i. RHYS-DAVIDS

ii. Vol. 3
WAYFARER'S WORDS
NOTE

Like its predecessors, *Wayfarer's Words* I and II, this present volume is a collection of articles and reviews, lectures and addresses published or delivered by Mrs. Rhys Davids over a number of years, and in the case of the former, in a variety of philosophical, religious and literary journals issued in three continents. It is an inestimable benefit, especially to students of original and early Buddhism, to have the majority of these shorter writings by one of its ablest exponents brought together in book form. Articles by Mrs. Rhys Davids were being accepted for publication up to the time of her last days on earth, as she would have expressed it. But that she had intended this to be the concluding volume of *Wayfarer's Words* is sufficiently indicated by the list of Works edited, translated and written by her (p. 1147), and which she had drawn up and arranged for inclusion at the end of this volume.

Mrs. Rhys Davids, before she died on June 26th, 1942, had the satisfaction of having received and read the proofs as far as the middle of the 87th article. Thus only comparatively few pages remained to be received from the printer. For these, and for the Index, I am responsible. She greatly appreciated the courteous and competent manner in which the publisher and printer alike handled this work amid all the difficulties attendant upon publishing in war-time.

The true humility of a great scholar always prevented her from seeking any publicity for herself. It is nevertheless thought that a portrait would not be out of place as a frontispiece to the volume which marks the conclusion of her work in this life.

I. B. HORNER.
PREFACE

In this, the third and last volume of such scattered items as I have judged merited a second birth, there are, with more sayings, about my special field, points about other ancient cults of no less interest for the history of religion in general; among them matters, that may well, in coming generations, claim worthier, closer attention than is given them to-day. For not yet, in such documents as we have, has there been sufficient delving beneath superstructures; not yet are we sure no further discovery of documents is possible; and not yet can we say, we shall never accept as true what coming helpers, coming 'founders' may have to tell mankind as Gotama, Jesus, Mahommed told to men. Wayfarers are we in what for me is best called a More on the way to our goal or 'Most', and long is the way we, each of us, have yet to go, and much it is that even the best among us anywhere and at any time has to learn, whether this much is a matter of past (and hitherto lost) information, or present, or future. This must we never say: we know all we need to know. Nor this: we can now conceive beyond which no conceiving is possible. For as we go, that is, as we grow, not only our knowledge but our conceptual power also grows, and what this will ultimately reveal we cannot yet name in words. Poets in scripture and elsewhere have tried to do so, but nowise save perhaps in music can there be even partial success in convincing. Listen to the final
lines in the *Dream of Gerontius*, and to Elgar’s music wherein the words are smothered, transcended by the music, and it will be understood what I would say. Some think the ‘mystic’ gets here and now, now and then, to the Goal. They are wrong. He too works with finite instruments. Some think, the saint plunges at death into the Goal. They are wrong. For him too, truer is the Girl Guide notice of a departed member: ‘Called to higher service.’ If we deem mystic or saint wins, now or then, to more than this, we are bringing down to our present ‘More’ our own present imperfect idea of the ‘Most’. We are making This a Less. And such as will read these little words of a wayfarer, in this or other worlds, are every one of them but wayfarers in the greatest of all quests.

Once more I offer thanks for permits to print kindly given.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENTS</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LXI. Man’s Responsibility in the Creeds</td>
<td>721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LXII. Vardhamāna Mahāvīra, Founder of Jainism</td>
<td>737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LXIII. Man and the Way</td>
<td>748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LXIV. (1) A Greeting to Jains</td>
<td>758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) The Child of Promise</td>
<td>760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Are there Jain Values in Buddhism?</td>
<td>766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LXV. Sāṅkhya Logic</td>
<td>771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LXVI. “God-wayfaring”: A Sequel</td>
<td>778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LXVII. Man and the Creeds</td>
<td>785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LXVIII. Asoka, Heir of the Way</td>
<td>794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LXIX. Birth-stories and the Long Quest</td>
<td>807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LXX. Buddhist Parables and Similes</td>
<td>819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LXXI. Sage and King</td>
<td>839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LXXII. Sakyamuni and Ramakrishna</td>
<td>847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LXXIII. What “Buddha” said</td>
<td>854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LXXIV. About the Going and the Goal</td>
<td>861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) The Going</td>
<td>864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) The Goal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LXXV. An Apologist in Buddhism</td>
<td>870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LXXVI. Ceylon and the Pali Text Society</td>
<td>880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LXXVII. India and the Pali Text Society</td>
<td>889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LXXVIII. Wording Old and New</td>
<td>895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LXXIX. Old Words and New Will</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LXXX. Worthy Names and the Nameworthy</td>
<td>916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LXXXI. Yoga and the Fellowman—(1) and (2)</td>
<td>926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LXXXII. Reincarnation</td>
<td>943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LXXXIII. A Word from Outside the Creeds (A) and (B)</td>
<td>953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LXXXIV. Enemy Action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) “Dialogues of the Buddha” and A Bomb</td>
<td>962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) “Minor Anthologies” and A Bomb</td>
<td>972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LXXXV. Man and Invisible Helpers</td>
<td>975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LXXXVI. Does Religion Unite or Separate?</td>
<td>989</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONTENTS

LXXXVII. Basis and Ideal in our Outlook - 998
LXXXVIII. The More in Man
(a) More-will and More-well - 1018
(b) A Hallmark of Man and of Religion 1022
LXXXIX. Tribunals and Man’s Opportunities - 1028
XC. George Croom Robertson as Teacher - 1036
XCI. Last Wayfarer’s Words
A Word in Metre - 1048
Waymaking for Peace - 1049

APPENDIX

COMMENTS ON OTHER WAYFARER’S WORDS

1. “Why India is Poor in History” - - - - 1054
2. Survival in Buddhism - - - - 1058
3. “The Inner Sentinel” - - - - 1066
4. Role of Religion in a Changing World - - 1070
5. “The Milinda Questions” and the Man - - 1072
6. Mahāyāna Buddhism - - - - 1074
7. “Buddha and not Buddhists” - - - - 1079
8. Translators - - - - - 1083
9. Sānkhya and Original Buddhism - - - 1090
10. Animal Rebirth - - - - 1093
11. A “Basic Conception” of Buddhism - - - - 1096
12. “Vedantic Leaven” - - - - 1105
13. Piercing the Veil - - - - 1107
14. Dr. Schweitzer and “Indian Thought” - - - - 1112
15. “Horizons of Immortality” - - - - 1114
16. “Eastern Religions and Western Thought” - - 1116
17. Uniformity in World-Religion - - - - 1117
18A. “Nirvana” - - - - - 1119
18B. “Le Dogme et la Philosophie du Bouddhisme” - 1121
19. Faith in Buddhism - - - - - 1123
20A. Missing the Essential - - - - - 1127
20B. Buddhism in England - - - - - 1136
21. “My Life” - - - - - 1139
22. Brief Notes on HJAS 4. 116-190 - - - 1140
WAYFARER'S WORDS

LXI

MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY IN THE CREEDS

The greater creeds differ in the degree to which they show interest in, and lay stress upon what our feeble imagination has called 'the last things.' No greater creed ignores these things; none is so limited, so materialistic in purview as to do that. But the emphasis differs; the curiosity about them differs; the mandate about them differs. The original mandate in each has doubtless got more or less worsened in the several scriptures; hence I am here referring, under 'last things,' to just the surviving wording about them in each creed. But I am making in this short compass no inclusive comparative survey of this varying interest. I am but comparing in this respect two of those greater creeds, and linking the diversity in them with that in a third creed.

No one can even glance at the Avesta documents on the message of Zarathustra (Zoroaster) without coming up against his appeal in prayer to the Most High for knowledge of a man's fate at death, and the not withheld reply. And if we who read have but

1 Published originally in Oriental Studies in honour of D. S. C. E. Pavry, Oxford, 1930, and revised for this volume.
2 Or, in the more learned term "eschatology." I have often grumbled that, if we must use such terms, "archistology"—next things—were better.
rid ourselves of the cloak of tradition on the one hand, and of the eye-dust of scepticism on the other, we may well wonder, not that the prayer was put up, but that there is but one great messenger who is recorded as having made it.

No one, on the other hand can search carefully through the oldest surviving documents on the message of the founder of Buddhism without discovering in two contexts, more or less similar, what he is alleged, not to have asked, but to have told of a man's fate when he leaves earth. And if we who read have learnt not to judge the record at its face-value, we may well wonder why it is, that the followers of the creed now called Buddhism seemingly ignore it altogether in what—so far as I have seen—they both teach and write.

In the Zoroastrian creed we have man's next step placed to the front, in scripture earlier and later. "Zarathustra's pre-eminent concern," Dr. J. D. C. Pavry has written, "with the bearing of eschatology on conduct can easily be seen from a study of the Gāthās."¹ And he might have added, for he goes on to show it, "and with the theory and revelation of eschatology itself," both in the Gāthās, and chiefly in the later Avesta. In the latter tradition we see the next step believed in as true in fact, but the how, and the wherewithal are mainly ignored.

That 'as we sow we reap' is taught in both this creed and in Buddhism, as in Christianity. When however regarding man's next harvest, we seek for what has been uttered respecting the man as and when and how he harvests, or, more truly, is himself harvested, this in any strikingly worthy way is not

¹ The Zoroastrian Doctrine of a Future Life, 1926.
brought to the front in Buddhism in either earlier or later scriptures, or with the intelligent interest we might have expected.

Here then is a striking and interesting divergence, and I wonder whether any one has inquired why or how it has come about? When I brought the matter forward some years ago in a Buddhist journal, now defunct, an English 'vert accused me, in referring to his scriptures' emphasis on post mortem tribunal, of lowering his creed's teaching to 'police court business.' As if the warding of the public welfare by such courts were not the worthiest expression of man's care for man, no matter in what world it takes place! Zoroastrianism, as we know, is in its origin older than Buddhism; how much older we do not know. Both creeds include, amid much aftergrowth due to temporary conjuncture, messages that are true for all time, though they were, for the Many, new words when first uttered. Such as, that the Highest is 'the good'; that man, aiming at the Highest, 'becomes good.' But to, be wise as to the next step, the next things, was equally interesting, equally important for the man who heard Gotama as for the man who heard Zarathustra, for the man who heard Jesus as for the man of to-day in the interim. What has pushed back the question and dimmed its importance for both us of to-day and the compilers of Buddhist scripture? We need to ask these questions as students of religious history and also as ourselves historical subjects. We study the stream, but we are in it.

Here anyway is what the Saying referred to contains. It is entitled the Deva-dūta Sutta, or Deva-messengers: No. 130 in the Majjhima Nikāya, and No. 35 in the
'Threes' of the Anguttara Nikāya. The former is in the last section of the Majjhima and may hence possibly be later accretion. The latter is in the early part of the Anguttara Nikāya. Placed as fourth in the Four Collections of the Pali Canon, it bears traces, for me, as being earlier than the longer, more carefully edited compilations comprising the First and Second Collections. In the other, the Majjhima version of the Sutta, two fairly patent glosses appear. What are they both about? I take the earlier version and give a condensed translation. "There are these three deva-messengers. . . . Some one acts amiss in deed, word and thought. When the body breaks up after dying, he rises up (uppajjati) in a woeful way in purgatory, warders grasping him and showing him to the Yama as one who, unfilial, without respect for the worthy and holy things, or for the head of the family, deserves punishment. Him the Yama admonishes: 'See here, man (purisa)! Did you not see manifest among men the first messenger?' 'I did not see, sir.' 'Did you not see among men any aged woman or man, feeble, tottering, grey?' 'I did see, sir.' 'See here, man, to you ware and mindful of the aged one did not this occur: I, even I too shall get old; come now, I will do the good in deed, word and thought?' 'I will not have succeeded, sir; I will have been careless.' 'See here, man, by carelessness you did not the good in deed, word and thought. Verily, man, according to what was careless, so will they do to you. For lo! this evil action was done neither by mother, nor by father, nor by brother, nor by sister, nor by friends and colleagues, nor by kinsmen, but by you, yea, by you was that evil action done,
It is you who experience the results thereof.' Him the Yama admonishes again: 'See here, man! did you not see manifest among men the second messenger . . . a woman, a man ill, suffering . . . or the third messenger . . . a woman, a man dead . . .?' (The man answers as before. The Yama denounces him as before.) 'The Yama was silent.'

Then follows a fairly lurid account of tortures such as men could and did speak of with unuplifted hair what time they would go forth to witness some man or woman so treated after sentence, as being one of life's diversions.

Of good men it is not stated that they too appear before the Yama—a curious omission—but they are just said to have duly heeded the sign of the three messengers.

If we turn to the version in the Majjhima Nikāya, we see, not three messengers but five. These include the man as new born babe, and the man as receiving legal punishment on earth. Moreover the purgatorial paragraphs are extended. And at the beginning of the Saying is the noteworthy simile, used twice elsewhere in this Collection, comparing man’s life to two houses, and the intelligent man as he who sees, watching what goes on in both.

It may be known to some readers, that this Sutta is not the only variant in the teaching of other-world envoys. The three (not the five) have been incorporated into the Saga of the Founder’s life with a fourth messenger added, a samāna, or religieux, as typifying the not careless, the heedful right-living man. There may well have been a true group of incidents in the Founder’s life, when in three drives he is said to come up against some man on his estate he will have
greeted, on a later drive found ill, on a yet later drive found deceased—a man who may have made on him the strong impression, that the natural limits and uncertain tether of the bodily life called out for more knowledge, for a clearer view of what lies beyond this life in a body, and what may here be done to insure a happy prospect in the beyond. He himself was not content to grope along. We read of him later, that people would throng to him in his old age, just to have that dark veil lifted by his psychic gifts. For his frequent converse with men of the Unseen is not seldom in the records. And in speaking of himself as being a mirror to the unseen for the Many, it is probably a gloss, and an unworthy one, that makes him suggest he might be weary and vexed with inquirers.¹ Or this might be, that old age had hindered his ready will:

When rolling back the cloaking veil
With pain gone by and weariness
He saw both this world and the next.²

I doubt it.

As to those other two inserted messengers, the babe suggests the monkish hand, which taught that rebirth was 'ill' instead of being, as it is, a fresh opportunity. And whereas the earthly tribunal has a plausible look, it is not on a level, as the mandate of an inspired helper, with the original three messengers. For although it shows man as warned to heed what is worthily meant, namely that which, at a given time and place, it is held he should not do, this code varies with time and place. But the three messengers are indexes to a code not of earth, but of the worlds,

¹ Dīgha, ii, 91f.
² Ibid. iii, 28f.
true of man at all times and everywhere. They call
to man as man. As such they belong to the message
of an inspired helper. And it is the conception which
each of us forms of the nature and mission of such
a helper which must decide for each, whether Gotama
may have spoken of the judgment and the why of it
and the thereafter of it, as he is said to have done.
With this weighty question I have dealt elsewhere.¹

Here I will but suggest two reasons why it may have
come about, that, with so vivid a Saying as the Deva-
dūta, comparable in its live terse intensity, as in its
very different ethical outlook, with the Jesus-saying of
the judging 'son of man'² Buddhism, old and new,
should have shelved this line of teaching, as Zoroas-
trianism did not. I think, in Buddhism the reasons
are not very far to seek. I offer two.

We know that, apart from the question of its source
and growth, the doctrine known as an-attā,³ one of
the three slogans of monastic Buddhism, had come
so much to the front in orthodox tenets that, by the
beginning of the A.D. era, in the important Questions
of Milinda, it alone, and not the other two slogans
(anicca, dukkha)⁴ is alone dealt with. (With the
historical reasons for this I have dealt elsewhere).⁵

This doctrine: that the very man or self or spirit
is not 'got at' in any ultimate sense; that he is
only found in 'mental states' or phenomena; that
these go on in a continuum (santāti) in habitual
sequence, naturally affected seriously the ability of
even the cultured, let alone the average man, to

¹ Kindred Sayings on Buddhism, ch. ii, 1930.
² Matthew, xxv.
³ The unreality of the very man.
⁴ All is transient and ill.
⁵ The Milinda Questions, 1930.
conceive personal survival at death. Much resort came to be had to analogies, ill-fitting because in them the immaterial, the psychical is likened to the material, the physical. But they often formed the Buddhist monk’s substitute for scientific reasoning.

Nor is it discerned how entirely the whole business of any after-death judgment, no matter under whom, is by this an-attā doctrine made irrational. For judging is valuing, worth-ing, holding in worth, rating, assessing. And the judgment is passed on some one who might, or might not have acted as he did. Now this is not judgment as at a cattle show. It is not a question of judging about something which just happened to be, or not be, but of some one who might or might not have chosen to do or not do. Some one therefore who was, as we can say—India could not¹—responsible. The cow judged is not held responsible for poor milk or a crumpled horn. The man judged is held responsible for the possibly poor show revealed in his dossier, when, had he followed the drive, the urge in him which India called dharma, and we now call ‘conscience,’ he would have come out with a better record.

I am aware it is usual here to speak of ‘free will,’ but to me it is an almost meaningless term, and I never use it. It is the man who is free or not free to act; to will he is always free, however he wills. His will is his self-expression of that freedom and its limits. And we must not lose sight (as we are ever tending to do) of the man. It is not Buddhists only who do so.

Here we have no mere sequence of ‘states’ of mind

¹ The only Indian term I can find is na mutto: “not freed-from.”
as Buddhists said. Here we have a valuer valuing one who is himself a valuer: the Yama or Controller. Note how, in the Saying, it is a valuer who is indicted: the 'man,' not his 'states.' Deeds have only meaning because of the doer. Yes, they are brought to the front, but only because of the man whose they were; "not the 'states,' but you, 'you'"; as Philip II (or was it Alba?) swore to the doomed Egmont and Horn: no los Estados ma vos, vos!

Now the ancient Persian did not go astray here. He valued what was essential:—the Man,—in calling him, as he went over to the judgment of the next step: 'urvan.' That is, according to what Dr. Pavry gives us as Williams Jackson's interpretation of this obscure but much-saying word: var-: the chooser. Chooser is choice-maker, valuer, willer. Zarathustra may have found the word to hand. He may have received it in his mandate; or he may have so taught that the word emerged into use, is only found occurring after the Gāthās:—I know not. The fact remains that, in its name for man as passed over, Zoroastrianism is in a right attitude—as Buddhism is not, and as Christianity, with its semi-spectral term 'soul,' hardly is—to appreciate rightly the belief which all three hold in a rating of the individual after death.

And the last named creed is at odds as to the belief. Reformed sections relegate the judging to an indefinitely remote term, and tend to interpose a (to me) dreadful notion of intervening sleep, as if the 'man,' as well as the worn or ailing or smitten body, were reborn tired! But the Catholic Church, maintaining with other creeds the doctrine of a purgatory, would seem to imply some arraignment
as taking place when those other two creeds place it, namely, just after death. And in the ‘story’ of Dives and Lazarus, the New Testament supports this. For these two men adjudication of a sort has taken place. But it is only the teaching that sees, in man-in-passing, the urvan, which, in its deep emphasis, is in a right and rational position to uphold the important and rational tenet of another world being concerned, as a group of urvans, to safeguard its communal wellbeing by a watchful selection among incomers.

For herein is surely a much overlooked feature of the ‘next things.’ The next step is of supreme importance to the individual. But he does not therein cease to be of the Many. His betterness, his worseness is never matter of importance to himself only. A somewhat overlooked Saying of Gotama bears on this. “You brahmins seek sodality¹ with Brahmā,² and you allow that he and his world are moral in conduct. Can you expect to win to him in sodality, if here you are not shaping your conduct to fit with the life he leads, and which you hope for in that?”

And there is another reason, I said, for the shelving that has befallen the Deva-dūta Saying, with its emphasis on the man (puruṣa) and the “Thou art the man”: doer, chooser. This is what may be called the ‘Arahan theory.’ Namely, whereas man in general, it was held, passed over somehow, some-as, some, relatively a few, did not. This theory was that which Buddhism came virtually (not explicitly) to set over against the brahmin theory of Immanence:

¹ Dīgha, No. 13.
² Governor of a better world.
'Thou art That.' No, it said, he can become that, even on earth. And he can become That, to wit, the Highest or Best on earth, or, just failing that, to one more better rebirth, as 'deva.' We know that this perfectibility of man-on-earth involved, as corollary, the being no more reborn, the no further dying, or at most only once more, the cessation of 'thusness' or 'suchness' or 'hereness' (itthatta). There is no shelving of this; the formulas about it are repeated again and again. And inasmuch as the Sayings were almost wholly for monks, and the becoming Arahan was practically a monopoly of the monk-life, it is not surprising that the no further need of rebirth into life, as conceived and worded here, and the cessation, for such an one, of all tribunal hereafter, should have greatly dimmed the emphasis on the latter event. That was for the laity. The Saying, let me remind the reader, was evidently a talk to men who were not monks, else we should not read of 'honouring the head of the family.' The monk-editors had to edit such a talk for monks, in an older gospel intended for everyman, but they were often acting thus.

There was no asserting that the Arahan at death of the 'last body' was non-existent. He was only, at least for men of earth, uncognizable, as is the outblown flame for earth-sense. For Buddhism, early and late, annihilation (uccheda) was anathema. But in this negative vision of him as in any future, it was inevitable that the idea of waiting assizes faded; and further, that the idea of one held on earth to have 'done all that was to be done,' perfected, as being summoned before a tribunal, also faded. That wise devas would be welcoming him, acclaiming him was held of no account. There is, it is true, a touching
Jātaka (the 'Nimi') telling of such a welcome given to a man transported to 'heaven' by the many he had helped, who had preceded him. But then Jātakas were laymen's diet. Too much had the Arahan been deemed to have won to the top as if independent of his fellowmen. It is little wonder he became superseded in Mahāyāna Buddhism by the compassionate bodhisattva: the man who becomes the More through (and with) the many.

These two reasons: anattā and arahan, go far, I judge, to account for the very slighting treatment accorded to the Deva-dūta lesson. In this venerable utterance the weight for me lies herein:—it sees, wayfaring from world to world, the very man, the same man, yet one who was and is in a state of coming-to-be. It does not see, in the man arraigned, a new complex of attributes only. It sees in the man the more that is in him to become. It sees in him also a possible, a probable less, a less than what he might have been. It sees in no man, as yet, a Most.

At the Third Council the men who cleaved to the original teaching asserted that man persisted in that he was becoming; persisted as very man, as self, spirit, soul. But the majority of that day maintained, that the man as entity did not persist, and that the arahan had done with becoming. And so it came to pass, that the Sutta, in spite of its emphasis on the man as entity, underwent a double fate:—as a venerable tradition it was preserved canonically; it was preserved probably only in part. The fate of man-in-the-Less is preserved fully and added to; the fate of man-in-the-More, namely, of those meriting

1 Cf. art.: XXXIX.
acquittal, is passed over hastily and briefly. It is only in Jātaka story, in ballads for the Many (the "Stories of the Mansions") and in one passage of a Dīgha discourse, that we find mention made of a glad welcome given to the more deserving, and of how their good works too are as welcomers awaiting them.

Had the tribunal Suttas been treasured as of the central teaching, we might still have looked in vain on their stage for the arahant, who had, it was held, passed beyond his fellow-man's Yea or Nay as being his judge—judge here or Yama there. But we might well have found discourse on just this as given by or about men allowed to be already, not only supermen, but the Most. We find no such word. In that he was held, in the theory, to be, as man, the Most a man could become, the way to an ever-growing conception of the ineffable Most was undergoing blockage. That way the creed had ceased to grow, nay, it was in decline from the promise of its birth.

(Added later). In those two reasons a third is involved. This is that the new message brought in 'Buddhism' failed to bring out strongly enough the inherent notion of 'promise' in the teaching of Immanence of which it was heir. Not only for some buried reason did it shun the use of its word for 'choice' let alone 'chooser'; it also does not appear as stressing the word for promise: pātiṇṇā; I have only found it brought forward in one discourse: the 40th in the Second Collection. And there it is concerned, not with man's nature and destiny so much as with his earth-vocation of being a 'recluse' or samanā. Man, as by nature divine and hence a child of supreme promise, is therein essentially
responsible over against the actually Divine to grow out of and beyond his present potential divinity. We here have inherited a strong word, which in Indian literature I have only seen paralleled by the negative term 'not freed from.' But for our forefathers responsibility meant a pledge or promise (spondeo), made sacramental by a libation. We can trace the libation in India, even in Buddhist stories. But with no use of a strong term to drive it home.

As responsible, man vows himself heir to a more than he is or has here. As very man, he is consecrated to fulfil the promise that is in his nature, whether we call that 'sonship of God,' or 'identity with the Divine spirit' (ātmā). He is as a boy in lower school, sent thither so to live, work, train as to come in time to the top form and go forth to higher tasks elsewhere. One 'not freed from' is he till he has won to worthiness to be with 'more-men,' in a world of the More, and finally, to life of an ineffable Most, free in 'the liberty of the sons of God.' 'Home for holidays' the boy may go, being as yet in earth's school. But he takes his responsibility with him. Yet how pathetically backward are we as to this! But yesterday I was listening to a broadcast play wherein men once famous on earth were made to say: "We've done with life. We're spectators only."¹ As if 'life' were limited to earth and to one span of earth-life! How can we hope to build up for our day and the morrow a finer outlook on the long way before us if we have grown so blind? Here are very live men taking counsel for the race, yet pretending they are not 'alive'! How can we live worthy of the great gospels of Zarathustra and Gotama if we

¹ The Cornerstones, by Eric Linklater.
limit ourselves as choosers of the Better, as willers of the More, to a few years only?

Children are we of a More and in a More, and as we fare onward through it and beyond, we must see ourselves as pledged to win the approval of higher courts than those of this world. As responsible to these, who distribute justice, as man at a more advanced stage looks at it, it is for us here to will to live the more in life as our best ones see it, and, in willing, to become 'choosers' so to live.

There is yet one more historical reason to account for the oblivion undergone by this old teaching of the tribunal in Buddhism. This is the fairly patent fact, that the concept of uniformity-in-procedure in both mind and religious truth, contemporary with the rise of 'Buddhism' assumed such strength, that early Buddhists not only used it to confirm their teaching of the power in man of effective energy (or 'will'), both to bring about and to stop, but even made it a cardinal principle. But the doctrine of *an-attā* helped to block out 'causer' from 'cause.' Causation became virtually a doctrine of automatism determining man's life here and hereafter. 'Sower, reaper' and 'lord of the field and the harvest' were replaced by the belief, the faith, that acts of the class \(x\) would result in effects of the class \(y\). And this, so I have gathered, is where Buddhism has lain passive to this day.

Not for the denominational Christian (or the Muslim) is it to be here critical of the Buddhist. Christianity now gives out a divided voice. For the Catholic practically everyone, on dying here, is swept into the prison of 'purgatory' with no clear teaching as to adjudication, Deity believed to be sole adjudicator.
For the Reformed churches all adjudication has been tacitly postponed till a cataclysmic last day, with no clear teaching as to man's wayfaring in the interval, and which leaves present-day hearers very cold. Buddhists, let alone Zoroastrians may well smile at this chaotic state of blind acceptance, or lack in a clearer, united forward view. In one of the Four Gospels there is the profound teaching, that man's only diploma to future happiness is his treatment of his 'neighbour' here. Yet the when and where of adjudication is given on a faltering note. I do not smile, but I incline to think, that hereon Christendom may incur shipwreck sooner, and more than on any other rock of dissension.
VARDHAMĀNA MAHĀVĪRA
FOUNDER OF JAINISM

When I was asked to contribute an account of this great man among the great men of India, I was keenly aware of my unfitness, for my work is chiefly associated with another of India's great ones. And I refused. The request was renewed. It then seemed to me that the man I was asked to tell about was somehow near me and I had but to write as I was willed. That which came to me may not be on all fours either with the legends accepted by the one half of the Jaina world, or with those accepted by the other half. But while the one and the other are both purely "legends," too long orally handed down to be accepted as sober records of historical fact, I for my part have not invented a single phrase.

But this I would say first. In the books I have read on the beginnings of the Jain movement there is, for me, an insufficient depicting of the religious soil from which that movement, with its Founder, sprang. It has been called, and rightly called, a reform movement, but I have not seen treated with right emphasis that which, in the generating soil, was calling for

---

1 Published in *Great Men of India*, Odham's Press Ltd., 1939.
2 The Svetāmbaras and Digambaras.
reform. So much is made of the legend of a prehistoric line of founders of a proto-Jainism, of which my subject is held to be a latest outcome, that little if any attention has been paid to that which is, for the culture of our day, an historic fact, namely, that a reform movement is begotten and determined, not by a fancied cosmic necessity for a line of teachers carrying out an independent plan, but by a certain evolution in man's religious quest, born in a certain land at a certain time, which, for the wise man, shows symptoms of needed correction and expansion. Thus we see Jesus rising to show that man, in the new conditions of the Roman domination and "pax," was not rightly regarding his fellowman as just that, as "neighbour," as "brother." And Islam largely arose because of the polytheism the Founder witnessed at Mecca and the growing polytheism in the church of Christendom. Similarly, the Founder of the Jain movement was a man urged by an inspiring call to rectify something he saw amiss in the accepted religious mandate of his day.

Now this mandate had been for perhaps some two centuries that volte-face, that inversion in the Nature-theism of the Vedic hymns, best called Immanence:—the perception of Deity less in powers of nature, and more in the essential nature of man. Learners in Brahman schools were told: "This immortal safe Brahman, this art thou! Worship Brahman as the self (or as I prefer to say, as the spirit). Seek to know that Self." That this was no alien creed to Vardhamāna we can see surviving in the Jain scriptures centuries later: "A wise man who knows that women are a slough, as it were, will get no harm from them, but will wander searching for the Self." (Uttarā-
I have nowhere seen noticed the interesting parallel there is here with the first public injunction recorded as given by the Founder of Buddhism: "What have you, gentlemen, to do with a woman?" Were it not better that you sought thoroughly after the Self?" Both records clearly hint that both teachers were followers of the Brahman teaching of Immanence. Yet both teachers, as such, set on foot a line of reformed teaching, not running counter to Immanence, but supplying something in which they deemed it lacking. And there has come to me that which claims to tell what this was.

This:—that those two reform movements sprang up, not in the region known as Central, the Majjhima-desa, where Brahmanism was strongest and best, but further east, east of where Delhi now stands, in the land alleged by scholars to be, as to Brahman teaching, more corrupt,—does not invalidate the need of making clear what was calling for reform. The local conditions may have made reform yet more needed: that is all.

I would add again: If it be said, that had the Founders felt that reform was needed in just that accepted cult of Immanence, they would have made this clear—as they do not—in their recorded teaching, I would answer: the man who is charged with, inspired by, a mandate of help for his neighbours, may, or may not, have discerned just how that mandate applies to the prevalent cult of his country and age. He is too near; he cannot see the application of it in perspective as we can. Or, if he did see it, the religious values of his own aftermen will have greatly changed by the time his own Sayings and

They had asked him, had he seen a thief they were seeking.
those of his helpers came to reach the form in which we read them to-day. In the days of those after-men 
a new polytheism had sprung up in northern India, 
in India generally; and, even if the Founder had 
pointed out wherein he found the cult of his day 
faulty, it is only too likely that later editors will have 
failed to keep alive the original point of his teaching.

And now to come to the Man himself.

"For those who know nothing of the subject it is 
best to remind him that Mahā-vīra (great hero) was 
not the personal or family name of the Founder of 
Jainism. This was Vardhamāna, a word meaning, not 
merely increasing, multiplying (the meaning given in 
Jain exegesis), but also growing, becoming. It was 
a name by no means unique in India then or now. 
I have preference for this more organic meaning, 
as significant of what I tried to do in the religious 
mandate in India of the sixth century B.C. I saw 
the man as able, in growing, that is spiritually growing, 
to win to a More, to a Better in the man he was. 
I saw the man as capable of such growth, if not now, 
then in the future. Herein is man's will active. 
He seeks the Better in all he does, the Better, that is, 
as he sees it. It may be a Worse. But for him 
it is a Better. Sooner or later he will find out whether 
it be so indeed. He knows there is a More in his 
manhood, even if he mask it as a more in what he gets.

"Now I was he who first worded a departure from 
acquiescence in the worth of the Immanence as then 
taught in India by the preponderant Brahman teaching. 
Brahmans were teaching the mandate first taught 
by a forgotten seer of the preceding age, perhaps two 
centuries earlier. This was, that man in very essence 
is divine, and as being such would one day attain
full Godhead. This was taught as in a way true of man even here and now. It was herein a dangerous teaching, for it treated the future as present; it told man he was, even now, as God: 'That art thou!' It was herein a lie in all but the basis. It passed over the fact of man's very imperfect, childlike state. It valued him in the present as he can only become in the future, when he could be said to be 'grown up.'

"I saw man as in a More, and in that only. I saw teachers holding in worth the unfit as the fit, the unhonoured as the honoured, the man as he may be not different from the man as he was as yet, even in the best.

"And I willed to differ from the Brahmans and teach a new mandate of effort in becoming.¹ I knew that herein I should be departing from the teaching of my colleagues. For I too was Brahman and a teacher. I was not Kshatriya, as is usually believed. I was of the Kaśyapa clan, and that was Brahman, as you know well, who know of many other Kaśyapa, or Kassapa Brahmans. I came to hear, in a later rebirth in India, of a legend which had grown up, of how the Ruler of the next world caused me in embryo to be shifted from a Brahman mother, Devānandā, to a Kshatriyan mother, Triśalā (Ācāranga Sūtra, III, 5). This was due to a growing worth in the Kshatriyan status, and to the will to show this taking shape in what folk told about me.

"I accepted the Immanence then taught as a More in the man, but I was dissatisfied with it, as were others known to me. And I persuaded these to will to make a new start in the wiser way of not

¹ It should be noted that the "sets" of thoughts in Jain scripture called bhāvanās and translated "meditations" or "reflections" really mean "(ways of) becoming."
merely seeing, in it, a great uplift for each man, but of working for this, in the effort to win what could be attained but was yet unattained. I saw this in the will to master the body in all its many wayward passions and hindrances in the way of the greater welfare. I had the idea that through the body man's will took effect in a Less, when that body was not kept under perfect control. I was, to this end, depending on the tapas of my day, the method of austerities, or ascetic exercises in the unpleasant:—fasting, exposure to heat or cold, or pain, endurance in effort to sustain, whereby the man, with a subservient body, might more freely will. It was he I willed to see dominant, not the mind—that came in later. It was the very man, who had the body, whom I wanted to free from bondage to the body.

"That in thus scourging the body I might weaken effort as much as I forwarded it I did not well see. I have now come to know better, and hold that to harm the body must involve a weakening of it, and so weaken the use the man, in seeking the Better through it as vehicle, can make of it. In moderation the idea was sound, and it was the search for advance in the More toward the Most in man's essential nature that stimulated me. But there was danger, that these painful exercises would pre-occupy man's will with a Less. I only saw that, unless man's will was an obedient slave, it would be a worse instrument. Now severe austerity would, I deemed, bring about this control.

"It was here that I treated will in the wrong way. Man wills his welfare, but when it is will in becoming a More than he was, he needs must be strong. He becomes a new man when he can turn all his strength,
bodily and mental, into his efforts. I did well to stress the greater need in current teaching for the putting forth of effort in man’s religious quest. Affirmation as to his nature was not enough. But man, as now in a Less, will become man in a More (let alone a Most) only when effort can be constructive, not destructive. My company were willing welfare, but to what extent we concentrated on *tapas*, we were training the will in a Less. This we did not see. We were exercising will in a Worse.

"After teaching a few years I had many followers. Two of these I held in high worth: Gautama, a Brahman, with whom I had myself been a learner, and Maskari, called Gosāla (of the cowstall),¹ These were true helpers, seeing a More in me as I saw in them men in a More. They too were in favour of *tapas*, but not in excess. They accepted the teaching of Immanence, holding that man had in himself the highest welfare, and the will to win it.

"Remember that when I say ‘will,’ I bear in mind that our word for it was *manas*. We used it as you use will. Its meaning was not merely mind, as was the word *citra*; it was purpose, which is mind and will in one. Striving with *manas*: this is all man can do as yet.

"I held women in high worth. They were with me in my teaching from the first. I was a married man and had children, though none save one daughter grew up. (*Ācāranga Sūtra*, II, 15.) The worthy women I met were honouring the will in our company to make effort in becoming the New—surely this is ever woman’s experience. I arranged that they of my company who willed to do so should make tours.

¹ In Pali, Makkhali.
But not women; that did happen, but only later. We toured around Vesali, and met many who approved of our object. It was men in the world to whom I looked; I did not seek to make men leave the world. It was my wish to see them coming to will a More in their daily life and business. My very will was in this, worthing man at his trade, his field-work, his care for the less fortunate, his warding the sick, his seeing the More in the child, his seeing the More in his fellow-man than he seemed to be, his will in the man of the To Be.

"Moreover, I had heed to man in the Unseen. I could be aware of such myself. It was from the Unseen that I was mandated to teach the New. I was one day meditating on these things and I was hesitating, lest the teaching of the More in man might be undermined by my disapproving in one respect. Then I seemed to hear a voice as it were within which said: 'Man needs the very More in the will in effort, if he is to become what he can become. Word effort!' I believed that man was in more than one world, and that he would return to earth again, in a More-will to word the new he had come to learn.

"I came in time to hear of other men, two or three, also wanting to teach that which they found lacking in the current teaching of Immanence, but they had not kept in view the More that is in man, and I found them worthless. They taught a Less in man, his being not real, his turning to monkhood, and they thus tended to keep man in the Less. I too had had the will to leave the world, and I have been shown as having done this. It was then a new idea: that in leaving the world a man could get quicker to the More in himself,
"Monasticism was not always in Indian life. Brahmans left the world when elderly, but not the man of other classes, let alone before he was elderly. Man had work to do, food to get, and he would have been much blamed had he left the world when still strong. But the idea was beginning to take hold of men that they should leave the world early, and not only if they were Brahmans. This may have been due to the cult of Immanence, for in that it saw a More in man, it showed him to himself as not called upon to be merely earthman. Seeing himself as in a way the Highest, he could be only concerned with the highest things if he would be true to his nature. He was world-forsaker in order to be ‘one who had become Brahman’ (Brahmabhūta) so far as he yet could.

"Now men of other new messages were as such welcome to me till I found I could not rate highly their changes. Then, when I was already elderly, I heard of the men of the Śākyas (whom your world calls Buddhists). They did not approve of tapas, and this made my follower’s unwilling to welcome them. I wanted to meet their leader, who, as I heard, accepted the Immanence-teaching about the man, but held that the one thing needful in it was, that man should not be held as being, nor as not being, but as becoming. I tried to see him, but failed, for the men in my company were silent about his movements, and so we never met. I valued their care of me, but it was a care of the sect, not of the man. I was then in weaker health and could no longer go on tour. Will was there but not strength. The much tapas had weakened me prematurely. And Gautama the Śākyan did not know how I wished to see him."
"In the scriptures compiled by Gautama's men of a later date, I am told there is recorded a conversation between him and one of my followers: one Upāli whom I can just remember. In this, Gautama is shown insisting to Upāli that, of the three modes of karma or deeds, the mode of manas is more effectual in its results on man's life for good or evil than is the mode of bodily action. What I really taught was, that bodily action is the vehicle of mind or purpose and, in the result of that purpose, responds to it. I never taught that body was the agent. Herein I have been misrepresented, as is the fate of all teachers of the More. I am not saying that Gautama misrepresented me. It was my disciples who did that. Have you not yourself found it true that '... his own disciple shall wound him worst of all.'

"The man who values will or manas will value the More in will. The will in man can yet take him far, and the will in becoming, when he realises it is this, can take him further still.

"Very will was with me till the end, but it lay less in austerities, for I had learnt how they shortened our term of usefulness, nor had they otherwise compensated me. The notion of karma was beginning to dominate the man of India. He had learnt the notion, not from me, but from other teachers, who saw in deeds done a sort of seed sown, which could not be, as plants, rooted out save by tapas, and this was foolish. The better karma, better actions, were enough to kill the effects of the earlier less worthy karma, so far as the doer himself was concerned.

"I taught this with emphasis, but my men were no longer listening to what I taught. They saw me

---

1 Rudyard Kipling. Cf. My Outlines of Buddhism, p. 5.
weak and ageing, and they tended me as a father who
has to see his sons rating him as no longer wiser than
they. They honoured me as teacher, but they
no longer heeded what I said. Their value was in
the teacher of a past day, not in the teacher grown
wiser of the later years. I hold in worth the teaching
that is new. The older teaching may be very true,
but it should be valued as something that is in process
of becoming.

"I was in good health till one day I had the wish
to mandate the men of Vesālī. I went, but I had
become weak—too weak for the walk—we all walked,
holding it amiss to use beasts to draw us. The
journey was too much for me and the end came.

"Man in his care for animals has gone to strange
lengths. He has had the idea that he might be
reborn as one, and that hence it might be well not to
treat them unworthily. I never held with this idea,
nor with the idea that noxious animals should not
be killed. I had a firm belief that man could not be
reborn save as man. Men have credited me with all
sorts of theories in this, as in other things. On my
shoulders got laid the childish ideas of the Many.
Man in the More has much to suffer from his fellows,
but he has also been their helper and therein lies
comfort.

The man of will is ever in the greater well-being,
since he wills it and finds it in his work. He may
suffer ill in many ways, yet is he happier than the
unwise, for he knows he is in the way to win to the
perfect Man."
The Editor has asked me to speak to readers of the Jaina Gazette. I am troubled at this honour. For in that he has been so kind as to send me recent numbers of the Gazette, I note that the contents are addressed to those readers as Jainis by writers wise about Jainism. Now my work for over thirty years has lain along other lines. It left me little or no time to study the history of older, or the ideas of present Jainism. There was so much pioneer work to do in my own field, that even a comparative study of the two fields had to be put aside. I am therefore not competent to write as one wise about Jainism to readers in so far as they are Jains.

Nevertheless I take courage and speak, for I have been for many years working with mother-thoughts about men and women. And by degrees the way and the history of men and women, as Jainis or as Buddhists, or as of the East or the West, has become of less than the first importance. An eminent French politician has lately said: "We should think not in French, but in European." Even that is not enough. We should think in 'Man'; we should think of men as 'Man.' Then it is that surface thoughts of creed and church, of party and country, nay, of continent shrivel and fall away. The residual Man it is that we

1 Published in the *Jaina Gazette*, Madras, 1926.
have then in mind, the whence and the whither of him, and where he now has come to walk. These are the subjects that remain supremely worth considering. These are the subjects I now try to write about in books. These are the subjects on which, and on which alone I have the will to speak in these pages. I offer what I have to say as a mother-woman to fellowmen on the Man.

The Editor has this year given to us his readers the paper he read recently at Madras on the Jaina conception of spiritual liberation known as Mokṣa or Mukti. Under that head he gives us an outline of the teaching known among us as Jainism. It has deeply interested me, both by its matter and its method. It is a gospel of lofty ideals, in a wording partly very old, partly less old, partly new. The ideals, the wording are not save in a distinctive emphasis here and there, exclusively Jaina. They are mainly Indian; they are here and there European. They blend, here with Brahmanism (ancient Hinduism), there with Buddhism. In its pages the worthy man chosen as typical is not ascetic, not monk, but householder. This type of man is said to take to a modified asceticism when he is getting old; he then goes to 'a forest where ascetics live' (some presumably not old like himself. This is Brahmanic.) Two of the three main factors of his way of good life are 'right knowledge, right conduct.' This is Brahmanic and Buddhist (vidyācāran). Souls are considered as 'potentially God.' This, if we omit the quite modern Western term 'potential,' is Brahmanic. A third factor is 'faith.' Here we have three characteristics of a worthy Buddhist in the first of the Four Pathstages. In samsāra, three realms of re-birth are recognized.
This is Buddhist. Then we read of āsravas (cankers), of karma, of bhāvanā (making to become), ahimsā (not-harming), dharma (what should be), samyak (sammā: ‘the fit,’ ‘the right’), realization, mārga (way), nirvāṇa;—why here I am quite at home! Here Jaina teaching might have gone from of old hand in hand with Buddhist doctrine. But then, there is jīva, soul,—here it did not. Mokṣa (vimutti):—here is a word not only very Buddhist, but as wide-reaching as India itself.

Now it was not always so. Mokṣa is not a Vedic term, either religious or social. I doubt if the Aryans had it as ideal in their immigrant days. There is short shrift, in the wanderer-host, for the man who would cast off the herd-life, the herd-ideals. Liberty is not for him. In solidarity alone is his salvation. But when Jainism and Buddhism arose, they found the ideal of liberation growing into a lusty youngster, the offspring of a stabilized Aryan comity, in which the individual could safely develop himself, and break out of a too static groove. And Jain and Buddhist helped to bring it into Brahmanism. Mokṣa belongs to middle and later Upanishads.¹ In all three religions an ardent cult of liberation as man’s very salvation has since those days grown up. Scarcely can we of the new world yet see how hoary, how barren is its rocky crest, or how unworthy we of both East and West shall judge ourselves to have been, to see in a negative word of ‘riddance’ our ideal of the Utterly Well!

Let us be quite honest about this word and about ourselves. Riddance, liberation, emancipation, as

¹ Cf. The writer’s article “Mokṣa,” Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. The earlier term was mukti and atimukti, Chānd. Upanishad.
such, is an ideal of the rebel. And we all do well, in much and at many times, to be rebels. But the ultimate ideal of the wise rebel can never be rebellion, riddance, liberty. These are but words of transition, proximate ideals, words of the struggle to get to the Better. They may have served, they may, and do even now serve as bearers of further ideals. But that does not make them worthy words, in themselves, for those ideals. They serve rather to mask them. And socially they have possibly done as much harm as good.

Here anyway we have seen a Jainist confession of faith, overflowing right and left into terms held in common by other venerable Indian creeds and, in this last term, uniting with those creeds. Is it not profoundly pathetic to find, under this partial, or complete agreement in words, several ‗isms‘ instead of concord, cleavage instead of harmony? So heavily do we pay in mutual estrangement, mutual strife, mutual hindrance, for our initial mistakes.

What were these initial mistakes?

In the wonderful sixth century before the Christian era, the religious mind in North India broke out in a ferment. The world of professional, hereditary interpreters and intermediaries of things unseen had, as a whole, fallen away from their high calling. The ancient deities were no longer worded as supremely worthy. The sacrifice and the ritual had virtually smothered the deities. The magic of the rites had become that which would compel. The strict standards of life for the celebrants were in many ways and cases disregarded. Ever was man still seeking after welfare in the Unseen Warding, in the Unseen of the after-life. But men were seeking it for and by themselves.
They were working out gospels without gods, without priests. They were expressing the New Will.

Jainism was such a working out, such an expressing. It had found and was expressing this:—Man’s Way here and hereafter was the thing that most mattered in that safety, in that Welfare here and hereafter. And his Way was not a thing he was, or was not born into, or got into by rites. It was how he lived. Words for Way and Way-faring—mārga, sāmsāra,—were coming-to-be-used in religious wording. The Vedas show that this had once not been so. Way of sāmsāra all were in, all had to be in. Way of Mārga a man might be in if he willed. Way as mārga was held to be a means of riddance, of egress, from Way as sāmsāra. It was to get from an unwell state to a perfectly well state. And it was chiefly and emphatically the having got out, or being rid of, that was worded as Nirvāṇa, Mukti, Mokṣa.

This, so far as we can gather from scriptures dated, as scriptures, centuries later, was the original message of the New Will in both Jainism and Buddhism. Man’s welfare—let us say for short ‘Well’—was grasped not as a static, blissful contemplation of placated Unseen Warding Willers, but as an active faring towards a (vaguely worded) End by a certain Way here and hereafter,—a chosen way of conduct, a way that closely involved man with fellowmen.

It was a difficult way. It was as the way of a boat steered, impelled, not drifting, across a mighty, turbulent flood. And it took a long time to get There. There was so much to change, to get rid of, to get well from. Forgiveness by a god for world-order (ṛta) violated was no more so much believed in. Man had to forgive himself. He had taken on to his
own shoulders, as Man, as jīva, the task of the ideal Guide and Judge. He had now to placate, to satisfy This. And it was not a forgiving judge—this Self.

He asked himself, was there no quicker way to reconciliation with himself, no speeding up, no intensive process? Yes, there was tapas, the bruising, the buffeting, the ill-treatment of the body. It was chiefly body that offended. The best was ever a something not of body. Let only body be plagued hard enough—its appetites for gratifying sense, its love of ease,—its wanton insolences,—man who was not body, man who was really jīva, would thereby be more quickly set free to fare further in the Way to his Well. Deeds were mainly of the body. Deeds were the penalties (daṇḍa) of the body. Past deeds were causes of present troubles. Present deeds were causes of future troubles. Let the embodied power of present deeds to sow be repressed, let the embodied power of past deeds to reap be worn away, by acts very unpleasant when self-inflicted. For such a short-cut all a man's strength and time were needed. World, world-work, world-joys must go. Life must be treated like a too prolific plant, and be hacked and pruned to its roots.

Now here we have one of those initial mistakes, one that led men wrong in two ways. Most of us admit to-day that man needs not a tormented, a reduced body as his instrument, to realize the best he may become. He needs a well-fostered, well-trained, well-developed body. It is by and through body that we advance, grow, become, 'werden.' Man wills; thereby he grows. But he wills through body, i.e. through open act, speech, mind. Again, man wills the welfare, the more-welfare of others through this threefold
way of body. We are the very worthless judges if we despise the body, our worser, our worker in the helping of fellowmen. We cannot do without body, nor shall we ever till we get to Way's-End. Neither can we do so well with a lowered, abused body. As well might the musician hack at his instrument, the writer split his pen, the mother bind her breast. There are morbid states of body where ascetic pruning may be needed and beneficial. But such bodies we do not consider as, at least for a time, fit for normal rules. They are hospital cases.

For man must advance in the Way with, not aloof from, his fellowmen. It is only there that he can come to know what is really his own well. He will not do so as a deserter, as a malingering. Those bruised, emaciated bodies were so many parasites on the working community. So also were king and courtier, army and harem, beggar and courtezen. Counter-service, it was claimed, was rendered by ascetic, as by monk. But it is a doubtful symptom of growth for a man to be content to help his fellows by giving them the spectacle of his pious, but unnecessary sufferings and aloofness. There is a benefit in teaching given, to be set over against support received. But counsels given in exchange for food received was not part of the ascetic's way as such. It was incidental, not essential. His way was to leave the burden of the world's work to others, albeit himself needing the results of that work.

Here then was a twofold initial mistake. In calling it such, I do but give voice to the intelligent conviction of the New World's New Will. It was a mistake to hold that the Man walked more swiftly in the Way with a battered body. It was a mistake to hold
that the prize of the Way's-End was for those who had run ahead of their spiritually weaker fellowmen. The knowledge and the wording of the new will came to suffer thereby, as onward moving has ever suffered, when one section of the community has sought to raise itself looking down upon the rest, be the rest the \textit{plebs}, the laity, the slave, the woman. So the new will, not rightly expressing itself as the healthy advance of the whole man in all men, became, as new will, wordless and diminished in two ways:— in one section of the Indian world it ceased to spread: it grew stationary; it has tended to die rather than grow. In another section of that world it has melted away from India, and where it now survives, either, in the south, it maintains its old uncompromising cleavage of church and laity, or, in the north-east, the world of folk-fed monks has become, not the buttress only of a folk-fed monarchy, but the very monarchy itself.

In a minute I have done, but I would still speak frankly. It is for creeds of to-day—old creeds, but sheltering much new-will,—to bring themselves to exercise that new will, with reference to initial mistakes, in two ways. Where they as yet countenance, where they as yet respect, as institution, or only in idea, the ascetic, the monk,—here the new will bids them seek man's forgiveness for those old hindering errors by an earnest repudiation of them.

To do otherwise is to cut themselves off from new world-will. It is to will old world-will in imitating an old dead world. The world is not as it was. We can now see better what life is, whither it is taking us, what we most need. We are without excuse, if we are ever looking backward and saying: 'Then this
was held to be right; it must be right now.' Never was argument less binding on man than that. Into our hands have come at our birth treasures of the new world: the expansion of the world, the will to win to the truth about the worlds, the race-fellowship with so much of the world,—with the whole of the Aryan world—and world citizenship, awaiting our entrance upon it, with all the world. It is with a life worthy of that citizenship that we have to do, and not with a little cluster of unclothed men in a corner of the dim past, overmuch concerned each with his own unworthy past.

Gone for ever, in that wider fellowship, is the unwise worsening, by those earnest little men and by their unwise followers, of the word 'deed,' 'action.' It was not honest wording. How shall we advance without action—the threefold action of limbwork, speech and will? The ideal of Not-doing belongs to that besetting weakness in Indian cults—the weakness of all ascetic, monkish cults—in both East and West, of naming the good by 'disnaming' the bad. The new Will teaches just the opposite. Its new methods of healing say: 'Dwell not upon your disease. To think about it fosters it. Dwell upon, and word, your getting better, your 'werden' towards well. Think on health.' Now India had only a negative word for health. It was not a healthy symptom.

It is not for us to forget the past. By it we learn what to avoid now. But we must look upon it as past, as dead, as showing our 'sins of youth.' Let us look upon it as we should look upon the past work of children of promise—with interest, with respect, with a mother's compassionate memories, but not, O not for imitation! Much have we learnt since all
that; but there is yet so much to learn. Wise was the word of that once new will, risen 'twixt East and West St. Paul's:—'Brethren, I count not myself to have apprehended, but one thing I do: forgetting those things which are behind and reaching forth unto those things which are before; I press toward the prize of our high calling . . .'

Once we are aware of our rich heritage as citizens of the new world, the new will, we shall the better realize our present, let alone our past failures in the things we hold in worth, in the things we word, in the things we spend ourselves over.

Notably—and this is my last word—in the way we look at and write about old scriptures. Ever do we need to see these venerable documents of ancient roots and gradual growth against their true background of a dead past in which they rooted and grew up. We are not the men amongst whom that plant took root, with whom it grew up. We are 'we'; we are not they. We need otherwise; we will otherwise, because we know, we see otherwise. If we are still needing, still willing in full accordance with the root and the growth of those scriptures, it is because we are forcing ourselves backward, and pretending we are wholly as were their authors. We are not showing the courage or the wisdom befitting our high calling. Walking on we are,—for somehow we must,—but we are looking backward for guidance, when we should be looking forward, around and within. We shall not hereby be earning man's forgiveness in the future.
I. A GREETING TO JAINS

JAINA brothers and sisters! I have been asked to send you a few words for this festal occasion; I thank you for the honour you do to me. To-day you are thinking of the past. It is a worthy thing to do. It is yet more worthy to be thinking of the present, of the future. Vardhamana did so. With the future of man in view, he taught the men and women of his day, not to dwell on the past and how to copy it, but how to live so as to express their own present in view of the future.

Vardhamana did not teach any of the wordy metaphysic which, in medieval and modern times, has grown up and around what has survived of your older scriptures. He led a great movement not in wordiness, but in life, a movement of the new will to bring to new and fuller life what we here call religion.

What is religion? In Vardhamana's day it was coming to be called Dharma. Dharma meant not what is done, not just how men act, but how a man might, would, ought to act, if he willed the best, if he chose the best, if he followed the best of which he was capable. Dharma is the May-be, the Should-be, the Ought to be. Dharma is the Right. Now

1 From messages sent to the Jain Mitra Mandal, Delhi on the occasion of its celebrating the 2,525th Birthday of Lord Mahavira on the 14th of April, 1927.
the Right is ever better than what is. Thus Dharma
is to express the present in the light of the future.
It involves a perpetual Becoming. It is to leave the
past behind as past, even as the youth leaves behind
the ways and words of the child. And Dharma
or religion in every man and woman is the inner urge
or will to choose the better, and having chosen and
followed the better, to become a better man or woman
than he or she was before. For we are as we live.
Jainism and Buddhism taught that.

Those early days you have to-day in mind saw
Jains, saw Buddhists picturing this seeking the
better and growing better as a WAY, a Wayfaring.
All life had come to be called a Way, samsāra. But
the right way, the dharma-way of wayfaring, the
way of wayfaring which would lead to the End—
this was called MARGA. The End Jainas and Buddhists
both call by negative names: ‘release,’ ‘end of ill,’
‘nirvana.’ Where men’s thoughts are weak, where
their will is weak, their words will be weak. Men’s
will about the future is, has ever been weak, so they
have used weak negative words. The end of Ill of
all kinds is the being utterly WELL. Absolute Health
of the very Man in each of us, not of the body, not
of the mind, but of the very Thee, the very Me:—
this is the very end of the Way of the worlds; this
is that Divinity for which neither you nor we have
as yet a fit name.

For the End cannot be attained on earth, past,
present, or future, with earth-ideas, no matter how
saintly the man of earth. The Marga is a Way of the
worlds. And here the old scriptures, from which man
has learnt much, fail him. To walk better in that
world-way we need more light of knowledge to help
our faith. The Helpers, the Jinas—I would that you called them Helpers!—are not only of the past. If this day of dwelling on a Helper’s past make you look forward and seek new light for the present, as he, in his earth-day did, he will know his work was not in vain.

II. THE CHILD OF PROMISE

My message is not for the Jain only; it is for the child of India.

Many centuries ago India gave to herself and thereby to the world a mandate of the first importance. It was about the man, the individual man or human being. It was about the worth or value of man as man. In Christendom the man’s highest worth is declared to be sonship of the Highest, by adoption. India’s mandate, at a much earlier date, had declared that worth to be identity of nature. It is his birthright. It is a direct lineage, not an indirect descent. Man was not declared to be of divine nature as one God among many Gods; he was declared to be in nature as one with supreme Deity. Herein India worded in her own way. The teacher, as we know, said: That art thou! The ‘thou’ is here emphasized, else had the verb alone been sufficient: _Tam asi!_ The point in the mantra is in what is said, not about _Tam_, but about the man. We are ‘wrong if we render it by ‘Thou art That!’ The ‘That’ needed no emphasis; the emphasis was needed in ‘the man.’

This emphasis, this needed emphasis was a New

1 Published in The Jain Acharya _Shri Atnaand Centenary Commemoration Volume_, Bombay, 1936.
Word. It told of a new uplift in man's idea of man. But at the same time it was, if lightly, if carelessly used, an intensely irrational saying. Much more so than if one were to tell a little child: 'You are a woman like mother; you are a man like father.' We say, it is true, proverbially: 'The child is father of the man.' We mean of course, that the promise and potency in the infant will in his growth become or develop into a certain sort of man. We are considering the child with an eye to the More that we believe he has in him to become. Thus understood, the proverbial saying is not irrational.

So also should we consider India's mantra. Her teachers had been considering this and that aspect of things and of the man, one and all, under the notion of 'becoming' rather than 'being.' We have but to read the older Upanishads (in the original, not in the translations) to see that this is true. This being so, there will ever have been, in the meaning and force of the verb as, asi, the background, deeper in meaning and in force, of the verb bhū, bhavasi. And thus, when the teachers taught the youths and possibly also the maidens¹ the so irrational sounding Tat tvam asi, this mantra had really the much more possible and plausible meaning of Tat tvam bhavasi. As if they meant to say—and possibly did go on to say in expounding—'Very children are you yet! so too are all of us older men. But in you and in us is the promise and potency of the Man, yea, of the More in Man, yea, even of the Most, the purusuttama. 'That' neither you nor we can yet find words for. That none of us can yet know. For none of us is That yet in very fact. That is matter of faith, matter

¹ Cf. the Taittirīya Upaniṣad.
of hope. Each of us is as a child who is told ‘You are a man like father.’ He will say ‘I am yet small; I’m weak, I will to be a man like him, but I cannot be it yet.’

Now we are like this boy. We are as to our More in a state of will. We are, as to the Most, only yet in will; not remotely the Most in fact, not in achievement, not in fulfilment, not in realization; only as yet in will. Or are we yet even so far as to be That in will? Do we not hold in worth the Highest as a state we do not want to be in? And is not this true of the stage of childhood? Is not the maturity they witness too ‘grown up’ to attract them? We appreciate what we are ready for. It is the things of the child we are yet holding in worth:—the fancy for now this, now that; the fighting for this or that; the wanting to possess this or that; the tiring of this or that. We value just that only for which we are fit. We will only to the extent of our vision. And that is only to the next bend in the road. It is not given to many to see even just round the next bend.

It is not given us yet to find fit words for the Uttermost. We are here but in a More. We shall be but in a More for many lives yet to come. We talk glibly of Deity; we have for That each our distinctive God-word, yet are we quite unable to frame any clear idea of Godhead. Our values are those of a ‘to have,’ not a ‘has’; of a ‘to be,’ not of an ‘is.’ We speak bravely of our will ‘to-be.’ But our will is the instrument of a valuer who is yet a child.

I am reminded here of a striking, I may say, a unique passage in the Pali Sūtras, as yet totally overlooked by writers on Buddhism.¹ A brahman

¹ Anguttara-Nihāya Chakka-nipāta, Devatā-Vagga.
is said to affirm before the Sakyamuni: 'There is no agency of the self, no agency of another' (Or as one recension reads: 'no self-doer (attakāri), no other-doer). The response is in swift protest: 'Say not so! Never let me hear of such a saying! What? When you stretch forth a limb, is not that an element of initiative (ārabbhadhātu) made by the self?' This is continued in detail.

Now the 'self' here is the man initiating an act by will. He reckons what he calls initiative, for want of a word for will, as being the starting of an action. He wills an act and does it. He is thus experiencing a more in self, a more in that other man, than if he (or the other) remained passive. It is a more, be it noted, in the shape of a familiar act. It is an experience which he knows about, not an act of which as yet he has no knowledge. But to such initiations he will sooner or later come, and he will come by will. He had often willed, as here, to walk. And he has willed further; he has willed to walk, to progress, on a mount of some kind, on a living mount, then on mounts of an infinitely complex mechanism, at an indefinitely higher rate of speed, nay, to walk, in emergency, by flinging himself into the air to float down to earth.

And he will come yet to worthier uses of will than all that. He will come to will a thing to be done without going to do it, by direct action of his will on the will of another, even without need of words. And yet more and above all: it is the greater welfare of that other man so influenced that he will quicken by this will at-a-greater-power. He in a greater morewill will not thereby serve merely personal ends, nor merely corporate, nor merely national ends as
such. It is just the paro, the other man, in his own way becoming More, faring towards the Most, that he will be willing to forward, even as he in himself is forwarding his own becoming.

Children are we yet, but in thee as in me is the promise and the potency, the essential tendency towards the coming-to-be. We are in the Way of Becoming, and we wayfare the better in so far as we will.

And now a word possibly of special interest to the Jain.

I have been speaking of man's instrument that we call collectively 'mind' in a special way, a way that I have discussed elsewhere and often. That India began, with Kapila, to specialize in analysis, not so much of philosophy as of the mind, is perhaps hardly as clearly understood as it might be. Herein India anticipated Europe by about 1200 years. The idea arose, that the man was not just body and a spiritual substance, but that from the latter an immaterial organism of factors, of processes, of uniformities might be distinguished, the essential spiritual substance or self having fundamentally nothing in common with either this substance, or that of the body. The new teaching 'caught on,' and was at length admitted into the established Brahman culture as Sāṇkhya, 'computing,' equivalent to our 'analysis,' and also into the younger teaching of Jains and of Sakyans (early Buddhists), the latter calling it Paṭisankhāna, or Vibhajja and Vibhatti: 'analysis.'

A feature for us of much interest is that the influence of the new teaching apparently acted as a stimulus to physiological analysis, India thus growing
scientifically in a way the inverse of our own. And we are reminded of Bergson's words: "What would have happened if modern science, instead of converging on the study of matter, had started by a study of the things of the mind?" India did so start, and this alone should entitle her results in psychological thinking, both old and new, to a respectful and interested hearing, such as is so far withheld. Surely it is worth our while to inquire whether she has come through the ages with the same, or with a different outlook and *modus agendi* in psychology from our own.

The metaphysic known as Sāṅkhya is of a much later date than that early analysis. But the attempt to distinguish between the man and his mind had deep-going results. Brahman culture, very dubious at first, put Sāṅkhya into harness and drove it. But the newer less established culture of early Buddhism was by Sāṅkhya put into harness and driven by it, till it ultimately out-ran Sāṅkhya, so that the detached man or self became entirely replaced by the mind, the subject by the object. The man became eventually a mere complex.

What had Jainism to say in this matter? Here is a point of intense interest in psychological history. A young unestablished culture, did it also become driven, or did it harness and drive? Where is the student, Jain or English, fresh from graduating in the science of psychology—no other is fit—who will go into this, as my husband commissioned me in like circumstances, to go to into the psychology of Buddhism?
III. ARE THERE JAIN VALUES IN ORIGINAL BUDDHISM?\(^1\)

I was interested to read, in the *Jaina Gazette*, courteously sent me by the Editor,—in last February's issue—the article: "Is Old Buddhism not Jainism" by Sital Prasadji. And I trust that, in responding to it, I may give a reply useful to the writer and to readers of the Gazette. If I begin on a negative note, this is merely to clear the road, and to be the sooner wholly positive in my contribution.

"Old Buddhism," or as it should more rightly be called Śākya, was never Jainist in its central message. But it was born a generation or so later (a generation is thirty years, is it not?), and was certainly touched by Jainist influences. These influences were religious rather than philosophical. There was never any "philosophy of Buddhism" for a millennium after the Śākyamuni's birth. I am not competent to speak so positively of Jainism, but I should be inclined to think, that original Jainism knew nothing of *syadvāda*. Such a manner of judging, when raised from a weighing in individual conversation (as in p. 46 of the article) to a technical term, betrays that the religion in question has become academic and sophisticated. We shall never get down to origins till we let philosophy slide and keep severely to what is in essence religion.

What is that? What is it to speak, as India came to do, of a teaching as Dharma? It is when we are concerned with the advent of a new Announcement, with the Announcer and his first helpers, with the expansion they bring, not of a 'system,' but of a

\(^1\) Published in the *Jaina Gazette*, XXVIII, Madras, 1932.
fresh outlook on the Man: on his nature, his life, his destiny, not only, not so much on earth but as persisting in other worlds, on his possibilities. The Announcement is essentially one for the Many. And its stress is, not as in philosophy and science, "This is so!", but "This ought to be so!" In other words: "This is Dharma!" In religion we are looking at not men, but the Man, the man as reaching out to a somewhat that is greater, less imperfect than he feels himself to be, reaching out in idea, in faith, in desire, in conduct. And this is to be in a state of Becoming (bhava), a state of Growth (v Ṗ u d ṇ h i, v Ṗ u r Ṗ h a).

Now Śākya was from the first a message of Becoming, of growth. It was born in the lap of that early Upanishadic religion, which bade man in seeking That Deathless Most or Highest or Best, look no more at external forces,—the sky, the winds, the storm, the sun,—but within himself. There only, so only, would he find, would he come to know, 'That' whom he sought, 'That' who was perfect where he was imperfect. And Śākya concerned itself, from the first, with seeking this perfect Self, with a true conception of It, as not merely man's body or his mind, but as a Self (or God-in-the-germ) wielding these. But true seeking was, not to speculate, not to pretend to know, but to grow less unlike that Self in one's conduct. This becoming-by-living was a very long process, involving spans of life in many worlds, many earth-lives, many other-world lives. And the great thing needful was will. There was no such good word as 'will'; it was worded as forming a resolve (abhinīhāra) to become a kind of being held to be much better than one's present self. In the end, this noble resolve, if
backed up by living more like such a being than men lived habitually, would lead a man to the goal of his quest: to 'That.' But ever he must reverence that Ought-to-Be Who spoke within him, that Dharma: the voice of God-in-Man. And well for him, if in Dhyāna he sought, listening, watching, for worthier ones of other worlds who were wishing to help him.

This, for me, and this only is "old Buddhism"; this is original; this is Śākya. There is little in it about release (mukti), vicious tendencies (āsrava), or nirvana. Nirvana, in Śākya's early years, did not mean any final goal; we are distinctly given to understand it meant, in the garden of man's growth, the weeding out of the undesirable; it was process, not End. Āsravas of course come under the bad weeds, and mukti is also process of riddance. All the stress on the Negative and the Evil belongs mainly to that growth in monastic outlook, which had begun, at the birth of Jainism, to spread like a very canker over India. It was not growth in the desire to be free from the worldly to help other men; it was the wish to accelerate the individual's own welfare—and the motives were not always as worthy as even that.

Sital Prasadji quotes many times from one or two English translations from Pali scriptures, made (with one exception) in a former generation. Then it was held, that here we had really got something that might be taken, as its own value, as "old Buddhism." It was nothing of the sort. What we were unfolding in these Pali Pitakas was a collection of works dating, as written matter, from 400 or 500 years after the Founder's day. In them, if one sought long and closely, the older values might be seen left in here
and there, linking the teaching with the India of the Founder’s day. But the things repeated and emphasized were monkish values, quite unworthy to be the New Announcement of a More in and to Man. The author is aware of my late husband’s wholesome scepticism about the Pitakas (p. 41), but none the less, he quotes passage after passage as being *what the Founders really did say*. No sound conclusions about “old Buddhism” can be arrived at by a short cut to study like his has been. It has taken me 40 years to come to anything sounder. Pali study is needing another generation of workers, this time of ‘higher criticism,’ before we can valse into conclusions after that manner.

Where Janism influenced Śākya was in the doctrines of *karma* and *ahimsā*. These terms were obviously new to early Upanishadic teachers. We know especially how cautiously the *karma* teaching is discussed in *camera* by two teachers. In the Pitakas *karma* emerges as, not originally given, but as keenly discussed by Śākya-muni and Jains, and, in the Śūtras, *karma* is given due weight in teaching of reward and retribution. But not as automatically resulting in these. Degenerate Buddhism now teaches that. Original Buddhism shows that a man’s deeds and their result are the programme of a special tribunal of *adjudication* awaiting him after each death. And *ahimsā* is mentioned not often, and almost as something annexed.

Jains can now study so much of the Pitakas in English translations, that I hope readers of the *Gazette* will come to look for discussions of resemblances and differences on a basis of more extensive preparation than is evinced in Prasadji’s article. I do not gather
that the Jain Angas can be considered as less palimpsests than are the Pali Pitakas. Both should be read, not as the actual sayings of the early teachers alleged to be speaking, but as much later compilations, made up from very brief memoranda handed down orally, and much glossed over by speakers and then writers, holding later monastic views. Both in a word need to be studied historically. Only so can the true be seen here and there emerging. Both Jains and Buddhists should so study both scriptures with the early Upanishads. Each has made notable contribution to the true in religion. Each could correct the other. Especially the Jain, for he never denied the reality of the Man. And both have to feel, in face of what lies in the future, wherein it is that both great creeds need that New Announcement which may yet be for to come. But that man is no static ‘is’, but is a Becoming, that as becoming he needed self-direction by will, that in him is a More guiding his will if he but heed, that in him it lies to become More to an extent he yet cannot grasp:—is there not here something original in both religions, something true of ancient India’s great quest on which they can agree, in which they could find mutual comfort and aid?
LXV

SĀNKHYA LOGIC

It is generally admitted to-day, that the development and foundation of logic in India was the work done, more or less contemporaneously, by Jains and Buddhists. On this matter Vidyābhuṣana, Garbe and Jacobi have had much to say. The emergence of such logic has been placed in the fifth century A.D. An early contribution to it is a manual in Sanskrit of only a few pages entitled the Nyāyabindu, —author unknown—its aphorisms embedded in a Commentary, which tradition assigns to a Buddhist monastic centre, located in the Deccan. It is not considered to be so early as the Nyāyāvatāra, dated about A.D. 533; it has been assigned to the following century. There may have been earlier manuals than either. I am not wise on the subject, and am not here going further into it. I will first only hazard this much, before coming to the gist of what I have to say:—the Nyāyabindu text is too set and dogmatic in its terse mantras, or aphorisms to let us see in it a pioneer effort breaking new ground. Such an effort may have begun earlier; but not very much earlier. For there is, in the Questions of Milinda, no conclusive signs of an existing organon of logic, of fixed logical technical terms and procedure, such as we can see peeping out in the Kathāvatthu and its Commentary.

1 Published in the Journal of the Taisho University, Tokyo, 1930.
The Questions belong probably to the first century of our era. The argumentation there is by way of similes, dilemma and inference,¹ but it is conducted in a ‘popular,’ not in an academic way. The author, in using the three methods, shows no critical awareness of how much, or of how little they are, in themselves, safe guides to truth. The first of the three (including analogy, simile, upamāṇa) is, in the Nyāyabindu, no longer recognized as a branch of Nyāya—and very rightly. In the Milinda analogy it is used recklessly, and held as logically satisfying, from the very start. Yet with a king and a monk so famed in debate as these two are made out to be, we might have expected to find, had there been a vogue in logical method, much courtly fencing in it.

On the other hand, I should not credit the little ‘Drop of Guidance’ manual with many predecessors. For it shows us logic as still awaiting fission, let alone weaning, from its parent, psychology, and as quite imperfectly developed. Its definitions are psychological oftener than logical. In Division (logical), it shows a twofold, not a fourfold division. Its Definition is not the scheme of Buddhaghosa. Its syllogistic formula is still rudimentary. There is nothing of the later Nyāyadarshana about it.

Somehow Buddhist thought has got the credit for the Nyāyabindu; but is it a Buddhist compilation? In it we see Indian logic taking birth from Indian psychology. Generally speaking, this is a normal development. Analytical study of the mind, as distinguishable from the ‘man’ himself, tends to be followed by analytical study of what, for the man, constitutes right (samyak) mind-ing. Right thinking

¹ upamāṇa, mendakapāṇa, anumāṇa.
must be consistent thinking, for consistency is one phase of the true. And logic is, practically, thinking or minding consistently.

Actually, it is true, this was the order of development in Buddhist culture. There had been a long process of preparation in thought both psychological and terminological, during many centuries. By the middle of the third century B.C. this development, stimulated by the growth of what was called Abhidhamma, had achieved a crude form of quasi-syllogistic method, revealed in full in the opening (and probably earliest) portion of the book Kathā-vatthu. That book, as the sequence, or rather lack of sequence in the contents shows, was a compilation of accretions, kept up, it may be, till nearly Buddhaghosa's day. But I hold strongly, for reasons put forward elsewhere, that the first section, the Puggala-kathā, was truly recorded in the four documents with us, as having been 'bhāsita,' spoken, by the president of the Patna congress, about B.C. 250-30. Nevertheless, neither does this book, nor do the works of Buddhaghosa, and his two distinguished contemporaries show any convincing anticipation of the ideas and methods of the Nyāyabindu.

Was it ever a Buddhist manual? We have had it worthily pointed out many years ago that Buddhism owed a considerable debt to the lay-culture comprised under the name Sāṅkhya. The date of its founder, Kapila, is, we know, uncertain. But we can trace in his teaching a new way of detaching the 'minding' as orderly process, from the man (purusā, ātman), which gradually became a powerful vogue, first in

2 Non-brahman.
the 'time-spirit' expressing itself in such movements as that of the Sakyan Community, or Sakyaputtiyas (as Buddhists were called), then in the 'orthodox,' Brahman world, first as protest against it, then in acceptance of it. But the message of the Founder of Sakya was a religious mandate, concerned with man as able to choose for himself how to live—'to wayfare'—so as to win through many lives ultimately to his utter weal. It was not the founding of a science of mind. Mind-analysis came into Sakya, as currents of new thought were bound to come in. Sānkhya on the other hand was, so far as the two could then be held apart, 'philosophical' rather than religious. It was not in the first instance a call telling man, man as one of the many, as Everyman, how, by his life, he could seek the Better, the Beyond, the Goal. Sānkhya gave to Sakya its start in psychology. It were only consistent to presume, that Sānkhya developed its own logic on its own lines. And the deduction is not far removed, that in course of time Sakya, that is, Buddhism took over its logic also.

My attention was first drawn to the probable Sānkhya origin of the Nyāyabindu by one of the aphorisms, in which the opposed positions in Sānkhya and Buddhism as to the reality of the "man" are confronted, but only the Sānkhyan defence of its position is quoted. This is as follows:—"Is there a self (i.e. man)? Yes, for it is clear that the eye and the other senses are not functioning for their own pleasure and profit, but for an agent." Or, as we should say: could the eye value what is seen, it would be the man, the valuer.

With this we may contrast the use of this argument in the predominantly Buddhist book Milinda-pañha
to arrive at an opposite conclusion. Were there an experiencer (*vedagu, vedako*), there would be no need of the specific channels or gates of sense. It is noteworthy, that both books ignore the (Buddhist) reference to *manas*, the mind, as a referee, or ‘resort’ (*patisarana*), in which the separate sensations are ‘enjoyed’ together.¹ Both here would wave aside the true enjoyer, the man; the Sāṅkhya, because *ātman* did not ‘enjoy’ anything, the Buddhist, because he was coming to believe there was nothing to enjoy beyond the mind.

I am not claiming that the Sanskrit Commentary to the Nyāyabindu is anything but Buddhist, nor in these few remarks am I dealing with it. I trust that readers of English will one day have access to an English translation. It will then be possible to compare the attitude taken in matters Buddhist and non-Buddhist by the Commentator, who is believed to have been of this persuasion. I have here neither time nor space to give to this adequate treatment. As a Sāṅkhyan manual, the text may perhaps be later than either the Kārikā, or the Sūtras, which betray no acquaintance, as texts, with it. But Sāṅkhyan it remains for me, in its attitude and in many of its terms.

Is it not also *more likely*, that just as India owed her first systematic attempt at the analysis of mind, and at enumeration of man’s nature, in so far as it was analyzable under categories, to the Sāṅkhyan school, so she should owe her first attempts at a valuation of the work of mind, as being valid, or not valid for one’s self (the perceiver) and for others (the inferers), to a natural development within that

¹ In Majjhima, 43, and Saṃyutta V.
same school—the school of 'computing' and 'naming,'—more likely than that she should owe it to a Buddhist development?

But why so? I see two possible reasons militating against such a development coming from Buddhism. The one is the one-sided application of causality in Buddhism; the other is the deifying of the founder and the falling back on doctrinal sanctions in Buddhism.

(1) The new valuation of causal law, or uniformity in phenomenal happening came into Buddhism from new ideas outside it in its earliest days. But the application made of it by monastic values was, not the production of a cause to produce a new effect, but the stopping of the cause so as to produce the stopping of the effect. The monastic tendency turned from the new, the new from which new truth may come, from which the new Better must come. It sought only to clarify by careful naming (a Sānkhyān influence) what was already given it in its 'Buddha-word,' its Suttanta. Had it not been for this barrier, shutting off the acquisition of new valid knowledge, Buddhism with its fine modern definition of causation: 'Given this, that comes to be, etc.,' might well have developed an organon of valid knowing, such as our little manual goes some way to present. And in such an organon, 'cause' (hetu) would not have been so limited in use as to serve for what we call middle term only, as in the Nyāyabindu. A Buddhist organon would have been built on causation in meeting the great problem of inference (anumāna). But Buddhism had excised from its causal doctrine the possibility of such an onward groping as our manual attempts.

(2) Kapila, the reputed founder of Sānkhya, was
never exalted, after his day, into a superman who knew all universals (and even particulars), and had thereon uttered all that men needed to, or could learn. On the early Sakya was laid the injunction of being illuminated and warded by the Spirit, but it wilted from this spirit, and looked instead to its formulated doctrines as its ultimate criterion of the true, and to its Three Refuges for protection. We see this running through Kathāvatthu, Milinda, Visuddhi-Magga and Commentaries. All confirmation is sought in what had been set up as Buddha-word in Vinaya and in Sutta. Now this was a bad soil for the seeds of man’s growth, in widening knowledge and in regulating it, to germinate.

This is talk of what might, or might not have been. The Sānkhyan character of the Nyāyabindu remains. In what way it may even to-day have a message for us, I may find opportunity to say should an English translation appear.
A YEAR ago—last February—it was my privilege to bring before The Buddhist Lodge the deepened, the widened meaning which this technical brahmin term: Brahmacaryam came to get in early Buddhism. Used, when the movement we now call ‘Buddhism’ was born, to mean the years of a boy’s, youth’s tutelage while residing with the Brahmin priest’s family, it was taken over in the new movement to include the whole of life. I referred to the number of contexts in scripture where this prolonged ‘training’ is asked about. And I added this: “It meant the whole of life . . . not just three-score years and ten only; it meant an indefinitely long period, past, present and future . . . many lives in many worlds, each and all calling for training” . . . until the goal of training was reached by each man, and that was in words ascribed to the Founder’s only real friend Sāriputta: “when the not known, the not seen, the not won, the not realized, the not mastered, should be known, seen, won, realized, mastered.” Or, in Puṇṇa’s words, when the last of the chariot relays had brought the king (the man) to the far goal he had sought.

Now I had then to make room for other speakers, and did not try to bring forward evidence that, for

1 See Vol. II, art XLVII. Published in Buddhism in England, 1942.
early Buddhism, the 'God-training' or 'holy life' did include the earnest seeker's life at survival of death of this life. For that matter a superficial study of Buddhism has, in this matter, left readers starved. For instance, in the two minor anthologies treating of virtuous and sinful survivors as happy and tormented respectively, there is nothing to show, that in either case life was considered as still a training, making for either the yet better, or for the riddance from a worse.

The happily reborn men and women taking holiday in the former, the work entitled Vimāna-vatthu, are shown surrounded with every kind of material prosperity and enjoying very 'worldly' if innocent amusements. But nowhere do we meet with any signs of for-gathering round teachers, or with seriously minded comrades discussing what this happier stage of the great Life-road means for them in religion, in their religious quest. There is nothing so nobly dignified as that Limbo of great pagans of the past consigned by an orthodox Dante to the Inferno, yet exempt from tortures, conversing "with sweet voices and eyes slow and grave" with Aristotle, become for Dante’s age "the Master of them that know." Nor anything to show a more advanced life of citizenship, in moral values, in outlook on life present and to come. Complacent memories and enjoyment of the present seem to be suffice.

Where these are asking nothing better, their less happy penalized fellows known as the Gone-Before:

1 I am glad to tell readers, that albeit much delayed by the war, these two anthologies, in the fourth (and last) volume of the sub-series I as editor have placed in Sacred Books of the Buddhists: Stories of the Mansions and of the Departed, are now published: the generous and efficient work of two American scholars respectively: Jean Kennedy and Henry S. Gehman.
pretas or petas, are at least, in unrest over their fate and what led to it, showing a healthier discontent and stirring of will. But neither in their case is there sign of a collective effort to express remorse and resolve towards betterment, given new opportunity.

But I have lately rediscovered in the fourth Nikāya, known, in the Pali translation, as the Book of the Gradual Sayings, a Sutta showing a much more advanced spiritual outlook. This, translated by F. L. Woodward and published by the Pali Text Society in 1933, as volume 2, contains a Sutta entitled Sōlānugatam, that is, got at by hearing. I give a condensed but otherwise literal translation. Monks are being addressed, but no speaker is adduced.

“There are four advantages to be got at by hearing, then considering and penetrating by your outlook. (1) When a monk who has thus studied religion dies and is reborn among devas, his memory is at first confused. They, the happy ones recite to him religious sayings, and he, his memory getting clear, quickly attains excellence. (2) A similar monk thus reborn hears one of efficiency and will-power teaching other devas. Slowly memory comes that he heard all that on earth when in brahmacharya, and he too quickly attains excellence. (3) Again, one so reborn may hear some deva he knew on earth teaching other devas religion, and to him also memory is cleared up and he too attains. (4) A monk similarly reborn meets a deva whom he knew as co-religionist on earth, and who recalls to him: “Do you remember how we used to practise the God-life?” “Ay,” he replies, “I do remember,” and quickly attains excellence.
Similes are used of lads playing together over mudpies, and of drum and conch heard while walking and recognized as familiar sounds. It is all very simple and does not perhaps take us far. But in two ways I find it deeply interesting and edifying. Firstly, in place of the gaudy and meretricious scenes of the *Vimānavatthu*, we recognize the sincere and earnest Wayfarers of earth pursuing in worthy company their life-quest under happier conditions for at least another life-span. Secondly, none but a psychically gifted man, as was the Founder and some of his disciples, could have told, as truth and not as mere surmise and as things hoped for, that progress in the Way was expected and pursued hereafter, no less than on earth.

This is confirmed by another Sutta in volume 3 of the *Gradual Sayings*. Here a woman-disciple is shown asking the Master's cousin Ānanda how the former could say, as apparently he had said, that her father and uncle, men of higher and lower morals respectively, had both, after death, become like-farers in the next world. Ānanda refers the question to the Founder, and is told, that their ways hereafter will have been different, faring the one to "excellence," the other to worsening, that "the one will have marched further forward than the other, is more exalted." But that earthly reckoners have here no power to measure justly as has a "tathāgata."

Such an one would have psychically that vision of man's wayfaring likened repeatedly to the seeing of two houses, to and from which men were ever coming and going.

I am not prepared to swallow whole the historic truth of either citation. Editors have probably
been busy over oral sayings long handed down. For instance, the word rendered "excellence" *vīsesa*: literally 'away-from-the-rest,'—as we might say, 'outstanding,'—is not an old compound. It is dated as 'Epic,' not of the earlier literature, and is only frequent in exegesis. The older term opposed to "worsening" (*hāna*) is, as I have elsewhere said, either growth, or becoming, i.e., 'coming-to-be.'

But that psychically gifted teachers should have left their disciples in ignorance of man's life in the hereafter: this is too absurd to be accepted. That disciples should fail to maintain value in such teaching, owing to their coming to concentrate on earth-values only: that is another thing and is alas! a historically true thing. But then who are we to reproach Buddhist tradition in just this matter? Who is so static, so far from a forward view about the next step as we? Either we are bidden to ignore all belief in it, or we are instructed, that we actually go on, not to a progress in a better or a worse, but to a Best straightforward or a Worst. I judge that here the older, the very old Buddhism can yet teach us wisdom. Namely, that progress or regress in the higher life or 'training' is not a matter of earth-life only, much less of years, here, of tuition only, but that we wayfarers have yet a long training before everyone of us, saint as well as sinner. "It's a long long way to" perfection of life.

If I say 'very old Buddhism' it is not only because I have traced (perhaps wrongly) no sign of interest in 'training' (*brahmachariya*) shown in Buddhist writings of to-day, but also because, already in the Pali Canon itself, we can note how teaching on this subject was being handled as matter for controversy. Let the reader refer to the first section in the book of debates
(called by S. Z. Aung and myself Points of Controversy), to that placed next, in time or importance, to the first debate on the reality of the very man or spirit, and to the second on the possibility of an Arahan ‘falling away’ from the perfection ascribed to him—namely, to the third: ‘That there is no living the higher life (brahmachariya-vāsa) among devas, i.e., better men after death here. He will find the orthodox pleader contesting the reality of such a life against the early dissentient school entitled Sammitiya, or Sammatiya, held in later writings to be pupils of one Sammātā. These claimed, that ‘training’ implied world-forsaking (namely as monk), an institution of earth only. Also, that in the sphere of life termed ‘unconscious’ (possibly a notion resembling that of some Christians that the ‘dead’ slumber), training was out of the question. The orthodox reply maintains, that the higher life is not limited to monks, and that it could be asserted as true of some forms of deva-life. In the later Tibetan versions of scripture, in the book called Dulva,¹ we find another school reckoned as schismatic, the followers of one Dhammagutta holding “as a fundamental doctrine,” that devas did practise ‘training.’

Nor is there, earlier or later, so far as I can see, any restricting the term brahmachariya to mean celibacy, a meaning it did largely come to have, and at which the second Sutta above quoted seems to hint. To what extent the word retained anything of its early technical meaning of spiritual and moral education, the schismatic views point to a gradual

¹ My authority is Rockhill’s History of Tibetan Buddhism as cited in Dr. Malalasekera’s excellent Dictionary of Pali Proper Names, art.: Dhammagutta I.
withdrawing of interest in the Way as a quest of Becoming which persists in world after world until the final Goal is reached. And this implies diminution of interest in that pushing back "the veil" such as some of the first Buddhist teachers could claim to bring about.
LXVII

MAN AND THE CREEDS

When the London Empire Exhibition of 1924 was drawing near, it occurred to a few of the more thoughtful, that the spiritual wealth of the Commonwealth merited a show, no less than its material products. It was certainly a worthy idea that the needs and wrought work of man's instruments: body and mind, should yield at least some place to the needs and wrought work of the man who owned them. The idea took shape, and was carried out in a series of addresses with presidential comment, at one meeting for each of ten 'living religions,' with one or more lecturers at each.

Half at least of the meetings were addressed by votaries, lay and ecclesiastical, of those religions. The remainder, from a more detached standpoint, considered some of the newer self-conscious ponderings of man on 'man as religious,' which show him as come to the verge of adolescence in spiritual growth—man as looking back at the way he has grown; man as looking forward to ways by which he may grow.

As to the speeches describing creeds old and newer, three conclusions may here be set down.

The first is the persistence of the old creeds, even after undergoing what might be called a general disarmament in each.

1 Revised from art.: published in the Hindu, 1929.
The second is the change in superstructure, in emphasis, in wording passed through by one and all, in the course of the centuries of their activity.

The third is the absence of any positively new light, comparable to their original message, coming from them in the later centuries. Newer forms there were, some of modern date, for instance the Ahmediyya of Islam, (which was represented in these meetings), but these newer departures were rather movements of reform within the old creed than any gospel of a New Word given to earth, shall we with Aristotle say, 'from without'?

I make here no comment on the 'remainder' of the Conference. But, in the first half, the words uttered on 'living religions' can scarcely be said to have done more than, as drill sergeants say, mark time. This was worth doing. We were shown, not the empire only, but the very earth marking time. We were shown the earth as needing to bring better to fruition the real messages in the old creeds before she deserves new light. We seemed to be shown, how the followers of the creeds need to become aware, that as man grows in his needs, in his widening life, in his spreading and deepening vision, there can be no further revelation identifiable with any message given him in past stages of his growth. We seemed to be shown, how the earth needs to make ready, and to come to listen for a new message, the time for which is not yet. Yes, the Conference was worth while.

There was a marking time too in this way. Except in the case of a number of so-called 'primitive' religions, each cult was worded by an earnest votary. And, as in the Parliament of Religions at Chicago
over thirty years ago, peace and order and outward fraternity were maintained. This could not be said of medieval conferences, held concerning one religion only. We have changed since then.

But one great living religion was not represented. When an Indian or a South Asian exhibition comes to be held at, say, Delhi, it may be that addresses on Hinduism and Islam will in their turn be withheld. Christianity, it was held, could, as a ‘living religion,’ be contemplated on the spot, or at least sampled. Had it been represented, this would have marked time, or possibly growth yet more effectively. To have presented it would have shown us as more disinterested than we yet are. For one growth was left to be marked by a curious inversion:—500 years ago a Conference was only possible, or advisable, on the creed professed by the State where the Conference was held. To-day, a Conference was only possible or advisable, on any and every creed except that professed by the State where the Conference was held.

And so once more they passed us in review: those old faiths, the great sisters off the stage—"daughters of time"—like great galleons of old, their wide sails set, their high poops, their wooden walls, still casting off the hungry seas of oblivion from their prows, still bearing their freight of souls crossing to the unknown shore. From their decks spoke earnestly men who had served aboard all their lives, spoke yet more earnestly men who had come aboard during their lives, spurning, the one and the other, at least in their hearts, the sea-going properties of any newer vessel, of any other older vessel. Either a man crossed on their ship, or he did not cross safely at all.

Man in a way resists change. And creeds are
wondrous symbols of how, once he has been driven to follow what is his truer nature, and has willed to change in the past, he has followed this up by resisting further change. 'Here I am safe; here I remain.'

It does not much matter to him, that he inherited his creed as a babe, or that he took over, as a new convert, as much of the creed's original teaching as appealed to him, or as much as had appealed to his folk when they took over the creed as a new one. His own interpretation, if he be a live wire, is sure to be just a personal interpretation. Yet, so long as it can be covered by the name of tenets, by the same formulas, it is enough (as a rule) for him to say with some Indians of old: "This is the true; all else is foolish." He is on the old ship. He serves under the old flag. The old ship's log is the only true book. It gives the Truth. It was inspired. It was no mere man's word, put together by late fallible editors. It alone gives the way to the Goal.

It does matter to him, that when his creed was taken over in the past by his people, or by himself as a convert, one old creed for him went down in the fray, another (possibly for him an older creed) triumphed. This to him means only, that the true overcame the untrue, or the less true. It does not convince him that no creed lasts for ever. It only means that his present creed will last for ever. It does not suggest to him that yet another creed unborn, bringing new light to the old light, may one day down his creed as being a thing of the old world. It only means that this, his creed gives all the light that man will ever need.

Yes, the creeds are wondrous works of man in their

1 _Idam saccam, mogham aññam_. Cf. many Pali Suttas.
twofold effect:—in their forwarding of the message they have become shaped to forward, whereby the earth is helped towards its welfare, and in the barriers they come to be in further progress towards that welfare. "The same yesterday, to-day and for ever" the creed-man will say, both of his creed and of its messenger. He does not see in this, not only a lovely truth, but also an appalling untruth.

The helper, willing to help men, inspired with a new word, a 'more-word,' a new light to earth, is a true thing, a fiat world without end. Usually "their name liveth for evermore." But the words of the new message, mixing in time with words of current, of older, of displaced rival doctrines, undergo a change, undergo many changes in emphasis, in importance, in wording. And there comes a day when, whereas the inspired message is wrought up into man's ideals of spiritual growth, the wording of the creed erected about it is outworn. If we say of that 'the same forever,' we must write it upon a tombstone.

For man's nature is more fundamentally to change than to resist change. And the creeds, though maintaining, as to a degree they must maintain, a set-out line, a frame-work, keywords, formulas dating, not from their birth, but from their youth, have not been able to persist unchanged in any other respect. They are the work of men. And among the very men, who help to spread the founder's message, are inevitably they who first change it in this or that wording and emphasis. In the new movement, dissenters from this or that in the accepted religious culture, seekers of a Better, they are each working from a somewhat different point of view. They rally round one who is like them, yet inspired more than
they, their friend and comrade, yet their leader, their wiser, stronger brother. They feel no deity in him, that they should repeat his sayings word for word. They watch his deeds rather than mark his sayings. They take no such note of these as to have ear-witnesses recording on the spot; they repeat his messages in their own words more or less, with their own emphases. It is only in 'scriptures,' come much later to birth, that we find men crediting the leader with supernormal grace and wisdom and authority. Gone will be the men who mourned when he passed away:

"And is the Comrade gone from hence? . . . The new men suit me not at all."¹

But if, with such early co-workers, a factor of change is thus early alive in the life of a 'Church,' how much less can we look for identity in doctrine or in emphasis, when the movement spreads far afield, and new material is ever brought in?

India, beyond any other religious land, has reminded the earth, that all things are transient, impermanent (anitya), and that in no bodily vehicle, whether of this world or another world, is the living man unching, or his works. Creeds are his work.

India, beyond any other country, has reminded the earth that man (not body and mind only) is by nature becoming, werdend, bhavamāna.

India, beyond any other country, has reminded the earth of the power of man's will. She was not as clear in wording this as we can be, but the reminder meets us at her hands again and again.

India has revealed to us more than these things. But in these three factors of man's nature we have

¹ Psalms of the Brethren. Pali Text Soc., 1913.
nearly all we need to understand, first, why there is, why there must be a changing, in the spirit if not always in the letter, of the old creeds; secondly, why the changes may, or may not be advanced towards what is better. For in changing, men do not revert to what they once were; they become what they were not—for better or worse, since not always is the New they seek the truly Better. Although all the time they are willing their welfare felt as not won. Else were they not alive.

Hence should India be foremost of our human brethren to apply these truths to the world of to-day and of to-morrow. Namely, that if there be one thing in man's nature wherein we may see the unchanging, it is in the necessity of his changing. He is in a material world, using a material instrument, a body. World and instrument must change. 'It is their nature to.' But neither is he, the man, spirit, soul, self, an exception to the universal rule. He, the very man, lives, and it is the way of all life to change. As he changes, his needs change, his will as to them changes. Where he once craved to fight, he now has begun to contemplate disarming. Where he once sacrificed men, then animals to his gods, he now limits himself to, it may be, bread, wine, flowers, fruit. Where he once massacrèd prisoners, enslaved, tortured, starved them, he now cries out in wrath if, in some woeful setback in his neighbours, these things are revived; he does not merely segregate the prisoner, he sets about making of him a man changed for the better. Where once he fed only bodies, he now trains ignorant minds as well.

In her old creeds, as in a mirror, we see these changes reflected. Once her gods demanded no warding of
the aged, of the sick, of woman and child. Once her wording of the way of the good life left out love and the service of man. Once, like us, she drew up no rites for the dedication of the child to creed with any word of dedication of him as keeper of his brothers and sisters. Now she begins to make central in her old gospels such things as these, which in their beginnings were not central. Were she called upon to remould her creeds, she would not word them as they are worded.

Will the old creeds always be able to stand a framework to this gradual inner development, going on either within the fold, or at first from off-shoots without? The new message in each of them was first given to a corner of the world only. In spite of propaganda, peaceful or violent, they are still regional. In spite of propaganda they are now mainly stationary. So there is yet room for all. The earth is marking time.

But still is she groping after new light. When she more fully feels her need of it here, there, then, it may be, will come the hour for the intervening of those other factors in the long way of spiritual life:— The Word of a New Message from the eternal Will of the source of such messages. If, and when that message comes, it will not, like those of the past, grow up in a corner. For we are now taking the world as our country. It will need therefore a world-framework as creed. And then, it may be, the earth will witness the foundering of the old ships. The messages they taught, and yet disregarded; the More-word to man they added to, covered over:—these will, by world-culture, have been wrought up into, not 'this religion,' but into 'religion.' Wording
also those messages, but adding the to-be-needed will come the New Word.

Does any one say, My creed is sufficient for my needs? Has he, has she made his needs, her needs wide enough? Great is still the mystery of life, the mystery of death, the bond between mind and body, between man and both... the creeds are silent. Or speak falteringling. The message, the New Word is given. But the creed is man's work: outcome of his needs of which he has become aware; outcome of his will to satisfy those needs; outcome of his weakness to see in that message just what it really meant; outcome of his certainty that he can attain to a More.
LXVIII

ASOKA, HEIR OF "THE WAY"¹

Much has been written on that great group of milestones in India's wayfaring through the worlds, the rock and pillar Edicts of Asoka, since, a century ago, they began to be discovered and deciphered by Western eyes. The scholarly decipherer and exponent has written, the caterer for the general reader has written. And if I now venture here and once more to say that revision is yet needed, this is not to pretend that a brief article, let alone the writer of it, is competent to show fully where and why it is so. Through imperfect knowledge of all that has been published about these milestones I also run the danger of ignoring what may, in this generation, have been said forestalling my own comments. If no criticism on these, published in the last decade, has reached me, there is in that nothing surprising, since it is for the general student I can alone pretend to write and, in that case, nonconformity is either overlooked, or held not worth discussing. It only remains for such as I to say it over again.

In doing this I am presenting Asoka in a perspective not, I believe, drawn about him before. By "Way" in my title I mean that figure which for early Buddhism is as typical of the teaching as is the Cross for Christianity. (The word more usually employed is "Path," which may suggest a track through a jungle. Our

¹ Published in Indian Art and Letters, Vol. XIV, No. 1, 1940.
translators had better have chosen Road than Path. The figure *came* to be applied to the few, the elect wayfarers. As taught *at first* it was the high road of life, the way of man through the worlds.) Those who have read the Edicts will say at once, the word "way" is never used; *magga*, *mārga* is there absent. This is true; the Magga of the Buddhist Sangha of which Asoka became the patron and disciple, the Magga which was, perhaps in his day, being edited into an "eight-fold" formula from either just "way" or "way-of-becoming" (*bhavamagga*), is not, as a technical or hortatory term, used in the Edicts. Nor, for that matter, as has been duly recognized, do we find in them any other of those technical terms which had come, or were coming in Asoka's day, to be enshrined in formulas—"truths," "marks," "causal genesis," "nirvana"—let alone those other three terms grouped with nirvana and inserted into the so-called "first sermon." The "moral practices" (*sīla*) are there, but not as a numerical formula of *pañca-sīl*. It is the *man* as moral or immoral (*sīlasa*, *asīlasa*) with whom Asoka, like the later king Milinda, with the wider view of the man of the world, was more concerned than with cloistral formulas. *Dhammacalane na hoti*, or *na* (*bhav)ai *asīlasā*: "faring according to dharma comes not to be by the immoral man."

Hence I felt it strange to come across this sentence in the late Vincent Smith's article "Asoka," in the *Ency. Rel. and Ethics*: "The religion of the Sinhalese monks to-day is practically the same as that of Asoka." I know not to what extent he had come nearer to them than I, who at a distance have watched their sayings for half a century, and have found these largely not bearing out the spirit of Asoka's Edicts.
The spirit! Herein it is that I see, in this man, a true heir of the great Helper of man to whom in one utterance he professed allegiance. The Edicts breathe the very spirit of the Way. I have often said that in original Buddhism we have a gospel of will without a fit word for will. That gospel was a message brought by Gotama of the Śākyans calling up a dynamic conception of the man, as of divine Immanence, yet not on that account and in any way divinely static. There was a risk that, with the growing vogue of monasticism and the Weltanschauung of things as transient (anitya), Divinity might become (as indeed it did become) conceived as an eternal Point of Rest: as Being, not Becoming, not working, not creating. Actually, the more man took up into himself the belief that he "was That" (tat tvam asi), the more, rightly so conceiving, would he see himself, not as a Self, an Ātmā, statically conceived, but as a Dharma-charāṇa: a wayfarer in the long Between separating him, the potentially divine, from "That," the actually divine.

It is too much suggested by comment on Asoka that, as the head of the new great Indian hegemony, and a remarkable reformer to boot, he was mainly intent on building up a new Utopia on earth, wherein with national and international amity well established, and life therein here and now made happier for all, man and beast, a long vista of earthly solidarity and peace opened up. And I am far from denying that in his reforms and ordinances he was going some way to bring this about, even though subsequent collapse, as with a satyr’s grin, shut down that vista. But if we study the wording of the Edicts with care and a wholesome mistrust of translators, we shall be ready
to agree that the motto "Je maintiendrai" would never have satisfied Asoka. It is recorded of Gotama’s friend and chief follower Sāriputta, that he said: "I praise not standing still; I praise growth: herein is man a striver." In these words we have for me the very spirit of the Edicts, of Asoka as heir of the Way, a preacher, he too, of the Way, even though he did not use the fit term he had.

As to why he did not use it, I have here a guess, that the Way, when drafted as a formula of eight points, became shrunken from the world-gospel it had been, to a sort of password in the teaching for the monk. This would seem to be illustrated by the Sutta "Āsīvisa" in the Third Nikāya (iv. 174), where the wayfaring man, at the close of his woeful adventures, crosses to nirvana in a raft, explained as the "eightfold way." I remember how years ago this jarred on me as coming only as a penultimate to consummation. Taught thus by monks to and for monks, it would no more come into the Śākyan lay-gospel than did nirvana, so much of a dual doctrine had the teaching by then become.

But even deprived, through this pre-emption, of so needed a word as "way," Asoka’s outlook from first to last is that of man not as a well-established Utopian citizen, but as a "pilgrim and a sojourner as all his fathers were." He may not have prescribed the use of magga, but he uses the old word for wayfaring, walking, moving on, car (char, chal), in this or that inflexion and compound, no less than twenty-seven times. And this always in a spiritual sense, namely of religious habit and progress. Again, and in the old Śākyan idiom, he makes ample use of two other words, different as figure or parable, but identical
in spirit with faring on: the words *vadh-*, growth, and *bhū-*, to become. Fortunately for us and for him these two had never got tied up in monk-formulas. They belong to the very opening of the Śākyan gospel; they attend it at the close of the Founder's generation. Both were then held up in opposition to the word *hāni, parihāni*: decay, falling away. "The people are perishing," said the deva to the hesitating Gotama; "teach dharma and they will become, come to be (*bhavissanti*)." "So long as the folk will do this and that," the aged Helper is shown saying, "so long will there be, not decline but growth (*vuddhi*)." And many more such passages might be quoted. Compare with these one of the Edict contexts—also twenty-seven in number—on decay (or decline) and growth: "This verily is the best work: the teaching of the dharma . . . in this aim growth and non-decay are good. For this aim has this been carved; now let men pursue growth and non-decay" (to just this degree—non-decay—does Asoka approve of "Je maintiendrai"!)

The other word, identical in spirit with faring on, is the one too often, as I judge, rendered as merely an alternative to "be, being"; I mean inflexions of the stem *bhū-* signifying "to become," and which, in Buddhist texts, when used (as it very often is) in the causative mood, is sometimes paraphrased by *vaddheta*, to make grow. Perhaps no word is used so often in the Edicts as is this, either in the *bhū-*form or in the shortened form *ho-* (and *huv-*). Omitting here and now the shorter form, together with the past participle *bhūta*, I will only repeat my protest at the misleading translation of the *bhū-*form when occurring six times in the compound *bhāvasudhi*, as, with
Senart, "purity of soul," or, with Hultsch, "purity of mind."

I know of no precedent justifying either rendering. It is not with the "purity" that my quarrel lies. As to that, the readers of this Journal will need no reminder that in this word, when used, as here, in a general religious sense, there is, in Indian idiom, no reference whatever to moral purity, let alone sex-purity. The term, as technical, has ancient bases in ritual, especially baptismal rites. To go no further back than converts to early Buddhism (Śākyya), we find them seeing a spiritual purity supplanting their former belief in such rites, thus Kassapa of the River:

\[\text{asuddhim maṇīsaṁ suddhim} \ldots \]

I deemed that "pure" religion which was false,
And blinded was I, shiftless, ignorant.

Likewise Kassapa of Gayā:

\[\text{suddho suddhassa dāyado, puttō buddhassa oraso} : \]

Now from all evil am I truly bathed,
Cleansèd from error, pure, immaculate,
In purity heir of the Purified,
His child, even the Buddha's very son.

\[\text{Suddhi thus meant a "moreworth" in faith, excellence,} \]
\[\text{truth, when attained by a man who was not merely} \]
\[\text{a ritualist.} \]

But the compound "purity of bhāva" is, I believe, found only in the Edicts. And in any composition it is very rare. I have met only with the relatively late and degenerate compound bhava-cakka: Buddhaghosa's "wheel of (re-)becoming," or rebirth. I shall be glad to find myself here proved ignorant of other such compounds. The only one approximately such a compound is the profoundly interesting compound,
in the Fourth Nikāya of the Pitakas, bhavya-rūpatā, so ill translated till, in the Pali Text edition, it was, I judge, rightly rendered by Mr. Woodward as "because it fits becoming." This is here listed as one of ten ways of religious teaching likely to be the text of any propagandist in the time of the Founder Gotama (namely, his own way), and which, he is shown saying, should be tested by its results on the life of a convert. I have dealt with it elsewhere, and refer to it here only as suggesting that in Asoka's day the Śākyan cult, then becoming preponderant, could be cited by the term Becoming: bhavya or bhava.

Incidentally I do not hold with those who would make out that Asoka went so far beyond Constantine, that he forced a little recognized cult, and not a strongly-growing one, into popular favour. Had the former been the case, we should have been "introduced" to the teaching of the Śākyan Sangha in the Edicts, as a new and true innovation among India's cults; whereas his references to it resemble more those of some African chieftain regarding the creed of white settlers and their missionaries. Man of the world, header for the practical, he set himself, as patron of Śākyya, on the crest of a tidal wave, no less than was virtually done by Henry VIII in regard to the anti-Rome movement in England. There is not one of Asoka's reforms which may not be found as enjoined in the Suttas: amity at home and abroad, regard for physical life, truthfulness, self-control, aspiration to a better world, and last but not least, worship of "dhamma."

Now these things had been taught in Śākyan mission

1 Gradual Sayings, i, 172.
2 Manual, 1932, p. 253; To Become, etc., p. 132.
tours about India for perhaps three centuries (I hold with the Indian dating of Gotama’s life), and it is reasonable to suppose that, between the term, “Buddhists” (“Bauddhas”), which was not yet born, and the term “Śākya,” which apparently was then only used as, in the lifetime of St. Paul, “Nazarenes” was, the cult of the growing Sangha-church may have been known under the name of its central doctrine: bhāvya or bhava. Few, if any, may as yet hold that this was the central doctrine. But then, few as yet, even if they admit that “Buddhism” was an offspring of Brahman—i.e., early Vedānta—teaching, are yet ready to point to the new birth, in that offspring, lying in the shifting of emphasis from what a man is (immanent Godhead) to what a man can and must become to be That actually, and not potentially only.

Anyway, if I am right, then the compound bhāva-śudhi, instead of being forced into a rendering, unmet elsewhere, of purity of soul or of mind, falls naturally into place in its contexts. Namely, man, as enjoined to cultivate “self-restraint and the religion of becoming,” has the twofold task of cleaning out the undesirable, the “weeds,” and of fostering the divine growth of the To Be in himself. Have we not here, so to speak, the Jesus-teaching of the futilely cleansed house, completed as he implied it should be, by the installing desirable inmates, and not leaving it empty?

That Asoka was not an earth-reformer only is duly recognized. It could not be otherwise in the face of his words reminding men to keep in view “both this

---

2 Matt. xii, 44; Luke xi, 25.
and the other world," and of the happier life in the latter as so very worth while. But that he went further and included in his creed not only, with Christians, a Communion of Saints but a Communing with Saints is not (yet) admitted. I have seen no dissent from the conclusion reached by the last generation of scholars, that the repeated sentence, "At the present time men of India who had not mixed with devas are mixed with them," refers to border-tribes who had till then lived as pagans. It is a conclusion that is not convincing. Nothing, e.g., were more untrue than to hold that border-tribes had no "devas" of their own: men, beings, in the Unseen. And there is nothing sectarian about Asoka to reserve the title deva for his own "communion of saints." I admit that I cannot equate the curious (inverted) compound missa-deva (for deva-missa)\(^1\) with Pitaka contexts. The monk-editors, be it never forgotten, were heading away from interest in the Unseen, that was so marked a feature in original Śakya, and such a phrase might linger in oral idiom, but not in monastic preference. But such a context as that of the Second Nikāya should never be lost sight of, somehow "left in." Asked if he knew of any absolute happiness in earth-life, Gotama is shown replying in the affirmative: "As long as a man, when duly musing, has attained to converse with devas living in a purely happy world, is present with them, talks with them."\(^2\)

Now this is what deva-missa would admittedly mean, and it is a great pity, albeit a fairly safe assump-

---

\(^1\) Cf. Böhtlingk and Roth's mention of the anomaly (in another combination), art. Miśra.

\(^2\) Sutta 79.
tion, that none of the scholars alluded to had given fair recognition to what such a text gives to think about early Buddhism. Why drag in the border-tribes? For the Śākyan founders the pāram, the Beyond, or what we call the Hereafter, was the Here and Now, the Greater Present. Plenty of "left-in" contexts show that. And who can tell that Asoka himself knew nothing of such happy converse, even if he, with many among ourselves and with Mary, said nothing, but "kept those sayings and pondered them in his heart"? The intransigent of the cloister might say with the nun Mittā:

\[
devakāyam na pathe'ham, vineyya hadaye daram
\]

I want no heaven of gods;
Heart’s pain, heart’s pining have I trained away!

But she may have lived to regret, in emptying her house of evil, the refilling with nothing positive. Let the student set beside this the warning in the Dhammapada, a work so often cited touching the Edicts:

\[
jantuno vītīna-paralokassa
n’atthi pāram akariyam (176).
\]

who with the further world no traffic hath,
there’s nothing bad he may not do!

Over one more protest already made more than once: the seeing in Asoka a sender of missionary propaganda, as warranted by the Edicts, a brief word must here suffice. Incidentally, I have not yet seen it pointed out that in them Asoka, adviser, condemns Asoka, propagandist. Namely, in Girnar XII, he deprecates "commending one’s own sect and blaming another’s . . . save lightly." It is difficult to see
how a missionary can find excuse to try to convert others without doing both; nor very "lightly" at that. The Edicts say only that he sent men of a sort, called incidentally dūte (a term never, I believe, used for religious missioners or messengers), "as far as" (i.e., to the confines of) certain Western dominions. My husband's words hereon¹ were perhaps too negative. It was as sagacious an act for a new dynasty, especially after the Macedonian aggressive campaign, to cultivate amicable relations with other, also new and revolutionary institutions in the hitherto unknown West, as it was, say, for Henry VIII, a "new man," to form an entente cordiale with France. But he has so far checked the too-ready assumption that the dūtas were Buddhist theras, that writers have begun to see not theological but ethical propaganda only in the rock reference. And further, in the latest article on Asoka, in _Great Men of India_, 1939, the writer is so far iconoclastic that he does not refer by a single word to any propaganda outside of India! Opinion, then, is not stagnant. I confess to a feeling of relief at its movement.²

Yet in conclusion I would take the writer and my here-cited husband to task in one respect—and it is an important one. Mr. D. Bury, to my thinking, "crashes" in the opinion that "the Edicts form the framework of an essentially practical non-religious philosophy." The reason is of course that, in them, there is no appeal or profession of faith made to any special deity or deities. Now in such a reason there is, for me, a lack of historical imagination. Of the

¹ _Buddhist India_, p. 298.
² Here, too, is movement: "were the 'envoys' ambassadors or missionaries?" J. E. Carpenter, _Buddhism and Christianity_, 1924.
one. I say this reluctantly, for my husband, the first President of this Society, trained me never to write without it. Nevertheless it may, as here, be misused, for instance in yielding to the relief afforded to some modern minds in imagining they have found, in the past, a worthy and notable exception to the human quest for an otherworldly ideal and revelation. They do not see that, to say this of Asoka, they are shutting him out of the picture in which he was but the foreground. Receding into the background behind him there had been some four centuries of a generally accepted cult of Immanence. It is true that, for the many folk, ritual of a kind had never ceased. But the teaching given to sons of nobles and of the priesthood had ever been the virtual ignoring of any system of personal theism or polytheism, the enjoining that Divine Being was to be sought in the being, the spirit (ātmā) of each man. In him was the City of God (Brahma-pura). In consequence, prayer and the heed to ritual faded almost entirely out in the religious conscience of these young men.

And more: the Śākyan tradition, from the day of its Founder, had set, beside this deified spirit of man, a more dynamic concept of It expressed in the word Dharma, or Dhamma. Here is no mere “morality,” as Hultsch has, alas! rendered it. Here is what “he who seeks for the Great Spirit should worship”—a pronouncement ascribed to Gotama before ever he had begun to teach, so wrong is it to identify the term, as Pitakas and Buddhists do, with any external code of teaching. It is true that Asoka does not so define Dhamma. In the very usual Indian way he pours out the associated ideas from the term’s casket,
and gives us the ways in which the Inner Goer (antaryāmin, that is Dharma) urges man to act.

Here, surely, is nothing “non-religious”! It is just the Way in which, for some centuries, Brahman India and then, alas! for a time only, Śākyan India followed the religious quest. The seeker wayfaring in a More, a Better, a Higher had been seeking the Within from the Within. In the spirit of his own epic he had been taught: “This here is thy true Kinsman; thou canst no other than be with Me; won to evenness and unity with Me, then only canst thou become He Who thou truly art.”

Whatever be the truth about the monkhood of Asoka’s closing years, it is in the Edicts that he is shown a true heir of Gotama’s Way of the Worlds. In them he sees man as a wayfarer striving onwards, if not towards a Highest yet inconceivable, towards a Higher, a More, a Better; a child growing in incessant Becoming, mindful of the Greater Present, seeking, “desiring, a better country, that is a heavenly.”

---

1 An Upanishadic term for Deity.
2 Viz., not “what is Dharma?” but “how many is Dharma?”; kati, not katamo.
3 Mahābhārata, Mōksha, Adh. 309.
LXIX

BIRTH-STORIES AND THE LONG QUEST

Some years ago I compiled by request a volume of selected stories from the collection of over 550 included in the Pali Canon of Buddhist scriptures under the title *Jātakam*.¹ (A word we might translate as Rebirthiana). This volume I am informed is now out of print, unlikely itself to find rebirth. In my Introduction I had stressed a feature, not, so far as I know, duly emphasized in the European comments on this remarkable thesaurus, nor indeed, in the much I had to say, stressed with sufficient point. I have thought it worth while to bring down my defunct work from its lonely shelf, and send its more special message once more in search of the critical attention readers of this Journal may hold it deserves.

Let me first remind readers, unfamiliar with Buddhist literature, of what the *Jātakam* is. I know of nothing to rival it in literature, especially in canonical literature. Other such Indian collections are not canonical. The Bible has its Psalms and Proverbs; Europe has her Æsop and La Fontaine. But in no book of folklore has either the plenitude or the underlying and consecutive interest of the *Jātakam* found a rival. Now it was, I believe, in the *Jātakam*

¹ For the *Treasurehouse of Eastern Story*; Chapman & Hall. Under the title of "Jātakas and the Long Quest," most of this article appeared in *Indian Art and Letters*, vol. xv, No. 2, 1941.
that Europe first came into contact, on any extensive scale, with Buddhist scripture. This it owed to the Danish scholar Victor Fausböll, whose text and exegesis (Pali) were published in 6 volumes during 1877-96, and to the widened interest set afoot by my husband who, translating the long preface 'Nidāna-kathā,' and the first 40 stories, published in 1880, handed over the completion of the translation to Edward Cowell, under whom a band of translators: Chalmers, Dr. Rouse, Francis and Neil produced a complete translation between 1897 and 1907.

On the face of it, it was not, in the interests of historic truth and light, a well-timed introduction to the ‘bible’ of a world-religion. Were we introducing visitors from afar to Christianity, we should not place first before them Chaucer's Canterbury Tales. It is true, as I am about to contend, that a very vital truth of original Buddhism runs like a Leitmotif through the Jātakam to which the framework attaching to each story bears witness. But it has been the stories that have caught our attention, mainly to the exclusion of the real ‘moral’ they were set to tell. A moral which is by no means merely that which is contained in the verses. And from them the foolish fancy has arisen, that a man or woman survives death as beast oftener than as human, and that this is a genuine part of the Buddhist gospel. The stories are but frills in the literature. A few are, in the Discourses, put into the mouth of the Founder, and may indeed have been used by him, even as both he and Jesus made use of the parable. But it is the attached ‘framework’ in each that lends them their religious significance. What then is this story-cum-framework?
This: that the story itself, called technically 'story of the past,' is introduced, in the Jātakām, by an account of some event alleged to have just happened in the little inner world of the "Order" (Sangha). This event is known as "the story of the present." The teller of the story of the past, who is always presented as the founder himself of Sakya (i.e., Buddhism), is then made to remember some similar act or saying, in the dim past, of the chief person in the story of the present: this he tells. He then, in concluding, is shown assigning this chief person, together usually with one or two others, to the story of the past, as having had the recorded experience in a former life.

Sometimes the pair of stories are in so many words just repetitions the one of the other. Certain persons, X Y Z appear as in more or less similar bodies, with similar mind-ways, in similar circumstances. As to what we rather quaintly call 'character'—what they do in a given situation—either they are morally no better, or they are worse, now than then, or they are better. But—and here I approach my point—certain present persons are made out as identical, quà person, quà 'man,' with the chief persons in the story of the past. Thus, for instance, it is said: A (in this present matter) was then X; B (whom you know now as 'she') was Y; but Z (of the past) was just I myself (whom you now see). This is how the 'framework' ends.

That they so end is a feature of high significance. No student of the history of Buddhist ideas can afford to neglect it to the extent that he or she does. Why not?

The Buddhist may say: But the Jātakām name
of Z, who is also termed Bodhisat, and who was the 'Buddha-to-be', was but a label for an ever-changing complex, evolving, as mind and body, in some unknown way, into a new complex. And we may then get trotted out the similes of the all but canonical Questions of King Milinda—late and mediaeval similes—e.g., of light transmitted from candle to new wick, of butter evoked from milk, of mangoes growing from seed. As if these merely physical similes afforded safe analogies, sure guides to that other unique world of the real, the spiritual man, to be valued as contemplator, not the contemplated; as valuer, not to be merged in the thing valued. The finding truth in any kind of analogy is, it is true, not only a late feature, and much mischief did it work in the evolution of Buddhist thought. Especially when the chariot (i.e., body) was, without horse or driver, held to be a fit analogy for the whole man.

But it is Gotama the 'Buddha' himself who over and over again knocks down the complex-malkin in a for me very radical way. Thus: it will be admitted that a new 'complex' succeeding death will be understood as being not basically the same as the preceding complex, or complexes. He will be complex $n$ succeeding complex $m$, etc. Has he not a different nāma and rūpa? True, I reply, but what about the "he" who "has"? Must there not be some identity to whom $n$ and $m$ are referred? Something that makes us for example call out, when light is turned on in a dark room, 'Why, it's You!'? Here, not your body is meant, save as revealing the You who "has" it. Else might we call out at seeing lit up a prone corpse, 'Why, it's You!' But we should not. Now Gotama is, in just this matter
of identity, perhaps more emphatic than in any other sayings referred to him, apt though he often appears in accentuating the ‘I,’ the aham. In a Sutta-Jātaka, such as are here and there met with, we find him made to say: “Now it may appear to you, Ānanda, that in those days this Jotipāla was a different person. Nay, not thus is it to be understood. I in those days was Jotipāla, the brahmin.”\footnote{Majjhima-Nikāya, No. 81.}

There is never a word from him, that the ‘complex’ you now call ‘Me’ was in that past time the different being I’ve been telling you of: X or Z. He was I; I was he. Nor can the exegetical argument hold here, that he would only talk in this way to the ‘many-folk.’ He is speaking to one of his nearest disciples. Nor is he, in the collection of stories, always talking to ‘the general.’ And if he were, did he not, by the scripture, emphatically repudiate teaching exoterically and esoterically?\footnote{Dialogues of the Buddha, ii, p. 107.}

And I now pass to my main point. This becomes more evident if we study the Pali Introduction or Nidāna-kathā: ‘talk on the origin, or basis.’ In the stories, the only method used in assorting is that of the numerical order of the verses, to which the prose story is the probably later script of what had been for centuries just ‘told’ by the exponent, as leading up to the verses. The verses were, it seems, not told, but chanted, are still chanted, if my Ceylon pupils in London informed me correctly—a chanting, as they showed, resembling what one hears in Catholic churches nearer home, plus a touch of Oriental querulousness in the cadences. But in the Nidāna-
kathā we are given, no such unprogressive mixture of the founder's rebirths, but a consecutive legend, presenting the Bodhisat in about a dozen rebirths, at long intervals of time, always as a distinguished being, whether as king, either of men, or snakes, or devas, or as warrior, anchorite, or brahmin. In these he is shown successively developing growth, not in bodily or mental attainments, but in spiritual advance; called, in the Indian sense of the word, an advance in the 'man,' in man-growth. He is shown as graduating in ten 'perfections' (pāramitā),¹ to become the perfect man. And in the earliest rebirth in the legend his definite point of departure in the long Wayfaring in the Better is told as an act of will: a resolve. This was abhi-nīhāra: 'superbringing-out,' (there was no good term for 'will'), a vow, namely, that one day he, "having become supremely 'awake,' might build a Dhamma-ship, and so cause the multitude to cross over the ocean of wayfaring, and then himself 'pass utterly away'."

Taking then the motley Jātaka-mass with this introduction, it is scarcely an overstatement to say that, for all the much foolishness we find in them, the oddities, the inconsistencies, the many distortions in ideals and in the quest of them, they are collectively the greatest epic in literature of the Ascent of Man, the greatest ballad-book on the theme, that man, willing the better becomes the better.

Nor here must we see, in 'man,' men or mankind only. We are given, crudely, childishly though it be, the life-history of the individual man; not as type of a family, tribe or race, but as a 'human unit, with an immensely long life-history of his own,

¹ Raised in later values to thirty!
distinct from any 'herd'-concept. This is surely worth considering by us who have been taught to consider evolution as a matter of bodily (and at best mental) history, and are being urged to 'think racially,' to develop a 'herd'-ethic.

And as to the lot of stories of Bodhisat as monkey, deer or other beast, we are here up against a popular method of giving moral powder in a dose of jam which is, as serious religious teaching, quite inconceivable in the faith of a man of the calibre of Gotama called (later) Buddha. Pythagoras and Empedokles may possibly, one or both, have derived from the East the notion of metempsychosis as breaking down the barrier between animal and human rebirth. But our vague knowledge of both men does not warrant us in saying more than that they played with the notion, but did not teach it seriously. In Gotama we have a bigger proposition: a man inspired with a new and positive message for the Many concerning man's life and destiny. It was not his business to play around the might-have-been, the may-have-been. His concern was with something which for the many was new and at the same time true. Had rebirth of man as animal been in that new and true message, he would have uttered it as that. It is true that, discounting the Jātakas (which are late) a discourse here and there in the books of the Sutta contains allusions to rebirth as animal. But for me at least they bear the stamp of ecclesiastical compilation; there is no good evidence that they were the very words of the founder or his early co-workers.¹

But, discounting the few stories of worse stages in

¹ Cf. Appendix, Art: 10.
the future 'Buddha's' life-career, the vast majority show him as either choosing in his own actions the better way, or as at least onlooker commending the better way in others.

That the individual man, and not the race only, requires ages of life-spans in which to consummate is not, is not yet accepted by us. As Indian tradition it is not a little wonderful that it should be accepted by Buddhists, who might seem to be little likely to do so. We might, in the light of their development in ecclesiastical dogma, have 'looked to see monks rejecting the Indian belief in rebirth, as being a vindication of the dogma they came to condemn, namely, of the persistent, immortal 'becoming' of the individual man. But on the contrary, they not only accepted it, but they raised it in power to a uniformity of nature, a natural law. With them it was no longer a question of how rebirth might be won by the sacrifice, the word-ritual, the priest; it was man's natural, inevitable fate to be somewhere, somehow reborn, not once only, but indefinitely often.

The Jātaka tradition of bygone stories told as real memories is as such probably entirely factitious, and belongs to the cult called Buddhology. But it was expressed in a way to effect edification of a story-loving people. And in that it has ever maintained the continuity of the one and most real man through many 'lives,' it has in its teaching something that is far nearer to the original 'Buddhist' message than all the dogmatics of the Sangha. In the Birth-stories we have a teaching for the Many, for Everyman. And Everyman wants a religion about "the man" (homo), not about ideas in a wordy abstract way. He wants, in his religion to hear about life, about the
worlds, about man and the Unseen. He does not usually suffer gladly the values of the learned, the mandate of the pundit.

Here perhaps we see the reason for the religious value, curious otherwise to us, which the Buddhist church has ever attached to a constant flow of Jātaka teaching (at least in Ceylon). It would almost seem as if they found herein a compensating value for the shrunken artificial picture of superman or arahàn, as presented in the less popular, the monastic ideal.

If this be so, we may see some justification in the age-long and still persisting zest shown for Jātaka teaching. When this is valued as just stories “with a moral” we can respect such zest as little as we should that of Christian teachers concentrating mainly on recitations from the book of Proverbs. Apart from the really great theme which is here emphasized, the groundwave, the vital thread, which makes this potpourri into a unity, it wavers much in its standards of spiritual or ethical excellence. There is in the stories no very clear idea of what constitutes “weal” in the highest sense. There is much about wisdom considered as superior cunning—of the serpent, so to say—about wisdom as practical efficiency, “wisdom” which in the very term had in older Buddhism been ranked as a supreme attribute. There is much about worldly success as layman, or as ascetic. But the highest achievement in “weal,” in that “aim” (attha), which it is man’s very nature to seek, does not appear much in the thoughts of the compilers.

It may be said, this cannot be maintained in view of the fact, that “leaving the world” is so frequent a feature in the stories, both of “the present” and of “the past.” But then I am not prepared to concede
that, to leave the world as 'recluse' is for the most part either the accomplishment of a man's weal, or even a progress towards it. To believe this is one of the great delusions of mankind in its efforts towards the better.

And herein, so interwoven is the monastic with the saner human ideal,—the ideal as I claim of the original Śākyan gospel—the stories by no means always advocate monastic aspiration. For instance, here and there, constant love between man and woman is told of, and is in no way belittled. This is the guiding motive in the Kusa Jātaka. Here it is amusing to note the jar between the monkish story of the present and the imported unmönkish story of the past. Whereas in the former, woman is held up as the very bane of man, in the latter, woman is shown, not only as sagacious manager and as regent, but also as the very inspiration and incentive to the man to overcome physical and professional impediments, and to test and draw out his will and endurance, finally, as this woman's husband winning, not ruin, but success and happiness. Yet because the West as yet sees in the original Sakya gospel a religion of monks for monks—and this is indeed what it grew to be—Professor Lüders, in his interesting introduction, finds it "somewhat strange" that a Bodhisat should figure as the constant lover. (But why on earth not?)

Woman in fact, albeit in the Hīnayāna Buddhism of the Pali Canon she may never become Bodhisat, plays in the Jātakam as many parts as does the man, and is credited with both will and capacity in many forms of activity. She appears as governing, whether it be husband, son, daughter-in-law, or kingdom; she mothers the man as in some way the weaker;
he admits he is unable to understand her; she saves his life, she, the "false one", by the power of a true word brings divine aid to his rescue; she chooses her mate; and in that same oddly jumbled Jātaka called 'the Nest' (No. 31), she persists in taking part in work for the public good.¹

It may be that, in this matter of the man as wayfaring, in the last resort, a distinct unit and alone and for an immeasurable time, India may have something to teach us. I have not seen (I may be wrong) that Max Müller, in believing this, found in the Jātakam such a lesson. Fausböll too seems not to have found it. Will the next of the other writers on the Jātakam see beneath the 'motley' of it the theme which constitutes its real significance—and this not for one elect man alone, but for each and all:

I see, look you, myself:
E'en as I willed, so have I come to be!²

Hard is it now for readers of Buddhism to realize all that the central figure of 'life as any one man's wayfaring through worlds to a Goal' meant for the early followers of Gotama. That figure of the Road has been much shoved aside as less than central, and weakened, as to its main lesson, by having been parcelled out into an 'eightfold' detail. The more significant is its emergence with something of its original force in the first two Jātaka stories. Both are about wayfaring in the desert; both show the Road as a great adventure, calling for wise and dauntless will, for fortitude, for enterprise. And

² Kusa Jātaka.
here we can understand how loyal followers came to call their great founder 'Lord of the caravan': sattha-vāha.

Yes, we are in these stories valuing a perpetual undercurrent of a More, in man's nature, life and destiny. We are not valuing a mere will to amuse, to point out witticisms, or an incidental moral to an incidental episode. Important as the amusing, the edifying was where the listeners were, and are even to-day, often the patrons, the almsgivers of the storytelling monk, there was, for original storyteller as for editor, a higher mission in the stories than this. Storyteller and editor bring us up against the will of the Man as Wayfaring in a long quest after a Better, as imagining ahead of his journey a Better. As up against the Man who in the Better sees implicit a Best. A Best that is not only for him but for all men. A Best not that of the Mass, the Herd, but of each man and woman.
BUDDHIST PARABLES AND SIMILES

It does not appear that the historians of any ancient literature have made a special study, comparative or otherwise, of the illustrative imagery contained therein. Parables, figures, similes have been considered incidentally to style and matter. It may be that separate treatment has been comparatively neglected through choice; it may be that choice will change. In any case the wide field covered by those general investigations precludes the possibility of any special analyses. But it is only yesterday, so to speak, that witnessed the commencement of a comparative treatment of the folk-lore story or fable, and of its analogues in, or travels to, different countries. The proverb has already received some separate consideration. To go no further back than 1904, there lies before me Colonel Gerini’s monograph on Siamese Proverbs and idiomatic expressions, many of them having survived unchanged from the date of their importation through the vehicle of Buddhist literature. Incidentally again, several figures and similes come into this interesting work. But the day of their independent consideration may yet be said not to have come.

There is nevertheless no hard and fast line to be

1 Published in The Open Court (Chicago), September, 1908.
2 Journal Siam Society, 1904.
drawn between the fable and parable on the one hand, and the simile and metaphor on the other. Every child knows that the first two are told to make interesting some lesson that is good but dull, or strange, or both. But the last two may be considered as fables and parables condensed. It is quite easy to condense the latter into the former, or to expand the former into the latter. Nathan’s dart, “Thou art the man!” feathered with the parable of the ewe-lamb, might have been expressed as the simile, “For even as a rich man who, to give sup to his guest, were to slay, not from his own flocks, but the one ewe-lamb of his poor neighbour, so hast thou, to whom,” etc.¹ The simile might even have been condensed into a word, “O thou Wolf!”—an epithet not less pregnant of rebuke than that in a later message, “Go ye and tell that Fox. . . .”² Such expressions as “lion-hearted,” “unlicked cub,” are, so to speak, midget composite photographs, which it is interesting to compare with similar pictures in remote, if not wholly alien literatures; “monkey-hearted” (kapicitto), for example—an Indian mind-picture for capriciousness or curiosity—and again migabhūyena cetasa³—“become in heart as a creature of the wild,” applied to those who had renounced all worldly worries. All such expressions are capable either of calling up in the memory familiar fables or anecdotes, or of being easily expanded into tale or instance. And hence, whether we expand or condense, the more briefly worded imagery seems to possess a claim on

¹ 2 Sam. xii.
² Luke, xiii, 32.
³ Pronounce chitto, che’tasā. Miga, specifically antelope, means generally all wild things, e.g., stho migarājā, the lion king of the beasts. “Deer-hearted” would here be misleading, fearlessness being essential to the state of mind referred to.
investigation differing, at most, in degree from the better recognized claim of illustrations that are more fully embodied.

As an aid to those who may wish to pursue investigation on these lines where the harvest is specially rich, the present writer has just completed, for the Pali Text Society's *Journal* (1906-7; 1908), a thematic index to the similes in the Nikāyas (Sutta Pitaka). This collection—the heart of the Buddhist canonical scriptures—includes the four great collections of discourses and dialogues; also the Jātaka, and several shorter poems, including the Dhammapada and Sutta Nipāta, which are now fairly well known to European readers. A moderate acquaintance with Pali, and the assistance of such translations as are yet made in English and German of these thirty volumes, will place the materials at the disposal of the investigator. And he or she will scarcely be disappointed. One literature will differ from another in fertility and aptness of imagery. But a literature which, in the first centuries of its being, grew, not at the point of style or pen, but in the mouths and ears and memories of its compilers, is likely to woo hearers and court remembrance by way of attractive images. And if, at the same time, those images have found expression in the vernacular of the regions where the literature took birth, and not in any diction reserved for priest or poet, if they are redolent of natural and social environment, if the greater part of them is employed to bring into relief an impressive body of ethical doctrine, deeply felt and earnestly disseminated, the results of such an inquiry should prove interesting in several ways.

The simile or parable, for instance, is there to throw
light on some point by way of analogy.¹ "I have made a simile for thee that thou shouldst understand my meaning," the Buddhist teacher is often made to say. And sometimes the words are added:—a simile "that is original and spontaneous." Being, as in sooth they are, such as "come home to men's business and bosoms" even across the seas and centuries, they can serve this, their original purpose, not ineffectively with readers of to-day. Their deep-lying aesthetic effect on those countries and cultures, where they were imbibed as an integral part of traditional doctrine, can of course by Christians be only imagined. But we can also try to imagine to what an extent, for Christians, the teachings of the Gospels would be remote, abstract and colourless, had they never been assimilated through the medium of those eighty to ninety similes, that range from the lamb and the lilies to the hen and chickens and the cup. We shall then be at a better point of view to understand something of the corresponding perennial charm which has won for the teachings of Gotama the Buddha their age-long hold over all the countries of their adoption.

This fact, again, that the imagery used is true to nature, drawn from the life, from the natural scenes and every-day life of a certain area of ancient civilization, indicates the high value that lies in these materials for the historian. It is well known how hypothetical are the conclusions of scholars as to the dates assigned to the great literary works of ancient India, from the Vedas to the Mahābhārata, and as to the areas within which they were compiled. Much of the evidence for

¹ The generic Pāli term for illustration, upamā, is nearly parallel to the Greek analogon; upa, towards, mā, to think.
such conclusions as can be made, depends on incidental allusions in one compilation compared with those in another. And these allusions occur very largely in illustrative imagery. The lion and tiger are instances, and so are the lotus and the palm-tree (fan-palm or palmyra). In the Rigveda, supposed to have been compiled before the Aryan immigration, lion-hunting is mentioned, but the tiger is not alluded to; the lotus (pundarīka) is named thrice, but there is no mention of the palm. In the later Atharva-veda, the tiger rivals and tends to supersede the lion, as the chief of wild beasts. In Buddhist imagery, the tiger is scarcely mentioned. The lion is still the lordly, lonely, fear-inspiring creature, and to him is now given the title "king of the beasts," a name he retained throughout the journeyings of fables from East to West, and which invests him, even at that early epoch, with the mythical halo of a remote half extinct creature. Lotus and palm are not infrequent in Buddhist imagery, but their poetic prominence is slight compared with later treatment. The Ganges, again, its "four great river tributaries," and "river" generally form one of the most frequent illustrations in the Sutta Pitaka, the older Vedas being silent on the subject. Snow mountains, as well as a season of snowflakes and frost, are sung of in the Rigveda as choses vues. In the Buddhist imagery, the snowy summits greet us once more, but only as distant visions. "Like to the snowy peak the good shine far." The magnitude of the Himalayas—"Himāvā king of the mountains"—is

---

1 Only in the explanatory stanzas added later to the longer Jātakas does such a verse occur as, "All hail, ye lions and ye tigers fell."
2 Dhammapada, verse 304.
referred to in anthologies, but when brooks "up in the mountains" are spoken of as rushing down in spate to fill the rivers running to the ocean, the agency called in is not melting snows, but, in the idiom of the plain and the little hills: 

*deve vassante* (Jupiter pluvius), the rain.

A classification of such incidental allusions will go far to locate a literature in the place and period of its origin. It has been carried out in the case of Vedic literature in Zimmer's *Althindisches Leben*, but similar analyses are yet needed for the Upanishads and the Pitakas, on an equally thoroughgoing system.¹

Once more, the various forms in which the illustrative imagery of the Pitakas is expressed are not without interest for comparative literature. Pali lends itself easily to compound adjectival phrases. "Wise as serpents and harmless as doves" could in Pali find expression in phrases like "crow-wise" (*kākapāṇṇa*)—a term alluding to the story of a very unwise bird,—and "having-forest-gloom-darkened-eyes" (*vanatimiramattakkha*). Both simile and metaphor, however, occur as substantives and as distinct phrases:

"He is the radiance supreme"

"To fellow-men a torch-bearer
Ever hath honoured been by me"

"As the dewdrop slips from the lotus"

"Even as the carter who has strayed... into a rough track broods over his broken axle"

¹ Analyses covering only part of the field, either in subject matter or in sources consulted are Dr. Fick's admirable *Soziale Gliederung im nordöstlichen Indien*, based on the Jātaka, and the author's "Early Economic Conditions in Northern India," *Journal Royal Asiatic Society*, Oct., 1901, and *Economic Journal*, Sept., 1901.
"Like to a lump of foam borne down by this Gangā river."

The great majority of illustrations, whether in prose or verse, take the form of the last three instances. But in about a dozen cases the illustration is given as a story of "once upon a time." These all occur in the four great "Gospels" reckoned as among the oldest,¹ and, through some unknown cause, have not been included in the great collection of tales known as Jātakas, or Birth-stories.

Of other illustrations, a few are given in what may be called the method of the object-lesson, as when the Buddha takes a pinch of sand, a handful of pebbles, or holds up his hand unwavering to make some comparison in magnitudes or in conduct. Thus he is shown as visiting his son, Rāhula, whom he left as a baby, and who early joined his father's order. Washing his feet with water brought by the youth, Gotama leaves a remnant of water in the pan, throws it away, turns the pan upside down, then back again, with each action admonishing his son how small, how thrown away, how topsy-turvy, how empty, is the religious profession of those who can deliberately tell lies without shame.²

Of those classed above as constituting a great majority, upwards of a dozen are, in form, so like the parables in the Gospels that it may be of interest to give an instance in full. This may be called the parable of "the border town and the messengers"³

¹ Digha, Majjhima, Saṃyutta and Anguttara Nikāya's, e.g., see that of the landsighting bird sent from the ship, in Dialogues of the Dīgha by Rhys Davids, p. 283.
² Majjhima Nikāya, Sutta LXI. Referred to in Asoka's Rock
and it is prefaced by another illustration, which is included among the Jātaka tales.¹

A monk inquired of first one brother and then another, by which way (of meditative discipline) insight might be purified. Discontented with their diverse replies, he appealed to the Buddha, who forthwith answered: "'Tis just as if, friar, a man who had never seen a judas tree (kimsuka) were to ask, what is a judas tree like? and were told by one and then another: 'It is dark like charcoal,' 'It is red like flesh,' 'It is white like the acacia,' 'Its foliage is like the banyan's'... each replying as the tree looked at that season. Even so have these good brethren declared insight to be purified according as each man's disposition had made experience thereof.

"'Tis even, friar, as a border town, having strong walls and towers and six gates, with a wise and prudent gatekeeper, keeping out strangers, welcoming friends. Thither should come from the East a swift pair of messengers, asking for the lord of the city. They are told, he sits in the midst at the crossways. And they twain, having delivered in very truth their message, regain the way by which they had come. And other swift twin messengers come from the West, and from the North, and so deliver in very truth their message, and so depart.

"Now I have made a parable for you, friar, that

¹ The Jātaka, ed. by Cowell, ii. p. 184. The others, contained in this and the Majjhima Nikāya, may be entitled The Antheap and the Digger (the seeker after salvation); The Herd of Deer, the Bog and the Guide (the saviour); The Trapper and his Snare (the snares of evil); The Wound and its Treatment (the go physician); The Plowman (the Work of the Teacher) Burden and its Bearer (the body); The Escape of the (the World and Salvation); The Way of the Pilgrim difficulties); The Knife of Insight; The Chiariotness; The Floating Log and the Bather (the dange
you might discern my meaning. And this is the meaning. The town is this body; the six gates are the six senses, the gatekeeper is consciousness\(^1\); the messengers are calm and insight; the lord is the man as aware\(^2\); the message in very truth delivered is Nirvana; the way is the noble eightfold Path.

There can of course be no question of multiplying instances long or short, where space is limited and the field so rich. Even that richness, when spread over the forty-five years assigned to a ministry interrupted, it would seem, only by sickness, gives a record that is nearly as scanty in proportion as are the brief logia chronicled of the three years' ministry of Jesus. But if the attempt be made to picture merely a day in the life of the Sage, as revealed in the Pitakas, it can be seen how naturally the imagery used by him springs from the scenes that will have met his eye. We can picture him setting out, while the day is yet cool, from his cell (vihāra) in some park, his leafhut in forest glade, his cave on the hillside, with bowl and staff, like the humblest of his disciples:

"... gentle and slow,
Radiant in heavenly pity, lost in care
For those he knew not save as fellow-lives,"

till, perhaps, he gains the riverside, where flows Mahi, Acharāvātī, or other tributary of the Ganges, or great Gangā herself. Nearly a century of similes group themselves along the banks. There is the broad-omed stream, mighty in power like the current of desires, in which the heedless are borne away to have sati is to be conscius sibi. Sati and hiri together talent of our "conscience."
or cognition. (Feer's text omits the South quarter.)
and sink; against which the strong-hearted "upstreamer." fights his way. Eastward, sea-ward bound flow those great streams; a host of diggers could not turn them westward, nor kings or millionaires turn back the heart of him whose "face is steadfastly set towards Nirvana." ¹

See that log drifting past! As its chances of reaching the sea, undelayed and intact, so are those in the career of the convert, as one of the parables shows in detail. Crossing the stream is also a fertile source of imagery: the hither shore of perils and the further shore of the safe desired haven; the brave and timid swimmers; the strong causeway ² and the frail woven raft. The temporary use of the raft, prompting the rescued man to leave it stranded and not bear it away, is likened to leaving the beginnings of mere law-prompted living and "going on unto perfection." ³

The fisherman busy with hook or net, the dumb ⁴ gasping fish, the wriggling eel and prudent tortoise, the dreaded crocodile and susuka, the sheaves of cut reeds, the floating masses of grass and bubbles of foam, the overhanging trees, all render service to the Man who saw. ⁵ But not all the calling of the man wishing to cross, would ever induce the inexorable law-bound further shore to come over to him, just as no priest ever taught righteous conduct by invocations to Indra and his compeers.

¹ Literally, "whose heart has long been set towards detachment, self-control," etc. (the simile occurs in different settings).
² Setu. No bridges are mentioned.
³ Heb. v. i. "Leaving things quâ lawful, let alone what lawless," are the words in the original; as it were, "getting b. 'Good' and 'Bad.'" See Majjhima-Nikāya, Neumann, Collection, I, 223.
⁴ Fish are repeatedly so characterized, a rendering now disallowed ((ὁλοκόντων ἐσιθων)) in the famous lines of Emp.
⁵ Simile for "the Teacher."
And now the cowherd, having in his charge the cattle of a whole community, as in Alpine pastures in the summer time, brings his herd to the ford to manœuvrē a safe crossing. The Teacher watches, and points out some eleven qualities, lacking which no herd deserves his trust, no monk is worthy of his calling. And the plaintive calves and anxious mothers remind him of the need his newer disciples have of him and of his care for them, a more famous simile being that of child and nurse.

Adjoining the pastures is the khetta, or arable ground of the community, into the young corn of which bullocks stray and are chastised, pointing a moral. Here again a great crop of rural images greets us. For the laity, the khetta is the world of teachers and all in holy orders, the field, that is, of opportunity for pious acts. For the teachers the hearts of all men are the field where they may plow and sow seed. And the seed, as in the Jesus-parable, meets with various fates, and again, seed, when representing the person, not the thing taught, is of varying soundness.

The farmer, while his plowmen and their oxen rest and dine, challenges Gotama to show he has earned his bowlful by ploughing, and the ready response comes entirely in agricultural metaphor. The farmer, be it noted, is a brahmin; a token that the age is anterior to the proscription in the ‘Laws of Manu,’ for that caste, of agriculture and trade.

He enters one of the gateways of the town, gates compared as in Bunyan’s allegory, to the avenues of sense, and we get another swarm of figures, from the street, the house, the market place. The wheel of cart or chariot follows the hoof like dogging retribution;

1 Translated in Rhys Davids’s Manual of Buddhism, S.P.C.K.
and revolves about its linchpin, as beings in birth cycles are bound to their karma. The rich man's well-trained carriage thoroughbreds, the râja's well-trained elephants come often into the pictures of an ethic of self-mastery, as does the sensitive temperament of the high-bred horse compared with the dulness of the plodding hack. The chariot of righteousness, driven by the Dhamma, by Reason, or by the Master, supreme charioteer, goes its way along the road that is called Straight, to the land of No-Fear, its syce, Right-Views, running before. The king's seven relief posting chariots, in readiness for a forced journey, are as the seven grades in the study of the holy life.

Soldiers in armour marching by suggest the armour of righteousness, as they did further west to St. Paul. And the evil doer they hale before the raja is not man's only enemy that can "break through and steal." At the "crossways," the nucleus of the town, are shops (āpāna) and workshops: the beef-butcher, as well as the mutton-butcher, is there, for these were days long before beef was tabu. The wheelwright planing knobs and blemishes out of his tyres; the fletcher moulding his arrow-points; the goldsmith applying the ordeal of fire to his precious metal; the potter, with his oven, his moulds in two parts, his brittle wares, is here; and so are the dyer, the painter, the house-builder, the cooper, the leather dresser, and the florist. "Even as a painter paints in colours frescoes of human shapes on panel, wall or cloth, so does the worldling cause to come into being the constituents of yet another rebirth."

Children playing then as now with sand or mud, jealously guarding what is "mine," and a minute later knocking it no less earnestly to pieces, afford
a picture of the power of self-analysis to dissipate the glamour about an object craved for, and the craving itself as well. The growing babies learn to do without leading-strings, and, from experience, to dread the fire, in these, as in Western similes, and more, to point a moral for adult disciples. These, if unwary are further compared to the mouse, whose imprudent move is looked for by the bilāra—pussy’s Pali name—waiting on the rubbish heap. And the watch-dog, chained to his post, then as now, might be bribed by a thieving tramp, as conscience is deceived by sense. If, again he winds his chain round the post, getting shorter range instead of longed-for liberty, he affords an ironic simile of that hankering after some form of after-life which did but bind the craving soul more closely to the bondage of life. For after-lives could only be conceived in terms of life as known.

If we halt with the Master at a house, another large family of images detach themselves to meet us;—the house itself, if that of a “house-father” in humble circumstances may be constructed, as were those of our Saxon forefathers, a thousand years later, “of planks and withy string courses, of rushes and mortar,\(^1\) enclosing a portion of space.” Equally definite were the constituents of bodily form with its, so to speak, enclosed portion of mental element.\(^2\) The roof terminated in a kūta, or peak, a figure for a culminating doctrine, virtue or vice. Looking into the doors of two houses set close together illustrates the power, attributed to the saint, of psychic power of vision as well as ordinary sight.

\(^1\) Majjhima-Nikāya, 28th Sutta.
\(^2\) A passage in the Upanishads, the current mythology, consigned mind, at death, to space, viewed as a fifth element.
Fire, whether within the house or without, as servant or as master, plays a great part in these similes. Its luminance, its dependence on fuel, its power, the danger of it, and its insatiableness, are primitive conceptions appealing to a doctrine which extols the splendid function of the wise and good, insists on the universality of causation, and emphasizes the might of the passions.

The adjuncts of the household fire, the copper or brazen pots and pans, have also to play their part in metaphor, the various coatings defacing the polished surface being likened to the five great Hindrances of the bright, arduous, efficient life of the pure in heart: sensuality, ill will, sluggishness, worry and doubt. The polished surface of the ādāsa or mirror illustrates the importance of reflection, the word-play being identical with that possible to European languages. More distinctive is the metaphor of the ward-robe, or clothes-chest whence the choice of special suits or "robe-pairs" (dussayuga) for different occasions, is used to illustrate the well-ordered, well-wardrobed man using his mind as were it his clothes.

The imagery grouped about the women busied round the hearth reveals a patriarchal state of society, with all the standpoints implied therein. The brethren diffident in their faith are compared to the newly-wed daughter-in-law's nervousness on entering her father-in-law's household. The housewife testing with finger and thumb the rice she is boiling, is said to have in common with all her sisters, a two-finger intelligence. And the ways of women are likened, for caprice, crookedness, wantonness, seductive power and all the rest, to the path of a fish in the sea, the bends of the

1 A simile idiomatic in Italian.
river, a public house or highway, to fire and flood, to the cat and other monsters. All such lore is of course Indian or Patriarchal, rather than Buddhist. Very few such similes have been fathered on the great Sage, who was quite impartial, in his appreciation of great intellect and high character, as to distinctions of sex. The degree to which women were at this time showing great unrest beneath the patriarchal regime and interest in the religious movement seething around their doors, does not come into our subject. Our central figure has regained the quiet of the woodland paths, and is either dining or taking siesta beneath a tree.

Some thirty to forty images are occupied with trees, from the folk-ethics, which compares treachery to a friend with lopping off the branch that gives you shade, to the doctrinal image of the tree’s long growth as resembling that endless succession of rebirths, which the wise man, like the woodcutter, was concerned to terminate. Fruit as a simile of attainment, and the analogy of “the sere, the yellow leaf” is of the East, no less than of the West. A more distinctively Indian simile is that of such plants as the reed, the bamboo and the plantain perishing on attaining fruition, as the evil-doer is punished by his own deeds. But perhaps the most distinctively Buddhist imagery where trees play a part, is that used by the Master in discoursing to his leading disciple, Sāriputta, on the five states in which living beings exist: hell, the animal kingdom, the world of “shades” or ghosts (pitti-visaya), human life and life in some heaven. The first two are by the Teacher likened to a burning pit and to a pit of filth, into either of which the weary foredone traveller unforeseeing falls. The
third is as a tree on barren soil, scanty of foliage, beneath which some such poor wayfarer finds no respite from the heat. The fourth is as the dense shade of a flourishing tree, where he would find great relief. The fifth is as a lofty terrace, where before a fine house the exhausted traveller sinks on a comfortable couch in great content. But,—and here the Buddha passes beyond the accepted beliefs—there is yet another state, likened to a lotus pool of cool translucent water, where, emerging from a fearsome forest, the wayfarer could plunge in, bathe, and drink, and then, heat, thirst, fatigue and anguish all appeased, could sit in blissful ease in that same wood erstwhile so impenetrable. This is emancipation, Nirvana;—the "rest remaining for" him or for her who has seen the one thing needful, and flung all hindrances to it aside.

It is but natural that to teachers practising the "simple life" of the open air in a subtropical climate, this image of sweet clear calm cold waters should possess peculiar attraction. It recurs over twenty times, and pictures forth various good things: not only emancipation, but also the doctrine itself, the emancipated one himself, the wise man, insight, rapture of contemplation, purity of heart, shallowness or depth of character.

Equally has the breezy silence of the mountain's breast lent impressive similes to Buddhist teaching. The granite peak unshaken by the tempest, the inexorable heights, the Homeric horror of a mountain imminent and toppling to its fall, the broad brae supporting its forest trees, the lengthening shadows stealing over the plain, are applied, respectively, to the unfaltering arahat, to the grim facts of life and
death, to the pressing facts of evil, to the benevolent patriarch, and to the remorseful conscience. But the similes most impressively felt seem to be those of the wider view, whether the idea illustrated be the expanded concepts of a higher ideal, the Lucretian consciousness of security above peril and turmoil, or the nobler vision of a world-saviour, looking down with pity and yearning.

For the student who will treat of this fascinating theme in a book, it will be possible, not only to do more than just scratch the surface, but also to deal with it from the comparative point of view. He or she will be able to winnow out the metaphors common to the folk-lore and folk-philosophy of India which inevitably found their way into the canonical literature of the then paramount school of thought, and lay them beside others from the great store of the world:

"Still waters run deep;"

"Noisily go the little rills:
Silent goes the great deep."

"It is hard for thee to kick against the pricks,"

"Ye would cleave a rock with your head...
Ye have thrust your breast upon a stake."

And the residuum, whether original, or annexed from the teachings of other ancient Indian schools, can be further distinguished, either as resembling images used in the religious and ethical teachings of other lands and other ages, or, so far as appears, as peculiarly Buddhist in form, in application, or in both.

1 Sutta Nipâta, verse 720.
2 Samyutta-Nikâya, i, 127.
Both Christian and Buddhist writings, for instance, have impressed the impartial elements, and the solicitous brooding hen into their service. But with a difference: "Love your enemies, . . . do good to them that hate you—that ye may be the children of your Father . . . for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good" . . . "Even, Rāhula, as men cast what it clean and what is unclean upon the earth, into the water, air, fire; and the earth, water, air, fire is not annoyed, does not repudiate, nor bear disgust, so should you practise this earthlike, . . . firelike disposition, nor let your heart be gripped by any contact as nice or not nice. Practise love Rāhula, . . . pity, sympathy, disinterestedness" . . . ¹ The sublimity in the passionate yearning of the Saviour of men over the stubborn city exalts the homely metaphor of the anxious little hen to its own height. The Buddha takes her in an early stage of her motherly cares, and concerning a subject where earnestness is not so poignant. "Let a brother, if he have done his utmost in right training, not be anxious as to the result. He will surely come forth into the light in safety. Even as a hen who has duly brooded over and sat herself round her dozen eggs, may yearn, 'O that my little chicks may break open the egg-shell . . . and come forth into the light in safety!' Yet all the while those little chicks are sure to do so." ²

These comparisons from the aesthetic standpoint would certainly prove not the least fascinating part of this book that awaits its author. Where, in Buddhist or other literatures, can we plunge so gallantly into the colour and sound, the stress and

¹ Majjhima-Nikāya, i, 423.
² Buddhist Suttas (S.B.E., xi), 233.
bustle of agitated mass-movements, as we do by the help of its similes, into the first book of the Iliad, with its buzzing bees, its wind waves in the corn, its refrain of roaring breakers, its crests of fire running over the slopes? How different is the wealth of quiet elemental beauty in the Gospel: "The wind bloweth where it listeth"... "They shall the righteous shine forth as the sun"... "I am the true vine"... Can any Christian possibly eliminate the personal equation in which these pictures lie enframed? Can he, with what Matthew Arnold called the "Indian virtue of detachment," discern elemental, or other beauties, subtly and broadly sketched in the imagery clustering about Buddhist ethics? Let her anyway, or him, not make too hasty a survey of figures that have not twined themselves about the growth of childhood. As a parting valediction I will translate one or two elemental pictures. In the former is a soberer loftier version of one of Heine's half sublime half ironical, wholly rhapsodical figures in the Nord-See.¹

"Men may use manifold speech towards you monks, rough, and smooth, kind and cruel. But ye have, towards every one of them to cultivate these thoughts: we will not let our heart be disturbed nor evil sound escape our lips, kind and compassionate will we abide, our heart affectionate, free from secret malice. And such a man will we irradiate with loving heart, and going beyond him will we irradiate the whole world with heart of love, broad, deep, unbounded. If a man sought with spade and basket to dig up and

¹ Readers will recall the fiery writing on the darkening sky of the Norway pine dipped into Etna: "Agnes, ich liebe dich!" The following two groups of figures occur in Majjhima Nikāya, 21st Sutta, and in Iti-vutthaka, a title meaning "The little 'Thus-saids'" (of the Buddha), the latter group recurring separately in other books with varying application.
remove the whole earth low should he succeed? for deep and immeasurable is the earth. Well then, say ye, we will suffuse the whole world with a heart like the great immeasurable earth. And if a man came with paints and sought to paint pictures on the sky, how should he? for formless and invisible is space. Well then say ye we will suffuse the whole world with a firmamental heart, grown wide and infinite. And if a man came and sought to dry up Ganges with a torch, how should he? . . . Well then say ye: we will suffuse the whole world with a heart like Gangā, deep and infinite, free from wrath and ill-will.” . . .

“All the means that can be used as a basis for well doing are not worth the sixtieth part of the emancipation of the heart through love. That takes all those up into itself, outshining them in radiance and in glory. Just as whatsoever stars there be, their radiance avails not the sixteenth part of the radiance of the moon. That takes all those up into itself, outshining them in radiance and in glory. Just as in the last month of rains, at harvest time, the sun, mounting up on high into the clear and cloudless sky, overwhelms all darkness in the realms of space, and shines forth in radiance and in glory. Just as at night, when the dawn is breaking, the morning star shines out in radiance and in glory. Just so all the means that can be used as a basis towards well-doing avail not the sixtieth part of the emancipation of the heart through love. That takes all those up into itself, outshining them in radiance and in glory.”

¹ A reference to lunar measurement of time.
SAGE AND KING

The fame of Gotama Buddha is world-wide, and perhaps crescent. The religious and philosophical doctrines associated with his name were at one time paramount in India—they were Indian culture. Few will be ignorant of or dispute either of these two statements. Yet it is singular to note how slight, and confined to how few are the movements on foot in our centres of learning, European and Indian, to acquire and to spread a better based and more intimate knowledge (1) of the earliest known, least apocryphal sources and methods of those doctrines, (2) of the earliest documentary evidence extant of the social and political atmosphere in which they arose. We know the methods of Sokrates, we know what may be the very words, let alone the character of the conversations and discourses ascribed to Jesus. How much is present to our mind of how, as preserved in the larger literature of the Nikāyas, the Sakyamuni dealt with his numerous interlocutors? We know the Sokratic Athens; we can almost see the hasty Herod, the reluctant Pilate, the contending Pharisee and Sadducee. Which of us has a mental picture of those two loyal inquirers and patrons, King Pasenādi of Kosāla and

1 Published in the Bhandarkar Commemorative Essays, Poona, 1917.
Sudatta, whom for his philanthropy men called Anāthapiṇḍika: 'Feeder of the forlorn'? Yet there are no other Indian laymen of so early a date, concerning whose life and character so much relatively early documentary evidence is extant. Chandragupta, compared with these, is but a name; Asoka lives chiefly in the records of his edicts. But in the Suttas of the Nikāyas, aided by the Vinaya, "the King, the Kosalan Pasenadi" walks and talks before us with all the strong and the weak points of his Kṣatriya characteristics. And we have documentary evidence of a similar kind for the character of the commoner.

But for the piety and support of these two men, it is conceivable that the Saṅgha, in Asoka's day, might not have been in such a position as to make it expedient for that ruler to patronize and propagate it. It is to aid a little in familiarizing some readers with the Pasenadi of Pāli literature and with the methods used in his case by India's greatest teacher, that the following selection from the Kosāla-Saṅyutta (ed. Feer, Pāli Text Soc.) is here offered. It will serve at least to fill out a little the brief outline of this king's career sketched in my husband's Buddhist India.

In these Suttas and in Buddhaghosa's Commentary¹ the Kosalan Pasenadi² stands out as a very real, if average aristocratic despot. He is shown combining, like so many of his class all the world over, a proneness to affairs of sex with the virtues and affection of a good 'family man,' indulgence at the table with an

¹ Saratthappahāsini. The Pali Text Society is preparing an edition (now published).

² Probably an official, possibly a clan name, as we might say the Egyptian Pharaoh, or the Rumanian Hohenzollern. He is elsewhere called Agnidatta (Divyā. 620; Bud. India, 10).
equally natural wish to keep in good physical form, a sense of honour and honesty, shown in his disgust at legal cheating, with a greed for acquiring wealth and war indemnities, and a fussiness over lost property, a magnanimity towards a conquered foe with a callousness over sacrificial slaughter and the punishment of criminals. Characteristic also is both his superstitious nervousness over the sinister significance of dreams, due probably, to disordered appetites, and also his shrewd, politic care to be on good terms with all religious orders, whether he had testimonials to their genuineness or not.

In all these respects then the Pasenadi is a typical Kṣatriya, with the qualities and defects of his class. Indeed it would seem that he shows some complacency in ranking himself as a good type of a prosperous monarch, greatly busied over the pleasures and duties, the advantages and disabilities of a ruler who, as in his case, had inherited a kingdom of expanded dimensions,¹ and had ‘won security therein.’ Nevertheless in one important respect he is revealed as superior to the average king, and that is in his discernment—according to his lights—of, and his inclination towards, that which was good and righteous, and also in his appreciation of the man who, in a transcendent degree, embodied all that was good and righteous.

These were matters, as the Sage reminded him, that were anything but easy for one in his position to recognize. Living amidst luxuries and distractions, flattery and lies, the Pasenadi had the strength of mind to secure time for solitary meditation, and to face the bed-rock questions of life and death, good

¹ Cf. Buddhist India, p. 25.
and evil. Hence his conscience was alert, and swift in response to the spur, lightly or heavily applied, of the Sage’s admonition. Frequently thus admonished, he remained a loyal lay-disciple of the master during practically the whole of his long public ministry. In the opening Sutta, his first meeting with the young and new teacher is given. After that the title *bho Gotama* is changed once for all to the *bhante* of the disciple. And in the eloquent valediction put in his mouth, in the Dhammadhetiya-sutta of the *Majjhima*, as spoken just before he went forth to meet desertion and a lonely death, he asserts that both he and his teacher are octogenarians. Viewed as a historical fact, this friendly intercourse is thus made to cover more than forty years. Did ever monarch do himself such high credit for so long a period?

Such was the Kosalan Pasenadi, the most powerful king of his day in India, whose realms extended from the Ganges to Himalaya, and were bound west and east by (probably) the Jumna and the Gandhak.

In the counsels which he sought and found, most of the methods employed by the Sage are illustrated. In discussing those methods in his introduction to the Kassāpa-Sīhanāda Sutta (*Dialogues of the Buddha*, i, 206 f.) Rhys Davids shows how, in conversing with one whose standpoint differed widely from his own, the Buddha invariably put himself as far as possible in the mental position of the questioner, accepting his starting points, attacking no cherished convictions, even adopting the very phraseology of the other, but, partly by a re-creating of the meaning of terms, partly by appeal to matters of common agreement, bringing him to a fresh and a higher conclusion. Several of the Suttas here presented exemplify these
words. Both Sage and King were of the same social class and country,¹ and of the same age, yet it were hard to find two persons more sharply contrasted in opinions and outlook than these two. Note then how the sage, who, save to help and uplift his fellow-beings, had entirely done with the world, stooped at every interview to the King’s outlook and stock of ideas, and grafted his admonitions on that stock and in that soil:—

His Majesty has been gluttonous. Abstemiousness is gently enjoined, not as favouring spiritual growth,² but because he will thus more lightly bear advancing age. How should he most wisely direct his almoners to proceed in the matter of doles, etc.? Use the same tests as you do in passing young men for your army. He has decided that nothing is so precious to any man as Ātmā, (the divine immanent Spirit or Soul). Then see that you hurt not the soul, so precious to him, in another man’ He has been busy after the manner of kings? Well, you often receive reports from special king’s messengers of an approaching crisis. I am such a messenger, and I tell you, you have no time to be busied over so much that kings hold important. In the face of this great crisis,—the brevity of this life, the approaching of death,—what alone remains for you to be busied withal?

The sympathetic appeal of such advice ad this specific hominem must have been very vital and rousing. In his graver and sadder moods the king is met by the ‘common sense,’ which opens the

¹ As the King reminds him (Dhammacetiya-sutta)—
Bhagavā pi khattiyo, aham pi khattiyo, Bhagavā pi Kosalako, aham pi Kosalako.
² Cf. the rebuke to Dāsaka (XVII,) and Belaṭṭhakāni (CI) in my Pss. of the Brethren.
casement of sorrow's private cell, and lets in the
bracing, if bitter wind of the 'common lot' . . . 'life
is but death' . . . 'the best are not exempt.' But
nowhere is he advised to leave the world, or be aught
but diligent over his kingly duties.

Sycophancy is as wholly absent in the Sage's replies
and comments on the King's acts, as is the rudeness
of a Diogenes. Whether surfeited or chastened, self-
complacent or vexed, the King and his actions meet
with unfaltering 'sweet reasonableness,'\(^1\) courtesy and
magnanimity. Not always is the guiding hand applied
heavily. There is a pretty touch of irony in speaking
of the liability of wealth to be 'confiscated by kings
or by thieves' to a monarch who had just absorbed
a millionaire's intestate property. Both King and
Sage indulge in covert humour when comparing the
unknown character, concealed (we should say) beneath
a cowl, to the disguises and transformations carried
out in the career of thieves as chartered spies. And
it lends no small charm as well as verisimilitude to
these little Sutta-etchings, when we discern the
Teacher and the King, who in comparison was but
as an average nice boy, finding themselves here on
common ground—that of men of experience wary of
judging by appearances, and together amused at the
parallel drawn by one of them.

But perhaps the most impressive feature in these
brief records is the several social ideals to which the
Sage points the way in reply to the King, or in com-
ment on his acts. We note him condemning the
methods of military aggressiveness, upholding the
dignity of woman as daughter, wife and mother, and
enjoining those public works for the people's good

\(^1\) Matthew Arnold's *έμεικεω* applied to Jesus.
such as would come under that righteous living, which it was alone of real importance for the king, confronted by the brevity of life, to be occupied withal. Thus it was all very well for the king to spare the life of his conquered foe, but in confiscating his war material, and indeed in waging war, he did but sow the seeds of retaliatory violence. Again, that a daughter might prove a greater blessing to a king than a son, that the birth of one was anyway not to be considered a disappointment and failure in achievement—these are startling words to hear coming from that time and that country, nay, and not from ancient India only. The Buddhist Canon contributes its quota—not a great one for a compilation by male and monastic editors—of blows and kicks at woman—‘dulce monstrum.’ And it would scarcely have surprised us to come upon a Sutta stating that the birth of a daughter was due to the Karma of some shortcomings in the parents’ antecedents, let alone those of the baby’s former lives. But in the verse on Mallika’s infant daughter and the disappointed parents we seem to hear the real voice of a teacher who transcended the bounds of time and tradition, of one worthy to rank as guide and healer of men and women of all ages and every race.

A woman-child, O lord of men, may prove
Even a better offspring than a male . . .

Verily a New Word!
The verses (in which a very possible saying of Gotama has been enshrined) on the utter futility of war in itself to settle anything to public advantage are so true even to-day, that I reproduce them here from my translation anticipated in the article:
A man may spoil another just so far  
As it may serve his ends, but when he's spoiled  
By others, he despoiled, spoils yet again.  
So long as evil's fruit is not matured,  
The fool doth fancy 'Now's the hour, the chance!'  
But when the deed bears fruit, he fareth ill.  
The slayer gets a slayer in his turn;  
The conqueror gets one who conquers him;  
Th' abuser wins abuse, th' annoyer fret.  
Thus by the evolution of the deed\(^1\)  
A man who spoils is spoiled in his turn.  

Kosala-Samyutta.  

The Book of the Kindred Sayings, P.T.S. ed.

---

\(^1\) Kamma-vivaṭṭa—a literal rendering.
LXXII

SAKYAMUNI AND RAMAKRISHNA

We are very willers of a More, whether it be a more in the things of the world about us, or in the things of the spirit. We are most truly our true self when we desire the spiritual More. With these desires religion is concerned. But religions are not usually valued and measured in these terms. We are bidden to see in them a teaching concerning, it may be, Deity, or concerning sin and evil, or about immortality, or worship, or devotion, or morals. Less clear is the bidding to see in a great religion a new value, a new measure of the very Man. They who bid us see this or that have, it may be, the many things in mind that have grown up with and over the first mandate. These growths come to be held in worth as the first mandate. This is no longer discerned as a revelation to the Man of a new, a hitherto undeveloped More in himself; a More that he has been holding, at the time and place of the revelation, in a less worthy way about himself.

Yet it was the More of the good (ḥu, su, eu) deed, word and thought in the Man that Zarathustra lifted to a higher power when he so conceived Deity. It was the More-in-worth in man's very being that the unknown Founder of Upanishadic teaching made.

1 Published in Prabuddha Bharata, "Awakened India"; Calcutta, 1933. Contributed by editorial request.
patent. No less was there a More in the man revealed in the teaching both of the Sakyamuni and of Sri Ramakrishna. Both teachers taught a way by which the Man, in experiencing a More, could advance toward a realizing of the Most, the Highest.

What was this ‘way’ in Sakya? It was a view of the very Man as not only That (Tat tvam asi), but also and essentially as a becoming That Who he only was potentially. How to become That actually was a Way which, as just believing, as just knowing by mind, he could not fully attain. The full reality of becoming lay in the very living, in Life itself. Not by any short-cut of miraculous living, but in the long, long trial of many opportunities, laid hold of, turned to good account.

We have perhaps too little idea how far from vital to the religious life was good conduct when Gotama Sakyamuni was on earth. The moral injunctions in the Upanishads may be put into a few lines. Nowhere is the moral life clearly shown as even a corollary of identity with the Divine. Much less is it taught as a necessary process towards that identity. The dearness (priya), the preciousness, the value of the ‘other man,’ because of his oneness with the Divine, is indeed taught. Yet nowhere is this great Mantra made a very basis of man’s relations with fellow-man. And nowhere do we find in this literature the intenser ethics of that televolition of amity, pity, benevolent joy and poise, which in the Buddhist Suttas betray a Brahman origin, and which were taken over and annexed by Gotama’s missioner fraternity.

In these Suttas the religious significance of conduct is everywhere insisted upon. “Make yourselves in your daily actions more like your ideal of the better
men you aspire to join; so only may you hope for communion with those hereafter who are more like That than are we of earth.” So runs for instance the Tevijja-Suttanta. “Since so dear is the Self to lover of the Self, let this lover see to it that he harms not the fellow lover.” So runs the comment ascribed to the Sakyamuni on the utterance of Vājnavalkya, as given in two of the Sutta-books. Here then was a new word concerning a More latent in man’s very nature, undeveloped at the time, but declared to every man by this great teacher. Faith, knowledge, without ‘works,’ is dead. The living what he believes, what in a way he ‘knows’—here was a More taught to men.

This we forget, we who have lived since those two and a half millennia ago under another word in a More—the More that the man is brother to man. This too we overlook: how vital and close for the Sakyamuni was that unseen other world of “those who are more like, or shall I say, less unlike, ‘THAT’ than we of earth.” How living and frequent is the intercourse between them and him and some of his first men shown to have been! How does not the next step in man’s life stand out in clear relief when we compare it with the vague hesitancies which pervade the earlier literature! What a More is there not here, yet how has it been misunderstood and neglected! The very simile in which he compared the man seeing himself in other worlds as a reflection, a result, of his life here—the simile of the mirror—was in the records distorted out of all pertinence with the context. India has disregarded that More. We are in the same case.

Ramakrishna saw in the modes of realization
known as Sādhanâ a More in and for the Man. In that quest he sought to bridge the great gap in the Actual between the That and the Thou of the Upanishadic teaching; he sought communion with this or that aspect of the Most, the Highest, the Best. Nay, he even sought an imagined union, both in waking body and in trance. We with our Semitic tradition are observers of a more reticent awe in this matter than is the Indian. Compared with us he is as an impulsive child, rushing in, as we say, where angels fear to tread. No man, not even a Ramakrishna, can conceive the Highest as yet, much less know, much less understand, and Ramakrishna now knows that well enough.

But we can dwell on the Highest as if knowable under this and that aspect, conceiving each in the utmost worth we are yet capable of: the Mother, the Child, the Friend, the Beloved. It is a high and noble work of will, and by it the man expands in a lovely More, such as Ramakrishna’s circle saw and were stirred to imitate. It was a way of showing a More in the very man unlike what, according to the Pali records, was shown by Gotama. There are, it is true, here and there allusions to profound absorption in samâdhi, but, whether rightly or not, they are not made prominent and central, as such episodes in Ramakrishna’s life are made to appear by his biographers.

Ramakrishna found his ‘More’ by addressing himself to the sole, direct quest of the Most. Gotama sought his ‘More’ by addressing himself directly and mainly, though not solely, to a quest of the More: the more in worth, the more in growth as such. He began his mission by exhorting men to seek after
the Self—Indians will know what was meant by that, as Europeans do not—in the very words of Upanishadic teaching. And that Self he found mainly under the concept of Dharma, that inner Guide whom he avowedly worshipped. But in habitual practice he sought converse with the world as sadavaka; that is, with the more worthy men or 'spirits' of such of the worlds, the universe, as were by most men unseen, unheard. From these he is recorded as admitting that he came to know what he had not known. By these he was enabled to impart a More in knowledge of the hereafter to inquirers. And this he did to increase, we read, to enhance their joy in growth, that is, in becoming a More, and to stir them up to attain the More, the 'thusness' (tathatāya) of those unseen ones.

But that any man could here and now, himself included, attain as 'Worthy' (arahān) to consummation as a Most of any kind, hence to wane out into an ineffable Void:—this is for me a teaching superimposed on his teaching by Aftermen. For him, for his disciples, for earth, yea, for "svarga" and for "tat-uttarim"¹ there was ever yet the More to come, the More as symbolized in his great figure of the Way, made graphic in early talks by the on-rolling wheel, by the dharma-driven chariot. The end, the paramartha was, even in Asokan reverberations of his teaching—if I read these aright—to be won as "salvation by becoming": bhava-suddhi.

The monastic editors show him as if dwelling wearily on the long saṃsāra of "you and me" in the past. They, as world-forsakers, overlook his forward view of hope, of patience (khanti), of seizing the

¹ Names for the next world and for 'beyond that.'
moment, the opportunity, time after time in the long way of Becoming in a More toward a Most.

So different was he then in the way he shared with Ramakrishna, the essential way, namely of showing a More in and for man. So like were these great brothers in insisting on the More there is in and for man in his warding the fellowman. At the one extreme we have the sublimely worded mandate said to have been given by Gotama to his missioners: the mandate to teach Dharma and the God-life to devas and to men. It may well be, this was only uttered in the early life of the community when well enough established and numerous enough to undertake local tours, and that it was then only that they made themselves into an Order of Śramaṇas. At the other extreme we read the last Report of the Ramakrishna Mission, with its mandate of a twofold More to be shown in its warding the fellow-man, both as man and as having a body and mind-ways, and the following records of the carrying out of the work.

What a bond have we not here of these two teachers of the More! What a renascence is there not here of the former’s influence in the latter’s—a renascence of a More in the Man! Renascence, I repeat, at least for India; for between these extremes lie the many centuries of that cult, both in India and in countries called Buddhist, of the Man in the Less: the Śramaṇa, the Sannyasin, bent on warding the Self in himself only, forsaking the world to be occupied with his own deliverance and with that of nobody else, save by reflected “merit.”

In these two Helpers on the other hand, we have the Man seeking a More in the ‘God-life’ in, with,
by, the seeing his More in a caring for the fellow-man. Emphatically did both seek to make-become\textsuperscript{1} that More in their own self-growth. Else, as Ramakrishna would say, the man has nothing to give. He must give not of his poverty, but of his fulness, his Bhūyas, his Bhiyyo. Thus did each of these give, each in his own way. Various is the great Way of the More, for various are the wayfarers. And happy are the wayfarers who come through these two to realize each his own More.

\textsuperscript{1} Bhāveti. This form of bhū, with its noun bhāvanā, as indispensable words in a Gospel of becoming, of will where was no good word for will, may be called a Sakyan and a Jainist contribution (at least in emphasis and habitual use) to Indian literature.
I have read with sympathy Ivor Brown’s article in the *Rationalist Annual*, 1940, entitled ‘What Christ said.’ Not because it contains any new point of view. We all know that Christianity came to us by the “tortuous way” of three languages. We have all surmised how much of what Jesus said may never have been garnered in; how what were preserved as just headlines of discourse may have been filled in later by men of changed values; how the brief life of the teacher was made to fit a theory, a “tradition of the elders,” about “fulfilment of the scriptures.” (“Ye search the scriptures,” as, we read, he ruefully said, “but ye will not come unto me.”) We too know that “complete, accurate, verbatim records were out of the question,” and deplore, with the writer, wranglings over such:—Protestant wranglings mainly, since for the Catholic Christian there is a way out, expressed negatively for me by an R.C. priest in Capri, when he said: After all, *cara signora*, does it very much matter what Jesus did say? Ivor Brown is right, that we are not yet ready to weigh the evidence, such as we have, in manuals and oral teaching, dispassionately and in historic perspective. Such a writer, such a teacher would not

---

1 Published in *Buddhism in England*, 1942. The *Rationalist Annual* for 1942 rejected it.

2 Cf. Revised version.
easily find publisher or pupils, nor would his book be passed as a suitable gift for the young.

Can we do anything to speed the coming of a day when the political liberty—we like to call it also the religious liberty—for which we are doggedly fighting will include this other, this detached free handling of our religious tradition, which we are not so much defending as not yet enjoying? Would there be found a remedy in widening both the backward and the forward range of our religious perspective?

Let us for a moment consider the former. It has been lately suggested, that “if we wish to have this advantage of detachment and objectivity, we must study a religious tradition as remote from our own as Christianity would be from the mental background of the visitor from Mars or Tibet.” And the author of the suggestion proceeds to use Buddhism (of the Southern kind) as the corpus vile of his inquiry. He admits, it is true, that knowing the religion only at secondhand, and modern ritual only from description is a drawback; but contends, that the being misled possibly by ignorance is a lesser risk than being misled by prejudice. Is he right?

It might have been better to have taken a shorter journey in space and time, and to have chosen the history of Islam on which to experiment. Herein I have consulted an orthodox teacher of it as to whether there exists as yet any so-called higher criticism of their sacred literature. I was told that, whereas

1 I have followed with appreciation the beginnings of such freedom in Mr. Alan Richardson’s talks on the Gospels in the B.B.C. programmes, 1941.
modern books of this kind exist, all are as yet only in
Arabic. Hence, since all the more important canonical
and earlier exegetical literature of Buddhism may
now be read in translations, more or less reliable, this
literature is at all events more ready to-day for the
experiment. And the work of higher criticism has
at least begun. Criticism too of the more pioneer
efforts at translation. This is the more needed when
it is remembered, how these were the work of men's
leisure hours, who were mainly otherwise pre-occupied,
how too the growing number of Pali first editions has
revealed changes in form and values in Pali itself,
this having been, as indeed was our English, a literary
diction framed within monastery walls. This prematu-
re and extra-time labour has not always resulted
in work showing maturity of historical outlook.
Translators have tended to take orthodox and there-
fore later utterances as being truly that which was,
when first spoken, a New Message for its day.

This proposed use of Buddhist literature has
naturally my good wishes wherever and if ever room
is made in curricula for teaching the comparative
history of religion. Till we are ready for the further
spread of really liberal Christianity, for handling the
history of our traditional religion with the sole aim of
getting the truth, such a study of the history of
Buddhism should not only prove the immensely
interesting subject that it is, but may strongly
minister to a freer outlook on the traditional cult.

And yet it may be possible, that even along this
suggested line we are not ready to forward the truer
outlook. So far anyway, writers who have taken it
have not shown the least curiosity to come to what
should surely merit to be considered the headquarters
for advice, as to the most recent output of materials going on now for some sixty years in Buddhist literature and research. I refer of course to the Pali Text Society, and its sister undertaking: *Sacred Books of the Buddhists*. And further: no awareness is shown how relatively new the whole study of Buddhism is, nor how dangerous this makes any reliable secondhand work done in it. Surely where the subject is an old but wide-spread religion, and its records of very unconfirmed dates of compilation, we should expect to find caution in relying on the historic truth of sayings ascribed to leading teachers. Orthodox editors of old in compiling such records took no pains to use such caution: their day did not look for it. But that caution is surely called for—in this case as an example—when our independent position does not compel us to walk bebridled and beblinkered.

I am referring to such modes of reference as “The Buddha began by saying. . . . The Buddha went on to say. . . . He then dealt with . . . The Buddha discusses how . . . ,” and so on. It is comparatively rare to find “The Buddha is reported to have said . . .”; or, “Buddhism teaches . . .”: a more guarded diction that provokes a sigh of relief. It may be said: any decently intelligent reader would read those last two clauses into all the others. But consider! The author has turned aside to Buddhism, just because, in dealing with Christianity, the orthodox teacher would invest the sayings ascribed to Jesus and the apostles with the sanctity of literal truth. Yet he has actually only transferred this literal truth to alleged sayings of the first Buddhist missioners. Does he really think he is training his readers in historic criticism when, to gain a truer attitude for
Christian studies, he only adopts an equally uncritical attitude for Buddhist studies; when he, at second-hand, seeks to give his readers at third hand the belief, that he is quoting an absolutely true record taken down on the spot?

Nay, it is just here that his corpus vile, so far from being a good parallel, imposes a greater strain on historic imagination. In its canon we have matter committed to writing, not, as is admitted in Christianity, within a century, but only within three centuries—and committed, as we have it, not in its motherland but under the changed skies of Ceylon.

I might pass without a murmur those references to 'Buddha' as saying this or that, were there as yet a chance that readers would see, in this name, bestowed generations after his earthly career on the founder. But 'Buddha' is, like 'Christ,' an institutional name, unmentioned in the records of the transactions of the first two Councils. It is clear, that all hope of using 'Buddhism' mentally when reading 'the Buddha said,' etc. and so winning to freer historical outlook, is frustrated by such carelessness of method. The general reader will not be heedful where the teacher has so failed him.

But this is not all the harm this byway of coming at truth in a particular and less familiar field may work. At present, mere knowledge at secondhand of Buddhism, is like all little learning, a dangerous thing. Thus I have heard an academic teacher call Buddhism a religion that started 'antitheistically,' mainly on the ground of a verse in the Canon, where Brahman—Indian supreme Deity—has by an early if famous translator been confused with Brahma, the temporary governor of the world ranking as better
than the next world, not the name of an immortal person, but just a title.

Again, who has not read the early translation of the injunction to take ātmā-cum-dharma as one's light and refuge so worded as to mean 'be self-reliant' in our modern sense, when in the day this was uttered, ātmā-cum-dharma had been declared by the speaker to be the One Thing he judged that he himself and all men should worship, the two terms in his day meaning, and taken to mean immanent Deity?

Space fails me for dealing with other such traps, in early translation (and only these seem to be quoted) and manuals, else could I have pointed to ill-founded conclusions, arousing regret, that a worthily intended advance, in illustrating the history of religious institutionalism by means of Buddhist records should have proved to be here and there an actual falling back. If only our scholars in the Faculty of Arts were as mindful to be up-to-date in their testing as are research students in the Faculty of Science, the former would not so merit the derision of the latter.

I turn to my other outlook for a remedy: that we seek to widen ahead the range of our perspective of life.

It is surely not wrong to say, that the secret at the heart of any world-religion, when new-born, is not a mere reclaiming of the lost, not a mere maintaining what has once been found, but a something further, a 'more' in the art of living. Come! have men said to men, "I will put a new song into your mouth! Behold! new things do I declare! I will do a new thing! I will make a way! I will put a new spirit within you!"¹ To see that would be to

¹ Sayings in the Psalms and Isaiah.
see this also: that we live looking for yet another
new song. To read of it with understanding is to
watch by the yet empty cradle of a new hope.
To take scripture at more than its face-value is
no doubt a road of profoundly interesting discovery;
but we shall not enlarge our view by looking only
back. We may thereby be paying the study of
wrinkles more attention than it deserves. We are
maybe drawing near to the next bend in the road.
Our Iron Duke used to compare campaigning with
speculating what lay beyond that bend. Beyond it,
in our religious wayfaring, lies a new 'more.' Liberty
of thought over what we have inherited involves
liberty to wipe out the belief, that we have passed
the last turn, that we have no new light to look for
where dawn in due. There is nothing 'rationalist'
in seeing for this earth a near future empty of this
new light. Better perhaps, at least while we get
better equipped for the looking back, were it to turn
from over-much pronouncing over the failure in
this way and that of old gospels, and lay our heads
together as to what it is, in the field of our religious
evolution, for which we most need new light, a New
Word,
LXXIV

ABOUT THE GOING AND THE GOAL

A

The Editor of the Prabuddha Bharata is so kind as to send me his periodical. In the last two issues, I have read a discourse, or a meditating aloud on Death and its occurrence, and also a two-part discourse on ‘Where do we come from? ’ and ‘Where do we go to?’ Indifference on the subject of the first and last titles is for me the worst kind of myopia. If we have come to know, that each of us must before long, it may be to-morrow, depart to take up our residence in an almost or quite unknown country, each of us will certainly use every effort to learn, if learn we may, anything about that country, geographically, socially, politically. Here we have, in what lies before us, not a may be, but a will be, a must be. How strange then, that in a land like India, claiming, and rightly claiming, that her chief preoccupation, as compared with other cultures, has ever been the whence, the what, the to-be of the ‘man,’ the puṇuṣa or soul, we should be reading to-day, in an intelligent and serious periodical, articles where not only these questions about the man are still raised, but where the writers seem to be as unable to predicate anything as certainly established and accepted as if they were neither of India, nor any men of to-day.

1 Sent to but declined by the Prabuddha Bharata, India.
When in the world are we going to get a move on in the matter? There are among us those who say, that move on is to-day possible for anyone who will just take the trouble to examine well-attested evidence. I agree with these; I have what is for me evidence, accumulating now for seventeen years; I am like one soon departing, say, for China, who has been at pains to find out all she can about 'China,' and is already in part a 'Chinese.' But I see no sign of these two writers having taken any steps whatever to do anything similar. What they seem to steer by are a few badly understood mantras selected from the Upanishads. But in the Upanishads the 'Where do we go to?' is there declared to be, not only at death, but also when, the earth-body being in deep sleep, the 'man' in his other body rises and, it may be, hies him to the other-world which will be his next home. Now this finds no mention in their articles. There would seem, for at least one of them, to be no alternative, nothing intermediate, between "whirling round in the cycle of birth, death and rebirth" and the "opening up of the mystery of heavenly bliss and evergreenhood"; and the latter is only for "the few blessed."

And more: one of the two is careful to compare a few points in world-religions about man's fate hereafter. But he omits something that should find mention, even if nothing else were said. This is the fact of adjudication by men once of earth, experienced by every man or woman just after dying. Buddhists, it is true, now ignore this and substitute an unfounded doctrine of automatic results of deeds done. Yet nothing is worded in their scriptures with heavier emphasis than this twice-told account, an account so
similar to, yet again so different, in its criterion of what is to pass or damn the man, from the Christian account of that tribunal, from the Zoroastrian account, or the Islamic tradition.

Now these accounts are not merely edifying and deterrent legends in ancient scripture. I have had them repeatedly and emphatically attested and endorsed during many years as incessantly going on to-day. And how rational is the institution! What should I think of my future 'China,' as a land fit to live in, if I heard that the murderer, the persecutor, the thief, the cheat, the fornicator of earth, on migrating there were let run loose in it?

And what do those accounts all reveal? Just this: that man’s life here and man’s life there is not either a 'whirling' round, like the wheel in a squirrel’s cage, or a final end of the whirling; more truly stated, it is neither a going no further, nor an ultimate 'got to'; it is a 'going,' a 'going on,' a long slow going forward, a long wayfaring extending between what 'thou art' and what 'thou wilt become.' THAT thou art potentially, as acorn to oak; THAT thou hast to become actually, thyself an oaktree. But is even the holiest of sannyasins anywhere near being the tree? Of course not; he cannot even conceive what Deity verily is:—the 'Man' (ātman), who is one with all consummated men, with every man and woman in potency. This is as yet far beyond human comprehension. We have as yet but two words wherewith we may, not comprehend, but conceive:—the Most (shrestha) and the Goal (paryosāna); the Goal in which we believe as we wayfare; the Most who is ever beyond the More wherein we yet wayfare and long shall wayfare.
Here is the ‘Going’ taught by the Śākyamuni, the mārga of man’s evermore coming to be. Here is the ‘Going’ taught by Yājñavalkya, the panthā of man’s ever faring higher on the way to Brahman. Here is what calls for our intimate efforts: not the ‘come from,’ riddle insoluble till the goal is reached, but the Going, a going which Buddhism figured by Way and also by Wheel, before it degraded the wheel into something rid of the helpful fiction of life in the worlds, and made it a wheel merely whirling in the air. As bhava-chakra it first meant wheel of becoming, becoming ‘What thou art.’ But when bhava came to be used for worlds and lives:—here monkdom saw nothing in these but woe; saw not the given opportunity there is in every life, here or beyond, for progress in the ‘Going,’ for coming to be what you were not before, for getting nearer to your Goal. And so we get the going on (saṃsāra) travestied as the miserable bhavachakra.

The first Śākyans gave a wonderful mandate to India, to the world about ‘where do we go to.’ Had this not been distorted,—men were flocking to the Śākyamuni to learn where their dear ones had ‘gone to’,—we might never, at this time of day, have seen India publishing articles of groping in the unknown such as I have noticed in these few words.

THE GOAL IN EARLY BUDDHISM\(^1\)

B

We are singularly poor in fit terms for the end or object of the religious quest. In Christianity there

\(^1\) Published in *Vedanta Kesari*, Madras.
is the vague term, the necessarily vague term 'heaven,' or the vague and negative term 'immortality,' in which we come near to the vague and negative term of ancient India: *amṛta*. Or there is the word 'God' for the idea which man has worded differently everywhere in every age, the idea namely of man conceived as perfected, as consummate, as all-this all-that, as Highest, Best, Most. Or, in terms of what man may win, there is the Latin *summum bonum*, highest good. Or, in terms of what man may become, *e.g.*, *nirvāṇa*. In the Gītā this last is a waning into, the quest here being Brahman, *i.e.*, God. In Buddhism it came to be held as a waning out, for the Man Consummate had, in the growing divorce from Brahman teaching, been let drop, and the man seeking consummation as God was being bidden to wane out, and that without delay, reaching perfection, as it was fancied he could, as man-of-earth.

Now this was monastic Buddhism; it was not early, I mean, original, Buddhism taught by the missioners known as Śākyans. If we weigh carefully the terms, the values in the older, the Pali scriptures, we find that the original term chosen to word the religious goal of man’s choice was *attha*, in Sanskrit *artha*. Both of these forms have undergone much change in Indian history. But in them the basic idea is *ṛ, artha*, the reaching out for something needed, something to be sought, something to be won, attained. This is the term for the goal taught in Vinaya and in Suttas, that is, where nothing in the shape of the gloss of later editing can be discerned. Thus we read in the Vinaya of a King of Magadha saying: I have instructed you in the *attha* that is of the present things (*diṭṭhadhamme*); now learn of the *attha* of
worlds beyond (samparāyika); the Bhagavā, he will teach you of that.” (Mahāvagga v, i.) And in the Sutta-nipāta: “With effort stirred up to win attha supreme (paramatthappattiya).” And in the utterance alleged to have been the initial chart, as it were, of the Śākyan mission, the middle way is said to be other than the two side-issues (antā: ‘extremes’ is not a good fit) neither of which “belongs to attha” (anatthasamhita). Clearly the middle way does “belong to, conduce to” attha. That this is not explicitly stated belongs to the history of the term, whereof more presently.

Now about attha I would point to three things not yet brought out. Attha is essentially a standpoint of the man, a valuation made by him. It becomes meaningless if in winning it he ‘wane out.’ It is he who, as the Suttas say, is athiko, as is the man in the forest “seeking timber” (sār'athiko). Secondly, the word is positive, not a negation. It is explicitly that which is needed, is sought, is to be won. It conveys no stress laid on what must not be needed, sought or won. It is a definite conception. Herein it is unlike amyta or nirvāna. Lastly, it is, as a positive conception, not final, not ultimate. Man had, man has as yet, no means of conceiving, much less imagining or wording the ultimate. Every so-called conception of ‘Deity,’ or of final consummation of life is frustrated and falls short, because for him this conceiving is as yet not possible.

Hence the choice of attha as the religious quest was eminently suitable. Attha included anything and everything that was held to be needed, to be sought, because it was something or other which for the needer, the seeker, constituted a More, a Better, a
Higher in some way. Translators of Pali often render it by profit, gain, advantage, (equating it with āni-
saṃsā), or again by any aim or purpose or intent. They cannot be called wrong. Nothing that we seek in religion can rightly be more for us, as yet, than just a Better. I have used the old word 'goal,' a word derived from the round pole (gaule, wāule, walus) set up at the terminus of a race, but the terminus may be only a 'lap,' a stage in a bigger competition. And it is noteworthy that the older Suttas refer to attha only twice—so I find—as paramathi. So wise were the really great Helpers of men:

In my Father's house are many mansions.
To-day shalt thou be with me in Paradise.

Here was no finality taught. As with the wine at the Cana feast, "the best was yet to come." The Best was, the Best is and will be; since all Betters, Mores, Highers have their logically ideal point in consummation. Man can never rest in a Better with any sense of finality, of real uttermost achievement. But this is matter of faith. In our religion the basis of faith is knowledge, and we know that we seek to be, to become, to hold a Better.

The fact remains, that for us, if not for India, good words are lacking. The word I find most fit for attha is 'well,' for when we pronounce a patient, a convalescent, 'well,' we really mean 'better.' Still is the healed body soon to perish, the mind-ways too by which we wield just this particular body. Our 'well' is as relative a value as is attha. But alas! we need strong wills among us to feel the need of 'well' serving as a noun, as it does in neighbouring countries. Even among the Greeks the noun: to eu,
'the well,' was forced. Their 'the Good,' which we have followed, is a comparatively plodding stodgy term. Strong wills might bring about the change. 'Urge,' once a verb only, is, as needed, gaining acceptance as noun.

But if attha meant 'good,' 'gain' of any kind, let it not for a moment be supposed, that for the Śākyans the attha of the Middle Way was just that. The distinction ascribed to the king above, worded as it will have been by Śākyan compilers, clearly shows that, in their teaching, life as a whole was meant, when they taught 'attha,' and that this life diṭṭhadhamme, being relatively but a moment, the attha of the worlds, samparāyika, was an infinitely greater matter. The Middle way itself, the way of becoming in the more, the better, is also called samparāyiko. (Anguttara, iv, 285, 322; iii, 49, 364).

I return in conclusion to that First Mantra of the Way. Instead of the Way being said to lead positively to attha, we find four terms substituted for it:—two belong to things of the mind: sambodhi, abhiññā; two to monastic ideals: upasamā, nibbāna.¹ This seems strange till, with much reading in Pali, we note what a new, what a literary value came into the word attha, namely, that of 'meaning' in a thing said, or, later, written. The vyāñjana or 'form,' 'letter,' 'word,' is one, the attha another.²

The business of collating and standardizing the bulk, grown unwieldy, of the remembered teachings had

¹ The term anuttara-yogakkhema (ennobling the mere 'getting and keeping' of the old Upanishaditic term) is comparatively rare in the Suttas.

² We note the later meaning thrust by editing into the missioners' charter bidding them to teach dhammaṁ satthāṁ savayañjanaṁ. The meaning of Dharma, once man's "inner controller," had become a literary matter of fixed forms of doctrine.
become very absorbing. Mission-work was coming to an end. The stationary work of cloistered editing was filling the field. The vogue of the study of mind—the young psychology of India—was very attractive, and only in the ‘mind,’ or four phases of mind, could the man, it was thought, be discerned. And monk in monastery had become of great importance. For him the catch-words were upasamā, quietude, nibbāna, waning out, far more than was atta. Mind and the ending of the man of body and mind came to be summed up in the term aṇīṇā: the having-come-to-know.¹

A term become ambiguous seemed undesirable for the venerated First Mantra. At some time and place, probably Patna, the Mantra underwent editing into the form in which it has survived, with the monkish outlook in the first words, the substitution of four mental and monkish terms for the one atta, and the mnemonic refrains of the long appendix, to say nothing of the substitution of the eight qualities of the Way for some term, probably bhava,—then fallen into disrepute. With this I have dealt elsewhere.² But perhaps nothing has done more to tie down the outlook for modern Buddhists, in the Way, to diṭṭhadhamme, and banish the samparāyika, than has that last change, that ‘eightfold’ substitution.

¹ In the Vinaya (M. V, i, 28) we find aṇīṇā actually a declaration of atta with the man eliminated. Could decadence further go?
² Cf. e.g., art. XLIV.
LXXV

AN APOLOGETIST IN BUDDHISM

At the Society for the Study of Religions, now in its eleventh year, we were recently meeting in memory of one of our original and influential members, George R. S. Mead, a name familiar to readers of this Journal. A lecture with the appropriate title "On the present position of the comparative study of religion," was delivered by Professor E. O. James. And by request, as one of the presidents of Mead’s Society, the *Quest*, and contributor to its Journal, I made brief allusion to his work and lofty ideal for the subject of the lecture.

Incidentally, and as critic rather than eulogist, I showed Mead as relatively less discerning, when he went abroad in a less familiar field than what he termed ‘the Life of Jesus Study.’ When namely, he inquired into canonically emphasized dogmas of early Buddhism, he accepted them without question as pronouncements of its Founder. The canon, it is true, puts them into his mouth, but to what extent was such a ‘putting into’ the work of editors, building up their “tradition of the elders” (as Jesus is recorded saying)? And such dogmas are just what, had they been not Buddhist but Christian institutional utterances, Mead would have queried, weighed and perhaps

---

1 Published in *The Theosophist*, Adyar, 1940.
2 *The Quest*, Oct., 1942. Cf. also art. LXXIII, above.

870
rejected. We have only to watch him at work in his Quest article: 'The Life of Jesus study' (April, 1924). But if we turn to him at work on the Buddhist dogma of the Three Marks, "All is impermanent, suffering, selfless," whereas he is not uncritical, he is not being guided by what he would in his own field have used:—the historic sense. This dogma represents the belief of the actual compilers of the Canon—now was it the teaching of the founders 300 years earlier? The utmost he ventures to say is "Doubtless when the Buddha enunciated them with all the authority of his spiritual presence, he carried conviction to the majority of his hearers." It is true that, in this article, we find expressions varying in point and emphasis concerning the same dogma:—'the Buddha said it'; 'the Buddha is said to have (discerned)'; 'what the gospel of the Buddha taught'; 'Buddhism said'; 'the Buddhist theory said.' But the indiscriminate use of such variants, all applied to the one topic, are at the opposite poles to his methods in more familiar pastures. In these he asks at every step what is more or is less likely, historically speaking, to have been the authentic teaching of the Founder; in the former, less familiar field, he weighs the dogma on its own, if modernized merits, unconcerned with the source and history of its coming, at a certain stage, into authentic teaching.

I do not forget that at the time Mead wrote, he was but following the procedure of the pioneer experts on Buddhism. No one was discerning a definite earlier and later in any one thesaurus of Buddhist literature. In Christianity 'higher criticism' was, relative to classical studies, very young; in Buddhism it was practically unborn. Thus Oldenberg accepted
unquestioningly the ‘four truths’ as the very marrow of the original gospel of Buddhism; and Dr. Grimm, with less excuse, has echoed this. Rhys Davids discerned none of the accepted Immanence of the day of the birth of Buddhism in the injunction to take ‘the Self’ as lamp and refuge, but equated it (implicitly) with Henley’s vaunt of to-day: ”I am the captain of my soul.” And Winternitz, yet more recently, has nothing to indicate of changing monastic and other values in his selections of passages deemed cardinal to the whole teaching. Here were three or four men who knew their Pali Canon at first hand as Mead, no Pali scholar, could not, yet who did not, by any weighing of their own, appeal to his historic sense. My own doubts I was beginning to utter just when Mead published the essay now cited, namely in 1924. Reprinting, through purchase of Messrs. Bell & Son’s permanent type, my little Buddhist Psychology, published at Mead’s request in his Quest Series, in 1911, I added in the supplementary chapters one on ‘The Anti-soul Attitude.’ In this an interval of 13 years (1911-24) had brought me to write thus:

“Let the reader bear in mind these typical cases of what we may call the more-wording of a simpler, older pioneer teaching, when he comes across such sweeping assertions as, that Gotama taught we have no souls, no ‘I.’ We have rather to consider, unfortunately, not what did he say? but what is he made to say? and (when and) by whom . . . how long after him, was his teaching with the (added or varied) ‘more-wording’ of his church set down?"

Since then, in getting an ever less scanty acquaintance with the Pali canon, I have in many books
striven to suggest, for more competent successors, how sorely 'higher criticism' is called for about it. If Mead and many others found it worth exercising about the Christian canon, committed to writing when writing had long been practised, about two to four generations after the presumptive date of the Founder, how much more was it not needed for a canon, only committed to the new art of book-writing perhaps after a period from four to six times longer after the date of that other Founder's life?

To the best of my knowledge no one, since the publication of Mead's article of 1924 has made critical comment on its unquestioning ascription of those 'three marks' to the Founder's own teaching. I certainly did not yet; I was but beginning to grope where the pioneers' blazed trail ceased. And let me be candid—I recollect feeling a little hurt, he had so utterly refrained from letting me into what he was about to lecture on and then publish. He too shared in that tendency, shown by Indologists and by other research-workers:—to maintain the apartness of the Hebrew 'prophet' against which Renan, nearly a century ago, so earnestly protested, enjoining that scholars, of all men, should seek to join hands of collaboration in their work of exploration.¹ And so, after this long interval, our memorial meeting has brought me to realize, that the delayed comment on this side-tracking essay has yet to be spoken. Not so much because it was Mead who wrote, but because the need for comment still exists. It is but recently that I have noticed myself stigmatized by Buddhists as "she who calls the great non-self teacher the teacher of the self." 'Non-self,' as I have

¹ Avenir de la Science. Ch. xiii, especially the end.
said, is the third of the three marks dealt with by Mead, and is, by some South Asian Buddhists, considered, in so many words, to be the very centre of their religion.

This however is, of necessity, but a brief article and not an essay, and I am here confining myself to the psychological aspect of the 'mark' of the non-self. As a dogma come into early Buddhism, it cannot adequately be treated of, if the subject of the Immanence accepted at the birth of Buddhism be ignored. I have treated of this elsewhere, and confine myself here to that later extension of the dogma which, after rejection of Immanence, went on to see in the man or person merely a label for a complex, or swift succession of mental phenomena or dhamma's, regarded either under fifty and more titles, or as five under the convenient notion of 'heaps' (khandha's) bodily and mental.

Mead first guards the dogma against what is not in it, namely denial of immortality; it is only reality that is denied. This may have seemed rational to him. For me the latter denial involves denial of the former. About the latter as denied he goes on in Humian vein: "no search reveals any self as permanent reality. Search for the searcher reveals an ever-changing Proteus, not to be apprehended in himself. The notions 'I' and 'mine,' my body, my mind keep the world ego-centric, vitiating all our judgments and valuations. You will never seize the 'I,' but only an increasing series of images and notions and states erroneously labelled as yours. The 'I'-notion is but an habitual attitude towards an ever-changing flux . . . leading to megalomania rather than liberation."

In such graphic phrases does this bad cause find
good championship. There is in it nothing so far unfamiliar to the modern psychologist, heir of the dragon's crop sown by David Hume, albeit Mead does not acknowledge this. Neither, it is true, does he acknowledge that champion of a more honest psychology, James Ward, for whom the first step in psychology lies in seeing all mental phenomena as 'presentations to a self'—a truth from which language does not let us get away, whether we deride it as the 'common sense' sneered at in the opponents to Hume, or forbid it as dragging metaphysic into psychology. Nor, I might add, does he acknowledge what Ward made perhaps too little of:—that the referee of presentations is equally a fact in our efferent nature; the going out to meet the presentation, as well as to react upon it.

But here I am more concerned with what Mead does champion in this dogma of institutional Buddhism, namely, how he apologizes so much more ably than do they who confess to the dogma. What can we show in the Pitakas, or in exegesis: in (to take only the apologists-in-Pali) Buddhaghosa, Dhammadāla, or Buddha-datta, omitting later names, to equal Mead's presentation? Starting Buddhist studies as I did in sympathy with the dogma, I had to confess that, in their apology, I found nothing better than one of two things:—iteration of the dogma—I have likened this to the asserting no bogies! in the dark to children—or reasoning by false, or at best materialistic premises. Namely, that, since all is in flux, and hence decay follows growth, therefore not-self means no self so called is permanent.

Here, be it noted, the very permanence denied to the self was conceded to those 'heaps': body and the
four mental phenomena; these were real, of indefinite duration;¹ only the self, or 'man' was non-existent. Moreover one and all of the exponents, for all their scriptural citations, invariably overlook the analogy wherewith the Founder met the assumption, that man is nothing more than a complex of the 'heaps.' Do we not, he is recorded as saying, in our judge-ruler, admit one who is more than the subjects, over whom he disposes? That if we reduce him to subject-level, there is left no judge, no disposer, no arbiter to keep the subjects in order?² Mead will have known nothing of this context, even in translation (then only to be had in a German one), so is it manhandled by the old Buddhist editors, getting past an awkward query to their dogma.

Moreover one and all of them agree in making (so far as I have followed them) no effort to explain the dogma's denial as does Mead. Namely, by considering the denial as implying in some way "a perfectioning of personality from the restrictions of 'I'-ness into a super-personal potency of consciousness and being, that is life itself as a whole, and has all life's potencies freely open before it." Brave words these, and admittedly put forward as a compromise to reconcile modern protest at the dogma's bleak 'No, no!' And modern Buddhists near and far tend now to lisp in terms of an All, a One, transcending the intensive force of seeing the very man in the 'I.' But modern it is, and no such apology was felt as needed by a church which had come to trample on the tremendous implications of Indian Immanence. Its conclusions were and remained just negation:

¹ See Compendium of Philosophy, VIII, 6.
² See Vol. I, art IV.
“There is here truly name and form
Wherein exists no being or man.

All states (of mind) are seen clearly as not a self.

A way there is but no goer:—”

Here are but a few of Buddhaghosa’s asseverations. Contemplated beside this institutional complacency, there is something pathetic in our well-meant and wider-hearted will to apologise and, if it may be, find truth where the earlier man has been content to ward off what he has held to be error.

I hold it were wiser to look to weaknesses in our own view, whereby we are not immune from sharing those in Indian thought, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist. Take the still living infection from Hume’s (not atheistic, but) sceptical standpoint. One of his two sceptical departures was, a century later met by Höfßding, who, in his Outlines of Psychology, contends, not that we cannot really know things as causes and effects, but that we really only know them as such. Reverting to the other and better known departure, I have yet to meet anyone who has contended similarly, that so far from stumbling upon a particular activity of the self when we try to ‘catch’ him, we have no knowledge of that or any activity save by our conviction, that ‘I’ am indispensably present as ‘catcher,’ as searcher, as knower, as doubter. Just as, to quote a famous Buddhist simile ever misinterpreted, we only truly apprehend and comprehend the parts of a chariot: wheels, pole and the rest, if we see them as the work, the activity of the chariot-maker and driver. Else are they idiotic output. Hume as seeker seeks to catch the seeker. Actually the seeker is ever present with all intelligent
effort:—searching, doubting, failing to find, affirming, denying, understanding:—what sense is there in any of these verbal forms where the corresponding agent-term is not there, preceding their use, their claim to be used? To label this claim as mere common sense is to brand metaphysic with confining itself, not to realities, not to the very man, but to things secondary and derivatives of him.

Again, take the Indian view that (a) the true is not phenomenal but persistent, not fleeting but static, unchanging, imperishable: a notion claimed for all that is at once immaterial and not illusory; (b) that of such, true vision consists in cleaning off error from him who sees, as when the moon emerges from clouds. In this way, if there be a real essence or entity called 'man' or self or spirit, he is this persistently static, not to be perfectioned is this being. (c) If, with the new light in Indian thought fostered by original Buddhism, we see the self or man as a growing, becoming entity, then, it was contended, since all that grows or becomes enters sooner or later on decay, he cannot be permanent, essentially eternal.

That there was here argument possibly from wrong premises is passed over. Can we rationally draw spiritual conclusions from material premises?

A culture already decadent had decided, that the word bhava or bhavya, once of such happy import of the promise of more and finer life, was to be shunned, as applicable only to conditions wherein man was encased in transitory nāma and rūpa, or body and mind. That the owner, the user, the encased one was as a very babe, faring onwards in evolution from the potential to the supreme Actual: this was rejected, and therewith the word 'becoming' came to mean
as it were a symbol of the non-reality of the very man. Was not everything impermanent?

Mead's work will live, not by his apology for monastic Buddhist dogma, but by his finer critical work where he was more at home. I would I could have persuaded him, as I could perhaps have done later, that apologies such as are here shown, are not for us to make. The teaching they defend belongs to a worn out value in the 'man' which we have, or should have outgrown. The canon-compilers who saw in such teaching the good and the true were of a time that held in worth a monastic outlook we have now outgrown. Why then try to defend the values in the outlook of that time?

Had Mead used his fine talents of sympathetic consideration and expression thereof to weigh such shallow oversights in Buddhist scholastics, he would have proved a nobler apologist, since he might through such have 'stumbled upon' the real New Word in Buddhism, instead of bolstering up doctrinaire myopia with non-Buddhist width of view. For he was and remained a worthy seeker of truth. I testified to this at our recent meeting, quoting from the peroration of the other article herein alluded to. Similar and not less moving is here his final word, and that is, that however we conceive and name the Supreme Good which orders the way of going of all things, whether as law, love, life, light, we shall ultimately come face to face with the smiling face of Truth. For me in some yet inconceivable form this will be the smiling face of the True Perfect Man by Whom and from Whom proceed all such concepts.
LXXVI

CEYLON AND THE PALI TEXT
SOCIETY’S WORK

To be dhammasaññī—to have the religious sense—a man must have man’s welfare at heart. And that welfare must be understood greatly, understood as not limited by earth-life. When that is so, then has man the greater, the true religious sense. Within certain limits Rhys Davids my late husband was a profoundly religious man. When he surveyed mankind, in any phase of culture, it was always with reference to man’s welfare and to what made for it, or did not do so. This meant that he ever regarded man as in a way of becoming better or worse. Man was for him no mere abstraction; man’s nature was for him not a fixed, unchangeable thing. And this was true whatever the time or place to be considered. To speak of the ‘unchanging East,’ he would often say, is nonsense. This meant that he handled every subject historically. And it also meant, that in everything that he handled, the greater welfare of man was the underlying motive.

It was further his firm conviction, that in the long run, progress in welfare depends upon progress in knowledge. It takes time, he would say, but ultimately the world is governed by ideas. True to these convictions he founded the Pali Text Society.

Ceylon, which gave him opportunity to realize the

---

1 Published in *The Buddhist Annual of Ceylon*, Colombo, 1927.

880
bright hopes of his early career, struck also the mortal
blow which led to its untimely end. But she gave him
a bigger opportunity, and by that he shaped the
remainder, the greater part of his life on earth. This
was a period of about half a century; he was about
twenty-nine when, with blighted prospects, he listened
to the voice of the greater messengers, and planned
the systematic completion of a work already begun
without system: the gift namely, to the world of a
new feature in world-literature, the gift of the literature
of Pali-Buddhism.

It was no mean gift. And it meant work, unpaid work,
to a man without means, who had resigned all possi-
bility of recovery in his profession; work in the teeth
of warnings and prophecies of failure and insolvency,
of head-shakings and shoulder shruggings. After some
years came success—success in this sense only, that,
in Buddhist idiom, a Dhammachakka, a wheel of
'the Right' had been set rolling 'appavattiyaṁ kenaci
lokassim,' not to be turned back by anyone in the
world. That wheel is rolling still, its creative work
now more nearly accomplished. But Rhys Davids has
slipped away from an ungrateful world, for the world
has yet to grow up sufficiently to discern its real
Ariyas, the men and women who work, not with per-
sonal advancement or wealth as their chief end, but
the greater welfare, the greater 'Well' of man. So
well had he founded, that when he went, his works, the
works he had begun, no longer depended upon him.
So far as patent, lasting acknowledgment goes, save in
the personal recognition of the thoughtful few, he
might never have lived, might never have, in his work,
made his country live in one way up to her respon-
sibilities in the East, or left, in that work, a solemn
message to Ceylon as to that for which Ceylon herself is responsible.

But if Rhys Davids was an ardent historian, he was no chronicler. Ceylon, the land of 'epics' so-called, which are chronicles rather than histories, should by now appreciate the distinction. He was thinker and organizer; he was not recorder. Or if he virtually had to be one, it was work against the grain, and was not persisted in. We have only to look at the Reports, after the first years, of his Society's Journals to see the truth of this. Nor had he got together such a Committee as could meet regularly, and so record and make its own chronicle. Hence I have no ready-made history of the coming to be of the Pali Text Society, from which I might here inform the readers of this Annual. There are some preserved of the letters received in response to the immense number he had to write to enlist support from the powers that be and from learned institutions. There is the first Prospectus of the Society's objects (printed in the early Journals); there are those early Journals themselves. There is an outline of the undertaking in his 'American Lectures on Buddhism' (Putnam). This is approximately all. The Society's history lies in its work done. Like its founder, it was never a talker, a parader.

But in the launching of that work, in the support of it and the purveying for it, the past generation of Ceylon played a part, which the present generation of the island will have utterly forgotten. Will they listen for a few minutes while I tell them about it? I quote from Rhys Davids's first Report, Journal, 1882.

"Slowly but steadily other subscribers came forward.
The result of my personal application to the Orientalists and great public libraries in Europe was in most cases satisfactory; and the especial thanks of the Society are due to Professor Lanman for his successful efforts in America. In the spring of 1882 there came the welcome intelligence that more than sixty of the most important of the members of the Buddhist Order in Ceylon had shown their appreciation of the work, and their trust in its promoters, by subscribing in advance to the cost of the printing. It is no slight thing that an established clergy should have come forward so readily to support the publication of the sacred books of their religion in an alien alphabet and by scholars of an alien faith. We need not perhaps be surprised that so liberal-minded a body as the Buddhist Bhikkhus should have acted so; but this was due, no doubt, in great measure, to the personal influence and high position of the Sinhalese gentleman who has so kindly consented to be our agent in Ceylon—the Atapattu Mudaliyar of Galle (Edmund Gooneratne).

"This assistance came at a very opportune time. The want of good manuscripts had already in several instances made itself felt; and it was intended to apply, for the purpose of supplying this want, the donations of some generous friends who, not themselves acquainted with the Pali language, had come forward to support the movement. . . . These donations having supplied at home the deficiencies which would otherwise have arisen in the charges for printing, if we had not had recourse to the subscriptions of the Bhikkhus in Ceylon, we have been enabled to leave the whole of the latter amount in the island, to be applied there exclusively to the purchase of manuscripts."

After the Report follows a complete list of all the
first subscribers, including of course those both of the laity and the Order in Ceylon. These amount to 99 persons, not including two institutions. To this ready response should be added mention of four letters from four of the subscribing members of the Order, in Sinhalese or in Pali, giving advice and encouragement. These are printed, the gist of their contents given in English, and a courteous response made to each. And it was in deference to this warmth of welcome that the founder decided to desist from further issue of Jaina and Buddhist-Sanskrit texts, and to confine the programme solely to Pali texts.

Let us quickly follow this support as registered in the next few reports.

In that for 1883 we see, that out of a total of R. 1144.50 subscribed in Ceylon, R. 362.50 have been spent, as had been decided, on procuring and forwarding MSS. and on new copies of MSS. and that most of the remainder has been sent to England. We see also that the list of annual subscribers has dropped to 87. Also that the sole woman subscriber has dropped out—Mrs. F. C. Dias of Matara. There was only one original woman subscriber in Europe to balance her, but she kept faithful for years. But after that first year not a single woman of Ceylon appears in the subscribers' register save one, and that was a welcome appearance of the last few years only. When we read Ceylon's Mahāvāṃsa, and note how the monkish chronicler, grudging as he, in common with his kind, ever is to women, has yet recorded the part apparently played by women in the conversion of Ceylon to Buddhism, we cannot but contrast with it the lack of interest shown in general by women both of East and West in the work of the Society. That work is not, never
was, denominational propaganda. This may possibly be a reason. But women, as well as men, are coming to see that greater light on the stream of history also makes for salvation. Will the women of Ceylon not read their Mahāvamsa, and ask themselves whether they see nothing there in their traditions that they have as a fine example, to carry on, not as then, but in a way befitting their own new world?

Passing on to 1884-1887, we find the list of subscribers in Ceylon shrunk to fifty, or to fifty per cent. of the first patrons! After that no further lists of subscribers have ever been published. When twenty years later I took from my husband's ailing health the burden of the secretarial work, there was remaining not a single subscriber of the Buddhist Order, and those of the laity might be, as now, counted on the fingers of one hand. One member of the Order, I am glad to say, we still have among our editors—the Reverend A. P. Buddhadda—and he is again at work for us—'more power to his elbow!' as the Irish say.

I have neither space nor time to say anything more about work done and to be done, about help once given, now for the most part withheld. I am not taking upon myself to write as critic or as judge. I have sought only to place a few facts before the readers of this Annual; and I will add one or two more. The cost of producing our texts and translations of the religious literature of Ceylon in England for the benefit of the whole world is about three times what it was before the great war, let alone the last century. Next, we have, thanks mainly to the generosity of Japanese donors, carried out our most costly scheme: a Pali-English Dictionary. Lastly, we ought to finish
our first editions of texts by about 1944. After that there should be only re-issues and perhaps more translations to justify our continued existence. To finish our programme and carry on, in sale and renewal of our stock, depends upon support derived from annual subscribers, purchasers and donors. Just now we have fewer subscribers and donors than we have ever had! But we ‘do’ more in sales. I think that, as far as it goes, this is as it should be. Sales mean that our books are becoming, in a little way, part of the world’s demand for literature, not the pious hobby of a few. Our keeping solvent till 1944 is just a question of that ‘as far as it goes.’ The sales do not go far enough for present costs of production. We may, unless the deficit is made up by Ceylon and other sympathisers, have to reduce our annual output of three volumes a year.¹ Our senior representative in Ceylon and annual subscriber, Dr. W. A. de Silva, has rallied to our aid with a gift of £20. Our junior representative (who has his way to make), Dr. G. P. Malalasekere, who raised a more than equal amount for us, wrote to me on his return of the signs he found of a revival of interest in the classic literature of the island. If this includes Pali Scriptures, it has not yet so embraced the spread of those scriptures in the world-script of the so-called roman-letter, as to make the Pali Text Society aware of it.

I hope that any revival of interest in Ceylon’s classic literature will be great enough in range and intelligence not to leave out of count what we have begun, carried on and are trying to finish. It is true, that last century’s wave of nationalism is only now making itself

¹ 1942: We have had to reduce this to two volumes. I may add that no response to this article reached me.
felt in many small countries, including Ceylon, where
the rise of nationalism has long been affected by an
imperial overrule. When that wave surges, it may
involve an anti-imperial feeling, which may irrationally
show itself in matters of literature and religion. On
the other hand it may be, it should be, that just because
of that overrule, the small countries subject to it will
the more quickly and intelligently transform their
growing nationalism into the greater imperium of a
commonweal embracing the whole earth. World-
citizenship, not nationalism, is now the way of the
earth, the only sure way of peace. ‘What can I give
the world?’ is the really worthy question of each
country.

The gift which Ceylon has been giving to the world—
a gift which she may yet help us to complete—is the
gift of a world-literature, a literature, in which mankind
can learn the history of a religion. In that Pali litera-
ture men can see, how an original inspired message,
born under limitations of time and space, yet needed
by the whole world when the right moment of growth
is reached, grows and expands, becomes fixed and
formulated, and so brings with it down the stream of
the ages the limitations of its youth. The earth,
wedded nominally in great part to other great religious
growths of later date, has yet to learn the lesson that
Pali literature waits to teach it. The machinery, the
vehicle that helped to bear the original message down
the stream:—this the literature shows as a thing of
the past, lingering, hoary, to be let go, as was the Raft
of the Buddhist parable. But the Message belongs
to the things eternally true:—that man is wayfarer
through many worlds many times over in the world-
way to the End, to the being utterly well; that he
fares well only if he lives well; that the will to, the choice of this lies within himself.

Viewed in this light, it is verily a world-gift which Ceylon is giving, and may yet aid to complete giving the world. There is also the gift, in this old literature, of showing a phase of great interest in the growth of a language. It is no mean mission to be the elder daughter in the inheriting and transmitting of a portion of Mother India's culture. Not again very likely will it be given me to speak directly to Ceylon readers. Let Ceylon not will the welfare of Ceylon only. Let her not will the welfare of the Empire only. Let Ceylon will the welfare of the world. Let her speak by her scriptures to the world. Let her help us to do so.¹

¹ From Report of the Society for 1940:

"The past year has been tragic indeed for us. . . .

"A solitary enemy bomb, dropped at Michaelmas as if at hazard on Guildford, smashed into a new building of our printers, Messrs. Billing & Sons, and burnt all our reserve stocks stored for us by them, as well as those of the Sacred Books of the Buddhists: a wanton and stupid act by a country whose universities till 1914 and whose book trade were one of our main sources of income. All our bound Dictionary stock is fortunately, and so far safely, housed by our Assistant Hon. Secretary, I. B. Horner, who administers its sober-paced sales of about a dozen a year. But our publishers, the Oxford University Press, hold very small stocks (save a larger supply of Journals). . . .

"Our further tragedy—a temporary one only—is that we can neither collect subscriptions from neutral countries trodden by the heel of barbarous aggression nor send them our issues. Financially this is a last straw to our difficult position, and I fear it will be advisable to postpone the costs of further outlay for the duration. Subscribers—such as can send subscriptions—must treat me here as they think best. To complete our programme we have but some six more volumes to produce: Will they give us their advice as to procedure? Will they try to bring us immediate help towards solvency? Will they inquire as to existing funds for aid to such an enterprise as ours, or as to War Damage help, whereby the reprinting 'by offset' of at least our more important texts and translations might be carried out?"
INDIA AND THE PALI TEXT SOCIETY

When, some sixty-five years ago, my husband retired from the Ceylon Civil service, and came home, a man still young in years, but thrown back, saddened and ill—had he not protested on behalf of certain peasants’ grazing rights, thereby bringing on himself rebuke, and insidious attack with temporary dismissal?—he pulled himself together, refused to return to Ceylon and started afresh as barrister. But he was haunted and pursued by the spiritual legacy bequeathed him from Ceylon:—the making accessible to the scholar’s world the world-literature that was India’s legacy to Ceylon: the earliest known canon of Buddhist scripture and its exegesis, as still surviving in Ceylon, and elsewhere.

This he had not come to study in Ceylon, but it had been in a way laid before him in response to his inquiry. As magistrate, he had had brought before him a case of can I say? clerical succession to a cure? Was the deceased monk-parson (and school-teacher) to be succeeded by his own curate (samanera), or should it be an ‘elder’ (thera)? It was, he was told, a matter of ‘canon law,’ of Vinaya. Vinaya:—what’s that? And so he came to learn, not only about Vinaya and a Canon, but also of the survival,

1 From the Jubilee Number of the J. Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1942.
both blended with Singhalese and apart, of a literary diction, as dead as is Latin, and yet as alive, built out of old Indian dialects as the vehicle of the Canon which India had let go into exile, but which South Asia had preserved. And this he set to work to learn from a monk ardent in faith though suffering from a mortal disease; a man who, as he expounded grammar, dropped into alert ears morsels of his formulated faith; a man to whom this learner paid eloquent and moving tribute, when first promoted to lecture on Buddhism.¹

Beneath an agnostic myopia (more common perhaps sixty years ago than now,) Rhys Davids ever held firm a religious faith in spiritual growth. This he saw as proceeding from growth in knowledge. Of a fine will, he was, like his generation and this, slow to discern that ‘knowledge’ is a registering the preceding initiative:—The will to learn, to get to know. The good monk’s will had sown the seed; the pupil’s will to know watered it (did not the ‘Buddha’ tell Ananda of desire watering the seed of life?). But it was as a planned idea that there grew up in him the way to make fruitful the new attention that was being given to ‘palm-leaf manuscripts’ in monastic libraries.

This meant much toil of thought and hand for a penniless lawyer, struggling to get briefs to keep himself alive; one who had no bond as alumnus with British universities—and whose German university gave no aid. But his fine will stood the test, waving aside the friendly gibes at the insolvency that would inevitably undermine his house of cards. He laid his plans to survey materials, and place

collected MSS. among scattered editors in East and West. He drew powerful allies in the scholar-world into his net—was it not the 'Blessed One's' way?—to make critical editions, always in roman letter (a far wiser decision than had he chosen the mediumship of Devanagari):—such men as Oldenberg the German, Trenckner and Fausböll the Danes, Minayeff the Russian, Feer and Finot the Frenchmen, Richard Morris the fellow-Kelt, after whose established enterprise the 'Early English Text Society,' this younger child was named, and last but not least, Edmund Hardy, the Germanised Englishman. These men, to mention no others, gave their leisure hours for years for no pecuniary reward or worldly fame to examine, collate and edit the manuscripts sent them by Rhys Davids, who himself with the comrade and scholar in religious history, J. Estlin Carpenter, edited the opening volume of the compiled discourses or Suttantas.

Learned institutions began to subscribe, and there were found by the probing net donations here and there, even from a crowned head, and printing was not the costly thing it now is. So a substantial bank-balance carefully tended came into being, instead of the threatened bankruptcy. Preceding the Society's creation, Oldenberg's first edition of the Vinaya, with a substantial financial backing from the India Office and the Berlin Academy, was approaching completion (1879-83), and served as, so to speak, a literary introducer of the new society's remainder of the Canon, but financially it had its own donors and stood upon its own feet. The better to win support from South Asian orthodoxy, the inclusion of the more pronounced Prakrit Jainist scriptures
was abandoned, and a pair of Pali texts was issued every year.

In time, two branches sprang from the parent stem. (1) With increase of literary material, it became evident that Childers's great work, his Pali Dictionary needed re-writing. In his interleaved copy, bequeathed him by Childers, Rhys Davids, for twenty years inserted every new word and phrase. These he then had copied on slips, and distributed to half a dozen Indologists, in planning a dictionary which should be an instance of that brotherhood in work, the absence of which Renan had so deplored in his Avenir de la Science, then a new work. Like Renan, he was in advance of his age. The 'brotherhood' did not fructify, though only ill health hindered a great scholar and good man, Ernst Windisch in carrying out his part. No completed section of letters was handed in save that of the letter S, by Sten Konow, and later, the K letter by C. Duroiselle of Burma, and it became evident that the great work of a new dictionary would have to be done by one worker, old age now making it impossible that this should be the society's founder. Of Dr. W. Stede's timely aid there is no need here to speak. His ten years of unremitting labour and its result belong to this century. The Society paid him a modest salary, and thereafter, for three years a pension.

(2) The other new branch was a series of translations, to carry on more thoroughly the mere samples presented in Sacred Books of the East and begun, in Sacred Books of the Buddhists, by Max Müller. Finances being still favourable, this was begun by an extra subscription-volume every year till nearly thirty were published.
But meanwhile Europe had been laid waste by a ghastly war of five years, and whereas, by 1936, the Society's programme was approaching completion, so too were its financial resources. The war had crushed German university subscriptions and catholicism of effort, France was bled white, and printing had leapt up in price, so that the Society's expenditure was out-running its receipts. It had sold out its modest capital; it had not raised its subscription. Its remaining items were of exegesis only, arousing naturally less demand over and above such subscriptions as persisted. Then there fell on it yet another war—war of unprecedented rapine and barbarous methods, impoverishing both aggressors and attacked. No European subscriptions could reach us; our best support in the book trade, the home of the main aggressor, left a large debt owed to us. A misaimed bomb over Guildford burnt out all our reserve stock, and the Pali Text Society was left more or less ruined, insolvent, with some six volumes wherein to complete three unfinished first editions, and bring out three shorter works. For the first time since its start the society can promise not even one text this year, although the materials are at hand.

I have sought for special financial aid from America's generosity, but have failed to get any. I may say, as yet, the same of India, she indeed being it would seem, not of a mind to take up this sorely wounded, this all but completed undertaking, so as to make possible, if not yet the reprinting of the results of 60 years output, at least the issue of some at least of those six remaining volumes. Of all our earlier South Asian 'orthodox' support, Ceylon alone is not yet in the grip of this war of patent greed and our own
engrossing resistance to it. But Ceylon has long lost her early testimony of sympathy with our work to make world-literature of her scripture. After the last war she seemed to shrink into mere nationalism. In India we have still a small handful of subscribers. Will India now go further and adopt us? It is not likely I shall be here to write Finis to our work. Even were the issues of texts finished, we have still a half-finished Pali Concordance slowly piling up to serve the future scholar as only a good Concordance really can. But I leave very worthy representatives to carry on, notably Miss I. B. Horner, M.A., now editing and publishing (at her own expense) the first complete translation of the Vinaya-Pitaka, for the Sacred Books of the Buddhists, which I still edit, the Pali Text Society being unable to include more in its own series. Will India help?
LXXVIII

WORDING OLD AND NEW

Two years ago I published in the Pali Text Society's Report the news, given me by our Burmese Correspondent, Professor P. Maung Tin, of the completion of the publication in Burmese of a translation of the first four Nikāyas. A wealthy layman, whose name was not given, had financed the printing, and several hands had carried out the translation, the chief worker being "an ex-monk." Not that the work was in opposition to the wishes of the Burmese Sangha; the late revered Ledi Sayadaw is quoted as literary adviser and promoter, as well as another well-known monk. Incidentally I may add, that at present the work, published in 18 volumes at a total price of Rs. 180, is beyond the reach of any but well-to-do purchasers.

It has not come to my notice that Ceylon has been stirred by this pioneer effort among Southern Buddhists either to do likewise, or even to say anything for or against it. Outsiders like myself may well wonder if this is so, and if so, why? This year I have published in our last Report an account by Mlle. Suzanne Karpelès, herself up to the eyes in work, of the new wave of activity in forwarding Pali studies and dissemination of Pali scriptures in the countries of South East Asia, including translation of these into

1 Published in The Buddhist Annual of Ceylon, 1932.

895
Cambodian and Laotian. We outsiders know what a mighty effort was produced in the churches and the laity of Christendom by the translation into European tongues of the Christian scriptures between the 14th and 16th centuries. We know what the Head Sangha at Rome thought about this activity. Is Ceylon become the Roman Sangha of Buddhism?

Evidence of much literary industry, in at least a section of the Ceylon 'Church,' comes not seldom to hand in the form of editions of Pali texts, grammars, and even articles in English on this and that well-known orthodox formula. The last named may contain translation into English of Pitaka passages; hence there can be nothing of an offence in expressing a Pali saying in another language. Long ago the Commentator converted (with much of his own exposition) the Singhalese Commentaries into Pali:

Rejecting from that work the speech of them
Of Tambapanni, placing into it
The faultless speech that follows of the text,
The Method ...

And, since it was question of a teaching not for Ceylon only, the establishment of a common tongue for it was then a statesmanlike thing to do. To-day things are different. And if sentences put into another tongue are not profanity, is a whole Nikāya of sentences a profane work?

Surely it is not from 'bibliolatry' that ecclesiastical Ceylon is suffering? I have just discovered this to be an accepted word in an Encyclopedia, and defined as the worship of a book. Men have funny ways of worshipping. We have only to survey relic-worship in East and West to know that. One would think

---

Buddhaghosa’s Commentary on Dhammasangani.
that the best way of showing reverence for a book is to understand it, so far at least as the worshipper can. And of all religions it is Buddhism that would say, here the worshipper himself is best able to decide as to that. Here too is no abstruse system of metaphysic or technics suitable only for the few. It is true that this particular Book takes a lot of reading, and more—a lot of imagination, so little exercised as yet over it. A lot indeed, to see, as one reads, what an overgrowth there is over the great New Word, that came to "fulfil, not to destroy," the best religious teaching of India of that day, and how the very first utterance of that Word for every man has been re-shaped into an inner teaching by monks to monks for monks. Is this perhaps the reason why the present representatives of those first Sākyans, who gave with open hands their best to every man, speaking in his own tongue, withhold from the reading by every man of the "furthermost isle" (dīpam uttamaṃ) of what is here recorded about those founders? Or am I wrong in believing, that to-day, unless a man of Ceylon knows Pali or English or German, he cannot learn about this save by listening to what those present representatives choose to tell him?

Almost are we outsiders forced back on to that idea that a profaning or worsening in translating is feared. Yet Sinhalese seems to have so much of Pali (as we of Latin) in its diction, that translation into it should have been a first, rather than a last concession. And as to that, why should Pali be held worthy of any bibliolatry? Surely no one now believes, that in Pali we have the genuine Magadhese or Kosalese, such as it may be supposed was spoken, say, by Sāriputta! There were many dialects of the general Prakrit
vernacular, and who can now say which was current at Sāvatthī when, probably in the old age of the Founder, his men were busy fixing “sayings” in prose and verse? Compare the Prakrit of the beginning of the Dhammapada bark MS. found forty years ago in Khotan:

-juo namo so magu, abhaya namu sa disa,
radho akuyano namu, dhamatrakehi sahato,

with the Pali equivalent, now alas! transferred to the Saṃyutta-Nikāya:

Ujuko nāma so maggo, abhaya nāma sā disā
ratho akujano nāma dhammadakkehi saṃyuto.¹

Here is as much difference as there is between standard English and a dialect of the 14th century. Yet it is from three or four groups of such Anglo-Saxon dialects that our English, our own literary diction of this century has grown up, a matter of many centuries.

Yes, we too have had our bibliolatry here, but with education we are growing out of it. We now know, that even if we leave the English Bible and look at our Greek Testament, at our Latin (Catholic) rubrics, we are very far from the Aramaic in which Jesus and his men spoke. And more: with quickened imagination we can go back to the day of a New Word, such as they uttered, or such as the Sākyans uttered, and picture the wording of it in a tongue and diction unhallowed by long revered tradition:—how modern, how in a way unreligious it must have sounded!

¹ Straight is the name this Road is called and safe that Quarter’s name.
The chariot’s ‘silent runner’ named, fitted with Wheels of Dharm.'
A recent American recast of the gospels into modern colloquial English has had the same "shocking" effect. There was the "sacred" Law in old Hebrew for those; there were the "sacred" Vedas, in a very old diction for these; how wonderful in each has become the work of man when we take duration into account! But we can go a step further, and picture the "children of Israel" beginning their "Law," fresh from an Egypt of venerable "sacred" traditions. We can picture the Aryans when first settled in India, beginning, in the utterance of some inspired poets, the Vedic hymns:—here again will have been a beginning in the current vernacular with a crude newness about it we no longer feel. Yet in every case it was not the sanctity of the word that helped man to grow; it was what the word told him, the word of his day telling the man of that day.

To see, in the word, the very thing taught is no better than to see in the relic the man who used it. Worship of bone or book is for me the petrified religiosity that the Founders would have abhorred, nay, do abhor. So live were they, so wholly for the new, whence must come the Better, so adverse to the static, the stationary, the "done," the "has been"; so seeing man as moving, changing, becoming; both of them Men of the Way, Men of the Wayfarer, without whom Way has no meaning. Few can be the years left of this stage of the Way for me, but may I in them learn, that Ceylon is waking up to follow her younger sister’s example!
OLD WORDS AND NEW WILL

"I have no words ... ." So sigh parting lovers, so feels the mother welcoming the dear home-comer from the war, so stammers the man rescued by brother-man, so is aware the seer or hearer of new beauty, new truth. Will throbs as feeling inarticulate.

But where, in calm persistence, man’s will is registering and working the what and the how that he has pored over and come to know, there he will seek words, there he will find names. This may be a difficult task. He may find himself as a child in garments outgrown. He may have to clothe himself in garments of unwonted texture and shape. He may not find texture or shape available to clothe the new worthiness in his growth. He will make use of the best he can find. But he will clothe himself. He will find words. Even when he is expressing himself in music or plastic form; he is then not using a speaking medium; it is another form of wording; but where man’s will is working, it is mainly a wording will.

He may be working where he has already found fit words. Here he lacks no names, either for things or ways or concepts; or at least he is not aware that

---

1 Published in the *Indian Historical Quarterly*, 1925. Also a second version, as "Ancient Legacies and New Heritage" in the *Sir Asutosh Mookerji Memorial Volume*, Patna, 1926. I have here blended the two articles.
he lacks. Or he may be working in new fields, where he has not yet such a wealth of names. Here, as he comes to know, he seeks, he finds, he makes words. He makes, it may be, provisional words, and these are as the stakes set up round his new 'claim,' even as gold-seekers stake a promising area.

But where his will is not wholly in his work, where he is not keenly interested in it, he will be no wordmaker. He will fall back on, he will continue to use old wording, even when new words are needed. Where he lives by routine, by catchwords, according to tradition, he will need few words, little more than animals need them, living by instinct. It is in proportion to his interest in new knowledge that he will find words; he will find these commensurately with the value, the worth he assigns to the fresh aspects of life he has won. Where once, I repeat, men will strongly about anything not accounted for in their stock of words, they will find a name for it. Language, old and new, is strewn with such increments.

Animals are not interested in three fields which stimulate this word-finding. These are the looking at things in the whole, the looking at things in their origin and their end; the looking at things as new, as coming to be. Curiosity is aroused, but gives way to indifference, to avoidance. In these three fields man goes out to meet the new, the not yet understood, aiming at adapting it into his life. If he be living only as intelligent beast, he takes life as it comes, he watches, copes if need be with, the pageant of things, the changes in things when arrived, when recurring; he does not go out to foresee, to forearm, to seek them, explain them, change them, or change his life by better knowledge, by a better way.
This finding words for things that came has left its mark on two literatures at least; Hebrew and Buddhist. We read of Adam doing it, naming as if by a heaven-mandate interesting beasts passing before him. We read of Gotama the Sākyan naming the interesting ways of the mind-world, newly calling on him to name them. Newly, I say, and later, for man was slower and clumsier in finding words for the hidden things, the beginnings, the changes, the not fully grasped, for mind, unseen medium of the self.

And when he did try to explain, it was rather in generalizing, than in accounting for. Thus, where he has seen effects only and not causes, he will word the effects only. Where he has seen only effects and last, or proximate causes, he will not find names for the deeper lying causes. The day comes when he finds names for these also. And where the cause is that which transcends man's personal, man's racial experience, nor is bounded in his idea by that, he will find names for the cause which grew with his growth.

Thus to say:—the crescent moon when "lying on its back" means windy weather, is to word one effect by another effect.

This will not satisfy him as he grows. He will seek to word effect as such, namely, as arising from a cause. And if the cause, though relatively proximate, be unseen, unsee-able, he will tend to call it ultimate. He will name it as paramātman (supreme spirit), or dharma, or ho theos, or hoi theoi, or "power not ourselves that makes for righteousness," or "summum bonum": names for the 'Most' in this or that stage of a people's growth. Things of unseen origin, things of a whence not understood man comes to clothe in words more or less fitting, more or less happily
chosen. And with the new wording, his life takes on, by so much, a richer meaning—a yet richer meaning if the new words are pregnant: words that name not only the newly found, but point to a yet further harvest of what will come to be wrought, come to be understood, with what we are even now in travail.

Our zest in wording depends, as I have said, much on the worth we discern in that for which we seek new words. Is our welfare in any deep vital sense wrapped up in the new vision, the new synthesis? If we deem it is not, we shall either remain wordless, or at best we shall remain content with old terms, guess-words of our ignorance.

Or again, our zest in wording depends much on the degree there is with us of faith and hope that we may and shall come to know, by our will-efforts, things that we are now not knowing as things understood, as things we call natural laws. Where faith and hope are met by the fiat: We cannot know. We may not know. We cannot prove:—there we feel little zest in wording. We are then not persuaded that our welfare is deeply involved in our coming to know these things also, as part of our life’s perspective and our life’s equipment. We say: Let be, and turn to other things.

Take electricity: We have always been liable to be ‘struck by lightning,’ but hitherto we, as peoples, have left it at that. Now that we are finding more and more, that we can enrich our life indefinitely by adapting to this and that purpose a natural force or mode of motion we call electricity (a word built since the Middle Ages), we turn to this adapting or to these new adaptations with zest. And we accordingly enrich our tongue, wording them, with a vocabu-
lary of new terms, from telegraph to marconigram, not one of which is in any dictionary older than the last century.

But take the mode of motion in the man, the woman, who work by body and yet are obviously not body—the mode of motion of them when body dies and is left to ways of motion that are just of body only—the way of disintegration, of resolution into other compounds—here we have as yet not faith, not hope that we can by willed effort come to know, as natural law, the way, the mode of motion thenceforth, of the man, the woman.

And so we have no words; no words for the next state or stage of life; no word for ourselves in that next state; no word for the how or where of it—for to say “above” belongs to the old, dead ideas. We talk of the “dead” when we do not mean that which is dead. We talk of “spirits” when all the while we mean re-embodied man. We talk of “soul” as something which has left “the man,” and we do not mean that. India to some extent has been wiser. For Jain and Buddhist, devatās or devas are not what we in the West term “gods” so much as men and women in the next state when they have merited happiness. “The ascetic has lied about me,” says an indignant soldier, visitor from “beyond the grave,” to Gotama. “I am not in hell; I am a deva in the Tāvatimśa (the next) world.” And yet so little has been the serious attention devoted to this all-important matter for every one of us:—What is my life’s next step, should the body die to-morrow?—that most scriptures old and new slur over the whole question and launch us into misty vagueness. And so do they side-track the matter, that we are puzzled to follow up their one
clear implication that man, wherever man be, works embodied, not disembodied.

To only two conclusions can we reasonably come:—the first is, that neither does the Indian any more, as yet, than the western mind worth the way that is about to be my way, your way. Let us once be persuaded that it belongs very urgently to our welfare in the deepest sense to be less ignorant than we all are herein, then shall we find words. We shall find words because we shall will to find what we need. The way of the man and the woman will have become as important in our perspective as the way of electricity. We shall "more-worth" the one as we do the other. Electricity brings the earth more to our ken. The science of the world-way will bring the next state more to our ken. We shall know better what to will, what to do, if only we can extend a little further the rays of our light.

The second is, that neither does the Indian mind, any more than the western mind realize and worth the driving power of concerted wills, when once the willed end is worthed. Concerted wills have done much, in my country, that the more inert bulk of willers who drifted with tradition did not like or will. We created a navy to save our independence; we approved of plantations, yet we strove to end the slave-trade; we distrusted education, yet we carried out free elementary education to every child; we hated standing armies, yet in three years we created an immense army; we prize our individualism, yet we came to stand by the League of Nations. All the while the more inert bulk has sneered and drifted, but a sufficient number of concerted willers have willed for the rest and have done the work.
But zest in the new findings of science ignores that which is as yet the blind spot in the eye of science. Zest too, in the study of the past, in the study of men, not 'man,' turns from that which lies right across the way of you, of me. And the malaria has infected the teachers of the old creeds. They have no new message to give us to place beside the new dogmas of science and history. They tend to pare down their wisdom of the world-way to systems of ethics.

This is not because they are no longer intent on finding 'truth.' More intent perhaps than ever before on that quest, men have forgotten, that they have to seek what is true concerning not only man's body and mind, but also what is true as to the user of these, the very man. In these we can fix a standard of truth, namely by the scale of the senses, valid for the things of earth, to be learnt through body and mind. But there is another world of values in which the True can be learnt: this man has lost sight of, as not reaching him through what for him is the limit of 'sense.' Now long ago this was for him the very true. In finding words for the unseen, the not understood he was sure he was dealing with the actual, the real. Sure also, that herein was a warding of him, a warding that was both of his seen life and of his life not yet seen. Many things had he to fear, and his own warding against them was often weak and of little or no avail. Mightier warding lay in the unseen, could he but get the will of the unseen warding Willers on to his side.

But among his fellows there will have been a few who had the gift of hearing where he heard not, who could even see, where he saw not. These claimed
to be able to get at the will of the unseen, and in it to find mighty Allies. And man left this calling will to these few, recognizing them as his 'priests,' his intermediaries, his 'medicine-men,' his celebrants, sacrificers, prophets, seers, intermediaries linking him with the Warders, unseen but surely there. They, having worded their work and its object, had found fixed forms for their calling, ritual of word and act to hand on as man succeeded man. They officiated, they chanted, they passed from earth, but the fixed forms remained from generation to generation. Around the way of the rite and the ritual men lived and changed and grew, as grow man must, his wording changing, his thought changing. Till at length the unchanging ritual grew hoary, the wording became as a dying thing.

And the chanters of the ritual, once the very worders to man of the things unseen, became the wordless ones, for man had got round and beyond, and his will was at work on that which had since come to be, and which he now saw as a deepened, or new vision. Still he looked to the unseen, but he sought in it a Welfare and a wording and a way toward which he had been growing, past which he would one day grow. Here or there were men whose will had been working in those three fields of the coming-to-know, and who did not leave the quest to the medicine-men. They felt that these had come to be mere imitators, repeaters, man of ritual and routine, unable to guide the growing will, which was finding new wording, or new depth in old wording. Among these newer willers was now and then, here or there, one man who had, in some not understood way, been willed to work in uttering things the many needed, for their welfare, to know.
Such a man felt, that the chanters, the repeaters were unable to express the newer will which was seeking to be worded anew. He uttered that newer will.

We have such a crisis in the life of India. Along the watershed, the course of the Ganges some 25 centuries ago, the day arose when the family-order of intermediaries called brahmins had fallen away from being the ‘live wires’ they once had been. Still was it reckoned, that to be seeker and worder of warding in the unseen was work of highest worth. But on the one hand, the brahmin still claimed, in virtue of his birth, a class-monopoly in that seeking and wording, whether in conduct he lived, or did not live worthily. On the other hand, it was dawning on an ever greater number, that neither caste and privilege, neither sacrifice and invocation was the way leading to warding by the unseen. A new standard of values was rising. The life of man it was, that made him, or made him not, very brahmin, very worthy (arahant).

"He who in his life, his deeds is this, not that, him I call brahmin."¹

And with this new conception of the way to unseen welfare, the wording of man’s outlook thereon had changed. The old words ceased to have their former weight. To know the Vedas no longer impressed. Sacrifice seemed much ado about something grown less worthy, rites that worried men and tortured beasts, or offered the unfit to the unneeding:

“For Brahmā feedeth not on food like that.”

And fire-tending and water as sin-purging had become empty symbols.

But sīla: ‘moral habit’: here lay the very rock-bed of the true Brahmā-life; karma: ‘act’ as

¹ A repeated line in early Buddhist anthologies.
bearing responsibility: here was the arena of man's victory or defeat; mārga, 'road': here was no mere day's journey from village to town. It was the Way. Unlike saṃsāra, later word, the way all must go unless they will not to, Way was the road man should will to go, happy means to happy world's end. No longer was life a mere rolling on 'twixt births and dyings; it was a way of advance, past what man was to what he might become, marked by mile-stones of will-explosions in resolve and aspiration. New words too grew up for worlds' end. Svarga, of happiness too earthlike and transient, gave way in time to nirvāṇa, a not understood utter welfare. And mōksha, wording a new feeling after liberty when, for the immigrant aggressive Aryan, only solidarity had been possible, now pointed also to a supreme welfare, but, like nirvāṇa, conceived only negatively, as riddance.

The quickened will, thus working and wording, prevailed till the cults of the Way were forces to be reckoned with by rulers. Asoka, reputed as at first a fratricide, and actually a war-like aggressor, was a notable opportunist. He marked the strength of the Jain and Buddhist ethical reforms, and fathered both them and brahmins very cleverly, establishing in peace and worthiness his war-renouncing sovereignty.

But that living will of the new spirit had not been all-wise. It had called to its aid a way coming at its birth to be deemed the only truly wise, yet which barred its world-progress. This was the finding the unseen warding more surely, more quickly by leaving, by 'coming forth from', the things seen. It was to leave the fellowship in life and work with fellowmen and fellow-women, who had not 'come forth,' the while it profited by the life and work of those fellow-
men, to sustain the life of all. And thus it was, as to
warding of earth-life, to become a parasite, no less than
king and courtier, courteznàn, warrior and beggar were
parasites. Counterservice was, it was claimed, ren-
dered by the monk no less than by those other parasites.
But chiefly it was claimed for the goers-forth that they
had cast off their own hindrances. They had not had
the extra burden of aiding many thousands to go un-
hindered. They, the goers-forth, could work free
from care as their own intermediaries with the things
unseen, needing no priest.

The mistake lay in holding that the prize of the
Way’s End was for those who were thus held to have
run ahead of their spiritually weaker fellowmen.
Knowledge and wording of the newer will came to
suffer thereby, as all onward moving has suffered when
one section of the community has sought to raise itself
with its veto on the rest, be the rest the commons,
or the slave, or the woman, or the laity. So the new
will in its turn became wordless; melted away from
India, and where it now survives, tending to maintain
its old uncompromising cleavage of church and laity,
and in the far north in Tibet even becoming, not the
buttress of a folk-fed monarchy, but the very monarchy
itself.

Yet the wording of what had been once a creative
will lived on in India, as we may see in the later
scriptures of the reascent post-Asokan world of
brahmin intermediaries. Here there is much that
could be said on what befell this revived will and new
wording in the warders of it as the years rolled on.
Others can do this with more competence. To-day it
is with the very great significance in our having words
or not having words that I end my say.
To-day we are earnestly looking back over our shoulders at these old-world, and at much older-world leavings. This has its uses. To it for that matter, in one corner of it I have given the best part of my life. For it is still my conviction that inquiries into the bases, as well as into the growth of ancient thought may become a living force in present evolution, even as the explorer, carving a way to the forward view, turns to adjust his bearings by some rearward range of hills with kindred trend.

But we tend to overlook how heavy a tax it is levying on our will's creative energy in seeking and wording the new. Because of its absorbing just those willers who are not attracted (as are most) by research in the world of matter, but who are attracted by research into the world of the man himself, his becoming and what he has yet to accomplish, the residue of will-force left to look not backward but ahead is sadly to seek.

And because there is so little will-work being wrought, not in what man has done, not in what man has been, but in what he is and is coming to be, we have no new or quickened wording on it.

In those old-world leavings we shall win no new treasures in the claims we stake. At the worst we come only on cast-off clothes; at the best we come upon some ever-true wording that once was new. We learn old things we did not know, and that, so far as it goes, is well. If now we find among them a new message for us, it is because we have been slothful and dull not to have discerned it before, for instance, what was the genuinely original message in what we now call Buddhism.

But by this very poring over the old—especially in so far as it shapes our education of the young—our
life and outlook are moulded by the limitations of the old. We tend to live and think in a world where is enthroned the king, conqueror, judge, little god, victims at his feet, offerings held out to him; in a world with underworld of prisoner and slave, courtier and woman; in a world where welfare is of the body, of a dominant class, where growth, success, progress is of material things, rather than of character, or of world-amity; in a world where the whole of it is still mainly alien or even unknown, the outlook over it very small; in a world where worth is rated by power, by ruthlessness, by victory in war, by subjugation of the majority¹; in a world where worth is still too little rated, by increase in the welfare of man as man. And all of it, save for some immortal world-words, which we have taken, or should have taken up into our lives, all is dead, of a dead world. The living men, the living women whose were those husks so long ago, what of them? Are we perhaps deaf as we dig to that old world-word: "Why seek ye the living among the dead?" the live men among the dead things? Of them we say, with our eyes full of dead things, they are just dead. Of some thousands mostly nameless we say "Their name liveth for evermore." So did a poet echo the word of a mainly dead writing, wording it in a wrong way, because he had been trained to pore over dead old things.

Those of us, who would work and word in the field of the man regarded as not the dying body but the user of it, are as heirs for whom a kingdom waits, while we are searching to make good our claim to it. Let us enter upon our kingdom. The men of old did no less.

¹ A cankered outlook in our midst we are now [1942] held up over, having to cut it out.
They did not seek to recreate their past. They worded their present, if they were world-worders. They worded truly, for their present: that was they. But their present, that is not you or I. We are changed. Not only is our world new; the man, the woman, the soul, spirit that we are is not persistingly old. Hence is the wording we have to give no more the same. We can be the vivid, the true worders only of that which we now are. We can word what the past did not know, did not want to know, was not ready to know.

Even the child of Asia, even the Indian words new ideals, words his world-words not as he did in the past. Or not with the same meaning. Into the bottles of ancient wisdom they, (as we) tend to pour new wording of a newer outlook, the while we say, Let that ancient teaching be our guide. Nay, all the guidance it can give us, as old wisdom, is that by it we may measure how far we have come. Herein it gives us a wording we ought else to be slow in accepting to-day. We can come to know the word we need by the measure of words the old world had not, and was not ware that it lacked.

Our chief creative energy to-day is willing work in the world of matter. There, working to come to know, we find new wording: names of elementals not known before: ion, proton, electron; names of new ways and means for man’s rushing to meet and word his fellows, conquering space. Here has creative energy been at work, finding and naming like a very Adam. But we do not see corresponding energy at work in that world of willers who seek to know the new, the unknown, the possibly knowable about not matter but man, about not men’s bodies but about the man who uses body, about not the mind or will, but about man as wielding
it. Such wills are either burying themselves in the past, seeking the living among the dead, or they are following too servilely, as to mind, the way of research in matter, seeking man in his animal body, his "herd" mind, or explaining him by repressed and stunted growth of will.

Nor are such wills preparing our sons to be more fruitful workers in the field of the man and of the world-way of him and of what he may become. Eight to twelve precious years are too often filled with what we frankly call "dead" languages. This means firstly, that their young outlook is narrowed (we deem complacently it is widened) by the leavings and the wordings of an outgrown past; secondly, that they go forth among their fellow-men, not equipped as once were learned men, with a common tongue containing such written wisdom as we once had, but crippled and dumb for want of means of access. When they travel or write, they are still self-islanded, self-frontiered by the one and only live tongue they can speak. They are as deaf-mutes. The intermediary they most need is not the priest, but the interpreter. They cannot feel the pulse that throbs in the native tongue of other fellow men; they cannot discuss together the common good, the outlook before man; they cannot be forwarding the international training in world-peace, world-citizenship, world-warding.

So do we hinder ourselves where we might be moving on together. So do we make a little world where we might be in a greater one. So do we harness our vision to a corner, in time and space, of our world, when ours, as man, is the way of all the worlds of earth and the rest.

We are brave workers, but we tie our arms. We
are swift to find words where will works, but we gag ourselves. When we have so worked that we can name, our will as from a springboard bounds forward to find the new name, the 'more-word.' Now are we wordy, but not worded. Our books are largely cud-chewers. We do not know what more-wording may not come, once our wills are set to find new pasture, new worlds to conquer, once we fare forth to word the new, and not so very much the old.
WORTHY NAMES AND THE NAMEWORTHY

There are, it may be, some who are content to call 'being well' just being rid of pain. I knew a teacher—one of the best from a land of great teachers, Scotland—who spoke from the chair with sympathy of this way of naming happiness, or pleasure, or being well. "Why seek a better wording, some say," said he, "than just riddance of pain? We can live without positive happiness; we can resolve to do without pleasure, but we cannot live ever in pain." He suffered much and often. He doesn't now. But that pain was of the body. The man was neither quenched not daunted by it.

Languor was not in his heart,
Weariness not on his brow.

for, while he ailed in body, he was, as man, seeking the good of the 'man' in us; he was naming to us nameworthy things that he saw; he was seeking to make us well. Like a skilled player, he made that marred instrument of body express for us so much able guidance, that few were aware how jangled it could be with pain.

Happiness, pleasure, well-being, or, as Continentals say, 'well'—these are all very nameworthy things.

1 Published in Current Thought, Madras, 1927.
2 G. Croom Robertson.
If they are not always in the very van of our activities, they are ever at the central spring of the living will. We are not always, in this and that work, consciously aiming at them. But it is not a worthy name for them to call them riddance of pain, absence of suffering, freedom from sorrow. Such a way of naming them indicates that we are, when rid of pain or woe, looking back at our riddance, and not forward to what that riddance means, and lets us do. It means that we are like a shipwrecked, rescued man, who is content to stand, with Lucretius’s coastwatcher, on the cliff and survey seawards the waves he has won out of, and does not look landward at where he is now able to go. It is the opposite attitude to that of the new healing, which bids us concentrate on our betterment, and not keep ill by brooding on ill, by wording our ills.

It is in old Indian literatures that this naming of the ‘well’ by the not-ill, the good by the not-bad, is for the European student a very obtrusive feature. Especially in the language of Buddhist books, of which I am less ignorant than I am of others, it was ever rising up and hitting me in the eye. But it was well to be in sympathy with their outlook, so I looked around for the same sort of terms in nearer tongues. They were far fewer. ‘Immortality,’ ‘independence,’ ‘infinite,’ ‘invaluable,’ ‘unconditioned,’ ‘absolute,’ with the implicitly negative ‘liberty’—are there any more of prime importance? We of the West do not describe springs of good action as non-greed, non-hate, non-dulness; we do not name kindness as non-harm, generosity as non-covetousness, benignity as non-malevolence, disinterestedness as non-lust. Nor do we call health non-disease. Nor do we conceive the Goal as a going out (as of fire), as a going forth (as
from a jungle), as cessation, as passionlessness, as the unborn, the not-dead, the unshaking, as the 'not-whence-(cometh)-fear,' as liberation.

I am not saying that with names, mainly negative, it is impossible to express earnestly, impressively. How could I say so whose it has been to deal with the language of such saintly rapture as:

This that doth ne'er grow old, that dieth not,
This never-ageing, never-dying way—
No sorrow cometh there, no enemies.
Nor is there any crowd; none faint or fail,
No fear cometh, nor aught that doth torment—
To this, the Way to Immortality, have gone
Full many.¹

There is holy passion in Sumedhā's lines, but it all has to be got in naming the things she did not want to meet.

Yet we also, I thought, do thrill to those negative terms: immortality, infinite, liberty. We have only to credit other traditions with a more widely distributed thrill, arising from a greater number of terms. And more: there may have been deliberate purpose in this more negative way. It emphasized the need of cleansing, of clearing out the transmitted badness of ages of past lives in the individual: of pruning, of purging the present outcrop of activities, which hinder the man from admitting the better, from developing his best, from concentrating on the one thing needful. Only by much 'not this, not thus' could he so refine his life, that it became not merely an average quantity, but of a transformed quality. For of such was Arahatta, supreme worth.

This apology was all well-meaning, but it was not

¹ Psalms of the Sisters (Therīgāthā), verses 512, 513.
very wise. It sought truth, but in the wrong way. It sought to interpret the old world by the new. It was an apologia for certain features in Indian religion which its votaries neither worded, nor judged to be called for. It was an effort to make the modern West, including the writer, swallow and justify the standpoint of a certain epoch in Indian religions. Those religions had developed under certain conditions. The result was an attitude which led to a negative naming of the Good, of the Well, of the Goal. No apology for that attitude had been judged needful. Apology was judged to be needed for those who did not accept the attitude.

That attitude was that saintship is won and the Goal brought close by the man who cuts himself off from the common life, who denies the 'will to live' in the world of men now, or in other worlds of men called Devas hereafter. The Sāṅkhya school and the Jains praised, in that out-of-the-world life, the practice of tapas (asceticism). The Buddhists rejected this, albeit many actually fell back on modified forms of it. Cynics and sceptics ridiculed the religious world, then as now. But the bulk of the people honoured them. They were the 'worthy,' the holy; their nearness and the tending of them conferred merit.

But the ascetic’s or monk’s view of life and of the worlds is of necessity largely negative. He has cut himself off from most of what is positive in the world in which he has grown up, and in which he will end his present span of life. And he is not clearly informed as to any other worlds awaiting him. He words them chiefly as ‘not’ (ne’ti). There is much left of an unworldly character in his thinned-out life which he can word positively. But where monasticism and
asceticism have absorbed a certain proportion of the people, as they have done in Southern Asia, at different times and in different degrees, the tendency to consider life as only worthy, if most of that which fills it up has been got rid of, is very strong, so that it infects even the saintly vocabulary. And the forward view, though it may be an attitude of confidence, is in substance of the vaguest; the backward view over vanquished perils is much more usual.

Moreover, these modern apologies help the Oriental sectarian of to-day to go on accepting old traditions:—the honouring of asceticism and monasticism, acquiescence in the wording of old scriptures and so forth—which he ought by this time to put aside as ways of an old dead world.

Thus is the old misrepresented and the new man held back.

But slowly we are getting wiser. We are coming to accept the old as old, and as such the less likely to be fit for the new world. We can witness how so much of it has died, is dying. We can witness, in old scriptures, how an inspired message becomes clothed about with institutions which for a time grow, and then grow no more. Commentaries are then written, which accept and vindicate the institutions without disentangling the ever-living message or 'Gospel.' And men grow on, and finally the inspired message, having become wrought up into their ideals, they tend to father these ideals on to the old scriptures, instead of disentangling the original message and finding in it something that is assumed in their own religion.

But, any way, it may be said, the essential moral code is as negatively worded in the West as in the East:—'Thou shall not kill' and so forth.
WORTHY NAMES AND THE NAMEWORTHY

That is true. The moral code, as worded in the old world by a handful of Hebrews, once helped the world of the West, and then, by the form of that wording, retained a strangle-hold upon its new growth. We still hear the sneer of the Cain of those old Hebrew scriptures over the murdered Abel: 'Am I my brother's keeper?' even from worthy lips. 'Thou shalt not kill' is good, as far as it goes. But to that merely negative wording it is largely due that we hear the sneer to-day. For it is nearly two thousand years ago since there came to a newer world a man with a better wording:—that he *was* his brother's, sister's keeper.

To the question: 'Who is my neighbour?' that man replied with that greatest of all Jātakas, of all parables: 'The Good Samaritan.' All are your neighbours, your 'near ones,' who are, who may be wanting warding. Here was the moral law reworded: 'Thou shalt ward the life, the health of thy fellowman.' So also should we re-word the rest:—'Thou shalt ward thy fellowman's goods,' 'thou shalt ward those dear to him,' 'thou shalt ward him in all thy speech,' 'Thou shalt ward thy body for him in thy drink.'¹

The good Samaritan is now an old word in an old scripture, but it is not a dead teaching; it is of the kernel of the original ever-living message of a world-helper. Yet it also is only just as far as it goes. We have come to believe that we need more. We have come to believe that we are the warders of the minds of our fellowmen, as well as of their bodies, even though here, again, we may hear the sneer 'To educate the minds of the masses is bad.' Nay, we have to

¹ The Buddhist fivefold code reworded.
get further yet. Badly yet do we ward the will of our fellowmen. Nor will that one day be enough. For when we have once come to realise what that means, we shall be willing to ward each other both before and after this life on earth.

So far, then, it is we who have to find worthier naming for our name-worthy moral code. In this we are no further than Buddhist and Jain with theirs, and their ahimsā and the rest. What then of those other negative names to which we on our part still cling? Is not 'immortality' (amṛta, amāta) worthily named?

Far from it. It is but a name for our ignorance. For what do these words mean but just 'absence of death'? When Xenophon's weary, errant Greek soldiers in Asia Minor at long last caught sight of the sea, they did not cry: 'No land! No land!' They shouted and sobbed 'Thalatta! Thalatta!' The sea! The sea! For them that shimmering azure meant ships, meant the coast, meant Greece, meant home. They worded not the soil they were painfully getting done with; they worded the way out. More-will-to-the-sea surged up in them, to sail, to get home. So wrote a man in a newer world:—'This one thing I do: forgetting the things that are behind and reaching forth unto the things that are before I press forward....'\(^1\) Immortality says nothing whatever about the more-living. And so, veiled in that old word and its Indian parallels, we grope along, weary errant soldiers. Yet, already we are beginning to use a more positive name: survival. It doesn't take us far, but it does at least name our frontal sea, and not the mere fact of our leaving land. One day we shall

---

find a better name and thrill no more to the hollow ring of the old.

The negative name 'infinite' (ananta) is no better. It is but an excuse for lazy thinking. It is good that we let our limited minds practise expansion. It is not good to rest content with expansion as such. The lecturer on astronomy expands our cramped imagination, but he does that, not by merely showing us the vast inane, but by charting it for us. He shows it to us as a teeming manifold—a bhūman. I question the accuracy of certain translators who have rendered that notable term bhūman as 'infinite,' 'unbeschränkt.'

Nor do our minds feed healthily on the inane left by the negative names 'unconditioned,' 'absolute.' We are left by these with a world, with a being into which nothing on earth fits, no name, no idea, no experience. With such a being we can enter into no relations whatever. When heaven, when deity is thus named, by the speculative thinker, men, ay, and men of good will put these on one side, and seek either nothing involving the larger duty, or only a nearer goal, finding deity in man.

But 'liberty,' 'deliverance,' 'emancipation,' 'moksa,' 'mukti,' 'vimutti':—are not then these worthier names for the highest, the best? Here are no negatives—Nay, can that really be claimed for them? When did these names come up in history? They are not the oldest names for things most name-worthy. They can be seen emerging in scriptures not the oldest. How could the invading Aryan host afford, on their great adventure, to shake off, even in idea, the

¹ Chāndogya Upanishad. VII, 22 f; So Max Müller and Deussen. R. E. Hume: 'plenum.' Tatyā: 'immensity.'
close solidarity of the herd, the horde? They could not. But once they were settled in the new home, once that was made safe, then the individual might begin to weary of the social groove, then might his religious aspirations take on the language of the freed captive, the escaped slave; then, and then only could 'liberty' begin to call up the thrill we of Europe have long known politically, as India now knows it, as India has known it spiritually so long a time.

But what do the names 'liberty' and 'moksa' and the rest signify in themselves but just a negation, a riddance? They convey to us nothing of that to which the escaped one can look forward. They imply only that he can look forward, that he can move as he wills. That he is freed from, he knows; but what is he freed into?

This, the most name-worthy thing that we can conceive, it is not easy to name, much less to name more worthily than we do. But the life of each of us is very long. There is time for each and all of us to grow towards the worthier naming, and to concentrate upon it as we grow. And this we can be doing now by cultivating a healthy discontent with all negative naming now taking front rank in names of things most nameworthy. We shall never grow on negative names.

But let us never cease to be sure that, as to these things, we can grow and shall grow. Because men have for ages thrilled to the idea, in different tongues, of the immortal, *amrta*, or of liberty, *moksa*, or of nirvana, is no safe guarantee that they will always do so. Man has conceived these ideas, man has made these names, and the mind of man, the wording will of man is not duller, is not more limited than it was. It is chiefly of man's will coming to worth, coming to hold in
worth the way not merely towards this or that minor good, but towards his becoming utterly well. If he so contemplates life's opportunities, he will find himself brought up against a few very strong, very terse, very precious names:—will, worth, way, ward, warden, weren, well. Let him see in them clues to the very bedrock of man's nature, the very chart of the whole of man's world-way.

If he will do this, it may not be so very long before he finds that those famous negative names, which have so long dominated his imagination, which still so largely hinder his growth, will show signs of being undermined. Let us at least put them to the test. They are all Aryan names worthy to be, in one Aryan form or another, held in higher worth than they now are. Indian Aryan tongues can very worthily equate one and all of them, if India wills.
YOGA AND THE FELLOWMAN

It is surely a new and a notable thing for a man expert in the medical science of the West to be launching an international periodical under a name closely associated with the mystical lore of the East, a name which is hoary over against a medical science which is relatively young, a name which in its meaning, or meanings is an outcome, not of effort to heal body or mind, but of a quest for the melioration of the very man, wielder of body and of mind. Well, so be it! I like new things. The new is not always the better, but the better is ever of the new. And with my fellow-contributors and fellow-readers, I shall watch the way of this newcomer, the Yoga-Zeitschrift, with interest and good-will.

Here I will only add three suggestions to guide the European reader of Yoga.

1. We know that yoga is etymologically one with our "yoke," Joch, joug, yugum, both in form and in first meaning. But when we go further than this we must distinguish. For classical usage in Europe, yoke means bondage, servitude. This is what it

1 These two articles were published in the opening issues of a German International Journal entitled Yoga, in 1931. I never heard any more of the movement, either from the Editor, Helmut-Palmié, or otherwise.
meant for the Bible, for Shakespeare. "Thy father made our yoke heavy; make thou it lighter!" is typical of the Bible usage. "Our country sinks beneath the yoke; it weeps, it bleeds!" is what Shakespeare saw in the word. The tamed beast of draught is the type. The yoke is the grip on the neck. Not here must the Indian, the religious, that is, the derived meaning of Yoga be sought. That meaning is throughout a "joining."

Nor is the joining to be understood as desirable save for one purpose. This is to win, in joining, strength. There is to be "a fitting in, a linking together." It is the mechanical arts that are the symbol, not the bound neck. And it is with this meaning only in view that we shall rightly approach and profit by the association of our culture with this venerable Indian term.

But wherein and when was such a yoking held to be needed, that strength and not frustration might result?

This was about a century after some inspired man and his followers had been teaching, in North India, that man should seek the Highest, not in external symbols or personalized forces, but in himself. The man of India was told, as the man of Israel had already been told, to go forth from his cave of shadows and learn, that the Most High was in neither wind, storm, earthquake, nor fire, but that, with face wrapped away from these, he was to heed a Voice within. And That, he was told, art Thou. Now this: the God as man the very Self, "proved to be a task as well as a problem." (Radhakrishnan, Study of the Upanishads.) The tremendous apartness had somehow to be bridged. Yoga was the
effort of the bridging. Without that effort frustration would have triumphed. For at the same time there was growing the new vogue in psychology, that is, in analysis of the body, and of the mind too, as not the Man. And this tendency, known as Sāṁkhya, threatened to complete, rather than to bridge over the apartness between the man-self and the Divine Self which Yoga sought to show as bridgeable.

2. Here again is where we need further to keep clear the Indian standpoint, the Indian values. Self, taken alone, is for us a depreciated word. Our Editor refers to the Self as Ego. But this too is a depreciated word. When this worsening began and deepened is none too clear. But it remains very fact. For us, “self” is so far from implying the highest we can be, or conceive ourselves as being, that it is used for the worst that we are or tend to be. So far are we from seeing in our fellowman the Holy Self who is “I,” that we set that “self” over against our fellowman’s interests. This is a deplorable loss. Christian teaching makes good in the doctrine of regenerate sonship: “Dearests! Now are we the sons of God.” But our usage of self separates us from Indian religious thought more effectively perhaps than anything else. For Indian religion, “self” is the man, not at his worst, but at his transcendent best. And the adjective of self, adhyātma, is at opposite poles to our ruined word “selfish.”

In compounds, it is true, we may get nearer:

Self-knowledge, self-reverence, self-control:
These three lead life alone to highest power

show a lessened contrast. Yet here it is a classic Greek, not a modern Western ideal that is presented;
and in the compound “self-control” we still have the self in the lower sense only. India, it is true, knew this compound well, when Yoga was developing, but for Yoga self in the higher sense was ever there, ever dominant. And if we read “self” in the higher sense in another literature—the Pāli writings—outcome of a teaching which began when Yoga was taking shape—this is because translators read European standpoints into Indian compounds:

“Be ye they who have the Self as lamp, the Self as chosen resort” is truer to India than the rendering “Leuchte in euch selbst”: selfit, “lamps unto yourselves.” There is here no bidding man fall back on his own unaided uninspired individuality—what a mockery of a gospel would that not be!—Mighty are the man’s allies, but he must look past earth to know them standing by. Mightiest the Ally, the “Witness” in himself, one with him at the root of his nature, a germinal potency to be developed. Greatly here do we need, in Yoga, to read India from within.

3. Hence, if we would, in these pages, “join” our cultural aspirations with those of India, we have ever to keep before us, that—to use our Editor’s word—“the fulfilment of our manhood” is no orphaned struggle of the lonely man. It is a much greater thing. No greater bidding to man on his nature and possibilities has ever been mandated to him, than this of India. We rate man as little and puny by his original nature, while we respect his efforts. But in that bidding we have the man, little and imperfect though he be as yet, bearing within him the essential being of That who is “perfectly fulfilled,” and therewith the guarantee that
perfect fulfilment is his birthright. To enter on that heritage needs a long, long process of "Joining." But nothing less than complete joining is implicit in Yoga. For that long wayfaring the German of to-day has a greater word than we or the Latin. He has the pregnant word "Werden," a word stronger, I believe, than was the Indian word bhū, bhava, the increased use of which, in the century preceding the development of Yoga, is so noticeable in Indian literature. To bridge the gulf of the Thou and the That, bhū seemed insufficient; Yoga took its place. But for us of to-day, the biological concept of Werden, Becoming, will avail more in our quest of fulfilment than the mechanistic concept of Yoga. We have to become That Who we are. Herein is no progress of body and mind to come between to obscure. In Yoga it was the very 'man who sought to "join." For us who belong to the morning, it is, it remains the man-in-man who seeks to become, who by nature wills to become, who by nature is bound to become.

B

There are few words more rich in meaning than the word Yoga. It covers a wide and long field of Indian culture; it covers several aspects of that field. Hence the interpreter, who belongs to a different field of culture, has to use more than any one term for it. Hence too he has to make explicit this or that feature covered by it, to a degree one "to the manner born" may not need. The former difficulty was pointed out (to mention no others) by Georg Bühler, when commenting on the various meanings in Yoga in the Bhagavad Gītā (S.B.E., VIII, p. 11), a difficulty
which is reflected in Garbe's translation a quarter of a century later. Here it is with the latter task that I am concerned. To what extent does Yoga 'cover' early Buddhism? Or, to what extent did early Buddhism make its own contribution to Yoga?

The latter is, at this time of day, perhaps the most needed consideration. Many things have been written of late years in more than one little manual and article about "Buddhism" having been practically a form of yoga. And with these assertions there has hardly gone a sufficiently careful scrutiny, plied with an active historic imagination, of those Pali scriptures which are, at present, our oldest guides. I have repeatedly these last four years published results of my own inquiries into the nature of what stood for Yoga in those scriptures.¹) I propose here to summarize those results and to show with new emphasis to what extent they reveal an interesting, if temporary development of such Yoga-culture as existed in the day of the inception of the Buddhist movement.

And here let me drop the, to me, objectionable word—a very mushroom in terminology—"Buddhism," (I do not dispute its usefulness in width of denotation) and, for the first few centuries of the cult, use the historic and Indian term of Sakya, or if you will: Shākya.

Whatever we may find in Sakya or Shākya as true to the tradition of yoga, we must at any rate drop the word itself. To the reader of the Pāli Pitakas, yoga has become sadly depreciated. Its basic meaning of 'joining,' glorified in the Mātri Upanishad as

¹ In the Indian Historical Quarterly (Dec., 1927), in Gotama the Man (1928), and in Sakya, or Origins of Buddhism (1931).
'making all one in the supreme imperishable,' has become, for the men of monastic ideals, solely a linking with things held as evil—with desire, viewed only as sensuous and worldly, with opinion, namely of the other man, with becoming, viewed only as usher in of ill, with ignorance, namely about ill. Nor does the word fare better with the intensive compound sam-, in the category of samyojanāni, or 'fetters.' It is, with very few exceptions, only in such compounds as anuyoga, yogakkhema, that we get the word yoga used clear of depreciated meaning, as a work or study calling for absorbing effort.

Among those very few exceptions, one is the lines in Dhammapada, an anthology abounding in survivals of pristine Sakya: yogā ve jāyati bhūrī, etc.:

From earnest pondering (yoga) is wisdom born, from lack of earnest pondering wisdom wanes: this parting of the ways when he doth know, by making-to-become, or the reverse, he may so fix the self that wisdom grows (282).

Either then we must seek for an equivalent term or terms: or we must seek a reason, in Sakyan teaching and practice, contravening the Indian content of the word yoga.

As to the latter alternative, so far are we from finding any opposed teaching, that the prescribed preliminaries for work of Yoga are often found in the Pāli Suttas in almost identical wording. We come to the former alternative, and find, that if, for the word Yoga, we substitute two of the terms, which in the Upanishads of middle date are called the six parts or factors (saḍanga-) of Yoga,¹ we are

¹ In the (later) Yoga sūtras, these are eight in number.
confronted by a ‘factor’ in Sakyan teaching and practice of no less vital importance than Yoga itself had come to assume, in the “established church” of Brahman teaching and practice. I refer to the two term: (1) samādhi-, and (2) jhāna-, in Sanskrit dhyāna-. In the Mātrī context just quoted, these two are classed with four others: (3) restraint of breath, (4) withdrawing of (attention by way of) sense, then (2) dhyāna-, (5) sustained (attention), or dhāranā-, (6) conjecture (intellectual activity proper or tarka-), finally (7) samādhi-. Here then must we seek, if we would talk of Yoga in equivalent Sakyan terms: here and not in the word Yoga itself.

And first, let it be remembered, that in these two words: samādhi-, and dhyāna-, we are not handling words of the oldest known Indian vocabulary. Relative to the rise of Sakya they had come in not long before. And samādhi- would appear to be the younger of the two. It does not occur in Upanishadic literature earlier than the relatively late Mātrī. Dhyāna- is found once in the Taittirīya Āranyaka, in just a passing mention. But attention is paid to the term in the Chāndogya Upanishad. And the notice is of interest. It forms, namely, with manas (the “measuring,” valuing, purposive attribute of man), a class as distinct from other attributes, while being held, in its class, distinct from manas. And again, it is judged as having or meaning a ‘more’ (bhūyas) than (a) one aspect of intelligence: citta, and less than (b) another aspect of intelligence: vijnāna. This distinction from other such aspects is maintained in the eloquent passage ascribing all such and more to the Self as their source (VII, 26, 1). And this is all!

For further reference we must come to an Upanishad
much nearer, I conclude, to the day of Sakya’s beginning: the Shvetāśvatara. The context is again for us of interest. In an attempt to distinguish between the divine all-containing Self and the human self, dhyāna is brought in as a mode of linking and illuminating:—“As by friction of the fire-sticks, fire is produced, so by contact of the visible man (deha-) and mystic speech (Om), is revealed in dhyāna a deva, as were he hidden fire.

The Maitrī, probably following the Shvetāśvatara at no great interval, maintains the old distinction in likeness of dhyāna with manas, and explicitly subsumes it under Yoga, as we saw. Otherwise it adds nothing.

Further references to dhyāna and samādhi are found, but only in later post-Sakyan Upanishads. But in the two from which I have just quoted, the values represented by these two terms are utterances of the time-spirit which was newly active, when the birth of Sakya took place.

The Sutta-Piṭaka is, it is true, a much later working-over, in composition, and again later in writing, of fragmentary Sayings, dating, many of them, from the time of that new activity. But in the high place they assign to the two terms they have maintained a tradition of it. At the same time they reveal a remarkable change of values in the way in which they deal with the objectives sought in the practice of either samādhi or jhāna.

We find in these Suttas, in the first place, a maintenance of the distinction between jhāna and ratiocinative thought. Thus, of two strengths in man, one is that of computation (paṭisankhāna): a term linking

4 Anguttara-Nikāya, ii, 1, 10.
the record with the new analytical tendency known as śāmkhya; the other is that of developing (bhāvanā-, lit. making to become). The former is described as purposive reflection. The latter is described, firstly, as an eliminating of the morally undesirable; secondly, as a developing of the spiritually desirable; thirdly, as the practice known as the four stages of jhāna. These stages are constantly referred to in terms of a formula. Samādhi is given a wider denotation, including these stages, and also various forms of zealous heedfulness in the study of blameless living. Samādhi may be jhāna; jhāna is always samādhi. Let us confine our attention to the more specific of the two.

In the recent writings cited above I have shown in some detail what appears, from the Piṭakas, to have a changed objective in jhāna. The result of this older tradition being transformed into a newer, more restricted object is mixed—as we should expect—leaving us in difficulties, if we persist in seeing in jhāna only the accomplished transformation. Thus, the formula, as it is cited, in catechisms, and in the sequent flow of sermons, is variously said to lead up to (a) a more abstract series of what are termed āyatanas, or undifferentiated plena of consciousness, terminating sometimes in coma, (b) psychic states, five in number, (c) spiritual enlightenment, called indifferently insight, knowledge, release, (d) stopping or nirodha, a word sometimes suggesting the meaning it has in the Yoga-sūtras, of suppression, sometimes identified with nirvāṇa. (Nirvāṇa again is now defined as elimination of the undesirable, now as a culmination to rebirth).

But if we dig around such careful mosaics of ritual, we unearth other connected fragments. Thus, those
four stages are sometimes called āpajhāna, or jhāna belonging to another worthier world, where dwell Brahmādevas. And jhāna is said, in such a connection, to be practised with the intent to gain access to that world, namely, to inmates of it:—"When for access to āpā he makes a way to become, then . . ." 1 Again, in a passage specifying three kinds of "sittings" (sayana), the third, called the "deva-sitting" is explained in terms of jhāna-formula. Yet again, a monk who has "attained to devas" (Pāli: devapatta) is described as expert in jhāna. Once more, when Gotama is recorded as being asked, when is a purely happy world made present? his reply runs: "As long as a man in Fourth Jhāna has attained to converse with those deva's who are living in a purely happy world, is present with them, talks with them." Finally, the leading disciple Moggallāna is recorded as entering fourth jhāna in order to observe, in men and women of another world, the happy results of good deeds done on earth, that so he might report to his fellows, encouraging them to do likewise. 2

These and other contexts reveal a background of aim in Jhāna which is, as it were, sedulously omitted from the formula, as well as from the majority of contexts in which that formula occurs. The formula begins and ends in terms of psychological interest. The practiser has, it is true, at the outset, to get aloof from worldly, morally undesirable things, but then he embarks on a process of eliminating inner, or mental activities, first intellectual, then emotional, till there is left only a dual experience of sati, or mental alertness, and upakkhā, or equanimity highly clarified.

2 Vimāna-vatthu Commy. For fuller treatment see Sakya, Chap. ix.
Here the fourfold formula ends. No ulterior object is put into words. We are obviously dealing with the cultivation of a *predisposing state* of body and mind. But it is and remains, as is hinted at in the Upanishads, a state which is not intellectual nor meditative, as we understand those terms. The general term for such activity: *manasikāra*, or work of mind, is not brought in; indeed it has been eliminated in the first stage. The word *sati*, a Pāli slipping down from the Vedic *smṛti*, ‘remembering,’ also ‘tradition,’ took on a new force in Sakya, when a divorce from the “established church” of Brahman teaching became inevitable. There came a breaking away from the support of *smṛti* (tradition), i.e., that which, in a bookless world, *was remembered*. Sakya became perforce a church of the New Word of an unformed tradition. Spiritual alertness (or mindfulness, or heedfulness) became more vital than recurrence to tradition. To be receptive became more essential than the quoting of Mantras. The forward view was more appropriate than the Vedic vista behind.

Now I would not readily grant, that, in this fourfold Jhāna formula—it is the one most frequently quoted in the Suttas—we have an original Mantra, dating from the day of the first Sakyans. I incline to see in it a later recension, based on an earlier form of words, which may have fitted better as a sequel to that opening phrase: “At what time he makes a way to become for access to rūpa (-devas) . . . .” Moreover we have in it keen interest in the new psychological culture of mind as *apart from the man* (*puruṣa*), which came to be known as Sāṅkhya, but which is not so relatively matured, as new interest, in old contexts in the Pitaka’s. And so I think, that for
present purposes we can put the formula on one side, with the remark, that if, in its emphasis on 'alertness' as preparatory climax, an original feature survives, it is this:—The attitude aimed at in the jhāyin was receptive, the tabula rasa, a readiness to be impressed; not trance, not ecstasy, not the fixed idea, not rapt meditation. There may have been something of all these in Yoga, first and last. But jhāna was distinctive, and if we heed those deva-allusions quoted above, it may be, we shall be reminded of what Eli said to the youth Samuel: "it shall be, that if he call thee, thou shalt say: Speak for thy servant heareth." I mean that the Sakyan jhāyin was listening, watching.

The response to the invitation, the 'call,' might conceivably come as a revealed idea in the form of 'inspiration.' It might come as an intuition of that Divine Self, or ideal Man, contemplated by the yogin as "my true Kinsman," till, "won to evenness and unity with Him, then only become I really He Who I am," of the Mahābhārata poems. Such would be the direct outcome of the established teaching, of immanent Deity conceived as the Self. But in early Sakyan teaching, the new idea is brought forward of the divinity within conceived as dharma: the idea of the 'ought-to-be,' the ideal 'standard' to which a man should conform. Hence we should not expect to find a divine Person inviting our spiritual 'introversion.'

Early Sakya thus did nothing to develop the Yoga and Gītā concept of 'Īśvara' (Lord).

Its mandate lay elsewhere. The time-spirit, in Sakya as in Jainism, was in labour-pains over the fellowman. This was not merely a cultural expansion
of communal life, in 'not doing to fellowman what you would not have done to yourself.' It found more positive expression in such new terms as mettā: amity, karunā: pity; and in such new teaching as 'suffusing' another in thought, i.e., by will, with these, and in the reiterated exordium bringing forward as aim 'the happiness of the many-folk, the need, the welfare, the happiness of devas and men' in a way then unprecedented. And I believe, that, at least in Sakya, this expansion is traceable to the teaching of immanent Deity. Man was coming to say:—'Since I am That, Who is the most precious thing (priya) in the world, in you also is That, most precious to you. Hence are you precious to me.'

But the logical mind of India did not stop here. 'You' would mean, not man (manussa) only, but all 'beings' (satta). Beings would include denizens of other worlds. And for the time-spirit of that day, these were no longer gods and devils of varying functions. The more worthy, those in happier conditions, were collectively called devas. It is very exceptional for one who is demonic to be called 'deva.' They would be a-manussa, as not of earthmen. But they would all be essentially puruṣa, essentially That, for they were at a different stage in the Way to become fully That, who potentially they already were. They too would be subjects for the suffusing with amity and even pity—since they too had before them their own waning of life, parting and decease, and rebirth, it might be, to grosser earth-conditions once more.

1 The Sutta verse: Since aye so dear the Self to other is, let the Self-lover harm no other man, Sāmyutta, I, iii, I, 8.
2 The dying of a deva is the subject of one Sutta in the Itivuttaka of the Sutta-Piṭaka,
But between man and deva's, if once a common nature in a common Source was taught, there was a yet more potent link. Deva's knew, deva's could tell; but could man hear and learn? Here is no aspiration of one age and one land only. But an age, an epoch, a country may show a surging in effort to roll back the veil hiding the next step. According to the Christian scriptures there was a phenomenal increase in faith-healing in the little province of Palestine, attending the birth of the Jesus-gospel. A somewhat similar phenomenon is suggested by the great numbers who, towards the close, at least, of the long mission of a known "psychic" as was Gotama Sakyamuni, flocked to him to learn of the fate of dear ones lost. If with this we couple things recorded of him:—that he was frequently jhāyin; that he would admit, he learnt this and that from a deva or devatā; that deva's resorted to him to ask and to state many things—if with all this we couple the main object in his life: the helping, by word and example, of his fellowman, there emerges, for me at least, a very positive contribution by Sakya to the field of Yoga effort and aspiration in ancient India. It was namely held, at least for a time, to facilitate, in the factor called āhyāna, intercourse with, sodality with, the fellowman as not on earth only, but also as in other worlds.

For a time, I say; for later wayfarers in the Sakyan vision of the worlds there was to come a closing down of the veil which Sakyamuni (vivattac-chādaka) had done somewhat to roll back.¹ Secession from

¹ And rolling back the shrouding veil, he saw both this world and the next. Dīgha, "Lakkhaṇa".
Brahman ideals, the growing curiosity over mental analysis, the growing monasticism with its pessimistic aversion from life in any worlds: all this diverted the new church from that vision of the One in the man, and the One in the fellowman, both here and yonder, and of faith and hope in the opportunities afforded in survival now in this world now in that. Segregation from sense-experience, deftness in introspective mastery of mind: these seem to be, in the Suttas, often obscuring those four alternative sequences to which here has been reference.

It is true, that one of these psychic states includes (in limited cases of course) an emergence of clairaudience, emergence of clairvoyance, called respectively deva-hearing and deva-sight (translators here are misleading). But the records invariably confine themselves to category-talk. There are no instances in Suttas of an individual ‘in jhāna’ getting either kind of access recorded. The one instance I know occurs in Commentary talk: the case of Moggallāna¹; and it is interesting to find the very old tradition handed down here exegetically, when in the more “set pieces” of discourse, the Mantra’s of prose and verse, it had been let die.

The fellowman in the worlds: it was a great idea of a greater sodality, wider than the ‘Communion of Saints’ and worthy of that great soul, the Sakyamuni. For it, in the earth of to-morrow, Indian Yoga, Indian dhyāna may be found no longer a necessary prelude. But the thing itself which Sakya sought herewith to further will not always be found, as now it is found, treated by both Buddhist and European with slighting and evasion. For the greater fellowship such an

¹ Vimānavatthu Comy. See foregoing pages.
idiom as 'worlds apart' will become, when considered as uncharted 'otherness' in conditions, as weak a phrase as it is now becoming, when considered as a matter of distance in space.

This sodality of worlds was, I hold, the now lost objective of Sakyan jhāna. That it co-existed for a time with that rapt absorption into, or contemplation of the divine self, which is the objective of Yoga in Indian classics, is strikingly betrayed by a little known Sutta in the Fourth Nikāya (Nipāta VI). In this, Yoga is termed dhammayoga, i.e., in Sakyan parlance, Yoga of the immanently divine, worshipped in Sakya, not as ātman, but as dharma, or inward monition (of the ideal, the Ought-to-be). The Sutta tells, that one of the first disciples, Chunda, while on tour, finds among monks (in the Cheti district), a tendency in those who were jhāyins to disparage those who were dhammayogins, and vice versa, with the result, that no good resulted to men or deva's from this. He exhorts both such classes of abnormal religieux to mutual appreciation—and why? Because such men were rare in the world, who by penetrating insight beheld the deep way of the Quest.

This is the only passage in the Pāli scriptures known to me, where Indian Yoga and Sakyan Jhāna stand side by side, as exercises of a rare gift to be devoted to the welfare not of men only, but of the worlds.
LXXXII

RE-INCARNATION

I am becoming, I was becoming, I shall become: this is for each man and woman the main truth about what is here and now called re-incarnation, rebirth or palingenesis. Of the three terms I prefer the shortest, the Saxon word, as least academic. It is easy to slide over alien words without griping what they really mean for us, that is, for me, for you. They should mean much. They may one day mean much. They have not been meaning much to each of us. None of the three had emerged when Johnson wrote his Dictionary. The terms, it is true, express very ancient values; but our civilization is relatively new, and those values are only now beginning to trouble the younger culture of our day.

I am, was, shall be becoming: our present cramped view of life as man, our apathy concerning the possibly wider range, in fact, of that life past and present is a very curious feature of our era, and we may one day be much marvelling it should have been so. For whereas great men of the Word in the past, both in East and West, have spoken of reincarnation, not only as imagined, but in many cases as a matter of personal belief, our culture, in so far as it still holds them in respect, does so not because of what they have said on this matter, but rather in spite of it.

1 Published in *Light*, Jan. 8th, 1942.
In recent years an outline of the great range of this testimony was compiled for English readers in Lutoslawski's *Pre-existence and Reincarnation* (G. Allen & Unwin, 1928). In it, it is regrettable, that in a sweeping inclusion of Indian thought on the subject, he omits to name the most famous utterances on rebirth, nor does he quote evidences for the belief in the Christian gospels, as current in the day of their compilation. Nor do I find that he inquires into the reasons for the relative silence of testimony during the Middle Ages, broken only by the Renaissance. On the other hand, his reference in outline to the many more or less eminent writers in modern European culture, from the 16th century to the present day, culminating in the late James Ward and MacTaggart, who have admitted, at least by a backstairs entrance, a belief in rebirth, together with his insistence on the firm hold which the belief in rebirth has on Polish men of letters—all this will have come as a surprise to many readers in this country.

Our own churchmen in literature, on the one hand, and our men of science on the other have severally observed a sort of conspiracy of silence, or at best a disparaging attitude of speech towards reincarnation. We observe no *tabu* over against hair-raising hypotheses flung out by astronomers, and we accept what they say, with no intention of taking any steps to verify their conclusions. They would tell us that these are arrived at by methods of scientific reasoning which we could prove if we would. But when we turn to the admissions of belief in rebirth, or in the probability of its truth to be found in the

---

1 As professor he had retired, but one dreads to contemplate his possible fate since 1939.
writings of thoughtful and high-minded men, past and present, India excepted, we tend to see in them no more than the play of imagination about it as a more or less serious subject, such as may have been all that the utterances of Empedokles and Plato's Sokrates and the Pythagoreans amounted to. And for that matter it is very possible, that in the palmy days of Greek culture there was a quasi-tabu on the subject akin both to our own and that of our early-modern forefathers, who, as they would say 'feared the stake.' If I err not, the surviving works of Aristotle are silent on the subject. The Greeks are credited with liberty of thought, yet we know the price paid by one illustrious victim for making use of it.

In our customary idiom too there will be other hindrances, hindrances due it may be from our ill-worded, because ill-reckoned attitude about our human nature. I mean that, for us, the real man is too much the seen man. We do not see him at all who is the real man, that is, the wire-puller of the earthly appearance of him, mental and bodily. "We're here to-day and gone to-morrow and that's the end of it," says the young 'hero' in a modern novel, and many such shallow sayings might be cited to lay beside it, as typical of what is held as, if not wisdom, yet not madness or stupidity for a 'hero' to fling about. But reincarnation is no mere ghostly survival. It involves the life, the lives of the real man as encased in other, and successively many other of such bodies as we now bear about, of this and of other worlds.

And if we are ever to grip the word reincarnation, that other word now having a vague vogue 'discarnate' must go. They who use it may say, it only means for them, to improve on Dr. Johnson, 'stripped of this
earth-flesh.' But this, as a term for man as reborn, is either too negative, or it assumes a good deal. I am not presuming to say that rebirth without 'flesh' is impossible. Then it is I who would be presumptuous. I would only suggest, that it is more unlikely than likely. Why? Because the man as he is here—by 'man' I mean the user of body and mind—is very far indeed from being ready to pass over straightforward into bodiless life. Even if he or she be a saint, either is as yet very unready. Neither has any idea of, and therefore words for, any forms which are not ultimately physical concepts. Down the ages man has tried to conceive a finer fleshless body, such as was to be called 'subtle.'

In Indian tradition we may even see the attempt to take it, so to speak, for granted. We read namely of the man emerging, when the body was in deep sleep, as either bodiless, or in some sort of assumed encasement, of which no description is taught, or of which all description has somehow dropped out. When anyway man does try to conceive and to word a different body, we may see what a wraith, what a confused undeveloped thing he makes of it. In such a mental fog about it, he would be as a very fish out of water, were he to pass straightway to a change so tremendous as a 'bodiless state of life.'

We have tended, I think, to overlook that the life to which he passes in (either deep sleep, or) surviving death is just a 'next step.' If only we had the will to expand our Western concept of life in respect, not only of the race, but also of the individual, we should be therewith expanding our concept of nature. And nature's way, the way of Becoming or Evolution seems to me to be chiefly a way of the next step.

1 Cf. G. R. S. Mead's *The Subtle Body*. 
What now would be such a next step for man as going from earth at death of this body? Might it not be a respite, a holiday, in his other body, for at least a spell, from that vast burden, the production, consumption and assimilation of food? The opportunity thereby given for developing in other ways would be very great indeed. But only as great as he is yet fit for. Here he is lost without food; he needs it at every turn. Yet with old age, if we be not slaves to the body, we lose zest about it; we are like silkworms about to spin, to be introverted, to change. Herein we are, as the real man, did we but see it, maturing for just the next step. I am not claiming weighed truth for this guess of mine, but I maintain, that here is something we can conceive as a scientific possibility, a body, namely, which is able to assimilate for nutrition those elements of the air which we here have to assimilate in flesh and vegetable compounds. If, in reincarnation or survival, we do not pass forthwith to timeless consumption, but only 'go home,' as the schoolboy goes home, for a spell, we can conceive the type of body we have here being retained, as type—stomach, teeth and all—during the not very long spell, it may be, of the next step, much as we here retain some organs not now in use. Such a minimum of physical change may be included in what we in our half-knowledge call the economy of nature.

It may also belong to this 'economy,' that the two bodies, earthly and 'subtle,' at our present disposal here, have much in common, whereby the wielding of each of them, by ways we are pleased to call our 'mind,' is but a single art, the art of the one 'man' or spirit directing both. Thus occasionally what is experienced by the 'man,' when exercising that other
body, appears to be recollected when he reverts to exercise of the earth-body. For instance, a trained critical observer, the late G. R. S. Mead, recorded in print how, when he had fainted in a company assembled in a room, he remembered, on coming to, how he had watched 'himself,' his body, lying prostrate, feeling (in the other body) unafraid, in the conviction he would soon recover. There is also a case, quoted by the late Conan Doyle, of a patient, emerging from an anaesthetic, asking about an accident in the street he had witnessed from the window, while the earth body was in coma. My own experience yields no such crucial evidence as this for existence, not only after death, but now already in another body. But I find no difficulty in telling myself on waking, and willing my other body, what it appears I experienced while sound asleep.

This kind of evidence goes to show, that the argument which derives the so-called 'double' from dreams can scarcely hold water. My own belief is, that dreams occur, not in deep sleep, but in what India has called 'monkey sleep,' the half-sleep before or just after deep sleep. In them we get both channels of memory mixed, I mean the memories belonging to our life in both this and the next world; hence possibly their often absurd confusions. A newer vogue sees in dreams a mixture of the same (the earth-body's) experience at different times. There may be some truth in this, but there is not enough in it taken alone. One day the dream-theorist will recast the matter, with the included premises of the dual body, and a sounder contribution to knowledge may result. It may help to explain the apparently dual self, of which man has ever believed himself to be aware. There
has, we may come to see, never been but one self, the very man. If he seem at times to be twain, or even twain of a different kind from an earlier 'twain,' or even up to seven selves—so it has been said—this will be explicable by the presence of other personalities, other 'men,' working on his will, themselves unseen.

But my interest in this matter is not physiological but religious. I have heard religious men reject belief in rebirth for more than one reason. Thus a Muslim, professionally religious, told me he found it illogical from an ethical point of view. Namely, that I, in relatively comfortable circumstances, in that I consented to be served by a charwoman, was unethically helping to prolong her harder line of life. I, he said, was hereby not blameworthy; it was the faith in rebirth that was unworthy, which could see her reaping results of sinful living in her past as needing later the presence of such as me to keep her down.

I give the view for what it is worth; it was, he said, for him convincing. For me it was quite unconvincing. The 'char' would be in training on earth as needing just that in her spiritual growth. I happened to have needed other training; I was not responsible for hers. That is ultimately a matter between her and the Most High. I might, had opportunity been given, have helped to check her in past wrong doing, but I could not avert the carrying out of her present discipline, in so far as this is a result of that.

Another objection, which is, I believe, shared by many more than the former, was made to me years ago by a respected friend, the late Estlin Carpenter. Given rebirth, without a man's having memory of one or more of his past lives, he could not use the lessons gained through experience to make any spiritual
advance when reborn. Hence rebirth seemed useless, and hence inadmissible in a divine economy.

I would reply as follows: It would appear, that memory of our earth-life is retained, after death, in our next-world life. These memories aid us there in growth. We there suffer remorse, or feel encouragement. We take warning: so we grow. Hence, though we come (after a lifetime there) back to earth into a new infant body with, so to speak, a blank tablet, we have an improved, because a grown, power of writing on it. We are as children, who after getting may be into disgrace in one school, are started, after the holidays, in a new one amid new surroundings, the better, as it were, to make that fresh start, forgetting, as St. Paul said, the things that are behind, and, he implies, getting on none the worse for that. We, who have been growing over there perhaps another threescore years and ten or more, come then as newborn to test the genuineness of that growth, but with a clean slate, untroubled by previous scrawling. We are given the so-called second chance discussed in Barrie's play Dear Brutus, but given it with wounds healed, and even perhaps with scars become invisible. If the scrawls remained, if we could remember where we went wrong when last on earth, every new life here would from our youth up become for some so misery-haunted, that memories might drive us to madness, and not only to remorse.

Another objector wrote to me, that for the Catholic, accepting belief in purgatory, as the next step for practically everyone, as a cathartic moral treatment, followed by release, there seemed to be no need of the further discipline of new life on earth. To this I would say, that a term of prison discipline after death is
rather a social safeguarding than an individual spiritual cure. Prison is, both here and there, rather to protect society from dirty-handed incomers being at large, free to repeat their harm to their new world. In it life can be no better than life at school. Confined, the man has no scope for individual enterprise, for new and reformed living, to prove his will to acquit himself better.

Finally, it is for me likely that, if our will has brought us to the power of tasting life in the next world through the 'other body' now, we are, when in deep sleep, for that limited interval, using a better instrument therein, and are to that extent already become and becoming a better man. Thus to some extent I, through the other body, can be to the self now on earth a sort of conscience, a reverberation as it were from life in a better world. For be it not forgotten, that for us, with our skies charted to millions of miles, the next world is now only a practical and a 'close-up' question, when we look on it as not so much otherwhere, but as otherwise. Further, that as otherwise, the body which is the earth-double, may be there as substantial, as solid as is the earth-body to us here, who, in our turn, may be the very wraiths in appearance to men of the next world.

That even only the next step is, for those who are ready for it, a better world, the wise and enlightened of all the ages have ever taught. The undesirables of earth go along to it with these, but find themselves adjudicated out of the way for a term, from the possibility of marring that better life. That this better consists merely in physical conditions we may discount; teaching hereon varies with the ages. There is a bigger Better, about which our 'still small voice'
in the other body may prompt us. That other body, as belonging to a better community, is the expression of a better 'I.' Now a better 'I' is not necessarily superior in body or mind, although he will use both body and mind to better purpose than will a worse 'I.' 'I,' invisible as all great forces are invisible, am in a way more real than these two. 'I' am the child of a larger growth; 'I' am adolescence eternal. When and how I began, I know not, but before me stretches a long way, a way for high adventure, of finer becoming, to a degree of value immeasurable, of will intensified, of conceptions as yet inconceivable. And I hold it probable that, with each new span of life, be it on earth, or be it elsewhere, that is, elsewhere, I shall arise, in or with a body, as long as I have need of such an instrument, and, in that body, I shall express myself much as I do now, through what we now call 'mind,' that is, in mind-ways. When I no longer need a body, when I shall have transcended that need, then, and then only shall I have come to the very end and goal of my wayfaring in the worlds; then is the long journey's end at hand; then am I one with the Highest; then am I made perfect, as the Highest, the Most, the End is perfect; then shall I no more need instruments to will and to work withal in ways which as yet and for a long time, I am and shall be unable to conceive, much less to understand.
LXXXIII

A WORD FROM OUTSIDE THE CREEDS

In the latest issue of the journal of the *Buddha Prabhā*, kindly sent me, I came across these words: "We may be sure that we always find what we seek. If we seek the good, we shall find it in everything." These are good words and remind me of a charming modern play, in which the inmate of a worthier world somehow comes as visible to earth, and lodges amid rather squalid surroundings. He invariably converses with each person so as to address himself to the ideal person in each, with the result that he draws out the best that is as yet in each, gradually transforming each to a surprising degree.

He has put into words for them a 'more' which was latent, germinating in them, a more than they were themselves aware of. Had he done the opposite, a corresponding result in worsening might have been attained. Now the latter is what some of us do, when we make out, not the best, but the worst possible case for beliefs which to some among mankind are very precious. The beliefs may represent what, as a whole, others may hold as very holy true ideals. But if, by as it were a lawyer's special pleading, we put forward some of them in the worst terms we can find to say about them,—things that may to an extent

---

1 Sent to the Buddha-Prabhā Society, Bombay, 1936.
be true, but true only of aspects held by the weaker, the least worthy—we hurt, we embitter, we provoke retaliation. We have here not sought the good, neither have we found it. Nay, more: we have not sought what is on the whole the true, and the true we have not found.

Let me illustrate by an imaginary comparison, where the special pleader is wishing to make out the weakest possible case for Buddhism. He tells us of a Founder who, when on the brink of gaining omniscience, is shown mentally fighting off a host of evil tempters, who just then could not have had any appeal for him, any effect on him whatever; who as omniscient is shown wavering as to what he shall say or do; who enters into a competition in magic powers with a rival; who is shown as saying, it is ill to love, e.g., one’s child since it brings sorrow; who says that woman is monster and demon; that it is profitable to one’s self to abstain from evil, others being relatively negligible; who refuses to admit women to the religious life, then gives way, saying that the duration of the good teaching will thereby be cut short by one half; who is now telling men to take as their guide and light a trinity: himself, teaching and Order, now to take as such only two: the self and the teaching and no other.

Should we not one and all say: What an unfair picture! That it is either just legend, or these things have somehow crept in? For, be it noted, every one of these references this impugning speaker will have found stated as true in the Pali Pitakas, not as mere Jātaka talk, but in Vinaya and Sutta.

In the same way, when men of other creeds so write about Christianity as to show it less as the Jesus-
teaching of the gospels, and more as the least favourable picture drawn from the first half of the ancient Jewish scriptures, omitting all reference to the often sublime levels of the sayings of the prophetic books, and labelling believers in that picture as fools and humbugs, we read with sorrow at such a seeking of the less, of the worse, not of the good, not of the more. For we see how such writing sets Buddhists themselves, when they so write, in a baleful light, delaying the growth among all men of that goodwill and honour among nations, the defence of which is now making such an unprecedented stand in Europe.

The growth: *vuddhi*—how is that not the keyword in original Buddhism when this is truly told! Growth: the becoming, the making become (*bhava, bhāvanā*)! Nay, the highest objective is not happiness, though India often maintains it is. This can be told better than thus. Happiness is but the reverberation in feeling of *being Well*. And we who seek in this creed or that for what is 'good,' for what is better, for what looms ahead thereafter as Best, are slowly and painfully wayfaring towards the being utterly Well. 'Well' is, in the sister-word, what we 'will' to become. Willing, we shall accomplish. As in the Jātaka, Śīlava-rājā says:

*Man should just hope; falter the wise should not.*
*I see, look you, myself:*
*E'en as I willed so have I come to be.*

---

1 *Āsimseth' eva puriso; na nibbindeyya paṇḍito.*
*Passāmi vo 'ham attānam:*
*Yathā icchīṃ tathā ahū'ṭi.*
B

CRITICISM FAIR AND UNFAIR

The editor of *Nava Yana* has welcomed, with words of kindness and goodwill, such criticisms as I have sometimes hesitated to send. I hold it much more important to send to his Journal sayings that are better than those of the writers I presume to criticise. Critics often blame, while offering no better solutions. This has been my fate time after time. I would not be this kind of critic. I would rather be of the kind who shows, that the writer he finds fault with is one who, in making a comparison, takes the best in one subject and compares it with the worst in a similar subject: say, in two religions. And this with no apparent sense that he has been flagrantly unjust, not only to the latter, but also to the former.

I refer to what is said in two articles in *Nava Yana* 2, 7, which the editor has kindly sent me. English people value perhaps above everything 'fair play.' Americans will, I believe, say no less of themselves. I am going to make out a fairer, juster case for Christianity than do those articles. If I were to quote this saying as typical of Buddhism: "For a man of wrong opinions I declare one of two destinies: hell or rebirth as animal," it would be said: "No; that is not a typical saying; it is conduct in Buddhism that decides our future, not our private opinions." I should agree; I should not myself quote it as a thing the great Founder will have said; he is shown, as I pointed out to readers of *Nava Yana* not long ago, saying that man after death is judged according to

---

1 Published in the *Hawaiian Buddhist Annual*, Honolulu, 1934.
what he has done, not according to what views he has held. None the less, the saying quoted has been by Buddhists put into the mouth of the Founder, and in a work of great antiquity and repute: the Dīgha-Nikāya, or First Collection of Suttas, No. XII. Lohiccha an interlocutor has said: "That is wrong view, Gotama." The rejoinder is, in the Pali: *Micchādiṭṭhissa kho aham dwinnam gatīnam aṁśataram gatiṁ vadāmi: nirayam vā tiracchānayonim vā:* the sentence quoted above in English.

Now wrong views may lead to wrong actions, but our idea of justice is that, till the views have so led him, a man is not to be judged as criminal; not for the views only. Even the Spanish Inquisition did not proceed against a man for his views until he had, by word or deed, shown that he held views judged to be unorthodox. But here the monkish editors have made their Founder damn a man for holding "wrong views," and for that alone. Truly it would not be fair to bring this up to show, that, in a way, Buddhism after all did show ecclesiastical intolerance.

Similarly, to quote Christian literature in a fair, because a typical way is not to cite (without either chapter or verse) alleged sayings by ecclesiastics of an intolerant kind, but to test Christianity by what was best in it. The message of Jesus was the brotherhood of man. The brother is to be warded whether he be blood-brother, brother by marriage or just fellowman. All are to rank alike in man’s will to care for them. "Who is my neighbour?" he was asked. And the parable of the good Samaritan followed: the tending the hurt of a man even of an alien race; the warding any man who has need of his fellowmen.
Now this was a new word to the Many. India had never said it. India never made a man call his own brother by that word. He would say, not bhātar, but tāta, an Aryan word akin to ‘daddy.’ We have used ‘brother’ and ‘brethren,’ in translation, for the awkward terms bhikṣhu and āvuso. Why? Because of our Christian tradition and usage; not because either word means that, for the one means literally ‘almsman,’ the other ‘(your) reverence.’ Buddhist monks only got so far as to call women ‘sister’!

This was commendable; but let not readers imagine it was to convey any idea of equality between women and men. If women precede men, and mother precede father in any inclusive statement in Indian literature, this is due not to Buddhism, but to a reverberating tradition from Matriarchate ages. I do not suppose that any monkish Christian literature can outdo the vile things that are repeatedly said of woman’s nature in the Suttas. It is true, that when Buddhism was born, woman was beating her wings to get out of her cage, but here the Jains had been beforehand. With the founding of that movement women, according to a Buddhist Commentary, had more to do than men. In the order of the Sakyans, on the other hand, while one or two outstanding women attained repute as teachers, nuns were in subjection to monks, as being a junior branch of the Order. I am not for a moment believing, that the foul sayings about women ascribed in Suttas to the Founder, could have been uttered by him. He did not value the ‘man,’ the soul or self, by way of sex. He went deeper, to the very-man, even though his aftermen came to deny there was really any such ‘very-man.’ Yet I would like in the Nava Yana ‘Answer’ about
my sisters, which gives an alleged saying by Gotama about there being "no meanness in women . . . they cannot be treated like chattels," to have been referred to the work whence it is taken.\(^1\) I should greatly like to know. The only reference to woman as chattel I have translated in the Pitakas is in the third Collection, where the 'Buddha' is said to tell a deva "Woman is the best of chattels." (\textit{iti} \textit{bhandānam uttamanam}).

Now in Christianity's saying that all men and all women are brethren in and under one Divine Father, we are seeing the best in it. We have put aside the Jewish elements of sacrifice and redemption which grew up into it, just as alien elements grew up into Buddhism. We have here something More about man, his nature, life and destiny, which Jesus brought into man's ideas about man and about God. Man who, for the Jew, so closely knit tribally, was 'my neighbour' my 'nigh' or 'near man' (there are 75 references to neighbour in the Old Testament, but the word appears to be quite absent in the Buddhist scriptures !), became through Jesus, a 'nearer-man,' became 'my brother'. And the claim upon man of 'my brother,' when in want or sickness or peril, has been on the whole worthily recognized and laboured for by monk and nun, by layman and priest in Christendom ever since. And when men of another creed make comparisons with Christianity, if they prefer to dwell on what is best in it rather than what is worst, they therein show that they themselves are seekers of the More, both in itself, and in that which other men believe in and revere. Never is it a healthy sign in a critic to see him dwelling on the worst in making comparisons.

But the \textit{Nava Yana} has in this number tended to

\(^1\) No such information ever reached me (1941).
take this unhealthy way, albeit its general tone is benevolent and gently tolerant. Has a change come over it? We should not rate the character of Hawaiians by the number and nature of those at a given time in prison. These are a minority, and as not normal, they have been given special treatment. We should represent Hawaiians by the character of the law-abiding majority, men who do not hurt or steal or act impurely or cheat or drink. We should again not measure them by the few saintly ones, but by the average majority. If we follow this method in rating religions, even where we do not take the pure gold of each, as I have done above, we shall anyway not go aside to quote rare sayings of intolerance, when, as to that, no religious literature has clean hands. We should rather imitate the spirit of Jesus, who, when his disciples said of a man who was healing his neighbour, "and we forbade him because he followeth not with us," replied: (or is said to have replied): "Forbid him not, for he that is not against you is for you." (Luke ix, 50).

Nor should we refer to the "Christian God" in terms fit only for the primitive tribal concept of the Highest, which belonging to the childhood of man, and pretending to find therein the notion of man as a favourite for whom nature exists. We should quote, as more fair to the Jew and the Christian, the way in which the Prophets speak of the Highest, as holding in worth men's showing "mercy and justice." We should quote as more fair the aspect of Deity as a Father pitying, loving as Jesus saw Him, and man as being his brother, sister, mother if he did the will of his Father. We should hesitate much before we supplanted the Highest in Buddhism by a mere
"cosmic universe." As a fact there is nothing of the sort warranted by the older scriptures of Buddhism. Belief in causal law and effect are never applied to anything save man alone, man's mind, man's destiny, never to what we now call Nature. We have here a putting modern ideas into a very old creed and then saying it holds all knowledge.

No good can come from lowering the worth in other religions to bolster up the worth in one of them. This is as if we praised a boy by saying, he's the best in his class, but all the rest are fools. The real way to show any surpassing merit in Buddhism is to let the best in another religion shine forth and then to point to something in Buddhism which is yet higher. To seek to exalt Buddhism by depreciating another great world-religion is to be writing, as the Suttas say, with a knife in the mouth, instead of a hand held out to the fellowman, the neighbour, the brother.

Here we are about once more to celebrate an event heralded from the Unseen as tidings of great joy to all mankind, of peace to men of goodwill. Let me send to some of these men, to our Editor and to his friends at Honolulu a will to this joy, this muditā, wherewith the Great Man of the Sakyans bade men see, in their current notion of morals, or sila, not merely the not hurting, in word, thought and deed, not merely the not doing this and that,¹ but the positive warding of the brotherman as taught by Jesus, the becoming in that More which leads in the Way to the Supreme Aim (paramattha), taught by the Sakyamuni.²

¹ Digha Nikāya, Suttanta No. 7.
² Editor's (H. B. A.) Comment. The editor welcomes all criticisms particularly as in this case constructive criticism. It is through such that we are able to make progress. Mrs. Rhys Davids' points are well taken.
ENEMY ACTION

A

DIALOGUES OF THE BUDDHA AND A BOMB

The following is a shortened version of a Preface I wrote in the second edition of the second volume of the translation entitled by my husband "Dialogues of the Buddha," made by him, then by us jointly for the Series Sacred Books of the Buddhists, from the First (Dīgha) Nikāya. This second edition I had published (at my own expense) only a year before the present war began. And a solitary bungled bomb smashed into our reserve stocks stored at Messrs. Billing's of Guildford, practically consuming all. In this, as in other ways, have the former champions of 'Kultur' proved its foes. They used to be our best purchasers. As editor and co-translator, I had written this preface to make clear certain reforms I deemed I had made on the first edition, as well as many others that needed making, but which, for given reasons, I had not made. It is a kindly act of sympathy with our tragic losses (I include those of the Pali Text Society) to permit me to restate these here. Much error (as well as much knowledge) has been disseminated by the first edition, and I would here again (as in my recent books) call attention thereto.

1 The Preface was sent to the Indian Historical Quarterly, 1941; I have not heard if it has been therein published.
THE NEW PREFACE

Does one but hold on long enough in this span of human wayfaring, one may be here to see even the translation of a Buddhist text sold out, with the gentle demand for it not yet exhausted. So has this work, after 28 years, attained to a second edition. By the process called 'off-set,' emendations are difficult and costly. And there are no funds. Hence I have made only such as were most desirable, leaving in much which I should have wished to see expressed otherwise, both in my husband's work and in my own, were this more thoroughly a 'new' edition.

A word first to make clear our partnership in both this and the third (and last) volume, the first being wholly his work (published 1899). He ceased from his labours here over 19 years ago, soon after completion of these Dialogues. From the beginning of this century he had undertaken engrossing work as holding the new, the first chair in a British University for the comparative study of religion, a task, at the present stage of research, fitter for half a dozen men than for one. Concentration on work in any one religious tradition had become impossible. It was only when Estlin Carpenter suggested that I should join in aiding the completion of the Dialogues that we both with good will started to do this. Of this second volume Rh. D. had already, in 1881, published Suttantas XVI and XVII in Sacred Books of the East, XI. All the rest I translated, he revising my work, inserting many of the footnotes and contributing all the Introductions save that to the Mahā-Nidāna Suttanta, which is my work.

Another eleven years passed before the remaining
volume got issued. Funds had to be raised, and our generous patron no longer sat on Siam’s throne. My husband was ageing, his health waning, and the accursed war came down, blighting the world and our happiness. Siam’s later monarch, however, paid the printer, and the Dialogues achieved completion in 1921. Introductions to XXXI–XXXIII I wrote and all the translation.

In this edition it is mainly my own work that I have revised. Not a little in my partner’s work needed revision, but there was not only expense, but the wish in me not to barge in on what was in a way a ‘classic.’ Moreover his footnotes, where a rendering seemed to him make-shift, often guard the reader. In all this there is matter in the history of research it may be well to keep in view.

Here I will briefly notice certain prominent renderings I have left unaltered, and also three of vital importance which I have altered.

(1) I have only altered Max Müllerian transliteration (a system now generally discarded) where cerebrals were involved. To write K for C, G for J, etc., has proved for the general reader, ay, and the general writer too misleading to be left in. Further, I have let stand the circumflex for the long å; also the less correct crude form of -i for -in, e.g., in Vipassin, and the crude form of -a in Gotama, etc. I never could share the partiality of some German and Asiatic scholars for the nominative in -o for general use. Such a phrase as “he told Ānando” is too unpleasant a shock—as were one to say “amo tu.”

(2) I have let stand the use of ‘god’ for ‘deva,’ but I do not find either ‘god’ or ‘angel’ historically fitting. In early Buddhism (as a consequence of the
accepted Immanence) Vedic gods had become friendly mortals, living close by and given, in friendly good will, to talk with the ‘man-who-saw’ and heard. Immanence had driven out, save for the many-folk, the notions of worship, prayer, ritual, intermediacy. Nor were devas always ‘messengers’ (angels) from a Highest. Nor do I like devatā, the abstract, as ‘fairy’; this I have changed to ‘being’ or ‘spirit.’

3 I have left in ‘brethren’ for bhikkhu, bhikkhave, etc. Unwillingly, but cf. footnote, rst ed., p. 8r. I have not the objection to ‘monk’ Rh. D. there shows, nor have I found Buddhists objecting. We should not, because of convenience and tradition, force in ‘brethren.’ The Pali for ‘brother’ could have been used, had it seemed meet; it never was used.

4 I have left in his ‘intoxications’ and my ‘intoxicants’ for ‘āsavā.’ We have no good word for spreading, absorbed, liquid bane. ‘Canker’ is on the whole best, yet is it too ‘dry.’ Drugs, taints, poisons have also served.

5 I have let viññāna be rendered by ‘cognition,’ or by ‘consciousness,’ albeit the older meaning: ‘man-as-surviving,’ or ‘soul’ is in the main truer. But not in all Suttas. We see, in Majjhima 38, how this older meaning of a persisting principle, referred to as “speaker, experiencer,” is being hounded out, to be replaced by a meaning virtually identical with that of the other two varieties of cognition: saññā, vedanā, as merely the mental outcrop of sensation. Viññāna, in the Indian tradition, could connote both meanings; we have no such Janus-word.

6 I have let ‘rapture’ in Jhāna stand for samādhi (lit. ‘concentration’), although it goes too far, is too near Chalmers’s ‘ecstasy,’ which also goes too far.
The only ‘rapture’ about samādhi is the ‘rapt’ quality of hyper-attention. As ‘rapture’ it is too easily confused with ‘pīti,’ or emotional rapture, which in samādhi had to be suppressed.

(7) I have let the usual ‘wobbling’ in translation stand, when it is bhava that has to be rendered. Thus (p. 131) the last two lines: “craving for future life—renewed existence . . . no more birth,” show just a triple use of the one word bhava, thus: “then is the craving for becoming rooted out . . . that which leads to becoming is faded out . . . there is no more becoming.” No one reading the former translation gets any idea of the sinister change which had come over this word. No one unhelped would recognize it as the joyous word on p. 267, when the king sends polite greeting: “May good fortune (bhava) attend the honourable Jotipāla!” (The Commentary strongly supports this rendering.) In original Buddhism ‘becoming’ is given as the reason why men needed Gotama’s message, as one which could promote that ‘good fortune’ in the spiritual growth of the man. It had come, in monasticism, to mean the dreadful persistence of life both as ‘rebirth’ and as ‘re-worlded.’ However, the translator, with his triple variant for the one Pali word, gets there, so far as the monastic outlook goes, and so I leave it.

(8) Then there is the great word, of all words hardest fitly to translate: Dhamma. This is quite inaccurately rendered ‘Truth.’ Had the Buddhist speaker wished to say ‘Truth,’ he had three strong words at hand: sacca, bhūta, tathatā. But no one regrets more than I that he and I did not hammer out more often our renderings together. Till near his end I was too much just pupil; let alone that we were
both more or less akin to the Sutta Nipātā rhinoceros:

_eko care khaggavisānaka_āppho.

My own view of that day I somewhat guard in a footnote (p. 29, 1st ed.) by adducing the term ‘Norm.’ But Dhamma wants a better word than what is a ‘good average.’ Gotama’s many brahmin fellow-workers will have had in mind the Upanishadic term _antaryāmin_. Yet will this not have sufficed for Dhamma, object from the first of the Leader’s avowed worship. This was more; it was inner incentive, urger, not merely restraining force. There was in Dhamma the push of conscience as well as its check. Hence possibly it is why _antaryāmin_ did not get taken over by them, as for a while did _āmyta_.

But _dhamma_ had also got the wider looser meaning of ‘religion’; for this no other word was current (save perhaps _suddhi_). Take an instance from our volume III, p. 37: “What is this _dhamma_ wherein you train your disciples, so that they win comfort and acknowledge inclination as the beginning of the training (_ajjhāsayaṁ ādibrahmacariyam_. How is not a stronger word, like ‘will’ wanted here!). For us religion here fits better than any other term. If the reader will bear in mind this wider meaning of _dhamma_, and let ‘Truth’ convey this, Rh. D. will not have misled him. Anyway it is better than the rendering ‘Law.’

Here a brief codicil. On p. 38 I have once more altered in a formula three epithets, usually applied to _dhamma_, and have let them apply, implicitly as in the Pali, to the life of the ‘wayfarer’ (_tathāgata_). If _dhamma_ means ‘religion,’ these epithets: “beginning, middle, end” have no fit place. Nor have they if we call _dhamma_ ‘truth.’ Nor can the three fit
the later meaning, now general among Southern Buddhists, of dhamma as a code of teaching, for, when this mission-chARGE was made to the first disciples, there was not yet any such code of oral teaching. Obviously, for me, the epithets apply to man’s span of present life, here or elsewhere: dhamma as ‘lovely at the beginning, middle, end.’

(9) A not unimportant matter is the leaving in, on p. 78 ff, ‘prosper’ for growth (vuddhi). In the text we find vuddhi opposed to ‘decay’ (parihāni): ‘just growth is to be expected, not decay.’ ‘Prosper’ is not in itself incorrect, but for me it is vital to remember, that not only here, at the end of his long mission, but at its very beginning, the inspiring message ran: ‘Men are decaying; as learners of (this) dhamma they will grow’ (lit. ‘become’). The great Man-lover is here shown keeping faith with the message from the Unseen from first to last. By the literal rendering ‘growth’ the reader can see this, as with ‘prosper’ he cannot.

This brings me to the three emendations I have made in our work, made because it is vital to an improved grasp of the teaching of original Buddhism that they should replace our own pioneer renderings, through which that grasp has been and still is crippled.

(10) The first is on pp. 29-32. Here, in translating, I had docilely followed Oldenberg’s rendering in Vinaya Texts (S.B.E.)—these pages being his work not Rh. D.’s—and also K. E. Neumann’s (p. 268 of his Majjhima Nikāya, 1917). A rendering I repeated, alas! knowing no better then, in Kindred Sayings, I, pp. 173 ff, 1917. These scholars judged that the word giving the better state for men who would hear Gotama teach meant just ‘will be,’ not ‘will become,’ or
'grow.' But this word 'will be' or 'become' is opposed to 'decaying,' thus indicating no mere future happening, but a causal process, an evolution, and hence had we all been more discerning, we should have seen that more was wanted than just a 'will be.' We had before us contexts in both Upanishads and Pitakas, where bhavissanti (and other bhū-inflections) clearly meant more than just a copula, or bare future state. The more pregnant meaning of 'will become' gives a hitherto buried consecutive force to the Hesitation scene and to its immediate sequel, as I have repeatedly pointed out.¹

(11) The second corrected context is no less important. It is on p. 108; a very solemn, very emphatic parting charge. Rh. D.'s rendering is echoed by R. O. Franke's, which is yet more free. But that is not the worst. Both entirely ignored the religious import, in Gotama's day, of the word attā (ātmā), import by which the accepted teaching of Immanence brought into the word 'self,' or 'spirit,' Deity Itself. "Lamps...refuge unto yourselves" may be good modern English tradition, but it was not Indian religious idiom of 500 B.C. And when our translators render similar compounds of ātmā in the Upanishads, their procedure is very different. Then it is 'Lamp of the Self, refuge of the Self,' or at least similar usage of this word. Why not this usage here also?

Buddhists and lapsed Christians have lapped up this apparent call to be depending on the actual average self, quite overlooking that, in the Pali scriptures, the believer is usually told to take as refuge, not himself, not the two of the injunction: "Live as they that have the attā, that have dhamma as lamp,

¹ Cf. esp. my To Become or not to Become, 1937.
as refuge, and no other," but a *trinity* of lamps or refuges. And he cannot have it both ways. But I am here not mainly concerned with inconsistencies. It is for me most vital, I repeat, if we are to grip rightly the Founder's teaching, that we reject the atheistic or antitheistic presentation of it which, true enough of degenerate Hīnayāna, is here thrust upon him who was the Child of a teaching of Immanence, the Child of an uplift in man—man as being, immanently and in germ, the Highest, the Peak of the Immortal (*t'amat'agge*)—an outlook unrivalled then and since in religious culture. I do not suppose we shall ever get the word 'self' to raise us religiously as it raised India. We have seen grow up, since Johnson's Dictionary registered our language, the meaning in self and unselfish of 'egoism,' 'altruism.' But long before it, St. Catherine of Genoa had taught Immanence with a personal pronoun. "My Me is God . . . by a process of transformation." For her perhaps *ipse, stessa*, did not mean the ugly thing they now do, yet she chose well. And I think that if our translators had consistently used 'spirit,' not 'self,' that rather absurd perversion by our translators of the pathetic farewell had never been made. But we started our Indian culture with research into grammar, and only then moved on into religion, taking with us the grammatical *ātmā*, when we, richer here than India, had the better alternatives of 'spirit' and 'soul,' India having but the one word.

(12) The third alternative is of but one word, yet it is hardly less important than the others. On p. 33, where the Hesitation scene, true it may be of Gotama only, is told as true of earlier Buddhas, we see the Teacher-to-be, for whom doubt has now been dispelled,
making glad response to the inspiring deva, whom psychically he has seen and heard. So glad was this for early compilers that it has been lifted into poetry:

*Opened for man the portals of the Undying!*

Man, as learning that he was essentially, not just a being, but a becoming, was herein to be shown how he had a very guarantee to winning the ‘immortal peak’ of Becoming, the very culmination of life (cf. p. 109). This glorious destiny for man conceived as essentially divine reverberates through the early Upanishads and was echoed by the Sakyan missioners.

But for the after-men the vision faded out. Life was to be realized—so far as man, his vision turned earthwards could see—not as an ever more and more, but as something to be got rid of. And for the virtually positive term *amata*, they substituted the actually negative term *nirvâna*. So we get the Commentary telling us, that the “portals” are “nibbâna reckoned as *amata,*” and the translators, alas! following it, choosing (possibly for aesthetic reasons) the more musical exegetical term, and turning from a word belonging, as that term did not, to the best religious teaching when ‘Buddhism’ was born. Late in time I have restored the ‘undying’ of the text, where *nirvâna* had been put.

Senior and junior translators, we may, in this volume leave an impression of ‘self-lit self-supported’ confidence that is misleading. Nay, none have been more mindful of difficulties. And I regret that, in the translation transferred from *S.B.E.* XI, for my husband’s general preface no room was found, since in it are words of modesty and historical sagacity. Thus he wrote: “with very great diffidence I yet
maintain, that the discovery of early Buddhism... has turned the flank, so to speak, of most of the existing literature on Buddhism." After a lapse of sixty years I venture to think, that we can only now go on to achieve that flank-turning: Only now can we, with regard to the refrains and emphases in the Pitakas, endorse with confidence the truth in his special and later Introduction, in this volume, to No. XVI (p. 77). Namely, that these records may be considered authentic enough, but only in the one way in which any such record can be considered authentic, that is, as evidence of beliefs, of values, held at the date at which it was composed.

Note. I regret that, in the foregoing I did not list my cited reading of t'amat'agge: 'the peak of the Highest' as a fourth alteration. In preparing the volume for reprint, it had broken in on me, that Buddhaghosa's interpretation (p. 109 fn.) was fantastic, and of the worsened outlook of degenerate values. "Darkness" (tamas) plays here no part. The t' is the emphatic ta; the agge is Magadhese nominative (lingering here and there in the Canon); and amata it was that the New Gospel professed to be revealing. The compound, coupled with the pregnant bhavissati, as 'will become' shows this very grand old man (yet ever young) closing his long work with the very words with which he had begun. But so far philologists have shaken sapient heads at me!

B

Minor Anthologies and a Bomb

For the same reason I include here a brief Editorial Note introducing Dr. B. C. Law's translation of the
third pair of Minor Anthologies, No. IX, Sacred Books of the Buddhists, 1938. The work was lost in the ruthless destruction of 1940, and what I here say has not been said elsewhere.

The Buddhavamsa and C(h)ariyā-piṭaka were the very first Pali texts published by the Pali Text Society, then a hopeful babe, in 1882. The editor of them, the late Richard Morris of the Early English Text Society, a recruit to Pali studies of whom my husband was justly proud, gives in his introduction a citation from Pali exegesis of the traditional history of the former work. Dr. Law, judging from this, places the compiling of it within the second century B.C. (History of Pali Literature, i, pp. 35, 42). This places them, I think rightly, as posterior to the great Revision of the (yet unwritten) ‘Sayings’ associated in Commentaries with the Council at Patna in Asoka’s reign, third century B.C.

They certainly bear in them the marks of degenerate Indian (and south Asiatic) Buddhism. There is still, it is true, in them wholehearted worship for the great Helpers. There is consistent appreciation of unfaltering will, called ‘striving the striving’ (padhānam padahitvāna), required in the spiritual evolution of such men. But the predominant aspect taken of the Helper is, on the one hand, that of the magician, on the other, that of the monk.

We begin with the old legend—who shall say it is untrue, less true than the Baptism in Jordan?—of the deva’s visit to Gotama arousing him from hesitation and reaction (the essence of the message is omitted). But the response is sadly degenerate. The Man of the New Word responds, not by taking up a mission of wise teaching forthwith, but by juggling a wonder
of architecture and jewellery in the sky! And all manliness has shrivelled in the hero of some of the little Jātaka-tales of the second anthology, who, as monk-to-be, holds the closest personal ties as not to be defended.

The childish elaboration of the Relic-business in the Buddhavaṃsa should be compared with the more sober account in the earlier records (Dīghanikāya, No. XVI), where the materialistic treasuring of discarded bodily vestments first rears its ugly head. Do the great ones who have gone before weep more over it than they smile?

We can with plausibility imagine the author or authors to have been inmates of a vihāra, say, at Kapilavatthu, or one of the other centres referred to in Saṃyutta, vol. V, their life free from all care as to means of living, occupied with the growing ‘library’ of repeaters, of written heads of discourse, or even with the new decision to write all down in full, eager with the new lust of self-expression by the stylus, to exercise what we now call a literary gift. They would not in the first instance care about historic truth; they would have their piety about their superman, their supermen; they would want to make an impression on their very few readers, if any; on their many listeners. And so they sat cross-legged and scratched their palm-leaves, toying with ideas culled from their great thesaurus of Sayings, and with the jig-saw fascination of words made to flow rhythmically. For us what they have left is not history, but it is not without historical value.
LXXXV

MAN AND INVISIBLE HELPERS

My humble desire is that I, though not invisible, may be a faithful intermediary between you and some that are. Incidentally, I hope also to make the subject complementary to the two which in these conferences were previously discussed: Aquinas’s Angelic Doctrine and Communion with God. After the former, I suggested a great blank had been left between angels and men on earth:—what of them who had left earth and gone before? In the latter, Deity was reverently spoken of as amounting to a Presence, a felt somewhat, indefinable, ineffable, but there was no allusion to other presences as mediating between That and us. Here, then, and now is opportunity given to deal with these empty spaces and, if it may be, fill in the picture a little more.

My title suggests a dual agency: a Source of help and purveyors of help: help as coming to us of earth (1) indirectly, (2) not only from helpers of our own world. This help has been given, has been believed to have been, and to be, given in more ways than one. I take chiefly the help received by the word, by the spoken message. The form this help has chiefly

1 Published in The Sufi, 1939. Adapted from an open conference delivered before the Society for Inter-Religious Fellowship, London, June 13th, 1938.

2 Lectures by a Catholic and a ‘Quaker’ respectively.
taken in ancient records is the oracle—the communication sought in a prescribed way—and the message given, as neither sought nor prescribed, by a speaker either seen or unseen. Putting aside for the moment the oracle, I will consider only the unsought voice with or without a visible speaker.

Such verbal help the records, which we know best, usually speak of as uttered by an 'angel.' And art has pictured the utterer, yes, and the recorder too, when he was not the actual recipient, as equipped with wings. In these for the body, as we know it, anatomical monstrosities, I see merely a symbol expressing speed and lightness in movement. I take no wingedness in the messenger as real, whether the wings be two or four or six, whether they be large or as small as those on Hermes' ankles; as no more real than the two or three extra pairs of arms in Indian statuary, but just symbolical of greater effectiveness in will-power.

I would also remind you that, whereas we use the word 'angel' in scripture, making no difference between the Hebrew and the Greek originals, the word means simply 'messenger.' It does not thereby mean of necessity one who is not-man. For me no angel is not-man. Angels are men at different stages in the vast More of life, some very near in process of becoming not a More, but a Most, even the Highest; some just more advanced than the best of us either here or in the world immediately next to us. If, when we lightly say 'angel,' we would recollect we are simply saying 'messenger,' we might to some extent clarify our pictured Invisible, our idea of this twofold Agency.

And further: the messages these 'men in the More' bring to men of earth are not peculiar to one time or place or cult. I go neither with the denomination-
alist, who claims a monopoly of the true for one age and creed, nor with the anthropologist, who sees in all wording from the Unseen something evolved out of some form of illusion: the dream, the ecstasy, the vision, the natural phenomenon. Truer for me is the statement, if broadly construed, of the opening lines of the Hebrews' Epistle: "God who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in times past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these latter days spoken unto us...." Always has man sought help in the Unseen. Always has man found help in the Unseen, however imperfectly he may have understood words and way in which it was conveyed. 'Prophets' are, for me, not only a small number of gifted messengers found in the Old Testament, but all such who earnestly sought after a Better for man, being gifted with psychic hearing and vision, or with will sensitive in them to working of a More-Will. Thus understood, there is, in the cited verse, no room for any religion, other than that of the epistle's unknown author, as being in origin merely fancy-begotten. Here is the Highest shown speaking to men everywhere at all times, ay, even to primitive man, and that through messengers in no mythical way.

Very possibly the author of the epistle had a more limited vision, writing as he does of "prophets" and of only one man as supreme above all other messengers. Other recorders have other limitations. The writers of Buddhist scripture for instance, had come to see, in the recipient man, one who was able of his own wisdom to teach and save. They do not concede, that this recipient man of the vision and the message was a chosen instrument, chosen by a greater than he. That he was instrument all the time is, for all that,
recorded, but the dogma of the omniscience of the chosen instrument has blinded them to much in their older records. And we of other lands have, as alas! so often, been misled by translators. According to the record, a helper from the Unseen gives him, who is hesitating and turning away, a mandate what he should teach. The usual translation only makes out, that he is urged not to turn away but to teach, and to teach just religion (dhamma).

Let us linger a moment over this much neglected picture. It will scarcely be equally familiar to all of you. Gotama, much later called 'Buddha,' eager to help his fellowmen, aware of his power to influence, is unable to charge his will with a fit, a moving gospel, appealing to Everyman. He has weighed choice between two new messages, but deems neither has any such appeal: a gospel of world-renunciation, or a gospel of a universal fact (of effect as following cause) in mind as well as in nature. 'Everyman' would not want to win salvation by living the life of a half-man. 'Everyman' would not be stirred to seek salvation by an abstraction. Either subject, he deems, would be a source of much worry to him as teacher. There then appears a vision: a man of noble aspect, revering him, speaking of man's sore need for he is in a state of (spiritual) decline; when he could learn from Gotama, he might become: a strong word then for India meaning grow in well-being. Gotama, apparently much moved, consents; the vision, gladly hearing, vanishes.

For us there is perhaps nothing new in the urge. We have been suckled on a growing tradition of education—chiefly it is true of body and mind only—and of evolution from something less to some-
thing more developed. But in the religion of that day the outlook was an undeveloped bud. How?

Man was taught he was in nature identical with the Highest: THAT art thou! But he was also taught that, when he, void of evil desires, might die, he would "become Brahman." Here was a loose end indeed. If man was That, he needed not to become That. Hence to be involved more than being; it implied a becoming, a growing from the present man to the perfect man. But though there was an increasing use of the word become, it was not yet applied to man's present spiritual need. The teaching of the day had, as a frequent refrain, man's need of seeking after That, seeking to know That; and it was said that to know you 'are That' is to 'be That.' So much then did the function of knowing a thing mean for the Indian mind. But in the new message is implied, that man was only potentially what he might become. For difference between the actual and potential India had no word. But India was feeling after it with the word become.

And then Gotama pondering the vision sees or thinks of the growing lotuses in water: buds beneath, half-opening on the surface, the lovely blossom above the surface. Even so was Everyman. Here was a becoming. Yet not enough becoming. Man was not as the stationary 'root-footed' plant. His to go with the pilgrims of an English poet: "always a little further."¹ And the central figure he chose was that of the Road:—the Way of Becoming.

Here if nowhere else do we find a world-religion taking its sanction, its rise from the word of an

¹ "We are the pilgrims, master; we shall go always a little further." Flecker.
invisible helper become visible. Who that helper will have been brings me to a vital point in this matter or worded help.

The Epistle says: 'God hath spoken . . .' but adds 'by' after the word 'unto.' I venture to say: Deity does not speak directly to man of earth. So much the more comes in here the invisible helper. Much, in this and that scripture, seems to say; Deity does speak directly. I contend this is due to man's ignorance as to the speaker, or as to whose is the heard voice, and also to man's changing values during the interval when his records have been taking final shape.

Consider the case I have cited. Gotama was alone, and must therefore have told some one or more disciples later on, when he had such, about his wonderful experience. These will have repeated it; the growing community will have treasured the story. After centuries of telling here and there it came to be written down. During that time a change had come over man's feeling about the Founder. He himself, a man credited with great truthfulness, will have spoken of a man in a vision (Gotama was clairvoyant), who had talked with him, charged him and vanished. But for his church, who had come to see in him one who was deva above devas, a supreme being, the visitor could be no one less than he whom Everyman considered as the Lord of all: the personified Brahman of that later date: Brahmā Sahampati.

It may be said: Isn't it arbitrary to accept the message and reject the messenger as named? Well, listen to a case of how these pious records take on growth. Certain lines accredited to a quite obscure nun called Vajirā came to be included last in a little collections of nuns' verses in an early collection of
Suttas (but were not included in the more important *Nun’s Anthology*). In these man is likened, by a clumsy analogy, to a carriage whereof we cannot say, that apart from the parts there is any entity: ‘carriage.’ So is man but a congeries of bodily and mental parts. Now this agreed so well with the new growing notion of man’s plurality, with what a Bertrand Russell would call ‘the momentary man,’ that Vajirā’s verses ‘caught on’ and became cited. But they needed a greater sanction than to be just the word of a mere woman. And we find stated in a later work, that they were spoken in the presence of the Master, this amounting to endorsement. Actually Vajirā is recorded as having been alone, but accosted only by a deluded person who ‘harped on’ man as ‘a being.’ Then in the late-composed authentic body of exegesis we find, that Vajirā has been smoothed out, and that the Buddha himself uttered her verses! Here we have an instance of how, with changed values in both doctrines and persons, changes are wrought in written records.

So, too, that vision, first told, then taught orally, and at last written, came to be rated, not as the visit of a messenger visible out of the Unseen, but as that of the Highest in human shape. I am not saying, as does the Buddhist, that the mandate what to teach was *not* an expression of the Divine Will. I judge that cannot be denied. Who are we to deny it? But I do maintain, that the divine inspiration, if such it was, needed a More-man to utter it in words to the man of earth. I suggest, so far is man of earth from the Highest, that intermediacy in words is necessary. A little child cannot take in the burden and implications of an adult philosophical discussion.
It may be for primitive man, more of a child even than we are, to speak cheerfully and childishly of Deity as a sort of big man. So we get Jehovah of the primitive Hebrew walking in the garden in the cool of the day and talking to Adam and Eve; we get Jehovah calling with two other beings on Abraham; we get Jehovah appearing and talking to Moses, arguing with Job, speaking as a voice to little Samuel, and later to Jesus, a voice appearing to some as if it thundered. But as man on earth evolves mentally, evolves spiritually, his concepts deepen and widen, and he comes to discern, that Deity cannot as yet be conversed with 'by word of mouth.’ Man can but be willed, he can be inhibited, but no more. He is here, I repeat (nay, I think, also in lives yet to come) as a child who should try to converse with learned adults on matters he is unable to understand. We should concede this more easily, did we not see in the human intellect, at its present best, a limit which is for us final, and not the immature instrument it really is. For him, as yet, is the indwelling Will, and the helpers of the worded message. And if he be wise he will say with Job: “I will lay my hand upon my mouth.”

I have it as once told by Cardinal Newman that, when writing a sermon, he had written “God spoke to man . . .” and was then aware of a present yet unseen someone, who said this inwardly: “God is unworthy by you as by me. We have a word to bring to men of worth. We are messengers to them, but no more. We are not the Highest; we do but give our messages as these are willed in us. You and we are in a More; not yet in the Most.”

I have heard it said, by two quite independent testimonies gained at a different place and time, that
Swedenborg, who wrote, that he had had converse, not only with 'angels,' but also with 'the Lord, the Creator,' was, on arriving at the post mortem tribunal, judged to have exceeded his mandate, and sentenced to a spell of imprisonment. It is true, that he more usually identifies the unseen speaker with Jesus; but for him Jesus is identified with Deity; is not just an 'angel,' or a greatly advanced man. Hence there is virtual assumption that he conversed with Deity.

A word here on the Far-Eastern Buddhist concept of the 'wisdom-being,' bodhisattva. These are held to be men who, having won, in the worlds, to a more in will, in compassion, in power than have men of earth, refuse to go on to consummation in and as Deity, in order that they may be the better able to help as saviours men on earth. For me the defect in this theory lies in the failure to see, in the concept of Deity, a real consummation of all that is for us human perfection. This does not mean Deity as, for this or that reason, unable to help better than a bodhisattva. It means a being most compassionate, most able, most willing to help. There might be some justification were the helping conceived as aiding bodily needs. But the helping is the saving, the furthering in spiritual growth, in will to the better. The theory is, as it were, as one of an isle where students, who had finally graduated on the mainland, were to cross over to live in entire segregation from their former and from future students, and who as such would be for us imperfect 'Old Boys.'

There remain among our invisible helpers the saint and the guardian angel. From my invisible helpers I have the following: That the child is guarded, where life on earth is to be preserved, is true. But it
is to limit the beneficent plan to believe it true for the child only. Everyone is warded, even when childhood is past, if only he or she wills, as children will, to be protected by a More than he, in the matter of physical safety, and also of mental balance. I have been aware of such an one whenever danger might seem to threaten, and even when there was not such seeming. I have even had a brief but unforgettable vision of him... for me a most rare happening. I have learnt he was, long ago on earth, and where and when, my father. Warders of life on earth, these bring comfort when that life is ending.

But if the man is still to have the privilege of this guardianship when childhood merges in adolescence, then must he seek it of deliberate purpose. He must align himself with the supreme Will by asking for protection. So doing there is nothing for him or her to fear. Then and only then are we safe.

It was an ill world for Europe when the Reformation robbed of Mother and Saints her picture of the Unseen. Yet how necessary became withdrawal when, for her, they had "become as gods," made to usurp prayerful devotion meet only for the Highest! Let them be once more approached, as angels, as messengers, not to be prayed to, but to be prayed for, as helpers and to be helped, and how great may not be our gain!

We had, not so long ago, among us a wise and noble man, Alfred R. Wallace, whose books contain a faith, a conviction, that the universe, so far from being 'run' as a vast mechanism, is worked in and towards harmony by a hierarchy of beings (i.e. man) having to carry out a system of devolved mandates... a mighty devolution of will. I cannot now discuss this and will but comment on how it expands in a sublime
way that other saying of the Hebrews' Epistle, that verily "we are compassed about by a great cloud of witnesses," watching, helping but not yet "made perfect," given it may be now and then to falter, with it may be cataclysmic results ... .

Largely in tune herein with the Epistle is a (much-over-looked) passage in an old portion of the Pali scriptures. Man, we read, has three mandates (adhipateyyāṇī): first, spirit or self (that is, for the age when this was uttered, the God-in-man); secondly, the worthy of earth and other worlds who are watching us and willing our welfare, and thirdly, dhamma, the inner motive power that we, here and now, call 'conscience.' Armed with these three mandates man, we read, will never fall back hopelessly in his onward wayfaring.

I see in this a lovely attempt to solve the mystery—let us not doubt that it is for us yet a mystery—of God as working in us yet through invisible helpers. Deity is Alpha and Omega: source of all help and guidance, as well as the taking effect in us of that help and guidance, but devolving the giving that help on to invisible (or not always invisible) helpers, not omitting helpers yet on earth, who are willed to speed us on our often difficult and dubious wayfaring towards a more-than-earth, where we shall meet and work with the helpers as yet unseen.

Shall I finally speak, briefly, of such as have but lately gone before, and who, as being as it were next to us, in space and other conditions, are, so I at least have found, deputed to come to our aid and encouragement when for one of us there is a passing over? This experience, if I have learnt truly, is to some extent like an event of common earth-experience:—the finding, when train or ship or aeroplane brings us to
some journey's end, the pleasant sight of waiting
kinsfolk or friends, glad to see us, willing to help us.
Such a meeting we hear of awaiting the man when
emerging from the dying body, not as discarnate
'spirit'—a thing yet inconceivable—but in his other
body, his usually stunted earthly body's counterpart.

When she is available it appears to be usually the
mother who meets, else it is kinsman, friend, or just
one attendant. Even here there has been devotion
in help. Word has come to these from the judicial
Court in the near Beyond to go at an approximate
point of time where son or daughter, kinsman, friend
will be coming 'over.' How the Court learns it, by
way, it would seem, of an oracular message, I am not
competent to tell. But I speak of first-hand experience
in these meetings, and chiefly can I never forget
hearing my husband's voice, audible only to myself,
as I stood at his deathbed, where his earth-body lay
breathing its last, and from which speech had for
many hours ceased to come. I was not in a morbid
state, but quietly content, glad that for him, long a
sufferer, release was already accomplished. I looked
up beyond the foot of the bed and asked: Well, Rhys,
are you free? Are you well? Swiftly came the lively
response: Yes, dear, I am free, I am well. I am so
glad it is all true. My mother is with me. I have
much to learn. I shall soon be seeing Arthur. Tell
the girls (they were beside me).

"I have so much to learn!" true surely of a quasi-
agnostic, who believed he would only live on as more
or less mind and in the work he had tried to bequeathe
to earth. The notion of the very man, who is more
than body or mind, living on in a sort of subjective
way, or again, as has recently been revived, in a dream-
existence, is for me utterly untrue, as untrue as the yet more foolish notion of life being followed by an indefinitely long period of sleep. Post-mortem sleep is only plausible as an attempt to account for, to justify the, I believe, equally wrong notion of a judgment deferred until some cataclysmic 'last day,' and so reconcile us to that otherwise awful miscarriage of justice;—adjudication postponed indefinitely after the commission of deeds good and bad. Judgment is swift, immediate. The next world is no perfect home, yet it is not so uninviting as to be cumbered with millions of sleeping bodies every hour of the twenty-four! But no account of our invisible helpers had been complete without mention of this most near and timely help at the hour of our painless passing—painless whether swift or gradual—of which I have plentiful testimony.

With this great theme entrusted for this occasion to me, I could not have shown how quick with life it is, had I omitted to include what is for me first-hand knowledge concerning this side of it. Knowledge my teachers would have said, not objectively valid, yes. And when only some two or three of us put such knowledge as we have together, how mutually discordant is as yet the testimony! So might be our interpretation of our space-relations, were there but a handful of us, who as babies felt our way into space each with our co-efficient of energy. No two descriptions of our three dimensions would agree. But we all everyone feel our way, and our vast collective experience has yielded a consensus as to those relations which seem so stable and positive that we say: thus and thus is the content of space, and no other. And when, in the not very distant future we shall, not in twos and threes, but all of us be at long last seeking
to know, while yet the day is with us, that which
awaits us at the first step into the beyond, then will
come consensus, and the fanciful fictions now
characterizing many isolated attempts will be ruled
out by wider and well-based knowledge.

As yet we are in a grievous want of will to get
more knowledge. We do not concede, that if we
would form a true picture of man's ascent in not earth
only, but in the worlds, of our wayfaring in the To Be,
towards the Highest, we must not be content with
just this foreground, and then a vast background of
vagueness called 'immortality.' Here too, as to that,
we live in the immortal, since we are alive, and not
our bodies only and in the ways we wield them called
'mind.' I am convinced that the mental and moral
sloth, which would hand over all feeling our way
among our invisible helpers to a few reckoned as
abnormally gifted, is not justified. I would say to the
normal too: You can if you will. And I would add
Kant's dictum: You can for you ought! Let there
but be a beginning void of theorizing, with the tabula
rasa, the clean slate of expectant faith and hope,
beneath the aegis of consecration to a co-operating
with the Divine Will, "waiting to be gracious." Let
there be the boy-Samuel attitude: "Speak Lord, for
thy servant heareth," and the helpers will look to it
that we shall hear.

And when such an effort becomes one of a more
general looking for things to come, then may earth
expect, not as in the past only, but once more even
in our own day a great New Word in response to the
will and work of earth, a word brought by a new
helper as yet invisible, but a son of earth to whom
listening she will be led out of the gross darkness in
which she has been too long content to live.
DOES RELIGION UNITE OR SEPARATE?¹

The more one thinks about this subject the more complicated and difficult it appears to be. To treat it adequately it would be necessary to take all cases in the history of the world of one race brought into contact with another, and to consider, in each case, the part played by religion in the resulting effect. A comparison of the different results in the different cases would then open up the way to certain qualified conclusions which would not fail to be both interesting and instructive. This is precisely one of the problems to which the young science of Comparative Religion hopes eventually to be able to give attention. It is also one of the numerous social and religious problems to which the scientific method has not yet been applied. The facts have not yet been collected. We have vague generalisations drawn from single instances. We have suggestive studies on one or two of the best known cases. But no attempt has yet been made to deal with the question as a whole.

A single case, though useless as the basis of any general conclusion, may be useful to illustrate some of the difficulties involved, some of the points that will have to be determined before any such general conclusion can be formulated.

¹ Published in (a) Interracial Problems, First Universal Races Congress, 1911. About two pages (the first two) were written by my husband. We were both invited to contribute. (b) The Hibbert Journal, 1942, a revised version.
When a horde of splendid barbarians burst upon the civilised states of Asia, they were no doubt inspired, in the fury of their onslaught, by what they would have called their religion. To each state in turn they offered the terrible alternative of conversion, tribute, or the sword. The amazingly swift and successful spread of Mohammedanism, from the time it started on its career as the militant missionary of a much maligned movement, engulfing in three or four centuries the half of three continents, is a matter of modern history. It seems to vindicate religion as, at the same time, a social consolidator and social disintegrator without parallel. What other motive, unless it were the driving consensus of hunger, could have availed so to stir and urge the different sections of the Semitic race hither and thither under the common banner of one Prophet, athirst to fling the world on its knees before the throne of the one God? From this present-time perspective, the movement reads like a frenzy for human consolidation, working by way of an equally frenzied disintegrating machinery. When we contemplate the loyalty, among many millions, of one man to another as servants of the Prophet, in the wake of that mighty wave of war, it is the consolidating power of religion that impresses us. When we consider the outrageous barbarity of the mind that says: "Because X has told me what to believe, I am going to kill you, unless you say X was right," we are overwhelmed with the baneful cleavage wrecking the progress in human concord and wrought in the name of religion.

Nor can it be generally claimed for militant propagandists, whether of Islam, or of the Christian Church, warring against heretics, that their dominant motive
was altruistic or ethical. Personal salvation for the individual rather than the good of the attacked, is put forward as the one thing needful and the exceeding great reward. Founders and reformers in all religions reveal the great heart that yearns to gather the human brood together in love and concord. But the fierce missioner more often appeals to individual interest. And this makes men act in concert rather along the parallel lines of individualism than along the converging lines of solidarity and mutual service. The questions: "What shall I do to be saved?" and "What shall I do to be of service?" may both be accounted as religious, but only the latter makes essentially and entirely for solidarity. The former question has at times found its solution in a life of solitude and withdrawal from sharing in the common lot.

In both of these extreme types, therefore,—the propagandist with sword in hand, and the apparently misanthropical recluse—we seem to see religion manifesting itself as a disintegrator among the factors that tend to bring mankind into closer mutual intercourse.

But is it after all accurate, in connection with Jehads and Crusades and persecutions and inquisitions, to call the motive and spring of these religion? Is not religion possibly a pretext employed to veil the real motives? Consider the elements engaged in any so-called religious war on either side. Never has any one of them approached the spiritual plane of the one host or the other in the Holy War dreamt of by our John Bunyan—the celestial armies of the Lord of hosts, and the battalions of evil spirits bent on the spiritual ruin of mankind and the reconquest of heaven. It needs a child's simple faith to people the camps of
Crusaders or Covenanters with hearts burning with the white purity and single-mindedness of a Joan of Arc. It is as impossible to imagine the first Christians going forth sword in hand to slay unbelievers as it is to picture a Buddhist, first or last, taking up arms against his fellow-creatures. "Put up again thy sword into the sheath," said Jesus to his first Crusader. "If my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight." Nor can the militant Christian justly infer from the words: "I came not to send peace but a sword," that it was a Christian's duty to be he who should draw the sword. Unmodified, unqualified for early Christians, as for all Buddhists, is St. James's answer to his own question: "Whence come wars and fightings among you? Come they not hence, even of your lusts that war in your members? Ye lust and have not; ye kill and desire to have. Ye fight and war... because ye ask not. Ye ask and receive not, because ye ask amiss, that ye may consume upon your lusts."

"That worldly motives," writes Mr. Haines in his *Islam as a Missionary Religion*, "played a large part in the conversion, not only of the Arabs but of the other nations that were conquered and converted by the Saracens, cannot be denied, and the Arab apologist dwells at some length upon the fact." When the Arabs of the harvestless desert tasted the delicacies of civilisation and revelled in the luxurious palaces of Chosroes, "By Allah," said they in their wonder and delight, "even if we cared not to fight for the cause of God, yet we could not but wish to contend for and enjoy these, leaving distress and hunger henceforth to others." Desire for gain, from the bare need of necessaries that parted the Abrams from the Lots
in so many folk-migrations up to the quest of treasure that drove the Spaniards over the seas and against the Aztecs, with the cry (O irony of history!) of Sant' Iago—St. James, their own denouncer—on their tongues, has waved on its hosts with the banner of religious zeal.

Race-aversion and race-pride is another cause of cleavage between man and man that finds in religious zeal and orthodox aggression a convenient outlet. Surviving as a fossil even in Buddhism, the very gospel of mutual toleration and amity (where the term "Ariya" has come to mean, not race-complacency but ethical excellence), hate of the alien as alien and not only as infidel, appears too obviously in religious wars to need exemplifying. And the enmity may become intensified when the alien is the embodiment of successful rivalry, or of radically different social institutions. When the Christian, sheathing the sword, prays for all Jews, Turks, infidels and heretics, he confesses those as most needing escape from damnation who are not only aliens, but who are or were the embodiments of success in business on the one hand and, on the other, of aggressive restlessness and Asiatic institutions. The Spaniard might live side by side with the Moslem; the Frank and the Teuton could not. And further, where there has been aggression in the name of religion within national borders, the anger of orthodoxy may always be traced at least in part to motives due to enmity of a political, social, and economic nature.

The terse and trenchant summary of St. James, which we quote, has so thrust us on to two of the three great roots of man's miseries preached by Buddhism, greed and enmity, that we find ourselves in
face of the remaining root or cause, and do not hesitate to bring it forward. If with Buddhist doctrine we class the yearning for rebirth in heaven under the general motive of greed or desire of gain, and if we then eliminate from all aggressive and inquisitorial measures, carried out under the sanction of religion, the greed and the enmity therein finding expression, we shall not greatly err in attributing the residual impulse to moha or unintelligence. It was over a Jerusalem which, with unintelligent, uncomprehending orthodoxy, persecuted the messengers of a new and purer word that Jesus wept. "If thou hadst known," hadst understood, hadst discerned, "the things that belong to thy peace! But now they are hid from thine eyes." That rulers and statesmen may discern, in the rallying and concentrating attending a war, the best occasion for effecting political unity is conceivable. But it is impossible to conceive any mind that has really grasped the spirit of an ethical religion, of a creed confessing a benevolent deity, to loose the dogs of war upon his fellow-men, or to coerce belief by prison or the stake. The stupidity behind "man's inhumanity to man" is perhaps the most tragic thing about it.¹

Once more: we have alluded to the apparently disintegrating effect of religion in the case of the recluse; driving him into an anti-social career of solitary living. But neither is the mind of monachistic temperament so simple as to act solely by one motive, religious or other. We must first eliminate all the

¹ What we, that is, most of the world, are even now battling against is not so much a keen, relentless far-sightedness in the aggressors as the blinding fog of muddled stupidity which seeks to build up a New State in the West and East by the paralyzing of the peoples they overrun with a torrent of bloodshed, plunder, rapine and torture by 'secret' police!
Christian Jeromes and the Buddhist Makākassapas, who adopt a retreat at intervals as a spiritual rest cure in the intervals of missionary labours, or again as an opportunity for intellectual production. These are only cases of men separating from their fellows, the better to work for universal amity. Nor must we confuse monachism with monasticism. Within cloistered precincts, the wider intercourse of the world is usually renounced in favour of the closer sodality of co-religionists. There remains the thorough-paced lifelong recluse. And here again, while not denying him religious ardour, we discern other motives beneath the religious pretext, or, at best, side by side with the religious motive. Men and women who are happiest in wild nature, who stifle in cities or in tamed confines of any sort, may be atavistic or morbidly shy, or otherwise abnormal.¹ But they are real types. And that injunction of all genuine religion which bids us foster the habit, with Plotinus as with the Buddhists, of "going alone to the Alone," affords such of them as are not frankly irreligious a sanction for their natural bent.

There is another real type of man, which seeks, not so much to alternate between the cult of 'the Alone' and devotion to the Many, as to cultivate both worlds at once, and who have, in some cases, sought to stave off segregation and bring about union between the two by carrying out among the Many a mandate which for them is deemed to emanate from the 'Alone.' And since, in man's immaturity on earth, faith and not knowledge must be his guide, it is his 'ideas about' that mandate which he follows

rather than what it truly is. And so we see, for instance, in 17th century France, the true welfare of the Many thrust aside or mauled to make way for denominational wars at home and abroad.¹

In the movements of social groups towards unity and concord made in the name of religion, it is often difficult to affirm that the driving power is genuinely religious. The human love of novelty and change may receive gladly the inoculation of religious ideas from without, and fraternize with their adherents over the border. These would deem they were advancing human fraternity by good missionary work, but conservative interests at home would judge, that the recipients were gone a-whoring after strange gods. Again, human gregariousness may fill church and chapel more effectively than any felt need to worship or be edified. Again, political unrest in the different race-factors of an empire may cause redistribution in religious profession, as was seen in my younger days in Austria. And religious tests, calling for certificates before the means of livelihood are granted, may produce appearance of religious unity that is anything but genuine.

To conclude this scanty glimpse at a great theme: Whether religion be a disintegrating or a consolidating force is no question that may be answered by a bare "Yea" or "Nay." Deeply as the religious instinct lies and stirs in the heart of man, it cannot find expression apart from his other instincts, however much it may and does serve as a cloak for them. And, accordingly, as these instincts make for social disintegration or solidarity, so will be the religious activity that is pressed into their service.

DOES RELIGION UNITE OR SEPARATE?

As the handmaid of theology, as the sanction of this or that social institution, as crystallised and formulated into a creed, or a sect within a creed, religion may become racialised. Thus narrowed, it will rather intensify the lines of cleavage between folk and folk, than bring them into closer intercourse.

But as an instinct, deep-rooted in the heart, religion transcends the barriers of race, in offering the bond of a common aspiration between individuals. And as the day of dogmas wears on to its long twilight, and the true inwardness of religion becomes acknowledged, we may come to invert the relation between religion, as pretext, and other motives calling themselves by its name. More and more shall we take other motives as pretext and expression for the religious instinct, which is our being’s noblest “creative impulse.”¹ We shall come to suffer the radio-activity of each man’s religion to work in the heart as a divine spring of action, and to take, as its pretexts, all our aspirations for the general increase of health and knowledge of beauty and happiness.

But still will this inner spiritual fount ever make both for division and for consolidation. Men and women will, in obedience to it, meet ever more and more, as here and now, in amity and ordered effort after mutual understanding and progress in fraternity. Yet no less will the inward monitor bid this man or that woman cultivate selection and solitude; ever will it lead them now to come away and now to approach, as befits the true aristocrat of the Spirit; ever will it urge them now and again to flee alone to the Alone, to feed and recreate the vital spark of divine flame before the altar of the Ideal.

¹ We refer to Bergson’s term, élan vital et créateur.
LXXXVII

BASIS AND IDEAL IN OUR OUTLOOK

Many years ago—it was that critical period of the European struggle,—1917—I was lecturing before a London women's club, the Lyceum, trying to show, that any philosophical system worthy to be so called built upon its basic principles an ideal of life—life considered as aim and destiny. Not as herd-aim, herd-destiny, but as goal and quest of each man and woman. Incidentally I contended that institutional Buddhism, so far as it adopted and emphasized certain philosophical gnomes of its day (such gnomes as were all that Indian philosophy then amounted to), had fallen short in such building. I have not seen the subject dealt with by others as it deserves to be.

I would re-state what I have just hinted: I am not crediting early Buddhism with anything amounting to a 'system of philosophy.' Writers so crediting it forget, that when Buddhism, i.e., the Sakyan gospel was born, sometime in the 6th century B.C., there was in India no such form taken by her culture as a 'system.' Culture was not so specialized. If, with the rising vogue started by the almost mythical teacher Kapila, Brahmin schools were discussing uniformities of procedure in man's inner world or mind, this new analytical (or 'computing') tendency

1 Published in the Kane Commemoration volume, Bombay, 1941, and in Review of Religion, 1942, New York.
would indeed find mention, but it was not yet specialized as the 'Sānkhya system.' And so for that other new vogue: the tracing, especially in those inner uniformities, a principle of causation:—this did not amount to a system. Philosophy, as specialized culture, has no meaning if used for any Buddhist teaching dating from before our era. Its earlier Canon:—the Pali Canon—bearing traces of long protracted oral structure—uses occasionally certain terms of what for us are of philosophic import), uses certain very general dicta, but nowhere launches on presenting these as a connected system in outlook on life. But there is one dictum strongly insisted on in that Canon's discourses, and that is the universality of transience or impermanence (anicca), also if rarely, called 'change' (aññathatta, i.e. 'otherness').

Is any claim made to originality, to novelty in this emphasis? Or was it already made in the teaching of the day, and are we hence only to see novelty in the religious structure built on it?

This is a question calling for more exhaustive research than such as I have made in Vedic studies. Here is as much as I have come upon. The only pre-Buddhist occurrence of the word chiefly emphasized by Buddhist Suttas: anitya: impermanent or transient, is in the Kaṭha, or Kaṭhaka, Upanishad. This, given, as to the total of 108 Upanishads, a midway date, was judged by Deussen¹ to suggest later influences than those reckoned oldest; it may hence have been affected by early Buddhism and is not pre-Buddhist. The word occurs also twice in the Bhagavadgītā;

¹ Discussed in my Buddhist Psychology, Supplement in 2nd ed., 1924; (1st ed. 1914 in Quest Society Series), as 'Buddhist Philosophy of Change.'
² Sechzig Upanishaden, pp. 26ff.
the senses, the world are so called. But this reference is no guarantee of pre-Buddhist date. The Kaṭha verse runs:

Something I know: 'tis treasure, but anitya,
How win from anitya the lasting (dhruvam)?
Therefore I built the Nachiketas fire,
And won, through anitya, the nitya;¹

the burning faggots, the flame preparing him for more lasting spiritual insight.

I am not prepared to say, that in Indian literature admittedly older than these works, the shadow of the transient is not in view and the light of the Immortal held up against it. Such an idea belongs to the very essence of all religion. Thus in the Rigveda, in the hymn to the Soma as the 'Flowing': Pavamāna, we find:

O Pavamāna, place me in that deathless undecaying world,
Wherein the light of heaven and everlasting lustre shines!²

But I have yet to find, that the nature of things as transient was made a prominent datum in any ideal religious structure. To this the total absence of the negative term anitya in pre-Upanishadic literature bears witness. I say this on the strength of the Vedic Concordance by Bloomfield. And I am inclined to think it not too bold a guess that, similarly to the rise, in the Upanishadic period, of release or liberty as an ideal, when the Aryan trek-spirit of solidarity had slowly waned out, the settling-need of a solidarity-ideal also gradually evanesced. The maintaining what had been won was no longer of first importance.

¹ II, 10.
Moksha (freedom) and anitya were possibly the swing of the active mind-pendulum away from the earlier need of solidarity and conservation.

Turning to philosophic utterances nearer to us than India, and probably not far removed in date the one from the other, we know, that the anitya fragments of Herakleitus are associated with similes of the transient: the stream, the flame. These became, in later Buddhist thought, no less closely bound up with its central principles. Less so with its inception. No simile occurs oftener than river and fire, but they are used for the most part to illustrate other doctrines than that of impermanence. Thus the Way of life: magga, is also compared to a stream: sota; and he who has chosen to see that Way as a quest came to be called 'stream-attained' (sotāpanna). The long stream of a man's lives is also called stream of becoming: bhava-sota. And the man as conscious continuum is once called viññāṇa-sota. Again, the kinetic being of fire is once called to illustrate:—“my perception was as the flame in a fire of chips, changing as it rose and ceased.”

So far for the Pitakas. But in the eleventh century manual credited to one Anuruddha of Ceylon, the Compendium of Philosophy, the vade mecum to this day of the South Asian Buddhist, sota, the stream, stands out in its terse and dry paragraphs: “So . . . consciousness (citta) . . . after rebirth goes on, in the absence of any process of cognition, in unbroken flux, like the stream of a river till the uprising of death-consciousness.” The term for this continuum is of interest. It was bhavanga; that is, I hold,

1 Fourth Nikāya, v. 9, P.T.S. ed.
bhavangya, a late abstract noun for the verbal noun bhava, ‘becoming.’ Of this more presently.

I have not the lore to cite a mediæval application of the fire simile. But here is flame (possibly a citation) used as a striking instance in the latest attempt at philosophy in Burma, written after all these centuries expressly for me and English readers through me, by a notable, now deceased teacher, Ledi Sayadaw: “Just as that flowing river or burning flame appears to those who contemplate it as a mode of motion, not as something static, and the motion itself consists in a continuous process of vanished past acts and of manifested fresh acts, so all these determinations into various ‘acts’ are only series of distinct phenomena, mental and bodily, made manifest by way of arising and ceasing.”¹

These Buddhist contexts are specific applications of change as true of the nature of man’s inner world usually called mind, rather than a contemplation of change as a datum of, or axiom of, things in general, such as was the ‘river’ at any given point, of Herakleitus. And I am not pressing the likeness in either as in any way suggesting historical connection, any more than I would suggest this between the Buddhist datum and Aristotle’s “All things are in motion; nothing steadfastly is,” although in point of time, Aristotle was more nearly contemporary with the compiling of Buddhist Suttas than was Herakleitus. The latter was nearer to the original teaching than are those compilations.

As to that, here is of course no need to seek any one man’s ‘system of philosophy’ to find a ‘principle of change’ as a discovery. Any philosophy would be

¹ J.P.T.S., 1913-14, p. 159.
but endorsing and confirming a very general human view of things in such a principle. From the Chinese writer Chwang-tzu: "The life of man passes by like a galloping horse, changing at every turn, at every hour," to the French proverb: "Tout lasse, tout casse, tout passe," with the modern Christian hymn thrown in:

Change and decay in all around I see.  
O thou who changest not abide with me!

show the universal consent of philosopher, proverbmaker and poet. The one question here is that of emphasis used as a basis for a religious conclusion. The poet here gets nearest: abide with me because all is fleeting.

Yet I do not see an emphasis in his creed equalling that of the Buddhist monks. Somehow, somewhy they got astride of this "galloping horse" and went further on it than do the compilers of Christian scriptures. They taught that ultimately, fundamentally, there is only change; that repose, fixity, permanence are illusions. The static is a fiction of sense and intellect. And so, centuries before Henri Bergson, they were ready to say "There are changes, but no things that change."¹ Or as I heard him say in London correcting William James: "There are flights (of the bird) but no perches."

I am still further from suggesting, that in that eminent philosopher we have a thinker inspired by Buddhist studies. I sent him the Compendium of Philosophy, since in its theory of perception I found striking coincidences with his own attitude, even in terms. Let the reader compare these: "When, say,

¹ La Perception du Changement, p. 24 (Oxford, 1911).
a visible object enters the avenue of sight and, the (continuum of) becoming is cut off, then consciousness of an apprehended object arises and ceases." (Compendium, p. 125 f). "Things are constituted by the instantaneous cut (la coupe instantanée) which the understanding practises at a given moment of this kind." (Creative Evolution, p. 262.) And the great man was kind enough to admit to me, both personally and by letter, that he had been struck by similarities in the little manual's outlook and "ce que 'nous' enseignons."

He had been specially interested," he wrote, "by what is said on the opposition of the point of view as to the mobility of time and as to the static point of view of space." (This is dated 1913.) It was perhaps a sentence in the book of one of his champions, the late Wildon Carr, that lit up for me the significance of the Buddhist terminology:—"Elements of experience are ... interruptions of movement. . . ."1 Interruption involves arrest; and our intelligence, building itself by the lessons of touch-based vision, is held (in the Bergsonian hypothesis) to create a world of fictitious static 'states' and 'things.' If it were built up by the teaching of the ear, the world, as we know it, might wear a very different aspect.

A certain degree of parallelism then may be traced in these utterances so widely separated in space and time. Bergson's admission is a worthy passport to a further word of reflection on the matter. I repeat, there is no question here of a conscious, a direct evolution of present dynamic concepts from those of a past and now barren era of thought. The only connection to be made out is just this: Given certain

1. Philosophy of Change, p. 39.
conditions in the growth of a local and temporal nucleus of ideas, these ideas will fructify in a certain line. Such a nucleus may be repeated, but be spatially and locally different. That many circumstances of time and space may thus differ in the one and the other nucleus of travelling minds will not prevent the owners of those minds from following a relatively identical line. But the line will be greatly modified. In this way history does and does not repeat itself.

In Bergson's "perception of change" we have on the one hand, a philosophic departure which has, at the back of it, a development in physical science of some centuries in duration; and in science of the mind of not more than two centuries. And he had some centuries of literary philosophizing behind him as well. But in that older Indian nucleus we have a philosophical evolution which has, at the back of it, a very scanty development in sciences of matter, a relatively developed analysis of mind, and no tradition of philosophizing with the pen, or rather stylus. Further, whereas the modern Western nucleus of ideas, say, on 'change,' has had within reach all that its tradition can teach it, the documents of, say, the ancient Indian philosophy of change are as yet imperfectly accessible, though less so than when I first dealt with this subject. Still as to knowledge of them are we much in the corresponding position of Christian culture at the beginning of the Renaissance, which knew little of its Plato, had its Aristotle largely from Arabian sources, and which was scarcely aware of its own poverty in materials.

So even now Indologists, pursuing the philosophy of Southern Buddhism no further than the Commentaries of the 5th century A.D., discuss the sub-
mergence, in India, of Buddhist metaphysic in the rising flood of Vedântism and other mediæval lines of thought, oblivious of the quietly continuous development that appears in the works of Buddhagatta, Anuruddha, Sumangala-Mahâsâmi, Ariyavaraṃsa, not to mention Ledi or others, who handed down the torch of philosophy and psychology in Ceylon and Burma. The work of the Pali Text Society covering nearly 60 years has advanced matters much in both text and translation, but much may for many a day remain undone. I may at least say thus much, that we have to-day a little more than the foot wherefrom to speculate about Hercules.

But this little article is no attempt to compare the history of Eastern and Western philosophy, even on a single point only. Nor is it a sketch of any 'Buddhist philosophy' of change. It is only a straying into the field of general notions about life, from which unspecialized Buddhist 'computing' (sankhâ) about man's mind was never fenced off. What then is this 'principle of change' as emphasized in Buddhist discourses?

The fact of universal and continuous change is expressed by several more or less synonymous terms; and this most emphatically by one abstract noun: (r) otherwiseness (aññathatta), but most often by the negative of the Vedic word for lasting or permanent: (2) a-nicca (-Vedic a-nitya), by (3) añña . . . añña (the one, the other, cf. alter . . . alter), by a stressed form of the Sanskrit parinâma, 'change,' viz., (4) vi-parinâma, by (5) 'evanescence' (vaya), by (6) 'mobility' (vâya), by the doublet (7) 'rise and fall' (udayabbaya), by (8) 'dissolution' (khaya), and others I may have overlooked. Last but not least, there is
the frequent use of bhavati (and its contraction hoti) with the noun bhava, 'to become,' 'becoming,' in place of forms of atthi, attitā, 'to be,' 'being,' save where existence is asserted (there is, there is not). We do not find, we should not expect to find discrimination of meanings among these, such as a modern review, e.g., that in the E.R.E. gives us.\footnote{Art.: *Change*, by James A. Hyslop, who distinguishes four types of change, but turns his back on Eastern thought!} But Buddhism has none the less its modern counterpart in Ledi Sayadaw's finding in viparītāma and aṭṭhathabhāva species of anicca, to wit, metastasis and subsequent modification in change.\footnote{In his essay *Vipassanādīpanī* (Rangoon).}

It is the second and fourth in my list which are employed in passages most crucial for our purpose. In fact they exhaust the two shades of meaning in our own curious, if useful Latin term 'change.' Thus, take anything that is obviously changing in time or space, material or mental, then this $x$ at any given moment, is, at another moment is not; $x$ then is impermanent "in the sense of not being," as the Commentary has it. Or, $x$ is now $x$ with a coefficient of $y$, or, if you like, of $n$. Thus $x$ is altered, i.e., has otherwiseness (aṭṭhathattha), and may proceed to alter so much, that we call it, not $x$, but $y$. At a given moment a baby boy lies on my lap; at another moment a young soldier leaves me for the war. My baby is gone, changed; my boy has evanesced.

Now in the older books of the Pitakas, the Four Nikāyas, change is usually presented in this guise of the evanescent or impermanent, fleeting, transient. The notion of otherwiseness is used in one or two more analytical Suttas of quasi-philosophical contents, thus:
There are these three condition-marks of that which is conditioned. ... Genesis is apparent, passing away (vaya) is apparent, otherwiseness while it persists is apparent."

But the more usual way of wording change is in such summary discourses as the bunch in the Third Collection on birth, etc. and on the transient. The one refrain runs right through: "All, monks, is (e.g.) transient (anicca)" and, as transient (aniccato), is to be put away (pahīyyati). And since little attention was in that age paid to 'nature,' but much to man's inner world, it is on this that the teaching chiefly bears: "decay and death, birth, becoming, grasping, craving, awareness," and so on. ... all these are "impermanent, conditioned, are withering away, passing away, fading away, coming to an end." And a stock argument against assuming that the impermanent could be the very spirit or self runs thus: "What think you? is body or mind permanent or impermanent? Impermanent. Then is such painful or pleasant? Painful. But that which is impermanent, painful, changeable, do we do well to contemplate it as 'this is mine, I am it, it is for me the spirit'? ... so is it to be regarded as by right insight it really is."

The term I have translated as change: viparināma: lit: much-bending-about, is in the foregoing formula used incidentally to fortify 'anicca.' In one category it attains position as one of the three forms of affliction (dukkhatā): the state of 'ill,' conditionedness and change.

1 Fourth Nikāya, i, 152, P.T.S. ed.
2 Third Nikāya, iv, 28, etc.
3 Bhava, in the sense of 'world' or 'life'.
4 Ibid., iv, 26ff.
5 Ibid., iii, 67, etc.
6 Ibid., iv, 259, etc.
The quasi-poetic compound ‘rise and fall’ is favoured in the chief Anthology, the Dhammapadā:

Better than that he live an hundred years not seeing how things wax and wane, were it to live but for a single day as man who sees the waxing and the wane

(udayavyayam).

And

When now, when then he grasps the rise and fall of mind and body, rapture, joy he wins of those who can discern the deathless ‘That’ (I13, 374).

Here it is not man’s inner world alone that is swept into the tide of the mutable. And Buddhist teaching came to include under this, not only the whole known world, concerning which it taught that all was in a moving cycle of involution and evolution, but also the Unseen and all its inmates without exception. As we might generalize: life might be renewed in recurring geneses, but it could not persist eternally in any conceivable phase, else it was not life. Buddhist did not so generalize; they did not speak of ‘life’ as we do. They had no fit word. They spoke of ‘becoming’ (bhava) as virtually meaning ‘lives,’ ‘worlds,’ neither of which words did they use in the plural; and they spoke of birth-and-death, of ‘going on’ (samsāra).

As to life not on earth, the worthy man, i.e. deva, in whichever of the two other-worlds he was, came to die as on earth, and be reborn, probably on earth. The current belief that there was imperishableness

1 It has two forms: udayabbaya, udayavyaya.
2 Samvāța, vivāța, e.g., First Nikāya, i, 14.
3 I have only found one use of ‘worlds.’
4 Iti-vuttaka, § 83.
(akṣaṇa), and no decay (akṣiṣṭa) in any divine mansions is vigorously contested. The inmates may feel complacent in the security of their tenure: "This our life is permanent (nicca), fixed (dhūva), eternal (sassata), absolute (kevala), inflectuate in its nature; without rebirth, decay or death; and beyond it is no further salvation." Then the monk-editor makes the Founder to know intuitively of this delusion and transport himself to that world, and, on being greeted with a display of the same confidence, shake, as it were, head and finger at them and say: 'Alas! the good deva! how ignorant he is! Inasmuch as he will be calling permanent, fixed, eternal, absolute, bound to persist, that which is impermanent, mutable, temporary, relative and bound to end . . . beyond which there is a different salvation.'\(^1\)

Then as to the soul or spiritual principle in man, I have come to see, that, whereas Buddhist teaching in its earlier centuries denied only the unchanging nature in this, it came eventually to deny the very existence of the 'owner' of body and mind, and saw in the word self or spirit nothing else but the transient body and mind. Whereas in the main trend of the Suttas it is ever the 'man' that is being incited to persevere in spiritual progress, by way of life of body and mind, it had come, in the day of the chief exegesists, to be strenuously asserted, that the man was only his changing transient body and mind, in other words, a complex of dhamma's or phenomena. For all was changing, and it was rejected, as traditional, that Deity could be so.

The rate of change too got intensive treatment. Already in the Suttas, the inner world-movement is

\(^1\) Third Nikāya, i, 142.
stated to be far quicker in change than that of the body. Nothing, we read, "equals the rapidity of thought (citta). It were hard to find an illustration to show how swiftly thought comes and goes."¹ Again, "It were better if the unlearned man of the manyfolk considered this body of the four elements (earth, etc.) as the spirit of him rather than thought. Wherefore? The body may last anyway for years, even for a century . . . but what is called mind or intelligence or thought, arising and ceasing at night is other than that which arises and ceases by day. It is even as a monkey in the forest, travelling through the timber, clutches one bough, looses that and clutches another."²

But for the Commentator compiling in Pali from the Sinhalese documents in the 5th century A.D., this wording was ambiguous, and he guards his reader from inferring, that any day- or night-long duration of a conscious state was here intended—a heresy refuted elsewhere in the Canon.³ For, he adds, in one instant many myriads of 'citta's' arise and evanesce. This elaborated explicitness of the apparently more leisurely rate of change, as taught in the Sutta, came about during the 1,000 years or so that elapsed between the compiling of the text and Buddhaghosa's new edition of the Commentary. Later Commentators screwed up the rate of mind-flux even higher.⁴

To sum up: this brings us thus far, that, of the two elements in the notion of 'change,' namely transience and alteration, nothing whatever, it was

¹ Fourth Nikāya, i, 10.
² Third Nikāya, ii, 95.
³ Points of Controversy (Kathāvatthu), p. 363.
held, either without or within was permanent. Everything, but especially mind, is perpetually altering, as composite phenomenon, nay, even in its elements, and is either coming to be, or passing away, or undergoing intermediate change. The ancient canonical phrase: *sabbe sankhārā aniccā*—all things are evanescent!—has ever been and is, for the Buddhist, a motto parallel to the kismet of the Muslim. Cited ever for your comfort (?) when death has struck, it is meant to express a resigned shrugging of the shoulders. Cited in the absence of anything worthier of comfort, it is as pitiful as the grin of a skull when we see it uttered by the followers of one who told men that, if they willed to, they would "become the Peak of the Immortal" (*t'amat'agge*).

The work that in time is as a bridge between the Suttas and the Exegesists: the *Milinda Questions*, has practically nothing to say about impermanence save the one assertion in three (a context which, as I have said,¹ is suggestive of a gloss): "That which, conscious or unconscious, is not subject to decay and death you will not find." The Questions are mainly concerned with the third only: the 'man' as not real. The preponderance of the monk had then become an accepted institution, and he needed no longer to be flag-wagging life as ill and things as transient, to justify his leaving the world before old age, and ask for support. Four centuries later again, when the "tradition of the elders" was thoroughly institutionalized, and the whole of the Canon could be disinterestedly taken into a quasi-philosophical survey, the feature-triad finds a place of its own; not here and everywhere, but where, in his *Visuddhi-

¹ *The Milinda Questions* p. 29.
magga for instance, Buddhaghosa found a pigeonhole for it.

To revert to the Suttas: beside their emphasis on change or transience as universal, they also see in this nothing casual (adhicca-sampanna), but an orderly or determined continuity. In other words, things changed not anyhow but as results of causes. Into this teaching, as (a) coming into vogue during the birth of 'Buddhism' and interpenetrating it, (b) as new mainly in its application to man's inner world far more than to physical nature, I have gone elsewhere,¹ nor is here space to say more.

But this has to be stressed: if the growing pre-possession that all is in a state of flux, or, to quote another exegetic term, of 'crumbling' (hejjana), affords a poor basis for a religious ideal such as the founder of Buddhism set out to teach, the belief in causation, as opposed to chance, does give a more hopeful foundation. Buddhist monastic teaching laid hold of it, albeit we read of the Founder rejecting it as a basic text for teaching. "This is a hide-bound race, and will not listen if I speak of 'this as caused by that'." Either he was brought round to a different view about his age, or the prominence given to causation in the Suttas is a proof, that this new teaching about mind-uniformities laid hold of his Order, more than it did of him. There is nothing about causation in either the First Utterance, or the Mission Chart.

Nay, the Order laid hold of causation in a way opposed to the inspiration that started him. It saw in cause and effect, not a sure means for helping man to bring about the new result, but a sure way for

¹ Ibid., p. 54 ff.
barring this. Stop the cause, the Order taught, and you stop the effect. This was well if one was seeking to eliminate evil, but what a tragedy so to stop the making the Better to become!

And what a yet greater tragedy was the submergence, in this partial view of causation, of that initial inspiration, by which the founders of Buddhism began their mission! The ideal, namely, that the man—not his body and mind only, but the very self, soul, spirit—is a creature of change, in that he can and must grow, must come to be! This was, as I have said, what Buddhism ‘tried to do’;¹ to build, on this so shifty-sounding, yet so true dictum: ‘that all things change,’ a religious ideal for man to walk by. His in that day it was, not simply to learn to know he was potentially the nature of the Highest. This, in the Sakyan ideal, was not enough. For it, there was to be no “standing still”² in this knowledge, or at least this faith. The great interval between the potential and the actual had to be traversed, as in a Way, a Road of wayfaring, of growth or ‘becoming’ in the very man, long though it might take. Not alone in body and mind did man change for better or worse. Man himself, as part of sabbam: of everything, “neither is, nor is not”; he is in a causal becoming.³ And when, after this one of his earth-lives, he reaps the effect of what he here has done, he is not then the very same, nor is he another: he has come-to-be, and will continue to come-to-be. Yea, even when in his fulness of time he “becomes Brahma.” For Deity too ‘becomes,’ in the act of ever creating anew. Present is then the will to

1 Outlines of Buddhism, ch. iii.
2 Fourth Nikāya, Gradual Sayings, v, 67.
3 Third Nikāya, Kindred Sayings, ii, 13.
"become more," not more perfect, not less imperfect, but New, but Other.

Here it seems to me was a hinting—no more than that has survived—at a superb ideal of man and man's life to be built upon, inferred from, the growing pre-possession of change in all things, the sapping at that human inclination to cling for salvation to the stable, the permanent, the unchanging, the static. And it may be, that with the current teaching of Immanence, which could say with the Christian mystic "my me is God,"¹ and also, with the Western poet "au fond de l'idéal Dieu fait signe,"² this emphasis might have been better brought out by the Western philosopher I have cited than it perhaps is. We read how Bergson envisages his ideal built on his "perception of change": "The more we steep ourselves in the sense of universal becoming (devenir) the closer we feel drawn to the principle in which we live and move and have our being, an eternity of which must not be an eternity of immutability, but an eternity of life and movement."³ And again: "Humanity . . . is one immense army galloping beside and before and behind each of us in an overwhelming charge, able to beat down . . . the most formidable obstacles, perhaps even death."⁴ Well, I fail to find here, for all its inspiring call, that peak of the ideal which Indian Immanence, let alone nearer mysticism and poetry could have made complete.

For Buddhism, had it followed faithfully in its Founder's Way, had it not got side-tracked by the narrowed ideal of monasticism, such a culmination was not impossible. It failed in that it ceased to try

¹ St. Catherine of Genoa.
² V. Hugo, L'Âne.
³ Creative Evolution.
⁴ Ibid.
to build where he had begun. What it actually built, on the gnome that all is transient, was not an ideal evolved therefrom, but a fearful search for an ‘emergence’ (*nissarana*) from the impermanent, landing itself eventually in a changed ideal of ‘nirvana,’ a ‘waning out’ from all impermanent conditions, a something men could call *sassāta* or perpetual. It would not see in change ‘a star to which to hitch its waggon.’ It became so occupied with the certainty that happiness was bound to evanesce into unhappiness, that it forgot the other swing of the pendulum, namely, that the blissful sense of returning happiness, of health, yes, and of the ‘new body’ awaking, at death of this body, to fuller life, was also change.

No, life-experience, was said to be painful, precisely because it was ever changing. And this meant for it, as it does not, or not yet for us, that life and experience had been going on in each man an awfully long time. *Anicca* is ever a term of baneful import. Even the stages onward in the fourfold Way, the path of ‘assurance,’ as the aspirant broke fetter after fetter, are never labelled as modes of benign change and otherwiseness. The one desirable state is defined, not in terms of spiritual consummation, but only of material riddance: the unborn, the unageing, the undying. The arahant or Buddhist saint was held to have finished, here already, with

Spinning down the ringing grooves of change,¹ and says:

Well! of all that now have I made an end!²

There is a total failure to discern, to perpetuate the

¹ *'Locksley Hall.'*
² *Psalms of the Sisters, 'Isidattā.'*
mighty spring at the heart of their Founder's message:

"Learners of dharma will become," i.e., will grow.¹

They ground down the man into his tools: body and mind, things of transience; hence there remained of him none of the eternal adolescence which is his true nature. They failed to see how he had thrown aside India's idea of the man as a sun obscured only by clouds of the worse and the less, and had, by the simile of the growing lotuses, seen in the very Man, (not his body and mind only) one undergoing, not a mere physical clarifying, but organic growth of its own kind, growth not bound ultimately to decay, growth that would ultimately culminate in a 'Well,' a wellbeing, not to be attained here, nor here to be adequately conceived, not to be worded, as in the Bhagavadgītā as a waning out into Brahma: Brahmanirvāṇa, but more fitly to be guessed at in what I have called "the splendid stride of the Man entering into his divine heritage of realization as not only More but Most, as not only One but Many."²

¹ Vinaya Texts (S.B.E.), Mhv. I, 5, 6 f.
² Milinda Questions, p. 166.
LXXXVIII

THE MORE IN MAN

A

MORE-WILL AND MORE-WELL

India began very long ago to talk, not so much of men as of 'the man.' And by this she meant, not just the seen living shape only, not just inner ways only, but also and mainly the worker and user of both: contemplator, valuer, enjoyer, chooser, agent. But she omitted, save in one utterance, to talk of the 'man' in his most fundamental aspect. It was perhaps too near to be discerned. Just once we read of man as being altogether kāma, a word which then meant will or desire, this kāma leading to intention, then action. This aspect then was: man as wanting, and in wanting turning towards, and, in turning towards, changing or becoming. This the man is ever doing. And because of this, he does not now think and do in many ways as he used to; he now thinks and does in many ways as he once did not. To take one instance. The man now wants his prisoner, not to be sacrificed, nor just made away with, not to be tortured, immured, deterred only; nor to serve as deterrent only, but—to be made a better man.  

1 Published in Calamus, original title of the organ of the Threefold Movement, London, 1929.
2 To Western readers: not Karma.
3 That aggressors in West and East have herein fallen back has called forth horrified protests from nations who have not so fallen back.
Those great Aryan relays who travelled, not southward to India, but westward, overcoming formidable odds, inanimate and animate, brought to utterance, as their Indo-Aryan kinsmen did not, a strong wording of this fundamental aspect. This utterance came, in our branch of the relays, to take the form ‘will,’ with ‘well,’ ‘weal’ and ‘wealth.’ ‘Worth’¹ too is radically the same, and as determining choice is shown in meaning to be very near. So wording their wanting and their turning towards, the Teuton and Latin Aryan went mightily forward and abroad. It was a great thing in ancient peoples to utter thought. Let us not overlook the significance of the finding of this word.

To the Indo-Aryan there came with the years a call to find and realize that fundamental factor in man. There was no fit word. But the Helper who called made a figure serve instead: the figure of the man as wayfarer, faring along the great road of life through many worlds and lives, ever turning towards the Thing Wanted (the *Attha*), the thing that really mattered, mattered as nothing else ultimately mattered, the goal and consummation of the life, the end of the way. In the way each man, as a separate wayfarer, was, as the ‘man,’ not a sheep to be led; he had to choose; he would choose anyway because he wanted, wanted something figured as better. And within him was That Who in a way he was. The Man of the Way saw It as Dharma: the ‘Ought to be.’

But his after-men, albeit taught in the Way, came to take a wrong turn. They judged that, if the man as wayfarer changed, he could be no more than

¹ All these words are in Indo-Aryan, in the stem *var-*, but not as strong words. Cf. Vol. i, p. 123.
body and mind, his changing tools. It was deemed that, in so far as he was said to be That, the Highest, he must be unchanging as being imperishable. Hence he was not That, but merely those 'tools.' And so for a while, by those governing India's thought, the 'man' was let die.

But in turn these governors of thought were let die by India. And their founder's teaching; which, if truly followed, might have given to India as she grew a wording of man's will, never bore this potential fruit; nay, was distorted into this: that 'becoming,' as involving further life-opportunities for way-progress, was a development of woe, which the truly worthy man must, it was held, seek to cut short.

The peoples streaming westward came also to receive a call, a call to use rightly the fundamental factor in man which they had come to find words for: will, well, worth. And with the centuries followed yet a more insistent call herein. Both calls said: Only by placing his will in a More-Will, nay, a Most-Will could man safely use it, safely express himself by it. And to that call and this the peoples west of India and them to some extent of India herself have made profession of loyalty.

But actually we are to a great extent frittering away our heritage. We too, as once the Buddhists, are seeing in 'the man' just body and mind. And, more guilty than any men of the Indian tradition, we have broken up 'will' into a chaos of impulses and the like, or else have let 'will' in fitful lawless phrases serve for 'the man,' 'the will-er.' As a result we are merging the 'man' in the herd; our war-memories reek of the tombs, the covering soil and flowers. And we are not valuing our will, our
wanting, our turning towards, our becoming—because-of-our-turning, as being our potent, our efficient instrument—when rightly placed—to bring about world-success to such noble aims of forward movement as those of this Society.

As sounder attitude towards 'man' and 'will,' I suggest three experiments. First, that we figure us as we really are, not so easily as 'my self,' or as 'my soul,' 'my spirit,' but rather as the 'man that I am,' 'the man-in-man'! It is a good rectifier. It shows up the really real thing about us; it shows the rest of 'me' as somehow less real.

Secondly, that we no more make a substance of will by using 'will' where we should say 'the man,' or 'I.' Nothing is more common in books than to meet with 'will' doing duty for both will and willer. Thus I read lately in an American book: "will is to will will." It was a brave attempt to force attention on will, yet it was silly, in its omission of the user of will, the 'willer,' a word oddly omitted from French and German dictionaries, and thus failing to put the word in its right perspective.

Thirdly, I would, without the slightest prospect of being attended to, urge us, who are 'becoming,' growing not necessarily in body or mind, but in that long, long adolescence of 'the man,' which outlives deaths, to enrich our forward view by what, for want of better words, I would call 'more-will,' 'more-well.' We use will to carry on, not to slacken off; to maintain, not to let slide. But as children of such a movement as the Threesfold, we aim at bringing about a 'weal' in humanity which is a 'More' than what we have yet attained. We are to get this not merely on the defensive. We attack. We need for this
more-will. What we seek is for each man, not merely for the sum of us, but for the 'man' in and of each of us, a Better, in that it is a step nearer to the uttermost Well to which we are wayfaring.

These three ways of experiment will not be very worth while if in the 'man' we see mind only, if in the man we see not the will as the willer in activity, if in conceiving an Utterly Well we see no man, but a No Thing.

If, on the other hand we try these three, seeing the man as user of mind, as well as of body, as mind-er of the mindings, if in will we see the man tending towards the Better; if in the greater, the More Well we conceive the man as having won past all our present conceptions of what he may be, then are we afoot towards a More Weal than the word as yet mandates. We shall work more effectively once we work in right perspective of what we are and of what we work withal. We shall have a vista infinitely transcending that of any earthly To Be.

B

A HALLMARK OF MAN AND OF RELIGION

My Indian readers will probably know, that by 'hallmark' we mean the quite essential lakṣaṇa of anything, and that the figure so called stamped at the Goldsmiths' Hall on articles of precious metal, attests their purity. I here use the word to mean what is, for me, an essential quality in man's nature as an essential quality in all true religious teaching. Such teaching is not mainly concerned with man as 'one

¹ Published in The New Indian Antiquary (i, 1), Poona, 1938 and here partly revised.
who is,' with man as 'being,' with man as maintaining this difference, that likeness, as to this or that. It sees in the man one-who-is-becoming; it sees him as willing to become a more, however he figure to himself that more. In particular it sees him as willing to become a more in the worthier, the better, the higher.

It is of profound interest to see this sense of man's nature, as presenting a 'more,' emerging into articulate thought in Indian culture. I have treated of it at some length in Birth of Indian Psychology\(^1\) as attesting the new attitude of Analysis that was, it may be in consequence of the almost mythical Kapila's teaching, becoming felt. We see as it were the dawn of this outlook in the distinction, not earlier I think than the Brähmaṇas, of the one Man into the duality of nāma and rūpa. But in the Chāndogya Upanishad we first come upon the idea of analysis as revealing all of man that was not 'seen' (rūpa) by the term 'more' (bhūyas). "Ay, verily, there is more than just names of this or that in nāma." "Sir, tell me that." And the teacher, as from a box, draws forth one mind-way after another. We have here as it were man in the New.

There is as yet no attempt at showing those contents as a series, as a classification. Translators have curiously overlooked this and have seen in the repeated 'more than' a progress from a less to a bigger or worthier content. R. E. Hume with his usual greater accuracy has just "more than." Yet he writes of this context as "a progressive worship . . . up to the universal soul." But Max Müller has, for bhūyas, "better than"; Deussen has "greater than";

\(^1\) London: Luzac & Co., 1936.
the Tatya edition has "even greater than"; Boehtlingk has "mächtiger als." Now there is no such order here meant. It is ruled out by the succession of selected terms. We are reminded in these of a child emptying his Christmas stocking of gifts. It is just a worth of man as a manifold, such as our modern analysis is ever giving us. And to the extent that he is a manifold he has a potency of "more" in his essential nature. We are putting up with man as a Less if we rest complacent in wording him by one word. As a Many we have found in him a More, a more various, a greater, a larger, a more manifold.

We need this, the having heed to the manifold, to a degree we tend to overlook. Our life as a whole—and India needs not to be reminded of that—is a matter not of 'threescore years and ten,' neither is it just that period followed immediately by a vague timeless 'immortality.' In that life as a whole come very many spans of life, all in time and in space. And in each span a man may prove capable of now swifter, now slower becoming a 'more' than in the previous span. I came across not long ago what may have been a case of this. I went to see a lady who had received 'psychically' and published teachings of spiritual value and beauty. My friend, the late Edmond Holmes had been so impressed by them, that he had privately published a tract saying so. But when a psychic 'spectator' heard that the invisible speaker had been himself, namely, the man we knew as Cardinal Manning, Holmes was indignantly sceptical, holding that such sayings could not have come from one he held to have been in some respects incapable of such high wisdom. But why rate Manning as remaining spiritually stationary in probably more
favourable conditions? We are often slow to do justice to the spiritual changes a man may undergo even in this limited span. But we are even slower if we place no faith in swifter change for the better under more favourable conditions.

It is just that spiritual More in every man that religion is concerned withal if it is to be worthy of the name. A religion that has come to be shown in formulas, teaching this or that about a Less in man, may have had a divinely inspired beginning, but it has been forced aside into unworthy ways and altered. We may see the spiritual quest after a More at the very start of the "Buddha's" mission, when he bade men (as recorded) "seek after the self" or spirit. In his day young men were taught this in these words by their brahman teachers. And these words then meant "seek after God." God, as we know, was then worshipped, not as external, but as the ideal self or spirit within, somehow within, each man. And it was a misleading rendering given by Oldenberg¹: "seek yourselves," thus giving the earlier idiom a modern, a European worth. Misleading too was the modern European rendering given by Rhys Davids to those closing words: attadīpā viharatihā, etc., "be ye lamps unto yourselves."² It was attā conceived as dhamma, the divine will working within him that was to mould his own choice; his potential, not his actual, 'self.' We lose all the original force if we render this in the modern, the European way, instead of rendering it as translators of the Upaniṣads rightly render the compounds of ātmā.

It is only in our so-called Mystics that we can read

¹ Vinaya Texts. I (S. Books of the East). He alone translated the first half of this volume.
² Buddhist Suttas: S.B.E. xi, p. 38.
in English the Indian way, the way of, as Jesus said, "the kingdom of God is within you." "My Me is God," wrote St. Catherine of Genoa, "not by simple participation, but by a process of transformation." So, more in our own day, Anna Bunston:

O little lark, you need not fly  
To seek your Master in the sky.  
He treads our native sod.  
Why should you sing aloft, apart?  
Sing to the heaven of my heart!  
In me, in me is God!

Here is indeed a very More in man, a More in a divine Becoming. Man here in a Less, a very much less, is speaking, singing of himself as having 'within,' as being in a way, the very Most. A dangerous, a heady teaching unless valued with right humility. That is, it is not so much the man here and now who is being spoken of; it is not the actual, it is the potential man they speak of if they speak rightly. Else they forget the long, long way that lies between these extremes. If we remember that great Between, figured by the first Buddhist as a Road, a Way of Becoming, a Way of the worlds, then, as the Suttas put it, "doth the Way come into being; then for us is there no more turning back, then do we see ourselves as further-farers in the life-divine."\(^1\)

Lost to view now is that Buddhist symbol as meaning faring in the great Between of the worlds. The dropping out of 'becoming' (bhava), the insertion of 'eight parts' of the good life here as the Way, have practically reduced South Asian Buddhism to just ethics. Its hallmark has got erased. Never now do we hear it cited:—the hallmark of Becoming, of be-

---
\(^1\) Anguttara-Nikāya, Pañcaka-Nipāta.
coming a more (bhīyyobhāva). Yet was the word, simple and compound, once its teaching: to quote one of many such contexts: "that good values may persist, may be clarified, for their 'becoming' more, for their expansion, for the 'making them become,' for the perfecting of them, he brings forth desire, he endeavours, he stirs up energy, he makes firm the mind, struggles."¹ Nor do we ever hear cited how the Śākyamuni is shown saying, he spoke to his co-workers of the happy fate of the worthy who had passed over in order to stir up in them joy, that such a fate they too might look forward to.²

That new analysis of the more in mind proved, when misdirected by monastic pessimism, to be the undoing of original Buddhism.

¹ Dīgha-Nikāya, iii, 221.
² Majjhima-Nikāya, No. V.
Our greater religions differ *inter se*, among other ways, in the emphasis they lay on what our feeble imagination has called eschatology, or word about the "last things." A less feeble imagination would have named this anchistology, or word about the "next things." No great creed ignores these next things; none is so limited in mandate and purview as to do that. But the emphasis differs; the interest in them differs; the mandate about them differs. The original mandate in each has doubtless got more or less altered in scriptural wording, according to the varying interest in each "Church" concerning man's hereafter; according also to the extent to which a changing Zeitgeist, reverberating in the Church, found need to vary a scripture not yet perhaps committed to writing, or not yet to a closed fixed form of the written things.

For instance, in the creed built on the mandate given to Zarathustra (or Zoroaster), the Persian, at some time preceding the mandate given to Gotama, the Sakyan of North India, emphasis on the next step is unmistakable: namely, adjudication on each man closely following the dying of his earthly body. In the post-Vedic pre-Vedantic mandate in North India of the God-in-man, such a tribunal is but implied, hinted at. In the Sakyan (original Buddhist) mandate

---

1 Published in the *Occult Review*, London, April, 1931.

1028
of man-becoming-God, the adjudication is a clear, explicit teaching; but it has been, through waning interest, placed without priority, or other distinction, within two masses of Sūtras, or Sayings, and with a varying recension in the two Sūtras recording the adjudication. In both Christianity and Islam the adjudication is partly implicit, partly explicit. Namely, the immediate consignment of most deceased persons to purgatory will be the consequence of a sentence pronounced by some court of justice not made scripturally evident as in the contrast of the fate of Dives and Lazarus in the Gospels. Evident is only such a court of justice at the end of this world, world of earth, an event which in the Christian Gospels was believed to be impending, and within the earthly lifetime of some contemporaries of Jesus.

Here, then, is considerable difference in both doctrine and emphasis. If here and now I put these reminders into print, it is not to teach accessible things in the history of religions; nor is it to show how men, as in the last two religions, will go on, as adherents, accepting differing mandates on a matter of tremendous importance to each man, in a vague way in which they would not accept anything of momentous import in earthly concerns.

I said the last two religions of those mentioned. But the "vague way" of acquiescence or of indifference is not confined to adherents of those last two. Take the case of adherents of Buddhism—as we in modern days (viz. for less than a century and a half) have come to call the religion of the Sakya; I have not yet seen the two Sūtras on the post-mortem tribunal—and they are strikingly emphatic—dealt with by any Buddhist or writer about Buddhism.
To take a crucial instance: a manual compiled and published lately by two or three Englishmen converted to Buddhism, entitled *What is Buddhism?* entirely ignores the two Sūtras, or for that matter any acceptance of an adjudication after death. Instead of giving the learner any such textual information, the writers fall back, in the matter of the hereafter, on an obviously unfair and inaccurate parallel between Buddhism and Christianity, and on a curious unfounded supposition of a state of "subjective existence," as if to fill in the gap of the positive traditional teaching left out.

Obviously we are here up against a case of the waning interest I mentioned, if not in the compilers of a Canon, yet in the aftermen’s adaptation of such portions only of a Canon as suited their own modern attitude of waning interest in the particular topic. This waning interest in the man’s hereafter is no new feature in Buddhism. It is very noticeable in writings of the scholastic era of Hīnayāna (Southern) Buddhism. In that era the canker, beginning early, of losing the high Indian faith in the reality and significance of the man, the very man (soul or spirit), had grown very malignant. And it was inevitable that with no responsible doer persisting after the death of the body, the reward or retribution for deeds done by him could not be brought up against a non-entity.

But the waning came about slowly, so that we find in one of the two Sūtras a fairly obvious embroidery on the other, presumably the older Saying. Both are called "Deva-Messengers," i.e., messengers to men on earth from the Worthy of the next world. (Literal accuracy would have chosen the word, "Reminders" for messengers.) These are three: old age, illness,
dying. They remind the man that his one way for acquittal before the tribunal awaiting him is the moral life. And the judge thereat is shown telling the delinquent, who has just passed death’s portal, and telling it with terrific emphasis, that what he did was done by him, and not by another. In other words—words the old diction had not—the man is in the last resort responsible, is he, that is, who is to make answer for the deed: the “that,” the “how,” the “why,” the “wherefore.”

In the elaborated Sūtra two more messengers are added: a babe and an earthly tribunal. The zeal of unabated interest has been busy. The babe may have been added for one of two reasons, or for both. Namely, that the man, if he be not gripped by one of the three envoys, has yet newborn opportunities such as each day brings along. Or, by some more monkish teacher—and these were in the ascendant—it may have meant an omen of the rebirth ensured to each by shortcomings here. The other added message is less ambiguously plausible. It would be strange if a belief in the survival of man did not carry with it belief in one of the most fundamental features of his earthly sodality as persisting along with him. Far stranger is it to read, as now we do read, communicated accounts of the hereafter which omit this very essential matter of an adjudicating tribunal conducted by those who have gone on before, and who are intimately concerned to ward their society from the ill-doer, condemned or undiscovered, dumped upon them day and night. Truly as yet are we content to let ourselves be told only just what we want to hear!

But this added messenger is not really on a level
with the earlier three as something unchangingly true, fit for a world-gospel. It shows man as warned to heed what earth, at one time, in one land, legally bids him not to do. But that code varies with time and place. And there comes a day when, in respect of some item in it, men rise up and say, This must be struck out! They have got round and past the law. So have we got round and past much in our own code—past torturing the body and maiming man’s efficiency to repair and make amends; past making the dungeon a hell upon earth for those we yet suffer to live. Still do we suffer some ill doers no more to live. Still are we content to sanction the employment of a man officially to murder in cold blood someone who either certainly or apparently has murdered in cold or in heated blood.

Eva Martin in her recent article in this Journal on the death penalty put plain truths before us about this thing. There had once more come about a drawing of the blinds from the misty stage where we still linger. Once more we had been asking, Shall this old legal murdering be struck out? Once more the blinds have been drawn down again: we fear that if we cease legally to murder, the potential murderers will be less deterred from other crimes.

As to that, we are not in this matter in the van of the nations; some have deleted legal murder from their Statute-Books; we have the opportunity of inquiring into their experience. I have not gathered that our recent decision was based on such inquiries. But I am not going into the whole question in these few words. I write to endorse Eva Martin’s point of view, because (1) I hold it true and wise, (2) because we cannot afford to put the matter on the shelf.
Not further to mix metaphors, those blinds have to come up again. And as just a potential juryman, I would say why.

Eva Martin's point was that, getting past all the surviving paraphernalia wherewith we, as heirs of primitive culture, testify to our fear of death, we should readjust our false and materialistic conception of it and see in it just a milestone in the continuous life of one and the same "man," i.e. of a real being (soul, spirit) encased now in this, now in that body. (This last clause is mine.) And that in handing over, by killing, such a survivor to another tribunal we are shirking a responsibility that is ours as long as the man's earthly life-span lasts.

Hereon my own brief commentary:

The superficial reader may say: (a) This is a belittling of death; why make outcry at the imposing of it? (b) Is it not giving the man a fresh start in opportunities? (c) Were not life's earthly remainder spent in prison worse? (d) Why may we not, in self-defence, violently deprive him of his remaining opportunities here?

On (d) I agree with Eva Martin. As to (a) I admit that when once we come to see life more and continuous, where now we fill up the view with "Death," it is a shrinkage in dying as being a mere material episode. But the vacuum becomes more than filled with a fresh significance in the view of life seen in the whole. What is this?

Life is a becoming. In this way or that we seek to get, to come to be that which we have not, are not. The becoming is maybe not for the better. Yet without becoming we should never be better. Opportunity to become, in thought, word, deed, is ever
with us. Even in the worst surroundings a man may be aware that, as Sir Thomas Browne wrote long ago, "there is a man within who is angry with me." And, whereas our prisons are may be as yet not what they ideally should be, they are far from being the "worst surroundings" in our day. Dying closes one chapter of this continuous opportunity to become. Dying by violence closes it unfinished. We give the victim a little time in which to repent. He may do this in thought, that is, in will. But he cannot make good in his remaining life that bettered will. We are depriving him of the opportunity. We are shirking our responsibility in him. It is denying in him the very quintessence of human life to say, He will never be any better. He is, it may be, very stubborn "sour" soil, but we have not exploited it as long as we have opportunity to do so. We are throwing away opportunity both for him and for ourselves. It was a doomed Jerusalem, we can now say, over which Jesus in mother-yearning wept. But then it was not a doomed city till it had murdered Jesus, cutting off its best opportunities to hear him and become better, cutting off also his opportunities to "grow in wisdom" himself in so doing. We put an end, in our legal killing, to a possible becoming better by making that becoming impossible.

So doing, (b and c) we open up new opportunities for the man elsewhere, but he enters upon them handicapped, as a dumped undesirable, when he might, after a spell in prison of reformed will and conduct, enter upon the new life with a pronouncement of acquittal. Judges there would recognize, that judges here, that law here had done its utmost. What would a judge say here if a magistrate passed on to
him a case where the latter had not gone to the end of his magisterial tether? What do judges there think of our judicial wisdom here in doing, in condoning, this dumping? What will they have to say about it to us, law-makers, law-retainers, law-administrators, when we each of us come in turn to appear before them?

Are not the Deva-messengers still with us, and the tribunal over there of which they warn? It may raise a smile to take seriously these venerable mandates. But does our age ever think what a tremendous foreshadowing is cast by such similes? Are these solemn assertions of post-mortem tribunals the utterances of the ignorant, the duper, the dreamer? If so, is not a day coming when the so-called wise and prudent of our time, in retaining outworn laws, will be in their turn rated as the ignorant, the dupers, the dreamers of the past? These matters of life and death call for solemn assertions and for bold action.

We have lately made internationally a solemn assertion condemning international murdering by war. We need such another for the individual. Without the former we cannot hope to survive internationally. Without the latter we may not deserve to survive nationally. From Ur to Stonehenge, from Mexico to the Pyramids, we are among remains of cities of past societies, who for some reason, not always just war-havoc, have perished. May not their vanishing be due to some field in their culture, their outlook on life and death, where they had stopped becoming, where they had stood still? Shall we survive as a society if we heed not these things?
GEORGE CROOM ROBERTSON AS A TEACHER

I speak as one who only came to know Croom Robertson in recent years, when he had nearly accomplished a term of respite between two attacks of the malady which finally carried him off. His exposition of ethical hedonism,—it was the middle of the session,—was tinged with the gloom of it. "Why look ahead," he asked, "to pleasure or a neutral object? It is sufficient to be wanting riddance of pain. We can resolve to do without positive pleasure, but we cannot live with pain and discomfort. . . . Such are the hard conditions of life, that much of our action is to avoid pain, and no calculus is necessary here." A speaker of robust vitality might have said as much with a wry smile of humour, but he uttered it with a look of color che sanno in his face not easy to forget.

It was not often indeed that he looked other than jaded and 'driven' when he entered his classroom, promptly closed the window next him, or else drew on with swift dexterity his black silk skullcap, and took his seat. A guide of la grande montagne once said as we set out, 'One should always start as if one did not quite know what one meant to do.' Under-assertiveness of this kind characterised the


1036
beginning of Croom Robertson's lectures. He did not exactly 'fool around,' but, placing in front of him a minute porte-feuille of notes, which he never consulted, he would commence, gazing side-ways up the sky, in a high-pitched, weary, distant voice, the words dropping from him clear and rhythmic, but with detachment and indifference. This at least was his usual way while he recapitulated 'last day's' lecture, often clothing his previously expounded arguments in an entirely fresh dress.

To take the first instance I find, after setting forth the nature of ethical philosophy and its connection with logic and æsthetics, he opened thus, the week after: "The fact that we can distinguish these three regulative bodies of doctrine,—mutually independent, —mutually unresolvable,—exhaustive, is to be regarded as a decisive argument for the tripartite division of mind. In psychology it is often hard to isolate the three and secure independence for them, but we can distinguish well enough that Intellection in the end has to be made True, Conation in the end has to be made Good, Feeling has to be raised to the grade of the Beautiful. And we cannot add hereto. The summary is exhaustive. True, we must discount from Intellection all save 'thinking' to come under the regulation of Logic; still we can fairly enough say that Logic regulates Intellection."

But this apathetic phase was short-lived. Energy either grew upon him as he broke fresh ground, or blazed up suddenly, but it never failed to respond to the mute demand in the eyes that were attentive, to the need in those that looked carelessly, and to hold us in the sleepiest hour of the student's day, wakeful, spell-bound, as though not logical sequence
alone, but δύναμις ἐξελθοῦσα from the ardent, eloquent spirit were stirring one and all to receptive activity. His own illustrations bear me out in part. "You might say that, whereas I was silent for one moment, and speaking the next, here was action going out, but no afferent stimulus. In a better example we might see this, but just then I had before me the sight of your expectant faces." Session after session discovered him delivering each to him familiar and well-worn stage of the "elementary" course to which the Grote professor is bound down, with all the zeal and zest of an entirely fresh exposition. And careful as he was to impose none of his own strong convictions as dogmas, no words can adequately convey the intense earnestness of manner and speech with which he sought to carry the listening intelligence up to commanding standpoints. "I want to give you a notion of how, from different points of view, this question of defining the conditions of knowledge has been met." "I want to bring prominently before you this Objectivity of knowledge . . . . I know nothing really, unless I can show you capable of knowing it as well as I." "But mark me here—I protest against ranking our experience of space with that of other sensations!" "I warn you against such careless phrases as 'Brain thinks';—it's stark nonsense!" "As to the specific character of the nerve-process accompanying every mental process, we are much in the dark and shall ever be probably. Till we are not in the dark, till it can be demonstrated in detail, no one can compel you to accept the general statement." Not less vigorous was the emphasis with which he set forth his own position, when need arose to submit it as non-coincident
with the theories of other thinkers. "Now for a confession!" was the exclamation introducing his dissatisfaction as an experientialist, with experientialist theories of external perception: "Else I can not get on!" the concluding alternative.

But it is not possible by fragmentary citations to reproduce the intense fervour with which all such asseverations were put forth, infusing the dryest arguments with the character of things beautiful. Leaning often far over the table as though he would project his own insight into his parvulos trahendos, he seemed to be wrestling with the ignorance, or callousness, or false views in each several mind, his glance for the most part directed just over the heads of the class, yet apparently congnisant of each student’s mental progress. Inattention was as difficult as interruption: when once a student broke a momentary pause by putting a question, the professor, as though unaware, resumed his argument forthwith, and talked through questioner and question more fervently than ever. I hasten to add that the more usual mode of hearing questions from the chair at the end of the lecture was not merely permitted. "You will be failing in a positive duty if you omit to bring me any difficulties. But let me advise you to write them down: half and more of your difficulties will vanish when once you have put them into definite form." Nor were his counsels accessible on these occasions only. At any time during term or vacation, the appeal of perplexity would secure a prompt reply, crowded more often than not into the back of a postcard,¹—a deliverance urbi et orbi, as he once said to me

¹ [With Prof. Robertson the writing of post-cards was a fine art.—G.F.S., ed. Mind.]
in humorous apology, pleading the delicacy of his then dual function of professor and examiner.

Yet let it not be supposed that this fervid manner, which, as Dr. Bain truly says, spent his limited strength far too lavishly, beat out earnest and emphatic monition and assertion incessantly. It would have failed in effect. He never laughed, he could not really be said to smile, ex cathedra, but touches of humour, like rays of frosty sunshine, not seldom lit up the less crucial phases. It was more revealed in the manner of saying than in any word-play, but I can remember such as these: "Smells are to quadrupeds rather intellective than emotional, especially to dogs, for instance. Why? They cannot afford to be as we. We can turn up our noses, as they cannot." (Possibly not an original point.) "We Scotchmen 'feel a smell,' and with considerable psychological justification." "Is Space a form of external sensation?—I omit Time,—for lack of it." An Aristotelian alternative was reverted to with complacency: "Every step in thought that proceeds under the laws of thought may be expressed in terms of necessity. Deny—and you are a vegetable!" In his discourses on the works of special philosophers the relative freshness of the subject and the relatively intimate discipleship of fewer, more appreciative hearers, drew him on to somewhat happier and even more vivacious disquisition. Few could be more jealous than he to wave off flippant criticism of thinkers past or present on the part of the novice; on the other hand, he gave free play in that closer circle to the promptings of his own matured satire, in racy allusions to the quarrels of commentators, the defects of theories, Oxford psychology, and what not.
But wherever and whenever his voice was raised to instruct, his utterances were invariably characterised by a severe and concentrated eloquence—an eloquence which clothed every thought in purest English, which never ran away with him, which rigorously abstained from analogy and metaphor, and yet, impelled by full conversance with its matter, repeated each point in a double or triple paraphrase of words, securing a maximum clearness, and allowing each following mind to overtake and take in. At the same time there was no lack of illustration, and that of the simplest and next to hand. No place could be more depressing than the kind of classroom he lectured in, nevertheless he projected a tiger into the adjacent one to lend a spring to his criticism of Dr. Bain’s Theory of Belief, he diverted the disturbing annoyance—exquisite to highly strung nerves—of noisy youths in the corridor to illustrate procedure in psychological analysis, he made the exasperating hour-bell bear witness to the ultimate constituents of mind, he made the ugly dado do service in spatially referring sensations, while the inartistic iron pillar, very much in the way as it always was, has become for all his students a “work outlasting monumental brass,” the “obstacle” to typify the fundamental property of Resistance in objective perception, the dual symbol of the phenomenological How and the epistemological What!

No, there was not much excuse for a student of average abilities and application who failed to make headway at the feet of Croom Robertson. His expositions were so artistically disposed that it was comparatively easy to set down in notes without much pressure, not only the substance of what he said, but often the form as well. There was an entire
absence of verbiage or 'padding.' The lecture never broke down into a talk; the sentences were terse, pithy, polished. But on the other hand he never hurried, nor even once introduced unfamiliar terms without carefully leading up to and determining them, while every point was reiterated with strenuous emphasis. What remained of the Scotch accent, which in his earlier London days he had been at much pains to smooth down, only served with its varied pitch, incisive accents and rhythmic cadences to throw his emphases into higher relief. To have technical terms dragged in from the books by way of answer to his catechising, which he himself had not led up to and introduced, thwarted him and called forth a rebuff, so fastidious was his procedure in guiding to new ground.

Mindful of "the notable and deplorable state of psychological and philosophical terminology," his own choice of nomenclature was, it need hardly be said, a model of studied selection, applied with unswerving consistency, and, when occasion arose, justified in detail. Instances are not far to seek in memory. He would not admit the philosophical study of Ideals of truth, goodness, and beauty into the category of sciences, reserving under the latter head purely phenomenological inquiries. The term 'normative science' he practically ignored. Logic, Ethic, Æsthetic, dealing with what ought to be, as formulated by intellectual construction from data, supplied by investigation into what has been, is, and, given certain tendencies, will, or may be, were for him "bodies of regulative philosophical doctrine." Again, he invariably used Intellection for Cognition, Conation for (simple) Volition. Cognition implied the committal of oneself
to a *cognitum*, was used equivocally for both process and product. Intellection better connoted bare intellectual process or *coming to know*. Will and Volition were not simple enough for the ultimate conscious residuum denoted by *Streben* or *tendency to act*. Needing Affection equally, as the third complementary equivalent in psychology, he mourned over its crippled popular use. "Bain falls back on a term which is safe if carefully used: feeling is Excitement. Yet here too there is a narrower sense. 'To be affected' is after all the more *effective* term." "*Idea*" was too hopelessly ambiguous to be used technically. In intellection progress from simple to complex, regress from (sense) presentation to re-representation, were adequately indicated by Percept, Image and Concept. 'Thought,' on the other hand, was a valuable term practically thrown away by psychologists.

Nothing again is more characteristic of his jealousy for logical purity of diction than his deprecation of the use, in a theory of sensation, of such a term as 'sense of movement.' "To account for space from movement is to beg the question. Movement is only explicable in terms of *space*. One is aware of some *thing* going from one *place* to another. Active touch, touch with a coefficient of 'consciousness of activity put forth, is all that sense (discounting active sight) gives us." Another anxious monition was: "Never confound 'moral intuition’ with 'moral instinct'—the primitive power of judging with the primitive tendency, or ability to act—knowledge not got from experience with action unlearned."

Carefulness in formal distinctions may seem to some mere academic logomachy and time lost. Not so to those who hold with a colleague of my late master
that "the true aim of a teacher must be to impart an appreciation of method and not a knowledge of facts"; not so to those who are conversant, as to method, with the modification required in scientific analysis when applied to the matter, and adjusted to the standpoint of psychology and of doctrines based on psychological data. Consistency in concepts becomes of as much importance as order and cleanliness amongst the bottles and labels of the chemical experimenta. "To show this clearly—the distinction and the bond—that is my chief task; for many are incautious," were the words with which Croom Robertson would launch into an inquiry. In his hands the study of Mind became almost, if not quite, as forcible an organon for instilling the principles of scientific analysis as one of the experimental, quantitative sciences. To resolve the complex into the simple, to explain a phenomenon in terms of another category of phenomena, to find the law of its happening, to inquire into some particular with reference to some general notion, under a certain aspect, in a special connexion, and so forth, together with the testing questions applied to current definitions and theories, to elicit what was really the ground-idea of some class (with, it might be, some such verdict as this: "Whatever else Belief is, THIS is not the most fundamental aspect!")—all this really simple procedure, uniformly and consistently carried out, gradually and deeply impressed on the mind the unity of all scientific method.

No text-books known to me, however substantially sound in procedure, would be likely to effect as much for the "self-taught" student in mental and moral science and philosophy. This at least was Croom

1 Prof. K. Pearson. The Grammar of Science, p. 8, footnote
Robertson's opinion, and he roundly denounced the extent to which candidates for examination in the subjects over which he presided at the London University sought to qualify themselves solely by systems of reading and written tuition, none the less that he on one occasion recommended this method to myself by way of *supplement* to oral teaching.

From beginning to end his course was one long lesson how to attain truth under the aspect of Consistency—the Larger Consistency which includes both formal and material agreement. And to this end he made his exposition, in each branch of his composite subject, a continuous and thorough-going application of the definitions and concepts with which he set out, so that the whole complex of notions fell apart and re-disposed itself around some fundamental axis of thought. In this way for instance he made us grasp the rationalising of *all* formal logic under the "Laws of Thought," and of all applied or material logic by the process of evolving Induction out of Analogy. The subjective phenomenon of Conscience and the source of its dictates knit together the student's confused notions gained from ethical treatises: the subjective phenomenon of Reality, its sources and implications, imparted backbone to metaphysics.

"Distinction and the Bond," as the tonic chord, was from his opening lecture made most audible and explicit. He then planned out, as he told me, and grounded the whole of his procedure, according to his view of what constituted right method in approaching and cultivating the investigation of experience based on psychology regarded under its unique and more proper aspect of the Subject science. This I have heard him do by setting himself at the outset to
rationalise, as if by way of apology, the present wording of the title of the Grote chair. Criticism of it served to launch him into a disquisition on the interrelation between science and philosophy, so lucidly set forth as to give the crude learner insight into the real import of this new departure in his studies, clearing away the dust for those who had pictured a vague mass of something ‘transcendental,’ and revealing to those who imagined they were substituting for mathematics something requiring only a little common-sense and journalistic facility, the length and steepness of the way before them.

Without a thorough grounding in the science of psychology he would have no one stir a step in the systematic study of philosophy. Kant and many another illustrious thinker had by wrong procedure built on sand. To give more than merely logical priority to “First Principles” was “at this time of day” a regress from the method of sound induction. On the other hand, many British philosophers had stayed so long over their psychology that they never got to philosophy at all, or, if they did, spoilt their scientific analyses with it, not distinguishing what they were about. “Whereas the path of salvation lies in distinction.” “Here I am mixing gloriously psychology with ethics,” he once said joyously, “but at all events I confess to it, that it is not ethics at all.”

It is not possible in the scope of a memoir to do justice to an influence which quickened many lives for their life-time, nor, in any way, duly to appraise the resultant tendency of that influence in different personalities. In its intensely critical methods, whether these were applied to ordinary subjective experience,
current theories or work sent in by students,—in which method and literary style were even more severely tested than matter,—it would, I believe, be of the nature of a highly regulative, often of an inhibitive, force, more effective for the fluent and self-confident, than for the self-critical and diffident. Positive praise was a thing unheard of. Commendation might arrive now and then by very indirect communication, but directly could only be inferred through hope on the strength of absence of blame. Intentionally he had of course no wish to paralyse intelligent effort. "I think you are quite right to make this plunge," I was told once, "I have no faith in the waiting on counsels of perfection." But this is a minor matter. The indubitable and lasting benefit of his teaching was the insight it afforded into the working of a fine, profound judgment when confronting, and co-ordinating in its perspective, the complex continua of thought and life, so presented that the methods of that working were handed over as a heritage to the listener to be assimilated and applied in his or her own case.

And as to the substance of what he taught, seeing how thus untimely the hope has been cut off of receiving from his hands an integral view of his thoughts on any great questions of philosophy, the idea may suggest itself to some who heard these orally, whether enough of recorded material is not in their possession to enable any of his more competent contemporaries to synthesise and perpetuate what of it is chiefly and worthily distinctive.¹

CAROLINE A. FOLEY.

¹ [This suggestion will probably be carried out.—G.F.S.]
LAST WAYFARER’S WORDS

A Word in Metre

An American oculist once told me how, in one year of his strenuous life, at once scientific and literary, all that he felt moved to write took a metric form. And for that year only. At an earlier date much the same thing had befallen me. I have inflicted nothing of this on readers then or at any time. But some 30 years later there came a sudden very brief revival. I awoke one morning with the lines below humming in consciousness, many of the lines unfinished. My day’s work done I set to and wrote them down mechanically, completing where necessary. The night had brought me no dreams, and nothing of the topic in the lines had been previously occupying my thoughts. The late editor of the now defunct *Quest Review* was good enough to publish what I had written, 1924.

Since the lines largely centre on the service of lads like my son, pioneers of the R.A.F. heroes of to-day, I insert Sir William Orpen’s portrait of him, painted in France, 1917, and to be seen in the Imperial War Museum.

Events have since shown that war-weariness, in a world of disunited warders of peace, was an unfit basis for the longed-for peace era. Defeat had begotten sullen hate, frustration and envy, and the healthy policing of the shattered foe by both hemispheres failed to come about.

The little poem is but a song before sunrise.
Mrs. RHYS DAVIDS' SON

Painting by Sir William Orpen
Waymaking for Peace

Si vis pacem, para—pacem.

We are the men who slew the sons. We were The men who let these things come then to pass. Had we been wise, had we not tied our hands By blundering into war in the far South, Unready, and estranging Europe, ours Had been the nobler task of brother-warding, ours, Nought hiding, baring all our arm, to thrust The intervening spear of candid speech Between the peoples putting trust in war: The central peoples forced by savage creed Of old-world fools to nurse their sons on war, (Foreseeing lust of vengeance from the West, Foreseeing danger from the heaving East), And them of East and West who feared no less. Had we been wise, had we made one with us Our little Western child, fit had we stood, Great mother of the far-flung commonwealth, To mother all this unwise, war-pledged world, And rede as once of old great Deborah.

The little men were we. We held aloof, We drifted when we should have stemmed the tide. We had the chance. We threw the chance away. We saw too late. We had not been the true, The loving brothers. We were all for self. We said, these things concern us not. We were The would-we-coulds, the might-we-nots, we had The world-way of the hidden policy, The will to be the men of words, but not

1 Published in the Quest Review, 1924.
To watch and work for, and to hold the peace,
The will to be the warders of the world.
We were the little waverers. We said,
Peace, peace! when peace was not. Inept were we
To lift the world out of its mess of war,
Its welter in a whirl of market-ways,
Its wordy more-win in the race for wealth.
The hour-glass ebbed. We threw the hours away.
We lost the heaven-sent chance to save the world.
We had the little men to lead, and they
Who could not lead thrust head in sand.

Our sons were as the mirror of the dawn,
Our lovely sons! A youth of fire and gold,
The very flower of all our wide-flung race.
For them we should have warded all the world,
For them thrown wide the great white way, the way
Of carrying on the works that make for peace.
We bore these blossoms, holding precious seed
In thought and word and deed to fructify
A quickened, happier world of nobler gest.
Wing’d Hermes they to link the severed worlds,
Strong sinewed sons with sense of wider life,
Poets with eyes of seers unveiling truth,
Apollos opening wells of lovely sound
Ineffable, builders of bridge and fane,
Way-showers of the past and future, such
As scent like sleuth-hounds hidden seats of ill,
Or mysteries disclose of nature’s ways.

Into the fiery furnace of the war,
Into the shambles of the hail of shell,
The filth, the muck of war’s appalling work
We cast those boys. In all their splendid youth
We saw them go, and tried to smile with pride,
And prattled of the noble art of war, as erst
Our sires had blustered in the far-off days
When the world knew no better. In our hearts
We hid the awful anguish, banned the guilt,
And tried to hope 'gainst hope. Theirs was our cause,
To win, to hold, to save; and they did save.
Their the gay valour, theirs the scorn of fear,
And theirs the tempered steel of fortitude.
They hated not the foe, nor hated war.
They had been taught that war was man's last word,
And would be always so, must come to pass.
Honour left them no other way. They were
The victims of the folly of the world,
The victims of the mandate of their sires,
The victims of the world in which they moved,
The victims of the time in which they lived,
The victims of the grip of man's worst foe,
The victims of the dead hand of the past,
The victims of the lust to hurt that lay
Latent in will of them who worded war.

They went, they fought, they fell—and we who live
Weep over empty worlds where they are not.
We look at little pictures, handle things
They touched and letters that we cannot bear
To read again, silent—our woe sleeps light.
We are the mothers of the piercèd hearts.
We are the mothers of the darkened lives.

And still we weep when fools speak praise of war,
Who will not understand, who will not learn,
Nor ever will till doom comes home to them.
And still we weep to see this mangled world,
Shorn of its glorious adolescent morn,
Hag-ridden yet by fear and stultified
By old-world grudge, suspicion, jealousy.

We will the world to wake from night-mare sleep.
We will the world to rive its prison-bars.
We will the world to heed that we can change;
That we have changed in many things, have changed
So far as more have willed the better way,
And not as few have willed it—so we grow.
We will the world to outgrow war, to burst
Its mouldy bonds as serpent sloughs its skin.
We will the world to war with woes of man,
To war with all the folly and the fret
That threaten war in the war-mongers’ words,
That war with man in vice, in fell disease,
In ignorance, where there should be self-help.

We cry in the dark days before the dawn,
While yet the world whispers of wars to come.
We watch the night upon our little towers.
And yet perchance the dawn is not far off.
A whiteness glimmers here and there, voices
Were heard from seats of men who lead\(^1\) a call
That we must change the very atmosphere
Between the nations; we must cease to outvie
In armaments, the food of war, must make
Long preparations for a world of peace . . . .

Yea verily! Yea now we must! Nor heed
The jeer, the fear of all the little men
Who cry to keep the old-world ways alive.
Let us be word-way-showers, willing peace.

\(^1\) The Labour Government, March, 1924.
We are the new, the morning world. We are
The children of the old-world men who were
The more-in-word, the more-in-deed for war.
But we have light they saw not, if we will—
If we but will to keep the forward view.
Our feet are on the hills to greet the sun
As lovely messengers. Too long we trod
Dark vales of enmity in word and deed,
Where came no sun nor any brotherhood.
We are the worded will of coming day.
We have the very long work yet to do.
We have the very little time to work.
The night may come again, an awful night.
We have to work to cleanse our words, our thought
Of old belief in war, to root it out,
To make it no-thing, thing we have outgrown,
With other foul things man has long outgrown.
Ours be the work to make the soil of peace,
Call into being and mother all the ways
That make for peace, to train the many wills
In all those ways, that when at last the more
And not the less shall will the death of war,
We can make all our world perform our will,
Make every home and teacher will the peace,
Bring up each little child as Prince of Peace,
Make every little man who leads the land
The servant of the nation's will to peace,
Make of ourselves the wills within the Will
Of One who wills and waits, who is our peace.
APPENDIX

Comments on other Wayfarer's Words

I here append a few of the many comments I have either been invited to make, or have felt called upon to make over several years on the way in which certain writers of to-day, in East and West, have treated subjects I hold very important in the history of religion. The way they have chosen has for me been either of values that are untrue, or of values not happily expressed. And I have read nothing, since publishing, to convince me I was wrong. Anyway, I republish certain excerpts in the hope I may at least make clearer things my own wayfarer's words have tried to say. My will is, that between us all the true may become the better established.

I

WHY INDIA IS POOR IN HISTORY

Commenting on Dr. J. Takakusu's article, entitled as above, in The Young East (Tokyo, 1926), I said, in a subsequent number of that periodical:—

Yes, India has indeed 'buried most of her ancient history under the cover of literature (p. 111). Too little of it is revealed when the 'cover' is scrutinized. It is with difficulty that we trace her slow evolution in ideas, in ideals, in her literature. Look at the largely worthless stuff of incantations of the later, the Atharva Veda:—far more history was stifled
there than just ‘honours bestowed on this or that man,’ or wars internecine (p. 112). How gladly would we not exchange all that Veda for the Annals of an Indian Tacitus or Thucydides! Even those despised war, and other records are not worthless; they betray stages in growth or decay just ‘there’ and ‘then,’ better than any relatively timeless Mahābhārata can show. Let us do all justice to Indian ideals, literature and art, but let us be at the same time quite honest, and not belittle the real tragedy there lies for the world in the poverty in Indian history.

India is so poor in ancient history because she began to write so late. Why so late? Partly because she had not discovered a plentiful and suitable material on which to write. The date-palm did not happen to be plentiful where the men lived, who would have been probably foremost in beginning to write. When the new will, the new forward movement, of which Jainism and Buddhism were important expressions, migrated to the East of India and to Ceylon, where that palm was abundant, the growing need of perpetuating new scriptures in a worthier way than by the too unautomatic human memory produced some man of the constructive hand and eye, who began to scratch with a style and rub in with ink on a palmleaf. (His name, his work are buried among other ‘despised’ matters for lack of historians!). Mid-Asia had long had her day, Egypt had long had her papyrus. But Ceylon had the umbrella palm in abundance, and it is from Ceylon that we have the first written Tipitaka, the first written Commentaries, the first written Chronicles, the first records in years of kings’ reigns, by which India and we could make
some sound surmise about the date of her Asoka and our Buddha.

This surely is one main reason why India 'has no volume of written history. It is not that she did not know how to write (p. 112).’ True; but it is not true to say that she simply did not see any necessity of possessing such a 'volume,' believing, as she did, that her arts were her history.' She did not 'see,' or 'believe' anything of the sort; she would by this time have said so in her literature; she would not have left it to Japan to say it for her.

Let your readers consult my teacher's, Rhys Davids's *Buddhist India*, chapters VII and VIII—'Writing—the Beginnings,—its Development,' where these historical facts are clearly shown. Then let them substitute for the romantic idea quoted above:—'she simply had not found a suitable writing material.'

Again, I think that, under the over-stretched word 'Buddhism,' the article in question gives credit to conditions and results among which Buddhism was one, but *not the only one.* In summing up this, to me, distorted view, it says that 'ancient India put in perfect order her civilization by the aid of Buddhism,' and that modern India will only achieve unification by the light of such ideals as Buddhism alone can give her (p. 115).

Now to do that Buddhism itself must change almost as much as India. It must present renovated ideals, different in nature, or in emphasis, or in both, from those with which it grew into prominence. One of these was that the right aspiration of all men should be, sooner or later, to become monks, else the perfect, saintly life could not be led. The lay life was inferior, worthy chiefly as a vehicle for maintaining the saint.
Now this is enough to damn any cult as a guide for India, let alone mankind. To unify a great country a cult must come, to all men and women, free from an artificial cleavage of this kind, to advise them in seeking their welfare as fellow-citizens in the work and intercourse of the world, and in the joyous growth of 'becoming' in the hereafter; it must see in children not hostages to misery, but the very hope of the earth's morning; it must turn public attention, not to life in the cloister, sundered from human ties, but to concerted action for bringing about worthier conditions of life, on earth and hereafter, for all men.

Shall I offend if I say, that civilization in ancient India, so far from being 'put in perfect order,' was as much worsened as, earlier, she had been bettered, by both Buddhism and her elder sister Jainism? The great value of these movements at their beginning is a world-fact. They were the new will of India, rising in protest against a people's religion that was decadent and external to 'the man.' They called to man the willer to choose himself 'the Way' to the Better. They showed him religion as a matter of the Life, the chosen conduct in Everyman. And it was Jainism, not Buddhism, which made central the teaching of 'Not-harming.' But, keeping to Buddhism, this grew into a system of a monk-world paramount, with backward-looking, negatively worded ideals, ideals in which life in the home with the mother and child was a relatively 'low thing' (hīna).

If we could cut out the monasticism as preponderant, sweep away the negative wording, transform the anti-social ideals into aspirations towards richer, that is fuller life here and hereafter, show the 'Way' as a progress through earthlives and other worlds to
a very positive uttermost 'Well,' reword that old saying: 'Ceasing of Becoming is the Going-out' as 'Growth in a willed Becoming leads to the supreme Life'—then Buddhism might be fit to guide, whether or no India made choice of her. But then would it still be 'Buddhism'? Would it not be more honest, more truthful to say: No, this is not the old lamp, though it will have been the spark that lit it. This belongs to the morning of our new world.

But the old system and the old wording, changed though they may be in national details, are still alive, are still predominant. There will not be real world-light and world-leading in what is known as 'Buddhism' till the monk-world is reduced to a by-path, as a period only of rest, of healing, for listening to the else unheard, for study; till the negative ideals, excusable only in a permanent monk-career, hinder-some rather than helpful to healthy aspiration, are swept away; till Buddhism, in the true spirit of its much, misrepresented Founder, returns to faith in 'the Man,' who is not body, not mind, who is Thou.

2

SURVIVAL IN BUDDHISM

(AN OPEN LETTER)¹

I greatly appreciate your letter inviting discussion on what Buddhism teaches about survival. Since much may be written to you on what "Buddhism is likely to think about it," it may be as well to say a little about what, in its older documents, it actually did think. That these documents are far more

¹ Published in Buddhism in England, January, 1928.
concerned with (1) man as a being not of earth only, but of the worlds, and (2) with men of other worlds, than most of us, to judge by our writings, imagine, I could take up much space in showing you. But take one only of the volumes of one Collection. Of the Suttas in Anguttara I, 25 per cent. are so concerned, in either one, or in many of the paragraphs. Of the section of 52 Suttas, ending the Majjhima Nikāya, 25 are so concerned. To these portions I come presently. In estimating, I have omitted to include those where reference to other worlds is negative only, e.g., to Nirvana, or a matter of just feeling or speculation.

With regard to your special inquiry, as to “life between personal incarnations,” there would appear by negative evidence to have been no belief, let alone revelation, that death here, or death in any other world, was followed by a period of rest or sleep, however understood. But speculation about such a period was apparently growing in two of the early so-called “sects,” for in the Kathāvatthu viii, 2 (Points of Controversy, p. 212), orthodoxy feels itself called upon to argue, that there is no such interval (bhavantaram). Incarnations in this world and in that just crowd it out!

With regard to dying in the next world, there is an interesting little saying, prose and verse, in the Iti-vuttaka\(^1\) of the short collections:—“When a deva deceases from deva-world, his life-span waning, devas utter three sayings of cheer:—“Hence, sir, go to happy bourne, to fellowship of men; become a man, win faith in the peerless teaching of the Better (sad-dhamma). That faith rooted and established,

\(^1\) As it was Said. Tr. by F. L. Woodward, S.B.B., viii.
immovable while life lasts in the peerless teaching of the Better, do you put off bad ways in deed, word and thought; do good, boundless, ungrasping, work well-based merit in giving, yea, much of it. And show other mortals the Better, the holy life. With this compassion devas cheer him, saying again and again: Come, deva!"  

For me early Buddhism is a phase of vital importance in the history of religion. Its Messenger brought a message. He has spoken. But in his mandate on man as a wayfarer of the worlds, and not of earth only, his message yet remains as that which is still to be said, still to be heeded. It meets us at the very threshold of the hereafter, with a teaching which is curiously unheeded by most writers on the subject, let alone teachers. Herein these are but mirrors of the lack of heedfulness in the matter, of the present age. It is true that the teaching of the Catholic Church agrees here with Buddhism, but then the present age neglects both teachings. Both Catholic Church and Buddhist scriptures teach, that the man is judged upon his arrival, at death of the earth-body, in the next world. Both teach that he is judged according to his conduct while on earth. That his views or beliefs may, or may not be involved, might be discussed, but not just now. The former religion is vague, I have gathered, as to who judges. The Gospels make the "son of man" the judge, but that is not at the time of passing from earth. The Buddhist gospels (maintaining an ancient Vedic title, "Yama") ascribe the function of judging to a set or group of devas (that is, worthy men in the next world) called Yamas, or "controllers," who preside

¹ Translation condensed.
over the whole penal system of purging the next world of undesirable entrants by a purgatorial training for a period. The corresponding system on earth tortured the bodies of criminals with a heart and conscience un wrung; hence it was only to be expected that a similar training would be meted out to similar deserts hereafter. That the man passing over is invested in a new body, permitting the tortures to be applied, both the Buddhist gospels and Dante’s church believed. It is only the later sophisticated Buddhist teaching (Questions of King Milinda), which denied that the “very man went over” (affirming that the very man was unreal), and the modern Christian teaching which sees the man gone over as an “immaterial being,” “discarnate,” “disembodied,” who thus clash with their own earlier doctrines. In both of these, the very man who leaves earth and earth-body stands before a judge, or judges, as the one really responsible, and as in a new body, permitting of the undeniably bodily punishment when such is called for. And I would add, that it will only be when both of these old teachings are once more valued in a better light than that in which we now see “the man” and “the worlds,” that this doctrine of a world, kept purged by man, in man, for man, will be heeded. With a creed of the departed as so many wraiths, or as so many new “complexes” of body and mind, the constructive imagination, so necessary in the search for truth, has too poor a material to work withal.

The Saying or Sutta about the judging occurs twice in the four chief Collections or Nikāyas, once in the second Collection (Majjhima) and once in the fourth (Anguttara). The former is in the last section;
the latter occurs early in the work. That the former is a later, because more edited version is probable. Two fairly patent "glosses" occur in the former. I here give a condensed translation of the older one.

"There are these three deva-messengers. . . . Someone acts amiss in deed, in word, in thought. At the breaking up of the body after dying he rises up in the woeful way, in purgatory, warders grasping him and showing him to the Yama as one who, unphilal, without respect for the worthy and holy things, or for his chief, deserves punishment.

"Him the Yama admonishes: 'See here, man! Didst thou not see manifest among men the first messenger?' 'I did not see, sir,' 'Didst thou not see among men any aged woman or man, feeble, tottering, grey?' 'I did see, sir.' 'See here, man, to thee, ware and mindful of the aged one, did not this occur:—I, even I too shall get old; come now, I will do the good thing in deed, word and thought?' 'I will not have succeeded, sir, I will have been heedless.' 'See here, man, by heedlessness thou didst not the good thing in deed, word and thought. Verily, man, according to what was heedless will they do unto thee. For lo! this evil action was done neither by mother, nor by father, nor by brother, nor by sister, nor by friends and advisers, nor by kinsmen, but by thee, yea, thee, was that evil action done; it is thou who dost experience the result thereof.

"Him the Yama admonishes again: 'See here man, didst thou not see manifest among men the second messenger . . . a woman or man ill, suffering, lifted up and dressed by others? . . . or the third messenger:—a woman or man just dead, or dead some days? . . . and did not this occur to thee:—
I too, even I shall die; come now, I will do the good thing in deed, word and thought? And the person answers as before. The Yama, too, denounces him as before. . . . The Yama was silent."

Then follows a fairly lurid account, a page in length, of tortures, and then other brief addenda, prose and verse, wherein, inter alia, of good men it is said, not that they do not appear for a favourable sentence before the Yama, but only that they do heed the messengers during their earth-life.

In the former, or Majjhima version we see, not three, but five messengers:—the helpless new-born man is put first, birth as such being now taught as a warning (instead of as an opportunity). And legal punishment on earth is inserted as a third messenger. Further, the purgatorial paragraphs are extended. Framework and conclusion are as in the earlier version. But the Sutta here is prefaced with a repetition of the simile comparing life to two houses, and the intelligent man is one who is mindful and watchful of both houses, i.e., worlds.

It may be remembered that this version is not the only recorded variant in the teaching of the "messengers." The three of the Anguttara version have been incorporated into the "legend" of the Founder's life, with the addition of yet another messenger: a monk, as the index to a solution! And there may well have been a true incident in the Founder's life, bringing to him a threefold message, not so much of warning—he was not heedless—but of the burden of ill from which man suffered in his ignorance of facts about the hereafter. Crowds, we read, would come to him in his old age just to have that dark veil lifted.
Whether in the parable of the other-world messengers we have a teaching actually uttered by the Founder, men, so long as they are "heedless" to get instituted trustworthy communications with other worlds, will never know. But they can at least see, in this instance of the varying nature of versions of one record, the sort of materials on which, so unaidered, they may come to weigh evidence. Some would say: Surely he may have taught not one, but all three ways. As to that again: So far do I agree that an original genius, in helping not men only but the man, would maintain no stiff uniformity in either material or wording, that I imagine him as never saying the same thing twice in the same way! But as to those "inserted" messengers I would...or, that two of them have a decide...nonkish emphasis very...of mortars. Further, that the message given by earthly punishment, while it has a very plausible look, is not on a level, as the mandate of an inspired Helper, with the nucleus of those "Three." It shows man as warned to heed what earth, at one time, in one land, legally bids him not to do. That code varies with time and place. The three messengers are indexes to a code not of earth, but of the worlds, true of man at all times in every land and world. They stand warning not Indians only, not Buddhists only. They call to man as man. As such they belong to the mandate of a Helper.

And it is the notion each forms of the nature of that Helper, which must decide for each, whether he will have spoken of the punishing in the way he is recorded to have done.

Very noteworthy is the pointed and extreme emphasis, in the Saying, on the "man" (purisa),
personally and solely responsible, who has come over from earth. His body, and with it the minding, or mind wrought up with it, he has laid down and left. Body and intelligence he has evidently come into afresh. But he remains the "man" who was on earth. He is not judged as a mere new fivefold "group" of body and of mind. He is as he was, to the extent that he is still the same inexpugnable "thou" and "thee." He has become—"bhava" has taken place in him—he has yet to become, and that many times. But "he" is neither body nor mind. He is More.

More, because he knew all along that he was heedless, where he should have taken heed. More, because, as wanderer in the Way, the Magga of the world's end, he was himself willed, he was chooser of the better way, or of the worse, a "law," as St. Paul worded it, "unto himself." "Dhamma": the "ought to be," the "may be," the immanently divine, was working on the "More" in him all the time. He does not plead ignorance of that which he should have heeded, only carelessness, as to their being other tribunals than that of earth. In such heedlessness verily he is a man of the twentieth century!

The Saying in its central three is evidently a talk to men and to the man, not to recluses. Nevertheless the editor has annexed it as a talk to monks. He was apt to act thus.

It is true, that the average monk was, as you say, "ordinary." A late Piṭaka book has even the coined term "average-good-monk" (puthujjana-kalyāṇaka-bhikkhu), the first adjective having been earlier applied only to the man of the world. And now there is talk once more of an "esoteric" Buddhist teaching—
term dear to Theosophists—not for laymen or average monk but for the few. As to that, there comes ever to me the voice of the aged venerable Master: "Not mine is the closed fist of the teacher, making this esoteric, that exoteric!" For me, this warning, applied here to the man, the āṇusā, can only mean, that we are to take this word, not in the meaning it came to have for the academic few, but in the meaning it had, and ever has had for men, namely, the "I," the "you," that, who is, 'in' me and 'in' you, more real than anything else in the world. Most surely it does not mean here a "name for something that does not really exist" (Abhidhammattha-Sangaha). . . .

3

'THE INNER SENTINEL'

In The Inner Sentinel: a Study of Ourselves (1930), Dr. L. P. Jacks, like all good teachers, asks us to come along with him: "Come ye yourselves apart with me" . . . but he is too good a fighter to be adding "and rest a while." There is, it is true, no mental toil in listening to him; for sheer lucidity of wording he is incomparable. But what he says and how he says it has, here again, for me, something of the vibrant tonic effect you may feel when reading much of Bergson's writing. This may not be because he is telling you the absolutely new (if indeed there be any such thing); it is perhaps the thing submerged, put away, overlooked, stunted within you, that he is bringing to light, the thought you had not yet told, as Emerson puts it. What is it then, in which for
you he would be maggakkhāyin: Way-shower, under this title of Inner Sentinel?

He calls it "the right direction, with the sense that the journey is worth while." Is there not something stimulating in this alone: to hear a teacher clothe his object in words that Gotama Sakyamuni himself would have chosen, did choose? It is natural, that the teacher, whose sanctioning way-showing he seeks, is Jesus: "I am the way..." for not yet do Western teachers know all the wealth of their heritage. But the Hibbert Journal is now doing its best to show this greater wealth.

But just what has a "Sentinel" to do with direction and a journey? Static vigilance it is that we expect from him, not the adventure of the wayfaring. To some extent the central chapter, from which the book is named, may be held to justify the mixture of metaphors. The Man—and perhaps this had been, for me, the apter title—as, not so much the sentinel as the captain in the Keep, has a double watch to hold, over the Keep and the things without the body’s walls. And we, he writes, of modern European attitude, heed too little the inner world, nor are mindful that our interest in all that is beating against the gates of that world, things and problems new and interesting, is, in the last resort, only to what extent they bring us light upon the mysterious treasure and destiny of the Keep. The things without "will not cease to interest us," but "our primary interest will be in the meaning behind" them. For we, he reminds us, are not spectators only; too much has "Pope Sight" tyrannised over us, making us space-thinkers; time-thinkers should we in mutiny tend more to become, mindful that we are carrying on
history "with every step we take . . . ware of it as a continuous pulsation in our lives." Yes, our inner sentinel is in no Keep, but is of the Camp and the March—now is not the great figure of the Sakyamuni more apt? The writer himself is ever coming along with way-figures of "adventure," and trek, and moving on, and "meaning to be." Only in two things does he herein not satisfy me: two things, the former of which Gotama made explicit (the monk has all but hidden it), the latter of which, for want of the word, is everywhere implicit; I mean, Becoming and Will. India was at one time bidding the world take this great fact of the Man as Becoming to its heart, but she broke down over it. But Dr. Jacks is sound enough about will (and not the spectator 'mind') being fundamental in the self-directing Man; he needs only to be more explicit in a generation sorely needing direction in this matter.

But his book will help many of us greatly in these ways, because, among the notable emphases in it, is just the attack upon work of mind, viz. upon ideas about this and that, as taking, for us, far too much the place of the Man who thinks the ideas. Here, again, I am tempted to illustrate from what befel the tradition-mongers of Buddhism, but refrain. More important is it for us to be reminded that we have among us one of to-day, who has listeners, and who is reminding us of the now dimmed significance in the word I AM, uttered by India as by Moses, revived in Descartes\(^1\) and overlooked by Hume, as "betokening the minder who does the minding"—a minder whose mighty implications are "best studied

\[^1\] A century before Descartes, Vijñāna, of India, had written: "The existence of the self stands firm as following from the idea: I know."
in the form of an inner dialogue.” (So too for the Indian: “Is there aught in which the self upbraids the self?” etc., etc.)

Too rich is the book in its talks with the reader as we fare together to be adequately appraised in a brief review. That readers of my words should read the book is why I write them. I have but a thought to add about the last chapters: ‘All men are soldiers’; ‘Death.’

“Nothing can ultimately be worth living for unless it is worth dying for” :-I agree, but I should hardly say that herein, unless he be a volunteer, it is the soldier who “has the root of the matter” in his profession. To very many, as we have been reminded, a scrap is the thing most worth while, and the issue a matter of luck. I should see in the martyr the best test. Not for him is, or was, mitigation found in the fierce joys of the fight, nor was there hope in coming through on earth. But so greatly did he value life, the whole life of the Man, that he rated death cheaply, nay rather as an incident in lucky promotion. And herein I deem that the secret of the matter was rather in the martyr than in the soldier. Both of these types scorned the fear of death. Yet we can hardly say with truth, that this was because something was worth braving death for. As a rule the soldier had no choice, but to acquit himself creditably. But for the martyr it was a life that was worth living for, so little significance was there for him in the death of just one body. This was a change of garment. It was a further Becoming. This is what for me goes bound up with the message of this book. It bids us see the whole Man in all that a man does; to that I would add: the whole of
his life in all that he is and does, and not this little earthly span of it only.

4

THE RÔLE OF RELIGION IN A CHANGING WORLD

Here, A. H. Silver, D.D., Litt.D., New York (1931), sees of course, changed and changing values—"in fact so much is being said of change to-day that men may come to believe that the nineteenth century discovered it." And surviving amid change he sees religion as the venerable ancient of days, science as the immature turbulent child. But again, he sees these two, not as rivals, but as "each other's complement and man's binocular vision." They have helped and help each other. And he finds a threefold help as religion's "rôle," not to cease telling of the universe as a manifestation of God and of "man's at-homeness in it" as such; to cherish the aspirations of hope and faith—these he compares, as contrasted with the inductive pyramid of science, to an inverted pyramid (p. 35);—I should have preferred to speak of the upshooting expanding sheaf of fire from beacon or volcano: the outrush of an essential force from within man—and thirdly, "to nurture the spirit of hopefulness among men," combating the pessimism which is an outcome alike of the materialism of yesterday and that of to-day. I come to the question of the last pages: "How shall we measure life? By what rule shall we gauge it?" He rejects time, as measure and gauge; he rejects (external) possessions; he rejects happiness; he rejects success. Then "by
what? Why, by growth! Growth! Mind and soul growth! How much have we grown since yesterday, since yestermonth, since yesteryear? How much have we bettered our yesterday's best?"

Here I go wholeheartedly with him. I might perhaps have used the word "becoming," as belonging to those ancient truths which religion is ever making true; the bhava of Indian Buddhism—that great word the true value of which in Werden we saw not and lost, and which even German thinkers see not as they might. Growth is a great word, but it is closer, for our materialistic outlook, up against decay as the complement. With man, the self, neglected, we fail to see, that in growth we have something other, far more central, than growth of his appanages, say, his mind. Mind is the skill of the executant; not the man who plays the instrument.

Let us keep frankly to Man: he, as the writer has it earlier (p. 37), is the real "domain of religion," through which "he can develop and enrich his personality." Not Men. This is not to uphold the "individualism which destroys the individual (p. 64)." It is rather to suggest the true line along which this precious, salvation-guaranteeing attribute of growth can alone look for that end, which is the essential meaning of growth, and to foster which is for the author the rôle of religion. It is 'the man', who as wayfarer of the worlds is heading slowly, painfully it may be, towards the culmination, the consummation of "growth." Golden ages of perfected communities have rightly been called Utopias: No-wheres-School can never become home. I would emphasise the cited phrase: "Lord, Thou art our dwelling-place. . . ."
THE MILINDA QUESTIONS AND THE MAN

This I sent to the editor of the *Ceylon Observer*, in June, 1931: on the comment in its columns by a member of the Buddhist Order whom a work of mine seemed to have made very angry:—

My attention has been drawn to a review in your columns, by Mr. Narada, bhikshu, of a book recently published by me: *The Milinda Questions*. Naturally I welcome ventilation of the book and its subject, even if fierce depreciation of my work and qualifications goes along with it. To quote the reviewer: "truth will eventually shine the brighter." As a rule I do not come between reader and reviewer; the former has to judge, not I. Nor do I here say, why I depart from this rule. I have but this comment to make on the teaching of world-religions, of which Sakya or 'Buddhism' became one.

Truth will be dimmed all the longer if it be not grasped, that Sakya, like every religion, has a history, and that the non-reality of 'the man' is not of its original teaching, but is an outgrowth. Religions hold up to man (a) how he makes himself the less, the worse in many ways, and (b) wherein his betterment lies. But here do they show man in his nature as capable of, as groping after, as destined for, the Better, the More, not the worse, not the less. It is neither wise, nor is it true to rate the man as in his nature unreal, that is, as less, as worse; nor is it the true original teaching of Sakya. There was at its birth no doubt as to the truth in the sublime reality of the man, the self. There was only the warning not to see him as what he was not, namely, as just
body or mind. But the outgrowth began early and went on for centuries, till it culminated in those two workers of sore mischief, Buddhaghosa and Buddhadatta, as a doctrine of the man being but a series of momentary states (dhamma's). In the Milinda Questions we are more than halfway there.

Unknown to ancient, to original Sakya was any teaching denying a doer, an experiencer who was only 'connected' as successive states of consciousness. Both as experiencer and as doer, the one man, the very man was responsible for (Pali: 'not freed from') what should hereafter befall him as no mere series could conceivably be.

So modati . . . so nandati:
'tis he who rejoices . . . 'tis he who laments (hereafter)
is the strong emphasis of the old Dhammapada verses, so meaning emphatically one and the same.

But original Buddhism tried to make India see, that this very real man was not just 'being,' he was a 'becoming,' a fact which did not make him less real, less ultimately one. India clove to her 'man' as 'being' (sat). Buddhism, dying unhonoured in India, dropped the 'man' for a sort of 'becoming' without any man to become.

In Mahāyāna the 'man' had never really died out, but he became largely concealed under abstractions. In modern propagandized Buddhism there is a partial melting down of 'an-attā' into an ethical unselfishness, which scripturally it never was. In the Hīnayāna theory of the 'arahan,' we have a virtual vindication of the reality of the 'man.' It may be, that herein, by a revived and explicit teaching of the True, the 'man' may yet come into his own again.
In his interesting article: "Mahāyāna Buddhism and Japanese Culture," of the July issue of this Journal, 1931, Shugaku Yamabe has twice referred to passages as being of Hīnayāna Āgamas. (I assume that by this is meant the Pali Nikāyas.) He omits to locate these references, which is regrettable. One of them is fairly accurately quoted from the Anguttara-Nikāya, (Pali Text ed. IV, pp. 128 ff); the other is quoted with equal inaccuracy from Vinaya-Piṭaka (Oldenberg ed. I, p. 22 f.). So inaccurately, that it seems possible he has had before him a later Sanskrit version. I am not contending that, in the Pali version either, we have a truly reported version, so corrupt it evidently is. But the opening words of this, the first lay-sermon of the Sakyamuni, are recorded as in a true Upanishadic vein, very different from the later vein of the version quoted, yet unquestionably one that would have been used by the Hīnayāna editors of the record, if it had been in their tradition.

The Pali version is, that certain kṣatriya gentlemen with their wives, at what we should call a picnic, find that a courtesan, included in the party, has made off with some property. (That she was as represented is probably a monkish error, so grotesque it is—for what was she "doing in that galère"?) Seeking her, they meet with the solitary, as yet unknown religieux, the kṣatriya Gotama, and ask: Has he seen a woman pass by? The reply is; What have you, kumāras, to do with woman? Were it not

*Published in The Eastern Buddhist, Kyoto, 1932.*
better that you sought the self, (attānam, or 'the man'; in the religious diction of the day ātmā and puruṣa would be equivalents)? That the Self, the Deity within, should be sought, be inquired after is a teaching in both the earlier Chāndogya¹ and the later Maitreya Upanishads, and as such, and as so worded, would not have been very palatable to Piṭaka monastic editors, and would in no case be a later gloss. Mr. Yamabe's version is: "Said the Buddha, Which is more important, the precious stones or the mind that seeks them? When they answered that the mind was more important, Buddha gave them a discourse on the subject. When this was finished, the men all abandoning their wives became at once homeless monks under the Buddha." Without dwelling on this deplorable termination, common to his version and the Pali, I would only add, the discourse in Pali was on "dhamma," not on "mind," but all we have in surviving records is alas! not the actual talk 'on seeking the Self,' but a set piece of stereotyped formula on a variety of subjects. No Indian teacher of that day would have dreamed of starting a life-mission on so relatively secondary a subject as the mind. As to that, has Mr. Yamabe's version for "mind," manas, or citta, or vijñāna? Each of these has a different force in the Piṭakas, and it is only the last that was then ever used to mean the man, and then only the man-in-survival. But as time went on vijñāna came to mean merely the being receptive of impressions, with the man left out! It was still later that it was used in the comprehensive way we use "mind."²

² E.g., in the manual Abhidhammatha-sangaha.
But in the Vinaya version of this crucially important utterance, the word is not "mind," but *atīnaṃ*, the self, or man. The significance of the word, as used then and there, has been quite obscured by translations having the relatively weak Western meaning (which was also the much later Pali meaning) of "yourselves."

With the writer's general contention, that these Mantras were "winged words" beyond any power they may seem to have for us, I agree. Eloquence the Sakyamuni had not; he was not just orator, but his will-power must have been compelling. That, however, the early Mantra, spoken in a bookless world, had power transcending any dead *record* of it, belongs to the magic of the spoken word in such a world, a power which will have been less of a rare phenomenon than it is now. Much more than it is now will it have been felt to be, not the words alone, not mind alone, but the very man,—let me use my word, the man-in-man—giving of himself to his fellowman. To call this-that-was-to-be-sought "the mind," is to hold up, not, as in Upanishadic teaching "the most precious thing in all the world" to me, to you; it is to hold up the man in a Less, not in a More, much less in the Most. And it is here that I chiefly join issue with the writer.

All religion worthy the name seeks to place before us man as a More. But we shall never worthily value man as that, if we quit hold of the man and glorify the idea. The Mahāyānist, when he extols *tathatā*, suchness, thusness, has in mind "truth," "reality," but ultimately he means *Man as and in* what is true, real. He means man as a More in so far as he has

1 Cf. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanishad*: *Saṃyutta-Nikāya* (Kosalā).
these values. Drop the man and you have but an abstraction, an idea in a general way. World-religions do not begin with abstractions. Jesus never spoke of "brotherhood," nor did the Sakyamuni of "becoming," or of selfness, or of suchness. Prescind the man from "such" "real," "true" and we have but a misty idea-world, a word-structure of what the man has been valuing "in" his minding. Ideals have in themselves no meaning, no reality save as works of Man, conceived, evolved by Man. It is only Plato and Platonists who would see in ideas a prius to the Man; or are Mahāyānists Platonists? They cannot be that if they are sincere in looking upon Sakya, the original teaching of Gotama Sakyamuni, as the cradle and foundation of their Buddhist faith. For then they must, as the reviewer of my Gotama the Man says in this issue, "turn back from," I would say, get behind, "the monk-made Buddhism of the Analysts, and seek the true spirit of the Buddha's doctrine." And this they will find, not in Ceylon, not in Burma or Siam, but in the teaching of India which Gotama sought to expand in that seeking of the Self, the Man, even the Divine Man, who is the innermost inner of every man. There will they find no ideas transcending the Man, but the Man mandating himself in ideas about the Highest, that is, the Most, by way of ideas about the More. Always it is the imperfect man of earth striving to advance to, to become a More, a Better, not by clinging to some abstraction, but by a beholding a higher Self: Witness, Inspirer, Urger, the perfect actual He, Who the man as yet only potentially is.

As yet he can only conceive a More, call It Highest though he may. And no absorption in any abstract
idea, be it Emptiness or Suchness or other, will transport him, the imperfect, into the Perfect. He is in process of becoming That Who he is potentially, and no "leap" to escape from reasoning, although it may aid him in becoming, will do more than this. I would echo the writer's words, only with an inversion of emphasis: "it is in the human personality that the grasped abstraction reveals its true significance."

Mr. Yamabe goes on to compare the man who is tathāgata—that is, as I understand the term, the Wayfarer, the man-in-the-Way, the Sakyamuni's Way—to the artist working as "instrument to a spirit." I agree, but I hold it a lazy way to be so vague as all that about "spirit." Mr. Yamabe could find out more as to sources of inspiration if he would try. Were such effort made with serious intelligent persistence, we should come to word our spiritual life more wisely. We should find, it may be, no encouragement to mistake abstractions as such for the true, the real. We might find, in both the artist's creations and our own inspirations, always the Man willing his instrument, the body, the mind willed.

Do I much offend if I say, that for me the weakness in Mahāyāna lies in the "more-worth" in which it holds abstractions, ideas? Herein it has strayed from the parent-stem of religion, and tends to lose itself, as do its Sūtras, in a maze of the Word. The writer does not so remain lost. Once more, in closing, he makes the Idea subservient to the Man, showing the man as in the last resort the builder of his own becoming, his own world. But let this be a world of real

---

1 That is, for me, not the late-interpolated "eightfold way," but the way-in-the-worlds, man's long process in Becoming.
"BUDDHA AND NOT BUDDHISTS"

"things," not of the abstraction qua abstraction: 
"reality."

7

"BUDDHA AND NOT BUDDHISTS" ¹

In his article (Indian Culture) 'Buddha and not Buddhists,' Mr. Mazumdar starts with the entirely laudable aim of 'ascertaining the faith of Buddha himself and not of the Buddhists.' But he proceeds to make affirmations, on this most difficult subject, on the basis of a few verses in a minor anthology which is largely a replica of Sayings in other compilations, hence perhaps a late comer in the Pali Canon, and also on two statements by deceased students of early Buddhism, the one a pioneer of the last century, the other, a very partial and crudely prejudiced writer, a doctor using hours of leisure. Recent editions of the Suttas, recent translations, made with careful collation and annotations, he entirely ignores. Recent writings by men and women who have spent half a century on these studies—Oldenberg (his latest writings), Winternitz, E. J. Thomas and myself: us he entirely ignores. We,—if I may speak for those who are with us—are not humiliated; we do but say: Tant pis pour lui! But we add: in no other branch of research would such procedure be possible, be dreamt of. What has this venerable documented religion done to be so treated? The last three of these four writers have been publishing volume after volume ever since Mr. Mazumdar ventured to send comments on Udana verses to the J.R.A.S. London, in 1911, both of translations and of

¹ Published in Indian Culture, iii, 3, 1937.
critical discussion:—Why has he not taken the trouble to consult *these*, to criticize *them*?

In particular there is Mr. F. L. Woodward's translations, of 1935, published by me in the Sacred Books of the Buddhists, of the Udāna and Iti-vuttaka. Here the very least he should have done was to consult Mr. Woodward's able renderings and footnotes, let alone our respective introductions. It makes Indian writers (on Buddhism) and European publications seem at a very mediæval distance one from the other.

Let me enlarge briefly on my first cause for wonder. Mr. Mazumdar, in repeating his 25 year old comments on terms in Udāna, prefers *pacca*, a v.l. to *pecca*, as (possibly) not a technical term for the hereafter. But why did he not refer to Commentaries, both on this passage (Woodward's edition, 1926) and on those in Dhammapada, *in both of which pecca* is described as *pacchā paraloke*: 'hereafter in the other world'? He is herein disposed to reject otherworldly implications as 'inconsistent with . . . the founder's teaching,' that man should not do good because of future reward. But where does he find this not put forward, in the Suttas, as 'an incentive'? The sayings on the contrary are full of this teaching; and why, in the name of reasonableness should they not be? If Mr. Mazumdar were intending to take up his residence in England, would he not be to some extent studying 'how to do in England as the English do,' and would he not be judged right in so doing? The Buddhists taught, that life after death would be a relatively happy time, for a time, if they did here what there is approved, in that such doers are adjudicated to honour and prosperity. That doing well here brings
about such spiritual growth, that a man, so grown, prefers to live righteously, needing no incentive from beyond:—that is quite true. But teachers of religion ancient and modern are none the worse in suiting teaching to growth. For instance in the Rakkha-gāthā (corrupted to rukkha-) in Theragāthā 303-6, after the line

_"adhammo nirayaṁ neti, dhammo pāpeti suggatīm,\(^1\)_

the poet straightway goes on

_tasma hi dhamme sukareyya chandaṁ iti modamāno sugatena tādinā:_

'therefore should he well-make desire in what is right...'

Again, he prefers, in Udāna II, 5, _vatam_ to _vata_, chiefly for metrical reasons. But why not have consulted such passages as Saṁyutta, I, 143, 6-10, where beside the particle _vata_ we have the Pali predilection for _vatta_, when _vrata_ is meant, and that in compounds:

_kīm me _purple_vata _silavattaṁ_

_...__...

_tan te _purple_vata _silavattaṁ—?

Then as to my second cause for wonder:—the writer is content to cite, without giving reference, two most unfortunate remarks of Rhys Davids and Dahlke: the one that Buddhism ‘ignores the two theories of God and the soul,’ the other, that it is ‘the only completely atheistical system in the world.’ He makes no attempt to inquire whether, by now, we have not got beyond these two premature and preposterously false citations (assuming both to be

\(^1\) Not-dharma leads to hell, dharma makes us win happy bourn.
accurate). What historical ignorance, as cited, do they not reveal! What a libel do they not constitute on a very great teacher!

The word ‘ignores’ is of course, on the surface, impossible. Our Piṭakan Concordance, now in the making, will reveal that there are few doctrinal terms used so often as ‘soul’: attan, and that Brahman is everywhere found in this and that compound. Brahma is there too, but he, as governor of the third world or brahmaloka, belongs to a much later revival of Indian theistic cult. But the terms attan, Brahman do not only occur, as recognized, not ‘ignored’; they are used in the sense they bore at the time when Gotama the Sakyam and his brahman co-workers began their mission. Gotama had no mandate—or shall I use the sadly vulgarized word ‘revelation’?—concerning the Highest; and why? Because a very great mandate had been taught, before he came, and accepted: that of the Divine Being Brahman, as immanent in man’s self, and as thus his ideal, his potential ātmā: ‘he.’ The task for Gotama was to pass on this mandate with a finer deeper view of That as not static, but as an inner dynamic urge: dharma: the ‘ought-to-be.’ And so we find him beginning his mission with the injunction, taught in the Upanisads: ‘Seek the Ātmā!’ Yea, ‘cowhunt for That’ (ga-yesatha)! So too we find him at the end: ‘Live as having the Ātmā as lamp, as refuge; Dharma as lamp, as refuge; and no other!’ Thus would man in the Way of growth, that is of ‘making to become’ (bhāvanā), ever be travelling through a more towards ‘becoming That Who he was.’

Here may Mr. Mazumdar get at the Buddha, not at Buddhists,—get rather at Gotama Śākyamuni,
not at the title given, generations later, by the expanding monastic institutional religion, a religion which came to see, in ātmā, a main tenet of that Brahmanism from which it had seceded, at first because of the excessive attention to ritual, sacrifice and pride of birth; a religion which came, next, because of the growing preoccupation with proto-Sāṅkhyan analysis of mind, to see in the attan, not the purisa himself, but a mere complex of skandhas. Well may he want to get away from 'Buddhists'! But let him no more rest complacent in the little way seen by pioneer and atheist. Let him sukareyya chandam: put forth will to learn more of what we of his day have been trying to open up and make known.

8

TRANSLATORS

Translation entitled Further Dialogues of the Buddha

A

Of the second and concluding volume of this much needed work I am not repeating, nor unsaying the appreciation I wrote on the first. I will here add a reminder and a criticism.

Readers need to be reminded, that in the Pali Canon each of the four so-called Collections (nīkāyā) is the final derivative and outcome of the 'tradition' of a special school of 'repeaters' of these so long oral sayings (bhānakā), appointed, it is alleged, at the first council after the Founder’s death, to concentrate separately on such sayings, as not yet put into standardized verbal form. As might be expected,
they will find, with much mutual agreement, interesting differences in doctrinal presentation and emphasis. And they may also note the emergence of the Sutta, or connected discourse, as (a) uddesa, or text,—‘argument’ our literature used to say . . . and (b) niddesa, or exposition, no longer left to the individual expositor. It may not be going too far to presume that in (a) we have what will have been written, i.e., stippled on thin metal plates, long before the discovery of less clumsy palm-leaf stylus work made possible the writing down also of (b).

And a word of criticism: Lord Chalmers has here raised so fine a standard of English style as to queer the pitch for any more of the somewhat poor specimens of it that have found publishers’ suffrages in translations from the Pali . . . of this I have spoken earlier. But by this translation translators may also learn certain things they should avoid. And that is (1) not to place, by never so slight a twist of language, ideas in the mouth of these olden time other-land speakers which they never intended to say. And (2) not to give them words, the equivalents of which did not exist in the speaker’s tongue. For all their high level of excellence I cannot give to either volume, in this respect, a clean bill of health. I give here but a sample as to (1).

If the reader will turn to Sutta VIII, he will find the translator making the founder of Buddhism say, what, to the best of my knowledge, is not to be paralleled in any other canonical passage treating of the same subject. Now, in that the Buddhist Order came to adopt a standardized wording to an extent that impairs most Suttas as literature, such a unique rendering at once looks fishy.
Here it is: "The way to get quit of these false views . . . is by seeing with right comprehension, that 'there is no mine,' no 'this is I,' no 'this is myself.'

I have yet to find anything quite so wild as this universal negative attributed to the 'Buddha.' Had the Pali meant to say this, the wording would have been *naththi kiñci mamā ti, naththi kocī aham asmī ti, naththi koci me attā ti.* But the text runs thus: *Yā imā diṭṭhiyo loke uppajjanti . . . tam: n'etam mama, n'eso 'ham asmi, na m'eso attā ti etam . . . passato,* etc. Literally rendered, this is: "The opinions which arise in the world . . . to one who sees with true wisdom that saying: 'it is not mine, it is not what I am, it is not for me the very man'—those opinions are got rid of."

The early Buddhists liked to quote the Śāṅkhya academic wordings, of which this is one. But the Śāṅkhya was emphatic, that the 'man' exists, only he *must not be confounded* with either his body or his mind. He is *attā:* spirit, soul, self. Now is it likely, that, aware of these implications, Buddhist teachers would have used a formula, in which these ideas were involved, *if they really held* "there is no 'this is I'?' But Buddhists and European writers, not discerning what Buddhism started withal, as different from what it grew to be, all too glibly maintain, that the denial of the 'I' was perpetrated from the beginning. It is more likely that, if the founder had taught that denial, he would have been considered, not a wise teacher, but a crank.

However, that may be, my point is, that the Pali here cannot rightly be rendered by a categorical negation. They who do not hold with me, that Pali
literature can be shown to betray a history in this doctrine of 'no self'; they who overlook the ambiguity in the word attā (ātmā) and its uses; they who do not see, that a side-issue of early Buddhism was a protest against seeing in body and mind the self in man:—i.e., the very man as God accepted in current (immanent) religion; they who will not discern, that this side-issue degenerated into a nihilistic view about the very man—these will not detect, in this misrendering, any distortion of historical fact.

To me this misrendering is a buttressing of error, which European Buddhists will bring forward to support that nihilistic view. It is a set-back in that historical grasp which better knowledge will one day make general. I only wish that these lines of criticism were likely to have any fraction of the influence which the rendering they impeach will have.

B

On Lord Chalmers' text and translation of the Sutta-Nipāta, entitled Buddha's Teachings (H.O.S., 1932), I wrote, in the Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies:—

This is a popular, rather than a scholarly, translation, by one capable of giving us the latter, no less than this. Hence perhaps we must feel, ruefully feel, that in its title the Harvard Management, as is admitted in the "Descriptive List," has kowtowed to "the publisher's point of view" and prefixed to the translator's accurate rendering a fairly gross misnomer. The latter's introduction, lucidly historical as far as it goes, should have made the Management, in the interests of truth, hold its editorial hand.
Nevertheless, if we agree ever to see in the later cult-
term "Buddha" just a symbol for an evolving series
of monkish teachings, and reserve the name Gotama
or Śākyamuni for the original "Teacher," I have
nothing whereat to take objection. Yet I do find it
unworthy of American scholars to acquiesce in a title
merely popular and historically false.

For the Sutta-Nipāta is unquestionably mainly,
though not wholly, an anthology by a number of
monks for any number of monks. The outlook, the
ideals of the "almsman" are alone held really worthy.
The man who "shoulders man's common lot"—a
happy rendering of vahanto porisam dukkham—is
patronizingly passed over for him who "in aloofness
tastes true peace," and who, in "walking alone
like a rhinoceros" is fearful lest, in "showing com-
passion to friend or comrade he with a bound mind
wither his own welfare." Here surely is no gospel
likely to have been the basis of a world-religion;
here is something most untrue and unworthy of the
man who gave his life to show compassion to every
man he found needing him.

It is no fit rejoinder to say: here are the monk-
interests of a "dual gospel." Cenobitic monk-
communities evolved their own gospel, to which
these poems owe their shrinking from having "life,
having it more abundantly," their ideal of a "waning"
into something there were no words to describe (ver.
1,076). The monks around Gotama were as yet
hardly so minded; they were like him, not true
recluses, but missionaries. And to them, not to lay
men only, we find him recorded as wishing them joy
in aspiring to the happy "suchness" (tathatta) of men
who had got so much further on the Way as to be
enjoying a happier world. (*Further Dialogues*, i, p. 332.)

I am not saying that the happy wayfaring of the Way is not in this book. It is there, and to that extent the "Teachings" ring true. But here comes in my quarrel with the English translator. Look out for the terms of the wayfaring: "schooling," "breeding," "fostering," "drilling," etc. How varied and rich is the English in this style of Jacobean-Bible-cum-Joseph-Hooker-and-Ken! Yet how poor a guide to those who are searching for the "Teachings"! For all these terms are in Pali *one and the same word*: the causative of bhū "to become." So again are the words "rebirth," "lives," "life to come," "worlds," "existence," "stage": all the one word bhava "becoming"! Let every reader watch carefully the page opposite, and see how, to be in literary style, translators have sedulously evaded using this great, pregnant, if somewhat awkward English word. Let them see how the *one* use of it, in 60 Pali passages where it is evaded, lifts the veil from the hidden teaching:—

He strips the veil from things, and so becomes (*bhavati*) the peerless all-enlightened . . .

But again: in these pages we find an inverse procedure with one English term for many Pali words: "peace" (with a capital P). No one conversant with the Piṭakas would even uncritically see, in this, a *sumnum bonum* in "Buddha's Teachings." Even for these it is too much a ship-wrecked sailor's, a charwoman's final quest. It may suit a sitting Buddha-rūpa; it is not of the ardent untiring spirit, fighting to the end, as of a very John Wesley, which
peeps out in the Suttas. But that opposite page reveals *nine* different words in the one "Peace," and one context where is no Pali equivalent (ver. 519).

Captious yet once again, I grieve to see the "purged of self" for *pahitatta* reproduced here from the *Further Dialogues*. We at least are not bound, as was maybe the commentator, to read, for *padahitatta, pesit-atta*, especially in a work where we have the parallel *bhāvitatta* (cf. the *bhāvattānām* of Dhp.) and *sukhit-atta*. But *pahitatta* whereas it illustrated the growth, the making-become the self as a More in the Way to the Most, showed the falsity of *anattā*, and so it had to be twisted absurdly into *pesitatta* (one who has sent away the self).

Far am I from underestimating the patient labour of nobly spent years or the enviable literary richness of the result. But there are things weightier than literary style. We have in the Piṭakas an historical problem of the utmost religious importance, and no peculiarly British vigour or elegance must come between us and it. An Indian-Buddhist translation into English of this anthology is still to be made.¹

¹ I rejoice to say my friend E. M. Hare's translation is now going to press.

**Note.**—Since writing this I have come to note the confusion in the treatment, by translator (and commentator) of the use of alternatives *attām, nirattām* in this anthology. Poetic usage sanctions *attām* in the accusative for *attānam* as meaning 'self' or 'spirit'. But the pair are usually in the nominative, and can then only mean 'elated' (*atta = āpta*) and the reverse. Thus ver. 919: the man of inward peace feels no elation, still less depression. Chalmers, in the four contexts, varies in interpreting the pair; Fausböll (S.B.E.), choosing 'grasping' and the reverse, keeps to it throughout.
SĀNKHYA AND ORIGINAL BUDDHISM

In an article in the Indian Historical Quarterly, 1933, on Mr. K. Bhattacharya’s article ‘Some Problems of Sāṅkhya Philosophy and Literature’ I wrote: I cannot claim to speak as an old student of Sāṅkhya, else I might be questioning the imputing so early to the shadowy if doubtlessly historical figure of Kapila anything amounting to a ‘system’ and a ‘philosophy,’ which emerged much later. It is where the Founder of the Śākyan new teaching, which very long after came to take shape as what is now called Buddhism, is held up as teaching a philosophy, and a philosophy of four fundamental principles, in accordance with similar principles of Sāṅkhya philosophy, that I find the writer wrong.

I am not saying, that monastic scholastic Buddhism did not frame those so-called four truths, or that later scholastic Sāṅkhya, with a category of four points about heya and hāna, may not have suggested the late Buddhist four about dukkha. I would only contend that, as a feature in the First Utterance of Benares, the four as worded are a pretty obvious gloss (as Deussen saw), and that, as fundamentals in what was not a philosophy, but the mandate of a great world-religion, they are impossible and entirely out of place. That mandate showed forth the man, the puruṣa, as the creator of his own salvation by the right choice of his will, in his quest for the Highest, the paramārtha. Here we have a revelation to man of a More in him:—in his nature, his life, his destiny. In the four truths, we are mainly concerned with a

1 Published in the Indian Historical Quarterly, 1933.
Less in the man:—with ill as his nature and life, unless he makes his nature wilt by cutting out desire, or will, the very source of the hope in what lies before him.

Throughout the Pāli Suttas we can see creeping up the influence of the early Śāṅkhyan teaching; not of any ‘system,’ but of a teaching which saw in the composite human being not just nāma-rūpa: the man with a shape or body, but the man as having both body and a set of mind-ways, distinguishable from the very man. The man is not denied in that teaching; far from it:—‘puruṣo’sti’, (the man is), it maintains, and for very excellent and unanswerable reasons, given, as Mr. Bhattacharyya will know very well, in the Śūtras. But he had an inner procedure as systematic as was that of the body. And it was this procedure that captivated the early Śākyan Saṅgha, probably even during the day of the first Śākyan teachers. Is it not clear enough in the Second Utterance, warning men not to confuse the very puruṣa or self with body or mind? This more-in-analysis of the man we see recognized in early Pāli Suttas as one of two strengths (balāmı) in the man: paṭisaṅkhānam, or discriminating thought, and bhāvanā, or ‘making-become,’ which was for the Śākyan world what Yoga became for the Brahman world.

But in all this there is no philosophy, as we understand the word. There never was a philosophic system of Buddhism till a thousand years after the day of the Founder. Nor for that matter was there any philosophic system in the Upanishads. These were religious utterances, mantras, aspirations. It is only we who try to read any system into them. Why can we not let them stand in their true value for what
they really were? When will Europe cease to talk in this way, and Indian writers no less? When is the Śākyamuni to be made no more to pose as a philosopher; as a pundit, full of wise and wordy discourse, of categories and ideas about men? There is no hope for India having a vision of him as he really was, till we banish from our eyes any imagining of him as prosing on about skandhas and the ills of life. A man was he in close touch with the unseen, with men in the unseen worthy to 'inspire' him, as we say—to will and word him with a message to this man and that woman, a message of a new amplitude in life, a new vista, a new joy in the mighty Becoming, the making-become that lay before him, before her. Verily are you That, but That you must make-become in you. There is here no actual Being, else is the religion of India absurd, irrational; there is only potential Being. There is becoming; a long 'Way.' Therein walk, 'attaining to happiness by happiness.'

And we shall not begin to understand him and his message as long as we take the many scriptures about him and his work at their face-value—at the value at which the compilers and then the revisers, the editors, have come to hold these, in their later day. Hardly any writer on Buddhism as yet is historically critical in dealing with Pāli literature. Many will assign one whole work as later than another work, but who yet digs into any one work to find what a palimpsest that one work is:—a history in itself? Mr. Bhattacharya, who shows some historical discernment in feeling after a gradual growth in Śāṅkhya, has nothing of the kind when referring to Pāli works. He sees Śāṅkhya, for instance, as pre-Buddhistic, because 'Śāṅkhya as a system of philosophy occurs
in the Lalitavistara." This is as much as to say, that because a certain teaching (a 'system') is known to the poet of a late Buddhist work, it therefore was known to the first Buddhist teaching of at least 1,000 years earlier! I am not saying this is the only evidence adduced; I say it is no evidence and should not have been mentioned, so worthless is it.

We live so remote from the day of the birth of a world-religion, that we, the after-men, have tended to mess up its original nature in wrappings and superstructures of ideas, in 'scriptures,' in exegesis. I do not lose sight of the piety and devotion ever at work on these, but I do see the original plant all but buried, of the Man bringing a message to Man to come up higher and behold a broader, brighter view about himself. And that will not have been said in list, formula or category, much less in a system of philosophical fundamentals.

ANIMAL REBIRTH

On the late Sylvain Lévi's translation of two Suttas from the Buddhist Canon in Sanskrit, entitled Mahākarmavibhanga and Karmavibhangopadesa: The greater analysis of deeds and Discussion thereon (Paris, 1932), which he had had given him on a visit to Nepal, I wrote:—

... We have on the one hand the relatively archaic Pali Sutta. The brahman Subha-Todeyya-putta asks Gotama Śākyamuni why man's fate on earth is so unequal. Their deeds, is the brief grave reply, are their heritage, the matrix of their circumstances

1 Published in the J.R.A.S., 1934.
here. Exposition is entreated, and in very general terms, simple and sober, it is told how man reaps what he has in his past lives sown. Recollecting Gotama’s frequent psychic converse with devas, I find nothing here that such an elect man may not have conceivably learnt from worthy advisers in the Unseen. That we have his very words recast into Pali I should be far from admitting. But in worth and dignity the short discourse is one well befitting such a man, and may possibly be a true, if a late garnered, memory. Others such, bearing the marks of vieille roche, we find also at the end of the Saṃyutta-Nikāya; they may possibly have been brought to headquarters during the Mauryan hegemony, when the whole question of revision and standardization, in an oral thesaurus grown unwieldy, appears to have become very pressing.

In the Sanskrit Sūtra, on the other hand, we have a silly story, relegated in the Pali scriptures to the Commentary—the jam round the powder—brought into the text to explain the occasion of its utterance, Subha-Todeyya-putta being now Śuka-Taudeyya-putra. Gotama visits the brahman’s house, where in the son’s absence the house-dog barks at him. Śuka returns and pursues his visitor, only to learn, after being thrice warned not to press the question, that the dog is his own father reborn. Śuka, naturally protesting, is sent back to his dog primed with a threefold instruction by which he can make the creature corroborate the truth of the Teacher’s saying. Śuka puts this to the test, the dog talking. He is convinced, and returns to acknowledge. He then proceeds to inquire into the ups and downs of rebirth in general (not, be it noted, of the case before
him). The Sage responds, also in old Sutta idiom, and, "the cackle being cut (or, rather, finished), gets down to the horses"—in other words to the wordy pedantic "Classification," so evidently the work of medieval pundits belabouring the tradition of a great but dead, because not growing, religious mandate.

Very significant for me is the silence in the Pali Sutta on rebirth as animal as compared with the Jātaka chatter about the dog of the Pali Commentary, which has been raised to Sūtra dignity in the Sanskrit recension. It is a silence, almost total, that runs throughout the Piṭakas, once we omit the later Jātaka Commentary. Mahā-Pajāpati’s reminiscent verses from the nun’s anthology, give us the true, the more original, outlook:—

Oh! but 'tis long I’ve wandered down all time
Living as mother, father, brother, son,
And as grandparent in the ages past—
Not knowing how and what things really are
And never finding what I needed sore . . . 1

Much editing of their own the Pali Suttas have undergone, yet are we in them, at least in this respect, nearer to that divinization of the man which led religious thought in India at the birth of the Buddhist movement, and with which such a worsening of the man as lies in animal rebirth seems so incongruous. Sharply shall I here be taken up with quotations from the early Upanishads. Yes, I know those three passages—are there not three only?—Brhad., Chândogya, Kauśitaki, and how the second contradicts the first. Very incongruous are they, too, with the lofty central teaching, as little inherent in it as are the passing allusions of Empedokles and Plato with their main

1 Therigāthā, No. LV.
positions. And I believe that, when at last the Upanishads come to be sifted by really historical criticism, these three passages will be voted to be glosses, cankers of later decadent editing.

M. Lévi may conceivably have judged what I said to be one of the hypothèses hâtives et constructions ambitieuses, which "so many questions left in suspense should give us humility to suppress" (p. 12). However that be, his travail de science austère leaves me profoundly grateful for a type of scholarly scrutiny, out of which the coming generation of Indologists will build more safely than I can a true history of Buddhist literature.

II

A 'BASIC CONCEPTION' OF BUDDHISM

I wrote this\(^1\) concerning the two Adharchandra Mookerjee Lectures by Professor Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya.

A few years ago it was 'The Central Conception of Buddhism' that a Russian scholar invited us to consider. Neither author has been content to use the indeterminate article 'a'; both have had sufficient confidence to use a 'the.' The former was asserting a metaphysical nisus as valid for Buddhism early and late. The latter asserts a religious basis as valid. Hence it comes perhaps, that the champion of the 'Basic' goes his way, unshaken by, and virtually unheeding the earthshaking of the earlier title. In both cases the title used makes a very great claim, the form being of assertion, not of inquiry. As such it calls for exceptional fitness to justify its use.

\(^1\) Published in *Indian Culture*, Vol. II, No. 4, 1936.
Fitness for such a difficult task as to be able, after a lapse of more than a millennium, to affirm what was the ‘basic conception,’ not merely in an old institutional cult like Buddhism, but in the very teaching of its founder—for that is what we are asked to accept—demands not only erudition. No one in either case questions that:—the having read widely and methodically. There is more, and it is an important ‘more,’ still, in Buddhist studies, in its cradle. It is to have read with a constant awareness, that the book under consideration was, at its hoary commencement, no newspaper report taken down from the lips of a teacher verbatim; but that it is a late outcome of a twofold process:—(1) the process of hearing, remembering, repeating, teaching as one’s own belief, and much later, of writing down; and (2) the process of coming in course of time to look at and value things differently.

The clash and interaction of this twofold process take effect in each and every compilation claiming to be to-day a book about this or that in the long past. In such a book there will be found what are often called different strata of teaching. There will be certain dominant emphases:—we may assume with some confidence, that these were the values upheld by the editorial compilers, when the book came to change its oral invisible shape for a visible written one. Perhaps the book never was oral only, but was actually compiled in writing. This can usually be easily discerned in its style. And then we can feel fairly sure that the written book, with the remains in it of oral style, is an older creation than the book bearing traces throughout of penmanship (or should I say ‘stylemanship’?). And if this written work
of style or pen puts forward sayings as uttered by a Founder, known to have lived long before anyone wrote sayings in India, we should accept these claims with far more diffidence, with far less credence, than such as appear in a work bearing traces of oral beginnings.

Such talk should by now be milk for babes. Why do I bring it up in this connection? Does not Mr. Bhattacharya consider, wisely enough, ‘the bewildering nature of the variety and extent of Buddhist records’ (p. 25), ‘the absence in them of agreement, the presence of omissions’? He does, and who, knowing them in any detail, could say otherwise? No one not conversant with the compilations bearing the marks of oral origin more perhaps than any other Buddhist records—I refer to the Pali Piṭakas—can realize how their predominant, their editorial emphases contradict those strata of earlier Indian religion which here and there come to the surface. (By ‘earlier’ I mean, not pre-Buddhist, so much as Śākyan, that is, the original teaching later called Buddhist.) Look for instance at this little ‘left-in’ Sutta of the Fourth Nikāya: To a brahman (?), making before the Founder the assertion that there is no such thing as a self-in-action, (atta-kāro), the abrupt reply is given: ‘Don’t talk like that! Never have I heard of such a saying! Why! when you move a limb, is not that an act of initiative? How then can you say no self is acting: as you or as another?’

On the one hand there is this Saying; on the other we have this author, listening to the emphases, the editorial emphases in the Piṭakas, and to their reverberations in a number of indefinitely later exegetical
compositions, and telling us, that 'the Buddha took a very bold step and advocated the doctrine of Anātman: the non-reality of the self.' (How the 'Buddha' did this without himself being a valuing, judging 'self' is for me in comprehensible, but I pass this by.) Here is indeed absence of agreement in the records; here I repeat we can all agree with the lecturer.

Nevertheless there must still be a certain amount of purveying of milk. Not once in these admissions of the heterogeneous quality of Buddhist records can I discern a fit awareness of what has brought about this quality. The main cause of this is the changing nature, down the centuries, of the corporate human vehicle, responsible for the handing on, the collecting, the revising, the final written composition of those records. How is it, that neither erudition, nor analysis, nor the analogical procedure in the history of other religious literatures seems to make writers realize, that in all lands men's outlook and ideals are ever, if slowly shifting, so that what they once held as true and compelling, they come to see as wrong, as to be repudiated?

Two mighty influences were growing in North India when the 'sons of the Sakyans' began their new, because corporate, mission work:—the new growing vogue of the monastic life as a cenobitic institution, and the seeing in 'mind' an orderly intermediate vehicle between the self or man (puruṣa) and his body. Added to these, and affecting the Śākyans (and Jains), was the degree to which these dissented from the established church of their day, in the matter of ritual, sacrifice and birth-monopoly. This dissent was only one side of the Śākyan move-
ment, but it gradually dragged in dissent from the central teaching of that ‘church’:\textemdash the teaching of God as immanent in man. Bent and led by this triple influence, we can trace the Gotamic Order coming to change its first ideals profoundly:\textemdash to adopt as its religious ideal the outlook of that half-man, the monk; to see in the fascinating new psychology the only way of getting at (upalabbhati) the very man, not merely as expressing himself by mind (manasā), but as being resolvable into mind; and finally to reject the central teaching of the institution which was there first, namely, the reality of a central principle, personally conceived, in the universe and in the visible man.

At the same time there had arisen an idealized quasi-deified conception of the Founder, as having been omniscient, and the sole source of most of the chief Sayings that had been more or less correctly memorized and handed down. Many among these may be shown to be or to include glosses, interpolations. But these adulterations have not prevented editors with changed outlook from maintaining the assertion, that it was ‘the Bhagavan’ (called later the Buddha) who had uttered them, gloss and all. And so we get a mass of utterances, mainly the compilations of ever more recent teachers and ‘bhānakas,’ fathered on the founder Gotama Śākyamuni, and often differing widely, painfully, from what he will actually have taught. Witness, to quote no further, the Sutta given above.

I should have no quarrel with those who are ever libelling the Founder in this way, if they made it plain, that when they say ‘the Buddha said,’ they were careful to explain that they mean ‘what the
Sangha said he said.' Yet even then the general reader would confound the monastic ideal, 'Buddha,' with the real historical Gotama the missioner.

Further, with the changing ideals, whereby much man-handling was perpetrated on the Sayings, many separate terms came to mean different things. I have instanced lately in these pages 'attha' and 'nirvāna.' There is another term, where the meaning is used for better or for worse, in both pre-Buddhist and Buddhist utterances: the term kāma. We have precisely the same varying meaning in our word 'desire.' Still can we use it to render the saying of the Hebrew Muni Haggai: 'And the Desire of all nations shall arise,' and say to-day with 17th century Dryden:

'Desire's the vast extent of human mind;
It mounts aloft and leaves poor hope behind.'

But the Shakespearean saying, with a worsened sense, is also no less valid:

'That satiate yet unsatisfied desire, that tub both filled and running'.

So too in the early Upaniṣad, there is no worsening of kāma in the powerful mantra: 'They say, a man is just kāmamaya. (I say :) As is his desire, such is his purpose, as is his purpose, such is the deed he does . . .' with which compare the later Kaṭha:

'The Man who creates desire after desire,
That is indeed the pure, that is Brahman,
That indeed is called undying.'

Or, to go back to the Brhadāraṇyaka: 'the man

1 Cymbeline.
who has desired but desires no longer, being Brahman has become Brahman.

How, with this noble use of \textit{kāma}, are we going to praise a Helper of man because he is said to have taught, that ‘extinction of desire brings about the stopping of suffering!’ How indeed is a man ever to win anything worth while \textit{without strong desire}? Clearly if desire be blamed, it is in its \textit{trṣṇā} or \textit{tānḫā} sense of unregulated lower desire. Now this lowered meaning of \textit{kāma} is just what one would look for in a monastic régime, where much desire, held in a layman to be legitimate, is excised from the monkish life. But a world-religion is not founded on a teaching for monks alone, and anyone fitted with historic sense will at once recognize, in the opening of the First Utterance of Gotama, that the monkish editor has been busy. He has twisted the opening to suit monks only. And he has crucified the divine gift in man of desire by calling it ‘craving.’ What a pitiful tragedy!

Now one who sets out to make pronouncement about ‘The’ basic idea in Buddhism should be alive to the way in which its vehicle became adulterated, in textual alterations and in verbal changes. And more: he should not follow other writers in seeing in those First Utterances \textit{what is not there}. Once more we are here asked to infer from the Second Utterance a denial of a self or ‘soul, independent, permanent, blissful.’ Actually, in the text, no such inference is required or expected or assumed. If writers would but see, in the speaker of that Utterance, not a myopic negativist of a later day, but a cultured man of the 7th century B.C. with a group of brahmins as his friends, uttering to them a warning against worsening the currently
accepted idea of the self as God-in-man, it may then come over them how absurd it was to see such a man held to be making a transient Skandha-complex the proper substitute for the Self as so taught.

If, says the speaker, either of your instruments: your visible shape (rūpa) or your mind were really You, the Self, the God in you, the instrument would no longer be the limited fallible thing it is; you could be and do what you willed. But since it is limited, fallible, it is clearly not the Self, the Very You. Where is there here denial of the soul? It is denial that anything else is Soul but just Soul himself. As I have said elsewhere, it is as if, seeking on a ship the skipper, we saw the boatswain and said ‘You are not he,’ or the purser and said ‘You are not he,’ never the while entertaining the thought: ‘Then there can be no skipper.’

There is no stronger testimony to the growing power over young institutional Buddhism of the growing Proto-sāṅkhya, or analysis of mind, than the seeing, in the clumsy ill-fitting skandha-complex, the creation of a teacher, who began by bidding men seek the Self, in the very words of the established brahman teaching of his day.

Lastly, to call this man ‘an out and out rationalist’ (p. 9f.), mainly because of a current rationalistic atmosphere, is to be curiously blind to the main trend of the teaching linked with his name in the Suttas. ‘Utilitarian’ might be urged with some weight. ‘Rationalistic’ surely not. In the very Sutta chosen to illustrate the latter assertion, the Kālāma discourse, the rational grounds for testing a gospel are only cited to be put aside:—‘Be ye not misled by report or traditions or hearsay, by proficiency in the
Collections, nor by logic or inference, nor after considering reasons or after reflection on and approval of some theory, nor because it fits becoming, nor out of respect for the teacher.' The one test to be used is 'What effect will this teaching produce on my life?'

Again, to call him rationalistic as not dogmatic cannot surely be maintained. He is shown ever making assertions he could not verify. About what, do you ask? About things unseen. To the question 'Whence learnt you this?' he would reply 'A deva told me.' And ever is he seen telling men what would hereafter be their fate, at the post mortem tribunal and after, because of what they were doing here. Here: the things seen; there: the things unseen. He was what we call psychic. Some of us are that too; some of us are in that way aware, that what he is said to have told about that tribunal is true even to-day. But few are so aware; and in his day also few could hear and so objectively verify what he asserted. To the majority he was assertive, dogmatic, bringing forward no evidential proof.

It is with a sore heart that I have written these words of protest. I have in these latter years done my utmost to provoke a truer, a deeper inquiry into the New Word brought by the Śākyamuni to the India of his day and all time. In these lectures, the clichés of the pioneers, who worked well but saw little, are maintained. And there is in them no reaching out to a newer fraternity, by whom a 'higher criticism' of Buddhism, that is, a historical research, such as has been wrought on the Christian scriptures, may accomplish great things. Will the next generation carry on a brighter torch?
VEDÂNTIC LEAVEN

In commenting on Professor Ghosh’s article ‘Vedântic Leaven,’ I wrote¹:—

I believe that the religion and philosophy of Immanence, which is put forward as a new message of tremendous vibrant significance in early Vedânta, has yet a great part to play in Western thought, but this article does not show any present tendency towards Immanence as the result of any knowledge of Vedânta. If here and there I now seem to see it faintly showing in, say, Western theology, this is due more to the Johannine valedictory utterances of Jesus and to Neo-Platonism, than to any Vedântic leaven.

And yet—and here I come to my ‘suggestion’—it is at times hard to believe that nothing—that no one—has ever supervened in mediæval Christian writings to inspire the writer. It is a subject I have neither space nor competence to go into, but to take one case only:—when we see St. Catherine of Genoa, in the 15th century, writing thus: (I quote from memory)—“My God is Me, not by simple participation but by a process of gradual transformation,” we are amazed. Not merely at the virtual restatement of the Upanishadic formula of Immanence, but at the way in which she improves on and rationalizes it. Yet her biographer von Hügel makes no comment about ‘leaven,’ and for the saint access to Indian literature will have been out of the question. Are we then to call such utterances just parallels, wherein Eastern sayer and Western writer have, through causes somehow similar, been driven to express themselves in similar terms?

¹ Published in Vedânta Kesari.
Now here I go further than Indian writers of to-day in general and the present writer in particular appear to have gone. I do believe that 'leavening' of one age by another, of one culture by another, is possible and is true. And it is not in this case the result of scripture exercised directly or indirectly. It is a leavening of a man by a man. And what I testify is the result of some years of personal experience. Hereby I have come to hold certain things as verities, if only subjectively valid. Namely, I believe in an indefinitely great power of will as a possible development even in this much handicapped earth-body. Telepathy, or, better, televolition,¹ known and taught by a saintly Brahman of forgotten name when the Buddhist movement began, and annexed his teaching, is now coming to be recognised scientifically.

Next, I believe in the indefinitely greater power of will wielded by man in the next world, and next world to that (svarga and Brahmaloka). Next, I believe in the emergence, as man in these becomes a More in his long wayfaring, of the long memory of his former lives, it may be a gradual, a partial emergence.

Lastly, I believe in the power and the will of the worthy in those two worlds to visit us of earth who may be trying to live our best and help others, and, in visiting, even where unseen and unheard, to will us with the knowledge they now have as stored in that longer memory. In the light of these four 'verities' it is possible to understand how a St. Catherine, in fifteenth century Genoa, could receive and express a teaching from an unseen willer, himself or herself mindful of what, in a former life, he or she had been taught some thousand years earlier in India.

¹ In what are called the divine moods (Brahma-vihārā).
My sceptical Hindu brethren may say I labour under a form of māyā, or indeed of mohā. My sceptical Christian brethren may say no less. Yet why should we accept, with at least respect, the testimony of the Śākyamuni and his men, of the boy Samuel and the judge Eli, of Jesus, of Peter, Paul, Mohammed and many more, and scout such experience as impossible for ourselves?

Or am I doing the writer wrong in classing him with the usual sceptic, when it may be, he means by ‘leaven’ precisely this psychic inspiration of modern men in the West by men in the unseen, modern no less, yet who may have so grown as to remember the wisdom they once knew on earth? Does he shrink, in a world, where narrow knowledge still provokes the sneer, from telling us more clearly what he means by ‘leaven’?

Be that as it may, I have here outlined what it has largely come to mean for me. And I would beg readers to consider it sanely and soberly, in that it opens up the possibility of a great More in life, not only in the life of a few elect men, but as within the scope and power of any earnest man and woman, ay, and any modern child Samuel—“Speak! Lord, for thy servant heareth!”—who single-mindedly desire to learn the true under the warding will of the Highest.

PIERCING THE VEIL

In an article in the *Aryan Path*,¹ thus entitled I commented on what had led me to offer the article LXXIV A.

I have noticed articles, in Indian journals especially,

wherein a myopia is shown and indeed complacently treated, about what I have called here the going and the goal, which India's age-old culture would not have led us to expect. India has claimed, and not wrongly, that her chief preoccupation, as compared with that of other lands, has ever been the whence, the what, the to-be of the man, *purusha*, soul, self, spirit. In so far as this is true, I cordially subscribe to her deeper wisdom. Yet now and then I see articles wherein these questions about the man are still raised in doubt and darkness, the writers seemingly unable to predicate anything as certainly established and accepted as is any child of the West. What they have seemed to steer by may be a few badly understood mantras from the Upanishads.

Yet in these the teaching that man *can anticipate* his departure from earth by his experiences in his "other body" during deep sleep (not the light sleep of dreams), finds no mention. Why is there no will shown to exploit this suggestion? Nor any other will of the same sort? If we have come to know (to repeat a parallel I have drawn before) that each of us must before long, it may be even to-morrow, leave home to take up our residence in a little known, or quite unknown, country, each of us will, *if we are civilized*, use every effort to learn, if learn we may, anything about that country, geographically, socially, politically. Here we have, in what lies before us, not a may-be but a will-be, must-be. Does indeed a country await us? If so, what is it like? Does nothing really depend as to our coming to know, on whether, or not, "we seek one yet for to come?" Do we seek? Can we call ourselves "civilized" if we do not?¹

¹ I may refer to my forthcoming book, *What is your Will?* (Published 1937 by Messrs. Rider.)
In the articles I have noticed there would seem to be nothing the writers have yet found between a "whirling round in the cycle of birth, death and rebirth" and the "opening up of the mystery of heavenly bliss and evergreenhood," the latter being only for "the few blessed." If such be the results of her modern seeking, all one can say is "Poor India!"

Again, there is a matter on which the great scriptures show much agreement, but which such blighted seeking seems wholly to ignore. This is the fact of adjudication, at or not long after death, administered not by god or devil or angel, but by men once of earth, from which no one is exempt. Here India, for all her claims, would seem to be woefully vague. Original Buddhism, before degenerating and dying out from her shores, had taught her much, at least as much as Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Islam, Christianity have taught, but Buddhists have forgotten this, ignore it and substitute an unfounded doctrine of automatic results of deeds done.

Now these accounts are not merely edifying, deterrent legends in ancient writ. From the time I won my way to direct psychic communication I learnt that such world-wide adjudication was proceeding, in country after country, incessantly by day and by night. But how rational is not such an institution, once the country to be sought is accepted as real! What should I think of a country, where an estate was awaiting me, if I heard that the murderer, the persecutor, the thief, the cheat, the fornicator among such as had migrated thither, were let run loose in it to work their will? In such adjudications are revealed, first, the persistent responsibility, not of a new-born
complex, but of the very man who has taken the next step; secondly, the mile-stones in his wayfaring in the worlds, he seeking not merely a country round the next bend in the road, but a further bourn, the ultimate goal of his going—that which as yet he believes in, but cannot conceive, much less comprehend. Here for the Indian is Yājñavalkya's way (panthā) of man's faring towards Brahman; here is the Śākyamuni's road (magga) of man's evermore coming to be. Had India remembered this, we should not at this time of day see her sons publishing articles groping in a dark unknown.

In other writings dwelling on the goal of life, I find a tendency, common to medieval Indian and modern European culture, to take ideas about a thing rather than the thing itself. Thus the goal is described or defined as "knowledge" or as bliss. These are of course of that late trinity: "being, mind, bliss," wherewith India came, as it were, to sum up Deity.

I agree with such writers that there is a goal and quest of "life." Oftener than not the man of to-day confines his outlook to a limited temporary bourn, a bourn limited to attainment merely in his instruments, bodily and mental, to the furtherance and wellbeing of these, instead of looking to culminate in That who is, in some yet inconceivable way, Man. But herein I do not agree with an interposing, between man-as-he-is and Man-as-he-may-become, a quality of the man, as being itself the goal, and wording this "how" of his perfected becoming as knowledge or as bliss.

This substitution of a quality for the supreme Thing Itself, for the Highest, Most, Best, breaks down when it is, as often happens, defined in terms of something
else. Thus I have read that 'happiness,' when properly analysed, is a state of self-elevation, self-expansion, self-joyousness and self-enrichment. Evidently here, for such writers, happiness or bliss is one aspect only in four of a something yet more central, more ultimate: the self, the man. Surely the supreme goal is not just one of these four, but That in whom all four may be resolved. Here the Christian saint was unwittingly at one with those Sayers of the Upanishads when he wrote: "Thou hast made us for thyself, and our hearts are restless until they find rest in thee." He did not say: "made us for happiness"; "rest in bliss." How feeble does not the makeshift sound! Happiness is not that which we seek; it is a state of him who is finding, of him who will have found. Happiness is his because of the state which he seeks; it is produced in him by the state he seeks, as the perfume is produced by the flower. It is his worth in that becoming-utterly-well which is his goal, whence comes his happy feeling, whether he be wayfaring or at way's end. It is not the thing sought.

Nor is the worth in "rest" or in "peace" the thing sought. Man's instruments aiding the search need rest; they wear out, but the user will not rest, nor will to rest till he find; and when he has found, he will not need rest. Peace, again, is the worth in a thing to be unneeded at way's end. Peace is a negative idea, a getting rid of worry, clash, jar, war; as such it belongs to the seeker as believing, as expecting. It is not the ultimate ideal itself. Lastly, I have noted bliss as equated by "perfect wantlessness." Here again is a negative idea, a result, one might say, of the static ideal expressed in the first
of the trinity of terms referred to. It is an ancient and a poor concept of the goal, the idea of "the getting rid of" a limited individuality or self, rather than the idea of a culminating man. It is conceiving "becoming" as merely the progressive dropping of imperfections, instead of an essentially divine nature ever willing to become the New. No shadow of the idea of a stopping, a having stopped, of static rest, should mar, should limit our concept of the Best, the Highest, the Most.

As yet and for a long time to come, we writers are wayfaring within the limits of the More. Not yet do we "know as we are known" by the Most. Wayfarers are we, and as such we can be happy, restful, peaceful because we have come to know ourselves as wayfarers. We have much to learn, and there is much we can now train ourselves to learn, concerning the Way that most of us think is here and now impossible.

DR. SCHWEITZER AND 'INDIAN THOUGHT'

On *Indian Thought and its Development*, by Dr. A. Schweitzer, I wrote¹:—

The author whose fine and disinterested work in more fields than one is well known, has here ventured into a field with which he is at first hand unfamiliar, and wherein the track he blazes is inevitably less reliable. He has put himself into the hands of, not many guides, but a few, with the result, that he could not weigh the guidance of the one against that of another, but has been led whither the few, and so far as ancient thought goes, I might almost say,

¹ Published in *Religions*, 1937.
the one guide has led him. It follows inevitably, that the reader who has special knowledge in any one part of so large and so long a subject as "Indian thought," is inevitably reminded of the Japanese remark after a conversion with Gladstone: 'He is wonderful! He knows all about everything except—Japan!' Dr. Schweitzer has finely critical insight, but where he has had to make shift with imperfectly presented materials, that insight cannot but come to conclusions that are not always historically sound.

There are two features in the book which, for me, are mainly misleading. The one is the application of the term mysticism to Indian thought. This is historically and geographically a misfit; there is no Indian equivalent; we are trying to read that thought with Greek, late Greek spectacles. The other is the setting out to interpret that thought in Schopenhauer concepts, called by the translator "world and life affirmation," "world and life negation." Schopenhauer left a splendid trumpet-call to the world in awakening men to the importance of 'will'; he blew too hard, seeing in 'will'—the main instrument of man—the very man, but it is better to call too loudly than to acquiesce in slumber. But in spite of the jewel in man's nature he held aloft, he saw in man mainly, not a more, but a less; he saw in life very much a less; as to life as a whole he was dim-eyed; life for him was this little span of it. And herein he is no good base-layer for Indian thought. It is good and needful to be humble—and Indian thought needs that leaven—but to call man "the poor human spirit" (page 264) is a monkish discord, common to Buddhist and Christian monasticism, but alien to the vision of great Gospel-bringers. These see in
that spirit the hidden, the immature God. That is the ‘self’ beloved by the Upanishad teacher; that is the self Gotama of the Sakyas bade men seek; that is the self both taught, as the “noble witness” and Controller within. And it was the Becoming, the growth, in the immaturity of the man as divine which is evident all through the early Upanishads and the ‘left-in’s’ of the Piṭakas, if the student trust not to translations, but give himself to first-hand study.

But that Becoming was no mere matter of one life-span only. And it is to take a sadly imperfect view of Gotama’s teaching if, in it, the constant other worlds be unheeded, the exhortations to become suitable here for joining them there be systematically passed over, the value in re-birth as ‘stations,’ opportunities, for Becoming be ignored. Monastic Buddhism fell into all these byways of unbelief. But monastic Buddhism is not Gotama-Buddhism. And it is a thousand pities that in this and other historical facts Dr. Schweitzer has not been more amply guided.

‘Higher,’ I mean, historical criticism in ‘Indian thought’ is still in its cradle; or to shift the metaphor, it is a yet untamed elephant, capable of lifting up and hurling down the incautious-in-approach. May it yet be given me before long to write a review of a rewritten edition of this book!

15

‘HORIZONS OF IMMORTALITY’

In Erik Palmstierna’s Horizons of Immortality (1937), I wrote¹:

It is a curiously over-done picture with which

¹ Published in the Hibbert Journal, 1938.
the opening "Quest" starts. The world in general is presented as being in a tumult of anguished anxiety as to where we are going. I could wish this were as true of folk generally as it is of a few earnest and sensitive souls like the author. It is a question which will one day become sufficiently general to show at least a portion of the inhabited earth as ready to demand and find an answer. For the present, unless the author lives so in the midst of "the din" as to know, mankind, save perhaps at one or two war-centres, is not so distracted. It is still for the most part contented to say XY was buried yesterday in Z cathedral, and to commemorate our beloved as "sleeping" beneath our feet! Verily here is no quest for learning whither we are going, or discontent, with smug incuriosity.

The following section, "Enlightenment," does not consist in well-considered views about the next step in our knowledge of life, nor about the adjudication conducted by our fellows, who have taken that step, so as to secure that those following them be not left adrift. It tries rather—and how many sermons do not try also—to take the man at death at a leap into a mystical world of so-called reality, described mainly in wordy "ideas about" ultimates, statements received apparently by automatic writers, but none of whom is named.

Preceding these is a disquisition on Historical Religions, as a study calling for removal of superstructure and exercise of historical imagination, which is an admirable ideal.

That in no case is any one of the messages "fathered" is unsatisfactory; it is not enough to read that, only in the Appendix concerning the long-
buried Schumann violin concerto, an informant’s name is given. The phenomenon of communication with the “beyond” so lends itself to work of unbalanced minds, of novelists out to thrill, to impish deceit, that everything that can be done by true recipients should be brought as near the threshold of objective validity as possible.

16

‘EASTERN RELIGIONS AND WESTERN THOUGHT’

In a review of this work I wrote¹:—

. . . . It is regrettable that, after referring (p. 8) to the saying, Europe would have had a more peaceful growth, had Stoicism prevailed and Christianity been exterminated, the remark follows: “Nature obviously had a different intention.” Professor Radhakrishnan’s religious genius has committed him too far to let him drop on us so second-rate a conclusion as this. He has taken us up to the hill of historic vistas, where shortsighted interpretations are out of place. The best in Stoicism, equally with the best in Christianity, might, under similar conditions, have been pressed into a Procrustes bed of institutionalism, and become intolerantly tyrannical. As he remarks: “History” —I should say, man in history—“has taken a different course.” And “nature” here is man in history, man in process of becoming, but not therein incessantly and everywhere making progress.

Incidentally, it is a little curious that, with his catholic learning and sympathy in dealing with Stoicism, the writer does not claim a Vedantic cousin-

¹ In Buddhism in England, 1939.
ship with the Immanence so remarkable in Epictetus: "Man has within him a part of God. . . . You carry God about with you . . . do not forget that when you think impure thoughts . . . you are defiling him. . . ." Or for that matter, with the equally remarkable Immanence in St. Catherine of Genoa (only mentioned for her ecstasies): "My 'me' is God, not as a perception, but by a process of transformation"—a worthier mode of expression than the ancient Tat tvam asi.

UNIFORMITY IN WORLD-RELIGION

You do me the honour of inviting comment on Bishop H. Henson's brief article: 'The Religion of Humanity,' in the Sunday Times for January 7th, in which he finds that, from a universal point of view, there are but three religions which can claim world-acceptance, as distinct from national assent only; moreover, that two of these, as having so far appealed in any wide way only to what he calls "coloured races" (?), are less likely to succeed herein than Christianity. In his article he alludes also to "the corrosive action of science and the rising standard of morality" as less likely to "disintegrate" Christianity than the other two.

Long research into the teaching of original Buddhism will have unfitted me from posing as in any way a champion of any of its modern forms, so widely have they departed from that first gospel. Did I hold with any one creed as a desirable Utopia, I might rather comment negatively on Christianity than

1 Published in Religions, April, 1940.
positively on another religion. Thus it was Islam rather than Christianity that welcomed advance in mediæval science—shade of Galileo!—and agnosticism in modern Buddhism has welcomed the materialistic conclusions in modern science. And as to a loftier moral ideal, Christianity has never culturally taught the lovely will-etic, adopted from another teacher by early Buddhism and called the Four Divine Moods, or Habits. Rather, I fear, have Christians to lay hand on mouth just now, when, with foes within, they are witnessing their ethics savagely stamped upon by the persecutions and brutal warfare-methods of countries reckoned till lately as of the Christian tradition. Such things have smirched Christianity no less to-day than when the 'Holy Inquisition' was rampant. Ashes on the head seem more called for than flag-waving.

Where I fail to be stirred by any such competitive survey, suggesting that of Paris and his apple, is its assumption, that there either can or should be conceived as desirable a world-uniformity in religion at any time. The object of religion is the salvation, let us say, not of men, but of man. Every man is differently pursuing the great Quest in his own way, and if by way of a creed, by way of the creed that is either his 'tradition of the elders,' or better suited to his convictions. That creed will teach him better than that he can look for a religious Utopia here or at any time on earth. It will show him he is a child at school, where there are many schools for different children, 1—"God Who at sundry times and in divers manners" 1—and he, now in this school, now in that,

1 Revised Version, Ep. Heb. i. 1: "by divers portions and in divers manners," πολυμέρος καὶ πολυτρόπος.
has to qualify for an Aim, a Goal, where schools will be no more needed as workshops of training for a Better. He may worship in his school-chapel, but it was not to found churches or chapels that the great Helpers came to men. It was to help each man in his own way towards the Goal. At their best this is what the great religions do, being at that best a great Fellowship, rather than singly a Monopoly that is to be.

18 A

NIRVANA


The author is ready to apologize for giving us more on Nirvana—has not “all been said about it?” This can never be so long as we have not his “all” about it. He has read so much; he writes so sagaciously; he has been growing so much. And his materials have been growing. . . . One day he will yet have a fresh word, a mot juste for us. Then as now he will be kindly appreciative of our labours; he will note attentively what we have been trying to bring forward, even while he is pulling our frocks, our collars straight. And he will always be interesting, even if here and there his style be allusive and even precious. . . . Let me give under two heads the impressions I here get.

First, it takes a lot to make up the history of a church, ecclesia, sāsana. He rightly distinguishes in the “lot” (1) the gospel to the layman of the good life insuring safety from ill rebirth; (2) the gospel to

1 Published in J.R.A.S., 1926.
the monk . . . insuring salvation from any kind of rebirth and transformation into the ineffable nirvana. He rightly rejects for Buddhism the word 'philosophy,' 'system of philosophy.' Buddhism in accepting certain basic facts did not inquire into them; even in Vasubandhu we find ourselves ultimately up against just dogma. But whereas a church starts from a "lot" of conditions, it does not start as a "lot." It will begin in the person of one or more outstanding men as a message of something new in the long way of man's coming to be. Gradually the messengers grow into the church or cult or what not. If this was monastic, the monk's ideals will dominate the human world-ideals. This is the history of Buddhism, the wood of its many trees, and this I should like to have seen steering the course of M. Poussin's many wise criticisms. For in the next place, as he discerns, Nirvana is only "central" for Buddhism in that secondary evolved system of ideas belonging to the world of the monk. The new, the God-inspired message never was, never will be a negation (as Nirvana virtually is). To conceive le Bien, the 'Well,' in the negative terms a-mata, nir-vana is the monk's way, and the way of the man of words. God said: Let there be light!—that is the way of the new messages. Rhys Davids made mistakes; pioneers do. But for him as he grew, there was no "centre du Bouddhisme" in Nirvana. "The eightfold Path: that is Buddhism":—it was almost the last word he said before me on the subject. That man can will to live the best life—not by self-indulgence, not by asceticism; that this is integral to all good dharma, no less than, more so than, by sacrifice and prayer, mantra and caste:—this was
the mother-logos round which all the Yoga-accretions entwined themselves.

18 B

LE DOGME ET LA PHILOSOPHIE DU BOUDDHISME


It should become a matter of critical interest, when the sagacious and savant author of these Études has written Finis to them, to elicit in a comprehensive review just what and how much he has built in the edifice of our knowledge about Buddhism. May be none-the-less live to write many more Études! I would now only tell the reader what here he may look for. He will find the dual title handled first (in Parts I and II) successively, and then in their mutual relations, namely, under "Origins of the Philosophy" and then as in mutual conflict. In conclusion, there are many pages of notes, offering those often wise and shrewd sayings which constitute for me, more than his examples of more general treatment, our real indebtedness to the author's erudition and good sense.

For not to any man or woman can it be given to achieve in 163 small pages any satisfactory treatment of that history of a world of centuries in religious thought, which we now call Buddhism! Least of all, when that history of changing ideas and changed skies is envisaged as dogmas (le dogme) wrapped up in "a very characteristic philosophy" (p. 81). The writer knows this as well as the best of us, and the

1 Published in J.R.A.S., 1931.
result of his awareness and his great erudition leaves us with a sense of having been browsing awhile in a vast field ripe for historical criticism, browsing on wise and witty sayings, and departing without a real sense of having gained that sammādiṭṭhi which he calls La Bonne Vue. A right view ought to leave with us a vista of the founding of a world religion as the work, the half smothered work, of an inspired man longing to bring to the Many the joyous compassion of a mandate expanding, in some way where it had proved weak, the best religious teaching of his day and his country, and so bringing new light to men on their nature and possibilities. How can this be so when La Bonne Vue, accepted as that of the original Sakya, is called "consciousness of sorrow and of impermanence as universal"? Conceive yourselves preaching a gospel to the Many in such terms! Was any great religion ever built on a message shrinking, wilting, negating the outlook on life of the man, the very man? We echo the sad little moan of the Kosalan wood sprite (in the Vana-Samyutta):—

Where are those Gotama-disciples gone? . . .

and Gotama himself? We learn more that is true of them and of "Sakya" in the admirable little introduction than in all the rest of the book.

But it is perhaps inevitable that prolonged study in the academic literature of mediæval Buddhist doctors, whence one emerges, it would seem, with the conviction that nairātmya¹ is its one philosophic keynote, should predispose the student to see, in the Piṭakakan worsenings of the man (puruṣa) in the puggala, in the worsening of adhyātma in attaniya, the real teaching of the Šakyamuni. I also tried, without

¹ "Not-self-ness."
our author's erudition, to get at some philosophic bases in the Piṭakas—years ago it was—but the result was, that never did I get back to Gotama and the first Gotama-disciples, to Sāriputta, for instance, who put foremost in teaching the mastery of the very man over the mind—not much nairatmya there, is there?

The writer, with characteristic modesty, tells us he has hurried this book out while waiting for some one to publish one which gives the three or four "plans sur lesquels se développe la vérité bouddhique . . ." While he was writing these words, I was trying my best to do this. But it were rash to hope this generation will judge the gap is in any degree filled thereby. But of this thing I am convinced: Sakya (to give the thing its proper name) is not to be rightly, that is, historically solved, by starting with the Abhidharmakosa, with its frightful canker of the Not-man full-grown, and by working backwards. It is with the greater Upanishads that we must start, and come to the Maitri, noting all the way how Brahmans too had been teaching "en dehors des cadres brahmaniques," and then look to our Piṭakas, prose and verse, for survivals of a buried gospel, which sought to expand that "framework" with a great teaching concerning the very man and how he lived and should live.

19

FAITH IN BUDDHISM

In the last decade Buddhists residing in Hawaii, including British, Americans, Japanese and Hawaiians, ran a liberal periodical entitled The Navayana, Journal of the Buddhist Institute of Hawaii, now defunct.
To it, under Correspondence, a certain British Buddhist was contributing, as 'John,' information about Buddhism as he saw it to one he called 'Tony.' And in one of the issues which the kindly editor, an Englishman, was sending me, I read the following: from 'John': "... why should I have more faith in the Dharma than in any other doctrine? ... in Buddhism there is no faith ... faith is replaced by knowledge." To this I took upon myself to make answer virtually to both as follows:—

My dear John,

What is this that I see you telling Tony: "in Buddhism there is no 'faith?'" Surely I must have dreamt it! Surely no one can have said it seriously! Is it you who have been dreaming? Or have you been taking things too much "on trust"? Years of study in Buddhism have shown me, that for it faith is no less important than it is for all religions worthy of the name. A little more study in its scriptures, a little hard thinking will make this equally plain to you. Do not be misled by the fact that what Buddhists have come to accept as binding upon all is not worded with an initial 'I believe.' The formulas, the categories, the teachings are none the less 'to be believed' for that.

Consider first the words for 'faith': saddhā, pasāda. You will find that the monastic teaching of the Suttas is ever recurring to the need of pasāda (participle: pasanno) in the trinity: Buddha, Dhamma, Sangha; e.g., avecca pasādena (unshakeable faith in): Dialogues of the Buddha, III, 219; (full belief in): Further Dialogues, I, 26; (unwavering faith in): Kindred Sayings, II, 48, Gradual Sayings, I, 202, etc., etc. You will find five spiritual faculties, (complements, as it were, of the five senses) enjoined upon learners, in which saddhā is put first: saddhā, effort, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom (or insight). You will find five 'strengths,' listed now as these, now as those, but here again faith is put first; faith is there always. It is the very starting point of the religious life. We will to believe; we will to act so, and
not so because we believe a certain way of life will in the long run lead us to a spiritual More in us; will in the longest run lead us to that Most, Which alone gives ultimate meaning to the More. "Take the case"—so you can read in the Kītāgiri Sutta (Further Dial., Sutta 70)—"of a man who with faith first draws near, then attends constantly... grows to ardour... weighs it all... strives... realizes...; had that faith not been there he would not have drawn near... nor striven."

Again, you find the Founder made to say to Visākhā, that the good disciple thinks about the men who have gone to well-merited happy worlds, and ponders: Such faith exists in me as they had when on earth, whence has come their happy promotion. (Gradual Sayings, I, 190). You will even find him made to say: \textit{Ye\textasciitilde{s}\textasciitilde{\textipa{\textemdash}}m mayi saddhāmattām pēmissattām sabbe te saggaparāyanā:}" "of them who do but believe in me, do but love me; all these are wayfarers to the happy world."

It is true that, as you wayfare, you may note how this mode of life has brought you a More in welfare, that mode of life a Less. Here you may say, and rightly say, I know. I don't only believe. This is true. Knowledge is better than faith. Daylight is better than dusk or dawn. But about two things you will need faith, for knowledge you cannot have, and here faith is the only guide, the good, the lovely guide.

In the first place, you cannot see your end, your Goal; you must believe in it no less than the bold adventurer setting sail for a Western land unseen but hoped in; believe in it no less than the scientific adventurer, who works on and on holding to his guess under the taller name of hypothesis. Wayfarers these to find out, to attain the yet unseen True. And so are you.

In the second place, the moment you call yourself a Buddhist or any other-ist, you have taken your seat in the ship of faith, not of knowledge only. This is not to say, in your particular -ism, that you must believe the Founder of it was, not a myth, but a real man. Let this be granted as a historical fact. I have said how for me this may be granted in a \textit{Manual of Buddhism} (1932). But that the
Founder said, in the 6th century B.C., all that he is, as I say above, "made to say" in the scriptures, which, so far as I know, are the only channels, which you or your teachers can go by:—here indeed is a way of faith, and of faith alone. What he actually said was, as you know, not taken down at the time by reporters. His hearers were often no men of earth. Centuries only, after his death, was anything written down of the teachings. And in the meantime drastic revisions had taken place. Don't be misled by talk about developed memories. Memorizing was among some Brahmans a fine art. Yet in the Vedas there exist no less than some 10,000 variants in words, phrases, sentences.

If you are indeed a Buddhist, you believe—you cannot know (as you at least would say)—that when your body dies, you will be brought before a judge, a fellowman, to hear the sentence upon your dossier of conduct here; and that you will enter upon either a happier, or a painful life, according to what is therein revealed. Do you say "I don't believe in that"? Then are you to that extent not a loyal Buddhist. That is, you have your eyes only on what is close around you. You are not living the greater life of a world-religion, in which some inspired man has lifted you up to his level, and bidden you see with him those two houses with open doors, in and out of which you with eyes of faith may see yourself and your fellowmen ever going, coming (Further Dialogues: Suttas 39, 77, 130). The Buddhist scriptures tell with solemn emphasis of this tribunal at the threshold of the new stage of life. If you doubt this, because you do not know, how can you know, that what other portions say about Nirvana and all the rest is not also to be doubted? These were at some time uttered, then written down by this man, that man. Now the fundamental meaning in sādāhā, pasāda, for the Orientals among whom this world-religion took birth, is "trust in Someone." In how many of these utterers, these writers have you put your trust, that you have come to call yourself a Buddhist?

Yours very faithfully,

C. A. F. Rhys Davids.

October, 24th, 1932.
(‘John’s’ courteous reply was reprinted in the English Buddhism in England for 1935 (10, 1), and may there be consulted. As he does not confute me, I do not publish it here. He admits that Buddhism requires faith, not in so many words, but by saying he has taken it “on trust” (i.e. in faith). I only cite further, that, for him, my placing a tribunal hereafter instead of that virtual ‘god’ of southern Buddhists: *Karma* (capital K) would be to reduce what he understands by *Dharma* or *Dhamma* “to the level of a police court.” Here he does but show unfamiliarity with what his great Teacher is recorded as having taught, namely, the two unusually emphatically worded Suttas on post mortem tribunal in the Pali Canon, following herein the yet more cardinal teaching of this in the Zoroastrian gospel. As to the police court jibe, it may surely be contested, that, in the police court, man’s immature growth in communal welfare reaches a high, if yet imperfect ‘level.’)

20 A

MISSING THE ESSENTIAL

In my country, possibly in India also, one may without fear avow loyalty to a given creed, or profess detachment from any and all. One may be sufficiently interreligious to discern true elements in one and all. But it is possible that this wider sympathy is not the result of discerning something that is, I hold, essential about one and all world-religions at their birth. This is that, in their original form, in the inspired New Word they brought to man there and then, they

1 Published in the *New Indian Antiquary*, 1939.
taught him something about himself, that we can, at all times, say was for him there and then a More.

If we take the scriptures of those world-creeds *as a whole*, without seeking a distinctive message as given at the start, we may find, on the contrary, that they present us with, not a More, but a Less in man’s nature, life and destiny. And we, lacking time or will to make historic inquiry into their evolution, accept what we read at second hand, as integral to their teaching, first and last. It, or any of it goes to constitute the teaching of the general name under which the religion is known. We thus get a false idea of what a given creed has stood for at its beginning. We read some formula to which institutional stiffening at this and that date has brought the given religion, and we say: “That’s what Hinduism or Christianity or Buddhism teaches.”

If we keep our ‘it says so’ to ourselves, harm, the harm of the half truth, the twisted truth, is wrought, but it is as light set ‘under a bushel.’ It is when men knowing only the half-truths, the twisted truths, take them for the genuine New Word of the More in Man, become ‘verts to a shrunken creed and publish propaganda; further, it is when the philosopher and man of letters, saving trouble, accept these propaganda results as fit to be cited as a genuine gospel, and not as the formulas of a degenerate church—it is then that the mischief infects, spreading like a canker.

Philosopher and man of letters may rejoin: ‘We are not concerned to disentangle the original message from the institutional formulas. We refer to what our day calls the given -ism.’ This might pass did they refrain from citing scriptural passages *as what*
the Founder said and taught; might pass, did they just say: ‘Moslems or Buddhists of to-day teach . . . ’ Were this so, I for one, shouldn’t worry. It is the hopeless want of discernment in their refer-
ences that brings me grumbling to print.

I am not presuming to hold a brief for all historic creeds. But I have, in my husband’s wake, spent years in helping to make accessible, by printed text and translation and comment, a corpus of ancient scripture: the so-called Pali Canon and exegesis of Hinayāna Buddhism. And I have seen that the present scanty acquaintance, on the page of propag-
gandists and the general reader (and author), with the results of scholars’ labours over some fifty years exposes “Buddhism” to peculiar and dangerous liabilities. Namely, the facile making of references places the maker of them at the mercy of (a) the half-
knowledge of the propagandist, (b) the often misleading work of translators. He does not realize, does not know that, unlike his own Western religious tradition, Buddhism lacks as yet anything that can worthily be called ‘higher’ criticism, that is, historical criticism having regard to evolution in history and in philology. In the history of religion (I put aside philosophy, as for Buddhism a very late comer and of merely scholastic importance), ‘Buddhism’ is a very new study, and should be referred to with as much caution as I, e.g., should use, were I citing from a text-book on magnetism.

Reared in countries where the Christian tradition is dominant, we are, to some extent, aware, that not all which is here or there accepted as orthodox teaching or observance can be referred to its Founder. We should not cite the Pauline injunction about
women being head-covered when "praying or prophesying," or the emergence of Madonna-worship in the 4th century (at first rebuked as heresy) as the teaching uttered by Jesus. But when Buddhism is cited, it is often analogous doctrines that are ascribed to its Founder, that most libelled of men. 'Higher criticism' is no easy study in Christianity, but it is far harder in Buddhism, wherein historic data are fewer, and where canonical compilation was longer in taking birth, and for centuries remained oral only.

Not realizing this, the citing speaker or writer is content to borrow uncritically from the output of the propagandist, who, working at secondhand, is at the mercy of the translator. Were he who cites to consult the most recent results of scholarship (and so long as a Pali Text Society, now in its 58th year, still exists, guidance can easily be got), he might be relatively safe. But I have lately noticed citations from propagandists' issues, and I find the results somewhat disastrous. True, citation has in one case been made from, not propaganda, but from the work of an expert. But the expert was a professor of a European literature (not of Pali), and he, in the one posthumous venture now published, has shown, in translating, no historic discernment, but a misleading of him who cites.

The citations referred to are in two notable books, which will not fail to make their mark on the thoughtful reader of our day. They are Lord Samuel's *Belief and Action*, and Mr. Aldous Huxley's *Ends and Means*. In the former the many references to 'Buddhism' are not singled out as subjects for argument, and I might have passed by in silence, were they not in a notable book. In the latter, a monastic
'teaching,' quoted as 'Buddhism,' would seem to be used somewhat as a sheet anchor, and any misleading in result becomes for the genuine original message the worse libel. I pick out a few references in these works, taking the former first.

I find it quoted as "Buddhist doctrine" that "there is no misery like existence," as from the anthology called Dhammapada. Reference here is made, not to the published texts (there are some dozen translations) but only to two propagandist works. Now as one of the dozen (and one of the more recent) translators, I have to confess that nowhere can I find any verse out of the 423 in this anthology which could rightly be thus translated. The nearest is 202: which more accurately rendered would be

There are no ills like unto body and mind.

But to render these useful if limited instruments of the Man by the word 'existence' is to go too far, even for the atheistic degeneracy that ate its way into early mediæval Buddhism. Buddhists do not like to be told, that man's consummation, which came to be called Nirvana, wherein body and mind would be no longer needed, was a non-existence.

Again, reference is made to "the Buddha having declared: 'I teach only one thing: suffering and emancipation from suffering'" . . . a self-limiting which is, over against what are usually admitted to be his teachings, absurd, and which is a wrong translation to boot. When I introduced this saying to England in a Home University Manual 22 years ago,¹ I was careful to render it: "Just this have I

¹ This I rewrote with maturer views, in 1934.
taught. . . .” The particle eva is, in early Pali, not the exclusive ‘one only’; it is merely emphatic. But here the ‘traitor’ translator came in: not the English Lord Chalmers who, failing to retain the emphatic Pali, wrote: “have I consistently taught,” but the Schopenhauerian German, K. Neumann, who wrote, “Nur Eines . . .” But citation has been made from the uncritical propaganda only.

Once more, on the subject of fatalism, Lord Samuel has the very forcible judgment: “The mischief that this perverse and illogical creed has wrought to millions of men through thousands of years is beyond imagination.” In the main I agree; man is a born striver, thanks be, but in fatalism he has taken upon himself the point of view suitable only for a Disposer, who is alone fitly Fatalist. But then come the lightly swept-in cults, and we read, that Buddhism, considering “the world as something at best worthless, urges spiritual detachment rather than effort for betterment, as the way of salvation.” (As if effort for betterment were not the ever recurring refrain of the very essence of original Buddhism!) And hints that the doctrine of Karma (action as result-bearing) has sometimes been interpreted as a form of fatalism. Here no reference is given, but from what I know of the scriptures, the Buddhist doctrine of responsibility (or as they put it: the “not-being-freed-from,” i.e., from results of action), as true for life as a whole and not in this world only, contains no hint of fatalism. The post-mortem judge is shown saying to the delinquent: ‘These acts were not done for you by any one else; they were done by you, yea, by you, and you must bear the consequences. You could have left them undone; you were “careless.”'
MISSING THE ESSENTIAL

Here is no mere misery making up life; here is opportunity again and again, yea, and in many lives. The central teaching of the Way shows that:—the long long Way leading through the many lives to the Peak (agga), the Beyond-That, the Supreme, the Goal, however reticent the Founder was in trying to word the not yet worthwhile. How eager with hope of this kind is a verse near to that which was misquoted:

Let but desire be born for the ineffable;
let but the mind of him therewith surcharged be,
from sense-desires unbound:—Upstreamer is he called.¹

The man long absent from afar safely returned
gives joy to kinsmen, friends and well-wishers,
Thus also him, who worthy work has done and from
this world to other gone, those worthy works receive
and welcome, as kinsfolk a dear one (safe) returned.²

Here, if I err not, is that More in man’s life and
destiny taught by the first men before ever their
leader figured as ‘Buddha.’ But the monk-world,
grown to preponderance, brought in a teaching of a
Less in and for man, a shrivelled gospel, which I
unruffled see called ‘Buddhism,’ so only the ‘Buddha,”
as, not a mythical god-let but a historical man, be
in no wise dragged into it.

The other writer, to whose references to ‘Buddhism’
I take exception, makes even more than does Lord
Samuel of the monkish ideal of detachment, which he
prefers to call non-attachment. He sees in this an
“ideal at the very heart of the teaching of the
Buddha” (p. 5), matching it with another “Buddhist
doctrine” that “desire is the source of illusion.” He
also shows curious readiness to accept propagandist

¹ Psalms of the Sisters, ver. 12.
² Stories of the Mansions (S.B.B. XII), p. 87.
statement, but he does consult one other source. This is a recent posthumous translation of the Dhammapada with Essay, written years ago by the late Irving Babbitt, once professing French literature at Harvard. Now for me the 'Essay' is chiefly valuable for its saying, that "in its essence Buddhism is . . . a psychology of desire," and that "knowledge in matters religious waits upon will." This is for me fine and true, but the problem how to reconcile these statements with the damning utterance, that will or desire is the source of illusion does not seem to have struck the borrowing author.

There is, it is true, a damning utterance about will or desire, occupying a strong place in the Pali Canon:—the second of the so-called Four Truths. But, whereas I have seen it cited as 'source of illusion or of ignorance (moha)', the formula has neither of these, but only 'ill' (dukkha). And a word held derogatory is used for desire, namely, thirst.

It is good to note one word of caution where Mr. Huxley comes riding so serenely on the twin mount of propagandist literature and a side-issue published by a literary expert in French; he does once write "discourses attributed to the Buddha" (p. 325), for which relief much thanks. But there is cheerful appreciation, as of a historic truth, that Buddhist teaching "concentrates on meditation." Quaint it is how this false notion of the much-prescribed Dhyāna (Pali: jhāna) has laid hold of the 'vert.' Dhyāna was not meditation; it was the making attention a tabula rasa for psychic communication. It was the later monk who converted this into mental hypnosis, or again, still later, into the practice of rosary and praying wheel.
But where the caution I note breaks down is in that matter of "non-attachment" as being for "the Buddha" a central ideal. Here is an utterance neither true nor worthy concerning the Founder of a world-religion. It is essential, in the New Word brought to man by such a man, that it be a positive message, a message telling of a More, not a Less, in man's nature, life, destiny. It is an even weaker word to tell man "Don't get attached!" than it is to tell him "Get freed from!" The will must be fed with something positive, else only harm is wrought. Jesus showed this well and truly with his 'emptied house' figure. Gotama too gave better food than "non-attachment."

For him whose central religious conception of himself and of man was, not recluse, actual or _in spe_, but 'wayfarer,' there is the middle way, not of loving his fellow or of disliking him, but of fellowship in wayfaring. Here we have a blend of the Gotama and Jesus gospels. Way-fellowship will allow for the Good Samaritan. I wayman, thou wayman: let us wayfare together! Here is combined a healthy degree of amicable detachment, like that of two friendly pilgrims, distinct units, each with his own long past and long future, but just here and now within touch, in a common stride. The opportunity is here and now; the Goal lies far ahead; you and I marching along, if we are willing wisely, in a More, a More whereby the Most that is ineffable is ever being lifted to a higher power, till the day and hour, maybe very different for each, when will come consummation.

And it is a new message about this More, and not a teaching about life as a less or man as a less, that each Helper of men has been moved to bring to birth.
Every world-creed has this More, and let us see to it, that we cite the word of the More and no longer busy ourselves about the later, the degenerate Less, whereby we miss the really Essential in the great world-gospels.

How does not Buddhism, how especially does not the original New Word in it, need to say with Maréchal Villars to his king: . . . defend me from my friends! Or with G. Canning's New Morality: Save, save, oh save me from the candid friend! For it is largely its would-be friends who hand over mistranslations and other misrepresentations of it for the alien reader and writer to use with an unsympathetic will. To use, I must add, with an incurious, uncritical carelessness, such as we should not find in references made to the literature of any other field of history.

20 B

BUDDHISM IN ENGLAND¹

Regarding the Rev. Kashyapa's criticism of my criticism of Mr. Auster's article, I would like with your permission to give expression to yet a further criticism, namely, of the former's method in general and his application thereof.

Nothing is for me more historically incorrect than to thrust our riper modern analysis of causation, or what not, into the simpler, more child-like thought of the very long ago. The Paticca-samuppada formula was not drawn up by "philosophers," but by earnest-minded monks, probably during the interval between the Councils of Vesālī and Patna. Their explicit

¹ Published in Buddhism in England, Nov.-Dec., 1934.
object was to present the "arising of this whole mass of ill" as a chain of cause and effect. They were not in the least bothering about any one cause in the chain as "a totality of antecedents." For them it sufficed in each link to say Y happens because of (paccaya) X. Had they bothered over X as "the totality of reality," they would have let us know they did. And, in enumerating this "totality," they would certainly have included the time-factor as one antecedent. The recognition of that factor in their teaching is stressed in the Suttas. My only objection lay in Mr. Auster's claim to rule out time from the casual process.

In the Rev. Kashyapa's second point, my objection to his unhistorical method is still stronger. Let me first state the position where, according to him, I "seem to assert." Let me not be held to "seem" here. I assert condemnation of the dogma called Anattā as being no teaching of the first Buddhists. (Anattā in early monastic, not original, Buddhism meant, not rejection of egoism, not rejection of a permanent self, but rejection of the reality of any "self," or "man, spirit, soul," whatever). I assert that it is this dogma which "cannot stand a philosophical scrutiny." I assert there is "a doer behind the phenomenal changes of body and mind." I assert, that the opening line of Dhammadāna 1 and 2 (whereby "twin verses" are made triplets) is a fairly obvious gloss which conflicts with the older, the Indian, the Upanishadic standpoint in the two couplets.

Well then, if a doer, as the Rev. Kashyapa asserts, "is never transcendental," so much the worse for things transcendental! What fitness is there in
yoking this modern European term to Indian culture so far as this is represented by the Piṭakas? No Pali parallel to it can be found there. There is the Abhidhamma *lokuttara*: supramundane. But this term nowhere severs the man or self from his deed. So far from the doer being "either mind itself or some one quite unknown" in the Piṭakas, it is this some one, this man who, in Dhammapada, "acts with (or by) mind" (*manasā*). Do I "exist nowhere apart from my physical and psychical existence?" Verily is he who says this flying in the face of the second mantra ascribed to the Sakyamuni: "Body is not the self: mind is not the self. If they were, then" (since self meant the God-in-man, when this was uttered) "could I the self become what I will to be." Servant A, servant B are not the master: here is no assertion that the master is non-existent.

Let my critic put away that "dangerous thing," a little (modern) learning, and turn to the Suttas: to the Fourth Nikāya: What is the Founder seen replying to the assertion: "in my opinion there is no self-doing"? This: "Never have I seen or heard such an opinion! What? If you standing put your leg forward have you not initiative? Yes? Well, then there is the self-doing." Or to the four contexts of Sāriputta's parable: "As a man dons from his wardrobe just the suit he wants, so is he who has the mind under control."

In the former is no divorce of doer and deed by any sophistication of transcendence. In the latter is no mind controlling body; here is the man controlling body by mastery of mind-ways. If the man be only body-mind-complex, then are there only clothes, not the wearer of the clothes. What has
come over writers on Buddhism that they so flout their own scriptures?

21

MY LIFE

By Havelock Ellis. 1940

This work, to the compiling of which the now deceased author devoted only his “finest moments” from his 30th to his 80th year, is not deserving of notice in just these pages, since it has nothing to tell on their subject. Yet is there one consideration suggested by it which should be of interest to readers of this Journal. Havelock Ellis, as a not unappreciated student and writer, occupied for half a century a side-position on the stage of the more prominent actors in Victorian and Edwardian culture. As such one turns over his 550 pages with anticipation. But only to be disappointed, since in almost every case reference to them is little more than a record of names. Nor are we entertained, in all this mass of well-written English, by a single gleam of humour, let alone wit. The burden of the consideration called up is mainly negative.

The work claims to be a study, not of ‘me,’ but of ‘life,’ and strives to be disinterested over its keen analysis of two or three characters other than the writer; strives to be non-propagandist and appreciative. But the outlook is intensely myopic, not only as to any cultural future, but also as to ‘life’ itself. There is entire unawareness shown that he is discussing in life one little span only. Length of

1 Published in Religions, Jan., 1941.
days seems to bring him never length of vision. Healthy in body and mind he enjoys 'life,' is keenly interested in what he calls life. Yet for him we are all but creatures of a day. Thus in commenting leniently on publication post mortem of intimate correspondence, e.g., of the Brownings, he finds no cause for blame—why? "Who can be hurt, if she and he now are only a few handfuls of ashes. . . ." Mark the 'only.' With no attack on 'religion' anywhere, he thus confesses to pure materialism. 'We . . . are . . . ashes.'

Centuries ago a great Helper of man spoke of one who had eyes to see as seeing ever two houses (of life) with men coming and going from one to the other. But in Ellis's reckoning the great Helpers need never have lived; nay, they have lived for nothing. When shall we come to look upon such a book as revealing an utter failure to understand life and the art of living?

He closes with the words: "I am glad to be alive, even though, when the moment comes, I shall go to meet Death as eagerly as a young man meets his bride." But when we leave a house we do not embrace the door. We look past it.

22

BRIEF NOTES

ON HJAS 4. 116-190

In his informative article of July last, "Some Pāli Words," Dr. Coomaraswamy has incidentally expressed himself in a way that has given me pleasure.

1 Published in Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, Dec., 1939.
He says, he is "appalled" by something I have written! This may be less pleasant than if, as he elsewhere says, he agrees with me. But it is the next best thing. He has, like a good patient, "sat up and taken notice." Others haven't progressed so far as that, and hence I have taken the advice of the French wit, and said it again and again, these eight years past. This is the position I took up, on the strength of Pāli evidence, in chapter IX of my Sakya, or Buddhist Origins (1931): "Musing (Dhyāna)." I there said, that Jhāna (Dhyāna) was not contemplation, but training in psychic susceptibility. The word sati (smruti) in the Pāli is strained to mean "attention," for which there was no fit term, and which my husband was rightly compelled to call "mindfulness" rather than the more usual "memory." Jhāna, I maintained, and still maintain, was not introversion but extroversion; or at least that interesting blend of the two, known to us psychics, who hear the voice claiming to come from without (the Buddhist term was parato ghoso: sound from beyond), yet heard as if within. That my view is based on collective evidence which, taken together, is for me crucial, the good Doctor ignores. More's the pity, since elsewhere he does at least, as many do not, consult the sources. That evidence has convinced my fellow translators in Pāli work. Let him and others test it also.

On one other point Dr. Coomaraswamy goes only half way with us. Under item "Bhū" he judges we have done what Americanese delightfully calls some wishful thinking. This is in Mr. Woodward's Gradual Sayings, ii, 42f. (not 34) and my To Become or not to Become thereon, where we take the future:
manussaṁ, etc. na bhavissāmī, not as the conjectural "I'll not be" of Irish idiom (as in the first part of the Sutta), but as "I shall not become," i.e., be reborn—a frequent use in Pāli idiom, as also in that of the Upanishads. Our wishful thinking is apparently the extreme of unwishfulness to credit Gotama (Buddha) with a sentiment about himself—a sentiment which we don't express. Actually our rendering is based on the context. The speaker is made to say, that, inasmuch as he got rid here of all that would need further training in rebirth, he will not become, be reborn, as a, b or c. He is purged from all that, hence, as I have claimed in *JRA* 1933, p. 910, he says: Call me purified (suddho), not as in the ecclesiastically emended text buddho. Here is no more room for a conjectural future; here a superman, so deemed, is shown predicting, not conjecturing about, his future existence.
INDEX

Abhidammap, 773, 1,138
Adjudication, 735, 769, 862, 987, 1,029 ff., 1,109, 1,115
Ākṣā, 769, 922
Amity, 939
Anīta, amata, 865 f., 922, 924, 971
Ānanda, 781
Angel, 964, 976
Animal, 747, 813; rebirth, 956, 1,094 ff.
Anitya, anicca, 999 ff.
Aññā, 869
Arahaṇ (theory), 730 ff., 851, 908, 1,016, 1,073
Asoka, 794 ff., 840, 909, 973
Atā, atmā, 734, 805, 843, 859, 863, 942, 969 f., 1,025, 1,075, 1,082 f., 1,085 f.; ar-, 727 f., 732, 735, 1,073, 1,099, 1,137; param-, 902
Attha, 815, 865 ff., 1,019
Babbitt, I., 1,134
Become, 978 f., 1,142
Becoming, 740, 759, 761, 767, 798 ff., 851 f., 878, 930, 943, 971, 1,026 f., 1,033, 1,068, 1,071, 1,088, 1,092, 1,114; man as, 732, 790, 1,014. See also bhava
Bergson, H., 765, 1,003 ff., 1,015
Bhagavadgītā, 865, 930, 938, 999, 1,017
Bhattacharya, K., 1,090 ff.
Bhattacharya, V., 1,096 ff.
Bhava, 761, 800, 864, 869, 878, 930, 955, 966, 1,009, 1,065, 1,071, 1,088; -chakra, 799, 864; -suddhi, 799 ff., 851; -sota, 1,001. See also Becoming.

Bodhisattva, 732, 983
Body, 753 f.; and mind, 746, 878, 1,010 ff., 1,020, 1,058, 1,065, 1,078, 1,091, 1,099, 1,131, 1,138
Brahma, 730, 858, 1,082
Brahmacariya, brahma-life, 780 ff., 908
Brahman, 745, 858, 864 f., 1,014, 1,017, 1,082, 1,101 f., 1,110
Brahmin, 908, 1,123
Brother, 921, 957 ff., 965
Brown, I., 854
Buddhaddatta, 875, 1,073
Buddhaghosa, 773, 875, 877, 972, 1,011, 1,013, 1,073
Buddhism, 733, 857 ff., 864 ff., 870 ff., 931, 960 f., 1,029 f., 1,056 ff., 1,090, 1,114, 1,121, 1,129 f.
Bühler, G., 930
Carpenter, J. E., 891, 963
Catherine of Genoa, 970, 1,105 f., 1,117
Causality, causation, 776, 1,013 f., 1,136 f.
Ceylon, 815, 858, 880 ff.; 889, 895 f., 1,055, 1,077.
Chalmers, Lord, 1,084 ff.
Change, 1,002 ff.
Childers, R., 892
Christianity, 729, 735, 855 ff., 954, 957, 959, 1,029, 1,116 ff.
Coomaraswamy, A., 1,140 f.
Council, Third, 732
Daughter, 845
Deeds, 753, 769, 862, 1,093, 1,138
Deity, 738, 847 f., 858 f., 866, 938 f., 969, 982 f., 1,014
Desire (hāma), 1,101 f., 1,134
Deva, 731, 780, 783, 802, 851, 904, 919, 936 ff., 964 f., 973, 1,009, 1,049 f., 1,062 ff., 1,094; -messengers, 724, 1,030 f.
Deva-dāta Sutta, 723 ff., 1,030 f.
Dhammapāla, 875
Dharma (dhamma), 728, 758 f., 766 ff., 805, 851 f., 902, 942, 966 ff., 985, 1,025, 1,065, 1,082.
Dhyāna, jhāna, 768, 933 ff., 965, 1,134, 1,141
Dialogues, 962 ff.
Dūta, 804
Ellis, Havelock, 1,139
Eschatology, 721 ff.
Faith, 1,124 ff.
 Fatalism, 1,132
 First Utterance, 1,013, 1,090, 1,102
Garbe, R., 931
Goal, 861 ff., 865 ff., 917, 919, 1,110 ff., 1,119, 1,125, 1,133
God, 865, 1,070
Gotama (Gautama), 734, 745 f., 802, 805 f., 810, 813, 839, 848, 850, 852, 902, 904, 940, 968, 971, 973, 978 ff., 1,028, 1,068, 1,074, 1,077, 1,082, 1,087, 1,093 f., 1,114
Growth, 767, 797 f., 801, 850, 955, 968, 1,014, 1,058, 1,070, 1,081 f., 1,114. See also Becoming.
Henson, H., 1,117
Hesitation scene, 969 f.
Higher criticism, 1,129 f.
Hinayāna, 1,030, 1,073 f.
Holmes, E., 1,024
Hume, R. E., 1,023
Huxley, A., 1,130, 1,134
Immanence, 730 f., 733, 738 f., 741, 744 f., 805, 876, 965, 970, 1,015, 1,105, 1,117
Immortality, 922
India, 751, 756, 760 f., 764 ff., 768, 771, 775, 790 f., 801, 806, 817, 839, 840, 852, 861, 864 f., 889 ff., 908, 929, 970, 1,018 ff., 1,054 f., 1,073, 1,077, 1,108, 1,110
Islam, 738, 786 f., 990, 1,029, 1,109
Jacks, L. P., 1,066 ff.
Jainism, 737 ff., 748 ff., 758 ff., 766 ff., 938, 1,055, 1,057
Jains, 904, 909, 919, 958, 1,099
Jātaka, 807 ff.
Jesus, 738, 839, 854, 898, 957, 960, 983, 1,029, 1,077
Jhāna. See dhyāna
Kapila, 764, 773, 776, 998, 1,023
Karma, 746, 769, 908, 1,132
Kassapa of the River, of Gayā, 799
Kathāvatthu, 771, 773, 777, 1,059
Law, B. C., 972 f.
Lévi, S., 1,093
Liberation, 749 ff., 1,000
Lion, 823
Mahābhārata, 1,055
Mahāyāna Buddhism, 732, 1,073 ff.
Mallikā, 845
Man, the, 729, 732, 742 ff., 748, 753, 759 f., 767, 770, 774, 801, 814, 817, 847 ff., 861 ff., 970 f., 1,010, 1,014 f., 1,018 ff., 1,025, 1,061, 1,064 ff., 1,072 f., 1,075 ff., 1,090 f., 1,099 ff., 1,108 ff., 1,122 f., 1,138; as becoming, 732, 740, 1,068, 1,085; as willer, 728 ff., 740, 1,065.
INDEX

Martin, Eva, 1,032 ff.
Martyr, 1,069
Maskari Gosâla, 743
Mazumdar, B. C., 1,079 ff.
Mead, G. R. S., 870 ff., 948
Milindapañha, 771, 777, 810, 1,012, 1,061, 1,072 f.
Mind, 743, 764, 774 f., 937, 1,002, 1,010 f., 1,075 f., 1,099 f., 1,138
Mittâ, 803
Moggallâna, 936, 941
Mokṣa, mūtī, 749 f., 768, 909, 923 f., 1,001
More, the, 734 f., 740 ff., 761 f., 769, 860, 847 ff., 866 f., 959, 976, 1,024 ff., 1,065, 1,076 f., 1,125, 1,135 f.
Most, the, 733 f., 761 f., 850 ff., 865, 902, 927, 976, 1,076 f.
Müller, Max, 817, 893, 1,023
Mysticism, 1,113

Neumann, K. E., 968, 1,132
Next things, step, 721 ff., 849, 904, 946 f., 951, 1,028, 1,110, 1,115
Nirvâna, 752, 759, 768, 797, 865 f., 909, 971, 1,119 f.

Oldenberg, H., 871, 968, 1,025, 1,079
Palmstierna, E., 1,114
Pasenadi, 839 ff.
Parables, 819 ff.
Prakrit, 897 f.
Pr(y)eta, 780

Radhakrishnan, S., 927, 1,116
Ramakrishna, 848 ff.
Rebirth, 812 ff.
Responsible, responsibility, 721 ff., 909, 1,030 f., 1,065, 1,073, 1,109, 1,132
Rhys Davids, T. W., 842, 872, 880 ff., 889 ff., 962 f., 967 ff., 1,025, 1,081
Robertson, G. Croom, 1,036 ff.
Šākya, 765 ff., 800 ff., 848, 931 ff., 1,072 f., 1,123
Šākyamuni, 766, 769, 848 f., 864, 940 f., 961, 1,027, 1,068, 1,074, 1,076 ff., 1,087, 1,122
Šākya(n)s, 745, 764, 774, 1,099
Samādhi, 933 ff., 965
Samāna, śramaṇa, 725, 733, 852
Samuel, Lord, 1,130 ff.
Sāṅkhya, 764 f., 771 ff., 919, 928, 935, 937, 999, 1,085, 1,090 ff.
Sāriputta, 778, 797, 833, 897, 1,123, 1,138
Schopenhauer, A., 1,113
Schweitzer, A., 1,112 ff.
Second Utterance, 1,091, 1,102, 1,138
Self, 727, 738 f., 753, 763, 767, 774, 796, 851, 873 ff., 927 ff., 938, 969, 985, 1,010, 1,014, 1,025, 1,075 ff., 1,085, 1,098 f., 1,103, 1,108, 1,114, 1,137. See also attā.
Sīla, 908, 961
Silver, A. H., 1,070
Similies, 819 ff.
Stede, W., 892
Stream (sota), 1,001
Subhaitodeyyaputta, 1,093 f.
Suchness (tathātā, tathattā), 731, 1,076 ff., 1,087
Sumedhā, 918
Survival, 728, 779 ff., 1,030 ff., 1,058 ff.
Suttas, 777, 865, 954, 1,013
Takakusu, J., 1,054
T'amāt'agege, 970, 972, 1,012
Tapas (austerities), 742, 745 f., 753, 919
Tathāgata, 967
Televitation, 848, 1,106
Thomas, E. J., 1,079
Thought (citta), 1,011
Tiger, 823
Tribunal, 723, 731, 733, 769, 863, 1,028 ff., 1,126 f.

Unseen, the, 744, 751, 802, 849, 908, 961, 968, 977, 1,009, 1,094
Upāli, 746
Upanishads, 848, 862, 932 ff., 937, 960, 971, 999, 1,025, 1,075, 1,082, 1,091, 1,095 f., 1,101, 1,108, 1,114, 1,123

Vajrā, 980 f.
Vallée Poussin, L. de la, 1,119 ff.
Vardhamāna, 738 ff., 758 ff.
Vedānta, 1,105 ff.
Vedas, Vedic hymns, 738, 752, 823 f., 899, 908, 1,000, 1,126
Vesālī, 744, 747
Viṣṇu, viṣṇu, 933, 965, 1,075
Vinaya, 777, 865, 954, 1,074
Visuddhimagga, 777, 1,012

Way, 752 ff., 759, 794 ff., 806, 851, 864, 868 f., 899, 909, 1,001, 1,026, 1,057, 1,065, 1,082, 1,088, 1,133; -farer, 806, 899, 967, 1,019, 1,065, 1,078, 1,135; -faring, 752, 759, 817 f., 863, 1,014, 1,088, 1,110, 1,135; of becoming, 764, 795, 979, 1,014, 1,026

'Well,' 753 f., 759, 867 f., 916 f., 955, 1,058
Wheel, 851, 864
Will, the, 735, 742 f., 746, 752, 754, 756 f., 759, 763, 790, 792, 796, 817, 901 ff., 1,019 ff., 1,068, 1,090, 1,106, 1,113, 1,134

Winternitz, M., 872, 1,079
Women, 743, 816, 832, 958
Woodward, F. L., 780, 800, 1,080, 1,141
Worlds, 864 ff., 868, 919, 940 ff., 1,009, 1,061, 1,065, 1,110
Writing, 1,055 f.

Yājñavalkya, 849, 864, 1,110
Yama, 725, 729, 733, 1,060, 1,062 f.
Yamabe, S., 1,074 f.
Yoga, 926 ff., 1,091
Zarathustra, 721 f., 729, 734, 847, 1,028

Printed in Great Britain
at the BURLEIGH PRESS, Lewin's Mead, BRISTOL
WORKS BY MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, D.LITT., M.A.
PALI TEXTS FIRST EDITIONS

Three of the seven canonical works of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka and the Commentaries on the last two, and the Visuddhi Magga.

Translations
Buddhist Psychological Ethics (Abhidhamma Piṭaka, I).
Psalms of the Early Buddhists, I, II (Sutta Piṭaka).
The Book of the Kindred Sayings, I-III (ibid.).

In collaboration
Dialogues of the Buddha, II, III (Dīgha-Nikāya).
Compendium of Philosophy (Abhidhammattha-sangaha).
Points of Controversy (Kathāvatthu).

Original Works
Buddhism (Home University Library, 1st ed., 1912; 2nd ed., 1934, re-written).
Buddhist Psychology (Quest Series, 1914, republished, 1924).
Gotama the Man (Luzac & Co.).
Kindred Sayings on Buddhism (Calcutta University).
The Milinda Questions (Routledge).
Sakya, or Buddhist Origins (Kegan Paul).
Manual of Buddhism (Sheldon Press).
Outlines of Buddhism (Methuen).
Indian Religion and Survival (Allen & Unwin).
The Birth of Indian Psychology, and Its Development in Buddhism (Luzac & Co.).
To Become or Not to Become (Luzac & Co.).
What Was the Original Gospel in "Buddhism"? (Epworth Press).
Poems of Cloister and Jungle (Wisdom of the East Series).

Works of a more general character
Old Creeds and New Needs (Fisher Unwin).
The Will to Peace (Fisher Unwin).
Will and Willer (Williams & Norgate).
"What is your Will?" (Rider & Co.).
More About the Hereafter (Psychic Review Ltd.).
Wayfarer's Words I, II (Luzac & Co.).

The works referred to in footnotes as Dialogues of the Buddha, Further Dialogues, Kindred Sayings, Gradual Sayings, Psalms of the Brethren, Points of Controversy, are publications either of the Pali Text Society or of Sacred Books of the Buddhists, and may be obtained from the Oxford University Press, London, or consulted at many leading libraries, in cases where books desired are out of stock. The miserable plan, this war, of enemy bombs dropped at random, or at best mis-aligned, has destroyed the entire reserve stocks of both these series, fruit of 60 years of disinterested labour.