ORIGINAL SANSKRIT TEXTS.
ORIGINAL SANSKRIT TEXTS OF THE
ORIGIN AND HISTORY
THE PEOPLE OF INDIA,
THEIR RELIGION AND INSTITUTIONS,
COLLECTED, TRANSLATED, AND ILLUSTRATED,
BY
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VOLUME THIRD.
The Vedas: Opinions of their Authors and of Later Indian Writers
On their Origin, Inspiration, and Authority.
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Arthepsavaḥ rishayo ṛevatāś chhandobhir abhyādhāvan
Anukramaṇīkā.

"Rishis, seeking to obtain the various objects of their desire, hastened to the deities with metrical compositions."
(See p. 211 of this volume.)
PREFACE.

The object which I have had in view in the series of treatises which this volume forms a part, has been to investigate critically the most important points in the civil and religious history of the Hindus. Having shown in the First Volume that the mythical and legendary accounts given in the Purāṇas, etc., regarding the origin of the caste system which has long prevailed in India, are mutually contradictory and insufficient to establish the early existence of the popular belief regarding the distinct creation of four separate tribes, as an original and essential article of the Brahmanical creed; and having endeavoured to prove, in the Second Volume, by a variety of arguments, drawn chiefly from comparative philology and from the contents of the Rigveda, that the Hindus are descended from a branch of the Indo-European stock, which dwelt originally along with the other cognate races in Central Asia, and subsequently migrated into Northern Hindustan, where the Brahmanical religion and institutions were developed and matured;—I now come, in this Third Volume, to consider more particularly the history of the Vedas, regarded as the sacred Scriptures of the Hindus, and the inspired source from which their religious and philosophical systems (though,
to a great extent, founded also on reasoning and speculation) profess to be mainly derived; or with which, at least, they all claim to be in harmony.

When I speak, however, of the history of the Veda, I am reminded that I am employing a term which will suggest to the philosophical reader the idea of a minute and systematic account of the various opinions which the Indians have held in regard to their sacred books from the commencement, through all the successive stages of their theological development, down to the present time. To do anything like this, however, would be a task demanding an extent of research far exceeding any to which I can pretend. At some future time, indeed, we may hope that a history of the theological and speculative ideas of the Indians, which shall treat this branch also of the subject, may be written by some competent scholar. My own design is much more modest. I only attempt to show what are the opinions on the subject of the Veda, which have been entertained by certain distinct sets of writers whom I may broadly divide into three classes—(1) the mythological, (2) the scholastic, and (3) the Vedic.

The first, or mythological class, embraces the writers of the different Purāṇas and Itihāsas, and partially those of the Brāhmaṇas and Upanishads, who, like the compilers of the Purāṇas, frequently combine the mythological with the theosophic element.

The second, or scholastic class, includes the authors of the different philosophical schools, or Darśanas, with their scholiasts and expositors, and the commentators
on the Vedas. The whole of these writers belong to
the class of systematic or philosophical theologians; but
as their speculative principles differ, it is the object of
each particular school to explain and establish the origin
and authority of the Vedas on grounds conformable to
its own fundamental dogmas, as well as to expound the
doctrines of the sacred books in such a way as to har-
monize with its own special tenets.

The third class of writers, whose opinions in regard to
the Vedas I have attempted to exhibit, is composed (1)
of the rishis themselves, the authors of the Vedic hymns,
and (2) of the authors of the Upanishads, which, though
works of a much more recent date, and for the most part
of a different character from the hymns, are yet regarded
by later Indian writers as forming, equally with the
latter, a part of the Veda. As the authors of the hymns,
the earliest of them at least, lived in an age of simple
conceptions and of spontaneous and childlike devotion,
we shall find that, though some of them appear, in con-
formity with the spirit of their times, to have regarded
their compositions as in a certain degree the result of
divine inspiration, their primitive and elementary ideas
on this subject form a strong contrast to the artificial
and systematic definitions of the later scholastic writers.
And even the authors of the Upanishads, though they,
in a more distinct manner, claim a superhuman authority
for their own productions, are very far from recognizing
the rigid classification which, at a subsequent period, di-
vided the Vedic writings from all other religious works,
by a broad line of demarcation.
It may conduce to the convenience of the reader, if I furnish here a brief survey of the opinions of the three classes of writers above described, in regard to the Vedas, as these opinions are shown in the passages which are collected in the present volume.

The first chapter (pp. 1–217) contains texts exhibiting the opinions on the origin, division, inspiration, and authority of the Vedas, which have been held by Indian authors shortly before, or subsequent to, the collection of the Vedic hymns, and consequently embraces the views of the first two of the classes of writers above specified, viz. (1) the mythological and (2) the scholastic. In the first Section (pp. 3–10), I adduce texts from the Purusha Sūkta, the Atharva-veda, the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, the Chhāndegya Upanishad, the Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa, and the Institutes of Manu, which variously represent the Vedas (a) as springing from the mystical sacrifice of Purusha; (b) as resting on (or inhereing in) Skambha; (c) as cut of scraped off from him, as being his hair, and his mouth; (d) as springing from Indra; (e) as produced from time; (f) as produced from Agni, Vāyu, and Sūrya; (g) as springing from Prajāpati, and the waters; (h) as being the breathing of the Great Being; (i) as being dug by the gods out of the mind-ocean; (j) as being the hair of Prajāpati’s beard, and (k) as being the offspring of Vāch.

In page 287 of the Appendix a further verse of the Atharva-veda is cited, in which the Vedas are declared to have sprung from the leavings of the sacrifice (uchchhishta).
In the second Section (pp. 10–14) are quoted passages from the Vishnu, Bhagavata, and Markandeya Puranas, which represent the four Vedas as having issued from the mouth of Brahma at the creation; several from the Harivamsha, which speak of the Vedas as created by Brahma, or as produced from the Gāyatrī; another from the Mahābhārata, which describes them as created by Vishnu, or as having Sarasvatī for their mother; with one from Manu, which declares the Vedas, along with certain other objects, to be the second manifestation of the Sattva-guna, or pure principle, while Brahma is one of its first manifestations.

The third Section (pp. 14–18) contains passages from the Brāhmaṇas, the Vishnu Purāṇa, and the Mahābhārata, in which the Vedas are celebrated as comprehending all beings, as being the soul of metres, hymns, breaths, and gods, as imperishable, as the source of form, motion, and heat, of the names, forms, and functions of all creatures, as infinite in extent, as infinite in their essence (brahma), though limited in their forms as Rich, Yajush, and Saman verses, as eternal, and as forming the essence of Vishnu.

The fourth Section (pp. 18–36) contains passages from the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa and Manu, in which the great benefits resulting from the study of the Vedas, and the dignity, power, authority, and efficacy of these works are celebrated; together with two other texts from the latter author and the Vishnu Purana, in which a certain impurity is predicated of the Sāma-veda (compare the Markandeya Purana, as quoted in p. 12, where the four
Vedas are described as respectively partaking differently of the character of the three Guṇas, or Qualities; and some others from the Vāyu, Padma, Matsya, and Brahma-vaivartta Purāṇas, and the Mahābhārata, and Rāmāyāṇa, which derogate greatly from the consideration of the Vedas, by claiming for the Purāṇas and Itihāsas an equality with, if not a superiority to, the older scriptures. A passage is next quoted from the Mundaka Upanishad, in which the Vedas and their appendages are designated as the "inferior science," in contrast to the "superior science," the knowledge of Soul; and is followed by others from the Bhagavad Gītā, the Chhāndogya Upanishad and the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, in which the ceremonial and polytheistic portions of the Veda are deprecated in comparison with the knowledge of the supreme Spirit.

The fifth Section (pp. 36–49) describes the division of the Vedas in the third or Dvāpara age, by Vedavyāsa and his four pupils, according to texts of the Vishṇu, Vāyu, and Bhāgavata Purāṇas; and then adduces a different account, asserting their division in the second or Tretā age, by the King Purūravas, according to another passage of the same Bhāgavata Purāṇa, and a text of the Mahābhārata (though the latter is silent regarding Purūravas).

Section vi. (pp. 49–57) contains passages from the Vishṇu and Vāyu Purāṇas and the Satapatha Brāhmana, regarding the schism between the adherents of the Yajurveda, as represented by the different schools of Vaisampāyana and Yājnavalkya, and quotes certain remarks of
Prof. Weber on the same subject, and on the relation of the Rig and Sāma Vedas to each other, together with some other texts, adduced and illustrated by that scholar, on the hostility of the Ātharvāṇas towards the other Vedas, and of the Chandogas towards the Rig-veda.

Section vii. (pp. 57–70) contains extracts from the works of Śāyāna and Mādhava, the commentators on the Rig and Taittirīya Yajur Vedas, in which they both define the characteristics of the Veda, and state certain arguments in support of its authority. Śāyāna (pp. 58–66), after noticing the objections urged against his views by persons of a different school, and defining the Veda as a work consisting of Mantra and Brāhmaṇa, asserts that it is not derived from any personal, or at least not from any human, author (compare the further extract from him in p. 105); and rests its authority on its own declarations, on its self-proving power, on the Smṛiti (i.e. non-vedic writings of eminent saints), and on common notoriety. He then encounters some other objections raised against the Veda on the score of its containing passages which are unintelligible, dubious, absurd, contradictory, or superfluous. Mādhava (pp. 66–70) defines the Veda as the work which alone reveals the supernatural means of attaining future felicity; explains that males only, belonging to the three superior castes, are competent to study its contents; and asserts that, inasmuch as it is eternal, it is a primary and infallible authority. This eternity of the Veda, however, he appears to interpret as not being absolute, but as dating from the first creation, when it was produced from Brahmā,
though, as he is free from defects, the Veda, as his work, is self-proved.

Section viii. (pp. 70–108) contains the views of Jaimini and Bādarāyana, the (alleged) authors of the Mīmāṃsā and Brahma (or Vedānta) Sūtras on the eternity of the Veda. Jaimini asserts that sound, or words, are eternal, that the connection between words and the objects they represent also, is not arbitrary or conventional, but eternal, and that consequently the Vedas convey unerring information in regard to unseen objects. This view he defends against the Naiyāyikas, answering their other objections, and insisting that the names, derived from those of certain sages, by which particular parts of the Vedas are designated, do not prove those sages to have been their authors, but merely the teachers who studied and handed them down; while none of the names occurring in the Veda are those of temporal beings, but all denote some objects which have existed eternally. Two quotations in support of the supernatural origin of the Veda are next introduced from the Nyāya-mālā-vistara (a condensed account of the Mīmāṃsā system) and from the Vedārtha-prakāśa (the commentary on the Taittirīya Yajur-veda). The arguments in both passages (pp. 86–89) are to the same effect, and contain nothing that has not been already in substance anticipated in preceding summaries of the Mīmāṃsā doctrine. In reference to their argument that no author of the Veda is remembered, I have noticed here that the supposition which an objector might urge, that the rishis, the acknowledged utterers of the hymns,
might also have been their authors, is guarded against by the tenet, elsewhere maintained by Indian writers, that the rishis were merely seers of the pre-existing sacred texts. Some of the opinions quoted from the Sūtras of Jaimini are further enforced in a passage from the summary of the Mīmāṃsā doctrine, which I have quoted from the Sarva-dārśana-saṅgraha. The writer first notices the Naiyāyika objections to the Mīmāṃsaka tenet that the Veda had no personal author, viz. (1) that any tradition to this effect must have been interrupted at the past dissolution of the universe; (2) that it would be impossible to prove that no one had ever recollected any such author; (3) that the sentences of the Veda have the same character as all other sentences; (4) that the inference,—drawn from the present mode of transmitting the Vedas from teacher to pupil,—that the same mode of transmission must have gone on from eternity, breaks down by being equally applicable to any other book; (5) that the Veda is in fact ascribed to a personal author in a passage of the book itself; (6) that sound is not eternal, and that when we recognize letters as the same we have heard before, this does not prove their identity or eternity, but is merely a recognition of them as belonging to the same species as other letters we have heard before; (7) that though Parameśvara (God) is naturally incorporeal, he may have assumed a body in order to reveal the Veda, etc. The writer then states the Mīmāṃsaka answers to these arguments thus: What does this alleged 'production by a personal author' (paurushāyatva) mean? The Veda, if supposed to be so pro-
duced, cannot derive its authority \((a)\) from inference (or reasoning), as fallible books employ the same process. Nor will it suffice to say \((b)\) that it derives its authority from its truth: for the Veda is defined to be a book which proves that which can be proved in no other way. And even if Parameśvara (God) were to assume a body, he would not, in that state of limitation, have any access to supernatural knowledge. Further, the fact that different śākhās or recensions of the Vedas are called after the names of particular sages, proves no more than that these recensions were studied by those sages, and affords no ground for questioning the eternity of the Vedas,—an eternity which is proved by the fact of our recognizing letters when we meet with them. These letters are the very identical letters we had heard before, for there is no evidence to show either that letters of the same sort \((G\text{'s}, \text{for instance,})\) are numerically different from each other, or that they are generic terms, denoting a species. The apparent differences which are observable in the same letter, result merely from the particular characteristics of the persons who utter it, and do not affect its identity. This is followed by further reasoning in support of the same general view; and the writer then arrives at the conclusion, which he seems to himself to have triumphantly established, that the Veda is underevived and authoritative.

The question of the effect produced on the Vedas by the dissolutions of the world is noticed in some extracts from Patanjali’s Mahābhāshya and its commentators, which have been adduced by Prof. Goldstücker
in the Preface to his Mānava-kalpa Sūtra, and which I have partly reprinted in pp. 95 ff. It is admitted by Patanjali, that, though the sense of the Vedas is permanent, the order of their letters has not always remained the same, and that this difference is exhibited in the different recensions of the Kāṭhakas and other schools. Patanjali himself does not say what is the cause of this alteration in the order of the letters; but his commentator, Kaiyyāṭa, states that the order was disturbed during the great mundane dissolutions, etc., and had to be restored (though with variations) by the eminent science of the rishis. Kullūka, the commentator on Manu (see p. 6), maintains that the Veda was preserved in the memory of Brahmā during the period of dissolution; and promulgated again at the beginning of the Kalpa, but whether in an altered form, or not, he does not tell us. The latter point is also left unsolved in Sankara’s commentary on Brahma Sūtra i. 3, 30, which I quote in the Appendix, pp. 300 ff. Pages 93 ff. contain some remarks (by way of parenthesis) on the question whether or not the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā admits the existence of a Deity.

In the extract given in pp. 98–105 from his commentary on the Brahma Sūtras,¹ Sankara, who follows the author of those Sūtras, and Jaimini, in basing the authority of the Vedas on the eternity of sound, finds it necessary to meet an objection that, as the gods mentioned in the Veda had confessedly an origin in time, the

¹ My attention was originally drawn to this passage by a treatise, then unpublished, by the Rev. Prof. Banerjea, formerly of Bishop’s College, Calcutta.
words which designate those gods cannot be eternal, but must have originated co-evally with the created objects which they denote, since eternal words could not have an eternal connection with non-eternal objects. This difficulty he tries to overcome (ignoring the ground taken by Jaimini, that the Veda contains no references to non-eternal objects) by asserting that the eternal connection of words is not with individual objects, but with the species to which these objects belong, and that Indra and the other gods are proved by the Veda to belong to species. Sankara then goes on to assert, on the authority of Brahma Sūtra, i. 3, 28, fortified by various texts from the Vedas and the Smṛitis, that the gods and the world generally are produced (though not in the sense of evolution out of a material cause) from the word of the Vedas (see pp. 6 and 16) in the form of sphota. This last term will be explained below. This subject above referred to, of the eternal connection of the words of the Veda with the objects they represent, is further pursued in a passage which I have quoted in the Appendix, p. 300, where an answer is given to the objection that the objects denoted by the words of the Veda cannot be eternal, as a total destruction of everything takes place (not, indeed, at the intermediate, but) at the great mundane dissolutions. The solution given is that, by the favour of the supreme Lord, the inferior lords Brahmā, etc., retain a recollection of the previous mundane conditions; and that in each successive creation everything is produced exactly the same as it had previously been. I then proceed in p. 105 to adduce a passage from Sāyāna, the
commentator on the Rig-veda, who refers to another of the Brahma Sūtras, i. 1, 3 (quoted in p. 106), declaring that Brahma was the source of the Veda, which Sankara interprets as containing a proof of the omniscience of Brahma. Sāyana understands this text as establishing the superhuman origin of the Veda, though not its eternity in the proper sense, it being only meant, according to him (as well as to Mādhava; see p. xi.), that the Veda is eternal in the same sense as the æther is eternal, i.e. during the period between each creation and dissolution of the universe.

In opposition to the tenets of the Mīmāṃsakas, who hold the eternity (or the eternal self-existence) of the Veda, and to the dogmas of the Vedānta, as just expounded, Gotama, the author of the Nyāya aphorisms, denies (Section ix. pp. 108–118) the eternity of sound; and after vindicating the Veda from the charges of falsehood, self-contradiction, and tautology, deduces its authority from the authority of the wise, or competent, person or persons who were its authors, as proved by the efficacy of such of the Vedic prescriptions as relate to mundane matters, and can be tested by experience. It does not distinctly result from Gotama’s aphorism that God is the competent person whom he regards as the maker of the Veda. If he did not refer to God, he must have regarded the rishis as its authors. The authors of the Vaiśeshika Sūtras, and of the Tarka Sangraha, as well as the writer of the Kusumānjali, however, clearly refer the Veda to Īśvara (God) as its framer (pp. 118–133). Udayana, the author of the latter
work (pp. 128–133), controverts the opinion that the existence of the Veda from eternity can be proved by a continuous tradition, as such a tradition must, he says, have been interrupted at the dissolution of the world, which preceded the existing creation. He, therefore (as explained by his commentator), infers an eternal (and omniscient) author of the Veda; asserting that the Veda is _paurusheya_, or derived from a personal author; that many of its own texts establish this; and that the appellations given to its particular sākhās or recensions, are derived from the names of those sages whose persons were assumed by Īśvara, when he uttered them at the creation. In pp. 125 ff. I have quoted one of the Vaiseshika Sūtras, with some passages from the commentator, to show the conceptions the writers entertained of the nature of the supernatural knowledge, or intuition, of the rishis.

Kapila, the author of the Sānkhya Aphorisms (pp. 133–138), agrees with the Nyāya and Vaiseshika aphorists in denying the eternity of the Veda, but, in conformity with his own principles, differs from Gotama and Kanada in denying its derivation from a personal (i.e. here, a divine) author, because there was no person (i.e. as his commentator explains, no God) to make it. Vishnu, the chief of the liberated beings, though omniscient, could not, he argues, have made the Veda, owing to his impassiveness, and no other person could have done so from want of omniscience. And even if the Veda have been uttered by the primeval Purusha, it cannot be called his work, as it was breathed forth by him unconsciously. Kapila agrees
with Jaimini in ascribing a self-demonstrating power to the Veda, and differs from the Vaiśeṣhikas in not deriving its authority from correct knowledge possessed by a conscious utterer. He proceeds to controvert the existence of such a thing as sphaṭa (a modification of sound which is assumed by the Mīmāṃsakas, and described as single, indivisible, distinct from individual letters, existing in the form of words, and constituting a whole), and to deny the eternity of sound.

In the tenth Section (pp. 138–179) I shew (a) by quotations from the aphorisms of the Vedānta and their commentator (pp. 140–145), that the author and expounder of the Uttara Mīmāṃsā (the Vedānta) frequently differ from Jaimini the author of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā in the interpretation of the same texts of the Upanishads. A similar diversity is next (b) proved at greater length (pp. 145–173), by quotations from the aphorisms and commentaries of the Vedānta and the Sāṅkhya, to characterize the expositions proposed by the adherents of those two systems respectively. One quotation is given in pp. 175 ff. to shew (c) that the same is true in regard to the followers of the Vaiśeṣhika philosophy, who distinctly reject the Vedāntic explanations; and last of all (d) I have made some extracts (pp. 177 ff.) from the Bhakti Sūtras of Śaṅḍilya to exhibit the wide divergence of that writer from the orthodox views of the Vedānta regarding the sense of the Vedas. In pp. 173–175 I quote some remarks of Dr. E. Roer, and Prof. Max Müller, regarding the doctrines of the Upanishads, and their relations to the different philosophical schools.
In the facts brought forward in this section we find another illustration (1) of the tendency common to all dogmatic theologians to interpret in strict conformity with their own opinions the unsystematic and not always consistent texts of an earlier age which have been handed down by tradition as sacred and infallible, and to represent them as containing, or as necessarily implying, fixed and consistent systems of doctrine; as well as (2) of the diversity of view which so generally prevails in regard to the sense of such texts among writers of different schools, who adduce them with equal positiveness of assertion as establishing tenets and principles which are mutually contradictory or inconsistent.

In the eleventh Section (pp. 179–207) some passages are adduced from the Nyāya-mālā-vistara, and from Kullūka’s commentary on Manu, to show that a distinct line of demarcation is drawn by the scholastic writers between the Vedas on the one hand, and all other classes of Indian scriptures, embraced under the designation of Smrīti (including the Darśanas, the Institutes of Manu, the Purāṇas, and Itihāsas, etc.), on the other, the first being regarded as independent and infallible guides, while the others are (in theory) held to be authoritative only in so far as they are founded on, and coincide with, the Veda. The practical effect of this distinction is, however, much lessened by the fact that the ancient sages, the authors of the Smrītis, such of them, I mean, as, like Manu, are recognized as orthodox, are looked upon by Mādhava and Sankara as having had access to Vedic texts now no longer extant, as having held communion with the gods,
and as having enjoyed a clearness of intuition into divine mysteries which is denied to later mortals (pp. 181–185). Sankara, however (as shewn in pp. 184–192), does not regard all the ancients as having possessed this infallible insight into truth, but exerts all his ingenuity to explain away the claims (though clearly sanctioned by an Upanishad) of Kapila, who was not orthodox according to his Vedāntic standard, to rank as an authority. In his depreciation of Kapila, however, Sankara is opposed to the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (p. 192). I then proceed to observe (pp. 194–196) that although in ancient times the authors of the different philosophical systems (Darśanas) no doubt put forward their respective opinions as true, in opposition to all the antagonistic systems, yet in modern times the superior orthodoxy of the Vedānta appears to be generally recognized; while the authors of the other systems are regarded, e.g. by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, as, amid all their diversities, having in view, as their ultimate scope, the support of the Vedāntic theory. The same view, in substance, is taken by Vijnāna Bhikshu, the commentator on the Sāṅkhya Sūtras, who (pp. 196–203) maintains that Kapila’s system, though atheistic, is not irreconcilable with the Vedānta and other theistic schools, as its denial of an Īśvara (God) is only practical, or regulative, and merely enforced in order to withdraw men from the too earnest contemplation of an eternal and perfect Deity, which would impede their study of the distinction between matter and spirit. To teach men this discrimination, as the great means of attaining final liberation, is one of the two main objects, and strong
points, of the Sānkhya philosophy, and here it is authori-
tative; while its atheism is admitted to be its weak-
side, and on this subject it has no authority. Vijnāna
Bhikshu goes on to say that it is even supposable that
theistic systems, in order to prevent sinners from attain-
ing knowledge, may lay down doctrines partially opposed
to the Vedas; and that though in these portions they are
erroneous, they will still possess authority in the portions
conformable to the Sruti and Smriti. He then quotes a
passage from the Padma Purāṇa, in which the god Siva
tells his consort Pārvatī that the Vaiśeṣika, the Nyāya,
the Sānkhya, the Purva-mīmāṁsā Darśanas, and the Ve-
dāntic theory of illusion, are all systems infected by the
dark (or tāmasa) principle, and consequently more or less
unauthoritative. All orthodox (āstika) theories, however,
are, as Vijnāna Bhikshu considers, authoritative, and free
from error on their own special subject. And as respects
the discrepancy between the Sānkhya and the Vedānta,
regarding the unity of Soul, he concludes that the former
is not devoid of authority, as the apparent diversity of
souls is acknowledged by the Vedānta, and the discrimi-
native knowledge which the Sānkhya teaches is an
instrument of liberation to the embodied soul; and thus
the two varying doctrines, if regarded as, the one prac-
tical (or regulative), and the other real (or transcenden-
tal), will not be contradictory. At the close of Section
eleventh (pp. 204–207) it is shewn that the distinction
drawn by the Indian commentators between the super-
human Veda and its human appendages, the Kalpa
Sūtras, etc., as well as the Smṛitis, is not borne out by
certain texts which I had previously cited. The Brīhad Āranyaka and Mundaka Upanishads (pp. 8, 31) seem to place all the different sorts of Śāstras or scriptures (including the four Vedas) in one and the same class, the former speaking of them all promiscuously as being the breathing of Brahma, while the latter describes them all (except the Upanishads) as being parts of the "inferior science," in opposition to the "superior science," or knowledge of Brahma. In the same spirit as the Mundaka, the Chhāndogya Upanishad also (quoted in p. 32 f.) includes the four Vedas in the same list with a variety of miscellaneous Śāstras (which Nārada has studied without getting beyond the confines of exoteric knowledge), and never intimates (unless it be by placing them at the head of the list) that the former can claim any superiority over the other works with which they are associated. As, however, Sankara could not, in consistency with the current scholastic theory regarding the wide difference between the Vedas and all other Śāstras, admit that the latter could have had a common origin with the former, he endeavours in his comment on the passage of the Brīhad Āranyaka Upanishad to which I have adverted, to shew that the other works, which are there said to have been breathed out by the great Being along with the Vedas, were in reality portions of the Brāhmaṇas. This explanation can scarcely apply to all the works enumerated, and its force is weakened by the tenor of the other passages from the Mundaka and Chhāndogya Upanishads, while any such distinction is repudiated in the statements of the Itihāsas and Purāṇas quoted in pp. 27–30 and 105.
In the twelfth Section (pp. 207–217) the arguments in support of the Veda, adduced in the philosophical systems, and by the various commentators, as above summarised, are recapitulated, and some remarks are made on these reasonings. My observations are intended to shew that the arguments in question are inconclusive, or assume the points to be established; that the rishis are proved by the contents of the hymns to have been their real authors; and that numerous events which have occurred in time, are undoubtedly mentioned in the Vedas. This as we have seen (above, p. xvi.) is admitted by Sankara.

The Second Chapter (pp. 217–286) exhibits the opinions of the rishis in regard to the origin of the Vedic hymns. Its object is to shew in detail that, though some at least of the rishis appear to have imagined themselves to be inspired by the gods in the expression of their religious emotions and ideas, they at the same time regarded the hymns as their own compositions, or as (presumably) the compositions of their forefathers, distinguishing between them as new and old, and describing their own authorship in terms which could only have been dictated by a consciousness of its reality. The first, second, and third Sections (pp. 218–244) contain a collection of passages from the Rig-veda in which a distinction is drawn (1) between the rishis as ancient and modern, and (2) between the hymns as older and more recent; and in which (3) the rishis describe themselves as the makers, fabricators, or generators of the hymns; with some additional texts in which such authorship appears
to be implied, though it is not expressed. Section fourth (pp. 245–283) contains a variety of passages from the same Veda, in which (1) a superhuman character or supernatural faculties are ascribed to the earlier rishis; and (2) the idea is expressed that the praises and ceremonies of the rishis were suggested and directed by the gods in general, or, in particular, by the goddess of speech, or by some other or others of the different deities of the Vedic pantheon. To illustrate, and render more intelligible and probable, the opinions which I have ascribed to the old Indian rishis regarding their own inspiration, I have quoted in the same Section (pp. 267–273) a number of passages from Hesiod and Homer to shew that the early Greek bards entertained a similar belief. I then advert (pp. 273–274) to the remarkable divergence between the later religious histories of Greece and of India. I next enquire briefly (in pp. 274–275) in what way we can reconcile the apparently conflicting ideas of the rishis on the subject of the hymns, considered, on the one hand, as their own productions, and, on the other, as inspired by the gods. Then follow (pp. 275–279) some further texts from the Rig-veda, in which a mystical, magical, or supernatural efficacy is ascribed to the hymns. These are succeeded (pp. 279–283) by a few quotations from the same Veda, in which the authors complain of their own ignorance; and by a reference to the contrast between these humble confessions and the proud pretensions set up by later theologians in behalf of the Veda, and its capability of imparting universal knowledge. The ideas of the rishis regarding their own inspiration differ widely from the conceptions
of later theorists; for while the former looked upon the
gods, who were confessedly mere created beings, as the
sources of supernal illumination, the latter either regard
the Veda as eternal, or refer it to the eternal Brahma, or
Īśvara, as its author. The fifth and last Section (pp.
283-286) adduces some texts from the Svetāśvatara,
Mundaka and Chhāndogya Upanishads, which show the
opinions of the writers regarding the inspiration, of their
predecessors; and refers to the similar claims set up on
their own behalf by the writers of the Itihāsas and Pu-
ṛāṇas, as shewn in the passages quoted in pp. 27-30.

With all its imperfections this volume may perhaps
possess a certain interest, not only for the student of
Indian history, but also for the divine and the philo-
sopher, as furnishing a few documents to illustrate the
course of theological opinion in a sphere far removed
from the ordinary observation of the European student,
—a course which, quite independently of the merits of
the different tenets involved in the enquiry, will, I
think, be found to present a remarkable parallel in
various respects to that which is traceable in the his-
tory of those religious systems with which we are most
familiar. In both cases we find that a primitive age of
ardent emotion; of simple faith, and of unarticulated
beliefs, was succeeded by a period of criticism and spec-
culation, when the floating materials handed down by
preceding generations were compared, classified, recon-
ciled, developed into their consequences, and elaborated
into a variety of scholastic systems.

In the Preface to the first edition I stated as follows:
"In regard to the texts quoted from the Rig-veda, I
have derived the same sort of assistance from the French version of M. Langlois, which has been acknowledged in the Preface to the Second Volume, p. vi. I am also indebted for some of the Vedic texts to Boehtlingk and Roth's Lexicon."

A comparison of the former edition with the present will shew that considerable alterations and additions have been made in the latter. The texts which formerly stood in the Appendix have now been transferred to their proper places in the body of the work; and various other passages have been transposed. The principal additions will be found in the first four sections, in the ninth (pp. 115-127), tenth (which is altogether new), eleventh (pp. 185 ff.), and in the Appendix.

I am indebted to various learned friends for assistance in different parts of the work, which I have acknowledged in the notes. My thanks are especially due to Professors Goldstücker and Cowell for various important corrections which they have suggested in my translations of passages of a scholastic and philosophical character, quoted either in the body of the volume or in the Appendix,—corrections which are incorporated in the text,—as well as for some further remarks and suggestions which will be found in the notes or Appendix. I am also under obligations to Professor Aufrecht for some emendations of my renderings in the early part of the work, as well as for his explanations of many of the texts of the Rigveda cited in the Second Chapter.

EDINBURGH,
November, 1868.

J. MUIR.
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ERRATA ET CORRIGENDA.

Page 24, line 11. For Brahmā read Brahmā.

" 45, " 15. For Yajush read Yajush.

" 53, " 8. For theologians read theologians.

" 62, " 2 from foot: For its author read their authors.

" 85, " 4 " Before Prajāpati insert xi. 243.

" 95, " 2 " For dhanītovam read dhanītam.

" 96, " 16. The same correction.

" 101, " 22. For Vanap. read S‘āntip.

" 149, " 6. For iabdādikshīter read iabdād ikshīter.

" 159, " 16. For chaindri- read cha indri-.

" 159, " 31. For paratveou- read paratve-. 

" 160, " 18. For pumar-uptattīr read pumar-anuptattīr.

" 213, " 16. For p. 120 read p. 118.

" 221, " 24. For vi. 21, 1 read vi. 21, 8.

" 224, " 7 from foot. Omit dhīshaṇū.

" 261, " 12. For vi. 62, 3 read vi. 26, 3.
CHAPTER I.


In the preceding volumes of this work I have furnished a general account of the ancient Indian writings, which are comprehended under the designation of Veda or Sruti. These works, which, as we have seen, constitute the earliest literature of the Hindus, are broadly divisible into two classes: (1) The Mantras or hymns, in which the praises of the gods are celebrated and their blessing is invoked; (2) the Brāhmaṇas, which embrace (a) the liturgical institutes in which the ceremonial application of these hymns is declared, the various rites of sacrifice are prescribed, and the origin and hidden import of the different forms are explained, and (b) the Āranyakas, and Upanishads (called also Vedāntas, i.e. concluding portions of the Vedas), which in part possess the same character as some of the earlier portions of the Brāhmaṇas, and are in part theological treatises in which the spiritual aspirations which

1 See Vol. I. pp. 2 ff. and Vol. II. pp. 169 ff. See also Professor Max Müller's History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature.

2 For more precise information see Müller's Anc. Sansk. Lit. pp. 313 ff. from which it will be perceived that only some of the Āranyakas form part of the Brāhmaṇas, and that two of the Upanishads are included in a Sanhitā.
were gradually developed in the minds of the more devout of the Indian sages are preserved. It is, therefore, clear that the hymns constitute the original and, in some respects, the most essential portion of the Veda; that the Brāhmaṇas arose out of the hymns, and are subservient to their employment for the purposes of worship; while the Upanishads give expression to ideas of a speculative and mystical character which, though to some extent discoverable in the hymns and in the older portion of the Brāhmaṇas, are much further matured, and assume a more exclusive importance, in these later treatises.

I content myself here with referring the reader who desires to obtain a fuller idea of the nature of the hymns, and of the mythology which they embody, to the late Professor H. H. Wilson's translation of the earlier portion of the Rig-veda, to his prefaces to the several volumes, to Professor Max Müller's History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, and to two papers of my own in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, entitled Contributions to a knowledge of the Cosmogony and Mythology of the Rig-veda. In the fourth volume of this work I return to the latter branch of the subject, and compare the conceptions which the rishis entertained of the different objects of their worship, with those representations of the deities who bore the same names, which occur in Indian writings of a later date, whether mythological or theological.

The task to which I propose in the meantime to devote myself, is to supply some account of the opinions entertained by Hindu writers, ancient and modern, in regard to the origin and authority of the Vedas. With this view I have collected from some of the later hymns, from the Indian writings of the middle and later Vedic era (the Brāhmaṇas and Upanishads) as well as from the books, whether popular or scientific, of the post-vedic period (the Purāṇas, the Itiḥāsas, the Institutes of Manu, the aphorisms of the Darśanas, or systems of philosophy, and their commentators, and the commentaries on the Vedas) such passages as I have discovered which have reference to these subjects, and propose to compare the opinions there set forth with the ideas entertained on some of these points by the writers of the more ancient hymns, as deducible from numerous passages in their own compositions.

The mythical accounts which are given of the origin of the Vedas
are mutually conflicting. In some passages they are said to have been created by Prajāpati from fire, air, and the sun, or by some other process. In other texts they are said to have been produced by Brahmā from his different mouths, or by the intervention of the Gāyatrī, or to have sprung from the goddess Sarasvatī, or to have otherwise arisen. I proceed to adduce these several passages.

Sect. I.—Origin of the Vedas according to the Purusha-sūkta, the Atharva-veda, the Brāhmaṇas, Upanishads, and Institutes of Manu.

Purusha-sūkta.—In the ninth verse of this hymn (Rig-veda, x. 90, already quoted in Vol. I. pp. 8 and 9) the three Vedas are said to have been produced from the mystical victim Purusha: Tasmād yajṇāt sarva-hutaḥ rīchāḥ sāmāni jajnire | chhandāmsi jajnire tasmād yajus tasmād ajāyata | “From that universal sacrifice sprang the rich and sāman verses: the metres sprang from it: from it the yajush arose.”

This is the only passage in the hymns of the Rig-veda in which the creation of the Vedas is described.

In the Atharva-veda the following texts refer to that subject:

x. 7, 14. Yattra rishayaḥ prathamajāḥ rīchāḥ sāma yajur mahi | ekshir yasminn ārpitaḥ Skambhaṁ tam brūhi katamaḥ svid eva saḥ |

. . . . 20. Yasmād rīcho apātakshan yajur yasmād apākashan | sāmāni yasya lomāni atharvāngiras mukham | Skambham tam brūhi katamaḥ svid eva saḥ |

“Declare who that Skambha (supporting-principle) is in whom the primeval rishis, the rich, sāman, and yajush, the earth, and the one rishi, are sustained. . . . 20. Declare who is that Skambha from whom they cut off the rich verses, from whom they scraped off the yajush, of whom the sāman verses are the hairs, and the verses of Atharvan and Angiras the mouth.”

3 The word yeda, in whatever sense we are to understand it, occurs in R.V. viii. 19, 5: Yah samidḥā yah āhuti yo vedena dadāsa martyo agnaye | yo namastu svadha- 
raḥ | 6. Tasya id arvanto raṁhayante āśvasaḥ tasya yajnamnītāmaṁ yaśaḥ | na tam aṁho deva-kritaṁ kutuḥ chana na martya-kritaṁ naśat | “The horses of that mortal who, devoted to sacrifice, does homage to Agni with fuel, with an oblation, with ritual knowledge (7), with reverence,—(6) speed forward impetuously; and his renown is most glorious. No calamity, caused either by god or by man, can assail him from any quarter.”
xiii. 4, 38. Sa vai rīghhyo ajāyata tasmād riche ajāyanta
“He (apparently Indra, see verse 44) sprang from the rich verses:
the rich verses sprang from him.”

xix. 54, 3. Kālād richeḥ samabhavan yajuḥ kālād ajāyata
“From Time the rich verses sprang: the yajush sprang from Time.”

The following texts from the same Veda may also be introduced here:
iv. 35, 6. Yasmat pakvād amṛitam sambabhavo yo gāyatrīḥ adhi-  
patir babhūva | yasmin vedāḥ nihitah viśvarūpaḥ tenaudanenāti tarāmi  
mṛityum |

“I overpass death by means of that oblation (ōdana), from which,
when cooked, ambrosia (amṛita) was produced, which became the lord
of the Gāyatrī, and in which the omniform Vedas are comprehended.”

vii. 54, 1. Richeḥ sāma yajāmahe yābhyaṁ karmāṇi kurvate | eko sadasi  
rājato yajnaṁ devaḥ yachhataḥ | 2. Richeḥ sāma yad aprukṣham hāvīr  
ojo yajur balam | esa mā tasmād mā himśīd vedāḥ prishṭāḥ sāchiptā |

“We worship the Rich and the Sāman, wherewith men celebrate
religious rites, which shine in the assembly, and convey sacrifices to
the gods. 2. Inasmuch as I have asked the Rich and the Sāman for
butter and for vigour, and the Yajush for strength,—let not the Veda,
so asked, destroy me, o lord of strength (Indra).”

The next passage is from the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, xi. 5, 8, 1 ff.:

Prajāpati vai idam agre āsid ekāh eva | so’kāmayata syām prajāyeya  
iti | So’rāmyat sa tapo’tapyata | tasmāh chṛntāt tepāṇāt trayo lokāh  
asṛjijanta prithivy antarikṣaṁ dyauḥ | sa imāṁs trīn lokān abhitatāpa  
tebhyas taptebhyaṁ trīṇi jyotimśhy ajāyanta agnir yo’yam pavate sūryāḥ  
sa imāṁs trīṇi jyotimśhy abhitatāpa | tebhyaḥ taptebhyaṁ trayo vedāḥ  
ajāyanta agner rigvedo vāyor yajurvedaṁ sūryāḥ śāmavedaḥ  sa imāṁs  
trīn vedān abhitatāpa | tebhyaḥ taptebhyaṁ trīṇi sūkṛayāy ajāyanta bhūr  
ity rigvedād bhuvāḥ iti yajurvedāt svar iti śāmavedaḥ | Tad rigvedenaiva  
hotraṁ akurvata yajurvedena adhvarvavoṣāṁ śāmavedena udgitham | yad  
eva trayyai vidyāyai sūkṛaṁ tena brahmatvam uchchakrāma.

“Prajāpati was formerly this universe [i.e. the sole existence], one
only. He desired, ‘may I become, may I be propagated.’ He toiled

4 See my translation of the entire hymn in the Journal of the Roy. As. Soc. for
1865, p. 381. The Vaiṣṇava Purāṇa, i. 2, 13, says: Tad eva sarvam evaitad evakātā-  
vyuktā-svarūpavat | tathā purusā-rūpeṇā kāla-rūpeṇa eka sthitam | “This (Brahma)
is all this universe, existing both as the perceptible and the imperceptible; existing
also in the forms of Purusha and of Kāla (Time).”
in devotion, he performed austerity. From him, when he had so toiled, and performed austerity, three worlds were created,—earth, air, and sky. He infused warmth into these three worlds. From them, thus heated, three lights were produced,—Agni (fire), this which purifies (i.e. Pavana, or Vāyu, the wind), and Sūrya (the sun). He infused heat into these three lights. From them so heated the three Vedas were produced,—the Rig-veda from Agni (fire), the Yajur-veda from Vāyu (wind), and the Sāma-veda from Sūrya (the sun). He infused warmth into these three Vedas. From them so heated three luminous essences were produced,—bhūḥ from the Rig-veda, bhuvah from the Yajur-veda, and svar from the Sāma-veda. Hence, with the Rig-veda they performed the function of the hotṛī; with the Yajur-veda, the office of the adhvaryu; with the Sāma-veda, the duty of the udgātrī; while the function of the brahman arose through the luminous essence of the triple science [i.e. the three Vedas combined]."

Chhāndogya Upanishad.—A similar passage (already quoted in Volume Second, p. 200) occurs in the Chhāndogya Upanishad (p. 288 of Dr. Röer’s ed.):

Prajāpatir lokān abhyatapati | teshāṁ tapyamānānāṁ rasāṁ prābhihad
agnim prithivyāḥ vāyur antarikshād ādityāṁ diveḥ | sa etāṁ tīrto devatāḥ
abhyatapati | tāsam tapyamānānāṁ rasāṁ prābhihad agner rīcho vāyor
yajñānāḥ śaṁ ādityāt | sa etāṁ trayāṁ vidyām abhyatapati | tasyāṁ
tapyamānāyāḥ rasāṁ prābhihad bhūr itī rīgḥhyo bhuvah itī yajurḥhyāḥ
svar itī śāmabhhyāḥ |

"Prajāpati infused warmth into the worlds, and from them so heated he drew forth their essences, viz. Agni (fire) from the earth, Vāyu (wind) from the air, and Sūrya (the sun) from the sky. He infused warmth into these three deities, and from them so heated he drew forth their essences,—from Agni the rich verses, from Vāyu the yajush verses, and from Sūrya the sāman verses. He then infused heat into this triple science, and from it so heated he drew forth its essences,—from rich verses the syllable bhūḥ, from yajush verses bhuvah, and from sāman verses svar."

5 See S’atapatha Brāhmaṇa, vi. 1, 2, 19: . . ayam eva sa Vāyur yo ‘yam pavate . . . “This is that Vāyu, he who purifies.”
6 Passages to the same effect occur also in the Aitareya (v. 32-34) and Kaushitaki Brāhmaṇas. That in the former will be found in Dr. Haug’s translation of the
Manu.—The same origin is assigned to the three Vedas in the following verses from the account of the creation in Manu, i. 21–23, where the idea is no doubt borrowed from the Brāhmaṇas:

Satveshāṃ tu sa nāmāni kārmaṇi cha prithak prithak | Veda-sabdeḥya evādau prithak saṃsthaḥ cha nirmame | Karmatmanāṁ cha devānāṁ so āriyata prāṇiṇām prabhuḥ | sādhyaṁ nāṁ cha ganaṁ sūkhmaṁ yajnaṁ chaiva sanātanaṁ | Agni-vāyu-ravibhyas tu trayam brahma sanātanaṁ | dudhaḥ yajna-siddhyartham rig-yajuh-sāma-lakshanam |

"He [Brahmā] in the beginning fashioned from the words of the Veda the several names, functions, and separate conditions of all [creatures]. That Lord also created the subtle host of active and living deities, and of Śādhyas, and eternal sacrifice. And in order to the performance of sacrifice, he drew forth from Agni, from Vāyu, and from Śūrya, the triple eternal Veda, distinguished as Rich, Yajush, and Sāman."

Kullūka Brāhmaṇa, the commentator, annotates thus on this passage:

Sanātanaṁ nityam | vedāpaurusheyatva - paksata Manor abhimataḥ | pūrva-kalpe ye vedas te eva Paramātmā-mūrtta Brahmanāḥ sarvajnasya smṛity-ārūḍhāḥ | tān eva kalpādāv agni-vāyu-ravibhyāḥ āchakarsha | śrāutsa cha ayaṃ artho na śaṅkanīyaḥ | tathācha śrutih | "agnir rigvedo vāyor yajurvedaḥ adityāt sāmavedaḥ" iti |

"The word sanātana means 'eternally pre-existing.' The doctrine of the superhuman origin of the Vedas is maintained by Manu. The same Vedas which [existed] in the previous mundane era (Kalpa) were preserved in the memory of the omniscient Brahmā, who was one with the supreme Spirit. It was those same Vedas that, in the beginning of the [present] Kalpa, he drew forth from Agni, Vāyu, and Śūrya: and this dogma, which is founded upon the Veda, is not to be questioned, for the Veda says, 'the Rig-veda comes from Agni, the Yajur-veda from Vāyu, and the Sāma-veda from Śūrya.'"

Another commentator on Manu, Medhātithi, explains this passage in a more rationalistic fashion, "by remarking that the Rig-veda opens with a hymn to fire, and the Yajur-veda with one in which air is mentioned."—Colebr. Misc. Ess. i. p. 11, note.

Brāhmaṇa; and the one in the latter is rendered into German by Weber in his Ind. Stud. ii. 303 ff.

Kullūka explains this to mean, "Having understood them from the words of the Veda" (Veda-sabdeḥya eva avagamyat).
To the verses from Manu (i. 21-23) just cited, the following from the second book may be added, partly for the purpose of completing the parallel with the passages previously adduced from the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa and the Chhāndogya Upanishad:

Manu, ii. 76 ff. Akārama chāpy ukāram cha makāram cha Prajayātipiḥ | Veda-trayād niraduhad bhuḥ bhuvah svar ititi cha | 77. Tribhyāḥ eva tu vedebhyāḥ pādam pādam adūduhat | "tad" ity rīcho'syāḥ sāvityāḥ parameshtḥi prajāpatiḥ | . . . 81. Oṅkāra-pūrvikās tisro maḥāvāyāḥ-rītayo'vyayāḥ | Tripadā chaiva gāyatrī vijneyāṁ Brahmaṇaḥ mukham.

76. "Prajāpati also milked out of the three Vedas the letters a, u, and m, together with the words bhūḥ, bhuvah, and svar. 77. The same supreme Prajāpati also milked from each of the three Vedas one of the [three] portions of the text called sāvitrī [or gāyatrī], beginning with the word tat. 8 . . . 81. The three great imperishable particles (bhūḥ, bhuvah, svar) preceded by om, and the gāyatrī of three lines, are to be regarded as the mouth of Brahmā."

The next passage, from the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, vi. 1, 1, 8, first speaks generally of Prajāpati creating the three Vedas, and then afterwards, with some inconsistency, describes their production from the waters:

So'yam purushaḥ Prajāpatir akāmaya "bhūyān syām prajāyeya" iti | so śrāmyat sa tapo'tapyata | sa śrāntas tepāno brahma eva prathamam asrijata trayam eva vidyām | sā eva asmai pratishtābhavat | tasmād āhur "brahma asya sarvasya pratishtā" iti | tasmād anūcchya pratitishthati | pratishtāḥ hy eṣāḥ yad brahma | tasyām pratishtāyām pratishtito 'tapyata | 9. So'po'asrijata vāchaḥ eva lokāt | vāg eva asya sā'asrijata | sā idāṁ sarvac āpnot yad idāṁ kinccha | yad āpnot tasmād āpaḥ | yad avrīnot tasmād vāḥ | 10. So'kāmaya "ābhya'dbhya'dhi praṣyeyan" iti | so'naya trayaḥ vidyāyā saha apaḥ prāviṣat | tataḥ ōḍaṁ samavarttata | tad abhyamriṣat | "aste" ity "asti bhūyo'ste" ity eva tad abravīt | tato brahma eva prathamam asrijata trayy eva vidyā | tasmād āhur "brahma asya sarvasya prathamajam" iti | api hi tasmāt purushād brahma eva purvat asrijata tada asya tad mukham eva asrijata | tasmād anūcchānām āhūr "agni-kalpaḥ" itī | mukhaṁ hy etad agner yad brahma |

8 This text, Rig-veda, iii. 62, 10, will be quoted in the sequel.
9 This passage with the preceding context is given in the Fourth Volume of this work, pp. 18 f.
"This Male, Prajāpati, desired, 'May I multiply, may I be propagated.' He toiled in devotion; he practised austere-fervour. Having done so he first of all created sacred knowledge, the triple Vedic science. This became a basis for him. Wherefore men say, 'sacred knowledge is the basis of this universe.' Hence after studying the Veda a man has a standing ground; for sacred knowledge is his foundation. Resting on this basis he (Prajāpati) practised austere-fervour. 9. He created the waters from Vāch (speech), as their world. Vāch was his: she was created. She pervaded all this whatever exists. As she pervaded (āpiṇot), waters were called 'āpah.' As she covered (aśtriṇot) all, water was called 'vār.' 10. He desired, 'May I be propagated from these waters.' Along with this triple Vedic science he entered the waters. Thence sprang an egg. He gave it an impulse; and said, 'Let there be, let there be, let there be again.' Thence was first created sacred knowledge, the triple Vedic science. Wherefore men say, 'Sacred knowledge is the first-born thing in this universe. Moreover, it was sacred knowledge which was created from that Male in front, wherefore it was created as his mouth. Hence they say of a man learned in the Veda, 'He is like Agni; for sacred knowledge is Agni's mouth.'"

The next passage from the Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa, ii. 3, 10, 1, briefly states that the Vedas were created after Soma:

\[
\text{Prajāpatīḥ Somaṁ rājānam aśriyata | tāṁ trayo vedāḥ anva aśriyanta |}
\]

"Prajāpati created king Soma. After him the three Vedas were created."

The same Brāhmaṇa in other places, as iii. 3, 2, 1, speaks of the Veda as derived from Prajāpati (Prajāpatyō vedāḥ).

\text{\textit{Satapatha Brāhmaṇa}.—According to the following passage of the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, xiv. 5, 4, 10 (≡ Bhāgā Aranyaka Upanishad, p. 455 of Röer's ed. and p. 179 of trans.) the Vedas, as well as other Sāstras, are the breath of Brahma:}

\[
\text{Sa yathā ārdadhāgner abhyāhitāt prithag dhūmāḥ vinischarantī evam vai are 'syā mahato bhūtaaya niśvasītam etad yad ṛgvedo yajurvedaḥ sāmadvedo 'thervāṅgirasāh itihāsaḥ purāṇāṁ vidyā upaṁsādah ślokāḥ sūtras anuvyākhyāṇāṁ vyākhyāṇāṁ asyaica etāṁ sāvāṇi niśvasītāṁ |}
\]

"As from a fire made of moist wood various modifications of smoke proceed, so is the breathing of this great Being the Rig-veda, the
Yajur-veda, the Sâma-veda, the Atharvângirases, the Itihâsas, Purânas, science, the Upanishads, verses (ślokas), aphorisms, comments of different kinds—all these are his breathings."

It is curious that in this passage the Vedas appear to be classed in the same category with various other works, such as the Sûtras, from some at least of which (as we shall see further on), they are broadly distinguished by later writers, who regard the former (including the Brâhmaṇas and Upanishads) as of superhuman origin, and infallible correctness, while this character is expressly denied to the latter, which are represented as paurushâya, or merely human compositions, possessed of no independent authority.

In the Brîhad Áranyaka Upanishad (pp. 50–53 of Dr. Röer’s ed.) Prajâpati [identified with Death, or the Devourer] is said to have produced Vâch (speech), and through her, together with soul, to have created all things, including the Vedas:

Sa tayā vâchā tena âtmanâ idaṁ sarvam asprjata yad idaṁ kincha riche yajûmhi sâmâni chhandâµsi yajnân prajâḥ paśûn

"By that speech and that soul he created all things whatsoever, rich, yajush, and sāman texts, metres, sacrifices, creatures, and animals."

And in Satapatha Brâhmaṇa, xiv. 4, 3, 12 (p. 290 of the same Brîhad Áranyaka Upanishad) it is said:

Trayo vedâḥ ete eva | vâg eva rig-vedo mano yajur-vedâḥ prânah sâma-vedâḥ |

"The three Vedas are [identifiable with] these three things [speech, mind, and breath]. Speech is the Rig-veda, mind the Yajur-veda, and breath the Sâma-veda."

The following text, from the Satapatha Brâhmaṇa, vii. 5, 2, 52, gives a singular account of the production of the Vedas:

"Samudre tvâ sadane sâdayâmi" iti | Mano vai samudraḥ | manaso vai samudrâd vâchâ 'bhryâ devâs trayîṁ vidyāṁ nirakhanan | tad esha śloko 'bhuyuktâh "ye (yat?) samudrâd nirakhanan devâs tikshṇâbhir abhiribhîḥ | sudevo adya tad vidyâd yatra nirvapanaṁ dadhur" iti | manâh samudro vâk tikshnâ 'bhris trayi̊̃ vidyā nirvapanaṁ | etad esha śloko 'bhuyuktâh | manasi tâm sâdayâti |

"I settle thee in the ocean as thy seat."10 Mind is the ocean.

10 I am indebted to Professor Aufrecht for the following explanation of this formula, which is taken from the Vâjasaneyi Sanhitâ, xiii. 63. The words are addressed to a
From the mind-ocean with speech for a shovel the gods dug out the triple Vedic science. Hence this verse has been uttered: 'May the brilliant deity to-day know where they placed that offering which the gods dug out with sharp shovels.' Mind is the ocean; speech is the sharp shovel; the triple Vedic science is the offering. In reference to this the verse has been uttered. He settles it in Mind.'

The next passage from the Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa, iii. 39, 1, speaks of the Veda as being "the hair of Prajāpati's beard" (Prajāpater vai etāni śmaśrūni yad vedaḥ). The process of its germination is left to the imagination of the reader.

In another text of the same Brāhmaṇa, Vāch (speech) is called the mother of the Vedas:

ii. 8, 8, 5. Vāg akṣharam prathamajā rītasya vedānām mātā amṛtasya nābhiḥ | sā no jūṣhāṇā upa yajnam āgād avanti devī suhāvā me astu | yām rishayo mantra-krīto manishināḥ anvācchhan devās tapasā śramena |

"Vāch (speech) is an imperishable thing, and the first-born of the ceremonial, the mother of the Vedas, and the centre-point of immortality. Delighting in us, she came to the sacrifice. May the protecting goddess be ready to listen to my invocation,—she whom the wise rishis, the composers of hymns, the gods, sought by austere-favour, and by laborious devotion."

Sect. II.—Origin of the Vedas according to the Vishṇu, Bhāgavata, and Mārkandeya Purāṇas, the Harivaṃśa, the Mahābhārata; eternity of the Veda; miscellaneous statements regarding it.

In the Vishṇu and Bhāgavata Purāṇas we find a quite different tradition regarding the origin of the Vedas, which in these works are said to have been created by the four-faced Brahmā from his several mouths. Thus the Vishṇu Purāṇa says, i. 5, 48 ff.:

Gāyatram cha pīchaś chaiva trierit-sāma-rathantaram | Agnishtomaṁ cha yajñānāṁ nirmane prathamad mukhāt | yajūnshi triaṁśubham ēhhandhaṁ stomaṁ panchedasāṁ tathā | Vrihat sāma tathokthyaṁ cha dakshinād asrijād mukhāt | sāmāni jagati-ehhandhaṁ stomaṁ saptadaśaṁ 

brick at the time when the hearth (chitya) for the reception of the sacred fires is being constructed. As the bricks are severally called apasya (properly 'efficient,' but erroneously derived from sp) they are addressed as if placed in various parts of water
tathā | vairūpaṃ atirātraṇaḥ cha paśchimād asrijad mukhāt | ekaviṁśam aṭhavaṇaṃ aṣṭoryāmaṇaṃ eva cha | Anuṣṭubhaṁ sa vairājan uttarād asrijad mukhāt |

"From his eastern mouth Brahmā formed the gāyatra, the rich verses, the trivrit, the sāma-rathanta, and of sacrifices, the agnishṭoma. From his southern mouth he created the yajush verses, the trishṭubh metre, the panchadaśa-stoma, the vṛhihat-sāman, and the ukthya. From his western mouth he formed the sāman verses, the jagaṭī metre, the saptadaśa-stoma, the vairūpa, and the atirātra. From his northern mouth he framed the ekaviṁśa, the atharvan, the āṣṭoryāmaṇ, with the anuṣṭubh and virāj metres."¹¹

In like manner it is said but with variations, in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, iii. 12, 34, and 37 ff.:

Kadācid dhīyayatāh srasṭur vedāḥ āsaṁ chaturmukhāt | kathaṁ sakṣaḥyāmy ahāṁ lokān samavetān yathā purā | . . . . Rīg-yajūḥ-sāma-tharvākhyān vedāṁ pūrvedibhir mukhaiḥ | sastram ījyāṁ stuti-stomām pṛayaśchittāṁ vyadhāt kramāt |

"Once the Vedas sprang from the four-faced creator, as he was meditating 'how shall I create the aggregate worlds as before?' . . . . He formed from his eastern and other mouths the Vedas called rich, yajush, sāman, and atharvan, together with praise, sacrifice, hymns, and expiation."

And in verse 45 it is stated that the uthnīh metre issued from his hairs, the gāyatrī from his skin, the trishṭubh from his flesh, the anuṣṭubh from his tendons, the jagaṭī from his bones (Tasyoshnig āsīl lomebhyo gāyatrī cha teacho vibhoḥ | trishtup māṃsāt snuto 'nuṣṭup jagaty asthnaḥ Prajāpateḥ).

The Mārkandeya Purāṇa says on the same subject, 102, 1:


¹¹ See Wilson's Transl. vol. i. p. 84.
kaśāṅkaṁ vadanāt tasya vedhasāḥ | sukha-sattva-tamahaṁ saumyā-
śaumya-svārūpavat | 7. Richo rajo-guṇāḥ sattevāṁ yajushāṁ cha guño-
mune | tamo-guṇāni sāmāni tamah-sattevam atharvasu |

1. "From the eastern mouth of Brahmā, who sprang by an imper-
ceptible birth from that divided egg (Manu, i. 9, 12), there suddenly
issued first of all the rich verses, (2) resembling China roses, brilliant
in appearance, internally united, though separated from each other,
and characterized by the quality of passion (rajas). 3. From his
southern mouth came, unrestrained, the yajush verses of the colour
of gold, and disunited. 4. From the western mouth of the supreme
Brahmā appeared the sāmā verses and the metres. 5 and 6. From
the northern mouth of Vedhas (Brahmā) was manifested the entire
Ātharvaṇa of the colour of black bees and collyrium, having a cha-
racter at once terrible and not terrible,12 capable of neutralizing the
arts of enchanters, pleasant, characterized by the qualities both of
purity and darkness, and both beautiful and the contrary. 7. The
verses of the rich are distinguished by the quality of passion (rajas),
those of the yajush by purity (sattva), those of the sāmā by darkness
(tamas), and those of the atharvan by both darkness and purity."

Harivaṃśa.—In the first section of the Harivaṃśa, verse 47, the
creation of the Vedas by Brahmā is thus briefly alluded to:

Richo yajūnshikānāṁ nirmanāṁ yajna-siddhaye | sādhyāṁ tair ayajan
devān ity evam anuśūrma |

"In order to the accomplishment of sacrifice, he formed the rich,
yajush, and sāmā verses: with these the Sādhyas worshipped the
gods, as we have heard."

The following is the account of the same event given in another part
of the same work; Harivaṃśa, verse 11,516:

Tato 'ṣrijad vai tripadāṁ gāyatrīṁ veda-mātaram | Akaroch chaiva cha-
turo vedān gāyatri-sambhavān |

After framing the world, Brahmā "next created the gāyatri of three
lines, mother of the Vedas, and also the four Vedas which sprang from
the gāyatri." 13

12 Ghorāghora is the correct MS. reading, as I learn from Dr. Hall, and not
gāvaddhāra, as given in Professor Banerjea's printed text.
13 The same words gāyatrīṁ veda-mātaram also occur in the M.Bh. Vanaparvan,
verse 13,432; and the same title is applied to Vāch in the Taît. Br. as quoted above,
p. 10.
A little further on we find this expanded into the following piece of mysticism, verse 11,665 ff. :

Samāhita-manā Brahmana moksha-prāptena hetunā | chandra-panḍalasāṅghānāj jyotis-tejo mahat tadā | Pravīṣya hrdayaṁ kshipraṁ gāyatryah nayanāntare | Garbhasya sambhavo yaś cha chaturdhā purushātmakaḥ | Brahmana-tejomayo'eyaktāḥ śāśvato 'tha dhruevo'vyayaḥ | na chandriyagunair yuko yuktas tejo-guṇena cha | chandrāmsu-vimala-prakhyo bhrajasīnur varna-saṅghitaḥ | Netrābhyāṁ janayad devaḥ rig-vedaṁ yajushā saha | śāmavedaṁ cha jihvāgrād atharvāṇam cha mūrdhdhataḥ | Jata-mātrāsa tu te vedāh kṣethrāṁ vindanti tatvdvatah | Tena vedatvam āpannā yasmād vindanti tat padam | Te śrijanti tadā vedāḥ brahma pūreiṁ sanātanam | Purushaṁ dieva-rāpābhāṁ scaviṁ scvair bhāvair mano-bhavaiḥ |

“For the emancipation of the world, Brahmana, sunk in contemplation, issuing in a luminous form from the region of the moon, penetrated into the heart of Gāyatrī, entering between her eyes. From her there was then produced a quadruple being in the form of a Male, lustrous as Brahmana, undefined, eternal, undecaying, devoid of bodily senses or qualities, distinguished by the attribute of brilliancy, pure as the rays of the moon, radiant, and embodied in letters. The god fashioned the Rig-veda, with the Yajush from his eyes, the Sāma-veda from the tip of his tongue, and the Atharvan from his head. These Vedas, as soon as they are born, find a body (kṣethra). Hence they obtain their character of Vedas, because they find (vindanti) that abode. These Vedas then create the pre-existing eternal brahma (sacred science), a Male of celestial form, with their own mind-born qualities.”

I extract another passage on the same subject from a later section of the same work, verses 12,425 ff. When the Supreme Being was intent on creating the universe, Hiranyagarbha, or Prajāpati, issued from his mouth, and was desired to divide himself,—a process which he was in great doubt how he should effect. The text then proceeds:

Itichintayatas tasya “om” ity evotithaṁ svaraḥ | sa bhūmāv antarīkshe cha nāke cha kṛitaśvam svanam | Taṁ chaivābhyaśatas tasya manah-sāramayam punaḥ | hrdayād deva-devasya vashaṭkāraṁ samutthitaḥ | bhūmyantariksha-nākānām bhūyaḥ svarātmakaḥ parah | mahāśmritimayāḥ punyāḥ mahāvyāhritayo’bhavan | chhandasāṁ pravara devi chaturvisākharā ’bhavat | Tat-padāṁ saṁsmaran dieyam sāvitrīm akarot prabhuḥ |
"While he was thus reflecting, the sound "om" issued from him, and resounded through the earth, air, and sky. While the god of gods was again and again repeating this, the essence of mind, the vashatâkåra proceeded from his heart. Next, the sacred and transcendent vyâhritis, (bhûh, bhuvah, svar), formed of the great smriti, in the form of sound, were produced from earth, air, and sky. Then appeared the goddess, the most excellent of metres, with twenty-four syllables [the gâyatri]. Reflecting on the divine text [beginning with] "tat," the Lord formed the sâvitrî. He then produced all the Vedas, the Rîch, Sàman, Atharvan, and Yajush, with their prayers and rites." (See also the passage from the Bhâg. Pur. xii. 6, 37 ff., which will be quoted in a following section.)

Mahâbhârata.—The Mahâbhârata in one passage speaks of Sarasvatī and the Vedas as being both created by Achyuta (Vishnû) from his mind (Bhîshma-parvan, verse 3019: Sarasvatīṁ cha vedāṁś cha manasaḥ sosriye 'chyutaḥ). In another place, Sânti-parvan, verse 12,920, Sarasvatī is said, in conformity with the texts quoted above, pp. 10 and 12, from the Taîttriya Brâhmaṇa, the Vana-parvan, and the Harivaṁśa, to be the mother of the Vedas:

Vedānāṁ mātaraṁ paśya mat-sthāṁ deviṁ Sarasvatim |
"Behold Sarasvatī, mother of the Vedas, abiding in me."

Manu.—According to the verses in Manu, xii. 49, 50, quoted in the First Volume of this work, p. 41, the Vedas, with the other beings and objects named along with them, constitute the second manifestation of the sattva guṇa, or pure principle; while Brahmâ is placed in a higher rank, as one of the first manifestations of the same principle. The word Veda in this passage is explained by Kullûka of those "embodied deities, celebrated in the Itihāsas, who preside over the Vedas" (Vedā-
bhimāninyaṁ cha devatāṁ vigravântyāḥ itihāsa-prasiddāḥ).

Sect. III.—Passages of the Brâhmaṇas and other works in which the Vedas are spoken of as being the sources of all things, and as infinite and eternal.

The first text of this sort which I shall cite is from the Satapatha Brâhmaṇa, x. 4, 2, 21:
Atha sarvānī bhūtāni paryākshat | sa trayayam eva vidyāyām sarvānī bhūtāny apāsyat | atra hi sarveshāṁ chhandasāṁ ātmā sarveshāṁ atomānāṁ sarveshāṁ prānānāṁ sarveshāṁ devānam | etad vai asti | etad hy amritam | yad hy amritam tad hy asti | etad u tad yad martyam | 22. Sa aikshata Prajāpatīḥ "trayayāṁ vāva vidyāyāṁ sarvānī bhūtāni | hanta trayim eva vidyām ātmānam abhisāmskaravai" īti | 23. Sa rīcho vyauhāt | deādaśa bṛihati-sahasrāṇy etāveto ha rīcho yāḥ Prajāpati-srishtās tās triṁśattame vyāhe panktishv atishṭhanta | tāḥ yat triṁśattame vyāhe atishṭhanta tasmāt triṁśad māsasya rātryah | atha yat panktisv u tasmāt pānktaḥ Prajāpatiḥ | tāḥ ashtāśataṁ śatāni pānktaḥ 'bhavan |

21. "Then he looked around upon all beings. He beheld all beings in this triple Vedic science. For in it is the soul of all metres, of all hymns of praise, of all breaths, of all the gods. This, indeed, exists. It is an undying thing. For that which is undying (really) exists. This is that which is mortal. Prajāpati reflected, 'All beings are comprehended in the triple Vedic science: come let me dispose myself in the shape of the triple Vedic science.' He arranged the verses of the Rigveda. Twelve thousand Brihatīs, and as many Rich-verses which were created by Prajāpati, stood in rows in the thirtieth class. Since they stood in the thirtieth class there are thirty nights in the month. Since they stood in rows (pankti) Prajāpati is called Pānkta. They formed eighteen hundreds of rows."

The next text, from the Taṅtirīya Brāhmaṇa, iii. 12, 9, 1, speaks of the three Vedas as being respectively the sources of form, motion, and heat, or brilliance:

Rigbyho jatam sarvaśo mūrttim āhuḥ sarvā gatir yajusḥi haiva śaśvat | sarvaṁ tejaḥ sāma-rūpyam ha śaśvat |

"They say that form universally proceeds from rich verses; that motion is always connected with the yajush, and that all heat has the nature of the sāman."

We have already seen, p. 6, that Manu (i. 21) speaks of the names,

14 "Always exists" (sarevadā vidyate).—Comm.
15 On this the commentator remarks: Yach cha martyam maraṇa-dharmakaṁ ma-nushyādi tad apy etat trayi-bhūtam eva | ato martyamṛtmatamāṁ sarvāṁ jagad attrāntarbhūtam | "And that which is mortal, subject to death, the human race, etc., is also one with the triple Vedic science. Hence the latter includes all the world both mortal and immortal."
16 I owe this interpretation of this clause to Prof. Aufrecht.
functions, and conditions of all things as fashioned from the words of the Veda. It is similarly said in the Vishṇu Purāṇa, i. 5, 58:

Nāma rūpaṁ cha bhūtaṁ kṛityānāṁ cha pravṛttanāṁ | Veda-sabdadebhya evādu devādināṁ chakāra saḥ | rishīnāṁ nāmadheyāni yathā veda-śrutāṇi vai | yathā-niyoga-yogyāni sarveshāṁ api sa' karot |

"In the beginning he created from the words of the Veda the names, forms, and functions of the gods and other beings. He also assigned the names of all the rishis as indicated in the Vedas, and as appropriate to their respective offices."

The same idea is repeated in the Mahābhārata, Śāntiparvan, 8533:

Rishayas tapasā vedān odhyāsnanta divāniśaṁ | An-ādi-nilānanā vidyā vāg uttārasa Svaśyambhvāḥ | āduan vedamayī divyā yatāḥ sarveḥ pravṛttayāḥ | rishīnāṁ nāmadheyāni yāṁ cha vedeshu srishtayāḥ | nānā-rūpaṁ cha bhūtaṁ karmāṇāṁ cha pravṛttayān (pravṛttanām?) | veda-sabdadebhya evādua nirmiṁīte sa īśvaraḥ |

"Through austere-fervour (tapas) the rishis studied the Vedas, both day and night. In the beginning knowledge (vidyā)" without beginning or end, divine speech, formed of the Vedas, was sent forth by Svayambhū (= Brahmā, the self-existent): from her all activities are derived. It is from the words of the Veda that the lord in the beginning frames the names of the rishis, the creations which (exist) in the Vedas, the various forms of beings, and the activity manifested in works."

The Mangalācharana, or prayer prefixed to their commentaries on the Rīk Sanhitā and Taittirīya Sanhitā, by both Śāyaṇa and Mādhava, is as follows:

Yasya niśvasitaṁ vedāḥ yo vedebhya 'khilaṁ jagat | nirnāme tam ahaṁ vande vidyā-tirthham maheśvaram |

"I reverence Maheśvara the hallowed abode of sacred knowledge, of whom the Vedas are the breathings, and who from the Vedas formed the whole universe."

The following passage from the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, iii. 10, 11, 3, asserts that the Vedas are infinite in extent:

Bharadvājo ha tribhir āyurbhir brahmacharyam uvāsa | tam ha jīrṇīṁ

17 In quoting this line in a passage of his Vedārtha-prakāśa, or commentary on the Taittirīya Sanhitā, which I shall adduce further on, Mādhava Acharīya gives the reading nityā, 'eternal,' instead of vidyā, 'knowledge.' It is possible that the line may be taken from some other book.
OF THE VEDAS, HELD BY INDIAN AUTHORS.

sthavirān śayānam Indraḥ upavrajya uvācha | “Bharadvāja yat te chaturtham āyur dadyān kim etena kuryāḥ” iti | “brahmacharyyam eva enena chareyam” iti ha uvācha | 4. Taṁ ha trīṇ giri-rūpān avijnātān iva
darśayānchakāra | teshaṁ ha ekaikasmad musthiṁ ādade | sa ha uvācha “Bharadvāja” ity āmantrya | “vedāḥ vai ete | anantāḥ vai vedāḥ | etad vai etais trībhur āyurbhir aneavochenathāḥ | atha te itarad ananāktaṁ eva | ehi imāṁ viddhi | ayaṁ vai sarva-vidyā” iti | 5. Tasmai ha etam agnim sāvitram uvācha | taṁ sa vidītvā amrīto bhūtvā svargaṁ lokam iyya ādityasya sāyujyaṁ | amrīto ha eva bhūtvā svargaṁ lokam ety ādityasya sāyujyaṁ yaḥ evaṁ veda | eṣaḥ u eva trayī vidyā | 6. Yāvantāṁ ha vai trayyā vidyāya lokāṁ jayati tāvāntam lokāṁ jayati yaḥ evaṁ veda |

“Bharadvāja lived through three lives” in the state of a religious student (brahmacharya). Indra approached him when he was lying old and decrepit, and said to him: ‘Bharadvāja, if I give thee a fourth life, how wilt thou employ it?’ ‘I will lead the life of a religious student,’ he replied. 4. He (Indra) showed him three mountain-like objects, as it were unknown. From each of them he took a handful: and, calling to him, ‘Bharadvāja,’ said, ‘These are the Vedas. The Vedas are infinite. This is what thou hast studied during these three lives. Now there is another thing which thou hast not studied, come and learn it. This is the universal science.’ 5. He declared to him this Agni Sāvitra. Having known it he (Bharadvāja) became immortal, and ascended to the heavenly world, to union with the sun. He who knows this ascends to heaven, to union with the sun. This is the triple Vedic science. He who knows this conquers a world as great as he would gain by the triple Vedic science.”

Another text from the Taittirīya Sanhitā, vii. 3, 1, 4, puts the matter somewhat differently:

Atha brahma (brahma-vādino?) vadanti parimitāḥ vai richeḥ parimitāṁ sāmāṁ parimitāṁ yajuṁśhi atha tasya eva anto nāsti yad brahma |

“The expounders of sacred science say, ‘Rich verses are limited, sāman verses are limited, yajush verses are limited; but there is no end of sacred knowledge.’

Vishnu Purāṇa.—At the end of Section 6 of the third book of the

18 This does not appear to mean, three lives in three different births, but a life of thrice the usual length, or already twice renewed.
Vishṇu Purāṇa we have the following assertion of the eternity of the Veda:

_Iī śākhaḥ prasankhyātaḥ śākhaḥ-bhedās tathaiva cha | karttāraś chaiva śākhānām bheda-hetus tathodikah | sarva-mancantareshv eva śākhā-bhedāḥ samāḥ smritāḥ | Prajāpatyā śrutir nityā tad-vikalpās tv ime devā |

"Thus the Śākhas, their divisions, their authors, and the cause of the division have been declared. In all the manvantaras the divisions of the Śākhas are recorded to be the same. The śruti (Veda), derived from Prajāpati (Brahmā) is eternal: these, o Brāhman, are only its modifications."

In another passage of the same book, Vishṇu is identified with the Vedas: Vishṇu Purāṇa, iii. 3, 19 ff.:

_Sa riś-mayāḥ sa sāmamayāḥ sa chātmā sa yajurmayaḥ | rig-yajuh- sāma-sārātma sa evātmā sārīrinām | sa bhidyate vedamayāḥ sa vedāṁ karoti bhedair bahubhiḥ saśākham | śākha-praṇetā sa samasta-śākhaṁ ānāna-svarūpo bhagavān anantaḥ |

"He is composed of the Rich, of the Sāman, of the Yajush; he is the soul. Consisting of the essence of the Rich, Yajush, and Sāman, he is the soul of embodied spirits. Formed of the Veda, he is divided; he forms the Veda and its branches (śākhas) into many divisions. Framer of the Śākhas, he is also their entirety, the infinite lord, whose essence is knowledge."

SECT. IV.—Passages from the S’atapatha Brāhmaṇa and Manu, eulogistic of the Veda, with some statements of a different tenor from Manu and other writers.

The following panegyric on Vedic study is taken from the S’atapatha Brāhmaṇa, xi. 5, 6, 1:

_Pancha eva mahāyaṇāḥ | tāny eva mahāsattrāṇi bhūta-yajno manushya-yajnaḥ pitri-yajno deva-yajno brahma-yajnaḥ iti | 2. Ahar ahar bhūtebhyo baliṁ haret | tathā etam bhūta-yajnaṃ samāpnoti | ahar ahar dadyād ā uḍā-pātrāt tathā etam manushya-yajnaṃ samāpnoti | ahar ahaḥ svadhākuryād ā uḍā-pātrāt tathā etam pitri-yajnaṃ samāpnoti | ahar ahaḥ svadhākuryād ā kāśṭhāt tathā etam deva-yajnaṃ samāpnoti | 3. Atha brahma-yajnaḥ | svadhāyāyo vai brahma-yajnaḥ | tasya vai etasya brahma-
OF THE VEDAS, HELD BY INDIAN AUTHORS.

eva sa nakhāgrebhayas tapyate yaḥ evaṁ vidvān svādhīyāyam adhīte | tas-
māt svādhīyāyo 'dhetavyah | 5. Madhu ha vai rīcho ghrītaṁ ha sāmāny
amritaṁ yajuṁshi | yad ha vai ayaṁ vākovākyam adhīte kshīraudana-
māṁsaudanau ha eva taur | 6. Madhunā ha vai esha devāṁs tarpayati yaḥ
evaṁ vidvān rīcho 'har ahaṁ svādhīyāyam adhīte | te evaṁ triptāṁ tarpa-
yanti sarvaiḥ kāmaṁ sarvair bhogaiḥ | 7. Ghrītena ha vai esha devāṁs
tarpayati yaḥ evaṁ vidvān sāmāny ahar ahaṁ svādhīyāyam adhīte | te
enaṁ triptāṁ ityādi | 8. Amrītena ha vai esha devāṁs tarpayati yaḥ
evaṁ vidvān yajuṁshy ahar ahaṁ svādhīyāyam adhīte | te evaṁ
9. Kshīraudana-māṁsaudanābhīyāṁ ha vai esha devāṁs tarpa-
yati yaḥ evaṁ vidvān vākovākyam itihāsa-purāṇam ity ahar ahaṁ svā-
dhyāyam adhīte | te evaṁ triptāṁ ityādi | 10. Yanti vai apaḥ | ety
adyāyaḥ | eti chandrāmaḥ | yanti nakshatrāṇi | yathā ha vai na iyur na
kuryur evaṁ ha eva tad ahar brāhmaṇo bhavati yad ahaṁ svādhīyāṁ
na
adhīte | tasmāt svādhīyāyo 'dhetavyah | tasmād apy rīchaṁ vā yajur vā
sāma vā gāthāṁ vā kuṁvyāṁ vā abhiṣeyahared vratayā avyavachchedayā |

"There are only five great sacrifices, which are the great ceremonies, viz., the offering to living creatures, the offering to men, the offering to the fathers, the offering to the gods, and the Veda-offering (brahma-
yajna). 2. Let an oblation be daily presented to living creatures. Thus the offering to them is fulfilled. Let (hospitality) be daily bestowed even down to the bowl of water. Thus is the offering to men fulfilled. Let the oblation to the fathers be daily presented, down to the bowl of water with the svadhā formula. Thus is the offering to the fathers fulfilled. Let the oblation to the gods be daily presented as far as the faggot of wood. Thus is the offering to the gods fulfilled. 3. Next is the Veda-
offering. This means private study (of the sacred books). In this Veda-sacrifice speech is the juhū, the soul the upabhṛt, the eye the dhruvā, intelligence the sruva, truth the ablation, and paradise

19 This sacrifice, as I learn from Prof. Aufrecht, consists in scattering grain for the benefit of birds, etc. See Böhtlingk and Roth's Lexicon, s.v. bāli. In regard to the other sacrifices see Colebrooke's Misc. Essays, i. pp. 150, 153, 182 ff., 203 ff.
20 In explanation of this Professor Aufrecht refers to Kātyāyana's S'rauta Sūtras, iv. 1, 10, and Manu, iii. 210, 214, 218.
21 Svādhīyāyaḥ eva-sākhādhyanan | "Reading of the Veda in one's own sākhū."—Comm.
22 These words denote sacrificial spoons or ladles of different kinds of wood. See the drawings of them in Prof. Müller's article on the funeral rites of the Brāhmans, Journ. of the Germ. Or. Soc. vol. ix. pp. lxxviii. and lxxx.
the conclusion. He who, knowing this, daily studies the Veda, conquers an undecaying world more than thrice as great as that which he acquires who bestows this whole earth filled with riches. Wherefore the Veda should be studied. 4. Verses of the Rig-veda are milk-oblations to the gods. He who, knowing this, daily reads these verses, satisfies the gods with milk-oblations; and they being satisfied, satisfy him with property, with breath, with generative power, with complete bodily soundness, with all excellent blessings. Streams of butter, streams of honey flow as svadhaṃ-oblations to the fathers. 5. Yaujush-verses are offerings of butter to the gods. He who, knowing this, daily reads these verses, satisfies the gods with offerings of butter; and they, being satisfied, satisfy him, etc. (as in the preceding paragraph). 6. Śāman-verses are soma-libations to the gods. He who, knowing this, daily reads these verses, satisfies the gods with soma-libations; and they being satisfied, satisfy him, etc. (as above). 7. Verses of Atharvan and Angiras (arthavān-girasaḥ) are oblations of fat to the gods. He who, knowing this, daily reads these verses, satisfies the gods with oblations of fat; and they etc. (as above). 8. Prescriptive and scientific treatises, dialogues, traditions, tales, verses, and eulogistic texts are oblations of honey to the gods. He who, knowing this, daily reads these, satisfies the gods with oblations of honey; and they etc. (as above). 9. Of this Veda-sacrifice there are four Vashaṭkāras, when the wind blows, when it lightens, when it thunders, when it crashes; wherefore when it blows, lightens, thunders, or crashes, let the man, who knows this, read, in order that these Vashaṭkāras may not be interrupted. He who does so is freed from dying a second time, and attains to an union with Brahma. Even if he cannot read vigorously, let him read one text relating to the gods. Thus he is not deprived of his living creatures."

xi. 5, 7, 1: "Now comes an encomium upon Vedic study. Study and teaching are loved. He (who practises them) becomes composed in mind. Independent of others, he daily attains his objects, sleeps pleasantly, becomes his own best physician. Control of his senses, concentration of mind, increase of intelligence, renown, capacity to educate mankind [are the results of study]. Increasing intelligence secures for

23 The Atharva Sanhitā is so called.
24 See Böthlingk and Roth's Lexicon, s.v. chhambaṭ.
the Brāhmaṇa the four attributes of saintliness, suitable conduct, renown, and capacity for educating mankind. When so educated, men guarantee to the Brāhmaṇa the enjoyment of the four prerogatives which are his due, reverence, the receipt of gifts, freedom from oppression, and from death by violence. 2. Of all the modes of exertion, which are known between heaven and earth, study of the Veda occupies the highest rank, (in the case of him) who, knowing this, studies it. Wherefore this study is to be practised. 3. On every occasion when a man studies the Vedic hymns he (in fact) performs a complete ceremonial of sacrifice, i.e. whosoever, knowing this, so studies. Wherefore this study, etc., etc. 4. And even when a man, perfumed with unguents, adorned with jewels, satiated with food, and reposing on a comfortable couch, studies the Veda he (has all the merit of one who) performs penance (felt) to the very tips of his nails: 25 (such is the case with him) who, knowing this, studies. Wherefore etc. 5. Rig-veda-verses are honey, Śāma-verses butter, yajus-verses nectar (amrīta). When a man reads dialogues (vāko-vākyā) [and legends], these two sorts of composition are respectively oblations of cooked milk and cooked flesh. 6. He who, knowing this, daily reads Rig-veda-verses, satisfies the gods with honey; and they, when satisfied, satisfy him with all objects of desire, and with all enjoyments. 7. He who, knowing this, daily reads Śāma-verses, satisfies the gods with butter; and they, when satisfied, etc. (as before). 8. He who, knowing this, daily reads Yajus-verses, satisfies the gods with nectar; and they, etc. (as before). 9. He who, knowing this, daily studies dialogues and the different classes of ancient stories, satisfies the gods with milk- and flesh-oblations; and they, etc. (as before). 10. The waters move. The sun moves. The moon moves. The constellations move. The Brāhmaṇa who on any day does not study the Veda, is on that day like what these moving bodies would be if the ceased to move or act. Wherefore such study is to be practised. Let

25 This sentence is differently rendered by Professor Weber, Ind. Stud. x. p. 112, as follows: "He burns (with sacred fire) to the very tips of his nails." In a later page of the same Essay we are told that according to the doctrine of a teacher called Nāka Maudgalya as stated in the Taṟtirīya Āraṇyaka, the study and teaching of the Veda are the real tapas (svādhārya-pravachane eva tad hi tapah). In the text of the Āraṇyaka itself, vii. 8, it is declared that study and teaching should always accompany such spiritual or ritual acts as ritam, satyam, tapas, dama, ċama, the āgnihotra sacrifice, etc. See Indische Studien, ii. 214, and x. 113.
a man therefore present as his offering a verse of the Rig-veda, or the Sāman, or the Yajush, or a Gāthā, or a Kuṇḍvyā, in order that the course of his observances may not be interrupted.”

• Manu employs the following honorific expressions in reference to the Vedas (xii. 94 ff.):

Pitri-deva-manushyāṅāṁ vedaś chakṣuḥ sanātanam | aśakyāṁ chāpramayaṁ cha veda-śāstram iti sthitiḥ | Yā veda-vāhyāṁ smritayo yās cha kāścha kudrīṣṭayaḥ | 24 sarvās tā nishphalāḥ pretya tamo-nisṛthāḥ hi tāḥ smṛtāḥ | Utpadyante chyavante cha yāny ato 'nyāni kāniceḥ | Tāny arvāk-kāliṅkatayaḥ 27 nishphalāny anṛūtāni cha | Chāturyaraṁyaṁ trayo lokās chaturārās chāsramāḥ prithak | Bhūtam bhavad bhavishyāṁ cha sarvaṁ vedāt prasiddhyati | sābdhaś sparśaḥ cha rūpaṁ cha raso gandhaḥ cha | panchamaḥ | vedād eva prasiddhyanti prasūti-guṇa-karmataḥ | Bibharti 28 sarva-bhūtāni veda-śāstraṁ sanātanaṁ | Tasmād etat param manye yaj jantor asya śādhanam | Sainīpatayaṁ cha rājyaṁ cha daṇḍa-netrītam eva cha | sarva-lokādhipatayaṁ cha veda-śāstra-vid arhati | Yathā jātabalo vahnir dahaty ārdrān api drumān | tathā dahati veda-jnāḥ karma-jaṁ domah ātmanāḥ | veda-śāstrārtha-tatteva-jno yatra tatrāsrame vasan | ihaeva loke tisrthān sa brahmabhūyāya kalpate |

“The Veda is the eternal eye of the fathers, of gods, and of men; it is beyond human power and comprehension; this is a certain conclusion. Whatever traditions are apart from the Veda, and all heretical views, are fruitless in the next world, for they are declared to be founded on darkness. All other [books] external to the Veda, which arise and pass away, are worthless and false from their recentness of date. The system of the four castes, the three worlds, the four states of life, all that has been, now is, or shall be, is made manifest by the

24 Drīṣṭārtha-vākyāni “chaitya-vandanāt swargo bhavati” ity ādini yāni cha antaraka-mūlāni devata-pūrvādī-nirākaraṇātmakāni veda-viruddhāni chārvāka-darśanaṁ | “That is, deductions from experience of the visible world; such doctrines as that ‘heaven is attained by obeisance to a chaitya,’ and similar Chārvāka tenets founded on false reasonings, contradicting the existence of the gods, and the efficacy of religious rites, and contrary to the Vedas.”—Kullūka.

27 Itāmāntakaṁvatā “From their modernness.”—Kullūka.

28 “Havir omnam hūyate | so’gnir ādityam upasarpati | tat śuryo raimbhir varshi | tenānnaṃ bhavati | aha cha bhūtānām upatti-sthitiḥ eti havir jāyate” iti brāhmaṇam | “The oblation is cast into the fire; fire reaches the sun; the sun causes rain by his rays; thence food is produced; thus the oblation becomes the cause of the generation and maintenance of creatures on this earth;’ so says a Brāhmaṇa.”—Kullūka.
Veda. The objects of touch and taste, sound, form, and odour, as the fifth, are made known by the Veda, together with their products, qualities, and the character of their action. The eternal Veda supports all beings: hence I regard it as the principal instrument of well-being to this creature, man. Command of armies, royal authority, the administration of criminal justice, and the sovereignty of all worlds, he alone deserves who knows the Veda. As fire, when it has acquired force, burns up even green trees, so he who knows the Veda consumes the taint of his soul which has been contracted from works. He who comprehends the essential meaning of the Veda, in whatever order of life he may be, is prepared for absorption into Brahmā, even while abiding in this lower world.”

The following are some further miscellaneous passages of the same tenor, scattered throughout the Institutes (Manu, ii. 10 ff.):

Srūtis tu vedo vijnayo dharma-sāstraṁ tu vai smṛitiḥ | te sarvārtheśv amāṁsye tadbhyāṁ dharmo hi nirbabhau | 11. Yo'vamanyeta te mule hetu-sāstraśrayād devijāḥ | sa sādhubhir vahishkāryyo nāstiko veda-nindakaḥ | . . . . 13. Dharmaṁ jijnāsamāṇānāṁ pramāgam paramāṁ śrutiṁ |

“By śruti is meant the Veda, and by smṛiti the institutes of law: the contents of these are not to be questioned by reason, since from them [a knowledge of] duty has shone forth. The Brāhmaṇ who, relying on rationalistic treatises, shall contemn these two primary sources of knowledge, must be excommunicated by the virtuous as a sceptic and reviler of the Vedas. . . . . 13. To those who are seeking a knowledge of duty, the śruti is the supreme authority.”

In the following passage, the necessity of a knowledge of Brahma is asserted, though the practice of ritual observances is also inculcated (vi. 82 ff.):

Dhyānīkāṁ sarvam evaitad yaḥ etad abhiśabaditam | na hy anadhyātma-vit kaśchit kriyā-phalam upāsnute | adhiyajnam brahma joped ādhidāvā-vikam eva cha | ādhyātmikāṁ cha satataṁ vedāntābhīhitam cha yat | Idam bharanām ajñānam idam eva vijñatām | idam anvichchhatāṁ svargam idam ānuyantāṁ ichchhatām |

29 This, however, must be read in conjunction with the precept in xii. 106, which declares: āraḥṣaṁ dharmopadesaṁ cha vedo-sāstraśirodhīnaḥ | yas tarkaṁyanusandhatte sa dharmo veda naṁ paṁḥ | “He, and he only is acquainted with duty, who investigates the injunctions of the rishis, and the precepts of the smṛiti, by reasonings which do not contradict the Veda.”
"All this which has been now declared is dependant on devout meditation: no one who is ignorant of the supreme Spirit can reap the fruit of ceremonial acts. Let a man repeat texts relating to sacrifice, texts relating to deities, texts relating to the supreme Spirit, and whatever is declared in the concluding portions of the Veda (the Upanishads). This [Veda] is the refuge of the ignorant, as well as of the understanding; it is the refuge of those who are seeking after paradise, as well as of those who are desiring infinity."

The following text breathes a moral spirit, by representing purity of life as essential to the reception of benefit from religious observances (ii. 97):

Vedās tyāgaḥ ca yajñāḥ ca niyamaḥ ca tapāṁsi cha | na vipradaśiha-bhāṣavaḥ siddhiṁ gachhanti karchichit |

"The Vedas, almsgiving, sacrifices, observances, austerities, are ineffectual to a man of depraved disposition."

The doctrine which may be drawn from the following lines does not seem so favourable to morality (xi. 261 ff.):

Hatvā lokān apīmāṁs trīn aśnanna api yatatahaḥ | Ṛigvedaṁ dhārayaṁ viṣṭro naināḥ prāṇnoti kinecha | Ṛiksāṁhitāṁ trīr abhyasya yajushāṁ va samāhitāḥ | sāmnāṁ va sa-rahasyānāṁ sarva-pāpaḥ pramuchyate | yathā mahā-hradam prāpya kṣiṇtam losṭaṁ vināśyati | tathā duṣcha-rītaṁ sarvaṁ vede tīvṛiti majjati |

"A Brāhmaṇa who should destroy these three worlds, and eat food received from any quarter whatever, would incur no guilt if he retained in his memory the Rig-veda. Repeating thrice with intent mind the Sanhitā of the Rik, or the Yajush, or the Sāman, with the Upanishads, he is freed from all his sins. Just as a clod thrown into a great lake is dissolved when it touches the water, so does all sin sink in the triple Veda."

Considering the sacredness ascribed in the preceding passages to all the Vedas, the characteristics assigned to three of them in the passage quoted above (p. 12) from the Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa, as well as the epithet applied to the Sāma-veda in the second of the following verses are certainly remarkable; (Manu, iv. 123 ff.):

Sāma-dhvanāv ṛig-yajushā nādhiyāta kadāchāna | vedasyādhiyā va ṛpy antam āranyakam adhitya cha | Ṛigvedo deva-daivatyā yajurvedas tu mānushāḥ | Sāmavedaḥ smṛitaḥ pitryas tasmāt tasyāsuhīr dhvaniḥ |
"Let no one read the Rich or the Yajush while the Sāman is sounding in his ears, or after he has read the conclusion of the Veda (i.e. the Upanishads) or an Āraṇyaka. The Rig-veda has the gods for its deities; the Yajur-veda has men for its objects; the Sāma-veda has the pīṭhas for its divinities, wherefore its sound is impure."

The scholiast Kullūka, however, will not allow that the sound of the Sāma-veda can be really "impure." "It has," he says, "only a semblance of impurity" (tasmāt tasya aśuchir ica dhvaniḥ | na tv aśu-chir eva). In this remark he evinces the tendency, incident to so many systematic theologians, to ignore all those features of the sacred text on which they are commenting which are at variance with their theories regarding its absolute perfection. As it was the opinion of his age that the Veda was eternal and divine, it was, he considered, impossible that impurity or any species of defect could be predicated of any of its parts; and every expression, even of the highest authorities, which contradicted this opinion, had to be explained away. I am not in a position to state how this notion of impurity came to be attached to the Sāma-veda. The passage perhaps proceeded from the adherents of some particular Vedic school adverse to the Sāma-veda; but its substance being found recorded in some earlier work, it was deemed of sufficient authority to find a place in the miscellaneous collection of precepts,—gathered no doubt from different quarters, and perhaps not always strictly consistent with each other,—which make up the Mānava-dharma-śāstra.

Vishnu Purāṇa.—The following passage from the Vishnu Purāṇa, at the close, ascribes the same character of impurity to the Sāma-veda, though on different grounds, Vish. Pur. ii. 11, 5:

Ya tu śaktī parā Vishnu rīg-yajuḥ-sāma-sanjñitā | saishā trayā tapaty aśho jagataḥ cha hinasti yat | saiva Vishnuḥ sthitāh sthityān jagataḥ pālanodyataḥ | rīg-yajuḥ-sāma-bhūto 'ntaḥ sācitur dvija tishṭhati | māsi māsi ravir yo yasy tatra tatra hi sā parā | trayīmayi Vishnu-śaktir avasṭhānam karoṭi vai | Richas tapanti pūrvāṁ madhyāhne 'tha yajūṁshy atha | vṛihadrathantarādini sāmāny ahnaḥ kshayo ravaun | angam esā trayā Vishnu rīg-yajuḥ-sāma-sanjñitā | Vishnu-śaktir avasṭhānam māśadīye karoṭi sā | na kevalāṁ ravaun śaktir vaishnavi sā trayīmayi | Brahmā 'tha Purusho Rudras trayam etat trayīmayam | sar-gādāv riṁmayo Brahmā sthitau Vishnu yajurmayah | Rudraḥ sāmamayo 'ntaṁ tasmāt tasyāśuchir dhvaniḥ |
"The supreme energy of Vishṇu, called the Rich, Yajush, and Sāman—this triad burns up sin and all things injurious to the world. During the continuance of the world, this triad exists as Vishṇu, who is occupied in the preservation of the universe, and who in the form of the Rich, Yajush, and Sāman, abides within the sun. That supreme energy of Vishṇu, consisting of the triple Veda, dwells in the particular form of the sun, which presides over each month. The Rich verses shine in the morning sun, the Yajush verses in the meridian beams, and the Vṛihad-rathantara and other Sāma verses in his declining rays. This triple Veda is the body of Vishṇu, and this his energy abides in the monthly sun. But not only does this energy of Vishṇu, formed of the triple Veda, reside in the sun: Brahmā, Purusha (Vishṇu), and Rudra also constitute a triad formed of the triple Veda. Acting in creation, Brahmā is formed of the Rig-veda; presiding over the continuance of the universe, Vishṇu is composed of the Yajur-veda; and for the destruction of the worlds, Rudra is made up of the Sāma-veda; hence the sound of this Veda is impure."

Vāyu Purāṇa.—Other passages also may be found in works which are far from being reputed as heretical, in which the Vedas, or particular parts of them, are not spoken of with the same degree of respect as they are by Manu. Thus the Vāyu Purāṇa gives precedence to the Purāṇas over the Vedas in the order of creation (i. 56\(^{30}\)):

Prathamaṁ sarva-sāstrāṇāṁ Purāṇāṁ Brahmanā śrīr̥ṣitaṁ | anantaraṁ cha vaktreṇyo pvasaṁ tasya vinisirītāḥ |

"First of all the Sastras, the Purāṇa was uttered by Brahmā. Subsequently the Vedas issued from his mouths."

Similarly the Padma Purāṇa says:

Purāṇam sarva-sāstrāṇāṁ prathamam Brahmanā śrīr̥ṣitaṁ | tri-varga-
sādhanaṁ punyaṁ śa-koṭi-pravistarām | nirdagdheshu cha lokeśu vāji-
r̥pena Keśavaḥ | Brahmanas tu samādeśād vedān akrītacān asau | angāni chaturu vedān purāṇa-nyāya-vistarā[ⁿ?] | mīmāṁsa[ⁿ?] dharmā-sāstraṁ
cha parigrīhyathā sāmpratāṁ | matsya-r̥pena cha punaḥ kalpādāv udā-
kāntāre | aśesham etat kathitam ityādi |\(^{31}\)

"The Purāṇa, which is an instrument for effecting the three objects

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\(^{30}\) Page 48 of Prof. Aufrecht’s Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS. in the Bodleian Library at Oxford.

\(^{31}\) See the same Catalogue p. 12, col. i.
of life, which is pure, and extends to the length of a hundred crores of verses, was the first of all the Śāstras which Brahmā uttered. When the worlds had been burnt up, Keśava (Krishna), in the form of a horse, and obeying Brahmā's command, rescued the Vedas. Having taken them with their appendages, the Purāṇas, the Nyāya, the Mīmāṃsā, and the Institutes of Law, he now at the beginning of the Kalpa promulgated them all again in the form of a Fish from the midst of the waters."

In the Matsya Purāṇa, iii. 2 ff., not only is priority of creation claimed for the Purāṇas, but also the qualities of eternity and identity with sound, which are generally predicated of the Vedas alone:


2. "Pitāmaha (Brahmā), first of all the immortals, took shape: then the Vedas with their Angas and Upāngas (appendages and minor appendages), and the various modes of their textual arrangement, were manifested. 3. The Purāṇa, eternal, formed of sound, pure, extending to the length of a hundred crores of verses, was the first of the Sāstras which Brahmā uttered: and afterwards the Vedas, issued from his mouth; and also the Mīmāṃsā and the Nyāya with its eightfold system of proofs. 4. From him (Brahmā), who was devoted to the study of the Vedas, and desirous of offspring, sprang mind-born sons, so called because they were at first created by his mind."

The Vāyu Purāṇa says further on in the same section from which I have already quoted:

Yo vidyāch chaturō vedān sāngopanishado dvijaḥ | na chet purāṇaṁ saṁvidyād naiva sa syād vīchaksānāḥ | Itihāsa-purāṇabhyāṁ vedān samupāvṛtiṁhayet | vibhety alpa-śrutād vedo mām ayaṁ praharishyati |

This quotation is made from the Taylor MS. No. 1918 of the India Office Library. The Guikwar MS. No. 3032 of the same collection, reads here tapas cha-cāhāra, "practised austerity," instead of rūpaṁ dadhāra, "took shape," and has besides a number of other various readings in these few lines.

See p. 50 of Dr. Aufrecht's Catalogue.
"He who knows the four Vedas, with their supplements and Upanishads is not really learned, unless he know also the Purāṇas. Let a man, therefore, complete the Vedas by adding the Itihāsas and Purāṇas. The Veda is afraid of a man of little learning, lest he should treat it injuriously."

The first of these verses is repeated in the Mahābhārata, Ādiparvan verse 645, with a variation in the first half of the second line na cha-khyānam iḍāṁ vidyāt, "unless he know also this narrative" (i.e. the Mahābhārata). The second of the verses of the Vāyu Purāṇa also is to be found in the same book of the Mahābhārata verse 260, and is followed by these lines:

261. Kāraḥṣaṁ vedam imāṁ vidvān śrāvayaṁtva 'nnam asnute...

264. Ekataś chaturu vedān Bhāratāṁ chaṅad ekataḥ | purā kila suraṁ sarvaiḥ sametya tulavā dhṛitam | chaturbhyāḥ sa-rahasyebhyo vedeḥbhyo hy adhikaṁ yadā | tadā-prabhyīti lokaśmin mahābhāratam ucyate |

"The man who knows this Veda relating to Krishṇa (the Mahābhārata), and repeats it to others, obtains food. . . . 264. All the collected gods formerly weighed in a balance the four Vedas which they placed in the one scale, and this Bhārata which they put into the other. When the latter was found to exceed (in weight) the four Vedas with the Upanishads, it was thenceforward called in this world the Mahābhārata."

Here there is a play upon the word Bhārata, as in part identical with bhāra, "weight."

The following verses of the same Ādiparvan and many others are also eulogistic of the great epic poem:

2298. Idāṁ hi vedāṁ sammitam pavtram api chottamam | śrāvyānām uttamaṁ chedam purāṇam rishi-saṁstutam |

"This (Mahābhārata) is on an equality with the Veda, pure, most excellent, the best of all works that are to be recited, ancient, and praised by rishis."

2314. Vijneyaḥ sa cha vedānām pārago Bhāratam paṭhan |

The reader of the Bhārata is to be regarded as having gone through the Vedas."

The benefits derivable from a perusal of the same poem are also set forth in the Svarga-rohaṇikā-parvan, verses 200 ff.

In the same way the Rāmāyaṇa, i. 1, 94, speaks of itself, as "this
pure and holy narrative, which is on an equality with the Vedas”
(idam pavitram ākhyānam punyaṁ vedaiś cha sammitam).

And in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, ii, 8, 28, it is said: Prāha bhāgavataṁ
nāma purāṇam brahma-sammitam | Brahmaṁ Bhagavat-proktam Brahma-
kalpe upagata |

“(Brahmarāta) declared the Purāṇa called the Bhāgavata, which
stands on an equality with the Veda (brahma), and was declared by
Bhagavat to Brahmā when the Brahma-kalpa had arrived.”

Brahma-vaivarta Purāṇa.—The Brahma-vaivarta Purāṇa asserts in
a most audacious manner its own superiority to the Veda (i. 48 ff.):

Bhavagan yat teyā priṣṭaṁ jnātaṁ sarvam abhīpsitaṁ | sāra-bhūtaṁ
purāṇeshu Brahma-vaivarttam uttamanam | Purāṇopapurāṇānāṁ vedānāṁ
bhrama-bhanjanaṁ |

“That about which, venerable sage, you have inquired, and which
you desire, is all known to me, the essence of the Purāṇas, the pre-
eminent Brahma-vaivarta, which refutes the errors of the Purāṇas and
Upapurāṇas, and of the Vedas.” (Professor Aufrecht’s Cat. p. 21.)

In the following passage also, from the commencement of the Mun-
daka Upanishad, the Vedic hymns (though a divine origin would no
doubt be allowed to them4) are at all events deprecated, by being
classed among other works as part of the inferior science, in contrast to
the Brahma-vidyā or knowledge of Brahma, the highest of all know-
ledge, which is expressly ascribed to Brahmā as its author:

1. Brahmā devānāṁ prathamaḥ sambabhūva viśvasya karttā bhuvanasya
goptā | sa brahma-vidyāṁ sarva-vidyāḥ pratishthāṁ Atharvāya jyesthā-
putrāya prāha | 2. Atharväṇe yāṁ pravadeta Brahmā Atharva tāṁ
purovāchāṅgire brahma-vidyām | sa Bhārudeśaiya Satyavāhāya prāha
Bhārudeśaṅaṅi ngirase parāvaram | 3. Saunako ha vai Mahāśālo ‘ngirasān

4 In fact the following verses (4 and 6) occur in the second chapter of the same
Mund. Up.: Agnir mūrdhāḥ chakṣushī cha chandra-sūryyau disāḥ śrotre vāg vieṇitā
cha vedāḥ | vāyūḥ prāṇoḥ kridayaṁ viśevam osya padbhūṁ prāthīvī hy iva sarva-
bhūtasthitatmaḥ | . . . . 6. Tasmād pichāḥ sūma yaḫuṁsi dīkṣāḥ yaṅuṁsasi cha sarve
kratavo daksarīgāḥ cha | saṁavatvasam cha yajamāṇāṁ cha lokāḥ soma yatra pavate yatra
sūryāḥ | “Agni is his [Brahma’s] head, the sun and moon are his eyes, the four
points of the compass are his ears, the uttered Vedas are his voice, the wind is his breath,
the universe is his heart, the earth issued from his feet: he is the inner soul of all
creatures. . . . . 6. From him came the Rich verses, the Sāman verses, the Yajush
verses, initiatory rites, all oblations, sacrifices, and gifts, the year, the sacrificer, and
the worlds where the moon and sun purify.”
vidhivad upapannah prapachchha | kasmin nu bhagavo vijnate sarvam idaun vijnatam bhavati |
4. Tasmai sa hovachha | deve vidve veditavye iti ha yada brahma-viko vadanti parar chaivaparar cha |
5. Tatraparar "rigvedo yajurvedah samaavedo tharvavedah sakshaka kalpo vyakaranam niruktam
chando jyotisham" iti | atha pararaya tad aksharam adhigamyate |

"Brahma was produced the first among the gods, maker of the universe, preserver of the world. He revealed to his eldest son Atharva, the science of Brahma, the basis of all knowledge. 2. Atharvan of old declared to Angis this science, which Brahma had unfolded to him; and Angis, in turn, explained it to Satyavaha, descendant of Bharadvaja, who delivered this traditional lore, in succession, to Angiras. 3. Mahasala Saunaka, approaching Angiras with the proper formalities, inquired, 'What is that, o venerable sage, through the knowledge of which all this [universe] becomes known?' 4. [Angiras] answered, 'Two sciences are to be known—this is what the sages versed in sacred knowledge declare—the superior and the inferior. 5. The inferior [consists of] the Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda, the Sama-veda, the Atharva-veda, accentuation, ritual, grammar, commentary, prosody, and astronomy. The superior science is that by which the imperishable is apprehended."

I adduce some further passages which depreciate the ceremonial, or exoteric parts of the Vedas, in comparison with the esoteric knowledge of Brahma.

My attention was drawn to the following passage of the Bhagavad Gita, ii. 42 ff., by its quotation in the Rev. Professor K. M. Banerjea's Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy:

Yam imam pushpitam vacham pravadanty avipaschitaḥ | vedā-vāda-ratāḥ pārtha nānyad astiti vādinaḥ | kāmātmānaḥ svarga-parāḥ jānma-karma-phala-pradām | kriyā-vīṣeṣha-bahulam bhogaiśvarya-gatim prati | bhogaiśvarya-prasaktanām tayā pahrita-chetasām | vyavasāyātmikā buddhiḥ samādhau na vidhiyate | traigunya-vishayāḥ vedāḥ nistraigunyo bhavār-

35 Compare the Mahabharata, Adip. verse 258, which speaks of the Aranyakas as superior to (the other parts of) the Vedas, and amrita as the best of medicines (āranyaka cha vedēhyā ca samuhadhikhyo 'mriteu yathā). Similarly the S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, x. 3, 5, 12 (quoted in Müller's Anc. Sansk. Lit. p. 315, note), speaks of the Upanishads as being the essence of the Yajush: Tasya vai etasya yajuṣho rasāḥ eva upaniṣhat |
juna | . . . yāvān arthaḥ udapāne sarvataḥ samplutadaka | tāvān sar-
vavedu vedsas vrahmaṇasya vijānataḥ |

“A flowery doctrine, promising the reward of works performed in
this embodied state, prescribing numerous ceremonies, with a view to
future gratification and glory, is preached by unlearned men, devoted
to the injunctions of the Veda, assertors of its exclusive importance,
lovers of enjoyment, and seekers after paradise. The restless minds
of the men who, through this flowery doctrine, have become bereft of
wisdom, and are ardent in the pursuit of future gratification and glory,
are not applied to contemplation. The Vedas have for their objects the
three qualities (satteva, rajasa, tamasa, or ‘goodness,’ ‘passion,’ and ‘dark-
ness’); but be thou, Arjuna, free from these three qualities . . . . As
great as is the use of a well which is surrounded on every side by over-
flowing waters, so great [and no greater] is the use of the Vedas to a
Brāhman endowed with true knowledge.”

Chhāndogya Upanishad, vii. 1, 1, p. 473 (Colebrooke’s Essays, i. 12):

“Adhīhi bhagavāḥ” iti ha upasasadā Sanatkumāraṁ Nāraḍaḥ | taṁ
ha uvācha “yad vettha tena mā upasidā tatas te ārdhavān vakṣhyām”
iti | 2. Sa ha uvācha “piṣvedum bhagavo ‘dhyemi yajurvedaṁ sāmavedam
ātharvanāṁ chaturtham itihāsa-purāṇaṁ panchamaṁ vedanāṁ vedam
pitṛyaṁ rāśin daivaṁ nidiṁ vākvaśyam ekāyaṇaṁ deva-vidyām brah-
ma-vidyām bhūta-vidyāṁ kṣatra-vidyāṁ nakṣatra-vidyāṁ sarpa-deva-
jana-vidyāṁ etad bhagavo ‘dhyemi | 3. So 'ham bhagavo mantra-vid evāsī
ama na atma-vit | śrutaṁ hy eva me bhagavaddhisbhya ‘tarati śokam atma-vid’
iti so 'ham bhagavah śocāmi tam mā bhagavān śokasya pāraṁ tārayate
iti | taṁ ha uvācha “yad vai kincha etad adhyāgishṭaṁ nāma evaitat | 4. Nāma vai piṣvedo yajurvedaṁ sāmavedaṁ ātharvanāṁ chaturthhaṁ itihās-
purāṇaṁ panchamaṁ vedanāṁ vedah pitṛyo raśīr daivo nidiṁ vākvaśyam
ekāyaṇaṁ deva-vidyā brahma-vidyā bhūta-vidyā kṣatra-vidyā nakṣatra-
vidyā sarpa-deva-jana-vidyā nāma evaitat nāma upāsva” iti | 5. “Sa yo
nāma brahma ḥty upāste yāvad nāmno gataṁ tatra asya yathā kāmachāro
bhavati yo nāma brahma ḥty upāste” | “asti bhagavo nāmno bhūyaḥ”
iti | “nāmno vāva bhūyo 'stī” iti | “tam me bhagavān bravite” iti |

1. “Nārada approached Sanatkumāra, saying, ‘Instruct me, venerable
sage.’ He received for answer, ‘Approach me with [i.e. tell me] that
which thou knowest; and I will declare to thee whatever more is to
be learnt.’ 2. Nārada replied, ‘I am instructed, venerable sage, in the
Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda, the Sāma-veda, the Ātharvāṇa, [which is] the fourth, the Itiḥāsas and Purāṇas, [which are] the fifth Veda of the Vedas, the rites of the pitṛis, arithmetic, the knowledge of portents, and of great periods, the art of reasoning, ethics, the science of the gods, the knowledge of Scripture, demonology, the science of war, the knowledge of the stars, the sciences of serpents and deities; this is what I have studied. 3. I, venerable man, know only the hymns (mantras); while I am ignorant of soul. But I have heard from reverend sages like thyself that 'the man who is acquainted with soul overpasses grief.' Now I, venerable man, am afflicted; but do thou transport me over my grief.' Sanatkumāra answered, 'That which thou hast studied is nothing but name. 4. The Rig-veda is name; and so are the Yajur-veda, the Sāma-veda, the Ātharvāṇa, which is the fourth, and the Itiḥāsas and Purāṇas, the fifth Veda of the Vedas, etc. [all the other branches of knowledge are here enumerated just as above],—all these are but name: worship name. 5. He who worships name (with the persuasion that it is) Brahma, ranges as it were at will over all which that name comprehends;—such is the prerogative of him who worships name (with the persuasion that it is) Brahma.' 'Is there anything, venerable man,' asked Nārada, 'which is more than name?' 'There is,' he replied, 'something which is more than name.' 'Tell it to me,' rejoined Nārada."

(Sankara interprets the words panchamaṁ vedānāṁ vedam differently from what I have done. He separates the words vedānāṁ vedam from panchamāṁ and makes them to mean "the means of knowing the Vedas," i.e. grammar. See, however, the Bhāg. Pur. i. 4, 20, below, p. 42, and iii. 12, 39, to be quoted further on.

Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, xiv. 7, 1, 22 (= Brīhadāraṇyaka Upanishad, iv. 3, 22, p. 792 ff., p. 228-9 of Dr. Röer's English): Atra pitā opitā bhavati mātā amatā lokāḥ alokāḥ devāḥ advēḥ vedāḥ avedāḥ yajñāḥ aya-jnāḥ | atra steno 'steno bhavati bhrūṇa-hā abhrūṇa-hā paulkasaḥ paulkasasā chāndalo 'chāndalāḥ śramaṇo 'śramaṇas tāpaso 'tāpaso anavāgatam puṇyena anavāgatam pāpena | tīrṇa hi tadā sarvān śokān hridayasya bhavati |

36 Vākuvākyam = tarka-īśūram — Sāyaṇa. The word is elsewhere explained as meaning "dialogues" (uktī-pratyakṣtī-rūpam prakārayam—Comm. on S.'P. Br. xi. 5, 6, 8). The sense of some of the terms in this list of sciences is obscure; but exactness is not of any great importance to the general drift of the passage.

37 I give here the reading of the Br. Ār. Up. The S.'P. Br. in Professor Weber's
“In that [condition of profound slumber, sushupti,] a father is no father, a mother is no mother, the worlds are no worlds, the gods are no gods, and the Vedas are no Vedas, sacrifices are no sacrifices. In that condition a thief is no thief, a murderer of embryos is no murderer of embryos, a Paulkasa no Paulkasa, a Chāṇḍāla no Chāṇḍāla, a Śramaṇa no Śramaṇa, a devotee no devotee; the saint has then no relation, either of advantage or disadvantage, to merit or to sin; for he then crosses over all griefs of the heart.”

(I quote from the commentary on the Br. Ār. Up. Sankara’s explanation of the unusual words anavāgata and ananavāgata: Navāgataṁ na anavāgataṁ ananavāgataṁ asambaddham ity etat punyena sāstra-viḥitena karmanā tathā pāpena vihitākaraṇa-pratishidhā-kriyā-lakshanena | “Navāgataṁ=na (not) anavāgata, and ananavāgata=asambaddha, unconnected. This condition is unconnected either with merit, i.e. action enjoined by the sāstra, or with sin, i.e. action defined as the neglect of what is enjoined, or the doing of what is forbidden.”

To the same effect the great sage Nārada is made to speak in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, iv. 29, 42 ff.:


“Brahmā himself, the divine Giriṣa (Siva), Manu, Daksha and the other Prajāpatis, Sanaka and other devotees, Marīchhi, Atrī, Angiras, Pulasṭya, Pulaha, Kratu, Bṛguṛ, Vasishṭha—all these exponents of sacred knowledge, and masters of speech, including myself (Nārada) as text gives ananavāgataṁ punyena ananavāgataṁ pāpena. And yet the commentary alludes to the word ananavāgata being in the neuter.
the last, though seeing, are yet, to this day, unable, by austerity, by science, by contemplation, to see Paramesvara (the supreme God), who sees all things. Wandering in the vast field of the verbal brahma (the Veda), which is difficult to traverse, men do not recognise the Supreme, while they worship him as he is circumscribed by the attributes specified in the hymns (mantras). When the Divine Being regards any man with favour, that man, sunk in the contemplation of soul, abandons all thoughts which are set upon the world and the Veda. Cease, therefore, Varhishmat, through ignorance, to look upon works which merely seem to promote the chief good, as if they truly effected that object, (works) which only touch the ear, but do not touch the reality. The misty-minded men, who, ignorant of the Veda, declare that works are its object, do not know [his] own world, where the divine Janardana abides. Thou who, obstinate man that thou art, strewest the whole earth with sacrificial grass, with its ends turned to the east, and art proud of thy numerous immolations,—thou knowest not what is the highest work of all. That by which Hari (Vishnu) is pleased, is work; that by which the thoughts are fixed on him, is science."

I copy the comment on a part of this passage, viz. on verses 45 and 46:

S'abda-brahmani vede urur vistāro yasya arthato 'pi pāra-sūnye tasmin varttamānāḥ mantrānām lingair vajra-hastatvādi-guṇa-yukta-vividhadevatā'-bhidhāna-sāmarthyaṁ pariçechehin nam Eva Indrädi-rūpam tat-tat-karmāgraḥena bhajantaḥ param Paramesvaram na viduḥ | Torhy anyah ko nāma | karmādy-agrahaṁ hitā Paramesvaram eva bhajed ity ata āhu "yādā yam anurgriññī” | anugrahe hetuḥ | ātmani bhāvitaṁ san sa tādā loke loka-evavahāre vede cha karma-mārge parinishtitāṁ matīṁ tyajati |

"Men, conversant with the verbal brahma, the Veda, of which the extent is vast, and which, in fact, is boundless, worshipping Paramesvara [the supreme God] under the form of Indra, etc., circumscribed by the marks specified in the hymns, i.e. limited to various particular energies denominated deities, who are characterised by such attributes as ‘wielder of the thunderbolt,’ etc.; worshipping Him, I say, thus, with an addiction to particular rites, men do not know the supreme God. What other [god], then, [is there]? He therefore, in the words, ‘When he regards any one with favour,’ etc., says, let a man, abandoning all addiction to works, etc., worship the supreme God alone. The reason for this favour [is supplied in the following words]:"
'Sunk in the contemplation of soul, he then relinquishes his regard directed to the business of the world and to the Veda, i.e. to the method of works.'"

The following passage from the Kaṭha Upanishad (ii. 23) is of a somewhat similar tendency (p. 107 of Roër's ed. and p. 106 of Eng. trans.):

Nāyam ātmā pravachanena labhyo na medhayā na bahunā śrutena
yam evaśa vṛmantha tena labhyas tasyaśa ātmā vṛmantha tanvīn svām

"This Soul is not to be attained by instruction, nor by understanding, nor by much scripture. He is attainable by him whom he chooses. The Soul chooses that man's body as his own abode."

The scholiast interprets thus the first part of this text:

Yadyapi dvurijneyo 'yam ātmā tathāpy upayena suvijneyah eva ity
āha nāyam ātmā pravachanena aneka-veda-svika ranena labhyo jneyo nāpi
medhayā granthārthā-dhāranāv śakyā na bahunā śrutena kevalena | kena
tarhi labhyāḥ ity uchya te

"Although this soul is difficult to know, still it may easily be known by the use of proper means. This is what [the author] proceeds to say. This soul is not to be attained, known, by instruction, by the acknowledgment of many Vedas; nor by understanding, by the power of re-collecting the contents of books; nor by much scripture alone. By what, then, is it to be attained? This he declares."

It is not necessary to follow the scholiast into the Vedantic explanation of the rest of the passage."

The preceding passages, emanating from two different classes of writers, both distinguished by the spirituality of their aspirations, manifest a depreciation, more or less distinct and emphatic, of the polytheism of the Vedic hymns, as obstructive rather than promotive, of divine knowledge, and express disregard, if not contempt, of the ceremonies founded on that polytheism, and performed with a view to the enjoyments of paradise.

Sect. V.—Division of the Vedas, according to the Vishṇu, Vāyu, and Bhāgavata Purāṇas, and the Mahābhārata.

Some of the Purāṇas, as we have seen above, represent the four Vedas as having issued from Brahmā's different mouths. If they had

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each a separate origin of this kind, it would seem that they must have had from the time of their production a distinct existence also. And yet it is elsewhere said that there was originally but one Veda, which was subsequently divided into four portions.

Thus the Vishnu Purana gives the following account of the division of the Veda, described as having been originally but one, into four parts, iii. 2, 18:

*Krite yuge paraṁ jñānam Kapilādi-svarūpa-dhīrik | dadāti sarva-bhū-tānāṁ sarva-bhūta-hite rataḥ | chakravartī-svarūpeṇa tretāyām api sa prabhuh | Dushtānāṁ nigrahaṁ kurvan paripāti jagattrayam | V erad ekaṁ chatur-bhedāṁ kriteva sākhā-satair vibhuh | karoti bahulam bhāyo Vedavyāsa-svarūpa-dhīrik | vedāṁś tu dvāpare vyasya, etc.*

In the Kṛita age, Vishnu, devoted to the welfare of all creatures, assumes the form of Kapila and others to confer upon them the highest knowledge. In the Tretā age the Supreme Lord, in the form of a universal potentate, represses the violence of the wicked, and protects the three worlds. Assuming the form of Vedavyāsa, the all-pervading Being repeatedly divides the single Veda into four parts, and multiplies it by distributing it into hundreds of sākhās. Having thus divided the Vedas in the Drāpara age,” etc.39

This is repeated more at length in the following section (Vish. Pur. iii. 3, 4 ff.):

_Veda-drumasya Maitreya sākhā-bhedaiḥ sahasrasaḥ | na śakyo vistara vaktuṁ sankshepeṇa śriṇuḥvam tam | Drāpara dvāpare Vishnur Vyāsa-rāpi mahāmune | V erad ekam sa bahudhā kurute jagato hitaḥ | viryaṁ tejo balam chālpam manushyānam avekṣya vai | hitaḥ sarva-bhūtānāṁ vedā-bhedāṁ karoti saḥ | yaya Śuritvam evaṁ prithak prabhuh | Vedavyāsabhādhanā tu sa mārttīr Madhuvīdviṣhah | . . . Ashṭa-viṁśatikriteva vedāḥ vyastāḥ maharṣhībih | Vaivasvate ’ntare tasmin dvāpareṣu punah punah |

“It is not possible, Maitreya, to describe in detail the tree of the Vedas with its thousand branches (sākhās); but listen to a summary. A friend to the world, Vishnu, in the form of Vyāsa, divides the single Veda into many parts. He does so for the good of all creatures, because he perceives the vigour, energy, and strength of men to have become

39 Compare on this subject portions of the passage of the Mahābhārata quoted in the First Volume of this work, pp. 144–146.
decreased. Vedavyāsa, in whose person he performs this division, is an impersonation of the enemy of Madhu (Vishnu). Eight-and-twenty times in the Dvāpara ages of this Vaivasvata Manvantara have the Vedas been divided by great sages." These sages are then enumerated, and Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana is the twenty-eighth.

The subject is resumed at the beginning of the next section (Vish. Pur. iii. 4, 1 ff.):


"The original Veda, consisting of four quarters, contained a hundred thousand verses. From it arose the entire system of sacrifice, tenfold (compared with the present) and yielding all the objects of desire. Subsequently, in the twenty-eighth manvantara my son, [Parāsara is the speaker] the mighty Vyāsa, divided into four parts the Veda which was one, with four quarters. In the same way as the Vedas were divided

40 For an account of the Manvantaras, see the First Part of this work, pp. 39, 43 ff. 41 Lassen (Ind. Ant. 2nd ed. i. 777, note) remarks: "Vyāsa signifies arrangement, and this signification had still retained its place in the recollection of the ancient recorders of the legend, who have formed his name an irregular perfect, viz. 'viṣṇu.' Lassen refers to two passages of the Mahābhārata in which the name is explained, viz. (i. 2417), Viṣṇuṣa vedān yamūt sa tasmād Vyāṣah iti smṛtah | "He is called Vyāsa because he divided the Veda." And (i. 4236) Yo vyasya vedāṁ chaturas tapasvā bhagavān rishīḥ | loke vyāstvam āpeko kāryṇyat kṛṣṇatevam eva cha | "The divine sage (Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana Vyāsa) who, through fervid devotion, divided the four Vedas, and so obtained in the world the title of Vyāsa, and from his blackness, the name of Kṛṣṇa."
OF THE VEDAS, HELD BY INDIAN AUTHORS. 39

by the wise Vyāsa, so had they been divided by all the [preceding] Vyāsas, including myself. And know that the śākha divisions [formed] by him [were the same as those] formed in all the periods of four yugas. Learn, too, that Krishṇa Dvaipāyana Vyāsa was the lord Nārāyaṇa; for who else on earth could have composed the Mahābhārata? Hear now correctly how the Vedas were divided by him, my great son, in this Dvāpara age. When, commanded by Brahmā, Vyāsa undertook to divide the Vedas, he took four disciples who had read through those books. The great muni took Paila as teacher of the Rich, Vaiṣampāyana of the Yajush, and Jaimini of the Śāman, while Sumantu, skilled in the Atharva-veda, was also his disciple. He took, too, as his pupil for the Itihāsas and Purāṇas the great and intelligent muni, Sūta, called Romaharshaṇa. 42

Vāyu Purāṇa.—In the same way, and partly in the same words, the Vāyu Purāṇa (section IX.) represents the Vedas to have been divided in the Dvāpara age. It first describes how this was done by Manu in the Svāyambhuva, or first manvantara, and then recounts how Vyāsa performed the same task in the existing seventh, or Vaivasvata manvantara; and, no doubt, also in the Dvāpara age, though this is not expressly stated in regard to Vyāsa.

The following is an extract from this passage (as given in Dr. Aufrecht's Catalogue of the Bodleian Sanskrit MSS. p. 54):

Dvāpare tu purāṇntte Manoḥ svāyambhuce 'ntare | Brahmā Manum uvāchedam vedaṁ vyasya mahāmate | Parivṛttam yugam tata svalpa-vīryāḥ dvijātayah | saṃvṛttāḥ yuga-doṣhena sarvaṁ chaiva yathākramam | bhrasṭa-mānaṁ yuga-vasād alpa-sīṣṭaṁ hi ārīṣṭate | Daśa-sāhasra-bhāgena hy avāsīṣtaṁ kriyād idam | vīryaṁ tejo balaṁ chālpaṁ saraṅ chaiva prāṇasyati | vede vedaḥ hi kāryyaḥ syur mā bhūd veda-viśānām | vede nāsaṁ anupraṇte yajno nāsaṁ gamiṣhyaṭi | yajne nāsaṁ deva-nāsas

42 Mahādhāra on the Vājasaneyi Sanhitā (Weber's ed. p. 1) says, in regard to the division of the Vedas: Tatruḍam Brahma-paramparayā praptam Vedaṁ Vedaevyāso manda-matīṁ manushyāṁ vichintya tat-kṛṣṇoḥ chaturdhaḥ vyasya Rig-yajus-sūma-tharavākhyāṁ chaturo vedaṁ Paila-Vaiṣampāyana-Jaimini-Sumantubhyāṁ kramād upadiseśa te cha aṣṭa-sūhṛkhyāḥ | Evam paramparayā sāhasra-sākho Veda jātaḥ | “Vedavyāsa, having regard to men of dull understanding, in kindness to them, divided into four parts the Veda which had been originally handed down by tradition from Brahmā, and taught the four Vedas, called Rich, Yajush, Śāman, and Atharvan, in order, to Paila, Vaiṣampāyana, Jaimini, and Sumantu; and they again to their disciples. In this way, by tradition, the Veda of a thousand śākhas was produced.”
tataḥ sarvaṃ praṇaṣyati | Ādyo vedaś chatush-pādo śaṭa-sāhasra-sammi-
taḥ | Punar daśa-guṇaḥ kritisno yajno vai sarva-kāma-dhuk | Evam utkas
tāthety ukteva Manuḥ ioka-hite rataḥ | vedam ekam chatush-pādaṁ chatur-
dhā vyabhajat prabhuh | Brahmano vachanat tata lokānāṁ hita-kāmyaṁ |
tad aham varttamānena yuṣhmākaṁ veda-kaḷpanam | manvantareṇa va-
kahyāmi vyattitānam prakalpanam | pratyakṣhena parokṣaṁ vai tad nibo-
dhata sattamāḥ | Asmin yuge krito Vyāṣaḥ Pārāśaryāḥ parantapaḥ |
“Dvāipāyanaḥ” iti khyāto Vishnoṁ aṁśaḥ prakīrtitāḥ | Brahmanā chodi-
taḥ so ’smin vedaṁ vyastum prachakrame | Ātha śīshyāṁ sa jagrāha cha-
turo veda-kāraṇāt | Jaiminiṁ cha Sumantuṁ cha Vaisampāyanam eva
cha | Pālaiṁ teshāṁ chaturthaṁ tu panchamaṁ Lomaharṣaṇam |

"In the former Dvāpara of the Śvayambhuva manvantara, Brahman said to Manu, ‘Divide the Veda, o sage. The age is changed; through its baneful influence the Brāhmans have become feeble, and from the same cause the measure of everything has gradually declined, so that little is seen remaining. A part (of the Veda) consisting of only these ten thousand (verses) is now left to us from the Krita age; vigour, fire, and energy are diminished; and everything is on the road to destruction. A plurality of Vedas must be made out of the one Veda, lest the Veda be destroyed. The destruction of the Veda would involve the destruction of sacrifice; that again would occasion the annihilation of the gods, and then everything would go to ruin. The primeval Veda consisted of four quarters and extended to one hundred thousand verses, while sacrifice was tenfold, and yielded every object of desire.’ Being thus addressed, Manu, the lord, devoted to the good of the world, replied, ‘Be it so,’ and in conformity with the command of Brahmā, divided the one Veda, which consisted of four quarters, into four parts. I shall, therefore, narrate to you the division of the Veda in the existing manvantara; from which visible division you, virtuous sages, can understand those invisible arrangements of the same kind which were made in past manvantaras. In this Yuga, the victorious son of Parāśara, who is called Dvāipāyana, and is-celebrated as a portion of Vishnu, has been made the Vyāsa. In this Yuga, he, being commanded by Brahmā, began to divide the Vedas. For this purpose he took four pupils, Jaimini, Sumantu, Vaisampāyana,

43 The Mahābhārata, Śāntip. verse 13,678, says the Vedas were divided in the Śvayambhuva manvantara by Apāntaratamas, son of Sarasvati (Tenā bhīnnoṁ tataḥ vedaṁ manoḥ svāyambhuva 'utare)."
and Paila, and, as a fifth, Lomaharshana" [for the Purāṇas and Iti-
hāsas, etc.]

Bhāgavata Purāṇa.—It is in its third book, where the different man-
vantaras are described, that the Vishṇu Purāṇa gives an account of the
division of the Vedas. In the book of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa where
the manvantaras are enumerated, there is no corresponding allusion to
the division of the Vedas; but a passage to the same effect occurs in
the fourth section of the first book, verses 14 ff.:

Deāpasa samanuprāpte trītiya-yuga-paryaye | jataḥ Parāśarād yogī
Vāsavyāṁ kalayaḥ Hareḥ | 15. Sa kadācit Sarvasvāyāḥ upaspriśya jalanā
śuchi | viviktaḥ ekaḥ āśīnaḥ uditā ravi-maṇḍale | 16. Parāvaram-jañāṁ sa
risiḥ kālenāyakta-raṇhāsaḥ | yuga-dharma-vyatikaram prāptam bhūi
yuge yuge | 17. Bhautikānāṁ cha bhāvānāṁ śakti-hrāsanā cha tat-kri-
tam | asíraddhādhanaṁ nisvatvān durmedhān hrasitāyushaḥ | 18. Dur-
bhagāṁs janānānāṁ vikṣhyā munir divyena chakshushā | sarva-vargā-sramāṇāṁ
yad dadhyau hitam amogha-drik | 19. Chāturhotraṁ karma śuddham pra-
jānāṁ vikṣhyā vaidikam | vyadadhād yajna-santatyai vedam ekaṁ chatur-
Pailaḥ sāmago Jaiminiḥ kaviḥ | Vaiśāmpāyana evaiκo nishñāto yajushāṁ
uta | 22. Atharvāṅgirasāṁ aśīt Sumantr dāruno munāḥ | itihāsā-purāṇā-
nāṁ pitā me Romaharshaṇāḥ | 23. Te eto rishayo vedaṁ svāṁ svāṁ vyasyann
anekadāḥ | śishyaiḥ prāśisyaiḥ tach-chhishyair vedaṁ te śākhino 'bhavan | 24.
Te eva vedaḥ durmedhār dhāryante purushaṁ yathā | evam chakāra
bhagaṁ Vyaśaḥ kripaya - vatsalaḥ | 25. Strī - śadra - devīabandhānāṁ
trayi na śrutī-gochārā | karma-śreyasi mūḍhāṅgaḥ śreyāḥ eva bhaved iha |
iti Bhāratam ākhyānāṁ kripayā muninā kṛtam |

14. "When the DeVāpara age had arrived, during the revolution of
that third yuga, the Yogin (Vyaśa) was born, a portion of Hari, as the
son of Parāśara and Vāsavyā. 15. As on one occasion he was sitting
solitary at sunrise, after touching the pure waters of the Sarasvati, (16)
this rishi, who knew the past and the future, perceiving, with the eye
of divine intelligence, that disorder had in each yuga been introduced
into the duties proper to each, through the action of time, whose march
is imperceptible, (17) that the strength of beings formed of the elements
had in consequence declined, that men were destitute of faith, vigour,
and intelligence, that their lives were shortened, (18) and that they
were miserable,—reflected with unerring insight on the means of benefitting the several castes and orders. 19. Discerning that the pure Vedic ceremonies ought to be performed for men by the agency of four classes of priests, he divided the one Veda into four parts, with a view to the performance of sacrifice. 20. Four Vedas, called the Rich, Yajush, Sāman, and Atharvan, were drawn forth from it; while the Itihāsas and Purāṇas are called the fifth Veda. 21. Of these the Rich was held by Paila, the sage Jaiminī chanted the Sāman, Vaiśampāyana alone was versed in the Yajush, (22) the dreadful muni Sumantu in the verses of Atharvan and Angiras, and my father Romaharshaṇa in the Itihāsas and Purāṇas. 23. Each of these rishis arranged his own Veda in many ways; and by the successive generations of their disciples the Vedas were separated into branches (ākhaṇa). 24. The venerable Vyāsa, kind to the wretched, acted thus in order that the Vedas might be recollected by men of enfeebled understanding. 25. And as women, Śūdras, and the inferior members of the twice-born classes were unfitted for hearing the Veda, and were infatuated in desiring the blessings arising from ceremonies, the muni, with a view to their felicity, in his kindness composed the narrative called the Mahābhārata.”

But notwithstanding the magnitude of the great legendary and theological repertory which he had thus compiled, Vyāsa, we are told, was dissatisfied with his own contributions to sacred science until he had produced the Bhāgavata Purāṇa consecrated to the glory of Bhagavat (Kṛṣṇa).44 The completion of this design is thus narrated, Bhāg. Pur. i. 7, 6:


“Knowing that devotion to Adhokshaja (Kṛṣṇa) was the evident means of putting an end to the folly of the world, which was ignorant of this, he composed the Sātvata-Saṃhitā (the Bhāgavata). 7. When a man listens to this work, devotion to Kṛṣṇa, the supreme Purusha, arises in his mind, and frees him from grief, delusion, and fear. Having

44 See Wilson’s Vishnu Purāṇa, Preface, p. xlvi.
completed and arranged this Sanhitā, the muni taught it to his son Suka, who was indisposed to the pursuit of secular objects.”

Towards the close of this Purāṇa also, in the sixth section of the twelfth book (verses 37 ff.), there is to be found what Professor Wilson (Vish. Pur. Pref.) calls “a rather awkwardly introduced description of the arrangement of the Vedas and Purāṇas by Vyāsa.”

The passage (as given in the Bombay lithographed edition) is as follows:


“Sūta speaks: ‘From the third of the supreme Brahma’s heart, when he was plunged in meditation, there issued a sound, which is
perceived [by the devout] when they close their organs of sense. By adoring this sound, devotees destroy the soul's threefold taint, extrinsic, inherent, and superhuman, and become exempt from future birth. From this sound sprang the oṃkāra, composed of three elements, self-resplendent, of imperceptible origin, that which is the emblem of the divine Brahma, the supreme spirit. He it is who hears this sound (sphoṭa), when the ears are insensible and the vision inactive,— (this sphoṭa or oṃkāra) through which speech is revealed, and which is manifested in the aether, from the Soul. This [oṃkāra] is the sensible exponent of Brahma, the self-sustained, the supreme spirit; and it is the eternal seed of the Vedas, including all the Mantras and Upanishads. In this [oṃkāra] there were, o descendant of Bhṛigu, three letters, A and the rest, by which the three conditions, the [three] qualities, the [three] names, the [three] significations, the [three] states are maintained. From these [three letters] the divine and unborn being created the traditional system of the letters of the alphabet, distinguished as inner (y, r, l, v), uḥmas (ḥ, ो, s, ṣ), vowels, long and short, and consonants. With this [alphabet] the omnipresent Being, desiring to reveal the functions of the four classes of priests, [created] from his four mouths the four Vedas with the three sacred syllables (evāhrītin) and the oṃkāra. These he taught to his sons, the brahmarshis, skilled in sacred lore; and these teachers of duty, in turn declared them to their sons. The Vedas were thus received by each succeeding generation of devout pupils from their

45 Dravya-kriyā-kāraka, which the scholiast interprets as answering to adhibhūta, adhīṣṭa, and adhidaiva. See the explanation of these terms in Wilson's Sūnyatā-kārikā, pp. 2 and 9.

46 I quote the scholiast's explanation of this obscure verse: Ko'isu paramātmā tam āha 'sriṇotī' iti | imam sphoṭam avyaktam oṃkāram | nanu jīvā eva taṁ sriṇotu | na ity āha | supta-śrotre kāra-pidhānādiyā acrīttike 'pi śrotre sati | jīvas tu karaṇādīvatevād na tadā śrotā | tad-upalabdhis tu tasya paramātma-devārikā eva iti bhūvah | Īvaras tu naiven | yathā sūnyā-dīrgh sūnyē 'pi indriyā-vargs dīk jñānāṁ yasya | tathā hi supta yado ābadaṁ śrūteva prabuddhayate na tadā jīvā śrotā śren- driyateva | ato yan tadā śubdāṁ śrūteva jīvam prabuddhayati sa yathā paramātma eva tadvat | ko 'su oṃkāras taṁ viśinashṭi sārdhena yena vyo brīhati vyajyate yasya cha hṛdayākāśe utamāṇaḥ sakāśad evaḥkātaḥ. The word sphoṭa will be explained below, in a future section.

47 These the scholiast explains thus: Gṛṇāḥ sattvādayah | nāmāṇi ṛg-yaṁja-sū- māṇi | ortāḥ bhūr-bhūvah-svar-lakāḥ | vṛttayā jñārad-udyāḥ |

48 If I have translated this correctly, the oṃkāra is both the source of the alphabet, and the alphabet of the oṃkāra!
predecessors, and in each of the systems of four yugas were divided by great sages at the beginning of the Dvāpara. The Brahmarshis, impelled by Achyuta, who resided in their hearts, divided the Vedas, because they perceived that men had declined in age, in power, and in understanding. In this manvantara also, the divine and omnipresent Being, the author of the universe, being supplanted by Brahmā, Īśa (Siva), and the other guardians of the world, to maintain righteousness, became partially incarnate as the son of Parāśara and Satyavatī, and divided the Veda into four parts. Selecting aggregates of Rich, Atharvan, Yajush, and Śāman verses, and arranging them in sections (vargas), he formed four sanhitās (collections) of the hymns, as gems [of the same description are gathered together in separate heaps]. Having summoned four disciples, the wise lord gave to each of them one of these sanhitās. To Paila he declared the first sanhita, called that of the Bahvrichas; to Vaiśampāyana the assemblage of Yayush verses, called Nigada; to Jaimini the Chhandoga collection of Śāman verses; and to his pupil, Sumantu, the Atharvāṅgirāsa."

The Bhāgavata Purāṇa, however, is not consistent in the account which it gives of the division of the Vedas. In a passage already quoted in the First Volume of this work, p. 158, it speaks of that division as having been the work of the monarch Purūravas, and as having taken place in the beginning of the Tretā age. From the importance of this text I will extract it here again at greater length.

The celestial nymph Urvaśī, the Purāṇa tells us, had been doomed, in consequence of a curse, to take up her abode upon earth. She there

49 Dvāparādau can only mean the "beginning of the Dvāpara;" but the scholiast undertakes by the following process of reasoning to show that it means the end of that yuga: Dvāparādau dvāparam ādir yasya tad-antyānsa-lakshaṇasya kūlasya | tasmin dvāparānte veda-vibhāga-prasiddheḥ S’antanu-sama-kāta-Vyāsēvatāra-prasiddheḥ cha | vyastā vibhaktāḥ | "Dvāparādaus means the period of which the dvāpara was the beginning, i.e. the time distinguished as the concluding portion of that yuga; since it is notorious that the Vedas were divided at the end of the Dvāpara, and that the incarnation of Vyāsa was contemporaneous with S’antanu. Vyastāḥ = vibhaktāḥ, divided."

50 From this it appears that hitherto the account had not referred to the present manvantara. The scholiast remarks: Evaṁ sāmānyato veda-vibhāga-kramam ukte vāivasvata-manvantare viśeṣhato nirūpayitum āha | "Having thus [in the preceding verses] generally described the manner in which the Vedas are divided, [the author] now states [as follows], with the view of determining particularly [what was done] in the Vaiśvānara manvantara."
fell in love with King Purūravas, the report of whose manly beauty had touched her heart, even before she had been banished from paradise. After spending many happy days in the society of her lover, she forsook him in consequence of his having infringed one of the conditions of their cohabitation, and Purūravas was in consequence rendered very miserable. He at length, however, obtained a renewal of their intercourse, and she finally recommended him to worship the Gandharvas, who would then re-unite him with her indissolubly.

The Purāṇa then proceeds (ix. 14, 43 ff.):

Tasya saṃstuvatas tushtāh agnīsthālīm dadur nṛpa | Urvasīṁ manyamānasa tāṁ so 'budhyata charan vane | Sthālīṁ nyasī vane gateva grihan ādhāyaṁ nīśi | Tretāyāṁ sampravṛttāyām manasi trayy avartāta | Sthāla-sthānāṁ gato 'svatthāṁ sāṁ-garbham evakshya saḥ | Tena devo aranyā śrutaṁ ekena-śūnayā | Urvasīṁ mantrato dhāyaṁ adhāraṇaṁ uttarām | Ātmānam ubhyor mādyo yat tat prajānanaṁ prabhuḥ | Tasya nirmathanāṁ jato jātavṛdhaṁ vībhāvauḥ | Trayyā cha vidyāyā rājñā putrato kalpitā trīverī | Tenyājasta yajñesāṁ bhāgavantam adhoksha-jam | Urvasī-locan anvichhāṁ sarva-devamayaṁ Harim | Eko evo purā vedāḥ prayaḥ sarva-vāṁmayāḥ | Devo nārāyaṇo nānyāḥ eko 'gnir varṇaḥ evo cha | Purūravasya evāṁt trayī tretā-mukhe nṛpa | Agnīṁ prajāyā rājā lokaṁ gāndharvam eyivan

"The Gandharvas, gratified by his praises, gave him a platter containing fire. This he [at first] supposed to be Urvasī, but became aware [of his mistake], as he wandered in the wood. Having placed the platter in the forest, Purūravas went home; and as he was meditating in the night, after the Tretā age had commenced, the triple Veda appeared before his mind.31 Returning to the spot where he had placed the platter, he beheld an ascetthā tree springing out of a samī tree, and formed from it two pieces of wood. Longing to attain the world where Urvasī dwelt, he imagined to himself, according to the sacred text, Urvasī as the lower and himself as the upper piece of wood, and the place of generation as situated between the two.32 Agni was produced from its

31 Karma-bodhakam veda-trayaṁ prōdūrabhūt | "The three Vedas, expounders of rites, were manifested to him," as the scholiast explains.
32 Allusion is here made to a part of the ceremonial for kindling a particular sacrificial fire; one of the formulæ employed at which, as given in the Vāj. Sanhitā, 5, 2, is, "thou art Urvasī" (Urvaśī asi), and another, "thou art Purūravas" (Purūravāḥ
friction, and, according to the threefold science [Veda], was under his triple form, adopted by the king as his son. With this fire, seeking to attain the heaven of Urvasi, he worshipped the divine Hari, the lord of sacrifice, Adhokshaja, formed of the substance of all the gods. There was formerly but one Veda, the sacred monosyllable om, the essence of all speech; one god, Narayana; one Agni, and [one] caste. From Pururavas came the triple Veda in the beginning of the Tretā age. Through Agni, his son, the king attained the heaven of the Gandharvas.\(^{53}\)

On the close of this passage the commentator remarks:

_Nano anādir veda-traya-bodhito brāhmaṇādīnāṁ Indrādy-aneka-deva-

_yajanena sarga-prāpti-hetūḥ karma-mārgaḥ kathaṁ śādir iva varṇyate _

_Tatrāha “eka eva” iti deśābyām | Purā kṛta-yuge sarva-vāṁśa
dhānāṁ vāca-bhūtaḥ prana-vaha iva eva vedaḥ | Devaś cha Nāra-

_yaṇaḥ iva eva | Agniś cha eva eva laukikāḥ | Varnaś cha eva eva haṁso

_nāma iva iva traya-tu Pururavasah sakāśād āṣīt . . . . Ayam bhāvaḥ

_krita-yuge sattva-pradhānāḥ prāyaścita saiva ‘pi dhvāna-nishthāḥ | rajā-

-pradhāne tu Tretā-yuge vedādi-vibhāgena karma-mārgaḥ prakato
dhāvam ity arthaḥ | _

"How is it that the eternal method of works, which is pointed out by the three Vedas, and through which Brāhmans and others, by worshipping Indra and many other gods, attain to paradise, is spoken of [in the preceding verses] as if it had a beginning in time? He [the author of the Purāṇa] answers this in these two verses. Formerly, i.e. in the Kṛta age, there was only one Veda, the sacred monosyllable om, the essence of all words, i.e. that which is the seed of all words; and there was only one god, Narayana; only one fire, that for common uses; and

asī), the former denoting the lower (adharāraṇī), and the latter the upper, piece of wood (uttarāraṇī), by the friction of which the fire was to be produced. See Weber's Indische Studien, i. 197, and note; Roth's Illustrations of the Nirukta, p. 164; the S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, iii. 4, 1, 22, and Kātyāyana's S'ruta Sūtras, v. 1, 28 ff. The commentator on the Vājasaneyi Sanhitā explains the formula Urvāṣī asi thus: _Yathā Urvāṣī Pururava-nṛśpatya bhogāya adhastāt sete tadavat tvam abho 'vasthātā _

'si | _" As Urvāṣī lies under King Pururavas for sexual connection, so thou art placed underneath."

\(^{53}\) This story is also told in a prose passage in the Vish. Pur. iv. 6. It is there stated that Pururavas divided fire, which was originally one, in a threefold manner (Eka 'gnir ādīv abhavaḥ Ailenā tu atra manvantara traitā praveśitaḥ). No mention, however, is there made of his having divided the Vedas, or partitioned society into castes.
only one caste, the Hansa. But the triple Veda came from Purūravas.

... The meaning is this: in the Kṛta age the quality of goodness predominated in men, who were almost all absorbed in meditation. But in the Tretā age, when passion (rajas) prevailed, the method of works was manifested by the division of the Vedas."

This last quoted passage of the Bhāgavata gives, as I have intimated, a different account of the division of the Vedas from that contained in the other two texts previously adduced from the same work, and in the citations from the Viṣṇu and Vāyu Purāṇas. The one set of passages speak of the Veda as having been divided by Vyāsa into four parts in the Dvāpara age; while the text last cited speaks of the triple Veda as having originated with Purūravas in the Tretā age; and evidently belonged to a different tradition from the former three. The legend which speaks of three Vedas may possibly have a somewhat more ancient source than that which speaks of four, as it was not till a later date that the Atharva asserted its right to be ranked with the three others as a fourth Veda. The former tradition, however, would appear to have had its origin partly in etymological considerations. The word Tretā, though designating the second Yuga, means a triad, and seems to have been suggested to the writer’s mind by the triple fire mentioned in the legend.

Mahābhārata.—The following passage from the Mahābhārata, Śāntiparvan (verses 13, 088 ff.), agrees partially in tenor with the last passage from the Bhāgavata, but is silent regarding Purūravas:

Idāṁ kṛita-yugāṁ nāma kālāḥ śrēṣṭhaḥ pravarttitaḥ | Aḥimsyāḥ yajna-paśavo yuge 'śmin na tad anyathā | Chatuspātī sakalo dharmo bhavishyaty atra vai surāḥ | Tatas Tretā-yugāṁ nāma trayī yatra bhavishyati | Prokshitāḥ yajna-paśavo badhaṁ prāpsyanti vai makhe 54 | Yatra

54 This legend is borrowed from the Śātapatha Brāhmaṇa, xi. 5, 1, 1 ff. (pp. 855–858 Weber’s ed.), where the motive for its introduction is to describe the process by which fire was generated by Purūravas in obedience to the command of the Gāndharvas, as the means of his admission into their paradise. See Professor Müller’s translation of this story in the Oxford Essays for 1856, pp. 62, 63, or the reprint in his Chips from a German Workshop; and the First Volume of this work, p. 226. The legend is founded on the 95th hymn of the tenth book of the Rig-veda.

55 Manu (i. 85, 86) differs from this passage of the Mahābhārata in making the Dvāpara the age of sacrifice: Anye kṛita-yuṣme dharmāṁ Tretā-yuṣme Dvāparāṃ pare | Anye kālāḥ yugāḥ śrēṣṭāḥ pārthāḥ | Tapāḥ paraṁ Kṛita-yuṣme Tretā-yuṣme jñānom ucyate | Dvāparāṃ yajnam evahār dānam ekām kulau yuge | “Different duties are practised by men in the Kṛita age, and different duties in the Tretā, Dvāpara, and
padaś chaturtho vai dharmasya na bhavishyati | Tato vai dvāparaṁ nāma
vāsraḥ kālo bhavishyati |

"This present Kṛta age is the best of all the yugas; in it it will be unlawful to slay any animals for sacrifice; in this age righteousness shall consist of all its four portions and be entire. Then shall follow the Tretā age, in which the triple Veda shall come into existence, and animals fit for sacrifice shall be slaughtered as oblations. In that age the fourth part of righteousness shall be wanting. Next shall succeed the Dwāpara, a mixed period."

The M. Bh. (Sāntip. 13,475) relates that two Asuras, who beheld Brahmā creating the Vedas, suddenly snatched them up and ran off. Brahmā laments their loss, exclaiming:

Veda me paramāṁ chakshur veda me paramam balam | . . . . Vedaṁ rite hi kiṁ kuryāṁ lokāṇāṁ srishtim uttāmāṁ |

"The Veda is my principal eye; the Veda is my principal strength. . . . . What shall I do without the Vedas, the most excellent creation in the universe?" They were, however, recovered and restored to Brahmā (verses 13,506 ff.).

Vishnu Purāṇa.—The following verse, Vish. Pur. iii. 2, 12, refers to the periodical disappearance of the Vedas:

Chaturyugante vedanāṁ jāyate kali-viplavaḥ | pravarttayanti tān etya bhūvi saptarṣhayo divaḥ |

"At the end of the four ages (yugas) the disappearance of the Vedas, incident to the Kali, takes place. The seven rishis come from heaven to earth, and again give them currency." (Compare M. Bh. Sāntip. verse 7660, which will be quoted further on.)

SECT. VI.—Accounts in the Vishnu and Vāyu Purāṇas of the schisms between the adherents of the Yajur-veda, Vaiśampāyana and Yājñavalkya; hostility of the Āthevaṇas towards the other Vedas; and of the Chhandogas towards the Rig-veda.

The Vishnu Purāṇa, iii. 5, 2 ff., gives the following legend regarding Kali ages, in proportion to the decline in those yugas. Devotion is said to be supreme in the Kṛta, knowledge in the Tretā, sacrifice in the Dwāpara, and liberality alone in the Kali.” See also Mahābārata, Sāntiparvan, verse 8505, which agrees with Manu. See also the First Volume of this work, pp. 39 ff.
the way in which the Yajur-veda came to be divided into two schools, the black and the white:

Yājnavalkyas tu tasyābhād Brahmarāta-suto devīja | Sīshyāḥ parama-
dharma-jno guru-vrītti-paraḥ sadā | Rishir yo’dya mahāmeruḥ samāga
nāgamishyati | Tasya vai sapta-rātraṁ tu brahma-hatyā bhavishyati | Pārvam eva muni-gaṇaḥ samayo ’bhūt krito devīja | Vaiśampāyana eka
nu tāṁ vyatikrāntavāṁśa tadā | Svāśriyaṁ bālakaṁ so ’tha padā spris-
ūtum aghātayaḥ | Sīshyān āha sa “bhoḥ sīshyāḥ brahma-hatyāpahaṁ vra
tam | Charadhvam mat-krite sarve na vichāryyyam idam tathā” | Athāha
Yājnavalkyas taṁ “kim edbhir bhagavan devījaḥ | Kleśitair alpatbobhir cha-
rishye ’ham idaṁ vratam” | Tathaḥ krūḍhaḥ guruḥ prāha Yājnavalkya
mahāmatiḥ | “Muchyatāṁ yat tasyāḥ dhītam matto viprāmamayaka | Nīte
jaso vādasy eteṇ yas tvam brāhmaṇa-pungavān | Tena sīshyena nārtho ’sti
mamājna-bhanga-kāriṇā” | Yājnavalkyas tathaḥ prāha bhoṭkau tat te mayo
ṛditam | Mamāpś alaṁ tasyāḥ dhītaṁ yad mayā tad idaṁ devīja | Ity uktā
rūdhīrāktāni sarūpāṇi yajūṣhi sāḥ | Chhardayitvā dadau tasmai yaya
ca svaḥhaya muniḥ | yajūṣhi atha viśrīstāni Yājnavalkyena vai devīja | Jagrīhus
titīrībhūtvā Tuttirīyās tu te tathaḥ | Brahma-hatyā-vratam
ehīrṇam guruṇaḥ cōdītaiś tu yaḥ | Charakhāreyavas te tu charaṇād
manisatamāḥ | Yājnavalkyo ’tha Maitreya prāṇyāma-parāyaṇaḥ | tusc
śva prayataḥ sūryam yajūṣhi abhilāshaṁ tathaḥ | . . . . Ity evam
ādibhiṣ tena sūyamanaḥ stavaḥ raviḥ | vāji-rūpa-dharaḥ prāha “vriya-
ūtāṁ” iti “vānceḥhitam” | Yājnavalkyas taddaḥ prāha pranipatya dvā-
karam | yajūṣhi tāṁ me dehi yāṇi santi na me gurau | Evam uktō da
dau tasmai yajūṣhi bhagavan raviḥ | ayātayāma-sanjñāni yāṇi vetti na
tad-guruḥ | Yajūṣhi yair adhitāni tāṁ viprāiḥ dvijottama | vājinā te
samākhyātāḥ sūryo ’svaḥ so ’bhavad yataḥ |

“Yājnavalkya, son of Brahmarāta, was his [Vaiśampāyana’s] dis-
ciple, eminently versed in duty, and always attentive to his teacher. An
agreement had formerly been made by the Munis that any one of their
number who should fail to attend at an assembly on Mount Meru on
a certain day should incur the guilt of Brahmamicide during a period
of seven nights. Vaiśampāyana was the only person who infringed
this agreement, and he in consequence occasioned the death of his
sister’s child by touching it with his foot. He then desired all his
disciples to perform on his behalf an expiation which should take away
his guilt, and forbade any hesitation. Yājnavalkya then said to him,
OF THE VEDAS, HELD BY INDIAN AUTHORS. 51

'Reverend sir, what is the necessity for these faint and feeble Brahmins? I will perform the expiation.' The wise teacher, incensed, replied to Yajnavalkya, 'Contemner of Brahmins, give up all that thou hast learnt from me; I have no need of a disobedient disciple, who, like thee, stigmatizes these eminent Brahmins as feeble.' Yajnavalkya rejoined, 'It was from devotion [to thee] that I said what I did; but I, too, have done with thee: here is all that I have learnt from thee.' Having spoken, he vomited forth the identical Yajush texts tainted with blood, and giving them to his master, he departed at his will.

[The other pupils] having then become transformed into partridges (tititiri), picked up the Yajush texts, which were given up by Yajnavalkya, and were thence called Taitiiriyas. And those who by their teacher's command had performed the expiation for Brahmanicide, were from this performance (charana) called Charakadhvaryus. Yajnavalkya then, who was habituated to the exercise of suppressing his breath, devoutly hymned the sun, desiring to obtain Yajush texts... [I pass over the hymn.] Thus celebrated with these and other praises, the sun assumed the form of a horse, and said, 'Ask whatever boon thou desirest.' Yajnavalkya then, bowing down before the lord of day, replied, 'Give me such Yajush texts as my teacher does not possess.' Thus supplicated, the sun gave him the Yajush texts called Ayātayama, which were not known to his master. Those by whom these texts were studied were called Vajins, because the sun (when he gave them) assumed the shape of a horse (vayin).

I quote also the parallel text from the Vāyu Purāṇa, as it exhibits some slight variations from the preceding (Aurfr. Cat. p. 55):

Kāryam āsid rishīnāṁ cha kincid brāhmaṇa-sattamāḥ | Meru-prishthaṁ samāsādyā taś tadā "'stv' iti mantritaṁ | Yo no'tra saptarātreṇa nāgachchḥed deva-sattamāḥ | sa kuryād brahma-badhyāṁ vai samayo naḥ prakṛttitaḥ | Tataś te sa-ganāḥ sarve Vaisampāyana-varjitaḥ | Prayayuḥ saptarātreṇa yatra sandhiḥ kṛito 'bhacat | Brāhmaṇānāṁ tu vachanād brahma-badhyāṁ chakāra saḥ | Sishyān atha samāniya sa Vaisampāyana 'bravit | "Brahma-badhyāṁ charudhvaṁ vai mat-krite devaḥ-sattamāḥ | sarve yugaṁ samāgamya braṁha me tad-hitaṁ vachāḥ" | Yajnavalkyaḥ uvācha | Aham eva charishyāmi tiṣṭhantu munayah tv ime | balaṁ chottāpayaśiḥyāṁ tapāśa svena bhāvihaḥ | Ecum uktas tataḥ krud-dho Yajnavalkyam athābravit | uvācha "yat teayā 'dhitāṁ sarvam prayat-
arpayaseva me | evam uktah sarupani yajumshi pradaadu guruh | ru-
dhirena tathah kttani chharditv brahma-vittamaah | Tathah sa dhyanam
asthyaasya suryam aradhayad devajah | "surya brahma yad uchchhinmam
kham gatev pratitishatati" | Tato yahi gatah urdhah yajumhshy
aditya-mandalam | Tani tasmai dadau tushthaah suryo vai Brahmaraataye |
Asha-rupaah cha martaando Yajnavalkyaah dhimate | Yajumshy adhiyate
yahi brahmaanah yena kenachit (yani kanchhit?) | asha-rupaani (-rupena?)
dattani tatas te Vajino bhavan 56 | brahma-hatyaa tu yai chirnaya charanat
charakah smritah | Vaishampayana-sishyaa te charakah samudahritah |

"The rishis having a certain occasion, met on the summit of Mount
Meru, when, after consultation, they resolved and agreed together that
any one of their number who should fail to attend there for seven
nights should become involved in the guilt of brahmanicide. They all in
consequence resorted to the appointed place for seven nights along with
their attendants. Vaishampayana alone was absent, and he, according to
the word of the Brahmans, committed brahmanicide. He then as-
sembled his disciples, and desired them to perform, on his behalf, an
expiation for his offence, and to meet and tell him what was salutary
for the purpose. Yajnavalkya then said, 'I myself will perform the
penance; let all these munis refrain: inspired by my own austere-
fervour I shall raise up the boy (whom thou hast slain).' Incensed at
this speech of Yajnavalkya [Vaishampayana] said to him, 'Restore all
that thou hast learned (from me).' Thus addressed, the sage, deeply
versed in sacred lore, vomited forth the identical Yajush texts stained
with blood, and delivered them to his teacher. Plunged in meditation,
the Bráhman (Yajnavalkya) then adored the sun, saying, 'Sun, every
sacred text which disappeares [from the earth] goes to the sky, and
there abides.' The sun, gratified, and [appearing] in the form of a
horse, bestowed on Yajnavalkya, son of Brahmaraata, all the Yajush
texts which had ascended to the solar region. As all the Yajush texts
which these Bráhmans study were given by him in the form of a horse,
they in consequence became Vajins. And the disciples of Vaisham-
payana, by whom the expiatory rite was accomplished, were called
Charakas, from its accomplishment (charaya)."

56 I am indebted to Dr. Hall for communicating to me the various readings of this
verse in the India Office Library MSS., but some parts of it seem to be corrupt.
57 In a note to p. 461 (4to. ed.) of his Translation of the Vishnu Purana, Prof. Wilson
It is sufficiently evident from the preceding legend that the adherents of the two different divisions of the Yajurveda (the Taittiriya or black, and the Vājasaneyi or white), must in ancient times have regarded each other with feelings of the greatest hostility—feelings akin to those with which the followers of the rival deities, Vīṣṇu and Śiva, look upon each other in modern days. On this subject I translate a passage from Professor Weber’s History of Indian Literature, p. 84:

“Whilst the theologians of the Rīch are called Bahvṛichas, and those of the Sāman Chhandogas, the old name for the divines of the Yajush is Adhvaryu: and these ancient appellations are to be found in the Sanhitā of the Black Yajush (the Taittiriya), and in the Brāhmaṇa of the White Yajush (the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa). The latter work applies the term Adhvaryus to its own adherents, whilst their opponents are denominated Charakādḥvaryus, and are the objects of censure. This hostility is also exhibited in a passage of the Sanhitā of the White Yajush, where the Charakāchārya, as one of the human sacrifices to be offered at the Purushamedha, is devoted to Dushkṛita or Sin.”

In his Indische Studien (iii. 454) Professor Weber specifies the following passages in the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa as those in which the Charakas, or Charakādḥvaryus are censured, viz. iii. 8, 2, 24; iv. 1, 2, 19; iv. 2, 3, 15; iv. 2, 4, 1; vi. 2, 2, 1, 10; viii. 1, 3, 7; viii. 7, 1, 14, 24. Of these I quote one specimen (iv. 1, 2, 19):

mentions the following legend illustrative of the effects of this schism. “The Vāyu and Matsya relate, rather obscurely, a dispute between Janamejaya and Vaiśampāyana, in consequence of the former’s patronage of the Brāhmans of the Vājasaneyi branch of the Yajur-veda, in opposition to the latter, who was the author of the Black or original Yajush. Janamejaya twice performed the Asvamedha according to the Vājasaneyi ritual, and established the Trisarvi, or use of certain texts by Asmaka and others, by the Brāhmans of Anga, and by those of the middle country. He perished, however, in consequence, being cursed by Vaiśampāyana. Before their disagreement, Vaiśampāyana related the Mahābhārata to Janamejaya.”

28 Vājasaneyi Sanhitā, xxx. 18 (p. 846 of Weber’s ed.): Dushkṛītyaḥ charakā-
chāryyaḥ | (charakāgūn gurum—Scholiast). Prof. Müller also says (Anc. Sansk. Lit. p. 350), “This name Charaka is used in one of the Khilas (the passage just quoted) of the Vājasaneyi Sanhitā as a term of reproach. In the 30th Adhyāya a list of people is given who are to be sacrificed at the Purushamedha, and among them we find the Charakāchārya as the proper victim to be offered to Dushkṛita or Sin. This passage, together with similar hostile expressions in the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, were evidently dictated by a feeling of animosity against the ancient schools of the Adhvaryus, whose sacred texts we possess in the Taittiriya-veda, and from whom Yājnavalkya seceded in order to become himself the founder of the new Charanas of the Vājasaneyins.”
Tāh u ha Charakāh nānā eva mantrābhyām juhvatī “prāṇodānau vai asya etau | nānā-vīryau prāṇodānau kuruḥ” iti vadantāh | Tad u tathā na kuryāt | mohayanti ha te yajamānasya prāṇodānau | api id vai enam tūshīṁ juhuyāt |

“These the Charakas offer respectively with two mantras, saying thus: ‘These are his two breathings,’ and ‘we thus make these two breathings endowed with their respective powers.’ But let no one adopt this procedure, for they confound the breathings of the worshipper. Wherefore let this libation be offered in silence.”

But these sectarian jealousies were not confined to the different schools of the Yajur-veda; the adherents of the Atharva-veda seem to have evinced a similar spirit of hostility towards the followers of the other Vedas. On this subject Professor Weber remarks as follows in his Indische Studien, i. 296: “A good deal of animosity is generally displayed in most of the writings connected with the Atharvan towards the other three Vedas; but the strongest expression is given to this feeling in the first of the Atharva Parisīshṭas (Chambers Coll. No. 112).”

He then proceeds to quote the following passage from that work:

Bahuvricho hanti vai rāṣṭram adhvaryur nāsayet sutān | Chhandogo dhanaṁ nāsayet tasmād Ātharvaṇo guruḥ | Ajnānād vā pramādād vā yasya syād bahuvricho guruḥ | desa-ṛāṣṭra-puramātya-nākas tusya na saṁśayāḥ | yadī vā ’dhvaryaveaṁ rājā niyunakti purohitam | kastrena badhyate kshipram parikshinärtha-vāhakaḥ | yathāiva pangur adhveṇām apakshī chānda-bhojanam (chānda-jo nabhah?)

“Bahuvrīcha (Rig-veda priest) will destroy a kingdom; an Adhvaryu (Yajur-veda priest) will destroy offspring; and a Chhandoga (Sāma-veda priest) will destroy wealth;—hence an Ātharvaṇa priest is the [proper] spiritual adviser. (The king) who, through ignorance or mistake, takes a Bahuvrīcha priest for his guide will, without doubt, lose his country, kingdom, cities, and ministers. Or if a king appoints an Adhvaryu priest to be his domestic chaplain, he forfeits his wealth and his chariots, and is speedily slain by the sword. As a lame man makes no progress on a road, and an egg-born creature which is without wings

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59 For the ingenious conjectural emendation in brackets, I am indebted to Professor Aufrecht. I adopt it in my translation.
cannot soar into the sky, so no king prospers who has a Chhandoga for his teacher. He who has a Jalada or a Mauda for his priest, loses his kingdom after a year or ten months.”

“Thus,” continues Professor Weber, “the author of the Pariśishṭa attacks the adherents of certain Sākhās of the Atharva-veda itself, for such are the Jaladas and the Maudas, and admits only a Bhārgava, a Paippalāda, or a Saunaka to be a properly qualified teacher. He further declares that the Atharva-veda is intended only for the highest order of priest, the brahman, not for the three other inferior sorts.”

The following passage is then quoted:

Atharvā spijate ghoraṁ adbhutaṁ śamayet tathā | atharvā rakṣate
yajñam yajnasya patir Angirāḥ | Diceyāntatikṣa-bhaumāṇāṁ utpātānāṁ
anekdāḥ | śamayitā brahma-veda-jnās tasmād dakṣiṇato Bhṛgūḥ |
Bṛhmā śamayet nādhvāryur na chhandogo na bāhṛchāḥ | rakṣāṁvi
rakṣati brahmaḥ brahmaḥ tasmād atharva-vīt |

“The Atharva priest creates horrors, and he also allays alarming occurrences; he protects the sacrifice, of which Angiras is the lord. He who is skilled in the Brahma-veda (the Atharva) can allay manifold portents, celestial, aerial, and terrestrial; wherefore the Bhṛgū [is to be placed] on the right hand. It is the brahman, and not the adhvaryu, the chhandoga, or the bahṛchā, who can allay [portents]; the brahman wards off Rakshases, wherefore the brahman is he who knows the Atharvan.”

I subjoin another extract from Professor Weber’s Indische Studien, i. 63 ff., which illustrates the relation of the Sāma-veda to the Rigveda,60 as well as the mutual hostility of the different schools: “To understand the relation of the Sāma-veda to the Rig-veda, we have only to form to ourselves a clear and distinct idea of the manner in which these hymns in general arose, how they were then carried to a distance by those tribes which emigrated onward, and how they were by them regarded as sacred, whilst in their original home, they were either—as living in the immediate consciousness of the people—subjected to modifications corresponding to the lapse of time, or made way for new hymns by which they were pushed aside, and so became forgotten. It is a foreign country which first surrounds familiar things with a sacred charm; emigrants continue to occupy their ancient men-

60 See the Second Volume of this work, pp. 202 f.
tal position, preserving what is old with painful exactness, while at home life opens out for itself new paths. New emigrants follow those who had first left their home, and unite with those who are already settlers in a new country. And now the old and the new hymns and usages are fused into one mass, and are faithfully, but uncritically, learned and imbibed by travelling pupils from different masters;—several stories in the Brhād Āraṇyaka are especially instructive on this point, see Ind. Stud. p. 83;—so that a varied intermixture arises. Others again, more learned, then strive to introduce arrangement, to bring together what is homogeneous, to separate what is distinct; and in this way theological intolerance springs up; without which the rigid formation of a text or a canon is impossible. The influence of courts on this process is not to be overlooked; as, for example, in the case of Janaka, King of Videha, who in Yajnavalkya had found his Homer. Anything approaching to a clear insight into the reciprocal relations of the different schools will in vain be sought either from the Purāṇas or the Chāraṇavṛti, and can only be attained by comparing the teachers named in the different Brāhmaṇas and Sūtras, partly with each other and partly with the text of Pāṇini and the gaṇapāṭha and commentary connected therewith (for the correction of which a thorough examination of Patanjali would offer the only sufficient guarantee). For the rest, the relation between the S.V. and the R.V. is in a certain degree analogous to that between the White and the Black Yajush; and, as in the Brāhmaṇa of the former (the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa), we often find those teachers who are the representatives of the latter, mentioned with contempt, it cannot surprise us, if in the Brāhmaṇa of the Sāma-veda, the Paingins and Kaushitakins are similarly treated."

It is sufficiently manifest from the preceding passages of the Purāṇas concerning the division and different Sākhās of the Vedas, that the traditions which they embody contain no information in regard to the composition of the hymns, and nothing tangible or authentic regarding the manner in which they were preserved, collected, or arranged. In fact, I have not adduced these passages for the purpose of elucidating those points, but to show the legendary character of the narratives, and their discrepancies in matters of detail. For an account of the Sākhās of the Vedas, the ancient schools of the Brāhmans, and other matters of a similar nature, I must refer to the excellent work of Professor Müller,

Sect. VII.—Reasonings of the Commentators on the Vedas, in support of the authority of the Vedas.

I proceed now to adduce some extracts from the works of the more systematic authors who have treated of the origin and authority of the Vedas, I mean the commentators on these books themselves, and the authors and expositors of the aphorisms of several of the schools of Hindu philosophy. 41 Whatever we may think of the premises from which these writers set out, or of the conclusions at which they arrive,

41 Although the authors of the different schools of Hindu philosophy (as we shall see) expressly defend (on grounds which vary according to the principles of the several systems) the authority of the Vedas, they do not consider themselves as at all bound to assert that the different portions of those works are all of equal value: nor do they treat their sacred scriptures as the exclusive sources out of which their own theology or philosophy are to be evolved. On the relation of Indian thinkers generally to the Vedas, I quote some remarks from an article of my own in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society for 1862, pp. 310 f.: "It is evident from some of the hymns of the Veda (see Müller's Hist. of Anc. Sansk. Lit. p. 556 ff.) that theological speculation has been practised in India from a very early period. . . . As, therefore, the religious or mythological systems of India became developed, it was to be expected that they should exhibit numerous variations springing out of the particular genius of different writers; and more especially that, whenever the speculative element predominated in any author, he should give utterance to ideas on the origin of the world, and the nature and action of the Deity or deities, more or less opposed to those commonly received. In the stage here supposed, a fixed and authoritative system of belief or institutions had not yet been constructed, but was only in process of construction, and therefore considerable liberty of individual thought, expression, and action would be allowed; as is, indeed, also shown by the existence of different schools of Brāhmans, not merely attached to one or other of the particular Vedas, but even restricting their allegiance to some particular recension of one of the Vedas. Even after the Brahmanical system had been more firmly established, and its details more minutely prescribed, it is clear that the same strictness was not extended to speculation, but that if a Brāhman was only an observer of the established ceremonial, and an assertor of the privileges of his own order, he might entertain and even profess almost any philosophical opinion which he pleased (Colebrooke, Misc. Ess. i. 379; Müller, Anc. Sansk. Lit. 79). In this way the tradition of free thought was preserved, and speculative principles of every character continued to be maintained and taught without hindrance or scandal. Meanwhile the authority of the Vedas had come to be generally regarded as paramount and divine, but so long as this authority was nominally acknowledged, independent thinkers were permitted to propound a variety of speculative principles, at variance with their general tenor, though perhaps not inconsistent with some isolated
we cannot fail to be struck with the contrast which their speculations exhibit to the loose and mystical ideas of the Purāṇas and Upanishads, or to admire the acuteness of their reasoning, the logical precision with which their arguments are presented, and the occasional liveliness and ingenuity of their illustrations.

I.—The first passage which I shall adduce is from Sāyāna’s introduction to his commentary on the Rig-veda, the Vedārthaprákāṣa, pp. 3 ff. (Sāyāna, as we have seen in the Second Volume of this work, p. 172, lived in the 14th century, A.D.):

*Naniu Vedaḥ eva tavād nāsti | kutas tad-avāntara-viśeṣaḥ rīgvedaḥ |
Tathā hi | ko’yāṁ vedo nāma | na hi tatra laksanaṁ pramāṇaṁ vā’sti |
načha tad-ubhayya-vyatirekkaṁ kinchid vastu pradhyayi | Lakṣaṇa-pra-
maṇgaḥbhyaṁ hi vastu-siddhir iti nyāya-vidām matam | “Pratyakhyāna-
mānagameṣu pramāṇa-viśeṣeṣaḥ antimo Vedaḥ iti tallakṣaṇaṁ” iti chet |
na | Mane-ādi-smṛitiḥc ativyāpteḥ | Sāmya-balena samyak paroksha-
 nibhaṇa-sādhanam ity etasya āgama-lakṣaṇasya tāv api sadbhāvam |
“apauruṣeyate vace sati iti viśeṣaḥ adoshah” iti chet | na | Vedaṣyāpi |
paramesvara-nirmitatvam prauruṣeyatvāt | “Saṁra-ḥaṁ-jiva-nirmitat-
vābhavād apauruṣeṣvātam” iti chet | [na] | “Saṁra-ḥaṁ-puruṣaḥ” |
ityādi-śrutibhir iṣvaraṣyāpi ṣaṁritvaṃ | “Karma-phala-rūpa-ṣaṁra-
 ḍhari-jiiva-nirmitatvābhava-mātreṇa apauruṣeyatvām vívakṣhitam” iti |
chet | na | Jīva-viśeṣeṣvar Āgneya-Vāyeyādityair vedānām utpāditaṭvāt |
“Rīgvedaḥ eva Agneya ajayata Yajurvedo Vāyoh Sāmavedaḥ Ādityaḥ” iti |
śrutē iṣvaraṇa agny-ādi-prerakatvān nirāṃśitvaṁ draṣṭaye |
“mantra-brāhmaṇātmakah sāba-raśi vedaḥ” iti chet | na | Ĳḍriśo |
mantraḥ | Ĳḍriśaṁ brāhmaṇaṁ ity anayor adyāpi anirṇitavat | Tasmād |
nāsti kinchid vedasya lakṣaṇam | Nāpi tat-sadbhavo pramāṇaṁ pasya-
maḥ | “Rīgvedaṁ bhagavo’dhyemi Yajurvedaṁ Sāmavedaṁ Ātharvaṇam |
chaturtham” ityādi vākyam pramāṇam” iti chet | na | tasyāpi vākyasya |
vedāntapātiteṇa atmākṛṣaṇa-prasangāt | Na khalu nipuṇo’pi eva-
skandham āroḍhīn prabhaved iti | “Vedaḥ eva devijātiṁ niḥsvayasa-
karaḥ paraḥ” iti ādi smṛiti-vākyam pramāṇam” iti chet | na | tasyāpi |
ukta-śrutī-mulatvān nirāṃśitavat | pratyakṣaḥādikāṁ sākṣitum api ayo-
portions of their contents. It was only when the authority of the sacred books was not merely tacitly set aside or undermined, but openly discarded and denied, and the institutions founded on them were abandoned and assailed by the Buddhists, that the orthodox party took the alarm.”
of the Vedas, held by Indian Authors. 59

Aryam | Veda-vishaya loka-prasiddhih sârva-janinâ 'pi “nilaṁ nabhaḥ” ityâdi-vad bhraṁta | Tasmāl lakṣhaṇa-pramāṇa-rahitosa vedasya sad-bhāvo na anigkarteśu śakyate iti purva-pakṣaḥ |


Nanv astu nāma Vedākhyā kāṣṭhit padārthaḥ | tathāpi nāsau vyā-khyānam arhati apramāṇatvena anupayuktavat | Na hi Vedāḥ pramāṇaṁ tal-lakṣhaṇasya tatra duṣṣampādatvāt | tathā hi “samyag anubhava-sādhanaṁ prāmanam” iti kechil lakṣhaṇam āhuḥ | apare tu “anadhitārtha-gantāḥ pravānaṁ” ity achaṅkate | na chaicād ubhayaṁ veda sambhavit | mantra-brāhmaṇātmaḥ hi vedaḥ | tatra mantriḥ kechid abodhakah | “anyak sā te Indra rishiḥ” (R.V. i. 169, 3) ity eko mantraḥ | “Yādriṣmin dāhīyam apasyayā vidad” (R.V. v. 44, 8) ity anyah | “Sṛṇyā iva jārbari turphartā” (R.V. x. 106, 6) ity aparāḥ | “Āpānta-manyus śrīpala śrībharmac” (R.V. x. 89, 5) ity-adayaḥ udāharyāḥ | na hy etair mantriḥ kāṣṭhit apy artho ‘vabudhyate | etesho anubhavo eva yadā nāsti taddat-samyaktvaṁ tadyaṁ-sādhanatvaṁ cha dārāpetam | “Adhāḥ svad āsid” (R.V. x. 129, 5) iti mantrasya bodhatve ‘pi “sthāṣur vā purusho vā” ityādi-vākya-vat sāndīghartha-bodhayatvād nāsti prāmanyaṁ | “Oshadhe trāyaśva enam” (Taitt. Sanh. i. 2, 1, 1) iti mantra darbha-vishayaḥ | “Svadhiṣṭa mā enam hiṃsir” (Taitt. Sanh. i. 2, 1, 1) iti kṣhara-vishayaḥ | “Śrīneta grāvyaḥ” iti pāṣhāṇa-vishayaḥ | Etewo acetenānām darbha-kṣhara-pāṣhāyanām chetana-vat sambodhanaṁ śrāyate | tato “deu chandramasaś” iti vākya-vad viparītārtha-bodhayatvād apramāṇ-
yam | "Ekaḥ eva Rudro na deveśyo 'vastathe" | "saḥasrāṇi sahasraśo yasya Rudrāḥ adhi bhūmyāṃ"22 ity anyas tu mantrayor "yāvaśīvam āham maunī" ity vākyā-vad vyāghāta-bodhakatēd aprāmāṇyam | "Āpaḥ undantu" (Taitt. Sanh. i. 2, 1, 1) iti mantra yajamānasya kshaura-kāle jalena śiraśah kledanam brūte | "Sūbhike śiraḥ āroha sōbhayanti mukham mama" iti mantra vicāha-kāle mangalāčaranārtham pushpa-nimātīyāḥ sūbhikāyāḥ vara-bodheḥ śirasy avasthānam brūte | tayoḥ cha mantrayor loka-prasiddhārthānucāditvād anadhibhātārth-āntātīrthāṇām nāsti | tasmād mantra-bhāga na pramāṇam |

Atra uchyate | "Anyagyao"-ādi - mantrāyam artho Yāskena nirukta- 
grantha 'vabodhitaḥ | tat-parichaya-rahitānām anavabodho na mantrānāṁ 
dosham āvahati | Āta eva atra loka-nyāyam udāharantā " na esha sthānār 
 aparādho yad enam andho na pasyati | purushāparādho sambhavati" iti | 
 "Adhāḥ svit āśīd" iti mantras cha na sandeha-prabodhanāya pravṛttāh 
kiṃkarhi jagat-kāranāya para-vastūno 'tigambhitavām niśchetum eva 
pravṛttāh | tad-artham eva hi guru-sāstra-smpadāya-rahitair durbā 
dhyayevam "adhāḥ svit" ity anyāvā vacho-bhāngyā upanyasyati | Sa eva 
abhīprayaḥ uparitaneshu "ko adhā veda" (R.V. x. 129, 6) ity 
adimantreṣu spaghśkritaḥ | "Oshadhya"-ādi mantreshe api chetanaḥ eva 
tat-tād-abhimāṇi-devatās tena tena nāmnā sambodhante | tāḥ cha devataḥ 
 bhagavata Bādaraśayanā "abhāmāni-vyapadesas tu" iti sūtra sūtrītāḥ | 
Ekāyāpi Rudrasya vam-mahīnā sahasra-mūrttī-sekārād nāsti parass 
paraṁ vyāghātaḥ | Jalādi-dravyena śiraḥ-kledanāder loka-siddhatve 'pi 
tad-abhimāni-devatānugrahayasya aprasiddhatvāt tad-vishayataena ajñātār 
tha-jñāpakatvam | tato lākṣaṇa-sadbhāvād asti mantra-bhāgasya pramāṇam |

"But, some will say, there is no such thing as a Veda; how, then, 
can there be a Rig-veda, forming a particular part of it? For what is 
this Veda? It has no characteristic sign or evidence; and without 
these two conditions, nothing can be proved to exist. For logicians 
hold that 'a thing is established by characteristic signs and by proof.' 
If you answer that 'of the three kinds of proof, perception, inference, 
and scripture, the Veda is the last, and that this is its sign;' then the 
objectors rejoin that this is not true, for this sign extends too far, and 
includes also Manu's and the other Smṛitis; since there exists in them

22 The Vājasaneyi Sanhitā, xvi. 53, has, aṣṭakhyātā sahasrāṇi ye Rudrāḥ adhi bhūmyāṃ |
also this characteristic of Scripture, viz. that in virtue of common consent it is a perfect instrument for the discovery of what is invisible.' If you proceed, 'the Veda is faultless, in consequence of its characteristic that it has no person (purusha) for its author;' they again reply, 'Not so; for as the Veda likewise was formed by Paramēśvara (God), it had a person (purusha) for its author.' If you rejoin, 'It had no person (purusha) for its author, for it was not made by any embodied living being;' [they refuse to admit this] on the ground that, according to such Vedic texts as 'Purusha has a thousand heads,' it is clear that Iśvara (God) also has a body. If you urge that apaurusheya (the having had no personal author) means that it was not composed by a living being endowed with a body which was the result of works;—the opponent denies this also, inasmuch as the Vedas were created by particular living beings—Agni (fire), Vāyu (wind), and Āditya (the sun); for from the text 'the Rig-veda sprang from Agni, the Yajur-veda from Vāyu, and the Sāma-veda from Sūrya,' etc., it will be seen that Iśvara was the maker, by inciting Agni and the others. If you next say that the Veda is a collection of words in the form of Mantras and Brāhmaṇas, the objectors rejoin, 'Not so, for it has never yet been defined that a Mantra is so and so, and a Brāhmaṇa so and so.' There exists, therefore, no characteristic mark of a Veda. Nor do we see any proof that a Veda exists. If you say that the text, 'I peruse, reverend sir, the Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda, the Sāma-veda, and the Ātharvāṇa as the fourth,' is a proof, the antagonist answers, 'No, for as that text is part of the Veda, the latter would be open to the objection of depending upon itself; for no one, be he ever so clever, can mount upon his own shoulders.' If you again urge that such texts of the Smṛiti as this, 'It is the Veda alone which is the source of blessedness to twice-born men, and transcendent,' are proofs, the objector rejoins, 'Not so; since these too must be rejected, as being founded on the same Veda.'

63 Or, the meaning of this may be, "If you urge that, as the Veda has no personal author, there is—in consequence of this peculiar characteristic—no flaw (in the proposed definition), etc."

64 I have translated this, as if it there had been (which there is not) a negative particle na in the printed text, after the iti chet, as this seems to me to be necessary to the sense. I understand from Prof. Müller that the negative particle is found in some of the MSS. [I am, however, informed by Prof. Goldstücker that na is often omitted, though understood, after iti chet.]
evidence of the senses and other ordinary sources of knowledge ought not even to be doubted.\textsuperscript{65} And common report in reference to the Veda, though universal, is erroneous, like such phrases as 'the blue sky,' etc. Wherefore, as the Veda is destitute of characteristic sign and proof, its existence cannot be admitted. Such is the first side of the question.

"To this we reply: The definition of the Veda, as a work composed of Mantra and Brāhmaṇa, is unobjectionable. Hence Āpastamba says in the Yajnaparibhāṣā, 'the name of Mantra and Brāhmaṇa is Veda.' The nature of these two things will be settled hereafter.\textsuperscript{66} The sense we attach to the expression 'consisting of sentences which had no personal author' will also be declared further on. Let the proofs which have been specified of the existence of the Veda, viz. the Veda (itself), the Smṛiti, and common notoriety, be duly weighed. Although jars, cloth, and other such [dark] objects have no inherent property of making themselves visible, it is no absurdity to speak of the sun, moon, and other luminous bodies, as shining by their own light. Just in the same way, though it is impossible for men or any other beings to mount on their own shoulders, let the Veda through the keenness of its power be held to have the power of proving itself, as it has of proving other things.\textsuperscript{67} Hence traditionists set forth this penetrating force of the Veda; thus, 'Scripture is able to make known the past, the future, the minute, the distant, the remote.' Such being the case, the authority of the Smṛiti, which is based on the Veda, and that of common notoriety, which is based on both, is irresistible. Wherefore it stands fast that the Veda, which is

\textsuperscript{65} The drift of this sentence does not seem to me clear. From what immediately follows it would rather appear that the evidence of the senses may be doubted. Can the passage be corrupt?

\textsuperscript{66} See the First Volume of this work, pp. 2 ff. and the Second Volume, p. 172.

\textsuperscript{67} The same thing had been said before by S'ankāra Achāryya (who lived at the end of the 8th or beginning of the 9th century, A.D. See Colebrook's Misc. Essays, i. 332), in his commentary on the Brahma Sūtras, ii. 1, 1: Vedasya hi nirapecchham svārthe prāmāṇyaḥ rova iva vīpu-viṣhayā | puruṣa-vacchāyam tu mūlāntarīpekšaṁ svārthe prāmāṇyaḥ vakṣṭri-smṛiti-vyavahitaṁ cha iti viprakaraṇaḥ | 'For the Veda has an independent authority in respect of its own sense, as the sun has of manifesting forms. The words of men on the other hand, have, as regards their own sense, an authority which is dependent upon another source [the Veda], and which is separated [from the authority of the Veda] by the fact of its author being remembered. Herein consists the distinction [between the two kinds of authority].'"
established by characteristic sign, and by proof, cannot be overturned by
the Chārvākas or any other opponents.

"But let it be admitted that there is a thing called a Veda. Still, the
opponents say, it does not deserve explanation, being unsuited for it,
since it does not constitute proof. The Veda, they urge, is no proof, as
it is difficult to show that it has any sign of that character. Now,
some define proof as the instrument of perfect apprehension; others
say, it is that which arrives at what was not before ascertained.
But neither of these definitions can be reasonably applied to the Veda.
For the Veda consists of Mantra and Brāhmaṇa. Of these mantras
some convey no meaning. Thus one is amyak sa te Indra rishir, etc.;
another is yādṛśīmin, etc.; a third is śṛṅyā iva, etc. The texts
āpāntu-manyuḥ,69 etc., and others may be adduced as further examples.
Now no meaning whatever is to be perceived through these mantras;
and when they do not even convey an idea at all, much less can they
convey a perfect idea, or be instruments of apprehension. Even if
the mantra adhāḥ svād āśīd upari svād āśīd, 'was it below or above?'
(R.V. x. 129, 5) convey a meaning, still, like such sayings as 'either a
post or a man,' it conveys a dubious meaning, and so possesses no au-
thority. The mantra, 'deliver him, o plant,' has for its subject grass.
Another, 'do not hurt him, axe,' has for its subject an axe (kshura).
A third, 'hear, stones,' has for its subject stones. In these cases, grass,
an axe, and stones, though insensible objects, are addressed in the Veda
as if they were intelligent. Hence these passages have no authority,
because, like the saying, 'two moons,' their import is absurd. So also
the two texts, 'there is one Rudra; no second has existed,' and 'the
thousand Rudras who are over the earth,' involving, as they do, a mu-
tual contradiction (just as if one were to say, 'I have been silent all
my life'), cannot be authoritative. The mantra āpāḥ undantu expresses
the wetting of the sacrificer's head with water at the time of tonsure;
while the text 'śubhike,' etc. ('garland, mount on my head and decorate
my face') expresses the placing of a garland formed of flowers on the
heads of the bridegroom and bride, by way of blessing, at the time of
marriage. Now, as these two last texts merely repeat a matter of

69 See Nirukta, v. 12, and vi. 15, and Roth's Illustrations. It is not necessary for
my purpose to inquire whether the charge of intelligibility brought against these
different texts is just or not.
common notoriety, they cannot be said to attain to what was not before ascertained. Wherefore the Mantra portion of the Veda is destitute of authority.

"To this we reply, the meaning of these texts, 'amyak,' and the others, has been explained by Yāska in the Nirukta. The fact that they are not understood by persons ignorant of that explanation, does not prove any defect in the mantras. It is customary to quote here the popular maxim, 'it is not the fault of the post that the blind man does not see it; the reasonable thing to say is that it is the man's fault.' The mantra 'adha svid,' etc. ('was it above or below?') (R.V. x. 129, 5) is not intended to convey doubt, but rather to signify the extreme profundity of the supreme Essence, the cause of the world. With this view the author intimates by this turn of expression the difficulty which persons who are not versed in the deep Scriptures have, in comprehending such subjects. The same intention is manifested in the following mantras ko addhā veda, etc. (R.V. x. 129, 6) ('who knows?' etc.) In the texts oshadhe, etc. ('o herb,' etc.), the deities who preside over these various objects are addressed by these several names. These deities are referred to by the venerable Bādarāyaṇa in the aphorism abhimāni-vyapadesāh. As Rudra, though only one, assumes by his power a thousand forms, there is no contradiction between the different texts which relate to him. And though the moistening, etc., of the head by water, etc., is a matter of common notoriety, yet as the goodwill of the deities who preside over these objects is not generally known, the texts in question, by having this for their subject, are declaratory of what is unknown. Hence the Mantra portion of the Veda, being shown to have a characteristic mark, is authoritative."

Sāyaṇa then, in p. 11 of his Preface, proceeds to extend his argument to the Brāhmaṇas. These are divisible into two parts, Precepts (vidhi), and Explanatory remarks (artha-vāda). Precepts again are either (a) incitements to perform some act in which a man has not yet engaged (apravṛttī-pravarttanam), such as are contained in the ceremonial sections (Karma-kāṇḍa); or (b) revelations of something previously unknown (ajñata-jñāpanam), such as are found in the portions which treat of sacred knowledge or the supreme spirit (Brahma-kāṇḍa). Both these parts

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69 See the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society for 1866, pp. 323, 329, 334, and 337.
are objected to as unauthoritative. The former is said (1) to enjoin things afterwards declared to be improper; and (2) to prescribe in some texts things which are prohibited in others. Thus in the Aitareya, Taittiriya, and other Brāhmaṇas, many injunctions given in other places are controverted in such phrases as, "This or that must not be regarded;" "This must not be done in that way" (tat tad na ādṛtyam | tat tatha' na kūryyam). And again prescriptions are given which are mutually contradictory. Another objection is that no result, such as the attainment of paradise, is perceived to follow the celebration of a jyotisṭoma or other sacrifice; whilst satisfaction never fails to be experienced immediately after eating (jyotisṭomādiśe apy anushhānā- nantaram eva cha svargādi-phalaṁ na upalabhya | na hi bhojanānan- taram tripter anupalambho 'stī |). The answer given to the earlier of these objections is that the discrepant injunctions and prohibitions are respectively applicable to people belonging to different Śākhās or Vedic schools; just as things forbidden to a man in one state of life (āśrama) are permitted to one who is in another. It is thus the difference of persons which gives rise to the apparent opposition between the precepts (tathā jartilādi-vidhir attra nindymāno 'pi kvachit śākhānare bhaved iśi chet | bhavatu nāma | prāmāṇyaṃ api tach-ḍhākhādhyaẏinam prati bhavishyati | yathā grihasthāśrame nishiddham api parānna-bhojanam āśra- māntareshu prāmāṇikaṁ tad-vat | anena nyāyena sarvatra paraspara-viruddhau vidhi-nishedhau purusha-bhedena vyavasthāpaniyau yathā man- treshu pātha-bhedāḥ |). In the same way, it is remarked, the different Śākhās adopt different readings in the mantras. As regards the objection raised to the authoritativeness of the revelations of things hitherto unknown, which are made in the Brahma-kāṇḍa, that they are mutually contradictory—as when the Aitareyins say, Ātmā vai idam ekaḥ eva agrे āsīt, "This was in the beginning soul only;" whilst the Taittirīyakas on the other hand affirm, asad vai idam agrे āsīt, "This was in the beginning non-existent;"—the answer is given that it is determined by a particular aphorism (which is quoted) that in the latter passage the word asat does not mean absolute vacuity or nothingness, but merely an

70 Compare the quotation given above, p. 54, from the S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, iv. 1, 2, 19.

71 Brahma Sūtra, ii. 1, 7, appears to be intended; but the text of it as given by Sāyāna does not correspond with that in the Bibliotheca Indica.
undeveloped condition (.... iti sātra Taittirīya-gata-vākyasya asachchhabdasya na śānya-paratvam kintu avyaktavasthā-paratvam iti nirṇītam ). Sāyaṇa accordingly concludes (p. 19 of his Preface) that the authority of the whole Veda is proved.

II.—The second passage which I shall quote is from the Vedārtha-prakāsa of Mādhava Āchāryya on the Taittirīya Yajur-veda (p. 1 ff. in the Bibliotheca Indica). Mādhava was the brother of Sāyaṇa, and flourished in the middle of the 14th century (Colebrooke’s Misc. Ess. i. 301):


72 Compare with the this passages quoted from the S'atapatha and Taittirīya Brāhmaṇas in the First Volume of this work, pp. 19 f., 24 f., 27 f., and from the Taitt. Sanh. and Brāh. in pp. 52 and 53; and see also the texts referred to and commented upon in the Journ. of the Roy. As. Soc. for 1864, p. 72, and in the No. for 1865, pp. 345–348.

73 Whether either of these two brothers, who were ministers of state, were the actual writers of the works which bear their names, or whether the works were composed by Pandits patronized by the two statesmen, and called after the names of their patrons, is a point which I need not attempt to decide.
OF THE VEDAS, HELD BY INDIAN AUTHORS.

brucat śāstram anupānyayoḥ stri-śūdrayor vedaḥ vyahyanam anishta-prāpti-hetur iti bodhayati | kathāṁ tarhi tayoś tad-upāyaḥ suvagamah | purāṇā dibhīr iti brūmaḥ | ata evoktam | “stri-śūdra-devijabandhūnam trayi na śruti-gocharā | iti Bṛhadātam ākhyānam muninā kriyā kṛitam” (Bhāg. Pur. i. 4, 25) | iti | tasmād upanitār eva traiyānikair vedasya sam-bandhaḥ | tat-prāmānyan tu bodhakatvāt svataḥ eva siddham | pauruṣeṣa-vākyāṁ tu bodhakam api sat puruṣa-gata-bhrānti-mulatva-sambhāvanāya tat-parihārya mūla-prāmāṇam apekṣaṇe na tu vedaḥ | tasya nityatvena vaktī- doṣha -ṣaṅkānudayāt | . . . . Nanu veda ‘pi Kālidāśa-vākyā-vaṭ puruṣeṣaḥ eva Brahma-kāryatva-śravāṇāt | “rīchah sāmāṁ jainire | chhandāmāṁ jainire tasmād yajus tasmād ajayata” | iti śrutēḥ | ata eva Bādaraṇyāṇaḥ (i. 1, 3) “śāstra-yonitvād” iti sūtraṇa Brahmano veda-kārayatvam avocat | maivaṁ | śrutī-śārīrībhyaḥ nityatveva-gamat | “vācha Viśūpa nityaya” (R.V. viii. 64, 6) ātēḥ “anādī- nidhanāṁ nityā vāg utarśīṁ śveyamāṇa” iti sūtraḥ cha | Bādaraṇyāṇo ‘pi devatādhiharaṇaḥ sūtrasamāśa (i. 3, 29) “ata eva cha nityatvam” ātēḥ | iti | tarhi “pariṇām-virodhaḥ” ātēḥ chet | na | nityatvasya vyāvahāri-katvāt | ātīṣṭhaḥ urdhvaṁ saṁhāṛat pārvas vyāvahāra-kālas tasmān ut-pattī-śīrṣādaṁ satyaḥ nityāḥ evaṁ veda ‘pi vyavahāra-kāle Kālidāśa-vākyā-vaṭ puruṣa-virachitavanbhavād māṇyāḥ | adi-ātīṣṭhaḥ tu kālaśādāṁ kāre veda Bhraṁaṇaḥ sakāsād vedaḥ patraṁ ātēṣāte | ato viṣaya-bhedāṁ na pariparā-virodhaḥ | Brahmano nirdoshatvena vedasya vaktī-doshabhavāt svatas-siddham prāmāṇyam tad-avas-tham | tasmāl lakṣaṇa-pramāṇa-sadbhavād viṣaya-prayojana-sambandhādhiṣṭhā-sadbhavāt prāmāṇyasya vربطvābh vedaBṛhaṇaḥ eva | “Now, some may ask, what is this Veda, or what are its subject-matter, its use, its connection, or the persons who are competent to study it? and how is it authoritative? For, in the absence of all these conditions, the Veda does not deserve to be expounded. I reply: the book which makes known (vedayati) the supernatural (lit. non-secular) means of obtaining desirable objects, and getting rid of undesirable objects, is the Veda. By the employment of the word “supernatural,” [the ordinary means of information, viz.] perception and inference, are excluded. By perception it is established that such objects of sense, as garlands, sandal-wood, and women are causes of gratification, and that the use of medicines and so forth is the means of getting rid
of what is undesirable. And we ascertain by inference that we shall in
future experience, and that other men now experience, the same results
(from these same causes). If it be asked whether, then, the happiness,
etc., of a future birth be not in the same way ascertainable by inference,
I reply that it is not, because we cannot discover its specific character.
Not even the most brilliant ornament of the logical school could, by
a thousand inferences, without the help of the Vedas, discover the
truths that the jyotishtoma and other sacrifices are the means of atta-
taining happiness, and that abstinence from intoxicating drugs¹⁴ is the
means of removing what is undesirable. Thus it is not too wide
a definition of the Veda to say that it is that which indicates super-
natural expedients. Hence, it has been said, 'men discover by the
Veda those expedients which cannot be ascertained by perception or
inference; and this is the characteristic feature of the Veda.' These
expedients, then, form the subject of the Veda; [to teach] the know-
ledge of them is its use; the person who seeks that knowledge is
the competent student; and the connection of the Veda with such
a student is that of a benefactor with the individual who is to be
benefitted.

"But, if such be the case, it may be said that all persons whatever,
including women and Sūdras, must be competent students of the Veda,
since the aspiration after good and the deprecation of evil are common
to the whole of mankind. But it is not so. For though the expedient
exists, and women and Sūdras are desirous to know it, they are de-
barred by another cause from being competent students of the Veda.
The scripture (śāstra) which declares that those persons only who have
been invested with the sacrificial cord are competent to read the Veda,
intimates thereby that the same study would be a cause of unhappiness
to women and Sūdras [who are not so invested]. How, then, are these
two classes of persons to discover the means of future happiness? We
answer, from the Purāṇas and other such works. Hence it has been
said, 'since the triple Veda may not be heard by women, Sūdras, and
degraded twice-born men, the Mahābhārata was, in his benevolence,

¹⁴ Kālajña-bhaksahgam is mentioned in the Commentary on the Bhāgavata Purāṇa,
x. 33, 28. In his translation of the Kusumāṇjali, p. 81, note, Professor Cowell says:
"Some hold the Kālajña to be the flesh of a deer killed by a poisoned arrow—others
hemp or bhang,—others a kind of garlic. See Raghunandana’s Ekādaśī tattva."
composed by the Muni.'

Then the authority of the Veda is self-evident, from the fact of its communicating knowledge. For though the words of men also communicate knowledge, still, as they must be conceived to participate in the fallibility of their authors, they require some primary authority to remedy that fallibility. But such is not the case with the Veda; for as that had no beginning, it is impossible to suspect any defect in the utterer.

A doubt may, however, be raised whether the Veda is not, like the sentences of Kālidāsa and others, derived from a personal being, as it proclaims itself to have been formed by Brahmā, according to the text, 'the Rich and Sāman verses, the metres, sprang from him; from him the Yajush was produced;' in consequence of which Bādarāyana, in the aphorism, 'since he is the source of the śāstra,' has pronounced that Brahma is the cause of the Veda. But this doubt is groundless; for the eternity of the Veda has been declared both by itself, in the text, 'with an eternal voice, o Virūpa,' and by the Smṛiti in the verse 'an eternal voice, without beginning or end, was uttered by the Self-existent.' Bādarāyana, too, in his section on the deities (Brahma Sūtras, i. 3, 29) has this aphorism; 'hence also [its] eternity [is to be maintained].' If it be objected that these statements of his are mutually conflicting, I answer, No. For in the passages where the word eternity is applied to the Vedas, it is to be understood as referring to the period of action [or mundane existence]. This period is that which commences with the creation, and lasts till the destruction of the universe, since, during this interval, no worlds are seen to

75 See the quotation from the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, above, p. 42.
76 This seems to be the only way to translate purushaya, as purusha cannot here mean a human being.
77 R.V. x. 90. 9, quoted in the First Volume of this work, p. 10; and p. 3, above.
78 Brahma Sūtras, i. 1, 3, p. 7 of Dr. Ballantyne's Aphorisms of the Vedānta.
79 These words are part of Rig-veda, viii 64, 6: Tasmāni nīnām abhijayya vīchā Viśvā nityayā | vṛṣṇye chodava suskṛtvam | "Send forth praises to this heaven-aspiring and prolific Agni, o Virūpa, with an unceasing voice [or hymn]." The word nityayā seems to mean nothing more than "continual," though in the text I have rendered it "eternal," as the author's reasoning requires. Colebrooke (Misc. Ess. i. 306), however, translates it by "perpetual." I shall again quote and illustrate this verse further on.
80 This line, from the M.Bh. S'āntip. 8533, has already been cited above, in p. 16.
originate, or to be destroyed. Just as time and æther (space) are eternal,\(^1\) so also is the Veda eternal, because, during the period of mundane existence, it has not been composed by any person, as the works of Kālidāsa and others have been.\(^2\) Nevertheless, the Veda, like time and æther, is recorded in Scripture to have originated from Brahma at the first creation. There is, therefore, no discrepancy between the two different sets of passages, as they refer to different points. And since Brahma is free from defect, the utterer of the Veda is consequently free from defect; and therefore a self-demonstrated authority resides in it. Seeing, therefore, that the Veda possess a characteristic mark, and is supported by proof, and that it has a subject, a use, a relation, and persons competent for its study, and, moreover, that its authority is established, it follows that it ought to be interpreted."

Sect. VIII.—Arguments of the Mīmāṃsakas and Vedāntins in support of the eternity and authority of the Vedas.

I shall now proceed to adduce some of the reasonings by which the authors of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, and Vedānta, aphorisms, and their commentators, defend the doctrine which, as we have already seen, is held by some of the Indian writers, that the Vedas are eternal, as well as infallible.

I.—Pūrva Mīmāṃsā.—I quote the following texts of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā which relate to this subject from Dr. Ballantyne’s aphorisms of the Mīmāṃsā, pp. 8 ff.\(^3\) I do not always follow the words of Dr. Ballantyne’s translations, though I have made free use of their substance. (See also Colebrooke’s Misc. Ess. i. 306, or p. 195 of Williams and Norgate’s ed.) The commentator introduces the subject in the following way:

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\(^1\) Passages affirming both the eternity of the æther, and its creation, are given in the First Volume of this work, pp. 130 and 506.

\(^2\) The same subject is touched on by Sāyaṇa, at p. 20 of the introductory portion of his commentary on the Rigveda. The passage will be quoted at the end of the next section.

\(^3\) Since the 1st edition of this Volume was published, the Sanskrit scholar has obtained easy access to a more considerable portion of the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras with the commentary of S’abara Svāmin by the appearance of the first, second, and part of third, Adhyāyas in the Bibliotheca Indica.
Sabdārthayor utpatty-anantaram purushena kalpita-sanketātmaka-sambandhasya kalpitavat. Purusha-kalpita-sambandha-jñānāpekshitavat sabdasya yathā pratyaksha-jñānāṁ suktikādau satyatvam vyabhicharatati tathā purushādhinatvena sabde 'pi satyatva-vyabhichāra-sambhavat na dharme chodanā pramāṇam iti pūreṇ-pakṣe siddhāntam āha |

"Since, subsequently to the production of words and the things signified by them, a connection of a conventional character has been established between the two by the will of man, and since language is dependent upon a knowledge of this conventional connection determined by man, [it follows that] as perception is liable to error in respect of mother-of-pearl and similar objects [by mistaking them for silver, etc.], so words also may be exposed to the risk of conveying unreal notions from [their sense] being dependent on human will; and consequently that the Vedic precepts [which are expressed in such words, possessing a merely conventional and arbitrary meaning] cannot be authoritative in matters of duty. Such is an objection which may be urged, and in reply to which the author of the aphorisms declares the established doctrine."

Then follows the fifth aphorism of the first chapter of the first book of the Mīmāṁsā: Autpattikas tu(a) śabdasya(b) arthena sambandhas(c) tasya(d) jñānām(e) upadeso(f) 'vyatirekaś cha(g) arthe 'nupalabdhe(h) tat(i) pramāṇam Bādarāyaṇasya anapekshatvāt | which may be paraphrased as follows: "The connection of a word with its sense is coeval with the origin of both. In consequence of this connection the words of the Veda convey a knowledge of duty, and impart unerring instruction in regard to matters imperceptible. Such Vedic injunctions constitute the proof of duty alleged by Bādarāyaṇa, author of the Vedānta Sūtras; for this proof is independent of perception and all other evidence."

I subjoin most of the remarks of the scholiast as given by Dr. Ballantyne, indicating by letters the words of the aphorism to which they refer:

(a) Autpattikaḥ | svabhāvikāḥ | nityaḥ iti yāvat | "Autpattika (original) means natural, eternal in short."

(b) Sabdasya | nitya-veda-gaṇṭaka-padasya "agnihotraṁ jhuyat svarga-kāmaḥ" ityādeḥ | "S'abda (word) refers to terms which form part of the eternal Veda, such as, 'the man who desires heaven should perform the Agnihoṭra sacrifice.'"
Sambandha (connection), "in the nature of power," i.e. according to Dr. Ballantyne, depending on the divine will that such and such words should convey such and such meanings.

Atas tasya | dhammaśya | "Hence' is to be supplied before 'this,' which refers to 'duty.'"

Jñānam | atra karane lyūṭ | jñapter yathārtha-jñānasya karaṇam | "In the word jñāna (knowledge) the affix lyūṭ has the force of 'instrument,' 'an instrument of correct knowledge.'"

Upadeśā | artha-pratipādanam | "Instruction, i.e. the establishment of a fact."

Aṣyātirekah | aṣyabhichāri | dṛiṣyate ataḥ | "Unerring,' i.e. that which is seen not to deviate from the fact."

Namaḥ "vahnināṁ iti sābda-śravaṇānantaram pratyaṣkṣheṇa vahnināṁ dṛiṣṭevā sābde pramāṭeṣvā gṛihṇāti iti loke prasiddheḥ pratyaṣkṣhādītara-pramāṇa-sāpekṣhataḥ sādasya sa kathāṁ dharma pramāṇam ata aha 'anupalabdhā' iti | anupalabdhe pratyaṣkṣhādi-pramāṇair ajñāte 'rthe | "Since it is a matter of notoriety that any one who has heard the words ' [the mountain is] fiery' uttered, and afterwards sees the fire with his own eyes, is [only] then [thoroughly] convinced of the authority of the words, it may be asked how words which are thus dependent [for confirmation on] perception and other proofs, can themselves constitute the proof of duty? In reference to this, the word anupalabdhe ('in regard to matters imperceptible') is introduced. It signifies 'matters which cannot be known by perception and other such proofs.'"

Tat | vidhi-ghaṭita-vākyāṁ dharme pramāṇam Bādarāyanaḥchāryasya sammatam | ayam āśayaḥ | 'parevato vahnināṁ' iti dharma-puruṣha-prayuktam vākyam arthāṁ vyabhicharati | atāḥ prāmāṇya-nischaye praty-akṣhādikam apekṣhate | tathā 'ghnihtraṁ juhoti iti vākyam kālā-traye 'py arthāṁ na vyabhicharati | ata itara-nirapekṣhāṁ dharma pramāṇam | "This, i.e. a [Vedic] sentence consisting of an injunction, is regarded by Bādarāyana also as proof of duty. The purport is this. The sentence, 'the mountain is fiery,' when uttered by a person defective [in his organ of vision], may deviate from the reality; it therefore requires the evidence of our senses, etc.' to aid us in determining its sufficiency as proof. Whereas the Vedic sentence regarding the performance of the Agnihotra sacrifice can never deviate from the truth in any time, past, present, or future; and is therefore a proof of duty, independently of any other evidence."
The commentator then proceeds to observe as follows: *Pūrva-sūtre śabdārthayos sambandho nityaḥ ity uktam | tach cha śabda-nityatvādāhinam iti tat sisādhayishur ādau śabdānitya-tva-vādī-matam pūrva-pakṣam upādayati* | "In the preceding aphorism it was declared that the connection of words and their meanings [or the things signified by them] is eternal. Desiring now to prove that this [eternity of connection] is dependent on the eternity of words [or sound], he begins by setting forth the first side of the question, viz. the doctrine of those who maintain that sound is not eternal."

This doctrine is accordingly declared in the six following aphorisms (sūtras), which I shall quote and paraphrase, without citing, in the original, the accompanying comments. These the reader will find in Dr. Ballantyne's work.

**Sūtra 6.** — *Karma eke tatra darśanāt* | "Some, i.e. the followers of the Nyāya philosophy, say that sound is a product, because we see that it is the result of effort, which it would not be if it were eternal."

**Sūtra 7.** — *Asthānāt* | "That it is not eternal, on account of its transitoriness, i.e. because after a moment it ceases to be perceived."

**Sūtra 8.** — *Karoti- śabdāt* | "Because, we employ in reference to it the expression 'making,' i.e. we speak of 'making' a sound."

**Sūtra 9.** — *Sattvāntare yaugapadyāt* | "Because it is perceived by different persons at once, and is consequently in immediate contact with the organs of sense of those both far and near, which it could not be if it were one and eternal."

**Sūtra 10.** — *Prakṛiti-vikṛityoḥ cha* | "Because sounds have both an original and a modified form; as e.g. in the case of *dadhi* atra, which is changed into *dadya* atra, the original letter i being altered into y by the rules of permutation. Now, no substance which undergoes a change is eternal."

**Sūtra 11.** — *Vriddhiḥ cha kartṛi-bhāmnā 'syā* | "Because sound is augmented by the number of those who make it. Consequently the opinion of the Mīmāṃsakas, who say that sound is merely manifested, and not created, by human effort, is wrong, since even a thousand manifesters do not increase the object which they manifest, as a jar is not made larger by a thousand lamps."

These objections against the Mīmāṃsaka theory that sound is manifested, and not created, by those who utter it, are answered in the following Sūtras:
Sūtra 12.—Samaṁ tu tatra darśanam | "But, according to both schools, viz. that which holds sound to be created, and that which regards it as merely manifested, the perception of it is alike momentary. But of these two views, the theory of manifestation is shown in the next aphorism to be correct one."

Sūtra 13.—Sataḥ param adarsanaṁ vishayānaṅgamāt | "The non-perception at any particular time, of sound, which, in reality, perpetually exists, arises from the fact that the utterer of sound has not come into contact with his object, i.e. sound. Sound is eternal, because we recognise the letter ṛ, for instance, to be the same sound which we have always heard, and because it is the simplest method of accounting for the phenomenon to suppose that it is the same. The still atmosphere which interferes with the perception of sound, is removed by the conjunctions and disjunctions of air issuing from a speaker's mouth, and thus sound (which always exists, though unperceived) becomes perceptible. This is the reply to the objection of its 'transitoriness' (Sūtra 7)."

An answer to Sūtra 8 is given in

Sūtra 14.—Prayogasya param | "The word 'making' sounds, merely means employing or uttering them."

The objection made in Sūtra 9 is answered in

Sūtra 15.—Aditya-vad yaugapadyam | "One sound is simultaneously heard by different persons, just as one sun is seen by them at one and the same time. Sound, like the sun, is a vast, and not a minute object, and thus may be perceptible by different persons, though remote from one another."

An answer to Sūtra 10 is contained in

Sūtra 16.—Varnāntaram avikāraḥ | "The letter u, which is substituted for i in the instance referred to under Sūtra 10, is not a modification of i, but a distinct letter. Consequently sound is not modified."

The 11th Sūtra is answered in

Sūtra 17.—Nāda-vṛiddhi-parā | "It is an increase of 'noise,' not

84 "Sound is unobserved, though existent, if it reach not the object (vibrations of air emitted from the mouth of the speaker proceed and manifest sound by their appulse to air at rest in the space bounded by the hollow of the ear; for want of such appulse, sound, though existent, is unapprehended)."—Colebrooke, i. 306.

85 The text as given in the Bibliotheca Indica has nāda-vṛiddhi-parā.
of sound, that is occasioned by a multitude of speakers. The word 'noise' refers to the 'conjunctions and disjunctions of the air' (mentioned under Sūtra 13) which enter simultaneously into the hearer’s ear from different quarters; and it is of these that an increase takes place.”

The next following Sūtras state the reasons which support the Mi-mānsaka view:

Sūtra 18.—Nityas tu syād darśanasya parārthaḥ | ‘Sound must be eternal, because its utterance is fitted to convey a meaning to other persons. If it were not eternal [or abiding], it would not continue till the hearer had learned its sense, and thus he would not learn the sense, because the cause had ceased to exist.”

Sūtra 19.—Sarvatra yaugapadyāt | ‘Sound is eternal, because it is in every case correctly and uniformly recognized by many persons simultaneously; and it is inconceivable that they should all at once fall into a mistake.”

When the word go (cow) has been repeated ten times, the hearers will say that the word go has been ten times pronounced, not that ten words having the sound of go have been uttered; and this fact also is adduced as a proof of the eternity of sound in

Sūtra 20.—Sankhyābhāvat | ‘Because each sound is not numerically different from itself repeated.”

Sūtra 21.—Anapekshatvāt | ‘Sound is eternal, because we have no ground for anticipating its destruction.”

‘But it may be urged that sound is a modification of air, since it arises from its conjunctions (see Sūtra 17), and because the Sikshā (or Vedāṅga treating of pronunciation) says that ‘air arrives at the condition of sound; and as it is thus produced from air, it cannot be eternal.” A reply to this difficulty is given in

Sūtra 22.—Prakhyābhāvacch cha yogasya | ‘Sound is not a modification of air, because, if it were, the organ of hearing would have no appropriate object which it could perceive. No modification of air (held by the Naiyāyikas to be tangible) could be perceived by the organ of hearing, which deals only with intangible sound.”

Sūtra 23.—Linga-darśanāch cha | ‘And the eternity of sound is established by the argument discoverable in the Vedic text, ‘with an eternal voice, o Virūpa.’ (See above, p. 69.) Now, though this sentence had another object in view, it, nevertheless, declares the eternity of language, and hence sound is eternal.”
"But though words, as well as the connection of word and sense, be eternal, it may be objected—as in the following aphorism—that a command conveyed in the form of a sentence is no proof of duty."

Sūtra 24.—Utpattau vā rachanāḥ syur arthasya a-tan-nimittvatāś
t

"Though there be a natural connection between words and their meanings, the connection between sentences and their meanings is a factitious one, established by human will, from these meanings (of the sentences) not arising out of the meanings of the words. The connection of sentences with their meanings is not (like the connection of words with their meanings) one derived from inherent power (see Sūtra 5, remark (c), above, p. 72), but one devised by men; how, then, can this connection afford a sufficient authority for duty?"

An answer to this is given in

Sūtra 25.—Tad-bhūtānam kriyārthena samāmnayo’rthasya tan-nimit-
tvatāś
t

"The various terms which occur in every Vedic precept are accompanied by a verb; and hence a perception (such as we had not before) of the sense of a sentence is derived from a collection of words containing a verb. A precept is not comprehended unless the individual words which make it up are understood; and the comprehension of the meaning of a sentence is nothing else than the comprehension of the exact mutual relation of the meanings arising out of each word."

Sūtra 26.—Loke sanniṣṭham prayoga-sannikarshaḥ syāt
t

"As in secular language the application of words is known, so also in the Veda they convey an understood sense, which has been handed down by tradition."

The author now proceeds in the next following Sūtras to state and to obviate certain objections raised to his dogmas of the eternity and authority of the Vedas.

Sūtra 27.—Vedāṇāṁ cha eke sannikarshaṁ purushākhyāḥ

"Some (the followers of the Nyāya) declare the Vedas to be of recent origin, i.e. not eternal, because the names of men are applied to certain parts of them, as the Kāṭhaka and Kauthuma."

This Sūtra, with some of those which follow, is quoted in Śaṅkara’s commentary on the R.V. vol. i. pp. 19 and 20. His explanation of the present Sūtra is as follows:

Yathā Raghuvvaṁśādayaḥ idāṁ linatāṁ tathā vedāḥ api | na tu vedāḥ

anādayaḥ | utaḥ eva veda-kartriśvena purushāḥ ākhyāyante | Viṣṇuśikam
Bhārataṁ Vālmikiyaṁ Rāmāyaṇam ity atra yathā Bhārata-dī-kartṛtvena Vyasādayaḥ akhyāyante tatā Kāṭhakāṁ Kaṭhuṁaṁ Taṇṭirīyaṁ ity evaṁ tat tad-veda-sākhā-kartṛtvena Kaṭhadīnām akhyātatavat paurushaṁ | Nanu nityānām eva vedānām upādhiya-vaṁ sampradāya-pravartakatvena Kāṭhakādi-sāmakhyā syād ity āsanyā yuktī-antaraṁ sūtrayati | ... kā tarhi Kāṭhakādy-ākhyāyikāyāḥ gatī ity āsanyā sampradāya-pravarttanāt sa iyam upopadyate |

"Some say, that as the Raghuvāṁśa, etc., are modern, so also are the Vedas, and that the Vedas are not eternal. Accordingly, certain men are named as the authors of the Vedas. Just as in the case of the Mahābhārata, which is called Vaiyāśika (composed by Vyāsa), and the Rāmāyaṇa, which is called Vālmikiya (composed by Vālmiki), Vyāsa and Vālmiki are indicated as the authors of these poems; so, too, Kaṭha, Kauṭhuma, and Taṇṭirī are shown to be the authors of those particular Śākhās of the Vedas which bear their names, viz. the Kāṭhaka, Kauṭhuma, and Taṇṭirīya; and consequently those parts of the Vedas are of human composition. After suggesting that the Vedas, though eternal, have received the name of Kāṭhaka, etc., because Kaṭha and others, as teachers, handed them down; he adduces another objection in the next Sūtra."

The explanation here indicated is accepted a little further on, in the remarks on one of the following Sūtras: "What, then, is the fact in reference to the appellations Kāṭhaka, etc.? It is proved to have arisen from the circumstance that Kaṭha, etc., handed down the Vedas." I proceed to

Sūtra 28.—Anitya-darśanāḥ cha | "It is also objected that the Vedas cannot be eternal, because we observe that persons, who are not eternal, but subject to birth and death, are mentioned in them. Thus it is said in the Veda ‘Babara Prāvanaṁi desired,’ ‘Kusuruvinda Auddālaki desired.’ Now, as the sentences of the Veda, in which they are mentioned, could not have existed before these persons were born, it is clear that these sentences had a beginning, and being thus non-eternal, they are proved to be of human composition" (‘Babaraḥ Prāvanaṁi akāmayaṁ’ ‘Kusuruvindaḥ Auddālakir akāmayaṁ’ ityādi (vākyānāṁ?) vedesu darśanāt teshāṁ janaṁ prāg imāṁ vākyāṁ nāsann iti sādītvaṁ anityatvaṁ paurushāyatvam cha siddham).

These objections are answered in the following aphorisms:
Sūtra 29.—*Uktaṁ tu śabda-pūrvatvam |" But the priority—eternity
—of sound has been declared, and, by consequence, the eternity of the
Veda."

Sūtra 30.—Ākhyā pravachanāt | “The names, derived from those
of particular men, attached to certain parts of the Vedas, were given on
account of their studying these particular parts. Thus the portion read
by Kaṭha was called Kaṭhaka, etc.”

Sūtra 31.—Parantu śruti-sāmānya-mātram | “And names occurring
in the Veda, which appear to be those of men, are appellations common
to other beings besides men.”

“Thus the words *Babara Prāvahāṇi* are not the names of a man, but
have another meaning. For the particle *pra* denotes ‘pre-eminence,’
vahana means ‘the motion of sound,’ and the letter 镱 represents the
agent; consequently the word *prāvahāṇi* signifies that ‘which moves
swiftly,’ and is applied to the wind, which is eternal. *Babara* again is
a word imitating the sound of the wind. Thus there is not even a sem-
b lance of error in the assertion that the Veda is eternal” (Yadyapi Ba-
baraḥ Prāvahāṇir ity asti parantu śrutiḥ prāvahany ādi-śabdaḥ sāmān-
ynam | anyārthasyāpi vāchakam | tathā hi | “pra” ity asya utkaraṇaś-
rayaḥ | “vahanaḥ” śabdasya gatiḥ | 镱-karaḥ kartta | tathā cha utkriṣṭa-
gaty-āśraya vāyu-parah | sa cha anādīḥ | Babaraḥ iti vāyu-śabdānukara-
nam | iti na anupapatti-pandho ’pi ()).

Before proceeding to the 32nd Sūtra, I shall quote some further
illustrations of the 31st, which are to be found in certain passages of
the Introduction to Śaṅkara’s Commentary on the Rig-veda, where he
is explaining another section of the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras (i. 2, 39 ff.).
The passages are as follows (p. 7):

> Anitya-saṃyogad mantrānarthakāyam | “kīm te kriṇvantī Kikaṭesha”
> iti mantre Kīkaṭo nāma janapadaḥ āmnātaḥ | Tathā Naichāṣākhaṁ nāma
> nagaram Pramagando nāma rājā ity ete’rthāḥ anityāḥ āmnātaḥ | Tathā
> cha sați prāk Pramagandād na ayam mantra bhūta-pūrveḥ iti gamyate
> And in p. 10: Yad apy utkam Pramagandādy - anityārtha - saṃyogad
> mantrasya anāditevaṁ na syād iti tatrottaṁ sūtrayati | “Uktaḥ chā-
> nitya-saṃyogah” iti | prathama-pādasya antimādikaraṇe so ’yam anitya-
> saṃyoga-dūḥōḥ utkāḥ pariśristāḥ | Tathā hi | tatra pūrva-pakṣe Vedā-
> nāṁ paurusheya-vaṁ vaktuṁ Kaṭhakāṁ Kalāpakam ity-ādi-purusha-
> sambandhāhābhidhānaṁ hetūkṛtaya “anitya-dārśanāch cha” iti hetv-antaraṁ
sūtritam | “Babarāḥ prāvāhaṇiḥ akāmayaḥ” ity anityānām Babarādīnām
‘arthānāṁ darśanaṁ ṭataḥ pūrvaṁ asatteṣāvat paurusheyo vedaḥ iti tasya
uttaraṁ sūtritam “parāṁ tu śruti-sāmānya-mātram” iti | tasya ayam
arthāḥ | yat Kāṭhakādi-samākhyaṁ tat pravachana-nimittam | yat tu
param Babarādy-anitya-darśanaṁ tat śabda-sāmānya-mātraṁ na tu tatra
Babarākhyāḥ kāśchit puruṣo vivekhitāḥ | kintu “babara” iti śabdaṁ
kurvan vāyur abhidhiyate | sa cha prāvāhaṇiḥ | prakarṣeṇa vahana-
śīlaḥ | Evam anyatāpy uhanīyam |

“it is objected that the mantras are useless, because they are con-
nected with temporal objects. Thus in the text, ‘what are thy cows
doing among the Kikaṭas?’ a country called Kikaṭa is mentioned, as
well as a city named Naichaśākha, and a king called Pramaganda, all
of them non-eternal objects. Such being the case, it is clear that this
text did not exist before Pramaganda.” The answer to this is given in
p. 10: To the further objection that the mantras cannot be eternal,
because such temporal objects as Pramaganda, etc., are referred to in
them, an answer is given in the following Sūtra: ‘The connection
with non-eternal objects has been already explained.’ In the last
section of the first chapter, this very objection of the hymns being con-
nected with non-eternal things has been stated and obviated (see above,
Sūtras 28–31). For in the statement of objections, after it has first
been suggested as a proof of the human origin of the Vedas, that they
bear names, Kāṭhaka, Kālāpaka, etc., denoting their relation to men, a
further difficulty is stated in a Sūtra, viz., that ‘it is noticed that non-
eternal objects are mentioned in the Vedas;’ as, for example, where it
is said that ‘Babara Prāvāhaṇi desired.’ Now, as it specifies non-
eternal objects of this kind, the Veda, which could not have existed
before those objects, must be of human composition. The answer to
this is given in the aphorism, ‘any further names are to be understood
as common to other things.’ The meaning is this: the names Kāṭhaka,
etc., are given to the Vedas because they are expounded by Kāṭha, etc.;
and the further difficulty arising from the names of Babara and other
objects supposed to be non-eternal, is removed by such names being
common to other objects [which are eternal in their nature]. No
persons called Babara, etc., are intended by those names, but the wind,
which makes the sound babara, is so designated. And prāvāhaṇi refers

84 See the First Volume of this work, p. 342, and the Second Volume, p. 362.
to the same object, as it means that which carries swiftly. The same method of explanation is to be applied in other similar cases.”

I proceed to the 32nd Śūtra. It is asked how the Veda can constitute proof of duty when it contains such incoherent nonsense as the following: “An old ox, in blanket and slippers, is standing at the door and singing benedictions. A Brāhmaṇa female, desirous of offspring, asks, ‘Pray, o king, what is the meaning of intercourse on the day of the new moon?’ or the following: ‘the cows celebrated this sacrifice’” (Nanu “Jaradgavo kambala-pādukābhyaṁ dvāri sthito gāyatī mangalāṁ” | tam brāhmaṇaḥ prichhati puttra-kāmā rājann amāyāṁ labhanasya ko’rthāṁ” | iti | “gāvo vai etat satram āsata” ity-ādināṁ asambaddhā- pralāpānāṁ vede satteat kathāṁ sa dharme pramāṇam). A reply is contained in

Śūtra 32.—Kṛte vā viniyogah syāt karamaḥ sambandhāt | “The passages to which objection is taken may be applicable to the duty to be performed, from the relation in which they stand to the ceremony” (as eulogistic of it).

As a different reading and interpretation of this Śūtra are given by Śaṭa in his commentary, p. 20, I shall quote it, and the remarks with which he introduces and follows it:

Nanu vede kvachid evam brāyaṭe “vanaspatayah satram āsata sarpāḥ satram āsata” iti | tatra vanaspatināṁ achetanatvāt sarpāṁ chetanatve ’pi vidyā-rahitateṇād na tad-anushṭhānam sambhavati | Ato “Jaradgavo gāyatī maḍrakāṁ” ityādy-unmatta-bāla-vākya-sādṛśateṇ Śv. kṛte vedāḥ ity āsānīya uttaraṁ sūtryati | “Kṛte cha avinīyogah syāt karaṇaḥ samstvāt” | Yadi jyotisṭomādi-vākyam kenachit purusheṇa kriyeta tadanāṁ kṛte tasyān vākya svarṣa-sādhanaṇaḥ jyotisṭomaṇya viniyogah na syāt | sādhya-sādhana-bhāvaya purusheṇa jnātum āsākṣatvāt | brāyaṭe tu viniyogah | “jyotisṭomaṇaḥ svarṣa-kāmo yajeta” iti | na ca etat unmatta-vākya-sādṛśaṁ laukika-vidhi-vākya-vad bhāvyā-karaneti-kartavyatā-rūpais tribhir āṁśaṁ upetāyāḥ bhāvanāyāḥ avagamāt | kohi “brāhmaṇaḥ bhojayed” iti vidhau kiṁ kena kathāṁ ity ākāṅkṣhāyāṁ

87 In his commentary on the following aphorism Sābara Svāmin gives only a part of this quotation, consisting of the words Jaradgavo gāyatī mātakāṁ, “An old ox sings senseless words;” and adds the remark: kathāṁ nāma jaradgavo gāyet, “How, now, can an old ox sing?” We must not therefore with the late Dr. Ballantyne take jaradgava for a proper name.
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triptim uddiśya odanena dravyena sāka-sūpādi-pariveshāna-prakāreṇa iti yathā uchyate jyotishtoma-vidhāc api svargam uddiśya somena dravyena dikṣaṇiṣṭādy-angopakāra-prakāreṇa ity ukte katham unmattā-vākya-

sadrīṣam bhaved iti | vanaspaty-ādi-satra-vākyam api na tat-sadriṣaṁ
tasya satra-karmano jyotishtomadinnā samavāt | yat-paro hi śabdaḥ sa
śabdārthāḥ iti nyāya-vidāh āhuḥ | jyotishtomādi-vākyasya vidhāyakatvād
anuṣṭhāne tatparyam | vanaspaty-ādi-satra-vākyasya arthavādatvād
prāśaṁsāyāṁ tātparyam | sa cha avidyamānenāpi kartuvā śakyate | achen-
tanāḥ avidvānso 'pi satram anuṣṭhitavantaḥ kim punaś chetanāḥ avidvānso
brahmaṇaḥ iti satra-stutiḥ |

‘But it will be objected that the Veda contains such sentences as
this: ‘trees and serpents sat down at a sacrifice.’ Now, since trees
are insensible, and serpents, though possessing sensibility, are destitute
of knowledge, it is inconceivable that either the one or the other should
celebrate such a ceremony. Hence, from its resembling the silly talk
of madmen and children, as where it says, ‘An old ox sings songs (fit
only for the Madras?)’ (see the Second Volume of this work, pp. 481 ff.),
the Veda must have been composed by some man. The answer to this
doubt is contained in the following Sūtra (which I can only render by
a paraphrase): ‘If prescribed by mere human authority, no rite can
have any efficacy; but such ceremonies as the jyotishtaṁoma rest on the
authority of the Veda; and narrative texts such as that regarding the
trees and serpents have the same intention as precepts, i.e. to recom-
 mend sacrifice.’ If the sentence enjoining the jyotishtaṁoma sacrifice had
been composed by any man then, as the sentence was so composed,
the sacrifice so enjoined would not have been applicable as a means of
attaining paradise; for no man could know either the end, or the means
of accomplishing it. But the application in question is prescribed in
the Veda by the words ‘let him, who seeks paradise, sacrifice with the
jyotishtaṁoma.’ Now this injunction does not resemble the talk of a
madman, since we recognize in it, as in injunctions of a secular kind,
the contemplation of the three characteristics of the action to be per-
formed, viz. its end, means, and mode. For, as when a question is put
in regard to the object for which, the instrument through which, and
the manner in which the precept, ‘to feed Brahmans,’ is to be fulfilled,
we are told that the object is to be their satisfaction, the instrumental
substance boiled rice, and the manner, that it is to be served up with

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vegetables and condiments;—in the same way, in the Vedic injunction regarding the jyotishṭoma, we are told that paradise is the object, that soma is the instrumental substance, and that the application of the introductory and other portions of the ritual is the manner. And when this is so, how can this precept be compared to the talk of a madman? Nor does the sentence regarding trees, etc., celebrating a sacrifice, admit of such a comparison, since the sacrifice in question is similar to the jyotishṭoma and other such rites. For logicians say that the meaning of a word is the sense which it is intended to intimate. The purport of the sentence regarding the jyotishṭoma, which is of a preceptive character, is to command performance. The object of the sentence regarding trees, etc., attending at a sacrifice, which is of a narrative character, is eulogy; and this can be offered even by a thing which has no real existence. The sacrifice is eulogized by saying that it was celebrated even by insensible trees and ignorant serpents: how much more, then, would it be celebrated by Brāhmans possessed both of sensation and knowledge!"

The following passage from the Nyāya-mālā-vistara, a treatise containing a summary of the doctrines of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā of Jaimini, by Mādhava Āchāryya, the brother of Śāyaṇa Āchāryya (see above, p. 66) repeats some of the same reasonings contradicting the idea that the Veda had any personal author (i. 1, 25, 26):


88 I have extracted this passage from Prof. Goldstücker's text of the Nyāya-mālā-
"[Verses] 'Is the word of the Veda derived from a personal author or not? It must (some urge) be so derived, since (1) it bears the names of Kāṭhaka, etc., and (2) has the characters of a sentence, like other sentences. No (we reply); for (1) the names arose from particular persons being teachers of the Vedas, and (2) the objection that the Vedic precepts have the characters of common sentences is refuted by other considerations. The Veda can have no personal author, since it has never been perceived to have had a maker.' [Comment] It is objected (1) that the names Kāṭhaka, Kauṭhuma, Taittirīyaka, etc., are applied in common usage to the different Vedas; and the taddhita affix by which these appellations are formed, denotes 'uttered by' [Kāṭha, Kuthumi, and Tittiri] (comp. Pāṇini, iv. 3, 101). Such being the case, it is clear that these parts of the Vedas are derived from a personal author, like the Mahābhārata, which is styled Vaiyāsika, because it was uttered by Vyāsa, etc. And further (2), the sentences of the Veda, being subject to different interpretations, must have had a personal author, because they have the properties of a sentence, like the sentences of Kālidāsa, etc. To this we reply (1), the name applied to any Veda originates in the fact that the sage whose name it bears, was an agent in transmitting the study of that Veda. But (2) in the books of Kālidāsa and others, the authors are discoverable [from the notices] at the end of each section. Now if the Veda also were the composition of a personal author, the composer of it would, in like manner, be discoverable; but such is not the case. Hence, the objection that the Veda partakes of the nature of common sentences is refuted by opposing considerations. Consequently the Veda is not the work of a personal author. And such being the case, as we cannot suspect in it any fallibility occasioned by the defects of human reason, the preceptive texts of the Veda are demonstrated to be authoritative in questions of duty."

II.—Vedārtha-prakāśa. The verses just quoted are repeated in the Vedārtha-prakāśa of Mādhava on the Taittirīya Sanhitā (p. 26), with a various reading at the beginning of the third line, viz. ‘ṣamākhyānam pravachanāt’ instead of ‘ṣamākhyā dhyāpakatevena.’ The comment by which the verses are explained in the same work, is as follows:

Valmikiyaṁ Vaiyāsikīyaṁ ityādi-ṣamākhyānad Rāmāyana-Bhāratā-vistara; and I am indebted to the same eminent scholar for some assistance in my translation of it.
dikāṃ yathā paurusheyaṁ tathā Kāṭhakaṁ Kauṭhumāṁ Taittirīyaṁ ity-ādi-samākhyaṇād vedaḥ paurusheyaḥ | kincha veda-vākyam paurusheyaṁ vākyatvāt Kālidāsādi-vākyā-vad iti chet | maivam | sampradāya-pravītyā samākhyaṇapatteḥ | Vākyatva-hetvau tv anupalabdha-viśuddha-kālaya-yāpadisṭaḥ | Yathā Vyāsa-Vālmiki-prabhūrītyaya tad-grantha-nirmāṇa-vasare kāśchid upalabdhaḥ anyair api avichhinna-sampradāyaṇena upalabdhyante | na tathā veda-karttā puruṣaḥ kāśchid upalabdhaḥ | pratyuta vedaṣya nityatvaṁ śruti-smṛitiḥbhyaṁ pūreṇa udāhritam | Paramātmā tu veda-karttā 'pi na laukiya-puruṣaḥ | tasmāt karttṛi-doshābhavād nāsty aprāmāṇya-sankā |

"It may be said (1) that as the Rāmāyaṇa, the Mahābhārata, and other such books, are regarded as the works of personal authors from the epithets Vālmikīya (composed by Vālmiki), Vaiyāsikīya (composed by Vyāsa), etc., which they bear, so too the Veda must have had a similar origin, since it is called by the appellations of Kāṇṭhaka, Kauṭhuma, Taittirīya, etc.; and further (2), that the sentences of the Veda must have had this origin, because they possess the properties of a common sentence, like those of Kālidāsa and others. But these objections are unfounded, for (1) the appellations of those parts of the Veda are derived from the sages who were agents in transmitting the study of them; and (2) the objection about the Veda having the properties of a common sentence is opposed to the fact that no author was ever perceived, and so proceeds upon an erroneous generalization."

For though Vyāsa and Vālmiki, etc., when employed in the composition of their respective works, were perceived by some persons to be so en-

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89 This phrase thus translated (kālātavayu-padisṭaḥ) is a technical term in the Nyāya philosophy, denoting one of the hetu-abhāsas, or "mere semblances of reasons," and is thus defined in the Nyāya-sūtras, i. 49, Kātalātavayu-padisṭaḥ kātalātitaḥ, which Dr. Ballantyne (Aphorisms of the Nyāya, p. 42) thus explains: "That [semblance of a reason] is mis-timed, which is adduced when the time is not [that when it might have availed]. [For example, suppose one argues that] fire does not contain heat, because it is factitious, [his argument is mis-timed if we have already ascertained by the superior evidence of the senses that fire does contain heat]." It does not, however, appear, how the essential validity of an argument can depend at all on the time when it is adduced, as is justly observed by Professor Goldstücker, who has favoured me with his opinion on the sense of the phrase. After consulting the commentary of Vātsyāyana in loco, he thinks the aphorism (which is not very distinctly explained by the commentators) must denote the erroneous transference of a conclusion deduced from the phenomena happening at one "time," i.e. belonging to one class of cases, to another class which does not exhibit, or only apparently exhibits, the same phenomena; in short, a vicious generalization.
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...gaged, and are known by others also [in after ages] to be the authors, from the existence of an unbroken tradition to that effect;—no human author of the Veda has ever been perceived. On the contrary, we have formerly shown that the eternity of the Veda is declared both by itself and by the Smṛiti. And even if the Supreme Spirit be the maker of it, still he is not a mundane person; and consequently, as no defect exists in the maker, there is no reason to suspect fallibility in his work."

No notice has been taken by these commentators of an objection which might have been raised to the validity of this reasoning, viz. that the hymns of the Rīch and other Vedas are all set down in the Anukramaṇis, or indices to those works, as being uttered by particular rishis; the rishis being, in fact, there defined as those whose words the hymns were—yasya vākyaṁ sa rishiḥ.90 (See Colebrooke's Misc. Ess. i. 26, or p. 12 of Williams and Norgate's ed.) Though, however, this objection has not been alluded to in any of the preceding passages, an answer has been provided to it in the well-known assertion of the orthodox Indian writers that the rishis did not compose, but only saw and afterwards repeated the hymns and other parts of the Vedas, which had in reality pre-existed from eternity.

Thus, in the Vedārtha-prakāsa on the Taittirīya Sanhitā, p. 11, it is said: Aśtindriyārtha-drashtāraḥ rishayah | Teshāṁ veda-drashṭritoṁ smaryate | Yugante 'nārhitān 91 Vedāṁ setihasan mahārshayaḥ | Lēbhire tapasa pūrvaṁ anujñātāḥ svayambhuvaṁ | (Mahābhārata, Sāntiparvan, verse 7660. See above, p. 49.) "The rishis were seers of things beyond the reach of the bodily senses. The fact of their seeing the Vedas is recorded in the Smṛiti: 'The great rishis, empowered by Svayambhū, formerly obtained, through devotion, the Vedas and the Itihāsas which had disappeared at the end of the [preceding] Yuga.'"

So, too, Manu (as already quoted, Vol. I. p. 394) says, in similar, although more general language: Prajahpatir idāṁ śāstrāṁ tapasaivā-śrijat prabhuh | Tathaiva vedāṁ rishayas tapasaṁ pratipedire | "Prajāpati created this Sāstra (the Institutes of Manu) by austere-fervour (tapas); and by the same means the rishis obtained the Vedas."'

90 Some passages from the Nirukta on this subject will be quoted in a later part of this volume.
91 The text of the Bibloth. Ind. reads tarhi tān. I have followed the M. Bh., which evidently gives the true reading.
The following extract from the account of the Pürva-mīmāṁsā philosophy, given in the Sarva-dārśana-sangraha of Mādhava Āchāryya (Bibliotheea Indica, pp. 127 ff.), contains a fuller summary of the controversy between the Mīmāṁsakas and the Naïyāyikas respecting the grounds on which the authority of the Veda should be regarded as resting:

Syād etat | vedasya katham apaaurusheyatvam abhidhiyate | tat-pratis-pādaka-pramāṇābhāvāt katham manyethāḥ apaaurusheyāḥ vedāḥ | sampradāyavichchhede saty asamyayamāṇa-karttrikatvād ātma-vad iti | tad etad mandaṁ viśeṣapāsiddhēḥ | paaurusheya-veda-vādibhiḥ pralaye sampradāyā-vichchhedasya kakṣhikaranat | kincha kim idam asamyayamāṇa-karttrikatevaṁ nāma | apratīyanāna-karttrikatveva asmaraṇa-ghocara-karttrikatvam vā | na prathamah kalpaḥ Paraṃśvarasya karttuh pramiter abhyupagamati | na deityo vikalpaśahatvāt | tathā hi | kim ekena asmaraṇam abhipreyate sarvair vā | na ādyāḥ | “yo dharma-śilo jita-māṇa-roṣah” ityadīshu muktakoktishu evabhičhārāt | na deityāḥ | sarvāsmaraṇasya asarvaṇa-durjñānatevāt |

Paurusheyate pramāṇa-sambhavāḥ cha veda-vākyāni paaurusheyāni | vākyatevāt | Kālidāsādi-vākya-vat | veda-vākyāni āpta-pranitāni | pramanatve sati vākyatvād Manv-ādi-vākya-vat iti |

Nanu | “Vedasyādhyayanaṁ sarvaṁ guru-adhyayana-pūrvakam | vedādhyayana-sāmāṇya adhunā ’dhyayanaṁ yathā” | ity anumānam prati sadhanam pragabhate iti chet | tad api na pramāṇa-koṭim praveshtum ishte | “Bhāratadhyayanaṁ sarvaṁ guru-adhyayana-pūrvakam | Bhāratadhyayanatvena sāmpratīdhyayanaṁ yathā” iti abhāsa-sāmāṇa-yogukshematvāt | nanu tatra Vyāsāḥ karttā iti smaraye “ko hy anyaḥ Punārīkākshād Mahābhārata-kiḍā bhavet” ity-ādāv iti chet | tad asāram | “riceḥ sāmāni jajnire | chhandāṁsi jajnire tasmād yajus tasmād ajayata” iti purusha-sūkhe vedasya sa-karttikatā-pratipadānāt |

Kincha anyityaḥ sabdāḥ sāmāṇyavatvāt sati asmad-ādi-vāhyendriya-grāhyatvād ghatā-evt | nanv idam anumānāṁ sa evaṣaṁ ga-kāraḥ ity pratīyabhījna-pramāṇa-pratiḥatam iti chet | tad ati phaluy “lāna-punarjāta-kēśa-dalita-kund”-ādāv iva pratīyabhījnyāḥ sāmāṇa-vishayateena bādhaṅkataṁbāhavāt |

Nanv skṛtārasya Parameśvarasya tāle-ādi-sthānābhāvena varṇochchāraṇaṃ sambhavāt kathāṁ tatt-pranitatvam vedasya syād iti chet | na tad bhadraṁ svabhāvato ’sarirasyaṁī tasya bhaktanugrahārtham lilā-vigraha-
graṇaṇa - sambhavat | tasmād vedasya apauroṣheyatva-vācho yuktir na
yuktā iti chet |

Tatra samādhānam abhidhiyate | Kim idam apauroṣheyatvaṃ sisādhaya-
skitam | purushād utpannateva-mātram | yathā asmad-ādibhir ahar ahar
uchchāryamāṇasya vedasya | praṃāṇāntaraṇa artham upalabhya tat-
prakāśanāya rachitaveśām vā | yathā asmad-ādibhir iva nibadhyamāṇasya
prabandhasya | prathame na vipratipattiḥ | charame kim anumāṇa-balat
tat-sādhanām āgama-balād vā | na ādyaḥ | Mālati-mādhavādi-vākyeṣu
savyabhāharaṇavat | atha praṃāṇate sati iti viśiṣhyate iti chet | tad api
na vipaśchitā manasī vaiśādyam āpadyate | praṃāṇāntaragocara-arthā-
pratipadakām hi vākyam Veda-vākyam | tat praṃāṇāntara-gocara-arthā-
pratipadakam iti sādhyamāne “mama mātā bandhīḥ” iti vad vyāhātā-
pātāt | kincha Paramesvarasya lilā-vigraha-parigrahābhyapagame ’py
atindriyārtha-dārśanaṁ na sanjāghatītī desa-kāla-svabhāva-vipra-kriś-
tārtha- grahanopayābhāeṣat | na cha tach-chakshur-ādikam eva tādriki-
pratiti-jana-na-kshamam iti mantavyam | drīṣṭānusārenaiva kalpanāyāḥ
āśrayanīyatevāt | tad uktām Gurubhiḥ sarvajna-nirakaraṇa - velāyam
“yatṛpaḥ atisaya drīṣṭaḥ sa svārthānātīlanāhanat | dūra-sūkṣmha-mi-
drīṣṭau syād na rūpe śrotra-vṛttītā” iti | atāḥ eva na āgama-balāt tat-
sādhanam |

“Tena proktam” iti Pāṇīṇy-anusāsane jāgratā api Kāṭhaka-Kalāpa-
Tāttirīyaṃ ityādi-samākhya adhyayana-sampradāya-pravarttaka-visha-
yatevena upapadyate | tad-vad aṭrapī sampradāya-pravarttaka-vishayate-
venāpy upapadyate | na cha anumāṇa-balat sābhasya anityatva-siddhiḥ |
pratyabhijña-virodhāt | . . . .

Nam idam pratyabhijṇanām gatevādi-jāti-vishayāṅa na gādī-vakti-
vishayāṁ tāsām prati-purumah bhedopalambhād | anyathā “Somāśarmā
’dhate” iti vibhāgo na syād iti chet | tad api śobhāṁ na bibharti gādī-
vakti-bhede pramāṇābhāvāna gatevādi-jāti-vishayā-kalpanāyām pramāṇa-
bhavat | Yathā gatevam ajānataḥ ekam eva bhimna-desa-parimāṇa-saṁ-
thāna-vyakty-upadhāna-vasād bhimna-desām iva alpaṃ iva mahaṃ iva
dirgham iva vāmaman iva prathate tatha ga-vaktim ajānataḥ ekā ’pi
vyānjaka-bhedat tat-tad-dharmanubaddhiḥ pratībhāsate | etena virud-
dba-dharmādhyāśād bheda-pratibhāsaḥ iti pratyuktam | tatra kim
svābhāviko viruddha-dharmādhyāso bheda-sādhakaveṇa abhimataḥ prā-
titiko vā | prathame asiddhiḥ | aparathā svābhāvika-bhedābhīvapage
daśa ga-kārān udachārayat Chaitra iti prattipattīḥ syād na tu daśa-
kritvo ga-kāraḥ iti | devīye tu na svabhāvika-bhedā-siddhiḥ | na hi
paropādhi-bhedena svabhāvikam aikyam vihanyate | mā bhuḍ nabhasa 'pi
kumbhādy-upādhi-bhedaḥ svabhāviko bhedaḥ | . . . . . . . .
tad uktam āchārya-yaiḥ | 'prayojanaṁ tu yaj jātes tad varṇād eva labhyate | syakti-labhyaiṁ
tu nādebhyaiḥ iti gatvādī dhīr ṛ̥̃iḥāḥ' iti | tathā cha 'pratyabhijñā
yadā śabdē jāgartī niravagrahā | anityatvānumanāṁi saiva sarvāṁi bā-
dhate' | . . . . . . . .
tataś cha vedasya apaurusheyatayā nirasta-samasta-śaṅkā-
kalankāṅkuraṃviva svataḥ siddhaṁ dharme prāmāṇyam iti suthitam |

"Be it so. But how [the Naiyāyikas may ask] is the Veda alleged
to be undervived from any personal author? How can you regard the
Vedas as being thus undervived, when there is no evidence by which
this character can be substantiated? The argument urged by you Mi-
mānsakas is, that while there is an unbroken tradition, still no author
of the Veda is remembered, in the same way as [none is remembered]
in the case of the soul (or self). But this argument is very weak, be-
cause the asserted characteristics [unbrokenness of tradition, etc.] are not
proved; since those who maintain the personal origin [i.e. origin from
a person] of the Veda, object that the tradition [regarding the Veda]
was interrupted at the dissolution of the universe (pralaya). And
further: what is meant by the assertion that no author of the Veda is
remembered? Is it (1) that no author is believed? or (2) that no author
is the object of recollection? The first alternative cannot be accepted,
since it is acknowledged [by us] that God (Parameṣevara) is proved to
be the author. Nor can the second alternative be admitted, as it cannot
stand the test of the following dilemma, viz. Is it meant (a) that no
author of the Veda is recollected by some one person, or (b) by any
person whatever? The former supposition breaks down, since it fails
when tried by such detached stanzas as this, 'he who is religious, and
has overcome pride and anger,' etc. And the latter supposition is in-
admissible, since it would be impossible for any person who was not
omniscient to know that no author of the Veda was recollected by any
person whatever.

92 This objection occurs in a passage of the Kusumānjali, which I shall quote
further on.
93 I do not know from what work this verse is quoted, or what is its sequel. To
prove anything in point, it must apparently go on to assert that such a saint as is here
described remembers the author of the Veda, or at least has such superhuman facul-
ties as would enable him to discover the author.
And moreover, [the Naiyāyikas proceed], the sentences of the Veda must have originated with a personal author, as proof exists that they had such an origin, since they have the character of sentences, like those of Kālidāsa and other writers. The sentences of the Veda have been composed by competent persons, since, while they possess authority, they have, at the same time, the character of sentences, like those of Manu and other sages.

But [ask the Mīmāṃsakas] may it not be assumed that, 'All study of the Veda was preceded by an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor, since the study of the Veda must always have had one common character, which was the same in former times as now;'
and that this inference has force to prove [that the Veda had no author or was eternal]? Such reasoning [the Naiyāyikas answer] is of no force as proof, [for it might be urged, with an equal show of reason, that] 'All study of the Mahābhārata was preceded by an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor, since the study of the Mahābhārata, from the mere fact of its being such, [must have had the same character in former times] as it has now;' and the advantage of such an argument is simply illusory. But the [Mīmāṃsakas will ask whether there is not a difference between these two cases of the Veda and the Mahābhārata, since] the Smṛiti declares that [Vishṇu incarnate as] Vyāsa was the author of the latter,—according to such texts as this, 'Who else than Pundārīkāksha (the lotus-eyed Vishṇu) could be the maker of the Mahābhārata?' (see above, p. 39),—'[while nothing of this sort is recorded in any Sāstra in regard to the Veda]. This argument, however, is powerless, since it is proved by these words of the Purushasūkta, 'From him sprang the Rīch and Sāman verses and the metres, and from him the Yajush verses,' (above, p. 3) that the Veda had a maker.

Further [proceed the Naiyāyikas] we must suppose that sound [on the eternity of which the eternity and uncreatedness of the Veda depend] is not eternal, since, while it has the properties belonging to a

94 The purport of this verse is, that as every generation of students of the Veda must have been preceded by an earlier generation of teachers, and as there is no reason to assume any variation in this process by supposing that there ever had been any student who taught himself; we have thus a regressus ad infinitum, and must of necessity conclude that the Vedas had no author, but were eternal.
genus, it can, like a jar, be perceived by the external organs of beings such as ourselves. But [rejoin the Mīmāṃsakas], is not this inference of yours refuted by the proof arising from the fact that we recognise the letter G [for example] as the same we have heard before? This argument [replies the Naiyāyika] is extremely weak, for the recognition in question having reference to a community of species,—as in the case of such words as ‘hairs cut and grown again, or of full-blown jasmine,’ etc.,—has no force to refute my assertion [that letters are not eternal].

"But [asks the Mīmāṃsaka] how can the Veda have been uttered by the incorporeal Parameśvara (God), who has no palate or other organs of speech, and therefore cannot be conceived to have pronounced the letters [of which it is composed]? This objection [answers the Naiyāyika] is not happy, because, though Parameśvara is by nature incorporeal, he can yet, by way of sport, assume a body, in order to shew kindness to his devoted worshippers. Consequently, the arguments in favour of the doctrine that the Veda had no personal author are inconclusive.

"I shall now [says the Mīmāṃsaka] clear up all these difficulties. What is meant by this paurusheyatva (‘derivation from a personal author’) which it is sought to prove? Is it (1) mere procession (utpannatva) from a person (purusha), like the procession of the Veda from persons such as ourselves, when we daily utter it? or (2) is it the arrangement—with a view to its manifestation—of knowledge acquired by other modes of proof, in the sense in which persons like ourselves compose a treatise? If the first meaning be intended, there will be no dispute. If the second sense be meant, I ask whether the Veda is proved [to be authoritative] in virtue (a) of its being founded on inference, or (b) of its being founded on supernatural information (āgama-balāt)? The former alternative (a) [i.e. that the Veda derives its authority from being founded on inference] cannot be correct, since this theory breaks down, if it be applied to the sentences of the Mālātī Mādhava or any other secular poem [which may contain inferences destitute of authority]. If, on the other hand, you say (b), that the contents of the Veda are distinguished from those of other books by having authority, this explanation also will fail to satisfy a philosopher. For the word of the Veda is [defined to be] a word which proves things that are not
proveable by any other evidence. Now if it could be established that this Vedic word did nothing more than prove things that are proveable by other evidence, we should be involved in the same sort of contradiction as if a man were to say that his mother was a barren woman. And even if we conceded that Parameśvara might in sport assume a body, it would not be conceivable that [in that case] he should perceive things beyond the reach of the senses, from the want of any means of apprehending objects removed from him in place, in time, and in nature. Nor is it to be thought that his eyes and other senses alone would have the power of producing such knowledge, since men can only attain to conceptions corresponding with what they have perceived. This is is what has been said by the Guru (Prabhākara) when he refutes [this supposition of] an omniscient author: ‘Whenever any object is perceived [by the organ of sight] in its most perfect exercise, such perception can only have reference to the vision of something very distant or very minute, since no organ can go beyond its own proper objects, as e.g. the ear can never become cognizant of form.’ Hence the authority of the Veda does not arise in virtue of any supernatural information [acquired by the Deity in a corporeal shape].

"Without any contravention 93 of the rule of Pāṇini (iv. 3, 101; see above, p. 83) that the grammatical affix with which the words Kāṭhaka, Kālāpa, and Taittīriya are formed, imparts to those derivatives the sense of 'uttered by' Kāṭha, Kālāpa, etc., it is established that the names first mentioned have reference [not to those parts of the Veda being composed by the sages in question, but] to the fact that these sages instituted the practice of studying those parts of the Veda. Here also these appellations ought to be understood in the same manner, as referring to the fact of those sages being the institutors of the study of the Veda; and we are not to think that the eternity of sound [or of the words of the Veda] is disproved by the force of any inference [to be drawn from those names], since this would be at variance with the recognition [of letters as the same we knew before] (see above, Mīmāṃsa Sūtras, i. 19 f., p. 75). . . .

"But [the Naiyāyikas will ask] does not the recognition [of G and other letters as the same we knew before] refer to them as belonging to the [same] species, and not as being the [same] individual letters, since, in fact, they are perceived to be different [as uttered by] each

93 Literally "although the rule of Pāṇini be awake."
person,—for otherwise it would be impossible for us to make any distinc-
tion [between different readers, as when we say], 'Somasarman is reading?'. This objection, however, shines as little as its predecessors,
and has been answered in this way, viz. that as there is no proof of any
distinction of individuality between G's, etc., there is no evidence that
we ought to suppose any such thing as a species of G's, etc. [i.e. of G's
and other letters each constituting a species]. Just as to the man who
is ignorant that G's constitute a species, [that letter], though one
only, becomes, through distinction of place, magnitude, form, indivi-
duality, and position, variously modified as distinct in place, as
small, as great, as long, or as short, in the same way, to the man who
is ignorant of an individuality of G's, [i.e. of G's being numerically
different from each other], this letter, though only one, appears, from
the distinction existing between the different persons who utter it, to be
connected with their respective peculiarities; and as contrary characters
are in this way erroneously ascribed [to the letter G], there is a falla-
cious appearance of distinctness [between different G's]. But does this
ascription of contrary characters which is thus regarded as creating a
difference [between G's] result from (1) the nature of the thing, or (2)
from mere appearance? There is no proof of the first alternative, as
otherwise an inherent difference being admitted between different G's,
it would be established that Chaitra had uttered ten (different) G's,
and not [the same] G ten times. But on the second supposition, there
is no proof of any inherent distinction [between G's]; for inherent
oneness (or identity) is not destroyed by a difference of extrinsic dis-
guises [or characteristics]. We must not conceive, from the merely
apparent distinctness [occasioned by the separation of its parts] by
jars, etc., that there is any inherent distinctness in the atmosphere
itself. . . . . It has been said by the Achāryya 'The object which
the Naiyāyikas seek, by supposing a species, is in fact gained from
the letter itself; and the object at which they aim by supposing an
individuality in letters, is attained from audible sounds (i.e. the se-
parate utterances of the different letters), so that the hypothesis of
species, etc., is useless.' And he thus reaches the conclusion that,'since, in respect of sounds (letters), recognition has so irresistible a
power, [literally, wakes, unrestrained], it alone repels all inferences
against the eternity [of sound, or the Veda].'' After some further
argumentation the Mīmāṃsaka arrives at the conclusion that "as every imputation of doubt which has germinated has been set aside by the underived character of the Veda, its authority in matters of duty is shewn to be self-evident."

I shall not attempt to carry further my translation of this abstruse discussion, as the remainder of it contains much which I should find great difficulty in comprehending.96

[Although not directly connected with the subject in hand, the following passage from Śankara’s commentary on the Brahma Sūtras, iii. 2, 40,97 will throw some further light on the doctrines of the Mīmāṃsā. In the two preceding Sūtras, as explained by Śankara, it had been asserted, both on grounds of reason and on the authority of the Veda, that God is the author of rewards. In the 40th Sūtra a different doctrine is ascribed to Jaimini:

Dharmaṁ Jaiminir atāḥ eva | Jaiminis tv ācāryyo dharmam phalasya datāram manyate | ata eva hetoh śrutah upapatteṣ cha | śṛṣyate tāvad ayaṁ arthaḥ "svarga-kāmo yajeta" ity evam ādīshu vākyesu | tatra cha vidhi-śrutah viśaya-bhāvopagamanād yāgaḥ svargasya utpādakāḥ iti gam-yate | anyathā hy anauṣṭhāṭriko yāgaḥ āpodyeta tatra asya upadesasya vaiyarthyaṁ syat | nanv anukṛṣṭaṁ-viśnāṁ karmanāḥ phalaṁ na upa-padyade iti parityakto 'yam pakhāḥ | na eṣa doshāḥ śrutī-prayāṇyāt | śrutīḥ chet prāmāṇaṁ yathā yam karma-phala-sambandhaḥ śrutah upa-padyate tathā kalpaivyāyaḥ | na cha anutpadya kimapy apāreṇa karma vinaśyat kālāntaritam phalaṁ dātuṁ saknoti ity atāh karmo vā sūkṣmā kācīd uttarāvasthaḥ phalasya vā pūrvaavasthaḥ apūrvaṁ nāma asti iti tark-yate | upapadīyaḥ cha ayaṁ arthaḥ uktaḥ prakāręṇā | Īśvaras tu phalaṁ dadāti ity anupapannam avichitrasya kāraṇasya vibhotra-kāryyānupapat-tēḥ vaishamya-nairghṛnyā-prasangād anuṣṭhāna-vaiyarthāpattēṣ cha | tāsmād dharmāṁ eva phalam iti

"‘Jaimini says that for this reason virtue [is the giver of reward].’ The Ācāryya Jaimini regards virtue [i.e. the performance of the prescribed rites and duties] as the bestower of reward. ‘For this reason,’

96 In fact I have left out some pages of the translation which I had given in the first edition, as well as the corresponding portion of the text. I am indebted to the kindness of Professor Goldstücker for various suggestions towards the improvement of my translation. But two of the passages on which he had favoured me with his opinion are, to my own apprehension, so obscure, that I have omitted them.

97 It is partly quoted in Prof. Banerjea's work on Hindu Philosophy.
and because it is proved by the Veda. This is the purport of the Vedic text, ‘Let the man who seeks paradise, sacrifice,’ and others of the same kind. As from this Vedic injunction we must infer the existence of an object [to be sought after] it is concluded that sacrifice has the effect of producing heavenly bliss; for otherwise we should be involved in the absurdity of a sacrifice without a performer [since no one would care to sacrifice without an object], and thus the injunction would become fruitless. But may it not be said that it is not conceivable that any fruit should result from a ceremony which perishes every moment, so that this view must be abandoned? No, this defect does not attach to our Mīmāṃsaka statement, since the Veda is authoritative. If the Veda be authority, this connection of the reward with the ceremony must be supposed to exist just as is proved by the Veda. But as a ceremony which perishes without generating any unseen virtue, cannot produce a reward at a distant time, it must be concluded that there is either a certain subtle ulterior form of the ceremony, or a certain subtle anterior form of the reward, which is called ‘unseen virtue.’ And this result is established in the manner before mentioned. But it it is not proved that God bestows rewards, because it is inconceivable that a uniform Cause [such as He is] should produce various effects, and because the performance of ceremonies would be useless, owing to the partiality and unmercifulness which would attach [to the supposed arbiter of men’s deserts]. Hence it is from virtue alone that reward results.”

How far this passage may be sufficient to prove the atheism of the Mīmāṃsā, I will not attempt to say. Before we could decide on such a question, the other Sūtras of that school which refer to this question (if there be any such) would have to be consulted.

Professor Banerjea also quotes the following text from the popular work, the Vidvan-modā-taraṅgaṇī, in which the Mīmāṃsakas are distinctly charged with atheism:

Devo na kaśchid bhuvanasya kartā bhattā na hṛtā ‘pi cha kaśchid āste | karmāṇurūpāni śubhāśubhāni prāṇoḥ sarvāḥ hi janaḥ phalāṇi | vedasya kartā na cha kaśchid āste nityāḥ hi śabdāḥ rachanaḥ hi nityāḥ | prāmāṇyaṃ asmin svataḥ eva siddham anūdi-siddheḥ parataḥ kathāṃ tat |

“There is no God, maker of the world; nor has it any sustainer or destroyer; for every man obtains a recompence in conformity with his
works. Neither is there any maker of the Veda, for its words are eternal, and their arrangement is eternal. Its authoritiveness is self-demonstrated, for since it has been established from eternity, how can it be dependent upon anything but itself?"

I learn from Professor Banerjea that the Mīmāṃsaka commentator Prabhākara and his school treat the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā as an atheistic system, while Kumārila makes it out to be theistic. In fact the latter author makes the following complaint at the commencement of his Vārttika, verse 10: Prāyenaiva hi Mīmāṃśā loke lokyātikritā | tāṃ āstika-pathe kartum ayaṁ yatnaḥ kriṣṇa mayā | "For in practice the Mīmāṃsā has been for the most part converted into a Lokāyata (atheistic) system; but I have made this effort to bring it into a theistic path." See also the lines which are quoted from the Padma Purāṇa by Vijnāna Bhikṣu, commentator on the Sāṅkhya aphorisms, in a passage which I shall adduce further on.]

It appears from a passage in Patanjali’s Mahābhāṣya, that that great grammarian was of opinion that, although the sense of the Veda is eternal, the order of the words has not continued uniform; and that it is from this order having been variously fixed by Kāṭha, Kālapa, and other sages, that different portions of the Indian scriptures are called by their names.

The following passages from the Mahābhāṣya, and from the Commentaries of Kāiṣyāṭa and Nāgojībhataṭa thereon, are extracted from the fuller quotations given by Professor Goldstücker in pp. 147 ff. of the Preface to his Mānava-kālpa-sūtra.

Patanjali: Nanu cha uktam "na hi chhandāmśi kriyante nityāni chhandāmśi" iti | yadyapy artho nityāḥ | yā te asau varṇānupūreśi sā anityā tad-bhedāḥ cha etad bhavati Kāṭhakaṁ Kālāpakam Maudakam Paippalā- daakam ityādi . . . . | Kāiṣyāṭa: "Nityāni" iti | karttur asmaranāt teshām iti bhāvaḥ | "yā te asāv" iti | mahāpralayādīshu varṇānupūreśvināśe punar upadya rishayaḥ saṃskārātiśayād vedārthaṁ smṛītvā śabdārahanāḥ vidādhati ity arthāḥ | "tad-bhedāḥ" iti | ānupūreś-bhedād ity arthāḥ | tataḥ cha Kāṭhādayo vedānupūreyāḥ karttāraḥ eva ityādi | Nāgojībhataṭa: Aṁśena vedasya nityatvaṁ sevārya aṁśena anityateṣam āha "yadyapy arthāḥ" iti | anena vedatvaṁ śabdārthobhayasriti-dhavānteṣam | nanu "dhatā yathā pūrve akalpayād" ityādi-śrutī-balena

See Colebrooke’s Misc. Ess. i. 402 ff., or p. 259 ff. of Williams and Norgate’s ed.
As Professor Goldstücker has only given (in p. 146 of his Preface) a translation of the above extract from Patanjali, and has left the passages from Kaiyyaṭa and Nāgojibhaṭṭa untranslated, I shall give his version of the first, and my own rendering of the two last.

Patañjali: "Is it not said, however, that 'the Vedas are not made, but that they are permanent (i.e. eternal)’? (Quite so); yet though their sense is permanent, the order of their letters has not always remained the same; and it is through the difference in this latter respect that we may speak of the versions of the Kaṭhas, Kalāpas, Mudakas, Pippalādakas, and so on." Kaiyyaṭa on Patañjali: "Eternal;’ by this word he means that they are so, because no maker of them is remembered. By the words, 'the order of their letters,’ etc., it is meant that, the order of the letters being destroyed in the great dissolutions of the universe, etc., the rishis, when they are again created, recollecting, through their eminent science, the sense of the Veda, arrange the order of the words. By the phrase, 'through the difference of this,’ is meant the difference of order. Consequently, Kaṭha and the other sages [to whom allusion was made] are the authors of the order of the Veda." Nāgojibhaṭṭa on Patañjali and Kaiyyaṭa: "Admitting in part the eternity of the Veda, he, Patañjali, declares in
the words, 'though the sense is eternal,' etc., that it (the Veda) is also in part not eternal. By this clause it is implied that the character of the Veda as such is constituted both by the words and by the sense. But is not the order also eternal, since it is a settled doctrine of the modern Mīmāṃsakas, on the strength of such Vedic texts as this, 'the creator made them as before,' etc., that the order also is the very same? No; this is incorrect, and in consequence, he (Kaiyāṭa) says, 'in the great dissolutions,' etc. Some say the meaning of this is, that the order is not eternal, inasmuch as it is formed in particular moments. But this is wrong, because it is opposed to the conclusion of the sentence, 'though their sense is eternal,' etc., and because the objects signified also, such as the jyotīśṭoma sacrifice, are not eternal. Others say that both the sense and the order of the words are eternal [or permanent], owing to the continuity of the tradition; and that, consequently, it is in different manvantaras that the order of the words is different, according to the text, 'in every manvantara this śruti (Veda) is made different.' Others again think that in the words, 'the sense is eternal,' etc., an admission is made by an objector of an eternity opposed to the idea of production, since it is only such a [qualified] eternity that is mentioned in the Veda; and that thus the word 'sense,' or 'object' (ārthaḥ), here refers to Īśvara, because he is the principal object which is had in view in the whole of the Veda, according to the words of the Bhāgavat-gītā (xv. 15), 'It is I whom all the Vedas seek to know.' He next states the proof of the assertion that the order of the letters is not eternal, in the words, 'through the difference of this,' etc. The difference in the order is proved by the difference in the things included under the category of non-eternity. Difference here means variety. But in Īśvara (God), there is no variety. He declares current usage to be the proof of difference, in the words 'Kāṭhaka,' etc., which mean that, though the sense is the same, we use the distinctions of Kāṭhaka, Kālāpaka, etc., in consequence of the difference of arrangement. Here by saying that the order is not eternal, it is implied that the words are the same. And this is what is asserted in the words [of Kaiyāṭa], 'consequently Kāṭha and the other sages,' etc.

99 I am indebted to Professor Goldstücker for a correction of my former rendering of this sentence, and of several others in this passage of Nāgojībhāṭṭa.
After quoting these passages at greater length than I have given them, Professor Goldstücker goes on to remark in his note: "I have quoted the full gloss of the three principal commentators, on this important Sūtra [of Pāṇini] and its Vārttikas, because it is of considerable interest in many respects, . . . We see Kaiyyaṭa and Nāgojibhaṭṭa writhing under the difficulty of reconciling the eternity of the Veda with the differences of its various versions, which, nevertheless, maintain an equal claim to infallibility. Patanjali makes rather short work of this much vexed question; and unless it be allowed here to render his expression varga (which means 'letter'), 'word,' it is barely possible even to understand how he can save consistently the eternity or permanence of the 'sense' of the Veda. That the modern Mīmāṃsists maintain not only the 'eternity of the sense,' but also the 'permanence of the text,' which is tantamount to the exclusive right of one single version, we learn, amongst others, from Nāgojibhaṭṭa. But as such a doctrine has its obvious dangers, it is not shared in by the old Mīmāṃsists, nor by Nāgoji, as he tells us himself. He and Kaiyyaṭa inform us therefore that, amongst other theories, there is one, according to which the order of the letters (or rather words) in the Vaidik texts got lost in the several Pralayas or destructions of the worlds; and since each manvantara had its own revelation, which differed only in the expression, not in the sense of, the Vaidik texts, the various versions known to these commentators represent these successive revelations, which were 'remembered,' through their 'excessive accomplishments,' by the Rishis, who in this manner produced, or rather reproduced, the texts current in their time, under the name of the versions of the Kaṭhas, Kalāpas, and so on. In this way each version had an equal claim to sanctity. There is a very interesting discussion on the same subject by Kumārila, in his Mīmāṃsa-vārttika (i. 3, 10)."

III. The Vedānta.—I proceed to adduce the reasonings by which Bādarāyaṇa, the reputed author of the Brahma, Sārīraka, or Vedānta Sūtras, as expounded by Sankara Āchāryya in his Sārīraka-mīmāṃsā-bhāṣya, or commentary on those Sūtras, defends the eternity and authority of the Veda. His views, as we shall see, are not by any means identical with those of Jaimini and his school. After discussing the question whether any persons but men of the three highest tribes are qualified for divine knowledge, the author of the Sūtras comes to the conclusion
that Śūdras, or persons of the fourth tribe, are incompetent, while beings superior to man, the gods, are competent (Colebrooke’s Misc. Ess. i. 348, or p. 223 of Williams and Norgate’s ed.) In Śūtra, i. 3, 26, the author determines that the gods have a desire for final emancipation, owing to the transitoriness of their glory, and a capacity for attaining it, because they possess the qualities of corporeality, etc.; and that there is no obstacle which prevents their acquiring divine knowledge. A difficulty, however, having been raised that the gods cannot be corporeal, because, if they were so, it is necessary to conceive that they would be corporeally present (as priests actually are) at the ceremonial of sacrifice, in which they are the objects of worship,—a supposition which would not consist with the usual course of such ceremonies, at which the gods are not seen to be corporeally present, and would, in fact, involve an impossibility, since Indra, for example, being but one, could not be corporeally present at numerous sacrifices at once;—this difficulty is solved (under Śūtra i. 3, 27) in two ways, either by supposing (1) that the gods assume different forms, and are present at many sacrifices at once, although invisible to mortals; or by considering (2) that, as a sacrifice is offered to (and not, by) a deity, many persons may present their oblations to that deity at once, just as one Brāhmaṇa may be saluted by many different persons at the same time. It is, therefore, concluded that the corporeal nature of the gods is not inconsistent with the practice of sacrifice. Having settled these points, Sankara comes to Śūtra i. 3, 28:

“S’abde iti chet | na | ataḥ prabhavāt | prayakshanumānābhyyām” |

Mā nāma vighrahavatvē devādīnām abhyupagamyamāne karmāni kāś- chid virodhaḥ prasānji | šabde tu virodhaḥ prasāyeta | katham | Au- pattikaḥ hi śabdasya arthena sambandham āśritya “anapekshavād” iti vedasya prāmāṇyaḥ sthāpitum | Idāniṁ tu vighrahavati devatā ‘bhuy- pagamyamānā yadyapy aśvāryya-yogād yugapad aneka-karma-samband- dhīni havṛtāhi bhunjita tathāpi vighraha-yogād asmad-ādī-vaj janana-ma- ranavati sā iti nityasya śabdasya anityena arthena nitya-sambandhe pra- līyamāne yad vaidike śabde prāmāṇyaḥ sthitam tasya virodhaḥ syād iti chet | na ayam āpy asti virodhaḥ | kasmād “ataḥ prabhavāt” | Ataḥ eva

100 For a discussion of the different question whether the gods can practise the ceremonies prescribed in the Vedas, see the First Volume of this work, p. 365, note.
hi vaidikāt śabdād devādikāṁ jagat prabhavati | Nanu “jannādi asya yataḥ” (Brahma Sūtras i. 1, 2) iti brahma-prabhavavām jagato ‘vādha-
rittāṁ kathāṁ iha śabaś-prabhavatvam uchyate | Apicha yadi nāma vai-
dikāt śabdaś asya prabhavo ’bhuyapagataṁ kathāṁ etātāṁ virodhāḥ śabdē 
parīkṣaṇaḥ | yaśata Vasaśu Ryadrāḥ Aḍityāḥ Visvedevāḥ Marutaḥ ity ete 
’ṛthāḥ anityāḥ eva utpattimatvāt | Tat-anityate ca tad-vāchakānāṁ 
vaidikānāṁ Vase-ādi-śabdānāṁ anityatevaṁ kena vā ryayate | Prasiddhaṁ hi 
loke Devadattasya putre utpanne Yajnadaṁtaḥ iti tasya nāma kriyate iti | 
Tasmād virodhāḥ eva śabda iti chet | na | Gavādi-śabdārtha-sambandha-
nityateva-darśanāt | Na hi gavādi-vyaktinām utpattimatvē ca ākṛitīnāṁ 
any eva vyaktimatvēṁ syād dravya-guna-karmaṇāṁ hi vyaktyāḥ eva utpad-
yante na ākṛityāḥ | Ākṛitiḥ hi ca śabdānāṁ sambandho na vyaktibhiḥ | 
vikṣaṇāṁ ānanyāt sambandha-grahaṇaṁ uṣpapate | Vyaktishu utpadya-
manāśe eva ākṛitīnāṁ nityatevaṁ na gavādi-śabdesu kaśchid virodho driś-
yate | Tathā devādi-vyakti-prabhavābhupagame ’pi ākṛiti-nityatvād na 
kaśchid Vase-ādi-śabdesu virodhāḥ iti draṣṭāväyam | Ākṛiti-viśeshaṁ tu de-
vādiṁ mantrārthavādiḍibhyo vigrahavatvaṛdāya-avagamānāvagantavyāḥ |

Sthāna-viśesha-sambandha-nimittāṣa ca Indrādi-śabdāḥ senāpatyādi-
śabda-vat | Tataḥ cha yo yas tat tat sthānam adhitishṭhaḥ sa sa Indrādi-
śabdair abhiḥhiyate iti na dosho bhavati | Na cha idām śabda-prabhavat-
vam Brahma-prabhavatvam upādāna-kāraṇatvābhuprayeṇa uchyate | 
katham tarki sthiti-vāchakātmanāṁ nitye śabde nityārtha-sambandhini 
śabda-vyavāhāra-yogārtha-vyakti-nishpattitr “ataḥ prabhavah” ity uch-
yate | katham punar avagamyate śabdāḥ prabhavati jagad iti “praty-
akhānumānābhyyām” | Pratyakshaṁ śrutīḥ | prāmāṇyam prati anap-
kshatvāt | anumāṇam smṛtiḥ | prāmāṇyam prati sāpekaḥ Kotvāt | Tē hi 
śabda-pūrvaṁ srishtiṁ darśayatāḥ | “Ete” iti vai prajāpatir devān 
asrijata “asrigram” iti manushyān “indavaḥ” iti pitṛṁs “tirāḥ pavi-
tram” iti grahaṁ “āśavaḥ” iti stotrāṁ “viśvāni” iti ṣastrām “abhi 
saubhāgā” ity anyāḥ prajāḥ iti śrutīḥ | Tathā ’nyatārāpi “sa manasa 
vācham mithunaṁ samabhavad” (Satapatha Brāhmaṇa x. 6, 5, 4, and 
Bṛhadāranyaka Upanishad, p. 50) ityādāṁ tatātra śabda-pūreikā 
srishtiṁ śrāvyate | Smṛhitir api “anādi-nidhāna nityāḥ vāg uṣṭrishtā scavayam-
bhuvā | ādau vedamayaściyā yataḥ savaḥ pravṛttayaḥ” ity uṣṭaro’y 
ayāṁ vācaḥ sampradāyā-pravṛttatvātmano draṣṭāvyah anādi-nidhāna-
ṛṣaḥ anyādriṣasya uṣṭaragasya asambhayāt | Tathā “nāma rūpaṁ cha bhū-
tanāṁ karmanāṁ cha pravṛttanam | Veda-śabdeṣhya evādau nirmane sa
maheśvaraḥ” iti | “sarvēṣhāṁ cha sa nāmāṁ karmāṇi cha prīthak prīthak | • Veda-sādhebhya evādau prīthak saṁsthāḥ cha nirmaṇe” iti cha | Āpičha chāktīśhitam artham anutīṣṭham tasya vācakāṁ sābdam pūrveṁ smṛiteṣa paścāt tam artham anutīṣṭhati iti sarvēṣhāṁ naḥ pratyakṣam etat | Tathā praṇāpate apī sraśṭuḥ sriśteḥ pūrveṁ vaiddikāḥ sābdāḥ manasi prādurbhāvāḥ paścāt tad-anugatān arthān ṣaṃsaṅgaḥ iti ṣamjaya | Tathā cha śrutiḥ “sa bhūr iti vyāharaṇ bhūmim aspiṣṭa” ity-evam-ādikā bhūr-ādi-sādhebhyaḥ eva manasi prādurbhātebhyaḥ bhūr-ādi-lokān prādurbhātān śrīśṭān darṣayati | kiṃ-ātmakam punah sābdam abhipṛtya idāṁ sābdā-prabhavaṃ ucyate | sphaṭam ity āha | . . . . Tasmād nityāt sābdāt sphaṭa-rūpaḥ abhidhāyakāt kriyā-kāraka-phala-lakṣaṇāṁ jagad abhidhēya-bhūtām prabhavatīt | . . . . Tūṣāḥ cha nityēbhyaḥ sādhebhya devādi-vyaktinā prabhavaḥ ity aviruddhaḥ |

Sūtra i. 3, 29. “Atha eva cha nityatvam” | svatantrasya karttuḥ smaranād eva hi sthite cedaya nityatve devādi-vyakti-prabhavaḥbhuvagamena tasya virodham āsāṁya “atāḥ prabhavaḥ” iti pariṇātya idāṁ tad eva veda-nityatvaṁ sthitāṁ draśhayati “atha eva cha nityatvam” iti | atāḥ eva cha niyatakṛteva devāda jātah cedā-sābdā-prabhavaḥvādv eva veda-sābdā-nityatvam api pratyetavam | Tathā cha mantra-vargāḥ “yajnena vācaḥ padaveyam āyaṁ tām anevidām rishikau pravīṣṭham” iti sthitām eva vācham anuvinnāṁ darṣayati | Vedavyāsaḥ cha evam eva sīmārati (Mahābhārata, Vanap. 7660) | “yugante ‘ntarhitān cedān setiḥāsān maḥarṣayaḥ | lebhīre tapasā pūrveṃ anujnaṭāh svayambhuce” iti |

“Sūtra i. 3, 28: ‘But it is said that there will be a contradiction in respect of sound (or the word); but this is not so, because the gods are produced from it, as is proved by intuition and inference.’

‘Be it so, that though the corporeality of the gods, etc., be admitted, no contradiction will arise in respect of the ceremonial. Still [it will be said that] a contradiction will arise in regard to the word. How? [In this way.] By founding upon the inherent connection of a word with the thing signified, the authority of the Veda had been established by the aphorism ‘anapekṣhatev,’ etc. (Mimāṃsā Sūtras i. 2, 21; see above, p. 75.) But now, while it has been admitted that the deities are corporeal, it will follow that (though from their possession of divine power they can act at one and the same time partake of the obligations

101 Compare S’atapatha Brāhmaṇa, xi. 1, 6, 3.
OPINIONS REGARDING THE ORIGIN, ETC.,

offered at numerous sacrifices), they will still, owing to their corporeality, be subject, like ourselves, to birth and death; and hence, the eternal connection of the eternal word with an object which is non-eternal being lost, a contradiction will arise in regard to the authority proved to belong to the word of the Veda; [for thus the word, not having any eternal connection with non-eternal things, could not be authoritative]. But neither has this supposed contradiction any existence. How? 'Because they are produced from it.' Hence the world of gods, etc., is produced from the Vedic word. But according to the aphorism (Brahma Sūtras i. 1, 2) 'from him comes the production, etc., of all this,' it is established that the world has been produced from Brahma. How, then, is it said here that it is produced from the word? And, moreover, if it be allowed that the world is produced from the Vedic word, how is the contradiction in regard to the word thereby removed, inasmuch as all the following classes of objects, viz. the Vasus, Rudras, Adityas, Vīṣṇuvedevas, Maruts, are non-eternal, because produced; and when they are non-eternal, what is there to bar the non-eternity of the Vedic words Vasu, etc., by which they are designated? For it is a common saying, 'It is only when a son is born to Devadatta, that that son receives the name of Yajnadatta,' [i.e. no child receives a name before it exists]. Hence a contradiction does arise in regard to [the eternity of] the word. To this objection we reply with a negative; for in the case of such words as cow we discover an eternal connection between the word and the thing. For although individual cows, etc., come into existence, the species to which they belong does not begin to exist, as it is individual substances, qualities, and acts, which begin to exist, and not their species. Now it is with species that words are connected, and not with individuals, for as the latter are infinite, such a connection would in their case be impossible. Thus as species are eternal (though individuals begin to exist) no contradiction is discoverable in the case of such words as cow, etc. In the same way it is to be remarked that though we allow that the individual gods, etc., have commenced to exist, there is no contradiction [to the eternity of the Vedic word] in the [existence of the] words Vasu, etc. [which denote those individual gods], since the species to which they belong are eternal. And the fact that the gods, etc., belong to particular species may be learned from this, that we discover their corporeality and other attributes in
the hymns and arthavādas (illustrative remarks in the Vedas), etc. The words Indra, etc., are derived from connection with some particular post, like the words ‘commander of an army’ (saṇāpati), etc. Hence, whoever occupies any particular post, is designated by the words Indra, and so forth; [and therefore Indra and the other gods belong to the species of occupants of particular posts]. Thus there is no difficulty. And this derivation from the word is not, like production from Brahma, meant in the sense of evolution from a material cause. But how, since language is eternal and connected with eternal objects, is it declared in the phrase ‘produced from it’ that the production of individual things, corresponding to the ordinary sense of words, is effected by a thing (sound or language), the very nature of which it is to denote continuance [and not such change as is involved in the idea of production?] 103

How, again, is it known that the world is produced from the word? The answer is, [it is known] ‘from intuition and inference.’ ‘Intuition’ means the Veda, because it is independent of any (other authority). ‘Inference’ means the smriti, because it is dependent on another authority (the Veda). These two demonstrate that the creation was preceded by the word. Thus the Veda says, ‘at (or with) the word ete (these) Prajāpati created the gods; at asrigram (they were poured out) he created men; at indavaḥ (drops of soma) he created the pitris; at tīraḥ pavitram (through the filter) he created the libations; at āśavaḥ (swift) he created hymns; at vieśāni (all) he created praise; and at the words abhi saubhagyā (for the sake of blessings) he created other creatures.’ 103

And in another place it is said ‘with his...”

103 This sentence is rather obscure.

103 According to Govinda Ananda’s Gloss this passage is derived from a Chhandoga Brāhmaṇa. It contains a mystical exposition of the words from Rig-veda, ix. 62, 1 (=Sāma-veda, ii. 180) which are imbedded in it, viz. ete asrigram indavas tīraḥ pavitram āśavaḥ | vieśāni abhi saubhagyā | “These hurrying drops of soma have been poured through the filter, to procure all blessings.” (See Benfey’s translation.) It was by the help of Dr. Pertsch’s alphabetical list of the initial words of the verses of the Rig-veda (in Weber’s Indische Studien, vol. iii.) that I discovered the verse in question in the Rig-veda. Govinda Ananda gives us a specimen of his powers as Vedic exegete in the following remarks on this passage: Ity etan-mantra-sthāṇaḥ padaḥ smṛtveda Brahmā devūḍiḥ asṛjata | tattra “ete” iti padam sarvanāmatvād devānām smārakam asṛg rudhirān tat pradāhān dehe ramante iti “asṛgāḥ” manuṣāḥ | chandra-sthānām pṛtiṃguḥ indu-ābdaḥ smārakaḥ ityādi | “Brahmā created the gods, etc., in conformity with the recollections suggested by the various words in this verse. The word ete (‘these’) as a pronoun suggested the gods. The beings who disport
mind he entered into conjugal connection with Vāch (speech).’ (S. P. Br. x. 6, 5, 4, Brīh. Ār. Up. p. 50.) By these and other such texts the Veda in various places declares that creation was preceded by the word. And when the Smṛiti says, ‘In the beginning a celestial voice, eternal, without beginning or end, co-essential with the Vedas, was uttered by Svayambhū, from which all activities [proceeded]’ (see above, p. 16), the expression ‘utterance of a voice’ is to be regarded as employed in the sense of the origination of a tradition, since it is inconceivable that a voice which was ‘without beginning or end,’ could be uttered in the same sense as other sounds. Again, we have this other text, ‘In the beginning Maheśvara created from the words of the Veda the names and forms of creatures, and the origination of actions;’ and again, ‘He created in the beginning the several names, functions, and conditions of all creatures from the words of the Veda.’ (See above, pp. 16 and 6.) And it is a matter of common observation to us all, that when any one is occupied with any end which he wishes to accomplish, he first calls to mind the word which expresses it, and then proceeds to effect his purpose. So, too, in the case of Prajāpati the creator, we conclude that before the creation the words of the Veda were manifested in his mind, and that afterwards he created the objects which resulted from them. Thus the Vedie text which says, ‘uttering bhāḥ, he created the earth (bhāmi), etc., intimates that the different worlds, earth, and the rest, were manifested, i.e. created from the words bhāḥ, etc., manifested in his mind. Of what sort, now, was this word which is intended, when it is said that the world was produced from the word? It was sphoṭa (disclosure or expression), we are told.’

I shall not quote the long discussion on which Sankara here enters, regarding this term. (See Colebrooke’s Misc. Ess. i. 305 ff.; Ballantyne’s Christianitv contrasted with Hindu Philosophy, pp. 192 ff.; the same author’s translation of the commencement of the Mahābhāṣya, p. 10; and Professor Müller’s article on the last-named work in the Journal of the German Or. Soc. vii. 170). Sankara states his conclusion themselves in bodies of which blood (asrück) is a predominant element, were aspriyāh, ‘men.’ The word indu (which means both the soma plant and the moon) suggested the fathers who dwell in the moon,” etc., etc. The sense of asriyram, as given above in the text, is “were poured out.” Govinda Ananda, no doubt, understood it correctly, though he considered it necessary to draw a mystical sense out of it.
to be that "from the eternal word, in the form of sphața, which expresses [all things], the object signified by it, viz. the world, under the three characters of action, cause, and the results of action, is produced," and finishes his remarks on this Sūtra (i. 3, 28) by observing: "Consequently there is no contradiction in saying that the individual gods, etc., are derived from eternal words." He then proceeds to Sūtra i. 3, 29: "Hence results the eternity of the Vedas." On this he observes, "The eternity of the Veda had been established by the fact of its being described in the Smṛiti as the work of a Self-dependent Maker. But a doubt had been suggested that this eternity is inconsistent with the admission that individual gods, etc., have commenced to exist. This doubt, however, having been set aside by the preceding aphorism, 'Since they are produced from it,' he now confirms the eternity of the Veda (which had been already proved) by the words of the Sūtra before us, which mean that as a result of this very fact that the world, consisting of gods and other beings belonging to fixed species, was produced from the words of the Vedas, the eternity of these Vedic words themselves also must be believed. Accordingly, the words of the hymn, 'by sacrifice they followed the path of Vāch, and found her entered into the rishis' (R.V. x. 71, 3; see the First Volume of this work p. 254, and Volume Second, p. 220) prove that Vāch already existed when she was discovered. And in the very same way Vedavyāsa records that, 'formerly the great rishis, empowered by Svaśambhū, obtained through devotion the Vedas and Itihāsas, which had disappeared at the end of the preceding yuga.'"

Sāyaña refers to the Sūtra just quoted (i. 3, 29), as well as to another of the Vedānta aphorisms (i. 1, 3) in p. 20 of the introduction to his Commentary on the Rig-veda in these words:

*Nanu bhagavatā Bādarāyanena Vedasya Brahma-kāryayatevaṁ sūtritam |
"śāstra-yonitvād" iti | rigvedādi-śāstra-kāraṇatvād Brahma sarveṣām
iti sūtrārthatā | bādham | na etāvatā pa sıurushyatvam bhavāti | manushya-
nirmitatvābhāvāt | idrīsam aparātāh yantam abhiprayā vyacahāra-dhā-
yām akāśa-vad nityatvam Bādarāyanenaiva devatādhikaraṇe sūtritam |
"ata eva ṣa nityatvam" iti |

"But it is objected that the venerable Bādarāyaṇa has declared in the aphorism 'since he is the source of the śāstra (Brahma Sūtras i. 1, 3), that the Veda is derived from Brahma; the meaning of the aphorism being, that since Brahma is the cause of the Rig-veda and other Śāstras,
he is omniscient. This is true; but it furnishes no proof of the human origin of the Veda, since it was not formed by a man. Bādara-yaṇa had in view such a superhuman origin of the Veda, when in the [other] aphorism 'hence also [its] eternity is to be maintained,' (which is contained in the section on the deities), he declared it to be, like the ether, etc., eternal, during the period of mundane existence."  

The remarks of Sāṅkara on the Brahma Sūtra (i. 1, 3) above referred to, begin as follows:

Mahataḥ ri̇g-vedādeḥ śāstrasya aneka-vidyā-sthānopabri̇mhitasya prȧdi̇pa-vat sarvārtha-dyotinasa sarva-jana-kalpasya yonīḥ kāraṇam Brahma | na hi i̇drī̇sasya śāstrasya ri̇gvedādi-lākṣaṇasya sarva-jana-guṇā̃vītasya sarva-jana ānya-taḥ sambhavo 'iti | Yad yad vistārārthaḥ śāstraṁ yasmāt purusha-viśeṣat kṣamhaut | yathā vyākaraṇādī Pāṇīṇyādī jñeya-kādā- deva-fastānām api sa tato py adhikatara-vijnānaḥ iti prasiddham lokam | kim u vaktavyam aneka-sākha-bhedā bhinnasya deva-tiryāṇa-manushya-varrāṇa-sāmāṇḍi-pravibhāga-hetor ri̇g-vedādy-akhyasya sarva-jnānākaraṇaśya apratynena eca līla-nāyena purusha-nīvāsa-vaḍ yasmāt mahato bhūtad yoneḥ sambhavaḥ (''asya mahato bhūtasya nīcvasītam etad yad ri̇g-vedādi ity-aśeḥ śruteś) taṣya mahato bhūtasya niraśiṣayaṁ sarvajñatevaṁ sarvākṣeṣṭvāṁ cha iti |''

"Brahma is the source of the great Sāstra, consisting of the Rig-veda, etc., augmented by numerous branches of science, which, like a lamp, illuminates all subjects, and approaches to omniscience. Now such a Sāstra, distinguished as the Rig-veda, etc., possessed of the qualities of an omniscient being, could not have originated from any other than an omniscient being. When an extensive treatise on any subject is produced by any individual, as the works on Grammar, etc., were by Pāṇini and others,—even although the treatise in question have for its subject only a single department of what is to be known,—it is a

304 See the quotation from the Vedārtha-prakāṣa, at the top of p. 70, above. The aether (ākāśa) is uncreated according to the Vaiseshikas (Kanāda’s Sutras, ii. 1, 28, with Sāṅkara Miśra’s commentary, and Sāṅkara Ācāryya on Vedānta Sūtras, ii. 3, 3: Na hy ākāśasya upeattiḥ sambhāvyāṣitum śakya śṛimāt-Kaṇabho-ahhiprāyāṇusārīsaṁ śavatu! "The production of the aether cannot be conceived as possible, so long as those who follow Kanāda’s view retain their vitality"). The Vedānta Sūtras, ii. 3, 1–7, on the other hand, assert its production by Brahma, in conformity with the text of the Taittiriyakas which affirms this: Tasmād vai etasmād itmanah ākāśah sambhātuḥ | "From that Soul the aether was produced."
matter of notoriety that the author is possessed of still greater knowledge than is contained in his work.\textsuperscript{105} What then need we say of the transcendent omniscience and omnipotence of that great Being from whom issued without effort, as an amusement, like a man's breathing (according to the Vedic text 'the Rig-veda is the breathing of that great Being'), that mine of universal knowledge called the Rig-veda, etc., which is divided into many śākhaś, and which gave rise to the classes of gods, beasts, and men, with their castes and orders?\textsuperscript{106}

It is clear from the aphorism last quoted that there is a distinction between the doctrine of the Pūrva Mīmāṃśā, and the Uttara Mīmāṃśā, or Vedānta, regarding the origin of the Veda, in so far as the former is silent on the subject of its derivation from Brahma, which the latter asserts. It is also to be observed that Śāyaṇa understands the eternity of the Veda as laid down in the Brahma Śūtras in a qualified sense (as limited to the duration of the mundane period) and not as an absolute eternity.

I may remark that in their treatment of the Vedic passages which they cite, the practice of Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the Brahma Śūtras, and of his commentator, ŚankaraĀchāryya, corresponds to their theory of the infallibility of the sacred text. The doctrines inculcated in the Śūtras, and expounded and vindicated by the commentator, profess to be based on the Veda; and numerous texts are cited in their support. Such passages as coincide with the theories maintained in the Śūtras are understood in their proper or literal (mukhya) sense;

\textsuperscript{105} Dr. Ballantyne (Aphorisms of the Vedānta, p. 8) renders the last words thus: . . . . "that man, even in consideration of that, is inferred to be exceedingly knowing." Govinda Ānanda's note, however, confirms the rendering I have given. Part of it is as follows: \textit{Yad yasch chhūtraṃ yasmād ōptāt sambhavati sa tatoḥ śūstrōd adhikhār-tha-jñānah iti prasiddham} | "It is well known that the competent author from whom any treatise proceeds has a knowledge of more than that treatise (contains)." The idea here is somewhat similar to that in the second of Bishop Butler's Sermons "Upon the love of God": "Effects themselves, if we knew them thoroughly, would give us but imperfect notions of wisdom and power; much less of his Being in whom they reside." . . . . "This is no more than saying that the Creator is superior to the works of his hands."

\textsuperscript{106} An alternative explanation of the aphorism is given by the commentator, according to which it would mean: "The body of Scripture, consisting of the Rig-veda, etc., is the source, the cause, the proof, whereby we ascertain exactly the nature of this Brahma" (\textit{athavā yathāktaṃ rigvedādī śūstrāṃ yo nāḥ kāraṇam pramāṇam asya Brahmanyo yathāvavat vārūpādhigam}).
whilst other texts which appear to be at variance with the Vedantic dogmas, and to favour those of the other philosophical schools, are explained as being merely figurative (gauya or bhākta); or other interpretations are given. See, for example, the Brahma sūtras, i. 1, 6; ii. 4, 2 f., etc., with Śankara’s comments. The supposition of any real inconsistency between the different statements of the sacred volume is never for a moment entertained. As, however, the different authors of the Vedic hymns, of the Brāhmaṇas, and even of the Upanishads, gave free expression to their own vague and unsystematic ideas and speculations on the origin of all things, and the relation of the Deity to the universe, and recognized no fixed standard of orthodox doctrine to which they were bound to conform,—it was inevitable that they should propound a great variety of opinions which were mutually irreconcilable. But as, in later times, the Vedas came to be regarded as supernatural and infallible books, it was necessary that those systematic theologians who sought to deduce from their contents any consistent theory of being and of creation, should attempt to shew that the discrepancies between the different texts were only apparent.

Sect. IX.—Arguments of the followers of the Nyāya, Vaiśeshika, and Sāṅkhya Systems in support of the authority of the Vedas, but against the eternity of sound.

I. The Nyāya.—The eternity of sound is, as we have already discovered from the allusions of the Mīmāṁsaka commentator, (above p. 73), denied by the followers of the Nyāya school. The consideration of this subject is begun in the following way in the Nyāya aphorisms of Gotama, as explained by Viśvanātha Bhaṭṭāchārya in the Nyāya-sūtra-vṛtti, ii. 81:

107 See Śankara on the Br. Sūtras, iii. 31 (p. 844 of Bibl. Indica), where he says, yadi punar ekasmin Brahmaṇi bahūni vijnānini vedāntāntareshu pratipādayishitāni teśām ekaḥ abhrāntam abhrānti śitaroṇi ṣaivaśa-prasanga vedāntesu tasmād na tato prativedāntam Brahma-vijnāna-bhedaḥ śaṃkṛto iti śakyate | “If, again, in the different Vedāntas (i.e. Upanishads) a variety of conceptions regarding the one Brahma be sought to be established, one of these (conceptions) will be correct, and the others erroneous, and thus the objection of being untrustworthy will attach to the Upanishads. It must not, therefore, be suspected that there is in each of the Upanishads a different conception of Brahma.”
**OF THE VEDAS, HELD BY INDIAN AUTHORS.**

Vedasya prāmāṇyam āpta-prāmāṇyāt siddham | na cha idāṁ yujyate
cedasya nityate vā ity āsankāyaṁ varṇānam anityatekāt katham tat-samu-
daya-rūpasya vedasya nityateva ity āsayena sābda-nityateva-prakaraṇam
ārabhate | tatra siddhānta-sūtram | "Ādimittevād aindyakatevāt kritakatevaṁ upachārāḥ cha" | 81. Sābdo 'nityaḥ ityādiḥ | ādimittevād sakāraṇakatevāt
| nanu na sakāraṇakatevaṁ kaṇṭha-tāle-ādy-ābhīgātāder
vyanjakatvenāpy upapattat atāḥ āha aindyakatevād iti sāmānyavattve
sati vahir-indriya-janya-laukikika-pratyaksha-vishayatevād ity arthaḥ |
... Aprayojakatevām āsanyā aha kritaketi | kriteka ghaṭādau yathā
upachāro jnānām tathaśca kāryateva prakāraṇa-pratyaksha-vishayatevād
ity arthaḥ | tathā cha kāryatevām anāhāryya-sārvalaukikika-pratyaksha-
balāvād anityatevām eva siddhātī |

"It has been proved (in the 68th Śūtra, see below) that 'the authority of
the Veda follows from the authority of the competent person who made
it.' But it may be objected that this is not a proper ground on which
to base the authority of the Veda, since it is eternal. With the view
of proving, in opposition to this, that since letters are not eternal, the
Veda, which is a collection of letters, cannot be so either, the author of
the Śūtras commences the section on the non-eternity of sound. The
Śūtra laying down the established doctrine, is as follows: 'Sound
cannot be eternal, as (1) it had an origin, as (2) it is cognizable by sense,
and (3) it is spoken of as factitious.' Sound is non-eternal, etc., because
(1) it had a beginning, i.e. because it had a cause. But it may be said
that it had no cause, as, agreeably to the doctrine of the Mīmāṃsakas
(see above, p. 74), the action of the throat and palate in pronunciation
may merely occasion a manifestation of sound [without creating it]. In
reply to this it is said (2) that sound is cognizable by sense, i.e. that
though it belongs to a genus, it is an object of ordinary perception
through an external sense." [A different explanation given by other
interpreters is next quoted, which I omit.] ... "Then surmising that
the preceding definition may be regarded as not to the point, the
author adds the words 'since it is spoken of as factitious,' i.e. as jars
and other such objects are spoken of as—are known to be—products, so,
too, sound is distinguishable by sense as being in the nature of a pro-
duct. And in consequence of this incontrovertible and universal per-
ception of its being produced, it is proved that it cannot be eternal."
[Two other explanations of this last clause of the Śūtra are then added.]
Leaving the reader to study the details of the discussion in Dr. Ballantyne’s aphorisms of the Nyāya (Part Second, pp. 77 ff.), I will pass over most of the Śūtras, and merely quote the principal conclusions of the Nyāya aphorist. In Śūtra 86 he says in opposition to the 13th Śūtra of the Mīmāṃśā (above, p. 74):

86. “Prāg uchchāraṇāḥ anupalambhāḥ āvāraṇādy-anupaladbhyāḥ” | S’abdo yadi nityāḥ syād uchchāraṇāt prāg apy upalabhyaṇa śrotṛa-sannikarṣa-sattecāḥ | na cha atra pratibandhakam asti ity āhā āvāraṇeti āvāraṇāḥ pratibandhakasya anupaladbhyāḥ abhāva-nirṇayat | deśāntara-gamanāṃ tu śabdasya amūrttatevad na sambhāvyate | atindriyāṇanti-pratibandhakatvā-kalpanāṃ apekshya śabdāntityatva-kalpanā eva laṅghīyasi iti bhāvaḥ |

“Sound is not eternal, because it is not perceived before it is uttered, and because we do not perceive anything which should intercept it.” If sound were eternal, it would be perceived even before it was uttered, from its being in contact with the ear. [Sound, as Dr. Ballantyne explains, is ‘admitted to be a quality of the all-pervading æther.’] And in the next words the aphorist says that there is no obstacle to its being so heard, since the non-existence of any hindrance, such as an intercepting medium, is ascertained by our not perceiving anything of that sort. And it is not conceivable that sound should have gone to another place [and for that reason be inaudible], since it has no defined form. The supposition that sound is non-eternal, is simpler than the supposition that there are an infinity of imperceptible obstacles to its perception.”

The 89th and 90th Śūtras, with part of the comments on them, are as follows:

89. “Asparśatvāḥ” | śabdo nityāḥ | asparśatvāḥ gagana-vād iti bhāvaḥ |
90. “Na karmāntityatvāḥ” asparśatvāṃ na śabda-nityatvā-sādhakaṃ karmāni vyabhichārāt |

89. “It may be said that sound is eternal, from its being, like the sky, intangible. 90. But this is no proof, for the intangibility of sound does not establish its eternity, since these two qualities do not always go together; for intangibility, though predicable, e.g. of action, fails to prove its eternity.”

The 100th and following Śūtras are as follows:

100. “Vināśa-kāraṇānupaladbhāḥ” | 101. “Ākṛavana-kāraṇānupalab-
dheḥ satata-śravana-prasangah” | Yady apratyakshād abhāva-siddhis
tadā 'śravana-kāraṇasya apratyakshatvād aśravanaṁ na vyād iti satata-
śravana-prasangah iti bhāvaḥ | 102. “Upanabhyamāne cha anupalabdhār
āsattvād anapadesah” | Anumānādīnā upalabhyamāne vināṣa-kāraṇe
anupalabdhār abhāvāt tvadīyo hatur anapadesah asaṅkhakaḥ asiddhatvāt
jaṁya-bhāvatevāna vināṣa-kalpanam iti bhāvaḥ |

“It is said (100) that ‘sound must be eternal, because we perceive
no cause why it should cease.’ The answer is (101), first, ‘that if the
non-existence of any such cause of cessation were established by the
mere fact of its not being perceived, such non-perception would occasion
our hearing continually, which is an absurdity.’ And (102), secondly,
‘since such non-perception is not a fact, inasmuch as [a cause of the
cessation of sound] is perceived, this argument falls to the ground.’
Since a cause for the cessation of sound is discovered by inference, etc.,
and thus the non-perception of any cause is seen to be untrue, this
argument of yours proves nothing, because its correctness is not estab-
lished. The purport is that we suppose, from sound being produced,
that it must also be liable to perish.”

Sūtras 106–122 are occupied with a consideration of the question
(above treated, pp. 73, 74, in Sūtras 10 and 16 of the Mīmāṃsā) whether
letters can change or not. The conclusion at which Gotama arrives is,
that the substance of letters cannot undergo any alteration, though they
may be said to change when they are modified in quality by being
lengthened, shortened, etc.

In a preceding part of the Second Book (Sūtras 57–68) Gotama treats
of the Veda, and repels certain charges which are alleged against its
authority. I shall quote most of these aphorisms, and cite the com-
mentary more fully than Dr. Ballantyne has done. (See Ballantyne’s
Nyāya Aphorisms, Part ii. pp. 56 ff.)

Sabdasya dviraśādīśaṁśārthaṁ catavēna deaśīdhyam uktaṁ tātra cha
adṛśaṁśārthaḥ-sabdasya vedasya prāmāṇyam parikshhitum pūreṇa-paksha-
yati | 57. “Tad-āprāmāṇyam anūriṇa-vyāghāta-punarukta-doshebhyaḥ” |
Tasya dviraśārthaḥ-evaśāntika-sabdasya vedasya aprāmāṇyam | kutāḥ |
anūriṇa-vāśi-dos̄hāḥ | tātra cha putreshibhi-kāryadu kavacī phalāntu-pat-
darṣaṇād anūritavat | vyāghātāḥ pūrvapara-virodhaḥ | yathā “udite
juhoti anudite juhoti samayādhyushite juhoti | sāvāvo svaḥ āḥutim abhyava-
harati ya uditte juhoti savaḥ svaḥ āḥutim abhyavaharati yo ’nudite juhoti
syāva-savālāv asya āhūtim abhyavaharato yaḥ samayādhyushite juhoti’”
a tra cha udita-vākyānāṁ nindānumitaniśṭa-sādhana-tā-bodhaka-vākya-
virodhaḥ | paunaruktyād aprāmāyaṁ | Yathā “trīḥ prathamām aneṣāḥ | 
trīḥ uttamaṁ aneṣāḥ” | ity atra uttamatvasya prathamatava-paryavasānāḥ 
trīḥ kathānaṁ cha paunaruktyam | etṣeṁ aprāmāyaṁ tad-dīśāśāntena 
tad-ekā-kartārikateva tad-ekā-jāttityateva vā sarva-vedaprāmāyaṁ su-
sādhanaṁ iti bhāvaḥ | siddhānta-sūtram | 58. “Na karma-kartri-sādhana-
vaigunyaḥ” | Na vedaprāmāyaṁ karma-kartri-sādhana-vaigunyaḥ pha-
lābhavopatteḥ | karmanāṁ kriyāyāṁ vaigunyaṁ ayathāvidhitvādī | kart-
tur vaigunyaṁ avidattvādi | sādhanaṁ suvṛtva vaigunyaṁ aprakshita-
tvādi | Yathokta-karmanāṁ phala-bhāve hy anvittayam | na cha evam 
asti iti bhāvaḥ | vyāghatām pariharati | 59. “Abhyupetya kāla-bhedo 
dosha-racanāt” | na vyāghatāḥ iti seshāḥ | Agnyādāna-kāle uditā-
humādikam abhyupetya śvākṛitya anudita-humādi-karaṇe purvokta-dosha-
kathānāṁ na vyāghatāḥ ity arthaḥ | paunaruktyam pariharati | 60. “Anucudopapattes cha” | chaḥ punar-arthe | anucudopapateḥ punar na 
paunaruktyam | nishprayojanate hi paunaruktyoṁ doshaḥ | sakti-sthāle 
tv anucudasya upapatteḥ prayojanasya sambharat | ekādaśa-sāmīdheniṇām 
prathamottamayos trī ruddhitāṁ hi panchadaśatevaṁ sambhavati | tathā- 
cha panchadaśatevaṁ śrūyate | “Imam aham bhūtrīvyam panchadaśāva-
rena vāgu-vajrega cha bādhe yo ‘śuṇā dveshiḥ yāṁ cha vayāṁ dvishmaḥ” 
iti | Anucudasya sārthakatevaṁ loka-prasiddham iti āha | 61. “Vākya-
vibhāgasya cha artha-grahaḥ” | Vākya-vibhāgasya | anuvādadathena 
vibhakta-vākasya artha-grahaḥ prayaṇa-śvākṛitāḥ | śiṣṭair iti 
sesahāḥ | sesāhāḥ hi vibhāyakānuvāda-kādi-bhedena vākyāṁ vibhāya 
āndakasyāṁi saprajojanatevaṁ manyante | Veda ‘py evam iti bhāvaḥ | . . .
Ecam aprāmāyaṁ-sādhakaṁ nirasya pṛāmāyaṁ sādhayaḥ | 68. “Man-
trāyurveda-vacḥ cha tat-prāmāyaṁ āpta-prāmāyaṁ” | Āptasya veda-
karttuḥ prāmāyaṁ yathārthopadesakatvaḥ vedasya tad-uktaveva arthā-
labhāh | tena hetunā vedasya prāmāyaṁ anumeyam | tatra drishṭāntam 
āha mantrāyurveda-vad iti | mantra viśūdi-nāsakaḥ | āyurveda-bhāgaḥ 
cha vedo-sthāḥ eca | tatra samvāddenā prāmāya-grahaḥ tād-drishṭāntena 
vedateśvachchedena prāmāyaṁ anumeyam | āptaṁ pṛihiṣat prāmāyaṁ 
yatra sa vedas tāḍāśekena vedatevaṁ prāmāyaṁ anumeyam iti kechit | “It had been declared (Nyāya Sūtras, i. 8) that verbal evidence is of 
two kinds, (1) that of which the subject-matter is seen, and (2) that of 
which the subject-matter is unseen. With the view, now, of testing
the authority of that verbal evidence which refers to unseen things, 
viz. the Veda, Gotama states the first side of the question. Sūtra 57.  
'The Veda has no authority, since it has the defects of falsehood, self- 
contradiction, and tautology.' That verbal evidence, which is distinct 
from such as relates to visible objects, i.e. the Veda, has no authority. 
Why? Because it has the defects of falsehood, etc. Of these defects, 
that of 'falsehood' is established by the fact that we sometimes observe 
that no fruit results from performing the sacrifice for a son, or the like. 
'Self-contradiction' is a discrepancy between a former and a later 
declaration. Thus the Veda says, 'he sacrifices when the sun is risen; 
he sacrifices when the sun is not yet risen; he sacrifices' [I cannot ex- 
plain the next words]. 'A tawny [dog?] carries away the oblation of 
him who sacrifices after the sun has risen; a brindled [dog?] carries 
off the oblation of him who sacrifices before the sun has risen; and 
both of these two carry off the oblation of him who sacrifices.' . . . .
Now here there is a contradiction between the words which enjoin 
sacrifices, and the words which intimate by censure that those sacrifices 
will occasion disastrous results. Again, the Veda has no authority, 
owing to its 'tautology,' as where it is said, 'he repeats the first 
 thrice, he repeats the last thrice.' For as the lastness ultimately coincides with [?] the firstness, and as there is a triple repetition of the 
words, this sentence is tautological. Now since these particular sen-
tences have no authority, the entire Veda will be proved by these 
 specimens to stand in the same predicament, since all its other parts 
have the same author, or are of the same character, as these portions.'

Here follows the Sūtra which conveys the established doctrine. '58. 
'The Veda is not false; it is owing to some fault in the ceremonial, or 
the performer, or the instrument he employs, that any sacrifice is not 
followed by the promised results.' Faults in the ceremonial are such 
as its not being according to rule. Faults in the performer are such as 
ignorance. Faults in the instrument, i.e. in the clarified butter, etc., 
are such as its not being duly sprinkled, etc. For falsehood might be 
charged on the Veda, if no fruit resulted from a sacrifice when duly 
performed as prescribed; but such failure never occurs.'

Gotama next repels the charge of self-contradiction in the Vedas. 
'59. 'There is no self-contradiction, for the fault is only imputed in 
case the sacrifice should be performed at a different time from that
at first intended.' The fault imputed to these sacrifices in the text in question would [only] be imputed if, after agreeing, at the time of placing the sacrificial fire, to perform the sacrifice after sunrise, one were to change it to a sacrifice before sunrise; there is, therefore, no self-contradiction in the passage referred to."

He next rebuts the charge of tautology. "60. 'The Veda is not tautological because repetition may be proper.' The particle cha means 'again.' 'Again, since repetition may be proper, there is no tautology.' For repetition is only a fault when it is useless. But in the passage referred to, since repetition is proper, its utility is apparent. For when the first and the last of the eleven sāmidhenīs (forms of prayer used on throwing fuel into the fire) are each repeated thrice, the whole number of verses will be made up to fifteen.108 Accordingly, this number of fifteen is mentioned in these words of the Veda, 'I smite this enemy who hates us, and whom we hate, with the last of the fifteen verses, and with the thunderbolt of my words.'"

He next observes that the advantage of repetition is commonly recognised. "61. 'And the Veda is not tautological, because the utility of this division of discourse is admitted,' i.e. because the necessity for such a division of language, that is, of a description of language characterized as reiterative, is acknowledged, viz. by the learned. For by dividing language into the different classes of injunctive, reiterative, etc., learned men recognise the uses of the reiterative also. And this applies to the Veda.'"

The author of the aphorisms then proceeds to state and to define (in Sūtras 62–67) the different sorts of discourse employed in the Veda, and to defend the propriety of reiteration. "Having thus refuted the arguments which aim at showing that the Veda is of no authority, he goes on to prove its authority. 68. 'The authority of the Veda, like that of the formulas, and the Āyur-veda (treatise on medicine) follows from the authority of the competent [persons from whom they proceeded].' Since the competent maker of the Veda possesses authority, i.e. inculcates truth, it results from the force of the terms that the Veda was uttered by a person of this character; and by this reasoning the au-

108 If there are in all eleven formulas, and two of these are each repeated thrice, we have \(2 \times 3 = 6\) to add to the nine (which remain of the original eleven), making \(6 + 9 = 15\). See Müller's Anc. Sansk. Lit. pp. 89 and 393.
tority of the Veda is to be inferred. He illustrates this by the case of the formulas and the Ayur-veda. By formulas (mantra) are meant the sentences which neutralize poison, etc., and the section containing the Ayur-veda forms part of the Veda. Now as the authority of these two classes of writings is admitted by general consent, the authority of everything which possesses the characteristics of the Veda must be inferred from this example. Some, however, explain the aphorism thus: a Veda is that in which authority is found or recognised. From such vedicity (or possession of the character of a Veda) the authority of any work is to be inferred.”

I add the greater part of the more detailed and distinct exposition of this aphorism given by the commentator Vātsyāyana (Bibliotheca Indica, p. 91): 109

Kim punar āyurvedasya prāmāṇyaṃ | yaḥ āyurvedena upadīṣyate
idaṁ kriyāḥ ishṭaṁ adhiṣṭhitiḥ idaṁ varjyayetva 'nishtam jahāti
tasya anuśhṭhiyamāṇasya tathā-bhāvāḥ satyārthāḥ - 'viparyyayāḥ
| mantra - padānām cha visha - bhūtāsani - pratishekhārthānām prayoge
'rthasya tathā-bhāvāḥ etat prāmāṇyaṃ | kim-kriyām etat | āpta-prā-
māṇya-kriyām | kim punar āptānām prāmāṇyaṃ | sākṣhāt-kriyā-dharmāt bhūtā-dayā yathā-bhūtārtha-chikhyāpayishā iti | āptāḥ khala sāk-
shāt-kriyā-dharmānāḥ idaṁ hātavyam ayam asya hānī-hetur idam asya
adhitantavyam ayam asya adhigamana-hetur iti bhūtāny anukampante |
teshāṁ khala vai prāga-bhūtān svayam anavabudhyāmānānāṁ na anyad
upadesād avadāba-kaśāṇaṃ asti | na cha anavabodhe samihā varijanaṁ vā |
na vā akritvā svasti-bhāvāḥ | nā‘py asya anyāḥ upakārāko ‘py asti | hanta
vayam ebhys yathā-darsanāṁ yathā-bhūtām upadīṣāmaḥ | te ime śrutvā
pratipadyānāṁ hēmaṁ āśyanty adhitantavya eva adhigamāhyanti
asti | evam āptopadeśaḥ etena tri-visheha āpta-prāmāṇyena parīkrihiṣo
’nushthiśyamāno ’rthasya sādhaka bhavati | evam āptopadeśaḥ pramāṇaṁ
evam āptāḥ pramāṇaṁ | dīrṣṭārthena āptopadeśena āyurvedena adriśh-
tārtho vedā-bhāyo ’numātayāḥ pramāṇaṁ iti | āpta-prāmāṇyaśa hekoḥ
samāνaṭvād iti | asya api cha eka-desa “grāma-kāmo yajeta” ity evam-adī-
drīṣṭārthas tena anumātayam iti | loke cha bhūyān upadesāśrayo vyā-
vahāraḥ | laukikasya api upadeshtur upadesāvārtha-jñāṇena parānūji-
ghrīkhyāya yathā-bhūtārtha-chikhyāpayishā yaḥ cha prāmāṇyaṃ | tat-pari-

109 A small portion of this comment, borrowed from Professor Banerjea’s Dialogues on Hindu philosophy, was given in the 1st edition of this vol. p. 210.
grahād ṛpatopadesāh praṃāṇam iti | drashti-pravakṣṭi-sāmānyāh cha
anumānam ye eva ṛptaḥ vedārthānāṁ drashti-rāśi pravaktāraś cha te eva
āyurveda-prabhūtinām | ity āyurveda-praṃāṇya-vad veda-praṃāṇyaṃ
anumātavyam iti | nityateव dva-vākhyānām praṃāṇaḥ te tat-praṃāṇaḥ
yam ṛptaḥ praṃāṇyād ity ayuktam | sādasya vāchakavād artha-pratipząttau praṃāṇatavacā na nityatevāt
| nityateva hi sarvasya sarveṇa vacanāḥ
eḥ hādārtha-vyavasthā 'nupapattīḥ | na anityateva vāchakatvam iti chet | na | laukikesvār adarśanāt | te 'pi nityāḥ iti chet | na | anāṃptopadesād
arthā-visāmāvādo 'nupapannāḥ | . . . Manvantara-yugāntaḥsu cha attānāgatesu sampradāyaḥbhāya-prayogāvichheda vedānāṁ nityatevām ṛpta-
praṃāṇyāḥ cha praṃāṇyaṃ | laukikesu śabdeshu cha etat samānam |

"On what then does the authority of the Āyur-veda depend? The Āyur-veda instructs us that to do so and so, is the means of attaining what is desirable, and to avoid so and so is the means of escaping what is undesirable: and the fact of such action having been followed by the promised result coincides with the supposition that the book declares what is true. So, too, the authority of the formulæ for neutralizing poison, repelling demons, and arresting lightning, is shewn by their application fulfilling its object. How is this result obtained? By the authoritativeness of competent persons. But what is meant by the authoritativeness of competent persons? It means their intuitive perception of duty, their benevolence to all creatures, and their desire to declare the truth of things. Competent persons are those who have an intuitive perception of duty; and they shew their benevolence to all creatures by pointing out that so and so is to be avoided, and that such and such are the means of avoiding it, and that so and so is to be attained, and that such and such are the means of attaining it. ‘For these creatures,’ they reflect, ‘being themselves unaware of such things, have no other means of learning them except such instruction; and in the absence of information they can make no effort either to attain or avoid anything; whilst without such action their welfare is not secured; and there is no one else who can help in this case: come let us instruct them according to the intuition we possess, and in conformity with the reality; and they hearing, and comprehending, will avoid what should be avoided, and obtain what should be obtained.’ Thus the instruction afforded by competent persons according to this threefold character of their authoritativeness [viz. (1) intuition, (2)
benevolence, and (3) desire to teach], being received, and acted upon, effects the object desired. And so the instruction given by competent persons is authority, and these competent persons are authorities.

• From the Āyur-veda, which conveys instruction given by competent persons in reference to objects perceptible by the senses, it is to be inferred that that part also of the Veda which is concerned with imperceptible objects is authoritative, since the cause, the authoritative-ness of competent persons, is the same in both cases; and the same inference is to be drawn from the fact that a portion of the injunctions of the last mentioned part of the Veda also have reference to perceptible objects, as in the case of the precept, 'Let the man who desires landed property sacrifice,' etc., etc. In common life, too, men usually rely upon instruction. And the authority of an ordinary instructor depends (1) upon his knowledge of the matter to be taught, (2) upon his disposition to shew kindness to others, and (3) upon his desire to declare the truth. From its being accepted, the instruction imparted by competent persons constitutes proof. And from the fact that the seers and decliners are the same in both cases, viz. that the competent seers and decliners of the contents of the (rest of the) Veda are the very same as those of the Āyur-veda, etc., we must infer that the authoritative-ness of the former is like that of the latter. But on the hypothesis that the authority of the Vedic injunctions is derived from their eternity, it will be improper to say that it arises from the authoritative-ness of competent persons, since the authority of words as exponents of meanings springs from their declarative character, and not from their eternity. For on the supposition of the eternity of words, every (word) would express every (thing), which would be contrary to the fixity of their signification. If it be objected that unless words are eternal, they cannot be declarative, we deny this, as it is not witnessed in the case of secular words. If it be urged again that secular words also are eternal, we must again demur, since the discrepancy of purport arising from the injunctions of incompetent persons would be at variance with this.” After some further argumentation Vātsyāyana concludes: "The eternity of the Vedas [really] consists in the unbroken continuity of their tradition, study, and application, both in the Manyvantaras and

110 Compare the commentator’s remarks introductory to the Nyāya aphorism ii. 57, quoted above, p. 112.
Yugas which are past, and those which are to come; whilst their authority arises from the authoritiveness of the competent persons (who uttered them). And this is common to them with secular words."

The phrase sākṣhāt-kṛita-dharmāṇaḥ, "possessing an intuitive perception of duty," which is employed by Vātsyāyana in the preceding extract as a definition of āptyaḥ, "competent persons," is one which had previously been applied by Yāska (Nirukta, i. 20) to describe the character of the rishis: Sākṣhāt-kṛita-dharmāṇaḥ rishayo babhūvah | te 'varebhayo
sākṣhāt-kṛita-dharmabhyaḥ upadeśena mantrān samprāduḥ | upadeśāya
glāyanto 'vare bilma-grahaṇāya imaṁ granthāṁ samāṇnāśishur vedāṁ
eha vedāṅgāṁ eha | "The rishis, who had an intuitive perception of duty, handed down the hymns by (oral) instruction to men of later ages, who had not that intuitive perception. These, declining in their power of giving instruction, compiled this work (the Nirukta), the Veda, and the Vedāṅgas, in order to facilitate the comprehension of details."

The Vaiśeṣhika.—Among the aphorisms of this system also there are some which, in opposition to the Mimāṃsakas, assert, 1st, that the Vedas are the product of an intelligent mind; and 2nd (if the interpretation of the commentator is to be received) that they have been uttered by God.\footnote{The second aphorism of the first section of the first book is as follows: Yato bhuyaḍaya-niśreyasa-siddhiḥ sa dharmah | "Righteousness is that through which happiness and future perfection \footnote{are attained.} are attained."}

After explaining this the commentator proceeds to introduce the next aphorism by the following remarks: Nanu niṣṛiti-lakshaṇo dharmas tatva-juṇāna-dvāra niśreyasa-hetur ity

\footnote{Of the aphorisms, which I am about to quote, the first has been translated by Dr. Ballantyne (who published a small portion of these Sūtras with an English version in 1851); and it, as well as the others, is briefly commented upon by the Rev. Prof. Banerjea, in his Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy, pp. 474 ff., and Pref. p. ix., note. See my article in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, No. xx. for 1862, entitled "Does the Vaiśeṣhika philosophy acknowledge a Deity or not?" from which the translations now given have been transferred with but little alteration and a few additions. And compare Dr. Roer's German translation of the Vaiśeṣhika aphorisms in the Journal of the German Oriental Society for 1867, pp. 309 ff.}

\footnote{The Commentator explains abhyudaṇa as = tatva-juṇānam, "a knowledge of the reality," and niśreyasa as ātyantiki duḥkha-niṣṛittyḥ, "the complete cessation of suffering."}
attrā śrutiḥ pramāṇam | śruter eva prāmāṇye vayaṁ vipratipadyāmahe
“anṛita-vyāghāta-punarukta-doshebhyaḥ” | . . . na cha āmnāya-pra-
tipādakaṁ kinchiḍ asti nityatev vipratipattau | nitya-nirdoshatevam api
sandigdham | paurusheyaṁ te bhrama-pramāda-vipratipatti-karaṇāpā-
ṭavādi-sambhāvanayā āptoktatevam api sandigdham eva iti na niśreyasaṁ
na vā tattra tatteca-jñānaṁ dvāraṁ na vā dharmah iti sārevaṁ etad āku-
lam | ataḥ āha “tad-vachanād āmnāyasya prāmāṇyam” | “tad” ity
anupakrāntam api prasiddhi-siddhatayā āśravam parāmṛśati | yathā
“tad-aprāmāṇyaṁ anṛita-vyāghāta-punarukta-doshebhyaḥ” iti Gauto-
miya-vātre tach-chhabdena anupakrānto 'pi vedaṁ parāmṛśyaṁte | tathā
cha tad-vachanān atena āśravam prāṇayanād āmnāyasya vedaṇyaṁ prāmā-
ṇyam | yadeva “tad” iti sannīhitam dharmam eva parāmṛśati | tathā cha
dharmasaṁ “vachanāt” pratipādānād “āmnāyasya” vedaṇyaṁ prāmā-
ṇyam | yad hi vāyayam prāmāṇyaṁ artham pratipādayati tat pramāṇam
eva yataḥ ity arthaḥ | āśravas tad-āptatevaṁ cha sādhayishyate |

“But may it not be objected here that it is the Veda which proves
that righteousness, in the form of abstinence from action, is, by means
of the knowledge of absolute truth, the cause of future perfection; but
that we dispute the authority of the Veda because it is chargeable
with the faults of falsehood, contradiction, and tautology”113 . . .
And further, there is nothing to prove the authority of the Veda, for
its eternity is disputed, its eternal faultlessness is doubted, and if it
has a personal author, the fact of this person being a competent utterer
is questioned, since there is an apprehension of error, inadvertence,
contradiction, and want of skill in composition attaching to him.
Thus there is neither any such thing as future perfection, nor is either a
knowledge of absolute truth the instrument thereof, or righteousness.
Thus everything is perplexed.”

In answer to all this the author of the aphorism says:

“The authority of the sacred record arises from its being uttered
by Him.”

“Here,” says the commentator, “the word tad (Him) refers to Īśvara
(God); as, though no mention of Him has yet been introduced, He is
proved by common notoriety to be meant; just as in the aphorism of
Gautama: ‘Its want of authority is shown by the faults of falsehood,

113 Here the same illustrations are given as in the commentary on the Nyāya
aphorisms, quoted above, pp. 113 ff.
contradiction, and tautology,' the Veda, though not previously introduced, is intended by the word *tad.* And so [the meaning of the aphorism is that] the authority of the sacred record, *i.e.* the Veda, is proved by its being spoken by Him, composed by Him, by Īśvara. Or, *tad* (its) may denote *dharma* (duty) which immediately precedes; and then [the sense will be that] the authority of the sacred record, *i.e.* the Veda, arises from its declaring, *i.e.* establishing, duty, for the text which establishes any authoritative matter must be itself an authority. The proof of Īśvara and his competence will be hereafter stated." The commentator then goes on to answer the charges of falsehood, contradiction, and tautology alleged against the Veda.

The next aphorism which I shall quote (vi. 1, 1) is thus introduced by the commentator:


114 For the sake of the reader who does not know Sanskrit, it may be mentioned that *tad* being in the crude, or uninflated form, may denote any of the three genders, and may be rendered either 'his,' 'hers,' or 'its.' I may observe that the alternative explanation which the commentator gives of the Aphorism, i. 1, 3, viz. that the authority of the Veda arises from its being declarative of duty, is much less probable one than the other, that its authority is derived from its being the utterance of God; for it does not clearly appear how the subject of a book can establish its authority; and, in fact, the commentator, when he states this interpretation, is obliged, in order to give it the least appearance of plausibility, to assume the authoritative character of the precepts in the Veda, and from this assumption to infer the authority of the book which delivers them. I may also observe that Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapanchāhana, the author of the Gloss on Sankara Miśra’s Commentary, takes no notice of this alternative interpretation; and that in his comment on the same aphorism when repeated at the close of the work (x. 2, 9) Sankara Miśra himself does not put it forward a second time. Dr. Roer (Journ. Germ. Or. Soc. for 1867, p. 310) argues in favour of the former of the two interpretations as the true one.
tvena anyathā-siddhiḥ | “svarga-kāmo yajeta” ityādāv iṣṭa-sādhana-
tāyaḥ kārya eightyah vā asmad-ādi-buddhy-agocaratvāḥ | tena svatatra-
purusha-pārvakataṁ vede siddhyati | vedatvaṁ cha śabda-tad-upajīve-
pramāṇātirikta-pramāna-janya-pramity-aviśhayārthakate sati śabda-
janya-vākyārtha-jñānajanya-pramāṇa-śabdatvam |

“An examination of righteousness and unrighteousness, which are the original causes of the world,” forms the subject of the 6th section. Now, righteousness and unrighteousness are to be constituted by virtue of such injunctions and prohibitions as these: ‘The man who desires paradise should sacrifice,’ ‘Let no one eat garlic,’ etc., provided these injunctions and prohibitions be authoritative. And this authoritative-
ness depends upon the fact of the utterer [of these injunctions or pro-
hibitions] possessing the quality of understanding the correct meaning of sentences, for the supposition of inherent authoritativeness is un-
tenable. The author, therefore, first of all enters upon the proof of that quality which gives rise to the authoritativeness of the Veda.

“Apurism vi. 1. 1.—‘There is in the Veda a construction of sen-
tences which is produced (lit. preceded) by intelligence.’”

“The ‘construction of sentences,’ the composition of sentences, ‘is produced by intelligence,’ i.e. by a knowledge of the correct meaning of sentences on the part of the utterer [of them]; [and this is proved] by the fact of these sentences possessing an arrangement like the arrangement of such sentences as ‘There are five fruits on the river side,’ composed by such persons as ourselves. ‘In the Veda,’ i.e. in the collection of sentences (so called). Here the construction of the sentences composing the collection is the subject of the proposition which is asserted. And this construction must not be ascribed to a wrong cause by assuming that it was the work of a [limited] intelligence such as ours. [Because, it was not a limited intelligence which produced these sentences]. For it is not an object of apprehension to the understandings of persons like ourselves that such injunctions as, ‘He who desires paradise should sacrifice,’ are the instruments of obtaining what we desire, or that they are obligatory in themselves. Hence in the case of the Veda the agency of a self-dependent person is

115 This, I suppose, means that the existence of the world in its present or developed form, is necessary in order to furnish the means of rewarding righteousness and punishing unrighteousness.
established [since these matters could be known by such a person alone.] And while the contents of the Veda are not the subjects of a knowledge produced by any proof distinct from verbal proof and the proofs dependent thereon, Vedicity, or the characteristic nature of the Veda, consists in its being composed of (authoritative) words, whose authority does not spring from a knowledge of the meaning of sentences arising from words [but depends on the underived omniscience of its author]."

"Or, Vedicity consists in being one or other of the four collections, the Rich, Yajush, Šāman, or A thravan."

I will introduce the next aphorism (x. 2, 9) which I propose to cite (and which is a repetition of aphorism i. 1, 3), by adding some remarks of the commentator on the one which immediately precedes it, viz. x. 2, 8:

_Nanu śrutī-prāmāṇya sati syād evam | tad eva tu āurlabhām | na hi māṃsakānīm iva nitya-nirdoshatena śrutī-prāmāṇyaṁ tvayā ishyate paurushya-avanaḥhyapagamāt purushasya cha bhrama-pramāda-vipralip-sādi-sambhavat | ataḥ āha "drishtābhāve" iti | drishtam paurushāntare 'smad-ādau bhrama-pramāda-[vaprati?] lipsādikaṁ purusha-dūshaṇāṁ tad-ābhāve sati ity arthaḥ | kshiti-karttṛiteṇa veda-vakṣṭriteṇa vā 'numitaśya purusha-dhaureyasya nirdoshatena eva upasūtheḥ | tathā cha tad-vachasāṁ na nirabhidheyatā na viparitābhidheyatā na nishprayojanābhidheyatā | bhūtendriya-manasāṁ doahād bhrama-pramāda-kārānapātaṇād-prayuktāḥ eva vachasāṁ avisuddhāyaḥ sambhāvyante | na cha īsvara-vachasi tāśāṁ sambhavāḥ | tad uktam "rāgajñānādhiḥ vaktā grastatād anritaṁ vadet | te chēsare na vidyante sa bruyāt kathām anyathā | nanu tena īśareṇa vedāḥ pranaṇāḥ ity atra eva viprapattir ataḥ āha | "tad-vachanat āmnāyaya prāmāṇyaṁ" | iti śāstra-parisamāptau "tad-vachanat" tena īśareṇa vachanat prāyanat "āmnāyasya" vedasya prāmāṇyaṁ | tathā hi | vedas śāvat purusheyāḥ vākyatevād iti sādhitam | na cha asmad-ādayas teshāṁ sahaṁ śāhāvachchhinānāṁ vaktāraḥ sambhāvyante atindriyārthatvāt | na cha atindriyārtha-śardino 'smad-ādayaḥ | kinchā āptoktaḥ vedāḥ mahājana-parigrihitatvāt | yaṁ na āptoktaṁ na tad mahājana-parigriheitaṁ | mahājana-parigriheitaṁ cha idam | tasmād āptoktam | seva-tantra-purusha-praṇītaveṇa cha āptoktavem | mahājana-parigrihitaveṇa cha sarva-śardanāntahpāti-purushānushthiḥya- mānārthatveṇa | kechit phalaśāvah karma-kartṛī-sādhana-vaiṣnuyd

The last words are a translation of the conclusion of Jayanārāyaṇa's gloss.
ity uktam | karttri-smaranâbhavâd na evam iti chet | na | karttri-smaranâ
dsasya pürvam eva sâdhitavât | tat-praâñitavaân cha sea-tantra-purusha-
praâñitavâd eva siddham | na tv asmad-âdinâm sahasra-sâkha-veda-prâ
nayaâne svâtantryaâm sambhavati ity uktavât | kincha pramâyâh guna-
janyatevâna vaidika-pramâyâh api guna-janyatvam àvâsyakam | tattra cha
guno vakti-yathârtha-vâkyârtha-jnânam eva vâchyaâh | tathâ cha tâd
riṣâh eva veda vaktâ yâh svargâpûreâdî - vishayaka - sâkshâtkaâraâvân |
tâdriśaâ cha na īśvarâd anyâh iti sushtubh

"Now all this will be so, provided the Veda is authoritative: but
this condition is the very one which is difficult to attain; for you do
not hold, like the Mîmâûnsakas, that the authority of the Veda arises
from its eternal faultlessness; since you admit that it has a personal
author, and error, inadvertence, and a desire to deceive are incident to
such a person. It is with a view to this objection that the writer says
in his aphorism, 'In the absence of what is seen,' i.e. in the absence
of those personal faults which are seen in other persons like ourselves,117
such as error, inadvertence, and a desire to deceive: for the Supreme
Person who is inferred from the creation of the world, or the author-
ship of the Veda, can only exist in a state of freedom from fault; and,
consequently, neither want of meaning, nor contradiction of meaning,
nor uselessness of meaning, can be predicated of his words. Incorrect-
nesses in words are to be apprehended as the results of error, inad-
verture, or unskillfulness in composition, arising from some defect in
the elements, the senses, or the mind. But none of these things is to
be imagined in the word of Īśvara (the Lord). And this has been
spoken in the following verse: 'A speaker may utter falsehood,
from being possessed by affection, ignorance, and the like; but these
[defects] do not exist in God; how then can he speak what is other-
wise [than true]?'

"But may not the fact that the Veda is composed by God be dis-
puted? In consequence of this, the author says (in the next aphorism):

x. 2, 9. 'The authority of the Vedic record arises from its being ut-
tered by Him.'

117 A different interpretation is given by the commentator to this phrase drishtâ-
bhâve, in an earlier aphorism in which it occurs, viz. vi. 2, 1. He there understands
it to mean that where there is no visible motive for a prescribed action, an invisible
one must be presumed (yattra drishtam prayojanaâm nepalabhâye tattra adrishtam
prayojanaâm kalpanîyam).
"Thus at the end of his treatise [the writer lays it down that] the authority of the Veda is derived from its being His word, viz. from its being spoken, i.e. composed by Him, i.e. by Ḡūndh. As thus: The Vedas are derived from a person, because they are formed of sentences. This has been proved. And persons like ourselves cannot be conceived as the utterers of these Vedas, which are distinguished by having thousands of Śākhās (recensions), because their objects are such as lie beyond the reach of the senses; and persons like us have no intuition into anything beyond the reach of the senses. Further, the Vedas [are not only derived from a personal author, but they] have been uttered by a competent author (āpta), because they have been embraced by great men. Whatever has not been uttered by a competent person is not embraced by great men: but this (book) is embraced by great men: therefore it has been uttered by a competent person. Now, composition by a self-dependent person is utterance by a competent person; and the reception (of the Veda) by great men is the observance of its contents by persons who are adherents of all the different philosophical schools: and (the infallibility of the Veda is defended by that which) has been already said, viz. that any occasional failure in the results (of ceremonies prescribed in the Veda) is owing to some defect in the rite, or in the performer, or in the instruments employed [and not to any fallibility in the Veda].

"If it be objected to this reasoning, that no author (of the Veda) is recollected, we rejoin, that this is not true, because it has been formerly proved that the author is remembered. And that it was composed by Him is proved by the simple fact of its being composed by a self-dependent person; and because it has been said that the self-dependence [or unassisted ability] of people like us in the composition of the Veda, consisting, as it does, of a thousand Śākhās, is inconceivable. And since authority (in a writing in general) springs from a quality [in its author], it necessarily follows that the authority of the Veda also springs from a quality. And there the quality in question must be declared to be the speaker's knowledge of the correct meaning of sentences. And thus (we have shewn that) there is such an utterer of the Veda, who possesses an intuitive knowledge of paradise, and of the yet unseen consequences of actions, etc., and such an utterer is no other than Ḡūndh. Thus all is satisfactory."
OF THE VEDAS, HELD BY INDIAN AUTHORS.

The ultimate proofs, then, of the binding authority of the Veda are, according to the commentator, 1st, its extent and subject-matter, and 2ndly, its unanimous reception by great men, adherents of all the different orthodox systems. Of course these arguments have no validity except for those who see something supernatural in the Veda, and on the assumption that the great men who embraced it were infallible; and therefore as against the Baudhhas and other heretics who saw nothing miraculous in the Vedas, and consequently regarded all their adherents as in error, they were utterly worthless. But possibly it was not the object of the commentator (for the greater part of the argumentation is his, not that of the author of the Aphorisms) to state the ultimate reasons on which the authority of the Vedas would have to be vindicated against heretics, but merely to explain the proper grounds on which the orthodox schools who already acknowledged that authority ought to regard it as resting; i.e. not, as the Mīmāṃsakas held their eternal faultlessness, but the fact of their being uttered by an intelligent and omniscient author; whose authorship, again, was proved by the contents of the Vedas having reference to unseen and future matters of which only an omniscient Being could have any knowledge; while the fact of these revelations in regard to unseen things having actually proceeded from such a Being, and being therefore true, was guaranteed by the unanimous authority of the wisest men among the faithful.

As it is a matter of some interest to know what is the nature of inspiration; or supernatural knowledge, as conceived by the Vaiśeṣhikas, I shall quote some passages bearing on this subject from the aphorisms, or from their expounder, Sāṅkara Mīśra. In his remarks on Aphorism viii. 1, 2 (p. 357), the commentator states that opinion (jñāna) is of two kinds, true (vidyā) and false (avidyā); and that the former (vidyā) is of two descriptions, arising from perception, inference, recollection, and the infallible intuition "peculiar to rishis" (Tāch cha jñānām devavidhām vidyā cha avidyā cha | vidyā chaturvidhā pratyaksha-laṅgika- smṛity-arsha-lakṣaṇā). Perception or intuition, again, is of different kinds or degrees (Aphorism ix. 1, 11–15, pp. 385 ff.). Aphorism ix. 1, 11 (p. 386), is as follows:

Tat evam bhāvabhāva-viśhayakam laukika-pratyakshaṁ nirūpya yogi- pratyakshaṁ nirūpayitum prakaraṇāntaram ārabhate | ix. 1, 11. "Ātm- many ātma-manaśoḥ sāmyoga-viśeshād ātma-pratyaksham" | jnānam ut-
padyate iti śesah | devidhās ātavad yoginaḥ samāhitāntakaranaḥ ye
"yuktāḥ" ity abhidhiyante asamāhitāntakaranaś cha ye "vīyuktāḥ"
ity abhidhiyante | tattra yuktāḥ sākṣhatkārtavye vastuny ādareṇa mano
nidhāya nididhyāsanavantaḥ | teshām ātmani svātmani parātmani cha
jnānam utpadyate | "ātma-pratyakṣham" iti | ātma sākṣhatkāra-vishayo
yattra jnāne tat tathā | yadyapy asmad-ādīnām api kaddēhid ātmana
jnānam asti tathāpy avidyā-tiraskritavat tad asat-kalpa ity uktam |
"ātma-manasos santikarasha-viśeshād" iti yoga-ja-dharmanugrahaḥ ātma-
manasoś santikarasha-viśeshas tasmād ity arthaḥ |

"Having thus defined ordinary perception which has for its objects
existence and non-existence, the author, with the view of determining
the character of the intuition of yogins, says: 'From a particular con-
centration of both the soul and the mind on the soul, arises the per-
ception (or intuition) of soul.' On this the commentator remarks:
'There are two kinds of yogins (intent, or contemplative, persons), (1)
those whose inner sense is fixed samāhitāntakaranaḥ), who are called
(yuktāḥ) united (i.e. with the object of contemplation), and (2) those
whose inner sense is no longer fixed, and who are called disunited (vīyuk-
tāḥ)." Of these the first class, who are called 'united,' fix their minds
with reverence on the thing which is to be the object of intuition, and
contemplate it intently. In this way knowledge arises in their souls
regarding their own souls, and the souls of others. 'Intuition of soul,
that is, a knowledge in which soul is the perceptible object of intuition.
Now, although persons like ourselves have sometimes a knowledge of
soul, yet from this knowledge being affected by ignorance, it has been
said to be like what is unreal. 'From a particular concentration of the
soul and the mind;' that is, from a particular conjunction of the soul
and the mind which is effected by means of the virtue derived from
yoga.' See also Aphorism xv. p. 390.

At the conclusion of his remarks (Bibl. Ind. p. 408) on the third sort
of true knowledge (referred to in p. 357, Bibl. Ind.), viz. recollection,
the commentator remarks that the author of the aphorisms does not
make any separate mention of the fourth kind of knowledge, viz. in-
fellible intuition :

The "mind" (manas) is regarded by the Indian philosophers as distinct from
the soul, and as being merely an internal organ.

This class is the more perfect of the two, as appears from the gloss of Jayanā-
rāyaṇa: ayam api viśisṭa-yogavatteṇa vīyuktāḥ ity uchyaṭe.
ix. 2, 6. . . . Ārshaṁ jñānam sātra-kritā prithaṁ na lakṣhitam |
yogi-pratyakshanārtha-vāhitaṁ | padārtha-pradesākhye tu prakaranage tād
uktam | tad yathā | “āmnāya-viḥātrīṇāṁ riṣhīṇām atītāgata-varttā-
mānesva atindriyārtheṣu artheṣu dharmādīshu granthopanibaddhesu vā
lingādy-anapekṣād ātma-manasoḥ samyoḍād dharmā-viśeṣāḥ cha prā-
tibhaṁ jñānaṁ yad upādyate tad ārsham iti | tach cha kadāchil lauki-
kānām api bhavati yathā kanyākā vadanit “śvo me bhrātā gantā iti hrī-
dayam me kathayati” iti |

“Rishis’ (ārsha) knowledge,” he says, “is not separately defined
by the author of the aphorisms, but is included in the intuition of
yogins.” But the following statement has been made (in reference to
it) in the section on the categories: ‘Rishis’ (ārsha) knowledge is
that which, owing to a conjunction of the soul and the mind, inde-
dependent of inference, etc., and owing to a particular species of virtue,
illuminates those rishis who have composed the record of the Vedas
(āmnāya-viḥātrīṇām), in reference to such matters, whether past,
future, or present, as are beyond the reach of the senses, or in refer-
ence to matters of duty, etc., recorded in books, etc. And this sort of
knowledge is also sometimes manifested by ordinary persons, as when a
girl says, ‘my heart tells me that my brother will go to-morrow.’”
See also Aphorism ix. 2, 13 (Bibl. Ind. pp. 414, 415).

The Tarka-sangraha, another Vaiśeṣika work, also affirms the divine
authorship of the Veda in these words: 121 Vākyāṁ devidhāṁ laukikāṁ
vaidikāṁ cha | vaidikam Īśvaroktavitāt saream eva pramāṇam laukikāṁ tu
āptoktam pramāṇam anyad apramāṇam | “Sentences are of two kinds,
Vedic and secular. Vedic sentences, from being uttered by Īśvara, are
all proof [or authoritative]. Of secular sentences, those only which
are uttered by competent persons (āpta) are proof; the rest are not
proof.”

In this text, the authority of the Veda is founded on its being uttered
by Īśvara; and this characteristic is regarded as limited to the Veda.

120 It had been already noticed by Professor Max Müller in the Journal of the
German Oriental Society, vii. p. 311, that “the Vaiśeṣikas, like Kapila, include the
intuition of enlightened rishis under the head of pratyakṣa (intuition), and thus sepa-
rate it decidedly from aitihya, ‘tradition.’” He also quotes the commentator’s
remark about a similar intuition being discoverable among ordinary persons, which he
thinks is not “without a certain irony.”

121 See Dr. Ballantyne’s ed. with Hindi and English Versions, p. 40 of the Sanskrit.
On the other hand, such secular works as proceed from competent persons (āptā) are also declared to possess authority. Here, therefore, a distinction is drawn between the authority of the Veda and that of all other writings, however authoritative, inasmuch as the former was uttered by Īśvara, while the latter have only been uttered by some competent person (āptā). But in the Nyāya aphorism, ii. 68, quoted and commented upon above (p. 114), the authority of the Veda itself is made to rest on the authority of the wise, or competent persons (āptā), from whom it proceeded. In this aphorism, therefore, either the word "āpta" must mean "Īśvara," or we must suppose a difference of view between the author of the aphorism on the one hand, and the writers of the Vaiśeshika aphorisms and the Tarka-sangraha on the other. We shall see from the next extract that the Kusumānḍjali coincides with the latter.

I quote from the work just named (of which Udayana Āchārya is the author), and its commentary, some statements of the doctrine maintained by the author regarding the origin and authority of the Veda. Mr. Colebrooke (Misc. Ess. i. 263, or p. 166 of Williams and Norgate’s ed.) speaks of this treatise as being accompanied by a commentary of Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha; but the one which is printed in the Calcutta edition, as well as in Professor Cowell’s, is by Haridāsa Bhāttāchārya. The object of the work is to prove the existence of a personal god (Īśvara), in opposition to various other antagonistic theories.

I. Kusumānḍjali, 2nd Stavaka, at the commencement: Anyathā ’pi paraloka-sādhanānusṭhāna-sambhavād iti dvitiya-vipratipattīḥ | Anyathā Īśvaraṁ vinā ’pi paraloka-sādhaṇa-yāgddy-anusṭhānaṁ sambhavati yāgādeḥ svarga-sādhanateasya veda-gamyatevāt | nitya-nirdoshatayā cha veda-sya prāmāṇyam | mahājana-parigrahāḥ cha prāmāṇyasya grahaḥ iti veda-kāraṇatayā na Īśvara-siddhiḥ | yogadhi-sampādita-sārvajña-Kapi-

122 The following words are put by the author of the Vishnu Purāṇa (iii. ch. 18; Wilson, vol. iii. p. 212) into the mouth of the deluder who promulgated the Baudhā and other heresies: Na hy āpta-vidōḥ nabhasso nipatanti mahāśvatāḥ | yuktīmad vacchanaṁ prāhiyam mayū ‘nyais ā cha bhavd-vidōhah | “Words of the competent do not, great Asuras, fall from the sky. It is only words supported by reasons that should be admitted by me and others like yourselves.”

128 This book was published at the Sanskrit Press, Calcutta, in the S’aka year, 1769. A new edition was published by Professor Cowell in 1864, accompanied by an English translation. I have availed myself of this excellent version to correct a good many mistakes in my own.
lādī-pūrvakaḥ eva vā vedo 'stu ity atra āha | "pramāyāḥ paratantratvāt
sarga-pralaya-sambhavat | tad-anyasminn avīścāsad na vidhāntara-sambhavah\n| S'abdā pramā vaktri-yathārtha-vakyārtha-dhi-rūpa-guṇa-janyā
iti guṇādhāratayā Īśvara-siddhiḥ | nanu sakarti ke 'stu yathārtha-vākyārtha-dhīr guṇah
| akartīke che vedo nirōshatvam eva prāmānya-pra
yojakam astu mahājana-parigraheṇa cha prāmānya-grahaḥ ity ata āha
| "sarga-pralaya-sambhavāh" iti | pralayottaram pūrva-veda-nāśad uttara-vedasya katham prāmānya mahājana-parigrahasyāpi
tadā abhāvāt | śabdasya anityatve ca utpanno ga-kāraḥ iti pratiti-siddham | pravāhāvich-
hheda-rūpa-nityatvam api pralaya-sambhavād nāsti iti bhāvaḥ | Kapilā-
dayaḥ eva sargadau pūrva-sargābhyaṣṭa-yoga-janya - dharmānubhavāt
sākṣhāt-kṛita-sakalārthāḥ karttāraḥ santu | ity ata āha | "tad-anya-
sminn" iti | viśva-nirmāṇa-samarthāḥ animādi-sakti-sampannāḥ yadi
saravajnas tadā laṅghavād eka eva tāḍāśaḥ vēkriyatām | sa eva bhagacān
Īśvaraḥ | anityāsarva-vishaya-jañānavati cha viśvāsah eva nāsti | iti
vaidika-vyavahāra-vilopaḥ | iti na vidhāntara-sambhavāh Īśvarānangik-
kartṛi-naye iti śeṣaḥ |

"The second objection is that [there is no proof of an Īśvara], since
the means of attaining paradise can be practised independently of
such Being. That is to say, the celebration of sacrifices, etc., which
are the instruments of obtaining paradise, can take place otherwise, i.e.
even without an Īśvara (God). For the fact that sacrifices, etc., are the
instruments of obtaining paradise is to be learned from the Veda, while
the authority of the Veda rests upon its eternal faultlessness; and the
[immemorial] admission of that authority results from its reception by
illustrious men. Now in this way there is no proof of the existence of
a God to be derived from the idea that he is the cause of the Veda. Or
let it be supposed that the Veda was preceded [composed] by Kapila
and other sages, who by their wealth in devotion had acquired omni-
science.

"In answer to all this the author says: [verse] ‘Since truth depends
on an external source, since creation and dissolution occur, and since
there is no confidence in any other than God, therefore no other manner
can be conceived [in which the Veda originated, except from God].'
[Comment] Verbal truth [or authoritativeness] is derived from the
attribute, possessed by its promulgator, of comprehending the true
sense of words [i.e. in order to constitute the Veda an authoritative
rule of duty, it must have proceeded from an intelligent being who
understood the sense of what he uttered]; and since God is the sub-
stratum of this attribute [of intelligence], there is proof of his existence.

"But it may be said that if the Veda had a maker, then, indeed,
such comprehension of the true sense of words as you insist upon may
be a quality belonging to him; but if the Veda had no maker, let it be
its faultlessness which imparts to it its authority, while the [imme-
memorial] admission of that authority results from its reception by illus-
trious men.

"In answer to this the author says: 'Since creation and dissolu-
tion occur.' Since the previous Veda [the one which existed during
the former mundane period] perished after the dissolution of the uni-
verse, how can the subsequent Veda [i.e. the one supposed by our
opponents to have existed during the dissolution] be authoritative, since
there was not then even any reception of it by illustrious men [who
also had all become extinct at the dissolution]. And further, the non-
eternity of sound is proved by the conviction we have that letters such
as G are produced, [and not eternal]: and even that eternity (or per-
petuity) of the Veda which consists in unbroken continuity of tradition,
does not exist, as there is probable proof of a dissolution. 124 But, again,
it is urged that Kapila and other saints—who, from their perception of
duty, springing from the practice of devotion during the former mun-
dane period, had acquired an intuitive knowledge of every subject—
may at the creation have been the authors of the Veda. This is an-
swered in the words, 'since there is no confidence in any other but
God.' If persons capable of creating the universe and possessing the
faculty of minuteness be omniscient, then, for the sake of simplicity,
let one such person only be admitted, namely, the divine Iśvara. 125
And no confidence can be reposed in any person who is not eternal, and
who is not possessed of a knowledge which extends to all objects.
Thus the Vedic tradition disappears. And so he concludes that no
other manner [of the origination of the Veda] can be conceived [except

124 The writers on the other side seem to reply to this Naiyāyika objection about
the interruption of the tradition of the Veda through the dissolution of the universe,
by saying that the Veda was retained in the memory of Brahmā or the Rishis during
the interval while the dissolution lasted. See Kulūka on Manu, i. 23, above, p. 6;
and the passage of Kaiyyaṭa on the Mahābhāṣya, above, p. 96.
125 "The law of parsimony bids us assume only one such," etc.—Cowell.
from Īśvara]; that is, in the system of those who deny an Īśvara [no way is pointed out]."

II. Kusumānjali, iii. 16.—"Na pramāṇam anāptoktir nādriṣṭe kvachīd āptatā | adriṣṭa-driṣṭau sarvajno na cha nityāgamaḥ kshamāḥ" | ayaṁ hi sarva-kartṛiteśābhisāvedakaḥ śabdaḥ anāptoktaś ched na pramāṇam | āptoktaḥ ched etad-artha-gocara-jñānavato nitya-sarva-vishayaka-jñānavat
tvaṃ indriyādy-abhāvāt | āgamasya cha nityatvam dūṣitam eva prāg iti
veda-kāro nityāḥ sarvajnāḥ siddhyati |

[Verse] "The word of an incompetent person is not authoritative; nor can there be any competency in regard to a thing unseen [by the speaker]. To perceive invisible things, a person must be omniscient; and an eternal scripture is impossible. [Comment] This [supposed] scriptural testimony, denying the fact of there being a creator of all things, if uttered by an incompetent person, would be no proof. If it was uttered by a competent person, then the person who possessed an acquaintance with this circumstance [that there was no creator] would be master of a knowledge which was eternal, and universal in its range, since he would not be limited by any bodily organs. And we have previously disproved the eternity of any scripture (see the first extract from the Kusumānjali, above). Consequently an omniscient and eternal author of the Veda is established."

III. Kusumānjali, v. 1.—"Kāryayojana-dhṛityādeḥ padāt pratyaya
tah śruteḥ | vākyat sankhyā-viśeśkāḥ cha śādhyo viśeśvair avyayaḥ" | . . .
pratyayataḥ pramāṇāt | veda-janya-jnānam kāraṇa-guṇa-janyaṃ prama
tvāt | pratyakshādi-pramāṇa-vat | śruter vedāt | vedāḥ pauruṣheyo veda
tvād āyurveda-vat | kīncha vedaḥ pauruṣheyo vākyateśād bharatādi-vat | veda-vākyāni pauruṣheyāṇi vākyateśād asmad-ādi-vākyā-vat |

[Verse] "An omniscient and indestructible Being is to be proved from [the existence of] effects, from the conjunction of [atoms], from the support [of the earth in the sky], etc., from ordinary usages, from belief [in revelation], from the Veda, from sentences, and from particular numbers."

The following is so much of the comment as refers to the words pratyaya, śruti, and vākyā: "From belief, i.e. from authoritativenss. The knowledge derived from the Veda is derived from the attributes of its Cause; since it is true knowledge, like the true knowledge derived from perception. From the śruti, i.e. the Veda. The Veda is [shewn
to be] derived from a person, by its having the characters of a Veda, like the Áyur-veda. It is also [shown to be] derived from a person, by having the character of sentences, like the Mahábhárata. The words of the Veda are [shown to be] derived from a person, by their having the character of sentences, like the sentences of persons such as ourselves.”


[Verse] “In the phrases ‘let me be,’ ‘I was,’ ‘I shall be,’ [which occur in the Veda], personal designations have reference to a speaker; and the names of the Sākhās could only have been derived from a primeval utterance. [Comment] The first person (I), when it occurs in the Veda, must be employed to denote a self-dependent utterer. Now there are many instances there of such a use of the first person, as in the words, ‘It reflected, I am one, let me become many.’ The author then specifies another signification of the term sankhyā in the clause, ‘and the designations,’ etc. For all the Sākhās of the Veda traditionally bear the names, the special names, of Kāthaka, Kālāpaka, etc. And these names cannot be connected with the mere study [of these Sākhās by Kaṭha, Kalāpa, etc.] from the infinite multitude of students, since they must have been studied before by others besides the persons just mentioned. Wherefore the particular Sākhās which Īśvara, the beholder of objects beyond the reach of the senses, the compassionate Lord, himself uttered at the beginning of the creation, when he assumed the bodies of Kaṭha, etc., which were drawn on by the destiny (adrishta) of beings like ourselves—these Sākhās, I say, were designated by the names of the particular sages [in whose persons they were promulgated]. And so it is proved that the contemplation of Īśvara is the cause of final liberation.”
I am unable to say if the ancient doctrine of the Nyāya was theistic, as that of the Vaiśeshika Sūtras (at least as interpreted by Sankara Miśra) appears to be, and as that of the Kusumānjali, the Tarka-sangraha, and the Siddhānta Muktiyāli undoubtedly is (p. 6 of Dr. Ballantyne’s ed., or p. 12 of his “Christianity contrasted with Hindu Philosophy,” and p. 13 of Dr. Roer’s Bhāshā-parichchheda, in Bibl. Ind.). The remarks of Dr. Roer on the subject, in pp. xv., xvi., of the introduction to the last named work, may be consulted. The subject is also discussed by Professor Banerjea in his work on Hindu philosophy, pp. 144–153. The solution of the question may depend much on the interpretation to be given to the aphorisms of Gotama, 19–21 of the fourth book.

III. The Sāṅkhya.—The opinions of the author of the Sāṅkhya aphorisms in regard to the authority of the Veda and the principles on which that authority depends, are contained in the 45th to the 51st aphorisms of the Fifth Book, which I extract with the comments of Vijnāna Bhikṣu:


136 Jñānādhikaranaṁ ātmaḥ | sa devidhā jñātmaḥ paramātmaḥ cha | tatra Īśvara sarva-jnaḥ paramātmaḥ eka evam | jñātmaḥ prati śāriro bhinnā vibhūrti nityaścha | “The substratum of knowledge is soul. It is of two kinds, the embodied soul, and the supreme soul. Of these the supreme soul is the omniscient Īśvara, one only. The embodied soul is distinct in each body, all-pervading, and eternal.”

137 Compare Dr. Ballantyne’s translation of the Sāṅkhya Aphorisms, books v. and vi., published at Mirzapore in 1856, pp. 26 ff., as well as that which subsequently appeared in the Bibliotheca Indica (in 1865), pp. 127 ff.
vīra-janyam iti vyāptir loke dṛishtā tasyāḥ bādhādir evam sati syād iti arthaḥ | nāv Adi-purushocharitatvād Vedāḥ api paurusheyāḥ eva ity āha | 50. "Yasmin adrishte’pi krita-buddhir upājyate tat paurushe- yam" | Dṛishte iva adrishte’pi yasmin vاست krita-buddhir buddhi- pūrvakatva-buddhir jāyate tad eva paurusheyam iti vyavahriyate ity arthaḥ | etad uktam bhavati | na purushocharitatā-mātṛena paurusheyataṁ śvāsa-praśvāsayaḥ susūnti-kālinayoḥ paurusheyatava- vyavahārā- bhāvāt kintu buddhi-pūrvakatvena | Vedās tu niḥsvāsa-vad eva adrishta- vaśad abuddhi-pūrvakāḥ eva Svayambhuvah sakāsat svayam bhavanti | ato na te paurusheyāḥ | tathā cha śṛutiḥ "tasyaitasya mahato bhūtasya niśvāsanam iti svakāsam eva yat riṣyeda ity āditya" iti | nāvev yathārtha-vākyārtha-jnānāpūrvakatvāt sūka-vākyasyave vedaṇām api prāmāṇyaṁ na svāt tatrāha | 51. "Nīja-sākyta-ahityaktaḥ svataḥ prāmāṇyaṁ" | Vedānām nīja svābhāviki yā yathārtha-jnāna-janana-sākytaḥ tasyāḥ mantrāyurveda- dāv ahityaktaḥ upalambhād akhila-vedānāṁ eva svataḥ eva prāmāṇyaṁ śiddhyati na vaktri-yathārtha-jnāna-mūlakatvādīnā ity arthaḥ | tathā cha Nyāya-sūtram | "mantrāyurveda-prāmāṇya-vach cha tat-prāmāṇyaṁ" iti | 134

"Sūtra 45. ‘Eternity cannot be predicated of the Vedas, since various texts in these books themselves declare them to have been produced.’ The sense is this, that the Vedas are proved not to be eternal by such texts as the following: ‘He performed austerity; from him, when he had thus performed austerity, the three Vedas were produced.’ [See above, p. 4.] Those other texts which assert the eternity [or perpetuity] of the Vedas refer merely to the unbroken continuity of the stream of homogeneous succession [or tradition]. Are the Vedas, then, derived from any personal author? ‘No,’ he replies in Sūtra 46. ‘The Vedas are not derived from any personal author (paurusheya), since there is no person to make them.’ We must supply the words, ‘since an Īśvara (God) is denied.’ The sense is easy. In answer to the supposition that there may be some other maker, he remarks, Sūtra 47, ‘No; for there could be no fit maker, either liberated or un-liberated.’ Vishnu, the chief of all those beings who are liberated even while they live, although, from the pure goodness of his nature, he is possessed of perfect omniscience, would, owing to his impassiveness, be unfit to compose the Veda consisting of a thousand śākhās (branches),

134 See Colebrooke’s Essays, i. 369, or p. 241 of Williams and Norgate’s ed.
while any unliberated person would be unfit for the task from want of omniscience. (See Sankara’s comment on Brahma Sūtras i. 1, 3; above, p. 106.) But does not, then, the eternity of the Vedas follow from their having no personal author? He replies (48), ‘Their eternity does not result from their having no personal author, as in the case of sprouts, etc.’ This is clear. But is it not to be inferred that sprouts, etc., since they are products, have, like jars, etc., some personal maker? He replies (49), ‘If such a supposition be applied to these (sprouts, etc.) it must there also be exposed to the objection that it is contrary to what we see, etc.’ Whatever is derived from a personal author is produced from a body; this is a rule which is seen to hold invariably. But if we assert that sprouts are derived from a personal author, we contradict the rule in question, [since they evidently did not spring from any embodied person].’ But are not the Vedas, too, derived from a person, seeing that they were uttered by the primeval Purusha? He answers (50), ‘That object only (even though it be an invisible one), which its maker is conscious of having made, can be said to be derived from [or made by] such a person.’ It is only those objects, be they seen or unseen, in regard to which a consciousness of design arises, that are ordinarily spoken of as made by a person. The sense is, that it is not mere utterance by a person which constitutes formation by that person (since we do not ordinarily speak of the inspirations and expirations of any person during the time of sleep, as being formed by that person), but only utterance with conscious design. But the Vedas proceed of their own accord from Svayambhū (the self-existent), like an expiration, by the force of adrishta (destiny), without any consciousness on his part. Hence they are not formed by any person. Thus the Veda says, ‘This Rig-veda, etc., is the breath of this great Being, etc.’ [See above, p. 8.] But will not the Vedas, also, be in this way destitute of authority, like the chatter of a parrot, since they did not result from any knowledge of the correct meaning of the words of which they are made up? In reference to this, he says (51), ‘The Vedas have a self-proving authority, since they reveal their own inherent power.’ The self-evidencing authority of the entire Vedas is established by the perception of a manifestation in certain portions of them, viz. in the formulas and the Ayur-veda, etc., of that inherent power which they (the Vedas) possess of generating correct knowledge, and does not depend on
its being shown that they (the Vedas) are founded on correct knowledge in their utterer, or on any other ground of that sort. And to this effect is the Nyāya Sūtra, that 'their authority is like the authority of the formulas and the Ayur-veda.' (See above, p. 114.)

In reference to the 46th Sūtra I add here the 98th aphorism of the 1st book, with the remarks by which it is introduced and followed:

_Nanu chet sadā sarvejñāḥ īśvaro nāsti tur hi vedānta-mahāvākyārthaśya vivekasya upadeśe 'ndha-paramparāsankayā aprāmānyam prasajyeta | tattvāḥ aha | 98. Siddha-rūpa-bodhrītvaḥ vākyārthopadesaḥ | Hiranyagarbhadināṁ siddha-rūpaśyaḥ 129 yathārthārthaśyasa bodhrītvat tad-vak-trīkāyurvedādi-prāmānyena avadhīritāch cha eshāṁ vākyārthopadesaṁ pramāṇam iti śeshāḥ |

"But may it not be said that if there be no eternally omniscient Īśvara, the charge of want of authority will attach to the inculcation of discriminative knowledge which is the subject of the great texts of the Upanishads, from the doubt lest these texts may have been handed down by a blind tradition. To this he replies: 86. 'From the fact that beings perfect in their nature understood them, it results that we have an (authoritative) inculcation of the sense.' As Hiranyagarbha (Brahmā) and other beings who were perfect in their nature understood the true sense, and are ascertained to have done so by the authoritativeness of the Ayur-veda, etc., which they uttered, their inculcation of the sense of the texts is authority;—such is the complete meaning of the aphorism."

In the 57th and following Sūtras of the fifth book, Kapila denies that sound has the character of sphota, or that letters are eternal:

57. "Pratity-apratītibhyāṁ na sphoṭātmakaḥ śabdaḥ" | Pratyekavarṇebhyo 'tiriktaṁ kalasāḥ ityādi-rūpam akhaṇḍam eka-padam sphoṭāḥ iti yogair abhyupagaṁya ite | kambu-grīvādy-avayacebhyo 'tirikto ghaṭādy-avayācive | sa cha śabda-viśeṣaḥ padākhyo 'rtha-sphoṭikaraṇāt sphoṭāḥ ity uchyate | sa śabdo 'prāmāṇikāḥ | kutaḥ | "pratity-apratītibhyāṁ" | sa śabdaṁ kim pratiyate na eva | ādye yena varṇa-samudāyena ānupuruṣ-

129 This directly contradicts the doctrine enunciated in the Vaiśeṣhika Sūtras and the Kusumānjali. See above, pp. 121, 123, and 129 f.
128 This is a various reading given by Dr. Hall in the appendix to his edition of the Sāṃkhya-pravachana-bhāṣya; and I have adopted it in preference to siddha-rūpasya which he gives in his text, as the former seems to afford a better sense.

Nanu pūrva-siddha-sattākasyaiva śabdasya dhaway-ādibhir yā 'bhivyaktis tan-mātram upattiḥ pratitā vishayaḥ | abhiyaktanām drīṣṭanām dipeneva ghaṭasya iti | Pariharati | 60. “Sat-kāryya-siddhāntaḥ chet siddha-sādhanam” | Abhiyaktiḥ yady anāgatāvasthaḥ - tyāgena varttamānāvasthā-lābhāḥ ity uchyate tadā sat-kāryya-siddhāntaḥ | tadṛṣṭa-nityatevaṁ cha sarva-kāryāṇām eva iti siddha-sādhanam ity arthaḥ | yādi cha varttamānātayaṁ sataḥ eva jñāna-mātra-rūpiny abhiyaktiḥ uchyate tadā ghaṭādi-nām api nityatāpattier ityādi | 

‘Sound has not the character of sphoṭa, from the dilemma that the latter must be either apparent or not apparent.’ A modification of sound called sphoṭa, single, indivisible, distinct from individual letters, existing in the form of words like kālaśa (jar), distinguished also from parts of words like kambu-grīva (striped-neck) and forming a whole like the word ghāta (jar), is assumed by the Yogas. And this species of sound called a word (pada) is designated sphoṭa from its manifesting a meaning. But the existence of this form of sound is destitute of proof. Why? ‘From the dilemma that it must be either apparent or not apparent.’ Does this form of sound appear or not? If it appears, then let the power of disclosing a meaning [which is ascribed by our opponents to sphoṭa] be regarded as belonging to that collection of letters, arranged in a particular order, by which the supposed sphoṭa is manifested. What necessity is there then for that superfluous sphoṭa? If, on the contrary, it does not appear, then that unknown sphoṭa can have no power of disclosing a meaning, and consequently it is useless to suppose that any such thing as sphoṭa exists.

“The eternity of the Vedas has been already denied. He now denies the eternity of letters also. 58. ‘Sound is not eternal, since it is clear that it is a production.’ The meaning is, that it is not reasonable to
infer on the strength of the recognition of the letter G as the same that we knew before (see Mīmāṃsā Aphorisms i. 13; above, p. 74), that letters are eternal; since it is clear that G and other letters are produced, and therefore cannot be eternal. The recognition of these letters has reference to their being of the same species as we have perceived before; since otherwise we are landed in the absurdity that, because we recognize a jar or any other such object to be the same, it must therefore be eternal.

"He expresses a doubt: 59. 'What we hear may be merely the manifestation of a previously existing thing, as a jar is manifested (not created) by the light of a lamp.' (See Mīmāṃsā Aphorisms i. 12, 13; above, p. 74.) Is it not the fact that it is merely the manifestation of previously existing language by sounds, etc., which we perceive as originating? An illustration of such manifestation is that of a jar by means of a lamp.

"He repels this doubt: 60. 'If the axiom that an effect exists in its cause be here intended, this is merely proving what is already admitted.' If by manifestation is meant the relinquishment by any substance of its past (?) condition, and the attainment of its present state, then we have merely the recognized principle of an effect virtually existing in its cause (see Sāṅkhya Kārika Aph. ix.); and as such eternity is truly predicable of all effects whatever, it is proving a thing already proved to assert it here. If, on the other hand, by manifestation be merely meant the perception of a thing actually existing, then we shall be involved in the absurdity of admitting that jars, etc., also are eternal, etc."

Sect. X.—On the use which the authors of the different Darśanas make of Vedic texts, and the mode of interpretation which they adopt.

I have already (in p. 107) touched on the mode of interpretation applied by the author of the Brahma Sūtras, or his commentator Sankara Āchāryya, to the Vedic texts, derived chiefly from the Brāhmaṇas and Upanishads, on which the Vedāntic doctrines are based, or by which they are defended, or with which, at least, they are asserted to be consistent. It will, however, be interesting to enquire a little more in detail into the extent to which the Indian scriptures are appealed to, and the manner in which they are treated by the authors or expounders of the different
Darśanas. The object proposed by the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā is an enquiry into duty (dharma-jijnāsā—Aph. i.). Duty is defined as something enjoined by the Veda (chodana-lakṣaṇa 'ṛtho dharmaḥ—Aph. ii.); and which cannot be ascertained to be duty except through such injunction. The first six lectures of the Mīmāṃsā, according to Mr. Colebrooke, "treat of positive injunction;" the remaining six concern "indirect command." "The authority of enjoined duty is the topic of the first lecture: its differences and varieties, its parts, . . . and the purpose of performance, are successively considered in the three next. . . . The order of performance occupies the fifth lecture; and qualification for its performance is treated in the sixth. The subject of indirect precept is opened in the seventh lecture generally, and in the eighth particularly. Inferable changes, adapting to the variation or copy what was designed for the type or model, are discussed in the ninth, and bars or exceptions in the tenth. Concurrent efficacy is considered in the eleventh lecture; and co-ordinate effect in the twelfth." . . . "Other matters are introduced by the way, being suggested by the main topic or its exceptions" (Misc. Essays, i. 304 ff.). It appears, therefore, that the general aim of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā is (1) to prove the authority of the Veda, and then to (2) deduce from it the duties, whether enjoined directly or indirectly, which are to be performed, the manner and conditions of their performance, and their results. It is also termed the Karma-mīmāṃsā, "as relating to works or religious observances to be undertaken for specific ends" (Colebrooke, i. 296, 325).

The Brahma-mīmāṃsā, or Vedānta, is, according to the same author, the complement of the Karma-mīmāṃsā, and "is termed uttara, later, contrasted with pūrva, prior, being the investigation of proof deducible from the Vedas in regard to theology, as the other is in regard to works and their merit. The two together, then, comprise the complete system of interpretation of the precept and doctrine of the Vedas, both practical and theological. They are parts of one whole. The later Mīmāṃsā is supplementary to the prior, and is expressly affirmed to be so: but differing on many important points, though agreeing on others, they are essentially distinct in a religious as well as a philosophical view" (Misc. Ess. i. 325). In fact the Brahma-mīmāṃsā proceeds upon a depreciation of the value of the objects aimed at by the Karma-mīmāṃsā,

131 See Ballantyne's Mīmāṃsā aphorisms, p. 7.
since the rewards which the latter holds out even in a future state are but of temporary duration; and according to Sankara it is not even necessary that the seeker after a knowledge of Brahma should first have studied the Karma-mimānsā before he conceives the desire to enter upon the higher enquiry (nunva iha karmācābodhānantaryayāṁ víśeṣaḥ | na | dharmā-jiṃnāsāyāḥ prāg apy adhīta-vedāntavya Brahma-jiṃnāsānopapatteḥ). (Sankara on Brahma Sūtra, i. 1, 1, p. 25 of Bibl. Ind.) This is distinctly expressed in the following passage, p. 28:


The author is explaining the word atha 'now,' or 'next,' with which the first Sūtra begins; and is enquiring what it is that is referred to as a preliminary to the enquiry regarding Brahma: ‘What, then, are we to say that that is after which the desire to know Brahma is enjoined?’ The answer is, ‘it is the discrimination between eternal and non-eternal substance, indifference to the enjoyment of rewards either in this world or the next, the acquisition of the means of tranquillity and self-restraint, and the desire for final liberation. For if these requisites be present, a knowledge of Brahma can be desired, and Brahma can be known, even before, as well as after, an enquiry has been instituted into duty. But the converse does not hold good (i.e. without the requisites referred to, though a man may have a knowledge of duty, i.e. of ceremonial observances, he possesses no preparation for desiring to know Brahma). Hence by the word atha it is enjoined that the desire in question should follow the possession of those requisites.' The next word atha, 'hence,' denotes the reason. Because the Veda itself,—by employing such words as these, ‘Wherefore just as in this life the world which has been gained by works
perishes, so too in a future life the world gained by merit perishes'—
points out that the rewards of the agnihotra sacrifice and other in-
struments of attaining happiness are but temporary. And by such
texts as this, 'He who knows Brahma attains the highest exaltation,'
the Veda further shews that the highest end of man is acquired by the
knowledge of Brahma. Hence the desire to know Brahma is to be
entertained after the acquisition of the means which have been already
referred to.'

In the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras, i. 1, 5, as we have seen above (p. 71), Bāda-
rāyaṇa, the reputed author of the Brahma Sūtras, is referred to as con-
curring in the doctrine there laid down. But in many parts of the
Brahma Sūtras, the opinions of Jaimini are expressly controverted, both
on grounds of reason and scripture, as at variance with those of Bāda-
rāyaṇa.122

I adduce some instances of this difference of opinion between the
two schools:

We have seen above, p. 99, that according to the Brahma Sūtras the
gods possess the prerogative (adhibāra) of acquiring divine science. This,
however, is contested by Jaimini (see Brahma Sūtras, i. 3, 31),
who objects (1) that in that case (as all divine sciences possess the
characteristic of being science) the gods would also have the prerogative
of becoming adepts in the science called Madhvidyā, etc., which would
be absurd, because the sun (Āditya), being the virtual object of worship
in the ritual connected with that science, could not be worshipped by
another sun, who, according to the supposition, would be one of the
deities skilled in it, and one of the worshippers. Similar difficulties
are furnished by other cases, as, for instance, that on the hypothesis
referred to, the Vasus, Rudras, and three other classes of gods, would
be at once the objects to be known and the knowers. In the next
Sūtra the further objection is made (2) that the celestial luminaries,
commonly called gods, are in reality destitute of sensation and desire;
and on this ground also the prerogative in question is denied to the sup-
posed deities. Bādarāyaṇa replies in the 33rd Sūtra (1) that although

122 Dr. Ballantyne refers to the Mīmāṃsakas as being the objectors alluded to by
Śankara in his remarks which introduce and follow Brahma Sūtra, i. 1, 4; but as
Jaimini is not expressly mentioned there, I shall not quote this text in proof of my
assertion. See Ballantyne’s Aphorisms of the Vedānta, p. 12.
the gods cannot concern themselves with such branches of knowledge as the Madhuvidyā, with which they themselves are mixed up, yet they do possess the prerogative of acquiring pure divine science, as that depends on the desire and capacity for it, and the non-existence of any obstacle to its acquisition (tathāpy asti hi suddhāyām brahma-vidyāyām sambhavo 'rthīva-sāmarthāyāpratisbedhādy-apekshatvād adhikārasya). An exception in regard to a particular class of cases cannot, he urges, set aside a rule which otherwise holds good; for if it did, the circumstance that the generality of men belonging to the three highest castes are excluded from the performance of particular rites, such as the Rājasūya, would have the effect of rendering them incapable of performing any sacrifice whatever. And he goes on to cite several Vedic texts which prove that the gods have both the capacity and the desire for divine knowledge. Thus: Tad yo yo devānām prayābhyata sa eva tad abhavat tathā pishnām tathā manushyāgām | "Whosoever, whether of gods, rishis, or men, perceived That, he became That." Again: To ha ūchur "hanta tam ātmānam anvichhāmo yam ātmānam anvishya sarvān lokān āpnoti sarvān cha kāmān" iti | Indro ha vai devānām abhi pravārāja Virochano 'surāgām iti | "They said, 'come, we shall enquire after that Soul, after investigating which, one obtains all worlds, and all objects of desire.' Accordingly Indra among the gods, and Virochana among the Asuras, set out" ("to go to Prajāpati the bestower of divine knowledge," according to Govinda Ānanda). And in reply to the second objection, Sankara maintains that the sun and other celestial luminaries are each of them embodied deities possessed of intelligence and power; an assertion which he proceeds to prove from texts both of the Veda and the Smṛiti. He then replies to a remark of the Mīmāṃsakas, referred to under Sūtra 32, that allusions in the Vedic mantras and arthavādas (illustrative passages) cannot prove the corporeality of the gods, as these texts have another object in view: and his reply is that it is the evidence, or the want of evidence, derivable from any texts which occasions us to believe or disbelieve in the existence of anything; and not the circumstance that such a text was or was not primarily intended to prove that particular point. The Mīmāṃsaka is represented as still unsatisfied: but I need not carry my summary further than to say that Sankara concludes by pointing out that the precepts which enjoin the offerings to certain gods imply that these gods have a particular form which the wor-
shipper can contemplate; and that in fact such contemplation is en-
joined in the text, “Let the worshipper when about to repeat the 
Vashaṭkara meditate on the deity to whom the oblation is presented” 
(yasyai devatāyai havir grihyitaṁ syat tāṁ dhīyey vashaṭkarishtyan).133

In Brahma Sūtras, iii. 4, 1, it is laid down as the principle of Bāda-
rāyaṇa that the knowledge of Soul, described in the Upanishads, is the 
sole means of attaining the highest end of man, i.e. final liberation; 
that it is not to be sought with a view to, and that its operation is 
altogether independent of, ceremonial observances (ataḥ | asmāt vedānta-
vihitād ātma-jnānāt svatantraḥ purushārthaḥ siddhyati iti Bādarāyaṇaḥ 
ācaryyaḥ manyate). This he proves by various texts (ity-evam-jaṭiyakā 
śrutir vidyāyāḥ kevalayāḥ puruṣārthā- hetutevam śrāvyati), such as 
Taraṭi śokam ātma-vit | sa yo ha vai tat param Brahma veda Brahma eva 
bhavati | Brahma-vid āpnoti param | “He who knows soul overpasses 
grief” (Chhāndogya Up. see above, p. 33); “He who knows that Brahma 
becomes Brahma;” “He who knows Brahma obtains the highest 
(exaltation);” etc. In the following Sūtra (2) Jaimini is introduced 
as contesting this principle, and as affirming that the knowledge of soul 
is to be acquired with a view to the performance of ceremonial works. 
The Sūtra in question, as explained by Sankara, means that “as the 
fact that soul is an agent in works implies an ultimate regard to works, 
the knowledge of soul must also be connected with works by means of 
its object” (kaṛtritvena ātmanah karma-śeshatvāt tad-vijnānam api . . . 
vishaya-dvārena karma-sambandhy eva iti). The same view is further 
stated in the following Sūtras 3–7, where it is enforced by the example 
of sages who possessed the knowledge of Brahma and yet sacrificed 
(Sūtra 3), by a text which conjoints knowledge and works (Sūtra 5), by 
a second which intimates that a person who knows all the contents of 
the Veda has a capacity for ceremonial rites (Sūtra 6), and by others (7). 
Sankara replies under Sūtra 8 to the view set forth in Sūtra 2, which he 
declares to be founded on a mistake, as “the soul which is proposed in 
the Upanishads as the object of knowledge is not the embodied soul, 
but the supreme Spirit, of which agency in regard to rites is not pre-
dicable. That knowledge, he affirms, does not promote, but on the

133 The passage in which S’ankara goes on to answer the objection that in cases 
like this the Itiḥāsas and Purāṇas afford no independent evidence, will be quoted 
below.
contrary, puts an end to all works’’ (na cha tād-vijñānaṁ karmanāṁ pravarttakam bhavati prayatna tat karmano uchehhinatit), and under Sūtra 16 he explains how this takes place, viz. by the fact that “knowledge annihilates the illusory conceptions of work, worker, and reward, which are caused by ignorance, and are necessary conditions of capacity for ceremonial observances” (Api cha karmaḥ kāśikā-hetoh kriyā-kāraka-pahalā-lakṣaṇasya samastasya prāpanchaśya avidyā-kritasya vidyā-saṁarth-thyāt svarūpopamanarddam āmananti). To Sūtra 3 Bādarāyaṇa replies that the ceremonial practice of sages is the same whether they do or do not acquire knowledge with a view to works; to Sūtra 5, by saying that in the text in question works and knowledge are not referable to one and the same person, but works to one and knowledge to another; and to Sūtra 6, by declaring that it is merely the reading of the Veda, and not a knowledge of all its contents that is referred to in the text in question. Another reason assigned in Sūtra 17 to show that divine knowledge is not dependent on, or subservient to, works, is that ascetics who practise no Vedic ceremonies are yet recognized in the Veda as competent to acquire it (urdhva-retassu cha āśrmaneḥu vidyā śrūyate na eho tattva kar-māṅgataṁ vidyāyaḥ upapadyate kārmābhavat | na hy agniḥottārāṇī vai-śikāt kārmanāṁ teshāṁ santi). In the following Sūtra (18) Jaimini is introduced as questioning the validity of this argument on the ground that the Vedic texts, which are adduced in support of it, merely allude to the existence of ascetics, and do not recognize such an order as consistent with Vedic usage, or that they have another object, or are ambiguous; while another text actually reprehends the practice of asceticism. To this Bādarāyaṇa rejoins in Sūtra 19, that the texts in question prove the recognized existence of the ascetic order as much as that of any other; and that the alleged ambiguity of one of the passages is removed by the consideration that as two of the three orders referred to, viz. those of the householder and brahmachārin, are clearly indicated, the third can be no other than that of the ascetic. The subject is further pursued in the next Sūtra 20, where the author and his commentator (who adduces additional texts) arrive at the conclusion that the practice of asceticism is not only alluded to, but enjoined in the Veda, and that consequently knowledge, as being inculcated on those who practise it, is altogether independent of works (tasmāt siddhaḥ urdhhvaretasassāḥ āśramāḥ siddham cha urdhhvaretassvāḥ vidhānād vidyāyaḥ svātāntaryam).
Again in Brahma Sūtras, iv. 3, 7–14, the question is discussed whether the words sa etān Brahma gamayati, “He conducts them to Brahmā,” refer to the supreme Brāhmā, or to the created Brāhmā. Bādari (Śūtra 7) holds that the latter is meant, whilst Jaimini (in Śūtra 12) maintains that the former is intended. The conclusion to which the commentator comes at the close of his remarks on Śūtra 14 is that the view taken by Bādari is right, whilst Jaimini’s opinion is merely advanced to display his own ability (tasmā “kāryyam Bādārī ity esha eva pakṣaḥ sthitāḥ | “param Jaiminir” iti cha pakṣāntara-pratipādana-mātrā-pradarśanam praṇā-vikāśanāya iti drasṭāvyam).

Further, in Brahma Sūtras, iv. 4, 10, it is stated to be the doctrine of Bādari that the sage who has attained liberation no longer retains his body or bodily organs, but his mind (manas) alone, whilst in the following Śūtra (11) it is declared to be Jaimini’s opinion that he retains his body and senses also. In the 12th Śūtra it is laid down as the decision of Bādarāyaṇa that either of the two supposed states may be assumed at will by the liberated spirit.

Jaimini and his opinions are also mentioned in Brahma Sūtras i. 2, 28, and 31; i. 4, 18; and iv. 4, 5.

I shall now adduce some illustrations of the claims which the founders of the other philosophical schools put forward on behalf of their own principles as being in conformity with the Vedas. I begin with a passage on this subject from Sankara’s note introductory to Brahma Sūtras i. 1, 5. ff.:

Brahma cha sarvaśakti jagad-utpatti-sthiti-nāsā-kāraṇam ity uktam | Sānkhyādāyas tu parinishṭhitaṁ vastu pramāṇāntara-ganym eva iti manyamānāḥ pradhānādīna kāraṇāntarāni anumāṇāṁ tat-paratayā eva vedānta-vākyāni yojayanti | sarvēva eva tu vedānta-vākyesu śrīśṭi-vishayesu anumāṇena eva kāryyena kāraṇam lilakshayishitam | Pra-dhāna-puruṣa-saṁyogāḥ nityānumeyāḥ iti Śāṅkhyāḥ manyante | Kāṇā-dās tv etebhyaḥ eva vākyebhyaḥ Īśvaraṁ nimitta-kāraṇam anumāte anāṁ ca samavāyi-kāraṇam | evam anye ’pi tārākhā vākyābhāsa-yuktyābhāśavathūmbhāḥ pāre-paśka-vādānaḥ iha uttishṭhante | tattra padāvāya-pramāṇa-jñena āchāryyaṁ vedānta-vākyānāṁ Brahmācāgati-param-tva-pradarśanāya vākyābhāsa-yuktyābhāsa-pratipattayaḥ pāreapakshi-kriya nīrākriyante | tattra Śāṅkhyāḥ pradhānāṁ triguṇam acetanaṁ jagataḥ kāraṇam iti manyamānāḥ āhur “yāṁ vedānta-vākyāṁ sarvaśa-
syā sarvaśaktier Brahmaṇo jagat-kāraṇatvam pratipādayanti ity avochas tāni pradhānā-kāraṇa-pakṣa 'pi yojaityuṁ śakyaite | sarvaśaktitevaṁ tavat pradhānasyāpi sva-vikāra-vishayam upapadyate | evaṁ sarvaśakṣevatvam upapadyate | katham | yat tvam jñānam manyaṁ sa sattva-dharmah "sattvaṁ sanjñaye jñānam" iti mrīteḥ | tena cha sattva-dharmena jñānena kāryya-kāraṇavantaḥ purushāḥ sarvaśajñeh yogīnaḥ prasiddhipah | sattvasya hi niratśayotkarṣe sarvaśatvam prasiddham | na cha kevalasya akāryya-kāraṇasya purushasya upalabdhī-mātrasya sarva-jñataṁ kincchij-jñataṁ vā kalpayituṁ śakyaṁ | trigunatvāt tu pradhānasya sarva-jñāna-kāraṇa-bhutaṁ sattvaṁ pradhānāvasthāyam api vidyate iti pradhānasya achetanasya eva sataḥ sarvaśatvam upacharyyate vedānta-vākyeshu | avasyaṁ cha tavyā 'pi sarvaśajnam Brahma abhyupagachtatā sarva-jñāna-sāktimatteva eva sarvaśatvam abhyupagantavyam | na hi sarva-vishayatjanānaṁ kurvad eva Brahma varttate | tathā hi jñānasya nityatve jñāna-kriyāṁ prati svatāntryāṁ hiyeta | atha anityaṁ tad iti jñāna-kriyāyaḥ uparame uparameta api Brahma | tada sarva-jñānā-sāktimatteva eva sarvaśatvam āpataḥ | api cha prāg utpattāḥ sarva-kāraka-śūnyam Brahma ēṣyaṁ tevyāḥ | na cha jñāna-sādhanānāṁ sarvendrīyādānāṁ abhāve jñānotpattiḥ kasyachid upapannāḥ | api cha pradhānasya anekātmakasya pariṇāma-sambhavat kāraṇatvopapatteḥ nṛṣīd-ādi-vat | na aṣāṁhatasya ekatmakasya Brahmaṇaḥ | ity evam prāpte idam sūtram ārābhyateḥ | 5. "Ikkhater na | aśabdam" | na Sāṁkhya-parikalpitam achetanam pradhānāṁ jagataḥ kāraṇaṁ śakyaṁ vedānteshv āśrayitum | aśabdam hi tat | katham aśabdam | "ikṣhithe " | ikṣhitriteva-sravāṇat kāraṇasya | katham | evaṁ hi śrayate "Sād eva saumya idam agro āśid ekam eva ādeviṣyam" ity upakramya "tad aṅkshata " bahu syāṁ prajāyeya' iti tat tejo-srijata" iti | tattra idam-śabda-vācyāṁ nāma-rūpa-vyākritis jagat prāg utpattāḥ sad-ātmanā vadhāryaṁ tasya eva prakṛitasya sachiḥbhada-vācyāya ikṣhaṇa-pūrvaṁ tevaḥ-prabhritevaṁ srasṛṭitvevaṁ darsāyati | tathā cha anyatra "ātma vai idam ekaḥ eva agre āśīt | na anyat kinchana mishat | sa aṅkṣhata lokān nu srijai' iti sa imaṁ lokān asrijata" iti ikshaḥ-pūrvikāṁ eva srisṭim acahaṣte | . . . ity-evam-ādīny api sarvajñesvāra-kāraṇa-parāṁ vākyāṁ udāhartaṁvyāni | yat tu uktaṁ "sattva-dharmena jñānena sarvaṇam pradhānām bhaviṣhyati" iti tad na upapadyate | na hi pradhānāvasthāyāṁ guna-sāmyāṁ sattva-dharmo jñānaṁ sambhavati | nanu uktaṁ "sarva-jñāna-sāktimatteva sarvaṇam bhaviṣhyati" iti tad api na upapadyate | yadi guna-sāmya sati sattva-vyapāraṁ jñāna-sāktim
āśritya sarvañjnam pradhānāṃ uccheta kāmaḥ rajas-tamo-vyapāsrayām api jñāna-pratibandhaka-sāktaṃ āśritya kincijñatvam uchceta | api cha na asākshikā sattva-vrittir jānāti na abhidhiyate | na cha achetanasya pradhānāsya sākṣhitvaṃ asti | tasmād anupannam pradhānāsya sarvañjna-tvam | yojinām tu ahetanavat sarvottkarsha-nimittam sarvañjna- tvam upa-pannam ity anudāharaṇam | atha punaḥ sākṣhi-nimittam ikṣhitritaṃ pradhānāsya kalpyeta yathā agni-nimittam ayaḥ-piṇḍāder dagdhritvaṃ tathā sati yan-nimittan ikṣhitritaṃ pradhānāsya tad eva sarvañjnam mukh-yan Bramha jagataḥ kāraṇam iti yuktam | yat punar uktam Brahmano 'pi na mukhyām sarvañjnaṃ upapadyate nitya-jñāna-krīyate jñāna-kriyāṃ prati svātantryāsambhavād ity attra uchyate | idāṃ tāvad bhavān prasātavyāḥ "kathaṃ nitya-jñāna-krīyate sarvañjna-tva-hānir" iti | yasya hi sarva-vishayācābhasana-kshamaṁ jñānāṃ nityaṃ iti osa sarvañjnaḥ iti viprathishiddham | anityate hi jñānasya kadācchij jānāti kadāchid na jānāti ity asarvañjnaṃ api syāt | na asau jñāna-nityate dosho 'sti | jñāna-nityate vajra-vishayā svātantrya-eyapadeso na upapadyate iti 'chet | na | pratataushna-prakāśe 'pi savitari dahati prakāśayati iti svātantrya-vyapadesā-darsanāt | naṃ savitur dāhyā-prakāśya-saṃyogato sati dahati prakāśayati iti eyapadesāḥ syāt | na tu Brahmanāḥ prāg upatter jñāna-karma-saṃyogo'asti iti vishamo dṛṣṭāntaḥ | na | asaty api karmanī savitira prakāśate iti karttritva-vyapadesā-darsanāt | evam asaty api jñāna-karmanī Brahmanās "tad aikṣhata" iti karttritva-vyapadesopapattat na vaishanyam | karmāpekṣhayāṁ tu Brahmanī ikṣhitrita-śrutayaḥ sutarūm upapannāḥ | kim punas tat karma yat prāg upatter īśvara-jñānasya vishayibhavati iti | tattvāntayatvābhyaṃ anirvācaṇāyāṃ nāma-rūpe avyākrite dvādhikrtakale扫一扫 iti brūmaḥ | yat-prasādād hi yojinām apy atītānāgata-vishayam pratyakhaḥ jñānāṃ ichhanti yogā-sāstra-viḍāḥ kimu vak-tvayeṁ tasya nitya-sūdhāsya īśvarasya śrīṣṭi-sthīti-saṃkṛiti-vishayāḥ nitya-jñānāṃ bhavati iti | yad api uktam prāg upatter Brahmanāḥ śari-rādi-sambhandaṃ antareṇa ikṣhitritvaṃ anupapannam iti nātah chodyam avatārati savitri-prakāśa-vaḍa Brahmano jñāna-vaccura-pityatena jñāna-sādhanāpekṣhānupapattatḥ | . . . . yad api uktam "pradhānāsya anekatmakatvād mṛd-ādi-vat kāraṇatvopapattir na asāmhatasya Brahmanāḥ" iti tat pradhānāsya asābadatena eva pratuyuktam | yathā tu tarkeṇāpi Brahmanāḥ eva kāraṇatevaṃ nirodhām śakyate na pradhānādīnāṃ tathā pra-panchhayishyate "na vilakṣhaṇatvād asya" ity-evam-ādīnaḥ (Brahma Sūtras ii. 1, 4) |
Attra āha yad uktāṁ “na achetanaṁ pradhānaṁ jagat-kāraṇam ikṣhitri-tva-śravaṇaṁ” iti tadbhavatāḥ anyathā ‘py upapadyate | achetane ‘pi chetana-vad upachāra-darśanat | pratyāsanna-pātanatam kālaśya alakṣhya kālaṁ pipatisat ity acetana ‘pi kile chetana-vad upachāra ārishtas tad-vad acetane ‘pi pradhāne pratyāsanna-sarge chetana-vad upachāro bhavishyat iti “tad aikṣhata” iti | yathā loke kaśchich chetanaṁ snātava bhūktvā cha “oparāhme grāmaṁ rathena gamishyāmi” iti ikṣhitvā anantaṁ tathāva niyamena pravarttate tathā pradhānam api mahād-ādy-ākāreṇa niyamena pravarttate | tasmāḥ chetana-vad upachāryyate | kasmāt punah kāraṇad vihāya mukhyam ikṣhitri-tvam upachārikaṁ kalpyate | “tad tejah aikṣhata” “tāḥ āpaḥ aikṣhanta” iti cha achetanayor apy ap-tejasāḥ chetana-vad upachāra-darśanat | tasmāt sat-kartṛtikam api ikṣhānam upachāri-kam iti gamyate upachāra-prāye vachanād ity evam prāpte idam śūtram ārābhyyate | 6. “Gaṇoṣa chet | na | ātma-sabdāt” | yad uktam pradhānam achetanaṁ sāch-cchabda-vācyam tasmiṁ upachāriki ikṣhitir ap-tejasor iva iti tadbhavatāḥ asat | kasmāt | ātma-sabdāt | “sad eva saumya idam agrā asā” ity upakramya “tad aikṣhata tad tejo ’ṣrijata” iti cha tejo ’b-annānāṁ ārishtam ukteś tad eva prakritam sad ikṣhiṭri tāni cha tejo ’b-annāṁ devatā-sabdāna parāmṛisyā ahā “sā iyāṁ devatā aikṣhata hanta aham imāṁ tisro devataḥ anena jīvena ātmanā ’nuprāmṛisyā namaṁ-rūpe vyākarāvāni” iti | tattra yadi pradhānam achetanaṁ guṇa-vṛtttyā ikṣhitri kalpyeta tad eva prakritatevat sā iyāṁ devatā parāmrṣiyeta | na tadā devatā jīvam ātma-sabdāna abhidakhyata | jeto hi nāma chetanaḥ sārtrṣādyakṣah prāyanāṁ abhārayita prasiddhāḥ nirvachanāḥ cha | sa kathā achetanasya pradhānasya ātma bhavet | ātma hi nāma sarvāpam | na achetanasya pradhānasya chetana jīvah sarvāpam bhavītaḥ arhati | attra tu chetanam Brahma mukhyam ikṣhitri parīṣṭhyate | tasya jiva-vishayaḥ ātma-sābda-prayaṅga upapadyate | tathā “sa yaḥ esho ’nimā etdātmyam idaṁ sarvaṁ ṣat satyaṁ sa ātma tattvam asi Svetaketo” ity attra “sa ātma” iti prakṛitaṁ sad-animānam ātmānam ātma-sabdāna upadīṣya “tattvam asi Svetaketo” iti chetanasya Svetaketor ātmānam upadīṣati | ap-tejasus tu vishayatevdachetanatevaṁ nāma rūpa vyākaranādaḥ cha prayaṅjyateva eva nirdeśat | na cha ātma-sābda-vat kincid mukhyatev kāraṇam asti iti yuktāṁ kula-vad gauṇātēm ikṣhitritevayā | tayor api cha sad-adhisthitatevēpekṣhaṁ eva ikṣhitritevam | satas tva ātma-sabdād na gauṇaṁ ikṣhitritevam ity uktam | atha uchyate | achetane ‘pi pradhāne bhavaty ātma-sabdāḥ | ātmanāḥ sarvārtha-kāritvāt |
yathā rājanāḥ sarvārtha-kāriṇī bhṛtye bhavaty atma-sabdā "mama atmā Bhadrasingah" iti | pradhānaṁ hi purushatmano bhogāpavargau kurvaḍ upakarotī rājanāḥ iva bhṛtyaḥ sandhi-vigrahādiṁ varttamānaḥ | athavā ekāḥ eva atma-sabdāḥ chetanačhetana-vishayo bhavishyati "bhūtātmā" "indriyātmā" iti cha prayoga-darśanād yathā ekāḥ eva jyotiḥ-sabdāḥ kratu-jvalana-vishayāḥ | tatra kutaḥ etad atma-sabdādīkṣiṣṭer agnauḥ samyak ity attra uttaram paṭhaḥ | 7. "Tan-nishṭhāsya mokṣhopadeśāt" | na pradhānaṁ achetanam atma-sabdādālambānam bhavitum arhati "sa atmā" iti prakṛitaṁ sad anīmānam adāya "tat team asi Svetaketō" iti chetanaśya Svetaketor mokṣhayitvāyaśya tan-nishṭhām upadiśya "Achāryavān purusho veda tasya tāvād eva chiraṁ yāvad na vimokṣhye ata sampatsye" iti mokṣhopadeśāt | yady hi achetanam pradhānaṁ sah-chhabda-vācayaṁ "tad asi" iti grāhayed mumukṣuṁ chetanāṁ sanantam "achetanā 'si" iti tadā viparīta-vādi śāstram puruṣhāsaṁ anarthāya ity apramānāṁ syāt | na tu nirdoshāṁ śāstram apramāṇaṁ kalpayitum yuktam | yady cha ajnāsya suto mumukṣhah achetanam anātmanam "ātmā" ity upadīṣeṣ pratmāna-bhūtāṁ śāstraṁ sa śraddhādhānataya 'nāha-go-lāṅgula-nyāyena tad-ātmā-driṣṭaṁ na parītyajet tad-vaṭyatīkaṁ ca atmānaṁ na pratipadyeta | tathā sati purushārthad vihāntaṁ anarthāṁ ca rīchhet | tasmād yathā svargāy-arthino 'gnihotraṁ-sādhanaṁ yathā-bhūtam upadīśati tathā mumukṣhor api "sa atmā | tat team asi Svetaketō" iti yathā-bhūtam eva atmānam upadiśati iti yuktam | evaṁ cha sati tapta-paraśu-grahana-moksha-driṣṭāntena satyābhisandhāsa mokṣhopadeśāṁ upapadyate | . . . . tasmād na sad-anīmanī ātmā-sabdāsya gaṇātavam | bhṛtye tu svāmi-bhṛtya-bhedaṁ pratyakṣhatvād upapanno gaṇāḥ ātmā-sabdā "mama atmā Bhadrasingah" iti | api cha kvačid gaṇāḥ sabdo driṣṭaḥ iti na etācata taṁ bhadra-pramāṇake 'rthe gaṇā kalpanā nyāyāya sarvattra anāśveśa-prasangāt | yat tu uktaṁ chetanačhetanayoḥ sādhāraṇaḥ ātmā-sabdāḥ kratu-jvalanayor iva jyotiḥ-sabdāḥ iti | tad na | anekārthaśasya anāasyatvat | tasmāc chetana-vishayaḥ eva mukhyāḥ ātmā-sabdāḥ chetanatvopachārād bhūtādiṁ pratyajye "bhūtātmā" "indriyātmā" iti cha | sādhāraṇate 'py ātmā-sabdāsya na prakaraṇam upapadoṁ vā kincid nīchāyakam antareṇa anuṣṭara-ṛṣitiṁ nirdhāryitum śakyaṁ | na cha atra achetanasya nīchāyakaṁ kincid kāraṇam atsi prakṛitaṁ tu sad ikṣhitī śannihitaś ca chetanāḥ Svetaketuḥ | na hi chetanaśya Svetaketor achetanāḥ ātmā sam-

114 The edition printed in Bengali characters reads puruṣhāsya ātmānaḥ.
bhavati ity avocchāma | tasmāc chetana-vishayāḥ iha ātma-badbāḥ iti
nīśchayāte |

"And it has been declared that Brahma, omniscient and omnipotent, is the cause of the creation, continuance, and destruction of the world. But the Sāṅkhyaṣ and others, holding that an ultimate (parinishṭhā) substance is discoverable by other proofs, and inferring the existence of Pradhāṇa or other causes, apply the texts of the Upanishads as having reference to these. For (they assert that) all the texts of the Upanishads which relate to the creation, design inferentially to indicate the cause by the effect. The Sāṅkhyaṣ think that the conjunctions of Pradhāṇa and Purusha (Soul) are to be inferred as eternal. From the very same texts the followers of Kaṇāda (the Vaiśeshikas) deduce that Īśvara is the instrumental cause and atoms the material cause (of the world). So, too, other rationalizing objectors rise up who rely on fallacies founded on texts or reasoning. Here then our teacher (achāryya), who understood both words and sentences and evidence, with the view of pointing out that the texts of the Upanishads have for their object the revelation of Brahma, first puts forward and then refutes the fallacies founded by those persons on texts or reasoning. The Sāṅkhyaṣ regarding Pradhāṇa, consisting of the three qualities (gunas, viz. satteva, rajas, and tamas, or "Goodness," "Passion," and "Darkness"), and inanimate, as the cause of the world, tell us: (a) 'Those texts in the Upanishads which, as you say, declare that an omniscient and omnipotent Brahma is the cause of the world, can be applied to support the view that Pradhāṇa is the cause. For omnipotence in regard to its own developments is properly predicable of Pradhāṇa also; and omniscience too may be rightly ascribed to it. You will ask, how? We answer (b), What you call knowledge is a characteristic of 'Goodness' (satteva), according to the text of the Smṛiti, 'From Goodness springs knowledge.' And (c) through this knowledge, which is a characteristic of Goodness, Yogins, who are men

125 Compare Sāṅkhya Sūtras, i. 69: pūrampyyade 'py ekatra parinishṭhā, etc., which Dr. Ballantyne renders, "Even if there be a succession, there is a halt (parinishṭhā) at some one point," etc.

126 The phrase so translated is sāmakāy-kāraṇam. The word sāmakāya is rendered by Dr. Ballantyne, in his translation of the Bhāṣāparichhedha (published January, 1851), p. 22, by "intimate relation" (the same phrase as Dr. Roer had previously employed in 1850); and in the translation of the Tarka-saṅgraha (published in September of the same year), pp. 2 and 4, by "co-inherence."
with bodily organs,\textsuperscript{137} are reputed to be omniscient; for owing to the transcendent excellence of Goodness its omniscience is matter of notoriety. Nor it is only of a person (prārthana) whose essence is mere perception, and who is devoid of corporeal organs, that either omniscience or partial knowledge can be predicated: but from Pradhāna being composed of the three qualities, Goodness, which is the cause of omniscience, belongs to it too in the condition of Pradhāna. And so in the texts of the Upanishads omniscience is figuratively ascribed to it, although it is unconscious. And (d) you also, who recognize an omniscient Brahma, must of necessity acknowledge that His omniscience consists in His possessing the power of omniscience. For He does not continually exercise knowledge in regard to all objects. For (e) if His knowledge were continual. His self-dependence (or voluntary action) in reference to the act of knowledge would be lost. But if knowledge be not continual, then when the act of knowledge ceases Brahma must cease (to know). And so omniscience results from the possession of the power of omniscience. Further (f) you, too, hold that before the creation Brahma was devoid of any impulse to action. Nor can knowledge be conceived to arise in anyone who has no bodily organs or other instruments of knowledge. Moreover (g) causality can properly be ascribed to Pradhāna (as it can to earth, etc.) owing to the variety in its nature,\textsuperscript{138} and the consequent possibility of its development, but not to Brahma whose essence is simple and uniform. These arguments having been urged, the following Sūtra is introduced: 5. 'No; for in consequence of the word 'beholding' being employed, your view is contrary to the Veda.' (a) The unconscious Pradhāna, imagined by the Sānkhyas as the cause of the world, can find no support in the Upanishads. For it is unscriptural. How so? From its beholding, i.e. because the act of 'beholding' (or 'reflecting') is in scripture ascribed to the cause. How? Because the Veda contains a text which begins thus: 'This, o fair youth, was in the beginning' 'Existent, one without a second' (Chh. Up. vi. 2, 1); and proceeds: 'It beheld, let

\textsuperscript{137} The epithet kāryya-karagavantah is rendered dehendriya-yukta in the Bengali translation of S'ankara's comment, which forms part of the edition of the S'ārirakasūtras, with comment and gloss, published at Calcutta in 1784 of the S'aka era. This translation is useful for ascertaining the general sense, but it does not explain all the difficult phrases which occur in the original.

\textsuperscript{138} The meaning of this is that Pradhāna, as cause, possesses in its nature a variety corresponding to that exhibited by the different kinds of objects which constitute the visible creation; whilst Brahma is one and uniform.
me multiply, and be propagated.' 'It created light' (3). By these words the scripture, having first determined that the world, denoted by the word 'this' and now developed as Name and Form, subsisted before the creation in the form of the 'Existent,' then goes on to shew that this very subject of the text, denoted by the word 'Existent,' became, after 'beholding,' the creator of light and other objects. And accordingly another text (Ait. Up. i. 1) declares in the following words that the creation was preceded by 'beholding:' 'This was in the beginning Soul, one only: there was nothing else which saw.' It beheld, Let me create worlds; it created these worlds.'" After quoting two other texts Sankara proceeds: "These and other passages may also be adduced which shew that an omniscient Isvara was the cause (of all things). And (d) the opinion which has been referred to, that Pradhāna will be omniscient in virtue of the knowledge which is an attribute of Goodness, is groundless. For since the three qualities are in a state of equilibrium as long as the state of Pradhāna lasts, knowledge as an attribute of Goodness cannot then belong to it. And the assertion (d) that Pradhāna will be omniscient from possessing the power of omniscience is equally untenable. If (d) in reliance on the power of knowledge residing in Goodness during the state of equilibrium, it be maintained that Pradhāna is then omniscient, a merely partial knowledge may with equal reason be ascribed to it on the strength of the power to obstruct knowledge which resides in Passion and Darkness (the other two qualities which constitute it). Besides, no function of Goodness can either be, or be called, knowledge, unless it be accompanied by the power of observing (or witnessing). But Pradhāna, being unconscious, possesses no such power. Consequently the omniscience of Pradhāna is untenable. And the omniscience of Yogins, (e) springing from their eminence in every attribute, becomes possible in consequence of their being conscious creatures; and therefore cannot be adduced as an illustrative argument in the case before us. If, again, you ascribe to Pradhāna a power of reflection derived from an observer (like the power of burning possessed by iron balls, etc., which is derived from fire) then it will be right to say that the source from which that power of reflection comes to Pradhāna, viz. the omniscient Brahma in the proper sense, and nothing else, is the cause of the world. Once more, (e) it is

139 This is the sense assigned in Böhtlingk and Roth's Lexicon to the word mishat. The commentators render it "moving" (chalat).

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urged that omniscience cannot in the literal sense be properly attributed even to Brahma himself, because if the cognitive acts were continual, His self-dependence (or spontaneity), in regard to the act of cognition, would be no longer conceivable: we reply, that we must ask you how the supposition that cognitive acts are continual, interferes with the existence of omniscience. Because it is a contradiction to say that he who possesses a perpetual knowledge which can throw light upon all subjects can be otherwise than omniscient. For although on the hypothesis that knowledge is not continual, a negation of omniscience would result, as in that case the person in question would sometimes know and sometimes not know,—the same objection does not attach to the supposition of a perpetuity of knowledge. If you reply that on that supposition, self-dependence (or spontaneity), in regard to knowledge can no longer be attributed, we deny this, because we observe that spontaneity, in regard to burning and illuminating, is attributed to the sun, although he continually burns and shines. If you again object that this illustration does not hold good, because the power in question is ascribed to the sun only when his rays are in contact with the objects to be burnt or illuminated, whereas before the creation, Brahma has no contact with the object of knowledge;—we reply that the parallel is exact, because we observe that agency in shining is attributed to the sun even when there is no object [for his beams]; and in the same way agency in regard to 'beholding,' is justly ascribed to Brahma, even when there is no object of knowledge. But the texts which record the fact of 'beholding' will be applicable to Brahma with still greater propriety if that 'beholding' have had reference to a positive object. What then is the object which is contemplated by Brahma before the creation? We reply, the undeveloped Name and Form which were not describable either in their essence or differences, and which He wished to develop. For what need we say, to prove the perpetual knowledge, relating to the creation, continuance, and destruction of the world, which belongs to Íśvara, the perpetually pure, from whose grace it is that the intuitive knowledge of things past and future, which men learned in the Yoga doctrine attribute to Yogins, is derived? And as regards the further objection (f) that Brahma, who before the creation was without body or organs of sense, could not be conceived to 'behold,'—that argument cannot be sustained, as from
Brahma’s existence in the form of knowledge being, like the sun’s lustre, perpetual, he cannot be supposed dependent upon any (bodily organs as) instruments of knowledge.” . . . “Then as regards the assertion (g) that Pradhāna, from its multiformality of character can (like earth, etc.,) be readily conceived as the cause (of the manifold products which we see around us), whilst such causality cannot be ascribed to the simple and uniform Brahma,—that has been answered by the remark that the existence of Pradhāna is not established by scripture. And that the causality of Brahma, but not that of Pradhāna, etc., can be established by reasoning will hereafter be shewn in the Sūtras, ‘Brahma, you say, cannot be the material cause of this world, because it differs from him in its nature,’ etc. (Brahma Sūtras, ii. 1, 4 ff.). Here the Sāṅkhyas remark: ‘As regards your objection that the unconscious Pradhāna cannot be the cause of the world, because the Veda describes that cause as ‘beholding,’ we observe (h) that that text, if otherwise explained, will be consistent with our view. For we find that even unconscious objects are figuratively spoken of as conscious. Thus we notice that any one who perceives that the bank of a river is on the point of falling, speaks in a figurative way of that unconscious bank as intending to fall.140 In the same way when Pradhāna is on the point of creating, it can be figuratively said of it, although unconscious, as of a conscious being, that it ‘beheld.’141 Just as any conscious person, after bathing and eating, resolves that on the following day he will proceed to his village in a car, and afterwards acts according to that plan, so too Pradhāna (becoming developed) in the form of Mahat (intellect), etc., acts according to a law, and therefore is figuratively spoken of as conscious. If you ask us, why we abandon the proper sense of ‘beholding,’ and adopt a figurative one, we answer that we do so because we find the term figuratively applied to Water and to Light, though unconscious objects, in the Vedic texts, ‘The Light beheld,’ ‘the Waters beheld’ (Chh. Up. vi. 2, 3f.). Hence from the fact that the expression is for the most

140 Kūlam pipatisati, literally, “The bank wishes to fall;” but, as is well known, a verb, or verbal noun, or adjective, in the desiderative form, often indicates nothing more than that something is about to happen. Here, however, the Sāṅkhyas are introduced as founding a serious argument on this equivocal form of speech.

141 See Vijnāna Bhikshu’s remarks on the Sāṅkhyā Sūtra, i. 96, where the same illustration is given.
part figuratively employed, we conclude that the act of beholding, performed by the 'Existent' also was a figurative one." These objections having been brought forward, the following Sūtra is introduced: 6. "If you say that the act of ' beholding' is figuratively ascribed to Pradhāna, it is not so, because the word Soul also is applied to the cause." (h) "The assertion that the unconscious Pradhāna is designated by the word 'Existent,' and that ' beholding' is figuratively ascribed to it, as to Water and Light, is incorrect. Why? Because the word Soul also is employed. The text which begins with the words, 'This, o fair youth, was in the beginning Existent,' and goes on 'It beheld, it created light,' after relating the creation of Light, Water, and Food, refers to that 'Existent,' the ' beholder,' which is the subject of the text, and to Light, Water, and Food, under the appellation of deities, thus: 'This deity beheld (or resolved), come let me enter into these three deities with this living Soul, and make manifest Name and Form' (vi. 3, 2). Here if the unconscious Pradhāna were regarded as being, through the function of the quality (of Goodness), the ' beholder,' it would from the context be referred to in the phrase 'that deity,' and then the deity in question could not denote a 'living being' by the term 'Soul.' For the principle of life is both according to common usage, and interpretation, the conscious ruler of the body, and the sustainer of the vital breaths. How could such a principle of life be the Soul of the unconscious Pradhāna? For Soul means the essential nature, and a conscious principle of life cannot be the essence of the unconscious Pradhāna. But in reality the conscious Brahma is understood in this text as the ' beholder' in the proper sense of the term; and the word Soul, as relating to the principle of life, is rightly applied to Him. And thus in the sentence 'This entire universe is identical with this subtile particle; it is true; it is Soul: Thou art it, o Svetaketu,' (Chh. Up. vi. 8, 6 f.) the author by employing the words 'it is Soul' designates the subtile particle, the Existent, which is the subject of the text, as Soul, by the term Soul, and so in the words 'thou art it, o Svetaketu,' describes the conscious Svetaketu as being Soul. But Water and Fire are unconscious things, because they are objects of sense, and because it is pointed out that they were employed in the manifestation of Name and Form; and so there is no reason, as in the

122 Vishayatevāt = drīg-vishayatevāt, "from their being objects of the sense of sight."—Govinda Ananda.
case of Soul, to describe them as 'beholders' in the proper sense: that term must be applied to them by a figure, as in the case of the 'river bank.' And their act of 'beholding' was dependent on their being governed by the 'Existent.' But, as we have said, the act of 'beholding' is not figurative in the case of the 'Existent,' because the word Soul is applied to it. But it is now urged (i), that the term Soul does apply to Pradhāna, though unconscious, because it fulfills all the objects of soul; just as it is applied by a king to his servant who accomplishes all his designs, when he says 'Bhadrasena is my soul.' For Pradhāna renders aid to a man's soul by obtaining for it both celestial enjoyment, and final liberation, as a king's servant assists him by acting in peace and war, etc. Or (j) the one word Soul may apply both to conscious and unconscious objects, as we see it employed in the phrases 'soul of the elements,' 'soul of the bodily organs;' just as the same word jyotis means both sacrifice and light. Why then, the Sānkhyas conclude, should you infer from the word 'Soul' that the term 'beholding' cannot be figuratively used?

"This is answered in the 7th Sūtra ('Soul cannot denote Pradhāna), because it is declared that the man who fixes his thoughts upon it obtains final emancipation.' Unconscious Pradhāna must not be understood to derive any support from the word 'Soul;' for after referring in the words 'it is Soul' to the 'Existent,' the 'very subtile thing,' which is the subject of the passage, and indicating in the words 'thou art it, o Svetaketu,' that the conscious Svetaketu, who was about to obtain emancipation, was intent upon it, the text above adduced declares his emancipation in the words 'the man who has an instructor knows, "this will only last until I am liberated; I shall then be perfected."' (Chh. Up. vi. 14, 6) For if the unconscious Pradhāna were denoted by the term 'Existent,' the words 'thou art it,' would cause the conscious person, who was seeking after emancipation, to understand (of himself) 'Thou art unconscious;,' and in that case the Sāstra which declared what was contradictory would be unauthoritative, because injurious to the person in question. But we cannot conceive a faultless Sāstra to be unauthoritative. And if a Sāstra esteemed authoritative should inform an ignorant seeker after emancipation, that a thing which was not soul was soul, he (the ignorant seeker) would in consequence of his faith, persist in regarding it as soul, as in the case of
the blind man and the bull's tail, and would fail of attaining to soul which was quite different from it; and would in consequence lose the object of its efforts, and suffer injury. It is therefore proper to conclude that just as the Vedic precept, that he who desires paradise should perform the agnihotra sacrifice is conformable to truth, so, too, the text which says to the man seeking after emancipation, 'this is soul, thou art that, o Svetaketu,' declares to him soul in conformity with the reality. And so,—as in the case of the man (charged with theft) who takes into his hand the red-hot axe, and (in consequence of the truth of his protestation of innocence) is delivered (Chh. Up. vi. 16, 2),—the promise of final emancipation will hold good in the case of the man whose thoughts are fixed on the true Brahma. . . . Consequently the application of the word 'soul' to the 'existent subtle thing' is not figurative. Whereas (i) the use of the same word when applied to a servant (as when it is said 'Bhadrasena is my soul'), is shown to be figurative by the manifest distinctness of a servant from his master. And the fact that a word is sometimes observed to be employed figuratively does not justify the supposition that it is so used in cases where the (proper) sense is established by the words; because that would give rise to doubt in every instance. Again, (j) it is incorrect to say that the word soul is common to things conscious and unconscious, (as the term jyotis means both sacrifice and flame), because the assertion that it has a variety of significa-

143 The story or fable here alluded to is told at length by Ānanda Giri, and more briefly by Govinda Ānanda as follows: Kaśchit kila dushtaṁ māhārṣya-mūrga petitam andham saṁ-bandaḥ-nagaraṁ jīvanam hūhaśe ḫim attra úyukhmatā duḥkkhena sthitaye "khiśya sa cha anṛhaṁ sukha-viṣṇuṁ ākaryya tum āptam maṭvā uśchā aho mad-bhūgadhaśyaḥ yad attra bhavan māṁ dūnaṁ svabhīṣṭa-nagara-vr̥ty-asamartham bhūshate" iti | sa cha vipralipsur dushta-go-yuvānam oniṣṭa tādiya-lāṅgulaṁ andham grāhâyomasa upadideśa cha enam andham "tāṇa go-yuva teṇām naraṁ nesñat mū tyaja laṅgulaṁ" iti sa cha andhaḥ śraddhānūtaya tad atyājan svabhīṣṭam aprūpya anartha-paramparaṁ pūptam tena nyāyaṁ ity arthaḥ |

A certain malicious person said to a blind man who was lying on the road through a forest, and wishing to proceed to the city of his friends, why, distressed old man, do you stay here? The blind man hearing the agreeable voice of the speaker, and regarding him as trustworthy, replied: 'O how great is my good fortune that you have accosted me who am helpless, and unable to go to the city which I desire to reach!' The other, wishing to deceive him, brought a vicious young bull, and made the blind man lay hold of his tail, and told him that the young bull would conduct him to the city, enjoining him not to let go the tail. Trusting to the speaker, the blind kept his hold, but did not attain the object of his desire, and encountered a series of mishaps;—such is the illustration.'
tions is unreasonable. Hence the word soul, which properly refers to conscious things, is applied to the elements, etc., by a figurative ascription to them of consciousness, as when we say, ‘the soul of the elements,’ or ‘the soul of the bodily organs.’ And even if it were admitted that the word soul was common to different things, it could not be ascertained whether it had reference to one thing or another unless the context or some auxiliary word determined the point. But in the case before us there is nothing to determine that it denotes anything unconscious; on the contrary, the subject of the sentence is the ‘Existent, the beholder,’ and in immediate connection with it is the conscious Svetaketu; for as we have already said an unconscious thing cannot be conceived as the soul of the conscious Svetaketu. Thus it is settled that the word ‘soul’ refers to a conscious being,” etc.

In the fourth section (pāda) of the 1st Book, the author of the Sūtras returns to his controversy with the Sāṅkhyaists, and Sankara, after alluding to the aphorisms in which they had previously been combated, proceeds as follows (p. 334):

Idaṁ te idāṁ avāśīṣṭam āśāṅkyate | yad uktam pradhānasya asābdatevaṁ tad asiddham kāsūhit śākhasu pradhāna-samarpaṇāhyāśām śabdānaṁ śrūyaṁśaṅvatat | atah pradhānasya kāraṇatvaṁ veda-prasiddham eva mahābhiiḥ paramarśhibhiḥ Kopīdhibhiḥ parigrihitam iti prasajyate | tad yāvat teshāṁ śabdānāṁ anya-paratvaṁ na pratipādyate tāvat sarvaṁ Bhumā jagataḥ kāraṇam iti pratipādyitam apy ākūṭhabhavet | atas teshāṁ anya-paratvaṁ daryāyitum paraḥ sandarbhaḥ pravarttate | “ānumānikam api” (Br. Sūtra i. 4, 1) anumāna-nirūptam api pradhānam “ekāṁ” sākhinām sābdāvad upalabhyyate | Kāthake hi paṭīyate “mahatāḥ param auyaktam auyaktāt purushaḥ paraḥ” iti | tattva ye eva yan-nāmāno yat-kramakāḥ cha mahat-avyakta-purushaḥ smṛiti-prasiddhāḥ te eva iha pratyabhijñāyante | tattva “avyaktam” iti smṛiti-prasiddheḥ śabdādi-kītaveḥ cha na vyaktam auyaktam iti vyutt-patti-sambhavāt smṛiti-prasiddham pradhānam abhidhīyate | atas tasyāḥ sābdavatvād asābdatevaṁ anupapannam 144 | tad eva cha jagataḥ kāraṇaṁ śruti-smṛiti-prasiddhibhyāḥ iti chet | na etad evam | na hy etat Kāthaka-cākyāṁ smṛiti-prasiddhyoḥ mahat-avyaktaḥ oṣṭiṁ-param | na hy attra yādriśaṁ smṛiti-prasiddhaṁ svatantarīṁ kāraṇaṁ trīyacute pradhānaṁ

144 The text given in the Bibl. Indica has upapannam, but I follow the old edition in Bengali characters in reading anupapannam, which seems required by the sense.


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But now this doubt still remains. The assertion that the existence of Pradhāna is not supported by the Veda is, say the Sāṅkhyaists, destitute of proof, as certain Vedic Sākhās contain passages which have the appearance of affirming Pradhāna. Consequently the causality of Pradhāna has been received by Kapila and other great rishis on the ground that it is established by the Veda; and this is an objection to the state-
ment which you make to the contrary. Until, therefore, it be established that these passages have a different object, the doctrine that an omniscient Brahma is the cause of the world, even though it has been proved, will be again unsettled; and consequently you bring forward a great array of arguments to shew that these texts apply to something else. In the words 'it may be deduced also,' i.e. it is determined by inference,—it is shewn that in the opinion of certain schools the doctrine of Pradhāna is scriptural, for in the Kaṭha Upanishad (i. 3, 11) we read the words 'Above the Great one is Avyakta (the Unmanifested one), and above the Unmanifested one is Purusha (Soul). Here we recognize 'the Great one,' 'the Unmanifested one,' and Purusha, with the same names and in the same order in which they are known to occur in the Smṛiti (i.e. the system of Kapila). Here that which is called Pradhāna in the Smṛiti is denoted by the word 'the Unmanifested one,' as we learn both from its being so called in the Smṛiti, and from the epithet 'unmanifested' (which is derived from the words 'not' and 'manifested') being properly applicable to it in consequence of its being devoid of sound, and the other objects of sense: wherefore, from its having this Vedic authority to support it, its (i.e. Pradhāna's) unscriptural character is refuted; and it is proved both by the Veda, the Smṛiti, and common notoriety to be the cause of the world. If the Sānkhyas argue thus, we reply that the case is not so; for this text of the Kaṭha Upanishad does not refer to the existence of the 'Great one' and the 'Unmanifested one,' which are defined in the Smṛiti (of Kapila); for here we do not recognize such a self-dependent cause, viz. Pradhāna, composed of the three qualities, as is declared in that Smṛiti, but the mere epithet 'unmanifested.' And this word 'unmanifested,' owing to its sense as a derivative from the words 'not' and 'manifested,' is also applied to anything else which is subtle or indistinguishable, and has not properly a conventional meaning in reference to any particular thing. As for the conventional use which the assertors of Pradhāna make of it, that is a technical application peculiar to themselves, and does not afford any means for determining the sense of the Vedas. Nor does the mere identity of the order (of the three words) furnish any proof of identity of meaning unless we can recognise the essential character of the things to be the same. For no man but a fool, if he saw a cow in the place where he expected to see a horse, would falsely
ascribe to it the character of a horse. And if we determine the sense of the context, it will be found that the Pradhāṇa imagined by our opponents finds no place here, since it is the ‘body’ which is indicated in the preceding simile. For here the body as represented under the figure of a chariot, etc., is to be understood by the word ‘the Unmanifested.’ Why? From the context and the remainder of the sentence. For the context which immediately precedes sets forth the soul, the body, etc., under the figure of a rider, a chariot, etc., as follows: ‘Know that the soul is the rider, the body the chariot, the intellect the charioteer, and the mind the reins. The senses are called the horses, and the objects of sense the roads on which they go. The soul accompanied by the senses and the mind is the enjoyer;’ so say the wise.’ After pointing out (in the following verses) that with these senses, etc., if uncontroled, the soul gains only this world, but if they are kept under control, it attains to the highest state of Vishnu, which is the end of its road; the author (in answer to the question ‘What is that highest state of Vishnu which is the end of the road?’) shews in the following verses that it is the supreme Spirit who transcends the senses, etc. (which form the subject of the context), who is alluded to as the goal, and the highest state of Vishnu: ‘The objects of sense are higher than the senses; the mind is higher than the objects of sense; the intellect is higher than the mind; the Great soul is higher than the intellect; the Unmanifested one is higher than the Great soul; the spirit (Purusha) is greater than the Unmanifested: there is nothing higher than Spirit, that is the end, that is the highest goal.’” After observing that the various terms in these lines are the same which had been previously introduced in the simile of the chariot, charioteer, rider, horses, etc., Sankara assigns the reason of the superiority attributed to each succeeding object over that which precedes it, and then goes on to say in regard to intellect and soul: “‘The Great soul is higher than the intellect,’ that soul, namely, which is figuratively described as a rider, in the words ‘Know the soul to be the rider.’ But why is the Soul

146 The words of the original, both as given here and in the text of the Kaṭha Upanishad are ātmendriya-mano-yuktam bhaktā, which are not very clear. The commentators understand ātman at the beginning of the compound as denoting body, and supply ātmānam as the subject. See Dr. Roer’s translation of the Upanishads (Bibl. Ind. p. 107).
superior to the intellect? Both from the use of the word Soul and because it aids the enjoyment of the enjoyer, it is shewn to be superior. Its character as the Great soul is proved by its being the master. . . The intellect of Hiranyagarbha, the first-born, is the highest basis of all intellect; and it is that which is here called the 'Great soul.' It had been previously comprehended under the word 'intellect,' but is here separately specified, because it also is superior to our intellects. . . . Thus the body alone remains of the objects referred to in the passage. After going over all the others in order, with the view of pointing out the highest state to be attained, he indicates by the one remaining word, the 'Unapparent,' the one remaining subject of the text, viz. the body—such is our conclusion. . . . Hence after examining both the earlier and later portions of the passage, we find that there is no place for the Pradhāna imagined by our opponents." Going on to interpret the next aphorism (i. 4, 2) 'But the subtile body may also be properly called 'unmanifested,'" Sankara begins:

"We have declared that, looking to the context and the only word which remained to be explained, the body, and not Pradhāna, is denoted by the word the 'Unapparent.' But here a doubt arises: 'How can the body be properly designated by the word 'unapparent,' inasmuch as from its grossness it is very distinctly perceptible, and therefore should rather be denoted by the word 'apparent,' while the word 'unapparent' signifies something that is not perceptible? We answer: In this passage the subtile body in its character of cause is intended, since what is subtile is properly designated by the term 'unapparent.' Although this gross body itself cannot properly be described by the word 'Unapparent,' still this term applies to the subtile element which is its originator" . . . Sankara begins his interpretation of the next aphorism (i. 4, 3) as follows: "Here the Sāṅkhyaas rejoin: 'If you admit that this world in its primordial condition, before its name and form had been manifested, and while it existed in its rudimentary form, could be properly designated by the word 'Unapparent,' and if the same term be declared applicable to body also while continuing in that state, then your explanation will exactly coincide with our doctrine of Pradhāna as the cause of all things; since you will virtually acknowledge that the original condition of this world was that of Pradhāna. To this we reply: If we admitted any self-dependent original
condition as the cause of the world, we should then lay ourselves open to the charge of admitting that Pradhāna is the cause. But we consider that this primordial state of the world is dependent upon the supreme Deity (Paramēśvara) and not self-dependent. And this state to which we refer must of necessity be assumed, as it is essential. For without it the creative action of the supreme Deity could not be accomplished, since, if he were destitute of his Sakti (power), any activity on his part would be inconceivable. And so, too, those who have been emancipated from birth are not born again, because this germative power (on the destruction,—which implies the previous existence,—of which emancipation depends) is consumed by knowledge.\(^{147}\) For that germative power, of which the essence is ignorance, and which is denoted by the word ‘Unapparent,’ has its centre in the supreme Deity, and is a great illusive sleep, during which mundane souls repose unconscious of their own true nature. This ‘Unapparent one’ is in some places indicated by the term ā ether (ākāśa), as in the text (Bṛih. Ār. Up. iii. 8, 11) ‘On this undecaying Being, o Gārgī, the ā ether is woven as warp and woof;’ in other places by the word ‘undecaying’ (ākṣhara), as in the text, ‘Beyond the Undecaying is the Highest;’ and is elsewhere designated by the term ‘illusion’ (māya) as in the line (Svētsāv. Up. 4, 10) ‘Know that Prakṛiti (or matter) is illusion, and the great Deity the possessor of illusion.’ For this ‘illusion’ is ‘unapparent,’ because it cannot be defined in its essence and difference. This is the ‘Unapparent’ which is described as above the ‘Great one,’ since the latter, when regarded as identical with the intellect of Hiranyagarbha, springs from the former. And even if the ‘Great one’ be identified with the embodied soul (jīva), the ‘Unapparent’ can be said to be above it, as the condition of the embodied soul is dependent upon the ‘Unapparent.’ For the ‘Unapparent’ is ignorance, and it is during its condition of ignorance that the entire mundane action of the embodied soul is car-

\(^{147}\) Govinda Ānanda explains this clause as follows: Bandha-mukti-vyacasthārtham api sa svēkāryāt ity āha “muktiḥnām” iti | yan-nāśād muktiḥ sa svēkāryāt tām vinā eva sriṣṭānu muktiṇām punar bandhāpatīr ity arthāḥ | “In the words ‘Those who had been emancipated,’ etc., he tells us that this ignorance must be admitted, in order to secure the permanence of emancipation from the bondage (of birth): that is, that ignorance by the destruction of which emancipation is obtained must be admitted; as without it those who had been emancipated would at the creation be again involved in bondage,” [because to be released at all, they must be released from something].
ried on. And that superiority of the ‘Unapparent’ over the ‘Great one’ is by a figurative description of body as identical with the former attributed to body also.”

By these subtle and elaborate explanations Sankara scarcely appears to make out his point. But I cannot follow further the discussion of this question, and now go on to the eighth aphorism (i. 4, 8) where the purport of another Vedic text is investigated:


‘Because, as in the case of the spoon, there is nothing distinctive.’ The assertor of Pradhāna again declares that Pradhāna is not proved to be unscriptural. Why? From the following verse (Śv. Up. iv. 5):

‘One unborn male, loving the unborn female of a red, white, and black colour, who forms many creatures possessing her own character, unites himself with her: another unborn male abandons her after he has enjoyed her.’ For in this verse the words ‘red,’ ‘white,’ and ‘black,’ denote (the three Qualities) Passion, Goodness, and Darkness; —Passion, from its stimulating character, being designated by the term

148 The text of Dr. Röer’s ed. of the Upanishad (Bibl. Ind. vol. vii.) has two various readings in this line, viz. lohita-krishna-vargam for lohita-śukla-krishnam (which latter, however, is the reading referred to by S’ankara in his commentary on that work), and sarūpām for svarūpāḥ.
'red,' Goodness, from its illuminating character, by 'white,' and Darkness, from its enveloping character, by 'black.' The unborn female is described as red, white, and black, with reference to the characteristics of the three components which make up the state of equilibrium. She must be called 'unborn' (Ajā), because she is not produced, since it is admitted that 'original matter' (Mūla-Prakṛiti = Pradhāna) is not a modification (of any other substance—Sāṅkhya Kārikā, verse 3). But is not ajā the conventional name for 'she-goat?' True (reply the Sāṅkyas), but that conventional sense cannot be adopted here, because knowledge is the subject of the context. And this unborn female produces many creatures characterized by the three Qualities . . . . And from this it is concluded that the theory of Kapila's followers regarding Pradhāna, etc., is based upon the Veda. We reply: that it cannot be admitted on the strength of this verse that the theory of the Sāṅkyas is founded on the Veda. For the verse in question, if regarded independently, is powerless to sustain any hypothesis whatever; and the reason is that, as this description of the state of the unborn female may be rendered applicable on any hypothesis whatever, there is no ground for determining specifically that the Sāṅkhya theory is here intended—'as in the case of the spoon.'" This aphorism refers to a verse quoted in the Brhad Āraṇyaka Upanishad, ii. 2, 3 (Bibl. Ind. p. 413 of the Sanskrit, and p. 174 of Dr. Roer's translation), and beginning 'a cup with its mouth down, and its bottom upwards,' which, as Sankara remarks, cannot, without some further indication, be applied to any one cup in particular; and in the same way, he argues, the unborn female in the passage under discussion cannot, in the absence of anything to restrict the application in any special way be understood as denoting Pradhāna (evam ihāpy avīśesho 'jām ekām ity anya mantrasya | na asmin mantle Pradhānam eva ajā 'bhipretā iti śakyate niyāntum). The question then arises what is meant by this 'unborn female.' To this the author of the aphorisms and Sāṅkara reply, that the word denotes the material substance of a four-fold class of elements, viz. light, heat, water, and food, all derived from the supreme Deity (Paramesvarād utpāyā jyotiḥ-pramukhā tejo 'b-anna-lakṣhaṇā chatur-viḍha- bhūta-grāmasya prakṛiti-bhūta iyam ajā pratipattavya). These four elements he however seems (p. 357) to identify with three, in the words: bhūta-traya-lakṣhaṇā eva iyam ajā vijneyā na guṇa-traya-lakṣhaṇā | 'This
unborn female is formed by three elements, not by the three qualities; and the ascription of the three colours in the text to these three elements is supported by a quotation from the Chhāndogya Upanishad, vi. 4, 1, which is as follows: *Yad agneḥ rohitam rūpaṁ tejasas tad rūpam yat śuklam tad apāṁ yat krishṇam tad annasya.* "The red colour of fire is that of heat; its white colour is that of water; and its black colour is that of food (which here means earth, according to the commentator on the Chhāndogya Upanishad)." In this way, he adds, the words denoting the three colours are used in the proper sense, whereas if applied to the three qualities they would be figuratively employed (*rohitādīnāṁ cha śabdānāṁ rūpa-visēsheshu mukhyate ād bhākta- tvāṁ cha guṇā-vishayatvasya*). Sākara concludes that this verse, descriptive of the unborn female, does not denote any self-dependent material cause called Pradhāna, but is shewn from the context to signify the Divine Power in its primordial state before Name and Form were developed (*na svatantrā kāchit prakṛtiḥ pradhānaṁ nāma ajā-mantreṇa āmnāyate iti sakyate vaktum | prakaraṇāt tu sā eva daive saktir avyākṛta-nāma-rūpā nāma-rūpayoh prag avasthānenāpi mantrena āmnāyate ity uchyate*).

Passing over the further questions, which are raised on this subject, I go on to the 11th Sūtra and the comment upon it, from which we learn that the words ‘knowing him by whom the five times five men, and the aether are upheld, to be Soul,’ etc. (*yasmin pancha pancha-janaḥ ākāśāḥ cha pratishtithaḥ | tam evaṁ śāmin evaṁ nāma videmāṁ ityādi*), are adduced by the Sāṅkhya in support of their system, as the number of the principles (*tattva*), which it affirms (see Sāṅkhya Kārikā, verse 3, and Sāṅkhya Sūtras, i. 61), corresponds to the number twenty-five in this text; while the applicability of the passage is denied by the Vedāntins on the ground that the ‘principles’ of the Sāṅkhya are not made up of five homogeneous sets of five each (p. 362); that if the Soul and aether mentioned in the text are added, as they must be, to the twenty-five, the aggregate number will exceed that of the Sāṅkhya ‘principles,’ among which both Soul and aether are comprehended (pp. 364 f.); that the fact of the correspondence of the numbers, if admitted, would not suffice to shew that the ‘principles’ of the Sāṅkhya were referred to, as they are not elsewhere recognized in the Veda, and as the word

149 See Babu Rajendra Lāl Mītra’s translation of this Upanishad, p. 106.
men' (janāḥ) is not usually applied to denote 'principles' (p. 365); and further that the phrase 'the five five men,' signifies only 'five,' and not 'five times five' (p. 366), etc. The conclusion arrived at in the twelfth aphorism is that the breath, and other vital airs, are referred to in the passage under consideration; and that although the word 'men' (janāḥ) is not generally applied to 'breath,' etc., any more than to 'principles,' the reference is determined by the context. Others, as Sankara observes, explain the term 'the five men' (panchajanāḥ) of the gods, fathers, gandharvas, asuras, and rakshases, and others again of the four castes, and the Nishādas. The Vedic teacher (Bādarāyaṇa) however, as his commentator adds, has decided that the breath, etc., are intended.

If we now turn to the Sāṅkhya aphorisms themselves, we shall find that their author constantly refers to texts of the Veda as supporting, coinciding with, or reconcileable with his dogmas. I have noticed the following instances, viz. Śūtras i. 5, 36, 51, 54, 78, 84, 148, 155; ii. 20–22; iii. 14, 15, 80; iv. 22; v. 1, 12, 15, 21; vi. 32, 34, 51, 58, 59, which may be consulted in Dr. Ballantyne's translation. I can only refer more particularly to a few of these with the commentator's remarks.

I begin with Śūtra i. 155, in which the author of the Aphorisms maintains that the great distinctive dogma of the Vedānta, the oneness of Soul, is not supported by the Veda. In Śūtra 150 he had laid it down as his own conclusion, established by the fact of the variety observable in the conditions of birth, etc., that there is a multitude of souls, and he now defends this as conformable to Scripture.

"Na advaita-śrutī-virodho jāti-paratvāt" | ātmaikya-śrutināṁ virodhā
tu nāsti tāsāṁ jāti-paratvāt | jātiḥ sāmāṇyam eka-rūpaṁ tattvād advaita-śrutināṁ tātparyyād na tv akhaṇḍatve pravojanabhāvād ity arthaḥ |
... yathā-śruta-jāti-sabdasya ādare tv "ātma-iddam ekaḥ eva agre asit" "sad eva saumya idam agre āsid ekam eva adeityam" (Chhānd. Up. vi. 2, 1) īty-ādy-advaita-śrutī-upapādakataya ēva sūtraṁ vyākhyeyam | "jāti-paratvāt" | vijñāya-advaita-nishedha-paratvād īty arthaḥ | tattvād ādyanvākhyāyām ayam bhāvāḥ | ātmaikya-śrutī-smṛitiśv evādi-sabdāḥ chid-

112 See the First Volume of this work, pp. 176 ff.
113 i. 154 in Dr. Hall's edition in the Bibl. Ind.
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ekarūpatā-māttra-parāḥ bhedādi-sadbāś cha vaidharmya-lakṣhāṇa-bhedā-
parāḥ |

"155. 'This is not opposed to the Vedie doctrine of non-duality, since that merely refers to genus.' Our doctrine that souls are numerous does not conflict with the Vedic texts which affirm the oneness of Soul, since these passages refer to oneness of genus. Genus means sameness, oneness of nature; and it is to this that the texts regarding non-duality relate, and not to the undividedness (or identity) of Soul; since there is no occasion for the latter view. The Sūtra must be explained with due regard to the sense of the word genus as it occurs in the Veda, so as (thereby) to bring out the proper meaning of such texts, expressing non-duality, as these, 'This was in the beginning Soul, one only; 'This was in the beginning, o fair youth, Existent, one without a second.' The words 'since that merely refers to genus,' mean 'since that is merely intended to deny a duality denoting a difference of genus.' The first of two interpretations given of the Sūtra is as follows: In the texts of the Sruti and Smṛiti relating to the oneness of Soul, the words 'One,' etc., denote simply that Spirit is one in its nature; whilst the words, 'distinction,' etc., designate a distinction defined as difference of nature." At the close of his remarks the commentator gives a second explanation of the Sūtra.

The author returns to this subject in the 61st Sūtra of the fifth Book:

"Na advaitam atmano lingat tad-bheda-pratiteḥ" | yadyapy atmanam anyonyam bheda-vākya-vad abheda-vākyāny api santi tathāpi na advaitam | na atyantam abhedah | ajādi-vākya-sthaiḥ prakṛiti-tyāgātyāgādi-lingair bhedasyaiva siddher ity arthaḥ | na hy atyantābhedo tāni lingāny upa-
padyante |

"'Soul is not one; for a distinction of souls is apparent from various signs.' Although there are texts affirming that there is no distinction, just as there are others which assert a distinction, of souls, still non-
duality, i.e. an absolute absence of distinction must be denied; because a distinction is established by signs, such as the abandonment and non-
abandonment of Prakṛiti, etc., mentioned in such texts as that about the 'unborn female,' etc. (See above, p. 165.) For these signs are incon-
sistent with the hypothesis of an absolute absence of distinction," etc.

A kindred subject is introduced in the next Sūtra, the 62nd:

"Na anātmanā 'pi pratyaksha-bādhāt" | anātmanā 'pi bhogya-prapan-
chena ātmāno na advaitam pratyakshaṇāpi bādhāt | ātmamāḥ sarva-bhog-
yābhede ghaṭa-paṭayor apy abhedāḥ syāt | ghaṭādeḥ paṭūdy-abhinnātmā-
bhedāt | sa cha bheda-grāhaka-pratyaksha-bādhitaḥ |

"Further, there is not an absence of distinction (i.e. identity) be-
tween Soul and non-soul, as this is disproved by the evidence of sense.' That is: non-duality (i.e. identity) is not predicable of Soul on the one hand, and non-soul, i.e. the perceptible objects by which our senses are affected, on the other, because this is opposed to the evidence of sense. For if soul were identical with all that is perceptible, there would also be no distinction between a jar and cloth, inasmuch as jars, etc., would not be distinct from soul which is not distinct from cloth, etc.; and such identity (of jars, etc., with cloth, etc.) is opposed to the evidence of sense which obliges us to perceive a distinction."

But how is this to be reconciled with such Vedic texts as 'this is nothing but soul' (ātmā eva idam)? An answer is given in Sūtra 64, which seems to admit that the passages in question do at least on a prima facie view convey the sense ascribed to them by the Vedāntins:

"Anyā-paratvam avivekānāṁ tattra" | avivekānāṁ avivekī-puruṣān 
prati tatra avaite 'nya-paratvam upāsanārthakānuvādh ity arthaḥ | 
loke hi sarira-sarīriṇo bhoga-bhoktroṣ cha avivekena abheda vyavahriyate 
"'haṁ gauro" "mama ātmā Bhadrasenaḥ" ityādiḥ | atas tam eva vy-
vaḥāraṁ anūdya tān eva prati tathā upāsanāṁ śrutir vidadhāti sattva-
śuddhy-ādy-artham iti |

"These texts have another object, with a view to those who have no discrimination.' That is: in the passages which affirm non-duality another object is intended, viz. a reference (to vulgar ideas) with a view to stimulate devotion. For it commonly occurs that undiscriminating persons confound the body and the soul, the object to be experienced, and the person who experiences it, as when they say 'I am white,' 'Bhadrasena is myself.' The Veda, therefore, referring to this mode of speaking, inculcates on such undiscerning people the practice of devo-
tion with a view to the promotion of goodness, purity, etc."

The author returns to the subject of non-duality in Sūtra vi. 51, which is introduced by the remark:

Nave evam pramāṇādy-anurodhena devita-sidhāvadeita-śruteḥ kā gatiṁ itī |

"But if duality be thus established in accordance with proofs, etc., what becomes of the Vedic texts declaring non-duality?"
The answer is as follows:

"Na śruti-virodho rāgināṁ vairāgyaya tat-siddheḥ" | advaita-śruti-virodhas tu nāsti rāgināṁ purushātirikte vairāgyaya eva śrutibhir advaita-sādhānāt |

"Our view is not opposed to the Veda, as the texts in question establish non-duality with a view to produce apathy in those who are actuated by desire." That is to say: There is in our doctrine regarding non-duality nothing contrary to the Veda, as the passages referred to affirm this principle with the view of producing in those who have desire an indifference in regard to everything except Soul."

The 12th aphorism of the fifth Book asserts that according to the Veda, Pradhāna, and notĪśvara, is the cause of the world. The details of the reasoning on which this view is founded, as here stated by the commentator, differ in some respects from those which Sankara puts into the mouth of the Sāṅkhyaas:

"Srutir api pradhāna-kāryyatavyasya | prapanche pradhāna-kāryyatavyasya eva śrutir asti na chetana-kāraṇatve | yathā "ajām ekāṁ lohitā-śukla-kṛishṇāṁ bahūḥ prajāḥ srijāmāṇāṁ sarūpāḥ" | "tad ha idaṁ tarhy avyākritam asti tad nāma-rūpābhyaṁ vyākṛiyate" ity-adir ity arthaḥ | yā cha "tad aikshata bahu syām" ityādiś chetana-kāraṇata-śrutih sā sargādāv utpannasya mahat-tattepādhikasya mahāpurushasya janya-jnāna-parā | kiṃvā bahu-bhavānuyodhāt pradhāne eva "kūlam pipatishtati" iti-vad gauṁ | anyathā "sākṣā chetāḥ kevalo nirguṇaṁ cha" (Svetāsvatara Upanishad, vi. 11) ity-adi-śruti-uktāparināmītevasya purushe nupapattat iti | ayaṁ cha īśvara - pratishedhaṁ aishvarye vairāgyārtham īśvara-jnānaṁ vinā 'pi moksha - pratipādaṇārtham cha prauḍhī-vāda-mātttram iti prāg eva vyākhyātam |

"There are also Vedic texts to support the doctrine that the world has sprung from Pradhāna, as its cause." That is: There are Vedic texts to shew that the phenomenal world has sprung from Pradhāna, and that it has not had a conscious being for its cause. They are such as these: 'An unborn female, red, white, and black in hue, producing many creatures like herself, etc.'; 'This was once undeveloped: it was developed with Name and Form.' As regards those other texts which affirm the causality of a conscious being, such as 'It reflected, let me become many,' they refer to the knowledge which sprang up in the great Male who was held at the beginning of the creation pos-
sessing the attributes of the principle of Intellect (Mahat). Or, in accordance with the idea of becoming multiplied, the expression (indicating consciousness and will) is figuratively applied to Pradhāna, as when it is said of the bank of a river that it ‘intends to fall.’ For on any other supposition the incapability of any modification which is ascribed to Purusha in such texts as ‘He who is the witness, the conscious, the sole being, free from the Qualities,’ could not properly be applied to him (since if he were the material cause of the creation he must become modified). And it has been before explained that this denial of an Īśvara is a mere display of ingenuity, introduced for the purpose of producing apathy in regard to glory, and of propounding a method of final liberation even independently of the knowledge of an Īśvara.’

The following is the 34th Śūtra of the sixth Book, with the remarks by which it is introduced and followed:


“But must we not adopt the theories of an illusory creation, etc., because the causality of Purusha (soul) is to be learned from such texts as the following ‘many creatures have been produced from Purusha?’ To this difficulty he replies: ‘From his opposition to Scripture the illogical outcaste does not attain to Soul.’ The sense of this is, that all the propositions, affirming the causality of Soul, which have been devised, are contrary to the Veda; and consequently the low class of bad logicians, etc., who adopt them have no knowledge of the nature of

122 See Vijnāna Bhikshu’s remarks, introductory to the Śūtras (p. 5, at the foot), which will be quoted in the next Section, and his comment on Śūtra i. 92. He is, as we shall find, an eclectic, and not a thorough-going adherent of the Sāṅkhya.
Soul. Hence it is to be understood that those also who assert that Soul is the substance of the qualities of pleasure and pain, etc., are incompetent reasoners: they too are destitute of the true knowledge of Soul. The Vedic texts which declare its causality are intended to inculcate devotion on the ground that there is no distinction between Power (Śakti) and the possessor of Power (Śaktimat); for the causality of Pradhāna is established by such texts as that relating to the ‘one unborn female,’ etc. But if it be affirmed that Soul is the cause of the world merely in the same sense in which the æther is the cause of clouds, etc., viz. by affording them a receptacle, we do not object to that, since we only deny the transformation (of Soul into material productions).”

In regard to the question whether the principles of the Vedānta or those of the Sāṅkhya are most in harmony with the most prevalent doctrine of the Upanishads, I shall quote some of the remarks of Dr. Röer, the translator of many of these treatises. In his introduction to the Taittirīya Upanishad he observes that we there find “the tenets peculiar to the Vedānta already in a far advanced state of development; it contains as in a germ the principal elements of this system.” “There are, however,” he adds, “differences” (Bibliotheca Indica, vol. xv. p. 5). The same nearly is the case with the Aitareya Upanishad (ibid. p. 27). In reference to the Śvetāsvatara Upanishad he remarks: “Śankara in his commentary on this Upanishad generally explains its fundamental views in the spirit of the Vedānta. He is sometimes evidently wrong in identifying the views of some of the other Upanishads with the tenets of the Vedānta, but he is perfectly right to do so in the explanation of an Upanishad which appears to have been composed for the express purpose of making the principle of the Vedānta agreeable to the followers of the Sāṅkhya” (ibid. pp. 43 f.). Of the Kaṭha Upanishad Dr. Röer says (ibid. p. 97): “The standing point of the Kaṭha is on the whole that of the Vedānta. It is the absolute spirit which is the foundation of the world. . . . . In the order of manifestations or emanations from the absolute spirit it deviates, however, from that adopted by the other Upanishads and by the later Vedānta, and is evidently more closely allied to the Sāṅkhya. The order is here: The unmanifested (avyakta), the great soul (mahātma, or mahat), intellect

153 See Dr. Ballantyne’s translation, which I have often followed. He does not, however, render in extenso all the passages which I have reproduced.
(buddhi), mind, the objects of the senses, and the senses," etc.184 The reader who wishes to pursue the subject further may consult the same author's remarks on the other Upanishads. On the whole question of the relation of the Vedânta and the Sânkhya respectively to the Veda, Dr. Röer thus expresses himself in his introduction to the Svetâsvatara Upanishad (p. 36): "The Vedânta, although in many important points deviating from the Vedas, and although in its own doctrine quite independent of them, was yet believed to be in perfect accordance with them, and being adopted by the majority of the Brâhmans, it was never attacked on account of its orthodoxy. The same cannot be said of the Sânkhya; for it was not only frequently in opposition to the doctrine of the Vedas, but sometimes openly declared so. Indeed, the Vedânta also maintained that the acquisition of truth is independent of caste (1) or any other distinction, and that the highest knowledge which is the chief end of man cannot be imparted by the Vedas (vide Kaṭha ii. 23); yet it insisted that a knowledge of the Vedas was necessary to prepare the mind for the highest knowledge (2). This the Sânkhya denied altogether, and although it referred to the Vedas, and especially to the Upanishads, still it did so only when they accorded with its own doctrines, and it rejected their authority (3) in a case of discrepancy."

I make a few remarks on some points in this quotation indicated by the figures (1), (2), and (3). (1) We have already learned above, p. 99, that, according to the Brahma Sûtras (see i. 3, 34 ff., and Sankara's explanation of them), at least, a Śûdra does not possess the prerogative of acquiring divine knowledge. (2) It appears from Sankara's argument against Jaimini that he does not consider a knowledge of the ceremonial part of the Veda as necessary for the acquisition of divine knowledge, but he seems to regard the Upanishads as the source from which the latter is derived. (3) I do not know on what authority this statement that the Sânkhyanas ever actually rejected the authority of the Vedas is founded. Their attempts to reconcile their tenets with the letter of the Veda may often seem to be far-fetched and sophistical; but I have not observed that Sankara, while arguing elaborately against the interpretations of the Sânkhya, anywhere charges them either with denying the authority of the Veda, or with insincerity in the appeals which they make to the sacred texts.

184 See above, p. 161.
OF THE VEDAS, HELD BY INDIAN AUTHORS.

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On the subject of the Upanishads the reader may also consult Prof. Max Müller's Ancient Sanskrit Literature.

I subjoin in a note some extracts from this work.\textsuperscript{155}

The Nyāya and Vaiśeshika Sūtras do not appear to contain nearly so many references to Vedic texts as the Sāṅkhya; but I have noticed the following: Nyāya iii. 32 (= iii. 1, 29 in the Bibl. Ind.); Vaiśeshika ii. 1, 17; iii. 2, 21; iv. 2, 11; v. 2, 10.

The author of the Vaiśeshika Sūtras affirms, in iii. 2, 20, the doctrine that souls are numerous; and in the 21st Sūtra, which I quote, along with the comment of Sāṅkara Miśra, and the gloss of the editor Pāṇḍit Jayanārāyana Tarkapanchānana, he claims Vedic authority for this tenet:

21. "Śāstra-sāmarthyāch cha" | (Sāṅkara Miśra) Śāstraṁ srutiḥ |

\textsuperscript{155} "They (the Upanishads) contain, or are supposed to contain, the highest authority on which the various systems of philosophy in India rest. Not only the Vedānta philosopher, who, by his very name, professes his faith in the ends and objects of the Veda, but the Sāṅkhya, the Vaiśeshika, the Nyāya, and Yoga philosophers, all pretend to find in the Upanishads some warranty for their tenets, however antagonistic in their bearing. The same applies to the numerous sects that have existed and still exist in India. Their founders, if they have any pretensions to orthodoxy, invariably appeal to some passage in the Upanishads in order to substantiate their own reasonings. Now it is true that in the Upanishads themselves there is so much freedom and breadth of thought that it is not difficult to find in them some authority for almost any shade of philosophical opinion." (p. 316 f.) Again: "The early Hindus did not find any difficulty in reconciling the most different and sometimes contradictory opinions in their search after truth; and a most extraordinary medley of oracular sayings might be collected from the Upanishads, even from those which are genuine and comparatively ancient, all tending to elucidate the darkest points of philosophy and religion, the creation of the world, the nature of God, the relation of man to God, and similar subjects. That one statement should be contradicted by another seems never to have been felt as any serious difficulty." (p. 320 f.) Once more: "The principal interest of the older Upanishads consists in the absence of that systematic uniformity which we find in the later systems of philosophy; and it is to be regretted that nearly all the scholars who have translated portions of the Upanishads have allowed themselves to be guided by the Brahmanic commentators," etc. (p. 322). \"In philosophical discussions, they (the Brahmans) allowed the greatest possible freedom; and although at first three philosophical systems only were admitted as orthodox (the two Mīmāṃsās and the Nyāya), their number was soon raised to six, so as to include the Vaiśeshika, Sāṅkhya, and Yoga schools. The most conflicting views on points of vital importance were tolerated as long as their advocates succeeded, no matter by what means, in bringing their doctrines into harmony with passages of the Veda, strained and twisted in every possible sense. If it was only admitted that besides the perception of the senses and the induction of reason, revelation also, as contained in the Veda, furnished a true basis for human knowledge, all other points seemed to be of minor importance.\" (p. 78 f.)
tayā ’py ātmano bheda-pratipādanāt | śrūyate hi . . . . (Jayānārāyaṇa) ito ’py jīvasya īśvara-bhinnatvam ity āha | śastraśya śruteḥ śāmartyāy āveśavarayor bheda-bodhakatvāt | tathā hi | “de eva brahmaṇi veditavye” (Maitrī Up. vi. 22) | “deva suparnā sayujā sakhāyā samānaṁ epiḥ kham parishaśvajāte | tayor anyāḥ pippalaṁ svādu atti anāśnān anyo abhīkha-kaśiti” (Rig-veda Sanhitā, i. 164, 20; Svetāṣṭr. Up. vi. 6; Munḍaka Up. i. 3, 1, 1) ity-ūdi-śruter āveśavarayor bheda ’vaśyam angikāryyaḥ | na cha “tai teem asi Śvetaketo” “Brahma-viḍ Bhrahma eva bhavati” ity-ūdi-śrutināṁ kā gatir iti vācyam | “tai teem asi” iti śrutes tad-abhedenā tadiyateva-pratipādanena abheda-bhāvanā-paratvāt | “Brahma-viḍ Bhrahma eva” iti śrutis cha nirdūkhaḥ ketadādā Īśvara-sāmyayā jīvasya abhidhatte na tu tad-abhedam | “niranjanaḥ paraṁ sāmyam upaiti” iti śruter gaty-antarāsambhavat | asti hi laukika-vākyesu “sampād-ādhiyāṃ purohito ’yaḥ rājā samavṛttaḥ” ity-ūdiṣṭhu sādriṣṭa-pareśe abheda-pacchāraḥ | na cha moksha-daśāyam ajñāna-nirvṛttāv abheda jāyante iti vācyam bhedaśyā nityatvena nāśayogd bheda-nāśāṅgikāre ’pi vyakti-dvayāvesthānasya āvayākate vā chī iha sangheṣaḥ | bheda-sādhakāni yuktā-antarāṇi śruti-antarāṇi cha grantha-gauravā-bhya parītyaktāni |

“‘And this opinion is confirmed by the Sāstra.’ (Sankara Miśra) The Sāstra means the Veda; by which also a distinction of Souls is established. For it is said,” etc. [He then quotes two texts which are repeated by Jayānārāyaṇa, the author of the gloss, whose remarks are as follows:] “There is another proof of the Soul being distinct from Īśvara; viz. this, that it is confirmed by the Sāstra, the Veda, which declares the distinctness of the two; and this principle must of necessity be admitted from such texts as these: ‘Two Brāhmaṇs are to be known,’ etc. and ‘Two birds, united, friends, attach themselves to the same tree; one of them eats the sweet fruit of the pippala tree, while the other, without eating, looks on.’ Nor are we to ask what will then become of such other texts as (1) ‘Thou art that, o Śvetaketu;’ (2) ‘He who knows Brahma becomes Brahma;’ for the former of these two passages (1) tends to convey the idea of identity by representing as identity with That, the fact of Śvetaketu’s entirely belonging to That; whilst

156 The full text is: Deev brahmaṇi veditavye śabda-brahma paraṁ cha yat—śabda-brahmaṇi nishśvitaḥ paraṁ bhramūdhipāchhati | “Two Brāhmaṇs are to be known, the verbal and the supreme. He who is initiated in the former attains the latter.” Here, however, by the verbal Brāhma, the Veda must be intended.
the second (2) affirms the equality of the Soul with Īśvara, in consequence of its freedom from pain and other weaknesses, and not its identity with Him; for it is shewn by another Vedic text, viz. 'The passionless man attains the highest state of equality,' that any other destiny would be inconceivable. In secular modes of speaking also, such as the following, 'From the abundance of his wealth the domestic priest has become the king,' we find a figurative assertion of identity. Nor can it be said that distinction disappears on the cessation of ignorance in the state of final emancipation, because distinction, from its eternity, cannot be destroyed, and because, even if its destructibility were admitted, two separate personalities must still continue to exist. Such is a summary of our argument: further proofs from reasoning, and further texts of the Veda, are omitted from a dread of making the book too bulky."

The charge of open contempt of the Veda is brought by Sankara against Śāṇḍilya, the author of the Bhāgavata heresy, as the orthodox Vedāntin considers it. Of that doctrine Sankara thus speaks in his remarks on Brahma Sūtra ii. 2, 45:

*Veda-vipratisṛdhaḥ cha bhavati | chaturṣhu vedeshu paraṁ śreyo 'labhvā Śāṇḍilyaḥ idaṁ śāstram adhigatavān ity-ādi-veda-ninda-darśanāt | tasmād asaṅgata eva kalpanā iti siddham |*

"And it also contradicts the Veda: for we see such an instance of contempt of the Vedas as this, that Śāṇḍilya, not finding the means of attaining the highest good in the whole four of them, devised this Śāstra. Hence it is established that these imaginations are absurd."

The points of the Bhāgavata doctrine objected to by Sankara do not however appear to be those which are principally insisted on in the Bhakti Sūtras of Śāṇḍilya, published by Dr. Ballantyne in the Bibliotheca Indica in 1861. I will notice some of these doctrines. The leading principle of the system is that it is not knowledge (jnāna) but devotion (bhakti) which is the means of attaining final liberation (Sūtra 1). Devotion is defined in the 2nd Sūtra to be a supreme love of God (sa paraṁ anuraktir Īśare). Knowledge cannot, the author considers, be the means of liberation, as it may co-exist with hatred of the object known (Sūtra 4). Neither the study of the Veda nor the acqui-

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137 See Colebrooke's Misc. Essays, i. 413: "A passage quoted by Sankara Āchārya seems to intimate that its promulgator was Śāṇḍilya," etc., etc.
sition of such qualities as tranquility of mind is a necessary preliminary to devotion. The only requisite is a desire of emancipation, according to the commentator (remarks on Sūtra 1). Ceremonial works, too, have no bearing upon devotion (Sūtra 7), which may be practised by men of all castes, and even by Chāṇḍālas, since the desire to get rid of the evils of mundane existence is common to all (Sūtra 78). The commentator explains that the authority of the Vedas as the only source of supernatural knowledge is not denied, nor the fact that only the three highest castes have the right to study them: but it is urged that women, Śūdras, etc., may attain by means of the Itihāsas and Purāṇas, etc., to knowledge founded on the Vedas, whilst Chāṇḍālas, etc., may acquire it by traditional instruction based on the Smṛti and the practice of virtuous men. Those whose devotion is not matured in the present world, will find the opportunity of perfecting it in Śvetadvīpa, the world of the divine Being (Sūtra 79). Even the wicked may have a penitential devotion (ārtti-bhaktā eva adhikāraḥ), and after they are freed from their guilt, they may attain to full devotion. The Bhagavad Gītā is much quoted by the commentator on these Sūtras; but the Veda is also sometimes adduced in proof of their doctrines; as e.g. the following words of the Chhāndogya Upanishad, vii. 25, 2, are cited to prove that devotion is the chief requisite, and knowledge, etc., subservient to it:

"Ātmā eva idam samam iti | sa vai esha evam pasya. evam manvānāh eva vijanān ātmā-ratir ātmā-kriyāḥ ātmā-mithunāh ātmānandalph sa svarūbhavati" | tatra "ātmā-rati-rupayāḥ para-bhakteh "paśyann" iti daśanam apiyatyādibhrama-nirśasa-mukhena āgān bhavati |

"'All this is Soul. He who perceives this, thinks this, knows this, delights in Soul, sports with Soul, consorts with Soul, takes pleasure in Soul; he becomes self-resplendent.' Here the sight expressed in the words 'perceiving,' etc., is by removing all errors regarding disagreeableness, etc., an adjunct of supreme devotion in the form of 'de' light in Soul.'"

In his remarks on Sūtra 31 the commentator quotes another passage of the same Upanishad, iii. 14, 4, in which a Sāṃdilya is referred to as the author of a statement. Sankara in his commentary on the Upanishad calls him a rishi. He cannot, however, have been the same person as the author of the Sūtras; although, even if he had been so reputed,
Sankara would have had little difficulty in denying that they could have been written by a rishi, as we shall see in the next section that he contradicts the opinion that the rishi Kapila, referred to in the Svetàsvatara Upanishad, was the author of the Sānkhya aphorisms.

SECT. XI.—Distinction in point of authority between the Veda and the Smritis or non-Vedic Sàstras, as stated in the Nyāya-mālā-vistara, and by the Commentators on Manu, and the Vedànta, etc.; difference of opinion between Sankara and Madhusudana regarding the orthodoxy of Kapila and Kanâda, etc.; and Vijñâna Bhikshu's view of the Sânkhya.

A distinct line of demarcation is generally drawn by the more critical Indian writers between the Vedas, and all other classes of Indian Sàstras, however designated. The former, as we have seen, are considered to possess an independent authority and to be infallible, while the latter are regarded as deriving all their authority from the Veda, and (in theory at least) as infallible guides only in so far as they coincide with its dicta. This will be clear from the following passages:

I. Nyāya-mālā-vistara.—The first text which I adduce has been already quoted in the Second Volume of this work, but is repeated here for facility of reference. It is from the treatise just named, i. 3, 24:


"It may be said that the Kalpa Sūtras and other works designated by the names of Baudhäusera, Æpastamba, Ásvalayana, Kàtyàyana, etc.,
and the Nigama, Nirukta, and six Vedângas, together with the Srûtis of Manu and others, are superhuman, because they impart a knowledge of duty, as the Vedas do; and that they should not be suspected of inferiority to the Vedas on the ground that they depend upon a primary authority, since the knowledge which they impart is independent, because it is admitted to be self-evidencing. But this view is incorrect, for the inference in question proceeds upon an erroneous generalization. The books referred to are called by the names of men, as 'the Sûtras of Baudhâyanâ,' 'the Sûtras of Âpastamba;' and these designations cannot correctly be said to originate in the exposition of the works by those teachers whose names they bear (as is really the case in regard to the Kâthaka, and other parts of the Veda); for it was known to some of the contemporaries of these men, at the time when they were composing these Sûtras, Srûtis, etc., that they were so engaged; and this knowledge has descended by unbroken tradition. Hence these books are, like the works of Kâlidâsa and others, of human origin. Nevertheless, they possess authority, as being founded on the Veda.' . . . The following additional remarks represent the opinion of the Guru (Prabhâkara) on the same question: "It is not yet proved that the Kalpa Sûtras possess the character of the Veda; it would require great labour to prove it; and, in fact, it is impossible to prove it. For the human origin of these books is established by the names which they bear, and by their being observed to have had authors."

II. Kullâka.—The same thing is admitted by Kullâka, the commentator on Manu, who (in his remarks on i. 1) thus defines the relation of his author to the Vedas:

Paurusheya'te'pi Manu-vâkyânâm avighita-mahâjana-parigrâhât Shrûtyupagrahâch cha veda-mulakatayâ prâmânyam | Tathâ cha chhândogyabrâhmane shrûyate "Manur vai yat kinchid avadat tad bheshajam bheshjatayai" iti | Frihaspatir apy âha "Vedârthopanibandhrâte tâ pradhânyam hi Manoh shrûlam | Manu-artha-viparitâ tu yâ smrîthi sâ na sasyate | Tavach chhâstrâni sobhante tarka-vyâkaraâyâni cha | Dharmârtha-mokshapadeshtâ Manur yâvad na driyate" | Mahâbhârata'py utkram "Purânam Mânava dharmâh sângo vedaâ chikitstam | âjnâ-siddhâni chateâri na hantavyâni hetubhih" | virodhi-Buddhâdhi-tarkair na hantavyâni | anukulâs tu mamâsâdâi-tarkâh pravartanâya'ha eva | ata eva vakshyati "arshaâm dharmopadesâm cha veda-sâstrâvirodhinâ | yas tarkânânusandhâte sa dharmâm veda netaraâh" iti |
"Though the Institutes of Manu had a personal author, still, as their reception by illustrious men of unimpeached [orthodoxy], and their conformity to the Veda, prove that they are based upon the latter, they are authoritative. Accordingly it is recorded in the Chhândogya Bráhmana that, 'Whatever Manu said is a medicine for remedial purposes.' And Vrihaspati says: 'As Manu depends upon the contents of the Veda, he is traditionally celebrated as pre-eminent. But that Smṛiti which is contrary to the sense of Manu, is not approved. Scriptures and books on logic and grammar are all eclipsed as soon as Manu, our instructor in duty, and in the means of attaining both earthly prosperity, and final liberation, is beheld.' And it is said in the Mahábhárata: 'The Purāṇas, the Institutes of Manu, the Veda with its appendages, and treatises on medicine, these four, which are established by authority, are not to be assailed by rationalistic arguments;' that is, they are not to be attacked by hostile reasonings, such as those of the Baudhás. But friendly arguments, such as those of the Mīmāṁsakas, are to be employed. And accordingly we shall find below (Manu xii. 106) that he says, 'the man who investigates the injunctions of the rishis, and the rules of duty by reasoning which is agreeable to the Veda, he, and he only, is acquainted with duty.'" (See above, p. 24, note 29.)

III. Nyāya-mālā-vistara.—But the precepts of the Smṛiti are not considered useless or superfluous. On the contrary, an authority is attributed to them corresponding to the antiquity, elevated position, and sacred character of their supposed authors. Thus the author of the Nyāya-mālā-vistara says (i. 3, 3):

Vimutā smṛitir veda-mālā | vaiḍīka-mauv-ādi-prāṇīta-smṛititevāt | upanayanadhyanādi-smṛiti-vat | na cha vaiyarthyaṁ śankanyam | asmadādīnām pratyaksheshu paroksheshu nāṇā vedeshu viprakirnasya anushthe-yārthasya ekatra sanks痹yamānāvatāt |

"The variously understood Smṛiti is founded on the Veda, because the traditions, such as those regarding investiture, study, etc., have been compiled by Vedic men, such as Manu and others. Nor is it to be surmised that the Smṛiti is useless, since it throws together in a condensed form a variety of injunctions regarding matters to be observed, which are scattered through different Vedas, both such as are visible and such as are invisible to us." (This last expression appears
to refer to the supposition that some parts of the Veda which Manu and others had before them when compiling their own works have now been lost. See Müller's Anc. Sansk. Lit. pp. 103–107.)

Accordingly the Sūtritis have an authority superior to that founded merely on the practice of learned men of modern date, who have no intuition into the past and invisible. Thus the Nyāya-mālā-vistara says (i. 3, 19):

Nā hi idāṁntanāḥ śiśṭāḥ Manu-ādi-vad deśa-kāla-viprakṛishtam vedam śivya-jñānena sākhāt karttuṁ saknvanti yena śiśṭācāro mūla-vedam anumāpyet

"For learned men of the present day do not possess the power, which Manu and others had, of placing before their minds, through divine knowledge, the Veda which is far removed from them both in place and time, so as to justify us in regarding the practice of these moderns as a sufficient ground for inferring the existence of a Veda as its foundation."

But as learned men, in any particular country or at any particular time, may be able to consult some Sūtriti which authorizes their particular observances, "these observances may serve as ground for inferring the existence of some Sūtriti on which they are founded, but not for inferring a Veda (tasmāc chhīśṭēcchāreṇa sūrītir anumātām śakyate na tu śrutiḥ). But a Sūtriti which is thus merely inferred to exist is set aside by any visibly existing Sūtriti of contrary import (anumūtā cha sūrītir viruddhayā pratyakshhayā sūrītyā bādhyate)."

IV. Sāṅkara.—The above passages, by assuming that Manu and other eminent sages had the power of consulting Vedic texts now no longer accessible, make them practically almost infallible. The same view is taken by Sāṅkara Āchāryya. (See, however, the passage quoted from him above, in note 67, p. 62; but there he has the author of the Sāṅkhya in view, whose tenets he regarded as contrary to the Veda.) In answer to the remark of a Mīmāṃsaka objector stated in the comment on the Brahma Śūtra i. 3, 32, that the Itīhāsas and Puruṇas, being of human origin, have only a derived and secondary authority (‘itīhāśa-purāṇam api pauruṣhēyatvāt pramāṇāntara-mūlātām ākān-khate”), Sāṅkara argues in his explanation of the following Śūtra (i. 3, 33) that they have an independent foundation:

Itiḥāśa-purāṇam api evākhyātena mārgena sambhavat mantrārthavāda-
mālayat prabhavati devatā-vigrahādī prapanchayaitum | pratyaksha-mūlam api sambhavati | bhavati hi asmākam apratyaksham api chirantanānām pratyaksham | tatāḥ cha Vṛṣāśadayo devatābhiḥ pratyakshaṁ vyavaharanti iti smaryate | yas tu brūyād idānānānām ita purvehām api nāsti devādibhir vyavahartānām sāmarthyam iti sa jagad-vāchityram pratisbedet | idānim ita cha na anyādaḥ 'pi śārvabhaunāḥ kṣatriyo 'stī iti brūyāt tatas cha rāja-sūyādi-chodanāḥ uparundhyāt | idānim ita cha kālāntare 'py ayyavasthitā-pravān varṇāśrama-dharmān pratijānīta tataḥ cha vyavasthā-vidhāyī sāstram anarthaṅkaṁ kuryāt | Tasmād dharmotkārṣa-vāsāt chirantanāḥ devādibhiḥ pratyakshaṁ vyajhur iti śrishyate | api cha smaranti "svādhīyādīśhīta-devatā-samprayaogah" ityādi | yogyo 'py animādyā-aścaryā-prāptiphalakaṁ śrayamāno na sakyate sāhasa-mātreṇa pratyākhyātum | śrutis cha yoga-māhātmyam prakhyāpayati | "pritiḥy-ap-tejo-'nila-khe samutthite panchatmaka yoga-gune pravṛttte | na tasyo roga na jāra na mrityuḥ praptasya yogād |" nīmaṁ bāriṁ " iti | rishīṇām api mantra-brāhmaṅa-darsināṁ sāmarthyam na asmadīyena sāmarthyaṁ upamātuṁ yuktam | tasmāt sa-mūlam itīhāsa-purāṇam |

"The Itihāsas and Purāṇas also, having originated in the way which has been explained, have power, as being based on the hymns and arthavādās, to evince the corporeality, etc., of the gods. It is also reasonable to suppose that they are founded upon intuition. For there were things palpable through intuition to the ancients, though they are not thus palpable to us. Accordingly it is recorded in the Smārthi that Vṛṣṇa and others associated face to face with the gods. Any man

135 Instead of yogād nīmaṁ the text of the Biblioth. Indica reads yogāyānimayam
139 See above, pp. 116, 118, and 127; and also Prof. Müller's article on the Vaiśeṣika Philosophy in the Journal of the German Oriental Society, vol. vii. p. 311, where it is remarked that the Vaiśeṣikas, like Kapila, include the intuition of rishis under the category of pratyaksha (ōrshāṁ jñānaṁ sūtra-kṛtā prīthak na lakṣhitām yogi-pratyaksha 'antar-bhūvāḥ').
130 Compare with this R. V. i. 179, 2: Ye chid hi pūrve rītanāpaṁ āsan sākṣāṁ devābhir avadann ritōni | te chid evārupaṁ ityādi | "The pious sages who lived of old and who conversed about sacred truths with the gods,—they led a conjugal life," etc. See also the passages quoted from the Vana-parvan of the Mahābhārata, the S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, and Plato in the First Volume of this work, p. 147; and compare Hesiod, fragment 119: ἐναῖ̂ δὲ τότε δίατε ἔσαν, ξυναὶ δὲ θνώκοι ἄναντοις θεῶις κατα-θυτίς τινὰ ἀνθρώπως.

"Immortal gods, not unfamiliar, then Their feasts and converse shared with mortal men." And Herodotus writes of the Egyptians, ii. 144: To δὲ πρότερον τῶν ἄνδρῶν τούτων.
who should maintain that the ancients, like his own contemporaries, were destitute of power thus to associate with superhuman beings like the gods, would be denying all variety in the history of the world. Such a person would in like manner affirm that as now there is no Kshatriya possessed of universal sovereignty, so neither was there ever such a prince; and would thus impugn the scriptural injunctions regarding the rājasūya sacrifice[which was only to be performed by a universal monarch]. He would also allege that in former times, as now, the duties of castes and of orders were scarcely at all in force, and would thus render fruitless the scriptures by which the rules relating to them are prescribed. By these considerations it is intimated that the ancients, in consequence of their eminent holiness, were admitted to associate immediately with the gods, etc. And the Smṛiti \(^{161}\) says that nearness to, and converse with the gods is gained by reading the Veda, etc. Again, when the Smṛiti talks of the practice of Yoga resulting in the acquisition of superhuman faculties, such as minuteness, this assertion cannot be impugned through mere audacity, \([i.e. \textit{it must have had} some good foundation}\]. The Veda, too, declares the immense power of devotion in these words: 'When the fivefold influence of Yoga, connected with the elements of earth, water, fire, air, and aether, has begun to act, and a man has attained an aethereal \([\text{or} \text{fiery}]\) body, he is no longer affected by disease, decay, or death.' And it is unreasonable to estimate, by the analogy of our own power, the power of the rishis, the seers of the Vedic hymns and Brāhmaṇas. Wherefore the Itihāsas and Purāṇas have an \((\text{independent})\) foundation.'

Sankara does not, however, treat all the ancients in this way. Like many other systematizers, he finds no difficulty in rejecting or explaining away any authorities which come into conflict with his views. It is thus that he deals with Kapila, the author of the Sāṅkhya. That eminent sage is thus spoken of in the Svetāsvatara Upanishad, v. 2: 

\[Yo yoniḥ yoniṁ adhitishṭhāty eko vīśāṇi rūpāṇi yoniḥ cha sarvāḥ \]

\(^{161}\) It appears from the gloss of Govinda Ananda that one of the Yoga Sūtras is here quoted. I give the sense according to his explanation: \textit{mantra-japād deva-saṅnidhyāṁ tat-sambhāṣayaṁ cha iti sūtrārthaḥ.}
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rishfin prasutam Kapilam vas tam agre jnanair bhiththi jayamanaam cha paayet

"The god who alone superintends every source of production and all forms, who formerly nourished with various knowledge his son the rishi Kapila, and beheld him at his birth, etc." 102

Towards the close of his comment on Brahma Sutras ii. 1, 1, which I shall cite at some length, Sankara makes some remarks on this passage of that Upanishad. After stating the points that had been established in the first Book (adhyaya) of the Brahma Sutras, and alluding to the objections which had been urged against the Sankhya and other hostile doctrines as contrary to the Veda, Sankara goes on to explain the object of the second book, and the purport of the aphorism with which it begins, as follows:

Idantam sva-paksha smrity-nyaya-virodha-parivahara pradhanaadi-vada
nam cha nyayabhosapribhithate prativedantaam srishthi-adi-prakri
yaya avigditave ity asya artha-jataya pratipadanaya deityo dhyayaah
arabhhyate tatvam prathamam tacaat smrity-virodham upanyasya pariha
rati yad uktam Brahma eva sarvejanaam jagatah karaanaam tad ayuktam
kuta "srivity-anavakasa-dosa-prasangat" smrityo cha tantrakhyo
paramarshi-pranitam sikha-parigrihitam anyas cha tad-anuvartinyah
smritayaah evaam saty anavakasaah prasajyeyan tat su hy achetanam pradh
naam satantraam jagatah karaanaam upanibhyate Manv-adi-smrityayas
tvaac chodanah-lakshanena agnihotrudinah dharma-jataena apekshilam
artham sanaprayaytaah savakaasaah bhavanti asya varnasya asmin kale
nena vidhanena upanayanam idrisas cha aharaah ittham vedadhyayanan
iththam sanvarthanam ittham saha-dharma-charinia-samyogah iti tatha
purushartham chatur-varnashrama-dharmam nanaa-vidhan vidhadhi na evaam
capiladi-smritiham anushhtheye vishaye vakasso sti moksha-sadhanam
eva hi samyag-darshanam adhikritya tath pranitah yadi tatra apy ana
vakasaah suur anarthakhyeem eva asam prasajyeta tasmatah ad-virodhe
vedantaah vyakhyataayah katham punar "ikshitya-adibhyo hetubhyo
Brahma eva sarvejanaam jagatah karaanaam ity avadharaaah shruty-arthah
"smrivity-anavakasa-dosa-prasangena" punar akshiyate bhaved ayaam
anakshepaah sva-tantra-prajnanam paramantra-prajnasa tu prayena jaanah

102 See Sankara's commentary on this passage in Bibl. Ind. vii. 351, and Dr. Roer's translation, p. 62, with the note; also Dr. Hall's note in p. 19 of the preface to his edition of the Sankhya Sutra, in the Bibl. Ind.
OPINIONS REGARDING THE ORIGIN, ETC.,

payanti śrutir “yad vai kincha Manur avadat tad bhesajam” \(^{184}\) iti | Manunā cha (xii. 91) “sarva-bhūtesu chātmānaṁ sarve-bhūtāni chāt- 
manī | samam pāyann ātma-yājī svārājyam adhīgachchhati” iti sarvāt-
matva-dārśanam prāṣāṁsatā Kāpilam mataṁ nindyate iti ganyate | Ka-
pilo hi na sarvātmata-dārśanam anumānyate ātma-bhedābhıyupagamat | . . . atā cha ātma-bheda-kalpanayā ’pi Kāpilasya tantrasya ved-
viruddhatevaṁ vedānusāri-Manu-vachana-viruddhatevaṁ cha na kevalaṁ sce-
tantra-prakṛiti-parikalpanayā eveti siddham | vedyasa hi nirapekshaṁ 
svārthe prāmāṇyaṁ raver iva rūpa-vishaye puruṣa-vachasān tu mālān-
tarapekshaṁ svārthe prāmāṇyaṁ vaktri-smṛiti-eyavahitaṁ cha iti vipra-
karṣaḥ | tasmād veda-viruddhe vishaye smṛity-anavakāśa-prasango na 
doshaḥ |

“But now the second chapter is commenced with the view of effect-
ing the following objects, viz. (a) to refute, in our own favour, the 
charge of contradicting the reasonings of the Smṛiti, to shew (b) that 
the doctrines regarding Pradhāna, etc., have nothing more than an ap-
pearance of reason, and (c) that the manner in which the subjects of 
creation, etc., are treated in each of the Upanishads is unimpeachable. 
First of all then the author states, and removes, the objection of con-
trariety to the Smṛiti. Our opponents urge that it is incorrect to say 
that the omniscient Brahma is the cause of the world. Why? Because, 
(1) as they allege, that doctrine ‘is chargeable with the objection of setting 
aside the Smṛiti as useless’" (Br. Sūtra, ii. 1, 1). This term ‘Smṛiti’ denotes 
a systematic treatise (tantra) composed by an eminent rishi, and received 
by the learned; and there are other Smṛitis in conformity with it. And 
the alleged difficulty is that (on the theory that Brahma is the cause) all 
these would be set aside as useless; since they propound an unconscious 
Pradhāna as the self-dependent cause of the world. The Smṛitis of 
Manu and others, indeed, which affirm that by means of the agnīhotra 
and other enjoined ceremonies, the objects desired (by those who practise 
these rites) will be accomplished, will still retain their use, viz. of pre-
scribing the objects to be pursued, viz. the various duties of the four 
castes and orders,—that such and such a caste shall be initiated at such 
a time and by such a process, and shall follow such and such a mode of 
life, that the Veda is to be studied, that the cessation of study is to 
take place, and that union with a woman following the same rites is to

\(^{184}\) See above, p. 181, and the First Volume of this work, pp. 188, and 510.
OPINIONS REGARDING THE ORIGIN, ETC.,

celebrated, in such and such ways. But [on the hypothesis of Brahma being the creator] no such room is left for the Smṛitis of Kapila and others, on the ground of any ceremonies to be performed [in conformity with their prescriptions]; for they have been composed as embodying perfect systems affording the means of final liberation. If in this respect also no place be left for them the difficulty will arise that they are quite useless. And hence the conclusion is reached that the Upani-

shads should be interpreted so as to harmonize with them. But, such being the case, how, it is again objected, have you determined on the strength of the reasons furnished by the texts about 'beholding,' etc., that it is the meaning of the Veda that Brahma is the omniscient cause of the world, thus exposing yourself to the charge of leaving no place for the Smṛiti? Although we hold that this charge is harmless as regards those who think for themselves; yet men have for the most part no independent opinion, and are unable by an unassisted act of their own judgment to determine the sense of the Vedas, and will consequently lean upon the Smṛitis composed by renowned authors, and adopt the sense of the Vedas which they enforce: and from their lofty opinion of these authors they will have no confidence in our interpretations. And it is moreover urged (2) that Kapila and the others are declared by the Smṛiti to have possessed an unobstructed intuitive (ārśha) knowledge; and there is also a Vedic text to the effect 'He who of old sustains with manifold knowledge Kapila when he is produced, and beholds him when born,' etc. (Svētāsv. Up. v. 2). Consequently their doctrines cannot be imagined to be untrue. And they further support their tenets by argument. On these grounds also, it is urged, the Upanishads must be interpreted by the aid of the Smṛitis. The questions thus raised are settled by the concluding words of the Sūtra, 'No; for this conclusion is vitiated by the objection that other Smṛitis would in this way be rendered useless.' (1)

If the doctrine that God is the cause of the world is chargeable with the objection that it leaves no room for the Smṛiti, in the same way the difficulty will arise (on the other theory) that other texts of the Smṛiti which affirm that God is the cause will be set aside. These we shall adduce.” After quoting some passages, Sankara proceeds: “In the same manner in numerous texts of the Smṛiti God is shewn to be both the instrumental and the material cause. I must answer on the

105 See above, pp. 116, 118, and 127.
strength of the Smṛiti the person who opposes me on the same ground, and so I just indicate this objection against his views as having the effect of setting aside other Smṛitis. But it has been shown that the sense of the Vedic texts is in favour of the causality of God. And since, if the Smṛitis are at variance with each other, we must of necessity accept the one set and reject the other, those of them which are conformable to the Veda will be authoritative, and the rest will deserve no attention: for it has been said in the section (of the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā) on proof (i. 3, 3), that 'if it (the Smṛiti) be contrary (to the Veda) it must be disregarded; but if there be no (contrariety) it must be inferred (that the former is founded on the latter).’ And it is inconceivable that anyone should discover things beyond the reach of the senses without the aid of the Veda, since the means of doing so are wanting. If it be urged that we can conceive such discovery (of imperceptible things without the help of the Veda) as possible in the case of Kapila and other perfect persons (siddhānām), because there was nothing to obstruct their knowledge;—we reply, No; because perfection (siddhi) is dependent upon something else, viz. on the practice of duty. Now duty is defined as something which is enjoined. And the subject-matter of an injunction which was previously promulgated cannot be called into doubt on the strength of the words of a man who became perfect at a subsequent period. And even on the supposition that confidence could be placed in such ‘perfect’ persons, yet, as they are numerous, and as such a mutual contradiction as we have already pointed out exists between the Smṛitis of different ‘perfect’ persons, there is no means left of determining the truth, but reliance on the Veda. Causeless partiality to any particular Smṛiti, on the part even of a man who has no independent opinion, is improper; but if anyone ever does exhibit such partiality, the charge of depriving truth of all fixity attaches to his procedure, because the opinions of men (which he takes as the standard of his belief) assume all sorts of forms. Consequently his judgment also should be directed into the right path by indicating the mutual contradictions between the different Smṛitis, and by distinguishing those of them which are conformable to, from those which are at variance with, the Veda. And (2) the Vedic text which has been pointed out, showing the transcendent character of Kapila's knowledge, cannot be a warrant for believing the doctrine of Kapila, though con-
trary to the Veda, since the word Kapila ‘has, in this text, a general sense’ [applicable to others besides the author of the Śāṅkhya] (Mīm. Sūtra, i. 1, 31), and another Kapila called Vāsudeva, the consumer of Sagara’s sons, is also mentioned in the Smṛiti; and since the indication of something which has a different object in view, and is therefore irrelevant to the matter in question, can prove nothing.”

There is, besides, another text of the Veda which sets forth the eminent dignity of Manu in these terms, ‘Whatever Manu said is medicine.’ And Manu—when he employs the words (xii. 91), ‘He who, with impartial eye, beholds himself in all beings, and all beings in himself, thus sacrificing his own personality, attains to self-refulgence;’ and, by saying this commends the tenet that everything is one with the supreme Spirit—must be understood as censuring Kapila’s doctrine. For Kapila does not assent to the identity of Brahma and the universe, since he holds a diversity of souls.” . . . (After quoting one passage from the Mahābhārata, and another from the Veda, to prove that Kapila is wrong, Sankara proceeds): “Hence it is proved that Kapila’s system is at variance with the Veda and with the words of Manu, who follows the Veda, not only in supposing an independent Prakṛiti (nature), but also in supposing a diversity of souls. Now the Veda has an independent authority in regard to its own contents, as the sun has (an inherent power) of manifesting forms; whilst the words of men have, as regards their own sense, an authority which is dependent on another source (the Veda), and which is distinguished (from the authority of the Veda) by the fact of their authors being remembered. Consequently it forms no objection to a doctrine that it sets aside a Smṛiti on a point which is contrary to the Veda.”

166 The words thus translated are explained as follows in the Gloss of Govinda Ānanda: Kīneka “yāh Kapilam jñānair bibhartī tam śivaram paśyey” iti vidhiyate tathā cha anuvādasya śivara-pratipatti-sahasya Kapilā-sarva-vajnavasya darśanam anuvādas tasya mānāntareṇa prūpti-iśūnyasya svārtha-sūdhakatvāyogyam na anuvāda-mātrād sarva-vajnavasya siddhiḥ ity āha | “And it is enjoined (in the text of the S'vētā-sūravatara Upanishad): ‘Let him behold that Iśvara who nourishes Kapila with various knowledge;’ and so since this ‘indication’ of, this reference to, the omniscience of Kapila, which has another object in view, and ends in the establishment of an Iśvara, and which on other grounds is shown to be irrelevant, cannot prove its own meaning,—this mere reference does not suffice to evince Kapila’s omniscience:—This is what S'ankara means to say.”

167 See the First Volume of this work, pp. 188 and 510.
See also Sankara's commentary on the Taittirīya Upanishad, Bib. Ind. vii. pp. 136, 137, where he says:

Kapila-kāṇḍādi-tarka-śāstra-virodhaḥ iti chet | na | teshām mūlabhāce veda-virodhe cha bhṛntyopapatteḥ |

"If it be objected that this is contrary to the rationalistic doctrines of Kapila and Kaṇḍāda [and therefore wrong], I answer no, since these doctrines are proved to be erroneous, as having no foundation, and as being in opposition to the Veda."

His remarks on a passage of the Praśna Upanishad, which are as follows, afford a curious specimen of the contemptuous manner in which this orthodox Vedāntist treats the heretical Sāṅkhya, etc. (Praśna Up. vi. 4; Bib. Ind. viii. 244):

Sāṅkhyaḥ tu avidyā-āhyāropitam eva purushe kartttritvāṃ kriyā-kāra-kam phalaṁ cha iti kalpayitvā āgama-vāhyateḥ punas tataḥ trasyantāq paramārthataḥ eva bhokttritvam purushasya ichchhanti | tatveśtaraṁ cha pradhānām purushat paramārtha-vastu-bhūtam eva kalpayanto 'nya-tār-kika-krita-buddhi-vishayāḥ santo vihanyante | Tathā itare tārkkāḥ sāṅkhyaśc ity evam paraspara-viruddhārtha-kalpanāḥ āmishārthīnāḥ iva prāṇino 'nyonyaṁ viruddhamānāḥ artha-dariśtvāt paramārtha-tattvāt tad-dūram eva apakrishyante | atas tan-matam anādṛtya vedāntārtha-tatteṣām ekave-darśanaṁ prati ādaraṇanto mumukshavah syur iti tārkkā-mate dosha-darśanāṁ kincid uchyate 'smabhār na tu tārkkā-tātparyyena |

"The followers of the Sāṅkhya imagine that the functions of action, and the enjoyment of reward which causes action, become erroneously attributed to the soul (purusha) in consequence of supervening ignorance; but as this doctrine differs from that of Scripture, they become afraid of it, and seek to ascribe to the soul enjoyment in the proper sense. And supposing another principle distinct from soul, viz. Pradhāna (or nature), which they regard as substance in the proper sense, they become the objects of correction by other rationalists, and are crushed. Thus, in consequence of the contrariety between the conceptions of the Sāṅkhya and those of other freethinkers, the two parties quarrel with each other like animals fighting for flesh; and thus, from their having an (exclusive) regard to (their own) views, they are all drawn away to a distance from the essential truth. Wherefore let men, disregarding their tenets, seek for final liberation by paying honour to the principles of the Vedantic doctrine, which maintains the unity of all being. We
have thus pointed out something of the errors of the rationalists, and
have said nothing in accordance with their views."

IV.—In thus depreciating Kapila, Sankara is in direct opposition to
the Bhâgavata Purâna (which, however, may be a work of later date
than his\(^{168}\)), in which the author of the Sânkhya is spoken of with
the greatest reverence. Thus in Bhâg. Pur. i. 3, 10, he is described as
the fifth incarnation of Vishnu:

\[ \text{Panchamaḥ Kapilō nāma siddhesāḥ kāla-viploṭam | provāchāsuraye}
\text{sānkhyaṁ tattva-grāma-vinirṇayam |} \\
\text{"In his fifth manifestation, he [in the form of] Kapila, and lord of}
\text{saints, declared to Āsuri the Sânkhya which defines the series of}
\text{principles, and which had been lost through the lapse of time."} \\
\text{And again, in Bhâg. Pur. ix. 8, 12, 13, Kapila is made the subject}
\text{of eulogy. A legend narrates that the sixty thousand sons of king}
\text{Sagara, conceiving Kapila to be the robber of a horse which had been}
\text{carried away from their sacrifice, advanced to slay him, when they}
\text{were burnt up by fire issuing from his body. The author of the}
\text{Purâna, however, denies that this was in any degree owing to passion}
\text{on the part of the sage:} \\
\text{Na sādhu-vādo muni-kopa-bharjitāḥ nṛpendra-putraḥ iti sattva-dhā-
\text{mani | katham tamo roshamayaṁ vibhāvyate jagat-pavitrātmani khe rajo}
\text{bhuvāḥ | yasyerita sānkhyaṁyai dṛḍheha naur yaya munukshus tarate}
\text{duratyayam | bhavārṇavam mṛityu-pathaṁ vipāschitaḥ parātma-bhūtasya}
\text{katham prīthaṁmatiḥ |} \\
\text{"It is not an assertion befitting a good man to say that the king's}
\text{sons were burnt up by the wrath of the sage; for how is it conceivable}
\text{that the darkness (tamas) of anger should reside in the abode of good-
\text{ness (sattva), or that the dust (or passion, rajas) of the earth should}
\text{ascend into the sky, the region of purity? How could that sage, one}
\text{with the supreme Spirit, by whom the strong ship of the Sânkhya was}
\text{launched, on which the man seeking emancipation crosses the ocean}
\text{of existence, hard to be traversed, and leading to death,—how could he}
\text{entertain the idea of any distinction between himself and others [and}
\text{so treat any one as an enemy]?"} \\
\text{It is not necessary for me to quote any further passages in praise of}
\text{the author of the Sânkhya. There is a great deal about this system}

\(^{168}\) See Wilson's Vish. Pur., preface, pp. xlii. and li.
in the Mahābhārata, Sāntiparvan, verses 11,037 ff. See Colebrooke’s Essays, i. 236 (p. 149 of Williams and Norgate’s ed.); Wilson’s Viṣṇu Purāṇa, pref. p. xciv. and text, pp. 18 ff. with notes; Bhāgavata Purāṇa, iii. chapters 24–30; Weber’s Ind. Stud. passim; Dr. Röer’s Introduction to Svetāsvatara Upanishad, Bibl. Ind. xv. 35 ff.; and Dr. Hall’s preface to the Sāṅkhya-sāra in the Bibl. Ind. p. 19, note.

We have thus seen that a distinct line of demarcation is drawn by the most accurate and critical of the Indian writers, between the Śrutis, which they define to be superhuman and independent, and the Smṛiti, which they regard as of human origin, and as dependent for its authority on its conformity with the Śrutis. Sankara, indeed, as we have also observed (above, p. 183 f.), goes very nearly, if not altogether, so far as to assign an independent foundation to the Smṛitis; but he confines this distinction to such of these works as coincide in doctrine with the Śrutis or Vedas, according to his own Vedāntic interpretation of its principles, while all other speculators are denounced by him as heterodox. It is, however, clear from the Svetāsvatara Upanishad, the Mahābhārata, the Bhagavad Gītā, the Viṣṇu, and the Bhāgavata Purāṇas, etc., that the doctrines of the Sāṅkhya must have been very prevalent in ancient times, and that Sankara, when he condemned them as erroneous, must have done so in the face of many powerful opponents.109

109 I quote the following passage from Dr. Röer’s Introduction to the Svetāsvatara Upanishad, pp. 36 f.: “At the time of the composition of the Svetāsvatara, the Sāṅkhya was not a new system, which had to overcome the resistance of old received opinions, and the prejudices of men in power, whose interest might be opposed to the introduction of a doctrine by which their authority could be questioned. It had found many adherents; it was the doctrine of Manu, of some parts of the Mahābhārata, and to its founder divine honour had been assigned by general consent. It was a doctrine whose argumentative portion demanded respect, and as it was admitted by many Brāhmans (sic), distinguished for their knowledge of the Vedas, it could not be treated as a heresy. The most learned and eminent of the Brāhmans were evidently divided among themselves with reference to the truth of the Sāṅkhya and Vedānta, and this must have afforded the opponents of the Vedaic system a most powerful weapon for attacking the Vedas themselves. If both the Sāṅkhya and Vedānta are divine revelations, both must be true; but if the doctrine of the one is true, the doctrine of the other is wrong; for they are contradictory among themselves. Further, if both are derived from the Vedas, it is evident that also the latter cannot reveal the truth, because they would teach opposite opinions about one and the same point. Such objections to the Vedas had been made already in ancient times, as is clear from the Upanishads, from several passages of Manu, from Yāska, etc.; and under these circumstances it cannot be wondered at, if early attempts were made to reconcile the
It is not necessary for me here to inquire with any accuracy what the relation was in which the different philosophical systems stood to each other in former ages. It may suffice to say that the more thorough-going adherents of each—of the Vedānta, the Sāṅkhya, the Nyāya, etc.—must, according to all appearance, have maintained their respective principles with the utmost earnestness and tenacity, and could not have admitted that any of the rival systems was superior to their own in any particular. It is impossible to study the Sūtras of the several schools, and come to any other conclusion. The more popular systems of the Purāṇas, on the other hand, bledded various tenets of the different systems syncretically together. In modern times the superior orthodoxy of the Vedānta seems to be generally admitted. But even some who hold this opinion refuse to follow the example of Sāṅkara in denouncing the founders of the rival schools as heretical. On the contrary, they regard them all as inspired Munis, who, by adapting their doctrines to the capacities or tendencies of different students, have paved the way for the ultimate reception of the Vedāntic system. Such is the view taken in the Prasthāna-bheda of Madhusūdana Sarasvati, who gives the following lucid summary of the leading principles of the different schools of speculation (Weber’s Indische Studien, i. 23):

Sarveshāṁ cha sāṅkṣepena trividhāḥ eva prasthāna-bhedaḥ | tatra āraṁbha-vādaḥ ekaḥ | parināma-vāda deśitīyaḥ | vivartta-vādaḥ tritiyāḥ | pārthivacāpya-tajjas-vāyačāryāḥ chaturvidhāḥ paramānaco dev-aṇukādi- krameṇa brahmāṇḍa-paryantaṁ jagad ārāmbhante | asad eva kāryāṁ kāraka-vyāpārād utpadyate iti prathamabāṃ tārīkāyaṁ mimāṁsā- kāṇanāḥ cha | satva-rajas-tamo-guṇātmakam pradhānam eva mahad- aṁkārayā krameṇa jagad-ākāreṇa parināmate | pāryam api sukṣhma- rūpeṇa sad eva kāryāṁ kārana-vyāpāreṇa abhivyajyate iti devityāḥ pakṣaḥ Sāṅkhya-Yoga-Patanjala-Pāśupatānām | Brahmaṇaḥ parināmo jagad iti Vaishnavānām | svā-prakāśa-paramānanda-deśitīyaṃ Brahma svā-māyā-vasād mithyaiva jagad-ākāreṇa kalpate iti tritiyāḥ pakṣo

tenets of the Vedānta and Sāṅkhya to save the uniformity of the doctrine, and thereby the sacredness of the Vedas as the Scriptures derived from the immediate revelation of God. So, for instance, it is recorded that Vyāsa, the reputed author of the Brahma Sūtras, wrote also a commentary to Patanjali’s Yoga-sūtra, which is still extant under his name. In the same manner composed Gaudapāda, the eminent Vedāntist, and teacher of Sāṅkara’s teacher, Govinda, a commentary to Īśvara Kṛṣṇa’s Sāṅkhya Kārikā; and the Bhagavad Gītā has also the same object."
Brahma-vādinām | sarvēshām prasthāna-karttṛīnām munināṁ vivartta-
vāda-paryavasānena advitiye Paramēśvara eva pratipādyā tātparyam | na hi te munayo bhrāntāḥ sarvejñatvāt teshām | kintu vahir-viśhaya-pravac-
āṇāṁ āpātataḥ purushārthe praveśo na sambhavati iti nāstikya-vāra-
ṇāya tāiḥ prakāra-bhedāḥ pradarśitāḥ | tatra teshūṁ tātparyam abuddhā veda-viruddhe 'py arthe tātparyam utprekṣhamāṇāṁ tan-matam eva upā-
deyatena grihyaṁ janaḥ nānā-patha-jus ho bhavanti | iti sarvam ana-
vadyam |

"The difference in principle between these various schools is, when briefly stated, three-fold. The first doctrine is that of a commencement of the world; the second is that of an evolution; the third is that of an illusion. Atoms of four descriptions—earthy, aqueous, igneous, and aerial—beginning with compounds of two atoms, and ending in the egg of Brahmap (the world), originate the universe: and effects, previously non-existent, come into being from the action of a causer. This is the first theory, that of the Logicians and Mīmāṁsakas. The second theory, that of the Sāṁkhya, Yogas, Pātanjalas, and Pāṇḍupatas, is that Pradhāna (or Prakṛiti = nature), consisting of the three guṇas (qualities), sattva, rajas, and tamas, is evolved, through the successive stages of mahat (intellect), and aññakāra (consciousness), etc., in the form of the world; and that effects, which had previously existed in a subtle form, are [merely] manifested by the action of their cause. Another form of this theory is that of the Vaishnāvas [the Rāmānujas], who hold the universe to be an evolution of Brahma. The third view, that of the Brahma-vādins (Vedāntists), is, that Brahma, the self-resplendent, the supremely happy, and the one sole essence, assumes, unreally, the form of the world through the influence of his own illusion (Māyā).

The ultimate scope of all the Munis, authors of these different systems, is to support the theory of illusion, and their only design is to establish the existence of one Supreme God, the sole essence; for these Munis could not be mistaken [as some of them must have been, if they were not all of one opinion, or, as those of them must have been who did not hold Vedāntic principles], since they were omniscient. But as they saw that men, addicted to the pursuit of external objects, could not all at once penetrate into the highest truth, they held out to them a variety of theories, in order that they might not fall into atheism. Misunderstanding the object which the Munis thus had in view, and
representing that they even designed to propound doctrines contrary to the Vedas, men have come to regard the specific doctrines of these several schools with preference, and thus become adherents of a variety of systems. Thus all has been satisfactorily stated."

I find that Vijnāna Bhikshu, the commentator on the Śāṅkhya aphorisms, takes very nearly the same view as is here quoted from Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, in regard to the superiority of the Brahma Mīmāṃsā or Vedānta over the other Dārsānas.

In his Śāṅkhya-pravachana-bhāṣhya (Bibliotheca Indica, pp. 3 ff.), he thus writes:

śāstram mahattaram | Dhiṣṭaṇena tathā proktam chārవākam ati-garhītām | daityānāṁ nāsanārthāya Vishnunā Buddha-ra-piṇā | Tvauddha-śāstram asat proktāṁ nagna-nilā-पaṭādikām | māyah-vādam asach-χhāstram prachchhannam brauddham eva cha | mayaica kathitaṁ devi kalau brahma-ra-piṇā | apārthaṁ śruti-vākyānāṁ darśayat loka-garhitam | kar-ma-svarūpa-tvāyīyatvam atra cha pratipādyate | sarva-karma-paribhrāṁ-bād naishkarmyāṁ tatra chochyate | parātma-jivayar aikyam maya -tātra pratipādyate | brahma-ṣya paraṁ rūpaṁ nirguṇaṁ darśitam maya | sarvasya jagato-py asya nāsanārthaṁ kalau yuge | vedārthaved mahāśāstram maya-vādam avaidikam | mayaica kathitaṁ devi jagataṁ nāsa-kāraṇaṁ" | iti | adhikāṁ tu brahma-mīmāṁsā-bhāṣhye prapanchitaṁ asāmāḥ | iti | tasmād āstika-śāstrasya na kusyāpy aprāmāṇyaṁ virodho vē svaccha-viśayeshu sarvesah abādhāt avirodhāh cha iti | nān evam puruṣa-bahuteväśe-py asya śāstrasya abhavyagama-vādatvaṁ svaṁ na svaṁ | avirodhāt | brahma-mīmāṁsāyam apy "aṁśo nānā-vyapa-deśād" ityaitsūtra-jātair jivātma-bahutevasyaiva nirnāyat | sānkhya-siddha-puruṣaṇāṁ ātmataṁ tu brahma-mīmāṁsāyā bādhyate eva | “ātmā iti tu upayanti" iti tāt-sūtraṇa paramātmanah eva paramārtha-bhāmag ātmatavedhāraṇaṁ | tathāpy cha sānkhya-sya na aprāmāṇyaṁ | vyāvahārikātmano jīvasya itara-viveka-jñānasya mokṣa-sādhanatva vivakṣhitārthe bādha-bhāvaṁ | etena śruti-smrīti-praśīdaḥyor nānātmaikātmano vyāvahārika-pāramārthika-bhedena avirodha-ḥ | "Be it so: let there be here no discrepancy with the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣhika. But it will be said that the Sāṅkhya is really opposed to the Brahma-mīmāṁsā (the Vedānta) and the Yoga [of Patanjali]; since both of these systems assert an eternal Īśvara (God), while the Sāṅkhya denies such an Īśvara. And it must not be said (the same persons urge) that here also [as in the former case of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣhika], owing to the distinction between practical [or conventional, or regulative] and essential truths, there may be no [real] contrariety between the theistic and the atheistic theories, nasmuch as the theistic theory may possibly have a view to devotion [and may therefore have nothing more than a practical end in view]; —you are not, it will be said, to assert this, as there is nothing to lead to this conclusion [or, distinction]. For as Īśvara is difficult to be known, the atheistic theory also, which is founded on popular opinion, may, indeed, be adverted to for the purpose of inspiring indifference to the conception of a Deity.
(just as it is [conventionally] asserted that soul has qualities); but neither the Veda, nor any other śāstra contains a distinct denial of an Īśvara, by which the merely practical [or conventional] character of the theistic theory could be shewn. [Consequently the theistic theory is not a mere conventional one, but true, and the contradiction between the atheistic Sāṅkhya and the theistic systems is real and irreconcilable].

"To this we reply: in this case also the distinction of practical and essential truths holds. For although the atheistic theory is censured by such texts as the following: 'They declare a world without an Īśvara to be false and baseless;' yet it was proper that in this system (the Sāṅkhya), the merely practical (or conventional) denial [of Īśvara] should be inculcated for the purpose of inspiring indifference to the conception of a Deity, and so forth. Because the idea of the author of the Sāṅkhya was this, that if the existence of an eternal Īśvara were not denied, in conformity with the doctrine of the Laukāyatikas, men would be prevented by the contemplation of a perfect, eternal, and faultless godhead, and by fixing their hearts upon it, from studying to discriminate [between spirit and matter]. But no censure on the theistic theory is to be found in any work, whereby [the scope of] that system might be restricted, as having devotion, etc., in view as its only end. And as regards such texts as the following: 'There is no knowledge like the Sāṅkhya, no power like the Yoga; doubt not of this, the knowledge of the Sāṅkhya is considered to be the highest,' they [are to be understood as] proving the superiority of the Sāṅkhya doctrine over other systems, not in respect of its atheism, but only of its discrimination [between different principles]. It is, moreover, established by the concurrence of Parāśara, and all other well instructed persons, that the theistic theory is that which represents the essential truth. Further, such texts as the following of the Parāśara Upaniṣa, and other works, shew that the strength of the Brahma-mīmāṃsā lies on the side of its theism, viz., 'In the systems of Akṣhapāda (Gotama) and Kaṇḍa, and in the Sāṅkhya and Yoga, that part which is opposed to the Veda should be rejected by all persons who regard the Veda as the sole authority. In the systems of Jaimini and Vyāsa (the Vedānta) there is no portion contrary to the Veda, since both these sages have attained to a perfect comprehension of its true meaning. In the same way it results from this text of the Moksha-dharma (a part of the
Śānti-parvan of the Mahābhārata), viz.: 'Many systems of reasoning have been promulgated by different authors; [in these] whatever is established on grounds of reason, of scripture and of approved custom, is to be respected;' [from this text also, I say, it results] that the theory,—declared in the Brahma-mīmāṁsā, the Nyāya, the Vaiśeshika, etc., in consonance with the tradition of Parāśara and all other well-instructed men,—which asserts an Īśvara, is alone to be received, in consequence of its strength; and [the same thing follows] from the fact that in such passages as this of the Kauṛma-purāṇa, etc., viz.—‘Take refuge with that Maheśvara, that Brahma without beginning or end, whom the most eminent Yogins, and the Sāṅkhya do not behold,—Nārāyaṇa (Vīṣṇu) and others assert that the Sāṅkhya are ignorant of Īśvara.

"Moreover, Īśvara is determined to be the principal subject of the Brahma-mīmāṁsā by the introductory statement, etc., of that system. If it were open to objection on that side [i.e. on the side of its principal subject], the entire system would be without authority. For it is a rule that 'the sense of a word is that which it is intended to denote.' Whereas the principal subjects of the Sāṅkhya are—(1) the grand object of human pursuit, and (2) the distinction between nature (prakṛiti) and spirit (puruśa), which is the instrument of attaining that grand object. Thus this system does not lose its authority, even though it be erroneous in so far as it denies an Īśvara. For it is a rule that 'the sense of a word is that which it is intended to denote.' Hence, as the Sāṅkhya has a certain applicability of its own, it is weak only in so far as it denies an Īśvara.

"Nor can it be alleged that it is Īśvara only, and not the eternity of his existence, that is the principal subject of the Brahma-mīmāṁsā; since, through the disproof of the objection (pūrva-paksha) that the theistic theory 'is chargeable with the defect of rendering the Smṛiti inapplicable,'¹⁷⁰ it is ascertained that the assertion of an eternal Īśvara is the main object of the Brahma-mīmāṁsā. But as the word 'Brahma' is properly employed to denote the supreme Brahma, the first aphorism of the Brahma-mīmāṁsā does not run thus, 'Now follows the enquiry regarding the supreme Brahma;'

¹⁷⁰ The aphorism here referred to (Brahma Sūtras ii. 1, 1), with most of Sāṅkara's comment on it, has been already quoted above, pp. 185 ff.
enquiry regarding Brahma.’] Hence we are not to surmise that, as they
[would otherwise] contradict the Sānkhya, the Brahma-mīmāṃsā and
Yoga systems must aim at establishing [not an eternal Deity] but a
[secondary] Īśvara, who is merely an effect. For this is disproved (1)
by the series of Brahma Sūtras (ii. 2, 1 ff.) which affirm that ‘an
unintelligent cause of the world cannot be inferred, as it is not conceiv-
able that such a cause should frame anything,’ and which would be
rendered inconclusive by the assumption of the independent action of
Prakṛti; and (2) by the fact that the eternity of God is clearly under-
stood from the Yoga aphorism [i. 26], viz. ‘He is also the instructor
of the ancients, as he is not circumscribed by time,’ as well as from
the commentary of Vyāsa thereon.171 Hence, as the Sānkhya, arguing
on its own special principles, and at the same time making a great dis-
play of ingenuity172 and so forth, has in view a merely practical denial
of an Īśvara, it does not contradict the Brahma-mīmāṃsā or the Yoga.
The method of reasoning on special principles is referred to in the
Śāstra. Thus it is said in the Vishṇu Purāṇa [i. 17, 54, Wilson,
vol. ii. p. 44], ‘These notions, Daityas, which I have described, are
the guesses of persons who look on the Deity as distinct from them-
selves. Accepting them as partially correct, hear from me a summary
(of transcendental truth).

“Or let it be [supposed] that even orthodox systems, with the view
of preventing sinners from attaining knowledge, lay down doctrines
which are partially opposed to the Veda; and that in those particular
portions they are not authoritative. Still in their principal contents,

171 I quote the commentary of Bhoja-rājā on this Sūtra, as given by Dr. Ballantyne
(Aphorisms of the Yoga, part first, p. 32): Pūrveśhām | ādyānām Brahmā-dinām api
sa gurur upadeshā yataḥ sa kīlēna nīvačchhidhyate anūdiṭvāt | teśām punar ādi-
mattevād asti kīlēna avachchhedaḥ | “Of the ancients, that is, of the earliest [beings],
Brahmā and the rest, he is the guru, i.e., the instructor, because He, as having no
beginning, is not circumscribed by time; while they, on the other hand, having had a
beginning, are circumscribed by time.”

172 I am indebted to Professor Cowell for a satisfactory interpretation of the first of
these two phrases, abhyupagama-vāda and pravṛddhi-vāda, as well as for various other
improvements in my translation of this passage. The phrase abhyupagama-siddhānta
is rendered by Dr. Ballantyne “Implied dogma” (Nyāya aphorisms, i. 31, p. 30, as
corrected in MS.). Professor Goldstücker s.v. renders it by “implied axiom.” In
Bohlingk and Roth’s Lexicon the phrase abhyupagama-vāda is rendered “a
discussion in a conciliatory spirit.” In regard to the sense of pravṛddhi-vāda see above,
p. 172.
which are consonant to the Šruti and the Smṛiti, they possess authority. Accordingly, in the Padma Purāṇa we find a censure passed even upon the several philosophical systems (Daśāṅgas), with the exception of the Brahma (the Vedānta) and the Yoga. For in that work Īśvara (Mahādeva) says to Pārvati, 'Listen, goddess, while I declare to you the Tāmasa works (the works characterised by tāmas, or the quality of darkness) in order; works by the mere hearing of which even wise men become fallen. First of all, the Saiva systems, called Pāśupata, etc., were delivered by myself. Then the following were uttered by Brāhmans penetrated by my power, viz. the great Vaiśeshika system by Kaṇṭāda, and the Nyāya, and Sāṅkhya, by Gotama and Kapila respectively. Then the great system, the Pūrva-[mīmāṃsā], was composed by the Brāhman Jaimini on Vedic subjects, but on atheistic principles. So too the abominable Chārvāka doctrine was declared by Dhishāṇa, while Viśṇu, in the form of Buddha, with a view to the destruction of the Daityas, promulgated the false system of the Buddhhas, who go about naked, or wear blue garments. I myself, goddess, assuming the form of a Brāhman, uttered in the Kali age, the false doctrine of Māyā [illusion, the more modern form of the Vedānta], which is covert Buddhism, which imputes a perverted and generally censured signification to the words of the Veda, and inculcates the abandonment of ceremonial works, and an inactivity consequent on such cessation. In that system I propound the identity of the supreme and the embodied soul, and show that the highest form of this Brahma is that in which he is devoid of the [three] qualities. It was I myself, goddess, by whom this great śāstra, which, composed of Vedic materials and inculcating the theory of illusion, is yet un-Vedic, was declared in the Kali age for the destruction of this entire universe.' We have entered into fuller explanations on this subject in the Brahma-mīmāṃsā-bhāṣṭya. There is, therefore, no want of authority, nor any contradiction, in any orthodox system, for they are all incapable of refutation in their own especial subjects, and are not mutually discrepant. Does, then, this system (the Sāṅkhya) lay down a theory based only on its own assumptions in respect of the multitude of souls also? It does not. For in the Brahma-mīmāṃsā also it is determined by such a kind of texts

173 A name of Vṛihaspati, according to Wilson's dictionary.
174 See Wilson's Viṣṇu Purāṇa, pp. 334 ff.
as the following (Brahma Sūtras, ii. 3, 43), viz. ‘the embodied spirit is a portion of the supreme soul, from the variety of appellations,’ that there is a multitude of embodied spirits. But it is denied by the Brahmamimāṇśa that the spirits (purusha) asserted by the Sāṅkhya have the character of Soul; for it is determined by the Brahma Sūtra (iv. 1, 3), ‘they approach Him as one with themselves,’175 that, on the ground of transcendental truth, the supreme Soul alone has the character of Soul. But, nevertheless, the Sāṅkhya is not unauthoritative; for as the knowledge of its own distinctness from other things, obtained by the embodied spirit in its worldly condition, is instrumental to final liberation, this system is not erroneous in the particular subject matter which it aims at propounding. In this way it results from the distinction of practical and real, that there is no contradiction between the two theories (made known by the Sruti and Smṛiti), of a multitude of souls, and the unity of all soul.

The view taken by Mudhusūdana, as quoted above, and partially confirmed by Vijnāna Bhikshu, of the ultimate coincidence in principle of all the different schools of Hindu philosophy, however mutually hostile in appearance, seems, as I have remarked, to be that which is commonly entertained by modern Pandits. (See Dr. Ballantyne’s Synopsis of Science, advertisement, p. iv.) This system of compromise, however, is clearly a deviation from the older doctrine; and it practically abolishes the distinction in point of authority between the Vedas and the Smṛitis, Darśanas, etc. For if the Munis, authors of the six Darśanas, were omniscient and infallible, they must stand on the same level with the Vedas, which can be nothing more.

I return, however, from this digression regarding the hostility of Sankara to the adherents of the Sāṅkhya and other rationalistic schools,

175 On this, however, Sankara (in loco) remarks as follows: Jīvaḥ Īśvarasya aṁśo bhavitum arhati yathā’gner visphulitah | aṁśah iev aṁśah | na hi niravayasya mukhyo ‘aṁśah saṁbhavati | kaśpuṭ punar niravayavatvād na eva na bhavati | “nāṁ-yopadesōtt.” “The embodied soul must be ‘a portion’ of Īśvara, as a spark is of fire (and not merely dependent upon him as a servant on his master). ‘A portion’ means, ‘as it were a portion;’ for nothing can be, in the proper sense, ‘a portion’ of that which has no parts. Why, then, as Īśvra has no parts, is not the embodied soul the very same as he? ‘From the variety of appellations,’ etc., etc.”

176 The original Sūtra runs thus: Ātmā iti tu upagachchhanti grāhīyanti cha | “They approach Him as one with themselves, and [certain texts] cause them to receive Him as one with themselves.” This refers to certain texts which Sankara adduces from one of the Upanishads, apparently.
and the opinions of later authors concerning the founders of those several systems. The distinction drawn by the Indian commentators quoted in this section between the superhuman Veda and its human appendages, the Kalpa Sūtras, etc., as well as the other Smṛitis, is not borne out by the texts which I have cited above (pp. 8, 31) from the Brāhad Āraṇyaka (= Satapatha Brāhmaṇa), and Muṇḍaka Upanishads. By classing together the Vedic Sanhitās, and the other works enumerated in the same passages, the authors of both the Upanishads seem to place them all upon an equal footing; and the former of the two authorities speaks of them all as having proceeded from the breathing of the Great Being. If the one set of works are superhuman, it may fairly be argued that the others are so likewise. According to the Muṇḍaka Upanishad, neither of them (if we except only the Vedāntas or Upanishads) can be placed in the highest rank, as they equally inculcate a science which is only of secondary importance.

As, however, Sankara (who, no doubt, perceived that it would be inconsistent with modern theories to admit that any of the works usually classed under the head of Smṛiti had been really breathed forth by the Creator, and that such a directly divine origin could, on orthodox principles, be assigned only to writings coming under the designation of Sruti), maintains in his comment on the text of the Brāhad Āraṇyaka Upanishad that the whole of the works there enumerated, excepting the Sanhitās of the four Vedas, are in reality portions of the Brāhmaṇas, it will be necessary to quote his remarks, which are as follows (Bibl. Ind. ii. 855 ff.):

... Niścasitam ieva niścasitam | yathā apratyanenaiva purusha-niśvāso
bhavaty evaṁ vā | are kiṁ tad niścasitaṁ tato jātam ity uchyate | Yad riṣvedo yajurvedaḥ sāmadevaḥ tharvangirasāḥ caturvidhām mantra-jātam |
itihāsaḥ ity Īrvaśi-Purānavasor saṁvādādir “Īrvaśi ha apsarāḥ” ityādi- 
brāhmaṇam eva | purāṇam “asad vā idam agro āsid” ityādi | vidyā
devajana-vidyā “vedah so’yaṁ” ityādiḥ | upaṇishadaḥ “priyam ity etad
upāśita” ityādyāḥ | ślokāḥ “brāhmaṇa-prabhavāḥ mantrās tad ete
ślokāḥ” ity ādayāḥ | sūtraṁ vastu-sangraha-vākyāni vede yathā “ātmā
ity eva upāśita” ityādīni | anuyākhyānāni mantra-vivarāṇāni | vyākhyā-
nāni arthāvadāḥ | ... evam āshtāvedham brāhmaṇam | evam mantra-
brāhmaṇayor eva grahaṇam | niyata-racanāvato vidyamānasya eva vedasya
abhivyaktiḥ puruṣa-niśvāsa-vat | na cha puruṣa-buddhi-pratyan-pur-
vakah | ataḥ pramāṇam nirapekṣah eva svārthe | ... tena vedasya apramāṇyam āśankate | tad-āśankā-nivṛtti-artham idam uktam | puruṣa-nīśvāsa-vad aprayatnotthitavat pramāṇaṁ vedo na yathā 'nyo graṇthāḥ iti |

"'His breathing' means, 'as it were, his breathing,' or it denotes the absence of effort, as in the case of a man's breathing. We are now told what that breathing was which was produced from him. It was the four classes of mantras (hymns), those of the Rīch, Yajush, Sāman, and Atharvāngirases (Ātharvaṇa); Itihāsa (or narrative), such as the dialogue between Urvāsi and Purūravas, viz. the passage in the Brāhmaṇa beginning 'Urvāsi the Apsaras,' etc. [S. P. Br. p. 855]; Purāṇa, such as, 'This was originally non-existent,' etc.; Vidyā (knowledge), the knowledge of the gods, as, 'This is the Veda,' etc.; Upanishads, such as, 'Let him reverence this, as beloved,' etc.; Slokas, such as those here mentioned, 'The mantras are the sources of the Brāhmaṇas, on which subject there are these ślokas,' etc.; Sūtras (aphorisms) occurring in the Veda which condense the substance of doctrines, as, 'Let him adore this as Soul,' etc.; Anuvyākhyaṇas, or interpretations of the mantras; Vyakhyānas, or illustrative remarks." The commentator adds alternative explanations of the two last terms, and then proceeds: "Here, therefore, eight sorts of texts occurring in the Brāhmaṇas are referred to; and consequently the passage before us embraces merely mantras and Brāhmaṇas. The manifestation of the Veda, which already existed in a fixed form of composition, is compared to the breathing of a person. The Veda was not the result of an effort of the intelligence of any person. Consequently, as proof in respect of its own contents, it is independent of everything else."

Sankara terminates his remarks on this passage by intimating, as one supposition, that the author of the Upanishad means, in the words

377 Compare S'ankara's Comment on Brahma Sūtra, i. 1, 3, as quoted above in p. 106, where this same text of the Bṛh. Ār. Up. is referred to. As the fact of Brahma being the author of the Vedas is there adduced to prove the transcendent character of his knowledge, and of his power, we must, apparently (unless we are to charge the great commentator with laying down inconsistent doctrines in the two passages), suppose that in the text before us he does not mean to deny that Brahma was conscious of the procession of the Vedas, etc., from himself, and cognizant of their sense (as the author of the Sānkhya aphorisms and his commentator seem to have understood, see above p. 135), but merely that his consciousness and cognizance were not the result of any effort on his part.
on which he comments, to remove a doubt regarding the authority of the Veda, arising from some words which had preceded, and therefore affirms that “the Veda is authoritative, because it was produced without any effort of will, like a man’s breathing, and not in the same manner as other books.” (See Sāṅkhya Sūtras, v. 50; above, p. 135.)

This attempt to explain the whole of the eight classes of works enumerated in the Upanishad as nothing else than parts of the Brāhmaṇas, cannot be regarded as altogether satisfactory, since some of them, such as the Sūtras, have always been referred to a distinct class of writings, which are regarded as uninspired (see Müller’s Anc. Ind. Lit. pp. 75, 86); and the Itihāsas and Purāṇas had in all probability become a distinct class of writings at the period when the Upanishad was composed. And Sankara’s explanation is rendered more improbable if we compare with this passage the other from the Munḍaka Upanishad, i. 1, 5, already quoted above (p. 31), where it is said, “The inferior science consists of the Rīch, Yajush, Sāman, and Atharvan Vedas, accentuation (śikṣā), ritual prescriptions (kalpa), grammar, commentary (nirukta), prosody (chhandas), and astronomy.” Here various appendages of the Vedas, which later writers expressly distinguish from the Vedas themselves, and distinctly declare to have no superhuman authority, are yet mentioned in the same category with the four Sanhitās, or collections of the hymns, as constituting the inferior science (in opposition to the knowledge of the supreme Spirit). From this we may reasonably infer that the author of the Brāhad Āraṇyaka Upanishad also, when he specifies the Sūtras and some of the other works

178 I take the opportunity of introducing here Sāyana’s remarks on this passage in his Commentary on the Rig-veda, vol. i., p. 33: Atigambhīrasya vedasya artham avabodhayitum śikṣādīnī shaṅ-angāni pravṛttāni | ata eva teshām aparā-vidyā- rūpateam Munḍakopanishady Aṭharvanikāh āmananti | "dev vidge" ityūdi | ... sādhana-bhūta-dharma-jñāna-hetuvāt shaṅ-anga-sahitānam karma-kīṃdānam aparā-vidyūtōm | parama-purushārtha-bhūta-brahma-jñāna-hetuvād upanishadām parama-vidyūtām | “The Śikṣā and other five appendages are intended to promote the comprehension of the sense of the very deep Veda. Hence, in the Munḍaka Upanishad, the followers of the Atharva-veda declare that these works belong to the class of inferior sciences, thus: ‘There are two sciences,’ etc. [see the entire passage in p. 31.] Since the sections of the Veda which relate to ceremonies [including, of course, the hymns], as well as the six appendages, lead to a knowledge of duty, which is an instrument [of something further], they are ranked as an inferior science. On the other hand the Upanishads, which conduct to a knowledge of Brahma, the supreme object of man, constitute the highest science.”
which he enumerates, intended to speak of the Vedāṅgas or appendages of the Vedas, and perhaps the Smṛitis also, as being the breathing of Brahma. The works which in the passage from the Munḍaka are called Kalpa, are also commonly designated as the Kalpa Sūtras.

This conclusion is in some degree confirmed by referring to the passage from the Mahābhārata, Śānti-parvan, 7,660, which has been cited in p. 105, where it is said that the “great rishis, empowered by Svavamabhū, obtained by devotion the Vedas, and the Itihāsas, which had disappeared at the end of the preceding Yuga.” Whatever may be the sense of the word Itihāsa in a Vedic work, there can be no doubt that in the Mahābhārata, which is itself an Itihāsa, the word refers to that class of metrical histories. And in this text we see these Itihāsas placed on a footing of equality with the Vedas, and regarded as having been, like them, pre-existent and supernatural. See also the passage from the Chhāndogya Upanishad, vii. 1, 1 ff. (Bibl. Ind., vol. iii. pp. 473 ff.), quoted above (p. 33), where the Itihāsas and Purāṇas are spoken of as “the fifth Veda of the Vedas.” The same title of “fifth Veda” is applied to them in the Bhāg. Pur. iii. 12, 39: Itihāsa-purāṇāni pan-
chamaṅ vedam Īswaraḥ | sarvebhyaḥ eva mukhebhyaḥ sasrīje sarva-dar-
śanaḥ | “The omniscient Īśvara (God) created from all his mouths the Itihāsas and Purāṇas, as a fifth Veda.” See also the passages quoted above in pp. 27–30, from the Purāṇas and Mahābhārata, where the Itihāsas and Purāṇas themselves are placed on an equality with, if not in a higher rank, than the Vedas. The claims put forward by these popular works on their own behalf are not, indeed, recognized as valid by more critical and scientific authors, who, as we have seen at the beginning of this section, draw a distinct line of demarcation between the Vedas and all other works; but it would appear from the passages I have quoted from the Upanishads that at one time the Vedas were, at least, not so strictly discriminated from the other Sāstras as they afterwards were.

Sect. XII.—Recapitulation of the Arguments urged in the Darśanas, and by Commentators, in support of the Authority of the Vedas, with some remarks on these reasonings.

As in the preceding sections I have entered at some length into the arguments urged by the authors of the philosophical systems and their
commentators, in proof of the eternity and infallibility of the Vedas, it may be convenient to recapitulate the most important points in these reasonings; and I shall then add such observations as the consideration of them may suggest.

The grounds on which the apologists of the Vedas rest their authority are briefly these: First, it is urged that, like the sun, they shine by their own light, and evince an inherent power both of revealing their own perfection, and of elucidating all other things, past and future, great and small, near and remote (Sāyaṇa, as quoted above, p. 62; Sankara on Brahma Sūtras i. 1, 3, above, p. 190). This is the view taken by the author of the Sāṅkhya Sūtras also, who, however, expressly denies that the Vedas originated from the conscious effort of any divine being (see p. 135). Second, it is asserted that the Veda could have had no (human) personal author, as no such composer is recollected (Mādhava, above, pp. 83 ff., and cannot therefore be suspected of any such imperfection as would arise from the fallibility of such an author (pp. 69 f.; Sāyaṇa p. 106). Third, the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā adds to this that the words of which the Vedas are composed are eternal, and have an eternal connection (not an arbitrary relation depending upon the human will) with their meanings, and that therefore the Vedas are eternal, and consequently perfect and infallible 179 (Mīmāṃsā Sūtras and Commentary, above, pp. 71 ff., and Sarva-darśana-sangraha, above, pp. 91 ff.) Fourth, the preceding view is either explained or modified by the commentator on the Ta̤Ittirīya Sanhitā (above, p. 69), as well as by Sāyaṇa in his Introduction to the Rig-veda (above, p. 106), who say that, like time, aether, etc., the Veda is only eternal in a qualified sense, i.e., during the continuance of the existing mundane system; and that in reality it sprang from Brahmap at the beginning of the creation. But this origin cannot according to their view affect the perfection of the Veda, which in consequence of the faultlessness of its author possesses a self-demonstrating authority. Fifth, although the Vedānta, too, speaks of the eternity of the Veda (above, p. 105), it also in the same passage makes mention of its self-dependent author; while in another passage (p. 106) it distinctly ascribes the origin of the Indian Scripture to Brahmap as its source or

179 In the Briḥad Aranyaka Upanishad (p. 688 of Dr. Röer's ed.) it is said: Vāchaiva samrūd Bhṛma jnāyate vāg vai samrūd paramam Brahmap | "By speech, o monarch, Brahmap is known. Speech is the supreme Brahmap."
cause. Brahma here must be taken as neuter, denoting the supreme Spirit, and not masculine, designating the personal creator, as under the fourth head. 180 Sixth, according to the Naiyāyika doctrine the authority of the Veda is established by the fact of its having emanated from competent persons who had an intuitive perception of duty, and whose competence is proved by their injunctions being attended with the desired results in all cases which come within the cognizance of our senses and experience (Nyāya Sūtras, above, pp. 116). Seventh, agreeably to the Vaiśeshika doctrine, and that of the Kusumānjali, the infallibility of the Veda results from the omniscience of its author, who is God (Vaiśeshika Sūtras, Tarka Sangraha, and Kusumānjali, pp. 119 ff., 127, and 129 ff., above).

These arguments, as the reader who has studied all their details will have noticed, are sometimes in direct opposition to each other in their leading principles; and they are not likely to seem convincing to any persons but the adherents of the schools from which they have severally emanated. The European student (unless he has some ulterior practical object in view) can only look upon these opinions as matters of historical interest, as illustrations of the course of religious thought among a highly acute and speculative people. But they may be expected to possess a greater importance in the eyes of any Indian readers into whose hands this book may fall; and as such readers may desire to learn in what light these arguments are regarded by Western scholars, I shall offer a few remarks on the subject.

In regard to the first ground in support of the infallibility of the Veda, viz. the evidence which radiates from itself, or its internal evidence, I may observe first, that this is a species of proof which can only be estimated by those who have made the Indian Scripture the object of careful study; and, second, that it must be judged by the reason and conscience of each individual student. This evidence may appear conclusive to men in a certain stage of their national and personal culture, and especially to those who have been accustomed from their infancy to regard the Vedas with a hereditary veneration; whilst to persons in a different state of mental progress, and living under different influences, it will appear perfectly futile. It is quite clear that, even in India itself, there existed in former ages multitudes of learned

180 See note in p. 205, above.
and virtuous men who were unable to see the force of this argument, and who consequently rejected the authority of the Vedas. I allude of course to Buddha and his followers. And we have even found that some of those writers who are admitted to have been orthodox, such as the authors of the Upanishads, the Bhagavad Gitā, and the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, while they attach the highest value to the divine knowledge conveyed by the latest portions of the Veda, depreciate, if they do not actually despise, the hymns and the ceremonial worship connected with them.

In regard to the second argument, viz. that the Vedas must be of supernatural origin, and infallible authority, as they are not known to have had any human author, I observe as follows. The Greek historian, Herodotus, remarks (ii. 23) of a geographer of his own day who explained the annual inundations of the river Nile by supposing its stream to be derived from an imaginary ocean flowing round the earth, which no one had ever seen, that his opinion did not admit of confusion, because he carried the discussion back into the region of the unapparent (ἐς ἀφανὴς τοῦ μύθου ἀνευκας οὐκ ἐχει ἔλεγχον). The same might be said of the Indian speculators, who argue that the Veda must have had a supernatural origin, because it was never observed to have had a human author like other books;—that by thus removing the negative grounds on which they rest their case into the unknown depths of antiquity, they do their utmost to place themselves beyond the reach of direct refutation. But it is to be observed (1) that, even if it were to be admitted that no human authors of the Vedas were remembered in later ages, this would prove nothing more than their antiquity, and that it would still be incumbent on their apologists to show that this circumstance necessarily involved their supernatural character; and (2) that, in point of fact, Indian tradition does point to certain rishis or bards as the authors of the Vedic hymns. It is true, indeed, as has been already noticed (p. 85), that these rishis are said to have only “seen” the hymns, which (it is alleged) were eternally pre-existent, and that they were not their authors. But as tradition declares that the hymns were uttered by such and such rishis, how is it proved that the rishis to whom they are ascribed, or those, whoever they were, from whom they actually proceeded, were not uttering the mere productions of their own minds? The whole character of these compositions, and the circumstances under which, from internal evi-
cence, they appear to have arisen, are in harmony with the supposition that they were nothing more than the natural expression of the personal hopes and feelings of those ancient bards by whom they were first recited. In these songs the Aryan sages celebrated the praises of their ancestral gods (while at the same time they sought to conciliate their goodwill by a variety of oblations supposed to be acceptable to them), and besought of them all the blessings which men in general desire—health, wealth, long life, cattle, offspring, victory over their enemies, forgiveness of sin, and in some cases also celestial felicity.

The scope of these hymns is well summed up in the passage which I have already quoted (from Colebrooke's Mise. Essays i. 26) in the Second Volume, p. 206: Artheypsavah rishayo devatah chhandobhir abhya-

ādha
dvan | "The rishis desiring [various] objects, hastened to the gods

with metrical prayers." The Nirukta, vii. 1, quoted in the same place, says: Yat-kāma
dhā rishir yasyām devatāyām arthopatyaṁ ichham stutim

prayunte tad-devatah sa mantra bhavati | "Each particular hymn has for its deity the god to whom the rishi, seeking to obtain any object of desire which he longs for, addresses his prayer." And in the sequel of the same passage from the Nirukta (vii. 3), the fact that the hymns express the different feelings or objects of the rishis is distinctly recognized:

Paraksha-kri
tāḥ pratyaksha-kri
tāḥ cha mantrāḥ bhūyishthāh alpaśāḥ

ādhyātmikāḥ | athāpi stutir eva bhavati na āśirvādaḥ "Indrasya nu vir-
yāṇī pravocham" iti yathā etasmin sūkte | athāpi āśir eva na stutī
d"suchakāh aham akshibhyām bhūyāsān svarchāḥ mukhena suśrut
dkāryābhṛyām bhūyāsam" iti | tad etad bahulam ādhibhayaṁ yājñeshu cha

mantreshu | athāpi śapathabhāṣāpau | "adya muriya" ityādi . . . athāpi

kasyachād bhāvasyāṁ āchikhyāsā | "na mrityur āsīd" ityādi . . . | athāpi

paridevānā kasmācchādhit bhāvāt | "sudevo adya prapted anāvriḍi" ityādi | athāpi nindā-praśaṁse | "kevalāgho bhavati kevalādi" ityādi | evam

aksha-sūkte dyutānādā cha krishi-praśaṁse cha | evam uchchāvachair

abhīprāyair rishiṁ mantrā-dṛṣṭāyō bhavanti |

"[Of the four kinds of verses specified in the preceding section],

(a) those which address a god as absent, (b) those which address him as present, and (c) those which address the worshippers as present and the god as absent, are the most numerous, while those (d) which refer to the speaker himself are rare. It happens also that a god is
praised without any blessing being invoked, as in the hymn (R.V. i. 32). 'I declare the heroic deeds of Indra,' etc. Again, blessings are invoked without any praise being offered, as in the words, 'May I see well with my eyes, be resplendent in my face, and hear well with my ears.' This frequently occurs in the Adhvaryava (Yajur) Veda, and in the sacrificial formulæ. Then again we find oaths and curses, as in the words (R.V. vii. 104, 15), 'May I die to-day, if I am a Yātudhāna,' etc. (See Vol. I. p. 327.) Further, we observe the desire to describe some particular state of things, as in the verse (R.V. x. 129, 2), 'Death was not then, nor immortality,' etc. Then there is lamentation, arising out of a certain state of things, as in the verse (R.V. x. 95, 14), 'The beautiful god will disappear and never return,' etc. Again, we have blame and praise, as in the words (R.V. x. 117, 6), 'The man who eats alone, sins alone,' etc. So, too, in the hymn to dice (R.V. x. 34, 13) there is a censure upon dice, and a commendation of agriculture. Thus the objects for which the hymns were seen by the rishis were very various.' 

It is to be observed, however, that although in this passage the author, Yāska, speaks of the various desires which the rishi expressed in different hymns, he nevertheless adheres to the idea which was recognized in his age, and in which he doubtless participated, that the rishi "saw" the hymns.

In the Nirukta, x. 42, the form of the metre in particular hymns is ascribed to the peculiar genius of the rishi Paruchhepa: 183 Abhyāse

181 In Nirukta, iv. 6, allusion is made to a rishi Tīrata perceiving a particular hymn when he had been thrown into a well (Tīrataṃ kūpe 'vahitam, etat sūktam prati babhau).

182 A Paruchhepa is mentioned in the Taittirīya Sanhitā, ii. 5, 8, 3, as follows: Nrimedhas cha Paruchhepari cha brahmaavodgyam acacetām "asmin dāroś āṛdvo 'gnim janayāva yataro nau brahmīyān" iti | Nrimedho 'bhavatad sa dhūnam ajanayat | Paruchhepoh 'bhavatad so 'gnim ajanayat | "rishe" ity abravi "yat samāṇāveide aṅkha tvaṃ aṅgīna' svarūpānām veda" ity abravi "yad ghrāvate padam anūchyate sa āsāṃ varṇas 'tāṁ teṣaṃ simēbhīr An girah" ity āhā sāṁdhēnaśke eva taj jyotir janayati | "Nrimedha and Paruchhepa had a discussion concerning sacred knowledge. They said, 'Let us kindle fire' in this moist wood, in order to see which of us has most sacred knowledge.' 2 Nrimedha pronounced (a text); but produced only smoke. Paruchhepa pronounced (a text) and generated fire. Nrimedha said, 'Rishi, since our knowledge is equal, how is it that thou hast generated fire, while I have not.' Paruchhepa replied, 'I know the lustre

1 "Without friction."—Comm.
2 "In regard to the Sāṁdhiṇi formulæ."—Comm.
bhūyaṁsam artham manyante yathā "aḥo darśaniya aḥo darśaniya" iti |
sat Paruchchhepaśya śīlam | "Men consider that by repetition the sense
is intensified, as in the words 'o beautiful, o beautiful.' This is Paru-
chhepa's habit."

In Nirukta, iii. 11, the rishi Kutsa is mentioned as being thus de-
scribed by the interpreter Aupamanyava: Rishiḥ Kutso bhaivati kartā
stomānām ity Aupamanyavacah | "'Kutsa is the name of a rishi, a maker
of hymns,' according to Aupamanyava."

So too the same work, x. 32, says of the rishi Hiranyakstūpa that "he
declared this hymn" (Hiranyakstūpah rishir idām sūktam pravācha).

I do not, as I have already intimated, adduce these passages of the
Nirukta to show that the author regarded the hymns as the ordinary
productions of the rishis' own minds, for this would be at variance with
the expression "seeing," which he applies to the mental act by which
they were produced. It appears also from the terms in which he
speaks of the rishis in the passage (Nirukta, i. 20) quoted above, p. 120,
where they are described as having an intuitive insight into duty, that
he placed them on a far higher level than the inferior men of later
ages. But it is clear from the instances I have adduced that Yāska
recognizes the hymns as being applicable to the particular circum-
cstances in which the rishis were placed, and as being the bonā fide ex-
pression of their individual emotions and desires. (See also the pas-
sages from the Nirukta, ii. 10 and 24, quoted in Vol. I. pp. 269
and 338, which establish the same point.) But if this be true, the
supposition that these hymns, i.e. hymns specifically suited to express
the various feelings and wishes of all the different rishis, were eternally
pre-existent, and were perceived by them at the precise conjunctures
when they were required to give utterance to their several aims, is per-
fectedly gratuitous and unnecessary. It might be asserted with nearly
the same shew of reason that the entire stock of ordinary language
employed by human beings to express their ideas had existed from
eternity. 123

of the Sāmīdhenaś. The sentence which contains the word ghrīta (butter) forms their
lustre. When any one repeats the words, "We augment thee, o Angiras (Agni) with
fuel and with butter," he then generates that lustre in the Sāmīdhenaś."

123 A difficulty of the same nature as that here urged, viz. that men and objects
which existed in time are mentioned in the Vedas which are yet said to be eternal, was
felt by Jaimini, as we have already seen (pp. 77ff.). I recur to this subject in p. 215.
In regard to the third argument for the authority of the Vedas, viz. that they are eternal, because the words of which they are composed are eternal, and because these words have an inherent and eternal (and not a merely conventional) connection with the significations or objects, or the species of objects, which they represent, it is to be observed that it is rejected both by the Nyāya and Sānkhya schools. And I am unable (if I rightly comprehend this orthodox reasoning) to see how it proves the authority of the Veda more than that of any other book. If the words of the Veda are eternal, so must those of the Baudhāya books be eternal, and consequently, if eternal pre-existence is a proof of perfection, the infallibility of these heretical works must be as much proved by this argument as the divine origin of the Vedas, whose pretensions they reject and oppose. Or if the meaning is that the words of the Veda alone are eternal and infallible, this is an assumption which requires proof. If their reception by great rishis be alleged as evidence, it must be remarked that the authority of these rishis is itself a point which cannot be admitted until it has been established.

In regard to the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh of the arguments above stated, as put forward by the representatives of different schools or opinions in favour of the authority of the Veda, it may suffice to say that they for the most part assume the point to be proved, viz. that the Veda did proceed from an omniscient, or at least a competent, author. The only exception to this remark is to be found in the reasoning of the Nyāya and Sānkhya aphorisms that the infallibility of the Vedas is shown by the fact that the employment of the formulas or prescriptions of those parts of them which deal with temporal results, such as can be tested by experience, is always found to be efficacious; a premiss from which the conclusion is drawn that those other parts of the Veda, which relate to the unseen world, must be equally authoritative, as the authors of these different parts are the same persons. This argument cannot appear convincing to any but those who admit first, the invariable efficacy of all the formulas and prescriptions

See, however, the comment on Brahma Sūtra, i. 3, 30, regarding the perpetual recurrence of the same things in successive creations from, and to, all eternity, which will be quoted in the Appendix.

181 See Dr. Ballantyne's remarks on this controversy, in pp. 186, 189, 191, and 192 of his "Christianity contrasted with Hindu Philosophy."
of the Veda which relate to such matters as can be tested by experience, and secondly, the identity of the authors of the parts of the Veda which contain these formulas and prescriptions with the authors of the other parts. It would be impossible to prove the former point, and next to impossible to prove the latter.

Against the eternity of the Vedas an objection has been raised, which Jaimini considers it necessary to notice, viz. that various historical personages are named in their pages, and that as these works could not have existed before the persons whose doings they record, they must have commenced to exist in time. This difficulty Jaimini attempts, as we have seen above (pp. 77 ff.), to meet by explaining away the names of the historical personages in question. Thus Babara Prāvahiqi is said to be nothing else than an appellation of the wind, which is eternal. And this method, it is said, is to be applied in all similar cases. Another of the passages mentioned by an objector (see above, p. 79) as referring to non-eternal objects is R.V. iii. 53, 14, "What are the cows doing for thee among the Kīkātas?" etc. The author of the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras would no doubt have attempted to show that by these Kīkātas we are to understand some eternally pre-existing beings. But Yāska, the author of the Nirukta, who had not been instructed in any such subtleties, speaks of the Kīkātas as a non-Āryan nation. (Vol. I. p. 342, and Vol. II. p. 362.) It is difficult to suppose that Jaimini—unless he was an enthusiast, and not the cool and acute reasoner he has commonly proved himself to be—could have seriously imagined that his rule of interpretation could ever be generally received or carried out. The Brāhmaṇas evidently intend to represent the numerous occurrences which they narrate, as having actually taken place in time, and the actors in them as having been real historical personages. See, for instance, the legends from the Satapatha and Aiṭareya Brāhmaṇas, the Taittāriya Sanhitā, etc., quoted in the First

135 In Sāyaṇa's Introduction to R.V. vol. i. p. 23, it is said: Manushya-vṛtīnta-pratipūdakah rīchō nārāśaṁsyaḥ | "The Nārāśaṁsīs are verses which set forth the histories of men." Yāska's definition is the same in substance, Nir. ix. 9. If these Nārāśaṁsīs are, as Sāyaṇa says, verses of the hymns (rīchā), and if according to his definition their object is to record events in human history, it follows that they must refer to non-eternal objects. See also the explanation of the words nārāśaṁsena stōmena in Vājasaneyi Sanhitā, 3, 53, given by the Commentator Mahidhara, which will be quoted further on.
Volume of this work, pp. 182, 192, 194, 328, 355, etc. And it is impossible to peruse the Vedic hymns without coming to the conclusion that they also record a multitude of events, which the writers believed to have been transacted by men on earth in former ages. (See the passages quoted from the Rig-veda in the First and Second Volumes of this work, passim; those, for example, in Vol. I. pp. 162 ff., 318 ff., 339 ff., and Vol. II. p. 208.)

We shall, no doubt, be assisted in arriving at a correct conclusion in regard to the real origin and character of the hymns of the Veda, if we enquire what opinion the rishis, by whom they were confessedly spoken, entertained of their own utterances; and this I propose to investigate in the following chapter.
CHAPTER II.

THE RISHIS, AND THEIR OPINIONS IN REGARD TO THE ORIGIN OF THE VEDIC HYMNS.

I have already shewn, in the preceding pages, as well as in the Second Volume of this work, that the hymns of the Rig-veda themselves supply us with numerous data by which we can judge of the circumstances to which they owed their origin, and of the manner in which they were created. We have seen that they were the natural product and expression of the particular state of society, of the peculiar religious conceptions, and of all those other influences, physical and moral, which prevailed at the period when they were composed, and acted upon the minds of their authors. (Vol. I. pp. 161 f.; Vol. II. pp. 205 ff.; and above, pp. 211 f.) We find in them ideas, a language, a spirit, and a colouring totally different from those which characterize the religious writings of the Hindus of a later era. They frequently discover to us the simple germs from which the mythological conceptions current in subsequent ages were derived,—germs which in many cases were developed in so fanciful and extravagant a manner as to shew that the simplicity of ancient times had long since disappeared, to make way for a rank and wild luxuriance of imagination. They afford us very distinct indications of the locality in which they were composed (Vol. II. Pp. 354–372); they shew us the Aryan tribes living in a state of warfare with surrounding enemies (some of them, probably, alien in race and language), and gradually, as we may infer, forcing their way onward to the east and south (Vol. II. pp. 374 ff., 384 ff., 414 ff.); they supply us with numerous specimens of the particular sorts of prayers, viz. for protection and victory, which men so circumstanced would naturally address to the gods whom they worshipped, as well as of those
more common supplications which men in general offer up for the various blessings which constitute the sum of human welfare; and they bring before us as the objects of existing veneration a class of deities (principally, if not exclusively, personifications of the elements, and of the powers either of nature, or of reason) who gradually lost their importance in the estimation of the later Indians, and made way for gods of a different description, invested with new attributes, and in many cases bearing new appellations.

These peculiarities of the hymns abundantly justify us in regarding them as the natural product and spontaneous representation of the ideas, feelings, and aspirations of the bards with whose names they are connected, or of other ancient authors, while the archaic forms of the dialect in which they are composed, and the references which are made to them, as pre-existent, in the liturgical works by which they are expounded and applied, leave no reason for doubt that they are the most ancient of all the Indian Scriptures.

We can also, as I have shewn, discover from the Vedic hymns themselves, that some of them were newer and others older, that they were the works of many successive generations of poets, that their composition probably extended over several centuries, and that in some places their authors represent them as being the productions of their own minds, while in other passages they appear to ascribe to their own words a certain divine character, or attribute their composition to some supernatural assistance. (Vol. I. p. 4, and II. pp. 206 ff., 219 ff.)

I shall now proceed to adduce further proofs from the hymns of the Rig-veda in support of these last mentioned positions; repeating, at the same time, for the sake of completeness, the texts which I have already cited in the Second Volume.

Sect. I.—Passages from the Hymns of the Veda which distinguish between the Rishis as Ancient and Modern.

The appellations or epithets applied by the authors of the hymns to themselves, and to the sages who in former times had instituted, as well as to their contemporaries who continued to conduct, the different rites of divine worship, are the following: rishi, kavi, medhāvin, vipra,
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vipāschit, vedhas, muni, etc. The rishis are defined in Böhtlingk and Roth’s Lexicon, to be persons “who, whether singly or in chorus, either on their own behalf or on behalf of others, invoked the gods in artificial language, and in song;” and the word is said to denote especially “the priestly bards who made this art their profession.” The word kavi means “wise,” or “a poet,” and has ordinarily the latter sense in modern Sanskrit. Vipra means “wise,” and, in later Sanskrit, a “Brāhmaṇ;” medhāvin means “intelligent;” vipāschit and vedhas, “wise” or “learned.” Muni signifies in modern Sanskrit a “sage” or “devotee.” It is not much used in the Rig-veda, but occurs in viii. 17, 13 (Vol. II. p. 397).

The following passages from the Rig-veda either expressly distinguish between contemporary rishis and those of a more ancient date, or, at any rate, make reference to the one or the other class. This recognition of a succession of rishis constitutes one of the historical elements in the Veda. It is an acknowledgment on the part of the rishis themselves that numerous persons had existed, and events occurred, anterior to their own age, and, consequently, in time; and it therefore refutes, by the testimony of the Veda itself, the assertion of Jaimini (above, pp. 77 ff.) that none but eternally pre-existing objects are mentioned in that book.

If, under this and other heads of my inquiry, I have cited a larger number of passages than might have appeared to be necessary, it has been done with the intention of showing that abundant evidence of my various positions can be adduced from all parts of the Hymn-collection.¹

R. V. i. 1, 2. Agniḥ pūrebbhir rishibhir īdyo nūtanair uta | sa devān eha vakshati |

“"Agni, who is worthy to be celebrated by former, as well as modern rishis, will bring the gods hither.”

The word pūrebhiḥ is explained by Śāyana thus: Purātanair Bṛhgu-
angirah-prabhritibhir rīshibhiḥ | “By the ancient rishis, Bṛhgu, An-
giras,” etc.; and nūtanaiḥ is interpreted by idānītanair asmābhir api;
“by us of the present day also.” See also Nirukta, vii. 16.

¹ I have to acknowledge the assistance kindly rendered to me by Prof. Aufrecht in the revision of my translation of the passages quoted in this and the following sections. As, however, the texts are mostly quite clear in so far as regards the points which they are adduced to prove, any inaccuracies with which I may be chargeable in other respects are of comparatively little importance.
THE RISHIS, AND THEIR OPINIONS IN REGARD


"O (god) of great power, listen to the invocation of Prasakaṇva, as thou didst listen to Priyamedha, Atri, Virūpa, and Angiras. 4. The Priyamedhas, skilled in singing praises, have invoked thee."

Here Prasakaṇva is referred to, in verse 3, as alive, whilst Priyamedha, Atri, Virūpa, and Angiras belong to the past. In verse 4 the descendants of Priyamedha are however alluded to as existing. The three other names are also, no doubt, those of families. In R.V. iii. 53, 7, (see Vol. I. p. 341) the Virūpas appear to be referred to; while in vii. 64, 6 (which will be quoted below), a Virūpa is addressed. In v. 22, 4, the Atris are spoken of.

i. 48, 14. Ye chid hi tvam rishayaḥ pūrve utaye juhūre ityādi |
"The former rishis who invoked thee for succour," etc.

i. 80, 16. Yāṃ Atharvā Manush pitā Dadhyāñ dhiyam atnata | tasmin brahmāṇi pūrvathā Indre uktāḥ samagnata ityādi |
"In the ceremony [or hymn] which Atharvan, or our father Manu, or Dadhyanch performed, the prayers and praises were, as of old, congregated in that Indra," etc.

i. 118, 3 (repeated in iii. 58, 3). Āhur viprāsaḥ Āsvinā purājah |
"O Āsvins, the ancient sages say," etc.

i. 131, 6. Ā me asya vedhavo naviyasaḥ manma śrudhi naveyasaḥ |
"Hear the hymn of me this modern sage, of this modern [sage]."

i. 139, 9. Dadhyāñ ha me janusham pūrvo Angirāḥ Priyamedhāḥ Kanvo Atrir Manur vidūr ityādi |
"The ancient Dadhyanch, Angiras, Priyamedha, Kaṇva, Atri, and Manu know my birth."

i. 175, 6. Yathā pūrvēbhyaḥ jāritribhyaḥ Indra mayaḥ iva āpo na tri- shyate babhūtha | Tāṁ anu tvā nividāṁ jōhāvāṁ ityādi |
"Indra, as thou hast been like a joy to former worshippers who praised thee, like waters to the thirsty, I invoke thee again and again with this hymn," etc.

iv. 20, 5. Vi yo varāpi rishiḥbhir vriṣbhir vriksah na pakvaḥ śrīyoh na jētā | maryo na yohāṁ abhi manyamāno acharā vivakmi puruhūtam Indram |
"Like a man desiring a woman, I call hither that Indra, invoked by
many, who, like a ripe tree, like a conqueror expert in arms, has been celebrated by recent rishis." 

iv. 50, 1. Īu pratnāsaḥ rishayo didhyānaḥ puro vipraḥ dadhīre manda-rjīhvaṃ 

"The ancient rishis, resplendent and sage, have placed in front of them [Bṛhaspati] with gladdening tongue."

v. 42, 6. . . . Na te pūrve Maghavāna na aparāso na viryaṁ nūtanaḥ kaśchana āpa 

"Neither the ancients nor later men, nor any modern man, has attained to [conceived] thy prowess, o Maghavan."

x. 54, 3. Ke u nu te mahimanaḥ samasya asmat pūrve rishayo antam āpuḥ yad mūtaraṁ cha pitarāṁ cha sākam ajanayathās tanvāḥ svāyaḥ 

"Who among the rishis who were before us have attained to the end of all thy greatness? for thou didst at once produce from thy own body both the mother and the father (earth and heaven)."

vi. 19, 4. Yathā chit pūrve jaritāraḥ āsur anedyāḥ anavadyāḥ arishtāḥ 

"As [Indra’s] former worshippers were, [may we be] blameless, irreproachable, and unharmed."

vi. 21, 5. Idā hi te vevishataḥ purājāḥ pratnāsaḥ āsuḥ purukrit sakhāyaḥ Ye madhyamāsāḥ uta nūtanaṁ utāvamasya puruḥūta bodhi 

"For now, o energetic god, men are thy worshippers, as the ancients born of old and the men of the middle and later ages have been thy friends. And, o much-invoked, think of the most recent of all." 3

vi. 21, 1. Sa tu śrutī Indra nūtanasya brahmānyato vīra kārudhāyaḥ 

"Heroic Indra, supporting the poet, listen to the modern [bard] who wishes to celebrate thee."

vi. 22, 2. Tam u naḥ pūrve pitaro navagvāḥ septa viprāsaḥ abhi vāja-yantaḥ ityādi 

"To Him (Indra) our ancient fathers, the seven Navagva sages, desiring food, (resorted) with their hymns," etc.

vi. 50, 15. Ēvaṇaṇato mama tasya dhibhir Bharadvājāḥ abhyarekhanti arkaḥ 

"Thus do the Bharadvajas my grandsons adore thee with (my?) hymns and praises."

2 Prof. Aufrecht thinks sṛṅgo na jeta may perhaps mean, "like a winner of sickles (as a prize)."

3 This verse is translated in Benfey’s Glossary to the Sāma-veda, p. 76, col. i.
vii. 18, 1. Tve ha yat pitaraś chid naḥ Indra visvā vāmā jariḷāro asan- 
vann ityādi |

"Since, in thee, o Indra, even our fathers, thy worshippers, obtained 
all riches," etc.

vii. 29, 4. Ulo gha te purushyāḥ id āsan yeshām pūrveshām aśrīnor 
ishīnām | adha aham tvā Maghavan johavini tvan naḥ Indra asi prama- 
tīḥ piteva |

"Even they were of mortal birth,—those former rishis whom thou 
didst hear. I invoke thee again and again, o Maghavan; thou art to 
us wise as a father."

vii. 53, 1. . . . . Te chid hi pūrve kavayo griṇantāḥ puro mahī dadhire 
devaputre |

"The ancient poets, celebrating their praises, have placed in the 
front these two great [beings, heaven and earth] of whom the gods are 
the children."

vii. 76, 4. Te id devānāṁ sadhamādaḥ āsann rātāvānaḥ kavayaḥ pūr- 
vyaśaḥ | gālham jyotiḥ pitaro aneavindan satya- mantrāḥ ajanayann 
USHASAM |

"They shared in the enjoyments of the gods, those ancient pious 
sages. Our fathers discovered the hidden light; with true hymns they 
caused the dawn to arise."

vii. 91, 1. Kuvid anga namasa ye vridhasaḥ purā devaḥ anavadyasaḥ 
āsan | te Vāyaśe Manave bādhitaḥ avāsayanā uṣhāsāṁ suryaṇa |

"Certainly those gods who were formerly magnified (or grew) by 
worship were altogether blameless. They lighted up the dawn and 
the sun to Vāyu (Āyu?) and the afflicted Manu.” (See Vol. I. p. 172.)

viii. 36, 7. Sīvāśasya sunvatās tathā śrīnu yathā aśrīnor Ātreḥ 
karmāṇi kriṇvataḥ |

"Listen to Śyāvāśa pouring forth libations, in the same way as 
thou didst listen to Atri when he celebrated sacred rites.”

ix. 96, 11. Tavā hi naḥ pitaraḥ Soma pūrve karmāṇi chakruḥ pava- 
māna dhirāḥ |

"For through thee, o pure Soma, our wise forefathers of old per- 
formed their sacred rites."

4 See Bencey’s Glossary to Śāma-veda, under the word vas 2.
5 Compare viii. 35, 19; and viii. 37, 7.
ix. 110, 7. Tve Soma prathamāḥ vṛkta-varhisho mahe vājaya śavase dhitvaṃ dadhuḥ |
"The former [priests] having strewed the sacred grass, offered up a hymn to thee, o Soma, for great strength and food."

x. 14, 15 (=A.V. xviii. 2, 2). Idāṁ namāḥ rishibhyāḥ pūrvajebhyāḥ pathikṛitābhyāḥ |
"This reverence to the rishis, born of old, the ancients, who showed us the road." (This verse may also be employed to prove that at the end of the Vedic period the rishis had become objects of veneration.)

x. 66, 14. Vasishṭhāsaḥ pitrivad vācham akṛta devān ilānāḥ rishi-vad | ityādi |
"The Vasishṭhas, like the forefathers, like the rishis, have uttered their voice, worshipping the gods."

x. 67, 1—will be quoted in a following section.

x. 96, 5. Tvam aharyathāḥ upastutaḥ pūrvebhīr Indra harikesa yaj-vabhiḥ |
"Indra, with golden hair, thou didst rejoice, when lauded by the ancient priests."

x. 98, 9. Tvam pūrve rishayo gīrbhir āyan tvām adhvareshu puruḥūta viśve |
"To thee the former rishis resorted with their hymns; to thee, thou much invoked, all men [resorted] at the sacrifices."

Vājasaneyi Sanhitā, xviii. 52. Imau te pakṣāv ajaratu patatrinau yā-bhyaṃ rakṣāṣi apajaṃsi Agne | tābhyaṃ patema sukṛitām u lokaṃ yatra rishayo jagumuḥ prathamajāḥ puruṇāḥ |
"But these undecaying, soaring pinions, with which, o Agni, thou slayest the Rakshases,—with them let us ascend to the world of the righteous, whither the earliest-born ancient rishis have gone." (This verse is quoted in the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, ix. 4, 4, 4, p. 739.)

The ancient rishis, as Sāyaṇa says in his note on R.V. i. 2, were Bhṛgu, Angiras, and others whom he does not name. In another place we find Atharvan, Manu, Dadhyanch, and others mentioned. I will not here enter into any particulars regarding these ancient sages. For some texts relating to Bhṛgu, I may refer to the First Volume of this work, pp. 443 ff.; and various passages relating to Manu will be found in the same volume pp. 162 ff., and in pp. 324–332 of the Second Volume. In regard to Atharvan, as well as Angiras, Professor Gold-
stücker's Sanskrit and English Dictionary, and in regard to the same personages and Dadhyanch, the Sanskrit and German Lexicon of Boehltingk and Roth, may be consulted.

Sect. II.—Passages from the Veda in which a distinction is drawn between the older and the more recent hymns.

From the passages which I propose to bring forward in the present section, it will be found that the hymns which the rishis addressed to the gods are frequently spoken of as new, while others of ancient date are also sometimes mentioned. The rishis no doubt entertained the idea that the gods would be more highly gratified if their praises were celebrated in new, and perhaps more elaborate and beautiful compositions, than if older, and possibly ruder, prayers had been repeated.

The fact that a hymn is called new by its author, does not, however, by any means enable us to determine its age relatively to that of other hymns in the collection, for this epithet of new is, as we shall see, applied to numerous compositions throughout the Veda; and often when a hymn is not designated as new, it may, nevertheless, be in reality of recent date, compared with the others by which it is surrounded. When, however, any rishi characterizes his own effusion as new, we are of course necessarily led to conclude that he was acquainted with many older songs of the same kind. The relative ages of the different hymns can only be settled by means of internal evidence furnished by their dialect, style, metre, ideas, and general contents; and we may, no doubt, hope that much will by degrees be done by the researches of critical scholars towards such a chronological classification of the constituent portions of the Rig-veda.

The hymns, praises, or prayers uttered by the rishis are called by a great variety of names, such as rikh, sāman, yajush, brahman, arka, uktha, mantra, manum, mati, manishā, sumeti, dhi, dhāti, dhishāna, stoma, stuti, sūṣṭuti, praśasti, bāma, gir, vāch, vachas, nītha, nivid, etc.

R.V. i. 12, 11. Sa naḥ stavaṇaḥ ābhara gāyatraṇa naviyasā | rayim vīravaṭim ishān |

"Glorified by our newest" hymn, do thou bring to us wealth and food with progeny." (Sāyaṇa explains naviyasā by pūrvaṇaḥ apy asampāditenā gāyatraṇa | "A hymn not formed even by former rishis.")

* Compare Psalms, 33, 3; 40, 3; 96, 1; 98, 1; 144, 9; 149, 1; and Isaiah, 42, 10.
i. 27, 4. \textit{Imam ā shu tvam asmākaṁ saniṁ gāyatram navyāṁsam} | 
\textit{Agne deveṣhu pravočaḥ} | 
“Agni, thou hast announced [or do thou announce] among the gods this our offering, our newest hymn.”

i. 60, 3. \textit{Tāṁ navyasi hridāḥ ā jāyamānam asmat sukīrttir madhujīhvaṁ āsyāḥ | yam rītvjo vṛjane mānushāsah prayasvantaḥ āyavo jīvaṁ nāṇta} |

“May our newest laudation (springing) from (our) heart, reach him, the sweet-tongued, at his birth, (him) whom mortal priests the descendants of Manu, offering obligations, have generated in the ceremonial.”
(See iii. 39, 1, in next page, and i. 171, 2 and ii. 35, 2, which will be quoted further on in the next section).

i. 89, 3. \textit{Tāṁ pūrvayā nividā hūmahe vayam Bhagam Mitram Aditiṁ Dakham Asridham ityādī} |

“We invoke with an ancient hymn Bhaga, Mitra, Aditi, Daksha, Asrīdha [or the friendly],” etc. (\textit{Pūrvakātināyā | nityāyā | nividā | vedātmikayā vāchā | “With an ancient—eternal, hymn—a Vedic text.”—Sāyaṇa.})

i. 96, 2. \textit{Sa pūrvayā nividā kavyatā Āyor imāḥ prajāḥ ajanayad maṁnām} |

“Through the ancient hymn, the poetic work, of Āyu he (Agni) generated these children of men.”

i. 130, 10. \textit{Sa no navyēbhīr vṛisha-karmann ukthais purāṁ darttaḥ pāyubhiḥ pāhi śagmāiḥ} |

“Through our new hymns, do thou, vigorous in action, destroyer of cities, sustain us with invigorating blessings.”

i. 143, 1. \textit{Pra tavyasiṁ navyasiṁ dhitim Agnaye vācho matiṁ sahasaḥ sūnave bhare} |

“I bring to Agni, the son of strength, a new and energetic hymn, a production of thought uttered by the voice (vāchah).”

ii. 17, 1. \textit{Tad asmiṁ navyam Angiras-vad archata ityādī} |

“Utter to him [Indra] that new [hymn] like Angiras.” (“New, i.e. never before seen among other people” \textit{anyesha adrīṣṭa-pūrvam—Sāyaṇa.})

ii. 18, 3. \textit{Hari nu kaṁ rathe Indrasya yojam āyai sūktena vachasā navena | mo shu teṁ atra bahavo hi viprāḥ ni vīrāman yajamānaśo anye} |

7 See the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa, p. 143 of Prof. Haug’s translation; and Vol. I. p. 180.
"With this new and well-expressed hymn I have yoked the steeds in Indra's car, in order that he may come hither. Let not the other wise sacrificers, who are numerous, stop thee (from coming to me)."

ii. 24, 1. Sa imām avidhā prabhritīṁ yah tishe | ayā viḍhema navayā mahā girā |

"Do thou who rulest receive this, our offering [of praise]: let us worship thee with this new and grand song."

iii. 1, 20. Etā te Agne jāminā sanāni pra pūrvāya nātanāni vocham |

"These ancient [and these] new productions I have uttered to thee, Agni, who art ancient." (Comp. R.V. viii. 84, 5, in the next section.)

iii. 32, 13. Yaḥ stomebhir vāśridhe pārvyebhīr yo madhyaśebhir uṭa nātanēbhīṁ |

"[Indra] who has grown through (or been magnified by) ancient, intermediate, and modern hymns."

iii. 39, 1. Indram matir kridāḥ ā vacayāmāna aṣṭhā pāṭiṁ stoma- 

tashtā jīgati | ā jāgrivir vidathe śasyāmāna Indra yat te jayate viḍhī 
tasya | 2. Divas chid ā pūrvāya jāyamāna vi jāgrivir vidathe śasyamāna | 
bhadra vastrāṇi arjunā vasāṇā sā iyaṁ asme sanajā pitryā dhīḥ |

"1. The vigilant hymn, formed of praise, and uttered from the heart, proceeds to Indra the lord, when chaunted at the sacrifice: be cognizant, Indra, of this [praise] which is produced for thee. 2. Produced even before the daylight, vigilant, chaunted at the sacrifice, clothed in beautiful and radiant garments,—this is our ancient ancestral hymn." (Pitryā is rendered by Sāyaṇa as pitrya-kramāgata, "received by suc- cession from our fathers.")

iii. 62, 7. Iyāṁ te Pūshan āghriṅe ushṭutīr deva nayasi | asmābhis 
tubhyāṁ śasyate |

"Divine and glowing Pūshan, this new laudation is recited by us to thee."

v. 42, 13. Pra sū mahē susaraṇāya medhāṁ giram bhare navaśīṁ 

jāyamānam |

"I present to the mighty protector a mental production, a new ut- terance [now] springing up."

6 Compare the expressions vaccha-yujā harī, "brown horses yoked by the hymn (R.V. viii. 46, 39; viii. 87, 9); brahma-yuj, "yoked by prayer" (i. 177, 2; iii. 35, 4; viii. 1, 24; viii. 2, 27; viii. 17, 2); and mansa-yuj, "yoked by the mind, or will" (i. 14, 6; i. 51, 10; iv. 48, 4; v. 75, 6; viii. 6, 2).
v. 55, 8. Yat pūreyam Maruto yach cha nūtanāṁ yad udyate Vasavo yach cha śasyate | viśvasya tasya bhavatha navedasah |

“Be cognizant of all that is ancient, Maruts, and of all that is modern, of all that is spoken, Vasus, and of all that is recited.”

vi. 17, 13. . . . Suvirāṁ tvā svāyudhāṁ suvojram ā brahma navam avase vaaritvāt |

“May the new prayer impel thee, the heroic, well-accoutred, the loud-thundering, to succour us.” (“New, i.e. never made before by others: prayer, i.e. the hymn made by us” Nūtanam anyair akṛita-pūrvam | brahma asmābhīḥ kṛitaṁ stotram—Sāyaṇa.)

vi. 22, 7. Tuṁ vo dhiyāṁ navasyaṁ śaśiḥśham pratnam pratna-vat parižānayadyai |

“I seek, like the ancients, to stimulate thee, the ancient, with a new hymn.”

vi. 34, 1. Saṁ cha tve jagmūr girāḥ Indra pūrvar vi cha tevā yanti vibheo maniśhāḥ | purā nūnaṁ cha stutayah rishinām paspridhre Indre adhi ukthārkāḥ |

“Many songs, Indra, are collected in thee; numerous thoughts issue forth from thee; both before and now the praises, texts and hymns of rishis have hastened emulously to Indra.”

vi. 44, 13. Yaḥ pūreyābhir uta nūtanābhir girbhir vāvridhe grīnatām rishinām |

“He (Indra) who grew through the ancient and modern hymns of lauding rishis.” (See R.V. iii. 32, 13, above p. 223.)

vi. 48, 11. Ā sakhāyāḥ sabardughāṁ dhenum ajadhvam upa navyasā vachaḥ |

“Friends, drive hither the milch cow with a new hymn.”

vi. 49, 1. Stushe janaṁ suvrateṁ navyasibhir girbhir Mitraavaryānā sumnayantā |

“With new praises I celebrate the righteous race, with Mitra and Varuna, the beneficent.” (“The well-acting race, i.e. the divine race, the company of the gods,” sukarṁāṇam janaṁ daivyaṁ janaṁ devasangham—Sāyaṇa.)

vi. 50, 6. Abhi tyaiṁ viśrīṁ girvaṇasam archa Indram brahmaṁ jāritar navena |

“Sing, o worshipper, with a new hymn, to the heroic Indra, who delights in praise.”

* Compare the words ni Agne navyasā vachas tanūshu śaṁnam etsaham, viii. 39, 2.
vi. 62, 4. Tā navyaso jaramāṇasya manma upa bhūshato yuyujāna-sapta ityādi | 5. Tā valgū dasrā purusākatamā pratnā navyasā vachāsā
vivāse |

"4. These (Aśvins), with yoked horses, approach the hymn of their new worshipper. . . . 5. I adore with a new hymn these brilliant, strong, most mighty, and ancient (gods)."

vii. 35, 14, will be quoted in the next section.

vii. 53, 2. Pra pūrvaie pitāra navyasībhīr gīr्भīḥ kṛiṇudhvam sadane
ritasya ityādi |

"In the place of sacrifice propitiate with new hymns the ancient, the parents" (i.e. Heaven and Earth), etc.

vii. 56, 23. Bhūri chakra Marutaḥ pitṛyāṇi ukthāni yā vah śasyante
purā chit |

"Ye have done great things, o Maruts, when our fathers’ hymns were recited of old in your honour."

vii. 59, 4. . . . abhi vah āvartt sumatir naviyasi 10 tāyāṁ yāta piṁ-
shavaḥ |

"May the new hymn turn you hither; come quickly, desirous to drink."

vii. 61, 6. . . . Pra vāṁ manmāni rīchase navāni kṛitāni brahma
jujushann imāni |

"May the new hymns made to praise you, may these prayers gra-
tify you."

vii. 93, 1. Suchiṁ nu stomaṁ nava-jātam adya Indrāgni Vṛitra-hanā
jushetham | ubhā hi vāṁ suhavā johavimi ityādi |

"Indra and Agni, slayers of Vṛitra, receive with favour the pure
hymn newly produced to-day. For again and again do I invoke you
who lend a willing ear,” etc.

viii. 5, 24. Tābhir ayātam utibhir navyasībhīḥ suśastibhiḥ yad vāṁ
vṛiṣhaṇvasā hue |

"Come with those same succours, since I invoke you, bountiful [deities], with new praises.” (The epithet navyasībhī in this text
might possibly be construed with the word utibhiḥ, “aids.”)

viii. 6, 11. Aham pratham manmanā girāḥ śumbhāmi Kaṇva-vat |
yena Indraḥ bāhman id dadhe |

10 The same words, sumatir naviyasi, occur in viii. 92, 9, where they may not have the same sense as here.
"I decorate my praises with an ancient hymn, after the manner of Kāvya, whereby Indra put on strength."

viii. 6, 43. Ḫmāṁ su pāreyāṁ dhiyam madhor ghritasya pipyushāṁ
Karvāh ukthena varvidhuh |

"The Kānvās with their praise have augmented this ancient hymn, replenished with sweet butter."

viii. 12, 10. Ityāṁ te ritevīvatī dhātir eti naviyasi saparyanti ītyādi |

"This new and solemn hymn advances to honour thee," etc.

viii. 20, 19. Yūnaḥ a su navishṭhayā vriśñṇāḥ pāvakān abhi Sobhare girā gāya ītyādi |

"Sing, o Sobhari, with a new hymn to these youthful, vigorous, and brilliant (gods).

viii. 23, 14. Srushṭī Agne navasya me stomasya vira viśpate vi mā-
yinas tapushā rakshasoho dāha |

"Heroic Agni, lord of the people, on hearing my new hymn, burn up with thy heat the deluding Rakshases."

viii. 25, 24. . . . Kāśāvantā viprā navishṭhayā mati maho vājināv
arvata sathā asanam |

"I have celebrated at the same time with a new hymn, these two sage and mighty [princes], strong, swift, and carrying whips."

viii. 39, 6. Āgni veda marttanām apiṣhyam . . . . Āgni dvārā vyār-
yute svāhuto naviyasi |

"Agni knows the secrets of mortals . . . . Agni, invoked by a new [hymn], opens the doors."

viii. 40, 12. Eka Indragnibhyāṁ pitṛ- vad naviyo Māndhātri- vad
Angiras-vad avāchī ityādi |

"Thus has a new [hymn] been uttered to Indra and Agni after the manner of our fathers, and of Māndhātri, and of Angiras."

viii. 41, 2. Tam a shu samanā girā pitṛināṁ cha manmabhīḥ Nabhā-
kaṇya prasūṣhibhir yaḥ sīndhunām upa udaye saptasvāsā a madhyamaḥ |

"[Worship] him (Varuṇa) continually with a song, with the hymns of the fathers,11 and with the praises of Nābhāka. He who dwells at the

11 The expression here employed, pitṛināṁ cha manmabhīḥ, occurs also in R.V. x. 67, 3 (=Vāj. S. 3, 53): Mano nu a huvāmahe nārājaṁena somena pitṛināṁ cha manmabhīḥ | "We summon his soul with Soma, accompanied by human praises, and with the hymns of the fathers." The Vājasaneyi Sanhitā reads stomena, "hymn," instead of somena. The commentator there explains nārājaṁena somena as "a hymn
birth-place of the streams, the lord of the seven sisters, abides in the centre.” (This verse is quoted in the Nirukta x. 5. Nabhāka is said by Yāska to have been a rishi (rishir Nabhāko babhāra). A translation of the passage is given in Roth’s Illustrations of the Nir. p. 135, where reference is also made to two verses of the preceding hymn (viii. 40, 4, 5), in which Nabhāka (the ancestor of Nabhāka) is mentioned thus: (verse 4) Abhyartha Nabhāka-vad Indrāgni yajasā girā . . . . (verse 5) Pra brahmāni Nabhāka-vad Indrāgniḥbhṝyām irajyata | “Worship Indra and Agni with sacrifice and hymn, like Nabhāka . . . . Like Nabhāka, direct your prayers to Indra and Agni.” In explanation of the seven sisters, Roth refers to Nir. v. 27 (R.V. viii. 58, 12) where the seven rivers are mentioned. See his Illustrations of Nir. pp. 70, 71.

viii. 44, 12. Agniḥ pratnena manmanā śumbhānas tanvaṁ svām kaviḥ vipṛṇa vavṛtikhe |
“The wise Agni, illuminating his own body at [the sound of] the sage and ancient hymn, has become augmented.”

viii. 55, 11. Vayaṁ gha te apūrṇā Indra brahmāni vṛttakhan | purutamāsaḥ puruhāta vajrivo bhṛtiṁ na pra bharāmasi |
“Indra, slayer of Vṛttakha, thunderer, invoked of many, we [thy] numerous [worshippers] bring to thee, as thy hire, hymns which never before existed.”

viii. 63, 7, 8. Iyāṁ te nāvayā matir Agne adhāyī asmād ā mandra sujāta sukrato amūra dasma atitke | sā te Agne śantamā chanishṭhaḥ bha-vatu priyā tayā vardhava susukṣte |
“O Agni, joyful, well-born, strong, unerring, and wondrous guest, this new hymn has been offered to (or, made for) thee by us; may it be dear to thee, agreeable and pleasant; lauded by it, do thou increase.”

viii. 65, 5, 6 . . . . Indrāṁ girbhir havāmahe | Indram pratnena manmanā marutaantam havāmahe ityādi | 12. (S.V. ii. 340.) Vācham ash-ṭāpādīm aham nava-sraktim rita-spriṣam | Indrāṁ pari tanvam mame |
“5. We invoke Indra with songs; we invoke Indra, attended by the Maruts, with an ancient hymn. . . . 12. I compose for the sake of

in which men are praised,” and pitṛīyāṁ cha manmabhīḥ, as hymns “in which the fathers are reverenced” (pitaro yāṁ stotnār manyante te manmānas tair ityādi). See Prof. Max Müller’s translation of this hymn in the Journal of Roy. As. Soc. for 1866, pp. 449 and 458.
Indra a hymn of eight feet and nine lines, abounding in sacred truth." (This verse is translated and explained by Professor Benfey, Sāma-veda, p. 255.)

ix. 9, 8. Nu navyase naviyase sūktāya sādhaya pathaḥ | pratna-vad vohaya ruchāḥ |

"Prepare (o Soma) the paths for our newest, most recent, hymn; and, as of old, cause the lights to shine."

ix. 42, 2. Esha pratnena manmanā devo devebhyaḥ pari | dhārayā pavate sutaḥ |

"This god, poured forth to the gods, with an ancient hymn, purifies with his stream."

ix. 91, 5. Sa pratna-vad navyase viśva-vāra sūktāya pathaḥ kriṇuki pračaḥ ityādi |

"O god, who possessest all good, make, as of old, forward paths for this new hymn."

ix. 99, 4 (= S.V. ii. 983). Taṁ gāthayā purāṇyā punānam abhi anūshata | uto kripanta dhitaye devānāṁ nāma bibhratīḥ |

"They praised the pure god with an ancient song; and hymns embracing the names of the gods have supplicated him." (Benfey translates the last clause differently.)

x. 4, 6. . . . Iyāṁ te Agne navyasi maniśhā yuktva rathāṁ na śuca-
yaddhir angaḥ |

"This is for thee, Agni, a new hymn: yoke thy car as it were with shining parts."

x. 89, 3. Samānam asmai anapavīrid archa kshmayā divo asamam brahma navyam ityādi |

"Sing (to Indra) without ceasing a new hymn, worthy of him, and unequalled in earth or heaven."

x. 91, 13. Imāṁ pratnāya sushṭutiṁ naviyasīṁ vocheyam asmai uṣate śriṇotu nah |

"I will address to this ancient [deity] my new praises, which he desires; may he listen to us."

x. 96, 11. . . . Navyāṁ navyāṁ haryasi manma nu priyam ityādi |

"Thou delightest in ever new hymns, which are dear to thee," etc.

x. 160, 5. Aśvayanto gavyanto vājayanto havāmahe teva upa gantavai u | ābhūshantas te sumatau navāyāṁ vayam Indra teva śunaṁ huvema |

"Desiring horses, cattle, and wealth, we invoke thee to approach us.
Paying homage to thee in a new hymn, may we, O Indra, invoke thee auspiciously."

SECT. III.—Passages of the Rig-veda, in which the rishis describe themselves as the composers of the hymns.

In this section I propose to quote, first of all, those passages in which the rishis distinctly speak of themselves as the authors of the hymns, and express no consciousness whatever of deriving assistance or inspiration from any supernatural source. I shall then adduce some further texts in which, though nothing is directly stated regarding the composition of the hymns, there is at the same time nothing which would lead the reader to imagine that the rishis looked upon them as anything else than the offspring of their own minds.

I shall arrange the quotations in which the rishis distinctly claim the authorship, according to the particular verb which is employed to express this idea. These verbs are (1) kṛi, "to make," (2) takṣḥ (= the Greek τεκταίνωμαι), "to fabricate," and (3) jān, "to beget, generate, or produce," with others which are less explicit.

I. I adduce first the passages in which (1) the verb kṛi, "to make," is applied to the composition of the hymns. (Compare R.V. vii. 61, 6, already quoted in the last section.)

R.V. i. 20, 1. Ayaṁ devāya janmane stomo viprebhir āśayā | akārī ratna-dhātamaḥ |

"This hymn, conferring wealth, has been made to the divine race, by the sages, with their mouth [or in presence of the gods]."

i. 31, 18. Etena Agne brahmāṇā vāvṛidhava śakti vā yat te chakrīna vidā vā |

"Grow, O Agni, by this prayer which we have made to thee according to our power, or our knowledge."

i. 47, 2. . . . Kauṇāsāṃ vāṃ brahma kriṣṇanti adhvare teshām su śṛṅgutān havam |

"The Kauṇas make a prayer to you: hear well their invocation."

i. 61, 16. Fvā te hariyojanā suvṛkṣti Indra brahmanī Gotamasāną akrān |

"Thus, O Indra, yoker of steeds, have the Gotamas made hymns for thee efficaciously."

12 See the note on vi. 32, 1, below.
i. 117, 25. 
Etāni vām Āśvinā viryaṇī pra pūryaṇī āyavaḥ avocharābhra maṃ kriṇvanto
ṛṣhayaḥ yuvalbhyaṁ suvīrasa āvādhamā vudema |

"These, your ancient exploits, o Āśvins, men have declared. Let
us, who are strong in bold men, making a hymn for you, o vigorous
gods, utter our offering of praise.”

i. 184, 5. 
Eshā vām stoma Āśvināv akāri mānebhīr mahacānā suvīrkti

"This hymn has efficaciously been made to you, o opulent Āśvins,
by the Mānas. (Comp. i. 169, 8; 171, 5; 182, 8; 184, 3.)

ii. 39, 8. 
Etāni vām Āśvinā vardhanāni brahma stomaṁ Gṛsamas-
dāsah akran |

"These magnifying prayers, [this] hymn, o Āśvins, the Gṛtsamadas
have made for you.”

iii. 30, 20. 
Śvayavo matibhis tubhyāṁ viprāḥ Indrāya vāhāḥ Kuśikāsah akran |

"Aspiring to heaven, the sage Kuśikas have made a hymn with
praises to thee, o Indra.” (The word vāhāḥ is stated by Sāyana to be
= stotra, “a hymn.”)

iv. 6, 11. 
Akāri brahma samidhāna tubhyāṁ ityādi |

"O kindled [Agni], a prayer has been made to thee.”

iv. 16, 20. 
Eved Indrāya vrishabhāya vrishne brahma akarna Bhṛgya
vo na ratham | . . . 21. Akāri te harico brahma navayāṁ dhiyāḥ syāma
rathyāḥ sadāsah |

"Thus have we made a prayer for Indra, the productive, the vigorous,
as the Bhṛgus [fashioned] a car. . . . 21. A new prayer has been
made for thee, o lord of steeds. May we, through our hymn (or rite),
become possessed of chariots and perpetual wealth.”

vi. 52, 2. 
Ati vā yo maruto manyate no brahma vā yāḥ kriyamāṇaṁ
nītisāt | tapuṇaṁ tasmāi vṛjiniṁi santu brahma-dvisham abhi tam
sochatu dyauḥ |

"Whoever, o Maruṭṣ, regards himself as superior to us, or reviles
the prayer which is being made, may burning injuries be his lot; may
the sky scorch the enemy of prayer.”

13 The reader will find Prof. Haug’s opinion of the sense of this phrase in p. 11 f.
of his German dissertation “on the original signification of the word brahma,” of
which the author has been kind enough to send me a copy, which has reached me as
this sheet is passing through the press. Prof. Haug mentions R.V. i. 88, 4; vii.
103, 8, as passages (additional to those I have given) in which the expression occurs.

14 Translated by Prof. Haug in the Dissertation above referred to, p. 6.
vii. 35, 14. Ādityāḥ Rudrāḥ Vasavo jushanta (the Atharva-veda has jushantām) idam brahma kriyamānaṁ naviyāḥ śṛṇvantu no dievāḥ pārthivāśo gojātaḥ ityādi ।

“The Ādityas, Rudras, and Vasus receive with pleasure this new prayer which is being made. May the gods of the air, the earth, and the sky hear us.”

vii. 37, 4. Vayaṁ nu te dāśvāṁsaḥ syāma brahma kriyavantaḥ ityādi ।

“Let us offer oblations to thee, making prayers,” etc.

vii. 97, 9. Iṣyaṁ vāṁ Brahmaṇaspati suvṛktir brahma Indrāya vajrīne akāri ।

“Brahmaṇaspati, this efficacious hymn, [this] prayer has been made for thee, and for Indra, the thunderer.”

viii. 51, 4. Āyahi kriyavāma te Indra brahmāṇi vardāhanā ityādi ।

“Come, Indra, let us make prayers, which magnify thee,” etc.

viii. 79, 3. Brahma te Indra girvaḥ kriyante anatidbhutā imā jushaseva haryāśeṣa yojanā yā te amamanahi ।

“Unequalled prayers are made for thee Indra, who loveth hymns. Receive favourably, lord of the brown steeds, those which we have thought out for thee, to yoke thy horses.”

x. 54, 6. . . . Adha priyaṁ śūṣham Indrāya manma brahmakṛito ।

Vṛihadukthād avācī ।

“... An acceptable and powerful hymn has been uttered to Indra by Vṛihaduktha, maker of prayers.”

x. 101, 2. Mandrā kriṇudhvam dhiyāḥ ā tanudhvāṁ nāvaṁ aitrāparānīṁ kriṇudhvam ।

“Make pleasant (hymns), prepare prayers, make a ship propelled by oars.”

It is possible that in many of these passages the verb kṛi may have merely the signification which the word make has in English when we speak of “making supplications,” etc., in which case it of course means to offer up, rather than to compose. But this cannot be the case in such passages as R.V. iv. 16, 20 (p. 233), where the rishi speaks of making

15 Compare riṣhayo mantrakṛito manishīnaḥ in Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa, i. 8, 8, 5; and R.V. ix. 114, 2: Riṣhe mantra-kṛitaṁ stomāṁ Kasyapodevardhayam girah | somaṁ namasya rūpam āy sajne virudhim patiḥ । “Rishi Kaśyapa, augmenting thy words with the praises of the makers of hymns, reverence King Soma, who was born the lord of plants.”

16 Prof. Haug thinks the word brahma-kṛit here refers to hymns, and mentions other passages in which it occurs: see p. 12 of the Dissertation above referred to.
the hymn as the Bhrigus made a chariot. And such an interpretation would be altogether inadmissible in the case of the texts which I next proceed to cite.

II. Passages in which the word takṣh, "to fashion, or fabricate," is applied to the composition of the hymns.

   i. 62, 13. Sanāyata Gotamaḥ Indra navyam atakṣhad brahma hariyo-
janāya ityādi |
   "Nodhas, descendant of Gotama, fashioned this new hymn for [thee],
Indra, who art of old, and who yokest thy steeds," etc.

   i. 130, 6. Imāṁ te vāchāṁ vasuyantaḥ āyavo rathaṁ na dhīraḥ svap-
āḥ atakṣhishuḥ suṁnāya tvāṁ atakṣhishuḥ |
   "Desiring wealth, men have fashioned for thee this hymn, as a skil-
ful workman [fabricates] a car; and thus they have disposed (lit.
fashioned) thee to (confer) happiness."

   i. 171, 2. Esha vaḥ stomo Maruto namasvān hridā tashṭo manasa
dhāyi devaḥ |
   "This reverential hymn, o divine Maruts, fashioned by the heart,
has been presented [or, made] by the mind. [According to Sāyaṇa, the
last words mean, 'let it be received by you with a favourable mind']."

   ii. 19, 8. Evā te Grītsamadāḥ sūra manma avasyavo na vayunāni
takṣhuḥ |
   "Thus, o hero, have the Grītsamadas, desiring succour, fashioned
for thee a hymn, as men make works." (Sāyaṇa explains vayuna by
"road.")

   ii. 35, 2. Imāṁ su asmāi hridāḥ ā sutasḥtam mantraṁ vochema kuvid
asya vedat |
   "Let us address to him this well-fashioned hymn proceeding from
the heart; will he not be aware of it?"

   v. 2, 11. Etaṁ te stomaṁ tuvi-jāta vipro rathaṁ na dhīraḥ svapāḥ
atakṣham |
   "I, a sage, have fabricated this hymn for thee, o powerful [deity],
as a skilful workman fashions a car."

   v. 29, 15. Indra brahma kriyāmaṇā jushasa yā te savishṭha navyā
akarma | vastreva bhadrā sukṛitā vasūyuḥ rathaṁ na dhīraḥ svapāḥ
atakṣham |

   17 See also v. 29, 15, and x. 39, 14, which will be quoted a little further on; and
in which the verbs kri and takṣh are both employed.
"O mighty Indra, regard with favour the prayers which are made, the new [prayers] which we have made for thee. Desirous of wealth, I have fabricated them like beautiful well-fashioned garments, as a skilful workman [constructs] a car." (Compare R.V. iii. 39, 2; above, p. 226.)

v. 73, 10. *Imā brahmāṇī vardhanaṁ Aśvībhyāṁ santu santamā | yā takahāma rathāṁ ita avochāma brihad namaḥ |

"May these magnifying prayers which we have fashioned, like cars, be pleasing to the Aśvins: we have uttered great adoration."

vi. 32, 1 (=S.V. i. 322). *Apūryā purutamāni asmai mahe vīrāya tave sī turāya | virāpsine vajrīne santamāni vachāṁsi āsāṁ 18 sthavirāya takham |

"To this great hero, vigorous, energetic, the adorable, unshaken thunderer, I have with my mouth fabricated copious and pleasing prayers, which have never before existed."

vi. 16, 47. *Ā te Agne richā havir hridā tasḥtam bharāmasi |

"In this verse, Agni, we bring to thee an oblation fabricated by the heart." (Comp. R.V. iii. 39, 1, in p. 226.)

vii. 7, 6. *Ete dyumnebhir visam atiranta mantraṁ ye vā arunī naryāḥ atakshan |

"These manly (Vasishthas), who have skilfully fabricated the hymn, have by their energy accomplished all things (?)"

vii. 64, 4. *Yo vāṁ garttam manasā takshad etam ūrddhāṁ dhītiṁ kriṇavad dhārayacha cha |

"May he who with his mind fashioned for you (Mitra and Varuṇa) this car, make and sustain the lofty hymn." (The same expression ūrddhāṁ dhītiṁ occurs in R.V. i. 119, 2.)

viii. 6, 33. *Uta brahmāṇyā vayaṁ tubhyam pravṛddha vajrīvo viprāḥ atakshma jīvase |

"O mighty thunderer, we who are sage, have fabricated prayers for thee, that we may live."

x. 39, 14. *Etāṁ vāṁ stotam Aśvināv akarma atakshāma Bhrigavo na ratham | ni amṛkṣhāma yoshanāṁ na marylīṇī na sūnūm tanayaṁ dadhānāḥ |

"This hymn, Aśvins, we have made for you; we have fabricated it

18 On the sense of āsā see Prof. Müller’s article in the Journal of Roy. As. Soc. for 1867, p. 232 f.; and Böhtlingk and Roth’s Lexicon, s.v.
as the Bhrigus [constructed] a car; we have decorated it, as a bride for her husband, continuing the series [of our praises] like an unbroken line of descendants." (See iv. 16, 20, above, p. 233.)

(The following is Sāyaṇa's comment on this passage, for a copy of which I am indebted to Professor Müller: Ḫo Āśvinau vāṁ yuvayor etāṁ yatoktaṁ stomaṁ stotram akarma akurma | Tad etad āha | Bhrigavo na Bhrigavaḥ iva ratham atakshāma vayaṁ stotram saṁskritavantaḥ | karmayogāḥ Ribhavo Bhrigavaḥ uchyante | athavā rathakāraḥ Bhrigavaḥ | kincha vayaṁ nityam śāsvataṁ tanayaṁ yāgānāṁ karmanāṁ tanitāraṁ sānum na aurasam putram iva stotraṁ dadhāṇāḥ dhārayanto martye manushye nyamrikṣhāma yuvayoḥ stutiṁ nitarāṁ saṁskritavantaḥ | "Āśvins, we have made this preceding hymn or praise of you. He means to say this. Like the Bhrigus, we have made a car, we have carefully constructed a hymn. The Ribhus are, in this passage,...... styled Bhrigus; or Bhrigus are chariot-makers. Moreover, maintaining praise as a constant perpetuator (like a legitimate son) of sacrifice and other rites, we have polished, i.e. carefully composed a celebration of you among men [?]."

In this comment the word yoshaṇa is left unexplained. In verse 12 of this hymn the Āśvins are supplicated to come in a car fleeter than thought, constructed for them by the Ribhus—a tena yātām manasso javiyasa rathaṁ yaṁ vāṁ Ribhavaḥ chakrur Āśvinā |

x. 80, 7. Agnaye brahma Ribhavas tataskishuḥ |

"The Ribhus [or the wise] fabricated a hymn for Agni.

III. I next quote some texts in which the hymns are spoken of as being generated by the rishis. (Comp. R.V. vii. 93, 1, in p. 228.)

iii. 2, 1. Vaiśvānarāya dhīshanāṁ ritārvidhe ghṛitaṁ naḥ patām Agnaye janāmāsi |

"We generate a hymn, like pure butter, for Agni Vaiśvānara, who promotes our sacred rites."

vii. 15, 4. Navāṁ nu stotam Agnaye divaḥ śyenāya jījanam | vasvaḥ kuid vanati naḥ |

"I have generated a new hymn to Agni, the falcon of the sky; will he not bestow on us wealth in abundance?"

vii. 22, 9. Ye cha pūrve rishayo ye cha nātāṁ Indra brahmāṇi jana-yanta viprāḥ |

"Indra, the wise rishis, both ancient and modern, have generated prayers."
vii. 26, 1. *Na somaḥ Indram asuto mamāda na abrahmāṇo maghavānaṁ sutasaḥ | tasmai ukthaṁ janaye yaṁ juvoshad nṛcād naivyaḥ śrīnavaṁ yathā naḥ |

“The soma exhilarates not Indra unless it be poured out; nor do libations [gratify] Maghavan when offered without a prayer. To him I generate a hymn such as may please him, that, after the manner of men, he may hear our new [production].”

vii. 31, 11. . . . *Swērkitim Indrāya brahma janayanta viprāḥ |

“The sages generated an efficacious production and a prayer for Indra.”

vii. 94, 1, 2 (=S.V. ii. 266). *Iyaṁ vām asya manmanyā Indrāgni pūrya-stutir abhrād vrishtir iva ajani | śrīnutaṁ jaritur havam ityādi |

“This excellent praise has been generated for you, Indra and Agni, from the soul of this [your worshipper], like rain from a cloud. Hear the invocation of your encomiast.” (Benfey thinks manman, “spirit,” is to be understood of Soma, whose hymn, i.e. the sound of his dropping, resembles the falling of rain. The scholiast of the S.V. makes manman = stotri, “worshipper”.)

viii. 43, 2. *Aṣmaie te pratiharyate Jātavedo vicharashyaṁ Agne janāmi sushtutim |

“Wise Agni Jātavedas, I generate a hymn for thee, who receivest it with favour.”

viii. 77, 4. *Ā tvā ayam arkaḥ utaye vavarttati yaṁ Gotamah ajijanan |

“This hymn which the Gotamas have generated, incites thee to succour us.”

viii. 84, 4, 5. *Śrūdhi havāṁ Tiraschyaḥ Indra yaṁ tvā saparyati suvṛtyasya gomato rāyaḥ pūrdhi mahān asi | Indra yaṁ te naviyastṁ giram mandrām ajijanat chikitvin-manasaṁ dhiyaṁ pratnāṁ pitasya pipyushim |

“Hear, Indra, the invocation of Tiraschi, thy worshipper; replenish him with wealth in strong men and in cattle, for thou art great. Indra (do this for him) who has generated for thee the newest exhilarating hymn, springing from an intelligent mind, an ancient mental product, full of sacred truth.”

(These verses occur also in the Sāma-veda ii. 233, 234, and are translated by Professor Benfey, at pp. 230 and 250 of his edition. The hymn referred to in this passage is apparently designated as both
new and old. How can it be both? It may have been an old hymn re-written and embellished; ancient in substance, though new in expression.¹³ Compare St. John's Gospel, xiii. 34, and the First Epistle of St. John, ii. 7, 8, and iii. 11.)

ix. 73, 2. . . . madhor dhārabhir janayanto arkam it priyāṁ Indra-
sya tanvam aśvērīdhan |

"Generating the hymn, they have augmented the beloved body of Indra with the honied streams."

ix. 95, 1 (= S.V. i. 530). . . . ato matir janayata svadhābhīḥ |

"Wherefore generate hymns with the oblations." (Professor Benfey makes janayata the 3rd person singular of the imperfect middle, and applies it to Soma.)

x. 7, 2. Imāḥ Agne matayas tubhyaṁ jātāḥ gobhir āśvair abhi grīṇanti rādhāḥ |

"These hymns, Agni, generated for thee, celebrate thy bounty in cows and horses."

x. 23, 5, 6, 7. Yo vācāḥ vivācho mṛidhravāchaḥ purā sahasrāḥ aśivā jaghāna | Tat tad id asya paunuṣyanā grīṇīmasi pītā ieva yaś tavishīṁ vā-
vṛidhe śavah | 6. Stomaṁ te Indra Vimadāḥ ajījanann apūrveyam puruta-
maṁ sudānave | Vidma hi asya bhojanam inasya yad ā paśuṁ na gopāḥ
kārāmahe | 7. Mā kir nāḥ enā sakhyā viyausḥus tava cha Indra Vimadasya
tva rīsheḥ | Vidma hi te pramatiṁ deva jāmi-vaḥ asme te santu sakhyā
dīvāni |

"5. Who (Indra) with his voice slew many thousands of the wicked uttering confused and hostile cries. We laud his several acts of valour, who, like a father, grew in vigour and strength. 6. For thee, O Indra, who art bountiful, the Vimadas have generated a copious hymn, which never before existed (apūreyya); for we know that it is gratifying to this mighty god, when we attract him hither as a cowherd drives his cattle. 7. Indra, may that friendship of ours never be dissolved, which exists between thee and the rishi Vimada: for we know thy wisdom, O god; may thy friendship be favourable to us, like that of a kinsman."

x. 67, 1. Imāṁ dhiyaṁ sapta-śirṣaṁ pitā naḥ ritaprajātāṁ bhrihatṁ

avindat | tvirīyaṁ svij janayad viścajan yo Ayāṣyaḥ uktham Indräya

kansan |

¹³ As Prof. Aufrecht expresses it: "Gīr is opposed to dhī, as form to substance a new utterance, but a primordial homage."
“Our father hath discovered [or invented] this great, seven-headed hymn, born of sacred truth; Ayāsya, friend of all men, celebrating Indra, has generated the fourth song of praise.” (In his Lexicon, Roth gives Ayāsya as a proper name; but says it may also be an adjective with the sense of “unworned.”)

x. 91, 14. *Kitāla-pe soma-prishtāya vedhase hridā matiṁ janaye cha-rum Agnaye |

“With my heart I generate a beautiful hymn for Agni, the drinker of nectar, the soma-sprinkled, the wise.” (See also R.V. i. 109, 1, 2, which will be quoted below.)

IV. In the following texts the verbal root ri, “to move, send forth,” etc., used with or without a preposition, is applied to the utterance or (it may even mean) the production of hymns.

i. 116, 1. *Nāsatābyām barhir iva praṇinje stomān iyarmi abhriyā iva vātaḥ | yāv arbhagāya Vimadāya jāyām senājuvā ni uhatuḥ rathena |

“In like manner as I spread the sacrificial grass to the Nāsatyas (Āśvins), so do I send forth to them hymns, as the wind [drives] the clouds; to them (I say), who bore off to the youthful Vimada his bride in a chariot swift as an arrow.”

vii. 61, 2. *Pra vāṁ sa Mitrā-Varunaḥ ritāvā vipro manmāni dirgha-śrūd iyartti | Yasya brahmāni sukratā avāthāḥ ā yat krātavā na saradāḥ priyaithe |

“The devout sage, heard afar off, sends forth his hymns to you, o Mitra and Varuna. Do you, mighty gods, receive his prayers with favour, so that for (many) autumns ye may not be satiated with his fervour.” (See Böhtlingk and Roth’s Lexicon, s.v. ā + pri.)

viii. 12, 31. *Imāṁ te Indra sushtutim viprah iyartti dhītibhiḥ | jāmim padā iva piprātim pra adhevre |

“In the sacrifice the sage, with praises, sends forth to thee this hymn, which is of kin to thee, and, as it were, supplies the places (of others?)

viii. 13, 26. . . .  *Ritād iyarmi te dhiyam manoyojam |

“. . . From the sacred ceremony I send forth a prayer which will attract thy heart.”

x. 116, 9. *Pra Indrāgniḥbyāṁ sucachasyāṁ iyarmi sindhāv iva prera-yaṁ nāvam arkaik |

“I send forth a [hymn] with beautiful words to Indra and Agni; with my praises I have, as it were, launched a ship on the sea.”
(Compare R.V. ii. 42, 1, spoken of Indra in the form of the bird called Kapinjala, a sort of partridge: \textit{Iyartti vācham ariteva nāvam} | “It sends forth a voice, as a rower propels a boat.” See also R.V. x. 101, 2, quoted above, p. 234.)

x. 4, 1. \textit{Pra te yakshi pra te iyarmi manna bhuvō yathā vandyo no haveshu} | \textit{dhanvann īva āpū āsi tvam Āgne iyakshave pūrave pratna rājan} |

“I offer thee worship, I send forth to thee a meditation, that thou mayest be accessible to adoration in our invocations. For thou, Agni, ancient king, art like a trough of water in the desert to the man who longs for thee.”

V. In the following passages other verbs are employed to denote the composition or presentation of hymns:

i. 61. 2. \textit{Indrāya hṛidā manasā manishā pratnāya patye dhiyo marjayanta} |

“To Indra, the ancient lord, they \textit{prepared} [or polished] hymns [or ceremonies] with the heart, mind, and understanding.”

i. 61, 4. \textit{Asmai īd u stomaṁ saṁhinomi rathaṁ na tashtā īva ītyādi} |

“To him (Indra) I \textit{send forth} a hymn, as a carpenter a car,” etc.

i. 94, 1 (= S.V. i. 66). \textit{Imaṁ stomaṁ arhaṁ Jātavedasa ratham īva sam mahema manishayā | bhadrā hi naḥ pramatir asya saṁsādi Āgne sakhye mā rishāṁ vayaṁ tava} |

“Let us with our intellect \textit{construct} (or, \textit{send forth}) this hymn for the adorable Jātavedas like a car, for his wisdom is favourable to us in the assembly. Agni, in thy friendship may we never suffer.” (The root \textit{mah} means to honour or worship.\textsuperscript{20} The reader may compare Benfey’s translation.)

There is to be found in the hymns a great multitude of passages in which the rishi speaks of presenting his hymns and prayers to the various deities who are the objects of his worship, without directly claiming for himself the authorship of those compositions. The natural inference to be drawn from the expressions which we shall find to be employed in most of the cases to which I refer, would, I think, be that the personality of the rishi himself was uppermost in his mind, and that he was not conscious that the praises which he was uttering to

\textsuperscript{20} See, however, the various reading suggested by Böthlingk and Roth \textit{s.v. mah + sam} and \textit{ah + sam}. 10
the gods proceeded from any other source than his own unaided faculties. Of this description are the following texts, which represent a manner of thinking and speaking very prevalent in the hymns:

i. 60, 5. *Tum tvā vayam patim Agne raṣīnām prāsamśām matibhir Gotamāsaḥ*

"We, the Gotamas, praise with hymns thee, Agni, the lord of riches."

i. 77, 5. *Eva Agnir Gotamabhīr pitācā viprebhīr astoshta jātavedaḥ*

"Thus has the holy Agni Jātavedas been celebrated by the sage Gotamas."

i. 78, 5. *Avochāma Rahūgaṇaḥ Agnaye madhumad vachahaḥ dyumnaīr abhi pra nonumah*

"We, the Rahūgaṇas, have uttered to Agni honied speech; we incessantly laud him with eulogies."

i. 91, 11. *Soma girbhis tvā vayaṁ vardhayāmo vacho-vidāḥ sumṛiliko naḥ āviṣa*

"Soma, we who are skilled in speech magnify thee with praises; do thou enter into us, full of kindness."

i. 102, 1. *Imāṁ te dhiyam prabhare maho mahīṁ . . . .

"I present to thee joyfully this great hymn . . . ."

i. 183, 6. *Ātārishma tamasas pāram asya prati vāṁ stomo Āśvināv adhāyi*

"We have crossed over this darkness; a hymn, o Āśvins, has been addressed to you."

iii. 53, 2. *Pitur na putraḥ sīcham ā rabhe te Indra svādisṭhayā girā bāchevaḥ*

"Powerful Indra, I lay hold of thy skirt (as a son does that of his father), with a very sweet hymn."

iv. 3, 16. *Etā viścā vidushe tubhyaṁ vedho nīthāni Agne ninyā va-

\[...

chāṃsi | nivachanā kavyāni aśaṁsisham matibhir vipraṁ ukthaṁ | "Intelligent Agni, to thee, who knowest, [have I uttered] all these songs and mysterious words; to thee, who art a bard, have I, a sage, uttered these hymns, these poems, with meditations and praises."

iv. 32, 12. *Asvēryāhanta Gotamāḥ Indra te stoma-vāhasah |

"The Gotamas, Indra, bringing hymns to thee, have magnified thee."

v. 11, 5. *Tubhya idam Agne madhumattamaṁ vachas tubhyaṁ maniśkā iyam astu śaṁ hride | Tvāṁ girā sindhum iva avanitr mahir ā priṇanti kavasā vardhayanti cha |
“Agni, may this sweetest of prayers, may this mental production
be pleasant to thy heart. As great rivers fill the ocean, so do the words
of praise fill thee, and augment thee with strength.”

v. 22, 4. Agne chikiddhi asya naḥ īdāṁ vacah sahasya | Taṁ tvā
susipra dampate stomair vardhanti Atryah gīrbhiḥ sumbhanti Atryah |
“Vigorous Agni, observe these our words; thee, with the beautiful
nose, the lord of the house, the Atris magnify with praises, the Atris
decorate with hymns.”

v. 45, 4. Sūkṭebhir vo vachobhir deva-jushtair Indrā nu Agni avase hu-vadhyai |
“Let me invoke you for help, o Indra and Agni, with well-spoken
words, such as are acceptable to the gods.

vi. 38, 3. Taṁ vo dhiyā paramāya purājām ajaram Indram abhi
anīṣhi arkaḥ ityādi |
“I adore thee, the ancient, imperishable Indra with an excellent
hymn and with praises.”

vii. 67, 5. Prāchim ū devā Aśvinā dhiyam me amṛidhrāṁ sātaye
kṛitaṁ vasāyum |
“O divine Aśvins, bring to fulfilment my unwearied prayer which
supplicates wealth.”

vii. 85, 1. Punisho vām arakasham manishām somam Indrāya Varu-
ṇāya juhevat | gṛita-pratikāṁ Uṣhasaṁ na devim ityādi |
“Offering soma to Indra and Varuna, I prepare for you twain the
sincere hymn, like the goddess Ushas, with glittering face.”

viii. 5, 18. Asmākam adya vām ayaṁ stomo vāhishtho antamaḥ | yuvā-
bhyam bhātu Aśvinā |
“May this hymn of ours approach near to you, to-day, o Aśvins, and
be effectual in bearing you hither.”

viii. 8, 8. Kim anye paryāsaṁ asmat stobebhir Aśvinā | putraḥ Kaṇ-
vasya vām rishir gīrbhir Vatso avīvridhat |
“Aśvins, do others than we sit round you with songs? Vatsa, the
son of Kaṇva, has magnified you by his hymns.”

viii. 27, 8. Ā pra ṣārta Maruto Vīśno Aśvinā Pūshan māṇinayā
dhiyā | 11. Idā hi vah upastutim idā vāmasya bhaktaye upa vo viśva-
vedaso namasyur āsrikhi |

21 Compare vi. 8, 1. Vaiśvīnārāya matir navyasi śuchīḥ somah iva prate chāru
Agnaye | “A new and bright hymn is purified, like beautiful soma, for Agni Vaiś-
vānara.”
“8. Come, o Maruts, Vishṇu, Aśvins, Pūshan, at my hymn. 11. For now, possessors of all riches, now, in order to obtain wealth, have I, full of reverence, sent forth to you a hymn.”


“2. Agni, receive my hymn: grow by this product of my thought: rejoice in our beautiful words. 22. And may my thoughts and words always augment thee; Agni, think of our friendship. 26. With my mental productions I adorn Agni, the young, the lord of the people, the sage, the all-devouring, the very restless.”

x. 42, 1. Astā iva suprataṅ rāyaṁ asyan bhūṣann iva prabhara sto- mam asmai | vācā viprā tarata vācām aryo nirāmaya joritaḥ some Indram |

“Like an archer discharging his far-shooting arrow, with zeal present the hymn to Indra. Sages, by your song, overcome the song of the enemy; worshipper, arrest Indra at the soma.”

x. 63, 17. Eva Plateḥ sūnar avivṛidhad vo viśe Ādityāḥ Ādite mani- shi | iśānāsā naro amartyena astāvi jano divyo Gayena |

“Thus, all ye Ādityas, Aditi, and ye ruling powers, has the wise son of Plati magnified you. The celestial race has been lauded by the immortal Gaya.”

x. 111, 1. Maniśinaḥ prabharaṅham maniśāṁ yathā yathā mata- yaḥ santi mriṇam | Indram satyāir a īrayāma kriśebhiḥ sa hi viro gir- vanasya vīdānaḥ |

“Sages, present the prayer, according as are the various thoughts of men. Let us by our sincere rites stimulate Indra, for he is a hero, he is wise and loves our songs.”

In the following verse, from a hymn in praise of liberality, it is said, though no doubt only figuratively, that the true rishi is the prince who is bountiful to the priesthood.

x. 107, 6. Tam eva rishiṁ tam a brahmāṁam āhur yajnayāṁ sāma- gāṃ ukhaśasam | sa śukrasya tanvo veda tisvo yah prathamo dakṣiṇayā raraḥa |

“He it is whom they call a rishi, a priest, a pious sacrificer, a chunter of prayers, a reciter of hymns; he it is who knows the three bodies of the brilliant (Agni),—the man who is most prominent in bestowing gifts.”
SECT. IV.—Passages of the Rig-veda in which a supernatural character is ascribed to the rishis or the hymns.

In the present section I propose to collect the most distinct indications which I have noticed in the Vedic hymns of any supernatural attributes attaching, in the opinion of the authors, either to the rishis themselves, or to their compositions. We shall see in the course of this enquiry (1) that a certain superhuman character was ascribed by the later rishis, who composed the hymns, to some of their predecessors; (2) that expressions are occasionally employed by the rishis which appear to ascribe their compositions to a divine influence generally; while there is a still more numerous set of texts in which the hymns are attributed in various forms of phrascology to the agency of one or more particular and specified deities; and (3) that there is a considerable number of passages in which a mysterious or magical power is ascribed to the hymns or metres.

I proceed to furnish specimens of these several classes of quotations.

I. I adduce some passages which ascribe a superhuman character or supernatural faculties to the earlier rishis. These are the following:

R.V. i. 179, 2. Ye chid hi purve ritaśopah āsan sākam devebhir ava-

"The pious sages who lived of old, and who conversed about sacred truths with the gods, led a conjugal life," etc.

vii. 76, 4. Te id devānām sadhamādhaḥ āsann ritaśānanaḥ kavyaḥ pūr-

"They were the associates of the gods, those ancient pious sages. The fathers found out the hidden light; with true hymns they generated the dawn."

x. 14, 15. Yamāya madhumattamaṁ rājne havyaṁ juhotanaḥ | idam

"Offer to king Yama a most sweet oblation. (Let) this reverence (be paid) to the rishis born of old, who were the earliest guides."

22 Compare A.V. x. 7, 14, quoted above in p. 3.
The sixty-second hymn of the tenth Mandala contains the following passage regarding the Angirases (see above, p. 223):


"1. Blessings be on you, Angirases, who, sanctified by sacrifice and liberality, attained the friendship of Indra and immortality. Do ye, o sages, graciously receive the man (who addresses you). 3. Ye who by sacrifice caused the sun to ascend the sky; and spread out our mother earth," etc.

This is succeeded by the following verses:

x. 62, 4. Ayaṁ Nābha vadati valguvo grihe deva-putrāḥ rishayas tat śrīnotana . . . | 5. Virūpasah id rishayas te id gambhira-vepasah | Angirasah sūnavas te Agneḥ pari jajnire |

"This Nābhan addresses you, brilliant beings, within the house. Hear this, ye rishis, sons of the gods. . . 5. The Virūpas are rishis, profound in emotion; they are the sons of Angiras; they have been born from Agni."

(The fifth verse is quoted in the Nirukta, xi. 17. See Roth's illustrations of the passage.)

2. Vasishṭha.—A supernatural character is attributed to Vasishṭha also in the following passage (which has been already quoted and illustrated in Vol. I. pp. 318 ff.).

vii. 33, 7 ff. Trayāḥ kriyantyā bhuvanasya retas tisraḥ praậḥ āryaḥ jyotir-āgrāḥ | trayo gharmaṇaḥ uhasaṃ saṃchante sarvān it tān anu iḍur Vasishṭhāḥ | 8. Śūryasye vasahatho jyotir evaṁ samudrasyeva mahima gabhīraḥ | vātasyeva prajāvo na anyena stoma Vasishṭhāḥ anu etave vaḥ |

The next verse (which, with the sequel, is quoted in my article "On the relations of the priests to the other classes of Indian society in the Vedic age," Journ. Roy. As. Soc. for 1866, p. 276) is as follows: 6. Ye Agneḥ pari jajnire Virūpāno divas pari | Navagve nu Dasagve Angirastaham saha deveshvī maṁhaṭe | "The Virūpas who were produced from Agni, from Dyauṣ,—the Navagva, the Dasagva, who is a most eminent Angiras, lavishes gifts along with the gods." Here the Virūpas would seem rather to be princes than rishis: and the same is the case in the following passage also: iii. 53, 6. Ime bhojaḥ Angiraso Virūpāḥ divas putraśa asurasya vīryaḥ | Visvāṃcitva yāya dadato mahāṁ śahasrasvē para tiranta aśyau | "These liberal Virūpas of the race of Angiras, heroic sons of the divine Dyauṣ (the sky), bestowing gifts on Visvāṃśita at the ceremony with a thousand libations, have prolonged their lives." (See Vol. I. p. 341 f.)
9. Te id ninyam hridayasya praketah sahasra-valbam abhi sancharanti | yamena tatam paridhiin vayantaḥ apsarasaḥ upa sedur Vasishṭhāḥ |

10. Vidyuto jyotiḥ parisanjhānam Mitrā-Varuṇaḥ yaḥ apasyaṭāṁ te婆 | tat te janma uta ekaṁ Vasishṭha Agastyo yat teヴァ viśaḥ ājāhāra |

11. Ulāśi Maitrāvaruṇa Vasishṭha Urvaśyāḥ brahmaṇ manaso 'dhi jātaḥ | drapsaṁ skanmaḥ brahmaṇā daivyena viśe devaḥ pushkare tvā adadanta |

12. Sa praketaḥ ubhayasya pravidevān sahasra-dānaḥ uta va sadānaḥ | yamena tatam paridhiin vayishyan apsarasaḥ pari jajne Vasishṭhāḥ |

13. Satre ha jātev ishitā namobhiḥ kumbhe retaḥ sisichituḥ samānam | tato ha Mānaḥ udiyāya madhyāt tato jātam rishim āhur Vasishṭham |

“7. Three [gods] create the fecundating principle in (all) existences; [there exist] three excellent productions of which light is the first: three fires attend upon the dawn: all these the Vasishṭhas know. 8. The splendour of these [sages] is like the full glory of the sun; their grandeur is profound as that of the ocean; like the swiftness of the wind, your hymns, o Vasishṭhas, cannot be followed by any other bard. 9. Through the intuitions of their hearts they seek out the mystery with a thousand branches. Weaving the envelopment extended by Yama [Agni? see R.V. i. 66, 4] the Vasishṭhas sat near the Apsaras. 10. When Mitra and Varuṇa saw thee quitting the gleam of the lightning, that was thy birth, Vasishṭha, and [thou hadst] one [other], when Agastya brought thee to the people. 11. And, Vasishṭha, thou art the son of Mitra and Varuṇa, born, O priest, from the mind of Urvaśī; all the gods placed thee—the drop fallen through divine contemplation—in the vessel. 12. He the wise, knowing both [worlds?], with a thousand gifts, or with gifts, Vasishṭha, being about to weave the envelopment extended by Yama, was produced from the Apsaras. 13. Born at the sacrifice, and impelled by adorations, they [Mitra and Varuṇa] let the same equal procreative energy fall into the jar; from the midst of this Māna (Agastya) issued forth; from this men say the rishi Vasishṭha was produced.”

Two of these verses are quoted in the Nirukta, verse 8, in xi. 20, and verse 11, in v. 14. See also Prof. Roth’s Illustrations of that work, p. 64, where he states his opinion that the foregoing verses which describe the miraculous birth of Vasishṭha in the style of the epic mythology, are a later addition to an older hymn. See the note in p. 321 of the First Volume of this work.
The two following passages also have reference to knowledge supernaturally communicated, or favours divinely conferred on Vasishtha. See Vol. I. p. 325 ff.

vii. 87, 4. Uvācha me Varuṇo medhirāya triḥ satpa nāma aghnyā bhibhartī | videṇa padasya guhyā na vohad yugāya vipraḥ uparāya sikṣaṇa |

"Varuṇa said to me, the intelligent, 'the cow has thrice seven names.' The wise [god], though he knows them, has not declared the mysteries of the word, which he desires to reveal to a later generation."

vii. 88, 4. Vasishṭhāṁ ha Varuṇo nāvi ā adhād rishīṁ chakāra svapāḥ mahobhīḥ | stotāram vipraḥ sudinatve ahnāṁ yād nu dyāvas tatanan yād uṣhavaḥ |

"Varuṇa took Vasishṭha into the boat; by his mighty acts, working skilfully he (Varuṇa) has made him a rishi; the wise (god) has made him to utter praises in an auspicious time, that his days and dawns may be prolonged." (See Vol. I. p. 325 ff.; and compare R.V. x. 101, 2, and x. 116, 9, in pp. 234 and 240, above.)

3. Viśvāmitra.—In one or more of the texts which I shall next produce, a superhuman character is ascribed to Viśvāmitra, if not to the Kuśikas.

iii. 29, 15. Aṃitrāyudhō marutāṁ iva prayāḥ prathamajāḥ brahmaṇo viścam iḍ viduḥ | dyumnavad brahma Kuśikāsaṁ eva ekaṁ eko dāme Agniṁ samidhiré |

"Combating their foes, like hosts of Maruts, (the sages) the first-born of prayer are masters of all knowlege; the Kuśikas have uttered an enthusiastic prayer; each of them has kindled Agni in his house."

(See Vol. I. p. 347.)

iii. 43, 5. Kuvid mā gopāṁ karasa janasya kuvid rājānam Mahavann pijishan | kuvid mā rishim papivaṁsāṁ sutasya kuvid me vasmāḥ amṛtasya sikṣāḥ |

"Dost thou not make me a shepherd of the people? dost thou not make me a king, o impetuous Maghavan? dost thou not make me a rishi, a drinker of the soma? wilt thou not bestow upon me imperishable wealth?" (See Vol. I. p. 344.)

iii. 53, 9. Māhan rishir devajāḥ devajātāḥ asabhāṁ sindhum arnavam nṛchakṣāḥ | Viśvāmitra yad avahat Sudāsam aprīyāyata Kuśikebhīr Indraḥ.
"The great rishi (Viśvāmitra), leader of men, god-born, god-impelled, stemmed the watery current. When Viśvāmitra conducted Sudās, Indra was propitiated through the Kuśikas." (See Vol. I. pp. 342. Indra himself is called a Kuśika in R.V. i. 10, 11. See Vol. I. p. 347.)

According to ix. 87, 3, of which Usānas is the traditional rishi, certain mysterious knowledge is said to have been possessed by that personage:

Rishir vipraḥ pura-etā janānāṃ ribhur dhīraḥ Usānā kāvyena | sa chid viceda nihitaṁ yad āśām apichyaṁ guhyaṁ nāma gonām |

"A wise rishi, a leader of men, skilful, and prudent, is Usānas, through his insight as a seer; he has known the hidden mysterious name applied to these cows."

Again in ix. 97, 7, it is said: Pra kāvyam Usaneva bruvāno devo devānāṁ janimā vivakti |

"Uttering, like Usānas, the wisdom of a sage, the god (Soma) declares the births of the gods."

In a hymn of the tenth Maṇḍala, the rishis are spoken of as "seeing" the objects of their contemplation in a way which seems to imply a supernatural insight (see above, pp. 116, 118, 125 ff.); in this hymn, x. 72, 1, 2, it is said:

Devānāṁ nu vayaṁ jānā pravočāma vipanyaya | uktāsru šasyamā-neshu yaḥ pasyād uttare yuge | Brahmanaspatir etā saṁ karmāraḥ iva adhamat | devānāṁ purave yuge asataḥ sad ajāyata |

"Let us, from the love of praise, celebrate in recited hymns the births of the gods,—any one of us who in this later age may see them. Brahmanaspati has kindled these births, as a blacksmith [blows a flame]: in the earliest age of the gods, the existent sprang from the non-existent." 24 (See Vol. I. p. 46.)

Another not less decided instance of this use of the verb to see, in the sense of supernatural insight, may be found in the verse of the Vālakhīlya already quoted in Vol. II. p. 220, which will be cited below. See also x. 130, 6, which will be quoted further on.

The next two passages speak of the radiance of the rishis.

viii. 3, 3 (= S.V. i. 250, and Vāj. S. 33, 81). Imāḥ u tvā puruvaso

24 The first of these verses is translated by Prof. Benfey in his Glossary to the Sāma-veda, p. 154.
“Lord of abundant wealth, may these prayers of mine magnify thee! Pure sages of radiant appearance have celebrated thee with hymns.”
vi. 6, 10. Aham id hi pituh pari mrdham ritasya jagrabha | aham sryah iva ajani |

“I have acquired knowledge of the ceremonial from [my] father; I have become like the sun.” (Is Indra the father here referred to?)
The following texts, which occur in the last book of the Rig-veda, speak of tapas (“fervour” or “austerity”) being practised by the rishis much in the same way as the later epic literature does. This use of the word is not known in the earlier books of the R.V. (See Boehtlingk and Roth’s Lexicon, under the word tapas.)
x. 109, 4. Devah etasyam avadanta purve sapta rishayas tapase ye nisheduh |

“The ancient gods spoke of her, the seven rishis who sat down for austere-fervour.” (See my article “On the priests of the Vedic age” in the Journ. Roy. As. Soc. for 1866, p. 270.)
x. 154, 2. Tapasah ye anadhriyahas tapasa ye svar yavuh | tapo ye chakire mahas tuns chid eva api gachhatat | 5. Sahasra-nithah kavayo ye gopayanti suryam rishium tapasvato Yama tapojan api gachhatat |

“Let him (the deceased) go to those who through austere-fervour are invincible, who by austere-fervour have gone to heaven, who have performed great austerity. 5. Let him go, Yama, to the sages of a thousand songs who guard the sun (see Wilson, Vish. Pur. vol. ii. pp. 284 ff.), to the devout rishis, born from fervour.” (See my article “On Yama” in the Journ. Roy. As. Soc.)
x. 190, 1. Ritaum cha satyaum cha abhiddhat tapaso adhyajyata | tato ratri ajayata tatah samudrah arnavah |

“Right and truth sprang from kindled austerity; thence sprang night, thence the watery ocean.”
In x. 167, 1, it is even said that Indra attained heaven by austerity:
Tvam tapah paritapya ajayah svah |

“By performing austerity thou didst conquer heaven.”
In some places the gods are said to possess in the most eminent degree the qualities of rishis, or kavis. This may possibly imply, e con-
verso, that the rishis were conscious of a certain affinity with the divine
nature, and conceived themselves to participate in some degree in the
superior wisdom and knowledge of the deities.

R.V. i. 31, 1. Tvam Agne prathamo Angirāh rishiḥ devo devaḥm abha-
vah śivah sakhā ityādi | 2. Tvam Agne prathamo Angirastamaḥ kavir
devānām paribhūshasi eratam |

"1. Thou, Agni, the earliest rishi Angiras, a god, hast been the au-
spicious friend of the gods. . . . 2. Thou, Agni, the earliest and most
Angiras-like sage, administereest the ceremonial of the gods."

i. 66, 2. . . . Rishir na stubhvā vikshu praśastāḥ ityādi |

"Like a rishi, who praises [the gods], he (Agni) is famous among
the people," etc.

iii. 21, 3. . . . Rishiḥ sreshṭhaḥ samidhyase yajnasya pra avitā bhava |

"Thou, Agni, the most eminent rishi, art kindled; be the protector
of the sacrifice."

v. 29, 1. . . . Archanti tvā marutaḥ pūta-dakshās tvam esām rishir
Indra asi dhīraḥ |

"The Maruts, endowed with pure dispositions, worship thee; thou,
Indra, art their wise rishi." (Śāyaṇa, however, here renders rishi by
drashtā, "beholder.")

vi. 14, 2. Agnir id hi prachetāḥ Agnir vedhastamaḥ rishiḥ |

"Agni is wise; Agni is a most sage rishi."

viii. 6, 41. Rishir hi pārvajā asi ekāh iśanaḥ ojasā | Indra chosh-
kūyaseesan vasu |

"Thou art an anciently-born rishi, who alone rulest by thy might;
Indra thou lavishest riches."

viii. 16, 7. Indro brahmā Indraḥ rishiḥ Indraḥ puru puru-hūtaḥ |
mahān mahībhiḥ sāchībhiḥ |

"Indra is a priest, Indra is a rishi, Indra is much invoked; he is
great through his great powers."

ix. 96, 18 (= S.V. ii. 526). Rishi-manā yāḥ rishi-kṛt svarṣāḥ sahas-
ranīthāḥ padaviḥ kavinām |

"Soma, rishi-minded, rishi-maker, bestower of good, master of a thou-
sand songs, the leader of sages," etc.

ix. 107, 7. . . . Rishir vipro vichakṣaṇāḥ | tvām kavir abhavo deva-
vitamaḥ ityādi |

"A rishi, a sage, intelligent, thou (Soma) wast a poet, most agreeable
to the gods," etc.
x. 27, 22. ... Indrāya sunvad rishaye cha śikhat |
    "... Let [men] present libations to Indra, and offerings to the rishi."
    x. 112. 9. Ni śu sidha gāṇapate gāṇeshu tvām āhur viprayatamaṁ kavi- |
    nāṁ | na rīte tvāt kriyata kīchana āre mahām arkaṁ Maghavanś chitrām |
    arche |
    "Sit, lord of multitudes, among our multitudes; they call thee the |
    greatest of sages [or poets]; nothing is done without, or apart from, |
    thee; sing, Maghavan, a great and beautiful hymn."
    x. 115, 5. Agniḥ kaṇeṭatamḥ kaṇva-sakha ityādi |
    "Agni is the greatest of the Kaṇvas, the friend of Kaṇva," etc.

II. The Vedic rishis, as we have seen, expected to receive from their |
gods every variety of temporal blessings, strength, long life, offspring, |
riches, cattle, rain, food, and victory, and they also looked for forgiveness |
of their offences, and sometimes for exaltation to paradise, to the same |
benefactors. Hence it would be nothing more than we might have antici-
pated, if we should further find them asking their different deities to |
enlighten their minds, to direct their ceremonies, to stimulate their devot-
tion, to augment their powers of poetical expression, and to inspire them |
with religious fervour for the composition of their hymns. I think the |
following passages will justify this expectation by showing that the rishis |
(though, as we have seen, they frequently speak of the hymns as their |
own work) did also sometimes entertain the idea that their prayers, |
praises, and ceremonies generally, were supernaturally suggested and |
directed. One of the modes (if not the most important) in which this |
idea is expressed is, as we shall discover, the personification of speech |
under different appellations. The following are the passages to which |
I refer: they are—

First, such as refer to the gods generally:

R.V. i. 37, 4. Pra vaḥ sardhāya ghrīshwayne teṣeṣa-dyumnāya sushmite |
brahma devattāṁ gāyata |
    "To your vigorous, overpowering, energetic, host [of Maruts] sing |
    the god-given prayer."

S.V. i. 299. Tvāṣṭṛa no daivyāṁ vachāḥ Parjanya Brahmanaspatiḥ |
putair bhṛatribhir Aditir nu pātu no duṣṭaram trāmaṇāṁ vachāḥ |
    "May Tvāṣṭṛi, Parjanya, and Brahmanaspati [prosper] our divine |
utterance: may Aditi with her[?] sons and brothers prosper our in-
vincible and protective utterance."
In the next passage, the hymn or prayer is spoken of as inconceivable.

R.V. i. 152, 5. Achittam brahma jujushur yuvānāḥ ityādi |
“The youths received with joy the incomprehensible prayer,” etc.

In R.V. x. 20, 10, Vimada, a rishi, is connected with the immortals:

Agno Vimado manishāṁ ārjonāpād amritebhiḥ sajoshāḥ giraḥ āvakshat
sumatir iyānāḥ ityādi |

“O Agni, son of strength, Vimada, united with the immortals,
hastening, has brought to thee a product of thought, and beautiful
hymns.”

In the two following texts the gods are said to have generated the
hymn or prayer:

x. 61, 7. . . . Svādhyo ajanayan brahma devāh Vāstoshpatiṁ vrata paṁ
niratakshan |

“The thoughtful gods generated prayer: they fashioned Vastoshpati
the protector of sacred rites.”

x. 88, 8. Sūkta-vākam prathamāṁ ād ād ād havir ajanayanta devāh |
sa esāṁ yajno abhavat tanāpāh tam dyaur veda tam pri-
thīri tam āpāh |

“The gods first generated the hymn, then Agni, then the oblation.
He was their sacrifice, the protector of their life. Him the Sky, the
Earth, and the Waters know.”

In the latter of the two following verses, Vāch (speech) is said to be
divine, and to have been generated by the gods. Though speech is here
spoken of generally, and nothing is said of the hymns, still these may
have already come to be connected with her in the minds of the Vedic
bards, as they were afterwards regarded as her most solemn and im-
portant expression.

R.V. viii. 89, 10. Yad vāg vadantī avichetanāṁ rūshtri devānāṁ nisha-
sāda mandrā | chatasrah urjam duduhē payāṛi kva svid asyāḥ paramāṁ
jagāma | 11. Devīṁ vācham ajanayanta devāṁ tāṁ viśvarūpāḥ paśavo
vadanti | sa no mandrā isham urjam duhanā dhenur vāg asmān upa
sushṭutā ā etu |

“When Vāch, speaking unintelligible things, queen of the gods, sat
down, melodious, she milked forth sustenance and waters towards the
four quarters: whither has her highest element departed? The gods
generated the divine Vāch; animals of all kinds utter her; may this
melodious cow Vāch, who yields us nourishment and sustenance,—ap-
proach us, when we celebrate her praises.
The last verse (as well as R.V. viii. 90, 16, which will be quoted below), derives some illustration from the following passage of the Brhad Arainya Upanishad, p. 982 (p. 251 English transl.), in which also Vāch is designated as a cow:

Vāchāṁ dhenum upāśita | tasyāṁ chatvāraṁ stanāṁ svāhā-kāro vashat-
kāro hanta-kāraṁ svadhā-kāraṁ | tasyāṁ devaṁ stanau devaṁ upajivanti
svāhā-kāraṁ cha vashat-kāraṁ cha hanta-kāraṁ manushyaṁ svadhā-kāraṁ
pitaraṁ | tasyāṁ prāṇaṁ rishabho mano vatsaṁ |

"Let a man worship the cow Vāch. She has four udders, the formula svāhā, vashat, hanta, and svadhā. The gods live upon her two udders, svāhā and vashat; men upon hanta; and the fathers upon svadhā. Breath is her bull; the mind, her calf."

The two verses, R.V. viii. 89, 10, and 11, occur in the Nirukta, xi. 28, 29. Roth (in his Illustrations of that work), p. 152, says the unintelligible utterance of Vāch in verse 10, means thunder. Whether this be the case, or not, the word appears to have a more general signification in the next verse, and to refer to speech in general, personified as a divine being. The speech which all the animals utter cannot of course be thunder.

In some of the preceding verses of this hymn there is a curious reference made to some sceptical doubts regarding the existence of Indra; which I quote here, though unconnected with the present subject.

R.V. viii. 89, 3, 4. Pra su stomam bharata vājyantam Indrāya sat-
yāṁ yadi satyam asti | na Indro asti iti nemaṁ u tvāḥ āha kah īm da-
darśa kam abhi stavāna | Ayam asmi jaritaṁ paśya mā iha viśvā jātāni
abhi asmi mahnā | rityasya mā pradiśo vardhīyanti ādādiro bhuvanā
dardarīmi |

"Present to Indra a hymn soliciting food, a true [hymn] if he truly exists. 'Indra does not exist,' says some one: 'who has seen him? whom shall we praise?' 'I am here, worshipper' [answers Indra]; 'behold me, I surpass all creatures in greatness; the directors of the sacrifice augment me; crushing, I destroy the worlds.'"

Second: the next set of passages which I shall bring forward either refer to Sarasvati, Vāch, etc. (various names of the goddess of speech, or different personifications of speech, or of prayer), or at least speak of prayer as divine.

R.V. i. 3, 11, 12. Chodayitrī sūṅgitāṁ chetanti sumatinām | yaj-
naṁ dadhe Sarasvati | . . . . dhiyo viśvā virājati |
"Sarasvatī, who further our hymns, and who is cognizant of our prayers, has sustained our sacrifice. . . . She enlightens all intellects."

i. 22, 10. Ā gnāḥ Agne iha avase Hotrām yavishtha Bhāratim | Varū-trīṃ Dhishanāṃ vaha |

"Bring here, youthful Agni, to our help, the wives [of the gods], Hotṛa, Bhāratī, Varūtrī, and Dhishanā."

(Varūtrī, "the eligible," may be merely an epithet of Dhishanā which, according to Śaṭya, at least, is = vāg-devī, "the goddess of speech.")

i. 31, 11. Iḷām akīraṇvan manushasya śāsanīṁ ityādi |

"The gods made Iḷā to be the instructress of men." (See Professor Wilson’s note on this passage, p. 82 of his translation of the R. V. vol. i.)

ii. 3, 8. Sarasvatī sādhayanti dhiyām naḥ Iḷā devī Bhāratī viśeṣatūrtiḥ | Tisro devī śvadhayā barhīr edam achhidram pāntu śaraṇāṁ niśadya |

"May Sarasvatī, perfecting our hymn, may the divine Iḷā, and the all-pervading Bhāratī; may these three goddesses, seated on the place of sacrifice, preserve by their power the sacrificial grass uninjured."

(See Prof. Müller’s translation of part of the verse in the Journ. Roy. As. Soc. for 1867, vol. iii. p. 224.)

iii. 18, 3. . . . Yāvad iśe brahmaṇā vandamānah imāṁ dhiyāṁ kata-seyāya devīm |

"Worshipping thee with a prayer according to the best of my power, in this divine hymn, to obtain unbounded wealth."

iv. 43, 1. Ka u śravat katamo yajniyānāṁ vandāru devaḥ katamo jushāte | kasya imāṁ devīṁ amrīteṣu preshāthāṁ hṛidi śreshyāma sushtutiṁ suhavyām |

"Who will hear us? which of all the objects of adoration? which of all the gods will be gratified by our praises? In the heart of whom among the immortals can we lodge this our divine and dearest hymn of praise and invocation?"

vii. 34, 1. Pra śukrā etu devī maniṣhāḥ asmat sutashṭo ratho na vajī |

"May prayer, brilliant and divine, proceed from us, like a well- fabricated chariot drawn by steeds."

vii. 34, 9. Abhi vo devīṁ dhiyāṁ 25 dadidhwam pra vo devatā vāchāṁ kriṇudhvam |

25 Compare the same phrase dhiyam devīṁ in A.V. iii. 15, 3, and daivyā vāchā in A.V. viii. 1, 3.
"Receive towards you the divine hymn; proclaim the song for yourselves among the gods."

viii. 27, 13. Devaṁ devaṁ huvema vājasātaye grīṇanto devyā dhiyā |
"Let us invoke each of the gods to bestow riches, praising them with a divine hymn."

viii. 90, 16. Vacho-vidaṁ vācham udirayantīṁ visēbhīr dhābhīr upatiṣṭhamānāṁ | devīṁ devebhyaḥ pari eyushīṁ gām ā mā avrikta marto yo dabhṛachetāḥ |
"Let not any mortal of little intelligence do violence to the cow, the divine Vāch, who is skilled in praise, who utters her voice aloud, who arrives with all the hymns, and who has come from the gods."

ix. 33, 5. Abhi brahmīṁ anuśhata yahīr ritasya mātaro marmrījyante diceḥ śīśam |
"The great and sacred mothers of the sacrifice have uttered praise: they decorate the child of the sky."


"1. When, o Bṛihaspati, men sent forth the first and earliest utterance of Vāch (speech), giving a name (to things), then all which was treasured within them, the most excellent and spotless, was disclosed through love. 2. Wherever the wise,—cleansing, as it were, meal with a sieve,—have uttered speech with intelligence, there friends recognize [their] friendly acts; an auspicious fortune is impressed upon their speech. 3. Through sacrifice they followed the track of Vāch, and found her entered into the rishis: 26 taking, they divided her into many portions: her the seven poets celebrate. 4. One man, seeing, sees not

26 See the use made by S'ankaīa of this text, above, p. 105.
Vāch; another, hearing, hears her not; to another she discloses her form, as an elegantly attired and loving wife displays her person to her husband. 5. They say that one man has a sure defence in [her] friendship; men cannot overwhelm him even in the conflicts (of discussion); but that man consorts with an unprofitable delusion who has [only] heard speech [Vāch] which is [to him] without fruit or flower. 6. He who has abandoned his discerning friend, has no portion in Vāch; whatever he hears he hears in vain; he knows not the path of virtue."

The second, fourth, and fifth verses of this obscure hymn are quoted in the Nirukta, iv. 10; i. 19, 20; and are explained in Professor Roth's Illustrations. Verses 2 and 4 are also quoted and interpreted in the Mahābhāṣya; see pp. 30 and 31 of Dr. Ballantyne's edition. The verse which is of most importance for my present purpose, is, however, the third, which speaks of Vāch having "entered into the rishis." See the First Volume of this work, pp. 254 f. The idea of Vāch being divided into many portions will be found again below in R.V. x. 125, 3.

x. 110, 8 (=Vāj. S. 29, 33). Ā no yajnam Bhārati tūyam etu Ijā manushvad īha chetayantī | tisro devir barhir ā idam syonām Sarasvatī svapasaḥ sadantu |

"Let Bhārati come quickly here to our sacrifice, with Ijā, who instructs us like Manush [or like a man], and with Sarasvati: let these three goddesses, skillful in rites, sit down upon this beautiful sacrificial grass."

x. 125, 3. Aham rāṣṭṝḥ sangamanā vasūnāṁ chikitushi prathamā yajniyānām | tām mā deva vyaddhuh purutrā bhūristhātram bhūri āveśayantim | 4. Mayā so annam atti yo vipaṣyati yā prāṇīti ya iṁ śrīnāti uktam | amantavo māṁ te upa kṣhiyanti śrūṇi śrūta śraddhīvaṁ te vadāmi | 5. Aham eva svayam idaṁ vadāmi jushṭāṁ devbhīr uta mānushebhīḥ | yaṁ kāmaye taṁ tam ugraṁ kṛṣṇaṁ tam brahmānaṁ tam rishiṁ taṁ sumedham |

"3. I am the queen, the centre of riches, intelligent, the first of the objects of adoration: the gods have separated me into many portions, have assigned me many abodes, and made me widely pervading. 4. He who has insight, he who lives, he who hears [my] sayings, eats food through me. These men dwell in my vicinity, devoid of understanding. Listen, thou who art learned, I declare to thee what is worthy of belief. 5. It is even I myself who make known this which is agreeable
both to gods and men. Him whom I love I make terrible, [I make] him a priest, [I make] him a riṣi, [I make] him intelligent.”

x. 176, 2. Pra deveṇ ṛdvajā dhiyā bharata Jātavedasam havyā no vakshad ānushak | “By divine prayer bring hither Jātavedas: may he present our obligations in order.”

x. 177, 1. Patangam aktam asurasya māyāyā hridā paśyanti manasā vipāṣchitaḥ | samudre antah kavyayo vichakshate marīcchīnām padam ichhanti vedhasah | 2. Patango vācham manasā bibhartī tāṁ Gandharve avadad garbhe antah | tāṁ dyotamānāṁ svaryam manishām ritasya pade kavyayo nipānti | “1. Sages behold with the heart and mind the Bird illumined by the wisdom of the Asura: the wise perceive him in the (aerial) ocean: the intelligent seek after the abode of his rays. 2. The Bird cherishes speech with his mind: the Gandharva hath uttered her in the womb: the bards preserve in the place of sacred rites this shining and celestial intellect.” (See also x. 189, 3, vāk patangīyā dhiyate.)

Third: I shall now adduce the passages in which other Vedic deities, whether singly or in concert, are spoken of as concerned in the production of the hymns:

Aditi.—In R.V. viii. 12, 14, Aditi is mentioned as fulfilling this function:

Yad uta svarāja Aditiḥ stomam Indrāya jījanat puru-prajasatam utaye ityādi | “When Aditi generated for the self-resplendent Indra a hymn abounding in praises, to supplicate succour,” etc.

Agni.—R.V. i. 18, 6, 7.—Sadasaspatim adbhutam priyam Indrasya kāmyam | sanim medhām ayāśīkham | yasmād rite na siddhyati yajno vipāṣchitaḥ chana | sa dhīnāṁ yogam invati | “6. I have resorted, for wisdom, to Sadasaspati (Agni), the wonderful, the dear, the beloved of Indra, the beneficent; (7) without whom

27 This passage, which is commonly understood of Vāch, occurs also in the Atharvaveda, iv. 30, 2 ff., but with some various readings, as āveśayantah for āveśayantim, and śraddhēyam for śraddhēam, etc. The hymn is translated by Mr. Colebrooke, Ess. i. 32, or p. 16 of Williams and Norgate’s edition. Professor Whitney, as I learn from a private communication with which he has favoured me, is of opinion that there is nothing in the language of the hymn which is specially appropriate to Vāch, so as to justify the ascription of it to her as the supposed utterer.
the sacrifice of the wise does not succeed: he promotes the course of our hymns.’’

iv. 5, 3. Sāma de-vi-barhah mahi tigma-bhrishtih sahasra-retah vrishabhus tviśhman | padaṁ na gor apagūhāṁ vivedvān Agnir mahyaṁ pra id u vochad manishām | 6. Idam me Agne kiyate pavaṁ aminate gurum bhāraṁ na manma | Brihad dadhātha dhriśhata gabhiraṁ yahvam prishtham prayāśa saptadhātu |

“Agni occupying two positions, the fierce-flaming, the infinitely prolific, the vigorous, the powerful, who knows the great hymn, mysterious as the track of a [missing] cow, has declared to me the knowledge [of it]. 6. To me who am feeble, though innoxious, thou, o Agni, the luminous, hast given, as a heavy load, this great, profound, and extensive Prishṭha hymn, of seven elements, with efficacious oblations.’’

iv. 6, 1. Tvaṁ hi viśvam abhi asi manaṁ pra vedhasāḥ chiṁ tirasi maniśhām |

“Thou presidest over all thoughts [or prayers]; thou augmentest the intelligence of the sage.’’

iv. 11, 3. Tvad Agne kāvyā tvad maniśhās tvad ukthā jāyante rādhyāni |

“From thee, Agni, are generated poetic thoughts; from thee the products of the mind; from thee effective hymns.’’

x. 21, 5. Agnir jāto Atharvanā vidad viśvāni kāvyā |

“Agni, generated by Atharvan, is acquainted with all wisdom.”

x. 91, 8. . . . Medhākāraṁ vidathasya prasādhanaṁ Agnim ityādi |

“Agni, the giver of understanding, the accomplisher of sacrifice.”

x. 4, 5. Yad vo vayam pramināmo vratāni vidūṣhāṁ devāḥ avidustarasaḥ | Agnis tad viśvam āprīgāti videvān yebhir devāṁ ritubhiḥ kalpa-yāti | Yat pākatrā manasaḥ dāna-dakshāḥ na yajnasya manvate martyā- saḥ | Agnis tad hotā krutavid vijānan yajishtho devāṁ rituśo yajāti |

“When, o [ye] gods, we, the most unwise among the wise, transgress the ordinances of your worship, the wise Agni completes them all, at the stated seasons which he assigns to the gods. When men, devoted to sacrifice, do not, from their ignorance, rightly comprehend the mode of worship, Agni, the skilful sacrificer, and most eminent of priests, knowing the ceremonial, worships the gods at the proper seasons.”

(As rites and hymns were closely united in the practice of the early Indians, the latter finding their application at the former; if Agni was
supposed to be the director of the one, viz., the oblations, he might easily come to be also regarded as aiding in the production of the other—the hymns. Verse 4 occurs also in the A.V. xix. 59, 1, 2, where, however, āprinātu is read instead of āprināti, and in place of the words yobhir devaṁ, etc., at the close of the verse, we have, somaḥ cha yo brāhmaṇān ā viveśa | “and Soma, who entered into the priests.”

Brahmaṇāṣpati.—R.V. i. 40, 5, 6. Pra nūnam Brahmaṇāṣpatir man- traṁ vadati ukthyan | yasminn Indro Varuṇo Mitraḥ Aryaman ādevaḥ okāṃsi chakriro | Tam id vochena vidatheshu sambhuvaṁ mantraṁ devaḥ anēhasam ityādi |

“Brahmaṇāṣpati (abiding in the worshipper’s mouth, according to the scholiast) utters the hymn accompanied with praise, in which the gods, Indra, Varuṇa, Mitra, and Aryaman, have made their abode. Let us utter, gods, at sacrifices, that spotless hymn, conferring felicity.” (Roth in his Lexicon considers okas to mean “good pleasure,” “satisfaction.” See also his Essay on Brahma and the Brāhmans, Journal of the Germ. Or. Soc. i. 74.)

Brihaspati.—R.V. ii. 23, 2. Uṣrāḥ iça sūryo jyotishā maho vīśveśhām iṣ janitā brahmaṇām asi |

“As the sun by his lustre instantly generates rays, so art thou (Brihaspati) the generator of all prayers.”

x. 36, 5. Ā Indro bārhīḥ sidatu pīnvatām Iḷā Brihaspatiḥ sāmabhīrtī rīkvo archatu |

“Let Indra sit upon the sacred grass; let Iḷā abound in her gifts; let the bard Brihaspati offer praise with hymns.”

Gandharva.—According to Professor Roth (see under the word in his Lexicon) the Gandharva is represented in the Veda as a deity who knows and reveals the secrets of heaven, and divine truths in general; in proof of which he quotes the following texts:

R.V. x. 139, 5. Viśvāvasur abhi tad no grīṇātu divyo Gandharvo rajaso vimānaḥ | Yad vā ghā satyam uta yad na vidma dhiyo hinvāno dhiyāḥ id naḥ avyāḥ

“May the celestial Gandharva Viśvāvasu, who is the measurer of the atmosphere, declare to us that which is true, or which we know not. May he stimulate our hymns, and may he prosper our hymns.

A.V. ii. 1, 2. Pra tad voched amṛitasya videṇa Gandharvo dhāma para- maṁ guhā yat |
"May the Gandharva, who knows the (secret of) immortality, declare to us that supreme and mysterious abode."

Indra.—R.V. iii. 54, 17. Mahat tad vah kavayaḥ chāru nāma yad ha devaḥ bhavatā visve Indro | sakha Ribhubhiḥ puruhuta priyebhir imāṁ dhiyaṁ sataye takshatasa naḥ |

"Great, o sage deities, is that cherished distinction of yours, that ye are all associated with Indra. Do thou, much invoked (Indra), our friend, with the beloved Ribhus, fabricate (or dispose) this hymn for our welfare." (This may merely mean that Indra was asked to give a favourable issue to the prayer of the worshipper, not to compose his hymn for him. See Roth’s Lexicon, under the word taksh, 3.)

vi. 62, 3. Tvāṁ kaviṁ chodayaḥ arkasatāv ityādi |

"Thou (Indra) didst stimulate the poet in the composition of his hymns," etc. (Sāyaṇa renders arkasatāv, "for the sake of finding food.")

vi. 18, 15. Krishaṁ kritno akritaṁ yat te asti ukthāṁ naviyo jana-yasva yajnaiḥ |

"Energetic (Indra), do what thou hast never yet done; generate a new hymn with the sacrifices."

vi. 34, 1. Saṁ cha toe jagmur girah Indra pūrvar vi cha tvad yanti vibheo manishāḥ |

"Many hymns are congregated in thee, o Indra, and numerous products of the mind issue from thee." (This half-verse has been already quoted in p. 227.)

vi. 47, 10. Indra mrila mahyaṁ jivatūm ichcha chodaya dhiyam ayaso na dhārāṁ | Yat kincha ahaṁ tvāyur idaṁ vadāmi tai jushasva kridhi mā devavantam |

"O Indra, gladden me, decree life for me, sharpen my intellect like the edge of an iron instrument. Whatever I, longing for thee, now utter, do thou accept; give me divine protection." (Compare with the word chodaya the use of the word prachodayāt in the Gāyatrī, R.V. iii. 62, 10, which will be given below.)

vii. 97, 3. Tam u namesā havirbhiḥ suśevasm Brahmanaspatīṁ griñīshe | Indraṁ śloko mahā daiyeah sishaktu yo brahmaṇo devakritasya rājā | 5. Tam ā no arkaṁ amṛitāya jusṭam ime dhāsura amṛitāsah purājāḥ ityādi |

"3. I invoke with reverence and with offerings the beneficent Brahmanaspati. Let a great and divine song celebrate Indra, who is king
of the prayer made by the gods. 5. May these ancient immortals make this our hymn acceptable to the immortal," etc.

viii. 13. 7. Praitva-vaj janaya girah sri pundhi jaritur havam | "As of old, generate hymns; hear the invocation of thy worshipser." 
viii. 52. 4. Sa pratnathah kavi-vidhah Indro vaksaya vakshanih | "Indra was of old the promoter of the poet, and the augmenter of the song."

viii. 78. 6. Yaj jayathah apureya Maghavan Vritra-hatyaya | tat prithivim aprathayas tad astabhnah uta dyam | 7. Tat te yajno ajayata tad arkah uta haksritih | tad viscam abhibhur asi yaj yatai yach cha jantvam |

"When, o unparalleled Maghavan, thou wast born to slay Vritra, thou didst then spread out the earth (the broad one) and sustain the sky: then thy sacrifice was produced, then the hymn, and the haksriti: (since) then thou surpassest everything that has been, or shall be, born."

Here therefore the hymn is asserted to be as old as Indra; though nothing more need be meant than that hymns then began to be produced. The hymn in which this verse occurs is not necessarily meant.

x. 112. 9. Ni shu vida ganapate ganeshu tvam ahur vipratamah khavnam | na rite tvat kriyate kinchana are maham arkah Maghavan chitram archa |

"Lord of assembles, sit amid our multitudes; they call thee the wisest of poets. Nothing is done without, or apart from thee; sing, o Maghavan, a great and beautiful hymn." (Already quoted in p. 252."

Indra and Vishnu.—R.V. vi. 69. 2. Ya vishvasam janitarah matinah Indra-Vishnun kala sa soma-dhana | Pra vah girah sasyamanah avantu pra stomaso gigamamah arkah |

"Indra and Vishnu, ye who are the generators of all hymns, who are the vessels into which soma is poured, may the praises which are now recited gratify you, and the songs which are chaunted with encomiums."

Indra and Varuna.—The following passage is not, properly speaking, a portion of the Rig-veda, as it is part of one of the Valakhilyas or apocryphal additions (described in Vol. II. p. 210), which are found inserted between the 48th and 49th hymns of the 8th Mandal. From its style, however, it appears to be nearly as old as some parts of the R.V.

xi. 6. Indravarunah yad fisheshyo manisham vacho matim krutam adattam agrah | yani sthanany asrijanta dhirah yajnam tanvamah tapasa 'bhyapasyam |
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"Indra and Varuṇa, I have seen through austere-fervour that which ye formerly gave to the rishis, wisdom, understanding of speech, sacred lore, and all the places which the sages created, when performing sacrifice." (See Vol. II. p. 220.)

The Maruts.—R.V. vii. 78, 3. Pra vaḥ Indrāya brīhate Maruto brahma archata |

"Sing, Maruts, your hymn to the great Indra." (Compare verse 1, of the same hymn, and the words brahmakṛtā Marutena gaṇena in iii. 32, 2.)

Pūshan.—R.V. x. 26, 4. Maṁśīmahi te vā vayam asmākaṁ deva Pūshan matināṁ cha sādhanam viprānāṁ cha ādham |

"We have called thee to mind, divine Pūshan, the accomplisher of our hymns, and the stimulator of sages." (The first clause of this, however, may merely mean that the god gives effect to the wishes expressed in the hymns. Compare vi. 56, 4: Yad adya te vā purushṭuta bravāma dastra mantumah | tat su no manma sādhaya | "Accomplish for us the (objects of the) hymn, which we utter to thee to-day, o powerful and wise god."

Savitri.—R.V. iii. 62 (= S.V. ii. 812, and Vāj. S. iii. 35). Tat Savitvā vareṇyam bhargo devasya dhimahi | dhiyo yo naḥ prachodayāt |

"We have received that excellent glory of the divine Savitri; may he stimulate our understandings [or hymns, or rites]."

(This is the celebrated Gāyatrī, the most sacred of all the texts in the Veda. See Colebrooke's Misc. Ess. i. pp. 29, 30, 127, and 175; or pp. 14, 15, 78, and 109 of Williams and Norgate's ed. Benfey (S.V. p. 277) translates the Gāyatrī thus: "May we receive the glorious brightness of this, the generator, of the god who shall prosper our works." On the root from which the word dhiṁahi is derived, and its sense, see also Böhtlingk and Roth's Lexicon, sv. dha and dhi; and compare my article "On the Interpretation of the Veda," Journ. Roy. As. Soc. p. 372.)

The Linga Purāṇa (Part II. sec. 48, 5 ff., Bombay lithographed ed.) gives the following "varieties" of the Gāyatrī, adapted to modern Saiva worship:

Gāyatrī-bhedāḥ | Tutpurushāya vidmahe vāg-viśuddhāya dhiṁahi |
Tun naḥ Śivaḥ prachodayāt | Gaṇāmbikāyai vidmahe karma-siddhyai cha dhiṁahi | Tun no Gauri prachodayāt | Tutpurushāya vidmahe Mahā-
devāya dhīmahi | Tan no Rudrāḥ prachodayāt | Tatpurushāya vibhīmhe Vakratundāya dhīmahi | Tan no Dantiḥ prachodayāt | Mahāsenāya vibhīmhe vāgviśuddhāya dhīmahi | Tan naḥ Skandaḥ prachodayāt | Tikṣṇaśringāya vibhīmhe Vedapādāya dhīmahi | Tan no Vṛiṣaḥ prachodayād ityādā |

"1. We contemplate That Purusha, we meditate 28 him who is pure in speech; may That Siva stimulate us. 2. We contemplate Gaṇāmbikā, and we meditate Karmasiddhi (the accomplishment of works); may That Gaurī stimulate us. 3. We contemplate That Purusha, and we meditate Mahādeva; may that Rudra stimulate us. 4. We contemplate That Purusha, and we meditate Vakratunda (Ganesā); may That Danti (the elephant) stimulate us. 5. We contemplate Mahāsena (Kārttikeya, and we meditate him who is pure in speech; may That Skanda stimulate us. 6. We contemplate Tikṣṇaśringa (the sharp-horned), and we meditate the Veda-footed; may Vṛiṣa (the bull) stimulate us."

Soma.—R.V. vi. 47, 3. Ayam me pīṭhaḥ udiyartti vācaṁ ayam maniśām uśatim ajīgaḥ |

"This [soma], when drunk, stimulates my speech [or hymn]; this called forth the ardent thought."

It may be said that this and the other following texts relating to Soma, should not be quoted as proofs that any idea of divine inspiration was entertained by the ancient Indian bards, as they can mean nothing more than that the rishis were sensible of a stimulating effect on their thoughts and powers of expression, produced by the exhilarating draughts of the juice of that plant in which they indulged. But the rishis had come to regard Soma as a god, and apparently to be passionately devoted to his worship. See the Second Volume of this work, pp. 470 ff., and especially pp. 474, 475; and my account of this deity in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society for 1865, pp. 135 ff.

Compare what is said of the god Dionysus (or Bacchus) in the Bacchae of Euripides, 294:

Mαῦτες ψδ δαίμων 5δε τό γάρ βακχεύσιμον
Καί τό μανιωθεὶς ματικὴν πολλὴν ἔχει.
"Or at γάρ ὁ θεὸς τοῖς τῷ σῶμι ἔλθη λόγον,
Λέγειν τό μέλλον τοῦτο μερινύτας τοιοῖς.

28 I retain here this sense of the word, which is probably the most commonly received.
"And this deity is a prophet. For Bacchic excitement and raving have in them much prophetic power. For when this god enters in force into the body, he causes those who rave to foretell the future."

R.V. viii. 48, 3. *Apāma somam amṛtāḥ abhāma aganma jyotir avidāma devān | kiṁ nūnam asmān kṛṇavad arātiḥ kim u dhūrtir amṛtar martyrasya |

"We have drunk the soma, we have become immortal, we have entered into light, we have known the gods; what can an enemy now do to us? what can the malice of any mortal effect, o immortal god?"

(This passage is quoted in the commentary of Gaudapāda on the Sānkhya Kārikā, verse 2, and is translated (incorrectly as regards the last clause), by Prof. Wilson, in p. 13 of his English version.)

A curious parallel to this last Vedic text is to be found in the satirical drama of Euripides, the Cyclops, 578 ff.; though there, of course, the object is merely to depict the drunken elevation of the monster Polyphemus:

'O 5' ὄφαντος μοι συμμεμέρετος δοκέι
Τῇ γῇ θεοσβαί, τοῦ Δίας τε τῶν θῶν
Δέωσι το παύ τε δαιμόνων ἄγων σίβας.

"The sky, commingled with the earth, appears
To whirl around; I see the throne of Jove,
And all the awful glory of the gods."

R.V. ix. 25, 5. *Arusho janayan giraḥ Somaḥ pavate ayushaḥ Indraṁ gachchan kavikratuḥ |

"The ruddy Soma, generating hymns, with the powers of a poet (or with the understanding of a sage), united with men, is purified, resorting to Indra."

ix. 76, 4. . . . *Pitā matīnām asamashta-kāvyāḥ |

"[Soma] father of our hymns, of incomparable wisdom."

ix. 95, 2. *Hariḥ spijānah pathyāṃ ritasya iyartti vācham ariteva nāvam | devo devānām guhyāni nāma avishkṛṇoti barkiṣṭi pravāče |

This text may be versified as follows:

We've quaffed the soma bright,
And are immortal grown;
We've entered into light,
And all the gods have known.
What foeman now can harm,
Or mortal vex us, more?
Through thee, beyond alarm,
Immortal gods, we soar.
"The golden [Soma] when poured out along the path of the ceremony, sends forth his voice, as a rower propels a boat. A god, he reveals the mysterious natures of the gods to the bard upon the sacred grass." (See R.V. ii. 42, 1, and x. 116, 9, quoted in p. 240.)


"Soma is purified, he who is the generator of hymns, of Dyaus, of Prithivi, of Agni, of Sūrya, of Indra, and of Vishnū. 6. Soma, who is a brāhmaṇ-priest among the gods (or priests), a leader among the poets, a rishi among sages, a buffalo among wild beasts, a falcon among vultures, an axe amid the forests, advances to the filter with a sound. The purified Soma, like the sea rolling its waves, has poured forth songs, hymns, and thoughts," etc. (See Benfey's translation of this passage in his Sāma-veda, pp. 238 and 253; and Nirukta-pariśishṭa, ii. 12, 13.)

Varuṇa.—R.V. viii. 41, 5, 6. Yo dhartā bhuvanānāṁ yaḥ uśrāgāṁ apichyā veda nāmnī guhyāḥ | sa kaviḥ kāvyā puru rūpam dyaur iva pushyati . . . . | Yasmin viścāni kāvyā chakre nābhir iva śrītā ityādi |

"He who is the upholder of the worlds (Varuṇa), who knows the secret and mysterious natures of the cows, he, a sage [or poet], manifests sage [or poetical] works, as the sky does many forms. . . . In him all sage works abide, as the nave within a wheel," etc. (See R.V. vii. 87, 4, in p. 248, and ix. 95, 2, above, in this page.)

Varuṇa, Mitra, and Aryaman.—R.V. vii. 66, 11. Vi ye dadhukh śara-dam māsam ād ahār yajñam aktuṁ cha ād rieham | anāpyam Varuṇo Mitraḥ Aryamanā khattraṁ rājānāḥ āsata |

"The kings, Varuṇa, Mitra, and Aryaman, who made the autumn, the month, and then the day, the sacrifice, night, and then the Rich, possess an unrivalled power." 31

30 It appears from Prof. Benfey's note on S.V. ii. 294 (= R.V. ix. 96, 6, quoted here), that the scholiast on that passage makes devānāṁ = riteviṣāṁ, "priests."
31 As this verse ascribes the formation of the Rich to the gods who are named in it, my remark, in p. 3 above, that the Puruṣā Śūkta contains "the only passage in
The following passage of the Rig-veda has (as we have seen above, p. 69, note 79, and p. 75) been quoted by Indian commentators and aphorists to prove the eternity of the Veda, on its own authority:

R.V. viii. 64, 6. Tasmāi nānām abhidyave vācāh Vīrūpā nityayā |
vrishne chodava sushūtim |
“Send forth praises, Vīrūpā, to this heaven-aspiring and prolific Agni, with perpetual voice.” (See i. 45, 3, etc., quoted above, p. 220.)

There is, however, no reason whatever to suppose that the words nityayā vācāh mean anything more than perpetual voice. There is no ground for imagining that the rishi entertained any such conception as became current among the systematic theologians of later times, that his words were eternal. The word nitya is used in the same sense “perpetual” in R.V. ix. 12, 7 (= S.V. ii. 55, 2), where it is said of Soma: nitya-stotro vanaspatiḥ dhiñnām antar ityādi | “The monarch of the woods, continually-praised, among the hymns,” etc., as well as in the two following texts:

R.V. ix. 92, 3.—Somāḥ punānāh sadāh eti nityam ityādi |
“The pure Soma comes to his perpetual abode [or to his abode continually], etc.

x. 39, 14 (quoted above, p. 236). Nityāṁ na sānum tanayaṁ dadhānāḥ |
“Continuing the series like an unbroken line of descendants.”

The tenor of the numerous texts adduced in this Section seems clearly to establish the fact that some at least of the ancient Indian rishis conceived themselves to be prompted and directed, in the composition of their hymns and prayers, by supernatural aid, derived from various deities of their pantheon. It may add force to the proof derived from these texts, and show that I am the less likely to have misunderstood their purport and spirit, if I adduce some evidence that a similar conception was not unknown in another region of the ancient Indo-European world, and that the expressions in which the early Grecian bards laid claim to an inspiration emanating from the Muses, or from Apollo, were not mere figures of speech, but significant, originally, of a popular belief. Most of the following passages, from Hesiod the hymns of the R.V. in which the creation of the Vedas is described,” requires some qualification.
and Homer, in which this idea is enunciated, are referred to in Mr. Grote’s History of Greece, i. 478.

Hesiod, Theogony, 22:

"Αἱ νῦ ποθ' Ἡσίοδον καλὴν ἐδίδαξαν αὐτὴν
Ἀρνας ποιμαίνονθ᾽ Ἐλικώνοι ὑπὸ ζαθων.
Τάνθε δὲ μὲ πρᾶτστα θεὶ πρὸς μίθον ἔσεται,
Μοῦσαι 'Ολυμπιάδες, κούραι Δίος ἀγιόχοι.
Ποιμένες ἄγραυλοι, κακὲ ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες διϊν,
"Ιδὲνε ψευδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐπίμοιοι ὁμία,
"Ιδὲνε δ’ ἢ, ἢντ’ ἐθέλωμεν, ἀληθέα μυθήσατον.
"Οι ἐφασαν κούραι μεγάλου Δίος ἀρτιεπειαί.
Καὶ μοι σκῆπτρον ἔδων, δάφνης ἐρυθῆλος ὅζων,
Δρέψασας θητόν ἐνέπενιον τε μοι ἄνδρῃ
Θείῳν, ὡς κλειομεν τ’ ἐσὸμενα, πρὸ τ’ ἐλοντα,
Καὶ με κλεόνθ’ ὁμείῳ πολλῷ χιλίῳ νεῖν ἐσόντων,
Χρᾶς τ’ ἀντὰς πρῶτὸν τε καὶ ὑπτερον ἀλείν ἀλίσειν.

"The Muses once conferred the dower
On Hesiod of poetic power,
As underneath the sacred steep
Of Helicon he fed his sheep.
And thus they spake, ‘Inglorious race
Of rustic shepherds, gluttons base,
Full many fictions we can weave
Which by their truthlike air deceive;
But, know, we also have the skill
True tales to tell, whene’er we will.’
They spake, and gave into my hand
A fair luxuriant laurel wand;
And breathed into me speech divine,
That two-fold science might be mine;
That future scenes I might unveil,
And of the past unfold the tale.
They bade me hymn the race on high
Of blessed gods who never die;
And evermore begin my lays,
And end them, with the Muses’ praise.”

Hesiod, Theogony, 94:

"Ἐκ γὰρ Μουσάων καὶ ἑκαβάλου Ἀτέλλανως
Ἀνδρεῖς δοῦλοι ἐκαίν ἐπὶ χθόνα καὶ κυβαρισταὶ,
Ἐκ δὲ Δίως βασιλῆς.

"The bards who strike the lyre and sing,
From Phoebus and the Muses spring:
From Jove’s high race descends the king.”

The following are the words in which the author of the Iliad invokes the aid of the Muses, to qualify him for enumerating the generals of the Grecian host (Iliad, ii. 484):
"Εσπέτε υνοι Μοῦσαι Ολύμπια δωμάτι᾽ ἔχουσαι,
'Τμεῖς γὰρ θεαὶ ἐστε πάρεστε τε ἱστε τε πάντα,
'Ἡμεῖς δὲ κλέος διον ἀκούομεν οὐδὲ τε θαμεν.

"Tell me the truth, ye Muses, tell,
Ye who on high Olympus dwell;
For, omnipresent, ye can scan
Whate’er on earth is done by man,
Whilst we vague rumours only learn
And nothing certain can discern."

But the Muses could also take away, as well as impart, the gift of song, as appears from Iliad, ii. 594 ff.:

"Ενθα τε Μοῦσαι
'Αντόμεναι Θάμυρι τὸν Θρήκην παῦσαν δοιδής'
Στεῖνο γὰρ ἐνχύμενος νικηφέμεν, ἔπερ τὸν δυνατὸ
Μοῦσαι δείδοιες, κοίραις Δίδυς ἀγαθοῖοι.
'Αι δὲ χολωσόμεναι πηρὴν θέσαν, δυνάρ δοιδήν
Θεσπεσίην ἀφέλοντο, καὶ ἐκλαθοῦν κιβαριστῶν.

"'Twas there the Muses, we are told,
Encountered Thamyris of old.
He boasted that the minstrel throng
To him must yield the prize of song;
Yes, even although, among the rest,
The Muses should the palm contest.
Aware of his presumption, they
Both took his skill in song away,
And power to wake the tuneful lyre;—
And struck him blind, in vengeful ire."

The following passages from the Odyssey refer to Demodocus, the bard who sang at the court of Alcinous, King of the Phaeacians (Odyssey, viii. 43 ff.):

Καλέσασθε δὲ θείοι δοιδήν,
Δημοδόκου τῷ γὰρ χίοις θείοι πέρα δικέοι δοιδήν,
Τέρπεις, ὅπερ θυμᾶς ἐντρίβοντο δείδειν.

"And go, the bard divine invite:—
The god hath given him skill
By song all others to delight,
Whenever he may will."

Odyssey, viii. 62 ff.:

"The herald came, and within him brought
The bard whom all with longing sought.
The Muse’s darling, he had good
As well as ill from her received;
With power of dulcet song endued,
But of his eyesight tamo bereaved."
Here the Muse is described as the arbiter of the bard’s destiny in other points besides the gift and withdrawal of song.

Odyssey, viii. 73:

Μοῦσαι’ ἄρ’ ἄουθν ἂν ἂν ποιεῖν δεῖδεμαι κλέα ἄνθρωποι κ.τ.λ.

"Stirr’d by the Muse the bard extoll’d
In song the deeds of warriors bold."

A little further on, Ulysses says of Demodocus (Odyssey, viii. 479 ff.):

Πάσι γὰρ ἀνθρώποις ἐπιχειρήσεωιν ἄουθοι
Τιμῆς ἔμοιροι εἰς καὶ ἄνδροι, δυναν’ ἄρα σχέισιν
"Ομισὶ Μοῦσαι’ ἐδίδαξε, φίλημα δὲ φόλον ἄουθοι.

"All mortal men with awe regard,
And honourably treat, the bard;
Because the Muse has taught him lays,
And dearly loves his tuneful race."

And again he addresses him thus (Odyssey, viii. 487):

Δημόδοκ’, ξοχά δὴ σε βρασῶν ἀνίσοις’ ἀπάντων.
"Η σε τε Μοῦσα’ ἐδίδαξε Δίας πύει, ἢ σε τ’ Απόλλων.
Διόν γὰρ κατὰ κόσμον Ἀχαιῶν δυνον ἀείδεις, κ.τ.λ.

"Demodocus, beyond the rest
Of mortals I esteem thee blest.
For thee, the Muse, Jove’s child, has taught,
Or Phoebus in thee skill has wrought;
So perfectly thou dost relate
The story of the Argives’ fate."

Phemius, the Ithacan minstrel, thus supplicates Ulysses to spare his life (Odyssey, xxii. 345 ff.):

"Αὐτὸ τοις μετόποισ’ ἄξοι ἔσεσαι, ἕκεν ἄουθοι
Πέφυκεν, ὅ τι τε θείαι καὶ ἀνθρώποισιν ἄειδε.
"Ἀντοδιδάσκων δ’ εἰμι, θέους δὲ μοι ἐν φρεσίν ἄμασ
Παυτολικ ἐνέργοιεν.

"Thou soon wilt grieve, if thou the bard shouldst slay,
To gods as well as men who pours his lay.
Self-taught I am; and yet within my mind
A god hath gendered strains of every kind."

"That is," says Mr. Grote, "Demodocus has either been inspired as a poet by the muse, or as a prophet by Apollo, for the Homeric Apollo is not the god of song. Kalchas, the prophet, receives his inspiration from Apollo, who confers upon him the same knowledge, both of past and future, as the Muses give to Hesiod." But does not this passage (Odyssey viii. 488) rather show that the Homeric Apollo was the god of song, as well as the bestower of prophetic intuition; and do we not learn the same from Iliad, i. 603? In any case, it is quite clear from Theog. 94, quoted above, that Hesiod regarded Apollo in this character.
The early Greeks believed that the gift of prophecy also, as well as that of song, was imparted by the gods to mortals. This appears both from Hesiod, as already quoted, and from the following passage of Homer (Iliad, i. 69):

Κάλχας Θεσπρωθής, διωνυσώλων δι' ἄριστος,
"Ος γὰρ τά τ' ἐόντα τά τ' ἐσόμενα, πρὸ τ' ἐόντα,
Καὶ νήσον ἔγχαιρε' Ἀχιλλ' Ἰλιὸν ἑσώ,
"Ημ δὲ μαυτοκόμης, τὴν δὲ πόρο θεοβότ' Ἀπόλλων.

"Of augurs wisest, Calchas knew
Things present, past, and future too.
By force of that divining skill,
Vouchsafed to him by Phoebus' will,
The Grecian fleet he safely bore
From Aulis' bay to Ilion's shore."

It is thus argued by Mr. Grote that the early Greeks really believed in the inspiration of their bards by the Muses (History of Greece, i. 477 ff.):

"His [the early Greek's] faith is ready, literal and uninquiring, apart from all thought of discriminating fact from fiction, or of detecting hidden and symbolized meaning: it is enough that what he hears be intrinsically plausible and seductive, and that there be no special cause to provoke doubt. And if indeed there were, the poet overrules such doubts by the holy and all-sufficient authority of the Muse, whose omniscience is the warrant for his recital, as her inspiration is the cause of his success. The state of mind, and the relation of speaker to hearers, thus depicted, stand clearly marked in the terms and tenor of the ancient epic, if we only put a plain meaning upon what we read. The poet—like the prophet, whom he so much resembles—sings under heavenly guidance, inspired by the goddess to whom he has prayed for her assisting impulse. She puts the words into his mouth and the incidents into his mind; he is a privileged man, chosen as her organ, and speaking from her revelations. As the Muse grants the gift of song to whom she will, so she sometimes in her anger snatches it away, and the most consummate human genius is then left silent and helpless. It is true that these expressions, of the Muse inspiring and the poet singing a tale of past times, have passed from the ancient epic to compositions produced under very different circumstances, and have now degenerated into unmeaning forms of speech; but they gained currency originally in their genuine and literal acceptation. If poets had from
the beginning written or recited, the predicate of singing would never have been ascribed to them; nor would it ever have become customary to employ the name of the Muse as a die to be stamped on licensed fiction, unless the practice had begun when her agency was invoked and hailed in perfect good faith. Belief, the fruit of deliberate inquiry, and a rational scrutiny of evidence, is in such an age unknown; the simple faith of the time slides in unconsciously, when the imagination and feeling are exalted; and inspired authority is at once understood, easily admitted, and implicitly confided in."

If we extend our researches over the pages of Homer, we shall speedily discover numerous other instances of a belief in divine interference in human affairs, not merely (1) in the general government of the world, in the distribution of good and evil, and the allotment of the diversified gifts, intellectual, moral, and physical, which constitute the innumerable varieties of human condition, but also (2) in the way of special suggestion, guidance, encouragement, and protection, afforded to individuals.

Illustrations of the general control exercised by the gods over the fortunes of mankind may be found in the following passages of the Iliad,—xiii. 730 ff., and of the Odyssey,—i. 347 f.; iv. 236 f.; vi. 188 f.; viii. 167–175; xvii. 218, 485 ff.

The following are illustrations of the special interference of the gods on behalf of their favourites: Iliad, i. 194 ff., 218; iii. 380 ff.; v. 1 ff.; vii. 272; xiii. 60 f., 435; xvi. 788 ff.:—Odyssey, i. 319 ff.; iii. 26 ff.; xiv. 216 f., 227; xvi. 159 ff. 33 Of the latter class of passages, I quote two specimens.

Odyssey, i. 319 ff.:

'Ἡ μὲν δέ εἰπον ἀπίθη γλαυκώπης Ἀθηνῆ,
"Ορκοῦ δ' ἢ ἀνοπάθει διήκπτατο τῷ ἕνεκεν θυμῷ
Θήνε μένος καὶ κάρας ὕπεμνησεν τέ ἐκ πατρός
Μάλλον εἰ γὰρ τὸ πάροικον ὅ γάρ φιλεῖν ἐσι νοήσας
Θάμβησεν κατὰ θυμόν, δισάτῳ γὰρ θεῶν ἵναι.

"As thus she spake, Athene flew
Aloft, and soared beyond his view.
His soul she filled with force and fire,
And stronger memory of his sire.
Amazed, he felt the inward force,
And deemed a god must be its source."

TO THE ORIGIN OF THE VEDIC HYMNS.

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When Telemachus urges his youth and inexperience as a reason for diffidence in approaching Nestor, Minerva says to him (Odyssey, iii. 26):

Τηλέμαχ', ἡλικὶ μὲν ἀντὶς ἐνὶ φρεσὶ σὴρι νοῆσεις,
Ἄλλα δὲ καὶ δαιμόνων ὑποθῆξαι ὅν γὰρ οἶω
Τινὲς τοίχων δέκητε γενέσθαι τε πραείμεν τε.

"Some things thy mind itself shall reach,
And other things a god shall teach;
For born and bred thou ne'er hadst been
Unless they gods had will'd, I ween.

These passages, however, afford only one exemplification of the idea which runs through, and in fact created, the entire mythology of the Greeks, viz. that all the departments of life and of nature were animated, controlled, and governed by particular deities, by whom they were represented, and in whom they were personified.

The Indian mythology,—as is evident to every reader of the Vedas, as well as (to some extent) to the student of the Purāṇas,—is distinguished by the same tendency as the Grecian. Indra, Agni, Vāyu, Savitṛi, Śūrya, and many other gods are nothing else than personifications of the elements, while Vāch or Sarasvati and some other deities, represent either the divine reason by which the more gifted men were supposed to be inspired, or some mental function, or ceremonial abstraction.

In the later religious history, however, of the two races, the Hellenic and the Indian, there is in one respect a remarkable divergence. Though the priestesses of the different oracles, and perhaps some other pretenders to prophetical intuition, were popularly regarded as speaking under a divine impulse, the idea of inspiration as attaching to poems or other compositions of a religious, didactic, or philosophical character, very soon became extinct. The Greeks had no sacred Scriptures. Although a supernatural character was popularly ascribed to Pythagoras, Epimenides, and Empedocles, the Hellenic philosophers in general spoke and wrote in dependance on their own reason alone. They rarely professed to be guided by any supernatural assistance, or claimed any divine authority for their dogmas. Nor (unless such

35 I express myself cautiously here, as a learned friend profoundly versed in the study of Plato is of opinion that there are traces in the writings of that author of a
may have been the case at a very late period) was any infallibility claimed for any of them by their successors.

In India, on the other hand, the indistinct, and perhaps hesitating, belief which some of the ancient rishis seem to have entertained in their own inspiration was not suffered to die out in the minds of later generations. On the contrary this belief grew up (as we have seen above, pp. 57–138, and 207 ff.) by degrees into a fixed persuasion that all the literary productions of those early sages had not only resulted from a supernatural impulse, but were infallible, divine, and even eternal. These works have become the sacred Scriptures of India. And in the popular opinion, if not in the estimation of the learned, most Indian works of any importance, of a religious, scientific, or philosophical kind, which were produced at a later period, have come to be regarded as inspired, as soon as the lapse of ages had removed the writers beyond familiar or traditional knowledge, and invested their names with a halo of reverence.

To return from this digression to the inquiry which was being pursued regarding the opinions of the ancient Vedic rishis on the subject of their own inspiration:

How, it will be asked, are we to reconcile this impression which the rishis manifest of being prompted by supernatural aid, with the circumstance, which seems to be no less distinctly proved by the citations made in the preceding section (pp. 232 ff.), that they frequently speak of themselves as having made, fabricated, or generated the hymns, without apparently betraying any consciousness that in this process they were inspired or guided by any extraneous assistance?

In reply to this I will only suggest (1) that possibly the idea of inspiration may not have been held by the earliest rishis, but may have grown up among their successors; or (2) that it may have been entertained by some rishis, and not by others; or again (3), if both ideas claim to supernatural guidance, though by no means to infallibility. See also the mention made of the inspiration ascribed to Pythagoras, in Mr. Grote's Greece, iv. 528, 530; and the notices of Epimenides and Empedocles given by the same author, vol. iii. 112 ff., vol. vii. p. 174, and vol. viii. 465 f.; and compare on the same subjects Ep. Thirlwall's Hist. of Greece, ii. 32 ff., and 155 ff.; and Plato, Legg. i. p. 642. See also Prof. Geddes's Phædo, note P. p. 251, and the passages there referred to; and the Tract of Dr. Köhler, above cited, pp. 60 and 64.
can be traced to the same author, we may suppose that the one notion was uppermost in his mind at one moment, and the other at another; or (4) that he had no very clearly defined ideas of inspiration, and might conceive that the divine assistance of which he was conscious, or which at least he implored, did not render his hymn the less truly the production of his own mind; that, in short, the existence of a human, was not incompatible with that of a superhuman, element in its composition.

The first of these suppositions is, however, attended with this difficulty, that both conceptions, viz., that of independent unassisted composition, and that of inspiration, appear to be discoverable in all parts of the Rig-veda. As regards the second supposition, it might not be easy (in the uncertainty attaching to the Vedic tradition contained in the Anukramaṇī or Vedic index) to show that such and such hymns were written by such and such rishis, rather than by any others. It may, however, become possible by continued and careful comparison of the Vedic hymns, to arrive at some probable conclusions in regard to their authorship, so far at least as to determine that particular hymns should probably be assigned to particular eras, or families, rather than to others. I must, however, leave such investigations to be worked out, and the results applied to the present subject, by more competent scholars than myself.

III. While in many passages of the Veda, an efficacy is ascribed to the hymns, which is perhaps nothing greater than natural religion teaches all men to attribute to their devotions, in other texts a mystical, magical, or supernatural power is represented as residing in the prayers and metres. (See Weber’s Vājasaneyi-Sanhitā specimen, p. 61; and Vol. I. of this work, p. 242.) Some of the following texts are of the latter kind.

Thus in R.V. i. 67, 3, it is said:

Ajo na kshāṁ dadhāra prithivīṁ tastambha dyāṁ mantrebbhiḥ satyaiḥ |

"(Agni) who like the unborn, supported the broad earth, and upheld the sky by true prayers."

The following is part of Śāyaṇa’s annotation on this verse:

Mantrair dice dhāraṇāṁ Taittirīye samānmātāṁ | "devāḥ vai ādityasya svarga-lokasya parācho 'tipatād abibhayaḥ | tāṁ chhandobhir adhirān dhriyā" iti | yadeva satyaiṁ mantraiṁ stāyamāno 'gnir dyāṁ tasmāṁ tasmāṁ iti |
"The supporting of the sky by mantras is thus recorded in the Taittirīya: 'The gods feared lest the sun should fall down from the heaven; they propped it up by metres.' Or the verse may mean that Agni, being lauded by true mantras, upheld the sky.'"

See also R.V. i. 96, 2, quoted above, in p. 225, and Ait. Br. ii. 33, cited in the First Volume of this work, p. 180.

i. 164, 25. Jagatā sindhūṁ divī astabhāyaḥ rathantare śūryam pari apaśyat | gāyatrasya samidhas tisraḥ āhus tato mahāḥ pra vīrīche maḥitva |

"By the Jagatī metre he fixed the waters in the sky; he beheld the sun in the Rathantara (a portion of the Śāma-veda): there are said to be three divisions of the Gāyatra; hence it surpasses [all others] in power and grandeur."

iii. 53, 12. Viśvāmitrasya rakshati brahma idam Bhāratas ījanam āśaḥ |

"The prayer of Viśvāmitra protects this tribe of the Bharatas."
(See Vol. I. pp. 242 and 342.)

v. 31, 4. Brahmāṇaḥ Indram mahayanto arkaɪ avardhayan Ahaye hantavai u |

"The priests magnifying Indra by their praises, have fortified him for slaying Agni."

Compare the following texts already quoted, iii. 32, 13, p. 226; vi. 44, 13, p. 227; viii. 6, 11, p. 228; viii. 8, 8, p. 243; viii. 44, 12, p. 230; viii. 63, 8, p. 230; x. 67, 13, p. 244; and also i. 10, 5; ii. 11, 2; ii. 12, 14; iii. 34, 1, 2; v. 31, 10; vii. 6, 1, 21, 31, 35; vii. 13, 16; viii. 14, 5, 11; viii. 82, 27; and viii. 87, 8, where a similar power of augmenting, or strengthening, the gods is attributed to the hymns.


"Atri, by his fourth prayer, discovered the sun which had been concealed by the hostile darkness. 8. . . . Atri placed the eye of the sun in the sky, and dispelled the illusions of Svarbhānu. 9. The Atris discovered the sun, which Svarbhānu, of the Asura race, had pierced with darkness; no other could [effect this]." (See Vol. I. of this work, pp. 242 and 469.)
vi. 75, 19. . . . Devās taṁ sarve dhūrvantu brahma varma mamāntaram |
“May all the gods destroy him; the prayer is my protecting armour.”

vii. 19, 11. Nu Indra śara stavamānāḥ ātī brahma-jūtaś tavā evaṁ
dhava ityādi |
“Heroic Indra, lauded, and impelled by our prayers, grow in body through (our) aid [or longing],” etc. (Compare viii. 13, 17, 25.)

vii. 33, 3. . . . Even nu kaṁ dāśarājne Sudāsam prāvad Indro brahma-
maṗṇa vo Vasishṭhāḥ | 5. . . . Vasishṭhasya stuvataḥ Indraḥ aśrod urum
Tritisubhayaḥ akiṇāt v lokam |
“Indra has delivered Sūdas in the combat of the ten kings through
your prayer, o Vasishṭhas. 5. Indra heard Vasishṭha when he praised,
and opened a wide place for the Tritsus.” (See Vol. I. pp. 242 and 319.)

viii. 49, 9. Pāhi naḥ Agnī ekayā pāhi uta dvitiyayā | pāhi gīrḥhis tis-
rihbir ārjāmpate pāhi chṛtasrihbir vaso |
“Protect us, Agni, through the first, protect us through the second,
protect us, lord of power, through three hymns, protect us through
four, thou bright god.”

The following passage celebrates the numbers of the metres:

x. 114, 8, 9. Sahasradhā panchadaśāni ukthā yāvad dyāvā-prithivī
tāvad īt tat | Sahasradhā mahimāṇāḥ sahasraṁ yāvad brahma vishṭhitaṁ
tāvati vāk | 9. Kaṁ chandasam yogam ācēda dhīraḥ ko dhishyām prati
vēcham papāda | kam rītvijam ashtamaṁ śūram āhur hari Indrasya ni
chikāya kaḥ svit |

8. “There are a thousand times fifteen ukthas; that extends as far
as heaven and earth. A thousand times a thousand are their glorious
manifestations; speech is commensurate with devotion. 9. What sage
knows the [whole] series [or application] of the metres? Who has
attained devotional speech? Whom do they call the eighth hero among
priests? Who has perceived the two steeds of Indra?”

(The word dhishyā is said by Yāska, Nirukta, viii. 3, to be = to
dhishnya, and that again to be = to dhishyaṁ-bhava, “springing” from
dhishyaṁ, “speech,” or “sacred speech.”

I conclude the series of texts relating to the power of the mantras
by quoting the whole of the 130th hymn of the 10th Maṇḍala of the
Rig-veda:

1. Yo yajno viśvatas tantubhis tataḥ ekaśataṁ deva-karmātir āyataḥ |
1. The [web of] sacrifice which is stretched on every side with threads, which is extended with a hundred [threads], the work of the gods,—these fathers who have arrived weave it; they sit where it is extended, [saying] ‘weave forwards, weave backwards.’

2. The Man stretches it out and spins it, the Man has extended it over this sky. These rays approached the place of sacrifice; they made the Śāma verses the shuttles for the woof.

3. What was the measure [of the ceremonial], what the form, what the type, what the oblation, what the enclosing fuel, what the metre, what the prāuga, and what the uktha, when all the gods sacrificed to the god?

4. The gāyatrī was associated with Agni; Savitri was conjoined with the uṣṇīhā; and Soma, gladdening (us) through hymns (ukthas), with the anuṣṭubh; the bṛihatī attached itself to the speech of Brīhaspati.

5. The virāj adhered to Mitra and Varuṇa; the tristubh, a portion of the day (?), [accompanied] Indra. The jagatī entered into the Viśvedevas. By this means human rishis were successful.

6. By this means our human fathers the rishis were successful, when this ancient sacrifice
was celebrated. I believe that I behold with my mind, [as] with an eye, those ancients who performed this sacrifice. 7. The seven wise and divine rishis, with hymns, with metres, [with] ritual forms, and according to the prescribed measures, contemplating the path of the ancients, have followed it, like charioteers seizing the reins.”

I shall not attempt to explain the meaning and purport of this obscure and mystical hymn, which has been translated by Mr. Colebrooke (Essays, i. 34, 35, or p. 18 of Williams and Norgate’s ed.). My object in quoting the verses is to show how the various metres are associated with the different deities, in this primeval and mysterious rite, and how a certain sanctity is thus imparted to them. In verse 7, it will be observed, the rishis are spoken of as seven in number, and as divine. The Atharva-veda (x. 7, 43, 44) gives the second verse somewhat differently from the Rig-veda, as follows: Pumān enad vayati udgrīṇatti pumān enad vi jahāra adhi nāke | ime mayūkāh upa tastebhur divaṁ sāmāni chakrus tasarāṇi vātave | “The Man weaves and spins this: the Man has spread this over the sky. These rays have propped up the sky; they have made the Sāma-verses shuttles for the wool.”

IV. But whatever may have been the nature or the source of the supernal illumination to which the rishis laid claim, it is quite clear that some among them at least made no pretensions to anything like a perfect knowledge of all subjects, human and divine, as they occasionally confess their ignorance of matters in which they felt a deep interest and curiosity. This is shown in the following texts:

R.V. i. 164, 5. Pākaḥ prichchhami manasā avijānan devānām enā nihitā padāni | vatsa bashkaye adhi satpta tantūn vi tatnire kavayah otavai ā | 6. Achkitvān chikitasaḥ chid atra kavīn prichchhami vidmane na videvān | vi yas tastambha shal imā rajāmi ajasya rūpe kim api svid ekam | 37. Na vi jānāmi yad iva idam asmi ninyaḥ sannaddho manasā charāmi | yadā mā agaḥ prathamajāḥ ritasya ād ād vācaḥ aśnuve bha- 

“5. Ignorant, not knowing in my mind, I enquire after these hidden abodes of the gods; the sages have stretched out seven threads for a wool over the yearling calf [or over the sun, the abode of all things]. 6. Not comprehending, I ask those sages who comprehend this matter; unknowing, [I ask] that I may know; what is the one thing, in the form of the uncreated one, who has upheld these six
worlds? 37. I do not recognize if I am like this; I go on perplexed and bound in mind. When the first-born sons of sacrifice [or truth] come to me, then I enjoy a share of that word."

I do not attempt to explain the proper sense of these dark and mystical verses. It is sufficient for my purpose that they clearly express ignorance on the part of the speaker. Prof. Wilson's translation of the passages may be compared. Prof. Müller, Anc. Ind. Lit. p. 567, renders verse 37 as follows: "I know not what this is that I am like; turned inward I walk, chained in my mind. When the first-born of time comes near me, then I obtain the portion of this speech."

x. 31, 7. Kum svid vanaṁ kaḥ u sa vṛkṣaḥ āsa yato dyāvā-prithiviṁ�ṁetatakṣaḥ | santasthāne ajare itaṁti ahāni pūrvar uṣahā jaraṁta |

"What was the forest, what the tree, out of which they fashioned heaven and earth, which continue to exist undecaying, whilst days, and many dawns have passed away?"

Compare x. 81, 4, where the first of these lines is repeated and is followed by the words: Maniṣhino manasā prichhata id u tad yad adhyatishthad bhavanāṁ dhārayan | "Ask in your minds, ye intelligent, what that was on which he took his stand when upholding the worlds;" and see verse 2 of the same hymn.

i. 185, 1. Katarā pūrve katarā aparā ayoḥ kathā jāte kavayo ko vi veda |

"Which of these two (Heaven and Earth) is the first? which is the last? How were they produced? Who, o sages, knows?"

x. 88, 18. Kati aghanāḥ kati sūryāsah kati uṣhasah kati u svid āpah | na upaspijam vah pitaro vadamī prichchhāmi vah kavayo vidmaṇa kam |

"How many fires are there? how many suns? how many dawns? how many waters? I do not, fathers, say this to you in jest; I really ask you, sages, in order that I may know."

Compare x. 114, 9, above, p. 227.

x. 129, 5. Tiraschino citato raśmir eshāṁ adahā svid āsid upari svid āsit | retodāhā āsan mahimāṁ āsan svadāḥ avastat prayatiḥ parastat |

6. Kaḥ adhā veda kaḥ iha pravocat kutah ajāta kutah iyaṁ visrīṣṭiḥ | arocā decaḥ asya visarjanena atha ko veda yataḥ ababhava | 7. Iyaṁ vis-

rishṭir yataḥ ababhava yadi vā daśhe yadi vā na | yah asya adhitakshaḥ parame vyoman sa anga veda yadi vā na veda |

5. "Their ray [or cord], obliquely extended, was it below, or was it above? There were generative sources, and there were great powers,
svadhā (a self-supporting principle) below, and effort above. 6. Who knows, who hath here declared, whence this creation was produced, whence [it came]? The gods were subsequent to the creation of this universe; who then knows whence it sprang? 7. Whence this creation sprang, whether any one formed it or not,—he who, in the highest heavens, is the overseer of this universe,—he indeed knows, or he does not know."

See the translation of the whole hymn by Mr. Colebrooke in his Essays, i. 33, 34; or p. 17 of Williams and Norgate's ed. See also Prof. Müller's version and comment in pp. 559–564 of his History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature; and my own rendering in the article on the "progress of the Vedic religion towards abstract conceptions of the Deity," in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society for 1865, pp. 345 f.

We have seen (above, p. 62) that a claim is set up (by some unspecified writer quoted by Sāyaṇa) on behalf of the Veda that it can impart an understanding of all things, past and future, subtle, proximate, and remote; and that according to Sankara Āchāryya (on the Brahma-sūtras, i. 1, 3) as cited above, p. 106, the knowledge which it manifests, approaches to omniscience. All such proud pretensions are, however, plainly enough disavowed by the rishis who uttered the complaints of ignorance which I have just adduced. It is indeed urged by Sāyaṇa (see above, p. 64) in answer to the objection, that passages like R.V. x. 129, 5, 6, can possess no authority as sources of knowledge, since they express doubt,—that this is not their object, but that their intention is to intimate by a figure of speech the extreme profundity of the divine essence, and the great difficulty which any persons not well versed in the sacred writings must experience in comprehending it. There can, however, be little doubt that the authors of the passages I have cited did feel their own ignorance, and intended to give utterance to this feeling. As, however, such confessions of ignorance on the part of the rishis, if admitted, would have been incompatible with the doctrine that the Veda was an infallible source of divine knowledge, it became necessary for the later theologians who held that doctrine to explain away the plain sense of those expressions.

It should, however, be noticed that these confessions of ignorance and fallibility are by no means inconsistent with the supposition that the rishis may have conceived themselves to be animated and directed in
the composition of their hymns by a divine impulse. But although the two rivals, Vasishttha and Viśvāmitra, whether in the belief of their own superhuman insight, or to enhance their own importance, and recommend themselves to their royal patrons, talk proudly about the wide range of their knowledge (see above, pp. 246 ff.), it is not necessary to imagine that, either in their idea or in that of the other ancient Indian sages, inspiration and infallibility were convertible or co-extensive terms. The rishis may have believed that the supernatural aid which they had received enabled them to perform what they must otherwise have left unattempted, but that after all it communicated only a partial illumination, and left them still liable to mistake and doubt.

I must also remark that this belief in their own inspiration which I imagine some of the rishis to have held, falls very far short of the conceptions which most of the later writers, whether Vaiśeshika, Māmānsaka, or Vedāntist, entertain in regard to the supernatural origin and authority of the Veda. The gods from whom the rishis supposed that they derived their illumination, at least Agni, Indra, Mitra, Varuna, Soma, Pushan, etc., would all fall under the category of productions, or divinities created in time. This is clearly shown by the comments of Sankara on the Brahma Sūtras, i. 3, 28, (above, pp. 101 ff.); and is otherwise notorious (see my "Contributions to a knowledge of the Vedic Theogony and Mythology" in the JI. R. A. S. for 1864, p. 63). But if these gods were themselves created, and even (as we are told in the Rig-veda itself, x. 129, 6, cited in p. 280) produced subsequently to some other parts of the creation, the hymns with which they inspired the rishis, could not have been eternal. The only one of the deities referred to in the Rig-veda as sources of illumination, to whom this remark would perhaps not apply, is Vāch or Sarasvatī, who is identified with the supreme Brahma in the passage of the Brihad Aranyāka Upanishad quoted above (p. 208, note 179); though this idea no doubt originated subsequently to the era of the hymns. But it is not to created gods, like Agni, Indra, and others of the same class, that the origin of the Veda is referred by the Vaiśeshikas, Māmānsakas, or Vedantists. The Vaiśeshikas represent the eternal Īśvara as the author of the Veda (see the passages which I have quoted in pp. 118 ff. and 209). The Māmānsakas and Vedantists, as we have seen (pp. 70 ff., 99 ff. and 208),
either affirm that it is uncreated, or derive it from the eternal Brahma. And even those writers who may attribute the composition of the Veda to the personal and created Brahma (see pp. 69, 105 f. and 208), with the Naiyāyikas who merely describe it as the work of a competent author (see pp. 116 f. and 209), and the Sānkhyas (see pp. 135 and 208), concur with the other schools in affirming its absolute infallibility. Their view, consequently (unless we admit an exception in reference to Vāch), differs from that of the Vedic rishis themselves, who do not seem to have had any idea, either of their hymns being uncreated, or derived from the eternal Brahma, or of their being infallible.

As regards the relation of the rishis to deities like Indra, it is also deserving of notice that later mythologists represent the former, not only as quite independent of the latter, and as gifted with an inherent capacity of raising themselves by their own austerities to the enjoyment of various superhuman faculties, but even as possessing the power of rivalling the gods themselves, and taking possession of their thrones. See the stories of Nahusha and Viśvāmitra in the First Volume of this work, particularly pp. 310 ff. and 404. Compare also the passages from the Rig-veda, x. 154, 2, and x. 167, 1, quoted above, p. 250, where the rishis are said to have attained to heaven, and Indra to have conquered it, by austere-fervour (tapas).

Sect. V.—Texts from the Upanishads, showing the opinions of the authors regarding their own inspiration, or that of their predecessors.

I shall now adduce some passages from different Upanishads, to show what opinions their authors entertained either in regard to their own inspiration, or that of the earlier sages, from whom they assert that their doctrine was derived by tradition.

I. Svētāsvatara Up. v. 2 (already quoted above, p. 184). Yā yoniṁ yonīṁ adhitih ṣhaty ēko viśvāṁ rāpāṇi yoniṁ cha sarejāḥ | rājeh pra sūtaṁ Kapilaṁ yas tam agre jñānair bibhartti jāyamānaṁ cha paśyetaḥ |

“He who alone presides over every place of production, over all forms, and all sources of birth, who formerly nourished with various knowledge that rishi Kapila, who had been born, and beheld him at his birth.”
II. Svetāsvatara Up. vi. 21. Tapāḥ-prabhāvad veda-prasadāch cha Brahma ha Svetāsvatara’tha videñāḥ ayaśramibhyāḥ paramam pavitram pravācha samyag rishi-sangha-jushtam |

“By the power of austere-fervour, and by the grace of the Veda, the wise Svetāsvatara declared perfectly to the men in the highest of the four orders, the supreme and holy Brahma, who is sought after by the company of rishis.” (Dr. Röer’s translation, p. 68, follows the commentator in rendering the first words of the verse thus: “By the power of his austerity, and the grace of God.” This, however, is not the proper meaning of the words veda-prasadāch cha, if the correctness of that reading, which is given both in the text and commentary (Bibl. Ind. p. 372), be maintained. Sankara interprets the words thus: “Veda-prasadāch cha” | kaivalyam udāśya tad-adhikara-siddhaye bahujanman samyag arādhita-paramēśvarasya prasādāc cha | “‘By the grace of the Veda:’ by the grace of the supreme God who had been perfectly adored by him during many births in order to acquire the prerogative of (studying) it (the Veda) in reference to kaivalya (isolation from mundane existence);” and thus appears to recognize this reading.

In the 18th verse of the same section of this Upanishad the Vedas are said to have been given by the supreme God to Brahmā:

Yo Brahmānaṁ vidadhāti pūreṇyo vai vedāṁ cha prahipoti tasmaī | taṁ ha devam ātma-buddhi-prakāśanumukhur vai saraṇam aham prapañye |

“Seeking after final liberation, I take refuge with that God, the manifest of the knowledge of himself, who at first created Brahmā and gave him the Vedas.”

III. Munḍaka Up. i. 1 ff. (quoted above, p. 30, more at length). Brahmas devanām praṣṭham sambabhava visvasya kartā bhuvanasya gopta | So brahma-vidyāṁ sarea-vidyā-pratishthām Atharvāya jyeshtha-putrāya praḥa |

“Brahma was born the first of the gods, he who is the maker of the universe and the supporter of the world. He declared the science of Brahma, the foundation of all the sciences, to Atharva, his eldest son.”

IV. The Chhāndogya Up. viii. 15, 1, p. 625 ff. concludes as follows:

Tad ha etad Brahmā Prajāpataye uaccha Prajāpatir Manavā Manuḥ praṇābhyāḥ | achāryya-kulād vedam adhyāya yathā vidhānaṁ gurūṁ kar-matiśeṣhena abhisamāvṛtitya kuṭumbe śuchau deśe svādhyāyaṁ adhiyāno
dhārmarikān vidadhad ātmanī sarvendriyāni sampratishthāpya ahiṃsan savya-bhūtāni anyatra tirthabhyaḥ sa khalo evaṁ varttayan yavad-āyusham Brahma-lokam abhisampadyate na cha punar āvarttate na cha punar āvarttate |

"This [doctrine] Brahmā declared to Prajāpati, Prajāpati declared it to Manu, and Manu to his descendants. Having received instruction in the Veda from the family of his religious teacher in the prescribed manner, and in the time which remains after performing his duty to his preceptor; and when he has ceased from this, continuing his Vedic studies at home, in his family, in a pure spot, communicating a knowledge of duty [to his pupils], withdrawing all his senses into himself, doing injury to no living creature, away from holy places,—thus passing all his days, a man attains to the world of Brahma, and does not return again, and does not return again [i.e. is not subjected to any future births]."

I quote the commencement of Sankara's comment on this passage:

_Tad ha etad ātma-jnānaṁ sopakaraṇam om ity etad akṣharam ity-ādyaiḥ saha upāsanaṁ tad-vāchakena granthena ashtādhyāya-lakṣhaṇena saha Brahmā Hiranyagarbhaḥ Paramēśvaro vā tad-deśeṇa Prajāpataye Kaśyapaṁ uvāca | asāv api Manave eva-putrāya | Manūḥ praśābhyaḥ ity evam śrut-yṛtha-sampradāya-paramparayā āgataṁ upanishad-vijñānam adyāpi vidētavyā avagamyate |

"This knowledge of soul, with its instruments, with the sacred monosyllable _Om_ and other formule of devotion, and with the book distinguished as containing eight chapters, which sets forth all these topics, [viz. the Chhāndogya Upanishad itself] was declared by Brahmā Hiranyagarbha, or by Prajāpati (the supreme God), through his agency, to the Prajāpati Kaśyapa. The latter in his turn declared it to his son Manu, and Manu to his descendants. In this manner the sacred knowledge contained in the Upanishads, having been received through successive transmission of the sense of the Veda from generation to generation, is to this day understood among learned men."

In an earlier passage of the same Upanishad iii. 11, 3 f. (partly quoted in the First Volume of this work, p. 195), we find a similar statement in reference to a particular branch of sacred knowledge (the _madhu-jñāna_):

3. _Na ha vai asmai udeti na ninlochati sakṛid divā ha eva asmai bha-
vati yaḥ etām evam brahmopanishadāṁ vedā | 4. Tad ha etad Brahmā Prajāpataye uvācha Prajāpatir Manavo Manuḥ prajābhyaḥ | tad etad Uddālakāya Āruṇaye jyeshṭhāya putrāya pita brāhma uvācha. | 5. Idaṁ vāvā taj-jyeshṭhāya putrāya pita brāhma prabrūyat prāṇāyāya vā antavāsino (6) na anyasmāi kasmaichanaḥ | yadyapy asmai imām abhiṁ parigrhitāṁ dhanasya pāṁ dadyāt etad eva tato bhūyāḥ ity etad eva tato bhūyāḥ iti |

"3. For him who thus knows this sacred mystery, the sun neither rises nor sets, but one day perpetually lasts. 4. This (Madhu-jnāna) was declared by Brahmā to Prajāpati, by Prajāpati to Manu, and by Manu to his descendants. This sacred knowledge was further declared to Uddālaka Āruṇi by his father. 5. Let a father expound it to his eldest son, or to a capable pupil, but to no one else. 6. If any one were to give him this entire earth, which is surrounded by water, full of wealth, this sacred knowledge would be more than that, yes, would be more than that."

Compare Manu, xi. 243, where that Code is said to have been created by Prajāpati (First Volume of this work, p. 394); and Bhagavad Gītā iv. 1, where the doctrine of that treatise is said to have been declared by Krishṇa to Vivasvat (the Sun), by Vivasvat to Manu, by him to Ikshvāku, and then handed down by tradition from one royal rishi to another (Vol. I. p. 508).
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Page 4, line 5.

I have omitted here the verse from the Atharva-veda, xi. 7, 24 (quoted by Professor Goldstücker in his Pañini, p. 70): \textit{Rīchāḥ sāmāni chandāṇī purāṇāṁ yajushā saha | uchchhīṣṭāj jājnīre savae devī devāḥ diviśritāḥ} \textsuperscript{1} "From the leavings of the sacrifice sprang the Rich- and Sāman-verses, the metres, the Purāṇa with the Yajush, and all the gods who dwell in the sky."

Professor Aufrecht has favoured me with the following amendments in my translations in pp. 7 and 8:

Page 7, line 13.

For "the text called śāvitrī [or gāyatrī]" he would substitute "the verse dedicated to Savitṛī."

Page 7, line 16.

For "the mouth of Brahma" he proposes "the beginning of the Veda." (Sir W. Jones translates "the mouth, or principal part of the Veda.")

Page 8, line 8.

For "from Vāch (speech) as their world" he proposes "out of the sphere (or compass) of speech."

Page 8, line 8.

For "Vāch was his: she was created" he proposes "For in creating the Vedas, he had also created Vāch."

Page 8, line 13.

For "He gave it an impulse" he proposes "He touched it."
Page 8, line 16.

For "Moreover it was sacred knowledge, which was created from that Male in front," he proposes "For even from that Male (not only from the waters) Brahma was created first."

Page 9, line 16.

This passage of the Brähad Ârañyaka Upanishad corresponds to Satapatha Brahmana x. 6, 5, 5.

Page 10, line 2.

"May the brilliant deity," etc., Professor Aufrecht would prefer to translate the second line of the verse, beginning sudevah (p. 9, l. 6 from the foot), "Goodness (the good god) only knows where they put the earth which was thrown up (nirvapana)."

Page 20, line 17.

See Åśvalâyanas Grihya Sûtras, pp. 155, and 157 ff.

Page 22, line 13, note 25.

I quote two verses from Manu, of which the second confirms the correctness of the rendering I have given of the words ā ha eva sa nakhâgrebhyaś tapyate, and the first illustrates the text of the Taittirîya Árañyaka cited in the note: Manu ii. 166. Vedam eva sādā 'bhuyas yat tapas tapayan devijottamaḥ | vedâbhyaśo hi viprasya tapah param ichhyate | 167. "Å haiva sa nakhâgrebhyaḥ" paramaiṁ "tapyate" tapah । yaḥ vra-gya api devī 'dāte svâdhyaśaiṁ śaktito 'nvaham । "Let a good Brâhman who desires to perform tapas constantly study the Veda; for such study is a Brâhman's highest tapas. 167. That twice-born man who daily studies the Veda to the utmost of his power, even though (luxuriously) wearing a garland of flowers (really) performs the highest tapas to the very extremities of his nails." This verse, it will be observed, quotes verbatim one of the phrases of the Brâhmaṇa, and gives definiteness to its sense by adding the words paramaiṁ tapah. Verses 165 ff. of the same book of Manu prescribe the abstemious mode of life which the student (brahmachârin) is to follow whilst living in his teacher's house. The Mahâ-bhârata, Udyoga-parvan, 1537, thus states the conditions of successful study in general; Sukhârthinaḥ kuto cidyā nãsti vidyârthinaḥ sukhama
sukhārthī vā tyajed vidyāṁ vidyārthī vā tyajet sukhām | “How can one who seeks ease acquire science? Ease does not belong to him who pursues science. Either let the seeker of ease abandon science, or the seeker of science abandon ease.”

Page 30, line 17.

Compare the lines quoted by the Commentator on Sāndilya’s Bhaktisūtra, 83, p. 60, from the Mahābhārata, Sāntiparvan, Moksha-dharma, verses 13,551 ff.: Sahopanishado vedān ye viprāḥ samyag āsthītāḥ | pa-thanti vidhim āsthāya ye chāpi yati-dharmaṁ | tato viśiṣṭāṁ jānāmi gatim ekāntināṁ nṛṇām | “I regard the destination of Ekāntins (persons devoted to the One as their end) as superior to that of Brāhmans who perfectly study the Vedas, including the Upanishads, according to rule, as well as to that of those who follow the practices of ascetics (yatis).”

Page 34, line 1.

Perhaps this was scarcely a suitable passage to be quoted as deprecatory of the Veda, as in such a stage of transcendental absorption as is here described all the ordinary standards of estimation have ceased to be recognized.

Page 43, line 10.

With the expression hrid-akāśa, “the aether of the heart,” compare the passage quoted from the Veda in Sankara’s commentary on Brahma Sūtra iii. 2, 35 (p. 873): “Yo ’yaṁ vahirdhā purushād ākāśo yo ’yam antah-puruḥe ākāśo yo ’yam antar-hriḍaye ākāśaḥ | “This aether which is external to a man, this aether which is within a man, and this aether which is within the heart.” See also the Brhad Āraṇyaka Upanishad ii. 5, 10 and iii. 7, 12.

Page 44, line 1.

See the Yoga aphorisms i. 2 ff. as cited and explained by Dr. Ballantyne.¹ The second aphorism defines yoga to be “a stoppage of the functions of the mind” (Yogas chitta-sritti-nirodhaḥ). “The mind then abides in the state of the spectator, i.e. the Soul” (tadā drasṭuḥ svarūpe’vasthānam—Aph. 3). “At other times it takes the form of the

¹ Two fasciculi only, containing two Pādās and 106 Sūtras, were published at Allahabad in 1852 and 1853; but a continuation of Dr. B.’s work has been commenced in the “Pandit” for Sept. 1888.
functions” (vritti-sārūpyam itaratra—Aph. 4). These functions, or modifications (as Dr. Ballantyne translates) are fivefold, and either painful, or devoid of pain, viz. proof, or right notion (pramāṇa), mistaken (viparyyaya), groundless imagination (vikalpa), sleep (nidrā), recollection (smṛiti)—Aphorisms 5–11. See also Dr. Ballantyne’s Sāṅkhya Aphorisms, iii. 31 ff.

Page 57, note 61.

With the subject of this note compare the remarks in p. 108, and the quotations from Dr. Roer and Professor Müller in pp. 173, 175, and 193.

Page 62, note 65.

Professor Cowell does not think that the text is corrupt. He would translate it, “the other pramāṇas, beside śabda, (scil. perception and inference), cannot be even supposed in a case like this” (which refers to such a transcendental object as the existence of an eternal Veda). Sāyaṇa, in his reply to the objector, recapitulates the applicable proofs as śrutī, smṛiti, and loka-prasiddhi,—all three only different kinds of testimony, śabda.

Page 63, lines 11 f., and note 68.


Page 84, note 89, and page 180, line 7.

I have been favoured by Professor Cowell with the following note on kālātyayāpadisātha:

“My Calcutta Pandit considered this fallacy to be the same as that more usually called bādha (cf. too Bhāshāparichchhedā, śl. 70, 77, and the Bengali translation, p. 65). Its definition is pākṣe sādhyābhāvaḥ. The Tarka-sangrāha defines a hetu as bādhita, ‘when the absence of what it seeks to prove is established for certain by another proof,’ as in the argument vahnir anushno dravyatvāt. The essence of this fallacy is that you deny the major, and therefore it does not matter whether you accept the middle term in itself or not. It is involved in the overthrow of the major term. I should translate it the ‘precluded argument,’—it might have been plausible if it had not been put out of court by something which settles
the point,—it is advanced too late (the pre in 'precluded' expresses the kalātita of the old name). This corresponds to the account in the Nyāya-sūtra-vṛtti: Kālasya sādhana-kālasavyāyate 'bhāve 'padishtaḥ prayukto hetur | etena sādhyābhāvapramālakshanārtha iti sūcitam | sādhyābhāvanirñaye sādhanāsambhavat | Ayam eva bādhitasādhyaka iti giyate. The Vṛtti goes on to say that you need not prove vyabhichāra (i.e. that your opponent's hetu or middle term goes too far, as in parvato dhumaṇān vahneḥ where vahni is a saivyabhichāro hetuḥ) in order to establish the bādha. I should therefore prefer to translate the passage from the Vedārtha-prakāśa, p. 84, 'your alleged middle-term vākyatva; the possessing the properties of a common sentence, is liable to two objections,—(1) it is opposed by the fact that no author was ever perceived, and (2) it also is precluded by weighty evidence (which proves that your proposed major term is irrelevant).’ Sāyaṇa then adds his reasons for each objection,—for the first, in the words from yathā Vyāsa down to upalabdhaḥ; for the second, in the fact that smṛiti and śruti agree in the eternity of the Veda (the pūrveam I suppose refers to p. 3 of the Calcutta printed text), and that even if the Supreme Spirit be the author he is not purushaḥ in the sense in which the objector uses the term. Either way, the major term of the objector’s syllogism pauruṣheyā is precluded, bādhita; or, in the technical language of the Nyāya, Sāyaṇa establishes an absence from the minor term (pakṣha) of the alleged major term (sādhyā); and hence no conclusion can be drawn from the proposed syllogism. I may add that I have also looked into Vātsyāyana, but his explanation seems to me an instance of what my Pandit used so often to impress on me, that the modern logic (which such a late mediæval writer as Sāyaṇa follows) is not always that of the Nyāyabāṣya. He makes the error lie in the example, i.e. in the induction; and it is therefore, as Professor Goldstücker says, a ‘vicious generalization.’”

Page 88, note 95.

Professor Cowell disagrees with the explanation I have hazarded of the object of the sentence in the text to which this note refers. He thinks that its purport, as shewn by the word vyabhichārāt, is to intimate that the former of the two alternative suppositions would prove too much, as it would also apply to such detached stanzas as the one
referred to, of which the author, although unknown to some persons, was not necessarily unknown to all, as his contemporaries no doubt knew who wrote it, and his descendants, as well as others, might perhaps still be aware of the fact. In this case, therefore, we have an instance of a composition which some persons did not know the origin, but which nevertheless was not superhuman (apauruṣheya). This is no doubt the correct explanation.

Page 99, line 1.

The argument in proof of the incompetence of the Śūdras for the acquisition of the highest divine knowledge is contained in Brahma Sūtras i. 3, 34–38. As the subject may possess an interest for any educated persons of this class into whose hands this book may fall in India, I extract the entire discussion of the question:

34. "Śuṣaṣya tad-anādara-śravaṇāt tad-ādṛvaṇāt sādhyahe hi" | yathā manushyādikāra-niyamam apodya devādīnām api vidyāsu adhikāraḥ uktaś tathāva dvijāty-adikāra-niyamāpavādāna śūdrasya api adhikāraḥ syād ity etām āśaṃkāṃ nivarttayītum idam adhikaraṇam ārabhyate | tatra śūdrasya api adhikāraḥ syād iti tāvatra āprāptam arthīva-sāmarthyayoḥ sambhavat | tasmāḥ "chhūdra yajne 'navakṛiptaḥ" itivach chhūdra vidyāyam anavakṛiptaḥ iti nishedhākravaṇaṇāt | yaḥ cha karmasv anadikāra-kāraṇāḥ śūdrasya anagnitvān na tad vidyāya adhikārasya avapādakam | na hy āhāvāniyādi-rahitena vidyā vedātum na śakyaḥ | bhavati cha lingaṁ śūdrādikārasya upoḍḥalakam | saṁvarga-vidyāyāṁ hi Jānaśrutim Pauṭrāyaṇāṁ śūrāśuṁ śūdra-śābdena pariṃśati "aha āhē tvā śūdra tava eva saha gobhir astv" iti | Vidura-prabhṛtayaḥ cha śūdra-yoni-prabhavahaḥ api viśiṣṭa-vedānā-sampannāḥ smaryyante | tasmād adhikriyate śādro vidyāsu | ity eva prāpate brāhmaḥ | na śūdrasya adikāro vedādhyayanābḥavat | adhita-vedo hi vidita-vedārtho vedārthesv adhikriyate | na cha śūdrasya vedādhyayanam asty upanayanapūrva-kāteśvadevedādhyayanasya upanayanasya cha varna-traya-vishayatvāt | yat te arthīvai na tad asi śaṃmartye 'adhikāra-kāraṇam bhavati | sāmartyam api na laukikāṁ kevalam adhikāra-kāraṇam bhavati śāstro 'ṛthe śāstṛasya śaṃmartyasya apecakhaṭavāt śaṃstṛaṇaḥ cha śaṃmartyasya adhyayana-nirākaraṇena nirākritzvāt | yach cha idaṁ śudro yajne 'navakṛiptaḥ iti tad nyāya-pūrva-kāteśvād vidyāyāṁ api anavakṛiptaṁ dyotayaṁ nyāyasāya śādhāranaṇatvāt | yat punaḥ saṁvarga-vidyāyāṁ śūdra-
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śabda-śravāṇaṁ lingam manyase na tal lingaṁ nyāyābhāvāt | nyāyokter
hi linga-dārsanaṁ dyotakam bhavati na cha āṭtra nyāyo 'sti | kāmaṁ cha
ayaṁ śūdra-śabdaḥ saṁvara-vidyāyām eva ekasyāṁ śūdram adhikuryāt
tad-viṣhayatvād na savāsū vindyuśu | arthavāda-sthavāt na tu kvachid apy
ayaṁ śūram adhikarttum utsahe | sakyate cha ayaṁ śūdra-sābdo 'dhi-
kṛita-viṣhaye yojayitum | katham iti | ucyate | “‘kam u are enam etat
santaṁ sayugvānam iev Rainkam āttha’” (Chāndogya Upanishad, iv. 1, 3.)
itv asmād haṁsa-vākyād atmano ‘nādaraṁ śrutavato Jānaśruteḥ Pauṭrā-
yanasya śuṭ upede tām rīshi Rainkāḥ śūdra-sābdena anena sācyāṁba-
bhāva atmanaṁ paroksha-jnānasya khyāpanāya ātma gamyate jāti-śūdrasya
anadhirārāt | katham punaḥ śūdra-sābdena śuṭ uppanā śucyate iti |
ucyate | tad-adraṇaya śucam abhiduvāraśu sācā vā bhidudrve sācā vā
Rainkam abhiduvāra ātva śūdrāvavārtha-saṁhāvad raḍghārthasya
cha asambhāvāt | drisyate cha ayam ar tho’śyaṁ ākhyāyikāyām |

35. “Kṣhattriyateva-gateś cha uttaratra Chaitrarathena lingāt” | Itās
cha na jāti-śūdro Jānaśrutir yat-kāraṇam prakaraṇa-nirūpaṇena khaṭ-
triyatevam asya uttaratra Chaitrarathena Abhiprātāriṇā khaṭtiṛiyena
saṁabhivyāḥyārāḥ lingād gamyate | uttaratra hi saṁvara-vīḍyā-vāyasya-
śeshe Chaitrarathir Abhiprātiṁ khaṭṭīriyaṁ sankirttāya | “atha ha
Saunakaṁ cha Kāpeyaṁ Abhiprātiṁāṇaṁ cha Kākhaśasemiṇīṁ sūdena pari-
vīṣyamānau brahmachārī bibhikṣhe” (Chh. Up. iv. 3, 5) iti | Chaitra-
rathitevaṁ cha Abhiprātiṁāṇaḥ Kāpeya-yogād avagamavam | Kāpeya-
yogo hi Chaitrarathasya avagataḥ | “etena vai Chaitrarathāṁ Kāpeyāḥ
ayājayan” iti saṁmāṇaye-yājināṁ cha prāyena saṁmāṇavayāḥ yāja-
kāḥ bhavanti | tasmāḥ “Chaitrarathir nāma ekaḥ kṣhattrā-patir ajayata”
itī cha khaṭṭā-jaṭītevaśamāt khaṭṭīryatvam asya avagamavam | tenn
khaṭṭīryena Abhiprātiṁāṇā saha saṁmāṇayaṁ vidyāyāṁ sankirttānam
Jānaśrute api khaṭṭīryatevaṁ sācyayati | saṁmāṇāṁ eva hi prāyena
saṁabhivyāhāḥ bhavanti | khaṭṭiṁ-preśaṁādy-aścīrya-yogāḥ cha
Jānaśruteḥ khaṭṭīryatevaśagatiḥ | ato na śūdreyā adhikāraḥ |

36. “Saṁskāra-parāmārasāt tad-abhāvābhilāpāc cha” | itās cha na
śūdreyā adhikāra yaḥ vidyā-pradeśehu upanayanadayaḥ saṁskāraḥ
parāṃpiṃyante “taṁ ha upaninye” | “‘adhīhi bhagavaḥ’ iti ha upa-
sāda” | “brahma-parāḥ brahma-nīṣṭhāḥ param Brahma aneṣhahāṁ
‘esha ha vai tat sarvāṁ vakshyati’ iti te ha samīt-paṇayo bhagavantam
Pippalādam upasannāḥ” iti cha “tān ha anupaniya eva” ity api pra-
darsitā eva upanayaṇa-prāptir bhavati | śūdreyā cha saṁskārāḥbhāvo
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bhilayate "śūdraḥ chaturtho varṇaḥ ekajātir" ity ekajātitva-smaranena 
na śūdre pātakaṁ kinchid na cha saṁskāram arhati" ity-adibhiś cha |
adhikāro yat satya-vachanena śūдрatvābhāve nirdhārite Jābāiṁ Gauta-
maḥ upanetum anusāsitum cha pravrīte "na etad abṛihatam vivaktum
arthi | samidham sonya āhara upa tvā neshye na satyād aghaḥ" (Chh.
Up. iv. 4, 5) iti śruti-līṅgāt |
38. "Śravaṇādhyayanārtha-pratisheḍhāt smṛiteś cha" | Itaś cha na
śūdrasya adhikāro yad asya smṛiteḥ śravaṇādhyayanārtha-pratisheḍho bhav-
ati | veda-śravaṇa-pratisheḍho vedādhyayana-pratisheḍhas tad-artha-jnā-
nānushṭhānayoḥ cha pratisheḍhāḥ śūdrasya smaryyate | śravana-pratishe-
ḍhas tāvad atha asya "vedam upaśriṅgavatās trapu-jutubhyāṁ śrotra-prati-
pūraṇam" iti "padyu ha vai etat śmasānau yat śūdras tasmāt śūdra-
samīpa na adhyetavyam" iti cha | ataḥ eva adhyayana-pratisheḍhaḥ |
yasya hi samīpeśpi na adhyetavyaṁ bhavati sa kathāṁ śrutim adhiśitiṣa |
bhavati cha uchchhāraṇe jhīva-chheda dhārane sārīra-bhedāḥ iti | ataḥ eva |
cha arthād artha-ārtha-jñānānushṭhānayoḥ pratisheḍhaḥ bhavati | na śūdrāya 
matiṁ dadyād" iti "devijātināṁ adhyayanāṁ ijaṁ dānam" iti cha |
yeshāṁ punaḥ pūrva-kṛta-saṁskāra-vasād Vidura-dharma-vyāḍha-pra-
hṛtiṇāṁ jnānottattis teshāṁ na sakyate phala-prāptiṁ pratibaddhauṁ 
jñānasya ekāntika-phalavatāt | "śrāvayech iṣṭuro varṇān" iti cha iti-
hāsa-pūrāṇaḥdigame chāturvarṇyādhikāra-smaranāt | veda-pūrvaṁ tu 
nāstī adhikāraḥ śūdrāṅgam iti sthitam |
34. "In the word 'Śūdra' reference is made to his vexation on 
hearing that disrespectful expression, and to his running up."

"This section is commenced to silence the doubt whether in the same 
way as it had been denied (above) that the prerogative of acquiring 
divine knowledge is restricted to men, and affirmed that it extends to 
the gods, etc., also, the limitation of the same prerogative to twice-
born men may not also be questioned, and its extension to Śūdras 
maintained. The grounds alleged in favour of the Śūdra having this 
prerogative are that he may reasonably be supposed to have both (a) 
the desire and (b) the power of acquiring knowledge, and that accord-
ingly (c) the Veda contains no text affirming his incapacity for know-
ledge, as it confessedly has texts directing his exclusion from sacrifice : 
and further (d) that the fact of the Śūdra's not keeping up any sacred 
fire, which is the cause of his incapacity for sacrifice, affords no reason
for denying to him the prerogative of gaining knowledge; since it cannot be maintained that it is impossible for a man who is destitute of the āhavanīya and other fires to acquire knowledge. There is also (e) in a Vedic text a sign which confirms the Sūdra's prerogative. For in the passage which treats of the knowledge of the Saṁvarga (Chhāndogya Upanishad, chapter iv. section 1-3) a speaker designates Jānaśruti, descendant of Janaśruti in the third generation, who was desirous of performing service, by the term Sūdra: ‘Keep to thyself, o Sūdra, thy necklace and chariot with thy cattle.’ (Chh. Up. iv. 2, 2.) And further (f) Vidura and others are spoken of in the Smṛiti as possessed of distinguished knowledge, although they were of Sūdra descent. Consequently the Sūdra enjoys the prerogative of acquiring various sorts of divine knowledge. To this we reply: The Sūdra has no such prerogative, because he cannot study the Veda. For it is the man that studies the Veda, and obtains a knowledge of its contents, who enjoys the prerogative of [access to] those contents. But a Sūdra does not study the Veda, for such study must be preceded by initiation, which again is confined to the three upper castes. As regards (a) the desire of knowledge,—that, in the absence of power, confers no prerogative. And (b) mere secular power does not suffice for the purpose; since scriptural power is necessary in a matter connected with Scripture; and such scriptural power is debarred by the debarring of study. And (c) the passage which declares that a ‘Sūdra is incapacitated for sacrifice,’ demonstrates his incapacity for knowledge also; since that follows

2 Such is the sense given to hāreteū by the Commentators, who make it out to be a compound of the words hāra, “necklace,” and ēteū, “a chariot;” but although ēteū might be the nominative of ētean, “going,” no such word appears in the lexicons with the sense of “chariot.” Besides, the compound seems a very awkward one. Perhaps the word should be separated into ha are ēteū; but then there would be no nominative to ēteu, and it would be difficult to construe ēteū, “thee.”—Since the above was written, I have been favoured with a note on the passage by Professor Goldstücker. He conjectures that the words should be divided as follows: ahaha are ēteū Sūdra tava eva saha gobhir ēteu; that ēteū may be the nominative singular feminine of the Vedic pronoun ēteu, meaning “some one,” and then the sense might be as follows: “O, friend, some woman belongs to thee, Sūdra! Let her be (i.e. come) along with the cows.” And Jānaśruti would appear to have understood the word ēteū in this sense here supposed, for we find that on hearing the reply of Raikva, he took his daughter to the latter, along with four hundred additional cows and the other gifts; and that on seeing the damsel, Raikva expressed his satisfaction and acceded to the request of her father.—The author of these puzzling words, it seems, intended a pun; and S’ankara perhaps gave only one solution of it.
from the rule, which is of general application. As regards the circumstance that in the Vedic text regarding the knowledge of the Saṁvarga, the word Sūdra occurs, which you regard as a sign in favour of your view; it is (d) no sign; because in that passage no rule is laid down. For the discovery of a sign indicates that a rule has been laid down; but in the passage in question there is no such rule. And although it were conceded that [if it were found in a precept regarding the Saṁvarga] the word Sūdra would confer on a man of that caste a prerogative in regard to that particular knowledge alone, (from its being intended for him), although not to all sorts of knowledge, yet as the word occurs [not in precept, but] in an illustrative narrative (arthaśāda) it cannot confer on him a prerogative in regard to any knowledge whatever. And in fact this word Sūdra can be applied to a person [of a higher caste] who possessed the prerogative. How? I explain: Vexation (śuk) arose in the mind of Jānaśruti when he heard himself disrespectfully spoken of in these words of the swan: ‘Who is this that thou speakest of as if he were Rainka yoked to the chariot?’³ (Chh. Up. iv. 1, 3). And since a Sūdra does not possess the prerogative of acquiring knowledge, we conclude that it is to this vexation (śuk) that the rishi Rainka referred, for the purpose of shewing his own knowledge of things imperceptible by sense, when he made use of this word Sūdra (Chh. Up. iv. 2, 2, see above). But again, how is it indicated by the word Sūdra that vexation (śuk) arose in his mind? We reply: by ‘the running to it [or him]’ (tad-ādravanāt); i.e. either ‘he ran to vexation,’ or ‘he was assailed by vexation,’ or ‘in his vexation he resorted to Rainka.’ We conclude thus because the sense afforded by the component parts of the word Sūdra is the probable one,⁴ whilst the conventional sense of the word Sūdra is here inapplicable. And this is seen to be the meaning in this story.

³ This appears to allude to the person referred to being found sitting under a chariot (Chh. Up. iv. 1, 8). See p. 67 of Babu Râjendralâl Mittra’s translation. This story is alluded to by Professor Weber in his Ind. Stud. ix. 45, note, where he treats Sayugvan as a proper name, and remarks “The Vedânta Sûtras (i. 3, 34, 35), indeed, try to explain away this” (the circumstance of Jânaśruti being called a Sūdra) and of course S’âṅkara in his commentary on them does the same, as well in his explanation of the Chhândogya Upanishad.” I am not, however, by any means certain that the epithet “Sūdra,” applied to Jânaśruti by Rainka, is not merely meant as a term of abuse.

⁴ The meaning of this is that the word S’ûdra is derived from such, “vexation,”
Sūtra 35. "And that Jānaśruti was a Kshattriya is afterwards indicated by what is said of Abhipratārīn of the race of Chaitrarathā."

"That Jānaśruti was not a Śūdra appears also from this, that by examining the context he is afterwards found to be a Kshattriya by the sign that he is mentioned along with Abhipratārīn of the family of Chaitrarathā. For in the sequel of the passage regarding the knowledge of the Saṁvarga mention is made in these words of Abhipratārīn Chaitrarathī, a Kshattriya: 'Now a Brahmachārīn asked alms of Saunaka of the race of Kapi, and Abhipratārīn the son of Kakshhasena who were being served at a meal' (Chh. Up. iv. 3, 5). And that Abhipratārīn belonged to the family of Chaitrarathā is to be gathered from his connection with the Kāpeyās; for the connection of Chaitrarathā with the latter has been ascertained by the text: 'The Kāpeyās performed sacrifice for Chaitrarathā.' Priests of the same family in general officiate for worshippers belonging to the same family. From this, as well as from the text: 'From him a lord of Kshat-

and dru, "to run." (See the First Volume of this work, p. 97, note 192.) Even the great S'ankara, it seems, was unable to perceive the absurdity of such etymologies. In his commentary on the Chhāndogya Upanishad the same writer tells us that various explanations had been given of the employment of the word S'ūdra in this passage: Namu rōṣu 'sau kshattrī-sambandhāt | "Sa ha kshattāram utva" (iv. 1, 5) ity uktam | vidyā-grahaṇēya cha brāhmaṇā-samipopagamēt | śūdrasya cha anadhi-kārt | katham idam ananuroopaṇa Raikvaṇa uchyate "śūdra" iti | tattra āhur oṣhār-vrūyāḥ | haṁsa-vachana-iravanṇāt utgam anuviveṣa | tena asau sūchā śruteḥ Raik-vaṇya mahīmnām eva dravatī iti | rishir ātmanah parokshajñātām darśayant "śūdra" ity āha | śūdra-vad būdhānena eva enam vidyā-grahaṇēya upajagōma na śūrūśhayā | na tu jātyā eva śūdraḥ iti | aparā punar āhur alpaṇā dhanān āhritam iti rushā eva enam uktavīn "śūdra" iti | "But is not Jānaśruti shewn to have been a king, (a) from his name being connected with a charioteer in the passage 'He said to his charioteer,' (b) from his resorting to a Brāhmaṇa to obtain knowledge, and (c) from a S'ūdra possessing no such prerogative? How then did Raikva address to him an appellation inconsistent with this in the words 'o S'ūdra?' Learned teachers reply: 'Vexation (śūk) took possession of him on hearing the words of the swān: in consequence of which, or of hearing (śruteḥ) of the greatness of Raikva, he ran up [S'ūdra is here derived either from sūchā + dravatī, or from śruteḥ + dravatī]; and the rishi, to shew his knowledge of things beyond the reach of the senses, called him S'ūdra. He had approached to obtain knowledge from the rishi by annoying him like a S'ūdra, and not by rendering him service; while yet he was not by birth a S'ūdra. Others again say that the rishi angrily called him a S'ūdra because he had brought him so little property." This passage is also translated by Bābu Rājendra Lal (Chh. Up. p. 68, note), who renders būdhānena (which I have taken to mean "annoying") by "paying" for instruction; but I cannot find any authority for this sense of the word.
triyas named Chaitrarathi was descended,' which proves that his family were Kshattriyas, we may gather that Abhipratārin belonged to this class. And the circumstance that Jānaśruti is mentioned in connection with the same branch of knowledge as Abhipratārin, the Kshattriya, shews that the former also was a Kshattriya. For it is in general men of the same class who are mentioned together. And from the fact of Jānaśruti sending a charioteer (Chh. Up. iv. 1, 5–7), and his other acts of sovereignty also, we learn that he was a Kshattriya. Hence (we conclude that) a Śūdra does not possess the prerogative of divine knowledge.

Sūtra 36. "From reference being made to initiation, and from a Śūdra being declared to be excluded from it."

"And that a Śūdra does not possess the prerogative of acquiring divine knowledge, may be further inferred from the fact that investiture with the sacred cord and other rites are referred to in passages where science is the subject in question. For the fact that the seekers after such knowledge obtained initiation, is shewn by such passages as the following: 'He invested him;' 'He came to him, saying, teach me, Sir' (Chh. Up. vii. 1, 1?); 'Devoted to Brahma, resting in Brahma, seeking after the highest Brahma, they approached the venerable Pippalāda with firewood in their hands, (saying) 'he will declare all this' (Praśna Up. i. 1); and 'having invested them,' etc. And that a Śūdra receives no initiation is shewn by the text of the Smṛti which pronounces him to be but once-born, viz. 'the Śūdra is the fourth class, and once-born;' and by such other passages as this: 'There is no sin in a Śūdra, and he is not entitled to initiation.'" ⁶

Sūtra 37. "And because he acted after ascertaining that it was not a Śūdra [who had come to him]."

"That a Śūdra does not possess the prerogative of acquiring knowledge appears also from this that [according to the Chhandogya Upanishad] Gautama proceeded to invest and instruct Jābāla after ascertaining by his truth-speaking that he was not a Śūdra: 'None but a Brāhmaṇ could distinctly declare this: bring, o fair youth, a piece of fuel; I will invest thee; thou hast not departed from the truth' (Chh. Up. iv. 4, 5)." ⁶

This last verse has been already quoted in Vol. I. p. 138, note 244.

⁶ I shall quote in full the earlier part of the passage from which these words are
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Sûtra 38. "And because, according to the Smṛiti, a Śūdra is forbidden to hear, or read, or learn the sense."

4: "And that a Śūdra does not possess the prerogative of acquiring divine knowledge, appears from this that, according to the Smṛiti, he is forbidden to hear it, or read it, or learn its sense: i.e. it is declared in the Smṛiti that he is forbidden either to hear the Veda, or read the Veda, or to learn it contents, or to practise its injunctions. Hearing is forbidden to him in these texts: 'If he listens to the reading of the Veda, his ears are to be filled with [melted] lead and lac;' and 'The Śūdra is a walking cemetery; therefore no one must read in his vicinity.' And consequently the reading of it is prohibited to him: for taken, both for the sake of explaining the allusion, and for the illustration which it affords of ancient Indian manners: Chh. Up. iv. 4, 1. Satyakāmo ha Jābālī Jābālīm mātarum ānātrayāνchakre "brahmacharyyam bhavati vīvatsyuम kiṇ-gotra ne aham asmi” iti | 2. Sā ha enam urūchā "na aham etad veda tūta yad-gotras tvam asi | bahu aham charanti parichāriγi yauvane tvōм alabhē | sā ’ham etad na veda yad-gotras tvam asi | Jābālī tu nūma aham asmi Satyakāmō nūma tvam asi | su Satyakāmāha eva Jābālī 'braeithāḥ' iti | "Satyakāma, the son of Jābālī, addressed his mother Jābālī, saying, ‘I wish, mother, to enter on the life of a religious student. To what family (gotra: see Müller’s Anc. Sansk. Lit. pp. 378 ff.) do I belong?’ 2. She answered, ‘I do not know, my son, to what family thou belongest. Much consorting [with lovers] and roving (or serving), in my youth, I got thee. I know not of what family thou art. But my name is Jābālī, and thine Satyakāma. Say, ‘I am Satyakāma son of Jābālī.’” He accordingly goes to Hāridrumata of the race of Gotama, and asks to be received as a student. The teacher enquires to what family he belongs and the youth repeats verbatim the answer he had received from his mother, and says he is Satyakāma the son of Jābālī. The teacher replies in the words quoted by S’ankara “No one other than a Brāhman could distinctly declare this,” etc. The interpretation of paragraph 2, above given, seems to convey its correct sense. Jābālī apparently—means to confess that her son was nullius fūlius; and that he must be content to call himself her son, as she did not know who his father was. The explanation of the words bahe aham charanti parichāriγi yauvane tvōm alabhē given by the Commentators and followed by Bābū Rājendralāl Mittra, that she was so much occupied with attending to guests in her husband’s house, and so modest that she never thought of enquiring about her son’s gotra, and that her husband died early, is founded mainly on the word parichāriγi, and would not account for Jābālī’s ignorance of her husband’s name (which she does not mention) or even of her husband’s lineage. In regard to the sense of charanti see the passage from the Šatapatha Brāhmaṇa, ii. 5, 2, 20, quoted in the First Volume of this work, p. 136, note 242. S’ankara was either ignorant of the laxity of ancient morals, or wished to throw a veil over the spurious origin of a sage like Satyakāma who had attained divine knowledge and become a teacher of it (see Chh. Up. iv. 10, 1). In his preface, however, p. 30, as I observe, Bābū Rājendralāl speaks of Satyakāma as a natural son in these words: ‘Although a natural born son whose father was unknown, and recognized by the contemptuous sobriquet of Jābālī from the designation of his mother Jābālī,” etc.
how can he, in whose neighbourhood even the Veda is forbidden to be read, read it himself? And if he utters it, his tongue is to be cut; and if he retains it in his memory, his body is to be slit. And it results from the meaning of the terms that he is prohibited from learning its contents, or practising its injunctions, according to the texts, 'Let no one impart intelligence to a Śūdra;' and 'reading, sacrifice, and liberality are the duties of twice-born men.' As regards (f) Viśvara, Dharma, Vyādha, and others in whom knowledge was produced in consequence of their recollection of acts performed in a former birth, their enjoyment of its results cannot be prevented, from the transcendent character of the effects of knowledge; and because in the text 'Let the four castes be made to hear them,' the Smṛiti declares that the four castes possess the prerogative of learning the Itihāsas and Purāṇas [by means of which Śūdras may attain perfection]. But it has been established that Śūdras do not possess the prerogative of acquiring divine knowledge derived [directly] from [the study of] the Veda.”

The Bhagavad Gītā affirms a different doctrine in the following verses, x. 32 f., where Krishṇa says:

Māṁ hi Pārtha vyapāśritya yo 'pi syuh pāpa-yanayah | striyo vaiśyās tathā śūdras te 'pi yānti parāṁ gatim | 33. Kim punar brāhmaṇāḥ puṇyāḥ bhaktāḥ rājarshhayas tathā |

"Those who have faith in me, even though they be of base origin, women, Vaiśyas, and Śūdras, attain to the most transcendent state. How much more pure Brāhmans and devout royal rishis."

Sankara could scarcely have been ignorant that his principle was not in harmony with this text; but he has thought proper to ignore this discrepancy of views, as he probably shrank from directly contradicting a work held in such high estimation.

See also the account of the views entertained on the same subject by Sāndilya which I have stated above, p. 178.

Page 105, line 24.

The following quotation continues the discussion of this subject; and will also serve to illustrate pp. 6 and 16, above, as well as p. 60 of the First Volume:

Brahma Sūtra i. 3, 30. "Samāna-nēma-rūpeatvāch cha āvrittāv apy
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avirodho darśanat smriteś cha' । aṭhāpi syāt । yadi paśe-ādi-vad deva-
vyaktayo 'pi santatyā eva utpadyeran nirudhyeraṁśa cha tato bhidhaṁ-
bhighe bhidhiḥti - eyavahārāvichhedat sambandha - nityatena virodhaḥ
śabde pariḥriyeta । yadā tu khalu sakalāṁ trailokyam parityakta-nāma-
rūpaṁ nirepam pratiyate prabhavati cha abhinavam iti śruti-smṛiti-vādāḥ
vadanti tadā katham avirodhaḥ iti । tattra idam abhidhiyate "samāna-
nāma-rūpatavād" iti । tadā 'pi saṁsārasya anādītvaṁ tāvad abhyupagan-
tavyam । pratipādayishyati cha ācāryyaḥ saṁsārasya anādītvaṁ "upā-
padyate ca apy upalabhyyate cha" iti (Brahma Sūtra ii. 1, 36) । anādau
cha saṁsāre yathā svāpa-prabodhayoh pralaya-prabhava-pravacanे 'pi pūrva-
prabodha-vad uttara-prabodhe 'pi eyavahārād na kaśchid virodhaḥ । evaṁ
kalpāntara-prabhava-pralayayor api iti draṣṭavyam । svāpa-prabodhayoh
cha pralaya-prabhavaḥ ūrhetye । "yadā supṭaḥ svapnaṁ na kanchana
pasyaty atha asmin praṇaḥ eva ekaḍhā bhavati tadā enaṁ vāk sarvair
nāmabhīḥ saha apyayante chakṣuḥ sarvaiḥ rūpaṁ saha apyayente śrotraṁ sar-
vaiḥ śabdaiḥ saha apyayante manaiḥ sarvair dhyānaṁ saha apyayente । sa yadā
pratibuddhyate yathā 'igner jvalataḥ sarvaiḥ diśo visphulingaḥ vipradi-
theram evam eva etasmād ātimanaiḥ sarve praṇaiḥ yathāyatanaṁ vipradi-
ṭhante praṇeṇbhyo devaiḥ devaḥbhavo lokaiḥ (Kaush. Br. Utt. A. 3, 3) iti । syād
etat । svāpo purushāntara-eyavahārāvichhedat svayaṁ cha sushupta-pra-
buddhasya pārpa-prabodha-eyavahārānusandhāna-sambhavat aviruddham
mahāpralaye tu sarva-eyavahārochchedaj janmāntara-eyavahāra-vach ca
kalpāntara-eyavahārasya anusandhatum asaṅkayavat vaishanyam iti । na
esa dosaḥ । sati api sarva-eyavahārochchedini mahāpralaye Paramēśvar-
rūṇagrahād iśvarāṇāṁ Hiranyagarbhdināṁ kalpāntara-eyavahārānu-
sandhānopaṭṭāḥ । yadyapi prakṛtaiḥ praṇino na janmāntara-eyavahā-
rāmaḥ anusandhānaiḥ driṣyante iti na tat prakṛta-vad iśvarāṇam bhavi-
tavyam । yathā hi prāṇīteśīveshe 'pi manushyādi-stamba-paryanteh
jnānaisvāryādy-śaṅkavandhaḥ pareṇa pareṇa bhūyān bhavan driṣyate
tathā manushyādiśvaha Hiranyagarbha-paryanteh jnānaisvāryādy-
abhivyaktir api pareṇa pareṇa bhūyāṁ bhavati ity etat śruti-smṛiti-
vādeshe asakṛtya eva anukalpaṁ prādṛśhvatam pārmaśvāryam vyām-
yāṇaṁ na sakyaiṁ nāṣi iti vāditum । tataś cha atta kalpānusṭhaṁ-
prakṛṣṭa-jnāna-karmāṇaiḥ iśvarāṇāṁ Hiranyagarbhdināṁ earttamaṇa-
kalpaṁ prādṛśhvatam Paramēśvarūṅgriḥitaṇāṁ supta-prakṛti-bhavat
kalpānta-eyavahārānusandhānopaṭṭāḥ । tathā cha śrutir "yo
Brahmāṇaṁ viadhdati pūrvaiṁ yo vai vedāṁś cha prahinotī tasmai । taṁ
ha devam atma-buddhi-prakāśam munukshu vair āraṇgam aham prapadyo”
(Svetāsvatara Upanishad, vi. 18) iti | s marrow cha Šaunakādayo Mādhucchandāḥ-prabhritibhir dasatathyo drishtāḥ iti | prativedaṃ cha evam eva kāndarṣh-ādayaḥ smaryante | śrutir apy rishi-jnāna-pūrvakam eva mantreṇa anuṣṭhānām darśayati “yo ha va aviditārśheya-chhando-
daivata-brāhmaṇena mantreṇa yājyati va adhyāpayati va athānuḥ cha richhati gartaṃ va prapadyate” ity upakramya “tasmād etāṃ mantra vidyād” iti | prāṇināṃ cha suha-prāptaye dharmo vidhiyate duḥkha-
parīhāraya adharmah pratisheṣhīhyate | dṛishtānuśratvika-duṣṭkha-sukha-
vishayau cha rāga-dveshau bhavato na vilakṣhana-vishayāḥ ity ato dhar-
mādharmah-pūrṇa-bhūtottarottarāḥ prīśhīr nishpadamānāḥ pūrve-srīśli-
śaḍrīṣy eva nishpadyate | sṛṣṭiṣ ca bhavati “tēṣaṃ ye yāni kārṇāṃ prāk-srīṣṭyāṃ pratiṣṭhēdīrī | tāṇya eva te prapadyante srīyamānāḥ punaḥ punaḥ | hiṃsāraṇīśre mṛīdu-kṛṣe dharmanām śrītānīte | tad-bhā-
vitāḥ prāpadyante tasmāt tāt tasya rochane” | iti | pratiṣṭhānaṃ api cha idāṃ jagat śekty-avāśeṣhāṃ eva pratiṣṭhētāḥ saktī-mūlam eva cha prabhavati itarathā ākasmikata-prasangā | na ca anekākārāḥ saktayaḥ śaṅkyaḥ kalpayitum | tasaḥ ca vičhindya vičhindya api udbhavatam bhūr-adī-
loka-pravāhāṇām deva - tiryāṇ - manushya - lakshanānam cha prāṇi-nī-
kāya-pravāhāṇām varṇāraṇa-dharma-phala-vyavathānānām cha anādau saṁśāre niyatātvan indraya-vishaya-sambandha-niyatātva-vat pratiyeta-
yām | na hi indriya-vishayā sambandhāder vyavahārasya prati sargam anyathātvam shashṭhindriya-vishaya-kalpaṁ śaṅkyaḥ utpekṣhitum | ataḥ cha saṁca-kalpānāṃ tūla- vyāhāratevāt kalpāntara- vyavahāranuvan-
dhāna-kshamatvā eka iśvarāṇām samāna-nāma-rupāḥ eva pratisargaṁ viśeṣāḥ prādurbhavanti samāna-nāma-rupateḥ cha āvṛttāv api mahā-
sarga-mahāpralaya-lakṣṇayāḥ jagato bhuyapaṃyamānānāṁ na kaś-
chich ekaḥ bahada-prāmāṇyādi-virodhaḥ | samāna-nāma-rupatām cha śrutī-
sṛṣṭi darśayataḥ “śūrya-chandra-maṇḍuḥ dātā yathā-pūrvek alakpayat |
dvāma ca prīṭhivin chāntariksham atho svaḥ” | iti | yathā pūrvek kalpe śūrya-chandra-maṇḍuḥ-prabhriti jagat kriptatā thātā sminn api kalpe Paramārtho kalpayad ity arthaḥ | thātā “Agnir vai akānayo ‘annādo devanāṃ syām’ iti sa evam agnaye kṛitti kābhyaḥ puruḍāsām asṭāk-
apālaṁ niravapād” iti nakṣhāṭhitv-vidhau yo ‘gnir nirvavapad yasmai vā ‘gnaye nirvavapat tayoḥ samāna-nāma-rupatām darśayati ity-evam-
jātiyakā śrutir udāharta evāyāṃ | sṛṣṭiṣ ca bhavati “rīṣhīnaḥ nāmadheyānī yās cha vedeshu dṛishtayaḥ | sarvāryyante prātāṇām tāṃ evaibhīyo dadāty

APPENDIX.
APPENDIX.

Professor Goldstücker is of opinion that here, as elsewhere, these words (nīma-rūpa) should be rendered "substance and form." See the note on the subject furnished by him in M. Burneuf's Introduction à l'histoire du Buddhisme Indien, p. 502.

Govinda Ananda remarks on the Sūtra before us, and S'ankara's comment: Namā-pralaye jāter apy asatteśā sādhaneśā sambandhānityayate ity āśāṃkya āha "samāṇa" iti | sūtraśā nirāsya āśāṃkā āha "athopi" iti | vyakti-santatyā jātinām avān-tara-pralaye sattēśā sambandhas tishṭhaṁ vyavahārāvichhedāj nijāteta cha iti vedasya anapekshatevena pramāṇye na kaichād virodhaḥ syāt | nirlepa-pralaye tu sambandha-nāsaḥ punah vyāstān kenačit punāḥ sanketaḥ karttavyaḥ iti purusha-buddhi-āpe-kshatevena vedasya aprānāṇyaṁ adhyāpakaśya āśrayasya nāśad āśvītasya anityatevān cha prōptām ity arthaḥ | mahāpralaye āpi nirlepa-layo āśādāh sat-kāryya-vadāt.
Brahma Sūtra, ii. 1, 36), ‘It is agreeable to reason, and it is ascertained.’ And the world being eternal, although the Veda declares that its dissolution and reproduction take place during the sleep, and at the waking (of the creator), still as the practice continues the same in the later, as in the previous, waking condition, there is no contradiction (of the sort pretended). And it is to be considered that the same must be the case in regard to the dissolutions and creations of another Kalpa (see Vol. I. p. 43 f.). Now dissolutions and creations are said in the Veda to take place during (the creator’s) sleep, and at his waking. ‘When the sleeper does not see any vision, and when his breath is concentrated in him, then the voice with all names enters into him, the eye with all forms enters into him, the ear with all sounds enters into him, the mind with all thoughts enters into him. When he wakes, just as sparks shoot out in all directions from blazing fire, so do all breaths according to their several seats issue from this Soul; from the breaths spring deities; and from the deities worlds’ (Kaushtakī Brāhmaṇa, latter part, 3, 3). But be it so, that [in the circumstances referred to] there is no contradiction of the kind alleged, because during the
tathā cha samskūrātmanā śabdārtha-tat-sambandhānām satām eva punah srīḥōv abhivyaktē na anityatevaḥ | abhivyaktānāḥ pūraṇa-kalpiṇa-nāma-rūpa-samānātevaḥ na sanketah kenachit kāryaḥ | viśhāma-srīḥōv hi sanketāpekṣāḥ na tulya-srīḥōv iti pariḥarati “tatra idam” ity-ādīnāḥ | “But since in a great dissolution even species cease to exist, will it not result that the connection of words with the objects they denote is not eternal? In reference to this doubt the aphorist says, ‘as the name and form are the same,’ etc. Waving the authority of the Sūtra, the Commentator expresses a doubt in the words ‘And further,’ etc. It is true that the connection subsists in consequence of the continuity of individuals owing to the existence of species during the intermediate dissolutions, and this connection will be known because the previous practice continues uninterrupted. And so from the independence of the Veda, there will be no contradiction in regard to its authority. But since in a total dissolution all such connection is lost, and some intimation (of what had existed before) must be given by some person at the new creation, the Veda will be dependent on the understanding of such person, and consequently its unauthoritateness, as well as the non-eternity of the dependent object, owing to the extinction of the instructor on whom it depended, will result. But even in a great dissolution an absolute annihilation is unproved, according to the doctrine that effects exist in their causes. And so, as words, the objects which they denote, and the connection between both, (all of which things previously existed), are manifested at the new creation as reminiscences of a previous existence, they are not non-eternal. As the objects thus manifested have the same names and forms as in the previous Kalpa, there is no necessity for any intimation (of what had existed before) being given by any person. For such an intimation would, indeed, be required in a dissimilar creation, but not in one which is similar. It is thus that the commentator removes the objection in the words ‘a reply to this is given,’ etc.”
sleep (of one person) the practice of others continues uninterruptedly, and even the person who has been in a deep sleep can ascertain the action which took place in his former waking state. But this is inapplicable to a great dissolution, because then there is an absolute annihilation of all practice, and because the practice which prevailed in another Kalpa, like that of another birth, cannot be ascertained. This objection, however, does not hold; for although all practice is annihilated by a great dissolution, still it is proved that through the favour of the supreme Lord, the lords Hranyakarbhā (Brahmā), etc., can ascertain the practice of the preceding Kalpa. Although ordinary creatures are not observed to evince the power of discovering the practice of a former birth, the limitation which is true of them will not attach to the great lords in question. For just as in the series of beings commencing with men, and ending with posts, although all the creatures included in it without distinction possess the attribute of life, yet, as we descend the scale, the obstructions to knowledge and to power are perceived to go on gradually increasing; so too, in the series beginning with men and culminating in Hranyakarbhā, there is an ever greater and greater manifestation of knowledge and of power, etc.; and thus the transcendent faculties which are declared in texts of the Śruti and Smṛiti to belong to the beings who again and again come into existence at the beginning of the successive Kalpas cannot be denied to be real. And consequently it is established that the lords Hranyakarbhā and others who during the past Kalpa had manifested distinguished knowledge and powers of action, and who again came into existence at the beginning of the present Kalpa, and enjoyed the favour of the supreme Lord, were able, like a person who has been asleep and awakes again, to ascertain the practice of the previous Kalpa. And accordingly the Śruti says: ‘Seeking final liberation, I take refuge with that God, shining by the light of his own intellect, who in the beginning creates Brahmā and reveals to him the Vedas’ (Svetāśv. Upan. vi. 18). And Saunaka and others record in their Smṛitis that the hymns in the ten Maṇḍalas of the Rig-veda were seen by Madhuchhandas and other rishis. In the same way the Kāṇḍarshis, etc., of each of the Vedas are specified in the Smṛitis. The Śruti, too, in the passage commencing ‘Any priest who in sacrificing for another person, or in teaching a pupil, employs a text of which he does not know the rishi, metre, deity,
and proper application, is turned into a post, or falls into a pit,' and ending, 'Wherefore let him ascertain all these points regarding every text;' declares that a knowledge of the rishi by whom it was seen should precede the ceremonial use of every text.9 Further, righteousness is prescribed and unrighteousness is forbidden, with a view to promote the happiness and obviate the misery of living beings: and love and dislike have for their objects nothing but the happiness and misery which are perceptible by sense or are scripturally revealed. Consequently each succeeding creation which is effected, forming, as it does, the recompense of righteousness and unrighteousness, is constituted perfectly similar to each of those which preceded it. And the Smṛiti, too, declares: 'These creatures, as they are reproduced time after time, perform, respectively, the very same actions as they had performed in the previous creation.10 They so act under the influence of (their previous tendencies) whether noxious or innoxious, mild or cruel, righteous or unrighteous, to truth or to falsehood; and it is from this cause that they are disposed to one or another course of conduct.' Besides, even when this world is destroyed, a residuum of its force (ṣakti) continues, and it is reproduced only because it has this force for its basis: for any other supposition would involve the difficulty of the world having no cause. And as we cannot conceive that there are many forms of force (ṣakti), we must believe that, as the relations between the senses and their objects are invariable, so too, in a world which had no commencement, the successions of earths and other worlds, and of different classes of living beings distinguished as gods, animals, and men, (although separated from each other in the period of their production,) as well as the ordinations of castes, orders, duties, and recompences are invariable. For we cannot imagine that such conditions as the re-

9 The object of these remarks of S'ankara regarding the rishis is thus explained by Govinda Ananda: Kineśa mantraṁ rishy-ūdi-jñāpāvaiyakatea-jñāpāpūrṇa śrutir mantra-dripa-śrīyām ādāyati ity āha | . . . . tathā cha jñānādikaiḥ kalpaṁ karitaṁ vedaṁ smṛitev evaḥ vārasya pravartitāv ānūdīteva anta-keśate va cha aviruddham iti bhaveḥ | "In these words S'ankara intimates that the S'ruti which declares the necessity of knowing the rishis, etc., thereby manifests the transcendent knowledge of the rishis who saw the mantras . . . . And so from the fact that these rishis, distinguished by eminent knowledge, recollected the Veda which had existed in a different Kalpa, and [again] gave currency to the [ancient] practice [of its precepts], it is shown that the eternity and independence of the Veda is not in contradiction to any fact)—such is the purport."  

10 See the First Volume of this work, p. 60.
lations between the senses and their objects, etc., should vary in every creation, in such a way, for example, as that there should exist objects for a sixth sense. Hence, as all Kalpas exist under the same conditions, and as the lords (Hiranyakagarbha, etc.) are able to ascertain the conditions which existed in another Kalpa, varieties (of beings) having the same name and form are produced in every creation; and in consequence of this sameness of name and form, even though a revolution of the world in the form of a great creation and a great dissolution is admitted, no contradiction arises affecting the authority of the words of the Veda, etc. Both Sruti and Smṛiti shew us this sameness of name and form. Here such texts of the Sruti as these may be adduced: 'The creator formed as before the sun and moon, the sky and the earth, the air and the heaven.' This means that in this Kalpa the supreme Lord fashioned the sun, the moon, and the rest of the world in the same way as they had been fashioned in the former Kalpa.' Again: Agni desired, 'May I be the food-eater of the gods.' He offered to Agni [as the deity presiding over] the Kṛittikās (the Pleiades) a cake in eight platters.' In this passage the Sruti shews that the two Agnis, he who in the ceremony of sacrifice to the constellation offered the oblation, and he to whom it was offered, had the same name and form. And such Smṛitis, too, as the following should be examined: 'The Unborn Being gives to those born at the end of the night (i.e. of the dissolution) the names of the rishis and their intuitions into the Vedas. Just as on the recurrence of each of the seasons of the year its various characteristics are perceived to be the very same (as they had been before), so too are the things produced at the beginning of the yugas, and the past gods presiding over different objects resemble those who exist at present, and the present (resemble the) past in their names and forms.'

I shall quote a part of Sankara's remarks on the Brahma Sūtra, ii. 1, 36, referred to if the earlier part of the preceding quotation, in which the eternity of the world is affirmed:

11 Kṛittikā-nakṣatṛākhyāprabhadhah—Govinda Ānanda.
12 Sāravāryy-ante praloyiṃte—Govinda Ananda.
13 The sense of the last words, which I translate literally, is not very clear. Govinda Ananda says that in the word vedahā the locative case denotes the object (vedahā iti viṣhaya-saptam). Compare the passages quoted above in p. 16 from the Viṣṇu P. and M. Bh. which partially correspond with this verse.
14 Already quoted from the Viṣṇu P. in the First Volume of this work, p. 60.
ii. 1, 36. "Upapadyate cha upalabhya cha" | "upapadyate cha" saṁsārasya anādītyam | adimatvā hi saṁsārasya akasmād udbhūter muk-
tānām api punāḥ saṁsārodbhūti-prasangaḥ | akṛitābhāyagama-prasangaḥ cha sukha-duḥkhādi-vaishamyasya nirnimmattacat | na cha iśvaro vaish-
mya-hetur ity uktam | na cha avidyā-kevala vaishamyasya kāraṇam eka-
rūpatvāt | rāgādi-kleśa-vāsanakshipta-karmāpekṣah te avidyā vaishamya-
kāri syat | na cha karma antareṇa sarirāṃ sambhavati na cha sarirām
antareṇa karma sambhavati iti itaretarāśraya-dosha-prasangaḥ | anādīte

tu vijñākura-nyāyena upapatte na kāścid dosho bhavati |

"'It is agreeable to reason, and it is ascertained.' The eternity of
the world is agreeable to reason. For on the supposition that it had
a beginning, as it came into existence without a cause, the difficulty
would arise (1) that those who had obtained liberation from mundane
existence might become again involved in it; 13 and (2) that men would
enjoy or suffer the recompense of what they had never done, as the
inequalities occasioned by happiness and misery, etc., would be cause-
less. But God is not the cause of this inequality, as we have said
(see the comment on Sūtra ii. 1, 34). Nor can ignorance alone be its
cause, since ignorance is uniform (whilst conditions are varied). But
ignorance, when connected with works induced by the surviving me-
ory of desire and other sources of disquiet, may be the cause of in-
équality. Further, corporeal existence does not originate without
works, nor works without bodily existence: so that (this hypothesis of
the world having had a beginning) involves the fallacy of making
each of two things depend upon the other. But on the supposition
that the world had no beginning, there is no difficulty, as the two
things in question may be conceived to have succeeded each other like
seed and sprout from all eternity." (See Ballantyne's Aphorisms of
the Sāṅkhya, Book i. pp. 60 and 126.)

Page 111, line 2 from the foot; and Page 113, line 11.

In the first edition, p. 78, I had translated the word samayādhyu-
shite "in the morning twilight." When revising the translation for
the new edition I became uncertain about the sense, and did not advert

13 i.e. as Professor Cowell suggests, if there is no cause for the production of
the world, it comes into existence at hap-hazard, and by some chance the liberated may
be born again as well as the unliberated.
to the fact that the term is explained in Professor Wilson's Dictionary as denoting "a time at which neither stars nor sun are visible." Professor Cowell has since pointed out that the word occurs in the second of the following verses of Manu, where a rule is given for the interpretation of the Veda in cases, such as that referred to by the commentator on the Nyāya Sūtras: ii. 14: S'ṛuti-deśaīdhān tu yattra syāt tatra dharmāv ubhau smṛitau | ubhāv api hi tau dharmau samyag uktau maniśhībhiḥ | 15. Udite 'nudite chaiva samayādhyushite tathā | sarvathā varttate yajñaḥ itiyām vaidikī śrutīḥ | "14. In cases where there is a twofold Vedic prescription, both the rites are declared in the Śṛiṇiti to be binding; since they have been distinctly pronounced by sages to be of equal authority. 15. The Vedic rule is that sacrifice may be performed in all the three ways [indicated in a particular text], viz. when the sun has risen, when it has not risen, and when neither stars nor sun appear, i.e. in the morning twilight." Kullūka says: Surya-nakṣatra-varjitaḥ kalāḥ samayādhyushita-sabdena uchyate | "a time devoid of sun and stars is denoted by the word samayādhyushita.

Page 142, lines 14 and 16.

The first of these quotations is from the Brīhad Āraṇyaka Upanishad, i. 4, 10; and the second from the Chhandogya Upanishad, viii. 7, 2.

Page 149, line 6.

For śabdaśiṣṭhita read śabdād śiṣṭhiter.

Page 154, note 140.

Professor Cowell observes on the close of this note that the Sāṅkhya opponent maintains that the metaphor is in every case a real one.

Page 157, line 18.

Professor Cowell remarks that the meaning of the phrase śabda-pramāṇake 'rthe is not correctly rendered by the translation here given, viz. "where the (proper sense) is established by the words." The author is laying down the general rule that in cases where there is nothing in the purport of any passage in which a particular word occurs to lead the reader to suppose that it is figuratively used, and where consequently the word itself is the only index to the sense, it must be understood in its primary signification. The proper rendering, therefore, is: "Where the sense can only be determined by the word itself."
Page 160, line 18.
For punar-uttpattir read punar-anuttpattir.

Page 181, lines 7 and 11 from the foot.
I learn from Professors Cowell and Goldstücker that vimatā smṛitiḥ should be rendered not "the variously understood Smṛiti" but "the Smṛiti which is here the subject of dispute."

Page 183, note 160, line 1.
With R.V. i. 179, 2, compare R.V. vii. 76, 4, quoted in p. 245.

Page 201, line 21.
The commentator thus explains this verse of the Vishṇu Purāṇa (I am indebted to Dr. Hall for a collation of the best MSS. in the India Office Library): Ete cha deoshopāsama-prakārah madhyamādhi-kārinām eva uktāḥ na tu uttamādhi-kārinām ity āha "ete" | "bhinna-drisā" bhedā-drishṭyaḥ | "bhinna-drīśam" iti vā pāthah | tatra bhinna-darsane "abhyupagamam" angikāraṁ kritvā deoshopāsama-śabdāḥ kathitāḥ | uktānām upāyānām paramārtha-sankshepo mama mattaḥ kṛṣya-tām | "In the words 'these notions,' etc.' he tells us that the methods of repressing hatred which have been hitherto declared are those which are followed by the persons who have attained only to the secondary, not to the highest, stage of knowledge. Bhinna-drīśa is the same as bhedā-drīṣṭyaḥ, 'with a view which distinguishes [the Deity from themselves],' or the reading is bhinna-drīśam, 'of persons who look [on Him] as distinct.' Accepting (abhyupagamaṁ kritvā), i.e. admitting, this opinion regarding a distinctness, 'I (the speaker in the V.P.) have declared these methods of repressing hatred. Now hear from me a summary' of the highest truth in regard to these methods."

Page 225, line 21.
There is a verse in the Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā, xiii. 45, in which also Agni is connected with the creation: Yo Agnir Agner adhi ajāyata śokāt prithivyāḥ uta vā divas pari | yena prajāh Viśvakarmā jajāna tam Agne hedaḥ pari to vṛiṇaktu | "Agni, may thy wrath avoid that Agni who sprang from Agni, from the flame of the earth or from that of the sky, by whom Viśvakarman generated living creatures." This verse is quoted and after its fashion explained in the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, vii. 5, 2, 21: Atha dakhinatō jām | "Yo Agnir Agner adhi ajāyata" ity
Agnir vai esha | Agner adhyanjayata | “śokāt prithivyāh uta và divas pari” iti yad vai Prajāpateḥ śokād ajayata tad divasa cha prithivyai cha śokād ajayata | “Yena praśāh Viśvakarma jajāna” iti vyāg vai ajo vācho vai praśāh Viśvakarma jajāna ityādā | “Then [he places] a goat (aja) on the southern side, (saying): ‘That Agni who sprang from Agni: this goat is Agni and sprang from Agni. ‘From the flame of the earth or from that of the sky:’ that which sprang from the flame of Prajāpati sprang from the flame of the earth and of the sky. ‘By whom Viśvakarman generated living creatures:’ The goat, [or the Unborn], is Vāch (Speech): Viśvakarman generated living creatures from Vāch,” etc. Compare R.V. i. 67, 5, quoted above in p. 275.

Page 235, line 9.

Add after this the following texts, in which the verbs takṣh and jan are applied to the composition of the hymns:

R.V. i. 67, 4. Vindanti im attra naro dhiyām-dhāḥ hṛidā yat tashtān mantrān asaṁsan | “Meditative men find him (Agni) here, when they have uttered hymns of praise fashioned by the heart.”

i. 109, 1. Vi hy akhyam manasa vasyaḥ ichhann Indrāgni jnāsaḥ uta và sajātān | nānya yuvat pramātir aṣṭi mahyaṁ sa vām dhiyām vāja-yantim atakṣham | 2. Aśravaṁ he bhūri-dācattarā vāṁ vijāmātutīr uta và syālāt | atha somavya prayati yuvabhyaṁ Indrāgni stomaṁ janayāmi nāvayam | “1. Seeking that which is desirable, I behold [in you], o Indra and Agni, relations or kinsmen. I have no other counsellor than you,—I who have fabricated for you a hymn supplicating food. 2. For I have heard that you are more bountiful than an ineligible son-in-law (who has to purchase his bride), or than a bride’s brother; so now, while presenting a libation of Soma, I generate for you a new hymn.”

Page 253, line 15.

Insert after this the following verse: R.V. x. 66, 5. Sarasvān dhībhīr Varuṇo dhīrita-crataḥ Pūsāḥ Viśṇuḥ mahimā Vāyuḥ Aśvinā | brahmakrito amritāḥ viśva-vedasah sarma no yaṁsa trīvara-tham aṁhaśah | “May Sarasvat with thoughts, may Varuṇa whose laws are fixed, may Pūshan, Viṣṇu the mighty, Vāyu, the Aśvins,—may these makers of prayers, immortal, possessing all resources, afford us a triple-cased protection from calamity.”
Supplementary Note on Kālātyayopadīṣṭa.—See page 84, note 89, and page 290.

I am indebted to Professor Goldstücker for the following additional remarks on this expression:

The Tarkasangraha, quoted by Professor Cowell in his interesting note which you kindly communicated to me, differs materially from the Bhāshāparichchheda in its interpretation of the fallacy called by them bādha; and I might add that the Tarkasangraha-dīpikāprakāśa offers even a third explanation of the same Vaiśeshika term. But I do not think that the bādha of the Vaiśeshikas is the same as the kālātīta of the Naiyāyikas. For when we find that the Bhāshāparichchheda in its enumeration at v. 70 applies to the fifth hetvābhāsa the epithet kālātyayopadīṣṭa (probably the same as the kālātyayopadīṣṭa of the Nyāya-sūtra i. 50) yet in its explanation of v. 77 does not call it kālātīta, as the Nyāya does, but bādha, such a variation in terms seems pointed; and when we find moreover that its interpretation of bādha differs from Vātsyāyana’s interpretation of kālātīta, there seems to be a still greater probability that the Nyāya and Vaiśeshika disagree on the question of the fifth hetvābhāsa.

For that there is no real difference between the Nyāyabhāṣya and the Nyāyavṛtti is still my opinion. Both commentaries, I hold, agree in stating that the fallacy kālātīta arises when a reason assigned exceeds its proper sphere (sādhanakāla), and neither, I think, can have taken kāla in its literal sense of “time.” This might have been the case if, as Professor Cowell seems to suggest, “plausibility” of an argument were the subject of the Sūtra; but as, in my opinion, the hetu is always intended to be a valid and good hetu, I do not see how such a hetu can become a bad one simply by being advanced too late. It would, however, become bad by being applied to a time, i.e. to a case to which it properly does not belong.

The circumstance that the Vṛtti and Bhāshāparichchheda are probably works of the same author, does not invalidate my opinion; it would seem on the contrary to confirm it, since the object of both these works is a different one: the former being intended as an exposition of the Nyāya, and the latter as one of the Vaiśeshika.
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