wealth of all the muses "to flower before us in a lonely word." And beside these powers of insight and verbal expression he has the capacity of bringing the aid of music to reinforce the power of words in giving expression to the thought and feeling which is the soul of the poem.

Though no canons are really laid down, yet such a general statement of the theory enables one to see the phases through which the poet's and the reader's mind must pass in composing and in comprehending a poem, and which the critic and reader will have to consider in order to judge intelligently how far poetic excellence has been attained.

(a) There is first the impulse to compose. The impulse is, of course, an emotion; "poetry is the overflow of powerful feelings. But feeling (emotion) is nothing by itself; it rises out of thought, and the thought is of something seen in nature or human life. The something seen excites wonder, or reverence, or anger, an indignation, or fear, or hope, or gratitude, and so forth, as the case may be. At the moment of passion, suffering or first impression, thought is at its minimum. But when "the emotion is recollected in tranquillity" together with the idea of that which excited it, the idea and its feeling excite a process of thinking, and the thinking completes itself in the production of the poem.
The poem has its beginning, therefore, in a "seminal" or germinal idea which fills him with emotion. The emotion sets his mind working and he cannot rest until the germinal idea is fully developed, and the feeling fully expressed. Thus the true poet is moved to compose by an irresistible impulse; he is "the ancient mariner" who feels that he has something to say, and cannot rest until he has communicated to other minds what he sees and feels. The burden of his vision is too great for him until shared by others.

The poem will be true to nature when the idea is of some truth really seen by the poet, and the feeling is really felt by him and not merely pretended. Otherwise the poem will be merely affected, sentimental, artificial, and unreal.

This power of insight into the truth and meanings of things is what distinguishes the poet of imagination from the poet of fancy merely, who describes things not for the sake of any meaning or thought which they express but for the sake of the amusement derivable from their novelty and variety.

Many of the new school attached much importance to sincerity of feeling and "faithful adherence to the truth of nature." Poetry should rise out of the circumstances of real life; only thus can it be prompted by genuine feeling. Hence they condemned much 18th century poetry as artificial, because inspired by no genuine feeling. On the contrary the traditional ballads, the Ossianic poems and poems of Burns were approved by them, because their authors appeared to feel what they said. Some German romanticists went further, and identified spontaneity and natural feeling altogether with inspiration, and depreciated works that had been deliberately planned and artistically composed, on the ground that they dealt with remote or imaginary events, regarding which there could be no genuine feeling. For this reason they preferred the Lusiad to the Aeneid, the Araucañes even to the Jerusalem Delivered, and the Voices of the Nations to the Odes of Horace, because these seemed to be artificial products of study, rather than spontaneous outpourings of the heart. The poet should sing as the bird sings,—to think too much about what he sings spoils the song. But Coleridge himself would have admitted that this was carrying the principle of spontaneity too far. Schelling himself admitted that the primary inspiration of the artist appropriates and works through the artist's own reason and art as an individual. A great poet is "no mere child of nature, no automaton of
genius, no passive vehicle of inspiration possessed by the spirit, not possessing it.''

Hence we can see that one task of the critic will be to determine and define clearly the germinal ideas and feelings of the poet's mind out of which his poems spring; and he may go further and endeavour to trace them back to their origin in race and country, and the circumstances of the poet's time and his individual history, and try to show how far he was "the child of his time" or the "voice" of his people, and how far he was original and unique, born, not made—a hero as Carlyle thought he should be.

(b) The germinal idea and feeling is abstract and incomplete in itself. It is an idea-force or impulse, and its impulse is towards the full concrete and permanent expression of itself. For this end, it unfolds itself, and branches out into many related ideas and feelings, each auxiliary idea leading on to others by some natural connection, and each serving to bring out some implication or aspect of the fundamental idea; until the whole, by their combined suggestive forces, give full expression to the fundamental idea which is the evolving soul of the whole. Thus the completed poem is a system of co-ordinated ideas (descriptions, metaphors, symbols) which rise naturally out of the one germinal idea, and are co-ordinated with one another in such a way as to give full development and expression to the fundamental meaning and purpose; as the organs of an organism are evolved by one common life and co-operate together in giving it full realisation. Thus the poem is like a living body, a many in one; and the meaning is its soul—a one fulfilling itself in many. Every part of the poem has a meaning, but its meaning rises out of and contributes to the common purpose which is the life, as it were, of the whole. And thus the fundamental idea and feeling, originally general and abstract, is presented in a concrete form, like soul invested in body, and thereby made visible to the mind's eye, and seen shining through the imagery of this poem as we see "the soul's construction in the face." And seeing abstract thought and feeling thus evolving and embodying itself and making itself to be visible in the harmony of many parts as in a concrete organism, gives the feeling of the beautiful.

There are different ways of filling in the details which are necessary for the adequate expression of the fundamental idea and feeling. It may be done by descriptive enumeration as is done by Shelley in the
Cloud and Skylark. Milton also in Il Penseroso and L'Allegro gives a picturesque description of such things as express and illustrate the lives of the thoughtful man and the cheerful man. Such picturesque enumeration, tending towards poetry of Fancy merely, seems to have been especially agreeable to critics of the type of Jeffrey and Hazlitt—attracted by poetry of Fancy, more than of Imagination. But the poet cannot enumerate all the illustrative details pertinent to his subject. Hence the greatest have the power of condensing and expressing many ideas in a few words—opening up far reaches of thought in a single phrase—reducing multitude of details to unity of effect. Thus Marlowe, wishing to impress the reader with the beauty of Helen, finds that he cannot do so without referring to the tremendous effects which it produced; but instead of proceeding to enumerate them as an epic poet or historian would do, condenses into two lines the work of many years,

"Is this the face which launched a thousand ships
And burnt the topless towers of Ilium,"

and these lines raise them before the mind more effectively than an enumeration could have done. In this way the poet can rise above space and time and "reduce multitude to unity and succession to an instant." The intensity of the thought aroused together with the simplicity of the means used, produces an effect which would be lost in a "hubbub of words." Such concentration of thought—of many into one—is essentially the sublime, and is met with most frequently perhaps in Shakespeare and Wordsworth.

To the subordinate details of the poem therefore the critic will apply the "logic of poetry." "Poetry has a logic of its own as rigid as that of science." Logic is the science of reasons. Every idea introduced into a poem should have a reason for its presence and its position in the poem, such that it cannot be removed without injury to the whole. In other words, every subordinate idea should rise out of the fundamental idea and co-operate with the other ideas in bringing out the common thought and feeling of the whole. Every detail introduced should be inevitable.

By this principle purple patches and unnecessary digressions are excluded. A poem must not be an arbitrary conglomeration of parts, but a living whole. But at the same time, in a poem, every part should not only contribute to the meaning and beauty of the whole, it should be beautiful and interesting in itself, as the leaf or flower is, on
the living tree. In this respect, a poem is contrasted with a scientific demonstration, in which the parts are of interest only as contributing to the common result of the whole. Thus with regard to unity of structure Coleridge is as exacting as any critic of the school of classical correctness, and that, although the besetting sin of his own school was negligence in this respect—introducing digressions, descriptions, and metaphors for their own sake,—purple patches contributing nothing to the fundamental purpose of the whole.

(c) But ideas and feelings, however well connected logically, have no coherence in themselves, and the life-force which evolves them naturally strives to embody them in a medium in which they will be fixed, preserved and made communicable from mind to mind. After thought, therefore, the greatest gift of the poet is command of language. To the greatest masters of expression, the words come so spontaneously that the thought and the expression seem to be one and inseparable, and not a word can be changed without injury to the whole. As the idea is inevitable to its place in the poet, so the words are inevitable to the idea. And the greater the inspiration of the poet, the more spontaneously do the ideas rise into their places, and at the same time embody themselves in the fittest language. And "language is not the dress but the incarnation of thought"; not anything attached to it arbitrarily from the outside, but part of the organism which thought evolves as its own concrete embodiment.

But with regard to the fittest and most natural language for poetical expression, a great controversy had risen. Wordsworth had raised the question in his Preface to the Lyrical Ballads, by maintaining that, as real poetry consists in thought and feeling and these are most effective when expressed in the shortest and simplest way and therefore in the language most familiar to all. Therefore there should be no essential difference between the language of poetry and that of prose. The question raised by him therefore was essentially this: If poetic thought must express itself in language, does it do so most naturally and effectively in the common language, or "language really used by men;" or must the poet contrive a new and special kind of language adapted to express his own thought and not for any other purpose? Must there be a special kind of "poetic diction" for the use of poets alone as chemistry, physics, mathematics have each a language of its own? Or may the language of prose and that of poetry be essentially
the same? The organic theory of poetry and expression (referred to above)—viz. that thought spontaneously embodies itself in language—seems to imply that it does so in the most direct and spontaneous way, and therefore in the commonest and simplest language. This is what Wordsworth maintained. But in the school of Pope and Johnson and their imitators, the habit had become prevalent of avoiding as far as possible the words and phrases most commonly used in prose and common speech, as vulgar and mean; and of substituting uncommon words, circumlocutions, personifications, generalities, and figures and allusions from ancient poets, as more dignified than simple statements in common language. And towards the end of the period this tendency had gone so far that a kind of "poetic diction" had grown up, which was thought to be essential to poetry, and even to constitute the essential difference between poetry and prose, and "poetry" had come to be largely "a translation of prose thought into (what was thought to be) poetic language." Against this Wordsworth had risen in revolt. Poetry consists not in the use of certain words and phrases, but in thought and feeling; and these naturally express themselves in the simplest language, and are best when so expressed. When applied to good thought, poetic diction is only a weakening of the thought by superfluous ornament; in other cases, it is only camouflage to conceal poverty of thought.

Wordsworth's theory of poetic diction had run quite contrary to the prevailing ideas, and he was assailed on all sides with contemptuous criticism. Coleridge also suffered from criticism. After seventeen years he lays the blame for this on Wordsworth; he had been supposed to agree with Wordsworth's theory of poetic diction, and part of the cold water thrown on Wordsworth had fallen on him. But he now tells us that he had never agreed with Wordsworth's theory of diction, and enters on a long criticism of Wordsworth's Preface. One wonders at this, seeing that his own best poetry had been written clearly under the influence of Wordsworth. The greater part of his poetry, however, had been written in a peculiar poetic diction of his own, and he is unwilling to give it up. He still thinks, in spite of Wordsworth, that "the florid and laborious diction" of his poetry was "not altogether vicious," but suited "to give a poetic colouring to abstract and metaphysical truths." But this is just the fault which Wordsworth finds with poetic diction—that it was an attempt to deceive people by
making them think that prose is poetry. It would follow from this that of Coleridge could not make abstract truth poetical by common language he was a bad poet.

After this justification of poetic camouflage, we cannot expect much light from Coleridge's treatment of poetic language. He seems never to lay hold of the real point of the question, but strikes aside as if quibbling, and tries to read into Wordsworth all sorts of perverse meanings. In his first important "experiment" in poetry, Wordsworth had undertaken to show that there is poetry even in "incidents and situations of humble and rustic life" (Coleridge makes him say low life), and makes shepherds and children talk in their own way: therefore he teaches that all poetry should deal with shepherds and children. Wordsworth had said that poetic thought naturally expresses itself in simple language, not essentially different from language used in prose: therefore he teaches that the poets should always use the coarsest talk of labourers and sailors. Wordsworth says the poet should as far as possible use the language really spoken by men; but the real language of men is vulgarity and profanity. Wordsworth found fault with the trifling personification, useless metaphors and irrelevant similes which many poets used as purple patches to give to prose the appearance of poetry; therefore Wordsworth forbids altogether the use of figures of poetry, and breaks his own law when he uses them himself. Wordsworth in his prosaic passages follows his own theory; but when he writes poetry, he rejects all these things and thereby contradicts his theory. But when we look at the examples which Coleridge gives in proof of this, we find that his whole criticism when boiled down amounts to this: Wordsworth's theory of poetical language makes poetry impossible; therefore when Wordsworth writes poetry, he must contradict his theory.

The controversy has continued to the present day, and we find not a few writers repeating the fallacies of Coleridge. Wordsworth's theory was simply that poetry is the expression of thought and feeling, and thought naturally expresses itself in the shortest and simplest way possible, and this will generally be in language near to common speech. Of course, he never thought of saying that every poet must use the same language as another, nor of denying that new thought may seek to find new forms of expression. But it must be such expression as comes naturally; artificiality and conventionality are to be avoided. And
what he says about the language of poetry follows so closely from his theory of poetry which is also that of Coleridge, that it is difficult to think of Coleridge's criticism as altogether sincere.

And what about the prosaic passages which must occur in every long poem? Coleridge himself points out that a long poem cannot be poetical in all its parts. There must be passages of transition and explanation which cannot be really poetical. How then are such prosaic details to be expressed? Should they be translated into artificial poetic diction to make readers think that they are poetry? Coleridge himself betrays a lingering fondness for poetic diction, "to throw a colouring of poetry" over prosaic details. Or should prosaic but necessary details be left as they are, without any attempt at disguise. This is the method of Wordsworth in accordance with his theory. Hence the complaint that there are in him so many prosaic passages. Other writers would have given them a deceptive appearance of poetry by means of poetic diction.

(d) But harmonious thought and feeling tends naturally to express itself in harmonious language. Milton said of his own thoughts, that they "voluntarily moved in harmonious numbers," and even Pope "lisped in numbers for the numbers came." For the purpose of poetry is to express thought and feeling; and music expresses thought to some degree, and feeling very strongly. Therefore, if the poem can be made musical and made to sing itself, the expression will be more complete; and the harmony of words, though it appeals more directly to the organs of pronunciation than to the ear, is closely connected with the ear and with harmony of sound. Harmony of words is realised in metre, that is, in measure, and rhythm or flow of articulations. Hence poetical thought and feeling naturally seek expression in metrical language, and the metre naturally varies with the feeling which it expresses; and when the expression reaches its greatest perfection, thought, feeling and sound so interpenetrate one another that they seem to make one indivisible whole, and any alteration injures the effect. Hence, as Shelley points out, the impossibility of adequately translating poetry; even though the version should be good in itself, it can never be the same as the original; the new words can hardly ever be made to express the same thought exactly; and the accompanying music can never be the same.

Coleridge summarises his conclusions on the nature of poetry in a
sentence which may be expanded thus: Poetic genius is characterised by Good sense in all its work. It applies Fancy to produce the drapery of its work — the decorative element (if any be admitted) which is like the fringes and flowers of a lady's dress, pleasant to contemplate, but not necessary to the purpose of the whole. It gives motion to his work, that is such interest and connection of parts, as carries on the mind rapidly and easily from idea to idea. It includes the intuitive power which discerns the truths or germinal ideas out of which poems grow; and the imaginative power which enters into the idea and unfolds it into the system of subordinate ideas or images which is the body of the poem; and makes the fundamental idea or meaning to be present in every part of the poem as the soul is present in every part of the body; and correlates all the parts into one living whole.

This, then, is an organic theory of poetry — that a poem grows by a power of life working within it, as opposed to the mechanical theory that it is made by putting parts together from the outside. Thus Coleridge, while adopting as of vital importance Wordsworth's distinction between Fancy and Imagination, deals in his discussions almost exclusively with the latter, because imagination is the vision and presentation of truth, and has therefore a deep philosophical ground. This cannot be said of Fancy which is the poetry of play, and requires no such deep investigation — though it was the whole of poetry to critics like Jeffrey and Hazlitt.

VII.

The history of Coleridge's political opinions gives a less favourable impression of the man than that of his philosophical and literary investigations. In his political thought there is a degree of inconsistency between his earlier zeal for progress and his later spirit of reaction which is difficult to explain, and has given rise to some suspicion regarding his strength or straightforwardness of intellectual character. This reversal of political opinion was founded, he wishes us to understand, on a reversal of opinion with regard to the nature and authority of reason. He had discovered that reason is not the supreme authority for human life which in earlier days he had supposed it to be. Therefore the political theories which he had founded on reason could no longer be maintained by him.

In early life he was an enthusiastic and evidently sincere believer
in the supremacy of reason, the essential goodness of human nature, and possible progress of society. "We call God the supreme reason 'whence the soul reason receives and reason is her being.'" God's reason pervades the world as the "law which executeth itself," and his word is "the foundation, the power and the life of the universe." Certain individuals appearing contingently from time to time may appear to be the causes of public revolutions and calamities, but to clearer thought these are only the agents of a deeper power "working out a good intent" even in revolutions, namely, the power of universal reason, working in their motives, and bending them in subservience to its own purpose. "And that reason should be our guide and governor is an undeniable truth. The moral nature of man originated in and subsists in his reason. From reason alone can be derived the principles which our understandings are to apply, the ideas to which we should approximate," and "in respect of reason all things are equal." Kant pointed out the law of reason underlying the moral life: act in such a way as to treat your fellow men always as ends to themselves, and not merely as means to something else. Every man is to reason, therefore, an end in himself, and not a mere thing which is only a means to ends; and, as it is his duty to act so and so to other men, so he has the right to demand that other men shall act so and so towards himself. All rules of life, individual, social, political, must be such as can be deduced from this principle of reason. Hence the rights of man as man are a part of universal reason, which is the will of God. This truth had long been forgotten. The truths of reason had been suppressed, concealed, perverted by violence and self-interest of individuals and classes. At last the French revolution had broken out to vindicate the neglected claims of reason. He had regarded the revolution therefore as the beginning of a new life, heralding the return of the golden age. The revolution was reason itself lifting its head against the forces of repression under which it had been concealed for so many ages. In poetical fervour he asks the sun and sky to bear witness: "With what deep worship I have still adored, the spirit of divinest Liberty," and how he hoped and feared

"When France in wrath her giant-limbs upreared,
And with an oath which smote earth, air and sea,
Stamped her strong foot, and said she would be free"

and how, when "to whelm the disenchanted nation,"
Like friends embattled by a wizard's wand,
The monarchs marched on evil day,
And Britain joined the dire array,

he hung his head for shame and "wept at Britain's name." Even English politicians of a new school were applying the same principles "to prove the imperfection and injustice of the present constitution of our legislature." He even thought that the progress made by French revolutionists and English reformers towards the emancipation of reason was too slow, and thought he could quicken the movement by force of example. He and his friends devised a scheme by which the principles of reason would be carried into effect all at once, in one place at least. They would settle a colony in some unoccupied district of America and form a community in which all the forces which had for ages repressed or misdirected the natural intuitions and instincts of man would be removed — a community in which there would be no written law, nor magistrate, nor priest, nor private property, but every person would be left free to follow his own natural impulses of duty and fellow-feeling.

But a change came o'er the spirit of his dream. His enthusiasm for liberty and the rights of men passed away. He could no longer believe in the supremacy of reason and its right to rule the actions of men. The rights of man become to him "a miserable sophism." He himself ascribes this change — this new found scepticism with regard to reason and the worth of human nature — to the action of the French republic which had opened his eyes to the fallacy of the theories on which it was based. The republicans were using the liberty which they had themselves acquired to take away the liberty of others. Nay, they were letting themselves become subject to a severer thraldom than that from which they had delivered themselves. He had long viewed without changing his mind the excess of the reformers, even when they were "weaving

"A dance more wild than o'er was maniac's dream."

But he could not bear up against the invasion of Switzerland and "the groans from bleak Helvetia's caverns sent." His ideas and opinions on political subjects now underwent a complete reversal. These things were enough to destroy all his faith in political reform. To remove political and social evils was only to rush into greater evils:

"The sensual and the dark rebel in vain,
Slaves by their own compulsion,"
and "sensuality and darkness" he now takes to be the natural condition of men. Pantisocracy with its equal rights for all has gone from his mind like a dream. For a time affirms that his admiration for Liberty is as great as ever, but there is no place for Liberty among human beings, she is like the dove of Noah which could find no ground on which to rest its feet; there is no place for Liberty but the empty air where she flies on 'her subtle pinions,

The guide of homeless winds, and playmate of the waves.'"

How is this radical change in Coleridge's mind towards his fellow-beings—this loss of his once so-confident faith in human nature—to be accounted for? Was it wholly owing to the high-handed proceedings of the republican government, as he assures us in one of his best poems? Yes, to some extent, but he gives us to understand that the tendency to change was strengthened by new intellectual insight. Following the Platonists too closely, he had misunderstood the true place and function of reason. He now becomes acquainted with Kant's distinction between reason and understanding, and sees that many errors in politics had risen from ignorance of that distinction. Understanding is that function of mind which deals with individual things, and accepting them as they appear to be outwardly to the senses, and assumes them to be separate and independent realities, acting and reacting on one another outwardly in space and time; and the mechanical philosophy, taking understanding as its standard, had assumed that this external interaction of units is the whole truth of things. But Kant had made a great discovery: he had discovered that reason is a power different from and higher than understanding: and views things from the opposite side. Understanding is the differentiating power, and dissects wholes into parts, and considers the parts as independent things. Reason is the unifying power and views things as wholes, and sees how the parts must co-operate to make a harmonious whole, and sees the laws and reasons which rise out of the whole, and underlie the outward appearances of things, and checks and corrects the conclusions arrived at by understanding.

Now the reformers had thought only in terms of understanding. Society is a plurality of individuals—of units which are primarily independent of one another, but can come together and make contracts for mutual convenience. Individuals are subject to no laws which are not of their own making as individuals. The individual unit is the ulti-
mate fact. Governments therefore are artificial structures which can be made and unmade as individuals think fit. They failed to see that immanent in all individuals there are universal laws of the whole, i.e. of reason, and conditions therefore which they can neither make nor unmake, and which will ultimately overrule the temporary constructions of individuals. Thus, applied to politics, true reason sees that every nation is one organic whole of which all the parts are dependent on one another as organs, and that the health of the organism as a whole is subject to conditions which cannot be made nor unmade by the individual organs themselves.

Therefore, political institutions are not made, but are a part of the life of the nation, and grow as it grows, keeping time with the vital requirements of the whole, as the bark grows along with the tree, adapting itself to the life of the growing organism. Therefore a constitution cannot be abolished nor altered artificially, without destroying or injuring the life of the nation. Reforms, if they must come at all, must grow gradually and naturally out of the slowly changing circumstances of the people. Making sudden changes of political institutions is like tearing the living bark from the tree, and substituting some artificial covering in its stead. There are no rights of men in the abstract. Individuals as parts have no rights other than what the whole, i.e. the state, in the course of its development, may assign them in correlation with the duties which it imposes on them.

But this theory of a contradiction between reason and understanding was unsafe ground to build on. And his new zeal soon carried him so far as to deny the validity of reason altogether in relation to state affairs and political rights. He first takes sides with Burke in denouncing "abstract rights." We may safely speak of rights so long as they are left in the air (or in the moral philosophy classroom), but we must not bring them down to earth and apply them to the practical affairs of men. He forgets that rights are nothing if not forces working in the concrete affairs of men, and that denying them in the abstract, i.e. as operating universally, is really denying them altogether.

Accordingly, following up this notion of Burke, he goes on to dispense, practically, with reason altogether in practical affairs. "There is no proof" that reason alone ought to govern and direct human beings either as individuals or as states; the laws of reason are unable to satisfy the first conditions of human society." And again, "proof
is wanting that the first and most general applications of the power of man can be regulated by reason." The fatal error of the French leaders was that they had endeavoured to regulate the collective life of their nation by rules deduced from first principles of reason, which had no application to such things.

How then does this rejection of reason affect the moral department of human nature? "The object of moral law is not our outward actions, but the inward motives of our actions; so far it is infallible." But is not the moral department of human nature a function of reason, as he has so often assured us. Yes, but morality amounts to this, that we should always have good intentions and mean well. "By what show of reason can we pretend that, from a principle by which we are to determine the purity of our own motives, we are to deduce the form and matter of a rightful government, the object of which is to regulate the outward actions of men according to their particular circumstances"? Either, therefore, the affairs of princes and states are so complicated as to render the application of moral principles impossible; or else they are altogether above the sphere of moral good and evil. Thus we find an English thinker of the early 19th century anticipating the Prussian state policy of the 20th. Still rulers must have some principle by which to regulate their actions; if reason with its moral law is helpless, some other standard must be found. Here Coleridge overlooks Kant, and goes back to the philosophy of the 18th century which he had formerly rejected, — the philosophy of understanding and of mechanism — and borrows one of its principles. Statesmen must regulate their actions by expediency, and rule according to the interest of their own state as a whole, or of the predominant party in the state. Nations grow by the evolving force of expediency. A government is formed by gradual equilibration of the interests of the strongest classes, so that any sudden change will destroy the equilibrium and life of the whole. The British constitution is the equilibrium of three interests, the landed, the manufacturing and the mercantile. It is "an accommodation which the necessity of the case has worked out for itself." And any artificial changes imposed on this self-adapted balance of interests, by pretended reforms, will "destroy our nationality, and convert our representative government into a degrading delegation of the populace." "But it appears to me that the wise and good in every country will become
every day more and more disgusted with the representative form of government thus brutalised by the predominance of democracy,” that they will entrust their interests more and more to the king and “the reason of the people will become efficient in the will of the king”—a prediction which has been realised only in Prussia.

The highest of all practical interests to Coleridge in his later days is to preserve the equilibrium of things as they are in church and state. Movements were proceeding which were likely to disturb the balance of things, and introduce democracy which is anarchy and ruin. There was the bill for the removing the political disabilities of catholics, whom he considered a source of danger to the state. There was the movement for the liberation of slaves in the colonies, which he considered to be an uncalled for and dangerous proceeding “a tremendous and unprecedented enactment” which will, he fears, “do harm to the cause of humanity and true freedom,” and what made it worse was that it was promoted by the “dissenting interest.” Again there was even a movement for the admission of dissenters to the national universities, which seemed to Coleridge, the old unitarian, an iniquitous proceeding. Worst of all, there was the bill for an extension of the franchise for which the forward party had struggled for half a century. It was founded on a claim of rights for the lower or lower middle classes. But this was a revival of the “rights of man”, and theory of “abstract rights,” forgetting that what these people had to consider was duties, not rights.

Various attempts have been made to account for the change which came on Coleridge in his later years. Some have thought it due to a spirit of time-serving, and obsequiousness to the reigning powers. But he assures us that he never obtained any reward for his political essays. Either they were too fragmentary and obscure in style, or scattered about in different little known publications. Others have thought it due to some measure of mental and moral decline in his later years. He himself ascribes it to intellectual enlightenment. At all events there is this difference between his earlier and his latest thought, that through early and middle life he was never weary of expressing his conviction that there are eternal principles of reason, and that no rules are to be accepted either for literary judgment or practical life which cannot be deduced from fundamental principles; while in later life he subordinated such principles to party interests and expediency.
THE NEW YELLOW PERIL.

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Introductory.

The employment of foreign capital for the development of Indian industries has given rise to a good deal of hazy controversy in the public press and on the platform within the last few years. It is unfortunate that the advocates of the different sides on this question have so far failed to give a very clear enunciation of their views and there is a good deal of misty talk continually going on which only serves to confuse the issues. It is equally unfortunate that any discussion of this question is liable to be coloured by the political prejudices of those who take part in the discussion. The object of this paper is not so much to hazard any dogmatic opinion as to present, provisionally, from the standpoint of a student of Economics, the different sides of this question, so that it may ultimately be discussed from a purely academic point of view free from any heat or political bias.

The Amount of Foreign Capital.

The amount of foreign capital employed in India cannot be easily calculated. By far the greater part of such capital has come to us from England—due solely to our political connection with her. The amount of British Capital invested in India and Ceylon has been variously estimated by different persons. Sir George Paish, who is a recognised authority on this question, calculated that it amounted to £365,000,000 in 1911, made up us follows:

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<tr>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>Railways</td>
<td>£137,000,000</td>
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<td>Government Loans</td>
<td>179,000,000</td>
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<td>Tea</td>
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<td>Miscellaneous</td>
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£365,000,000
Five years later, in a letter to me, Sir George Paish stated that the amount of British Capital invested in India and Ceylon amounted to £390,000,000 and the approximate annual income therefrom amounted to £16,000,000.

Similar estimates have also been made by other people. Sir Archy Birkmyre of Calcutta put it at £500,000,000 in 1917, which was probably an overestimate. Sir Edward Sassoon once put it at £420,000,000. The "Economist" some years ago put it at £470,000,000.

It is beyond the scope of my present paper to enter into the details of the method by which these calculations are made. I can only refer my readers to the two most instructive papers read by Sir George Paish before the Royal Statistical Society in 1909 and 1910 for any such detail.

It must be clear, however, that British Capital is not the only foreign capital that comes to India. A large portion of it—an amount which cannot be easily estimated—also comes from other foreign countries, e.g. France, the United States, Japan, etc. Germany, before the war, had invested a large amount of capital in India, but it was rigorously controlled during the war. During the recent industrial boom in India a large amount of American Capital has poured into India and the recent imports of British Capital into India have been on a very large scale. The estimates given above will therefore have to be revised, but for our present purposes, the above figures will do quite well.

Our Advantages.

It is impossible to deny that British Capital* has done much for India. It has enabled us to develop our vast natural resources quickly and to develop them so well. Without the aid of British Capital, it would have taken us many long years to do what we have been able to do so far. Our mills and factories, our coal mines, our tea gardens in Assam, the network of railways and shipping throughout the country—all these and many others are the best evidence of what British Capital has done for India. It has helped us to build our vast and prosperous trade, it has opened new and distant markets for our pro-

* Reference is made in these lines to "British" capital only as it forms the bulk of India's foreign capital. It must be understood, however, that what is said here of British capital applies almost wholly to all foreign capital coming into India.
ducts, it has given increased employment to our labour, it has given the cultivators—who form the majority of our population—the best price for their crops and has thus materially increased their prosperity and raised their standard of living. It has increased immensely our total national production of wealth, it has encouraged, increased and in some cases created our exports. The development of railways in this country of long in distances has transformed India and has altered not simply her economic but also her political history. For, if anything, the railways have made a strong Central Government possible in India and have thus given India her much needed peace within her borders and security from foreign aggression. For India, her great want is repose. The railways have helped to evolve the idea of a political unity for India and have given us the benefits of all that it means. It has given us a broader outlook in all economic and political matters, and it has destroyed some of the worst prejudices of our social systems. Shall India’s dreams come true?—we are asking this question for the last fifty years, but, next to English education, we look to our railways to gild our dreams. In the economic sphere, the railways have developed our trade and commerce in a way never dreamt of before, they have reduced the severity of our famines and have made them amenable to human control, they have increased the mobility of our labour and in a thousand ways have helped to increase our national wealth. British Capital has made Calcutta the Queen of the East, it has made Bombay one of the finest ports in the world.

But this is not all. British Capital has helped India in several other ways not easily realised because they do not lie on the surface. We all welcome the increasing share of Indians in our industries. We are proud of those Indians who prosper in these lines. We are happy when they succeed. But it must be admitted that part of the reason why they succeed so well lies in the fact that the field for them had been cleared long ago by British Capitalists. The losses of pioneer industrialism in this country were borne by them. The greater part of the capital which they invested did not become fully remunerative until after long years of strenuous waiting and work. The huge profits which these capitalists make—Sir George Paish puts it at £16 millions per annum—are seen; but the losses which they had to bear are not seen and are thus generally ignored. These initial losses are inevitable when a country is first sought to be developed. And these losses the British
Capitalists had to bear. But once the country is developed—as it is now—once railways and steamers are built, markets are established, demand is stimulated and created, population has increased, a labouring class is created and trained—all those who handle industries later on get the benefit of this development without being called upon to pay any price for it. Indian Capital which is now for the first time financing industries, has avoided all these initial costs of development. It has also escaped a good deal of such initial industrial losses. It is easier for the Indians to succeed than it would have been the case if the British pioneers had not lost. England has still a vast amount of her money invested abroad on which she still gets no interest at all.

Another most important advantage that we gain is the cheap rate at which England lends us money. Were it not for our political connection with England, the rate that we pay on our loans would have been much greater than what we do actually pay. It is perfectly clear even a slight increase of 1 p.c. on our national debt would cost us several millions more which would perhaps involve heavy increase of taxation. Thus our political connection with England economises the cost of our debts. And economy is in itself a great income.

I think, after all the above it would not be necessary for me to explain in greater detail how British capital has helped us. I am anxious not to be misunderstood and I desire to make it perfectly clear that though we have certain serious disadvantages under the heel of foreign capital—to which I turn later on—no one is more anxious than I am to acknowledge the immense benefits which we have received from foreign capital.

I now turn to another point. It is sometimes suggested, by people who ought to know better, that we Indians ought to be profoundly grateful for what British Capital has done for us. To this most of us would agree. But when more than this is suggested, when, as a matter of fact, the impression is sought to be conveyed that Britain has done all this for the mere love of India without any interest of her own, when, as I said, these and similar other suggestions are artfully put forward without being clothed in precise and definite language, it is then that we emphatically differ. We say that the gain has been mutual and that the material interests of both parties have been served. Let us turn therefore to the other side of the question, viz., what has England gained by her investments in India?
England's Advantages.

I will briefly set down here some of these advantages:

First.—India offers a vast field for the employment of British Capital. From 400 to 500 millions of pounds of British Capital find remunerative employment here. It is of course understood that from this account must be deducted a large sum in order to make allowance for the following heads, viz:—

(1) Depreciation of investments.
(2) Actual losses of capital.
(3) A large amount of capital which earns no interest at all.
(4) Changes of ownership by transfer, sale, assignment or compulsory state acquisition.
(5) There is another item which though inapplicable in the case of India, is still of sufficient importance elsewhere to demand a liberal allowance—it is the sums lent to certain defaulting states, e.g. Louisiana, Mississippi, West Virginia, Costa Rica, Guatemala. The Bolshevist Government in Russia has also repudiated the national debt.
(6) Further many loans, though issued in London, are largely subscribed by foreigners through their London agents or banks. All such foreign holdings have to be deducted.

After making all these allowances, England still employs a vast amount of her capital remuneratively in India. The annual income which she derives from India was put in 1916 at £16,000,000 by Sir George Paish. It must be much greater now.

Second.—This large employment of capital is made under such political conditions as to eliminate all political risks of repudiation as referred to above.

Third.—As allowance must be made for depreciation, it is equally necessary to take into account the possibilities of appreciation. The jute boom, for instance, some time ago in India led to such sensational values of jute shares that many British holders rapidly unloaded and transferred their assets to England. The increase of capital through appreciation on the Stock Exchanges in recent years must have been enormous.

Fourth.—The income which England annually draws from her investments, great as it already is, is quite small in comparison with
the total income which she will ultimately derive from them. Capital invested in recent years is not yet fully productive and will not be so for some years to come. England’s income from foreign investments will rapidly increase as years pass—not only because of new investments—we leave that for the present,—but also because of higher returns from capital already invested. The best actual illustration is the case of railways built with British Capital in India and America. For years they were worked at a huge loss and yet ultimately after some years they gave splendid gains.

Fifth.—Once investments are made, they almost automatically increase by continual re-investments of interests and profits. For England, both capital and its income accumulate abroad and the capital grows automatically. The size of this annual re-investment is not inconsiderable.

Sixth.—It gives England not only a large income, but a stable income as well. A large income and a more even income results from the fact that if one part of the world is depressed, another part flourishes, so that on the average a stable income follows. This is a very great advantage for her national finance.

Seventh.—Investments of capital abroad, on the principles of International Trade, result in a demand for British goods from abroad. Capital is exported in the shape of goods. Thus the British export trade prospers. Further the new industries which British Capital creates abroad send large orders for British goods for the construction of railways, canals, mills, factories, etc. Sir George Paish found a remarkable parallelism between the growth of England’s investments and the growth of her trade and prosperity. Mr. Edgar Crammond held that if British Capitalists suspended the investments of capital abroad they would inevitably reduce their export trade by one-fourth.*

Eighth.—England gains large commissions, brokerage and other agency charges by handling and managing these loans.

Ninth.—It offers a large field for the employment of the members of middle-class English families as managers, agents, superintendents, engineers, directors, clerks, secretaries, etc., in railways, mines, factories, tea gardens and in a great variety of other enterprises. Nor is this all.

It also gives, as Mr. Crammond pointed out, a great amount of employment in the city of London itself and elsewhere as directors, managers, clerks, solicitors, agents, accountants, auditors, etc.

Tenth.—In India, England earns not merely the interest on her capital but also the earnings of management and profits as well. This is due to the fact that England has not simply lent the capital to us, but she also controls and manages it. The work of running our industries is almost entirely in the hands of Europeans. The interest that we annually pay is estimated at £16,000,000. No estimate has yet been accurately made of the total business profits of industries controlled by Englishmen in India. But if the interests of British Capital amount to £16,000,000 annually, the profits must be very much greater than that. As a rough measure of such profits may be cited the estimate by Mr. Shirras, of the profits of the Bengal Jute mills only during 4½ years which he put at Rs. 31,00,00,000.

Eleventh.—It is, to Englishmen, a potent instrument of political power. The Englishmen in India, particularly the British merchants and traders, enjoy an amount of political influence and importance which has given rise to frequent exhibitions of explosive temper in the Indian press and on the platform, and has added much to the difficulties of administration in India.

Twelfth.—By developing other countries, England has developed and strengthened her own customers. She has also thereby assured for herself her much needed supplies of food and raw materials.

Thirteenth.—It may also be pointed out that the risks of pioneer industrialism which England may be said to have taken in this country is hardly true so far as a very large portion of our total foreign capital is concerned—we refer to our railway debt. The early British Capital which came to India for our railways came under a guarantee of interest from Government and as such it took no risks. On the contrary, the taxpayers paid, so that the British Capitalists might have a guaranteed minimum income. This was certainly a great advantage and British Capitalists took full advantage of it.

Our Disadvantages.

We now turn to our disadvantages under foreign capital. Before dealing with this point, let me repeat once more that I am anxious not to be misunderstood, and I refer to what I have already said about
it before. I will now briefly refer to some of our disadvantages under the following heads:

(1) The peaceful penetration of foreign capital unguardedly ends in the political domination by the alien capitalists. This is what we find, to some extent, in India and this is much more than what we bargained for. Instances are not rare when the veto of British Capitalism attempted to thwart our political aspirations. When Lord Ripon wanted to invest Indian civilians with criminal jurisdiction over European British subjects, it was suggested that the proposal would drive away Europeans and therefore British Capital from all mofussil stations, and this argument served its purpose at the time. Coming to our own times, when the whole world fought and bled for liberty and the right of self-determination and when India freely gave in men and money to fight England's war—which was her war also—and when in return the British Government nobly offered India a more liberal and responsible form of Government, the British Capitalist class in India fought hard against such reforms. A violent agitation—much of it being beautifully stage-managed—was set on foot in India and England to defeat the reforms. The "Statesman" regarded the Home-Rule movement as a rank imposture.* Sir Archy Birkmyre at a meeting of the European Association in Calcutta gave the signal and Sir Hugh Bray at Simla trumpeted a frontal attack. These two redoubtable knights between themselves gave out that there was a limit to the patience of even the European community, that they must have adequate guarantees, that they would not allow unwise premature concessions to jeopardise the interests of British Capital in India of which they constituted themselves to be the trustees. The reply that it provoked was prompt and crushing. "India," said Mr. C. R. Das, the most eminent counsel in Calcutta, "does not live for Sir Archy Birkmyre."† Capital was made for man and not man for capital. It would be really monstrous if the interests of foreign capital are upheld to deny a people its birthright. I may here refer to the remarks of President

* Vide issue 14th October, 1917.
† The political controversies of this period became so acute and it gradually came down to such a low level on both sides that Billingsgate might have gone to school them. Much of it was all fog, hopeless, impenetrable fog, highly coloured by political prejudices, highly explosive and hopelessly irrelevant. As an encounter of wits it might have been amusing, but as an attempt to solve an Imperial problem, it was highly disappointing.
Wilson at Turin in January 1919, when he said, "The plans of the modern world are made in the counting house. Men that do business of the world now shape the destinies of the world. The country is dominated by the capital invested in it. It is a fundamental idea that in proportion as foreign capital comes in and takes hold, foreign influence comes in and takes hold. Therefore processes of capital are in a sense processes of conquest." Foreign capital is closely identified with a foreign government and it manages to secure peculiar advantages whether in the economic or in the political sphere. The distribution of wagons between the Indian and the European collieries is a perennial complaint. The discrimination of some European banks between Indian and European customers has provoked much acid comment.* In industry, as in war, there is no merit in delay and the British Capitalists being first in the field have pushed their advantages to the utmost limits. They have no doubt brought material prosperity—but not under ideal conditions. And yet we cannot possibly do without it and we cannot get rid of it even if we wanted to! Capital is king and "the almighty dollar" must always work its way. The power of money is the power behind the throne, and this political domination is the most melancholy feature of this question in India.

(2) If it were simply a case of our borrowing money abroad and paying interest for it, no one would object. But our economic dependence goes much further than that. We have to pay not only interest but the huge profits of business as well. This annual drain of profits is enormous. We do not object to foreign capital in itself. We object to the control of our industries by such capital by Europeans. If our industries could be developed by Indians with foreign capital, we would gladly pay interest. Lord Curzon asked why should the employment of foreign capital in India be deplored when other countries of the world—and he instanced England—gladly welcome foreign capital? His Lordship forgot the initial and vital difference that in England it is foreign capital only—but not foreign control—that is welcomed. Would England submit to such a foreign control of her industries and such a drain of her profits as we have in India? It would, I am afraid, bring

* The startling disclosures of Mr. Currimbhoy A. Peerbhoy and others before the Indian Industrial Commission provoked a strong agitation. A large part of such evidence has, I believe, been treated by the Government as confidential and has not been published at all.
about a revolution in England. Like England, we are willing to pay interest; but why should profits go out as well? Already in England agitation is on foot seriously to restrict what little foreign capital and foreign ownership there exist in her industries so that if we err, we err in very good company.

I can perhaps anticipate the answer that will be given to me—I know it will be said that if Indians are so anxious to control the industries, why do they not do it? That is just our sore point with the British Capitalists. Modern industrialism is a new thing to India. The British Capitalists brought it here. They have made enormous profits out of India. What have they done so far to train up an efficient class of Indian entrepreneurs? We do not think it at all a proud record for them. How many European firms will take Indians as apprentices to learn the processes of trade or the details of management? The European, generally speaking, will welcome the Indian as a clerk, but as an entrepreneur—never. He will import his own countrymen from the west for all the productive stages. The Indian has not even been trained for the work—no opportunity has been given to him and yet judgment has been passed against him by default.* We say the British Capitalists had a moral responsibility to train up a race of efficient Indian entrepreneurs. This responsibility they have so long failed to discharge. A few Indians, no doubt, have made good—but that was not because of, but in spite of, the British Capitalists. The latter are always anxious to retain the entire control of their capital in their own hands. Mr. Edgar Crammond, speaking at the Royal Statistical Society (15th June, 1909), remarked, "It was desirable that the money sent abroad should continue to be controlled by British Companies, that was to say, it should be under the direct control of Companies, the head offices of which were situated in this country (England)." That is a fair sample of the British view.

(3) In consequence of the above, all the higher wages in our industries are monopolised by Europeans. The higher staff in all industries controlled by Europeans is almost wholly European. One of our advantages from foreign capital is the increased employment to labour—but it relates only to low-paid manual labour for which no

* I may invite a reference to my note presented to the Calcutta University Commission on this question; vide Report, Vol. IX, at pages 464 to 467.
European substitute is available in this country due to climatic and other reasons. If any such substitute could really be available, even that advantage would be lost. The lower wages we get, but all the higher wages we lose. This drain of higher wages is considerable and has a cumulative effect.

(4) As a result of (2) and (3) above there is, no doubt, a great economic loss to the country—a loss of her economic strength. If the profits and the higher wages came to Indians it would have prevented the commercial anæmia of India, it would have given increased employment to other Indians directly or indirectly by increasing the demand for their services or commodities, it would have multiplied wages and profits. It is one of the chief reasons of poverty in India.

(5) Foreign capital has produced a good deal of political and economic cleavage between Indians and Anglo-Indians. This is hardly desirable in the interests of good government. The average European has come to India to make money and money he makes. His first and last care is for his dividends. He has little time and still less inclination to co-operate with the Indians in all public matters. Even if he happens to find both, there is the policy of splendid isolation from all Indian affairs, not perhaps unmixed with a certain sense of racial superiority and class prejudice. For, of all things in this world, prejudice is the last to be demobilised. There is thus no identity of interests with Indians. Nor have we done our part well. The almost daily rehearsal of extreme nationalism cannot induce a spirit of cooperation and comradeship. But it must be pointed out that these rehearsals are of very recent growth. There was no great friendly cooperation even before it between the two communities. It is evident that both sides must be prepared for a considerable unloading of their programmes and both sides must cultivate a new humility of accent. The recent attempts at a closer co-operation have really come as a liberal education for all India. The European agitation against the Reforms has not been a glory to them and they might have overheard the judgment of posterity. The European must recognise his responsibility as a citizen of this country. The Indian on his part must give the European Capitalist his dues and recognise that he has been in many ways a potent instrument for the good of India.

(6) The use of foreign capital to exploit those natural resources of the country which may be regarded as part of the original endowment of
the people received from nature and which, once exhausted, can never be replaced, stands on a wholly different footing. Land has a perpetual life, but the other resources have not. Foreign capital used to grow tea in Assam is certainly different from foreign capital used to exhaust the coal mines in Jherria or the petroleum fields in Burma. In tea cultivation India loses—other things remaining the same—only a part of the fertility of her soil which however can be made good by adequate soil-dressing. But in the case of coal or petroleum, India loses for good her priceless natural resources which no human effort can ever replace. It is inevitable, because it lies in the nature of things. We cannot consume coal or oil without permanently destroying them. But, it may be argued, since this is so, it is most proper and desirable that the exploitation of these resources should be directed and controlled by the children of the soil. As Prof. Sarkar points out * "the conservation of natural resources for the future of the nation is of deeper importance to a people than the quick development of mines and industries. Moreover, at present, we derive in the form of royalty only a small fraction of the value of our minerals exploited by foreign capitalists." Sir Thomas Holland, President of the Indian Industrial Commission and now a member of the Government of India, once deplored † the use of foreign capital in the petroleum industry of Burma. The drain of profits he regarded as an "unnecessary and undesirable tax" which India must continue to pay until she could find her own capital.

The same view was also expressed by Sir Vithaldas Thackersey ‡ who thought that it would be to the permanent good of the country to allow petroleum to remain underground and the gold to rest in the bowels of the earth until the gradual development of India enabled Indians themselves to exploit these resources.

In Japan, Prof. Sarkar points out, foreigners are debarred from acquiring land or mining concessions. Similar legislation has also recently been introduced in some other countries of the world.

(7) The world to-day is entering upon a new era so far as the relations of Capital and Labour are concerned. Labour throughout the world has taken up a militant attitude and conflicts between the two are of

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* Economics of British India.
† First Indian Industrial Conference, 1905.
‡ Second Indian Industrial Conference, 1906.
almost daily occurrence. The present capitalistic regime has given rise to revolts of labour throughout the world. National strikes are threatened daily. One great strike is hardly settled when another takes place. The Labour flag is daily assuming a deeper red. Much of it is due to the results of the war—high prices, increased economic stress and the sweep of Bolshevism throughout the world. The settlement of these sharp disputes in the West is difficult enough, but it is nothing compared with the trouble which the future has in store for us in India—when Indian labour is sufficiently organised for strikes—because, in addition to the ordinary difficulties of satisfying the conflicting claims of the employers and the labourers—which are common to all countries in the world—there will be the further difficulty of a racial antagonism as between the Europeans and Indians in India. This question of racial antagonism between the native labourers and the foreign capitalists is absent in the West—where the employers and the labourers belong to the same race—but is present in India to a very large extent due to our large employment of foreign capital. Already Indian labour is extremely restless since the end of the war, due partly to economic reasons and partly to their recent political consciousness. For the first time in the history of India, Indian Labour has begun to talk politics and to talk about the rights of Labour. A recent instance of Labour's new alliance with politics was the death of Mr. Tilak when mills and factories in Bombay had to be closed to allow the labourers to observe mourning. The Labour leader and the All-India Trade Union Congress are new factors in Indian politics. The great need of the hour is a strong leader who will guide this new movement aright. It is clear that to such a state of things, the addition of a racial question as between the native labourers and the foreign capitalists means serious troubles ahead.

(8) Foreign capital might have been of infinite advantage to India if it had been used to break the power of the Mahajan. "The raiyat is India and India is the raiyat" and agriculture supports about 80 per cent of the people. But our agriculture lives on borrowed capital and the exceedingly high rates which the Mahajan charges have led to the alarming indebtedness of our cultivators. Sir Daniel Hamilton has described the whole situation very clearly and forcibly. "The power," he says, "which stands in the way of India's economic development is the power of evil finance—the want of a banking system for the people.
The people have many bankers but no bank. The land lies blighted by the shadows of the Mahajan. Go where you will, you find the people weary of waiting for a money monsoon which never breaks. The Mahajan still lies safely entrenched behind his money bags, while the victims of his silver bullet lie all around in heaps. When is this dacoity to cease? The ryot is robbed of his crops, his cattle of their food, the weaver of his cloth, a dry and thirsty land is robbed of its irrigation. A bank rate of 38, 48 or 60 per cent—is this all there is to show for 140 years of British rule? How much longer is the flag that stands for freedom to float over 300 millions of people who sit, mostly, in bondage? How much longer are the law courts which stand for justice, to assist in plundering the people? What India wants is an Act written not with a goose quill dipped in milk and water, but with an iron pen dipped in the blood of the Mahajan; for, until the banking system for which the Mahajan stands is dead, India will not live.*

This is our actual situation. If foreign capital had been used to accommodate our cultivators to the fullest extent necessary, the Mahajan and his evil finance would be nowhere. But the small cultivator gets no advantage from foreign capital. His wants are limited—"too small to interest the great financial houses."† The small cultivator is not known to them at all. Living generally in the villages, he cannot find sureties for him in the towns. The cultivator has nothing to pledge which the financial houses will accept. He can offer land as security but they will not accept it as it involves long and costly enquiries into title. Besides land cannot be readily sold and thus it would not be a liquid asset for the financial houses in times of emergency. Thus foreign capital might have been one of the greatest boons to India if it had chosen to break the Mahajan. But that it has not done at all.

(9) The foreign capitalists, as Prof. Sarkar points out,‡ being first in the field have forestalled the Indians of the future "by taking up the most profitable lands and concerns. The belated Indian capitalist who is now venturing into the same field, finds that only third-rate concessions are left for him. For this reason, in Japan, foreigners are

* Souls of a Good Quality and other papers.
† Sir Theodore Morison.
‡ Economics of British India.
debarred by law from owning land and acquiring mining concessions and the Railway Act prohibits the pledging of railway properties to aliens."

(10) Foreign enterprises in India are almost wholly controlled from England in the interests of foreigners. The Controlling Boards are generally located in England. The great railways of India—properties of the State—are managed by companies with their Head offices in London. Indian interests under these conditions always suffer. A Committee will shortly consider the whole question of Indian Railways and no doubt the location of the Boards will also be duly considered. But what is true of the Railways is also true of almost every other industry in the country.

Economic Imperialism.

This problem is not peculiar to India. The "Economic Imperialism" which has dominated the foreign policies of most European countries has resulted in the increased exploitation of the coloured races throughout the world. The white man's "burden" is now really a big source of individual as well as national profit and power. The real race for the partition of Africa, for instance, began about 1880, "since when, up to 1914, three and a quarter millions of square miles were added to the British Empire, four millions to the French and one million to the late German Empire."* The last war—the greatest war in history—was fought and won for the rights and liberties of the small nations, but its main effect—so far as the coloured peoples in Asia and Africa are concerned—has been the increased territorial expansion—call it mandates or call it spheres of interest, as you please—of the European Powers. Mesopotamia, for instance, is a very heavy financial burden upon England at present and yet it has been cynically observed, the mandate must be accepted because it would be a "mandate for oil!"

Once come, always stay is the rule, but the coloured peoples are entitled to ask—as some day, no mistake, they will ask—how has the white man discharged his "burden" and his "trust"? The white man has, in some cases, given them peace and order, but it may not be improper to point out that these act as much in the interest of the

one as of the other. Further, it may be pointed out, that peace imposed by bayonets and field guns is not the ideal method of spreading civilisation. "Law and Order" have generally been the excuse for armed intervention which resulted in increased economic and political concessions from the natives. The shocking atrocities of Belgium in Congo or of Germany in South West Africa or the Red Rubber atrocities of Putumayo are too well known to require repetition here. They were instances of economic imperialism run riot and this economic exploitation is ceaseless, remorseless, merciless and endless against which the coloured races are hopelessly powerless. The maps of Africa and the Middle East have changed their colours since the war and land hunger has run riot all round. Illustrations are in these cases odious but a few are needed. No black-man, in this twentieth century, has any legal title to land or property in some of the European colonies. The native is, in his own country, restricted to his own reserved area by a policy of racial and economic segregation—the best lands having been already appropriated by the white settlers. Indentured labour still prevails, and illiteracy is allowed to continue. Australia, New Zealand, East Africa, South Africa, Canada, have declared that they must be "white" and remain "white", though, in the event of a real Yellow Peril to her, it is to India—brown India—that white Australia may have to appeal. The Indian in South Africa is now reminded that he is a British subject, not a British citizen and as such he cannot claim the political and municipal rights of a citizen. The Indians helped substantially to build up her material prosperity in return for which he has been pursued by a policy of relentless persecution.

Thus, this "economic imperialism" as Prof. Vaswani points out, is the Orient's greatest danger. And yet, all the time, after five years of the greatest human agony in history, with a League of Nations more dead than alive, they are still protesting as if a new Jerusalem would presently descend out of Heaven amidst the thunders of cannon and the music of the Marseillaise. As a recent author pertinently remarked "You cannot combine a League of Nations in Europe and America, with the ideals of economic imperialism in Asia and Africa!"

Foreign capital in England and elsewhere.

These are some of our disadvantages. These are some of the reasons why we sometimes grumble against foreign capital. Indian
economists and businessmen do not object to foreign capital *per se*. Prof. V. G. Kale, Sir Vithaldas Thackersey, Mr. A. Chatterton, Hon. G. V. Joshi, Prof. J. Sarkar and others have no objection to foreign capital in itself. They all understand that the interest paid is not a drain at all but they feel that the profits are. They do not object so much to foreign capital as to foreign exploitation—just as in Japan Marquis Ito, Baron Shibu Sawa and others distinctly welcome foreign capital without foreign control. The Indian economists realise that foreign capital need not necessarily be injurious to us. What they are anxious to see is that they do not pay too high a price for it.

Our position on this question is not unique. The same or similar difficulties have also appeared in other countries and we will now turn to a consideration of this question as it affects England herself. She has invested millions of pounds abroad and when other countries invest capital in England we should expect to find her taking the situation philosophically. But that is not usually the case. The dangers of foreign capital and of foreign domination through it are already being keenly discussed in England. The Wrenbury Committee of the Board of Trade was appointed to consider the use of foreign capital in and foreign ownership of industries in England. It pointed out certain reasons of supreme economic importance which rendered it highly undesirable to impose any restrictions on the free flow of foreign capital into England. The main argument of the committee was that the maintenance of London as the financial centre of the world was of the first importance for the well-being of the Empire—and anything which would impede or restrict the flow of capital to the United Kingdom would in itself be prejudicial to Imperial interests.

It is necessary closely to examine the findings of the committee. It is clear that the main argument of the committee does not apply to India. Calcutta and Bombay will never aspire to be the financial centres of the East—not at least until we have a free market for gold and a much greater development of our trade and industries. Besides, the political position of India as a dependency will not allow of any such thing. Foreign governments wishing to float a loan in London can negotiate direct with the British Government in London. No such direct negotiation with the Government of India is possible and even the Government of India has become a *purdah* government living either in the solitary isolation of Delhi or on the Olympian heights of Simla.
Many of the witnesses before the Wrenbury Committee favoured legislation compelling the disclosure of nationality by all shareholders and, in some cases, they also advocated the limitation of the proportion which aliens may hold of the share capital of a company.

The question is complicated by the Law of Trusts. As the Wrenbury Committee pointed out—if A be the registered holder of a share, he is not necessarily the beneficial owner. He may be a trustee for B. To enact that the registered holder must be a British subject effects nothing. For B may be an alien or an enemy. Even if it is enacted that A, when his share is allotted or transferred to him shall make a declaration that he holds in his own right or that he holds in trust for B and that both A and B are British subjects, will not prevent the creation of a new trust the next day under which C, an alien enemy, will be the beneficial owner.

The committee, however, could not recommend any restriction, first, because of the political difficulties that it would create between England and even her allies in the late war, secondly, because the scheme can be easily evaded, thirdly, because it would encumber trade and commerce with heavy legal pitfalls and technicalities, and lastly because it was in the economic interest of the country that except in some limited cases the free flow of capital should not be disturbed.

Besides the above, there is another important political reason why the import of foreign capital into a free country like England should be encouraged. The foreign capital invested in the country remains as a sort of security for the capital which England has lent out to foreign countries. For instance, the Bolshevik Government in Russia began by repudiating the national debt. Mexico has cheated the investors by starting revolutions. In all such cases, Russian or Mexican capital invested in England, would be a good security. Roumania, for instance, in 1916, sequestrated a large amount of German Capital in Roumania as a reply to German atrocities in war.

It will be seen, however, that most of the arguments given above against restriction are inapplicable to India.

We have dealt so far with the situation so far as it affects England. I will now turn to what other foreign countries think of this domination of foreign capital. One thing is perfectly clear. All the foreign countries which have to do with foreign capital are very anxious to repay them as quickly as possible so as to get free from the
incubus of foreign gold. Japan is most anxious to pay off her loans for the Russo-Japanese war. The amount of British capital invested in 1910 in Russia was £38 millions, in Germany £6 millions, in France £7 millions, in China £26 millions, in Japan £53 millions, in Portugal £8 millions. These are being paid off as quickly as possible. England's investments in European countries are being quickly and largely repaid as those countries grow in wealth. England, for instance, was the greatest railway builder of the world, but most of these railways in Russia, Roumania, Brazil, the United States and elsewhere have been already paid for and their ownership has already passed away from the British people. This redemption of debt is proceeding so rapidly that Mr. A. W. Flux—one of the most acute economic thinkers in England—drew a gloomy picture of the day when the debtor countries begin to repay.* England, he said, must then either consume her capital unproductively or find new opportunities for investment.

It must be added, however, that the war—on account of the vast destruction of capital it involved—has, for some time at least, altered the above conditions and has saved the capitalist. The rebuilding of the world will require a vast capital and it can now dictate its own price.


Foreign Capital in the East.

Let me now turn to the problem as it affects the Orient. In Asia this threatens to become a serious problem. Foreign capital is being poured into the East in ever-increasing streams. British and American capital is moving far and wide for the commercial exploitation of Asia. India, Persia, China, Japan, Turkey, Siberia are being swept away by the deluge of foreign capital. And this deluge has created a new Pan-Asianic problem. Acute thinkers of the East are doubting if it is all for Asia's good. This financial bondage is now taken to be the greatest danger of the East. China is in danger of being bought up by the West, and this is danger enough for Japan. Kidd in his Principles of Western Civilisation refers to the dread of the black and yellow races of the world extinguishing the white races by their ability to wage an economic struggle on more purely animal conditions. Charles H. Pearson saw in his distant vision the day when the whole world would be girdled by a continuous zone of black and yellow races—the white races being elbowed out and superseded by them. This
is the Yellow Peril of Europe, but incidentally it may be fair to point out that these apprehensions are not wholly justified so long as the white races own and control their capital even in the "yellow" lands. It then becomes not a competition between the whites in Europe and the yellows in Asia but between one white man in Europe and another white man in Asia.

"The old yellow peril," says an acute writer writing in 1912, "was a phantom of the West. . . . . The new yellow peril is of the East, and no phantom at all: it is a well-grounded dread of the white man's yellow millions pouring into the East till the Orient is in hopeless financial bondage to the West. . . . . The new yellow peril is a remorseless force before which all opposition fails. Like a narcotic it creates in the victim a desire that finally consumes him. . . . . The greatest danger of the East is not from armed invasion: it lies far more in the insidious and irresistible pressure of western finance . . . . . From the coils of occidental finance that are slowly winding themselves about her, Japan can see no way of escape. Before the octopus of Western gold Japan and China stand appalled at this moment. Little has been said about it yet, but the undertone of apprehension is beginning to find expression. . . . . The Russian menace which Japan fought one of the greatest conflicts of history to remove was as nothing compared with this merciless force which no ingenuity of Japan can prevent. . . . . Japan can cope with arms—she knows how to fight; but with occidental bankers she is hopelessly at odds. . . . . The power that holds the purse strings is the power that rules. . . . . This power has invaded the East and already holds the people of the Orient in its grasp."

A few illustrations will make this clear. Let us look to China. Foreign powers will only lend to China under the most adequate safeguards and guarantees. These are not merely financial—one could understand the logic of them if they were only so—but also very largely political. After the defeat of China by Japan in 1895, the former has passed more and more under the influence of the foreign powers. As one writer puts it: "Strategic bases were established by successive encroachments on the territory of China and, . . . . the Powers entered upon a struggle—the Battle of Concessions—for the control of China in which the combination of politics and finance played a sinister part." This threatened the gradual dismemberment of China and it ultimately ended in a general agreement amongst the Powers as to
the various "spheres of interest." China—the same writer continues—
"was parcelled out by the Powers into geographical areas within which
each Power claimed for itself the primary right of economic exploita-
tion. This was manifestly unfair, inasmuch as the only terms upon
which China could obtain foreign financial assistance within the given
area were those which the Powers might choose to demand. China
was deprived of the advantage of buying in the cheapest market." As Kidd, in his *Principles of Western Civilisation* puts it, "the
competitive exploitation of Chinese resources proceeds in an environ-
ment of international intrigue, of social squalor and of moral outrage
and degradation almost without equal in history."

Nor is this all. This policy of distinct territorial "spheres of
interest" is derogatory to her sovereign rights as a state. It is impos-
sible even to think of any such arrangement in the case of any country
seeking trade or other economic concessions in any other independent
country of Europe. The idea, for instance, of Italy, France and Germany
seeking to divide the territories of Great Britain into three separate
"spheres of interest" for the primary or preferential right of economic
exploitation is absurd and the mere hint of it would be enough to
bring the Powers on the brink of war. It has been possible only in
Asia and Africa because both are drugged by foreign capital.

In Persia, too, the same phenomenon is at work. Persia is parti-
tioned into distinct "spheres of interest" like China. The loans granted
to Persia—like those granted to China—impose conditions of economic
exploitation and concessions which it would be impossible to dictate
to any first-class sovereign state in the West. Foreign capital is com-
ing into Persia on an enormous scale and, with it, foreign control. An
European has just been appointed to be the Financial Adviser to the
Persian Government.

The recent Turkish Peace terms afford another instance of stringent
financial guarantees. A Financial Commission is set up to manage the
Turkish Debt until the whole of it is discharged and in this Commission
Turkey will only have a "consultative voice!" "Voice" indeed! Turkey no doubt has long mismanaged her finances and some control
may be mutually advantageous. But to give her a merely "consulta-
tive voice" is to give her a mere shadow for the substance and where
her own vital interests are so intimately affected she certainly could
claim a much better treatment. Foreign capital has done a lot of
good in Turkey, but such a provision tells its own tale and has its
own moral!

*A New Monroe Doctrine for the East.*

It will thus appear that this New Yellow peril has become a grave
danger to the East. The silver bullets of the West, the well-loaded
cheques by which they hold the East, have set acute thinkers of the
East looking for a new Monroe Doctrine for the East. It will be an
economic doctrine which, if it may not succeed in eliminating the New
Yellow Peril, will still try to keep the danger within limits. Japan, for
instance, claims that in all future loans to China all the other powers
of the world must acknowledge the superiority and priority of her
rights and her interests. Japan regards it as a vital necessity—but it
has yet to be seen if the Western powers are prepared to concede it
without opposition. The signs are ominous. Japan is already restless
about it. The trend of the most advanced modern ideas in Japan is
most clear and definite. Geographically, she is situated in a very
advantageous position at the centre of the world’s Eastern commercial
routes. She is, as it were, the connecting link common to the three
most important inter-oceanic water-routes to and from Europe, Ame-
rica and Asia. China will soon be the most important Far Eastern
market in the world. The Siberian Railway is an accomplished fact and
Siberia is being gradually opened up with vast possibilities of economic
development before her. Japan’s ambition is to act as the leader of
the Asiatic countries and to lead the new Pan-Asiatic movement in
the world. “It is the mission of Japan,” says Prof. K. Ukita, “to set
up an example of a civilised and independent national state for her
Asiatic neighbours and then to make a confederation of all the Asiatic
nations on the basis of international law: just as it is the mission of
the United States of America to form one vast Pan-American Union
of all the republics of the new hemisphere” in order to hasten the
progress of the American world. Japan is rapidly acting up to her
ideals. As Mr. F. A. Mackenzie pointed out sometime ago, Korea is
shortly going to be closed against all but Japanese trade except over
a high tariff wall. The “open door” in China is rapidly passing
away over large parts of the country and attempts are being vigorously
made to capture the whole European trade in China. By her military
manœuvres in Siberia she is trying to secure concessions which, accord-
ing to Mr. Mackenzie, will include the control of the railways, full river
rights and a monopoly of mining concessions in Eastern Siberia.
"There will be," says Mr. Mackenzie, "no room for European trade
then. Behind these surface appearances there are still deeper move-
ments. Japan has resolved to make herself the mistress of the East.
She asks recognition of her dominant interests." A Pan-Asiatic League
has, it is said, been started in Japan with branches all over Asia to
combat the New Yellow Peril with a violently aggressive policy. The
last European war was fought not merely for political and dynastic
ambitions, but also for economic and commercial jealousies amongst
the European nations. It would be really a disaster to civilisation if
to the Old Yellow Peril which the West feared so much is to be added a
New Yellow Peril, which the East views with grave alarm, to complicate
and embitter the relations between the East and the West. This is a
problem which it would be difficult to solve because vital interests on
both sides are at stake. But it would still admit of an equitable solu-
tion and it will require the highest statesmanship and the greatest
amount of goodwill on both sides to solve it. We are confident both
will be forthcoming to solve it to the lasting peace of the world.*

* It has not been possible for me within the limits of this paper to discuss the vari-
ous ways in which the problems mentioned above may be met and solved. I hope how-
ever to deal with them on another occasion later on.
CONTEMPORARY ENGLISH POETRY.

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In a well-known passage of the *Biographia Literaria*, Coleridge writes: "The great works of past ages seem to a young man, things of another race in respect of which his faculties must remain passive and submissive, even as to the stars and mountains. But the writings of a contemporary, perhaps not many years older than himself, surrounded by the same circumstances and disciplined by the same manners, possess a reality for him and inspire an actual friendship as of a man for a man. His very admiration is the wind which feeds and fans his hope. The poems themselves assume the properties of flesh and blood. To recite, to extol, to contend for them is but the payment of a debt due to one who exists to receive it." * But these do not exhaust the considerations which invest contemporary poetry with special interest to the student of literature. It is obvious that if his knowledge and appreciation of a literature are to be adequate and comprehensive, he must get into touch with its latest developments and enter into an energetic realisation of the best of contemporary writers. His intimate and living knowledge of the environment in which their work is produced adds considerably to his capacity for sympathetic understanding and the confidence born of its qualities of excellence is also an inspiration for the future.

Facilities for such an appreciation of contemporary poetry have unfortunately not existed in our Universities, and judged by the syllabuses and curricula of studies even in the advanced courses, it would appear, they proceeded on the assumption, as Sir Quiller Couch puts it, † "that English literature took to its bed and expired and was beatified," on a certain date, for instance, with the death of Tennyson and Browning. It is often taken for granted, without even the faintest acquaintance with recent and contemporary poetry, that the Muse has been

* *Biographia Literaria*: Chapter I.
† *Sir Arthur Quiller Couch: Studies in Literature.*
silent in English or that her utterances, if any, are devoid of the true inspiration of song. Where this wrong belief is not due to actual ignorance, it is probably due to the widespread and perennial failing of man to be a blind laudator temporis acti.* The best refutation of this pessimistic and essentially incorrect outlook is in a lively appreciation of the achievements of English poetry in our own times. They lend support to Matthew Arnold’s fervent hope expressed years ago: “In poetry, where it is worthy of its high destinies, our race as time goes on, will find an ever surer and surer stay.”†

Before proceeding further, it may be pointed out that an examination of the work of contemporary poets would naturally fall under two heads; it would, in the first place, embrace the work of an older generation of writers who are still happily with us, but whose work has practically finished, and, secondly, it would deal with poets of a younger generation who are our contemporaries in the real sense. The limitations imposed by the title would at the same time exclude poets who have died in recent years, like Swinburne and Meredith, or Francis Thompson and Stephen Phillips and even Rupert Brooke who closed only the other day his intensely hopeful career of less than thirty years, amidst the din of the recent war.

Prominent among the surviving Victorian veterans and belonging to the older generation of writers is Thomas Hardy who has practically closed his work as a writer of fiction and has been busy producing volumes of poetry, though some of the pieces can be traced to much earlier dates of composition. Referring to the position occupied by Browning and Tennyson in the nineteenth century in the world of poetry in England, the late Rev. Stopford Brooke wrote: “Parnassus: Apollo’s mount, has two peaks and on these for sixty years, from 1830 to 1890, two poets sat till their rights to these lofty peaks became unchallenged. Beneath them during these years, on the lower knolls of the mount of song, many new poets sang; with diverse instruments, on various subjects and in manifold ways. They had their listeners; the Muses were also their visitants; but none of them ventured seriously to dispute the royal summits where Browning and Tennyson sat, and smiled at one another across the vales between.”‡ The position of

* Horace: *Ars Poetica*.
† *Essays in Criticism*: Second Series.
‡ Rev. Stopford Brooke: *Browning*, Chapter I.
Thomas Hardy in the world of contemporary poetry is not one of similar unchallenged supremacy, but his seat is undoubtedly on one of the loftier peaks and there are not many who can approach him either in profundity of philosophic outlook or in depth of tragic emotion. The Napoleonic drama of the *Dynasts*, with its epic proportions and strange innovations of dramatic form and spirit, may have some difficulty in finding its way into general appreciation, but his *Wessex Poems, Poems of the Past and Present, Time's Laughing Stocks, Satires of Circumstance* and *Moments of Vision*, which have all appeared within the last twenty years, have won a permanent and abiding place in literature. It would be a serious mistake to imagine that the excellence of Thomas Hardy's poetry consists only in the tragic intensity of its spirit, it deserves no less appreciation for its vigour of poetic diction, vividness of feeling and refinement of lyric workmanship.

There will, however, always be a section of people who will confess to a feeling of disappointment with Hardy's poetry—even as with his novels,—on account of its depressing and pessimistic outlook on life. It is probably no adequate answer to maintain that, as Byron said of Crabbe, he is "Nature's sternest painter yet the best," * and the representation is true to life, with its sordid elements of vice and sorrow. Even if the latter assumption were true, it would furnish little excuse for a continual indulgence in the deepest spirit of pessimism, especially for embodiment in art. May we not appeal to the singer inclined in that direction, in the words of another distinguished living English poet:

> Since life is rough,
> Sing smoothly, O bard! †

But the lyrics are full of the elements of Aristotelian "pity and terror" and are calculated to chasten the spirit like some of the sublimest productions of tragedy.

The peculiar nature of the poetic work of our present Poet-Laureate, Robert Bridges will always prevent him from carrying popular enthusiasm with him, for he only aims at finding "fit audience though few." ‡ With close classical affinities on the one side carrying the mind back to the literatures of Greece and Rome and a high and scrupulous sense of poetic purity on the other imposing a certain restraint on emotion, he gladdens the heart of the scholar and the serious student more than

* English Bards and Scotch Reviewers.
† Sir William Watson.
‡ Paradise Lost: Bk. VII, 31.
that of the man in the street. A generous meed of praise has, however, to be offered for the various distinguishing qualities of his poetic work, the felicities of verbal ordering, the beautiful descriptions of landscape and the essentially wholesome and vital atmosphere of his song. He has scattered with prodigal hand over all his works, sketches of many a purple patch on the broad bosom of Nature, and as he has also sung of them in language of clear and haunting melody, his position is as secure in the world of poetry as that of some of the most distinguished occupants of his office in the past.* He knows, There is a hill beside the silver Thames, but he knows of numerous other charmed spots too, and he is ungrudging as well as alluring, in his invitations to people to share in their enjoyment:

There is a hill beside the silver Thames,
Shady with birch and beech and odorous pine:
And brilliant underfoot with thousand gems
Steeply the thickets to his floods decline.
  Straight trees in every place
  Their thick tops interlace,
And pendent branches trail their foliage fine
  Upon his watery face.

Swift from the sweltering pasturage he flows:
His stream, alert to seek the pleasant shade,
Pictures his gentle purpose, as he goes
Straight to the carvened pool his toil has made.
  His winter floods lay bare
  The stout roots in the air:
His summer streams are cool, when they have played
  Among their fibrous hair.

A rushy island guards the sacred bower
And hides it from the meadow, where in peace
The lazy cows wrench many a scented flower,
Robbing the golden market of the bees:
  And laden barges float
  By banks of myosote;
And scented flag and golden fleur-de-lis
  Delay the loitering boat.

His landscapes are always touched with living human associations, for to this very stream,

Sometimes an angler comes, and drops his hook
Within its hidden depths, and 'gainst a tree
Leaving his rod, reads in some pleasant book
Forgetting soon his pride of fishery;
  And dreams or falls asleep,
While curious fishes peep

* They would be, by common consent, Dryden, Wordsworth and Tennyson.
About his nibbled bait, or scornfully
Dart off and rise and leap.

The concluding touch of an interest in the life of the animal world is another indication of the poet's wide sympathies.

In the course of an inspiring essay on *The Poet's Place in the Scheme of Life*, Sir William Watson defines the function of the poet to be, "to see the world through a kind of ecstasy; to heighten and emphasise its lineaments, though without distorting them; to see vividly, to paint nobly and to feel romantically, whatever in this universe is to be seen and felt and painted." * He is the next poet deserving of consideration and it may be said at the outset that he has lived up admirably in his work to his own high ideal. It is no ordinary compliment to a poet to say that he has realised with great success and in a very effective manner, all these noble aims and Sir William's work continues to be distinguished by loftiness of purpose and sound inspiration. At a time when the dignity of poetic composition is seriously threatened by over-zealous ideas of freedom from convention and poetry would like to revel in aspects of life which had better not be over-emphasized in art, it is delightful to be entertained by one who is a great believer in the best masters of song and whose constant endeavour is to see that "the ancient ancestral lineaments reappear" † in his work and "the noble tradition in which he was nurtured is being nobly perpetuated." ‡ He is not one of those who dislike and resent sound and solid workmanship; who think it one of the signs of genius to be careless of finish and scornful of technique; who fail to comprehend that real inspiration can work hand in hand with careful craftsmanship, not extinguished or hampered by it, but informing and ennobling what would otherwise be scarcely better than dull, mechanic toil. He will fashion his verse with the minutest care and the most scrupulous sense of self-criticism, in the wake of the great traditions of singers like Virgil and Tennyson, that he may have in the end, the very legitimate and proud satisfaction of declaring to the world:

I too, with constant heart,
And with no light or careless ministry
Have served what seemed the Voice; and unprofane
Have dedicated to melodious ends
All of myself that least ignoble was.

* The Muse in Exile. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid.
CONTEMPORARY ENGLISH POETRY.

For though of faulty and of erring work
I have not suffered aught in me of frail
To blur my song; I have not paid the world
The evil and the insolent courtesy
Of offering it my baseness for a gift.

In any case, it is hardly possible to expect anything more of an individual.

Considerations of space prevent detailed reference to the numerous aspects of excellence in his work, the beauty of epigrammatic expression, the delicacy and refinement of poetic feeling, the spotless purity of vocabulary and the general atmosphere of finished workmanship. Special reference must, however, be made to the somewhat novel feature found in his work—for the first time on any effective scale in English poetry—of the poetic treatment of poets themselves, of the vivid description of their work in verse. Sir William Watson has no hesitation in saying that poets and their works are among the most beautiful objects of the world and he has therefore sung of them with great affection and enthusiasm:

I have full oft
In singer’s selves found me a theme of song,
Holding these also to be very part
Of Nature’s greatness, and accounting not
Their descants least heroic of deeds.

The capacity to render into verse the facts of literary criticism is seen not only in such occasional expressions as the “frugal note of Gray,” “the lonely vesper-chime” of Collins, but also in longer passages occurring mainly in the course of his admirable elegiac poems on Burns, Wordsworth, Tennyson and Matthew Arnold and in poems like Shelley’s Centenary. Here is a vivid characterisation of the poetry of the Age of Pope, more informing and calculated to make a more lively impression on the mind of the student, than all the sombre passages of prose found in the numerous histories of English literature, written by professional experts:

Song from celestial heights had wandered down,
Put off her robe of sunlight, dew and flame,
And donned a modish dress to charm the town.
Thenceforth she but festooned the porch of things;
Apt at life’s lore, incursive what life meant.
Dexterous of hand, she struck her lute’s few strings
Ignobly perfect, barrenly content.

* Sir William Watson: Apologia.  † Ibid.  ‡ The Tomb of Burns; Wordsworth’s Grave; Lachrymas Musarum; In Laleham Churchyard.
Unflushed with ardour, and unblanched with awe,
    Her lips in profitless derision curled,
She saw with dull emotion—if she saw—
    The vision of the glory of the world.

The human masque she watched, with dreamless eyes
    In whose clear shallows lurked no trembling shade;
The stars unkenned by her might set and rise,
    Unmarked by her the daisies bloom and fade.

The age grew sated with her sterile wit,
    Herself waxed weary on her loveless throne.
Men felt life’s tide, the sweep and surge of it.
    And crave’d a living voice, a natural tone.*

The poet’s characterisation of the part played by those who heralded the Romantic Movement, each in his own small measure, even before the appearance of Wordsworth and Coleridge, is not less vivid, in spite of the increased complication of literary ideas involved in the sketch:

In sad stern verse, the rugged scholar-sage
    Bemoaned his toil unvalued, youth uncheered.
His numbers wore the vesture of the age,
    But, ’neath it beating, the great heart was heard.
From dewy pastures, uplands sweet with thyme,
    A virgin breeze freshened the jaded day.
It wafted Collins’ lonely vesper-chime,
    It breathed abroad the frugal note of Gray.
It fluttered here and there, nor swept in vain
    The dusty haunts where futile echoes dwell,—
Then in a cadence, soft as summer rain,
    And sad from Auburn voiceless, drooped and fell.
It drooped and fell, and one ’neath northern skies,
    With southern heart, who tilled his father’s field
Found poesy a-dying, bade her rise
    And touch quick Nature’s hem and go forth healed.
On life’s broad plain, the ploughman’s conquering share
    Upturned the fallow lands of truth anew,
And o’er the formal garden’s trim parterre
    The peasant’s team a ruthless furrow drew.
Bright was his going forth, but clouds ere long
    Whelmed him, in gloom his radiance set, and those
Twin morning stars of the century’s song,
    Those morning stars that sang together rose.
In elvish speech the Dreamer told his tale
    Of marvellous oceans swept by fateful wings—
The Seer strayed not from earth’s human pale,
    But the mysterious face of human things

* Wordsworth’s Grave.
He mirrored as the moon in Rydal Mere
Is mirrored, when the breathless night hangs blue,
Strangely remote she seems and wondrous near,
And by some nameless difference born anew.*

The shrill and boisterous imperialism of Rudyard Kipling has raised such a wall of adverse prejudice against him in India, that it seems almost a hopeless task to secure any recognition of his real poetic qualities, at least in this country. But even the most hypercritical judge of his poetic work, must pay a tribute of praise to his astonishing poetic energy, freedom of movement, vividness of description, sense of humour though with occasional lapses into violence, and imaginative power ranging from scene to scene with meteoric speed and brilliance. Nor is he entirely bereft of the more delicate touches of lyric song, though he is essentially a poet of action and movement in their more energetic aspects.

When allowance is made for the fact that Kipling is a satirist and his verse must sometimes necessarily offend the susceptibilities of his readers,—he has not spared his own countrymen in India—it should be possible for the Indian student to look upon his work with less than the usual prejudice. It is necessary to draw attention to the fact that there are numerous poems in his work in which he has expressed his warm and intimate sympathy with aspects of Indian life and civilisation. This element may appear somewhat inconsistent with his unqualified approval of the Englishman’s work in India, but it exists in him, as one can see from his successful attempts at dealing with the emotional workings of the Indian mind, or describing with enthusiasm, the Indian background of his poems. There is truth in Chesterton’s paradoxical remark that “he has an Indian element which makes him exquisitely sympathetic with the Indian; a vague Jingo influence which makes him sympathetic with the man that crushes the Indian; a vague journalistic sympathy with the man that misrepresents everything that has happened to the Indian.”†

Rudyard Kipling was born in India and it is due to the poet to remember the real affection for the land of his birth which he has expressed on more than one occasion, in verse as well as in prose.

* Ibid. The Poets referred to are recognised easily as Dr. Johnson, Collins, Goldsmith, Burns, Coleridge and Wordsworth.
† The Victorian Age in Literature.
In his dedicatory lines to his *Seven Seas*, he is proud of claiming Bombay as his mother:

Surely in toil or fray
   Under an alien sky,
Comfort it is to say
   Of no mean city am I.
Neither by service nor fee
   Come I to mine estate,—
Mother of cities to me,
   For I was born in her gate
Between the palms and the sea
   Where the world-end steamers wait.

The injustice has also been done to him of representing him as a prophet of disunion, anxious to emphasise the differences of the two races which have met in India. His oft-quoted couplet, "East is East and West is West and never the twain shall meet" occurs, as is unfortunately not generally known, in a passage intended to emphasise the common nature of humanity, for the next lines run:

But there is neither East nor West.
   Border nor breed, nor birth,
When two strong men stand face to face,
   Though they come from the ends of the earth.*

With Edmund Gosse, we pass on to a poet of an entirely different kind, a scholar of perfect literary taste, keen delicacy of refinement and consummate mastery of versification. In the course of a highly complimentary address which was presented to him about this time last year, on the occasion of his seventieth birthday, by a number of distinguished men of letters among his contemporaries, it was rightly observed that he made the dim and dusty passages of the Board of Trade, where he served for nearly thirty years, the amazing "haunt of singing birds" and his poems *On Viol and Flute* and *Firdausi in Exile and other Poems* produced during this period have taken an abiding place in English literature. The reputation of Mr. Edmund Gosse as a poet has been somewhat overshadowed by his splendid work as a critic and prose-writer, but justice demands that the fine and faultless lyric pieces of these volumes should receive adequate recognition. It should gladden every sincere lover of poetry to follow him in his poetic excursions: to bask in sunshine on the grassy slopes, watching the mowers sweeping their brawny

* Barrack-room Ballads.
arms in harmony, the lovers meeting in the dark-green beech-wood behind, their very broken words a prayer, and the rosy children coming to romp and play with the new-mown grass; * take flight with him and behold,

Far away, by the sea in the south,
   The hills of olive and slopes of fern
Whiten and glow in the sun's long drouth,
   Under the heavens that beam and burn;
And all the swallows were gathered there
Flitting about in the fragrant air,
   And heard no sound from the larks, but flew
Flashing under the blinding blue; †

stand by the grave of the Maenad, where poplars wave their sad gray foliage all day long and the river murmurs near her grave a soothing song; ‡ be suddenly transported to some distant ice-bound land in the North, where the reindeer champs the ghostly moss and over the sparkling peak that crowns the dim ravine, the sky is violet-blue; § and even dare accompany the sailors of Devon in the wonderful adventures of the Rover on the high seas. ||

Before passing on to a consideration of the poets who belong to a comparatively younger generation, or who have come into prominence in more recent years, it may be convenient to make a brief reference to the Irish School of English Poets, worthily headed by Mr. W. B. Yeats, though it must be confessed at the outset, that he is destined to leave a more lasting impression on the world of drama than on that of song. It would be the language of unpardonable exaggeration to speak of him, as one of his American admirers has done "as the greatest poet in the English language that Ireland has ever produced,' ¶ a remark which cannot be made with any knowledge and recollection of the work of Moore "the sweetest lyrist of her saddest wrong" || who dedicated all the chords of his national harp to "light, freedom and song." ‖‖ But Mr. Yeats is the embodiment of the spirit of pure poetry, a denizen of elfinland and a singer of mystic vision whose passionate worship of the muses knows no distraction. It is probably enough to say of his poetry that there are

* Lying in the Grass.  † The Return of the Swallows.
‡ The Maenad's Grave.  §§ Sunshine before Sunrise.
|| The Cruise of the Rover.
‖‖ Adonais.  ‖‖‖ Moore: Dear Harp of My Country.
few more peaceful havens in contemporary literature, offering refuge to readers from the feverish excitement of modern civilisation. There will be wide yearning for the poet’s ideal:

I will arise and go now, and go to Innisfree,
And a small cabin build there, of clay and wattles made;
Nine bean rows will I have there, a hive for the honey-bee,
And live alone in the bee-land glade,
And I shall have some peace there, for peace comes dropping slow,
Dropping from the veils of the morning to where the cricket sings;
There midnight’s all a glimmer, and noon a purple glow,
And evening full of the linnet’s wings,
I will arise and go now, for always night and day,
I hear lake water lapping with low sounds by the shore;
While I stand on the roadway or on the pavements gray,
I hear it in the deep heart’s core.*

He will always be of special interest to Indians as it was his discriminating and enthusiastic praise of the Gitanjali, ushered into the English language with his introduction, that began Rabindranath Tagore’s recognition in the West.

A fuller treatment of the subject of contemporary poetry would include an account of the work of A. E. (George Russell), not only because of the intrinsic merit of his own work, but also on account of the profound influence he has exercised on the other followers of the Irish School of contemporary English verse.

The difficulties of estimating contemporary poetry are complicated in the case of the younger poets, by the circumstance that they are bewilderingly numerous and their work is in no case even fairly complete and the time is not yet for a comprehensive examination. But it is gratifying to note that in several instances, they have already challenged the supremacy of the older generation and have begun to take honoured places in the world of English Song and reference may be made to at least a few typical examples.

John Masefield is easily the most popular of contemporary English poets among the younger generation and the great vogue of his brilliant tales in verse, The Everlasting Mercy, The Widow of the Bye-Street, Dauber and Daffodil Fields is recalling the haleyon days of Byron’s popularity, though it is not necessarily in itself an index of high poetic excellence. In the case of no other contemporary poet is the impress of autobiographical vicissitudes so deeply marked as in that of Mase-

* The Lake Isle of Innisfree.
field. He has passed through strange experiences, tramped his way across countries, lived by manual labour of various kinds, served as a waiter in American hotels, and been on the sea as a cabin-boy and sailor and it is surprising that his capacity for poetry should have survived all these phases of life—it is in itself a tribute to the reality of his poetic inspiration. The whole story may be read in his own words in the stirring lines of his Biography and every reader of his poetry will recognise this strenuous background of toil and suffering to all his work. He is no poet for the drawing-room, entertaining some fair listener with stories of knights and fairies and long-spun romances, of love, but one who sings of the grim tragedies of life, of domestic happiness marred by vice, of legitimate ambitions frustrated by the perversities of fate, of boisterous passions awakened by strange happenings and of terrible conflicts of mind and soul. It is probably some index of the trend of modern literary taste that tales of this kind should command such wide audience and the discerning student will probably notice a similar phenomenon in other branches of literature and art. This is the necessary reaction from the easy and graceful sentimentality of some of the productions of Victorian verse, a correction of the decadence in taste characterised by Lord Morley in the words: "The truth is, we have for long been so debilitated by pastorals, by graceful presentations of the Arthurian legend for drawing-rooms, by idyll not robust and Theocritean, by verse directly didactic, that a rude blast of air from the outside welter of human realities is apt to give a shock, that might well show in what simpleton's paradise we have been living. The ethics of the rectory parlour set to music, the respectable aspirations of the sentimental curate married to exquisite verse, the everlasting glorification of domestic sentiment in blameless princes and others, as if that were the poet's single province and the divinely appointed end of all art, as if domestic sentiment included and summed up the whole throng of passions, emotions, strife and desire; all this might seem to be making valetudinarians of us all. Our public is beginning to measure the right and possible in art by the superficial probabilities of life and manners within a ten mile radius of Charing Cross."

Besides vividness of poetic description and intense vigour of diction the most distinguishing quality of John Masefield is probably his wonderful capacity for rapid narrative which has suggested com-
parisons with Chaucer, though the parallel should not be pushed too far and must not of course be understood as implying equality of powers. Masefield cannot lay claim to the broad humanity, the soul-refreshing buoyancy of humour and wonderful variety of theme of the illustrious Father of English Poetry, but he is undoubtedly of the same descent as William Morris and other followers of Chaucer in the art of narrative song. He could exclaim with Morris:

Would that I
Had but some portion of that mastery
That from the rose-hung lanes of woody Kent
Through these five hundred years such songs have sent
To us, who meshed within the smoky net
Of unrejoicing labour, love them yet:
And thou, O Master!—Yea my master still,
Whatever feet have scaled Parnassus' hill.*

That Masefield has "some portion of that mastery" of Chaucer will be evident from any random examination of the tales in verse. He plunges into the narration with all the directness and self-confidence of Chaucer:

Down Bye Street, in a little Shropshire town,
There lived a widow with her only son:
She had no wealth, nor title to renown,
Nor any joyous hours, never one,
She rose from ragged mattresses before the Sun
And stitched all day until her eyes were red,
And had to stitch, because her man was dead.†

There are numerous other aspects of excellence which must be left to the enjoyment of the prospective reader and cannot be illustrated here by reference or example.

It is however necessary to enter an emphatic protest against two features of Masefield's work which if allowed to develop into wide-spread literary tendencies will bode no good to the future of English or of any other poetry. One is his intense gloom of outlook having an eye only for the seamy side of life almost unrelieved by aspects of happiness. The representation of the realities of life is proper enough ambition for the poet or dramatist, but life is not all darkness and to those who have eyes to see, "the poetry of earth is never dead"‡ even in realms other than mere beauties of Nature, in the very lives of the human souls around us.

* Life and Death of Jason, Book XVII, lines 5-12.
† The Widow in the Bye-Street.
‡ Keats: The Poetry of Earth is Never Dead.
Another is the extreme unconventionality of poetic diction, running riot to license in places, or lapsing into the mere trivialities of prose. He outdoes even Walt Whitman, in spite of his careful adherence to the principles of metre, and if serious poetry can deteriorate into verse such as this:

Come, Ma'am, a cup of tea would do you good;
There's nothing like a nice, hot cup of tea
After the crowd and all the time you've stood;

it is time to cry "halt!" and call upon people to go back to the masters of the past, in spite of any risks that may be involved in the way of propitiating the conventional too much in poetry.

Sir Henry Newbolt is another poet whose work makes a wide appeal all over the Empire by his fine sense of patriotism and his energetic rendering of heroic episodes in British history. It is difficult to say if occasionally there are not lapses into moods which are dangerously near national insolence, but he celebrates the great events of history with an eloquence and energetic realisation of vivid detail, which more than compensate for such failings. We can still hear in his verse the drum of Drake sounding in the Channel, or join in his greeting to *Admirals All*

Admirals all, for England's sake,
Honour be yours and fame!
And honour as long as waves shall break,
To Nelson's peerless name!

Sir Henry Newbolt has exhibited a strong Indian interest in his poems and there are several of them dealing with themes relating to this country, furnishing a vivid verse-comment on some events which have made a difference to the course of Indian history: *Gillepsie, Seringapatam, the Ballad of John Nicholson* and *the Guides at Kabul*. The Indian interest continues to be sustained in his work as in the fine *Ballad of Sir Pratāb Singh*, he wrote the other day, on the kinship of all the bold soldiers of the earth, whatever their caste or creed:

Wide as the world, free as the air,
    Pure as the pool of death—
The caste of all earth's noble hearts
    Is the right soldier's faith.†

It is however when we come to the work of Alfred Noyes that we are filled with the greatest confidence with regard to the work of the younger generation of poets. Mr. Noyes is just completing his fortieth

*The Widow in the Bye-Street.*  † *The Soldier's Faith.*
year, but he has already to his credit a considerable volume of verse of great merit and of even greater promise, and English readers are not likely to let die the numerous lyrics and narrative poems with which he has enriched the language. The poet is toiling away as a Professor of English at one of the American Universities, but his kinship is really with the Elizabethans of the past and he has in him noble longings for which the only parallel is probably in the lives of some of the early singers. His verse is enriched with the spirit of adventure and awakened to the noble enthusiasm of high endeavour; but it is at the same time deeply rooted in the primary emotions of man and he is also conversant in his imagination with numerous worlds of imperishable beauty. He will continue to live in the fairy world of his boyhood, in spite of the busy environments of modern life:

I am weary of disbelieving: why should I wound my love
To please a sophist's pride in a graven image of truth?
I will go back to my home, with the clouds and the stars above,
And the Heaven I used to know, and the God of my buried youth.

* * * * *

Books? I have read the books, the books that we write ourselves
Extolling our love of an abstract truth and our pride of debate:
I will go back to the love of the cotter who sings as he delve,
To the childish infinite love and the God above fact and date. *

If the element of the pure imaginative poet has found beautiful expression in the Loom of Years, the Flower of Old Japan, the Forest of Wild Thyme, the Enchanted Island and so on, the sturdy patriotism of the poet and his glowing enthusiasm for the achievements of the Anglo-Saxon race to which he is proud to belong, are embodied in the epic poem of Drake. It was the deep conviction of the historian Froude, that the great naval heroes of the Elizabethan period deserved commemoration in epic song, and it is interesting to see that it has been done by Alfred Noyes at least with regard to the greatest of them, Francis Drake. The epic is marred in places by diffusion of treatment and the narrative has not the fire and energy associated with epics of the Homeric type, but it will probably not be grudged in the long run a place of permanent interest in English literature.

Mr. Noyes has, in addition, deep scholarship and fine culture and his Tales of the Mermaid Tavern bring back the "spacious times" of Elizabeth before us and we are inspired by the presence, in flesh

* The Old Sceptic
and blood, of the great writers at the altar of whose song the student of literature has learnt to worship from his early youth. We have again the wonderful old pageant before us of wit and song and love, presented with great elaborateness of detail:

Souls of poets dead and gone,
What elysium have ye known,
Happy field or mossy cavern,
Choiceer than the Mermaid Tavern?

And here is the Elysium, still in existence for us and welcoming us to share in its revelries. There is also a strong classical element which illumines his work with pleasant reminiscence of all that is bright in the literature of Greece and Rome.

For obvious reasons, a study of this kind cannot be comprehensive and attention is not drawn here to the work of a number of other living poets: Mr. Laurence Binyon whose verse has keen susceptibility to all that is beautiful in life and in nature; Mr. A. C. Benson whose workmanship is equally chaste and finished in poetry as well as in prose; Mr. Walter de la Mare whose poems are an eloquent commentary on the poetry and romance of childhood and a number of others whose work is represented by typical examples, fortunately for the student of poetry, in the series of volumes of Georgian Poetry issued under the auspices of the Poetry Book Shop.† Lascelles Abercrombie, W. H. Davies, Wilfred W. Gibson, D. H. Lawrence, J. C. Squire and Rose Macaulay are names which cannot be ignored in any sympathetic appreciation of contemporary poetry. Nothing is more gratifying to the student of literature than the almost exuberant outburst of song in England to-day. Far from interfering with the progress of poetry, as was feared, the war has intensified the love of poetry all round, a phenomenon which was perceived by discerning eyes even during the progress of the struggle. The immediate presence of the great problems of life and death and the mighty questions of right and wrong involved in the war, opened the lips of those gifted with poetic utterance, while even the ordinary soldier in the trenches exhibited striking appreciation of the imperishable elements of true literature. From the sorrow and excitement of the war, people turned once again to the eternal consolations of song. The tendencies towards increased interest in poetry, visible immediately before the war, have

* Keats: The Mermaid Tavern.  † 1911-12; 1913-15; 1916-17; 1918-19.
strengthened and there is much that is hopeful in the productions of even the youngest generation of contemporary poets. No fuller treatment is possible here, but it is hoped that the achievement of the present, with its consequent promise of the future has been amply demonstrated. Is further inducement needed for entry into the world of contemporary poetry and should not the student who has till now been indifferent to its beauties begin to "sit in the meadow," in the exquisite words of Euripides, "and pluck with glad heart the spoil of the flowers, gathering them one by one?" *

* Fragments.
EDUCATION AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ENGLAND.

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It is, indeed, becoming more and more apparent that reconstruction is not so much a question of rebuilding society as it was during the war, but of moulding a better world out of the social and economic conditions which have come into being during the war.

The War Cabinet, 1917.

Having during recent leave enjoyed opportunities of studying current educational thought and practice in England, I think it may not be unfitness to offer a short contribution on this subject to a volume commemorating services to education. It will be obvious that I can touch on only a few of the many questions that arise.

I may say at the outset that the last four or five years have seen an interest in the welfare of education, and an estimate of its value, seldom seen in England. The war is largely, not entirely, the explanation. War is an effort to destroy, and to avoid destruction. The latter aspect elevates economy and reconstruction into national policies, and educational efficiency falls under both heads. To get the best result from effort and expenditure, to make every boy and girl as efficient as possible for the work of the nation, is the highest form of economy and reconstruction. Dissatisfaction with existing systems was abundant before the war, but it was stimulated by the conflict of ideals that the struggle revealed. "If we are to face the future with any confidence after this exhausting war, we must face it as an educated people," wrote the Times in 1915, and its Educational Supplement, changed from a monthly to a weekly in 1916, has had a great share in educating the nation to this view.

Educationally the war had diverse consequences. It lowered standards for the time. Universities and colleges were empty. Schools lost their keenest and most robust teachers. Buildings were largely used for hospitals and barracks, school hours were cut down to meet the lack of accommodation and teachers. Children were released from school at an earlier age. The mind was coarsened by horrors and hates. On the other hand, the gallantry and patriotism of teachers won a new
repute for educational work. The great schools increased their fame. Unknown schools won fame. Boys from all classes of schools served nobly and died gallantly, and boys and girls at school, with minds uplifted by the achievements of their elders, found opportunities of unselfish service in a variety of ways. Above all, the nation began to see in education a force that would more than restore what had been lost.

These years may conveniently be described as years in which the nation prepared itself to make the necessary sacrifices for educational efficiency when the call came, and it came with the appointment of Mr. Fisher as President of the Board of Education in December 1916. He satisfied the national temper. From the first he stood out as a man of might and courage, aiming at national welfare through education, not at political triumph or career.

His greatest achievements, the Education and Pension Bills, will be referred to presently. In preparation for them much examination of the ground was necessary. School medical attention received increased appreciation, and in 1917 "the maintenance of an adequate system of medical treatment" was made one of the conditions of the grant paid by the Board of Education. Provision was made for the training of women in prenatal and infant care, in continuation of the instruction in mother-craft given in elementary schools. The education of working boys and girls received attention from a committee appointed in 1916, which recommended inter alia that no child should be exempted from school under the age of 14, and that local educational authorities should be obliged to provide suitable continuation classes for all between the ages of 14 and 18. Committees were appointed to consider salaries of teachers in elementary and secondary schools, adult education, the place of science and modern languages and classical languages in the educational system. Experiment was encouraged by grants and by the temperament of the Board's officers: schools were given ample freedom to re-examine teaching tradition and build up new experience.

The reports of the committees on the place of science and modern languages in the curricula have special interest for secondary schools and universities. The rivalry between the 'classical' and 'modern' views is a commonplace of educational history, and able cases have been made out for both. It is valuable to have the claims of the contending subjects set out authoritatively; with this guidance a compromise can
be worked out in the arrangement of the time-table, and by improved teaching methods which, eliminating the non-essential, ensure greater advance in the time available. This is in accord with the tendency embodied in the 1917 regulations for secondary schools. These, while increasing state grants to schools on the Board of Education’s list, provided additional grants for schools developing advanced courses for pupils above the age of 16 who specialised in selected subjects or groups of subjects. These grants are £400 a year for each advanced course that a school organises, and are intended for staff and equipment. Up to the present, as may be expected, most applications have been received from schools in large urban areas. The new Higher School Certificate Examination of the University of Cambridge, recognised on conditions by this University as exempting pupils of our European Schools from the Intermediate Examination, illustrates the same development: a candidate offers one group of allied subjects, and a small number of subsidiary subjects in which a less detailed knowledge is required, the group being examined by a number of searching papers, the subsidiary subjects by a paper each of less advanced standard. For general recognition a secondary school must provide instruction in English, at least one other language, geography, history, science, and drawing. "A curriculum including two languages other than English, but making no provision for instruction in Latin, will only be approved where the board are satisfied that the omission of Latin is for the educational advantage of the school." "In schools for girls the curriculum must include provision for practical instruction in domestic subjects." "By special permission of the board, languages other than English may be omitted from the curriculum, provided that the board are satisfied that the instruction in English provides special and adequate linguistic and literary training, and that the teaching staff are qualified to give such instruction." The advanced courses will be based upon the earlier work; in every such there must be "a substantial and coherent body of work taken by all pupils, and occupying a predominant part of their time, the remainder being given to some additional subjects." Three such groups are contemplated; (1) science and mathematics; (2) classics, i.e. Latin and Greek, with their literature and history; (3) modern studies, i.e. languages, literature, history of Western Europe in modern and mediaeval times. Whatever course is selected, "adequate provision must be made for the study and
writing of English by every pupil.' In I. L. Kandel's "Education in Great Britain and Ireland," Bulletin No. 9, 1919, of the American Bureau of Education, the applications granted up to date were summarised as 63 in science and mathematics, 13 in classics, 19 in modern studies.

The recommendations of the committees on science and modern languages may be studied in their reports, and in the pamphlets published by the Ministry of Reconstruction. It is sufficient to observe here that while appreciating their 'practical' value, they lay great stress on their value as humane studies, appealing to the highest in man, and developing the highest powers of the intellect. The claim is familiar, and perhaps no less deserved, as a defence of classical education. Our environment is of two-fold nature; we can afford to neglect neither the physical forces nor the human forces developed by human activities—language, literature, law, philosophy, art. There must come a time when no man entirely ignorant of one aspect will be deemed adequately prepared for the business of life. Schools are already in large measure adapting themselves to this outlook; even some of the most famous 'classical' schools now include science in the curriculum of all pupils. The committee on the place of the classics has not yet, I believe, issued its report. Whatever its recommendations may be, Greek as a language would appear to have already disappeared except for the few, but there is a growing belief in the value of the study of its literary masterpieces in competent translations.

After fifteen months of preparatory labour Mr. Fisher passed his Education Bill in 1918. One important alteration was forced upon him by the House of Commons. Provision was originally made for the compulsory attendance at continuation schools of all young persons between 14 and 18 for 8 hours a week for 40 weeks in the year. Strong opposition was offered by a group of employers, anxious about their labour supply, and ultimately the operation of this clause was postponed for 7 years from the date of passing of the Bill, and the 8 hours a week were reduced to 7. We are too near the event to estimate its magnitude: what is certain is that its author is already regarded as our greatest figure in educational achievement, and that the nation despite its anxieties on other accounts courageously endorsed the demands he had courageously made. Briefly the act provided the follow-

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1. Compulsory education to 14: where the local authority so chose, to 15 or 16.

2. Medical inspection and treatment of all children before school, and through school up to 18.


4. Compulsory continuation schools from 14 to 16, and, after 7 years, to 18.

5. Increased opportunities of higher education for poor but able children.

6. Transference to educational authorities of all powers over the activities and welfare of children.

7. Inspection and supervision of private schools.

8. Equal distribution of cost of education between local rates and national revenues, all being contributory to the one aim of "establishing a national system of public education available for all persons capable of profiting thereby," for which purpose "it shall be the duty of the council of every county and county borough, so far as their powers extend, to contribute thereto by providing for the progressive development and comprehensive organisation of education in respect of their area." All the local authorities in the county have consequently been engaged in working out the lines of advance, and many of the reports are documents of great educational value.

As a necessary concomitant, the position of teachers has been improved. Salary scales will probably be put widely into effect by the Board of Education which has powers for the purpose, and pensions have already been provided for by the Teacher’s Superannuation Act of 1918. The Act includes in its operation teachers in grant-aided elementary, secondary, and technical schools, training colleges for teachers, and other institutions below the grade of universities and university colleges. Benefits are due at the age of 60 after 30 years of qualifying service: the maximum pension is one-half of average salary, and in addition a lump retiring allowance is given of one-thirtieth of average salary for each year of service, subject to a maximum of one and a half times the average salary. Death gratuities are paid after five years’ service. The system is non-contributory and is administered by the Board of Education.

The Act of 1918 relates mainly to elementary education. But opinion has long busied itself with the need also of a good system of
secondary education, and it is a claim in the programme of some reformers that every child should have easy access to secondary school and university. The *Times* and the *Athenaeum* have urged the introduction of a system of free universal secondary education: proposals to this effect were made in the House of Commons during the debates on the Fisher Bill: at least one big city has seriously discussed the making of such provision at the city's expense. The experienced educationist would perhaps not go so far: for him the problem is the provision of opportunities for higher education for all likely to profit by them. A considerable expansion would seem to be necessary, and may be expected as a corollary of what has been done for elementary education: pressure for admission is everywhere great, partly because secondary and public school boys did so well in the war. The Head-Master of one famous school told me that of boys whose names had been down for 5 years about 1 in 16 secured admission.

As one of many interesting experiments to meet the demand for something better than the education given in elementary schools by children who expect to earn their living at an early age, the central schools may be briefly referred to. These are found in various parts of the country, chiefly in large towns, and in London, where they are especially developed, are distinguished from the ordinary elementary schools by the fact that the pupils are specially selected and go through a complete 4 years' course with a special curriculum, and from the secondary schools as being public elementary schools providing free education and a curriculum framed with a view to enabling pupils on leaving to pass directly into commercial and industrial positions. The curriculum aims at giving both a better general education and a bias towards industrial or commercial life. In schools of the former type, mathematics, mechanics, drawing, wood and metal work are made much of: in schools of the latter type French, shorthand, typewriting. In all English is an important subject. In London there are some 50 central schools, for boys and for girls, of which 9 have an industrial bias, 24 a commercial bias, 17 both an industrial and a commercial bias. The course is 4 years: in a few schools some children voluntarily stay for 5 years. Children are selected at the age of 11, the fitness of every boy and girl in the elementary schools of the district receiving careful consideration: the selection is made annually by a special committee for each school, and no pupil is admitted unless the
parent signs a declaration that he intends to keep his child at the school until the completion of the course. These schools, which in London date from 1911, have proved their worth, and their pupils are eagerly sought by employers; the 4 years definiteness of aim would appear to develop capacities not always possessed by the pupil of 16 leaving the secondary school without completing the course, and I formed the opinion that these schools were becoming serious rivals to secondary schools in their localities. In London the central school course includes no examination; each school is an individuality, with its own standards, and the freedom allowed to the staff is probably an important element in their success. But local circumstances vary, and I visited rural schools in different parts of the country, where 'special tops' were superimposed on elementary schools, to meet the local needs for higher education. Such 'tops' were usually small, consisting of from 20 to 30 boys and girls of the ages 13–18: they were often organised as secondary schools, had the outlook of secondary schools, and prepared for the Oxford or Cambridge Senior Examinations. In one county I found these 'tops' largely used for the education of boys and girls who at the age of 18 intended to proceed to Training Colleges for Elementary School teachers. The Act of 1918 includes a clause that recognises the value of central schools: "It shall be the duty of a local education authority so to exercise their powers ... as (a) to make ... adequate and suitable provision by means of central schools, central or special classes, or otherwise (i) for including in the curriculum of public elementary schools, at appropriate stages, practical instruction suitable to the ages, abilities and requirements of the children (ii) for organizing in public elementary schools courses of advanced instruction for the older or more intelligent children in attendance at such schools, including children who stay at such schools beyond the age of 14." This probably points to a wide extension of the central school system, and it will be necessary to work out with precision the relations between the central and secondary school, lest there should be overlapping and waste.

This brief sketch will, I hope, convey some idea of the profound interest that England has in education at present, and of her determination to repair ravages by offering better chances to her children of developing the best in them. In Mr Fisher the present idealism of the nation has found a fitting leader: from what has been achieved
and attempted other countries may derive new courage and inspiration.

Most of the subjects touched on in this paper may be more fully studied in Kandel's survey, already referred to.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF ANARCHY AND THE IDEA OF TIME.

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For some time philosophy has been in a parlous condition. It used to be assumed that philosophy was reasoned thought. In the last century many thinkers did their best to make it such, by trying to bring it under the methods of exact science; some introducing everywhere methods of precise definition, analysis and synthesis; others attempting to apply to the department of psychology the methods of mathematics. Such attempts may have been premature in some things but they had the merit of clear reasoning, making it easy to detect error, and point it out convincingly. Half a century produced as much closely reasoned thought as would have required another half century to master, popularise and apply to new developments. But a reaction set in. Philosophy ceased to be reasoned thought, and came to be thought without the reasoning. In the most popular and influential works on philosophical subjects rhetorical prolixity and self-assertion began to take the place of reasoning. Philosophy was in danger of becoming only another name for the preaching of fads, paradoxes and crude analogies. In accordance with this tendency, the strange habit of depreciating intellect and reason began to gain ground, and of magnifying, in opposition to them, the claims of interests and of automatic impulses and supposed instincts, as the really authoritative guides of life. This tendency threatened an irruption of dogmatism and anarchy into scientific thought—not to speak of ethics and politics. Logic being set aside, we might expect that the old effort to ascertain what we should believe would come to be superseded by whimsical pretexts for believing what we wish to believe, making the wish to be parent to the thought. That the old effort to find what is universally true, would be superseded by the desire to find what will be useful to ourselves under our particular circumstances. And if the use of the intellect is to go out of fashion, and "intellectualism" is to be set aside as a relic of the dark ages, and belief thus liberated from the control of exact reasoning, what more
is to be expected? We may expect to meet with a glorying in the deliverance from the bonds of intellect like that of Russian peasants in their new-found anarchy—with a corybantic orgy of paradox, and a juggling with reason, truth and belief—the foundations of science and practical life. And the impartial spectator who looks over the most popular and influential works in recent philosophical literature will find such expectations pretty fully realised.

This new corybantic school of assertion and paradox is made possible by the assumption that Will and Belief are antecedent to and independent of Intellect, and need not be controlled by it. Thus we may assume that Intellect is a later product of evolution, and that Will is identical with the primitive evolving force which produced it, and which therefore worked originally by blind impulse, unguided by reason which had then no existence. If this be so, then Will, as representing the deepest and most original impulses to action, will be higher than reason, antecedent to it, and independent of it. Willing will be unlimited by anything outside of itself. We shall be absolutely free to believe and to do. Subservience to intellect and reason—"intellectualism" or "rationalism"—will be a standpoint definitely overcome and abandoned, and the era of freedom will have begun. Hitherto, to common sense, reason and rational self-determination had appeared to be the "truth" of mind as mind, and to be the apex of human development. All the evolving powers inherent in life were supposed to combine in the production of self-consciousness and in realising through consciousness that power of seeing what is good, and of co-ordinating the activities of life towards foreseen good, which is called reason; and the excellence of man among living creatures was supposed to consist in this power of controlling the automatic impulses which rise out of the needs of organic life, and making them subservient to the highest ends and possibilities of life, as discerned and understood by reason; and will was reason in action.

We find, however, that some writers now consider this view to be too old and commonplace; and have thought to prove their originality and daring, and to send a thrill of wonder through the thinking world, by reversing all this; there is room for sensationalism in philosophy as well as in religion and literature. But how is the subjection of reason to be accomplished? It might be attained, to be sure, by identifying life with the physical processes of nature. But this would be materialism which is unpopular at present. We must therefore dethrone reason by
setting up some other branch of the mind itself, and giving it the supremacy in opposition to reason. We may proceed in this way: Life is, of course, a form of activity, and will and intellect are both forms of life-activity. They have hitherto been regarded as correlative sides of one mental activity. But undoubtedly a large part of the activities of life are not directly mental, viz. the automatic impulses of organism—reflex, instinctive, spontaneous and the like. We may therefore disjoin will from intellect, say that will is fundamentally and originally identical with the automatic processes of life, and proclaim the intellectual processes to be late accretions, occasional, accidental, subordinate, and competent for guidance only in the minor affairs of life; and accept the automatic impulses—now to be called will—as suprarational and superior to reason, they must have been developed as the guides of life long before the intellectual and reasoning powers appeared. We should therefore look to them, and not to intellect, for guidance in all the higher interests of life. In this way, "intellectualism" and "rationalism" can be overcome; and human will can be liberated from the fetters of the old rational logic of the Greeks.

Thus the movement began by putting "Voluntarism," or the primacy of will, in the place of "intellectualism," which had made will to be only a function or correlative of reason. But there is only a step from voluntarism in this sense to anarchism. We may speak reverentially of organic inclination, feeling, impulse, and instinct, as if they were mystical intuition and divine inspiration. But when reason is dethroned from its rule over conduct, the inevitable result will be the enthronement of the great god, Wish. Or rather, irrationalism must end in thorough-going automatism which leaves no room for wishes. There is no firm ground to stand on between reason and mechanism.

I.

Foremost perhaps of this corybantic school, and certainly the most influential, was the half-crazy fanatic Nietzsche. Different ways of thinking, to be sure, are suggested in his writings, for there was but little method in his madness; but what thrilled the world most, and made his name famous, was his discovery that the old conceptions of good and evil, and of the value of Christian meekness and pity, are old-world fallacies which have befooled the world under the false garb of rationality: and that we want a new world in which all moral values will be
transformed and rectified. Mankind must put an end to the usurpation of reason over life, and set the Will free, as the real essence of human nature. And when Will is made absolute, what can it will? It can will only itself, that is, unlimited power. And the will to power will produce the super-man for whose production all creation has been groaning and travailing so long. But, reason being removed, every individual Will must will itself into being super-man; and human history will end in that bellum omnium contra omnes in which it has so often been supposed to have begun.

Professor William James was very far removed from the wild iconoclasm of Nietzsche, but had certainly the same desire to prove his originality and astonish people by dethroning reason and reversing received opinions; and showed it, among other ways, in his theory of Belief. Hitherto Belief in the proper sense of the word (i.e., as distinguished from passive acquiescence and surrender to impulse) had been thought to rise out of previous intellectual work, i.e. out of perceiving, remembering, reasoning. We believe, it was thought, what, by perception and reasoning, we see, directly or indirectly, to be true. When we see a thing to be true or good, we are in a settled state of readiness to act upon it; and this mental attitude of arriving by effort of thought at a settled conclusion, and consequent preparedness to act accordingly, was Belief. Thus Intellection passed over, it was thought, into Belief, and Belief at the suitable time passed over into voluntary action in accordance with what was believed. The natural order was Thinking—Belief—Will. This was a plain psychological result. And James was a psychologist, but he could not let a paralogism stand between him and his ambition to "stagger creation." This he did by his discovery of the "will to believe." Reasoning does not make Belief, and Belief does not make Will. Reason can be dispensed with, Will can make Belief, instead of being made by it. What does it matter if, by taking away the function of intellect in Belief, we abolish Belief altogether, and leave nothing but Will, so called; and reduce what has hitherto been called Will (voluntary action) to be nothing more than an automatic process of organism?

But apart from this result, another result follows. If we can, in this way, resolve to believe things by act of will then Will is antecedent to and independent of reason; it is made to be the absolute. James however was a mild man and we hear nothing from him about the "will to power"
and the "super-man." Yet, if we thus make the Will to be absolute, we are bound to draw the same conclusion which Nietzsche drew. If Will is the absolute, what other belief can it believe, than its own power and supremacy? But James's ambition to astonish the world deserts him here; he is content to hold with the old utilitarianism that we should will to believe those beliefs which will be useful to us. His favourite phrase, to be sure, is "that which will work." But this phrase is not an improvement on the old formula—"what will produce most pleasure"—as it points so directly to the automatism of will, already implied in the theory of belief. For it is according to this principle that the lowest organisms regulate their life-work—the amœba in the pool, the maggot in the fruit. Doubtless he means what the utilitarians meant: that we should learn from experience what lines of action will be easiest and most profitable. But after all, if Will is absolute, why should one not will to believe that forging notes or scuttling ships is "what will work best," under his circumstances. To be sure James himself has not explicitly drawn these consequences. Perhaps his theory of belief and polemic against intellect were meant to be only harmless paradoxes, and his whole system may be nothing better than quibble.

But the above systems are incoherent in their parts, and the philosophy of paradox needs a philosopher to make its parts hang together. The philosopher came in the person of M. Henri Bergson. His philosophy has little or nothing original in it, apart from its metaphor, rhetoric and paradox. At its best it is an expansion of Schelling's second and third periods. The force which evolves the world is antecedent to reason. But reason is not in any sense immanent in the nature of the productive force, as it was according to Schelling. On the contrary, it is made to be an accidental by-product at a particular time and place, and is not admitted to have any part in the essence of the world-process. Men have come into being by chance, and, like a colony of larvae in a great fruit, they have come to distinguish automatically what is palatable and nutritive to themselves, from what is not; and this is all that reason amounts to. But the reason thus mechanically acquired has no truth outside the range of the creature's own circumstances. The great flood of force which fills the world and sweeps human beings along within it, has itself nothing in common with anything so local and temporary as human reason; and it would have been well if human beings had let themselves be carried along passively by the wave from the beginning,
as the lower creatures have done. For the current of life, though it has no reason immanent in it, is assumed to produce, in some unexplained way, the same effects which reason would produce, as is seen in organic development and the instinctive actions of animals. In those creatures which continued to surrender themselves to the _clan vital_ of nature, organic tendencies and instincts were developed, which guide them straight to the attainment of their needs. This excellence is seen especially in insects, which Bergson seems to consider the highest products of the vital impulse. The human race, unfortunately, at some point on the long road of animal development, took the wrong turning. Instead of letting themselves be developed at last, by the life of nature, into sublimated grasshoppers and dragon-flies, they separated themselves from nature; and began to regulate their own actions, and thereby to develop their powers of intellect and reason. They thus entangled themselves in the meshes of logic and intellect which can lead to nothing. If they had continued to surrender themselves to the central flow of life, they would have been able to go straight to everything needed as the bee shoots straight to the flower; instead of having to wander round and round in the mazes of reasoning, and generally missing their mark. Man’s breaking off thus from the central stream of tendency, and setting up for himself, was the original fall of man, which “brought death into the world and all our woe.”

Yet all hope is not lost. We may yet recover at least some parts of our lost paradise. There is a way of escaping from these meshes of intellect which we have woven for ourselves. Intellect, he tells us, consists in differentiating the unity of life into plurality, and fixing attention on particular aspects or cross sections, as it were, of the current of vital activity separating them from the current itself, building them up into “concepts,” operating upon them as if these “concepts” of our own making were real things, and as if they were the materials of which the world is built. Yet they are rather like the leaves which fall withered from the living tree and have no longer any connection with life of the tree. Thus intellect deals not with the inner flow of life which is reality, but with a lifeless world of its own making. Therefore to get at the truth we must exclude from our mind for a time this artificial world of intellectual construction. If we do so, and turn our attention inwards on ourselves, we shall become aware of the real unitary flow of life within ourselves because it is the substance of our own being; and shall learn
to surrender ourselves passively to its spontaneous impulses; and thus shake off the deceptive influences of intellect, and merge ourselves again in the life of natural instinct. This looking back into the current of our own life is "intuition" as contrasted with intellection. And in thus looking inwards on our own innermost nature, we penetrate behind the plurality of things and states into which intellect would split us up, and the "concepts" which it forms out of them; and become directly aware of the life-current, the élan vital, which is the essence of our being; and can feel and surrender ourselves to its natural tendencies and impulses, that is, to the life of nature. But as consciousness consists just in this discrimination into parts and building of concepts—i.e. in this work of intellect—therefore in shaking off this habit of intellection, we subside more and more into the unconscious or subconscious life of nature and animal instinct, and this, from Bergson's point of view, will be the highest good.

Thus in becoming conscious of reality, we penetrate deeper than the plurality, discrimination and concepts, on which consciousness depends, and must gradually subside into the unconscious or subconscious life of animal instinct, and be able to dispense more and more with Intellect, and with Will as function of Intellect. Therefore the fundamental difference between this "new philosophy" and the old, turns on the meaning and relation between Intellect (Reason) and Will. Philosophy hitherto had commonly assumed that life is an activity striving towards an end or good, which might be described provisionally as self-preservation and perfection; and that Intellection is the activity by which life makes itself to be aware of its own relations to the world around it, and judges in what its good consists and what lines of action will be conducive to its highest good; and that Will (as distinguished from automatic processes of organic life) is life transferring itself from activity of thought to activity of physical action (or of some other form of thought) for the attainment of some form of good (after the general pre-adaptation of the system to action, which is belief). In other words, instead of being determined passively by the forces of nature operating through the organism, in the forms of instinct and impulse (as in lower animals), life becomes in man aware of itself and of its own ends; and is able to guide itself, through means infinitely more complex, towards ends higher and more remote than those of animal instinct; and in so doing rises,
from being determined passively by nature, to being a nucleus of self-
determination, "after the image of God." This is the common view
of the nature of Will.

And this conception of human nature has generally been accom-
panied by the tendency to think (on the principle nihil ex nihilo) that
what is highest in man, viz. this intuition of good and this power of
rational co-ordination of action for good, must be implicit at the same
time in the world power from which man derives his being; and that
the life of nature is essentially what the life of man is, viz. a struggle
towards a good.

The new philosophy reverses this order. Will does not rise out of
Reason. Will is the ultimate and absolute productive power, and there-
fore antecedent to reason which is a subsequent contingent and local
product of the world forces. The co-ordination of means to ends in
nature is not original, but has resulted from interaction and gradual
adjustment of physical forces. The co-ordination of human actions
to ends which has been ascribed to an immanent power called reason,
is really due to adjustments which have been formed automatically in
the course of ages, by the random interaction of physical forces. Thus
M. Bergson explicitly denies the immanence of reason in the creative
forces of nature. James is excluded from any theory of immanence
by his pluralism and polytheism, which makes everything rational to
be the product of a non-rational power of nature. As to the name
of this creative power which is antecedent to reason, some have adhered
to psychological analogy and called it Will, while depriving it of its
rational ground. Bergson, preferring biological analogy, calls it Life.
Materialism more frankly calls it Force or Energy. But when ration-
ality is taken away, Will, Force, Life, are really the same thing.

II.

The question therefore reduces itself to this: What is Force or
Life or Will, as the terms are used in these anti-intellectualist or
anti-rational theories? Or, as one or other of these is assumed to
be the ultimate and absolute ground of all things, the question may
take the form: What is the absolute? Or, as the world is a series of
changes, one may ask: What is the ground and beginning of all change?
As a guiding thread to the different hypotheses one may take the re-
flections of Faust when he returns from his evening walk, and sits in his
study and falls back at once into his old train of meditation on the absolute beginning of things. He opens the gospel and reads: "In the beginning was the word"; but finds himself baffled at once. How can a word be the beginning of things?

Here am I balked. Who here can help afford?
The Word! Impossible so high to rate it,
And otherwise must I translate it.
If by the spirit I am truly taught,
Then thus: In the beginning was the Thought.
This first line let me weigh completely.
Is it the thought which works, creates, indeed?
In the beginning was the Force, I read.
Yet as I write a warning is suggested
That I the sense may not have fairly tested,
The spirit aids me; now I see the light:
In the beginning was the Act, I write.

Here four different kinds of absolute beginnings are suggested, namely, Word, Thought, Force and Act. But the list admits of some reduction. The term Word, which baffles Faust so much, covers two meanings. It may mean (a) the word of command, and thereby a volition or act of Will, which has been, to so many, the favourite beginning. But this, taken by itself, is identical with Act, and admits of the same analysis. But it includes also (b) the something commanded or willed, and the something willed is present as Idea, or thought of an end and of the means of realising it, which is the product of logos or rational consideration; and the great question will be the relation of the Idea to the Act—of reason to Will. The word Power or Force here used appeals to those who find the absolute in self-existent force or energy or change. And finally, Faust's Act or Deed may be regarded as springing from Idea or Reason, in which case, Reason will be the ultimate and absolute; or it may be identified with Force considered as thing in itself without having its ground in any reason.

Thus Faust's four absolutes are reducible to two, viz. Force and Reason, corresponding to Irrational and Rational philosophies. The question here raised, therefore, is the claims of Force and Reason respectively to be considered the absolute.

III.

The theory of an irrational beginning or ground of all things has presented itself recently in three forms, or at least under three names
(not to speak of the older and frankly materialistic form). Some are satisfied with a physical analogy and say simply that the beginning is Force—or an "infinite energy underlying phenomena." Some appeal to psychological analogy and called it Will. Some prefer biological analogy and called it Life.

A. In connection with the Force-theory of the absolute—that the absolute First which produces all things without being itself produced by anything antecedent to itself, is what in science is called (in different connections) Force or Energy (though the term energy is used correctly only in connection with the rational theory of origins)—it is necessary to consider the question: What is the origin and content of this idea of Force or Energy which is thus made to explain all things.

In the first place, the theory clearly assumes Force to be itself a thing in itself, antecedent to all other things; producing all other things as effects or as modes of itself; operating eternally by necessity of its own self-existent nature. There is no sense, therefore, in asking why it exists and operates, as if it were subject to some use, purpose or reason, because it is antecedent to all reasons, uses and purposes. Reasons and uses are finite and relative things, which may arise occasionally and accidentally, at some point within the world, and in the experiences of conscious beings who themselves originate contingently, and have no meaning in connection with the absolute originating force. The finite, local and temporary relations arising contingently within the world of produced things cannot have anything in common with the producing power.

But how do we obtain this idea of Force, which by some is thus raised into the absolute? We generally think of force as something which we are conscious of in our own experience when we lift a weight or resist a moving body. In this connection it is more properly called energy (working from within). It rises always out of an intention, purpose and desire of future result, which is itself a product of reason. Energy is experienced only in trying to do something, i.e. to attain a purpose. Indeed we should not think of it as energy at all if we did not think at the same time of the purpose for which it is exercised. But according to the new school, there can be no reason in the absolute beginning. We have no right to carry back such a subjective experience to the absolute, which is not compelled to push or resist anything.
Therefore, in speaking of the absolute, we should use the word Force. But the idea of force as thus used by the school cannot have a psychological origin. Indeed the word, where thus used, is evidently nothing more than a logical abstraction. The world presents a series of changes following one another in time. We abstract the notion and possibility of change, substantialise it into an idea of something real and different from the changes themselves, and suppose it to be something which makes the changes, and call it Force. In other words, it is the abstract possibility of change transformed into a thing, and made to be the cause of change. Thus the idea of Force, as an absolute, is founded on the common fallacy of concreting abstractions. The simple fact is that things change; and their changes seem to follow one another with certain uniformities which can be expressed in general propositions; and the word Force may be a convenient counter to work with, in making calculations, but we fall into fallacies if we attempt to explain anything by means of it, as if it were something real and concrete.

Yet the word Force is one of the most frequently used words in some kinds of philosophy. But it is used too frequently without any clearly defined meaning. Thus (a) it seems to be assumed sometimes that it is a self-existent something which springs into operation only at a certain point, and there and then produces and enters into a world. This is equivalent to assuming that time and the world have an absolute beginning,—that there was a point before which there had been no world, and no time. But this view of the beginning comes under that kind of beginning which Faust calls Act. Or (b) it is supposed to be a substance, and to be that substance of which all things are modes. Thus a very popular form of thinking in recent times, often wrongly called Energism, consists in resolving matter into forces or "energies." The absolute is assumed to be eternal and self-existent "energy," which for some unexplained reason falls asunder into an infinity of energies. These resist and hold one another in equilibrium, and form more or less permanent systems of equilibrated forces, which correspond to the atoms and molecules of the older materialism. These again, in some places and times, form the still more highly co-ordinated and self-adjusting systems which we call organisms; and the forces of organism, when they attain their most perfect co-ordination, become conscious of themselves as mind. Thus mind is the highest and rarest form of energy, and reason is the most complex of its modes of operation. Reason, therefore, is a product
of the more highly organized systems of energies, and these again of lower ones. It belongs therefore to \textit{natura naturata} or world of things produced, and has nothing to do with \textit{natura naturans} or the producing power. And this much is made clear that the absolute productive energy is antecedent to all law, idea and purpose,—these arising contingently from the interaction of finite forces.

Here, apart from the fallacy of substantiating an abstraction (viz. force), there is the difficulty of understanding the relation between the one absolute "energy" which is the ground of all things, and the finite world-forces which it in some way gives rise to. Does the one fundamental force resolve itself wholly into these finite forces so that its unity (as absolute) is lost in the plurality of finite things—thus giving rise to a pluralistic universe of individual forces? Or does it retain its original unity as one unifying and co-ordinating power immanent in all finite forces? The former hypothesis would lead to all the difficulties of pluralism. The latter would be without sense if the co-ordinating force does not contain in itself form, reason and purpose, by which to give unity and order to the plurality of finite forces, as many in one. For there can be no other unity of many in one than that of common end.

Thus while resolving the world into an endless series of changes—perpetually flowing on—the Force-theory leaves the meaning of change unexplained. Can there be any change without a meaning or reason for it? In our experience, change implies always something to be done. Energy is the doing of something. What is this world-energy doing? Energy is effort to accomplish something. Even force means forcing, or overcoming difficulties in the way of something. Apart from purpose or end to be attained by it, all talk about force or energy is meaningless. Indeed this new philosophy of force or energy as absolute, is much less able to stand by itself, than the old frankly materialistic theory of matter and motion as absolute.

B. Then as to the Will-theory of the absolute. To the same class of anti-intellectualist thinkers we must refer those who think to improve matters by applying the name Will to the absolute, and say that the absolute creative force is Will-force, but in doing so separate Will from Reason, making it to be independent and antecedent; and making Reason to be a later and contingent product. The philosopher Schelling was perhaps the first to apply the name Will to
the absolute, but to him reason was immanent in the primal activity; indeed that activity was essentially an effort to become explicitly rational by evolving a rational world; therefore, to him after all, reason was the absolute. But in Schopenhauer reason seems to be finally exorcised from the beginning of things, and a pre-rational force put in its place under the name of Will (though his strange attempt to introduce the Platonic ideas into his system of voluntarism, makes his consistency doubtful). James, by his doctrine of the "will to believe" (if it is to be taken seriously) clearly gives the primacy to Will and takes his stand with anti-intellectualist thinkers. But we can see that his theory, consistently applied, not only deprives belief of any real meaning, but also that self-determination, which is Will in the correct sense of the word.

For Belief and Will had always been regarded as products of intellation. Thus the self must turn its activity into the forms of perceiving, remembering and reasoning in order to understand its relations with the world, and bring its present ideas into correspondence with future experiences, which is necessary to its continued existence. When in any case it sees that such correspondence between ideas and future consequences of action has been attained, it has a restful feeling of having attained its purpose thus far, and has made itself ready for future action. This mental attitude is Belief. And when the need comes, the preparedness for action which is belief, passes into voluntary activity for the believed result. Thus, exercise of reason leads to belief that such and such forms of action will be best, and settled belief passes over into the actions thus believed in. Action thus prepared for, and rising out of reason through belief, is self-determination or Will proper. Apart from this feeling of completed intellectual effort resulting in preparedness for future effort — following intellation and preceding will — there is no such thing as Belief at all. And if we make the last to be first and say with James that we "will" to believe, we are taking away the intellectual preparation which is essential to self-determination, and reducing will itself to be, in man, an automatic process; and to be in the absolute a blind self-existent act, antecedent to reason, form and law, and therefore identical with the absolute force of the materialists,—"the infinite energy which lies behind phenomena." And the depreciation of intellect as a source of knowledge, in which James seems to take delight, points in the same direction; and if the supremacy of reason is denied
nothing remains to guide action but arbitrary will, and will is reduced to being only the strongest physiological impulse of the individual.

And as *every* individual Will, being above reason, can will ultimately only itself, every Will will be an absolute (giving James's "Pluralistic Universe"). Therefore the maxim of the ancient sophist that "man is the measure of all things" will be proved incorrect, because there will be no such thing as man, but only men. The correct formula will be "the man is the measure," that is, every man for himself; which is the principle of anarchy.

IV.

C. The most elaborate attempt in recent times at an interpretation of experience, viz. that of Bergson, strives to find everywhere confirmation of the same irrationalist or anti-intellectualist view of the world and the same justification for dethroning reason from its old position as the supreme co-ordinating power of human life. It seeks to vindicate the freedom of belief and conduct by depreciating the claim of intellect to be the faculty of revealing truth and imposing laws; and casting doubt on axioms hitherto regarded as intellectually necessary, thereby liberating thought from the trammels of logic. By thus depriving knowledge of its universality it points towards anarchy in thought and life.

It seeks (a) to liberate science from subjection to the uniformities of natural law in the same way as the other anti-rational theories do, viz. by finding a beginning which is antecedent to reason and law; and (b) to deliver reason from the meshes of intellect by supplying a source of belief which is deeper than intellect.

It accomplishes the former result by appealing to biological analogy, and carrying back to the absolute the life-force found in man, and making the creative force of the world-whole to be an *élan vital*. It accomplishes the latter by setting up a new source of belief in opposition to intellect and its logic, under the name of intuition. To attain this latter result he has to reverse the common view of the nature of intellect. Intuition had hitherto been regarded as a factor of intellect—which was supposed to include intuition of materials of knowledge, discrimination of parts and qualities, and synthesis into related wholes. These activities were supposed to be dependent on one another so that no one could operate without the others, and thus to form necessary correlates of one process. But Bergson made a great discovery. He discovered that intuition is a power of cognition standing by itself
apart from intellect, and revealing the deepest truths without the help of intellect and reason; so that these must henceforth be degraded from the commanding position hitherto assigned to them.

(a) To justify his theory of life as an irrational absolute he has to reverse the usual view of the meaning of life. Life, to be sure, has been understood in two ways: Some have understood it to be the resultant of the physical and chemical forces working in the organism, thereby making life to be a product of the organism, instead of making the organism to be a product of life,—admitting frankly that life is a form of mechanism, and that consciousness rises, as heat does, out of the interaction of forces in the organism. This must be assumed both by those who make matter and force to be the absolute, and by those who resolve matter into force ("materialists" and "energists").

But the common view has been that life is antecedent to organism and that organism is a product of life. This is equivalent to assuming that life is not a formless force working at random, but a force working according to inherent form. And a force can have form only by being the energy of a purpose or end. Life, therefore, is the self-realising energy of a purpose, realising itself through organism; and rising into conscious self-determining mind or reason; and rising above the individual mind to organisation of minds in society. And as nothing can come out of nothing, it may be reasonably inferred that the force of nature out of which finite mind-force comes, is itself the expression of ultimate purpose and reason; and that the world itself is an organism, and reason, its evolving and co-ordinating power. It is this immanence of purpose, then, that makes life to be life, and distinguishes it from the lower forces of nature.

M. Bergson seems, at first sight, to be in agreement with the latter spiritualistic view. He makes life to be the evolving principle of the organism instead of being its product merely; and to be, indeed, the evolving principle of the world as a whole. But we soon find that life as he understands it, is not life as hitherto understood. Life, to him, is not the energy of a purpose working itself out into actuality in accordance with the general scheme of things. It is a primordial force antecedent to all form, law and purpose. It is perpetually rushing into being out of nothing (or out of some infinite and formless reservoir which would be equivalent to nothing); resolving itself into an infinity of finite branches, forming clusters and whirlpools of forces which enter into
equilibrium with one another, and form solid bodies and worlds; and tend, by interaction and adjustment, to produce uniformities of action among themselves which have the appearance of being universal laws but are not. And having formed the organism by such automatic adjustments, it tends to work according to the forms imposed upon it by the organism; and thereby takes the forms of impulsive, reflex and instinctive action. And having begun to think, it acquires temporary habits of thinking and acting by interaction and adjustment, and these are what we call our intellect and reason. These are therefore only of contingent origin, and only of local and temporary validity. The creative force itself is above law and reason—these are only occasional by-products of the formless creative power.

But the creative force did not cease at any moment of time: it continues to operate through all time, and is identical or correlative with time itself. Therefore new force is perpetually flowing into the systems of equilibrated forces already formed (called matter and mind), and mixing with and modifying the forces already at work; and does so without any law, principle or purpose of its own. Owing to this unceasing inflow of new force in time, which is indeed identical with the flow of time itself and is subject to no law, there can be no universally uniform laws of nature or mind, and no sure inference from past to future. The future cannot be like the past; because the future will be in time, and time itself is the unceasing inflow of new life into the world of things. Therefore 'all things flow'—mutability is the lord of all.

Is there any essential difference between this and the older philosophy of materialism? To the latter there are two realities, matter and force. Matter is changeable in outward forms and relations, but eternally unchangeable in substance and properties. Therefore the changes which force produces in matter are subject to the eternal conditions inherent in matter; and therefore the processes of nature and mind are subject to eternal laws. Hence the uniformity of nature which makes science and logic possible. The new theory resolves this unchangeable matter with its laws into forces which have no law; and thereby takes away all permanence and necessary uniformity from the results of nature, leaving only contingent and temporary adjustments and habits, and reducing nature to a shifting cloudland of forces, of which nothing can be predicted, and anything may happen. Bergson seems to claim for himself the merit of making nature to be alive again. The world is life
and life is freedom; and to allow it freedom we must remove all necessary law and uniformity. But the formless, purposeless, lawless change assumed by him is not life at all. The older system was accused of taking away moral, and leaving only physical law. The new system, consistently applied, takes away physical law also and leaves a state of anarchy or "nihilism."

(b) Again, reasoning deductively from such premises, Bergson thinks that he can dispose of the assumed supremacy of intellect in human life. This is refuted from the origin of intellect. For if there is no reason in the power which evolves the world and finite mind, there can be none inherent in finite mind itself—it can be nothing but a subsequent and contingent product. Therefore the knowledge which intellect and reason can give, can only be knowledge by external contact. They cannot enter into the internal flow of life and time, which is the essence of things. All they can do is to observe and enumerate the external phenomena of the world, and draw inferences from the present to the future, assuming that things will go on in the future as in the past. But scientific logic is founded wholly on the uniformity of nature and conservation of force. These are now proved to be only concepts of intellect formed by generalisation from occurrences in past experience; and are indeed inconsistent with the nature of time. The new life-force which is flowing into being with every moment of time and which is itself above all law, deprives them of the universality and necessity ascribed to them by science. The future will not be like the past; the amount of force in the world does not remain the same. The so-called laws of thought assumed by popular logic are equally contingent. It may be assumed that human thought is moulded into conformity with the laws of nature by immemorial interaction and adjustment. This is what the old empirical school had maintained. But they believed that the laws of nature, because they rise out of the eternal constitution of matter, are universal and necessary. If they are only contingent, local and temporary, the laws of logic founded on them will be contingent also. Therefore the conclusions of our intellect have no universal validity.

(c) And we arrive analytically at the same sceptical result if we consider the nature and methods of our intellect itself. It consists essentially in differentiating and integrating—in taking things asunder into parts and qualities, and considering them in their separation, as if parts had separate and independent existence; and putting them together
again into classes under concepts; and building up a world of the concepts or class-ideas which it thus makes for itself. This is how science forms its conception of the world. Such concepts are of our own making, and not taken directly from reality. They are like the fallen and withered leaves which give no understanding of the living tree. In fact science treats the world is if it were but a stational conglomerate of lifeless parts. It ignores the fact that every moment of time is something new, and that the world is full of life and is therefore a system of processes and changes, which are outwardly many, but fundamentally one; and life is one with time, and is therefore a power of absolute origination, above law and reason as we understand them. To get at real knowledge we must get beyond outward plurality and classification of units, and reach to the inward essential unity of the world-process. This can be done only by suspending the working of the differentiating and life-destroying intellect, which "murders to dissect"; and turning the spiritual ear inwards, and listening to the flow of the life-current within us, which is the essence of our being. In that way we shall open our minds to the real flow of the world's life which, without our being aware of it, produces the natural impulses and instincts of our nature unknown to intellect. Then by surrendering ourselves to the innermost flow of being (as insects and lower animals do), we shall be what we should have been if we had not yielded to the misleading influences of our own intellect. This is Bergson's 'Intuition,' which is the only source of genuine knowledge, and which, when recognised as such, will supply the materials of the new Bergsonian metaphysics and logic which is soon to supersede that of the intellect and of Aristotle.

But if we accept this analysis, we overlook the fact that differentiation is consciousness itself—to be conscious is to become aware of the differences of things; and that reducing the many which result from differentiation, to unity again by classification and conception, is also of the essence of consciousness. Therefore intuition as understood by Bergson, by leaving behind it the processes of intellect, means sinking out of consciousness altogether—cast ing off individuality and "swooning" back into the infinite as mediaeval mystics thought they could do—a state which was to them a state of ecstasy but not one from which they pretended to bring back knowledge of anything. Or it is a sinking back into that sub-consciousness or semi-consciousness of animal instinct which we have so long left behind, and for their retention of
which, he envies so much the lower animals. But if such intuition be really a source of knowledge, Bergson must have learnt a great deal from it himself,—otherwise he could not know it to be such. What new truth then has he brought back from his voyage into the vague and formless infinite? Indeed he has got nothing to show in the way of intuitions, from his discovery, beyond commonplaces which have evidently no deeper source than intellectual common sense.

It may be admitted that at one point in his criticism of science, he comes near to hitting the nail on the head. This is in criticising its statical conception of the world, constructed wholly by differentiation, enumeration and classification. The world is certainly not a vast museum of dead articles arranged on shelves in a museum, as science often assumes. It is a process of many processes like a living whole. But Bergson, while admitting this, will not tell us what life really is, nor why all things flow. He assumes that the unity of the world is explained by calling it life. But life is the most complex as well as the most unitary of things, and the principle which makes it to be both unity and plurality is certainly purpose. Yet, in Bergson's *élan vital* eternally flowing out of the formless infinite, i.e. out of nothing, and rushing on into an empty futurity which also is nothing, there is no principle of unity. And this criticism of science has been made by many others besides Bergson, and applies only in so far as science is mainly analytical and inductive, which it must be provisionally. It is true, however, that the prevailing scientific thought with its mechanical principles of uniformity and conservation and its purposeless laws of nature has taken all the life out of the world, and made it to be a great machine, capable of working forwards or backwards, but grinding out always the same results, and incapable of producing anything new.

This applies to the old atomistic science which came down from Democritus. But the forms which have been given to it in recent times under such names as "energism" and "voluntarism," and "Bergsonism," by reducing matter to "force" or "energy" without law, form or purpose, abolish that uniformity and necessity of law for which the old matter was but a working metaphor, making the world to but a shifting cloudland without form or substance, and thereby deprive science of a sure foundation; and from a scientific stand-point are therefore inferior to the old materialism. We might say of their world what was said of a certain other shape,
THE PHILOSOPHY OF ANARCHY.

"If shape it might be called that shape had none
Distinguishable in member joint or limb,
Or substance might be called that shadow seem'd
For each seem'd either."

V.

But popular thought at all times, and philosophic thought from the time at least of Plato, have clung to a rationalistic conception of the world. This way of thinking has made itself felt most forcibly in the idealistic systems represented by Plato, Aristotle and Hegel. Therefore an anti-rationalistic philosophy must, before everything else, refute idealism. This Bergson undertakes to do, taking Plato as its representative. And indeed his refutation of Plato may be taken as a test of the value of Bergson's philosophy as a whole.

Now the fallacy of rationalism according to Bergson consists in this: It makes the future to be continually a repetition of the past, and excludes that origination and novelty which is implied in the very nature of time.

This fallacy is seen most clearly in the idealist theory of the world which supposes that the world existed from all eternity in the form of idea. If this had been so, there would have been no real creation or origination at all—only an endless repetition of the same things. And if this had been literally the case, there would have been no such thing as time—only one eternal now.

The theory is drawn from the analogy of human conduct. Human reason is a power of seeing what is or will be good, and of seeing from past experience what lines of action, when duly co-ordinated, will result in the production of good. Therefore the future good is now present in idea; and the idea of something good and desire of realising it, is the spring of human actions. Rational life, therefore, is the co-ordinating of means for the realisation of ideas, i.e. for the attainment of future good present at first in the form of idea. The idealist philosophy carries this analogy back to the absolute creative power. That power is aware of a good which exists not in actuality but only in idea, and puts forth energy and co-ordinates means for its realisation. Thus the world is a system of means for working out ends—the ultimate cause is final cause, i.e. an ultimate end or good which as yet exists only as idea, but which is the moving force of the whole world-process. The widespread suspicion and aversion with which this
conception is often regarded in both science and philosophy, is
due largely, no doubt, to the extremely anthropomorphic way in
which it is often applied in common speech and popular discourse.
Thus, for example, to speak of the Divine as the "great artificer"
seems to reduce the Divine to a finite being. And one cannot help
thinking that Bergson chose to think of the hypothesis in some very
anthropomorphic sense. We are bound, however, to take it in the sense
in which it was held by the great representatives of the hypothesis,
Plato, Aristotle, Hegel. And Bergson's criticism is directed almost
wholly against Plato.

His criticism of Plato is not new. Previously it was given more in
jest than in earnest, but it is repeated by Bergson seriously. Plato tells us
that the good, beautiful and real are the ultimate realities, and that they
exist eternally as "Ideas," above space and time; and that the process
of the world is an endless struggle to realise these ideas in a world of
concrete things.

But this, Bergson argues, makes the process of the world and of time
to be a useless reduplication of what exists already. Why talk of realising
what is already real? Why should nature waste its energy in
making imperfect copies, of what is already perfect? Thus every
theory of the world which seeks for the beginning in a reason—
every theory of purpose, teleology, final cause—reduces the process of
time to be a useless copying, or reproducing of what already is. But this
is the reverse of the truth; the creative power is ever at work in the
form of time, and is ever producing something new, and never reproduc-
ing the same things over again. The future is never like the past.
There is at every moment something new which cannot be predicted. And
this criticism is applied by him not to idealism alone, but also to the
common view of physical science which assumes the uniformity of nature
and the reign of invariable law; which would lead to endless reproduction
of the same. Such a state of things cannot exist in a living world; life
is free, and above absolute law.

But what did Plato really mean? His thought was prompted by
the conclusion drawn by Heraclitus many years before, that the world
is continuous change—that "all things flow." Plato set himself to
understand the reason why the world goes on changing instead of remaining
in changeless rest as Heraclitus's opponent, Parmenides, argued
that they really do—making change to be an illusion. Change, causeless
and absolute, appeared to Plato to be a contradiction in terms. He saw that a change is the doing of something, and that there could be no change without something to be done; and that the ground of the change lies in the something to be done, which makes the doing of it to be necessary. This is equivalent to saying that every "doing" has an end or purpose, and that the purpose was present in the "doing" as a need or necessity, and was thereby the reason of the "doing." Now, within the world one finite thing causes changes in other finite things, but changes of the world-whole cannot be caused by anything within the world. Therefore the reason why, in the world, "all things flow," must be in the nature of the absolute itself as the ground of the world; that is, in the absolute it must be self-originated.

But how can any such necessity of self-transformation within the absolute be reconciled with its absoluteness? Parmenides had argued that the absolute must be perfect in itself, and that plurality and change are inconsistent with perfection; and that therefore the absolute reality must be above all plurality and change. But Plato saw that an absolute without difference and change would be but a lifeless block, or would be simply nothing; and he saw, at the same time, that change without a permanent something underlying it to give connection and unity to successive changes, would also be nothingness. He could not accept an absolute which has nothing to do, nor an absolute which is always doing, but never does anything. He saw, therefore, that the world must consist just in the correlation of these contradictories: permanence and change, unity and plurality, being and not-being.

The ultimate question then came to be: how were these contradictories to be reconciled as factors of one world?—a permanence which is impossible without change, and change which is impossible without permanence; a one which cannot be without many, and a many which cannot be without one; being which is constantly ceasing to be, and not being which is constantly coming to be. He saw that this apparent tissue of logical contradictions is explained when we see that all change is becoming; and that all becoming is the becoming of something; and that the becoming has its ground in the something which becomes. This means that all becoming, i.e. all change, is made to be such by something which as yet is non-existent. This again means that the non-existent future something is really present, and working in the change as its reason or cause. This again means that it is present as a need or want.
And want draws life-force in the "direction" of what will supply the want, i.e. towards a Good. But the striving of life-force towards the realisation of Good which as yet is not, is Idea. The thing is done because it was needed, and it is the need that makes it to be done. This is the principle underlying all idealism. For the need which makes the thing, is itself the idea of the thing. It is therefore the same whether we say that the moving force behind all change or becoming is Idea, or Reason, or Good. To speak strictly, the force of Idea or Reason is the force which constitutes life itself,—the *elan vital*—working in and through the Idea for its own preservation and perfection, or for the end for which it exists.

But how can this self-realisation of idea or good be applied to the absolute? In following Plato we must reject a granite or cast-iron absolute—an absolute which is complete and ready-made, and has nothing more to do, and is therefore a lifeless block. The absolute is not a thing. It is something which has need of being, or should be, and which is eternally making itself to be; and the making of it is never exhausted because it is infinite. This means that the absolute is eternal life; because life is what makes itself; life is self-development or self-realisation. It is in this infinite (i.e. unfinished) self-realisation that the 'perfection' of the absolute consists, not in its being something finished and complete (finite). This, however, regarded from the finite side or that of the world itself, means that the world is incomplete and imperfect. It has not attained to Plato's absolutely good, beautiful and real. It has some want and need at the heart of it. In it, the absolute is not realised nor exhausted. Therefore it is a process, a system of changes, a perpetual becoming, and all change is towards a good, which is always being realised but is never exhausted, and its inexhaustible realisation is the life of God. And the reason and cause of all the changes is the need or want, or more precisely the presence of what will supply the want—the agency of the future in the present, of non-being in being—which is Idea. Hence some speak of the moving force of all things as absolute Idea—the Good which is perpetually realising itself, but is never exhausted, and therefore continues to be both Idea and reality. Others have spoken of it as the Logos or active reason, which is at the same time God.

These considerations, then, have to be applied to Bergson's criticism of Plato's Ideas. His criticism is that Plato and other idealists make the world to be a perpetual reduplication of things which already exist,
thereby failing to account for anything new. But Plato’s Ideas are not things which already exist; they are ideas of Good which does not exist. He does not make the world to be a perpetual repetition of the same thing, but to be a perpetual creation or evolution of something new—the satisfaction of a want, the correction of imperfection, the filling up of a vacuum at the heart of things. Only to him, what is new does not mean what springs out of nothing in a random, meaningless, purposeless way: it is the bringing into being of something wanted. It is new not because it has suddenly sprung out of nothing and has therefore no connection with anything in this world, but because it is needed as a part of the world. The reality of Plato’s ideas does not consist in their being eternal “things,” but in their eternal oughness, which makes them to be eternal powers, determining the development of the world, and attaining finite and incomplete existence in nature and humanity. Bergson thinks that nature having got the “idea” of good, need not reduplicate the idea by realising the good: but this is equivalent to saying that, having once got a want or imperfection, we should remain satisfied with that, and proceed no further. Nature, it is said, abhors a vacuum; but if it has got the vacancy and the striving to remedy it, why should it not remain satisfied with these? One has an uneasy feeling and has the idea of a meal as what will remove it; why then should be reduplicate the idea by seeking the reality?

Bergson’s reasoning on this subject therefore, must be set aside as altogether unsatisfactory. To idealism the evolving force does not lie in anything that is, as he supposes, but in what is not but should be. The want is present and draws the life-force to its own rectification, and thereby into the idea of what is needed to supply the want—the idea of Good. The world is a one in which all parts and processes are correlated to one another; the idea, as realising force, is present in all, and constitutes that, élan vital which Bergson speaks of but understands so differently, and is the immanent life of the world.

VI.

Faust came to the conclusion that the absolute beginning of all change and therefore of the world-process is an Act. But having previously rejected Word, which contains reason in it, he must, by act, understand an Act absolute, i.e. one which had no ground nor reason antecedent to itself. The above systems assume this to be the nature
of the beginning, and most explicitly, that of Bergson—though he
differs from the rest in making the beginning to be a perpetual one,
viz. by identifying time itself with new creative force still springing into
being. But their insufficiency is obvious—they give no account of the
origin and meaning of the act or the force—merely assuming it dog-
matically. We must return, therefore, to Faust's theories, and consider
the one he rejected, viz. Word. Word may mean command: God
spake the word, "Let there be light." But command is not ultimate;
it supposes a reason. Therefore Word must include in its meaning
the reason (Logos) underlying the command. The thing to be con-
sidered therefore, is, whether Reason can be considered to be the ultimate
ground of all change. This conclusion, which has already been drawn,
may be further confirmed by considering (a) the nature of Reason, (b)
the analogy of human conduct, and (c) the nature of time.

(a) We commonly think of reason as the power by which we form
ideas of what is true and false, right and wrong, beneficial and injurious,
and of the means by which the one may be attained and the
other avoided in our future life—in order that we may preserve our-
selves and attain to greater perfection.

This popular definition is true so far as it goes; but it gives us little
light on the matter until we consider how it accomplishes all these
things. In the first place, we can see that it does so through the
medium of ideas—reason may be called the faculty of ideas.

Ideation, again, is the vital power applying itself to the filling up of
its own defects and imperfections by rising above time and place and
making past and future to be present, and applying past and present
as means of realising what is still future. The motive force contained
in it is the feeling of want to be overcome. The effort to fill in what
is wanted makes the idea. (i) In the case of memory what is wanted is
the renewed presence of something experienced in the past. The striving
may reach no farther than a direction of tendency and effort, and result
in a general or abstract idea; or it may extend to a reconstruction of
the past experience in terms of mind, and give ideas of memory and
imagination. (ii) In practical life, the want can be supplied only by
giving reality to something which as yet is not. The vital effort pro-
duces the something wanted at first ideally, or as mental image of
something future; and subsequently flows over, through the form of
idea, into that of muscular action, by which it projects the idea (to
speak figuratively) into the objective world, and makes it "real"; and this objectification of idea is called an act of volition.

We sometimes speak of the idea realising itself through the act of volition. This is because the vital activity works in and through the idea, or is itself the idea; so that the idea is the realising energy of life in the initial stage of its work. After confirming and strengthening itself as idea, it passes over into objective self-realisation.

Analysis therefore shows that in the forward push of mental life, thinking and doing, intellection and volition, are identical, or are at least different phases of the same. Rational mind is not a conglomeration of faculties, like a bundle of sticks tied together, but a single complex process. Reason is life (the élan vital) struggling through ideation and muscular activity towards a good; and the spring of all change in nature and mind lies not in what is, but what should be. The élan vital is not blind impulse or physiological mechanism, but life-power which rises through intellection to power of viewing things sub specie aeterni—from above space and time—and "looks before and after and pines for what is not"; and this is made possible by its rationality as mind. Its rationality consists in this power of rising above time and place by making past, distant and future to be present, seeing from them and from its own nature what is good, and making the good, as self-realising idea, to be the motive-force of its own life.

This then is the Idealism which Bergson pretends to refute, and the rationalism which he pretends to dethrone. The moving power is not an "existent" thing—not the pushing force of the past nor a force springing blindly out of nothing,—but the future in the present, the universal in the finite, the whole in the part, the working in time of that which is above time—the Highest Good as realising reason. The absolute is not a thing, finished and complete once for all leaving nothing more to be done, but the Idea—the "what should be," leaving room for a world of life and work—the Logos or evolving Reason which is God. It is the Good which, as purpose, holds past, present and future together, and makes each to be operative in the other; and realises itself in the flow of time, and gives to time the unity in plurality, the permanence in change, which makes it to be time.

(b) The above conclusions are supported by the analogy of human action. It has often been argued that nothing that is true of a finite
being can have any meaning when affirmed of the infinite or unlimited being. This, however, is equivalent to making an impassable gulf of separation between infinite and finite, the unfinished and the finished, absolute and relative, which is unjustifiable. The infinite enters into the finite and the finite has itself a share of infinity; the relative is a factor in the being of the absolute; and what is in the one is reflected, and can be read in, the other. Therefore, if change and self-development be immanent is the nature of the absolute, it must appear in the finite also. And it is legitimate to argue that, whatever is the meaning and ground of change in finite beings it must have an ultimate ground of its own in the absolute itself. Therefore if we find that human life is regulated by the non-existent in the form of idea and reason, we may infer that this has its ground in the absolute, and is true of the world as a whole.

And here again we are compelled to ask the question: Why should there be any change at all? Change is not a thing which might stand absolute and self-existent by itself, as the above thinkers everywhere assume. It is only a relation between two terms, and we must avoid the fallacy of making relations to be themselves concrete things. But "energism", "voluntarism" and the like, are guilty of separating, the relation from the related things, and giving it substance. Change is a relation between terms. But what are the terms? This much always holds good, that it is a relation between something present and something future—something which is, and something which is going to be. Now we know that the present is filled with substantial things, but what about the future? According to Bergson and school the future counts for nothing, and therefore change is a relation between something and nothing. But we cannot accept this. The future must be something that counts. Not-being must itself be being in some sense.

We find all this illustrated in the series of changes which constitute human life, and reach their climax in voluntary action. Life is a continued effort to preserve, complete and perfect itself. There is present to it, therefore, a perpetual feeling of limitation and imperfection, and every action rises out of some form of want. But how can feeling lead to any definite form of action; in itself it would be only vague uneasiness and lead to nothing; a feeling must be a feeling of something. There can be no action without a definite direction and purpose of action, some feeling of want to be overcome.
then is the vital activity led towards things which will fill up its wants. In man, life has attained to intellect and reason. By intellectual power it differentiates and represents past actions and results, and by rational power it is able to rise above time, and see what actions and results will relieve each particular need; and the energy of life is concentrated in differentiating, defining and realising the something wanted. Its realisation is at first subjective and in terms of mind merely, i.e. it goes no further than a mental representation or idea in which the future is made present. But in idea there is the feeling of want, the flow of life-energy to overcome the want, producing the mental construction (the idea itself), which anticipates the something wanted. One particular idea-force may be checked by another; but when liberated, the vital activity which, guided by reason, evolved the idea, passes from the form of idea into muscle-activity, and thereby into the changes of things which are required for the realisation of the idea, the relief of the want.

Thus the analogy of human life tends to show that every change has a reason, that the reason is not in the past (not merely a force pushing mechanically and blindly forward in the dark), but in the future; and that the future operates in the present in the form of idea; and that reason is a power which includes under its view both past, present and future as one system of things, and uses what has come from the past to bring about the realisation of what is still future; and that the future not only counts in the system of things, but is the source of all the moving force of life and of the world. This then is Idealism because what is not present in actuality is yet active as idea, and it is Rationalism because it is reason that organizes the whole system of things under the idea of the highest good. The future is not nothing, but a world of idea and tendency, actively correlative (in the absolute) with past and present.

VII.

(c) As to Time: It follows that the possibility of time supposes the reality of the future as a factor of time; past and present by themselves would not be time. And the reality of the future means that it is not a gulf of darkness into which the world is blindly rushing at every moment, but an ideal world of good, towards which the whole creation tends; and that the future works in the present as force of self-realising idea, while
the past works in it mechanically. The present, therefore, is not merely a point in which the accumulated forces of the past meet and push forward blindly into nothingness; it is a point at which the force of the future meets with the past; and rational action is the resultant of both; and the flow of events thus determined and made to be one connected system, makes time. Thus time is the manifestation of something which is making itself to be in the series of changes, and is therefore present in all the changes, and remains identical with itself through them all, and gives them that unity and connection which makes them all to be factors of one time and one world. Time is therefore the unity of permanence and change. What is new in the future is not a creation out of nothing, which would belong to another world and another time; but a further realisation of the same self-realising something, and therefore a factor of this same world and of its time, and underlies the whole as Idea.

But this is not the conception of time adopted by the "new philosophy." Time is too often regarded, and even by the new philosophy, as if it were nothing but a plurality of changes, and changes often regarded as if they were things in themselves having existence of their own, without reference to one another, or to the ground out of which they rise. They are described as successive, but no attempt is made to show what makes them to be successive, or what succession means. Succession is used to explain time, and time to explain succession.

M. Bergson makes so much use of time and change that his work has been called a "philosophy of change." But it is open to this criticism that his time has no future, and is without that principle of unity and continuity without which time would not be time. For (1) in time we see changes rising out of one another in such a way that the preceding is always necessary to the following and goes on living and working in the following. This presence of the past in the present is called by M. Bergson duration, and this is regarded by him as one of the most important points in his philosophy. But in forming his conception of time, he stops here. Time is to him past and present only. The future counts for nothing because affects in no way the present and past. His time ceases at the present moment; every new moment is a new creation. But the continuity of time supposes continuity of the past and present with the future and therefore the reality of the future. For the idea of time includes what is going to be or what is
becoming, as well as what is and was—and this implies the reality of the future as something which counts in the making of time, and therefore in the flow of change which makes the history of the world. And the future can work in the present only in the form which we call Idea. Therefore in time we have the ever present proof of Idealism.

(2) And Bergson's theory also regards time as continuous creation but in a way which involves in itself a contradiction. This new creative force which rises out of nothing or out of the formless infinite (itself nothing) is itself formless. This new and formless force pouring unceasingly into the world, will destroy whatever continuity and connection among themselves the already existent forces have attained. But this is equivalent to destroying time, which consists in the continuity and unity of things. Or it is interrupting the flow of time, which makes the present world, and beginning a new world with a new time. If he say that the infinite out of which this new force comes, is not formless, he is falling back into the idealism which he has been trying to refute.

Consider then what is really included in the idea of time, and without which time would not be time. It certainly involves continuity of change which means that the changes rise out of one another—that every new state rises out of what was contained in the previous state. Anything absolutely new and not belonging to the system would interrupt the flow of time, and begin a new time and another system unconnected with the present. In this way there would be not one time but many distinct times. Events in time are not like units in a spatial series—separated by empty intervals. If they were such, every separate event would be a little world by itself with a time of its own, and no one of them would know anything of the others. Time is not formed by an addition of separate parts. It is all one. It is not a mathematical, but rather an organic unity, in which each part rises out of, and depends on all the rest, and there is one common life pervading them all.

The great question regarding time, then, comes to be: how can this continuity of all changes in one living system of time be explained; or what is implied in it. It evidently implies a single power underlying and working in all these changes, giving them their order and connection,—in them all, and at the same time one and above them all. Without such evolving and unifying power there would be no time at
all, or every distinct unit would be a world with a time of its own. And this evolving power cannot underly past and present only. These would not by themselves make time. Time is constantly pressing on into the future, and cannot be thought of without the future. The power which makes time includes the future in one correlative system with past and present. And if the past is contained in and works in every present state, the same must be true of the future; and if every change rises out of what was contained in the preceding change, it is because the future was contained in it, as well as the past. The present is the point in which past and future, being and not-being, meet, and by their interaction, make the continuous flow of changes; and by their unity of ground, make all changes to be in one time.

What then can this something be—this unity of ground—which works in and makes all time, and is yet above time, and ever changing and yet ever the same. It cannot be a thing which is made, finished and complete, and needs nothing more. It must be something which is always making itself. It can therefore be nothing but a purpose which is realising itself through the whole series of changes, and whose realisation is never exhausted because it is infinite (if it completed itself, it would be then a finished thing, and would be the dead world of Parmenides). Time is activity; activity is the doing of something; the something which has to be done is ideally present in the doing of it, as its soul or realising force. Time therefore is the doing of something, and the something to be done must pervade and unify it all, like soul in body, God in world. This pervading purpose can be conceived only as Good. And the Good, as that straining towards self-realisation and self-development which makes it to be the absolute creative power, is Idea. In relation to the changes or events which it produces for its own realisation, it is Reason (Logos) or organizing power; and it is safe, in spite of many appearances to the contrary, to say with the idealist philosopher "whatever is real is rational." It has a reason for its existence otherwise it would not be at all—there is no other creative force in this world. And it is safe to add, "whatever is rational is or will be real." This does not mean that everything in the world is good. On the contrary, the good is Idea, and it takes eternity to complete its realisation. To finite beings, the highest good consists in their fulfilling the reason for their existence, which is to work for the realisation of good. It is by so doing that they share in
that good. Time, therefore, is made by one unifying Idea working in past, present and future, and making them to be one continuous life.

This account of the meaning of time is confirmed by what we see of the origin of the idea. We get it as we get our other fundamental ideas, from consciousness of our own self. To our own consciousness time is revealed in the series of changes which are made to be continuous, and at the same time to be one, by their being the working out of one underlying purpose, viz. the life of our own self. Our self which lives in the series of states and activities, is in each of them and at the same time above them; and makes them to be the materials of its own life and means of its own higher development. And this self-evolving unity of purpose makes our life to be in time; and in our consciousness of our life we become conscious of time. Applying this idea to the world, we think of a power and purpose working itself out in the world and giving continuity and connection to all its events, and in this notion we see time. If we did not see events to be connected together by causality underlying reason, in which the future is active as well as the past, there would be to us no time.

Thus any analysis of the idea of time, whether logical or psychological, reveals inevitably a world of reasons and ideas, behind the experienced world of changes—extending forward into the future and back into the absolute—and shows that changes both in the world and in mind have their ultimate reasons in an ideal world. These, together with many other facts, tend to show that the world to which we belong is not a mad world, but that there are reasons for everything; that there are uniform laws of both nature and mind, which have their ground in the creative reason itself and its purposes; that the future will indeed differ from the past but not by chance, but according to principles essential to the universal system; and that there are laws of good and bad, right and wrong which have their ground in the absolute reason, and really are "eternal and immutable." And we may fairly conclude that the "philosophy" of anarchy or irrationalism has no justification in sound philosophy.
THE DATA OF REGIONAL ECONOMICS.

DR. RADHAKAMAL MOOKERJEE, M.A., PH.D.

I. Economic Regions and Types.

An analysis of the data of comparative economics will show that while there is a general movement of economic evolution, it is embodied in diverse economic institutions arising out of a diversity of physical, biological and psychical factors and these institutions congregate round particular economic regions and zones so as to form particular economic types and series. Such types and series are determined by different sets of factors working together, the chief of which are:—

(1) External conditions of regional geography and physiography;
(2) Internal organic factors such as the biological and psychosociological instincts and impulses, as well as compelling life-ideals and social values;
(3) The historical tradition, which has been built up layer upon layer by the inter-action of the external and the internal factors in the life of a people.

Such conditions should not be considered only in their static aspect. They are plastic, fluent, growing, and must therefore be conceived in their dynamic progression.

No analysis whether of economic theory or of economic institutions is adequate or scientific which does not investigate these in intimate relation to the above environmental factors and genetic conditions, conceived not merely statically but also dynamically.

We shall now proceed to analyse more specifically the different elements that go to constitute a distinctive economic region or centre.

The complex of conditions contributed by the economic geography, the social psychology and the political history of a people furnishes a distinctive element in the determination of a particular economic type or region as a separate entity. The economics of an island people, adventurous and fecund, and with strong migratory instincts must be different from that of a people locked up in a continental centre with
plenty of fertile land but perhaps demarcated by natural barriers from adjacent lands and without outlets to the sea. Geographical conditions such as deficiency or plenitude in mineral resources, specially of adjacent coal and iron supplies, the length or shortness of the coast line, the mountainous or desert character of the country; physiological conditions such as the physical endurance, stamina and average duration of life of a people often depending on latitude and the dietary; or again psychological conditions such as the strength of acquisitive instincts and prudential motives, the quality and scale of wants determining a people's consumption, the mentality of a people such as expresses itself in the norms of the economic man and the economic market; political conditions like the economic dependence or integrity, indebtedness and favourable or unfavourable balance of exchange due to its political history, the character of the land tenure and the customs in relation to rent and property which are always determined by political antecedents, and, last though not least, the general sociological outlook as represented by the social stratification which governs the industrial classification, and the standard of social values and ideals, the ensemble of conditions like these, so far as they are peculiar, distinct and persistent or transmissible from generation to generation, produce characteristic economic situation, which must be explained by a distinctive set of intermediate economic formulae or applied principles, and which therefore constitutes an economic type or region. Production, and consumption, distribution and exchange are all equally affected by the ensemble of such conditions in such a particular situation. They vary in the same direction like correlated organs, so to speak, in the same individual or the same species under the influence of changing environments and of natural selection. It is the business of comparative and regional economics to find out such types of correlated economic structures and functions, correlated production, consumption, cum-distribution and exchange, which answer to the multiform variations in sociological types, and from which the economist will derive primary classifications and first inductions that will furnish the basis of universal economic laws. In the succeeding chapters of this work, we shall study the particular economic region that India represents and analyse it into its elements, categories, and laws, and in so doing we shall note the corresponding conditions and norms of a rival type associated with the West.
An economic type has been just now considered more or less as a distinctive and integral economic unit. But each type is seen to produce specific variations in sub-centres or subordinate zones within the region or type. The normal curves of production, consumption and population which may be regarded as the generalised curves of the economic region as a whole undergo modifications and variations due to relative changes in the determinants of the curves in subordinate economic centres. In economic centres like America, Australia, Germany, etc., any statistical study will at once show that these curves with their statistical and mathematical constants are important variants from the generalised normal curves of the general economic type or order to which these countries belong. And it is also to be seen that the curves and constants of production, distribution, exchange, consumption and population vary in correlation with one another, being subject to the same set of influences in any given economic situation, and these correlated and concurrent variations must find their explanation in any scientific economic analysis in the ensemble of conditions which is thus seen to constitute a sub-species or subordinate variety, that tends to maintain its general configuration under static conditions and to undergo developments under dynamic conditions along lines of its own. In America, for example, the physical and geographical conditions of the richest continent in the world, forests ready grown to the hand of the labourer, limitless expanses of fertile land ready for cultivation, silver, gold and copper in unexampled wealth, "two-thirds of the known coal, and all or nearly all of the natural gas and of the petroleum of the world,"* the psychological conditions such as the instincts of mastery and leadership of the enterprising Anglo-Saxons, and diverse virile stocks of the European continent, aggressively utilising the concurrent advantages of modern science and virgin opportunity, the sociological conditions such as the development of popular institutions under the form of local and individual initiative which give equal opportunities to all, a high standard of consumption depending upon the latitude and the dietary, the great development of an industrial technique which has harnessed the forces of nature, the waterfalls as well as the natural gas and petroleum,— these conditions are distinct and persistent in their operation and have

* Ingram-Scott.
contributed to develop a subordinate variety within the western economic order to which America belongs.

The following table of comparative increase of population, wages and of manufacturing industry would give the economic facts that underlie the difference between the varieties within the same economic order:—

*Population.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1887</th>
<th>1897</th>
<th>Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>36,600,000</td>
<td>39,830,000</td>
<td>3,230,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>343,070,000</td>
<td>379,890,000</td>
<td>36,820,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2,740,000 (1881)</td>
<td>4,240,000 (1895)</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>50,155,783 (1880)</td>
<td>62,622,250 (1890)</td>
<td>7,556,468 (1900)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percentage of increase of Population.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1810</th>
<th>1820</th>
<th>1830</th>
<th>1840</th>
<th>1850</th>
<th>1860</th>
<th>1870</th>
<th>1880</th>
<th>1890</th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>1910</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>121-70</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>43-84</td>
<td>35-43</td>
<td>41-22</td>
<td>19-48</td>
<td>17-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Manufactures in United Kingdom, Europe and the United States.*

*Millions of Dollars.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1820</th>
<th>1840</th>
<th>1860</th>
<th>1894</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U. Kingdom</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>1411</td>
<td>1883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>5644</td>
<td>8341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percentages of the increase of real wages.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1850-54</th>
<th>55-59</th>
<th>60-64</th>
<th>65-69</th>
<th>70-74</th>
<th>75-79</th>
<th>80-84</th>
<th>85-89</th>
<th>90-94</th>
<th>95-99</th>
<th>1900-04</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>82-5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>1891</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>866</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Among the different determinants of production which we have described in the first chapter, the physical determinant, viz. the natural store of energy and its mode of transformation, has under the American conditions received greater emphasis and constituted more to the determination of the form and elements of the production curve than in other economic organisations in which the natural store is far more limited and exhausted, and less efficient motive powers and agents are employed than in the United States of America.

Again, labour demands a larger physiological repair and maintenance, and there is a greater addition to the total dividend in proportion

* Mulhall.
to the expenditure of human energy, thus wages are higher than the scale of wages in other countries of the West. The Wage Fund theory, accordingly, as is well known does not properly apply except as an instance in arithmetical division. Among the determinants of wages, which we have already described, the physical one of productivity and the physiological one of restoration and efficient maintenance are the most pronounced factors which shape the form of the distribution curve so far as it relates to the wages of labour. Accordingly it is significant to note that in economic analysis, the influence of demand and supply, which was the real basis of the classical English treatment of the wages question—wherein demand was vaguely defined as equivalent to capital—was put in the background, and productivity was brought to the front. Among the factors of production, it was not land with its "original and indestructible properties," as in the old country, but labour which "produced" it was emphasised. Again, the abundance of land has, in connection with a democratic people, begotten a system of land-ownership which has made the distinction of land and capital less obvious than it was in the home of classical economics.* The idea of capital as the aggregate of capital goods has been criticised, and the idea of capital as a mobile fund emphasised and developed. This thorough recasting of the concept of capital has led to the treatment of the rate of interest as a species of rent, and of rent and profit far less as differential gains than as returns for productive investments in the one case and wages of management on the other. Profit which, as we have seen, arises out of surplus return to energy and skill in collocation of matter (including human material) has assumed from the beginning a distinctive character under American conditions on account of the scarcity of labour and capital. The importance of the management factor has been accentuated, and the reward of the entrepreneur for skill in business management and in collocation is a more considerable determinant of profits than the differential gain of a capitalistic monopoly. And so we find an American economist, Walker, emphasising profit as an independent and separable share of the entrepreneur as 'wages of management.' The tendency of profit to a minimum is therefore seriously checked, and the curve of profit exhibits the variation due to this factor. In the sphere of consumption the scale of

* Haney.
utility and satisfaction is higher and the per capita consumption of food is greater under American conditions. Thus the consumption curve and the related curve of utility and stimulus here also vary in the same direction as the curve of production, and the curve of wages. In the same way, the productivity and utility curves, as we have seen, determine the broad trend of the population curve, and limit its fluctuations due to biological and psycho-sociological factors, and, accordingly, the population curve is different from the generalised demogenic curve of the economic order as a whole. The pressure on the normal standard of subsistence is not so felt, and hence the Malthusian limit on population counteracted though in this case immigration complicates the problem. Accordingly, the Malthusian doctrine had its earliest critics in Carey, Thompson, and Peshine Smith, and among modern theorists also its importance has been minimised to a considerable degree. Nor should historical factors be disregarded. The relative isolation of America and the continental variety and scale of magnitude of her natural resources as well as political antecedents early made her a protectionist country, and ‘the American System,’ according to which home markets were to be developed and imports discouraged implied in a manner an economic counterpart of the Monroe doctrine. We should also note that a beginning has thus been made in the practice of dumping goods, of introducing two sets of prices for commodities having the same cost of production in artificially segmented markets,—a practice based upon the principle of securing the maximum return out of differential prices, and one that is subversive of the great economic postulate of substitution and equivalence, and therefore fraught with important consequences if it be generally applied and extended to internal markets by a greater co-ordination and concentration of business to which there are no economic limits. Thus among other characteristic phenomena which constitute the economic situation in America are trusts and combines on the one hand, and tariffs and currency on the other, which manipulated as they are by close and powerful financial rings on a political or a quasi-political basis show the influence of political determinants or causes, in other words of the politically organised instincts of greed and gain, as opposed to those of conquest and earth-hunger, in producing variations from the generalised normal conditions as well as the generalised normal curves in regard to markets, exchange and prices. Thus America forms a sort of sub-region or subordinate
zone in the characteristic economic region and zone represented by the occidental cultures. The formulae and norms which the classical and the neo-classical economists of England have laid down with regard to land and labour, capital and rent, wages and profits, consumption and population or the economic market, national and international, are neither identical with, nor comprehended under, but only coordinate with those of the American sub-centre. For these English norms have been derived from the characteristic conditions of Great Britain, its insularity, its limitation in land-resources, its crowded population and the pressure on the subsistence limit, its manufactures subsisting on raw materials from without, its colonial and imperialistic necessities and lastly its social stratification and connected industrial differentiation of land-owning aristocrat and landless labourer.

It is not that the American curves and norms are particular cases under particular conditions of certain general or generalised forms of which the classical English curves and norms are pure and unconditional examples but both are co-ordinate variants or specific determinations of a general economic order prevailing in the West to which other co-ordinated orders are possible in other zones. It is the business of regional economics to investigate these general orders as well as the subordinate varieties or types within these orders, localising them in particular geographical and cultural zones and formulate their corresponding general and specific curves and norms.

II. Economic Stages.

1.

Hitherto we have confined ourselves to an analysis of an economic region in its static aspects. But every region has a history of its own, and the stages of this history determine the part of the curve, ascending or descending, whether of productivity, utility, or population, and the place in the cycle of ascent or descent which assign to the region its position in the economic scale. Such curves should not be confounded with the conventional curves relating to the increasing or decreasing volume of production and consumption without reference to the differential curves of ascending or descending, productive efficiency, or utility or fecundity. Changes in the former, while no doubt of great moment for the practical economist are of little value in a scientific theory in the determination of an economic type or stage, which latter depends
on the variations of the differential curves, as appearing from a comparison of a given situation with another or with itself in its successive periods. One and the same economic region as constituted by an ensemble of geographical or cultural conditions may exhibit by reason of its dynamic conditions of art and invention an ascending curve of productive efficiency or productivity, or, in the course of its industrial history, may go through the relatively stationary, or even, perhaps, the descending part of the curve of productivity. The American sub-centre, for example, in its earlier history of colonisation and settlement in a virgin soil showed the phenomena of an ascending productivity due to a fresh, abundant natural store; which, in spite of the natural tendency to arrest and decline, has been more or less maintained, in its subsequent course, by new developments of mechanical efficiency with the application to industry of new prime movers. As with productivity, so with utility, one and the same economic region in the course of its history may show an ascending or descending scale of want and utility. In the early history of American and Australian labour conditions, the Yankees' worship of the Almighty Dollar, the craving for the Klondike gold nuggets, or the Australian prospecting for the silver mine fields are an index to that increasing excitability and responsiveness to stimuli which characterise the ascending part of the scale of want and utility. On the other hand, under semi-tropical conditions the Indian relaxation of labour and contentment with immediate satisfactions, and generally inertia and irresponsiveness to stimuli show that the scale of want and utility is a rapidly descending one. Similarly, in correlation with productivity and utility the curve of population rises or falls in the course of its history, and, as we have seen, the economics of ascending and descending productivity are divergent in many essentials. Among the characteristic accompaniments of the ascending stage are phenomena of high wages, super profits, monopoly gains, dynamic conditions of arts and industry, labour migrations and settlements in virgin soil, in backwoods and mining camps. Phenomena like these constitute a stage of an economic order or region, such as we notice in the earlier history of America, Australasia, and South Africa. As we have also seen, it is very often the case that increasing productivity, utility, and population go together, and this is specially the case in the early history of new settlements and plantations, and also in new cyclical beginnings under dynamic conditions of new wants, capacities
and opportunities when they break in upon old and populous countries. But in such case in the absence of proper adjustment between production and consumption between the different factors of production, land, capital and labour, between socio-legal customs and economic institutions, or between political conditions and economic development, there may be want of congruence between the trends of productivity, utility and population, one rising while the others fall or falling while the others rise; a situation which implies an economic unsettlement and unrest, with its hardships, friction and embitterments, that may bring about either an economic decadence or an economic revolution.

2.

We have already seen how the American sub-centre represents a type of economic organisation in a certain stage of its economic history, and the stage or that aspect of it which we have been considering influences the type mainly with regard to the ascending or descending curves or cycles of productivity and population. But the particular stage of history which an economic type is passing through in a particular case may influence it not merely with regard to productivity and population but also, and mainly, by introducing or developing new modes of economic grouping or organisation, involving significant changes in distribution and in scales of valuation as distinguished from increasing or decreasing productivity or utility. This may be illustrated by a reference to the phases through which communalism is passing or has passed in the course of its history in the East as well as the West. In the West to-day communalism casts its shadow as a coming event in the progressive unfolding of the constructive force of co-operation, as a principle of social grouping. As we have seen, after the polymorphic and particularist phases in the Feudal regime, co-operation entered on a period of central control or centripetal configuration. But these experimental constructions in state-poity as well as in capitalistic economics to-day evidently stand in need of vital correction and readjustment by new developments of the primal force of co-operation in a new direction, viz. of intermediary communal groupings. After many an unsuccessful experiment in state-centralisation and exploitative capitalism followed by the nemesis of individual separatism and social revolt, the West is now groping its way to a form of communalism, which by its principle of free voluntary
grouping will seek to reconcile the individual in the community and the community in the individual. By the reconciliation of state control and individual autonomy, not by annulling one by the other as in state-collectivism or unregulated individualism, the West must develop a favourable field for experiments with social groups on a free voluntary basis, which will give shape to incipient tendencies and make a particular Western variety of communalism possible in the future both as an economic stage and as an economic order. But in the East communalism has had another history. Here communalism is an ancient institution and we must note the stage it is now passing through at the present day. The geographical and psychological conditions of many a semi-tropical or fertile eastern country, and many a socialised ethnic and cultural stock have been favourable to the relatively early appearance of this communalism in a rich and exuberant variety in however simple and homogeneous structures. In India in particular, the physiographical, psychological and cultural conditions have been and are favourable to the maintenance and development of this communalistic order and type though this is now brought into conflict with an opposed economic type, as represented chiefly by the Western countries. The phenomenon of conflict of economic types next demands our attention.

III. Conflict of Economic Types and Regions.

We shall now trace the influence of one economic region or type over another, when these are brought into contact and collision by the incidents of political history. Here we may suppose different conjunctures. There may be such a case of conflict when a type with a higher standard of productive efficiency or consumption breaks in upon another region with a relatively low standard, as in the political encroachments of the whites on the yellow, brown and black races in the Asiatic and African continents. Or again, there may be an economic friction and collision with a lower scale of wants and of productivity, when an economic type is by reason of indentured or free labour emigration, imported into an economic world with higher standards in these respects. In the early stage of a plantation for example, where arid wastes inhospitable to white labour for reasons of heat, moisture and miasma have to be converted into smiling pastures and agricultural settlements, or where forms of labour such as work in mines,
sugarcane and tobacco plantations, do not suit the white settlers, coloured labour more adapted for climatic and social reasons is employed and sometimes forcibly, for the economic development of the region, very often by political and international action. Later on as the settlement grows the descendents of the early white settlers are compelled by economic pressure to take to the forms of labour, agricultural, mining or industrial, which gradually spring up while succeeding generations of coloured labour also gradually and naturally overflow its old limits.

When in either of these ways two economic types are made to face each other the conflict arising out of the difference in their economic levels may be two-fold. In the first case where the more complex economic type invades the less complex one there is among the people so invaded an artificial raising of the standard of consumption which is incommensurate with the lower productivity of the indigenous economic type, resulting in widespread economic disturbance, as expressed in the pressure on the subsistence limit, declining vitality and population.

Higher productivity with its accompaniment of more efficient business organisation enables the foreign type to exploit agricultural and mineral resources, to disorganise if not to kill the indigenous forms of industry, and more and more of the land and labour of the country more and more of its assets come to be mortgaged as it were to meet the claims of the foreign capitalist entrepreneur or trader. The crucial test for a people in such an economic situation is to find out a new level of consumption and productivity which with the help of its natural adaptation to the region will enable it to hold its own and overcome the intrusion, and thus to reach an economic equilibrium. Such is the economic struggle for existence which, by the conflict of different levels, and the disturbance of the customary adaptation of old economic habits and institutions, is well calculated to secure the economic evolution of a people if it has sufficient vitality and resisting power to meet the situation. India with the natural advantages of her people in respect of caloric, low nitrogenous subsistence and climatic adaptation, her cheap and multiplied labour, the fertility of soil, and the continental variety of her natural resources as well as the strong endowment of co-operative and communal instincts of her people, may be expected to attain this equilibrium in the end even under conditions of
free and open competition. In this process India in contact with the economic organisation of the West will gain in a freer and fuller sense of the individual's right to live, to grow and to get the best out of his own life, as well as in a free and consciously organised ethical custom by which the individual, freed from a regime of mechanical routine will find himself anew and in ever fuller measure in the life of the group and the community. India will also gain in material efficiency by evolving more and more complex forms of economic organisation on a co-operative basis in the conquest and utilisation of her vast resources in prime movers as well as the soil. But while the Indian communalism may gain in these ways in moral as well as material values, it will go counter to the fundamental principles of economic regionalism if she were to lose her temperament, her soul by forsaking the economic type or order which she has evolved through the ages in adaptation to the genius of her stocks and races and her moral and physical environment. The characteristic features of the Indian communalism, her emphasis on communal as against individual property in the family as well as the village, her attachment to the land and homestead, her co-operative or communal distribution of a share of the income, her co-operative organisation of village life and village economy, her emphasis on co-operative consumption and 'social utility' her preference of man to the machine in crafts and workmanship and lastly her strong predilections for human and social values in the scheme of social ethics and ideals,—these are the original and indelible lineaments of India's economic physiognomy. The true theory of comparative economics and of regional evolution demands that the economic type or order should progress along its own lines preserving its specific organism though no doubt moving in convergence to the general trend of the world movement in economics.

In the second case we have supposed the conflict of economic types when through emigration of labour, stocks and races like the brown and the yellow are introduced into an environment of a disparate character. Our first supposition related to a case in which the stock of the lower level was adapted to the natural conditions of the environment, and the higher level of efficiency was an intruder more or less unsuited to those conditions. In such a case, ordinarily, the crisis would not arise if it were not for the incidents of political history. We have seen how the economic crisis must be met in such a situation.
But where an emigrant labour population of politically weaker stock of a lower scale of economic consumption and economic productivity finds itself in more highly developed foreign surroundings, it may so happen that the so-called lower scale of efficiency is better adapted to certain forms of labour, and succeeds in ousting the so-called efficient labour from these fields. The question therefore arises in what sense is one stock more efficient than the other. For example, it may be asked if the Chinese and the Japanese emigrants in the United States or the Hindu emigrants in Natal, the Transvaal and other South African regions are found to be more successful in agriculture, dairying, fruit growing, and in certain kinds of shopping, hawking and other varieties of retail trade, why the so-called infallible test of competition in conventional economics should not be applied to these cases, or why in subversion of the accepted economic creed the door should be slammed in the face of the emigrant stocks or the engine of political or municipal power should be so worked as to degrade in civic, social as well as economic status those who have been inveigled into the situation, and used as instruments of the country’s advance but now discarded as having served their day. The policy of shutting the door in certain latitudes and longitudes and forcing or breaking it open in others can have no justification in economic science. The plea of disturbance of the living standard is available on both sides, there being an unsettlement or maladjustment of the economic standard for each of the parties concerned and as to the efficiency of any body of workmen, it has to be judged not in a general reference but for particular forms of labour, provided these are essential to the economic organisation of the country. If the test of such efficiency be success in competition, any labour corps, white or coloured, which passes this test has or should have an indisputable right to work under equal civic or political conditions according to the received economic doctrine.

After the South African war there was a shortage of unskilled labour all over South Africa and the work of political and economic reconstruction of the new colonies under Lord Milner as well as the financial condition of South Africa were threatened with disaster. Under these circumstances Lord Milner saved South Africa from an economic crisis by the importation of Chinese labour. From 1904 to 1906 the average number of indentured Chinese labourers increased from 9,668 to 51,427. In 1907 the Transvaal government under pressure
from the Home government decided an political grounds to put an end gradually to the employment of Chinese labour. This enforced withdrawal of the 50,000 Chinese labourers inflicted great economic injury. That the gold industry was adversely affected by the repatriation of the Chinese has been generally admitted. In the first place, the 50,000 Chinese were more valuable industrially as being more efficient than a corresponding number of African natives, and in the second, the labour requirements of the industry were so great that it needed for its unfettered development the Chinese as well as any additional African labour which it can secure. This is the testimony of an English editor of the Johannesburg Star, and well brings out the racial bias and colour prejudice that stand in the way of an unarrested economic prosperity in the colonies by disregarding considerations of the efficiency of the Labour Corps, when it is black or yellow. A similar story can be told about Indian labour in the colonies. We quote here, from the report of the Lord Sanderson Committee on Emigration from India:—"There can be no doubt that Indian indentured immigration has rendered invaluable service to those of her colonies in which on the emancipation of the Negro race the Sugar Industry was threatened with ruin, or in which a supply of steady labour has been required for the development of the colony by methods of work to which the native population is averse. The Indian immigration has had a two-fold effect. It has admittedly supplied labour which could not be obtained in sufficient quantities from other sources. But we were also told by some competent witnesses that according to their observation in British Guiana and the West Indies at all events the thrifty and perseverant habits of the Indian immigrant have had an educative effect, perceptible though gradual on those among whom he has come to live, and that his example and his competition have introduced new habits of industry and improved methods of agriculture." Thus, Sir H. H. Jonston has witnessed that the Indian would do a great deal towards improving African agriculture, for the African as a race has no idea of the use of manure. With the Indian it is the reverse; he is extraordinarily economical about land, and will teach the native a lot. Thus rice cultivation was introduced in British Guiana by the Indians; and this instance can be repeated all over Africa. The report continues, "It is moreover generally admitted that the majority of the Indians who remained in the colony after expiration of their inden-
tures, either as small proprietors or as free labourers prove a valuable addition to the population, and that in the second and third generations many inhabitants of Indian extraction become men of considerable property and attainments. Those who turn to other forms of employment whether with greater or less success are also recognised as useful in supplying various needs and rendering services to which the other elements of population are more or less averse. In Fiji a certain amount of jealousy of the remarkable success of Indian traders appears to be felt among the European population, and the same feeling no doubt exists in the East Africa Protectorate." The subsequent history of the gradual adoption of unworthy and degrading subterfuges to discourage Indian immigration need not be recounted. About this Lord Curzon said in course of a speech in the House of Lords, February 4, 1908, "We send him (i.e. the cooly) to a colony which he enriches by his labour, and then society here appears to turn round him as if he were a pariah dog. He is penalised there, not for his vices but for his virtues. It is because he is solemn, industrious, frugal and saving man that he is such a formidable economic danger in the situation. And then the Indian remembers that at any rate in a large number of cases he has fought for the British empire in South Africa and that it was largely owing to his efforts that Natal was saved."

The principle of competition, indeed breaks down in such a tangle of political and economic interests. The argument that is usually advanced is that the higher standard of consumption must be maintained at any cost in the interests of stock improvement for social and moral reasons. These non-economic considerations are no doubt legitimate and fundamental. But a community of larger consumption and greater quantitative production is not necessarily a desirable community, for it may mean wasteful consumers and joyless mechanical producers, what is essential is (1) in an economic sense the surplus productivity and not the scale of productivity or of consumption as such, and (2) in a more comprehensive point of view including economic as well as ethical considerations surplus production of value in terms of happiness, qualitative as well as quantitative. In considering the economic surplus, any natural advantages of a tropical or semi-tropical people in stores of calorie, in the dark pigmentation of the skin and iris regarded as a protection against heat, light, and actinic rays or in continuous discharges of cell energy though
at a slower rate, in the adaptive distribution of sebaceous or other secretive glands, in lower level of proteid metabolism for the maintenance of health and efficiency, or it may be other forms of adaptation to the soil and climate must be counted in its favour no less than there must be reckoned on the other side the advantages of inhabitants of temperate or cold climates in respect of physical hardihood and length of life, a toned up constitution, with capacity for spurts and explosive cell discharges often due to a higher nitrogenous diet, resulting in high pressure short time work of a concentrated and strenuous character. A credit and debit account is not so very easy if we proceed to judge by whole circles of latitude and longitude, the more so as different stocks vary in powers of acclimatisation (including immunisation from disease) natural as well as acquired. For example, as a rule tropical and semi-tropical people stand cold climates better than inhabitants of the latter bear the tropical heat, and this for physiological reasons. But the whole subject of climatisation has to be scientifically investigated from the economist's point of view, and it will be the business of comparative economics to apply the conclusions that may be established by such an investigation. The proneness to certain diseases has been well known to be a serious obstacle to the white man's expansion in tropical and semi-tropical regions.

Sometimes it is brain-trouble as in Uganda, sometimes enteric as in India and brain-trouble too, or sometimes dysentery as in Ceylon. And geophagy in its civilised form is as great a scourge as the Negro's trypanosome. The capacity for resisting specific climatic changes should be investigated for each of the migrating and colonising races. Comparative Economics must then apply the conclusions which rest upon the more fundamental basis of ethnological and geographical fact than upon political status or stages of economic development. Broadly speaking the unsuitability of climate or the presence of a large and settled population ought to mark the limits of an economic exploitation by the white population, while the exploitation of sparsely populated and entirely undeveloped countries like vast areas in Central and East Africa, Central Australia, the interior of British Guiana, and of Borneo and New Guinea should be left to those Asiatics or Polynesian that are migratory and colonising, and are well adapted to a permanent establishment for climatic and other reasons.
A cognate consideration of even greater significance is that there are different levels of efficient metabolism in different regions and among different ethnic stocks and that consequently the physiological condition of wages involved in recuperation and efficient subsistence which thus varies in different stocks must be regarded as giving rise to differential natural advantages as between stock and stock, which are governing factors of the economic conflict between the economic types and economic regions. An artificial raising of the standard of wages in the torrid zone due to a fancied physiological demand of the white labourer is as much a case of wasteful and unproductive consumption as an artificial depression of the standard in cold climates by tropical immigrants is an instance of inefficient subsistence.

The key to the solution of this vexed inter-racial and inter-regional economic conflict is to be found only in Comparative Economics. Appealing to the gospel of free and open competition for purposes of exploitation and wielding a two-handed engine which by the right hand forces the door open for the Westerner on the East and by the left hand shuts it forcibly against the Easterner in the West is not quite worthy of those who claim to be in the vanguard of civilisation. The gospel of the Superman and the Super-race to inherit the earth and enjoy the fruits thereof which would alone justify this course would bring the world to a greater crisis than the present Armageddon.

Ringfences have been put round Australia, Canada, South Africa and New Zealand; the discrimination has already proved to be a source of great irritation, and in the case of South Africa even the most level-headed men hold the strongest opinion as to the unfavourableness of displacement of local indigenous labour under the circumstances of the case and the inequity of the regulations that have been passed imposing the white a colour bar against Indians. About "the white Australia" I cite an American witness: "Australia is following a policy that ignores to extend natural and economic laws. The government would redeem a virgin and tropical wilderness by Saxon labour and domicile within the torrid zone a race of workers whose physiological adjustments have fitted them for colder climates. But Australia must meet the facts that tropical industries are at present conducted by processes requiring cheap labour, and that world-wide competition, from which no country can escape, has fixed the wage of the labourer in the torrid zone far below that required by Caucasian workers. The
fringe of continent which the Commonwealth possesses, bending far north toward the equator, still await the pioneer. As its capacities are tested and its resources advertised, the demand for its development will become more insistent.” Indeed, the growing demand that the modern world makes on the special products of the tropics,—sugar, tea, cocoa, tobacco, caoutchouc, cotton, etc., is so exigent, that international economy and justice would insist, as Comparative Economics seeks to do, that no nation can lock up in perpetual reserve large tracts of productive territory.

To neglect material resources is to forfeit them. A very large part of the island continent is not even explored, but recent exploration seems to show that the interior of the continent is not such a desert waste as it has often been described to be. Exploration on a great scale is urgently needed. The whole island must be opened up by transcontinental railways and the rainless districts be supplied with water under all conditions. But the population of Australia is yet small. It is settled only upon the outer rim. Indeed, even the outer rim is not settled, as is shown, for example, by the condition of the Northern Territory. The total population of Australia is only 4½ millions as against 312 millions of India, which does not very greatly exceed Australia in size. The figures will explain the reason why the West Australian Premier stated that Australia must either settle her unoccupied territories or she will be deprived of them.* Again, the distribution of population is not equitable at all and the evils of congested town life and deserted rural districts have gone far.

A comprehensive transcontinental scheme of railways and irrigation, however, cannot be undertaken until population has grown considerably and much more wealth than now exists accumulates. But the White Australia policy checks the settlement and cultivation of Australia, which would be immensely expedited if the people were willing to admit coloured labourers. The sugar industry in Queensland was founded and carried to prosperity by the employment of indentured coloured labourers, and at one time it seemed probable that the extremely hot parts—that is the northern portion—where there are exceedingly few whites, and very probably always will be very few whites, would be largely populated by coloured people. Opinion,

* Lloyd, Theory of Distribution and Consumption, Chapter XLII.
however, has now entirely declared against that, and the labourers on the sugar estates are being gradually got rid of. Indeed, the decision goes very much farther. It is that the coloured people of all races and in all stages of civilisation are to be excluded: The decision, in fact, excludes the Indians and the Japanese. For the present Japan is busily engaged in Japanising Korea and in colonising Hokkaido; but she is feeling very much the need of new outlets for her surplus population. Japan with her growing trade and population regards as an insult the exclusion of her people from a British territory. Will the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, then, be able to continue if this policy is maintained? Nay, more, is it not possible that Japanese feeling may become anti-British if the Japanese, in spite of their active co-operation in the great war, are branded as undesirable settlers like many other Asian peoples that they must be excluded altogether from Australia, New Zealand, Canada and from the United States? In India there is strong feeling because of the exclusion of Indians from the self-governing portions of the British Empire. At present the feeling is mainly against exclusion from South Africa because Africa has been a land of settlement for Indians from time immemorial and because owing to the gold mines and the recruitment of coolies from India there had grown up a very considerable Indian settlement. The co-operation of Japan and India and of the component parts of the British Empire in the battle fields of Europe and Asia has spelt the death of a mean selfish policy which has hitherto been regarded as an insult as well as a grievance and the causes of future trouble will certainly be removed as a result of this war whose chief object apparently is to end wars for all time to come. In the South African war it was decided that no coloured man of any kind was to take part in it—even Indian soldiers of the Crown were to be excluded. This policy has been abandoned in the present war and thus it will be altogether wrong and inconsistent to allow the colour prejudice to stand against the equitable settlement of the problems of emigration and tropical reconstruction after the war, apart from the fact that the colour prejudice cannot commend itself to the moral sense of civilised humanity and is incompatible with the lasting peace of the world and the harmonious development of its resources in men and raw materials. India could send her troops to the front at the time of the Empire's greatest need, when South Africa where Indians have been treated with extraordinary meanness not only could not send any aid
but was causing grave anxiety as the centre of a formidable rebellion. It is inevitable that the policy of South Africa and the wrongs done to Indians who are emigrants and who have already settled must go. Similarly, the services rendered by Japan in the war must imply the definite abandonment of the attitude of suspicion towards and distrust of Japan manifest in Canada and Australasia. The great response of India and Japan to the necessities of the war situation renders it obvious that the claims of the Indian and Japanese labourer, capitalist or trader within the limits of the British Empire must be recognised after peace and unless the right of free and undisputed entry is accorded to them one great advantage of the war in facilitating the progress towards the consolidation of the smaller federation called the British Empire will be lost. Of course, the introduction of aliens whose wages must be lower owing to their temperate habits and their abstention from beef and beer must not be allowed to bring about social and economic unsettlement and suicide, and protective measures should be adopted, but not of the mean type which have hitherto received the sanction and even encouragement of the Imperial Government.

The Imperial Conference accepted in 1917 the principle of reciprocity of treatment between India and the Dominions, and recognised the right of the Government of India to enact laws which shall have the effect of subjecting British citizens to the same conditions in visiting India as those imposed on Indians desiring to visit such country. In the League of Nations, of which the British Empire is said to be but a precursor, many an old colonial interest and prejudice will have to give way to a more liberal conception of the rights and interests of the component parts of the Empire.

As regards other powers in the west, the United States have excluded the Chinese from their shores by special enactments of Congress. The Japanese labourers since 1907 have also been kept at arm's length by an informal agreement between Washington and Tokyo popularly called "the gentleman’s agreement." The circle of exclusion has been deepened and widened by an arbitrary geographical boundary line fixed by the Immigration Law of the United States, 1917, which prohibits from entrance into United States the people of India, Indo-China, Siam, New Guinea, Borneo, Sumatra, Java, but which leaves untouched the people of Africa, the greater part of Arabia, Turkey, Persia, Northern Asian regions as well as the Philippine Islands. To in-
clude or exclude peoples by means of a line in the map is at once arbitrary and unreasonable. Japan has all along vigorously protested against the Exclusion Law of 1917, and secured changes to suit her. Both in America and the British Colonies the few Japanese that are permitted to live have to submit to vexatious regulations with regard to land and therefore are deprived of full liberty in regard to natural development and prosperity. At the Peace Conference she is demanding to-day more vigorously than ever that racial discriminations and restrictions should not be practised any more and be dropped forthwith. The time has indeed certainly come when race or colour prejudice should not stand in the way of an equitable, scientific and consistent arrangement regarding the international and inter-regional distribution of labour and industry for the efficient utilisation of the world’s resources in labour and raw materials. Scientific humanitarianism ought to forestal in every field the operation of force and the might of arms in the solution of the vexed problem of oriental migration.* Enlarging the markets and spheres of influence by every possible means in the Far East, and denying economic opportunities and legitimate rights to the Asians in the West are at once harmful and invidious and have raised difficult issues which should be solved sooner or later. So long as racial discriminatory treatment in international intercourse persists, all peace conferences, leagues and federations will be as a house built on sands and no true peace can be hoped for.

The economic federation, of which we shall presently speak, will govern the distribution of labour and the utilisation of natural resources on the surface of the globe so as to yield the maximum service for man-

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* Even among the Japanese themselves, writes a Japanese Publicist, there is a good deal of divergence between popular and official opinion on such questions. What the ruling classes would like is to have Japan given a free hand in East Asia, in return for her withdrawal of all demand for unrestricted immigration in English-speaking lands which is possibly the real meaning of the request for a Monroe doctrine for Asia. But the masses of Japan whose poverty looks out on the high wages of British and American labours with envy do not want to be turned towards China, Korea and Siberia as prospective immigration fields. Obviously it will take the Japanese centuries to become inured to the northern winter. They naturally prefer the warmer and richer labour regions of the Pacific, the yearn for a semitropical clima like California, North Australia and the islands of the Pacific, consequently if fate drove them northwards their progress might be indefinitely stayed, as witness the effect on the yellow races of Europe and North-America. But official policy pays little heed to science or anthropology. It has to work in the direction of least resistance, and is convinced that a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.
kind at large while affording opportunities of vital development to every particular people or region in and through that service. Such a federal policy will make the Australian void and the African wilderness as much of an economic impossibility as a vacuum in nature. Nature abhors a vacuum in every sense. And the federal distribution of industries, labour and capital among different peoples and regions for the maximum utilisation of material human resources has been brought to our very doors as a pressing practical problem requiring solution immediately after the war, and though at first such an understanding may be confined to imperial economic unions and Zollvereins separated from one another this cannot be final but must lead on to an economic federation of the world which may come even earlier than the League of Nations or the World-State.

But racial antagonisms die hard. These exclusive tendencies have erected tariff walls and propose to build up close commercial leagues and Zollvereins in the near future. The herd instinct, as we have seen, has been the mother of many an experiment in social grouping and solidarity, but in its more early manifestations—the animal instinct of preying in packs and herds—has died hard, and is now apt to be resuscitated as a ghost that stalks abroad in the highways of commercial exploitation, and international tariff warfare. The reconciliation of the conflicting inter-racial claims must be sought as the new science of Comparative Economics goes to show in an economic federation of humanity based on the claims of each economic type or region which has evolved by mutual adaptation of its stock and clime, and will so continue to evolve along its own lines. Such a natural adaptation can alone secure to every progressive type or race, given only free opportunities for economic growth, self-expression and the pursuit of its own scheme of life values, the highest surplus productivity in an economic sense and the highest surplus production of human and social values in terms of happiness, qualitative as well as quantitative. Comparative Economics, however, furnishes no foundation for the exclusive and mutually hostile delimitation of economic regions or for economic self-sufficiency or self-centredness, because more than any other economic system or method, Comparative Economics emphasises the mutual inter-dependence, and complementariness of the various divisions and zones of the world which but represent and embody the physical and psychical phases of one great order.
The physical and biological unity of the earth as embracing different geological, botanical and zoological regions and zones, and the psychical unity of Man as embracing different racial temperaments and ethnic values have made human history one, though it is a web of diverse threads and diverse colours, and similarly the history of man's economic activity both in the utilisation of natural resources and the natural construction of economic structures and organisations shows the same phenomenon of one broad dynamic movement comprehending divers or multilinear series in divers economic regions and zones. There has been an iron and steel age, for example, followed throughout the world by steam and now by electricity. There has also been an age of guilds and factories followed by an age of trade-unions and combines, of co-operative and communalistic experiments. Consumption is following the same general trend amongst thriving peoples throughout the world. From material and sensuous to intellectual and social wants, the progressive expansion and deepening of wants show the unfolding of a common pattern. In exchange also there has been the regime of barter and industrial economy, followed by money and exchange economy with developments of banking and credit, and similar other forms and institutions throughout the world. In relation to land, there has been an evolution from communal to individual ownership, and then from peasant-proprietorship to the Feudal system or other type of landlordism, or again from the village to the city,—an evolution which is now turning its course towards experiments in state or communalistic ownership and towards the garden city implying the ruralisation of the city and the urbanisation of the village. And yet it is only through specific adaptation and regional differentiation, based upon the special and distinctive natural resources as well as human gifts of different regions and stocks that the general course of economic evolution can accomplish itself. It is for this reason that the loss or suppression of any particular thorough-bred economic type, which had been the historic expression of the needs and instincts, of the physiognomy of any great people or culture must mean a disruption or a dissolution of continuity in the body economic of Man and inflict loss on humanity as a whole. The recuperative processes of economic evolution would slowly re-evolve, with proper modifications, the economic type which the particular geographical and cultural environment requires for progressive adaptation, and thus painfully heal the wound in the
centuries to come. Every such region or type has a place of its own which none other can fill in human economy, and it must utilise to the full its natural products and human potentialities for its own maintenance and development as well as for the service of the world at large. A world scheme of the distribution of the products necessitates an international division of labour and distribution of occupations. The economic conflict can never be solved by trusting to narrow protectionism or to blind competition for a sound scientific geographical distribution of industries and manufactures. With an economic federation of the world when the various states and regions will be organised in the pursuit of the common good of humanity as a particular national economy is now organised for the fulness and enrichment of the national life, the delimitation of production and consumption by tariff walls and exclusive monopolies of commercial rights and privileges will come to be regarded as a blind, haphazard and wasteful method which destroys the patrimony of the race and reduces the fund of enjoyment for each and for all. The fundamental principle of social utility and social consumption is that the enjoyment is multiplied in the sharing of it. And this will apply not merely to social utility in the sphere of congregate individual life but also to social utility in the congregate life of nations, or in international life and consumption. It is thus an imperative demand of social consumption that different peoples and nations help one another in the creation and increase of common values for common disinterested enjoyment. This is the verdict of the science of economics building on the bed-rock of physical and physiological fact, and the statification and distribution of human instincts and social values worked up in multiform regional types and orders in the economic evolution of the race. Neither the abstract doctrinaireism of an a priori deductive economics, from Ricardo and Mill to Marshall and Pigou nor the equally abstract classifications of a self-styled historical school, from the empiricism of Vico and Montesquieu to the nationalism of List and Roscher, neither the Law of Nature, nor the Law of Nations, neither the arbitrary conventions of international jurists, nor the pacific gospel of an international credit or commerce, neither the feverish hope of a hunger-born Socialism nor the siren lure of Commercial Leagues or Zollvereins will make for a permanent settlement of a world distracted by the conflicting claims of armed hostile camps into which the nations stand divided to-day.
The problems of a scientific civilisation cannot be solved without a recourse to the methods of science. It is only the new vision of a cosmic humanism re-reading the story of man's life and man's history on earth and building on a scientific study of the biological and sociological forces which have been the originating conditions of the great historical types and regional cultures that can hope to grapple successfully the vexed problems of inter-racial and inter-regional conflict, and direct and control the course of inter-racial co-operation and conscious organised selection in the evolution of a Universal Humanity.
IMPERIAL FEDERATION.

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Apart from the major questions of international peace, one of the most important problems awaiting solution at the present moment is the organisation of the British Empire. The unity of the Empire was manifested in a remarkable way in the Great War, when the resources of the various dependencies were fully and freely given to help Great Britain in the struggle. The response of the Dominions was as emphatic as it was spontaneous, and now that the war is over the question of imperial organisation has become more pressing than ever. The Great War has proved the fact of imperial unity, but statesmen are now faced with the difficult problem of creating definite institutions to perpetuate the unity. One of the most favoured schemes has been Imperial Federation. The implications of federalising so scattered an empire have so rarely been examined that in this paper I propose to show what difficulties actually confront any attempt to do so.

I.—Classification of British Dependencies.

First let us briefly examine the actual system of government prevailing in the various dependencies of Britain. I use the word "dependencies" to cover all those territories the governments of which are subordinate to the British government. I am aware that official objection has been taken to the use of this term, and that the phrase Self-Governing Dominions was introduced into the official phraseology of the Colonial Office in deference to the wishes of these Dominions. The introduction of the term Dominions unfortunately has added confusion to our terminology. The word dominion is commonly used for all the units of the Empire, or, as they used to be called "possessions." Now Dominion (with a capital D) is used for one particular species of the genus. We are therefore forced to fall back on the old word "dependency" to indicate all the ‗possessions.‘ Of the genus "dependencies" the Self-Governing Dominions are a species. Whether this is
a rise or fall in their status cannot be helped. Properly speaking they have subordinate governments, therefore they are not self-governing. The name self-governing is a salve to their amour propre.

Dependencies are territories with subordinate governments, or, as John Stuart Mill puts it, they are "outlying territories of some size and population which are subject more or less to acts of sovereign power on the part of the paramount country without being equally represented (if represented at all) in its legislature." Dependencies, as Lucas points out (in his Introduction to Cornewall Lewis's Government of Dependencies) are of two kinds "dependencies which a country rules, and dependencies which it settles; lands where the climate forbids European settlement or which are sufficiently peopled already by coloured races; and new homes for emigrants from an old country, where population is wanted where the soil and climate bid the incomers be fruitful and multiply, colonies in the real sense of the term."

It is these "Colonies" in the real sense of the term that are now officially known as the Self-Governing Dominions. Thus the general classification is

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 Dependencies
   Self-Governing Dominions
       Other Territories
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The "other territories" are of a most miscellaneous kind, but among them one stands out from the others, viz. India. India possesses a subordinate government, but she is not a colony. Her prominence gives her a right to a classification separate from the miscellaneous list of Crown Colonies, and territories under the Colonial Office, the Home Office, or the Foreign Office. She is an Empire by herself; she possesses a member of Cabinet and a separate Office in the English Government to look after her interests. She has given to His Majesty the King the additional title of Emperor. India, therefore, may be placed in a class by herself.

Deducting India, we may classify the British dependencies according to the type of government prevailing in each or according to the authority in the British Government which regulates them. Many of the British possessions cannot be classified with any certainty on the basis of their form of government. Particularly in the larger dependencies, the form of government tends to change from time to
time as the people of the territory are educated and are able to take part in governing their own country. The most complete dependencies from that point of view of government are the Self-Governing Dominions, such as Australia and Canada. The other dependencies are all moving towards self-government, so that a classification of them at any particular period in history may not be suitable for a generation hence. At the other extreme is a number of possessions of the British Crown which are occupied for military or naval purposes. These possessions must continue to be governed according to the purposes which they serve. The question of full self-government in them is subservient to their utility as military or naval stations.

Adopting the two-fold basis of the form of government and the authority which regulates them in the British executive, the dependencies may be classified thus:

(I) The Self-Governing Dominions or, simply, Dominions. These are: (a) the Dominion of Canada, (b) the Commonwealth of Australia, (c) New Zealand, (d) Newfoundland and (e) Union of South Africa.

(II) Colonies which do not possess responsible government: the administration is carried on by officials responsible to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Protectorates with a similar form of government may be classed under this heading, although in the latest official classification Protectorates and Protected States are classed separately. These Protectorates, examples of which are the East African Protectorate, the Uganda Protectorate, the Zanzibar Protectorate, the Nyasaland Protectorate, the Somaliland Protectorate, and the Bechuanaland Protectorate, as a rule are under the Secretary of State for the Colonies, to whose charge they have been transferred from time to time by the Foreign Office.

These Colonies may further be sub-divided according to the development of their legislative bodies thus:—(a) Colonies which possess an elected house of assembly, or representative assembly, and a nominated legislative council or upper house. The types of these are the Bahamas, Barbados and Bermudas. (b) Territories which possess a partly legislative council in which there is sometimes an official and sometimes a non-official majority. This class includes Ceylon, British Guiana, Cyprus, Fiji, Jamaica, the Leeward Islands, Malta and Mauritius. (c) Territories, both colonies and protectorates, which possess a legislative council which is purely nominated by the Crown.
This class includes British Honduras, British East Africa, the Falkland Islands, Gambia, the Gold Coast, Grenada, Hong-Kong, the Nyasaland Protectorate, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, the Seychelle Islands, Sierra Leone, Southern Nigeria, the Straits Settlements, Trinidad and Tobago. (d) Territories, both colonies and protectorates, which have no legislative council. This class includes Ashanti, Basutoland, Bechuanalnd, Gibraltar, Northern Nigeria, the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, Somaliland, Swaziland, Uganda, St Helena, Wei-hai-wei and various islands in the Western Pacific.

(III) Territories controlled indirectly by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Some of these are practically independent, others are administered by chartered companies. This class includes South, North-Eastern and North-Western Rhodesia, North Borneo and Sarawak, and Zanzibar, which is practically under British protection. The Sultan is the nominal head of Zanzibar and he is assisted by a number of British officials who are under the control of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

(IV) Various territories administered by authorities other than the Secretary of State for the Colonies. This class includes (1) Egypt, which is under the Foreign Office in the few matters in which it is not independent; (2) the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, which is partly under the British and partly under the Egyptian Government; (3) Ascension Island, which technically is regarded as a man-of-war and is governed directly by the Admiralty; (4) the Channel Islands, which are under the Home Office; (5) besides these there is a large number of small islands and rocks in the various parts of the world which technically come under the British Crown. Some of them are uninhabited. Others are inhabited only at certain periods of the year, for example, by whale-fishers. Others are used as light-house posts. Still others are leased by individuals or companies from the government for the collection of guano or copra or for cocoanut growing. One, Tristan-da-Cunha in the South Atlantic, is nominally British, but its government is carried on by the inhabitants themselves under the oldest member. It has a permanent population of about one hundred souls and is rarely visited by anyone from the outside world. (6) Islands in the Pacific Ocean governed by the Commonwealth of Australia or New Zealand.

This classification is temporary. There is a constant movement upward among these Dependencies, a movement from pure executive
control to a self-governing status. The self-governing Dominions are the apex of the system. Even a modified form of complete nationhood may be claimed for these "Dominions." Article I of the Covenant of the League of Nations declares that "Any fully self-governing State, Dominion, or Colony not named in the Annex, may become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the Assembly, provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military, naval, and air forces and armaments."

The phrase "fully self-governing Dominion or Colony" is, as we at present understand the meaning of Dominion or Colony, self-contradictory. A mere *ex cathedra* statement by diplomats does not affect the truth that all the British dependencies by law and fact possess subordinate governments. But the Article is a remarkable admission of tendencies.

The official classification of the British dependencies is somewhat unstable. On May 17th, 1920, the official definitions were given in the House of Commons thus—

The term "Dominion" is used officially as a convenient abbreviation of the complete designation "self-governing Dominion." The term "Colony" is an abbreviation of the official designation "Colony not possessing responsible government," and includes all such Colonies, whether or not they possess an elective legislature, but does not include Protectorates or Protected States. The term "Crown Colonies" is properly applicable only to those Colonies in which the Crown retains control of legislation. This classification, like the classification just given, is temporary as regards individual areas, e.g. Malta has now received a qualified form of self-government and Ceylon is in the process of moving from Crown government to semi-responsible government.

II.—The Form of Government in the Dependencies.

The Self-Governing Dominions, as the name implies, conduct their own business of government. They have all adopted the type of Cabinet Government prevailing in the United Kingdom. Some of them, Australia, Canada and South Africa are federal unions and the "states" or provinces of these unions also have the cabinet type of government. Each Dominion, and each province of the federal Domi-
nions, has adopted the bi-cameral system of legislature and in every case financial legislation is controlled by the popular or lower house. The number of ministers in the cabinets of these Dominions and provinces varies from time to time. Generally there are about ten ministers in the central governments, but as a rule the number is smaller in federal provinces. In Canada at the present moment the Cabinet, or as it is also called, the King's Privy Council, has twenty members. In all these Dominions the functions of the Crown in England are performed by the Governor or the Governor-General as the case may be. In the provinces the functions are carried out by the state Governors, who, as in Australia, are appointed by the Crown, or, as in the case of the Lieutenant-Governors of the provinces of Canada, by the Governor-General.

The constitution of all these countries are really acts passed by the Imperial Parliament and they can be altered only by the Imperial Parliament. Certain features are common to all these self-governing dominions in their relation to the United Kingdom—

(i) The Crown appoints the Governor or Governor-General, as the case may be, although, as in Canada and the Union of South Africa, the Crown does not appoint the heads of the provinces.

(ii) The Secretary of State for the Colonies controls no officials within the Self-Governing Dominions except the Governor. In other words the Secretary of State for the Colonies never interferes in the internal administration of these Dominions.

(iii) The legislative powers are governed by acts of the Imperial Parliament. These acts lay down the limits within which the legislatures may act and within these limits the legislatures are all-powerful. The chief limits laid down are that the acts passed by the Dominion parliaments shall apply only to their own territories and that they must not conflict with the laws of England which affect the Dominions. Theoretically, of course, the British King in Parliament is legislative sovereign for all the British possessions and as such has power to legislate in matters great or small affecting the Dominions. This power of course is not used.

(iv) All laws passed by the legislatures of the Self-Governing Dominions are subject to the same procedure as laws passing through the Imperial Parliament. They pass through both houses and must be signed by the Governor as the representative of the King.
(v) The Governor is empowered by the constitutions of these Dominions to give his consent at once to a law passed by the legislature, or he may refuse to give his consent, or he may reserve the bill for the decision of Crown, signified through the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

(vi) Certain types of bill must always be reserved for the decision of the Crown through the Colonial Secretary. The Governor cannot give his assent to these bills without first consulting the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The subjects included in this class of legislation are divorce, currency, the imposition of differential duties, laws affecting imperial treaties, laws affecting the forces of the Crown, laws imposing on non-European persons disabilities which are not placed on Europeans, laws making grants either of land, money or anything else to the Governor, certain laws affecting shipping and laws which contain matter to which sanction has already been refused by the Crown.

(vii) The Crown through the Secretary of State for the Colonies can also disallow legislation. This power must be exercised within one or two years after the law has reached the Colonial Office, even if the Governor has assented to it.

(viii) An appeal lies from the colonial courts to the King in Council, i.e. the Privy Council.

In regard to the other Colonies and territories a large number of restrictions and reservations have been laid down by the Imperial Government. Usually the Executive Councils of those colonies consist of the principal officers of government, sometimes with, and sometimes without, the addition of non-official members. The official members of the Executive Councils are usually the holders of posts definitely specified in instructions to the Governor, or persons appointed by a royal warrant or by instructions from the Crown issued through the Secretary of State. The Governor is usually empowered to make provisional appointments in the case of vacancies. The members of the Executive Councils can be dismissed by the Crown alone although they may be suspended temporarily by the Governor.

The Executive Council, according to the Colonial Regulations, assists the Governor with its advice. The Governor is required to consult the Council in all important matters except in cases of urgency, when he takes measures himself and informs the Council of them, and in cases where the Governor considers it might be prejudicial to the public interests to consult the Council. The Governor may act in
opposition to the advice of the Council unless he is definitely instructed to accept the majority vote of the Council. In the case of disagreement he must report his reasons to the Secretary of State as soon as he can.

The constitutions of these Colonies and territories are usually rigid. The Colonies themselves have no power to amend their constitutions, but, in some cases, they have powers of altering the organisation of their government within specified limits. An act altering the constitution of any of the Crown colonies usually must receive the royal sanction signified through the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The legislatures of most of these Colonies and territories are nominated. In some cases the whole of the legislature, in other cases, some of the members are nominated. In a few cases the Governor himself has the power of legislation. With a few exceptions, such as the Bahamas, Barbados and Bermuda, the Crown, i.e. the executive, has the power of legislating by means of orders in council. In all cases the acts of the legislature of these dependencies require the assent of the Governor, and even after receiving his consent they may be vetoed by the Secretary of State. Beyond these disabilities the legislatures of the Crown Colonies and other dependencies have a wide power of legislation in internal matters. Within the limits laid down by their constitutions they have practically complete power.

In all cases the non-responsible Colonies and other territories are forbidden to enact laws concerning the list of subjects forbidden to the Self-Governing or Responsible Dominions. Some additional restrictions have been imposed. The supremacy of the executive makes it essential for money bills to be presented by the Governor, or at his direction. But beyond these restrictions the Crown Colony legislatures have complete freedom of debate and complete freedom of action within their constitutional limits.

The Governor is always appointed by the King on the recommendation of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. His Executive Council, and the nominated members of the legislative council are usually the chief officials of government. The franchise qualifications and qualifications for membership vary from territory to territory. Where there is no executive council, and the Governor exercises the functions of the Crown by himself, the territory concerned is usually retained for some special purpose, e.g. military. In all settled terri-
tories the tendency is to give more freedom of action to the officials on the spot and to create legislative councils with non-official majorities to assist the Governor.

In the various provinces of Rhodesia, which were declared within the British sphere of influence in 1888, a charter was granted to the British South Africa Company for the administration of the territories under the protection of the British Government. Each of the provinces is governed by an administrator appointed by the Company and approved by the Secretary of State. The Administrator of Southern Rhodesia is assisted by an executive council composed of few members, and a legislative council with an equal number of nominated and elected members. In North and North-Western Rhodesia there are no councils. These territories are administered under the High Commissioner for South Africa, who has to submit the more important matters of Government to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

III.—The Conditions of the Problem: the Existing Institutions of Imperial Unity.

The need for Imperial unity has been amply demonstrated by the Great War. The most fundamental factor in unity is imperial defence. If Great Britain is implicated in war, the dependencies are implicated at the same time. They are as liable to attack as Britain herself. They stand or fall with her. A scheme of imperial defence obviously requires the co-operation of all the units of the Empire. Such co-operation needs not only man-power, but money and some organisation or organisations to draw up plans of defence and apportion expenses.

Imperial defence also implies co-operation in foreign affairs. With the growing self-reliance of the dependencies it can hardly be expected that they will co-operate in a struggle which they disapprove. At present, though the Imperial Parliament is legal sovereign for all the dominions, military co-operation is not enforced on the Responsible Dominions by the British Government. During the Great War compulsory service was enforced in Great Britain by the British Parliament. The Responsible Dominions, however, were free to enforce compulsory service or not as they wished. Canada enforced universal service; Australia did not. It happened that the War with the Central Powers was approved by all the Dominions, so the question of co-operation or abstention did not arise. But for future wars it would
be unsafe as well as unwise to trust to the spontaneous help of the Responsible Dominions if they have no voice in the policy which leads to the war.

For almost a century, the colonial policy of Great Britain has aimed at giving responsible self-government to the dependencies wherever possible. After the Durham Report of 1839, the advance of colonial self-government was very rapid. The five Self-Governing Dominions—Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Canada and Newfoundland—have long since possessed responsible governments. In 1919, a large measure of responsible self-government was granted to India. The other dependencies presumably will travel by the same road when they are sufficiently developed to bear the weight of responsibility. As the peoples of the various units of Empire develop, they naturally feel a pride in, and love for their own land. In the Colonies properly so called, the population is now largely native born. In the early days of colonial settlement the settlers owed their first and native allegiance to Britain. Britain was their home, or as it is still affectionately called, "the old country." But to later generations, who know Britain only by hearsay, the colony itself is the real home. The populations of the colonies, too, became mixed. Immigrants came from other European nations, and, once the first generation had disappeared, the loyalty of the second and subsequent generations was to the home they knew from their youth upwards. Still more potent in the development of colonial nationalism has been the gradual realisation by the Colonies of their community of interests. Each colony has its own economic problems, and by the grant of responsible government the solution of these problems in the main has been left to the Colonies themselves. Not only is the community of interests vital to the native born colonists: it is equally important to the immigrants who have left the old country to seek a career in the colonies. Many of these immigrants enter into the spirit of colonial government, and actually many of the leading politicians of Canada, Australia, and other Dominions have been Englishmen, Scotchmen or Irishmen by birth.

The community of interests is political as well as economic. On the one hand these political interests tend to foster nationalism; on the other they increase the desire for closer imperial unity. As the commerce and industries of the colonies develop so does their wealth.
Their wealth and opportunities attract the envy of other nations and in the event of Britain being implicated in war, the colonies would not only prove a ground of attack, they would also be prizes for the conqueror if Britain were defeated. Vice versa, an attack on any of the dependencies at once involves Britain. Thus defence is a matter not for one Colony, but for the Empire. The Colonies depend on the army and navy of the old country as if it were their own. They know at the same time that their own best efforts for the common well-being are expected not only by the mother country but by their sister dependencies.

The growth of nationalism has been even more marked in dependencies the populations of which differ in race, colour, language, religion, traditions and manners from the United Kingdom. The progressive grant of self-government in these dependencies has hastened the growth of a national feeling which is more natural than in the real colonies. In India, for example, the population is alien in almost every respect to that of Great Britain. The rule of Britain in India has been possible because of the heterogeneous nature of the Indian peoples, their lack of co-operation, and their inequable state of development. The British Government has organised India, and has laid a basis of common rights and civic order which will unite India as never before in history it has been united. In India national feeling has developed rapidly, though there is no community of language, religion, traditions or historical antecedents as there is in the Colonies. But in India, as in the Colonies, the common interests involve imperial unity as well as Indian nationalism. India is as open to attack as any of the Colonies; her strategic position, indeed, makes her more open to attack than several of the Colonies. Her defence is as much a matter of imperial interest and importance as is, say, the defence of Canada. So it is with the other dependencies. As they grow in material resources and advance in education and culture, the two opposing tendencies will become apparent, the one towards self-government and nationalism, the other towards imperial unity.

At the present time, beyond the sentiment of unity which exists in the Empire, there are certain definite institutions which bind the Empire together. These are (a) the King. The King is the supreme executive and legislative head of the Empire. All the executive acts of government are carried out in his name. Actually his powers are
more nominal than real both in the United Kingdom and in the Empire at large, but his position as King or King-Emperor (as he is in India) is all important. He is the focus of imperial loyalty. The King, of course, cannot be present in person in the dependencies, but by periodical tours by himself or the heir-apparent the actuality of the kingship is made real to the peoples of the dependencies. The Governors-General, or, in India, the Viceroy (which literally means in the place of the king), act in his name and to some extent share the pomp which surrounds the royal house. The King is also Commander-in-Chief of all the forces of the Empire. Through the Privy Council, which promulgates its legal decisions as "advice to the Crown," he is the fount of justice. He also confers all titles.

(b) The King-in-Parliament. The British Parliament (technically the King-in-Parliament) is legislative sovereign for all the Empire. In virtue of its sovereign powers, Parliament has granted such measures of self-government to the various dependencies as it has considered advisable. The relation of Parliament to the dependencies is the most vital part of the whole imperial problem. While very full powers of local self-government have been granted to both the self-governing Dominions and India, a large number of reservations have been made in subjects on which action of the local legislatures is restricted, e.g. divorce, coinage, and acts affecting the forces of the Crown. According to the party system prevailing in the United Kingdom, the dependencies, in matters outside their own powers, are really at the mercy of the party-in-power in the British Parliament. The same is also true of foreign policy, at least in these parts of foreign policy which come under party influence. The party divisions in the Self-Governing Dominions do not correspond to the divisions in the United Kingdom, and even if they did, it is unlikely that the same parties would be in power all over the Empire at the same time. From this arises the very just claim of the Dominions to be represented in foreign affairs.

(c) Definite institutions such as the Colonial Conferences, the Committee of Imperial Defence, and the High Commissioners or Agents-General of the Dominions. The official governing agencies—the Secretaries of State for the Colonies, for Foreign Affairs, India, War Home Affairs, and the First Lord of the Admiralty, as well as being the heads of departments which control the dependencies, also represent their views to the British Government.
The Imperial Conference has been held at indefinite intervals since 1897. It was composed originally of delegates from the Self-Governing Dominions, but latterly a representative of India was included. The Prime Minister or Secretary of State for the Colonies presides over the Conference. It has now been decided to make the Conference a definite institution, with a definite constitution and regular meetings. The Committee of Imperial Defence started in 1895, as a Committee of the Cabinet. At first this Committee was informal: it kept no minutes and had no regular meetings. In 1902 it was set on a more definite basis. It was to be composed henceforth of the Prime Minister, the Secretaries of State for War and for India, the first Lord of the Admiralty, the first Sea-Lord, and the Directors of Naval and Military Intelligence. In 1904, the Committee was granted a permanent Secretariat. At the outbreak of the Great War, the Committee at once assumed first rate importance. Its executive powers were greatly increased, but in theory it still remained an advisory body under the Cabinet. In 1916, its functions were taken over by the Imperial War Cabinet. In 1911, the Committee of Imperial Defence adopted a resolution to the effect that one or more representatives of the Self-Governing Dominions should be invited to attend meetings of the Committee of Imperial Defence, when questions of naval and military policy affecting these Dominions were being discussed. The Committee also suggested that Defence Committees should be created in each Dominion. The Dominions did not show any alacrity to accept the proposal: they seemed to think that permanent representation through a minister in London would be unnecessary, as the Imperial Committee had previously worked smoothly with the Dominion governments.

With the creation of the Imperial War Cabinet during the War definite representation was given to the Self-Governing Dominions and India. The Imperial War Cabinet was a real attempt at the organisation of the British Empire. It had three full meetings, one in 1917 and two in 1918. Towards the end of 1916, Mr. Lloyd George invited the Prime Ministers of the Self-Governing Dominions to attend a meeting of the War Cabinet, to consider the question of imperial policy in the War. The Prime Ministers of these Dominions became members of the War Cabinet. India also asked to send representatives to assist the Secretary of State for India in representing the views of India at this imperial meeting. At the first session all the Dominions except
Australia were represented by a minister. India was represented by the Secretary of State and three assessors nominated by the Government of India. The Secretary of State for the Colonies represented the non-responsible Colonies and the Protectorates. At these meetings the representatives of the Dominions and India met on equal terms with the members of the British Cabinet. The early meetings were so successful that, in 1917, Mr. Lloyd George proposed that the Imperial Cabinet should be held regularly, and should be attended by the Prime Minister of England and such of his ministers as were in charge of departments dealing with imperial matters, the Prime Ministers of the Dominions, and a representative for India. At the second meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet in 1918, the United Kingdom was represented by the members of the War Cabinet and the heads of the chief war departments. India was represented by the Secretary of State, Lord Sinha (then Sir S. P. Sinha) who was a member of the Executive Council of the Governor of Bengal, and the Maharaja of Bikanir, the representative of the ruling princes of India. At this meeting a resolution was adopted by which each Prime Minister of each Dominion was authorised to name a colleague to represent the Dominion at the meeting of the War Cabinet between the full sessions. Thus an attempt was made not only to have an annual full meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet but to organize it in such a way that it could meet at any time with all interests represented.

The last meeting of the War Cabinet was held after the end of the war. Representation was very much the same as in the previous war sitting.

The Imperial War Cabinet was a peculiar body. The essence of English Cabinet Government is that the Government is responsible to the House of Commons. The Imperial War Cabinet however was responsible to no single house; each member was responsible to his own government. The various ministers represented the views of their own government, and could be responsible only to their own governments when they returned to their own countries. Mr. Lloyd George himself expressed the purpose of the Imperial Cabinet in these words, "That the responsible heads of the Governments of the Empire, with those Ministers who are especially entrusted with the conduct of Imperial policy should meet together at regular intervals to confer about foreign policy and matters connected therewith, and come to decisions
in regard to them which, subject to the control of their own Parlia-
ments they will then severally execute." The future of Imperial
representation is still in the balance. The Imperial Conferences are to
be resumed. In the meantime the right has been conceded to the Pre-
miers of the Self-Governing Dominions to correspond directly with the
Premier of the United Kingdom, and to be represented in the Cabinet
when matters affecting their own governments are being discussed.

The High Commissioners and Agents-General of the Responsible
Dominions are sent by the Colonies to represent them in their dealings
with the British and other Governments, private firms and individuals,
in political, commercial and other matters. Their offices in London
are the centre of all correspondence and negotiations with their govern-
ments. The High Commissioners and Agents-General are in a sense
ambassadors. Like ambassadors they occupy a high social position
and enjoy considerable prestige in the imperial capital. By the India
Act of 1919, the Crown is empowered, on the recommendation of the
Secretary of State for India, to appoint a High Commissioner for India.
Sir William Meyer was appointed the first High Commissioner.

Another method of colonial representation is by means of the
House of Lords and House of Commons. The King may create colonial
or Indian peers if he so wishes, or is so advised, or Australians, Canadians,
Indians or others may stand for election as M.P.'s for British constitu-
encies. In recent years both courses have been adopted, but the
creation of Canadian and Australian peers was not favourably regarded
in the countries concerned. The election of members of the House
of Commons cannot be satisfactory. The Member of Parliament
is elected by a British constituency with definitely British interests,
and though an individual here and there may do good work for his
own country, he cannot well satisfy his own constituency and his own
country at the same time. Moreover, to be a Member of Parliament at
all he must be a member of a British political party. The whole
method is too casual and adventitious to be of real permanent value.

The question of Imperial Preference as a method of uniting the
Empire has again been revived as a result of the Great War. Origin-
ally Imperial Preference was advocated as a means towards furthering
the economic interests of the colonies, but with the very rapid growth
of wealth in the Dominions, this position is now no longer strongly
maintained. The issue of Imperial Preference became a burning ques-
tion of party politics in the United Kingdom. Its chief supporter was the late Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, the basis of whose argument was that Imperial Preference would pave the way to Imperial Federation. The whole subject is a matter of economic, not of political theory. The Free Trade party (the Liberal party) rejected the idea as inconsistent with the accepted free-trade position, and in the interval the view of most Dominion statesmen became more concerned with foreign affairs than with imperial preference. At the present time it seems that if preference is to be revived at all it will be revived not as an instrument of imperial unity but as a method either of raising revenue or of increasing the trade of the United Kingdom itself.

IV.—Imperial Federation: Sir Joseph Ward’s Scheme.

The question of Imperial Federation is much more complicated than it appears at first sight. The popularity of federation in the modern world has led many to see in a federal organization the most simple solution to an Empire which contains so many diverse elements. The movement for federation started about 1880, but at first it was so vague as not to attract serious attention. At the first Colonial Conference of 1887 the Imperial Government definitely ruled out the subject of federation as a matter for serious discussion. In 1891 the question was mooted, but no definite scheme was put forward. At the conferences of 1897, 1902 and 1907 the subject was not raised. It was first seriously suggested at the Imperial Conference of 1911 by Sir Joseph Ward, the Premier of New Zealand. He proposed that there should be an Imperial Parliament for defence. This Parliament was to be elected on a basis of one for every 200,000 of population, the members to be elected as each Dominion might decide. This was the lower house, There was also to be an Upper House, or Senate, of twelve members, two for each unit represented. The executive power of this union was to be vested in a body of fifteen, of whom not more than one should be a member of the Senate. The main subject of legislation was to be naval defence, as it was of common interest to all the Dominions. But the Parliament was also to have powers in relation to treaties and questions of war or peace, in a word, foreign policy. Measures were also suggested for financing the new machinery, and a basis was laid down for the assessment of contributions by the Dominions for purposes of defence.
Another proposal was that there should be an Imperial Council of State for all the dependencies, whether self-governing or not. This Council of state was to be advisory to the Imperial Government. This proposal was the original New Zealand proposal, but for it Sir Joseph Ward substituted the idea of an Imperial Parliament, which in effect would mean the federation of the Empire.

This proposal shows clearly the weakness of any federation of the Empire. In the first place, the federation was to include only the Self-Governing Dominions and the United Kingdom. No provision was made for India, the non-responsible Colonies and other dependencies. No Imperial federation can be complete which omits some of the largest and most important units of the Empire. Though India and the non-responsible Colonies are not on the same self-governing basis as the Responsible Dominions, the avowed policy of the British Government is to grant responsible self-government to these as soon as they are fitted for it.

In the second place, if a complete federal union of all the units of Empire were drawn up, those units would lose much more than they could gain. The smaller units in particular would suffer, as representation would presumably be on a proportional basis. Owing to the differences in population even the Responsible Dominions would be overshadowed by the representatives of the United Kingdom. Under federalism they would have much less power than they have now. At present the British Government always listens to the views of the Dominion Governments, but where the Dominions would have to depend on an Imperial legislature their chances of carrying their views would be much less. The same is true of India. The smaller units would be completely swamped, whereas at present their views receive perhaps even more respect than is proportionate to their size and importance. Certainly at present the various Secretaries of State, High Commissioners, Agents-General, Conferences, and other Imperial institutions are far more powerful for both the representation of views and, through their acceptance by the British Government, for their execution than any Imperial Parliament could be. The dependencies are more autonomous now than they could ever be under a federal system.

In the third place, as we have seen, the growth of individuality in the Colonies, India and other dependencies has resulted in intense
local patriotism. Federalism has appealed to statesmen as a compro-
mise between this patriotic nationalism and imperialism; but within
the nationalism are questions which first must be settled by some sort
of compromise. Each dependency has its particular problem. South
Africa, with its mixed population, has a national problem distinct
from the problems of Canada or Australia. India, again, has her own
national problems. To bring all these together in a common council
chamber would be to court disaster. It would encourage diversity
more than unity. One of the most elementary needs of a federal union
is a community of interest. Though the apparent unity of interest in
the Empire may promise well for a federal union, it may happen
that when the representatives of the Dominions find themselves side by
side as common legislators the unity may become more chimerical.
Sir Joseph Ward’s proposals originally included only naval defence: but
inevitably they extended to war and peace, and foreign affairs generally.
Were these proposals resuscitated after the experience of the Great
War they could hardly omit military defence. Defence implies finance,
and the financial arrangements suggest almost infinite difficulties.
Sir Joseph Ward’s proposals were relatively simple. But finance is a
subject which branches out in many directions. It would almost cer-
tainly lead to discussions on commercial policy, and the Imperial Parlia-
ment would either try to have its constitutional powers extended, or
friction resulting from financial adjustments would lead to desire for
dissolution of the Union. Dissolution would be fatal to the Empire
insomuch as the very fact of its possibility would have a most adverse
effect on unity. At present much of our imperial unity is sentimental
or psychological. It depends on love of and respect for the mother
country, on pride in a connexion with the greatest Empire of history.
Dissolution of an attempted federal union would mean bitterness and
ill feeling between either the dependencies themselves or between them
and the mother country. The Common connexion they have at present
with the old country seems much preferable to the possibility of inter-
necine imperial disputes.

That disputes are not merely supposititious may be judged from
the policy of Canada towards Indians, the White Australian policy and
the Indian difficulties in South and East Africa. Racial homogeneity
within the Empire might obviate difficulties, but such racial homo-
genity is notoriously absent. How are the interests of India to
coincide with those of Canada, New Zealand, or, say, the future units in West Africa? And supposing the federal Parliament at first included the responsible Dominions and the semi-responsible India, how is it to decide when, say, East Africa, Hong-Kong, Nigeria, and Jamaica are to be included? How is the constitution to be framed with relation to future entrants into the Union? Are they to be admitted by amendment of the constitution or by a majority vote in the two Imperial Houses of Parliament? These are fundamental questions, the solution to which offers much difficulty. For instance, if a community which considered itself fit for representation were refused admission the effect would be far from encouraging imperial sentiments in that community. Admission would lead to endless jealousy and heart-burning, all of which are prevented at present by the policy of the British Government. All the dependencies are not on equal basis as regards self-government, but all can equally depend on a fair hearing from Britain. The less developed may safely put their faith in the British policy of progressive responsibility for progressive development, and they may also trust that the liberal policy of the past is not likely to be reversed in the future.

This points to a fifth difficulty. It may be said that with the growing liberalism of political opinion prevalent throughout the world that the Imperial Parliament might continue uninterruptedly the policy of the British Parliament. But the members of the Imperial Parliament would in all likelihood be party politicians. There is no guarantee that the party views of Canada, Great Britain, Australia, India and South Africa will be the same. The party views would likely be reproduced in the Imperial Parliament, and the clash of party views might well prove another element of disunion.

Again, it is not clear what advantage an Imperial Parliament would be unless the representatives were instructed, like the members of the old German Bundesrath, by their home governments. The free discussion of Imperial questions and free votes by members elected in the various units of Empire conceivably might result in laws out of accord with the desires of the governments of the dependencies. Members elected by Australia, for example, though their minds might be made up on a particular problem at the time of election, might alter their views when they had heard the views of the members for Great Britain, India, or Canada. This raises the question of responsibility of mem-
bers. The executive of the Empire would be responsible to the legislature, but would the members of the legislature be responsible to their governments, constituencies or their own consciences? Their own constituencies would be so vague that responsibility to them would have little meaning, if, indeed, it were felt at all. The normal constituency is not interested in imperial affairs. Its main interest is in its own national government. Thus members would either be instructed by their governments, or they would exercise a free vote. In the latter case in all probability their views might conflict with those of their own government. Their own governments would then be in a powerless position, for if the member could secure his return in his own constituency, his home government could not unseat him. On the other hand, if the members are to be instructed, it is difficult to see why a huge organisation like a federal union, beset with legal and other difficulties, should be set up at all. Under the present system the views of the governments of the dominions are conveyed through their official representatives. The voice of the dominions at present is only advisory; federalism is meant to make it compulsory. But as we have seen, the voices of the dependencies would even be less powerful than before. The United Kingdom would remain supreme, at least for many years, under the scheme propounded by Sir Joseph Ward.

In Sir Joseph Ward’s scheme one member is to be elected to the Imperial Lower House for every 200,000 of population. The nature of this proposal, if extended to all imperial units, may be gauged by a comparison of the United Kingdom, the Responsible Dominions and India according to the last census. The figures were:

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<tr>
<td>The United Kingdom</td>
<td></td>
<td>45,516,259</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,206,643</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,455,005</td>
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<td>New Zealand</td>
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<td>1,099,449</td>
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<tr>
<td>Union of South Africa</td>
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<td>5,873,394</td>
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<td>Newfoundland</td>
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<td>252,464</td>
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<td>India</td>
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<td>315,156,396</td>
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According to this proposal India would control the Empire. Nothing better could illustrate the difficulty of arranging an electorate for an Imperial Parliament or of apportioning the relative importance of the units of Empire. At present the equal relation of the dependen-
cies to the British Government, with the ample opportunities each unit has of pressing its own views seems to be infinitely preferable, from the points of view of the dependencies themselves, to a common legislature elected on some sort of proportional basis. Newfoundland, for example, ranks equally with the other Dominions, but, one may ask, what would her voice count in the proportional federal Parliament?

The policy of Britain during the last century really makes the name Empire almost a misnomer. We are accustomed to associate the ideas of power and central government with empire. But in the British Empire both these are absent. Instead of keeping power, Britain has given power. For central government she has substituted local or dominion government. Her policy has been centrifugal more than centripetal. She has created a number of potential nations instead of trying to weld them into one imperial nation. But one thing she has preserved—the supremacy of the British Parliament. All attempts at federal organisation of the Empire must be faced with this cardinal difficulty—the historical position of the British Parliament and constitution. Sir Joseph Ward's scheme implied—indeed it openly included—the subservience of the British Parliament to the proposed Imperial Parliament. Other proposals of federalism take the present Parliament of the United Kingdom as the basis of Imperial representation. A number of members will be added to Parliament to represent the Empire. Such a plan can only be supported on the plea that the federal theorists are afraid of making all at once too great ravages into the present English constitutional system. The present British Parliament is primarily British: it represents the people of Britain; it enacts, and, through the Cabinet, executes the laws of the country. Only on rare occasions is it called upon to enact laws the preponderating interest of which is colonial or imperial. Normally the business of the dependencies is conducted by the government departments which control them. Rarely do colonial politics assume the importance that they did during the Imperial preference controversies. Even that controversy was artificially stimulated by its connexion with the general party struggle over free trade and protection, and by the dominating personality of the late Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, who happened to be, not only one of the most prominent party leaders of the time, but also Secretary of State for the Colonies. The very fact that colonial politics rarely appear as party issues in the United Kingdom, of course, shows the completeness of
devolution of government to the Colonies, but our main point is to show that it would be dangerous, as well as foolish, to burden the normal domestic legislature of the United Kingdom with imperial politics. For one thing, the colonial members would have little interest in either English constitutional practice or English domestic legislation. Nor would the English members care to have the normal course of legislation—already overburdened—blocked by imperial matters. An analysis of this suggestion, however, shows the difficulty—and it is a fundamental one—of impairing the position of the present British Parliament.

Any sound federal organisation would require a separate organisation—some such organisation as was proposed by Sir Joseph Ward. The implications of such an organisation are vital, and the very fact that the logical conclusions have been so seldom elaborated by the federalists themselves points to the fact that their schemes lack in reality. No form of government requires more careful handling than federalism. The apparent success of America, of the late German Empire, of the dominion federal unions of Canada and Australia, has frequently led to the hasty conclusion that federalism is the best form of government. But the success of a nation depends on many factors other than its form of government, and the very conditions which have made modern federations successful may show the impossibility of federalism as the solution of our imperial problem.

The history of federal government gives no parallel to guide us. In the United States there was no preponderating partner among the states when the Constitution was made. Recognising the value of union, the states agreed to form a federal union which was to look after common interests. Even in the original states, where the common interests were made so obvious by the War of Independence, the federal government was at first looked on with suspicion. The states were intensely patriotic to their own governments, and they carefully circumscribed the powers of the central government, not only in the scope of legislation but by a very rigid constitution. The process of federalisation was both gradual and difficult. Even after more than half a century of federal experience in a land knit together by geographical, linguistic, historical and racial unity, a civil war was necessary to complete the federal bond. As in many federations, force was necessary to weld a weak link in the chain and, let it be marked, war was necessary within the United States which is often looked on as
the best type of federal government in existence. And the United States, in matters of government, started with practically a *tabula rasa*. In the original thirteen states the community of race, language, religion, traditions and interests had been sealed by blood spilt in a common cause. The expansion of the area and population of the United States was marked by no vital differences in the normal 'unities' of either nationality or federalism. Nowhere apparently could a more favourable field be found for federal experiments. Yet the southern states never lost the feeling of independence, the reality of which had passed with the adoption of the Constitution. Ostensibly on the grounds of the existence or non-existence of slavery, the feelings for secession on the one hand and unity on the other came to a head in a civil war. The causes of the war seem trivial in comparison with the potential causes of dispute already in existence in the British Empire.

Or take the example of Germany. Unlike the United States, Germany had no *tabula rasa*. Her historical antecedents had created a large number of states or principalities, each of which tenaciously clung to its past history and privileges. The elements of union as well as the feeling of union existed, but only a policy of blood and iron brought actual union into existence. And even that union was deficient. It was not national. Austria, which was German in population, language and sentiment, had to be excluded from German hegemony before Bismark's policy of persuasion and force could make the German metal flow into the mould which Prussia had created.

Thus in both the federations which have commanded the respect of modern observers, force has been necessary. And force was necessary in spite of the presence of the normal 'unities' of federalism. What more favourable ground for federal government could have existed than the homogeneous populations of Germany, or (as it was when federalism was accepted) of the United States? Common interests, geographical contiguity, a spirit of unity among the people, the elements of nationhood existed in both. Yet federalism was accompanied by war. How much more are the chances of dissension in an Empire so diffused in space, so mixed in race, so motley in language, so unequal in culture as the British Empire? In many of the units, moreover, the elements of nationhood are not yet clear. While the French-Canadians or Irish-Canadians do not endanger the nationhood of Canada, there is still a question as to the future of South Africa, and who can foretell

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what the national tendencies of India, East and West Africa or Egypt are to be? And the question of complete separatism or independence in the Responsible Dominions themselves not infrequently has been voiced by responsible statesmen. These are indeed only ripples on the surface of the imperial sea. Yet they are indications enough that there is danger in shackling an Empire within federal greaves where the elements of diversity are infinitely more numerous than were the differences in the United States and Germany.

How, then, would a federal organisation effect the present constitutional position of the English legislature? In the first place, the whole constitutional machinery of the United Kingdom would be upset. Federalism demands a rigid constitution. The British constitution is flexible. Save for the abortive Instrument of Government drawn up by Cromwell, it has been flexible during the whole course of its history. The whole spirit of the constitution is opposed to rigidity. The whole tenor of British constitutional history, and indeed the history of the relations of Britain to the Dependencies, is made up of a vast number of laws, understandings and customs which have been passed or have accumulated as circumstances have demanded. One might even go so far as to say that the English constitutional habit of meeting exigencies as they arise—and meeting them successfully—not only makes a rigid federal constitution unnecessary, but in time would so alter that constitution as to make it unrecognisable. Even the constitution of the United States has expanded by extra-legal methods. In the separation of the executive and legislature, for example, the liberty loving early Anglo-Americans thought they had found one of the keys to freedom. But they were defeated by their own instincts. An attempt rigidly to separate these two powers caused the extra legal system of party government to develop, so that, whereas the Americans tried to circumscribe their government by a constitution which could be amended only with the greatest difficulty, they are now circumscribed themselves by the most rigid party tyranny in the world. The American Constitution and American party government represent the two extremes of the pendulum of the Anglo-Saxon political instinct.

In the second place, Imperial Federation as in Sir Joseph Ward’s scheme, would imply a series of local parliaments in Great Britain. The possibility of such a development has been before the people for a considerable time, not because of any theory of imperial organisation,
but because of the Irish Home Rule controversy. This controversy has given an undue prominence to the idea of so-called "Home Rule." It has spread from Ireland to Scotland and Wales, and to other parts of the Empire. But the main idea in this Home Rule vogue is not federal government but local self-government. The idea of federal devolution in the United Kingdom is partly the result of an attempt to conciliate Ireland by persuading her that if she accepts the federal solution, so will England, Scotland and Wales. The average English statesmen is not prepared to repeal the Act of Union of 1801, but he magnanimously says that if Ireland goes so far on a certain way, the rest of the United Kingdom will go so far to meet her. The necessity of federalism at all is a loss, but it is a loss which the Englishman must incur to please Ireland. Only a very few who accept this solution—either English or Irish—have paused to consider what the loss may be. At present it seems that federalism will not satisfy Ireland, so it is difficult to understand why the federal solution should be suggested at all. The extent to which Home Rule for Scotland has captured the imaginations of Scottish politicians may be judged from the debate on the subject in the House of Commons in April of last year. The debate came to an inconclusive end because not enough members were present to adopt the closure. No Scotchman takes any real interest in Scottish Home Rule.

More in jest than in earnest, the cry of English Home Rule has been raised, and not without reason. England is the predominant partner in the United Kingdom, and a not unusual feature of Home Rule schemes for the other members is that the schemes usually provide for complete self-government for themselves, but also include a considerable representation at Westminster to guide Imperial and English affairs. These schemes are both a compliment to the greatness of England and a recognition of the fact that a central authority at Westminster is necessary for the major matters of state. Were the cry in England for English Home Rule really a live one, the Scottish and perhaps even the Irish Home Rulers, would quickly be brought to heel, for both Scotchmen and Irishmen, whatever their outward protestations, know in their hearts that if England got Home Rule, they themselves would irretrievably suffer. By their connexion with England they became great. The power, wealth, and personal force of the English gave Scotchmen and Irishmen their opportunities. Their
nationality and national characteristics mean much more in the world now than they would have done as an obscure home-ruling federal unit. Better arrangements may be made for governing Scotland, but that is another question from federalism. Scotland, Ireland and Wales would be petty units even in a federal Parliament of the United Kingdom, they would be microscopic in an Imperial federal Parliament elected on a proportional basis.

In the third place, Sir Joseph Ward's scheme made no provision for the non-responsible Colonies and other dependencies. The difficulty of extending the representation from an Imperial Parliament for the mother country and the responsible Dominions only has already been noted. But, supposing such a Parliament were created, what agency is to rule or manage the rest of the Empire? Presumably this function would be exercised by some Parliament in London. If, however, a federal United Kingdom were established, would it be the federal government of the United Kingdom, or, if there were to be only local provincial or state governments for England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales, each with the same relation to the new Imperial Government as the Governments of Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, would India and the other dependencies be governed by the English Parliament alone? And if so, would not the constitutional limitations of that Parliament absolutely destroy its power as a governor of dependencies, and would India, Egypt, East and West Africa and the others be content to be dependencies of what in itself was a dependency?

For this is really the marrow of the question. A federal government would practically make the United Kingdom herself a dependency. Mr. Asquith put the matter clearly in his reply to the contentions of Sir Joseph Ward at the Imperial Conference:—

"It would impair, if not altogether destroy the authority of the Government of the United Kingdom in the conduct of foreign policy, the conclusion of treaties, the declaration or the maintenance of peace and the declaration of war, and, indeed, all those relations with foreign powers, necessarily of the most delicate character, which are now in the hands of the Imperial Government, subject to its responsibility to the Imperial Parliament. That authority cannot be shared, and the co-existence side by side with the Cabinet of the United Kingdom of this proposed body, clothed with the functions and the jurisdiction which
Sir Joseph Ward proposes to invest it with, would in our judgment be absolutely fatal to our present system of responsible government."

V.—Legal Difficulties of Imperial Federation.

Surprisingly little attention has been paid to one aspect of the question—the legal difficulties of federalism. The majority of federal theorists has very wisely omitted this subject from their books and speeches. Such omission is the more surprising when one considers the actual legal difficulties encountered in Canada and Australia. In his Imperial Unity and the Dominions Professor A. B. Keith gives a most interesting collection of evidence on this point, evidence which very clearly shows not merely the legal difficulties of federalism but the tremendous amount of loss of time, waste of energy, and irritation that arise from the legal consideration of whether acts or bills are ultra or intra vires.

The existence of such legal difficulties makes the initial step of federation difficult. In Canada, the earliest colonial federation, the completion of the federal system was largely due to the danger of annexation of some of the Canadian provinces by the United States. Even the proximity of so powerful a neighbour did not appeal to all the provinces of Canada as sufficient reason to give up their independence. Prince Edward Island almost withdrew from the union at the last moment, and Nova Scotia recanted after having first decided to join the Union. The Hudson Bay Company’s Territories and British Columbia were added largely by the influence of the British Government. In Australia the actual process of federalization was long and arduous. Australia had not the same stimulus of self-defence as Canada, and the states were slow to give up the advantages of self-government that they enjoyed. Only after a long struggle was the Commonwealth instituted, its Constitution with its compromises being emblematic of the jealousy with which the states regarded any attempt to deprive them of their rights.

The actual delimitation of powers in both Canada and Australia, though the federal types are quite different, has led to endless difficulties in both executive and legislative action. In foreign affairs, for example, the Canadian Government has full powers of both legislation and execution in respect to obligations contracted both before and after the union. The acts of provincial legislatures and the consent of the
provinces are both ignored. In Australia the power to legislate regarding external affairs belongs to the Commonwealth, but this power has not been unchallenged. On one occasion, the Dutch Government complained to the Imperial Government that the South Australian authorities had not arrested the crew of a steamship, as required under a treaty of 1856 between Holland and Britain. The British Government sent the complaint to the Commonwealth Government, asking for a report and explanation from the Government of South Australia. The Government of South Australia refused to report to the Commonwealth Government: it declared that legally its duty was to report to the Imperial Government. It argued that the authority to which application in any subject should be made was the authority which had the legislative, and therefore the executive power in that subject, according to the constitution. Even had the Commonwealth power to act, it could not act until it had empowered itself by legislation under the constitution to act in that matter. Thus the powers belonging to the Commonwealth under the constitution which the Commonwealth had not exercised because it had not passed the necessary legislation, belonged to the states. The Commonwealth could exercise powers only in reference to those matters specially given to it by the constitution.

Both the Commonwealth and the British Governments refused to accept this view on the common-sense grounds that foreign affairs were essentially a matter for the central or federal government, and that if the British Government had to correspond with any of the states it would be against the spirit of union. The British Government therefore could correspond only with the Commonwealth Government. But the position held by the government of South Australia was to a certain extent legally justifiable. The Commonwealth Government does not control the legislation of the states, and cannot compel the state executives to act in a certain way. At present the procedure in similar cases is that the British Government actually refers all such matters to the Commonwealth Government, which has not power to compel a state government to report. The same difficulty arises in the case of legislation by state Governments. If the British Government, for imperial or treaty reasons, wishes laws proposed in state legislatures to be amended in any way, they must correspond directly with the states: otherwise by corresponding with them through the federal government, they may risk a refusal or rebuff.
The same difficulties exist in all foreign matters. The practice is now recognised that the Commonwealth Government must accede to all treaties whatever the states may think: but the Commonwealth does not accede unless the states concur and promise to pass the laws necessary to the fulfilment of the treaties. Theoretically the chief executive, the King, could make or accede to treaties for any part of the dominions, but it would not be good policy for him to do so without reference to the locality concerned. The recognition of consular officers is subject to the same difficulties.

Similar complications arise from the relative positions of the Governors of the Australian states and the Lieutenant-Governors of the Canadian provinces. The former can correspond directly with the Imperial Government. The latter cannot: they must correspond through the Dominion Government. In Australia the semi-independent powers of the governors has caused much friction between them and the Governor-General, especially in Melbourne, where both the Governor of Victoria and the Governor-General reside. An excellent example of such friction is a case which arose over the position of Government House, New South Wales. The old Government House of New South Wales at the time of federation was placed, rent free, at the disposal of the Commonwealth Government as a residence for the Governor-General. The federal capital of Australia is to be at Canberra in New South Wales, but till Canberra is built Melbourne continues to be the seat of the Commonwealth Government. The idea in giving the Government House to the Commonwealth was that the Governor-General would reside there during the recess between the sessions of the Commonwealth Houses. The agreement was renewed for five years, but on the expiry of the second term, the New South Wales Government asked, if the agreement extended, that rent should be paid. The Commonwealth Government declared that it was unconstitutional to pay to a state rent for a residence for the Governor-General. But the New South Wales Government persisted, and, after the last visit of Lord Denman, the Governor-General, in 1912, the Government started to convert the stables into a conservatorium of music. Enraged at the Government’s action, a section of the citizens of Sydney brought an action against the Government to obtain an injunction against their using the house for anything else save as a residence for the King’s representative. They won their case, but, on appeal, they lost it in the
High Court the decision of which was upheld by the Privy Council. The whole case was really the result of ill-feeling between New South Wales and the Commonwealth, but it shows how trivial a cause may lead to great trouble where the spirit of accommodation is absent.

In Canada the Governor-General possesses power to dismiss Lieutenant-Governors, subject to a statement of his reasons in the Dominion Parliament. This power may or may not be used for party purposes. Such interference with the local executives by the central executive is not common: but the Dominion Government exercises effective and direct control over provincial legislation. The Dominion Government has power to disallow any provincial act within a year after its receipt by the Governor-General from the Lieutenant-Governor. In the early days of the union, this power was used to enforce the Dominion views of the constitution. Latterly the Dominion Government has interfered more seldom with the provincial legislatures. The interpretation of the constitutional powers of the provinces and the Dominion is now a matter for the Law Courts, and the growth of responsibility in the provinces in legislation has lessened the need for the exercise of the veto. There is, too, a marked disinclination on the part of the Dominion Government to censure provincial governments.

One notable example of the disallowance of provincial Acts by the Dominion Government is the recent case of the anti-Asiatic legislation of British Columbia. Various acts were passed by the legislature of British Columbia to exclude Asiatics, particularly Japanese, or to restrict their occupations when admitted. On the ground that these exclusion Acts were opposed to Imperial policy, the Dominion Government disallowed them. In this they were supported by the Courts, which declared that the power to regulate treaty matters and immigration, vested in the Dominion, enabled the Dominion Government to override similar legislation in the provinces if it conflicted with Dominion legislation.

The functions of the Courts in these, as in all federal governments, assume much more importance than in unitary governments; but in addition to their normal functions of interpreting the constitution and its bearing on laws, the actual legal machinery itself is complicated. Thus, for Canada, the Privy Council is the chief interpreter of constitutional powers. In Australia the High Court interprets the constitution, as no appeal can come to the Privy Council save from the High Court.
The Privy Council and the High Court have adopted very different attitudes towards these constitutions. The Privy Council has treated the Canadian constitution as an ordinary law of the British Parliament: the Australian High Court has treated the Commonwealth constitution as a sacred document, emendable only by a special process. This difference of attitude has had important results. Professor Keith quotes an interesting instance. The case in question was the taxation by the states of the salaries of federal officers. The Judicial Committee interpreted this problem according to the letter of the constitution. The powers of the states, it declared, remained inherent in them unless expressly given to the Commonwealth Government. The power to tax was unaltered, therefore the states had the right to tax these salaries. The High Court of Australia, however, followed the American doctrine of the immunity of instrumentalities, according to which the instruments necessary to the carrying out of the functions of federation cannot be subject to state governments. The High Court insisted on this interpretation in spite of the Privy Council, and the Commonwealth passed special legislation to support the Court. The Supreme Court of Canada, on the other hand, accepted the ruling of the Privy Council even though it previously had decided in the same way as the Australian High Court. The High Court of Australia, it may be added, has followed the American Courts in other respects, e.g. in the doctrine of implied powers.

The courts themselves have proved singularly ineffective in interstate cases. Their ineffectiveness was shown in both Canada and the Commonwealth in the case of their trans-continental railways. In both these cases the terms of union included the building of a transcontinental railway. In neither case were the terms sufficiently clear to enable the aggrieved parties to bring the matter to court. Much ill-feeling was caused in both the suffering provinces—British Columbia in the one case and Western Australia in the other—by the long delay in building the railways. Yet they could not get redress in the courts. The federal conditions have now been fulfilled not because of the power of the courts but because of political or politico-strategic reasons. An even better instance was the action of the Commonwealth in the Brisbane strike of 1912. The cause of the strike was a dispute between the manager of the Brisbane tramways and the trade union employees on the right of unionists to wear a trade-union badge. The
strike was ineffective owing to the help given to the company by non-
unionists. The Trades Council thereupon called other unions out in a
sympathetic strike. Disorder resulted, and, under a specific article
in the constitution, the Queensland Government asked the Common-
wealth to send military forces to preserve order. On the ground that
the disorders were not sufficiently serious to warrant such action, the
Commonwealth Government refused. The riots ultimately were
quelled by the local police. The real reason for the non-intervention
of the Commonwealth Government was that the Prime Minister, as a
Labour member, really sympathised with the strikers. The Queensland
Government argued that had they not the right in such cases to the
Commonwealth forces, neither they nor the other states would ever
have surrendered their militia. The state government had a good
legal case, but, in spite of a threatened action, nothing came
of it.

The cases of federal complications arising from the delimitation of
powers between the central and state or provincial governments are
very numerous. They arise in almost every subject, in company law,
taxation, marriage, railway legislation, the jurisdiction of the courts
themselves, labour legislation, including arbitration and conciliation,
extradition, shipping, inter-state and foreign trade. Not only are
there legal complications: there are also the actual complications that
arise through the diversity of systems in the various states and in the
Dominion or Commonwealth as a whole.

Many of these difficulties are remediable by legislation, but to
remedy a federal constitution is no easy matter. The case for consti-
tutional amendment may be obvious and desirable enough, but it is
quite another question to pass a proposed amendment. This difficulty
of amendment is even more important in Imperial Federation. In an
imperial constitution, presumably amendment would at least be sub-
ject to the consent of the contracting parties. Otherwise there would
be little purpose in creating the imperial constitution at all. In all
probability even a more rigid machinery of amendment would be
devised. But at its simplest the process of amendment suggests suffi-
cient difficulty to make one pause. From this point of view alone, the
flexible type of constitution is much more desirable than the rigid. A
flexible constitution can be bent and twisted into all sorts of shapes
without being broken. It is questionable whether a rigid federal
constitution of the Empire would survive one serious shock or break, for it is difficult to think of a more miscellaneous congeries of fusing elements.

In Australia the opinion has been freely expressed that the Canadian type of constitution, which defines the powers of the provinces, and leaves the residue to the central government is preferable to the Australian or American type, which defines the powers of the central government and leaves the residue to the states. The amendment of the constitution in this direction has frequently been proposed, but as yet the constitution remains unchanged. Just as America devised the party system to soften the rigidity of her constitution, so Australia has fallen back on extra constitutional methods. The custom has grown up of holding periodic conferences between the state Prime Ministers or Cabinet Ministers. At these conferences are discussed various matters of common interest, and the success that has attended them gives ground for belief that the inter-state friction which has been not uncommon in Australia will be lessened in the future. These conferences are particularly interesting to the student of constitutional law insomuch as they are typical instances of the English constitutional habit of meeting exigencies as they arise, whatever be the constitutional limitations. They are also indicative of a much more important fact, that in such customs or conventions lies the best method of solving the whole question of imperial organisation.

The difficulties of superimposing federalism on federalism need no elaboration. These difficulties alone would give good cause to hesitate, but when to these are added the enormous waste of time and energy that would be caused by the distance of the various units of the Empire from each other, the case for federalism seems almost hopeless. The absence of any approach to geographical unity is both first and last an insurmountable obstacle to the successful working of federal empire. Sir Joseph Ward's proposal, as coming from New Zealand, was all the more remarkable, because neither Australia nor New Zealand would agree to a federal Australasia. Each preferred the more complete autonomy of the direct relation to the British Government, and the completion of the federal Commonwealth of Australia was not without difficulty. If doubts existed in the minds of the important states of Australia as to the relative virtues of a federal Commonwealth or distinct states standing on an equal basis with relation to the British
Government, how much more would there be doubts as between, say Canada, New Zealand, South Africa and India?

That the difficulty of distance is not merely a theoretical one may be judged from the difficulties of union between Newfoundland and Canada, though the distance between them is inconceivable as compared with the distance between Canada and Great Britain or Australia.

Before the transcontinental Canadian-Pacific Railway was built, Canada experienced difficulty with British Columbia. The same difficulty existed in Australia. Now that the railway between West and South Australia has linked up the continent, the difficulty will disappear, but the very fact that Perth, the capital of West Australia till quite recently was several days' sea-journey distant from Melbourne to a certain extent alienated West Australia from the rest of the Commonwealth. In these cases not only did the peoples of British Columbia and West Australia develop distinct types of what may be called sub-national individuality, but the actual difficulties of transit meant difficulties and delay in government.

Such difficulties and delays would be increased a thousandfold in a federal empire. The loss of time in both executive and legislative action, the constant irritation of acts either being *ultra vires* or being made subject to the legal processes to decide whether they were *ultra vires* or not, the continuous hampering of executive action owing to constitutional limitations—all these exist in a normal federal union. With the multiplication of federal limitations they would become almost unbearable. The constant chafing in the body politic would mean irritation and exasperation to an extent unknown even at present with little or no-compensating advantages. To many modern writers and thinkers, federalism is almost a fetish. There seems to be some magic in the word. The United States and Germany, two modern federations, seem to have been successful, but it by no means follows that they have been successful because they are federations. It would be as reasonable to argue that because Germany and United States were at war, federalism is a pre-disposing cause of war. In principle federalism seems an excellent compromise between independence and subjection, but when analysed its benefits prove negative. No form of government by itself will weld a people together where the spirit of unity is absent, and, conversely, where the spirit of unity exists, the form of government is not of prime importance. Organisation does
not make a state. Organisation is only a form of government. The state itself rests on the minds of the units which compose it. Governmental machinery, it is true, is necessary for a state, but nothing can be more calculated to kill the spirit of unity than a type of machinery which does not fit. The unity of the British Empire, moreover, is not so complete and self-contained that it can afford to be bound in the iron fetters of a federal constitution. Federalism at the best would achieve only nominal unity, and such unity in all probability would be achieved at the expense of the real unity of the Empire. As a form of government it would be good only in those respects in which it took to itself the characteristics of a flexible constitution. Why, then, should the present flexible constitution be sacrificed to the very problematic virtues, and very certain vices of Imperial Federation?

As president of the Imperial Conference in 1911, Mr. Asquith, in these words, expressed the basis of imperial relations so far as the United Kingdom and the Responsible Dominions were concerned:

"This empire of ours is distinguished by special and dominating characteristics. From the external point of view it is made up of countries which are not geographically coterminous or even contiguous, which present every variety of climate, soil, people and religion and, even in those communities which have attained to complete self-government, does not draw its unifying and cohesive force solely from identity of race or of language. Yet you have here a political organisation which, by its mere existence, rules out the possibility of war between populations numbering something like a third of the human race. There is, as there must be among communities so differently situated and circumstanced, a vast variety of constitutional methods, and social and political institutions and ideals. But what is it that we have in common, which amidst every diversity of external and material conditions, makes us and keeps as one? There are two things in the self-governing British Empire which are unique in the history of great political aggregations. The first is the reign of law: wherever the King's writ runs, it is the symbol and messenger not of arbitrary authority, but of rights shared by every citizen, and capable of being asserted and made effective by the tribunals of the land. The second is the combination of local autonomy, absolute, unfettered, and complete with loyalty to a common head, co-operation, sponta-
neous and unforced, for common interests and purposes, and, I may add, a common trusteeship, whether it be in India, or the Crown Colonies or the Protectorates, or within our own borders, of the interests and fortunes of fellow subjects who have not yet attained, or perhaps in some cases may never attain, to the full stature of self-government."

These admirable words sum up not only the imperial position and policy of the British Government, but they are excellent indices of the lines of future development. Mr. Asquith speaks of a political organisation which rules out the possibility of war between a third of the human race. The elements of that organisation—a common headship in the Crown, the theoretical legal sovereignty of the British Parliament, and almost complete local autonomy—seem casual enough. They do not suggest strength. Its strength lies not in its organisation but in its spiritual basis, else why the "co-operation, spontaneous and unforced" in the Great War, by the Dominions India, and other dependencies? The "common trusteeship" has begotten a common trust which does not require the legal hedges of a federal constitution. As the empire has existed, so it seems best that it should continue to exist. It will be a bad day indeed when the present system so betrays its trusteeship or forfeits its trust as to require the passing of laws, and though, not expressed, the implied punishment which follows the breach of law.

To the constitutionalist infinitely the best system of imperial Government lies in the gradual development of the present policy and practice. The Imperial Conferences and other Imperial Institutions are by no means perfect, nor is the constitutional law which binds the Colonies and dependencies to the mother country. But, as Professor Dicey says, the relation between England and the Dominions and the other dependencies need not be developed by "arduous feats of legislation." And, with the same eminent constitutional authority, we may believe that an imperial constitution "based on good will and fairness may within a few years come into real existence, before most Englishmen have realised that the essential foundations of Imperial unity have already been firmly laid," and that the constitution of the Empire, like the constitution of England, may be found to rest "far less on parliamentary statutes than on the growth of gradual and often unnoted customs."
VI.—Suggested Reforms in the Existing Relations.

While we accept the theory that the future of the Empire rests more on consent than on a rigid imperial constitution, we must at the same time recognise that some of the legal relations at present existing between Great Britain and the dependencies are more irksome than useful. Wherever possible, the friction which must result from the theory of self-government and the legal fact of subordination should be reduced to a minimum. In the theoretical language of Political Science the British Empire aims at preserving the ultimate legal sovereignty of the Empire, and at granting as complete an outlet as possible for the political sovereignty of the dependencies by means of legislative devolution. In the earlier part of this paper I have given the main restraints exercised over the various legislatures. These restraints are arranged in a more or less ascending scale. They are least at the top, i.e. in the Self-Governing Dominions. What is true of the Self-Governing Dominions to-day we may assume will be true of the other dependencies to-morrow, so that an analysis of the present relations of Self-Governing Dominions and the British Government a fortiori will be true for the others.

In his Imperial Unity and The Dominions Professor Keith is not optimistic regarding the union of the Empire. The "insuperable obstacle" to even the Union of Consent advocated by Professor Keith is "in the spirit of the Self-Governing Dominions, whether it be called the proud self-consciousness of national destiny or a narrow and short sighted parochialism, or as is more just, it may be deemed a blend of both." Professor Keith declares that he yields to none in admiration of the ideal of a true union of the Empire, but, he says, "I have as little faith in the possibility of its consummation at an early date as I have in the fruition of schemes of the permanent pacification of Europe or the effective control of foreign policy by democracy."

Professor Keith is doubtful of the success even of the present loose system of union. How much less, then, may we expect a cumbersome and legalistic federal system to be successful. Far from suggesting more intensive legal or constitutional ties between Britain and the Self-Governing Dominions, he suggests that the present legal bonds showed be loosened.

In summary his suggestions are:—

1. That the Governors-General and Governors of the Dominions
and of the States of Australia should be placed as regards local liability for their official acts on the same basis as the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, i.e. they should enjoy the privilege of non-liability for their official acts on the constitutional theory that the king can do no wrong. The ministers, not the Governors should be liable. The Lord Lieutenant of Ireland enjoys such freedom, but in law the Dominion Governors-General and Governors are liable to legal process for their official acts. In practice action is not taken against them, but the laws permitting such action should be repealed.

2. That the Governors-General and Governors be required in the conduct of the executive government of the Dominions to observe the same procedure as the Crown in England, that is to say, full responsibility. This should also be enforced in the case of dissolution of the legislature.

3. That the personal responsibility of the Governors-General and Governors in respect to the exercise of the prerogative of mercy should be removed. At present in many cases the Governor is personally responsible for granting pardons, whereas in a fully responsible Government the onus of responsibility should be borne by the minister of justice or equivalent official.

4. While the supremacy of the Imperial law should be observed the powers of reservation and disallowance of Dominion legislation should be abandoned.

5. That the legal restrictions on the legislatures of Self-Governing Dominions to regulate merchant shipping should be removed, and that provision should be made throughout the Empire for uniform shipping laws.

6. That where the present provisions are defective means should be provided for the amendment of the Dominion constitutions without reference to the British Parliament.

7. That the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, as the final court of appeal for the Dominions should be made representative of the Dominions and that it should also hear appeals from the United Kingdom at present heard by the House of Lords.

8. That educated British Indian subjects should not on the grounds of race or colour be restricted from entering into any of the Self-Governing Dominions.

9. That whenever desired by the governments of the Dominions,
arrangements should be made for their representation at international conferences in such a way that all agreements on foreign affairs should be made after consultation with the authorities appointed by the Dominions.

10. That the Dominion governments should be kept fully informed of the foreign policy of the Imperial Government and that the leading ministers of the Dominions should visit England frequently to keep themselves and their governments informed of foreign policy.

11. That defence be organised on imperial and not on a local basis.

Professor Keith thus aims at securing imperial co-operation or partnership in the vital imperial interests of foreign affairs and defence. He leaves as an imperial bond the legal sovereignty of the King-in-Parliament, and does not suggest a withdrawal of the main heads of legislation forbidden to all the legislatures of British dependencies. But he goes as far towards giving colonial independence as is consistent with unity. In both small and large matters which, from the experience of the Colonial office, have caused friction, he advocates complete freedom to the Dominions.

Another proposal of reform may be made which largely would remove the stigma of legislative subordination. One of the most illogical points of the present system is the responsibility of the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the House of Commons. In theory at least the whole domain of colonial policy is subject to a majority vote in the House of Commons. Since the Chamberlain controversies on Imperial Preference neither the House of Commons nor the British electorate has taken up its attention with matters closely affecting the interests of the dependencies. But there is no reason why they should not. The Colonies at any time may have imposed on them a policy which may be forced through the British legislature by a party majority. As our modern system of responsible government works, the dissent of a few members of a party on a particular question is usually less important than party discipline. The orders of a government whip overrule both private reason and conscience.

While this danger is not imminent, it is both real and possible. One never knows in what channels the minds of a modern Cabinet may run. There is, too, the possibility of a dominating Colonial
Secretary forcing his views on a lukewarm, semi-ignorant Cabinet. In the British Parliament nothing is easier for a man with a prepared plan and knowledge than to force a bill through the Commons. In both Colonial and Indian affairs—in fact affairs affecting all the dependencies—the will of Parliament is controlled mainly by the member of Cabinet in charge of the department affected. The ordinary M.P. cares little for and knows less of the affairs of the various dependencies. In the House of Commons, for example, the members who know about India from first-hand experience are a very small fraction of the whole. The Secretary of State can force his bills through by a party majority composed of members completely ignorant of India, however much the members who know India may oppose his measure.

It has, therefore, been suggested that Parliamentary control should be withdrawn, and that colonial affairs should be entrusted to the Privy Council. The Privy Council is a permanent body, and owes allegiance not to the changing House of Commons but to the permanent head of the Executive, the King. The Privy Council would thus secure permanence and continuity in the affairs of the Self-Governing Dominions. The necessary liaison between the legislature and the executive could be secured by the nomination to the Colonial Committee of the Privy Council (or whatever it might be named) of prominent members of Parliament and others interested in colonial affairs, and all the members of Cabinet. The members of Cabinet as a matter of course are Privy Councillors. Their legal position as executors of the laws is derived from their membership of the Council, not of the Cabinet. The Committee, too, might include all the Privy Councillors of the Dominions. Membership of the Privy Council, moreover, can be regulated so as to secure representation for even the smallest units of the Empire. In the first instance such a Committee would be established for the Self-Governing Dominions only, though it affords an easy and elastic method of expansion to include all the units of the Empire. Sub-Committees for particular areas might be appointed from the main Committee.

The abolition of the Secretaryship of State for the Colonies in the British executive would at once largely remove the taint of legislative inferiority. The Privy Council would be the supreme executive not only of England but of the Empire. Nor would the legal supremacy of the King-in-Parliament be impaired. The British Cabinet could
at any time introduce a bill affecting the Colonies into Parliament. In practice this power would be very much in reserve.

This plan would certainly save the Self-Governing Dominions from vexatious interference and from the appearance of inferiority. In the course of time it would provide a good constitutional basis for regulating the relations of the less advanced dependencies with the Imperial authority. It would help to save all, Self-Governing Dominions, India and the rest, from the tender mercies of "well-wishers" in the House of Commons and the inanities and fatuities of M.P.'s whose vision of world policy is limited by the English Channel, the British working-man, and the Income Tax.

In the Montagu-Chelmsford Report the suggestion is made that there should be a Select Committee on Indian affairs in the House of Commons. This Select Committee, according to the Report, is to be well-informed on all matters concerning India; it is to examine all bills affecting India after their second reading; it will take an enlightened and continuous interest in Indian affairs. Such a Committee is most desirable in the case of those dependencies whose affairs cannot yet be handed over to a permanent committee of the Privy Council. Where the legislative control of Parliament is still necessary the territories concerned must be guarded against two evils. One is the zeal of individual Secretaries of State, the other is the imperial lethargy of the average Member of Parliament. A Select Committee is an excellent check on both. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report says that a joint Committee of both Houses was ruled out. This seems unfortunate as the House of Lords is frequently much better informed in matters of Indian administration than the House of Commons. The most experienced Indian administrators in England are ex-governors and ex-governors-general. They are usually peers, or are created peers for their services. They are also Privy Councillors. The suggested parliamentary Select Committee thus rules out the most experienced men. A permanent Committee of the Privy Council in all probability would include them. The stage for the abolition of the Secretary of State for India, however, and his replacement by a Committee of Privy Councillors, has not yet arrived. An Indian Privy Council is also suggested, which would pave the way to the Indian Committee of the Privy Council.

In these matters we may learn from our late enemies. In the
new German Constitution the Reichstag (the lower house) has to
appoint standing committees which are to be permanent (the actual
committees named in the Constitution are a Committee on foreign
affairs, and a Committee to safeguard the interests of the people's
representatives against the Executive, i.e. the President and ministers)
These Committees are not affected by dissolutions; they are more like
permanent statutory commissions than parliamentary Committees
Select Committees in the British system of the type suggested in
the Montagu-Chelmsford Report have the great drawback that they
are temporary. They must change with each change of Parliament.
The Privy Council is permanent, hence the relative value of Privy
Council Committees. These new statutory Committees in the German
legislature are an interesting constitutional experiment. It is to be
hoped that they will be successful.

It would be easy to take a pen and paper and rebuild the
constitutional system of Great Britain. Neither system nor logic is it
strong point. But it has weathered the storms of many centuries, and
such new departures as must be made to meet new conditions must
fit into the old ship. Even the British working man, though he has not
the vaguest idea of what it is, is proud of the Constitution. He thinks
it is some semi-divine influence that saves the country from ruin.
The English lawyer, or constitutional historian, who does know what
it is, has much more reason to be proud of the Constitution. The
Constitution is a monumental replica of gone and almost forgotten
ages. It stands out alone and supreme among the constitutions of
the world as one which has stood the strains and stresses of all political
storms. Round it, its neighbours, even its close relations, have
taken to themselves the more legal methods of written constitutions.
But the old Constitution remains unwritten, unrigid, elastic, free,
illogical, incomprehensible—but effective. Into the system of that
Constitution we must try to fit our newer ideas of government. A
revolutionary Germany may build anew: we must either fit in fresh
materials or make slight additions. The Privy Council is a ready-
to-hand constitutional body which may be moulded in such a way
as to satisfy the imperial needs of dependencies which regard them-
selves as self-governing. Hitherto the executive functions of the Privy
Council have been overshadowed by its judicial functions. New needs
point to the advisability of resuscitating its old executive functions.
By orders-in-Council it may also, within limits, exercise legislative functions. Whatever it does it will always be subject to the sovereignty of the King-in-Parliament. Thus it would preserve the imperial supremacy of the British legislature, and reduce the subordination of the dependencies to a minimum.

One point remains to be noted. In the plenitude of their indulgence, it has pleased the makers of the Covenant of the League of Nations to rule, in an Article already quoted, that "any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony" may be admitted to the League, on certain conditions. A typical comment on this article is that of Sir Geoffrey Butler in his *Handbook to the League of Nations*. He says, "It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of this clause in the Paris scheme. It is arguable that it is its most significant single measure. By it the British Dominions have their independent nationhood established. There may be friction over small matters in giving effect to this internationally acknowledged fact, but the Dominions will always look to the League of Nations Covenant alike as their Declaration of Independence and their Treaty of Versailles. That the change has come silently about, and has been welcomed in all quarters through the British Empire, is a final vindication of men like the United Empire loyalists."

Acting on this Article, the authorities of the League have already admitted the Self-Governing Dominions and India—India is to have three members—into the League. How such representation is possible in face of the wording of the article is not clear. The drafting leaves much to be desired. Presumably the drafters meant to include the Self-Governing Dominions and India in the League, but their wording is extremely unfortunate. Not one of the British dependencies is fully self-governing. If they are fully self-governing, they should be called States, not Dominions or Colonies. This legal looseness in drafting the article is the more amazing because the League in all probability will develop more as a legal than as a legislative body. The membership of both the Assembly and of the Council will contain a considerable number of lawyers, and it will indeed be surprising if objection is not taken to the Dominion and Indian representatives on the ground that their countries are not fully self-governing.

The intention of the British government, which doubtless was mainly responsible for Article I, is clearly to associate the dependencies
with them in foreign policy. This will go far towards removing the exclusiveness of our pre-war diplomacy. Nominally the League is the most important diplomatic body in the world. Its future, however, is by no means secure, but the plan of summoning Dominion or Indian ministers or representatives to Cabinet meetings when foreign affairs affecting them are discussed, will mean a real and permanent co-partnership in foreign policy.

The British Constitution thus is adaptable enough to meet imperial needs as it stands. The rigid yoke of federalism is not only not necessary; it would be dangerous, perhaps disastrous. The political instincts of the British people have built up a flexible British constitution which has served their needs in fair times and in foul. The good sense of the Empire may be trusted to make a similar Imperial constitution.
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