JOURNAL OF THE MALAYAN BRANCH,
ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY
JOURNAL
of the
Malayan Branch
of the
Royal Asiatic Society

25066
Vol. III.
1925.

This Journal forms the continuation of the Journal of the Straits Branch, Royal Asiatic Society, of which Nos. 1-86 were published 1878-1922.

SINGAPORE:
PRINTED AT THE METHODIST PUBLISHING HOUSE,
1925.
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The
Malayan Branch
of the
Royal Asiatic Society

Patron.

H. E. Sir Lawrence Guillemard, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., Governor
of the Straits Settlements and High Commissioner for the
Malay States.

Council for 1925.

The Hon. Sir W. G. Maxwell,
K.B.E., C.M.G.  President.

The Hon. Mr. E. S. Hose, C.M.G.
And the Hon. Mr. R. O.
Winstead, D.Litt.  Vice-Presidents for the S.B.

Mr. J. B. Scrivener and Mr. A. W.
Hamilton  Vice-Presidents for the F. M. S.

The Hon. Mr. J. L. Humphreys
And Mr. C. C. Brown  Vice-Presidents for the Un-

federated Malay States.

Mr. C. E. Wurtzberg
Hon. Secretary.

Mr. R. E. Holttum
Hon. Treasurer.

Dr. F. W. Foxworthy and Messrs.
A. P. Richards, W. G. Stirling,
J. D. Hall, F. N. Chasen
Council.
Proceedings
of the
Annual General Meeting.

The Annual General Meeting was held in the Selangor Club, Kuala Lumpur at 5 p.m. Friday 27th February 1925.
The Hon. Sir W. G. Maxwell, K.B.E., C.M.G., in the Chair.

1. The Minutes of the Annual General Meeting held 21st February 1924 were read and confirmed.
2. The Annual Report and Statement of Accounts were adopted.
3. The election of Officers and Members of Council for the current year resulted as follows:

President ... ... ... The Hon. Sir W. G. Maxwell,
K.B.E., C.M.G.
Vice-Presidents for the S.S. ... The Hon. Mr. E. S. Hose and
the Hon. Dr. R. O. Winstedt.
Vice-Presidents for the F.M.S ... Mr. J. B. Scrivenor and Mr. A.
W. Hamilton.
Vice-Presidents for the U.M.S ... The Hon. Mr. J. L. Humphreys
and Mr. C. C. Brown.
Hon. Secretary ... ... Mr. C. E. Wurtzburg, M.C.
Hon. Treasurer ... ... Mr. R. E. Holttum.
Council ... ... ... Dr. F. W. Foxworthy and Messrs. A. F. Richards,
G. Stirling, J. D. Hall, F. N. Chasen.

Five new members were elected.
A vote of thanks to the Chair concluded the meeting.

Annual Dinner.
The usual annual dinner was held in the Selangor Club on Friday 27th February at 8 p.m. The Hon. Dr. R. O. Winstedt a Vice-President of the Society presided.

1. Name and Objects.

1. The name of the Society shall be 'The Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.'
2. The objects of the Society shall be:

(a) The increase and diffusion of knowledge concerning British Malaya and the neighbouring countries.

(b) the publication of a Journal and of works and maps.

(c) the acquisition of books, maps and manuscripts.

II. Membership.

3. Members shall be of three kinds—Ordinary, Corresponding and Honorary.

4. Candidates for ordinary membership shall be proposed and seconded by members and elected by a majority of the Council.

5. Ordinary members shall pay an annual subscription of $5 payable in advance on the first of January in each year. Members shall be allowed to compound for life membership by a payment of $30. Societies and Institutions are also eligible for ordinary membership.

6. On or about the 30th of June in each year the Honorary Treasurer shall prepare and submit to the Council a list of those members whose subscriptions for the current year remain unpaid. Such members shall be deemed to be suspended from membership until their subscriptions have been paid, and in default of payment within two years shall be deemed to have resigned their membership.

No member shall receive a copy of the Journal or other publications of the Society until his subscription for the current year has been paid.*

7. Distinguished persons, and persons who have rendered notable service to the Society may on the recommendation of the Council be elected Honorary members by a majority at a General meeting. Corresponding Members may, on the recommendation of two members of the Council, be elected by a majority of the Council, in recognition of services rendered to any scientific institution in British Malaya. They shall pay no subscription: they shall enjoy the privileges of members (except a vote at meetings and eligibility for office) and free receipt of the Society's publications.

III. Officers.

8. The Officers of the Society shall be:—

A President.

Vice-Presidents not exceeding six, ordinarily two each from (i) the Straits Settlements, (ii) the Federated Malay States and (iii) the Unfederated or other Protected States, although this allocation shall in no way be binding on the electors.

*Bye-Law, 1922. "Under Rule 6 Members who have failed to pay their subscription by the 30th June are suspended from membership until their subscriptions are paid. The issue of Journals published during that period of suspension cannot be guaranteed to members who have been so suspended."
An Honorary Treasurer. Five Councillors.
An Honorary Secretary.

These officers shall be elected for one year at the Annual General Meeting, and shall hold office until their successors are appointed.

9. Vacancies in the above offices occurring during any year shall be filled by a vote of the majority of the remaining officers.

IV. Council.

10. The Council of the Society shall be composed of the officers for the current year, and its duties and powers shall be:

(a) to administer the affairs, property and trusts of the Society.

(b) to elect Ordinary and Corresponding Members and to recommend candidates for election as Honorary Members of the Society.

(c) to obtain and select material for publication in the Journal and to supervise the printing and distribution of the Journal.

(d) to authorise the publication of works and maps at the expense of the Society otherwise than in the Journal.

(e) to select and purchase books and maps for the Library.

(f) to accept or decline donations on behalf of the Society.

(g) to present to the Annual General Meeting at the expiration of their term of office a report of the proceedings and condition of the Society.

(h) to make and enforce bye-laws and regulations for the proper conduct of the affairs of the Society. Every such bye-law or regulation shall be published in the Journal.

11. The Council shall meet for the transaction of business once a quarter and oftener if necessary. Three officers shall form a quorum of the Council.

V. General Meetings.

12. One week's notice of all meetings shall be given and of the subjects to be discussed or dealt with.

13. At all meetings the Chairman shall in the case of an equality of votes be entitled to a casting vote in addition to his own.

14. The Annual General Meeting shall be held in February in each year. Eleven members shall form a quorum.
15. (i) At the Annual General Meeting the Council shall present a Report for the preceding year and the Treasurer shall render an account of the financial condition of the Society. Copies of such Report and account shall be circulated to members with the notice calling the meeting.

(ii) Officers for the current year shall also be chosen.

16. The Council may summon a General Meeting at any time, and shall so summon one upon receipt by the Secretary of a written requisition signed by five ordinary members desiring to submit any specified resolution to such meeting. Seven members shall form a quorum at any such meeting.

17. Visitors may be admitted to any meeting at the discretion of the Chairman but shall not be allowed to address the meeting except by invitation of the Chairman.

VI. Publications.

18. The Journal shall be published at least twice in each year, and oftener if material is available. It shall contain material approved by the Council. In the first number of each volume shall be published the Report of the Council, the account of the financial position of the Society, a list of members, the Rules, and a list of the publications received by the Society during the preceding year.

19. Every member shall be entitled to one copy of the Journal, which shall be sent free by post. Copies may be presented by the Council to other Societies or to distinguished individuals, and the remaining copies shall be sold at such prices as the Council shall from time to time direct.

20. Twenty-five copies of each paper published in the Journal shall be placed at the disposal of the author.

VII. Amendments to Rules.

21. Amendments to these Rules must be proposed in writing to the Council, who shall submit them to a General Meeting duly summoned to consider them. If passed at such General Meeting they shall come into force upon confirmation at a subsequent General Meeting or at an Annual General Meeting.

Affiliation Privileges of Members.

Royal Asiatic Society. The Royal Asiatic Society has its headquarters at 74 Grosvenor Street, London, W., where it has a large library of books, and MSS. relating to oriental subjects, and holds monthly meetings from November to June (inclusive) at which papers on such subjects are read.
2. By rule 105 of this Society all the Members of Branch Societies are entitled when on furlough or otherwise temporarily resident within Great Britain and Ireland, to the use of the Library as Non-Resident Members and to attend the ordinary monthly meetings of the Society. This Society accordingly invites Members of Branch Societies temporarily resident in Great Britain or Ireland to avail themselves of these facilities and to make their home addresses known to the Society so that notice of the meetings may be sent to them.

3. Under rule 84, the Council of the Society is able to accept contributions to its Journal from Members of Branch Societies, and other persons interested in Oriental Research, of original articles, short notes, etc., on matters connected with the languages, archaeology, history, beliefs and customs of any part of Asia.

4. By virtue of the afore-mentioned Rule 105 all Members of Branch Societies are entitled to apply for election to the Society without the formality of nomination. They should apply in writing to the Secretary, stating their names and addresses, and mentioning the Branch Society to which they belong. Election is by the Society upon the recommendation of the Council.

5. The subscription for Non-Resident Members of the Society is 30/- per annum. They receive the quarterly journal post free.

_Asiatic Society of Bengal_. Members of the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, by a letter received in 1903, are accorded the privilege of admission to the monthly meetings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, which are held usually at the Society's house, 1 Park Street, Calcutta.
Annual Report.

of the

Malayan Branch, Royal Asiatic Society

for 1924.

Membership. The membership of the Society at the close of the year stands at 583 as compared with a nominal total of 627 at the end of 1923. There are 15 Honorary Members, 3 Corresponding Members and 565 Ordinary Members.

The decrease is apparent rather than real and is due to the operation of Rule 6: all those gentlemen who have not paid subscriptions since 1922 are deemed to have resigned their membership and their names have been removed from the list.

During the year 49 new Members were elected. Their names are:

Alexander, J. A.
Bird, R.
Boyd, R. M.
Carr, C. E.
Caseley, J. D.
Cheeseman, H. B.
Clarke, L. M. D.
Constant, Dr. C. F.
Coventry, Major C. H.
Dato Muda Orang Kaya Mentri
Dato Muda Orang Kaya Kaya Panglima Kinta
Denham, G. C., C.B.P.
Eldridge, Capt. E.J.M., O.B.E.
Elster, C.
Fleming, E. D.
Fry, R. M.
Gammans, L. D.
Gibson, A.

Graham, W. H.
Hamzah bin Abdullah.
Kemp, T. F. H.
Little, Major W. B.
Lock, J. T.
Mahmud bin Mat.
Matthews, Rev. J. B.
Meado, J. M.
Mills, L. I.
Morris, A. G.
Jantan Omar.
Pennefather-Evans, J. P.
Purecell, V. W. W. S.
Raja Bendahara of Perak
Raja Kechil Tengah
Raja Muda of Perak
Raja Musa bin Raja Bot
Raja Omar bin Raja Ali
Raja Salim bin Mohamed Yusuf
Rasmussen, H. C  Smedley, N.
Reed, J. G.       Smith, J. D. M.
Rooke, C. E.      Tungku Abdulrahman bin Yang
Rowe, A. S.       di-Per Tuan Besar
Ryves, V. W.      Tungku Mohamed ibni Almarhum
Sarim bin Haji Ali Sultan Ahmad Maazam Shah
Sime, F. D.       Wynne, M. L.

The Society lost by death Dr. N. Annandale, F.R.S., a distinguished Corresponding Member, Dr. T. H. Jamieson, the Hon.
Dato Mohamed bin Mahbob and Messrs F. H. Desbon, R. M. Goldie
and R. N. Goodwin.

Ten resigned their membership.

Council. The Council remained unchanged during the year save
that Mr. J. Johnston was succeeded during leave by
Mr. C. E. Wurtzburg, M.C. During the absence of the Hon.
Secretary his duties were undertaken by Dr. R. O. Winstedt.

General Meeting. The Annual General Meeting was held on 21st
February at Singapore and was followed by
a dinner in the Singapore Club at which were present H. E. Sir
Laurence Guillemard, Patron of the Society, and 28 members and
their guests.

Journal. Three Journals forming Volume II of 308 pages, 5
plates, one map and various text figures, were published,
one in June, one in November and the last in December. The
volume contains fourteen short and fourteen longer papers dealing
with Zoology, Geology, History, Languages, Customs, Beliefs and
Antiquities. The Council was in possession at the end of the year
of several important papers submitted for acceptance.

Finances. In explanation of the more favourable financial position
the Council is happy to report that the Governments
of the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States have come
to the support of the Society with monetary contributions commencing in the current year; the former has promised a grant-in-aid
of $1000 a year for five years and the latter a similar amount for
three years. This assistance is most welcome. The necessity of
raising the annual subscription, or restricting the activities of the
Society, which the Council had for some time been considering is
no longer urgent and the gratitude of all interested is due to the
two governments for their generosity.

The Society finishes the year with a balance of $2967.49 as
against $1609.41 at the end of 1933. If the $3000 granted by the
Straits and Federated Malay States Governments be deducted, there
is seen to be an excess of expenditure over ordinary income of
about $600; this however will be made good by the promised contribu-
tion of $600 from the Government of British North Borneo towards the cost of printing the Dusun vocabulary published in Volume II, part 2. The Society is under obligation to publish "Trong Pipit," towards the cost of which $500 was received in 1923 from the Government of the Federated Malay States.

Income from subscriptions is about the same as in 1923; it includes $200 from four new life members. Income from sales of maps and journals again shows a considerable falling off. Ex-
penditure on printing has been about $1000 less during 1924 than 1923.

The Life Members' Reserve still stands at $4700, against a membership of 93. In addition there are 15 Honorary Members who pay no subscription, but receive publications.

C. Boden Kloss,
Hon. Secretary.
## MALAYAN BRANCH, ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY.

### Receipts and Payments Account for the year ending 31st December 1924.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cash</th>
<th>Receipts.</th>
<th>Payments.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Printing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Balance at Mercantile Bank</td>
<td>1,585.64</td>
<td>Vol. II, part 1: $ 796.76</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>part 2: $ 1,176.00</td>
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<td>Illustrations: $ 496.97</td>
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<td></td>
<td>$1,609.41</td>
<td>Index to Vol. I: $ 23.25</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Circulars: $ 18.30</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total: $ 3,080.01</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Stationary: $ 56.31</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Postage: $ 206.02</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Salaries: $ 408.00</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Total: $ 670.34</td>
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<td>Almeirah: $ 29.90</td>
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<td>Freight from London on Vol. I, part 3: $ 32.67</td>
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<td>Annual dinner, payments not received: $ 56.69</td>
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<td>Sundries: $ 24.21</td>
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<td>Total: $ 2,987.49</td>
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<td>Petty cash in hand, Dec. 31st: $ 18.61</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Balance at bank, Dec. 31st: $ 2,968.88</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Total: $ 6,880.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R. E. Holtum,
Hon. Treasurer.
List of Members for 1925.

(as on 1st January 1925.)

*Life Members.  †Contributors to the Society’s Journal

Honorary Members.

Year of Election.

1903.1923.  †Abbott, Dr. W. L., 400 South 15th Street, Philadelphia, U.S.A.


1921.  Brandstetter, Prof. Dr. R., Luzern, Switzerland.


1903.1917.  †Galloway, Sir D. J., Singapore. (Vice-President, 1906-1907: President 1908-1913).


1921.  Snouck-Huyghenje, Prof. Dr., Leiden, Holland.

1921.  †Van Ronkel, Dr. P. H. Zoeterwondsche Singel 44, Leiden, Holland.

Corresponding Members.

1920.  †Laidlaw, F. F., M.A., Hyesfield, Uffculme, Devon.

1920.  †Merrill, E. D., Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley, California, U.S.A.

1920.  †Moquette, J. P., Kebonsirih, 36, Weltevreden, Java.
LIST OF MEMBERS.

Ordinary Members.

1923. ABDUL KAMIR BIN DAUD, State Secretariat, Johore Bahru.
1918. ABDUL MAJID BIN HAJI ZAINUDDIN, Haji, c/o Police Office, Kuala Lumpur.
1922. ABDULLAH, Dato Stia Raja, Rembau, Negri Sembilan.
1923. ABDULLAH BIN YAHYA, Lieut. Sheikh, Johore Bahru.
1916. ABRAHAM, H. C., Taiping, F. M. S.
1907. *ADAMS, SIR ARTHUR, K.H.E., Penang.
1921. ADAMS, C. D., Simanggung, Sarawak.
1920. ADAMS, P. M., Kuching, Sarawak.
1909. ADAMS, T. S., Taiping, Perak.
1923. AHMAD BIN ANDAM, Johore Bahru.
1922. ALEXANDER, C. S., Kuala Lumpur.
1921. ALLEN, DR. R., B.Sc., Sarawak Oilfields, Miri, Sarawak.
1914. AMERY, REV. A. J., Geylang School, Singapore (Council 1921).
1921. ANDREINI, CAPT., E. V., Kuching, Sarawak.
1923. ANTHONY, P. A., M.G.
1908. ARTHUR, J. S. W., Malacca.
1923. ASTON, A. V., Malacca.
1915. BADDELEY, F. M., B.A., Lagos, Nigeria, West Africa.
1923. BAILEY, HON. MR. ARNOLD S., Kuala Lumpur.
1915. BAIN, NORMAN K., B.A., 122 York Road, Penang.
1922. BAKAR, INCHE ABU BIN HAMAD, Johore Bahru, Johore.
1921. BALL, S. H., Bekoh Estate, Malacca.
1899. *Banks, J. E., c/o The American Bridge Co., Cambridge, Pa., U. S. A.

1920. Barbour, Dr. T., Museum of Comparative Zoology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., U. S. A.


1923. *Beamish, C. A., c/o Education Department, Malacca.


1921. Belgrave, W. N. C., Department of Agriculture, Kuala Lumpur.


1884. Bicknell, W. A., 2, Phillipps Avenue, Exmouth, Devon.


1908. *Bishop, Major C. F., R.A.


1921. Black, Major K., F.R.C.S., Tan Tock Seng Hospital, Singapore.


1923. Boothby, J. V., Kudat, B. N. B.


1924. Boyd, R. M., c/o Java Bank, Pontianak, Borneo.


LIST OF MEMBERS.

1918. BRADNEY, G. P., Kuala Lumpur.
1909. BROWN, Mr. Justice A. V., Johore Bahru, Johore.
1915. BROWN, C. C., Kota Baharu, Kelantan.
1923. Campbell, Hon. Mr. J. W., Malacca.
1924. Carr, C. E., Alor Gajah, Malacca.
1924. *Cheeseman, H. R., Education Department, Penang.
1921. Clark, H. T., Inspector of Schools, Singapore.
1922. Clarkson, H. T., Raffles Hotel, Singapore.
1917. Clifford, G. F. W., Lawas (Sarawak) Rubber Estates, Lawas, via Labuan, S. S.
1923. Corb, F., Raffles Institution, Singapore.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Address</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>Cochrane, C. W. H.</td>
<td>Federal Secretariat, Kuala Lumpur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>Cocker, T. B.</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>Coe, Capt. T. P., M.C.</td>
<td>Tapah, Perak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Colenette, C. L.</td>
<td>Gottic Lodge, Woodford Green, Essex</td>
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<td>Conlay, W. L.</td>
<td>88 Cannon Street, London, E. C. 4</td>
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<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
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<td>Batu Gajah, Perak</td>
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<td>Dodds, H. B., M.D.</td>
<td>General Hospital, Penang</td>
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<td>Dept. of Agriculture, Johore</td>
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<td>Drury, Capt. F., O.B.E.</td>
<td>Bukit Zahara School, Johore Bahru</td>
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</table>
1920. Dunstan, W., Grove Estate, Grove Road, Singapore.
1915. +Dussek, O. T., Sultan Idris Training College, Tanjung Malim.
1922. Eckhardt, H. C., Residency, Kelantan.
1922. Edgar, A. T., Suffolk Estate, Sitiawan, F. M. S.
1921. Elker, Dr. E. A., 33 Raffles Place, Singapore.
1923. Elles, B. W., Taiping, Perak.
1924. Elster, C., Silkeborggade, Copenhagen.
1924. Ermen, C., 9, Cavendish Place, Bath, England.
1919. Finnie, W., Mintlaw Station, Aberdeen.
1921. Forrie, H. A., Penang.
1918. +Foxworthy, Dr. F. W., Kuala Lumpur (Council 1923-).
1921. *Fraser, Hon. Mr. F. W., D.B.E., Jesselton, B. N. Borneo.
1908. +Freeman, D., Kuala Lumpur.
1924. Fry, R. M., F. M. S. Police, Seremban.
1922. Fulfiller, J. C., Seremban.
1923. Gan Khek Keng, 26, Oxley Road, Singapore.
LIST OF MEMBERS.

1923. GARDNER, H. G., Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, Penang.
1917. GARNIER, REV. KEELPEL, Penang.
1923. GATER, B. A. R., Department of Agriculture, Kuala Lumpur.
1920. GEALE, DR. W. J., Ulu Kelantan.
1924. GIBSON, ASHLEY, Kuala Lumpur.
1921. GIBSON, L. B., Cadets' Bungalow, Macalister Road, Penang.
1903. GIBSON, W. S., B.A., Kuala Lumpur.
1922. GILMAN, E. W. P., Kuala Lumpur.
1923. GILMOUR, A., Labour Office, Penang.
1902. *GIMLETTE, DR. J. D., 18, Pulteney Mansions, Bath.
1922. *GLASS, DR. G. S., Municipal Offices, Penang.
1909. GOULDING, R. R., Survey Department, Kuala Lumpur.
1919. GOW, G. AUBREY, Lebong Tandai, Benkoeien, Sumatra.
1921. GRAHAM, W., Sarawak Oilfields, Miri, Sarawak.
1924. GRAHAM, W. H., Malacca.
1923. GREEN, DR. P. WITTLERS, Johore Bahru.
1923. GRIEVE, C. J. K., Seremban.
1918. GRIFFIN, N. A. M., Chief Police Office, Penang.
1911. GRIFFITHS, C. S., Kuching, Sarawak.
1911. GRIFFITHS, J., Survey Department, Kuala Lipis, Pahang.
1911. GRIST, D. H., Department of Agriculture, Kuala Lumpur.
1922. GUBBINS, W. H. W., Seremban.
1916. GUPTA, SHIVA PRASAD, Naudansah Street, Benares City, India.
1923. *HACKER, DR. H. P., Medical Research Institute, Kuala Lumpur.
1923. HAINES, MAJOR O. B., S.O.S., Estate, Selama, Perak.
1923. HALFORD, SIDNEY, F. M. S, Railways, Kuala Lumpur.
1922. HALL, A. C., Singapore.
LIST OF MEMBERS.


1911. *HALLIFAX, F. J., Oakwood, Brompton, Cumberland.

1921. HAM, G. L., Treasury, Singapore. (Council 1922).

1915. †HAMILTON, A. W., Kuala Lumpur. (Vice-President 1922).

1918. HAMPSHIRE, A. K. E., Kuala Lumpur.


1924. HAMZAH BIN ABDULLAH, Inche, Court House, Ipoh.

1923. HANCOCK, A. T., 22-2 Tanglin Road, Singapore.

1922. HANTSCH, P. H. V., P. W. D., Alor Star, Kedah.

1921. HARDIE, J. A. H., Kuching, Sarawak.


1922. HARRISONS, C. W., Kuala Lumpur.

1922. HAWKIN, G., M.B., Medical School, Singapore.

1921. HART, Dr. H. H., B.A., 314 Louxst Street, San Francisco, California, U. S. A.


1921. †HASHEM, CAPT. N. M., Parit Buntar, Perak.

1921. HAWKINS, G., B.O., Balik Pulau, Penang.

1919. HAY, M. C., B.A., Batu Pahat, Johore.


1922. HAZLITT, P. K., Kulim, Kedah.

1922. HELMINS, G. S., Johore Bahru.

1923. HEMMANT, G., Johore Bahru, Johore.


1921. HETWSON, C., c/o Lyall & Evatt, Singapore.

1923. *HICKS, E. C., Education Department, Alor Star, Kedah.

1878. HILL, E. C., 26, Highfield Hill, Upper Norwood, London S. E.

1922. HILL, W. C., Singapore Oil Mills, Havelock Road, Singapore.

1922. HINDE, C. T., Mersing, Johore.


1921. HOLMITE, M. R., c/o Education Dept., Malacca.


1922. HOLTTUM, R. E., B.A., Botanic Gardens, Singapore. (Hon. Treasurer, 1923-).

1921. †HOOPS, Hon. Dr. A. L., Singapore.

1917. *HOSE, DR. CHARLES, Riddlewood Road, Purley, Surrey.

1897. HOSE, Hon. Mr. E. S., C.M.G., Singapore. (President 1924).
LIST OF MEMBERS.

1923. HOWL, Capt. F. W., F. M. S. Railways, Kuala Lumpur.

1891. tHOYNCK, Van PAPENDRECHT, P. C., Le Tanglin Avenue, Trespo, Pau, Basses Pyrenees, France.


1922. HUGGINS, Capt. J., m.c., Kajang, F. M. S.


1907. tHUMPHREYS, THE HON: MR. J. L., Trengganu (Vice-President 1922-).

1922. HUNT, Capt. H. NORTH, Kota Tinggi, Johore.

1921. HUNTER, Dr. P. S., Municipal Offices, Singapore.

1922. IRVINE, Capt. R., m.c., Teluk Anson, Perak.

1921. ISMAIL BIN BACHOK, DATO' B.P.M.J., Johore Bahru, Johore.

1921. IVENS, F. B., Bannon & Bailey, Kuala Lumpur.

1921. tIVIKEY, F. E., Kedah.

1923. JAAPAR, Dato' ABDULLAH BIN, Tarom, Johore Bahru.

1921. JACQUES, Dr. F. V., Ipoh, Perak.

1922. JACO, E., Department of Agriculture, Kuala Lumpur.

1921. JALLALUHIN, AHMAD, Malay College, Kuala Kangsar.

1918. tJAMES, D., Goebilt, Sarawak.


1918. JANSSEN, P. T., Lebong Tandai, Post Ketaun, Benkoelen, Sumatra.


1911. JELF, A. S., Singapore.

1910. JOHNSON, B. G. H., Teluk Anson, Perak.

1920. tJOHNSTON, J., Raffles Library, Singapore. (Council 1924).


1913. JONES, S. W., Federal Secretariat, Kuala Lumpur.

1919. tJORDAN, A. B., Chinese Protectorate, Seremban.


1921. KASSIM, TUNKU, BIN SULTAN ABDUL HAMID HALIM-SHAH, Alor Star, Kedah.

1921. *KAY-MOAT, Dr. R. J., King Edward VII Medical College, Singapore.

1921. tKELLIE, J., Padang Tungku, Pahang.


1924. KEMP, T. F. H., F. M. S. Police, Kuala Lumpur.

1913. KEMPE, J. E., Trengganu.


1920. tKEIR, Dr. A. F. G., Bangkoks, Siam.

1921. KIDD, G. M., Kulim, Kedah.
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<td>Norregade 34, Aarhus, Denmark.</td>
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<td>Harada Mura, Kobe, Japan.</td>
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<td>2, St. Thomas Walk, Singapore.</td>
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<td>Sepang-Tanab Merah Estate, Sepang, Selangor.</td>
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<td>†MARRIOTT, THE HON. MR. H., C.M.G., Singapore. (Council, 1907-8, 1910-13, 1915-18; Vice President 1919).</td>
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<td>MJURERO, E., Curator, Sarawak Museum, Kuching, Sarawak.</td>
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<td>MOHAMAD, ISMAIL MERICAN, BIN VAFOO MERICAN NOORDIN, Legal Adviser's Office, Alor Star, Kedah.</td>
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<td>1922</td>
<td>MOHAMMED, SAYID BIN SAYID ALI IDID, Haji, Alor Star, Kedah.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF MEMBERS.

1920. MURSE, G. S., 27, Grange Road, Singapore.
1923. MULLOY, A. A., Sungai Ledang, Kuala Kerling, F. M. S.
1913. MURRAY, Rev. W., M.A., Gilstead Road, Singapore.
1921. NAGALINGAM, C. R., Anglo-Chinese School, Teluk Anson, Perak.
1917. NAGLE, Rev. J. S., c/o Board of Foreign Missions, 150, Fifth Avenue, New York, U. S. A.
1922. NASH, G. H., Johore Bahru.
1921. NATHAN, S. J., Sarawak Oilfields, Miri, Sarawak.
1921. NEILSON, Major J. B., M.C., Education Dept., Alor Star, Kedah.
1923. NIXON, H. E., Devon Estate, Malacca.
1900. NORMAN, HENRY, Collector of Land Revenue, Penang.
1906. NUNN, R., c/o Colonial Secretariat, Singapore.
1924. OMAR, JANTAN, Jesselton, B. N. Borneo.
1911. †O'MAY, J. O., c/o Harrisons, Barker & Co. Ltd., Kuala Lumpur.
1916. ONG BOON TAT, 37, Robinson Road, Singapore.
1921. ONG TUYE GHEE, 17, Latter Street, Rangoon.
1923. OPIE, R. S., Tebak Tin Fields, Kemaman, Pahang.
1920. OSMAN, MEGAT, Kota Bharu, Kelantan.
1913. †OVERBECK, H., c/o Behn, Meyer & Co. Ltd., Sourabaya, Java.
1922. OWEN, G. N., Jesselton, B. N. Borneo.
1922. PAGE-TURNER, F. W., Simanggang, Sarawak.
1919. PARK, MUNGO, Pontian, Pekan, Pahang.
1921. PARNELL, E., Kuching, Sarawak.
1908. †PARK, THE HON. LT. COL. C.W.C., C.M.G., O.B.E., British Resident, Perak.
1921. †PATERSON, MAJOR H. S., Kuala Lipis, Pahang.
1921. PEACH, REV. P. L. 4, Mt. Sophia, Singapore.
LIST OF MEMBERS.

1921. Pedlow, J., Penang.
1922. Peel, Hon: Mr. W., Alor Star, Kedah.
1924. †Pepys, W. E., c/o Federal Secretariat, Kuala Lumpur.
1930. Peter, E. V., Bundi, Kemaman, Trengganu.
1924. Purcell, V. W. W. S., Singapore.
1924. Raja Bendahara of Perak, Kuala Kangsar.
1924. Raja Kechil Tengah, District Office, Parit Buntar.
1924. Raja Muda of Perak, Teluk Anson.
1924. Raja Musa Bin Raja Bot, Kajang.
1924. Raja Omar Bin Raja Ali Court House, Ipoh.
1924. Raja Salim Bin Mohamed Yusuf, Selama, Perak.
1923. Rimbaud, A. E., Forest Department, Kuala Lumpur.
1924. Rasmussem, H. C., 2, St. Thomas Walk, Singapore.
1917. Rattray, Dr. M., Europe Hotel, Singapore.
1923. Read, C. C., Kuala Lumpur.
1921. *Rex, Marcus, Johore Baharu.
   (Council 1924).
1921. Richards, Major F. W., D.S.O., M.C., Sarawak Oilfields, Miri, Sarawak.
1918. Ritchie, C., The Sagga Rubber Estates Sialau, F. M. S.
1923. Robertson, Capt. R. M., Ascot Estate, Port Dickson.
   (Council 1916-1920: Vice-President, 1922-23).
   (Vice-President, 1909, 1913, 1922-23; Council 1920).
1923. Robson, the Hon. Mr. J. M., Kuala Lumpur.
1924. Rooke, C. E., F. M. S. Railways, Singapore.
1924. Rowe, A. S., Papar, B. N. Borneo.
1923. Sanmugan, S. V., Court Interpreter, Johore Bahru.
1919. Santey, Denis c/o Swan & Maclaren, Singapore.
1920. Scharff, Dr. J. W., c/o Chief Health Officer, Singapore.
1921. Schuber, Dr. R., Asiatic Petroleum Co., Miri, Sarawak.
1920. *Scott, Dr. G. Waugh, Sungai Siput, Perak.
1888. Seah Leang Seah, c/o Chop Chin Hin, Singapore.
1915. *See Tiong Wah, Balmoral Road, Singapore.
1922. Sehested, S., 3, Cecil Street, Singapore.
1923. Shah, Inche Mahmud Bin Mohamed, Johore Bahru.
1921. Sheriff, Mohamed Bin Osman, Office of the Director of Lands, Alor Star, Kedah.
1924. Simé, F. D., Bukit Lintang Estate, Malacca.
1921. Sircom, H. S., Kuala Lumpur.
1922. Smart, Dr. A. G. H., Kedah.
LIST OF MEMBERS.

1913.  Smith, Harrison W., Papeete, Tahiti.
1924.  Smith, J. D. M., District Officer, Temerloh, Pahang.
1921.  Smith, Dr. G. T. F., Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd.,
        Miri, Sarawak.
1924.  Smith, W. Maxwell, Temerloh, Pahang.
1920.  Soh Yew Jin, 119, Devonshire Road, Singapore.
1910.  Song Ong Siang, Hon: Mr., M.A., L.L.M., c/o Messrs.
        Aitken and Ong Siang, Singapore.
1921.  South, F. W., Department of Agriculture, Kuala Lumpur.
1918.  Stanton, Dr. A. T., Kuala Lumpur.
1922.  Stone, Hon: Mr. O. F., Kuala Lumpur, Selangor.
1921.  †Stooke, G. Beresford, Kuching, Sarawak.
1921.  Stowell, De La M. Free School, Penang.
1911.  Stuart, E. A. G., 89, Albert Bridge Rd, Battersea,
        S. W. 11.
1910.  †Sturrock, A. J., Ipoh. (Vice-President, 1924).
1922.  Summerhayes, R., K.C., c/o Swan and MacLaren,
        Singapore.
1921.  Sutcliffe, H., Research Laboratory, Pataling,
        Selangor.
1912.  Swayne, J. C., Miri, Sarawak.
1923.  Sworder, G. H., Taiping, Perak.
1925.  Symes, Dr. H. L., Kinta, Perak.
1908.  Tan Cheng Lock, Hon: Mr., 59, Heeren Street,
        Malacca.
1913.  Taylor, Lt. Clarence J., Telok Manggis Estate,
        Sepang, Negri-Sembilan.
1921.  Taylor, E. R., Estates Department, Singapore Harbou
        r Board.
1917.  Tennent, M. B., Eliot Vale House, Blackheath S. E.
        3.
1921.  Terrell, A. K. A. Beckett, c/o Presgrave &
        Mathews, Penang.
1920.  Thompson, Hon: Mr. H. W., Residency, Kuala
        Lipis, Pahang.
1923.  Travers, Dr. T. O., Kuala Lumpur.
1921.  Trewin, H. P., Government Printing Office, Singa
        pore.
1924. Tungku Abdulrahman Ibni Yang Di-Per Tuan Besar, Kuala Kubu, F. M. S.
1924. Tungku Mohamed Ibni Sultan Abdul Hamid Halimshah, Alor Star.
1924. Tungku Mohamed Ibni Almarhum Sultan Ahmad Maazam Shah.
1921. Ungku Abdul Aziz, Johore Bahru.
1887. †Van Beuningen Van Helsinghen, Dr. R., 74, River Valley Road, Singapore, (Hon. Librarian 1914-1915, 1920).
1922. Veers, Lindsay, Kuala Lumpur.
1921. Wade, F. W., Alor Star, Kedah.
1921. Walton, B. S., Kuala Selangor, F. M. S.
1922. Walker, E. G., United Engineers Ltd., Singapore.
1923. Wan Idris Bin Ibrahim, Johore Bahru.
1922. Ward, D. J., 50-5, Grange Road, Singapore.
1916. Watson, J. G., Forest Department, Johore Bahru.
1923. White, D. P., Veterinary Surgeon, Singapore.
1913. Whitfield, L. D., Malay College, Kuala Kangsar, Perak.
1920. †Wilkinson, R. J., C.M.G., Post Restante, Mitylene, Greece.
1921. †Willbourne, E. S., Batu Gajah, Perak.
1922. Williams, E. B., Seremban.
1921. Wilson, Dr. W. B., M.C., 4, Battery Road, Singapore
1923. Winson, V. H., Posts & Telegraphs, Malacca.
1904. †Winstedt, Hon: Dr. R. O., M.A., D.Litt, Singapore. (Vice-President 1914-1915, 1920-21, 1923-).
1918. Wolde, B., c/o Malacca Club, Malacca.
LIST OF MEMBERS.

1923. Woods, A. A., Egerton Road, Seremban.
1922. Woodward, the Hon. Sir L. M., Kuala Lumpur.
1922. Woolley, H. W., Forest Department, Kuala Lumpur.
1911. Worsley-Taylor, F. E., c/o Singapore Club, Singapore.
1905. *Worthington, the Hon. Mr. A. F., Kota Bharu, Kelantan (Vice-President, 1924).
1924. Wyley, A. J., Lebong Tandai, Benkoelen, Sumatra.
1923. *Yates, H. S., United States Rubber Plants: Kesaran, Asahan, Sumatra.
1920. *Yeowdall, Capt. J. C., Sitiawan, Lower Perak.
1916. Young, E. Stuart, 85, Wilbraham Road, Chorltoncum-Hardy, Manchester, England.
1904. *Young, H. S., Rosemount, Tain, Rossshire, Scotland.
A note on some coins struck for use in Tarim, Southern Arabia.

By Sir John A. S. Bucknill, K.C.,
President, Numismatic Society of India.

(Plate I)

During my residence in Singapore (1914-20) I had on several occasions brought to me silver coins of three sizes (obviously a set) and a copper coin as to the history and use of which there appeared to be considerable mystery. The silver coins are shown on Plate I. With regard to the silver coins it was popularly supposed that they had been struck at Batavia in Java for the use of Muhammadan pilgrims visiting Mecca and Mr. W. H. Lee-Warner of the Malayan Civil Service, who had been during part of the War on duty in Southern Arabia and who had there obtained some of these coins, presented them to the Raffles Museum at Singapore with the following note: "Coins in current use in West Hadramaut (South Arabia): reported to have been struck at Sourabaya (Java) for Kathiri Sultans by Sayid Alkaff." I had some difficulty in tracing them to their source; Mr. J. P. Moquette at once repudiated any suggestion of their having been struck in Java and the enquiries which I made from the Mints in India proved that they did not emanate from that country. From their general style I myself was inclined to think that they had been coined in England and I sent specimens, at a venture, to "The Mint, Birmingham (formerly Ralph Heaton & Sons), England" from whose works so many Colonial coins have been issued. In September 1921 I received from the Managing Director the following most courteous information:

"In 1902 and 1904 we executed orders for a small quantity of these silver coins

(a) "20 Cents or Komsh: diameter: 21. mill: 900 fine: weight, 3.10 grammes.
(b) "10 Cents or Komsh: diameter: 17. mill: 900 fine: weight, 1.55 grammes.
(c) "5 Cents or Komsh: diameter: 11½ mill: 900 fine: weight, 0.35 grammes.

We regret we cannot give you any information as to the copper coin and we do not think they have ever been minted in this country."

In November they wrote:

"These silver coins were executed by us to the order of Messrs. Guthrie & Co., and Messrs. Hurndall and Son both of whom are London Merchants trading in India. We do not know from whom they received the orders. The usual Government authority was produced to us."

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
On receipt of this information I communicated with the well
known firm of Messrs. Guthrie & Co., in Singapore who very ob-
ligingly furnished me in July 1932 with the following interesting
particulars:—

"Immediately on receipt of your letter we got in touch with
Sayid Abdulrahman bin Shaikh Alkaff, the proprietor of the
firm of Alkaff & Co., of this town and that gentleman very kindly
"gave us the following information respecting the silver coins
"forwarded with your letter.

"Coins similar in size and value to the ones sent us were
"first minted in 1898 and continued being minted till 1906. They
"were minted for use in the interior of Hadramut. They are
"used throughout the interior but not on the coast. They are still
"in circulation but more than half the coins introduced are now
"used as ornaments. The coins were minted in Birmingham—to
"our order—and the total value minted amount to not more than
"$10,000.

"The values of the coins sent us are as follows:—
The large coin—six of these are equal to $1 Straits Currency.
The next—12 of these are equal to $1 Straits Currency.
The smallest—24 of these are equal to $1 Straits Currency.

"The above coins were all minted in the same year viz: 1315
(Arabic year). The current year (1922 up to 24th August) is
the Arabic year 1340. We much regret we are unable meantime
"to tell you the number of each coin minted. We will try to get
"this information for you.

"The figure "910" on the coins represents the same
"Shaikh"—part of the name of Shaikh Alkaff—the gentleman
"who ordered the coins and who is now deceased.

"The characters stand for the word 'minted.'

"The other characters on the coins represent the year 1315.

"The Alkaff family has very large interests in Hadramut.

"At our last meeting with Sayid Abdulrahman bin Shaikh Alkaff
"he informed us that he was to ask us to have a further supply of
"the coins in question minted. He tells us he will have no diffi-
culty in getting the necessary permission."

I think that the above-quoted letters settle the matter quite
conclusively. I may say that Mr. W. H. Valentine was under the
impression that they were struck for use in Tunis.

The Copper coin still remains somewhat of an enigma. Mr.
Valentine has attributed it to Tarim in his work on the copper
coins of Muhammadan States. The coin is described under the
heading 'Miscellaneous Indian Coins No. 215' by Atkins at p. 191
of his 'Coins and Tokens of the Possessions and Colonies of the

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COINS USED IN TARIM, SOUTHERN ARABIA.
A note on some coins struck for use in Tarim. 3

British Empire." [London 1889.] He offers no view as to its provenance. It was apparently figured in Leo Hirsch's "Reisen in Sud-arabien" (Leiden 1897) with a note to the effect that they were struck in Java to the order of a Sayid.

Mr. J. P. Moquette is, however, quite confident that these coins were never struck in Java and is certain that they were minted in England. He informs me that it would have been quite out of the question for any Arab possibly to have obtained permission to have coins minted to his wish or order at any of the Java mints: he adds that although the Batavia and Sourabaya mints were shut down in 1842 it might have been conceivable for a very old established firm, such as Areken & Co., had occasion arisen to have obtained permission to have coins struck for them up to the year 1852 but not later than that date.

He writes with regard to the design that he thinks that the huge enlargement of the "zarb" is "merely playful and so written on purpose so that one should think the whole design consists of native arrows and a bow." To my idea there seems little doubt but that this coin was struck, as were probably all of the Copper Tokens minted to the order of British Merchants in Malaya, at the famous Soho Mint at Birmingham (long since dismantled) of Messrs. Boulton and Watt and that it approximates to that series. Of course the scales and the word "Adl" are familiar enough on Indian currency, notably on that emanating from the Bombay Mint between at any rate 1791 and 1834, but they are also seen on two of the Malayan Tokens (Nos. 40 and 41) of the series to which I refer as described by Lt. Col. H. Leslie Ellis in his "British Copper Tokens of the Straits Settlements and Malayan Archipelago" (Numismatic Chronicle, 3rd Series, Vol. XV, pp. 134-153). The present coin certainly corresponds in size and general style with the one Keping Token pieces: and the date 1841-42 is not amiss as the example for Sarawak (Ellis No. 38) is dated September 24th, 1841. There has from time immemorial been a close connection between Arabia and the Malay Peninsula and I am inclined to think that these copper coins were struck to the order of some Arab merchant of the Straits Settlements for use in Arabia largely by the pilgrims of whom great numbers annually visit Mecca from the Malay Peninsula and Archipelago.

One Chomsih or Doit (?) or One Keping (?). E. Diam. 21 mill: Plain edge. struck at the Soho mint, Birmingham (?) 1841-2.

Obr. The letters "r" (Tarim) between two four pointed stars:

date \text{\textcopyright} A (1258) below: below the date

(i.e. ? Zarb (i.e. 'struck') ; or a bow? or a canoe?) ; below again, a pair of crossed arrows.

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
Notes on Dipterocarps.

No. 10. On Balanocarpus hemsleyanus, King.

By I. H. Burkill.

(With text-figures.)

To reconstruct the whole tree from an examination of a few weather-beaten branches projecting above flood-water is the problem before the botanist who would classify the Dipterocarpaceae. It is a problem of such intricacy that Bentham and Hooker in their Genera plantarum, 1, (1873) pp. 190-191, deviated from their custom so far as to offer alternative classifications: the two commence alike, for the first genera show in all the then-known species wind-distribution by means of enlarged sepals, while the three genera known then as not provided with such enlarged sepals came in the one key fifth (Pachynocarpus) and eleventh (Vateria) and twelfth (Monoporaandra) out of twelve, and in the other fifth, and eighth and ninth.

The very slight tendency thus disclosed to segregate the genera not wind-distributed from the genera wind-distributed, was extended by subsequent authors. For instance, Sir William Thiselton-Dyer in Sir Joseph Hooker’s Flora of British India, 1 (1874) p. 294, (in which place he was not called on to discuss Pachynocarpus) gathered all the wingless species to his last pages: and Sir George King in his Materials for a Flora of the Malay Peninsula, No. 5 (Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1893, pp. 87-137), except for Ancistrocladus which is not a Dipterocarp, ends his account with the wingless genera Retinodendron, Isoptera, Balanocarpus, and Pachynocarpus; while he draws the least winged species of Shorea to the end of their genus. Again further, Sir Dietrich Brandis in the Journal of the Linnaean Society, Botany, 31, (1895) pp. 1-148, commences his classification with winged genera and ends it with the wingless genera Pachynocarpus, Stemonoporus, Monoporaandra and Vateria; and in the middle he has successively Shorea (a few not winged), Isoptera (not winged), Balanocarpus (not winged), Cotylelobium (winged), and Vatica (winged and not winged in various stages). Mr. Ridley in his Flora of the Malay Peninsula takes from the Shoreas the species that is not winged for the constitution of a wingless genus—Pachychlamys; and he cuts out of Vatica as a genus Synaptea that he may separate the

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winged species. In his sequence all the latter genera, i.e., Vatica, Isoptera, Balanocarpus, and Pachyocarpus are wingless; and among the earlier genera all except Pachychlamys, which stands eighth, have the calyx developed in various ways into wings.

A classification, which so disposes winged and wingless genera, carries an implication that the branches of the tree bearing the wind-distributed genera arise upon the opposite side to the branches bearing the genera which are without wind-distribution; and though the classification has such high authority, it remains unsatisfactory, particularly because the wings in the different genera are produced from different sepals, so that a common line of descent is out of the question; and among the genera which do not avail themselves of wind-distribution, the method of dispersal varies.

Alone among workers on the Dipterocarps, Dr. Heim set himself in opposition to such a view, as is clearly shown in the table of affinities which appears upon p. 129 of his *Recherches sur les Dipterocarpacées* (Paris, 1892). In that table the wingless genera are scattered; and he still leaves the wingless Shoreas within that genus, where they constitute a section, the *Brachypterae*. Close to Shorea he admits Isoptera, stating of it on pp. 49 and 53, that is seems to be more related to winged Shoreas than to the *Brachypterae*. Out of Balanocarpus he takes four species and calling them Richelia brings them also to the neighbourhood of Shorea. Thus he groups round Shorea certain Dipterocarps that are wingless. As Bailliodendron he cuts a wingless species out of Dryobalanops and leaves it a development from the latter. Balanocarpus erosu he made the type of his section *Eu-balanocarpus*, and credited it (on p. 74) with affinities to the winged genus Hopea: Balanocarpus ulitis he made the type of his section *Pachyocarpoides*: Balanocarpus zeylanicus he made the type of his section *Microcarpus*: and Balanocarpus sphaerocarpus of his section *Sphaerocarpae*. After stating that these are distinct enough, he added that on account of our meagre knowledge it is rather difficult to determine towards what sections in Hopea they lean, but that each possibly attaches itself to a different one as a type with rudimentary wings derived therefrom (p. 77). *Pachyocarpus* he associated with Vatica: and out of Vatica he cast Retinodendron, but admitted the affinity (p. 107). His genus Pierrea, founded upon an inadequately known Bornean species, and then enlarged by the insertion into it of the malayan “Chengal,” he connected with the Retinodendron-Vatica group, Pierrea penangiana, Heim, the “Chengal,” subsequently became Balanocarpus Heimi, King. The winged Synaptea he separated: and connected with it he placed the wingless genera of which mention has just been made, namely *Pachyocarpus*, *Vatica*, Retinodendron and Pierrea,—a fourth group, but with affinities to Balanocarpus in Pierrea.

The suggestion in Heim’s table is that (1) Shorea has exhibited a tendency to winglessness whence have arisen the *Brachypterae*, and Isoptera, in different ways; (2) Dryobalanops has ex-

1905] *Royal Asiatic Society.*
hibited the same tendency, and thence Baillonodendron; (3) Hopea, likewise, giving rise on various sides to the diverse sections of Balanocarpus; (4) Vatica, Retinodendron, Pachynocarpus and Pierrea have had one common stem, and (5) Stemonoporus, Monoporandra and Vateria, at any rate in part, another.

The geographic distribution of the Dipterocarps does not render such a view difficult of acceptance, for the groups numbered 1, 2 and 4 can be assumed to have reached their present development upon the east side of the Bay of Bengal, and the group numbered 5 upon the west; while Hopea which is found to the east and to the west can be held the origin of group 3, both east and west. But everyone will agree that the position is weakest in regard to Balanocarpus, i.e. 3; for which Heim suggests a multiple origin.

Heim's first critic was Sir George King. Of such of Heim's new genera as he had to deal with, he reduced Richelia and Pierrea; he retained Retinodendron, (Synoptea in his view equals Vatica). The second critic was Sir Dietrich Brandis and he retained none of Heim's genera, Retinodendron going back to Vatica. Into the section Brachypetrae of Shorea he placed the species S. lissophila of Ceylon, thus admitting a tendency in Shorea west of the Bay of Bengal to winglessness akin closely to the tendency exhibited east of the Bay; but he added that the species is anomalous in the section.

It was quite natural that systematists of the calibre of Sir George King and Sir Dietrich Brandis should not accept Heim's new genera; for Heim's work needed, and still needs much further prosecution in order to establish it: but that they felt a certain amount of dissatisfaction at the position is equally evident. Touching Balanocarpus alone, Trimen had doubted (Handbook to the Flora of Ceylon, 1, 1893, p. 130) if B. zeylanicus is rightly associated with the other south indian species; Sir George King had said of B. maxinum "the flowers do not exactly answer to Beddome's diagnosis of the genus Balanocarpus inasmuch as they have 10 instead of 15 stamens, and neither of the cotyledons is lobed" and he adds of B. hemsleyanus that it "is an altogether anomalous species. It has leaves like several of the scabrid species of Shorea and its flower is also more like those of Shorea than Balanocarpus." Sir Dietrich Brandis echoed Sir George King's opinion that B. hemsleyanus is anomalous. Lastly Mr. Ridley has taken Shorea Thistelianii out of Shorea and Balanocarpus hemsleyanus out of Balanocarpus to be his two species of Pachychlamys. Now Pachychlamys, Dyer, is the Bornean Shorea brachyptera, and therefore one of the Brachypetrae of Heim and Sir Dietrich Brandis: from which it is to be inferred that Mr. Ridley would transfer the whole of the Brachypetrae (unless he would except the cinghalese Shorea lissophylla) to Pachychlamys. At any rate Mr. Ridley's act is an expression of dissatisfaction with the genus Balanocarpus as it has been constituted.

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In the writer’s opinion it may be said that there is no genus in the Dipterocarpæae worse constituted than *Balanocarpus*; and unfortunately this note which deals with one of the species, only emphasises the fact without materially clearing away any confusion. The species with which it deals is *Balanocarpus hemsleyanus*, King, otherwise *Pachyclamys hemsleyanus*, Ridley.

The writer found in the Tanjong Pondok forest reserve, Perak, on March 25th, 1924, a tree of it with nearly mature fruit; and to the kindness of Mr. B. H. Barnard he owes the collecting of ripe fruits as soon as they fell. These were germinated and studied in the Botanic Gardens, Singapore. Unfortunately a sufficient supply could not be got for the purpose of having done at the same time such a chemical analysis as would ascertain if it is a species yielding oil in the characteristic way that the *Brachypteræae* do.

The fruit is heavy and is not supplied with even a trace of wing. It falls at maturity to the floor of the forest, and without delay germinates, the fruit-wall being burst from within in exactly the same was as that of *B. maximus* (vide Journal No. 87, p. 221).

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**Fig. 1.** The fruit of *Balanocarpus hemsleyanus*, at maturity. nat. size.

**Fig. 2.** (above) The embryo in germination with the fruit-wall and seed-coats removed; the placental cotyledon is below. nat. size. Figs. 3 and 4. (below) sections at a and b respectively.

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
The radicle extrudes, and bends earthwards, anchors the young plant and then lifts the cotyledons up while they push off the fruit-wall. Figure 1 is of the fruit as it hangs on the tree. Figure 2 is the embryo bared and just germinated: figures 3 and 4 are sections showing the relative sizes of the two cotyledons. The cotyledons are green. They lie parallel within the fruit, both reaching to the base of the cavity, and though the placental cotyledon may be shut out from the very apex, it is only so by 1-2 mm. In germination the lobes part as is seen in figure 4, where the parting is just commencing; ultimately their divergence is as much as in figures 5 and 6. The two cotyledons take different positions as drawn in figure 7.

Fig. 5. (above) The outer cotyledon from its inner face.
Fig. 6. (below) The placental cotyledon from the face towards the placenta. Both after expansion, and \( \frac{1}{2} \) nat. size.

They persist for four months, by which time the seedling may have as many as ten leaves. The first leaves after the cotyledons stand in a pair as in figure 8, and they are followed by alternate leaves well spaced. These are green.

The shape of the cotyledons can be gathered from figures 5 and 6.
Fig. 8. The young plant four months old. ¼ nat. size, showing the cotyledons in the act of falling off, and showing that the first leaves after them are a pair.

In the following table the differences observed between the six already-studied species of *Balanocarpus* are given.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>zeylanicus.</th>
<th>curtisi.</th>
<th>hildebrandianus.</th>
<th>penangianus.</th>
<th>maximus.</th>
<th>Hetum.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cotyledons in the seed parallel</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not parallel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotyledons broader than long</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>longer than broad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cotyledons when expanded stand vertical</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>one vertical and one horizontal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>both horizontal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outer cotyledon with its apex pointed and not in a notch</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pointed and in a notch</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not pointed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner cotyledon with its apex pointed and not in a notch</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pointed and in a notch</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not pointed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First leaves after the cotyledons a pair four together</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1925] *Royal Asiatic Society.*
Malay literature is deficient in historical works. The great break in tradition that occurred (in the 14th and 15th centuries) when the Malays forsook Hinduism and Mahayana Buddhism for Islam, no doubt caused the loss of most of their older literature. Probably it may not have included historical chronicles, for Indian culture lays little stress on history proper: it is prolific of myths and legends, many of which have survived among the Malays. The oldest Malay history the Sejarah Melaka, or Malay Annals belongs to the second decade of the 17th century, and commemorates the fortunes of Malacca, which performed in the 15th century, on a smaller scale, the same functions that have built up the prosperity of modern Singapore. There the merchants of Arabia, India, Burma, Java, China, and Japan met and exchanged their wares and bartered for the tin of the Malay Peninsula, the spices of the Moluccas, and the various products of the Archipelago.

The Portuguese conquered Malacca in 1511. After some preliminary wanderings, the Sultan and his nobles settled at Bentan, an island just south of the end of the Peninsula. The Portuguese attacked them, and they fled for refuge to the valley of the Johor River. Some of their allies and vassals went over to the enemy. The Sultan of Kampar in Sumatra, though a near relative and the son-in-law of the exiled Sultan of Malacca, curried favour with the Portuguese and not long after the conquest went to live at Malacca, where he was executed by his new friends on a suspicion of treason. Some of the minor States quarrelled amongst themselves. The Sumatran Raja of Indeagiri raided Lingga in the absence of its ruler, the latter retaliated, and to save himself from reprisals by the combined forces of Indeagiri and Bentan, successfully invoked the help of the Portuguese against his overlord the Sultan of Bentan and the Raja of Indeagiri, who was the Sultan’s son-in-law. Siamese influence increased in the north of the Peninsula; while in Sumatra there arose the new power of Acheen, which was hostile both to the Portuguese of Malacca and the Malays of Johore. In their triangular duel with Malacca and Acheen the luckless Johor Sultans generally had the worst of it. Their repeated attacks on Malacca all failed; they were raided by both sets of enemies, turn and turn about, and early in the 17th century they were driven to seek the help of the Dutch, who in 1641 conquered Malacca from the Portuguese, and temporarily revived the fortunes of the doomed Johor dynasty.

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The Sejarah Melayu was written, or at any rate begun, more than twenty years before this last turn of the wheel of Johor's fortunes. It is a work of much interest, but of a miscellaneous character, with myth and legend interwoven with history, not merely in the earlier chapters, but even in its account of the events of 1511. There is little doubt that it was founded on earlier records, which have not survived. Several variant recensions exist, as any one knows, who has read the fragment published by Dulaurei with comparative readings in foot-notes. Oriental copyists, and particularly Malay scribes, take great liberties with texts: improving them according to their own taste, and introducing considerable verbal, and even more than verbal differences. The texts of the Sejarah Melayu are in substantial material agreement until the last half a dozen chapters, in which the story of the conquest of Malacca is ended and the subsequent events are being related. It is mainly here that MS. No. 18 of the Raffles collection of Malay MSS. in the Library of the Royal Asiatic Society London differs from the text of Shellabear. In the part corresponding to the first 34 chapters of that text, this manuscript sometimes arranges its chapters in a slightly different order, putting chapter 5 before 4, chapter 22 before 21, chapter 32 before 31, and omitting chapter 16 altogether. After that point, it has the eight chapters here for the first time printed, differing entirely from the published text, introducing new matter not contained in it at all, and relating in a somewhat different way some of the events that the published text also deals with. There is, for example, a full and graphic account of two attacks on Malacca made by the Malays. The details of the squabble between the rulers of Inderagiri and Lingga are also new.

It looks rather as if the two recensions had been supplemented, but independently of each other and by different hands. The supplement in the published version professes to be not later than about 1673, and may be a good deal older. The manuscript of our variant text is not more than a century old. It is written on English paper (size 12½ x 7½ inches), of which portions bear a watermark containing the name C. Wilmott and the date 1812. So clearly it was a copy made for Raffles from some older manuscript, and its ultimate source may well have been of quite respectable antiquity. I think that this is shown by the archaic spelling which suggests the 17th century rather than the 19th. In Chapter 34, it may be noted, the better reading turun daripada bizerai occurs instead of Shellabear's daripada wizir-nya. Its accounts of the vicissitudes and squabbles, the festivities and misfortunes, of the Malay Rajas are vivid, and it is hard to believe that the manuscript does not embody a genuine tradition. Evidence of this, in my opinion, is that it is much franker than the published text over the failures and defeats of the Malays in their struggles with the Portuguese. We need not accept every detail of these

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stories. For example, it is not necessary to believe that the royal elephant broke its right tusk in charging the fortress wall of Malacca. But a letter reported to have been addressed by Sultan Mahmud to his minister who was in charge of one of the sieges that failed, is interesting and in accordance with that monarch's unamiable character:— "If a man professes to be braver than Hamzah and 'Ali, and more learned than the Imam Ghazali, but is not, then he is a bigger liar than the Sayid al-Hak", whoever that successor of Ananias may have been. The unsuccessful minister ascribed his failure to a storm on the night when the attack should have been delivered, causing it to be postponed, and letting the Portuguese profit by the delay. He faced his accuser, the Maharaja of Inderagiri, a son-in-law of Sultan Mahmud, in full durbar, and told him that he was not afraid of him but ready to fight him anywhere. These dissensions between the Malay chiefs are so typical of this period, that the story is probably true. 

At any rate the details about this siege of Malacca include the mention of several place-names and show intimate local knowledge.

A later chapter tells of a conspiracy raised in the town of Malacca against the Portuguese. It was detected and the ring-leader executed. According to our text, the Portuguese sent an envoy to Johor to report this fact, whereupon the Malay ruler incontinently had the envoy killed by way of reprisal. The Portuguese bombarded the Malay stronghold, which had to be abandoned with much loss. The survivors fled higher up the Johor River and established another little capital. This account also appears to refer to real historical events. We know that the Portuguese did raid Johor.

It looks therefore as if this variant text is a genuine document, not far removed in date from the time when the main body of the work was composed. One point raises a doubt. Space is devoted to establishing a link between the Johor dynasty (which as sprung from the royal house of Malacca represented the leading ruling family of the Peninsula) and the royal family of the State of Perak. The latter house claims to be descended from the former through a princely exile from Johor, who is alleged to have founded it. This prince is merely named in the published text, but there is not a word to indicate that he went to Perak. Our variant text tells all about it. This looks rather like special pleading, invented at a comparatively late date to support a doubtful or fictitious genealogical claim. Whether the claim was genuine or not, it seems as if the author of the variant text had some reason for putting it forward. He may have been a Perak man, concerned to establish an authentic pedigree for his rulers. Some of the spellings suggest that he belonged to the north of the Peninsula, for they rather represent a northern dialect of Malay. But this evidence from spelling is based on only a few words, and is inconclusive.
Anyhow, although parts of these supplementary chapters may have been written for a special reason, yet as a whole they seem to embody much genuine historical tradition.

The eminent Dutch Orientalist Van der Tuuk, in his catalogue of the Society's Malay MSS., published 57 years ago, noticed that this manuscript of the Sêajarâh Melayu contained a variant text. Oriental scholarship sometimes proceeds at a rather leisurely pace, and during the last half-century nothing more has been done in the matter. There are still many unedited Malay MSS. in our libraries, that deserve attention.

I have to thank the Council of the Royal Asiatic Society for allowing me to borrow the MS. for the purpose of copying the following chapters. The MS. contains 292 pages of Malay script, and six lines on page 263. The normal number of lines to a page is 25.

After the story of the death of Sultan Ahmad by the order of his father Sultan Mahmud and the subsequent killing (at his own request) of Sultan Ahmad's faithful follower Tun Ali Haji (here مات, or Mati, probably a copyist's error), ending ماتا hebêrapa titah hêndak mengidap Tun Ali Mata ini luâda jua maha, hêndak mina di-hunok pûga, di-surah oleh Sultan Mahmud Shah, 'Bunah-lah Tun Ali Mata,' the text proceeds as printed here, introducing matter which in the published version is given in a somewhat different order.

Outline of the New Chapters.

(I). Abdullah, ruler of Kampar, not wishing to pay homage to Bentan, applied to the Portuguese Captain at Malacca for help, whereupon a verse was composed on his childlike folly in "deserting the sweet mangosteen for ripe saffron."

The consequent attack by Sultan Mahmud Shah on Kampar was worsted at sea by the Portuguese, and his captains under Sri Amarabangsa were driven to leap overboard at Kramutan and walk to Indragiri, where one of them, Tun Biajit, son of the famous Hang Tuah, beat all comers at cockfighting including Sultan Narasinga, the ruler:—when they leapt overboard, Tun Biajit's mistress swam ashore with nothing but one artificial cock's spur. From Indragiri the captains returned to Bentan. Raja Abdullah, going aboard to thank his defenders, was carried off by the Portuguese first to Malacca then to Goa and finally to Portugal. Sultan Mahmud blamed Abdullah's chiefs and changed the title (Paduka Tuan) of the Bendahara of Kampar to Amaradiraja.

(II). The Maharaja of Lânga died and his successor, Maharaja Isup went to Bentan to do obeisance to Sultan Mahmud Shah. During his absence, Narasinga, Raja of Indragiri, ravaged Lânga and thereafter proceeded to Bentan, where he was given the style of Sultan Abduljalil and the band of Sultan Mahmud Shah's daughter, (widow of Munsir Shah, ruler of Pahang, recently

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slain by his father for adultery with his consort), by whom he was to have two sons, Raja Ahmad and Raja Muhammad (nicknamed Pang). While Sultan Abduljalil is occupied at Bentan, Maharaja Isup ravages Indragiri in return and saves his own country Lingga from retribution by invoking the aid of the Portuguese at Malacca. An attack by Sang Stia on behalf of the ruler of Bentan on Lingga was frustrated by the Portuguese fleet and another attack on Malacca by the Laksamana on behalf of the same ruler was beaten off by new captain, Gonzalo.

A later attack on Malacca led by the Paduka Tuan and other chiefs from Bentan, an attack by land and sea, also failed. The Paduka Tuan broke the left tusk of Sultan Mahmud’s elephant (fetached from Muar) charging the fort but Sultan Abduljalil, hurt at this chief’s refusal to be present when his royal drums were beaten, carried word to Sultan Mahmud that the failure of the attack was due to him. Sultan Mahmud wrote to Paduka Tuan a curt letter (p. 12 supra) but later accepted his excuses.

(III). Sultan Ibrahim of Siak dies and is succeeded by his son, Raja Abdul, whose mother was a Malacca princess. He does homage at Bentan and is given the title of Sultan Khoja Ahmad Shah and the hand of a daughter of Sultan Mahmud Shah, who bore him two sons Raja Jamal and Raja Biajit.

One day Sultan Mahmud Shah reflected that Bruas and Manjong and Tun Aria Bijadiraja, a ruler in the west (di-barat), had neglected to pay him homage since the Portuguese conquest of Malacca. Tun Aria Bijadiraja was a relative of the wife of the Paduka Tuan. So the Paduka Tuan is sent to summon the neglectful chief to the Bentan court. This errand the Paduka Tuan executes, marrying at the same time his son Tun Mahmud (called also Dato’ Lekar or Legor) to Tun Mah, a daughter of Tun Aria Bijadiraja, and giving him charge of Selangor.

(IV). The suit of Sultan Hussin of Harn, a handsome and valiant prince, for the hand of Raja Puche, daughter of Sultan Mahmud, is approved. This section describes the festivities and gives a graphic vignette of the prince and his stay at Bentan.

(V). Sultan Mahmud Shah of Bentan gives his daughter Hatijah in marriage to the ruler of Pahang, after Sri Naradiraja has refused her hand because he is a commoner. The Portuguese attack Bentan and drive the Sultan from Kota Kura to Kopak. Sri Awadana the Temenggong was rebuked by the Sultan for not producing all his slaves to help strengthen the fort. Tun Mahmud, son of the Paduka Tuan, comes from Selangor with twenty boats and takes the Sultan to Kampa. He is given the title of Sri Agar Raja. Sultan Mahmud Shah died and was succeeded by Sultan ‘Ala’u’d-din Iskavat Shah, the chiefs banishing the Raja Mudin, “before the rice in his pot was even cooked”, together with his wife Tun Trang (a niece of Tun Narmangsa) and his son.
Mansur Shah. The exile fled first to Siak, and then to (?). Kang, whence a trader, Si-Tumi, from Manjong, carried him to Perak, where he was proclaimed ruler with the title of Sultan Muzaffar Shah. He invited Sri Agar Diraja from Selangor, (where that chief had married Raja Stia, a daughter of the Sultan of Kedah), to be his Bendahara. By Tun Trang Sultan Muzaffar Shah had 16 children in all, including Raja Dewi, Raja Alimad, Raja Abduljalil, Raja Fatimah, Raja Hatijah and Raja Tengah; and by a concubine he had a son Raja Muhammad.

(VI).—After going to Pahang and wedding a sister of Sultan Mahmud Shah of that state, Sultan 'Ala'ud-din Riayat Shah returned to Ujong Tanah, lived at Pekan Tua and built Kota Kara. There is a story of an attempt to address a non-servile letter to the King of Siam, when Pahang sends the customary tribute. Angered at the appointment of Sri Agar Raja as Bendahara of Perak, Sultan 'Ala'ud-din Riayat Shah despatches Tun Pekerna to summon him. The ambassador goes to Perak and proceeds upstream to Labuhan Jong, but the Bendahara sends him "rice in a pot and condiments in a bambo", whereupon he returns in anger to his master. The Paduka Tuan himself voyages to Perak and brings down the recalcitrant Sri Agar Diraja to Ujong Tanah.

The Adipati of Kampar sent tribute to Ujong Tanah.

By 'Ala'ud-din Riayat Shah's order Tun Pekerna attacks Merbedang.

(VII).—Sang Naya plotted to attack the Portuguese while they sat unarmed in their church at Malacca. But the Portuguese Captain discovered that he had arms concealed, threw him down from the fort, and sent an ambassador to inform the Sultan at Pekan Tua. 'Ala'ud-din Riayat Shah had the ambassador thrown down from a tall tree. The Portuguese attacked Kota Kara. The fight going against the Sultan, Tun Narawangsa and Tun Pekerna flung all the arms into the sea and the Sultan retreated to Sayong. At Rebut Tun Narawangsa felled a tree to prevent further pursuit. Tun Amat 'Ali carried a letter from the Sultan to the Portuguese, who finally returned to Malacca.

Sri Naradiraja died and was buried at Sayong, (where his posthumous title was Dato' Nisan Besar 'Chief of the Big Tomb').

(VIII).—Raja Jaimad succeeded Muhammad Shah as Sultan of Pahang and sailed to Sayong, where 'Ala'ud-din Riayat Shah gave him the title of Muzaffar Shah. On the royal barge was one Patih Ludang or Batin Sang Pura of Tanah Adang, who having had a feud with one Sang Stia had fled to Pahang. Sang Stia called his enemy off the barge and slew him. Sultan Muzaffar Shah was enraged but pardoned the offender when Sultan 'Ala'ud-din Riayat Shah sent him into his presence bound:— he refused to be bound by the Laksamana, a fellow captain, but let the Bendahara bind him.

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Notes on Spelling.

Throughout the MS. the spelling is archaic.

(1) The final vowel is omitted in harta, kéna, mina, goa, nyata, kali, kuha, lantu, batu, lalu, kamu, tahu, bértému, tipu, pérahu, bahan, janji, maiti, hértam, duji, kali, dahi, sunyi, bérkelahi, kali, jadi, pérmadani, ganti, banty buni, bérdiri, périgi, mëmbäkki, and so on.

(2) The medial vowel in closed syllable is omitted.

Keluar; di-luar; bédal; di-Muar; batul; buangkan; tiimbul; dalok; hanting.

(3) The medial vowels are inserted in an open syllable upon which the accent falls—usually the penultimate.

Mancing-masing; ubali; baharu; bercium; lakì-laki.

In derivative words formed by the addition of suffixes the vowels are shifted to the penultimate of the derived word:

Beda-nya; tiada; lah; mali-lah; mari; lah; kembali; sa-bénar-nya; lah;

(4) Noticeable are the morphologically correct forms

Kenakan; kenaikan.

(5) There are archaic spellings of a few Malay and Sanskrit words:

Delapan; pernah; marga; dosa; wangsa; doga (Skt. drohaka) durhaka.

(6) Gila is Commonly written as and as gila;

Segala; guna; Gonzalo; tanggar;

Kecil; di-chongting-nya.

(7) Noticeable are

Di-adap; di-amok-nya; débil; diambil;


Wa-laluh a’lamu bi-s-sawab.

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(1) Al-kesah.

Maka tersebut-lah pérkataan Sultan Abdullah, Raja Kampar, (7) mendērhaka, tiada manu mënıyemlah dan tiada manu mënгадap kal-Bentan; mënputus ia ka-Mélaka mianta bantu pada Féringgi, maka di-beri bantu oleh Kapitan Mélaka. Itu-lah di-pērbuah orang nyanyi, démikian bunyi-nya :

"Di-hela-hela di-rētak sa-hasta
Kundis di-pēnggalkan.
Alang-ka hila raja kēchil! Mēnggusta
Manis di-tinggalkan.

melihat buah hartoal masak."

Sa-tēlah Sultan Mahmud Shah mënēngar khabab Raja Abdullah itu, maka baginda tērlalu murka, maka Sultan Mahmud Shah mënihatkan bērēngkap akan mënýerang ka-Kampar. Maka yang di-titahkan itu ēmpat-puloh orang mëněri, pērtama Sēri Amará-
bangsa, kēdua Sēri Utama, kētiga Sēri Petim, keempat Sēri Nata, kellima Tun Biajit, anak Laksanāma Hang Tuah, p. 3 (171) sa-orang hulubalang-nya. Sa-tēlah sūlah bērēngkap, maka pērghi-lah mēreka itu, Sēri Amarabangsa akan panglima-nya. Sa-tēlah dat-

pēleh-nya, maka mēnyahang-lah ia. Sa-tēlah di-lihat oleh sēgalu Mē-
angkabau Tun Biajit mēnyahong, maka di-tandangi-nya oleh sēgalu Mēnangkabau, maka oleh Tun Biajit di-lawan-nya18 sēgalu Mēnang-

kabau itu mēnyahong, tērkadang mēnang Tun Biajit, tērkadang alah, tētapi kērē-lah Tun Biajit mēnang. Maka sēgalu Mēnangkabau bērēngal-samau, maka ada sa-ekor hayam pada Raja Naras-

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"Ka-sana-sana raja dudok
Jangan di-timpah oleh papan.
Di-kētahuni ganja sērebok,
Mēngapa maka di-makan?"


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(II) Al-kesah.
Sa-bērmula akan Raja Narasinga Raja Indēragiri pun bērlēngkap hēndak mēngadap ka-Bentan, sa-tēlah di-dēngar baginda.

sakalian tiada mau mengerjakan dia, jikalau datang had nyawa patek sa-kali pun yang $
$ itu patek sakalian serta juga.$
Maka kata Maharaja Isup,$
'Tienda-kah kamu sakalian tahu akan anak isteri-ku habis di-tawan oleh orang Indéragiri? Akan sekarang kita hindak menyering Indéragiri. Maulah kamu sakalian menyertai daku?'


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Sa-telah ia mencengar kata Sang Guna, maka ia pun berdiam dirinya, bagai-bagai oleh orang mengutati, suatu pun tiada kata-nya. Ada berasa hari, maka Sang Jaya Perkemna pun mati-lah.


"Gongsalo nama-nya kapitan Mêlaka,
Malu-nya rasa-nya kédapatan kata."

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Sa-telah itu, maka Laksamana dan Sang Naya pun kembali-lah ka-Bentan lalu masok menganadap Sultan Mahmud Shah. Maka baginda murka akan Laksamana tiada man pergi ka-Langga, tetapi akan Sang Naya di-anggerahai persetian dan gundek baginda yang bermama Tun Sadah itu, maka di-péristi-nya oleh Sang Naya, berasak dua orang, sa-orang laki-laki bermama Tun Dolah, sa-orang pérémpuan bermama Tun Munah di-dudokkan dengan Tun Bilang anak Tun Abdul, itu anak laksamana tua Hang Tuah, berasakan Tun Mérak.28


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Sa-tēlah itu, maka lalu-lah ka-Mělaka, maka běr-jamī-lah akan mělanggar pada malam jumaat, Sang Séntia dari lauti, Paduka Tuan

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\(^{44}\) hamba mäghâra


Yaung-di-pértuan sa-orang gérang hamba takut, tuan hamba, batu képala hamba, sa-akan Raja Indéragiri pun tuan hamba, apa kéhendak tuan hamba sédia hamba lawan." Maka Sultan Abdul-jalil tundok menénggar kata Paduka Tuan itu, maka Sultan Mahmud Shah pun diam-lah. Sa-telah sudah lama baginda di-adap orang, maka Sultan Mahmud Shah pun bérangkat-lah masok, maka ségalá orang yang méngadap itu pun masing-masing kembali kárumah-nya.

Wa-llahu a’lamu bi-s-sawah, wa ilaihi-l-mar ji’u (wa) l-ma’ab. (23)

* = ménégjamkan shut the eyes to. (5)

? = vassal raja. (6) téngah or séhab should be omitted.

ديكيرن (10) سد (5) دفتر (3) فق (7)

كمسال (14) بكي (12) دولان (13) علي (11)

نفکر (20) لونة (19) بركتل (17)

Punggor about 4 miles ESE. from Malacca along the coast. (21) The village just to the east of Malacca town. (22)

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Arakan pada suatu malam Sultan Mahmud Shah terkénnang¹ akan ségala négrî tawalok baginda yang arah ka-barat, lama-lah tiada datang, sapêrti Bêrâas dan Manjong, dan Tun Aria Bijadiraja² itu pun sênjak² Mélaka alah, in tiada mengadap baginda. Maka Sultan Mahmud Shah pada malam itu juga menyuroh menanggil Bêndahara. Maka Bêndahara pun datang, maka titah Sultan Mah-

* The old name of Pulau Besar S.E. of Malacca.

Al-kesah.

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"Baik-lah."

Sa-télah datang-lah pada hari yang baik Tun Mahmud pun
di-kahwinkan orang-lah dengan Tun Mah.14 Sa-télah itu, maka
Paduka Tuan pun kembali-lah ka-Bentan, maka Tun Mahmud pun
di-tinggalkan pada Tun Aria Bijadira, maka Sélanger di-bérikkan
Paduka Tuan akan Tun Mahmud, maka Paduka Tuan pun
kembali-lah.

Sa-télah datang ka-Bentan, maka Paduka Tuan pun masok
mengadap Sultan Mahmud Shah, maka kata Tun Aria Bijadira
itu semua-nya di-pérsémáhkan pada Sultan Mahmud Shah. Maka
Sultan Mahmud Shah pun térlalu amat suka15 méngengar dia. Ada
pun péninggal Paduka Tuan maka Tun Aria Bijadira bélengkap
akan pérghi ka-Bentan, tiga-puloh banyak kélengkapan-nya. Sa-
télah sudah lángkap, maka Tun Aria Bijadira, pun pérghi-lah.
Sa-télah datang ka-Bentan, maka ja pun masok mengadap Sultan
Mahmud Shah, maka Sultan Mahmud Shah pun térlalu sukačitta
méllihat Raja Barat datang itu. Maka di-anugeráháyá baginda pérsalín
sa-lángkap-nya dan di-anugeráháyá baginda nobat di-surow
baginda nobat di-bérat. Maka Tun Aria Bijadira pun bérechákáp
mémbawa orang Mantjong16 dan sélgala orang rantau bérat akan
mélanggar Mélaka. Maka oleh Sultan Mahmud Shah Tun Aria
Bijadira di-surow baginda kembali ka-bérat, maka di-chabut
baginda chinchin di-jari baginda, di-bérikkan pada Tun Aria Bijá-
dira. Maka titah Sultan Mahmud Shah, "Ada pun Tun Aria
Bijadira sèpèrti jàni kita ini-lah kita bungan kan ka-laut, jíkalau
ada unteng kita, kalau timbul." Maka Tun Aria Bijadira pun
menjunjung duli, di-anugeráháyá pérsalín sápérti-nya, maka Tun
Aria Bijadira pun kembali-lah. Bèrpa lama-nya di-jàlan, sampai-lah ka-bérat, maka Tun Aria Bijadira pun nobat-lah di-bérat,
maka sélgala huluhalang-nya semua-nya mengadap nobat. Sa-télah
sudah nobat, semua-nya orang ményémbah pada Tun Aria Bijá-
dira, maka Tun Aria Bijadira ményémbah mengadap ka-Bentan
sèraya kata-nya, "Daulat Sultan Mahmud Shah?" Ada pun akan
Tun Aria Bijadira bérának tiga orang laki-laki, sa-orang bérgeñar
Raja Lela, kédúa bérgeñar Tun Rama, kétiga bérnama Tun Sayid.
Sa-télah itu, Sultan Abdul Jalil pun mohon pada Sultan Mahmud
Sháh kembali ka-Indéragiri, bérpa lama-nya sampai-lah ka-Indéra
giri.

Wa-llahu a'lamu bi-s-sawab.

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(IV) Al-kesah.

Maka tersêbut-lah pêrkataan Raja Haru; Sultan Husain nama-nya, têrlalu baik rupa-nya dan sikap-nya, p. 15 (183) shahadan dengan gajah bêrani-nya, baginda bêrakhap, "Jika aku di-atas gajah-ku


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Maka oleh baginda itu di-sayong-nya[22] tangan baju-nya, erek-orok.

Jari


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Sa-bérnula, di-anugérakahakan baginda anak tuan-tuan, empat p. 18 (186) puloh laki-laki, empat-puloh pérempuan, akan anaká baginda di-Haru itu, ada yang bini-nya pérgi, ada yang tinggal bapa pérgi, ada yang tinggal anak pérgi bapa. Sa-télah itu, maka Sultan Husain pun hilir-lah, maka Sultan Mahmud Shah pun ménéngantar anaká baginda hingga tajar²⁷ Sa-télah tiada-lah

¹⁹²⁵ Royal Asiatic Society.

Wa-llahu a'lanumu bi-s-sawab.

1. (1) There seems to be omitted some such phrase as sahaya langgar. (2)风筝 (3) جو (4) خبر (5) كنايكن (6) passim. (7) ظفر (8) Apparently a copyist's slip. (9) Omitted in MS. (10) ? omit. (11) مغفل (12) الأند (13) عدن (14) ? منعرينج (15) ? منعرينجوكان (16) ككوان (17) دين (18) سديس (19) منته (20) Omitted in MS. (21) سسين (22) ساباي (23) سفاس (24) كرفك (25) Omitted in MS. (26) سبكي (27) sa-bagai or sa-hagia datang "welcome." (28) Should be omitted. (29) Omitted in MS. (30) كامفت (31) نايكن (32) اسم (33) شكر (34) here and elsewhere. (35) ? di-kesit-nya. (36) كركات (37) حاف (38) برك (39) قار (40) أهف (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50)

(V) Al-kèsah.


* Journal Malayan Branch [Vol. III, Part I,}
raja-raja itu pun mohon pada Sultan Mahmud Shah, lalu masing-masing kembalí ka-négerí-nya.


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Maka Tun Narawangsa pérgi, sa-bentar bérjalan, bérténn dengan sa-orang pérémpanun membawa nasi dalam baku. Maka kata Tun Narawangsa, "Mari ibu, bérj akan nasi sadikit!"


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Maka Tun mahmud, anak Paduka Tuan, datang dari Sélango, dua-puloh kélengkapan, bértému dengang Tun Pékérma. Dدور


Journal Malayan Branch [Vol. III, Part I,
maka Paduka Tuan dan segala orang kaya-kaya dan segala pegawai semua-nya pun datang-lah mengadap Sultan Mahmud Shah.


1925] Royal Asiatic Society.


Sa-bémula akan Seri Agar Diraja, sédia di-suroh Bendahara Paduka Tuan dian di-Sélanger, pénaka raja-lah ia di-Sélanger. Ada pun akan Sultan Kélah bémak sa-orang pérémpuan, Raja.

(1) This clause seems superfluous.

Possibly a genuine old form. It seems to make better sense in Sanskrit than Udana.

(VI) Al-kesah.


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Raja Pahang pangkat tuan pada Béndahara." Maka salut Béra-
kélang, "Ia di-sana" di-mana tahu? Ada pun di-sini yang
istiadat-nya Béndahara Ujong Tanah itu lebuh juga mértabat dari-
pada Raja Pahang. Jikalau tuan lamba tiada pérchaya, lihatlah
dalam tambéra." Suroh ubah surut Raja Pahang, supaya ku-
térima." Maka di-salin-lah oleh utusan itu, di-ubah-nya 'sembah',
maka di-térima oleh Béra-kélang, maka utusan Pahang pun kembali-
lah ka-Pahang. Sa-télah sampai-lah ka-Pahang, ségala péri hal
itu sémua-nya di-katakán-nya pada Sultan Mahmud.

Hata bérapa lama-nya Sultan Alauddin Riayat Şah di-Pahang,
maka baginda pun kembali ka-Hujong Tanah. Sa-télah datang
ka-Hujong Tanah, Sultan Alauddin Riayat Şah pun diam di-
Pékán Tua ménbuat KotaKarah di-hulu Sungai [ ]. Hata maka kédéngaran-lah ka-Hujong Tanah, bahawa Séri Agar
Raja jadi Béndahara di-Perak, maka Sultan Alauddin pun télralu
murka. Sa-télah Béndahara Paduka Tuan ménéngar khabar itu,
maça Béndahara pun ménmuangkan déstár, maka kata Béndahara,
"Jikalau Séri Agar Raja bélum ku-bawa méngadap duli Yang-di-
perťuan, bélum aku béréstár!" Maka Béndahara Paduka Tuan
masok ka-dalam tiada béréstár, su-hingga kérís dan baju, maka
sémah Béndahara pada Sultan Alauddin Riayat Şah, "Tuanku,
patek mohon ka-Perak hondak mémanggil Séri Agar Raja." Maka
titah baginda Sultan, "Jangan Béndahara pérgi, biar-lah Tun
Narawangsa kita titahkan!", maka titah Sultan Alauddin Riayat
Şah, "Mau-kah Tun Narawangsa kita titahkan pérgi ka-Perak
mémanggil Séri Agar Raja?" Maka sémah Tun Narawangsa,
"Jika tuanku titahkan méngalahkan Perak sa-kali, mau-lah patek
pérgi; hángga mémanggil dia, mohon-lah patek, karna Raja Pérmé-
puan di-Perak itu anak pondok patek déngan dia patek." Maka
titah Sultan, "Jika démikian, Tun Pékérmia-lah pérgi ka-Perak
mémanggil Séri Agar Raja," Maka sémah Tun Pékérmia, "Bäk-
lah, tuanku," maka Tun Pékérmia pun bőrléngkap.

Sa-télah sudah lénkap, lalu pérgi ka-Perak. Sa-télah bérapa
hari di-jalan, sampai-lah ka-Perak, mødek ka-hulu hángga Labohan
Jong, kédéngaran-lah ka-Perak ménagatakán, "Tun Pékérmia datang
hédak mémanggil Béndahara Séri Agar Raja." Maka oleh Béndah-
ara di-suroh autari Tun Pékérmia nasí déngan périok-nya, gulai
dalam buloh: datang ka-pada Tun Pékérmia, maka télralu amarah
ia mélhat kélakan itu, maka Tun Pékérmia pun kembali ka-Hujong
Tanah. Sa-télah datang ka-Hujong Tanah, lalu masok méngadap
Sultan Alauddin p. 27 (195) Riayat Şah. Pada kétika itu baginda
sédang di-adv orang, maka Tun Pékérmia pun datang ményémah,
lalu dudok pada témplat-nya, maka ségala hal ahwal-nya itu sémua-
nya di-pérsémabahn-nya ka-bawah duli Sultan Alauddin Riayat
Şah. Sa-télah Béndahara Paduka Tuan ménéngar khabar itu,
maça sémah Béndahara ka-bawah duli Sultan Alauddin Riayat
Şah, "Tuanku, jikalau lain dari-pada patek di-titahkan ka-Perak,
tiada akan Séri Agar Raja datang. Biar-lah patek pérgi ka-Perak.

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Istiadat."

Maka upěti itu di-sěralakan pada Běndahara\(^{28}\) p. 29 (197) Raja masing-masing pada pęgangan-nya.


Wa-lahu a'lamu bi-s-sawab.

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
(2) Mahmud Shah omitted. (3) Pheo (formerly Brah) Khlang.
(4) Shah omitted. (5) error for Klang.
(6) error for suruh.
(7) Ayodha (Ayuthia), the old capital of Siam.
(8) ?
(9) or
(10) Dān
(11) Darōngśēm
(12) ?
(13) Rām
(14) passim
(15) though jadi-lah seems correct.
(16) Mendulikā 'local (or district) officer' occurs in the Trengganu inscription & in the Nagarakrtagama.
(17) 'local (or district) officer' occurs in the Trengganu inscription & in the Nagarakrtagama.
(18) mentulih
(19) Aft
(20) Bistālah
(21) sābali masok gēreja;ā sēgala sēnjata-nya tiada di-bawā-nya.
(22) aftar
(23) di-bawā-nya pada Sang Naya, maka di-buboh oled Sang Naya di-bawā-nya pada Sang Naya.
(26) Sang Naya itu, sēgala kēris-nya di-sērahkan-nya pada Sang Naya, maka di-buboh oled Sang Naya di-bawā-nya pada Sang Naya.
(27) Sang Naya itu, sēgala kēris-nya di-sērahkan-nya pada Sang Naya, maka di-buboh oled Sang Naya di-bawā-nya pada Sang Naya.
(30) Sang Naya itu, sēgala kēris-nya di-sērahkan-nya pada Sang Naya, maka di-buboh oled Sang Naya di-bawā-nya pada Sang Naya.

(VII) Al-kesah.


dahan-nya. Maka di-tambat orang pada tali kail itu tunda, maka di-tarik ka-atas; maka di-tambatkan pula selampit" yang sini.
Ada pun akan Béndahara Paduka Tuan dan Sérí Naradıraja dan Sultan Alauddin Riayat Shah, maka sémah Béndahara pada Sultan Alauddin Riayat Shah, "Tuanku, patek mohon ka-hílir hendiak miëihat kélakuan orang pérang itu."
Maka Sultan Alauddin Riayat Shah pun menyuruh membéria surat ka-pada Kapitan Mor Feringgi itu: siapa di-suroh itu bér-baléek tiada sampai, oleh béélil-nya dari ghalias-nya tér-laaru sangat.


Wa-llahu a'lamu bi-s-sawab wa ilaihi-l-marji 'u wa-l-ma 'ab.


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(VIII) Al-kesah.


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kembali mengadap Sultan Alauddin Riayat Shah, maka sägala kata Sang Sétia sämua-nya di-përsembahkan ka-pada Sultan.


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(1) ملكة (2) أنه لودغ (3) أد باتن سب لور ناته أ случ (4) ابلغ (5) فته (6) akan
(7) سدي (8) Omitted from MS. (9) مب. (10) جفكرة أن (11) وكابه (12) كلكلله
an obvious error. Raja Bongsu is the writer.
Malay Customs and Beliefs as Recorded in Malay Literature and Folklore.

By H. OVERBECK.

Part II.

Early Youth and Education.

The duties of parents towards their children are laid down in the Mahkota Segala Raja (Chapter XIV). For a wet nurse they should choose a virtuous honest and healthy woman as the child will be influenced by her character. When the child has reached its sixth year, it should be circumcised, taught manners and good behaviour, and given a good name in place of its nursery name. When it has reached its seventh year, it should be allotted a separate sleeping-place and taught to pray. In its thirteenth year, it must be made to attend the prayers, and brought back if it runs away from them. When a son has reached his sixteenth or seventeenth year, he must be given a wife.

Abdullah bin Abdul-Kadir (Singapore, 1907, I p. 11 seqq) relates that from the fourth month after his birth he was always sick. "And the people said: 'If such is the boy's fate that he never ceases to be ill, his parents perhaps are not fit (biada so-rasi) to bring him up, and it would be better to sell him to other people who have many children.' For that was done by the people in former times." "But the custom of selling children was not identical with the selling of a slave; it was nominal, and the price only a wong or five duit. That money was spent by the child's parents on cakes. The child remained in their care, and they only called it 'the child of N. N.' As they loved me so greatly, my parents allowed everything to be done for my good and thanked God if I remained alive. I was sold by my mother to six or seven families, and I had about fifteen or sixteen nurses."

Abdullah adds: "People further believed that if a boy had a high-sounding name it would bring sickness or death." In the Hikayat Hang Tuah (III, p. 65 sq.) the hero is sentenced to death by the Raja of Malacca. He warns Hang Jebat, who, he foresees, will succeed him in the king's favour, that on no account must he bear the title of Paduka Raja. Tun Teja, the king's favourite consort also warns the Raja that the title of Paduka Raja belongs to the members of the family of the Bendahara, who may resent its gift to an outsider. "Perhaps Hang Jebat will not be able to bear the (high-sounding) title of Paduka Raja." In spite of her warning the Raja confers the title on Hang Jebat, who soon becomes presumptuous and loses his life. Another passage (I.c. IV, p. 208) implies that a "lucky" title will avert ill-luck decreed by fate or inherited. A son of Hang Jebat went to Inderapura after the death of his father and found favour with the ruler.

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When the king wants to confer a title upon him and hears that he is the son of a rebel, he thinks: "What a pity his father was a rebel! It will be well to give him the title of Orang Kaya Sang Si-Tuah, or 'Sir Lucky One'." Nevertheless the youth meets with an unhappy death.

The duties of parents towards their children are often alluded to in the Hikayat Awang Sulong Merah Muda. When the hero "can discriminate between profit and loss, rotten and good, dear and cheap," Batin 'Alam his guardian arranges for him to study the Koran (p. 49) and later (p. 68) to provide him with a wife. He was delivered to a learned Kedzi to learn to read the Koran and to write Arabic, and then taken to Malim Kechil to study grammar (nahu) and logic (mantek). His foster father next (p. 55) teaches him skill in arms and charms for invulnerability (penchek denggan silat, apong denggan kabal).

When the hero of the Hikayat Anggun Che Tunggal (p. 20) reached his seventh year, he was taken to a learned man to learn the Koran. When he has finished the thirty chapters of the holy book and has done with

"Grammar and syntax, (Tammat suraf denggan nahu, "Logic and meaning, Tammat mantek denggan maana, "Explanation and commentaries," Tammat tafsir denggan bayan)

he is sent to a warrior to be taught skill in arms and charms for invulnerability and strength (Penchek denggan silat, apong denggan penimbulp, kabal denggan kuat). Next he learns the customs, conventions and manners (isti'adat, lemabagan, resam, bahasa) and the plays and pastimes of princes, such as chess, draughts (jogar) and football (sepak raga).

Raja Bujang Selamat, the cousin and brother-in-law of the hero of the Hikayat Raja Muda when he is twelve years of age is taught (p. 3) to read the Koran and to learn

"Grammar and logic, (Nahu denggan mantek, "Pronunciation and meaning," Lafiath denggan maana).

How princes are treated in school we read in chapter of the Sejarah Melaka. Raja Mutlaflir, grandson of Sultan Mahmud of Malacca, is given a fine pandanus-mat with coloured flower-pattern (tikar puchar), spread on the top of a carpet under which lies a common floor-mat (hampurun). On the pandanus-mat is placed a low seat (peterana) on which the Raja sits during the lesson. When later a son is born to Sultan Mahmud, the seat (peterana) is taken away, and when the new-born prince has his head shaved and has received his nursery name, the carpet also is taken away and Raja Mutlaflir sits on the floor-mat.

Abdullah in his autobiography complains bitterly of the lack of schools for teaching the Malay language, and in his account of his voyage to Kelantan he says (p. 16):——

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“It is the custom in all Malay countries that the people do not study their own language, but from childhood begin to read the Koran, without, however, understanding it. Perhaps among a thousand there is not one who understands the Koran thoroughly.”

Of punishments and customs in the usual Koran-school Abdullah gives a good description (I. p. 18):—

There is the upit China, four pieces of rattan bound together on the lower end. The upper ends have holes through which a string is passed. The fingers are inserted between the pieces of rattan and the tops are bound together, so that the fingers are badly pinched. It is the punishment for boys who have stolen something or have beaten their school-fellows. The kayu palat is a round piece of wood, half the width of a man’s chest, with three holes in it. Strings are put through the two outer holes and the loose ends are passed through the middle hole. If a boy has run away from school or has climbed a tree or has kicked his school-fellows, both his feet are passed through the ropes and turned upward, while his soles are beaten with a rattan. There is further the iron-chain, about a fathom or more in length. One end is nailed to a large piece of timber, and the other end can be closed with a lock. If a boys runs away every moment or often quarrels with his school-fellows or does not listen to the words of his parents, or is very slow at learning, he has the chain locked round his waist and is ordered to carry the piece of timber round the school room. Sometimes they are left, when the school closes, fastened to the chain and are not allowed to go home; their food is sent to them. Then there is the sengkang, a punishment for boys given to contradicting and of naughty disposition. They have to hold their left ear with the right hand, and their right ear with the left hand, and are made to sit down and stand up without stopping. There is another punishment for boys who are lazy or otherwise offenders. A smoking fire is made of dried coconut-husks, and the boy is held upside down over the smoke; sometimes red pepper is put into the fire, and the smoke makes eyes and nose smart much more than usual, so that they water. A boy who is very wicked and offers resistance or is in the habit of running away or stealing, is hung up by both hands with his feet off the ground. Another punishment for very wicked boys or those who constantly run away is to lay them face downward, and beat their posteriors with a cane. Boys who are great liars or use bad language have their mouths rubbed with red pepper. “All these punishments can be inflicted by the teacher in school, whether the child is the son of a prince or a high dignitary. He can beat a boy in the school till the blood flows, and no lawsuit can be brought against him, as long as his teaching is good.”

When a child is to enter a Koran-school the father or the mother comes first to pay obeisance to the teacher, bringing a salver with betel, a tray with cakes and the prospective pupil. The

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parents say to the teacher: "Sir, there are only two things I beg of you, that you do not hurt the boy's eyes, and that you do not break his arms and legs; otherwise you may do with him what you like." The boy pays obeisance at the teacher's feet, and the teacher prays for a blessing on him. The cakes are distributed amongst the schoolboys, the teacher takes the money, and sandal-blossoms are also distributed. In the Hikayat Sang Kanchil (Singapore, 1915, p. 21) when he brings his children to Sir Mouse-deer (Sang Kanchil), who pretends to teach the Koran, the Tiger says: "There are only two things your servant begs of you, firstly do not break, and secondly do not blind (pértama patah, kédua buta): otherwise do with them whatever you like."

When a boy has finished his studies, a feast is given by his parents, and often he is circumcised.

"My parents," writes Abdullah (I, p. 21) "agreed with their relations that I should finish my study of the Koran and be circumcised at the same time. Invitations were sent out, and there was a large assembly. I was dressed in beautiful garments, silver and gold, and brought before the company. I was ordered to read out of the Koran whatever any one wanted to hear. My teacher was present. There were many clever men, who put me questions about the reading of the Koran, the pronunciation and so on; when I had answered, the priest or the preacher read the prayers. After that my parents gave the teacher a change of raiment; on a metal plate they placed a sarong, a coat, a handkerchief and a pair of shoes, together with ten or twenty dollars. These presents they put down in front of the teacher doing obeisance and asking him to discharge me from my studies. In the evening my nails were stained with henna, as it is done with bridegrooms. For the following day hundreds of persons were invited and entertained with food and drink; at night time I was carried round the town in procession, seated in a carriage, with hundreds of people and music following me. On the next day guests were again invited and entertained. After prayers the circumciser got ready. Seven days later I had my first bath and could walk about. A change of raiment was then given to the circumciser, together with his fee of three or four dollars."

When Awang Sulong had learned to read the Koran and other sciences as well as fencing and the secrets of invulnerability, his foster-father sent for the officers of State and ordered them to prepare for his circumcision. When seven days and seven nights of feasting had passed, the mudin was fetched. Awang Sulong is dressed in Arab clothes. The Maharaja Menteri takes him on his shoulders, the Kadzi calls to God three times, and everybody answers. To the thunder of cannons and other fire-arms, accompanied by fencers, dancers and fakirs who try to stab themselves with awls to show their invulnerability, Awang Sulong is carried seven times round the town and then to the landing-place, where he dons bathing clothes and is shampooed, powdered with cosmetics.

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sprinkled with sacrificial rice-paste, rubbed with limes and bathed by the mudin. In his Arab dress he is then carried back in procession to the palace, and when he arrives at the stairs, soaked rice (beras basahan) is scattered over him. He sits on a golden throne, and the wives and daughters of the high dignitaries sit in front of him on chairs, eight to the right, eight to the left, all with the yellow silk-cloth on their shoulders. The sons of the high dignitaries carry swords and spears with tufts of horse-hair; the Kadzi sits to the right, the Malim Kechil to the left of Awang Sulong. A meal is served, the Kadzi recites prayers, and betel is brought. Awang Sulong rises from his golden throne and opens his garments. Night comes, and the singers and dancers continue their songs and dances, the fakirs their tricks and the fencers their fencing until midnight, when the mudin dresses Awang Sulong again in his clothes. The fencing-master approaches and in ceremonious, theatrical steps presents the hemaa (menarikan kain) to stain Awang Sulong’s nails, while tambourines and castanets are sounded (sera menukul rebana layu cheechuk kain). When dawn approaches, a banquet is served and the guests return home. Only the mudin stays with Awang Sulong, who at the time of the early morning-prayer sits in cold water (berehadam), where a meal is served to him. Returned to the palace he changes his bathing-clothes for his usual garments. The mudin places him on a banana-stem, puts on the nippers (sepil) and performs the operation, uttering the confession of faith. He applies medicine to stop the bleeding and prevent blood-poisoning, blows into the air a charm against the influence of spirits and fairies (di-hembuskan tangkal hantu puri) and dissolves in water a charm against the spirit of the water (tangkal hantu ayer pun di-tawarkan). All people pray three times as a sign that the flesh and blood of the son of a great king has been thrown away.

The Red and White Flag Societies

By W. G. Stirling.

(With text figures).

While stationed in the Customs and Chandra Monopoly Departments in Perak from 1911-1913 I was able to gain information from the local Malays and Chinese about the Red and White Flag Associations, better known as “Bandera Merah and Bandera Putih Kongsia’s” which existed there in 1887 and down to 1890. The following brief notes give an outline of these two parties.

These two secret societies were obviously branches of the notorious Ghee Hin and Ghee Hok (Triad Societies). The White Flag Society came into prominence about 1889, its aims being at 1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
first religious: to assist at religious ceremonies, circumcisions, weddings, and funerals, to help a brother when in need, and to assist him to redress his wrongs. The Red Flag Society was established a little later.

Their activities were mostly in the Native States.

Allied with the Ghee Hin and Ghee Hok these two societies were chiefly composed of Malays, Javanese, Boyanese, and Tamils as well as some Chinese whose business it was to keep an eye on their Muhammadan sworn brethren unknown to them. At the outset, like the Ghee Hin and Ghee Hok, the Red and White Flag societies were mutual benefit societies and only men of deserving character were admitted. Later any rascal could join and the societies were often in fierce conflict. Like the Ghee Hin and Ghee Hok they lost their religious object and resorted to all sorts of malpractices, the cause of their downfall.

No brother might interfere with the wife or property of another member, no brother might give evidence against another: if forced, he had to perjure himself in favour of his sworn brother. No brother might take action against another even if wronged by him: he had to refer the matter to the Head-men of his particular Branch of the Society. No brother might steal from another brother, and if called on by a sign to assist another (even to commit murder) he was to do all in his power to help. He was not to disclose a brother culprit's name, and if possible was to facilitate his escape.

One of the test questions of the Red Flag Society was, "Has your mother old iron?" The exact answer I am unable to give. Some say it was, "She has three cash," possibly an allusion to the three cash used in the Triad Ritual. If the person asked could not give the correct answer, he was beaten. Another test question was, "Who is your mother?" the answer begins, "The Red Flag Society."

The entrance fee to the Red Flag was $1.25 and the White $3.25. They terrorized districts and forced poor people to join. When feasts were held, or a lawyer had to be engaged to defend a brother, each member had to pay 30 cents. In this way sums of $300-400 were collected, a portion being taken by the Headman and the remainder used to pay the lawyer, witnesses, travelling expenses and at times to buy evidence!

In the Red Flag Society, as Malays shake hands, the grip was as follows. The thumb was placed with a distinct pressure on the knuckle of the forefinger and in withdrawing the hand, the tips of the fingers were drawn lightly along the tips of the fingers on the other man's hand. Members of the White Flag Society on shaking hands pressed the point of the forefinger slightly into the palm of the other man's hand and withdrew it sharply. As the Chinese do not shake hands, the following method was adopted for Chinese members. On meeting a stranger the hand was raised

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to just below the ear, thumb upright; if the person tested was a member he did the same but raised the forefinger. If a murder had been committed by a member of the White Flag Society and he desired the assistance of the Society, placing his queue then worn by Chinese over his shoulder he made a bight in it, passed the running end round his neck and made a slip knot in the bight; the tassel end he held in his hand and gave it a tug. If the offence is one of grievous assault he released the queue by a sharp tug, pulling it clear. A Malay member made a similar sign using a cloth round his shoulders. Illustrate I. If assistance was asked in a quarrel, the hand was raised to just below the jawbone, the arm lifted to the full extent and brought down in a circular motion, the first and fourth fingers being extended. If the member carried a stick, the sign was given by reversing the stick. When a member introduced a non-member to a Society feast he warned members present by taking a cup of water or tea and spilling a little of it on the floor. (This is a Chinese custom. A cup of tea is presented by Chinese to a visitor and if he does not want to drink it he takes a little and spills it on the ground). Were the person introduced a member of a friendly society, a little of the drink was poured into the plate or on the table.

When a candidate had been sworn and taught the pass grips and desired further instruction, he was told to fold a square of paper into different shapes. There were 5 different ways of folding the paper, each called by certain names.

A. Moja  Table
B. Baju  Coat
C. Seluar  Trousers
D. Sampan  Boat
E. Kasut  Shoes

Chinese candidates at initiation held 3 sticks of incense, swore secrecy on them and extinguished them by plunging the lighted ends into a bowl of water or wine, saying "So may my life be extinguished, if I divulge the secrets of this society.

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These societies being branches of the notorious Ghee Hin and Ghee Hok Triad Societies, it was necessary for the Chinese Triad members to have some members of the mother Lodge join the Red and White Flag societies in order to spy on them, keep covertly in touch with their doings, and detect possible traitors.

The oath of secrecy for the Chinese was literally; "If I betray my oath, may the devil get me when I am dead." The middle finger of the candidate's right hand was pricked and a drop of blood squeezed into a cup of wine. A white cock was decapitated and a drop of its blood also was mixed with the wine. A sip from this gruesome cup was taken by all the members and newly initiated candidates and in this way they became sworn blood brothers. In swearing in Malays, the Koran was placed on the candidate's head and with arms held aloft he repeated the following oath, "If I betray the secrets of this Society, may the Koran devour my entrails." A cup of blood from the drops taken from candidates' fingers was sometimes mixed with milk, as emblematic of mother's milk and foster brotherhood.

There can be no doubt that the Red and White Flag Societies were created at the instance of the Headmen of the Ghee Hin and Ghee Hok Triad Societies and were used to deal with the local police (the majority of whom are still Malays) and such other Malays as headmen, schoolmasters, bailiffs and other Government employees. The word "Red" signified 'righteousness' and the word "White" 'loyalty.' For Righteousness and Loyalty were the two watchwords of the Triad Society. The colour of the flags, which were triangular in shape were Red and White, such flags are in common use among Muslims. Votive flags of these colours are often found at sacred spots, where spirits are supposed to reside.

The existence of these societies was purely local. Their members were mostly bullies and were engaged by the Chinese Triad Society to do work, which the Triad Society did not want brought home to it. The two societies were never recognized or registered by the Government in the same way as the Ghee Hin, Ghee Hok, and other Triad Societies were recognized before 1890, when all of them were declared unlawful and dangerous and compelled to hand over their seals and insignia to the Government. These Malay
bodies had no political aims like the original aims of the Triad Society. From first to last they were appendages and conveniences of the Triad Society. Some time after the suppression of the latter they became insignificant though at odd times they caused trouble by levying blackmail and fostering disturbances. But their activities never caused serious concern and I suppose they no longer exist to-day. The formation of secret societies is rather alien to the Malay character and must depend generally on a religious motive. The Red and White Flag Societies were only kept alive by the knowledge that they had in the Triad Society a powerful organization behind them.

The Diploma of the White Flag Society was an oblong piece of yellow silk with a diamond on one side round which was written the oath of secrecy; on the other side appeared the name of the member. The Red Flag Diploma was a ticket on yellow or red paper. On one side was written the name of the member and his address or kampong; on the other side a device bearing crossed red triangular flags and a facsimile of the Eight Diagrams "Pat Kwa" which showed the influence of the Chinese Triad Society.

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**A Preliminary Account of the Geology of Kelantan**

*By H. E. Savage.*

**Preface**

A discussion as to the ages and systems to which the rocks of Kelantan belongs, is unnecessary. The formations are similar in every respect to those of the rest of the Peninsula, which have been determined by Mr. J. B. Scrivenor to be as follows:—

The sediments are divided into two main groups, the Raub Series (calcareous), and the Quartzite and Shale Series. The age of the former is from Carboniferous to Permian, while that of the latter is Triassic. The exact relation of the cherts to these two series is still undecided. While at first it was thought that they were a distinct series occurring between the Raubs and Quartzites and separated from the latter by an unconformity, it now seems quite possible that they form a passage from the calcareous to the sedimentary rocks. The Pahang Volcanic Series, being found in both the Raub and Quartzite and Shale Series, ranges from Carboniferous to Triassic in age. The granite of the Peninsula has been determined as Mesozoic and younger than the Quartzite and Shale Series.

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I. Previous Literature, Etc.
II. Physical Features and General Geological Sketch.
III. The Granite and Allied Rocks.
IV. The Rauk Series,
V. The Chert and Associated Rocks.
VI. The Pahang Volcanic Series.
VII. The Quartzite Series.
VIII. Tertiary Rocks.
IX. Recent Deposits.
X. Old Gold and Tin Workings.

Literature Dealing with the Geology and General Physical Features of Kelantan.


Other probable references are:—Journals Straits Branch, Royal Asiatic Society, Nos. I, VI, XI, & XXIV.

II. Physical Features and General Geological Sketch.

The main granite range of the Peninsula forms the western boundary of Kelantan. Following the range north-north-eastwards from Gunong Yong Yap (7,090 ft.) on the Perak border, there are several peaks of 6,000 ft. and 7,000 ft. in height, of which Gunong Ulu Temengor (7,020 ft.), Gunong Grah (6,899 ft.) and Gunong Noring (6,194 ft.) are perhaps the best known.

North of Gunong Noring, the granite outcrop of the Main Range bifurcates, one arm trending north-north-west into Upper Perak, and the other north-north-east through the north-west corner of Kelantan into Siam, sending out a spur in a north-eastern direction into Kelantan. Trending east-south-east from Noring there is a smaller spur containing the peaks of Gunong Ayam (5,030 ft.) and Gunong Setong (4,880 ft.).

In the north of the State there is an alluvial plain with an area of more than 1,000 square miles. It is bounded on the north and east by the China Sea, and on the north-west by the Sungei Golok, which forms part of the boundary between Kelantan and Siam. In the south, at a distance of about 25 miles from the coast, the land rises and small isolated quartzite and shale hills appear. These,

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increasing in number and height, eventually form a range that has Gunong Tahan (7,186 ft.) on the Pahang border, as its highest peak, and thus may be identified with the Tahan Range of quartzite and shales in Pahang.

In the east of the plain, about ten miles from the coast, there are some small granite hills, which, isolated at first, increase in height and run together to form a spur, the northern extremity of the granite range which, separating Kelantan and Trengganu, has several peaks upwards of 4,000 ft. in height.

There are many large and small limestone hills and ridges in the south-east part of the State, which rise abruptly out of the extensive alluvial plain through which the Sungai Galas flows. They are obviously of the same series which, in Ulu Pahang, contains the Churual Range. Between these limestone hills and the Main Range, there are quartzite and shale hills, which are a prominent feature in Pahang, where they are known as the Main Range Foot-hills.

Further work in this district may reveal Chert Series rocks and calcareous rocks between the Main Range and the Main Range Foot-hills. In the Ulu Sungai Betis, cherts have been found, together with actinolite-epidote schists, quite close to the granite.

Strong shearing is a typical feature of the rocks older than the granite (i.e. Quartzite and Shale Series, Chert, Pahang Volcanic Series, and Raub Series.)

III. The Granite and Allied Rocks.

The granites of Kelantan are similar to those of the other parts of the Peninsula. That of the Main Range, which is the predominant type, is usually a coarse-textured variety with large porphyritic crystals of felspar. Non-porphyritic granite and finer-textured granite are found in several districts.

Bukit Kemahang and Bukit Roh, at the head of the spur that projects from the Main Range in the north, consist of masses of the coarse porphyritic granite, with local modifications.

The porphyritic granite has large phenocrysts of orthoclase in a groundmass of quartz and biotite, and occasionally some green hornblende. In places the outcrops are finer-textured, and differ considerably as to their acidity or basicity; this is due to flow in the unconsolidated magma. These “gneissic” bands and patches often have a width of 4 ft.

Sometimes the granite passes into quartz-porphyry, which, however, forms only small and isolated patches in the mass. At Bukit Roh granite-porphyry is found.

The outcrops on Bukit Jeléi are of similar rocks.

Gunong Noring Kechil (Noring East) is a very steep mountain. No outcrops were passed either on the ascent or the descent, but boulders occur. They are of soft, decomposed biotite-granite, non-porphyritic but fairly coarse-textured. Granite from the hills close by, and in the Sungai Bala, which runs near the foot of Noring
Kēchil, is the usual porphyritic variety, with occasional outcrops of finer-textured biotite-granite.

Gunong Sētong is a mass of similar granite capped with metamorphosed limestone. At the summit the rock contains many secondary minerals, derived from contact with the limestone, chief among which are:—garnet, pyroxene, epidote, amphibole and sphene. Granite from Ulu Sungei Bētis are described elsewhere.

The Kēsiai Range, which is part of the Kēmahang spur, is composed of typical Main Range granite.

The Kelantan-Trengganu boundary range is granite of somewhat similar nature. Phenocrysts of felspar are common, and the dominating ferro-magnesian mineral is biotite, although there is nearly always hornblende in addition, and sometimes it is so abundant that the rock becomes a hornblende granite. On the Pasir Puteh-Kota Bharu road, Bukit Gunceng, and Bukit Padang Rāja are of coarse porphyritic biotite-granite containing hornblende, Bukit Marak is biotite-granite and Bukit Mak Lipah is biotite-hornblende-granite. Bukit Jawa gives outcrops of hornblende-granite and hornblende-biotite granite. They are not porphyritic and are of medium texture.

On the Trunk Road, Bukit Kēmuning gives two varieties of hornblende-granite, one coarse and porphyritic, the other of medium texture and non-porphyritic, an ordinary biotite granite, and a biotite-hornblende granite. Bukit Batu Bēsar is hornblende-biotite granite of coarse texture. Bukit Sabot is also hornblende-biotite-granite coarse in texture, but the felspars are pink, giving the rock in general a salmon colour.

On the Pasir Puteh-Tēmangan road, Bukit Hangus, Bukit Jēram, and Bukit Ayer Tinggi Kēchil are all of medium-textured biotite-granite. Bukit Tualang Chāpa is biotite-hornblende-granite, and Bukit Kahong is hornblende-granite. Bukit Yong is biotite-granite with local modifications of quartz-porphyr, and Bukit Batu Pēngasah is porphyritic biotite-granite.

About four miles up the Sungei Pahi, a tributary of the Sungei Lēhīr, there are extensive outcrops of hornblende-granite. The Sungei Lēhīr Kēchil flows over granite country which extends to within three or four miles of its mouth. Biotite and biotite-hornblende-granites occur, some of which also contain pyroxene.

Hornblende-granite also occurs on the railway trace about six miles S. E. of Kuala Gris.

A weathered hornblende-syenite is found at Bukit Pač hat, where it is intruded into rocks of the Pahang Volcanic Series. Pyroxene is an accessory mineral. Associated with the granite are dykes of aplite. These are found cutting the outcrops at Bukit Jēram, Bukit Ayer Tinggi Kēchil, Bukit Marak, and in a stream at the foot of Bukit Batu Pēngasah.

Boulders of greisen are found at Bukit Tajam, a ridge about 4,000 ft. high, north of Gunong Noring Kēchil. They are composed of quartz and muscovite, with subordinate iron-minerals.

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Diorite is found at Bukit Sëtambul, and in the Ulu Sungei Përgau. Those from Bukit Sëtambul contain abundant hornblende and pyroxene in addition to felspar (albite), biotite, pyrrhotite, and other iron minerals.

A dyke of altered lamprophyre 8 ft. wide, is intruded into the limestone in the Sungei Sokor, about 1 ½ miles above Kuala Liang. It strikes W. S. W./E. N. E. and dips 80 N. N. W. The fact that this strike is parallel to the trend of the Këmahang Spur, and the dip directly towards it, suggest a connection with that granite.

The lamprophyre consists of a groundmass of abundant laths of plagioclase (oligoclase-andesine), and biotite, with larger crystals that have been replaced by a mixture of chlorite and calcite. The shapes of these pseudomorphs are typical of hornblende and olivine, and one or two suggest augite also. A few small crystals of hornblende, partly altered to chlorite, can be seen. There is abundant finely disseminated black iron-oxide.

IV. The Raub Series.

As in the other parts of the Peninsula, this calcareous series includes phyllites and schists in addition to crystalline limestones and shales. The general strike of the series, as far as has been ascertained, varies from E.N.E./W.S.W. to N.W./S.E. The dip may be to either east or west or vertical. The majority of readings taken gave strike N. S., dip steep to either east or west or vertical. Many gave N.N.W./S.S.E. with dip either vertical or steep to E.N.E., some gave E.N.E./W.S.W. with dip steep to N.N.W., and isolated readings gave N.N.E./S.S.W. dip gentle to W.N.W., N.N.W./S.S.E. dip steep to W.S.W., and N.W./S.E. dip steep to N.E. Limestone and shale outcrops are found in Ulu Sungei Sokor, Ulu Sungei Liang, Ulu Sungei Përgau, in the country on both banks of the Sungei Galas from the Pahang boundary to Jëram Apit, on the railway trace between Manik Urai and Kuala Gris, in the Sungei Aring and near the Sungei Durian. (Both these rivers are tributaries of the Sungei Lëbir, the latter in the extreme N.E.)

Metamorphosed limestone forms the cap of Gunong Sëtong, and is evidently the remains of limestone that subsided into the granite when the Main Range anticline was broken up and the granite intruded. The rock is now a mass of crystalline calcite in which are streaks and patches of secondary minerals and of the altered granite. The commonest secondary minerals are melanite garnet, greenish pyroxene, epidote, greenish biotite, pale green muscovite, chondrodite and sphene.

In the Sungei Aring are several exposures of limestone, metamorphosed by intrusions of Pahang Volcanic Series rocks, (dolerites), into marble. Several handsome figured marbles were obtained, the colours being:—Indian red with patches and streaks of white and darker red; mixture of white and pink with "hairs" and small spots of black and red; patches of blue-grey with veins of
pink and white and thin streaks of black and white; patches of Indian red, grey and pink, streaked with "hairs" of black and red. All the above are of very fine texture; in addition there are fine-textured plain white and grey-white varieties, and a coarse saccharoidal greyish-white marble.

A less metamorphosed limestone occurs at Gua Gelak (near Manik Urai). The colours are:—streaks of yellow-brown and blue-greyish white, and an ivory-like variety which is a very pale yellow-brown with black spots. The only Pahang Volcanic Series rock seen in actual contact with this limestone is a narrow band of volcanic ash from four to eight inches wide.

On both banks of the Sungei Galas, and in the river from just above Kuala Néggiri to Chégar Panjang (near Kuala Lébir), are continuous outcrops of phyllites. They are usually of a greenish colour, and are evidently strongly sheared volcanic ashes which were interbedded with the original Raub shales. In them calcite is a common secondary mineral.

Mica-schists and hornblende-schists also occur. Some of the latter contain abundant zoisite.

So far the only fossils found in Kelantan are ferns, which were obtained from a single outcrop of Raub shales, dark grey in colour, about half a mile up the Sungei Chiku (a tributary of the Sungei Galas, just above Kuala Néggiri).

V. The Cherts and the Associated Rocks.

In Kelantan Chert Series rocks have so far only been met with in the Ulun Sungei Lébir, where several outcrops are exposed and in the Sungei Betis. The strike varies from E.N.E./W.S.W. to N.N.W./S.S.E. The dip may be either westerly or easterly, and is usually steep, sometimes vertical.

In the Sungei Aring, about one and a half miles below Kampong Bérawin, they are associated with Raub rocks—limestones and shales—and Pahang Volcanic Series rocks. A similar exposure occurs about half a mile above Kampong Bérawin. The cherts are interbedded with shales and volcanic ashes, the beds of chert having an average thickness of about 8 inches.

Farther up the Sungei Lébir, a few hundred yards above Kuala Pértang, they are associated with the Quartzite and Shale Series and Pahang Volcanic Series rocks, the cherts being interbedded with volcanic ash, shales and fine grained quartzites. The thickness of the beds varies from 2 inches to 1 ft. Other exposures are found south of Kuala Pértang up to Kuala Durian, where both Raub and Quartzite and Shale Series rocks are found.

Some of the cherts have been more or less strongly sheared and brecciated. Their usual colour is green with occasional thin bands of white. Some of the interbedded quartzites contain fragments of chert and apparently a certain amount of felspar.
It has been noticed that these outcrops usually occur in districts where both Raub and Quartzite and Shale Series rocks are found, and usually having the same strike and dip as them. This suggests that they are either the oldest rocks of the Quartzite and Shale Series or the youngest of the Raub Series.

Cherts, some of them radiolarian, are found in the Sungai Nenggiri near the Perak boundary, between Kuala Kedap and Kuala Pérías, and just above Kuala Pérías. In the Sungai Bētis, they are found at Lata Gajah.

VI. The Pahang Volcanic Series.

In his memoir on the Geology of Ulu Pahang, Mr. J. B. Scrivenor, speaking of the Pahang Volcanic Series says (p. 41), "These volcanic rocks are most numerous in country composed of Raub Series rocks, but are found sparingly with the Gondwana (i.e. Quartzite and Shale Series) rocks also." This is not the case in Kelantan, where Pahang Volcanic Series ashes and lavas are interbedded with Quartzite and Shale Series rocks over an area which extends from North to South for about 70 miles. The Sungai Lebir flows over the greater part of this district, and in this river the outcrops of the Pahang Volcanic Series rocks are far more abundant than those of the Quartzite and Shale Series. It is quite probable that Pahang Volcanic Series rocks are even more common in districts composed of Raub Series rocks but the outcrops in the Sungai Lebir, and on the right bank of the Sungai Kelantan below Kuala Lebir, cannot be described as "sparing." Rhyolites are most common in the north of the district, but one or two outcrops are found in the south. Andesites occur in the south. Dolerite outcrops are found in the north and south, those in the north being by far the larger.

The following are descriptions of typical rocks.

**Rhyolite.** Composed of strongly resorbed phenoecysts of quartz and felspar, which originally had good crystal outline, in a base apparently mainly composed of micaceous aggregates, (derived from felspar). Flow structure is usually marked and spherulites are common. Calcite is a common secondary mineral.

**Hornblendie Andesite.** The groundmass is usually composed of micaceous minerals resulting from the decomposition of felspars. Clear sections show it to consist of minute needles and laths-of plagioclase arranged more or less parallel to each other, and suggesting flow structure. In it are phenoecysts of zoned felspars, commonly twinned in irregular fashion, which are mainly plagioclase. (Extinction angles of labradorite have been obtained, although usually the felspars are too decomposed for their extinction angles to be recognised). A few laths of brown hornblende are present, also a few fragments of colourless pyroxene. Secondary epidote is common.

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
Augite Andesite. In structure similar to the above, but phenocrysts of honey-coloured augite are abundant, instead of hornblende. Secondary epidote is common.

Dolerite. The structure of the rock is ophitic. It consists of small lath-like crystals of felspar (Carlsbad twinning clear, polysynthetic twinning not distinct), with larger masses and some crystals of augite, some of which have been altered to chlorite and serpentine. Cavities filled with chlorite are common; chlorite and secondary calcite make up most of the base.

Quartz Dolerite. Composed of abundant small idiomorphic crystals and laths of plagioclase (oligoclase-albite) with interstitial greenish chlorite and abundant ilmenite, which is commonly altered to leucoxene. There are sporadic blebs of quartz, some colourless pyroxene and a small amount of epidote present.

South of Manik Urai andesitic ashes, breccias, and tufts are very common, more so than the lavas. In addition to fragments of lava (andesite), shale, chert, and quartz, the tufts and breccias sometimes contain rounded fragments—resembling pebbles—of a siliceous rock which is probably similar to that described by Mr. E. S. Willbourn, on page 505 of his paper "The Pahang Volcanic Series." (Geological Magazine, 1917, Vol. IV.) The minerals commonly forming the matrix of the tufts, etc., are abundant laths of felspar, some quartz, colourless pyroxene, yellowish hornblende, a black mineral (probably magnetite) and varying amounts of chlorite and epidote.

Rhyolite ashes occur together with the rhyolites in the north. They contain resorbed crystals of quartz, and sometimes plagioclase, set in a felspathic (cryptocrystalline) base. Small flakes of muscovite and occasionally hornblende are present. Epidote is common.

Other ashes which cannot be classified are common over the whole district.

Quartz-porphyry of the same eruptive period is found in the north at several places. It sometimes so much resembles the rhyolites as to be indistinguishable from them.

Pyroxene-granite-porphyry—probably a similar rock to that mentioned by Mr. E. S. Willbourn, in his memoir on Négrí Sémblan and South Selangor (p. 59)—is found on the railway line near Manik Urai from pegs 3647 to 3662. It is strongly sheared and is intruded into calcareous epidote-chlorite-schists and mica-schists which were once Rauh Series shales. No granite outcrops were found in the same district with which this intrusion could be connected, and the rock is believed to be of Pahang Volcanic Series age on account of this and the strong shearing shown both by the granite-porphyry and the country schists, which is attributed to the movement caused by the intrusion of the Main Range Granite.

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The intrusions of the Pahang Volcanic Series have formed several hill ranges, some of them well over 1,000 ft. in height, generally trending N/S, on both sides of the Sungai Lèbir and the Sungai Kelantan between Tanah Merah and Kuala Lèbir. Of these the Témangan Range (968 ft.) is rhyolite, rhyolite-ashes and the quartz-porphyry mentioned above. The Bukit Genting—Bukit Pachat Range is dolerite, as are also a few small hills north of the range, and Bukit Makah north of Tanah Merah. Bukit Mèngkubuh is of rocks similar to those of the Témangan Range. Bukit Pinang (1,760 ft.) gives outcrops of andesite tuffs and ashes. On Bukit Papan outcrops of augite-andesite were found; Bukit Kusan is of andesite ash.

Pahang Volcanic Series rocks intrusive into the Raub Series extend from just above Kuala Nènggiri, in Ulu Sungai Galas, to Jèram Apati, in the Sungai Galas below Kuala Pèrgau, and are continued northwards to the Ulu Sungai Sokor. The outcrops in this area are not so abundant as those in the Sungai Lèbir. The commonest rock is a strongly sheared ash, the phyllites mentioned at the end of chapter IV. These occur interbedded with the shales over the whole district. They usually contain a fair amount of secondary calcite.

Lavas outcrop at Kuala Sungai Nènggiri; Jèram Tras Minyak and in the Sungai Chiku; rhyolites, often glassy, being predominant. Some weathered lavas may be trachytes, and one specimen is like a weathered quartz-dolerite. Andesites were not found. Extensive outcrops of rhyolites, tuffs and ashes occur in the Sungai Chiku. Near Kuala Chiku they are interbedded with fossiliferous Raub shales, but towards the Ulu they become the country rock. These rocks were followed for some six miles up the Sungai Chiku. It is probable that they form part of, or are connected with, the rocks that form Bukit Kusan on the Sungai Lèbir.

The phyllites mentioned above also occur in the Sungai Nènggiri, between Kuala Nènggiri and Kuala Lah.

Between Pulai and Kundor an outcrop and a boulder of ash occur a quarter and half a mile respectively beyond the Sungai Batu Papan.

The Pahang Volcanic Series rocks in the Ulu Sungai Sokor are ashes, and ashes are also found interbedded with Quartzite and Shale Series rocks in the Sungai Nènggiri between Kuala Pèrolah and Kuala Kèdad, and in the Sungai Pèrgau near Kampong Kandek.

VII. The Quartzite and Shale Series.

The best outcrops of these rocks occur in the Sungai Sokor, from Kuala Sokor to Kuala Liang. Over this distance the outcrops are almost continuous, and all varieties of the series are found, ranging from soft, clayey shales, through sandy shales, fine-grained quartzites and coarse-grained quartzites, to conglomerates. Pahang 1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
Volcanic Series rocks are not at all abundant, only one or two sills of an altered porphyry and a few beds of ash being found, but Bukit Batu Mengkubang (see Chap. II.), round the base of which the river flows, represents that series in this district.

In the Sungai Lébir, although the outcrops are less numerous, they are found over a greater area, (from Kuala Lébir to Sungai Durian).

The commonest rocks in the Sungai Kelantan, between Bukit Panau and Kuala Lébir, are soft, weathered shales, with occasional outcrops of quartzite (at Bukit Panau); sandstones (at Téhing Tinggi and Temangan); carbonaceous quartzite (Kuala Sokor); and fine-textured muscovite-schists, which represent strongly sheared quartzites, (at Kuala Hau, Kampong Irak, Pasir Klang and Taku).

The cuttings on the railway-line between Bukit Panau and Manik Urui are all composed of soft weathered shales, interbedded with which are occasional beds of weathered volcanic ash, with a few intrusions of lava.

At several places on the Sungai Galas, quartzite and shales are found, alternating with outcrops of Raub Series rocks.

Coming down the river from Pahang, they are first met with at Pasir Usir, about 12 miles from the boundary. The outcrops continue for about 4 or 5 miles to the Sungai Asap, when limestones reappear, only to give place to shales of this series about 4 miles downstream. These shales persist for about 8 miles, to within a mile of the railway-station site at Limau Késturi. The remainder of the country up to the station-site is limestone.

The Series is not met with again until one reaches the Sungai Kénumbun, about 25 miles below Limau Késturi. Here, outcrops of sandy shales occur over a distance of about 3 miles.

Kuala Pérgeo Estate is on Quartzite and Shale Series country, outcrops of shales and boulders of quartzite being commonly found in many parts of the estate. The series continues up the Sungai Pérgeo to above Kampong Rantau Manis.

In the Sungai Béthis, near the Perak boundary, there is a granite-schist (Quartzite and Shale Series) junction, just below Kuala Alor Mahang. The schists are continued to within two miles of Kuala Béthis, and they outcrop again about one mile below Kuala Béthis, after which they can be followed to Kuala Kédap. Excluding Kuala Béthis, the distance covered is about 25 miles.

It is probable that some of the phyllites in the Sungai Galas should be included in the Quartzite and Shale Series. Bukit Kuang, on the Sungai Golok, is composed of very fine-grained white quartzite. Shales and quartzites are also found in the river above the hill, almost up to Kampong Tédog and below, to Jérém Pérdah. Weathered, clayey shales occur along the railway line from Rantau Panjang to a mile or so beyond Gual Périoik Station, where they are white and very soft, consisting almost entirely of kaolin.
These Sungei Golok rocks are on the line of strike of the more southerly outcrops, and are probably a continuation of them. Some schists, boulders of which are found near Kampang Gémang, suggest that on the map the series should be carried right up to the granite. The same applies to Bukit Roh and Bukit Buloh. Biotite and quartz-schists have been found as boulders on the former hill, and between the latter and Kampong Jégoh. As with the other rocks older than the granite, strong shearing is a common feature of the Quartzite and Shale Series.

The average strike of the series is N.N.W./S.S.E.; strikes of N.E./S.W. and W.N.W./E.S.E. have been recorded. The dip is usually very steep, and may be either easterly or westerly, or vertical.

East of the Kelantan-Trengganu Boundary Range, near the coast in the Pasir Putch district, there are two small isolated hills, Bukit Péraksi and Bukit Gélombak. Bukit Péraksi, the larger of the two, consists of white, fine-grained quartzite similar to that of Bukit Kuang, with some weathered altered shales stained brown by iron oxide. Mountains that are almost certainly composed of quartzite are:— Gumong Siam (5,040 ft.), about 10 miles E.N.E. of Pulai; Gumong Sinting (about 4,000 ft.) some 12 miles N.N.W. of Pulai; and Bukit Sênting (approx. 3,500 ft.) about 10 miles E.N.E. of Pulai. These names and rough positions are given on the strength of information supplied by local Malays and Pulai Chinese. It will be seen that on the map, Gumong Sinting is called Gunong Rabong, and Gunong Siam, Sinting.

There is a range of hills (Main Range Foot-hills) seen from Bukit Kuba near Pulai, which are probably between the Sungei Nénggiri and the Sungei Pérolah and may continue as far as the hills near Gumong Sêntong. The Sungei Bêtis and Sungei Nénggiri quartzites are believed to be part of this range.

VIII. The Tertiary Rocks.

As yet no Tertiary sediments have been found in Kelantan. Dykes of various igneous, non-granitic rocks, cutting, and therefore younger than the granite, will be mentioned and descriptions given. At Bukit Batu Pénasah (near Bukit Yong, in the Pasir Putch district), and in the Sungei Bala (a tributary on the right bank of the Sungei Pérang), and at Bukit Gélungor, dykes of dolerite occur.

The first, from Bukit Batu Pénasah, in addition to the soda-lime plagioclase (basic andesine), contains abundant brown hornblende and colourless pyroxene. Large areas of chlorite, and fine needles of apatite are common.

The dolerite from the Sungei Bala is a pyroxene-bearing variety. Many of the laths of plagioclase of the groundmass have been replaced by a black mineral. Chlorite is abundant. A dyke and a small vein of porphyrite cut the granite at Lata Bunga, (in the Késial section of the Kémahang Spur).
An altered porphyry occurs at Bukit Mak Lipah, (north end of the Kelantan—Tréngganu boundary range).

IX. Recent Deposits.

The alluvial plain described in Chap. II. is very similar to that of Kólah. It is probably of marine origin, modified by river action. Old sea-beaches have been seen in several places about 5 or 6 miles from the coast, notably at Pasir Puteh and between Kota Bharu and Tumpat. The latter runs parallel to the railway line a few yards south-west of it.

X. Old Gold and Tin Workings Etc.

Gold has been worked in Kelantan by Chinese miners from a very remote period. Traces of old working can be found in several parts of the State, notably on the Kelantan-Perak and Kelantan-Siam boundaries, and in the Pulai district.

Pulai was founded by a band of Kheli Chinese, cut-throats and robbers, who fled from Pahang into Kelantan, late in the eighteenth or early in the nineteenth century, and who, coming upon the beautiful open country of the Sungei Bong and UlU Sungei Galas, decided to stay there. They discovered that the district was gold-bearing, and turned their attention to mining. It is reputed to have quickly become a very rich settlement, into which until fairly recently, people other than Khelis ventured at the risk of their lives.

Early in the 20th century, from about 1904 to 1907, Europeans worked gold in Kelantan, and produced the greater part of the gold exported from the State during the year 1906-1907, the value of which was about £25,000.

About this time, places, which had been, or were being, prospected for gold by Europeans, included the Sungei Rélai on the left bank of the Sungei Lébir; the Sungei Galas between Kuala Gris and Kuala Pérgeru; the Sungei Sarasa and Sungei Chiku, both tributaries on the right bank of the Sungei Galas; and the Sungei Bong in the UlU of the Sungei Galas. Other districts worked mainly by Chinese for gold were as follows.

Sungei Betis, until 4 or 5 years ago.
Sungei Chiku, 25 years ago.
Sungei Muan, 20–25 years ago.
Sungei Jandêka (Chenero). 1913–14 and before.
Sungei Tellminy { Long ago.
Sungei Bujang (Berjan) { Long ago.
Sungei Kerak { Near Limau Kesturi.
Sungei Beluk } Long ago.
Sungei Rendok. Old workings and in Kundor and Pulai districts.

*Journal Malayan Branch [Vol. III, Part I,*
In 1907 several European mining enterprises were in being, their concessions covering nearly all the State. The rivers Galas, Nenggiri, Pergau, Lēbir and the Kelantan down to Kuala Kesia, were all being prospected, as also were Bukit Yong and Bukit Mōrbau, both at the north end of the Kelantan-Trengganu boundary range. The latter two districts are reported to have yielded some tin, and tin is said to have been obtained from the Kelantan-Trengganu boundary Range, at Bukit Sabot in the north, and at the Ulu Sungei Lēbir Kēchil in the south, but no tin mines were opened up.

Apart from the Chinese gold-washers, the only serious attempt at mining was that of the Duff Development Company, at Ulu Liang,—a tributary of the Sungei Sokor, on the right bank. Here, they found deposits of sulphides, (iron, lead, zinc). In 1907 they exported auriferous—argentiferous—lead ore to the value of $8,000.

In 1910 a Malay started boring for oil, but only succeeded in discovering some clay which contained no trace of oil. What was apparently the same land, Sungei Lemang, near Pasir Mas, was prospected in 1913 by a Dutch mining company, with negative results.

Monazite of good quality occurs in Kelantan; assays mentioned in 1915 gave 5.3% and 9.4% thorium.

A concentrate examined in 1920, from the Sungei Bakon consisted mostly of titaniferous iron-ore and epidote, with some tourmaline, zircon, kapatite and hornblende (doubtful). Another concentrate from Sungei Lawang was nearly all zircon.

It has not been possible to publish a map with this paper; the reader is referred to the Kelantan Government map for localities.
A Boy's trip to Gunong Angsi.

An Ulu Jempul man died and turned into a member of this tiger band. One Hari Raya eve, he came at nightfall to visit his former home. Finding one of his grandchildren outside, he assumed his old human shape and told the boy fascinating stories about the wonders of the settlements on Gunong Angsi. The boy consented to follow him there. Whereupon he found himself transported on the back of his grandfather to Gunong Angsi. There he beheld with amazement the activities of the tiger brotherhood. Some were praying, some were reading the Koran, some learning and practising the art of fencing, others were cooking and singing. Dato' Paroi was their supreme and revered lord. For two days the boy was missing from home,—in fact throughout the Hari Raya festival. On the third day, punctually at the hour when he was first missed, he returned. His grandfather had taken him back "in the twinkling of an eye." He was found sitting at the foot of a coconut palm, dazed and oblivious of what was passing around him. Taken up to the house, he gradually regained his normal consciousness of material things. Questioning elicited from him a full account of the visit of the old grandfather, of his own trip with the old man to the abode of spirit-tigers on Gunong Angsi, and of all that he had seen.

The Boy-Attendant of Dato' Paroi.

Popular belief has it that wherever he goes Dato' Paroi takes with him, hidden in his left foot, a boy-attendant who carries his betel-box. As proof, it is alleged that sometimes one meets a tiger's footprints, each of which contains within it in clear outline...
the small footprint of a human being. Such footprints belong to Dato' Paroi. The earth where they are found is sacred. It is dug up and kept as a protective talisman against all demons, sickness, misfortunes and especially temporal tigers.

The Meat-Buying Incident.

In villages where meat cannot be had whenever wanted, it is customary for Malays to combine and kill a buffalo (never a cow or any other animal) or two at their mosque on the evenings before the Fasting Month and the two Hari Rayas. The meat is distributed at a fixed price among every family in the village which desires to buy. (Possibly this custom is a survival of a sacrificial rite practised in pre-Muslim days on any great occasion). It is regarded by villagers as essential to the welcoming of the Fast or the Hari Rayas. Not infrequently quarrels take place between husbands and wives, if very little or no meat is procured for the family. It is a time of crying and sorrowing for the mother or grandam of a family if her house is so unlucky as to be unable to secure even a slice of meat.

Now on a certain Hari Raya eve when villagers were busy skinning, cutting and dealing out the meat of slaughtered buffaloes, a stranger lad was seen among them with two huge bamboo baskets (rupa) and a carrying stick slung across his shoulder. He desired to buy some meat. This was granted and both baskets were piled high. Having paid the value in cash, he left carrying his burden. For some distance he followed the beaten path; then he turned sharply in the direction of the forest. Those present felt curious, firstly because of the extraordinary strength with which he carried the two piled baskets (the weight of which would be too heavy even for a grown man) and secondly on account of his strange arrival and departure. Several persons followed him and watched. The boy came to a place in the forest. There on a raised patch of ground a big tiger was sitting. The boy collected dry leaves and twigs, and setting light to them threw all the meat into the fire till the flesh was half-burnt and fairly roasted. The cooked meat he served to the tiger who devoured it in a short time. Knowing at once that this tiger could be no other than the Dato' Paroi, and fearing he might observe them, the watchers hurried back to the mosque and told their story. Henceforward, it was firmly believed that Dato' Paroi takes a boy attendant with him wherever he goes, and that the boy's footprint often seen within the footprint of a tiger is that of the boy to whom the villagers sold meat that day. Evidently, the story is an ex post facto invention to uphold a popular belief already in vogue. The name of the village is unknown.

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The War with Dato' Gunong Ledang.

Independent of the community under Dato' Paroi, and centring around Gunong Ledang (Mt. Ophir) there is supposed to be another tiger-clan. The leader is Dato' Gunong Ledang. The two clans are said to have been for ages on unfriendly terms. The Gunong Ledang tigers were formerly all enchained (harimau héruntai) on account of their wildness and ferocity.

Long ago when Bukit Putus (between Seremban and Kuala Pilah) had not yet got its name one of these chained tigers got loose. After wandering and making depredations for some months, he entered the confines of the Dato' Paroi's domain, where he continued his career of plunder and destruction. The damage done was very great, and the insolence of the intruder intolerable. So he was severely punished by a party sent by Dato' Paroi, and had to retire to Gunong Ledang with broken limbs and exhausted strength. His chief, Dato' Gunong Ledang, was furious and determined to avenge the slight. He released a few score of his enchained warrior-tigers, and led them in person into Dato' Paroi's territory. His main desire was to seize and punish Dato' Paroi, his rival. All the tigers met on the way told him that Dato' Paroi was then at Gunong Angsi. After a few days journey the party reached the place now known as Bukit Putus, on the outskirts of Gunong Angsi proper. There they met what appeared to them to be a small wild-cat.

"Can you tell us if you have seen the Dato' Paroi anywhere about here?" One of them asked of the wild cat. "If you have not", he continued, "can you tell us where we shall find him?"

"Why are you asking these questions, Sir?" answered the cat humbly; "I suppose you have some object in seeing him?"

"You must not question, despicable brat!" growled the other. "We want an answer. Dato' Paroi needs to be taught a lesson. One of us has suffered grave injuries by his orders. We have come all the way from Gunong Ledang to exact the penalty due. If he but pass within sight of us, we shall devour him whole, body and all (kami makan dengáu tuhi-tahi-nya)."

All the while the cat was growing in size and looking more and more dignified and formidable. In a few minutes the tallest meranti trees were under his belly. Then he shouted:

"I am Dato' Paroi! Do your worst. Devour me whole!"

Dato' Gunong Ledang's followers were now beginning to feel awe'd; but at their leader's orders and signals they took courage to attack the huge adversary before them. A struggle ensued in which Dato' Paroi was mostly on the defensive. One by one his attackers found him invincible. At last they attacked him together, and Dato' Paroi had to take the offensive. He seized two or three of his assailants and dashed them on the ground. The rest
he dealt smashing blows, till they took to their heels. Dato’ Paroi chasing them “as a great cat would chase mice!” In the scramble the hills on which the battle took place were cut in two. This was the origin of the name Bukit Putus.

The fugitives ran for their lives to Gunong Ledang, leaving their disabled comrades to the mercy of Dato’ Paroi. Up to this day no Gunong Ledang tiger has never ventured to come again within Dato’ Paroi’s territory.

This is, of course, an ex parte version to the glorification of the mythical tiger-lord. The other side of the case, if there be one, has never been heard. But research may yet discover many an unknown tale.

The expression “Dato’ Paroi” has become a by-word throughout Negri Sembilan. Anything of enormous size or stupendous magnitude or anything very awe-inspiring, evokes the interjection “O, Dato’ Paroi! ai!” or “Sa-gédang Dato’ Paroi!” (i.e. “As big as Dato’ Paroi”). An imprecation such as di-tangkap harimau panjang tujah, buaya panjang ssembilan in Perak would be expressed in Negri Sembilan by saying di-patahkan oleh Dato’ Paroi, or “Hisap-lah Dato’ Paroi!” (i.e. “Drink his blood, Oh Dato’ Paroi!”).

Even at this moment the Dato’ “immortal and unchanged” is supposed to be roaming the wide forest reserves of Negri Sembilan.

The Kéramat of Paroi.

The sacred spot that bears his name (Kéramat To’ Paroi) is situated by a small rill a few yards towards the left of the road from Seremban to Kuala Pilah. The visitor will find nothing except a few chips of stone soiled by the red wax of Chinese candles, or wrapped in strips of red and white cloth. Yet it is far-famed throughout the “Nine States” and revered by Malays, Chinese and Tamils alike. The Chinese light joss-sticks (chalok) and red candles and offer prayers, especially during festivals. Malays go there from Terachi, Jelebu, Johal, and Jempul to pay their vows. One or more goats are sacrificed, and with the blood of the animals the supplicant lathes the child or other person on whose account the vow is made. After the sacrificial oblation has been duly performed, Malays feast on saffroned rice, boiled eggs and curried flesh of the goats. To this feast neighbouring têbei and laymen are invited. Incense is burnt, toasted rice scattered broadcast, prayers read in Arabic, crackers fired and alms given in cash and kind, the former amounting from one to fifty cents (Straits currency) for each person present. Then the suppliant returns home with a clear conscience, having discharged a bounden duty!

Except for the Arabic prayers, and probably the alms-giving,—two Muslim elements which have crept so strangely and incongruously into the ritual—the ceremony is heathen, a survival of primitive beliefs and practices in the "Days of Ignorance" when the Malays were first animists and afterwards disciples of a superficial Hinduism.
The Origin of Some Malay Place-Names.

By ZAINAL ABIDIN BIN AHMAD.

Some place-names have interesting traditions attached to them, worthy of the attention of local antiquaries. Unfortunately, most of these traditions are unrecorded, many are forgotten or tend to be forgotten; and others are improved upon by the imagination of a later generation. Many such traditions are only inventions to explain the forgotten, grandmothers' tales to satisfy the curiosity of inquisitive children. In course of time, such inventions are added to a country's folklore.

Some place-names have sprung from geographical features e.g. Pasir Panjang, Pasir Pelangi, Batu Kikir, Bukit Berapit. Others like Dasun Tua, Durian Sabatang, Batu Gajah, Ipoh, Pulau Pinang are from some tree, rock or other prominent landmark. Others come from some discovery or "find" reputed to have been made at the founding of the place e.g. Linggi. Others owe their origin to some incident or superstition associated with the place when it was first opened. Such are Tanjong Malim, Labu, Remban, Sungai Ujong and Pengkalan Batu. Rivers, hills, and other geographical features also must have got their names in these ways.

Many places in Malaya have changed their names within living memory. As St. Peters burg has been changed to Petrograd and Christiana reverted to its ancient name, so has Kuala Kelang been changed to Port Swettenham, Semujong to Seremban, Durian Sabatang to Telok Anson, Pengkalan Batu to Kelang, Sungai Genta to Tanjong Malim.

Taking first Malay place-names whose story of origin is recorded in literature, the traditional uncritical derivation of the words "Singapore" and "Malacca" are given in the "Malay Annals." Again. Seremban the capital of Negri Sembilan used to be known as Semujong or Sungai Ujong (sometimes Sang Yang Ujong, Sening Ujong), and is still so known among old people. Nowadays "Semujong" is seldom heard but Sungai Ujong is in use, to denote however not the town but the whole area over which the Dato' Kelana Putera has authority. To explain these two names there are some uncritical legends.

Semujong is said to have originated from Jong Tersëmu, a petrified junk (jong). The locality where Seremban stands was "in geological times" a broad expanse of water. A needy young man left his parents to seek fortune in foreign lands. In time he became a successful merchant, the owner of many ships. After a decade he returned in a gorgeous ship bringing a beautiful bride. For years the old mother had awaited news of her boy. Finally she had given him up for lost. When word was brought that he was in the harbour she hurried aboard his ship. But seeing how ugly

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and ill-dressed she was, the son was ashamed to own her and drove her ashore. In her wrath she cursed him:—"If this be truly my son and he has the heart to treat me in this manner, may the gods turn him, his bride and his ship into stone!" Instantaneously son, bride and ship were turned into stone, and the expanse of water became dry land. To this day one can see the petrified ship in the shape of the Temiang hill, though now it has suffered too much weathering to be easily recognised. Formerly visitors could see not only the petrified ship but also the petrified crew, furniture, coins, cups and crockery! This of course is a variant of the story of Nakhoda Ragam. (J. R. A. S., M. B. II p. 266 & Notes and Queries II pp. 40-46).

In April 1916 I visited the Temiang hill which is known as Bukit Jong. All that was to be seen was a sort of cave sheltering a rude Chinese temple, with a big bell and the wax of red candles all around. Unmistakably the Chinese are the greatest frequenters of the place as suppliants and worshippers.

Sungai Ujong the other variant, is explained as having originated from the fact that the principal river of the State has its "end" or head (source) in that district; or again from an enormous mérbau tree which had its base in Remban, and, when it fell, lay across a river within the now Sungai Ujong territory with its end (ujong) on the further side of the river. Remban received its name from the base of the same tree! (J. R. A. S., S. B. XIII, p. 241).

Mr. Bagden has given a critical account of the real origin of these alternative names (ib. No. LIII, pp. 150-1).

Linggi, a village in the Coast District of Negri Sembilan on a river of the same name, is said to have derived its name from the linggi (the covered portions of the prow or stern) of a boat unearthed when the founders of the settlement were opening up the place. The village is about 200 years old and according to local traditions was founded by Bugis settlers from Riau. It is mentioned in the Hikayat Abdullah as one of the places where branches of Chinese secret societies were found.

Labu, a village on the main railway line from Seremban to Kuala Lumpur, is said to have got its name from a gigantic pumpkin (labu) which grew in the locality. The huge stem became a bridge (titi), and each pumpkin growing from the stem took scores of men to lift up. A branch of the main stem spread up-river and gave the name Labu Hulu to the village there. Another branch took a turn down-stream, and the village there received the name Labu Hilir.

Pengkalan Batu was the old name of Klang. It is still known to old people. To account for the name a story is related similar to that given above for Semnjong (Sungai Ujong), though with some variations. Along with the mother the father also went to the ship and when they were driven away the father left without once looking back, but the mother was continually casting a loving look towards...
her son. Meanwhile, Sang Kelumbai, the fairy wizard, arrived and accosted them, whereupon the two were transformed into mango trees. One of them representing the father inclined towards land and bore sour fruits; the other representing the mother inclined towards the sea and had sweet fruits. The ship, the sea, and everything in the vicinity were turned into stone and solid earth. All that was left of the sea was the channel of the Kelang river.

Kuala Lumpur has been dealt with by Mr. E. Macfadyen in Journal No. 72 of the Straits Branch, R. A. S.

Tanjong Malim, according to one story, was formerly known as Sungai Genta-so says a very old resident of the place who gives his age as 103 years. The change of name was in honour of a living saint (alim or muallim, a religious teacher) who used to practise devotions and austerities in a hole dug in the ground at an angle of the Bernam river near the point where it is now crossed by the railway bridge. The spot is marked by two trees the leaves of which are much used for medicine. In the end, the saint mysteriously vanished. The new name was used first to denote the particular spot but as time went on, its application was extended to a wider area.

According to another account, however, the old name of Tanjong Malim was Berenam. Six men, all brothers, came from Sumatra and settled along the river where Tanjong Malim stands. One of them happened to choose a piece of land next to the angle of the river mentioned above. He was very learned in religion. When the six brothers died, there were six unpretentious graves by the river-bank. This led to the place being called Bérenam! Later the grave of the learned brother was revered as a sacred place (Kéramat), and the projecting angle became one of the most frequented landing-places on the river. In course of time, the name Bernam fell out of use, and Tanjong Malim was substituted for it!

Connected with these stories is the legend of Kubang Nyiru (Pool of the Winnowing Basket) now no longer known. The pool had in it a very huge winnowing basket, the habitation of a jin who used to step backwards and forwards to the long ranges of hills visible towards the north of Tanjong Malim. There he still lives. The Pool was in the neighbourhood of the present Sultan Idris Training College. Formerly it was regarded as a separate place, but now it is included in the name Tanjong Malim. Sickness resulting from the displeasure of this jin requires the offering of a buffalo, if death or serious consequence is to be averted.

Ipoh, according to one account, got its name from a very big ipoh (or upas) tree said to have been flourishing there when the town was being opened up. Before that the place was called Pulak-a name still used by the Chinese, but which Malays apply to a neighbouring village. The giant tree was felled so recently that its huge stump is still to be seen somewhere on the Laksamana Road. According to another account, the name Ipoh was simply due to

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the abundance of ipoh trees, big and small, found at the time of opening up the town.

Place-names like Malim Nawar (Malim Menawar, or "the religious pundit who recites charms"), Setiawan, Kota Lama in Perak; like Kajang, Telok Panglima Garang, in Selangor; Kota Tinggi, Bandar Penggaram, Batu Pahat, in Johore;—all no doubt have some interesting folk-tales behind them, purporting to explain their origin. Perhaps some day curious enquirers familiar with those places may write about them.
Miscellaneous Notes.

A Kelantan Invocation to the Earth Spirit.

The Earth Genie is called also the Black Genie. He dwells in the cracks (séliseh) of the earth and controls all earth-borne (e.g. vomiting and diarrhoea) and water-borne diseases. In Kelantan, whence this account comes, he is invoked as follows:—

Hai jin tanah! Jembalang bumi!
Hantu tanah! Koh bumi?
(?) Asek tanah! (?)Jéjok bumi!
Jin Hilam Kelantanu!
Jin Hilam, Sang Gangga di-bumi!
Sang Gangga téngah antara!
Jin Hilam, Sang Gangga di-langit!
Jin Hilam bérlampong tujoh! Képala délapán!
Béruma songsang! chalit di-dahi!
Bérékor panjut! sopak di-kaki!
Mu-déngar, déngar pésanun aku!
Aku minda panggil ségala puak-mu!
Jikalau ada tésabit-saba
Puak mérnu bésnu siak adara
Jembalang di-ager
Sédang patah lintang jalan
Si-rinís déni, si-rantás tanjong,
Ekor mélér, si-lidah panjang,
Mu-panggil sakulian siak malik jembalang di-kampong
Silah manek ihu di-bumi,
Sang Gérandang jembalang di-padang,
Sang Gámana jembalang báhána,
Séri Léngong (?) Si-padena!
Sang Rangga, Sang Bóró!
Panggil ségala puak pénghawa-nu balek bérzénang!
Aku nak hantur sépala hasit máhsul
Chukai khuraja! (?)bab bénjala,
Tempat makan-nyu tepak kékil Palembang muda,
Sangka agong tiang satu,
Jin Hilam Séri pénalok.

The invocation is full of difficulties, which some student acquainted with the Kelantan dialect may be able to solve. Anyhow it seems worth while saving from the white ants this address to Shiva in his aspect of Kula,—"eight-headed, with seven patches on his skin, the hairs of his body upside down, a smear on his forehead and skin-disease on his feet"!

R. O. W.

A Perak Invocation to the Langsuyar.

Bism’illahi ’r-Rahmani ’r-Rahimi!
Hai !_, si-kutok-milok, si-kutamilok! _._
Aku-lah Maha Rishi Gila!

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Aku bunuh tiada bértanya,
Aku panas cong tiada perekan.
Aku-lah kulubalang Allah dalam dunia.
Sakalian yang menjadi aku dapat binasakan,
Ma asal mani, aku asal manikam,
Ah patah! ah bilah!.
Aku chakap biswa samata sakalian,
Hai si-jupang jupai, si-dada bidang,
Si-rësek yigi, si-changgal panjang,
Si-gërhang rambul, si-liok-limbai!
Jikalan éngkau dudok di-kayu,
Si-Përikat nama-mu;
Jikalan éngkau dudok di-jëram,
Song Ringga nama-mu;
Jikalan éngkau dudok di-tunggul,
Sëri Bola nama-mu;
Jikalan éngkau turun ka-tanah,
Sëri Limbai nama-mu;
Jikalan éngkau naik ka-tanga,
Sëri Sila nama-mu;
Jikalan éngkau dudok di-pintu,
Sëri Dëpang nama-mu;
Jikalan éngkau dudok di-alang,
Sëri Tinjun nama-mu;
Jikalan éngkau turun ka-lirur,
Sëri Tempoh nama-mu.
Jangan éngkau mëndëngki khuniat kapada anak Adam
manusia.
Ku-sumpah durhaka-lah éngkau kapada Allah!
This invocation, which exemplifies how the magician calls on a spirit by every possible name, was taken down in 1909 from Pu' Mek Chik, a medicine-man of Temengor in Upper Perak. A translation is given on pp. 19-20 of my book, "Shaman, Saiva and Sufi." The Langsuir is terrified of the ikal hétok (puyu-puyu).

R. O. W.

Masa'lah Sa-ribu by Dr. G. F. Pijper.

Leiden has seen many notable theses submitted by candidates for a Doctorate at that University, Rinkes' Abdoeraof van Singköl, Kraemer's Een Javaansche Prinsen uit de Zestiende Eeuw, Rasers' De Pandji-Roman, to take a few recent examples. And now we have G. F. Pijper's Het Boek der Daizend Vragen.

Wilkinson refers briefly to the Kitab Sa-ribu Masa'alah (or Misa'il) in his "Malay Beliefs" (p. 4). Dr. Pijper gives us a critical text and an interesting history of the book, prefacing his introduction with a quotation from Dr. H. Hirschfeld: "the imagination displayed by the writer of this little volume recalls the most extravagant reveries of the Arabian Nights or the wildest fancies of some portion of the Quran itself." In 1143 the Arabic edition was translated into Latin, and influenced mediaeval Europe's conception

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of Islam. There are versions also in Portuguese, Dutch, Turkish, Persian, Hindustani, Malay and Javanese. The hero of the book is 'Abd Allah bin Salam, a Jew converted to Islam, whose history is discussed at length by Dr. Piiper (and is given shortly in English in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*). He asks the Prophet questions concerning cosmogony and eschatology, heaven and hell and natural science, and the book contains these questions together with the Prophet's marvellous answers. Both the Malay and Javanese texts purport to be derived from a Persian original, but according to Dr. Piiper the Malay text at any rate represents an older recension than the extant Persian version. The Javanese text is founded either on an unknown Malay recension or an unknown Persian or Arabic original.

The thesis is representative of a line of research for which such well-known scholars as Brandes and Van Ronkel are eminent. It is greatly to be hoped that some day a scholar will tackle the large *Bustanu s-Salatin* in the same scientific way.

R. O. W.

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**A Peculiar Custom in Kuala Kangsar.**

*By Haji Abdul Majid bin Haji Zainuddin.*

There is custom among the villages of Kota Lama and Saiong in the district of Kuala Kangsar, Perak, called *menghantar*, that is, "the sending" (of presents). I have not heard of the custom being in vogue anywhere else in the Malay Peninsula. So far I have not been able to trace its origin; but hope that, once it is put on record, other enquirers may get facts and data which will help to explain the matter.

As a rule, the *menghantar* is practised during the fruit season and naturally fruits form the major portions of the present, cakes and sweets being used to supplement these. The whole is placed in a tray and arranged in such a way that it looks not unlike a Christmas tree, with paper-birds and other animals hanging from the branches. The more elaborate the arrangement is made, the closer or more affectionate the relationship it signifies between the sender and the receiver.

How is the tray of presents sent? With any ceremonials? No! The idea is to get it delivered at the door of the receiving family without any of them knowing, and so it is always done, not in broad day-light, but in the evening about the time people retire for the night. The firing of crackers informs the inmates of the house that the tray has been placed at their door. A rush is at once made by the younger and more nimble members of the family to capture the party of senders, while the women or elderly men take the tray into the house and eagerly try to find out whence it comes. This is not an easy task, for though a missive is always there among the presents it does not say who the writer or sender is. As often as

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not it is written in *sha'ir* or *pantuns*, the purport of which is
generally in praise of the family to whom it is sent; it recounts all
the good turns each of them has done to the people in the village,
particularly to the members of the family that is now sending the
presents.

It is considered a disgrace if the family cannot find out
from whom the present has come; for, of course, courtesy requires
them to give in return, unless, happily, they succeed in capturing
the senders before they get back home, when the necessity for a
return gift is removed. The captured party is then disgraced by
having their faces smeared with soot and such like dirty stuff and
being made to eat their own presents in the presence of the whole
family of the capturing party, plus whatever food happens to be
found in the house at the time.

I need hardly add that if a family after receiving such presents
has to make a return gift, its members will be subjected to the same
treatment if they are caught in sending them. The party that
succeeds in sending their presents without being caught is con-
sidered to have scored against the other party.
A new Ground-Gecko (Gymnodactylus) from the Malay Peninsula.

By Malcolm A. Smith, F.Z.S.

(Records of the Raffles Museum, No. 7).

I am indebted to Mr. Hope Sworder for the pleasure of examining a small collection of reptiles and amphibians collected by him in Johore. Among them is a single specimen of a Ground-Gecko which appears to be undescribed and which may be recognized by the following characters.

_Gymnodactylus sworderi_, sp. nov.

Type male, author's number 8266, collected about 9 miles due north of Kota Tinggi, Johore, in September 1924.

Description. Ear opening oval, oblique, its length equal to one-third the diameter of the eye; rostral large, quadrangular, broader than long; nostril between the rostral, the first supralabial, a supranasal and five small granular scales; 14 upper and 10 lower labials; mental large, subtriangular, with a pair of large chin-shields in contact with each other behind it.

Head covered above with small granules largest upon the snout; occiput with small granules and larger rounded tubercles; back covered with small granules and larger rounded, subtriangular tubercles; a feechle fold along the flank from the axilla to the groin; ventral scales small, imbricate, about 42 across the middle of the belly between the lateral folds; two rows of three preanal pores each, slightly diverging from each other, and a series of 10 or 11 enlarged femoral scales, pitted but not perforated, extending outwards from the preanal scales.

Limbs moderate, digits rather short, the plates beneath the basal phalanx roundish, convex, about half the width of the digit; the forelimb pressed backwards extends two-thirds the distance between the axilla and the groin; the hindlimb reaches to the axilla; tail (reproduced) covered with small scales.

Dark brown above, with smallish, irregularly-shaped white spots; these extend in two series along either side of the head leaving the remainder of the upper part of the head uniform in colour; lower parts yellowish-white.

Length of head and body 77; tail 58; forelimb 26; hindlimb 35 mm.

_Gymnodactylus sworderi_ is most nearly related to _G. peguensis_ Boulenger, from lower Burma and Siam. It differs slightly in the arrangement of the preanal pores and in the number of supralabials and, very markedly, in coloration.

The type will be presented to the British Museum of Natural History.

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Banteng in the Malay Peninsula.

By N. TREWHELER.

(Records of the Raffles Museum. No. 8).

According to reliable native information Banteng are not uncommon West of Tung Song. The jungle down the middle of the Peninsula is continuous and suitable for them as far South as the Tung Song—Kantang railway line, and I should certainly think that they extend Southward to that railway in the neighbourhood of Hue Yot. I have also heard of them as far South as Haad Yai but cannot say if this is correct.

Personally I have only been into the jungle to the East of the water-shed between about 8° 50' and 9° 20' N. Lat., in which area I have seen Banteng on several occasions in herds of eight to fifteen head. They keep to the same kind of ground as Gaur (Seladang). Once I saw a single Gaur bull with a Banteng herd, and another time a mixed herd. The two species appear quite indifferent to one another and probably collect only when feeding, for mutual safety, but when frightened separate and move on independently.

The Banteng are considerably smaller than Gaur and can easily be distinguished by their white markings. In bulls these markings contrast sharply with the black coat, and in the open, can easily be seen when within gun-shot. The Banteng cows are more red than the Gaur cow, have short black horns and white markings similar to the bull, though I have never noticed these markings on a living cow.

In the above area I saw a solitary Banteng bull shot in February 1922; I did not take any notes, but so far as I remember he differed from a Gaur in the following.—Smaller; colour—darker glossy black, legs and rump white and a white stripe from middle of back to base of tail; the head had no coarse light coloured hair on the forehead; the horns were much the same in shape and colour as a Gaur's and I should say 20" long measured along outside curve. I did not see the head after it was skinned and do not know whether the skull differed much in shape.

Description of a cow Banteng shot on the 12th August 1924. Colour—whole body a fox colour, legs from hoofs to above knees and hocks white with a margin 2" wide of black hairs between the fox and white colour, a sharply defined black stripe 1½ inches wide from end of dorsal ridge (middle of back) to tip of tail, rump whitish; Height about 14 hands at shoulder (not measured), dorsal ridge prominent as in a Gaur cow, tail reaching little below hocks; head—no frontal ridge between horns, in fact rather concave; horns—slipping back from head, round in section, 7½" circum. at base, 8" long along outside curve, colour all black except small patches of yellow at base on the back of the horns.

Two species of wild Cattle occur in Malaysia—the Seladang (Bos gaurus) which ranges throughout the Malay Peninsula; and a smaller animal, the Banteng or Tembadau (Bos banteng syn. sondaicus) which occurs in Java and Borneo and again in the northern Journal Malayan Branch [Vol. III, Part I,
PRE-NATAL FAWN OF THE MALAY RUSA.

(Cervus unicolor equinus.)
half of the Peninsula as the above note shows.

The Banteng is reported to exist in the hills between Sentul and Perlis, but its occurrence south of this latitude (6° 50' North) though at times rumoured, is so open to question that it may fairly be said, at present, that we have no knowledge of its existence there. Apart from other characters, the possession of white buttocks and "stockings" easily distinguishes Banteng from Seladang. C. Boden Kloss].

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**On the Colour-pattern of the young Malay Rusa (Cervus unicolor equinus.)**

*By F. N. Chasen.*

*(Records of the Raffles Museum, No. 9.)*

*(Plate II.)*

Considerable interest is attached to the young of those mammals that display a colour pattern of bold spots or longitudinal stripes whereas the adult of the same species is self-coloured.

At present there is a marked tendency to believe that this conspicuous juvenile livery is indicative of an earlier or ancestral type of coloration which was common to the species throughout its life, and furthermore the evidence obtained by a broad survey of the facts, considering mammals and other animals alike, suggests that patterns consisting, in the main, of spots are more "recent" (less archaic) than those in which longitudinal stripes are predominant. Retention of these primitive types of coloration may be correlated with the degree of protection they afford to the weathers.

In illustrating this idea it would be difficult to produce more pointed examples than those afforded by two Malayan mammals, the Tapiir (*Tapirus indicus*) and the Kijang, Muntjac or Barking Deer (*Muntiacus muntjac*). In the case of the Sambur or Rusa (*Cervus unicolor*), published authorities are by no means agreed as to the colour of the fawn and it seems just possible that the presence or absence of spots is correlated with limited areas in the geographical range of the species and therefore a subspecific character. Of the Indian form of this deer (*C. u. unicolor*) Blanford (1) and Lydekker (4) both agree that the young is unspotted. According to the latter authority "young fawns are uniformly red, without light spots but apparently with a black tail and a stripe of the same colour down the middle of the back."

In the case of the Malay Rusa (*C. u. equinus*), a well-marked subspecies, the young are at least very frequently spotted.

Lydekker (*tom. cit*, p. 215) states:—"The fawns are foxy red in colour, with the upper surface of the tail and a line down the back black or blackish and in many instances, although by no means invariably, they are more or less distinctly spotted on the hind quarters. A spotted fawn was born at Woburn Abbey in January 1898."

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Ridley (5) declares of the same form that the young is:—
“coloured like the adult but with much softer hair. There are,
however, faint traces of light spots on the rump which disappear
after the first week.”

Both authorities thus agree that it is only the hind quarters
that are spotted.

Turning to Borneo we find that Charles Hose (3) was so
impressed with the well spotted and coloured appearance of a young
deer collected on Mt. Dulit that he described it as a new species
under the name of Cervus brookei at the same time stating that
young specimens of deer from other parts of Sarawak are almost or
quite unspotted, a statement in which Shelford (6) a much later
authority, concurs. Hose’s statement “young not spotted at any
stage,” (2) published almost simultaneously with his description
of C. brookei supports the fact that the Bornean deer like the
peninsular form may or may not be spotted. (Cervus brookei, how-
ever, is still accepted by systematists on account of distinctive
characters other than those given in Hose’s diagnosis. ) An adult
female deer of the peninsular form (Johore) recently came into
the possession of the Raffles Museum and was found to contain a
well developed fawn which would surely have been born in the course
of a day or two. This specimen is so well spotted that it seems to
merit notice.

The type of C. brookei is described as being spotted not only on
the rump but on the shoulders, but in the specimen before us in
addition to the spots on these parts there is a very distinct, longitudi-
dinal row of spots running along each side of the spine and the
whole of the nape is indistinctly spotted while faint spots occur on
the flanks also.

This young specimen is darker and more blackened than adult
animals, except on the nape which is buffy brown with a tawny
median line.

It is interesting to note that the pattern seen on this prenatal
Rusa is essentially similar to that of the newly born Muntjac which
differs chiefly in that the spots are comparatively larger, more
distinct and more numerous.

We have examined another fawn, by no means newly born
(hind-foot about 255 mm.) but unfortunately of unknown origin
in which there are not only three fairly conspicuous spots on the
rump, but faint indications of lighter patches on the shoulders and
even traces on the hind-neck and anterior part of the spine.

LITERATURE.

1. Blanford, W. T., 1891. The Fauna of British India, Mamm-


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Notes on the Fauna of Pulau Galang, Rhio Archipelago.

By F. N. CHASEN.

(Records of the Raffles Museum, No. 10.)

Pulau Galang, one of the largest islands of the Rhio Archipelago is situated a few miles to the north of the Pangelap Strait, which we are disposed to think should be regarded as a division between two minor faunal areas.

The group of islands to the south of the Straits, or the Längga Archipelago, well known on account of the ancient sultanate, has well marked mammalian characteristics which include the presence of Nannosciurus, Tana and Tupina minor. In the northern islands, the Rhio Archipelago proper, forms of Presbytis albocinerea and Sus barbatus are found.

Furthermore it would seem that a north-western group embracing the islands to the west of Durian Strait can be recognised for here alone are found Sciurus prevosti and S. lowii.

Pulau Galang is separated by very narrow channels from Rempang on the north and Galang Bharu on the south.

It has certainly been visited at least once previous to the present occasion but the only record in zoological literature referring to the island is one by Lyon (Proc. U. S. Nat. Mus. XXXVI, 1909) wherein Tragulus perflavus (= T. javanicus stanleyanus) is mentioned as having been collected on Galang by Kloss.

Much of the ground, indeed most of it, has been cleared in past years for gambier planting but with the exception of a very small area this has now been replaced by rubber. Unlike Pulau Bulan, very little ground is given to coconuts and there is an interesting path running for several miles through almost untouched jungle containing big trees. Unfortunately time for trapping in this area was not available. A good many acres once cleared for gambier are now under belukar (secondary growth).

Otherwise the island is just like scores of others that dot the sea thereabouts:—plenty of mangrove but also with sandy beaches here and there fringed with casuarinas.

The following short account of the mammals and birds is based on a collection made on behalf of the Raffles Museum in the last week of December, 1924.

Before the list of mammals can be considered as anything like complete the jungle mentioned above should be trapped.

In the following lists we have included all those species of which we have any knowledge as occurring on the island but only those of which we have examined specimens are numbered.

To Mr. Carlton P. Brook of Pulau Galang our best thanks are due. Mr. Brook not only acted as host to the members of the expedition but he kindly presented to the museum specimens which he had personally collected.

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MAMMALS.

1. *Macaca irus* Cuv.

Only two of the males are adult and the collector’s external measurements of these in millimetres are:

- Head and body: 425, 425
- Tail: 580, 535
- Hindfoot: 130, 125
- Ear: 35, 31

Macaques of this species are very common on Galang and not at all shy. Some of the specimens listed above were obtained on Pulau Ngeowal, a small island S. W. of Pulau Galang Bharu. As a species they are extremely variable especially in the tone of the colour of the back and outer sides of the limbs and we cannot recognise that they are even subspecifically distinct from the form inhabiting the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra. Names for the macaques inhabiting no less than five islands of the Rhio Archipelago have been proposed by Elliot, viz. *alacer* (Kundur), *karimoni* (Karimon), *lingae* (Lingga) *impudens* (Sugi) and *bintangensis* (Bintang and Batam), and these are allocated to two subgenera! The colour of the face in this monkey is subject to almost as much individual variation as that of the pelage.

In the immature animals, the face and chin are sooty brown, but there is an area over the eyes (“forehead”) which is fleshy in colour. The dark parts deepen with age and a dusky wash sometimes almost obliterates the fleshy forehead although, normally, adult animals retain a more or less conspicuous perpendicular fleshy stripe between the eyes. A strongly marked fleshy forehead is therefore a sign of immaturity and of little use as a character in a systematic sense.

2. *Presbytis cristata pullata* Thos. and Wr.

Apparently prefers the coasts and creeks and not fond of the more inland districts.

*Presbytis albockinerea* subsp.

A distinct view of another langur was obtained in the jungle area. This was no doubt a form of *P. albockinerea*, the nearest representative of which is *rhomias* Miller, of Bintang. The Kundur form has also been separated by the same author (*canu*).

*Nycticebus coucang* (Bodd.).

Mr. Brook informs us that he has seen examples of the Slow-Loris captured on Pulau Galang. No specimens actually obtained in the Archipelago seem to be on record.

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Arctogalidia trivirgata subsp.
Mr. Brook has described to us a small carnivore which his dog chased from tree to tree in the rubber plantation. We are inclined to regard this as an Arctogalidian.

Lutra sp.
All the local inhabitants seem agreed that Otters are numerous thereabouts but we did not meet with any on the present occasion.

Muntiacus muntjac subsp.
Mr. Brook, who has done a considerable amount of big-game shooting and knows the call of the Kijang quite well, is confident that he has on one occasion heard the call of this deer on Pulau Galang. Its presence on Bintang has been fully established but its occurrence on such a small island as Galang is unexpected.

3. Tragulus javanicus stanleyanus Miller.
♀.
Exactly like specimens from Pulau Bulan.

4. Sus cristatus subsp.
♀ 4 skulls.
Three names have been applied to the small pigs of the "vittatus" group found in the Nioh Archipelago. S. rhionis Miller, was described from Pulau Ungar and S. andersoni Thos. and Wr., from Bintang; but both these forms are recorded by the latter authorities (Journ. F. M. S. Mus. IV, 1911, p. 127) from Karimun Besar Island and Lyon (P. U. S. N. M. XXXVI, 1909, p. 480) in recording rhionis from Pulau Chomhol identifies an adult male from Pulau Penjait-Layer as indistinguishable from the Sumatran S. vittatus and quite distinct from rhionis.
More material from the island is therefore required before the validity and ranges of these pigs can be determined. The matter is complicated by the fact that the larger number of the specimens that come to hand are immature.

5. Sus barbatus oii Miller.
♀ 3 skulls (2 ad., 1 juv.).
Pigs are certainly less common on Pulau Galang than on Pulau Bulan (where apparently the large S. barbatus does not occur) but as they are destructive to the rubber, steps have been taken to reduce their numbers of recent years. We saw rubber trees completely "ring-barbed" (i.e. ruined) by them.

6. Petinomys vordermanni (Jentink).
Sciuropleurus vordermanni Jent. Notes, Leyd. Mus. XII, 1890, p. 150 (Billiton).
♀ 1♂ (vix. ad.).
Dimensions in millimetres:—Head and body 95 (100), tail 116 (110 with tuft), hind-foot 21 (21), ear 12 (12.5).

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Skull:—Greatest length 30.5 (27), nasals 8 (7), greatest breadth 18 (17), palate 13 (11.5), diastema 6.5 (5.5), length of upper molar series 6 (5.5).

The measurements in brackets are those given by Jentink for the type of *vordermanni*; and the skull has been measured by a similar method for the purpose of making the comparison. This is perhaps the most interesting specimen examined from the island. It was collected by Mr. C. P. Brook in April 1924.

Compared with two *Ptenomys* from the Malay Peninsula (Bukit Kutu, Selangor) which are, *fide* Thomas, *phipsoni* (Tenasserim Town) it seems more brightly coloured.

7. *Sciurus vittatus* subsp.

1 ♂, 3 ♀.

These resemble a series of *peninsularis* of Johore and a much larger series of specimens from Singapore Island in the colour of the upper parts, but they have the greyish tail of *lunaris* of Pulau Balian rather than the warmer coloured tail of the former animals.

On the underside the black lateral stripes are rather more reduced than in *peninsularis*.

On the whole they seem nearest to *lunaris* from which they differ in having the upper parts not so dark and, taken as a series, the tail above still lighter. We leave them under a specific name pending examination of material from the Karimun Islands.


2 ♂, 1 ♀.

9. *Rattus rattus rhionis* (Thos. and Wr.),

3 ♀.

Very dark above.

10. *Rattus rattus diardi* (Jent.).

House rats are very common on the island.


♂ ad.

Dimensions in millimetres:—Head and body 359, tail 228, hind-foot 55, ear 20.

Craniol measurements:—greatest length 69; greatest breadth 43; least interorbital breadth 18; maxillary toothrow (alveoli) 31.5.

Thomas and Wroughton have said (Journ. F. M. S. Mus. IV, 1909, p. 111,) "we find the Flying Lemurs inhabiting the Rhio Archipelago, Aor Island, the Natunas and Borneo agree in being of medium size with very small teeth in marked contrast to the large teeth of *peninsulae*. But among themselves we have failed to find any constant local differences warranting their division into races—."
Of the various described insular races of this species, founded mainly on comparative cranial characters, the nearest geographically is chambolis Lyon (Proc. U. S. Nat. Mus. XXXVI, 1909, p. 487; Type loc. Pulau Chombol).

12. **Cheiroromeles torquatus** Horsf.

13. **Cynopterus brachyotis** (Muller).

1♂, 8♀.

The length of the car ranges from 16 to 18 with an average of 17.2 mm. The forearm averages 64.3 mm.

14. **Halicore dugong** (ErxiL).

♂, ♀ Skulls.

The male was taken in the strait between Pulau Galang and Pulau Kuras and the female to the west of Pulau Panjang, a small island at the south-west corner of Rempang.

**Manis javanica** Desm.

Stated by Mr. Brook to occur on the island. We have also recently received a specimen from Bintang Island.

**BIRDS.**

There is, as usual, when dealing with the birds of small coastal islands in the Malayan region, little of interest to record concerning Pulau Galang.

1. **Ducula a. acnea** (Linn.).
   Streptopelia chinensis tigrina (Temm. and Knip.).
   Amaurornis phoenicura javanica Horsf.
2. **Gallirrex cinerea** (Lath.).
   Sterna sp. (? bergii).
3. **Squatarola squatarola** hypomelus (Pall.).
4. **Charadrius mongolus** subsp.
5. **Charadrius alexandrina** petoni (Rup.).

These small plovers are not uncommon on the narrow sandy beaches of Pulau Galang and Pulau Bulan where no doubt they breed, as pairs were seen on Bulan in April. Mr. H. C. Robinson has recorded chicks in the down from Bintang Island taken in June. This should no doubt be considered a resident race of alexandrina but other forms of the same species occur in the Malay Peninsula in autumn and winter. The wings of two birds collected on Pulau Galang measure ♂ 100 mm., ♀ 97 mm., i.e. smaller than the usual run of migrant immature examples of dealbatus or alexandrina.

**Numenius arquata** lineatus Cuv.

6. **Numenius phaeopus** subsp.
   Tringoides hypoleucus (Linn.).
   Butorides striatus javanicus (Horsf.).
   Cincula leucogaster (Gm.).
   Haliastur indus intermedius Gurney.

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7. Ninox scutulata malaccensis (Eylton).
    Conurus longicauda (Bodd.).
    Eurytomus orientalis subsp.
8. Ramphalecyon capensis hydrophila Oberh.
    Ceyx sp.
    Haeleyon chloris subsp. cyanescens (Oberh.) ?
9. Anthracoceros coronatus convexus (Temm.).
    Merops superciliosus javanicus Horsf.
    Carpimulguus macrourus bimaculatus Peale.
    Hemiprocne longirostris hartteri Strescm.
10. Thripoxonax j. javensis (Horsf.).
   HIRIADO rustica gutturalis (Scop.).
11. Coracina sumatrensis (S. Mull.).
     rather large. Wing 164.
12. Pycnonotus s. simplex Less.
    Irides red.
14. Mixornis rubricapilla pileata (Blyth).
    Copsychus saularis musicus Raffles.
    Orthotomus atrigrataris Temm.
15. Corvus enca compillator Richm.
16. Dissemurms paradisens platurus (Vieill.).
    Gracula j. javana (Cur.).
    Aplonis panayensis strigata (Horsf.).
    Munia oryzivora (Linn.).
    Passer montanus malaccensis Dubois.
    Aethopyga s. aiparaia (Raffles).
    Leptocoma jugularis ornata (Less.).
    Dicaeum errentatum subsp.
    Dicaeum t. trigonostigma (Scop.).

Remarks on the black and red squirrels allied to Sciurus prevosti.

By F. N. Chasen and C. Boden Kloss.

(Records of the Raffles Museum, No. 11).

Most of the black and tan squirrels of Sumatra (other than Ratula) resemble the typical Sciurus prevosti Desm., of Malacca in that they possess broad white lateral stripes. Such are S. p. rafflesii Vig. & Horst., S. p. melanops Miller, and S. p. harrisi Stone and Rehm. These forms inhabit the southern two-thirds of Sumatra and the islands adjacent to this area also possess white-sided races (S. p. penalicus Lyon, Penjalei Island, S. p. condurensis Miller, Kunder Island, S. p. carimonomensis Miller, Karimun Island).

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The northern third of Sumatra, as far south at any rate as the neighbourhood of Deli on the east coast and Siholga on the west, is occupied to the exclusion of three-coloured animals, by a squirrel black above and red beneath, entirely lacking any white stripe, though occasionally there are a few grizzled hairs near the base of the fore-limb: this is S. piceus Peters (syn. S. erebus Miller).

Distinct as this squirrel looks it is yet only a strongly differentiated race of S. prevosti and it is clearly linked to the more typical southern animals by a subspecies occupying the island of Rupat on the east coast, S. nyx Miller. This animal has the side of the neck, the shoulder, the outer side of the thigh and frequently the side of the body above the red belly grizzled with buffy, a feature which evidently represents the white side stripe of the typical prevosti. S. nyx is obviously the link between the black, red and white Sumatra form and that which is black and red only and we therefore regard piceus and nyx as races of prevosti.

The case in Sumatra is simple, but it is not so in Borneo where a number of very variable races of S. prevosti occur; for in more than one area at least, viz. the lower slopes of Mount Kinabalu and the Bunting River, East Borneo (vide Gyldenstolpe) we apparently find black and red animals living side by side (i.e. at the same place and time) with side-striped ones. Great as is the individual variation of the prevosti squirrels of Borneo it is difficult to believe that the two are only phases of the same form though some of the black and red animals do show a small pale side stripe. It seems that a good deal more knowledge of these Bornean squirrels is required before we can definitely place all the forms which have been described and it is probable that some of them will have to be discarded.

For instance S. haluensis Bonhote, seems to have no real existence: the type came from Mt. Kinabalu, 1000 ft., and according to the describer, it occurs also on Mt. Dulit up to 5000 ft. We have seen specimens from Mt. Dulit 4000 ft. and from the banks of the Baram River and we consider it to be only an extreme individual variation of S. p. griseicauda to typical examples of which it is linked by many intermediate specimens.

To return to the black and tan squirrels of Borneo which have either no light lateral stripe or only a very small one. As in Sumatra they seem to be found in the northern third of the island only.

First we will take S. pluto Gray, from “Sarawak”. We have no specimens before us from that State but the race is represented in our series by eight examples from British North Borneo; four from Sabah, two from Kinabalu 3000-3400 ft. and two from Gantian, north-west coast. Of the “Sabah” specimens one shows no sign of a side stripe; in two it is represented by a small bronzed area and the fourth shows an elongate buffy patch. Of the Kinabalu animals one has a faint bronze mark, the other a buffy stripe about two inches long between the limbs. The two Gantian individuals agree with the last.

* The old name for British North Borneo.

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The variation in seven skins from Labuan Island is from one with no trace of a side stripe through others with a small stripe to one with a narrow white stripe starting behind the forelimb and broadening out over the upper thigh. These are Sciurus rufoniger Gray, said to be from “India”. This derivation is, of course, erroneous and we select as type locality Labuan Island, N. W. Borneo.

Until it can be shown by further knowledge of their distribution and changes of colour that these two forms are races of S. prevosti as we suspect, and as should be the case by analogy with Sumatra, we must call them S. rufoniger pluto and S. rufoniger rufoniger respectively.

This is not quite satisfactory as it indicates that the Bornean black and red squirrel is specifically distinct from the Sumatran animal which it is difficult to believe owing to the extreme similarity of examples from the two islands.

The alternative is to place pluto, piceus and nyx as forms of rufoniger which latter name has priority. The disadvantage of this course is that two species are then recognised, viz. prevosti and rufoniger, whereas in Sumatra the facts clearly indicate that piceus is only an altered form of prevosti.

If squirrels of the rufoniger and prevosti colorations are regarded as dimorphic forms of one species an interesting situation is created. In some cases one form occupies an area to the exclusion of the other; in other areas the two forms exist side by side. Furthermore each phase of the dimorphic species is readily divisible into geographic races.

The principal difference between pluto and rufoniger is that whereas the first has only a narrow black line between the red belly and the pale lateral stripe when this is present, (and which does not spread over the thigh) in the Labuan animal this black line is very broad, always far broader than the white one; further in the latter the inner sides of the wrists and ankles and the chin are more broadly blackened than in the mainland form.

S. piceus of which we have examined specimens from Aru Bay, Langkat and Deli has the chin, wrists and ankles approximately as in pluto, although the amount of black on these is a somewhat variable feature, the lateral stripe completely obliterated and the underparts brighter than in either of the Bornean forms.

On the Introduction of an Australian Scink into Singapore Island.

By F. N. Chasen.

(Records of the Raffles Museum, No. 12).

That certain species of birds, a few of them not uncommon locally, owe their presence in Singapore to direct human intervention is certain and it seems not improbable to attribute the introduction of some other animals to the same cause.

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
In 1896 (P. Z. S. p. 968) Flower wrote of the "Bull-frog" (*Kaloula pulchra*), "I have been told by both English and natives that this frog was unknown in Singapore until some nine or ten years ago, when it was introduced by a half-caste, why it is not known, and that it rapidly spread about the island." In a little popular book of "Memories" written by an old resident of Singapore there is mention of Bull-frogs having been introduced into the Island from Siam and the name of the person responsible, a Government servant, is given but no date is mentioned.

In 1913, Boulenger (Fauna of the Malay Peninsula; Rept. and Batr. p. 264) observed that this frog is very locally distributed in the Peninsula and as in the southern portions of the Peninsula it is only found in large towns he was tempted to write that it was probably introduced into that area.

The records of several species of reptiles from Singapore also seem doubtful, (especially a specimen of the Ceylonese *Hemidactylus depressus* in the British Museum) and even if the statement as to their provenance is above reproach it seems only reasonable to regard them as having been artificially introduced. Small house-geckos are sometimes found on coasting steamers and Flower (t. c. p. 652) mentions having caught a specimen of *Lygosoma chalcides* on board a boat on a voyage from Siam to Singapore.

Such events must be expected to occur but perhaps it is as well to chronicle the early history of introduced species as the facts are soon forgotten.

The well-known "Tokay" (*Gecko verticillatus*) is common in Siam both in towns and in the country and is common as far south as Patani. In the southern parts of the Malay Peninsula, it seems to be unknown in the Federated Malay States but is recorded from Penang, Province Wellesley and Singapore, all large settlements on the coast be it noted. Although the species had already been recorded from Singapore, prior to the date on which he wrote (1899) Flower (t. c.) remarks that it must be very rare or local in Singapore. He did not meet with it himself nor did he meet any Englishman who had seen it for certain.

At the time of writing this large gecko is found not uncommonly in Singapore but it is very local in distribution and apparently confined to houses in one of the native quarters. Its distinctive call is unknown to most Europeans in Singapore. In passing it may be mentioned that *G. verticillatus* is very common on Pulau Galang in the Rhio Archipelago where it occupies houses and is also found in the country districts where its loud call made be heard in the jungle. One account of the introduction of this gecko into Singapore fixes the date at about 1898 and relates that the individuals were brought from Java.

We have recently examined an example of the Australian skink, *Egeria depresa* (Gunft.) which was captured near the Tanjong Pagar docks in Singapore and as there are four other specimens of
On the Introduction of an Australian Scink.

_Egernia_ in the Raffles Museum, three certainly, and all presumably, taken on the island there seems to be a reasonable chance of this alien becoming established. Two of the older specimens are labelled as having been caught in the dock area and one was discovered in a cargo of sandalwood.

_Egernia depressa_ is roughly the size of the common garden scink of Singapore, _Mabuya multifasciata_, but it has a stumpy tail and is immediately recognised by the parallel rows of short, backwardly directed spines on the back and the yet more formidable armature of the tail.

Those boats carrying timber, largely exported from the ports of south-western Australia, are no doubt the means by which the scink reaches Singapore but it is perhaps significant that it has not yet been recorded from outside the dock area of the city.

Bird Notes.


(Records of the Raffles Museum, No. 13).

A. On the capture of a second example of Piprisoma squalidum sordidum R. & K.

On the 14th June, 1913, an example of a Flower-pecker, then new to the Peninsula, was obtained at Rawang, Central Selangor, and was described with the name of *Piprisoma sordidum*, by Messrs. Robinson and Kloss (Journ. Fed. Malay States Mus., VII, 1918, p. 239).

The specimen remained unique until quite recently, when on the 25th November 1924 Mr. O. J. Wilson, O. B. E., M. B. O. U. obtained a second mule at Sungei Buloh, near Kuala Lumpur, and also only a few miles away from the locality whence came the first.

This example agrees exactly with the type except that it is perhaps a little more olivaceous. Total length 105, tail 34, wing 60, tarsus 13.5, bill from gape 11 mm. “Iris pale yellow, maxilla horn grey, mandible pale plumbeous, feet black.”

This bird is a race of *P. squalidum* of Ceylon, India and Assam and has no relationship with the other *Piprisoma* occurring in the Malay Peninsula *P. modestum*, a distinct species represented by *P. m. finschii* (Bartels) (syn. remotum R & K).

The specimen has been presented to the Raffles Museum by the collector.

B. *Micropus pacificus cooki* (Harington) in the Malayan Peninsula.

Having recently been asked what forms of the White-rumped Swift occurred in the Malayan Peninsula advantage was taken of a visit to Kuala Lumpur to examine the specimens in the Federated Malay States Museum as material in the Raffles Museum is very scanty.

The following is the result:

*M. pacificus pacificus*
- Kuala Lumpur, Selangor, 4 examples.
- Koh Pennan, East Coast, Peninsular Siam, 2 ex.
- Kandyhuli, Chaiva, do do 1 ex.

*Intermediate*
- Nearer *M. p. pacificus*
  - Semangko Pass, Selangor, 2500-4000 ft. 1 ex.
- Nearer *M. p. cooki*
  - Semangko Pass, Selangor, 2500-4000 ft. 1 ex.
  - Bukit Tangga, Negri Sembilan, 1 ex.

*M. pacificus cooki*
- Kedah Peak, Kedah, 3000-4000 ft. 1 ex.

This race must therefore be included in the fauna of the Malayan Peninsula. It was described by Harington from Goteik, Northern Shan States (Bull. B. O. C. XXXI, 1913, p. 57) and discussed at greater length in Journ. Bomb. Nat. Hist. Soc. XXIII, 1914, p. 155.

C. *Setornis criniger.*


The description given by Lesson of a supposed Sumatran species, *Setornis criniger* admirably fits the Bornean bird later described as *Trichophoropsis typus*.

This is lowland species, common in the neighbourhood of Kuching in Sarawak and in view of the large collections recently made in Sumatra we feel at liberty to suppose the original citation of the type locality of *Setornis criniger* as "Sumatra" to be an error.

This was suspected by Blyth (J. A. S. B., 1845, p. 577 footnote) and realized by Walden (Ibis, 1872, p. 377 pl. XII) who uses Lesson's name for the Bornean bird and gives a good figure of the species which only differs from a series of twenty we have recently examined from Sarawak in being browner (less yellow) below and slightly deeper brown above.

Walden notes the feet as very pale pink or flesh colour but figures the bird with these parts as dark bluish grey. The latter is no doubt correct as the feet are noted as grey or blue on the labels of the birds we have recently examined.
This bird has nothing whatever to do with *Tricholestes criniger*. Blyth, J. A. S. Bengal XIV. p. 577 (ex A. Hay, M. S.) from which it is sufficiently distinct, in spite of the presence of nuchal filo-plumes, to warrant generic separation.

The series before us is extremely uniform varying only in the intensity of the subocular dark stripe which in some specimens is almost obsolete and in the colour of the ear coverts which show different shades of grey or brown.

There does not appear to be any difference in the sexes beyond the slightly shorter wing of the females.

Wing, 10 ♂: 95-105 mm.
Wing, 10 ♀: 90-98 mm.
British Malaya
1824–1867

By L. A. MILLS

With Appendix by C. O. BLAGDEN

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DEDICATION.

To Sir Charles Lucas, with grateful thanks for his unfailing encouragement and assistance.
Preface.

No one who is interested in the British Empire can fail to be impressed by the fact that of the many books which appear every year on Imperial History very few deal with the Crown Colonies. While much painstaking research has been devoted to the development of the self-governing Dominions, no adequate account has yet appeared of a very large number of the Crown Colonies. This book is an attempt to supply the want so far as British Malaya is concerned, for the period 1824 to 1867. The first four chapters form an introduction giving a brief account of the earlier history of the Straits Settlements from 1786 to 1834. The principal events in this period have already been dealt with by Swettenham, Egerton, Boulger and others, so that the introduction is intended merely to summarize, and in some points to supplement, their conclusions, as for example the account of the legal and economic history of Penang and Singapore. The remaining ten chapters of the book are almost entirely based upon my own investigations.

In the matter of acknowledgments I have to express my deep sense of obligation for the assistance which I have received from Sir Charles Lucas, K.C.M.G., Sir Herbert Warren, K.C.V.O., Mr. C. O. Blagden, Professor Egerton, Professor Coupland, and Mr. E. M. Wrong, by their encouragement and valuable criticisms. I am also indebted to Mr. Blagden for the Appendix of Malayan documents which he discovered and translated at Malacca. They give the Nanning War from the native point of view; but unfortunately they did not come into my possession until it was too late to use them in the writing of this book. I have to thank Mr. S. C. Hill, late of the Indian Educational Service, for the use of his unpublished manuscript on East Indian piracy. It is also a pleasure to acknowledge my indebtedness to Mr. Evans Lewin, the Librarian of the Royal Colonial Institute, and to Mr. Foster, the Librarian of the India Office Library, for their assistance in discovering and placing at my disposal a number of valuable documents.

Magdalen College, Oxford,

June 25th, 1924.
The English and Dutch in the East, 1579-1786.

The vagueness of the term British Malaya renders it desirable to define exactly the area to which it applies. For the purposes of this thesis it includes the Straits Settlements and the British Protectorates on the Malay Peninsula, south of the boundary fixed by the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of Bangkok in 1909, Labuan and the British Protectorates in Borneo, viz. Brunei, Sarawak, and North Borneo. The Cocos or Keeling Islands and Christmas Island are not included. Since the thesis is primarily concerned with Singapore, Malaca and Penang, the other parts of British Malaya are dealt with only in so far as they affected the history of the Straits Settlements.

Although the foundation of the Straits Settlements dates only from 1826, British Malaya is one of the earliest fields of English enterprise in Asia. Within less than a generation after Drake’s famous voyage of 1579 in the “Golden Hind”, trading posts were founded in various parts of the Malay Peninsula. They were soon abandoned however, and for more than a century and a half no attempt was made to reestablish them. For the explanation of this early failure and final magnificent success it is necessary to summarize the history of the English East India Company, its long and bitter rivalry with the Dutch, and the downfall of the Dutch East India Company’s supremacy in India and the Archipelago.

The initial lack of success was in no respect due to the Portuguese; their empire vastly imposing in its outward seeming, proved to be only a hollow sham which collapsed almost as quickly as it had arisen. Within forty years after 1596, when the English and Dutch made their first important attacks upon it, it had already ceased to be a serious rival. Although a generation more elapsed before it shrank to a few half-ruined trading stations, its fate was clearly only a matter of time, for this catastrophic collapse four reasons may be assigned.(1)

(1) The Portuguese was essentially a commercial empire, which had been rapidly built up on an insufficient territorial basis in Europe. Portugal was too small a country to support the drain in men and resources necessary to maintain and defend an empire which extended from Africa to China. After 1580 Spain might have supplied this deficiency, but its rulers were too absorbed in

(1) Birdwood, “Indian Records”—175.

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
other interests, and neglected the interests of their new dependency.

(2) Of scarcely less importance was the fact that the Portuguese Empire depended for its existence on the command of the sea. It consisted only of trading stations and a few naval bases, like Goa, Malacca, etc. In 1589, for example, when its trade was almost at the zenith, the only places where they maintained garrisons in the whole of the Malay Peninsula and the East Indies were Malacca, Amboyna and Tidore. Moreover the Portuguese territorial possessions were small, consisting generally of only the few square miles immediately surrounding the towns, because the garrisons were too tiny to hold large areas. The loss for example in a foray of 12 men of the Malacca garrison was a disaster of the first magnitude. The empire was merely a widely extended chain of trading centres to which the Portuguese compelled the trade of the East to resort. Like the British Empire its vital weakness lay in this, that it could not possibly survive the loss of the command of the sea. Once this was gone, the fall of the scattered factories and forts became only a question of time. And in 1606, only ten years after the Dutch first appeared in the East, Admiral Cornelis de Jouve with eleven ships met the Portuguese fleet of 26 sail off Malacca and defeated it. This battle sealed the fate of the Portuguese Empire. The command of the sea had passed to Holland, and although the Empire was strong enough to hold out for a generation, and even to continue the contest for Eastern supremacy, its ultimate collapse was certain. There was much hard fighting still to be done before Dutch and English could afford to ignore their rivals, but the most important object of the war had been attained. (3)

(3) The "into'er able bigotry" of the Portuguese, the result of their wars against the Moors militated against them. They regarded themselves as "above all things........knight's errant and Crusaders", and every Asiatic "as an enemy at once of Portugal and Christ." Even in the century of Alba and the Inquisition their deeds can confidently challenge comparison with those of Spain. In consequence the natives hated them bitterly, and on the arrival of the Dutch and English, assisted them in every way possible. (4)

(4) For a generation before the arrival of the Dutch and English, the Portuguese Empire had been falling into decay. In 1550 it was at the zenith of its power, but thereafter the growth of its trade and the decay of its power had progressed steadily

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(2) Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Straits Branch, No. 66, p. 60. Translation of article of Dr. Miller by P. van Papeudrecht.
together. An interesting picture of the empire at the height of its magnificence is given by Jan van Linschoten, who visited Goa in 1583-89. He found carelessness, incapacity, neglect of duty and corruption rampant amongst the officials, the majority of whom owed their appointment to high rank, nepotism and influence rather than to their own merits. The local governments were utterly corrupt, the man were degraded by their marriages with native women, and the women were given up to debauchery.

For these reasons the empire of Portugal collapsed almost as rapidly as it had arisen. After the command of the sea was lost in 1606 the Dutch and English gradually wrested from it possession after possession. In spite of temporary fluctuations of fortune the Portuguese Empire grew steadily weaker. By 1630 its rivals had broken its power in India and Persia, and seized most of its principal settlements in the East. With the fall of Malacca in 1640 the Portuguese Empire rapidly sank into insignificance. By 1661 it had been reduced to Goa and a few other towns, the trade of which was so insignificant that neither of its rivals troubled to annex them.

The failure of the English East India Company to maintain its early acquisitions in the Malay Peninsula was thus in no way due to Portugal, but was caused by the bitter hostility of the Dutch. The earliest attacks upon the Portuguese trade monopoly were made by the English: but it was the Dutch who first effectively established themselves in the East and who did the lion’s share of the work of ousting the Portuguese. Holland’s first voyage was not made until 1596, but by 1599 she had already secured a firm foothold in Portugal’s preserves. In this year there occurred an apparently insignificant event whose ultimate result was to be the foundation of the British Empire in India and Malaya. The Dutch merchants raised the price of pepper against the English from three shillings to six and eight shillings a pound. This decided the London merchants to form an Association for trading directly with the East Indies, and on December 31st, 1600, the English East India Company was formally incorporated. An expedition was sent out which founded a factory at Bantam in Java, and concluded a commercial treaty with the King of the native state of Achin in Sumatra. Thus began the long history of the British connection with that state, which lasted until 1871.

In the following years other expeditions were sent out, and by 1623 many trading posts had been established in India, the

(6) Smith, "India," 335.
(7) Birdwood—"Indian Records," 185.
(8) Ibid., 196, 197. Danvers, "Indian Records," 1, 1, 21-22.
(9) Danvers, 1, 1, 22-23.
(10) Ibid., 8.
(11) Birdwood, "Indian Records," 293.

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
East Indies, and the Far East. In 1610 a factory was built at Patani, on the eastern coast of the Malay Peninsula. This was the only English factory in the Peninsula. On the whole the Company's net profits were very large, averaging between 100% and 200% on each expedition sent out. It is important to note that until it was ousted from the East Indies by the Dutch, the Company was principally concerned with developing its trade in the Archipelago rather than India. The trade in spices, pepper, cinnamon, cloves, etc.—with the Moluccas was the main reason for the founding of both the Dutch and English Companies, and the struggle between them was really a fight for the monopoly of the spice trade. It was only after the English found themselves too weak to make head against their rivals that from 1615 onwards they gradually concentrated their attention upon India, and abandoned the East Indian Islands to Holland.

Remarkable as was the prosperity of the London Company, that of the Dutch was far greater. By 1620 they had established a network of forts and factories in India and the Archipelago, and from the point of view of resources—wealth, soldiers, fortresses, and fleets—they were much more powerful. The cordiality which had characterized the relations of the two Companies in the early years of the century, when the Portuguese were still opponents to be feared, had long since died, and the quondam allies had already begun to attack one another's vessels. The Dutch superiority was due to several causes. The merchants of Amsterdam were far more wealthy than those of London, and hence were able to support the cost of fleets and armies which would have been beyond their rivals' means, even if the English had been willing to engage in a race of armaments. Moreover the English merchants were not on the whole very vigorously supported by the government of the Stuarts, nor did they until after the Amboyna Massacre in 1623 attract the attention of the nation at large. So discouraged did the London Company become by lack of support against its rivals, debt, and the injury done to its trade by English interlopers, that on several occasions it seriously considered abandoning the East altogether. The Dutch East India Company on the contrary was vigorously supported by the States General, and could count on the assistance of all the wealth and power of the Netherlands. A typical example of this occurred in 1602. During the first six years of Dutch enterprise in the East several companies were formed to trade there. So intense did their rivalry become that the States General realizing that this was injuring Dutch commerce, compelled them to unite and from the Dutch East India Company which was given a monopoly of the trade.

(12) Danvers, I, i, 26.
(14) Birdwood, "Indian Records," 46.
Company was the Dutch nation, the English was merely an ordinary private association of merchants. These causes coupled with the crippling effect of the Civil War, hampered the English operations for many years; and when at last the Company recovered and found itself in a position to contest the Dutch, the Netherlands supremacy in the Archipelago was too firmly established to be shaken.

In spite of inferior resources the London Company could have resisted the Dutch more effectually than it did, had it been willing to cut down its dividends and spend more on ships and forts. It might perhaps have maintained its rights to a share in the trade of the Spice Islands. But as it was, and especially before 1669—the vital years when the foundations of the Dutch power were being laid—the English only sent out scattered ships at intervals, while the Dutch despatched a constant succession of well equipped fleets which established their empire so firmly that the English Company with its much smaller resources had to give way.\(^{(16)}\) In 1692, for example, the Dutch had 83 ships in the East, the English only 28.\(^{(17)}\) Wilkinson refers to the East India Company's early activities in scathing terms. \"It is a sordid record of unprofitable servants who defrauded their employers and disgraced their country, and of a sanctimonious Company that supplied its employees with devotional literature, underpaid them, and sacrificed their lives rather than reduce its dividends. Rather than contribute to the cost of the Dutch Company's troops and fleets, the British Company deliberately sacrificed its share of the trade of the Archipelago.\"\(^{(18)}\) The earliest Dutch traders were as much averse to costly fortresses, troops and territorial possessions as the English, and like them vastly preferred the unsafe but cheap "factory." They soon learnt however that the unfortified trading-post was too dependent for its prosperity, and even for its security, upon the goodwill of greedy native rulers to be permanently successful. Early in the seventeenth century therefore they began to turn their factories into fortresses, and to build up a strong army and navy.\(^{(19)}\)

It is only fair to the London Company to remember that there was another side to the question. One of the principal reasons for the fall of the Portuguese Empire had been its inability to support the constant drain of men and money required to maintain its fortresses and fleets. The Dutch also, in spite of their great resources, found the burden very heavy. Sir Thomas Roe studied the question carefully on his embassy to the Great Mogul in 1615, and strongly advised the English Company not to adopt the Dutch

\(^{(16)}\) H. Wright, Early English Adventures in the East, 177-188.


\(^{(19)}\) Ibid., 44-45.

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
policy.\(^{(20)}\) In fact of so competent an authority, and considering how inferior were the English resources, the Directors were perhaps wise in refusing to imitate their rivals.

The Directors' refusal to spend large sums on armaments was finally confirmed by the realization that, while it would probably lead to the loss of the trade with the East Indian Islands, by concentrating their efforts upon India they could retain its immensely valuable commerce, and at the same time avoid heavy expenditure for defence. This is clearly established by the correspondence between the Directors and their agents in the East over the Dutch proposal of 1615 that the two rival companies should be amalgamated.\(^{(21)}\) The Dutch proposed that the English should assume part of the cost of carrying on the war against the Portuguese, and that, when victory had been attained, the two allies should divide the Eastern trade. The reason for this offer was that while the Dutch had gained command of the sea and captured many of Portugal's possessions, they were still compelled to maintain a large fleet and army to complete their conquests. The Portuguese were far from being reduced to impotence, and the Netherlands Company found the drain upon its resources caused a most serious reduction of profits. When faced by this offer the London Company temporised; it had profited by the Dutch armaments without contributing to their cost, and it desired that so satisfactory a state of affairs should continue as long as possible. This unwillingness to diminish dividends for the sake of security was characteristic of the Directors' policy throughout the greater part of the century. They much preferred that their unprotected agents should be exposed to periodical insults, imprisonment and extortion from native rulers or the Dutch rather than incur the expense of troops and fortifications.\(^{(22)}\) Furthermore, at this time they did not believe that the Dutch would dare to carry their hostility beyond empty threats.\(^{(23)}\) The Netherlands Company pressed for an immediate answer to its proposal, and its agents in the Indies did not hesitate to attack the English ships which interfered with their trade. Finally the Directors were informed by their agents in the East that although a refusal of the offer would probably end in the English being ousted from the Archipelago, they would nevertheless be able to maintain their position in India and secure a monopoly of its trade. The Directors therefore evaded the acceptance of the Dutch offer.\(^{(24)}\)

While they realised to what their decision might lead, they

\(^{(22)}\) Wright, "Annesley of Surat and His Times," passim.
\(^{(23)}\) Foster, "Letters Received by the E. Ind. Company," III, Intro., xxxvi.
continued to establish factories in the East Indian Islands, for they hoped to avoid incurring the expense of armaments and yet at the same time enjoy the benefits which would have resulted from them.

During the next few years Anglo-Dutch relations grew steadily worse, until by 1618 the two Companies were at open war. The principal reason for this was the English attempt to secure a firm foothold in the Moluccas, or Spice Islands, the principal goal of European enterprise in the East. In this connection it is curious to note how from the time of the Portuguese, all the Western nations failed to realize the immense value of the Indian trade "per se," and devoted their main efforts to securing a monopoly of the supply of cloves, nutmegs, pepper, cinnamon and other spices.(25) With the exception of pepper these were to be found only in the Molucca and Banda Islands;(26) and it was primarily for their possession that the wars of the Portuguese, Dutch and English traders were fought. It might almost be said that British India is the unexpected result of the loss of the spice trade. The situation in these islands was that by 1615 the Dutch had conquered the Moluccas and established themselves in the Bandas after some hard fighting against the Portuguese. This they had accomplished without any English assistance, and they refused to share the fruits of victory with their rivals. The Dutch attempt to establish a monopoly threatened to destroy the English Company's former lucrative trade.(27) Some of the Spice Islands were however still unoccupied in 1615-20 and the English made several unsuccessful attempts to obtain possession of them. In this they were aided by the Bandaese, who had been driven into rebellion by the harshness of the Dutch rule, and looked upon the English as deliverers. The Dutch first tried threats, but finding them useless they drove the English by force out of Pulo Ai and Pulo Roön, two of the Banda Islands where the natives had invited the London Company to form factories.(28) The conduct of the Dutch was peculiarly indefensible in the case of Pulo Roön, since they had never even visited it before the arrival of the English, and the natives had ceded it to England.(29) From 1618 to 1620 there was open war between the two Companies in the East; and on the whole the English had decidedly the worst of it, as was to be expected from their inferior resources.(30)

(26) Crawford, "Descriptive Dictionary of the Indian Islands:"
(27) Foster, "Letters Received," III, xxix-xxx: IV, xxi.
(30) Foster, "English Factories in India, 1618-21," xxxviii-xiii.

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
A hollow truce was patched up by the so-called Treaty of Defence of 1619, negotiated in London between King James' government and Dutch Commissioners. The Dutch and also King James appear to have been satisfied with it, the Company was not, but "fante de mieux," had to accept it. Many important disputes of long standing had been left unsettled by the treaty, and furthermore the terms of the agreement itself soon gave rise to a host of new controversies. Both sides accused one another of bad faith, and the so-called alliance did little more than add fresh fuel to the flames of English and Dutch hatred.

Finally, in 1623, came the notorious massacre of Amboyna. The Dutch tortured and executed a number of Englishmen and their Japanese mercenaries stationed at the London Company's factory of Amboyna, in the Spice Islands, on a false charge of conspiring to seize the Dutch fortress there. With this outrage vanished all hopes of future co-operation between the two nations in the East. The President and Counell at Batavia (the capital of the English Company's possessions from 1620 to 1623) were confirmed in the decision which they had made even before the massacre occurred. This was that their factories in the Moluccas, the outlying parts of the Archipelago, and the Far East must be abandoned, since it was impossible for them to carry on a profitable trade in the face of unremitting Dutch hostility. By the end of 1623 the English Company's factories at Patani, in the Malay Peninsula, Hirado, in Japan, and Siam, had been abandoned, while its posts in the Archipelago were reduced to those at Achin and Jambi in Sumatra, Japara in Java, and Macassar in Celebes. In 1628 Batavia itself was abandoned and the seat of government was transferred to Bantam.

The year 1623 was one of the most important dates in the history of the British Empire in India for in it the Directors ceased to regard the East Indian Islands as the principal field of their operations, and concentrated their attention more and more upon the development of their Indian trade. Like most great changes, this revolution was not the work of a single year; the Directors had been gradually inclining towards it ever since about 1615, when it became evident that they must either spend large sums on armaments or be ousted from the Archipelago. As long as it was possible to do so however they clung to their East

(34) Ibid., xxxvi.
(35) Ibid., xxxvii.
(36) Danvers, "Indian Records," 1, 1, 30.

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Indian factories, and it was only the revelation that the Dutch were prepared to go to any lengths against them which finally drove them to reverse their policy. Even after 1623 however the Directors did not wholly abandon their trade with the East Indian Islands. They still retained their factories in Java and Sumatra, and on various occasions attempted partly to regain their former position in the Archipelago. The uncompromising hostility of the Dutch however, combined with the growth of their Indian commerce, gradually diverted their attention almost completely to India, until the Company’s trade with the Archipelago became only a minor affair.

Before tracing the later history of English enterprise in the Eastern Archipelago it is necessary to explain how the Company had contrived to build up so prosperous a trade in India, and why they were able to resist successfully the attacks of the Portuguese and Dutch there. Although the early Dutch victories had soon broken the back of Portuguese power, they had “scotched the snake, not killed it.” The might of Portugal was wanting, but she was still able to send new fleets to the East, and for over a generation after she lost command of the sea in 1606, the dismembered fragments of her empire continued to oppose the English and Dutch, before they finally succumbed. Moreover Surat, the principal English factory in India, was on the West Coast, only about 400 miles from Goa, the principal seat of Portuguese power, and the London Company was thus peculiarly exposed to their attacks. The Great Mogul had at first been unwilling to allow the English to trade in India partly because of the influence of the Jesuit missionaries in his court, and in part because his empire possessed no navy, and its trade was at the mercy of the Portuguese ships, which were considered invincible. In 1612 however the English fleet waylaid the Indian merchantmen going to Mocha and Aden, compelled them to trade, and levied a heavy ransom on the ships from Diu and Surat, as punishment for the exclusion of English vessels. In the same year the English fleet defeated a Portuguese squadron which attacked it. These events had a great effect in India: they broke the tradition of Portuguese invincibility by sea, and also showed that Indian trade was as much at the mercy of the English as of Portuguese ships. As a result, the Great Mogul granted the London Company permission to trade, and a factory was established at Surat.**(28)

The embassy of Sir Thomas Roe in 1615 to the Great Mogul very greatly improved the position of the English merchants. In addition to Portuguese hostility, they had hitherto had to contend against the jealous opposition of Indian traders, and the extortions of local officials. Only the dread of English sea power and fears of retaliation upon native merchants had saved them from ex-

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pulsion. Roe failed to obtain valuable trading privileges, but he accomplished three results of the highest importance. He greatly raised English prestige at the court of the Mogul, who had hitherto not been very favourably impressed by the Englishmen—merchants and swashbuckling adventurers—whom he had seen, he won over influential courtiers to support the Company, and he procured the recall of the powerful and unjust governor of Surat. Roe thereby "instilled into his successors a wholesome dread of offending the foreign merchants who had so powerful a friend at headquarters. If, after his departure English found in India... a free trade, a peaceable residence, and a very good esteem with that King and people, it was due very largely to the character and ability" of Roe.(38)

During the next few years the position of the Company grew steadily stronger. The Portuguese attacks were defeated, and in 1632 the English carried the war into the enemy's camp when in alliance with the Persians they besieged and captured Ormuz, a strong fortress of vital importance to Portugal for the safeguarding of her Persian trade, and one of the principal commercial centres of Asin.(39) The concluding stages of the war may be briefly summarized. Desultory hostilities continued until 1635, but although the arrival of strong fleets from Portugal sometimes resulted in English defeats, the balance of success inclined more and more to the side of the Company. The Portuguese also succeeded in alienating Jehangir by their kidnapping of his subjects, by their slave trade, and by their plundering of Indian merchantmen. On several occasions he attacked them and did them much damage. For these reasons the Portuguese had by 1635 ceased to be serious rivals of the Company, either in trade or war.(40) Moreover for several years both had been feeling that their real enemy was the Dutch, and that instead of attacking one another they would be much better advised to make common cause against them. Accordingly in 1635 a treaty of peace was signed, and henceforth the quondam adversaries tended to support one another against Holland.(41)

Despite the long war, English trade on the whole prospered exceedingly. Factories were established on both the East and West Coasts of India, and on the Persian Gulf, Surat being the Indian headquarters of the Company. Very large profits were made, and in 1629 the Directors recorded their opinion of Surat that "no place proveth so good, so sure, nor any trade so profitable, and..."

(39) Foster, "English Factories, 1622-23:" vii-xiii.

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is in fair possibilitie to prove more and more profitable."(43) The contrast between the rapid increase of the Indian trade, and its comparative security compared with the precariousness of the situation in the Eastern Archipelago, clearly shows the reason for the Directors' reversal of policy in 1623.

Despite the victory over the Portuguese the success of the Company remained very doubtful. So hopeless did the outlook appear that on several occasions, e.g. in 1625-27, 1630-36, and 1647, the abandonment of the trade was seriously considered. It was not until about 1657 that its fortunes began steadily to improve. While Dutch hostility was the principal reason, there were several other contributing causes. The Company was hampered by debt, credit was very difficult to obtain, and it received little support from the governments of James I, Charles I, and the Commonwealth, during its earlier years. There was dissension within its own ranks, and furthermore trade was gravely injured by the operations of interlopers, like Courten's Company, founded in 1635. Far from assisting the Directors against their rivals, Charles I aided in the establishment of Courten's association. During the Civil War and the first years of the Commonwealth conditions became even more serious. Not only did the Directors' trade suffer from the war, and from the levies made upon their funds by both King and Parliament, but they were also unable to recover the £50,000 lent to Charles I in 1640. It is not without cause that Foster characterises the period 1643-57 as "the darkest years in the history of the Company."(44)

During the same period the fortunes of the Dutch were rapidly approaching their zenith. Their war with Portugal came to an end in 1644, after they had annexed everything worth taking. One of their last and most important successes was the capture in 1641 of Malacca which, owing to its very strong fortifications, had resisted their many previous attacks. Its fall consolidated the supremacy of Holland in the East Indian Archipelago, for not only was it one of the principal trading centres of Asia, but it also occupied a very commanding strategic position on the Straits of Malacca, the best trade-route to the East Indies and China. Nearly every merchantman bound for the Archipelago or the Far East either put in at Malacca or else passed close by. Entrenched in the great fortress erected by the Portuguese, the Dutch dominated this route, and could interfere with or destroy the trade of all other nations at pleasure.(45)

(45) J. R. A. S. S. B., No. 60, pp. 61 and 70. Muller.

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On comparing the relative strength of the two Companies at this period, it is easy to understand why the English were not more successful against the Dutch, supported as they were by the wealth and power of Holland. The wonder is that the London Company succeeded in keeping its trade going although on a somewhat reduced scale. The Dutch were the dominant power in the East Indian Islands, and scarcely tolerated English competition there. Bantam and the factories subordinate to it in Celebes, Java and Sumatra, continued to exist, but trade gradually decreased. The Commonwealth's War with Holland afforded another proof of the weakness of the English Company. Bantam was blockaded, and its trade practically brought to a standstill. Everywhere the Company's commerce practically ceased to exist, many ships being captured and others forced to take refuge in the neutral native ports. In India also the Dutch were at this period much more powerful than the English. Their fortresses were more numerous and much wealthier and in 1649 they imposed terms on the Great Mogul himself. Without sea power he had to choose between submission and the destruction of his trade. To contemporary observers it seemed probable that Holland would combine dominion in the Archipelago with supremacy in Hindustan, and so become paramount in the East, from the Cape of Good Hope to the China Sea. (46)

The fortunes of the London Company began to improve about 1657. In 1658 Cromwell compelled the Dutch to pay an indemnity for the Massacre of Amboyna, and to promise to restore Pulo Roon, the Spice Island which they had wrested from the English in 1620. (47) Real prosperity however did not return until the Restoration brought back public confidence and general tranquillity. (48) Charles II was genuinely anxious to promote English trade, and the Company enjoyed his high favour. It prospered greatly, and established many new factories in India. (49)

Both in India and the Archipelago however the Dutch retained their supremacy until towards the close of the seventeenth century. They continued their old policy of hostility to English trade, and were more than once guilty of hightanded actions in India. In 1664 for example they ordered the English to withdraw from Pora because they had decided to build a factory there. (50) In the East Indies, the headquarters of their power, their actions were even more tyrannical. Despite the treaty of 1658 they retained Pulo Roon, and finally in 1667. Charles II was compelled to recognise

(50) Birdwood, "Indian Records," 190, 220.
their possession of it by the Treaty of Breda.(31) The trade of Bantam and the other English factories in the Eastern Archipelago was hampered in every way. Finally in 1683, the Dutch expelled the English from Bantam. The Directors made no serious attempt to regain it, and ordered the abandonment of all their remaining posts in the East Indian Islands, and of the factories recently re-established in Siam, Tonquin, Amoy etc. They considered that in the face of persistent Dutch hostility trade in the Archipelago was hopeless.(32) For over a century the Dutch supremacy in the Malay Peninsula and the East Indian Islands remained almost unchallenged.

Considering the Dutch policy in the Archipelago, it seems somewhat surprising that they did not try to drive the Company from India also, for by itself it was quite unable to resist them. Apart from an abortive attempt in 1685-90 to make it a military power, until about the middle of the eighteenth century the Directors adhered to the traditional policy of refusing to build forts and maintain troops. At the end of the seventeenth century the Company had only a small, though very efficient fleet of armed merchants, a few hundred soldiers, and the three fortresses of Bombay, Madras and Calcutta. The Directors preferred to remain a peaceable commercial corporation, securing trade rights and immunity from oppression by making lavish presents to the Mogul officials. (33) The explanation appears to be that the Dutch centred their attention on the Spice Islands and the Eastern Archipelago and regarded their Indian trade as of only minor importance.(34) While they drove the English out of the East Indian Islands to complete their monopoly there, in India they did not consider it necessary to rid themselves of a rival whose weakness they regarded with contempt. It was only in 1759 that, comprehending the full significance of Plassey, they made a desperate attempt to check the growth of English power. It was too late; the Dutch Company had long been sinking into decay, and the only result of its action was ignominious defeat, and the final withdrawal of the Dutch from Indian politics.(35)

Before the end of the seventeenth century the period of violent collision between the Dutch and English Companies was at an end. Both had firmly established themselves on the whole in separate spheres, the English in India and the Dutch in the Archipelago. Three more attempts were made however by the English Company to gain a foothold in the Archipelago, at Bencoolen in Sumatra, and in or off Borneo at Banjarmassin and Balambangan. Bencoolen, one of the most costly and unprofitable stations which the Company ever possessed, was founded in 1685. The Directors had abandoned

(31) Dunmore, "Indian Records," I, i, 31-33, 34.
(33) Smith, "India," 449-50, 456, 466.
(34) Smith, "India," 241, 449.

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hope of winning part of the trade in the more costly spices,—cloves, nutmegs, etc., but they believed it was possible to gain a share of the valuable trade in pepper. Its cultivation was not confined to a few islands in the very centre of the Dutch Empire, but was widespread in Java, Sumatra and many other parts of the Archipelago. Accordingly a fort was built at Bencoolen on the West Coast of Sumatra. This island had long been noted for its pepper plantations, and furthermore had few Dutch factories, since Holland like Portugal had rather overlooked its importance and had pressed on Eastwards to the Spice Islands. During the early period of its existence Bencoolen appeared to justify the high hopes entertained of it. For a few years its commerce amounted to over 6000 tons of pepper a year, and several branch factories were established in the neighbouring districts. The settlement however never paid, comparing the total receipts with the very large expenditure required for its fortifications and upkeep. Several reasons can be assigned for this. The climate was very unhealthy, and there was a very high death-rate amongst the staff and the garrison. The officials neglected their duties consequent on their being allowed to trade on their own account, and the settlement was too far removed from the usual trade route to China to become a commercial centre. The Dutch greatly hampered trade, by establishing posts in the neighbourhood and intriguing with the natives. In 1760 the French dealt Bencoolen a very serious blow, since they destroyed the fortifications and for a time reduced the settlement to ruin. The Company also made the discovery, confirmed by the experience of every other European power in the East Indian Islands, that it was impossible to obtain a satisfactory return from plantations worked by Malay labour. For all these reasons the annual yield of pepper gradually diminished until it became negligible. Meanwhile the yearly expenditure was always very high, so that Bencoolen was kept up at a heavy annual loss. Finally the Directors realised the hopelessness of the situation, and decided to establish a fort in a more central position in the Archipelago. The subsequent history of Bencoolen may be told in a few words. It continued to be a heavy loss to the Company, and when Sir Stamford Raffles came there as Governor in 1818 he described its condition as "a miserable state of ruin... The natives say that Bencoolen is now a dead land." Raffles with his usual energy and ability set himself to restore the settlement to prosperity, and during the five years of his governorship he introduced many reforms which went far to attain this end. The Directors however had become utterly weary of Bencoolen: for one hundred and fifty years they had annually


(57) Ibid., 46-49.

expended about £100,000 on it, and in return they received a few tons of pepper. At various times they had been given forecasts of returning prosperity; but the result had always been increased deficits and diminishing returns. Bencoolen was thoroughly discredited, and the Directors refused to sanction the further outlay required by Raffles’ projects. They preferred to write it off their books as a dead loss, and willingly ceded it to the Dutch in 1824 in exchange for Malacca. (59)

The second attempt of the English Company in the eighteenth century to obtain a share in the trade of the East Indian Islands was made at Banjarmassin, in Southern Borneo, between 1698 and 1701. A fort was built, but in 1707 the natives attacked it and drove the English out of the country. In 1738 trade began again, but it came to an end in 1756, when the Dutch obtained from the Sultan the monopoly of the yield of pepper. In 1785 Banjarmassin became a Dutch province, the Sultan ceding it and continuing to reign as their vassal. (60)

Balamangan, an island in the Sulu Archipelago, was the scene of the Company’s third attempt. It was ceded to the British in 1762 by Bantelan, the Sultan of Sulu. In the following year he made a further cession of the northern and northeastern parts of Borneo, roughly the area of the present British protectorate of North Borneo, which the Sulus had wrested from the Sultan of Brunei. About 1771 a fort was built on Balamangan, but in 1775 it was surprised and sacked by the Sulus. No attempt was made to revive the settlement for nearly thirty years. In 1803 it was reoccupied by the Company’s orders; but it was not a financial success, and was therefore abandoned in 1804. (61)

Perhaps the most significant lesson in the record of failure at Bencoolen, Banjarmassin and Balamangan was that in no case was the want of success primarily due to the Dutch, although their hostility to all three attempts was clearly established. Yet they contented themselves with covert attacks, and did not try to expel the English by force, as they had done in the seventeenth century. The explanation is to be found in the steady decay of Dutch power which began about the end of the seventeenth century. The reasons for the fall of the Dutch East India Company in many respects bear a curious resemblance to those which brought about the collapse of the Portuguese Empire. In both cases the mother country was unable to support the drain in men and money needed to maintain its overseas possessions. During the greater part of the sixty years


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between the outbreak of the first naval war with the Commonwealth in 1652 and the Peace of Utrecht in 1713 Holland was at war with France or England, and sometimes both together. She emerged from the struggle with her possessions intact; but the drain on her resources had been tremendous, and even before the final peace signs of exhaustion made their appearance. The situation at home inevitably reacted upon the position in Asia, and during the eighteenth century the power of the Dutch East India Company steadily decayed. The brilliant success of the Dutch in the East was to a considerable extent nullified by their victories against Louis XIV. Furthermore the policy of the Company in the East Indian Islands was a potent cause of its own downfall. From the earliest years of its history it looked upon the government of an empire as a purely business proposition. The Archipelago was cold-bloodedly exploited to wring from it the last florin, without any regard to the well-being of the natives. From this arose an endless series of revolts during the greater part of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They were suppressed with great brutality; but the drain on the wealth of the Company was very heavy. The corruption and dishonesty of its employés was also a factor in bringing about its ruin.

During the last few decades of the eighteenth century the rate of decay became greatly accelerated. With waning resources the Company was no longer able to maintain sufficient troops to enforce its policy of monopolising trade. The English Company was quick to seize the opportunity, and by about 1770 at latest it had built up a flourishing and steadily increasing smuggling trade, English manufactures being exchanged for spices. Perhaps the most striking instance of Dutch decay was the voyage of Captain Forrest in 1774. He was sent from Balambangan to obtain clove, cinnamon and other spice plants, from unoccupied islands in the Moluccas, that their cultivation might be established in English territory. In a Malay prau of moderate size, Forrest cruised down the East Coast of Borneo and through the Moluccas and Bandas. He returned to Balambangan only to find it destroyed by the Sulus, and eventually sailed away in his prau to Bengooleen. One hundred years before well-armed East Indiamen had been driven out of the Indian Archipelago by Dutch ships: yet Forrest in a small native boat cruised about with impunity in the most jealously guarded preserves of the Dutch Empire.

(65) Forrest, "Voyage to New Guinea," passim.

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The next step in the Netherlands Company's fall was the gradual abandonment of one group of islands after another. In 1795, on the eve of the English capture of Malacca and the Moluccas, the Dutch Empire had been reduced to Java, Malacca, the Moluccas, and a few forts in Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, and some other islands. All the rest had been given up or destroyed by the natives. Even in the Malay Peninsula, the subjection of the Malay Sultans, reinforced though it was by the garrison at Malacca, was breaking down. Finally, in this same year of 1795, a Commission appointed by the States General reported that the Company was bankrupt and its commerce nearly annihilated. Three years later, the newly established Batavian Republic annulled the charter of 1602, and took over the administration of the remnants of its empire.

The weakness of Holland was England's opportunity. The foundation of Penang in 1786 was a deadly blow to the commercial prosperity of Malacca; but the Dutch were too feeble to oppose it save by the most ineffectual of intrigues.

CHAPTER II.

Penang, 1786-1830.

Until 1786 the Malay Peninsula as a whole was held in small esteem by the Directors of the English East India Company. Like the Dutch, their eyes were fixed on the spice trade, and they pressed on past the Peninsula to the Eastwards, overlooking the great wealth which lay nearest to them. The Company's factory at Patani which existed from 1611 until the Massacre of Amboyna in 1623, was the only one in the Peninsula. From Patani indeed great things were expected; it was proposed to make it one of the five principal posts, and the headquarters of all the Company's factories in Siam, Cochin-China, Japan, Borneo etc. Not the least of its advantages was the comparative security for trade. As one of the Directors' agents put it, "though the ruler be a woman, the government is reasonable good." The rest of the Peninsula was dismissed as of negligible value, although Perak and Junk Ceylon (more correctly named Ujong Salang) an island off the West Coast of the Peninsula, were known to have "great store of Tin."(1) The Massacre of Amboyna caused the abandonment of the Patani factory, and no further attempt was made before 1786 to found a post in the Peninsula, with the exception of a small agency in Kedah. This was established in 1669, but does not seem to have prospered, and after a few years it was given up.(2)

There were several reasons which induced the Directors again to turn their attention to the Peninsula. They were not influenced solely by commercial motives, as in the seventeenth century, but by considerations of naval strategy as well. About 1763 the Directors seem to have had in mind the advisability of obtaining some good harbour in the Eastern Archipelago, although in the quarter of a century which elapsed before Penang was actually founded trade motives also became very important.

The naval motive has been presented very fully in three works, one by Admiral, (then Captain) Popham in 1805, and the other two apparently by officials of the East India Company in London, who drew up detailed memoranda for the convenience of their superiors, some time between 1790 and 1810. Although written after Penang was occupied, they give the fullest account of the strategic reason for it. Popham began his book by pointing out that although the West Coast of India had ceased to be, as in the

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seventeenth century, the centre of British power in India, yet the only dockyards were at Bombay. The centre of gravity had shifted to the Eastern coast; and naval battles were generally fought in the Bay of Bengal, during the period of the South-Western monsoon. The whole matter is so bound up with the question of the monsoons that it is necessary to examine the vital rôle which they played in the days of sailing ships. During the South-Western Monsoon (during which the wind blows from the South) ships could safely remain in the Bay of Bengal; but about the beginning of October comes the setting-in of the North-Eastern Monsoon (when the wind blows from the North). This lasts from October to March, when it is again replaced by the South-Western Monsoon. Moreover the period of change is accompanied by violent storms, so that it was dangerous for a sailing ship to remain on the Eastern Coast later than October 12, or to return before March at the earliest. During the South-Western Monsoon, that is, from January to September, a fleet could with perfect safety remain on the Coromandel (Eastern) Coast, and even undertake repairs in the open road-steads, although "owing to a continued high surf the communication with the shore is at all times inconvenient, and sometimes entirely impracticable." But in October the fleet had to retire, to a safe port "to avoid the violent and dangerous hurricanes which generally happen in October or November," and to make such repairs as could not be undertaken in an open road-stead. Furthermore if during the period of the South-West Monsoon a man-of-war should become so seriously disabled that she could not make good the damage while riding at anchor in the Bay of Bengal, there was no alternative save to sail for Bombay. Even during the favourable season it was "extremely circuitous, tedious and difficult" for the best-equipped ships to make Bombay; and many bound for that port were compelled to sail to Achen or the Straits of Malacca until the monsoon had abated. Disabled ships were quite unable to reach Bombay from the Eastern Coast. The difficulty in their case was further complicated by the absence of even a good road-stein on the Coromandel Coast; the only one available was at Madras, and even this was frequently dangerous.

How serious the situation was, is shown by the following quotation.

"Experience has shown that a fleet cannot leave the coast to refit at Bombay and be at their station again before the

(3) Popham, "Prince of Wales Island," 7-9, 11. Popham had held important commands in Indian waters for over twenty years, and is very reliable except in his prophecies regarding the future of Penang. Like so many others in the Company's service he greatly overrated its value as a naval base and trading centre.


(7) Ibid. 30.
beginning of April, by which means three of the most valuable months are lost, during which time an enemy who may have refitted at Trincomalee or Acheen (as the French did last war) (8) or any other Eastern port, will be on the coast to co-operate with the force on shore. But it is unnecessary to insist on what such recent experience has so fully evinced." (9)

That is, from October 22 at the latest, (10) the most important port of the British Empire in India was entirely at the mercy of any enemy who might happen to have a squadron in the Bay of Bengal, unless the land defences were strong enough to resist an attack. That the menace was by no means theoretical the following incidents show.

In 1758, after the naval action between the British and French squadrons, the British fleet sailed to the dockyard at Bombay to refit, and was absent from October until April 30, 1759. Meanwhile a French squadron appeared in the Bay, while Lally attacked Madras by land and besieged it for sixty-six days. He failed to take it only because six of the East India Company's ships arrived on February 16, 1759. (11) It is very significant that the earliest orders of the Directors to search for a suitable port to the Eastwards were issued in 1763. (12) Again in 1788, the Company found itself at one and the same time involved in war with France, Holland, and Haider Ali, and was in a very parlous state. Five indecisive naval engagements occurred between Admirals Suffren and Hughes in which both fleets were much damaged. The Company begged the British commander to remain off the Coromandel Coast to protect them, since the French had fourteen or fifteen ships of the line at sea. Hughes accordingly remained until October 15, when his ships were severely damaged in a great hurricane. He was then forced to go to Bombay to refit, and meeting with adverse winds and currents on his return, he was unable to regain the Bay of Bengal until June. Suffren on the other hand refitted at Achin Roads instead of going to Mauritius, the French naval base, and consequently arrived off the Coromandel Coast much earlier than the British squadron. For some months he was therefore free to sweep the seas. He drove the Company's commerce out of the Bay of Bengal, and almost completely block-
aded Calcutta.\(^{(13)}\) The following year, 1783, after the action between the "Arrogant" and the "Victorious", the British sailed to Bombay, while Seroy, the French commander, went to the Mergui Archipelago in Southern Burma to refit. From their base at Trincomalee, the French cruisers swept the Bay immediately after the change of the monsoon, before the British squadron could arrive from Bombay.\(^{(14)}\)

All these events bore a common moral: a naval base must be established at some good harbour on the Bay of Bengal, preferably, of course, on the Western or Indian side. The Directors became convinced that Bombay was too far off, and in 1785-1788\(^{(15)}\) appointed a committee of ten, of which Popham was a member, to examine New Harbour, in the Hugli River. It had been recommended as the best site for a dockyard, but Popham believed that Lord Cornwallis, who presided at the investigation, did not approve of it. Popham himself gave a very unfavourable verdict.\(^{(16)}\) The position was found to be too unhealthy for a naval base; and surveys of the western coast of the Bay of Bengal showed that it lacked any suitable harbour.\(^{(17)}\)

Accordingly, search was made for a harbour somewhere to the Eastwards of the Bay. Penang was not immediately selected as the site, and for some years it was thought that a preferable position would be the old French base in Achin, Trincomalee, the Andamans, or the Nicobar Islands. By 1800 however these had been abandoned as either unattainable or unsuitable.\(^{(18)}\) It will therefore be observed that although Penang was occupied in 1786, partly for strategic reasons, the Government had not definitely decided that the island was the most suitable site for the projected naval base. It is also noteworthy that while orders were given to search for a harbour in the Eastern Archipelago as early as 1768, it was not apparently until about 1788 that the Indian side of the Bay of Bengal was finally held to be unsuitable.

The Company was also influenced by motives of trade. The Directors wished to increase their commerce with the East Indian Islands, but after repeated failures at Bencoolen they had become finally convinced that it was too far removed from the principal trade routes of the Archipelago over to become an important centre of commerce. They determined to establish a factory in a more central part of the East Indian Islands, and make it the headquarters of their stations in the Archipelago.\(^{(19)}\)

\(^{(14)}\) Ibid., S. Trapaud, "Prince of Wales Island," 22-23.
\(^{(15)}\) Captain Kyd gives the date as 1774-75, v. his report of 1785 in S. S. R., I.
\(^{(18)}\) v. this chapter, infra.

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Allied with this was the desire to have some port of call for British merchantmen engaged in the China trade, a most valuable branch of the Company's commerce. The most direct route to the factory at Canton and the most frequently used lay through the Straits of Malacca, although there was a somewhat longer passage down the West Coast of Sumatra, and through the Straits of Sunda. Between Calcutta and Canton, there was not a single British port except the isolated station of Bencoolen. The Company's merchantmen, if in need of supplies or disabled by storm, had to seek shelter in a Dutch port. Even in times of peace the relations between the two rival companies were none too friendly, and British captains complained of the "very exorbitant" charges imposed for the use of the Dutch harbours.\(^{(20)}\) In time of war the situation was much more serious. The trade route to China lay through the centre of the Dutch Empire and the passage, through the Straits of Malacca, was completely dominated by Malacca. For a time at least, the Chinese market might be completely cut off from India. In a letter from MacPherson the Acting Governor-General, to Light, dated January 22, 1787, only six months after the occupation of Penang, he wrote: "At present our great object in settling Prince of Wales Island (the official name of Penang) is to secure a port of refreshment and repair for the King's, the Company's, and the country ships, and we must leave it to time and to your good management to establish it as a port of commerce."\(^{(21)}\) The same consideration was emphasised in a letter from Light to MacPherson conveying the offer of Penang from the Sultan of Kedah. He reminded MacPherson that he had said that the Company wished for "some useful and convenient port for the protection of the merchants who trade to China, and for the service of His Majesty's fleet in the time of war in either monsoon." He then pointed out how completely Penang satisfied these requirements. It was eminently suitable as (1) a harbour for refitting ships, (2) a centre for the commerce of the Archipelago, and (3) a mart where the ships in the China trade could buy the products of the Eastern Archipelago which were suitable for the Canton market.\(^{(22)}\) This letter was quoted by an anonymous writer, apparently an official of the Company in London, who drew up a memorandum on Penang some time before 1800. Commenting on it he said:—

\(^{(20)}\) Ibid. 25.
\(^{(21)}\) Journal of the Indian Archipelago IV, 633-34.
\(^{(22)}\) The very large demand in China for the products of the Archipelago is dealt with in the chapter on Trade. It formed an exceedingly important part of the commerce of the Straits Settlements; and the consideration of this advantage appears to have had great weight with the Company's officials as long as they held the monopoly of the China trade.

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important Passes as the Straits of Malacca and Sunda. Every means of declared and open Hostility on the part of your Government should be used to encourage and support the natives in resistance to any attempts to enslave them, and to encourage them trading with us."(23)

An attempt was first made to secure a harbour in the Straits of Sunda; but by 1766 it was decided that no suitable site could be found.(24) Efforts were then made to find a situation to the south of the Straits of Sunda, but by about 1770 it was decided that the enterprise was hopeless.(25) The Government of India next turned its attention to the possibility of finding the desired position in the Straits of Malacca. The Beneoolen officials scouted the idea as proposerous because of the remoteness of the Straits from the Company’s stations on the West Coast of Sumatra; but the Directors instructed the Madras Government in 1771 to despatch a mission to the court of Achin with a view to obtaining permission from the Sultan for the establishment of a factory there.(26) Before carrying out these orders the Madras Council sought information from the firm of Jourdan, Sullivan and De Souza, Madras merchants who had for some years been trading with Achin and the Straits of Malacca. They complied with the request, and forwarded to Government several letters containing a proposal which they had received from the agent in charge of their factory in Kedah, a young ex-naval officer named Francis Light.(27) So impressed was the Madras Government by these letters that it concluded that Kedah was a much better site for the new factory than Achin "because we conceive the great object to be the means of supplying of the China market."(28)

The Francis Light whose proposal had so influenced the Madras Council had been a lieutenant in the navy, but like so many young men of good family at this period, he had resigned his commission in order to seek his fortune in India. Becoming the captain of a Country ship (that is, a ship owned in India and engaged in commerce in the Indian seas), he had made several voyages to Malaya. At this date, 1772, he was thirty-two, and was known as an able man very well acquainted with the Malay language and countries.(29) His letters and subsequent actions show that he shared to the full in the prevalent dislike of the Dutch, and that like Raffles he was firmly resolved to exalt his

(23) S. S. R. 1; Anon. Memorandum on Penang.
(25) Ibid., 52-3.
(26) Ibid., 53.
(27) Ibid., 54.
(28) Sumatra Records, XV. "The Diary and Proceedings of the Select Committee of Fort St. George in consequence of the orders of the Select Committee of the Honourable the Court of Directors, dated 8 May, 1771, for forming a settlement at Acheen, etc."

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own country at their expense. By his honesty and tact he had acquired a very strong influence over the Malays, who liked and trusted him greatly.\(^{30}\)

Kedah, to which he had succeeded in attracting the attention of Government, was the most northerly of the states on the West Coast of the Malay Peninsula, its frontier being partly coterminous with that of Siam. Burma also was not far distant. Consequently Kedah led a somewhat chequered career, being generally in a rather vague way a tributary of one or the other, usually of Siam, when that power was strong enough to coerce it. At this time however, Siam was in no position to do so, since it had been overrun by Burma about 1760, and had its hands full in expelling and chastising its chronic adversary and the Cochin-Chinese. Burma was too busy fighting Siam to concern itself with Malaya, and for the moment Kedah appears to have been practically independent.\(^{31}\)

Other tribulations had however come upon it, since in 1771 a rebellion had broken out, and the rebels, aided by the Sultan of Selangor, had laid waste the country. The Sultan of Kedah was too weak to retaliate, and he therefore offered to Light the port and fortress of Kedah Town if his employers would assist him.\(^{32}\) Light wrote several letters strongly urging acceptance of the offer.\(^{33}\) This correspondence was turned over to the Madras Government when they applied to the firm for information, and it was the perusal of it which turned their attention to Kedah as well as to Achin.\(^{34}\) In his letters Light urged that Kedah was a very lucrative area for trade: it also possessed an excellent harbour for refitting ships sailing to China, and if the firm refused the offer would be made to the Dutch. They would accept, and could prevent British vessels from passing through the Straits of Malacca, since with their existing fortress at Malacca “they would possess the entire command of the whole Straits.”\(^{35}\) These letters, whose tone was one of great urgency and earnestness, appear to have been written by Light on his own initiative, and not as a consequence of his employer’s demands for information, although he was doubtless aware in a general way of the Government’s intention of establishing a new headquarters station somewhere in or about the Straits.\(^{26}\)

While the port offered by the Sultan was on the mainland, it is interesting to notice that Light mentioned Penang, which fifteen years later he was to succeed in obtaining as a British settlement.

\(^{30}\) Leith, “Prince of Wales Island,” 2-3.
\(^{32}\) Wright and Reid, “Malay Peninsula,” 56.
\(^{33}\) Ibid., 56-62.
\(^{34}\) Ibid., 62.
\(^{35}\) Sumatra Records, XV. Light to De Souza, Nov. 25, 1771.
\(^{36}\) Wright and Reid, “Malay Peninsula,” 61.
In a letter to his employers, dated November 25, 1771, he dwelt at length on its advantages. It possessed an excellent harbour, and facilities for refitting all ships bound for China; and it could also become a trading-centre from which they would be supplied with tin, pepper, rattans, etc. He concluded by saying that Penang might perhaps suit the East India Company better than his employers.\(^{(37)}\)

As a result of these letters the Madras Government sent a mission under the Honourable Edward Monckton to Kedah to negotiate with the Sultan. This was the more remarkable since the Sultan had previously made the same proposal to the Council, and had only offered Light the concession after it had been rejected. At the same time a mission was despatched to Achin to negotiate for a settlement there.\(^{(38)}\)

In both cases the result was a complete failure.\(^{(39)}\) In Achin this was not to be wondered at, since it had long been a settled policy of the Achinese Sultans not to permit Europeans to build forts in their country. This was the third mission sent to Achin by the Company in ten years, similar attempt having been made in 1762 and 1764 with the same lack of success.\(^{(40)}\) In Kedah the failure was due to a different cause, the firm refusal of the Company to become involved in the quarrels of the Malay rulers. When Monckton was sent it was known that the Sultan’s offer was made on the condition that a force should be sent to aid him against Selangor, yet the Madras Government believed that it could gain the desired concession and not pay the price demanded for it. In this it was completely mistaken; and after some months of futile negotiation, Monckton left Kedah.\(^{(41)}\)

During the next twelve years little was heard of the project of establishing a new settlement. The period was a very critical one in the history of the Company, and Warren Hastings was too busy organizing the government in India and defending the British possessions there to spare time for such a minor consideration as the affairs of Malaya.\(^{(42)}\) Light continued his trading, and made his headquarters on Ujong Salang (Junk Ceylon). He had not however abandoned the dominating aim of his early career, his hope of planting the British flag in Malaya, and he was quietly preparing the way for it by gaining the confidence and goodwill of the Malay rajas.\(^{(43)}\) In 1780 he came to Calcutta on a trading voyage and interviewed Warren Hastings. He proved that the Dutch were try-

\(^{(37)}\) Sumatra Records, XV, Letters of Light to De Souza, Nov. 25, 1771.
\(^{(38)}\) Wright and Reid, "Malay Peninsula," 62.
\(^{(39)}\) Ibid., 64.
\(^{(40)}\) Danvers, "Indian Records," 1, 4, 76.
\(^{(41)}\) Wright and Reid, "Malay Peninsula," 64-5. Sumatra Records, XV, June 25, 1772.
\(^{(42)}\) Smith, "India," 510-47.
ing to exclude the British from any share in the trade of Malaya, and urged the necessity of occupying Ujong Salang. This was a large and valuable island lying to the North of Kedah. It had a good harbour, and carried on a flourishing tin trade, which was capable of great development, since the tin-area was very extensive. Light was empowered by the Governor of Ujong Salang to offer it to the Company. Hastings was strongly impressed, but was unable to spare either men or money for a new settlement, and the enterprise came to nothing.\(^{44}\)

In 1784 Warren Hastings again took up the project of establishing a port to the Eastwards, despatching a mission under Kinloch to Achin, and another under Captain Forrest to Rio an island in the Straits of Malacca, to obtain a site for the settlement. Both failed: Forrest was forestalled by the Dutch, and Kinloch, after struggling in vain against the Sultan’s hostility for fifteen months, was forced to return empty-handed.\(^{45}\)

Light of course knew of these failures, and he now determined to obtain possession of Penang. "as a barrier of Dutch encroachments" before they should annex it also. He had a great deal of influence over the young Sultan of Kedah, the son of the man with whom Monckton had negotiated in 1772. Moreover the Malay ruler felt his own position to be somewhat insecure: several powerful rajas were unfriendly to him, and he had to fear the possible hostility of the other Malay States and above all Siam. Siam had now expelled its Burmese conquerors of 1760, and was soon to become more powerful than at perhaps any previous period of its history. Accordingly Light succeeded in obtaining a grant of the island, to be offered to the Company as a site for a settlement; and he immediately sailed for Calcutta to persuade the Government to establish posts there and on Ujong Salang. The Acting Governor-General, John MacPherson, had a high opinion of Light, and persuaded the Company to establish a factory at Penang with Light as its Superintendent. MacPherson however decided not to occupy Ujong Salang, since "It would have required a greater force than could with any degree of convenience have been sent," and also because the situation of Penang was preferable, owing to its being nearer the Straits of Malacca.\(^{46}\)

The selection of Penang rather than Achin or some other position seems to have been due partly to force of circumstances, and partly to Light’s convincing account of the great advantages of the island. A port was desired somewhere in the neighbourhood of the Straits of Malacca, and there were few alternatives left from


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which to choose. As Light wrote to the Governor-General on February 5, 1786:

"The Dutch now possess all the Straits of Malacca from Point Romana [near Singapore] to the River Krian [the northern boundary of Perak]... on the Malay side, and they have forts, factories and pretended claims from Bintang or Rhio to Diamond Point on the Sumatra Coast so that there is no part left for you to choose but the small kingdoms of Junk Ceylon, Acheen or Quedah [Kedah]."(47)

Every attempt to obtain permission to establish a post at Achin had failed; and as Light pointed out "To form a settlement there of safety and advantage, a force sufficient to subdue all the chiefs would be necessary."(48) How true this statement was is proved by the Company's experiences when after Raffles' Treaty of 1819, it made a further attempt to secure and establish itself there.(49)

The reasons, naval and commercial, which led to the occupation of Penang were given in a despatch of MacPherson to Light, dated January 22, 1787. He wrote that Penang was founded mainly "to secure a port of refreshment and repair for the King's, the Company's, and the Country ships, and we must leave it to time and to your good management to establish it as a port of commerce." To induce merchants to resort to Penang "we desire you will refrain from levying any kind of duties or tax on goods landed or vessels importing at Prince of Wales Island, and it is our wish to make the port free to all nations." That the foundation of the settlement was somewhat tentative was shown by his query regarding how far it would "answer the ends proposed, that... we may be enabled to judge whether it will be prudent to continue or withdraw it altogether."(50)

A report on the harbour of Penang was drawn up by Captains Wall and Lewin, members of the expedition, on August 11, 1786, the very day on which the settlement was founded. In this again the emphasis was laid, not so much on the commercial advantages of the site, as on its value as a port for the warships and vessels in the China trade. Great stress was laid on its security, "an exceedingly safe place for ships to ride at all times of the year, being extremely well sheltered, and very convenient for heaving down and refitting ships... Provisions are plenty." It "may, we think, be very beneficial to all British ships passing the Straits of

(49) v. chapters on foundation of Singapore, and the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824.
(50) J. I. A., IV. 633-34. The establishment of free trade at this early date is a very interesting anticipation of Raffles' regulations for Singapore. As will be seen later in the chapter, it was only the insistent demand of Government that the revenue should in some degree compensate for the expenses which led to the reluctant reversal of this policy.

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Malacca." Another strong point in its favour was that it was only one week's sail from the Coromandel Coast. Admiral Popham declared that even a disabled warship could make the port in ten days from the usual scene of naval actions in the Bay of Bengal.

The Directors in giving their assent to the foundation of Penang appear to have been influenced chiefly by commercial considerations. At least they defined the reasons for its establishment as being "for extending our commerce among the Eastern islands, and indirectly by their means to China." It was also intended to prevent the Dutch from gaining complete control of the Straits of Malacca and Sunda, and to "break their spice monopoly." War with Holland was to be avoided, but at the same time it was enjoined that the Malay States should be encouraged, and "every assistance privately be given them in resisting" Dutch attempts to enslave them.

On August 11, 1786, Light formally took possession of Penang. In honour of the Prince of Wales it was named Prince of Wales Island, but in spite of the use of this name in all official correspondence the native name Penang persisted. It has practically dispossessed the nominal title, and is therefore used throughout this thesis except where the name Prince of Wales Island occurs in quotations from documents. The island of Penang is about 15 miles long by 9 broad, and is very hilly, the highest point being about 2,400 feet. The harbour is formed by the channel, from 2 to 5 miles in width, which separates it from the mainland of the Peninsula. Until the Company acquired Province Wellesley, the strip of territory on the mainland facing the island, in 1800 from the Sultan of Kedah, it only controlled one side of the harbour.

The new settlement had many difficulties to contend with, and it was peculiarly fortunate that it possessed as its first Superintendent such a man as Francis Light. A generous tribute has been paid to him by Sir George Leith, who became Governor of Penang some six years after his death when many merchants and officials who had known and worked with him were still on the island. Leith's description may therefore be taken as substantially correct, even though he himself seems never to have had any personal relations with his predecessor. "Mr. Light was extremely well qualified, by his perfect knowledge of the language, laws and customs of the Malays, to discharge the trust imposed in him. He was also well known and much respected by the principal men in

(52) Trasand, "Prince of Wales Island," 23.

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the neighbouring countries, which he had long frequented as a merchant; and what, at that period, was of still greater consequence, he possessed much personal influence with the King of Quedah." (57)

There is a very remarkable resemblance between Francis Light and his greater successor, Sir Stamford Raffles. They were alike in their devotion to British interests, in their hatred of the Dutch, and in the liberal yet wise and firm manner in which they conducted their administration. Both had also a wide knowledge of Malayan languages and customs, and very great influence over the natives, the result of the respect and affection inspired by their firm but just and sympathetic attitude towards them. Light's reputation has been much overshadowed by the more brilliant attainments and greater service of the founder of Singapore; but if he had not firmly established British power on the borders of the Archipelago, Sir Stamford could never have planted the flag at its very heart. It is true that Penang never attained, and never could have attained, the importance of Singapore; from its position on the Western Edge of the Eastern Archipelago this was inevitable. But unless Light had taken the first step, British Malaya would never have existed. Light's truest epitaph is found in Kipling's lines,

"After me cometh the builder,
Tell him I too have known."

When Light's squadron arrived Penang was a jungle uninhabited save by a few Chinese; and he at once set to work to clear a site for a town and fort. His letters show what energy he pushed forward the task, and in a few months a small but rapidly growing settlement had arisen. (58) The garrison was weak, too weak for safety, for it consisted of only one hundred newly-raised marines, absolutely untrained, fifteen artillerymen, and thirty lancers; and Light was "in hourly dread of some mischance" arising from a dispute between his troops and the turbulent Malays who came across from the mainland. (59)

Settlers arrived very fast, in spite of Dutch attempts to prevent them. On February 1, 1787, Light wrote to his friend and supporter, Andrew Ross:

"Did not the Dutch keep a strict watch over the Malays, most of them would leave Malacca; forty of them had prepared to come in the "Drake," but were stopped by order of the (Dutch) Government; and not a man is allowed to leave Malacca without giving security he will not go to Penang. . . . The contempt and derision with which they treat this place, and the mean dirty art they use to prevent people coming here, would dishonour any but a Dutchman." (60)

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(60) Ibid., 29-31.
The history of Penang from 1786 to 1867 fell into four periods. During the first of these, from 1786 to 1805, the island was a dependency of Bengal, and at least until about 1799 was more or less on trial. On several occasions it appeared not at all improbable that the settlement would be abandoned. From about 1799 to 1805 the value of Penang was recognized; and great, in some cases extravagant and ill-founded expectations, were formed of it. The culmination of this period of optimism came when in 1805 Penang was created the fourth Indian Presidency, with a large staff of officials. 1805 to 1826 may be described as the period of disillusion. The high hopes which had arisen were soon disappointed, and as in the case of Bencoolen, the Directors became more and more dissatisfied with the heavy and unremunerative expense which the settlement entailed. The foundation of Singapore in 1819 strengthened this attitude, since the commerce of Penang, and in consequence its revenues, which were derived largely from customs duties, suffered severely from the competition of the new trading centre. The third period began in 1826 when Malacca and Singapore were transferred from Bengal to the control of Penang, and for four years more the Eastern Presidency was given a chance to justify its existence. Finally however the heavy and unremunerative expenditure required by Malacca and Penang exhausted the patience of the Directors. In 1830 the Presidency was abolished, the staff of officials and the expenditure were greatly cut down, and the Straits Settlements were reduced to the rank of a Residency. For a few years longer the centre of administration remained at Penang, but the rapid growth of the trade of Singapore soon made it the principal station, and in 1833 the capital was transferred to it. During the fourth period, from 1830 to 1867, Penang and Malacca gradually sank to a position of less and less importance as compared with Singapore, until its history became almost the history of the Straits Settlements.

During the first period, from 1786 to 1805, the history of Penang fell into four main divisions:—

(1) The long discussion as to whether it provided a suitable naval base, ending in the abortive decision that it was an excellent site for it.

(2) The question of the terms on which Penang was ceded. This gave rise to a long and bitter controversy as to whether the Company were or were not bound to defend the Sultan of Kedah against his tyrannical suzerain, Siam.

(3) The rapid growth of population and trade, which led to the formation of extravagant hopes regarding its suitability as a means of gaining the control of a considerable part of the commerce of the East Indian Islands.

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(4) The very acute problem which was raised by the difficulty of maintaining law and order amongst a turbulent native and European population when no legally constituted courts were in existence on the island. This difficulty was not solved until the creation of the Recorder's Court in 1807.

The other questions with which the administration had to deal, the scourge of piracy and the attempt to introduce the cultivation of pepper, nutmegs and cloves, in order to render Great Britain independent of the Dutch Spice Islands, are not dealt with here, but in the chapters on Commerce and Piracy in the Straits Settlements.

It has been already pointed out that while the foundation of Penang was dictated in considerable measure by the desire to have a naval base, yet the Supreme Government["]

1796 it seems to have regarded the Andaman Islands as preferable. Furthermore the expenditure exceeded the revenue, and the Government began to doubt the wisdom of maintaining at a loss a position of whose value it was not convinced. The settlement was therefore of a somewhat tentative character, and for about eight years the advisability of transferring it to the Andamans or some other locality was seriously debated. The early volumes of the Straits Settlements Records are filled with letters on the subject, and show clearly how narrow an escape Penang had from being abandoned. Light vigorously combatted the Government's doubts, but his enthusiasm tended to carry him away, and subsequent events proved that many of his prophecies were incapable of fulfilment. He was on firm ground when he contended that the island had a very good harbour and was well situated as a port of call for warships or merchantmen in the China trade. He was wrong however when he claimed that Penang would soon gain a considerable share of the trade of the Archipelago, that revenue would equal expenditure, and that the island would soon produce enough food not only to support its own population, but also to supply ships which called there. The Government was not convinced by his arguments, and appointed several commissions to inquire into the relative merits of Penang and the Andamans as a naval base. The reports were all strongly in favour of Penang, and their authors were as much misled as Light himself as to the unlimited possibilities of the island. The Government appears finally to have been convinced by this flood of testimony, the more so because a settlement which had been

(61) Throughout the period 1786 to 1867 the Governor-General of India in Council is constantly referred to in official despatches as the Supreme Government.

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established in the Andamans in 1789 was abandoned in 1796 on account of the unhealthiness of the climate.\(^{(62)}\)

In 1797 the strategic value of Penang was proved beyond question. The army and fleet which were assembled for the conquest of Manila made it their rendezvous. Admiral Cochrane, who commanded the squadron, praised it in the highest terms for the excellent facilities which it possessed for refitting ships.\(^{(63)}\) The Duke of Wellington, then Colonel Wellesley, was also there in 1797, and was so greatly impressed by it that he submitted a Report on it to the Indian Government. His brother became Governor-General in 1797, and he was no doubt influenced by Wellington's opinion.\(^{(64)}\) By about 1800 the strategic value of Penang was realized by the Company. The Manila Expedition proved that its possession added very greatly to India's power to attack; and the subsequent naval events of the war showed that whoever held it commanded the Straits of Malacca, and therefore the trade-route to China. The Company became more and more convinced of its great value, and regarded it as the natural centre of English power in the East Indian Islands.\(^{(65)}\) A striking proof of this was given after Malacca had been captured by a British force in 1795. At first the Directors prized it more highly than Penang, but when the superior strategic value of the latter was shown during the concluding years of the century, they did everything in their power to destroy the older settlement by diverting its trade to Penang.\(^{(66)}\) It is possible that the Directors were not un influenced by the consideration that Malacca might eventually be restored to Holland, and therefore thought it wise to make the most of their opportunity.

The new attitude towards the island was shown by the eulogistic descriptions of it in Government despatches from about 1800 onwards,\(^{(67)}\) and by three books which were published between 1803 and 1805. Two were written by Penang officials, Captain MacAlister and Lieutenant Governor Leith, while the third (already quoted in the earlier part of this chapter) was by Captain Popham. All three contended that Penang was at once an excellent centre for trade with the Archipelago, and an ideal naval base. There were abundant supplies of good timber, water, \(\ldots\)

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\(^{(63)}\) Wright and Reid, “Malay Peninsula,” 94.

\(^{(64)}\) Ibid., 93.

\(^{(65)}\) Ibid., 93-4.

\(^{(66)}\) S. S. R., 186: April 18, 1805.


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and provisions, an excellent climate, and a large harbour which was perfectly safe in all weathers. Moreover the island was within easy sail of the Coromandel coast in either monsoon and even in the worst weather.\(^{(68)}\) The Directors and the Admiralty became fully convinced by these arguments; and one reason for the cession of Penang into a Presidency in 1805 was the expectation that it would become an important naval base.\(^{(69)}\)

The second important question in the early history of Penang was the dispute which arose as to the terms on which it was ceded by the Sultan of Kedah. Was the Company, or was it not, morally bound to defend the Sultan against his enemies, and above all Siam? The matter was of more than academic interest, because in 1821 Siam conquered Kedah and expelled the Sultan, the Company refusing to assist him. In consequence a bitter controversy arose, which raged in the Straits Settlements until about 1845. The Sultan contended that the Company had broken its word, and in this he was supported by the great majority of non-official Europeans in the Straits, and also by several important officials. Of these the most noteworthy were John Anderson, a man with a wide knowledge of Malayan affairs, Robert Fullerton, Governor of the Straits Settlements from 1826 to 1830, and above all, Sir Stamford Raffles.

On the other hand the consensus of official opinion in the Straits was that no promise of assistance had been given or implied. This view received additional weight from the adhesion of John Crawford, who after Raffles’ death was the greatest English authority on Malaya. It was also held by Colonel Burney, who negotiated the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1826, and by Major Low, who was especially concerned with the affairs of Kedah and Siam during his official career at Penang, which extended from 1820 to 1840.

The most authoritative writer on the subject in recent years, Sir Frank Swettenham, has investigated the question in great detail, and fully supports Anderson’s position. He holds that when the Company accepted Penang it knew that the grant was made almost entirely with a view to obtaining its assistance against Burma and Siam. While the Directors refused to bind themselves to give aid in the formal treaties ceding Penang, yet by continuing to hold it they were implicitly bound to render the assistance in consideration of which it had been granted. The Company should either have assumed the moral obligation which the occupation

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\(^{(69)}\) S. S. E., 186; Directors’ Despatch of April 18, 1805.
entailed, or else have evacuated the island. Swettenham stigmatises the Company's conduct as "cowardice... ending in a breach of faith which sullied the British name and weakened its influence with Malays for very many years." (70)

Swettenham has dealt with the question so fully that only a brief account of it is given here. Moreover the main point at issue was settled long before 1824, the date at which this thesis begins. (71) The argument on which the supporters of the Company based their case was that from time immemorial Kedah had been a dependency of Bangkok. The Sultan of Kedah had therefore no right to cede Penang to England on his own authority or to refuse obedience to Siamese orders, and the destruction of his kingdom in 1821 was the fitting punishment for his contumacy to his "liege lord." (72) The principal proofs of Kedah's dependence were found in the Bunga Mas, and in the forced contributions of men and money.

The Bunga Mas consisted of two ornamental plants with leaves and flowers of gold and silver, valued at about £1,000, which

(70) Swettenham, "British Malaya," 87.
(71) The best account of the question is found in Swettenham, "British Malaya," pp. 36-54. The best statement of the case for Kedah was written in 1824 by John Anderson, Secretary to the Penang Government. He charged the Company with breach of faith and duplicity. It is valuable for its frequent and accurate quotations from the Straits Settlements Records, but apart from this must be used with caution because of its strongly partisan viewpoint. The despatches quoted are in the first few volumes of the Straits Records, and in Vols. 81 (Appendix and 83).

The book was published under the authority of the Penang Government, and only 100 copies were printed. Its circulation was confined to Government officials. Immediately after its appearance it was suppressed and great efforts were made to recover all the copies. At least five however escaped, of which one is now in the library of the Royal Colonial Institute. Fullerton, the Governor of Penang, regarded the book as very useful and reliable (e.g. S. S. R., 90: Dec. 16, 1824), and it seems to have much influence in leading him to adopt his strongly anti-Siamese policy. The Indian Government also spoke of the book as "very useful, extremely creditable" (S. S. R., 100: Jan. 14, 1825). The best defence of the Company is by Colonel Hurney, who negotiated the Treaty with Siam in 1826 (Hurney MSS, D. IX and D. XXVI, in the Royal Colonial Institute Library). It must however be used with caution, since it is even more partisan than Anderson's work. The same side is taken by Major Low (J. L. A., 111, 334-36, 486-88, and 609-13): and by John Crawford ("Embassy to Siam," 447-48: "Descriptive Dictionary," 243-45, 336, 362: "Hist. of Ind. Islands," II, 404). All these authorities, however, and especially Crawford greatly weaken their case by extravagant advocacy of the most extreme Siamese claims. Crawford for example claimed every state in the Peninsula as a Siamese tributary from time immemorial, including in this list even the great Malayan Empire of Malacca (Crawford, "Hist. Ind. Is." II, 404, and "Descrip. Diet." 243-45, 336, and Bengal Political Consultations, Range 123, Vol. 42, pp. 201-3). Wilkinson however has confirmed the truth of the ancient tradition that Malacca was not only independent, but also severely defeated Siam (Wilkinson, "Malay Papers: History of the Peninsula," I, 22-24, 38). Other states like Perak were always independent during the pre-British period.


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were sent triennially to Bangkok. Its exact significance was very differently interpreted, the Siamese and their English advocates maintaining that it was a “direct admission of suzerainty on the part of the Rajah who sent it”; while the Malay Sultans “entirely denied this” and held that it was “merely a token of alliance and friendship.” (78) Anderson regarded it as “a mere interchange of civility.” (14) What may be called the pro-Siamese party denied this, and contended that the Bunga Mas was not merely a complimentary and free-will offering, but a “token of submission and vassalage, well-known in all the Indo-Chinese countries.” (75)

The truth appears to lie somewhere between these two extreme views. In some instances the Bunga Mas was undoubtedly an admission of vassalage; but others rather support the contention of the Malay rajahs given above. (78) Sometimes moreover motives besides that of submission actuated its despatch. Although Siam for example had long been independent of China, in 1829 the Bunga Mas was still sent triennially to Pekin. The motive was the gifts received in return, and the very valuable commercial privileges thereby secured, the ambassadors, who were royal merchants, being exempt from customs duties. (77) The only definite conclusion to which one can come seems to be that the exact significance of the Bunga Mas depended on the particular circumstances of each case. Its despatch was an admission of the inferiority of the sender, either feigned or real. In the instance given above of Siam and China it seems to have been purely formal and complimentary, a delicate piece of flattery which cost the Emperor of Siam nothing in actual power, but secured him substantial privileges.

In the case of Kedah, the Bunga Mas does not seem to have been sent for this reason, as Anderson contended it was. (78) The evidence of the heavy and frequent contributions of men, money and supplies seems conclusive on this point. The Sultan of Kedah was compelled to send them whenever they were demanded by Siam. He denounced them as a tyrannical breach of ancient custom, and in this he was supported by Anderson and Raffles. (79) This was denied by the pro-Siamese party, who held that the despatch of the Bunga Mas carried with it the obligation to fulfill these demands, which were “regulated only by the wants, caprice

(75) Burney MSS. D. IX and D. XXI. J. I. A., III, 609-13, Low.
(78) Ibid., 20, 54.
and power at the time of the superior state." (80) Here again the truth seems to lie between the two theories. The Bunga Mas did not, as Burney and Crawfurd thought, invariably carry with it the legal obligation to obey the orders of the recipient. On the other hand, it did involve this, if the receiver of the Bunga Mas were strong enough to enforce it. Whether forced contributions were made or not seems to be a fairly accurate test of whether the Bunga Mas was a mere formality, or an acknowledgement of some degree of dependence. An almost exact parallel is to be found in the feudal oath of vassalage to the German Emperors taken by the great tenants-in-chief of the Holy Roman Empire. It depended entirely on the power of each Emperor whether the oath entailed obedience to his orders or was practically an empty form. Applying the test of the forced contributions, it seems that Kedah was in some way more or less a dependency of Siam.

It remains to determine the character and extent of Siamese suzerainty. Was Kedah merely a province of Siam, and its Sultans hereditary governors appointed by Bangkok, as the Siamese asserted, (81) or were the Bunga Mas and the forced contributions in the nature of blackmail, paid by a weaker to a more powerful state to save itself from destruction? Here again there is the same complete divergence of opinion between the contemporary advocates and opponents of Siamese claims. (82) The conclusions of both parties are equally suspect because all have more or less the nature of special pleadings, emphasizing the facts which favour their side and minimizing or ignoring those which do not. They are self-appointed lawyers defending their clients, not impartial judges. Moreover almost all the early writers made the mistake of applying to the relations of Siam and Kedah the same principles which govern the relations between a European power and its subject dependencies. With the exception of Raffles and, to some extent Newbold, they failed to see that there was a fundamental difference, and that analogies drawn from European international law were quite inapplicable.

Newbold put the real situation in a nutshell when he wrote: "It seems after all that the Lord of the White Elephant (Siam) has about as much original right as present power and ancient aggression can give him, and no more." (84) Siam was large, powerful and united as compared with the neighbouring Malay States, which were small, weak and generally divided. Individually, its soldiers appear to have been vastly inferior to the Malays as fighting men, but sheer weight of overwhelming numbers made them very formidable. Like most Asiatic monarchies from the

(80) Burney MSS. D. IX and D. XXVI.
(81) Burney MSS. D. IX and D. XXVI.

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days of Sargon and Thothmes the Great, both Siam and Burma were predatory states. They were engaged in chronic warfare to subdue one another, the conqueror of one generation being the conquered of the next. Both moreover were ambitious to extend their sway over the Malay States of the Peninsula, and as soon as either had temporarily subdued the other, the attention of its rulers was turned to its Malayan neighbours. The Malay Sultans had then to choose between sending the Bunga Mas and paying tribute, or having their territories plundered and their people decimated by all the barbarities typical of Siamese and Burmese invasions. A powerful Malay Empire, like Malacca, successfully defied attack; but Kedah, weak and from its position peculiarly open to invasion, generally submitted to the victor of the moment. The subjection thus imposed would last just so long as the suzerain had strength to enforce it, and no longer. Like all Asiatic despotisms the power of Siam and Burma waxed and waned. The decay of an Eastern empire has always been the signal for its outlying dependencies to throw off the yoke, one of the most recent examples being the gradual emancipation of Tibet from Chinese control during the last fifty years. (84) Kedah would then enjoy a period of independence until one or the other of the northern powers was strong enough to subdue it, when the whole process would be repeated. Hence it was that Kedah at one time would send tribute and the Bunga Mas to Siam, at another to Burma, and sometimes to both at once. Generally however it was to Siam, the more powerful and the nearer of the two northern empires. A small state which lay within easy striking distance of more powerful and predatory neighbours could not afford to take chances. (85)

The clearest and most impartial exposition of the situation is found in two of Raffles' despatches. Referring to the Siamese claim that they had several times overran the Peninsula, a claim unsupported by historical evidence, he wrote:—

"This they have construed into a right of conquest, which has since been repeatedly asserted... whenever they found themselves sufficiently strong and their neighbours sufficiently weak." (86) In his letter of instructions to Crawfurd, written just before he left Singapore in 1823, Raffles dealt with the same subject at greater length.

"The policy hitherto pursued by us" [of acquiescing in and even supporting the Siamese claims] "has in my opinion been founded on erroneous principles... These people are of

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(86) Lady Raffles, "Memoir," 49.
opposite manners, language, religion and general interests, and the superiority maintained by the one over the other is so remote from protection on the one side or attachment on the other, that it is but a simple exercise of capricious tyranny by the stronger party, submitted to by the weaker from the law of necessity. We have ourselves for nearly forty years been eye witnesses of the pernicious influence exercised by the Siamese over the Malayan states. During the revolution of the Siamese government these profit by its weakness, and from cultivating an intimacy with strangers, especially with ours over other European nations, they are always in a fair train of prosperity. With the settlement of the Siamese government, on the contrary, it invariably regains the exercise of its tyranny and the Malayan states are threatened, intimidated and plundered. The recent invasion of Quedah (in 1821) is a striking example in point. By the independent Malay States, who may be supposed the best judges of this matter, it is important to observe that the connection of the tributary Malavs with Siam is looked upon as a matter of simple compulsion. ... I must seriously recommend to your attention the contemplation of the probable event of their [the Malay States] deliverance from the yoke of Siam and your making the Supreme Government immediately informed of every event which may promise to lead to that desirable result." (87)

When the Company occupied Penang, Kedah was practically independent. Siam had been overrun by the Burmese about 1760, and although by 1786 it had expelled its conquerors, the war did not end until 1795. The Emperor of Siam was fully occupied with it, and had no time to spare for asserting his pretensions over the Malay states. Recovering from the Burmese invasion, Siam became more powerful perhaps than at any previous period in its history, and during the next generation attempted to compel the unwilling Malay States to abandon their independence and submit to its harsh and capricious overlordship. (88) It was in no sense of the word a reassertion of ancient legal rights, but merely an illustration of

"The good old rule, the simple plan,
That he may take who has the power,
And he shall keep who can."

Although it must be granted that in this peculiar sense Kedah was a tributary of Siam, Sir Frank Swettenham has proved that the Company's behaviour towards Kedah is open to grave

(87) R. Pol. Range 123, Vol. 59: March 5, 1824, No. 49.

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When the Company accepted the cession of Penang in 1786, it negotiated with Kedah as an independent state, although then or soon afterwards it knew that Kedah was in some vague way a Siamese tributary. Moreover the Government of India was well aware that the principal, and in fact almost the sole reason for which the grant was made by the Sultan, was to obtain the armed assistance of the Company against a possible Siamese invasion. While the demand for a defensive alliance was referred to the Directors, an agreement was arrived at on the other demands made by the Sultan, and letters were written to him by the Acting Governor-General of India so worded that the Sultan could hardly interpret them otherwise than as assurances that the alliance would ultimately be granted. In 1787 the Government of India decided not to make a defensive alliance with Kedah. The Directors issued similar orders in 1786, and the policy was steadfastly adhered to despite many despatches from Light urging that the Sultan's request should be granted. Light found his position exceedingly difficult and unpleasant: the Sultan continued to press for an alliance, and refused to accept a money-payment in lieu of it. In an attempt to retain his friendship, Light was driven to take refuge in evasions and delays, while he wrote endless despatches to the Indian Government fruitlessly urging that an alliance be granted. The Sultan became more and more distrustful and hostile, and finally in 1791 made an abortive attempt to expel the English from Penang. Warlike measures having failed, the Sultan agreed to make a formal treaty ceding the island in return for an annual money payment and without the promise of protection for which he had so long contended. Swettenham's contention is that after the Indian Government decided in 1787 not to give assistance in case of invasion, the retention of Penang was a breach of an implied, though not a written, obligation. Logically, the refusal to form a defensive alliance should have been followed by the evacuation of the territory which had been ceded in the hope of obtaining protection. He stigmatises the conduct of the Company as follows:

"Mr. Light, who was on the spot, could make the best of it, for, to people in Calcutta, the whole affair was of very trifling importance... Penang had been secured: seven years of occupation had proved its value, and shown that it could be held, without difficulty, by a small garrison against Asiatics:... a treaty, which said nothing about offensive or defensive alliances, had been concluded; the promises of 1785

and 1786 were forgotten or ignored; and the Sultan of Kedah might be left to settle accounts with his northern foes, as soon as the conclusion of their mutual quarrels should give them time to turn their attention to him." *(99)*

The next important event in the relations of Penang and Kedah was the acquisition in 1800 of Province Wellesley, the tract on the Kedah mainland opposite the island. The principal reason for obtaining it was to obtain complete control of the harbour of Penang, which was merely the strait separating the island from the Malay Peninsula. A very similar case was the acquisition of Kowloon, which was obtained from China in order to gain possession of both sides of the harbour of Hongkong. It was also hoped that the acquisition would make Penang independent of Kedah for its food. The island was unable to produce nearly enough to support its population, and if the supplies from Kedah had been cut off, Penang would have been reduced to the utmost distress. It was hoped that in time sufficient rice would be raised in Province Wellesley to make Penang independent of all foreign supplies. *(99)*

The Treaty ceding Province Wellesley was negotiated in 1800 by Sir George Leith, the Lieutenant-Governor of Penang. As in the Treaty of 1791 it was stipulated that provisions required for Penang could be bought in Kedah without impediment or paying duty. All previous treaties were cancelled, and there was no mention of a defensive alliance. All that the Company bound itself to do was to refuse shelter to rebels or traitors from Kedah (Article VII); and "to protect this coast from all enemies, robbers, and pirates that may attack it by sea, from North to South." (Article II). Province Wellesley was ceded to Great Britain in perpetuity, and the Company was to pay the Sultan $10,000 a year so long as it should occupy Penang and Province Wellesley. *(99)*


*(92) Alitchison, "Treaties," I, 401-3. The annual payment of $10,000 was of so much importance in the subsequent relations of Penang and Kedah that an account of its previous history is given. In the letter of the Sultan of Kedah of 1780 in which he offered to cede Penang he demanded an annual subsidy of $30,000 to compensate him for the loss of his trade-monopoly. In the reply of the Indian Government accepting the island it was stated that this request had been referred to the Directors. (Alitchison, "Treaties," I, 398-99). Between 1786 and 1791 varying amounts were paid to the Sultan by Light at different times. By the Treaty of 1791 the subsidy was fixed at $4,000 a year. (Ibid., I, 400). At the same time Light promised to recommend that this amount should be increased to $10,000 annually, as requested by the Sultan. After 1791 the Sultan received $10,000 a year, (Leigh, "Prince of Wales Island," 5-6 and 34), although the payment was not authorised until the Treaty of 1800, when this amount was fixed as the annual subsidy for the cession of Penang and Province Wellesley together. (Alitchison, "Treaties," I, 401). The later history of the $10,000 is given in the chapter on "Anglo-Siamese Relations.

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The omission from the Treaties of 1791 and 1800 of any reference to a defensive alliance might be regarded as the abandonment by the Sultan of an untenable claim. Burney and most of the Company's officials did look upon it in this light. Swettenham however explains that the Sultan's consent to the treaties did not mean that he was giving up what he regarded as his right. It was merely a manifestation of Malay psychology.

"If a British officer, accredited by the British Government, makes, during the progress of negotiations with a Malay Raja, any promise on behalf of his Government, it would not occur to the Malay to doubt that such promise would be accepted, and honourably fulfilled by those who sent the envoy. Were such a promise given, and, on the strength of it, territory ceded to the British Government, the acceptance of the cession would be deemed by the Malay the acceptance of the promise, if nothing were then said or written to him, to the effect that his demand could not be complied with. If, after five years' occupation of such ceded territory, a treaty were concluded, though that treaty did not contain the fulfilment of the promise, the Malay would not consider that the British Government was thereby released from performing an engagement, on the faith of which the occupation had taken place. If such a treaty were then, or afterwards, styled "preliminary," and it were necessary to obtain sanction from a distant Government to important provisions, it is probably the Malay would be told that this particular request of his was still under consideration, and that when instructions were received from that high and distant authority, a further and permanent treaty would be concluded with him. Under these circumstances a Malay Raja, dealing with British officers, would accept their advice. Lastly, if the British having been in occupation of a strong position for five years, as the friends of a Malay Raja, proposed to conclude with him a treaty which was not all, or anything, that he could have hoped for, it is difficult to see what the Malay would gain by refusal."(55)

The Company could have saved Kedah from the terrible fate which overtook it in 1821 at the hands of Siam by granting the Sultan "two companies of Sepoys with four six-pounder field-guns."(54) So timid and worthless were the Siamese troops that even this would probably not have been necessary: "little else than the name of the Company will be wanted."(56) This was Light's opinion in 1787, and it was fully endorsed by Crawford and Burney in the Reports on their embassies to Siam in 1821-26.(58) Swettenham is fully in agreement with them:

(54) Ibid., 44.
(55) Ibid., 43.
(56) v. chapter on "Anglo-Siamese Relations."

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“Kedah was safe as long as Siam and Ava believed that an attack on Kedah might involve a trial of conclusions with the British; but when it was publicly given out, that the assistance for which Penang had been ceded...would not, in fact, be given, then the fate of Kedah became a mere question of time. The cause...was the cowardice of the East India Company, ending in a breach of faith which sullied the British name and weakened its influence with Malays for very many years.”

During these years from 1786 to 1800 the population and trade of Penang were rapidly increasing. Almost from the moment of its foundation immigrants began to settle there, and a flourishing trade sprang up. This seems to be traceable to three principal causes—the remarkable energy with which Light pushed forward the development of the settlement, the great trust the natives had in him, and the system of free trade which prevailed until 1808. The policy of free trade was established by Acting Governor-General MacPherson when Penang was founded, to foster a rapid development of its commerce, and it was only abandoned in 1801 on the insistent demands of the Directors that customs duties should be levied to produce a revenue equal to the expenditure. Light was strongly in favour of free trade, and defended it in many despatches, pointing out the success which had attended it. Light and Sir John MacPherson deserve a share in the credit which has been given to Raffles as the founder of free trade in Malaya.

Within two years after the occupation of Penang its population numbered about 1,000. During the following years it steadily increased, until by 1804 it had grown to 12,000. The census returns are often incomplete, but a study of the available evidence reveals the same general tendencies at work as in the later history of Penang. From the very beginning, the bulk of the population was Asiatic, the majority being Malays. Next in point of numbers came Indians, then Chinese, and finally a varying number of half the races from Burma to Celebes. The Europeans were very few, but as in Singapore, they were the mainspring of the development of the island. Almost all the important merchants were British, while the artisans, many of the small traders, and the great majority of the agriculturists, were Asians. Both Europeans and natives

(27) Swettenham, "British Malaya," 37, 45-46. The subsequent History of Kedah is given in the chapter on "Anglo-Siamese Relations."
(101) S. S. R., Vol. 3.
were necessary for the growth of Penang's trade. Without the British commerce would have developed much more slowly, in fact the town would never have existed; but without Asiatic assistance the growth of trade would have been crippled, while agriculture would hardly have existed at all.

Of all the native races the most valuable, though not the most numerous, were the Chinese. The rôle they played in the early years of Penang was a remarkable forecast of the part which they later took in the development of British Malaya. Looking back over the history of the last hundred and forty years, it seems prophetic that by 1788 the number of Chinese had grown from nothing to over two-lifths of the total population.\(^{(103)}\) One of the most striking phenomena in the history of British Malaya has been the great attraction which the justice and security of British rule has had for the Chinese, and the way in which the growth of British territory in the Peninsula and Borneo has been followed by a rapid influx of Chinese into countries where previously few of them had dared to venture.\(^{(104)}\) It was also characteristic that by 1794 they were already regarded by the government as the "most valuable" part of the native population, because of their docility, industry and initiative.\(^{(105)}\)

The most vivid description of the diverse and kaleidoscopic character of the population is found in a letter of Dickens, the Magistrate, written to the Lieutenant-Governor of Penang on June 1, 1802.

"The greater part of this community are but sojourners for a time, so that the population of the island is continually shifting as to the individual members of whom it is composed; this population includes British subjects, foreigners, both Europeans and Americans, people of colour originally descended from European fathers and Asiatic mothers, Armenians, Parsees, Arabs, Chooliars (Indians), Malays from the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, and the Eastern Islands, Buggesses from Borneo, Celebes and other islands in the China Seas, Burmans from Pegu, Siamese, Javanese, Chinese, with Mussulmen and Hindoos from the Company's territories in India."\(^{(106)}\)

The development of trade was as rapid as the increase in population. In 1786 it was non-existent, the island being an almost uninhabited jungle; but by 1789 the total value of imports and exports was Spanish $553,592.\(^{(107)}\) By about 1804 the total value

\(^{(103)}\) S. S. R., 3.
\(^{(104)}\) v. chapter on the Chinese in the Straits Settlements.
\(^{(106)}\) J. I. A., V, 297.
\(^{(107)}\) S. S. R., 3.

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was $1,418,200.\(^{(108)}\) This amount does not seem impressive when compared with the phenomenal growth of Singapore; but the latter as will be shown, was unique in the Archipelago.

Analysis of the trade returns shows that Penang, though to a lesser degree than Singapore, owed its prosperity largely to its transit trade. The manufacturers of Great Britain and India were brought to it for distribution throughout the East Indian Islands, while the products of the Archipelago were collected there for transmission to India, China, and the United Kingdom. The principal imports from Britain and India were opium and piece goods (woollen, cotton, and silk cloths), steel, gunpowder, iron and china-ware. These were sold at Penang for the typical products of the Archipelago or, to use the term frequently applied to them in the Records, Straits Produce, e.g. rice, tin, spices, rattans, gold-dust, ivory, ebony, and pepper. The greater part of these commodities came from the countries lying near Penang, and especially Burma, the Malay Peninsula, and Sumatra. Owing to Penang's position on the western edge of the Archipelago its trade with the islands to the East of Sumatra and the Peninsula was comparatively small. A large and increasingly important part of the commerce of Penang was carried on by native merchants, who collected the Straits Produce, and sold it in Penang, buying in exchange British and Indian manufactures.\(^{(109)}\)

Soon after the occupation of Penang attempts were made to introduce the growth of spices, so that the Company might no longer be dependent on the supplies obtained from the Dutch possessions. Light's attempts to cultivate cloves, nutmeg and cinnamon failed, but he introduced the growth of pepper, which was eventually to become of considerable importance. It is interesting to note that the first man to engage in it was a Chinese, who introduced pepper plants from Achin with money advanced to him by Light.\(^{(110)}\) When Holland entered the war against Great Britain as an ally of the French Republic the Directors seized the opportunity for which they had long been looking. It was no longer necessary to respect Dutch susceptibilities, and in 1796 and subsequent years agents of the Company were sent to the Moluccas to secure pepper, clove, nutmeg and other spice plants. Many thousands of seedlings were sent to Penang. At first they threw, and about 1803 it seemed that the island would soon become a rival of the Moluccas.\(^{(111)}\) Unfortunately this early success was soon followed by failure, and


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it was not until about 1825 that the cultivation of spices revived. (112)

No sketch of the early history of Penang would be complete which did not refer to the very serious problem that arose owing to the absence until 1807 of any legally established courts or code of law. In 1788 and 1794 the Supreme Government drew up a few general rules as to the mode of trial and character of punishments to be inflicted at Penang, but did not feel itself at liberty to do more without the authorization of the Directors. (113) These regulations remained the law of the island until 1807, and owing to their defects actually impeded the administration of justice. (114) They were very vague as to the code of law to be administered and the sentences to be imposed, they left far too much to the discretion of the Superintendent of Penang, and they made British subjects practically independent of his jurisdiction.

Petty civil cases were tried by the Captains of Chinese, Malays, and Chulias (i.e. Tamils). These were prominent natives appointed by the Penang Government to assist it in maintaining law and order amongst their own countrymen. More important civil and criminal cases were tried by the Assistants of the Superintendent or, to give him the title introduced about 1800, the Lieutenant-Governor of Penang. The most serious charges, civil and criminal, were tried by the Superintendent, who had also a right to revise any sentence passed by his subordinates. Until the arrival of Dickens, a Calcutta barrister and an uncle of the novelist, who was sent as magistrate in 1800, the judges were not trained lawyers. (115)

Neither English Civil nor Criminal Law was in force. In criminal cases the magistrates punished crime in a rough and ready fashion by acting in accordance with the dictates of their own common-sense, assisted by the very vague Regulations of 1794. The usual penalties were imprisonment, moderate flogging, and banishment from the island. Convicted native murderers were imprisoned pending the decision of the Bengal Government as to their sentences. In civil cases "as many systems of law were in force as there were nationalities in the Island; and all these laws again were probably tempered or modified by that law of nature, or that natural justice which appears to have been the chief guide of the European magistrate who constituted the Court of Appeal...In the midst of all this confusion this much, and this much only, seems to be clear, that so far from the law of England being in force as the law of the land, its most general and elementary principles were not...

(112) For subsequent history of the spice cultivation v. chapter on Trade and Agriculture.
enforced.” (116) A report of Dickens, written to the Governor-General in 1803, pointed out the grave inconveniences caused by the indefinite character of the law. After describing how Penang was “governed arbitrarily, and not by fixed laws,” he continued:

“The law of nature is the only law declaring crimes and respecting property which...exists at Prince of Wales Island... But as the law of nature gives me no precepts concerning the rights of... succession or inheritance... or concerning many other things which are the subject of positive law, I have often been much embarrassed in the execution of my duty and judge...; and many cases there are in which I am utterly unable to exercise jurisdiction... The cultivation of the island, the increase of its commerce and of its population, has made it necessary that fixed laws of property, as well as laws declaring what acts are crimes should be promulgated by due authority.” (117)

The most serious defect of the Regulations of 1794 however was that it left Europeans almost exempt from any jurisdiction, except for murder and “other crimes of enormity.” In those cases they were sent to be tried in the Bengal courts. (118) The result of this immunity, as Lieutenant-Governor Leith pointed out in 1804, was that they took advantage of it to commit many nefarious actions, principally against the natives, who had no legal redress against them. (119) The same complaint is found in a despatch to the Directors written in 1805 by the Penang Council soon after the establishment of the Presidency. “The more turbulent European remains on the island free from all restraint, with the power of committing every act of injustice and irregularity towards his neighbour and the most peaceable native, having set at defiance all authority as not legally established on the island.” Unless radical reforms were introduced, “we venture to predict that the prosperity of this settlement cannot be permanent. It will be deserted by all orderly, and will become an asylum for the flagitious and the enemies of government and law.” (120)

Many similar despatches were sent, and finally in 1807 the Directors obtained parliamentary authorisation for the establishment of a Recorder’s Court at Penang. The law which was thus introduced was for both civil and criminal cases the law of England as it existed in 1807. The charter of justice directed that especially

(117) J. I. A. N. S., IV, 32-34, quoted by Maxwell.
(120) S. S.R., 179: Nov. 12, 1875.

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in the form of procedure of the Court, native religions and usages should be consulted so far as these were compatible with the spirit of English law.\(^{(121)}\)

With the year 1805 Penang entered on a new phase of its history. The island was then at the height of its glory; never before or since was such a brilliant future hoped from it. Penang was to be the long sought naval base in the Eastern Seas; it was to produce fabulous yields of spices; it was to become one of the greatest trade marts of Furthest Asia.\(^{(122)}\) With high hopes the Directors raised it to the proud rank of a Presidency, the Fourth Presidency of India; and almost at once disillusion began.

The causes are not far to seek.\(^{(123)}\) An undue depreciation had been followed by an exaggerated over-estimate of the possibilities of Penang. The first great disappointment was the discovery that it was not suitable for the proposed naval base. The harbour was excellent, but closer investigation showed that it was not practicable to construct dockyards. Moreover the trees on the island were found to be unsuitable for shipbuilding, and no good timber was to be had nearer than Burma. In 1812 the plan to make Penang a naval base was finally abandoned.\(^{(121)}\)

The second great disappointment was the failure of the settlement to become a great trading-centre for the East Indian Islands. Commerce increased until 1810, but thereafter remained practically stationary until 1819. Soon afterwards it began to decline from the competition of its new rival, Singapore. This was a necessary consequence of Penang’s position on the western edge of the Archipelago. Native traders greatly appreciated its low duties and freedom from irksome regulation, but for the great majority this attraction was not strong enough to induce them to sail several hundred miles out of their way through the pirate-infested waters of the Straits of Malacca when other, though from the point of customs duties, less attractive ports were closer at hand. As in the early days of its history, the trade of Penang continued to be mainly with the countries in its vicinity, such as Burma, the West Coast of the Malay Peninsula, and Sumatra. Since the Company was unalterably opposed to extending its empire in the Straits, it was impossible for trade with the Peninsula to develop as it did after Great Britain began to bring the Malay States under her control in 1874. Finally, the spice cultivation, after its initial success became almost a total failure for many years.

\(^{(121)}\) J. I. A. N. S., IV, 25-43, Maxwell.
\(^{(122)}\) S. S. R., 186: April 18, 1805. Director’s Despatch to Penang Council.
\(^{(123)}\) The history of the Penang Presidency, so far as it concerns the period after 1824, is given in greater detail in the chapters on Anglo-Siamese Relations, Trade and Agriculture, and the Civil Service.
\(^{(124)}\) S. S. R., 179: Nov. 12, 1805. J. I. A., IV, 11, 17; VI, 521-44.
Last and greatest disappointment Penang proved to be a drain upon the Indian Treasury. Before 1805 the expenses always exceeded the revenue, and after that date the annual deficit became much larger. The principal reason for this appears to have been the greatly increased number of well-paid officials who were sent to Penang after the establishment of the Presidency in 1805.\(^{(125)}\) Attempts were made to remedy the situation by increasing the customs duties but in spite of this the annual deficit grew steadily larger.\(^{(128)}\)

As in the case of Bencoolen, the Directors came to look more and more coldly upon a settlement from which they reaped nothing but a heavy annual loss. They repeatedly sent orders to the Penang Council to reduce expenditure; but despite fervent promises of economy the yearly deficit increased. During the last ten years of the Presidency, from about 1820 to 1830, the Council seem to have spent much of their time and ingenuity in trying to convince the Directors how economical they really were, and how absolutely indispensable was every item of their expenditure. The Directors for their part replied by further exhortations, and cold and sceptical questioning of the necessity of each new call upon their treasury.\(^{(127)}\) Finally their patience became exhausted, and in 1830 they tried to gain an approximation to their desires by abolishing the Presidency and cutting down the staff of officials to a fraction of their former number. The Straits Settlements—for in 1826 Malacca and Singapore had been placed under the control of Penang—became a Residency subject to Bengal, and the Eastern Presidency ceased to exist.

\(^{(125)}\) S. S. R., 186: April 18, 1805.
\(^{(127)}\) S. S. R., 1829-30, passim. There is hardly a volume which has not some reference to the subject, and in many it forms a large part of the contents.
CHAPTER III.

Singapore—1819-1826.

Lord Fisher remarks in his "Memories" that the three essential qualities of a great naval officer are imagination, audacity, and the genius to disobey orders at the right moment. Without the imagination and audacity to frame conceptions upon the grand scale, and the strength of mind to carry them out in the face of his Admiral's veto, as Nelson did at Copenhagen, mere common-sense or skill in his profession will not make a seaman of the first rank. The same test holds good of statesmen, and especially perhaps of the governors of the overseas Empire. Nowhere can there be found a case more in point than the career of Sir Stamford Raffles in the East Indian Islands during the years from 1816 to 1824. Had it not been for his determined disobedience to orders in all human probability the Malay Peninsula would to-day be a Dutch colony.

The career of Sir Stamford Raffles is one of the most remarkable in British Colonial History. He first came into prominence in 1808 when as the obscure Assistant-Secretary of the Penang Presidency he induced the Supreme Government and the Directors to reverse their policy towards Malacca. His opportunity came to him in this wise. Malacca had been in British hands since 1795, but the Company was afraid that some day it might be returned to the Dutch, since it was only held in trust for the exiled Stadtholder of the Netherlands until his rebellious subjects should restore him to his throne. In that case it might be a serious rival to Penang, since it was 240 miles nearer to the centre of the Archipelago. Acting on the advice of the Penang Council, the Supreme Government and the Directors had determined to destroy the fortifications and divert the trade of Malacca to Penang. They hoped to reduce it to an uninhabited jungle, so that it would be useless to Holland should she ever recover it. (1) In 1807 the fortifications which had been built by the Portuguese and were said to be the strongest in the East Indian Islands, were completely destroyed with the exception of a single gate, and great efforts were made to induce the population to migrate to Penang. This they obstinately refused to do. (2) In 1808 Raffles went to Malacca for the recovery of his health, and saw the folly of the British policy. He drew up a masterly report in which he pointed out that it was impossible either to persuade the inhabitants to leave, or to divert what was left of Malacca's trade to Penang. If the site were abandoned by

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(2) Newbold, "Strait of Malacca," I, 125-27.

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the British, it would soon be reoccupied by some native ruler and eventually by a European power, because of the great strategic value of its position. Hence sooner or later Malacca would be re-established as a rival port to Penang, but with the vital difference that it would no longer be under British control. Raffles therefore urged that Malacca should be retained "until we are actually obliged to give it up."(3) So impressed were the Supreme Government and the Directors by this report that they gave orders that the attempt to destroy Malacca should be abandoned.(4)

Raffles' action has also another and a far more important result. The Governor-General of India, Lord Minto, was much impressed by the report, and decided that the young Assistant-Secretary was a man from whom great things were to be expected. Two years later, in 1810, Minto appointed him his Agent to the Malay States, to prepare the way for the expedition which conquered Java from the Dutch and French.(5)

In 1811, at the age of thirty, he was appointed Lieutenant-Governor of Java.(6) In four years the obscure official had become the protegé of the Governor-General, and the ruler of a much more important island than Penang. His meteoric rise gained the unyielding hatred of his former colleagues at Penang, and in 1819 their jealousy led them to do everything in their power to prevent the establishment of Singapore.

Raffles' government of Java, which lasted from the 18th September 1811 to the 11th March 1816 established his reputation as a great administrator. Indirectly it affected British Malaya, since it brought them into disfavour with the Supreme Government and the Directors. From the very beginning it was uncertain whether Java might not be restored to Holland. The policy which Raffles pursued with the strong approval of his patron is best expressed in the words of Lord Minto himself:—"While we are here let us do as much good as we can."(7) In five years Raffles attempted to perform the impossible task of sweeping away the abuses and injustices of centuries of native and Dutch misrule. Opinions differ as to the wisdom of his precipitancy and the measure of his success. Perhaps the best testimony to his wisdom is to be found in the conduct of the Dutch themselves. Despite their hatred of Raffles, they have adopted most of his plans, although it took three generations to carry out the reforms which he initiated.(8) While very beneficial to the Javanese, Raffles' governorship brought much trouble upon his own head. As long as Lord Minto lived Raffles could count upon his cordial support;

(4) Ibid., 75-76.
(6) Ibid., 58.
(7) Ibid., 59.

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but unfortunately he died in 1813, and the new Governor-General, Lord Moira (afterwards the Marquis of Hastings), was hostile to him until 1818. (9) False charges were also brought against Raffles by General Gillespie, who commanded the troops in Java, and he was under a cloud until they were disproved in 1817. (10) While however the Directors were at last convinced of the honesty of his conduct many of them were far from satisfied as to its wisdom. Raffles was animated by a burning zeal for reform which refused to be governed by considerations of profit and loss, and the Supreme Government and the Directors frequently censured him because of the heavy demands which his Javan reforms made upon the Indian treasury. Hence while they cleared his character in 1817 from all imputations of dishonesty, they reserved their opinion as to the wisdom of his actions. (11)

Raffles' very strong dislike of the Dutch also brought him into disfavour. Throughout his career in the East this was one of the guiding motives of his policy, and as Governor of Java he tried to build up a British East Indian Empire. He was animated partly by the desire to save the natives from again suffering the cruelties of Dutch rule, and also by his realization of the great wealth which the Archipelago would ultimately bring to Britain. Unfortunately Raffles' project called for immediate and heavy expenditure. In the early nineteenth century few men had his vast knowledge of the infinite possibilities of the East Indian Islands, and the Directors were quite unconvinced by his arguments. They saw only the immediate expense, and had no desire whatever to have an empire thrust upon them. From long experience of Raffles' masterful tactics however they were uneasily aware that any mail from India might inform them that he had carried out some daring "coup," and presented them with a most unwelcome "fait accompli." The Cabinet was equally opposed to any extension of British power in the Archipelago. It must be admitted that Raffles was a most inconvenient servant for a commercial corporation and a government which only desired to maintain the "status quo" in the East Indian Islands. (12)

When Java was restored to Holland in 1816 Raffles visited England, and tried to convince the Directors that the Dutch would revive their former policy of monopolizing the trade of the Archipelago. He was only partially successful, but they confirmed his appointment as Resident of Bencoolen, which Minto had given him several years before, in case Java should be restored to Holland. They also raised his rank from that of Resident to Lieutenant-Governor, and instructed him to watch and report on the conduct of the Dutch. His despatches were to be sent to the Directors in

(10) Egerton, "Raffles," 115-17, 127.
(11) Egerton, "Raffles," 115-17, 125.
person instead of going first to the Supreme Government, the usual official channel. Raffles may therefore well have supposed that his position was more than that of a mere commercial agent; but it seems scarcely doubtful that his sanguine nature attached undue importance to encouraging words spoken in private conversation. He considered and indeed described himself as "Representative of the British Government in the Eastern Seas," a title which the Directors regarded as an unwarranted assumption of authority. (13)

From the point of view of British interests, the situation which confronted Raffles on his arrival at Bencoolen in 1818 was very serious. At the Congress of Vienna Great Britain had restored to Holland all her former possessions in the Eastern Archipelago; and the Dutch Government lost no time in re-establishing its authority. The bankrupt Netherlands East India Company had been replaced by the Government of Holland, which could command far greater resources than the Company had possessed in the later part of its existence. The object of Holland was to re-establish her former supremacy in the Archipelago, and to recover the monopoly of its commerce. An essential part of this policy was that the flourishing British trade which had grown up with the East Indian Islands must be confined to the Dutch capital of Batavia, where it would be easy to restrict it to such limits as Holland might think desirable. All other ports in the islands must be closed to all save Dutch ships, and the British must be prevented from establishing any more settlements in the Archipelago. In fact, so far as it was possible, Holland wished to restore the conditions of the seventeenth century. It was of course impossible to use the old methods of open force, for times had changed, and Holland no longer dared to pursue the policy by which she had expelled the English in the days of the Massacre of Amboyna. It was not through her own strength that she had recovered her empire, but solely because it suited British policy to restore it. At the Congress of Vienna one of Castlereagh's principal objects had been to make Holland powerful enough to act as a barrier against a possible renewal by France of her attempts to secure the Rhine frontier. With the border states of the German Confederation Holland was Europe's first line of defence against another outbreak of "Revolutionary madness". To secure this end was even more important for Britain than for the other Great Powers, because of her age-old policy that the Low Countries must be held by a weak and friendly state. Holland's East Indian empire was restored to her to secure her good-will, and to make her sufficiently powerful to resist France. Furthermore British statesmen failed to realize the immense value of the Archipelago. It was not considered worth keeping, when weighed in the balance against the importance of Dutch friendship in Europe. Ceylon, Cape Colony, and other former Dutch possessions which were known to be of value to British trade were retained, but the East Indian Islands were


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restored, because they seemed to be of little importance. Holland clearly understood the situation, and laid her plans accordingly. An open attempt to expel the British from the Archipelago would not be tolerated; but as long as she used more subtle methods there was not much danger of interference. Rather than drive Holland into the arms of France British statesmen were prepared to leave her a fairly free hand in the East Indian Islands, and they would be far from pleased with any of the Company's agents like Raffles, who by openly opposing the Dutch threatened to cause strained relations between the two nations in Europe. The far from disinterested benevolence of British policy was Holland's strongest card, and during the next few years she played it with great skill.

The Dutch Government sent a large fleet and army to the Archipelago, and reoccupied all the settlements of the Netherlands Company, including those which had been abandoned many years before it finally collapsed. New posts were also established on many islands which the Dutch had never formerly possessed. The old treaties with native rulers, giving Holland the monopoly of their trade, were again enforced. There were many Sultans who had never entered into such engagements with the Netherlands Company; but by more or less peaceful persuasion similar truces were gradually secured from the majority. British ships were forbidden to visit any port in the Archipelago except Batavia, and the native prawns were ordered to sail only to Dutch settlements to prevent them from trading with the Company. A large fleet of small warships was maintained to enforce these commercial regulations. (14)

From the date of his arrival at Bengcoen, Raffles combatted the Dutch designs in Sumatra. He was quite unsuccessful however, and only succeeded in drawing upon himself severe censures from the Directors and the Cabinet. (15) It seemed that British trade with the Archipelago was doomed, but in 1819 the tide turned. The Marquis of Hastings had been hostile to Raffles during his administration of Java, but he had gradually become convinced of his ability and integrity. In October 1818 he granted Sir Stamford permission to visit Bengal and discuss the future of Bengcoen. The result of this voyage was the foundation of Singapore. (16)

Raffles gained the favour of Hastings and converted him to his policy for safeguarding the interests of British trade in the


Archipelago. He convinced the Governor-General that the Dutch "had been actuated by a spirit of ambition, by views of boundless aggrandizement and rapacity, and by a desire to obtain the power of monopolizing the commerce of the Eastern Archipelago, and of excluding the English from those advantages which they had long enjoyed". (17) The success of this project would also "give them the entire command of the only channels for the direct trade between China and Europe." (18) To defeat their aims it was decided to concede to them their pretensions in Sumatra and the exclusive control of the Straits of Sunda, and to confine British efforts to obtaining a port at the Southern entrance to the Straits of Malacca. For several years Raffles had advocated the establishment of a settlement there, to secure part of the commerce of the Archipelago, and as a port where ships in the China trade could obtain provisions and make repairs. The situation was far better than that of Penang for trade with the East Indian Islands, since Prince of Wales Island was "too far from the centre of things to be an effective station," and was "so distant from the principal native ports of the Archipelago, that, under the uncertainty of the passage up the Straits, but few native vessels are induced to go there." (19)

On November 26, 1818, Raffles received his Instructions. He was to go first to Achin and establish British interests there in order to secure the control of the Northern entrance of the Straits of Malacca. He was then to go on and establish a post at Rhio, since this appeared to be the most suitable position for commanding the Southern entrance to the Straits, affording "the only efficient means of accomplishing the object of securing a free passage" through them. Raffles was appointed Governor-General's Agent, and was thus made independent of the Government of Penang. The proposed new settlement was also to be independent of Penang, and was to be controlled by Raffles, as Lieutenant-Governor of Bencoolen. In conclusion the Instructions strictly enjoined him to avoid all disputes with the Dutch, and not to attempt to occupy Rhio should he find on his arrival that they had already done so. (20) Rhio was an important native port on an island in the Rhio-Lingga Archipelago, at the Southern entrance to the Straits of Malacca, and not far distant from Singapore. It was "the principal station of the Arab and Bugis traders on the Western side of the Archipelago." (21)

Curiously enough, on the very day on which these Instructions were signed, the Dutch secured a treaty from the helpless Sultan of Rhio by which they obtained control of the island. (22) The

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(18) Egerton, "Raffles," 172.
(20) Ibid., 271, 298-301. Egerton, "Raffles," 172.
(21) Ibid., 298-301.
(22) Egerton, "Raffles," 172-73.
probability of their forestalling him however had been much in Raffles' mind; and on December 5, doubtless at his suggestion, additional instructions were issued authorizing him, in case the above contingency should have occurred, to negotiate with the Sultan of Johore for obtaining a site for a settlement. He was forbidden to do so however if the Dutch advanced claims, even of the slenderest, that the Sultan was their vassal.

Sir Stamford seems to have exaggerated the amount of support on which he could depend from the Governor-General. In reality Lord Hastings does not seem to have decided anything more in his own mind than that something must be done in the Straits, and that Raffles was the only man to do it. He had not given him his entire confidence, and he would have abandoned the whole enterprise at the first check, if his agent had not been too prompt and too strong for him. When Sir Stamford sailed from the Hughli in December 1818 the die was cast. He knew the hostility and vacillation of his superiors, and he strained every nerve to accomplish his task before they had time to countermand his orders. How true was his estimate of them was shown by a despatch which Lord Hastings sent after him before he had set sail. It directed him to "desist from every attempt to form a British establishment in the Eastern Archipelago". Fortunately however Raffles carried out his mission so quickly that Singapore was occupied before the letter reached him.

Sir Stamford arrived at Penang on December 31, and found that the Dutch had already occupied Bencoolen. Colonel Bannerman, the Governor of Penang, was bitterly jealous of Raffles, and strongly urged him to give up the enterprise. This he refused to do, and Bannerman thereafter tried by every means in his power to make the foundation of Singapore a failure. Curiously enough however, in one way his hostility proved of the greatest service. Raffles' orders were that he must first carry out the mission to Achin; and if this had been done, Hastings' despatch forbidding the establishment of the new post would have caught up with him before he left Sumatra. Bannerman was most insistent that the Achin mission should be postponed pending certain representations he wished to make to the Supreme Government. Raffles knew that there was no time to lose unless the British were to be forestalled at Johore as well, and he was therefore only too glad to find so excellent an excuse for pressing on with the more important part of his commission. Accordingly, on January 19, 1819 he sailed from Penang with his little squadron of six vessels.

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Nine days later, on January 28, 1819, the ships anchored off the island of Singapore. Influenced by his knowledge that an important trading city had existed there until its destruction some four hundred and fifty years earlier, Sir Stamford had decided before he left Calcutta that Singapore would be the best site for his proposed settlement in case he should find on his arrival that the Dutch had forestalled him at Rhoio. (28) The only inhabitants of the island were the Temenggong of Johore and some one hundred and fifty of his Malay followers, who gained a precarious livelihood by fishing and offering an asylum to the pirates who swarmed in the Straits of Malacca. Abdullah Munshi, a protege of Raffles who came to Singapore a few months later, has left a very vivid and amusing account of Singapore as it was in 1819:—

“At that time no mortal dared to pass through the Straits of Singapore, jins and satans even were afraid, for that was the place the pirates made use of to sleep at and to divide their booty. There also they put to death their captives, and themselves fought and killed each other in their quarrels on the division of the spoil. . . . All along the beach there were hundreds of human skulls, some of them old, some fresh with the hair still remaining, some with the teeth still sharp, and some without teeth: in fine, they were in various stage of decay. Mr. Farquhar ordered them to be collected and thrown into the sea. They were all put in sacks and thrown in accordingly.” (29)

Discovering that the Dutch had made no claim to Singapore, and that the Temenggong was willing to allow an English settlement, Raffles made a Preliminary Agreement with him on January 30. It stipulated that the Company might establish a factory, and that as long as the British remained and protected the Temenggong he would not enter into relations with any other power nor allow it to settle in his country. In return he was to receive $3,000 a year. (30)

Despite this treaty Raffles felt that his legal title to Singapore was still insecure, since it came from the “de facto” and not the “de jure” ruler of the country. That no loophole might be left for the Dutch he decided to secure a grant of the territory from the Sultan as well. The explanation of how there came to be two rulers claiming control over Singapore is to be found in the decay of the ancient Empire of Johore. In the sixteenth century it had been a powerful state, but during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries its strength had steadily decayed. The Sultans had removed their capital from Johore City, in the present state of Johore, to Lingga.

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They were practically puppets in the hands of their nominal ministers, the Raja Mudas or governors of Rhio. The Raja Mudaship was the hereditary office of the Princes of the Bugis merchant-pirates who had settled on the coasts of continental Johore, but more especially in the Rhio-Langka Archipelago, during the eighteenth century. The continental dominions of the Sultans continued to form a nominal part of the Empire of Johore, and were ruled by their great officers of state, the Temenggong at Johore and the Bendahara at Pahang. Theoretically subject to the Sultan, in fact they had gradually become practically independent.

This was the situation when in 1810 Sultan Mahmud II died leaving two sons. The elder, Hussein, was his destined successor; but at the time of his father's death he was in Pahang to marry the sister of the Bendahara. During his absence the Bugis Raja Muda of Rhio, Rajah Jaafar, persuaded the younger son of the late Sultan, Abdulrahman, to mount the throne. Hussein had been unable to recover his rights, and had since then been living in poverty at Rhio. The Dutch treaty of 1818, by which they had obtained control of Rhio, was a revival of the former treaty of vassalage which they had imposed on Sultan Mahmud II in 1785. It was concluded with the younger brother, Abdulrahman, the "de facto" ruler of Johore, no attention being paid to the elder brother Hussein. Moreover Raffles carefully ascertained that the provisions of this treaty were confined to Rhio, and that under it the Dutch could lay no claim to Singapore. It was certain that they would oppose the British occupation of the island, and equally evident that their puppet, Abdulrahman, would refuse to confirm the Temenggong's grant of Singapore. Raffles wished to confront the Dutch with an indefeasible title in the diplomatic contest which he foresaw. In Hussein who was indisputably the lawful Sultan of Johore, he saw the means of obtaining what he wanted. Raffles saw clearly that the Temenggong was the "de facto" ruler of Singapore, although in theory only the Sultan's agent. While however Hussein's power was in practice nil, he was the "de jure" sovereign. If the Company's title to Singapore were based merely on the Temenggong's grant the Dutch might be able to overthrow it on the ground that theoretically he had no right to make the cession. But with a grant signed by both the "de facto" and the "de jure" sovereigns, the Company's title was legally unassailable. Accordingly Raffles entered into negotiations with Hussein, and had no difficulty in persuading him to come to Singapore to be installed as the rightful Sultan of Johore and receive a comfortable pension as long as he lived. In return he was to give the Company the right to build a factory on Singapore. (31)


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On February 6, 1819 a treaty was signed by Raffles, Sultan Hussain, and the Temenggong. By it the Company received the right to build a factory, while the Sultan and the Temenggong agreed that so long as it should be maintained they would not form a treaty with, nor consent to the settlement in any part of their territories, of any European or American power. The Company was to pay the Sultan a yearly pension of $5000, and the Temenggong $3000, while in addition the Temenggong should receive half of whatever dues it might be decided to levy on native vessels. Furthermore, as long as the Sultan and Temenggong resided near the Company's factory they were to be protected; but it was specifically stated that this alliance did not in any way bind the British to interfere in the internal affairs of Johore, or to maintain the Sultan's authority by force of arms.\(^{(32)}\)

On the following day, February 7, Raffles left to carry out his mission to Achin. A state so powerful in the seventeenth century, that even the Dutch had to treat it with some circumspection, had dwindled to a small district at the northern end of Sumatra. Even here the Sultans were too weak to restrain their rebellious vassals, who had become virtually independent. Anarchy reigned supreme, and each petty chief did very much what seemed best in his own eyes. In Raffles' opinion Achin was falling to pieces "through the personal imbecility and political weakness of the monarch" and its break up was imminent.\(^{(33)}\) Sir Stamford was strongly prejudiced in favour of this potentate, Alauddin Jaubhar al-Alam Shah, whom he described as of "estimable qualities... though perhaps weak." He appears at least to have been dissolute and imprudent. In 1815 Alam Shah had been dethroned by Syed Hussain, a wealthy Penang merchant, who at once abdicated in favour of his son. The new ruler was strongly supported by the Penang Government.\(^{(34)}\) This was the situation when Raffles returned to Achin on March 14, 1819, with instructions to establish friendly relations with the Chinese ruler, and exclude Dutch influence.

He insisted that Alam Shah had learned wisdom in adversity and was supported by the majority of his people. Raffles gained the reluctant ascent of the other Commissioner, Captain Coombs, to the restoration of the dethroned Sultan. He was accordingly reinstated, and the usurper pensioned by the British. Raffles was censured by the Supreme Government for the cavalier way in which he treated his fellow-Commissioner, while the treaty which he made was ratified as the "best course now to be pursued," although the only result certain to accrue from it was "the expense

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which is at once incurred." He was also instructed that there was to be no further interference. (33)

By the terms of the treaty a perpetual defensive alliance was established between the Company and Aehin, and a British Agent was to be received at the Court. The customs duties charged on British imports were to be "fixed and declared" and no one was to be granted a monopoly of the produce of the state. The Sultan also engaged for himself and his successors "to exclude the subjects of every other...power...from a fixed residence in his dominion," and not to negotiate, or make treaties without the knowledge and consent of Britain. (34)

If the Company had used the opportunities given by this treaty to establish itself in Aehin, it would have controlled the northern as through Singapore it dominated the Southern entrance to the Straits of Malacca. This was undoubtedly Raffles' intention. (35) On the other hand, having regard to the impotence of the Sultan, the strong hostility of the Aehinese chiefs to foreign control, and the powerful anti-British faction in the country, it is quite conceivable that such a course might have involved the Company in a war like that which the Dutch had to wage for over thirty-three years when they attempted to conquer Aehin after 1871. As it was, by the orders of the Supreme Government a policy of non-interference was followed. In 1825, Fullerton, Governor of Penang Presidency, reported that the treaty of 1819 had "been a dead letter from the day it was signed," since Sultan Alam-Shah never recovered his authority, his "influence, or even his respect." Power continued to remain in the hands of various chiefs who had established their independence. Fullerton declared that it would be "utterly impracticable" to establish British influence in Aehin, without "in plain terms...subjugating the country—an alternative which it never suited British policy to resort to." (36) The Supreme Government agreed that Alam Shah had never had the power to fulfil his treaty obligations, while the Directors went even further and declared that they had "never approved of an intimate connection with that state." (37)

Meanwhile the "paper war" with the Dutch had begun. They appreciated as clearly as Raffles the significance of his latest move, and left no stone unturned to secure the abandonment of Singapore. Naturally the Government at Batavia could not avow the real reason for their hostility, that Sir Stamford had ruined their cherished scheme for monopolizing the trade of the East Indian Islands. It was therefore decently veiled under an emphatic

(37) Souttenham, "British Malaya," 111.
(39) Ibid., Jan. 28, 1825.

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protest against Raffles' shameless violation of the sanctity of treaties. The Dutch contended that their treaty with Abdulrahman applied not only to Rhio, but to the whole empire of Johore. They declared that Abdulrahman was the lawful Sultan, while Hussein was merely an impostor brought forward by Raffles to give a show of legality to his nefarious actions. Finally, they accused Sir Stamford of terrorising the Temenggong and Hussein into ceding the island.**(40)**

Raffles replied by bringing forward much evidence to prove that Hussein was lawful Sultan, and that even apart from this Abdulrahman was not legally the ruler, since he did not possess the regalia of the Sultans of Johore, and had never been recognised by the Temenggong and the Bendahara. By the custom of Johore his coronation was invalid. Raffles also disproved the charges that he had extorted the cession of the island by force.**(41)**

Colonel Bannerman, the Governor of Penang, supported the Dutch representations. He was actuated partly by jealousy of Raffles, and in part by a well-grounded fear that Singapore would injure the prosperity of Penang. There were rumours that the Government of Batavia intended to attack Singapore and expel the British by force. Farquhar, the Resident of Singapore, appealed to Bannerman for reinforcements. The Colonel not only refused them, but even urged Farquhar to abandon the island and return to Penang. Bannerman then wrote to the Governor-General bitterly attacking Raffles, and urging that Singapore should be restored to the Dutch, its lawful owners.**(42)** If the Governor of Penang had been a Dutch agent, he could not have worked more zealously for their cause.

When the protests from Batavia and Penang reached Calcutta, Lord Hastings was very angry with Raffles for involving the Company in a quarrel with Holland. He greatly regretted the occupation of Singapore; but since it was an accomplished fact he felt that immediate withdrawal was impossible. To have withdrawn would have been to admit the validity of the Dutch claims, and of this he was not convinced. He proposed that the matter should be referred to the home authorities for decision as to which power had the legal right to the island. To this the Dutch agreed.**(43)** Colonel Bannerman received a sharp rebuke from Hastings for his zealous partisanship which grievously surprised him, and resulted in the immediate despatch of the reinforcements asked for by Farquhar.**(44)**

When the first news of the occupation of Singapore arrived in London, and the Directors and the Cabinet learned that Raffles

**(40)** Egerton, "Raffles," 181-82.
**(42)** Ibid., 316-23.
**(43)** Egerton, "Raffles," 183.
had again involved them in a quarrel with Holland, they became thoroughly exasperated. On August 14, 1819, the Directors sent a despatch to Hastings denouncing Raffles and all his works. He was a mischievous agitator, always stirring up trouble with the Dutch, and they were inclined to consider his proceedings at Singapore an unjust violation of Holland's claims to the island. Before retaining or relinquishing Singapore however the Directors would await further explanations from Lord Hastings. (42)

Ominous as this despatch appeared, it granted the one thing which Singapore required, Time. To preserve good relations with Holland the Directors and the Cabinet might quite probably have given up an island whose commercial value was uncertain, even though they had an incontestable legal claim to it. But, as events were to show, when Singapore proved that it was the long-sought trading-centre for the East Indian Islands, they refused to surrender it. The one danger had been that in the first flush of their exasperation the Directors might have ordered it to be handed over to the Dutch. That peril had been avoided and Singapore was given the opportunity to show its worth.

From the beginning Raffles foresaw the great future of Singapore, and his letters to the Supreme Government and to his friends are an almost uncannily accurate forecast of its subsequent history. With an excellent harbour, and easily defensible, the island commanded the Southern entrance to the Straits of Malacca. In the event of war it would no longer be possible for Holland to close the Straits and so destroy the trade to China. As a trading-centre the situation was preferable even to that of Rhoio, since it was closer to the trade route through the Straits. "Our China trade....and every native vessel that sails through the Straits....must pass in sight of it." Henceforth British merchantmen would be independent of Malacca for obtaining shelter and refitting. Raffles also foresaw that a very large trade would be built up with the Malay Peninsula, Siam, Indo-China, and China. Most important of all however, Britain had at last secured a position which would give her a large share in the commerce of the East Indian Islands. Summing up the vast significance of his move in one sentence, Raffles wrote:—

"Whether we may have the power hereafter of extending our stations, or be compelled to confine ourselves to this factory, the spell is broken, and one independent post under our flag may be sufficient to prevent the recurrence of the system of exclusive monopoly which the Dutch once exercised in these seas and would willingly re-establish."

So long as Singapore remained free from all customs and port dues, it "must eventually destroy the spell of Dutch monopoly." (43)


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From the very beginning, Singapore amply justified Raffles' confidence. One of his first actions after the occupation of the island was to order that commerce should be free from all customs dues.\(^{(47)}\) As a result of this, and of the great affection which the natives had for Sir Stamford, the population and trade increased at a phenomenal rate. As soon as the news of Raffles' action reached Malacca, there was a veritable exodus of Malays to Singapore, despite the frenzied efforts of the Dutch to prevent it.\(^{(48)}\) Besides the Malays, there soon arrived English and Scotch merchants, Bugis traders from Celebes, and the ubiquitous Chinese. By June 1819 the population already exceeded 5000, and by August 1820 it numbered between 10,000 and 12,000, the majority being Chinese.\(^{(49)}\)

The growth of trade was even more remarkable. On April 3, 1820 Raffles wrote that the imports and exports on native craft alone exceeded $4,000,000 a year.\(^{(50)}\) By the end of 1820 the Resident Farquhar reported that Singapore's trade "already far exceeds what Malacca could boast of during the most flourishing years of its long continuance in our possession."\(^{(51)}\) Early in 1821, the value of the imports and exports for the preceding two years was $8,600,000. Of this $5,000,000, were carried by native ships from China, Siam, and East Indian Islands. By 1822 the value of the imports and exports was $8,568,151, and in 1823 it leaped to $13,266,397.\(^{(52)}\) A third and most convincing argument for the retention of Singapore was the small cost of its administration. It amounted to only £12,000 to £14,000 a year, while the annual expense of Bencoolen was almost £100,000. Moreover by August 1820 the total cost of the administration was paid for by the revenue raised at Singapore.\(^{(53)}\)

The argument of phenomenal success, joined to the unwearied efforts of Raffles and his friends in England, finally won the day, and by the autumn of 1822 it was known that Singapore would not be surrendered.\(^{(54)}\) After years of failure, Raffles had at last achieved a success which more than compensated for his previous failures.

In 1822-23 Raffles came to Singapore for the second time. His duties as Governor of Bencoolen prevented him from visiting it more frequently, and the administration had been in the hands of the Resident Farquhar, under Sir Stamford's general super-

\(^{(47)}\) Buckley, "Singapore," I, 41-44.
\(^{(49)}\) Lady Raffles, "Memoir," 465.
\(^{(50)}\) Ibid., 444-45.
\(^{(51)}\) Boulger, "Raffles," 338.
\(^{(52)}\) Raffles, "Statement of Services," 56.

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intendence. His service in the East was now drawing to a close: the climate of Bencoolen had wrought havoc with his health, and he had decided to return to England by 1824 at the latest.\(^{55}\) Before leaving however he wished to carry out many measures necessary for Singapore's prosperity. The amount of work which he accomplished in 1822-23 was as varied as it was colossal. Among the more important items were town-planning, drawing up rules for freedom of trade, regulations for police and general security, the institution of a magistracy, and the formation of a code of law.\(^{56}\)

The most serious problem with which he had to deal was the prevailing lawlessness. The situation was much the same as that which had existed at Penang from 1786 to 1807. There were only a few officials and a mere handful of police to maintain order amongst a population composed of half the races of Eastern Asia. Moreover no courts or code of laws had been legally established. There were many murders, and robberies were constantly committed in broad daylight. In most cases the offenders were never punished.\(^{57}\)

Raffles therefore by Regulation III of 1823 appointed twelve Magistrates who were to be nominated yearly by the Resident from among the principal British merchants. They were to try minor civil and criminal cases under the general supervision of the Resident; but this court was never actually constituted by Raffles.\(^{58}\) The code of law which he drew up was based to some extent on the principles and forms of English law; but he directed that as far as possible regard should be paid to native customs, especially in matters of religion, marriage, and inheritance. Raffles' regulations were very general in form, and left large discretionary powers to his Magistrates. They were to decide cases in accordance with their common-sense, combining with it the principles of English and native law as far as they were applicable. The legality of these regulations was later successfully challenged by Crawford, Raffles' successor; although Sir Stamford himself does not appear to have realized that he was exceeding his powers.\(^{59}\) It is clear however that whether legal or no, some code of this sort was necessary to serve as a stop-gap until such time as the Company should provide a substitute.

In June 1823 Raffles left Singapore for the last time, and returned to England. He was now, as he described himself, "a little old man, all yellow and shrivelled, with his hair pretty well

\(^{55}\) Ibid., 284-86, 330.
\(^{58}\) Egerton, "Raffles," 220: Buckley, "Singapore," I, 97:

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blanched." Three years later, in July 1826, he was dead. The harsh treatment of the East India Company after his retirement had proved too great a shock for his enfeebled constitution, undermined by twenty years in the East.(60) He was buried in a nameless grave, of which the very site remained for many years unknown. The city which he founded is his truest memorial, and it is peculiarly fitting that his statue at Singapore should bear the inscription:—

"Si monumentum quaeris, circumspice."

After Raffles' departure Singapore was removed from the control of Bencoolen and made a dependency of the Supreme Government.(61) The new Resident, who held office from 1823 to 1826, was John Crawfurd. He was one of the most famous Malayan scholars of his day, an able administrator, and a fair diplomatist. Formerly a member of the Bengal Medical Service, he had spent three years at Penang as a surgeon, and had then been one of Raffles' assistants in Java. In 1823 he had recently returned from an abortive embassy to Siam and Cochin-China. As Resident of Singapore he showed himself to be a very painstaking and capable official, and worked hard to promote its interests in every way. He fostered agriculture, combatted piracy so far as his scanty means allowed, and grappled with the prevailing lawlessness which arose from the absence of legally constituted courts. With all his good qualities Crawfurd was not popular. He lacked the easy manners and courteous demeanour which had made Raffles and Farquhar so well-liked by both Europeans and natives, and he was frugal to the point of parsimony. There is an amusing story told of him that on the occasion of a banquet given by him to celebrate the anniversary of the foundation of Singapore, the party broke up at ten because the Resident's scanty stock of wine was exhausted. Furthermore, so far as one can judge from his writings and actions, he was obstinate and dogmatic, and impervious to argument once he had made up his mind. Abdullah the Munshi, no mean judge of character wrote of him:

"He was impatient, and of a quick temper; but in what he was engaged he did slowly and not immediately. Further, it could be perceived that he was a man of good parts, clever and profound. Yet it was equally true that he was much bent down by a love for the goods of this world. His hand was not an open one, though he had no small opinion of himself. Further, his impatience prevented him from listening to long complaints... As sure as there was a plaint, he would cut it short in the middle. On this account I have heard that most people murmured and were dissatisfied, feel-

(60) Egerton, "Raffles," 250-62.
ing that they could not accept his decision with good will, but by force only.” (62)

The two most important questions with which Crawfurd had to deal were the negotiations for the cession of the whole island of Singapore, and the problem of maintaining law and order. Raffles’ treaty of 1819 as Crawfurd pointed out, “amounted to little more than a permission for the formation of a British factory. . . . There was in reality no territorial cession giving a legal right of legislation. The only law which could have existed was the Malay code. The native chief was considered to be the proprietor of the land, even within the bounds of the British factory.” (63) The cession of the island was thus necessary before the Company could legally set up courts of law. Furthermore, the Sultan and Temenggong had taken advantage of the form of the treaty to levy exactions upon native crafts coming to Singapore, on the ground that it was a Malay port subject to their laws. Many of their followers were notorious evil-doers, but it was almost impossible to punish them for their frequent crimes owing to the protection given them by the two Malay rulers. The Sultan and Temenggong also took some part in the government and in the administration of justice, a rôle for which they were quite unfitted by their character and ability. (64)

To deal with this situation Raffles had made a Convention with the Sultan and Temenggong on June 7, 1823. The Sultan was to receive $1500 and Temenggong $800 a month for life. In return they gave up all right to levy dues upon native trade and to act as judges, although they were still entitled to a seat when they chose to attend. English law was henceforth to be enforced “with due consideration to the usages and habits of the people,” special respect being paid to Malay law in cases involving religion, marriage and inheritance, when it was not contrary to “reason, humanity and justice.” Finally, the whole island of Singapore and the adjacent islets were declared to be “at the entire disposal of the British Government,” with the exception of land occupied by the Sultan and Temenggong. (65)

Although this Convention abolished many of the unsatisfactory conditions arising from the treaty of 1819, it did not entirely meet the needs of the case. In the opinion of the Advocate General of Bengal, it failed to give an “absolute cession

(62) "Hikmat Abdullah," trans. Thomson, 208. Buckley, "Singapore" 1, 140-41, 155. Other parts of Crawfurd’s career are dealt with in the chapters on Anglo-Siamese Relations, Trade and Agriculture, the Civil Service and the Transfer.
(63) Crawfurd, "Embassy to Siam," 566.
(65) B. Pol. Range, 123, Vol. 59: March 5, 1824, No. 52.
of the Right of Sovereignty," although there was "a near approach to it." (66) Crawford also pointed this out to the Supreme Government on January 10, 1824, and asked for permission to conclude a treaty which should place British sovereignty at Singapore beyond dispute. (67) On March 5, 1824 he received the required authorization. (68)

As he had anticipated, he found "considerable difficulty" in carrying out his orders. Owing to the remarkable development of Singapore the two Malay chiefs had prospered beyond their widest dreams. They fully realised the advantage of their position, and were determined to make as much as possible out of the surrender of their rights. Hence the Company was compelled to pay them far larger pensions than if the whole island of Singapore had been ceded in 1819. (69)

Crawford's Treaty with the Sultan and Temenggong was signed on August 2, 1824. The island of Singapore "together with the adjacent seas, straits and islets" lying within a radius of ten miles were ceded "in full sovereignty and property" to the East India Company, its heirs and successors forever. By Article VIII the Malay chiefs promised that as long as they continued to draw their pensions they would not form an alliance or correspond with any foreign power whatever, without the knowledge and consent of the British. Article IX guaranteed the chiefs a "personal asylum and protection" at Singapore or Penang should they ever be compelled to flee from their own territories; but Article X made it clear that there was to be no offensive and defensive alliance between the Company and the ruler of Johore. By this section it was mutually agreed that neither party should be bound to interfere in the internal affairs of the other, or in any political dissensions or wars which might arise, or "to support each other by force of arms against any third party whatsoever." By Articles XI and XII the chiefs promised to do their best to suppress piracy in Johore and the Straits of Malacca, to "maintain a free and unshackled trade" in their dominions, and to admit British commerce on the terms of the most favoured nation.

In return the Company promised to pay to the Sultan $33,200 and a pension for life of $1,300 a month; while the Temenggong was to receive $26,800 and $700 a month for life. The two chiefs were to be treated "with all the honours, respect and courtesy belonging to their rank and station, whenever they may reside at or visit the Island of Singapore." By Articles VI and VII the Company agreed to pay the Sultan or his heirs $20,000 and the Temenggong or his successors $15,000 for all their lands and houses at Singapore, should they at any time prefer to leave it and live in

(66) Ibid., No. 15.
(68) Ibid., 167.
(69) Ibid., 160-63, 167.

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some part of Johore. By Article XIV all previous Treaties and Conventions were annulled, except insofar as they conferred on the Company any right or title to the possession of Singapore and the adjacent islands. (70)

Crawfurd’s despatch of August 3, 1824, had several important comments on this treaty. (71) In it he explained that the reason for the apparently unimportant cession of the islets near Singapore, was that they were absolutely necessary for the defence of the town, and “towards our safety from the piratical hordes that surround us, against whose incursions and depredations there would be no indemnity if we were not in the occupation of the numerous islets which lie upon the immediate coast of the principal Settlement.” Piratical praus were in the habit of lurking behind these islands, and capturing native traders almost within sight of the harbour.

With regard to Articles VIII, IX and X, Crawfurd wrote that the Malay rulers were quite willing to bind themselves not to have relations with any other power. “Their evident desire throughout was to persuade the Company to form an offensive and defensive alliance with them. Crawfurd took great pains to word the treaty in such a way as to make it clear that the Company had not in any way undertaken to assist them in their wars. There was especial need for caution at this time, since the Temenggong was involved in hostilities with the Raja Muda of Rhio and the Dutch, who were trying to seize the Carimun Islands and the present state of Johore on the plea that they belonged to Sultan Abdulrahman. (72)

Crawfurd had a very low opinion of both Hussein and the Temenggong and expressed in this despatch a fervent wish that they and their disreputable followers would leave Singapore. Of this he had little hope, since they thoroughly appreciated the “repose and security which they at present enjoy.” The unequivocal cession of sovereignty however had greatly simplified the problem of dealing with them; henceforth their followers would be as completely amenable to the laws as the rest of the population.

With the ratification of Crawfurd’s treaty by the Supreme Government on March 4, 1825, the final seal of approval was set upon the Company’s possession of Singapore. This was however merely a formality, since it has been shown above that as early as 1822 it had been decided to retain the island and in the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of March 1824 Holland had already withdrawn her objections to the British occupation. (73)

The second important problem with which Crawfurd had to deal was the absence of any legally constituted courts at Singapore.

(72) V, Chapter on Treaty of 1824.
(73) Ibid.,

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For two reasons the Company was unable to create them. In the first place it did not obtain the rights of sovereignty over the island until the Treaty of August 2, 1824, although in the opinion of the Advocate-General of Bengal Raffles' Convention of 1823 was "a near approach to it," so that henceforth English law could "be made to operate with effect and without injustice." (74) Even after this obstacle was removed however there remained the difficulty that the cession of Singapore had not been ratified by Parliament. This was not done until 1826, and hence it was only in 1827 that the Directors were able to establish courts of law in the settlement. (75)

In an important trading-centre it was of course necessary that some form of law should be administered unless trade were to be hopelessly strangled; and the Resident was therefore compelled to assume an authority which by law he did not possess. (76) Every decision given by him or his subordinates was technically illegal, and he was open to prosecution in the Indian courts by anyone on whom he had inflicted a penalty. Granted the justice of his decisions, there seems no doubt that in such a case the Government would have protected him by an Act of Indemnity; but to a man of Crawford's cautious disposition the situation was intolerable.

Soon after his arrival he consulted the Recorder of Penang on the legality of Raffles' Regulations. The judge's opinion confirmed Crawford's suspicions as to their illegality and to rid himself of part of his responsibility he abolished the office of magistrate created by Raffles. Since it was plainly necessary that some kind of tribunal should exist, Crawfurd substituted for Raffles' judiciary a Court of Requests, or small debts court, presided over by his Assistant, and the Resident's Court. This, the principal court of Singapore, decided all civil and criminal cases "on the general principles of English law," so far as local conditions and the "character and manners of the different classes of inhabitants" permitted. Crawfurd and his Assistant acted joint judges. (77) Trial by jury did not yet exist at Singapore, and the procedure was very summary. The penalties inflicted were light fines or floggings, or imprisonment up to six months. The only penalty for a conviction for murder or piracy was indefinite imprisonment. From this it would appear that while the form of the courts differed from that institute by Raffles, the law administered in them was much the same as that which he had prescribed.

As at Penang the Europeans were the most difficult class of the population to control, since they were aware of the legal weakness of the Resident's position, and the more turbulent took full advantage of it. In Crawford's despatch to the Supreme Govern-

(74) P. Pol. Range, 123, Vol. 59: March 5, 1824, No. 14 and 15.
(75) Ibid., No. 15, Ibid., Vol. 65, May 21, 1824 No. 37.
(76) Ibid. Crawfurd "Embassy to Siam." 557.

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ment of July 1, 1823, he wrote that they were "at present amenable to no authority at this place and the ill-disposed had it always in their power to set the authority of Government at defiance, and to render themselves a bane to the peaceful inhabitants. There exists no means whatever in civil cases of affording the natives any redress against them, nor in criminal cases any remedy short of sending them for trial before the Supreme Court of Calcutta."(78) The harassed Resident received little help from the Government of India. All that it could do was to advise him to make the natives pay their debts by selling their property or by occasionally imprisoning them. Europeans however, he was recommended only to banish from Singapore.(79)

Conditions remained substantially unaltered until the establishment of the Recorder's Court in 1827, although Crawfurd contrived to make the administration of justice more effective after the cession of Singapore by his treaty of 1824. The police force, maintained by voluntary contributions from the principal European and native inhabitants, became very efficient. About 1826 the leading merchants as well as the government officials were appointed Justices of the Peace, with power to try civil and criminal cases.(80)

On March 20, 1827, the long-sought charter of justice arrived and the courts existing at Singapore were abolished. The charter was "in all essential respects" similar to that of 1807, and merely extended the jurisdiction of the Recorder's Court of Penang to Malacca, Singapore, and all present or future dependencies of the Straits Government. The court could hear civil, criminal and ecclesiastical cases, but by some unaccountable omission it did not possess Admiralty jurisdiction. Until this was granted in 1837, all captured pirates had to be sent to Calcutta for trial, with the result that often they were not tried at all. The Recorder's Court was peripatetic, two sessions of Oyer and Terminer and Gaol Delivery, and two sessions of the peace being held in each of the three settlements every year. In the intervals the Resident Councillor of each settlement tried civil and minor criminal cases. The judges of the Court were three in number: the Recorder, a barrister appointed by the Crown, the Governor of the Straits Settlements, and the Resident Councillor of the town where the assize was being held. Only one of the three was a professional lawyer, and the two officials took precedence in rank over the Recorder. In each settlement there was also a Court of Requests, or small debts court, presided over by civil servants entitled Commissioners. The Justices of the Peace continued to exist. They were nominated

(79) Ibid., 165.
(80) Crawfurd ""Embassy to Siam."" 558.
by the Recorder's Court, largely from the principal European inhabitants, and tried minor offences. (*)

A few months before the arrival of the charter Crawfurd was transferred to Rangoon. With his departure in 1826 the history of Singapore as a dependency of the Supreme Government came to an end, and it entered upon a new phase of its existence as part of the Penang Presidency. Only seven years after its foundation it was already clear that the island was rapidly becoming the principal British port in the Eastern Seas; and more and more the history of the Straits Settlements tended to become the story of the expansion of Singapore.

CHAPTER IV.

The Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824.

In the history of British Malaya few events have been of more momentous importance than the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1824, and few have been decided with so little attention to the importance of the local interests involved. By this treaty the British Cabinet completed the work begun at the Congress of Vienna, and by further cessions of territory made it impossible to build up another British Empire in the East Indian Islands.

The reason for this policy was largely the same as that which had dictated the retrocession of the Dutch possessions in the Archipelago in 1815. The Cabinet wished to make sure of Holland's friendship and support in Europe. Ministers failed to realize the value of the territories which they surrendered; and in any case they considered the loss was well repaid by the strengthening of good relations with Holland. Conditions had somewhat changed since 1815; the danger to be apprehended was not so much a fresh outbreak of "Revolutionary Madness" in France as the Holy Alliance. The policy of the French Government was becoming increasingly reactionary, and by 1824 it was a fully accredited member of the Holy Alliance. During the last years of Castlereagh's life Britain had been steadily drawing away from her late allies, and at the Congress of Verona in 1822 the breach had become irrevocable. The events of the next few years served to show the complete divergence between the policy of Britain and that of the great European monarchies.\(^1\)

Under these circumstances, the Cabinet was very anxious that the friendship of Holland should be assured. However cordial the relations between the two governments might be in Europe, there was continual friction between their agents in the East, and there was always a danger that this might estrange the two powers in Europe. The foundation of Singapore for example had greatly angered the Dutch, and Raffles' whole career in 1818-19 had on several occasions threatened to cause trouble with Holland. British hostility to the Dutch in Asia was a traditional policy, dating from the seventeenth century. Originating in the high-handed actions of the Dutch Company to secure control of the trade of the Archipelago, it had been kept alive by the commercial rivalry of the two great Companies wherever they came into contact, as in


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Sumatra. The records of Bencoolen and of the Dutch factories in Sumatra, for example, are full of charges and countercharges of intrigues, plots, violence, etc. (2) With the restoration of the Dutch East Indian Empire in 1816, and the monopolistic policy which Holland immediately reintroduced, the dormant antagonism at once sprang again into life. Almost every reference to the Dutch in the records of the Penang Presidency for the years 1818-24 shows that the Council regarded them with inveterate suspicion and hostility. The British Government decided to try and put an end to the constant friction in the East by settling all matters in dispute, and by dividing the Dutch and English spheres of influence, so that their agents would no longer come into contact. Negotiations were begun about the end of 1819, and although interrupted in 1820 by necessary reference to the East Indies they were resumed and successfully concluded in 1824. (3)

The treaty was signed in London on March 17, 1824, and was accompanied by an exchange of Notes, in order to define more clearly certain Articles. (4) The territorial provisions were contained in Articles VIII to XV. Holland ceded to Britain all her factories in India, and "renounced all privileges and exemptions enjoyed or claimed in virtue of" them. In the Malay Peninsula she withdrew her objections to the occupation of Singapore, ceded to Britain the "town and fort of Malacca, and all its dependencies," and engaged "never to form any establishment or any part of the Peninsula of Malacca (the Malay Peninsula) or to conclude any treaty with any native Prince, Chief, or State therein." For their part the British ceded to Holland Bencoolen and all the Company's possessions in Sumatra, and promised that "no British settlement shall be formed on that island, nor any Treaty concluded by British authority with any native Prince, Chief, or State therein." They also engaged that they would neither make settlements nor treaties in the Cerrion Islands (a small group to the South Westward of Singapore), the Rhio-Lingga Archipelago, "or on any other islands south of the Straits of Singapore." All ceded territories were to be handed over on March 8, 1825; and their inhabitants were to be allowed six years to dispose of their property and go wherever they chose "without let or hindrance." Article XV contained a stipulation which in later years became one of the main causes of the Malacca land problem. It provided that none of the ceded territories should be "at any time transferred to any other Power. In case of the said Possessions being abandoned by one of the present Contracting Parties, the right of occupation thereof shall immediately pass to the other." Article VI engaged that British and Dutch officials in the East should be ordered "not to form any new settlement on any of the islands in the Eastern Seas without previous authority from

their respective governments in Europe." The principle underlying these provisions was that the British and Dutch spheres of influence should be separated by the cession of all territory lying within one another's spheres, and that by a mutual self-denying ordinance neither power should interfere in the area of the other. The British Cabinet hoped by this means to avoid disputes such as those for example which had arisen in 1818-19 because of the conflicting claims of Raffles and the Dutch in Sumatra.

The Treaty also attempted to settle the commercial rivalry. The general principle underlying these Articles was that while the right of Holland to control in her own interests the trade within her sphere was fully recognised, she agreed to make no attempt to monopolise the commerce of the Archipelago. She also promised never to discriminate unfairly against British trade as she had often done in the past. The two powers mutually agreed to grant each other "most favoured nation" treatment in India, Ceylon, and the Archipelago, and laid down general rules as to the amount of duty to be charged. Article III was aimed at a very common manoeuvre of both countries in hampering one another's trade. "No treaty hereafter made by either with any native power in the Eastern Seas shall contain any article tending either expressly or by the imposition of unequal duties to exclude the trade of the other party from the ports of such native power; and that if in any treaty now existing on either part any article to that effect has been admitted such article shall be abrogated upon the conclusion of the present treaty." By Article IV both powers promised that they would in no case "impede a free communication of the natives in the Eastern Archipelago with the ports of the two governments respectively, or of the subjects of the two governments with the ports belonging to native powers." By Article VII the Moluccas were expressly excluded from these provisions, and Great Britain recognised the Dutch right to retain the monopoly of the trade with the Spice Islands. This concession was of far less importance than it would have been two centuries earlier, because the value of the spice trade with Europe was much less than it had been in the seventeenth century. The British Note accompanying the treaty contained a clear declaration of a very important principle, for it recorded "the solemn disavowal on the part of the Netherlands Government, of any design to aim either at political supremacy or at commercial monopoly in the Eastern Archipelago."

The third subject dealt with by the Treaty was Piracy. By Article V the two powers bound themselves "to concur effectually in repressing it." As will appear this agreement was more honoured in the breach than in the observance.

In the Notes which accompanied the Treaty the British and Dutch plenipotentiaries indulged in the pious hope that thenceforward there would be the most cordial friendship and cooperation between the two powers in the East. This expectation was pre-
mature by at least a generation. Traditional hatreds die hard, and no one can read the despatches of Straits officials, and especially the Singapore newspapers, without realising how strong was the dislike of the Dutch. The separation of the Dutch and British spheres however prevented the rise of territorial disputes, and thus one great cause of friction was removed. The Dutch commercial regulations however remained for many years a very sore point with both officials and civilians in the Straits Settlements. The British contention was that the Dutch evaded the articles of the Treaty, and hampered British trade with the Archipelago wherever possible; The Dutch on the other hand denied the charge, and declared that the complaints were entirely unjust. A long and at times acrimonious correspondence ensued, and continued with intervals for over twenty-five years. No attempt is made to deal with it here, for to establish the rights and wrongs of the case would require a volume as long as the present. Moreover it was not merely the trade of Singapore which suffered, and the inquiry would resolve itself into the history of the whole of British commerce with the East Indian Islands. All that can be said is that the despatches on the subject scattered through the Bengal Records seem on the whole to make out a fairly strong "prima facie" case for the British charges. Rightly or wrongly, belief in Dutch duplicity and dishonesty seems to have been a cardinal article of faith with every British merchant in the Straits. (*)

The commercial value of the Treaty to British commerce is uncertain; but on considering the relative value of the territorial cessions one returns to solid ground. Regarded purely from the point of view of British interests in the East Indian Islands, there is no doubt that Britain surrendered far more than she retained. The retrocession of territory in 1815 had deprived her of the chance of building up in the Archipelago an empire which in wealth would have been a worthy second to India. There still remained however Sumatra, whose great latent resources were pointed out to the government by Raffles. (*) Furthermore many other islands in the Archipelago were as yet unoccupied by the Dutch. Great Britain had still the opportunity to form a very large Malayan empire.


This has no pretensions to being an exhaustive list of references to a subject which, as said above, it has not been attempted to investigate thoroughly; it merely indicates some of the sources from which material can be obtained.

(6) Egerton, "Raffles," 146-70.

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valuable as British Malaya has become, a more aggressive policy in 1824 would have secured an East Indian empire of far greater importance. The opportunity was thrown away, and it has never returned.

Regarding the British policy from the wider point of view, there is much to be said for it. It was important to retain the friendship of Holland, and a policy of territorial expansion in the East Indian Islands might well have alienated it. Furthermore, there was a somewhat vague but by no means negligible danger that a more grasping policy would eventually have provoked dangerous jealousy on the part of the other Great Powers. Great Britain could not pursue an indiscriminate Forward Policy and run the risk of uniting the world against her.

Furthermore, the Treaty proved to be of service to Britain fifty years later. By the withdrawal of Holland from the Malay Peninsula, Great Britain found herself quite unhampered by rival European claims when, after the Treaty of Pangkor in 1874, she at last began to bring the Malay States under her control. Even if Holland had not ceded all her rights it is improbable that in the intervening half-century the whole Peninsula would have become a Dutch colony, considering her limited resources, and the extent of her commitments elsewhere in the East Indies. Having regard however to the usual Dutch policy of establishing their suzerainty over the native rulers, there seems little doubt that the same course would have been followed in the Peninsula. This indeed as will be seen, had already been done in Perak, and a few states of the Negri Sembilan. Rash though it may be to prophesy, it seems that had it not been for the Treaty of 1824 part of the Malay Peninsula would to-day be a Dutch colony.

The Dutch sphere in the Malay Peninsula in 1824 was confined to the Negri Sembilan, Selangor and Perak. Malacca was still, as it had been since 1641, their capital in the Malay Peninsula, but it had sadly fallen away from its ancient glory. Owing to the sitting-up of the harbour and other causes, its trade had gradually declined, although there was a temporary revival from about 1779 to 1795. Its commerce suffered very severely from the foundation of Penang, and from the deliberate attempt made by the East India Company to ruin it after the British conquest of 1795. Malacca remained fairly prosperous however until 1819. The foundation of Singapore gave Malacca its death-blow, and by 1824 it retained only a fraction of its former commerce. (1) Furthermore the former strategic value of Malacca was almost nullified. It could no longer dominate the sea-route through the Straits of Malacca, since both entrances were now commanded by Penang and Singapore. It is significant that Holland regarded the moribund station of Benecolen

(1) Swettenham "British Malaya," 18-10, v. Chapter on Trade and Agriculture.

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as a fair exchange for Malacca and the few hundred square miles of territory known as the Malacca Territory, which surrounded it. The inheritance of the East India Company was a decayed port, a chronic deficit, a costly native war, and a land problem which defied solution for over forty years.

The Dutch trade with the Peninsula consisted mainly in tin, and the constant object of their policy was to secure a monopoly of the output. Although the quantity of tin produced was far less than in the later nineteenth century, it was of considerable importance, the largest mines being in Perak. (8) Dutch connection with Perak dated from about 1648, when they obtained from Achin, of which Perak was then a dependency, a treaty giving them the monopoly of the tin-output. The Malays of Perak refused to submit, and it was only after a generation of desultory warfare that they agreed to the Dutch monopoly in 1681. On several subsequent occasions the Malays made further vain attempts to expel the Dutch. On the conquest of Malacca in 1795 the Dutch fort in Perak surrendered to the British. (9)

The East India Company did not seek to continue the Dutch monopoly, and until 1818 Perak remained free from European control. A trade in tin grew up with Penang. On the restoration of Malacca to Holland in 1818, Timmerman Thyssen the Governor sent a mission to Perak to renew the former treaty. The Sultan refused, although far too weak to resist a Dutch attack. No attempt was made to overcome his reluctance, probably because the Government at Batavia knew that the exchange of Malacca for Bencoolen was already in contemplation. (10)

Selangor was also under Dutch control. It had been colonised about 1718 by Bugis pirates from Celebes, who established themselves along the coast and rivers. Making Selangor their base of operations they raidied the whole West coast of the Peninsula, and the state bore a very bad reputation for piracy. In 1783 the Bugis of Rio and Selangor made an abortive attack on Malacca, but were badly defeated. As a result, in 1786 the Dutch compelled Sultan Ibrahim of Selangor to sign a treaty which acknowledged Dutch suzerainty, gave them a monopoly of the tin, and undertook to expel all other Europeans from Selangor. (11)

On the capture of Malacca in 1795 the Company allowed this treaty to lapse, and until 1818 Selangor was entirely independent. In 1819 Governor Thyssen of Malacca compelled the Sultan to sign

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(8) J. R. A. S., 8 B., LXVI., 64-65, Müller.

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a treaty which was practically the same as that of 1786. Sultan Ibrahim of Selangor was now an old man but his hatred of the Dutch was as bitter as ever. He also cherished a very great liking for the British, and before accepting the Dutch demands he made a vain attempt to secure the Company’s assistance against them. The Batavian Government however refused to ratify the treaty, for the same reason probably as in the case of Perak. Selangor was therefore allowed to declare itself independent.¹²

Dutch suzerainty also existed over some of the petty states of the Negri Sembilan, although there is some doubt as to the exact number of principalities affected, and the extent of their subjection. The Negri Sembilan (literally, the Nine States), formed part of the Empire of Johore, and was colonised in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries by Malays from Menangkabau in Sumatra. The immigration seems to have been peaceful, the newcomers intermarrying to some extent with the wandering tribes of aborigines who then inhabited the country, instead of exterminating or expelling them after the usual Malay practice. By successive waves of immigration a number of petty principalities arose. During the first half of the eighteenth century the power of the Emperors of Johore steadily decayed, and their control over the Negri Sembilan appears to have been little more than nominal. They were therefore quite willing to grant titles and concessions to any chiefs who would acknowledge their supremacy. In this way the petty rulers obtained from the Emperors of Johore the recognition of their hereditary rights as Rajas of their respective states, and the insignia of their rank. The Emperors could not however confer any real power, and there were constant wars between the newly created dignitaries and rival claimants to their rank. Although Negri Sembilan means literally Nine States, the number of principalities varied at different times. Moreover there was no real confederacy, but merely a congeries of small chiefdoms.¹³

The overlordship of Johore grew steadily more nominal, and it is therefore not surprising that in 1757 the Emperor of Johore ceded to his allies the Dutch his unprofitable rights of suzerainty over Rembau. It is uncertain whether the grant referred to Rembau alone, or whether, and this is more probable, it also included Sungai Ujong and several other principalities.¹⁴

The Dutch, following their usual policy in the Malay Peninsula, never attempted to conquer the Negri Sembilan. Their object was tin, not territory. Controlling as they did the sea-coast and the river-mouths they were able to enforce their monopoly pretty effectually without incurring the expense of sending large forces into an unknown and almost pathless jungle, to carry on an endless

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¹² Ibid., S. S. R., 102.

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campaign with such experts at guerilla warfare as the Malays. Moreover, none of the petty rulers would gratuitously have offended the Netherlands Company. (15) Remban, being on the border of Malacca Territory, was perhaps more fully under Dutch control than the other states. In 1759 the Dutch made a treaty with Remban, by which the state gave the Netherlands Company a monopoly of its tin, and acknowledged itself to be a dependency of Malacca. (16) The Dutch appear also to have exercised the right to confirm the appointment of the nominal overlord of the Negri Sembilan, the Yamutan. (12)

During the British régime, from 1795 to 1818, no attempt was made to enforce the Dutch rights. In 1818 however Governor Thysen of Malacca renewed the Treaty of 1759 with Remban. Batavia refused to ratify the treaty, but retained "a sort of paramount power over its chiefs." (18) This vague suzerainty passed to the British in 1824.

In 1823 the Dutch attempted to bring under their control the part of the ancient Empire of Johore which now forms the modern state of that name. Holland's treaty of 1818 with Sultan Abdulrahman applied only to Rhio; but when Raffles produced Hussein as the lawful Sultan, the Dutch instigated Abdulrahman to wrest from Hussein the present state of Johore. This territory was the hereditary fief of the Temenggong of Johore, and he and Hussein appealed to Raffles for protection. This Sir Stamford was quite willing to grant, so far as he could without embroiling himself with Holland; and in February 1823 he allowed the Malay chiefs to hoist the British flag in Johore, in order to ward off any attack by Abdulrahman. His reasons were that the Temenggong's "hereditary and legal" right had never thither to been questioned, and that self-interest required it, as without the Hinterland of the Peninsula Singapore was valueless. (19) The Dutch protested strongly, and the Supreme Government ordered the flag to be removed, strongly censuring Raffles' conduct. (20) Crawford, who succeeded Raffles at Singapore in 1823, regarded Johore as entirely worthless, and after protracted discussions compelled Hussein and the Temenggong to remove the British flag. This they were most unwilling to do, and advanced the entirely untenable claim that the Treaty of 1819 ceding Singapore bound the Company to defend them. (21) This contention was entirely false, as Article II of the Treaty expressly declared that the British were not bound to inter-

(20) Ibid., No. 21 and No. 25 of May 21, 1824.
(21) Ibid., May 21, 1824 and No. 23.

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fere in the affairs of Johore. (22) Nothing however came of the Dutch manoeuvres, since by the Treaty of 1824 Continental Johore fell within the British sphere of influence.

Pahang, although nominally a part of Johore, does not appear ever to have been interfered with by the Dutch. (23) The Bendahara, the hereditary and practically independent official of the Sultan of Johore who governed Pahang, was the brother-in-law of Hussein, and at first supported him against Abdulrahman. Apparently realising the hopelessness of Hussein’s prospects, he seems to have given his allegiance to Abdulrahman about 1812. (24) No attempt was made to make the overlordship effectual, and until 1824 the Bendahara continued to be the nominal vassal of Sultan Abdulrahman. After this date the Dutch withdrew from all participation in the affairs of the Peninsula, and since unaided Sultan Abdulrahman was quite unable to assert his supremacy, the Bendaharas of Pahang gradually abandoned even their shadow of allegiance, and assumed the position of independent sovereigns. When the British finally intervened in the affairs of Pahang, they recognised the real situation by creating the Bendahara Sultan of Pahang. (25)

The inevitable result of the Treaty of 1824 was the dismemberment of the Empire of Johore, which was divided between Abdulrahman and Hussein. The former was known in the documents of the time as the Lingga or Rhio Sultan, because his capital was at Lingga, and he ruled over the island possessions of Johore, such as the Rhio-Lingga Archipelago, which lay within the Dutch sphere of influence. Hussein, from his residence at Singapore, was known as the Singapore Sultan. Nominally the overlord of Pahang and the present state of Johore, in point of fact he was practically an emperor without an empire, since the Temenggong and the Bendahara would not allow him to interfere with their rule. The Dutch supported their protege in enforcing his authority over his island possessions, but they were unable to give him any assistance in dealing with Pahang and Johore, which he was quite unable to subdue without their help. They also secured for him the Carimoon Islands, a group which occupied an important strategic position to the South-Westward of the Straits of Singapore. They were indisputably a possession of the Temenggong, the source indeed of much of his revenue; but they lay within the Dutch sphere, and were therefore claimed by Holland as part of Abdulrahman’s sultanate. Sultan Hussein refused to give them up, but in 1827 Hussein’s followers were attacked and expelled by Abdulrahman’s Malays with the assistance of a Dutch force. (26) The Penang officials maintained an attitude of strict

(23) J. B. A. S. S. B., LXVI., 74.
(25) Ibid., 60.

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neutrality, partly on the ground that the Treaty ceding Singapore did not require them to aid the Malay chiefs, and partly because of the Directors' orders. Just before the annexation a despatch from the Directors arrived which declared that the Dutch could do as they chose with the Carimons, since by the Treaty the islands had come within their sphere of influence, and that the Company must not interfere.\(^{(27)}\)

The Treaty of 1824 radically changed the Company's relations with Achin, as settled by Raffles' treaty of 1819. During the five years which had elapsed since his mission, conditions in Achin had grown steadily worse. The restored Sultan Alam Shah, never regained his authority, the central government had almost completely broken down, and the country was in a state of general anarchy. From the day of its signature Raffles' Treaty had been "a dead letter", since the Sultan was powerless to carry it into effect. The Company had not tried to enforce its rights, since to do so would have involved an expensive war, and the conquest of the whole country. Moreover, curiously enough, Penang's trade with Achin was more flourishing than ever before, since all the independent Rajas had thrown open their ports to British trade, whereas the policy of the Sultans had been to confine it to the capital, Achin.\(^{(28)}\)

Raffles' treaty was referred to in the Notes interchanged when the Treaty of 1824 was concluded, and was declared to be incompatible with it, as it was designed to exclude Dutch trade from Achin. It was therefore to be replaced by a "simple arrangement for the hospitable reception of British vessels and subjects." The Dutch promised to respect the independence of Achin.\(^{(29)}\)

The Directors fully approved of the proposed alterations, true to their usual policy of refusing to form alliances which might involve them in Malayan wars. In a despatch to the Supreme Government they remarked that even if the Anglo-Dutch Treaty had not affected Raffles' arrangement, alterations in it would have been necessary, since "we have never approved of an intimate connection with that state." Whether a "mere commercial arrangement" should be made with Achin was left to the discretion of the Indian Government.\(^{(29)}\) The Supreme Government forwarded the despatch to Penang, and left it to the discretion of the Council whether a "mere commercial arrangement" should be

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\(^{(30)}\) S. S. R., 100: Aug. 4, 1824.
made or not, it was also impressed upon Penang that "our political interests in connection with Acheen have now ceased." (31)

The Penang Council decided that a commercial treaty was unnecessary, since to negotiate it with the powerless central government would be labour wasted, and to do so with the independent Rajas was unnecessary, as they had shown their entire willingness to trade freely with the British. The only danger was from Holland, whose good faith the Council strongly suspected. They feared she would establish her influence in Acheen and "embarrass if not put an end to," British commerce there by imposing the Dutch tariff. They therefore recommended that a sharp watch be kept on her actions. (32)

The subsequent British policy towards Acheen followed Penang's recommendations: after 1824 all diplomatic and political relations with Acheen and the whole of Sumatra ceased, and the intercourse was purely commercial. (33) The only exception was that occasionally as in 1837 and 1844 British warships visited Acheen to punish piratical rajahs and exact compensation for injuries done to traders. (34)

On November 2, 1871, a Convention was concluded between Great Britain and Holland by which the Dutch were given a free hand in Acheen in exchange for their colonies on the West Coast of Africa. By the Treaty of 1824 Holland had agreed to respect the independence of Acheen; but by Article 1 of the Convention of 1871 the British Government promised to make no objections to the extension of the Dutch dominion in any part of Sumatra. The interests of British trade were safeguarded to some extent, for Article II stipulated that "in any native state of Sumatra that may hereafter become a Dutch dependency", British commerce should "enjoy all rights which are or may be granted to Dutch trade." But whereas hitherto British merchants had paid only the moderate Acheenese customs duties, they were henceforth to be subject to the much heavier Dutch dues. (35) Great Britain resigned valuable trading privileges, and threw away what faint chances still remained to her of ultimately securing Acheen. It will be remembered that British control of Acheen had been an essential part of Raffles' policy in 1819, since together with Penang it dominated the Northern entrance to the Straits of Malacca. The ultimate result of the Convention was that Great Britain became involved in the Ashanti War, while the Dutch entered light-heartedly upon a war for the conquest of Acheen which lasted over thirty-three years. (36)

(31) B. S. and P. 328: No. 1 of Jan. 28, 1825.
(32) S. S. R., 100: March 21, 1825.
(34) Ibid., 439, Despatches to Bengal and India, 19: Jan. 4, 1839.
(35) Altehson, "Treaties" 1, 440, 450-60.

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
CHAPTER V.

The Civil Service in the Straits Settlements, 1786-1867.

The subject of the present chapter is the Civil Service as it existed during the first eighty years of British rule in the Straits, the nature and powers of the personnel, the method of appointment and promotion, and the character of the training given to cadets. No attempt is made to deal with municipal government at Singapore, Penang and Malacca. Whether copies of the municipal records were ever sent home from the Straits is unknown. If so, they were apparently destroyed, and only a few scattered references to local government can now be found. (1)

The administrative history of the Straits Settlements falls into four distinct periods. From 1786 until 1805 Penang was a Residency subject to the control of the Governor of Bengal. In 1805 the Directors constituted it the Fourth or Eastern Presidency, on an equality with the Presidencies of Bengal, Madras, Bombay, and, like them, subject to the general control of the Governor-General of India. Until 1826 Singapore and Malacca were independent of Penang. During Raffles' term of office, from 1819 to 1823, Singapore was a dependency of Bencoolen; and from 1823 to 1826 it was under the direct control of the Governor-General of India.

Malacca was also a dependency of the Supreme Government from its cession in 1824 to 1826. In 1826 they were combined with Penang in a single Presidency, the headquarters of the government remaining at Prince of Wales Island. In 1830 the Eastern Presidency was abolished, and the Straits Settlements became a Residency under the control of the Governor and Council of Bengal. The capital of the Straits remained at Penang until 1832, when it was transferred to Singapore, as the most important of the three settlements. (2) No further change was made until 1851, when the Straits Settlements were removed from the supervision of Bengal to that of the Governor-General of India. (3)


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The powers hitherto exercised by Bengal were vested in the Governor of the Straits, but a study of the records seems to show that his authority remained substantially unaltered. The change was more nominal than real; British Malaya continued to be a Residency and nothing more. The difference was that instead of being a dependency of Bengal it was henceforth under the direct control of the Governor-General. The abolition of the East India Company in 1858 had no effect upon the form of administration in the Straits Settlements. They automatically passed under the control of the India Office, which replaced the Company, and remained subject to it until 1867, when they were transferred to the Colonial Office, and became a Crown Colony.

The staff at Penang during the first nineteen years of its history was exceedingly small. Captain Light, the founder of the settlement, was its first Resident. His appointment was contrary to the usual policy of the Company since he had been a merchant and not a member of the Indian Civil Service. He was selected because the island had been secured solely through his exertions, and his influence amongst the Malays made him uniquely fitted for the post. In some of the records he is referred to as the Superintendent, and in others as the Resident of Penang. He had only a single Assistant, although there were several minor members of the staff, a Storekeeper, a Beachmaster, a Writer, etc. The members of the administration formed part of the Bengal Civil Service. During this period the officials were allowed to engage in trade and both Light and his Assistant availed themselves of this permission. Captain Light frequently pointed out to the Bengal Government the undesirability of this arrangement, but said that much as he regretted it he was compelled to take advantage of it because his salary was insufficient to pay his expenses. He urged the Company to increase the salary of the Resident sufficiently to free him from this necessity, and to forbid its officials to trade. (1) No attention was paid to his requests however until shortly after his death in 1794, when the Resident's salary was doubled, and he was forbidden to trade. At the same time his title was changed to that of Superintendent, and two additional Assistants were appointed. (2) In 1798 the number of Assistants was reduced to two. (3) No further change appears to have been made until 1800, when the title of Superintendent was changed to Lieutenant-Governor, and a new post was created, that of Secretary to the Lieutenant-Governor. (4) At the same time the Lieutenant-Governor's powers were extended. (4) Sir George Leith, who was selected for the post, was not a member

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(2) Ibid., Wright & Reid, "Malay Peninsula,"—90. S. S. R., Vol. 1, and VI, Aug. 1, 1794.
(3) S. S. R., Vol. I.
(4) Ibid.

1825] Royal Asiatic Society.
of the Company's Civil Service. When the Directors were informed of these proceedings they approved of the administrative changes, but ordered the removal of Leith on this score. (9) He was succeeded in 1803 by Robert Farquhar, who later became Sir Robert Farquhar, the Governor of Mauritius. Farquhar was a Madras civil servant who had been employed in the Moluccas and in the abortive attempt to establish a factory on Balambangan. (10) It was probably his previous service in the Archipelago which gained for him the governorship of Penang.

Owing to the extravagant hopes which were entertained of the future of Penang, it was in 1805 elevated to the rank of a Presidency. It thereby ceased to be a dependency of Bengal and stood on an equality of rank with the three Indian Presidencies. Like them Penang was subject to the control of the Governor-General in Council or, to use the term so often applied to it in contemporary documents, the Supreme Government. Penang could not engage in war, or make treaties with the native states without the permission of the Supreme Government and had to send it regular reports of its proceedings. (11) Since the Directors hoped that Penang would become the greatest trading centre in the East Indies, they felt that the staff of the new Presidency should be worthy of its future greatness. Accordingly, in place of the Lieutenant-Governor and three Assistants there arrived at Penang some fifty or sixty officials. There was a Governor, with three Resident Councillors to assist him, the Colonel commanding the garrison, a chaplain, Secretaries, Accountants, and a host of other Covenanted Civil Servants from India. There were between thirty and forty Uncovenanted civil servants to fill the minor posts. The salaries of the twenty or twenty-five Covenanted officials amounted to about £42,700. (12) With the additions which were from time to time made to it, this sum went far to explain why the annual account of revenue and expenditure always showed a large and increasing deficit, amounting on the average to £81,448 a year. (13)

The Covenanted Civil Servants were most of them members of the Bengal service, although a few came from Madras, and two from Bombay. They were forbidden to trade, or, if they bought spice plantations (as at first they were encouraged to do) to sell the produce for export. The prohibition against trade was always strictly enforced in the Straits Settlements, and about 1840 the Indian Government also forbade its officials to own plantations. (14)

(9) S. S. R., Vol. I.
(10) J. I. A., V, 400.
(11) Vincent Smith, "India," 521.

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Since the Directors' hopes never materialised the number of officials was much larger than the needs of the island required. Raffles, who was himself a member of the Penang establishment from 1805 to 1811, was strongly of this opinion. He urged the Government of India to abolish the Presidency and reduce the island to the rank of a Residency with a reduced staff of officials. (15) By 1816 the Directors admitted the failure of their expectations, and ordered that the expenditure at Penang be reduced. (16) The Council promised to comply, but by 1829 expenses were as great as they had ever been. (17) The records of the intervening years are an endless series of expostulations and excuses, the Directors and the Supreme Government urging economy, and the Penang Council explaining how hard it was trying, and why it never succeeded. (18)

During this period only two events of importance occurred, the incorporation in the Penang Civil Service of the Bencoolen staff in 1824, and the union of the three Straits Settlements in 1826. When the Company's factory of Bencoolen was ceded to Holland by the Treaty of 1824, it became necessary to provide for the officials who thus lost their employment. Of the Covenanted Civil Servants, those who were members of the Bengal service returned to their Presidency, the remainder were incorporated in the Penang service according to their rank. This was determined by their length of service. It thus happened that some of the Company's officials who had already spent several years in the Straits suddenly saw their prospects of promotion deferred, because they were inferior to the new arrivals in point of seniority. Of the Uncovenantal Civil Servants from Bencoolen, the more deserving were given positions in the Straits, the remainder were pensioned. Several of those who thus unexpectedly found themselves in the Straits Settlements later on played a very important part in their development. (19)

The incorporation of Malacca and Singapore under the government of Penang also introduced some changes into the civil service. Malacca had hitherto, since it was formally handed over by the Dutch in March 1825, been in charge of Cracroft, a Penang Civil Servant detached for this duty. He was responsible only to the Supreme Government. In Singapore the whole administration had been carried on by a Resident, aided by two Assistants.

(17) Ibid., 35.
(18) S. S. R., 1816-1829, passim; e. g. Vol. 86: Aug. 1, 1822, and Vol. 105: March 27, 1829.
and two or three clerks. The Resident in 1826 was John Crawfurd, formerly a member of the Bengal Medical Service. He had been one of Raffles’ subordinates in Java, and in 1822 had been the head of the abortive mission to Siam. His term of service in the Straits had now drawn to a close, and in 1827 he was sent as ambassador to Burma. About 1830 he retired from the Company’s service, and returned to England. Throughout the remainder of his long life he was indefatigable in forwarding the interests of the Straits. He played an important part in the long and successful struggles to prevent the Directors from imposing customs duties on the trade of the Settlements, and in the agitation which resulted in the severance from the control of India in 1867.\(^{(22)}\) The name of John Crawfurd is written large on the early history of Singapore.

To return to the events of 1826, the Directors took the opportunity of the incorporation of Singapore and Malacca in the Penang Presidency to reduce the number of official positions in the Straits. At this time there were fifteen Covenanted Servants in Penang alone, a number of vacancies having remained unfilled. It was directed that henceforth there should be nine at Penang, three at Singapore, two at Malacca, and four supernumeraries to fill vacancies. With the Governor this made nineteen in all. Owing to the presence of unemployed Bencoolen officials, this total was exceeded by three. It was decided however that they should remain and be given positions as vacancies occurred. The duty of the Governor was to exercise a general control over the administration, and visit each of the settlements from time to time. There were three Resident Councillors, one in charge of each town. Their actions could be vetoed by the Governor, and reference had to be made to him in all matters of importance.\(^{(23)}\) These arrangements however lasted only four years.

The Directors had become utterly weary of a Presidency from which they reaped nothing but heavy annual deficits. Since 1826 there had been ominous hints that sweeping reductions were impending.\(^{(24)}\) but when the blow fell in 1829 it surpassed Penang’s most pessimistic forebodings. The Directors ordered that the Eastern Presidency should be abolished, and the Straits Settlements reduced to the rank of a Residency under the control of the government of Bengal. Whether the three towns should continue to form a single administrative unit, or should be divided into three distinct Residencies was left to the discretion of the Governor-General. All other details were also left to be settled

\(^{(21)}\) Crawford, ‘‘Embassy to Siam’’—556-57.
\(^{(22)}\) v. chapter on Singapore, 1819-26, Anglo-Siamese Relations, and the Transfer.
by him; but it was suggested that eight Covenanted assisted by
a few Uncovenanted officials, were sufficient to carry on the
government.\(^{(25)}\)

Final arrangements were not made until November 1830. In 1829 the Governor-General, Lord Bentinck, visited the Straits
Settlements, and discussed the proposed changes with the
Governor, Fullerton.\(^{(26)}\) After Lord Bentinck's departure there
followed twenty months of correspondence between India and the
Strait, before the matter was decided. It was considered that
to separate the Straits Settlements would be inadvisable, and that
they should form a single Residency, subject to Bengal. As the
Directors had suggested, the number of Covenanted Civil Servants
was reduced to eight. Penang and Malacca were each to be in
charge of a Deputy Resident, and Singapore of an Official with
the same powers, but with the title of First Assistant. There
were also to be one Assistant at Singapore, one at Malacca, and
two at Penang and Province Wellesley. Several offices were held
by each official. The three Civil Servants at Singapore for
example divided between them the duties of Superintendent of
Lands, Chief of Police, Superintendent of the Convicts, Magistrate
and Commissioner of the Court of Requests (the small debts
court), Superintendent of Public Works, etc. They also served
on the Committees which managed municipal affairs. The
office of Governor of the Straits Settlements was retained, al-
though the title was changed to Resident. As before, his duties
were to supervise the administration, and to conduct foreign
relations with the Malay States of the Peninsula and Sumatra.
He visited the three settlements periodically, and had the right to
overrule the acts of his subordinates. His headquarters remained
at Penang, until 1832, when the capital was removed to Singapore.
Fullerton's proposal that Malacca should be made the capital was
rejected.\(^{(27)}\) The Resident and the Deputy-Residents retained
their positions as judges, and when the Recorder went on circuit,
they had the right to sit with him and hear cases. The Resident
was empowered to make local regulations for the Straits Settle-
ments, but these did not have the force of law until they had been
approved by the Government of India. The principle that the
civil power was supreme in the Straits, and that the officers of the
garrison could not overrule its orders, was unaffected by the
reforms. On the other hand, the Government was required not
to interfere unnecessarily with military affairs. This rule was

\(^{(25)}\) Despatches to Bengal, Vol. 110: April 7, 1829.
\(^{(26)}\) The Honourable Robert Fullerton, was a Madras civil servant,
and had been a member of Council there before becoming Governor of
Penang Presidency. He was the Governor who took so prominent a part
in the Anglo-Siamese negotiations of 1824-27, and in the Malacca Land
Problem. In 1830 he retired to England and died in 1831. (Buckley—
"Singapore," J. 194.)
\(^{(27)}\) S. S. K., Vol. 123; June 30, 1830; and v. Chapter on "Malacca
Land Problem."
established during the regime of Captain Light at Penang, and has ever since been one of the fundamental principles of the government of the Straits Settlements. The supreme legislative, judicial and executive authority was thus centred in the same persons. In addition to the Covenanted there were also a number of Uncovenanted civil servants who filled the minor posts, e.g. the Harbour-Masters, who had charge of shipping and harbour regulations, the Superintendent of Naning, etc.⁴⁹ Four surgeons and three Anglican chaplains were also members of the civil service.

Two years later, in 1832, the former titles of Governor and Resident Councillor were restored. When the Penang Presidency was abolished, on June 30, 1830, (29) it was held—erroneously it would appear—that by the abolition of the old names of Governor and Resident Councillor their legal right to serve as judges ceased, since the charter of 1826, by which the Straits' judiciary had been established, gave them the right under these titles. The Recorder could not legally try cases alone, and he had returned to England and no successor had yet been appointed. All courts except those of the magistrates were closed. (20) The result was chaos. No criminal or civil cases were tried, and it was no longer possible to compel anyone to pay his debts, or carry out his legal obligations. The trade of Singapore was "almost entirely suspended." (19) The situation was so serious that on his own responsibility the First Assistant at Singapore, Murchison, tried the more important cases himself. The merchants of the city agreed to abide by his decision, and the Government of India approved his action.²² The matters remained in this condition until 1832, when the Directors restored the former titles of Governor and Resident Councillor. A new Recorder also arrived, and the regular courts were reopened. (23) The Straits Settlements remained only a Residency, but owing to this incident the titles of the chief officials were those which they had borne in the days of the Eastern Presidency.

The reforms of 1830 are of importance because the number and distribution of the civil servants determined by them remained


substantially unaltered until 1867. It would seem that the reductions made in 1830 were too drastic, and that whereas before the officials had been too many, they were afterwards too few. One of the clearest proofs of this was to be seen at Malacca, where the land problem was in no small degree due to the lack of a surveyor. Between 1830 and 1867 the history of the civil service in the Straits resolved itself largely into a struggle between the local administration to increase, and the Government of India still further to decrease, the existing staff. In 1837 for example when Young was appointed Commissioner to settle the Malacca land problem, he was instructed to devise measures for a sweeping reduction in the number of officials. This proposal was combatted by Bonham, the Governor of the Straits, and apparently, after examination, by Young himself. Nothing more was heard of it. A few years later, the Straits Government secured a few additional appointments. In 1844 an officer of the Madras army was made Superintendent of Convicts at Singapore, and in 1848 a similar post was created at Penang. Since there were between 1000 and 1500 convicts in the Straits, and most of the roads and public buildings were constructed by them, the necessity for men who could devote all their time to this duty was very great. Owing to the lack of proper survey and registration the land tenures in all three settlements had become involved in an inextricable tangle. The situation at Malacca was the worst but in all three settlements the services of a Government Surveyor were urgently required. After countless applications the Government of India sanctioned the creation of these posts in 1843 at Singapore, in 1846 at Penang and in 1858 at Malacca. In 1851 a Secretary and Aide-de-Camp to the Governor was appointed. In 1856 the office of Commissioner of Police was created at Singapore, and Deputy Commissioner-ships at Penang and Malacca. Hitherto the duties had been performed by the Resident Councillors. Especially at Singapore, the position was one of great importance, owing to the activities of the Chinese Secret Societies, and for many years the Europeans had demanded that the office should be filled by a man who could give his whole time to the work. The first Commissioner at Singapore was Théomas Dunman, an Uncovenanted civil servant who had been a member of the

(35) v. chapter on "Malacca Land Problem."
(38) McNair, "Prisoners Their Own Warders," passim.
(40) Ibid., 37.
(41) Ibid., 37.

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police since 1843, and for many years had practically controlled it. He had great influence amongst the leaders of the Chinese, and to this, coupled with his wide knowledge of their customs, his great success in dealing with gang-robberies and the activities of the Hués was due. Owing to their confidence in him the Chinese frequently gave him valuable information denied to others. Dunman's appointment was an exception to the Directors' general rule that important positions could be held only by members of the Covenanted service. In addition to several minor posts, two further offices were created in 1858, the Chief Engineer for the Straits Settlements, and the Post Master of Singapore. Hitherto these duties had been performed by the Superintendent of Convicts and other officials. The Chief Engineer had charge of the construction of all public works; and owing to the growth of trade the Post-Mastership required a man who could devote his whole time to the work. With these minor exceptions the number of officials in the Straits Settlements remained in 1867 the same as it had been in 1837, although the volume of work had increased manyfold.

The actual degree of independence possessed by the Government of the Straits Settlements from 1830 to 1867 is difficult to estimate. It is nowhere clearly defined, and must be deduced from a study of the records. Apparently it was very limited. The Company's form of administration was highly centralised, and a detailed account of everything great and small was made to the Government of India. All matters of importance were referred to it for decision, and even in the most insignificant local affairs—such as the construction of a twenty ton gunboat for use against pirates—action was usually deferred until India's sanction had been received. This rule was strictly enforced, especially in cases where the policy proposed by the local government would increase the expenditure. Until 1864-5 the Straits Settlements had a heavy annual deficit which was met from the Indian Treasury, and as the Company had derived no profit from Malaya since the cessation of its China trade in 1833, it was always unwilling to sanction proposals which seemed likely to add to the drain upon its resources. If any project involved an increase in the annual expenses, the Governors could not obtain approval for it, much less undertake it on their own initiative, unless they could show that it was of the greatest importance to the prosperity of the Straits. Most of the few problems which required to be dealt with during this period did involve directly or indirectly an

(43) Braddell, "Statistics"—37.
(44) Bengal and India Public and Political Consultations passim. No small part of the despatches from the Government of the Straits Settlements to India deals with the unavailing attempts of the Straits administration to make revenue balance expenditure. Cavenagh, "Reminiscences"—372.
increased expenditure. Hence they were usually left unsolved and handed on as a legacy to the Colonial Office, or else their solution was long delayed. Cases in point were the suppression of piracy, the Malacca land question, the extension of British power in the Malay Peninsula, and the increase of the civil service. The Governors were well aware of the Company’s attitude, and usually refrained from urging projects which they knew would not be sanctioned. They contented themselves with pointing out how hard they were trying to reduce the deficit, and how much they were doing with the limited means at their command. During this period the problem of finance conditioned almost every action of the Straits government.

When a matter was referred to India, a year or more frequently elapsed before the decision was received, because of the enormous volume of work with which the Indian administration had to deal. Owing to these delays, the interests of the Straits Settlements suffered at times; but on the whole the results were not serious. Of the problems which arose between 1826 and 1867, very few were of importance, so that the injury caused by the delay in settling them was not great. The Straits Settlements had practically no foreign relations, while the population was small, only 273,291 in 1860, (45) and on the whole law-abiding. Since farming was a minor industry, agricultural problems were much more of a side-issue than in most of the Indian Residencies. Moreover there were practically no taxes, and such as existed, as for example that on opium, were most of them sold by auction to Chinese tax-farmers. The task of the Governors was to preserve law and order, to construct what roads and public buildings the limited revenue would allow, and to sell the tax-farms for as large an amount as possible. They had also to cope with piracy as far as their scanty means permitted, and to foster trade and agriculture, largely by letting the merchants take care of themselves.

In the field of foreign affairs the principal duty of the Straits administration was to watch Holland and Siam, and to report to the Government of India if they appeared to be taking unfair measures against British trade. The government of the Straits Settlement had no power to make representations itself. In emergencies however, when immediate action was clearly imperative and there was no time to await instructions from India, the Governor could act on his own responsibility. It was on this ground for example that Cavenagh justified his bombardment of Trengganu in 1862. Foreign affairs were of much less importance than they had been in 1818 to 1826. After 1827 the aggressive policy of Siam in the Peninsula was practically confined to Kelantan and Trengganu, where British trade interests were small. Even there it was much less high-handed than formerly. In the


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Malay Peninsula the Company was wedded to a policy of strict non-intervention, and the Governors were practically precluded from taking any steps to increase British influence or protect British merchants there. Since the Directors' attitude was well-known, it was rarely that the Governors even proposed a more aggressive policy.\(^{(46)}\)

During the period 1786 to 1867 training and selection of the Covenanted Civil Servants was very different from the system which prevails at the present day. Between 1786 and 1805 the small staff was composed partly of Bengal officials without previous experience in Malaya, and in a few cases of men who, like Captain Light, had not formerly been employed by the Company, but were appointed because of their local knowledge. When the Penang Presidency was established in 1805 the Company decided to build up a "distinct" Straits Civil Service separate from that of India, and composed of men specially trained in local conditions who were to spend their official careers in Malaya. Ten Covenanted Servants were sent out as writers, the junior grade in the Company's service, and as they were promoted the vacancies in their ranks were filled by fresh appointments. Following the custom of the Company from this time onwards promotion was usually by seniority, determined by length of service. The rule however was not always strictly enforced. After 1805 the higher posts were usually no longer filled by officials detached from the Indian Presidencies, but by the promotion of civil servants who from long residence at Penang were acquainted with Malayan conditions. The four exceptions to this rule were Governors Bannerman, who opposed the foundation of Singapore in 1819, Fullerton, (1824-1830), Butterworth (1843-1855), and Cavenagh (1858-1867). Colonels Bannerman, Butterworth and Cavenagh were Indian army officers, and Fullerton, a man of unusual ability, had been a member of the Council of the Madras Presidency.\(^{(47)}\)

Civil Servants destined for the Straits received their preliminary training at the Company's college of Haileybury, which was founded in 1806. The principal subjects were Greek and Latin, Mathematics, Law, Philosophy, Political Economy, English History and Geography. Little attention was paid to Oriental studies, since the object of the course was to give a liberal education, and leave the special training until the student arrived in the East. Owing to the influence of the Directors, the standard of excellence at this period was not high.\(^{(48)}\) Graduates of

\(^{(46)}\) v. chapter on "Native Policy."


Haileybury who were sent to India were required to study Oriental languages and law at the colleges established at Bombay, Madras and Calcutta before beginning their work.\(^{(49)}\) No similar institution existed in the Straits for the study of Malay, Siamese and Chinese, and the Civil Servants learned them on their own initiative in their spare time. The records do not contain much information on the subject, but it would seem that a knowledge of the languages was not compulsory, and that information regarding native laws and customs was gradually acquired in the course of their duties. The language of which a knowledge was most essential was Malay, since it was the "lingua franca" of the Straits. By 1828 however very few of the Civil Servants knew it.\(^{(50)}\) Those who had studied Siamese were far fewer: indeed the only officials who spoke it appear to have been Captain Burney and Lieutenant Low, officers of the Madras army who gained a knowledge of it while stationed in the Straits.\(^{(51)}\) After 1830 a few of the officials learned Chinese, especially Bonham, Governor from 1837 to 1843, who devoted himself to the study of the Chinese language and customs.\(^{(52)}\) The importance of a knowledge of the languages was however recognised by the Penang Council, and at least after 1826 an effort was made to encourage their study. Absence from office during regular hours for this purpose was forbidden; but an allowance was generally made to the student for paying his "munshi", or native teacher. The examination in Malay, which was held by senior members of the civil service, embraced the subjects of Malay grammar, conversational Malay, translation from English into Malay, and Malay into English. Successful candidates were given a bonus of Rs2000 (at that time about £225). For proficiency in Chinese or Siamese the bonus was Rs3500 (about £394). The most successful candidates were appointed Translators of the native languages, and were given an increase of salary above the fixed office allowance of from about £23 to £28 a month. In some cases a much larger bonus was granted. Lieutenant Low for example was given £450 in 1824 for proficiency in Siamese.\(^{(53)}\) When the Penang Presidency ceased to exist in 1830 these regulations were abolished, and no further reward was given for the study of native languages.\(^{(54)}\) It appears uncertain whether a knowledge of them was now made compulsory, but in 1867 Sir Hercules Robinson reported that all the Indian officials in the Straits knew Malay.\(^{(55)}\) The failure to


\(^{(51)}\) Ibid., Vol. 94 passim.


make a knowledge of native languages compulsory was of less importance than it would otherwise have been since until about 1855 the Straits Government was mainly composed of ex-members of the old Penang and Bencoolen Civil Services, many of whom knew the Malay language well.

The survival of these officials was of great importance in the history of the Civil Service after 1830. Without their long local experience the depleted staff would have found the task of government vastly more difficult. When the Eastern Presidency was abolished in 1830 there were about twenty Covenanted officials in the Straits, while the number of positions was reduced to eight. The Directors refused to allow those who were thus deprived of their posts to be transferred to the Indian Civil Service, but gave them the alternatives of retiring on pensions or of being retained in the Straits as unemployed supernumeraries. Their salaries were to be small but as vacancies occurred they would be reappointed to the Straits Civil Service. The Directors also decided that no further cadets should be sent out from England to join the Straits administration. All vacancies which should occur after the last of the supernumeraries had been reappointed were to be filled by members of the Bengal Civil Service. Several of the ex-officials retired on the pensions offered, but over half preferred to remain. It thus happened that until 1855 practically all the more important positions, and until about 1845 every post was held by former members of the Penang Civil Service. As late as 1860 there was still one survivor of the old régime, W. T. Lewis, the Resident Councillor of Penang. It was only about 1845 that Bengal civilians began to be appointed.

Four typical cases may be quoted as examples of how long the men trained in the Penang Civil Service continued in office in the Straits. Samuel George Bonham, who entered the Bencoolen Civil Service in 1818, was transferred to the Straits Settlements in 1824, and became Assistant Resident of Singapore. From 1837 to 1843 he was Governor of the Straits Settlements. Owing to his knowledge of the Chinese language and customs he was appointed Governor of Hong Kong from 1848 to 1854. He played an important part in the early history of Hong Kong, and on his retirement was made a baronet. Another example was E. A. Blundell, a graduate of the Company's college at Addiscombe, who came to the Straits as a Writer in 1829. He gradually rose in rank, becoming Resident Councillor of Malacca and Penang.


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and finally Governor, from 1855 to 1858. Church, who was Resident Councillor of Singapore for nineteen years, from 1837 until his resignation in 1856, joined the Bencoolen Civil Service in 1815, and was transferred to the Straits in 1824. Samuel Garling, who entered the Bencoolen service in 1809, was transferred to the Straits in 1824. From 1833 to 1855 he was successively Resident Councillor of Malacca and Penang, and Assistant Resident at Singapore. After forty-six years' service, he retired on a pension of £250 a year.

The Madras Army also supplied the Straits with some of its ablest officials. From an early date the garrison was drawn from Madras, and a number of the officers studied Malay as a hobby. Those who became proficient were often detached from their regiments for administrative work. Captain Burney, who made the treaty with Siam in 1826, entered the Straits service in this manner. Another typical case was that of Colonel James Low, an officer of Madras Native Infantry, who joined the Penang establishment in 1818. He studied both Malay and Siamese, and was several times sent as envoy to native states in connection with Burney's mission to Siam. From 1823 to 1840 he was in charge of Province Wellesley. He then became Assistant Resident at Singapore, and in 1850 returned to Europe. In 1860 six out of the nineteen members of the administration, including, the Resident Councillor of Malacca, were officers of the Madras Army. Between 1830 and 1867, two of the Governors of the Straits Settlements were also Madras army officers, namely Colonel Butterworth, Depute Quartermaster General of the Madras Army, who was Governor from 1843 to 1855, and Colonel Cavenagh, Governor from 1858 to 1867. Neither had had any previous experience in Malaya, since their whole careers had been spent in India. The appointments were for this reason unusual, but Butterworth and Cavenagh proved to be two of the most capable governors sent to Malaya.

(64) V. Chapter on "Anglo-Siamese Relations."
(65) Ibid.
The Uncovenanted Civil Servants in the Straits were usually residents of Malaya employed as the Government had need of their services. The Company's rule that only the less important and less lucrative posts were open to them was on the whole observed, but on several occasions it was broken. The reason was that it was very difficult to find Covenanted servants qualified to deal with the peculiar problems of Malaya, so that the administration was compelled to use the services of local residents.\(^{\text{69}}\) The rule was most completely broken in the case of W. T. Lewis, an Uncovenanted official at Bencoolen from 1806 to 1824. He was transferred to the Straits, and obtained the favour of Governor Fullerton, who made him head of the Land Department at Malacca.\(^{\text{70}}\) In 1840 he became Assistant at Penang, then Resident Councillor of Malacca, and finally, in 1855, Resident Councillor of Penang, one of the most important posts in the administration. Lewis held this position until he retired in 1860.\(^{\text{71}}\) This case appears to be unique in the early history of the Straits Settlements. Another Uncovenanted official who held an important office was Dunman, who was Commissioner of Police at Singapore from 1856 to 1871, and Assistant Resident.\(^{\text{72}}\) Westerhout, a Dutch inhabitant of Malacca, was in charge of Nanning after its conquest in 1832, and in 1837 was appointed Assistant at Malacca. In each case the appointment was avowely made because no one else could be found equally competent to undertake the work.\(^{\text{73}}\) A fair number of other instances are to be found of Uncovenanted officials holding important positions.\(^{\text{74}}\) The Civil Service in British Malaya was thus, as the Governor-General of India wrote in 1859, "nearly as mixed in its material as the population which it governs."\(^{\text{75}}\) The disappearance of the members of the old Penang Service did not lessen the efficiency of the government. So thoroughly had they trained their subordinates that their influence lasted long after their disappearance. In 1867 the Government was conducted by a very competent body of officials, with splendid traditions of duty. Sir Hercules Robinson, who was sent to report on the conditions existing in the Settlements just before the transfer to the Colonial Office, paid


\(^{\text{70}}\) v. Chapter on "Malacca Land Problem."


\(^{\text{73}}\) B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 64: June 2, 1847.


high tribute to the calibre and qualifications of the Straits Civil Service.\(^{(76)}\)

Only in one respect, the absence of a separate Malayan Civil Service, did the establishment fail to meet with his approval. In 1830 the Directors had decided that in future no graduates of Haileybury should be appointed directly to the Straits, but that when vacancies occurred they should be filled by men detached from Bengal. The result did not answer their anticipations. Bengal civilians began to be appointed to Malaya about 1845. They were given subordinate positions, and it was intended to advance them to the higher offices when they had gained a knowledge of local conditions. Governor Butterworth supported the experiment, but in 1854 he informed the Government of India that it had failed. Owing to the small number of important positions the chances of promotion were very few compared with those of Bengal. Everyone therefore after a short experience wished to return to India. The requests were granted, and Butterworth predicted that this would always be the attitude "with every civil servant possessing energy and ambition." The administration lost their services just when their local experience was making them valuable.\(^{(77)}\) The Governor-General of India, Lord Canning, in 1859 described the situation in even stronger terms. He wrote that since India "now... has no Chinese service in which its officers can look for advancement as they rise in standing, in truth, it has come to this, that no officer of the Indian Civil Service will willingly go to the Straits for a permanency, except in the position of governor. To be transferred there at the beginning of his career, on the understanding that he shall remain attached to the Straits throughout the whole or even the greater portion of it, would involve so large a sacrifice of prospects on the part of a young Indian Civil Servant, that he cannot reasonably be expected to make it." \(^{(78)}\)

Lord Canning also emphasized the "absolute necessity" for the Straits officials receiving a special training instead of being left to gain their knowledge in the course of their work. He described the existing system as "a positive evil." "Indian officers have no opportunity of acquiring experience of the habits or the language of either Malays or Chinese, and accordingly, when officers are sent to the Straits, they have everything to learn. The Government of India is unable to keep a close watch upon their efficiency; the field is so narrow as to afford little or no room to the Governor of the Settlements for exercising a power of


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selection in recommending to a vacant office; and there is consequently so complete an absence of stimulus to exertion, that it may well be doubted whether Indian civil officers sent to the Straits ever become thoroughly well qualified for, or heartily interested in the duties they have to discharge. The character of the Chinese, the most important and at times a very unmanageable part of the population of the Straits Settlements, is quite different from that of any people with which Indian officers have to deal. . . . (They are) the very opposite of our Indian fellow subjects." (29) Sir Hercules Robinson agreed with Lord Canning, and advised the Colonial Office that cadets should be sent out to learn the languages and customs of the Chinese and Malays, and a separate Straits Civil Service built up, composed of men specially trained in the peculiar conditions of Malaya. (30) From the acceptance of this policy has arisen the Civil Service in British Malaya as it exists today.

(29) Ibid.
BRITISH MALAYA, PART II.

CHAPTER VI.

The Malacca Land Problem 1825-1884.

The most serious problem with which the Government of the Straits Settlements had to deal at Malacca was land settlement. It has been aptly described as "one long history of want of knowledge on one side, and fraud and evasion on the other."(1) In order to understand the peculiar difficulties it is necessary to describe briefly the Malay form of land-tenure, according to which the Dutch land-holders of Malacca held their estates in 1824. By the Malay code all land was the property of the Raja, who had the right:

(1) to dispose of all waste (i.e., uncultivated) lands as he chose;
(2) to receive a percentage, usually one-tenth, of the produce of all cultivated lands;
(3) to exact forced service from his raayats or peasantry. It was unpaid, and neither its nature nor amount was defined by Malay law.

The raayat also had certain rights which were as inalienable as those of his feudal superior.

(1) He was usually permitted by his Raja to take up without interference as much waste land as he could cultivate. The reason for this was that the population was small, while the land area was large and covered with such heavy jungle as to be useless until it had been cleared.

(2) He could not be ejected from his land as long as

(i) he rendered the forced service demanded, and paid a percentage of his produce, usually one-tenth, to his Raja;

(ii) he did not let his land go out of cultivation. In the case of rice fields, for example, the proprietary rights lasted as long as the area was under cultivation, and for three years thereafter; while in the case of orchards, they lasted as long as any fruit tree survived as evidence that the land had formerly been cultivated. The rules for other varieties of farm-land followed the same principle. In all cases, when the land went out of cultivation the former owner ceased to have any claim to it. It then became Waste Land (tanah mati, "dead land") and could be granted by the Raja to whomsoever he chose.


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It will be observed that despite the Raja's nominal right to all the land, as long as the raayat complied with the conditions under which he held it he could not be ejected.

When a Raja granted lands to a favourite—whether waste or cultivated, or both—he did not thereby surrender his own title to it, nor did he in any way interfere with the rights of the cultivators. All that he gave up to the grantee was the power to exercise the royal privileges of

(1) disposing of all waste lands, and
(2) collecting the tenth from the raayats.

In other words, the apparent owner of a tract of land was not a landlord in the English sense, but was really, to use the Indian term, a sort of Zemindar. He could not claim the ownership of his land—that lay with the Raja—nor dispossess his tenants; his sole right was to collect from his estates, a revenue the amount of which were fixed by custom. The exact position of what one may call the Malay Zemindar is a point of the utmost importance, since this was really the status of the so-called Dutch Proprietors who in 1825 were in possession of Malacca Territory.\(^2\)

The reason for this was simple: the Portuguese, and after them the Dutch, on their conquest of Malacca, simply retained the unwritten native land-tenure unchanged. In the other Dutch possessions, even in Java, the centre of their power, they consistently followed the same policy. Furthermore the Dutch archives at Malacca show that they upheld the customary rules of native land-tenure there, and did not draw up any other system of land-laws. About 1824 the Government of Holland considered the advisability of enacting a code of regulations which was founded in all respects upon native custom and had nothing in common with any European system. Owing to the approaching transfer of Malacca the project was dropped. From these considerations it is clear that the so-called Dutch Proprietors who in 1825 claimed to be the landlords of their estates in the English sense of the term were really nothing more than Malay Zemindars. The title to their lands remained with the Government, as the inheritor of the rights of the ancient Sultans of Malacca whom the Portuguese had expelled in 1511; and all that they had received from the Dutch Company was the right to collect and enjoy the tenth from their lands. This they did through Chinese farmers i.e. individuals who bought from them the right to collect it, just as they bought the opium, and other farms, in Penang and Singapore. These concessions must have been of very little value to the Dutch Proprietors owing to the restrictions upon agriculture, and it is probable that they never lived on or visited their lands. They were absentee Zemindars, taking no interest in their estates beyond trying to secure as high a price as possible for the sale of their privileges. The Proprietors

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\(^2\) Ibid., 77-93, 103-110.
undoubtedly understood their own position, although the British officials did not, and for some years they tried to deceive the Straits Government into treating them as "bona fide" owners of the soil. As subsequent pages show, it required much toilsome investigation of the archives of Malacca before the new administration ascertained that their real status was the one outlined above.

When the Company's officials arrived from Penang in 1825 they found that with the exception of the small state of Nanjing, the whole of Malacca Territory outside the limits of the town was in the possession of a few individuals, the majority of whom were Dutch, who claimed to be, not Zemindars, but the absolute owners of their property, jungle as well as cultivated land. The raayats they declared were merely their tenants. The "Proprietors," as they called themselves, were trying to succeed in a colossal game of bluff, trusting to British ignorance of local conditions to alter their status from that of Zemindars to absolute owners of the soil. It might have been expected that since Malacca had already been held by the Company's troops from 1795 to 1818, much information would have been acquired about local conditions. The earlier occupation however had been military and of uncertain duration. The administration appears to have continued much as it had been under the Dutch Company, the British Resident not interfering or interesting himself greatly in it. The only changes seem to have been the removal of the restrictions on trade and agriculture and Lord Minto's abolition of judicial torture. The Company was therefore unable to secure any enlightenment from this source.

Governor Fullerton at once ordered an investigation to be undertaken, in order to discover whether the Proprietors' claims were true. To obtain reliable information was by no means easy. Those best qualified to explain the situation, the Proprietors themselves, were the last persons to wreck the game which they were playing; and the only other source of information, the Dutch archives at Malacca presented many difficulties. Two centuries of neglect, and white ants had utterly destroyed many of the records, while of those which survived some were almost indecipherable. To cap the climax, when the Dutch administration left Malacca it carried off part of the archives, including all the original deeds granting their lands to the Proprietors. Under these circumstances progress was slow, and between 1825 and 1827 meetings of the council held to settle the land question had several times to be postponed in order that a further investigation of the records might be made. It was not until 1828 that the matter was finally


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settled, and even then serious mistakes were made through ignorance.

The first important meeting held to consider the Malacca land-problem appears to have been on July 5, 1827. The discussion was summed up in an able Minute of Governor Fullerton. (7) He pointed out that since all the original deeds granting land had been taken away by the Dutch in 1835, it was very difficult to ascertain the exact rights of the Government, the Proprietors, and the Raayats. What evidence had been obtained from the archives however contradicted the claims of the Proprietors that they were not Zemindars but absolute owners of the soil. Furthermore the evidence appeared to show that the grants had been made in order to encourage certain forms of agriculture, and that the government had the right to resume uncultivated land. The Proprietors had used their privileges and neglected all their obligations, so that the Government seemed to have a legal right to take away their estates. On their part the Proprietors did not question the legality of this attitude, but contended that it was unjust since they were unaware that the possession of their land involved any liabilities—presumably because they had never taken the trouble to find out the terms of their grants, and the Dutch Government had been equally lax in enforcing them.

When an attempt was made to discover the relations existing between the Proprietors and the Raayats, confusion and contradiction became even more marked. The Proprietors claimed to be the absolute owners of their estates, both waste land and cultivated; yet in the next breath they admitted that while there was no law fixing rent the general custom was for the landlord to receive one tenth of the produce. They also admitted that as long as the tenant paid it he could not be evicted, and could sell, mortgage or bequeath his farm, or increase it by taking up waste land at will. Fullerton saw the inconsistency in such statements, and made a shrewd guess at the Proprietors' real position. He was already strongly inclined to believe that the tenth described as the usual rent, was not a land-rent at all, but a tax—the immemorial right of the Malay Raja to one-tenth of the produce of his lands. The Dutch Company, as the inheritor of this right, had granted it to the Proprietors, who were therefore, he suspected, not the absolute and unfettered owners of their land, but merely individuals who had the right to a percentage of the produce. No decision was made however, and the question was postponed pending further investigation.

On March 7, 1827, the Resident Councillor of Malacca reported to the Penang Council that so far as he could ascertain the wording of the grants did not warrant the conclusion that they were irrevo-


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able, as the Proprietors contended. (*) About the same time a
document was discovered in the archives which proved that Fuller-
ton's surmise was correct, and that the "Proprietors" were not
land-owners, but Zemindars. This was a proclamation issued by
the Dutch Government in 1819, referring to one in 1773 which
expressly forbade Proprietors to demand more than one-tenth of
the produce from their tenants. The Council met on January 30,
1828, and agreed that the proclamation proved that the Dutch
Company had given up, not the absolute right of ownership to the
soil, but merely the government's right to collect from it one-tenth
of the produce. The Dutch Proprietors "had no other claims upon
the produce, nor upon the occupiers, not founded in abuse."

The cultivators were the real proprietors of the soil. (*) It
was therefore clear that to take over the lands would not be an
act of high-handed spoliation, but would be perfectly justifiable,
provided the Proprietors were compensated. That to do so was
desirable, the Governor and his Council did not doubt for a
moment. In the first place, the Proprietors had done nothing to
encourage agriculture, and did not even take sufficient interest in
their estates to collect the tenth, preferring to farm it out to Chinese.
So negligent were they that they did not even know the amount
which was due to them, so that in practice they received from the
Chinese far less than one-tenth. "The Proprietors will neither
cultivate the land themselves or allow others to do so. Few of
them have ever quitted the town of Malacca or visited estates not
fifteen miles distant." (11) Despite the great fertility of the soil,
only 5000 acres were under cultivation in the whole of Malacca
Territory, and a district which could easily be self-supporting had
to import over half of its grain. The Council felt persuaded that
if the deadening incumbrance of the Proprietors were removed, agri-
culture would greatly increase. (11) The second consideration, which
strongly influenced the Council, was that the Malay raayats suffered
great oppression, because of the Proprietor's practice of annually
auctioning the right to collect the tenth to the Chinese. The
Proprietors made no attempt to protect their raayats from extortion,
and the tax-collector "having only one year's interest in the
country, extracts from it the most he can, and it appears.... that
moreover their services are required, and labour exacted from the
tenants: in short they are kept in a state of vassalage and servitude
quite inconsistent with the encouragement of cultivation. The
right of levying the government rent carries with it all the real
power of the state; that right vested in the Dutch proprietors,

June 17, 1829.
Sept. 30, 1829.

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by them transferred in the mass to Chinese, has established a power and influence in that class too great even for the officers of Government to hold in check." (12)

Last, but by no means least, the Council confidently hoped that eventually as a result of the increased cultivation which they believed would follow the elimination of the Proprietors, the revenue would increase sufficiently to pay the cost of the administration of Malacca. Hitherto there had always been a heavy annual deficit, for while the expenses of government were large, only a small revenue was obtained from a decaying settlement with a rapidly decreasing trade and a stagnant agriculture. (13)

A further consideration however influenced the Governor more than any of the foregoing: he wished to make Malacca the capital of the Straits Settlements. As the former centre of Malay, Dutch and Portuguese power in the Peninsula, it had amongst Malays a prestige immeasurably greater than Penang or Singapore. The central position, within two days' sail of Singapore and four of Penang, made Malacca more suitable than either of the other two towns for the headquarters of the garrison in the Straits. "In a political point of view it is conveniently situated for combating the intrigues of Siam in the Malay states, and "it is besides near enough to the south end of the Straits to watch the proceedings of the Netherlands Government." Knowing that the soil of Malacca was fertile, and that eleven-twelfths of it were uncultivated, Fullerton was convinced that with "unremitting zeal and exertion" on the part of the government, agriculture would, as in India, prosper exceedingly under the security and justice of British rule. To deny the possibility of this "seems a perfect libel on British administration." Fullerton saw that with the competition of Penang and Singapore, Malacca's days as a great trading-centre were over, and that "it must look entirely to its own agricultural resources for improvement." In this it had a great advantage over the other two settlements because far more land was available for cultivation. Fullerton believed that the agriculture of Malacca could be increased to such an extent that it would not only provide sufficient revenue to cover the cost of administration, but would also grow enough rice to feed the whole population of the Straits Settlements. They would thus no longer be dependent for the greater part of their food upon Kedah, Sumatra, and Java, which being outside the control of the Penang Presidency, sometimes caused much distress by raising barriers against export. (14) Because of very inaccurate information, Fullerton's terms to the Proprietors were too liberal, but at least, his actions were not due to blind and reckless extravagance.

For all these reasons The Council decided to buy back from the Proprietors their right to levy the tenth on all cultivated lands, about 3000 of the 54000 acres in Malacca Territory. It declined to recognize that they had any title to the Waste Land, and at once resumed possession without compensation. The Proprietors acquiesced in the justice of this step, and made no demands for compensation. They were also willing to sell their right to the tenth. Many of the titles were questionable, and a large number of the estates had grown by dubious means. Nevertheless the Council decided to treat the Proprietors generously; "the circumstance of their having been long in possession of the rights, such as they are, is the main argument to induce the offer of pecuniary compensation for their resumption." It therefore decided that the Proprietors should surrender all their rights in return for annual pensions, "the full equivalent of what they now receive... payable as long as the British Government shall remain in possession of Malacca."

Lewis, the Superintendent of Lands at Malacca, was ordered to negotiate with the Proprietors. On June 13, 1828, he reported to the Council that the tenth on almost all the lands had been transferred to the Company, in return for a total annual compensation of about £1735.11.0. The transfer of the lands was not complete, a few small estates, amounting in all to four or five square miles, being left unredeemed because their Proprietors were absent from Malacca, or legally incapable of making a contract. In 1884 they were still unredeemed. As a temporary measure, the tenth was farmed from July to December 1828; but on December 11, 1828, the Penang Council ordered that in future it should not be farmed, but collected by the Malacca Land Department. Full information of the Government's land-policy was sent to the Directors, and in their reply they expressed themselves as "extremely glad" that the Proprietor's rights had been redeemed. They also approved the Council's proposal to manage the lands directly.

In the same despatch the Directors gave their approval to the code of land-laws which had been submitted to them. Pending their decision, the regulations had already been in force as a temporary measure since 1828. This code, Regulation IX of 1828.

(16) Ibid.
(17) Ibid.
(18) Ibid.
1830, was largely responsible for the creation of the Malacca land problem. Yet in many respects the laws were admirable, and showed that the Penang Council understood Malay land-tenure. The Government was declared to have the right to one-tenth of the produce of all cultivated lands, while the raayats were also liable to the excise and to all other duties which might be established. Whether the tenth was to be paid in money or in kind was left undecided for the time. The tax of each district was to be collected by its Penghulu, or headman, under the supervision of the Land Department. The Penghulus, as formerly, were to act as police and revenue officers in their districts. The Government also reserved to itself the "full and absolute right over all waste reserved to itself the "full and absolute right over all waste and forest lands not cleared and cultivated" within the memory of man, or twenty years, "with power to make for their future occupation... such terms as they see fit."

The raayat's rights over the cultivated lands were declared to be "the privilege of transfer by sale, gift, or bequest according to the will of the holder, subject always to the tenth." The Company promised not to interfere with lands already under cultivation, except that all lands left uncultivated for ten years reverted to it. A great boon was conferred upon the Malays by the provision abolishing the Company's right to forced labour, except for such public necessities as repairing the roads. Henceforth payment was to be made in all such cases. Another provision declared that a complete survey was to be undertaken. Hitherto no survey appears ever to have been made. Titles describing their Holdings were to be given the raayats, and these, as well as all future land-transfers, were to be registered.

The fundamental mistake of Regulation IX of 1830 was that it was an attempted compromise between two entirely different systems of land-tenure, English and Malay. The Company should have decided whether it intended to retain the ancient Malay system, or to sweep it away and replace it by English land-law. The mistake is all the more strange because the Penang Council was well acquainted with Malay tenure, and knew how utterly different it was to the English system. The history of the Council's negotiations with the Proprietors, and the provisions of Regulation IX of 1839, all show this. If further proof were needed, it could be found in the Recorder's decision in 1829 in the case of Abdullahiff vs. Mohammed Leh. The judge correctly described Malay land-tenure, mentioning every essential feature of it. Yet the Company, while retaining Malay tenure for the lands then under cultivation, decided that for all lands disposal of after 1830 grants and leases should be issued in accordance with the forms of English law. The

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(26) S. R. B., 171; March 24, 1830.

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result of combining two utterly different systems of land-tenure was "incessant confusion."(27) Even if the survey contemplated by Regulations IX of 1830 had been made, the Land Department would have found its task difficult. The survey was however never carried out, owing to the sweeping reduction in the Straits Civil Service made by the reforms of 1830. In 1831 the Governor of the Straits asked that a surveyor be appointed, but in spite of representations the Government of India refused to comply until 1858.(28) As a result, "the old lands cultivated and liable to tenths before 1830 remained subject to the native customs, but they were not identified by registration or survey. Lands taken up and brought into cultivation after 1830, could not therefore in subsequent years be distinguished from them." The ryots could always plead that they had held them prior to 1830, and the Government lacking the records of a survey, could not disprove the claim, even when it knew that it was false.(29)

As if the situation were not complicated enough already, in 1835 the Recorder ruled that the Singapore Land Regulations of 1830 were illegal, because they were not a law for imposing taxes, the only purpose for which the Straits Government could legislate. Since the Malacca Land Regulations had been passed by the same authority, they also were illegal.(30) Moreover in 1834 the Recorder had ruled that the Charter of Justice of 1826 had introduced the law of England, except in certain specified cases, and had abrogated any law previously existing.(31)

The result of these two decisions may best be shown by a Minute of Governor Fullerton of May 18, 1829 which can fairly be called prophetic. Owing to the Recorder's decision the Straits Government had no power to pass new land laws; and if payment of the tenth were refused, it had to enforce it through the Recorder's Court, which acted in accordance with the rules of English law, with all its slow and cumbrous procedure. In the words of Fullerton's Minute, the case was "tried under principles that have no relation or resemblance to the local situation of the country and its inhabitants... The land tenures at Malacca bear no analogy or resemblance to any English tenure; yet by such they must in case of doubt be tried." Until these two hindrances were removed it was "quite useless to attempt the realization of any revenue whatever."(28)

Almost immediately the consequence feared by Fullerton began to show itself, but to a much more serious extent than he had

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anticipated. The reason for this was as follows. Soon after 1830 efforts were begun to induce the raayats to accept title deeds to their land drawn up in accordance with the forms of English law. A decision of the Court declared the earliest form of lease, technically illegal; and the Directors ordered new leases to be prepared which satisfied the technical requirements of English law. Raayats without valid titles to their land were to be compelled to accept and register them.\(^{(33)}\) Unfortunately the disallowance of the first leases by the Court had been interpreted by the ignorant raayats as meaning that henceforth they were to hold their farms rent free, or else on payment of a merely nominal amount.\(^{(34)}\) Moreover about 1832-33 the Government of the Straits Settlements issued orders that the raayats of Malacca and Nanning were to be induced to pay their tenths in money instead of in kind.\(^{(35)}\) The conservatism of the Malays made them averse both to title deeds and money payments, since they were altogether different from anything to be found in Malay land-tenure. The principal cause of their opposition however was the intrigues of the former Dutch Proprietors, who for ten years persuaded the ignorant raayats that the Government had merely bought the farm of their privileges, and not the rights themselves. The Dutch thus preserved most of their former authority, and used it to oppose the efforts of the administration. Their manoeuvres were not discovered until in 1837 Young was appointed Commissioner to examine the affairs of the Straits Settlements.\(^{(36)}\)

The assertions of the Proprietors were false; but the terms of the deeds under which their lands had been redeemed in 1828 lent plausibility to their falsehoods. It will be remembered that these were to the effect that in return for an annual payment they surrendered all their rights to the Company as long as the British should retain possession of Malacca.\(^{(37)}\) Incidentally this wording added yet another element to the Malacca land-problem. A few years after 1828 it was discovered that the Company could not give a full title to any of the land which it had redeemed at such a heavy loss, not even to those which were Waste. There was no reasonable ground for belief that the British would ever evacuate Malacca, but owing to the phraseology of the deeds an intending purchaser could only be given a title to any lands he bought for so long as Malacca remained under British rule. The result was that capitalists were unwilling to invest their money in the settlement and for many years in spite of the richness of the soil few plantations were formed for the growth of sugar, coconuts, etc., as in Province Wellesley and Penang. Land remained undeveloped, and the prosperity and

\(^{(33)}\) Public Letters to Bengal, Vol. 14, June 2, 1830 and Feb. 9, 1831.
\(^{(34)}\) Ibid.
\(^{(36)}\) Despatches to Bengal and India, Vol. 28, pp. 957-60. Sept. 1, 1841.
revenue of Malacca suffered. (38) This was not remedied until 1861.

The result of all these unfavourable conditions was that the revenue realized from the tenth, far from yielding a surplus, was always much less than the annual payment to the Proprietors. Up to 1836 the average annual loss was Rs.10,000 or about £1000. (39) Incessant references were made to Bengal, and the Bengal Public and Political Consultations of 1830 to 1840 record constant discussions of the subject. It is no exaggeration to say that there was scarcely a single meeting of the Bengal Council at which the affairs of the Straits were considered in which some reference was not made to the Malacca land question.

Finally in 1837 the Indian Government repealed the land laws of 1830 and appointed W. R. Young Commissioner for the Eastern Settlements, to investigate land-tenures and the general situation in the Straits Settlements. (40) Far from improving conditions at Malacca, his intervention seems if anything to have made them worse. The two problems with which he had to deal were the refusal of the raayats to commute the tenth into a money payment or to accept English title-deeds to their lands, and the powerlessness of the Straits Government to compel them owing to the Court's decisions of 1834 and 1835. The alternatives before Young appeared to be to recommend either the formal enactment as law of the Malay customs for the collection of the tenth, or, if English land-tenure were desired, the grant to the Straits Government of power to deal with its recalcitrant tax payers. He did neither; he deprecated legislation and advocated reliance on patient explanation and persuasion to overcome the Malays' objections. (41) Young himself appears to have used this method successfully, (42) and it might perhaps have succeeded if he had not retained the idea of compelling the raayats at the same time to receive a title to their land drawn up in English legal terminology.

"The idea started in Regulation IX of 1830 that each cultivator was to have a title deed for his holding seems to have taken complete possession of that generation of Land Revenue officials, and the object of every succeeding administration seems similarly to have been to force documents of title upon an unwilling population." (43)

At the same time Young urged that the system which by the Directors' orders had prevailed in the Straits Settlements since

(41) Ibid., 957-60.
(42) Ibid.

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1831 of refusing to sell the land and granting it on a twenty-year lease, renewable for another thirty years, hampered the growth of agriculture. The Government of Bengal supported his representations, and in 1841-43 the Directors ordered that henceforth all lands still held by Government were to be sold outright, no annual rent being imposed. At Malacca an exception was made because the cultivators were Malays, who understand only their own native land-tenure. At this settlement therefore instead of selling the Company’s waste land outright, occupation was to be permitted on a perpetual tenure, subject to the payment of the tenth the amount of which was to be revised after twenty years. It was also ordered that as soon as possible the tenth should be commuted into a money payment.

The result of Young’s recommendations was complete failure. This is shown by a report prepared for the Directors in 1843 by the Straits Government. Six years had elapsed since Young’s investigation, yet only 5029 had been issued out of the 11342 commutation papers which he had estimated to be necessary in order that all the ruayats might have title deeds and might commute the tenth in kind into a money payment. The majority of the cultivators refused to accept commutation papers; and even if they should eventually do so, it was estimated that Fullerton’s bargain with the Proprietors would entail a yearly loss of Rs.6,000 (about £600). Meanwhile the average annual deficit was Rs.12,000 (about £1,200), the cost of the Proprietors’ pensions and of the Land Department being more than double the amount of revenue collected.

The most vivid description of the situation was written by E. A. Blundell, who served many years at Malacca, and eventually became Governor of the Straits Settlements. Technical English legal indentures between the tenants and the East India Company were drawn up with all the precision and formality of a practising attorney in England, fixing the amount of the tenth for the ensuing twenty years.

"This legal document occupies the whole of one side of a sheet of foolscap, while the other is filled with Malay writing purporting to be a translation of the English, but as may well be supposed, failing entirely to convey to a native reader any idea of its meaning. It requires some knowledge of law to understand the English original……and the attempt to translate those terms into Malay has produced an utterly

(45) Despatches to Bengal and India XXVIII, 993, Sept. 1, 1841, B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 42; April 26, 1843, No. 3.
unintelligible jumble of words...... To secure therefore the payment (often of a few annas only per annum) the tenants (ignorant Malay peasants) were sent for in shoals to put their marks to these sheets of foolscap paper filled with writing. They naturally got alarmed and evinced the greatest reluctance to affix their signatures."

Blundell concluded by a description which was true not only of the period before 1847, the date at which he wrote, but also down to 1861.

"To overcome this reluctance and to induce a general signing throughout, seems to have been the great and almost sole object of the Land Department from that time to the present. All the ingenuity of Residents and Assistants has been exerted to this end, and all the principles of political economy have been exhausted in endeavouring to explain the advantages of the system, but in many parts without success. Threats, coaxings and explanations have been set at defiance, and an obstinate determination evinced not to sign these legal papers." (47)

Finally, in 1843 or 1844, the Resident punished those who refused to sign by farming the collection of their tenths to the Chinese. It will be remembered, that it was partly to do away with the farm that the lands had been redeemed in 1828. (48) This system of punishment was still in use about 1858. (49)

From 1847 to 1861 the situation remained almost unchanged. In many cases no tenths were collected after about 1841. (50) So, at last till 1853, in every year the amount of land revenue received was much less than the cost of collecting it and paying the Proprietors. Between 1842 and 1853 the yearly receipts amounted to only a few hundred pounds, being sometimes less even than the costs of collection alone, which varied from £300 to £350. (51) Frequent complaints were made to India regarding the refusal of the raayats to accept titles and pay the tenth, and the inability of the Government to grant a clear title to purchasers, owing to the wording of the agreement of 1828.

The Governor of the Straits also pointed out repeatedly that a survey of Malacca was a vital necessity. It was impossible to estimate accurately the area and population of the interior, and districts existed which had never been visited by European officials. (52) The Malays however found the situation much to

(48) Ibid., 742.
(49) Cavenagh, "Reminiscences," 266.
(51) Braddell, "Statistics," II.

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their liking. Since 1830 they had brought various tracts of jungle under cultivation; but as no survey had been made, and many raayats had refused to register their holdings or accept title deeds, the Government found it impossible to prove in Court that any piece of land had been occupied since 1830, even when it knew this to be the case. Much revenue was thus lost, because while land cultivated prior to 1830 paid a fixed and unchanging tenth, holdings taken up after that date were subject to a revision of the tenth every twenty years. The only solution of the problem was a survey of Malacca by which the status of every person claiming to have title to land should be ascertained and declared.

Finally, in 1856 the Indian Government made an attempt to remedy the situation. A surveyor was appointed at Malacca and in 1861 a Land Act was passed. The measure summarily settled the ridiculous claim of the Proprietors that the Government had merely rented their privileges by vesting the land in fee simple in the Crown. Since it was believed that they were willing to sell their annuities for fair compensation, the Governor of the Straits was empowered to negotiate with them. The greater number availed themselves of this offer. In the second place the Act provided a scheme of survey and settlement, analogous to the Indian system, so as to ascertain and record the rights and liabilities of every cultivator. The surveyors were empowered to require the attendance of raayats and the production of documents, and to decide questions of title, subject to an appeal to the courts. Other provisions of the Act divided the landholders into two classes:

(1) Those who held their farms by Malay customary tenure were liable to the tenth in money or in kind.

(2) All other cultivators were to be treated as squatters, without legal right to their holdings, and must either pay whatever rent the Government might fix, or vacate their farms. The vexed question of the alteration of the tenth in kind to a money rent was dealt with in a clause which empowered the Government to commute the tenth to an immediate payment and an annual quit-rent. The Malacca Land Department drew up a scale of assessment for the land-tax very favourable to the raayats, which relieved them from the oppression of the Chinese farmer. Provision for the future growth of agriculture was made by empowering the Straits Government to dispose of the Waste Lands at its discretion, either in perpetuity or for any term of years and subject to any quit-rent agreed on with the purchasers. The Malay custom of taking up Waste Land and acquiring a proprietary right over it by cultivation was abolished. Every raayat however was allowed to increase his holding by obtaining from the Government Waste Land adjoining

(54) Ibid.

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his farm in the ratio of one part of jungle to every four of land cultivated by him. (56)

Maxwell, the leading authority of Malayan land-tenures, considered that if this Act had been properly carried out by the local officials, it should have settled the land problem of Malacca satisfactorily. (57) Owing to the Malacca Land Department it did not. While a fairly good survey was made of the coastal region, (about one-fourth of the settlement), no complete survey was made of the whole Territory; and on the departure of Quinton, the Surveyor-General, in 1867, systematic work in Malacca came to an end. (58) Furthermore the Land Department, undeterred by its failure in 1830-60, still tried to make the raayats sign their landleases, although the Act distinctly aimed at making them pay their regular annual rental whether they had signed title deeds or not. (59) This of course roused the opposition of the Malays. They also resisted the application of the Act, partly from Oriental dislike of change, and partly because they believed that the new arrangement would benefit the Government and injure them. This impression Governor Cavenagh thought, was "no doubt mainly caused by reports circulated by the Revenue farmers" Chinese who had profited by the old order of things. (60) Moreover, as in former years, the raayats were reluctant to abandon the tenth in kind for the payment of a fixed rent in money. (61)

The result of these various factors was the failure of the Act of 1861. The Malays refused to sign leases, they evaded the payment of the tenth, and they opened up new waste lands in defiance of the provisions of the Act. The situation was accurately described in a speech of Braddell at the Straits Legislative Council in 1882.

"The cultivators, finding themselves better off under the Pengulus, with whom (when they had no written titles registered in the (Land) Office, and followed by regular demands for the rent expressed in the title deed), they were able to evade payment of the tenths, still refused to take titles, and continued to occupy old lands and to open up other lands with impunity, owing to the weakness of the Land Department, which was provided with so few, and such inefficient officers, that there was no regular supervision, and when any person was found encroaching on the Crown Lands he was all ready with the excuse that the land was prescriptive tenant land." (62)

(57) J. R. A. S. B., XIII, 162.
(60) Cavenagh. "Reminiscences," 266.
(61) S. S. Administration Report, 1862-63, pp. 12-13, 34.

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One of the principal objects of the Act of 1861 had been to end this practice; but the failure to make a complete survey defeated this aim, since the number and extent of the holdings existing in 1861 were not ascertained. It was therefore impossible to check the encroachments on the Waste Lands which were made in subsequent years.

The Malacca land-problem was still unsolved a quarter of a century after the passage of the Act of 1861. Sir William Maxwell's comments on the situation as it existed in 1884, the date at which he wrote, showed that from the point of view of obtaining revenue, the position of the Government was not much better than it had been in 1839. The fundamental cause of the trouble he ascribed to this, that the Malay system of land tenure and revenue in Malacca had never been properly ascertained and codified. As a result it had always been, and in 1884 still was, more or less unworkable under English law. (63) The situation was still what Fullerton feared it might become when he wrote his prophetic Minute of 1829 already quoted. Owing to the absence of a survey, the condition was steadily extended over the Waste Lands. To quote Maxwell again:

"though the native revenue system cannot be satisfactorily worked, for want of power to exact the tenth, the officials have been unable to oblige the people to adopt the English tenure, because lands, really only recently brought under cultivation, cannot always be proved not to be old holdings under the native tenure." (64)

This concludes the history of the Malacca land problem, so far as it lies within the scope of this thesis. It was born of misconception, it lived in travail and tribulation, and it closed in failure. Consistent throughout, it was one unending chronicle of excellent intentions and faulty execution, of disappointed hopes and continual losses—the most depressing chapter in the history of British Malaya.

CHAPTER VII.

The Naning War, 1831-32.

Apart from the perennial land problem, the Naning War was the only event of importance in the history of Malacca during the period 1824 to 1867. The episode was an egregious blunder. Hasty action based on insufficient and incorrect information led to two military expeditions whose exploits bordered on the farcical. The result was that after nine months' campaign twelve hundred Indian troops overcame a few hundred badly-armed Malays, and obtained for the Company an annual revenue of perhaps $100 at a cost of £100,000. While the disloyal intrigues of Dutch merchants at Malacca were partly responsible for the war, an almost equal share of the blame must be borne by Fullerton, the Governor of the Straits Settlements, and Lewis, the Superintendent of Lands at Malacca.

Naning was a small inland state of about 200 square miles, between Kempang and Malacca Territory, and only about ten miles from the town of Malacca. By the census of 1829 the population was estimated at 4875 Malays, of whom some 1200 were men able to bear arms. (1) Crawfurd described it as "a poor unprofitable possession, for the most part covered with jungle." (2) It produced rice, tin and such typical Straits products as rattans, gambier and fruit. The annual revenue was about $3,000. (3)

This little state was one of the first to be founded by the great influx of Malays from Menangkabau in Sumatra in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and was one of the earliest members of the loose confederacy which later became known as the Negri Sembilan. Like its neighbours, it acknowledged the suzerainty of the Sultan of Johore. (4) During the eighteenth century Naning became virtually independent of Johore, like the other principalities in Negri Sembilan; and in 1757 the Sultan of Johore ceded his nominal rights of suzerainty to the Dutch. (5)

Over a century earlier however Naning had become to some extent a Dutch dependency. How complete the subjection was is still uncertain, owing to the ravages of time and white ants in the Dutch records at Malacca. The evidence which is available however seems to prove that it was more nominal than real. In

(3) Moor "Notices of the India Archipelago," article by Lieutenant Newbold, 246-54.

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1643 a Dutch force invaded Nanjing and obtained a treaty by which the Malays bound themselves to pay a yearly tribute of one tenth of their produce. The chiefs were to come annually to Malacca to do homage, and were to accept Dutch advice in carrying on the government. Despite this treaty however, the Dutch of Malacca seem to have lived in no small dread of the "traitorous and merciless Menangkabows."(6) In the eighteenth century the chiefstainships became hereditary in the family of Abdul Said, the ruler against whom the war of 1831-32 was fought; but each chief before his accession was confirmed by the Dutch.(7)

In spite of the Dutch rights their suzerainty was apparently much more nominal in practice than in theory. The Malays bitterly resented the necessity of paying a tenth of their crops as tribute, and the Dutch found themselves unable to collect by peaceful means more than a small fraction of the full amount. They did not attempt to enforce their legal rights by conquering Nanjing, because they saw that no revenue which could possibly be obtained from such a small and poor state would repay the cost of a war. About 1765 the Dutch commuted the tenth to a nominal yearly tribute, of 400 guntangs or quart measures of paddy, about one thousandth of the total crops.(8) Braddell, a Straits official who made a careful study of the Dutch records at Malacca, believed that they rarely interfered with the internal government of Nanjing, which was exclusively managed, even to matters of life and death, by its Malay chiefs. In support of his contention Braddell pointed out the significant fact that while the whole of Malacca Territory was granted out to the Proprietors, none of Nanjing was thus treated.(9) Wilkinson agrees with Braddell's opinion of the Dutch position in Nanjing.(10) In short, while the Dutch described Nanjing as part of Malacca Territory, in practice they seem to have contented themselves with a nominal suzerainty. At the same time the legal rights given to the Dutch by the treaty of 1643 to control the administration and receive the full tenth continued to exist on paper. The mistake made by Governor Fullerton and his Council was that they failed to realize that these rights had become obsolete from long disuse, so that the Malays had forgotten that they had ever existed.

During the first British occupation of Malacca, from 1795 to 1818, Nanjing was regarded as part of the conquered territory but little attention was paid to it except that in 1801 a treaty was made with Abdul Said, the new Penghulu or chief of Nanjing, by Colonel Taylor, the British Resident at Malacca. By this engage-


ment Nanning promised that it would be faithful and obedient, would commit no act of hostility against the Company, and would trade only with Malacca. Article III distinctly affirmed the right of the British to receive a tenth of all produce, although on account of the poverty of the people it was commuted to a yearly payment of 400 gantangs of paddy, (the same tribute which the Dutch had received). This was to be paid as a token of submission when the Penghulu or one of his chiefs came to Malacca to pay his annual homage.\(^{(11)}\) It was also declared that whenever the post of Penghulu became vacant, the British could either confirm the Malay candidate or appoint some other person instead. This treaty was later regarded by Governor Fullerton as a clear proof that Nanning was an integral part of Malacca; but Braddel took an opposite view. He contended that it showed that "Nanning was treated rather as a protected state than as part of Malacca, as the European governments in these countries do not make treaties with their own subjects."\(^{(12)}\) The Penghulu "continued to exercise exclusive jurisdiction in Nanning, even to the power of life and death as before, till 1807." when Farquhar, the British Resident at Malacca, deprived him of the power of passing the death sentence. Apart from this no change was made.\(^{(13)}\) There appears to be no evidence to show that the Penghulu or his chiefs came to Malacca during this period to pay their yearly homage.

Matters remained in this condition until 1827, when Governor Fullerton began his investigations into the land questions of Malacca Territory. His attention was naturally attracted to Nanning, and since little was known about it he ordered Lewis, the Superintendent of Lands at Malacca, to make inquiries into its status, and the form of land-tenure prevailing there.\(^{(14)}\) Lewis was the well-intentioned evil genius of the Nanning War. An examination of the Straits records from 1828 to 1831 shows that he was one of the warmest advocates of the full exercise of every British legal right in Nanning. He was also stirred to indignation by the tyranny which the Penghulu practised upon his subjects, and urged British intervention to protect them. He completely misjudged the Malays' attitude for he believed that there would be no resistance, and that they would welcome liberation from their tyrant. As a matter of fact, this was the very last thing they wanted, and they fought hard to prevent it. Lewis unfortunately had great influence with the Governor, and his advice overbore the opinions of the members of the Penang Council, who opposed the rigorous enforcement of the Company's legal rights.\(^{(15)}\)

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\(^{(11)}\) Aitchison, "'Treaty,'" I, 395-96.
\(^{(13)}\) Ibid., 199.
\(^{(15)}\) For Lewis' character and influence v. especially his despatches in S. S. R., 169; passim; and B. Pol., Range 126. Vol. 4: Oct. 23, 1829, No. 2-5.

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personality of Governor Fullerton seems also to have much influence in shaping the course of the negotiation with Naning. Fullerton was a man of vigorous and determined character, who preferred an aggressive to a passive policy whenever possible. He was also something of a legalist; once he had ascertained that the Dutch had possessed certain theoretical rights, he regarded it as sufficient reason for the Company to exercise them; and he waved aside as irrelevant the fact that they had not been enforced for an indefinite period. Another factor which contributed largely to the Council's mistaken policy was insufficient information. Lewis began his investigations into the status of Naning in 1827, but his final report was not submitted until March 11, 1829. (1*) Meanwhile the Council had to decide on its policy by means of the partial reports which he submitted from time to time. Unfortunately his information was not only incomplete, but was also misleading. In 1831, after the war had broken out, Ibbitson, Fullerton's successor, had the Dutch records reexamined. He then found that Lewis and Fullerton had been mistaken in contending that Naning was an integral part of Malacca Territory, and was fully under British sovereignty. Fullerton's opponents on the Penang Council were shown to have been correct when they opposed the Governor's policy. (17) If the facts discovered in 1831 had come to light three years earlier, the Naning War would never have occurred.

Abdul Said, the Penghulu of Naning, was not the man to submit to the curtailment of his powers. He enjoyed the reputation of being a man of unusual sanctity, both among his own people and the Malays of the neighbouring states. Arrogant and ambitious, he exploited the veneration of the Malays, and aped the titles and practices of Mansur Shah, the great fifteenth century Sultan under whom the Empire of Malacca had reached the height of its glory. (18*) Furthermore Abdul Said was deceived to his own undoing by designating counsellors, some of whom were Dutch merchants of Malacca. They encouraged him to refuse the demands of the Company, persuading him that Fullerton's orders were the irresponsible actions of a subordinate official, whose superiors would never allow him to go to war. They wished to bring on a war, because of the great profit which they would make by selling stores to the troops. (19*)

The first important discussion of the status of Naning took place at a meeting of the Penang Council on January 30, 1828. Lewis submitted a report on the Dutch archives so far as he had examined them. The irreconcilable division of opinion as to the position of Naning, which continued throughout the next three years, manifested itself at this first meeting. Garling, the Resident


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Councillor of Malacca, argued that the evidence, incomplete though it was, "rather favours the independence of Nanjing." He could see no ground on which the Company could claim the sovereignty, demand the tenth, or extend the jurisdiction of the Recorder’s Court to Nanjing. Fullerton was convinced that Nanjing was as completely under British sovereignty as Malacca Territory. Far from being a tributary ruler, the Penghulu was, like the other Penghulus of Malacca Territory, a petty revenue and police officer for his own district. The Governor believed that the Company had full right to levy the tenth, and to extend to Nanjing the jurisdiction of the Recorder’s Court. For the time being however he decided to let matters remain as they were, and to refrain from attempts to levy the tenth or assert the Court’s jurisdiction.\(^{(20)}\)

For several months this policy was adhered to; but in July 1828 Lewis, the Superintendent of Lands at Malacca, urged that for financial reasons Nanjing should no longer be exempt from the tenth. The tenth levied on the crops of Malacca Territory was collected when the Malays brought their produce to the town of Malacca for sale. The crops of Nanjing came to the same market, and it was hard to distinguish between them. In consequence, much Malacca produce was likely to escape the tax. Furthermore he estimated the Nanjing tenth to be worth about $4500 a year, a welcome addition to the revenue. He therefore advised that small pensions be given to the Penghulus and minor chiefs of Nanjing, to induce them to act as the Company’s local revenue-officers.\(^{(21)}\) This despatch persuaded Fullerton to alter his Nanjing policy, owing to Lewis’ representations that Nanjing could be brought under the same system of administration as Malacca Territory by amicable arrangements with the Penghulu.\(^{(22)}\) The Governor therefore directed that Lewis should levy the tenth on Nanjing, and that small pensions should be given to the Penghulu and Sukus (the four assistant-chiefs). In return they were to perform the duties of the other penghulus in Malacca Territory, viz., to collect the tenth and maintain order in their own districts.\(^{(23)}\)

Lewis was sent to Nanjing to carry out the desired arrangements. The Penghulu and the other chiefs were anxious that their jurisdiction should not be interfered with, and were strongly opposed to the tenth. Lewis held out no hopes of their prayers being granted. He discovered that the rayaits were ground down by an incredible degree of tyranny and oppression, and felt "persuaded that the inhabitants will quietly acquiesce in the order."\(^{(24)}\) On

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November 10, 1828 the Straits Government approved Lewis’ communications to the Penghulu.\(^{(25)}\)

Lewis himself was too much occupied with the Malacca land-settlement to return to Nanking, but he sent his agents to collect the tenth. They met with such opposition that they asked that sepoys might be sent for their protection. There was a division of opinion in the Penang Council on the advisability of sending troops, some of the members being as before far from convinced that the Company had any right to levy the tenth. It was decided that the Land Department should try to persuade the people to pay, but should not use troops to compel them. If the Malays refused to do so, the matter was to be left in abeyance until the arrival of Fullerton at Malacca in a few weeks’ time.\(^{(26)}\) Braddell considered that “this delay and hesitation had a bad effect, as it inflamed the mind of the Penghulu, and laid the foundation for the resistance which was afterwards experienced.”\(^{(27)}\)

Shortly before this time, in December 1828, an event occurred which made the Governor and Lewis still more determined to bring Nanning under the complete control of Malacca. A murder was committed in Nanning, and the Penghulu vindicated the ends of justice by killing the family of the victim.\(^{(28)}\) The Penang Council regarded his action as illegal, since at various times the Dutch had forbidden the Penghulu of Nanning to try cases of murder, and in 1807 Farquhar, the Resident of Malacca, had repeated the prohibition.\(^{(29)}\) No action was taken however, because it would probably have led to further injury to the family of the murdered man, since the Company had no officials in Nanning; but the Penghulu was informed that in future such cases must be tried at Malacca.\(^{(30)}\)

On February 2, 1829, another meeting of the Council was held to decide what policy should be adopted in view of the refusal to pay the tenth and the Penghulu’s usurpation of judicial functions.\(^{(31)}\) The only result was to reaffirm the sharp cleavage of opinion which had already shown itself, and to make it evident that no one knew the exact relation in which Nanning stood to Malacca. Both Garling and Anderson, members of Council with much greater experience of Malaya than the Governor, were inclined to believe that the records might not tell the whole story. They felt that as in many Malay states, the chief might possess certain customary or understood powers which had never been enshrined in a legal

\(^{(25)}\) Ibid., 168: Nov. 10, 1828.
\(^{(26)}\) Ibid., 169: Jan. 6, Feb. 11, and March 11, 1829.
\(^{(27)}\) J. I. A. N. S., I, 201. T. Braddell.
document, but which were none the less genuine. They doubted whether the Company had the right to levy the tenth, or to extend the jurisdiction of the Straits Court over Nanning. Even if the chiefs' powers were usurped, it would appear that they had been enjoyed for about a century without interference from either the Dutch or British beyond "a trifling or merely nominal tribute." Allowance should therefore be made for the chiefs' recalcitrance, and for their objections to a policy "which would at once deprive them of all the authority hitherto possessed by them, and level them with the common stipendiary officers of police . . . . in the Malacca District."

Fullerton refused to consider anything except the actual documentary evidence which Lewis had collected. From this he concluded that Nanning was an integral part of Malacca Territory, entirely subject to the Company's sovereignty, and the Penghulu a glorified village headman. Whatever additional powers he might be exercising were due not to "the supposed existence of certain hereditary feudal rights," but to usurpation. The Governor proposed to take away these "usurped" powers, and retain the Penghulu and his four Sukus in office as revenue collectors and constables in their own districts. Pensions might perhaps be given them by way of compensation; but if they proved disobedient, or unwilling to serve under the new conditions, they would be dismissed, and others appointed. This policy was not to be enforced immediately; but the raayats were to be informed that the Penghulu no longer possessed jurisdiction over them, and encouraged to appeal to the Courts. It could then be settled whether it was the Company or the Penghulu who possessed the rights of jurisdiction and of levying the tenth.

In March 1829 Lewis submitted the final report on his investigations of the Dutch archives, and another meeting of the Council was held. The report convinced Fullerton that his previous convictions were correct, and that his colleagues were in the wrong. He decided however to leave the existing state of affairs unaltered until the death of Abdul Said, and to refer the question of the tenth to the Directors.\(^{32}\) A despatch was sent detailing the difference of opinion which existed in the Council, and asking the Directors to decide whether Nanning was an integral part of Malacca, and therefore subject to the tenth and to the jurisdiction of the Court. In the meantime the collection of the tenth was suspended.\(^{33}\)

During Fullerton's visit to Malacca he summoned Abdul Said to meet him, but the Penghulu refused to come. The Governor was now forced to return to Penang to meet the Governor-General of India, the Penghulu still remaining recalcitrant.\(^{34}\) In May Abdul Said advanced a step further in his opposition to the Govern-

\(^{32}\) Ibid., 169: March 11, 1829.
\(^{33}\) Ibid., 184: Letters to the Directors of April 18 and May 2, 1829.
\(^{34}\) Ibid., 169: March 11 and 20, and May 18, 1829.
ment, and began covertly to impede the process of taking the census, and to other attempts of the Land Department to intervene in the internal administration of Naning. By the Governor's orders, Church, the Deputy-Resident of Malacca, was sent to Naning in July 1829, with a guard of sepoys. A body of troops was also held in readiness. He was instructed to tell the Penghulu that disobedience would entail his deposition, and to insist that the census be taken. Abdul Said was to be reassured if possible that the Company had no desire to interfere with his personal liberty; but he was to be told that Naning was an integral part of Malacca, subject to the same regulations. For the time being the collection of the tenth was deferred, but no guarantee was given that this policy would be continued. Church was also instructed not to agitate the vexed question of the Court's jurisdiction, and the consequent continuance or otherwise of the chiefs' hitherto sovereign authority. He was to inform the Penghulu that the Company would not interfere needlessly in Naning, but that if it were compelled to do so he must obey.

Church's mission was on the whole satisfactory. He reported that there was reason to believe that the Penghulu's insubordination had been chiefly caused by inhabitants of Malacca, who took every opportunity of deluding him with exaggerated stories of the intentions of Government, until he became terrified, fearing that his liberty was in danger. Church believed that he had succeeded in allaying Abdul Said fears. The Penghulu was also dissatisfied because he feared that the Recorder's Court intended to destroy his authority by taking away his judicial powers. Should this be attempted, Church anticipated resistance, since the Malays' veneration for him was so great that they would rise to a man. Temporarily however, good relations were reestablished; the Government's orders were obeyed, and the census taken. So complete was the change that Church was able to travel through Naning and collect much information, which he submitted with his report. Fullerton was unable to revisit Malacca until October 19, 1829; and by that time the efforts of the Penghulu's evil advisers had succeeded in undoing the good results of Church's mission. Abdul Said refused to come to Malacca, and meet the Governor, thereby putting himself in open opposition to the Company. He also sent embassies to the adjacent states, and prepared for war. Fullerton collected an expeditionary force to invade Naning; but at the last moment he concommoded it since the dissentient members of the Council refused to agree with him. They were still unconvinced that the Penghulu was so entirely subject to the Company or that his conduct warranted an invasion, and they recommended negotiations.

(35) Ibid., 129: May 18, 1829.
(36) Ibid., 169: June 22 and 25, 1829. Ibid., 129: June 8 and July 7, 1829.

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The Governor laid the matter before the Supreme Government, expecting a reply within two months. The Indian Government however referred it to the Directors, so that almost two years elapsed before an answer was received. (38)

The change of policy made war inevitable. The destination of the force had been well known, and when the attack was countermanded Abdul Said interpreted it as a sign of weakness. Braddell commented as follows.

"The English power had not been directly exercised in these seas for ages. It had been taken on trust, as reflected from India and very recently from Burmah; and now on the first appearance of opposition the authorities hesitated. That this hesitation arose from any cause but fear, was not considered for an instant as possible, and in consequence,......

the Penghulu......became so elevated......that he threw off the air of reserve and respectful assistance which he had hitherto worn." (39)

It was not long before Abdul Said signalised his new attitude by openly flouting the Company. In October 1830 he seized the fruit of certain trees claimed by Inche Surin, a Malay Proprietary in Malacca Territory who had recently transferred his holding to the Government under Fullerton's land-redemption scheme of 1828. Inche Surin's holding lay outside the boundaries of Nanjing, and there were documents to show that Surin's ancestors had held it from at least as early as 1723. Abdul Said however claimed the particular trees and the ground on which they stood, and when the Straits Government ordered him to withdraw he refused to obey. Had the Court been sitting at the time, this open and contemptuous defiance would have at once precipitated a crisis, since when judgement had been given, the administration must have protected the officers of the court sent to evict the Penghulu's followers. As it happened however the Recorder had left for England, and no successor had yet arrived. Moreover the Directors' reply to Fullerton's despatch of 1829 had not been received, and the Penang Presidency had recently been abolished. Ibbetson, the new Governor could not undertake so heavy a responsibility as the ejection would involve without orders from India, and therefore no active steps were taken. (40)

The despatch from the Directors with instructions regarding the policy to be pursued towards Nanjing was not received until the following year, 1831. The Directors' letter, which was dated June 2, 1830, supported Fullerton's view that the Company possessed sovereign rights over Nanjing. It was therefore subject to the levy

(38) J. I. A. N. S., 1, 203-4. T. Braddell. The original documents untraceable in the Straits Settlements and Bengal Archives.
(39) J. I. A. N. S., 1, 204. T. Braddell

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of the tenth and to the jurisdiction of the Straits Court. To avoid the possibility of war, however, the Directors approved Fullerton's policy of not insisting upon these rights for the time being.\(^{(41)}\)

On January 17, 1831, Ibbetson wrote to the Supreme Government that it was now too late to follow the Directors' instructions to preserve peace by remitting the tenth during Abdul Said's lifetime. His successful defiance would encourage the natives of Malacca to refuse to pay the tenth, and furthermore the concession would be useless, since he had now gone too far to retreat, and had been obdurate to all the Government's overtures. Ibbetson advised that troops he sent into Nanning to collect the tenth, and put an end once and for all to the Penghulu's disobedience, a course to which he believed the Malays would offer no resistance.\(^{(42)}\) The Supreme Government replied on April 2, 1831, giving the Governor discretion to act as he thought best.\(^{(43)}\) A last unsuccessful attempt was made to persuade the Penghulu to give way but he refused all terms short of actual independence.\(^{(44)}\)

Preparations were then, in July 1831, publicly made at Malacca for the despatch of an expedition to Tabeh, Abdul Said's capital. No serious resistance was anticipated. So the force consisted only of 150 sepoys, and two six-pounders drawn by bullocks. The troops were almost entirely ignorant of the topography of Nanning, and were too weak to leave detachments to keep open the line of communications. Nanning proved to be an undulating country covered with dense jungle except in the valleys, where the sepoys had to wade through marshes and rice-swamps. There were no roads, and only an occasional path so narrow that hours of work were required to get the guns along. The Malays followed their usual tactics of refusing a pitched battle; but harassed the column from ambush, and finally cut the line of communications. Supplies ran short, and the troops retreated to Malacca. The Malays attacked the retreating column, felling great trees across the path, and the two guns had to be spiked and abandoned.\(^{(45)}\)

The British defeat was in large part due to the assistance which the Penghulu had received from Remban, a small state in the Negri Sembilan which lay on the borders of Nanning. Abdul Said had deceived Raja Ali, its ruler, into believing that the Company intended to conquer Remban as soon as Nanning had been overcome. Accordingly Raja Ali sent his son-in-law Saiyid Shaaban, and several hundred Malays, to help the Penghulu.\(^{(46)}\)

\(^{(41)}\) Public Letters to Bengal, 1830-31, Vol. 14: June 2, 1830, No. 18.

\(^{(42)}\) B. Pol., Range 126, Vol. 27: April 2, 1831.

\(^{(43)}\) Ibid.


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So startled was the Governor of the Straits Settlements at this unexpected event that he at first believed that he was faced by a confederacy of all the neighbouring states. There seems to be no evidence however that Nanning was joined by any state except Rembau. Ibbetson asked for reinforcements, and for permission to form an alliance with Rembau in order to detach it from its ally.

This unexpected reverse also stimulated the Straits Government to further researches into the Malacca Archives. The results were enlightening, but not altogether pleasant, since they showed the policy of Fullerton and Lewis had been in the wrong, while their critics Garling and Anderson had been correct. It was discovered that by about 1765 the Dutch had decided that it was too expensive to conquer Nanning in order to exact the tenth, and had commuted it into a small annual tribute. When the British attempted to collect the full tenth the Malays looked on it as a breach of faith, and feared that after Nanning had been conquered the same tax would be levied upon the adjacent states. As a result Rembau joined Nanning in resisting the British attack.

When the Indian Government learned that the blunders of the Straits administration had provoked an expensive and unprofitable war, it took no pains to conceal its displeasure. Ibbetson's proposal to form an alliance with Rembau was approved and the necessary reinforcements were sent, since the Bengal Council realized that to restore British prestige the campaign had to be carried to a successful conclusion, "worthless as the object" was. "We have hitherto been entirely misled by the erroneous information in those Settlements, otherwise we should never have been drawn into this useless warfare for a worthless object. We cannot now in policy recede from it without establishing our superiority."  

From September to January the rains made campaigning impossible, and the time was spent in negotiations with Rembau. Raja Ali was finally convinced that the Company had no desire to attack him, and he realized that in the end it would win. On January 28, 1832, a treaty was made between the Company and Assurances were given that neither would attack the other, and the Company renounced whatever claims it might have had to suzerainty over Rembau by virtue of the old Dutch rights. Rembau was thus recognized as an independent sovereign state. In

(49) B. S. and P. Vol. 363: Nov. 25, 1831, Nos. 69-70.

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return Raja Ali withdrew his contingent from Nanning whose force was thus reduced to about 600 men, and a few months later sent it to join the British troops. (51)

In March 1832 the campaign reopened. From Malacca to Taboh, the capital of Nanning, was twenty-two miles, for the last twelve of which there was no road. The strategy of Colonel Herbert, who commanded the British force, was not brilliant, though it was solid and slow. He cut a road 600 feet wide all the way to Taboh felling trees, burning the undergrowth, and filling up the swamps. The rate of advance was about three to four miles a month. The Malays rarely made a stand, contenting themselves with harassing the covering parties who were sent into the jungle to protect the pioneers and convicts engaged in cutting the road. Neither side suffered much loss. The Penghulu’s force never exceeded a few hundred at most, and was greatly inferior in numbers to the invaders who had 1200 to 1400 men; but Colonel Herbert, who might perhaps be charitably described as nervous, painted gloomy pictures of his perilous condition, harassed by “prodigious numbers” of the enemy, and with his force reduced to the defensive. At the end of April Saiyid Shaaban, the son-in-law of Raja Ali, arrived with a force of Malays, and in a few weeks transformed the situation. Well-informed by his spies of the enemy’s movements, he was able to capture their stockades when they were left temporarily undefended, owing to the Malays’ habit of making periodical trips to their farms. In June Taboh was captured, Abdul Said and his chiefs took to flight, and the resistance of Nanning collapsed. (52) The troops were gradually withdrawn, and by April 1834 the garrison of the Straits had been reduced to the same strength as before the war. (53)

The Government was by no means anxious to retain Nanning, since it was clear that the revenue would not equal the expenses for many years if ever. (54) The country was offered to Raja Ali of Rembau in return for his services, but he refused it, saying that he had enough land already and preferred to receive his reward in a more tangible form. (55) It was therefore decided to make Nanning an integral part of Malacca Territory, subject to the Recorder’s


Court and the tenth. The offices of Penghulu and Suku were abolished, and the country was placed under a Superintendent, who was a gentleman of Dutch descent in Malacca. He was assisted by fifteen village headmen, each of whom collected the taxes and maintained law and order in his own district.\(^{(34)}\)

Abdul Said fled on the fall of Taboh to the neighbouring states, but willingly surrendered on the promise of pardon. The Company gave him a house and gardens, a pension of Rs.100 a month, and liberty to live freely in Malacca so long as he did not intrigue or try to run away.\(^{(37)}\) By the unique expedient of involving the Company in a war which cost it £100,000 Abdul Said obtained an assured income of larger amount than he had ever had before. The Malays still regarded him with deep veneration, and the old man turned it to good account by setting up in business as a farmer, trader, and doctor. His ventures were successful, and in 1849 he died in the odour of sanctity.\(^{(58)}\) It is said that the generous treatment of Abdul Said did more to strengthen British influence in the Malay states than the successful issue of the war.\(^{(59)}\) Save for a small revenue which did not cover the cost of administering Nanking, this was all the Company had to show for an expenditure of £100,000.\(^{(60)}\)


\(^{(59)}\) Ibid., 217.


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CHAPTER VIII

Anglo-Siamese Relations in the Malay Peninsula, 1824-1867.

During the first quarter of the nineteenth century the Governors of Penang feared, and with reason, that a great part of the Malay Peninsula would come under the yoke of Siam. By about 1800 Siam had completely recovered from the Burmese invasion and, more powerful perhaps than at any previous period of its history, at once resumed the traditional policy of establishing its supremacy over the Malay States of the Peninsula. Over some of them, as for example Kedah, the government of Bangkok could claim a vague but undeniable right of suzerainty, based on "ancient aggression and present power." (1) Siam was also determined however to extent its authority over states like Perak and Selangor which had never been under its control. The policy of Siam was, in short, to conquer the whole Peninsula,(2) acting on the time-honoured principle of Asiatic monarchies that the stronger has the right to subdue the weaker power.

The East India Company was wedded to the policy of non-intervention in Malayan affairs,(3) and for as long as possible it refrained from interfering with Siam's designs. The logic of events however proved too strong for it, and at last the Company with great reluctance found itself compelled to intervene. The causes of this change of policy were twofold, the Siamese conquest of Kedah in 1821, and the unfair treatment of British merchants at Bangkok.

Kedah, from its situation on the Siamese frontier, was naturally the first state to suffer from the policy of Bangkok. The Sultans were the allies of the Company, and between 1786 and 1821 they frequently complained of the heavy and—as they said—unprecedented demands for men and supplies periodically made upon them. Owing to the weakness of Kedah they were unable to resist, and they pressed for the defensive alliance which they contended the Company had promised in return for the cession of Penang in 1786.(4) The Supreme Government however denied that any

(1) For an examination of the Siamese claims to Kedah v. chapter on Penang.
(3) v. chapter on Native Policy.

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pledge to this effect had ever been given. It felt that it could not interfere between a suzerain and a dependent state, and thereby encourage the Sultan "to renounce his vassalage." The Sultans' demands for an alliance were therefore rejected, and the Penang Council was forbidden to protect Kedah against Siam.\(^5\) At the same time it was authorised to negotiate with the government at Bangkok when it should judge the occasion propitious to secure a revision of the Siamese demands on Kedah "on principles of equity, with reference to the resources of the kingdom."\(^6\) The Council did not avail itself of this permission.\(^7\)

In 1818 the Sultan of Kedah was compelled by Siam to conquer Perak and force it to send the Bunga Mas to Bangkok. This was an act of pure aggression, since Perak had always been entirely independent of Siam, and there was no cause of quarrel between it and Kedah. The object of the policy was to weaken both states so that they would fall an easy prey.\(^8\)

Three years later Kedah's own turn came. As long as the government at Bangkok feared that an attack on it might involve war with the British, Kedah was safe. Once assured however that there was nothing to fear in that quarter, there was no further hesitation.\(^9\) The Sultan of Kedah had been remiss in sending the Bunga Mas, and he had not complied with various demands for supplies and money. He was also accused by his brother and other enemies of intriguing with Burma. The Sultan received orders to come to Bangkok and justify himself, but fearing for life he prudently refused to obey.\(^10\) In 1821 a Siamese army made a sudden attack upon Kedah, and conquered it after a short campaign. The country was laid waste, and the atrocities committed were barbarous to a degree. Thousands of fugitives fled to Province Wellesley, while the Sultan himself escaped to Penang.\(^11\) The Siamese pursued the refugees into Province Wellesley, but the despatch of a company of Sepoys sent the whole army hurrying back to Kedah.\(^12\) The Raja of Ligor, the Siamese commander, sent an insolent letter to the Governor of Penang, demanding the surrender of the Sultan, with the veiled threat to attack the island unless he complied.\(^13\) The Governor firmly refused, and there-

\(^{(5)}\) Ibid., S. S. R., 66: June 22, 1818. Ibid. 83: Jan. 31, 1811.
\(^{(6)}\) Ibid., 81: Feb. 25, 1814.
\(^{(7)}\) Ibid., 66: June 22, 1818. Ibid., 83: Sept. 21, 1818.
\(^{(9)}\) Swettenham, "British Malaya," 45-46.
\(^{(10)}\) Alchinon, "Treaties," I, 388. Burney MS. D. XXVI.
\(^{(13)}\) Ibid.
after the Raja was much more humble in his behaviour towards the Company. (14)

The dethroned Sultan asked the Company to restore him, contending that it was bound to do so by the agreement under which it had secured Penang. (15) The Supreme Government was willing to assist him by negotiations with Siam, but it refused to restore him by force. The Sultan was too weak to regain his throne unaided, and finding that he could expect no armed assistance from the British, he began to intrigue with Burma. The Court of Ava eagerly embraced the opportunity of wresting Kedah from its ancient enemy, and preparations were made for a combined attack on Siam by Burma, Kedah, Selangor and other Malay states. In return Kedah was to become a tributary of Ava. The Penang Government learned of these negotiations and was greatly displeased, since the Sultan had intrigued against Siam while under British protection, and also because Burma was regarded as an even less desirable neighbour than Siam. The Council sent the Raja of Ligor full information of the proposed attack. (16) Owing to this disclosure and to the Anglo-Burmese war which soon afterwards broke out, nothing came of these intrigues. The only result, as will be seen, was that they still further embittered the government of Siam against the Sultan, and destroyed whatever slight chance there might have been of its restoring him to his throne.

While the restoration of the dethroned Sultan was one of the motives which led the Company to enter into political relations with Siam, this was far from being the most important cause. The reasons for the step were primarily economic. In the first place, the Penang Council was afraid that the Siamese conquest of Kedah would interfere with the food supply of Penang. The attempt to make the island self-supporting had failed, and it was dependent for the greater part of its food upon Kedah. The Council was always very sensitive to any change which seemed to threaten this source of supply, and it was greatly perturbed by the possibility that Siam might place obstacles in the way of obtaining food. The Malay government had been "at times froward and troublesome," but it was always "kindly disposed" and "easily dealt with." The Council seems greatly to have overrated the power of the Siamese, and it anticipated much trouble from them because, through their "insolence and haughtiness," they "could only be held in check by the strong arm of power." (17)

The Council also wished to secure the revision of the Siamese commercial regulations, since they greatly hampered the development of trade. The commerce of Penang with Siam began about 1817, and in 1820-21 was valued at £207,750, an increase of almost

(14) Ibid.
(17) S. S. B., 81: passim. Ibid., 83: Nov. 28, 1821.

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39% in three years. The principal import from Siam was sugar, while the most important exports were opium and piece-goods (i.e., cotton and other cloths) from India. The Penang Council rightly judged that under more favourable customs regulations the trade was capable of great expansion. In addition to the direct trade with Bangkok, Penang had an important trade in tin with Perak, Patani, Ujong Salang, and other Siamese dependencies. Siam greatly hampered the trade with Ujong Salang, the principal source of supply, and the Penang Council wished to improve conditions by sending a mission to Bangkok.\(^{(18)}\)

With the permission of the Supreme Government letters and presents were sent to Bangkok in 1818 and 1819 expressing the profound veneration which affected the East India Company whenever it thought of the "Lord of the white Elephant," and diplomatically suggesting a revision of the conditions under which trade was carried on at Bangkok.\(^{(19)}\) As a result of representations from Penang the Government of India gave permission to send an envoy to Bangkok for commercial purposes only.\(^{(20)}\) In 1821 Phillips, the Governor of Penang, sent to Bangkok a Singapore merchant named Morgan, ostensibly as a private trader, but really as a secret agent of the Company, to collect information and sound the Siamese ministers on the possibility of improving commercial relations. The Siamese were inordinately suspicious of Europeans, and it was felt that this mode of procedure was the least likely to awaken their hostility.\(^{(21)}\)

At the time of Morgan's despatch the Supreme Government was preparing to send a mission to Bangkok and Cochin-China. The envoy selected was John Crawfurd, a member of the Bengal Medical Service who had been many years in the East Indies, and was one of the leading authorities of the day on Malayan affairs.\(^{(22)}\) The objects of the mission were primarily commercial, the political aims, such as the restoration of the Sultan of Kedah, being emphatically minor points. In his Instructions to Crawfurd the Governor-General emphasized that the first object of the mission was to allay the "very general fear and distrust of Europeans, highly detrimental to the interests of commerce," which was "predominant" in the countries of Indo-China. Crawfurd was absolutely forbidden to ask for any of the privileges which had formed so important a part of the commercial treaties of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, such as the erection of forts or factories, extra-territorial jurisdiction, monopolies etc.\(^{(23)}\) While the establishment of a good understanding was to

\(^{(18)}\) Ibid., 66: June 22, 1818. Ibid., 83: Dec 27, 1821.
\(^{(19)}\) Ibid., Vols. 66, 81 and 83: passim.
\(^{(20)}\) Crawfurd, "Embassy to Siam," 598.
\(^{(21)}\) Ibid., 81: April 24, 1821. Ibid., 83: April 24, 1821.
\(^{(22)}\) For Crawfurd's career v. chapters on Singapore and on the Administration.
\(^{(23)}\) Crawfurd, "Embassy to Siam," Appendix B: 589-90.

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be Crawford's principal object, he was to try and place commerce "on a defined and permanent footing, so as to expose the British traders to the least possible vexation." The Government of India wished for example to substitute a fixed and known scale of duties for the unknown and often exorbitant fees which were then levied. The Government wished to benefit not merely the trade of Penang, but also that of India and Great Britain, by reviving the extensive commerce which had existed in the seventeenth century. While it did not expect that this initial attempt would be entirely successful, it trusted that Crawford would make a beginning by removing the Siamese distrust and dislike of the British.(24)

Crawford was also directed to collect as much information about Siam and Cochinchina as could be obtained without alarming the Siamese.(25) For this purpose a surveyor and a botanist were attached to the mission. During the early part of the nineteenth century Indo-China was practically a "terra incognita," and in spite of every effort, the Supreme Government was able to supply its envoy with only the vaguest details. An incident told by Crawford throws a flood of light upon the ignorance regarding Indo-China which prevailed even in the best-informed circles. While at Penang he met the captain of a Siamese trading-ship, and gathered from him "more useful and practical knowledge than all he had before obtained from printed sources."(26)

As to the restoration of the Sultan of Kedah, the Government left it entirely to Crawford's discretion whether the subject should be mentioned at all or not. It was impressed upon him that the improvement of commercial relation must not be jeopardised by the introduction of matters distasteful to Siam. Should he however perceive a favourable opportunity for securing the Sultan's restoration "by a friendly and unostentatious representation" he was instructed to take advantage of it.(27)

Before sending the mission the Governor-General asked the Penang Council to inform him of the objects which it thought desirable of attainment. In its Minute the Council concurred with the Supreme Government in regarding the restoration of the Sultan of Kedah as rather a minor matter to be mooted only if Crawford should judge that it would not endanger the establishment of improved commercial relations. The Penang Government regarded it as much more important to obtain from Siam a recognition of the Company's right to Penang. Since the island had been ceded by Kedah, it was clear that the grant was invalid, as Kedah was a dependency of Siam, and the Sultan's action had never been confirmed by his suzerain. The Minute emphasized however that the objects whose attainment the Council

(25) Ibid., 592-94.
(26) Ibid., 11.
(27) Ibid., 593-94.

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had most at heart were economic. These were the development of the growing commerce with Siam, and especially the tin-trade, by the revision of the customs regulation, and the continuance of the free importation of supplies from Kedah, "on which indeed the existence of this establishment almost depends."(28)

Crawfurd's mission was almost a complete failure, apart from the fact that he obtained much information which was of great value in subsequent negotiations. He also secured a title of a sort to Penang with which he and the Supreme Government were much pleased. The reasoning by which Crawfurd convinced the Government and himself that the Company had obtained a clear title to Penang was sufficiently curious. Wherever possible, the Siamese Ministers avoided all reference to Penang, but when they were compelled to mention it they spoke of it as a British possession. Crawfurd was quite convinced that their acquiescence in the British occupation was prompted solely by the knowledge that they were powerless to prevent it. On the grounds however that the Company had for thirty-six years held undisputed possession of the island, and that the Siamese had not questioned the validity of the occupation. Crawfurd and the Supreme Government agreed that he had "established a virtual acknowledgment of our right of sovereignty in Penang."(29)

Crawfurd tried to persuade the Siamese government to restore the Sultan of Kedah, but failed completely. The Ministers attempted to gain from him a promise that the Sultan should be handed over to them, and that the annual payment of $10,000 for Penang and Province Wellesley should in future be made to a Siamese nominee. Crawfurd utterly refused to agree, and declared that the Company would continue to protect the Sultan and to pay him the annual subsidy of $10,000. He also discovered that the conquest of Kedah in 1821 was due to the intrigues of the Prakhklang, and of Prince Kromchiat, the leaders of the most powerful faction in Siam, in alliance with the influential Raja, or Governor, of the Siamese province of Ligor.(30)

The most important result of Crawfurd's mission was the valuable information which he collected about the geography, population and resources of Siam, the character of the government, and the weakness of its powers.(31) He was much impressed by the great field which it presented for British commerce; but he pointed out that trade would be very seriously handicapped by the corrupt policy of the Ministers. European commerce to Bangkok was under the control of the Prakhklang, or Minister for Trade and Foreign Affairs, of Prince Kromchiat, who soon afterwards became

(28) S. S. R., 81: Dec. 27, 1821.
(30) S. S. R., 87: Nov. 28, 1822.
king, and of a group of able and unscrupulous Mohammedans, descendants of Indian immigrants. This faction was the most powerful party in the state, and made a very large profit out of the trade by such expedients as exorbitant duties whose amount varied with the wealth of the merchant, forced gifts, and open demands for bribes. Crawfurd stigmatised their proceeding as "most indecent." One of their favourite practices was to compel the merchant to sell them his cargo at a very low figure, and buy Siamese goods from them at a very high price, by the simple but effective expedient of forbidding all other traders to deal with him.

This powerful faction was in charge of the negotiations with Crawfurd, and since his object was to put an end to the very state of affairs from which they drew such large profits, he believed that their hostility was the principal reason for the failure of his mission. After months of tedious and evasive negotiations, in the course of which Crawfurd was subjected to as much humiliation and disrespect as the Ministers dared to inflict on him, all that he could secure was a written promise that the (unknown) amount of the duties would not be increased, and that in future British merchants should be assisted by the benevolent exertions of the Prakhlang and his satellites. In other words, traders would continue to be as much in the power of these rapacious and unscrupulous officials as in the past.\(^{22}\)

Crawfurd did not regard the presence of the Siamese in Kedah as in any way a menace to the safety of Penang, and he entirely dispelled the illusions of the strength of Siam which were held by both the Penang Council and the Supreme Government. In support of his contention he gave a description of the Siamese character which was most uncomplimentary. Its truth however was vouched for by the testimony of Burney, and every other Englishman of this period who was brought into contact with the Siamese. The national character was a peculiar blend of overweening vanity, suspicion, and an astonishing degree of cowardice. "To a character of venality and corruption we found superadded a remarkable degree of national vanity, yet with an extraordinary jealousy and distrust of all strangers, and especially Europeans." "Although essentially weak and pusillanimous," they were "vain and arrogant to such an extreme as to fancy themselves nothing less than the very first nation on the globe . . . . It is scarcely safe even to attempt to conciliate them, and thus the most moderate policy on the part of other nations will always be in danger of being construed by them into timidity, and apprehension for their own power." Yet despite its bravado, the government secretly entertained "very serious apprehensions of the power of the English." Crawfurd was convinced if the Company had opposed by force the invasion of Kedah in 1821, "the fears of the Siamese Court would have induced it

to have withdrawn its forces from Queda (Kedah), and even
forborne in future from meddling in the affairs of that state." The Siamese army was "extremely contemptible," being an undisci-
plined and ill-armed mob raised from a "cowardly and timid
people." The fortifications of Bangkok, the centre and most
vulnerable part of the empire, were "feebly and unskillfully con-
structed. Two small gun-brigs would destroy it."(33) The
Supreme Government was strongly impressed by Crawfurd's report,
and his views had great influence on its policy towards Siam during
the following years.(34)

From July 1822, the date at which Crawfurd left Bangkok,
until 1824, there were no further negotiations with Siam. Several
causes co-operated to bring about the despatch of the second mission
in 1825. One was the desire of the Indian Government to remove
the grievances of British merchants trading at Bangkok.(35) The
outbreak of the Anglo-Burmese War in 1824 also contributed to
this end. Shortly before war was declared the Supreme Govern-
ment wrote to Penang pointing out how advantageous it would
be if Siam could be induced to declare war on its ancient enemy
and thus create a diversion.(36) During the early stage of the
campaign the troops made very slow progress, and the generals in
command strongly urged the great desirability of obtaining the
co-operation of a Siamese force.(37) In 1824 two missions were
therefore sent to Ligur to persuade the Raja to send a Siamese
contingent, and whatever small boats he had for service on the
Irrawaddy. The mission were a failure, except in so far as they
cleared up a serious misconception under which the Government
of Penang had been labouring. The Council had been inclined
to regard the Raja of Ligur as a semi-independent ruler, and had
negotiated with him as such. Lieutenant Low, one of the envoys,
ascertained that he was merely a Siamese official, one of the most
powerful in Siam it was true, but still unable even to let the
British have the use of a single boat without authorization from
Bangkok.(38) The Siamese refused to declare war, and by 1825
the Supreme Government no longer needed their assistance. The
campaign was progressing well, and India had also come to the
conclusion that Siamese troops might be "an accession of weak-
ness" owing to their jealousy and arrogance, their inferiority to
the Burmese soldiery, and their "cruel and barbarous mode of
warfare." This view had been strongly urged by Crawfurd, the
late envoy, and by the Penang Council. When therefore Burney

(33) S. R., 87: Nov. 28, 1822. Crawfurd, "Embassy to Siam,"
344-46, 296-97, and passim.
(37) Ibid., 90: July 28, 1824.
(38) Ibid., 94: April 26, 1824. Ibid., 95: June 11 and 25, 1824. Ibid., 96: July 28, Sept. 6, 13 and 24, and Nov. 19, 1824. Ibid., 98.

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was sent as envoy to Siam in 1825, he was instructed to tell the Siamese Ministers that while the Indian Government was quite willing that they should declare war on Burma, there must be no co-operation between the two armies, and that the Siamese force must not operate in a district in which there were any British troops. (39)

The Indian Government had by this time abandoned another idea which it had held in the opening months of the war. This was that the restoration of the ex-Sultan of Kedah and the negotiation of a favourable commercial treaty might be obtained from Siam in return for ceding to it part of the territory on the Tenasserim Coast which the Supreme Government intended to take from Burma. The Company had at first no desire to retain these conquests, and it felt that Siam might be willing to make concessions for their restoration, as they had been Siamese territory until annexed by Burma sixty years before. (40) By the time that Burney was sent as envoy to Bangkok in 1825 the Supreme Government had changed its mind, and decided not to cede any of its conquests to Siam in return for concessions. India felt that it was impossible to hand over the conquered Burmese to their barbarous enemies, and it had also realised that the Tenasserim Coast was an important strategic position. The French had used it as a naval base in the eighteenth century; and the country lying on the frontiers of Burma and Siam, also provided a strong base of operations against both. Since it was no longer possible to avoid relations with Siam, in case of eventualities it was well to hold a position which would menace its security. (41) The Supreme Government was undecided as to which parts of its conquests should be retained. As a temporary measure they were in 1825 to 1826 placed under the control of Penang, which was ordered to organise the administration and to collect information about them. Of the Penang officials who were sent to the Tenasserim Coast, several remained permanently in its administration. (42)

While the Burmese War had caused the Supreme Government to take a much greater interest in Siam than had hitherto been the case, it seems highly improbable that the desire for Siamese assistance or for a favourable commercial treaty would have led to the despatch of the Burney mission to Bangkok in 1825. Even before India decided to send it, it had determined not to ask for a Siamese contingent; while as for obtaining a commercial treaty, Crawfurd’s failure had brought the government to the conclusion that undue precipitation was likely to defeat its own ends. The

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(40) Ibid., 94: Jan. 27, 1824. Ibid., 99, Nov. 19, 1824. Ibid., 96: May 31, 1824.
importance of the war and the desire for commercial concessions lay in this, that they predisposed the government of India to pay more attention to the representations of the Penang Council than would otherwise have been the case. The most important cause of the despatch of the Buncay mission was that Siam's attempts to subjugate Perak and Selangor happened to coincide with the arrival at Penang in August 1824 of Robert Fullerton, a Governor of decidedly different temper from his predecessors. Hitherto the Governors of the Penang Presidency had acquiesced in the Siamese claims to overlordship in Malaya. The bare official records of the proceedings of a Council are not an ideal source for evidence of character; but Governor Fullerton was a man of such strong personality that it stands out clearly even in the dry accounts of the meetings of his Council. He was able, energetic and determined, and in foreign policy his guiding principle was to protect British interests in the Malay states wherever possible. Moreover, when the orders of the Supreme Government ran counter to his plans, he was in the habit of interpreting them in a somewhat liberal spirit, so that in the end he often got his own way. Fullerton was very strongly influenced by Anderson, the leader of the anti-Siamese party at Penang—many of the Governor's despatches paraphrase or tally almost word for word with Anderson's oft-quoted pamphlet—and like him contended that Kedah was "de jure" an independent state. Fullerton set himself the task of restoring it to what he considered its legal rights, and he firmly opposed Siam's attempts to subjugate Perak and Selangor. (43) An incident which occurred in May and June of 1825 gives a more vivid picture of the Governor's character than pages of description. The Raja of Ligor had collected a fleet to conquer Selangor, and the Penang Council obtained some evidence—later shown to be erroneous—that he intended also to attack Penang. The town was put in a state of defence, but Fullerton was far from satisfied with such passive measures. Only the most vehement expostulations on the part of his Council induced him very reluctantly to forego his intention of sailing to Ligor and destroying the Siamese fleet before it left harbour. (44)

Soon after Fullerton's arrival he wrote on October 19, 1824, a despatch to the Supreme Government which foreshadowed his Malayan policy of the next three years. He strongly advocated the restoration of the ex-Sultan of Kedah as a measure "not less supported by strict justice than by sound policy," and urged in its favour arguments which read almost like an abstract of Anderson's pamphlet. Referring to the rumours that the Raja of Ligor was about to attack Selangor, the Governor insisted that it was "indispensable to the future peace and tranquillity of the Malay Peninsula" that Siam should renounce all claims to sovereignty.

(43) S.S.R., Aug. 1824-1827, Vols. 95-121 and 128-142, passim.
(44) Ibid., 101: May 12 and 19, 1825 and passim. Ibid., 102: passim.

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over every Malay state south of Patani and Kedah. Its pretensions had no legal justification, for “no act of superiority whatever has been exerted over any state South-East of Kedah within the memory of man.” Furthermore a Siamese conquest would “entirely destroy” the important British trade with the Peninsula. The Governor therefore urged that the Company should protect the Malay states by making representations to Siam. Should this method fail, it “might even warrant stronger measures.”(45)

The Supreme Government’s reply to this despatch gave the key to its Malayan policy during the years 1824 to 1827. As in the past, the Indian Government was most reluctant to make a political treaty with Siam, lest the Siamese should break it and so compel the Company to go to war. The Government would greatly have preferred to continue its former policy of avoiding all political relations with Bangkok. It recognised however that this was no longer practicable since the conquest of Kedah in 1821 had brought the two Empires into direct contact, and because it wished to obtain a share of the valuable Siamese trade. The Indian Government therefore desired to reconstitute Kedah as an independent or a feudatory state with clearly defined obligations under the ex-Sultan, in order to serve as a buffer kingdom between the Penang Presidency and Siam. The Government hoped that when the two Empires were no longer in direct contact the danger of disputes or of being entangled in Siamese affairs would disappear. The second object of the Government was by a “moderate and reasonable” policy to obtain a commercial treaty giving a “fair share of freedom and security” to British trade in Siam. Apart from this the Supreme Government wished to avoid all relations with Siam, lest they should lead to an entirely undesirable war. For this reason Fullerton’s proposal that the Company should become the protector of the Malay states with scant favour: “we fully coincide...but we entertain the strongest doubts of the practicability of inducing the arrogant and haughty Court of Siam to waive pretensions...and we question the expediency of agitating the proposition at all.”(46)

This rebuff entirely failed to quench Fullerton’s determination to protect the independence of Perak and Selangor. Perak had expelled its Siamese conquerors in 1822, mainly through the assistance of Sultan Ibrahim, the able and piratical ruler of Selangor. Ibrahim had conquered and held Perak from 1804 to 1806; and it was by the request of its Sultan that he had expelled the Siamese in 1822 and reasserted his former supremacy. The two rulers signed an agreement whereby Perak was to pay tribute to Sultan Ibrahim, and a Selangor force under Raja Hassan, a relation of Ibrahim’s, was left in the country to collect the tax.

(45) Ibid., 96: Oct. 19, 1824.
(46) Ibid., 99: Nov. 19, 1824.

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Hassan began to plunder the Perak merchants; but much as the Sultan of Perak desired to be rid of him, from fear of Siam, he endured him as the lesser of two evils. Meanwhile the Raja of Ligor, supported by the faction in Bangkok which Crawfurd had criticised so bitterly, began to make preparations for the conquest of Perak and Selangor. To secure a pretext, he forced the Sultan of Perak to sign letters asking for Siamese protection against Selangor. The weakness of Perak compelled its ruler to obey, although the last thing he wanted was to see the troops of Ligor in his country. Sultan Ibrahim of Selangor, who hated the Siamese as fervently as he admired the British, began to prepare for war, regardless of the fact that his weak and anarchical state was quite unable to resist an attack.\(^{(47)}\)

Although rumours as to the intentions of the Raja of Ligor reached Penang, the Governor did not receive reliable information about them until January 1825. He then learned that the Raja was secretly preparing a fleet to conquer Selangor and Perak.\(^{(48)}\) Fullerton had a difficult game to play. From the Indian Government’s recent despatch he knew that it would refuse to go to war to protect Perak and Selangor, and he had no authority whatever to threaten the Raja of Ligor with hostilities if he persisted in his policy.\(^{(49)}\) Fullerton however knew that the Siamese did not know this; and he counted on their timidity and fear of the British power to prevent matters from coming to a crisis. He therefore engaged in an elaborate and completely successful game of bluff. Towards the Malay states his attitude was scrupulously correct. He ordered Cracroft, the Resident of Malacca, to confine his relations with them “as much as possible to general expressions of good-will and friendship, and avoid every measure calculated in any way to commit the British Government to any new alliance or obligation of defence or guarantee.”\(^{(50)}\) Towards the Raja of Ligor Fullerton assumed a very different tone. He warned him that the British, as the inheritors of the old Dutch treaty-rights with Perak and Selangor, would be far from indifferent to an attack on them, and hinted darkly that an invasion might involve Siam in war with the Company.\(^{(51)}\) Finally, when in May 1825 information was received that the Raja’s 300 galleys were about to sail from the Trang River, Fullerton sent the gunboats at Penang to make a feint of blockading the river mouth.\(^{(52)}\) This supreme effort of bluff was successful, and the fleet never left port.

\(^{(48)}\) S. S. E., 99: Jan. 28, 1825.
\(^{(49)}\) Ibid., 99: Nov. 19, 1824. Ibid., 104: Sept. 2 and 10, 1825.
\(^{(50)}\) Ibid., 100: March 11, 1825.
\(^{(51)}\) Ibid., 100: Feb. 18 and 28, 1825. Ibid., 101: May 24, 1825.
\(^{(52)}\) Ibid., 101: May 3, 1825, and passim.

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Meanwhile an event had occurred which did much to convince the Indian Government of the necessity of sending a second embassy to Bangkok. This was the mission of Captain Burney to Ligur and the neighbouring Siamese provinces in January 1825. Captain Henry Burney was born about 1790, and was the nephew of the famous Fanny Burney, Madame d’Arblay. Appointed ensign in 1809 in a regiment of Bengal Native Infantry, he took part in the conquest of Java in 1810-11, and in 1811-14 was stationed at Penang with his regiment, the Twenty-fifth. He then returned to India, but in 1816 he came back to Penang, and was Military Secretary to the Governor from 1818 to 1824. He spent his leisure time in learning the Siamese language, and in collecting information about the politics and geography of the Malay Peninsula. With one exception, he was the only official at Penang who could speak Siamese, and he also submitted to the government some maps and reports of the Malay Peninsula. The Penang Council sent him on several missions to Kedah and Ligur, and had a very high opinion of his abilities. The Indian Government was also impressed by the valuable information which Burney had collected, and considered that in the event of a second mission to Bangkok, he was peculiarly fitted to act as envoy. Fullerton held him in high favour owing to his anti-Siamese views, and in 1825 sent him to Calcutta to advocate the despatch of a mission to Bangkok. Partly as a result of his "able and interesting reports," the Indian Government decided to do so, and appointed Burney himself as envoy. His conduct of the negotiations was perhaps as successful as was to be expected considering the great difficulties of his situation; but it gained him the enmity of Fullerton and the anti-Siamese party at Penang. On Burney's return from Bangkok in 1826 he was bitterly attacked, and preserved amongst the Burney Manuscripts is a challenge to a duel from an official at Penang. Burney was then in India, so the challenger suggested that it would be equally convenient for both if the duel were fought at Rangoon. The Indian Government had been greatly pleased by Burney's conduct of his mission, and in 1828 it appointed him one of the Commissioners for the administration of the Tenasserim Coast. Here his courage saved a British detachment from annihilation during an insurrection. Owing to his unique qualifications he was in 1830 appointed Resident at the Burmese Court. He remained there until 1837, and did valuable work in fostering the development of British trade, and investigating the history and geography of Burma.

(33) Burney MSS, passim.
(34) S. S. R., 95: pp. 357-82. Burney MSS.
(36) S. S. R., 102: May 18, 1825.

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In 1841, now a Lieutenant Colonel, he is found in London warmly defending the Company’s Kedah policy against its critics. The Directors highly approved of his efforts, and based their attitude towards the restoration of the ex-Sultan of Kedah in 1842 largely upon his recommendations.\(^{(28)}\)

Returning to Burney’s mission to Ligor in 1825, he was sent there at the request of the Indian Government to ascertain the attitude of Siam towards the Burmese war and the recent British conquests on the Tenasserim Coast. He was also instructed to discover the views of the Raja of Ligor on Kedah, the negotiation of a commercial treaty with Siam, and the despatch of a mission to Bangkok. Furthermore he was to find out whether the Raja was a semi-independent ruler, or a mere official “implicitly bound and actually obeying the dictates” of his superiors.\(^{(69)}\)

Burney entirely confirmed the report of the mission of 1824, that the Raja of Ligor was not a semi-independent chief in, but merely an official appointed by the Emperor of Siam. His power indeed was great, but on pain of death he dared not negotiate with Europeans. The attempts of the Penang Council in previous years to restore the ex-Sultan of Kedah by negotiating with him had been doomed to failure. The only chance of success lay in dealing directly with the Emperor of Siam. Burney also confirmed Crawford’s reports from Singapore that the timid and suspicious government of Siam was not yet, in January 1825, convinced that the British were really at war with Burma, much less that they had gained victories.\(^{(61)}\). This mission was of great importance in clearing the way for the preliminary negotiations which led to the treaty with Siam in 1826. It showed that the only means of securing the objects desired by the Penang Council was to deal directly with the Court of Siam. Accordingly, Fullerton urged upon the Indian Government that a mission to Bangkok was “indispensable,” and that Burney was the man best fitted to conduct it. To convince the Governor-General, Burney was sent to Calcutta to lay his “valuable information” before him.\(^{(62)}\)

During July and August 1825 events occurred which greatly furthered Fullerton’s anti-Siamese policy, and led directly to the despatch of a mission to Bangkok. Burney returned to Ligor, and entered into negotiations with the Raja. The Raja said that he had abandoned his intention of attacking Selangor by sea, but that he was determined to send 3,000 men by land to give the Sultan of Perak the assistance for which he had asked against Sultan Ithnab. Burney adopted a firm attitude, refusing to recognise Perak as a Siamese dependency, and warning the Raja

\(^{(59)}\) Burney MSS. and v. infra.
\(^{(60)}\) S. S. R., Vols. 94-98 and 99: Jan. 4 and 18, 1825.
\(^{(61)}\) S. S. R., 99 and 100: passim.
\(^{(62)}\) Ibid., 100: April 7, 1825, and passim.
that the Company, as the inheritor of the Dutch treaty-rights, would not be "indifferent" to an attack on it or Selangor. To send the army might involve the Raja in a quarrel with the British, and on Burney's report of his conduct the issue of peace or war would probably depend. All of which was pure bluff; but the Raja was greatly impressed, and promised not to send his troops to Perak.\(^{63}\)

The final result of Burney's negotiations was a Preliminary Treaty with the Raja of Ligor which was signed on July 31, 1825. Burney was to take the treaty to India, and if the Governor-General approved of it he was to return to Ligor and go with the Raja to Bangkok. The Preliminary Treaty was then to serve as the basis of negotiations with the Siamese Court for a settlement of all the questions at issue between the Company and Siam.

The terms of the Treaty were as follows:

\(^{1}\) The Raja of Ligor promised that no Siamese force should go to Perak or Selangor by land or sea, or should settle there. The Company declared that it had "no desire to occupy Perak or to interfere with its government," and promised to remove Raja Hassan, to prevent the Sultan of Selangor from disturbing the peace of Perak, and to settle the quarrel between Selangor and Ligor.

\(^{2}\) The Company declared that it "entertained no desire to interfere with the Government of Queda." If the ex-Sultan were restored, the Penang Council promised that he should send the Bunga Mas triennially, and $4,000 annually, to Bangkok. The Raja of Ligor promised that if the Emperor of Siam restored the Sultan, he would withdraw his opposition, and would not attack Kedah by land or sea. In this treaty, as throughout the course of his mission to Bangkok, Burney adopted the policy of trying to restore the ex-Sultan by securing the co-operation of the Raja of Ligor, the man who had been chiefly instrumental in dethroning him.

\(^{3}\) Other clauses of the treaty provided for mutual assistance in suppressing piracy, and for the negotiation of a commercial treaty at Bangkok.\(^{64}\)

In a despatch to the Penang Council Burney defended his departure from the Company's former policy of strict non-intervention in Malayan affairs. He pointed out that this course could no longer be followed with advantage, and predicted that interference would not entail a war with Siam or the other complications feared by the Indian Government. Future events completely confirmed Burney's forecast. "I feel convinced that such an evil (interference in the affairs of the Malay states)
cannot any longer be avoided, that its inconveniences are not so great as supposed by many, and that at all events it is not to be compared with the greater evil of permitting Siam to overrun the territories of our Selangor neighbours, to turn the inhabitants of them into pirates, and to disturb for many years all native trade. I certainly think and hope that the terms of this treaty cannot be very burdensome to us." To Burney's mind the great point gained by the treaty was that henceforth the Penang Council had for the first time a legal right to prevent all Siamese troops and galleys from going to Perak or Selangor. Burney also succeeded in persuading the Raja of Ligor not to insist in the treaty on a clause compelling Perak to send the Bunga Mas to Bangkok. Whether it was sent or not was left to the decision of the Sultan of Perak, Burney agreeing that the British would make no objection if he should wish to do so. Since to send the Bunga Mas was the last thing the Sultan would willingly agree to, Burney had won a very important success for the Company. (65)

Fullerton considered Burney's treaty "extremely satisfactory", and at once appointed Anderson, the author of the oft-quoted pamphlet, and a strong opponent of Siamese pretensions, to settle the disputes which had arisen between Perak and Selangor as a result of Raja Hassan's depredations. It was impressed upon him that he was to act merely as a disinterested mediator, and must not commit the Company to military intervention. He was also to convince the Malay Sultans that the British did not wish to annex their territory, or to "interfere in any way with their independence." (66)

Both in Perak and Selangor, Anderson was everywhere received with the greatest "joy, and I may say enthusiasm." He found that the Malays were as friendly to the British as they were hostile to the Siamese, and that they were prepared to do whatever the Penang Council might suggest in order to settle their differences and avoid a Siamese attack. The Sultan of Perak was especially cordial, and urged the Company to annex his state, allowing him only a small pension. His reason was that "Perak could never be tranquil without the superintending control of a European government." (67) In such an atmosphere of general good-will, Anderson's mission was successful. He made a treaty with Selangor on August 20, 1825, by which Sultan Ibrahim promised to remove Raja Hassan immediately, and agreed never to attack Perak or to interfere in its government. The claim of Selangor to suzerainty over Perak was thus relinquished, and the Bernam River was fixed as the boundary between the two states. (68) Anderson also concluded a treaty with Perak on September 6,
1825, by which the Sultan accepted the Bernam River as the frontier, and promised never to invade Selangor or to interfere in its administration. At the same time the Sultan wrote a letter to Governor Fullerton in which he offered, if Fullerton should advise it, to send the Bunga Mas to Siam. While he considered the demand of Bangkok entirely unjust, he was willing to submit in order to escape the fate of Kedah, "for I am a very insignificant man, and am under great apprehension." The Sultan left the decision entirely to Fullerton's discretion, and he, needless to say, did not advise that the token of submission should be sent.\(^{69}\)

The Raja of Ligor however had no intention of letting Perak slip from his grasp. He no longer dared openly to attack it; but within a few weeks of the signature of the treaty with Burney on July 31, 1825, he sent a small force to Perak under the guise of an embassy to assist the Sultan in his government. This was clearly an infraction of Burney's treaty, and Fullerton peremptorily demanded the recall of the embassy.\(^{70}\)

The Raja of Ligor made evasive replies, and continued his veiled attack on Perak. Before the question was settled despatches arrived from the Indian Government which ratified the Preliminary Treaty of July 31, 1825, approved Anderson's mission to Perak and Selangor, and announced that Captain Burney was to be sent as envoy to Bangkok. The Government doubted whether he would be much more successful than Crawford, since he was unable to bargain for concessions by offering in return part of the recent British conquests on the Tenasserim Coast. It was clearly seen that the decision not to cede them to Siam converted a possible success into a very probable failure. The Indian Government therefore instructed Burney that ostensibly the mission was to be "entirely complimentary and conciliatory," to congratulate the new Emperor on his accession to the throne, and to promote friendly relations between the two empires. The Court was in a state of "the utmost apprehension" at the rapid downfall of Burma, and it actually believed that the Company intended to extend its sway over Siam and the Malay Peninsula. It was hoped that Burney would succeed in disabusing the Ministers of this ridiculous notion.\(^{71}\)

The other objects of the embassy were regarded as of only secondary importance, and it was left to Burney's discretion, to decide whether they should be mentioned or not. Under this head came the negotiation of a favourable commercial treaty, the restoration of the ex-Sultan of Kedah, and the safeguarding of the independence of Perak, Selangor and the other Malay states.

\(^{69}\) S.S.R., 103: Sept. 15, 1825.
\(^{71}\) Ibid., 102: May 13, 1825. Ibid., 104: Sept. 2 and 16, 1825. Ibid., 105: pp. 444-54. Burney MS. D. XXVI.
The Indian Government was anxious to attain these objects, but since it could offer nothing in return it was not prepared to press for concessions if Siam should prove obdurate. (72)

The instructions which Burney received from the Penang Council were by no means identical with those of the Supreme Government. Fullerton had been authorized to modify its orders in the light of his greater knowledge of local conditions, and he took full advantage of the permission. His instructions to Burney were decidedly hostile to Siam, and emphasized as the most important objects of the mission the very points which the Indian Government regarded as only secondary. The Governor held that Burney's main object was to establish the independence of all the Malay states of the Peninsula lying within the area which is to-day under British control. Siam's claims to supremacy over them were "a nullity..., the mere assertion of a claim which the asserter never had, never could establish." Unfortunately, owing to the former policy of the Company, the Government had acknowledged the justice of Siam's pretensions in Kedah, and to some extent in Perak. So far as these two states were concerned the British case for independence was somewhat weak, and all that could be done was to try to improve their status by negotiations. Fullerton regarded the restoration of the ex-Sultan of Kedah as a matter of the utmost importance, dictated alike by expediency and honour. As for Perak, if Burney were unable to restore it to complete independence, he should try to limit the claims of Siam to the sending of the Bunga Mas. He was also instructed to prevent further Siamese aggression in the other Malay states, and to maintain their independence. Fullerton realized that only the threat of war was likely to make Siam abandon its pretensions to suzerainty over them, and from this Burney was precluded by the orders of the Indian Government. The Governor therefore suggested that perhaps it would be advisable to refrain from all mention of the other states, and to confine the negotiations to the status of Perak and Kedah. The Company had never recognized Siam's claims over the other states of the Peninsula, and to refrain from all mention of them would leave the Government's hands free to act in whatever way it chose. Fullerton anticipated that sooner or later the Company would adopt the policy which has been followed since 1874, of "taking those states under our protection and effectually maintaining their independence." (73)

Burney's negotiations at Bangkok lasted from the end of 1825 to June 1826. His despatches fully confirmed the very unfavourable picture Crawford had drawn of the Siamese character, and of the open dishonesty of the government. As in the case of Crawford's embassy, deliberate attempts were made to treat

(72) S. S. R., 102: May 13, 1825.
(73) Ibid., Ibid., 102; Sept. 24, 1825.

[1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
the British mission with contempt. Warned perhaps by his predecessor's experiences, Burney showed far less meekness than Crawfurd when exposed to these affronts, and thereby secured more honourable treatment. Burney soon found that the British victories in Burma working on the natural timidity and suspicion of the Siamese, had intensified the difficulties of his task. The Ministers had an uneasy suspicion that the Indian Empire was more powerful than Siam. They feared that the Company intended to attack them, and that Burney had been sent to spy out their defences, yet at the same time they were most tenacious in maintaining every pretension of Siam. Burney was regarded with extreme suspicion, and every proposal he put forward was thought to conceal some diabolic and subtle device for the downfall of the Empire. If no guile could by any possibility be detected in his suggestions, this was regarded as proof conclusive that his craftiness was particularly deep. The involved and naive wording of the Burney Treaty of 1826 was due to this attitude of mind. The Siamese were so inordinately suspicious of every document written by Burney that he suggested that the Ministers should draw up the treaty in Siamese. They were much pleased with the proposal, and the English translation merely reflected all the vagueness and circumlocution of the original.\(^{(74)}\) Burney also found that the Siamese were most anxious to obtain the British conquests on the Tenasserim Coast; and it is quite possible that in return they would have abandoned some of their claims in the Malay Peninsula. The Indian Government however had deprived its envoy of this as well as of his other most potent weapon, the threat of war. He was compelled to seek for concessions when he could make neither promises nor threats in return. The hopelessness of his situation wrung from him the exclamation: "I could not wish to set my worst enemy a more difficult task than to send him to Bangkok, to negotiate matters connected with the Malay Peninsula without authority or means for employing effectual intimidation."\(^{(75)}\)

Considering the difficulties of the situation, it is remarkable that Burney achieved even a partial success. Almost the only point in his favour was the timidity of the Siamese. The recent British victories in Burma had greatly increased their dread of the power of the East India Company, and Burney played skilfully upon the fears of the Court. He hinted darkly that unless the Siamese moderated their pretensions in the Malay Peninsula they might find themselves involved in war with the British. Burney also received valuable support from the Raja of Liger, in questions which did not affect his own interests. When however Burney's success would have meant a financial loss to himself, as in the case of the restoration of the ex-Sultan of Kedah, he secretly

\(^{(74)}\) S. S. R., 138; July 10, 1826.
\(^{(75)}\) Ibid; Oct. 5, 1826.
worked against him. While Burney was partially aware of this duplicity, it would rather seem that he placed undue confidence in his alliance with the Raja. (76)

One result of the mission which the Indian Government regarded as the greatest importance was the recovery of some Burmese who had been kidnapped by the Siamese from the British conquests on the Tenasserim Coast. With infinite difficulty Burney succeeded in discovering 1,400 of the captives, whom he compelled the Siamese to restore to their homes. (77)

Despite the bitter opposition of the Phra Khlang and his faction, Burney succeeded in obtaining a commercial treaty granting British trade somewhat more favourable terms than those secured by Crawford. Henceforth British merchants were to pay only the customary duties, and were to be free to buy and sell without any opposition from the Siamese officials. (78) Governor Fullerton's comment on the concessions undoubtedly proved to be prophetic:— "They appear to be advantageous, but so little faith do I repose in their fulfilment that I scarcely think it worth while to enter into any serious discussion regarding them." (79) The engagement was "systematically violated by the Siamese." (80)

Perhaps the most interesting passages in Burney's despatches from Bangkok are his accounts of the interminable negotiations over the status of Trengganu and Kelantan. The question is of special interest, because the article of the Burney Treaty which defined their position is a masterpiece of ambiguity. This was partly due to the fact already mentioned that the treaty was first drawn up in Siamese, and then translated into English; but it was also in a measure the result of Burney's deliberate policy. The states of Trengganu and Kelantan are on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula, the more northerly, Kelantan, lying immediately to the south of the Siamese frontier. Both, and especially Kelantan, the weaker of the two, were thus far more exposed to Siamese attacks than the Malay states which lay further to the south. For many years before and after the date of the Burney treaty, the government of Bangkok attempted to establish its supremacy over them. The situation resembled that in Kedah before 1821. The Sultans of both Trengganu and Kelantan sent the Bunga Mas to Bangkok, but they contended that by im-


(77) For references v. Note 76, and also S. S. R., 141: April 18, 1827.


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memorial custom this was the only service which could be required of them, and that the periodical demands of Siam for money and supplies were illegal. This was also the view of their position taken by Raffles, Swettenham, and Cavenagh. The Sultans of both states resisted the aggression of Siam as openly as they dared; but they realised that they were too weak to defy it. At various times therefore between 1786 and 1825 they tried to form an alliance with the Company, and obtain its assistance against the Siamese. The Indian Government always refused to depart from its policy of non-intervention for the benefit of two states whose exact relation to Siam was unknown, and with whom British trade was unimportant. The Company knew that Siam claimed Trengganu and Kelantan as tributaries, and that the Sultans of both sent the Bunga Mas to Bangkok. It also knew that Kelantan, weaker and nearer to Siam, was more completely under its control than Trengganu. The British had been unable to find out whether the Siamese pretensions to complete supremacy were justified, or whether the two Sultans were practically independent, and sent the Bunga Mas merely as a token of respect, to ward off the attacks of a strong and predatory neighbour. Fullerton maintained that the claims of Siam were no more justified than in Kedah or Perak.

Burney himself had scant respect for the pretensions of Siam, and would have solved the problem by making offensive and defensive alliances with Trengganu and Kelantan. He was convinced that this course would not lead to war, for “the prudent government of Bangkok would pocket the affront.” Since however the Indian Government would not permit this policy, he was sure that Siam could not be persuaded to abandon its claims. He believed therefore that the wisest course was to avoid all discussion of its assertions of suzerainty. The Company had never admitted the validity of these claims, and was thus free to act as it chose whenever it seemed desirable. By avoiding the subject Burney would preserve its freedom of action unimpaired.

Nevertheless the question of the status of Trengganu and Kelantan was brought up during Burney’s negotiations at Bangkok. The Siamese Ministers asserted that from time immemorial the two states had been contented tributaries. Burney refused

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(33) S. S. R., 103: Sept. 19, 1825.

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to admit the validity of their claims, contending that the Bunga Mas was merely a "token of respect, friendship and awe," sent by two weak states to a powerful empire, and that Trengganu and Kelantan "had not given up their independence.... The English cannot admit that those Malayan states are subject to Siam in the same manner as her own provinces of Ligore and Singora.... (or) to the same extent as Prince of Wales Island is a possession of the English." (84) By vague threats of war Burney tried to persuade the Ministers to promise that they would not attack the two states. In return the Company would promise not to annex them, as the Siamese feared it would do, and would not prevent the Sultans from sending the Bunga Mas. Burney defended his concession of the Bunga Mas on the ground that Trengganu and Kelantan had "already submitted so much to Siamese pretensions," and particularly because he feared if he did not do so, the Court would carry out its intention of sending troops there before the Company had time to interfere. (85)

After several months of negotiations Article XII of the Burney Treaty was finally evolved: "Siam shall not go and obstruct or interrupt commerce in the states of Trengano and Calantan; English merchants and subjects shall have trade and intercourse in future with the same facility and freedom as they have heretofore had; and the English shall not go and molest, attack or disturb those states upon any pretence whatever." (86) The Article raised a storm of protest at Penang. Fullerton declared that it was "so worded as to amount to the admission of the actual dependence of Trengano and Calantan on Siam," and that the phraseology was so vague that two entirely opposite meanings could be drawn from it. The British might argue that it precluded Siam from any interference, "for every such interference must produce confusion and interruption of trade; it might be construed as conveying to us the right of direct interposition in case of such interference." The Siamese however might contend that the article gave them "the right of complete subjugation, so long as our trade is not interrupted." If the article could be interpreted as giving the British "the right of interposition in the event of the Siamese meddling in their affairs, assuming a paramount control—in short protecting them in their independence,—all is gained that we require." Under this condition, and only under this condition Fullerton would recommend that Article XII be ratified. (87)

Captain Burney in his defence contended that this was precisely what the Article did mean. Hampered as he was by the

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(84) Ibid., 138; July 10, 1826.
(85) Ibid., 109; March 23, 1826. Ibid., 138; June 19 and July 10, 1826.
(87) S.S.B., Vol. 138; Sept. 29, 1826.

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
instructions of the Supreme Government, he had made the best of a difficult situation. He had himself drawn up the article, carefully wording it in such a way that while it would not arouse the suspicions of the Siamese, it nevertheless gave a valid excuse for interference with Siamese encroachments if at any time the Government should decide to take advantage of it. It would be "impossible for the Siamese to oppress those states or to molest their governments without interrupting our commerce, for the preservation of which alone it appeared to me to be our policy to interpose in favour of those states....Had I admitted...the complete supremacy of Siam over these states, there would have been no occasion whatever for Article XII: the other stipulations of the treaty fully provide for our commercial intercourse with all places and countries subject to the Siamese. Coupling this article then with the whole tenor of my communications with the Siamese Ministers....the British Government may surely assume the construction desired by the Honourable Board (the Penang Council), namely that the Article leaves to us the right of opposing all forceable interference of the Siamese, as also the right of direct treaty and negotiation with the Malay States, provided only that we do not go and molest, attack or disturb the present Malay Governments." (88)

It was a characteristic of Governor Fullerton that when once he had made up his mind he was very unwilling to change it, so when he received Burney's explanation he merely reiterated his former opinion. (89) In support of his view he pointed out that on the return journey from Bangkok Burney had informed the Sultan of Trengganu that "the British Government had not liberated him from Siamese supremacy, nor pledged itself in any manner to protect his country against Siam, to which therefore he must still pay such respect and attention as he had hitherto been accustomed to pay (i.e. send the Bunga Mas to Bangkok); but that if the Siamese interrupt trade and commercial intercourse at Trengganu, His Highness should send immediate notice to the Governor of Prince of Wales Island, who will determine what degree of interference the British Government may consistently use in favour of His Highness." (90)

The comment of the Supreme Government on Article XII was guarded, but distinctly more favourable than Fullerton's. The Indian Government ratified the Article, and discussed its future policy towards Trengganu and Kelantan in terms which seem to indicate that it did not consider that the treaty had acknowledged the Siamese claims to suzerainty, and therefore precluded the British from intervening. It approved "of your having cautiously avoided to commit your government to ulterior procedures by any

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(89) 179 Ibid: Oct. 5, 1826.
of your acts at Bangkok. Should the circumstances of our more intimate connection with the Malay Peninsula consequent on our establishment at Malacca or any other causes, induce any change in the views of the Home Authorities in that respect, ample opportunities may hereafter offer for extending the protection of the British Government over the states of Kelantan and Trengganu, and thereby relieving them from Siamese supremacy."(92)

The negotiations over the status of Perak and Kedah were long and at times acrimonious, especially where Kedah was concerned. The Raja of Ligor, the Prakhlang and their faction used all their influence to prevent the Emperor from giving way to Burney's representations. (93) The Siamese Ministers made no claim to suzerainty over Selangor; but they insisted that the Sultan of Perak desired nothing so much as to send the Bunga Mas to Bangkok. They proposed that the Company should adhere to the Preliminary Treaty of July 31, 1825, and protect Perak from all attacks by Selangor. In return the Siamese would not send an army to Perak, but merely embassies to "settle and instruct the chief of Perak, and give him a title and great presents, in the same manner as the other countries subject to Siam." (94) Burney was well aware that the requests of the Sultan of Perak for Siamese assistance had been made as a result of the threats of the Raja of Ligor, and he therefore firmly opposed any form of Siamese interference direct or indirect. He took up the position that the British, as the inheritors of the Dutch treaty-rights, could not allow the Siamese to intervene in Perak, and had the right to protect it. (95) Burney's case was greatly strengthened by a very valuable piece of information which he discovered after his arrival at Bangkok. Through some strange lapse into truthfulness the Prakhlang and his friends admitted that the Sultan of Perak had been entirely correct in his contention that before the conquest by Kedah in 1818 Siam had no "right or claim whatever" in Perak. (96) While the East India Company was prepared to respect time-honoured rights of suzerainty, it was in no way bound to recognize mere aggression without a shred of legal justification to support it—especially when the invaders had been expelled four years after the conquest.

The status of Perak was finally settled, "after several hours very warm discussion," by Article XIV of the treaty. At first glance it seemed to concede a great part of the Siamese demands; but Burney knew that the concessions were more apparent than real. He was sure that the desire of the Sultan of Perak to sever

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(93) Ibid., 109: March 23, 1826. Ibid., 128: June 19, 1826.
(94) Ibid., 109: March 23, 1826. Ibid., 128: June 19 and Sept. 20, 1826.
(95) Ibid., 109: March 23, 1826. Ibid., 128: June 19, 1826.
1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
all connection with Bangkok, warmly supported as it would be by
Governor Fullerton, would change his seeming surrender into a
victory for Malayan independence. The terms of the Article
were as follows. Siam promised not to "go and molest, attack
or disturb" Perak or Selangor, while the Company gave the same
undertaking as regards Perak, and bound itself not to allow
Selangor to attack it. The Company also promised not to inter-
fere should the Raja of Ligor or the Sultan of Perak desire to
send to each other diplomatic missions of forty or fifty men.
Furthermore, "the Siamese and English mutually engage that the
Raja of Perak shall govern his country according to his own will.
Should he desire to send the gold and silver flowers [the Bunga
Mas] to Siam as heretofore, the English will not prevent his doing
as he may desire."

This success was some compensation for Burney's complete
failure to secure the withdrawal of the Siamese garrison from
Kedah, or the restoration of the ex-Sultan. The influence of the
Raja of Ligor and his faction contributed largely to Burney's
defeat; but even apart from this the Emperor and all his advisers
were implacably hostile to the deposed ruler, because of his in-
trigues with Burma. Furthermore, Burney was unable to offer
the Siamese the territory which they coveted on the Tenasserim
Coast, and he was compelled to rely on the feeble weapons of
argument and persuasion. For several weeks he persisted in his
attempts to restore the Malay government of Kedah; but he at
last desisted on the realisation that while he might succeed he
could do so only at the price of failing in all the other objects of
his mission, and of preventing the establishment of cordial
relations between Siam and the Company. The Government of
India regarded the restoration of the Sultan as a matter of only
minor importance, and Burney did not feel justified in jeopardis-
ing for its sake objects which the Supreme Government was more
anxious to attain. Article XIII of the treaty, which determined
the status of Kedah, was therefore a complete victory for Siam.
Its terms were as follows:

"The Siamese engage to the English that the Siamese
shall remain in Kedah, and take proper care of that country
and of its people; the inhabitants of Prince of Wales Island
and of Kedah shall have trade and intercourse as heretofore;
the Siamese shall levy no duty upon stock and provision....
which the inhabitants of Prince of Wales Island or ships
there may have occasion to purchase in Kedah, and the
Siamese....shall levy fair and proper Import and Export
duties. The English engage to the Siamese that the English

(66) Ibid., 138: Sept. 20, 1826.
(68) S.S.R., 109: March 23, 1826. Ibid., 138; June 19, July 10,
Sept. 20 and Oct. 3, 1826. Burney MS. D. XIII.

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do not desire to take possession of Quedah, that they will
not attack or disturb it, nor permit the former governor of
Quedah (the ex-Sultan) or any of his followers to attack,
disturb or injure in any manner the territory of Quedah, or
any other territory subject to Siam."

Lastly, the Company pledged itself not to allow the ex-Sultan to
live in Penang, Province Wellesley, Perak, Selangor or Burma.

Article XIII safeguarded Penang’s indispensable need of ob-
taining supplies from Kedah, and secured some guarantee of good
government for the Malays. The agreement that the Company
should control the Sultan’s place of residence was not unreason-
able, since he, a British pensioner, used Penang as a base from
which to stir up revolt in Kedah, and the Siamese firmly believed
that he was assisted in so doing by the Company. The removal
of the Sultan was therefore necessary to prevent the abuse of
British protection and to promote friendly relations with the
government of Bangkok. So far it would seem that Burney was
justified in submitting to the inevitable. It is difficult however
to find any justification for his promise, not merely that the
Company would abandon the cause of an ancient ally, but that it
would actually aid the Siamese to prevent him from regaining his
kingdom. Burney defended his conduct on the plea that the
clause merely required the Company’s assistance if the ex-Sultan
tried to regain Kedah while living in British territory, and not
if he did so while residing on foreign soil. The plain wording
of Article XIII seems entirely to contradict this construction, and
as will be seen the Government acted on this assumption.

Article XIII raised a storm of protest at Penang. Fullerton
dwelt on the gross unfairness of the pledge to prevent an ancient
ally from regaining his kingdom, and censured Burney for relying
so greatly upon the Raja of Ligor, his most determined enemy.
The Governor concluded by expressing his regret that the mission
to Bangkok had ever been entrusted to a man so unfitted for the
charge. During 1826 and 1827 bitter attacks were made upon
Burney in the press of Penang and Singapore, some at least of the
articles being written by officials at Penang. The Supreme
Government however ratified Article XIII as well as the other
sections of the treaty, and ordered that the ex-Sultan should be
persuaded to go to Malacca.

Shortly after Burney’s return from Bangkok in 1826 two
events occurred which finally established the independence of

(100) Burney MSS, D, IX.
(101) Ibid.
(102) S. S. R., 138; Sept. 29 and Oct. 5, 1826,
S. S. R., 1826-27, passim; Burney MSS, passim; and Moor "Notices of
Indian Archipelago," 222.
(104) S. S. R., 141; April 18, 1827.

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Perak. These were the Low Mission and the Kurau River Incident. During the year which had elapsed since the signature of the Preliminary Treaty of July 31, 1825, the Raja of Ligor had consistently violated his engagement not to interfere in Perak by sending embassies and detachments of troops there. Ostensibly they were to "assist" the Sultan in his government; in point of fact they were to intimidate him into sending the Bunga Mas to Bangkok. The Sultan appealed to Penang for protection, and Fullerton made strong but unavailing protests to the Raja of Ligor.\(^{(105)}\) By September 1826 it was evident that the Siamese Court had no intention of observing Article XIV of Burney's treaty, by which the Sultan was to be left free to decide whether he would send the Bunga Mas or not. No open attack would be made; but by covert interference the unwilling Sultan would in all probability be intimidated into professing his willingness to be a Siamese tributary. In September 1826 the Governor sent Captain Low with forty sepoys and a small warship as envoy to Perak. Low was instructed to explain to the Sultan that by the terms of the treaty he need not be tributary to Siam unless he so desired; and to advise him to write a letter declaring his wish to be independent. The Sultan was to be assured that he might "rely on the assistance of the British in expelling any Siamese who may proceed to Perak, and resisting any interference with his government." Captain Low was also instructed to inquire into the objects and actions of the various Siamese bands which had been appearing and disappearing in Perak, and if any were still present, to "warn them to depart forthwith." Low was empowered merely to make an inquiry into the condition of Perak, and to promise the Sultan that he could rely on the Company's support in case of Siamese aggression.\(^{(106)}\)

Captain Low however was a member of the anti-Siamese party at Penang, and he interpreted his instructions in a broad and catholic spirit. To be more precise, he exceeded them in a thorough-going fashion which drew down upon himself the horrified rebuke of the Governor-General of India. On his arrival in Perak Low found that British interference was urgently needed if the independence of the state was to be preserved. In defiance of treaty-obligations the Raja of Ligor had sent detachments of troops and "embassies" to Perak which had treated the state as a conquered country, and had deprived the Sultan of most of his power. Moreover the Raja had bribed the Heir-Apparent and many of the principal Malay nobles to oppose the Sultan and support Siamese designs. The Sultan himself was altogether unwilling to be a tributary of Bangkok; but he dared not make use of the rights.

\(^{(105)}\) Ibid., 108: Jan. 27, Sept. 20 and Sept. 28, 1826. Ibid., 138: June 1 and Sept. 20, 1826. Ibid., 139: Nov. 13, Nov. 29, Dec. 7, and Dec. 18, 1826.

\(^{(106)}\) Ibid., 138: Sept. 20, 1826.
conferred upon him by Burney's treaty unless he could count upon British support to avert from his country the fate of Kedah. He was keenly desirous of a British alliance, and was determined to be loyal to the Company if only it would protect him. The Sultan put himself entirely in Low's hands, trusted him implicitly, and without hesitation did whatever he advised.\(^{(107)}\)

Low's measures were as thorough as they were efficacious. For the moment there was no fear of complications with Siam, since the three hundred Siamese troops who were in Perak hastily returned to Ligor as soon as they learned of his arrival. Low was therefore free to turn his attention to the Heir-Apparent and the other traitorous Malay nobles. By his advice the Sultan deprived them of all power, and appointed loyal Malays in their stead. It was clear however that as soon as Low and his sepoys withdrew the Raja of Ligor's forces would return and restore the Siamese faction to office. The only way to prevent this was to make a treaty promising the Sultan that the Company would support him in such an event. The Sultan received Low's suggestion with enthusiasm, since alliance with the British was precisely what he had been seeking for almost ten years.\(^{(108)}\)

The terms of the treaty, which was signed on October 18, 1826, were as follows:

(1) The Sultan promised never to have any communication with Siam, Ligor, Selangor or any other Malay state on political affairs or on the administration of Perak. He also agreed not to support any of his subjects who mightleague themselves with these states so as to cause disturbance in Perak.

(2) "Henceforth and forever" the Sultan would send neither the Bunga Mas nor any other form of tribute to any of the above states; and he would not permit embassies from them even to enter Perak if their object was political. Furthermore no party from these states should ever be allowed to enter Perak "should its strength even consist of no more than thirty men." If "such parties or armaments" arrived, or if the above-mentioned states allied themselves with the Sultan's subjects to disturb his rule, he would rely, "as he now relies and in all future times will rely, on the friendly aid and protection of the....Company....to be manifested in such a manner and by such means as may to them seem most expedient."

(3) "If His Majesty....will faithfully adhere to and perform all and each of the stipulations contained in this engagement....then His Majesty shall receive the assistance of the British in expelling from his country any Siamese or Malays as


\(^{(108)}\) S. S. R., 139: Nov. 2, 1826.

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
above states, who... may at any time enter the Perak Country with political views or for the purpose of interfering in any way with the government of His Majesty.” If however the Sultan failed to perform any part of the treaty, “the obligation on the British to protect him assist him against his enemies shall cease.”

(4) Anderson's commercial and political treaty of 1825 was confirmed, and it was made clear that the prohibition against entering Perak did not apply to “bona fide” traders. Merchants of every country could trade unmolested in Perak provided they did not interfere in its affairs.

The treaty was to be perpetual, and the Sultan insisted on inscribing on it that he had signed voluntarily and “with great satisfaction.” (109)

Governor Fullerton received the report of his envoy’s mission with mixed feelings. It was clear that Low had flagrantly violated his instructions, for by no conceivable effort of the imagination could they be held to cover his drastic remodelling of the administration of Perak, and above all his treaty of alliance. In defiance of the repeated orders of the Supreme Government he had committed the Company to interference in the internal affairs of a Malay state, and to the possibility—most unlikely though it was—of war with Siam. On the other hand Low’s investigations had conclusively proved that the Siamese had assented to the article in Burney’s treaty regarding Perak because they believed that the Company’s desire to preserve the independence of the state would be defeated by the “underhand” policy which the Raja of Ligor was even then pursuing. Unauthorised though Low’s actions had been, the Governor believed that they had checkmated the manoeuvres of Siam. The Penang Council had not the power to confirm the treaty, and it was therefore referred to the Governor-General. (110) Reading between the lines of Fullerton’s despatch, one feels that he felt much more satisfaction at his envoy’s proceedings than he permitted to appear in the Council minutes; it was a bold stroke entirely after his own heart. Most certainly the Governor’s next step showed no disapproval. He sent the Raja of Ligor a letter, phrased with careful vagueness, warning him that further interference in Perak in defiance of the Burney treaty might lead to war with Great Britain. (111)

Before the decision of the Government of India was received the Kuran River Incident occurred. The Kuran was a river in Perak some ten leagues south of Penang, which for several years had been the headquarters of a band of about one hundred Malay pirates under Nakhoda (Captain) Udin. He had been denounced as a pirate in 1822 by the Raja of Ligor; but soon afterwards the

(110) S. S. B., 139: Nov. 13, 1826.
(111) ibid.
two formed an alliance. Udin was allowed to pursue his piratical raids unmolested, and was furthermore appointed by the Raja Governor of the Kura River District. In return Udin aided his patron in his efforts to destroy the independence of Perak. The Sultan of Perak was powerless to expel Udin; and by 1826 the pirate had grown so bold that he made almost nightly raids into Penang harbour and kidnapped many British subjects whom he sold as slaves. The situation became intolerable, and with the cordial assent of the Sultan of Perak Fullerton sent Low and a force of sepoys to destroy Udin's stronghold. The position was captured, Udin and many of his men being taken prisoners. Since the court at Penang did not possess Admiralty jurisdiction, it was not competent to try him, and he was accordingly sent to the Raja of Ligor with a polite request that he should be put on trial there.\(^{112}\)

The Raja quite failed to see the humour of the situation. Indeed, he was very seriously annoyed, and when in June 1827 Burney came to Ligor to exchange the ratified copies of the treaty of 1826 with Siam, he complained bitterly of the attack on Udin as a violation of Siamese territorial rights. He contended that the Kurau was part of Kedah, and not of Perak, denied that Udin was a pirate, and also attacked Low's treaty with Perak in 1826 as a piece of sharp practice. Burney persuaded him to let the Penang Council decide whether the Kurau River was in Perak or Kedah; but he joined the Raja in the protest which he sent to the Governor-General.\(^{113}\) It is difficult to understand Burney's conduct in this matter. Before he was sent to Bangkok in 1825, and even during the greater part of the time he was there, he was a strong opponent of Siam's claims in Malaya. After his return from Bangkok in 1826 however he became one of the leading members of the pro-Siamese faction in the Straits Settlements. He seems also to have developed a sentimental weakness for his quondam enemy, the Raja of Ligor, and supported him as vehemently as he had condemned him before 1826. In the present instance Burney wrote a despatch to the Government of India bitterly attacking the policy of the Penang Council, and representing the Raja as an upright and persecuted exponent of the sanctity of treaty-obligations. The policy of the Penang Council in Perak was covertly attacked as involving the Company in "unprofitable, expensive and embarrassing" intervention in Malayan affairs; while Low had been guilty of "questionable proceedings." Burney also agreed with the Raja that Udin was not a pirate, and that the Kurau was in Siamese territory.\(^{114}\)

\(^{112}\) Ibid., 139: Nov. 2, Nov. 13, and Dec. 18, 1826. Ibid., 141: Feb. 8, March 7, March 29, April 18, and May 1827. Ibid., 184: Oct. 21, 1827.

\(^{113}\) Ibid., 141: June, 1827.

\(^{114}\) Ibid., 141: Aug. 16, 1827.

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The Government of India was convinced by Burney's despatch that the Penang Council had been entirely in the wrong, and its irritation was not diminished by the occurrence of the Kuran River Incident so soon after Low's mission to Perak. The Penang Council was informed that it had exceeded its powers in interfering in Perak without the previous consent of the Supreme Government, and was sharply warned that the action must not be repeated. The strictures passed upon the conduct of the Council were as nothing compared with those lavished upon Captain Low. In his mission to Perak he had greatly exceeded his instructions, he had given just cause of offence to Siam, and had made a treaty which involved the Company in Malayan affairs "to an extent which was never contemplated or desired." To complete his work of destroying Siam's authority in Perak he had invented the charge of piracy against Udin, a Siamese official, and had invaded Siamese territory in order to crush him. Pending a fuller investigation of his conduct Low was suspended from all political employment.\(^{(113)}\)

Fullerton's reply to this fulmination was a judicious compound of self-justification and humble abasement before the hand which chastised him. He explained that he had believed the Burney treaty gave him the right to intervene in Perak for the preservation of its independence without previous reference to the Supreme Government. In future however he would take no action without the permission of the Indian Government, no matter what policy the Raja of Ligor might pursue. Low's disregard of his instructions was defended on the ground that his drastic action alone could have preserved the independence of Perak against the "underhanded" intrigues of the Raja of Ligor. As to the Kuran River Incident, Fullerton firmly denied that it had any political significance, or that it was an invasion of Siamese territory. He overwhelmed the Supreme Government with a flood of testimony proving that Udin was a pirate and that the Kuran was in the territory of Perak. Carrying the war into Burney's camp, Fullerton showed by lengthy quotations from that officer's reports that in 1825 he had advocated the very policy which Low had carried out in 1826. Moreover the Governor proved that the destruction of Udin's fort had been decided on because of Burney's own statements. Fullerton produced a map and a report which Burney had submitted about 1824 proving that the Krian River was the boundary between Kedah and Perak, and that the Kuran lay in the territory of Perak. Burney's charges were not merely exaggerated and inconsistent; but in his blind devotion to his friend

\(^{(115)}\) Ibid., 141; April 18 and Aug. 16, 1827. Ibid., 142, Sept. 6, 1827.
the Raja he had deliberately made statements which he knew to be false.\(^{(116)}\)

While waiting for the Government of India's reply, Fullerton sent a letter to the Raja of Ligor informing him that the Penang Council had conclusive proof of Udin's piracy, and that the Kurau was within Perak territory. The matter therefore could not be discussed.\(^{(117)}\) Apparently this despatch had the desired effect, since no more seems to have been heard from the Raja on the question.

The incident was closed by a despatch from the Government of India on November 16, 1827. The Supreme Government was "entirely satisfied" that Udin was a pirate, and that the Penang Council had believed the Kurau River was within the territory of Perak. The destruction of Udin's stronghold had clearly no political significance, and the Government revoked the censures passed upon Captain Low, and his suspension from political employment. If the Raja of Ligor still persisted in his contentions, he should be compelled to disprove Perak's long admitted right to the Kurau River.\(^{(118)}\)

No mention was made in this despatch of Low's treaty with Perak in 1826, and search amongst the documents of the period has failed to disclose any proof that it was ratified. Fullerton declared that he had no power to confirm it, and all the despatches of the Supreme Government, far from ratifying it, condemned it as unauthorised and undesirable. Yet in 1844 and 1853, when the Sultans of Perak appealed to the Company for assistance on the ground of Low's treaty, both the Government of India and the Directors regarded the treaty as binding. In 1844 the request of the Sultan was granted; and although aid was refused in 1853, the reason given by the Governor-General was that the terms of the existing treaty did not require British intervention in that particular case.\(^{(119)}\) No other treaty was made with Perak during the intervening period, and it must be presumed therefore that Low's treaty was accepted by the Government of India as binding. The point is of some interest because the authority under which Governor Sir Andrew Clarke granted the request of the Perak chiefs for British intervention in 1874 was Low's treaty.\(^{(120)}\)

After the Kurau River Incident Siam made no further attempt to destroy the independence of Perak. Fullerton and Low had done their work so thoroughly that it never needed to be


\(^{(117)}\) Ibid., 141: July 18, 1827.

\(^{(118)}\) Ibid., 173: Nov. 16, 1827.


\(^{(120)}\) "Treating Affecting the Malay States," p. 19.

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repeated. Fettered though they were by the orders of the Supreme Government, with no weapons save Siamese timidity and British prestige, they saved Perak from the fate of Kedah, and brought to an end the southward advance of the Siamese Empire on the West Coast of the Peninsula. “Perak instead of Salangore thus became the barrier to their further advance... in this quarter.” (121)

After 1837 the relations between the Company and Siam became much less strained than they had been in the preceding four years. The Siamese abandoned their attempts to subdue the Malay states on the West Coast, and resigned themselves to maintaining their position in Kedah. This proved to be far from easy, for the Malays hated their conquerors, and frequent revolts occurred which were suppressed with British assistance. On the East Coast the Siamese continued their aggressive policy in Kelantan and Trengganu. The Government of the Straits Settlements opposed them so far as it could; but the refusal of the Supreme Government to intervene in the affairs of these two states prevented a repetition of Fullerton’s policy in Perak. Apart from perennial trade disputes, little occurred to disturb the harmony of British and Siamese relations until the bombardment of Trengganu in 1862.

The article of Burney’s treaty concerning Kedah proved a great source of trouble to the Government of the Straits Settlements. The Government of India ordered that in conformity with its terms the ex-Sultan should be persuaded to go to Malacca, where a house and land would be given him. He refused however to leave Penang, and declined to bind himself never to attack Kedah or Siam. Moreover he intrigued against the Siamese in Kedah, and the Raja of Laguna demanded the fulfilment of the treaty. By December 1827 the patience of the Council was exhausted, and the ex-Sultan’s yearly pension of $10,000 was stopped until such time as he should obey. Although he was reduced to the utmost poverty, he refused to give way. Finally in 1831, when a revolt occurred in Kedah, the Straits Government compelled him to go to Malacca by the threat to remove him by force if he would not leave voluntarily. (122) In 1832 the Governor-General restored the Sultan’s original pension of $10,000 with full arrears. (123)

(121) B. S. and P., 369: Nov. 19, 1832, No. 2.
The removal of the ex-Sultan was the least of the troubles which the Siamese conquest brought upon the Government of the Straits Settlements. After 1821 there was a constant series of attacks on the Siamese garrisons by bands of exiles from Kedah. They were joined by many professional pirates, who combined a little fighting against the Siamese with a great deal of looting and piracy. The invariable result of these attacks was that the Siamese continued to remain in Kedah, and that Penang's trade suffered even more severely from pirates than was normally the case. The Government of the Straits was convinced that the Malays could never recover Kedah unaided, and regarded their attempts solely in the light of vexatious interferences with commerce.\(^{(124)}\)

In 1831 a very serious revolt occurred. Three thousand Malay refugees who were living in Province Wellesley crossed the frontier, and drove the Siamese out of Kedah. The rebels were joined by hundreds of Malays from Penang and Province Wellesley, and most of their supplies were sent by sympathisers at Penang. Outside Government circles the whole population of the Straits Settlements, European as well as native, sympathised strongly with the Malays, and aided them as far as possible. The attack came as a complete surprise to both the British and the Siamese governments, for although the plans for the rising were made at Penang, and were known to hundreds of Malays, not one betrayed them. The police and some of the European merchants were also involved in the conspiracy of silence.\(^{(125)}\)

Throughout the rebellion the Government of the Straits Settlements showed itself most friendly to the Siamese, and very hostile to the Malays. As soon as the Governor, Ibbetson, learned of the rising he ordered the gunboats and warships at Penang to blockade the Kedah coast and prevent the rebels from receiving further assistance from Penang. The ships were also ordered to attack the rebel praus, and to treat as pirates any of their leaders who might be captured.\(^{(126)}\) So completely did Ibbetson sympathise with Siam that he was actually indignant at the Malays for attempting to recover their country, and at the ex-Sultan for not betraying the plot.\(^{(127)}\) The Government of India did not altogether approve of Ibbetson's measures, and declared that the Burney Treaty did not require armed co-operation with Siam. The Governor should have confined his efforts to preventing the rebels from securing supplies from Penang.\(^{(127)}\) The revolt lasted

\(^{(127)}\) B. Pol., Range 126, Vol. 31: July 22, 1831, Nos. 43-46.
\(^{(128)}\) Ibid., Vol. 35: Sept. 9, 1831, No. 2.

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from April till October 1831, when the Siamese finally reconquered the country. The Company's blockade of the Kedah coast contributed largely to this result, since one of the principal reasons for the collapse of the revolt was the cutting off of supplies from Penang.\(^{129}\)

Five years later, in 1836, the Straits Government was again compelled to assist the Siamese. The ex-Sultan had received permission to leave Malacca for a visit to Deli in Sumatra, on his promise to go directly thither and return the same way. Instead he went to Bruns, in Perak, and began to collect a fleet for the invasion of Kedah. There was no doubt as to his intention, and the Siamese called upon the Company to fulfill the terms of the Burney treaty. After vain attempts had been made to persuade the ex-Sultan to go either to Deli or Malacca, two warships were sent to Bruns to bring him back by force if necessary. The Malays resisted, but after a brief resistance their fleet was destroyed, and the ex-Sultan captured and sent to Malacca. As a punishment his pension of $10,000 was reduced to $6,000 a year, the full amount not being restored until 1841.\(^{130}\)

In 1838 another rebellion broke out in Kedah. A force of Malays entered the country from British territory, and for the second time expelled the Siamese. As in 1831, the supplies and many of the invaders came from Penang and Province Wellesley. The natives in the Straits Settlements and the majority of the Europeans who were not officials sympathised with the rebels and assisted them. The Government of the Straits, holding itself bound by the Burney treaty, at once blockaded the Kedah coast. The British warships did not attack the Malays, but by preventing the arrival of arms and reinforcements from Penang they contributed largely to the failure of the rebellion. The Directors and the Government of India entirely approved of the action of the Straits Government. In 1839 the Siamese reconquered Kedah and drove out the rebels.\(^{131}\)


The failure of this insurrection convinced the old Sultan that he could never regain his Kingdom by force. So in 1841 he sent Tunku Dye (Daik?), his eldest son, to Bangkok, to beg for pardon and reinstatement. Bonham, the Governor of the Straits Settlements, was very sceptical of success; but with the approval of the Supreme Government he gave Tunku Dye (Daik?) a letter to the Prahklang. In it he urged that the Sultan should be restored to his throne, and warned the Siamese that the Company had grown weary of bolstering up their power in Kedah. Should another revolt occur, the Straits Government had been ordered not to assist in its suppression. The old Sultan’s petition was made at a propitious moment. The Emperor of Siam had at last learned that there was no profit to be obtained from governing as a Siamese province a distant state whose inhabitants were resolved not to submit to alien rule. The experiment had been tried for twenty years, and the only result had been a constant series of rebellions in which the prosperity of Kedah had been ruined. Had the Raja of Ligor been alive the decision might have been different, but the Sultan’s implacable enemy was now dead. In 1842 the Emperor of Siam accepted the Sultan’s submission, removed the Siamese officials from Kedah, and restored to him the greater part of his former kingdom. To lessen his power however the remainder was formed into two new states under Malay rulers over whom he had no control. The Sultan asked the Company to form an alliance with him, pledging them to maintain him on the throne. The Directors refused his request, being greatly influenced in the matter by the adverse opinion of Colonel Burney, the negotiator of the treaty of 1826.

The Government hoped that it was at last freed from Kedah entanglements, but it was soon deceived. In 1843 the Sultan seized the Krian District of Perak, claiming it as part of his Kingdom. The Sultan of Perak prepared for war, and demanded British assistance under the terms of Low’s treaty of 1826. The Government acknowledged the validity of his claim; but persuaded him not to commence hostilities until the effect of negotiations had been tried. The Sultan of Kedah refused to give way, even when in 1844 his annual pension was taken away from him. Finally, in 1848, the Governor of the Straits Settlements compelled him to restore the Krian District to Perak by the threat that otherwise his troops would be expelled by force. The annual

(123) Letters Received from India and Bengal, Vol. 34: July 4, 1842. Despatches to India and Bengal, Vol. 33: Dec. 30, 1842. Ibid., Vol. 40: July 17, 1844. Burney MS. D. X.

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pension of $10,000 was then restored.\(^{(124)}\) At the present time it is still regularly paid.\(^{(125)}\) Until 1909 Kedah remained a Siamese dependency ruled by the descendants of the restored Sultan. By the Treaty of Bangkok in 1909 Siam renounced its rights of suzerainty; and the state became a British dependency.\(^{(126)}\)

The cordiality which characterised British and Siamese relations in Kedah after 1827 was less marked in Trengganu and Kelantan. From the date of the Burney treaty until the end of the century Siam lost no opportunity of trying to reduce the two states to subjection. Kelantan, weaker than Trengganu and nearer to its powerful enemy, suffered more severely than its neighbours. By 1836 it was described by Newbold, the Malayan authority, as nominally independent but “now almost succumbed to the Siamese yoke.”\(^{(127)}\) The Government of Bangkok gradually established strong influence there, and the appointment in 1902 of a Commissioner to “advise” the Sultan was in many ways merely the recognition of an existing state of affairs. Trengganu was more fortunate; its Sultans resisted the covert attacks of the Siamese as firmly as they dared, and succeeded in preventing them from attaining the influence which they gained in Kelantan.\(^{(128)}\) Apart from the triennial despatch of the Bunga Mas to Bangkok, the overlordship of Siam was practically nominal.\(^{(129)}\)

The Government of the Straits Settlements opposed the designs of Siam as far as it was possible to do so, and at the same time obeyed the orders of the Indian Government not to interfere in the affairs of the Malay States. The Straits officials sympathised with the desire of Trengganu and Kelantan to preserve their independence; and they also feared that the establishment of Siam’s supremacy would destroy the growing trade of Singapore with the two states. Until 1862 no incident of importance occurred. The Siamese made no open attacks on the independence of Trengganu and Kelantan, but tried to gain their ends by intrigue. The Government of the Straits Settlements kept a suspicious eye upon their proceedings; but it was forced

\(^{(124)}\) Letters Received from India and Bengal, Vol. 43; July 22, 1844. Ibid., Vol. 52; Nov. 7, 1846. Ibid., Vol. 59; Aug. 7, 1848. Despatches to India and Bengal, Vol. 43; March 19, 1845. Ibid., Vol. 60; Feb. 21, 1849. Ind. Pol. and Foreign, Range 196, Vol. 48; March 23, 1844, Nos. 50-54. Ibid., Range 198, Vol. 23; April 14, 1848, Nos. 14-31. Ibid., Vol. 57; Oct. 27, 1849, Nos. 60-63.

\(^{(125)}\) Colonial Office List, 1926, p. 368.

\(^{(126)}\) Ibid., 388 and 398.


to content itself with reporting the course of events to the Government of India.\(^{(149)}\)

In 1862 Siam abandoned its policy of obscure manœuvring in favour of a scarcely disguised attempt to obtain control of Trengganu and possibly Pahang as well. The ultimate cause of the incident was the death in 1858 of the Bendahara of Pahang. He left two sons to fight for the inheritance, and almost immediately civil war broke out between the elder, who became Bendahara, and the younger Wan Ahmad. Neither side did much harm to the other, but between them they wrought havoc with the growing British trade in Pahang. The Singapore merchants complained, and the Governor of the Straits Settlements, Colonel Cavenagh, offered to mediate between the two brothers. The Bendahara agreed, and promised to allow Wan Ahmad whatever pension Cavenagh might name. Ahmad refused the amount offered, and the war continued until about July 1861 his forces were driven out of Pahang by his brother.\(^{(141)}\)

At this point Siam appeared upon the scene. Shortly before the Dutch had deposed and banished the Sultan of Lingga because of his incurable propensity for intriguing. The Sultan was the descendant of Sultan Abdulrahman of Johore, whose career was described in the chapter on the foundation of Singapore. By virtue of his descent the banished Sultan declared himself to be the rightful ruler of Pahang and Johore. This claim the British Government refused to recognise, since it challenged the basic principle of the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1824, the division of the Empire of Johore into British and Dutch spheres.\(^{(142)}\) Eventually the banished Sultan went to Bangkok, and the Siamese Ministers saw in him a fit instrument for their designs. They had determined to depose the Sultan of Trengganu, because he firmly refused to do homage in person at Bangkok, or to acknowledge the supremacy of Siam except by the customary gift of the Bunga Mas. It was decided to instal the Sultan of Lingga in his place. Wan Ahmad had also come to Bangkok, and seems to have reached an understanding with the Siamese. Cavenagh received information of the Ministers' intentions, and asked the British Council at Bangkok, Sir Robert Schomburgk, to investigate the matter.\(^{(143)}\) By this Time, July 1863, the Sultan had been taken to Trengganu on a Siamese warship. He was apparently accompanied by Wan Ahmad, and a small fleet of praus. Schomburgk was assured by the Siamese that the Sultan's departure had no political significance: he merely wished to visit his aged mother in Trengganu, and the Emperor of Siam, touched by this display of filial affection,


\(^{(141)}\) P. P., H. C., No. 541 of 1863, pp. 1-3, 6-11, (Vol. XLIII).

\(^{(142)}\) Ibid., 3, 24-25.

\(^{(143)}\) Ibid., 2-3, 5.

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had given him a warship to make the journey.\(^{(144)}\) Although Schomburgk and Cavenagh had to accept this explanation, they both took the liberty of doubting its truth.\(^{(145)}\) For one thing, the Sultan’s arrival synchronised suspiciously with the appearance in Trengganu of three Siamese warships on which were the Crown Prince and the Chief Minister of Siam. Cavenagh had learned of their intended visit, and sent the “Hooghly,” a small gunboat, to watch them. When the Siamese squadron found her at Trengganu the Prince and the Minister decided not to land, but went on to Singapore.\(^{(146)}\) Wan Ahmad began to prepare for another attack on his brother. In this he was assisted by the Sultan of Lingga, who, Cavenagh suspected, had been the real instigator of the attacks on Pahang. The Sultan of Trengganu also assisted Ahmad by allowing him to gather arms and recruits, and prepare his forces in Trengganu.\(^{(147)}\)

Colonel Cavenagh viewed this twofold design against Pahang and Trengganu in the gravest light. He was convinced that Siam intended to use the Sultan of Lingga and Wan Ahmad as tools to bring both states under the control of Bangkok. The success of this policy would do great injury to British trade; and even if Wan Ahmad’s attempt on Pahang should in the end fail, the renewal of civil war with the Bendahara would be harmful to the commerce of Singapore. Cavenagh was therefore convinced that he had the right to intervene in Pahang, as he had done in the preceding war, and the more so as the Siamese themselves advanced no pretensions to supremacy over it. With Trengganu the case was somewhat different, for there was no doubt that the state was to some extent a Siamese tributary. The Governor believed however that he had the right to intervene in order to preserve its independence, on the grounds that its subjection was practically nominal, and that the aggressive policy of Siam must inevitably do great harm to British trade. These reasons he set fourth in his despatches to the Indian Government.

In a despatch of July 19, 1861, he spoke of the rumours which had reached him of the Siamese intentions as follows:—

“The exact position with reference to the authorities at Bankok \(\ldots\) is not very clearly defined by the treaty of \(\ldots\) 1826, but I believe there can be no doubt they do acknowledge themselves to a certain extent as tributaries.” This Cavenagh considered was proved by a statement made to him by the Sultan of Trengganu that every thirty months the Bunga Mas and presents of camphor, cloth, etc., were sent to Bangkok in return for gifts of equal value.

\(^{(144)}\) Ibid., 2-3, 14-16.
\(^{(145)}\) Ibid., 14-16.
\(^{(146)}\) Ibid., 2-3, 5-6.
\(^{(147)}\) Ibid., 3, 16, and 26.
Nevertheless the Governor believed the dependence to be so nominal that from the legal point of view it was negligible, for he continued:

"By Article X of the above-quoted treaty it is evident that neither Trengganu nor Kelantan have ever been considered as Siamese provinces, whilst from Article XII it is equally evident that the Siamese Kings are precluded from adopting any measure with regard to those states that might lead to any interruption of our commerce. That the measure stated to be now in contemplation would have that effect is, I conceive, beyond a doubt, for the ex-Sultan of Lingga is an intriguing, restless character, banished by the Dutch from their territories owing to his being concerned in some conspiracy, who would almost immediately upon his resumption of power endeavour to extend his influence over the neighbouring native states......and thus create a feeling prejudicial to our interests. Moreover it is not to be imagined that the Sultan (of Trengganu) would yield his post without a struggle, and the whole country would in all probability be soon involved in a civil war, to the utter prostration of our trade, which is now of considerable value, and provided peace and quietness can be maintained is likely to increase. For general reasons of policy it is also apparently advisable that we should as far as practicable prevent any interference (by Siam) in the affairs of countries so intimately connected with the British possessions......as Trengganu and Kelantan." (148)

Cavenagh believed that India was not prepared "to recognise the right of Siam to exercise over the two above mentioned state a protectorate of this nature under any circumstances." (149) The contents of this despatch were approved by the Supreme Government. (150)

The Governor’s attitude towards Siam’s pretensions was still more clearly shown in a Report which he forwarded to the Government of India in 1862.

"Trengganu is an independent principality......the ruler of which, as is often customary with weak Oriental states, dispatches a periodical embassy with presents to his powerful neighbour, the King of Siam; but he has never acknowledged obedience to the latter, and has always refused to do him personal homage. When the Treaty of 1826 was concluded......the independence of Trengganu and the adjoining state of Kelantan was mutually guaranteed by Article XII......he (the Sultan) has, at all times, been recognised as an independent chief." (151)

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(148) Ibid., 3-4.
(149) Ibid., 14.
(150) Ibid., 1-3.

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From July till October 1862 Cavenagh and Schomburgk made unsuccessful attempts to persuade the Siamese to remove the Sultan of Lingga and Wan Ahmad from Trengganu. Meanwhile Ahmad again invaded Pahang, apparently at the instigation of the Sultan of Lingga.\(^{(152)}\) On October 23, 1862, the Government of India approved of Cavenagh's action in asking Schomburgk to call upon the Siamese to remove Ahmad and the Sultan of Lingga from Trengganu.\(^{(153)}\) About the same time, Schomburgk informed Cavenagh that the Siamese had at last consented to remove the Sultan.\(^{(154)}\) In his reply Cavenagh wrote that if the disturbances in Pahang continued he would, in accordance with the Governor-General's instructions, take whatever measures seemed necessary to protect British interests and maintain peace in the Peninsula.\(^{(155)}\)

Barely a month later it became necessary to carry the threat into execution. The time of the North-East monsoon was rapidly approaching, when from the high surf it would be impossible to make a landing at any harbour on the East Coast of the Peninsula. The Siamese kept evading the fulfilment of their promise, and made no attempt to equip a warship for the voyage to Trengganu. It appeared that they were deliberately postponing action so that it would be impossible to carry out their pledge until the change of the monsoons in April 1863. In the meantime the Sultan of Lingga and Wan Ahmad would have several months in which to carry out their plans.\(^{(156)}\) About the end of October 1862 the Singapore Chamber of Commerce complained to Cavenagh that their Pahang trade was at a standstill owing to a fresh invasion by Wan Ahmad, which was openly supported by the Sultan of Lingga and Trengganu. They also pointed out that the change in the monsoons would occur in eight or ten days, and begged him to act speedily.\(^{(157)}\) Cavenagh satisfied himself of the truth of their information about the monsoons, and then being convinced by the despatches from Bangkok that the Siamese intended to take no steps until the weather made effective action impossible, he determined that drastic measures were necessary. A warship was sent to Trengganu with orders to bombard the port and blockade it unless within twenty-four hours after its arrival the Sultan of Trengganu handed over the Sultan of Lingga for conveyance to Bangkok, and promised that no further assistance should be given to Wan Ahmad.\(^{(158)}\) The Sultan of Trengganu refused to give way, and his fort was accordingly shelled, the town and its population being spared. The Sultan of Lingga escaped in the country.

\(^{(153)}\) Ibid., 21-22.
\(^{(154)}\) Ibid., 22-23.
\(^{(155)}\) Ibid., 23-24.
\(^{(156)}\) Ibid., 27-33.
\(^{(157)}\) Ibid., 27-31.
\(^{(158)}\) Ibid., 27, 30-33.

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and although the coast was blockaded for some weeks he was not surrendered. Cavenagh’s actions were approved by the Government of India.

While the bombardment failed in its immediate objects, it ultimately produced the effect which Cavenagh had desired. The Siamese Government sent a warship to Trengganu on November 25, with the obvious result that as the monsoon had changed the Sultan of Lingga could not be taken off. The Siamese also sent letters to the British Government, claiming Kelantan and Trengganu as tributaries, and protesting at the bombardment as a violation of their territorial rights. But despite their complaints, in March 1863 they removed the Sultan of Lingga from Trengganu, and sent him back to Siam. Thereafter he ceased to trouble the peace of the Peninsula. A few years later his ally, Wan Ahmad, became Bendahara of Palang on the death of his brother, without any objections being raised on the part of the British Government.

The bombardment of Trengganu gave rise to two debates in the House of Commons, and on the whole Cavenagh’s conduct was condemned. In Trengganu however his firmness had excellent results. Soon after the incident was closed the Chief Minister of Siam visited Cavenagh at Singapore, and vainly tried to obtain from him an admission of Siam’s rights of suzerainty over Trengganu. Cavenagh also refused to use the Government of Bangkok as an intermediary in any communications which he might in future find it necessary to make to the Sultan of Trengganu. After this date Siam made no further overt attempts to destroy the independence of the state; and although threats and intrigues were lavishly employed, they proved unavailing. In 1909, when Trengganu was transferred to the British sphere of influence, its independence was still substantially unimpaired.

Looking back over the history of Anglo-Siamese relations in Malaya during the nineteenth century, there is one salient fact which impresses itself with irresistible force. It is to the British Government alone, and more especially to the Government of the Straits Settlements, that the Malay States of the Peninsula owe the preservation of their independence. In 1821 it seemed inevitable that the greater part of the Peninsula at least would sooner or later fall under the control of Siam. The Malay States, weak and 

(139) Ibid., 34-40.
(140) Ibid., 1-3.
(141) Ibid., 49.
(142) Ibid., 46, 48, 68-69.
(144) Buckley, "Singapore," II, 693-94.
(146) Cavenagh, "Reminiscences," 308.

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divided, were powerless to avert the fate of Kedah. That this
catastrophe was averted was due almost entirely to the Government
of the Straits Settlements. The Directors and the Indian Govern-
ment were but little interested in the fate of Malaya; and the
policy of Fullerton and his successors found only censure or half-
hearted support. Yet though the odds were against them, the
members of the Straits Civil Service persisted in their policy,
and by 1867 the danger was nearly past. Kedah had fallen,
Kelantan, and to some extent Trengganu, were still menaced; but
the greater part of the Malay Peninsula was saved.
CHAPTER IX.

The Malayan Policy of the East Indian Company, 1786-1867.

During the eighty-one years that the Straits Settlements were under the control of India, the Government wherever possible followed a policy of strict non-intervention in the affairs of the Malay States. Not only was the increase of British territory forbidden, but all attempts to form political treaties were regarded with strong disapproval. It was feared that alliances might finally compel the Company to intervene in the affairs of the native states, and that it would become involved in the constant wars which by 1874 had brought nearly every state of the Peninsula to a condition of anarchy. India was also afraid that alliances with the Malay Sultans might lead to war with Siam. British relations with the Peninsula were almost entirely commercial. On the few occasions in which intervention occurred it was due either to treaty obligations, or to attacks on British interests so flagrant that they could not be permitted.

The reason for the Company's policy was that its interests in Malaya were purely commercial. The Straits Settlements were regarded, not as the nucleus of a Malayan Empire, but solely as trading centres; and the Directors were more than content that their territorial responsibilities were practically limited to the land upon which the towns were built. This attitude was much strengthened by the Company's loss of its monopoly of the China trade in 1833. Hitherto the Straits Settlements had been valuable to it as depots where the products of the Archipelago was collected for transmission to the Company's factories in Canton. Henceforth they ceased to be a source of direct profit, and were maintained by the Company at considerable annual loss, for the benefit of British trade. The Indian Government derived no benefit from them except indirectly, through the increase of Indian trade with the Straits Settlements.

During the whole period between 1786 to 1867 the Malay States of the Peninsula were hard at work committing political "hara-kiri." The process had begun at a much earlier date; but during the nineteenth century it became greatly accelerated. There were constant wars between the different Sultans, and the states were also weakened by frequent civil wars between rival claimants to the throne. The power of the Sultan decayed, till even petty rajas were able to set themselves up as independent local rulers, free to plunder and fight pretty much at will. Piracy flourished, and trade declined. In many ways the condition of the Peninsula was very much like that of England during the reign.
of Stephen. In the Malay States, as in mediaeval England, the organization of society was feudal, the relation of the Malay rajas towards their Sultan strongly resembling that of the Norman barons towards the king. With the breakdown of the central government, the vassals seized the opportunity to establish themselves in a position of local independence at the expense of their weaker neighbours and the peasantry. No man's life and property were safe unless he were strong enough to defend them. The career of Geoffrey de Mandeville had many parallels in nineteenth century Malaya. Throughout the Peninsula, from Siam on the north to the Straits Settlements on the south, there was only one state where anarchy was not the order of the day. In Johore peace was maintained owing to the scantiness of the population and the British control over the Sultan and Temenggong. The other states were torn asunder by the convulsions of a dying feudalism. (1)

From 1844 onwards the Singapore newspapers frequently referred to the decay of the Malay States, and gave vivid pictures of the state of anarchy and semi-barbarism into which they were sinking. (2) Their testimony perhaps may be somewhat suspect, since they advocated the development of British trade with the Peninsula, either by annexing the Malay states, or else by governing them by means of advice tendered to the Sultans—an interesting forecast of the Residential System which has grown up since 1874. (3) The despatches of the Straits Government frequently contained similar descriptions. In 1841 for example Governor Bonham reported to the Government of Bengal that "the Malay States on the Peninsula......from some cause or other appear to be crumbling away into entire insignificance." (4) In 1847 a valuable account was written by E. A. Blundell, the Resident Councillor of Malacca, who had spent twenty-five years in the Straits.

"The petty states surrounding (Malacca) are all of them in a sad state of anarchy and disorder, without any settled government; and enjoying no protection of either person or property. The chiefs......are needy and rapacious, ready to sell themselves to any party that will purchase the use of their name and influence; and the people are wretchedly poor and enjoy no means of bettering their condition, for though the countries are as fertile as Malacca, and some, if not all of them, still more abounding in mineral products, yet such is the state of insecurity and lawlessness among them that but

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(3) Ibid., 575.

very little can be done to benefit by such resources. We have ourselves in our wisdom tended greatly towards this result by an apparent exhibition of liberality.....We have......withdrawn from all interference of any kind with these countries.

.... The policy of withdrawal from all interference with the neighbouring petty states is extremely doubtful. They are fast becoming little more than the receptacles of the lawless and evil disposed, whose sole means of livelihood will be plunder and robbing, obliging us, in the end, for the safety of our own people, to take possession of the country, the very object we sought to avoid by our withdrawal and subsequent exhibition of liberality. One very injurious effect of this refraining from the exercise of our influence and control.... is the complete stoppage of the overland trade which once existed with Pahang and other states in the Gulf of Siam. Pahang.....is tolerably flourishing.... But between Malacca ....and Pahang......there lie two or three of those petty Malayan states....which being....little better than a refuge for idle and dissipated Malays, the intercourse between the two countries is entirely precluded. Pahang is well know to be rich in both tin and gold."

In 1849 Governor Butterworth submitted a long report to Bengal which showed how completely the Negri Sembilan was given over to anarchy and misrule as the result of constant wars.(*)

The Company's policy of non-intervention dated from the earliest years of British rule in the Straits. It will be remembered that Captain Light was strictly forbidden to involve the Company in the affairs of the native states, and was for this reason forbidden to assist Kedah against Siam. The appeals of Perak and Trengganu for defensive alliances were likewise rejected.(7) Although the aggressive designs of Siam finally compelled the Company to intervene in order of safeguard British trade, it did so with extreme reluctance, and took great care of safeguard itself from any obligation to defend the Malay states against Siam. The severe censures passed upon Captain Low for his treaty with Perak in 1826, and indeed the whole history of Anglo-Siamese relations in the Malay Peninsula are convincing proofs that the policy of non-intervention was followed wherever possible.

During the 30 years which followed the Burney Treaty the same principle was adhered to. In 1832 for example a treaty was made with Rmban by which the Company voluntarily renounced all the rights inherited from the Dutch to a monopoly of the tin and to suzerainty.(*) The same year the Government of Bengal sent the following instructions to Governor Ibbetson regarding the Nanning War which was then in progress:—"It cannot be too

(8) v. Chapter on the Nanning War.

strongly impressed on your mind that extension of territory at Malacca is no point of our policy, and that such an extension as might tend to involve us in further contests is greatly to be deprecated.” (9) A still more striking instance occurred in 1833 when the boundary between Malacca Territory and the tiny state of Johol (in the Negri Sembilan) was being delimited. Between the two lay a debateable land which had formerly been claimed by both. It contained rich mines of tin and gold, including Mount Ophir, famous for its veins of gold. Governor Ibbetson regarded the frontier delimitation as an excellent opportunity for showing “that accessions of territory and encroachments upon their rights is the furthest from our views and intentions.” Although the chief of Johol had made no demand for this territory—indeed he appears to have offered to resign it to the Company—the Governor with the approval of the Bengal Government resigned any claims the British might have to it, and included it within the area of Johol. (10) During the same year the Lingga War broke out. Saiyid Shaaban, Yamtuun Muda of Rembau, wished to conquer Inche Katas the petty chief of Linggi, near Malacca territory, who controlled important tin-mines. Some of the Chinese merchants of Malacca were interested in these mines, and their trade suffered greatly because of the war, and because Shaaban levied a heavy duty on tin coming down the Linggi River. Ibbetson refused to interfere, in spite of the loud outcry of the Chinese, whose complaints were echoed by the Singapore press. He reported the case to Calcutta, and the Government entirely agreed with him that it was quite impossible to intervene in a quarrel between two independent chiefs, even though British merchants suffered severely from its effects. (11) Saiyid Shaaban was defeated, and he and his father-in-law Raja Ali, the ruler of Rembau, were in 1835 forced to seek refuge in Malacca. They were given shelter, but when asked for British aid to reinstate them, it was refused, although their alliance had been of great assistance in the Naning War. There was no breach of faith, because the British treaty made with them in 1832 did not require the Company to assist them. Since treaty-obligations were not involved, Governor Ibbetson felt himself bound by the Bengal Government’s orders not to interfere unless to do so meant a breach of treaty-engagements. The Supreme Government approved of his action, and directed that no assistance whatever was to be given the exiles, since if granted it was almost certain to involve the Company in future entanglements. (12) For many years Saiyid Shaaban lived in Malacca on a pension from the Company, until in 1847 a faction in Rembau invited him to resume his former position. Governor Butterworth allowed Shaaban.


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ban to accept, but told him that by so doing he would forfeit his pension, and compel the Straits Government to inform all the adjacent states that his attempt was not made with British support. The Company could not permit the neighbouring Sultans to think that it was trying to interfere in the affairs of a native state, even in the interests of a man who had rendered such great services as Syed Shaaban. The Governor's attitude received the approval of the Supreme Government. (13)

Two years later, in 1849, Governor Butterworth submitted a long report on the anarchy and misrule which were rampant in the Negri Sembilan. The country was ravaged by constant wars, the ruling chiefstains were penniless and powerless, and the states were given over to the struggles of "a number of needy, desperate, petty chiefstains," who claimed complete independence. They were imposing many illegal exactions on British trade, and the Governor's ire was especially roused by the impudence of a freebooting raja who had built a stockade at Sempang, on the Longgi river, bordering on Malacca territory. He was a mere robber and pirate, and was able to maintain himself at Sempang solely because his nominal suzerain was too weak to expel him. Like a mediaeval robber baron, he had established himself on a river which was the sole water route to Sungai Ujong, from which Malacca drew much of its supply of tin; and he levied toll on all traders who passed. The British merchants were loud in their complaints. The Governor had seen the stockade, and pronounced it to be a ramsnake affar of palm-logs which a few round shot would knock into a heap of ruins. Yet his hands were tied by the policy of non-intervention. Since the Sultan was powerless, Blundell, the Resident Councillor at Malacca, urged that the Straits Government should try to end the ceaseless wars by offering to mediate between the Malacca chiefstains. Butterworth asked the Bengal Government to sanction this suggestion, but frankly admitted that he was very sceptical of its utility. When the Straits administration was forbidden to use the threat of force, how could it be expected, he plaintively asked, that "we can exert effectually over the barbarous rule of a number of needy, desperate, petty chiefstains an influence unbounded, but altogether dissociated with fear or dread?" Personally, he was a believer in the efficacy of action rather than moral suasion, and he asked that if Lebai Kulp, the robber baron of Sempang, declined to mend his ways, the Straits Government might be authorized to expel him by force. (14) The Supreme Government refused to sanction Butterworth's request, and declared that it was opposed to any attempts to gain wide influence in the Negri Sembilan. British interference was to be confined "within very narrow limits," and no proceedings likely to lead to war with a Malay state were to be undertaken without the previous consent of India. (15)

(15) Ibid., No. 36.

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In 1853 the Sultan of Perak was dethroned by a rival. Both invoked British aid, and the request was referred to India. The Supreme Government forbade intervention since the Sultan's fall was the result of his vices and his incapacity to govern, and Low's Treaty of 1826 contained no provision binding the Company to interfere in such a case. The Straits Government was empowered to offer its mediation, but it was warned to be most careful not to commit the Company to support either faction. Butterworth accordingly proffered his services as mediator. They were refused, and in 1854 Perak was still in a state of anarchy as a result of the war. The Governor decided not to renew his offer, but to wait until the Malays asked him to settle the quarrel, because he was "perfectly convinced" of the inexpediency of taking an active part in the internal affairs of the Malay states except when it was absolutely unavoidable. The Supreme Government in its reply commended the soundness of his views on Malay Policy.

Although as a rule, the East India Company adhered strictly to a policy of non-intervention, cases occasionally arose when interference was unavoidable. The reasons which were held to justify this course were the invasion of British territory, the ill-treatment of British subjects, and treaty-obligations. In 1828 for example the Temenggong or chief of Muar (a small dependency of Johore on the border of Malacca) occupied some ninety square miles of Malacca Territory on the River Kesang, adjoining Muar. He claimed it as rightfully part of his own state; but the Government after careful inquiry decided that it belonged to the Company. Lengthy negotiations followed, but every attempt to persuade the chief to evacuate the territory failed. A company of Sepoys was accordingly moved against him, and the raja was given the alternatives of voluntary retirement or expulsion. He chose the former and the incident was closed.

Interference to obtain redress for injuries inflicted on British subjects generally occurred when pirates were given shelter by native rulers. The imposition of illegal exactions upon British merchants (usually it would seem, Chinese), occasionally brought about the Government's interference. In 1860 for instance Governor Cavenagh made successful representations to the states of Rembau and Sungai Ujong to secure the removal of illegal exactions which were inflicting losses upon Malacca's trade. In 1862 a somewhat similar incident occurred in the Larut district of Perak. This proved to be the beginning of the disturbances which twelve years later brought about permanent British

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(19) V. chapters on Piracy and Rajah Brooke.
(20) "Straits Settlements Administration Reports, 1860-31;" pp. 18-19.
intervention in that state. On this occasion, to collect the sums awarded to Chinese merchants who were British subjects as redress for their losses, Cavenagh was compelled to blockade the Larut River until the amounts were paid.\(^{(21)}\) In the same year occurred the bombardment of Trengganu. The motives were partly to protect British trade, but in the main to checkmate Siamese aggression.\(^{(22)}\) About the same time Governor Cavenagh found it necessary to take the Temenggong of Johore and his son Abubakar to task for punishing natives who were British subjects according to Malayan law. He told them that he "could not permit British subjects to be at the mercy of the caprice of any native chief," since "there was no regularity of certainty about judicial proceedings in Johore." Abubakar showed a strong desire to comply with the Governor's orders: he released his prisoners and promised to draw up a code of laws which he would submit to Cavenagh's inspection.\(^{(23)}\) Colonel Cavenagh's Malayan policy however cannot be regarded as typical of that pursued before 1867. He was much more inclined than any of his predecessors except Fullerton to take strong measures for the protection of British trade or checking Siamese aggression. In many ways the Colonel's vigorous policy was more nearly allied to that adopted after 1873 under Sir Andrew Clarke than to the traditional policy of non-intervention.

On several occasions the Company intervened because of its treaty-obligations. It aided the Siamese to crush the Malay revolts in Kedah, because of its supposed obligations under the Burney treaty of 1826. In 1844-1848 it compelled Kedah to restore the Krian District to Perak, because the British were required to give assistance in such a contingency by the terms of Low's treaty.\(^{(24)}\)

A study of the Malayan policy of the East India Company would be incomplete without some account of the negotiations between the Sultan and Temenggong of Johore, which resulted in the final disappearance of the ancient dynasty, and the elevation of a new reigning house, in the person of the grandchild of the present Sultan. Only a brief summary is necessary, since the incident has already been very fully treated in a recent work.\(^{(25)}\)

It will be remembered that the treaties of 1819 and 1824 ceding Singapore were signed by both Sultan Hussein and the Temenggong of Johore. The signature of the Temenggong was necessary because while in theory he was merely the Sultan's deputy, with the decay of the central government he had become practically an independent ruler, holding his position by hereditary right. While however he was the "de facto" sovereign of Singapore and the present state of Johore, the "de jure" ruler was his nominal.

\(^{(21)}\) Ibid., 1861-62; p. 44.
\(^{(22)}\) v. chapter on Anglo-Siamese Relations.
\(^{(23)}\) Cavenagh, "Reminiscences," 233.
\(^{(24)}\) v. chapter on Anglo-Siamese Relations.

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suzerain, Sultan Hussein. In point of fact Hussein—poor, almost friendless, and ousted from his throne by his younger brother—was quite unable to enforce his theoretical rights. His signature was obtained in order that no loophole might be left for an attack on the legality of the cession of Singapore, on the ground that the Temenggong had given away what theoretically he had no power to grant.

Both Raffles and Crawfurd clearly grasped the real positions of the Sultan and Temenggong, and understood that Hussein was merely a figurehead, all real power being with the Temenggong. Thus Raffles, in describing the negotiations of the Preliminary Agreement of January 30, 1819, made with the Temenggong before Hussein’s arrival, wrote:—"As the land was the property of the Temenggong we did not hesitate to treat for the occupation of the port."(26) Crawfurd’s dispatch to the Supreme Government of August 3, 1824 spoke of the Temenggong as a "virtually independent chief," and continued that in drawing up the treaty of 1824 he had "received the Sultan as possessing the right of paramount dominion, and the Temenggong as not only virtually exercising the powers of government, but being, like other Asiatic sovereigns, 'de facto' the real proprietor of the soil."(27) Exception may be taken to the description of one who theoretically was merely a high Court official as "being like other Asiatic sovereigns." Both Raffles and Crawfurd however diagnosed the situation with perfect accuracy: it was the story of the "faînent" Merovingians and the Mayors of the Palace in a Malayan setting.

In 1825 the Temenggong died, and his son succeeded to his office. Although the treaties ceding Singapore did not require the Company to pay any pensions to the descendants of the Sultan and the Temenggong, it allowed the new Temenggong a pension of $350 a month, because his father had lived to enjoy his subsidy so short a time.(28) Sultan Hussein lived until 1835, but his manner of life was so extravagant that his family were left at his death in very straitened circumstances. He had never possessed more than the shadow of power, and even this died with him. His son Ali was left with nothing save a small income, many debts, and an unimpeachable claim to an empty title. The Sultan’s heirs petitioned for a pension, and Governor Murchison advised that $350 a month be allotted them, since they were destitute.(29) The Government of Bengal granted a pension of $250 a month, an amount which in 1840 was increased to $350.(30)


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At the time of Hussein's death his son Ali was too young to apply for the Government's recognition of his title as Sultan. Garling, the Resident Councillor of Malacca, strongly recommended that it should be granted to him; but he was opposed by Governor Murchison on the ground that he considered it "desirable to allow the family to merge as quickly as possible into untitiled stipendaries. The late Sultan was never recognised by the Malay States as Sultan of Johore, and enjoyed neither revenue nor political sway in that country. He was pronounced Sultan by the British; but it was for a particular object, and no reason now exists for the recognition of a mere titular prince." The Government of Bengal in its reply made no reference to the question, and nothing was done in the matter. (31)

As Ali grew older he began to petition the Company to recognise him as Sultan, and finally in 1840 a proclamation was issued to the effect that Ali "is looked upon by the British Government in every respect as the successor of his late father, and entitled to all the property granted to the late Sultan by the East India Company" at Singapore. (32) The meaning of this proclamation was decidedly ambiguous, although on the face of it it would seem as though the Company thereby recognised Ali as Sultan. Church, the Resident Councillor of Singapore at this time, declared that it was issued principally to establish Ali's claim to the late Sultan's property, so that the younger members of his family could not appropriate it. (33) The Recorder's Courts in 1843 also decided that it "does not necessarily import" his recognition as Sultan, and "can scarcely be construed into more than an acquiescence in the defendant's claim to the piece of ground specified." (34)

Hitherto the recognition of Ali as Sultan of Johore would have brought him no increase in income, the country being practically deserted and producing hardly any revenue. Between 1835 and 1840 however the failure of the spice plantations on the island of Singapore caused many of the Chinese to migrate across the strait of Johore. Here they established pepper plantations, so that the country at last began to produce a revenue. The opium-farmer of Singapore offered the Temenggong $300 a month for the opium farm of Johore. (35) Ali was very poor and threatened with imprisonment for debt, so that it became of great moment to him to obtain recognition as Sultan and a share of the revenue.

He was however fighting an uphill battle. The Temenggong controlled Johore, and when the Sultan attempted to assert his rights there his followers were expelled by force. Moreover even

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(33) Ibid.
(34) Ibid., No. 8.
(35) Ibid., No. 3.

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Ali's few friends among the officials admitted that he was far from being an estimable character, and was in every way much inferior to his rival. Indolent, weak-willed and somewhat feeble-minded, he was a striking contrast to the energetic, clever and active Temenggong. The Temenggong had all his life associated with the European merchants of Singapore, and had won their liking, so that their powerful influence was behind him in the struggle. Last, and most important of all, he had the warm support of Colonel Butterworth, the Governor, and of Church, the Resident Councillor at Singapore. The Governor was in his favour partly because he considered him so infinitely superior to his opponent, but principally on account of the very real assistance which he had rendered in the suppression of piracy. In former years the Temenggong had been strongly suspecting of secretly protecting pirates; but of late he had zealously cooperated in the work of destroying them. (36)

When in 1847 Ali again petitioned the Government of Bengal to be recognised as Sultan, Butterworth's report on his request was far from favourable. He did not actually advise against it, but he gave a long account of Ali and the Temenggong, and showed that Ali was a thoroughly undesirable person to have as Sultan. Sultan Hussein had never been more than a mere figurehead set up by Raffles to secure an indefeasible title to Singapore, while the Temenggong had been "the chief, I may say the only, negotiator." Moreover, ever since 1819 the control of Johore had lain with the Temenggong. Finally, Butterworth pointed out that to instal Ali as Sultan would be an expense to the Company. His existing pension being insufficient to maintain the state necessary for such a rank, it would have to be increased, and there would also be the cost of the ceremonies of the installation, which the Government would have to defray. (37)

Ali's petition was regarded by the Company solely from the point of view of expediency; and since no advantage would have followed from his installation, his request was refused. The Supreme Government replied to Butterworth's despatch as follows:— "Unless in your opinion some political advantages would be likely to accrue from such ceremony, His Excellency in Council is not disposed to it." (38) The question was reported to the Directors who concurred in the decision of India. They remarked:— "Unless compelled by some positive engagement we see no reason for your acknowledging a successor to this merely titular dignity." (39)

(38) Ibid., No. 9.

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For several years nothing more was heard of the matter. In 1852 however Butterworth went on leave of absence for two years, and Blundell became Acting-Governor. He was far more in sympathy with Ali than his superior, and when he appealed to him for aid against the Temenggong, who was preventing him from securing any share in the revenue of Johore, Blundell on July 20, 1852 attempted to persuade the Indian Government to instal him as Sultan. He admitted that on grounds of expediency it would be advisable to refuse the request, but strongly urged Ali's claims for reasons of justice.

"I cannot deny that it seems better for our interests that the rule over the country of Johore should remain as at present, wholly in the hands of the Temenggong..... (He) is undoubtedly superior to the young Sultan in the capacity to govern the country in subservience to British interests,..... I agree with the Resident Councillor (Church) in thinking that much confusion and trouble may ensue from recognizing him as the Sultan, but still I am impressed with the injustice of disregarding the claims of the son of the Prince from whom we obtained the island of Singapore, simply because it is less troublesome and perhaps more advantageous to us that the rule should continue in the hands of a subordinate officer.” (40)

The Indian Government in its reply dismissed Blundell's contention that justice demanded British intervention on the ground that the Treaties of 1819 and 1824 did not bind the Company to interfere in the internal affairs of Johore. On grounds of expediency it was clear from Blundell's own despatch that intervention "might tend to involve the Supreme Government in... internal dissensions," and it therefore determined "to allow matters to remain as they are now." (41)

Despite this rebuff Blundell returned to the charge with a despatch dated January 14, 1853. He induced Ali and the Temenggong to agree to a compromise. Ali was to promise never to interfere in the affairs of Johore, and to leave its government entirely in the hands of the Temenggong. In return the Temenggong was to instal him as Sultan, and to pay him half the revenues of the Country. The amount was fixed at $300 a month for three years, after which time it was to be revised. The Indian Government was asked to confirm this arrangement solely on the grounds of justice, since from motives of expediency there were no reasons which could be urged. (42)

The Indian Government was much annoyed at Blundell's action, and in its reply of March 4, 1853 it took him sharply to task for his "meddling measures... directly in the face of its

(41) Ibid., No. 184.

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instructions not to interfere." If however the Temenggong "should be willing to purchase entire sovereignty by a sacrifice of revenue in favour of the Sultan I conceive the measure would be a beneficial one to all parties." (43)

In spite of this grudging assent Blundell made no attempt to carry the arrangement into effect during the brief remainder of his period of office. In 1854 Governor Butterworth returned and instead of a friend Ali now found an opponent at the head of the administration. Negotiations were recommenced, and by December 22, 1854 a second agreement was arrived at, much more unfavourable to Ali than the former one. Ali appears to have consented because he felt that he must either take what was offered, or go without anything. Moreover he was in such extreme poverty that an immediate settlement was essential for him. The terms of the agreement were that Ali was to promise that he and his heirs would never interfere in the affairs of Johore. In return he was to be installed as Sultan, and his successors were also to receive the title. The Temenggong was to pay him $5000 at once, and $500 a month in perpetuity, while the district of Muar in Johore was also to be given to Ali and his heirs. The territory was of small value, but was prized by him because some of his ancestors were buried there. It is somewhat astonishing that in his despatch reporting this agreement Butterworth spoke of these terms as those sanctioned by India when Blundell proposed them in the previous year. As a matter of fact, they were entirely different. In Butterworth’s agreement the monthly pension was never to be increased, while in that of 1853 it was to be revised after three years. This was a change of the utmost importance, since the revenues of Johore were rapidly increasing. The whole tone of the despatch shows however that the Governor’s guiding principle was to make the terms as favourable to the Temenggong as possible. The Indian Government sanctioned Butterworth’s projected agreement. (44) On March 10, 1855, a treaty embodying the foregoing terms was signed, and Ali was formally installed as Sultan—an empty honour, since by the agreement the full sovereignty over it had been ceded to the Temenggong and his heirs for ever. (45)

- The final extinction of the old reigning house of Johore occurred on the death of Sultan Ali in 1877. Sir Archibald Anson, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Straits and a firm friend of Abu-bakar, Temenggong of Johore, was then Acting Governor of the Settlements. He at once placed Muar under the control of Abu-

(43) Ibid., Nos. 102-63.
bakar, pending the Colonial Office's decision. His action was confirmed, although with some reluctance, and thus the ancient line of the Emperors of Johore which had once ruled over almost the whole of British Malaya, was deprived of the last shred of territory in the Peninsula.\(^{(47)}\) Moreover the descendants of Sultan Ali never received the title of Sultan, although the Treaty of 1855 had promised that this rank and the territory of Muar should be held by them. His son and grandson were known simply as "Tunku", a title of princely rank and royal with not necessarily implying sovereignty.\(^{(48)}\) Meanwhile in 1868, the Temenggong was raised to the rank of "Maharajah of the State and Territory of Johore" by the British Government.\(^{(49)}\) As some compensation for the loss of Muar, Sir William Robinson, the new Governor, in 1877 induced Abubakar to raise the monthly pension from $500 to $1250 a month.\(^{(50)}\)

The Company's interference in the affairs of Johore was not inconsistent with its policy of non-intervention, although at first sight it might appear so. The proximity of Johore to Singapore, and the presence of the two chieftains with their Malay followers in the city itself, meant that war between them would have immediate effects upon its trade. The despatches which have been quoted above frequently referred to the bitterness of the feud between the two factions, and the probability that it would end in bloodshed. Altogether apart from the considerations of justice which so influenced Blundell it was very natural that the Straits Government should be anxious to settle a dispute which contained the seeds of much future trouble. Since moreover both chieftains lived in Singapore, and drew a large part—in Ali's case, the whole—of their incomes from the Company's pensions, they were much more amenable to the Government's control than the Sultans of the other Malay States.

Of the wisdom of the Company's Malayan policy it is difficult to speak with certainty. The ease with which British control was established after 1874 is too apt to lead critics to forget that warfare in an unmapped and almost pathless jungle against an enemy expert in guerilla fighting was much more difficult in the days of muzzle-loading cannon and the Brown Bess than when it became a case of sword and musket against the Martini Henry and modern artillery. Even so the experience of Rajah Brooke in Sarawak shows that the Directors greatly overrated the risk and expense of a forward policy. A certain amount of fighting would have been inevitable; but there seems no reason to suppose that it would have been very serious. Half the battle had already


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been won; the British had established what may be described as a moral predominance over the Malays. The Malay rulers felt themselves "checked and to some extent overawed by the presence of a race the extent of whose pervasion they cannot estimate, and whose civilization they cannot expect ever to attain to or even to imitate."(51) Regarding the question solely from the point of view of the Indian Government there was however much to be said for its attitude; the policy of non-intervention was the natural course to adopt towards a region in which it was so little interested as the Malay Peninsula.

CHAPTER X.

Trade and Agriculture in British Malaya.

The Straits Settlements throughout their history have been the most important centre of British trade with Further Asia. Then, as since 1867, no local manufactures of importance existed, with the exception of the sago and (for some time after 1867) the tapioca factories; and Agriculture was always a minor, though not unimportant industry. The Straits Settlements then as now were essentially centres of exchange, and grew wealthy by their transit trade. Their prosperity was the result of two causes, their situation on the great trade-route through the Straits of Malacca, and their system of free trade. The manufactures of Europe and India were brought to the Straits Settlements, and above all to Singapore, for transhipment to China, or for distribution throughout Indo-China and the East Indian Islands. Conversely, they were the great depot where the products of Siam, the Malay Peninsula, and the Archipelago were collected, to be sent to Great Britain, India and China. The history of the Straits Settlements is in its essence the expansion of their commerce from Burma to Australia and from Java to China.

Agriculture before 1867 was of much less importance than it has since become through the formation of rubber plantations in the Peninsula. During the earlier period it was largely confined to the cultivation of spices and gambier, although there was a large amount of rice-farming in Province Wellesley and Malacca. There were also some sugar and coconut plantations. About 1803 the Directors hoped to make of Penang a second Moluccas, and so render themselves independent of the Spice Islands. For a few years the prospects were most encouraging. (1) Pepper was the staple product, the average annual output until about 1810 being some 4,000,000 pounds while in quality it was superior to that of any other part of the East Indies. (2) The price obtainable decreased however, and the industry was gradually abandoned. By 1835 the amount produced had sunk to about 266,600 pounds, and by 1847 the growth of pepper had become unimportant. (3) The same lack of success attended the early attempts to grow cloves and nutmegs—principally, it would appear, because the

(1) v. chapter on Penang.
planters were ignorant of the proper methods of cultivation.\(^4\)

By 1818 the industry had in great measure been abandoned, and until about 1833 only a single planter, Brown of Glugor, made any serious attempts to continue the cultivation.\(^5\) The refusal of the Company until 1841-42 to sell lands in perpetuity, or grant them on long leases, also hampered cultivation greatly. Spice cultivation required a heavy initial outlay, and since it was many years before the plants began to bear, capitalists were unwilling to spend large sums of money on lands which they could only obtain on short leases.\(^4\) By 1833 Brown's efforts were at last successful, and there was an immediate and marked increase in the number of plantations.\(^1\) By 1847 nutmegs and cloves had become the staple product of Penang. This continued until 1860 when a blight fell upon the spice-plants. At this time half the island was covered with spice plantations, but in a few years the greater part of the trees were killed by disease.\(^3\)

The growth of sugar, began in Province Wellesley during the thirties of the last century, but did not become important until 1846. The change was due to the reduction of the duty on Penang sugar imported into England to the same amount as that levied on sugar grown in Bengal. The granting of land in perpetuity instead of on lease, referred to above, also fostered the growth of the industry. From this time the area under sugar cultivation steadily increased.\(^8\)

The history of spice-cultivation at Malacca can be dismissed in a few words: there was none. The Malacca land question proved itself to be a veritable Old Man of the Sea, and successfully strangled every attempt to foster agriculture. In spite of the excellence of the soil Malacca did not even produce sufficient rice to feed its own population. It exported only a few coconuts and a little fruit.\(^9\)

In Singapore the cultivation of cloves, nutmegs and sugar was a complete failure, although for many years pepper and gambier yielded large returns. As early as 1824 Governor John Crawfurd, the encyclopaedic oracle on all matters Malayan, had predicted that this would be the case, since the soil, while well-

\(^{(4)}\) Low "Dissertation on Penang," 16-17.

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suited to the pepper plant, was unsuitable for the more valuable spices.\(^{11}\) His warnings were unheeded, and for over a generation much labour and money were wasted in the growth of cloves, nutmegs and sugar. Spice-cultivation had been introduced by Raffles in 1819, and for about twenty-five years the prospects of success appeared hopeful. Until 1841–45 the Company’s land laws hindered cultivation as at Penang; but even after they were amended the natural unsuitability of the soil was an obstacle which no legislation could overcome. By 1847 the growth of cloves and nutmegs had failed. The sugar-plantations also were never of much importance.\(^{12}\)

Gambier and pepper however were for many years cultivated with much success. There were many large plantations which, as at Penang, were entirely owned and worked by Chinese. It may be questioned however whether they were not in the long run an evil. Their sole object being to make money as rapidly as possible, they made no attempt to manure the soil, and in a few years exhausted its richness. As soon as their plantations became unproductive they abandoned them, moved further into the jungle, and recommenced the same process. Large areas on the island thus relapsed into wilderness, and could never again be used without a heavy expenditure to restore the soil. By 1840 the natural richness of the island had already begun to wane, and the Chinese planters in growing numbers abandoned it for the neighbouring mainland of Johore, where they commenced the same method of agriculture.\(^{13}\) By 1860 only some 40 square miles out of an available area of about 225 were under cultivation, and the amount of pepper and gambier produced had greatly decreased.\(^{14}\)

The trade of Penang between 1786 and 1819 in the end proved as great a disappointment to the Directors as the cultivation of spices. After the British conquest of Malacca and other Dutch possessions in 1795, and above all when, with the capture of Java in 1811 the empire of Holland was annihilated, Penang had the most favourable of opportunities to show whether it could become as its penyevrits averred, the trading centre of the Archipelago. In this it failed signally. From 1786 to 1819 indeed commerce increased rapidly; but from 1810 to 1821 it remained practically stationary. In 1821 the value of its trade was $600,000, about


one seventh of that of Singapore in 1854, thirty-five years after its foundation.\(^{(15)}\)

The reason for the Directors’ disappointment was not far to seek. Penang lay on the Western edge of the Eastern Archipelago, hundreds of miles from its centre. Moreover the Straits of Malacca swarmed with pirates, who did immense damage to the small and ill-armed praus (native craft). Furthermore Penang had two rivals whose position was much superior, Malacca, which lay 280 miles to the South Eastward, and Rhio, the great Bugis port near Singapore. The disadvantages more than counter-balanced the points in Penang’s favour. These were the Malayas’ strong dislike of the Dutch and preference for the British, and the great attraction of the low customs duties at Penang as compared with the heavy dues levied at Dutch ports. The majority of the praus from the Eastern part of the Archipelago stopped at Rhio or Malacca, and only a comparatively small number made the long and dangerous journey to Penang. Apart from these, and a small but flourishing trade with Siam and China, the bulk of Penang’s commerce was with the countries in its immediate neighbourhood. These were Burma, the Western coast of the Malay Peninsula, and above all Achin and the petty states of Northern Sumatra. In 1867 Northern Sumatra was still the most important market, British and Indian manufactures being exchanged for pepper. Northern Sumatra was in 1824 the most important pepper-producing country in the world, its output being about 58% of the total amount.\(^{(15)}\) Raffles saw the position clearly, and pointed out again and again that the position of Penang was an insuperable obstacle; the only way to obtain an important share of the trade of the East Indian Islands was to establish a post near the Southern entrance of the Straits of Malacca.\(^{(17)}\)

The occupation of Singapore marked the beginning of a new chapter in the history of British trade with the Archipelago. Although fluctuations inevitably occurred, from the date of its foundation to the present day there has been on the whole a steady and phenomenal increase in the volume of commerce. The hostility of Holland, the partial closing of many markets, as for example in Indo-China owing to the French conquests, these and many other obstacles have been powerless to impede its progress.

\(^{(15)}\) S. S. R., 102: July 18, 1825. Braddell “Statistics.” 6. The commercial year in the Straits Settlements was from May 1 to April 30.

\(^{(16)}\) Crawfurd, “Embassy to Siam.” 423.

The growth of Singapore's trade has few parallels in the history of commerce.

The secret of its prosperity lies primarily in its position. At the Southern entrance of the Straits of Malacca, the island was designed by nature to be the centre of trade for the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, and the islands to the Eastwards. Within easy sail of Siam, Indo-China, and China, and lying on the shortest trade-route from Europe and India to the Far East, Singapore inevitably became the centre where the merchants of Europe and the Orient came to exchange their manufactures for the products of the Archipelago. Singapore's position by itself, however, would not have sufficed. Its trade would have been far smaller had it been burdened with the heavy duties and vexatious regulations which in 1819 were in force in every Dutch port. The Bugis of Celebes, the principal traders of the East Indian Islands, would scarcely have sailed hundreds of miles out of their course for the privilege of paying heavy duties when so many Dutch ports lay at their very doors. Sir Stamford Raffles foresaw that a town where commerce was untaxed and harbour-regulations were almost non-existent would prove an irresistible attraction. His policy was soon justified: merchants flocked to Singapore from every part of the Archipelago and the Far East, and every effort of the Dutch to prevent them proved unavailing. By 1824-25 the total value of the exports and imports had already risen to $13,519,137, more than twice the trade of Penang, and eight times that of Malacca. (18) The merchants of Singapore, Chinese as well as European, always regarded Free Trade as the palladium of their city, and firmly, and on the whole successfully, resisted the periodical attempts of the Company to tamper with it. To its continuance, and to their spirit of daring enterprise, they owed their continued prosperity.

Almost an immediate result of the foundation of Singapore was that the trade of Penang and Malacca began rapidly to decline. Writing in 1830 Governor Fullerton reported that Singapore had "annihilated" the declining trade of Malacca, and "bade fair to annihilate that of Penang also." (19) While the Governor was unduly pessimistic, the annual trade-returns show that he had good cause for uneasiness.

From 1819 to 1821 the trade of Penang was apparently unaffected by Singapore, the value of the imports and exports in 1822 about $6,500,000 being the highest yet attained. (20) In 1823 however the decline began and by July 1825 Penang's commerce had decreased to $5,265,902. (21) The trade for the following year, 1825-26, showed a further decrease of over $300,000, the total

(18) Crawfurd, "Embassy to Siam," 337.
(21) Ibid.

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value being only $4,964,141. (22) In subsequent years the decline became more rapid than before, until in 1830 the trade of Penang amounted to only about $3,149,151 or £708,559. (23) This was little more than half what it had been in 1821.

The decline of Penang's commerce was the inevitable result of the superior situation of Singapore. An analysis of the trade returns shows that after 1822 Singapore had captured almost all of the older settlement's trade except with Northern Sumatra and the West Coast of the Malay Peninsula—in short, the territory which lay much nearer to Penang than to Singapore. Even here the competition of Singapore was very keen. Penang also retained an important trade with China, apparently because the island served as a depot for the collection of pepper, tin, birds nests, etc., from the adjacent countries, and it was found more convenient to ship the produce directly to China than to forward it to Singapore for transmission from there. But with these exceptions the trade of Penang had almost ceased to exist. Over three-quarters of its commerce with Siam had passed into the hands of Singapore, and apart from an insignificant amount of trade with Java, Penang had lost almost the whole of its former commerce with the islands east of the Straits of Malacca. Even in the trade area remaining to it Penang was becoming to some extent a commercial dependency of Singapore. The ships from Europe which formerly stopped there went on to Singapore without calling at Penang; and a large part of the European manufactures required for its trade no longer came to it directly, but were taken to Singapore, and sent back from there. (24)

The remedy proposed by the Penang Council to restore the trade of Penang was to destroy the freedom of trade at Singapore, by extending to it the customs duties levied at Penang. The Council also urged that the same course should be followed at Malacca, which had also been a free port since its transfer to the Company. (25) The Directors consented, but the friends of Singapore in England brought up the matter in Parliament. The Cabinet not only forbade the imposition of customs duties, but also ordered the abolition of those at Penang. (26) With much chagrin the Directors obeyed, and in 1827 Penang became a free port. (27) Thus the unexpected result of the attempt to fetter the

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(22) S. S. R. 114.
(27) S. S. R., 112: Nov. 23, 1826. Ibid., 184: Jan. 25 and Nov. 6, 1827.

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trade of Singapore was to establish free trade throughout the Straits Settlements.

If the effect of Singapore's competition on Penang was serious, upon Malacca it was disastrous. The town had already suffered severely from the occupation of Penang, which had deprived it of its trade to the Westward. A second blow had been struck during the first British occupation, when a partially successful attempt was made to destroy the town and divert its trade to Penang. Furthermore the harbour of Malacca was rapidly silted up. The foundation of Singapore however was a far more serious blow than any of the foregoing. By its position 120 miles to the South East of Malacca the new settlement had exactly the same advantage over Malacca which that port had formerly held over Penang. Within a few years Malacca lost forever the whole of its commerce with the Archipelago and China. With rival ports on both sides, the trade of the ancient city became almost entirely confined to the neighbouring states of the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra. Malacca also retained a small direct trade with India and China; but on the whole it became a mere depot where the produce of the adjacent countries was collected for transmission to Penang and above all Singapore. (28)

Most of the trade-returns for the early nineteenth century seem to have perished, but enough remain to show how complete was Malacca's downfall. In 1779 it was still very prosperous; but in 1826 its commerce had fallen to £1,037,649, or about £200,000. (29) In 1829 its trade reached its lowest point, with a total value of £133,067. (30) Fullerton scarcely exaggerated when in 1830 he wrote that through the competition of Singapore its already declining commerce had been "annihilated." (31) As early as 1838 Governor Fullerton saw that its days as a great trading centre were over, and that henceforth it must depend upon its agricultural resources. His attempts to develop them were defeated by the Malacca Land Problem. (32) The city sunk rapidly into a state of stagnation, a picturesque back-water to which the wealthy Chinese merchants of Singapore retired to spend their declining years.

(31) S. S. R., 133; April 29, 1830.
(32) V. chapter on Malacca Land Problem.

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The remarkable growth of trade in the Straits Settlements during the period 1825 to 1864 is shown by the following table.\(^{(33)}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Penang</th>
<th>Singapore</th>
<th>Malacca</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1825</td>
<td>£1,114,614</td>
<td>£2,610,440</td>
<td>£3,184,426</td>
<td>£4,403,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>£708,553</td>
<td>£3,948,784</td>
<td>£1,112,205</td>
<td>£4,798,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1840</td>
<td>£1,475,759</td>
<td>£5,851,924</td>
<td>[No data]</td>
<td>£7,327,683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>£1,644,931</td>
<td>£5,687,287</td>
<td>£439,175</td>
<td>£7,721,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1859</td>
<td>£3,530,000</td>
<td>£10,371,300</td>
<td>£920,000</td>
<td>£14,821,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td>£4,496,205</td>
<td>£13,252,175</td>
<td>£821,698</td>
<td>£18,570,080</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The trade of Penang reached its lowest ebb in 1830, but after this date it rapidly recovered until it attained to about the same amount as in 1819. It then remained practically stationary until 1843. Thereafter commerce steadily increased, although to a far lesser degree than at Singapore, until by 1867 it was more than double what it had been in 1819. The trade area of Penang continued to be limited to the West Coast of the Malay Peninsula, Northern Sumatra, Siam, Burma, and to a small extent, Java, China, and Borneo. The increase of trade after 1843 was the result of developing trade with the markets which Penang had retained after 1819, and was not due to acquiring any new fields of expansion. The most important area from which Straits Produce, and especially pepper, was obtained, was Achin, and the States of Northern Sumatra. That the rate of increase was much slower than it became after British intervention in the Malay States was largely due to the anarchic condition of the Peninsula, and to the very hampering effect upon trade of the Company's policy of non-intervention in Malayan affairs even to protect British merchants.

Penang continued to be what it had already become by 1830, a local trading-centre where the produce of the adjacent countries was exchanged for the manufactures of Great Britain and India. Commerce with China recovered, and became an important branch of the island's trade. The centre of the opium traffic had shifted to Singapore; but large quantities of silks and other goods from China were imported and exchanged for Straits Produce. Straits Produce was the trade term for the typical products of the East Indian Islands and the Malay Peninsula, such as pepper and other

\(^{(33)}\) The figures for the years 1825, 1830, 1840 and 1850 are taken from Braddell "Statistics," p. 6; for 1859 from P. P. H. of C. No. 259 of 1862, p. 44; for 1864 from the Tabular Statement of the Trade of the Straits Settlements, 1864-65, pp. 1-131. The figures for 1864 have been converted from rupees to pounds sterling at the then exchange value of two shillings to the rupee. Many of the trade reports for the period are missing from the India Office archives; and of those which can be found, not all classify trade under the same headings. Trade between the three Straits Settlements, for example, is sometimes omitted, sometimes included in the trade returns for each city, or at times put down in a lump sum so that it is impossible to apportion it among the three Settlements.
spices, gambier, tin, camphor, beeswax, coffee, ebony, antimony from Borneo, tortoise-shell, beche-de-mer, birds' nests, rattans, gold-dust, pearls, sandal-wood. It is an interesting fact that an important part of the island's trade with China was composed of sea slugs, birds' nests, and similar delicacies. To some extent Penang was a commercial dependency of Singapore; a great part of its trade was not carried on directly, but through the medium of Singapore. Much of the Straits Produce which it collected was not sent directly to Great Britain, India, and China, but was shipped to Singapore and forwarded from there. Similarly a great deal of the British and Indian manufactures which it required did not come to it by direct shipment, but was sent first to Singapore, and then transmitted to Penang. 

The trade of Malacca remained in a moribund condition until 1843. It then began to increase, and by 1865 was over six times as large as in 1829. No new markets were obtained, and the trade area of Malacca continued to be confined almost entirely to the neighbouring states of the Malay Peninsula and the opposite coast of Sumatra. The trade with the Peninsula should have been far larger than it was, especially since from October to April the monsoons prevented vessels from calling at the ports on the East Coast. The anarchic condition of the Malay states however had almost closed the ancient overland trade-routes. Malacca had very little direct trade with China or India, and practically none with Great Britain, the supplies of British and Indian manufactures which it required, coming to some extent from Penang, but in the main from Singapore. The Straits Produce collected at Malacca was not sent directly to its destination, but was forwarded to Penang and Singapore for shipment. To a greater degree than Penang, Malacca was an outpost, a commercial dependency of Singapore.

The trade of Singapore overshadowed that of Penang and Malacca so completely that a description of the commerce of the Straits Settlements is apt to assign to the two other ports even less importance than they deserved. The Straits Government of the period behaved in similar fashion; after a few pages devoted to Penang and Malacca, officials hastened to plunge into folios of description of the marvellous growth of Singapore. So great was

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their enthusiasm that even reports of imports and exports read like panegyrs of praise. The Government of India itself, little given as it was to regard the Straits Settlements in a roseate light, joined in the chorus, soberly and with reserve, in general, as be- fitted its dignity. At times however the Governor-General and his Council were carried away by some astounding leap forward, and became almost lyrical in their satisfaction.

From 1825 to 1867 Singapore was the centre of the British commerce with the East Indies, and, with Canton and Hongkong, the headquarters of the trade with China. The bulk of its import and export trade was with Great Britain and India, while the commerce with China was a good second. The principal imports from Britain were cotton and woollen cloths, “piece goods” as they were called, iron, and manufactured articles. From India came opium (one of the most important items of trade), Indian cloths, etc. Part of the imports from India and Great Britain were intended for the China trade. From Singapore they were either carried to their destination by European vessels from India, “country ships” as they were called, or were sold to the Chinese junks which every year came to the port in large numbers. The goods from Great Britain and India which were intended for the trade with the Archipelago were sold at Singapore to the native merchants who carried them far and wide over the East Indian Islands, and in return brought back Straits Produce. Few European vessels engaged in trade in the Archipelago itself. The exports of Singapore consisted of imports from China, such as tea, silks and cassia, and Straits Produce, collected from every part of the East Indian Islands. Half to two-thirds were sent to Great Britain and India. The amount of trade with Continental Europe and the United States was small, but increasing. The exports were the same as to Great Britain and India, while the imports were principally wines, piece goods, steel and iron.

Next to the commerce with Great Britain and India, and rivalling it in importance, came the trade with China. For a thousand years or more Chinese junks had made regular voyages to the East Indies, and they very quickly appreciated the importance of Singapore. The island rapidly became the greatest trading centre in the Archipelago, and by 1860 its commerce amounted to £10,371,300, while that of the whole Dutch East Indian Empire was only £14,300,000, moreover it was free from the duties and regulations of the Dutch ports. To it therefore they resorted in ever-increasing numbers, exchanging their cargoes of silk and tea for Straits Produce, opium and British manufactures.

In addition to the trade with China, the basis of Singapore’s prosperity was its trade with the East Indian Islands and the Malay Peninsula. Each year hundreds of praus throned the

(36) P. P., H. of C. No. 259 of 1862, p. 44. (Vol. XL).

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harbour, drawn from every part of the Archipelago, from Sumatra to New Guinea. The Dutch hampered this trade so far as they were able, especially in Sumatra; but despite all their efforts the native merchants preferred to risk long voyages through the pirate-infested waters of the Archipelago rather than take their wares to a Dutch harbour. Even when Holland finally brought herself to sacrifice revenue and created free ports she was unable to do more than capture part of the trade of the islands near them. Rioh, the old Bugis trading-centre near Singapore, was made a free port in 1834, but the move was a complete failure. The harbour remained almost deserted, and what little trade the island possessed was mainly with Singapore. Macassar in Celebes, which was created a free port in 1847, diverted to itself a considerable amount of trade from the South-Eastern part of the Archipelago, but this was more than atoned for by gains elsewhere. It may be observed in passing that the returns of trade with Borneo show a sudden and remarkably large increase after 1840, and thus bear eloquent testimony to the results of Rajah Brooke’s work in Sarawak and against the Borneo pirates.

Java and the other Dutch islands were one of the most important markets of Singapore. Holland restricted the commerce in many ways, and frequent complaints were made that in seeking to hamper it she was breaking the Treaty of 1824. In spite of all her efforts however the trade with the Dutch colonies was always one of the most valuable branches of Singapore’s commerce. The principal imports from them were European manufactures, tin, and Straits Produce, while the exports were British and Chinese piece goods in very large quantities, opium, silk, iron etc.

Singapore also carried on a very flourishing trade with Siam, and, to a lesser degree, Cochin-China. The exports were British manufactures, opium, and Straits Produce, while the imports were rice, ivory, salt, and most important of all, sugar. Towards the end of this period the French conquests greatly curtailed the trade with Cochin-China.({}^7)

Owing to the subsequent extension of British power over the Malay Peninsula, special interest attaches to the commercial


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relations which existed at this period between the Straits Settlements and the Hinterland. The trade was of far less importance than it became after British intervention began in 1874. Penang had a valuable trade with the West Coast of the Peninsula, while Singapore had a small trade with the West, and an increasing commerce with the East Coast. From 1825 to 1865 Singapore's East Coast trade grew steadily in value, although it does not seem ever to have exceeded about £100,000 a year or 4% of the total commerce. The trade was due to the energy of native traders, especially Chinese, and was carried on in small native vessels. British and Indian piece goods, iron and opium were exchanged for Straits produce, especially gold-dust and tin. The greater part of the trade was with Pahang, where there were large colonies of Chinese miners. Up to 1836, and to a lesser degree for about twenty years thereafter, the trade with the East Coast suffered severely at the hands of Malay, Chinese and Lanun pirates, against whom the small and ill-armed trading praus could make only a poor defence. 

The question of how much was known in the Straits Settlements during this period of the resources of the Peninsula is of great importance. One of the principal reasons for the agitation which led to the severance from the control of India in 1867 was the strong dissatisfaction aroused by the Government's Malayan policy which greatly hampered trade with the Hinterland. It is clear that while very little was known of the interior, it was realized that the Peninsula was exceedingly rich in natural resources, and that trade was capable of almost indefinite expansion. The existing commerce, small as it was, furnished ample proof of this. Furthermore, the evidence from this source was supported by the information collected between 1820 and 1860 by officials and merchants in the Settlements. The investigations of Sir Stamford Raffles first aroused interest in the Peninsula. His example inspired others, and in the generation which followed his departure from the Straits several valuable works were written on the subjects. The most important was Lieutenant Newbold's "Straits of Malacca," a most painstaking compilation of all the information which he acquired during the years he served with his regiment in the Straits, either from personal investigation or the reports of natives. During the thirties and forties Newbold was the standard authority on the Malay Peninsula, and was frequently quoted by the Straits Government in its despatches. John Crawfurd, the ex-Resident of Singapore, wrote several very valuable books dealing in part with the Peninsula. During the


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forties and fifties there appeared a very excellent review, the "Journal of the Indian Archipelago" edited by a group of Singaporeans. It is a mine of information on all matters relating to the Peninsula, and was supported by the Straits Government, the contributors including many of the leading officials in the Straits. While it is difficult to estimate how widely these works were read, it seems clear that the information which they contained was generally known. Much of it was supplied by the merchants of the Straits; and the local newspapers helped to diffuse it by publishing extracts.

On reading these works, the salient fact which emerges is how little was known of the Peninsula, and yet at the same time how important the information was. Fairly accurate information was obtainable regarding the coasts and a belt of land extending a few miles inland; but the interior was practically a "terra incognita." Nevertheless it was clearly realized how rich a field the Peninsula was for commercial expansion. The merchants of the Straits Settlements were well aware that it was "a great magazine of tin, incomparably the greatest on the globe."(39) Pahang was believed to have large gold deposits, iron and coal had also been found in various places, and it was known that the rich soil of the Peninsula was well adapted for plantations of sugar, rice, etc. In short, the inhabitants of the Straits Settlements saw clearly that their Peninsula trade could be vastly expanded if the Indian government would intervene and put an end to the anarchy in the Malay States.(40)

In concluding the account of the commerce of Singapore, a description of the type of vessels employed is of interest, if only as a record of conditions which have long since passed away. The steamship did not reach the Straits Settlements until 1845, and until then much of Singapore's trade with China, and practically the whole of that with the Archipelago, was carried on by vessels owned and manned by Asiaties. Every year when the North-East monsoon began to blow in November, the junks sailed from China on their annual voyage to Singapore, and arrived at the port after a passage of twenty to forty days. Not only the merchants on board, but also the officers, and crew, had each a stock of merchandise to dispose of. The junks did not leave until the winds changed and the South-West Monsoon began to blow, so that nearly eight months might be spent in making a single


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voyage to and from China. (41) By about 1840 the number of junks which came annually to Singapore was between 150 and 250, of from 50 to 700 tons burden. The largest junks were 1200 tons, the same size as the best ships of the East India Company 1820. (42) The competition of steamers proved fatal to the junks, as to European sailing ships. By 1847 the number had already declined, and by 1865 it is said to have decreased to fifty. (43)

The fleets of the Bugis have followed the Chinese junks into oblivion. Before the days of steamships, Singapore's trade with the East Indian Islands was very largely carried on by small native craft, varying in size from a few tons up to sixty. Many races were engaged in the traffic, but the most important were the Bugis of Celebes. The Phoenicians of the Archipelago, their ships were found on every sea, and colonies were established in all the important ports. Skillful and daring sailors, they were noted for their courage, and in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Bugis mercenaries were often employed by the British and Dutch East India Companies. In spite of their bravery and seamanship the Bugis, strangely enough, did not as a rule take to piracy, at least in the nineteenth century. Every year they came to Singapore to buy British piece goods, opium, iron, etc., in exchange for the Straits Produce they had collected. It was largely owing to the Bugis that British manufactures were so widely disseminated throughout the East Indian Islands. In 1828 the number of Bugis praus which came annually to Singapore was over 100, and by 1840 it had increased to about 200. As steamers became more and more extensively used in the Archipelago the fleets of the Bugis gradually dwindled away. (44)


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CHAPTER XI.

The Chinese in British Malaya.

No account of the Straits Settlements could be complete which ignored the great part that the Chinese have played in their development. It is no exaggeration to say that the prosperity of British Malaya is based upon the labour of the Chinese. The Europeans, never more than a handful, have been, almost without exception, officials, merchants, planters, sea-captains, or professional men. In other words, they have been the brains, the guiding and impelling force, in the development of the colony. Unaided however they could never have created the prosperity and wealth which the Straits at present enjoy. British Malaya is in the main the product of British initiative and Chinese labour. Most of the mines are worked by Chinese; the plantations depend on them for much of their labour, while the artisans, small tradesman, and the employees of the great merchants are on the whole Chinese. It is not in these subordinate positions alone however that they are found. Many professional men, and a large number of the wealthiest, most energetic and most influential merchants are of the same race. The Chinese can claim no small share of the credit for creating British Malaya as it exists to-day.

Exaggerated as this description may seem, it is borne out by the testimony of every administrator of importance in the history of the Straits Settlements. Captain Light considered the Chinese to be "the most valuable part of our inhabitants."(1) Crawfurd reported to the Government of Bengal that the Chinese "form not only the largest, but the most industrious and useful portion of the Asiatic part of the population."(2) He considered them to be "next to Europeans, and indeed in many respects before them, the most active and valuable agents in developing the resources of the Peninsula."(3) Newbold regarded them as "by far the most useful class in the Straits Settlements."(4) Sir Frank Swettenham held that "their energy and enterprise have made the Malay States what they are today."(5) And finally, Sir Charles Lucas, considers that it is "impossible to overestimate the importance of their share in the development of the Straits."(6)

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(1) S. S. R., 6.
The reason for this is very simple: the Malays, cannot be induced to undertake hard and continuous work. As one writer has uncharitably but truthfully put it, they are "the most incorrigible loafers on the face of the earth." (7) It is true that being a maritime people, with an inborn aptitude for seamanship, the Malays formed the greater part of the crews of the Country ships. This however was almost the only calling in which they proved satisfactory, apart from intermittent work on their own farms or as fishermen. For all the other requirements of a great commercial and agricultural colony they were useless. (8) As in all tropical countries, it was impossible to use Europeans as manual workers, and recourse was therefore had to the Indians and the Chinese.

The rôle which the Indian has played in the development of British Malaya is not a small one, but his contribution is far less important than that of the Chinese. Although many Indians are found in Singapore, the greater number have always been confined to Penang and Province Wellesley. In a lesser degree they have filled the same positions as the Chinese, the vast majority being servants, clerks, boatmen, artisans, petty traders and agricultural labourers. In all these callings however the Chinese have been better workmen and command higher wages. Moreover few Indians showed the characteristic Chinese energy and ability. It is significant that Straits officials whose early training had been received in India, and who were rather predisposed to favour the Indian, always rated the Chinese as a much more valuable class of immigrant. (9)

How completely the Straits Settlements depended upon Chinese labourer is shown by the following quotation. "The Chinese are everything: they are actors, acrobats, artists, musicians, chemists and druggists, clerks, cashiers, engineers, architects, surveyors, missionaries, priests, doctors, school-masters, lodging-house keepers, butchers, pork-sellers, cultivators of pepper and gambier, cake-sellers, cart and hackney carriage owners, cloth hawkers, distillers of spirits, eating-house keepers, fishmongers, fruit-sellers, ferrymen, grass-sellers, hawkers, merchants and agents, oil-sellers, opium shop-keepers, pawn-brokers, pig-dealers, and poulterers. They are rice-dealers, ship-chandlers, shop-keepers, general dealers, spirit shop keepers, servants, timber-dealers, tobacconists, vegetable sellers, planters, market-gardeners, labourers, bakers, millers, barbers, blacksmiths, boatmen, bookbinders, boot and shoe-makers, brick-makers, carpenters, cabinet makers, carriage builders, cartwrights, cart and hackney carriage drivers, charcoal burners and sellers, coffinmakers, confectioners, contractors and builders, cooper, engine-drivers, and

(7) Ireland, "Eastern Tropics," 137.
fire-men, fishermen, goldsmiths, gunsmiths and locksmiths, lime-burners, masons and bricklayers, mat, kajang and basket makers, oil manufacturers, and miners. To which we may add painters, paper lantern makers, porters, pea-grinders, printers, sago, sugar and gambier manufacturers, sawyers, seamen, ship and boat builders, soap boilers, stone cutters, sugar boilers, tailors, tanners, tin smiths and braziers, umbrella makers, undertakers and tomb-builders, watch-makers, water-carriers, wood cutters and sellers, wood and ivory carvers, fortune-tellers, grocers, beggars, idle vagabonds or "samsengs" and thieves."(10)

The extension of British power over the Malay States after 1874 was at once followed by a great increase in the number of Chinese there, until at the present day they are to be found in every part of the Peninsula. The passing years have not diminished their importance: they have become more numerous, more indispensable, and more influential than ever. It is said that nearly the whole internal trade of British Malaya is in their hands.(11) They work and own most of the mines, they include many of the leading shop-keepers, and they supply the bulk of the artisans, mechanics, petty shop-keepers, and a large percentage of the agricultural labourers.(12) In Sarawak, the Chinese have been equally important in the development of the country, although of course their work has been on a much smaller scale. The second Rajah, the successor of Sir James Brooke, said of them that "without the Chinese we can do nothing."(13)

Nothing is more characteristic of the history of the Chinese in the Straits Settlements than the frequency with which the penniless immigrant of a generation ago has become the respected and influential merchant prince of to-day. This tendency is not confined to British Malaya, but is found also in Burma, Hongkong, British Columbia, and California—wherever in fact the Chinese enjoy just government and protection. Many indeed from ill-fortune, gambling, or opium-smoking, after years of hard work filled paupers' graves; but a surprisingly large number achieved remarkable success. The explanation was to be found in the almost inhuman industry, and the talent for business which are national characteristics. The average emigrant from China was a penniless labourer who had been allured by tales of the great riches to be won in Malaya. His ambition was to work hard for a few years, save a little money, and then return to his own home. The Chinese was a "bird of passage:" he did not regard the East Indies as his adopted country, but merely as a place of exile to which grinding poverty had driven him. Very often he had not sufficient money to pay his passage on the junk which took him to Penang or Singapore, and it was


1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
advanced to him by the captain. When such a junk arrived at the Straits the Chinese plantation and mine owners who wished to obtain labourers came on board, and the captain sold them the services of the coolies whose passage he had paid. The new-comers or Sinkhehs, were then bound to work for their employer for one year, receiving in return board and lodging and a very small wage. This was the system which prevailed until after 1867 and naturally it afforded opportunities for oppressing the immigrant. The Straits Government took great pains to prevent this by supervising the proceedings, and making sure that the new arrivals were not unfairly treated. At the conclusion of their year of service the Sinkhehs became their own masters, and scattered all over the Peninsula and the adjacent islands. Gradually they earned money, a part of which was regularly sent to their relatives in China. Many of the coolies finally attained their ambition; with a few thousand dollars, the fruit of years of hard work and frugal living, they returned home to live among their own people. A large number however remained in the Straits Settlements. Many were too poor to leave, others too successful. After a few years the poverty-stricken labourer—if he escaped ruin at the gambling-table or the opium-den, and did not cross the path of the pirates or of some rapacious Raja—had earned a few hundred dollars. He might then become the owner of a pepper-plantation or a tin-mine, or he might invest his little savings in trade. Frequently he fared forth into the anarchy-ridden Peninsula or the dangerous waters of the Archipelago. Between predatory Rajas on land and Lampam pirates at sea it would be hard to say which course was the less perilous. Impelled however by their longing for wealth, thousands of Chinese faced the risk. Many found a nameless grave, while others gained a fortune. As their resources increased their ambitions grew, until amongst the wealthiest merchants of Singapore and Penang there were many who had landed on the docks with little beyond a threadbare coat and trousers of blue cotton. Gradually too the wealthy Chinese abandoned the idea of returning to China, and came to look upon the Straits Settlements as their home. In the course of years a new class sprang up, the Straits Babas, as they were called. In 1865 this evolution was still apparently in its infancy; at the present time however the number of Chinese who regard the Straits as home is large and increasing. The movement was no doubt accelerated as the first generation died out and the sons—frequently the children of Malay mothers, born and brought up in the Settlements—succeeded to their fathers' businesses. 

tendency is observable in Sarawak,\(^{(15)}\) and in cities like Vancouver and San Francisco where there has for years been a large Chinese population.

Although on the whole law-abiding the Chinese had two characteristics—a passion for gambling and for forming secret societies—which frequently brought them into collision with the Straits Government. A love of gambling seems to be ingrained in the race, and the mere fact that it was forbidden in the Straits Settlements appeared to them to be no reason why they should abstain from it. Attempts were continually made to evade the law, and often they were successful.\(^{(16)}\) Moreover during the first forty years or so of the existence of Singapore, it was afflicted by a constant series of Chinese gang-robberies. Bands of from twenty to one hundred made frequent attacks at night on native and sometimes isolated European houses. The thieves were not very brave, and a determined resistance often frightened them away; but on many occasions they were successful, and for years the police were unable to prevent these attacks.\(^{(17)}\)

Gambling and robbery however faded into insignificance when compared with the activities of the Secret Societies. Although as a rule the respectable Chinese were not members, the whole of Chinese society in the Straits was permeated by these covert and often dangerous organizations. This state of affairs was not confined to British Malaya: in Sarawak, the Dutch East Indies, and in China itself the same conditions existed. A genius for combination is a predominant characteristic of the Chinese: from one point of view China itself might almost be regarded as a congeries of associations for agriculture or commerce. The villages form agricultural societies in which each man has his part, so that farming may be more efficiently carried on; and merchants unite in associations for trade. Benevolent societies to provide for needy members and ensure their decent burial are also very numerous. It need therefore cause no surprise that societies were formed which, despite their ostensibly benevolent purposes, might be described with fair accuracy as the Pirates and Robbers Co-operative Association. Many of them tried to be an "imperium in imperio," to enjoy the benefits of British rule and at the same time ignore any laws which did not suit their convenience. Moreover the societies were often bitterly hostile to one another, and their rivalries periodically culminated in bloody street-fights in which dozens of Chinese were sometimes killed. It is noteworthy however that on these occasions


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no attempt was made to attack Europeans unless they interfered to stop the fighting. The rival mobs would suspend operations and allow them to pass through their midst unscathed. (18)

Before dealing with the Secret Societies, it is necessary to refer to a peculiar form of protest indulged in by the Straits Chinese when they wished to obtain redress for grievances. If for example a law were passed which they did not understand, or of which they disapproved, they would close their shops and take to breaking one another's heads. Even on these occasions Europeans were very rarely molested, and the few exceptions appear to have been caused by the over-zealous attempts of the police and Volunteers to stop the fighting. These manoeuvres seem to have been merely a unique and forcible means of calling attention to grievances. It more or less corresponded to writing to the "Times." There is evidence however to show that the Secret Societies played an important part in instigating and organizing these riots of protest. When explorations were given to the Chinese, or their grievance was redressed, the rioting ceased. In these cases the Government often found the services of the leading Chinese, men highly respected and with wide influence amongst their fellow countrymen, of the greatest service. (19)

The genuine Hué riots in Singapore were of two kinds, those between the rival branches of the Thian Tai Hué and the quarrels of the Kongsi. Most of the Chinese in the Straits came from the maritime provinces of China where the inhabitants were notorious for their turbulence. A large number of the immigrants were criminals, the lowest and worst class of Canton and other cities. (20) Furthermore the people of the different provinces, and sometimes of the districts of the same province, hated one another bitterly, and for generations had carried on bloody feuds.

The inhabitants of each province moreover were united in Kongsi, or associations. These were mutual benefit societies intended to assist needy members, carry out various religious rites, give aid in all disputes, etc. Unfortunately the Chinese who migrated to the Straits carried their ancestral feuds with them as well as their Kongsi. Turbulent, often criminal, and well-organized, every condition was favourable for carrying on in Penang or Singapore the quarrels in which they had engaged at home. Many of the riots in the Straits and notably the ten days' riot of 1854, the most bloody of all, in which 400 Chinese were killed, were really provincial faction fights. The Kongsi cut across the lines of the other secret societies, the branches of the Thian Tai Hué, which accepted members from every part of China. Many Chinese

belonged to both organisations, so that those who were brothers in the Thian Tai Society cut one another’s throats with great zest as members of rival provincial Kongsi.\(^{(21)}\)

The most dangerous, as it was the best known of all the Secret Societies in the Straits, was the Thian Tai Hué. It was known by various names, the White Lotus, the Heaven and Earth, or Hung League and the Triad Society. Its history is wrapped in obscurity, since it very successfully preserved secrecy by killing traitors and indiscreet seekers after information. The investigations of Schliegel and Pickering however, based on documents seized by the Dutch and British police, enable one to form a sufficiently accurate idea of it. The Triad Society originated in China, perhaps early in the Christian era, and in its ritual and teachings had many resemblances to free-masonry. It was not a provincial organization like the Kongsi, but drew its members from every part of China. For many centuries it appears to have been a praiseworthy Society, following its motto of “Obey Heaven and Act Righteously.” It taught that all members were brothers, and must always aid and do good to one another. When however the last native dynasty, the Ming, was overthrown by the Manchus, the Tartar invaders of the seventeenth century, the Triad Society became in addition a revolutionary organization. In its ritual and practice a new motto took its place beside the former lofty concept: “Destroy the Tsings (the Manchus), restore the Mings.” For over two centuries the Triad Society worked zealously to this end. Its lodges were organized on military lines, under the supreme control of five Grand Masters, and several rebellions were engineered. They were crushed, but one at least, the great Taiping Revolt of 1849, shook the Manchu power to its foundations. The Emperors replied by persecuting the Society with great vigour: the penalty for being a member was death. Under these circumstances it is perhaps not surprising that the Triad Society degenerated. The old ritual with its exhortations to a righteous life was retained, but practice fell far short of theory. The Hung League became “a band of rebels and robbers that seemed to have lost every notion of the proper spirit of its association.”\(^{(22)}\)

The Triad Society in the Straits Settlements retained the worst, and but few of the better features of the degenerate parent organization. How early it appeared in the East Indies is unknown, but in the nineteenth century it was spread broadcast over British Malaya, Sarawak, and the Dutch possessions. Wherever the Chinese coolie came the Hung League followed. It was divided into local lodges each under its Master and Generale, while all were

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affiliated with the headquarters in China. Where possible the lodge, with its elaborate buildings and defences, was erected in some inaccessible tract of jungle, and guards were stationed to keep off intruders. When this could not be done the meetings were held in the homes of the Lodge Masters.

In the Straits Settlements the patriotic motive of the League—the overthrow of the Manchus—could find no expression, and the Hué therefore became a mutual benefit society of a peculiar kind. The age-old ritual with its exhortations to brotherly love and works of righteousness was retained, and the Thian Tai Hué did much good work in settling disputes between members and giving them assistance when necessary. A large number of the members however were Chinese criminals of the lowest class, and the headmen were often unscrupulous. Many of the Chinese pirates and robbers who infested Singapore belonged to the League. The ritual contained an elaborate code of passwords whereby the other members could avoid molestation if they chanced upon their lodge-brothers in the discharge of their professional duties.

The greatest emphasis was laid upon the solidarity of the order. Members were forbidden under severe penalties to submit their disputes to a court of justice: all quarrels were to be decided by the headmen of the lodge. Chinese who were not members but who had a dispute with a "brother" were also compelled to resort to the same tribunal. The statutes of the lodges contained elaborate provisions designed to defeat the ends of justice. When a member had committed a crime all other members were required to cooperate in his defence. Witnesses against him were bribed not to appear, and if necessary murdered; if the criminal had to fly the country his escape was provided for, while if he were fined, the amount was paid by the Society. Members were also forbidden to give any assistance whatever to the police, and were required to take part whenever a riot was determined on. The penalties for breaking these and the other laws were merciless floggings, mutilation and death.

The method by which new members were enrolled was equally criminal. The Triad Society was regarded with terror by the Chinese—for example blackmail collected from the brothels and small shop-keepers was a regular part of its income in the Straits—and there were very few who dared to disobey its orders. When a Sinkheh, or newly arrived coolie came to British Malaya, and the local headmen wished him to become a member, he was ordered to join the Society on pain of death. If he refused, he was executed. Abdullah Munshi, the protégé of Raffles, who in disguise attended a meeting of the Hué about 1825 saw one man who remained obdurate beheaded.(


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The secrecy of the society was no mere fiction: up to about 1860 very little was known of its procedure, and still less of its actual members. One principal reason for this was that before 1867 very few officials in the Straits Settlements could speak Chinese, or were intimately acquainted with their customs. Abdullah gleaned some information at the risk of his life, and the police from time to time secured a little more; but it was not until Schlegel's book, based on documents seized by the Dutch police, was published in 1866 that the governments obtained much authoritative knowledge of it. No assistance could be obtained from Chinese who were not members, for to them it was an impalpable, ever-present menace. A man's own brother might be a member and he would never know it. The laws of the Society were no idle enactments: how many times their penalties were inflicted will never be known. It is certain however that for many years after 1819 the bodies of Chinese were found in Singapore and Penang with the mark of the Triad Society neatly carved upon them. The murderers were very rarely caught. Chinese who had suffered from the League dared not give evidence against it, or even complain of wrongs inflicted upon them. There are cases noted in the Straits Records where Chinese who had been robbed and nearly killed by members of the Society refused to prosecute so that the culprits escaped scot free. (24) English law, Pickering declared, proved to be ill-adapted for such a situation; and the Indian Government refused to follow the example of the Dutch and Spaniards by giving the police and the courts extraordinary powers to deal with the Hués. (25)

As the century advanced the original Triad Society in the Straits became divided into about a dozen different Hués, all offshoots of the parent organization, but bitterly hostile to one another. Their strength was unknown: in some cases it was a few hundreds, in others it extended into the thousands. Periodically the feuds between the rival Hués found vent in faction fights; and for a few hours or days the streets of British cities were filled with howling mobs of armed men. Eventually the police would subdue the rioters, bury the corpses, and all would be quiet—till the next time.

The aim of the headmen of the Societies was to create an "imperium in imperio," to enjoy all the benefits of life in a British settlement, and at the same time be free to do as they chose, and govern the Chinese as they pleased, without any interference. In fact, they wished to ignore the constituted government altogether. As a rule they were prosperous and eminently respectable individuals who took no overt part in proceedings, but gave their orders and left it to their gangs of ruffians to carry them out. Whatever happened, they had an unimpeachable alibi. It

(24) C. R. Vol. 133, May 31, and June 8, 1850.

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was an intolerable situation, yet one which it was extraordinarily difficult to alter. (26)

The problem of the Chinese Secret Societies arose only a few years after the foundation of Penang. In 1799 several of them were already established there, and giving trouble to the Resident; while as time advanced the question became more serious. Daring robberies, frequent murders, constant interference with the course of justice, all were traced to the Hôé. And there the matter ended: it was known that powerful and criminal associations were at work; but to convict the members or seriously to hamper their activities was usually found impossible. Then, from about 1846 to 1885, came a series of riots in Penang, Malacca, and Singapore. In all there were about twelve serious outbreaks. Some of them assumed very large proportions, as for example the Kongsí riots at Singapore in 1854, when 400 Chinese were killed, and for ten days the whole island was the scene of pitched battles between the rival factions. The police finally subdued the rioters and no attack was made upon the European quarter of the city. How serious the situation might have become was shown in Sarawak in 1857. In that year the local branch of the Triad Society terrorized the whole Chinese population of 4000 into revolting, sacked the capital, and nearly murdered Raja Brooke and his staff. The Hôé had been encouraged to rise by the belief that the Raja was in disgrace with the British Government, and that no retribution would follow his murder. In their mad venture however the Chinese had quite failed to take into account the Orang Laut, the Sea-Dayaks who had now become the faithful allies of the Raja. In a few days they were assailed by 10,000 of the dreaded ex-pirates, and a mere handful of the rebels escaped into Dutch territory. (27) As the number of Chinese in the Straits increased the riots became bloodier and more frequent. (28)


Colonel Cavenagh, the Governor of the Straits from 1859 to 1867, managed to abate the Singapore riots by a very ingenious device. It was known though it could not be proved that these fights were always engineered by the Lodge-Masters of the Societies, and therefore, whenever one broke out, these headmen were sworn in as special constables. They were sent out to patrol the streets, with a guard of police to see that they did not weary in well-doing. Most of these gentlemen were portly and well-nourished, accustomed to an easy life, and by no means in training to enjoy hours of walking in hot streets under a blazing sun. So after a brief taste of this unwonted exercise the riot would suddenly come to an end. (29)

The problem of dealing with the Societies was not finally solved until their suppression in 1889, during the governorship of Sir Cecil Smith. Fourteen years before that time it had been deemed impossible to destroy the Hués, (30) and it was therefore decided to bring them under the control of the Government. In 1877 a new branch of the administration, the Chinese Protectorate, was formed, with officials well acquainted with the Chinese language and customs. The Government was very fortunate in securing as the first head of the department W. A. Pickering who not only knew the Chinese well, but also had their confidence to a remarkable degree. To his influence the rapid success of the Chinese Protectorate was due: so great was his prestige that the Chinese called it the "Pek-ki-lin," i.e. Pickering. (31) The duties of the department were to protect the Chinese from any injustice, and by explaining to them the meaning of new laws by which they felt themselves aggrieved, to prevent the former riots of protest. The Secret Societies were compelled to give a list of their members, and afford information as to their actions. Strict surveillance was kept over their proceedings: Pickering himself for example sometimes attended lodge meetings. The Hués were no longer protected by the abysmal ignorance of the administration and its inability to secure information. In a few years their power for ill had greatly diminished, and the evil practices which had formerly characterized them were largely abandoned. By 1878 members of the same Hué dared to appear as witnesses in the law courts against one another, and offenders were handed over to the police by their Lodge-Masters. The Hués and Kongsis became of real assistance to the authorities in keeping the Chinese under control. Pickering considered that by 1878 the headmen honestly tried to prevent their men from breaking the laws and thus involving them in trouble with the Government. The presidents of the rival lodges


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also co-operated with one another, and settled thousands of petty disputes which would otherwise have encumbered the work of the law-courts. They also prevented many riots from becoming serious. (32)

Apart from the Hués and from gambling however the Chinese were a remarkably law-abiding and peaceful race, easy to control. They did not run amok or make treacherous attacks like the Malays, or assault Europeans and indulge in religious riots like the Hindus and Mohammedans in India. They paid their taxes, and attended to their own affairs. Schlegel put the whole case in a nutshell when he wrote: "Whenever due regard is paid to the prejudices of the nation, and when care is taken to explain to them the necessity or expediency of a new law or regulation, the Chinese, the most reasonable and cool of all Eastern races, will remain at ease, and the existence of their secret society will not endanger in the least their quietness." (33) So far as gambling and their Hués were concerned the Chinese did indeed offend grievously against the law; but they regarded these matters as their own private concerns, and looked upon the interference of Government as merely another inexplicable trait of the Western barbarians among whom their lot was cast. The Chinese formed two-thirds of the population of the Straits Settlements; but they were never a menace to their security. It is a fact of the utmost significance that during the worst riots the bulk of the garrison at Singapore was usually left in barracks; the Governors realised that the danger to Europeans was slight, and that only the police were required to restore order. It is true that if the reins of authority were relaxed the Chinese were apt to get out of hand, but even then they confined themselves to fighting amongst themselves. A comment passed by the Governor-General of India on the riots 1854 aptly described the whole attitude of the Chinese towards the British Government: "There was in this peculiar case an outrageous violation of all laws, with little if any resistance to constituted authority." (34)

In concluding one cannot forbear from commenting upon the strong partiality which the Chinese have shown for British rule. The date of their first arrival in the East Indies is unknown, although it is probable that they visited trading-posts established there—on the Isthmus of Kra, for example—over a thousand years before Penang was founded. Long before the arrival of the Portuguese, their junks carried on regular intercourse with Malacca.

(33) Schlegel "Thian Ti Hwaui." XL.

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Johore, Kelantan and Pahang. Their number in the East Indies was probably small; in 1830 Crawfurd estimated that there were only about 255,000.

The establishment of the Straits Settlements was immediately followed by a great influx of Chinese. They keenly appreciated the security, justice and freedom from molestation which they enjoyed in British territory. This seems to be proved by a study of the history of Chinese immigration in the Malay Peninsula. In the Hinterland of the Peninsula wealth could often be gained much more quickly—there was practically no tin or gold within British territory for example—but the merchant and the miner were never sure when they might lose not only their savings, but even life itself. For this reason few of them settled permanently in the native states before 1874; and although many went there as traders or miners, they did so with the intention of remaining only a few years. As a rule moreover they formed little settlements at the tin-mines or the native ports, and did not venture to live alone among the Malays. Even so, a large number were killed. These small colonies were found in almost every state of the Peninsula, most of the trade and mining of the country being in their hands. Their number is unknown, but all the evidence seems to show that it was not large. Crawfurd in 1830 estimated it as 40,000; a few years later Colonel Low, a reliable authority, put it at 15,000 or 20,000. In both cases the figures were based on information obtained from native traders.

When compared with the number in the Straits Settlements, at that time, the difference is almost startling. In the whole of the peninsula, the Chinese were about 20,000, perhaps one tenth of the diminishing Malay population; in the tiny Straits Settlements only a few hundred square miles in area, they were far more numerous that all the other races put together, and increased by thousands every year. The number in the Malay States did not increase in anything like the same proportion. The following table shows the number of Europeans, Chinese, Malays, and Indians,


1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
the most important races in the Straits Settlements, between 1817 and 1860.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Malays</th>
<th>Europeans</th>
<th>Indians</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Total Pop.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1819-20</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>5000(40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830-</td>
<td>5173</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>6555</td>
<td>16634(41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1840-</td>
<td>9032</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>3159</td>
<td>17179</td>
<td>39681(42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850-</td>
<td>12206</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>6261</td>
<td>27988</td>
<td>59043(43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860-</td>
<td>10888</td>
<td>2443</td>
<td>12971</td>
<td>50043</td>
<td>80792(44)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Penang.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Malays</th>
<th>Europeans</th>
<th>Indians</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Total Pop.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1818-</td>
<td>12190</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>8197</td>
<td>7858</td>
<td>35000(45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830-</td>
<td>11943</td>
<td>1877</td>
<td>8858</td>
<td>38683</td>
<td>33959(46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1842-</td>
<td>18442</td>
<td>1180</td>
<td>9681</td>
<td>9715</td>
<td>40499(47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851-</td>
<td>16570</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>7840</td>
<td>15457</td>
<td>43143(48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860-</td>
<td>18887</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>10618</td>
<td>28018</td>
<td>59956(49)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Province Wellesley.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Europeans</th>
<th>Indians</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Total Pop.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1820-</td>
<td>5399</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>6185(50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1833-</td>
<td>41702</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1087</td>
<td>2259</td>
<td>45953(51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1844-</td>
<td>48761</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>1815</td>
<td>4107</td>
<td>51500(52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851-</td>
<td>53010</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>8731</td>
<td>64801(53)</td>
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<td>1860-</td>
<td>52836</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>3514</td>
<td>8204</td>
<td>64816(54)</td>
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**Malacca.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Malays</th>
<th>Europeans</th>
<th>Indians</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Total Pop.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1817-</td>
<td>13988</td>
<td>1667</td>
<td>2986</td>
<td>1006</td>
<td>19627(55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1829-</td>
<td>19765</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>2830</td>
<td>4797</td>
<td>30164(56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1842-</td>
<td>32622</td>
<td>2544</td>
<td>3258</td>
<td>6882</td>
<td>46091(57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1852-</td>
<td>48226</td>
<td>2283</td>
<td>1191</td>
<td>10608</td>
<td>62514(58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860-</td>
<td>53534</td>
<td>2618</td>
<td>1026</td>
<td>10039</td>
<td>67267(59)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It will be observed that in both Penang and Singapore the Chinese formed the bulk of the population; and that it was only at Malacca and Province Wellesley, agricultural districts with a large number of Malay rayaats, that they were in a minority. The final proof of this contention that—to paraphrase the proverb—the Chinese followed the fray, is shown by this, that as soon as British power was extended over the Western Malay States, thousands of

(41) Ibid., 283.
(43) J. L. A., IV, 106.
(47) S. S. R., Nov. 3, 1829.
(48) S. S. R., "Statistics," 2. Many of the census reports are missing from the archives. The figures for Europeans are also unreliable. Eurasians being sometimes included. There were never more than a few hundred Europeans in each Settlements.
Chinese poured into them until in a generation, from being a small minority they formed about two-thirds of the total population. (49)

The testimony of the Chinese themselves bears out the truth of this theory. So free from irksome restrictions was British rule that they almost forgot they were in a foreign country, and looked upon Penang and Singapore as Chinese cities, the administration of which was left in British hand. (50) With no desire to assume the wearisome task of governing themselves, and indifferent to who ruled them so long as their business was not interfered with, they regarded the British as inexplicable philanthropists who for some quite undiscoverable motive took all the burdens of administration off their shoulders, and left them at full liberty to make as much money as they chose. (51)

Before 1874 the greatest desire of the Chinese was that Great Britain should extend her rule over the whole Peninsula, and so enable them to make yet more money in perfect safety. (52) When the Treaty of Pangkor was being drawn up in 1874 a headman of one of the Kongsis in Perak was heard to exclaim: "When the British flag is seen over Perak, and Larut, every Chinaman will go down on his knees and bless God." (53) One does not associate religion with the chief of a Secret Society, but if the words are apocryphal the sentiment is probably genuine. Whether the Chinese felt any democratic fervour at the thought of British liberty is dubious, but that they appreciated its solid advantages is beyond doubt: Their attitude may perhaps be summed up in the words of a Penang boatman: "Empress good: coolie get money—keep it." (54)

(49) "Colonial Office List, 1922," 397-410.
(53) Ibid., XXVIII, 31. Kruyt.
(54) Bird, "Golden Chersonese," 255.
Chapter XII.

Piracy and the Straits Settlements.

No feature in the history of British Malaya has so impressed the popular mind as piracy. Mention a Malay to the average person and he at once conjures up a picture of a treacherous, blood-thirsty ruffian armed with a long wavy "kris." His favourite occupation was piracy, varied occasionally by running amok; and Europeans sailed the Eastern seas at the peril of their lives.

This conception is very far wide of the mark. It is true that one hundred years ago piracy was rampant throughout the Archipelago, and hundreds of ships were sunk. The vessels which suffered however were almost always the praus or native trading-boats; European ships were rarely molested.

The explanation of this is simple. The pirate was first and foremost a man of business: he wanted plunder and slaves, and preferred to win them with as little risk as possible. His vessel was generally a small low galley, while his guns were usually clumsy and of no great size. European merchants were many times his tongue; much higher out of the water, and heavily armed. Moreover they always put up a desperate resistance. The pirates knew that an attack on a merchantman meant a very heavy death-roll with no certainty of capture at the end of it. Such a prize was worth many native praus; but the pirates wanted plunder, and not hard knocks. A European ship was rarely attacked unless she were wrecked, or becalmed, or surprised in harbour. If the wind failed her off a pirate coast a fleet would gather as if by magic and then, unless a favourable breeze sprung up, her fate was usually sealed. The pirates would overpower her by weight of numbers, and would usually carry her by boarding after a long battle, then they were sure from the silence of her guns that she had no powder left. Many ships were also captured in native ports when the crew were off their guard, by pirates who had come aboard disguised as merchants. Apart from these cases however European vessels were rarely attacked unless they were so small as to promise an easy capture. Malay praus and the smaller Chinese junks were the ships usually attacked. In many cases their size was not greater than that of a large pirate galley, they were not well armed, and their crews rarely resisted so well as Europeans. (1)

From this it must not be concluded that the pirates were cowards: there are far too many instances of the desperate courage with which they fought when escape was impossible. Moreover, they frequently attacked small European warships, and on several occasions captured Spanish and Dutch gunboats; while more than one British and Dutch war-schooner barely made good her escape. Out of many cases two typical instances may be quoted. In 1807 the small British sloop of war "Victor," 18 guns and 114 men, met three large Lamun pirates off the Java coast at sunset and ordered them to come alongside her. They obeyed, and a small guard of sailors was placed on two of them while their crews and cargo were being transferred to the war-ship. The Lamuns had been disarmed and about 120 brought on board when it was noticed that the third prau was beginning to draw away. A stern-gun on the "Victor" was fired at her, and sparks from the discharge ignited a large heap of loose powder from one of the captured praus which had been thrown on the deck nearby. The whole stern of the warship was blown up, and the ship caught fire. The sailors guarding the Lamuns on the "Victor" dropped their muskets and sprang for the hoses. The pirates promptly seized the muskets and their own weapons, which were lying on the deck, and fell upon the crew. At the same time the Lamuns still on the two captured galleys overpowered the prize-crews and then began to climb on board the warship. Seeing what was going on the third galley rowed back and opened fire. For the next thirty minutes the British had a very busy time of it, putting out the fire, working the guns, and trying to clear their decks of the pirates. There was a desperate hand-to-hand fight, cutlass and clubbed musket against spear and kris. At last the pirates were driven overboard, leaving 80 dead or "in a most mangled state" on the decks. The "Victor" lost nearly 30 killed or mortally wounded. One of the praus was sunk, the other two escaped. The "Victor" had so many casualties and was so severely damaged that she seems to have lost all interest in Lamuns, and instead came limping into port for repairs.

The second instance was the defeat of a squadron of eleven Balanini galleys by the H. C. (4) steamer "Nemesis" in 1817. The Balanini galleys were long, low open boats, something like the Viking ships, and carried 350 men in all. They were returning home after a successful voyage around Borneo when their ill-fortune brought them across the track of the "Nemesis." 103 men and four heavy guns. It was the first time the Balanini had seen a steamship, and they tried to escape. The steamer overhauled them, and the pirates took up their position in a bay close to shore. The action began at one in the afternoon, and for five hours the "Nemesis" steamed slowly up and down their line, pouring in broadsides of

(4) H. C. i. e. "Honourable Company's," the letters always prefixed to the names of ships in the East India Company's navy.

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grape and canister at only two hundred yards range. Captain Mundy, who heard the story from the officers of the "Nemesis" wrote that the pirates fought with splendid courage. Eventually, six of their galleys beat off a boat attack supported by the steamer’s fire and about 9 p.m. escaped in the gathering dusk. Five were taken, and the six which got away had been so battered that three foundered before they reached home.\(^5\)

Malay piracy—to use a well-known but somewhat misleading term—was in 1825 a wide-spread and very honourable calling. It was the profession not merely of outlaws, but of merchants, noblemen, and even Sultans. Its origin is lost in antiquity, but there is evidence that before the arrival of the Portuguese in the East it was a recognised thing for needy rajahs to replenish their treasury by piratical raids.\(^6\) The geography of the East Indian Islands is so peculiarly suitable for piracy that the surprising thing would have been if it had not existed. The whole of the vast Archipelago is a maze of islands divided by straits and gulfs, some of them of great size, and others so narrow as to be barely navigable. The coasts are lined with dense mangrove swamps, through which innumerable creeks and rivers afford easy passage into the interior. A more suitable field of operations cannot be conceived. The Malays were a race of skilled seamen and while their boats were rather crude, the numberless islands offered secure refuge in case of storms. The mangrove swamps and rivers, and the countless intricate passages between the islands served alike as hiding-places while waiting for their prey and safe refuges in case of defeat. The seas of the Archipelago abound in shoals and reefs close inshore, and while the pirate galleys always light in draught and knowing every foot of the way, negotiated them and disappeared in the creeks and swamps, their heavy European pursuers either ran aground or found the water so shallow that they had to give up the chase. Once the pirate had reached the shelter of the swamps he was safe, for the warship’s boats soon lost all trace of him in the maze of waterways. Little help was to be had from the inhabitants of the country, since most of them were pirates when occasion served.\(^7\) An interesting comparison can be drawn between the Malays and the Greeks of the Homeric period. In each case the same geographical features—an archipelago abounding in good harbours and safe lurking places—produced the same result.

The advent of Europeans probably gave a great impetus to piracy. The subject has never been properly investigated, but it is known that the Portuguese, and above all the Dutch, totally disorganized the very flourishing native commerce which had existed


Piracy and the Straits Settlements.

for centuries. In order to gain a monopoly, the Dutch forbade many of the islands to carry on any trade while others were allowed to bring their merchandise only to certain ports. By this means Malays must have been ruined. The Rajas too lost a large part of their revenues, for then as later the chiefs were merchants as well as rulers. It was natural that a race of seamen should try to make good their losses by a means so congenial to their adventurous dispositions. By the nineteenth century there were few Rajas who did not covertly support the pirates, and give them arms and shelter in return for a share of their plunder, "so that a pirate prau is too commonly more welcome in their harbours than a fair trader." Many went further, and openly sent piratical fleets to sea. Another contributing factor was the universal decay of the Malay governments, which by 1825 was going on with alarming rapidity. Even if the Sultan wished to check piracy, he was often too feeble to do so. The petty chief of a few river-villages set up as an independent ruler and his suzerain was too weak to control him. To keep up his train of ragged followers required money, and since a Malay was too proud and indolent to work hard, revenue was obtained by the easy means of piracy.

So deeply engrained was piracy in the native character that any sea-coast Malay would engage in it if the opportunity seemed favourable. The ordinary Malay trader was merchant and pirate by turns, as opportunity served. In this as in so many other respects the semi-feudal conditions prevailing in Malaya in the nineteenth century strongly resembled those of Europe in the Middle Ages. There is a very interesting parallel between the native merchants of the Archipelago and the English, French and Flemish traders of the Channel ports six hundred years ago. No stigma attached to the career of piracy: it was an honourable profession, hallowed by antiquity and patronized by the bluest blood of the East Indian Islands. The native attitude towards it was perfectly expressed by the views of Datu Laut, an important Lamun chieftain of North West Borneo about 1850. "In his own view he was no criminal; his ancestors from generation to generation had followed the same profession. In fact, the Lamuns consider cruising as the most honourable of professions, the only one which a gentleman and a chief could pursue, and would be deeply offended if told that they were but robbers on a larger scale. Notwithstanding his profession, Laut was

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a gentleman." (13) Precisely the sentiments which one would have expected from a Norman baron of the reign of Stephen.

By 1825 piracy had become so firmly established that it could truly be described as "a great and blighting curse," "a very formidable and frightful system," "an evil so extensive and formidable that it can be put down by the strong hand alone. (14) From Penang to New Guinea, and from Java to the Philippines, fleets of galleys scoured the seas in search of plunder and slaves. As with the Mediterranean pirates whom Pompey crushed, captives were as valuable a prize as merchandise. In Sulu, Brunei, Sumatra and other places were great depots where the pirates sold their loot and bought supplies. (15)

By far the most formidable were the Lanuns of Mindanao, in the Philippines, the dreaded "Pirates of the Lagoon." The Balanini, who lived in a cluster of islands in the Sulu Sea, were almost equally dangerous. They appear to have been less numerous and warlike, and for this reason their ravages were not so extensive. With this qualification the following description is equally true of both races. The Lanuns lived on a large lagoon-like bay on the island of Mindanao, surrounded by impenetrable mangrove-swamps, pierced by numerous runways over which their galleys could be drawn to escape pursuers. The lagoon was defended by many heavy batteries, and there were also a large number of slips for the construction of galleys. Raffles estimated the number of their warriors at 10,000. The Lanuns also had settlements in North West Borneo, at Tantoli in Celebes, in Sulu and at Indragiri in Sumatra, at the Southern end of the Straits of Malacca.

Their boats were long and narrow, propelled by oars and sails, and very swift. Attached to each fleet were often a number of light, fast spy-boats, to scour the seas and bring back news of approaching prizes. The galleys varied from 40 to 100 tons burden and carried from 40 to 60 men. The crew was protected by a breastwork of thick planks, and at times by a deck of split rattans. Their largest galleys were often over 100 feet long, and carried 150 men. Admiral Hunter, who accompanied the Lanuns on a cruise in 1847 disguised as a Malay, wrote that the flagship, on which he sailed, was 95 feet long, with 90 oars, double-banked. She had 50 fighting men, and was armed with twelve lulus (a light gun of native manufacture, more noisy than effective), and a Spanish eighteen-pounder. (16) Each galley was armed in somewhat similar fashion, and also carried muskets, swords, spears, and shields. The oars were rowed by captives, who were treated with great cruelty. They were fed principally on rotten rice and bad water, and when worn out were

(13) Hunter, "Adventures of a Naval Officer." 83.
(16) Hunter, "Adventures of a Naval Officer." 60.
thrown over-board. They were forced to row for hours at a time, and when they became exhausted the Lanuns kept them awake by rubbing cayenne pepper into their eyes.

The Lanuns had several hundred galleys, and sent out fleets every year under the command of an Admiral. Each ship had a captain and three officers, and the loot was divided according to a recognised scale. As a rule the fleets sailed first to Tampassuk, their principal settlement in North-West-Borneo. There they divided into squadrons, which between them covered the whole of the Eastern seas. Some circumnavigated Borneo and visited Celebes and New Guinea; others ravaged the coasts of Bengal and Java; yet others sailed to the East Coast of the Malay Peninsula and the Gulf of Siam; while every year, in August, September and October, the "pirates' wind" brought Lanun squadrons to the Straits of Malacca. There they lay in wait for the praus sailing to Singapore, and did immense damage. The Rhio-Lingga Archipelago was ravaged with mathematical regularity, and until about 1835 Lanun squadrons sailing through the Straits of Malacca visited Penang and Kedah. Their ships were even met as far to the North as Bagoon. These cruises often lasted several years, and the pirates carried them out according to a definite schedule, visiting each part of the East Indies at a recognised time. So thoroughly was this the case that the Government in its reports referred as a matter of course to the events of the Lanun season. The Philippines, which lay nearest to Mindanao, perhaps suffered even more severely than other parts of the Archipelago. Since 1589 the Spaniards had fought a number of wars with the Lanuns and had generally got the worst of it. They claimed suzerainty however over them, apparently on the ground that Spain had formally annexed them, and therefore "ipso dito" they were conquered. The Lanuns unfortunately declined to see the logic of this position, and having great contempt for the Spaniards, constantly raided even into the harbour of Manilla itself.

The damage done by the Lanuns and Balanini was incalculable. To estimate it is impossible, since they acted on the principle of "spurlos versenkt." A prau would disappear. Perhaps years later one of the crew might escape from slavery and eventually tell his tale in Batavia or Singapore; but in most cases not a single soul of the whole ship's company would ever be seen again. Villages near the coast were also raided, and all the inhabitants killed or carried into slavery. Whole islands in the Rhio-Lingga Archipelago were depopulated in this way. Like all the other pirates, the Lanuns avoided European merchantmen and warships, although quite a few traders, especially Spaniards, fell victims to them. They had the utmost contempt for the Dutch gunboats which protected the coasts of Borneo, Java and the other possessions of Holland. They seem rather to have enjoyed a fight with them, and captured a fair number. As late as 1844, Sambas,
the principal Dutch port in Western Borneo, was constantly blockaded by Lanun squadrons.

Had the Balaminis and Lanuns made common cause with the Malay pirates they would have been even more of a menace than they actually were. Fortunately however they were the bitter enemies of the pirates of the Rhio-Lingga Archipelago, the headquarters of Malay piracy. So intense was their hatred that if either were attacking a merchantman and these rivals have in sight, the trader was abandoned while the pirates hastened to engage one another. (17)

Near Mindanao lies a cluster of islands known as the Sulu Archipelago. Sulu, the principal town, was a line of houses straggling along the shores of a harbour. This was the commercial headquarters of the Lanuns and Balaminis, the greatest slave-mart and thieves’ market in the whole East Indian islands. Here the pirate fleets returned after their long cruises to sell their slaves and booty and buy supplies from the Chinese and Bugis merchants who came to it. A few venturesome Europeans also traded there. There appears to be some doubt as to whether the Sulus actually engaged in piracy themselves, or whether they merely aided and profited by their friends and allies the Lanuns. The best authorities seem to argue that the latter was the case. Hunt, who made a long report on the Sulus to Raffles in 1815, lived for six months on the islands. He contrived to win the friendship of the leading Datus, or chiefs, and had excellent opportunities for gaining information. He reported that the Sulus were arrant cowards, and while refraining from piracy themselves, equipped the Lanun squadrons, receiving in return 25 per cent of the booty. Sulu “is the nucleus of all the piratical horde in the seas, the heart’s blood that nourishes the whole, and sets in motion its most distant members.” Hunt gave a very graphic picture of the keen activity which prevailed in this den of thieves. “Not a day passes without the arrival or departure of at least twelve to fifteen praus.” During the six months he was there he heard of the capture of twenty-


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seven or twenty-eight ships, including a Spanish brig, the kidnapping of 1000 natives from the Philippines, and sundry murders and minor piracies.(18)

After the Lunans and Balanini the most important pirates were the Malays. Formerly they had been the most dreaded pirates of the Archipelago; but in the nineteenth century they had sadly degenerated from the lofty tradition of their ancestors.(19) The great centres of Malay piracy were within the Dutch sphere of influence. They were the Carimon Islands, the Rho-Lingga Archipelago, near the Southern entrance of the Straits of Malacca, and Galang, Galang, an island to the South of the Straits of Singapore, was a miniature Sulu, the Malays' principal market for the sale of slaves and booty. Pirate settlements were also scattered all along the Sumatran coast as far as Achin, and in every state of the Peninsula from Trengganu on the East to Kedah on the West.

The Lingga Sultan (the Dutch protégé who ruled the island portion of the Empire of Johore) was strongly suspected both by the Dutch and British of tacitly encouraging piracy, even if he did not share in the spoils. His great court-officials openly supported it, equipping the Malay fleets in return for 100 per cent profit on their outlay. The Sultans of the different states of Sumatra and the Peninsula also aided the pirates in return for a share of their booty, the most notorious offender in the British sphere being the Bugis Sultan of Selangor. The Singapore Sultan, Raffles' nominee, and the Temenggong of Johore were strongly suspected both by British and Dutch officials of being deeply implicated. This was the Temenggong who in 1843-48 rendered great services to the British in suppressing piracy, and was warmly defended by Governor Butterworth against the aspersions cast upon his character. Possibly he was a much maltreated man, perhaps he had seen the error of his ways; in the thirties at any rate officials and merchants alike strongly suspected him, although they could never obtain definite proof.

There seems some reason to believe that pirate praus were fitted out in Singapore itself, and that many pirates were accustomed to visit it when not engaged in professional duties. Little could be done to prevent this, as Singapore was a free port, and had not the elaborate system of registration and control which enabled the Dutch officials to ascertain fairly accurately the real character of trading-praus. It is probable that arms and supplies were sometimes obtained at Singapore, and that the pirates had spies in the port who sent them information when a rich prize was about to sail. Many respectable traders moreover could not resist the

(18) "Malayan Miscellanies." J. Hunt, "Report to Raffles on Sulu, 1815, I, 16-83. Moor Notices of the Indian Archipelago." Appendix, 30-5.

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
temptation to capture another prau if they saw a favourable opportunity. Since the cargo was then sold as their own, and no inconvenient witnesses were left, it was very difficult to convict them of piracy.

It was believed that the Malay pirates had between 300 and 400 praus. Their boats were smaller and usually carried fewer men than the Javan galleys; but they were sufficiently powerful to overcome most native traders except the large Chinese junks. The praus were generally of from six to twenty tons, propelled by oars and sails and armed with leias (native cannon), or swivel-guns, usually of small calibre, muskets, swords, and spears. The crews varied from thirty or less to eighty or a hundred; and each vessel was under the command of a Panglima (fighting-man) and two mates. The spoil was divided between the crew and the Raja who had lent money to finance the cruise according to a recognised schedule. The galleys were extremely fast, and attached to each squadron were a number of smaller and faster spy-boats carrying only a few men apiece. The Malay praus were less dangerous than the Javan galleys, and the Malays themselves were neither so brave nor so daring as the "Pirates of the Lagoon."

Occasionally a warship would burn a few Malay villages, or would happen upon a pirate squadron too far off-shore to make good its escape. Such incidents however did little more than give a pleasurable zest to a very profitable occupation. The Malays carried on their piracy in accordance with a well-arranged schedule. A few months were spent in fishing and repairing the galleys; but when the season of favourable winds arrived, each island and river sent out its ships. In squadrons of ten to twenty praus they cruised along the whole coast of the Malay Peninsula from Trengganu to Kedah, and also visited Bangka and Java. The Dinding Islands, in the Straits of Malacca, were a favourite resort.

Penang received annual attention from the date of its foundation, and the pirates built villages on the neighbouring islands, and in Kedah and Perak. Penang’s trade suffered severely, and in 1826 raids were still frequently made into the harbour at night to capture prisoners for sale at Galang. As late as 1830 the pirate squadrons on their return home from their annual cruise were accustomed to sail through the middle of the harbour, between Penang and Province Wellesley. It saved them the trouble of rowing around the island.

The foundation of Singapore eventually caused the downfall of the Malay pirates, but for many years it actually increased their prosperity. The island was so conveniently situated in the midst of their settlements that no long and toilsome voyages were necessary before they reached the scene of operations; and the warships at the disposal of the Straits Government were so few and ineffective that they could afford little protection to the trading praus. Native traders generally sailed by themselves, or in groups.
of three or four, so that they were easily overpowered by the pirates, whose squadrons were made up of ten or twenty, and sometimes double that number of praus. Large fleets of Malay, Balanini and Lanun pirates swarmed in the Straits, or lay in wait at Point Rumenia and other places close to Singapore. As late as 1835 attacks were actually made by daylight on boats plying between the shore and ships lying at anchor at the mouth of the harbour. Many vessels were captured when barely out of sight of the town. The native merchants suffered immense loss, and the situation grew steadily worse as the years passed. Many praus were afraid to visit Singapore because of the danger; and by 1830 the Straits Government seriously feared that the native trade must eventually become extinct. (20) A Malay of Singapore could not "set out on a voyage to the back of the Island (of Singapore) ... without risk of being robbed and killed." (21)

After about 1840 the native trade of the Straits Settlements began to suffer from a new enemy, the Chinese. Before this date only isolated cases occurred; but at the very time when the Lanun and Malay pirates were being suppressed, the attacks of the Chinese rapidly increased. While they usually confined their operations to their own coast or to the Gulf of Siam, they were frequently met with as far South as the neighbourhood of Singapore. After 1860 their attacks gradually ceased.

The Chinese were more dangerous to native traders than the Malays or Lanuns, although in point of courage they were much inferior. Their ships were much larger, however, and carried heavier guns and stronger crews. The typical pirate junk was from 70 to 150 tons, with anything up to 25 cannon, and 100 to 200 men. Their largest boats were of 200 tons. Many renegade European seamen served as gunners and officers, whereas with scarcely a single exception the Lanun and Malay galleys were manned entirely by natives. Owing to these advantages the Chinese captured not only native traders, but even many European vessels.


1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
The suppression of Chinese piracy belongs to the history of Hongkong rather than to that of the Straits Settlements. Although the coast of China had been notorious for piracy from time immemorial, it was not until the nineteenth century that European governments paid much attention to it. The change was due to the increase of their commerce with the Orient. Great Britain was the power mainly responsible for the suppression of Chinese piracy. Her trade with China was much larger than that of any other nation, and the commerce of Hongkong suffered severely from Chinese pirates in the early years of its history. Fleets of from 20 to 100 junks infested the neighbouring waters. From about 1849 onwards the British China squadron made constant expeditions against the pirates and destroyed several hundred vessels. Owing to these attacks Chinese piracy was finally suppressed, although even at the present day isolated cases are not unknown. With the destruction of the pirates' fortresses and fleets their squadrons gradually ceased to appear in the waters of the Archipelago. (23)

Piracy was also carried on in many other parts of the Archipelago, the Moluccas, Celebes and New Guinea, for example. The West Coast of Borneo was notorious in the early part of the nineteenth century. By 1835 however Holland had brought under her control Sambas and all the other West Coast states except Brunei, and within her sphere piracy was practically at an end. (24) The natives of these islands confined their operations largely to their own neighbourhood, and their depredations affected British trade only in a minor degree. The principal sufferer from them was Holland, so that in a history of the Straits Settlements they can be ignored. During the period 1824 to 1867 the five races of pirates with whom the British came in contact were the Lanuns, and Balanini the Malays, the Chinese, and the Sea-Dayaks of Brunei in North West Borneo. The latter were local pirates of a peculiarly dangerous kind, and are dealt with in the chapter on the work of Rajah Brooke.

Some difference of opinion exists whether the Bugis of Celebes were pirates during the nineteenth century. At an earlier date they certainly were so, and Crawfurd considered that they still practised it. (25) His opinion is supported by a few isolated cases in the Straits Settlements archives, and by the account of Dalton,


(23) Crawfurd, 'Descriptive Dictionary,' 75.
an Englishman who spent some time in their settlements on the Eastern Coast of Borneo in 1828-29.\(^{26}\) Crawfurd however was speaking from hearsay, and the government of the Straits after examination of Dalton appears rather to have doubted the truth of his story.\(^{27}\) Furthermore the various books written by Europeans living in the East Indian Islands never spoke of the Bugis as pirates. Moreover, Earl, who from his various voyages in the Archipelago, knew them well, warmly defended them against the charge.\(^{28}\) From the evidence which is available it would seem that during the period 1824 to 1867 the Bugis did not engage in piracy. Instead they devoted themselves to trade, and were the most important native merchants in the whole East Indian Islands.\(^{29}\)

Until after 1835 the total suppression of piracy was regarded by many well-informed authorities as impossible. In spite of every effort, it was actually on the increase. Yet within twenty-five years, between 1835 and 1860, Malay piracy was almost ended, while even the Launs and Balamini were far less of a scourge than they had been. The problem was solved by two means—the use of steamships and the repeated destruction of the pirate strongholds. In the days of sailing ships the suppression of piracy was almost impossible, for ships of the line, frigates, etc., were of little use. Their great height and towering masts made them visible long before they sighted the long, low galleys of their quarry, and sent every pirate for miles scurrying for shelter amongst the islands and swamps. Only if they chanced upon a prau too far from land to reach it had they much chance of capturing it. Even then, if the wind fell, the galley often escaped by rowing, while the men-of-wars' boats were left toiling hopelessly astern. On many occasions the pirates attacked and plundered traders in full view of a warship, helplessly becalmed and unable to assist. As to the small, swift gunboats which were used extensively by Spain, Holland and Great Britain, in too many cases they seem to have been ornamental incompetents. They had sails, and occasionally oars, and were armed with one or two heavy guns. The crews were generally natives—sometimes ex-pirates—although the captain was often a European. In proportion to their number and cost they were singularly ineffective, because their native crews could not be depended on to fight well.\(^{30}\)

\(^{26}\) Moer, "'Notices of the Indian Archipelago.'" 15-29.
\(^{28}\) Earl, "'Eastern Seas.'" 389-91.
\(^{29}\) Ibid., Crawfurd, "'Descriptive Dictionary,'" 75. v. chapter on Trade.
\(^{30}\) It is difficult to give exact references for this opinion, but it is the general impression which one obtains from the countless reports in the Straits Settlements Records, the Bengal Public and Political Consultations, and the works of Keppel, Brooke, De Groot, etc., e.g. Osborn, "'Quedah.'" 29. J. I. A., IV, 160-61, 401-2. Anon.
With the advent of the steamship in 1833-37 a new era began, for it was small and inconspicuous, and no longer at the mercy of a favourable wind. Within a few years there was a marked decline in the number of piracies committed. Brooke expressed the situation exactly when he wrote:—“A small steamer . . . . would do more towards the suppression of piracy than half-a-dozen sloops of war.” (31)

It was also found essential to exercise a steady, remorseless pressure upon the pirates by constantly destroying their strongholds and ravaging their country. The sinking of a few praus, or the occasional burning of a village, had no lasting effects. The houses—built of palm-logs and branches—could be rebuilt almost as quickly as they were burned; and when the pirates found that a repetition of the offence brought no renewal of the punishment, they soon recovered their old audacity. When however a recurrence of piracy brought repeated and wholesale destruction upon them they soon decided that freebooting was too dangerous to be continued. A perfect example of the application of this principle was the success of Brooke and the British navy in destroying Lanun and Sea-Dayak piracy in Borneo. (32) With all his humanity Rajah Brooke was convinced that the suppression of piracy, could be brought about “only by steadily acting against every pirate hold. Without a continued and determined series of operations of this sort, it is my conviction that even the most sanguinary and fatal onslaughts will achieve nothing beyond a present and temporary good. The impression on the native mind is not sufficiently lasting. Their old impulses and habits return with fresh force; they forget their heavy retribution; and in two or three years the memory of them is almost entirely effaced. Till piracy be completely suppressed, there must be no relaxation.” (33) “When these communities lose more than they gain by piracy, and feel piracy is like sitting on a barrel of gunpowder with a lighted match in the hand, then, and then only, they will discontinue it. Heretofore the efforts to put down piracy have been desultory and ineffective.” (34)

The suppression of piracy in the East India Islands was due to the British, Dutch and Spanish. The Spaniards may be dismissed in a few words. Their efforts were confined to protecting the Philippines against the Lanuns, a task in which they were fairly successful. (35) They also scored several notable successes. In 1848 they expelled the Balanini from their islands although this

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victory was to a considerable extent nullified by the fact that many of them went elsewhere and for many years continued their raids. (36)

A few years later the Spaniards captured Sulu, and thereupon announced that they had conquered the whole Sulu Archipelago. In point of fact their conquest appears to have been limited practically to the town itself, since the Sultan and his followers retreated to the hills, and for many years continued their resistance. As late as about 1880 the Spanish soldiers did not dare to stray outside the walls of their fortress. It was however a great blow to the Lanuns that they no longer possessed a trading-centre where they could sell their booty and obtain supplies. Gradually moreover the Spaniards extended their sway over the Sulu Archipelago and Mindanao and the Lanun raids dwindled away into insignificance. (37)

The work of the Dutch was much more important, and on the whole they seem to have done more towards the suppression of piracy in the East Indian Islands than any other nation. Their efforts were directed mainly towards the protection of their own commerce, a duty which they performed much more systematically and efficiently than the British. (38) They had always far more warships in the Archipelago than Great Britain. Between 1819 and 1830 the government of the Straits Settlements had only a few gunboats and schooners, with occasionally a larger ship from the Company's or the Royal navy. Between 1830 and 1840 the Straits marine was increased; a steamship was sent out in 1837, and ships from the China squadron made periodical cruises. In 1841 the British Government finally realised that piracy could only be put down if warships made regular, instead of occasional voyages in the Archipelago. From this time at least one and sometimes several men-of-war were stationed there, along with one or more of the Company's steamships. There were occasions however when these ships had to be withdrawn for service in China, and the Straits Settlements were left with only a few gunboats to protect their trade. (39) Dutch commerce on the other hand was always protected by a large flotilla of gunboats and small schooners which patrolled the coasts of their possessions, as well as by a powerful squadron a larger vessels. In 1848 for example when the British had about two steamers and two sailing ships in the Archipelago the Dutch had nine of the former and twenty-four of the latter. (40)
The reasons for the disparity between the fleets of Great Britain and Holland is easy to understand. The East India Company was unwilling to incur heavy expense for a settlement from which after 1833 it derived no revenue. The Royal Navy had so many calls upon it that it could not spare enough ships to police a distant and by no means the most important field of British interests. Holland on the contrary had few colonial possessions of importance outside the East Indian Islands, and it was therefore natural that the greater part of her navy on overseas service should be concentrated there. Considering the vast extent of her empire in the Archipelago, the astonishing thing is not that she had so many warships, but so few.

The Dutch methods for combatting piracy were four in number. They kept up a fairly regular patrol of their coasts, and sometimes protected praus by forming them into convoys under a guard of warships. They compelled native rulers to sign treaties promising not to give aid to pirates; but they found that it was far easier to obtain these agreements than to compel their observance. The Dutch also enforced an elaborate code of regulations prescribing the size, build, armament and crews of praus, to prevent pirates from masquerading as traders. Lastly, the Dutch made periodical although somewhat desultory expeditions against the pirate settlements within the limits of their empire. They rarely attacked piratical areas outside their own sphere of influence. Especially before 1843 the number of expeditions made by Holland greatly exceeded those of the British. By these means piracy was gradually put down in Celebes, the Moluccas, Dutch Borneo, the Rio-Lingga Archipelago, and Sumatra. In the two last-mentioned places a large share of the credit belongs to the British. There was however never any effectual co-operation between the British and Dutch navies, although the Treaty of 1824 had intended that they should work together. Despite several efforts to carry it out there was no common plan of operations, and the British and Dutch attacks on the pirates were independent of one another.

Great Britain was entirely responsible for the destruction of piracy in the Malay Peninsula, while she also deserves a very large share of the credit for its suppression in the Rio-Lingga Archipelago and the Sumatran states bordering on the Straits of Malacca. Through the efforts of Brooke and the navv Sea- Dayak piracy in Brunei was entirely put down, and the Lamans of North-West Borneo were driven out and reduced to insignificance. Moreover such heavy punishment was inflicted upon roving squadrons


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of Lamuns and Balanini that they gave up cruising near the Malay Peninsula. And finally, Great Britain, far more than any other nation, was responsible for the suppression of Chinese piracy.

In 1835 however no one could have foreseen that within a generation piracy would sink into insignificance. The Straits of Malacca swarmed with pirates, Malay, Lamun and Balanini, and their fleets infested the waters near Malacca, Singapore and Penang. There were pirates in fleets, and in single praus, pirates in big hundred-oared galleys, pirates in small galleys, pirates in row-boats, and solitary pirates in tiny skiffs. The great pirate mart at Galang did a flourishing trade in booty and captives, many of whom had been kidnapped from Penang. The Southern part of Province Wellesley was uninhabited because no man dared to live there lest he should be captured and sold into slavery. Praus were constantly taken almost within sight of port, and the pirates were very rarely captured. In 1836, for example, the Resident Councillor of Singapore reported that he received "constant accounts" of the loss of trading-praus. "The shores and islands between this and Malacca are infested with piratical praus ... as soon as a native sail appears they assail their prey, which is seldom able to make any effectual resistance."(45) The records of Penang and Malacca are full of similar reports.(44)

The Government of the Straits Settlements was quite unable to protect native trade or, except in very rare cases, to capture the pirates, owing to the ridiculous inadequacy of its naval force. In 1824 the largest warship at Penang was a small schooner, the "Jessy," unfit for further service, and the Council therefore asked the Supreme Government to send it a warship and four gunboats. (44) The gunboats did not arrive for over a year.(46) The experiment was made at Singapore in 1826 of arming a few fast praus, but the attempt to check piracy by this means was a failure. (47) The H. C. Cruiser "Hastings" was stationed in the Straits from 1826 to 1828, when it was replaced until 1831 by the yacht

(43) S. S. R., 111: Sept. 8, 1826.
(45) B. S. and P., Nov. 19, 1824.

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“Nereide.”(48) The records make no mention of any captures made by these vessels. In 1831 the Straits Settlements had only three small ships for the protection of trade, the largest, the schooner “Zephyr,” being only 84 tons.(49) The Straits Government in its despatches to India frankly admitted its powerlessness. In 1828 for example it spoke of the marine as “totally inefficient” for the protection of trade.(50) In 1830 Murchison, the Resident Councillor of Singapore, pointed out that the navy in the Straits had always been too weak to do more than protect the harbours and the waters immediately adjacent.(51)

The most striking characteristic of the despatches of the Straits Government before about 1835 is their tone of hopelessness. It was taken for granted that to extirpate piracy, or even effectually to check it, was utterly hopeless except at an expense which the Company would never sanction. Piracy was rapidly increasing, and by 1829 the Straits Government were afraid that the native trade of Singapore would eventually become extinct, because praus would be afraid to take the risk of sailing to it. The seven years between 1828 and 1835 were the zenith of Malay and Lautum piracy in the Straits of Malacca.(52)

Before dealing with the attacks on the pirates between 1830 and 1840 reference must be made to the occupation of the Dinding Islands in 1826. The district now known collectively as The Dindings is composed of Pangkor and some smaller islands in the Straits of Malacca, and a tract of land on the mainland of Perak opposite. The islands had long been notorious as “the chief haunt of all the pirates who come from the Southward,” and a favourite hiding-place while waiting for their prey.(53) The nominal ruler, the Sultan of Perak, was powerless to suppress the pirates, who were doing great damage to his trade, and in 1826 he voluntarily offered to cede the islands to the Company. He asked it to place a garrison there, and drive out the pirates. The Burney Treaty with Siam had established Perak as an independent state and there was no question as to the Sultan’s right to grant the territory. The Company therefore accepted his offer; but no British force was stationed on the islands until after the Treaty of Pangkor in 1874.(54)

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(49) Ibid.

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In 1830 the British navy at last appeared in Malayan waters. H. M. S. “Southampton” cruised in the Straits of Malacca, and her boats together with the Straits gunboat “Diamond” routed a fleet of some thirty pirate praus after several hours fighting. (55) In 1833 H. M. S. “Harrier” destroyed a notorious pirate settlement at Durian, an island south of the Straits of Singapore. (56) With these two exceptions no effective measures were taken by the government until 1835. In 1831 the Bugis merchants of Singapore complained to the Resident Councillor of the supineness of the Company, as compared with Holland, pointing out that a fleet of twenty-two large galleys, then cruising off the Johore coast, had in a few days captured seven praus. They informed him that unless there were a change of policy they would be compelled to abandon their voyages to Singapore. (57) The records for 1832 are full of accounts of praus being captured. In August of that year pirates chased a trading prau into the very entrance of Singapore harbour. (58) The Chinese of Singapore suffered some heavy losses, and in May 1833 the government allowed them to fit out at their own expense four large boats to attack the pirates lurking outside the harbour. They succeeded in sinking a pirate prau. (59)

In 1833 the same conditions prevailed. Pirate fleets roamed the seas with impunity, and twenty of their praus, meeting the Company’s gunboat “Hawk” near Penang, attacked and forced it to retreat. (60) The most amazing event of the year occurred in April. A small fleet of Chinese traders, carrying a cargo valued at over $200,000, was blockaded by pirates at Pahang. The Government at Singapore had no ship available to assist them, and the Chinese escaped only by good luck, and the assistance of a Malay ruler. (61) In consequence of this event the Chinese merchants of Singapore petitioned the Company to afford them effectual protection. They pointed out that they had built up a valuable trade, worth over $1,000,000 a year, with the East Coast of the Malay Peninsula, with the result that they were affording a very comfortable and regular income to some forty or fifty pirate galleys who preyed upon it with impunity. The Chinese estimated their annual loss at $15,000 to $20,000. (62) During 1834 conditions remained unaltered; but in 1835 a new series of remonstrances finally roused the Indian Government to action. Petitions were submitted to Parliament and to the Supreme Government by the European and Chinese merchants of Singapore, and the Bengal

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(56) “One Hundred Years of Singapore,” I, 293. T. E. Brooke.
(58) Ibid., 147.
(60) J. I. A., IV, 152. Anon.
(62) Ibid.

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
Chamber of Commerce, urging that effective measures should be taken against piracy. Of late years it had increased rapidly, and it “threatened the extinction of the native maritime trade of the Eastern Settlements,” on which the prosperity of Singapore “in great measure” depended. The Singapore petitions also asked that Admiralty jurisdiction should be given to the Recorder’s Court. Bonham, the Governor of the Straits Settlements, strongly supported the petitions.\(^{(68)}\)

The lack of Admiralty jurisdiction prevented the Straits Court from trying prisoners accused of piracy, so that they had to be sent to Calcutta for trial, together with the necessary witnesses. In practice the result was that men charged with this crime were often released because it was not within the competency of the Straits Recorder to deal with them. Even when sent to Calcutta they frequently escaped from lack of evidence, because many of the witnesses were poor native traders who could not afford so expensive a journey.\(^{(64)}\) The question was referred to the Directors, and in 1837 they secured the passage of an Act of Parliament granting Admiralty jurisdiction to the Recorder’s Court.\(^{(68)}\)

Meanwhile the petitions submitted in 1835 resulted in the despatch of H.M.S. “Andromache,” Captain Chad, to the Straits of Malacca. In 1836 the Supreme Government appointed Chad and Bonham, the Governor of the Straits Settlements, Joint Commissioners for the suppression of Malay piracy. They were given very extensive powers, and the Straits marine—increased by three new gunboats—was placed under their control. Two other warships, H.M.S. “Wolf” and “Raleigh,” were also sent to the Straits and did good work. During 1836 the ships cruised in the Straits of Malacca and along the East Coast of the Peninsula, and destroyed many pirate settlements both in the British and Dutch spheres of influence, including the notorious trading-centre on Gullang Island. Chad also defeated several pirate squadrons with very heavy loss by disguising his ships as traders, and thus inducing the Malays to attack him. Malay piracy received a blow from which it never recovered.\(^{(66)}\)


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H. M. S. "Wolf" remained in the Straits from 1836 to 1838, and inflicted heavy losses upon the pirates. Much of her success was due to her habit of disguising herself as a trader carrying tropical animals. To quote one of her officers:—"Baboons flew playfully at your legs, a loathsome orang-outang, crawled up to shake hands... pigs and peccaries, sheep, fowls, a honey bear, and a black panther" made her a perfect floating menagerie."(67) During 1837 and 1839 the Dutch were also very active in the Rhio-Lingga Archipelago and other islands near Singapore.**(68)

The Government of India decided in 1837, permanently to increase the naval force in the Straits, so that the pirates might not forget the lesson taught them in 1836. Until conditions improved so far as to warrant a reduction, it was to consist of two ships of the royal navy and five gunboats. The Supreme Government also decided to station in the Straits the "Diana," a small steamer of 168 tons. Her speed was five knots an hour, and she carried two nine-pounder guns and twenty-five men.**(69) The despatch of the "Diana" was due to the strong representations of the Straits Government and the Admiral commanding the Indian Squadron. They were at one in asserting that piracy could never be suppressed by sailing-ships and gunboats, and that the only effective weapon against it was the steamer.**(70) The arrival of the steamship in the East Indian Islands was a turning-point in the history of piracy. The advent of a vessel which was independent of favourable winds destroyed the galleys' comparative immunity, and in a few years many even of the Lununs gave up piracy.**(71)

The first engagement of the "Diana" in 1837 was a painful surprise for the pirates. Six Lunun galleys were plundering a Chinese junk off the Trengganu coast when they sighted her. Never having seen a steamer, they decided from her smoke that she was sailing ship on fire, and bore down on her at full speed, anticipating an easy capture. To their horror, the "Diana" came up to them against the wind, and then, suddenly stopping opposite each prau, poured in her broadsides at pistol-shot range. One prau was sunk, 90 Lununs were killed, 150 wounded, and 30 taken. The other five galleys escaped in a shattered condition, "baling out apparently nothing but blood, and...scarcely a man at the oars." Three of them foundered before they reached home.**(72)

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(70) Ibid., Vol. 17: Jan. 27, 1836, Nos. 1-2; and Feb. 3, 1836, Nos. 3-4. Ibid., Vol. 18: April 27 and May 1, 1836, No. 1, Ibid. Vol. 19: July 6, 1836, No. 14.

(71) Hunter, "Adventures of a Naval Officer," 84-85, 93-94 and y., infra.


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As a result of the navy's attacks from 1836 to 1839, and especially of Chads' cruise of 1836 and the "Diana's" fight of 1837, piracy in the Straits greatly decreased for several years. Very few praus were attacked, and the native traders had never been so safe. (73) About 1843 there was a recrudescence of Malay and Lainun piracy in the Straits of Malacca and along the East Coast of the Peninsula. It continued until 1849, and many trading-praus were captured, some of them very close to Singapore. Conditions however never became nearly as serious as they had been before 1836. (74) The Government of the Straits Settlements, with the assistance of the China squadron, and the Temenggong of Johore, managed to cope with the situation fairly well. It was greatly hampered however because the fleet was unable to spare sufficient ships to police so wide an area. (75) Gradually Malay piracy waned under the British and Dutch attacks, and after 1849 it dwindled into insignificance. (76)

For many years however piracy continued to exist on a petty scale in the neighbourhood of the Straits Settlements. It usually took the form of attacks by a few Malays on row-boats or small praus, although occasionally a junk or a fairly large prau was taken. (77) Such incidents grew steadily rarer, even though the Straits marine was not really effective. Sailing were not replaced by steam gunboats until 1861. Moreover the "Hooghly," the largest steamer, was very old and frequently disabled, as her boilers were nearly worn out. She was quite unable to catch a fast pirate galley. In 1862 she was replaced by a more powerful iron steamship, the "Pluto." (78) The Straits marine was much improved by the addition about the same time of a new steam gunboat, the "Avon," a large and fairly fast ship with twenty and sixty-hour pounder guns. (79) Even at the present day, instances of Malay piracy occasionally occur. The Most notorious was the Selangor incident in 1871 which led to British intervention in the state. (80) In 1884 and 1909 Chinese merchantmen were

(75) Ibid., Vol. 54: Aug. 27, 1845, Nos. 12-13.
(79) Hill MS, § 942.
attacked by Malayan pirates near Singapore. (81) Speaking broadly however, one may say that Malayan piracy has been extinct for over forty years.

In addition to crushing Malayan piracy the British navy also made many attacks on the Labuns and Balanini. During the thirties their fleets suffered heavy losses, as for example in the "Diana's" engagement of 1837; but until 1845 no serious attempt was made to attack their settlements. In 1845 and 1846 the British navy, assisted by Rajah Brooke and his Malays, destroyed the Labun settlements in North-West Borneo, and piracy there came to an end. This result was achieved very largely through the terror inspired by the steamships. (82) In 1847 the H. C. steamer "Nemesis," inflicted a very severe defeat on a Balanini squadron near Labuan. The pirates suffered so heavily that for fifteen years they carefully avoided the coast of Brunei. (83) The Dutch were also very active at this time in destroying Labun settlements; and the Spaniards dealt the Labuns and Balanini two heavy blows by the capture of Sulu and the Balanini Islands in 1848 and 1851. (84)

The Labuns and Balanini continued their annual cruises for many years after 1851, but their power gradually decreased until they sank into insignificance. Their decline was due partly to the growth of Spanish power, but in much larger degree to the terror inspired by steamships. (85) By 1854 the Straits Settlements had for some years been almost free from Labun attacks. Soon afterwards the names of both the Labuns and Balanini disappeared forever from the Straits records. In 1862 there occurred what proved to be almost the last fight between the British and the Labuns. A squadron returning home from a successful cruise on the East Coast of the Malayan Peninsula rashly ventured into Sarawak waters. It was attacked and almost wiped out off Bintulu in Brunei by Rajah Brooke's tiny steam gunboat after a desperate fight in which the pirates showed all their ancient courage. (86) Long after the Straits Settlements were free from their navages the Dutch, and especially the Spaniards, were compelled to send periodical expeditions against the Labuns and Balanini. (87)

(81) "One Hundred Years of Singapore," I, 299. Brooke.
(85) Ibid., I, 292: 11, 235, 240.

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When the British North Borneo Company was founded, its officials discovered that Lanun and Balanini colonies had been established on the East coast of Borneo. Tunku, the principal settlement was founded by Lanuns from North-West Borneo after the destruction of their strongholds there by the British navy in 1845 and 1846. The pirates had only a shadow of their former power, but in 1878 they still carried on raids against the natives of Borneo and the Philippines. Tunku was destroyed by H. M. S. "Kestrel" in 1879, and in 1886 two villages were bombarded by a British warship because of various small acts of piracy. As a result of this punishment, and the firm rule of the Borneo Company, the last embers of Lanun and Balanini piracy in the island were stamped out. By the combined efforts of the British, Dutch and Spaniards the most famous pirates of the Archipelago were at last compelled to abandon their raids.

At the very time when Malay and Lanun piracy was coming to an end, the Chinese pirates suddenly rose into prominence. The worst period seems to have been from about 1848 to 1855, although attacks were made until the seventies. The principal sufferers were junks from Cochin-China; and from the inadequacy of its marine the Government of the Straits Settlements could do little to protect them. The main theatre of Chinese operations was the Gulf of Siam, although many vessels were captured near Singapore. The attacks gradually died away as the China squadron destroyed the fleets and fortresses of the pirates in China.

No one who studies the history of piracy in the East Indian Islands can fail to be impressed by its resemblance to that of the Barbary Coast. In each case piracy was fostered by a peculiarly favourable environment. How important this influence was in the development of piracy in the Archipelago has already been shown. The coast of North Africa was equally suitable. It is a "series of natural harbours, often backed by lagoons which offer every facility for escape." There are "endless creeks, shallow harbours and lagoons where the Corsairs' galleys (which never drew more than six feet of water) could take refuge," and much of the coast is protected by shifting sand-banks. Moreover in both cases the pirates' country lay alongside some of the most important of the world's trade-routes.

In Africa as in the Eastern Archipelago the actions of European nations greatly stimulated the piracy which already existed. What the destruction of the native trade-routes was to

(88) Ibid., 124.
(91) Lane-Poole, "Barbary Corsairs," 16-21, 186-91.

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the Malays, the expulsion of the Moors from Spain was to the Corsairs. The Pirates of Northern Africa were not a very serious menace until their numbers were greatly increased towards the end of the fifteenth century by a swarm of refugees from Spain, filled with a burning sense of their wrongs, and determined to avenge the cruelties they had suffered at Christian hands.\(^{(92)}\) The Corsairs also resembled the pirates of the Archipelago in that they were slavers as much as robbers: one of the principal objects of their cruises was to make captives for the slave-markets. With the possible exception of the Lamuns however none of the East Indian pirates seem to have treated their slaves with such callous cruelty as the Moors.\(^{(93)}\) The last point of resemblance is that in both cases neither the ships nor the forts of the pirates were very formidable to European warships. They were a terror only to merchantmen.\(^{(94)}\)

Apart from these points of similarity however the two races of pirates were radically different. Except in rare cases the Malays and Lamuns were never a menace to European merchants; while the Corsairs were the terror of every trader that passed their harbours. The reason for this was threefold, the assistance of Turkey, the encouragement of the great European powers, and the use of European renegades. From about 1518, when Charles V. began to make serious attempts to crush them, until 1571 the Barbary Corsairs were under the protection of Turkey. The Janissaries, the flower of the Sultan's army, were sent to sail on their raids, and the pirate galleys formed part of the Turkish navy. Barbarossa and the other great leaders of the pirates commanded the whole Turkish fleet, and assisted the Sultans in their campaigns. Until the battle of Lepanto in 1571 the Turkish fleet had the command of the Mediterranean; and the Corsairs were protected and enabled to grow strong in the early years of their power when they could most easily have been crushed.\(^{(95)}\)

Lepanto deprived the pirates of this protection, and they ceased to be robbers on the grand scale. The great powers of Europe could easily have crushed them; yet in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries their ravages were more extensive than ever before. Hundreds of European merchantmen and thousands of captives fell into their hands, the Mediterranean seaboard was constantly pillaged, and even villages in England and Ireland were destroyed. The pirates arrogated to themselves the right to war on every nation of Europe which did not buy their forbearance by tribute. Moreover they constantly broke the treaties which they

\(^{(92)}\) Playfair, ""Scourge of Christendom,"" 1-3. Lane-Poole, ""Barbary Corsairs,"" 7-13, 22-27.
\(^{(93)}\) Playfair, ""Scourge of Christendom,"" 6, 20, and passim.
\(^{(94)}\) Ibid., 8-13, and passim.
\(^{(95)}\) Ibid., passim. Lane-Poole, ""Corsairs"" 13-181. Currey, ""Sea Wolves of the Mediterranean,"" 177-78.

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were bribed to sign, and renewed their ravages. Yet, apart from a few sporadic attacks never pushed home, the great powers replied by fresh gifts of money, new treaties, and more stores and munitions. The truth was that England, France and the other powers found the Corsairs too useful as a means of injuring one another’s trade to allow them to be destroyed. While attempting to buy immunity for their own merchants by lavish gifts, they were constantly trying to bribe the pirates to attack their rivals. (96) The position was rather like that of Turkey and the Concert of Europe during the last seventy years, when the attempts to secure just government for the Sultans’ Christian subjects failed because the mutual jealousy and distrust of the great powers made effective action impossible.

Finally, much of the power of the Corsairs was due to their employment of Christian renegades. Their gunners, many of the commanders of their galleys, and some even of their rulers, were renegades. Renegades generally guided them on their voyages, and formed the most daring part of their crews. In 1630 there were 8000 in Algiers alone. The abandonment of the galley for the sailing-ship at the beginning of the seventeenth century was due to a Fleming, Simon Dander, who taught the pirates how to build ships on the European model. Owing to the great superiority of their new type of vessel the Corsairs were able to extend their cruises into the Atlantic, and ravage the coasts of England and Ireland. (97)

The Malays and Lamuns on the contrary had none of these advantages. No European power protected or assisted them with arms and money as a means of injuring its rivals’ trade. That they flourished so long was due not to the encouragement but to the indifference of Europe. Moreover the pirates of the Archipelago were not joined by European renegades. There appears to be only one case, in 1820, where a European commanded a Malay squadron, and even here there is no certain proof, but merely strong suspicion. (98) The Malays and Lamuns were therefore greatly inferior to the Corsairs in their types of vessel, their armament, and their skill in gunnery. For these reasons they were rarely a danger to European merchantmen, but only to the ill-armed native trading prans. So far as enthusiasm for their chosen profession went, the pirates of the Archipelago were fully the equals of the Corsairs. Had circumstances been favourable, they might have been as great a scourge to Europeans as the Moors: it was their misfortune, and not their fault, that they were comparatively innocuous.

CHAPTER XIII.

Rajah Brooke of Sarawak and the Suppression of Piracy in Brunei.

No history of the Straits Settlements would be complete which did not refer to the work accomplished by Sir James Brooke in Sarawak. In 1839 the North-West Coast of Borneo was one of the most notorious pirate strongholds in the whole Archipelago; by 1850 their power was broken, and by 1860 even the Lanuns gave the coasts of Brunei a wide berth. To Rajah Brooke, far more than to anyone else, belongs the credit for this great achievement.

Brunei, the scene of his success, was a decadent Malayan state in the North-West part of Borneo. When the Portuguese first visited it in the sixteenth century it was a large and powerful kingdom; but in the course of three hundred years it had decayed until its power was but a shadow, and only a fraction of its former territory remained. At the present day its area has decreased to a small district surrounding Brunei Town, the Capital; but in 1839 it included the present state of Sarawak. The population was composed of several elements. There were first the Malays, a small minority, but the dominant race, comprising the Sultan, his nobles, and their followers, who lived either in the capital, Brunei Town, or near the mouths of the rivers. The mass of the population was of a somewhat different race, and had been conquered by the Malayan invaders. It was divided into several tribes, the Kayans, very numerous and warlike, the Dayaks, and others. The Dyaks were of two kinds, Land and Sea Dayaks. The inhabitants of Sarawak were in the main land Dayaks, a kindly and unwarlike race, not much given to fighting, though not without somewhat of a predilection for head-hunting. The Sea Dayaks, or Orang Laut, were of altogether different calibre. Their villages were near Sarawak, on the banks of the Batang Lupar, Serebas, and Kaluka Rivers. They were excellent seamen, pirates to a man, and notorious all along the West Coast of Borneo for their fearlessness and ferocity. Between the Orang Laut and Brunei Town on the Rajang and Igan Rivers lived several peaceable Dayak tribes who manufactured sago in the intervals between the raids of the sea Dayaks. Northwards of Brunei Town the country was a stronghold of the Lanun pirates, who had fortified towns at Tampassuk, Pandassan, and other places.

The whole state was nominally under the government of the Sultans of Brunei, but in point of fact their dependencies were rapidly slipping from their grasp. The rule of the Malays
was as weak as it was cruel and oppressive; individually brave, they were unable to prevent their state from crumbling to pieces before their eyes. Rajah Brooke's "Journals" show that when he first went to Sarawak he hoped to revivify the ancient dynasty of Brunei, but after many attempts he discovered that the task was hopeless. The Malay nobles appear to have divided their time between intrigue and dissipation at Brunei Town, and the oppression of their Dayak subjects the Land Dayaks, be it well understood; no one had courage enough to tyrannize over the Orang Laut.

The oppression to which the Land Dayaks were subjected would be incredible if it were not attested by the accounts of such unimpeachable eye-witnesses as Spenser St. John, Sir Hugh Low, and Admiral Keppel. A Malay noble for example would send a bar of iron or some other article worth a few dollars to a Dayak village and compel the inhabitants to buy it for ten times its value. If they were unable to pay the price, he and his followers would sack the village and carry off the young men and woman as slaves. It also frequently happened that a Malay would see a Dayak boat which he fancied, and, if he did not carry it off at once, would put a mark on it as a sign that it was his. Very often four or five marks would be set on a boat before some Malay would take it away with him. The Dayak owner was then compelled to visit all the other Malays who had placed their mark on his boat, and pay each of them its full value to recoup them for their disappointment. (1)

Besides plundering the Dayaks, the Malays also engaged in piracy. About 1800 Brunei Town was so notorious for this that the former flourishing trade with English merchantmen ceased altogether, since several large ships had been taken and their crews murdered. The cessation of this trade in the end helped to bring about the downfall of Brunei, since the Malays had been greatly enriched by it. In 1839 the more far-sighted nobles were therefore anxious to renew it. By this time Brunei Town itself had given up actual piracy, but the Sultans and their Datus (Malay nobles) protected pirates and received a share of their plunder. The town was a harbour of refuge where the pirate praus came to sell their slaves and booty, and to buy supplies. (2) Other parts of Brunei however more than made up for the backsiding of the capital, The Lanuns sent out squadrons from their fortified bases on the North-West and North-


ern coasts, and ravaged the seas for hundreds of miles. These Lununs were immigrants from the great pirate stronghold on Mindanao in the Philippines, and were in league with their kinsmen. (4)

Another race which played an important rôle in Borneo piracy was the Arab. The Malays have always shown great veneration for the Arabs, since it was from them that they received Mohammedanism. This, joined with their mental superiority to the Malays and Dayaks, gave them great ascendency over the natives of the Archipelago. While there were no Arab colonies in Borneo, quite a few individuals had established themselves amongst the Lununs and the Sea-Dayaks, and combined with great success the rôles of holy men, pirate chieftains, and slavers. Typical of the class were Sharif Osman of Marudu Bay, and Sharifs Mular, Salap and Masahor in the Orang Laut country. Frequently the Arabs did not lead the pirate raids in person, but confined themselves to the safer task of building strongly fortified towns, from which they sent out fleets manned by their Malayan or Sea-Dayak followers. When the squadrons returned after a successful cruise, the Arab Sharifs took a goodly share of the profits. The influence of the Arabs upon the Malays was denounced by authorities like Brooke, St. John, Low, and Raffles as most pernicious. They prostituted their intellectual superiority and the superstitious veneration in which they were held to foster in their followers their inborn love of piracy. (4)

The piratical tribes with whom Brooke was brought most closely in contact were the Sea-Dayaks, whose villages were scattered along the banks of the Batang Lepar, Sadong, serebas and Kahuka Rivers. When in 1849 the Radical Party in Great Britain opened its attack upon Rajah Brooke, it contended that these notorious marauders were peaceable farmers and fishermen, of inoffensive and lovable disposition. In point of fact, the evidence of their depredations fills many stout volumes; and it was only from force of circumstances and not through any fault of their own that they were not as great a scourge as the Lununs. Originally they had been agriculturists who differed from the Land-Dayaks only in their stronger partiality for human heads, and because they were so brave and warlike that to oppress them was out of the question. It therefore appealed to the Malays and the Arab Sharifs as an excellent idea that such splendid fighting material should be diverted from the toilsome and comparatively


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unproductive work of farming to piracy for the benefit of their mentors. So apt were the Orang Laut in a short time they were the scourge of the West Coast of Borneo. They became excellent seamen, and their naturally blood-thirsty instincts were greatly stimulated. The Malays and Arabs found their passion for heads of the utmost service, for when a capture was made the Orang Laut were quite content to leave all the booty to their leaders and take as their share the heads of the slain or of any captives too weak to be sold as slaves.

When Brooke arrived in Sarawak they were at the height of their power. They were divided into two tribes, the Serebas and Sakarran, and could put into the field 20,000 warriors, armed with spears, long heavy swords with a razor-like edge, and large shields ornamented with dyed human hair. Trained to the sea from infancy, they were adepts at managing their small craft. In rough weather, when their boats were almost filled with water, they were accustomed to leap overboard and, clinging to the gunwale with one hand, swim until the storm was over. Their galleys were long and low, propelled with oars and sails, and extraordinarily swift. They were made of long planks lashed together, so that when hard pressed by men-of-war's boats, they could run ashore and quickly cutting the lashings, carry them away piece-meal into the jungle, to be put together again at leisure. Since the boats of the Orang Laut were trailer than the big Lanun galleys, and hence less adapted for long sea-voyages, they confined their depredations to the Borneo Coasts, and did not wander far afield, although at times they allied themselves with the Lanuns. For this reason also the Orang Laut did not attack European merchantmen, but confined their attention to native trading-praus. The Sea-Dayaks also laboured under the great disadvantage that they had no fire-arms, and were somewhat afraid of them. The towns of the Arab Sharifs however were provided with cannon and musket and the Malays who usually accompanied the Orang Laut expeditions took their fire-arms with them. Under these circumstances the character of the Sea Dayaks was far better known to the Dutch than to the British Government. At the inquiry held on Brooke's attacks upon them in 1854 a Dutch naval officer gave most important testimony regarding their ravages on the Dutch possessions on the West Coast of Borneo.\(^{(5)}\)

Such was the situation in Brunei when in 1839 James Brooke sailed into the Sarawak River with his small schooner, the "Royalist," and a crew of some twenty picked Englishmen. Brooke had come to the East to fulfil the dream of his life, a voyage of exploration and scientific research in the Archipelago. (6) The visit to Borneo was only an incident in his travels, and if anyone had told him that in less than twenty years he would be the ruler of the greater part of Brunei, he would have scoffed the idea as preposterous.

Sarawak at this time was in revolt against the Sultan of Brunei. So unprecedented had been the tyranny of Makota, the Sultan's governor of the province, that he had actually succeeded in uniting against him the Land Dayaks and their hereditary enemies the Malays. Pangeran Muda Hashim, the Regent of Brunei, had been sent to suppress the rebellion, but owing to the cowardice and incapacity of his officers he had completely failed. The war promised to drag on indefinitely, and meanwhile Hashim's enemies at the capital were undermining his influence with Omar, the incapable and almost imbecile Sultan. Muda Hashim was therefore anxious to return to Brunei Town as quickly as possible. He welcomed Brooke warmly and a strong friendship quickly grew up between them. While somewhat weak, Hashim had many excellent qualities. His treatment of the Dayaks was comparatively just, and he wished to suppress piracy, and to re-establish trade with the British. With proper guidance he would have made a satisfactory ruler; and his claim to the throne was as good as the Sultan's. In point of character he was infinitely preferable to Omar, whose guiding principles were plunder, women, and dissipation. Moreover the Sultan was as weak as he was worthless, and always followed the advice of his latest councillor. His most congenial advisers were Hashim's enemies, who led by Pangeran Usop, were the patrons of piracy, and the slave trade, and were notorious even in Brunei for their oppression of the Dayaks. (7)

After a few months Brooke sailed to Celebes, but in 1840 he returned to Sarawak. Hashim had become convinced that the rebellion could only be suppressed by Brooke's assistance, and in return he offered him the Governorship of Sarawak. Brooke accepted, not from any hope of personal gain, but solely because he saw in the offer an opportunity of ending the intolerable oppression of the Dayaks. He suppressed the revolt, and treated the Malays and Dayaks with such kindness and justice that in a few months he completely won their allegiance. Makota, the Governor of Sarawak whose oppression had caused the revolt, and a notorious patron of the pirates, saw that Brooke's appointment would ruin

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(6) Templer, "Private Letters of Sir James Brooke," I, 4-9, 11-14, 16-33, 76-77, 86.

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his opportunities for extortion, and therefore persuaded Hashim to put off installing him in office. Several months thus elapsed, until finally Makota made a futile attempt to poison Brooke. The Rajah cleared his ship for action, and demanded that Hashim should fulfil his promise. The Dayaks, and the majority of the Malays at once joined Brooke; and Muda Hashim proclaimed him Governor of Sarawak, on September 24, 1841. In 1842 the Sultan confirmed his appointment. (*)

When the English Radicals attacked Rajah Brooke in 1849 they accused him of being an unscrupulous adventurer, who extorted from a powerless Sultan the rule of a rich province in order to amass wealth by exploiting the natives. To anyone who has studied the history of Brooke's career the charge is so grotesque as to seem unworthy of refutation. It has been denied, not only by the Rajah's followers, but also by authorities of such unimpeachable integrity as Low, St. John, and Swettenham. (*) Nothing however proves the falsity of the accusation so completely as the bare facts of Brooke's administration. An adventurer who wished to grow wealthy would not impoverish himself by spending the greater part of his small fortune in restoring prosperity to a poverty-stricken country, while consistently refusing to enrich himself by exploiting its resources. Rajah Brooke obtained the Governorship of Sarawak from no desire for power or wealth, but solely in order to rescue the inhabitants from intolerable oppression. He never fell short of his high ideal, and his whole life is a triumphant refutation of the charges levelled against him.

The history of Rajah Brooke's rule in Sarawak lies outside the scope of this thesis. Suffice it to say that for twenty-five years his life was one long battle against Brunei misrule. Gradually he restored order and prosperity in Sarawak, and built up his system of administration. He won the enthusiastic devotion of his Malays and Dayaks; and the inhabitants of the other provinces of Brunei sent embassies begging him to extend his rule over them. Brooke was eager to put an end to piracy and the tyranny of the Malay nobles; and the Sultan for his part was quite willing to extend his province. The Malay Governors of his dependencies had made themselves practically independent, and only sent him tribute when the spirit moved them. Sultan Omar cared nothing for the misrule of Dayaks; but he keenly appreciated a governor who kept his word and regularly sent him the tribute agreed on. So the area of Sarawak gradually increased, until by

(9) Ibid., passim. Low "Sarawak" 93-123. Swettenham, preface, p. viii, in "My Life in Sarawak" by the Rance of Sarawak.

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1860 it extended from Cape Tanjong Datu to beyond Cape Tanjong Sirik. (10)

Soon after 1840 Brooke began his attempt to interest the British Government in Brunei. His own means were insufficient to destroy piracy and restore prosperity in Sarawak, without continuing the extortionate taxes of the Malays, and this he refused to do. Still less was he able unaided to put an end to the appalling misrule in Brunei. Furthermore, to establish British influence in Brunei would not only benefit British trade, since the country was rich in natural resources, but it would strike a blow at Holland. Like most other Englishmen in the Eastern Archipelago the Rajah thoroughly detested the Dutch because of their harsh treatment of the natives, and their constant attempts to monopolise the trade of the island. Brunei was the only native state in Borneo which was still independent, and the Dutch had for long been casting longing eyes upon it. So far they had found no excuse for intervention; but the anarchy and misrule which was rapidly converting the country into a congeries of piratical principalities was certain to give them their opportunity within a very short time. Moreover excellent coal had been discovered in Brunei and Labuan, an island off the North-West Coast of Brunei, near the capital; and Britain needed a coaling station for the China squadron, and for steamships in the China trade. The situation of Labuan, almost on the trade-route to China, and in a central position, 707 miles from Singapore, and 1009 from Hongkong, made it peculiarly suitable. The influence which Brooke had obtained in Brunei was so great that he could obtain for the British Government whatever it wanted. The Sultan was too weak to prevent his governors from setting up as independent chiefs, and was willing to cede large tracts of territory in return for a small payment and British protection.

Brooke therefore urged the British government to proclaim a protectorate over Brunei and Sarawak and annex Labuan. While he would have preferred to be retained as Governor of Sarawak, he offered to allow his own province to be annexed without any post being given him. Far from wishing to destroy the power of the Sultan he wished to preserve and revivify it, and sweep away misrule by means of a British Resident who should advise the Sultan, as was done in the Malay States of the Peninsula after 1874. In this connection it is of interest to note that the Residental System by which the British Government at present controls the Sultans of the Malay States has been greatly influenced by the form of administration evolved in Sarawak by Rajah Brooke.

Sir Hugh Low, who in 1877 was appointed Resident of Perak,


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formerly served under Brooke; and the methods of government which he adopted were modelled very largely upon those of the Rajah. (11) The instrument whom Brooke designated for the regeneration of Brunei was his faithful friend, the Regent, Muda Hashim. Properly controlled, he could be depended on to suppress misrule, put down piracy, and foster trade. Not that Brooke advocated the deposition of Sultan Omar; provided he ceased to protect pirates and gave up oppressing his subjects, it was better that he should be left undisturbed. But Omar's two sons were both illegitimate, and Hashim's claim to the throne was as good as his master's. There was every reason why he should succeed Omar either on his death, or sooner, if ever it became necessary to depose him. (12) The murder of Hassim and all his supporters by Sultan Omar in 1845 ruined the plan, since it left no one who had the desire and the ability to reform the government. The decay of Brunei therefore went on faster than ever.

Through the medium of his friends and relatives in London Brooke laid his proposals before the Cabinet. About 1842 he was introduced to Wise, an able but as events proved unscrupulous man of business in London. Wise cared nothing whatever for Brooke's humanitarian projects; but he saw clearly the great financial profit which he could make by exploiting Brunei. For some years he successfully deceived Brooke as to his real motives, and gained his entire confidence. In the end this alliance nearly ruined the Rajah, for when he discovered Wise's real intentions he severed connections with him. In revenge Wise by his slanders did much to instigate the Radical attack on Brooke. (13) Between 1842 and 1846 however, as the Rajah's London agent, he seems to have done much useful work in interesting the public in Brooke's projects, and in persuading the Cabinet to annex Labuan.

The Government was very unwilling to accept Brooke's proposals—it rather inclined to the belief that to lose colonies was more blessed than to obtain them—but it was anxious to secure the coal, if it were proved to be of good quality. Negotiations were carried on for several years until the Cabinet was finally convinced by the reports of officers sent to inspect Labuan that the island would be valuable both as a coaling-station and as a centre for trade with Brunei and Sulu Archipelago. By 1846 the Government had decided to accept Sultan Omar's offer of 1844 to cede Labuan and give a concession to work the Brunei coal-field. The formal offer, together with a request that the British would sup-

(11) St. John: "Brooke," preface XV.
press piracy, had been made through Brooke's influence. At the same time it was decided not to proclaim a protectorate over Sarawak and Brunei, nor to interfere in any way with the Sultan's government. (14)

Meanwhile in 1844 Muda Hashim had been re-established in his rightful position in Brunei Town as Regent. The following year he defeated an attack by the piratical faction of the Malay nobles, led by Pangiran Usop, who was captured and executed. Usop was the Sultan's favourite, and was notorious even in Brunei for his plundering of the Dayaks, and his protection of pirates. He had also enslaved two shipwrecked British lancers. At last it seemed that Brooke's policy was near to success. Only a few months later the unbelievable happened. One night early in 1846 by the Sultan's orders the homes of Muda Hashim, his brother Badrudin, and all their friends and relations were attacked. With hardly a single exception the whole of his party was wiped out. With them fell all hope of reforming Brunei through its native rulers. (15) St. John considered that Brooke was mistaken in believing that the murders were caused by Hashim's fidelity to him and by his resolve to put down piracy: the real reason was that the Regent was seen to be aiming at the throne. Therefore the Sultan's advisers, "a set of scoundrels inferior to none in villainy," together with the remains of the piratical faction, persuaded him to destroy Hashim and his party root and branch. (16)

The Sultan also attempted to murder Brooke, and to capture by treachery a British naval officer, Admiral Cochrane, whose squadron, with Brooke on board, sailed for Brunei Town. While filled with indignation at the massacre, the admiral felt that if it were purely a palace conspiracy he could not interfere, since Omar was an independent ruler. If however he had broken his agreement with the British Government made in 1844, then the situation was changed. (17) On arriving at the mouth of the river on which Brunei Town is built a message was sent to the Sultan asking him if he meant to adhere to his engagements. He replied with studied discourtesy; and after waiting several days the fleet ascended the river to the capital, first informing the Sultan that there would be no attack unless he began it. Omar had strongly fortified the town, and opened fire on the leading ships. After a short but hot fight, Brunei was taken, and the Sultan fled to the country. The Admiral now sailed for China.


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leaving Captain Mundy to effect a settlement. It was decided to let the Sultan retain his throne, and he returned to the capital. He made a treaty with Brooke ceding him Sarawak in perpetuity with full rights of sovereignty, without the payment of the annual tribute hitherto sent.

Soon afterwards Palmerston's despatch to Brooke arrived, instructing him to accept the offer of Labuan and make a commercial treaty. Treaties were accordingly made in 1846 ceding Labuan and pledging the Sultan to do all in his power to suppress piracy, and the slave-trade, and to protect shipwrecked crews from pillage or enslavement. Most favoured nation treatment was granted to British commerce. The Sultan also promised never to alienate any part of his dominions to any foreign power without the consent of the British Government. The subsequent history of Labuan is not given, since its government was entirely separate from that of the Straits Settlements until 1905.

Brooke now returned to England where he found himself feted and lionised. He was knighted, and appointed Governor of Labuan, and Commissioner and Consul-General to the Sultan and independent chiefs of Borneo. He found however that the administration of Sarawak left him no time properly to carry out his duties at Labuan, and he resigned his post as Governor in 1852. In 1854 he also resigned the Consul-Generalship.

The annexation of Labuan, and indeed the whole of Brooke's career evoked strong remonstrances from Holland. In 1845-46 there was an exchange of somewhat pungent notes between the British and Dutch Governments. After attacking Brooke as an intruder who was interfering in Holland's preserves, the Dutch went on to contend that the British actions in Brunei were a breach of the Treaty of 1824. In support of their charges they advanced an interpretation of the Treaty which meant that, wherever Holland had a post, however small, on any island in the Archipelago, the British must not establish themselves in any other state of the island, even though it were independent. Since the Dutch had station on almost every island of importance, their claims would practically have confined the British to the Malay Peninsula. The British Government warmly defended Brooke against the attacks, and denied that by any conceivable ingenuity could this interpretation of the Treaty be read into it. The Cabinet also seized the favourable opportunity to remind Holland of her continual violations of the commercial provisions of the Treaty. A long list of her transgressions was appended, and it was suggested that greater

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respect for treaty-obligations would go far to improve the relations of the two powers. (29)

During the years in which Brooke was trying to establish British influence in Brunei, he was also carrying on active warfare against the Orang Laut and the Lamans. The Sea-Dayaks had long been accustomed to make raids on Sarawak, and at first they quite failed to understand why the appointment of an English Governor should interfere with their habits. For a time they continued to ravage his province as of old. Brooke made careful inquiries as to their character from "Nakhodas" (captains of native traders), fishermen, and others; and from their evidence and from what he saw with his own eyes in Sarawak he became convinced that both tribes of the Orang Laut, the Seribas and the Sekarrans, were, as a Dutch official later described them, "the scourge and terror of the West Coast." (21)

Brooke's first step was to free his own province from their attacks. On several occasions when they raided Sarawak he pursued them with a handful of his faithful Malays. Some of the pirates were killed, and others who were captured were tried and executed. After a few experiences of this sort the Sea-Dayaks gave Sarawak a wide berth; but Brooke's resources were too limited to make them abandon piracy altogether. The Rajah soon saw that this could only be brought about by means of the British navy. (22)

Meanwhile the Sea-Dayaks were preparing to attack him. The leaders of the plot were four Arab Sharifs, Suhap, Jupar, Mular and Masahor. They were the Sultan's Governors of the Orang Laut, and at the same time the principal pirate chiefs and slavers in the country. Pangeran Usop, the Sultan's favourite minister, who was executed by Muda Hashim in 1845, was secretly in league with them. They had also been joined by Makota, the ex-Governor of Sarawak whose oppression had caused the rebellion there, and whom Brooke had driven out of the province in 1843. (23) The threatened attack never materialised, because of the events about to be described.

In 1843 a new chapter began in the history of Borneo piracy. The Governor of the Straits Settlements had complained of the numerous attacks on Singapore praus made off the Brunei Coast, and Captain Keppel, H. M. S. "Dido," sailed to investigate. (24) He called at Sarawak and met Brooke. From this meeting arose a warm friendship which lasted until the end of the Rajah's life.

Brooke told Keppel of the enormities of the Sëribas and Sekarran Dayaks, and asked him to attack them. Before doing so the Captain carefully assured himself that they were pirates. "I made every necessary inquiry......I collected such a mass of testimony from numerous persons of various nations," both native and English, "as left no doubt whatever of the extensive and systematic depredation carried on by these pirates."(25) Furthermore before taking action Keppel referred the matter to Muda Hashim, the Regent of Brunei, who in reply wrote him a letter describing the piratical character of the Sëribas and Sekarran and asking him to punish them.(26) A similar letter was obtained by Keppel from Hashim before his attack on the Sekarran in 1844.(27) These details are of importance since as will be seen a few years later Hume, Cobden and others said that the attack had been made without preliminary investigation, merely on Brooke's allegations.

Finally convinced, Keppel sailed to the rivers occupied by the Sëribas Dayaks, accompanied by Brooke and a flotilla manned by the Sarawak Malays. The Sëribas had considered their strongholds impregnable, but the British captured them and ascending their rivers for one hundred miles ravaged the country. Keppel had intended to continue his work by defeating the Sekarran; but the "Dido" was ordered to China.(28) In 1844 however he was back again, and with Brooke's Malay auxiliaries sailed to attack the Sekarran. They were, if possible, more blood-thirsty than the Sëribas and were led by Sharif Sahap, the most powerful and dangerous of the local Arab chiefs. The same success attended the expedition. The pirates' strongholds were destroyed, their country ravaged, and Sahap's power was broken. Soon afterwards he died of a broken heart.(29)

The complete success of Keppel's two expeditions terrified the pirates, and for almost three years their raids greatly diminished in number. Both Brooke and Keppel warned the Government however that a single lesson was not enough permanently to discourage them, an that a steamship should be sent to the coast periodically to punish any recrudescence of piracy. If this step were taken the Sea Dayaks would realize that the good old days were gone forever; if not, Keppel's work would have to be done all over again. The advice was not followed, with the result that the prediction was absolutely fulfilled. As the Orang Laut found that their tentative expeditions did not bring a British warship into

(27) Ibid., 167-68.
their rivers they grew bold again, and by 1847-48 Sea Dayak piracy had assumed appalling proportions. The work of 1843-44 had to be repeated, and it was not until the crushing defeat of their united fleets at Batang Maru in 1849 that Orang Laut piracy finally came to an end. (26)

In 1845 the navy turned its attention to the Lanun settlements on the North-West Coast. Admiral Cochrane and his squadron attacked Sharif Osman of Marudu Bay, an Arab who was one of the principal leaders of the Lanuns in Borneo. He had enslaved a number of British Indians, and boasted that the whole China squadron was powerless against him. He was also the ally of Usop, and had been threatening Muda Hashim and the Sultan with vengeance for daring to pledge themselves to oppose piracy. On arriving at Marudu Bay it was discovered that the position was a very strong one. The harbour was defended by two forts mounting heavy guns and a floating battery, while across the entrance was stretched a double boom of large logs bolted together by iron plates and a heavy ship's cable. The channel was too shallow for even the light steamers, and the attack was made by nine small gunboats and fifteen rowboats from the warships, carrying 550 men in all. The boats rowed to the boom, and under a heavy fire attempted to cut it through with axes. For fifty minutes it resisted every effort, and eight or nine of the British were killed or mortally wounded. At last an opening was made, and soon a column of black smoke announced to the watchers in the fleet that Marudu had fallen. The pirates' losses were very heavy, many sharifs and Lanun chiefs being killed. Amongst the number was Sharif Osman. The fall of Marudu was the heaviest blow which had yet been struck at Borneo piracy. The pirates were filled with consternation, for they saw that their most impregnable strongholds were powerless against a British attack. (21)

The following year, 1846, after the capture of Brunei Town already described, Admiral Cochrane and his squadron sailed to China, destroying on their way Tampassuk and Pandassan, two of the principal Lanun settlements on the North-West Coast, as well as several other Lanun villages and a number of pirate prasins. (22) The Admiral left Captain Mundy, H. M. S. "Iris" to complete the work of crushing the Lanuns. Haji Saman, one of the leaders of the piratical faction in Brunei Town, had fortified himself in the Mambakut River; and after several days fighting


(22) Ibid., II, 189-200, 210-11.

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Mundy entirely destroyed his forts and villages.\(^{(23)}\) So successfully did Mundy do his work that every Lannun settlement on the North-West Coast was abandoned. The pirates never returned but took refuge at Tunku, on the North-East Coast of Borneo, where for many years they remained unmolested.\(^{(24)}\)

Borneo piracy had almost run its course. Only one step remained to be taken: a final blow had to be struck against the Sea-Dayaks. It was not until 1849 however that Brooke, despite all his efforts, could secure the aid of a British warship. The China Squadron, as Admiral Cochrane pointed out to the Admiralty, was far too small to carry out properly all the duties required of it, and could not spare a ship for service in Borneo.\(^{(25)}\) The result was that by 1847 the piratical faction among the Sérías and Sékarran Dayaks had overcome the anti-piracy party which Brooke had succeeded in building up after Keppel’s attacks in 1843 and 1844. From 1847 to June 1849 there was a great recurrence of piracy. St. John described the destruction wrought as “appalling,” and the Sultan of Brunei asked Brooke to attack the Sea Dayaks because of their ravages.\(^{(26)}\) Accordingly he with his Malays and the boats of the H. C. Steamer “Nemesis” raided the Sea Dayaks’ country early in 1849, and for a time checked their piracy.\(^{(27)}\) A grossly false account of this expedition, published in a Singapore newspaper, was copied by the London “Daily News,” and marked the beginning of the Radical attack on Brooke. So small a force was quite unable to break the power of the Orang Laut; and on August 25, 1849, Brooke finally persuaded Admiral Collier to send Commander Farquhar, H. M. S. “Albatross,” to Sarawak. H. M. S. “Royalist,” and the East India Company’s Steamers “Nemesis” and “Semiramis” also took part in the expedition.\(^{(28)}\)

The squadron sailed to the Sea-Dayak country and cast anchor at Batang Maru. It was known that a very large fleet, manned by about 4000 Orang Laut and Malays and having on board most of the principal chiefs, was at sea on a piratical cruise, and would soon return. To reach their homes the Sea Dayaks must enter the rivers at Batang Maru, and the British decided to lie in ambush for them. The steamship “Nemesis” was to prevent the pirates escaping by sea, while the boats of the warships and Brooke’s natives blocked the mouths of the rivers. The Rajah’s followers were 2000 in number—mainly respectable traders, fishermen etc., who had

\(^{(23)}\) Ibid., I, 213-30.
\(^{(27)}\) Ibid., 170-71.
\(^{(28)}\) Keppel, “Meander,” I, 143-44.
\(^{(29)}\) P. P., H. of C, No. 53 of 1851, pp. 1-2. (LVI, Pr. 1.)
suffered severely at the hands of the Orang Laut—manning 74 war-canoes. It was a very neat trap, and the enemy walked—or rather paddled—straight into it.

The pirate fleet arrived at night, and never suspected the presence of the British until it was fired on. After a few minutes' hesitation it rowed at the boats guarding the rivers, but failed to force a passage through them. The "Nemesis" had now come up and opened fire; and the light Dayak canoes were riddled without being able to make any effective reply. There were only four small cannon in the pirate fleet, although each prau had a few muskets. The Orang Laut soon saw that their position was desperate, and most of them drove their canoes ashore and escaped into the jungle. One division, however, tried to get away by sea. The "Nemesis" caught up to it and, passing slowly down the line, poured a broadside of grape and canister into each prau in turn. In a few minutes the squadron was a hopeless wreck. Then, turning, the warship drove right over the mass of sinking boats and struggling men. The scene as the Dayaks were caught up and pounded to a pulp in the steamer's paddle-wheels was terrible.

Daybreak saw the bay and the shores covered with battered praus, shields, spears, and the bodies of the fallen. In the jungle were found the bodies, horribly mutilated, of several women captured during the late raid and murdered by the pirates in the anger of their defeat. The British saw that 3000 of the pirates were trapped on a peninsula, and that by occupying its narrow neck they could all be destroyed. Although pressed to do this Brooke refused, and allowed them to escape: he hoped that the lesson was already severe enough to cure their love of piracy, and he wished to avoid shedding blood unnecessarily. Out of the entire fleet of over one hundred "bangkongs" or war-boats only six had escaped, while of the 4000 pirates between 300 and 500 had been killed. Including those who subsequently died of hunger in the jungle while making their way home, their total loss was only 800. However, to drive home the lesson the expedition ascended the rivers, destroyed the Sérivas and Sékarran villages, and ravaged the country far and wide. Lord Palmerston fully approved of the whole affair. (40)

Batang Maru "killed Sea-Dayak piracy." The Sérivas and Sékarran at once made submission to Brooke, and promised to abandon piracy. The chiefs who were friendly to him and opposed to piracy returned to power. Never again did an Orang Laut fleet sail forth to ravage the seas; and in a few years the Sea-Dayaks had become peaceful traders, and were numbered amongst Brooke's most faithful subjects. For a time indeed a minority wished to revive piracy, and made several attacks on the peace party. Brooke

however built forts on the rivers, to support his friends, and prevent the malcontents from sailing down-stream to the ocean. Technically this action was illegal, since the Sea-Dayak country was outside Sarawak; but the Sultan of Brunei gladly ceded it to Brooke for half its surplus revenue on his return from England in 1853. Between 1850 and 1860 there was desultory fighting between Brooke's government and the piratical faction. By about 1860 even this was at an end, and the Orang Laut abandoned piracy forever. (41)

The battle of Batang Maru practically closed the history of piracy in Borneo. Roving squadrons of Lanuns and Balnmin visited the West Coast from time to time until 1870; but they were so severely dealt with by the Sarawak gunboats that it was only very rarely that they dared to appear. On the East Coast of Borneo, far outside Rajah Brooke's dominions, piracy was occasionally carried on, as late as about 1880. Finally Tunku (the settlement formed by the Lanuns of Tampassuk and Pândassan when they were driven from the North-West Coast by Admiral Cochrane in 1846) was destroyed by H. M. S. "Kestrel" in 1879 because it had been guilty of several piratical raids. (42) The man who far more than any other deserved the credit for the destruction of piracy in Borneo was Sir James Brooke. He it was who first brought it prominently before the British people; and it was due to his untiring persistence that warships were finally sent to destroy it. Captain Mundy, who knew Brunei well, considered that more important even than Brooke's destruction of piracy was his complete success in putting an end by 1847 to the practice of enslaving all shipwrecked sailors. (43)

The Straits Settlements benefited from the destruction of Borneo piracy in two ways. The native trade of Singapore was freed from marauders who had levied a heavy toll upon it. (44) and a new and valuable field of commerce was opened to the merchants of Singapore in Sarawak and Brunei. Practically the whole of Sarawak's import and export trade was with Singapore; and it grew in value from almost nothing in 1842 to $574,097 in 1860. (45)

The immediate result of Batang Maru was a violent attack on Brooke by the English Radical party. For five or six years they strove by every means in their power to ruin him; and although in the end he was completely exonerated, the anxiety caused by this

(43) Mundy, "Brooke," II, 368-70.
(44) Command Paper [1876], 1854-55, passim (XXIX).
disgraceful persecution helped to break down his health and shortened his life. The real instigator of the whole shameful episode was Henry Wise, Brooke's discredited agent. Able, plausible and unsgrumulous, he had become Brooke's agent in 1842 that he might use his reputation for integrity and self-sacrifice to enrich himself. His ultimate intention was to form a company, buy out Brooke's interest in Sarawak, and then retain him as a cloak against all suspicion while he exploited the natives for his own gain. Some years elapsed before the Rajah, trustful and no man of business, began to see through his agent's designs. Perfectly willing that Wise should make a fair profit in return for his services, he had allowed him to form a company with the monopoly of the Sarawak antimony and the Brunei coal fields. Gradually however he began to grow suspicious. The evidence accumulated that to obtain capital Wise was publishing in London wildly exaggerated accounts of the ease with which fortunes could be made in Sarawak. To Brooke's expostulations he always replied with the advice "to shut my eyes, say nothing, and see what God will send me." He promised to make Brooke "the wealthiest commoner in England." The Rajah had no desire for money gained by wilful misrepresentation; and he was determined that the company should not be a repetition of the South Sea Bubble. He also found that under Wise's management he had apparently suffered a personal loss of £8,000 or £10,000; yet his agent refused to give a clear explanation of how he managed his employer's affairs. In August 1848 Brooke ordered Wise to give a full explanation to Cameron, his lawyer. He refused to do so, and his connection with the Rajah therefore ceased. From this time Wise became Brooke's open enemy, and in the battle of Batang Marn he saw his opportunity.⁴⁶

Convincing proof of Wise's dishonesty was given in 1853. Angered by his persistent attacks, Brooke prosecuted for fraud the Eastern Archipelago Company, which Wise had founded in 1847, and of which he was the managing director. The Courts found them guilty of "gross fraud," "a gross abuse and misnomer of the privileges conferred by the charter."⁴⁷ The charter was cancelled, and the company ceased to exist. The offence of which they were proved guilty was that when they possessed a capital of only £5,000 and a mine purchased on credit which they themselves valued at £16,000, they certified to the Board of Trade that they had £50,000 of paid up capital. Commenting on "this flagrant act of delinquency" in its editorials, the "Times" wrote:—"Obtaining the benefit of the charter by such falsehoods is nothing

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less than swindling, and the issuing so grossly false a certificate little less than perjury." (48)

One of the most convincing proofs of the falsity of Wise's charges is the fact that while he had become Brooke's secret enemy as early as 1846, in consequence of his discovery that the Rajah had begun to distrust him, as long as he hoped to make a fortune by his assistance he concealed his anger, and continued to land him in public, the while he slandered him to his friends. Moreover, although Wise had paid a long visit to Sarawak and Brunei in 1844, the year of Keppel's second expedition against the Sea Dayaks, it was only in 1849, when his hopes of exploiting Brunei had been shattered, that he suddenly discovered that the Orang Laut were not pirates. (49)

The attack on Brooke in 1849 began in Singapore. In that city there was a needy journalist, Robert Wood, the editor of a struggling newspaper, the "Straits Times." Although it was never proved that he was Wise's agent, it seems clear either that this was the case, or that his motive was to increase his circulation. A cryptic remark which he made in 1861 may be taken either way:—"Well, it has not done him any harm after all, and it has educated my boys." (50) This much at least is certain, that from 1849 to 1854 he led the anti-Brooke faction in Singapore, and published virulent attacks on the Rajah in his paper. In 1849 he printed a flagrantly false account of the first expedition against the Orang Laut in that year, accusing the force of having committed many atrocities. (51)

The account was copied by the London "Daily News," on June 25, 1849. It declared that the Sea-Dayaks were not pirates but merely head-hunters, and that the expedition had been made in revenge for a head-hunting raid. There were gory details of the head-hunting activities of Brooke's native auxiliaries, who were accused of committing "atrocities at which human nature shudders." Crookshanks, one of the Rajah's officers, was declared to have wantonly killed an unarmed and helpless old man. (52) On the following day the "News" returned to the attack with an editorial insinuating that Brooke had falsely accused the Orang Laut of piracy, and that he had collected his native force by promising them all the heads they could collect. By this means he secured "fifty prans crammed with valiant head-smokers, rallied under... the missionary of the head-smoking faith." (53)

(50) Buckley, "Singapore;" II, 438, 601, 604.

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Joseph Hume apparently knew nothing of the Sea Dayaks until he read these accounts. Scenting iniquity in the far off marches of the Empire, he cast about for some one who could enlighten him as to the criminality of Rajah Brooke, and found him in—Henry Wise. "By garbled extracts, by untrue reports, by means which I know not, he managed to obtain the confidence of obstinate old Joseph Hume, who dearly loved a grievance. . . . Hume may be called a libeller by profession, who began his career by making his fortune in the East India Company's service in a few years—a remarkable achievement; and who afterwards when in Parliament brought himself into notoriety by attacking "three prominent officials."(54)

Soon afterwards the news of Batang Maru arrived in England, and the attack on the Rajah began in earnest both in the press and in Parliament, where Hume repeatedly demanded an inquiry. The "Spectator," and the "Daily News" bitterly denounced Brooke, while the "Times" defended him. The Peace Society and the Aborigines Protection Society joined in the hue and cry. Cobden, Sidney Herbert and Gladstone supported Hume. The Rajah's enemies denied that the Sea-Dayaks were pirates: they were merely gentle savages exercising their legal right of waging war on the cruel head-hunters of Sarawak. Their only offence was that they opposed Brooke's ambition to annex their country: for this reason he had slaughtered them and invented the charge of piracy to conceal his crime. The Rajah and his allies in the navy were denounced as murderers, butchers of inoffensive head-hunters engaged in the legitimate exercise of "inter-tribal warfare." Brooke was defended by Palmerston, Grey, Ellesmere, Drummond, Captains Keppel and Mundy, and a dozen others, but without the slightest effect. Hume and his party refused to be convinced, and the controversy raged with unabated violence for five years.(55)

The passion aroused was reflected in Singapore. The newspapers teemed with letters and articles, the "Free Press," defending, and the "Straits Times" attacking, the Rajah. Everyone was Brooke or anti-Brooke: questions of trade in the Chamber of Commerce were decided by Brooke or anti-Brooke majorities.(56)

The Rajah visited the city in 1851, and remarked that: "It is the abiding-place at present of hatred, malice and all uncharitableness."(57)


(56) Ibid., 77.

(57) Keppel, "Macander;" II, 131.

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The public was inundated with pamphlets full of virulent and hysterical abuse of Brooke. To examine their charges in detail would serve no good end; for they were conclusively disproved by the Royal Commission of 1854, which established the piratical character of the Sea Dayaks. (38) The pamphlets are of interest however as an example of the absurdities which well-intentioned but ignorant humanitarians can produce when they refuse to pay any attention to the case for the defence, and insist on acting in accordance with their own preconceived opinions. Without exception they substituted insinuation and falsification for proofs, and mistook hysterical invective for argument. A very favourite expedient was to publish excerpts from Brooke's Journals without any reference to their context. On anyone who knew nothing whatever of Brunei the effect was very convincing. Omit to mention that the government of Brunei was unspeakably tyrannical, that Pangerans Usop and Makota were the chief offenders, and the Sultan little better; suppress all reference to the great benefits which the Rajah's rule had brought; and finally make no allowance for the undeniable fact that stern measures are sometimes unavoidable in dealing with savages—then the actions of Brooke can be made to look very black indeed. He had seized Sarawak by violence, and driven out the chivalrous and high-minded Governor Makota because he objected; and he had then tried to place his tool Muda Hashim on the throne of Brunei. When the Sultan murdered him, as he had a perfect right to do, Brooke persuaded the navy to bombard his capital, a flagrantly illegal action. Brooke's whole career in Brunei was an attempt to make himself the ruler of the country, so that he might exploit its resources. He invented the charge of piracy against the inoffensive Sea Dayaks because they and their leaders, the "magnanimous Sherifs," were high-souled lovers of freedom who scorned to come under his yoke. Even Hume could not deny that their fleets sometimes raided their neighbours; but this was explained away as mere "legitimate inter-tribal warfare." All the evidence proving Orang Laut piracy was dismissed as false. The Admiralty Court of Singapore for example had adjudged them guilty of piracy in 1849; (39) but its decision was rejected as a judicial mockery.

Another characteristic of the pamphlets was their inability to realise that nineteenth century England was ages apart from Brunei, whose stage of development was in many respects that of twelfth century Europe. They never understood that until the pirates had received drastic punishment, peaceful measures were only interpreted as a sign of weakness. When sunk praus and burning villages had taught them that piracy did not pay, then, and only then, could gentler measures be efficaciously employed. The success of these very tactics with the Orang Laut after 1849


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is a case in point; and the same lesson is taught by the whole history of piracy in the Archipelago. The pamphleteers without exception also failed to realise that in dealing with piratical savages it was not always possible to adhere to the strict letter of the law. A favourite complaint was that the Orang Laut had never attacked a British merchantman, so that even if they were pirates the British navy had no right to molest them, since this contingency had not been provided for in the Admiralty's official instructions governing the suppression of piracy. Presumably the murder of helpless native traders did not matter, so long as the letter of the law remained unbroken. Or again, at Batang Maru, the pirates were not formally summoned to surrender before the battle began. How four thousand ferocious pirates who made a violent attack on the fleet almost as soon as they discovered its presence were to be summoned to surrender at dead of night, these arm-chair critics did not explain.

Before closing, one cannot refrain from quoting a few typical specimens of the gems of argument, or invective—in most cases the terms seem to have been regarded as synonymous in these pamphlets. A certain gentleman who concealed himself under the safe anonymity of W. N. abounded in such phrases as the "recent bloody butchery"—"pharisaical Rajah," "Mission of blood," "naval executioners," "horrible and disgusting destruction of human life." Of Batang Maru he wrote: "The lowest computation given (of the slain—300) makes one shudder." How the death of 500 pirates out of 4000 engaged in the battle can be described as a "pitiless and ruthless slaughter," is rather hard to see. However, readers were assured that the action was an "inhuman battle," "pitiless to an extreme," and "repugnant to all Christian principle." Perhaps the palm for intemperance of language may be awarded to a pamphlet published in 1850 by the Aborigines' Protection Society. From beginning to end it was written in a tone of the most violent hostility to Brooke, and assumed the attitude not of a judicial critic, but of a bitter partisan. The opening paragraph ran as follows. "We use the word massacre with a full knowledge of its import. It means murder. . . . and we use it, because it is the only word we can use. . . . Another blood-bedabbled page has been added to our crime-stained colonial history. Once more have Christianity and Civilization been foully calumniated. . . . The red slander, reeking from its unholy fount, has ascended high up into the blue heavens. . . . War and his hideous and obscene allies are stalking abroad."(60)


1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
Brooke's enemies brought strong pressure to bear on the government for the appointment of a Royal Commission to investigate his actions. Hume, strongly supported by other members of the Radical party, and by the Peace Society and the Aborigines' Protection Society, organised deputations and wrote interminable letters to the Cabinet demanding an investigation. Cobden bitterly attacked the Rajah in a speech at Birmingham in 1850. Supported by Bright and Cobden, Hume attacked Brooke in Parliament in 1850 and 1851, and pressed for the appointment of a Royal Commission. His charges were entirely disproved by Brooke's supporters; and in closing the debate in 1851, Lord Palmerston declared that he had seldom seen accusations so effectively answered, and that he "must denounce these charges as malignant and persevering persecutions of an honourable man." The two motions for an inquiry were lost by majorities of 140 and 211.

In 1851 a sad accident befell Burns, one of Hume's favourite authorities anent the virtue of the inoffensive Sea-Dayaks. Burns had gone out to Brunei in 1845 to make a fortune. The Sultan and his nobles were soon complaining bitterly to Brooke about his gross discourtesy, and his cheating and oppressing the natives. Furthermore, "he wishes to take people's wives; whether they like it or not, he takes people's wives." The Rajah was much angered and succeeded in putting a stop to Burns' method of amassing wealth by exploiting the natives. In revenge Burns joined Wijp in his attack, and zealously devoted himself to proving that Brunei pirates were not pirates, but harmless and kindly children of Nature. Unfortunately the gentle children of Nature aforesaid were singularly unappreciative of his good offices. A band of them boarded his schooner disguised as merchants, stabbed Burns to death with some of his crew, and captured the ship and Burns' native mistress.

Joseph Hume was a man upon whom argument was wasted, and despite the refutation of his charges, he persisted in his demand for a Commission of Inquiry. Captain Keppel has left a description which fits him to perfection. "There will always be some peculiarly constituted minds, fortified by a sort of moral gutta percha, through which neither preconceived opinion can evaporate, nor a deluge, even, of new evidence effect an entrance."


At last, in 1854, Hume succeeded. The Aberdeen Coalition Ministry had come into power in 1853, but its tenure of office was insecure. Its Radical supporters had to be placated, and so Brooke was thrown to them as a peace-sop. In 1854 a Royal Commission of Inquiry was appointed to investigate the charges against him. (65)

The inquiry was held at Singapore in September and October 1854 by two officials of the East India Company, Prinsep and Devereux. The result was a complete triumph for Sir James Brooke. Witness after witness, both European and native, testified to countless acts of piracy committed by the Seribas and Sekarran Dayaks. Wood, the leader of the anti-Brooke faction in Singapore, was allowed by Prinsep to act as a sort of prosecuting attorney; but although he was a skilful lawyer his cross-examination failed to shake their evidence. Last of all came the crowning proof. Boudriot, for five years a Dutch official of importance in Borneo, happened to be passing through Singapore, and heard of the inquiry. The Government of Holland was bitterly hostile to Brooke; but in the name of justice and fair play Boudriot voluntarily came forward as his defender. Quoting from his own personal knowledge and from the information in the Dutch official records he proved that the Orang Laut were pirates, the "scourge and terror of the coast." The Commissioners unanimously agreed that the charge of piracy was fully proven, and that the theory of "legitimate inter-tribal warfare" was ridiculous. As to the loss of life at Batang Maru, and the subsequent ravaging of the country, Devereux considered that "there does not appear any reasonable ground for sympathy with a race of indiscriminate murderers." The inquiry also completely disproved another favourite charge of the Radicals, that the Rajah had used his position as a British official to further his interests as a private trader. There was not a shred of evidence that he had engaged in trade after his appointment as Governor of Labuan in 1847. (66)

"Now is the winter of our discontent
Made glorious summer by that blockhead Hume,
And all the clouds which lowered about our house
In the dull bosom of the Blue Books buried." (67)

Brooke's enemies in England received the news of his vindication in the spirit which was to be expected of them. Hume unfortunately had not lived to see his failure; but the "Aborigines'
Friend,” proved that his mantle had fallen upon its shoulders. It tried by insinuations to show that the Rajah was guilty of the charges which the Royal Commission had just disproved, and concluded with a few remarks on “Borneo massacres,” “revolting butchering,” and the statement that nothing could ever “obliterate the indelible stain... of a deed which... disgraces the proud civilization of the Anglo-Saxon race.”(69) Comment is needless. The whole miserable episode was typical of that extraordinary type of mind, peculiar it would seem to the Anglo-Saxon race, which is pre-disposed to believe that an Englishman abroad is naturally prone to acts of violence and injustice.

Unfortunately the attack on Brooke produced consequences which could not be alloyed by the findings of a Royal Commission. The Admiralty in 1853 ordered that henceforth its instructions of 1844 must be stringently obeyed. These were that no warship should seize a vessel for piracy unless it had “within view attacked some British vessel,” or unless there were “such proof... as would satisfy a Court of Admiralty.”(70) The hands of British officers were tied, and for some years there was a recurrence of piracy.(71) In Sarawak itself the Radical attack produced a belief that Brooke was in disgrace with his government, and that no action of his enemies would bring upon them retribution from the British navy. This was one of the principal causes which led to the revolt of the Chinese Secret Society in 1857; and to the attempted rising of a few discontented Malay chiefs in 1859. The Chinese rebels burned Kuching, the capital of Sarawak, and murdered many natives and Europeans before they were conquered. Amongst Rajah Brooke’s most faithful supporters were the Seribas and Sekarran Sea Dayaks, whom only eight years before he had punished so severely at Batang Maru.(72)

(70) Command Paper [1771], 1854, pp. 33-34. (Vol. LXXII).
CHAPTER XIV.

The Transfer.

The year 1867 marked the end of an epoch in the history of the Straits Settlements. The transfer of the Colony from the India to the Colonial Office was more than a mere departmental change; it was the inauguration of a policy which in many respects differed materially from that pursued under the old regime. After 1867 much greater attention was paid to the needs of the Straits Settlements than had been the case when they were only a distant Residency of the Indian Empire. An immediate result of the transfer was the creation of a distinct Malayan Civil Service. A few years later the Colonial Office adopted the policy of intervention in the Malay States which has led to the creation of British Malaya as it exists to-day.

The transfer was brought about after several years of agitation in the Straits Settlements, which had become very dissatisfied with the results of Indian Government. In this movement Singapore played by far the most important part. In all the records connected with the question there are scarcely any references to Penang or Malacca. The number of grievances was legion, but they may be briefly summarized as follows:

(1) The Straits Settlements were so far away from India and their problems were so totally dissimilar, that the Government at Calcutta failed to understand and rapidly deal with local needs. Moreover since the loss of the monopoly of the Chinese trade in 1833 the Indian Government took very little interest in the Straits, and refused to consider the reasonable wishes of the population. The "Times" expressed the Straits Settlements' point of view to a nicety when it wrote in 1858:—"What was Singapore to do with India? It carries on a larger trade with China than with India. The true idea of the settlement, colony, or by whatever name it may be called, is as the centre and citadel of British power in the Eastern Seas, the great house of call between Great Britain and China. It is from this point chiefly that the ceaseless intrigues of the Dutch to exclude us altogether from the Indian Archipelago can be defeated."(1) No one who has read the books, the newspapers and the official records of the Straits Settlements between 1820 and 1867 can avoid the conviction that merchants and officials alike felt that the three Settlements had an importance out of all proportion to their area and population. They were not merely a third-rate Residency in an isolated quarter


1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
of the Indian Empire, but the keystone of British commercial supremacy in Further Asia. The mistakes of the Indian Government did not merely injure the Straits; they were also a blow to the prosperity of Great Britain.

(2) The Indian Government had altogether neglected Raffles' advice to extend the sphere of British influence in Malaya. On every hand the Dutch, the French and the Spaniards were carrying out an aggressive policy, and seizing all available territory, and shutting out British trade from it. Meanwhile the Supreme Government clung tenaciously to its policy of strict non-intervention, so that Great Britain's interests suffered and her influence declined.

(3) It was also a very sore point with the Straits merchants that the Settlements were made a dumping-ground for Indian convicts of the worst type. This complaint was not altogether just, for the colony owed some at least of its prosperity to the roads and buildings constructed by them free of charge.(2) As in Australia however what was once hailed as a blessing was in the end regarded as a burning grievance. The Settlements also complained that they were overburdened with troops, with a quite disproportionate number of field officers, and that they were made to pay for both troops and convicts.

(4) The Europeans objected strongly to the government's being entirely in the hands of the officials and demanded the establishment of a Legislative Council some of whose members should be elected by the people.(3)

Although the agitation which brought about the transfer only began in 1855, the genesis of the movement must be sought at a far earlier date. For many years there had been smouldering discontent which imperceptibly gained strength until it burst forth in the demand for severance from the control of India. The Company's pro-Siamese policy towards the exiled Sultan of Kedah had been bitterly opposed by the non-official British population in the Straits; and the half-hearted measures taken to combat piracy were for years a standing grievance.(4) By 1854 however these causes of resentment survived only as the memory of former grievances. Moreover they were minor matters, and never aroused so much ill-feeling as other policies of the Company which were equally at variance with the wishes of the population, and affected its interests far more intimately.

Of these one of the most important was the Company's policy towards the native states of Malay Peninsula. This grievance had steadily increased in magnitude as a result of the growth of Dutch

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(2) McNair "Prisoners Their Own Warders."
(3) P. E., H. of C. No. 259 of 1862, pp. 3-6 (Vol. XL). Singapore Petition of Sept. 15, 1857; the most comprehensive account of the Straits' grievances.
(4) V. chapters on Siam and Piracy.
and French power in Further Asia. Holland was gradually adopting a more liberal commercial policy based on free-trade principles, in Macassar for example. Combined with the extension of her empire this was interfering to an increasing degree with British trade in areas where the merchants of the Straits had been supreme for more than a generation. The French too were laying the foundations of their empire in Cochin-China, and were excluding British commerce from a former market. It was therefore natural that the merchants of the Straits Settlements sought to redress the balance by developing their trade with the Malay Peninsula. Although this trade was small, it was sufficiently valuable to show that properly developed it would become of great importance.(5) Moreover the Peninsula lay within the British sphere of influence, so that there was no possibility of British merchants being driven out by any European power. As early as 1844 the newspapers of Singapore advocated the annexation of the Malay States; and in subsequent years the same course was proposed on several occasions.(6) The policy of the Indian Government however was unalterably opposed to annexation, or even to interference in the affairs of the native states.(7) Since the Peninsula was by this time rapidly sinking into the state of hopeless anarchy from which it only recovered after the British intervention of 1874,(8) it was obvious that commerce could not flourish unless traders were protected from the exactions of any petty raja who chose to despoil them. The Straits merchants bitterly resented India's policy, and in 1857 it formed one of the principal reasons advanced for the transfer.(9)

An equally important grievance and, as it happened, the immediate cause of the agitation for the transfer, was the attempt of the Indian Government to impose taxes on the ports, and in various ways to interfere with the freedom of trade. No one who has studied the records of the period 1820-1867 can fail to be impressed by the universality of the conviction that free trade, and free trade alone, was the palladium of prosperity in the Straits. Merchants, professional men, and officials with scarcely an exception, all held that the slightest interference with this principle would have the greatest effects upon commerce. The lesson of Sir Stamford Raffles had been well learnt. It was never forgotten that the miraculous growth of Singapore was above all due to the freedom of its trade from all taxes and restrictions. The Straits Settlements never failed to resent most bitterly the slightest hint of imposing taxes on commerce, and the agitation of 1857 was the result of the various attempts of India to do so during 1855 and 1856.

(5) Buckley "Singapore," II, 573, 584.
(6) Ibid., 421-22, 503, 575, 584-85.
(7) x. chapter on Native Policy.
(8) Ibid., and Buckley, "Singapore," II, 584.
(9) P. P., H. of C. No. 239 of 1862, pp. 3-6, (Vol. XL).

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
This was not the first time that the Company had made the attempt. As early as 1826 the Directors wished to levy small duties on the trade of Singapore, contending that it was unjust that the Company should have to bear the whole cost of administration, when it did not have the monopoly of the trade. The proposal excited much opposition in England however, and it was vetoed by the Board of Control. (10) From 1833 to 1836 another attempt was made to impose taxes to defray the cost of protecting Singapore's trade against piracy. The merchants petitioned Parliament against the measure, and positive orders were sent from England forbidding it. (11) In 1832 the Indian Government imposed tonnage duties on European and native craft to cover the cost of maintaining a light-house near Singapore. This evoked strong protests, and soon afterwards the act was amended so that the dues were restricted to European ships. (12)

Three years later the Supreme Government passed two laws which brought the smouldering resentment in the Straits to a head. These were the Currency Act of 1855, and the imposition of port dues in 1856. Of these two measures the latter was the less important, and is dealt with first. Towards the end of 1855 the Indian Government proposed to levy port dues on the Straits Settlements, to defray the cost of light-houses, buoys, jetties, etc. Its intention became known at Singapore in 1856 and vigorous protests were made to England. The matter was at once taken up by the Old Singaporeans in London, headed by John Crawford, the Resident of Singapore from 1823 to 1826. In Singapore's frequent conflicts with the Company, the Old Singaporeans filled the role of Napoleon's Old Guard. They retained a warm affection for the city where they had spent the best years of their lives, and whenever it was urging some cause in England it was always the Old Singaporeans who headed the fray, or when all seemed lost, made a final and often successful attack on the enemy—the East India Company. In this case their intervention, supporting the petition to Parliament from Singapore, was successful. They interviewed the Board of Control, and the Directors sent out instructions to the Government of India forbidding this interference with free trade of the Straits. (13)

The dispute evoked a comment from one of the Singapore papers which is significant as it shows the light in which these constant disputes had caused the Indian Government to be regarded at Singapore. "Statesmen of all parties in England have ever

(10) P. P., H. of C., No. 254 of 1857-58, pp. 5-7. (Vol. XLI.)


recognised the importance of maintaining in all its integrity the system on which Singapore is conducted (absolute free trade) .... Our immediate rulers in India however have never been able to regard the Settlement of Singapore through any other medium than a revenue one; and whenever therefore there has been an excess of expenditure over receipts, whether arising from ordinary sources of disbursement or from measures required for the protection of trade, they have frowned upon the unfortunate place, and the one sole remedy propounded... is the imposition of duties on the trade."

In such an atmosphere of suspicion and hostility the Currency Act of 1855 was like a spark in a powder magazine. At first sight the terms of this enactment, Act XVII of 1855, appear innocent enough; but great was the commotion which they caused. They did not interfere with the use of the silver dollar and the copper cent, the universal currency of the Straits; but they declared that the Indian pice was henceforth to be legal tender in the Settlements, not merely for fractions of the rupee, but also for the subdivisions of the dollar. Hereafter also only pices, and not cents, were to be minted by the Company.\(^{15}\) It was unnecessary to declare the rupee legal tender in the Straits, since this had been done by Act XVII of 1835, which had never been repealed.\(^{18}\) The merchants of Singapore protested strongly, declaring that the measure would be most injurious to their trade.

In order to understand their criticisms, which were entirely justified, it is necessary briefly to investigate the currency of the East Indies. Since the days of the Portuguese the coins most widely in use, most readily accepted by the natives, were the silver dollar (varying in value at different times from four shillings and sixpence to three shillings and sixpence), and the copper cent (roughly equivalent to a halfpenny). All attempts, of the Dutch to supplant it by their own coinage had failed hopelessly in face of the firm conservatism of the Malays, who declined to accept unfamiliar looking coins. India had already tried to substitute its rupee coinage on several occasions between 1820 and 1835, but with complete lack of success. Nominally the rupee was the only legal tender in the Straits Settlements, and all government accounts were kept in rupees. Apart from this the rupee was practically ignored by the whole population of the Straits; and the dollar remained the most universal form of currency in the Archipelago.\(^{14}\) In 1864 Sir Hercules Robinson condemned the

\(^{14}\) Buckley, "Singapore," II, 639.


\(^{16}\) Ibid.


1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
attempts to introduce the rupee which he said had completely failed, and advised that the dollar should be made the sole legal currency of the Straits Settlements. (18)

The Directors for their part had a natural desire to enforce a uniform system of coinage throughout the whole of their empire. When the rupee was willingly accepted in every part of India, they failed to see why an exception should be made in favour of a small and little-known Residency whose expenses so far exceeded its revenue that it was a constant and heavy drain on their finances. What the Directors quite failed to realize was that conditions were so totally dissimilar that the imposition of the rupee upon the Straits Settlements would have had disastrous effects upon their trade.

In 1847 the Supreme Government had for the moment accepted the inevitable by passing Act VI of 1847, which declared copper cents to be the only legal copper currency of the Settlements. This compromise appears to have worked well. Legally the rupee was the only silver coin current, but by force of custom the silver dollar alone was in circulation. Both by custom and by the Act of 1847 the cent and its fractions were the only legal copper coins. The only thing which the Straits Settlements still desired was that the Company should recognize the position of the dollar by declaring it legal tender, and establish a mint for its coinage. (19)

Their satisfaction was rudely shattered by the Currency Act of 1855. Ostensibly its provisions did not interfere with the existing dollar currency; they merely made the anna and pice legal tender for fractions of the dollar as well as of the rupee. (20)

In a letter to Governor Blundell in 1856 the Supreme Government wrote that the intention of the Act was not to provoke a conflict between the two monetary systems and drive the dollar out of circulation, but merely to provide a legal copper currency for the Straits. (21) Lord Granville, defending the Act in the House of Lords, said that the Cabinet although doubtful of its advisability had sanctioned it as an experiment, which would be repealed if it proved a failure. (22)

The people of the Straits Settlements however were quite unconvinced by these professions: they saw in the act the thin edge of the wedge, the opening moves in an insidious attempt to replace the dollar by the rupee. When the Government’s intentions first became known, and before the bill was passed, a public meeting of protest was held in Singapore on October 13, 1854.

Petitions were drawn up and forwarded to the Legislative Council of India and to Parliament, pointing out that two systems of coinage so dissimilar could not exist side by side, and that the attempt to force a rupee coinage upon the Straits would injure trade very seriously.\(^{(22)}\) A few months later, at the spring assizes of 1855, the Singapore Grand Jury presented a public nuisance "the partial interference that has already been effected by the Government with the established currency of this Settlement and with the greater and more serious changes contemplated ... in the Draft Act which has lately appeared" (i.e. the bill which was afterwards passed as Act XVII of 1855). It charged the Government with trying to force the Indian currency into circulation, and predicted that it would prove a serious blow to trade, and "singularly oppressive to the poorer classes."\(^{(24)}\) On June 1, 1855, another meeting of protest was held, and a further petition against the proposal was sent to India.\(^{(25)}\) It arrived too late, since on May 29 the bill had become law.\(^{(28)}\)

When the news arrived at Singapore, there was great indignation at the neglect of its wishes. On August 11, 1855, a public meeting was held at which nearly every European in the town was present. The intention was to discuss the Currency Act; but the meeting proved to be of far greater significance than its promoters had intended. It marked the beginning of the agitation for the transfer from the control of India.\(^{(27)}\) A resolution was proposed and carried; "That by the passing of the Act 17 of 1855 this meeting is forced into the painful conviction that the Legislative Council of India, in treating with utter disregard the remonstrances of the inhabitants, have shown that they are neither to be moved by any prospect of doing good, nor restrained by the certainty of doing evil, to the Straits Settlements, and that it is therefore the bounden duty of this community to use every exertion and to resort to every means within its reach to obtain relief from the mischievous measures already enacted, and to escape from the infliction of others of the same nature, more comprehensive and still more hurtful."\(^{(28)}\) From this time onward popular sentiment grew steadily more in favour of severance from India.

Meanwhile the agitation against the Currency Act increased in strength. The Old Singaporeans in England rallied as usual for the fray, and headed by their veteran leader John Crawfurd, waited upon the Board of Control, and went far to convert its

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\(^{(22)}\) Buckley, "Singapore," II 397-98.
\(^{(25)}\) Ibid., Vol. 18: July 13, 1855, No. 13.
\(^{(26)}\) Ibid. No. 14.
\(^{(27)}\) Buckley, "Singapore," II, 623. As in the case of most of the other public meetings held in the Straits, no reference to it can be found in the India Office Archives.
\(^{(28)}\) Ibid., 623-24.

1923] Royal Asiatic Society.
President, Singapore continued to support their efforts by fresh petitions to Parliament and to British Chambers of Commerce connected with the Straits. (29) By the middle of 1856 it was clear that the Act had failed. Blundell, the Governor of the Straits, was an advocate of the rupee currency; but in his report to the Government of India he admitted that after a year's trial of the Act, "its effect hitherto has been a nullity, and will remain so as long as cents continue in sufficient abundance." (30) As a result of this discouraging report, and of the strong opposition aroused in the Straits and in England, the Company abandoned its attempts to introduce the Indian coinage. Reversing its instructions of 1853 that all payments by or to government, e.g., the payment of taxes, must be made in rupees, in 1857 it ordered the complete resumption of the use of the dollar in all government transactions. (31)

Meanwhile the sentiment in favour of severance from the control of India had increased in strength. In July 1856 at a public meeting called to protest against the Currency Act, a resolution was introduced to petition Parliament to make the Straits Settlements a Crown Colony. The proposal was carried by a majority, but was subsequently withdrawn. (32) In January 1857 a meeting which had been called to consider some serious riots amongst the Chinese which had recently occurred, developed into a discussion of the advisability of transferring the Settlements to the direct rule of the Crown. (33) A few weeks later the Indian Mutiny broke out, and although the Sepoy regiments in the Straits remained loyal, the war finally brought matters to a head. The merchants of Calcutta had petitioned that the government of India should be transferred from the Company to the Crown; and on September 15, 1857, a general meeting was held at Singapore to consider the advisability of taking a similar step. (34) Opinion was unanimously in favour, and a petition was drawn up and sent to Parliament. (35) A summary of it has already been given at the beginning of this chapter.

Lord Bury, presented the petition in the House of Commons on April 13, 1858, and in an able speech pleaded the justice of the demand, and the neglect and ignorance of the East India Company. Other members followed, some supporting the petition

(30) Ibid., 638.
(31) Ibid., 644-45.
(32) Ibid., 638.
(33) Ibid., 644-45.
(34) Ibid., 755.
(35) P. P., H. of C. No. 259 of 1862, pp. 3-6. (Vol. XL). The papers relating to the transfer are scattered through the archives of the Colonial, India and War Office; but for convenience of reference the citations in this chapter are made where possible to the two parliamentary papers in which they are contained.

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and others defending the Company from the charges brought against it. Even those who were favourable to the Company showed no great hostility to the demand for the transfer. Once more the Old Singapoteans brought all their influence to bear. Their leader, John Crawfurd, deserves a large share of the credit for the final success of the petition. On July 22, 1858, he presented a long and valuable Memorandum to Lord Stanley, the Colonial Secretary, and also circulated it amongst the members of Parliament. His arguments are in large measure a repetition of those in the petition.\(^{(35)}\)

The Colonial Office was strongly impressed by the justice of Singapore's case, and on March 1, 1859, Lord Stanley wrote to Lord Canning the Governor-General of India, asking whether it would not be advisable to transfer the Straits Settlements to the Colonial Office. He pointed out that since India had lost the monopoly of the China trade the Straits Settlements had ceased to be of much value to it; while their relations with China had become much more intimate than with India. One sentence of Lord Stanley's letter summed up the situation very accurately. "It can scarcely be urged that there are any reasons, geographical, political, or otherwise, why the Straits Settlements should continue to be governed and controlled from India."\(^{(36)}\)

Lord Canning replied on November 7, 1859, in a very able Minute which greatly influenced the Home Government. He strongly urged the transfer to the Colonial Office for the following reasons. (1) The Straits Settlements were far removed from the sphere of India's interests now that it no longer had any commercial relations with China. Moreover the Supreme Government was not competent to deal with the affairs of a colony the conditions of which differed so widely in every respect from those of India; and the Governor-General had few opportunities of gaining a correct knowledge of its needs by visiting it, or by meeting Straits officials.

(2) The Indian Government found almost insuperable difficulty in providing competent officials for the Straits Civil Service. It had no means of training them to deal with the peculiar problems of the Chinese and Malays, so that they had to learn their duties after assuming office. The prospects of promotion were also so poor that it was impossible to find Indian civil servants who were willing to remain permanently in the Settlements.\(^{(37)}\)

(3) In case of war, India would be powerless to defend the Straits against a strong hostile fleet. The East India Company's navy had been abolished, and the safety of both India and the Settlements depended on the British navy.

\(^{(37)}\) P. P., H. of C., No. 259 of 1862, pp. 6-8 (Vol. XL).
\(^{(38)}\) P. P., H. of C., No. 259 of 1862, p. 9 (Vol. XL).
\(^{(39)}\) For a fuller account v. chapter on Civil Service.

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
(4) Lord Canning then dealt with the objection which had been raised to the transfer on the ground that it would involve a heavy drain on the Imperial Treasury, to make good the yearly deficit in the Straits’ budget. He pointed out that the growth of trade had brought with it a steady and phenomenally rapid increase of revenue, while the expenditure had grown in a much smaller degree. He gave it as his opinion that this process would continue, so that in a short time the revenue would equal the expenses. On February 7, 1860, Sir Charles Wood, the Secretary of State for India, forwarded Canning’s Minute to the Colonial Office with a covering letter to the effect that he entirely concurred in it.

The transfer had now been agreed upon in principle by the two departments most immediately concerned, and it only remained to arrange the details. What at first sight appeared a simple matter turned out to be exceedingly difficult. The War Office and the Treasury were drawn into the negotiations, and for the next seven years the four departments were busily engaged in inundating one another with endless demands and counter-demands until at times the whole problem appeared hopeless of solution. The Transfer proved to be as many-headed as Hercules’ Hydra, and with an equal facility for growing new heads to replace any which were lopped off after many weary strokes of the pen. To detail at length the course of these complicated negotiations would be as involved as it would be un instructive, and only a summary is therefore given.

Late in 1859 the India Office had sanctioned the construction with funds from the Indian Treasury of the Tanglin Barracks at Singapore; and in 1860 it began to demand that since the Imperial Government would reap the sole benefit from them, the cost of their erection should be refunded. The Colonial Office refused to pay for the half-finished barracks, on the ground that the India Office had begun their construction after it knew that the transfer was probable. The Treasury also opposed repayment because it would have been at its expense. Many months elapsed during which the three departments exchanged letters, or varied proceedings by compiling memoranda for one another’s use. The War Office soon added its quota to the flood of correspondence. It was by no means assured that the Singapore garrison was sufficient for the city’s defence; and until this matter was satisfactorily settled, it refused to assent to the transfer. The force which would have contented the War Office would have been so expensive as greatly to increase the annual deficit in the Straits’ budget. This would have to be made good by the Treasury, so it refused to consent to the transfer until assured that the Straits could pay for their own defences, and not be a burden on the British exchequer.

(41) Ibid., 25.

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At the same time another complication was introduced by the India Office. It demanded that the Colonial Office should make itself responsible for the public debt of the Settlements. This public debt consisted largely of loans made to the Straits Settlements from the funds of minors and suitors of the Company, which had been entrusted to it for investment. The debt had arisen in the following manner. To avoid the inconvenience of drawing drafts upon the Indian Treasury to make good the annual deficits the Directors had ordered that the deficits should be covered by loans made to the Straits in the form of bonds bearing interest at 4 per cent. The Colonial Office regarded the public debt as a debt of the Indian Government, since the amount had been lent by its orders to save itself from inconvenience, and therefore refused to make itself liable for it. The India Office declined to agree, and by 1863 the negotiations had come to a deadlock.\(^{43}\)

Meanwhile Singapore was not idle. It sent many petitions to Parliament in which it laboured to prove that the revenue of the Straits Settlements was amply sufficient to cover expenses, so that the Imperial Treasury would not have to provide annual subsidies. On January 1, 1863, the Government of India imposed Stamp Duties upon the Settlements, to hasten the transfer by making the revenue balance the expenses. The tax was very productive, and the petitions urged that its favourable result should be sufficient to allay the fears of the Imperial Treasury.\(^{44}\) The Old Singaporeans were also active. They organized deputations to wait upon members of the Cabinet, and inculcated them with reams of statistics proving that the Straits were self-supporting.\(^{45}\) John Crawfurd did especially useful service, and his memoranda appear to have had great influence with the Colonial Secretary.\(^{46}\)

In 1863 an attempt was made to end the deadlock by appointing a Commission to inquire into the advisability of transferring the Straits Settlements to the Colonial Office. The members were three in number, an engineer officer chosen by the War Office, a member of the government of Singapore nominated by the India Office, and a member of the Colonial Civil Service. The Colonial Office appointed Sir Hercules Robinson, the Governor of Hong Kong, who was about to leave for England on leave. The Commission was ordered especially to investigate the state of the fortifications and barracks at Singapore, the probable cost of their completion, and the number and character of the garrison required for the Straits.\(^{47}\) The Treasury impressed upon Sir Hercules Robinson that the primary object of the inquiry was to determine


\(^{43}\) Ibid. 3-4. Buckley, "Singapore," II, 773.

\(^{44}\) Ibid., 768 and 771.

\(^{45}\) P. P., H. of C. No. 259 of 1862, pp. 6-9, 44-53. (Vol. XL).


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whether the Straits Settlements could defray their own expenses without involving any charge upon it. He was informed that under no circumstances would the Government sanction any contribution towards its revenues.\(^{(47)}\)

Sir Hercules Robinson, the principal member of the Commission, arrived at Singapore on December 4, 1863, and remained there several weeks. In his report he strongly advocated the transfer and considered that the local revenues were amply sufficient to meet all legitimate calls upon them. The Public Debt, had been used as a means to diminish the annual deficits which otherwise the Indian Government must have paid; and he therefore considered that it was an Indian liability. "The Straits Settlements could not with fairness, I think, be now asked to refund the amount, any more than they could be expected to repay the deficits of former years." He regarded the annual deficits as the result of unfairly charging the Straits with various items of expenditure which ought to have been defrayed by India, such as the cost of maintaining the convicts sent there from the three Presidencies. If this practice were reversed, the revenues, greatly increased by the Stamp Act of 1863, would more than cover the expenses, so that there would be no charge on the Imperial Treasury.\(^{(48)}\)

The Colonial Office agreed with Sir Hercules’ conclusions; and the War Office also accepted with a few alterations the Commission’s plan for the defence of the Straits.\(^{(49)}\) The Treasury still opposed the transfer. It held that the estimate of the future surplus of revenue over expenditure given by the report, about £10,000, was so small that it demanded assurances that if necessary the revenue could be increased so that the Imperial Treasury would not have to make good any deficits.\(^{(50)}\) Accordingly, on September 19, 1864; and February 1, 1865, Crawford and other Singaporeans in London sent memoranda to the Colonial Office demonstrating with a wealth of statistics that Singapore’s revenue would so increase with expanding trade that the Treasury’s fears were groundless.\(^{(51)}\)

At length the interminable negotiations were drawing towards a close. In March 1865 the India Office, with the approval of the Treasury, finally accepted the Colonial Secretary’s proposal that the Colonial Office was never to be called upon to repay the Public Debt to India.\(^{(52)}\) Meanwhile however the War Office had decided that a larger garrison was necessary; and it was not until April 21, 1866, that it agreed to accept the amount of £50,000 a year proposed by the Colonial Office as the annual contribution of the

\(^{(47)}\) Ibid. 9.
\(^{(48)}\) Ibid., 9, 19.
\(^{(49)}\) Ibid., 26, 28-29.
\(^{(50)}\) Ibid. 27-28.
\(^{(51)}\) Ibid. 30-35.
\(^{(52)}\) Ibid. 36-38.
Straits Settlements towards the cost of their defence. The full cost of the garrison was £70,000 but it was felt that since part of the troops were maintained in the Straits for Imperial purposes it would be unfair to compel the colony to pay for them.\(^{(33)}\) The objections of the War and India Offices had now been silenced; but the Treasury was still in the field. It discovered that the £50,000 for defence did not cover such items as the cost of transport, stores, etc. and on May 12, 1866, it demanded that the Straits Settlements' contribution towards their defence should be £59,300 a year.\(^{(34)}\) The Colonial Office consented, on the condition that the amount should be revised after five years.\(^{(35)}\) To this the Treasury agreed, and on June 2, 1866, it consented to the transfer of the Straits Settlements to the Colonial Office.\(^{(36)}\) On August 10, 1866, an Act was passed to transfer the Straits Settlements from the control of the India to the Colonial Office; and on April 1, 1867, the Indian Government formally transferred the Straits Settlements to the Crown.\(^{(37)}\)

British Malaya owes a debt of gratitude to the East India Company: It is true that the prosperity to which it had attained in 1867 was in large measure due to the unaided enterprise of the inhabitants. It is true also that the policy of the Company was often timorous and short-sighted, and that from ignorance and absorption in the affairs of India it made serious mistakes. But it should not be forgotten that through its Malayan policy a great part of the Malay Peninsula was saved from falling into the hands of Siam; and that the Company established an able and just administration under which the Straits Settlements were free to build up their trade unhampered. While it is easy to contempt the Company for parsimony, it was not a little thing that for thirty-four years, from 1833 to 1867, the Indian Government supported a constant drain upon its finances to maintain a colony from which it derived no profit, and which paid hardly a penny in taxes. The history of the East India Company in the Straits Settlements is the story of a great trust, well and faithfully guarded.

\(^{(33)}\) Ibid., 36, 44-47.
\(^{(34)}\) Ibid., 48-49.
\(^{(35)}\) Ibid., 50.
\(^{(36)}\) Ibid. 51.
\(^{(37)}\) Buckley, "Singapore," II, 780.
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Abbreviations used in the Notes.

B. Pol.........................Bengal Political Consultations.
B. Pub.........................Bengal Public Consultations.
B. S. P.........................Bengal Secret and Political Consultations.
I. Pol.........................India Political Proceedings.
I. P. F.........................Indian Political and Foreign Proceedings.
I. Pub.........................India Public Proceedings.
S. S. R.........................Straits Settlements Records.
P. P.........................Parliamentary Papers.

I. PRIMARY SOURCES

A. Documentary Material.
The official records relating to the history of the Straits Settlements between 1786 and 1867 are all in the archives of the India Office. They are contained in the following sets of Records:

Sumatra Records, Volume 15.

"The Diary and Proceedings of the Select Committee of Fort St. George in consequence of the orders of the Select Committee of the Honourable the Court of Directors, dated 8 May, 1771, for forming a settlement at Acheen, etc."

This volume contains the history of the abortive attempt to establish posts at Achin and Kedah in the years 1765 to 1776. It was quoted in a partial and somewhat incorrect form by Colonial Institute. With this exception the incident was 1840, and now deposited with his other papers at the Royal Colonial Institute. With this exception the incident was entirely forgotten until it was rediscovered a few years ago by Arnold Wright. A full account of the episode is given in his book on the Malay Peninsula (v. infra).

Bengal Public Consultations
Bengal Political Consultations
Bengal Secret and Political Consultations
Despatches to Bengal
Letters Received from Bengal

Journal Malayan Branch [Vol. III., Part. H. 1800-1855]
These series also contain the records of the government of the Straits Settlements from 1805 to 1830, but in practically every case the despatches are duplicates of those in the Straits Settlements Records. After about 1855 little material is to be found in the Bengal Records.

India Public Proceedings
India Political Proceedings
India Political and Foreign Proceedings
India Secret Proceedings
Despatches to India and Bengal
Letters Received from India and Bengal

From 1830 to 1855 most of the despatches in these records are duplicates of those in the Bengal Series, although they contain an increasing number not to be found there. After 1855 they are almost the sole source of information. Occasional references to the Straits Settlements are also found in the

India Financial Consultations
India Home Consultations.

Since the Directors required very full reports from their subordinates these records contain a vast amount of information on every phase of the government's activities. Every question is dealt with, from the most important to such clerk at a few rupees a month. It not infrequently happens clerk at a few rupees a month. It not infrequently happens however that a subject begun in one series is suddenly transferred to another. Furthermore, many despatches were not entered in the records until several years after the date when they were written. The records moreover are incomplete; a number of despatches, some of them important, e.g., annual trade-returns, were either not transcribed in the records or have been destroyed. The Despatches to and from the Directors contain a few letters of importance, e.g., declarations of policy; but they are chiefly of value as a summary of events and as giving the gist of more detailed reports which have disappeared. Most of the volumes were indexed at the time of writing, but in a few cases the documents referred to in the table of contents are missing.

Burney Manuscripts.
Presented to the Royal Colonial Institute, London, in 1921. They comprise a large number of despatches, letters, etc., dating from 1806 to 1840, relating to the official career of Colonel Burney, who negotiated the Treaty with Siam in 1836. The despatches are mostly duplicates of those in the India Office, but contain two or three not to be found there.

B. Printed Material.

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Parliamentary Papers.
Very few parliamentary papers refer to the Straits Settlements. The exceptions are almost exclusively concerned with Rajah Brooke's career in Borneo, and with the transfer to the Colonial Office in 1867. The numbers and volumes of the various papers are given in the footnotes to the various chapters.

Hansard's Parliamentary Debates.
These refer principally to the attack on Sir James Brooke and the transfer of 1867. The references are given in the footnotes.

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Calcutta ... ... ... ... ... 1892.
A semi-official publication giving the text of all treaties concluded before 1867.

"Annual Reports on the Administration of the Straits Settlements, 1856-1867."
This series is not to be found in any of the London libraries, with the exception of a volume in the India Office containing the reports for 1860 to 1863.

"Tabular Statements of the Commerce and Shipping of Singapore, Prince of Wales Island, and Malacca, for the official year 1864-65.
Calcutta ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 1866.

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Singapore ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 1877.

Newspapers.
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The English newspapers have a few references to the attack on Rajah Brooke, and the transfer of 1867. The references to them are given in the footnotes.

II. JOURNALS OF LEARNED SOCIETIES.

"Journal of the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society." Singapore ... ... ... ... ... ... 1878 ff.
This is a most valuable and authoritative journal, containing a vast amount of information on every subject connected with British Malaya. Many of the articles are very exhaustive studies of local problems by leading Straits officials e.g. Sweitenham, W. E. Maxwell, and Pickering.

This Society also published:

"Miscellaneous Papers Relating to Indo-China and the Indian Archipelago."

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London.

This is a reprint of rare pamphlets and articles relating to the Straits. It contains some valuable information on the early history of Penang, and also Groeneweldt's work on the Chinese in the East Indies before 1600. The series was edited by Doctor Rost, the Librarian of the India Office.

Singapore 1847-1859.

This journal was one of the fruits of that keen interest in all matters Malayan which resulted from Raffles' researches, and did not die out until about 1860. It is a most valuable mine of information on every subject connected with the East Indies and the Malay Peninsula. The enterprise was launched with the cordial approval of Governor Butterworth and the Bengal Government, and by special permission the Straits officials were permitted to contribute to it. (J.I.A. I, i: B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 64: April 28, 1847, Nos. 26-28). Of especial value are the accounts of the Nanyang War and the Malacca Land problem by the officials at Malacca, and the history of Penang from 1786 to 1810. The articles on Penang were published anonymously, but are known to have been written by Governor Blundell (J. T. Thomson, "For East, II, 1). They contain many citations from the official records; and a comparison of the documents quoted with the originals has proved the absolute reliability of the quotations. The articles on Siamese and Malayan affairs, by Low, Newbold, etc. are also useful, but less trustworthy, and must be compared with other sources.

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W. N.
"Remarks on a Recent Naval Execution."
London ... ... ... ... ... 1850.
One of the earliest pamphlets attacking Brooke.
London ... ... ... ... ... 1839.
The standard work on British Malaya for forty years, it was frequently quoted as the last word in authority in the Straits Government’s despatches. W.E. Maxwell described it in 1878 as "still by far the most valuable authority on Malay subjects in the English language" (J.R.A.S.S.B., I, 86). The book was the result of much painstaking and careful investigation of the government archives, the works of previous European authorities, e.g. Raffles, Malay manuscripts, information derived from Straits officials and natives, and Newbold’s own explorations in Negri Sembilan. He indicated his authorities for each chapter with considerable care, and was in this respect much superior to most of the other
Malayan writers of the period, Wilkinson's investigations have rendered obsolete much of his information on the Malay form of government. Newbold was also incorrect at times in matters of detail, and his strong anti-Siamese prejudice occasionally obscured his judgment. With these exceptions a study of the records and other authorities has shown that on the whole he is a very reliable and valuable authority.

Osborn, Captain Sherard, R. N., C.B.,
"Quedah: or Stray Leaves from a Journal in Malayan Waters."
London ... ... ... 1857.
Osborn in his preface says the book is in the main a transcription of his diary for the years c. 1835-10, written in 1850 while searching for Sir John Franklin. It presents a reliable and vivid picture of Malay piracy and the Kedah Revolt of 1838, in whose suppression Osborn took part.

Phillips, W. A.
"The Confederation of Europe, a Study of the European Alliance, 1813-1823." 2nd ed.
London ... ... ... 1920.

Playfair, Colonel Sir R. L., H.M. Consul-General at Algiers.
"The Scourge of Christendom: Annals of British Relations with Algiers Prior to the French Conquest."
London ... ... ... 1884.
A detailed history of the Barbary Pirates, founded apparently on much documentary research.

Popham, Captain (late Admiral) Sir Home.
"A Description of Prince of Wales Island, in the Straights of Malacca; with its Real and Probable Advantages and Sources to Recommend it as a Marine Establishment."
London ... ... ... 1805.
Very valuable and reliable for its account of the influence of the naval motive in the foundation of Penang. Popham took part in some of the events he describes.

Pryer, Mrs. W. B.
"A Decade in Borneo."
London ... ... ... 1894.
Has a reliable description of the last days of Lanun piracy.

Raffles, Sir Thomas Stamford.
London ... ... ... 1817.
"Statement of Services."
London ... ... ... 1834.
Contains some valuable information on the foundation and early history of Singapore.

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
Raffles, Lady

"Memoir of the Life and Public Services of Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, F. R. S. etc. particularly in the Government of Java, 1811-16, and of Bencoolen and its Dependencies, 1817-24; with Details of the Commerce and Resources of the Eastern Archipelago, and Selections from his Correspondence."

London ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 1839.

Useful because of its extracts from Raffles' papers.

Read, W.H. C.M.G., K.N.I.:

"Play and Politics, Recollections of Malaya."

London ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 1901.

The book was published anonymously, but it is known to have been written by Read, who played an important part in the affairs of the Straits from 1841 to 1887. (Buckley, "Singapore," I, 367-69). Read was the agent of the Sultan of Johore from 1850 to 1877, and the book contains an account of the Johore Succession. There is also a valuable chapter on the Chinese Societies in Singapore.

Ross, J.D.,

"The Capital of a Little Empire; A Descriptive Study of a British Crown Colony in the Far East."

Singapore (?) ... ... ... ... ... ... 1898.

Deals almost exclusively with the period since 1867.

St. John, Horace,

"The Indian Archipelago, its History and Present State."

2 vols.

London ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 1853.

The account of piracy is useful, but badly arranged.

St. John, Sir Spenser.


London ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 1862.

A very valuable and reliable account of Brunei, c. 1840-50.

St. John became the Secretary of Rajah Brooke in 1848, in 1855 he was appointed H. M. Counsell-General in Borneo and he also served at Labuan. While a staunch friend of Brooke, he was in no sense a blind partisan, but an impartial narrator. The work is based on his own diaries, and those of Sir Hugh Low.

"The Life of Sir James Brooke, Rajah of Sarawak, from his Personal Papers and Correspondence."

London ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 1879.

An impartial and valuable account by one who had taken part in many of the events he described. In some minor points additional information is to be found in Miss Jacob's "Life of Brooke."

Sainsbury, Miss E. B., ed.

"A Calendar of the Court Minutes of the East India Company, 1640-43."

Journal Malayan Branch [Vol. III, Part, II.]
Intro. by W. Foster.
Oxford 1909.

Sainsbury, W. N., ed.
"Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, East Indies, China
and Japan, 1513-1624." 3 vols.
London 1862-1878.
Contain valuable introductions on early English trade with
the East.

Schlegel, Gustave.
"Thian Ti Hwui. The Hung League, or Heaven-Earth
League, A Secret Society with the Chinese in China and
India."
Batavia 1866.
Pickering, who was well acquainted with the Hung League,
considered that "any European who will take the trouble
to thoroughly digest M. Schlegel's invaluable work... will
know more of the origin, ceremonies and ostensible objects
of the Thien Ti Hui than nine out of ten of the Masters
of Lodges in the Straits Settlements." (J.R.A.S.S.B. I, 64);
and quoted it frequently in his own account. Schlegel was
the Chinese Interpreter to the Batavian Government, which
turned over to him for the purpose of writing this book all
the documents concerning the Hué seized by the Dutch
police. Other documents were given him by Europeans and
the information in Newbold and other writers was also used.
Owing to the fear of the Leage, Schlegel could not obtain
the assistance of a single Chinese. (Preface). The work is
supplemented by Pickering's accounts (J.R.A.S.S.B., I and
III); and together they form the most complete and authori-
tative description of the Triad Society which has yet appeared.

Skeat, W. W., and Blagden, C. O.,
London 1906.

Smith, Vincent A.
"The Oxford History of India from the Earliest Times to
the End of 1911."
Oxford 1920.

Steuart, A.F.
"A Short Sketch of the Lives of Francis and William Light,
the Founders of Penang and Adelaide, with Extracts from their
Journals."
London 1901.
Brief, but accurate, except in two points; (1) the abortive
negotiations of 1772, of which Steuart knew very little, and
(2) the Company's relations with Kedah, wherein he is
entirely untrustworthy. Contains many extracts from govern-
ment records and Light's papers.

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
Swettenham, Sir Frank, K.C.M.G.,
London ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 1920.
An invaluable work, the combination of his own experience and wide and accurate research.
“Malay Sketches.”
London ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 1895.
“The Real Malay: Pen Pictures.”
London ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 1900.
Very valuable for an understanding of Malay character and the feudal type of society which prevailed before 1874.

Temminck, C.J.
Leyden ... ... 1846-49.
A detailed description of the Dutch East Indies, based on the Dutch archives. It contains valuable information on piracy.

Thomson, J.T.
“Some Glimpses into Life in the Far East.”
London ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 1864.
“A Sequel to Some Glimpses of Life in the Far East.”
London ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 1865.
Reminiscences, written fifteen years after the events they describe, of social life in the Straits during the thirties and forties. The descriptions are very vivid, and appears to be true. The chapters on the Company’s administration however are of dubious value, since Thomson’s bitter hatred of its rule coloured and distorted everything he wrote.

Trapaud, E.
“A Short Account of Prince of Wales Island, or Pulo Penang, in the East Indies.”
London ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 1788.

Vaughan J. D.
“The Manners and Customs of the Chinese of the Straits Settlements.”
Singapore ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 1879.
The author was an ex-officer of the Company’s navy who lived in the Straits from 1851 until 1891, when he was drowned at sea. From 1851 to 1869 he served at Penang and Singapore as Police Magistrate, Superintendent of Police, and Assistant. His work brought him into close contact with the Chinese, and his book contains much valuable first-hand information. He is inclined to take a more favourable view of the Huêys than Pickering.

Webster, C. K.
“Congress of Vienna, 1814-15.”
London ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 1920.

Journal Malayan Branch [Vol. III, Part, II.
Peace Handbooks, Vol. XXIV; issued by the Historical Section of the Foreign Office.

Wilkes, C., U.S.N.,
"Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition during the Years 1838-1842." 5 vols and atlas.
Philadelphia; ... ... ... 1843.

Wilkinson, R. J., and others,
"Papers on Malay Subjects."
Kuala Lumpur ... ... ... 1906-1915.
A series of pamphlets, written and published by the orders of the Government of the Federated Malay States, for the information of Cadets and Civil Servants. The books deal with every phase of Malay life—government, law, history, customs, literature, arts and industries etc.
They were edited by Wilkinson, who served in British Malaya until after he became Colonial Secretary of the Straits Settlements. He wrote some of the pamphlets, while the reminder were written by members of the Civil Service in the Malay States. The books embody the results of a century of investigation and are exceedingly reliable. The volume on the history of the Peninsula is based on a careful study of the Dutch, Malay and British records.

Wright, A.,
"Early English Adventurers in the East."
London ... ... ... ... 1917.
A valuable account of English trade in the East in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
"Annesley of Surat and his Times; the True Story of the Mythical Wesley Fortune."
London ... ... ... ... 1918.

Wright A., and Reid, T.H.,
"The Malay Peninsula, a Record of British Progress in the Middle East."
London ... ... ... ... 1912.
APPENDIX.

By C. O. Blagden, M.A., D. Litt.,

Malay Documents relating to the Naning War.

Introductory Note.

The Malay documents here collected throw considerable light on the events which led to the outbreak of hostilities between Naning and the East India Company. The real ultimate cause of the trouble was undoubtedly the peculiar status of Naning. In the eyes of the Company it was a vassal territory, whose ruler owed his position entirely to delegation from them; and that is the true historical and technically legal view, as is amply proved by the Dutch treaty of 1641 as well as by the British one of 1801. But in the eyes of Menangkabau and Malay inhabitants of Naning their Penghulu, who with his four heads of clans or Sukus, was the de facto ruler of the territory in all general matters of internal administration, was invested with the attributes of sacrosanctity with which Malay rulers are credited,* and he belonged to a family that had given rulers to Naning for a considerable time.

It must, therefore, be admitted that though the Company was entitled to impose its will on the Penghulu, within the full limits of his engagements, it might have been well advised to exercise a more careful and skilful diplomacy in the process. As to that matter, the tone and tenour of their correspondence with him need comment. Further, although it cannot be denied that the Penghulu showed contumacy, he was at the beginning of the long drawn out dispute merely holding on to the rights secured to Naning by the treaty of 1801; it was the Company that was endeavoursing to abrogate those rights. Their objects were primarily financial. After the definite establishment of British rule in Malacca in 1825 the Company’s officials proceeded to look into ways and means. Ultimately they bought out most of the “title impro priators” of Malacca, and made a pretty poor bargain of it. They hoped to get the Naning tithe at a cheaper rate. It had been expressly waived in the treaties of 1641 and 1801 but the theoretical right to it might be regarded as still subsisting and held in reserve. In the event, the process of acquiring it cost the Company, in all probability, a good deal more than the fee simple value, at that period, of all the lands of Naning. Of the moral aspect of the transaction it is unnecessary to speak.

The arbitrary attitude of the Company’s officials’ is sufficiently illustrated by the way in which they handled the final dispute, whereon they elected to proceed to extremities. Among


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the tithe impropriators was one Kuche' Surin, who owned the
tithe of a tract of land in Malacca territory bordering on the
Nanning frontier and duly marked in a map contained in Moor's
Notices of the Indian Archipelago (Singapore, 1837) facing p.
247. His right to collect the tithes had been commuted for an
annual payment of 179 Sceika rupees.* But he must have been
also the owner of a kawasan or occupancy holding, probably within
the lands over which he had owned the tithes, and certainly also
adjacent to the Nanning border, and his rights in that capacity
remained, of course, unimpaired by the commutation of his right
to tithes. There were other landowners similarly situated, one of
whom (a member of the de Wind family) possessed occupancy
holdings at least down to the period 1890-94 within the limits
of the very large area of which his ancestor J. B. de Wind had
been tithe impropriator. In October 1830 Surin complained to
the Resident Councillor that the Penghulu of Nanning's men
had trespassed on his land and taken fruit from his duku trees,
whereupon the Resident Councillor required the Penghulu to
ascertain the facts, and, if they were as stated, make restitution,
adding that even if the land were on Nanning territory it was
nevertheless under the jurisdiction of the British Crown, a remark
tirely irrelevant to the merits of the case. The Penghulu
promptly replied claiming that the trees in question were not
on Surin's land at all but on land which had been for a long time
in his own possession and that he had taken no dukus belonging
to Surin, the land being within the Nanning frontier.

Here was a claim of right and a plain issue of fact. One
would have thought that the Resident Councillor's next step
would be to have an enquiry made on the spot or at least to
take the evidence of witnesses intimately acquainted with the
local circumstances. Instead of that, he proceeded to bully the
Penghulu and entered into a hectoring and acrimonious corres-
pondence containing threats of punishment and eventual deposi-
tion; and it is only weeks later that we get a hint that some local
enquiry, of a quite ex parte nature, was attempted, the results of
which are not stated. The Resident Councillor's main argument,
apart from threats, was that the Malacca Government records
proved Surin to have an ancient holding; a fact which the Peng-
hulu had never denied and which was beside the point: the issue
was, were the disputed fruit trees on that holding, or not? In
short, anything more unjudicial than the Resident Councillor's
procedure in this matter can hardly be imagined. The upshot
was the first campaign against Nanning in August 1831, which was
carried on with such iniquitude that it failed miserably. The
second campaign begun in January 1832, retrieved at any rate

* Journal of the R. A. S., Straits Branch (1884), No. XIII, p. 196,
(Appendix p. xxviii). The commutation took effect as from the 1st of July

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
the military reputation of the Company. The fullest account of these operations is given in Begbie’s *The Malayan Peninsula*, pp. 163-260.

There is probably no one alive now who was living in Nanping or Malacca during that war, but in 1895 an old Malay woman, in the witness-box of the Alor Gajah police court, by way of giving an approximate statement of her age, told me that as a child she had been taken by her parents into the jungle on account of the panic caused by the British invasion. This would probably refer to the second campaign, as in the first one the panic was mainly on the other side.

The Malay documents here appended and abstracted form part of a large collection extending down to July 1853, but after August 1845 they consist mostly of short formal letters to pèng-hulus of Malacca villages ordering them to bring parties or witnesses to attend the courts. Only the earlier ones are of historical interest; and I have confined the present selection to those which seemed to have a direct bearing on the affairs of Nanping, and particularly on the origin and conduct of the Nanping war. The documents are in book form, written in the Arabic character, and were evidently copied a long time ago from a file of Malay correspondence in the office of the Resident Councillor at Malacca. The collection was presented, probably about thirty years ago, to the late Archdeacon Dunkerley, at one time chaplain at Malacca, by his Malay munshi. With the Archdeacon’s permission, given some years after his retirement from the Straits, I copied the more interesting documents, hoping to be able to use them eventually as an Appendix to a work on the history of the times. The occasion having now arrived, I am glad to have been permitted to avail myself of it. At the time I must here record my great indebtedness to my lamented friend the Archdeacon, and also to his widow, who was good enough to allow me to retain the Malay originals, which were still in my possession at the time of the Archdeacon’s death, and perhaps I may be permitted to inscribe this Appendix to his memory.

**Documents.**

I.

16 July 1801, Lieutenant-Colonel Aldwell Taylor, British Resident and Commandant, Malacca, to Raja Mèrah Dol Sa’id of Nanping.

Appointing Dol Sa’id to be Captain* over all the Menangkabau, Malay, and other inhabitants of Nanping and its dependencies, subject to the suzerainty of the Company at Malacca,

*Captain is also the title given to the principal chief of Nanping in the Dutch treaty of 1841. It had probably been taken over from Portuguese times.*

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and directing him to carry out any instructions be might receive from the Resident in Council or the Resident alone on pain of annulment of the present investiture.

Lieutenant- Colonel Aldwell Taylor Gobernador Commandant yang sêmayam di-atas takhta kêrajaan kota nêgêri Mêlaka yang di-atas Raja Mêrah Dol Sa'id* yang tétap di-dalam Naning


Dënîkian lagi Kapitan hêndak-lah bêrlêngkap dan bêrsêdia serta datang jua sa-suatu pêrentah dan idzin dari-pada pehak sinja azadî* ya-itu Gobernador dêngan sêgala hakim-nya serta yang dari-pada Tuan sêndiri sa-lama ada-nya di-sini ta'dapat tiada apubila tiada juga môngikut sia-sia-lah sahaba ini


II.

16 July 1801. Treaty entered into by Lieutenant-Colonel Aldwell Taylor, British Resident and Commandant, Malacca, (on behalf of the Governor of Madras) with Sêri Raja Mêrah Dol Sa'id, Lela Hulubaling, Orang Kaya Kêchi', Mêmêbunun Kaya, Maharaja Nê Kaya, and Maulana Garang, chiefs of Naning, to be voluntarily sworn to.

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Raja Meri Daul Seid

* Or sêgala, or sêgala sakalian: the one word is written over the other:—

: Evidently corrupt: possibly representing Sinyor Rade[n], "Counsellors"!

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
Art. 1. The Captain and chiefs in the name of all the inhabitants of Nanning voluntarily swear allegiance and obedience to the British Ruler, the Governor and Council of Madras, the Resident and officials of Malacca, and their successors, rejecting all previous engagements to the prejudice of the Company.

Art. 2. Mênangksabaus or Malays disobeying the orders of the Resident or his officials are to be delivered up by the Captain to Malacca for punishment.

Art. 3. The Captain, chiefs, and inhabitants of Nanning according to former custom paid a tithe of rice, paddy, and fruit to the Company, but in view of their poverty it shall suffice for the Captain or one of the chiefs to come once a year to Malacca in token of submission and pay half a koyan of paddy.

Art. 4. Inhabitants of Nanning desiring to go to Malacca are required to have passes with the Captain's chap, and similarly inhabitants of Malacca shall be required to have passes signed by the Shahbandar (by order of the Resident) or else they shall be sent back; but inhabitants of Malacca provided with passes can settle in Nanning as cultivators, planting betel, etc., conforming themselves to local usage like other inhabitants.

Art. 5. All tin brought from Séri Mênanti, Sungai Ujong, and Kêmbau, etc., to Nanning is to be sent to the Company at Malacca, payable at the rate of 44 dollars per bahara of 300 katis, to be paid in Surat rupees.

Art. 6. All Surplus pepper exported from Nanning is to be delivered to the Company at 12 dollars per bahara.

Art. 7. The Captain, chiefs, and people of Nanning must not trade with people of other States, but bring all their goods down

* The English text of this document is printed as No. CXXXXVIII in Atchison's Treaties, Engagements and Sanads (1869), Vol. II, pp. 485-88, and agrees substantially with the Malay text (which latter is not, however, a very good specimen of a translation). In the English text the names of the Malay parties are badly garbled. But it would seem to follow from it that the Orang Kaya Késhi' was called Musuh (perhaps for Muss), the Mëmbangun Kaya was named Konchil, and the Maharaja Nan Kaya was Sumuma (probably Summa). The names of the signatories at the end are given under the forms 'Dholl Syed, Belal-Moren, Kantjul, Soemos, and Moulana Günn.' From a comparison of these various names and titles with the information given by Newbold (Political and Statistical Account of the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca, Vol. I, p. 238) and Begbie (The Malay Peninsula, p. 148) it appears that the heads of the subas or clans (themselves commonly called Sukus for short) were the Orang Kaya Késhi' (Mungkal), the Mëmbangun Kaya (Tiga Batu) the Maharaja Nan Kaya (Sëmcëuggang). The head of the Anak Malacca was the Dato' Andika, and it does not seem clear that they were represented at the signing of the treaty. Newbold (op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 454-59) also gives the English text of this treaty, with slight variations in the names of the parties.
the Malacca river, and not down the Pênajeh (i.e. the Linggi river), on pain of fines and severe penalties.*

Art. 8. If any of the chiefs resigns or dies, a qualified successor shall be proposed and come to Malacca, but not appointed pending the order of Government, which may appoint whom it wishes.

Art. 9. Runaway slaves of the Company or of Malacca inhabitants escaping to Nanning shall be immediately arrested and taken to Malacca, for which a payment of 10 dollars a head only shall be made.

Art. 10. For runaway Nanning slaves escaping to Malacca desiring to become Christians compensation shall be made to the owners of half their value as assessed by a Committee of two to be appointed by the Resident.

Art. 11. Anyone taking Christian free persons or slaves of Malacca away, whether by force or with their consent, and selling them to Muslims or with a view to their circumcision or conversion, shall forfeit his life and goods.

Art. 12. All runaway Malacca slaves then in Nanning are to be delivered up to the Resident at Malacca.

Art. 13. The Captain and chiefs in the name of all the inhabitants of Nanning swear on the Koran to observe all the foregoing provisions and to arrest and deliver to the Company for punishment anyone transgressing them.—Signed, and sealed with the Company’s Seal.

Sworn to in the Fort of Malacca, 16 July 1801.
(The form of oath includes a promise to obey any future orders faithfully as loyal vassals).


Përkarâ yang përtama
Kapitan dengan penghulu yang tua-tua dengan nama sêgala orang Nanning sudah-lah bersumpah dengan suka-nya dengan takhta kêbêsaran Tuan Béasar di-Inggëris lagi dengan Tuan General di-Madras dengan sêgala hakim-nya lagi dengan Go[be]rnador dengan sêgala hakim-nya di-Mêlaka kêmudian jikalau orang lain datang mêmêrentah démikian juga tiada bërubah jikalau dengan hati bêtul kêpérchayaan maka masing-masing itu

* The English text has, “on pain of forfeiting their lives and property.” It also penalises “holding any communication with such inland nation.”

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Pěrkara yang kědua
tiap-tiap sēgala orang Naning dari-pada anak Měnangkabau atau anak Mělayu jikalau bělalui ordi Sinyor Go[be]məndor děngan sēgala hakim sēpěrti yang těrsēbut itu maka hěndak-lah Kapitān děngan sēgala pěnghulu bawara orang itu ka-Mělaka ka-pada Sinyor Go[be]məndor akan di-běri (upah-nya) hukum-nya*

Pěrkara yang kětīga

Pěrkara yang kěmpat

Pěrkara yang kělima
lagi Kapitān děngan pěnghulu sudah běrkata hěndak běrqega timah yang datang dari Sērī Měnantis dan Sungai Ujong dan dari Rēmbau datang ka-Naning atau dari těmpat-těmpat lain anak

* This last is written under the former, presumably as a correction.

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Pêrkara yang kêenam

lagi sudah kata lada sêmua yang kêluar di-Naning jikalau ada sa-kira-kira boleh banyak atau têrlebih sêdikît di-bawa dan di-bêri harga-nya pada sa-bahara dua-bêlas rial

Pêrkara yang kêtujoh

Kapitan dengan pênghulu dengan sêgala orang Nanîng tiada boleh bêrniaga dengan orang dari negeri lain lagi hendak-lah sêmua-nya jualan-nya dan pêrniagaan-nya di-bawa-nya hilir dari Sungai Mêlaka jangan di-bawa ka-pada Sungai Pênajeh bêrniaga dan tiada boleh bêrjual bêli dengan orang lain negeri sahaja dilarang-lah sa-kali jikalau dapat orang bagitu di-dênda barang-barang-nya la* [sic] kêna hukum di-atas bêrat-nya

Pêrkara yang kêdulapan

lagi Kapitan dengan pênghulu berkata kalau suatu pênghulu datang ka-pada massa ia kêluar atau pada hal mati maka hendak-lah pada antara itu barang yang ada lebeh pêngêtahan-nya yang têrdëkat Kapitan datang ka-Mêlaka ka-pada Sînyor Go[be]rnador dengan sêgala hakim têtapi orang itu tiada boleh di-namaî Kapitan karna belum boleh ordi Sînyor Go[be]rnador dengan sêgala hakim maka barang siapa yang hendak di-jadikan-nya

Pêrkara yang kêsêmbilan


Pêrkara yang késapuloh


Pêrkara yang kêsâbelas

lagi barang siapa membawa Sêrani anak m êrêheka atau hamba orang di-Mêlaka di-bawa-nya dengan kêras-nya atau dengan suka-

* Orig. has ل here.
† Orig. has كنیر.

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nya minta bawa maka di-jual-nya ka-pada orang Islam atau hendidak di-khatankan-nya atau ka-pada lain bangsa agama jikalau orang yang mêmbara itu akan késalahana-nya hilang-lah* batutan-nya orang tua† dengan ségala barang-barang-nya pun hilang-lah sa-kali

Pérkara yang kéluabélás

maka ségala yang tersedut itu Kapitan dèngan pénghulu sudah bérkata dengan ségala orang Naning bagaimana sudah sumpah dahulu itu hendidak-lah di-pulangkan ségala hambra orang yang lari dari Mélaka yang ada di-sana semua-nya hendidak-lah di-bawa ka-Mélaka pada Sinyor Go[be]rnador di-sèrahkan-nya

Pérkara yang kétigabelás

Kapitan dèngan ségala pénghulu dèngan nama ségala orang Naning sudah bérsumpah pada Kuran al-adzim hendidak mêmégang tégoh pénchobaan dari Sinyor yang bérgetar General dengan ségala hakim-nya barang siapa tiada ménurut ordi ini di-tangkap orang itu di-sèrahkan ka-pada Kompéni supaya dapat di-dénda barang sa-patut-nya mêméberi kua-ordi ini maka mêmhubohkan tapak tangan di-atas kêrtas ini dèngan chap Kompéni Inggéris
démikian-lah yang di-kèrjakan bérsumpah di-dalam bichara besar di-dalam kota négéri Mélaka ka-pada tarih en'am-bélás hari bulan July sanat 1891 ya-itu ka-pada tarih èmpat hari bulan Rabí'u-l-awal sanat 1216.


III.

30 April 1825, Walter Sewell Cracroft, Resident, Malacca, to the Pénghulu of Naning.

Informing the Pénghulu of the writer's arrival at Malacca and the transfer of the settlements from Dutch to British sovereignty, an event to be notified to the neighbouring rulers; and enclosing a letter to be forwarded to Baja Ali, Yang di-pértuan [Muda] of Rémboau, by the hand of some trustworthy person of Naning, who was to be instructed to convey the reply thereto to Malacca.

* Here has been cancelled.
† Probably to be amended to itu.

Journal Melayu Branch [Vol. III, Part, II.
Bahawa ini surat dari-pada Tuan Raja Mister Walter Cracroft Yang di-pertuan negeri Melaka serta dengan daerah-nya datang ka-pada Penghulu Naning Raja Mērah

kemudian dari-pada itu hendak-lah kētalai Penghulu ahwal kita sēkarang tēlah tiba-lah kita ka-Melaka serta mēnerima negeri ini dari-pada orang Welandah serta mēnaiikan bēndera Inggēris yang mulia di-dalam Melaka

oleh sēbab itu maka ada-lah kita bērkirim surat ka-pada sēgala raja-raja yang hampir mēnyatakan hal yang sudah sampai di-dalam Mēlaka


termakutb surat ini di-dalam negeri Melaka ka-pada sa-bēlas hari bulan Ramadzan sanat 1240 ya-itu tiga puloh hari bulan April sanat 1825.

IV.

8 Shawal 1240 (26 or 27 May 1825) : Walter Sewell Cracroft, Resident, Malacca, in conference with the Penghulu and Sukus of Naning at Malacca.

Laying down the boundary of Naning with the territories subject to Johore* and Rēmbau, and instructing the Penghulu and Sukus to guard the boundary as being the limits of the territory delivered to the Company by the Dutch Commissioners (under the treaty of 1824) and neither to transgress those limits themselves nor allow any other persons to transgress them.

Bahawa ka-pada dewasa ini Penghulu Naning Raja Mērah serta kēempat Suku Naning sudah datang ka-Melaka bērjumpa dengan kita ya-itu Tuan MisterWalter Sewell Cracroft Yang di-pertuan negeri Melaka serta dengan sēgala daerah-nya

sa-bērmula maka ada-lah kita sudah mēnyatakan ka-pada Penghulu serta kēempat Suku dari-pada hal sēgala bichara negeri Inggēris di-Nanling yang baharu ini yang di-tērima oleh kita dari-pada Tuan Komisaris Maharaja Welandah maka ini-lah sēmpadan antara tanah Komplēni Inggēris dengan tanah yang

* This document treats Johol as being still under the suzerainty of the Sultan of Johore. Apart from this, Naning did not border on the territory of Johore at all. Cf. Aitchison, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 491-93 (CLII, CLIII).

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
di-bawah pērentah Sultan Johore dan Raja sērta orang yang mēmērentah di-dalam nēgēri Rēmbau


maka ini-lah surat bērtitah ka-pada Pēnghulu Naning dēngan kēempat Suku mēnūnggu sēmpadan itu dēngan damai sērta muhabat dēngan sēgala pēnghulu-pēnghulu Sultan Johore dan

* Bēlgak
† Kēpar
‡ Tampin
§ Kēndang
¶ Bēlun
** Bēlgak

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Appendix.

Raja Rembau dan orang besar-besaran Rembau seperti adat negeri yang berdamai sahabat bersahabat dan jangan-lah Pengerlu dengan empat Suku Naning melampaui* perecntah dari-pada sempadan Kompensi seperti yang tersebut di-atas ini

dan jangan Pengerlu dengan empat Suku membenedarkan lain orang melampaui* perecntah-nya dari-pada sempadan Kompensi itu-lah ada-nya tamar

termaktub di-dalam negeri Melaka ka-pada tarikh ona-puloh delapan hari bulan Shawal sanat 1240

V.

2 Dzu-l-hijah 1240 (18 or 19 July 1825). Walter Cracroft, Resident, Malacca, to the Pengerlu and Sukus of Naning.

Acknowledging the receipt of the commission of investiture granted to the Pengerlu by Col. Taylor and criticising it as being in various respects tyrannical and at variance with the character of British administration, reciting that the Pengerlu and Sukus had come to Malacca and again sworn allegiance to the British Crown and that they and all the inhabitants of Naning were now British subjects just as much as the writer and entitled to the same rights and liberties as the inhabitants of Malacca and other British possessions; giving the Pengerlu and Sukus the right to administer Naning according to law and ancient custom not at variance with freedom and justice, such as all British subjects enjoyed; reciting that according to ancient custom the Company, as the owner of the land, was entitled to the tithe, but that as the Pengerlu and Sukus bore the expenses of the administration they should be allowed to retain two-thirds of the revenue collected and send the remaining third to Malacca to the Company's treasury, either in dollars or in tin, pending the decision of the Governor-General of India; repudiating any desire to obtain an excessive revenue, in view of the poverty of the inhabitants, and recommending the Pengerlu and Sukus to adjust the taxes on a moderate scale so as to encourage settlement and agriculture; forbidding the levying of tolls on persons bringing goods from other States through Naning until the writer's permission should be given, and requiring that they should be assisted in their difficulties and allowed to buy and sell freely; requesting that the inhabitants near the Naning boundaries be informed of the position of the boundaries as laid down in the preceding letter, so that disputes might be avoided; remarking on the scantiness of settlement and cultivation in the western corner of Naning and recommending that steps should be taken to develop that section in view of its facilities for the sending of produce by water to Malacca; and

* Orig. has ملحوظ

1825] Royal Asiatic Society.
generally wishing success to the Nanning administration in the
development and just government of the country.

Bawa ini surat kaseh sayang yang tiada bërkeputusan dari-pada kita Tuan Mister Walter Cracroft Yang di-pértuan négréi Mélaka serta dengan ségala daerah-nya ka-pada Raja Mérah Penghulu Nanning serta dengan émpat suku Nanning yang ada déngan sélamat sêntosa-nya amin


* فنوس.
shahadan dari-pada hasil itu kita mungkin suai akan hal orang Nanjing tiada daya upaya akan menjadi kékayaan itu-lah tiada kehendak kita mengerasi sungat atas orang rayat-rayat maka boleh Pênghulu dengan empat suku membicha-rakan hal itu dengan kemurahan ka-pada kétika ini supaya boleh segala orang Melayu datang duduk bérhimpun di-bawah péliharaan pérrentah Inggeris membuat bêndang dan kêhun dan segala jénis pérniagaan dengan kebebasan dan késenangan

shahadan lagi dari-pada fasal segala orang dari-pada negeri di-hulu sêperti Johore dan Rémbau dan Pahang dan Terêngganu dan lain-lain yang ménghikut jalan Nanjing dengan mêmbara dagangan datang ka-Mêlaka jangan-lah Pênghulu menambah barang suatu apa hasil dan chukai atau kharajat* atau hadiah yang bésar† dari-pada orang itu sémêntara mendapat idzin dari-pada kita têtapi hêndak-lah tolong ménolong dari-pada barang sukar sekat mèreka itu sa-lama ia datang dengan baik dan tiada bérsalahan dengan rayat-rayat orang di-dalam negeri segala yang ia mêmbara jual atau ia kêhêndak bêli di-jalan di-dalam Nanjing biarkan-lah ia membuat dénikian dengan harga yang késukaan ka-pada tuan yang empunya harta

sa-bagai lagi dari-pada fasal hal sèmpadan tanah Kompéni di-Nanjing sudah-lah kita témakub suatu surat dengan kédilian maka kita ménghantarkan surat itu ka-pada Pênghulu dan kékempat Suku boleh-lah Pênghulu dengan empat Suku membéri tahu ka-pada segala orang yang dudok dêkat sèmpadan itu baik yang di-dalam baik yang di-luar supaya tiada ménjadi kIL kIL suatu pêrdawani

shahadan dari fasal segala tanah Nanjing yang ada di-tépi Sungai Bésar Rémbau kita sudah lihat suatu témäp pun tiada dúsun atau kampung yang ramai di-tépi sungai itu jikalau Pênghulu dengan empat Suku Nanjing boleh membicha-rakan ajak orang membuat dúsun dan kampung di-Klua Léndu dan Klua Sénirbau dan lain-lain témäp tépi sungai itu sêrtà buat kêhun dan ludang dan bêndang di-sana ka-pada hemat kita térerlau amat banyak untong boleh menjali ka-pada orang yang membuat pêkérjaan itu karna sungai ada dalam ayer-nya dan jadi késenangan ka-pada segala pérahu-pérahu yang hilir mudek dan boleh menjali jalan kéluar segala jénis tanam-tamanan akan datang jual ka-Mêlaka dan lain-lain bandar têtapi segala kérja itu hêndak-lah ada dengan késuakaan orang yang békérja itu

shahadan ini-lah kita kirimkan surat ini ka-pada Pênghulu dengan empat Suku harap-lah kita banyak-banyak boleh sa-génap negeri menjali ramai dan Pênghulu dan empat. Suku membicha-rakan atas segala orang miskin dengan pérrentah yang adil itu-lah ada-nya tamat

* Orig. has راجع
† Orig. has yangapr.

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Itermaktub surat ini di-dalam negeri Melaka ka-pada dua hari bulan Dzu'l-Hijjah sanat 1240.

VI.

18 September 1826. Samuel Garling, Resident Councillor, Malacca, to the Penghulu and Sukus of Naning.

Announcing the sending of Mr. Lewis on a mission to inspect land with a view to ascertaining suitable sites for plantations; and demanding the assistance of the Penghulu and Sukus.

Ini surat dari-pada Tuan Raja Samuel Garling yang memerintah di-dalam negeri Melaka serta taalok-nya ka-pada Orang Kaya Raja Merah Penghulu Naning serta keempat Suku-nya.

wa baada-hu dari-pada itu hendid-lah ketahui Penghulu serta keempat Suku ada-pun kita membéri surat in menyatakan ada sa-orang sahabat kita nama-nya Tuan Lewis ya-itu di-dalam sahari dua ini hendid datang ka-Naning bérjalan melihat-lihat negeri itu kalau-kalau ada holeh dapat tempat tanah yang baik membuat kétum peraman-tanam melainkan apabila sampai tuan itu ka-sana hendi[k] Penghulu serta keempat Suku memulikan dan memeliharakan dia serta menolong dari-pada barang hal ahwal-nya dan maksud-nya sa-hingga ada tuan itu di-sana itu-lah ada-nya intihal-kalam.

Itermaktub surat ini ka-pada dulapan-belas hari bulan September sanat 1826 ya-itu ka-pada lima-belas hari bulan Safar sanat 1242.

VII.

26 February 1827. Mr. W. T. Lewis (Assistant, or Deputy, Resident, Malacca,) to the Penghulu and Sukus of Naning.

Requiring the Penghulu and Sukus to order the inhabitants of Naning to clear the banks of the rivers and streams of underground, etc., to a width of four yards on either bank.

Bahwa ini surat dari-pada kita Tuan Lewis menyatakan ka-pada sahabat kita Orang Kaya Dato' Penghulu Naning serta keempat Suku-nya.

maka ada-lah kita telah dapat perentah menjadi képala akan melihat sérta menyuroh suchikan dan ménérgakan sungai maka kita-pun telah sudah perentahkan di-atas segala orang-orang yang ménaroh-tanah di-tépi sungai menyuroh suchikan atas sempadan masing-masing.

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dan chabut ségala tunggul-tunggul-nya dan akar-akar-nya hingga sampai dua dépa ka-darar lebar kiri kanan sungai itu hændak-lah di-kërjakan dengan ségéra-nya

dan apabila sudah di-kërjakan pêrentah ini hændak-lah Pêng-
hulûn mêmêrî tahu ka-pada kita supaya boleh kita datang mélihat pêkêrjaan itu itu-lah ada-nya

kêmudian dari-pada itu tabek kita ka-pada Pênghulû sêrta kêmêmpat Suku intihia-l-kalam
têrmaktub surat ini dalam Mêlaka ka-pada sêmbilan-lekor hari bulan Rajab sanat 1242 ya-itu ka-pada dua-puluh esam hari bulan February sanat 1827.

VIII.

19 March 1827. Samuel Garling, Resident Councillor, Malacca, to the Pênghulû of Nanning.

Announcing the sending of Mr. Lewis on a mission to investigate matters relating to revenue or otherwise to the development of the country, demanding the assistance of the Pênghulû and requiring him to give Mr. Lewis full information on these matters, while also inviting him to make to Mr. Lewis any other communications he might desire to make.

Ini tuladan surat dari-pada Tuan Raja Samuel Garling ka-pada Dato' Pênghulû Nanning

wa baada-hu dari-pada itu kita maffumkan ka-pada sahabat kita Pênghulû maka ada-lah kita telah mêminta ka-pada Tuan Lewis ya-itu pêrgi mudek ka-hulu mêmêreksa dari-pada sêgala hal ahwal pêrkara mana yang boleh mêmêndatangkan kêbajikan dari-pada [h]asîl-[h]asîl* atau yang lain-lain-nya di-atas kêbêsar-
an nêgêri itu shahadan oleh itu pêrmintan kita hendumlah sahabat kita† dan mêmêlong ka-pada Tuan Lewis itu sêrta mêmêrî tahu dari-pada sakalian pêrkara apa-apa yang sahabat kita kêtahuni dan lagi jikalau ada barang sa-suatu khabar atau maksud sahabat kita hendum mêmêrî tahu ka-pada kita ya-itu boleh-lah sahabat kita khabarkan ka-pada Tuan Lewis itu karna ya-itu wakil mutlak dari-pada kita jua ada-nya

kêmudian dari-pada itu tabek kita ka-pada sahabat kita intihia-l-kalam
têrmaktub dalam Mêlaka ka-pada sêmbilan-belas hari bulan March sanat 1827 ya-itu sa-lekor hari bulan Shaabân sanat 1242.

21 April 1827. W. T. Lewis to the Pênghulû of Nanning.

Acknowledging the receipt of a letter from the Pênghulû together with seven runaway slaves of the Company brought in by the Pêng-

* Orig. has اصل.
† There seems to be no omission here.

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hulu’s son, in respect of which the latter had been paid 10 dollars a head by the writer, that being the customary amount as fixed by the Resident Councillor, although the Pênghulu had written that he had had the slaves arrested in Rêmbau, where he alleged that the customary reward was 20 dollars. Mr. Lewis added that he was aware of the last mentioned fact, but reminded the Pênghulu to adhere to his engagements and established usage.

Ini tuladan surat dari-pada Tuan Lewis ka-pada Dato’ Pênghulu yang mêmèrentah Naning

wa baada-hu dari-pada itu ada-pun sêpêrti surat sêrta dêngan têman Kompêni tu Joh orang yang lari sahabat sorooh nautarkan ka-pada anak sahabat kita va-itu têlah sampai-lah ka-pada kita dan apa-apâ yang têrsêbut di-dalam itu-pun têlah maßhum-iah kita

sa-bêrmula maka ada-lah têrsêbut di-dalam surat sahabat kita itu mengatakan dari hai têman-têman Kompêni itu sahabat kita sudah mêmûroh tangkap dapat di-Rêmbau dan adat-nya itu pada sa-orang orang dua-puloh rial maka sêkarang ada-lah Tuan Raja sudah bavar pada sa-orang orang sa-puloh rial maka rial tejah sudah kita bavarkan di-tanggan anak sahabat kita jumlah-nya tujohn-puloh rial maka boleh-lah sahabat kita têrima rial itu


ürmaktub surat ini dalam Mêlaka ka-pada dua-puloh êmpat hari [bulan] Ramadan sanat 1242 ya-itu ka-pada sa-lekor hari bulan April sanat 1827.

15 June 1827. Samuel Garling, Resident Councillor, Malacca, to the Pênghulu and Sukus of Naning.

Announcing the impending visit to Malacca to the Governor of the Straits Settlements, requesting the Pênghulu and Sukus to be prepared to come to Malacca to meet him immediately on being summoned, and suggesting that they should also at the same time bring the Naning tribute with them to please the Governor.

Ini tuladan surat dari-pada Tuan Raja Garling yang mêmèrentah di-dalam nêgêri Mêlaka sêrta taadok-nya ka-pada Dato’ Pênghulu Naning sêrta keêmpat Suku-nya dêngan puji-pujiang-nya

wa-baada-hu dari-pada itu ada-pun kita mêmûri surat ini mêmûyatakan ka-pada Pênghulu sêrta keêmpat Suku ada Tuan Bêsar Raja Pulau Pinang mahu datang dari Singapura ka-Mêlaka di-dalam ênam tujohn hari lagi oleh itu hêndak-lah Pênghulu sêrta keêmpat Suku-pun datang bêrjumpa ka-pada Tuan Bêsar itu mêmûyakan sêrta sampai surat ini hêndak-lah Pênghulu sêrta

* See I (Art. 9).
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kéempat Suku bërsiap sërtá tiba Tuan Bésar itu ka-Mélaka nanti kita ménynoh membëri tahu ta’dapat tiada hëndak-lah Pënghulu sërtá kéempat Suku-pun dëngan sëgëra-nya hilir ka-Mélaka

sabagai lagi kita ingatkan yang boleh jadi këbajikan dan këpujian nama Pënghulu tiada mënînggalkan dari-pada përjanjih Pënghulu oleh itu apabila Pënghulu hilir sa-baik-baik-nya dibawa bërsa-ma-sama yang mana padi-padi hasil Naning itu supaya yang boleh jadi kësukaan Tuan Bésar itu di-atas Pënghulu itu-lah ada-nya

këmudian dari-pada itu tabek kita ka-pada Pënghulu sërtá kéempat Suku intîha-l-kalam

tërmaktub surat ini di-dalam Mélaka ka-pada lima-bëlás hari bulan June sanat 1827 ya-itu ka-pada sëmbilan[-bëlás]* hari bulan Dzu-l-Kaëdah sanat 1842.

XI.

24 June 1827: Samuel Garling, Resident Councillor, Malacca, to the Pënghulu and Sukus of Naning.

Ordering the Pënghulu to present himself at Malacca within three days from the above date to meet the Governor.

Inî tuladan surat dari-pada Tuan Baja Samuel Garling yang mêmêrentah di-dalam negerî Mélaka sërtá taalok-nya ka-pada Dato’ Pënghulu Naning sërtá kéempat Suku-nya sërtá puji-pujian-nya

wa baada-hu dari-pada itu hëndak-lah këta-huí Pënghulu sërtá êmpat Suku ada-pun kita membëri surat ini mënayatkan sëkarang telah sampai-lah Tuan Bésar yang mêmêrentah Pulan Pinang sërtá Mélaka dan Singapura maka ini-lah kita membëri tahu dari hal Tuan Bésar itu sëdïkit hari jua malu tinggal dalam Mélaka këmudian hëndak bèlayar oleh sëhab itu di-dalam tiga hari dari-pada hari yang tërsebut di-bawa[h] ini ta’dapat tiada hëndak-lah Pënghulu ada sëdia di-dalam Mélaka bërjampa dengan Tuan Bésar itu jangan sa-kali-kali di-datangan sa-suatu përtanggoan atau nanti mënanti mëlainkan ta’dapat tiada mahu-lah Pënghulu datang dengan sëgëra-nya

këmudian dari-pada itu tabek kita ka-pada Pënghulu sërtá kéempat Suku itu-lah ada-nya intîha-l-kalam

tërmaktub surat ini dalam Mélaka ka-pada dua-puloh êmpat hari bulan June sanat 1827 ya-itu ka-pada dua-puloh sëmbilan hari bulan Dzu-l-Kaëdah sanat 1842.

XII.

20 June 1829: Samuel Garling, Resident Councillor, Malacca, to the Pënghulu and Sukus of Naning.

* Probably the ultimate original had sëmbilan-bëlás. But to square the calculation with the dates in the next following letter the sëmbilan-bëlás ought to have been dua-puloh.

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
Announcing the sending of Mr. Church, Deputy Resident, on a Mission to explain the policy of the Government with regard to the territory of Naning to the Penghulu and Sukus at Sungai Pétai. Ini surat dari-pada kita běhormat Samuel Garling Resident Council[lor] datang ka-pada Penghulu Naning serta empat Sukunya.


terkārang surat pada dua-puloh hari bulan June tarikh sanat 1829.

XIII.

26 June 1829: Samuel Garling, Resident Councillor, Malacca, to the Penghulu and Sukus of Naning.

Complaining generally of the Penghulu’s conduct, reminding him that he owed his position to the Government to which he had sworn allegiance, that the Government had postponed the exaction of a tithe on Naning lands merely as an act of grace, that there had been opposition to the holding of a census, that the Penghulu’s letters had not been respectful and that he was not carrying out his agreement; announcing the sending of Mr. Church on a mission to explain the intentions of Government, with power to hold a census, and to require the Penghulu to return with him to Malacca, and threatening that in the event of any opposition Government would appoint another Penghulu or undertake the administration of Naning itself, and that the Penghulu would be responsible for anything that happened.


wa baada-hu dari-pada itu Government itu menjadi těrlalu hairan serta susah di-dalam hari akan melihatkan kělakan yang di-pěrhat oleh Penghulu itu dan lagi patut-lah kira-nya Penghulu měngětahui-nya dari hal kědudukan Government děngan Penghulu ada-pun dari hal Penghulu-penghulu yang dahulu itu turun pada Penghulu ini-pun bukan-kah ia měndapat kěběsaran-nya itu dari Government yang měmběri-nya dan menjadikan Penghulu-pun děmikian juga?

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dan lagi ada di-dalam surat waktu Pénghulu menjadi pénghulu itu bukan-kah sudah di-buat suatu surat maka Pénghulu membuboh tanda tangan di-dalam surat itu di-bérikan pada Colonel Taylor mengaku dari késuakaan Government itu menjadi pénghulu?

dan lagi kétika Kompéni Inggérís datang méngambar négéri Mélaka dari tangan Wolandah itu maka ada-lah Komisaris-nya itu bénama Tuan Cracroft itu dan Pénghulu sêrta émpat Suku-pun sêrta tuan-tuan orang bichara-pun bérsumpah dêngan sêtia ka-pada Government Inggérís

dan lagi dari sêbab itu-lah pérťama-tama dari Pénghulu-pénghulu yang dahulu itu dan kédua surat-surat Pénghulu yang ada pada tangan kita dan kétiga dari pérsumpahan Pénghulu itu-pun tu-dapat tiada mélainkan Pénghulu turut sêgala pérrentah dari Government sêperti orang yang lain yang ada mêmêngang kuasa dari Government itu jikalau tiada ménghikut sêperti itu menjadi sia-sia-lah suhuan pérrentah yang di-béri oleh Government itu


dan lagi jangan-lah kira-nya Pénghulu dengan émpat Suku menjadi kérugian dari hasil itu mélainkan Government mahu mêmêbêri pada waktu itu pada Pénghulu dengan émpat Suku pada tiap-tiap tahun wang kéngantian itu di-bélakang kali orang-orang Nanging juna sêrta dengan kaseh sayang di-atas Pénghulu dengan anak buah-nya itu

shahadah lagi ada-pun dari hal banchi orang Nanging itu Government ményuorhkan orang-nya akan mêmînbanchikan itu di-dalam itu maka datang-lah kêsukaran dari-pada orang Nanging tiada mahu mêmêbêri kêtérangan-nya jika tiada dengan pérrentah Pénghulu

dan lagi di-atas hal banchi itu Pénghulu sëndiri-pun mahu mênolongi têtapi dari hal ini sa-patut-patut-nya pèkerjaan Pénghulu

dan lagi ada-pun dari hal Pénghulu itu di-bawah pérrentah Government apabila surat-surat yang di-hantar oleh Pénghulu itu tiada dengan hromat sêrta dengan bahasa-nya yang tiada bérpatut-an menjadi sa-olah-olah mèringankan pada Government

dan lagi tiada ménghikut sêperti pèrjanjian Pénghulu itu

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
dan lagi di atas pikiran Government itu tiada dengan sengaja Penghulu membuat pekerjaan yang demikian ini maka dari sekab ini maka ada-lah Government menyuruhkan Tuan Church itu pergi ka-Nanning supaya boleh mengurangkan dari kehendak Government di atas Penghulu dengan empat Suku itu ada-pun Government itu sa-lama ini mensebarkan dari perbuatan Penghulu dan sekaran ini maka ada-lah Government membeli pemberit pada Penghulu dan empat Suku boleh mengerti dari kehendak Government itu

dan lagi Government tiada mahu menerima barang sa-suatu kkehlanan* atau kesangkutan dari-pada Penghulu dan jikalau Penghulu melakukan jua kekerasan dan tiada menurut melainkan Government menjadikan penghulu yang lain atau memerintah sendiri di-dalam tanah Nanning maka sekaran ini Tuan Church itu ada mendapat kuasa mem-bancikan orang Nanning melainkan ta'dapat maka mahu-lah Penghulu menurut dari kehendak Tuan Church itu atau Penghulu sendiri yang di-surol-nay atau dengan surohan Penghulu dan lagi jikalau Tuan Church menyuruh Penghulu hilir bersama-sama ka-Melaka ta'dapat tiada melainkan mahu-lah hilir


XIV.

13 October 1830: Samuel Garling, Resident Councillor, Malacca, to the Penghulu and Sukus of Nanning.

Stating that Enche' Surin had complained that the Penghulu's men had trespassed on his land and taken his duktus and requesting the Penghulu to make enquiry and ascertain the value of the fruit and, if the complaint was founded, pay it to Surin, inasmuch as even if the land were on Nanning territory it was nevertheless under the jurisdiction of the British Crown from which the Penghulu derived his powers. Further, complaining that a Chinaman named Kwi Chang Ho had been robbed in Nanning territory and requesting that enquiry be made into the case.

Ini surat dari-pada kita Tuan Raja Samuel Garling yang memerintah di-dalam negeri Melaka serta taulok-nya ka-pada Orang Kaya Penghulu[lu] Nanning serta keempat suku-nya

* So in orig., perhaps for 'kehulangan.'

XV.

(Undated) : Pénghulu and Sukus of Naining to Samuel Garling, Resident Councillor, Malacca, in reply to the last.

Stating that the dukus claimed by Surin were not his but on land in Nanning territory that had been for a long time in the possession of the Pénghulu and that the Pénghulu had taken no dukus belonging to Surin. Further reporting that, on enquiry into the alleged robbery, the Chinese complainant would not swear to the facts nor could he produce witnesses, and recommending that Chinese going up country should not travel singly but two or three together so that in the event of there being any difficulties the case should be clear.

Balasan surat Pénghulu ka-pada Tuan Raja Mélaka Samuel Garling. Bahwa ini surat dari-pada Dato' Pénghulu Nanning

* Or dua duít?

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serta dengan keempat Suku menyatakan* kirim tabek serta puteh hati maka barang di-sampaikan Allah subhana-hu wa taala apalah kira-nya datang ka-hadapan Tuan Raja Samuel Garling yang duduk dengan istrilah al-khair

wa baada-hu kemudian dari-pada itu ada-lah seperiti surat Tuan itu telah sampai-lah dan seperiti perkhbaran itu telah terdengar-lah Dato' Penghulu dan lagi seperiti falsal duku itu sa-kali-kali bukan-nya Enche' Surin punya zaman bercaman ia-lah Dato' Penghulu yang punya karna tanah itu yang empunya Kompéri Inggeris yang memerentahkan Dato' Penghulu serta keempat† Suku ada-nya dan lagi sa-kali-kali tidak Dato' Penghulu mengambil duku Enche' Surin ada-nya da[n] lagi karna duku itu perentahan di-dalam tanah Nanning ada-nya


XVI.
19 October 1830: Samuel Garling, Resident Councillor, Malacca, to the Penghulu and Sukus of Nanning, in reply to the last.

Reminding the Penghulu and Sukus that Nanning was under the jurisdiction of the Company and administered by the Penghulu only by their permission, and that he must therefore carry out any orders given to him asserting that it was for the Resident Councillor alone to decide the ownership of the land claimed by Surin, that Government had after enquiry found that it was his and was not within the borders of Nanning, and that he had to pay tithe on it to the Company; adding that the Penghulu's intervention constituted an act of opposition to the Resident Councillor's orders for which an appropriate punishment would be inflicted, and reminding the Penghulu of his oath of allegiance in 1801.

Ini surat balasan dari-pada kita Tuan Raja Samuel Garling yang memérentah di-dalam negeri Melaka serta taalok-nya datang ka-pada Orang Kaya Penghulu Nanning serta keempat Suku-nya

* Orig. hus
† Orig. has ada-nya here also.

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wa baada-hu dari-pada itu maka ada-lah kita mafhumkan ka-
pada Orang Kayu sêrta këempat Suku sëperti tersebut dari hal
tanah Naning itu yang èmpunya Kumpeni Inggiris maka Orang
Kaya boleh mêmèrentah sahaja karna Orang Kaya di-bawah pê-
rentah kita ta'dapat tiada maka mahn-lah Orang Kaya mèngikut sègala pèrentah dari kita

shahadan ada-pun dari hal dusun Ènche' Surin itu kita sahaja
yang boleh mënentukan siapa yang èmpunya hak itu ada-pun di-
atas këpèreksean Government telah bènar-lah dusun itu sudah
di-pulangkan ka-pada Ènche' Surin dan tiada-lah boleh masok
di-dalam sëmpadan Naning têtapì dari hasil dusun itu ta'dapat
maka mahn-lah Ènche' Surin mêmbarang hasil-nya ka-pada Kompéni
pada sa-puloh satu

shahadan lagi jikalau Orang Kaya mêmasonki dari hal ini
mènjadi Orang Kaya mèlanggar-lah pèrentah kita ini mèlaiñkan
ta'dapat tiada nanti kita jalankan bagaimana patut hukan-nya
di-atas orang yang mèlanggar pèrentah tuan-nya itu maka ada-lah
kita mèmbèri pèringatan ka-pada Orang Kaya ada-pun ka-pada
èmpat hari bulan Babir'ul-awal sanat 1216 Orang Kaya sudah
bèrjanji lagi bërsumpah mènjadi hati bètul taalok ka-pada Kompéni
yang mahn mèngikut sègala pèrentah hèndak-lah di-pègàng
dèngan hati yang suchi tegoh

tèrsuratka-pada sèmbilan [bèlas] hari bulan October sanat 1830.

XVII.

(Undated): Pènghulu of Naning to Samuel Garling, Resident
Councillor, Malacca, in reply to the last.
Reasserting that the land claimed by Surin was not his but had
always been Naning land and that Surin's claim was quite a new
affair as the land had been immemorially within the Naning
jurisdiction.

Babwa ini surat mênayatank* puteh hati sêrta tabek ya-itu dari-
pada Dato' Pènghulu Naning maka barang di-sampaikan Allah
subhana-hu wa taala apa-lah kira-nya datang ka-hadapan Tuan
Raja Samuel [Garling] yang mêmèrentahkan di-dalam nêgeri Mèlaka

wa baada-hu kêmudian dari-pada itu ada-lah.Dato' Pènghulu
sêrta këempat Suku bërmauluman surat sa-kêping dan sêperti
surat itu telah malm-un-lah bunyi di-dalam surat dan lagi sêperti
tanah Ènche' Surin itu tanah Naning ada-nya sa-lama-sama-nya
dan lagi khabar Ènche' Surin itu orang mèngakut baharu ini
karna tanah itu zaman bêrzaman pèrentahà Naning jua sa-lama-
lama-nya ada-nya. Tamat kalam bi-l-khèir.

* Orig. has متنانک
+ Orig. has مسفر

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
4 November 1830: Samuel Garling, Resident Councillor, Malacca, to the Pênghulu of Nanïng, in reply to the last.

Expressing surprise at the tenour of the Pênghulu's letter; and stating that the records in the Government Office proved that the land claimed by Surin had been his for a century, that it was evident the Pênghulu had trespassed on the property of a man under the jurisdiction of the British Crown, that failure to pay the value of the dukus would amount to a breach of the Pênghulu's treaty of agreement with Lt.-Col. Taylor, that the Resident Councillor would probably find some other means of administering Nanïng, and that he refused to receive any further correspondence on the matter, which was to be considered as finally decided.

Ini surat balasan dari-pada kita Tuan Raja Samuel Garling yang memérentah di-dalam négréi Mêlaka serta taubok-nya ka-pada Orang Kaya Pênghulu Nanïng ada-nya

wa baada-hu dari-pada itu maka ada-lah kita mahumkan ka-pada Pênghulu ada-pun surat Pênghulu itu telah sampai-lah sudah ka-pada kita apa yang têrsèbut di-dalam surat itu menjadi hari-ran-lah kita mendêngar bunyi perkataan surat Pênghulu itu

ada-pun dari hal tanah sempadan itu bukan sudah kita mé-nyatakan telah nyata-lah sudah Enche' Surin yang émpunya dan lagi ada kétérangan-nya pula di-dalam surat kantor yang Enche' Surin punya tanah dari zaman bérzaman hingga ada sa-ratus tahun sudah láma-nya sekarang ini yang ada têrsèbut di-dalam surat Enche'; Surin punya tanah itu dan apa sébab-nya Pênghulu membuaat kélakan yang sa-rupa itu? ada-pun sekarang ini sudah-lah têntu Pênghulu mengambil hak orang yang ada bênaung di-dalam pêrentah Maharaja Inggrîs itu dengan kêkérasan sahaja

dan lagi jikalau tiada di-bayar harga-nya duku itu ka-pada Enche' Surin meláinkan putus-lah sudah pérjanjian Colonel Taylor yang ka-pada Pênghulu itu

shahadan lagi barang kali maka boleh-lah kita méñcharikan jalan yang lain akan memérentah négréi kita Nanïng itu

dan tiada-lah sa-kali-kali kita mahu méñerima surat dari Pênghulu dari hal ini meláinkan putus-lah sudah ada-nya
térsurat ka-pada émpat hari bulan November sanat 1830.

XIX.

(Probably received 20 November 1830): Pênghulu of Nanïng to Samuel Garling, Resident Councillor, Malacca.

Setting forth (with reference to instructions given by the Resident Councillor to the Pênghulu of Durian Tunggal to make enquiries) the old established boundary between Nanïng and Malacca, asserting that Surin's claim was newfangled and the duku trees
in dispute were not on Surin’s (old Malacca) holding,* and (with reference to the threat in the Resident Councillor’s last letter to depose the Pénghulu of Naning on account of this dispute) maintaining that the old boundary as stated was the boundary between the Naning lands and the Malacca holdings, that the Pénghulu had never granted the disputed land to Surin and that it was the Pénghulu’s by inheritance.

Ini surat balasan dari-pada Pénghulu Naning datang ka-pada Tuan Raja Samuel Garling yang memérentah di-dalam negeri Mélaka serta tasalok-tasalok-nya.

Bawa ini surat dari-pada Dato’ Pénghulu Naning ményatakan kirim tabek serta putuh hati maka barang di-sampaikan Allah subhanna-hu wa taala apa-lah kira-nya datang ka-hadapan Tuan Raja Samuel Garling yang memérentahkan dalam daerah bandar negeri Mélaka yang duduk dengan istirahat al-ikhair ada-nya wa baada-lu kémudian dari-pada itu ada-lah Dato’ Pénghulu ményatakan khabar ka-pada Tuan Raja akan hal sépérti Tuan Raja ményuoroh ka-pada Dato’ Pénghulu Durian Tunggal mémérekaså† hal sépérti bichara tanah sempadan Naning dengan tanah Parit Mélana itu dan zaman bérzaman tatkala dahulu kala tanah sempadan tanah Naning kanan mudek Pangkalan Supit dan Lidah Tanah dan Durian Sabatang Lésong Batu dan Bukit Bér-duri dan Dusun Langsat dan Bangkong Chondong dan Bua’ Makan Tanah dan Batu Békérut dan lagi tatkala kiri mudek Bukit Kérja dan Titian Akar ka-Pénudak Batang dan Bukit Kaya Arong‡ dan ka-Bukit Pémbagian dan Ulu Ayer Bétong§ dar Kuala Ráman China Bésar ada-nya itu-lah sempadan ada-nya

dan lagi sépérti Enche’ Surin itu ménagku baharu di-dalam tanah Naning ada-nya

sépérti duku itu bukan-nya di-dalam tanah télusun itu-lah ada-nya

dan lagi sépérti pérkhabaran surat dahulu itu yang di-bawa di-samán| ménagatakan péchat† Dato’ Pénghulu Naning sébab-bichara duku itu dan zaman bérzaman itu-lah sempadan tanah

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* It is not clear whether it is not suggested in this passage that Surin himself had admitted as much. The word ménagku is ambiguous, meaning as it does both to claim and to admit. But, in view of the similar phraseology in XVII, the former sense seems to be the one intended here.

† Orig. has مرسكي.
‡ Should probably be Arong.
§ Should probably be 逆袭. Orig. has بمن. It is not clear what this means. Probably the text is corrupt.
¶ Orig. has دسامان. 1925] Royal Asiatic Society.

Ini surat (datang)† ka-pada dua-puluh hari bulan November sanat 1830.

XX.

8 August 1831:** William Lewis to the Pênghulu of Naninging. Announcing his impending arrival with a military force to subdue Naninging and depose the Pênghulu, forwarding a Government proclamation (presumably to that effect—Newbold, op. cit., 1, 227); summoning the Pênghulu to come to Malacca immediately and meet the writer on the way there, on pain of being regarded as an enemy to the Company, accompanied only by the four Sukus, unarmed, (the writer threatening to open fire on any group of more than five persons); and guaranteeing the Pênghulu’s life if he surrendered as ordered.

Bawha ini surat dari-pada kita Tuan William Lewis datang ka-pada Pênghulu Dol Said

maka ini-lah kita mënnyatakan ka-pada Pênghulu ada-pun ke-datangan kita dengan halatantéra Kompéni datang ka-Naninging ini bendak mënñantukan dan main mënjadikan negeri Naninging ini bendak di-jadikan seperti tempat-tempat yang ada taalok dengan negeri Melaka

shahadon dari hal pèrbuatan Pênghulu dari bichara tanah Enche’ Surin itu mënjadi Kompéni terlalu murka di-atas Pêng- hulu mélainkan sèkarang dari pêrentahan Naninging itu mélainkan Pênghulu boleh bérhenti tiada boleh mënêrentah lagi

shahadon maka ada-lah kita mënghantar sa-buah pêlekat lari-pada Tuan Bésar yang mënêrentah tiga buah negeri Pulau Pângan dan Singapura dan Melaka mélainkan Pênghulu boleh lihat bagaimana yang ada tèrëbut di-dalam pêlekat itu

maka sèkarang kita bendak dengan sa-kètika ini jua Pênghulu turun ka-Mélaka dan jikalau tiada Pênghulu datang bértému déngan kita di-jalan ka-pada esok hari mélainkan pada pikiran kita Pênghulu bendak mélawan pêrentah Kompéni

shahadon di-dalam itu jikalau Pênghulu datang bértému itu mélainkan dengan émpat Suku salah tiada dengan bérşnjata

* Orig. has François.
† Datang appears to be cancelled in orig.
‡ This date seems doubtful. If Begbie (op. cit., pp. 169 seq.) is to be trusted, Lewis despatched a letter of this type on the afternoon of the 6th. The Naning border was crossed on the following day and hostilities began at once, by a Naning pênghima hurling a stone from a sling, to which the invading force replied with grape shot.

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jikalau ada lēbeh darj lima orang itu ta'dapat tiada mēlaimkan dēngan sa-kētika itu jua di-bēdil ka-pada orang-orang yang bērkumpul itu bahwa sa-sunggoh-nya kita mēnyatakan ka-pada Pēnghulu jikalau Pēnghulu dengan ēmpat Suku itu datang kapada kita mēnyērahkan diri mēlaimkan nyawa dan badan Pēnghulu itu di-atas kita akan mēnanggong-nya bahwa ini-lah kita nyatakan ada-nya
tērkaran g ka-pada [dē]lapan hari bulan August sanat 1831.

XXI.
(Undated): Pēnghulu of Nanjing to Lewis, probably in reply to the last.

Stating that the Pēnghulu and Sukus maintained their ancient loyalty, and in spite of Mr. Lewis's declared intention to destroy them they did not swerve from the traditions of the men of olden time.

Bahwa ini surat dari-pada Dato' Pēnghulu Nanjing mēnyatakan kirim tabek sērta puteh hati maka barang di-sampaikan Allah subhāna-hu wa taala apa-lah kira-nya datang ka-hadapan Tuan Lewis yang dudok dēngan istirahat al-khāir

wa baada-hu kēnmadian dari-pada itu Dato' Pēnghulu sērta dato' kēempat Suku bērkhabarkan hal sēpērti Dato' Pēnghulu Nanjing bahwa sa-kāli-kāli Dato' Pēnghulu sērta dato' kēempat Suku tiada mēngubah-ubah sēpērti sumpah sētia sa-lama-lama-nya zaman Tuan-tuan Bēsar dahulu sampai kapada Raja Mister Farquhar maka pada titkala ini Tuan Lewis hēndak mērosakkan dato'-dato' Pēnghulu Nanjing sērta dato' kēempat Suku itu maalum-lah ka-pada Tuan Lewis tētapi sa-kāli-kāli Dato' Pēnghulu sērta dato' kēempat Suku' sa-kāli-kāli tiada mēngubahkan pūsaka* orang-orang dahulu

itu-lah ada-nya. Tamat al-kalam.

XXII.
20 August 1831: Samuel Garling, Resident Councillor, Malacca, to the Pēnghulu of Nanjing.

Acknowledging receipt of a letter from the Pēnghulu to the effect that Lewis had entered Nanjing territory with an armed force, and summing up the Company's complaints against the Pēnghulu, viz. disobedience, first in neglecting to come to Malacca when summoned two or three years previously, obstructing the taking of a census, neglecting to keep order on the roads of Nanjing, and finally, trespassing and robbing fruit on Surin's land and claiming it as his own, in spite of the fact that Nanjing was admitted by under the Company's jurisdiction, stating that the Pēnghulu's

* Orig. has فسوكو

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procedure having been reported to the Directors in England, authority had been given to enforce the Company's supremacy, and therefore Lewis had been sent to Nanning, but the Pênghalu's conduct having led to the presumption that he would offer opposition to Lewis, the latter had been furnished with a military force, that the Company was entitled to send its forces whatever pleased within the territories under its jurisdiction, and that the Pênghalu's men had taken the initiative in attacking the force sent, which was not intended to commence an attack, that, on arrival at Sungai Pêtai, Lewis had written to the Pênghalu inviting him to come and meet him, and that as he had failed to do so, there was no alternative but for the force to proceed to Nanning; that there would have been no blood shed if the Pênghalu men had not begun hostilities, and that the Company was strong enough to subdue its vassals and the Pênghalu could not hope to escape the consequences of opposing it, that the writer believed the Pênghalu did not realize the character of the Company's policy and would be well advised to come to Malacca and submit to the Company's orders as in former times, in which case the writer would explain matters to the Government and perhaps avert the disaster which was impending over the Pênghalu, and the writer guaranteed the Pênghalu and his men a safe return to Nanning, but personal attendance on the Pênghalu's part was essential, and the attendance of the Sukuns without the Pênghalu would be of no avail.

Ini surat dari-pada Tuan Garling datang ka-pada Pênghalu Nanning wa baada-hu dari-pada itu ada-pun surat Pênghalu itu ada mengatakan Tuan Lewis masok ka-Nanning dengan balantántera péperangan itu sudah kita têrima maka sekaring kita membëri ingat ka Pênghalu ada-pun dari hal Pênghalu punya angkara yang tiada menurut përentah menunjukkan di-dalam dua tiga tahun di-bélakang ya-itu pêmulaan-nya Pênghalu tiada mahu datang ka-Melaka apabila di-panggil séperti pêrjalanan zaman daluhu itu dan lagi apabila Kompêni punya orang datang ka-Nanning hûndak membëri orang Nanning itu maka Pênghalu menégahkan dan tada memëliharakan dari hal baik dan jahat di-jalan tanah Nanning itu dan lagi pula dari sebuah mërampus buah-buahan sërta Pênghalu mëngaku tanah Enche' Surin itu tanah Nanning shahadan ada-pun yang tanah enche' Surin Pênghalu mengatakan tanah Nanning mëlainkan tèntu bukan jikalau ia sa-kali-pun bukan Pênghalu sudah mëngaku di-dalam surat-surat sëgala tanah Nanning itu Kompêni yang empunya dia?


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itu menjadi shak yang Pengkap itu mencegahkan Tuan Lewis dari-pada ménjalaikan péréntah Government maka dari sebah itu balatantéra pépérgangan ada ménégikut déngan Tuan Lewis

ada-pun Kompéni ménýurohkan orang pérang-nya itu tiada déngan tiada patut mélainkan patut-lah dia naik dan turun ka-pada tiap-tiap négeri dan tanah Kompéni itu maka ada-lah kita mén-gingatkan téléh dahulu ka-pada orang Pengkap yang mélawan pérang ada sa-orang Pénghira ménmulai déngan umban tali sérta déngan bédil ka-pada tautéra Kompéni Inggérís tatkala mélaini Ikan Lémak itu maka ada-lah kita ménýatakan ka-pada Pengkap ada-pun dari kénhédak Kompéni ka-Nanning itu tiada mahu ménmbédil atau méréosakan di-atas sa-orang* orang Nanning itu jikalau tiada lebéh dahulu di-mulai orang Nanning itu
tatkala Tuan Lewis sampai ka-Sungai Petâi itu maka ada-lah di-kirim sa-puchok surat ka-pada Pengkap ménýuroh Pengkap itu datang bérjumpa maka Pengkap itu tiada juga mahu datang bérjumpa maka dari sebah itu tiada-lah sa-suatu perjalanan yang lain sélah balatantéra itu naik ka-Nanning
tétépi Pengkap itu mahu-lah ingat sérta pikir jikalau orang Pengkap tiada ménmulai mélawan sa-titek darah-pun tiada akan tumpah ka-bumi maka Pengkap-pun méngetahui jua kuasa Kompéni itu yang boleh ménbinasakan sérta méréosakan ka-pada sélala orang-orang bésar dan pénéngulu-pénéngulu yang ada taalok ka-pada Kompéni jikalau ia mélánggar péréntah-nya itu dan jangan-lah kira-nya Pengkap boleh lépas dari hal pékerjáan ini jangan-lah kira-nya Pénéngulu itu tiada nanti di-hukumkan dari sebah mélawan Kompéni

ada-pun kita ménérima surat dari Pengkap itu déngan yang baik jua dan kita pikir Pénéngulu tiada ménérti apa yang kénhédak Kompéni itu mélainkan Pénéngulu turun-lah ka-Melaka supaya Pénéngulu boleh ménurnut sélala péréntah dan maksud Kompéni sérteri bagaimana zaman dahulu ya-itu bagaimana péréntah Major Farquhar dan boleh kita ménérangkan dari hal ini ka-pada Government barang kali boleh ménjadi kěbajikan sérta ménlong-kan di-atas Pénéngulu bala yang akan datang ini supaya Pénéngulu boleh lépas maka ada-lah kita bérjanji dengan sétiawan di-atas diri Pénéngulu sélala ménanggong yang tiada boleh ménjadi satu † apa-nya baik dapat mufakat atau tiada mélainkan Pénéngulu déngan orang-orang sakalain-nya boleh pulang kěmbali ka-Nanning déngan kěséngangan-nya itu

* Orig. may have sa-orang.
† Orig. has , perhaps for sa-suatu.

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
ada-pun bichara muafakat ini tiada* boleh dengan empat Suku sahaja ta’dapat tiada muafakat ini mahu dengan Pênghulu sendiri ada-nya

tèrkaran ka-pada dua-puloh hari bulan August sanat 1831.

XXIII.


Stating that the writer had heard that evilly disposed persons had informed Raja Ali that the Government intended to attack Rembau; disclaiming any such intention, and assuring Raja Ali that the Government had no desire to interfere with any of the inland rulers and chiefs and requesting him so to inform them; stating that the writer had received news that Raja Ali was assisting the Pênghulu of Nanning with troops and guns, but doubted the truth of such report, there being many false reports circulated by evil-minded persons; and forwarding a copy of a letter from the Governor of the Straits Settlements, the original of which was supposed to have perhaps miscarried.

Surat Tuan Samuel Garling datang ka-pada Yang di-pèrtuan Raja Ali di-dalam Rembau ada-nya

wa baada-hu dari-pada itu maka ada-lah kita mendapat khabar orang-orang yang jahat-jahat itu menyatakan ka-pada sahabat kita Government Inggeris itu bêndak mèrosakan negeri sahabat kita maka dari hal itu ini-lah kita nyatakan ada-pun dari pêkhabaran* itu tiada-lah bênar sa-kali-kali maka dari sebab itu tèrlalu banyak saka jikalau sahabat kita menghukumkan ka-pada orang yang membuat dusta dan angkara menyèbutkan nama Government Inggeris itu

Shahadan ada-pun sahabat kita ada berasahbat dengan Government Inggeris dan Government Inggeris-pun ada berasahbat dengan segala raja-raja dan pênghulu-pênghulu yang di-darat itu dan Government Inggeris itu tiada mahu memasuki di-dalam bichara bichara raja-raja dan pênghulu-pênghulu yang di-darat itu ada-pun dari hal itu melainkan sahabat kita khabarkan-lah dari hal ini ka-pada raja-raja dan pênghulu-pênghulu yang di-darat itu

shahadan ada-pun sekaranah ini ada kita mendapat pêkhabaran† sahabat kita ada ménolong ka-pada Pênghulu Nanning itu serta meng[...]+atar rayat dan meriam dan sènjata akan Pênghulu Nanning itu tètapi bagaimana-lah kita boleh pèrchaya dari hal pêkhabaran† yang dèmikian itu?

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* Orig. here has another داد, wrongly.

† Orig. has تکبران

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maka dari sēbab itu bahawa ini-lah kita bērkirim sa-puchoh surat ini ka-pada sahabat kita supaya sahabat kita bolch mēngē-
tahui-nya yang kēhēndak kita itu bagaimana ada tersēbut di-atas-
satar* ini jua

shahadan sēkarang ini banyak-lah orang-orang yang jahat-
jahat itu mēmbawa khabar ka-sana ka-mari khabar yang dusta-
dusta itu-lah ada-nya
dan lagi ada-pun surat (yang)† sahabat kita itu sudah-lah 
sampai ka-pada Tuan Bēsar itu dan Tuan Bēsar itu ada mēmbēri 
surat pērjawahan itu di-[h]antarkan ka-pada pērahu orang Lānggi 
tētapi di-dalam pikiran kita ēntah ada sampai surat itu ka-pada 
sahabat kita ēntah-pun tiada maka sēkarang ini ada-lah kita 
pēsērtakan surat salah pērjawahan† dahulu itu itu-pun bērsama-
sama dēngan surat ini datang ka-pada sahabat kita ada-nya

tersurat ka-pada dua-puluh hari bulan August tarikh sanat 
1831.

XXIV.

3 January 1832:§ Governor Ibbetson to the Yang di-pērtuan 
[Muda] Raja Ali, the Dato' Pēngiulus Lēla Maharaaja, and 
the four Sukus of Rēmban.

Acknowledging the receipt of a letter from the addressee and 
noting with regret that they had been giving assistance to the 
Nanling rebels on the basis of false reports against the Government 
which they had not attempted to verify; declaring that Govern-
ment would overlook the matter so far as the addressees were 
concerned but would enforce its claims against Nanling in order 
to put it on the same footing as the rest of Malacca territory, 
inasmuch as the Pēngiulus of Nanling had disobeyed all orders and 
also trespassed and robbed on the land of Surin, which was not 
within the limits of Nanling jurisdiction, and that his acts of 
disobedience had been frequent; maintaining that there was no 
alternative but force, as the British Government was not 
accustomed to admit defeat at the hands of any earthly ruler, and 
the addressees were well aware that in former times Nanling was 
subject to the same customs of government as Malacca, and it was 
only on account of the poverty of the inhabitants that some relief 
was subsequently given to them as an act of grace, but no change 
was made in its general status; apologising for delay in replying

* Orig. has ضِرْع
† Cancelled in the variant copy.
‡ Orig. has فِرْجِاَوَانِ
§ The original has 1831, which is certainly wrong.

[1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
to the addressee's letter and expressing a desire to meet them with a view to making a new treaty of friendship between Malacca and Rëmbau.

Ini surat dari-pada Tuan Ibbetson Resident tiga buah negeri Pulau Pinang Singapura dan Melaka bërkipim ka-pada sahabat kita Yang di-përtnan Raja Ali serta Dato' Penghulu Lela Maharaja serta keᵉmpat Suku yang mëmëngang përrentah di-dalam negeri Rëmbau ada-nya


shahadan maka sëkarang dari hal bënchana itu sudah-lah [h]abia mënjadi luput-lah sudah dari hati kita sëbab këtergan surat sahabat kita itu dan lagi dengan suçi ikhlas hati kita dari hal itu tiada-lah Government mënuntut-nya lagi dan jangankan di-tuntut-nya itu Government hëndak mënëgoëkan antara kita sahabat bërsahabat dengan përjanjian yang ba[h]ru supaya këmuđian hari-nya mënjadi têtup


maka sëkarang tiada apa-boleh di-buät lagi mëlainkan për-jalanan yang këkerasan jua jikalau tiada démìkan itu boleh mënjadi luput-lah têkelur-nya dan aminya-nya itu Government Inkigëri tiada biasa mënewaskan diri-nya ka-pada sa-suatu raja di-dalam dumia ini maka sahabat kita-pun yang tërlebeh-ëlebeh maalum orang Naning itu dahuñu kala-nya ada mëmakai adat përrentah sëpërtri

* The reference is no doubt to the treaty settled on the 20th January 1832 (Atchison, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 488-91, No. CL) subject to ratification by the Governor General. Atchison dates it the 28th, but Begbie's account (op. cit., pp. 196-99) makes it clear that it was signed and sealed on the 20th.

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adat orang Mêlaka jua kêmudian di-kaschani di-atas-nya karna ia têrlalu miskin dan pêrjalan-an-nya itu ada baik jikalau bagitu jua sampai sêkarang ini pêkêrja-an-nya itu ta'dapat tiada tiada di-
ubahkan

shahadah ada-pan dari hal kita tiada sêgêra membalas warkat sahabat kita itu selah têrtahan pêkêrjaan kita yang sêdikit itu têtapiti kita sêrta sampai sêkarang ini di-Mêlaka maka kita kirim surat ini ka-pada sahabat kita

maka ada-lah yang têrlêbeh-lêbeh maksud kita hêndak bêrtêmu dêngan Yang di-pêrtuan sêrta Dato' Pênghulun yang bêrdua sêrta Suku yang kêduhapun itu di-Pangkalan Kota dan mana*

bahwa kêtika itu boleh-lah kita dêngan sahabat kita mêmbuat pêrjânjian sêtia mêmgoahkan sahabat bêrsahabat antara Mêlaka dengan Kêmban supaya kêkal sa-lama-lama-nya
têrkarang surat ini ka-pada tiga hari bulan January sanat 1832.†

XXV.

7. Shaaiban 1247 (11th or 12th January 1832). Governor Ibbetson to the Yang di-pêrtuan of Sêri Mênaanti, the Dato' Kêlana Putêra of Sungai Ujong, and the Pênghulun of Johol.

Assuring the addressees that the expedition prepared by Government was meant merely to suppress the rebellion in Nanning and not aimed at any of the neighbouring States, in so far as they did not aid Nanning; and adding that authority had been received from the Governor General of India to enter into an amended treaty of friendship with the addressees for mutual benefit in the future.

Bahwa ini surat dari-pada kita Tuan Ibbetson Resident tiga buah negeri Pulau Pinang dan Singapura dan Mêlaka ada bêrkirim ka-
pada Yang di-pêrtuan di-Sêri Mênaanti dan Dato' Kêlana Putêra Sungai Ujong dan Pênghulun Johol

wa baada-hu dari-pada itu jangan-lah kira-nya sahabat kita menjadi hebat mêmênggar Government ada mêmumpulkan bala-
tanêra pêpêrangan di-Mêlaka ini ada-lah pikiran baik juga kita mêmêbêri khabar ka-pada sahabat kita jangan-lah kira-nya menjadi shak dan lagi dari hal antara kita dengan sahabat kita itu bagitu jua sa-lama-lama-nya sahabat bêrsahabat

shahadah maka ada-lah kita mêmûyatakkan ka-pada sahabat kita Government Inggeris telah têntu-lah akan pêrgi mêmukul Nanning yang derhaka ka-pada tua-n-nya itu têtapiti tiada man mêmbuat pêrgadohan ka-pada negeri yang lain-lain jikalau tiada mêmolong ka-pada Nanging itu

shahadah jangan-lah kira-nya sahabat kita kurang mêmûrti ada-lah kita mêmûyatakkan telah sudah-lah kita mêmêndapat ilêzin dari-

† This reads awkwardly and there seems to be something omitted here.
† The original has 1831.

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
pada Governor General Bénggala akan membaiki perjanjian sahabat bersama dan dengan sahabat kita yang boleh menegolukan antara kita dengan sahabat kita sa-lama-lama-nya maka mereka-mereka yang kedua pehak negeri boleh menjadi séniasa dari nyawa-nya dan harta-nya itu

shahadatan mélainkan sahabat kita boleh ménërima pérkantaun yang térsébut ini tandá ikhlas-nya Government Inggëris supaya dengan ségëra-nya sahabat kita boleh mënmbéri maksud dari hal ini ada-nya

térsurat ka-pada tujoh hari bulan Shaaiban sanat 1247.

**XXVI.**

12 January 1832: Governor Ibbetson to the Yang di-pértnuan Raja Ali, the Dato' Penghulu Lela Maharaja, and the four Sukus of Rémbau

Acknowledging a letter from the addresses to the effect that owing to there being no boats available they were unable to meet the Governor at the mouth of the Lánggi river; stating that owing to the shallowness of the river higher up it was impossible for the Governor to meet them at Ramuan China, but suggesting a meeting half way, i.e. at Sempang Bandar, where the river forked, and offering to send boats for the convenience of the addresses; and forwarding (or promising to forward) a draft of the proposed treaty for the information of the addresses.

Ini surat dari-pada Tuan Ibbetson Resident tiga buah negeri Pulau Pinang Singapura dan Mélaka bérkirim surat ka-pada sahabat kita Yang di-pértuan Raja Ali sèrís Dato’ Penghulu Lela Maharaja sèrís keëmpat Suku yang mënëgang pérëntah di-dalam negeri Rémbau ada-nya sèrís dengan puji-pujian

wa baada-lu dari-pada itu ada-pun surat sahabat kita yang témazakur ka-pada tujoh hari Shaaiban itu télah sampai-lah sudah ka-pada kita apa yang térsébut di-dalam warkat itu télah mafhun-lah kita maka ada-lah sahabat kita mënayakan dari sèbáb këtdikán péráhu itu maka sahabat kita tiada boleh datang bërtëmu ka-pada kita di-Kuala Lánggi itu dan kita-pun dëmikian itu jua karna kapal kita tiada boleh mudek ka-Ramuan China itu sèbáb ayeuy Sungai Lánggi jalan Ramuan China Këchil itu tiada chukup-dalam ayer-nya maka dari sèbáb itu menjadi këskaran antara këdua pehak kita dengan sahabat kita itu barang mëlum-lah kira-nya sahabat kita maka boleh-lah kita mënabgi dua dari këskaran itu maka boleh-lah kita bërtëmu dengan sahabat kita di-Sempang Bandar ya-itu tèntang mana Sungai Lánggi dari kuala mudek bërchabang dua satù chabang ka-Lánggi dan satu chabang ka-Rëmbau mélämkan dari maksud kita ini télah harap-lah kita akan sahabat kita mënukakan yang dëmikian itu jua dan boleh-lah kita mënghantarkan péráhu-péráhu akan mënjëmput sahabat kita itu

*Journal Malayan Branch* [Vol. III, Part, II.]
shahadon di-dalam antara samai ka-pada waktu kita dengan sahabat kita beretmu itu ada-lah kita hantar ka-pada sahabat kita tuladon surat perjanjian yang henda di-perbuat itu maka bolehlah sahabat kita membacha dan sahabat kita boleh mengeltahui dari maksud Governor General Benggala itu

shahadon di-dalam antara sahabat kita membalas surat kita ini melainkan kita bersedia-lah kita akan berangkat itu-lah ada-nya [tersurat] ka-pada dua-belas hari bulan January sanat 1832.*

XXVII.

9 February 1832: Government Proclamation.
Announcing the intention of Government to send a second expedition against Naning; assuring the inhabitants of Naning and neighbourhood that no harm would be done to them provided they remained quiet, or carrying on their usual occupations, but that houses found abandoned would be destroyed; and offering the following rewards for the capture of the undermentioned persons, viz.

Dol Sa'id—1000 dollars
Andika, chief of the suku Anak Melaka, of Naning,
Peta Melayu, of Ayer Gajah Mati,
Pendekar Tambi, of Melaka Pindah,
Enche' Muhammad and Enche' Had, of Jeméntah, Muar,
—200 dollars each.

Pélekat
Membéri tahu bahwa balatantéra Kompéni henda naik kembali ka-Naning akan henda mengalakan† ka-pada yang membuat dêhraka di-Naning itu

maka ada-lah di-béri tahu ka-pada ségala orang-orang yang ada tinggal di-Naning atau mérêka-mérêka yang ada tinggal di-dalam daerah yang ada dékat-dékat itu jikalau ada ia tinggal dengan diam-nya atau dêngan pékerjaan-nya yang sa-lama ini ta'dapat tiada melainkan di-peliharakan oleh afsir‡ Government akan rumah tangga dan anak bini haria henda sakalian itu

jikalau ada démikian itu pada kêmudian hari-nya nanti Government boleh membalaskan di-atas-nya itu dêngan këbjikan jua

jikalau tiada démikian itu dan dapat rumah tangga-nya têr-tinggal nêschaya binasa-lah olesh balatantéra itu

* The date is doubtful in the original, looking like 1832 corrected to 1831. But the former must be the right date.

† Orig. has ملاكن
‡ officers.
shahadan barang siapa yang boleh menerima sertai mambawa orang yang kepala derhaka yang tersebut di-bawa[h] ini ta'dapat tiada melayikan boleh-lah menerima upah-nya sa-ribu ringgit besar

Dol Sa'id

dan lagi barang siapa yang boleh mambawa pula orang-orang yang tersebut di-bawa[h] ini maka boleh menerima upah-nya ka-pada sa-orang dua ratus ringgit besar

sa-orang Andika Suku Anak Melaka di-Naming
dan sa-orang Peta Melayu yang ada tinggal di-Ayer Gajah Mati
dan sa-orang Pendekar Tambi yang ada tinggal di-Melaka Pindah
dan sa-orang Enche' Muhammad and Enche' Had orang Je-
mehentah tanah Muar ada-nya
terkarang pêlekak ini ka-pada sêmbilan hari bulan February tarikh sanat 1832.

XXVIII.

(Undated): Samuel Garling, Resident Councillor, Malacca, to the Temênggong of Muar.

Complaining that the Temênggong had made an armed incursion upon two villages in Malacca territory, viz. Rim and Chaban, thereby terrifying their inhabitants, in violation of established usage between friendly states and presumably under advice from evil counsellors; protesting vigorously against such acts of aggression and complaining that Enche' Muhammad and Enche' Had, together with armed followers, had been left behind in the raided territory when the Temênggong returned to Muar, and were terrifying and robbing the inhabitants [Here the letter, which appears to be a fragment, ends].

* The name of Dol Sa'id appears in the margin with an indication that it should be inserted in the text between mambawa and orang yang kepala derhaka. But the wording shows that that would not be its proper place.

† The Dato' Engkau Temênggong Paduka Tuan of Muar had already as early as February 1829 (during the short Dutch interregnum) begun to assert his pretensions to the border village of Chaban. This appears clearly from two chops granted by him to the pênhulu of that village which were still in the possession of his descendant and remote successor Pênhulu Sulong Arin of Chaban and the latter's aged father in 1893, when copies were made of them by permission of the owners. The first one is dated Friday, 3 Jumada-I, 1825 and the second merely 1237. Both documents contain little else than injunctions to enforce Muslim religious observances, particularly attendance at the mosque service (under penalty of being fined for absence, 10 dollars in the first chop, and 20 in the second). The first one gives the pênhulu jurisdiction as far as the hamlet of Asuhan, inclusive. The second mentions that the sukars (or clans) represented in the mukim were Mungkal, Sêmênggeng, Bidnanda, and Tilga Batu, in that order, and that the pênhulu of the village at the time was Dato' Dâlim. There is a reference to this act of aggression in J. E. A. S., Straits Branch (1884), No. XIII, pp. 261-2, Appendix pp. xxxiii, xxxiv. See also Begbie (op. cit., pp. 263-4).

Journal Malayan Branch [Vol. III, Part, II.
Bahwa ini surat dari-pada kita Tuan Raja Samuel Garling yang mêmérentah di-dalam negeri Melaka serta taalok-taalok-nya datang ka-pada sahabat kita ya-itu Têmênggong di-dalam Muar

wa baanda-hu dari-pada itu maka ada-lah sekarang tiga-puluh hari sudah lama-nya Têmênggong datang bersama-sama dengan anak-anak raja serta penglima dan hulubalang membawa alat sênjata masok ka-dalam tunah Kompéni ya-itu tempat-nya Rim dan Chaban itu mêméberi takut ka-pada anak buah kita yang di-tempat itu

bawah Têmênggong-pun yang têrlébeh mêmégtahui jua adat-nya sa-suatu raja-raja akan datang mêmâsoki dengan alat sênjata ka-dalam tempat sa-suatu raja-raja yang ada bêrsahabat itu jikalau tiada têrlébeh dahulu mendapat idzin-nya itu dan lagi istimewa pula kira-nya sahabat kita jikalau orang yang lain datang mêmâsoki dengan alat sênjata ka-dalam negeri sahabat kita itu nêshaya sahabat kita-pun mêméjadi marah jua pékerjaaan yang dêmikian itu

shahadan pada pikiran kita telâh ada-lah orang yang burok punya ajaran ka-pada sahabat kita mêményuroh; melakukan kêlakan yang dêmikian ini karna sahabat kita-pun ada-pun ada muda belum sampai chukup akai dan lagi têrlébeh-lébeh pula pikiran kita sêbab sahabat kita dengan sa-bêntar itu jua pulang kêmbari ka-Muar

barang maulum kira-nya sahabat tiada-lah kita hêndak mêm-natakan yang lain mêmélainkan tiada patut sa-kali-kali pêruhatan sahabat kita yang dêmikian ini mêmélainkan pada lain kâli-nya jangân-lah sahabat kita mêmbuat yang dêmikian ini

têtapi maka ada-lah sahabat kita mêménggalkan di-dalam tanah kita itu Enche' Mohammed dengan Enche' Hâd dêngan orang-orang-nya yang bêrsênjata itu waktu sahabat kita kêmbari itu maka sekarang orang itu ada membuat takut di-atas anak buah kita di-tempat itu maka dengan kêkêrasan-nya ia mêmângâbil wâng dan bêras

[Here the fragment ends]

XXIX.

29 February 1832: Government Proclamation

Stating that a report had been received that stockades had been erected on the Nanjing road with a view to obstructing the passage of the expedition; informing the inhabitants of Nanjing that all such stockades would be destroyed and warning them to remove from them any paddy or other goods, as it was not the desire of Government to harm the property, such as buffaloes, paddy, etc., of those who offered no resistance; and assuring them that, provided they remained quiet, or carried on their usual occupations, no harm would be done to them, or if any were done, they should immediately lay a complaint.

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
Bahwa Government telah ménadapat khabar ada banyak kubu-kubu
sudah di-dirikan orang di-jalan Naning itu akan mengadang balatantéra Government
maka ini-lah di-béri tahu ka-pada sakalian orang yang ada
tinggal di-Naning itu maka ségala tempat-tempat itu hendas di-
rosakan oleh balatantéra itu
shahadat barang siapa yang ada ménaroh padi atau barang-
barang yang lain di-dalam kubu-kubu itu mélainkan dengan ségéra-
nya baik di-kéluarkan karna bukan maksud Government itu hendas
binasakan dari hak orang-orang yang tiada melawan pérëntah
Government itu sèpérëti kérban atau padi atau harta-nya itu

shahadan hai orang Naning jangan-lah tiada ménérëma-nya
pengajaran ini sèbah Government tiada menjadi taksir ka-pada
kémudian hari-nya itu

shahadan jikalau ada ia tinggal dengan diam-nya atau dengan
pékérjan yang sa-lama ini térperlhara-lah oleh képala balatantéra
supaya tiada boleh orang-orang balatantéra itu binasakan dari
anak bini dan harta benda-nya itu dan jikalau ada yang démikian
itu mengadu-lah ka-pada kétika itu jua ada-nya
térkarang pélekát ini ka-pada dua-puluh sèmbilan hari bulan
February sanat 1832.

XXX.

20 March 1832: Government Proclamation,
Requiring all strangers entering Malacca by sea or by land to
report themselves to the police within twenty-four hours under
pain of severe penalties to be inflicted on them and on persons
harbouring them.

Pélekát

Mémbrëri tahu ka-pada sakalian orang sèpérëti pérëntah Polis yang
telah sudah di-dalam négréi Mélaka ini dari hal orang-orang
dagang yang masok ka-dalam négréi ini baik dari laut atau dari
durat

shahadat dari sèbah itu ségala orang-orang dagang itu ta-
dapat tiada mahu ia sênd[i]-nya mémbrëri tahu ka-dalam Polis
lama-nya di-dalam dua-puloh émpat jam dan barang siapa yang
mélanggar pérëntah yang térèsbut ini ta’dapat tiada nanti di-
hukum dengan sa-pénõh-pénõh hukuman di-atas orang itu dengan
orang yang punya rumah yang ada ménaroh orang dagang itu

March dua-puloh hari bulan sanat 1832.

XXXI.

18 April 1832: Samuel Garling, Resident Councillor, Malacca,
to the Téménggong of Muar,
Complaining that persons under the Téménggong’s jurisdiction,
viz. Téngku Busu, Enche’ Muhammad and Enche’ Had, with
about 100 men from Ségamat, had gone to assist Naning, which as between friendly states was an unfriendly act.

Bàihwa ini surat dari-pada kita Tuan Samuel Garling datang pada sahabat kita Òêmênggong Muar dengan puji-pujian

wa baada-hu dari-pada itu maka ada-lah kita mëncraugkan ka-pada sahabat kita ada-lah kita mëndapat khabar Têngku Busu dan Òêneche' Muhammad dan Òêneche' Had ada mënbawa orang Ségamat ada kira-kira-nya sa-ratus orang akan mëno long ka-Naning sërta bërjanji pula hëndak memluantu dengan orang-orang lagi

shaladan maka ada-lah kita melëpaskan* taksir ka-pada sahabat kita ada-pun pëkërjanan ini tërëbeh-lëbeh maalum kirunya sahabat kita karna mëreka yang tërëbut itu† di-bawah përentah sahabat kita ada-pun Mëlaka dengan Muar ada bërsahabat juga dan lagi Têngku Busu dan Òêneche' Muhammad dan Òêneche' Had itu di-bawah përentah sahabat kita ada-nya
tërkarang surat ka-pada dulapan belas hari bulan April sanat 1832.

XXXII.

29 May 1832: Samuel Garling, Resident Councillor, Malacca, to: Raja Ali of Rembau, the Dato' Kêlana Putëra of Sungai Ujong, the Dato' Penghulu of Johol, and the Têmênggong of Muar,

Referring to previous letters assuring the addressees that the intentions of Government were merely to arrest Dol Sa'id, Penghulu of Naning, expel evil doers, and restore prosperity in Naning, and requesting the addressees to prevent their subjects from giving assistance to Dol Sa'id and to inform the Government of anything that might cause trouble to it in connection with the Naning affair; expressing astonishment at hearing that Dol Sa'id had received assistance in the shape of men, arms, and ammunition from States that were regarded as friendly to the British Government, but presuming that the addressees were ignorant of this or unable to prevent it; in view, however, of the damage done thereby in British territory, announcing an immediate blockade of the Linggi, Kêsang, and Muar rivers, to prevent the conveyance of arms and provisions to the enemy, such blockade to cease when hostilities ceased but to continue as long as Dol Sa'id continued to resist the Government's forces in Naning.

Bàihwa ini surat dari-pada Tuan Samuel Garling Resident Councillor di-dalam négëri Mëlaka ada bërkirim sa-buah surat ka-pada Yam Tuan Raja Ali di-dalam Rembau dan sa-buah surat ka-pada Dato' Kêlana Putëra di-Sungai Ujong dan sa-buahi surat ka-pada

* Orig. has ملائم
† Orig. may have isi بني

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Dato' Pencbulu Johol dan sa-buhu surat ka-pada Téménggong Muar dengan puiy-pujian-nya

wa benda-lu dari-pada itu maka ada-lah kita membayankan ka-pada sahabat kita dari hal surat Tuan Resident yang merénolah tiga buah négeri itu yang telah sudah dahulu di-nyatakan ka-pada sahabat kita dari-pada hal angkara Dol Sa'id yang di-jadikan Pencbulu di-dalam Nanjing ya-itu tanah Kompién

maka ada-lah kěhěndak surat kita yang dahulu itu sahabat kita jangun měnjadi wasangka dari sébab balatantéra itu naik ka-Nanlng itu tiada dengan sa-suatu jalan délainkan hanya-lah maksud kita yang hěndak měnangkap Dol Sa'id itu sahaba sěrtà měng-làlaukan orang-orang yang měmbuat kěbinasaan di-dalam tanah kita supaya boleh měnjadi kěbajikan di-atas Government dan lagi boleh měnjadi kěsěmpurnan dan sějahtéra-nya di-atas sěgala anak buah kita yang di-Nanling itu

ada-pun surat kita yang dahulu itu ada-lah kěhěndak kita sahabat kita boleh mělarangkan di-atas orang-orang yang ada ta-lok di-bawa pěrentah sahabat kita itu akan měmolong Dol Sa'id itu dan lagi boleh měnbéri khabar dengan sěgěra-nya jikalau ada sa-suatu hal yang měndatangkan kěsukaran ka-pada Government dari sébab fasal Nanling itu

maka hairan-lah kita měnděngar yang Dol Sa'id itu měndipat kětolongan orang-orang dan sěnjata-sěnjuta dan ubat pěluru da-rí-pada těmpat-těmpat pěrentah yang láin ada-pun yang sa-lama ini di-dalam pikiran kita ada sahabat dengan Government Inggeris itu pada ikhtiar kita barang kěi sahabat kita tiada měngétahu dari hal pěkěrjran atau tiada kausa akan mělarangkan dia tětapi měn-jadi juga kěbinasaan jua di-dalam tanah kita di-daratu itu hingga sampai ka-pada hari ini měnjadi pěrgadohan jua maka dari sébab itu Government ta'dapati tiada hěndak-lah měmbuat pěrjalan dan yang kěfěntuan sěrtà dengan sěgěra-nya yang amat téghoh dari dahulu itu

sa-běrmula ada-pun dari hal Sungai Linggi dan Sungai Kěsang dan Sungai Muar itu hěndak di-kawal maka dari hal itu kita měnbéri khabar ka-pada sahabat kita Government hěndak empang sungai-sungai yang těrsěbut itu dengan sěgěra-nya jua supaya jangan boleh di-kawa-nya masok pěrkara sěgala sěnjata-sěnjuta dan mukan-makanan itu ka-pada sětěru kita


těrkaran surat ini ka-pada dua-puloh sěmbilan hari bulan May sanat 1832.
XXXIII.

29 May 1832: Samuel Garling, Resident Councillor, Malacca, to the Tengku Penglima Besar Sayid Sa’aban.

Informing him that his good services to Government had been reported to Governor Ibhetson who expressed his high appreciation of them and desired that his thanks should be conveyed to Sayid Sa’aban, with the further intimation of a reward to be granted after the cessation of hostilities.*

Bawah ini surat dari-pada Tuan Samuel Garling ka-pada sahabat kita Tengku Penglima Besar va-lat Sayid Sa’aban yang ada sēkarang ka-pada waktu ini di-dalam Naning di-Bukit Sahasok dengan puji-pujian-nya

wa baada-hu dari-pada itu ada-pun dari lal sahabat kita yang sudah mēnjalankan pēkērjaan di-atas Government itu pēkērjaan yang kēbajikan itu mēlűnkan kita-pun sudah-lah sampai kan ka-pada Tuan Ibhetson Governor pada tīgas buah nēgēri maka Tuan itu-pun mēmuji-muji-lah di-atas pēkērjaan sahabat kita dan lagi bagitu banyak punya tērima kaseh di-atas sahabat kita

shahādan apabila sēlēsai-lah pērgadohan ini nēschaya nanti di-kurniakan di-atas sahabat kita ada-nya

tērkarang surat ini ka-pada dua-puluh sēmbilan hari bulan May sanat 1832.†

XXXIV.

9 June 1832: Government Proclamation.

Complaining that in spite of protests addressed to various rulers and chiefs assistance continued to be given by neighbouring States in the shape of men, arms, and ammunition, to Nanning, which was in rebellion against the Government in breach of the oath of allegiance of its Pēnghulu and Sukus; stating that letters had been sent to various rulers and chiefs announcing the intention to blockade the Linggi, Kēsang, and Muar rivers until such time as such assistance ceased to be given to the rebellious Dol Sa’id and Nanning had become settled; and accordingly proclaiming the aforementioned blockade, to prevent anyone from entering or leaving by the said rivers, until such time as aforesaid.

Pēlekat

Bawah ada-lah tanah Nanning itu yang ada dērhaka ka-pada Government Inggēris ada-pun tatkala dahulu Pēnghulu-nya dengan kē-empat Suku-nya telah sudah bērsumpah setia di-lawah pērentah

* As stated in a letter from Mr. Thomas Lewis, Acting Resident Councillor, Malacca, dated 24 February 1837, this took the shape of a monthly allowance of 104 Company Rupees eight annas, as from November 1836, subject to a proviso that it might cease if he made trouble with neighbouring States or did anything that the Malacca Government did not like.
† The figure 2 is not clear but this must be the year.

1920] Royal Asiatic Society.
Government itu maka ada-lah sekarang kéraraptali-nya khahar sampai ka-pada kita ménnyatakan térlahu amat banyak kétolongan ya-itu orang-orang dan sénjata-sénjata ubat péluru dari raja-raja dan pénghulu pénghulu yang sa-lama ini pada kira kita ada bér-
sahabat dengen Government Inggérís

shahadah ada-lah Government Inggérís yang télah sudah mén-
nyatakan ka-pada raja-raja dan pénghulu-pénghulu akan mèlarang-
kan di-atas anak buah dan rayat-nya itu jangan ia masok di-dalam pèkerjaan Dol Sa'id yang dèrhaka itu tétapi di-dalam pada itu ada juga kétolongan-nya

maka dari sèbab kétolongan ka-pada dèrhaka Dol Sa'id itu
maka ada-lah surat-surat di-kirimkan ka-pada raja-raja itu dan
pénghulu-pénghulu akan hénjak ménghawali sungai-sungai ya-itu
Lìnggi dan Késang dan Muar sampai [h]abis térlépas kétolongan
ka-pada dèrhaka Dol Sa'id itu dan tanah Nánìng itu boleh ménjádi kè-
sémpranaan

bawa ini-lah mèmbéri tahu ka-pada ségala orang maka ada-
lah Sungai Lìnggi dan Sungai Késang dan Sungai Muar itu ada
 térkawal ka-pada kétika ini tiada boleh orang masok atau keluar
dari sungai-sungai itu sampai [h]abis pèkerjaan Nánìng itu dan
orang-orang dan hartà bênda sakalian-nya itu boleh ménjádi kè-
sémpranaan dengan sèjahtéra-nya

térkawal pelèkák ini ka-pada sèmbilan hari bulan June tarikh
sanát 1833.

XXXV.

10 June 1832: Samuel Garling, Resident Councillor, Malacca,
to the Témènggong of Muar.

Acknowledging receipt of a letter from the Témènggong; informing
him of the arrival of a British war ship to blockade the neighbouring
rivers; requesting him immediately to recall his Ségamat
subjects who under the leadership of Ènché' Häd and Ènché' Mùhammad* had gone to the assistance of Nánìng; expressing the
intention to blockade the mouth of the Muar river until the
unlawful encroachments on the border villages, Rim, Chohong, etc.,
between Mt. Ophir and Sungai Chinchin Hilang had ceased and
Nánìng had been conquered; and expressing the hope that the
Témènggong would take prompt steps as requested.

Bawah ini surat dari-pada kita Tuan Samuel Garling datang ka-
pada sahabat kita Témènggong Muar ada-nya

wa baada-hu dari-pada itu surat dari-pada sahabat kita itu
sudah-lah sampai ka-pada kita apa-apa yang tèrmazkúr di-dalam-
nya itu tèlah mafhum-lah kita

* In a letter to the Yang di-pèrtuan Muda of Rêmban, under date
3 Rabi‘u-l-akhir 1252 (13 July 1836) Samuel Garling wrote that these
persons would be allowed to enter and leave the Company's territory like
anyone else provided that they conducted themselves properly and made no
further trouble there; and that their old offences were forgotten.
shahadan maka ada-lah kita menerima tahu ka-pada sahabat kita kapal perang Inggeris telah ada-lah datang akan mengawali sungai yang dekat-dekat itu ada-pun nama Kapitan kapal perang itu Plumridge* dan kapal Maharaja Inggeris itu Magician†.

shahadan ada-pun maksud kita dengan singa-nya sahabat kita menyuruh memanggil kembali dari Nanning akan buah sahabat kita orang Singapura itu yang di-perentahkan oleh Enche' Had dan Enche' Muhammad itu sahabat kita mengegalkan orang-orang itu masok ka-dalam tanah perentah Melaka.


shahadan dengan sa-penoh-penoh harap kita di-atas sahabat kita akan menjalankan pekerjaan ini boleh dengan singa-nya menjadikah kebajikan dan kesempurnaan dan sejahtera-nya tèrkarang ka-pada sa-puloh hari bulan June sanat 1832.

XXXVI.

16 June 1832: Samuel Garling, Resident Councillor, Malacca, to the Dato' Kelana Putera of Sungai Ujong.

Acknowledging the receipt of a letter from the Dato' Kelana requesting that the Linggi river might not be blockaded and suggesting that he himself could prevent the transit of goods to Nanning; pointing out that, as the addressee was well aware, a quantity of arms and ammunition had been sent to Nanning since the beginning of the rebellion and that Government had evidence that most of them came by way of that river and were regularly forwarded from thence to Nanning; maintaining that Government had been very patient in confining itself to the prohibition of that traffic, but that as that course had not answered to expectations, there was no alternative left but to blockade the mouth of the river; assuring the addressee that this would not have been done if there had been any other way of stopping the traffic in question, and that the blockade would cease as soon as the Nanning affair had

* Orig. haa
† Orig. haa

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
been settled; and expressing the hope that the addressee would be of assistance in the matter and prevent any further help being given to the rebellious Dolo Sa'id.


ada-pun permintaan sahabat kita jangan-lah di-tutup Kuala Lànggi itu sèrta sahabat kita boleh mélarangkan barang apa-apa bênda pêrgi ka-Naning

shahadan sahabat kita tërêlêbeh-lêbeh maalum yang ada pêrgi ka-Naning itu tërêlalu banyak sênjata-sênjata ya-itu sênapang-sênapang dan ubat bêdil dan pélluru sa-lama Dolo Sa'id mënêrihaka ka-pada Government maka ñëkarang dapat-lah kêtêrangan-nya kébanyakan bênda-bênda yang têrsêbut itu datang dari Sungai Lànggi dan ada satu képala* tinggal di-tëpi sungai itu in-lah kébanyakan bênda-bênda yang têrsêbut itu datang dari Sungai sahabat kita tërêlêbeh-lêbeh kêtahu sa-lama ini Government sabar-kan jua mêlainkan di-surow mêlarangkan jua pèrbuatûn itu di-dalam pikîran kita boleh ia bêrênti

shahadan ñëkarang ini kita lihat tiada lulus maksud kita itu tä'dapat tiada mêlainkan tiada jalan yang lain hanya-lah kita tutup kualâ itu

shahadan jikalau ada perjâhannan yang lain janggan bênda-bênda itu di-bawa ka-Naning sa-lagi ada Dolo Sa'id mënêrihaka ka-pada Government përch luihâ-lah sahabat kita tiada kita mênutupi kualâ itu

shahadan lagi apabila pêkërjaan Nanîng itu sudah jelas mêlainkan kawal-kawal itu nanti di-rëntsikå

shahadan tërêlêbeh-lêbeh harap kita yang sahabat kita boleh mënolong di-dalam pêkërjaan ini sêrta mêlarangkan kêtolongan ka-pada Dolo Sa'id itu supaya orang itu yang ada mungkur di-atas përsumpahan sëtia itu ya-itu ada kërap kali përsumpahan-nya yang dëmikian itu Melaka dan Sungai Ujong itu menjâdi satu di-dalam maksud akan mënulamaikan nëgëri

shahadan sahabat kita boleh lêbeh-lêbeh pikîr dari ha l Ini pêkêrjaan yang këbañikan ada-nya
tërkarang surat ini ka-pada ènâm-bèlas hari bulan June sanat 1832.

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* Orig. has كُنْلَأ but perhaps كُنْلَا is meant.

† Orig. has مُغَيِّيْلاَكَن
**ERRATA.**

The Volume and Part Number lines at the foot of even pages, 2 to 184 should read: Vol. III., Part II., not Vol. I, Part II, as printed.

The division into Parts on p.p. 1, 99 and 199 was made in error and should be disregarded.

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A Chinese Wedding in the Reform Style

By W. G. STIRLING.

With the birth of the Chinese Republic many old-time ceremonies have been set aside. Of course not all Chinese have accepted modern innovations. Some have adopted the new style owing to the great saving of time and money. Many cling to their old customs.

The wedding ceremony which I here describe seems to be that generally accepted by the advanced school. Whether it is legal or illegal in our local courts is a point that awaits a test case. It would appear that as easily as these marriages are made so easily if the parties agree can they be dissolved.

In former times the young people did not even see one another before the wedding day. Witness the following verse written by some Sinologue.

"A mien severe and eyes that freeze
Become the future bride.

No whispering underneath the trees
Ere yet the knot be tied."

Marriages were arranged without reference to the wishes of the young couple. Go-betweens exchanged presents of cakes, geese, foodstuffs, money and jewellery and an endless number of cards on red paper.

The following list gives an idea of the nature of these red cards:

1. Horoscope from Bridegroom’s family to that of the Bride.
2. Horoscope from Bride’s family to that of the Bridegroom.
3. Preliminary presents from Bridegroom’s family to the Bride’s family.
4. Preliminary presents from Bride’s family to Bridegroom’s family.
5. Betrothal presents from Bridegroom’s family to Bride’s family.
6. Betrothal presents from Bride’s family to Bridegroom’s family.
7. Milk money presented to the Bride’s mother usually sent along with No. 5.
8. Betel nut money, also sent with No. 5.
9. Fee for preparing the documents sent with Nos. 5 and 6.
10. Card announcing the approach of Bridegroom to the Bride's house.
11. Card acknowledging the above.
12. Card inviting the Bride to come and worship the ancestors of the Bridegroom.
13. Marriage contract from the Bridegroom's family to that of the Bride—sent along with No. 5.
14. Marriage contract from Bride to Bridegroom—sent along with No. 6.

Tips had to be given to the bearers of these various articles, and to persons officiating. The cost of the ceremony itself was very heavy.

All this has now been cut down to a ceremony which lasts about two hours and owes something to Western and probably American influence.

The bride was formerly conveyed in a red chair that admitted no light and little air. This vehicle is supplanted by an open-work palanquin decorated with flowers or a motor car decorated with red cloth and flowers. Badly made European clothes, a frock-coat far too long, or an ill-fitting morning coat, with a top hat, have taken the place of the impressive Chinese robes.

The certificates of marriage, one for each of the contracting parties, are sheets about 20" x 14", decorated with a border of flowers. In the centre appear two coloured butterflies coquetting with each other, or a dragon and phoenix. The names of the contracting parties appear with their respective ages, dated so many years before the foundation of the Republic. The name of the president before whom the contract was made, the names of the parents of the contracting parties, the two witnesses, and the date of the marriage all appear in their order. Each person, or his representative in the case of the parents (one or both of whom may be absent), signs his name.

Having received an invitation from a young friend of mine to witness his wedding on Easter Sunday, April 1923, I went to the Yong Cheng School at the top of Club Street, Singapore. The marriage was fixed for midday.

The presents consisted of Chinese scrolls, pictures and addresses, many of them beautifully done but in appalling frames. A few of the pictures were painted on glass, a bizarre modern type of Chinese art. Apart from these gifts I saw no presents such as one might expect to see, pieces of cloth, bottles of scent, shoes, cakes of soup etc.

Crackers announced the approach of the bridal car. I was shown to my seat close to that of the director of ceremonies and on the side of the bridegroom's family. The people in the hall took
Place of the Ceremony showing the distribution of the various persons taking part.

(Chinese Marriage in the Reform Style).
their places and the director rang a brass hand-bell, which reminded me of tea-time at school, and was kept in continued use. Musicians composed of the Yong Cheng School boys band entered and took up their place at T. A few minutes later the director ringing his bell called on the master of ceremonies to take up his place at C. The master of ceremonies then called on the director of ceremonies (who is his prompter if required) to take up his position at D behind an altar or raised table. Next with a ring of his bell he invites the attendants to take up their respective places at R and I. visitors to take up their places at O and L, ladies going to O, and gentlemen to L; the relatives of the bridegroom to be seated at Q and the relatives of the bride at P. Finally the master of ceremonies invites the parents or guardians of the bride and bridegroom to take up their positions at F and G respectively. With another ring of the bell the master of ceremonies announces the president who takes up his chair at A exactly behind the altar or high table. On this table there was nothing except writing materials, two round red cylindrical cases containing the marriage certificates, and a small tray with two gold wedding rings. The table was covered with a cloth and there were no decorations, candles, festoons or flowers to suggest anything of the old-time marriage custom. The hall however was festooned. The master of ceremonies next calls on the witnesses to take up their positions at B on the left and right of the president; it is their duty to prove the marriage and sign the documents one for the bride and the other for the bridegroom.

The master of ceremonies then rings his bell and calls on the bride and bridegroom to appear. Music is played, and they enter, first the bridegroom with his attendants, then the bride with her ladies-in-waiting. They take up their position at H and I their attendants going to their places at M, J, N, K. Nobody stood up when the bride and bridegroom entered. They however have to stand the greater part of the ceremony. The bridegroom was dressed in a morning coat and trousers, white gloves and held a top hat in his hand. The bride in a kind of semi-Chinese European dress with a long veil done up in a sort of knot on her head.

After what sounded extremely like a cake walk the president then rose and delivered an address giving the names of the contracting parties, their parents, their witnesses etc. This concluded, the bride and bridegroom bowed once to the witnesses seated at B, thrice to each other and thrice to their respective parents or guardians. They then bowed once to the president. The president read out the certificates of marriage, which are the only documents, no register of the marriage being kept. The bride and bridegroom signed them. Next the witnesses, the parents or guardians signed, and finally the president signed and sealed them. The master of ceremonies hands the tray with the two gold rings to the bridegroom who takes one and places it on the third finger of the bride's left hand.
hand. The other ring he hands to the bride who places it on the
bridegroom's ring finger. The young couple bow once to the
president, three times to their respective parents, once to their
relatives, once to the guests and once to their witnesses. The
schoolmates of the bride and bridegroom now sing or recite a piece
of poetry at the conclusion of which the president reads out the
names of the donors of the complimentary address presented to the
young couple. First the president, then the parents or guardians
and certain near relatives give addresses of advice to the newly
married couple. Music followed. Certain visitors, of whom I was
one, were called on to make short speeches of congratulation. The
parents thank those present for coming to witness the marriage.
The young couple bow their thanks to the president, to the witnesses
or middlemen, to the guests, to those who have assisted at the
ceremony. They bow three times to their parents and then retire.
Music announces the conclusion of the ceremony. Tea and refresh-
ments are now served, ladies going to one room the gentlemen to
another. Finally a wedding group is taken. The order of cere-
mony is printed on a pink programme. The whole proceeding
lasted about 2 hours.

The certificates of marriage are kept by the bride and bride-
groom respectively. With the exception of the most important
items, such as the signing of the marriage contracts and the ex-
change of rings, other items may be added or deleted according to
arrangement. It is curious to note that neither party is asked if
they agree to marry each other.

The cutting of a wedding cake by both bride and bridegroom is,
I was told, an additional feature. In this case the cake was there
but not cut.

Only a small fee is charged which goes to the coffers of the
place where the ceremony is held, usually some school or public
reading room. At present there is no special place where marriages
shall take place, but some public place is favoured.

The future must decide many problems: the method of divorce
and separation, the taking of a second wife (which however I am
told this form of marriage does not allow) and the possibility of
the bride being married against her will.
Notes on Malay Magic

By B. O. Winstedt, D. Litt.

Note. The abbreviations used in this article are those employed in my recent book on Malay Magic—Shaman Saiva and Sufi.

Nudity.

There is a tradition that to acquire a nigglet a Sakai bage will dance stark naked and dandle a child's corpse into the similitude of life before biting off its tongue. A Cham prophetess must resort on the night of her initiation to a ant-heep in the moonlit forest, sever a cock from head to tail and dance naked, uttering incantations that will restore the fowl to life. For many of the ceremonies of black magic nudity is prescribed, either because abnormal ritual goes with abnormal acts or because the celebrant would exhibit utter submission to the spirit invoked or because indecency can shock a spirit into compliance. Islam has banished nudity from Malay magic. But probably a ritual older than Islam first forbade the Malay fisherman at his stakes to insult the gods of the sea by bathing naked. Wilfully to expose the person in an indecent manner is the grossest form in which one Malay can insult another.


Semi-nudity.

Brahmans bare themselves to the waist in a holy place or in the presence of superiors. Half a century ago the waiting-maids at the Perak court so bared themselves to serve the ruler. No one wearing a coat may approach a patient stricken by the Spectre Huntsman, who is an avatar of the great god Siva. And the Malay shaman at a séance is naked from the waist upwards.


Bahdi.

The bahdi of a deer can be expelled by sweeping first a gun, then a branch, and finally the noose in which the animal was caught over its carcass from muzzle to hind-legs; the noose is quickly slipped on a stake and tightened round it. Here the

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magician appears to remove "transmissible properties of matter" to the stake. That done, he turns over the blood-stained leaves where the carcase has been cut up, to hide all traces of the chase. While turning over the leaves with a stick, he recites a charm, upon the conclusion of which the hunters must depart without looking back. If a man experiences the dizziness and ague which afflict victims of the bahdi, he must smear his person with the clay and mud that lie nearest to him. The Orphic mysteries required an initiate to be cleansed with clay and they taught him that in the next world sinners will be buried in it, but cleansing hardly seems the object of the Malay rite. Soot is daubed on the face of a Malay baby so that ghostly assailants may fail to recognize it, but the agued hunter has already been recognized and attacked. The explanation of the hunter's rite appears to be that he is putting himself under the protection of an earth-spirit, like the Greek actor who daubs his face with wine lees in order to show that he is under the protection of the god of wine. The same magician who prescribed mud against the attack of the bahdi prescribed that for the bite of a water-snake one should invoke the water-spirit and splash water over the wound. One form of Malay hide-and-seek is called "the game of the aura of the stag," and the traditional story invented to explain this name relates how once a band of hunters omitted to perform the proper rites over a slaughtered stag and therefore became mad, each man hiding from his companions or in lucid intervals searching vainly for them. Syncretism has affected the Malay's conception of these auras. The idea of potent soul-substance appears to have become merged in the idea of malicious spirits. In Patani the aura of a murdered man takes the shape of a mannikin and the auras of beasts are addressed as slaves of Siva.


The Spectre Huntsman.

According to the Mantra he is like Kala black. If a man crossed by him suffer from severe fever and vomiting, the appropriate incantations muttered by the Perak medicine-man over incense and betel must reveal possession of the esoteric knowledge that this spirit has no navel, a clear indication of godhead.

When at night the passing of this demon is betokened by a rushing mighty wind, no Malay will refer to it or awaken his neighbour, and if from fright one nudges or pinches a sleeper, no word may be uttered as to the cause of the alarm until the storm has abated.

The man who hears the Spectre Huntsman's challenge will die slowly; the man who is kicked by him or crosses his path will expire

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suddenly. No one suffering from his attack may be fanned with a shawl or have limes or fresh banana leaves brought to his house. The Spectre Huntsman is accompanied by a flock of common bee-eaters which Malays say fly on their backs at night and are sure harbingers of storm: sometimes they are called their master’s casting-net, sometimes his dogs. Those who hear their cry should claim kinship with them or tap wall or floor to show they are awake, or they may scare these birds of ill omen by burning rubbish but they may not address them by name.

In Pahang the Spectre Huntsman when not engaged in the chase is called the Tall Spirit, and this spirit is identified with Jin the son of Jan; the cock sacrificed to the Tall Spirit after harvest must be yellow, the colour sacred to Siva.

Unpublished Perak Ms.; JFMSM., XII Part I, pp. 27-28, 30;
Notes & Queries (JRASSB) p. 39.

Rain-Making.

There is no rain-god other than Father Water. In the monsoon region such a divinity would be too beneficent to retain fearful devotion. But there are primitive ways of influencing Father Water. Rice-planters often soak a cat to procure rain, the reluctant quadruped being regarded apparently as a pleasing sacrifice. To kill a snake, whose skin looks always moist, or to dress up a frog in a cradle will cause disastrous floods, rain and these animals being so closely associated that insult to them invites vengeance from their protector. In parts of Pahang where Sakai influence is strong, to tease any undomesticated animal, to celebrate a mock marriage between dog and cat or between coconut monkey and crab-eating macaque, to push a weaver-bird’s nest with one’s punt-pole and make it spin or to play with a wild bee’s-nest are all methods of causing terrific storms and landslides. It is to be noted that the tormentors must always mock their victims, and that when the flood comes it is only these mockers who cannot escape, every spot where their feet tread becoming soft. In the interior of Pahang, too, to invoke kindly rain before the planting out of the rice Malays wade through the shallows of a river, plant banana-suckers, sugar cane and young betel and coconut palms on a sandy islet that has appeared owing to the drought, and then to the din of rough music carry in procession on the sand a boy or an old man costumed in rain-compelling paraphernalia. His umbrella is a succulent aroid leaf on whose surface showers leave water standing, his cap is the cane stand for a cooking-pot, his dagger is a rice-spoon. The symbolism is not so far fetched as it looks. Rain kings and a leaf-clad boy or girl, who represents vegetation, figure in rain-making ceremonies in many parts of the world. The Mantra “believe the sky to be a great pot suspended over the earth by a string.” And a common Malay method of calling down rain from
“that inverted bowl we call the sky” is to wash the cooking-pots and their cane-stands. For a prospective bride or bride-groom to eat food out of a stewpan on the eve of marriage is sure to bring showers to mar their wedding-day, presumably because their action involves tilting the pan. Rice-spoons are closely associated with cooking-pots. The Torajas of Celebes dip rice-spoons in water to make rain: to kill a storm the Malay fisherman will tie a rice-spoon across his mast in the direction of the wind and command it to die before this pointing. While in other regions blood is spilt as a sympathetic charm to induce the falling of rain, in Pahang, again under Sakai influence, an animal is sacrificed so that its blood dropping on the earth may cause the torrent of rain to cease, or, if an animal cannot be procured, the villagers will cut their own hands or feet. That is, if no one knows what broken tabu has caused the downpour. If one knows, it suffices to count seven and cut the hair of the person at fault, whereupon the storm stops. This last custom recalls the Malay sailor’s prayer to the wind to let down her long flowing tresses and may be intended to stay “the rustle of rain” by imitative insulation from its source. Australian aborigines use human hair for rain-making.


Wind-raising.

An account written in 1850 describes how in calms Malay sailors would send the ship’s cook aloft as high as he could go with a bowl of rice, where after making a great noise he scattered the rice and invoked the wind, and how this ceremony was repeated at intervals until the wind was raised. This ritual was indigenous and older than the coming of Vayu. The bowl, as we have seen, symbolized the sky and the white falling rice must have represented scudding clouds or rain-drops.

JIA., IV, p. 690.

Smar.

In one form of exorcism practised in Kelantan the shaman becomes possessed and waves over the sufferer a leather figure of Smar, the clown and butt of the Javanese shadow-play. Smar, however, is not only a buffoon; for sometimes he turns into the One and Only God and overthrows divinity after divinity, Indra Yama and even Siva, whom in the Malay story of Sang Samba he forces to surrender the water of life in order that the hero of the tale may be restored to life. If from this quaint form of exorcism recovery ensues, among the final sacrificial offerings a model of a wayside resting-place is reserved with dainties for Kala.

Gimlette p. 94; PMS., Wilkinson’s Malay Amusements p. 52.

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
God a Magician.

"The magician before time existed was Allah and He revealed Himself by the light of moon and sun and so showed Himself to be verily a magician."

The idea of god being a magician is common to Indonesian and Semitic magic. According to the Mantra the first magician, Mertang, was the child of the sky-god and the earth-goddess. Marduk, the leader of the Babylonian gods and creator of man, was priest, looser of tabus and lord of incantations.

Shaman, Saiva and Sufi p. 48; R. C. Thompson's Semitic Magic (London 1908) passim.

Sacrifice at House-Building.

In the foundations of a new house Dayaks, untouched by Muslim influence, placed formerly a slave-girl and more recently a chicken to be crushed to death by the descent of the main-pillar, or they bled a girl to death and sprinkled the posts with her blood. The Malay of the Peninsula slits in orthodox fashion the throat of fowl goat or buffalo, according to his means and the degree of malignity imputed to the local earth-demon; sometimes he bids the vengeful children of Siva avant, sometimes he uses Muslim prayers and cries on Allah and Muhammad. About the main house pillar are deposited the head and feet of the victim, a detail that reminds one of Frazer's theory that the bisected pieces of human or animal victim are thought to guard the intermediate space from the incursion of evil powers:— "When Peleus captured the city of Iolcus he is said to have taken the king's wife, cut her in two and then led his army between the pieces into the city." The sacrifice of beast or fowl at the laying of a foundation popular Islam could not condemn. For so too Muslims of Arabia offer a victim on the threshold of a new building in order to redeem the inhabitants from the attacks of Jinn who may be jealous at the trespass.

To put the new wine of Semitic magic into the old bottles of Malay belief was not difficult and it must have intoxicated many early converts into acceptance of Islam. But certainly it is startling to find the Mantra, who remained heathen, cutting the rice-soil with the Basmula and muttering charms that invoke the aid of Allah and His Prophet to abase their enemies. "If Muhammad be oppressed, then only can I be oppressed," runs a Mantra charm for protection; "I dwell within a fence of Angels, eleven on each side of me." From temporal assailants the Mantra needed no fence other than his jungle home. Hindu and Muslim traders might dominate ports and ascend rivers in Malaya but they

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could find no word of power to keep wide for their faiths the gate of the trackless forest.


**Primae gravidæ used for launching ships.**

There are curious legends as to the power of girls pregnant for the first time to lie down and serve as rollers, that will induce the most heavy and recalcitrant vessel to glide into the water. Sometimes a number of girls were required, either three, five or seven, but always an uneven number. And the girls always escaped without hurt. In Kelantan to this day rollers are dyed red for the launching of sea-faring boats.


**Sunset.**

The afterworld of all the aborigines of the Peninsula lies in the west and is connected with sunset, and the Malay's fear of its yellow glow is very old. "Look not on the setting sun," one of his proverbs advises lovers, "for fear you lose yourself on a trackless path." Among many tribes in the Archipelago the doors of houses face the west so that a man entering confronts the east, for fear his soul be taken westward with the setting sun. If a Malay child is taken out in the late afternoon the lobes of its ears and the crown of its head are smeared with betel juice whose redness spirits fear. And at the same hour a Perak woman will walk round a house where young children are and spit out yellow turmeric at seven points.

**JRASSB. No. 2, p. 33; No. 7, p. 21; Rosalind Moss's *The Life after Death in Oceania and the Malay Archipelago* (1925) pp. 84, 174.**

*By the pricking of my thumbs*

*Something wicked this way comes*

Macbeth Act IV, Scene 1.

The Mantra believe in a water-demon with the head of a dog and the jaws of a crocodile who kills men by sucking the blood of toe or thumb. It is to the finger-ends of the patient that the Malay nugget retires when hard pressed by the magician.

**JIA., I, pp. 307, 362.**

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The Origin of Tigers and Crocodiles.

The tiger is remarkable for its leaping powers and its readiness to swim. Therefore it must be related to the frog! 'Ali, the Prophet's son-in-law, was the lion of God. The Malay lion is the tiger. Therefore 'Ali must be related to the tiger! And a Malay legend relates how 'Ali, the warrior who fought on Syrian plains, was the father and a frog the mother of twins, the tiger and the crocodile, the two most dreaded animals of Malaya! Other legends preserve the relationship between these disparate animals. According to a Perak account the mother crocodile eats up those of her young who run away from the water, and those that escape her maw turn into tigers. There is some evidence that like the tiger, the crocodile was regarded as an avatar of Siva. Generally the crocodile is associated with 'Ali's wife, Fatimah, the daughter of the Prophet:—

I know thy origin!
From Fatimah art thou sprung!
Moulded from a clod of clay!
Thy bones of sugar-cane knots!
Thy blood of saffron!
Thy breast of palm-spathe!

JRASSB, No. 3, pp. 110-1; Skeat, pp. 91, 283-4, 289;
Shaman Saiva and Sufi, p. 58.

The Victim at Sacrifices.

At small feasts the victim is a goat, black if the sacrifice is in honour of earth-spirits, white if it is in honour of a saint or sacred animal.

The commonest offering of all is a fowl. Today the Malay has no explanation of this choice of domestic animals for the altar. But Dayak song tells why for waving and for offering no jungle-fowl, crane, argus-pheasant, kingfisher, owl, hornbill or any other wild bird is worth a fowl as big as the fingers. The domestic fowl is in debt to man for rice and sugar-cane, maize and pumpkins, nest and roost, and moreover it is a bird for whose redoubtable appearance familiarity has bred undeserved contempt:—

"Ye fowls have many crimes and many debts!
Ye bear away the spirits of sickness,
The spirits of fever and ague and headache,
The spirits of cold, the spirits of the forest....
Ye fowls have beaks as sharp as augers;
Your feathers are like fringes of red thread,
Your ear-feathers like sharpened bamboos;
Your wings flap like folds of red cloth;
Your tails are bent down like dragging ropes;
Your crops weigh heavily like many iron hawkbills;
Your nails are like sharp iron knives."

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In the Peninsula upon the grave of a revered ancestor or saint a white cock is sometimes sacrificed but oftener released. That Proto-Malay, the heathen Mantra, would carry two white fowls and a tray of food to a hill-top reputed to be the haunt of a kindly spirit. One of the fowls he would kill and set on a tray which he laid on the summit or hung from a tree; the other he would release. Then he would silently intimate to the spirit his heart's desire and afterwards eat a meal on the spot.

In dire illness Muslim Arabs will use swine's flesh as medicine. If other offerings have failed to bring catches to Malay fishermen on the east coast of the Peninsula, the pious depart and a pig is sacrificed on the seashore. This is the sole instance of the sacrifice of this unclean animal by Muslim Malays, though a prescription for turning brass into gold is to bury it wrapped in the paunch of a wild pig, and in order to expel the influence of maleficent auras the Malay elephant hunter, following possibly Siamese example, will smear the sufferer with a lotion that includes water from a pig's wallow. In a ceremony at Selangor fishing-stakes spiritual arrack was offered by the Muslim celebrant to the gods of the sea.

JRASSB, No. 19, pp. 95-6; No. 39, p. 36; No. 45, p. 38; JIA., I, p. 320; R.C. Thompson's Semitic Magic p. 209; Skeat p. 188.

Sacrifices at Communal Rice Ceremonies.

"In most places where rice is grown elaborate propitiatory ceremonies of a communal character are celebrated in the spring of every third of fourth year."

A buffalo is slaughtered and in Negri Sembilan a portion of the flesh is given to each farmer to plant in the corner of his (or her) field as an offering to earth-spirits. Malay's latest religion can hardly frown at this survival of paganism. In Arabia, too, farmers sprinkle new plough-land with the blood of a peace-offering to placate malignant spirits of the soil.


The Substitute in Sacrifice.

On the twisted roots of a tree by the Diobh river in Negri Sembilan offerings are laid, incense is burnt and trays of food are hung for a sick man's recovery. It is said that if cured he makes a thank-offering of white and black broth, a black fowl and a model of himself in dough. It is probable that the use of this symbolic model is Muslim and Semitic, especially as dough is foreign to Malays, and that its use has been misconstrued. One Assyrian charm bids the medicine-man fashion a figure of his plague-
stricken patient from clay, place it on the sick man’s loins at night and “make atonement” for the patient on the morrow, using the figure as his “substitute.” In another Assyrian charm seven loaves of pure dough are “substituted” for the sick man and placed under a thorn-bush in the desert. A Kelantan magician will put a taper and dough images of birds, beasts and fishes on a tray, make the patient hold a particoloured thread, one end of which is stuck under a taper, and recite a charm commanding the devils to accept the banquet of flesh and blood, sharks, lobsters and crabs, the various “kinds of substitute” offered on the tray. “The use of particoloured thread in Eastern magic is a distinct reminiscence of Mesopotamian wizardry:” it is common among Malays.


Muslim influence on Malay Charms.

A Malay love-charm runs

“I fry sand from the footprint of my beloved;
Nay, I fry her heart and liver
Night and day, as this sand is fried.”

In late Hebrew charms the sorcerer cries: “Ye holy powerful angels! just as this pot is burnt in the fire, so shall ye burn in the heart of so and so to follow after this girl.”

It is easy to exaggerate the influence of genuine Hindu magic on the Malay. Very largely his indebtedness to India has been for Muslim charms infected with Hindu phraseology. In Semitic magic as in Hindu the exorcist must know a word of power, the name or description of the demons he would expel, and something material, be it drug amulet or wax figure, to aid his muttered incantation. In Semitic magic as in Malay the exorcist goes through a catalogue of ghosts and demons, not to miss any cause for his patient’s illness, and he disclaims power for himself and ascribes his knowledge to some “lord of incantation.”

Thompson’s Semitic Magic, pp. XLVI—I, 13, 41.

Malayo-Muslim Philtres.

Many philtres have been imported with Islam. According to an old Hebrew prescription the burnt ashes of a black kitten will enable one to see demons, and “the ashes of a black cat are a popular form of magicians’ stock-in-trade in modern Arabic books on sorcery.” The Kelantan magician saturates seven pieces of thread in the blood of a murdered man and the blood of a slaughtered buffalo, adds the eyes of a tiger and the eyes of a black cat, burns all these ingredients to ashes, mixes the ashes with oil and rubs the philtre on his eyebrows to enable him to see through a

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brass dice-box and learn whether red or black will win. To make
the assurance of this Semitic magic doubly sure the Malay (or his
Indian preceptor) has added the eyes of a tiger. For the killing
of cats formed no part of the black art of the Malay. To him as
to Hindus such an act "is sinful. Indeed he believes that, if a cat
is killed, he who takes its life will in the next world be called to
carry and pile logs of wood as big as coconut trees to the number
of the hairs on the beast's body."

Thompson's *Semitic Magic*, p. 61; Gimlette p. 9; Enthoven's
"The Folklore of Bombay," p. 216; Clifford's *In Court
and Kampong* (1897) p. 47.

**Royal Installations.**

At the installation of a Sultan of Perak, His Highness has to
sit motionless "while the royal band plays a certain number of
tunes. . . . Any movement by the Sultan would be extremely
inauspicious," which reminds one that to be able to sit perfectly
rigid for hours was considered by Siamese Buddhists to be a sign
of the commencing divinity of a king.

*JRASSB*, No. 26, p. 164.

"The herald who proclaims the election of a new Yamtuan is
expected to stand on one leg with the sole of his right foot resting
against his left knee."

Formerly in Siam a temporary king, whose reign for three
days every April preceded the sowing of rice, had to stand at
different places on each of those days for three hours at a stretch
with right foot against left knee in order to gain victory over evil
spirits. Failure to maintain the posture was believed to be a bad
omen and was punished by forfeiture of property: success entitled
the performer to take the contents of any shop in the town or of
any ship in the harbour. Again in the sixth month the king of
Siam had to circumambulate the city for seven days and if there
was delay in the preparation of his conveyance he had to stand on
one foot till it was ready, or lose his crown. The author who
records these Siamese rites says that Brahman sun-worshippers
also stand on one foot with the other resting on the ankle and that
some Hindus stand on one foot with hands joined before their faces
in order to salute a superior. The Malay hunter who uses a certain
elephant charm strongly infected with Hindu imagery has to stand
on one leg and mutter it three mornings at sunrise. One charm
for the abduction of a person's soul has to be recited at sun-rise
with the big toe of the reciter's right foot resting on the big toe of
his left. This position of the toes is assumed also by the magician
who squats to plant the first rice seed, and it recalls the European
superstition that the person, who clasping hands unconsciously

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puts the thumb of the right hand above the thumb of the left, is one who will have the upper hand in marriage.


White Blood.

The white blood of Malay princes is that ascribed by Buddhists to divinities, by Malays to Siva and by Muhammadan mystics to certain saints.

JRASSB, No. 26, p. 165; Shaman Saiwa and Sufi p. 8.

Annual 'Cleansing' of Malay Regalia.

It may be noted that even the regalia of the commoner chief of Naming were cleansed annually: the sword bestowed on the first chieftain by the Sultan of Johore and the silk coat given along with it, into whose neck only the head of the rightful claimant to the office can be inserted. Once a year they were brought out, the sword cleansed and the coat smoked in incense, while the chieftain's subjects bowed to the earth in homage. There is however no record of a séance accompanying the ceremony.


The Miniature Universe of the Creator Magician.

The idea of the tiny universe of the creator magician is, indeed, an Indonesian conception, seeing how Dayaks believe that at first the creator stretched out the heavens no bigger than a mango, and that a medicine-woman in a Dayak legend satisfied a whole army with rice cooked in a pot the size of a chestnut and with meat cooked in a pot the size of a bird's egg.

The magician's world was the breadth of a tray with a sky the breadth of an umbrella. The royal drums of the former raja of Jelebu were fabled to have been headed with the skins of lice! The shield of the Sultan of Minangkabau was made of the skin of a louse; his drums were fashioned each from the hollow stem of a minute shrub; the pillars of his hall were nettles and its threshold beam a stem of spinach! The appanages of Malay royalty as of Malay medicine-men were supernatural, come from that world where Titania's mannikins "creep into acorn cups" and her fairies "war with rear-mice for their leathern wings to make her small elves coats."

Shaman Saiwa and Sufi pp. 48, 50; JRASSB, No. 8 p. 146; No. 16, p. 278; Skeat pp. 27, 28; Tjindoer Mata ed. J. L. van der Toorn (1886) p. 69.

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Circumcision.

Custom demands that members of his family, male and female, bathe along with the sufferer. In one folk-tale when the princely hero was about to undergo the rite, his two sisters in the palace soaked fingers and toes in a jar of water.

JRASSB, No. 18, p. 258.

Belief in Aboriginal Magicians.

The wild tribes of Malaya are credited with marvellous powers of harming a person from a distance. A Sakai can mutter incantations over a knife till it drips a molten stream into his hand, and then vanishes to slay an enemy fifty miles off, who will straightway die vomiting blood! The Proto-Malay shaman will avail himself of a strong wind blowing towards his victim's house to matter a spell over wax from an abandoned bees' nest and gaze into a vessel of water lit by candles; if he can see the image of his victim in its surface, he throws the wax into the air, when it is carried to his victim and at once strikes him with sickness or death. No wonder more than one observer has seen Malay women prostrate themselves at the feet of these magicians!


Paddling to the Pawang's Spirit-World.

Proto-Malays of the Peninsula dig a trench round a grave, wherein the soul of the deceased can paddle his canoe. Even canoe-coffins have been common in Indonesia, occurring in Nias, Borneo, the Moluccas and among the Torajas. In some parts a dug-out canoe may have been regarded merely as a convenient receptacle for the dead. For some tribes the canoe-coffin is a vestige of migration, the dead being supposed to return overseas to the tribe's original home. Other tribes have possessed no island afterworld but, perhaps noting the Malay's despatch of evil spirits to sea in a boat, have adopted this form of coffin for the deceased's voyage to the spirit-land. Milanau magicians will quit Sarawak, their earthly home, to fetch a departed spirit from the other world. Their heads shrouded, two magicians will squat side by side on a mat, and paddles in hand behave and talk as if they were guiding a boat down-stream past overhanging trees and hidden rocks. Sometimes their fancied craft is upset with a realistic splashing of water all over the room. At last the performers reach the afterworld and recognize one lost friend by his lameness and another by some ghastly wound he suffered while alive. Falling on hands and knees they grope around till one of them cries that he has caught the spirit for which they are seeking. Kelantan Malays prescribe a method of acquiring a shaman's
powers that shows an accretion of Muslim belief on this primitive idea. Sitting one at the head and one at the foot of the grave of a murdered man, the would-be shaman and a companion make believe to use paddles of coconut frond. The landscape comes to look like a sea and an aged man, apparently Luqmau al-Hakim, the father of Arabian magic, appears.

_The Life after Death in Oceania and the Malay Archipelago_ by Rosalind Moss, pp. 4-31; JRASSB, No. 57, p. 173; Skeat pp. 69, 61; _Shaman Saiva and Sufi_ p. 45.

**Tree-Burial.**

In the Peninsula the Negritos of Kelantan and some Sakai and Proto-Malay tribes have, like the Sea Dayaks, reserved tree-burial for magicians. The Kelantan Negritos deposit a dead shaman in a tree so that he may be able to fly over the head of the fearful figure that blocks the narrow way to Paradise. The Sakai of northern Perak bury all except magicians, who are laid out in the forest in a hut. The Sakai of southern Perak deprive the wizard of the honour of tree-burial, if he utters a groan during his last illness: for his familiar tiger-spirit would not visit him on the seventh night to rend the corpse and release the soul. The Benua placed a shaman’s corpse erect against the buttress of a large forest-tree and watched and supplied it with food for seven days, the period needed for the deceased’s transformation into a tiger. The Jakun of Rompin place a shaman’s body on a platform and his soul ascends to the sky, while corpses of ordinary folk, who go to the underworld, are buried. Malays now bury their magicians. "The majority of sacred places in the Patani States are the reputed graves of great medicine-men." But there are traditions of the older practice. Some seventy years ago in Upper Perak it was customary not to bury the corpse of a magician, who possessed a tiger spirit as his familiar, but to place the corpse leaning against a tree (perah,* in order that the familiar might enter another man. One Alang Dewasa, a wizard of this type, was buried but soon after his interment the ground was found to be disturbed, and frequently in answer to the invocations of magicians Alang Dewasa has appeared as a tiger with one eye closed, the effect of an injury received in the grave. The last Malay shaman left unburied in Perak was "stuck up" in a tree with purple flowers (Lagerstroemia floribunda) near the village of Raja Kayu between 1870 and 1875 and is now a tiger with a white patch! Today in two of the States on the west coast, at least, when a practiser of black magic is in the throes of death, it is believed that the spirit of life can escape only if a hole is made in the roof, a survival of the idea of the upward flight of a wizard’s soul. Some Jakun believe that great magicians are translated alive to heaven.

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*Note. *Elateriospermum tapus* Bl., conspicuous for the brilliant red of its young shoots. The fruit contains an edible seed oil.

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There are several forms of tree-burial. The body may be exposed upon a branch or in the hollow trunk of a tree, or on a platform in a tree or in a hut in the forest. In some tribes exposure is not a survival or a privilege retained for wizards but the usual form of disposal for all their dead. The mixed Sakai-Jakun tribes of Selangor expose their dead in a jungle-hut, to be watched by relatives for seven days, after which the corpse disappears. Kindred tribes in Pahang leave them unburied in abandoned houses, seeing that burial would prevent the escape of the spirit aloft. Sakai of Ulu Langat erect a platform in front of the house where a death has occurred, place the corpse on it for a day and then bury it and burn or desert the house. Branches of all the aboriginal tribes of the Peninsula have practised exposure in tree or on platform as an honourable form of burial for magicians, who were sometimes chiefs as well as wizards. Exposure of the bodies of chiefs in trees is customary in Timor Laut, in Ceram and among the Negritos of New Guinea.

Are there relics of former aerial burial among the civilized Malays? There are the recorded instances of Upper Perak magicians. And many of the graves of rulers of Perak are raised platforms, though graves waist-high are built by Hindus also for holy men.


Soul-Huts & Grave-Gifts.

As we have seen, Sakai and Proto-Malays expect the soul of a magician exposed in tree-burial to quit the corpse on the seventh day. All the aborigines of the Peninsula suppose that the soul of a dead person haunts the grave for a short period, usually seven days. For seven days the Negrito fears the spirit of the deceased and on the seventh night invokes the guardian of the dead to remove the ghost. For seven days or more Sakai place food on the grave and light a fire beside it. The Proto-Malay explains that the fire he kindles for his dead is to keep the hovering soul warm so that it may not weep and wail from cold. For seven days the Jakun will beat no drum and have no debts collected or trading done in the neighbourhood. For seven days he will watch an exposed corpse and place food on the grave of the buried. Even the Muslim Malay has a quatrain describing how the newly dead “weeps at the door of the tomb longing to return to the world.”

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“In the Pyramid texts, which are amongst the oldest literature of the world, mention is often made of the ladder up which dead Egyptian kings climb to the sky.” A yard or two from a Besiak grave is built a temporary hut, furnished for a man or a woman as the case may be, with inclined stick-ladders to enable the soul of the deceased to climb into it. The grave of a Proto-Malay chief who died in Johore in 1879 is described as follows. “The body lies about three feet underground, the tomb, which is made of earth beaten smooth, rising about the same height above the surface. A little ditch runs round the grave, wherein the spirit may paddle his canoe. The body lies with the feet pointing towards the west. The ornamental pieces at each end of the grave answer to tombstones” and have a Malayo-Arabic name. “On the other side of them are seen the small, plain, upright sticks, called soul-steps, to enable the spirit to leave the grave when he requires. There are four horizontal beams on each side of the grave, joined in a framework, making sixteen in all, laid on the top of the grave and so forming a sort of enclosure, in which are placed, for the use of the deceased, a coconut shell, a torch in a stand, an axe-handle and a cooking-pot, while outside this framework hangs a shoulder-basket for the deceased to carry his firewood in.” Another enquirer was told that at the foot of a Jakun grave a five foot post or soul-ladder is set up. “This post has fourteen notches cut in it, seven running up one side, and seven down that opposite... I was given to understand that the seven ascending notches represent the surviving relatives, while the descending notches represent, or are for the use of, the dead person’s soul.” It has been surmised that the hut is for a grave ghost who may have been developed from the idea of the soul lingering for a while beside the grave, but it seems to have been built originally for the temporary sojourn of the soul.

Proto-Malay tribes place articles of daily attire in or on the grave, a woman’s rings, a man’s chopper and blowpipe and quiver. One account explains that these are to serve the deceased on his journey to the afterworld in the west. Sometimes the chopper is of wood and the blowpipe is broken. Wooden weapons to fight spirits have been employed by the midwife at the birth of a Muslim Malay and carried before boys about to be circumcised. Considering the remoteness of these forest graves, the small value of a blowpipe and the dread their Malay visitors have of graves, it appears unlikely that the aborigines break the grave-gift to prevent theft. More probably they break it just as they desert the deceased’s house because it is taboo to use a dead man’s personal property. Another possible reason is that given by the Klemantans of Borneo and the northern Sakai of Perak, namely that the spirit world is a world of opposites where that which is whole looks broken and that which is broken looks whole.
The food laid by Proto-Malays on a grave is supposed generally like the articles of daily attire to be for the use of the dead in his or her travel to the after world. This is borne out by the frequent deposit of betel, which one chews night and day, inside the grave beside the body. On one Jakun grave food was laid not only for the dead woman but also for the ghosts of her ancestors. After the death of a Besisi rice is planted which when harvest has come will feed the soul of the deceased. This indicates a belief that the spirits of the dead will revisit the glimpses of the moon long after their arrival in the afterworld and recalls the annual feast to the guardian ancestor spirits of a Malay state.

The immediate reason for abandoning a house where a death has occurred is fear of the ghost of the deceased before it has departed to the afterworld. But another reason may be a vague and complex idea of ill-luck attaching to the spot. Anyhow dislike of remaining there outlasts the days of mourning.

Evans pp. 176-9, 224-230, 265-7; S. & B. ii, pp. 89-116; Moss pp. 60, 76, 90-93, 179.

Black Magic.

To destroy an enemy there is prescribed in Malay versions of Muslim treatises a world-wide method of sorcery. The Bornese pagan makes a wooden image of his enemy, immerses it in a pool of reddened water symbolical of blood, transfixes it with a spear, buries it as those who have died by violence are buried and invokes the hawk, ominous messenger of the gods, to work his victim's death. An Indian Muslim takes earth from a grave, kneads an image of his enemy a span long, and having read over it the hundred and fifth chapter of the Quran strikes pegs into its trunk and limbs, wraps it in ceremonials and buries it in a cemetery under the name of his enemy. A Muslim Malay is advised to make an image of wax from an empty honey comb, pierce it with a skewer from head to buttocks, shroud it as one shrouds a corpse and read over it the prayers for the dead. Sometimes a cabalistic symbol is inscribed on the wax.


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Betrothal and Marriage.

Of the ceremonies of betrothal little mention is made in Malay literature. The roving princes of the fairy-tales generally marry without any previous ceremony of betrothal, and in books of history the marriages of royal personages are mostly arranged by ambassadors sent by one prince to another. On such embassies the *Hikayat Hang Tuah* (I, p. 99) says:

"The king of Malacca intends to ask the king of Inderapura for the hand of the daughter of the Bendahara of that country. The Bendahara of Malacca advises: 'We should send Tun Utama and Tun Bijasura, as in asking a princess in marriage one should always send senior officers so that the matter may wear a weighty aspect in the eyes of the other party.'"

The betel of betrothal sent by the bridegroom to the parents of the bride is mentioned in the *Hikayat Anggun Che Tunqat* (p. 33). The hero's great-aunt, princess Gondan Genta Sari, journeys to Tiku Benua, the country of Raja Laksamana, the land of whose daughter she wants to ask for the hero. "Everything is done according to the custom of great kings when they go to ask a princess in marriage." Twelve elephants carry the princess and her ladies of honour, and the prime-minister (Orang Kaya Besar) accompanies her. Raja Laksamana orders the palace to be decorated, and accompanied by his queen, Princess Lindungan Bulan, goes to meet his visitors. Raja Laksamana brings the prime-minister into the hall of audience, whilst his queen invites Princess Gondan Genta Sari into the palace. "The presents and the betel of betrothal are brought by servants who carry royal betel-boxes made of gold, sixteen rectangular betel-boxes of Palembang work and sixteen betel-boxes made in Banjar." Raja Laksamana sits on a carpet together with the prime-minister, and the servants who carry the betel-boxes sit down in due order. Raja Laksamana offers a quid of his own betel to the prime-minister, who accepts it. This ceremony ended, Raja Laksamana asks the prime-minister: "What has brought our elder sister (Princess Gondan Genta Sari) hither?" The prime-minister replies: "The royal sister of Your Highness has come because she wants to ask a favour of Your Highness and your royal consort." The prime-minister
bows low to the knees of Raja Laksamana and sits down opposite to him. The hall is filled with princes, dignitaries and commoners and the queen takes Princess Gondan Genta Sari and the female household to the gallery (rongsari) next to the hall to witness the primeminister presenting the betel of betrothal in accordance with custom. The prime-minister puts a cloth of yellow silk over his right shoulder, pays obeisance and in a set of quatrains asks for “the diamond, which shall be made the top of the crown of Tiku Benua and Tiku Periaman.” He presents the betrothal betel and “though it is not as it should be,” begs that the gift of the jewel may be granted. Raja Laksamana smilingly beckons to the chief lady-in-waiting, who pays obeisance and sitting down next to the prime-minister answers in a similar set of quatrains granting the request with the stipulation that whoever breaks faith shall be turned into a monkey! A banquet is served to Raja Laksamana, the prime-minister and the whole assembly, whilst in the palace the queen entertains her female visitors.

When later Anggun and his bride meet at the magic launching of the ship “Dendang Panjang,” they confirm their betrothal and the condition thereof and exchange arm-rings (p. 46).

In chapter XXXIV of the Sçjrôsh Mëlayu (II, p. 251) the wedding of the daughter of the Sultan of Johore and the grandson of the Sultan of Pahang is arranged by ambassadors, and the Sultan of Pahang comes to Johore with his grandson. The guests are given a palace specially erected for them, and “after a few days the Sultan of Pahang orders the betel of betrothal to be taken over to the Sultan of Johore.”

Of a betrothal of children in their earliest days there is an instance in the Hikayat Raja Muda (p. 2). Sultan Degar Alam’s queen gives birth to a girl, Princess Lindongan Bulan, and his brother’s consort to a boy, Raja Bujang Selamat. Sultan Degar Alam “treats the two children alike, exchanges their swaddling-clothes and betroths them.” In the same story (p. 35) Raja Muda and his cousin and brother-in-law, Raja Bujang Selamat, agree that the children they expect shall be married if they should be a boy and a girl.

Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir relates (I, p. 132) that he had been engaged for two years when his marriage took place.

Two forms of marriage are mentioned in Malay literature, one abbreviated, the other with full ceremonies. The first form is without any or with very few festivities and is conducted only with such ceremonies as are deemed essential to ensure happiness (mëngambil sélamat). This form is apparently adopted when a court is in mourning, but more often no reason is stated, and frequently the marriage is celebrated a second time later with full festivities including the ceremonial wedding-night, even if years have passed since the first informal wedding and children have been born in the meantime.

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In the *Hikayat Malim Dewa* (p. 132) the hero marries the daughter of Raja Laksamana, the ruler of Kuala Medan Baik, after only seven days and nights of festivities. In the *Hikayat Malim Demam* (p. 101) the hero marries Princess Terus Mata “without any festivities and only with the ceremonies necessary to ensure happiness.” In the *Hikayat Anggun Che Tunggal* (p. 101) Nakhoda Bahar is to marry Princess Gondan Geodariah. Her father, Raja Laksamana, orders festivities of only three days’ and three nights’ duration and on the fourth day the queen adorns her daughter only sufficiently “to ensure happiness.” The court was in mourning for the supposed death of Anggun Che Tunggal. In the *Hikayat Raja Muda* (p. 13) Sultan Degar Alam orders his prime-minister to prepare for the marriage of his daughter with Raja Bujang Selamat, “no great festivities, but to ensure happiness only.” The marriage is repeated with full festivities several years later, after Raja Muda, who at first objected, has given his consent (p. 38). When the hero of the same story marries the fairy-princess Bidadari Segerba, her father does not come down from fairy-land to earth, but sends his *kadzi* to marry the pair “in accordance with the custom of great kings when they marry without festivities, only to ensure happiness” (p. 30). This marriage is repeated with great pomp after the daughter who has been born in the meantime has been married to Raja Seri Mandul (p. 132). At the marriage of St. Luchchait with the daughter of the king whom he had murdered there were no festivities but those to ensure happiness (*Chërila Jenaka* (1914) p. 101).

The marriage with full festivities generally proceeds on the following lines.

(1) The initial festivities *bérjaga-jaga* (lit. to keep awake continuously), or *bérkérja* (lit. to be busy), are of 3, 7, 20, 40 days or even longer duration. If a marriage has been officially arranged between two courts, such festivities are held at both, and if the bridegroom has come to the bride’s country and has a special palace assigned to him, he has festivities of his own in that palace.

(2) At the close of these festivities comes the adorning of the bridegroom and bride and the procession of the bridegroom, generally seven times round the capital. The procession ends at the palace, and the bridegroom is led to the hall of audience and takes his seat on the throne.

(3) Then comes the *nikah*, or religious wedding-formula, said by the priest before the bridegroom, whilst the bride is not present. After that the father of the bride leads the bridegroom into the palace.

(4) The interior of the palace is the place for the sitting in state of bridegroom and bride on a dais. The bride sits on the left of the bridegroom.
(5) Then follows the bērsuap-suapan (lit. the feeding by mouthfuls). Rice is brought, and bride and bridegroom eat a few mouthfuls out of each other’s hand. After this the young couple are led to the bridal bed.

To the initial festivities all the people of the country, and all officers and rajas of subject countries are invited. Descriptions of such festivities have been translated in the prefaces to the *Hikayat Malim Dewa*, *Hikayat Awang Sulang Merah Muda* and *Hikayat Malim Deman* edited by Messrs. Winsteadt and Sturrock in the *Malay Literature Series*. Everybody has to contribute to the festivities and bring presents.

We read in the *Hikayat Raja Muda* (p. 128) how for the marriage of Raja Seri Mandul and Princess Renek Jintan the rajas of subject countries brought their presents: “some in the shape of a dragon, some in the shape of a lion, some in the shape of a Walimana (a fabulous bird), some in the shape of the Borak (the fabulous animal that carried Muhammad to heaven), some in the shape of Vishnu’s bird Jentayu, some in the shape of flying carriages (rata) some in the shape of royal sedan-chairs (šempuan), some in the form of pavilions with wheels turning (balu jentora bōrpising), all filled with sweets and cakes.” Moreover the rajas brought buffaloes and goats, and each raja on arrival was received by the king with music.

A similar description is given in the *Shaër Seri Banian* (p. 86 seq.). At the wedding of Princess Salindong Daima and Prince Dewa Utara the rajas and guests bring the sīreh pēnolong or sīreh pērsēmbahan (lit. “the betel of assistance” or “the betel to be offered to the king,” i.e. presents to contribute to the cost of festivities). The betel is made up in the form of an Akasa-bird (?) with a Rakshasa on its back, in the form of a throne studded with gems, in the form of a royal barge, in the form of a ship with a tree on its bows on which a peacock spreads its tail, in the form of a Walimana-bird, in the form of clouds and eagles, in the form of a boat called the peacock flying under the clouds and other fantastic shapes. During the initial festivities the bridegroom, too, sends presents and money towards the cost of the wedding.

In the *Hikayat Hang Tuah* (II p. 145) we read how a king of Malacca sailed to Menjapahit to marry the daughter of the Batara. He was given a special palace, and both parties began with the festivities. He bade Hang Tuah and Patih Kerma Wijaya prepare presents (pēnumah, Jav., the presents of a bridegroom to the parents of the bride) for the Batara viz. 7 bahara of gold towards expenses (mas bēlanja), seven changes of clothes, seventy beautiful serving-maids, seven pieces of embroidered cloth and many other articles. The presents were carried in procession to the Batara, and Patih Kerma Wijaya and Tun Utama said:

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"Sire, these are the presents of your royal son (-in-law) for Your Majesty. They are not as they ought to be, and are as it were a single flower, but they are a sign that he is Your Majesty's servant." The Batara replies: "We thank our son, the raja of Malacca, but he should not have contributed towards the expenses of the marriage, as all we have we shall give to him. We have not several children but only the raja of Malacca." Patih Kerma Wijaya replies: "Sire, your servant begs your pardon and favour, but such is the custom of the Malays, and even if he should offer the present of a single flower to Your Majesty, it would be the sign that he is the servant of Your Majesty."

At the wedding of the grandson of the Sultan of Pahang and the daughter of the Sultan of Johore the Sultan of Pahang sent his contribution towards the expenses of the wedding (wang belanja) together with the betel of betrothal. It is said further that during the festivities seven cannon-shots were fired every morning by both parties (Sejarah Melayu II p. 251).

The last day of the wedding is frequently described in Malay literature.

In the Hikayat Malim Daman (p. 55 seq.) the marriage of the hero and Princess Bongsu is celebrated again on their return to Kuala Bandar Muar, the hero's home. After a month of festivities bride and bridegroom are adorned and the bridegroom having been carried round in procession "the king lets his children sit on a throne twelve storeys high. Sixteen officers carry umbrellas, and sixteen with yellow silken cloths over their shoulders carry the insignia of the state and candles. The royal kettledrums and the trumpets are sounded in accordance with the custom when princes sit in state by the side of their brides. The king sprinkles scented water on the heads of the couple. The rice of peace and good understanding in octagonal form is placed before them and the wives of high dignitaries assist them to eat out of each other's hand. Then the young couple take betel and pay obeisance to the bridegroom's parents. Finally, Si Kambang China, the chief female attendant, joining their little fingers, conducts them into the bridal chamber.

In the Hikayat Raja Muda (p. 68 seq.) the marriage of the hero is celebrated with all ceremonies. Festivities of forty days' duration precede, and then the Raja Muda wearing the royal insignia takes his seat on the throne, where the kadzi conducts the formal marriage. After a meal the marriage-procession starts, announced by nine cannon-shots. Meantime the bride is adorned, and the wives of the princes and high dignitaries lead her to a golden throne. Opposite the princess the female servants take their place, and the virgin-daughters of the officers of the court stand at both sides with yellow silk cloths over their shoulders. When Raja Muda has been carried in procession seven times round
the city, the prime-minister conducts him into the palace, where he takes his seat at the right side of the princess on a bridal throne twelve storeys high. The candles of state are lit under sixteen umbrellas of state carried by virgins chosen from among the female attendants of the court. The wives of the princes and high dignitaries bring the bridal rice arranged in octagonal pattern, on which a silver tree with golden leaves and flowers of precious stones in eight different colours has been placed. They assist at the concur rivalry and then the bride's mother sprinkles the heads of the young couple with rose-water. (At this moment Princess Bidadari Segerba, the neglected fairybride of Raja Muda, intervenes, transfers her unborn child to the bride by giving her her own betel-quid, and quenches all desire in the bridegroom for seven years by giving him seven quids of betel which he must chew.)

When the young couple have been led to the nuptial chamber, the king gives a banquet to all male guests in the audience-hall, while the queen entertains the women.

In the *Hikayat Anggun Che Tunggal* (p. 157) when the hero marries the daughter of Raja Laksamana the isi kahuwin was one thousand boat-shaped bars of tin (*sa-ribu jongkong timah*).

If no priest is available, the marriage service can be performed by a lay-man. The hero of the *Hikayat Awang Sulung Merah Muda* (p. 129) is married to princess Dayang Seri Jawa by Che Emas, the mate of the ship (*muaim*), by order of her father.

In the *Hikayat Anggun Che Tunggal* (p. 134) the hero and his trusty page enter the palace of princess Kacha Bertuang, and the hero falls in love with the princess, whilst his page makes love to the princess's maid. The hero reads the marriage service for his page and the maid. And the page reads the marriage service for the hero and the princess. In the *Chêrita Jênaka* it is related how Pa' Pandir is married by Raja Shah Malim in the middle of the night and in the dark to the daughter of the Raja, Pa' Pandir having pretended to be a king of spirits (*raja mambang*).

It seems to have been customary for bride and groom not to eat more than three mouthfuls of the bridal rice as may be inferred from an anecdote given in the *Sejarah Melayu* (II p. 166). Hang Hussain Jong, one of the four intimate friends of Sultan Mahmud Shah, was marrying the daughter of Hang Usop. When bride and groom had eaten three mouthfuls each, the attendants wanted to take away the rice, but the bridegroom grasped the dish and cried: "Don't take it away so quickly. I still want to eat, as I have spent so much money." He then finishes half the dish, exciting laughter in the spectators.

In the *Hikayat Malim Dewa* (p. 112) on the morning following his marriage with Princess Andam Dewi the hero rises, leads his-wife to the bathing-place, and after the bath they return and
sit down on a throne and breakfast in the presence of all the
female attendants of the court. The young couple then leave the
bridal chamber and go to pay obeisance to the bride's mother. On
the morning after his marriage with Princess Kaeha Bertuang,
Anggun Che Tunggal (p. 142) takes his bride to the bath in the
royal park. After the bath they dress again in their marriage-
clothes and again sit side by side on the bridal throne, where they
take a meal. Anggun and his bride then approach with ceremonial
steps Raja Pertagal and Raja Sianggerai and their queens, and,
The right knee standing up (Terdiri lutut yang kanan)
The left knee bent under the body Tertimpah lutut yang kiri.
Performs the salute called "lela Sembah bernama "Leila sembah"
sembah"!
With head laid down in the lap. Ulu di-hantarkan ka-atas ribaan
Their majesties with joy receive the homage paid to them, and the
four of them give to the couple ("as a cushion during the saluta-
tion (lapak sembah) four thousand pieces of gold."

The ceremonial bathing of the couple a few days after the
marriage is mentioned in the Sèjarah Melayu (I. p. 23) when
Sang Si Purba marries the daughter of Demang Lebar Daun, the
ruler of Palembang. Demang Lebar Daun ordered a bathing-
pavilion (pancha pèrsada) to be erected, seven storeys high, with
a five-pointed roof. After festivities lasting forty days and nights
"the bathing-water was carried in procession (to the pavilion)
with the full band playing, and Sang Si Purba and his consort
were carried in procession seven times round the pavilion and then
bathed inside it."

The Hikayat Hang Tuah (II. p. 159) describing the marriage
of the king of Malacca and the daughter of the Batara
Menjapahit gives a lengthy account of the ceremonial bath. Pathù
Gajah Mada, the prime-minister, built a pavilion seventeen storeys
high and decorated it with many umbrellas and jewels: at the
four corners he put four dragons from whose mouths flowed the
water for the lustralion. On one of the storeys of the pavilion
are princelings carrying the jewelled betel box and the watercan
of the princess. On another storey are the children of chiefs and
virgins guarding the jewels of the princess. On another storey.
are the sons of princes, carrying swords in golden scabbards. On
another storey are the children of nobles and ministers carrying
changes of clothing, and on another storey are the children of the
officers of the court and state playing all sorts of games, together
with the royal band. The raja of Malacca and Radin Mas Ayu
are seated on a throne and carried in procession three times round
the pavilion. They enter the pavilion and are given cosmetics
for the ceremonial bath by old members of the royal family; the
full band plays and princess scatter precious stones and pearls
while rose-water pours through the mouth of the dragons. While
the couple bathe, the other princes exhibit all sorts of magic
tricks or feats of arms. After the bath the couple are carried in procession three times round the pavilion and back to the palace.

Mention of the *pancha pêrsada*, the royal bathing-pavilion, is also made in the *Shaër Kin Tambuhan* (p. 68) and the *Shaër Sêri Râniân* (p. 89).

The ceremonies described above refer only to the marriage of a prince or king to one of his legal consorts, of whom apparently he may have four. (The hero of the *Hikayat Malim Deva* however has five!) Their titles according to the *Shaër Kin Tambuhan* are Permaisuri, Paduka Mahadewi, Mahatur and Paduka Lâku. Klinkert (under *langi*) says that a Javanese prince apparently had five consorts of whom only the Permaisuri had to be of royal blood: he adds Mahalangi to the other four.

Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir (II p. 302) mentions marriage to a weapon, the form by which a Hindu girl is married to a prince or to a god. (JRASSB, No. 79 and Winstedt's *Shaman Saiva and Sufi* p. 141):

"There is a disgraceful custom practised by some Malay rajas, which is not a custom of Muslim peoples or of any other people in the world, but a custom inspired by the devil and lust. When a raja takes a girl of the people to make her a concubine, quite against her own will and that of her parents, they have recourse to menaces and have her brought to their houses. They call in a khatib or lêbai who is stupid unacquainted with Muslim law and covetous of fees, and order him to marry the girl to their kérîs, this weapon taking the place of its owner. A man carries the kérîs on a crossbelt over his shoulder and holds a jug full of water and a tray with betel, while by that khatib, that inhabitant of the hell, the girl is married to the kérîs out of fear of the raja."

The wedding ceremonies of lesser people are seldom described. The following passage from chapter XXVI of the *Sêjarah Melayu* is interesting:

Seri Dewa Raja wants to marry the daughter of Kadli Menawar. When an auspicious moment has come, he starts in procession on a royal elephant called Belidamani. Tun Abdul Karim, a son of Kadli Menawar, sits on its head, Tun Zainu'll Abidin shares the saddle with the bridegroom, and Seri Udani sits on its hindquarters. Kadli Menawar awaited them with crackers and petards. He had shut the gate of the fence and had said, "If Seri Dewa Raja succeeds in entering my compound, I'll let him marry my daughter; if he does not succeed, I won't." The elephant arrived outside the gate. Kadli Menawar gives orders to fire the crackers and petards, and there is a great shouting of people, mixed with the din of music. Belidamani is frightened, and all efforts of Tun Abdul Karim to steady him are vain. When Seri Dewa Raja sees this, he says to Tun Abdul Karim: "Brother,
brother, come here to the middle seat and let me sit on the head of the elephant." Tun Abdul Karim retired to the saddle, and Seri Dewa Raja took his seat on the elephant’s head. He made Belidamani turn and drove him against the gate. Belidamani pays no attention to the din. The gate is opened, and the party enters. The elephant is brought close to the hall of Kadli Menawar; Seri Dewa Raja jumps down and is married in the presence of Sultan Mahmud Shah.

The roving prince of a Malay fairy-tale marries here and there on his wanderings, but leaves his consorts and does not take them with him, only visiting them afterwards from time to time in their respective countries. In chapter XXI of the *Sejarah Melaju* we are told how a raja of Champa came to Menjapahit and married the daughter of the Batara. When he wanted to return, the Batara said: "Very well, but I cannot allow my child to be taken away." The Raja of Champa therefore sailed home without his consort.

In the *Hikayat Hang Tuah* the raja of Malacca marries the daughter of the Batara of Menjapahit, and it is made quite clear that the Batara and his wily prime-minister do all they can to prevent the raja of Malacca from returning with his bride to his country over the sea. The raja succeeds in bringing his bride away only owing to the courageous behaviour of Hang Tuah.

Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir in his autobiography (II p. 200) complains that he never felt comfortable in Singapore, as he was unable to induce his wife follow him. He inveighs against the custom that the people of Malacca consider it debasing to take away a woman of good family from the town. It was called *melanykah lautain* (lit. to step over the sea) according to Klinkert a proverbial saying for taking a risky step.
Some Malayan Birds and Insects.

By A. W. HAMILTON.

Mérébah Jambul The red-whiskered bulbul (*Otocompsa emeria*) a very popular cage bird in Penang on account of its song. It is also found wild in places adjacent to Penang, having possibly established itself from individuals escaped from captivity.

Burong Udang The redshank (*Tringa totanus eurynius*) a common migrant on the mudflats of the Kedah coast and usually found in small flocks intermixed with whimbrel and other waders.

Burong Upeh The ashy stork (*Pseudotantalus cinereus*) found on the sea coasts.

Paha Kèlati The small drongo (*Chapthia malayensis*) a black plumaged bird of the size of a starling with crossed tail feathers from the appearance of which it derives its Malay name. "The curving arm of betel-nut scissors."

Gèmbala Kèrbau The white eyed mynah (*Aethiospar fuscus*) a very common bird in Kedah where it is fond of associating with buffaloes in order to feed on the ticks on their hides hence the Malay name "buffalo bird." This mynah is very noticeable in flight on account of the white circular patches under its wings.

Kèlémayar A luminous centipede (*Geophilus*), a small harmless phosphorescent centipede one to two inches long and reddish in colour.

Kumbang Hijau A green chafer beetle (*Anomala cupreipes*) a plain beetle green above and bronze coloured below about the size of a finger joint and with a slight ridge down the centre of the back, it is a favourite amusement of Malay children to tie this beetle to a hair by a back leg and suspend it when it spins like a top for some considerable time.

Chèngkiak A termite (*Macrotermes gilvus*). The soldiers of this species are black and armed with formidable mandibles which they use on the slightest provocation. They frequently forage at night and are a source of annoyance to any barefooted wayfarers who should happen to cross their path, as their bite is sharp and once having bitten they refuse to let go their hold when pulled, even at the expense of head and body parting company.

1925] *Royal Asiatic Society.*
Kélulut

The damar bee (Melipona) a minute bee which forms small protruding funnels of a thin waxy material leading to its nest which is very often formed in the hollows at the junction of house beams. They form a species of wax called damar kélulut which at one time was much sought after for use in assaying gold.

Gonggok (Johore) or Sépah Bulan (Kedah)

A millipede (Chilognatha) a reddish brown millipede which is very common in gardens and rolls itself into a flat coil when touched. A large variety is found in the forests and called Sópah Bulan Rimba. The ashes of this millipede when burnt are used in certain Malay poisons.

Angkut Angkut

The mason wasp (Eumenes gracilis) a common mud wasp in houses where it builds its adobe nest on walls and other articles. Having deposited its ova in the nest the parent wasp then proceeds to lay in a stock of caterpillars and spiders stung into a state of torpidity for her young to feed on when hatched, and having plastered up the entrance leaves her infant welfare centre severely alone. The mason wasp itself is yellow and black in colour with a very attenuated waist ending in a distinct blob at its extremity.

Lipan Bara

A large fiery red centipede (Scolopendra sp.) said by Malays to have an extremely painful sting. The Malay name is due either to the smarting effects of its sting being like "bara," i.e. live coals, or more probably to the fiery glow of its skin.

Some Malay Words.

By A. W. Hamilton.

The present collection of words is in continuation of the similar list published in the October 1923 number (Volume 1) of this Journal and on precisely the same lines, that is to say it contains a few new words but in the main consists of amplifications or modifications and corrections of meanings already given to certain Malay words in Wilkinson's Malay English Dictionary. (W. stands for Wilkinson, Win. for Winstedt).
Jatoh-kan ayer muka orang. To cause a person to lose face. To shame a person in public.

Andar or Mati andar. Labour in vain, wasted energy; no result for one's labour or trouble. Balek andar = to return as from a fishing expedition without any catch. Jangan-lah kita mati andar = don't let us have no results to show for our pains.

Ta'achi. That won't do, that's not allowed, that's not in the game, that's not a fair move etc. (W. The bet is off).

Achap. Awash, up to the brim, up to the hilt. Bila ayer pasang pulau itu achap = When the tide is in, the island is awash. Kena tikam achap = To get stabbed up to the hilt. Satu hari aku beri achap muka engkau = One of these days I will push your face in. (W. deeply immersed in anything).

Asai (or Kasai). A wood weevil very destructive to furniture which creates fine granular dust habok kasai or simply asai (W. a fruit weevil).

Anggar. To reckon (W.). Ayer anggar lutut baru pasang empang = When you reckon the water is about up to your knees then place the net in position. Minum bembah daripada anggaran = To take an over dose or a drop too much.

Anggal. Lightly laden (W.). Masa yang anggal bagi kami = When I have a little spare time and am not overburdened with work etc.

Angin-angin. A bamboo contrivance on the principle of a windmill with fluted ends which is placed on trees and turned by the breeze emitting a melodious moaning sound of varying intensity.

Mengapi (from api). To incite, make mischief.

Amaran. A warning, caution. Beri amaran = To let off with a caution, to caution.

Bagai. Tinda sa-bagai-nya = unique.

Belubor. Piled up. Navi belubor dalam pinggan = a plate heaped up with rice.

Batu anting. An epithet applied to the man nearest the bows who hangs out over a sailing kotlek's side to trim the boat; he acts as a lookout.

Bakar bata. A brick kiln: a brick field.

Batu kisaran. A mill stone: a quern.

Badai. An ornamental cloth covered tudong wiji.

1926] Royal Asiatic Society.
Basoh lantai. A feast generally held 40 days after child birth.
Basi. Rotten, no good, as a hand at cards etc., (slang) from basi stale, musty.
Barang andal. Good and reliable articles. Barang gudang barang andal = articles from a European store are good and reliable. Orang yang andal = a trusty man, a good fighting man (handal).
Bakal guru-guru. Future teachers, embryo teachers; from bakal intended for.
Bulang-baling (or Pusing angin). A weather-cock.
Baloï. Stagnant. Ayer baloi = stagnant water; padang yang tebas berbalak baloi = a once cleared field reverting to a state of stagnation.
Tikam ta'ber-balas. To stab once only, a saying often used to a person who only takes one helping of rice at a meal.
Mëmbaung. Having a concave surface. Luka mëmbaung = a cup-shaped wound like an open ulcer.
Sapëmbawa kaki. To follow one's feet i.e. to go at random.
Bawang. A bulb of a plant.
Bahang. Efluence, glow. Bahang ayer balu = the cold draught which comes off ice. Këna bahang orang sakit = to be affected by the efluence of a sick person.
Anak orang baik-baik. Of gentle birth, the child of gentlefolk.
Basi. Mëngambil basi harus = to allow for the current in crossing by heading upstream.
Bayu. A term of address used towards middle-aged Javanese women (Embok bayu).
Bëlënggu. Terbëlënggu hati manusia = Men's hearts were enthralled.
Bëtulkan. To correct, as papers etc.
Simpul bëng-karong or simpul biawak. Cramp.
Bungkus. To make off with (slang). Bërfumpu përëm-puan di-bungkus-nya = he no sooner meets a woman but he bags her.

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Bingal. Obtuse (téak, tengkarar, shandi). Buat bingal = to pretend not to hear. Kolek bingal = a slow lumbering kolek.


Bëlibis. A shoulder strap or tongue of a shoe.


Bëntor. A small trap for catching crabs. Bëntor chabak = A small expanse of wide-meshed net on a hoop frame two feet in diameter with a light wand: some five feet long passing through the centre where the bait is attached; the wand is stuck in the mud of a river so that the top portion is visible and the hoop drawn up so as to leave the net in the form of a cone. When the crab crawls on to the net and nibbles the bait, the wand oscillates and the fisherman comes quietly along in his canoe and pulls up the stake with the crab entangled in the net. Bëntor chumpak is a similar contrivance with a closing half hoop for deep water and a line instead of a stake. It is closed with a jerk of the line when the crab is felt to be nibbling.

Bansum bakau. The pointed rootlets of mangrove trees found sticking up in the mud.

Boroskan. To waste.

Main bunga ké-pala. To play at heads and tails.

Bongok. Heavy of build, squat. Muka bongok = A heavy face: térbongok dudok = Sitting in a heap.

Buak. To well up. Bérbuak ayer di-luan péruh = The water foamed up at the stem.


Mëmbolot nam-pak-nya. He appeared to be in great hurry. From bolot to wrap up hastily.

Bolot. To get away with another’s belongings. Habis di bolot semua kENTongan itu = All the gains were swallowed by him.

Këbulor. Sahaya tu’këbulor = I don’t want it. (From këbulor = hunger) = sahaya tu’tingin.

Bunoh tali. To tie up a string or rope.

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
Some Malay Words.

Bechoh

Bechoh mulut = confused noise of many voices.

Jarum biku.

A pin.

Bela.

Atonement by blood. Mati ta’berbelu = To die unavenged; buntut bela = To demand damages for injury caused.

Cholek.

To draw a card from the table with a finger. Cholek daun chëki = To draw a card at chëki. Chëcholek = rojak, a pungent salad.

Chebet.

To scoop up en passant; chebet buku musok = to pick up and bring in. Chebet ayeu sadikit = to bring a little water en passant.

Chëkah.

To force open by outwards pressure as fruit: To cock a gun etc. Kuda-kuda sënapang di-chëkah.

Chëlonet.

The projecting tip of anything as a lip etc. (Vide chonet or jonet).

Champong.

Broken clean off, broken in two; snapped asunder as a board, tree, man’s leg or a fishing-line.

Chanting.

Chanting-chanting, chantis-chantis = scrawled and scribbled all over.

Chantum.

Coming together, used of the edges of a wound.

Chanchang.

Sticking up, rising to a point. Rambut-nya chanchang = with hair sticking up. Orang pun berchanchang-chanchang di-bëleakang = The people were standing up behind.

Chëndërâ mata.

A reminiscence; a souvenir.

Chucha rimau.

A spell to protect one from tigers by neutralising their powers.

Chuar.

To project, to stick out: tërchuar lûtut = with knee sticking up of a man lying down; di-chuar ka-hulu ka-hiliir = he pushed it out in all directions. Mënjuår = sticking out.

Chongak-changip.

Moving up and down as the head: opening and closing of a sarong. Chùba chôngak, bërkira dengan chôngak = to put one’s head on one side and think; to do mental calculations.

Chopong.

A cup made of horn or bamboo.

Chopol (Chupul W).

Too short or too small. Kasut chopol = shoes that are too small. Kadatangan masa têrchopol = to come when time is limited.

Cholang-chaling.

In confusion. Bërdayong cholang-chaling = To row out of time. Bërchakap cholang-chaling = to be at sixes and sevens.
Cha’ok. A dimple.
Térchadok. Sitting up as a snake ready to bite.
Changok. Arched; curving; the proud curve of a hawk’s neck when perched on a bough. Térchangok-haluan-nya = Having a curved stern, of a kolek.
Changkong. To sit down on one’s haunches as a man or dog. Anjing dugok mënchangkong.
Chêngkek. Thin in the centre, as a lady’s waist etc. (chêngkek - W).
Chonggang-chonggek. Bobbing up and down = chonggang-changgit.
Chêngam. To seize with a snap as a crocodile (chêngkam).
Chap. To lap as milk: Kuching baharu sakali chap susu di tinggal-kan = The cat took one lap of milk and left it.
Didek. My chick, fosterchild. Ini-lah didek aku = This is my little fondling or production.
Bêrdamai. Sedah bêrdamai or sudah bêrbaik = consummated, of a marriage.
Dêbing. The sound of a blow on the person: bêrdêbing bunyi-nya.
Mêndêrus. A violent approaching roar as of thunder or a person charging into a room.
Dêram. To growl. Anjing bêrdêram di-bawah rumah = The dog was growling under the house. Sabagai kuching mêndêram ikan = Like a cat growling over fish. Rumah bêrdêram = The noise of a falling house.
Bêrdêgar. To slam as a door. Bunyi pintu bêrdêgar.
Gêdêgah-gêdêgoh. To thud; a thumping noise made by a walking stick etc.
Dêgup. To gulp down: ikan makan dêgup.
Dendeng. To hold up any thin material such as cloth to the light so as to examine it.
Doyak. An octopus.
Dedis. To cut in fine slices (didis = to hash W).
Ênjut. To jerk. Ênjut jala = To give a jerk forward to a casting net. Ênjut-ênjut papan = To sit jerking up and down on a piece of plank.
Ênjal. To force down as food down a child’s throat.
Jalan bêrenchut. To shuffle along slowly as a man with a bad leg.

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
Enggan. Limit: Boundary: Up to: Enggan mana tanah tun= = How far does your land go, where is the boundary of your land.

Empang. A deep net pegged down to the bottom and usually supported on poles for the purpose of completely damming rivers or bays which are almost dry at low tide, it is drawn up at full tide and catches the fish on the ebb.

Gamam. Flurried: Tangan jadi gamam = flurried, all of a dither.

Galak. Menacing: Rampant: Fierce: Devouring: Pencuri sedang galak = Thieves are rampant: Api pun menggalak pada mala itu = The fire became fiercer than ever at that moment: Galak menjanu orang = Always entertaining i.e. fierce at entertaining.

Goda. To torment: To rack: Sentiasa di goda uteh demam = Frequently racked by fever.

Gulai. To make it hot for a person: To settle a person's hash: Engkau ini lemak sungat aku gulai kan sakarang = You are just a little bit too rich I'll carry you in a moment (said to badly behaved children etc. in scolding).

Gaharap. Amber.

Gewang. Mother of pearl obtained from the siput gewang and often made into buttons etc.

Gebeng, meng-gebeng, bér-genchok. To dance in the attitudinising manner common to Malays.

Gérobo. A chest or cupboard for crockery, provisions etc.; a meat safe (vide kérobo).

Gélap-katup. Pitch dark.

Gérak hati. A presentiment.

Hai-hui. Woe is me! Orang di-dalam hai-hui = people in a state of tribulation.

Jauh hati. To feel slighted; to feel hurt.

Busok hati. Ill natured.

Kéchil hati. To feel very small; to be at loggerheads. Kéchil rasa-nya hati or kéchil rasa-nya hati = I felt extremely hurt and small. Orang bérdua bérudek itu bérkéchil hati satu dengan lain = The two brothers are at loggerheads with one another.

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Męmbawa hati. To betake oneself away on account of some slight or great loss or sorrow and not to return to the old surroundings.

Sakit hati. A grudge.

Kueh hasidah. A sweet-meat like dodol Maskat.

Bau hangit. An acrid stench as of sweat, ketiak hangit.

Hapak. A musty smell as of clothes which have not been aired for some time.

Hala. Direction. Męriam di-hala kapada kota = The guns were trained on the fort. Térhala kapada pelurn = Exposed to the bullets. Rumah térhala sangat = A very exposed house.

Orang halus. Impalpable fairy folk; a departed spirit.

Hambat. Hambat hati = to win people's hearts; pandai hambat hati = winsome.

Bęrhanyut. To play and sing at ease for amusement.

Hantar. Hantar mari = send here.

Hang. Temporary stands put up for the spectators at a bull fight (Kedah).

Habok kayu. Saw dust.

Bęrabok: chakap bęrabok. To quarrel; heated argument. (i.e. to make the dust fly from kobok).

Hęmpok. To throw down on. Itu sęma di-hęmpok atas képala aku = It was all thrown on to my head.

Injak or hinjak. To tread on; to trample on; (a variant of hęnjak). Ta' pęnah saya hınjak ka-rumah itu = I have never stepped inside that house. Kępala kuli di-injak oleh kuda = The coolies head was trampled on by the horse.

Injap. The name of a crab pot with inturning spikes.

Bęrinjap also męngunjap (Kedah). To turn inwards with a contracting muscular movement as anemones.

Indok. A base or home in playing certain games.

Igal muka. To brazen out: to endure pain stoically.

Ilu. A small receptacle for sirci leaves.

Męnjęrmbeh. Slipshod, carelessly dressed: (from ręmbeh). Orang tua męnjęrmbeh = A slovenly old woman.

Jijik. Dirty, nasty. A word usually used towards children when admonishing them not to touch some nasty object.

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
Ikan Jukut. All kinds of fish to eat—a frequentative of ikan: ikan jukut soak petok.
Jarang. Loose of texture in cloth: kain jarang.
Jérāhāp. To fall down flat on one’s face as a person or a house.
Jérongkong. On all fours as an animal. Mēnērongkong = to bend over, to stoop down.
Jérongkong. Stumbling along; falling and rising. Hence hantu jérongkong.
Térjērembat. To have a slight fall on one side. Tiada jatoh pun tērjērembat = Though he did not get a fall he got a good shaking (a proverbial expression).
Karong. Mēŋkarong to sew a sareh vertically (from karong sack).
Kilas. A rattan thong for the feet used when climbing a coconut tree.
Kandul. A pocket; a bulge in a piece of cloth, netting etc; the pocket for the fish at the end of a pukal. Baju dalam kērkandul = a ladies vest with bulges for the breasts.
Kēnnyit. To wink; to blink the eye-lids; to raise the eye-brows. Kēnnyit bētina = To wink at a woman. Mata tērkeēnnnyit-kēnnyit = Blinking eyelids.
Mata kau. A chancre.
Kotes (Kotis W). To take a pinch at a time: (mēngotes). Pēngotes = A person who abstracts a little at a time from another's belongings; a pilferer. Kotes kuch sikit-sikit = To take a little helping of a cake.
Kulai-balai. Swinging about suspended by very little. A frequentative of kulai.
Kitai. To move tremulously as the hands of a nervous man or the antennae of a crayfish.
Kirakan. To arrange about. Englēu kīra-kan kuli = you will arrange for coolies.
Kirikan. To pass a person anything (a polite form of speech from Kīrī, left; the right hand being the proper hand to pass anything with).
Kepak. To break off by bending as a twig etc. Kolek tērkeēpak-keēpak = Of a boat swinging idly backwards and forwards.

Journal Malayan Branch [Vol. III, Part, III,
Kekok. Awkward, strange, ill at ease. *Dudok kekôk* — To sit in an awkward manner. *Kekôk ranu-nya baju ini* — This is a very strange fitting—awkward coat. *Turun sabélah kanun kekôk* — It feels strange getting down on the right hand side.

Kérésai. Crisp as dry rice, bread, hair etc.

Kèrepek. Thin slices of tapioca-root or bananas dried and then fried in sugar.

Kekut. To curl up; to shrivel up (vide *kèreket*). *Mérekut; mëngérérekut* — Curled and twisted as a man in convulsions.

Képurun. A sweet-meat.

Kérónchong. Anklets of tiny bells used in certain dances.

Kélétok. The sound of repeated hammer-like blows; to tap (frequentative of *kétok*). *Kélétok-kélétok orang bérchongkuk* — The tap tap tap of the seeds when people are playing *changkuk*.

Kélédék rébus. A simpleton.

Kélesa. Lazy; an idle careless worker (W. careless and slovenly of work).

Kénching kuda. Smelling salts (ammonia).

Kinchah. To curse at, revile; also = *basoh* i.e. to give a person a washing down; “dressing down” is a somewhat similar equivalent in English.

Kayu-kayan. Wood; trees (a frequentative of *kayu*).

Karut kéliling mulut. Wrinkled all round the mouth.

Kénching nanah. Gonorrhoea.

Kapai. Waving or flapping about aimlessly and helplessly. *Térkapai-kapai tangan-nya* — His hand was wagging about helplessly.

Kébas. To dust with a cloth.

Kétap. To grip firmly by compressing. *Tembok mëngélap paku* — A wall gripping a nail.

Kétok métek. Odds and ends.

Kétok-kétok. A sweetmeat of mashed *kéladi* and *gula Mélaka*.

Kéchut muka. To shrink with fright.

Kéchëpong- këchëpang. The sound of splashing in water.

Kédap. Close meshed of fishing net etc.; The opposite of *serang*.

1925] Royai Asiatic Society.
Kërëtik. To creak slightly.

Pusing luan. To alter a ship’s course; to change direction. Kapal la’butuh bawa luan = A ship that will not answer her helm. Mëngambil luan ka-lain = To go off in a different direction.

Lawas. Easy of a motion. Ka-sungai lawas = To have easy motions (stool).

Lawan. An accessory, counter-part; any thing that goes with something else. Teh lawan-nya susu = Milk goes with tea.


Lëbar-lëbu. To thump. Lëbar-lëbu hati pityut = My heart was in my mouth; violently excited.

Langgan; or Bërlanggan. (W. Langgan). Langganan = A subscriber.

Lap. To mop up moisture; To clean with a damp rag.

Lëpir. Careless; Not watching (vide lépa).

Lop-lap. To plash. Lop-lap bunyi bërjalan di-lumpor = To plash about in mud. Din masok lop kà-dalum rumah = He plumped into the house.

Lëmah. Slack of tide, as opposed to harus têrajang a strong current.

Lëpas. Open, unbounded. Lautan lépas = The open sea. Hutân lépas = The boundless forest.

Lëpak. To fall with a thud. Lëpok-lëpak = To drop continuously of fruit. Aku lëpak-kan budak itu sakarang = I shall give that boy such a smack in a moment.

Latch. To exercise, practise regularly. Latehan pë-përangan = Warlike exercises, manoeuvres. Pëlateh = a cadet.

Lajak. Momentum, way on a moving body. Tër-lajak masok ka-dalam përit = His momentum took him into the ditch.

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Lazim. Customary, usual. *Sudah kélaziman* = It is usual.

Lambat laun. Sooner or later. *Lambat laun bértému juga* = We shall meet again sooner or later.


Lambut (Mé-lambut). To well up, gush, spout up of blood, smoke etc.


Lémau. Weak, sleepy, apathetic. *Urui-nya lémau* = his muscles are flabby and weak. *Ben itu mélemau buni-nya* = The band sounds very lifeless—as opposed to *pédas* = lively. *Rasa lémau* = insipid as a soft drink. *Su-lémau-lémau pun-tong di-dapor di-tinp bérnala juga* = No matter how dead the embers appear to be they will rekindle if blown upon.

Lémpai (ményé-lémpai). To droop, curl over at the edges. *Rambut mé-lémpai* = With hair drooping over his face. *Lémpak-lémpai* = Bent and drooping over on one side.

Lénting. To leap about of live embers or fish, writhe and shrivel as paper on a fire etc. *Mélénting marah* = To dance with rage.

Lanjar. Long drawn out as a cable in a swift current (opposed to *tégak*); *panjang lanjar*.

Térlanjor. Anything that has overstepped the bound. *Lanjar* = Protracting; prolongation, etc. *Sudah térlanjor ka-mari* = Now that we suddenly find ourselves here. *Péchakapan térlanjor* = Anything which slipped out in the heat of conversation.

Mélesir. To trail along the ground of a long garment or plant; to lie about in the house anyhow and blether as an old woman.

Lonjak. To bob up and down. *Nampak dia térlonjak-lonjak* = He was seen to be rising up and down.

Some Malay Words.

Lenyek. To squash or mash up by rubbing as with the fore-finger.
Méluat. Sickening, disgusting. Meluat aku mengok dia = The sight of him makes me sick.
Lêmbekek Iotek. As soft as putty.
Mêlochak. To be disturbed of water, to slap about of liquid in a moving vessel. Ayer laut mêlochak = The sea was disturbed. Mêlochak nesa tumpah leleh = The honey was disturbed and spilt over. Also mêlochak (vide kochak).
Kueh lopes. A sweetmeat of steamed pulut steeped in a sauce of gula Melaka and sprinkled with grated coconut.
Luek. To retch slightly as on eating something disagreeable.
Lolong. To howl of dogs, babies, children etc. Ter-lolong-lolong = howling.
Loyang. A metal tray used in making sweets.
Lecher. To waste time, to dissipate, be slack. Lagi lucha lagi lecher = Not only immoral but a wastrel as well. Lecher kërja ini = Work that drag on indefinitely. cf. lechah.
Tali lidah. The tendon below the tongue.
Leret. To drag on, drag along behind, drag down behind. Mêleret di-burihan = Dragged down in the stern. Kërja-nya mêleret = His work drags on.
Lampu gantong. A hanging lamp.
Lampu dudok. A table lamp.
Madu manchong. The 'V' shaped cut at the bottom of the opening of a Malay baju kurung.
Mamek. A slightly nasty flat taste.
Médu, sakit médú. Dyspepsia, indigestion.
Kaseh mêséra. Love; to be really fond of a person; inseparable love.
Mêngkol. Anxious, ill at ease. Mêngkol dudok sa-orang.
Batu mongkom. Large dome-shaped rocks in the sea.
Pinggan mongkom. A soup plate (From mongkom = dome-shaped). The remains: a small amount,
Mandi pėloň. Bathed in perspiration.

Muak. To retch slightly, slight nausea, hence disgust. *Makan nasi minyak lékas muak* = *Nasi minyak* is a dish which quickly brings on a feeling of nausea.

Tidor mereng. To sleep on one's side.

Topi di-pakai mereng. To wear one's hat cocked on one side.

Dodol megan. A viscus sweetmeat composed of sugar, flour, eggs and *minyak sapi*; when granulated it becomes antakésoma.

Ményeriding. To lie on one's side (From *sêriding* = an edge).

Tidor menyiding. To sleep on one's side (From *siding* = an edge).

Munai. Soft, moist, and odorous. (Vide unai). *Pokok tahi agam munai* = The lantana shrub on account of its soft black berries when ripe.

Mémbal. *Ikan membal* = Fish soaked in brine and then taken out so that the fish is still soft and damp; pieces of fish so treated are exposed for sale in this condition (From *émbal* = damp).


Nyenyet. Puffed or pulled out a little.

Ngongoi, mëngo- ngongoi. To weep, of a child.

Nasi. The white contents of a pimple when squeezed; (*kéluer nasi*, to exude the same).

Ngap. A gasp. *Ta' dapat ngap* = No time to breathe, not a moment to oneself.

Ondak. To pitch up and down, heave up and down. *Kapal mëngondak di-tëngah laut* = A ship pitching up and down in a heavy sea (and necessarily making little headway). *Dudok dalam lungcha dërondak* = To be jerked up and down in a slow rickshaw.

Oja. To bait animals; To excite one animal to attack another (W. to set a cock on another).

Ogam. To urge on, lead on. *Kalau tiada di-ogam orang diam-lah ia* = If he had not been led on by others he would have remained quiet. *Tu- kang ogam* = A man who excites or urges one on by a show of words etc.
Sa-olah-olah. As if. *Di-pandang-nya sa-olah-olah saya membuat* = He regarded me as if he thought I had done it.

Ombak béralun. A method of wearing a *sarong* by women when it is gathered up into several folds at the side (*kain ikat ombak béralun*).

Ong-ang. The croaking of frogs.

Mémadang. To be flat and open of country (*from padang*).


Pémanchar. The white expressed milk of a coconut taken from the second or subsequent squeeblings when mixed with water as opposed to the thick pure *pati santan* obtained from the first squeezing.

Péngap. To take and do away quietly with other people's property (*also pénadap*).

Main péranja. A *mayong* troupe which plays in one spot for some time erecting a screen and seats as at a circus and charging for admission.

Pénggal. To sever, cut off. *Pénggal yang késa* = The first part of a book etc. *Buleh-kah pénggal dua almari itu* = Can that almírah be taken into two pieces (*W. panggal*).

Panggok. To place or pile on top of. *Di-panggok dýéngan kérusi lain* = Another chair was piled on top of it.

Pégarí. Visibility. *Buleh pégarí* = Can be seen. *Dýéngan péruatu dýan pégarí* = Lost to view bed and all. (*W. invisibility*).

Pélus. To put one's foot unexpectedly through the ground or the floor etc. = *pélus, térpéélus*. *Pélus kaki dalam lumpor* = His foot went into the mud.

Térpélanchut, térlanchut. To shoot or slip out under pressure, squirt up. *Mélanchut bénor laku-nya* = Unruly behaviour (*A little squirt*).

Térpélanchit. To shoot out, of smaller bodies and with greater force as when a seed pops out of its pod on being squeezed.


Péparu. Purple.

Para buang. A shelf for crockery etc. in a Malay house made by thrusting out the side planks of the house at an acute angle and flooring the bottom of the space with spaced laths.

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Pakis. A maidenhair fern.
Pisang mēman-dak. The condition of a banana tree just previous to putting forth a fruit stalk (from pandak = short) due to the swollen and rather stumpy appearance.
Panchang serong. A method of wearing a surong by women with one edge at an acute angle (Kain ikat panchang serong).
Pēndaram. A paté of prawns etc. (W. pēnaram).
Main pantat. Sodomy.
Pintal. A twister, cheat (Slang—vide pusing).
Pēmidang. A square frame used for stretching embroidery or skins: a picture frame.
Penjong. A point, projection; a point of land jutting out.
Pēnyēdap. A husband or wife (from sēdap pleasurable).
Pusar. A whorl of hair (Win. pusar-pusar) (The varying situation of these whorls is important in the description of a buffalo).
Pupok. To apply a plaster, to plaster. *Batās rosak di-pupok dēngan darah* = Broken dykes are plastered with earth. *Di-muna api bērpupok* = Wherever fire is applied.
Pukal. A lump, meaty. *Pukal isi-nya ikan ini* = This fish is full of meat. *Pukal hati* = to make up one’s mind. *Tēdak pukal hati-nya hēndak mēnchērīkān istēri-nya* = He cannot make up his mind to divorce his wife.
Pokah. Rotten, worthless, of cheap and easily broken articles (slang). *Pokah sangat orang-nya o Daud itu* = Daud is a worthless loafer.
Poni. A mug, tin vessel (W. A tin spoon or ladle).
Punah (also Punah ranah). To revile.
Pesong. To turn out of its proper direction or course; *Pesong ibu langan-nya kēna badan* = His thumb was put right out by striking against the person. *Wakē hērdīrī ṭeṛpesong badan kēna lānggar* = He was knocked against whilst standing and turned right round at an angle.
Pelet. To smear on a slight quantity (Vide chalit). *Pelet kapor* = To smear a little lime on a leaf.
Pinang masak. A deep rich yellow.

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Some Malay Words.

Pérengau. Gaping open. *Pérengau bahu-nya kēna pēturu = His shoulder was gaping open where he was shot.

Péregang sēluar. Trouser stretchers. (From *rēgang = To stretch).

Pérēlas. To scrape off. *Di-pérēlas habis barta-nya uleh bētina itu = The woman stripped him bare of all his possessions.

Buah Pérambung. A joking name for the clown in a mayong.

Rondeng. To calculate, discuss. *Bērondeng = To go into ways and means; to go into the pros and cons; to discuss a matter at a meeting. *Rondengan = Discussions, deliberations.

Rënnuyt. To throb. *Lain rënnuyt-nya anak ikan = small fish give quite a different little tug on the line. *Mërrnuyt anak dara di-rumah = The house was full of girls.

Gérënnym. To feelitchy, to feel excited sexually. *Naik gérënnym = To be on heat.

Përotan. A wood cutter.

Rodok. To thrust into, jab upwards. *Rodok sēndok dalam mulut = He shoved the spoon into his mouth.


Mëruang. To cleanse a dead body of impurities by expressing any excreta especially the tahi asal or original excrement which forms part of our being and comes away at death or when on the point of death.

Mëruap. To boil up. *Bau mëruap ka-hidong = The stink strikes up into one’s nostrils.

Rumah api. A light house, a receptacle for a lamp as in hurricane lamps.

Royal. Happy (= joli) bērjian royal.


Mërebet. To drag in third parties to a dispute etc. *Suka mërebet orang = He is fond of dragging in other people. *Rebet = rabit.

Risau. Ill at ease, anxious, troubled. *Risau dudok di-rumah = To feel miserable and vexed at having to stay in-doors.

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Rĕbus taʾ ēmpok. To be boiled without getting any softer i.e. a hardened sinner (W. rĕbus taʾ ēmpok).

Tĕrênchat. Stunted (= kĕrênchat).

Pĕrabun. A charm for dulling an opponent’s senses so that he is unaware of our presence. (From rabun = To fumigate).

Ragum. Anything in the nature of a vice, a ticket collector’s punch, a pair of pincers.

Mĕrayang. Su-lagi ada duil mĕrayang = So long as he has got any money his brains in a whirl i.e. he wanders around spending it foolishly. (From rayang = dizzy).

Mĕrĕd ap. Api makan mĕrĕd ap = A fire consuming inwardly. Mĕrĕd ap hari = An aching heart due to love, anguish etc.

Rĕsa. Natural impulse or inclination. Mĕngikut rĕsa = To follow one’s own inclination as to dress etc.

Rangsang. Mĕrăngsang huu-nya = A very strong or exciting scent.

Pĕrĕngap. A charm which extinguishes an enemy’s power of injury (= kĕnă rĕngap).

Tĕrongkas. To fall or slip off. Takut kain tĕrongkas = For fear of my dress falling off.

Rangkap. To combine, to join two things together. Daun nyior di-rangkap-kan = The coconut leaves are stitched together. Dua-dua hukum di-rangkap-kan = The sentences will be concurrent, or both the sentences may be inflicted.

Renggis. Scraggy, as a tree with a few pointed branches (rĕnggis W.).

Ayam panggang pĕringgi. A full grown but not quite mature hen (also used metaphorically of girls).

Mĕrĕpak. To increase and multiply. Padi mĕrĕpak = To spring up thickly of padi.

Rĕpuį. Rambut-nya sudah rĕpuį = His hair was falling out at the least touch.

Mĕrĕmut. To pulsate: to be alive with. Mĕrĕmut orang di-padang = The plain was alive with humanity.

Ransum. (vide ransum). Si-anu di-ransum ulekh lima orang = So and so was raped by 5 persons one after the other.

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Rempat. Blown about at the mercy of the wind and waves. *Dia mērẹmpat kasana kamari mēnchari kērja* = He drifted from place to place looking for work.

Rumpun. A tuft: A clump (of grass, bushes etc.).

Rantam. To club together: *Baik kita bērantam* = Let us get together and subscribe. *Si Awang'nak diārantam dek China* = The Chinese had bound themselves together to give Awang a thrashing.


Renda. Lace (W. gold or silver lace). *Baju bērenda* = A woman's lace jacket.

Sotoh. A terrace; terraced roof.

Songket. To wrest up: (To wrest open). *Pēnyongket hotol* = A bottle opener of the key type. *Kain meja bola di-songket-nya* = He ripped up the cloth on the billiard table.

Sēngkar. A thwart, cross seats in a boat.

Sangkil. Successful accomplishment. *Tuju pun sangkil* = His black arts were successful. *Bēluum duapat kasek-nya sangkil* = His suit was unsuccessful.

Sēngkol. *Pērut sēngkul* = A pleasant cold feeling of the stomach.

Sēpok. To fling down or aside as clothes. *Jatoh tēr-sēpok* = To fall in a heap.

Sēpoh gigi. A recipe for giving a polished appearance to teeth. One of them is *ambil mumbang paras bontol-nya dan panaskan, bila sudah suam kumōr dēngan ayer-nya tujob kali*.

Sok-sek. The sound of whispering. *Bērchakap sok-sek*.

Sēling. Small silver change.


Sembat. To whip up, jerk up. *Tali sembat* = The line which closes a bēntor crab-pot with a snap. *Jahit sembat* = A stitch.

Sēmbat. To whip the water as a skate: to beat down on anything with a broad surface.
Sampok. To run up against; to run right into (as in charging to football); to interrupt. Tersampok = A mysterious affection caused by running into a ghost.

Sempal. Lidah menyempal = Unable to pronounce words properly, tongue-tied.

Sampun. Rambut di-sampun = To let the whole head of hair grow without restraint.

Bersimpan. To pack up, to tidy up a house; to bury (Penang).

Sintal. Well nourished (of a person) (W. pot-bellied).

Senang-lenang. The epitome of ease, a frequentative of senang.

Senoh. Comfortably full, neither hungry nor the reverse.

Senyar. The tingling feeling in an aching tooth.

Suji. A thick sweet wheat flour paste eaten as a pudding.

Sudip bēsi. A flat iron ladle for turning over eggs cakes etc. in cooking.

Sodok. To shovel up. Kolek ménynodok = A kolek that dips her nose badly into the sea. Kena sodok dēngun kēris = He was given an upper cut with the kēris.

Surai. To separate. Orang jēmputan pun bērsurabulab =* The guests broke up and departed. Dēnum nak surai = The fever is breaking up. Roti surai (Penang) = Shredded wheat-bread.

Sanapas. A breath. Chium sa-napas = A long kiss. Lari sa-napas = To run off as hard as one can go (i.e. without a breather). Tinggal napas = Tired out and panting.

Sara. Means of support: provisions. Mēnerima sara dari kērajuan = To be supported by the Government i.e. to receive a pension; masing-masing mēnyarakun diri.

Sakat. To annoy; to tease.

Sakal. To rap with the knuckles.

Saki baki. The remainder: What is left over. A frequentative of baki.

Saleh. To turn round; To revert; to change over. Saleh pokok limau ini manis jadi masam = This lime tree has changed completely over from sweet to sour.
Mat Salleh. A nickname for a European "Holy Mat."
Saji. A form of entertainment: main saji.
Sëbak. Sakit sëbak; angin sëbak = wind in the stomach making breathing difficult.
Sëtiram. A chandelier.
Sëbar. Numb. The peculiar tingling sensation of numbness. Jari sëbar = A finger that has gone to sleep. Sakit sëbar mëmbawa tepok = A condition of numbness leads to palsy.
Sëbu. Full. Sëbukan lubang = To fill up a hole. Sëbu muku-nyu = Having a full face. Përut terasa angin sëbu = To have an inflated feeling of the stomach.
Sërabai. Full of holes (as a nest).
Sërawa. A sweet stew of boiled sugar, santan and fruit such as durian, bananas, bread fruit, sweet potatoes.
Sërobah-sërobeh, Sërbah-sërbeh. Dishevelled of clothes.
Sëremban. The game of knuckle-bones played usually with pebbles or seeds.
Susok. A small thin plate usually of gold let into the cheek to give the owner a bright captivating countenance: masok susok.
Susun bantal. A pyramidal pile of cushions. Anak susun bantal = Having a regular series of children one smaller than the other.
Sokong. The boom which stretches out the sail in a kolek.
Suam. Suam-suam kuku = Lukewarm.
Sibar. To add an edging to a central piece. Sibar layur = To add on a strip of cloth to a sail to enlarge it. Sibar rumah = To add on side balconies to a house.
Siar. To wander, promenade (from the Arabic сигар = going in any manner or at any pace). *Surat khabar yang tērsiar sa-luruh 'alam = A newspaper which reaches to every corner of the globe.

Seman. A man.

Sawan inau. A type of convulsions combined with heavy breathing met with usually amongst children.

Sakit mēmbaka. Hereditary disease.

Sēgar-pugar. Fresh, revived. A frequentative of sēgar. Sēgar-pugar sēgala pokok = All the plants were revivified.

Sēbat. To flitch (slang) (from sēbat = to switch). Kasut sahaya di-sēbat orang = Somebody has pinched my shoes.

Sa-chap. A slab or plait of vermicelli: la'as sa-chap.

Tidor tēr-bongkang. To sleep stretched out at full length.

Mēmbanting tulang. To work hard.

Tabek-tabek. Begging your pardon; If I may be excused for mentioning it. A polite phrase used when about to mention something indecent.

Tatap. Ta'makan tatap = Unable to bear close inspection, of beauty, cloth etc. (from tatap= careful inspection.

Tajor. A fishing rod. Mēnajor = To fish with a rod for cuttlefish etc.

Tarah. To level rough ground.

Mēnapak. To track (from tapak = the sole of a foot) also a technical term for going out when playing chongkak. Mēngatur tapak = To walk mincingly. Tapak rumah = The site of a house. Tapak pokok bunga = A flower bed.

Mēnakak. To sew two pieces of a half-width sarong together horizontally (from takak).

Tahi minyak. Unreliable; useless; a rotter (slang). Banyak tahi minyak-nya = He is full of dirty tricks.

Takek. Aku takek kēpala ēngkau dēngan pisau = I will notch your head with a knife.

Takok-takok (or bērtakok-takok). Banded; ridged, ringed as the trunk of a coconut tree, certain birds' necks etc.

Tayang. To hold an article up to the light so as to observe it.

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
Tangkap.  Tangkap dēgān = grapple with. Tangkap kata orang = grasp a person’s meaning.

Tēdoh, tēmpat tēdoh.  Shelter: a sheltered spot.


Bērtongkong-tongkong.  In large lumps, of wood, sago etc.

Sa-tangkup.  A handful.

Tīga tangkup ayer.  Three handful’s of water.

Kuat tonggang.  A hard drinker from tonggang = upside down i.e. of a bottle. Senonggang: head-downwards.

Tōnggong.  Piled up. Bēndera bērtonggong-tonggang = Of flags piled up above each other on a decorated mast.

Tonchet.  A tuft or lock of hair: a small queue: (konchel).

Tēnggek.  To push out the buttocks to one side. Dītēnggek orang jatoh tērpēlanting = Knocked sprawling by a lateral push with the buttocks as in playing football.

Tērān.  Pēnērān = a strainer, squeezer as for lemons.

Bērtanggam.  Interlocked as fingers: spliced together as the two ends of a rope.

Pāpan lantai bērtanggam.  Grooved and tongued of planks.

Bērtēlēkan pinggang.  With hands akimbo.

Tahi tēmbaga.  Verdigrase.

Tēmbus.  To go right through of a road. Jalan ini tēmbus kamana = Where does this road come out?

Tēmbam.  Prominent as of the cheeks. Muka tēmbam = Full faced (W. tēmban).

Tēmpuras.  Scattered around by leakage. Rēmpah habis tēmpuras dari batu giling = The curry stuff was scattered about having flown off the currystone.

Tampin.  A cylindrical plaited leaf receptacle for bēlachan etc. Bēlachan sa-tampin.

Tīndeh pēr-kataan.  To cap a story.

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Some Malay Words.

Torch. A shallow groove; a deep scratch; an incision on bark as in tapping for rubber. Pénoreh gélah = a rubber tapper; méno-reh gélah = to tap rubber. Muka di-torch ta' bérda-rah = Pale from fright or shock.

Tengol. Foolish, idiotic.

Tuam. To “give it” to a person hot and strong (slang). Día pun tuam-thà = He let fire etc.

Tipam. To strike with the flat of the hand.

Titek. To rap: A succession of hammering blows as in beating out a metal.

Tepok (or angin tepok). Palsy or partial paralysis of the lower limbs often due to childbirth etc.

Tilan. A children’s complaint the manifestations of which are pain in the stomach and crying.

Tebak. To dig out: Tebak tanah = To dig out earth with a changkul etc.

Umpil. To propel a boat by resting an oar on the gunwale and levering outwards (uwet).


Ubang. To alter the course or position of a thing: Ubang khalun = To alter the course of a vessel.

Bérubah muka. To change colour under the influence of a sudden shock, accusation etc.

Méngubah janji. To break one’s promise.

Udíp(also médit). Mean.

Méngurat. To be keen on a woman (vide gila ‘urat’).

Usek. To meddle with. Jangan bagi orang usek: bérang tia = Don’t allow anyone to meddle with these things.

Upak. To stir up (figuratively), to foment. Orang pérupak = A mischief maker, one who stirs up people.

Umbi. The heart of the root of a tree or of a bulb upon which its life depends it corresponds to umbil which is the heart of the tree etc. above ground (W. that portion of the root which is buried).

Umpamakan. To liken to (W. to compare). Tiada di-umpamakan orang = To be treated with scant respect or as of no account.

Hati yap-yap. A disinclination (to do something).

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
Corrigenda

In Journal No. 85 of March 1922 the following misprints appeared in the comparative lists of Singapore and Penang words given at the end of my article on Penang Malay.

- (Achī lor) tutup itu read Tutup ibu.
- Bēngkang
- Bēngkang gula merah
- Biji asam (main) kucha kērāt loan (Chinese)
- Chak burong.
- Chak pipet.
- (Champin) a slight flow
- Chor Kodak
- (Enau) the sugar plant
- (Gebang) to yarn
- Gēti
- Jērumal
- Kēpak
- Kērēnāh
- Kērja tērgah-togah.
- Kērtas pedap
- Lēkeh
- (Lēndip) tertib
- Pa' saut
- Pēleta.
- Pēnakun abang; saudara abang

- (Pējal) kēnnyat
- Sēriak
- (Sigolak) Kolak-kolak
- Tali kērangang
- Timun bētek
- Ubi ikan

Bēngkang.
Bēngkang gula merah.
Main biji asam; main kucha kērāt loan (Chinese).
Burong Chak.
Chak pipet.
A slight flow.
Chor Kodak.
The sugar palm.
To yarn.
Gēti.
Jērumal.
Kēpak.
Kērēnāh.
Kērja tērgah-ogah.
Kērtas pedap.
Lēkeh.
Tertib.
Pa' sauk.
Pēlida.
Abang pēnakun, ubang saudara (similarly for the rest of the pēnakun relationships).
Kēnnyat.
Sēriat.
Kolok-kolok.
Tali kērangang.
Timun bētek.
Ikan ubi.

A. W. HAMILTON.

Journal Malayan Branch [Vol. III, Part III,
A List of Minerals found in British Malaya
together with a description of
their Properties, Composition,
Occurrences and Uses.

By E. S. Willbourn,
Assistant Geologist, F. M. S.

INTRODUCTION.

Specimens of most of the minerals described in this paper
are contained in the registered collection at the Geologist's Office,
Batu Gajah, and the information about their method of occurrence
has been extracted from notes made by members of the Department.
Mr. J. B. Scrivenor's long experience has furnished the greater
part of the material, and his notes on the collections of minerals
in the Perak Museum, the Selangor Museum, and the Raffles
Museum, have also been used, so as to make the account as
complete as possible.

The list does not include the names and descriptions of all
the minerals which occur in British Malaya, but only those which
are found as abundant grains in concentrates, or as fairly large
specimens. In addition, certain rare minerals (such as gold) are
included on account of their value, although they do not form
large specimens, nor do they occur abundantly in concentrates.
On the other hand, some minerals (for example, biotite) form a
considerable proportion of various rocks, and yet they seldom or
never occur as masses of size sufficient to form hand-specimens.
Such minerals are omitted if they are not of particular interest,
and if it is likely that they will never be of commercial value.

Probably most of the readers of this paper are not accustomed
to the use of the microscope, so, except in one or two instances,
no mention has been made of those properties which can only be
studied by means of polarised light, or under magnifications higher
than those obtained by a pocket lens. For a similar reason, very
little attention has been paid to chemical properties.

Malay-English Glossary.

Bukit       hill.
Changkat    hill, hillock.
Gunong      mountain.

Klian       mine.
Pulau       island.
Sungei      river.

1923] Royal Asiatic Society.
Minerals found in British Malaya.

Explanation of Certain Terms and Abbreviations.

Amang is a heavy black sand which is separated from cassiterite when washing up the contents of the sluice boxes, in tin-mining. It is a mixture of various minerals.

One pikul = 100 käties = 133½ pounds avoirdupois.

H., Hardness. The hardness of a mineral is determined by a rough comparison with certain known minerals which are adopted as standards. The standards usually taken are crystals of the following, here arranged in increasing order of hardness.

1. Tale. 4. Fluorite. 7. Quartz.

10. Diamond.

The finger nail is a little over 2 in hardness, since it can scratch gypsum and not calcite. One of the Straits Settlements nickel five cent pieces is between 3 and 4; it can scratch calcite, and can itself be scratched by fluorite. The steel of a pocket knife is just over 5, and ordinary window glass has a hardness of 5.5.

S.G., Specific Gravity. This is the weight of the substance compared with the weight of an equal volume of water. The determination of the specific gravity of a mineral is an important aid to its identification.

LIST OF MINERALS.

Agate, see under quartz.
Amethyst, see under quartz.
Anatase, see octahedrite.
ANDALUSITE.
ANGLESITE.
Arsenical pyrites, see arsenopyrite.
ARSENOPYRITE, mispickel, arsenical pyrites.
Asbestos, see under serpentine, and also under tremolite.
AXINITE.
AZURITE, chessylite, blue copper carbonate.
BARITE, barities, heavy spar.
Barytes, see barite.
Bismuth glance, see bismuthinite.
BISMUTH, NATIVE.
BISMUTHINITE, bismuth glance.
Black jack, see sphalerite.
Black tini, see cassiterite.
Blende, see sphalerite.
Blue copper carbonate, see azurite.
Bog iron ore, see limonite.
Bog manganese ore, see psilomelane.
BORNITE, purple copper ore, erubescite, peacock ore.

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BROOKITE.
Brown haematite, see limonite.
Cairngorm, see under quartz.
CALCITE, calc spar.
CARBON.
CASSITERITE, tin stone, black tin.
CERUSSE.
Chalcedony, see under quartz.
CHALCOPYRITE, copper pyrites.
CHALYRITE, spathic iron, siderite.
Chessylite, see azurite.
Chialtolite, see under andalusite.
China clay, see kaolin.
CHLORITE.
CHONDRODITE, humite, clinohumite.
Chrome iron ore, see chromite.
CHROME OCHRE.
CHROMITE, chromic iron, chrome iron ore.
Chrysolite, see under serpentine.
CINNABAR.
Clinohumite, see chondrodite.
Coal, see under lignite.
Cobalt glance, see cobaltite.
COBALTITE, cobalt glance.
COLUMBITE.
COPPER, NATIVE.
CORUNDUM.
DIOPSIDE, malacolite.
DOLomite.
Emery, see under corundum.
EPIDOTÉ.
Erubescite, see bornite.
EUxENITE.
FELSPAR.
FLUORITE, fluor spar.
Fluor spar, see fluorite.
GALENA.
GARNET.
GOLD, NATIVE.
Graphite, see under carbon.
Green copper carbonate, see malachite.
GYPSUM.
HAEMATITE, red haematite, specular iron ore.
Heavy spar, see barite.
Hübnerite, see wolfram.
Humite, see chondrodite.
Hyacinth, see zircon.
Iceland spar, see under calcite.
Idocrase, see vesuvianite.
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ILMENITE, menacanite, titaniferous iron ore.
Ilmenorutile, see under rutile.
Iron pyrites, see pyrite.
Jacinth, see zircon.
Jargon, see zircon.
Jasper, see under quartz.
Kampylite, see mimetite.
KAOLIN, China clay.
LEPIDOLITE, lithium mica.
LIGNITE.
LIMONITE, brown haematite, bog iron ore.
Lithium mica, see lepidolite.
Lodestone, see magnetite.
Magnesia mica, see phlogopite.
Magnetic iron ore, see magnetite.
MAGNETITE, lodestone, magnetic iron ore.
Magnetic pyrites, see pyrrhotite.
MALACHITE, green copper carbonate.
Malacolite, see diopside.
Menacanite, see ilmenite.
Mica, see under muscovite.
Micaceous haematite, see under haematite.
Milky quartz, see under quartz.
MIMETITE, kampylite.
Mineral oil, see petroleum.
Mispickel, see arsenopyrite.
MOLYBDENITE.
MONAZITE.
MONETITE.
MUSCOVITE, white mica.
OCTAHEDRITE, anatase.
Onyx, see under quartz.
Opal, see under quartz.
Peacock ore, see bornite.
PETROLEUM, mineral oil.
PHARMACOSIDERITE.
PHLOGOPITE, magnesia mica.
PSILOMELANE, wad.
Purple copper ore, see bornite.
PYRITE, pyrites, iron pyrites.
Pyrites, see pyrite.
PYROLUSITE.
PYROMORPHITE.
PYRRHOTITE, magnetic pyrites.
QUARTZ.
Red haematite, see haematite.
Rock crystal, see under quartz.
Rose quartz, see under quartz.
RUTILE.

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Sapphire, see under corundum.
Scheelite.
Sconodite.
Serpentine.
Siderite, see chalybite.
Smoky quartz, see under quartz.
Soapstone, see talc.
Spathic iron, see chalybite.
Specular iron ore, see haematite.
Sphalerite, zinc blende, blende, black jack.
Spinel.
Streptite, see talc.
Stibnite.
Stolzite.
Struverite.
Talc, steatite, soapstone.
Tinstone, see cassiterite.
Titaniferous iron ore, see ilmenite.
Topaz.
Tourmaline.
Tremolite.
Tungstic ochre, see tungstite.
Tungstite.
Vesuvianite, idocrase.
Vivianite.
Wad, see psilomelane.
White mica, see muscovite.
Wolfram.
Wollastonite.
Xenotime.
Yellow ochre, see under limonite.
Zinc blende, see sphalerite.
Zircon.

**Andalusite.**

Occurs in coarse prismatic forms. In colour it is whitish, often rose-red when occurring as grains in *amang*. H = 7.5; S.G. = 3.16 to 3.20.

In composition it is aluminium silicate, $\text{Al}_2\text{SiO}_5$.

Andalusite has been found as large white lumps showing crystal faces at Chenderiang, in alluvium near a granite limestone contact, and it has been found also, with pinkish coloured mica and quartz, as a vein in limestone at Gopeng, connected with a kaolin-vein. In small grains it is common in *amang* from many parts of the country.

Andalusite is sometimes found in crystals which have a core of carbon, in section showing the form of a cross. This variety

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is known as *chiastolite*. It has been developed in many parts of Malaya in non-calcareous shales, where they have suffered alteration owing to intrusion of granite, as, for instance, in the Kenaboi Valley, Negri Sembilan.

Andalusite is not used for any commercial purpose.

**Anglesite.**

OCCurs massive or in prismatic crystals. It is usually white, tinged yellow, gray, or green, with a lustre varying from adamantine to resinous and vitreous. H. = 2.75 to 3; S.G. = 6.12 to 6.39.

In composition anglesite is lead sulphate, PbSO₄. It is formed through the oxidation of galena. A sample sent to the Geologist's Office, in 1916, for analysis, found by a firm who were prospecting in the neighbourhood of Ipoh, contained approximately 69 per cent of lead sulphate, and some quartz was present.

It was said that there was a considerable deposit of the mineral, and, if this is the case, it should be commercially valuable.

**Arsenopyrite, mispickel, arsenical pyrites.**

OCCurs often as twinned crystals in granitic rocks, with some faces striated. It may occur in granular condition. It is brittle, and is silver-white in colour, with a metallic lustre. It is opaque, and the streak is dark grayish-black. H. = 5.5 to 6; S.G. = 5.9 to 6.2.

It is sulph-arsenide of iron, FeAsS.

Arsenopyrite is found in large quantity in many places, associated with tin ore, and, where it has to be removed from the ore by roasting, the white arsenic is sometimes collected as a by-product. In 1921, 900 pounds were exported from Sungai Lembing, Pahang, by the Pahang Consolidated Company, Limited; in 1922 the amount exported was 10 tons, and in 1923 15½ tons. A considerable quantity of white arsenic is now being produced at Selibin Lode Mine (Beatrice Mines), Kinta.

The value of white arsenic recently was £60 to £80 a ton. It is used in insecticide and weed-killing preparations, and in the glass industry. A small quantity is used in the preparation of drugs.

**Axinite.**

OCCurs usually in broad crystals with a highly glassy lustre, colour clove-brown and blue-violet; streak uncoloured, transparent to sub-translucent. H. = 6.5 to 7; S.G. = 3.3.

It is a borosilicate of aluminium and calcium, with varying amounts of iron and manganese. Its exact composition is doubtful.
It occurs with epidote in thin veins in granite at Ulu Piak, Kinta, near limestone, and with epidote, in some highly metamorphosed limestones and schists, in a cutting on the Pahang railway between Krambit and Kuala Lipis. It has been found also at Bundi, Kemaman, and near Kuah on Pulau Langkawi.

There is no commercial use for axinite.

**Azurite, chessylite, blue copper carbonate.**

It may occur as an earthy mineral, or in crystals with a vitreous lustre and intense azure-blue colour. The streak is blue, and the crystals are transparent to opaque. H. = 3.5 to 4; S.G. = 3.7.

It is basic copper carbonate, $2\text{CuCO}_3\cdot\text{Cu(OH)}_2$.

Only one specimen is known from this country, and it is in the Selangor Museum, said to have been collected at Changkat Pari, near Ipoh.

**Barite, barites, heavy spar.**

Sometimes occurs in tabular crystals, but often granular, resembling white marble. H. = 2.5 to 3.5; S.G. = 4.3 to 4.6. Its weight easily distinguishes it from marble.

In composition it is barium sulphate, $\text{BaSO}_4$.

It is found in the hills behind the resthouse at Kroh, and between Pong and Kroh in Upper Perak, in the hills about ten miles from Pulai, Kinta, and with micaceous haematite at Sungei Belong in the Perak River.

The price obtainable per ton is only about £1, so it is not likely that it will be found in payable quantity in this country.

**Bismuth, Native.**

It is a brittle silver-white metal, usually in coarsely foliated masses, with streak also silver-white. It is opaque. H. = 2; S.G. = 9.79 to 9.83. It is very easily fusible, more so than galena, and the globule obtained is distinguished from lead by its brittle nature, lead being very malleable.

It is pure bismuth, Bi.

It has been found at the Rotan Dahan Mine, Kinta, as large lumps in clay, at Menglembu, and also in Gunong Lesong Forest Reserve, Ulu Pontian, Pahang, near a granite margin. It is possible that native bismuth occurs with the bismuthinite near Kuah, on Langkawi Island, but it has not yet been proved in the small quantity of ore as yet available for testing.

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Bismuth expands on solidifying, and so it is used in stereotype alloys, where a specially clear impression of the type is required. It is used in the manufacture of various fusible alloys, in porcelain painting and enamelling, in staining glass, in dental solders and amalgams, in silvering mirrors, in electrical fuses etc., and, most of all, in making salts for pharmaceutical purposes. The price of pure bismuth varied, in 1919, from $3.50 (American) per lb. in January, to $2.65 (American) per lb. in December. In 1922 and for the first part of 1923, the price was 10 shillings per lb.

So far, bismuth has not been mined in this country except on Pulau Langkawi (see under bismuthinite).

Bismuthinite, bismuth glance.

Usually massive and foliated, sometimes fibrous. It is opaque, has a metallic lustre, and is lead-grey in colour, with a greyish-black streak. It shows a perfect cleavage, often with a strongly striated cleavage face. H. = 2.5; S.G. = 6.5. (about).

In composition it is bismuth sulphide, Bi₂S₃.

Towards the end of 1922 a mine was started, near Kuah, on Pulau Langkawi, in a contact metamorphic deposit of mixed zinc and copper ores containing a little bismuth. The commonest ore-mineral present is sphalerite (zinc-blende) containing about 5 per cent of copper and about 0.1 per cent of bismuth, and bornite is the next commonest ore mineral. Small quantities of a mineral were collected which contained about 50 per cent of bismuth and about 13 per cent of copper, both occurring as sulphides. This mineral is probably bismuthinite.

The ore body occurs at a granite limestone contact, and, apart from ore minerals, it is made up for the most part of wollastonite and green garnet, though in one place a small quantity of zinc blende, pyrites, and bismuthinite was found in a rock largely composed of fluorite and a green pyroxene.

The uses of bismuth are described under Bismuth, native.

Bornite, purple copper ore, scurbescite, peacock ore.

Bornite occurs in massive form, with granular or compact structure. It has a metallic lustre, the colour ranging between copper-red and brown, when fresh, but quickly becoming iridescent. The streak is pale grayish-black. H. = 3; S.G. = 4.9 to 5.4.

It is a sulphide of copper and iron, with varying proportions of these metals in massive specimens, whereas the composition of the crystals agrees with Cu₉FeS₃.

Bornite has been found in a contact metamorphic deposit near Kuah, on Pulau Langkawi, in altered limestone. The commonest ore-mineral present is sphalerite (zinc blende) with a smaller
quantity of bornite, and still smaller amounts of bismuthinite. The gangue minerals are wollastonite, green garnet, and a green pyroxene, with varying amounts of calcite. Mining operations were started on this deposit in 1922. Bornite is also known to occur in Kinta. It is a widely occurring and important ore of copper in other parts of the world, but it is not known in quantity in this country.

**Brookite.**

Occurs in tabular crystals with metallic, adamantine, or submetallic lustre. The colour varies, being brown, reddish, green, to iron-black. The crystals may be translucent or opaque. H. = 5.5 to 6; S.G. = 3.87 to 4.01.

In composition it is titanium dioxide, TiO₂.

It occurs in concentrates, associated with cassiterite, in several localities, examples being the Tekka Ltd. Mine in Kinta, a mine between Kuchai and Kajang in Selangor, on Atherton Estate near Silian, in Negri Sembilan, and in a tributary of Sungai Galas, between Kuala Krai and Kuala Pergau, in Kelantan.

Brookite has no commercial value.

**Calcite.** *Cale spar.*

Calcite is usually found in compact masses, but it may occur as crystals of varied habit, from thin tabular to long prismatic, and, less commonly, in iceland spar, as rhombohedra. It may also occur in fibrous form, or very often, granular; also in earthy form; also stalactitic and nodular.

Calcite is usually colourless or white, but it may be yellow, pink, purple, blue, to brown, and black. Transparent to opaque. H. = 3 (easily scratched with a knife); S.G. = 2.7.

In composition it is calcium carbonate, CaCO₃.

It is a very commonly distributed mineral in Malaya, constituting in one or other of its forms a considerable part of the earth's crust. In any of the limestone hills most of the forms can be seen.

Calcite is being mined in many localities by lime-burners. Near Ipoh a limestone hill is being quarried for marble, and quarries are also being opened in the Langkawi Islands. At Batu Caves in Selangor it was used in the manufacture of cement. In many localities it is quarried for use as ballast on the railway, and it is used as road-metal where no better stone is obtainable.

No occurrences of iceland spar in crystals large enough to be used for optical purposes are yet known in the Malay Peninsula.

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Carbon.

Carbon is found in the non-crystalline state, disseminated in shales, chert, sandstones, and limestones, all over the Peninsula, and it is also found in granitic intrusions. In some of the intrusions it may be an original mineral, but it has found its way into others from sedimentary rocks which were metamorphosed by the intrusion.

As a rule, the percentage of carbon in carbonaceous shales of this country is not greater than 12, but this amount is quite sufficient to give a dense black appearance to the shale. Very many cases are known where such carbonaceous shales have been thought to be of value, either as fuel or for their graphite content, but actually the deposits are worthless. One case is known where selected pieces from such a deposit contained 48 per cent of carbon, but the percentage of silica is too high for the deposit to be of any use.

Graphite. This is a crystalline variety of carbon, often with a metallic lustre, though sometimes it is dull. Its colour is iron-black to dark steel-gray. It often has a reddish tinge when viewed by reflected light. H. = 1 to 2; S.G. = 2.09 to 2.23. It has a greasy feel.

It occurs as small scales in metamorphosed limestone in the north quarry at Lenggong, but not in sufficient quantity to be worth concentrating. Another occurrence is at Bukit Bekok, seven miles from Bekok railway station, Johore, where it occurs in quartzite. Graphitic schist is known in several places, one being Ulu Telom.

Cassiterite, tin stone, black tin.

Usually occurs in a massive granular state, lustre adamantine, colour brown or black, sometimes red, gray, white, or yellow. It varies from nearly transparent to opaque; the streak is white, grayish, or brownish. It is brittle. H. = 6 to 7; S.G. = 6.8 to 7.1.

In composition cassiterite is tin dioxide, SnO₂.

Cassiterite occurs in very many localities in the Malay Peninsula. It was deposited at the time of intrusion of the Mesozoic granite, and it is now found:

1. in the granite; in veins and one known pipe, and disseminated.
2. in the limestone hills; in caves, and fissures, as in Perlis and at the Jehoshaphat Mine in Kinta.
3. in the limestone valley-floors; in pipes, veins, and as detrital ore in caves.

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(4) in veins and "stockworks" in shales, schists, and quartzites, near the junction with the Mesozoic granite.

(5) in recent alluvial deposits.

Several varieties have been found which differ from the usual common type. One very dark coloured type, found on the Kinta Tin Mines, Gopeng, and in other localities, contains a high percentage of iron so that small fragments can be lifted by the electromagnet. This magnetic type contains a trace of titanium. A very light brown variety was found at Siputeh occurring as extremely minute grains and prisms.

At Sungei Gau Mine in Pahang, there is a remarkable occurrence of cassiterite in long crystals, so long as almost to be termed acicular, each bounded by four prism faces and terminated by a pyramid. The exterior of a crystal is yellow in colour, the interior varying from brown to purple. Some pieces of ore, specimens of which are in the British Museum, show individual crystals, similar in form and colour to the above, each encased in a thin shell of chaledony. Garnet and amphibole are associated with the cassiterite, and the aggregate of minerals is enclosed in a groundmass of chaledony.

Mr. J. B. Scrivenor has come to the conclusion that the country rock at Sungei Gau was originally impure limestone or calcareous shale, that tin deposits were formed by the intrusion of granite, and that, at the same time, the calcareous rocks were metamorphosed to hornstone containing patches of material consisting of garnet, amphibole, cassiterite, and abundant calcite. The calcite formed a matrix enclosing all the other minerals. At some later date, hot waters charged with silica flowed over the mass, dissolving away the calcite, and replacing it by chaledony.

When examined under the microscope, with polarised light, a very characteristic pleochroism, from carmine to olive-green, is found to be common in Malayan cassiterite.

Cassiterite is the only common ore of tin, a metal used in the manufacture of tin plate, and many alloys, such as type metal, soft solder, pewter, Britannia metal, gun metal, bell metal, bronze, and various fusible alloys.

Cerussite.

Occurs in concentrates, sometimes as good crystals. It has adamantine lustre, is colourless, white, or gray, and transparent to almost opaque. H. = 3 to 3.5; S.G. = 6.55, which is heavy for a mineral with a non-metallic lustre.

In composition cerussite is lead carbonate, PbCO₃. It has been formed by the oxidation of galena in the presence of carbonated waters.

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It has been found in large quantities at Changkat Pari, associated with cassiterite, quartz, topaz, zircon, tourmaline, and some magnetic minerals. A Swansea firm, in 1913 offered £12-10s. per ton for this concentrate, which assayed 42 per cent of lead, and 11 per cent of cassiterite, the lead containing 2.8 ozs of silver per ton. The firm said that they could take large quantities of it, but the price was not regarded as sufficient to warrant working the deposit.

**Chalcopyrite, copper pyrites.**

Occurs sometimes as crystals of sphenoïd shape, but usually massive and compact. The mineral has a metallic lustre and a brass-yellow colour, often tarnished and iridescent. The streak is greenish-black. H. = 3.5; S.G. = 4.2 to 4.3.

In composition chalcopyrite is sulphide of copper and iron, CuFeS₂.

It is not known to occur in quantity in this country, though it is recovered as a by-product from the tin-ore worked at Sungai Lembing, Pahang. Two tons seven hundredweights of concentrates, containing 49 per cent of copper, were exported from there in 1921, and 4½ tons was the amount exported in 1922. A sample of copper ore sent for analysis from Siam contained 29.2 per cent of copper, and another sample of copper from Siam contained 92 ounces of silver to the ton of metal. A little chalcopyrite occurs with arsenopyrite and cassiterite in the Selibin lode, also with native copper and tin at Rotan Dahan, Kinta, and it is found with sphalerite and small quantities of bismuth in altered limestone near-granite at Kuah, Langkawi.

**Chalybite, spathic iron ore, siderite.**

Occurs in massive, granular, and coarsely crystalline masses, at times botryoidal, compact, and earthy. In colour it is usually pale yellowish-brown. H. = 4; S.G. = 3.8.

In composition it is ferrous carbonate, FeCO₃.

Chalybite sometimes occurs, with other minerals, as a skin covering the limestone surface at the base of alluvial deposits, as, for example, at Siputeh, and, mixed with chlorite, tremolite, and wollastonite, at Tanjong Rambutan. It occurs with pyrites at Sungai Gau Mine, Pahang, and at Chemor. In some concentrates it occurs as well-shaped rhombohedral crystals, as at Siputeh; in others it forms grains with a characteristic dumb-bell shape, as at Pusing Bharu, Kampar, and on the Malayan Tin Dredging Company's land near Batu Gajah; and in other concentrates, as at Tambun, and near Kuala Lumpur, there is no characteristic shape to the grains.
In Great Britain chalybite is an important ore of iron. It is valueless in Malaya.

**Chlorite.**

Apart from its occurrence as a minor constituent of many rocks, in small flakes, which are usually an alteration-product of mica, chlorite occurs in massive form. It is dark green in colour, with a vitreous to pearly lustre, transparent to sub-translucent. H. = 2 to 2.5; S.G. = 2.6 to 2.8.

In composition it is hydrated silicate of aluminium with ferrous iron and magnesium.

A band of chlorite about one foot in thickness can be seen at the contact of limestone and granite at Gunong Jala, near Ampang, Kinta.

There is no use for chlorite in the Malay Peninsula.

**Chondrodite, humite, clinohumite.**

Chondrodite has a vitreous lustre and brownish-yellow colour. H. = 6 to 6.5; S.G. = 3.1 to 3.2.

In composition it is a fluo-silicate of magnesium, $\text{Mg}_3\text{(MgF)}_4\text{Mg(OH)}_2\text{Si}_3\text{O}_{12}$. Iron replaces part of the magnesium. Chondrodite, humite, and clinohumite have the same chemical composition, differing only in crystalline form.

The only localities where chondrodite is known to occur are the north quarry at Lenggong, where it occurs as grains embedded in crystalline limestone, and under similar conditions, in limestone near granite, at Bukit Setong, Kelantan.

There is no use for chondrodite.

**Chrome Ochre.**

Chrome ochre is a clayey material containing some chromium oxide. It occurs earthy, tinted green in colour.

Chrome ochre is found on Cheroh Rubber Estate, about ten miles to the northwest of the Raub Gold Mine, as a clay coating on large boulders of vein quartz which are scattered about on the flat land.

Mr. J. C. Shenton made the following approximate analysis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loss on ignition</td>
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<td>per cent.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Silica</td>
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<td>Alumina</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iron oxide</td>
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<td>Chromium oxide</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lime</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnesia</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>99.20</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
Minerals found in British Malaya.

This analysis indicates a composition identical with kaolin, in which some alumina has been replaced by chromium oxide.

**Chromite, chromic iron, chrome iron ore.**

In Malaya chromite is only known as grains in concentrates. Its lustre is submetallic, and the colour is iron-black to brownish-black. It is opaque; microscopic splinters are translucent. The streak is brown; the mineral is brittle. H. = 5.5; S.G. = 4.3 to 4.6.

In composition chromite is oxide of iron and chromium, with varying amounts of the iron replaced by magnesium, and chromium replaced by aluminium, \((\text{Fe},\text{Mg})\text{O} \cdot (\text{Cr},\text{Al})_4\text{O}_3\). Varieties which contain less than 10 per cent of chromium are classed as spinel.

Occurrences are known in the Sungei Cheroi, near Raub, in the Telemong Valley in Ulu Pahang, and specimens have also been sent to the Geological Department from Bentong.

Chromium forms an alloy with iron called ferrochrome, used in the manufacture of chromium steel. Chromite containing 30 per cent of \(\text{Cr}_2\text{O}_3\) could command a price of only about $6 per ton in 1916, and, as the above three examples are the only occurrences known in the Malay Peninsula, it is not likely that the mineral will ever be of commercial importance here.

**Cinnabar.**

Cinnabar is a finely granular massive mineral, with a dull lustre, a cochineal-red colour and a scarlet streak. The mineral is soft and very heavy. H. = 2 to 2.5; S.G. = 8.0 to 8.2.

In composition it is mercuric sulphide, HgS.

Cinnabar occurs in the Kenaboi Valley, Negri Sembilan, specimens having been picked out of the sluice-box at Kenaboi Tin Mine. It has also been found in a tributary of the Telom, Pahang.

**Cobaltite, cobalt glance.**

Cobaltite is often crystalline, resembling pyrite in form, i.e. commonly occurring in cubes or pyritohedra, with striated faces. Some crystals are octahedra. It also occurs in massive form. It is opaque, has a metallic lustre, colour silver-white inclined to red. It has a poor cleavage. The mineral is brittle, with uneven fracture. The streak is greyish-black. H. = 5.5; S.G. = 6 (about).

In composition cobaltite is sulpharsenide of cobalt, CoAsS.

The only case definitely known of an occurrence in Malaya is one about which information was furnished by the Manager of the Ipoh Branch of the Straits Trading Company. Tin ore from Kong Kee's Mine, in the Pusing neighbourhood, between Redhills and the Malayan Tin Dredging Company's land, was found to
contain .5 per cent of cobalt and .8 per cent of arsenic. The ore was the last sweepings from the floor of the mine before it was closed down in August 1925. Examination under the microscope revealed the presence of small grains of cobaltite, some of them being well-shaped octahedra. It is reported that some tin ore from Delapang also contains cobalt.

Cobaltite is an important ore found in silver-bearing deposits at Cobalt, Canada, where the dressed ore averages about 3½ percent of nickel, 8½ of cobalt, 25 of arsenic, and 300 to 1000 ounces of silver per ton. Of recent years cobalt has been utilised in the manufacture of steel and other alloys, which creates a much bigger demand than does its old use in pigments.

If concentrates containing large amounts of cobalt are found in Malaya, they will be valuable, but a small percentage like that in the tin ore from near Pusing merely reduces the value of the tin ore.

**Columbite.**

Columbite is known only in concentrates, usually associated with cassiterite. It is an opaque iron-black mineral, with submetallic lustre, and a streak coloured dark red to black. It is brittle. H. = 6; S.G. = 5.3 to 7.3. It is lifted by the electromagnet.

It is niobate and tantalate of iron and manganese, \((\text{FeMn})_\text{2} \text{O}_\text{5}\text{Ta} \text{O}_\text{4}\) passing, by a gradual increase of tantalum, from normal columbite, the nearly pure niobate, to normal tantalite, the nearly pure tantalate. The iron and manganese also vary widely. Tin and wolfram are present in small amount.

Samples of columbite have been sent to the Geologist's Office from Kedah, from Siam, and from some unknown locality said to be eight miles from Penang. A Chinese sent a sample of columbite and cassiterite, which, he said, occurred in quantity at Muar, Johore, but the columbite portion contained only 19 per cent of tentalic acid, and so the ore was unsaleable.

**Copper, Native.**

Occurs both as crystals and as shapeless grains, with metallic lustre. H. = 2.5 to 3; S.G. = 8.8 to 8.9.

In composition it is pure copper.

It has been found with tin ore at New Gopeng, Rotan Dahan, Changkat Puri, and with gold and cassiterite at Khan Bahru, Batang Padang. It does not occur in sufficient quantity to constitute a source of supply of copper.

1925] *Royal Asiatic Society.*
Corundum, sapphire.

Occurs massive; lustre adamantine to vitreous; colour blue, red, yellow, brown, gray, and nearly white; fracture uneven to conchoidal; brittle; very tough when compact; very hard; heavy for a mineral with non-metallic lustre. H. = 9; S.G. 3.95 to 4.10.

In composition it is alumina, \( \text{Al}_2\text{O}_3 \).

It occurs abundantly in the Kinta Valley, near the granite limestone contact, as boulders embedded in clays. Some of the localities are Gopeng, Kramat Pulai, Penkalan, Tekka, and Ampang. Some specimens suggest that originally the mineral formed veins, and the corundum is frequently traversed by thin veins, also of corundum. Specimens of corundum which bear well-marked rhombic imprints, probably formed by calcite crystals, have been found at Kramat Pulai. In all these occurrences the mineral is extremely pure, the percentage of alumina being greater than in any sample of corundum which has been analysed, except ruby and sapphire. An analysis made in the Imperial Institute gave these results:

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{SiO}_2 & & 0.15 \text{ per cent} \\
\text{Al}_2\text{O}_3 & & 97.10 \\
\text{CaO} & & 0.50 \\
\text{MgO} & & \text{trace}
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{H}_2\text{O} & & 2.41 \\
\text{Total} & & 100.16
\end{array}
\]

Corundum in mainly used for abrasive purposes in the same manner as emery, and the finer varieties are used in the place of gems in the movements of clocks and watches. In 1904 material from Kinta was sent to a commercial expert for an opinion as to its value. He said the material might be worth from £15 to £25 a ton for abrasive purposes. If it would take a high polish it could be used for the movements of clocks and watches, and might be sold at a higher price. Kinta corundum was used in the crown of a drill working on the property of the Malayan Collieries Limited, in Selangor, and one setting lasted for 800 ft., giving a good core.

Other varieties of corundum are not common, ruby has not been found, and sapphire has been found only in small specimens in tin mines at Chenderiang, Batang Padang. Emery, fine-grained corundum mixed with magnetite and other iron ores, occurs near Batu Gajah.

Diopside, malacolite.

Diopside is a pale green to dark green mineral occurring in granular condition in crystalline limestones near granite contacts.

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In composition it is calcium magnesium silicate, $\text{CaMg} \ (\text{SiO}_2)_2$.

It is not definitely known to occur in Malaya, because analyses have not been made of those minerals whose physical and optical properties correspond to diopside. Such minerals occur in the south quarry at Lenggong and in altered limestone near the 55th mile on the Grik road. A green pyroxene near the granite limestone contact at Bukit Kanching, Selangor, was thought to be diopside until analysis showed it to contain 13.09 per cent of iron oxide, $\text{FeO}$, and 7.95 per cent of alumina, $\text{Al}_2\text{O}_3$.

Diopside has no commercial value.

**Dolomite.**

Dolomite occurs as coarse-grained, fine-grained, or compact masses, and in crystals. It has a vitreous lustre, and is usually pink or white in colour, though it may be darker.

In composition it is carbonate of calcium and magnesium $\text{CaMg} (\text{CO}_3)_2$.

It occurs in rock masses, as dolomitic limestone and marble, irregularly distributed in ordinary limestone. The dolomite and calcite can easily be distinguished by the fact that a drop of cold hydrochloric acid will not produce effervescence on the dolomite, whereas there is a brisk action on the calcite. Dolomite can occur mixed with calcite in all proportions, constituting dolomitic limestone.

A fairly detailed examination of the Batu Caves limestone hill was made in order to try to find large deposits of limestone free from dolomite, and a remarkable unevenness of composition in the limestone was then revealed. There was no part of the hill which was built of limestone of uniform composition. The magnesia content varied, in an irregular manner, over a distance of a few feet; a sample at one place contained 15.4 per cent of magnesia, and only a few feet away, another specimen contained only 0.5 per cent. During the course of this investigation at Batu Caves it was found that crystalline limestones high in magnesia were opaque, as compared with crystalline limestones with a low magnesia content, which were translucent. This distinction has not yet been tested for limestones elsewhere than at Batu Caves.

Dolomite can be used as a building and ornamental stone, for the manufacture of certain cements, and for the manufacture of magnesia used in the preparation of refractory linings of the converters in the basic steel process, but no deposits of dolomite have been found in Malaya. Dolomitic limestone is sometimes used, like ordinary limestone, as road-metal or as ballast on the railway.

1925] *Royal Asiatic Society.*
Epidote.

Occurs fibrous, granular, and forming rock masses. The colour is usually yellow-green. H. = 6.5 (about); S.G. = 3.4 (about).

In composition it is a hydrated silicate of calcium, aluminium, and iron, \( \text{II} \text{Ca}_3(\text{A}_1,\text{Fe}^3_2) \text{Si}_3 \text{O}_{13} \).

Epidote occurs in microscopic grains in metamorphosed calcareous rocks, and also as an alteration-product in igneous rocks, such as granites, quartz-porphyries, and rocks of the Pahang Volcanic series. It is known in fairly large crystals with axinite in an altered limestone on the Pahang railway, a few miles south of Kuala Lipis, and in smaller quantities in limestone at Ulu Piah, near the granite contact.

Epidote has no commercial value.

Euxenite.

A mineral akin to euxenite, found as occasional crystals with tin ore, was forwarded by the Manager of the Titi Tin Company, Negri Sembilan.

The exterior of the crystals is covered with a light coloured mineral matter, the interior is of a resinous brown appearance.

Its exact composition is not known, but the mineral contains titanium, tantalum and niobium, uranium and ytrria earths.

The mineral occurs only in small quantities, and, so far as is known, it has no value.

Felspar.

It is usually crystalline, in colour white or gray, though it may be red. It has cleavages in two directions almost at right angles. H. = 6; S.G. = 2.5 to 2.9.

Under this name several silicates are included, all of which contain alumina with potassium, sodium, or lime, or mixtures of them. Orthoclase and microcline are potash felspars, \( \text{K}_2\text{O} \cdot \text{A}_1\text{O}_3 \cdot 6\text{SiO}_2 \); albite is soda felspar, \( \text{Na}_2\text{O} \cdot \text{A}_1\text{O}_3 \cdot 6\text{SiO}_2 \); anorthite is lime felspar, \( \text{CaO} \cdot \text{A}_1\text{O}_3 \cdot 2\text{SiO}_2 \). Oligoclase, andesine, labradorite, and bytownite, are mixtures of albite and anorthite, the first two containing more albite than anorthite, and the last two containing more anorthite than albite.

The common felspars in granitic rocks in Malaya are orthoclase, microcline, albite, and oligoclase, and mixtures of them, and they often occur as large crystals more than one inch across.

Felspar is used in pottery manufacture. It is obtained by crushing and hand-picking the crystals from granite which has been selected for the purpose as containing felspar crystals in number and size greater than the average.

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Potash felspar contains from 10 to 15 per cent of potash, and so, in other countries, rocks rich in potash felspar are sometimes crushed and used as fertilisers. However, potash felspar is very insoluble, and so the potash is not readily available to plants. As it becomes slowly available because of decomposition due to weathering, and as weathering is much more rapid in Malaya than in more temperate climates, such crushed rocks should be more valuable here as fertilisers than elsewhere. Future experiments will probably discover methods by which the great reserves of potash can be brought into soluble form.

In countries where mica is worked in pegmatites, the potash felspar is recovered as a by-product.

There will be no difficulty in finding large quantities of potash felspar in Malaya, although, without hand-picking, it will be impossible to separate it from the quartz and other minerals which are present.

**Flourite, fluor spar.**

Flourite is usually crystallised in cubes. It may be massive or finely granular. It has good cleavages, vitreous lustre, is transparent to translucent, in colour very varied, often colourless or purple. H. = 4; S.G. = 3.18.

In composition it is calcium fluoride, CaF₂.

Flourite is of widespread occurrence in this country, often being found in veins either as the chief mineral, or associated with metallic ores such as cassiterite and scheelite, as, for example, at Ulu Piah and Kramat Pulai. It is common in dolomite and limestone, and occurs as a minor accessory in granitic rocks.

Flourite is used mainly as a flux in the making of steel, in the manufacture of opalescent glass, in enamelling cooking utensils, in the manufacture of pottery, in the preparation of hydrofluoric acid, in the electrolytic refining of antimony and lead, and in the production of aluminium. In 1918 the average price in America was $20.72 (American) per ton, and in 1919 $25.43 (American) per ton. This is a big increase from the price in 1914 when it was only about $5.90 (American) per ton.

Enquiries were once made for deposits of flourite which could supply a demand by a local firm, and in 1922 enquiries were made about the possibility of supplying the mineral to a Calcutta Steel Works.

**Galena.**

Galena often occurs in cleavable masses. It crystallises most commonly as cubes. It has a bright metallic lustre, and its colour and streak are lead-gray. H. = 2.5 to 2.75; S.G. = 7.4 to 7.6.

In composition it is lead sulphide, PbS.
Galena is of widespread occurrence associated with limestone, quartz, and fluorite. It usually contains silver. A specimen from Kobar (Kinta) contained 58.79 ounces of silver to the long ton, and a specimen of stone from Gunong Lanno (Kinta) when assayed contained 31.95 per cent of tin and 199 ounces of silver per long ton of rock. Probably a silver ore was present in the stone, otherwise the weight of silver in the lead would be extraordinarily high. Galena from other localities contains only a little silver, for example, a specimen from Jambu, Kuantan, contains only 11 ounces per ton. A specimen from Ulu Kenaboi (Negri Sembilan) is associated with pyrites and sphalerite (zinc-blende).

Galena, in other countries, is practically the only source of lead, and an important ore of silver. Metallic lead is used chiefly for conversion to white lead (a basic lead carbonate), which is the principal ingredient of the best white paints, or into the oxides, for use in making glass and in giving a glaze to earthenware. The metal is also used as pipes and sheets, for shot, and as an ingredient for solder, type metal, and low-fusion alloys.

**Garnet.**

Crystallises often in regular symmetrical crystals with 12 or 24 faces. It is a hard mineral, with a vitreous to resinous lustre. In Malaya, it is red in colour, usually not at all transparent except in tiny grains. The streak is white. H. = 6.5 to 7.5; S.G. = 3.15 to 4.3, according to the composition.

Garnets vary very much in composition, being mixtures of silicates of calcium, iron, aluminium, magnesium, manganese, and chromium.

The lime garnets are widely distributed throughout the Malay Peninsula, and in most cases it can be seen that the mineral was formed, often with pyroxene, by the interaction of granite and limestone or calcareous shales, as, for example, at Gunong Terendam, Kramat Pulai, and the Ulu Piah Mine in Kinta, near Batang Malaka (Negri Sembilan) where garnet crystals have been found more than an inch across, at Lenggong, and near the divide between Perak and Patani near S. Timun. Garnet occurs in the cassiterite-bearing lode at Ginting Tua, Manchis, Pahang, and it was found in a vein with pyroxene, penetrating enstatite-apessartite rock at Pulau Ubin, Singapore. The mineral occurs also in natural concentrates.

No specimens are known in this country of sufficient size and clearness to be valuable as gem-stones, and garnet does not occur sufficiently concentrated in quantity for it to be mined for use as an abrasive.
Gold, Native.

Gold usually occurs in irregular plates, scales, or masses, of yellow colour, varying considerably in the particular shade. It is very malleable and ductile. H. = 2.5 to 3; S.G. = 15.6 to 19.3.

In composition, native gold ordinarily consists of gold with varying amounts of silver, and smaller amounts of copper and iron.

It occurs both in situ in hard rock, and also as small grains in alluvial beds. The only lode mines at present working in Malaya are those belonging to the Raub Australian Gold Mines, Limited. An output of over a thousand ounces of gold a month is usually obtained. The body of the gold-bearing stone is quartz, often associated with veins of calcite which do not contain gold. The calcite has been derived from the country rock of calcareous shales. Lode mines were also worked at Kechar, Silensing, Punjom, and Bentong, in Pahang, and at Chindras, Pesoh, and Batu Bersawah, in Negri Sembilan, but all these mines were closed down because they did not pay to work.

Alluvial gold is won as a by-product in tin mines, notably in Batang Padang, where the annual output of gold is usually over one thousand ounces, and it is known to be very widely distributed throughout the Peninsula, though, unfortunately, in too small amount for the cost of winning it, except under very favourable circumstances. Abandoned alluvial workings are known in many localities, and some of them were under European management. Sometimes Malays return to them when the rice crops have been poor, but the amount of gold which they win is not enough to induce them to do steady work.

Gypsum.

Calcium sulphate, CaSO₄.

Gypsum was reported to have been found as a white earth on the floor of a cave in Gunong Lanno, one of the limestone hills of Kinta, associated with a deposit of phosphate.

It might be used as a dressing for soil requiring the application of calcium sulphate.

Haematite.

The usual mode of occurrence of the mineral in Malaya is as a massive blue-black crystalline aggregate, which has a coating of red powdery mineral where it has been exposed to weathering.

It may be in columnar or reniform shapes, with a fibrous appearance, or it may occur as an impure form in small globular or lenticular concretions, as oolitic haematite. Another variety, occurring in flat crystals, or masses of flat crystals, with micaceous

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
structure, and with a brilliant lustre, is known as micaceous haematite. Haematite is opaque except in very thin laminae. The streak is light to dark Indian-red.

H. = 5.5 to 6.5; S.G. = 4.8. to 5.3.

In composition haematite is ferric oxide, \( \text{Fe}_2\text{O}_3 \), containing 30 per cent of oxygen and 70 per cent of iron.

In Malaya a large deposit is known to occur on Gunong Panjang Estate, near Tambun, where the country rock is limestone. There are possible two million tons of good haematite ore available above surface drainage level, and probably 4½ million tons additional within 100 feet below that level. A deposit at Bukit Medan, Batu Pahat, Johore, is being worked by a Japanese Company (Goshi Kaisha, Nanyo Kagyou Koshi) who said, on first beginning work, that it was worth $29 a ton in Japan, but in October, 1923, Mr. Y. Nishimura the Manager stated that the price obtained was only ten Yen per ton. About 20,000 tons of haematite averaging 64 per cent of iron were being exported monthly, the labour force being 500. The ore contains a little magnetite and a little hydrated oxide.

A deposit is known at the foot of Gunong Jerai, near the 26th mile from Alor Star, on the road between Gurun and Bedong in Kedah, and, judging from surface indications, it seems that it is an occurrence of considerable size. An analysis showed that the haematite boulders contained 63.6 per cent of iron. In Johore, outcrops of haematite have been examined in Kota Tinggi district, on the ridge dividing Sungei Seluang from Sungei Perisik, tributaries of Sungei Johore, also between Ulu Kramat and Ulu Poh, in Kuala Pualai, and on the coast at Kuala Pendalis (Tanjong Kupang).

Micaceous haematite is known in many localities, one being in granite at Sungei Relong, above Pulau Lalong, an island in the Perak River. It is said that 500 pikuls of the mineral were carried to the river under the belief that it was tin ore. It contains a small amount of barytes. Micaceous haematite also occurs in Kelantan, near the railway between Manik Urai and Kuala Gris.

Haematite is the most abundant ore of iron. With the exception of the Bukit Medan deposit, none is being mined in Malaya, owing to the difficulty in finding a market.

Ilmenite, menacconite, titaniferous iron ore.

Usually occurs in thick black tabular crystals with a metallic or sub-metallic lustre. It is not transparent, even in very thin laminae. The streak is black to brownish-red in colour. H. = 5.5 to 6; S.G. = 4.7.

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In composition it is ferrous titanate, FeTiO₃, but it may contain ferric oxide, so that the ratio between the titanium and iron often varies widely.

In Malaya it is very widely distributed, being perhaps the commonest of the heavy minerals occurring in alluvial sands, and it always forms a large percentage of *amang*. Its black colour makes it conspicuous in sandy stream beds where eddies cause a natural concentration of the heavy minerals, and tidal and wave-action on the sea-shore may give a similar result, as near S.Nibong, on the northwest side of Langkawi Island.

Ilmenite is a constituent of concentrates in which monazite occurs, and it can be obtained as a by-product in the magnetic concentration of the monazite.

Ilmenite has a very small commercial use. A little of it present in a body of magnetite makes smelting so difficult that the ore is almost valueless. In the United States iron ores containing ilmenite are now a source of ferro-titanium, which is used in the manufacture of rails. Amorphous titanic acid has lately come into use as a white pigment, and it is claimed to be better than zinco-white in covering power. During 1923, in America, 3804 tons of ilmenite carrying 52 per cent TiO₂, was shipped to Niagara Falls, to be used for the manufacture of titanium pigment and ferro-titanium. The titanium-white is also manufactured at Fredrikstad, on the south coast of Norway, from ilmenite occurring in the district. The percentage of ilmenite in the *amang* of Malaya would be too low for this purpose.

**Kaolin, China clay.**

Kaolin or China clay is not a single mineral, but it consists to a large extent of kaolinite, a hydrated silicate of aluminium, \( \text{Al}_2\text{O}_3.2\text{SiO}_2.2\text{H}_2\text{O} \), with other minerals of similar composition, and quartz, mica, and felspar. The quartz, mica, and felspar are removed, as far as possible, from the China clay rock by washing, and the refined kaolin approximates to kaolinite in composition, containing, however, more silica and alkalies.

Kaolinite is a definite crystalline mineral which can occur in the form of microscopic six-sided plates. In China clay it usually shows no definite crystalline form, being made up of very small irregular crystalline plates and fibrous aggregates.

China clay is less plastic than ordinary rock clay, because, whereas the China clay is crystalline, the rock clay is amorphous, and plasticity is the result of the presence of colloidal (*i.e.* amorphous) clayey matter. Kaolinite is a highly refractory mineral, though a small quantity of impurities makes it much more easily fusible.

1925] *Royal Asiatic Society.*
In Malaya, kaolin of a very pure white colour is being worked at Gopeng, and other deposits are known near Bidor, in Singapore, at S. Perpat, Johore, and in Kedah. In smaller quantities it is known to occur in or near granite areas in many parts of the Peninsula.

It is usually considered that kaolin was not formed by atmospheric weathering, but by the action of vapours escaping from a deep-seated acid magma, which attacked the alkali felspars of the already consolidated granite. So far, there is no decisive information as to whether this is correct in the case of the Gopeng veins. Excavation work during the next few years may settle the question. Kaolinite is, however, undoubtedly formed in this country by ordinary atmospheric weathering of felspar in many granite outcrops.

The principal use of kaolin is as a filler for cloth and paper, and it is an essential ingredient in the manufacture of pottery. It is used in mixture with zinc oxide in the manufacture of Chinese white, and as an adulterant or filler in various medicines and foods.

**Lepidolite, lithium mica.**

It is a pink or lilac-coloured mica, occurring in scaley aggregates, translucent, H. = 2.5 to 4; S.G. = 2.8.

In composition it is lithia mica, K,Li[Al(OH,F)₂]Al(SiO₃)₂.

Lepidolite has been found at Chenderiang. A pink mica is known to occur occasionally in carbonaceous limestone at Siputeh, and it is also known at Gopeng. An analysis of the Gopeng pink mica showed only a trace of lithium.

Lepidolite was formerly used as a source of lithium compounds, of which lithium carbonate is used in medicine and in the manufacture of lithia water, but amblygonite, a fluo-phosphate of aluminium and lithium, is more useful, and lepidolite seems to be no longer in request for this purpose. There is no likelihood that lepidolite will be found in commercial quantities in the Malay Peninsula.

**Lignite.**

Lignite or brown coal is typically a dull coal, generally brown in colour, containing a large proportion of woody matter. When freshly mined it contains a large amount of moisture, much of which it loses on standing exposed to the air, and, in consequence, it cracks and breaks up when being stored. The following figures show the usual range in composition for brown coals, calculated free from ash and sulphur:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fixed carbon</td>
<td>30 to 40 per cent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volatile matter</td>
<td>40 to 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moisture</td>
<td>10 to 30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Sub-bituminous coal usually is also dull, or only feebly lustrous, and its colour is brown-black to black. It contains less water than brown coal, and does not break up after drying. There is a bigger percentage of fixed carbon than of volatile matter, and it has better fuel properties than brown coal or lignite. The following figures show the usual range in composition for sub-bituminous coals, calculated free from ash and sulphur:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fixed carbon</td>
<td>45 to 55 per cent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volatile matter</td>
<td>35 ° 45 °</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moisture</td>
<td>5 ° 10 °</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The coal which occurs in the small outcrops of Tertiary beds in Malaya differs in appearance both from typical lignites and from sub-bituminous coals, and in composition it is intermediate between the two. It is black and lustrous. It contains about 20 per cent of moisture, like a lignite, but the percentage of fixed carbon is higher than that of volatile matter, like a sub-bituminous coal. It has a low percentage of ash and it does not clinker.

Coal of Tertiary age is being mined by the Malayan Collieries, Limited, at Batu Arang in Selangor, and other occurrences are known at Enggor and in Perlis. The Enggor deposit, though small, is now being opened up commercially; that in Perlis has not yet been thoroughly prospected. The output from the Malayan Collieries, Limited (Selangor), from 1920 to 1923 was

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>247, 917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>299, 351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>381, 828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>317, 892</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Seams of brown and sometimes black lignite are found overlying tin-bearing sandy clays in Malaya. In the Kinta District occurrences have been examined in Lahat, Pusing, Siputeh, Tanjung Rambutan, Tronoh, and Pulai, where it is seen that the lignite is usually mixed with a lot of sand, which renders it worthless as a fuel. The only seam which might have been useful as fuel was in the Rambutan Ltd. Mine, at Tanjung Rambutan, but the deposit was very small.

Lignite seams have also been found associated with clay and sand in limestone cups in Kinta. It is supposed that the beds were originally deposited more or less horizontally, on the limestone surface, that a hollow was dissolved in the limestone by underground water, and that the clays sands and lignites sank down into the cup.

The coastal alluvium of the Malay Peninsula contains a certain admixture of peaty material, but, in the bore put down 275 feet at Bagan Dato, and in the one which had reached a depth of 582 feet in July, 1923, on Westenholz Estate, near Telok Anson, the sands and clays contain no seams of peat or lignite of value.

1925] *Royal Asiatic Society.*
Minerals found in British Malaya.

Probably all these deposits of lignite are of Recent age—younger than the Tertiary period—and many of them contain fairly well preserved timber, with seeds remarkably like those of our living jungle trees.

**Limonite, brown haematite, bog iron ore.**

It is a non-crystalline mineral, dark brown to black in colour, with a sub-metallic lustre. It may have mammillar or fibrous form. The streak is yellowish-brown. H. = 5 to 5.5; S.G. = 3.6 to 4.5

In composition it is hydrated iron oxide, $2\text{Fe}_2\text{O}_3\cdot3\text{H}_2\text{O}$.

Limonite is a mineral of very widespread distribution in Malaya, being an invariable constituent of the surface-deposit popularly known as laterite. In Malaya the term laterite is applied to the surface decomposition-product of both sedimentary and igneous rocks which is used as a road-metal. *Yellow ochre*, which is often seen in "laterite," consists of limonite mixed with clay material.

**Magnetite, magnetic iron ore, lodestone.**

Magnetite sometimes shows well-developed octahedral crystals, or twelve-sided crystals of the cubic system. More frequently it occurs in a massive granular condition. It is a black mineral, with metallic lustre, and it is opaque even in the smallest fragments. The streak is black. Magnetite has an uneven fracture. H. about 5.5; S.G. about 5. It is highly magnetic, fragments being attracted by a small horse-shoe magnet.

In composition it is an oxide of iron, $\text{Fe}_3\text{O}_4$, containing 72.4 per cent of metallic iron.

Magnetite associated with haematite occurs in octahedral shaped crystals at Bukit Medan, Batu Pahat, Johore, where iron ore is being mined for export to Japan, and it also occurs, associated with intrusions of granite, in the quartzite which forms Kedah Peak (Gunong Jerai). It is reported as being present in large quantities in an accessible part of Trengganu.

Magnetite is an important ore of iron.

**Malachite, green copper carbonate.**

It usually occurs as bright-green opaque radiating fibrous masses, with botryoidal or stalactitic structure. H. = 3.5 to 4; S.G. = 3.9 to 4.03. It may be granular or earthy.

In composition malachite is basic carbonate of copper, $\text{CuCO}_3\cdot\text{Cu} (\text{OH})_2$.

It has been found at Sungai Lembing near Kuantan, and at Changkat Pari in Kinta. It is an important copper ore, but no deposits of commercial value are known in the Malay Peninsula.

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Mimetite, kampylite.

Mimetite is like pyromorphite in appearance and form of crystals (see description of pyromorphite). H. = 3.5; S.G. = 7.0 to 7.25.

In composition it is arsenate and chloride of lead, part of the arsenic being replaced by phosphorus, Pb₃As₂O₆PbCl₂.

A lump of decomposed material in the Perak Museum, Taiping, from Naga Bisi, near Ipoh, contains lead, arsenic, phosphate, and perhaps chloride. It is not certain that the arsenic in this specimen is combined with the lead. Probably the specimen contains some mimetite, but owing to the decomposed nature of the material the evidence is not conclusive.

Molybdenite.

Occurs in platy or scaly forms which are very flexible, though they are not elastic. It has a metallic lustre, is bluish-black in colour, has a perfect basal cleavage, and a greasy feel. The streak has a greenish tinge. H. = 1; S.G. = 4.8. It is distinguished from graphite, firstly, by the blue tone in its colour, whereas graphite has a brown tinge, secondly, by the difference in S.G., and thirdly, by chemical tests.

In composition it is molybdenum disulphide, MoS₂.

It has been found in granite in two quarries on Singapore Island near the Bukit Timah road, and at Linggui Tin Mine, about 25 miles north of Johore Bahru, where it occurred in small quantities as large scales lying at the base of the alluvial deposits and on the weathered granite surface. It is reported also from Pahang in the Pontian District. As yet, no deposits of commercial value have been found. In December, 1914, molybdenite ore, containing the equivalent of 90 per cent molybdcic acid, was quoted at £6-10s. per unit per cent, or £382 per ton of 2240 lb. In April 1915 ore containing 90 per cent molybdenum sulphide was quoted at £6 per unit per cent or £540 per ton of 2240 lb, delivered in the United Kingdom.

Molybdenum is used in hardening steel. Compounds of the metal are also used in scientific work, and as pigments in various arts and industries.

Monazite.

In the Malay Peninsula, monazite is usually found as small irregular fragments or well-rounded grains in sands, and, if it is fresh, it is transparent and of a golden-yellow colour, with a resinous lustre; weathered fragments are dull and opaque and may be cream-coloured or grey. H. = 5.5; S.G. about 5.2, but variable. Monazite is slightly magnetic, being lifted by a strong electromagnetic field.

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
In composition it is a phosphate of the cerium metals, cerium, lanthanum, and didymium, \(\text{Ce}(\text{La},\text{Dy})\text{PO}_4\), with variable amounts of other ingredients, notably thorium.

It occurs in sands in many rivers in Malaya, and is often present amongst the heavy minerals associated with tin ore in alluvial beds. In a few localities, such as S. Betong, near Langkap in Negri Sembilan, it is found in decomposed granite or pegmatite, as comparatively large fragments up to one inch across, showing good crystal faces. In this particular case, the monazite is much altered. A newly-fractured surface is pale-brown in colour and quite dull, but the weathered exterior of the unbroken fragments is paler, sometimes being white. Occasional crystal faces have a vitreous lustre. The optical properties of this altered mineral cannot be studied owing to its opacity, but chemical analysis shows that it consists largely of cerium phosphate, with about 6 per cent of thorium.

A few detailed examples will now be given of the occurrence of monazite in *amang*.

A concentrate from Sungei Bisek, Serai Valley, Pahang, consisted approximately of 63 per cent of cassiterite, 29 per cent of ilmenite. The monazite portion, however, contained only 0.62 per cent.

A concentrate from near Gambang, Kuantan, in addition to cassiterite, contained 74 per cent of monazite and 8 per cent of ilmenite. The monazite portion, however, contained only 3.62 per cent of thorium.

*Amang* which was being thrown away by Chinese tin miners, in 1911, near Kulim, Kedah, contained cassiterite, ilmenite, and 41.3 per cent of monazite. The thorium-content of the monazite was 3.5 per cent.

A concentrate from near Bentong contained a lot of wolfram and scheelite, some monazite, and a little cassiterite. Fifteen to twenty pikuls a month of this concentrate were being won in 1916.

Monazite concentrated by the Malayan Tin Dredging Company, Batu Gajah, contained 6.5 per cent of thorium.

A concentrate from a tributary of the Kuantan River contained cassiterite, ilmenite, and monazite, the thorium content of the monazite being 3.15 per cent.

1.5 per cent of a sample of *amang* from Buias Tujoh, Kampar, was monazite, with thorium content between 4 and 5 per cent.

The monazite in a concentrate from Ulu Sempam, Pahang, contains 8.38 per cent of thorium.

The principal use of monazite is as a source of thorium, the chief ingredient of the mantles used in incandescent gas-lighting. The thorium-content of monazite from other countries ranges usually from 3 to 10 per cent, but it is sometimes greater, and, in rare cases,
may be as much as 30 per cent. As monazite is a much more common mineral than thorite and thorianite, it is the chief source of thorium, although the thorium contents of thorite and thorianite are respectively 50 to 70 per cent and 70 to 90 per cent.

It is also the commercial source of cerium. Formerly the only use for cerium was as cerium oxalate, of which small quantities were needed as medicine. Lately, however, it was found that cerium forms a pyrophoric alloy with iron (ferrocerium) which is used in sparking devices. Owing to its inflammability through air-friction, ferrocerium was used to illuminate the paths of shells in the war. Cerium fluoride is used in naval searchlights.

Monazite sand is sold on the basis of its thorium-content, that is, at so much per unit, the unit being one per cent of thorium per ton. The price per unit in England has varied a good deal. Before the war it was not less than £5 per unit. In June, 1920, the c.i.f. value at European ports was £6-10s. per unit. The price quoted in 1921 by Messrs. Curtis & Harvey Ltd. of London for monazite containing 6.25 per cent of thorium was £20 a ton.

**Monetite.**

Monetite occurs in pale yellowish semitransparent crystals with a vitreous lustre. H. = 3.5; S.G. = 2.75.

It is acid calcium phosphate, HCaPO₄, with approximately the following composition:

\[ \text{P}_2\text{O}_5 \text{ 32 per cent, CaO 41 per cent, H}_2\text{O 7 per cent}. \]

Certain crystals which occur commonly in the phosphate deposits of Perlis, in particular in a cave deposit at Gunong Jerneh that was being worked in 1923, are now thought to be monetite. They were coated with gypsum and it was not possible to isolate the crystals completely. Mr. J. C. Shenton analysed the yellow crystals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loss on ignition</th>
<th>8.80 per cent.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \text{P}_2\text{O}_5 )</td>
<td>38.6 per cent, corresponding to calcium phosphate 84.29” “</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxide of iron</td>
<td>0.20 “ “</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alumina</td>
<td>0.92 “ “</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The crystals have S.G. = 2.863, and their optical properties correspond more closely to monetite than to any other phosphate mineral.

**Muscovite, white mica.**

Is found foliated in large and small sheets, and in scales, rarely as six-sided crystals. It has a perfect basal cleavage, allowing the mineral to be split into exceedingly thin sheets. The 1925] *Royal Asiatic Society.*
folia are flexible and elastic. It has a vitreous to pearly lustre, and is transparent and almost colourless in thin sheets. H. = 2 to 2.5; S.G. about 2.8.

In composition it is a silicate of aluminium and potassium, $K_2O.3H_2O.3Al_2O_3.6SiO_2$.

Muscovite is found in fairly large flakes, up to two inches across, in pegmatite-veins on Kedah Peak and in the neighbourhood of that mountain. A syndicate has been working the mineral at Tanjong Jaga near there. It is known in a finer grained massive condition, as a dull pale green waxy-looking mineral, at the 15th mile from Kuala Lumpur on the road to Bentong, and near granite contacts in several localities. A variety of mica akin to muscovite, known as pinite, has been observed occurring in massive condition in Kinta. One example is at Beatrice Mines, Selibin, in a lode in limestone which is cut by numerous faults; near them the pale green translucent massive mica is common.

Muscovite is valuable because of its combination of physical properties, cleavage, flexibility, elasticity, transparency in thin sheets, non-conductivity of heat and electricity, brilliancy of cleavage-flakes, and softness. It is used in the manufacture of sound boxes for gramophones, as an insulating material in the manufacture of electrical apparatus, and as a transparent material for stove doors, lanterns etc. Scrap mica is used in the manufacture of wall papers, as a lubricant when mixed with oils, as a non-conductor of heat, and as a fire-proofing material. The greenish fine grained mica might serve for decorative purposes, and as a pigment in paint.

The price obtainable for muscovite depends on the size of the sheets, and the mineral does not pay to mine unless pieces yielding rectangles larger than 1\(\frac{1}{2}\) by 2 inches can be obtained, which can only be expected to occur in pegmatites. The smaller pieces would only pay to work for scrap mica if a considerable quantity of the large sheets could be obtained.

Brown mica, or biotite, is not found in large sheets like muscovite, and its dark colour would give it a more limited use.

**Octahedrite, analase.**

Occurs as well-shaped pyramidal blue crystals with adamantine lustre. It is transparent to nearly opaque. H. = 5.5 to 6; S.G. = 3.82 to 3.95.

In composition it is titanium dioxide, $TiO_2$.

It is found in *amang* in many localities in the Malay Peninsula, one being Atherton Estate near Sillau in Negri Semulian. There is no market for octahedrite.

*Journal Malayan Branch* [Vol. III, Part, III,
Petroleum, mineral oil.

Petroleum is a mixture of liquid hydrocarbons, which, on being refined yields the following products:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Temp: of distillation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum spirit (including</td>
<td>lower than 150°C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>benzine, petrol, and gasoline</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerosene (illuminating oils)</td>
<td>from 150°C to 300°C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubricating oils</td>
<td>higher than 300°C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other products obtained are vaseline and paraffin. Crude petroleums range from about 0.78 to about 1 in specific gravity, though more commonly from 0.85 to 0.95.

In the Malay Peninsula oil has been distilled from oil shale of the Tertiary beds at Batu Arang Coal fields. Only a few cubic centimetres of oil were examined, and it was found to consist of kerosene, heavy oil, and paraffin wax. The absence of petroleum spirit was probably due to the crude apparatus used when distilling the shale. Oil shale is also known in the Tertiary beds of Perlis—a single distillation gave 3 gallons per long ton. The oil was heavy and contained much bitumen.

There is no doubt about the occurrences of oil shales in the Tertiary beds, but in spite of many rumours of "finds," there is no evidence of oil being stored in large quantities in natural reservoirs in the rocks of the Malay Peninsula. Escapes of marsh-gas from the decaying vegetation in coast-alluvium have been responsible for some of the rumours, but the bores so far put down have not yielded any oil. Other reported finds seem to have originated in dishonest attempts by natives to claim rewards.

Pharmacosiderite.

Occurs as cubic crystals with a greasy lustre. Their colour is green passing into yellow-brown, sub-transparent to sub-translucent. H. = 2.5; S.G. = 2.9 to 3.

In composition it is a hydrated arsenate of iron, with a formula perhaps 6FeAsO₄, 2Fe(OH)₆ + 12H₂O.

A specimen, associated with arsenopyrite, was sent from Kuala Kubu district, and other specimens were collected from loose tin-bearing stone in the lampans at Galip, Pahang. Pharmacosiderite occurs only in small quantities, and is of no commercial value.

Phlogopite, magnesia mica.

Phlogopite is a mica, often yellowish-brown in colour. H. = 2.5 to 3; S.G. = 2.86.

In composition it is silicate of magnesium, potassium, and aluminium, with formula perhaps H₂K₂Mg₆Al(8SiO₁₈)₃, and it usually contains about 3 per cent of fluorine.

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
It occurs as a product of metamorphism in the marble at Lenggong, and also in the rich cassiterite-bearing "pipe" in limestone at Selhibin, Kinta. Its physical properties, except its colour, would enable it to be used for all the purposes enumerated under the description of muscovite, but it is not known to occur in the Malay Peninsula in sufficient quantity, or in sheets of sufficient size, to make it commercially valuable.

Pslomelane, wad.

It occurs as a massive, botryoidal stalactitic, black mineral, with a brownish-black streak. H. = 5 to 6; S.G. = 3.7 to 4.7. It is harder than the other manganese ores. It is usually found with pyrolusite.

It is of uncertain composition, being chiefly manganese oxides, MnO₂ and MnO, with combined water. It contains small amounts of barium oxide, cobalt oxide, etc. One sample analysed in Kaala Lumpur was shown to contain copper, iron, aluminium, cobalt, nickel, potassium, and manganese. No barium was present.

Pslomelane has been found on Serendah Hydraulic Mine, at Tronoh with pyrolusite, and at Titi. A deposit of manganese ore is now being mined in Trengganu for export to Japan, and details are given under pyrolusite. The composition of the ore is not yet known.

Wad is an earthy form of psilomelane. A specimen was collected from a kaolin-vein on Gopeng Consolidated Mine.

Pyrite, pyrites, iron pyrites.

Occurs in massive, granular, reniform, globular, and stalactic forms, as well as in crystals. The most common crystal forms are the cube, often with striated faces, the striae on adjacent faces being perpendicular to each other, the octahedron, and a twelve-faced form in which each face has five sides. In colour pyrite is pale brass-yellow, with a bright metallic lustre. Its streak is greenish-black or brownish-black. It is unusually hard for a sulphide. H. = 6 to 6.5; S.G. = 4.95 to 5.10.

In composition it is iron disulphide, FeS₂.

Pyrite is the most common of the sulphides. In Malaya it is found in rocks of all ages, associated in veins with many different minerals, for example, with cassiterite and galena. It is widely distributed as an accessory mineral in both igneous and sedimentary rocks, although, as it is usually scattered in small grains throughout a rock mass, it is nearly always of no value.

One large deposit occurring at Buundi, Kemaman, mixed with pyroxene, is the only occurrence at present known to be possibly of commercial value, and it has not yet been mined.
Pyrite is often worked, in other countries, for the gold or copper associated with it. It is valuable as being the chief source of sulphuric acid and ferrous sulphate. Sulphuric acid is needed for many purposes, including the purification of kerosene, and in the preparation of mineral fertilisers. Sulphur dioxide, prepared either by burning sulphur, or by roasting pyrite, is used a lot in the preparation of wood-pulp for manufacture into paper. Ferrous sulphate (copperas) is used in dyeing, in the manufacture of inks, as a wood-preservative, and as a disinfectant.

Pyrolusite.

Occurs in massive fibrous form, with radiating structure, as a black mineral with a sub-metallic to dull lustre. It has a black streak. H. = 2; S.G. = 4.8.

In composition it is manganese dioxide, MnO₂.

It is found with psilomelane in several localities, for example, at Tronoh and Tambun Mines, at Tanjong Tembun and at Pulau Tilui in the Langkawi Islands.

A manganese mine has recently been opened by a Japanese Company on a hill near Sungei Kemaman, in Trengganu, at a point 18 miles from the mouth of the river. Work began in September 1924 and there are 400 coolies employed at present. The ore occurs as rock which can be worked with a pick, and it has not been necessary to have recourse to blasting. It is said that mining is carried on by driving horizontal tunnels into the hill side. After about a year’s work, 2,000 tons of ore has been exported to Japan, but this was the result of merely development work, and arrangements for ensuring a regular output had not yet been completed. Communication with the mouth of the river is by motor launch for twelve miles, and, for the next six miles, a trolley line has been laid down. This information was supplied by Mr. Y. Nishimura, Manager of the Bukit Medan Iron Mine, in Johore. Little is known yet about the mineralogical composition of the ore. The price obtainable in Japan for material containing 45 per cent of manganese is about 40 yen per ton, but the percentage of manganese in the Kemaman ore is smaller than this, and the average price so far obtained is 15 yen per ton. The ore is being used in the manufacture of steel.

Some years ago, a large sample of clay, rich in pyrolusite, from Tambun, was sent to England, but it was reported that, without hand-picking, the ore was unsaleable. The price obtainable was not large enough to pay for the cost of preparing the ore.

Pyromorphite.

It occurs as hexagonal prismatic crystals, green, brown, or yellow in colour, or it may be in granular or fibrous masses. It is sub-transparent to nearly opaque. H. = 3.5 to 4; S.G. = 6.5 to 7.1.
In composition it is chloro-phosphate of lead, $3\text{Pb}_4(\text{PO}_4)_2\cdot\text{PbCl}_2$.

A specimen of yellow and black sand in the Perak Museum, Taiping, from Ulu Pahang, consists of pyromorphite mixed with gold, and there is also a piece of pyromorphite from Patani in the same Museum. It is known to occur at Merbau, near Tronoh, and fairly large lumps were obtained in good crystals, associated with quartz and tourmaline, in a shaft 81 feet below the surface.

It is not an important ore of lead, and it is not likely that it will ever be commercially valuable in the Malay Peninsula.

Pyrrhotite, magnetic pyrites.

Pyrrhotite nearly always occurs in massive form with granular or lamellar structure. It is brownish-bronze in colour, with a metallic lustre, and the streak is black. H. = 4; S.G. = 4.65. Usually it is slightly magnetic.

In composition it is sulphide of iron, varying from $\text{Fe}_3\text{S}_4$ up to $\text{Fe}_{10}\text{S}_{17}$. It usually carries a small amount of nickel.

Pyrrhotite is found as small grains in blocks of quartzite near Siputel, the other heavy minerals present being cassiterite and zircon. It occurs also in concentrates from various localities.

Its use is as a source of nickel, but there is no prospect of payable quantities being found in the Malay Peninsula.

Quartz.

Crystals are commonly hexagonal prisms, usually terminated by hexagonal pyramids, but quartz is more common in massive forms of great variety, from coarse to fine-grained, crystalline to flint-like or cryptocrystalline. It also occurs as sand. It is usually white or colourless, with vitreous to greasy lustre, but it may be almost any colour owing to impurities. Transparent to opaque. Conchoidal fracture. H. = 7; S.G. = 6.65 to 2.66.

In composition quartz is silicon dioxide, $\text{SiO}_2$.

Crystalline Varieties. The ordinary clear colourless variety of quartz is named rock crystal. This is found in many areas in the Malay Peninsula, and good crystals are found also in veins traversing the quartzite of Gunong Tahan, but large clear crystals are, unfortunately, uncommon, and blocks and pebbles suitable for optical purposes have not yet been found. Amethyst is violet, the colour perhaps being due to a trace of manganese. Small crystals of poor quality were seen, many years ago, at Lahat. Rose quartz has been reported from Taiping, Chenderiang, and Sungai Kairi, in Perak. Milky quartz is milky white in colour and nearly opaque. It is common in certain huge reefs of quartz that are known in the
Peninsula, for example, on the west of Seremban, and the mass forming the conspicuous white cliffs, 1000 feet high, near Klang Gates. Cairngorm or smoky quartz has been found at Chenderiang.

Cryptocrystalline Varieties. Jasper is impure opaque quartz containing inclusions of haematite or hydrated iron oxides and clayey matter. In colour it may be red, yellow, or brown, and some specimens are banded. It is known in several places where cherts occur, for example, in the Kenaboi Valley, but there is no use for it as a gemstone, as it is usually weathered. Chalcedony is found massive with fibrous or cryptocrystalline texture, often also in mamillary or botryoidal shapes. It occurs at Sungai Gau Tin Mine. Agate is chalcedony with colours arranged in curved parallel bands. It was said to occur in Upper Perak, but no confirmation of this has been obtained. Onyx is a banded chalcedony, like agate, except that the bands are arranged in straight parallel lines. It is found at Sungai Gau. It was reported in 1904 that opal, an amorphous form of hydrated silica, was found in Perak, but none has since been heard of.

All of the varieties of quartz in the Malay Peninsula are unsuitable for use as gemstones. A possible use is for glass-making, in which is needed a sand consisting of white or colourless grains, practically free from minerals other than quartz. In texture the sand should be of medium grain, and as uniform as possible, angular grains being preferable to rounded grains. The grain sizes in the best qualities range from 0.5 mm. to 0.2 mm. diameter. It is not known if natural sands occur here fulfilling these requirements, but a suggestion has been made to make an artificial sand, by crushing material from one of the huge veins mentioned above.

Rutile.

Usually occurs as prismatic crystals with pyramid terminations, or as rounded grains, in sands and gravels. It is red, reddish-brown, to black in colour, and it is usually nearly opaque, although it may be transparent. H. = 6 to 6.5; S.G. = 4.2.

In composition it is titanium dioxide, TiO₂.

It is widely distributed in the Malay Peninsula, being one of the heavy minerals in many sands and sandstones. It often occurs in amang, and it is found with gold and epidote in the Benom Range, Pahang. Rutile is one of the minerals formed by the thermal metamorphism of limestone at Lenggong. It is found in recent alluvial sands on Atherton Estate in Negri Sembilan, associated with cassiterite, and with two other minerals, also of composition titanium dioxide, namely octahedrite and brookite.

Ilemnorutile is a black variety of rutile with up to 10 per cent or more of ferric oxide. S.G. = 5.1. It occurs in alluvial gravels in the flat land at the base of the hills Tempurong and

[1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
Minerals found in British Malaya.

Chantek. A black variety of rutile also containing iron is present in the alluvial beds worked by the Kamunting Tin Dredging Company, Taiping.

Rutile is a source of titanium, which is used in steel and cast-iron manufactures, for electrodes in arc lights, to give a yellow colour to porcelain and to false teeth, and in making a white pigment. No deposits of commercial value are known in the Malay Peninsula.

Scheelite.

Scheelite may occur as massive granular masses, or it may occur in pyramidal crystals. In colour it is usually white, though it may be yellow, green, or brown, and it has a vitreous to adamantine lustre. It is usually translucent to opaque, rarely transparent. H. = 4.5 to 5, S.G. = 6.05, which is unusually high for a mineral with non-metallic lustre.

In composition it is calcium tungstate, CaWO₄. Molybdenum is usually present, replacing a part of the tungsten.

In the Malay Peninsula, scheelite was fairly extensively mined as an ore of tungsten during the war, when the price of the metal was high. Mines were producing it at Kramat Pulai and near Ampang, Kinta, at Kanching and near Batu Caves, in Selangor, and a lode rich in scheelite was known at Salak North. Many occurrences in smaller quantities are known in the tin-fields in limestone districts.

For the uses of tungsten, see under wolfram.

Scorodite.

Occurs as green translucent crystals, sometimes octahedra, sometimes prismatic. H. = 3.5 to 4; S.G. = 3.1 to 3.3.

In composition it is a hydrous ferric arsenate, Fe₃AsO₄·2H₂O

Scorodite was found on limonite at Pusing Lama, Kinta, with arsenopyrite in a tin-bearing lode at Titi, Negri Sembilan, and in a quartz vein traversing granite on Ulu Tiram Estate, Kota Tinggi road, Johore.

It has no commercial value.

Serpentine.

Occurs as a massive rock, sometimes fibrous. It is olive-green to blackish-green in colour, having a greasy lustre, wax-like in the massive varieties, and silky when fibrous. It is translucent to opaque. H. = 2.5 to 5, usually 4; S.G. = 2.5 to 2.65.

In composition it is magnesium silicate, H₂Mg₃Si₂O₇.

It has been found at Bersiah in Upper Perak, where it seems to be the result of alteration of olivine, but in other localities it
is thought to be derived from altered amphibole. At the 42nd mile from Malacca, on the road between Kuala Pilah and Tampin, it forms quite an extensive deposit suitable for quarrying. The fibrous variety, chrysotile, is not known to occur in any great quantity, though a little of it is present in various localities. In other countries chrysotile is used commercially as asbestos.

Serpentine in other parts of the world is known to contain small quantities of chromium and the rare metals platinum and osmiridium, and the alluvial sands derived from the weathering of such masses of serpentine are valuable as a source of these metals. Prospecting was carried out in the alluvial sands derived from the serpentine at the 42nd mile from Malacca, on the Kuala Pilah Tampin road, but no trace of platinum or the other rare metals was found.

**Sphalerite, zinc blende, blende, black jack.**

Sphalerite usually occurs in massive coarse-grained form, in which the cleavage can be readily observed. It may have compact botryoidal form. Its colour is usually yellow, brown, or black; if pure it may be white. Its lustre is adamantine to resinous to submetallic. The streak is white to yellow and brown, the dark varieties (black jack) having a reddish brown streak. Microfragments are transparent. H. = 3.5; S.6. = 4.

In composition it is zinc sulphide, ZnS. It almost always contains iron replacing the zinc, and often it contains radium. In Langkawi some samples contain 5 per cent of copper and 0.1 per cent of bismuth.

Blende occurs in veins in granite, in limestone, and in sands. It is known to be associated with galema in granite at Blat and Jambu, near Kuantan. A specimen with quartz was found at Penkalan, Kinta, and a lode in granite at Bujang Malaka, Kampar, contained blende with tourmaline, pyrite, and a little cassiterite. Sands containing cassiterite, ilmenite, tourmaline, topaz and blende, occur at Malim Nawar, near Kampar. It was also reported from Kramat Pulai Mine, Kinta, and Ulu Kenaboi, in Negri Sembilan. A sample sent to the Geologist’s Office by a Kuala Lumpur firm contained about 56 per cent of blende, but the locality of the ore is not known. Mining operations were being carried out in 1922 near Kuah, Langkawi, on an ore body in altered limestone near granite. That part of the body which was seen was rich in sphalerite, which, as mentioned above, contained also copper and bismuth.

It is the most important ore of zinc, but apart from the new mine in Langkawi no supplies of possible commercial importance are known to occur in British Malaya.

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
Minerals found in British Malaya.

Spinel.

Spinel usually occurs as octahedral crystals of various colours, red, lavender, blue, green, brown, black, with a vitreous lustre. The streak is white. H. = 8; S.G. = 3.5 to 4.1.

In composition it is a mixture of oxides of aluminium and magnesium, MgO. Al₂O₃.

Ruby spinel is found associated with tourmaline, garnet, and other minerals in the beach sand on the east coast of Taibah, Langkawi Islands, and in a range of hills between Kedah and Siam. Dark green spinel is found in the amang at Chenderiang. It is common in small quantities near granite limestone contacts, but no fragments suitable for use as gems have been found.

For chrome spinel see under chromite.

Stibnite.

Occurs in radiating crystal groups, or in bladed forms with prominent cleavage. The colour and streak are lead-gray, and the lustre is metallic. H. = 2; S.G. = 4.55.

In composition it is antimony trisulphide, Sb₂S₃.

Stibnite has been found at Kramat Pulai, Changkat Puri, Jasing, between Papan and Lahat, and at Tambun, in Kinta, on the Rahman Hydraulic Mine, Intan, and it is reported to have been found in quantity at Silensing, Ulu Pahang.

Deposits of commercial value have not been found in the Malay Peninsula.

Stolzite.

Stolzite may occur as octahedral crystals, or in aggregates of poorly shaped crystals. Its lustre is resinous, and in colour it is green, yellow-gray, orange-yellow, brown, or red. The streak is uncoloured. It is faintly translucent. H. = 2.75 to 3; S.G. = 7.87 to 8.13.

In composition it is lead tungstate, PbWO₄.

There is a specimen of stolzite, associated with a little pyromorphite, in the Perak Museum, Taiping, which was collected in Batang Padang. Another specimen, consisting of grains yellow to orange-yellow in colour, is in the collection at Raffles Museum, Singapore, said to have come from Malacca.

Struverite.


An analysis by the Imperial Institute of the sample from the Malay Peninsula shows that in composition it is perhaps a solid
solution of tapiolite in rutile, with cassiterite, silica, and water, occurring as impurities. Tapiolite is a tantalate and niobate of iron, $\text{Fe(TaNb)}_2\text{O}_6$. Rutile, as already described, is titanium dioxide, $\text{TiO}_2$. Spectroscopic examination showed that very small amounts of the rare element scandium are present.

Strüverite is found in Perak, half a mile above Salak North, in the basin of Sungai Sebantun. There are only one or two other places in the world where strüverite occurs.

The only constituent of the mineral likely to be of commercial value is the tantalic oxide. Tantalum is used for the manufacture of filaments for incandescent electric lamps, and it can be used for hardening steel. Tantalite is the principal source for this purpose, and it commanded £90 a ton in England in 1911. Strüverite will be less valuable than tantalite, as it contains a lower percentage of tantalum, and is more difficult to smelt.

Talc, steatite, soapstone.

Usually occurs as a foliated massive rock. It is well cleaved. It is green, gray, or white, in colour, with pearly lustre, translucent to opaque. It is very soft and it has a greasy feel. $H. = 1$; S.G. $= 2.8$.

In composition it is a magnesium silicate, $\text{H}_2\text{Mg}_3\text{(SiO}_3\text{)}_4$.

Foliated talc is common in the Malay Peninsula, forming a prominent constituent in talc-schists, as in rocks seen in road-cuttings between Seremban and Port Dickson, and between Sungkai and Bidor. Soapstone occurs in a massive form with cryptocrystalline structure, in limestone districts near granite masses, as at Batu Caves, the Jehoshaphat Mine near Kuala Dipang, and at Jelapang, but as no chemical analyses have been made of the rocks in these localities, it is impossible to be certain that they are really talc or soapstone. However, true talc was found in February, 1925, in the Selibin Lode, (Beatrice Mines, Kinta), associated with arsenopyrite, cassiterite, pyrite, and copper pyrites. It appears to have been formed by the alteration of magnesium mica, a mineral which constituted the greater part of the gangue at the time of formation of the metallic ore minerals.

Mr. J. C. Shenton analysed the talc:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alumina,</td>
<td>$\text{Al}_2\text{O}_3$</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lime</td>
<td>$\text{CaO}$</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnesia</td>
<td>$\text{MgO}$</td>
<td>33.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferric oxide</td>
<td>$\text{Fe}_2\text{O}_3$</td>
<td>5.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silica</td>
<td>$\text{SiO}_2$</td>
<td>60.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss on ignition</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>99.72</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
Minerals found in British Malaya.

A mineral with the appearance of soapstone, found at the junction of a kaolin-vein with limestone, on the property of the Kinta Tin Mines Ltd., Gopeng, was found to have the following chemical composition:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Formula</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alumina</td>
<td>Al₂O₃</td>
<td>25.0 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lime</td>
<td>CaO</td>
<td>absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnesia</td>
<td>MgO</td>
<td>21.8 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potash</td>
<td>K₂O</td>
<td>3.4 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soda</td>
<td>Na₂O</td>
<td>0.3 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silica</td>
<td>SiO₂</td>
<td>39.2 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss on ignition</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.4 &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100.1

This mineral is certainly not soapstone.

Soapstone is used in the form of slabs for table tops, hearth stones, etc., but it is not likely that deposits will be found in the Malay Peninsula of sufficiently large extent to be worked for this purpose. Tale is used in powder form as a filler for paper, for finishing silk goods, as a lubricant, for toilet powders, in paints, as a heat insulator, and as an adulterant in soap.

Topaz.

Occurs as transparent clear prismatic crystals, usually white but occasionally blue-tinted, with vitreous lustre. H. = 8 (unusually high); S.G. = 3.52 to 3.57.

In composition it is silicate and fluoride of aluminium, 2AlF₃, Al₂O₃, SiO₂.

Topaz was found in the alluvial deposits worked for tin in the Chenderiang Valley.

Tourmaline.

The crystals are usually prismatic and vertically striated, with a vitreous to resinous lustre. Often the crystals have a rounded-triangular shape in cross section. The colour varies, depending upon the composition, but commonly tourmaline is black. More rarely it is light coloured in shades of red, pink, green, blue, yellow, etc. H. = to 7.5; S.G. = about 3.1.

In composition tourmaline is a complex silicate of boron and aluminium, containing varying amounts of ferrous iron, magnesium, manganese, calcium, sodium, potassium, lithium, hydroxyl, and fluorine.

Tourmaline is very widely distributed in the Malay Peninsula, being particularly common in tin-mining districts. In other parts

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of the world, green and red tourmalines are sold as semi-precious stones. Rarely tourmaline of these colours is found in the Malay Peninsula, but not of good enough clarity to be valuable.

**Tremolite.**

Tremolite occurs in distinct crystals, long and bladed, often also in aggregates, long and thin columnar, and also in compact granular massive form. It is white to dark gray, with silky lustre. Sometimes it is transparent and colourless. H. = 5 to 6; S.G. = 2.9 to 3.1.

In composition tremolite is calcium magnesium silicate, \( \text{CaMg}_2\text{Si}_4\text{O}_{12} \).

It is found in altered calcareous rocks near granite intrusions, most commonly in tiny needle-like rods, disseminated through the limestone. In such cases it is inconspicuous, and only detected under the microscope, or after dissolving away the limestone by means of acid. An example of this mode of occurrence was in black limestone at the Siputeh Ltd. Mine in 1909. In massive form it has been collected from tin mines at Ampang, Pengkalan, Selibin, and between Gopeng and Kuala Dipang; in the last three cases it constituted part of the gangue of a tin-bearing lode or "pipe" in limestone.

The variety known as asbestos was found at Kramat Pulai. It occurred in sheet form, associated with fluor spar and purple quartz, as veins in limestone near a granite intrusion. It was of a good white colour, and individual fibres were of a considerable length. The deposit would have been commercially valuable, but unfortunately there was not much of it. Pieces of tremolite asbestos were brought up from a depth of 45 feet by the dredge working on the Kinta Tin Dredging Company's property, near the 2nd mile from Batu Gajah, on the Tanjong Toh Allang road, in 1925.

**Tungstite, tungstic ochre.**

It occurs, filling cavities in other tungsten minerals, as crystals of a sulphur-yellow colour, but it may be in powdered or earthy form.

It was supposed some years ago that tungstite was the anhydrous oxide of tungsten, \( \text{WO}_3 \), but, as such a mineral has never been proved to exist, it is suggested that the name tungstite should be used for the hydrated oxide.

Hydrated oxide of tungsten is found as minute but well-shaped crystals at Kramat Pulai, associated with scheelite. In its earthy form it is not uncommon in the wolfram and scheelite producing mines. Commercially it is of no importance.

1925] *Royal Asiatic Society.*
Vesuvianite, *bilocerate*.

Occurs as greenish or brown crystals of prismatic form, with a vitreous to resinous lustre. It is translucent. The streak is white. H. = 6.5; S.G. = 3.4.

In composition it is silicate of calcium and aluminium, usually with small amounts of magnesium and iron.

Vesuvianite has been found at the Jabus Mine, Chenderiang, and at Ulu Johan, in Kinta. A specimen was sent to the Geologist's Office from Chendai Meru, Kinta, said to have been taken from the cap of a tin lode.

It is of no value.

Vivianite,

Occurs as a fibrous or earthy mineral, and occasionally as prismatic crystals. It is colourless when unaltered, blue to green when altered. H. = 1.5. to 2; S.G. = 2.58 to 2.68.

In composition it is hydrated ferrous phosphate, $Fe_3P_2O_8 \cdot 8H_2O$.

Vivianite occurs in alluvium at Cheras, Selangor, at Tronoh South Mine, and at Jeher, Tanjong Malim.

It is of no value.

Wolfram.

Occurs usually massive, rarely as tabular crystals, giving bladed forms. Masses which show no crystal-faces have a perfect cleavage giving flat lustrous surfaces. It has a sub-metallic to resinous lustre. Its colour is black for wolframite, and brown for hüblnerite; streak from nearly black to brown. H. = 5 to 5.5; S. G. = 7.2 to 7.5.

Wolframite and hüblnerite are tungstates of ferrous iron and manganese; in wolframite, (FeMn)WO$_4$, the ratio of the iron to the manganese varies between 9 to 1 and 2 to 3; hüblnerite is nearly pure MnWO$_4$.

A large proportion of the wolfram mined in the Malay Peninsula is won from lodes in which it occurs with cassiterite.

Wolfram occurs near Tapah, Ulu Klang, Ulu Langat, and Ulu Kanching. It is also found in some tributaries of the Serendah River, and in hills behind Ampang in Selangor. Titi produces mixed ore, cassiterite and wolfram. A little wolfram came from Sipiau and the land adjoining the Seremban Tin Mining Co.; large quantities were obtained from near Sintok, Kedah; and it was also mined at the Dungun Mine, and the Chendrong Mine, in Trengganu. Wolfram was found at several
localities in the neighbourhood of Bentong. A small occurrence, of no commercial value, was noted in a P. W. D. granite quarry at the 27th mile from Kuantan to the road to Jerantut.

Wolfram is the chief ore of tungsten.

Tungsten is used as a hardener of steel, as the material for making the filaments of electric glow-lamps, and as a substitute for platinum in the manufacture of contact points. Sodium tungstate is used to impregnate wood to render it fireproof, and as a mordant in the dyeing trades.

Wollastonite.

Usually occurs in massive form with a fibrous structure, or else in compact form. It has vitreous lustre, pearly on the cleavage faces, and it is sometimes silky when in fibrous form. It is usually white in colour and translucent to opaque. H. = 5 to 5.5; S.G. = 2.8 to 2.9.

In composition it is calcium metasilicate, CaSiO₃.

Wollastonite occurs in altered calcareous rocks near granite intrusions in many parts of the Malay Peninsula, and specimens can be obtained near Kuala Kenering in Upper Perak, at the Sungei Gau Mine in Pahang, at Kanching in Selangor, at Tado in Kelantan, at Gunong Dato in Kinta, near Bandar in Kedah, and at Pulau Bumbun Kechil in the Langkawis.

It is of no commercial value.

Xenotime.

Occurs as rolled grains in stream sands derived from granitic veins. It is yellow to reddish-brown in colour, with a vitreous to resinous lustre. It is opaque. H. = 4 to 5; S.G. = 4.35 to 5.1. It is slightly magnetic.

In composition xenotime is yttrium phosphate, YPO₄. Erbium may be present, with smaller amounts of cerium, silicon, and thorium.

Xenotime was reported by the Imperial Institute as probably present, with monazite, in heavy sand from the alluvial tin workings of the Dindings, and from the Kemaman River, Trengganu. The Imperial Institute gave the result of a physical analysis of a coarse concentrate from Kinta as: ilmenite, 53 per cent; wolframite, 35 per cent; tinstone, 6 per cent; magnetite, 1.5 per cent; xenotime, 1 per cent. A concentrate from an unknown locality in Pahang consisted of ilmenite, zircon, garnet, and xenotime. A mineral resembling xenotime was found, with a mineral like monazite, at the junction of a granitic rock with limestone, at Lenggong, Upper Perak.

[1925] Royal Asiatic Society.
There is little demand for yttrium minerals which are unaccompanied by more valuable constituents, such as thorium, uranium and radium. Probably the small amounts of xenotime available in the Malay Peninsula will never have any commercial value.

Zircon.

It is usually in crystals, sometimes in irregular grains. Usually the crystals show a simple combination of prism and pyramid of the first order. The lustre is adamantine, the colour often some shade of brown, also colourless, gray, green, or red; transparent to opaque. H. = 7.5; S.G. = 4.68.

In composition it is zircon silicate, ZrSiO₄.

Zircon is a very widely distributed mineral in the Malay Peninsula, occurring amongst the heavy minerals in alluvial sands, in the ancient arenaceous rocks, and in the igneous rocks. Large quantities could be obtained from among if a market was available.

Zirconia, ZrO₂, is used as a refractory material for crucibles and furnace-hearth, and also in Xerest lamps, but zircon is not now the source of zirconia, for the mineral baddeleyite, ZrO₂, which occurs in large quantities in Brazil, requires very little preparation. Hyacinth or jacinth is transparent brownish or reddish-coloured zircon, and jargen is the pale green, yellowish, or smoky variety. These are gemstones. They have been found with tin ore at Sungei Besrah, near Kuantan, but only as small grains.
The Leading Saints in Rembau

By Dato' Sedia Raja Abdellah.

It is difficult to collect such outstanding incidents in the lives of the principal saints of Rembau as would make authentic biographies. Into the traditions chronicled by local Pawangs there have crept by degrees the inventions of a later generation. This is, the writer thinks, due to the well-known habit of learned Malays of the old school to regard every branch of religious and secular knowledge ('Huru Akhirat and 'Huru Dunia) as a secret which they are reluctant to impart to their disciples. Hence later inventions were the result of an endeavour on the part of a younger generation to satisfy its curiosity—a mental tendency by no means peculiar to the Malay race. It is, therefore, not seldom that one hears conflicting traditions attached even to the most highly revered saints of the Rembau district. Probably the following biographical sketches are as nearly authentic as possible, particularly as they have been related by a Pawang who is regarded as a high authority on medicine and the arts of his profession; for among other things, a good Pawang must be thoroughly acquainted with life-sketches of the local leading saints.

There are two types of Kéramat. One is the living but invisible class, and the other, termed Kéramat Hampiran, consists of ordinary persons to whom sanctity and supernatural powers have been presented by the former class.

The Living but Invisible Kéramat.

The principal saints in Rembau trace descent from the supreme Kéramat at Pagar Ruyong named To' Anjong who, by his marriage with Siti Fatimah, had a son, Patawalau and a daughter Puteri. By reason of the number of Kéramat already in existence at Pagar Ruyong, when these children had reached the age of discretion, they were requested by their father to leave their native place. They traversed the wide ocean on foot and landed at Johore Baharu, where Patawalau married a Johore princess, nicknamed Puteri Sa-Kunnum Bunga, and his sister Puteri was married to a Johore prince named Patawali. Leaving his sister in Johore, Patawalau and his wife journeyed on over the sea on foot. It was while the princess was thus travelling that she got her flowery nickname. She was by nature a bit mischievous, and owing to her superhuman powers and lightness, she capsized many a ship, till struck by her prowess her husband weighed her and to his surprise discovered that she was only as light as a flower.

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Leading Saints in Rembau.

While still on the sea, they noticed the summit of Gunong Dato' (Gunong Rembau), on which they were later destined to establish their permanent abode.

In time seven children were born to them: To' Paroi, To' Dalong, To' Gayah, To' Sigai, To' Lendek, To' Diah and To' Manggam, who later settled respectively at Paroi, Batang Malaka, Seri Menanti, Gunong Pasir, Padiang Muar (Johore), Batang Malaka and Mampong (Rembau). The saintship of To' Manggam was first revealed in a dream to a pious man To' Lebai Tanjong Kling who became a great friend of the saint of Mampong at the time when the Lebai was engaged in taking steps to found the settlement of Tanjong Kling. In accordance with the recognised custom (ménélau) To' Manggam married Siti Zuliah and the couple were blessed with six children: To' Saeh Serban Kuning (Palong, Sepri), To' Multan Kali (Rantau Paya, Sepri), To' Fakhe Kechil (Penajis, Sepri), To' Juan Pahlawan (Tuntong, Sepri), To' Saeh Raja 'diraja (Chembong) and To' Saeh Sur 'Alam (Chuwai).

All those saints are believed to be alive but invisible and their living existence is testified by the fact that now and then they make their appearance in the dreams of some villagers, by the presence of ancient trees growing in the places of their abode, by stone relics which were once articles for their daily use and by the presence of their sacred tigers and crocodiles. They possess houses and like ordinary villagers keep domestic animals. It is owing to the presence of To' Palong's protecting buffaloes that the cattle of the tribal folks of Chembong, Batu Hampar and Sepri are practically immune from rinderpest, which has always attacked cattle in other parts of Rembau.

At To' Saeh Serban Kuning's and To' Fakhe Kechil's abodes at Palong and Penajis (Sepri) can still be seen praying-mats long ago converted to granite. And there are three wells converted to the same material at To' Saeh Raja 'diraja's settlement at Chembong. In these wells and on the stone praying-mats are placed saffron rice, together with lemon juice mixed with water, with which the people who have made the vows bathe their faces, hands and feet, a ceremony performed for the proper payment of the vows offered. The village folks visit these holy places annually just before the season for tilling the wet rice-fields, in order to beseech the help of the Dato' in driving away evil spirits from the crops. Goats and buffaloes are sacrificed, public feasts given and the proceedings end with the village Lebai offering prayers in Arabic. Then the people return home with a conviction that the year's crop will be satisfactory; and if the crop is damaged owing to the lack of proper safeguards against pests and of uniformity in the time of planting they lay the blame at the poor Pawang's door! When illness overtakes any member of the tribes, he never seeks medical advice but consults the local Pawang who will inform him.
that the illness is due to the evil demons of such and such marshy ground or mountain or ravine or gorge and that the only way to achieve recovery is to beseech the aid of such and such a saint. When the patient has recovered, his family visits the saint's abode and pays its vow.

To' Sach Serban Kuning's Gift.

At noon on a certain Monday many years back when the village folks had assembled at Palong (Sepri) just before the time for transplanting the young rice from the wet nurseries, the famous To' Pawang Idris of Sepri beheld before the squatting people a big plate (Punggan Jambar) with the article of the Islamic faith La 'Hala ilaa ilah Muhammad Basula' Ilah inscribed on it, together with many other illegible words in Arabic. The people were astounded at the Pawang's discovery made as it was under their very eyes. They marvelled why they had not noticed it before but explained the mystery by the fact that the plate was the personal gift of the saint to his favourite Pawang. It is said that the plate is still in the possession of the deceased Pawang's wife that during his life-time it used to sound of its own accord every Thursday night, if it had first been smoked in incense but that owing to the widow's ignorance of the way to treat it, this miracle has now ceased. The plate is regarded as a supremely effective amulet against all demons and a person suffering from poison can be cured by drinking a cup of water in which it has been placed.

Keramat Hampiran.

To' Hijau, the founder of Kampong Chembong, was born with a green complexion. Green, too, was the blood from his mother's womb at the time of his birth. After the midwife had bathed him, it was discovered that the right side of his body was pure green-skin, blood, flesh, bones, nails, and hair. Any one who crossed his path without permission fell down unconscious; squirrels or fowl, jumping or flying above his head, met with a like fate. His saliva, as also the water in which his feet had been bathed, had remedial virtues and his powers to cure any form of illness by other means were equally great. The Pawang visits his grave just before the period when the mock combats (Berpuah) are held, in order to secure this saint's active cooperation in the matter of praying for a good crop. The saint has a white tiger that guards the village against the invasion of evil spirits.

On page 277 of the J.B.A.S., M.B. (Vol. II, Part III), Dr. Winstedt relates the story of an orphan called Lebai Janggut who became a saint. Dr. Winstedt's informant gave a somewhat different account from mine.
This saint is known as To' Anggut, owing to his beard reaching his knees, and during his life-time he was much respected for piety. He was in the habit of shutting every hole found in his house and when asked for the reason he would reply that a ship at sea was about to be wrecked and her passengers would be lost, were it not for his timely action. To the villagers' surprise, three months later, the people who had thus been saved by the good act of this saint would visit him and pay the vow they had offered to him at sea. The drum at Masjid Tanah was made by To' Anggut in the neighbouring forest of the saint To' Hijau, and the whole village failed to lift it when completed till To' Anggut ordered forty four virgins to convey it to the mosque. This they did easily and the big drum afterwards sounded of its own accord every Thursday night and continued to do so until many years back it collapsed from age.

Another Kéramat Hampiran was To' Lumpoh of Sepri. He had paralysed limbs and a hairy tongue. This hair made his voice hoarse, whence his nickname To' Lumpoh Serak Suara. When people came to him for medicine, they gave him pisang kelat, which made the hair adhere to his tongue and enabled him to say or sing his magical incantations.

Other minor saints were To' Rangan and To' Anggoh who were once great dukun ("doctors") and the number of such saints in Remba, as also that of the Kéramat Hampiran, can be multiplied by the hundreds.

To' Pawang Idris, the man credited with having received the personal gift of To' Sæch Serban Kuning died only twelve years back, and may in course of time become a recognised saint. Already people have paid vows at his grave! It is difficult to foretell the destinies of these "doctors" of the present days. The number of such saints appears to be steadily increasing.

Such is the influence of these saints on the overwhelming majority of the Malays and it is needless to add that this influence is a lamentable obstacle to their economic, spiritual and moral advancement. Though Islam recognises no intercessors between man and Allah, the relics of the pre-Islamic "Days of Ignorance" survive and will continue to exercise a disastrous influence so long as Malays are ignorant of the fundamental teachings of their religion and remain indifferent to the benefits of secular education. It is gratifying to note that for the rising generation primal beliefs are slowly but surely disappearing.
Early Reference to the suitability of Singapore.

By C. F. Wurtzberg.

In the many accounts which I have read as to the reasons which prompted Raffles to select Singapore as the post to be established at the Southern extremity of the Straits of Malacca, I have never seen any reference to a large work in two volumes called "Oriental Commerce" by William Milburn of the East India Company's service. Volume 2 contains, to quote its title, "a geographical description of the principal places in the East Indies, China and Japan...the rise and progress of the trade...particularly that of the British East India Company...."

The author claims that his book is founded on "practical experience obtained in the course of seven voyages to India and China."

This book was published in 1813 and considering the nature of its contents and the fact that its author was in the Company's service it is not unreasonable to suppose that copies were sent to the principal stations of the Company. Moreover three years only after its publication Raffles was in England writing his history of Java. It would be strange indeed if Raffles did not read the recent work of a member of his own service which devotes a whole chapter to Java, apart from other chapters dealing respectively with Malaya, Sumatra and the Dutch East Indies in all of which Raffles was profoundly interested. It is not impossible to suppose that Raffles knew Milburn personally. In any case the following extract from the book under the heading of Johore, to which place Raffles's attention was specifically drawn by his instructions, when he started on the expedition which lead to the foundation of Singapore, is not without interest. It is on page 329 of Volume 2.

"In 1703 Captain Hamilton visited the place, (Johore) and was kindly received. The King made him a present of the Island of Singapore, situated near the entrance of the river; but he declined taking possession of it, notwithstanding its convenient situation for trade, and the surrounding country being well supplied with excellent timber and trees fit for masts."

1925 | Royal Asiatic Society.
The Incantation and Sacrifice of the Pawang Ma’yang

By W. B. Clarke.

The stage having been erected with its roof-tree pillars pointing East and West, at about 6.30 p.m. on the day of the first performance the Pawang sits crosslegged midway between the two pillars, facing the setting sun. In front of him is a tray containing the following articles:

Telur sa-biji
Beras berte sa-piring
   basah
   kungit
Nyior sa-biji
Lilin sa-balang
Sirih empat kapor
Bara api satu

Thirty cents (as a minimum)

The Pawang uses the following incantation on each occasion marked * below:

Jin tanah! Baham tanah! Nenek yang bëri penyakit, jangan ménghak?
Nenek telleguru yang mënjaga-jaga, yang bërchachut, yang bërchëlah!
Jin hilam!—Bintang timor asal êngkau!
Bërkat doa! La ilaha illallah!

After all the actors have assembled the Pawang starts his sacrifice to

(1) The indigenous spirits of the soil (jëmbalang)
He mixes rice from each saucer*—takes the egg*—a quid of betel*—places them separately in his hand—digs a hole at the foot of the western pillar*—buries the whole in the ground*.

(2) The spirits of the air (Jin puteh)
He mixes rice*—takes a quid of betel*—and casts the whole into the air*.

(3) The spirits of the winds (Jin kuning)
He mixes rice*—and throws it round the stage*.

(4) The spirits of the earth (Jin hilam)
He lights the candle*, which he places between his feet—mixes rice*—scatters it around the candle*—hammers it into the ground with his hand*—places a quid of betel on top of each of the two drums**—orders all the instruments to be sounded—distributes the monetary offering in any proportion that he may desire.

If the site proves inauspicious, a fresh one is selected and the above performance repeated.
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