WAYFARER'S WORDS
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PREFACE

In this second volume of sporadic writings and lectures I have grouped such as set out more explicitly wherein my long work in early Buddhist sources has led me to differ from (a) current Southern Buddhist values and (b) certain opinions (and translated terms) of Western students of Buddhism. The few earlier items show a consistent anticipation of the majority which are the work of the last ten years.

In particular, I have exploited the hypothesis put forward in the re-written Buddhism of the Home University Library in 1934, chap. 3. Briefly this is that man, in bringing forward a new worth in welfare to his fellows, will teach this as a more in their nature, life or destiny, because he holds them capable of and aiming at a ‘more’ therein, at an ideal. If he is shown as rating man in some way as a ‘less,’ we may suspect that available records have been reading into his message the later values of a degenerate orthodoxy. It is the pursuit of an ideal ‘more’ that is man’s inherent, essential quest as wayfarer in the worlds.

If readers find me, in this volume also, repeating, if in different terms and on different occasions, certain comments, of a more or less contentious nature, on dogmatic teachings that have grown up and survived in Southern Buddhism of to-day, let me refer them to the latter half of the little Preface to the first volume. So long as that Buddhism, so long as writers
on that Buddhism fail to evince any historical flair for their subject, I judge it is up to me to go on fighting. I would very much rather not.

For permissions to print let me again express my thanks.
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WAYFARER'S WORDS

XXXI

BUDDHISM AND CHRISTIANITY

The two great subjects which I have been asked in this talk to relate are obviously very different. Their differences leap to the eye. They have been treated repeatedly under this aspect of two very different things. To-day I propose to treat them under the aspect of likeness.

By that I do not mean that I am going to make out that Buddhism and Christianity teach or taught the same doctrines, or that the one was in any way dependent on the other in the matter of external historical descent, or as having influenced the other. These are not, when we are considering that most wonderful phenomenon, the birth and growth of world-religions, of central importance. We have to get at the back of the fixed doctrines, which have come to be formulated later, at the back of the external history, which has happened since their birth. We have to get down to the very conjuncture which brought them forth. Further than that no man as yet can penetrate. To get further we should need to be at the very heart of universal design. Let me talk of my own experience in these subjects.

When, over half a century ago, my husband put

1 A lecture given in London a few years ago to a society of Theosophists.
his S.P.C.K. *Manual of Buddhism* into my hands, I was as one to whom a closed door had been opened. The comparative study of religion, still a new subject, had not then reached the average reader. The little group of books published by the S.P.C.K. on non-Christian religions was a new enterprise, inspired, it may well be, by Max-Müller's *Sacred Books of the East*, itself a new departure. I then learnt that the fact of a great world-religion having been founded by the lifework of one man, reputed to have given up some relatively high destiny on earth or elsewhere, to consecrate himself utterly to the spiritual aiding of Man was no unique phenomenon, as we Christians had all been taught it was. Here, I found, was not one Helper, but at least two. And in the legend of each there were several common features. In the legend of the, shall we say, Church, founded by each, there were also common features. In the legend of the teachings, too, were common features: the stress on life to come, the heeding of the fellow-man, the importance in "religion" of the life to be lived here. Thus there was, I say, a door opened for me; thus there was, I may say, a seed sown.

Years of academic study and work in other subjects followed. But from psychological economics or economic psychology¹ I came back to the study of religion, of this particular religion linked with my husband's name, where lay, as he said, a field ripe for harvest and no labourers. A little first-hand knowledge brought me from seeing likenesses to seeing difference. Deeper knowledge, I imagine, always does that. All sheeps' faces are to you alike, but the shepherd will know the different look in each.

¹ Reference to Walter Elliott's *Whither Britain?*
And the question became: What had Buddhism contributed to religion, or to spiritual culture, that was different from the contribution of other religions, other cults? This occupied my chief attention for nearly 30 years more, years of editing first editions and translating, and only writing about what I had thus been getting at first hand.

And then came a new mandate: the seeing the likeness which lies beneath the differences; the perception that the differences were mainly a matter of externals, of contingent conditions, or differences in race, place, time and language, where the world-religion had taken birth, where it had grown to adolescence, where it had hardened into ecclesiastical institutes. And then the question arose: have we sufficient instances of the birth of religions and of their parentage to see in them anything that we may call a genus, a class, whether of the man who founds, who is Helper, or in the men who are helped? Can we show a deeper likeness when the materials for comparison are so very restricted, where many are not at all documented. We have but some four world-religions of which we can name a founder, as well as a point in space and time for their birth and records that have been more or less well preserved. And there is a fifth, where founder’s name is lost and date uncertain: I mean the Immanence religion of the Upanishads. And yet another, where records and votaries remain, but nothing else: the Mandaeans of Iraq, of whom John the Baptist was more probably votary than founder.

Here we have the great, the central problem of the comparative study of religion. In this we are only so far advanced that we are as yet still building up
inductions, trying to get at essentials. And I distin-
guish, in this building, three things we must mainly
consider: (1) the when, where and to whom the new
mandate came; (2) the man who uttered it, or Helper;
and (3) the nature of the mandate itself, if we can be
sure what that mandate or gospel was. The last of
these three—the helped, the helper and the new means
of help or new word—is the relation or bond between
the other two. And I have been at pains in recent
writings to put forward a hypothesis in trying to find
a true mark or specific difference in the gospel of a
world-religion, which is true for all three things: the
man to whom the message came, the messenger and
the message he brought. I will try to lead up to this
hypothesis.

In religion we see man seeking a Highest, a Greatest,
a Most, a Best, seeking to place himself in a position
of advantage over against that Highest—or, to use
the language of politics, to secure a most favoured
relation to or with that Highest—to secure in that
Highest an ally, the greatest, the surest of allies.
Over against the Highest, the Mightiest he can conceive,
he knows himself to be weak, a very child, but, as
alongside of that Highest, he also knows himself to
be, as a child, not merely weak, ignorant, but a child
of just that Highest whom he seeks, as being somehow
himself akin to That; not an alien. He fears much
and often in his quest, and yet the process of finding,
that is of going on to find, reduces fear. He comes to
think of the Highest as That from Whom he no more
shrinks away. In willing ever to find, he comes to
word his quest as a becoming ever more like, or as
becoming ever less unlike That to Whom he is akin.

1 Cf. my Buddhism (new ed., 1934), Home Univ. Library.
Now if you grant me this as being at the very heart of all religion, truly so called, it follows that, when a spiritual Helper arises with a message we called inspired, his message will only appeal to men (who are in the religious quest, consciously or unconsciously) if it reveal to them some way in which, just because of that kinship with the Highest, there is in them some aspect of that kinship which they had as yet not seen, a something More in man, whether it be in his nature, his life, his ultimate destiny which he had not had eyes to see. You will find, I repeat, this that we may call a More in man in all world-religions, at the start of them. And contrariwise, what you will not find as truly belonging to these gospels is, that the Messenger made any appeal to see, in nature, life, destiny, a Less, a Worse, a shrinking, a contraction.

This is what I have called my hypothesis. I think that, if we grant man's religious quest to be what I have described it as being, it is a reasonable hypothesis. But hypothesis it is, and so remains. For this reason: that we have so few instances by which to test it. And further, that one of the great world-religions, I mean Buddhism, is at present very largely maintained to be an instance of just the contrary to my hypothesis. Buddhism, in what is claimed to be its original form, is taught as being based on three aspects of man, and indeed of all things. Namely, that he (like them) is transient or fleeting, is ill or suffering, and is not a self, soul or spirit (only body and mind). In those three features, man, in nature, life, destiny, is shorn of all that can show him as akin to the Highest, the Best, to Deity in the most general terms.

So far from being shown to be, in any of those three aspects, a potential More, seeking to become one with
a Most, he is shown as being very awfully a Less. So that, until and unless we can show that, in this threefold less, we have not the gospel of Buddhism as it at first was, our hypothesis is proved faulty in one out of the only four widely diffused religions in the world's history, so far as we have that history.

Now my studies, both in the oldest Buddhist records we yet have, and also in the religious literature acknowledged to be more or less earlier than the birth of Buddhism, have convinced me that the kind of Buddhist teaching which I have called the showing man a Less in nature, life and destiny, is not the original Buddhism. These studies have shown me that we can disclose fragments of an earlier gospel, having, as to its central teaching, conformity with that prior Indian religious literature, but as having also a widening, a deepening of that teaching—a gospel which, so far from showing man that he is a Less, is destined to become a Less, shows him in himself a More, and a More which reveals a somewhat that was lacking in that earlier literature.

Now if we can show, in this older Buddhist gospel and in the Christian gospel (assuming we have the original Christian gospel in the New Testament) this common revelation of a More in man, my hypothesis so far holds good. This is not to say that between these two great gospels there is only likeness, no difference. But so long as the differences we see can be shown to be the result of different conditions in those three points: the men to be helped, the helper and the words he used, all of these being relatively external or contingent, not inherent, not basic, not central, we may still find that there are such essential features as are true of these two world-religions at
least, and that one of these essential common features is that revelation of some More in man which is my hypothesis.

Let us seek this feature in them both.

Man’s nature, man’s life, man’s destiny:—Jesus, in teaching the Highest under the aspect of Father (no new teaching for the Hebrews) is recorded as teaching a oneness of man with God, not as in India oneness in person (albeit the Fourth Gospel does include a practical teaching of Immanence) or nature, but oneness in family, as of sons: “that they may all be one, even as thou, father, art in me and I in thee, that they may also be one in us.” And this was taken up in the Epistles. I need scarcely remind you of such words as “Dearests, now are we the sons of God.” This was a More than we find in the Jewish scriptures. There man, as the “sons of God” appears only in a utopian prophecy of Hosea, or else ‘man’ is limited to the Jew. By Jesus the brotherhood of men as sons of the father was made emphatic, as revealing a potency in the nature of every man. It was the new note needed by the world that was waiting for him: the new world suggested by the Roman empire; not a world of mutually alien races, but one of man needing an international brotherhood, bound to ward, to help his fellowmen wherever warding and help were needed.

Now when Buddhism came to birth, the basis of this oneness with the Highest was there long before. It was a oneness not emphasized by a family concept of father and children, but by a personal identity expressed in the one word ‘self.’ There was, in the very self that man is, an identity of nature with the Divine. If you hurt another man, you hurt the very
self that you are. This did not mean man's body or mind, mind which he was just beginning to distinguish from either body or very man, as something that was not the very 'he.' The 'man' for India meant not these, but the *experimenter* by these: in Indian words the 'enjoyer,' for whom body and mind are instruments. This had been a very great More in a gospel uttered in India by some man whose identity is lost to us.

Original Buddhism brought yet a More to this accepted More. It continued to speak of Deity¹ as the self of man, as in some way within him, one with him yet distinguishable from him. But it substituted for the 'Man is God' of the accepted teaching, the true link between the two: the Man as becoming God. Its message of a More that it showed to man in his nature was practically what 2,000 years later was uttered by the Christian, St. Catherine of Genoa: "My Me is God, my being is God, not by simple participation but by a true transformation of my being." This 'transformation' was, I fully believe, originally equated in India by 'becoming,' or 'growth,' spiritual growth, not bodily or mental growth. And becoming or growth needed that man should ever be exercising will in the form we call choice. This was symbolized by the figure of a Road or Way, in which man wayfared in the past lives he had lived, lived in the present and would live in future lives, toward the goal of actual identity with the Highest, called either Agga or Parama or Anuttara, or also in the Indian term for immortality: Amata.

Now to wayfare further, or carry out this new

¹ Deity as meaning "Father of all that has or will become" occurs once or twice in Brahman and Buddhist literature.
'more,' there was needed a doctrine of conduct far more insistent than the older 'more' had taught. The 'more,' the 'becoming' was to be the work of living, of conduct. And herein the founders of Buddhism pointed the way to a great ethical advance. This was not so much advance from tribal, or national ethics to international ethics, for the reason that the world had not then been opened up to India, as it was later to Palestine. It was a showing the way to an intermondal ethics, or the need and duty of man to ward and help, not his own world only, but other worlds, worlds through which the Road had led and would lead him. Jesus sent missioners in pairs to go to the Jews only, or wherever he was intending to follow them up. Gotama's mandate, as recorded, was to send pairs of missioners to teach "both men and devas" (or beings of the next world) without limit. Christianity has been better than its first mandate; Buddhism has fallen away from its first mandate.

But Buddhism lacked entirely the conception of men (and devas) as 'brothers' one of another. As to that, it is true that, with one notable exception (Mark iii, 31, etc.), Jesus is not recorded as teaching explicitly that man was spiritually brother to brother in virtue of a bond having nothing to do with earthly family ties. We cannot tell how much of a more explicit teaching has failed to come into the records; we certainly see the early Church addressing each other as 'brother' with frequency. And we have Stephen's misplaced protest ascribed to Moses just before his martyrdom: Are we not all brothers one of another? And the faithful referred to as "the brotherhood," in especial.

But the English translation of fellow-Buddhists as 'brethren' is quite incorrect; so is it to speak of the
monkish Order of disciples as a 'Confraternity.' The Indian never spoke of his fellowman as brother; he never apparently addressed even his blood-brother as such (bhāta) either, but called him just tāta. No, the relation actually deepened by the Sakyan gospel between men was that of amity, friendship. It was natural that a gospel, of which monks became the only vehicle and guardians, should develop this relation alone. The monk had taught himself a Less by starving himself in all family relations.

I have spoken of the More which world-religions bring into man's life as including a More taught in man's destiny. Let me say at once, that I here do not include any utopian vision of man's life on earth. The religion of the Jew did include such, but the mandates of Gotama and of Jesus did not. Their gospels, at their beginning, were not political. It is true alas! that the gospel of Jesus tended that way pressed by current ideals, but that way brought it to an untimely end. For this great pair earth-life was and remained just school-life, the so-called Arahan theory being, I hold, a later innovation. It was too hypothetical, surely, for these great practical visionaries to predict for man, so greatly and indefinitely hampered as he is, and will be, by physical limitations and physical uncertainties, the possibility of doing more than passing a discipline in spiritual becoming or growth while on earth, however often he may have to return to it.

That both Gotama and Jesus saw earthly life or lives, in their being disciplinary in growth, as so many stages in a long course of what we may now call spiritual evolution is not, I think, sufficiently admitted. The Christian admits that this life is a brief ordeal: 'work while it is yet day; the night (of this span of life)
cometh when no man can work." "Say not: yet four months, then harvest... Lift up your eyes, for the fields are white already unto harvest." But he tends to see just one disciplinary stage in this present life, and then a perpetual 'rest,' as if perfection were to be so swiftly gained as all that. The Buddhist admits that this life is mainly a troublous time; he admits further that it is one of many such. But he has forgotten how his founders spoke of it as an ordeal, an opportunity for growth. How they called it repeatedly a 'moment' in time, which must not be suffered to pass by so as to entail remorse hereafter; or again as a conjuncture, an occasion (thāna)—word for 'opportunity' there was not, save perhaps the word 'space,' 'room' (okāsa).

In the next step to this life both teachers appear to have seen a relatively pleasant spell, if the man, after his passing, were judged as being worthy. Jesus spoke of it, we read, as 'paradise,' and as of many mansions or stopping-places: words having no finality or consummation about them. It is true that in the replies, alleged to have been given by Gotama, the psychic, to persons inquiring after the fate of loved and lost ones, a further stage only in wayfaring is the usual, alas! very 'edited' reply. But that is all, and this is more than I find in the Gospels; and it is evident that, in his very short career, Jesus reveals no mandate to man about life as a whole, life in the worlds.

Gotama, in his longer mission, was more explicit; he, we find, tells his disciples he has revealed to them this and that happy news about the next step in the Way for the worthy, for friends who had passed on, so that they might be glad and stimulated to follow
after and attain that 'suchness.' That in the 'suchness' won there was also opportunity for yet further growth is, I believe, not brought out anywhere. But if we read his figure of the Road intelligently, we can see that other worlds, with or without return to earth, meant further wayfaring, and all wayfaring is work of will to further progress. His insistence on what I have called intermondial ethics, or moral service, as both called for and practised between this world and the next, and the world beyond the next: the Brahmā-world,¹ is far more vital and developed than anything we find in the Gospels. These, it should be remembered, were the result of seed sown in a soil unfavourable for transmundane culture, culture of few, Greek and Roman.

On the other hand we must not forget how the Gospels affirm the truth of the warding of at least the child by the 'guardian angel.' And further how, in the Christian emphasis on prayer, whether the prayer be to Jesus or to Virgin Mother or saints, the whole world of earth is encouraged to cultivate interworld ethics in that it appears to be the duty, the very nature of the happier world to minister to the needs of the weaker world.

I do not go into the question how either Helper referred to the ultimate spiritual destiny of man. Both, I believe, were wise enough to see, in that, something that neither eye nor ear nor mind of man could yet conceive, much less know. I would only say, that to find anything on it in the words of Jesus is to read too much into them, while into the silence of Gotama men see wrongly a belief in the ultimate

¹ Let readers not confuse this with any final "union with Brahman."
waning out of the very man. Always he recognized a Goal to the Road, but he left it at that. This was not by way of protest. The teaching of his day was extremely vague about the End, but it sorely needed reticence, humility about highest attainment here and now.

In general, as to the paucity of clear teaching about other worlds attributed to either of these great Helpers, let us remember that Gotama came to take up and carry further the torch of the nameless Helper whose message we find in the Upanishads. Buddhists do not grant this yet; their attitude is too sectarian; their ignorance of what is half-buried in their scriptures is too great. They look in history for another Torch-bearer to come of whom those scriptures once briefly speak: Metteyya. But actually for them the 'Buddha' is final: final in omniscience, in quasi-deity. They do not admit that the coming of Metteyya implies a shortage in Gotama's revelations. Christians will as yet admit no Torch-bearer as a possible successor to Jesus called Christ. They will not admit that a great teacher of the more recent past, Muhammed, carried further his torch.

If Jesus had been sent to tell us all we yearn to know in matters most intimately concerning our life as man, that is, as spirit, as soul, we might herein go with the Christians. But it is clear that, if he did, nothing of it has survived. The veil shrouding the next step is there. We cannot even make up our minds collectively to sift what has been said by men and women of abnormal vision or hearing, and so be getting ready for a new revelation, so much do we muddle along with over-concentration on the things of body and mind and hope for the best, so much do we allow ourselves
to be drugged by being told that all that we need has been revealed.

Why we should not agree with the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews in his opening verse I do not see: "God who at sundry times and in divers manners hath spoken unto us by the prophets hath in these latter days spoken unto us by his son. . . ." Here is no finality. Almost I seem to hear in the context Jesus calling to us: "Look for him who shall come after us! Make ready the way for him!"
A CHANGING IDEAL

In religions we find man ever with an ideal in view, an ideal who or which is in some way a better, a greater than himself as usually manifested. But we also find him from time to time outgrowing the form in which he contemplates and worships that ideal. At one time and place it may be power; at another it may be the good in deed, word and thought; at another it may be the Divine will. He may come to have yet other ideals, for, even if it be unconsciously, he seeks the New, since, for him ultimately, the More he seeks lies in the New. When he is intent only on maintaining or reverting to a status from which he has fallen, he is then really seeking a less. For as seeker, and as such, one who is coming-to-be, it is his to pass on to a novel Better.

In speaking thus of 'man,' I had in mind those varying quests of man, or mankind, after a More, a New, which emerge for us in surviving ritual and scripture. It is rare to come upon such a change in ideal, in the latter, being consciously made and recorded, but one who made the change was one of the most famous 'saviours' of men. And there it is, in records written down over a thousand years ago, albeit in this century only turned into English, first I believe by myself in 1917, then in a parallel context by Mr. F. L. Woodward sixteen years later. That the ideal was being

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1 Published in *Review of Religion*, New York, May, 1941.
changed, and consciously changed, is clearly recorded by both text and commentary, the latter on both passages using the word 'new.' But this 'new' was not, in the text, stated as a discarding of a present ideal for the new. The new is referred to as naming an effectual means for attaining to, or approaching a current ideal, thus: "he who strongly desires X should worship, as I worship, Y." A later passage shows this 'saviour' enjoining his followers to make both X and Y together with a third ideal their dominant influence. But at the end of his life he is shown bidding his followers "to live as having X and Y as their lamp and refuge . . . and no other." Hence what I have called changing ideal is not an exchange in ideals, but the enriching of an older ideal, a change in emphasis, a transformation of an ideal into something truer.

What is it I have in mind? It is strange that I should need to explain, as if the scripture I cite had been somehow buried all these centuries. None the less, so far as Buddhist utterances on the matter, or writings by non-Buddhist comment have come to my knowledge, not a word on this repeated context has reached me. On the contrary, speakers and writers have ignored it. This is not due to lack of proclaiming it on my part. In one decade I have referred to it in at least six books. So that I now draw attention to it for the seventh time. And I hope that the magic of this number may prevail! What then is this X and Y about?

In what is entitled the Divine, or God-chapter of

1 Sakya, p. 68; Manual (S.P.C.K.), p. 165 f.; Buddhism, 2nd ed. only, p. 84; Outlines, p. 21; To Become . . ., p. 82; Original Buddhism, p. 46. Nay: seven books: Gotama the Man, p. 56.
the Third Collection, the founder, soon after his
decision to start a mission, is shown pondering on the
fittest object of worship, and coming to a decision
about that. This is tersely expressed in a verse,
following a more wordy version in prose. I am reluc-
tant to quote the wording given to his pondering in
prose, so patently is it the stilted compiling of editors;
still, it amounts to this: “I do not see in the whole
universe anyone divine or human whom I, for his
perfection in morals, concentration, wisdom or emanci-
pation, should worship. Is it not this dhamma,
(which is) for me the very enlightened, just that which
I should worship?”

He thereupon is said to tell how there comes a vision
of the chief of the Brahmā-world, who, saluting him,
says: “Even so have the enlightened in the past,
worshipped dhamma, as also the enlightened to-day
worship, and as also the enlightened in the future will
worship.”

This affirmation is then repeated in four lines of
verse. Then come these two lines:

wherefore by one desiring weal, by one for mahatta yearning,
very dhamma is to be revered, mindful of wakened ones’
behest.

Here are explained my words stated above: he who
desires X worships Y: to obtain mahatta one should
worship dhamma.

Now what was meant by mahatta, and wherein lies
here change of ideal?

There is here a difficulty in true rendering, since
mahatta may mean (a) greatness, abstract of mahā;
(b) great soul or spirit, better known to us in its

1 Brahma-Saṃyutta.
Sanskrit form as *mahātmā*. On the surface it is impossible to say which is here right. Nor is it quite easy if we go below the surface and ask, which is the *more likely* meaning, given the time and place when the original saying of the founder, if indeed he really said so, was uttered. Both meanings are rare in Buddhist literature, especially the latter. I know of only one context in it where the latter meaning is the true one, but there at all events one cannot doubt it is true. In the Fourth Collection, in the chapter preceding that containing the cited verse, is a discourse in which the man who is a little soul (*appātumā*) is contrasted with him who is *mahattā*: "one (that is) who has cultured body, morals and thought, has developed insight . . . is a great: soul his life is immeasurable." The man who is *appātumā* is in each respect the opposite. (The more unusual form here used of 'soul': *ātumā* may have been used because the corresponding form *app'attā* would equally well mean *appatta*, one who has not attained.) The former meaning: greatness\(^1\) is found, but in most cases it refers only to material greatness or number, *e.g.*, size of a mansion,\(^2\) quantity of monks. But not always. In such later works as *Jātaka* No. 532,\(^3\) and the *Visuddhi-magga*, *mahatta* is applied to moral eminence of good parents, winning them the epithet of Brahmā,\(^4\) to the Master's character, and to excellence of spiritual qualities. In other Indian literature, *e.g.*, early Upanishads, especially such as were first composed earlier than the beginning of Buddhism, the term *mahātmā* occurs, if rarely. Once only in the early

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\(^{1}\) See above.  
\(^{2}\) *Vimāna-vatthu*, I, 5, 12.  
Chāndogya, where they who attain "greatness" are said to brood in alertness like mountains and other great natural phenomena, but where, in a different context, the deva is said to have swallowed up certain "great spirits," that is, certain natural forces. But in the later Kaṭhaka, death is called "great spirit," and in the yet later Śvetāsvatara it is Deity Itself who is termed mahātmā: "that all-worker great soul seated in the hearts of men . . . exercising universal lordship . . ." and in the perhaps even later Maitri, too, Deity the mahātmā "has a dual nature"; and men who are devoted to That become manifest as themselves "great souls."

Again, in that poem of uncertain date, the Bhagavad Gītā, there are in all eight contexts with the word mahātmā, four referring to Deity, four to men of divine promise. In the vision revealed to the warrior Arjuna, where Deity, the One, appears as the Many, "the light of that Mahātmā" is as sunrise a thousandfold. On the other hand we find: "the man of knowledge, the mahātmā who finds refuge in Me is very rare." And so on.

From such passages it is clear, that in early days of Buddhism the compound term was current in that accepted religion of Immanence, which saw in Deity and man an identity of nature, differing only as More and Less. And in the idiom of that religion, which came to be called Sanskrit, the ambiguity of meaning would not arise, namely between mahātmā and mahatā.

Hence it is legitimate to say, that during the infancy of Buddhism, the term mahātmā (and mahatā) was current for immanent Deity as well as for adherents of that cult. But it is not quite so certain, that in
earliest Buddhism, aspiration to "greatness" without qualification was a religious phrase. Greatness of this or that person or quality, yes, but not greatness as such. In so saying I feel more cautious than I seem. For all early Vedic and Vedantic literature we have the guidance, so precious for the history of terms, of two great Concordances. But for Pali literature the slowly growing Concordance is not yet complete, and we must depend on our own reading and on invariably defective indexes.

But what, it may be said, of the very copious Pali exegeses? Do these not tell us how we should read the word mahatta which you have cited? Well, even if they do, it by no means follows that they give the true explanation of such an ancient tradition as is suggested by that verse. Commentaries are the explanatory patter of vocal exposition, varying with exponents of a differing time and place, and not reduced to an 'authentic' version till centuries had past, skies had been changed, and therewith the whole religious outlook. Our earliest knowledge of a written Pali edition of the Commentaries tells of an earlier Sinhalese version, converted into Pali some 450 years later. What modifications will not monks of Ceylon have wrought on that older pattern brought in verbal form from India, where at the birth of Buddhism a religious ideal prevailed which Buddhism sought to expand, but which was alien to Ceylon? Let us consult these results.

In the Commentary on the verse actually cited (Third Collection), after a very brief chat on the monk-compiled pondering of the founder (in which the only emphasis is laid on the alleged conviction that no one human or divine could teach him anything:
(“There is no teacher for me; there’s none like me!”), the more ancient verse is dismissed with the curt comment: “By one longing for mahatta means by one aspiring to great being (mahā-bhāva).” He was evidently in no doubt on the matter. Neither was the editor of the corresponding Commentary in the Fourth Collection. But he had further to comment on a fairly obvious gloss in the text: the introduction of the Sangha or Order of monks—a body which had not come into being when the founder, “first thing after his enlightenment,” makes the new ideological outlook. It came to be held that where ‘Buddha’ and ‘Dhamma’ were in the foreground, there also must be mention of the Sangha. And this is also to be worshipped because of its longstanding (! rattaññu-), abundance (!), holy living and supremacy in achievements (or gains).

(It may also be mentioned that this version of the verse gives the more usual form of the word for greatness: mahantam (with a v.l.: mahattim).)

Again, the one line I am dwelling on occurs in the little canonical anthology called Story of the Mansions, and the commentary on that ‘explains,’ it is greatness of result (vipāka) that is longed for. Yet again: whereas, in that version, the word ‘greatness’ appears in less ambiguous form (mahantam), the word ‘self’ or spirit appears earlier in the line. Namely, attha- (which I have rendered by ‘weal’), appears as atta-: attakāmena, “by one desiring, or by desire for, the self.” This is not an unknown Pali compound.

In the Kosala chapter of the Third Collection we

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1 It should be recollected that the Founder is recorded as announcing his ‘change of ideal’ before beginning his life’s mission, hence before his Order came into being.
come upon Suttas closely linking teaching ascribed to the founder with current Immanence doctrine. He is shown talking with the king of Kosala, and with his queen on the Upanishadic emphasis laid on the love felt in Immanence for the Deity as the More in and of the human spirit, and maintaining, with a logic not well emphasized in that teaching as we have it, that

Since aye so dear the soul to other is,
Let the soul-lover harm no other man.

"Soul-lover" is here more literally "one who desires the spirit (attakāmo)." Here the rendering attha- would be without the point there is in atta-.

Now this compound ātmakāma is of Upanishadic diction, both early and of middle date. Thus in Bṛhadāraṇyaka:

Verily this it is in which his desire is satisfied, in which he is ātmakāma (4; 3, 21; 4, 6).

And in Maitri:

He verily is God . . . he is to be sought by one desirous of ātmā (6, 7).

But the compound atthakāma (arthakāma) is later, occurring once only in the Gītā (5), and meaning only "desirous of worldly goods," namely, in the depreciated meaning artha came to have outside Buddhist tradition.

Again, we find it in a Sutta of the Second Collection. The founder is shown at a park gate, seeking a cousin who is in a 'chummery' of three disciples. He is bidden by the park-keeper to keep away, since these are such as are attakāmā. The English and the German renderings are quaintly different: "there
for their souls' good," and "die selbstzufrieden scheinen" (who appear to be self-contented). There is here apparently no v.l. of nīthakāma; although that is the interpretation put on the phrase by Lord Chalmers' translation. He was doubtless influenced by the Commentary (as was his wont), which conjures up a picture suitable probably under the changed skies of a later Ceylon, of men who, in forsaking the world, had genuinely sundered all traffic with it. Neumann's rendering is hardly worth discussing. But if we consider the Sutta in the light of Indian culture centuries older—and for me it bears marks of belonging to very early tradition—we may not feel contented with this minimizing the historic significance of that compound: desiring-spirit (atta-kāma). After all, the acceptance of that great volle-face Immanence, with its abandonment of Vedic polytheism, must have meant for deeply religious minds, a "coming apart" to seek what this God-within-man upheaval involved and implied. It is not indeed incredible that research will one day see, in that coming apart, the beginnings of Indian monasticism, so far removed at its inception, as producing the 'recluse,' rather than the later cenobite—a love of withdrawal to which the old recluse-programme in the Collections testifies.

But with the widening of the rift between Brahman teaching of Indian well-born youth and the tendency in the Sakyan (or early Buddhist) teaching, we should expect to find this prolonged sacrament of forest-life losing its original urge and object; we should expect to find that departure losing its positive significance and winning credit of a merely negative sort—just a turning away from worldly activities. And then would come the tendency to interpret atta-kāma by
attha-kāma: the desire for (spiritual) profit in development of 'character' (as we might say), and to interpret mahātmā by mahatta, or just eminence of attainment in such qualities.

If, on the one hand, we wed, in the contexts cited, the attakāma in the one with the mahātmā in the other, we get an access of poetic stress in the two halves of the śloka verse, enhancing what is for me the older meaning, thus: "By one desiring the Spirit, by one longing for the Great Spirit..." beside which the renderings of Commentator and of translator become in religious values relatively a Less.

If on the other hand we select the relatively less in religious value as the truer rendering of those two terms viz. attakāma, mahatta, then the significance in the repeated Sutta is not thereby destroyed; it is only made less striking. I refer to what I have said as to the change in concept of a religious ideal. The worship of Y remains; the desire for X is lowered. Let us come to "the worship of Y."

The Commentaries on both versions are unanimous in this point, and explain: "the Teacher thinks, 'I will live depending upon and honouring the new supramundane religion (dhamma) which I have discerned.'"

Here if anywhere was opportunity for an exponent of historical perspective to have told us the real reason for this feeling out after a More in ideal. But his tradition had long lost sight of what had been the ideal when his founder was on earth, and it was the quasi-deified greatness of that founder which alone had formed the tradition he, the exponent, had inherited. Namely, the founder tells himself he has topped all spiritual attainment, and must find new
worlds, as it were, to conquer, a new spiritual *summae bonum* before which even he could bow. That is all. None the less the importance in my theme lies in that confession of a "new."

But that which they had lost to view need not, thanks be! by us be lost to view. We can, as they could not, see the episode of this 'new' in its right perspective. We know that in the founder's day religious culture was teaching, that Deity, as the self or spirit in man, was to be sought after, inquired into, contemplated, 'known.' The seeking was a quest, a travel, a travail of mind. Knowing involved being. But for Gautama the founder this was not enough. For him this seeking was no mere work of mind. It was a striving so to do, so to live as to be ever becoming That Who the man potentially is. It is true, this is not declared in so many words. But it may be seen in the whole trend of the teaching. The wording of that day's culture fell out of favour in the movement he started. For static contemplation of identifiable Deity he substituted a dynamic living the will-to-become. And this he found best expressed in the word *dharma*, Pali, *dhamma*, best expressed in our alas! defective verb 'ought.' *Dharma* is not necessarily what is; it is what ought to be; it is an appeal from man's mind to man's will. When Gautama, at the start of his mission, remonstrates with the young nobles: (seek not that woman thief!) Were it not better that you sought thoroughly for the Spirit? and they acquiesce, he talked to them, not of how to conceive spirit, but said, "I will teach you *dhamma*." It is true that what has survived is a little set piece used as a formula, but, poor little gloss though it is, it tells not of what should be thought, but of what
should be done, of the 'religious life,' as we might say. Thus did he show, that if spirit—that is, in that day Deity—were to be sought after, as desired, the way to do so was by honouring that inward monition to the better life that was then implied in dharma, but which we have come to call 'conscience.' As to that, I have often reminded readers that we too have identified 'conscience' with Deity or spirit in our own poet's words (see The Tempest and cf. below, p. 438).

In this way did Asoka, true heir of this ideal of religion in the deed, make aspiration to a better world resolve itself into a "walking according to dhamma," reminding his subjects as to what was the content of that word.

That Gautama rejected the current ideal of the 'Great Self, or Spirit' cannot be rightly maintained, however much Buddhism now claims that he did. Our own lowered use of the word 'self' has greatly hindered us in right understanding here. There is no anti-ethical meaning in the Indian term. That 'self' (spirit) is the More in man's make-up is often made clear. That self, with dharma, and the judgment of worthy men, here and in other worlds form a trinity in ideals survives in an emphatic discourse. And the two: ātmā and dharma are solemnly, at his life's end, commended to his followers, as the two things, or two in one, by the light of which, in the shelter of which they are to live. "Live as men who have Spirit as lamp and shelter, as men who have Dharma as lamp and shelter, and nothing else." I have tried here and there to show how irrational, how for India of that day impossible was the interpretation we of here and to-day have put into that injunction. It may be that only better knowledge coming to us in other worlds will show whether I am right.
It is true that another parting word of this great Reformer, seeking, not to destroy, but to deepen and heighten the ideal of his day, names Dharma but excludes Spirit as his successor. Actually two are named: "Dhamma and Vinaya; let them after I am gone be the Teacher to you."\(^1\) Vinaya or discipline implied a body of Rules. And were it not too misfitting, the reader might be content to see herein a legacy to the laity and the church. Misfitting, since the two are collectively called 'Teacher' (sattha), and, rightly, the second was but an Appendix to the former, suitable only to the special life of the monk. The injunction is recorded as made to his cousin and attendant Ānanda only, and it is just possible that his future loyalty needed this reminder being made dual.

As a gospel not specifically for the monk, such as later it mainly became, but for Everyman, there can be little doubt that the attentive reader of Indian literature deriving from the sixth century B.C. will admit, the words best expressing the difference between early Vedânta and Pitaka are these two: Ātma and Dhamma, and the emphasis as given to the former term in the one and to the latter term in the other. Incidentally it may be recalled that in a book of the Vedânta, the Maitri Upanishad, a wrong teaching is condemned, in that it enjoined study of Dharma, and in ways destructive of the Vedas and other teachings. That among these the then inculcated Immanence was not rejected by the man who took Dharma as his ideal, but on the contrary was held to be the better "sought for" by way of cultivating Dharma, is for me vindicated by his holding up the two ideals side by side as comprising for men religious

\(^1\) Dialogues of the Buddha, II, p. 171.
guidance. If this is so, it certainly points to the twain as coupled in the verse wherein aspiration for the one should be forwarded by veneration of the other—aspiration, that is, for the "great spirit," and not for just "greatness." (Cf. above, XXXII).

Nor need there be for us anything ancient and out of date in this subject. Actually for Buddhism the new order that arose let drop the older ideal—and sorely to its loss has this been. For us, not under the burden of that tradition, there is surely matter here of perennial adolescence. Namely, in the strengthening an older ideal of Mind by the wider and deeper foundation, that, in an ideal of man’s Will, of man as willer, our quest of the supreme ideal and goal is more truly shown.
THE TWO ENDS AND THE MIDDLE WAY
A SUGGESTED RECONSTRUCTION

Of the five opportunities given me these thirty-nine years for such a talk on such an occasion as this, the present one may well be the last. I have on these occasions considered, in the Buddhist field, Women, the Will, Natural Causation, and the Man as Real.\(^2\) I would now say a few words on that which is, historically speaking, the most central subject of all—the subject which is, by general assent, within and without that religion, the New Word with which it was introduced, the first Mantra recorded as of the Founder of it, the so-called Benares ‘sermon.’ For we may talk much about legends of him on the one hand, or about the many ways in which his teaching expanded at later periods, in so-called philosophy and in this and that word-value, obscuring the man-value, but the one thing of chief historical importance is and remains the Mantras he first uttered as teacher, and their significance in the religious history of the there and then. To this I would add, in the pertinent phrase of a recent synoptical narrative, “the meaning which these will have had in the mind of their original author.”\(^3\)

We “conscientious Indianists,” we there read, have not, after nearly a century’s poring over texts,

\(^1\) An address to the India Section, XVIIIth Congress of Orientalists at Leiden, printed in \textit{J.R.A.S.}, 1932.


\(^3\) Marie Gallaud, \textit{La Vie du Bouddha}, 1931.
come to agreement about this matter. This is correct, albeit I would limit the interval by a few decades. Nor need we herein blame Indianists. Have we yet, after over two centuries of research, discovered just what electricity is? The excavation of our materials, in this far newer subject of the history of Buddhism, is not yet completed; much less can our sifting and comparison of these be more than just begun.

This being so, we have at present to guard ourselves from taking the foreground in our field for the whole picture; from taking, I mean, the repeated and the emphasized for the original. We shall, if we do not so heed, be as an anatomist, who sees the animal’s whole history in its mature organs, and overlooks those atrophied ‘rudimentary’ organs pointing to an earlier history. We have been directed by one notable pioneer to see in “the simple statement of doctrines found in identical words, paragraphs, verses, recurring in all the books, the oldest.”¹ By another we have a six-editioned work on Buddhism based in doctrinal structure solely on such a recurring statement.² But were those two pioneers here and now with us, would they not tell us: Emulate us in our will to the true, but do not rest content with the guesses we made at it?

Which way lies improvement on these guesses? Let us say, along two ways. One is in distrusting, as original, any of those refrains of numbered categories, schemata, formulas, on which pioneers based conclusions. These all will have taken time to come to, and when they were come to, values will have changed, so that the emphasis in them will be other

¹ Rhys Davids, Buddhist India (1903).
² Hermann Oldenberg, Buddha.
than that of the first day. Oldenberg saw in one of these the expression of a widespread aspiration to liberation: Erlösung. I would dare to let this go too. Not of these is the birth of a world-religion. Erlösung, it is true, was in the air, growing. But it was no fit gospel for the Many. It made appeal to a special kind of man and woman. It was a call to the bound, the weak, the woeful to come apart. The retreat was fundamentally spiritual, but its physical counterpart was, to speak bluntly, a way out for the shirker.

And in world-mandate, India had already received her call of release. The Upaniṣads tell not rarely, how that "clearly to know God as the self" is "release from all fetters," is "to be no more afraid." Had this been taught to the Many from the first, this Erlösung theory might have received a wholesome check. The child, had he but learnt it, was already in his father's arms. He would have trusted and feared not.

Nor are we at the birth if we see, as central, a teaching of Mettā, amity. The ground for this, as transcending common morality, was also there already. That "the Self was to each man supremely precious," involved, implied the seeing that Most Precious in the other man, calling in him for like warding and reverence. This only needed endorsement, stressing, in a new religion, and it is thus that we find it, in a saying ascribed to the Founder:

Since to each man so precious is the Self,
See he to it, he harm no other man!¹

Let us then come, for the New Word, to the Mantra of the Ends and the Middle Way. Here is a presentation we do not, I believe, find in previous Indian

¹ Samyutta-Nikāya, i, 75.
records. Way, as *panthā*, not *yāna* only, we do find:

Scarce visible and old there lies a Way  
That touches me, e’en me, was found by me,  
Thereon the wise fare onward . . .

but not as “middle way” or “way by the middle,”  
nor as with the Ends-feature.

Rightly to estimate both, we need to consider them,  
not only in the first Mantra, but in all their contexts.  
We shall then better see them as a way of looking at  
Man in general, not under one aspect only. For,  
once a teacher had got the worth of his message in  
this striking shape, he would wish to apply it to the  
Man in many respects. And such is what we find.  
The Ends are various; the Man choosing is a constant;  
is the Way also always the same?

I will refer to two other contexts beside the First  
Mantra. In *this*, the Ends are concerned with religion  
in choice of living. In another context, they are  
concerned with the further living, the destiny of man.  
Namely, either the man as agent is identical with the  
man as experiencing the results of his actions, or he  
is (will be) a different person. In yet another context,  
the Ends are concerned with the essential nature of  
man. Namely, Either everything (and *a fortiori* man)  
is (i.e., has static reality), or nothing (*a fortiori* man)  
is (i.e., is merely *ksara*, *anitya*, transient).

Here then is variety. In the form of words showing  
the Man as choosing a better way, we find no variety,  
or virtually none. There is in one the word *yebhuyyena*:  
“for the most part” (man follows one end): this may  
have dropped out in the others. But this sameness

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2 *Samyutta*, ii, 75f., etc.  
3 *Ibid.*, 76, etc.
in wording the choice leads us to consider whether, in the solution of the Middle Way (not this way here, that way there), there may have ever been an identical decision symbolized as a way or road, or course (magga and paṭipada)? Actually we find two: one in the First Mantra, one in the other contexts. Was there originally one way in all?

But first a general consideration. And this is: New Word though Ends and Middle Way may be, we might rather wonder, that they had not been introduced in Upaniṣadic or other teaching at about that time. For during the preceding century India had had a tremendous contrast in "Ends," namely, in the teaching of Deity as conceived. Conceived first as external to, apart from the man, immeasurably so, although as personal, individual; later, as not external, not apart, not other-personal, but as the innermost Inner of the man. Here indeed were two Ends to be decided about! And it may only have been that the latter End was yet too close to teacher and learner, for the great perspective to have been caught. Yet, as a mere surmise, may not the Śākyamuni, when he hesitated over his mandate to his fellows, have contemplated such two Ends and a Middle Way, with which his own probably lost Middle Way was identical? This may be clearer presently. I would only remind you of this: None but he could have revealed (a) that he did hesitate, (b) about what he was hesitating. He probably told his one real equal, Sāriputta. A little Sutta in the Anguttara suggests this.¹ But what he is made to hesitate over, although it also is two ends, or at least a dual theme, is not the subject of the First Mantra. This dual theme was (a) a

¹ Vol. I (Tika-Nipāta), p. 133: cf. Vinayā, i, 5; Samyutta, i, 137.
monastic gospel, (b) a gospel of causation. Neither really fitted for the Many. What, between any pairs of ends, became for him the way of decision?

I would like here to refer to the vision of which he being alone will alone have told (assuming we have here a veritable telling, and a true record). The deva, in urging him to teach, says that without it, even they who would learn, were declining ("will decline," perish, pariḥāyanti). "Bhavissanti," he goes on, "dhammassa aṁṇātāro." This clause has always been translated: "There will be they who will understand the teaching (or truth)." I suggest it could equally be translated: "Learners (of your dharma) will become," that is, will grow. The equation is often made between bhū and viṣṭh. I only refer to this because of the weakness of our own 'become.' Where the word 'become' was strong, as in the Vedic word, and had been greatly exploited by Brahman teaching, as appears from the Upaniṣads, it would possess a significance we may not see. That the future tense is the same for "will be" and "will become" does not make "will be" in this context right. And the close apposition of bhavissanti here with its opposite pariḥāyanti is suggestive. We should note too, that the verb jñā with the prefix ā (viz. aṁṇātāro) has the force of connaître, erkennen, "coming-to-know," at least as much as of "to understand."

Anyway we next read of the Founder considering his fellow-men in their different stages of growth or becoming. And then comes the simile of the growing lotuses, the origin possibly of that widespread symbol figuring as the seat of the Buddha: the lotus-seat. From these inspirations: "decay . . . becoming," both spiritual and physical, he went forth to teach his
Middle Way. He meets one Upaka, is questioned on his ardour, and probably rehearses it. (This is more likely than that he spoke the bombast put into his mouth.) It is noteworthy, that in one recension, the Majjhima-Nikāya, Upaka responds with the one word, Huveyya, a form it is said, of Bhaveyya. In the other, the Vinaya (here too he first responds to the mighty claim put forward, and when this is qualified), he responds with Hup eyya. This word has been translated 'It may be so,' and 'Mebbe.' It were equally right to render it: 'One may become.' Or when, as we shall see, 'bhavya' got discredited, an original comment of 'Bhavya!' may have been altered to Bhaveyya. It may here be said: Scarcely! The persistence in survival of the dialectical form militates against the probability of such an alteration.

Well, I would not press it as contributory evidence. Yet, given the will to erase a traditional bhavya, the changed readings: huv-, hup-, met with at revision-time in some repeaters' versions, might be welcomed as more effectively erasing than the less "provincial" form bhaveyya. If my suggested reconstruction be considered, we get a response, still of the briefest, but expressing not a semi-scepticism, as has been implied, but a repetition of the most central and significant word to which he will have been listening: either "Sure to become!" (bhavya), or "He may become!" (bhaveyya).

That the Ends selected in the First Mantra were practical, not theoretical, is not without deep significance. We see a gospel where ultimate salvation depends on the man living his religion. But I am now more concerned with the relation of the Ends to the
Middle Way. Usually they are called "extremes." I think I did wrongly to follow this tradition. We have in fact no word coinciding with the elasticity of the Indian anta. It means at once terminus and nearness. Life is called maraññatika; but when you open a conversation you may be ekamantam nisinno: 'seated beside.' Anta is not something opposed and divergent; it is rather "what comes next." Applied to an aspect of life or belief, it then appears as partial, inadequate, if solely adhered to. We need not here suffer ourselves to be misled by the much monastic editing inflicted on the Mantra. We can see it has been reduced from the message to Everyman to a mandate from a monk to monks for monks: "for him-who-has-left-the-world (pabbajitena)." And this sectarian view has led to a wording which is excessive in condemnation, and to the Way emerging as the sectary's narrow pronunciation: idam saccam, aṁñaṁ mogham. In my judgment the ends-and-way meant, for this teacher: That a man wills his artha (summum bonum) is well; that he regulate his will is also well; the middle way linking both is that he combine the two. Desire and rule are both needful.

The man has here to choose. Equally in those other contexts he has to judge, to decide, where it is a question of belief affecting his outlook. It may be said: But in each context the matter has already been decided for him, namely by a superman called tathāgata.

As to that, we must first remind ourselves, that to see, in the word tathāgata: 'one thus gone,' an epithet used for any wayfarer in 'the Way,' and only much later reserved for the Founder, has been accepted by

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1 In Pali, koṭi, agga.
Indianists\(^1\) for many years. I would only add, that we might, by the analogy of the parallel term \textit{paṭipanna}, render it as thus \textit{going}, rather than \textit{gone}. Both this and the parallel epithet: \textit{sugata}, wellfarer, are found in the Suttas, referring to disciples in general, as well as to Śakyamuni.\(^2\)

In the next place, the whole point of the New Word is blunted if we see here a thing done, a choice made, and men bidden to follow as in a herd. Here is Everyman confronted with matters wherein he has to choose. He cannot, save at the cost of his manhood, stand aloof; he may not go back; he must on. Now this was for India a new mandate, and one for which words were lacking. The word ‘choose’ was tied up with a proffered boon (\textit{vara}); nor even then do we find the very rare word “choosing” used; only “take” (\textit{迦毘利} \textit{阿豆})).\(^3\) In the Mantra we find only the weaker terms: ‘not having gone up to’ (\textit{anupagamma}); ‘not to be followed’: \textit{asevitabba}. And these obscure the real issue. The very lack of the fit word may betray the newness of a gospel. Had Jesus a word for brotherhood? Ancient Mantras call for vision to get past words.

I come to the Middle Way. In the two other contexts quoted, we have this described by a formula, that of the Paticca-samuppāda. To see the Founder of a world-religion answering a query in suchwise is unthinkable. Why then has it been inserted? A string of assigned causes and effects, it is said to account for ill (\textit{dukkha}). Actually it is a procedure in \textit{bhava}, becoming, \textit{werden}, \textit{devenir}. And in the middle,

\(^1\) Cf. especially E. Senart, \textit{J.R.A.S.}, 1898, p. 865, on R. Chalmers’ “\textit{Tathāgata}.”
\(^2\) Cf. Ang. i, 217; \textit{Samy.}, iv, 253.
\(^3\) The one exception I find is in Kauṣ. Up., 3, 1.
ill-fitted, is this key-term: bhava. If now we seek originals by discarding formulas, which are the work of "creatures of a Code," and by holding to the key-term, we get a direct and significant reply to both pairs of Ends. "Man is neither identical nor other; he is in a process of becoming." "Man neither is nor is not (as India understood then those terms); he is by nature becoming." A solution which it has needed both Hegel and science to give our age.

But why should bhava have been buried, obscured, softened in a formula?

Bhava had become a black-listed word through the growing vogue of monkdom. Man in India was potentially That, viz. Deity. To be That actually, he needed a very long process of becoming, involving lives, worlds. For the monk all this was dukkha. But these opportunities of becoming had come to be called "becomings" (bhavā); both 'lives' and 'worlds.' And bhava is perhaps the worst-curst word in the Piṭakas. Hence we can well imagine that, on occasions of revision, it will have been held advisable to soften, to enformulate the term, where the word could hardly be eliminated.

But in places, by some lucky contingency, it has got left in, left in not only uncursed, but with a glint of its old splendour. In such passages we see that atrophied organ to which I have made allusion. Here are, for instance, a few of such 'left-ins':—

Bhabbo: 'bound-to-become': a term for the man 'with his face set toward' salvation, e.g., Iti-vuttaka, § 117, Majjh., i, 104.

Bhavyarūpata, 'suitableness for becoming': commended with other qualities in a man's teaching, in Anguttara, i, 189.
Bhava described as man likened to a seed planted in this and that world, needing for his growth the moisture of the will, lit. strong desire. Ānanda has asked his cousin: what is this that is called bhava, bhava? (The reply has been cleverly edited to throw discredit on bhava.)

Bhāveti, bhāvanā, the latter usually mistranslated as ‘meditation.’ The causative, evading the blackened form bhava, took over all the prestige of this term, and was especially applied to the Way: maggam bhāveti.

Bhavam nissāya: “(man survives) depending upon becoming”; this appears in the Kathā-vatthu debate (I, i), as a tenet of the teaching discredited at the Patna Council by the newer orthodoxy.

Bhavaśudhi. This, with the alternative form bhāvaśudhi, occurs in six inscriptions of Aśoka, and always in the same context, as being an ideal of all religious teachings, no matter of what sect. It has been translated by purété de l’âme (Senart), and by ‘purity of mind’ (Hultzsch), the short-vowel rendering being ignored. I venture, mindful this is, for me, an untrodden field, to see, in both renderings, both of which can mean ‘becoming,’ just this meaning, and not ‘soul’ or ‘mind’ or ‘state.’ I cannot fit a compound where bhāva, as prefix, can mean ‘state,’ or soul, or mind, into any literature round about Aśoka’s time. As affix, yes; not as prefix; but I speak subject to correction. But Aśoka’s injunctions are, in an overwhelming preponderance, concerned not with ‘state’ (much less with psychology); but with ‘growth,’ with advance, with vaddhi, vuddhi, which is often equated by bhāveti. I have counted eighty such references, and have elsewhere dealt with this.¹ And

¹ Sakya, ch. xxiii.
where he uses the verb bhavati it is nearly always with the significance of 'coming-to-be,' although this has been much overlooked. I am not disputing the correctness in translators' rendering of the Upaniṣadic antithesis: bhava, abhava, by existence, non-existence, ¹ nevertheless, it had been equally correct to put becoming, non-becoming. Bhava can, in fact, hardly be exactly rendered by us, for whom these alternatives are so much more different in form. Our classical dictionary gives the meaning of bhava as "Werden, Sein," but in our renderings we cannot well put both. But the fact that with Aśoka we get both forms, and the fact that he saw religious life essentially as growth, makes me cast my vote for bhava-suddhi as meaning 'salvation by, in, becoming.'

Finally as to the Middle Way in the First Mantra: I have come to the conclusion that, in view of (1) these 'left ins,' (2) the items in those two other contexts of bhava, (3) the pre-occupation, just before the utterance of the Mantra, with 'decline' and 'becoming (?)', (4) with man-growth and with lotus-growth, it is reasonable to see, beneath the palimpsest of the orthodox eightfold formula, the one pregnant compound: Bhava-Magga. The way was symbol of the will-to-perfection, of living in growing towards perfection (which was, in India, so often called suddhi, purification).

After all, that list of eight, now so tightly tied up to the Way, is, in the venerable Sangīti Sutta, not so tied; it is set apart from any 'way' as the Eight Samattas. But, to soften Bhava in the First Mantra, there could be no foisting in of the Paṭicca-samuppāda. That was taught, worded, as leading to Ill. Here the concern was Artha, the summum bonum.

¹ E.g. Śvet. Uп.
I leave here the problem with two suggestions: Think it over with Upaniṣads in your right hand, and in your left the Suttas 151, 152, of the Tika-Nipāta of the Anguttara. In the former, note the striking pre-occupation with bhū, bhav-, even up to Divine creation, till a revulsion of opinion brought in the feared (physical) complement of decay. In the latter, note how all the other lists in the so-called Bodhipakkhiya-dhammā, beside that of the Way as eightfold, are in succession "tried-on" as a Middle Way, suggesting a prolonged interim of indecision before the eight sammā's or sammatta's were finally decided upon.

Brahman India rejected bhavya, the biological concept of how to reconcile the tremendous apartness of Perfection with imperfect manhood. She decided one day to prefer the mechanical concept of Yoga, the joining, the splicing, the effort, as a bridge to the gap. And Yoga did good service.

Sakya also rejected bhavya, when its Founders brought it out from inner circles of culture to the Many. The Man was not to be conceived as 'becoming' by the long trail indispensable to developing into the perfection of 'That.' It came to be held that Arahan-ship could replace that long trail awaiting even the best. It is true that Sakya retained the causative bhāv- in full favour. But it was ideas about the Man that were to be made-become; the Man himself, save by inconsistent magnifying of arahān and Buddha, was laid on the shelf.

Forty years ago I found in early Buddhism a gospel and discipline of will with no fit word for it. I did not see that will without werden, becoming, is like a squirrel turning a cage-wheel. I did not see this great concept, so fit for Everyman: to choose, to will
"becoming" in his way through the worlds towards That Perfect One. Both Rhys Davids and Oldenberg perched for a moment on Becoming, and flitted away again. But either Becoming means, in the very Man, nothing, or it means everything. It means the very guarantee of ultimate salvation: bhavaśuddhi. And I believe it meant this for the Teacher of the Ends and the Middle Way.
WHEREIN I DIFFER¹

I have been invited to talk to you about the position I have taken up in my books for nearly a decade as to what was for me the truer notion of original Buddhism than that which either Buddhists now teach, or books about Buddhism tell you. And I am glad the invitation was worded in this special way. For why should I take up your time and mine to speak about just what you do find so spoken about, so written about? Little 'books about Buddhism' by 'verts and non-Buddhists' are easily and cheaply got. But I have come to conclusions, after many years of study, differing from those of the little books. Different not merely in particulars, but as to that which was vitally, essentially the message, the new word, in what we have lately come to call Buddhism. These my conclusions it were more fit to call Gotamism, but I have preferred to call them after the name by which its teachers and disciples were called in India for perhaps a thousand years. And that is Sakya, in Sanskrit Shākya. the teaching of the sons of the Sakyan, Gotama.

Which of us is going in the long run to win: the little books, or they who may come to think as I do, I shall not be here to see. But I cheerfully believe that vera (I prefer the concrete word) prevalebunt,

¹ Lecture delivered before the Cambridge Theological Society, May, 1935. (The latter portion has been shortened and revised.)
because these, my true things, are founded on evidence, because they will stand historical criticism better than the views now holding the field, and because they are founded on what is, I hold, a truer hypothesis of what must be there to make a world-religion. Do not forget that we have, in Buddhism or Sakya, a new study. It has taken us some 1,800 years to get historically critical over Christian evidences, and Buddhism we have studied only for one twenty-fifth of that interval. Let us come without further delay to our tilting-ground.

How do books about Buddhism agree, more or less, in describing the outlines of the teaching, and how do I differ from them?

Let me first admit wherein I find they are not wrong. They agree, that from the first the teaching stressed (a) the need of living what a man believes, (b) an attitude of amity or good-will toward the fellow-man without restriction of colour or habitat (the latter extended even to more worlds than this, albeit this is mainly lost sight of), both (a) and (b) being an advance on the established religious teaching of the day of the birth of this teaching. As to the second (b) of these two emphases, not one of the sayings recorded in the scriptures, as first utterances, has anything to say about amity. It is not, for instance, in the so-called Eightfold Path. But neither do we look for the essential message of Jesus in his first utterances. And I agree that, with reservations, conduct and amity were things stressed in early Buddhism, as they were not stressed in the current established teaching. The having lived what you believed was taught as the very passport to a safe hereafter, no less than it was in the Jesus-gospel. There was no hope in either for
acquittal, if you could not show a clean sheet in this respect. I am not saying that the standard of morality in both gospels was the same—was there not a matter of some five centuries between them? In the Sakyan teaching a man was only, at the post-mortem tribunal, condemned to purgatory, if he had neglected moral duties of a negative and elementary kind. In the Jesus teaching he was only acquitted if he had (not believed in a sacrifice or atonement, but) had warded, cared for, served his fellow-man. But in both gospels it was the life that counted, the life that passed him, at death of the body, to better or to worse conditions. And what the one gospel called loving thy neighbour as thyself, the other, showing willing the neighbour amity, or mettā, was or soon became taught as essential.

But beyond these vital teachings, what do we read, in the scripture, was early Buddhist teaching? Agreement among writers would seem to be remarkable. If for brevity I quote one book only: the outline in Menzies' History of Religions, I could bring many Buddhist and European expositions to echo it. This is, that Buddhism (with no distinction made between early and late, Central or Eastern Asian), although it was the offspring of Brahman teaching, has no place for God or the soul, for prayer, priesthood, worship or sacrament; taught that everything was impermanent, ill or painful, without a real entity, man a fortiori being so also; taught that the cause of all this ill was strong desire or craving, which was to be rooted out; taught that the way to do so was an eightfold road of fit or right deed, word and thought; but taught also that the sumnum bonum was the so living as to live ultimately no more that which men
called life, i.e., birth, old age, disease, death, and the sooner the better. This sumnum bonum was called 'nirvana,' going out or waning out. And whereas it was popularly conceived as a supremely happy somewhat, it could not be described in words. The assurance of this state as a certainty might be won by a man here and now in the life of the world, but it could only be safely retained by his leaving life in the world and living as monk (or as nun).

Notice in passing, that whereas those first two points, religion to be lived and amity, show a teaching pointing to a More in man's life, nature, destiny, of a hopeful kind, these latter five points, atheism, unreality of man as spirit, impermanence, ill, nirvana, show mainly a less in man's nature, life and destiny.

Now all of these five points I accept as true, but—only for what I would call institutional Buddhism, that is, for the teaching after it had been handed on by a growing monasticism for a few generations at least after the day of the founders. The oldest Buddhist scriptures we yet have bear the signs of having been taught orally for an indefinite time before being committed to writing (we have a date for this, but it is of Ceylon only, and may have preceded, or have followed a similar event in India). In these scriptures you will find those five pessimistic teachings. But you will also find, in the same scriptures, sayings which stand out as discrepant with those five; sayings which are even more discrepant with the later Pali literature than they are with those five.

From this we can reasonably deduce that these outstanding sayings cannot well be later insertions, and were left in, either because they were a very venerable tradition, or because, during revision, the deciding
monk, or monks, may have been of the older school, out of harmony with the newer values that had come up.

Take as instance the post mortem tribunal I have referred to. This is taught in two of the four main Collections of sayings. One of the two is an elaboration of the other. No use is made of it in later exegeses, even though it is not taught as mere parable, but with very urgent diction. The one point that survives is that the man automatically reaps what he has sown. Adjudication has faded out (as alas! it has with us save perhaps as to that miscarriage of justice: a Last Day), and so I say that the Tribunal Suttas are not a late insertion. They are old stuff, vieille roche.

Neither is the older teaching pessimistic. It shows a Way leading, not from earth direct to an ultimate heaven; it shows man as, if he has lived decently here, reborn in a world of, not the Best, but the Better. The Founder is shown talking with young brahmans who are discussing the Way to the Highest; Brahman, the neuter term for Deity as alpha and omega. He directs them to the intermediate world of Brahmā, the deva governing that world as temporary president, and bids them prepare for it by so living here as they deem men of that world live there, namely, by a good moral standard. And we are reminded of Jesus’ words about a paradise and ‘many mansions’ wherein is nothing final or consummate—as yet.

Now it is in the matter of the ‘left-ins,’ as I call this older matter, that there emerged for me a picture of a teaching discrepant from the emphases on which our ideas about early Buddhism have been based, but tending to be in harmony with, and an expansion
of, the best teaching of India in the literature assigned to the immediately pre-Buddhistic epoch. What was this in its essentials?

It was a form of Immanence which had been gradually superseding, among the more cultured, the Nature deities of the Vedas and the ritual preoccupations of the books called Brāhmaṇas. Those nature deities were not lost sight of, but they had become relatively mythical. Deity had come down from heaven to dwell in the ‘city’ (pura) of man’s spirit; between the two there was basically identity. We may more closely follow this if we drop out our possessive pronouns, and speak only of spirit or self, not of ‘my’ soul, ‘my’ spirit. This very wrong way of speaking inevitably relegates the spirit or soul to the possession of the man as something he has or owns, when, rightly to understand Immanence we must see, in the basic identity I speak of, not only Very God but Very man, and that is ‘spirit,’ ‘soul’ as both, not as what each has or owns. The Greek makes something of a compromise with its “the soul of me, or for me” (hē psychē emou) and “my joy I leave with you” (chara, hē emē). It is only in the Latin and Teutonic languages that we get the annexing grab of the meum and tuum, and cannot rightly express the true Immanent point of view.

Note by the way, that our modern worsening of the word ‘self’ never existed for the Indian. Immanence showed him the self, as not the worst object of our aspiration but the best, the ideal self. It is better therefore to render the Indian ātmā, not by ‘self,’ but by spirit. We then get level with the use of spirit in the New Testament, where it may mean equally man as spirit and Holy Spirit:—
"the spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit,"
and the like expressions.

Now take two ‘left in’s.’ One is usually overlooked, and has alas! been wrongly translated, i.e., from the European, not the Indian idiom. The Founder has just begun his mission and is resting beneath a tree. Men of his own rank, aristocrats, pass by and ask him if he has seen a woman who has run from their party with property of their wives? The answer is: What have you, gentlemen, to do with a woman? Were it not better that you went hunting for the self? Now here was uttered a refrain of the current teaching by brahmins of Immanence: ‘‘to seek out, inquire into, learn about the Self? (I might add that ‘man’ in Indian idiom was synonymous with self ($\text{purusha} = \text{âlmâ}$); by this the aptness of the answer becomes more apparent:—seek, not that woman, but the man.) Here alas! the ‘left in’ fades out. The response given is, Yes, it were better. He bids them be seated and he would teach them religion ($\text{dhamma}$). But what he is made to say is a little set piece of monastic morals, not touching at all upon the self.

But the fragment shows clearly, that so far from denying God or soul, these are here taught as man’s religious aim: seek the nature of man, seek Holy Spirit.

The other ‘left-in’ is never passed over, but is used to draw very crudely a quite wrong inference. It is the second utterance, a mission of the Founder cautioning his new fellow-workers that body was not self, nor was mind, else a man could say, as were he God (also self), ‘I will be this or that.’ ‘Let me become this or that.’ As it is, he is hindered, impotent, not omnipotent, by the body and the mind. Neither
then is Self, as then taught. The Self, we might say, is not man's instruments. But it was not an age of instruments, as is ours, and there was no collective word for instrument or tool.

But here is no denial of self. As the Founder is made on a later occasion to say—a passage quite overlooked by Buddhists—'it is only when you make the king as judge not different from the subjects whom he adjudicates, that you lose your judge. Yet you do not deny that he is, as judge, a More than the subjects.' The application of the simile, slurred over by later embarrassed editors, is: Even so do you deny the real man all his distinctive functions when you confuse him with the things over which he disposes.¹

The debater is silenced, refuted. Indeed it would have been held a crazy position seriously to have held, that because neither body nor mind was the self—that is, potentially divine—therefore there was no self. Yet this is what Buddhists to-day of southern Asia emphatically assert as in their orthodox teaching. And some bolster up the fallacy by identifying the position, that the spirit or self is real, with a cult of egoism, with which, in their scriptures, it has nothing whatever in common.

We of here and now may wonder and regret, that in this utterance the Founder did not couple an assertion that the spirit or soul is. But in his day such an assertion was no more needed than Jesus needed to affirm the existence of a heavenly Father. The current Indian religion had maintained the reality of the One God, of whom all deities were manifestations, with utmost insistence. I am not denying that academically the question of man as mere complex may

¹ Majjhima-Nikāya, No. 35.
WHEREIN I DIFFER

have been raised. Such a view is touched upon for instance in the Kaṭha Upanishad, perhaps not far removed in time from the birth of Buddhism:

‘He is, say some; is not, say others,’

but that there was at that period any section of religious teachers holding an atheistic, a materialistic doctrine, as much later the Charvākas, does not appear in either early Buddhist sayings or Brahman teaching.

I come to the threelfold slogan: impermanence, ill, not-self. No formula is made more central to-day than this. Yet as formula it appears in none of the first utterances, nor in the early collected numbered sets: of teaching, called the Ones, Twos, Threes and so on. Suttas about it do form one group of the Third Collection, now translated as The Book of the Kindred Sayings. But the third item known as an-attā: not-self, which orthodox teaching in Ceylon looks upon as the very pith of its principles, cannot be contemporary, as orthodox, with the first sayings I have been quoting to you: that the self or spirit should be sought after, and held as lamp and refuge. For the anattā dogma is the bluntest denial of the spirit’s distinct reality. It is not, as some, in hedging, maintain, merely the denial of a permanent unchanging self only, but is denial of any entity of any kind that can be called self. Only the complex exists, and that is as such impermanent. This is made very clear in the works of that Buddhist Aquinas, Buddhaghosa, of the 5th century A.D., not to mention his contemporary Buddhadatta.

Then the second item ‘ill’ (dukkha), into which the first item ‘all is transient’ is by Buddhists held

1 I.e., man surviving death.
convertible—nothing has been so tightly stuck on to the Founder as the notion that he, in the prime of manhood, left home obsessed with the idea of world-ill, man-ill, and was out to end it. Now what, in Buddhist scripture is this ānākha? Mainly it is resolvable into bodily ills: old age, illness, death, to which birth, in deeper pessimism, gets often added. Now and then there is added mental ill, namely, nearness of the unloved, parting from the loved (‘loved’ is more literally ‘dear’). But nowhere do we find emphasis laid on spiritual ill, failure to advance in the religious quest. This is indeed elsewhere dwelt on, but not in definition of ‘ill.’

Now ‘to end ill’ sounds a lovely aim to a quest, but is it the true aim of a religious teaching worthy of that name? Is it not mainly the doctor’s business? Could not the doctor—and medicine and surgery were then much to the fore—round on the teacher and say, ‘Clear out! This is none of your business! You’re here to make men good, not physically well’? I confess that for me this has evidential weight. It is not the real, the fit, the true aim of the saviour of the soul. Is not that to help men grow up to the full stature of the perfect man? The aim of both is to make well, or, in the negative Indian way, which had no word for ‘well,’ not-ill (aroga). And we may blame Indian idiom here and with justice. (But why do not we follow our European neighbours and make a noun of ‘well’?)

Take the so-called ‘first sermon,’ an outline of proposed teaching. Much edited as it surely is, the opening sentences show religion as the right choice of a way to the ‘well,’ or to the aim: attā. (Do not confuse this with attā: spirit; attha means what
is wanted, what is sought.) Free play of will, and over-restriction of will are deprecated, as both excessive; it is a good balance that should be chosen. To this is appended abruptly the diagnosis of 'ill,' famous as the Four Truths. What ill is, what its cause, what its detachment from that cause, and the way of detaching. Now so preponderant became this linking up the Founder's message with ill, that the main, the leading teaching of man's choice in wayfaring became obscured, and it is only the Truths about ill that are considered central.

Further, by a fairly obvious gloss the positive form of aim (atitha) has been ejected for four substitutes belonging to later values, one of which is the monkish 'ideal 'nirvana.'

It may be held, that in this chart early Buddhism justifies the accusation of atheism. How were it possible to draw up such a chart without allusion to the Alpha and Omega of accepted teaching, Brahman, as that goal which, as was taught, man might aspire "to become" in reaching transmundane consummation?

It was at best extremely reticent. Could so reserved a gospel avail to help the Many to whom it was to be sent out?

I do not belittle this silence, so different from the religious ideal of our tradition. We may I think explain it in one of two ways. Either it was definitely, to say the best, an Agnostic teaching, or it was so far from being, in that or in any way, a positive departure from the accepted teaching, that it did not show the need of indicating a divergence as to the Highest.

I hold the latter view is right. If we were bringing forward some reform in hygiene, we should not need
to hammer the ideal as being the getting well, the getting more well. We should have some new point to stress in emphasis, in practice. And this was just the object of the Sakyian mission: its emphasis lay, not on the Most, Highest, Best, but on the More, the Way in which man could become that More, the carrying out religion, not in ritual, not in assertion of identity with the Highest, but in so living as to be growing, fructifying in that More on the way to the Most.

If herein it showed great sobriety, and reticence in its religious vocabulary, let us not forget, first, that the current teaching of Immanence could be for the Many a dangerous doctrine in its assertion of identity with the Highest, secondly, that this doctrine loosened and diminished the practice of prayer as a felt need in religion. You have only to read the Upanishads to see this. In them prayer as invocation and petition has become very rare; it has become mainly introversion. And herein the new step taken by Gotama was, by his own alleged confession, the seeing the indwelling Holy Spirit or ideal self as inward monitor, under the name of dharma, or duty. Here was the avowed object of his worship, And he coupled with dharma as identical his final injunction to live as having the one, the other, as lamp, as refuge, and no other.

And so I see him trying to do for the teaching of his day what Sufism did later for Islam, and what Quakerism and what John Wesley did still later for Church Christianity, a quickening, a deepening of religion as man’s quest, seeking to become actually, what he was potentially: man in the More seeking man in the Most.
WHEN YE PRAY

The Buddhist Way

It is ever our hope that what is well in our lives may be maintained; it is ever our will that a Better, shall I say a more-well, may come into our lives. And when both maintenance and betterment are threatened with undoing, with defeat, with overthrow, we look around for aid. When none seems at hand, and we stand alone, then, more than before, do we seek aid in the Unseen. In and to that Unseen we were brought up by tradition, by education; all things were possible, for in That was a More than are we. We may have lost the habit, may never have had the habit, of seeking that aid at every turn in life, but, given dire peril, the need of seeking It comes to the front. When the liner Titanic was sinking, in the dark, a boat-load of survivors of all sorts with one consent murmured the Lords’ Prayer. And now we, confronting alone great peril, have summoned ourselves to pray, perhaps more urgently than ever before. We in our representatives will this summons; we willed that in our response; but in that we called summons and response “prayer,” it was mainly an asking, a plea for a giving, that we had in mind. We were mainly as one who, having wielded a now blunted sword, called for the wielder of a mightier sword to take our place and fight for us. We were saying, it may be, “Thy will be done,”

1 Published in the Hibbert Journal, January, 1941.
too much as lookers on. I am not saying that to pray is solely to ask, saying “Help! Give!” Ritual and improvised prayer almost always include adoration. Much hereon has been written. But mainly, in religions, praying is asking, especially where and when the need for help is urgently felt. Are we, I wonder, right in seeing prayer as more than anything else an asking? Has mankind always so sought aid?

It has been my lot, in the comparative study of religion, to be mainly concerned with a phase in the history of Indian religion. And therein I have seen India passing from an ancient cult, full of praying by man for aid from an Unseen widely remote from himself, through a later cult, wherein, by a tremendous volte-face, man, seeing himself as intrinsically one with the Unseen, sought that “Self,” that More-Self, but little by way of prayer, and more by effort to realise that Oneness; on to a new worth in that More-Self, namely, a seeking to become actually that Self Who man only is potentially, to become That by willed effort in growth of spiritual adolescence. And I noted that, in this third period, the exercise of prayer, as an adoring asking, fell away utterly, the willed growth having to be effected, so far as the individual self was to be affected, by his own endeavour, and so far as the fellowman was to be affected, by a willed effort (not limited to will only) to irradiate or suffuse the fellowman with, now amity, now pity, now gladness, now balance or poise, in the exercise of which the latter might be deficient.

In the literature betraying these great changes I find no awareness of them. Cult-literature is too self-satisfied to see itself as outgrowth from a mother-cult; as become institutional, it is too much occupied
with its own outstanding excellence to be a loyal daughter; it is too much occupied with the shortcomings around it, which it seeks to supersede, to see itself as a Quest after what is better than the Good that was there before it. It is the student of an after-day who must compare the one with the other. What then do we find in what we now call Buddhism, to set over against the hymned prayers of the Vedas and the seeking to realise identity in the Upanishads? Can the reader detach himself for a brief moment from to-day's monstrous hurly-burly and listen to the reply?

In a chapter of the Second Collection (Second Gospel, so to speak) of the relatively old Pali Canon, Gotama of the Sakyas (later called Buddha) is seen with his closest fellow-workers enjoying a fine moonlight evening, each in turn saying what he holds may yet embellish that beauty. He is appealed to as judge between these views; he appreciates them collectively, then gives his own view: "listen also to me. It is by intense struggle to win what may be won by force, by energy, by striving while you sit..."

Let two points be noted. He does not reply in terms of any of the formulas brought to the front in the Buddhism of South Asia. Indeed, his saying, so full of interest as revealing, if true, a very special emphasis of his own, I have never seen cited by any Buddhist or writer on Buddhism. Further, his saying is more fully worded in a formula, cited at any rate by early followers in the Canon: "Do ye struggle on, saying to yourselves: gladly would I have my body's flesh dry up if only I may hold out until I win what may be won by force, by energy, by striving."

Now here we have the then new outcome of the
change in religion which was spreading over North India. *In it* we see what was replacing the Vedic hymn-prayers asking for this and that from forces outside the praying man, prayers which linger on sparsely in the Upanishads. *In it* man has turned for what may be, for what may come to pass, to himself. Man has become, as man, the More in man, nay, the Most in man: man as a very More in a less. The welfare that he seeks he is no longer asking for; he is willing it, willing it as a becoming in his own growth. No longer is man prostrate in adoration and supplication before a distant Incomprehensible. This he had come to see, in Upanishadic phrase, as That "from Whom we no more shrink away," because "we are That"; and, in the Buddhist view, as the welfare which we seek to win by will.

It is true that this willing was not expressed in terms of will, or even of desire, of aspiration. As I have often said, in these pages as elsewhere, there was no longer any fit term for pure "will," and no word of desire or wish held, as term, any longer in sufficient worth. *Modes* of will: effort, energy, endeavour were brought in to help.

On the surface the contrast between this attitude and that of other world-religions stares us in the face. Especially if we forget the changing ferment which had preceded Buddhism. Especially shall we of the Christian tradition contrast it with the Jesus-words: "Ask and ye shall receive." "Thy will be done." And it is possible that to-day's exhortations to public supplication (which is mainly what they mean) may among many to-day, not flustered and panic-striken, provoke rather some searchings of heart, as to whether a worthier attitude about prayer is not urgently
needed. The very repetitions that are so great a feature in the exercise, eliciting from Jesus the epithet "vain," may one day become a great deterrent. Apparent absence too of result of supplication may provoke a lowered concept of Deity comparable to that in Elijah’s taunts hurled at the Baal-worshippers, and to the simile of the "unjust judge," even if that was a simile by way of contrast. Is not mere asking too passive? Does not the accompanying adoration suggest (a) the attitude of slave to tyrant, (b) the notion of great separateness? Can there be a drawing near where this is believed in?

In Immanence, on the other hand, as also in Yoga-worship which emerged from it in India, the man needs not to draw near; in a way he is "there" from the start. His devotional work is neither approach nor petition; it is strengthening of union by the striving will to become more like. This is best attempted by placing his will within the will of the Highest, of the Best he can conceive, and by striving his utmost to will with that will. I am not suggesting that the Indian believer in Immanence so worded his substitute for Vedic prayer; I have said why he could not so word it. But it amounted to this. Buddhism in its own way worded it so.

Nearer to this is the remainder of the Jesus-word: "seek and ye shall find; knock and it shall be opened unto you." Here is no passivity nor insurmountable separateness. Seeking implies effort of will far more than does asking. Knocking implies a will to open and enter. And whereas in the Immanence of the early Upanishads, "seeking" is often enjoined and by "Buddha" also in similar terms, it was replaced, as we have seen, by the wording of will to attain the
Better, a feature which the mother-teaching of Immanence lacked. In the daughter, the (implied) will to realise a Highest "within" was resolved into a willing to attain a Higher, a Better, a More. Such anyway was the ideal, before the later ideal of an ineffable Incomprehensible in "nirvana" blotted this out. In neither is there any sign of the devotee reaching out to any perfect and therefore omnipotent Person distinct from himself. It is true, if often forgotten, that early Buddhism has ever an acknowledged background in its picture of a "highest" (agga, agra), a "beyond" (pāra), a further-than-that (tat-uttarim), a highest of the immortal (amat' agga). But its reticence here is profound; no cry for help is ever sent up.

Attention, effort is concentrated on, not the Most, but the More. It is this becoming, or, as it was worded, this "making-become the More" by a living spiritual growth that is in Buddhism the chief emphasis. This does not exclude a Most. It may well be questioned whether honestly valued there can be a pursuit of More without an implicit Most—our grammars teach us that—given the condition of infinite time. And I hold it certainly a gross ignoring of the historic evolution of early Buddhism to read the solemn charge to take "spirit" (or "self") as light and refuge (together with conscience, called dhamma) in the sense of dependence on the actual, earthly man alone. On the contrary, it was a testimony to that inherent Highest Who was not then to be conceived as separate from the man. It was a claim that, by energy, by endeavour, that is, by will to be "made-become," the man could emerge from the effort stronger, better, wiser than before.
There is no question here of a conscious, an explicit substitution of the willing just this or that for the just asking for this or that. This is for us to discern. We have but to contrast it with such an emphasis on mere asking as St. Chrysostom's: "Fulfil the desires and petitions of thy servants as may be most expedient for them." It is true that in piously willing "Thy will be done," we need not be passive. But there should surely be more expression of the aspiration to will with that will. I have not appreciation here for the Hebrew legend of Jacob's wrestling with an angel. It is no fit question of little will contending with greater will. I see rather the possible efficacy in the pouring forth aspiring will as ready instrument of a commanding will, a pouring forth too by massed procedure, the which, were we in religion advanced enough to do it, and so aligning wills with the divine will, might have wonderful results. As a Most we cannot yet will. But did we but will in a More, that is, seeking, making for, wayfaring towards a Most, we have as yet no conception as to what we might not, as more capable instruments, perform.

This act of will in so-called prayer is with many present\(^1\) but, in our wording, of ritual or otherwise, it is too much below the surface. In the child we hold in worth, not so much the facile "Please may I?" "Please give!" as the hand placed in ours and the "Yes, Mother, I will, I'm ready." Our "Most" need not be relegated to the background as came to pass in Buddhism. Ever can the aspiring will be aligned with the will in the Highest. But is it not conceivable, even probable, that a massed aligning of will may have more efficacy than a massed supplica-

\(^1\) Cf., e.g., this day's letters in the *Daily Telegraph*, October 23rd.
tion, in a right carrying out, a right putting into effect the aiding Will?

This is not to will a blasting with curses, as did the Rishis of old. In so willing we should be aspiring to a Less in and through ourselves. A "blasting" there has alas! to be. Our will, the will of man, in all its past blundering and slovenliness has hindered our growth, has brought on us this instant need to-day to break down, to undo, to cut out as by a surgeon's knife, to end, before we can build up. We are thereby none the less willing a greater welfare for each and all; we know this; we were perhaps never so sure our will is rightly aligned, that we are co-operators in will with a will, nay, with a Willer Who is more than we. Let us ask less. Let us will more—will with confidence, since we can, as perhaps never before in war, see that our will, even if to-day it must be mainly destructive, is certainly bent on a greater welfare to man that will follow.
XXXVI

IS BUDDHISM A RELIGION?¹

The question is sometimes raised, whether a given cult, ancient, world-wide and still living, can rightly be called a religion. Can it be so called, when about one tenet or another, which most people would hold to be fundamental in any religion worthy of the name, it appears to teach nothing definite? Or when it even appears to teach rejection of one or more of them. The question was raised in 1918 before the British Academy by Rhys Davids—it was the last piece of critical work he did. He asked it concerning certain great Asian cults, especially of course concerning Buddhism. He tested these by applying to them five features, which Max Müller had decided might fairly be called "the broad foundations on which all religions are built up," namely, "the belief in a divine power, the acknowledgment of sin, the habit of prayer, the desire to offer sacrifice, and the hope of a future life." He judged, having tested, that not one of those Asian cults had any one of these five. "Religions," he adds, "are constantly changing." The term 'religion' in popular usage has also to change "to cover these variations." And he suggests that a word so elastic as to result in much self-contradiction should be superseded.

¹ Printed in The Aryan Path, April, 1933. For an earlier and in many details different exposition see vol. I, xxv.
Now the word religion is a term much younger than are most of the great cults to which it is applied. It would be difficult to find in any of them a word fairly synonymous with religion. And as to that, it is only we of to-day who, in coming to generalize about religion, feel the need of a general term. But we may find approximations to such a general term. Take this: In the 25th Suttanta of the Pali Dīgha Collection\(^1\) we find, as usual, an ingenious, even eloquent discourse built up around what is perhaps a very old mantra. This is made to take the form of a test question, namely: "What is this —— of the Blessed One in which he trains his disciples, and in which they, trained and having found comfort, confess as 'will is the beginning of the God-life'?"\(^2\) Now where I have left a blank, we might reasonably put 'religion,' or at least 'religious teaching.' Actually the word is dhammo. This, meaning for India the 'ought-in-things,' the what should be, had come, in Buddhistic Scriptures, to be externalized as a body-of-teaching about what should be in man's life. And if it be conceded that 'religion' would be no inapt rendering here for dhammo, we have lit on yet a sixth foundation of what may be so called, and one not rejected by Buddhism.

Are we sure then, that in Max Müller's 'five' we have got deep enough to say: here is religion's true basis? As to that, he lived over a score more of years after putting these forward in his Lectures on the Science of Religion (1873, p. 287), and they may very well not have been his last word on the subject. At

\(^1\) *Dialogues of the Buddha*, III, pp. 36 ff.

\(^2\) *Ajjhāsayam ādi-brahmacariyam*. *Ajjhāsayam* is no stronger a word than inclination. There was no good word for 'will.'
the same time not one of the five can we afford to waive aside. Can we say Rhys Davids was right in saying that, e.g., Buddhism has not one of those five? But Max Müller was not happy in the way he worded the five. He might have expressed them in such terms that, without sacrificing a single vital truth, he could rightly have shown Buddhism as not to be excluded from his definition of religion. Let me try to show in detail what I mean.

Consider the second of the five fundamentals: acknowledgment of sin. The word ‘sin,’ a Teutonic, an Anglo-Saxon word, has long been associated with a Hebrew equivalent parallel to the transgressing or the defaulting in respect of a power greater than the individual man, and looked upon as external, whether the power be a code, a community or a higher being or beings. And the making good is in Hebrew bound up with confession, with offerings, which may count both as a fine and as a profession of contrite loyalty. In its verbal form, sin is none of these things; it is connected, I read, with the verb ‘to be’ and means identification of the sinner as being such: “Thou art the man!” “The guilty man,” quotes Skeat, “is he who it was.” We see the word lingering, e.g., in the German sind, ‘are.’ The guilty man acknowledges: “It is I.” Now in some cults it is not easy to equate the judicial force in the derived meaning of ‘sin.’ In Buddhism, transgression may be against the fellow-man, against the moral code, against the monastic rule; but not, e.g., in the tribunal after death, so strangely passed over by modern Buddhists, is he judged as sinning against a Deity as externally conceived. On the other hand, he is often depicted as aware of, and as acknowledging unworthy conduct
in thought, word, deed. If then we word this fundamental in terms of the man, we see that it is not only a feature in Buddhism, but as a fact a very prominent feature. We see also, that it is not only awareness and confession that figures; there is more: the man or self is confronted by a Self, witness of his conduct, making him aware of ill-doing. The phrase: "Does the self accuse the self?", the lines

... thou scorn'st the noble self,
Thinking to hide the evil self in thee
From self who witnessed it,\(^1\)

are no mere poetic dramatizing for those who see in original Buddhism as a new shoot in its parent stem, Indian religion.

To strengthen this fundamental No. 2, I would reword it as "belief in every man that he is not habitually what he may be, can, should, ought to be." In a word, recognition of what we now call 'conscience': "this Deity within my bosom."\(^2\)

But since this term is only of the West, I would exclude it with 'sin' from the definition.

The third fundamental, 'habit of prayer' has also its deeper wording. A superficial acquaintance with the Pali scriptures and Commentaries may seem to justify here the exclusion of Buddhism. But if we put aside the exegesis of later values, if we keep in view that the founders of Buddhism were attacking, not the heart of Indian religion, but its overdone externals, if we never forget, that with Deity in that 'heart' become immanent, prayer had become aspiration and righteous conduct, rather than any form of

2 *Shakespeare, The Tempest*. 
supplication, we hesitate. The word itself is never long absent from Sutta pages: the word brahma. This underwent cheapening in the hands of exegesists, and under the influence of monasticism. But for ancient Indian religion it was of supreme import. "Starting as 'prayer,' sacred formula, religious act, it becomes the symbol of holy thought and utterance, the outpouring of man in his highest longings. It is the best wish of a spiritually minded people that becomes for a while a personal god, and at last the divine essence of the universe."¹ We have no word of like power wherewith to equate brahma, brahman, but this we should do: we should keep in view what the word meant for religion in Gotama's day, and how deep was its significance, in his mandate to teach brahma-chariya to all men. Where Divinity has become accepted as immanent; where, as in original Buddhism, That was conceived, not as a Being, but as a Becoming, to be developed by and in the man through his way of living, prayer tends to be yearning and effort to become. The Jew could call the one a 'panting'; the Christian could speak of the other as laborare. In the word bhāvanā, 'making become,' the Buddhist has a no less fine contribution.

In the fourth, a more fundamental wording is "desire to make vicarious surrender of the self in what the self has, and direct surrender of what the self is." The "Take me! Use me!" of aspiration towards a Highest, Best, Most, is as truly to be called sacrifice (literally a making holy), as is any less direct offering. Outward rite of surrender is more accidental than essential. And here Buddhism proves no defaulter:

¹ Bloomfield, Religion of the Veda, p. 273.
I lay no wood, brahman, for fires on altars;  
Within th self burneth the fire I kindle.  
Ever my fire burns; ever tense and ardent  
I live the worthy life, the life that is Brahma.'

So is the Founder shown speaking. Here have we  an offering noble in word, made nobler by the long  life he led. For me such a fundamental were best  worded as Man willing to place himself in the Highest  Will.

I come to No. 5, the hope of a future life. Here  it is only the word 'hope' that could sanction the  exclusion of this feature from Buddhism. Had No. 5  been called 'belief in survival' my husband would  have withdrawn to that extent his claim. But even  so, it is only for the monastic values emphasized in  the Piṭakas, that 'hope' ceased to be true. It was  only for the śramaṇa who had turned from life in any,  even a happier world, that 'becoming,' that is, ex- ternally considered, rebirth, appeared undesirable. I  cannot see this as true for the first teachers. No  phase of Indian religion did more to strengthen and  make relatively real a belief in man's life as a matter  not of earth only, but of worlds than did original  Buddhism. The winning by a worthy life a happy  survival in a better world, as one further stage in  'becoming,' was held out from the first (so far as we  can know it) down to the message of Asoka's Edicts  as a sure and desirable result. The original teaching  seems to have seen the man as ever in a state of change,  and in this of effort to become. And so long as the  materialistic feature of decay, as succeeding to becom- ing, is held as not applying to the spiritual man,  a teaching of a vast hope will necessarily be integral

1 Kindred Sayings, I, p. 212.
with it. That the material feature did get hold of Indian religion I have shown recently in these pages.

Finally, what of the first fundamental, "belief in a divine power"?

Here once more the wording is unfortunate. The idea of 'power' is important, but it is made to bear too heavy a mission. This and that cult may single out this and that attribute in manhood carried to an infinitely high value, and see in it Divinity. Other cults may differ. But there is one aspect of Divinity which is fundamental, in that it is a corollary from the other four. These four when combined amount to a concept of Man as seeking after and striving towards a More than he knows himself habitually to be:—awareness of shortcoming, aspiration after that More than he yet actually (though not potentially) is, will to identify himself with, to co-operate with that More-in-will, and the belief that, as inherently, not matter, but spirit, he does not perish in process of becoming a More, but goes on to become that More elsewhere or elsewise.

But this More is irrational without a possible culmination in a Most. The living ever 'higher' bears the implication of a life, a being, yea, a becoming that is Highest. The point of consummation is quite beyond the conception of the man of earth, and probably for many a stage beyond earth. But he knows he is seeking, is becoming; he believes in a consummation in or with a Most, a Best, a Highest. Here, I believe, is a fundamental feature that neither Buddhism nor any other cult would commit suicide by rejecting.

So long then as we take accidents and partial aspects in religions, we may make out a case for rejecting from 'religion' this or that cult. And this is true also
if we seek to equate particular terms from one cult with those in others. But if we take our very man—not body or mind, but the user of these—our man-in-man, and get down to what is bed-rock in his life-quest, we may find that what is really fundamental in that quest is true of every world-religion, and calls for the exclusion from 'religion' of none. For religion reveals to us the man seeking to become, as very man, a More with respect, explicit or implicit, to a Most.
XXXVII

MAN AND DEITY IN ORIGINAL BUDDHISM

We read always, we hear often, that Buddhism was, from the first, a gospel wherein man has banished God from earth and from heaven. This, it is conceded, is held to be proved by negative rather than by positive evidence. Thus Buddhism is said to have brought no new aspect of the Divine to the Many, such as Zarathustra’s Good Mind, Good Word, Good Deed, or Jesus’s pitiful Father of the humble and the contrite, or Muhammad’s loving Accepter of devotion. It taught no prayers, it devised no sacraments, it sang no praises. Was it not rightly to be called antitheistic? At least until, in its far Eastern development, its “Awakened” Founder was deified into an Ādi-Buddha, a primæval Spirit, sending emanations, as Gotama and the rest, to earth to bring help?

But what is it, in general terms, to be antitheistic? Is it just to put aside this or that old God-picture of a day when the New is working in man to seek after a worthier conception? There will then be antagonism to a specific form of theism; there will not be necessarily antitheism in general. Did not Emerson write about: “When half-gods go, the gods arrive?” Disdeification of a sort there will be, when this happens. Take the verse from the venerable Dhammapada of the Buddhist canon:

1 Published in The Aryan Path, Bombay, 1938.
Nor even deva, nor the sprite who bringeth luck, 
nor Māra with a Brahmā could unmake 
the victory by such a person won—

the victory, namely, over the lower self. I have lately 
heard this cited in public as evidence that early 
Buddhism was antitheistic, and by an Indologist, his 
conclusion being that since all great and yet living 
religions were theistic, Buddhism earned this title 
only by becoming, in Mahāyāna, theistic, as it were, 
in spite of its founders.

But when the first Buddhist mission started, there 
had been a teaching, perhaps a century old, of a new 
Immanent religion in the North Indian Brahmin 
schools, with this result, that the Vedic "devas" had 
become quasi-human figures for conveying religious 
vistas and concepts to men of the earth. Even the 
sublime impersonal concept of Brahman, source of 
all, end of all, had been made personal by the appear-
ance of a masculine Brahmā on the religious horizon: 
Brahman the unutterable had become Brahmā the 
perceptible, the enthroned. Further, there had grown 
up the concept of a world better than that to which 
man first went at death: the Brahmā-loka, where 
lived his fellow-men who, having gone before, had there 
died and been found worthy to go in survival yet 
further. And so elastic had become the word "deva," 
that it was used occasionally to express the five senses.

No one with any knowledge of Buddhist scriptures 
worth the name would ever see in the Brahmā of the 
verse cited any but an other-world fellow-man of 
relatively higher worth; never would he see in it a 
reference to that supremely Divine, surviving in such 
compounds as Brahma-chakka:—God-wheel, Brahma-
charya:—God-living, Brahma-bhūta:—become God.
A deva was no longer exclusively one to be worshipped, to be sacrificed to, to be invoked. The word, I say, had taken on a new elasticity, resembling the range of our term "spirit."

If early Buddhism seem to have disregarded the sort of theism we of a Semitico-Hellenic tradition look for, it was but carrying on the accepted teaching of the Brahmanic schools of its day, through which most of its first missioners had passed. It is rare in the Upanishad academic lessons, early or late, to find prayer or priesthood or praise.

Into this realm and day of Deity, come to dwell within the man ("Brahman we worship as the self!")\(^1\) arose the man Gotama with no new mandate as to the Highest—the day was not needing it—but with an urgent mandate for man of the crying need to become, by his daily life, and not only in belief, in knowledge, the divine offshoot which he was told that he was. Here on the one hand, were a day and a realm where teachers of noble and priestly youth were exploiting a new and astonishing uplift in the conception of God and man—the ultimate identity of both—in that the supreme Brahman was worshipped as the manifest worth in "self" of each man. Here, on the other hand, was a certain lack, in this uplifting mandate, of insight into the need of long and most pressing work in transforming potentiality of nature into actuality of nature. "That art thou!" was needing to be rendered as "That canst thou become." Hindus do not like my saying this, but the fact remains, remains as yet without any worthy rejoinder, that the early Upanishads lack earnest emphasis on the need, especially in such a mandate, of the whole earth-life being quickened and

\(^{1}\) Or 'as spirit,' a better religious rendering of ātmā than 'self.'
sublimated into a training in thought, word and deed, of what man had it in him, not so much to be, as to come to be. Yet an acorn, he was, as it were, told he was the oak tree. To become that what years upon years of growth were necessary!

To realize that we have here the real mandate of Gotama, and no antitheistic implications about it, we need first to compare Pițakan with Upanishadic emphases. In the former the immensely preponderant emphases are on man’s need to train himself in good ways of life. The frequent exhortation: “Tell yourselves: thus and thus must there be training; we will become—this or that,” is sadly overlooked by critics, let alone Buddhists. We need secondly to ponder critically the apparent slighting of the external “theistic” observance here and there in the Pali records. Scathingly Gotama is shown referring to those who believed that by merely and repeatedly invoking this and that manifestation of Deity—Indra, Varuṇa, Prajāpati—a happy rebirth could be insured at death. But there is here no denial of the reality of either Deity, or devas, or worlds, or rebirth. The emphasis lies in the need to set afoot the right will-in-becoming, and so to live here as to be fit for the worthier fellowship hereafter. But not for the fellowship of the supremely Highest; the wise reticence of the early Buddhists as to That is a most worthy pendant to their earnestness in stirring up men to wayfare persistently in the long Between separating the ideal from the actual.

When, then, we read in manuals or hear from speakers, that Buddhism has nothing clear to say about God or soul, or the nature of the bond between them, let us more justly consider the setting of early
Buddhism in its frame of current Immanence, and its true mission within that frame. Let us also consider more historically the specific objective of the founders. Their mission was, not to the few in the Academy, but to the Many without; not to the learned—albeit to these too its mandate was applicable—but to man in the home, the field, the market place. The majority were not devotees of the inner teaching of the Brahmins, but were worshipping God in many worthless ways. None the less the impact of the Immanence upon the younger generation of Brahmins was bound to be immense; the Many for whom these would be "celebrating" were bound to be more or less affected by it. And the Many are always rather more than less practical. They would apply the "New" to their life, not merely holding it at arm's length in thought. The new aspect of man's nature would arouse in them a sense of the importance of a man's life. They would begin to see this as they never before had seen it. And they needed teaching about life as being a trust, an opportunity in man's long way through the worlds. That was the God-word the Many were needing. They were coming to feel after religion (which they vaguely called "dharma") as something bound up with man's relation to man, as something with which their happiness was bound up. This was not clearly known or worded. It was Gotama's work to word it for them:—the worthier life and its consequences:—this was his God-word; this was his God-spell; this was his "dharma."

And it is just in this hitherto vague word "dharma," Pali: "dhamma," that, so far from teaching anti-theism, he taught a new theism. To judge by the Piṭakas, the promise for him of a worthier conception
of the Highest, then conceived as Self, lay in the word "dharma." I have seen this taken to mean ultimately "the stable," because of its stem dhṛ, "to bear" (usually qualified as "to bear in mind"). But this is due to our present unfortunate omission of the man from the idea. The bearing in mind is only true and important when we keep in view the bearer-in-mind, and the Man as borne in mind. And This is, primarily a thing not stable, but dynamic, a Live One, a Quickener of mind. In the solitary moral lesson we find in the Upanishads, teaching the student what should be done, he is told to "walk according to dharma." He is not merely to think, or remember or be steadfast; he is to walk, to act, to behave. That is, according to the prompting of a something within that was More than he: a standard, a norm, as I used to say, taking the word to mean, as it scarcely does, not an average but an ideal.

The powerful figure used for the Self conceived in this way as the Man in the mind, the Watcher, the Witness, the Monitor, the Ought to-be, the Divine Urge whom we with our term conscience should more justly call the "consciencer," was Antaryāmin, the Inner Controller. And it is a thousand pities that the term, if ever used by the first Buddhist missioners (who were mainly Brahmins) was not taken over by the Pali Sayings. It is only too likely that, as the real man of the self became progressively deprived of deity and then dropped entirely, this term was let die. That the higher self is called lord (nātha), witness (sakkhi), goal (gati): these have fortunately been left in, and betray the possibility of earlier companion-terms.

The plural dhammā, in the Sayings, meant just
"things." (The notion that it meant metaphysical entity or monad is quite impossible in any but the scholastic Buddhism of centuries later.) But in the singular it meant, not "thing," but "more-thing"; less "what is" than "what ought to be." And in a gospel of a more-will to the Better, dhamma came nearer to expressing this than any other available word. It points to man's nature as essentially a coming-to-be, a becoming, and to the Highest conceived as the tendency and will to become, working in man. It is a noble crown in the Buddhist mission, most lamentably lost to sight by Buddhists in their identifying this word with a mere code or canon of teaching, with the "institutes" of an orthodox scripture.

It is twice recorded, that the founder decided, before he began his teaching, that aspiration for the "Great Self" involved revering dhamma, or the inner monitor.

None the less, let it not be forgotten that it was with the term "self" (ātmā; Pali: attā) considered as something supremely worth seeking, that Gotama began his mission. Herein he echoed the words of an Upanishadic refrain: "Were it not better that you thoroughly sought for the self?" But, as I have said elsewhere, because the first translator of this, Oldenberg, in the Vinaya, put aside his Vedic learning and judged Buddhism as a world apart, we have the misfortune to have learnt the injunction as "seek after yourselves"—a European turn to the text, which no scholar, translating the same words where they occur in the Upanishads, ever uses.

And it was with the combined 'self' and "dharma" that Gotama ended his long career of service:

Live as they who have self as lamp, as refuge, who have "dharma" as lamp, as refuge, and none other.
This, too, alas! has suffered mistranslation at the hands of Rhys Davids and others, being rendered "Be ye lamps unto yourselves," etc.—again the European way of rendering the pronoun from a text where the possessive form ("your-self") is non-existent. Here, too, where in the Upanishads ātmā- is prefix in a compound, as it is in the Pali, translators of the former do not hesitate to detach the prefix, where the context demands it, and give it the higher meaning: thus for instance, in ātma-vidyā: "knowledge of ourselves and of the Self"; in ātma-vid: "knowing sacred things, not knowing the Self"; and in the well-known compounds: ātma-mithuna, ātma-nanda, ātma-rati, ātma-krīḍa: "intercourse with, delight in, love for, sporting with, the Self." Whether from superficial attention or from a mistaken perspective, there has been taken the course of severing early Buddhism from its parent and presenting it as a species of Indian agnosticism and rationalism, in short, of antitheism.

But could a message, when and wherever first uttered to man, which eventually grew into a world-religion, have begun as antitheistic? Or begun and later turned theistic, as it were, in spite of its original aim and bent? I think not. I have been accused of using "intuition" in historical treatment, an ambiguous word which I never use or countenance, and which is, I presume, a refined way of saying "guessing." But no, I am holding my opinion on documentary evidence. And I would contend, so far as I yet know, that no religion, starting in the long past and surviving till to-day with a body of scripture, can be truthfully, critically shown to have begun with a disregard of what man has, at the time, looked upon as higher than
himself, as the Highest he can conceive, and of his relation to That. Forms of theistic presentation that were getting worn thin:—these may have been either tacitly disregarded, or explicitly put aside. Jainism, never really antitheistic, can be said to be shown doing the latter, if one can read into its late scriptures what was really taught by it just before Buddhism was born. But Buddhism at its birth—so far again as its scriptures can rightly testify—Buddhism with its search for the self as the God-in-man, its holding up of that self and dharma, the inner working divine will, as sole light and refuge, its reverence for God-compounded terms, its saying that amity to all men was "what men were calling 'God,'"¹ its quest here and everywhere for Deity, reverently expressed in such universally valid terms as Highest, Best, Supreme, Peak (terms far more fit and world-credal in time and space than such locally and temporarily used terms as Brahma, deva, or God), with its first and last aspiration towards That whom man needs and seeks, namely "Artha," the term it used before ever Nirvana emerged as a Goal—Buddhism at its birth was in a finer, truer way theistic than other world-creeds. It laid hold, to express man's quest and end, of terms which cannot fade or die save with the ending of man himself.

¹ Khuddakapāṭha, of the Sutta-Pitaka (last sentence).
So asked Pontius Pilate. Which would the Jews of his day have set free to come again among them, the man of the Less in worth, in conduct, in ideals, or the man of the More, the man of a New Word?

I am not dealing with that crisis, but I would place another alternative, in fact and in values, before the reader of my day.

It is a curious feature of the books and periodicals of our time, especially of the latter, whether these be propagandist or not:—the number of books and of articles concerning something entitled Buddhism, that are written by those who reveal in what they write that they have no knowledge of their subject, as so betitled, at first hand. I do not say that the number, measured against the total literary output of any year, is more than infinitesimally small. It is not enough to reveal any serious growth of interest in the subject. My point is the apparently secondhand and circumscribed nature of the authors’ knowledge.

There are several ways in which these writers betray that their knowledge about "Buddhism" is both of these. One is, that when a passage of scripture is quoted, its context is neither named nor discussed. Another is, that the passage is often varied in its wording to suit the point which the writer is pressing. Another is, that such passages have already been cited, to endorse his specific point, by some scholar of repute.

1 Published in The Occult Review, London, 1931.
But a more essential self-betrayal lies in this, that such compilations fail to show any critically historical curiosity as to whether this or that, which is cited without question as Buddhist dogma or doctrine, is of the original mandate, or is an aftermath of ecclesiastic monasticism. The corpus of teachings, which these writers have somehow learnt to call "Buddhism," is accepted en bloc as all synchronous, all mutually consistent (or if apparently not always so, to be interpreted as such), all equally and at all times orthodox. All, that is, which is allowed to be what is called Hinayāna, or Theravāda, or "Southern Buddhism," or of the Pali Canon. For present purposes we can leave Mahāyāna doctrines on one side.

The authors in question would possibly reply: "It is true we have made no study of the Hinayāna Canon in the original; but we have read some translations. And we have considered the manuals on Buddhism by scholars whose knowledge of those scriptures at first hand is incontestable. We believe what others have thus told us."

I hold this to be a probable answer and a good one as far as it goes. How far is that?

Have such docile disciples seriously considered (a) how new is the access of the whole of the Pali Canon to scholars; (b) how little evidence there is, in scholars' manuals, of critical, historical weighing of internal evidence in materials which have only in this century become wholly accessible; (c) how impossible it has been for those few pioneer scholars adequately to weigh such evidence (their Pali labours have all been wrought out of their leisure hours, their working hours being pre-empted in other directions); (d) how irrational it is, even for the learner at secondhand,
to see, in a body of doctrine which he knows was for centuries oral and under revision, then for centuries added to and written, also under revision, a teaching wherein changes of vital import have not been going on?

These four points may give the reader pause. He will have his answer to them none the less. But let us first sum up the doctrines which are usually brought out as the bases of (Southern) Buddhism.

These are (1) three essential "marks" in all things, but chiefly in man—man is anitya, transient; man is dukkha, ill; man is anattā, not-self\(^1\); (2) four worthy or noble true things, viz., a diagnosis expanding the second mark, and including the cause of man's being ill, the ending of this, the way going to the ending; (3) the worthy, or "noble" way, called eightfold: a prescription of rightness, or rather "fitness," in thought, word and deed; (4) certain statements concerning the founder of the religion, a man to whom the title of "Buddha" (awake, wise) came to be applied; namely (i) that he was superman; (ii) omniscient, (iii) ceased at his death to be any more a person, (iv) was silent when certain questions were put to him, and, on one occasion at least, made an apology to a listener for being silent, (v) never explained ultimate truths.

These teachings are, one and all of them, stated repeatedly and with emphasis in the Pali scriptures. They are either affirmed categorically, or they are fully implied in descriptive statements. Further, they would be accepted as central in Hīnayāna teaching by monastic teachers of South Asia, whether born

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1 Readers with a slight knowledge of modern (Southern) Buddhism, who may not see in (1) a 'basis,' should consult Religions of the Empire, as expounded by adherents in London, at the Empire Exhibition, 1924, where an eminent layman of Ceylon cites these as 'the' main category.
in the tradition, or European converts to it, and also by lay propagandists. Indeed, it is the exception to take up a propagandist organ without seeing in it some man or woman, usually of the laity, trotting out yet another 'sermonette' on the "eightfold path," or the "four truths."

"Ill" and escape from it comes in an easy first. That the man is or has no "self" makes a good second. That the man, as "not-self," falls to pieces in impermanence goes without saying. That "the Buddha" was, or acted thus, makes a fairly poor third in the running. Perhaps it is due to this: the European writers are mainly, if not wholly, lapsed Christians, seeking a religion which gives not so much a Divinely Highest to be sought, or an inspired teacher to lead, as categories of ideas about things, parallel, in religion, to the categories of laws of things in science. And in these "Buddhist" tenets, thanks in part to a sympathetic bias in most Buddhist-manualists, writers on this subject at secondhand judge, that they have found the one and only creed which does not appear to demand from them belief in the things from which they have lapsed.

These are momentous conclusions. As yet no doubt their momentum is of the slightest. It does not follow that it will remain ineffective. An alliance between a scientific creed that is largely materialistic and a religious creed that is held to be in harmony with modern science may be pregnant of results. And it may be a wise thing for those, who are not knowers at secondhand only of what is now called Buddhism, to invite the reader, who may be only such a knower, to look for a moment into the sanctions and the grounds for such an alliance.
The sanctions, in view of what has been said, I have but to sum up. There is first the Buddhist tradition attaching to the Buddhist cailt in Southern Asia. Discounting a few earlier travellers' records, we have gradually become aware of this since the beginning of the nineteenth century, when the treaty of Amiens ceded to us Ceylon. We came to discover there a creed of cenobitic monachism plus the laity, claiming to have been adopted from North India in the third century B.C., as attested by two national epic poems dating from seven and eight centuries later.\(^1\) The manuscript scriptures of this creed, written in a literary diction akin to the old Indian Vedic, Prakrit, Sanskrit, are, in those poems, said to have been, as a closed corpus of sayings, written down in a certain King's reign nearly 2,000 years ago. Voluminous commentaries also, committed to writing in Singhalese, were, it is recorded, recast into the Pali' diction by scholars from India about 600 years later. And these admit that the scriptures had repeatedly undergone first oral, then written, revisions.

So far for the scriptural sanction. Based on it we have the sanction of the ecclesiastical succession, from then till now unbroken, of the oral teaching of the church of monks in Southern Asia. This has been the laity's only access to the scriptural sanction. Till last year no publication of a (partial) translation of the scriptures as a whole into a S. Asian vernacular has come to my knowledge.\(^2\) Moreover, for the monk the "Pali" text is as sacred and untouchable as ever were Christian scriptures for a Christian sacerdotal succession. Moreover, for the monk there never was

\(^1\) Entitled Dipavamsa and Mahāvamsa. Both have been translated into English.

\(^2\) I am glad elsewhere, in this volume too, to be able to say this is no longer true in Burma.
question of the *inner history* in the life of his scriptures. They were there not to explain, much less to be explained; they were there to edify, to impress. And they were, first and last, as the Buddha-vāchāna—the word of the wondrous founder—all equally true, equally *independent of time*. For the native monastic teacher the question of an evolving of values in time does not arise. The whole body of doctrine is there, to be taken or left, *en bloc*.

Nor, for that matter, is the monk-teacher familiar with his scriptures from end to end as is any, even the obscurest, Christian teacher of religion with his Bible. Those scriptures are many times the bulk of the latter, and all are in a tongue which the former knows, it is true, but not as vernacular, nor knows as being, now of a more archaic form, now of a less.

Lastly, there is the sanction conferred on those doctrines cited above by the men and women who have written "books about Buddhism" as accredited experts. (Let the reader include the writer, down to 1912.) Of these I have spoken. And concerning the pioneer, immature nature of the *tradition they have set up*, viz., that to learn the original gospel out of which "Buddhism" has grown we must note what is reiterated and emphasized in the Pali Canon, I have only to add that it is a tradition without sound foundations, and that there are signs it will give way when a more thorough historical criticism—such as is now possible—has been at work. This criticism will (a) link up certain utterances in the Pali Canon with the immediately preceding religious teaching at the birthplace of "Buddhism"; (b) treat with suspicion the emphasized, the repeated, in a scripture attested as being a much revised compilation; (c) take that scripture to
task as to whether the weight in its teaching, which is of monks, to monks, for monks, is likely to have been the new word brought expressly to the Many, to the Man—that New Word out of which, spite of all monastic witlings, a great world-creed has managed to grow. And further (d) this criticism, having come to provisional conclusions as to (a—c), will compare and test these with what they have found in such fragments of other Buddhist Canons as have survived.

Now the utterances cited above, dear to the propagandist and the lapsed believer at secondhand, are under (b) the reiterated, the emphasized sayings, dear also to the monastic editors. Dear, because they uphold him, not in any premature sympathy with a non-existent science, but in his position as a world-forsaker. He had turned his back on any work, any duties life in the world had for him, even though he might be yet young. His contracted life conformed to a contracted gospel.

Shall we, under (a), inquire whether a gospel may yet emerge in the monks' canon, not reiterated, not emphasized—a buried city—which teaches, for the Many, expansion, not contraction, a More, not a Less?

My editor will be saying, "Time is up!" and I must refer the reader to recent books in which I have tried to expand the premature scholars' sanction into what is, I hold, historically more true. Put into briefest wording, it is this:

When Gotama of the Sakyas and a little band, chiefly of brahmins, began to teach, their aim was to expand the best religious teaching of the day. This was that each man, each woman—as "self" (not body, not mind)—was by nature a being akin to the Highest Being, to Deity, then called Brahman and
Ätman (self). There had been growing a tendency to see the man less as a Being, more and more as Becoming. (Translations of Vedic do not accurately show how much "more.") But the tendency was waning. Was not 'becoming' followed by decay? The Gotama-men upheld that tendency of the Becoming with the vigour of a new inspiration. The self, they taught, in the very words of Brahmin teaching, must "be sought after"; but not here as Being, not there as not-Being; but by the middle way as Becoming. The dictum "Thou art That" were more truly "Thou art becoming That." And by it, and in, the Way thou livest, now in this world, now in another, thou canst become That. Will to become what you yet, save potentially, are not.

Here was need of our "potential," but the word was not there. Here was need of our priceless word "will"; it was not there. Instead we meet with "make become," "stirred-up effort," "keen desire." And to bring home the right, the middle choice of will, we find the figure of life as a Way, and the man as Wayfarer towards his "highest good."

Here is no negation of the man, whether we call him self, soul or other name. Here is no wilted world-lorn monk-gospel. Here is man shown the More, not the Less, that lies in his nature, in his destiny.

And if it be said, "But this is surely not Buddhism," I would say, "Keep the 'Buddhism,' if you will, for the contracted gospel evolved by monastic editors." By what often seems sheer luck, all that has just been said survives in word or in spirit in the Pali Canon. But it is the gospel not of an ideal "Buddha" of Buddhists. It is the gospel of Gotama of the Sakyas.

Which will ye . . . ?
XXXIX

HOW DOES MAN PERSIST

My readers will expect from me some words on that subject which, in the field of Indology, has been associated with the name of Rhys Davids for nearly half a century. I will not disappoint them. I will take as my text a question and its answer, which is recorded to have been part of a great debate, compiled, rather than discussed, in the days of king Aśoka. It is this:

"Opposer: Puggalo kim nissāya tiṭṭhatīti?
"Defender: Bhavam nissāya tiṭṭhatīti."

The Pali translated means: "The man: on account of what does he persist? It is on account of becoming that he persists."

This compiled debate is entitled the Puggāla-kathā. At later intervals many other debate-talks were added, forming the bulky book of the Kathāvatthu (translated by S. Z. Aung and myself as Points of Controversy), one of the seven works in the Third Part of the Pali Tripitaka. But this talk is said to have been "spoken" by the President of the so-called Third Council, held at Patna for the purpose of revising and standardizing the authentic teaching of the Śakyas. Once this was done, the heads of the then preponderant Śakyans

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1 Published in the Prabuddha Bharata, May, 1931. I here add this note. Literally tiṭṭhatī means he stands (i.e., the physical posture). It is, by India as well as by us, carried over into the notion of standing-in-time, i.e., per-sist-ing. That Buddhist exegesis saw this meaning in it here appears from the Commentary, which has, for 'becoming' the synonym upapattihāva: 'state of being reborn.'

2 Pali Text Society Translations Series, 1915.
church could proceed to purge their community of heretics, that is, of all who did not believe and teach as the majority of that day were believing and teaching. A large portion of the minority were Puggālavādins: defenders of the reality of the Man (Puruśa, Ātman), as not identical with the complex of body and mind. This reality belonged to the original Śakyan mandate, as we can still see from many surviving passages in the Pali scriptures—passages parallel to the Upanishadic sayings, which I have collected, but have no space to give here. That the man was not a perduring entity, that the man was virtually to be resolved, as knowable, into dhammas, or states of mind is, in the Pitakas, replacing the older teaching, and it was held by the majority, or, may be, by all the heads of the church in Aśoka’s time. And to distinguish these from those defenders of the older faith, the “election-term” arose of “the Analysts” (Vibhajjavādins), a term which gradually died out when their victory was won, and they remained “the Sangha,” or church.

To make clearer their position, and the reasons for their upholding it against the Conservatives, who were mainly not of Patna, the new imperial capital, but of Vaisālī, the lengthy composition from which I quote was, it is said, composed. And there seems no reason to doubt the record.

Let us glance at the context. The opposer rejoins:

“But does not becoming involve change, transience, waning, decay, ending?”

The defender is made to give away his case with the simple reply: “Yes.”

“But,” goes on the opposer, “does not (your) man also, as man, involve change, transience, waning, decay, ending?” “Nay, not that,” protests the defender.
Now here, had we in the debate, anything but a piece of special pleading, we should have the defender allowed to say, that "becoming" (bhava, bhavya) in the very Man was not a materialistic becoming, such as we see in the world of matter, and that the man's expression of himself through the body, in what is called collectively "mind," only reflected the waning, in old age or illness, of the body. Nothing of the kind is permitted. The opposer hurries on. "In that you have admitted change and so on in becoming, you have admitted all that in the man-as-becoming. Acknowledge yourself refuted, yea, well refuted." This disingenuous way of making the defender merely a dummy man, raising no awkward points, but only such as the opposer can by mere logomachy refute—I mean, by limiting the meaning of a crucial term—is the main characteristic in the Opposer's method.

But it is also possible, that the teaching represented by the defender had weakened over this most important matter of bhavya. For it was a weakening in the Indian religious teaching generally of that day. This we can read and discern in the Upanishads, albeit it is curious that not more attention has been paid to it. The early Upanishads are possessed, as are by no means Vedas or Brāhmaṇas, of an earlier date, with the idea of the man as becoming. At every turn we read of him as "he becomes (bhavati) this or that. And for more than the man also; even time's three dimensions are worded, not as past, future, present, but as in terms of becoming:—become, is becoming, as well as the bhaviṣyati common to both 'will be' and will 'become.'

It is true that the learner is told, "Thou art That," not "thou art becoming that." As to this, it should be remembered that, as with Buddhism, so with the
Upanishads, we have barely begun to apply intensive historic criticism to these scriptures. It may well be, that this famous mantra, when it was first taught by progressive teachers, was also worded in the way of becoming, which so pervades those Upanishads. If once you conceive Becoming in a way worthy of the *puruṣa*, and not in a way fit only for the transient body and mind, you can see, in the idea of becoming, a fit attribute of the *puruṣa*, even that divine becoming whereby he grows to be actually That who by nature he is potentially, or in the germ. Nay, even more: it must not be forgotten, that whereas, of the Supreme Ātman, those Upanishads say: In the beginning He is, or He was, they also say that His creating was *from the desire*, being one, *to become many*. Here then we have a becoming conceived as actually an attribute of the Highest, a creative activity in the Divine sport (*līlā*) of evolving the New, the Other, the Varied. Such a becoming is far beyond the nature of that material becoming of which decay is the necessary complement.

But when we turn to somewhat later Upanishads, we find just this lower becoming replacing the sublimier idea. When the Īsā and the Māṇḍūkya were finally redacted, signs of controversy over the term are evident, and they who wished to reinstate *sat* (being) for *bhavya* speak of the latter as mere *sambhūti*: that which has come to be, not that who is ever becoming.

And this lowered contracted idea was taken over, to its infinite harm, by the community of the followers of Śakyamuni. Not by him; far from it. By presenting his message in the figure of a Way, and the man as wayfarer in the worlds, he tried to strengthen and bring to the centre the conception of the man as
launched in a long career of progress in becoming That Who he in nature was; a becoming, as he warned his men, neither of body nor of mind, but of the Self Who was to be sought. That men and things are (sat),—not so, he said; that men and things are not—not so, he said. There is a majjhena paṭipadā, a course by way of the mean between these; namely, everything is becoming. And the man, if he will, if he choose, can by the divine urge of dharma within him, the driver as it were, of the chariot, be "one who has the Self as lamp, the Self as refuge," and "as bourn" (gati) that supreme bourn (paramagati) to which he as wayfarer, rightly faring (dhamman caram) through lives on earth, in svarga and other goals, both better and worse, will ultimately attain that Bhava-suddhi, or salvation by becoming, of which Aśoka's Edicts speak on carven rock.

But his wise and constructive teaching became irrecoverably bent and altered under the influence, growing in his day, of two main factors: (1) the influence of the professional monk, or bhikṣu as distinct from the missionizing monk, (2) the influence of the attraction found in the analysis (Sāṅkhyya) of the mind, as a somewhat which was other and distinct from the self. The former influence emphatically justified severance, in the young not only in the old, from the world, by stressing life in this and any world as "Ill," and damned becoming as meaning only life in this and that world. Under the latter influence, the man, no longer essentially a "More," working towards a "Most" in process of becoming, was gradually held to be known only as mind or mental states, and was finally held to be, as man, not real.

We can now better perhaps understand first, why
the Defender of the ātman is seen, in my text, basing the persistence, the survival of the man on becoming, and secondly, why he is seen as attacked in this, the very centre of that old Śakyan gospel, to which he clung.

Such defenders, I say, were mainly of Vaisāli. Surely it lends a pathetic significance to the record, borne out by the cairn subsequently built, that of the Last Look, that when he, the aged Śakyamuni left Vaisāli on his last tour, he turned and looked a last farewell on the city, the one place perhaps faithful to his teaching!

It is not easy to write of this tragedy, so tragic is it, even after this long lapse of years. Think of it. On the one hand there had arisen in India the world-helper of forgotten name, whose mighty influence converted her religious world from external polytheism to acceptance of an immanent God in manhood, the man around whose message the teaching, so far as it was new, of the Upanishads was taught. On the other hand, there arose in India the world-helper of the remembered name, but the almost smothered message of the Way of salvation through becoming, a radiant morning-message of hope for Everyman, that he was no fixed immutable "being," incapable of ever attaining to a Godhead far too wonderful to be adequately conceived, even by the saints while hampered by their earthly encasement, but that he was a mutable growing "becoming," bound as such ultimately to attain to That. This second great Helper sought to bring home to the Many, to Everyman that truth in his nature, which was the very surety that he would so attain. Yet the very means thereto, the word "becoming" was changed in meaning to something sinister: to the
punabbhava, or rebirth, which in the monk-estimate meant, not the very opportunity itself of More-becoming in the Way, but the mere ushering in of more Ill; so that on the word bhava all sorts of evil names were piled, and the 'stopping becoming' (bhava-nirodha) was called Nirvāṇa.

There would be nothing beyond a tragedy of history—and how many are there not?—in this, were it a question of religious teaching true only for a place and a time. But we are here up against things which you with me may deem to be true for all time and for everywhere:—the very Man as rightly conceived, the progressive conception of what the Man in his nature ultimately is, the very Way in him of Bhava and of Dharma by which he must ultimately reach consummation. But—and herein lies my call to you—if this be so, then is this tragedy of a thwarted New Word in India's history not one that need be extended to darken India's, nay, the world's near future. India still cherishes the teaching of the very man, the Man-in-man; she has let drop the degenerate teaching of the Not-man. May she never suffer it to revive! But she has not even yet grasped fully the significance of my text: Puruso bhavyam nissāya tiṣṭhati: "The man-in-man persists through becoming"—not through being. Nor do we in Europe realize, absorbed though we are with the becoming in body and mind, the becoming that is followed in the individual by decay,—realize at all as we should, the Becoming that is of the very Man, the sūddhi that is his by bhava. Will India herein help us?
WHAT BUDDHISM MEANS

It was in the train coming from Oxford that I met him—a young Sinhalese, whose parents had sent him over to England to be taught something of what Western culture means, in economics and law, on a very slender basis of education gained at an English school in Ceylon. He was feeling perplexed and very homesick.

Like an English youth, with his Rome of Cicero's day, and his Athens of Aristophanes' day, I knew more about the ways and ideas of Buddhists in pre-Christian India than I did about those of the Buddhist of to-day in Ceylon. But sympathy bridged the gulf between us, for we were both inquirers in religion, both aware that it meant the biggest thing in life to us, both aware that it had in different ways for each of us things of utmost worth, both feeling after things of no less worth which it had not yet to give either his country or mine.

Yes, he said, I am a Buddhist. I was brought up as one. My people are Buddhists, they have none of them joined the Christians, as many in our island have. My parents are pious people. They worship the three Refuges—Buddha, Teaching, Sangha; that is, men in the religion—and they keep the Silas—do you know what I mean? Not to take life knowingly, not to steal, not to be adulterous, not to lie, slander, abuse,

1 Written by request for The Daily Express, May 21st, 1927.

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or chatter, not to go where strong drink is drunk. That's what we profess, you know, when we say we are Buddhists. It's a very short profession—creed, you would call it—and of course it means a lot of credence, of faith, chiefly in what we call "refuges."

There's the last, the Sangha. I've heard we all of us used to be counted-in in that, but actually the Sangha is the world of the bhikshus, or priests. "Not priests, surely," I interrupted, "they are not celebrants, intermediaries. Why not say monks? After all, it was to Buddhist missions in Egypt centuries ago that Christianity owes its importation of the monk." Well, then, monks, he went on. We respect and support the monks; we give them alms when they pass our houses on their alms-rounds; we give in other ways; we go to hear them recite from the scriptures on uposatha—that's your Sunday—and full moon days. When the reciting is in Sinhalese, and we understand, we can get good from it; we can get good fun sometimes, when it is birth-stories that are being told.

We have faith in our monks; we believe they will instruct us not in what is wrong, but in what it is good for us to follow. They don't instruct us fully about life; their teaching about women and about children seems to leave out much; they have nothing to teach us about the bigger things we're up against now—the other races, the Empire, world duties—world duties where there are no monks. No, we should not look to them for teaching on these; we do feel a need of them when we are in trouble, or are ill or dying.
What will they tell you then, you ask? If you wish it, they may come and recite a paritta (warding rune) for you. There are several of these; I believe, though I am not sure, that they are all from our scriptures. The one we have oftenest is about the wise and good life which brings a man the highest luck; others are professions of good will towards all creatures as a way of warding off harm from any form of them. They are very old, these parittas; I am told that, whereas before our Dhamma was taught, Rishis or seers warded by blasting with curses, our Dhamma taught men to make friends of all that might hurt them by sending out a feeling of good will to all.

Then, again, the monks tell us in our last hours not to be afraid of the hereafter if we have tried to be good and heap up merit; we must keep before the mind our good works. It will then not be ill with us, and we shall be reborn in a happy world and for a long time, before we die there, to be again reborn somewhere else. That world will be something like this one, and we shall know it with a new body and mind. Or, rather, "we" shall not know it; the new body and mind will.

How we are to get these the monk never tells. I rather think he does not know. Do your clergymen know? He just tells us we shall be born again and again. Sometimes not knowing more worries me. Can there be light about it in the scriptures?

You see, we don't know what is in our scriptures. Of course, we can all read, but very few can read their old language, the Pali. It's an Indian tongue, you may not know—not Sinhalese. Some little poems from them are in Sinhalese, like the Dhammapada;
but those are verses on what we should do, but not teaching about what we are or shall be. There are many words of Pali in our own language, but not enough for us to be able to follow the scriptures. Was it ever like that with your Bible, which you have now in English, and all seem to know a good deal?

When the monks tell us things out of our scriptures they always tell of the better way of the men who are monks, the better fate for the man who is a monk. We value the monks and their way of life, not because we want to be monks ourselves, but because we believe that to take care of monks is the surest way to avoid a dreadful fate after death. Care of them will be all to our credit then. But I do not clearly know who decides in the matter, although I have heard the name Yama mentioned. Do your clergymen know?

And I suppose that if we thought more about these things, if we believed in them more earnestly, we should really all of us become monks, so as to be safe both here and hereafter. According to the Ceylon chronicles, this did very largely happen when Buddhism was brought to Ceylon. But you see the fact is that once a man becomes a monk, he is not really "we." We do not see very much of the monks' world; we do not really love their life; we feel they teach and preach mainly for and about themselves.

What, then, of the man who began that world in Buddhism? You see, we believe he was not just a man; he was extraordinary, he was a wonder-being. And we believe we others cannot well enter into what he thought. And of him, now, we believe he is no more in any world, either earth or any other, as reborn.
It is impossible even to imagine him. We can and do pray to him, we can and do try to meditate on him, on what we are told about him. But we never look for any answer. We believe we shall be somehow better if we meditate and pray—that is all. But that is so with you, isn’t it?

They tell me that now in all countries men are revering the Buddha, yet what can he be to them? He is our Buddha; we have his Dhamma; we have his Sangha; he mandated it from the beginning—so we believe; he made it. They tell us he did not think so much of the laity as of the monk-sangha. Sometimes I wonder whether this can be true? Did he not really care so much for us, whose work supports the monk, as well as the old parents and the little children? He was filled, they recite, with great pity for all men, he was the very compassionate as well as the very wise.

They recite sometimes how he taught a man, Sigāla, what a good man should do as a man of the world, not as a monk. Perhaps he told this very often? Men are now, I hear, speaking of him as not above all the devas and great devas or gods, but as a man who may still be “alive.” Will the earth ever see another like him? We believe it will; another Buddha, Metteyya, but again of India. Do you think there will be another Jesus? I wish there were a Metteyya here now. I get very weary of being told there is no way of getting word from him, to tell us much we want to know.

Sometimes I think, when, as here, I see men believing this here and that there, that we want a messenger and a dhamma, or message, for the world, and not for any one country. Sometimes, too, I
think we want a helper who when he leaves the earth will not let go of us. Perhaps—it is not orthodox, do you call it, to say so, I whisper it—perhaps our Buddha did not want men to let him go into such utter blankness when he left the earth.

Some of his disciples were able to speak with men of other worlds, just as he did, so they say. Is it perhaps because they did not try to speak to him, to listen lest he might answer, using that sort of rapt musing we learn was called Jhāna in which they tell us he died? Christians tell me they can get near Jesus in the sacrament. But to us that seems just a matter of the body. They tell me also of a "holy spirit" who wills or guides in what should be done, and that is a lovely idea. But I seem to want a helper who will give me some light just where the monks at home, as I was saying, do not.

Our Buddha spoke of the good life as a way, and the monks teach it as an earth-way—that is, how rightly to walk in this life. But then life, they also say, is very, very long; and beyond this little bit of it we seem to have no good way. We are in the dark. Don't you think the perfect teacher, the helper greater than the gods, would be always helping men—at least till they could themselves see with Him the end of the long way approaching?
XLI

BUDDHA, ' THE LIGHT OF ASIA ' ¹

We have before us for our talk two words; both of them class words; I mean, each names a class; neither is personal. Buddha is like Christos, a class of persons to whom the word was, came to be, held fitting:—Christos meaning anointed, that is, recognised as king or high priest, and buddha meaning awake, awakened, and, in secondary meaning, enlightened, wise: an epithet bestowed from a certain period in India on any man wise in a striking way, thus:—

"Unbound, well-farer, awake: him I call brahman" (man of worth). ² Both of these are cult-names: names which came to be given when the passage of time made faint both the personal names: Jesus, Gotama, by which their contemporaries had known them, and when there was growing up, about and over the personal names, the nimbus of a great cult.

And Pioneer is one who prepares the way: the forerunners in an army: pionnier as the French word goes, with a doubled agent-affix: -on and -ier, derived from Spanish army use, namely the word peon, footer, the d of pedes, foot, having been dropped, even as in master, maître, we have dropped the g of magister.

We have then to consider a man properly called Gotama, more fully Siddhattha Gotama, as coming to

² Asattam sugataṁ buddhaṁ; tam aham brūmi brāhmaṇam. Dhp., ver. 419.
be known as 'buddha,' and as being justly classed as a pioneer, a waymaker. Here a word on 'pioneer' as peculiarly fit for him. He was not only, as we here and now may see, a true pioneer, he was also so called by the disciple who, of all his disciples, should best have known what his Master stood for as a teacher. When asked, after that Master's death, by a brahmin statesman, whether the Sakyan (the Buddhist) Community had in it anyone like the lost Leader, the disciple Ānanda is recorded as breaking out into a noble testimony to him and his mission: "Nay, we have no one like him. For he was one who made arise a Way not arisen, he was one who made perceive a Way not perceived, he was revealer of a Way not revealed; Wayknower was he, Waywitter, Way-master!"¹ You will find that books on Buddhism and Buddhists all ignore this striking tribute, this tremendously emphatic passage. You will read about "Buddhas pointing the way"; you will hear a lot about a 'Path' split up into eight parts, not one part of which was wholly new in Indian teaching. But you will not find this linking of the Founder's name with, as here, not the so-called "eightfold path," but a Way unrevealed before, nor any worthy explanation of what was so new about the Way. We must come back to it presently.

There is a little bit of embroidery about the title of our talk which calls for comment: "The Light of Asia." There are few present who will not in it recognize the title of a poem to which many English and indeed other readers owe pretty well all the little they know about this great Pioneer. I have often wondered why Edwin Arnold lit upon this flash of fancy. He

¹ Majjhima-Nikāya, No. 108.
was careful to make his poem spoken by an Indian Buddhist devotee, so as to give the work an Indian, not a European flavour! 'Light of Asia' is such a non-Buddhist, non-old-Indian term! There was no India in those days, much less Asia; there was loka, the world, composed of a great region of different districts: Kasi, Kuru, Deccan, Kosālā, Māgādha and others, with border-districts; all vaguely called Jambudvīpa, the island of rose-apple, jambu, whatever that quaintly-named plant may be. And why 'island'? No word in Arnold's Preface or Appendix reveals what led him to the title. Probably it was in sequence with his having already adapted a Scriptural, or at least a Hebrew name: the Song of Songs, 'Schir Haschirim,' for his translation of the Bhagavadgītā, that he proceeded to follow further what I have seen called 'the publishers' point of view,' and make the title of his later poem commercially attractive in approaching the title given to Jesus (said to have been claimed by him), of 'the Light of the World.' 'Light of Asia' is not a happy title save perhaps for the publisher; it goes too far for most Christians; it doesn't go far enough for most Buddhists; it is not for either correct if, by Light of, we mean That which lights up Asia, since this is obviously uncharitable to Islam and Parseeism, and ignores the entire north of that continent.

But we can gladly condone the frill of the title when we consider how, using, as he had to, only very late, much recast records, Sanskrit, Tibetan, Sinhalese, not Pali, and not getting at that in which Gotama really was a great pioneer, Arnold nevertheless revealed, in this often very moving and lovely work, the Founder of a relatively non-monastic world-
religion. For one who comes from long study in the older records, the Pali Suttas, compiled by monks mainly for monks, it is refreshing to see it was not salvation by a final monk-career that Arnold makes his hero teach. This may well be because, with his main authority: the Lalita-vistara, a Sanskrit poem dating from perhaps 1,000 years after Gotama's day, he stops the biography with the beginning of the long mission, telling us nothing of the monkish legends which show Gotana becoming a monk directly after he leaves home, or his first disciples becoming monks by a miracle of transformation. We do feel we are looking at a man seeking to help man and woman as just man, and not as one launched into a career that is a sort of half-man, and teaching that career and the outlook of that career as a gospel fit, and on the whole best, sooner or later, for every man.

One thing more in the suggestions given to Europe by this poem is, as a rule, carefully overlooked by such as do not want to see. This is Arnold's critical remarks in his preface on "the inevitable degradation which 'priesthoods' always inflict upon great ideas committed to their charge," on Buddhist records as "sorely overlaid by corruptions, inventions and misconceptions," and on his "firm conviction that a third of mankind" (this is of course a gross if widely diffused error) "would never have been brought to believe in a blank abstraction or in Nothingness as the issue and crown of Being." Arnold has recently had a boom among English-reading Buddhists, but these sagacious sayings I have not seen noticed in the slightest degree. What he said is, for all that, slowly coming to be gripped by our culture, as it realizes the truth of Kipling's lines:—
He that hath a gospel whereby heaven is won,
Carpenter or Cameleer or Māya’s dreaming son,
Many swords shall pierce him mingling blood with gall,
But his own disciple shall wound him worst of all.

Let me come away from Arnold’s late materials and see if I can show you anything in such earlier materials as he had not by him.

There is the date of Gotama’s life, as Gotama. Arnold gives only the orthodox Buddhist date, from “about 620 B.C. to about 535,” 83 years. This, taken in conjunction with the tradition of Gotama’s dying so many years before the coronation of Asoka, 269 B.C., and other matters, has made Western scholars place the date some 58 years later. But some 16 years ago, in a cave in Orissa, an inscription was discovered which tends to re-establish the orthodox earlier date. Namely, the two kings (father and son) of Magadha with whom Gotama was, according to all records, contemporary, appear to be too early for this correction to a later date. The earlier date it is true would make Asoka precede the invasion of Alexander the Great by half a century, which is absurd. Hence, if the earlier date be right, the error lies in the Buddhists fixing Asoka’s coronation as 218 years later than the death of Gotama. Some error there has been somewhere; and perhaps it doesn’t much matter. All dates in early Indian culture are so terribly to seek.

But I incline to the earlier date, partly because that “118 years” is a late appearance, of some 600 years after Asoka’s time, hailing from Ceylon, partly because so much had come and gone in changing values before the Buddhist Pali scriptures took their present form, that we do well to keep the things in those scriptures far apart from the Founder’s date, and to see in him an
Indian of the day when the main teaching of the scriptures, called the early Upanishads, had been widely accepted, and was only just in certain points, in certain values, suffering a decline.

I am not going to talk about the now very legend-smothered life of the young laird of the hills (a rajah of the Sakyans was nothing more than that, and it is a little foolish to be harping with Arnold on the title 'prince' and 'king'). Nor about the legend-smothered records of his going forth and of the theatrical assault of Māra, the evil one, under the Bodhi-tree. Like most legends they cannot all be true. A man who is on the verge of becoming, as Buddhists say, 'enlightened' (sambuddha), or as I would say 'willed with a divine mandate to bring new light to men,' would not be aware of any such onslaught of evil, or the daughters of evil, much less disturbed by it for the good reason, that unseen warders would keep far from him all disturbance of the kind. Or, if you prefer it otherwise: there would be such absence of appeal for him in anything of that sort, that he would not be in the least aware of it. Only he can have told of it, and of such a confession we have, in the Canon, only one partial record. Popular fancy and the poets got to work on it; fanciful stories were, alas! not powerless to impress popular fancy and the poets.

Again, a youth who has been reared so 'sheltered' that he does not even recognize an aged, a sick, a dead man, when seeing these in his drives, cannot well be the youth who, in the legends, is accustomed to display his sporting and athletic skill before a crowd, or sit by his father when the latter is functioning as a magistrate, and hearing his people's woes and quarrels.

1 Saṃyutta-Nikāya, Māra Section.
I have but this to say about one of the legends and the teaching mission that followed. The legend of the three drives takes almost the form of a ballad, in the Canon too; and this in a way rationalizes, for our literary culture, the peculiar form they take. The Canon also presents the old, the sick, the dead man elsewhere as three deva-messengers, that is, warnings from those who will judge each person as he passes at death, that a man waste not his time or means with what is unworthy. And for me there is this amount of historical truth in the legend: the young laird was, like all wise young things, inquiring into life's mysteries, and in particular, as one who expected one day to be himself a superlaird over his fellow Sakyan rajahs and subjects, into the troubles of man’s common lot. He would will to become a wise and effectual ruler in the future. And yet, when he is in the Canon represented as musing over those troubles:—“Alas! the world is fallen on evil! One is born, one ages, one dies:—where is a way out to be found?”—he is not shown asking: How can I help them to become better men and women? And we sit up and ask, was such a man fit to be the founder of a new religion? To make old age, sickness, death at least less of an ordeal for folk is surely doctor’s work; that is the work of science, the work of philanthropy, not the mandate of a Saviour. It is spiritual health that religion is concerned withal, not with the body and its wearing out, or the mind, which is our name for the ways in which we exercise part of our bodies. It is we, not body or mind, who are the true patients for a new religious cure.

And this has led me to wonder whether there may not have preceded Gotama’s youth some terrible
visitation such as India knows too well, and not India alone: earthquake (earthquakes are such a frequent feature in Sutta inventions), plague, famine, fire, war. Mankind usually takes the bodily handicaps in its stride, resignedly, seeking for them no miraculous or revealed intervention. Save only when one of them suffers so much more through some visitation of force majeure, that men cry out in anguish at the unbearable. Such was the effect of ruthless civil wars in Japan in the 7th century A.D., when Honen taught in a revival, in a cult mixed of Shinto and Buddhism, of Jodo, the Pure Land, awaiting them who clung in faith to the holy name of Amida. I do not lay weight on this supposition of mine, because there is no evidence of such a calamity before Gotama's day.

But that on which I do insist is, that it is doing this great Pioneer a wrong to make him carry these early medico-philanthropic musings over into his real gospel, and see in that just a release from old age, illness and death; just a matter of bodily betterment.

It is true, that when we see him bringing out a new scheme of teaching to a few friends as a basis of a gospel which would appeal to the India he knew, there appears suddenly in the middle a tidy fourfold category about the nature, cause, stopping and means of stopping ills. The four so-called 'truths' have a suspicious look of having been carefully edited, yet I am not for rejecting reference to a combating of ills, so as to get Well, as having formed the conclusion of the genuine part of the plan. But there is this about them. Had the ejection of bodily ills, or indeed of any ills remained with Gotama, as the real theme of his gospel, he would have given the four the first place in his scheme as the main theme, and not where and as we find it. When
in this theme the word ‘ills’ (dukkha) is defined, the wording breaks down rather badly as being unworthy of a gospel for man’s spiritual help. The three: age, illness, dying, come first, then more mental ill, that is defeated desire. Moreover, the cause of ills is said to be strong desire, literally thirst (tanha); but the fact that without will, yea, strong will, man will not get well, get rid of ill:—that is, by these four, quite passed over. We only get ‘will’ called by the bad name of thirst or craving, and no other reference made to it, to the very essential self-expression of the live, the active man; the will, without which he is a mere drifter on the current of fate. And so much did Buddhism become hag-ridden by dukkha or ill, as its main basic tenet, that we find ‘thirst’ is valued as bad, because, through it, those three bodily ills were brought about and prolonged.

We must look elsewhere for the really great mandate that was eventually laid upon him—laid upon him when, in his ‘grand tour’ (I think it was nothing more than that for him at first) he realized, that to preside over the Sakya clan on his return was not to be his destiny, but something much greater.

What do we gather from the fragmentary records of his six years of wandering studentship? What did he find that man was then in religion seeking, needing a new, a ‘more’-word about?

I put what I believe he found under four heads, four which are for me more true than the so-called four truths, or, more accurately, more real than the four real things (satyāni):—

(i) that man, in being, is more truly to be called becoming;
(ii) that man wills his becoming, not by passing out of life, but in and by life in many worlds;

(iii) that man needs a Guide greater than himself, yet not external to himself;

(iv) that man has to ward, to protect his fellow-man as 'becoming' along with him, a warding which is not confined to men on earth only.

_How do I come by these four?_ Take the last first: the mutual warding of man by man. And remember always that, in very old scriptures like the so-called Pali MSS., we must not place our trust in what is written down as officially important—it took a long time to come by that. Such statements are like the Nicene Creed, the Athanasian Creed in Christian prayerbooks. We must of course keep an eye on what is recorded, but especially on what is recorded as it were in a more or less accidental yet quite natural way; recorded and—passed over.

We find Gotama seeking instruction after leaving home from one man and then another who trained in what India called Jhana. This word means a quiet concentrated brooding, or musing—not one of our words fits well—a holding oneself alert and intent, without letting either one's external world or one's inner world take up the attention. If you have ever gone in for psychic training you may see the object of this. Probably your trainer will have somewhat darkened the room, just to keep off distraction through surrounding objects. He may then have uttered some little prayer or serious saying to help banish frivolity, or to call for help. Then there may or there may not be holding of hands, as you sit quite quiet and at ease, but attend: you wait and see, or you wait and listen,
or both. Then either he or you will perhaps be able to say what comes to be seen or heard or both.

Now it was so to hear and see the abnormal, the supernormal, in a way, not of licence but of edification, that India once practised Jhāna. It took me a long time to find this out, for no other writer had found it out, nor did the prescribed formulas for Jhāna in any literature guide me, so utterly had the real old values seem to have died out. But evidence was furnished by the Pali scriptures, evidence more crucial than contributive only. I have given this evidence in more than one book, but scholars and Buddhists still fight shy of the subject. None who write as yet studies the canonical books sufficiently.

Neither of the two Jhāna-teachers Gotama resorted to seems to have taught, that through Jhāna a better way of living could be learnt, or a way of helping the fellow-man. Gotama tried the austerities of the Jainist new Society, but judged he weakened his body thereby to no good purpose. A better way of living spelt health and sanity, not a hurting of man's instruments. But there is no word in his first utterances of making his message dependent on the helping of the fellow-man. That it was closely concerned with how a man lived is evident from the charter spoken to his disciples before touring as missionaries: they were to teach the Godly training to both devas and men. But the morals of his day consisted rather, as in most of our Ten Commandments, in avoiding what should not be done. And it is quite incidentally that we find him reproving monk-disciples for neglecting to tend sick comrades.

Another precious fragment in two books shows him allying himself with the great ethical basis taught in
the current Brahman teaching. That said, "Dearest of all is to me the indwelling God; others are dear to me because That is also in them." We find Gotama endorsing this with the words: "Since so dear to each is that God dwelling within, let each see to it that he harm not the other man" (in whom was also That).

I can hardly think he stopped there. His life was such an example of going further by deeds rather than by words.

Still going backward, we come to my third real or true thing: that man needs a Guide greater than, but not external to himself. In pre-Buddhist teaching India said—we still say it too much—that which is perfect IS, IS once for all, does not need change, cannot change. See the danger here for man in immanent theism. He was told That Art thou; art here and now, art already. If it was an uplifting idea, as it certainly was and is, it was also one that tended to be paralysing. Knowing, realising was held sufficient to make a man safe as to eternity. No need was there any more for him "to shrink away from That," as the teachers said.

Yet what a difference all the time between this wonderful potency in the man, and the man as he lived, handicapped by earth-body, earth-mind. All the difference, as we can now say—India could not put it into words—between the "potential" and the "actual." What was really needed was not to go on Being but to go on Becoming, a Becoming which would take a very devil of a time, since the better a man became, the better would his notion of perfect Being become. Lives, many, many lives here and elsewhere were needed of brave effort, of ever new-born will.
And guiding help, wiser than that of fallible man was needed.

Now there was a word India here could use, better than what we have, meaning just 'ought to be borne,' borne in mind, borne out in action. This was dharma. We come near it when we say duty, or conscience or ideal. And we find Gotama (twice) recorded as virtually substituting dharma for the divine Self, before he began to teach. "If a man greatly longs for the Great Self he should worship dharma, as I do."¹

In this new ideal we see the static Being, dangerous in the Self-concept, transformed into a dynamic ideal of a Better, of Becoming a Better. And this we get in the Indian idiom of "walking according to dharma," for so, the Buddhist scriptures say, "Dharma guards the man." And so we get here the idea, known to other scriptures, of Deity as the inner Guide: "Lead us, heavenly Father, lead us." "Be Thou my Guardian and my Guide."

My first and second real things I have now anticipated. But I must say in a few words how the records of Gotama's beginnings as a teacher show him, in these too, as a Pioneer.

That man is more truly becoming than being is emphasized very early in some Canonical records thus: To the question whether things really are or whether they really are not, he is said to have answered, Neither. What then? Then, alas! for his decision, we find a church-made formula about how ills come to be. This is scarcely the clear answer of a wise pioneer. But if we pull the formula to pieces, we find it is all about how things become, come to pass, because

¹ Samyutta-Nikāya, Brahmā section; Anguttara-Nikāya, the 'Fours.'
of some other thing, and that the word 'Becoming' is in the middle, in a rather superfluous function, as merely one factor when all is about 'becoming.' Just the same thing happens when he is asked: Is the doer of deeds here the same man as he who reaps hereafter their result, or a different man? Neither, is the reply, the man will have been becoming, between deed and result. Here too the wretched formula smothers the reply. So hard is it to find the great pioneer underneath.

Once more, when he hesitates about beginning the strenuous life of a pioneer, dreading lest what he had thought of saying would never catch on with Everyman, he has a vision of a deva entreat ing him to teach—what? Just 'dharma,' but the word came to have as wide a meaning as our religion. He is told, whereas mankind was perishing, they, when they learnt his dharma, "will become." And then pondering over this, Gotama sees, physically or mentally, how in a tank waterlilies are at all stages of growing in bud beneath the water, rising and expanding to the surface, opening their lovely faces above the water—why, even so were all men, was every man. And forth he went God-inspired to teach man the great new gospel of man, the innately divine, growing as he lived, and through his living, to the full stature of his Divinity.

Lastly, how did he do this? This is my second real thing: He said (as recorded): Each of you has before you a Road along which it is yours to travel. This wasn't new. Not very long before a great teacher has this recorded of him:—

Scarce visible and old there lies a way
That touches me, e'en me, is found by me. . . .
But of how to wayfare on it that teacher said too little. Gotama said: Choose your road: not the course of unrestrained impulses, not the course of too many harsh rules; choose the middle road (meaning thereby one where man's will has play but is regulated). So wayfaring, will you come to the thing you seek, to your artha. A little later we find him telling men the thing they should seek was the Self, a terribly misunderstood word. The ideal Self, the Spirit, the inner Guide, we can now see he meant. And with those two great words, great as India of his day understood them: Self and Dharma, standing out in the last things he is said to have said, we can round that great Pioneer's life into a lovely whole.

Ātmā the ideal self, dharma the divine monitor, artha the quest for the End, marga the way leading to that End, herein lay the stepcutting of this mighty Pioneer.

So far as India became Buddhist it followed this great wayman in at least one way: the way of bringing conduct into religion. The Way was so intimately bound up in the older tradition with more worlds than just earth, that the teaching of the immense importance, in a man's conduct, for his future well or ill being runs right through the Canon. Men were incited to do this, not do that, not because in itself the one was lovely, the other ugly, but because of the consequences. It is curious to hear Buddhists claiming that their religion is above such considerations. It is so untrue! And (since conduct involves intercourse) moral considerations, though not newly taught in Buddhism, took on an emphasis unknown before, hampered only by the fact that, in the growing monasticism which took over the Gotamic teaching, the importance of human relations became practically
limited to those of teacher-pupil and friends, the family counting, in monk-life, for next to nothing.

But Gotama’s central teaching: that man is not being but becoming, and that this *becoming is of many worlds*, and that it is a personal choice or act of will, and that the Way or Road or Wayfaring is the great symbol of becoming:—all this suffered terribly under monasticism. Of these things I have spoken elsewhere, still am speaking elsewhere.

Let us leave our subject with this reflection. The Pioneer, the Footer, the Man of the Waymaking makes our own wayfaring clearer to us who come after. That he is also a Pioneer to other Pioneers who follow in due time in due place, this Buddhists have ever acknowledged. They do not perhaps acknowledge, as he would, that his work *has been carried on* by other great Pioneers, nay, will be carried on by Pioneers yet to come, but in ways they, we too, do not see.

As a pendant to the institutional name ‘Buddha,’ the following item, published in the *J.R.A.S.* for 1933, may be of interest.

**BUDDHA OR SUDDHA?**

There is in the Fours section of the Fourth Collection of the Pali Canon a Sutta unique in form entitled *Loké.* (This is possibly a Magadhese nominative, not a Pali locative; meaning ‘the world,’ rather than ‘in,’ or ‘as to the world.’) It opens with a legendary reference to the footmarks held to be made by little wheels on the soles of a ‘super-man.’ Doṇa, a brahmin has it seems been led by these to where Gotama of the Sakyans is seated alone, and he asks of the latter, how he expects to be reborn, lit. to ‘become.’
The reply is to the effect that he will not be reborn as X, Y, or Z, because, just as a lotus gets no smear from contact with water, so he has got no smear from contact with the world, and "therefore am I buddho," lit. wise or awakened. So the verses in the latter part; the preceding prose is in keeping with this, but, for the last clause, has a different emphasis: "consider me as buddho!"

I suggest it is here more likely that the word buddho, in older, if not original versions of the Sayings, was suddho: pure, clean. Certainly the context calls for it, in a way it does not call for 'awake' or 'wise,' much less for an honorific title. The association too of suddho, suddhi, with not spiritual purity only, but with salvation itself, in both Vedic and Pali literature, is well known.

But the Suttas, in getting sorted together on some revisional occasion, may conceivably have borrowed from juxtaposition, oral and aural, if not yet in written order. And the Sutta preceding this one ends with verses ascribing repute among men in a man possessed of four qualities. As such he is said to be "buddho, in his last body, very wise, great man."

I hold it likely that a reverberation from this may have affected the present Sutta. And, in the growing Buddha-cult (of which the records of the First and Second Councils show no trace), it is possible, that a personal ascription to himself of the term buddho by the founder may have been judged to be a much more edifying way of teaching than to observe a careful congruity with the context, and to be also a more up-to-date predication.

A somewhat similar preference for edification over congruity is suggested by our own long acquiescence
in the rendering: "Search the scriptures . . ." (John v, 39) for "Ye search the scripture . . . yet ye will not come to me . . ." as now adopted in the Revised Version.

Conceivably the shifting from sūddho to buddho here may not, for many bhāṇakas (repeaters), have been the jolt with the context there seems for us to be. The compound sūḍḍha-buddhi is not unknown in Sanskrit literature.\(^1\) Anyway it is not a clerical error that we are here up against. It is rather the need of giving fuller verbal expression to the growing value in the supermanhood of the founder. No one yet knows when this began to find expression in such words as tathāgato and buddho.

\(^1\) Böthlingk and Roth refer to a work here as Ashtav., whatever that may be.
XLII

HOW HE TAUGHT MAN THE WAY¹

You will have learnt that Gotama the Sakyan, who came later to be called Buddha, used to speak of the way, the way leading or going to uttermost welfare. But you may not have been asked to consider a few interesting points about it. I would here put them before you.

The first point is, that the Way was used as a symbol of something which travelling along a way strongly suggests. The second is, that the goal of the journey along the way was the positive word *artha*, which is “what you finally reach” or attain, and which also means “what you need.” The way is the means to that. The third point is of a critical kind, and concerns the form of words in which the Way is usually taught in both speech and writing. For instance, for this great symbol of our life, considered not as of earth only, or as of once on earth only, but of our life as a whole, the meaner word Path is still used. Path is also less fit, because *Marga*, way, stands, as it does with us, for means, as well as for road. And there are many more things to say about the ‘way’ of teaching the Way, which belong to the history of this very old teaching. This history we must ever have at back of our mind, for about an old teaching there are many dead and dying things clinging, even though the teaching be, at the heart of it, true for all time and every

¹ Published in *The Hawaiian Buddhist Annual*, Honolulu, 1931. 491
place. But here and now we can put point three on one side.

Perhaps a good way of considering point one is to look for records showing the Man of the Way talking about the Way in helping his fellowman. That *hardly any such talks have survived* is a fact and a sad one, for it hints at those entanglements grown up about the real teaching of this great Son of Man which are so plain in those records. But here is one talk which, save for some entangling stuffing which has got into it, really points to a very old wording. It can now, that is, since 1925, be read in an English version, in Mr. F. L. Woodward’s translation for the Pali Text Society; and yet I dare to say, that not one in every hundred thousand calling themselves Buddhists has ever read the story in any language. It is in the Saṃyutta-Nikāya, in the Khandhāyatana-Saṃyutta—not at all the right place for it; it should be in the Magga-Saṃyutta of the Mahā-vagga—and it is called just “Tissa.” In the English translation, it is in vol. 3 of the *Book of the Kindred Sayings*, p. 90.

Tissa is of the Sakyen Order; he is a cousin of the Founder, having doubtless followed him some time after it was started, as did Ānanda, Devadatta and other Sakyen rājas, that is lairds or land-owners of the Sakyen oligarchy. And poor Tissa is feeling bad; he is, from what he says, bilious, and depressed and fed up with the *brahmachariya* (the God life), and perhaps hankers after life with his folk in the Northern hills, and would fain leave Sāvatthī. They tell his cousin and Chief, who sends for him, and to whom Tissa is made, in the usual fixed way of wording, to repeat his troubles.

There then comes a very “stock” set of catechizing
about his body and mind, reasonable as subject for a healer, but so worded, in a quite general, standardized setting, as to be fit only for a manual, not for a great Helper out to help, not a "set," but "you" and "you." We can cut it out, as belonging to the way in which little memorized Sayings, which were all that had been remembered, got into fixed word-frames when, long, long afterwards, monastic editors were wanting to make up sermons, and yet later, to write these spoken things down in manuscripts.

The Way talk then begins, quite abruptly, and not as led up to by the monkish paragraphs interposed about "the five khandhas":

"Suppose, Tissa, there were two men, one skilled in wayfaring, the other not. And the second asked the first for advice; and the first were to say: The way, good man, is thus: Go on for a little and you will see it fork in two ways; leave the left, take the right. Go along for a while, and you will see a dense jungle; go through it for a while and you will see a low swamp; go by it for a while and you will see a steep precipice; go on for a while and you will see a level region, a delightful district. . . ."

"Now all this is my parable to show your welfare, your goal. And what is that?"

Here again we come up against the later editing work, put in to make good, with monkish ideals, what had been forgotten, or gradually changed in telling. The very word for "goal, welfare," attha, had then come to be changed to just "meaning." But in the first public Utterance of the Founder, and indeed sometimes afterwards, we see the older meaning in use. That goal, to be won by wayfaring, undaunted by all that you came up against in life, but ever persisting in
getting onward, as "dhamma" (that is, the urging of the Best that you were) prompted you, was the consummation of the Man that you are. This was the best religious teaching in India when the Sakyamuni began his mission. It was taught by brahmin teachers to their pupils, but he wanted to bring that teaching out into highway and byway, to Everyman. Many brahmins joined him; his leading co-workers were nearly all brahmins. Nor in the records where he disputes with brahmins is there ever any dispute about this perfecting the Manhood which was also the Godhead within.

And the long slow perfecting was called just "becoming," coming-to-be (Bhava), by steady sustained effort of will. They had no word for will, and that was a great handicap. But they very much used "becoming," a word which tells us of this experience; that if we truly desire the Better, and in our life carry out that desire, we surely come to be what we were not before. We wayfare in a Way of the More towards the Most. The Most is so wonderful, that we cannot as yet even conceive it, but we shall gradually do so, in our becoming. Not here for sure; but without our bit of becoming here and now, our bit of the Way just before us done, we shall not get on by so much towards the Goal.

Now for the end of the little story, in which I think we have a glimpse of the beloved Helper. Whether he laid his hands on Tissa's shoulders, or made other gesture we know not. But of a sudden the telling of the Way ends, and he says literally this:

"Be of good cheer, Tissa! Be of good cheer, Tissa! I with counsel . . . I with upholding . . . I with teaching . . ." And that is all.
We have clearly here either words dropped out by scribes, or a very elliptical idiom. I believe we have both; not much dropping out, but the surviving, in the fragments, of a most vivid memory of a teaching mainly by look, by gesture, by tone of voice, by transferred living will. And as to idiom, we have only to add the one little word *kim*, "what," before *aham*, "I," and we get this well understood meaning: *What need have I to...*

Do you not now see how, from the buried years, there comes to us a very shout of joyous comradeship in the vista of the Way, a cry from one wayfarer to a brother wayfarer: "*Be of great joy, my lad!* (See what lies ahead! See all the More in life there is to come for you! See what you can be doing to win it for and in yourself!) *What need have I to exhort? What need have I to uphold? What need have I to teach?*

Is there not in such a picture of vivid life and ardent will something much more in keeping with the vision of the Man of the Way than is the later monk-valued figure of the rigid immobile perpetual Sitter? Far forward will he have gone now, even to Way's End, to its Paramattha. And for us the Way yet to go is very long. Yet the Way is here as well as there, now as well as then. And Becoming is of us too, as much in our very nature as it was, nay is, in his. For children of the Wayfaring through the worlds, "*I'll*" has once for all ceased to be Central. We are as those Greek soldiers who, long errant, came at last upon a vista of the sea and its innumerable laughter. They did not call out No more land! They shouted The sea, the sea! They looked ahead. That was the right spirit of the Way. ¹

¹ I now incline to think the 'What need have' is a less probable rendering than the emphasized 'I.' This emphasis is characteristic of him, and here it emphasizes also the comradeship in wayfaring.
THE WORDING AND THE MAN

There came to me the other day a day-dream. I was aware of a man standing before me. He was dressed as a man of active life might have been dressed in our mid-Middle Ages. He was fair; his eyes were beautiful; his countenance shone with good will. Here, one felt, is a brother-man. He spoke to me at some length in very simple words, in a wording not wholly as we speak. And this is the substance of what he said:

I (he said 'we' where we would say 'I') am a very worder to you of things I well remember. I am one of the very men who was with Gotama whom men call Buddha. I was of his company, his order. I was in his friendship, in his ardent will, in his work, in his new word. I left my teacher to walk with him, because I heard he had a Way to show men, and I wanted a way, a way by which I might live, a way which would lead me beyond worries and woe, a way to the happy worlds, the deathless worlds. When I knew him, it became for me a way to where the man himself would be, so dear he was to me. I had been in the world of the sceptics, the lively world of the wordy, where there was ever arguing whether anything was truly worded or not. They were very wordy word-worders; they never worded work, they never worded Way, they never worded the Life.

1 Published in the Buddhist Chronicle, Colombo, May, 1925.
I was with that Gotama in His work. He was a man of few words. He spoke to touch the will. He spoke of what this man or that man needed to be in the way of his true welfare. He worded the worried, the wilful, the worldly, the will-less, the blind, the ailing, the wordy. He was not a preacher of sermons. Wordy talks are put into his mouth. That was not his way. He was a will-healer. He would take our hands, our arm, and will us to be the very liver, not the talker. He would talk to the man in us, the woman in us. I was no lively worder myself. I was of silent habit, word-worried by that other teacher. I wanted will; I wanted way. I found both. I spoke more then, for I had him and his way to talk about. I wanted to tell others of the life he lived, and how the way to safety hereafter was the very worthy life here.

I was not with him till he went. I was not old, but world-worn and I passed to other worlds grieving to leave him. When after other lives I was once more a monk, I took part in the lively doings at Patna, when the men of the church were making the word-wording of the teaching very much as you now have it. My work was to learn a portion of the new wording, the wording so worded as to be easier to learn and remember. There had come to me memories of my first life in the Order, and I found that the wording was not what I could remember it was at first. I said that the way in which I worded the sayings was the truer way. But I was not a man of high standing, and I was a worry to them, and was bidden to change nothing. One saying I was given was that on the wood. Now the body and mind were not 'you,' just as the faggots borne away were not the wood. But I remembered the first teaching said, you are the wood;
yet this was left out. I was very loth to learn after this sort. But the monks had willed the wording to suit the notion they had worded about the man. Now Gotama had been man-healer, man-willer, man-worder. His teaching I had fain worded, but I was helpless.

So I left the Order and worked in the world wordless and unwarded by it. It happened long after, that I was on earth in the West, as a Roman legionary, just where men of the Christians were writing down what was repeated as the sayings of Jesus. They were worthy men and friendly with me. But the very truth was not what they sought. They were heedful that the wording should suit their own views. I stirred them up to set down the true and only that, but they were vexed and bade me not to interfere. I found that the better among the Christians were not the worders, but the livers of the brother-life, the service-life Jesus had taught. They it was who were the friends to all, who warded, who cared for all. They were not priests nor monks; just world-men. They were as my brothers.

In another later earth-life I was the uncle of Mohammed in Arabia. I learnt his words, I lived them. But I worked as a merchant travelling in Egypt and Palestine often. We did not write down his words. We worded them after him. He was not a wordy man. He would utter a few word-willing sayings. He was eager that women, who were little heeded, should be the warders of men, the mothers of minds as well as of bodies. He was most earnest to word Allah as Willer; and that the right will for men to will was as Allah willed and that they should seek so to will by prayer direct to Allah. But when he was ill, much worry came to me, for I found that his worders were
wording his sayings not as he spoke, but as they were inclined to word them. I told them this was wrong, but they would not listen, and I was sad.

Now would I send this little message to the thoughtful men of Ceylon. They are now studying more than before, for themselves, those old books their Scriptures. Let them put away from themselves that they are reading the Word of the Buddha. Let them see in those books the word of the Church, not the word of the Church's first teacher. They will find them the wordy, word-made, monk-made word about a teaching that had been mainly forgotten in its wording, long before it was written down, long before it was set in its wording. It is the work of a monk-world. It is not all the food we of the new world need to guide us in willing and in working for the well of the whole earth as world-brothers. There is not anywhere in the books the words Will and Well. There is the word Worthy, the word Way. But there is no teaching that the man the Willer is worthy who walks in the way to his, to all men's Well. It is in the world, and not in the old books that they will find that Way to the Well to be Willed by Willers.

Lo! I am now of them who are the well-willers of the worlds.
We will the well of men.
We will the well of the man, the man who uses body or mind but is not either.
We will the well of each man and woman in Ceylon.
We will well in the Will of the Willer of Well.

Note. By 'Well' understand 'Welfare.'
THE SO-CALLED EIGHTFOLD PATH

It is a wonderful thing that, in so old a gospel as what came later to be called Buddhism, we should, in the imperfect records about the birth of that gospel, find as much as we do about the inner and outer struggles going on in the man who founded it. How much would we not give to have even that much in the inner conflict Jesus may have gone through, before his New Word took shape for him! We have not nearly as much as the Buddhist scriptures have preserved for us, even though this took place some six centuries earlier, where and when written records were not yet made.

In the deeply moving hesitation scene—few, if any but I, call it so—the Founder came to a decision, we are told, by a double event: by the visitation of a deva, and by a pool of lotuses showing all stages of growth. Somehow this double picture is never made really significant by books on the subject. I make no exception here of my own works, save only those of the last few years. I was dominated by what scholars had said (or left unsaid). But whence has come this lack of insight?

I think it has come from three causes. The first is the tendency to see in the Founder so much the Rationalist among great teachers, that episodes bring-

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¹ A (revised) lecture to the Theosophical Society, London Headquarters, 1937, the subject being by request.
ing in what is called the supernatural are glided over as so much added legend. The second cause is a mistranslation in the plea put into the mouth of the *deva*. The third cause is, that the central figure of the teaching having been a 'Way, Road or Path, the lotuses have been lost to view. And these three causes have together sufficed to divert attention from what I have called the Hesitation scene, and transfix it on the ensuing issue of that chart of the new teaching miscalled the first sermon, its traditional name being 'the setting a-rolling the wheel of religion.'

Now this threesfold defaulting is a lamentable thing, causing us to lose to a great extent the real significance of the New Message, and to see in it practically only an ethical reform. It was that, but it was very much more. Men in religious orders have written often about the beginning of Buddhism, but, in that they have had to derive information from first-hand scholars, they have not insisted sufficiently that, from the ethical materials handed out to them, no great world-religion could have sprung. They have seen no significance in the vision or the message. They have not connected message with lotus-growth.

I have done what I could to make good my own want of vision. On the one hand I have maintained during this decade that, had the Founder's teaching been rightly handed down, we should see it as the greatest liaison set up by any religion between the things that are seen and those that are unseen. I have, to the best of my judgment, rectified the mistranslation in the *deva's* message. And I have given reasons why the lotus figure, though it found echoes in the teaching, was well superseded by the yet more needed figure of the Way. Here and now I will confine myself to this
third cause: the superseding the lotus figure by that of the Way.

I believe that Gotama called Buddha chose to figure life—not here only, but life in each man taken whole—as a Road, a Journey, because of the urge he felt to show man’s nature, not as the involuntary evolution of seed into fullgrown plant, but as a work in the exercise of will. The wayfarer, the traveller must be taken worthily—I mean, not as a drifter, not as a sheep, or man marshalled under orders, but as one out to get somewhere by choice of the Better, not the worse Way. And this is why he chose the figure of Magga or Road.

It was not a new figure. Before him, in old Persia, the two Ways had been held up to man. Before him, Yājñavalkya, the brahmin teacher, had spoken of a Way to the goal, calling it path: panthā, rather than magga or road:

Scarce visible and old there lies a path,
that touches me, e’en me, was found by me.
thereon the wise, whose is the Brahmalore,
fare onward to the world of light, and there
are utterly released. . . .

But for Yājñavalkya it was a passing vision; it was not the key to all his teaching. Nor is there any clear suggestion of choice exercised. Nor does he say what, in man’s life, is the significance of showing salvation as a path. Goal is there, as centuries later it was in Newman’s hymn, where is some mention of what the way consisted in:

Then let my way appear
Steps unto heaven;
All that Thou sendest me
In mercy given,
So by my woes to be
Nearer, my God, to Thee. . . .
In Newman we see something of what was exercising Gotama; something that came in with Jesus: will is there; man’s will placing itself inside the Divine Will: “If a man will to do his will, he shall know of my teaching, whether it be of God, or whether I speak for myself.” (John vii).

Here we are looking at something clearly expressed, because there was a word for it: the word, noun and verb, for will:—

ean tis thelē to thelēma autoũ poiein . . .

But Gotama had no such strong fit word.

There had been the strong word kāma (desire, not karma, action), but it was degenerating, as happens to words, into meaning sensuous, even sensual desire. Manas (mind), once meaning as much ‘will’ as ‘mind,’ was being pre-empted for the new psychology which scholars call proto-Sāṅkhya, to mean grouped sense-perception, and lumped together with other words (chitta, viññāna) as meaning just ‘thought.’ Samkappa, purpose, was tending to mean not pure will, but will emerging in action, not that inner urge which precedes both thinking and purpose.

You may say: the Way-talk we have read, the first “sermon,” speaks of what is virtually choosing; wasn’t there a word for that? If there was, and it wasn’t used, are you not over-stressing will in Gotama’s gospel?

Yes, there was a word for choosing: vṛnoti, but it is not in that context, and oddly enough, it is avoided even where it could and should be used. Where there is definite question of choice, the word ‘take’ or other substitutes are used. The Indian stem-form of will: var-, is used, but either in a negative way for forms
of repression: sam-vara: self-constraint, the willing not to do; or as 'elect' (vara). This in morals and religion is a necessary consideration, but it is insufficient apparatus for a gospel for the Many.

But there are two marked substitutes or makeshifts for 'will' which in early Buddhism appear from the first: forms of words for effort (i.e., modes of using will), and forms of the word to become, or come to be. Into these I have gone elsewhere, nor can I here stay over them, but concerning the former there has lately come within the English reader's reach a translation of a Pali poem called the Lineage of the Buddhas,\(^1\) where is a refrain, characterizing the self-training of such a man, that he passes a term of "striving the striving" (padhānam padahitvāna), a phrase of unique emphasis. And whereas the poem is a relatively late work, it here reveals a tradition, that Gotama was inspired with the need of effort to win to the ultimate goal of life in the worlds, of getting on, of pressing forward and leaving behind, as St. Paul expressed it. And this makes the religious atmosphere of the Suttas different from that of the Upanishads, even though these are records of what was taught to youth.

We now see that the figure of the Road or Way was eminently fitted for such a gospel. Religious life is essentially one of effort and progress, of change into the different, the further, a feature which the superposed epithet of eightfold quality has done much to dull and soften. And the question arises: Was that 'eightfold' quality superposed? and if so, why and when?

I would first say, as a general warning, that a close study of the First or Way-Utterance reveals it as

\(^1\) Sacred Books of the Buddhists, IX, 1938, tr. by Dr. B. C. Law.
something that has, in all probability, been much, not in one feature only, editorially manhandled. It is true that the records tell it was not the public utterance of a teacher, but was spoken as the result of solitary thought and resolve on the part of one man of a group of friends, when he had come back to those friends. And the legend has it that the formal 'becoming a monk' was from the start of the religious mission an essential step. I do not say this is true; I do not think it was. The monk-vocation, as suitable for younger men, being for that day an ominous novelty, probably proved advisable only when longer touring to teach became the rule. Anyway, the new monk-vogue has converted the First Utterance, from being a chart for the teaching of the Many, into a talk by a monk to monks for monks. You may recollect it begins: For one who has 'left the world' there are two ends (or side-issues): one, that he give impulse (i.e., will) full play, the other that he curb it tightly by rule and austerity (such as the new community of Jains was prescribing as essential for all who were religiously earnest). Now no great religion will declare itself as concerned mainly with one section, and that an unpopular one, of the community; it appeals to all.

We are then told, that a better way is the middle way, or mean between these two. *These* do not lead to the Aim or Goal (*atitha*); *that* will do so. Here we have first, that the Goal has become dissociated in words from the middle Way. A fourfold group has got thrust in instead of 'goal'; four terms which, at the beginning, did not amount to attainment, but only to preparation for it. Secondly, we have the middle way qualified as eightfold; not the old Indian and older Persian trinity of good or right thought, word and deed,
but eight consisting of a blend of the three. Thirdly, the figure of the man as chooser, willing and ‘striving’ in the quest of salvation, is blurred by the figure used for him: —*tathāgata*: ‘one thus going,’ being a name that came to be identified with a Founder reckoned as all-wise. He has striven, has chosen and, knowing all about it, is placed as the Model. Fourthly, there follows abruptly a fourfold diagnosis of the nature, cause, expulsion and remedial way, of ‘ill’ (a comprehensive noun and adjective covering all in life that is undesirable), the eightfold road being the remedial course, the word here used being, not ‘road: *magga*, but the ‘step-by-step’: *patipadā*. Lastly follows a sort of autobiography of how the Founder found it all out, ending on the pessimistic note, that the good thing is ‘to be freed,’ freed from the tendency of things to produce so much ‘ill.’

It doesn’t hang well together, this that begins so tersely and wavers out in terms now and then suspiciously sophisticated. One noted scholar called it ‘inorganic.’ Yet the monk-editors through whose mouths these unwritten words—unwritten for perhaps four or five centuries—were passed on, were not untidy thinkers. Give them a purely monkish theme, or, shall I say, monkish points superposed on an older theme, and they will show themselves, in the narrower limits, consistent and tidy. But here was a Saying immensely venerated as belonging to the beginnings of their cult. In it were words they had come to value less: I mean especially the word ‘goal’ or ‘aim’: *attha*, and which, *for them* of a later day, stood for ‘meaning’ as against ‘text’: spirit as against letter. It will have been natural they will have wanted to supplement such a depreciated word by others they
as monks had come to value more. I mean those four: 'enlightenment, higher knowledge, calm, waning out (nirvana).’ As monks, too, they will have ever had to insist on the life in the world as full of 'ill,' if only to justify themselves, not, later, so much as missioners to it, but as refugees from it. Again, their cult will have become, less one of man seeking the growth of the Godhead within him, as was the teaching when the Founder was on earth, and more a deifying of the Founder himself. Way-terms for the man seeking: tathāgata, sugata, had become a monopoly of the Man who had taught. And he had become, in idea, teacher of the Goal as being, rightly expressed, the doctor’s ideal of “the end of ill” (dukkhas’anta), the cause of the ill being considered to be that ‘thirst’ for the things of the world, which they as monks had forsworn. No form of ‘striving’ or of will is set over against ‘thirst’ in this devitalized gospel, telling of progress in the Middle Way. There is worded nothing of that potency of man to become an ever better, higher. It was, on the contrary, stated, at the end of the autobiographical appendix, that supreme freedom lay in ceasing from ‘becoming.’ N’atthi dāni punab-bhavo: there is now no more again-becoming!

Let not this amount for you to a precise damning of spiritual progress as we understand it. The word bhava, when the editors were busy (and from time to time they were very much so, getting their teaching into authorized forms), had come to be used for forms or conditions of ‘becoming,’ such as we can call ‘lives’ and ‘worlds,’ for which there were no adequate plural terms. So that the word punabbhavo would mean ‘more lives here or there,’ lives being by monks mainly looked upon as a being born and dying.
But what a wreck had they not made of the vigour and truth there will have been in the chart Gotama drew up for his teaching! 'Becoming' is what it would appear he taught as true of everything, hence of man: "he is? no; 'he is not?': no; he is becoming." And it would appear that effort in 'becoming,' once we get the passages rightly translated, is ever being prescribed by him. So that I have ventured on a bold speculation, namely, that the original words about the middle way did not call it 'eightfold,' in somewhat pedantic specifying, but called it 'the Way of Becoming': bhava-magga. But bhava coming to be a discredited term, as meaning 'more lives,' it would present itself in the Utterance as an undesirable wording, and, since a qualifying of the word magga was in the tradition, a more desirable substitute of bhava was sought... and found, as better than to say just 'magga, namely, eightfold magga.'

You may say: Surely this is very free guessing to substitute, not another term, but a list of terms! I agree. But it was the scriptures themselves that suggested to me it might have been so. At the end of the groups of Threes in the, I think, oldest Collection: the Fourth (Anguttara), is a group of talks on the Three Ways. In the last, to the question: What is the Middle Way? is given, as alternatives, the List of Lists held to be of the old teaching given by the Founder before his death: 3 of four heads, 2 of five heads, 7 of seven, and 8 of eight heads, the last being the eightfold now linked with the Way. This reply has the appearance, that at one time it was authorized to teach the Middle Way as consisting of any one of these Lists. It is possible that, when opinion was wavering about leaving in or excising bhava- before-
'Way,' these Lists were, so to speak 'on approval' as substitutes. And it came to me, as we say, in a flash, to be placed beside other surmises, pointing to the Way as once taught as something much bigger than a tidy list of ways of thought, word and deed: as a Road of the Worlds, along which each man had, life after life, to wayfare seeking ever the Better on his way to the Best. Was it not said (also in the Fourth Collection), that by 'the Way' it was, that mother and son, parted in this life might hope to meet again? And was not here all but betrayed how, in inserting 'eightfold,' an insertion had been made, the perhaps original "Just this way" (of becoming) being followed by the explanatory "eightfold way"? Was there not also the fact, that we get the eight in the Suttas without Way, and Way also, and at times with greatest emphasis, without 'eightfold'? Was there not also the startling fact, that in the scripture list of eightfold doctrines, there was no mention of the eightfold way, although Way was mentioned under the Threes, and, again under the Tens as a tenfold Way?

One clear thing emerged from all this, and that was, that it was a long time after the birth of Buddhism before the 'Way' became settled as just eight, and not as three-, four-, five-, six-, seven- or ten-fold. This does not make my hypothesis about the qualities coming in as a substitute a fact, but it does show, that the way as "eightfold" may not have been a feature in the "first utterance." It was, as stated there, threefold only. That there was a middle way—that has been retained. It was the way making for the

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1 The context runs: "Ayam eva maggo, attangiko maggo. Anguttara, i, 178. I regret that the excellent translator has overlooked possible significance in this.
Goal (attha) that has been superseded. Hence my hypothesis, that yet something else has been superseded appears as less far-fetched. I leave it at that.

If it be asked, why, out of those alternate lists was the one eightfold category made authentic, it is fairly plain, when the other six lists are considered, that this one of eight, enlarging the ancient triad of the good thought, word, and deed, was best fitted for a teaching suited for both monk and layman.

One day we shall come to know the truth about this. I do not expect that Buddhists of South Asia will not cling tightly to their tidily categorized ‘Path,’ and refuse to accept the broader view of the Way of the Worlds, the Road of Becoming. Only once have I found the writer of one of the Commentaries get, as we say, ‘hot,’ so near is he to ‘Way of becoming.’ This is vaṭṭhanaka-पतिपदाः: ‘the course belonging to growth.’ ¹ ‘Becoming,’ in the form that did not get worsened, the causative, or ‘make-become,’ is often paraphrased by ‘growing.’ And the emphasis on growth (vuddhi), as compared with decay (parihāni) is in Buddhism, from the message given Gotama from the unseen, before he began to teach, to the end of his days, a frequently sounded note.

But Buddhists have lost the original outlook on life taught by their Great Man, that man by right of way is wayfarer in the worlds, and that the Goal (attha) is ‘beyond the worlds’: samparāyika, as their scriptures say. To you in this matter I leave the choice.

¹ Commentary on Majjhima, No. 53, iii, p. 32. Pali Text Soc. ed.
THINGS HE WILL NOT HAVE TAUGHT

In a little book recently published: *What was the original gospel in 'Buddhism'?* I have made positive statements as to what are, for me, the things that Gotama called the Buddha may, by critically weighed evidence, be held to have taught as his essential Message. I have there, incidentally or otherwise, rejected certain teachings now held as orthodox, as neither essentially nor in any way his Message. Here, not incidentally but in a definite catalogue, I would touch briefly on the chief of the teachings I reject as not his.

There is nothing exceptional in world-religions like Buddhism in such critical eclectical decisions. With the advance of higher criticism, that is, of historical criticism, such decisions will be more definitely come to, more freely stated than is now the case. To compare such criticism as has so far been made in Christianity with its like in Buddhism were to compare an adolescent with a babe. But we can, forestalling the future, see that advance in deciding about 'things that will,' and 'things that will not have been taught' by the respective Founders are complicated by the difference in the time-interval before the compilation of authentic written scripture, supplanting that which had been orally taught only. Believers in the superior

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1 Printed in *A Volume of Indian and Iranian Studies. Denison Ross Commemorative Volume*. Poona, 1940.
reliability of a carefully conducted oral transmission may, with a recent writer, point to "the 10,000 variant readings in the New Testament." I would set over against this the book of the 10,000 Vedic Variants, as, pace the respective length of documents, no mean case of pot versus kettle.

I maintain, that an oral thesaurus (with possibly only lists or heads or at most an 'argument', written on metal leaves), which is recorded as having been set down in writing (no mention made of the language) some 350 years, at the shortest reckoning, after the death of the Founder of the religious institution adhering to that teaching, is bound to have come thus to a second birth in a very different world of religious values from that of the Founder. And therein and thereby to have undergone important editorial changes, necessarily exceeding those in scriptures where compilation of a Canon has taken place in less than half that interval.

Here is one important result of this difference in interval. In Christianity the relatively shorter interval prevented the Hebraic environment from affecting the teaching in the New Testament to the extent to which that 'affecting' came to change the institutional teaching of later Christianity:—the doctrine namely of sacrificial expiation. We are able to catch the reminiscences of the life and ministry of the Founder before they had, under the hand of time and changing values, become relatively much altered. That which, in Christianity is reminiscence handed down unwritten during a few generations, has in Buddhism become

2 Vedic Variants, by Bloomfield and Edgerton.
almost purely legendary cult. Time and changing values have been much longer at work. The Man, loyal friend and helper of man, has become a superman, object of awe and worship. The monastic cult grown great has superposed its own outlook, on life as ‘ill,’ on the original message which sought to expand and safeguard the teaching of Immanence current in its day. The analytic cult of the new psychology has seen, in the man who “is That,” just body and mind. The protest against brahmin ritual has come to include protest against all, even the central, brahmin teaching. It was in this environment that the Pali Canon was built up, was finally closed, was finally written down. It is hardly strange that in it we find much, very much more of which we can plead: this and that he will not have taught, than we can find in the Christian Gospels.

For all that, I am not complacently expecting agreement with my ‘Nots,’ any more than with my positive statements as to what Gotama Śākyamuni did teach. I would only, while yet for brief space the light (such as it is, of earth) is with me, have both Ayes and Noes clearly set down, so that I be judged by what I have said and not (as has happened before) by what I have not said.

I sum my ‘Nots’ up under ten things he will not have taught to man about man, and one thing he will not have taught about himself. (I could add others.)

_He will not have taught that_

1. the man, the very man: self, spirit; soul, _puruṣa_ is not real.
2. the very man is but a compound of bodily and mental parts or states.
man was to trust in, depend upon his present, actual self as lamp and refuge.

dhamma had value and reality as code or body of teaching only.

religion was mainly about ‘ill,’ namely, old age, illness, death.

craving as such was to be stopped.

‘leaving the world’ was a higher life than living ‘in’ the world.

causation had religious value as stopping, not as bringing about.

man’s religious concern was mainly with life here and now.

man’s ultimate goal was waning out as man.

Finally—

he will not have taught about himself that he was omniscient or outstandingly ‘Buddha’ (awakened, wise).

These ten, with the 11th, are ranked by Hinayānists (or, if they prefer it Theravādins) as either central tenets, or as important. And it is expressly claimed, by record, or tradition, or both, that “the Buddha taught them.”

I will briefly dismiss the last first. We have in the Second Collection, a categorical repudiation of being omniscient ascribed to Gotama. A man asking: “I have heard it said that you are all-knowing, all-seeing” enlarges on this. The answer is: “This witness is not true; it imputes to me what is false, untrue.”¹ His reply could be supported by such admissions in the Canon, that he hesitates whether he can profitably

¹ Majjhima, No. LXXI.
teach men or not; that he, seeking former teachers, is *informed* from the unseen that they are deceased; that, being asked whence he had knowledge of this or that matter, he is made to say: "A deva told me." It is added (significant addendum): "And I knew it of myself." Again, where he is once recorded as saying: "Think of me as 'buddha,' brahmin" and in the following verse: "hence am I buddha," the context demands, as I have pointed out, that the needed word is, not *buddha*, but *suddha*: purified.\(^1\) I have also elsewhere shown, that, in the records of the first two councils after his death, at the interval of a century between the two, he is not referred to as Buddha.

I come to the ten 'Nots' concerning his teaching. Let us take Nots 1, 2 and 3:—denial of an entity in human personality; acceptance of him as a body-mind complex only; and that this complex was to be its own saviour. These three may be seen and heard as the orthodox Hinayānism of to-day times without number. But the third is more taught now than by the exegesists, it being largely due to European mis-translation which has affected Buddhists of the present day. That which is lacking in all three assertions is *the atmosphere of the religious culture* which was present about the birth of Gotama's message.

When Jesus taught the sonship of every man to a Divine Father, he was bringing to the front of his teaching a background concept of the Old Testament, of some Apocalyptic literature, of Stoic philosophy. The "Have we not all one father? Hath not one God created us?" of the prophet Malachi has many

\(^1\) *Anguttara*, ii, 30. P. T. S. ed. See appended note to article XI.f.
echoes in these teachings, as Paul reminded the Athenians. In the same way, when Gotama began his mission by advising men to seek thoroughly for the Ātmā (spirit, self), and ended it by bidding men live as having the Ātmā for their lamp and refuge, he spoke within the atmosphere of current religious Immanence, using its phraseology. “We worship Brahman as the Ātmā” was the accepted teaching, which Gotama sought “not to destroy but to fulfil.” To the extent that man was to choose the better, the “middle way” in his life, not once, but at every turn is the one item in the teaching that may, at first sight, support the notion of self-saving. But to see in this, not, as it is, the exercise of man’s will in his quest, but the winning of the quest itself, is as bad as to confound ‘conversion’ with final attainment.

Nor is Buddhism in this misconstrued slogan of self-saving logical. It had clearly no such tenet in mind when it set up for the believer the trinity of ‘Buddha, Dhamma, Sangha’ as everyman’s ‘refuge,’ forgetting that the Founder had limited such refuges to two: Ātmā, and Dharma—“and no other,” among the last words ascribed to him. It has not only changed the first of his two refuges, putting ‘Buddha’ in the place of his ‘Ātmā,’ it has added a third to the two, namely, Sangha.¹

Further, Buddhism has committed another logical absurdity about the man or self. Because the Second Utterance enjoins that he be not identified with either body or mind, it has concluded that therefore ‘he’ does not exist. As if, as I have said, we were to pass over boatswain and purser, in seeking the captain, and say: Then there’s no captain. The Founder himself

¹ The gloss about the Sangha is obvious in the Anguttara.
is shown recognizing the absurdity. In an overlooked saying,¹ he is shown reminding a debater that you cannot recognize as king-judge one who disposes of his subjects' life and fortunes, and at the same time see in him a mere subject. He is a more than they.

Buddhists cannot have it both ways. Either they are wrong, or their scriptures make the Master contradict himself. Nor must we forget that in their numerical lists of titles of doctrines, the apparently oldest of these lists² does not mention the title, under its Fives, of the five groups (khandhas) into which body and mind came to be divided. Nay, it is fairly clear, from another canonical saying, that at one time the 'five' included the very man, thus: body, three mental functions and the experiencer through these (vinnāna), invisible but very real.³

I have tried to show elsewhere, how we see here the way in which—much as with Europe in our own age—the new psychology or proto-Sāṅkhya was causing the growing Buddhism to lose touch with the Brahmanic teaching of Immanence, and to concentrate, not on the Man, but on his instruments.

In the fourth Note:—the original place in the teaching of 'dhamma'—the new foreground detaches itself somewhat from the older background of Immanence. But only to this extent. Gotama, in speaking of man as longing for the Great 'Ātmā,' declares himself a worshipper of 'dhamma.' This word was no new term in his day, but it corresponded rather to the concept of propriety in conduct: the 'what is done, is not done.' He saw in it the higher force, the more

² Cf. Art.: LVII.
³ Anguttara, iii, Pañcakanipāta. Cf. below, Article L.
dynamic ethic, of what ought to be, or not to be done. He virtually equated it with the antaryāmin of the Upaniṣads, the ‘conscience’—“ay, that Deity within my bosome”—of our own time and place. It was this that he is shown naming as his sole successor, not the externalized code of teaching which it became. Nor do I find anything in Hinayāna justifying a modern tendency to look on dhamma as cosmic law, a tendency possibly due (?) to the newer attention that is being given to Mahāyāna. Dhamma is only rightly rendered as ‘law’ in the sense of conscience as a ‘law unto one’s self.’ Early Buddhist poetry calls it a man’s ‘best of wayfarers.’ (The seeing in the word a Leibnitzian monad is a metaphysical emergence a thousand years later than the day of Gotama.) Midway between those two dates we find it, in the Pali books, as applied to religion in general: thus “what is this dhamma by which your disciples, being comforted, see in man’s inclination the basis of the godly life?’ As if the word had come to stand for religion with the growth of men’s seeing in religion a mockery were it not ‘lived.’

In numbers five to ten we see a certain emphasis due to the steady growth of monasticism, beginning in Gotama’s day and gaining strength so much that it transformed that earlier background into his own back-and-foreground. If we, to get truth through sympathy, assume the monastic ideal that life as layman is “the low thing” so-called in Buddhist scripture of life, as leading even at its best to material welfare here and an otherwise material welfare hereafter, with no term set to recurrence of death—if we then create

1 Shakespeare, The Tempest.
2 Theragāthā, ver. 303-6.
3 Dīgha, iii, 40.
a teacher of the ideal that a distaste for, and renunciation of life, as we know it, is best, we shall then be able to accept these six Nots as very much what we should expect such a teacher to say. We should not, with the teacher, be seekers, more than are most laymen. But not if he were a Christian monastic! Why? Because in the Buddhist teacher's case, two conditions would bend him in another direction. He would not, with the Christian, be seeking more than most laymen, "a better country, that is an heavenly." He would be bent aside by the rupture with Brahmanic Immanence and by the new psychology. All living, the 'heavenly' too, would be to him 'ill' (dukkha). He was not out to "seek another country." He was out so to live as hereafter no more to experience being born, living, dying 'in' or of any world, but to win to an indescribable state, indescribable save that it was one of "supreme happiness." To do that he would have to persist as a happy 'man'; but in so far as he identified 'man' with mere body and mind, there must be an outgrowing of such manhood. For this, nirvana, the new, the later summum bonum, was truly a wan ing out, attainable only when the age-long wayfaring in many lives, many worlds was consummated. But the Christian monk would cheerfully look forward to further wayfaring in that "better country."

But he would have this notion of 'ill' better conceived than was the case of the Buddhist monk. He would make little of bodily and psychological 'ill': old age, illness, mental worry, dying, birth. For him 'ill' would spell mainly or solely the spiritual Less which he sought to improve in a spiritual More. For the Buddhist monk, it was the former class of ills.

1 Ep. Hebrews, xi, 16.
which are avowedly called dukkha. Spiritual disease does find mention, but rarely. He sang:

    Like forest fires behold them drawing nigh:
    Death and disease, decay, dread trinity.1

And when he did conceive in verse his notion of happier conditions rewarding moral effort here, it is mainly a physical betterment that he describes.2 There is, it is true, the negative "no fear, no grief" of the Islamic paradise, but added well-being is not worthily made out as spiritual. In the only passage I know, where a happier hereafter is made a replica of a sincerely religious life here, the Master is made to describe it as just a happy "suchness" of the latter.3

But that, here and now, the monk-life implied, as such, a higher stage in preparation is emphatically rejected in the Master's saying, that for him a man had worth, not in being a monk rather than a layman, but solely in better conduct.4 Monasticism, again, went far in obliterating the emphasis in the (much-edited) First Utterance on man as willer, as chooser. Not only in the substitution of a superman for the 'Wayfarer' therein, but also in the condemnation of will or desire as 'thirst,' usually translated as 'craving.' Now for the 'man,' 'everyman,' there is nothing in 'will', under any name for it, that he can afford to wipe out. Where would man as constructive creature be, had he excised all will having a strong co-efficient of feeling, namely, yearning, longing, craving? But the monk, walking 'in the world yet not of it,' has found it often needful to cool off desire or efferent will; at

1 Theragāthā, ver. 447-50.
2 Cl. e.g., the Vimāna-vathu.
3 Majjhima, No. LXVIII.
4 Anguttara, i, 69.
least the Buddhist monk with his curtailed outlook certainly did so. Note, on the other hand the persistence in the refrain urging to ever further effort: "thus and thus must ye train yourselves; this and that still remains further to be done"—fine calls upon will as desire to attain. And so illogical is it to see, in the teacher of these, the man who could call any term for "desire to attain, to accomplish" the necessary precedent of 'ill,' that I cannot see both calls and condemnation as truly his.

Nor can I accept as his the formula known as Arising by Causation.\(^1\) His long mission may have permitted formulas to be drafted in his lifetime. But this one, wherein the natural course of man's life is shown as so many conditions of 'ill' and that alone, is but a one-sided application of the current interest in man's inner causal uniformities. It is unworthy to stand alone\(^2\) as illustrating the more general statement of causal law: Given this, that follows; stop this and that is stopped. How did not monasticism weaken Buddhism by this decapitation!

Finally, we have in number 9 perhaps the most tragic result of the darkened monastic outlook:—its dread namely of a protraction of life; its conversion of the great symbol of man's progress, the Wheel of his becoming, into a mere Ixion-rotation of sameness. Forgotten are the canonical sayings calling the Master's goal or aim in religion one that is of the Beyond (samparāyika). Forgotten the description of the Way, not as an inadequate 'eightfold' string of qualities, but as solely "leading to the Beyond."\(^3\) So that

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\(^1\) Pāṭicca-samuppāda.
\(^2\) The one bright exception does but end sadly, Samyutta, ii 30. P. T. S. ed.
\(^3\) Sutta-nipāta, ver. 1130.
we can even hear young Ceylon say: “He taught us about life here, and left the next world to take care of itself.” What a monstrous description of his teaching, who is said to have found “sheer happiness” in converse with good men of other worlds, who was sought after to give news of lost ones gone before, who bade disciples look forward to a happiness hereafter within their power to win!

This is but a hasty exposition of certain things which both scripture and our own unprejudiced judgment tell us the founder of a great world-religion did not teach, nay, could not have taught. Historical criticism has not yet duly exerted itself to show that things put into his mouth are largely, even mainly, the work of compilation from older materials preserved by the editors holding, under the long pressure of certain influences, different values from those of his day. If we set that historic figure in its true place and time, we can see that, to be what he was, not one of those things will he have taught. They are all of the Less in man’s nature, life, destiny. There is no evidence that he judged his age had been rating these as too much in a More. If anywhere he checked the uplift in a More of the current Immanence, it was in his reticence concerning the Most. Man was being taught to call himself the ‘Most.’ Gotama saw him as, at best, in a More, and taught the More there lay before him to become.
XLVI

SELF-DEPENDENCE AND ORIGINAL BUDDHISM¹

Popular expositions of Buddhism, whether made by Buddhists or by writers on Buddhism, lay often somewhat complacent stress on the distinctive way in which Buddhism (so-called) tells man he must rely on himself, save himself, rely on nothing superhuman to guide or save him. This emphasis has found response in our western world, in us who are herein unconsciously heirs of Stoic thought which saw in man the arbiter of his own life. Few lines of modern poetry are oftener quoted than Henley's

I am the master of my fate,
I am the captain of my soul.

If this is indeed held to be response to Stoic teaching, it is based on misconception. The Stoic actually relied on things bigger than himself; on certain beliefs he called 'nature' or cosmic law. The Buddhist too misinterprets the injunction handed down in his tradition, on which alone he can justify self-dependence. What is this injunction?

The founder shortly before passing away is recorded as saying:

\textit{Attadīpā viharathā, attasaraṇā viharathu, nānām sarāṇā ...}

¹ A lecture given before the Osiris Club, London [about 1934].
the sentence being repeated with substitution of \textit{dhamma-} for \textit{atta-}. The line literally rendered is: "Live-ye having 'self' as lamp, 'self' as refuge, having no other refuge." And so also for \textit{dhamma-}, however it may please readers to translate that difficult, much-saying word. The affix \textit{-dīpā} may also be rendered island (lit. 'tway-watered'); if I prefer lamps, it is because the similar metaphor occurs in the teaching current when Buddhism was born; the other not so.\footnote{\textit{Atmā-jyotih.} Shvetāsvatara Upanishad.}

Now the line has been rendered by European scholars as 'Be ye lamps unto yourselves, a refuge unto yourselves. . . .' The western reader may not discern any vital difference. But, were he familiar with the Immanence taught where and when Buddhism was born, he would know better. Even were I to render the compounds \textit{attadīpā}, etc., as compounds: 'self-lit, self-protected,' he would know, that for ancient India in the 6th century B.C. such compounds could not be understood in the way we understand Tennyson's

\begin{displayquote}
Self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control:
These three alone lead life to sovereign power.
\end{displayquote}

Here, though it be a goddess, Athene, who is lecturing Paris, the advice is, not to call on her or her Olympian colleagues, but to be independently guide to one's own destiny. Note too, that she has nothing to say about any divine monition within the man: any sense of duty or conscience which is greater than himself. He is, for her, to be a very orphan, weaned, a child thrown into the sea to sink or swim.

Now this was not the Indian way there and then. That way was spoken of in such lines as these:
The one God hidden in all things,
All-pervading, the hidden Self of all,
the Overseer of deeds, in all abiding,
Witness, sole Thinker, One Controller,
The wise who see Him standing in the self,
they, and no others, have eternal happiness. ¹

Here we see Deity regarded as a super- or ideal soul
or spirit spiritually ‘within’ the man’s self or spirit.
And if we had lived in India then and had heard this
saying, and were then to hear another teacher speaking
of the soul or self as a lamp and refuge, we should not
have understood either teacher to mean: Look to
just yourselves, your imperfect human selves, for
such guidance as you can get. No, we should judge
they meant: Look to That within you Who is in a
way like you, yet infinitely your Superior, even as the
oak tree is superior to the acorn. But, by mistranslation,
we have, for the time we have known anything
about these old Buddhist scriptures, been deeming
that the Upanishads taught this latter way, and
Buddhism the former, ‘self-reliant’ way. Yet listen
to these lines from Buddhist scriptures and note how
near they approach to those cited from the Upanishads:

Nowhere can any cover up his sin.
The self in thee, man, knows what’s true or false.
Indeed, my friend, thou scorn’st the noble Self,
thinking to hide the evil self in thee
from Self Who witnessed it.

Thus he who has the self
as Master, let him walk with heed. ²

Here too we have a “greater Self . . . standing within
the man’s self,” urging him—and here is the new

¹ Kaṭha Upanishad.
² Anguttara, i, 149.
Buddhist note—as what we call our conscience. So that, for early India and for early Buddhism too, to call a man self-reliant meant that he in a way was bearer of the God within him as a greater, an ideal self. You see then how misleading it becomes to translate that text: Be ye lamps unto yourselves.

In the first place, we have in our religious tradition no such lofty transformation of the notion of man as self or spirit, which, when Buddhism began, was current and accepted in Indian religion. Next, the compound ‘yourselves’ is non-existent in Indian idiom. ‘Self’ in the plural only came in later. And the possessive pronoun is not prefixed to ‘self,’ either in singular or plural. Nor even the definite article. India said just ‘self,’ and by it, meant not as we do, man’s worse or selfish self, but his best self.

Do not, however, think that the West never approached this Indian view of an inner Divine Self. St. Catherine of Genoa, as von Hügel showed us, wrote in her Latin letters: “My me is God (me est Deus), nor do I recognise any other ‘me’ except my God. My being is God, not by simple participation, but by a true transformation.” More than a century later the author of the Tempest wrote: “Conscience! ay, that Deitie within my bosome!” And a little later Sir Thomas Browne wrote, “there is a Man within who is angry with me.” Later still Goethe wrote in Faust:

The God within my breast Who dwells
can deeply move my inmost thought.

In this way then, and in this way only, did Indian religion, including early Buddhism, teach what it meant to have self-reliance. It meant: See the Captain of your ship as aboard with you, and then feel safe.
Now lay beside this truer view another overlooked point which bears it out, bears out, that man was not to rely on an unaided self in Buddhist teaching. Everywhere in this the man is taken by the hand and led. He is told even to-day to "take as his refuge" the Buddha, Dhamma, the Sangha or church. It is not for him to choose whether he will or will not do so. Again, if disciples wanted to meditate alone, they are shown coming to the teacher to ask for a fit theme. And what they were to believe and to do was put into formulas to be learnt.

For all this Buddhists are not wrong when they claim that in their religion it is the man who has to decide, not a church or a founder or a code. But so have the monk editors of their scriptures muffled up this teaching, that no one sees the real message in the way it was given. This, as I hold, if we read beneath the palimpsest of the so-called First sermon, showed, that in religion the man is willer, the man decides what way he should take. He is shown as between the opposite ways of letting will have free play and of over-regulating it. And the middle way is not commanded, but indicated, as alone leading to religion's Aim. He is shown as wayfarer in life, implicitly as having to choose.

But in this chart, so great has been the editing, that, in the first place, it has been restricted to a monk's choice, not that of everyman; secondly, where his will is alluded to, only his will in the worse is mentioned, and damned as craving or thirst. Lastly, he as chooser has been superseded by a superman, who has learnt all about it and has chosen the middle way—one who is called by a special name\(^1\) which, possibly

\(^1\) Tathāgata: thus-comer, or true-comer.
originally used for everyman, came to be used for the founder only, much as 'son of man,' an Aramaic term, I am told, for 'man,' came to be reserved for Jesus. Hence we are left with a chart which does not so much tell man he has to choose, but implies he is to follow the Guide 'Thus-Come' who knows all about it.

We must look around and afield to find that there was indeed an appeal made to man's initiative at the outset in Buddhism. And in saying 'outset' I am not wildly guessing. I judge, that such an appeal, if found, will be of the 'old rock,' because the prevailing trend in the scriptures is to ignore it. I have at the same time to remind you, that the founders of Buddhism were handicapped by the absence of such a clear strong word for initiative as we have in 'will,' and, how recourse was had to (1) words of mind or thinking, with implication only of 'will,' such as words for purpose, intention, and (2) words for effort, which is, not will, but a mode of using will. Here are instances of sayings betraying a will-urge in the teaching left on one side.

Gotama is recorded as addressed by a sceptic, called a brahman, who says (as if challenging to debate): In my opinion there is no agency (one MS. has 'agent') who is self or another (self). Gotama's reply is: 'I have never heard or seen (sic) anything of the sort! When you move forward or backward, stand or sit or lie down, are you not using initiative? (Are you not making a fresh start?) Well, isn't that self-agency?'

I think we would have said here, are you not using will? Are you not willing the movement? The previous state of you doesn't will the change in

1 *Anguttara*, iii, 337.
movement; it is you who will it; or it is another man. Here is another:

Gotama is asked 'What is the religion (dhamma) by which your disciples, confessing and comforted, come to acknowledge ajjhāsaya as the starting-point in the holy life?'

Now ajjhāsaya is usually rendered inclination, a week term for will, such as we mean when we say, one can take a horse to the water but not make him drink. But consider how notable the saying becomes if we say Will is the starting-point in the holy life. Once more:

One of the first and leading disciples is recorded as saying: "When sankappa arose in me, then did he teach me more than that.'

This word is another makeshift term for will; meaning rather purpose. The remark becomes much stronger if we say, 'When will arose in me...'. And this emphasis on the need of will is borne out by sayings showing the dynamic aspect of the 'holy life' (lit.: the God-life) required in followers. Thus a student, asking how the true may be attained, is told that striving will aid him, striving aided by weighing, aided by effort, aided by desire; that the stirring up of knowledge comes by gradual training, work, progress. One who draws near in faith, attends, remembers, scrutinizes the aim that is taught, begets desire, thence effort, thence striving... and so attains highest truth. Disciples are bidden to prove their vows by ever asking what more remains to be done.

1 Dīgha, iii, 40.
2 Lit.: 'up-to-on-lying.'
3 Anguttara, iv, 160; Theragāthā, 902.
4 Majjhima, i, 271 ff.
5 Ib., ii, 174.
6 Ib., i, 480.
of men, in a parable, is shown never resting content with the attained. This becomes sameness, "now I am for a More."  

All such is not to be paralleled in earlier Indian literature. I see in those first missioners a phenomenal wave of will stirring, as phenomenal as was, at a later day, the wave of healing power quickening in men in a little corner of Palestine, giving the New Word wings to become endowed with persistent force and develop into a world-religion.

This urge of will, believe me, is almost wholly overlooked in early Buddhism. It is so easy to overlook the thing that is present, when there is no good word for that thing found in the records, a heedlessness made easier when the observers of a later day are themselves still overlooking the basic significance of will in the religious life. I have tried to make out, in these few contexts, that original Buddhism looked upon man as more a willer than a thinker. This was a new emphasis for India. Indian religion had been magnifying the static position: Man is That; man knows That; man as immanent Deity is eternally persisting, i.e., continuing to stand. Original Buddhism tried to show him that his essential nature was a moving on, a growing, a becoming, rather than a being. It is by his willed onward effort that a man is to be tested: a willed becoming.

Will, Becoming: in these two words we have the very core of that New Word which came afterwards to be so changed, that in what is called Buddhism you rarely hear these two words mentioned. In urging on man that he should see himself as, not a being, but a becoming, the first 'Buddhists' revived the

1 Anguttara, iii, 214.
drooping gospel of the Upanishads with new and quickened significance. In seeing Becoming as a will-process, as a response to initiative rather than as response to a code, they were adding to Indian religion a new emphasis. And more than that: they were teaching something eternally true.

To resume: the parrot cry that in Buddhism man is told to rely on himself and on nothing greater than himself, is based on a misconception, a misconception which arises from a forgetting what relying on 'self' meant, and could only mean, for the Indian of the 6th century B.C. It was just as much telling him to submit his limited earth-self to the God within him as it would be, in other religions, to bid him trust in God. As a matter of fact he came to be told to trust, not himself, but a great model and a code. And that he was told, in so doing, to exert his will towards the Better is either edited out of all semblance of such, or is just overlooked, evaded.

It is a hopeful sign for me, that Theosophist circles are apparently feeling a perhaps new interest in early Buddhism. I say apparently, because, in place of no recognition hitherto of my work, I am this year speaking by request at least five times to Theosophists. It is a hopeful thing, I repeat, because in their case one chief barrier to a right understanding of early Buddhism is absent—a barrier which stands as high as ever in the way of South Asian Buddhists. Theosophists do not deny the reality of what India has ever called the Man—what we call soul; spirit, self, the real Man, user of body and mind. For Buddhists the Man is body and mind, is his suits—I quote an early Buddhist saying—suits of clothes, not the wearer of them. For Theosophists the Man is wearer, and they can see,
as Buddhists cannot and do not: that, as Gotama's chief disciple is shown teaching, the aim of man willing to become a More, is to dispose as he chooses of his clothes, body and mind, and not be at their disposal. If Theosophists will aid me in this fight for recovery of the true original Buddhism, I believe that the truth will prevail the sooner.
A TECHNICAL TERM IN EARLY BUDDHISM

I am not going to be so dull as my title threatens. I am not interested in technical terms generally, least of all in those of religion. In them we get straightway to the peel of the fruit, the shell of the nut, away from the real thing to be enjoyed. In them we are no longer at the cradle of a child of promise, nor watching its early growth. We are considering the institution that child's life-work has led to, considering that wherein the lightning-stroke of his genius has got merged in a superstructure not solely its outcome. You can lay the blame for the title on a bishop. A few Sundays ago Bishop Selwyn broadcast for a few minutes on Christian technical terms, selecting the one word "Christ" (so ugly in our language). I am not discussing either this technical title or that other, equally ugly in English: 'Buddha.' But the bishop reminded me that what I was wanting to bring to your notice was a technical term in Indian Buddhism, and further, that it was no husk-word merely, but went to the heart of the Buddhist world-message. Through it new wine was put into an old bottle, but the old bottle was a reminder of the significance and value of the new wine. Through 'this technical term, borrowed from the established system of education by brahmin

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4 Spoken at a special meeting of the Buddhist Lodge, St. Ermin's Hotel London, February, 1941.
teachers, the Sakyan missioners gave to men a new, because it was a wider, a deeper meaning.

This term was brahma-chariya, literally God-way-faring, God-procedure. The latter half should not be a strange word to you, since we have it in our chariot, car, cart, carriage: a moving onward. But what was it used to mean?

When we speak of a youth qualifying for achievement on physical lines we may say 'he's in training'; for achievement on intellectual lines, we may say 'he's reading for' (or with schoolboys 'swatting for'); for achievement on artistic lines, 'practising for' (using the terms otherwise than in the case of the fledged lawyer or doctor). These technical terms refer to matters in a temporary way of life: diet, habits, work. Now for school-cum-college life in ancient India, the technical term was used: 'by man brahmacharya\(^1\) is being lived.'

I am not contending, that when used, the tremendous literal significance was to the fore, any more than it is with us when we say such names as Godfrey, Godstone. None the less, the term does point to a serious outlook on a 'young gentleman's' education, just as, if we could go back far enough, we should find a solemn interest attaching to the bestowal of either of those two names. The Indian term is not older than the Vedas. It occurs only once in the latest book Rig-Veda X, in an appended hymn of possibly later date than the rest, in the form brahmachārī: the man who is in brahmachariya. But it comes into use in the subsequent literature of Brähmanaśas and Upanishads. And it refers mainly, not to what is studied, but to the conditions of study: how the youth became an antevasika, or boarder at

\(^1\) The Pali adds an i before y.
his tutor's house, not alternating, as we do, mobile and in a little country, three times a year, but staying in that house for perhaps twelve years or even more, maybe, as we read, taking his tutor's fee back after returning home. Among those conditions it was of the first importance that there should be no nonsense between him and the women of the tutor's household. Hence the urgency of his life resembling that of a novice at the monasteries which were to be plentiful in India in the coming centuries. And so it came about that the technical term, so widened, as we shall see, in early Buddhism, took also a narrowed meaning, namely that of chastity or celibacy. Buddhism did not escape this narrowing; you may see the word in the negative: *a-brahmacharīya* used for the third *sīla* or moral precept in the Khuddakapāṭha list of the five; in the old first book of the Third Collection it is said that "woman is the stain on *brahmachariya*," and I have had Ceylon students using celibacy for the term in over-seas examination papers.

That this term should be borrowed (and improved upon) in early Buddhism could easily happen, since most of the first missioners were brahmins and practically all of them were of the rank—brahmin and noble—who will have practised *brahmachariya* at their tutor's when young. Save the Founder, whose home was probably too far from a high-class tutorial centre. But which, if anyone of them was first to suggest the borrowing is forgotten.

But that the term was assigned work of the highest importance has been emphatically recorded. Look at the mission chart drawn up (verbally only) for the first missioners. They are enjoined to go forth on tour among devas and men (how do Buddhists not
forget that coupled term !) for their good, in sympathy with them, to "teach dharma, and reveal brahmachariya, perfected and purified."

There is, alas, no hint given by the translators of this context that brahmachariya was a technical term and borrowed. Oldenberg in S.B.E. says just "a life of holiness," and three decades later I call it "holy life." Neither explains. Nor, so far as I know, does anyone else. So the term as borrowed is not grasped by the reader of translations. Nor is he able to grasp why it is, that the only question in the Suttas asked at least a dozen times is about brahmachariya: With what aim (object, purpose, = attha) is brahmachariya lived under the Master? (The last three words not being always added.) But once we know that the term is a school and college word, the reason for this frequency suggests itself: Why do you fellows who have left school life behind you keep talking about living brahmachariya?

We have no time to go into all the answers. Nor in most cases would we learn much. For nearly all are telling what livers of brahmachariya don't do, or are not to do. Monks ask, if people question us thus, what are we to answer? I can understand older monks answering novices in cautious negatives. But I cannot hear the Utterer of a great New Word in religion so teaching. Let me rather cite those two replies which are positive, and accredited to two very eminent first missionaries: Puṇṇa of the Mantānis, fearless missionary in wild regions, and Sāriputta, head of the disciples. I omit all the scholastic frills of later terms where-with editors have filled in the slender Saying handed down from earliest tradition, and find the gist of Puṇṇa's reply in the parable of the chariot relays,
which has given its name to the Sutta—No. 24 in the Second Collection. Living brahmachariya is like our king arranging to go a long journey on some business in special time by a system of chariot relays. In these it is not only the last relay that "does it"; each relay matters within its range. In so many words it is meant that, in a life's training, every step forward is at the time equally important, the one essential being to keep going, to turn not aside, to lose no time. The end of the journey is not merely the termination of school time; it is the winning of the ultimate goal of life (expressed, alas, in scholastic terms).

The other reply, in the Fourth Collection (Gradual Sayings, iv, pp. 254 f.; ib. iii) is assigned this time to Sâriputta himself, answering his fellow-disciple's, fellow-brahmin's, Koṭṭhita's question: "Is the brahmachariya lived with the aim X?" Here too we have a frill of five positive and five correspondingly negative motives: a set that we elsewhere find the Founder credited withal in interrogating Jains. The editor's hand is again betrayed, even if the alternatives are more simply worded. But Sâriputta's answer so sweeps them all aside that we may venture to hope we have here a historically true reply: "My friend, it is the not known, the not seen, the not won, the not realized, the not mastered that is to be known, seen, won, realized, mastered, that the training is to be lived."

Here was for the brahmin of that day indeed a New Word. He had as his cult the belief, that to see in man Deity was already to accomplish all those five ends. Man could here and now be not only potential but actual Deity. Sâriputta substitutes the process, indefinitely long, of becoming all That. Not for a
moment do I say we have here all that Sâriputta will have said; not for a moment do I wish to embroider with modern ideas on what remains of his words. Were we met for study of Suttas I could discuss how this one is patched up with the gloss of the Four Truths to fit it for entry under the Nines, plus those five alternatives I have mentioned. Let us rather recollect what that extension of the technical term brahmachariya meant for Sâriputta.

It meant the whole of life, not just youth only, not just threescore and ten years only; it meant an indifferently long period, past, present, and future. It meant many lives in many worlds, each and all calling for training; each and all calling for aiding others, both friends and Everyman, to carry on the training. Who can tell how far Sâriputta even now, it may be, reborn an Englishman, on earth or from another world, has been helping English inquirers in the "godly training," especially maybe in inquiry of your sort and mine to see what is the truth? Nay, that he may even here and now be helping us to-day to realize how true it ever is, that we are each and all in 'training' for the ultimate goal? How it is for us to learn the unknown, win the not yet won—and more: that all this is possible, is the 'May Be.' That there is no question of a 'Can't,' much less of a 'Won't,' but of a message filled with lofty faith and hope. That all these earth-years our will must be in brahmachariya, to grow, to go further, to word better our true aim: the ineffable 'Well' that is ahead of us all. Let us remember other fine words of Sâriputta: "I praise not standing still; let alone waning out; I praise growth. Herein is man a striver." (Ib., v, 67.) And the fine lines he may so well have said:—
Now am I bound to become one turning no more back.
I shall become a Further-Farer in the Life Divine
(brahmachariya). (Ib., iii, 61.)

Is there need for me to heed your bill and relate
Buddhism "to present affairs"? Is not this keyword of the religion: 'training,' in tune with the events of any day, warlike or peaceful? Externally we must adjust ourselves, but the fact of training enters into it all. By it we realize, that in war or peace life is always difficult, always arduous, often thwarting, yet always worth while as training, more worth while than any life that is not training, calling for growth in will, growth in becoming, showing us that there's here, hereafter too, no rest, no halt for us spiritually. That we are each and all of us

Further-farers in the life divine.
XLVIII

THE EVOLUTION OF A SYMBOL

BUDDHIST WHEEL AND WAY

We shall never, I imagine, archæologically discover the inventor of the wheel as a magnifier of man's mobility. Or, it may be truer to say: the distributed inventors thereof. Yet he or they merited that man should have awarded here below an immortality in name. That by the addition of a pair of discs to an axle man found he could progress faster and longer than he could walk, without himself having to roll over and over, could progress as long as the tamed drawer could endure, could make progress as much as weight matched that endurance:—here is for man a More calling for immemorial personal acclaim. The utmost man's poets have done is to see in those progressive discs, rolling on as well as round, symbols of the procession of cosmic forces, or the advance of an aggressive conqueror. Men lost count of how the invention had added to the value, the width, the permanences of their various mobilities. Man no longer walked or rode abroad to return to the stabler, if weaker essentials of a home:—to the old, the very young, the goods no saddled beast could get away with. He could now on trek move within the picture of his near surroundings.

1 The original of this was a lecture to the Society for the Study of Religions, Dec., 1938, but articles more or less similar I have published in England, Switzerland and India.
He could leave the 'root-footed' plant mode of life; he could uproot himself as never before. He could transplant himself into the new in a new way. Wayfarer he ever was, but now on wheels he could wayfare in a true sense together with fellow-men as fully represented.

All this I fail to find belauded in the oldest poetry we yet know. I may in ignorance err; I should gladly learn better. I have probed only a little into this matter in old Indian literature and into India's later advent as sculptor. Here, in giving testimony to how the wheel emerges therein, not as in itself memorable, but as symbol of cosmic and religious things hymned as more memorable, my chief concern is to emphasize a historic mobility as yet too much passed over; in other words a great transition in values.

Let me invert history at my start, and show how, in a religion become institutional, a symbol may serve to betray lowered ideals.

I have heard it remarked by a Christian that Buddhism must be a foolish faith when it bade men pray by twiddling a wheel with a roll of texts inscribed inside it. It was an unfortunate remark to make. The scoffer was unaware how vulnerable was his own faith in this observance. He apparently did not know of Breton churches, wherein are hung wheels of fortune, by the picture of a saint, called just there Saint of the Wheel (santic ar rod), and where on payment of a few centimes you may turn the wheel with its little bells tinkling, to secure luck, here or hereafter. Nor is this a mere hole and corner belief of rustic Brittany. We read that, in the original Winchester Cathedral 1,000 years ago, St. Ethelwold, the bishop, had a wheel hung covered with little bells, to be turned on special feasts
so as to excite devotion (ad majoris excitationem devotionis)—as any church peal may nowadays be said to attempt. And the custom was wider spread than this:—in Greece, in Egypt, in N. India and Tibet. Plutarch and Heróon both mention the presence in Egyptian temples of such wheels, the one holding that they were symbols of the passing of all things, the other that, if turned by those entering the temple, they aided purification—much like the dipping fingers in the waterstoup in Catholic churches and tracing the sign of the Cross—a custom analogous to that of the rosary, used in both East and West, a persistent repetition in tribute as it were to an underlying truth, that salvation is not a thing to be won by stillness and repose, but by ceaseless effort.

If it be said: But these were but a by-play in Christian usage, the same can be said for Buddhism taken as a whole. Wheel is in Buddhism early and late, but with it these ‘praying-wheels’ so-called have nothing in common. No one, I believe, knows so far when they become thus used in Northern Buddhism, but in all that the best in Buddhism has held important, these praying-wheels just do not count, any more than does, in the Christian gospel, the Breton or Saxon wheel of mechanical prayer and exaltation.

But let me say no more encyclopædia-fashion—all my wisdom here comes from the Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics, the wisdom belonging to the eminent authority Goblet d’Alviella. The one point of interest for me in this kind of wheel-cult is that, used as an implement, not of further-faring but merely of repetition, it is associated with the will to hope and pray, and not with something hopeless and to be somehow ended. The earliest hint at the latter meaning
known to me is in the Maitri Upanishad, when a cloud of rising pessimism is seen coming over the more radiant teaching of earlier Immanence. It is here the potter’s wheel that we find:

"By him indeed driven the body goes round and round like the wheel turned by the potter. The body becomes minding, in other words, the mind is its driver." (Maitri, 2, 6.)

Here we have progress in the man dulled by the picture of a mere whirl of repetition spoiling the immediately preceding and, for India, more familiar simile of the progressive chariot.

Belief in rebirth, that outlook of further opportunity towards betterment, only made things worse. Instead of showing the hopeful opportunities each new life brought, lives were looked upon as merely revolutions of a wheel, reminding us of tormented Ixion revolving, or of the equally unfortunate squirrel capering on his cage-wheel. Life, it came to be held, was just a being reborn, getting ill, older, dying, reborn. Oh me! the maligned Founder of Buddhism is made by editors to say, to what an ill pass has the world come, with being born, ageing, dying! Where can a way out be found? A way out: nissārāna! What a mockery of the earlier figure of the wheel as one of progress, of the morning, of victory! Things material were becoming the nucleus about which religion turned. These grew, but then decayed; how then, it was argued in council debates, can you declare you persist in life by ‘becoming’ (bhava)? Argument surely unsuitable for things immaterial. Cf. xxxix.

And so we find the wheel and the degraded word ‘becoming’ linked together in the compound ‘wheel of becoming,’ usually rendered wheel of life, of which
a leading exegesist wrote centuries after the birth of Buddhism, "this bhava-chakka, moving in its twelve parts by causation without known beginning, an eddy of residual vices, actions, results . . . keeps rolling round without a break." (Visuddhi-magga, in trans. (P.T.S.), iii, p. 695.)

The later Buddhism of Tibet took up this worsened aspect of the wheel, and we know it in Tibetan cloth paintings, with which the late L. A. Waddell first made us familiar,¹ shockingly miscalling it "The Buddha's Secret"—alas! for that maligned Helper of men. A grinning devil holds up the picture of a wheel of twelve spokes, and round the tyre twelve pictures of how, in man's life, birth leads on to mere physical dying and rebirth. In the later group of legends called the Divyâvadâna, now being translated for the Sacred Books of the Buddhists, there is told how such a depicted wheel was placed over the gateway into a monastery at Râjgir, monks taking shift-duty to explain it. Here there were only five spokes, one for each world of rebirth: hell, petas, human life, animals, devas. In the middle were a dove, serpent and pig, symbolizing lust, hate and stupidity. Survival, i.e., rebirth was pictured by water falling, as in a watermill, on to a wheel. A dreary picture of religious degeneration.

And somehow it seems to have made some headway in infecting religious thought in southern Europe, judging by what archaeology has discovered in Italian and Sicilian tomb-inscriptions. I only know of these through Rohde's well-known 'monumental' work Psyche, completed half a century ago. They belong to what readers will know as Orphic theogony, into

¹ J.R.A.S., 1894.
which I am not qualified further to go. In these we come across the notion of rebirth considered as a weary unending cycle of fate or necessity: κύκλος τῆς γενέσεως, ὁ τῆς μόρας προχός, etc., from which the soul longs to escape, and entreats the gods, especially Dionysos (λυγεύς; θεὸς λύσιοι) for release from the wheel.¹ Thus in the verses inscribed on one of three golden funereal tablets dug up near the site of Sybaris the line occurs:

“And I escaped from the wheel, the misery-laden!”²

I do not know whether this reference to wheel is unique. If we turn to Greek poets for whom life was no mere matter of here and now, it is not so much wheel that we find as road, e.g., in Empedocles, seen as toilsome: ἄργαλέας βιῶτοι κελεύθους; or chariot, e.g., in Plato, from which the soul, as he drives it after the procession of the gods, falls, dragged down by desire for carnal things. The question of a genetic connection between Oriental and Hellenic notions as to rebirth is of the greatest interest, and it may well be that von Schroeder’s belief in such a connection is well founded. Most of us incline to the more ‘orthodox’ view in the Greek typified by Swinburne in his ‘Atalanta in Corydon’:

I am gone down to the empty weary house,
    Where no flesh is, nor beauty, nor swift eyes,
    Nor sound of mouth, nor might of hands and feet,
—a myopic outlook, where it is the more remarkable to find such an idea shifted in a haunting dread of the Greek revisiting, on the wheel of anangke, the scene he was so loth to leave. There does seem hinted in

¹ κύκλον τε λῆξαι καὶ ἀναστένασι κακότητος.
the Orphic outlook that will to the Better, in that rebirth was a stage in a course of moral evolution and effort after purification. But in neither alternative is seen a glad hope and expectation. Is the wheel in earlier ages a brighter symbol? Do we for instance find it on banners as a symbol of victory, like cross or crescent?

So far as I know, we do not. We once find, in early Buddhist scriptures, such a battle-symbol, but it is not a wheel. It is called the ‘top of the banner,’ whatever that may have been (dājāggera). The prattle of the Commentary, in aligning to it the vast size of all else in ‘Sakka’s’ world, says that it gave forth a fivefold musical sound when struck. The myth is used to point a religious injunction, thus: Sakka, governor of the next world addresses his army before a fight saying: “If you, in the thick of battle, are gripped by panic, look up to the top of my banner and you will lose all fear. Or look up to that of Prajāpati, of Varuṇa, of Ḣaṇa, and you will lose all fear. Just so, when a monk is alone in the depths of the forest and is gripped by fear, by panic, let him only think on the Teacher (bhagavā) . . . or on Dhamma, or on the church (sangha) and he will lose all fear.”

Yet the wheel, in other old Sayings, is found as the very symbol of advance, of military aggression. The compound ‘wheel-turner’ is a type-name for a conquering king (chakravartī). In the First Collection of the Pali Canon, we read, that a certain legendary king has a vision of ‘the divine wheel’ and has been told, this means he is to become a wheel-turner. So he sprinkles the wheel and invokes it: Roll on, sir wheel! Go forth and conquer, sir wheel! And the wheel

1 Sāratprajākāsinī, i, 341, on Saṃyutta, i, 218 f.
rolls down and onward after it the king with his whole army to east, south, west, north, meeting with homage from other kings, and, in this case, playing the rôle of a wise and beneficent overlord.¹

I do not find the wheel thus used in Indian literature before the Buddhists brought it forward; I find it only in the Mahābhārata (of many dates) and a late Upanishad. But there was a special reason for Buddhists pushing the idea, just when they were making a first and great effort to arrange and make authentic their loose and scattered accretions of, not writings, but sayings. A new hegemony had arisen just then, subsequent to Alexander the Great’s attempt on India, in the person of king Asoka. The then much-divided Buddhist church was striving to reform itself and present a tidy shopwindow wherewith to win the patronage of the king. And it is a natural result of this, that the legend of a wheel-turning king—a sort of Indian King Arthur—should be brought forward in that new effort after unity, in an authentic body of teaching.

What then was there at the back of this myth of a divine wheel?

In the thesaurus of the older Upanishads, most of them pre-Buddhistic, the wheel is used some five times as an impressive simile in religious teaching, though in no way so credally significant as the cross became elsewhere, and elsewhen. Thus, firstly, the wheel is a figure for the life of man regarded as the breath (prāṇa) on which (as the wheel’s contents) all seemed to depend.

"As spokes fastened in a hub, so on this breathing is everything fastened."—Praśnā.

¹ Dīgha, Suttanta xxvi.
Next, the whole of the divine work (karman) in the world is likened to a wheel:

"As the work of God the whole world revolves, a Brahma-wheel."—Shvetâsvatara.

Next it is Deity Itself Who is the Brahma-wheel, not so much as Itself revolving, but as embracing everything, enclasping all men:

"As spokes held together in hub and felly, so in this spirit all things, all gods, all worlds, all creatures, all beings are held together."—Brhadârañyaka.

Compare with this the more critical vision of the later Shvetâsvatara:

"We understand Him as the Brahma-wheel, in whom the man as bird flutters."

Here the older idea is repeated with this further emphasis, that man has no reason to fear death and the unknown. The God-knowers understand and become merged in the immanent God:—

Whereon the parts rest firm—like spokes on hub of wheel—on Him I know as Man, wherefore let death disturb you not.

This 'Brahma-wheel' we shall find again in early Buddhism.

And then there appears the potter’s wheel, with which I have dealt.

Let me now, passing over the less poetic ritual books, go back, seeking wheel, to the oldest, the more poetic sayings, the Vedas. We there find the wheel again, but as just a figure, not as a symbol. Nor very often. I omit one or two appearances of wheel as discus, or quoit, where apparently the makeshift term
was alone to hand. The Veda outlook on Deity was on the forces or phenomena of nature. Here, in a hymn to Ushas the dawn, we find these striking lines:

O Ushas, O wealthy lady!
Thou Morning, turning thee to every creature,
Standest on high, ensign of the Immortal,
To one same goal ever and ever turning,
Now like a wheel newborn roll hither!

Next to the Sun:—

The sun’s eye moves, encompassed by the firmament . . .
Thou, Indra, hast sped the wheel upon its way.

Again also to Indra:

Let the sun roll his chariot-wheel anear us,
Let the thunderer go to meet the foe.

Once more, to the Ashvins, twin gods of the dawn:

High on the forehead of the bull one wheel ye ever keep,
The other round the sun revolves.

Next, and more abstractly wheel is used as emblem of cosmic or world-order, usually expressed in the great little word \( \text{rita} \). In Rig-Veda, iv, are these lines:

Fitted with twelve spokes this wheel of lasting order rolls round the heavens. Herein established are 720 children, referring to months, days and nights of the year, or, as one might say, of \( \text{rita} \) in space and time.

It is clear from these contexts, that we must by no means give all the credit to the sun as suggesting wheel as symbol. Ever is it rather the progress, the dynamis, the onward force in the universe to which the wheel is referred, to onward movement rather than, as in one or two Upanishads, to circular comprehensiveness. In wheel we do not ‘stay put’; we move on. Justice
has hardly been done to this. Let me now come down the centuries again to Buddhism.

Take the compound Brahma-wheel: it is fairly safe to assume that, where we find a term of the older-accepted teaching used, we have older sayings, especially since it is in metric speech that they occur. Sayings suggestive of, if no more belonging to, a time of the widening rift between Sakya (early Buddhism) and the earlier tradition was scarcely begun. I refer to such lines as:

For worlds of devas as for those of men
he the Wayfarer set the God-wheel rolling.

The meaning here would not be that of dawn, sun, or world order. In these Buddhism was not interested. It was more akin to the Immanence taught at its birth. I do not find the compound in exegetical literature. And the word Brahma- is there toned down to mean a thing that is best (*settha*) of its class.

But we find wheel in a compound new as such, and significant of that very dynamic quality lacking on the surface in the word Brahma. This is *dhamma-chakka*:

When th' Enlightened fully knowing
sets the Dhammawheel a-rolling.¹

And:

... as the Blessed One's own son,
who like me kept the wheel-of-Dhamma rolling.²

Here in very early Buddhism we have the earlier concept of Deity or Spirit as the *Antaryāmin* or inner controller at work in the man, the urge of that which we have come to call conscience. This, and not the

¹ Anguttarā, ii, 34, also 9, and iii, 148
² Sutta-Nipāta, 556 f.
miserable *samsāra* wheel was the dominant feature in the original message of what we call Buddhism: a rolling on, not a turning round. Buddhism of to-day has lost this dynamic concept. For it Dhamma has become just external 'doctrine'—as it is to-day—and its votaries the 'creatures of a code'. In Mahāyāna indeed it has come to have, in the term *dhammakāya*, a deeper significance. Or it may have started with such, since in its foundations Mahāyāna is, for me, elder sister to the Hīnayāna which made its institutional start as Vibhajjāvāda at Patna, 300 years after the Founder's day.

So we have our wheel thus brought in, if not as symbol, as emblem of the New Word which Gotama Sakyamuni sought to read into the teaching of his day. And it is interesting that, whereas Buddhism has lost this dynamic element in his teaching, the draft of that teaching made by him still bears the traditional name of "The Saying of the Setting the Dhamma-wheel a-rolling."

As such then, to what extent early Buddhism made use of the wheel-emblem, it was clearly something of luck, of happy omen, which in the New Testament finds similar utterance in the words: "Behold! I make all things new!" Testimony of a direct kind is actually borne to this in a line of the later Sanskritized collection of legends, known as the Divyāvadāna, and already cited, where I read:

"bringer of the luck and joy of the wheel, the Master."

And how strange is it to find this line not far from the description of the ghastly decadent wheel-picture described already in these pages (p. 544).
I find it strange too that we do not, as I so far find, come upon the wheel used as symbol of the central figure of the Founder’s “Way,” or Road (magga, añjasa, paṭīpadā), used from the first for man’s quest of the Immortal. He is recorded to have set out on his mission, saying he was going to sound the drum of the Immortal, the gates to which stood opened. Actually his chart of teaching drops the drum-figure, drops too the lotus figure of growth or ‘becoming,’ and pictures Man as having to seek the right, the middle Road, whereby to attain the Aim (attha). And to this way-picture, it is the wheel that has usurped the title. Yet how fit for a Message of the Way had not been the Wheel, a far better graph for the Way than just two parallel lines! Imagination would here prove an unsafe guide, since it is as opposites in man’s welfare that we come upon them, in for instance Rudyard Kipling’s Kim, how by him gotten who can now say? You may recall the good old lama’s refrain: “And they are all bound to the Wheel from one life to another. To none has the Way been shown.” Something had arisen to divorce the two emblems, apparently so happily supporting each other.

In Indian sculpture it can hardly be doubted that ‘the luck and joy of the wheel’ has the upper hand. We have only to look at Asokan sculpture: the lion pillar, the Sānchi tope, to feel sure of that. It is true that the great broken circle topping the Northern Gate of Sānchi may not have signified a wheel, but if it did, a wheel of sinister import will hardly have been there erected, or, as to that, on other ruined gables in Turkestan, such as the views von le Coq showed in London several years ago.

Very possibly the to us obvious link between wheel
and way was not taken up in parable and trope by the first Sakyan missionaries, because they were too much at grips with their new urge in religion to be troubling themselves with the picturesque, the embroidery of 'doctrine' such as is characteristic of an older established institution. It takes years surely for such things to become of pictorial significance in a new line of religious thought. These point to an already organized institution.

But some may say: Did not Jesus refer already to the taking up of the cross and following him before he suffered on one? I would not say here that the gospel authors had no true memory of a remark handed down for generations. But consider: was the sight of a condemned man bearing his cross to his Golgotha so unknown in those Palestine days of Roman Nazidom? A walk with one's teacher might bring at one turn followers to view and the consideration "See the lilies!"... and the next turn the condemned man or men might be encountered and suggest the comment: "Look, my children, at yon men! You may have one day to take up what may bring you suffering." Is not this quite a possible explanation of his remark?

I do not know whether such things found their way into classic literature, but look at ours! The Elizabethan reader was acquainted with sights now happily not met with, but which, in the writer, provoked such lines you may recognize as:

We are at the stake,  
and bayed about with many enemies.  

(\textit{Julius Caesar.})

Or:

I will die in the opinion at the stake!  

(\textit{Much Ado.})
Or:

Upon the rack of this rough world
stretch him out longer.

(Cymbeline.)

There is in such lines no reference to a coming ordeal
to be suffered by the speakers, and they incline me to
look upon the gospel remark as such a reference
without symbolic significance of the kind ascribed.

But to conclude, in reverting: First missionaries
have more serious heart to heart things to teach than
institutional symbols. They are occupied with an
inward and spiritual message of the New to the very
man. But—and herein lies the tragedy involved as
I have hinted, in the shrivelling of the wheel-figure
of spiritual and moral progress to a mere mill or grind-
stone—the very root and heart of this Message was
a grip of the forward movement necessary for religion,
and not a recurring sameness. This was where the
accepted teaching needed expansion. Compare a
truer Saying in that message to the gloomier turn it
took:

"And in him reflecting hereon the Way comes to birth,
and that Way he follows, makes it become, makes it a
More... and he knows: Now am I bound to become
one turning no more back; I shall become a Further-
farer in the life divine."¹

This is for me the really original teaching at the
birth of the world-religion which we have, for but a
little over a century, come to call Buddhism. And
when its exponents will have bethought them as time
went on to talk picturesquely about the things they
held most worthwhile, there was in the traditional
culture of their day this ancient figure of the Further-

¹ Anguttara, iii, 75.
Faring: the Wheel: wheel of dawn, wheel of sun, wheel of world-order, of symmetry and of movement: the eternal march of things ready to hand. But—there had been also growing up about them a newer culture: cult of monasticism, cult of analysis, of repetition, cult of impermanence; and ever with it the growing rift between the established religion and their own. And one result of this was the conversion of the wheel-emblem into a suspended wheel where is rotation but no progress.

This is the really impressive wheel-lesson in the history of Buddhism.
XLIX

A BUDDHIST RUBICON

If under this title I once more put forward, this time especially before readers in India, the suggestions I made about the great Patna Congress recorded as having been held in Asoka’s reign, it is because I have not yet found those suggestions duly bearing fruit. Whereas Southern Buddhists hold to what is called the dogma of anattâ, as belonging to the original teaching, the record of that Congress shows up this dogma as rejected by thousands in the Buddhist Sangha, and the Congress as called to decide whether to accept it (in a modified form) or reject it. The fate of Hinayâna Buddhism was in the balance and, to revert to the simile in my title, the decision there and then arrived at was as momentous in the history of that section of the new Buddhist India as was Cæsar’s crossing the Rubicon in the history of his career. It might have been expected that the book of Debates, very closely associated as to its first part with that Congress and published by the Pali Text Society a quarter of a century ago, would have stimulated treatment of that event as of first importance for the history of Buddhism. But this, so far as I have seen, has not happened. So I take this opportunity to follow the advice of a French humorist: I say it over again.

The Patna Congress (or 'Council') is recorded as having taken place during the reign of king or emperor Asoka round about the middle of the third century B.C. Our authorities as to the event are not contemporaneous, though one and all are in Pali. Sanskrit Mahāyāna records ignore it, leaping to the Council under Kanishka as the Third. This may well be, because it was an event spelling disgrace and expulsion for those sections of the Order whence sprang what is now called Mahāyāna. These Pali records are in the commentaries on Vinaya and Kathāvatthu (the 'Debates'), and in the Ceylon 'epics,' Dīpavaṃsa, and Mahāvaṃsa, literature which came into being as literature several centuries after the time of Asoka. As records of a great work and a great crisis they are meagre, jejune, all but childish. The 'epics' were the work of men of letters more anxious to interest orthodox readers and audiences than to recover the true. Buddhaghosa and his world were earnest, but in them the historical sense is totally absent. Kern's damning the records as 'full of glaring untruths' is too fierce a bark, but, albeit he too much mixes up event with 'story,' he does bring us to this important statement:

"The object (of the Congress) was to prove that the Vibhajjavadins ... were the real and original sect, i.e., the Sangha."

Who were the 'Vibhajjavadins' and whence the name? I judge that the prevailing tendency to belittle this Congress comes from the failure to grant all that lies of historical, if temporary, importance in this term.

The four records referred to deliberately affirm that
the founder of 'Buddhism' (or rather 'Sakya') was a Vibhajjavādin, that is, an Analyst, and hence such were also all his true followers. Kern sees in the term an invention of the Ceylon (Mahāvihāra) monks. To that I would answer that those monks, at leisure, far removed in space and time from the bustle and stress of the Patna crisis, are very unlikely to have invented such a name. 'Analyst' is only likely to have been invented while the issue was at stake and being fought over. Once victorious, any specific name, serving the while as a slogan, became unnecessary: So, at the Council of Nicæa, Athanasian fought Arian and won. Thereafter the name 'Athanasian' survived only to distinguish an elaborated fixed wording of creed from other such. The term 'Arian,' 'Arianism' for a large, if defeated, sect lingered on. The former name became merged in 'the Church,' orthodox, authentic. For me this word, 'the Analysts,' appearing as it does only in the accounts of the Congress save for one passing reference, is a party slogan, invented, not by the party so named, but by the lay world, onlooker in a great and long struggle into which monarchy itself appears to have been drawn. So our own English was speaking but a decade ago of 'Revisionist' and 'Antirevisionist' over the question of the English Church Prayer Book. Our history abounds in such labels, discarded in the case of the winning side.

The passing reference alluded to lends point to my argument. It occurs in the opus magnum of Buddhaghosa¹: to explain such a formula as that of 'Causal Happening,' one is recommended to 'go to an assembly of analysts....' So might we recommend the 'going to' the school of economic science or of oriental

studies here in London to get an explanation of some problem or terminology in the one school or the other. It is fairly obvious that the term 'Analysts' has become reduced to such a purely technical use.

About twelve years ago Dr. Walleser, in *Die Sekten des alten Buddhismus*, submitted a possible explanation of 'analysts' in the idea, recently more than once exploited, that there had always been in the Sakya two ways of regarding certain terms: either the conventional, or people's meaning (*sammuti-kathā*), or the meaning of philosophical intuition (*paramattha-kathā*). And in considering rightly that the chief bone of contention at the time in the Sangha was the reality of the 'man' (spirit, self, soul) over and above body and mind, he suggested that the party who were careful to distinguish in which of these two meanings—the being more, or not more, than body and mind—the 'man' was taken, were known as the Dividers (*Vibhajjavādins*).

Dr. Walleser did not stress the plausibility of his view; and I scarcely think it can survive historical sifting. What do I mean?

Had this distinction in terms been thought out and named—I mean that of those two *kathā's*—at any time preceding the Congress, we may be quite sure that it would, as a potent 'silencer,' have been brought forward by the orthodox debater in those Kathāvatthu discussions which are ascribed to the Congress President Moggaliputta-Tissa as having been 'spoken' by him. But in the opening and important debates on the reality and nature of 'the man,' no use is made of it! The first time we meet it is in the *Milindapañha*, between two and three centuries later. Even then such double meaning in teaching is not imputed to the Founder.
But some three centuries later still, we find doctrine with labelled Founder named, not where it should have been, in the text of the Debates, but in the Commentary on it. There it is set forth as the peroration of the comments on the first and momentous debate: "Is the man to be got at in a true and highest meaning?" At the time of the Congress the word paramattha is never contrasted with sammuti, 'learned' over against 'popular.' It meant highest in value, as in the Sutta-Nipata line:

āraddhvārīyoi paramattha-pātīyā
(he of energy stirred up to win the highest aim.)

It would not help the 'distinction' theory if the Kathavatthu were held to be of later date (at least as to its first debates—it is obviously an accretion of debates). If this were so, we should not in the first debate find lingering old Asokan Pali ke for ko and the like, archaisms in Buddhaghosa's time and corrected by him in the Commentary.

We come, then, to what is, I venture to think, a sounder view of the sort of 'hustings' term I think vibhājjavādin was. The Founder's message: The Way through the worlds for Everyman, Everyman walking as Self-guided by inner 'dhamma' (a message alas! altered later as only for the 'recluse') was not the founding of a church of recluses as against a lay world. Hence he made no arrangements to secure church doctrine or church authority with reference to that lay world. He and his followers formed themselves, for touring purposes, into a dual body of religieux and laymen. But there being no hierarchy

\(^1\) Puggalo upalabbhati saccTaṭṭha-paramatṭhenāti?
and at first only a moral code—the laity looking on, criticizing, and supporting—the monk world began very industriously to disagree with itself from the Founder’s day onward.

With the rise of the Mauryan hegemony, a new broader conception of unity must have stared the now preponderant Sakyan Community in the face at Patna and elsewhere. To this new political development they presented a glaring contrast. They were, by the records, in a fairly chaotic state of disunity. Their ablest divines, if Tissa the President be not a unique case, had retired from the city monastery in disgust to hillside vihâras. But to win over the patronage of the busy sagacious king to their support was of great moment. A good shop-front was necessary, paying him the compliment of initiating the new political unity. The Congress was summoned, and, like Cincinnatus or Venizelos, Tissa was induced to come back and preside over the work of unifying.

Thus far we have a fairly clear picture. But the records make three statements which, from their obvious improbability, call for criticism. Only a small highly efficient executive could cope with the gigantic task of revision and authentification of the scattered mass of Sayings (there were as yet no books), and then of testing the summoned members of the Sangha by the results. Now, we are told that the executive numbered a thousand monks, that the work of editing (dhamma-sangaha) took only nine months, and that the expulsions of the monks not holding the views which had come to be pronounced orthodox preceded the revision by which alone their orthodoxy could be tested.

As to these three matters I would suggest, as a truer
account, that albeit (as with the League of Nations Council) the full personnel of each general meeting was large, the actual revisors and judges may well have been very few, nay, must have been few. It is even conceivable that, following a recorded precedent in the Second Council, the number may have been eight. At that Council the eight consisted of four from each opposing side. Is it not at least conceivable that at this Third Council there was a similar pair of fours, and that it is through this that we get the striking 'left-in's,' as I call them, of teachings so opposed to the anti-Immanence emphasis in the bulk of the Pali Canon?

Next, the work of revision, to be thoroughly done, must have lasted years, not just nine months! With plenty of books and writing and typing material, our own little Prayer Book revision took twenty years. With plenty of MSS. around, the output of the authentic version of the Mahābhārata at Poona is taking, I was once told, the rate of issue of one fascicle per annum. At Patna there were no books, no full MSS., few and awkward writing materials, and 'sayers' come from regions near and far faring on foot and taking long. I am not suggesting that any and every vihāra sent bhāṇakas. I suggest that possibly only six did so, namely the six places referred to in the Saṃyutta-Nikāya, in Suttas beginning with the abbreviated opening Sāvatthī-nidānam, or Pātaliputta-nidānam, etc.¹ The 'sayers' from each of these six will have come, in sections perhaps, before the judges, or before this or that judge, and have repeated, at one and the

¹ The six were Sāvatthī, Kapilavatthu, Benares, Sāketa, Rājagaha and Patna (Pātaliputta) itself. Nidānam, in the exegesis, is explained as repository, and should probably be spelt nidhānam...
same sitting, some bhāṇavara or portion of one section of what ultimately was grouped into a Nikāya or other work, something like a competitive Welsh Eisteddfod. Where they were all in verbal agreement, if this ever was the case, the judges may not have dared, even had they wished, acting possibly as single arbiter, to revise. Where there were variant versions, one had to be selected, or many had to be combined into a standard version. The rest would either be ruled out or may have been combined into the miscellanies we find in the third and fourth Nikāyas.

Thus the Way, the mārga, will have been finally entered up as ‘eightfold,’ albeit in the numbered titles of the fourth Nikāya it is only titularly entered as ‘tenfold.’

Then, as to the (for me) inverted order in time of the actually long work of revision and the expulsions, the dismissal of ordained monks as dissenting from Vibhajja may have, in the chronicle, got confused with a number of summary expulsions recorded to have been made of ‘gate-crashing’, mendicants, who had not been ordained but claimed membership in order to get material support. To this extent I judge the order of events in the records correct, but no further. The drastic expulsion of ordained monks for ‘heresy’ such as was not, in the Vinaya, included under Pārājika or expulsion offences, is in itself strange enough. But even as a quite exceptional fiat, it can only have been justified when a unified, standardized authoritative ‘Word’ had emerged as sanction. Handed down in Sakya as accredited to the Founder’s own injunction

1 With this interesting anomaly I have dealt elsewhere. Cf. Visvabharati Quarterly, 1937: “An Inquiry into Buddhist Cataloguing”; and my What was the Original Gospel in ‘Buddhism,’ Appendix. Cf. also LX below.
was the one traditional sanction as to credal guidance: ‘the disciples’ Teacher was to be Dhamma and Vinaya’. The Founder, did he actually say so, will have meant ‘your inward monitor (conscience, as we say) and your outward code of rules.’ But Dhamma had *come to mean* verbalized sets of teachings. And with Dhamma and Vinaya edited, revised, reworded in a Revised Version, it only remained to get rid of those whose views did not run on all fours with those of the majority of the revising committee.

Let us now consider on what disparity in views chiefly hinged. Compare the last test-question put at the Congress with the contents of the First Debate (Kathâvatthu I). Any acquaintance with this,¹ as well as with its Commentary,² will leave no doubt as to the paramount importance of the opening debate: Is the ‘man’ got at (‘caught,’ the philosopher Hume would have said) in the true and highest sense? Yet not nearly enough significance has been attached to this sign-post of the past. It can only mean that the question of man’s real nature, either as a being using body-mind *skandhas*, or as only those *skandhas*, was the chief question at issue in the fight for unity of teaching. Is our teaching, it will have been asked, to be of ‘man’ as *attan* (âtman) with all that the word become so venerable implies in Indo-Aryan tradition, or *an-attan*? Proto-Sâńkhya had taught the ‘man’ as distinguishable from the mind. The Sâkyan Sangha, while it had been drawn into the Sâńkhyan way of analysis, had come to see the ‘man’ as just

¹ Translated as *Points of Controversy*, P. T. S., 1915, by S. Z. Aung and myself.
² Translated by Dr. B. C. Law, P. T. S., 1940.
body and mind, or as so many bodily and mental phenomena (dhammā), and had carried out their Revision so as to make this appear as authoritative as repeaters' versions enabled them to appear.

Nevertheless they could not well put the test-questions save in terms sanctioned by older tradition—terms which were already used for wrong views in the Brahmajāla Suttanta, No. 1 in the First Collection, chanted, in more or less completeness, at the First Council. The views there condemned, which were selected as tests, do refer to the nature of the man,' but not as to whether 'got at' or unget-at-able. They turn on whether he survives death—that mighty test yesterday, to-day, and for ever. If the man survived death—not this death only, of course; the Indian mind here was more logical than ours—then he was divine, i.e., imperishable, unchanging, blissful. If on the other hand, he did not survive, the believer was the despised Nihilist (ucchedaka). Other groups of suspects were tested by other dogmas from the same source. It was only one group of suspects who are shown as taxed with the Analyst test. For the rest those ancient wordings sufficed for the expelling.

But there remained a third alternative view by which it had come to be held that a monk's orthodoxy might be passed. It was this view which had come, during the Congress, to be popularly known as that of the Vibhajjavādins. And if only the compiler of the first or 'Man' talk in the Debates had been as clear, in positive statement of the orthodox view, as he was explicit in negativing the Man-supporter's arguments, we should not now be groping. But we may conclude positively for him that his analysis of man's nature had brought him curiously near, save in space and
time, to David Hume. Namely, he does not deny that the very man exists in some way. The utter denial came later; it first appears in the *Milinda Questions*, and later in the written MSS. of the Commentaries, but most of all in the Essays by Buddhaghosa and Buddhadatta. In the *Debates* the man *is*, but is only *got at* (*upalabhati*) in the mind. And mind, as his Suttas enabled him to say, is ‘multiple, many-kindled, manifold,’ not a unity. And there he left him. The defender maintains that man survives because he by nature is in process of becoming (*bhava*). This is rejected by the assumption that all that becomes subsequently decays—an unfounded analogy from things merely material and mental. Survival, however, was orthodox, although the physical analogies adduced to support it belong to later Buddhism, as did the conviction of the reality of process in survival. The Analyst reduced his ‘man’ to an atomistic idea of *dhammas*, and there left him.

I suggest, then, that we have here the origin of the word *vibhajjavādin*. Later records would not have invented it with no tradition to rest on. It is true that in the Second Nikāya the Founder is shown calling himself a *vibhajjavādin*. But this had nothing to do with the points at issue at Patna. It is simply to refuse to make facile, shallow generalizations (*ekanta-vāda*). It is like what a famous Christian Buddhaghosa said ‘Distinguo.’

Again, the *Kathāvatthu* debates *do not mention the word*. It is only in the chronicle of the Congress at the beginning of the Commentary. Suddenly the name appears and as suddenly disappears. I have suggested why. While the judges were pursuing their long and arduous labours, or, more likely, when the great
test-tribunal was summoned, companies of monks from this and that vihāra had been mustering at Patna, and it may be that, as our young folk would say no end of a hoo-ha was going on in waves of discussion, culminating perhaps in a great crescendo when revision was complete and the ‘elections’ drew nigh. So viewed, it is not strange that a catchword or slogan should have arisen, maybe among the populace, maybe among the ‘king’s men,’ may be among the monks themselves, for the formidable party now at last become corporate and articulate as such: the party who saw, in the man, one who could actually, when, analysed, only be traced, beyond his bodily factor in the manifold of the mind.

“Man as not to be viewed save in terms of body and mind” is, I suggest, the Rubicon-crossing or milestone in Buddhist thought attained at the Patna Congress. It is not to be confounded with the further milestone in the Milinda Questions, nor with the yet further milestone revealed in Buddhaghosa and Buddhadatta: the pure an-attā position that ‘in’ nothing whatever is there any attā. The position at Patna was not one of sudden growth. It may be seen at work in the Pitakas. How much in these was work of earlier growth, how much was furthered and established as new at the Patna revisings—this is for us a problem likely to remain insoluble. For instance, to which of the two do we owe the probable substitution of manas (mind) for the more natural ‘man’ or self in passages in the Nikāyas? Or the omission of the ‘man’ in the parable of the faggots in the Jetavana Wood? Surely to compare body and mind to faggots, gathered and borne to burning (as at death), and then leave unsaid
the inference—the wood remained to blossom afresh, but you do not remain, you do not blossom afresh in your Becoming, for you are not, save in the faggots—is a funny, a sorry jumble, unworthy of the wise Speaker!

Is it odd that we writers on Buddhism have so slurred over all this growing divergence from the time of the Founder’s caveat that the ‘man’ was not his body or his mind—spoken in a day when to have denied the man’s reality would have been the teaching of a madman—to Asoka’s day? Is it odd that we feel no jolt as we pass over the intrusions and gaps in the documented teachings, so strangely un-Aryan as to be losing sight, in their chequered history, of the truth that, whatever factors the ‘man’ may be vibhajja-ed into, he is—he the more than they, he, the user of them, the valuer by them, the analyser in every analysis? Jolt indeed! Have we not rather felt a smoother going in our research as we noted this ‘mind’ functioning where, and as other old documents would have made the ‘man’ functioning? We have commended “Buddhist psychology” as akin to our own, at least to that of yesterday.

‘Akin to our own’—that’s why we’ve slurred, that’s why there was no jolt. The Analysts at Patna put the very ‘man’ behind a curtain as unget-at-able. We have done the same. Our psychology, not so long ago, weaned itself from its mother, philosophy, analysing mind, that is minding, and threw the minder back into the mother’s lap. And there it leaves him. Early Buddhism was caught by the Sānkhya vogue, in which mind, as distinct from the man, was analysed. And it went one better (or worse,) adapting the Sānkhyan formula—“This am I not, this is not mine, is not for
me the self"—but negating where Sānkhya only accentuated difference. It is we who have, quite unawares but as the outcome of a somewhat similar cause, followed Buddhism. We too have lost sight of the wood for the faggots. "I grant your 'man' if you see him as a complex of events," wrote one philosopher to me.¹

The Founder of Sakya told inquirers, it is said, that they could see themselves, if they would, as in a mirror. Perhaps if we can see an episode of our own history of ideas in this Buddhist mirror, the way of a wiser psychology of our nature may not be far off, and we may be a stage nearer to the Goal of our highest welfare.

¹ The late Prof. S. Alexander.
L

HITA

To the Buddhist Society of Bombay I send cordial wishes for the success of their new Journal. Its object I understand, is to word fellowship in the Society itself and fellowship with the world without. It is a good object. To put into print work that is done together, and will or should be done together is a mode and a forwarding of that work. Difficulties as my teacher used to tell us, may be thereby half-solved. And we are thereby confessing, that we have little faith in each man working for himself. Even if we are not telling of a common task, even if we are writing of a work unshared, we in writing of it make our readers to be our friends, our critics, our counsellors, we make the world our help-mate. We cannot work fruitfully alone. We sometimes think we can. We may be choosing to work alone. But our work will only be the worse for that. Open must doors and windows be now and again to let in the will of our fellows upon our work. It is, it should be, for them. It is only by the worth they hold it in that it will ever grow and fructify. The work that no man values save its author will wither, will not grow. There is will enough without, new will, to blow upon it and foster it, if it is of a nature to grow at all. If, as a Society you give voice to your aims, your work, then the new

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worth coming from the little world of your members, the worth coming from the greater world without—these, and these alone will quicken you to longer, stronger life.

How can you win over that new worth-giving will to help you?

Readers, and more readers, must find in your new word matter of value. What is it in your new word that will be of value? Your making it always clear and unmistakable, that it is HITA you desire both for your little world and for the greater world around.

What is Hita? Hita is what I like to call Well. We usually say Welfare. Our neighbours more sensibly say just ‘well’—‘le bien,’ ‘das Wohl,’ etc. In the ancient days when in India no other word of religion now surviving was taught save the Vedas, Hita, as the good, the well of men, was not taught in them as religion. Hita was only used in its primary meaning of what was laid, or set down, or arranged (dahati), and hence was fit, proper, convenient. We once read of a king having good, that is fit friends (hita mitra). But as man’s will grew, so that he came to see his spiritual ‘well’ in his relations to his fellows, where he had only seen it in his relations with unseen warders, he needed a word for this new feeling about his welfare. He found it in both those old words, hita and mitra, used with new significance. They worded his feeling out after a Well that lay in the fellowship of man with man.

He desired Well as much as ever, for he was alive and that means to be seeking ‘well.’ But ‘well’ may be an unworthy ‘well.’ It had come to be judged unworthy if he sought, no matter how, only his own ‘well.’ To gain an end—wellbeing—at the
cost of harm to others no longer came to be held as really worthy. Still he sought unseen warding, here and hereafter, but it was felt as bound up with the warding of his fellows here and hereafter. So he worded *hita* and *mettā* as he worded his idea of fellowship. Namely, men were to be harmless (*ahimsa*); they were to abstain from hurting either life, or property, or folk’s dear ones, or reputation. Man was not to hurt the other man’s self any more than he would hurt his own self.

Now that was for men in general the Well aimed at in early Buddhist teaching. There was, it is true, a further, a wider work of well—the bringing more *hita*, more happiness to *all* men, the living and working solely for this. But this was held to be only the work of the lovely Helpers of men, who came singly at very long intervals, and of the few they chose to work with them. They were not content to live not harming; they worked to ward each and all; they worked for the ‘more-well,’ not only for the ‘less-harm.’ But men in general were not bidden to become in this way imitators. Disciples, it is true, were bidden to ward each other, especially in sickness. But even in their case it was not made the leading, the central rule, *as now it might be*. It was recorded under the rules about monks’ dress! Nor is it made the test, in the scriptures, at the Judgment awaiting every man just after death, as it might be now, that he had, or had not warded his brother-man. He was judged according to his harmlessness on earth, i.e., his moral habits.

No, we of to-day are not of that older comity of men such as we find in all old scriptures, on all old carvings about man’s past. We are no longer content, or we should not be content, with their standards of worth.
We believe, whether we are quite honest about it, or not, in a newer, a greater Well, which grows in form and in word as we grow. We have to foster this, our newer 'Well,' we have to word it in our own new scriptures, such as in this Journal. In it we of the new age have to word what we are, and what we may be, just as those old scriptures worded what they who composed them worded that men were then, and what it was willed that man might become. In part that 'might-become' is now accomplished. It is accomplished in so far as we no longer take as our ideals, our gospel, that which once sufficed for us. The way of the Silas, the way of harmless love is now become, as the great Teacher said it ought to be, not our ideal, but our firm earth. We walk on Sila; we seek a rule to walk by a better than Sila. We repeat the old surpassed 'Thou Shalt Not' of old Sila-creeds. But what we aim at, what we seek as our newer 'Well,' our 'Morewell,' is the 'Thou Shalt,' in warding of each one of us. The Buddhist Societies need no old injunctions to 'abstain' from this and that. We should teach and print, as our newer Sila: "I vow to ward the 'Well' of every living creature. I vow to ward the goods of my brother, my sister. I vow to ward the purity of each sister and brother. I vow to ward truth and to ward kind speech. I vow to ward temperance in myself and in others." We should then be setting our faces toward the morning, not turning them back over our shoulder. We should be walking on the ancient causeway, but we should be lifting our eyes to a risen, a rising way.

It is only thus that the Journal of this Society will be a world-word of value, and not the organ of a little party. And further, it will only become a world-
word of value to Buddhists, or to any other fellowship, if, in its warding, it forwards the worth, the 'Well' of the Man, the Woman, rather than the worth, the Well of the body, or the mind. These are our instruments by which we express ourselves. They are capable, by training, by moulding, to become worthier instruments. But they can never be more; they can never be 'we.' We lose sight too much of the changing, growing, becoming *willer* of them—'the man,' who is, said the Good Teacher, not body, not mind, but who 'should be sought.' We have to seek 'That' along the Way, the whole Way of our faring towards the utterly well. And to word all this, we must put aside, once for all, the 'not-words' of the ancient gospels. We must try to word the 'man' and his Way and his Well as it is, and as we think it should and may be; not as it should not, and may not be. We are of the new world; let us find, in this Journal, the new world's 'Well' in the new and the fitter words. Let us word the New as the old world did not, because it could not. We are richer than was it. Let us use our new wealth, our new values, in our new wording. Hita is a good word in this, that it is not a 'not-word' as are so many in your old scriptures, but it is an old word, strained to bear a changed meaning that once was new. It is now charged with a yet newer, richer meaning. Are we too poor of wit to find fit words for what Hita has come to mean in this our day?
LI

AMITY

The idea of friendship and of the attitude of man as friend has a history in the religious thought of India of considerable interest. A comprehensive historical treatment of the subject I have as yet not come across. It may exist; but I incline to the belief, that as yet European writings on friendship are too much confined to its history as limited on the East by Palestine. The Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (Edinburgh 1908-21) exemplifies this in its odd and irregular way, in the article on Friendship. The author of this starts with a discarding reference to Hinduism, as a religion tending to repress individuality, the key to friendship lying in this. There is truth in the last clause; but there is a singular want of truth in the preceding clause, for which he makes no one responsible beyond himself. So he leaves us only one point to deal with. It is difficult to find any religion in which the individuality of the man reaches the height and emphasis attained in Hinduism old and later, from about the 8th century B.C. onwards, that is, from the day when man began to realize, not only that Deity was fundamentally one, but also that man's nature was fundamentally That Who is Deity. So completely was this a consummation of the idea of the 'individual,' that Indian polytheism became ultimately an immanent monotheism: "many the forms but all are One"—and, as inherently divine, the self attained a perfected

1 Published in the K. B. Pathak Commemoration Volume, 1931. 575
singularity which all but excluded in language, save in the literature of one cult, the use of the word ‘self’ in the plural.

This being so, we ought (according to the cited clause), in the old recorded sayings or mantras of India, to find so marked a religious conception of individuality forming the key to a notable expression in any mantras on friendship. We do find such an expression. But we do not find it developing synchronously with the new word of a religious mandate. Man elaborates and embroiders the New Word, diverting it here and there to other mandates of the spirit of his age; but the New Word is given him; is, as such, not elaborated. Hence it is later, that the idea of amity between ‘my self’ and ‘thy self’ found a deeper, worthier expression. But it will not have been long after the idea known as ‘That art thou’ reached and unlocked this further door. That note was struck in the teaching associated with the Sakyamuni.

I have said ‘not long after.’ This is not because I would see, in the records showing this teaching, which are known as the Pali Piṭakas, compilations dating soon after the compiling of the older, greater Upaniṣads, wherein we find the oneness of the individual, Divine and human, at its apogee. On the contrary, I see in the Piṭakas compilations of a later period, ranging from the reign of Aśoka till the last century B.C. I say ‘compilations’; I do not mean, that for the three preceding centuries a thesaurus of oral sayings was not growing in bulk. But the compiling these into connected ‘discourses, vaggas, nikāyas,’ ‘books’—all this was later work, with which went an indefinite amount of editing. But many of the Sayings, surviving in a more or less fragmentary state, and the inspired
mandates themselves will date, I believe, from an earlier day, even from the day itself of some of those Upaniṣads we now call pre-Buddhistic. The Sakya mandates are one thing; the completed Pīṭakas are another. And just as, in those Upaniṣads, individuality in idea touches its highest religious development, so, in the Sakyan mandates surviving in the monastic elaborations of the Pīṭakas, there appears a new and remarkable development of the idea of amity. It was based on nothing less than a new ground for the cherishing of friendship between man and man.

Friendship among men was not the new word. That was indefinitely old. Man cannot live in sodality without it, however circumscribed be the group-limits within which it be exercised. Life is, even now, a matter of intermittent peril, but in earlier epochs peril was chronic, as was also, more or less, famine. And it is in peril that the comrade-relation emerges most. We still know it in war, at sea, on the heights, in exploring. The friendship of the comrade comes then to a sharp accentuation, the after-sweetness of which is abiding. It is a matter largely of potential and actual warding of the bodily life as being in the comrade's hands. If with it there goes a fellowship in ideas, purposes, tastes, in which mind may ward mind, the comradeship becomes all the more that which we now understand by friendship. In all this the Indian had nothing to learn, when there came to him the New Word that, as man, he was as God—that he as man was Divine. The warding forces of nature had annexed the term 'friend.' Mitra may have meant mihir, the sun, in Persian-Aryan sources, but it was as friendly-divine that the Indian Aryan valued the word. And he pictured all that went to compel the fulfilment in
rites of his prayer as a friend coming as ally to his help in a fray.¹ The old literature is poor in passages on friendship, but the friend is there, whether as God-comrade, in Mitra and Varuṇa, to ward this bodily life, or as man-comrade to do no less.

But when Sakya was about to be born, there had come a new note into the former, the God-comrade relation. This was a new reason for warding life. In it life became no mere transient coming-to-be and passing-away of an earthly body. Man as inmate of a body, had been subject to, had exercised affection for, man as inmate of body. And not as friend only, but as husband, father, as wife, mother. Friend with friend, parent with child, conjugal pair mutually: herein was play of affection, covering both ‘man’ and body as ‘priya.’ (I do not include mind in any distinct way, for the influence of Sāṅkhya, creating in India a separate study of mind, as not ‘the man,’ was yet young, and although its powerful wedge had got into discussions, it had not yet re-shaped India’s thought.) But now there had come into the concept of the ‘man’ a new inwardness, a sacredness which, in Christian traditional diction would be best expressed by the word ‘sacramental,’ in that of later Greek religion by the word ‘mystery.’ The Christian mystic of the Apocalypse “saw the holy city coming down from God out of heaven, as a bride to her husband.” But the Indian mystic of an earlier era beheld with inner vision the God Itself taking up Its abode within the man. The coming was not new; the realization of the Something implicit in man’s nature was new. Once realized, the ground of that which was ‘dear’ in the

man was transformed; the man himself was transformed. No longer a 'be-minded,' or 'be-manned' body, doomed in a few years to decay and death, he was now akin to, nay, of, the imperishable, the Eternal. He himself was the thing most prize-worthy in all the world. But not for his visible attributes. Within and of him was the value of values; his body was but the shrine, the garbha of the holy of holies.

Was he then to live absorbed in himself, dear only as being himself? Not so, for the friend was even as he, a shrine of the divine Self. So was also the woman of his choice, the child he loved. So too for her was her child and the man of her choice. There was thus come, through a new word in religion, a new infusion of reverential tenderness into the relations of affection. And this new note we find sounded by Sakya, as the new basis of ethics, or the warding of man by man. In the Brhadāranyaka Upanishad is the prelude to this. "That self (Brahman) is dearer ... than all else, for It is nearer. ... He who reverences the Self as dear, verily what he holds dear is not perishable. ..."

And in repeating this in a dying charge to his wife, the teacher says: "... Lo! verily not for love of all is the all dear, but for love of the Self is all dear." This, as taught by (let us say) his Brahman chaplain, the king of Kosala is recorded as repeating to his queen Mallikā and then to the Sakyamuni. The latter makes rejoinder:

The whole wide word we traverse with our thought,
And nothing find to man more dear than self.
Since aye so dear the Self to others is,
Let the Self-lover harm no other man.¹

(Samyutta-Nikāya, Kosala, 8; Udāna, I, 5.)

¹ According to Rockhill’s translation of a Tibetan recension of the Dhammapada, in which the verse cited occurs (but does not in the Pali version), the last line reads: “hurt not others with what pains yourself.”
Read as a European will read it, this verse will not be appreciated. It finds the ground for ethical action in the inference from a principle, which he will call egoistic. And he will, if he be apologist for ‘Buddhism,’ try to explain away the force lying in the word Self: atta-; I tried to do so when translating the Sutta 14 years ago. It seemed then to me impossible that the Founder of Sakya would have taken the saying in the way a Brahman would. I now know better. I believe it is far more likely, that the original speaker of the verse used atta- in the sense in which the original speaker of the Upanishad utterance used ātman. I believe it is far less likely, that the Sakyan used atta- in the sense in which the Piṭaka compilers came to use it, much later. For those two older speakers, the ātman, the atta- was that More in each man Who was potentially the Most in him. And we shall come to see this is so, when we realise, that in the Pāli Piṭakas we have works, which, while they record half-forgotten events of a long-ago, and religious ideas of that day in half-forgotten fragments, are themselves the output of changed and diverted ideals.

Hīnayāna Buddhism has been accused of egoism in its ideals. The accusation is not unjustified, albeit Indian ideals are to a certain extent involved, not those of Hīnayāna only. But let accusers look to it, that they are not reading the modern West into the ancient East. They would not call it egoistic, to see the warding of the fellowman called for from devotion to God. They would allow, that for the Theist all men are, as sons of God, warders of each other, as is the Divine Father warder of all men. Yet this reasoning, with other emphasis, is just what that survival of original Sakya teaching bears in itself implicitly. It is something
far above what we call egoistic. In and of each man is that Most Holy Thing, and it is with That, and not with a be-minded body only, that a man is dealing in his relation with another man. Tender will he be towards him and reverent, as were he dealing with a woman pregnant with maternity. There is nothing new in this idea for us, for the best of men and women among us observe this attitude, and teach it, especially in the right attitude towards the child. But just now we are preoccupied with the brother-relation between man and man. We have not yet come to the mother-relation, or parental relation, which sees, in right intercourse, the man warding his fellowman as the child who is becoming, who will eventually become That Who he is in germ.

The brother-relation was not in the day of ‘Sakya’ developed in India. The word of course, ‘brother,’ was there, but never did a man call his fellow ‘brother,’ ‘brethren.’ He did not even call his blood-brother by that word. He was just ‘tāta.’ It is the Christian parallel on the one hand, and the difficulty of conveniently rendering the monk-appellatives: ānuso and āyasmā, together with a certain scruple in fitting ‘monk’ to bhikkhu, that led Rhys Davids, and after him present-day votaries of Hīnayāna Buddhism to use the word ‘brethren.’ The Christian analogy was of course very strong, and the difference between ‘monk’ and bhikkhu was exaggerated. Early Christians did address each other as brother, brethren. The very first public utterance recorded after the Founder’s death has the words ‘Are ye not all brethren one of another?’ But, in Sakyan records, even when the Founder is seen

1 Speech of Stephen the Martyr.
tending a sick disciple and rebuking his neglectful fellows, he does not use such a saying, or such a word.

And the ethic in the verse is negative: it is the ethic of that Dhammapada verse of the bee extracting honey or pollen without harming the flower. That the bee actually rendered service to the flower is passed over. This negative idea of well-doing—the keynote of Jainism and the main chord in Sakyan morals—was more; it was Indian. Averting the undesirable was stressed more than bringing about the desirable. To be well was to be 'not-ill.' Had it been otherwise, the whole trend in Indian religious thought would have been different. For, one day, a teacher tried to bring in the ideal of making the Better to become, of the New, the Added, the Growing, the Positive, but in vain. The teaching wilted and shaped otherwise. This happened with the creative ideal worded as a Becoming More. This happened with man worded as becoming the more in his life as a whole, figured as a Way in the worlds. The simpler idea stuck fast, that man is, does not become (only the body, it was held, did that); that man as the Highest was the Not-perishing, the Unchanging, the Stable. We too are a conservative people, we of Europe, but as compared with India we are less so. We have found the word for the motor of change: the 'will.' India never found it, that is, she lost the Aryan root-idea. I have said this elsewhere.¹ She chose on the whole the way of the negative in her self-expression, and with this result, that the possibilities conceivable for man in his becoming were more and more tied down to life on earth.

But in its first days Sakya was little touched by these

¹ See Sakya, and later works.
limitations. Its most noteworthy ideas were positively worded. Always it strove to express a More in the man; this was developed later in the theory of the Arahan, a word which in Veda sayings meant nothing more than 'fit for,' 'suitable,' 'worthy,' as applied to this or that. It described the man, not as 'is' or 'is not,' but as becoming. It figured this becoming as a Way through life as a whole to the consummation, and man the wayfarer as so far unfinished; as the To Be. It strove to make good the want of words for will and choice by notable idioms of energy. And the man's recognition of fellowman as co-wayfarer was most-worthily expressed as a suffusing of the more that He was into that fellowman: —amity, pity, joy, poise With these four as not originally Sakyan, but as adopted very early by the founders I have dealt elsewhere.

Of the four, amity, mettā is by far the most frequent in the records. And it is only in mettā that we come upon the idea of a relation between man and man, which is independent of all social and worldly relations. It was the more in man calling to the more in man. The comradeship of body and mind of which I spoke at first is usually worded by sahāya. But mettā only appears with the distinctive qualification of 'freedom of mind, or purpose': chetovimutti. In mettā the man, the Self, met the man, the Self, divested of other relations.

Hence the accompanying belief in its tremendous possibilities, namely, the power of warding off harm from threatening foe or beast. It was only the mother-love in a beast which was held to have this potency. I will return to this.

It is interesting to trace the influence of monasticism on the cult of mettā. Cut off from all human relations
save those of friend with friend, and of teacher and pupil, monastic life will have served as a stimulus to that amity which was solely and absolutely disinterested, at least in theory. I can well believe, that monastic Buddhism, even with its wilted concept of the self, availed in this way of monk-life to hand down the original emphasis on amity. Buddhist monks were no less notorious for quarrelsomeness than the monks of other cults; but then it is the quarrels that get into the records as calling for rules. The Sangha upheld the importance of mettā and left that as a worthy legacy to India. But it was a fostering of the virtue in unhealthy, in hot-house conditions. It could not attain wholesome, sturdy growth save when the man, in midst of other human relations, asserted and fostered the culture of the one relation which distinguished him as very man, and was based on the ultimately true attitude towards his nature and his life:— the man as bearing about in him the true Kinsman, the true Friend, That Who he is coming to be. We should not expect to see the plant of friendship fostered by monastic conditions developing between monk and layman; it did not. But neither should we expect to find it developing between monk and monk; it did not. I do not say it was not held in lip-worth, and, among chosen spirits, in more than that. The Anthologies, here and there bear witness to this, the only eloquent testimony being that of a notable woman, the Founder’s aunt:—

āraddhaviriyā pahitatte niccam dalhaparakkame
samagge sāvake passa! . . . esā buddhāna vandanā!
Behold the disciples in concord ever, with strenuous energy and the self established, stoutly advancing— this is the (true) worship of enlightened men!

(Therigāthā, 161.)
And in such lines as those ascribed to Gotama, a brahmin disciple:—

mittam idha kalyānam sikkhāvipulam samādānam
sussusā ca garūnam: esa samaṇassa pāṭirūpam,

(Theragāthā.)

Religious friendship in the Rule, a course of ample training, and the wish to hear men fit to teach:—this the recluse beseems.

we get the term, elsewhere called kalyāṇamittatā expressive of that amity between man and man as such, which our own Jeremy Taylor well expressed as "made, not by nature, not by contact, not by interest, but by souls." In other words, growing not out of juxtaposition of circumstances, nor out of worldly relations, but out of an appreciation of the man by the man. In such a relation, as Emerson well said, unaware perhaps how well it fitted the case for India, "truth and tenderness are the main elements": truth about that which each sees in the man, and tenderness for That holy thing Who he as man is.

But when we look for particular cases of such friendship in Pali literature, the absence of them is striking. I can cite no lovely lines like those of David to Jonathan, nor episodes which in another poet would have called forth such an utterance. Mettā was indeed highly valued, and was, with the fourth vihāra, 'poise,' as pity and joy were not, a qualification in 'supramundane' (lokottara) training; nevertheless the accepted definition of the Arahān was that of the lone man: eko, adutiyō, un-seconded: eko vūpakaṭṭho ... tad anuttaram brahmačariya-pariyosānam ... vihāsi.

'Alone in retreat ... lived this supreme end of the

1 I owe these two citations to the art., "Friendship," E.R.E..
God-life.’ And to the question: Who is the man’s second (i.e., mate)? the answer is Faith—

Saddhā dutiyā purisassa hoti (Sānyutta-Nikāya, I, p. 38, P.T.S.).

Nor was mettā likely to be appreciated in its true worth as the ideal relation between man and man in a teaching, where the reality of the man was being ever more sapped at the root. The worth of it, especially in those four so-called Brahmagānas (p. 583), could only be maintained by an implicit belief in the reality of the man, when body and mind were discounted. It thus involved a perpetual unspoken contradiction between theory and ideal practice.

I judge then that, in the high, the new value placed in mettā, patent in the Pāli scriptures, we have the surviving outcome of a gospel, preached by Gotama and his men (most of whom were Brahmans), who were themselves filled with amity toward men, who had accepted the current Brahman ideal of the man as akin to Deity, and who sought to advance it by seeing man so conceived as not just being, but as in a way or process of becoming That. And the monk-vehicle of that gospel, in developing into an ever larger, more self-contained world of monks, was on the one hand in a position to force the growth of mettā, was on the other, both by their artificial sodality and by their repudiation of the man’s reality quā man, only able to maintain the tradition, but was not capable of producing really fine cultures of the relation.

There is one interesting, and in a way anomalous handling of the subject of amity—this time in post-canonical writing—where imperfect treatment is due to lack of fit words, and I may add, lack of exploiting
a new and useful word. I invited comment on this a few years ago\textsuperscript{1} and received none. I will here be my own commentator.

In the Dilemmas section of the Milindapañha this point is raised: Of the eleven benefits accruing to the man who fully 'makes-become' amity, one is, in that Sutta passage, said to be his immunity from harm through fire, poison, or weapon. Now in the Sāma Jātaka, Sāma so practised \textit{mettā}, yet was he all but mortally wounded by an arrow. Either then the Sutta has a false statement, or the \textit{mettā} is falsely ascribed to Sāma.

The problem, on the surface of it, is not hard to solve. At the moment of the arrow piercing him, Sāma was not sending out \textit{mettā}; he was engaged in drawing water. Incidentally it is interesting to note, that the writer had in mind (or before him) a different version of the story, in which Sāma is represented as disturbed by the upset of his water jar. In the version we know, he is acting with utmost calm and poise. None the less he was not practising \textit{mettā} at the moment, and the explanation is not invalid. You must, says the apologist, hold a tarn-root in your hand to be invisible; you must enter the cave in rain, would you not get wet. You must be \textit{willing mettā}, for it to make you immune.

But the last clause is not so worded. The words are: "These are not virtues (i.e., the eleven benefits) of the man (\textit{n'ete gunā puggalassa}); these virtues are of a making \textit{mettā} to become\textsuperscript{2} (\textit{mettā-bhāvanāya' etc. gunā}).

\textsuperscript{1} J.R.A.S., 1924, p. 442.
\textsuperscript{2} Rhys Davids here translated "they are in... the love that he is calling up in his heart." This is very free, but his note on \textit{bhāvanā} deserves utmost attention (S.B.S., vol. xxxv, p. 281).
Now here, as I suggested, the apologist lands himself in a worse crux than that which he tried to solve. He has divorced the man who calls up, or makes become, from that which is his work. The causative bhāv- is hereby stultified; the right word would be bhav-: a becoming of mettā. But unless we make a goddess, a Kwanyin, of the idea mettā, or a divine Idea of a Platonic sort—and there is nothing of either traceable in Hinayāna, into which tradition the Milindapañha was incorporated—we are landed in a great difficulty. We havē on the one hand a Mettā working, willing; on the other a Robottian five-skandhā-ed Sāma wrought upon by that Mettā. And I would here only stress this, which is virtually in my note, that if the apologist had had a right notion of the will, as well as a word for it, he might not have had recourse to his anomalous reason: man is one thing, the creation of amity is another. For that matter the old teaching of the Brahmavihāras ‘put it across’ better than he, when, for lack of the word ‘will,’ it said “he with mind accompanied by mettā suffuses X or Y,” or, as in the Sutta-Nipāta, “makes-mettā-to-become” in a man. Even in early Abhidhamma which preceded the Milinda, mettā is considered as a factor of the citta, and the citta is not yet held up over against the puggala.

It is a problem not without particular interest, albeit of not great intrinsic importance. I do not think the writer of the Dilemmas was a Buddhist. He is careful to show his debaters are dummies, not the real king and sage of the conversations. At the same time (a) his training had been Buddhist, (b) his readers (mainly hearers) would be mainly Buddhist, and (c) his work will have undergone Sangha-editing after reaching
Ceylon. I commend these points to one considering the dilemma, and finally this: Sakya suffered the fate of other religions where a successful first mandate has grown into an orthodox church, annexing current academic culture, and giving it fresh food:—it became preoccupied with the word and the idea more than with the thing. I would not treat the problem as more important than as just a ‘college debate.’ At the same time it may show what some Buddhist monk teaching at that college, say, Nālandā, may have asserted—a straw in the current of ideas about the wilting ‘puggala.’

Were the solution put forward in the Milinda true, it would quash my theory, namely, that the Brahmanic gospel of the man as immanently divine, still fresh when Sakya was born, had, as one corollary, that development in the teaching of metā which is both new and marked in Sakyan records. One result of that gospel was, I incline to think, of a very opposite tendency. It was a ‘God-intoxicated’ idea, and sent men filled with it to muse apart in the then new vogue of the śramaṇa. But men are of all sorts; and in others, more alert in social relations, it would blossom in that heightened sense of the Deity as immanent in the fellowman no less than in the self. In either case it was a mighty awakening to this true thing; that a man is, somehow, yet evermore, a coming to be that who he was not, that he is in a Way, the end of which is not yet, that this becoming it is, which in life he cherishes, both as he realizes it in himself and also in another. As with the better mother’s love for her child goes the sense of his becoming More from day

1 See hereon my The Milinda Questions, 1930.
2 In the earlier Upanishads the word śramaṇa occurs only once.
to day, so in that Indian idea of the Uttermost, inherent, potential in the Man, was implicit the More to be fostered, cherished, made-to-become which, between man and man, found its noblest expression in mettā.
LII

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN EARLY BUDDHISM AND BRAHMANISM

We have an old literature of India handed down by a great class, later called caste, in her sodality: the Brahmans, or as some still prefer to say, Brahmins—a literature which has remained peculiarly that of India herself. If we speak of Indian religious literature, we do not mean the Jain Angas, we do not chiefly mean the Buddhist Tripitaka, nor any other literature; we mean the Vedas, the Brâhmanaś, the Upanishads and what may be grouped as the Vedânta literature. The Jain scriptures have survived in, and remained of, India; the Buddhist Tripitaka has long been lost out of India; but no one would call either the typical literature of India. Hence it is very interesting to consider how either literature came to rise in India at all. Are these two literatures the result of movements in open opposition to that Indian type-literature? Did these movements arise as ignoring it (in so far as it was then in fixed, if oral form)? Or were those movements, from which these other literatures sprang, in sympathy and agreement with the dominant, the older, the still prevailing teaching, and did they only gradually break away from the mother-teaching?

1 A lecture delivered before the Society for Promoting the Study of Religions on January 17th, 1934. By the courtesy of the Hon. Editor of the Society’s Transactions, I was permitted to publish it in the Indian Historical Quarterly, June, 1934, before its appearance there. The Lecture opened a series by different exponents on Great Religious Schisms.
Here is a very interesting historical problem, and not an easy one. Chiefly why? Because, to leave aside the question of Jainism, neither the older, the type scriptures, nor the Buddhist scriptures (the oldest we yet have) help us out in the least with any record of any rupture whatever, as following on an earlier state of agreement.

As to that, the very word for rupture or schism (bhedā) I do not so far find in the type-scriptures reckoned as preceding, or as contemporary with early Buddhism. It does occur in the Maitri Upanishad, which may more or less overlap the birth of Buddhism, but only in the meaning of parts of a whole, not religiously meant. Yet in just this Upanishad (vii, 9) we come across one passage, possibly a later accretion, which looks like a warning against a smouldering restiveness such as may precede open rupture. It runs: "men are saying that there should be attention to dharma, which is destructive of the Vedas and of other teachings (śastras); hence one should not attend to this."

This is all, and we cannot say whether we have here any illusion to the prominence given in the risen Buddhist movement to the notion of Dharma, as mainly replacing the Brahman term for God as working in man as an ever-moving monition—now by us termed 'conscience.' Deussen held that there was here a reference to Buddhism.

Anyway we do not find that this discontent emerged in any open rupture in such relations as there may have been between the nascent Buddhism and Brahmanism. And nowhere do we find reference, in Brahman literature of that date, to a body of teachers identified with this Dharma-teaching by name.
In the Buddhist scriptures there is plenty about *bhedā* in the meaning of religious ruptures, reminding us of St. Paul's anxieties on this score. But one and all such divisions were internecine; there is no reference in the Tripitaka about any rupture with the Brahmins. Four 'Councils,' held to secure *sangīti* or a standardized scriptural reciting, are named in Pāli and Tibetan scriptures, but in all these the unity aimed at is one that has a Buddhist Sangha as its centre and not a Brahman priesthood. Nowhere is there any record known to me of a Council, convened either by Brahman orthodoxy or Buddhist non-conformity, to have it out between them. Neither are meetings on a smaller scale recorded, where convened Brahmins are found censuring Sakyan heterodoxy between themselves, or where convened Sakyans are found denouncing the main tenets of the religion as taught by Brahmins as such.

And so the question may arise: Did Buddhism start outside Brahmanism from the very first? And thence the further question:—Did it start as neutrally disposed towards the established religion of the Brahmins? Or as openly opposing it? And if the latter, is it possible its votaries could have escaped open and persistent censure and counter-opposition from the Brahmins?

Here we need to avoid making untrue parallels between this matter and the history of the central Church of Christendom and reforming bodies. There was nothing in Brahmanism resembling the ecclesiastical autocracy of the Holy Roman Church of the Middle Ages. We cannot truly say, as we could say of the latter, that there could be neither secession from the orthodox church, nor independent start, without the upstarts encountering the open hostility of that
church. Brahmanism was concerned with two main things: the ancient ritual, partaking in which was not enforced on the laity, and the education of gentlemen’s sons. We also come across Brahmans as official advisers of kings. A new body of missionaries, such as were the first Sakyans (i.e., Buddhists) could steer clear of both these activities unscathed. There were many Brahman clans of celebrants, many houses receiving sons of Brahmans and of Kshatriyas as resident pupils; there was room for all of them to work mainly independently, as there is in parallel matters with us. There was also no social feeling adverse to the free discussion of cultural topics, in which religion was not a specialized subject.

But in the early Buddhist or Pāli scriptures there is not a little, which we can lay hold of as fairly good contributory evidence about the relations between Brahmans and early Buddhists—evidence which points, I hold, to something very vital for the first Buddhist teachings. It points to both agreement and disagreement. There is agreement with what was the internal religious teaching of the Brahmans; there is disagreement with what were the external observances among Brahmans. It is of the utmost importance that we keep this double relation in view. I take the former first. (For the latter see p. 502).

It is unquestioned, that when the first Sakyān mission began, the religion of the Ganges valley was, both as a taught cult and as a system of observances, predominantly Brahman. It is difficult for us of Europe to compare the status of these teacher-celebrants with anything similar in other cults. It was a sort of magnified tribe of Levi in Judaism. It attached value to hereditary descent comparable to
what may be found in an exclusive aristocracy. It claimed monopoly in the right of teaching and repeating the (orally) fixed hymns and mantras of authoritative religious doctrine. It claimed the right of training in such teaching the sons of nobles and its own children. It claimed a monopoly of conducting such ritual as was in accord with its body of oral sayings on the subject.

As to the inner teaching of matters spiritual, Brahmanism was itself still throbbing with a great religious reform, with a form of what we now call Immanence, of God as not externally conceived, as is for example, relatively true of Judaism and early Christianity, but as identical in nature with the very centre of human individuality. That is, of course, not with man’s limited body, nor with any inner functioning that we might call mind on sense, but with the user of all these, with that who experienced by these, valued by these. In other words, the Brahman teacher had come to believe in God as identical with the self, soul, spirit of man, or with, as India more wisely said, “the man.” This was a great change from the older Vedic way, which sought Deity without, above, around, in rites and soma-juice. This said: “seek God in your very self, your best self. You are That; seek That; know That; thus can you become safe, free from fear, bound for the Immortal.”

Here some may say: In that teaching Buddhism in a way is more like the older Vedism, for in the Pali Suttas we find a personal Deity, not the impersonal ‘Brahman’ of the type-literature, but Brahmā, a masculine personage, as the one Creator and Disposer of things. Here is no reference to an immanent Deity. Yes, and such a personification we also find in the
very teachings of that immanence, in the older Upanishads. There also (if hardly ever) do we find Brahman as Brahmā, sitting on a throne in a heavenly hall and speaking to a human visitor. But with this difference from the Buddhist references:—In the Upanishad the personified Brahman is identified with the human self. "What Thou art," says the visitor, "That am I." So we see that it is a picturesque way, for youthful hearers, of making it possible to speak of the ineffable. Just as in the Old Testament prophets, the ineffable Deity, named with the groping utterance, "I am That I am," is personified as revealing Itself as "The Lord," an autocratic monarch. The Upanishads called this way of speaking 'the two Brahmans': the phenomenal and the superphenomenal, the latter only to be described negatively as akshara, amṛta (imperishable, immortal).

But in the Buddhist reference we have the Brahmā picture left uncorrected; we have the phenomenal Brahmā only, with the identity with man left out. The immanent Brahman is there, in the Suttas right enough, but surviving only in compounds: brahma-chariya, brahmachakka, brahmabhūta and brahmavihāra. And the lively presentations of a Brahmā, who is, not Alpha and Omega, but just the titular name for the governor of the Brahmā-world, is due to the renascence of Deity as personal that was going on in India when the Pitakas were taking shape as literary compositions, perhaps some 300 years after the birth of Buddhism. With Brahmā as personal were coming up a masculine, not a neuter Shiva, and the Vedic Vishnu was reborn. (And it is not impossible that it was also in a later editing, that the old Upanishad came in for that more childish, if poetically more impressive vision of a regal
Deity). The later Buddhism was only conforming to the diction of its day, when it referred to this regal Brahmā in terms befitting a universal monarch, such as existed in the ancient tradition of the Chakravarti (world-conqueror), and for that matter had, in the Mauryan dynasty, materialized as a political fact.

But let us go back those three centuries or more to the birthday of Buddhism, and find out, if we can, what were the relations between the first Sakyan missioners and Brahmans. There are many Suttas, roughly one hundred, telling of meeting between them. In almost every case the meeting is, in these Suttas, marked by courtesy on both sides. In some cases, where the Brahman visiting or visited is a magnate in property or learning or both, the Saykan founder is treated with honour and his views are accepted. Where one young Brahman has shown marked rudeness, his teacher, of high fame, calls on the founder to apologize for him. There is shown a wish to obtain 'Gotama's view on several subjects, and this, not as in certain Jain interviews, for purposes of heckling and dispute, but in order to learn what a teacher of high standing thought. Even before Gotama begins his mission, we find him consulted by an earnest-minded Brahman as to what makes the (true) Brahman. I do not wish to over-estimate the respect here alleged as shown. The Suttas are the work of prejudiced compilers, and we have no Brahman counterparts of these interviews. But it is evident that the Buddhist editors retained no tradition of any chronic ill-feeling as existing between their founders and Brahmans.

Next, in all these talks, the central tenet of the Brahman teaching of that day, Immanence, is never
attacked by the Sakyans, nor brought up for debate by Brahmans. Let this never be overlooked for overlooked it strangely is. Contradict me if I have overlooked anything to the contrary. For me, it is not merely contributory evidence; it is crucial. Never do we find Gotama (or his men) attacking Brahmans for seeing Deity in manhood, nor do we find him attacked by Brahmans for holding any contrary and therefore damnable view hereon. Never do Brahmans charge him, in these interviews, with denying either Deity (i.e., Brahman, Source and End of all), or the aspect of Brahman as man’s very self in essence, as man’s ideal Self. Consider, had the opposite been the case, how much the later Buddhist editors, in their detractation of the self, would have made of such debates! How would they not have shown their founder triumphant over his opponents! Compared with the heat we can imagine in such non-existent attacks, the few occasions when Brahmans do come with a grievance are as very milk and water.¹ Consider how much those editors did make of such debates of three centuries later, when the issue did lie between (a) the man as a real entity and (b) as only to be ‘got at’ as so many dharmas, constituents of body and mind—I refer of course to the Patna Debates in Asoka’s day. There the debaters maintaining man’s reality were the surviving upholders of the old, the original tradition. It was its own house, which, in the opposite side, turned and rent Buddhism; it was not Brahmans.

A third point is, that in the older Anthologies of the Canon (the Tri-Pitaka), the truly worthy, good man is over and over again called ‘brahman.’ To quote one of many in Dhammapada and Sutta-Nipāta:

¹ E.g., on behaviour towards the aged.
“Whoso has come to know in every way decease of beings and their going to be, without attachment, wellfarer! awake! that man I call a Brahman!"

Do you not agree that it is putting a great strain on probability to judge, that the Sakyans would have so termed the saint as revered by them—and that linked with the very words ‘sugata, buddha’ (wellfarer, awake) had the word ‘Brahman’ meant for them a man holding views they detested?

There is one more point hinting at a closer relationship between Brahman tenets and those of the Sakyans, which is all I have time to add. This is that, of the ten or eleven chief disciples cited as often surrounding the Founder, eight were Brahmans, and only three or four of his own class.\(^1\) I do not think this is taken up into our picture of the first missioner as it should be. Do you say: But may not those Brahmans have been rebels, seceders from the tenets of their class? And may they not have come into the little band, because they thought it was out and up to oppose those tenets, that ritual?

Well, what is the record about the coming in of any of them? In the Canon we have only that of the two reckoned ever after as the ‘chief pair: Sāriputta and Moggallāna.’ These are said to have been earnest seekers after amata, which we should call immortality. They were disgruntled with their teacher Sañjaya, but he was a noted sceptic or sophist, a man unlikely to have been teaching the sublime faith of the Upanishadic Immanence. But the quest of these two was Upanishadic, and was the then accepted Brahman creed. And yet it was in Gotama that they appear

\(^1\) Brahmanes: Sāriputta, Moggallāna; Koṭṭhita, Kaccāna, Kassapa, and Sāriputta’s brothers; Chunda, Revata. Kshatriyas: Anuruddha, Kappina, Ananda, Rāhula.
to have found their good guide, with no recorded abjuration of what they had taken as their ideal. They may have thought their Brahman teachers were not helping them in an adequate way. They were perhaps like Nicodemus the Pharisee, coming to Jesus by night, to get a better Way in religion, than he as a 'teacher in Israel' had found. There is no hint that Nicodemus objected to the teaching of Jewish religious tenets.

These three points are, I contend, strongly suggestive, that the first Sakyans were as far from denying the Immanence accepted and taught in their day as were, say, John and Charles Wesley from denying the central teaching of Christianity. So much for the start of Buddhism in its relation to the inner religious teaching of the Brahman teaching of the young. Let us glance at evidence pointing to a much worsened relation, and finally to what amounts, on the Buddhist side, to absence of relations.

If any person has read the Pāli Suttas he may round on me and say: But look at what we find the founder saying to young Brahmins about their teachers, say, in the Tevijja Sutta, No. 13, of the Dīgha-Nikāya. Is it not a very contemptuous sneering attitude, condemning them as men of faith merely, and not knowledge, and as no better than blind teachers of the blind?

This is quite true. And if we would save Gotama from being revealed as a man who said very inconsistent things, we must perforce choose one of two conclusions: Either this sneering attitude is earlier and the pleasant courtesies later, or the mutually respectful conversations are earlier and the sneering belongs to the editing of a later date. Holding the latter attitude, he could
not possibly have been welcomed and consulted as those scores of Suttas allege that he was. Nor could the respectful attitude have come later, when as we can see, the Brahman teaching of Immanence was being ever more rejected by the Buddhist Sangha for an altogether worsened teaching about the man or self. The *Tevijja* has for me a core of very old teaching, for it shows Sakyan and Brahman seeking salvation under the figure of a Way or Path (*mārga*), and it shows us in a most precious way, what that Way meant for the Sakyans, namely, works and not faith only, conduct not ritual. But to sneer at teachers for holding that the End of the Way was, is, always a matter of faith is impossible in the true teacher of religion. And no one held faith (*saddhā*) higher than did the Sakyans. It is the queerest error to hold, as I have seen Buddhist 'verts hold, that in Buddhism there is only knowledge, not faith. Let such read the Suttas more thoroughly.

It is fairly obvious that those Dīgha Suttas are very carefully compiled compositions made up from a number of oral sayings, and that into them comes much that is earlier, much that is later. It is not a thing I say lightly, nor with any charge of forgery. We have just to try to imagine the history of the changing, changed conditions under which the compiling and the much amending of scripture (to which Buddhist chronicles bear witness) were made. And I say, that the lowered esteem of Brahmans as teachers is a later feature.

But to come to the new teaching itself: Was there anything in it to show agreement with, or disagreement from, the cultured religious teaching of the day?

This is a most important point, but it is one I have elsewhere often discussed (*e.g.*, "The Man," No. 1.
Transactions of the Society for Promoting the Study of Religions). To sum this up: (1) We find (if we read closely, and get behind the formulas) the Pāli Scriptures in agreement with the Brahman Immanence, namely, that what is there called 'self' bore the dual meaning of Spirit and Holy Spirit; that man was as it were a dual self, the one, the ideal Self, being One who was to be sought after by the other, the actual self, as being the 'Goal,' the 'Witness,' the 'Guide,' the 'Protector,' the Judge of the actual self. (2) We find that this tenet is nowhere attacked as being a Brahman tenet, but that there is evidence of a tendency to substitute, for attan (self), dharma or sense of the 'ought-to-be' in man.

What then must there have been to cause a man to come forward as, not an opponent, but a reformer of things that Brahmins were teaching? This: I find the early Buddhists soon taking up a standpoint in involving certain disagreements with Brahmanism as to ritual observances, the paying deference because of birth or caste, and the weight attached, and to be attached in religion to conduct or morals. It is this external system that was weighed and found wanting, not the internal system of spiritual values. It is in those external matters that we find the Suttas critical of the established religious cult.

And here remember, that Buddhism was born in the Eastern half of the so-called Middle Country, or watershed of the Ganges and Indus, not in the Western. There is silence in the Buddhist scriptures about the country west of the junction of the Ganges and Jumna, save only in a rare sporadic way, such as reference to

1 See especially the Suttas 93, 95, 96, in the Second Collection (Majjhima).
Ujjeni. I have it on scholars' authority, that eastern Middle Country Brahmanism was in a more morally lax, less organized state than was western Middle Country Brahmanism; hence, may be, the birth and growth of new reform movements in cult in the eastern half, such as Jainism and Buddhism. The suttas do not hesitate to hint that Brahman morals were lax, where the first Buddhists taught,¹ albeit the class-respect claimed by Brahmans was none the weaker for that. Now, when we reflect, that the very central drive in the new mission work of the first Buddhists lay in this, that the one and only test for a religion lay in the life, the conduct of its votaries, and that this was not at all stressed in the Brahman teaching—all the moral injunctions in the Upanishads could go into a single page—we see here a wedge that was bound to force the new popular teaching apart from the established teaching. The Upanishad teaching would seem to have accepted the moral code as making just for social amenity; as what it was proper to do. It is true that we do find one or two isolated but forcible passages about man shaping his future life's welfare by his morals. But the teachings as a whole do not rub this in as do the Buddhist Suttas. And it is even possible, that in these few passages we may have glosses, inserted later, due to the grown influence, not of Buddhism only, but of more morally earnest Brahman editors.

I think, that if we look on these two new emphases

¹ In the Brāhmaṇadhammiṁka-Sutta of the Sutta-Nipāta, Gotama is described as (a) consulted as Sāvatthī by Brahmans as to his opinion of how Brahmans compared with their predecessors, (b) comparing them unfavourably with these, (c) not uttering a word of dissent from their religious beliefs, but only disparaging their moral standards.
as wedges: the negative emphasis of dissatisfaction with the importance attaching to rite and sacrifice and the positive one emphasizing the cardinal importance of conduct in religion (that is, in man as a spiritual being not of earth only), we have the first and main cause of the young Buddhist cult beginning to diverge from the established Brahman cult. Had that first cause been dissatisfaction with the central Brahman teaching of the day, the teaching of Immanence, we should find this included in those other Sutta criticisms of Brahmanism: its externals in observances, its external moral ethical teaching. But we do not.

In fact, the shoe is on the other foot. There is one never-quoted Sutta in the Fourth Collection,1 showing the founder censuring a Brahman for ruling out the reality of the self as agent in myself, in yourself. The Brahman gives it as his opinion that there is no such agent. The founder is recorded as saying: "Never have I had even heard of such an opinion; when you move leg or arm, don't you use initiative? If so, how can you say it is not you, the self, who take the initiative?" This may not be a true memory; or the disputer may have been a young Brahman sceptic of the Academy; or the word 'Brahman' may have been interpolated because, at the time of revising the scripture, the Brahman had become the typical dissentient, or holder of wrong view. But the Sutta deserves to come out from oblivion.

But there was, following these two wedges, another. Or, to shift the metaphor: With those first leakages of disaffection towards the established religion the fission widened, and there flowed out disaffection with the central tenet of Immanence itself. Namely, the

1 Anguttara, iii, p. 337, P.T.S. ed.
lofty uplifted idea of the man gradually gave way, and that in, I think, three stages of decline. Firstly, the man was shorn of the Ideal Man, deity as Self, the God-in-Man. Secondly, the man could not be identified as real save in this or that state of body or mind. This word 'state' (or thing) was the word dhamma used only and always in the plural, as we have in our collective plural: 'things,' or 'ills,' or 'interests.' When you seek the man you "can't get at him" (na upalabbhati); you 'stumble' upon these 'dhammas,' to use the word David Hume used, in a parallel grouping, many centuries later. Lastly, it was denied that there was any real man: there were only these things or states; they alone were real. Man was but a word for the complex of them.

Now all this growth in the third leakage may be found in the Sutta-Pitaka, but with great variety in frequency and emphasis.

First, whenever you see the stock bit of catechism about 'man cannot be ātmā because he is transient and suffers', you should read Man cannot be Deity; manhood is not Godhead. Here it is the Brahman Ātmā view that is denied. It is not atheism; there is plenty to show that man can become the Highest, the Uttermost, the Best, the Perfect, the very Goal if he follow the way of becoming, and if he become all that, he is Deity actually, not potentially only. But the term Brahma, for that Highest, was falling out of favour, together with the dissent from moral and external Brahmanism.

Next, whenever you see, the man cannot be got at save through the mental item of dhammas, you have the working of the new psychology called Sāṅkhya or Analysis: the Humian phase in Buddhism.
Finally, whenever you see a positive denial that there is any self whatever, not merely of a permanent self, an unchanging self, but of any self, you are in the later days of the mediæval scholastics a thousand years later, such as Buddhadatta and Buddhaghosa. These even denied there was a Wayfarer in the Way or Path, or a man saved in salvation, or a doer in doing:—Yes, in just so many words. Utter nihilism! Only ideas! I have found them anticipated, as yet, once in the Suttas, and once at an intermediate period, in the Questions of King Milinda. From the contexts I judge that both are later insertions, so different are they from their contexts, so badly do they fit. It were impossible to give details here and now. I can refer anyone to both and what I have said about them.

This third leakage, in this threefold way, took time; it was more genuine a leakage than were those first two ways of dissent, namely, with observances and with the importance of conduct. But it came gradually to make the resumption of the friendly relations of past centuries impossible, even when moral reform on the Brahman side might otherwise have gone far to knit together and bring them once more into being.

It is curiously hard to elicit anything informative about the relations between Brahman and Buddhist in the centuries between Asoka and the dying out of Buddhism in India. We cannot gather from Asoka's injunctions to tolerance between religions whether he had these two in view at all. A century and a half after his day, in the Questions of Milinda, we find no bitterness about Brahmins, nor anything amounting to interest either. Their duties as a class are recited

1 Buddhaghosa, in his Visuddhi-magga, gives no heed to Brahmins whatever, save to make passing comment on the immoderate eating to be seen in 'some' of them.
as just a matter of social tradition. Later again, in
the Jātaka Commentary, in the "Ten Sorts of Brah-
man" Jātaka, the criticism of Brahmanas, in nine of
the ten, is put into the mouth not of a Buddhist, but
of a rājā, rivalry between whose class and the Brahmanas
was old and social, not religious. And when finally
we see the Bauddhas or Saugatas discussed in a Hindu
Manual of a late mediæval date, the writer's concern
is merely academic.

As to the waning out of Buddhism from practically
the whole of India and how far it may have been a
result of its estrangement from the mother stem of
Indian religion, this would need a separate treatment.
There may once have been, to adapt Shakespeare,
"room enough in" India for both religions. But that
day passed. Brahmanism (i.e., Hinduism) and
Buddhism had to fight for life with the incoming
Muhammadanism. Especially Buddhism, since in it
the worship of the Highest, the Most, the Perfect
was not nominally kept ever to the front. And it was
Buddhism that lost its enfeebled life.

Where, as in the case of decadent Buddhism, that
Highest had become dimmed by concentration on,
not the Most, but the More. . . . I mean, where
arahan and Buddha had replaced Deity . . . ejection
was easier and quicker. Decadent Buddhism could
not stand, and petered out through inherent decay
in its religious ideals, and through India's insistence,
in her own way, itself decadent, but not so decadent,
on man's need of keeping the Most, the Highest,
as his main quest.

To sum up: I have tried to show, that if we speak
of Buddhism as arising within Brahmanism, we mean,
not Brahman externals, either in attention to ritual,
or relative want of attention to the religious importance of conduct. We mean, Buddhism started in agreement with the central religious tenets or principles of the Immanence in Brahmanism of that day. Next, that in drifting apart from Brahmanism, Buddhism, in not attaching importance to ritual and in attaching importance to the religious sanction of conduct, did so without any crisis arising such as we look for in schisms or ruptures. Next, that, while drifting apart in this twofold way (ritual and conduct), it was inevitable that there should be dragged-in a ‘drifting apart’ also in the central teaching of Immanence. In this way the lofty meaning of ‘self’ or spirit suffered in Buddhism the same worsening, though in a different way, which it has suffered in our days in Europe. For us, self means usually our worse self; for India self meant, means our best self; for Buddhism it came to mean something that was non-existent. This, the third and greatest phase in the breach in relations, was aided in two ways from non-Brahmanical movements: (i) the study of mind-ways as apart from the man; (ii) the growth of a monasticism, in which the standard of manhood was lowered to mean, not something capable of becoming Godhead, but something it was better to end. Finally I hold, that this gradual divergence from its parent stem should come more into account than it does, when the causes of the decay of Buddhism in its native land are sought.
A VANISHED SAKYAN WINDOW

The other day I was talking with a man engaged in the work of excavating the venerable Abbey of Bury St. Edmunds, once a proud and famous fane. He showed me fragments sifted from spadefulls of earth. Some were mere scraps of folded strips of lead. These, he said, had gone round the windowpanes of painted glass: an inference from the useful lowly casing to the past existence of works of beauty they had held up to view. And I saw in them a sort of parallel to the opening and concluding words in many Buddhist Suttas, for instance these: cattāro me puggalā santo saṁvij-jamānā lokasmīm, with the echoing close: ime kho cattāro . . . lokasmin ti. “There are, existing in the world four men . . .” And not four only. We find, in the Anguttara-Nikāya categories, that this somewhat emphatic opening is used for three, four, five, six, seven, eight, ten men. In this peculiar window casing, now used, now discarded for a less emphatic predication, there had once been, it seemed to me, a window-picture now broken and lost. Will there not have been a reason why some of these many categories, ranging from ones to elevens, should have begun in this way, while the greater number did not?

You may say: But have we not here, in every case, the actual window surviving with the one framework

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1 Published in the Festgabe to Moritz Winternitz, Prague, 1933. Reproduced in Indian Culture, Vol. II, No. 1, 1935.
or the other? Have we not, in every case, the substance of the Sutta as well as its opening and its close?

Yes, it is true that we have a window, many windows. But we have to account for a peculiar ‘framework,’ differing from the majority of such. Why should a certain number of Suttas begin (and usually close) with this distinctive insistence upon actual real existence: santo samvijjamāṇā lokasmīṁ? Compare this with other similar openings to categories: ekapuggalo loke uppaṇjānaṃ uppaṇjati; āve me puggala dullabhā lokasmīṁ; tayo ca assasadassa desessāmi tayo ca purisasadasse; asappurisaṇca vo desessāmi as āp- purisena ca asappurisataraṇca; cattāro puggalā; idh’ ekacco puggalo . . .: paṇcahi dhammehi samannāgato bhikkhu . . .¹ and the rest. . . . I do not anywhere else find that distinctive insistence. Under the ‘one’ there is insistence of a kind, but it is only on the fact of happening, whether of a sammāsambuddho, or of an eminently bad or good man.

Is there then anything in the content of Suttas having this peculiar opening to explain why the ‘men’ in them are stated with iteration ‘to be, to exist’? For that matter you may say that I am insisting on an emphasis where there is really none worthy of comment. Is not santo samvijjamāṇā lokasmīṁ only a variant in the predication that there are such men in the world?

I venture to think the emphasis is there. Consider! As the sceptical view about the reality of the ‘man’ went on growing among Sakyans, the matter of real

¹ One (kind of) man is reborn, being reborn in the world; these two men are hard to find in the world; I will teach the three colts among horses and the three colts among men; I will teach you the unworthy and the yet unworthier; four men: here a certain man . . . having five qualities becomes a monk. . .
existence will have become of great importance, and with it the question of truth in affirmation will have been often raised. Herein the words vijjati, samvijjati, as supplementing affirmation by terms belonging to ās and bhū, play a part. If we open our Dīgha-Nikāya we come quickly on to such a combination. On p. 3 (P.T.S. ed.) we read: Iti āpi etam abhūtam, iti āpi etam atacchām, natthi c'etam anhesu, na ca pan’ etam anhesu samvijjatīti: “This is neither fact nor real; among us it is not, among us it is non-existent.” Again, in assertions of possible happenings we find vijjati combined with avakāsa, e.g., as to there being opportunity or place (ṭhānam) for something to happen.¹ Once more, in later assertions of ultimate reals and unreals we find the verb samvijjati used (during an indefinitely long preceding interval) in a category of things under this aspect. Namely, the 8th chapter of the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha, on paññatti, takes any name to be sixfold according as it is

- a naming of something existing (samvijjamāna),
- a naming of something non-existing (asamvijjamāna),
- a naming of something non-existent by something existent (vijjamānena avijjamāna),
- a naming of something-existent by something non-existent (avijjamānena v.),
- a naming of something existent by something existent,
- a naming of something non-existent by something non-existent.

Literally, as we know, (sam-)vijjati means ‘is not found.’ This for an age, thinking and speaking with

a certain degree of scientific caution, falls short of 'does not exist.' I judge, however, that the word in the foregoing instances did not so fall short, but was tantamount, at least in an unqualified context, to 'is,' 'exists.'

Let it then be granted that there is a certain emphasis on actual existence in Suttas beginning with the phrase *santo saṃvijjanānā lokasmīṃ.* Does then the content of these Suttas justify the need of such an emphasis?

Let us first look closer into the range and relative frequency of its occurrence. Of the Four Nikāyas I do not find it in the First or Third. I find it thrice in the Second (Majjhima, Suttas 51, 60 and 94), in the category of the man who torments himself, others, both or neither. In the Fourth I find it 57 times, as follows:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sutta</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ekanipāta</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dukanipāta</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tikanipāta</td>
<td>13 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catukkanipāta</td>
<td>36 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pañcakanipāta</td>
<td>3 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chakkanipāta</td>
<td>once</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sattakanipāta</td>
<td>once</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aṭṭhakanipāta</td>
<td>twice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dasakanipāta</td>
<td>once</td>
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57 times.

Thus more than half of all the occurrences are in the categories of the Fours. The occurrences in the Threes amount to more than all the rest (Fours excepted) put together; and the Fours-occurrences are nearly three times as numerous as those of the Threes. Hence there may have been a strong tradition associating this opening sentence with some teaching concerning
men' under four heads or aspects, and a tradition, less strong, associating such teaching with three heads or aspects.

In the Fifth Nikāya I have nowhere (at least as yet) found a single occurrence. In the Third Piṭaka we find the opening only where we should expect, namely, in the Puggala-paññatti, which is practically a sifting of puggala-statements out of the Anguttara. It occurs, however, only ten times: nine in the Fours section and once in the Fives. It has become practically a monopoly of the Fours.

I return now to the matter of the content of Suttas with the distinctive opening. And I have to confess that they contain nothing which seems to merit such a beginning. They are like other Suttas starting with just such a puggala, but without the santo, etc., considered with respect to this or that complex of states or ways. They are not specifically concerned with his being, on that or any other account, real. Our windows here are not showing us anything which is essentially true, essentially real about every man. They depict man as exceeding manifold. He has indeed become a peg on which to hang a bundle. The Fours-Suttas are, as we might expect, much occupied with giving us this manifold in terms of the four alternatives of affirmation and negation of Indian logic, early and later. Thus, 'men' are either walking towards their own good (attahitāya paṭipainā), or that of the other man, or towards both or neither.¹ It is a very excellent feature, this exploring the Many in the man. But it does not seem to call, in some such ex-

¹ I should be glad to correct here a wrong quotation of the Majjhima in our Points of Controversy (Aung and Rhys Davids), pp. 16, n. 2, 401. The Majjhima does not give the Sutta there cited. I return to it presently.
ploring, not in others, for the distinctive opening which is the framework of those 57 Suttas.

But about one of these Four-s-Suttas there is a notable association—an association not with the peculiar opening, yet with the meaning, the emphasis explicit in that opening. It has this opening in the Anguttara (Catukka-nipāta, pp. 95-99)—it is the Sutta to which I have just referred—but when we meet with the allusion to the Sutta in the Kathāvatthu (I, i) we find just the word atti: 'there is':—atti puggalo attahitāyo patipanno. And the reason why the Sutta is cited has nothing to do with the contents: walking towards his own good, etc. It is cited solely in connection with the first two words: the man exists.

In the First Debate of the Kathāvatthu, the earliest, the longest, the most critically momentous number in the whole work, we have, as we know, the Defender of the reality of the 'man,' as an entity not to be merged in body or mind, arguing with a member of the current majority, in the Sangha at Asoka's capital, Patna, who were known for a period as Analysts or Vibhavādins. Five times¹ does the defender call to his aid the tradition that the Bhagavan, unassailable for his truthfulness, taught in terms of the man as real. He did not teach, that the man was only 'to be got at' (upalabbi) or ultimately known, as being so many dhammas, physical and mental. When he said: 'There is the man who is walking towards (or practising for) his own good,' and so on, he meant just what he said.

This appeal to authority, recurring as it does five times amid the defender's other arguments for man's essential reality, is, as stated, so different from what

¹ §§ 74, 136, 147, 157, 236.
we might try to make him say, is, as stated, so apparently lacking in cogency, that readers’ sympathies have tended to side with the orthodox attack. Is it not perhaps wiser to see that something here has been lost or has been changed? Why does he appear as making out so meagre an argument for his side, the side which sought to uphold the great tradition of what the Founder had really said?

We forget, if we say this, that the defender of man’s reality is not here in these debates to speak for himself. His victorious opponent holds the floor, and can make the man evicted say pretty much what he chooses. This may, it is true, have been a more restrained ‘chooses’ when the debate was compiled. The only surviving records say, that Moggaliputta-tissa, president of the Revisionist Council, ‘recited the compilation’ (*pakaranam*) of the debates, for the crushing of other men’s teaching in future. But it is conceivable, that this debate (with possibly the next few also) was actually held in presence of the Council and who knows how large a company besides. We have the debate only as put, after the event, into a fixed form of wording, learned and repeated orally till writing came in; carried either orally or in writing to Ceylon, a country which had no religious tradition of the ‘Tat tvam asi.’ We have to see it finally as committed to writing in Ceylon, with God knows how much more editing, editing confessed to, which would naturally strengthen only the special pleading of the attack.

But when the oral debate came to birth, the defenders of the ‘man’ were still present and vocal. The voting which ousted them had not yet taken place. They were officially still undefeated. And this presence of them has survived in our text to this ex-
tent:—whenever the Bhagavan's affirming of the man is adduced, the Defender (in the Commentary: puggalavādin) is shown both as attacking and as having the last word. The Analyst (called in the Commentary sakavādin, "our" speaker) is never shown as countering the attack till the very end of the debate. He too has to hear himself called "refuted, yea, well refuted." It is not till we come to the Appeals to Authority, that he counters the 'āthi puggalo,' and also the 'ekapuggalo' (of Anguttara I, 22) 'uppajjamāno uppajjati' with a few sayings asserting non-existence of the man in what sentient experience yields. The isolated recurrence to logical debate at the end, as a second Appendix, occurs, I believe, nowhere in the other debates. It amounts to an attempt to show, that the man is more than can be put into any one word.

Anyway, this last tag of debate gives the Commentator an opening for a peroration on the distinction which his day had come to draw between conventional and ultimate truth (sammuti-paramatthasaccam). Had it emerged in the culture of Asoka's time, we can imagine how the Analyst would have trotted it out, so convenient a weapon has it since become, for both Hīnayānīst and Mahāyānīst. That it is not used by the Analyst is good evidence for its later emergence. We see it beginning in the Milindapañha.¹ The Commentator bases his peroration on a text from a Dīgha-Suttanta,² but it is unfit to support any assertion beyond this: that names, words, are in themselves no guarantee of essential truth. The reality of the 'man' has a surer foundation than the expression of it in

¹ Mln. 160. Sammuti occurs once, separately, in a later Debate.
² D., I, 202 (Poṭṭhapāda).
words. It is an inexpugnable conviction, not to be upset or confirmed by appeals to verbal expression, however high the traditional authority assigned.

I come back for a moment to the words in which the defender makes his appeal. Namely, that he does not use the distinctive opening of the "four men as being, existing in the world, who," etc.; he begins simply with atti puggalo, and then for some lost reason adds, not four alternatives about hita, but just the one qualification: attahitāya paṭipanno.¹ This form, too, is maintained in the 'Appendix' of appeals to authority. This leads us to ask, whether the word atti can convey any emphasis as to reality?

I am dealing with a time prior, in India, to the written book, hence an equivalent to our 'italics' is out of the question. But the voice could convey emphasis; so to some extent could the form of the sentence. Thus we have the response to such questions as "Is there then a way?" in the surely emphasized words: atti maggo, atti paṭipadā . . .² The question itself may have been emphasizing fact or not fact: atti devā ti; nattti nibbānam.³ So here, since no-confirmation of existence can be got out of the attahitāya paṭipanno, it is only possible to see any point in the citation, if we see some traditional stress on existence conveyed by the atti. For that matter the reference may have been to an ancient Saying by the founder which had nothing to do with the alternatives on hita given in Dīgha and Anguttara.

We have now found five fragmentary features in our digging, which may be tabulated as follows:

¹ E.g., Samytta, v, V, 7; Anguttara, i, 180, etc.
² Majjhima, II, 130, 212.
³ Ibl. Nos. 90, 100; Mmn., 326.
(1) a peculiar opening to certain Suttas, so worded as to stress the real existence of that about which things are predicated: *santo saṃvipjajamāna lokasmīm*;

(2) no apparent justification, in the things predicated, for the stress;

(3) the stress does not refer to ‘man,’ but to men, usually three or four sorts, who are identified with specific dispositions or ways;

(4) a much stressed association asserted between one of the Suttas, having, in two books that peculiar opening, and the alleged feature in the founder’s teaching, that the ‘man’ really existed *quā ‘man,’* not merely *quā* complex;

(5) the Sutta so associated is (apparently) cited partially, not with the peculiar opening, but with just the word *atthi,* an opening in which there may, or there may not be stress on real existence.

Can we from these fragments reconstruct our ‘window’?

No, we cannot, if we see our fragments as pieces of synchronous work. If we place them in historical perspective, I incline to think we can.

Firstly, as to (1) and (5): we can imagine the first Sakyans expounding their teaching about the ‘man’: *purisa, attā,* his nature, life and destiny, with an *atthi,* long before there will have been a business of drawing up numbered categories: *dhe, tayo,* etc. At the same time the use of *atthi* will not have stressed real existence. Why should it? They had as yet no need to do so. Only a mad teacher would have queried that the man was anything but real. (There is no ruling out the
attā in the 'Anattalakkhaṇa-sutta.' There is only a warning not to see the 'man' in the tools.) On the contrary, they taught at a time when the reality of 'me' and of 'thee' had been immensely strengthened and deepened by an accepted cult of immanent divinity.

But be it never overlooked, that this wrong 'seeing' became, before long, a growing danger. The Sāṅkhya vogue of distinguishing the mindways from the very 'man,' and of analyzing these was an ever-increasing prepossession. The rich variety in man's inner world was emerging: the thinking rather than the thinker. And the sovereign man himself was tending to fade out of the picture. Kauśītaki had uttered a warning as to this. It was not on the 'man,' on whom the attention of later teachers was bent; it was on that plurality of his inner world which they were coming to call dhammā: no longer just 'things,' but 'things-as-knowable,' as to be experienced, Vorstellungen, Werte, worthings, values.

We may see this shifting of interest going on in the mass of the Suttas in the Anguttara. Attention here and there is still retained for the man, not men; for the man who is twofold, threefold, manifold. E.g., the man as trainer with four methods, the man as warrior in four ways, the man who is more worthy (sappurisataro) or less so, on four grounds, etc. But mainly it is less the man that we find, it is more the men: one man per attribute or disposition. It is the many as such that is preoccupying these later teachers; the many things rather than the unitary phenomenon of the nature, the growth, development, werden, bhava of the man.

I am not saying that the earlier teaching never had

1 Kauṣ. Up., 3, 8.
recourse to heads two, three, four, etc. Did not the teaching begin with a two: dvē antā, two sides, or ends (converted into a ‘three men’ in the Anguttara). I say only, that the ‘man,’ being more impressive than the many men, I can rather hear them teaching about him in the form we may see surviving in the early Abhidhamma Mātikās:—in the Vibhanga on the khandhas.1 The ‘man,’ it is true, has here been made to give way to a resolution of him into five groups of dhammā. But each of these is analyzed into a unity which is duvidhena, tividhena, catubbhidhena, etc., and beneath each of these sections we get atti this, atti that. I suggest that we may here have a mode of categorizing at least as old in traditional form as the arithmetical progression of the Anguttara lists. And it is just possible, that this form may have served for that teaching about the purisa or atta, the seeking whom was the first public injunction of the Šakyaṃuni. In this way: whereas the man is ever One, he may be considered -vidhena, under more than one aspect: atti kāyo, atti cittam, atti viññānam: man as having body, as having mind, as surviving death. (In the Vibhanga viññānam has become merged in cittam, in manas, and so it has remained in Buddhism ever since; but for the first Śakyas viññānam meant the man as persisting beyond this life.)2

Here then is at least a conceivable reason for the association of certain Suttas about the man in triplets with insistence on the reality of him, an insistence which the growing tendency to merge him in mind may have led to the buttressing of him, by conservative editors, with the words santo samvijjamāna. But

2 Cf. art. LVII.
whence the buttressing of a much larger number of Suttas about the man as fourfold?

I see herein a possibility of man's relation to 'the other man' having been included. Man was not to be rightly understood, rightly categorized, out of relation to his fellowman. That this relation, as an integral part of true religion, was in and of the expansion made by Gotama in the brahminical teaching of his day is for me strikingly attested by the rejoinder ascribed to him when conversing with his friend, the king of Kosala. The king, possibly also the queen, as is recorded, have been apparently listening to a chaplain's discourse from the Upanishadic teaching on the preciousness of the (Divine) self who is the man. Ay, is the Śākyamuni's rejoinder, but since that holds good for each man, each woman, see that you hurt not the fellowman,¹ (in whom also is That Most Holy Thing). So run the records in words which, in spite of the woefully deteriorated values shown in the Commentary, have retained the worth held in Gotama's day. Atthi paro (there is the other man), he is saying, and hence atthi parahitam (the other man's good). Is it not perhaps significant, that the attahitam and the parahitam are the subject of the one Sutta selected by the Defender of the Man, in his appeal to the Founder's having taught the reality of the man? Have we not perhaps here that original catubbidhena puriso?

I may say here that I use puriso, not puggalo intentionally. We do not know when this oddly ugly word pudgala, puggala came to be substituted for the older purisa or pulisa, or puruṣa. I have not come across any inquiry into the matter. It appears in the Anguttara categories as mainly, but not wholly

¹ Udāna, 1, 175, V. i.
ousting *purisa*; moreover it occurs as a compound of the two: *purisapuggalo*, bridging as it were the traverse. We find this used with appreciation, e.g., Ang., I, 130, with depreciation, ibid. 32; Sāny. IV, 307, 309, with both, ibid. I, 206; Ang. 1, 173, 189; III, 349. And it is especially associated with the stock description of laity and sangha, with reference to the Way as fourfold. A rehabilitation of *puggala* as not just ‘male’ but as ‘handsome male,’ belongs only, I believe, to mediæval Sanskrit. For the Pali Commentator the word *puggala* has a very worsened exegesis, viz., *pun-gala*: hell-crier or -swallower, revealing to us how set the monastic teaching became on blotting out the ancient lofty implication of Puruṣa, and on showing what a ‘rotter’ the man was when bereft of his divinity. Our translations lose all this change in values. ‘Person,’ ‘Mensch’ are not essentially derogatory. Almost we need some such word as our slang term ‘bloke’, our old term ‘wight.’

But no protest against the change over from *purisa* to *puggala* survives. Mainly ancient scriptures record, not the doing, but the done! In older Sayings we have the man conceived as revealing in his essential nature the promise of a Becoming of infinite worth, to be realized in the Way (*mārga*, *yāna*) of the worlds. In younger Sayings we have the man only to be conceived as a complex such as he is seen to be on earth, and the perfect Becoming of him attainable only as the waning out of that complex. In the opening words *santo samvijjhamānā lokasmīṃ* I see an intermediate and vain attempt made to stem the shrinkage in the concept of the man, and buttress the transcendent reality of him:—an attempt made, we may imagine, because of one of two alternative conditions. Either
there was a temporary renascence of the older teaching on the Man and his reality, resulting in revision of sayings (or writings) here and there; or, when the Sayings came to be written (at first probably in India), the immense work was placed in different hands, under separate supervision, and a conservative believer in the man's reality may have been in charge of at least portions of the Anguttara, another of certain Suttas of the Majjhima.

These are unproveable suggestions, but they suggest nothing very improbable.

Such is my adumbrated reconstruction of this vanished window. In the curious, distinctive opening I see a vanished tradition of a teaching in which the 'man' was the central theme. The man as in a long way wayfarer towards becoming that who he potentially is. The man as taught under three and under four heads, or aspects: -vidhena. The man in all this as the one very Real Thing that we can know. The man as fading before the growth of the many, the manifold of his inner world of manas, which was coming to engross Indian preoccupation. The man's reality as fading, but as reinstated by that distinctive opening. The tradition of the older teaching of the man being appealed to by the defender of it, reduced to fighting, his back to the wall, for what had been the very heart of it.

I am aware that, in view of the prevailing acceptance of the monastically edited Pâli scriptures, this attempted reconstruction stands as a very Sebastian in vulnerability. Nothing has been cited that can be called more than at best contributory evidence, but the number of such surviving scraps, and hence their cumulative worth are not, in the history of Buddhism,
a negligible fact. It will only be, when we have taken fully into account the many 'left-ins' of the Pāli scriptures, now so much overlooked by both Buddhists and writers on Buddhism, that we shall begin to build up a worthy history of a great religious movement.

I here append another offering sent to commemorate the work and passing of the same eminent Indologist.

GOING FAR OR GOING BEYOND?¹

(*Pāragā, Pāragū*)

I know of but one scholarly critic—happily still with us²—who has equalled Moriz Winternitz in generous recognition of those who, like myself, have been spending ourselves in research such as entitles us to doubt, that the Buddhism presented to us in most manuals on 'Religions,' and by Buddhists of South Asia, is indeed the original New Message brought to India and the world by Gotama Śākyamuni, in the 6th century B.C. Critic, often disagreeing critic was Winternitz; his position had largely been that of the 'manuals' and of Hīnayāna. And was I not trying all I knew to drag him on from that position and make him grow in spiritual adolescence, as I saw it, in his outlook on this particular religion? He claimed indeed to have been for twenty years on the side of those whom Dr. Weller called "us younger men,"³ in that Winternitz, in his *History of Indian Literature*, II, 1913, affirmed, that "the entire older literature of

¹ Published in the Winternitz Memorial number of the *Indian Historical Quarterly*, No. 1, 1938.
² Professor James B. Pratt.
³ *Asia Major*, V, 1930, pp. 149 ff.
the Buddhists was nothing but a great collection of collections, and that the different portions of such collections belonged to different times." (This is repeated in the re-written English version of 1933, p. 4). And indeed the historical attitude in his article to the Geiger Commemoration volume: "Can the Pali Canon teach us something about the older Buddhism and its history," as well as its child, "Problems of Buddhism" in the Viśva-Bharati of 1936, five years later, might almost deserve to be placed as the preface of every research-student's notebooks in such studies. And I would say the same of his brief introduction to the 110 excerpts given us in his Der ältere Buddhismus, of a previous year.

I said "almost deserve"; I wish I could delete the 'almost.' But, if what I have in these last years brought forward of 'left-ins,' of things overlooked by scholars, let alone Buddhists, so unversed in their own Hīnayāna scriptures, had sufficed to drag him almost to the standpoint of the "younger men," it wasn't far enough. Tenaciously he clung to the last to the position of the "older men" (wir Älteren), who have taken their stand on the belief, that "there has never been a Buddhism without the sermon of Benares" (as it stands!): "the middle path, the four noble truths, the eightfold path—or without maitri...."¹ In other words he abode in the dangerous position, that the original New Word in a gospel is to be found in church-made formulas. He admitted "the Pāli sources may give but a one-sided picture," but insisted, that "without them, other sources gave us a quite distorted picture." Granted! But why

¹ Almost I think he had dropped one or more of these Sine qua non's in his "Problems of Buddhism"; I have mislaid my copy.
lean on the *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus* of the formulas cited?

I could illustrate this in detail by showing that, in his selection in the Bertholet Series, named above, he has not picked out a single passage which, so I have found, betrays some old stone in, or under monkish superstructure—found, I mean, as being at odds with the position that is mainly emphasized, and at yet greater odds with the later exegetic teaching. But this were here out of place, and I have done it elsewhere.

Almost does Winternitz’s departure close the brave band of the pioneers, of the ‘Aelteren.’ By these I mean them who were not only the pathfinders but who were, in disclosing the new country, unable to discriminate truly the changes that country had undergone in taking on its present configuration. It is, for instance, going far in the blazed trail to say, as he did that not only ‘collections’ differ mutually in date, but that each has a matter of different dates. But he failed to get further and see, that many technical terms in these can be shown to betray a history: words like *dhamma, attha, bhava, nibbāna.* Herein be it for the younger men to catch up his faltering torch.

Let them for instance consider the singular evolution in values undergone by just one of those words: *bhava,* and its verb, in the history of early Buddhism, i.e., Hīnayāna. For Winternitz it was just *Werdelust,* used, he deemed, only in the pessimistic monk-outlook on more life; not as more opportunities (*khaṇa*) in which the further to ‘become’ or grow, but as mere and deplorable repetition. Herein there arises, in Sutta-study, an interesting point: In such lines as

\[ \text{virajam asokaṁ sammappajānāti bhavassa pāraśū.} \]

*(Ang. iii, 157.)*
(he knows the stainless griefless state: beyond becoming hath he gone) or:

*bhavatha jātimaranassa pāragā* (*Iti-vuttaka*, §46)

(become ye they who birth and death transcend),

and half a dozen other such, we may take *pāragū* (or -gā), literally 'beyond goer,' as meaning either expert knower,¹ or transcend-er. The genitive case of the object may incline the translator to choose the latter. But when the broad loose nature of the Indian genitive is kept in view, the meaning may well have been 'in becoming,' not 'of becoming,' just as we can say 'versed in,' or 'expert in' this or that subject. Now take the earlier Buddhist, the early Upanishadic meaning of 'becoming,' where was no worsened meaning: 'becoming' used for good luck, prosperity,² or consummation, or for the further progress of the soul:—'becomes Brahman,' or 'whither, death to be attained, becomes the soul ?'—and we see that, for the early Śākyan missioners those Pali terms might have meant 'yonsfarers in becoming,' that is, progress in the Way of the worlds towards the final goal, the *pariyosāna*, the *paramattha*. However, I write not as with certainty, for the association of the word *pāragū* with such a monkish sentiment as that of Dhammapada 348:

Let go the past, let go the things hereafter,
Let go the middle things, yon-farer of becoming!

inclinies me to think, that *pāragū* may have been a later term in the sense only of transcendence.³

I commend my 'yon-farer' or 'yonderfarer' to the

¹ E.g., of the Vedas. (*Dīgha*, i, 88 (?)).
² E.g., in *Dīgha*, 19:—"tell master Jotipāla I wish him luck (bhavam hotu!)."
³ Cf. hereon my *To Become or not to Become*, p. 61 f. (1937).
'Jüngeren' (our old English has 'yongate': 'in such a way, in that way'), if only because it is just a literally truthful rendering, leaving it uncertain whether 'of' or 'in' becoming is preferred.

Far more earnestly do I commend to them to keep in full view the original, the Śākyan worth in bhava as 'becoming,' as weren, not merely in this one little earth-span of life, but in life as a whole: becoming, that is, in the worlds. Herein it is that not a few pioneers in Buddhist research have been heavily handicapped. More or less agnostically handicapped themselves, they have found the modern agnosticism in to-day's degenerate Hinayāna attracting them. And herein they have sorely overlooked how close was the tie in the original teaching between the Śākyan missioners and the unseen. Seeing in the Founder of it an independent thinker, they have misjudged him as a rebel against the Immanence in the accepted religion of his day; they forget the testimony that men flocked to him to learn of him the fate of departed fellowmen,¹ or that he spoke to them of the unseen, to encourage disciples to emulate here the good example set them by some amongst those departed, that so they might hereafter share in their fate (their 'suchness').² They ignore the evidence that the urgently enjoined practice of Jhāna was just what is now called psychic training.³ They pass over the description ascribed to king Bimbisāra of the Founder's teaching as not of a secular but a further-world aim (an aṭṭha not āṭṭhadhamme but samparāyiko).⁴ They have consented to see the Way of the worlds as a tidy set of

¹ Dīgha, Sta. 18.
² Majjhima, Nalakapāna S.
⁴ Vinaya, Mhv. V.
eight moral qualities of monkish editing, when the Sutta-nipāta, credited as of early date, could have taught them better:

He who would practise as the Teacher taught,
'Tis he may go from hence to the beyond.
Yea, hence to the beyond 'tis he may go,
Making the Way Incomparable to become,
The Way this is for going to beyond,
And therefore is it Yonderfaring called.¹

The worthy historian of religion is the man who sees not a less, but a higher value in a man's nature, life and religious quest. To have seen a less in these, to have seen man as a creature of a little spell in one earth-life is incompatible with true greatness in the founders of world-religions. The pioneers in Buddhist research have not all or always shown themselves in this as fit men to undertake to write about religious history. They have themselves not been fully in tune with their great subject. This was the case with the fine and indomitable worker whose leaving us this volume commemorates. In the pain of bereavement he could write: "as I do not believe in any mythological 'future life.' there is really no reason for either rejoicing or mourning, but . . ." And there followed a brave list of coming work to be shouldered. Well, now he knows better.

¹ Pārāyana.
We have barely begun the necessary labour of intensive historical criticism of the Pali Tipiṭaka. Nor have similar labours on each of the earlier Upanishads got very far. I say "necessary," in the meaning, that till we have so laboured, we are not in a position to say, as is now constantly said: This and that will have been among the sayings of the original Sakyasons; this and that will not have been among their sayings. At present we read of this and that tidily worded dogma as being "the kernel of the Buddha's doctrine," but not of any sifting of the setting of such a dogma among a mass of monastic values, possibly conceived and worded by monks for monks. Never has the trans-buddhist appreciation of Gotama the Sakyamuni, as a great and wise Helper of man, been so extensive as it is to-day. Yet still we find him uncritically credited with sayings, the logic and wisdom of which not one of us can honestly approve. Surely must the hour be come, when we should ask ourselves this question: Was he indeed such a teacher as comes now and again to bring a New Word of light and leading to man when man was ready for it? And if he was, what have his after-men been doing with his teaching so to mangle it? Sensitive he seems to have been about misrepres-
sentation; a fixed wording has apparently survived about this. Thus to one who spoke of him as omniscient, he is recorded as using it: "They who say the samaṇa Gotama is omniscient . . . not of me are they sayers-of-the-said; they misrepresent me, they do, by the not-real, the not-fact."

Must we then give up trying to find, in these monastic documents, what it was that he really truly taught? Certainly not; the very words just quoted shame such despair. They are what he will in all probability have said; and why? Because the later editors of the Sayings, who thought of him as sabbaññu: omniscient, will never have invented or annexed such a disclaimer as said by him. And if we will but get into the right attitude for seeking such true survivals, we may find more. We must say, as our Faraday would say, when witnessing experiments: Tell me what to look for. To this I would add its implication, made explicit: Tell me what not to look for. Namely, what are the things that Gotama the Sakyān, being the kind of man he is generally admitted to have been, could not possibly, not conceivably have taught?

Here I may be held up and scolded, as scolded I was, if in friendly wise, over my Gotama the Man, being told, that we have emphatically no right to "tell the Indians, especially them of two and a half millennia ago, what a worthy religion, a true message has to be and not to be." To this be it here sufficient to remind my critic, that the Indians of one millennium and a half ago rejected, as unworthy of further tolerance, a religion containing the things which Gotama the Sakyān was, by his later followers, made to say. I am not dictating to, or prescribing for Indians past or

1 Majjhima Nikāya, Sta. 71.
present; I do but contrast, with Indian religious ideals of the past, the sort of things which writers on Sakya or early Buddhism claim to have been the gospel of Gotama, but which India, in banishing Buddhism, pronounced not worthy, not true.

And I say, that for him to have gained the wonderful reception that for a few centuries was his in India means this: that his teaching will not have sought to detract from, or upset the best religious teaching of his day. It will, on the contrary, have strengthened and expanded it in some way where buttress and expansion were needed.

Now the Indian religion prevailing in his day had brought forward with a quite fresh emphasis the fact of the man as becoming, werdend, in manifold ways. Translators, even German translators, notably Deussen, with the fine equivalent of bhū in their hand, do not make this as clear as accuracy bids. But Deussen was hyper-Vedântist, was a believer in the divinity of the static Sat, not of the dynamic Bhū, and he often calls in makeshift terms for the latter. For Indian thought, too, was, soon after the Sakyamuni's time, to go back on its own dynamic blossoming, abuse the concept of "sambhūti," and still later damn the Baudhhas, the Saugatas, for upholding a belief in the very man, the self as by nature werdend.

But before, not long before, the beginning of this lapse, it was in the man's nature as Werden, that Gotama, in his figure of the Way and wayfaring, and in the real trend of his teaching, brought a buttress and an expansion to the reforming Brahman teaching preceding him. It showed the man actually through many lives becoming that who he potentially was. No word had he for potential, but neither had the
Greek before Aristotle. *In the very words used in an early Utterance* the Sakyamuni is recorded as teaching that, whereas it is untrue to say “all” (and *a fortiori*, the man), “is, or is not,” the middle Way is that he is—well, we only get here a monkish formula, wherein Werden, *bhava*, has been as it were reluctantly left in. But if, for the pedantic half-man editing, we substitute the real Man of the New Word speaking, we *must say*: “he is becoming.” *This* is declared to be true, where ‘is,’ ‘is not’ are not true.

So much he will have taught, and by it India, long after, remembered his teaching. Hence that which he will not possibly have taught was a worsening, a shrinkage, an impoverishment in the nature and possibilities of man. In his own way, and it was not another’s way, he will have forwarded the ideal of (I use Radhakrishnan’s terms) the God-in-man, calling it Dhamma (“lovely in youth, middle age, at the end of life”—for so, I hold, the usual wording should be understood), or Tat-uttarim, or Attha, or Pariyosāna—how could a man more fitly name That Whom he was not yet fit thoroughly to know? But to teach that the man, that is, “everyman,” who in the long Way of Werden would come to know That—that this Everyman was not ultimately a real ‘self’: this, I say with utmost conviction, he cannot possibly have done.

So all but buried is his teaching, that to affirm this is all but hypothetical. But buried history, no less than all scientific reconstruction, needs hypotheses; why should we, in historical research alone, be un-scientific? I have elsewhere (in my *Sakya*) likened research in the history of religions to the excavator, digging for some original city beneath superimposed

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1 ‘Beyond that, Aim, Goal.’
ruined cities. Let us vary the figure and see our site as a sheet of water covering a submerged Atlantis, where here and there stands a reef, a rocky fragment still emergent. We hold that such reefs are older than the waters, older than the sand we see beneath, but are denuded of the land once surrounding them. Applying the figure, we might say: sayings or terms denuded of their original context in our documents. And I give here one of the few passages which I deem, from the lack of appropriate context, of supporting emphasis, or from some unfitting feature in them, are reefs of a sunken older teaching, which once had in it the emergent force of a New Word. I come across such fairly often; I may find a little archipelago of them before I have done. But to-day they are not reckoned to be older than the surrounding water.

Here is; I think, one such reef. It occurs twice in the Four Nikāyas or Āgamas, in all but identically worded recensions; in Sutta 109 of the Majjhima, and 82 of the 22nd Samyutta: the ‘Khandha-Samyutta.’ A question is raised in a dialogue, recorded as taking place at a sabbath full-moon conference between Gotama and some disciples, in the Eastern Park of Sāvatthī. The dialogue is for the most part so worded as to dispose me to think, that it is a later ‘set piece’ —a talk in which Gotama in his day never took part—framed to teach layman or novice the tenets come to be held orthodox, about the man conceived as knowable only in body and mind, yet with the earlier teaching (namely of the Second Utterance) still maintained, that he, the man, was not to be identified with either. We have the older phrase of “the beminded body” (saviññānakā kāyo) surviving with the later unfortunately devised category of “shape,” or visible form
(rūpa), and four mental phases, all called “heaps” (khandhā).¹ We have the early interest in causality, but deflected and shrunken to the one-sided monastic interest in it, viz., not as conditioned growth to be stimulated, but in a conditioned series of stages in “ill,” to be stopped. We have the Sānkhyān features, not only of interest in mind as not the self, but of the mental function called “I-making.”² And we have also the stereotyped wording of the monastic outlook on the lure, the danger, the escape from the man’s bodily and mental vehicle.

All this makes quite excellent monkish catechism in that outlook. As the actual response a gifted, inspired individual, strongly individual man-of-the-New Word would make to an individual questioner, they are impossible, unthinkable. Of the dummy here called Bhagavā we should say with Shakespeare, were we not reading of a bookless world: this man “answers by the book.” Too easily do readers, Buddhist and non-Buddhist, acquiesce in the pedant often figuring under the great name of Gotama in the Piṭakas.

But now there is introduced a question of a different kind, not at all “by the book”; searching, vital, breaking away from the crude psychology of the Sānkhya vogue of the day, breaking away from the growing śramaṇa-vogue, monk-vogue of the day: a question of human, of mondial import. I give it in Pāli: Atha kho aṭṭhatarassa bhikkhuno evam cetaso parivitakko udapādi: Iti kira kho rūpam anattā, vedanā... saññā... sankhārā... viññānam anattā; anattakatāni kammāni kam attānaṃ phusissantīti? I translate: Then a certain monk pondered thus in

¹ In Commentaries equated with rāsi.
² As we should say: self-consciousness.
mind: So, sir, you would say: neither body nor mind is the self: what sort of self will deeds done without (the) self affect?

The great man is made out as divining this unnamed man's thought. And this is quite in order; it was a form of supernormal knowledge (abhīññā), not unknown even to-day, which he could and did practise to render help as teacher. But he then proceeds to reply, not to the intelligent self-questioner, but to the company, first alluding to the unput question as one that might occur to some "futile man" (moghaḥpuriso), and then answering him, whose thought he had divined, not in words of direct address, of positive upbuilding in faith, but in another "set piece" of formula! Surely he will have said: Nay, my son, the body, the mind through which the deeds were done: these were indeed not the self (an-attānī); it is the self, the puruṣa who acted through them whom the results "will touch."

I say again, that for such a man, the reply put into his mouth is impossible, nay, unthinkable. But, given the changing conditions to which I have alluded and given the peculiar way in which the records were handed down, and the modes of teaching fathered on the "Bhagavā," then this alleged reply I substitute becomes thinkable, becomes possible, becomes probable.

I may provoke the shoulder-shrugging comment: Thank you, but we have learnt to read critically. Have we not had our R. O. Franke? Have we not, speaking on his work, our Professor Schaeder's sage remarks?¹ This is true and I am glad of it. The

¹ Königsberger Beiträge, 1929: ... "ja die Späteren haben die kirchliche Lehre, wie sie sich in Jahrhunderte langer Entwicklung herausgebildet hat, in die Verkündigung des Stifters hineinzuschieben ... gewusst." (Gedächtnisrede, H. H. Schaeder.)
latter pointed out two alternatives for research in Sakya, or earliest Buddhism. The one was Franke’s: a working to the sceptical conclusion, that valid evidential knowledge of the Sakyan mandate was impossible. But so far is this from being the generally adopted position among scholars, that I still come across the tags: “hat der Buddha gesagt”; “dit le Bouddha,” appended to sayings more or less impossible, unthinkable, in recent works by scholars of our day. The other alternative is the belief (or “hope”) to attain, with “historical tact”—I like that phrase!—to a certain degree of historically objective fact. And this is what I am after, as elsewhere, so in these brief remarks.

The first way, in sweeping away the endlessly recurring baths of formulas and categories, sweeps away the precious babies of surviving bits of world-gospel with them. Or, to keep to my opening figure, sees but a waste of water where once was Atlantis, and overlooks the upstanding reefs.

But even the other way has its own dangers, if it go not thoroughly to work, but rest satisfied, that in a tidy monkish quartett of “Erlösung” by way of “four truths” and a triple Missgeburt of anicca, dukkha, anattā, also monkish, we have our lost Atlantis. This is to take the standards and opinions of Pīṭaka editors for the standards and religious teaching of the day of Gotama and his men. And this is still done by nearly everyone. It is to see the few reefs above in the superimposed sands beneath the waters. I come back to my particular reef.

By the way I did my immature best to apologize for the recorded reply to the unsaid question, in a little work called “Buddhism.” (The editor of the series
containing it would not let me give a title more specifically suitable. 1) I suggested it was a rebuke to the committed fallacy of "Plurium Interrogationum," as if a man were to say, to the question: Have you left off beating your wife? "But I am a bachelor!" Namely, that the hearers were to keep, in their arguments to such certain data as they had: rūpam anattā (body is not the 'man'), etc. Poor apology for a poorer reply! If we only get at the real Sakya, we shall find it needs none of our excuses.

One little word in that monk's intelligent self-communing it is, which reveals a point of rock yet unsubmerged: the word "bho." Has any reader asked himself, how it came there?

When I asked a Singha!ese student this he promptly replied: "He was just addressing himself." Now in the first place, nothing is more unvarying, in Pali prose, than the appellative used with almost every remark made by one man to another—and very wearisome reading it makes. In the second place, nothing, in that prose, is more usual, than for an occurring idea, an Einfall, to be worded in direct idiom. Much rarer is it to find the indirect method: e.g., "it occurred to him, that, given x, y, z, he might say or do a, b, c…." But I have yet to find a passage, where a man, thinking as if speaking to himself, uses just this appellative: bho: sir! I have consulted scores of instances in the Nikāyas without success. Even if the present case be not unique, a parallel instance might prove to be another "reef." I wish it could be found. But I contend, that for a man self-communing to call himself

1 Home University Library, London, 1912. Since this article was written I have re-written the work almost entirely (1934).
so is not the Piṭaka diction. Nor would the editorial
stylists, were we dealing here with a passage compiled
to make up a catechism, have made the monk say
bho. He would be shown saying āvuso, or ambho
purisa, or samma, or tāta. He would not have been
made to say "Herr." Or if he were in thought address-
ing the Master, he would use bhante.

What is this little word trying to tell our historischem
Takt?

And as to that, why in the world have translators
ignored it? 1 What traditori can traduttori be! Clearly
they have not realised how irregular is its appearance.
Where, I wonder, would Franke have brought it in,
in his funny theory of Chullavagga Councils as lessons
in monk-etiquette, which I translated—bless my soul!
—23 years ago for the JPTS? He too has overlooked
it—he would surely have mentioned it—it would have
been an interesting little bone to worry over. Nor
would he have come to my conclusion.

This is what bho taken with its context (but eliminat-
ing the skandha gloss) tells me:

I seem to hear one of those Sons of the Sakya telling
me about it. He is saying: We used to have men
asking us, whether it was possible to know the man
(puruṣa) save in body and mind? They would say:
What then is the man if he be not body and mind?"
We would then say to these: "When body and mind,
Sir, disperse at death and the results of what has been
done in them are rated at the tribunal just after death—
in which you too believe—who will be rewarded or
punished for them? The dispersed body and mind
will not be held answerable for them. The new body
and mind are innocent. The man alone is answerable,

1 E.g., Neumann and Chalmers and myself.
is responsible"—ah! we had no words for it; we had to say "will touch him." ¹

Here we have the bho in its proper ordinary usage. The Sakyan teacher is addressing one of the laity, or one not of his own Order, just as we find Sakyan monks or Gotama addressed by kṣatriyas or brahmans: bhoĀnanda, bho Gotama. We do not, it is true, find monk or Gotama addressing laymen with similar courtesy; they are addressed either as brāhmaṇa, kumāra, māṇava, gahapati, or simply by their name. This does not of necessity weaken my case, in which I see the Sakyan using the politer bho to men not of his Order. The self-esteem of the Sangha will have greatly increased as the monk-vocation spread in numbers and prestige, and it may well be, that the bho, which a Sāriputta would have used in converse with laymen or ‘wandering’ students, had given way to blunter or more condescending modes of address. And as to the presence of the "man" at the tribunal, we know how sharply emphatic is the wording in the Devadūta Suttas on the individual arraigned: ambho purisa! and the thou and the by thee in the assigning responsibility for the deeds.

Now this challenging question will have been handed down as a very important, very pertinent, very serviceable mantra in the quiver of the early Sakyan missionizers; as a rune not to be dropped out; as a saying repeated, without varying versions, at the great Patna revision of all repeated sayings. But either the contexts varied, or had been lost. For whereas the mantra was in fixed wording, the teacher would use, for the context, his own words. Gradually the layman’s doubts about the man being “get-at-able” (uppalab- ¹ See above: phusissanti.
bhatī) save in body and mind had spread to the Sakyan Order itself. And in the great dressing up of the Sayings that will have gone on then, or before, largely at Sāvatthī and after, by busy editors, whose outlook was profoundly modified from that of the Founder and his co-workers, we can see the question, once used as a challenge to sceptical lay-inquirers, converted—perverted—into the heterodox thought of a man pronounced to be a moghapurīsa! The question which Gotama would have used to drive in the reality of the man, the self, has come to be as a nail he is made—O the tragic shame of it!—to drive into the coffin of that man's invisible spiritual reality. The irony of history can no further go!
A HISTORICAL ASPECT OF NIRVĀNA

Dr. Law has once more rendered good yeoman service to Indian research by the way in which, in his recent article in this Journal, he has collected and grouped a mass of material from which the historian of Indian religion can profitably draw. If, to my word of appreciation I go on to supplement, with his permission, one of his Groups: the Historical Aspect (Vol. II, 2, pp. 330-332), it is because of something I fail to find in it.

What we do find is (a) that nirvāna as ‘an innovation or invention on the part of the Buddha’ is (rightly) scouted, (b) nirvāna, as a distinct term of religious thought, ‘is undoubtedly due to the greatest importance attached to it . . . by the Buddha, and his immediate disciples’; that ‘to contemplate dhamma as propounded by him is to contemplate nibbāna’ . . . ‘the ultimate of all that a Buddha taught or would teach.’

What we do not find in this group (or this article) is (a) that the question in two Suttas: ‘What is this that is being called nibbāna?’ may very possibly betray a new emergence of this term in religion, not necessarily as early as the lifetime of the Founder or his disciple to whom the question appears as put, but when those two Suttas were included as authorized recensions in the Canon; (b) the more truly original

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term for the ultimate, or *summum bonum* which, co-existing in usage for a time with the (?) newly emerged term, was by it gradually ousted and dropped; (c) that this older term was dropped from its high estate because of a new bifurcation in values, in meaning, which had befallen the term, the one change appearing in Sanskrit literature, the other in Pali literature.

My object here and now is to make clear what I mean by the (a), (b) and (c) which I do not find in Dr. Law's article. His meanwhile be the merit of my starting to discuss on the basis of his labours.

In dealing with my (b), I shall incidentally discuss (a) and (c).

The whole history of religion is largely an evolution in values: an evolution of what is either a growth in value, or—and this is far oftener the case—a worsening in value. If what I have to show in these fluctuations may seem to the wise very simple, I apologize for the simplicity, the while I affirm that I have not as yet (so backward is historical work on Buddhism) found this particular fluctuation adequately treated.

I have been for years trying to get at what was really the message, the evangel of the first Śākyan missionaries (not called Buddhists till centuries later). Now that message was clearly from the first intended for the people, for him we call Everyman—alas! how much is that not forgotten! And that message took for granted that Everyman, in his religion, was bent on a quest: something that he needed, through which he could evolve into (India said ‘become’) a More than he in his earth-life amounted to, a something that he sought to win. In a 'folk-gospel' like that message, we should expect to find its quest something which was (r) the man seeking to attain, and finally attaining,
his welfare as man; not a welfare without the man; the man must be in it; (2) a quest which is positive, not negative; (3) a quest which is not something as yet inconceivable by man, but is something which he can even now comprehend, or at least conceive. Now in nirvāṇa we have not (1), not (2), not (3). Nirvāṇa is an end without the man in it. Nirvāṇa is an end in negative terms. Nirvāṇa is a word prejudging what is as yet inconceivable, let alone comprehensible. Hence I believe, without going further, that nirvāṇa cannot have been the quest and end set before man in the folk-gospel which Buddhism appears to have been, when, as we read, its first charge to its missioners was to go on tour and teach 'devas and men out of compassion (or sympathy), not to aim at nirvāṇa, but to lead the 'God-life.' Here was no message sent to philosophers or mystics or ascetics, but just to men and women in this world, or for a while in the next. And here therefore I protest against Heinrich Zimmer's recent assertion in his Indische Sphären, that 'from the outset the Buddha-teaching is shown as a way for the few.' He cannot possibly have studied his Vinaya and Suttas to have arrived at such a conclusion! It is yet another libel heaped upon the head of a great friend and helper of 'Everyman.'

Well, then, if not nirvāṇa, what was the word first used for the quest, its way and its end or goal?

It is a curious fact, how many vitally important things about this religion are to be gleaned, not so much from openly asserted mantras and from formulas, as from topics which, as to their title and subject-matter, would seem to be quite irrelevant and unimportant.

1 Cf. Paṭisambhidāmagga Commentary and Visuddhimagga XVI.
2 There is nibbāna, but no man-who-wanes.
Contrast with this an instance from Christianity. There is perhaps in the story of Jesus no more touching object-lesson of the heart of his mission as one of the duty of man to ward, to tend his fellowman than the way in which he washed his disciples' feet. "I have given you an example that ye should do unto one another as I have done unto you." That object-lesson is, as we know, carried out, as such, to-day, every year, in the chief centre of the Christian Church, by the head of the Church. It is not handed down in a different, an irrelevant context. It is not put in a corner.

When, then, we ask ourselves whether, in the mission of another great Friend of man, we find anything similar, we may look in vain if we pay heed to what Buddhists call the central teachings of their Founder, to Suttas, to formulas. Then perhaps one day we may be turning over the pages of the endless often finicky rules in the Book of the Discipline. And we see as we go a chapter of 32 rules about the robes of monks. How dull! we say, and make to pass on —when look! in an account introducing the 26th rule we find the 'Blessed One,' with his cousin and attendant Ānanda, going about the monks' beds and there finding one occupied by a sick monk suffering from dysentery and left neglected and filthy. "Why are they not looking after you?" ... "Sir, I am of no use to them." In a moment Ānanda is dispatched to fetch hot water, and the two lift the man from the foul bed, do the needed cleaning and put him back to rest. Then Gotama summons the monks and tells them what he thinks of them. "You have no mothers and fathers to wait on you. If you wait not on one another, who indeed is there who will? Whoever would wait on me, let him wait on the sick."
How like the words ascribed to Jesus: "Inasmuch as ye have not done this to the least among my brethren, ye did it not unto me." But just perhaps because this little object-lesson is hidden away in Vinaya rules, I never heard or read any Buddhist alluding to it, save once when a layman did so, who had some acquaintance with what we were saying about it.

Now there is another very important saying in those same Vinaya rules, which has nothing whatever to do with the particular rule, which, moreover, is never cited, but which is very pertinent to my subject. Possibly monks teach the rule and its context to monks in South Asia. But it is never quoted by Buddhists, monk or lay, when they address us Europeans about their creed. It is this:

Among the rules on shoes, seats, etc., there is one permitting men who easily got blisters to wear a lining in their sandals. This is led up to by a foolish sort of narrative, bringing in a visit paid at the same time to the place called Champā, now Bhagalpore on the Ganges below Patna, by both Gotama on tour and also Bimbisāra, king of Magadha, also on tour. The king, after convening and addressing village headmen, dismisses them with these words: "You have been instructed by me in the aims, the objects of this life. Now go and wait upon the Blessed One; he will instruct you in the aims, the objects of the life hereafter."

The words 'aims and objects' are in Pali the one word attha (artha). "Of this life" is the usual term dīṭṭhadhamme": seen things; of the life hereafter is the less usual, but current Sutta term samparāyīke.¹

¹ The syllable 'parā-' may mean either 'beyond' in time or space, or just 'other,' 'different.'
Attha, as aim, object, quest could thus be applied to mean things worldly and otherworldly.

Now unless my readers' experience in things said and written by Buddhists be very different from mine, they will not have been told, that Buddhism is a religion the aim or quest of which is 'otherworldly.' Much more likely are they to have learnt, that Buddhism is so essentially in touch with modern ideals, because it is concerned mainly with the good life here and now, a life which is to be led without care as to its being mainly and rightly a fitting oneself for otherworld life. And further, no Buddhist save a Mahāyānist will be prepared to admit, that his own present teaching differs from that of these earlier scriptures in that it is a higher and better gospel, withheld for centuries by apostolic tradition till the earth should be ready for it. The Hinayānist of Ceylon, Burma, Siam will on the contrary contend, that he has and now holds the original teaching 'in its pristine purity.' He says this lightly, because his much ignorance of his scriptures, unknown as yet in the vernacular, prevents him from seeing how, in many things, he accepts as orthodox much that is discrepant with the earlier teaching. He ought for instance to see his teaching as sampārayika, but he does not.

To get, if get we can, at that earliest teaching, I contend that we must use a better historical lens than is usually employed. We must not only weigh the date of one book against that of another; we must see, in each book, a history in little. We must see that it is not only with us that words come to acquire different values, a different meaning down the centuries. I mean, for instance, that our 'wilful,' in Chaucer's day, meant just 'wished,' 'voluntary'; two centuries
later it had come to mean 'stubborn of will'. “What! trow ye that I would live in povert wilfully?” This, of the Pardoner’s Tale, is not the same as the “To wilful men the injuries that they themselves procure must be their schoolmasters,” of King Lear. When are we going to see writers on Buddhism in East and West, recognizing that this sort of thing can also be seen taking place in early Buddhism, not only in different books, but in one and the same book?

To take a recent instance: my late lamented friend and helper Charles Eliot, a man as all know of great parts, industry, sympathy and learning. In his posthumous work Japanese Buddhism, he for some reason thought fit to traverse again the field of ‘Indian Buddhism’ already handled at length in his earlier work. In this chapter he knows nothing of samparāyika attha, declared in my citation to have been just ‘what the “Buddha” did teach.’ He assumes, infers, from certain selected passages, that nirvāṇa is the one word for the religious quest; sees no history going on in the emergence of this term; sees not that a scripture, which took a long time to reach its present bulk and form—a scripture which for centuries was oral only, was amassed at different centres, each with its own traditions of exposition—would certainly, when the day came for collecting all the scattered sayings at one headquarters and revising them, undergo much editing, much revising, so that all the provincial recensions might be brought into harmony with the later outlook and ideas which had come to be held by the metropolitan editors.

Let me for a few minutes go a little into the history of these rival terms: attha and nibbāna, and weigh
whether, as name for the supreme quest, *attha* did not precede *nibbāna*.

We have seen the way in which a contemporary of Gotama is said to have associated him, not with *nibbāna*, but with *attha*, *attha* of a special kind. If we turn to the First Utterance, called ‘of Benares,’ which was a chart or outline agreed upon as nucleus of mission teaching, we come upon, not *attha* as the right quest, but *nibbāna*. Now does this settle matters in favour of the latter term? (I cannot trace any reference to this in Dr. Law’s "Historical Aspect," or elsewhere.) Let us recall the mantra. Critically read, I think it calls on us to vote for *attha*.

It was a call to man as seeking, as one willing to seek, as one able to seek, his own salvation. As such it was a new thing in Indian literature. The man was free to choose which way he would take. (Much has it got obscured by 'the man' being identified with a superbeing who had understood all about it.) The choice before the man is exemplified by a threefold way, a device used also for other subjects. He is warned that Way A and Way C alone do 'not belong to *attha,' that is to what he wants, what he seeks. These are *an-attha-samhita*. But the middle Way B, as middle, is different. Implicitly it combines the two things, wherein the other two, each pursued solely, may be harmful. To give your will free play (essential though it be that you 'will') is dangerous. To tie your will up in rules, ever living as the creature of a code, is also dangerous. In B you walk with a strong but regulated will.

Is not in the context the conclusion logically inevitable, that Way B is *attha-samhita*? The two terms are not seldom linked in the Suttas; hence the positive
form was as current as the negative. But somehow *attha-samhita* has got left out. We find instead four other terms ‘bargeing in’ as it were, in discordance with the context.

What do they mean? How and why did they get there? Why is *attha* not there?

The four are *sambodhi*: enlightenment, *abhiññā*: higher knowledge, *upasamā*: quiet, *nibbāna*: waning out. The value in the word *attha* had changed between the day when the first missionaries drew up their plan and the final (?) Patna revision of versions of the mantra. It no longer meant the religious, the other-world aim. It had undergone a curiously bifurcated value. In Brahmanic literature it was coming to mean ‘man’s business,’ *affaires*, worldly profit; in Buddhist literature it was coming to mean, not only ‘matter’ (that probably came in earlier), but ‘meaning,’ ‘connotation.’ With the long growth of a great thesaurus of Sayings, the linguistic, the literary aspect of these had been becoming ever more complicated. Much, as we tend to forget, had been left to free exposition of a given text or *uddesa*, embodying the *attha*. The specific form, spoken, and eventually written, the *vyañjana*, was, of that, the complement. We even see this late compound inserted in one Sutta: the *attha-vyañjana*, where *attha* separately survives in its older sense in another Sutta close by. In the Commentaries we are incessantly reminded that such and such is the ‘meaning’ (*attha*) of the text.

Now the first utterance remaining ever a mantra of the first importance, it could not be fit to leave in it, especially concerning the supreme quest, a term which had become ambiguous, and in a way worsened. So here the editors got busy, and the result is the odd
feature that, with two things, both called 'not-X' we have a third opposed thing called not 'X,' but 'D, E, F, G.'

But why those four terms? They too are part of the history of Buddhism. The former pair shows a pre-occupation with the new Indian psychology, which men were calling sānkhya, Pali: sankhā, sankhānam, analysis namely of mind. The gradual growth of this is visible in the Upanishads, both in those preceding, and in those contemporaneous with, the birth of Buddhism. The latter pair betrays the growth of the monastic vogue. Thus the former pair give us intellectual superiority; the latter, religious or 'mystic' attainment. All four show us what had been engrossing religious attention during the few centuries following the death of the first missionaries. We shall never understand the history of early Buddhism, if we do not see how these two influences were the main currents which swept it along and down.

A word on that other bifurcation of attha. We may recall the opening of the Mahābhārata: 'This is the excellent śāstra of what is duty (dharma); this is the best śāstra of artha, and is also a śāstra of mokṣa.' Here we have mokṣa as the ideal, not artha. This had emerged by about the 3rd century B.C. Artha had come to mean what it means in the Arthaśāstra ascribed to Kauṭilya, who is said to have been brahman minister to Aśoka's grandfather. Dr. Winternitz (Ind. Rel. Gesch. I, 272) translates artha here by 'das praktische Leben,' and claims that dharma, artha and kāma are 'gewissermassen das Um und Auf des menschlichen Daseins, nach der Indischen Ethik'¹ (i.e., of that date).

¹ 'To a certain extent the round and about of human existence, according to Indian ethic.'
Now whatever be the inclusive date of the great epic, I should put these brief opening lines late, since the author of them has evidently before him an acquaintance with the work as a finished compilation. They may even be of the date when the epic came to take written form, namely, in our era. And between that time and the birth of Buddhism great changes in values had come over these three terms: \textit{dharma}, \textit{artha}, \textit{kāma}. In the Vedas we do not find this trinity of institutes, nor in any Indian literature, if I err not, till the Mahābhārata itself. In the Rig-Veda \textit{artha} means just object, aim: Indra bethought him of that aim’ (\textit{artham cetati}). ‘Agni accomplishing his purpose’ (\textit{artham hi-asya taranī}). In the early Upanishads it is used with this same meaning, and in the middle Upanishads it also means just object of sense (\textit{indriyānam artha}). This last meaning it never has in Buddhism, probably just because it had been pre-empted first for a higher purpose, and then, because of the literary divergence in meaning of which I have spoken.

But in the \textit{Gītā} episode—also a work of some duration in time—we are presented with a history in little of the word \textit{artha}. Thus in Book II, \textit{artha} is profit, namely, ‘which there is in a well-fed pool.’ In Book III it is object of sense, and again aim: ‘he has no object here, etc.’ Then in Book XIII we are lifted to \textit{artha} as ideal: ‘knowledge and vision of the \textit{artha} of truth.’ Finally, \textit{at the end of the last chapter} we come upon \textit{artha} in that threefold insitutional meaning: ‘the persistence with which anyone eager for reward pursues \textit{dharma}, \textit{kāma} and \textit{artha}, O Arjuna, that is the duration of \textit{rajas}.’\footnote{‘Passion’}

However used, the word is closely akin to the active
will of man seeking the needed More. (This is true even of objects of sense.) And this is after all the root meaning of ṛ, arla, a reaching out after. But it is only in the earliest Buddhism, that we find it raised persistently to the goal of man’s religious quest, to a quest that is infinite, is otherworldly. That religion is a quest: this had been repeatedly insisted upon in the early Upanishads. Ever recurs the refrain: “This it is Who should be sought after, Who should be desired. . . .” And following this, the teaching of his day, Gotama is shown beginning his teaching with the same injunction: “Were it not better that you sought thoroughly after the Self?” And one who so seeks is in the Sutta-Nipāta called

əraddhaviriyə paramatthapattiya (ver. 68, cf. 2, 9):

one who has stirred up effort to win the attha supreme.

From all this we get two deeply important, and, I hold, true conclusions: that man in religion is a seeker, essentially and before all else a seeker; that man, in this seeking, may word his quest not necessarily in a word which tries to convey something he cannot yet conceive, but as a Better which, for the time being, is for him a Best. And we now see how in attha we get those three features suitable for a folk-evangel, which we did not get in nirvāṇa. Atiha is essentially a standpoint of the man, not of one who in gaining it ceases somehow to be a man. It is the man who is valuing: this is my aim. It becomes meaningless if, in winning it he wane out. It is he who, as the Suttas say is atthiko, as is the man in the forest sār’ atthiko.1 Secondly, the word is positive, not a negation. It is that which is sought for, is to be won. It is not

1 Seeking 'heart of oak,' good timber.
something that is a NOT. Lastly it is not something which having won, a man judges to be so 'void,' that he cannot value. It is ever true as being that which man, in seeking, ever figures as the Best, the Most he can as yet conceive.

In translating it I have sometimes used the word 'goal' (=pariyosāna), a word derived, I read, from the gaule or pole set up at the terminus of a race. Now that terminus need not always be final; it may be but to mark a 'lap' in the full stadium of a longer competition. As such it is the runner's next objective. So attha in its admirable elasticity can mean either ideally the final goal, or that nearer objective in his quest which the man can yet conceive as the 'best.' So wise indeed were the great Helpers of men. According to them, if we have their very words: "In my father's house are many mansions: monai pollai, stopping places, the homes of many a schoolboy of to-day, which, as he knows, his family may quit even before he leaves school." And: "To-day shalt thou be with me in paradise"—no one looks on 'paradise' as final. Here is no finality taught, no ultimate inconceivable ending. As with the wine at the Cana feast: "the best is yet to come." All betters, mores, highers have their logically ideal point in consummation, in best, most, highest. Man can never rest long in a 'better' with any sense of real uttermost achievement therein. I have tried and found it wanting.

A word on the obscure history of the word nibbāna, nirvāna. When and how did this curious word find its way into India's religious culture? As yet no one knows. As verb, with the confused stem vā, to blow, vr, to cover, with nir, nis, the prefix of diminishing, ending, ejection, the word is unknown in Vedas,
Brāhmaṇas, Upanishads, emerging first in the Mahā-
bhārata and in the Pali Piṭakas. In the latter it can
mean 'put a stop to, extinguish.' Dr. Law might here
have added the lines in the Therīgāthā, which an
English literary scholar (the late Professor Herford)
told me he found strangely moving:

Then going to my cell I take my lamp,
And seated on my couch I watch the flame.
Grasping the pin, I pull the wick right down
Into the oil . . .
Lo! the nibbāna of the little lamp!
Emancipation dawns! My heart is free!

As meaning a religious ideal, as in this simile, it emerges
full-blown in the Gītā or the Epic three or four times,
with the prefix Brahma-: "he attains when the end
is at hand extinction in Brahman (brahmanirvāṇam'
. . . " become Brahman he attains Brahmanirvāṇam."
Or here without it: "the yogī wins the peace that is
rooted in me, the last end of which is nirvāṇa."

Did the Gītā, in its final recension, precede the Pali
Suttas and Gāthās in their final recension? Here is
part of the problem. In it we must keep this in view:
in the Gītā the term is clearly understood and accepted.
In the Piṭakas this is also the case with the one exception
alluded to above, where it is asked, "What is nibbāna?" 1
The answer, as we know, is not that nibbāna is anything
of the nature of a goal or ultimate, but that it is a
cathartic discipline in ejection of evil; hence a means
only to the attainment of a Better. This remarkable
silence about a goal, and apparent curiosity as to
'what' was nibbāna, is flanked, in the great thesaurus
of the Suttas, by very many contexts, where nibbāna
is unquestionably used to mean a sumnum bonum,

1 Saṃyutta, iv, 261.
as may be seen in Dr. Law's article. And it is only a vivid reconstruction of the circumstances I refer to above, under which this body of literature came to take its final shape, which will discern how, in a superstructure, certain older stones were left in, built into that structure as being, in tradition, of venerable associations. One thing only is clear: the word nibbāna had somehow got in to stay, and the word attha, which for me is an old stone, gradually got dropped out.

This too is very significant, noticed I think as yet by no one. The dropping out of attha is preceded by that tragic worsening in values: the dropping out of 'the man,' that is, 'the self.' We know that, in drifting apart from the mother-teacher, Brahmanism—the immanence of God as in and of the man—early Buddhism first cut out Deity from the term attā, then cut out the reality of the attā himself, a decadent process covering centuries. In the Vinaya episodes, in the second context quoted above, we find this: "Thus do clansmen tell of what has come to them: in declaring aññā (gnosis), they refer to attha, they do not bring in attā." Now India was, as we know partial to punning: a feature natural in an oral teaching, going by sound, not sight. In this saying we have a palpable, though not a brilliant pun. I have had to spell out for scholars not Indologists, the difference between attha and attā, and hence perhaps can see here the pun which Oldenberg and Rhys Davids, in their Vinaya translation, pass over.

With attā and then attha dropped from its quest of the ideal, Buddhism built over these buried stones the rococo superstructure, which the founders of the movement would have had pain and difficulty in recognizing,
and of which they would certainly not have approved. The attha which they taught was not nibbāna, a vanishing Less in a vanishing attā. It was a persistent living on in that More which saw the quest as a man becoming more in the worlds: the attho samparāyiko. “Is there any one thing,” we read of a brahman asking Gotama, “which compasses and establishes both kinds of attha: that of this life and that of life hereafter?” “There is.” “What is it?” “Earnestness” (lit, the not being slack: appamādo). “Make this become, and you will get both attha’s.”¹

And in what did this appamādo consist? So to live as to become more fit for the ‘companionship’ (sahavyatā) of what is samparāyiko, namely, not by any means as yet for ‘union with,’ or ‘extinction in Brahman,’ but for the society of those gone before who were very worthy: the Brahmā devas,² who have seen behind the veil, have learnt the things that are truly worth while, as you have not yet learnt them, who are waiting near to help you to that attha, that lap in the long way to consummation, which is all that they have as yet attained.

I have come then to a conclusion very different from that to which the much edited Pali Suttas and Pali exegetical works have brought the writer of “Aspects of Nirvāṇa.” This is, that the founder, the founders, of Buddhism, those Sakyan missionaries, with their gospel for Everyman, did not teach the religious quest with the word nirvāṇa, did not equate it with dhamma (which for them had not come to mean any ‘code of teaching’), had no use for it save as riddance of the undesirable. I have come to see, that to speak of

¹ AnguttARA, iii, 364 (so that one can ‘have it both ways’).
² Dīgha, No. XIII.
'what Buddhism teaches' is divided by centuries from what 'the Buddha taught.' For most of us, the two still mean the same. In the latter term, I see a word taken up during those centuries to mean what his church called him and 'made him say.' Him I see as Gotama of the Śākyas, a dim but tremendously real figure of India of the 7th-6th centuries B.C., giving to his world a new, genuinely 'inspired' word, expanding, deepening the religion of his day: the teaching man how, as wayfarer in the worlds he might, seeking his *attha*, finally *become* That.
LVI

NIRVANA IN THE NEGATIVE

I came the other day upon a derelict sheet of proof. It was from C. V. Joshi's edition of the Commentary on the book of the Sutta-Pitaka called Patisambhidamagga:—the Saddhammapakasini; "she who sets forth the good religion" would, I suppose, be reckoned the proper rendering. In its pages I saw that, in the exposition of the so-called Third Truth, nirodhasacca "ending" or "stopping," nirodha offers in all its variations so many synonyms for nirvana:—"Nirvana is one, but its names are many, in the sense of being the opposite to all composite things"; or, as the West would say, being Absolute.

There were twenty-six of these synonyms, as follows:—

Entire passionlessness— (assavirago)
Entire stopping— (assesanirodho)
Giving up— (cago)
Resigning— (pañinissaggo)
Release— (motti)
Not-cleaving— (analo)
Waning of lust— (rāga-kkhāyo)
Waning of hate— (dosa-k)
Waning of muddledness— (moha-k)
Waning of thirst— (tañhā-kkhyo)
Not-happening— (anuppādo)
Not-proceeding— (appavattam)
Not-marked— (animittam)
Not-longed-for— (appanikilam)
Not-striving-for— (anāyāhanam)
Not-connected— (appatisandhi)

1 Printed in The Aryan Path, April, 1939.
2 As an internationalized word, this is spelt thus.
Not-gaining— (anuppatti)
Not-bourn— (agati)
Not-born— (ajāīaṃ)
Not-ageing— (ajāraṃ)
Not-ailing— (abyādhi)
Not-dead— (amatam)
Not-grieving— (asokam)
Not-lamenting— (aparidevam)
Not-despairing— (anupāyāsaṃ)
Not-corrupted— (asankhīṭham)

And I read a note I had made in the margin: "Of twenty-six, nineteen are negative in form, seven virtually negative, as meaning riddance." This was six years ago, when the Pali Text Society was putting the volume through the press.

As I turned away, I saw inwardly apple-trees, a falling apple, and a man we call great watching it:— "Why did that apple fall?" Newton, we know, went on to consider, not a little apple as done with, as come into a less, but the great "more" of the attracting centre, the earth. But in my case I seemed to hear him saying: "In those negatives man is trying to rid a great More-in-idea of what is done with, as opposed or as not enough. They are dropped apples. He is seeking to word a new, a more. Indeed he would give name to the Most, but words fail him. He must know before he can name fitly. But man, as in his long wayfaring he grows, must not be content with his dropped apples, must not hold that his cast-out failures in naming are the best he can do. He is ever able, as he goes, to set up as milestones a 'Thus far . . .'."

Now this is just what man's great Helpers have done for him. It is the wayfarers coming along after, who have tended to forget the milestones and have treasured the dropped apples. The tree, cleansed of ripe or rotting apples, is at the moment of no further use. The house made clean needs a plenishing with the new,
the better, else it only becomes worse—so Jesus reminded men.

India has shown herself too far content with halting over her negatives, her "No, no," or "not thus, not thus" (na-iti). Her discontent, shown by the rejection, was a healthy sign. But she has tended to stop there and abide with her dropped apples. It is conceivable that, when wording a concept pertaining to highest things by a negative, the supreme background implied may so colour the weak eliminating word that this takes on the splendour of the positive. I am thinking of the term in those twenty-six—the one term where this can be said to be felt perhaps all the world over and not in India only—the word amata, the immortal, the deathless, the undying. It can scarcely be contended that, for one at least whose mother-tongue is English, the negative term here is weaker than the corresponding positive term "everlasting."

There is one other parallel term which should have been added to the twenty-six, the word ārogya, the "not-ill," which is the only Indian term for health. Europe has been fortunate and wise in finding and in maintaining her strong positive terms for health from the ages of Greek and Latin culture till now. But it is conceivable that here too the splendour of the background, when the roga is eliminated, lends strength and reality to the negative word. There is perhaps no finer term as yet for man's conception of his sumnum bonum than a term for "being well." The day may come when the English language will evict such weaker words as "good," "happiness," and even "immortality." But there is this to be said for the last of these three, that the compound "not-dead," amata, is on all fours with another of the twenty-six,
the "not-ill" (or "not ailing"); they both, after the eliminating, leave us with their great contradictories: life, and health. Our word "life" means what is "left over." So health too is what illness ejected leaves over.

But if we take those remaining twenty-four, we find in them, more or less, not the trumpet-call (or, as original Buddhism said, the drum-beat) of a More, but the idea of a less in man's outlook. Truly a "not-proceeding," a "not-striving," a "not-bourn" (or "not-aim") are poor clarion calls to bring a gospel to the Many. They have rather the toneless sound of the secluded life of the cloister. One does not bring Everyman along by a teaching of negatives.

It may be objected:—Nirvana has only negative force, whether we derive it from a going-out or from a covering-up. Yet has it not been for Buddhism from the first the *summum bonum*?

I have spent myself in showing that this can be conceded only if we read our Buddhist scriptures like Fundamentalists, ignoring the latent history lying under the scriptural palimpsest.¹ To the critical reader it is fairly evident that in the First Utterance the original *summum bonum* of the Aim (*attha*) has been thrust aside (as having become ambiguous with the years) and nirvana with three partners made to replace it. Both *nibbāna* and *nirodha* were terms for cathartic training, before ever they were promoted by the negating monk to figure as Goal.

He, alas! stayed bending over the fallen apple. In the new talk about (mental) cause and effect he saw virtue only in bringing about the stopping (*nirodha*) of effect by stopping the cause. He saw in life only

¹ *Sakya or Origins of Buddhism*, p. 101 ff.; *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 112 ff.; *What Was the Original Gospel in Buddhism?* Ch. VIII.
something better brought to a "not-going-on." Unlike his later Christian brother he was not bent on "seeking another country, that is . . . a heavenly." A very fallen apple he is, and there will be no rediscovery of all that original Buddhism taught of life, of going-on-to-be, of what was called the Drum of the Immortal, till something so "done with" as what he stands for is purged from that great teaching.

Let us not blind ourselves as to where monasticism in South Asia has brought this matter of man's ultimate Goal, judged to be fitly worded by the term nirvana. For the Southern Buddhist—he makes no secret of it—man here is just a complex of body and mind, and nothing else. Long ago, but not so long ago as the birth of his cult, his church decided that we knew man as a fivefold group; one of body or bodily states and four of mental states. He lost sight of the fact that at first the division was into body, three mental groups and the "man," the knower. He forgot that his scriptures testified to that. And at death he held that body and mind crumbled away, with no "man" surviving to carry on, no "man" to face the fact that in another world he would be held responsible for what he with his instruments had been doing. This is even worse than our own tendency to see in surviving man a mere wraith. Very surely it is a gospel of man as a Less, as a Not.

To those who say that any world-gospel began with a teaching of the Negative such as this, history replies "You lie!" Nirvana has beauty of sound, but it is in sense a very Fata Morgana. The name for man's Goal must satisfy three conditions—it must have in it Man; it must word the positive; it must not prejudice the as yet inconceivable. In all these three Nirvana is found wanting.
LVII

TOWARDS A HISTORY OF THE SKANDHA-DOCTRINE

I

In giving lately and by request an outline of what I had been doing in re-issuing my *Buddhist Psychology* (1st ed. 1914), I ended thus: "One new note is strenuously affirmed. This is, that the resolution of the whole man into five portions (*khandhas*) is an editorial increment, quite out of date for, and unworthy of the first Buddhist missioners. Here I know I am charging windmills, but in this case I hold it an honour to be a Don Quixote."²

What have I there said, in my tilting?

(1) That Buddhists, in placing the senses foremost long before we of Europe did, had worsened the idea of the man, the subject, the self, and had made mind, as a sort of sense, into a dummy-man. They were as a-psychological as are we. They clung long to a fivefold analysis of body-cum-mind, a defective one and clumsy, on the negatively worded plea, that it was made the better to eliminate the man or self. (2) Centuries later they refashioned their analysis, making the dummy-man into a mind (*citta*) having constant and contingent factors (*cetasikā*) like our genus and species. This appeared in their standard mediæval

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manual.³ (3) But there is still an acquiescence among writers on Buddhism, let alone Buddhists, in that fivefold agglomerate as being a teaching permissible to ascribe to the Founder himself. (4) I maintained, that to the critical writer, the peculiar ways in which the five sometimes find mention in the Piṭakas, whether as an evident gloss or insertion which doesn’t fit, and that they sometimes are omitted where one would look for them, e.g., in the categories of ‘fives,’ should have given pause to an ill-founded conclusion.

And I concluded (5) with a credo, which, in that it is hypothetical, may be taken as provisional. Namely, that a religion, destined to be a ‘world-religion,’ will not have begun with a teaching of man as, in nature, life, destiny, a less, but with the contrary. That to tell man, that the self, that is he, is not a central unity, with ways of coming to know and of expressing himself, i.e., with instruments of which he is user, but is merely the sum (or product) of those ways, is to teach a less in him.

In the confined limits of a manual I was not able to include a detailed examination of those glosses, insertions and omissions. Nor can they be all detailed in any one article, however generous the editorial management. But I give just a few, in the hope that someone else may feel moved to collaborate and amplify. Evidence can only be contributive; we have no documents telling of a stage in the early history of Buddhism when the khandha analysis first came in. But the aggregate of contributive detail may together form a strong case. It might have been thought, that the long Khandha-Saṃyutta in the Third Nikāya, 158 Suttas in length, would have proved

³ Abhidhammattha-sangaha, Pali Text Soc. ed.
fertile. But that Samyutta may have been compiled precisely in order to give full emphasis to the teaching of a doctrine which had become established as fully and alone orthodox:—man as resolved into five khandhas, no more and no less. Any way I have gone through it, and give here the results in a contribution 'towards,' as the German would say, any decision future scholarship may take in the matter.

Let me say at once, that in the majority of the 158 Suttas, khandhas as five form either the main topic, or an important part of it. And were the collection a manual of crude academic tuition, the contents would not call for the weighing I suggest is called for. But we have in it a quantity of versions of khandha-teaching, as essential to the main teaching, brought, either before, or in, or possibly after the Council of Patna, in Asoka's time: cc. B.C. 250-30, from different centres of Buddhist teaching in North India, all orally taught only, and as such, subject to the process of being handed on by monastic repeaters and teachers, none of whom will have been an automatic machine like our gramophones—subject in other words to the outlook and influence of individual selves and minds. And then there is the process of revision in order to standardization to bear in mind, a procedure of which we have no record, whether the revisors were many or few, or whether they worked in sections, one man only undertaking to revise, as the repeaters passed before him, a bunch of Sayings. I merely repeat these reflections, because we need to imagine, more than we do, the difficulties hampering effective revision in Pīṭaka compilation, making it scarcely surprising if success was not complete, and making the amount of standardization that was achieved the more remarkable.
I come to certain features in the Collection chosen, which seem to suggest that the fivefold scheme lacks the appearance of having been there from the birth of the teaching. These features are (1) intrusion of the five into what is apparently a more original way of summing up 'the man'; (2) where reference to the five suggests either insertion, or later appendix; (3) where the reference to the five interferes with, and is misfitting to a seemingly older procedure.

(1) Quoting from the Pali Text Society's edition, I would point to Samyutta III, pp. 77f., 80, 103, 136, 169f., where the subject is introduced as that of 'the body with viññāna' (kāyo saviññānako), and this is then, without any indication of this duality as being expanded, followed by description in the usual detail of the five khandhas. Now, in the first place, the method is not on the surface of it, natural. It would not be natural for us; I do not find it followed by the compilers generally. Secondly, we have kāyo for body, not the khandha-term rūpa. And the term viññāna has its older significance of, not one fourth part or aspect of mind, but of the man-as-minding, and of the man-as-persisting beyond life of the body, as we find it used in both early Upanishad (Bṛh., 2. 1, 15) and certain Pali Suttas.

Again, we find (p. 151f.) the five somewhat thrust in where the talk is mainly on mind as called cittā, a term somehow banished from the khandhas, nor is any attempt made to explain whether cittā was in any way distributed among the four mental khandhas.

(2) In the first Sutta (p. 1) a sick old man has just left the Founder, encouraged by being told, that even if he ailed sorely in body, he could keep well in the unailing 'self.' (The word used is cittam anāturam,
not attā, but such a teaching would be both contrary to truth, and in such sheer opposition to the religion of that day, that I have ventured to assert attā anāturo will have been originally used.) He encounters Sāriputta—N.B. a brahman by culture—who explains to him that, to keep his attā (or his citta) well, he must never see it as in any way one of five khandhas. I cannot picture the later exegesis of the Sangha more forcibly represented than it is here, in this supplementary coaching of a visitor, who from the Fountainhead had heard of his visible and his invisible manhood, with no subdivision into five parts.

Again, in a talk to a sick disciple, Tissa (p. 106ff.), we get healing talk on the Way and its adventure, given by his cousin, Gotama, with no word in it of his khandhas as being unwell, but a disquisition on these is made to precede the Way-talk. If we can strip ourselves of the habit of looking on the five as basic to the teaching, we must, I think, see how forced is the entry of them here, when contrasted with the real Way-teacher’s words later.

Again, let the reader disinterestedly consider the Sutta called Channa (p. 132ff.). Channa, apparently after the decease of the Founder, goes, at Benares, around the cells of the Order seeking teaching on ‘dhamma.’ The response is the meagre fare, that each of the five khandhas is impermanent (anicca), and void of self. But Channa has other notions of the teaching worrying him; they are worded as was one of the two mission-subjects rejected by the Founder, when he hesitated about teaching anything (Vin. Mahāv., I, 5, 2). And his citta, let us say, his will, did not ‘leap forward’ in response. He bethinks him of Ānanda, and tells him all about it. Ānanda has no comment or endorsement
about khandhas. He tells him what the Teacher had told the inquirer Kaccāna (Samy., II, 17), to see all things in a state of becoming. Does this not suggest, that in those he first consulted, Channa found the 'new men' full of the new mind-analysis, the proto-Sānkhya coming so much into vogue, but that in the survivor of the 'Old Brigade,' Ānanda, he found older stuff, void of a khandha-doctrine?

Yet once more: the Sutta named Gomayam (p. 143) is similarly suggestive of the newer analysis intruded into the possibly older popular Way of exposition. A monk at Sāvatthī asks the Founder, whether there is any permanent element in body or mind, these being named by the fivefold list? The answer says nothing whatever about khandhas, but speaks only of attabhāva. Then abruptly, the Founder launches into a description, like that of the MahāSudassana Suttanta (Dīgha, II, p. 169), of all the wordly means of enjoyment he once possessed as the ruler of Kusāvatī, and of how nothing of all that had persisted. Neither here, nor in that oddly elaborated narrative is there a word about khandhas.

For that matter it is worth noticing how singularly free are the Suttantas of the First Collection (Dīgha), with one important exception from mention of the khandha-complex. I find reference to it only in the last two, which are lists of catalogues. For instance, in the Suttanta called "The Questioning of Sakka" (Sakkapañha, II, 282ff.), the talk is largely psycho-ethical, and opportunities for khandha-talk are plentiful. Yet no reference to them occurs. Here however, in our Saṃyutta, a context from that Suttanta is adduced (p. 13), just to give "full meaning" (vitthārena) to a 'concise statement' (sankhittena), by
describing how the term ‘freed’ is to be understood. The Second Collection, on the other hand, has a good deal to say in khandha-talk, whereof no more just here and now. The Fourth Collection (which I see as older than the Third and Second) has relatively very little about khandhas, and—a noteworthy feature—omits them from its list of ‘Fives,’ as a ‘five,’ only adducing reference to them as the last in a list of results, a last which could be cut out without impairing the sequence or force in the teaching.

Speaking of last sentences, I do not find, in the Saṃyutta, Suttas with khandha-talk apparently added appendix-wise. But such an addition seems fairly obvious in the ‘important exception’ just mentioned above. In the Dīgha account of the ‘bo-tree episode’ (II, p. 35, §§ 22), the supplementary nature of the "contemplation of the rise and passing of the khandhas of grasping" is patent.¹

(3) This section I might have logically brought under the preceding, but I make it separate, because the introducing the fivefold complex is a patent misfit in a probably older context, and even mystifies the Commentator. I have only one Sutta to mention in it; the first of the two called Hāliddikāni (the other being the last cited), p. 9. Here too we have an older set of Sayings mentioned: the Sutta-Nipāta section called Māgandiya-Sutta, (verse 844 of the whole work). The Sutta-Nipāta, by the way, makes no allusion to the khandha-doctrine.

The layman Hāliddikāni quotes a metrical Saying

¹ I would here confess to an oversight in p. 183 of my Birth of Indian Psychology. I have written of the ‘Burning Sermon’ as if it made allusion, in a supplementary way to the khandhas. This is true only of the Second Utterance. The Sutta referred to, Saṃyutta, iii, 71, forms an appendix to the ‘Burning’ theme: The khandhas are on fire.'
to the brahman disciple of Gotama, Kaccāna 'the Great,' about the sage (muni) being a 'home-leaver, detached from worldly ties and the 'wordy warfare' these induce, and asks, he too, for a 'full meaning of this concise saying.' He is told, that the body is the home of viññāna, namely of the intelligent principle or indwelling 'man.' The latter is called 'the home-haunter.' But 'the home-abandoner' has cut free from all that home implies. And so on, each word in the Saying being similarly parsed.

Were there here no mention of five khandhas, the parsing would have lost practically nothing. But just after the explanation, that home meant the body, three of the mental khandhas are inserted: feeling (vedanā), perception (saññā), activities (or plans, sankhārā), but the fourth, viññāna, is omitted since this has just been called, not body, the 'home,' but the 'home-haunter.' And the exegesis holds, that this is omitted from the contents of the 'home' 'to avoid confusion.'

I judge that here we have the older dual division of kāya (body) and viññāna (man-as-intelligent) cluttered up with the newer division of the person-complex or sakkāya into five khandhas, with an overlapping of the five on to the second term of the duality.

Viññāna was coming to be looked upon, not as a name for the persistent man, the man who arrives in his new world at death,—without earth-body, but, as viññāna, still intelligent,—but as a name for one aspect of mind, the mind which was just then beginning to absorb interest as a body of uniform processes, analogous to those of body as is the sword to its sheath, the plant to its kośa, a new interest brought out so strikingly in the second
Suttanta of the Dīgha, the Sāmaññaphala (I, p. 77). And in this Saṁyutta-sutta we have the older teaching and the newer, the dual and the fivefold, jumbled together, because the newer 'five' have been inserted into the older 'two.'

These are all the instances of more or less manifest intrusion which I have found in this Saṁyutta. And seeing that its existence, as a special collection of 'kindred sayings' will have been due to the importance attached to this fivefold aspect of the man, it is remarkable that there are so many what I call 'left-ins' from an older view of the man.

A word on the number 'five,' and the change from kāya to rūpa. Not that I can contribute anything here of positive worth in explanation. I do but call attention to matters where I find attention withheld.

That man-as-we-know him should have been divided up into one bodily and four mental (a-rūpino) parts must have been due to some reason. Buddhaghosa gives the current (or his own?) explanation of the doctrine as a whole,1 but does not ask, I believe, 'Why five, no more, no less?' We need not go far to see in five a comprehensive unit in Indian thought (cf. Pali Text Society's Dictionary), probably derived from the pañcangulika formation of the human hand. Five again, I read, is the lowest group-unit of families constituting the grāma or village-entity. But since we are in the field of personality, I incline to think, that the pattern for the five will have lain in the five senses: pañcindriyāni. The Buddhist Sangha did its best to make a sixfold system of these, adding the dummy-man manas, mind, to the five. Yet they did not so prevail over usage as to get the senses spoken

1 Visuddhi-magga, Ch. XIV (p. 478, P.T.S. ed.).
of as the six; it was at best 'the five, mind-as-sixth,' and that but rarely. Their main object, as Vibhajjavādins, was to shrivel up the man or self, from being considered as user and valuer of his instruments, to being looked upon as wholly a complex of these, in name, a mere label. So utterly did their Founder's warning in his so-called second utterance come to be set at naught.

Lastly, the calling 'body,' not kāya, but rūpa. Kāya it must be remembered, means 'group,' as in the more usual nikāya. So long as the man was contemplated over against the 'group' of his instruments, this term was felt as fitting. But when, with the rise of mind-analysis, such as is revealed already going on in the Chāndogya and Brhadāraṇyaka Upanishads, the mind was detached from the idea of self in a more pointed way and looked upon as a plurality, kāya became unfit for body, and the older complement of nāma, in the Vedic term nāmarūpa will have seemed alone fit. The change was from the newer to the older, but it was fitting in view of the new view of the mind.

II

In this second part I am setting beside the analysis of such contexts in the Khandha-Saṃyutta all the remaining contexts that I have found in the Sutta-Piṭaka and some in the other two Piṭakas. With the remarkably rare references to the khandhas in the Dīgha-Nikāya I have dealt incidentally in my first part; also with the total omission of reference to them in the Sutta-Nipāta.

References to the khandhas, either by name, or also as five in number, or to them without reference to
name or number occur, in these materials, in the varying frequency indicated in the following table:—

**VINAYA-PITAKA.**

Mahāvagga, I, 6, 19; and 38 f., viz., in the First and Second Utterances.

**SUTTA-PITAKA.**

Dīgha-Nikāya (see Part I of this article).
Majjhima-Nikāya: 17 references.
Saṁyutta-Nikāya, excluding Khandha-Saṁyutta: 19 references.
Anguttara-Nikāya, 15 references.
Khuddaka-Nikāya:
Khuddakapāṭha, 1 reference (not under head 5, but under head 4).
Dhammapada, 1 reference: khandhānam udayabbayāṁ.
Udāna, no reference.
Iti-vuttaka, 1 reference.
Sutta-Nipāta, no reference.
Peta- and Vimāna-vatthu, no reference.
Thera-therī-gāthā, 6 references.

The other six books of this Nikāya, together with the seven of the Third Piṭaka I put aside for the purpose of this table. They are admittedly later compilations, and it is with the earliest appearances of the khandhas that this study is concerned.

Let me here say I have, for these statistics, relied mainly on indexes. None knows better than I how far indexes, even those compiled by the best-intentioned indexmakers, are incomplete. Hence I am cautious in drawing conclusions from frequency of reference or the reverse. For instance, from the paucity of allusions in 7 of the 8 books of anthologies above. That paucity is fairly well balanced by the frequency apparent in the last-named, so that it were no fit argument to say, that allusions to a category of
psychological analysis, such as is that of the 5 khandhas, are not likely to find mention in poetry. It should here be remembered, that Pali verses are not always to be credited to the poetic muse; they were largely due to mnemonic need. And further: there came to be coined a metrical tag embracing the main heads of that analytical vogue which so overmastered the adolescent Buddhist Sangha. It ran

_khandh'āyatana-dhātu ca_,

"the factors, spheres and elements," as one might translate it, and several of those 15 references consist in this. Another tag, a prose one, in the monastic vocabulary, was _khandhānam udayabbayam_, which is also metrical: "the rise and passing of the groups." This also occurs repeatedly in verse. The only conclusion I can draw from the silence about khandhas in three of the anthologies above, and the one reference only in three of the others is, that had the curriculum of monk-teaching, when those seven were mainly compiled, put strongly forward the khandha-analysis as substitute for the soul or spirit, reference to this would have occurred, and oftener.

I have said 'mainly' compiled and with point. Every anthology will have had its own history. And into that individual story the future historian of the Pali Canon will have to go. Let him or her her note, that the reference in the Theragāthā to the khandhas are not made by any contributor of whom we can say with confidence, that he was a contemporary of the Founder, with this one exception: Soṇa-Kūṭikāṇṇa (Vin. Mhv. V, r3). And in his verses, the khandhas are only mentioned in an obvious gloss at the end, when Soṇa has done his compilation, an appendix
which is added to other gāthās (ver. 368-9). Thus:

Thereafter in the presence of the Chief,
The Wake, did Soṇa, framing goodly speech,
Utter the very Dhamma, man o' the Very Wake.
Well doth he know the factors five, making the Road to come to be.
Having attained the utter peace, unblemished will he make an end.

There is no mention of khandhas in the verses of Sāriputta, Moggallāna, Ānanda, Kassapa, Revata, Kappina, Puṇṇa, or any others of the Old Brigade. I judge this is contributory evidence of some weight, however much Sāriputta's name, in the Suttas, has got mixed up with khandha-talk.

There is another quasi-silence about the 'five,' which I am loth to pass by, however explicitly I have guarded myself from deductions from it. It is that silence of the Dīgha-Nikāya. There is plenty of patchwork in this venerable compilation, as we know. I would remind readers, how the whole of the First, the Sila, Section is silent about the remarkable taking over of a forgotten Brahman's televolitional ethics till the end of the last chapter, when it comes in as a patchwork. There was call and scope for khandha-reference in the Śamaññaaphala Suttanta, in all conscience (p. 76); or in the Poṭṭhapāda Suttanta; still more perhaps in the Nidāna-Suttanta, the Sakkāpāṇha, the Pāyāsi, and most of all, in the Sampasādaniya and Pāsādika Suttantas, wherein all the points in sound religious teaching are rehearsed. I am not here wondering why the 'five' were not introduced into the 'points,' once Thirty, then Thirty-seven, called later bodhipakkiyā dhammā. Neither were the Four Truths inserted into these. Those 'dhammas' were processes
in ethical, in religious training. The Truths, the Khandhas were, as was supposed, just statements of fact. But these Suttantas, especially the Sampasādaniya set forth what the Founder was held to have taught. And the omission there of the Khandhas is really not without significance.

Why then does the Second Collection (Majjhima) harp where the First (Dīgha) is all but silent? The answer lies buried in the lost centres, the seats of ‘bhāṇakas,’ where each Collection was developed from remembered Sayings:—just texts of discourse or episodes or, it may be, complete if short talks,—into finished literary compositions, oral and then written. I do not attach weight to the tradition quoted in the Dīgha Commentary, of the Dīgha being handed over to Ānanda’s care, the Majjhima to the school of Sāriputta (the Saṃyutta to Kassapa, the Anguttara to Anuruddha). It is a bald statement, perhaps good for nothing. Yet I do not forget Ānanda’s ignoring of the khandhas when the perplexed Channa appealed to him. (See part r of this article.) We can, in default of evidence, only surmise, that the Majjhima centre was more under proto-Sāṅkhyan influence, more engaged in mental analysis than the Dīgha centre. Or it may have been that, whereas the Dīgha tradition was one in which Brahmans had held Gotama in high respect (cf. Suttantas 3–8, etc.), the Majjhima centre may have been one where the rift between Brahmins and Sakya over ritual and sacrifice grew more quickly to include central matters of Immanence, of the Ātman. So marked in such things is the difference between the two Collections, that it is at times hard to believe them to have sprung from a common source. The difference in length
does not account for the silence of the one, for the Dīgha is over three quarters the length of the Majjhima.

The disparity in proportion of reference in the two other Collections is even more remarkable, since to the 19 of the Saṃyutta in my Table we must add 158 references, i.e. one for each Sutta of the Khandha Saṃyutta. We get thus, in two Collections, the total lengths of which are about \( \frac{1}{4} \), a proportion-in-reference of \( \frac{17}{25} \). Now it is possible, that the amassing of Suttas on 'kindred' subjects (I refer to my husband's choice and mine of the title 'Kindred Sayings') may have entailed much sweeping in from different centres, accomplished either when on tour, or by special tours, or not till the great Patna revisional Congress. Hence it may not be true to see in a Saṃyutta-bhāṅaka centre a special preoccupation with the khandha doctrine. On the other hand it must never be forgotten, that the 'Fives' Section in the Anguttara omits all titular mention of khandhas—an overlooked fact pointed out by myself. And this looks suspiciously as if no such doctrine was in existence when that Section was compiled.

I am not saying that five khandhas find no mention in this Fifth Section. I find one and only one—and that comes last in a fairly obvious appendix to a Sutta. This is No. 30, 'Nāgita.' The Founder is shown resenting being fussed over, and his expression of it begins and is rounded off in the same terms "let such an one enjoy . . . flattery." Then comes an appendix of five points, the khandhas being possibly put in to lend dignity to a talk that certainly lacks graciousness, to say nothing more:—(We may thus go a step further than the schoolboy's definition of an appendix:—"a portion of a book of which no one
has yet discovered the use"). "Whoever abides seeing the rise and passing of the fivefold group of attachment (upādānakkhandha) . . ."

Nor are the subjects, classed as 'fives', only of the nature of processes—to repeat what I was saying above. The student may quickly see the great diversity so classed in the table I made of them all in the Anguttara Index Volume (pp. 174–92) 26 years ago.

I have for some time judged that, in the Fourth Collection, we have not the latest, but the earliest attempt made to collect and classify the growing thesaurus of Sayings, and that hence, if the Anguttara omits—and it does omit—categories, formulas, which are now placed as central to Buddhist teaching, it is because, during the making of that attempt, these had not yet been made. That the khandhas find incidental mention in the Anguttaras some 15 times does not affect this conclusion. The hand of the later editor is too palpable throughout, not to betray whence khandhas and other tenets may have come to be inserted.

Let us now look into other of these khandha-contexts, if haply (1) we may get any light as to whether they were originally integral to the discourse, or whether they were later insertions and additions; secondly, (2) whether, as probably the latter, they form a misfit in the text, such as we found in the Khandha-Saṃyutta. Next, (3) whether the contexts suggest an earlier usage for which a more detailed statement of 'mind' was felt to be needed. Lastly, (4) a word on khandhas in the Third Piṭaka.

1. Of the khandha contexts in the Sutta-Piṭaka, the majority evidently treat the subject as a well-recognized
tenet in orthodox teaching. The pentad, whether it be referred to as such, or under each of the five heads, is either woven up into the discourse, or is used with other tenets in summing up, or is used as opening, or forms the one theme, or is cited in terms of what I have called a tag, a cliché, or is mentioned in passing. Specimens of each of these usages may be seen in 
(1) the Snake Sutta, S. IV, 173; (2) the Mahāhat-thīpadopama, M. No. XXVIII; (3) the Minor Miscellany, M. No. 44 and Rāhula Sutta, M. No. LXII; (4) the Sutta 'Pattam', S. I, 112; (5) the First Utterance, and wherever the description there given of dukkha is repeated: sankhittena pāñcupādānakkhandhā dukkha; (6) Vajirā's and Selā's verses (Therīgāthā, and S. i, 135.) Let it not for a moment be supposed, that the task of undermining the place at present occupied by the khandha-tenet is an easy one. It would not sit as firmly as it does in books on Buddhism, were the majority of contexts other than such as are in this sixfold list.

2. I will now ask readers to consider certain, if fewer contexts, where the tenet does not sit so firmly. It will be seen, that their instability shows interesting variants to those I gave from the Khandha-Saṃyutta.

Let me first cite where a later (?) appendix seems apparent. I find such contexts in

Saṃyutta i, 246 and 250; Anguttara, ii, 45,
   "  iii, 186. Theragāthā. I, 120 & 440.
   "  v. 60. "  I, 90 (approximately).

Reading these contexts can alone bring assent or dissent.

I come to one or two 'misfits in khandha-contexts.
I do not stress the partly different names for the 'five' in S., I, 112.

*Rūpam, vedayitam, saññam, viññānam yañca sankhatam,*
nor the difference in order, because we have here what may have been only metrical exigency. Nor do I attach significance to the attempt made here and there in the long Saññutta on Causation (Nidāna), to weave in the five in this or that version of a talk on cause (e.g., S. II, 28, 30).

But I do see an appended reference to the four mental khandhas, where originally only the body was referred to in the following:

There is a much repeated description of material form, given for instance in M. No. LXII, again in A. i, 284; ii, 171, 202, etc.),—“whatever rūpa there is, past, present, future, within, without, gross, subtle, high, low, far, near, it is not mine, I am not it, it is not for me the self.” The Founder is shown saying this as he goes before his son on an alms-round. Rāhula is then made to say: “Just rūpa, sir?” The answer is “Not just rūpa, but also feeling, perception, complexes, awareness.”

So far so good. Here is no reason for alleging insertion or misfit. The son may have only wished to make sure (what he surely must, as his father's pupil, have known), that neither were any ways of mind to be considered as the self, they, no less than body, being but the limited instruments of the self. But wherever elsewhere this description of rūpa is cited, both in the Majjhima (three times) and in Saññutta and Anguttara, the description is explicitly applied to each mental khandha. And this drives me to conclude, that this older description of 'matter'
or body, worded of the man when contemplating his bodily frame, came to be extended to the fourfold aspect of mind, when this division of mind came into vogue, a description which, for anything immaterial, is in part a misfit. We have only to look among the Suttas for descriptions of manas, citta, viññāna to see how quite otherwise each is described. I have submitted this context to a few of my wisest friends, and their verdict is unanimous, that we have here a strong case for later insertion of the four mental khandhas.

One other misfit I find in an interesting position, namely, in the ‘Fours’ of the Anguttara. (I repeat, the ‘five’ are not a titular item in the Fives). In the Sutta Sokhummāni, ‘subtle things’ (IV, II, 16), we read of a man having power to penetrate subtlety of rūpa, of saññā, of vedanā, and of the sankhāra’s. The verses follow:

Knowing the subtlety of form and knowing
How feelings come to be, and whence arises
Perception, how it ends, knowing the activities
As other and as ill, but not as self:
(These things) if he do see aright, the monk . . .

Here we have the all-important reservation made of the (unnamed) fifth khandha, viññāna, as implicitly meaning still, not the mere mind-way it came to mean, but as the very man, the self, here ‘the monk.’ It was the man conceived as persistingly aware, in both this world and hereafter, that was expressed by viññāna, both in the Upanishads and in Piṭakan ‘left-ins,’ and which we see so fiercely attacked by the growing monastic ideals in the Majjhima (No. 38), and there reduced to the mere resultant of a preceding sensation.

The Sutta is for my subject of historical interest,
since it shows a perhaps brief stage in the outlook on body and mind prior to the emergence of these as fivefold. We have the outlook as fourfold with the retention of the man as not yet a mere fifth item. There is no sign that the Sutta is a later insertion. But we can feel fairly sure, that had that outlook become fivefold when the titles of the Fourth and Fifth Nipātas were selected, the Sokhummāni would have been held back for inclusion in the Fifth, and the Fifth would have had the Five among its titles.

Before leaving the subject of misfits, I will mention a negative one, so to speak; I mean, where the ‘five’ would almost certainly have found mention, had they already come into the ‘church’ curriculum. In the Majjhima are two catechetical Suttas, (Nos. 43 and 44), called the Major and Minor Miscellanies. We see two very eminent fellow-workers of the Founder agreeing to play teacher and pupil, to draft an oral vade mecum for the use of learners. The trend of the talk is psychological; viññāna and vedanā and paññā being discussed. But there is never a word about any fivefold division of body and mind! With the second Sutta, alleged to have been between the eminent nun Dhammadinnā and her ex-husband, the catechism starts with the khandhas; and for us the query rises: Was this beginning interpolated to make good the omission in the former? No reply short of a psychic one is here to be hoped for, and I pass, with this Sutta beside me, to add a word on what may possibly have been, at their introduction, the chief use to which the ‘five’ were put.

Here and repeatedly we find them used to expand the term sakkāya-diṭṭhi, “the view of the (man as being a) group.” This is a label for a formula which
is actually an expansion of the caution given in the 'Second Utterance' of Gotama, spoken to his first few adherents.\(^1\) But in its aim it *virtually inverts that caution*. The *argument* in the Utterance belongs to the current teaching of Immanence. 'You' are by nature divine, but having here to work with limited instruments, body and mind, you limit your Divine nature, *if* you see that nature in either instrument. Against this dangerous tendency of the day, Kauśitaki also warned his students, as I have often pointed out.\(^2\) But the *formula*, albeit it does not say in so many words there is no 'you' over and above the 'five,' bodily and mental, virtually admits this. The wrong 'view' is to 'see' the man as any one of the five, or as having it,\(^3\) or as being in it, or as seeing it in the man. And this pluralistic conclusion of man-as-many, not as one, became and has remained the main doctrine of Hīnayāna Buddhism to this day. I wrote once, replying to the letter of a young Ceylon monk, you make the man out to be merely the body and mind he uses. The rejoinder was: What in heaven's name is he if not these two?

Now this pluralism, although it is a disgrace—as James Ward pointed out—to what extent it is found in the religion and the psychology of to-day, was a very new and growing tendency in the India of the late centuries of the last era, and it asserted itself at the Council of Patna, when the Sangha won for itself the by-name of 'Analyzers' (*vibhajjavādins*). And so we have the pathetic historical tragedy before us, of a great teacher's *caveat*, warning men not to

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3. As a tree has its shadow. Comy.
confuse the man with his limited instruments, twisted into an insistence on the truth of this very confusion! In his day it will have seemed to the Founder Gotama impossible that man could come to deny his own reality; the one danger lay in confusing that unique reality with what he used for self-expression. At the opposite pole to his teaching we have, after a thousand years, Buddhaghosa affirming, that there is no such unique reality in man or in anything else whatever.

There are, I well know, many who, if they read that phrase: "at the opposite pole to his teaching," will protest I go too far. Will they, perhaps for the first time consider the talk, as between Gotama and Saccaka the Licchavi, in Majjhima, No. 35? Gotama, made to speak in terms of the five khandhas, elicits from Saccaka, that he (Saccaka) holds this opinion: "I, master Gotama, say thus: For me body is the self, feeling is the self, perception, complexes, awareness, is the self." To him thereupon Gotama: "Would a king of Kosala, of Magadha, have punitive power over offenders among his subjects?" Saccaka: "Ay, and republics too." (That is, if we remember that for India the only 'judge' was the political chief, these chiefs would not have that power were they just subjects). To him Gotama: "Can you then, as self (i.e. as being innately Divine) order body to do as you wish?" Saccaka sits silenced. The question is repeated concerning the other four khandhas. Saccaka then retracts and admits it is not proper to identify the self with what is so far from divine— i.e. transient, ill, changeable—as is each of the five.

Now the analogy with the judge it is that is here overlooked. The king is judge because he is not any of his subjects. By analogy, the self is not his tools,
body, mind. But it does not follow that, because the king is not John Smith, *therefore there is no king*!

So we have on the one hand Gotama affirming that the relation of the man or self to his body and mind is as much a reality as is that of judge to delinquent, and on the other Buddhaghosa and Buddhists, nay, and writers on Buddhism merging the reality of the man or self in his delinquent body and mind. I call this being at opposite poles.

3. But was there not very likely an intermediate stage in the growing canker? It may be that, when these Suttas were taking shape, the slaying of the man was not yet completed, that it was only his Divinity that was taught as in the word ātman, (attan) which was denied of him. I still hold this is probable, a sliding rock arrested halfway down the mountain-side. Probable partly because of the attributes of Deity brought into a much repeated formula in which the 'five' are usually called in. Thus: since we cannot say of body, etc. that it is permanent or blissful, therefore it cannot be ātman, i.e. Deity, (or Holy Spirit). There may yet be a 'self,' but, as was to be much harped upon, he can only 'be got at' (*upalabbhati*) through the khandhas, or the many dhammas.

4. With the period of the gradual compilation of the Third Piṭaka, and its inclusion in the Canon,¹ the coffin, as I have said, of the five khandhas was taking shape. It was namely becoming orthodox to teach the man as 'being,' not so much a fivefold aggregate, as a much more numerous group of *dhamma's*. We see this already in the crude introspection of the Dhammasangani, where this and that 'thought' (*citta*), or fleeting moment of consciousness, is analysed

into some fifty dhammā and more. The khandhas are then brought in, with other categories, as being, as we might say, so many aspects of the given citta. The later division: citta and cetasikā, as a given (state of) mind and its contents, already peeps out in the work (1022f), an analysis which was to achieve a long paramountcy in the standard Manual. In it a dummy man-of-mind came to make good the unsatisfying pluralism of the khandha’s and dhamma’s. Here he was at least as a unity (genus) to a plurality.

In the fourth book, Designations of Man, we only find the ‘five’ given in the introductory exposition of the six sorts of ‘designation.’ They are not in the remainder of the work,—another posthumous revenge of the ‘dead man’ or self. In the fifth book, that of the Debates, khandha-reference is little more than an aid to mere argument in words, not things.

I do not claim to have said here all that could be said on the history of the ‘five,’ and certainly not the ‘last word’ about them. I claim only to have said enough to make future writers about early Buddhism more guarded than were their predecessors in concluding, that this unhappy ill-knit group ever belonged to the original gospel of the Man Gotama.

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1 Tr. as Compendium of Philosophy, P.T.S. ed. 1910.  
2 Puggala-Paññatti, P.T.S., Trans. by B. C. Law.
XLVIII

THE PALI TIPITAKA

The consideration of any ancient body of records which has come to be held in great worth as 'holy writ,' or as 'sacred,' or as 'inspired,' provokes mixed feelings. Such a body of records testifies to man's persistent, permanent quest for a mandate that is, or may be, for him a stronger, wiser, safer guide than are his own counsels independently formed, whether these be of his own devising, or whether they be corporate decisions. A 'scripture' is a proof of his conviction that he is, as average unaided man, unfit to be "a lamp, a refuge unto himself, unto yourselves." It should be enough to convince him that, if such an injunction be found in a venerated scripture, the injunction has been wrongly translated, or misunderstood. That persistent, permanent quest makes for his salvation, and will—such is my belief—in the long run, lead him to his goal, his ultimate goal. On the other hand, his worth in a scripture betrays at the same time a weakness. He values because "it is written," or because "it was said by." He sees truth in what is venerable as such. He places worth in the Word as word, in the commandment as such, in the whole scripture as, in some unknown way, linked and interdependent. Such mixed feelings does

1 Published in Religions, Journal of Transactions Society for (Promoting) the Study of Religions, 1934, from a lecture.
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the scripture known as the Pali Canon or Tipiṭaka arouse, when the study of it is disinterested.

It reveals brave, persistent labour ungrudgingly given to keep alive and pass on what was once a New Word, bringing new light, new help to men. And it reveals much more—it betrays an absence of adequate means and organized method to keep alive and pass on; it betrays also a considerable time taken in those labours before it came to be judged, that the body of records must be declared closed to further increments; it betrays notable changes in religious values, showing themselves in certain sayings which are not in harmony with sayings in other contexts of the records; it betrays much honest effort to deal with many different ways of presenting one subject, effort by which there has been inclusion where the different ways presented no disharmony of conviction, effort too, by which there has been rejection and, later, insertion, where disharmony prevented standardization; effort finally to bring to the front in glosses some matters which had come, later, to be held as of highest value.

All this miscellaneous effort in compilation will, I judge, have been easier to exercise in a scripture (both during its growth and when it came to be finally revised), which was evidently a product of memorized audition, long before it became a genuine 'scripture,' the work of style or pen. In saying this, there is no repudiation of the high efficiency of verbal memory, where the resort of writing down ideas has for some reason been long delayed, as it was in India. There is no known limit to the amount any one, even a modern Western reproducer of any kind, can retain in memory and give out, and that faultlessly.
And where the eyes have not been called in to aid the ears, auditional memory will certainly be abnormally strong. Such abnormal memories are met with even to-day in India, and checking by the written word is less resorted to than it is with us. But then we do not forget, when that written text is resorted to, the many thousands of 'variants' in Vedic literature, which Western scholars have detected and published.

As to that, can we be surprised to find that it has proved harder to maintain uniformity in an oral tradition than in a written body of scripture? I have had enough to do with scribes' manuscripts to know, that neither in the latter is any sure guarantee of accuracy. It is a matter of degree. But in the scribe, the word of recording is become a long way more automatic than it can be in the oral recorder. Many of us know what a different thing it is to sing or play someone's musical composition from notes or from memory, or similarly, to read to others a literary composition or recite it. In the latter case, the interpreter has made the piece his own, and could, were the original a heard speech in prose, easily vary it, making it thereby a little more 'his own.' Now imagine the listener who, without definite engagement as professional recorder, listens to the teacher of a New World and, in the course of propaganda, reproduces that teaching afterwards. If he be more or less of a human automaton, he may reproduce very faithfully. But to what extent he is a 'live wire,' moved by, absorbing the message of that new More in his nature, life, destiny, he will give it out afterwards with something of his own mind-ways impressed on it. To what extent the message has reached and touched the very man of him, the spirit, self, soul,
he will respond to the message of the very man in
the teacher, and the result will tend to unison. To
what extent he has attended to the message as words,
as a mental outcome, he will tend to reproduce a
word-cum-mind version of his own. The more
‘original,’ the less of a machine he is, the more will
his repetition tend to vary, whether the variety be
in the way of repeating only, or in the core, or in
both.

And when we remember that the will to possess
in records, a chronicle of what is historically true is a
comparatively new demand; when we remember
that in past times the chief demand from a mandate,
oral or written, was to be impressed with, was to be
edified by, statements of what man ought to say,
do or think, we may be prepared to condone well-
meant efforts to improve upon the wording in those
chronicles, oral or written.

But whether edification or historic truth was the
chief thing sought, it is certain, that to have the
mandates seen as well as heard will have been realized
by India as a More in her wealth, when once the
innovation of publicly writing those mandates became
practicable. In this way, the Rock-edicts of King
Asoka were a highly important innovation, and may
well have stimulated the will to make written com-
munications at length, once a more suitable material
than thin metal plates, used for memoranda, had been
found.

I have introduced my brief survey of the Pali
Tipiṭaka in this way, that you, my listeners, may
come quite away from the idea, that in it we are
concerned with a book, or with a set of books sprung
long ago into literary existence like a bed of mushrooms
in the night. The Tipiṭaka is, in its present form, less 'a book,' a Bible, than an institution, a building of very long and gradual growth. The very language of it had to be made, much as we, adequately to make known our Christian scriptures, had to build up a standardized English out of several dialects. That language came to be known as 'the Row' (cf. our word 'paling'), so new was it then to see words in space, not hear them only air-borne. The 'Row' (pāli) was also known as the text (pāṭha). And row, text, piṭaka (or 'basket') we first hear of, not in the motherland, but in the southern daughterlands: Ceylon, Burma. Buddhism had warred against itself, and ejected those who taught its early Indian ideals. Weakened thus, it crumbled away in India, surviving only in South Asia and East Asia. All our Pali MSS. have come to us from Ceylon, Burma and Siam.

It was about half a century after Ceylon had been added to our empire, in 1802, that palm-leaf manuscripts containing a closed 'canon' of scripture began to find their way to Europe. For the next quarter of a century the zeal of a Fausböll, a Childers; an Oldenberg, a Rhys Davids was let loose on them. The last-named founded in 1881 a Pali Text Society, the collaborators in which have ever since been editing and translating both the Canon and its chief Commentaries. Within a decade its work should be finished.

Ti-, in Sanskrit Tri- piṭaka, means triple basket. A Buddhist would probably be as little able to tell why this noun was chosen as a Christian could say why his Canon is called 'Testaments.' He is usually as ignorant of their history as compared with knowledge of their contents as a Buddhist is usually ignorant of the one and the other. The digger with
spade and ‘piṭaka’ we meet with in the scripture; also with ‘piṭaka’ in the sense of a body of traditional sayings. Later Pali speaks of such as were "three-piṭaka-ite" men in learning.

Its three parts are: (1) the Vinaya, or body of monastic rules, together with the traditional episodes on account of which each rule was said to have been made. It is in three sections: the Pātimokkha, or ‘leading’ general rules of all monastic life, with a Commentary on each. Then two further divisions of rules, called Great Section, Little Section. Why so called it is not easy to say, since, under the former some minor details on food, dress, medicine are grouped, while under the latter occur the important subjects of schisms and the records of the first two councils. But since these refer to later events, and since the former gives skeleton sketches of the founding of the monk-Order, we may take it that Little Section meant ‘later,’ or Appendix. Lastly, a Summary (parivāra) will have also been a later addition.

The Second Piṭaka is called that of the Suttas. This word is of uncertain origin. Meaning literally what is ‘sewn,’ hence possibly a connected talk, as something more than just a mantra, or affirmation, it has also been derived from the Sanskrit sūkta (su-ukta; in Pali su-vutta): what is well said, a word applied to Vedic hymns. It is highly probable that in the first decade or two of the Sakyan (Buddhist) mission, nothing was drawn up in fixed (oral) form save just mantras or ‘texts,’ the exposition being in every case left to the free wording of the individual teacher. Such texts came in time to be called mātikā’s, literally ‘channels.’ With the growth of
the new Order and of many mantras, it would become
advisable to buttress the 'mātikā's' with authorized
exposition. And here we have the rise of the Sutta.
Or again, a venerable, venerated teacher would utter
impressively a mantra, or 'argument,' then leave an
understudy to explain it in detail. Such episodes
are found in the Suttas. The word 'sutt'anta,' lit.
'Sutta's end' is used vaguely, not implying any
culmination in teaching. The Suttas of the First
Collection are sometimes called Suttantas. Asoka's
Rock-edicts have once the word pari- or pali-yāya,
for 'passages' of the teaching.

This second 'basket' consists of five 'collections'
(nikāya's) of Suttas, in either prose or poetry, or
both mixed; the Long (Dīgha), the Middling-(long),
or Majjhima; the Connected ((Saṃyutta); the One-
(point-) more (Anguttāra); the having little items,
(Khuddaka). Of the when and the why determining
the assortment of all these, we have nothing historical
to guide us. Nor is there here space to go into their
contents. But a yet unsaid word of reflection may
be suggestive.

Take the Fourth Collection: with its sections of
'one point,' 'two points'—up to eleven points:
why it broke down just there is a mystery. There
is neither finality nor luck in this number. We
see it just petering out, making up the number by,
say, a five + four + two. Now it is clear, that at the
start we have in this Collection the beginnings of a
summary of 'texts,' or points. This is emphatically
not the case with the other three Collections, especially
with the first two. In these we have inclusive,
deliberately planned discourses (albeit in places, por-
tions are evidently patched on). And I can imagine
that by the time the redactors, at the time of the great Revision at Patna in Asoka's day, were getting, in the Fourth Collection, to double figures in 'texts,' e.g. the 'Tens,' 'Elevens,' other redactors had been compiling, from old Sayings, the more elaborate discourses, such as, in the First collection, the Divine Net, the Fruits of Recluseship, in the Second, the Discourse on Bases, the Heirs of Dharma, etc. With the elaboration of a method of exposition in 'refrains'—all Sutta readers will recognize what I mean—it had become possible to get text and exposition into a form making memorizing of both practicable; the free exposition needed no longer to be left to the exponent; all could be learnt by heart. Thus the way of the Fourth Collection will have been falling from favour, and to continue it after the 'Elevens' was given up. It is true, that the 'One-More' method is resorted to also in the last two Suttas of the First Collection, but neither peters out at the elevens. Both end at the Tens, a very lucky number.¹

That the Fifth Collection was called 'khuddaka' was not because its contents were of a less weighty character. It opens with anthologies which yield place in the Piṭaka to no work for sanctity of status. The Dhammapada, e.g., has in it verses that must be old since they are, in teaching, Upanishadic.² The Sutta-Nipāta is cited, in this or that section of it, in the Third Collection. Later, the Fifth Collection came to belie its name, since very long works were appended to it: the Jātaka Book of 551 stories; the An-

¹ I have gone a little more fully into this in my Buddhism, new edition, Home University Library, 1934.
thology of the Apadāna (apparently a written, not an oral composition, and hence dating from perhaps the second century B.C.), and the lengthy Paṭisambhidā-magga.

The Third Piṭaka or Abhidhamma consists of six catechetical books, mainly introspective in character, and one of Debates, a book of obvious accretions, but in its earlier portion affording contributive evidence of great value in the problem, of what it was that split up the early Buddhist 'church' in its desperate effort to establish unity of teaching and tradition, an effort by which it banished all hope of ever becoming the leading religious culture in India, or indeed any Indian culture at all. In these debates of the Kathā-vatthu, we find ourselves in a different world from that of Vinaya and Sutta. A fixed academic method of debate has been evolved. In it you get your opponent to concede the validity of your own view of his premises, then demand that he deduct your own conclusion. The opponent is never shown as disputing the use made of his premises especially in the flagrant use of what logic calls the undistributed middle (term). The tradition is that these debates were held at a great Patna Council (a council ignored by other Buddhist schools), at which great numbers of monks who refused to call themselves Analysts (i.e., who refused to resolve the real man into body and mind only) were expelled, expulsions in which Indian Buddhism signed its own death warrant.

The Kathā-vatthu is the fifth book of the seven, and, so far as it was then compiled, terminated the Abhidhamma Piṭaka in the third century B.C. The other two books of catechisms bear traces of being
later accessions, showing us that this Piṭaka, which is later than the other two, evolving, from Mātika’s during the fourth century B.C., will not have been ruled as closed till well after Asoka’s day (B.C. 274-235). The debates, one and all, cite from the Sutta-Piṭaka to buttress the arguments of either side. In the first debates these citations form an Appendix, suggesting later editing. The six catechetical books are almost entirely analytical inquiry into Sutta terminology. Of any ‘system,’ philosophical or metaphysical, they are empty. They are just expansions of the immense preoccupation with the mind of man, viewed as a sort of inner ‘body,’ which had been fastening itself on Indian thought as what we may call Proto-Sāṃkhya, or primitive Indian psychology. The way of the Suttas was that of the Vedas and Upanishads: to speak of man’s experiencing ‘with the mind’ as an instrument. In the Abhidhamma we see the overwhelming interest in ‘mind’ submerging the man, and finding reality for him only in mind.

Such, very meagrely described, is the Pali Tipiṭaka, the only Buddhist Canon which has survived in what Commentators insist is its entirety. A noteworthy thing about this quite remarkable scriptural monument is the way in which, up to the present day, the laity in Buddhist countries, and to a great extent the monastic world also, lives on in almost total ignorance of nearly all its contents. The laity has taken its scanty acquaintance with it from the monks, in the shape of a few formulas and hymns, together with a copious amount of telling of Jātaka stories as sermons. To the extent to which contexts in the Suttas traverse these formulas is either not known or is kept out of sight. To-day, however, there is here and there,
notably in Japan, Burma and French Indo-China, a stirring of stagnant waters, and a great work of translation into vernaculars is going on, with it may be future results as momentous for Buddhism as were those the Christian world came, after like labours, to undergo.
LIX
A MILESTONE IN PALI TEXT
SOCIETY WORK

We have come this year to another milestone in the Society's annals—that is, the completion of our editions of the seven books of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka and of the three books of the Commentary thereon, ascribed, in the Pali recension which we find in the palmleaf MSS, to Buddhaghosa. All of these are first (roman letter) editions, and their history dates almost from the start of the Society. In the first Journal (1882) we find that three of the seven books had been already put in hand and, in the second Journal, one of the Commentaries. This year we complete our edition of the seventh, the (so-called Great) Book of the Patṭhāna, and the Commentary on the second book, Vibhanga, the voluminous Sammoha-Vinodanī, "She who disperses bewilderment"—hopeful title for an exegetical Baedeker such as the Commentaries were. Below is the inscription in our milestone:—

ABHIDHAMMA PITAKA

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<td>7. Paṭṭhāna.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1911, 1913</td>
<td>6. Yamaka.</td>
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1 Published in J. Pali Text Soc. of 1923, and rewritten in J. R. Asiatic Society, April, 1923. These combine both articles.
### COMMENTARIES.

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<td>Sammoha-Vinodanī</td>
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This table shows that, whereas, when the old Sinhalese Commentaries were recast into Pali—presumably by Buddhaghosa—fancy names were found for the commentaries on the first two books, the commentaries on the remaining five books were lumped together under the one prosaic title of *Commentary on the Five Books*. Why there should have been this apparent impatience I do not know. Only two of the five books are much shorter than the rest. Not one of the five was held to be unimportant. The last, in fact, in the eyes of the orthodox mediæval Buddhist, was supreme in the infinity of its wisdom and, to use a modern sports term, 'extended' the Teacher very considerably when, according to the quaint myth, he inflicted it upon his long-suffering mother and her fellow-devas. It is conceivable that fancy titles were running short. It is a pretty problem.

### TRANSLATIONS.

- **1900.** Of the Dhamma-Sangañi, by Mrs. Rhys Davids, published by the Royal Asiatic Society, second edition, 1923.]
- **1915.** Of the Kathā-Vatthu (Points of Controversy), by S. Z. Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids.
- **1920-1.** Of the Commentary: Atthasālinī, *The Expositor*, by P. Maung Tin.
- **1923-4.** Of the Puggala-Paññatti, *Designation of Human Types*, by Bimala C. Law.
Finally, as a coda or, as some would prefer to say, an introduction to the lot, we might add the famous little manual Abhidhammatthasangaha of a later date:—


The founder of the Pali Text Society did not a little unacknowledged editing on other texts, and where he could not do so, some have wished ruefully that he could have. But he made no public venture in Abhidhamma. He placed the Dhammasangani in my hands, as it were a tangled skein, in 1893.

All then is now done, unless it be judged well (a) to make more translations, (b) edit any Tikâs. Whatever may be decided about (b) it is not in this Society’s original programme to publish editions of these. Of (a) it might be worth while to publish translations of the Commentary on the Vibhanga and on the Kathâvatthu. 1 It is true that our Points of Controversy gives the gist of the latter. The former is a voluminous work, longer by 100 pages than its predecessor The Expositor, but in no way a repetition, and, in so far as it illustrates further the half-erudite, half-childlike, historically wholly uncritical mind of its day, is quite interesting. Besides these, the first pages, the Paccaya Niddesa, of the Paṭṭhāna, are worth presenting in English.

If we discount the many topics of clerical controversy discussed with much crude inconclusive dialectic in the Kathâvatthu (together with the irruption of that dialectic itself), we can say that the analysis of causation into the twenty-four passages or modes of relation,

1 Accomplished by Dr. B. C. Law, and published 1940.
considered as causal, is the most outstanding and significant contribution to anything approaching an epistemology in the whole Abhidhamma Piṭaka. The only other matter to put beside it in constructive value is the analysis of sense in the Rūpakaṇḍa of the Dhammasangaṇi. We may look in vain for any other contributions in these seven books of a like positive nature.

Indeed, as to the rest of the Paṭṭhāna, the whole of the Yamaka, of the Dhātukathā, and a good deal of the Vibhanga, we, as looking back from our new world, may well marvel that it was ever held worth while to compile them. I have not said this hastily, but as one who has spent a long slice of one life-span in the work of revealing the contents of this Piṭaka. I should be too glad to learn that the time was not wasted. But the venerable Ledi’s apologia¹ did not convert me.

Have we, who have taken forty-one years in laying these many volumes on library shelves, any sheaves to show that may serve, first the historian of science and of religion, and then, through him, the average educated masses? We have left him with plenty of problems, but, as the founder used to say, “we have deepened their significance.” Let me try to make a brief and quite provisional summary.

Taking the problem of the order in which these seven books came to be compiled and made canonical, why on earth was the book usually called the latest made the fifth and not the seventh? I suggest a solution.

At the Council of Patna, there were no such six ‘books’ as we now have, and of course, as yet no

record of any Debates (as made during and after the Council). There was (in addition to Vinaya and Suttas) only the Mātikā, or 'opening sentences' with which the Abhidhamma Piṭaka begins. (This is referred to in the Vinaya as co-ordinate with Vinaya and Dhamma). And there were probably the first four collections (books as we say) out of the present total of seven. After the Council, a record of Debates held at it was compiled, namely ch. I of the so-called Kathāvatthu. This record will have concluded what was included in the new 'Piṭaka,' making a total of five. Later on more Debates on various subjects came to be added. Also two more collections of catechetical analyses: Yamaka and Paṭṭhāna. No record survives of a prior authorized closing of the Canon. Hence why should there not be later inclusions?

It is true that the Kathāvatthu refers to two or three of the twenty-four paccayas (No. V) (No. VII). But just when it would have served the orthodox apologist to cite the Paṭṭhāna (since it, too, was, if in a modified degree, held to be Buddhavacana), no such citation is given. And more: where points calling for citation, in support, from the Dhammasangāni occur, this work is also not referred to. Hence I incline to think it possible that the Council of Patna had an Abhidhamma Mātikā, but that it had no more a seven-book Abhidhamma Piṭaka than had the two earlier Councils of Rājagaha and Vesālī. That the three Councils—three at least—were held as recorded I see no reason to doubt.¹ Why should such accounts be fictitious? But we may well be accepting too uncritically the commentarial account of the Patna Council.

Not for me is it to try to solve the problem. But a comparative study of the internal evidence to be got out of these texts may widen and deepen its significance.

Further, we can now better mark, with them as an intermediary stage, the growth in the older Buddhism of the cult of words and of wordiness, the growth of a rudimentary logic of division and definition, the growth of co-ordination and subsumption in term-concepts (*paññatti*), and the discovery or the specialization of terms for concepts. On this I have dwelt more than once as our work was progressing.¹ Here I will only instance such new appearances as (1) the division *cittacetasikā dhammā* for the clumsy old system of the five khandhas—a system which later on that division entirely routed;² (2) the specialization of *hetu* under the wider induction of *paccaya*³ (these terms were used as alternatives in the Suttas); (3) the evolution of introspective analysis (we may compare the rudimentary catalogue in the Anupada-Sutta of the Majjhima with those in the Dhamma-Sangāni); and (4) the appearance of the term *bhavanga* for the continuum or flux of actual life and potential mental activity.⁴

More significant are these books in the growth of the church of the Theras than we have perhaps realized, and more sinister. It is a different growth from the flamboyant metaphysics of Mahāyānism, but it is no less effective in smothering up for us the very reason why, and for what, that church first came into exist-

¹ See *Bud. Psy. Ethics* and preface to *Vibhanga*.
² Cf. *Dhs.*, § 1022, with the *Compendium*, pp. 1 f.
³ In *Dhs.* and *Pāṭhāna*.
⁴ *Pāṭhāna*, p. 34, etc. Occurring once in an Anguttara Category, it is paraphrased in the Commentary as *attabhāvo*. I see in the word an abstract *bhavanga*, 'becoming-ness,' as truer for man's nature than 'being.'
ence. In Mahāyāna the cult of words begat a metaphysic of Absolutism; in the Theravāda the cult of words begat some psychology and a logic. In both the founder as a real man, and his real gospel, were practically lost sight of.

For the chief outcome of these years of work on the Abhidhamma is perhaps just this—and it does deepen the significance of the problems confronting the historian of Buddhism—the necessity of distinguishing, far more acutely than has yet been done, between these two factors in Theravāda Buddhism—the work and message of the living friend of his fellow-men, Gotama, and the overwhelmingly monastic teaching of his order, his church. In the Abhidhamma the founder has become a shadow, an echo, a most unreal concept, a term, a word. His central message, turned long before into an 'eightfold' formula, is cut up and slashed about, with all the life-sap gone out of it.

We need not quarrel with our Ābhidhammikas on that account, nor hold them worse perhaps than the man in orders who, so frequently in this country, teaches his school classes in a purely 'secular' way. With the spread of 'the Dhamma' from Asoka's time, and its annexation of so much of the culture of that and succeeding centuries, the Ābhidhammikas became necessarily to some extent secularized schoolmasters, teaching a somewhat narrow, crabbed curriculum. Much the same thing went on in Europe in Christendom.

But we do need to be ever profiting by increase in materials, such as these texts afford, to sharpen and clarify our historical perspective. We need to be ever recalling Aquinas's word Distinguo. We need to be ever sceptical when the uncritical glibly quote
the 'Buddhavacana,' saying, the Buddha said this and that, even when the passage bears sure fingermarks of the cloistered editing compiler, filling out with set phrase and church formula the fragmentary, but living natural sentences which alone have survived oblivion.

In the version of this article published in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, I made, not an opposing, but a different conclusion, which I find it worth repeating here.

Such, then, are the works, and such has been, on and off, the P.T.S.'s work these forty years. "All is over except the shouting"—or, shall we say, the little choric dance we twelve may hold in spirit round the cenotaph of these fourteen first editions, continent linking hands with continent in us, nay, world with world, for already a third of us are on the other side. And after the dance—for has not a burden fallen from our backs?—a few minutes of reflection.

I have said cenotaph, for least of all do I labour under any illusion that even the most finished European editions or translations—let alone our rough pioneer efforts—will quicken these dead bones to any power of teaching and enlightening our world, either East or West, as they once to a very limited extent may have done when a little world of monastic culture was by them taught *how to think consistently*. So little can this prospect be entertained, that we may well be disposed to ask ourselves whether this cenotaph of the works of a dead culture may not be *kenōs* as well as *koinōs*—empty as well as common. Has it all been a waste of time and energy, of life and the zest of life well spent? A learned decanal journalist has just committed himself to saying: "Almost the whole
duty of man lies in the maxim: Waste not." (Dean Inge).

Over against this we might equally well dogmatize: The chief duty of man is to grow—to grow in himself, to make knowledge grow and goodness and beauty grow. Whether or not he grow or cause to grow wastefully is a secondary, if an important consideration. And when it is a quest of opening up buried treasures of past ideas, or opening up new vistas of unverified powers and resources, it is impossible for explorer and experimenter to judge beforehand, that this is waste of time and energy. Much digging and many experiments will prove to have been so. And yet who will assert that pioneer work should therefore be shirked, nay, may it not be that, as Rhys Davids once said, "we grow by all such"?

Much treasure of old, and yet in a way of up-to-date thought, it was held a generation ago, might well be lying hid in Abhidhamma. The analogy of the term तद् मेताद तद् फुलकाद seemed to fit it well. At the very outset of his task the commentator, discussing the term Abhidhamma, wrote in a rather misleading way of how it "exceeded and was distinct from the Dhamma,"¹ much as a deva might be eminent among his peers (ati- or abhi-deva). And one of us, Dr. Taylor, pointed out this passage three years before it was edited.² Might we even hope to find in those seven books a plank here and there of positive exposition bridging over the lacunae and the reserves and the silences in many of the Suttas? So, more or less, may some among us have hoped.

Anyway, we set forth, one now, another then, to

¹ Or possibly dhamma's (doctrine).
² J.R.A.S., 1894, 560.
explore our several seven hills, and we brought back our quarry. The cynical may say, this—is it not a mountain’s way?—amounted to a bed of mice. We have revealed much meticulous catechizing, some inconclusive dialectic, and quite a little world of word permutations. Has our knowledge grown by it? Have labour and time been utterly wasted?

Speaking, if I may, for my spade-mates as well as for myself, we think not. We think we have in these works contributed a chapter to the history of the growth, within limits of time and location, of the human spirit. Considered in its due context, this chapter reveals how a certain kind of intensive culture may on the one hand stimulate, and on the other stultify that growth. And by all such considerations we ourselves grow.

Among these Abhidhamma compilers of the cloistered lives, and among the commentary compilers, a certain growth may be discerned. It was of the kind that intensive culture in close-barred conditions naturally brings about. The great world of earth they knew nothing about. The teacher whom they had come to call ‘omniscient’ had told their forefathers in the Order nothing about it. They were secluded in their work even from the little world of their fellowmen without the vihāra walls. They inherited as members of the Order an ample oral tradition of Vinaya and Sutta and Mātikā. And the Mātikā or tables of classification they expanded into a so-called Abhidhamma with certain patches of commentary in parts. The Vinaya was largely framed to meet special cases. The Suttas were largely record of how other special cases were met. Mostly, that is, they were precepts ad hominem. Thus the precept was served up in
a way called *pariyāya* (a tiresome word to translate; etymologically a going round about). The Ābhidhammikas sought how to serve up the precept *nippariyāyena*; in the abstract, stripped of its accessories and no longer an *oeuvre d’occasion*.

Engaged on such work they would inevitably clarify their concepts, adjudge definite meaning to terms, coordinate and subordinate among terms and, where necessary, evolve new terms. In brief, it was, as I have said above and elsewhere,¹ a discipline in consistency of thought and language. And this, at that stage of Indian thought, was not a little needed.

Those cloistered Ābhidhammikas were doing their best to let shine such light of thought about body and mind as the earlier tradition of their church had been able to kindle. There was probably not very much of the real original teaching of the founder in that tradition. The ‘Eightfold Path’ is no longer central, is chopped about in all manner of ways, and the idea of carrying on his beneficent work seems undreamt of. Indeed, he has himself become a very shadowy figure, a person only alluded to in formulas. And, in the fifth book, Docetic and other heresies about him are discussed in a very cut-and-dried manner.

Herein, however, these early scholastics were not different from Christian teachers in the secular education of to-day. The academic teaching of the Theravāda was becoming practically no less secular. In the twelfth century manual,² generally used ever since, the name, let alone the teaching of the Founder has faded out utterly save for a grace-before-meat allusion.

¹ *Buddhist Psychological Ethics*, Introd., pt. iv; *Vibhanga*, xx; *Buddhist Psychology*, pp. 139, 177, etc.
² *Abhidhammatthasangaha*.
Had those early scholastics been living in closer, saner touch with their fellows, had that doctrine not become a closed tradition bound up in iron formulas, they might have let the lessons of earth-life play over them, they might have discerned that life to be in the throes of new moral growth, they might have let the light of this moral awakening shine on their church-built Dhamma: they might have grasped the truth—O! the triumph of it over tradition!—that, whereas body after body was used and laid down, whereas the force, the šakti, which they called mind, in this term and that, informed, innervated body after body, it was just that attā on which they were bidden to depend, it was that Self who was really 'they,'¹ as neither body nor mind could be, it was that 'Self' whom at the very outset of his career the master bade men go and seek,²—this it was which, down the ages of rebirth, was to grow and grow till he blossomed into the very nature of the final goal.

But the artificial life decreed by ancient India, with its cleavage between lay and religious, shut them up in a paddock. And the formulas of a church which taught that all had been told, so that expansion of import and exposition was alone lawful, shut them up in a cellar. What their missionary brethren could learn, serving their fellows more directly, they could not. Hence in their psychology all and every kind of reaction is pre-determined. The essential creativeness of life and mind is undreamed of. Confronted with this creativeness, complex and unpredictable, any theory of relations has always, even in our own day, proved a quite sterile subject. Buddha-

¹ "Yours": tumhākām. S., iii, 33 f.; iv, 81 f.
² Vin. i, 1, 14.
ghosa makes play with twenty-four relations in his Visuddhi Magga expositions, but they led him to no new vista of truth. Truth, in his day, as the result of centuries of this cloistered culture, had very largely become a knowledge of ‘marks’ (lakkhanāni), or salient features in just those concepts (and no others) which made up the little world of thought occupying the mind of the wise man in orders. So far he was at least positive, if circumscribed. Beyond this, truth consisted, according to that tradition with which he associated the name “men of old” (phorāna), largely in negations. Where, ages before, the founder had been silent, where the founder had rejected alternatives without making any sweeping denials, there Buddha-ghosa has been taught to say: there is not, there is nothing, there is no one. He does not seek to convince. He dogmatically denies.

And as we leave this house of cloistered lives, of a closed tradition, of a past dominating present and future, we have a sense of rooms swept and garnished, clean and tidy, of sealed windows, of blinds drawn down, of no outlook towards the dawn.
LX

CURIOUS OMISSIONS
IN PALI CANONICAL LISTS¹

Indologists have at this time of day come to know how prominent is the part played by numbered categories in the Pali Canon. The whole of the Fourth Nikāya, the Anguttara, is composed of such. The two last Suttantas of the First Nikāya: the ‘Sangīti’ and the ‘Das-uttara,’ are composed of such. Five Suttas of the Second Collection have numerical title and treatment.² The Third Nikāya alone, the Samyutta, has nowhere conformed to this method. In the case of the Anguttara- and Dīgha-Nikāyas the subjects are not only grouped under numbers, they are taken in arithmetical progression: the Ones, Twos, Threes, etc. The lists are apparently out to exclude nothing which will have been of doctrinal importance to the compilers, whenever and wherever that compilation took place. That the Anguttara progression should cease at the Elevens, as though it were a cricketing chronicle, has not yet been inquired into, if I may except myself (in my re-written Buddhism, Home University Library, 1934).

Now if we are to be guided in our conclusions by writers in general, Buddhist and European, as to what is, and has been from the start of doctrinal importance and centrality, we shall ascribe these features to four

² Nos. 59, 102, 112, 115, 117
credal formulas: the Three Refuges, the Three Marks, the Four Ariyan Truths, and the Way as Eightfold. And we should therefore confidently look to find all of these, not only included in their due numerical place in all those three series of lists, but given priority of place. They would be there: they would come first. I might add that we should, under the Ones, look to find nirvana. Do we find these expectations borne out?

We do not. We find that inclusion of all of these as titular items is either partially or wholly absent. Nirvana is among the latter. I append a table of such results as I have found:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Doctrine.</th>
<th>As in Anguttara.</th>
<th>As in Dīgha.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Four Truths (dukkha, samudaya, nirodha, magga)</td>
<td>Catukka-nipāta: nil.</td>
<td>Sangīti: as “knowledge, not truths.” Dasuttara: last item but one.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With regard to the last item, I have already pointed out (Manual, 1932) that in the Sangīti we get the ‘eight’ āṅgas, but not as attributes of a Way. They are a list of eight ‘fitnesses’ (samattā). Further, that in a Tika-nipāta Sutta (Anguttara, I, p. 296) we find a number of lists, those subsequently called bodhipakkhiyā dhammā, being as it were tried on in turn as forming a Middle Course. And I surmised,
that some term, then qualifying the Way in the First Utterance was being let drop because of its depreciated value, and a worthy substitute was being sought. That word was bhava, depreciated from its lofty meaning of spiritual growth, in bhava-magga, or bhava-paññapada, to mean ‘lives’ and ‘worlds,’ both bhavā, and surviving only in the later bhava-cakka, or wheel of becomings, i.e. of lives, or worlds.

With regard to all the lists above, I am not here saying, that they are not scattered about in all four Nikāyas. They are; it is only that, as items, as it would be thought, of the first importance, their occurrence where they should one and all have come, ay, and been given first rank, is seldom made titular, is curiously intermittent and is the reverse of what we should find, had they always occupied that doctrinal centrality of which Hīnayānists and writers on Buddhism are for ever telling us. By us their treatment in these three sets of categories has not yet been weighed with historical criticism as it should be. It points to an age when their position in the cult of the Buddhism of India and of Southern Asia was not what it has since come to be. The revising compiling standardizing gentlemen of the Patna Sangha were, as to their main dogmas, in a relatively fluid state of mind. And as they progressed with the long business of arranging important teachings in numbered lists, a super-recognition of certain of these was evolving.

Thus, whereas the Eights omit listing as item an ‘eightfold way,’ when we come to the Tens we find a Way of many points, but it was then only possible, in titles to lengthen matters and call it tenfold.

In such matters I am as yet in a minority of one—an, eka-nipātā. But I appeal again to writers on
these things—votaries we must leave to a more distant future—to look closer into evidential material now available, and to see Buddhism less as a ready-made, if bifurcated, cult, and more as a growth with a long history.

Had I not been concerned solely to upset original centrality in just these doctrines, I might have included the body-mind pentad called khandha’s. But although these are persistently called original teaching, they are not claimed as central. Yet I will here add, that the Fives of the Auguttara do not include them (the one reference to them is at the end of a gloss-like passage at the end of a Sutta, No. 22, and merely incidental), but both Dīgha Suttantas include them in the Fives and give them front rank. In this I see possibility of compilation later than that of the Anguttara.¹

¹ This brief premonitory note is expanded in the *Visva-bharati Quarterly*, N.S. Ì, 2, 1937, in response to an implicit challenge in the preceding issue, published by M. Winternitz, and reprinted as Appendix in my *What was the Original Gospel in Buddhism?* (1938).
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