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THE BRITISH-INDIAN QUESTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

AN APPEAL TO THE EMPIRE

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Before dealing with the present position of our British-Indian fellow-subjects in South Africa, and with the origin, history, and development of this most important Imperial factor, it is my intention to lift the veil from the sufferings that have been undergone patiently, self-sacrificingly, and patriotically by those British-Indians—men, women, and children—who for many years have been domiciled in this our most recent self-governing British possession.

It is hoped that a recital of this terrible tragedy will awaken something more permanent than mere verbal expressions of cordial sympathy, and will evoke something more tangible than mere academic resolutions of protest from the people of the British Empire, whether of Asiatic or European descent.

I think I cannot do better than to quote a speech of Lord Selborne’s at the outbreak of the South African War in 1899, in which His Lordship says—and truly says:

“We are not dealing with our own personal interest or our own personal money; we are trustees for our
brothers in Canada, in Australia, at the Cape; Trustees also for our own fellow-subjects of different races and of different colours—the Negroes of South Africa and the Indians of India—trustees for all these and for the unborn children of these. Therefore, the test we have to apply in an emergency like this is the simple test of duty. Is it or is it not our duty to see that the rights and the future interests of those I have named shall be maintained? Is the British Government going to make its name respected, and to have the pledges given by it faithfully observed? Is it going to see that the British subject, wherever he goes, all over the world, whether he be black or white, whether he come from Great Britain itself, or from Canada, or New Zealand, is to have the rights that his Queen has secured for him?"

In the same year, Lord Lansdowne, who is now at the head of His Majesty's Opposition in the House of Lords, made the following statement:

"Among the many misdeeds of the South African Republic I do not know that any fills me with more indignation than its treatment of the Indians. And the harm is not confined to sufferers on the spot; for what do you imagine would be the effect produced in India when these poor people return to their country to repeat to their friends that the Government of the Empress, so mighty and irresistible in India, with its population of 300,000,000, is powerless to secure redress at the hands of a small African State?"

And what is the position to-day? It is that for thirteen years South Africa has been part and parcel of the British Empire—Cape Colony, Natal, the Orange Free State, and the Transvaal.

Shortly after the British occupation, British-Indian refugees (who had, many of them, lost everything they possessed during the war, whilst others had sacrificed
themselves in various directions, even to the extent of forming an ambulance corps) were allowed to return to South Africa in carefully restricted numbers.

In May, 1901, a notice appeared in the Gazette, notifying the opening of an Asiatic Immigration Office, where British-Indians were required to change their original passes for new ones, and in 1903 the Peace Preservation Ordinance was passed, requiring British-Indians to provide themselves with permits to enter and reside in the new British Colony of the Transvaal. It was in this year that complaints began to be made by European traders in certain towns, that British-Indians, who were not pre-war refugees, were entering the Colony, and they called upon the Government to take preventive measures.

Lord Milner, who was then High Commissioner, received an assurance (which he accepted) from the Chief Secretary for Permits that an illicit influx on any but the minutest scale was an impossibility; but the Transvaal British Indian Association had recently proved to the Government the existence of bribery and corruption amongst their own officials charged with the administration of Asiatic affairs, and, as a result, these officials were subsequently dismissed.

In 1906 certain negrophobe leaders of the European Community, juggled with false statistics, and utilized the malicious allegations of the Indians' trade rivals, the functionaries of the Asiatic Department of the Transvaal, they gained the ears of their official superiors, and so succeeded in inducing the then Crown Colony Government to believe in the existence of an organized conspiracy, on the part of the British-Indian leaders and Community, to flood the Transvaal with British-Indians who had no rights of pre-war residence. Lord Selborne, who had spoken in such strong and emphatic terms in 1899, was influenced to so great an extent by the constant repetition of these charges, that he eventually sanctioned the introduction of a measure into the nominated Legislative Council, aimingosten-
sibly at the complete re-registration of the Asiatic population.

This measure was known as the Asiatic Law Amendment Ordinance, and was described by the Colonial Secretary as an effort to secure “fair and just treatment” for the lawfully resident Asiatic population.

Now, why was it necessary, in the speech of Lord Lansdowne in 1899, to make all these apologies and all these excuses for allowing British subjects to remain in what was then a British colony, without molestation? All this tall talk about the rights of British Dominions to manage their own affairs, whilst excellent in theory, is ridiculous in practice, especially in view of the fact that all British subjects, without regard to colour or race, should receive equal treatment within the British Empire. Where is the advantage of being a British subject if one does not receive this equal treatment?

It has been contended that Indians work for next to nothing, that they are content with a very low standard of living, that they do not add to the wealth of the Community amongst which they reside. This is all nonsense.

We are dealing with South Africa. South Africa’s mercantile population consists largely of a horde of cosmopolitan European adventurers—Russian, Polish, Italian, Galician, Hungarian, Spanish, and Portuguese. These people are engaged in trade and commerce—some as merchants, some as importers, and many of them as hawkers and traders. Being whites, no question is asked of this class, no standard of morality is fixed, and upon their mode of living and of acquiring property no restrictions are placed.

Upon the hard-working, sober, and industrious British-Indians, all sorts of conditions are imposed. They may not acquire property with the Union of South Africa; they are not allowed to ride on the railways except in carriages labelled “for coloured people”; in hotels, restaurants, and places of amusement, they are not tolerated except as
servants; ordinary citizens’ rights are denied them; and in the face of all these disabilities, it is urged against them that their standard of living is an inferior one.

In certain European countries a similar charge was brought against members of the Jewish race, and when these latter were confined within the pale of the Ghetto, there was a certain amount of truth in these allegations; but when the Ghetto barriers were removed, it was found that the Jews were the most liberal supporters of charities, were the keenest educationists, were the most hospitable entertainers, and were only too anxious to spend their wealth with the peoples among whom it had been acquired.

Although in the present state of public opinion in England, and in view of the fact that various religious bodies, here and elsewhere, are constantly invoking the aid of the British Government to suppress slavery in the Portuguese cocoa plantations, and to suppress the horrors of the rubber trade in South America, yet it has done nothing, absolutely nothing, to improve the condition of the indentured labourers in the British province of Natal, and yet the indentured Indian immigrant is not peculiar to this province. Other colonies can point to a longer and wider experience of him, and in their case the Indian has proved not a difficult problem, but an exceedingly valuable asset.

Take British Guiana. For more than sixty years the imported Indian coolie has been found in Demerara a source of strength—physical, moral, and financial. The colony owes a debt to him which it is ever ready to admit, and although at the end of his five years’ residence he is entitled there to a back passage to India, he is, in many instances, resolved to settle in that colony, and to-day he represents 40 per cent. of the population, which comprises Europeans, Negroes, and even Chinese.

Unlike his fellow-countrymen in Natal, the immigrant in British Guiana suffers from no disabilities. Every pro-
fession is open to him: he can exercise the franchise; he can sit in the Legislature. In no case are the demands of the Constitution excessive. He is a British subject, with all the rights of a British subject. His English trade competitors are content to regard him as a business rival, and to meet his rivalry as they would that of a fellow-countryman.

It has been argued that Natal, and indeed the whole of South Africa, enjoys self-government, but it must not be forgotten that Indian immigrants were introduced into Natal long before that Province was emancipated from the direct control of the Colonial Office.

Lord Hardinge, the Viceroy of India, has, by his spirited protest against the ill-treatment of Indian fellow-subjects in South Africa, earned the thanks of the hundreds of millions of Indians in India, and it is devoutly to be hoped that now that the matter has been brought home, the Government here will use its best endeavours to remove this, the greatest of all stigmas, against the British name in South Africa, seeing that the whole blame for this treatment rests with the Home Government. The great mistake that it made was that when it granted autonomy to South Africa, it did not insist that the rights of every British subject, of whatever race or colour, should be properly safeguarded.

In conclusion, one cannot do better than quote the Marquis of Crewe, His Majesty’s Secretary of State for India, who received a Deputation at the India Office on December 1, on the subject of the Indian disturbances in South Africa. Lord Crewe was of opinion that the South African Ministers were honestly anxious to deal out fair treatment to our Indian fellow-subjects in the Colony of Natal and to see that the laws were humanely administered. He then goes on to say:

“He was bound to add that they were often hampered by the existence in South Africa of a public opinion that was less enlightened than in this country,
and by a degree of racial prejudice from which, as individuals, the Ministers themselves were largely free. It was generally conceded that South Africa could claim to restrict immigration into that Dominion—that was to say, that if there had been no Indians there at all South Africa might have declined to admit any. But from that concession two reflections arose.

In the first place, South Africa invited the Indians there, and she had profited greatly by the skilful labour of the indentured labourers in the town and by the amount of pioneering trading which in the early development of the Colony was done by Indians. Secondly, they had to bear in mind that special claims were established by those facts for considerate treatment of the Indians, claims which he was afraid they could not regard as having been generally recognized in South Africa as a whole."
A PLEA FOR THE MAHRRATT A BRAHMIN

BY MEHERBAN NARAYANRAO BABASAHI B,  
Chief of Inchalkaranji.

The attitude of the Mahratta Brahmin towards the British Government has long been a subject for adverse criticism. No single reason is sufficient to account for it. In common with the rest of the community they have suffered from the famines and plague that have sorely tried many districts in the Deccan in recent years. Then, owing to the cost of living becoming higher, without a corresponding increase of income, the middle class, to which the Brahmans belong, have suffered sadly. The stress of competition has hit them hard, and they do not so readily find employment in the work to which they are accustomed, as was the case a generation back. Some thirty or forty years ago a young Indian who became a graduate could easily obtain an appointment at 100 rupees, or £6 13s. 4d., a month. To-day a Brahmin, even if he graduates in a class (i.e., with honour), finds the greatest difficulty in securing an appointment even at a salary of only 30 rupees, or £2, a month. I am stating these facts in England, not to justify the mood of these people, but in order to show that there are extenuating circumstances.

The Oriental ideal of government is a paternal one; and as a father or mother would care for all their children, and display an equal interest in them, whether a particular child
was well-behaved or not, so also our King will, I am confident, try to do what he can for his subjects, even for those who, by their words and deeds, do not merit his favour. That is a high ideal, I know. But it is also politic, because it is not good even for a strong and well-established Government to have any considerable portion of its subjects in a state of more or less chronic discontent with their position. As a matter of fact, this dissatisfaction is not confined to one class. Nearly a century has passed since the British Power was firmly established in India, and for the first fifty years or so the Government was popular all over India, and especially in my part of the country, and the beneficial results of British rule were appreciated. The generation who were able to see for themselves the difference that has been wrought in the state of India by the presence of the British remembered the devastations of the Pindaris. They recollected what sort of exactions they had to undergo at the hands of the petty officers of the many small Governments of other days. They were also well aware that they could now till their land and be sure of their produce. They were more lightly taxed, and in all respects they were far better off than were their fathers, or they themselves in the beginning of their career. But after a time the new subjects of the British régime became used to these advantages, and they began to take these things as a matter of course.

Men are not grateful to the sun for his wonderful gifts, to the clouds that provide moisture to raise the crops, or for any other of the free gifts of Providence. But if any of these blessings are not forthcoming, as in a bad season, they at once realize how precious they are. This is the case with a settled government. When you have had it for some time, you cease to appreciate it at its true value, and you begin to fret over the smaller inconveniences that beset you. It is human nature always to over-estimate the good things which have been enjoyed in the past, and think only of the minor troubles of the present. Nowhere
more than in India do men look to the past for the Golden Age.

Now, first to explain briefly the Brahmin ascendancy in Hindu society, I should point out that it has almost always been religious and intellectual in character. Though ages have elapsed since the caste formed itself, nothing could deprive them of their intelligence, their power of endurance, and the many virtues that go to make honest and useful members of society.

The reason for this is to be found in the inherent vitality of the people and their natural ingrained tendencies.

It is often said that the system of caste has been a creation of Brahminical ideas. But I would point out that caste has its origin in the failings of human nature. Even in this twentieth century we see traces of it in racial difficulties in America and South Africa. During the greatest ascendancy of Rome and Greece it was present there, and even in Western countries you now find that, though there is no recognized caste system, still there are class distinctions which are almost as marked. So far as the fundamental conception goes, it is present always in more or less distinct form, the only difference being that caste prejudices are allowed to come in the way of your comfort and the advancement of your interest, whereas a class difference is brushed aside when the above advantages are to be gained.

Given this sense of superiority of caste on the one hand, and self-abnegation from the luxurious life of this world, coupled with studious, abstemious, and virtuous living, on the other, you get a type of Brahmin class on the one side, and in pursuance of the accepted doctrine of division of labour you naturally come across the other types of men, such as the warriors given to political power and luxurious life, the money-making traders and the obedient domestics.

Many reformers, from Buddha to Kashab Chandrasen, have striven to abolish caste, but have not proved successful.

So far as their religious importance goes, although the ascendancy which they enjoyed in the past is not possible to
the same extent under the altered circumstances of the
time, still, looking to the past history of the country, while
there have been efforts, and very strong efforts, to under-
mine the religious influence of the Brahmins, they have all
failed.

It is not true to say that the Brahmins have arrogated to
themselves all the good things of this world, leaving the
masses in darkness and misery.

If this accusation is true of Brahmins, it is also true of
all the higher classes. But, fortunately, the higher classes
are not more culpable in this respect than is the case with
people all over the world.

The Brahmins would not have held the respect of the
whole community for so long a time if they had not been
doing some useful service. If they had really oppressed
the people, they would have been annihilated long ago.

It is well known that the class about whom I am
speaking is very intelligent, hard-working, abstemious,
and at the same time very ambitious. The late Justice
M. G. Ranade has said of them that “It is the privilege
of a Brahmin to be poor and ambitious.” They have from
time immemorial held responsible positions as advisers to
the King, or as religious and secular preceptors.

Can we wonder, therefore, if they still aspire even now
to something equivalent to this favoured position they once
enjoyed?

Coming to the British period, we find that at the time of
the downfall of the Peshwas almost all the Brahmin Chiefs
and other influential men in this part of the country threw
in their lot with the Government, and some of the most
faithful servants who worked under Mountstuart Elphin-
stone and his successors were Brahmins.

As a matter of fact, after the downfall of the Peshwa,
almost all appointments under the successors of the Mah-
ratta Power were held by this class. The new rulers naturally
sought for their agents amongst the class who knew most
about administration and had influence amongst the people,
and who certainly were pre-eminent amongst the Indian communities for intelligence and administrative capacity. There were few British officers then in the country, and much of the important work of Government had necessarily to be done through Indian agency.

With one exception, all the Chiefs, a majority of whom are Brahmins, on this side of the country were thoroughly loyal to the British Government, and some of them rendered valuable service. The same was the case with the general population of the country. If there had not been a real love for the British administration and an appreciation of the advantages conferred upon them by the change of rulers, this would have been impossible.

Then, from the time of the establishment of the peaceable rule of British Government, the class of Brahmins have faithfully served the Government in the administration of the country.

Even now, if an examination is made of the posts held under Government and other important employers of intelligent labour, it will be found that the percentage of Brahmins is relatively large.

As I have shown, Brahmins have done good service to the Government, and I may be pardoned if I point out that at the time of the great Mutiny, although almost the whole of Northern India was in convulsion, the very seat of the Peshwa’s Government was as peaceful as could be expected in so disturbed a time.

The Chitpavan community is said to be by far the most disloyal in India. I should absolutely deny this allegation.

On the contrary, it is said of Chitpavans that when they take up a cause earnestly they are loyal to it. The British Government found this to be so in its first endeavours to establish their rule in the Deccan, and in the pacification and administration of the country until recent times.

It is true, no doubt, that recent disloyal offenders against law have included many members of this community; but it must be remembered, as pointed out by a correspondent
in the Times two years ago, that this community is strongly represented in all the activities and movements of the society of which they form a part, and, as was shown in that memorable letter refuting this very idea, the best advocates, doctors, authors, publishers, Government officers, and even actors, in the Indian community came from this particular class.

In these days of enlightenment they cannot be totally suppressed. It would be generous of the Government to try a better and more honourable way, by providing proper outlets for their activities, and thus turning them into more useful and loyal citizens of the Empire.

It is not, however, to be denied that a certain section of the Brahmin community has grown up to be violent in denunciation of the Government, and that has led to some regrettable incidents. It has therefore become necessary for the Government, as well as for the leaders of this community, to see what can be done to eradicate this feeling. I must, however, say that the discontent that we see in India is a phase of the discontent we see all over the world, and especially in Asiatic countries.

The Brahmins being the most intelligent and observant class, it is but natural that they should share to some extent in this general discontent, and that they should give expression to their feelings.

It is often said that the discontent among the Deccani Brahmins is due to their memory of the days when they were the rulers of the country. In this connection I should like to point out two things. Firstly, if the Administration is taken as a whole, it has to be borne in mind that, though at the end of the Mahratta rule many appointments were held by Brahmins, still, under the earlier Peshwas, and even in the time of the later ones, many important offices were held by men who were not Brahmins. I will not enter into detail, but I can say without fear of contradiction that nearly up to the régime of Sawai Madhavarao, administrative offices were held indiscriminately by those who were
the best fitted for them. Naturally, military appointments fell largely to the lot of Mahrattas, and civil appointments fell more to the share of Brahmins.

The second point I wish to insist upon is, that those who held high posts, and may be termed the official aristocracy, whether they were Mahrattas, Muhammadans, or Brahmins (except, of course, the Jaghrirdars and military men, who were recognized as feudatory chiefs), went down with the Government that they had served. Those Indians who received appointments after them were men of poorer families, who were willing to learn the English language and serve under British officers in civil employment, for military employment became scarcer and scarcer in the Deccan. It was nearly fifty years after the fall of the Peshwa that any representative of the old aristocratic families were willing to undergo the necessary training for the higher posts in Government service. In other words, the discontent, if there be any at all, is not so much in the families who suffered most by the downfall of the Peshwa as among the families that supplanted them after the establishment of British rule.

Whatever the causes, and among whomsoever the dissatisfaction exists, it is for the Government and the leaders of the community to see whether it can be eradicated. My own opinion of the present unrest is that it is more of an economic than of a political nature. I know that I shall be contradicted by some in this statement, but I am putting down what I believe to be the real position of affairs. I have freely moved among all sections of the Indian communities (Brahmins as well as others). Besides, my position gives me access, on terms of intimacy, to all British official and non-official classes, from the highest to the lowest, and I have been watching movements in the Deccan for the last quarter of a century. It is my firm conviction, as I have said, that the reason of this discontent is rather economic than political. If with the growth in number of this community the opportunities for obtaining employment
also had increased, there would have been little discontent; in fact, I feel that the British Government would have been nearly as popular now as it was fifty years ago.

As a boy, I remember being impressed by even Brahmin priests emphasizing the fact that the word of an Englishman was more to be relied on than the written promises of Indian Rajas. This was quite a general belief then. See what a change has since been brought about in the minds of some of our educated people! They feel that special promises made in solemn documents and in open Durbar count now for nothing. It is not meant, I believe, that the promises are not actually held valid. What is meant by men who talk in that strain is that they are not realizing as much benefit as they had hoped to derive.

It is to be regretted that Europeans occupying high official positions in India make a point of showing their antipathy to the Brahmins, in season and out of season. I would ask whether that is just, whether it is politic, and whether it is not doing a great deal of harm to the cause of civilization in India, creating a state of feeling which is likely to hinder the British Administration in all its good work. So I would earnestly appeal both to Britishers here in this country and those out in India to give dispassionate thought to the subject, and to realize what their instincts as Britishers and lovers of fair play and equal opportunities urge them to do.

There is a feeling, which we are bound to recognize, that the Brahmins, especially the Chitpavans, have become distasteful to the Europeans in the country. I would ask whether it is fair to denounce a whole community for the shortcomings or errors of some of its members. Again, is it politic to think unfavourably of or run down a class which has been doing valuable service to the Government and the country, and which forms such an important factor of the body politic of India? This dislike, though it is not difficult to account for, must be got rid of, if we are to co-operate for the real progress of India.
My object in putting forward this plea is to try and help to eradicate, or at least to minimize, the feelings of estrangement which exist on both sides.

I know the British do not wish to take the well-known drastic measures for dealing with disloyalty which were in vogue under their predecessors, and Brahmans are not a community to die, so to speak, a natural death. Therefore some means must be devised, in the interest of the Government as well as in the interest of the community, by which a better state of things can be brought about. As I have already hinted, it is dissatisfaction and not disaffection that exists, and the cause of it is mainly the want of congenial and proper employment for the talents of these people.

I may seem to be arguing as if the community were devoid of feelings of loyalty and patriotism, and as if they did not know their own interest and the interest of their country. But, as a matter of fact, almost all the members of the community are conversant with the truth that the well-being of the country depends upon the permanence and strength of the British Empire.

Now I would like to address a few words to this community in detail. They must first be awake to the fact that if one person of the community commits a bad act, it brings a slur on the whole community and prejudices the interests, not only of the community, but the nation at large; and then they must also see that charity begins at home, and that, as they are really an important and useful part of India, it is their duty to maintain themselves in their present position of advantage, even from a patriotic point of view. Running counter to such a beneficial but strong and resolute Government, they are only jeopardizing their own interests, if not their existence. Then it must be realized that material injury to this class means an injury to the nation generally. Moreover, no class can live unless it is in the enjoyment of the necessaries of life, and these one cannot expect to get unless one is a peaceful member of society.
Some leading members of the community helped the downfall of the Mahratta Power, and the same idea of self-preservation and appreciation of the merits of the British induced them to actively help the British, and the rest of them acquiesced in it for more or less the same reasons.

The extremists seem to be possessed with an idea that they ought to sacrifice their own interest for the interest of their country, and, as far as the idea goes, it is excellent.

But the interest of the country does not lie in disorder and anarchism. It lies in peaceful, strong, and civilized government.

In seeking after some imaginary good, a few members of the community have done tangible harm to the Brahmin community as a whole. I don't for a moment mean to suggest that Brahmans should not be patriotic. They would not be true to themselves and to the education that they are receiving under the British Government if they were not so. What I mean to convey is that they also ought to look to the duty they owe to their parents and their family before they devote themselves to the work of benefiting the country at large.

Not only this, but they will soon come to realize that it is to their interest to go with the Government, and not against it. There is no room in India for people who deliberately set themselves to thwart the authority of the Government. The continuance of the British rule in India and the peaceful advancement of the country are synonymous terms. He who is a traitor to the Government is also a traitor to his country, and this fact is slowly but clearly being brought home to the malcontents.

Before concluding what I have to say to the Brahmans, I want to bring to their notice that providentially we have a Government of the nature we want, and it is the duty of every citizen to uphold it to the best of his ability. So if a sacrifice is to be made, it ought to be made in upholding this Government, and not in trying to subvert it.

Every other important community is having its own
conferences, and gathering funds for the promotion of its own particular welfare. The only exception seems to be the Brahmans. But as their share in Government offices and their political influence are becoming smaller and smaller, it is imperative that they should rely on their own efforts for promoting their advancement. They must either advance or fall back. They cannot remain stationary. If they want to keep up their position of vantage, they must devise means for their progress and advance with the times.

And it would also be an advantage to start an association for promoting good citizenship and loyalty, and for the furtherance of their interests, as is done in almost all classes of society in India now. This would be a great help to the community and to the Government in securing a proper solution of the difficulty which exists.

But there is small possibility of their undertaking any work of importance in India without the direct co-operation of Government officials. Some time ago it was suggested to call a conference of Brahmans with the object of promoting loyalty in that class and of discussing schemes for their advancement—social, industrial, commercial, and scientific.

But apparently the time had not yet arrived for such a movement, and the idea had to be dropped for various reasons.

If the co-operation and sympathy of the official classes were forthcoming, it would be easy to arrange for a conference to further the avowed objects. Many people, like myself, would be only too willing to offer their services for the advancement of the cause.

I think this is the time for the leaders of the community and the officials to endeavour to devise means for removing the misunderstanding that exists between the official classes and the discontented section of the Brahanm community, and to win back this section to loyal contentment.

The independent professions are over-stocked, especially
the legal career. So it is no good everybody aspiring to such openings.

I do not mean to say that they should be given many more appointments under Government than they have been accustomed to get. I am one of those who think that the bait of official employment is to be used only for the encouragement of education in backward communities in the initial stage of their progress, because at that stage no one would care to receive education, and especially higher education, unless one felt there was a prospect of Government service for them.

It would be to their own advantage, as well as to the benefit of the country at large, if more of them would endeavour to make a career for themselves in other avenues of employment, and so keep open the beaten path for some of their less fortunate countrymen.

I do not mean by this to convey that Government offices and political power are things to be despised and to be shunned when they are available. It is the other way—whenever you can get them, by all means have them.

I also know of some families that occupy themselves in agriculture even above the Ghats; but, unfortunately, there is a growing tendency amongst these classes to let their farms rather than cultivate them themselves. With the advent of machinery I am quite sure that they can be made to revert to the fields in larger numbers than they have been doing.

Unfortunately, the clerical class, as I may term it, have not in any large degree taken kindly to the arts and industries or to scientific pursuits, although, strictly speaking, there is no reason why Brahmins should not enter upon scientific as well as literary careers. Their natural aptitude and their hereditary predisposition ought to lead them to both branches of work, provided they have sufficient means and are able to give close application to their pursuits. As living is becoming so costly, and the
competition for employment is so keen, many Brahmins are now taking to industrial and commercial pursuits. If the right direction were now given to this new phase of activity, I think a large section of the community could be thus employed. There are technical schools in our country, no doubt, but they are not at all as well equipped and managed as some of the institutions that I have had the good fortune of seeing in England. If institutions such as we see here were started, and every facility were given for the literary classes to avail themselves of them, the Brahmins would not feel the want of a career as they now do. It is not that the literary classes or the Brahmins cannot change their professions. In former times they have changed from one occupation to another almost as freely as any other community in India.

There is an impression, I am told, that the presence of Brahmins in the agricultural, technical, and other institutions I have mentioned, is not regarded with favour. This certainly ought not to be the case. The purpose of the Government ought to be to provide facilities for this class to make a decent living by following all available walks of life.

I want the Government in India to give good opportunities to the Brahmin class to enter into agricultural, commercial, industrial, and scientific pursuits. Now that the usual avenues of employment are becoming scarce and congested, this class is prepared to take up other avocations, if only proper facilities are held out to them.
THE OMINOUS QUIET OF PERSIA

By G. D. Turner.

With the tragically sudden death of Mr. H. F. B. Lynch there is left scarcely one optimist in regard to the future of Persia. For years Mr. Lynch, in and out of Parliament, pressed the claims of Persia for sympathetic consideration, and insisted on the enormous importance of maintaining its independence as a State. At the most depressing moments he remained cheerfully hopeful for the future, and at great crises brought the weight of his personal influence and of the Persia Committee, of which he was chairman, to bear against the oppression and betrayal of that unfortunate country.

The voices are many which proclaim the impending disintegration of Persia, and express unsympathetic regret at her "derelict" condition, with trite explanations of the contributing causes; but no one has the boldness to prophesy what would happen in that great plateau, the corner-stone of the European and Asiatic continent, should the oldest State in the world cease to exist. The political seers hesitate, no doubt, to delineate the future from an uncomfortable sense that the question is one of immeasurably greater importance than a matter of the disappearance of an Oriental State, and that the fate of Persia may have a profound bearing on the future history of Asia. This feeling does not arise merely from a recollection of the part played by
Persia in past history, though the remembrance that, for example, it was as much the disturbing menace of Persia as the bravery and determination of Charles the Hammer that saved Europe from the Moors, should always make one hesitate to belittle the Shah community; but we feel that, for reasons as inscrutable as the laws which governed the contour of the earth's surface, Persia will one day become either a great battle-ground or a great market-place for the nations of the world.

If there were any hope left of an independent and powerful State rising from the ashes of despotism and revolution, some encouragement might be gained from the fact that, on the surface, things seem no worse to-day, but rather better than they were a year ago. The last customs returns for three months show an increase of nearly 25 per cent. over those for the corresponding period last year. We are told that the organization of the inland revenue service has reached a fair state of efficiency, with promise of greater improvement, and that the gendarmerie is proving itself an effective force in keeping the roads open for trade and putting down the robber bands; so much so that we are assured by the Teheran correspondent of the Times that Europe will very soon be astonished to learn of the grip which these two services have taken on the country. The Bakhtiaris, an uncertain and very powerful element, have been brought under control, and their influence is being directed into useful channels. The return of the Regent, Nasr-ul-Mulk, to the capital provides a much-needed authority and form of responsibility, and although nothing very definite has resulted from his resumption of control, he is succeeding in reconciling conflicting elements and keeping things quiet. Again, the disappearance from Persia of Salar-ud-Dowlah, the brother of the ex-Shah, relieves the Government of a very harassing source of trouble and a rallying-point of reactionary royalist plots. The long-standing dispute with Turkey over the frontier seems in a fair way of being finally settled. For some time
there has been no news of any violent disturbance anywhere.

But when all this has been said, the disturbing conviction remains that the outlook for Persia is not bright. There is no sign of any disposition on the part of Russia to withdraw her troops, or even part of them, notwithstanding repeated promises that this would be done—promises with which Sir Edward Grey has so frequently soothed the uneasy conscience of Parliament. Russia's position in Persia is becoming consolidated, the use of her money and her language is more and more common, the people are growing wearily accustomed to the continual presence and interference of Russian soldiers and Russian officials. Persian officials, even the highest, in North Persia exercise authority only by grace and under the veto of the diplomatic agents of the Czar. Nothing which is viewed with disfavour by 'the power in the North' has the remotest chance of being carried through. The last year has seen the granting to Russia of at least two valuable concessions—the one for a motor service from Enzeli on the Caspian to Teheran, with a branch from Kasvin to Hamadan; the other for a railway from Julfa on the Caucasian frontier to Tabriz, with the option of extension to Urumiah and Teheran. This line will be on the Russian gauge, and will connect at Julfa with the Tiflis-Baku line. When the Tiflis-Vladikavkuz line is completed, Tabriz will be brought within six days of London. This concession includes the right to work all minerals in a zone thirty miles wide on either side of the railway, a very valuable concession, as the country is known to be rich in different minerals, a fact with which the Russians had made themselves well acquainted. The Russian military invasion of Persia has been followed by an economic invasion, a very much more formidable threat to her independence. The imposition of a Russian duty on all goods imported into Persia from other countries through Russia was a practically impossible handicap, over-
come to some extent by English and German manufacturers sending goods there through the parcel post. Russia is now taking steps to prevent importation by this channel, and will in this way secure a complete monopoly of the markets of Northern Persia. This is still further safeguarded by encouraging brigandage on the Trebizond road, making it impossible to bring caravans into Western Persia from the Black Sea through Turkish territory. Mr. Philips Price met last year a robber chief who was an honorary colonel in a Russian regiment, and was supplied from the Caucasus with the ammunition required for his little expeditions. The concentration of Russian forces on the Turco-Persian frontier at Kum indicates that an advance is contemplated at some future date across the frontier to Erzerum, the Turkish stronghold which is the key for the domination of the whole Armenian plateau.

Another feature of the situation that contributes to a pessimistic view is the failure to summon a new Mejliiss, in spite of repeated attempts to do so. This is partly due to the destruction of the former machinery and partly to the fact that the first impulse to Constitutional Government has been dissipated, and the people are weary of ineffectual attempts; but it is due most of all to the disappearance of the real leaders of the people. In Northern Persia the majority of these have either been killed or have had to flee the country, thanks to the brutality and oppression of Russia. The massacre of nationalists during the early part of last year at Tabriz and the enforced exile of those who escaped have entirely removed from Azerbaijan those at all fit to represent the people in a national assembly. It will take a considerable time before their places are filled. The same is true about other provinces. Some sort of Mejliiss the Regent may be able to summon, but it will not have the same character as that which was elected with great enthusiasm at the commencement of the constitutional régime six years ago.

At the present moment Persia is drifting. It is the pious
hope of Lord Morley that she is drifting into something better; it is the very real fear of the friends of Persia that she is drifting to destruction. It is apparently no concern at all of Sir Edward Grey, to whom, perhaps more than anyone else, is due the present desperate situation. In defiance of age-worn experience of the absolute unreliability of Russian promises, he entered into agreement with the traditional enemy of all liberal government in regard to Persia. He affirms repeatedly, in spite of every fact to the contrary, the intention of Russia to assist Great Britain in maintaining Persia as an independent state. He declares that Russia is about to withdraw her troops at the same moment that fresh Cossack brigades are being entrained for Persia. He advises the Persian Government to submit to the most exorbitant demands of Russia, and withholds his support when they endeavour to make even the slightest resistance. The Spectator has assured us that anyone who was not a fool could have foreseen that the result of the Anglo-Russian Convention would be the Russian occupation of Northern Persia. The Spectator might have added that anyone with a particle of understanding would know that such an occupation means the eventual occupation of the whole country with trains-de-luxe for Russian armies to the frontier of India. Sir Edward Grey not only constructed a door for Russian aggression by his agreement with them, but in bringing about the dismissal of Mr. Morgan Shuster he took from the hands of the Persians the key that might have availed to shut that door. Can this be described as an act of wisdom? It cannot.

If this land of poets and dreamers were of no political importance one could understand why the feeble voice crying for life and liberty should be disregarded by a statesman who cannot permit himself to be governed by sentimental considerations, and to whom the protests of Messrs. Lynch and Browne and the members of the Persia Committee seem nothing more than the ravings of cranky idealists; but if Persia is of importance, if it is as some see it, the
inevitable corner-stone of the Eastern Hemisphere, now is surely the time for action and not for temporizing conversations and studied indifference.

Sir Harry Johnston suggests that Russia's aspirations might be met by ceding to her a strip of Persian territory from the Caucasus to the Gulf; others hope that Russia might be bought off with Azerbaijan and Ghilan, and that a new Persia might be built up from the remainder: whatever the result of the political game may be, it is of supreme importance that the cards should be placed on the table and the game played out now. The plain fact is that our position in the Persian Gulf and the safety of India depend absolutely on our ability to make Russia keep her word. No one can believe for a moment that Russia will keep her word under any circumstances save those of compulsion, and the statesman who says otherwise is telling a diplomatic lie. If Persia is divided between Russia and England, if Russia is given whole slices of the country, there is not the slightest reason to believe that she will recognize any treaty or agreement if it suits her purpose to break them. She has not kept the agreement of 1907; why should she keep an agreement of 1914 or of 1921? It is far easier to coerce her now than it will be when her grip on Persia has fastened, when her railways are built, and her pernicious influence has undermined what is left of the spirit of independence in the country. Compelled she must be. And so long as our Foreign Minister refuses to face this fact, and is inclined to hide from the people of Great Britain the real issues at stake, and only describe the difficulties of the situation, so long will matters continue to go worse for Persia and for all the races whose countries border on the Empire of the Czar.
TURKEY AFTER THE WAR

By Bedwin Sands.

The Prime Minister's speech at the Guildhall banquet has apparently given satisfaction to our Turkish friends. It was prompted by a desire to assuage the fears of those loyal and devoted subjects of the British Crown, the Moslems of India. It may be that we were all mistaken in our estimate of the somewhat unjustifiable threat made earlier in the year by Mr. Asquith, when the Turks had reoccupied Adrianople, or that the Indian unrest has brought the Government to a different and more Imperial view of the whole question. Yet, on taking into account the whole policy of England towards Turkey during recent years, it seems incredible that meetings of protest in India, and even in this country, could have had any great influence upon the Guildhall speech. There are serious reasons for considering that it was nothing more than the expression of a platonic opinion that the integrity of Asiatic Turkey should not be infringed. The last part of that speech showed unmistakably the truth of a rumour which is an unpleasant portent to the friends of Turkey. It was an admission, which would have been indignantly repudiated only a few years ago, that there are other Powers who have a special concern in the development and well-being of Asia Minor.

In the light of recent facts this only meant that what we feared had actually come to pass. Russia objected to our
having consented to afford efficient help to the Young Turks, and the Government admitted that she was within her rights in doing so. Efficient British administrators had been promised to Turkey at her request, because the experience of recent years has shown that when they were British they were successful. If it falls to the lot of Englishmen to reorganize the administration of some semi-Turkish provinces, it is certain that no trouble of any kind would be experienced in future in Asia Minor. International Commissions, on the contrary, have proved time after time that they lack that cohesion and singleness of purpose that are indispensable in these cases. Rightly or wrongly England pledged herself in 1878 to protect the integrity of Turkey. If our Government intends to repudiate that treaty, then our moral duty is to evacuate Cyprus. If we retain Cyprus it only means, to all honourable men, that we intend to follow our policy to defend the Asiatic possession of Turkey against Russia, since Russia was expressly named in that treaty.

Then, as now, the ambitions of Russia were directed towards the Dardanelles and that part of Asia Minor which is wrongly called Armenia. If we intend to abide by the terms of our treaty, it seems incredible that we should by doing so prepare difficulties for ourselves. Unfortunately we are doing so. Reports from Armenia prove conclusively that an extensive campaign is being carried on in the Armenian districts by semi-official agents and by some of their tools, Armenians of Russia. An International Commission of Reforms, on which Russians serve, would have great difficulties in effecting its purpose, while, on the contrary, British administrators alone or British and French administrators together, paid servants of Turkey for the time being, would find it comparatively easy to restrain the activities of that advance guard of Russia.

Since we cannot hope for an immediate change of front on the part of the Government, we must trust to the common sense of Germany and France in the drawing up
of the international scheme of reforms. We must also trust in the firmness of the present Turkish Government. The Grand Vizier and Talaat Bey do not need to be told that further coercion of their country would be most unpopular in England, in Germany, and in France. There has never been trouble in Armenia, as Sir Mark Sykes has so ably pointed out, that could not be traced to provocative agents. There will be no trouble in future if those agents are expelled from the country. The Grand Vizier quite rightly considers that international advisers are no more acceptable to Turkey than international inspectors. The Sultan's Government wished to see Armenia properly ruled—that is why they asked for British administrators; but they have no desire to help in the preparation of an international scheme of reforms, which would give their enemies an official footing in Turkey. They have already appointed two Turkish inspectors, and are sending to Asia, under the command of Colonel Hawker, a body of gendarmes—of those same "Blues" who, in Macedonia, in Constantinople, and lately in Adrianople, have proved their efficiency. Their French and English officers have testified to their ability. All sincere friends of Turkey wish to see those Turkish inspectors and gendarmes accomplish their task unaided by an International Commission, which would include Russian officials. If, indeed, Russia possesses officials who can draw up a scheme of reform and carry it out, she stands in more need of them in Russia itself.

The Armenian question seems to be now the main difficulty of the Young Turks. The death of Kiamil Pasha has deprived the enemies of the Committee of the support his name afforded them.

The elections, which will shortly take place, cannot but bring a majority in support of the present Government, which is composed of honest and able men. The reduction in the number of non-Turkish electors will increase the comparative force of the Arabs and of the Turks.
Turkey after the War.

There is no reason to doubt the genuineness of the agreement made by the Committee of Union and Progress and the Government with the Arabs. The brother of the Grand Vizier, Abbas Halim Pasha, Governor of Brusa, has become a member of the new league of Moslems which has been established in Constantinople, and which comprises a large number of Arabs.

The question of the loan is being satisfactorily settled, and money will also be forthcoming from other sources. New recruits are continually coming in from the interior, while the demobilization continues, ridding the army of its less useful and active elements. But it is to the reorganization of the navy especially that the Turks are applying their energies. Public festivities all over the country are being made the occasion for renewed activity in the raising of the National Defence Fund. Villagers even go so far as to refrain from buying certain small luxuries of life, to which they were used in the weeks that followed the month of Ramazan, in order to devote the money thus saved towards raising funds to buy warships.

They do the same for education, and, in every capital of Europe, Young Turks are eagerly at work learning, so that they may be able to teach. The greatest cause for rejoicing on the part of those friends of Turkey, who have studied seriously the conditions of the country during the last two years, is that the Young Turks are gradually replacing those officials who were but Old Turks in disguise. It is to be hoped that the Committee of Union and Progress will proceed with that matter with even greater energy.

When we come to the economic development of Turkey in Asia, we find the conditions perhaps less hopeful. That Turkey will maintain herself in Asia Minor is, of course, obvious. We will not see a nation like the Turks annihilated in this century. The Turk is at his best in defensive war, but in time of peace is prone to letting his national instincts subside. His good nature and carelessness for economic enterprise, no less than his lack of capital, prevent him from
doing himself what foreign capitalists do for him in his own country.

The economic development is bound together, however, with progress in other directions in Turkey. There is a proposal now on foot to internationalize Turkey, to guarantee her integrity by international agreement. Personally, I view this proposal with serious suspicion. I do not believe in general disarmament, but if I did admit such a possibility, even then would I assert that it is not the Turks who should start. For, of course, an international guarantee of the integrity of Turkey simply means that the promoters of the scheme wish to weaken her a little more, so that she can be divided the more effectively into spheres of influence by the great banks and companies which now dictate the foreign policy of Europe, without the fear that, relying on her strengthened army, Turkey might suddenly show her force. Knowing what we do of the unsavoury machinations that take place behind the veil, and often without the knowledge of the foreign chancelleries, this proposal can only mean that Turkey would soon be forced to disarm, that she would be further cut up economically, and that the Turkish peasant would be sweated in order to enrich foreign speculators.

Fortunately it is more than doubtful whether an agreement can be reached over this question. Neither Djavid Bey, nor Talaat Bey, nor the Grand Vizier himself, will ever do anything that can be calculated to deeply mortgage the future of their country. Concessions to France, to England, to Italy, will only last for a time, and will, so to speak, neutralize one another. As for the Bagdad Railway, in spite of what it has cost Turkey, the Turks are deeply thankful to the German company for it. It is a great boon to them, and wherever it is now working it has brought some measure of riches to the Turkish peasant.

Even in the economic field, Turkey is developing, thanks to the energy of the Young Turks and to the members of the Committee. It is quite usual to hear the leaders of the
Committee of Union and Progress described as incompetent failures, incapable idealists, and inconsequent politicians. In spite of everything that may have been said, or even proved, against them, we are perfectly satisfied that the only hope of Turkey, at the present day, is in the leaders of the Committee. They have learned, and are still learning, a bitter lesson, which cannot fail to make a deep impression upon their able minds. Neither they themselves nor their country are as yet out of the wood, but when the events of recent years come to be recorded, unless we are indeed becoming utterly oblivious to realities and have lost the national sense of fair play, the work of the Young Turks will attain its justification at the bar of history.
THE MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS AND
DEFENCE OF INDIA

By H. P.

The great peninsula of Hindustan being bounded on its north-western, northern, and north-eastern frontiers by physical features presenting extreme difficulties to the passage of traffic of all sorts, mercantile and military, renders the consideration of India's communications and defence to a preponderating extent, as far as the strategy to be employed is concerned, dependent on sea-power. Although in many ways self-supporting, India at present is incapable of supplying the bulk of the requirements of her garrisons, civil and military. All reinforcements and reliefs for the European personnel, together with all stores not obtainable in the country, must be sea-borne at all times, and in time of war the probabilities are that the Government of India will be dependent on submarine cables and wireless stations for certainty and secrecy of transmission of all messages.

The combinations of nations as allies and as enemies vary so rapidly and unexpectedly as to make anything approaching a dogmatic statement of opinion as to the best strategy to employ highly inadvisable. The best that can be done is to consider the matter in its broadest lines, indicating merely certain probabilities and factors in the general situation.

Throughout these considerations two main facts must be borne in mind. These facts cannot be better presented than as they are stated by Admiral Mahan. Firstly, the
ocean all the world over is one vast plain, trackless, yet traversable by all, free and open to all. Although there are no definite tracts on the ocean, certain routes are more convenient and direct than others; and where these routes converge on or cross one another will occur, and have always occurred, the fiercest struggles for supremacy. As a general rule the actual conflict has taken place near the terminal point of several routes, or at some definite point close to where several routes meet. Secondly, although a few isolated ships operating on a trade route may do a great deal of harm for a short time, their depredations will be short-lived if the main force from which they have been detached is not superior to their enemy’s main force.

From the first of these axioms follows the conclusion that any country and any country’s trade is perfectly safe from permanent and crushing destruction if the enemy’s main force is marked or contained by a superior force. The forces need not be in immediate contact, for the chance of a conflict will cause the weaker to concentrate all the strength he can in anticipation of a chance for attacking should opportunity offer, or will cause him to withdraw to a friendly harbour in the hope that continued watching at sea will wear his adversary down. In any case, the weaker belligerent’s power for harm is greatly curtailed, if not eliminated. It is not a matter of any moment where this marking process is carried out; in the case of India, now under consideration, the effect is the same if the hostile fleet were checked in the North Sea as if it were defeated in the Indian Ocean, and if the work is satisfactorily done, India and her trade are both safe, except for sporadic raids.

At the present time the British Navy is sufficiently powerful to be able to close the Straits of Dover to any nation, or combination of nations, having their sea-frontiers on the North Sea or Baltic. A few isolated vessels might break through, but not an organized body. The route round the North of England for any Continental nation’s
fleets is almost impracticable, as at the very outset the fleets would have to pass through waters thickly strewn with submarines and torpedo craft of all sorts, with the added risk of a fleet action. The nearest neutral port would be about 800 miles distant, and for practical purposes, in this connection, the northern European Powers have no bases of their own.

England has not now, and probably can never again have, a navy sufficiently powerful to be a match for the combined navies of Europe. At the present time, however, it seems unlikely that the British Navy will have to face such a contingency; it also seems unlikely that the Empire will be involved in a simple duel with any single European Power, the United States, or Japan. An outbreak of hostilities beginning as a duel would in all probability rapidly develop into a general struggle along Triple-Alliance-Triple-Entente lines, the various component nations under these arrangements seizing the most favourable occasions for entering the fray, with a view to the furtherance of their own objects. In any case, should the original duel not develop in this manner, the general state of unrest, tension, and anxiety, would dictate a disposition of naval forces on the part of possible belligerents on exactly the same lines as would be necessary at the beginning of a general war.

On the broadest lines, as far as can be foreseen, the greatest concentration of naval forces in the world would be in the North Sea, in case of hostilities between the British Empire and any European Powers having their seaboard east and north of Dover, and in these circumstances the forces of all belligerents would be fully occupied in looking after each other, and but little could be spared from any main body for subsidiary work, such as trade destruction and interruption. It is just possible that a small detachment might get round the North of England and disturb the western ports and trade routes, but such a raiding force would within a very few hours either have
to fight or retire; similarly isolated vessels breaking through the Straits of Dover might for a very limited time play havoc at the western entrance to the English Channel. Timely warning and good organization, such as causing all vessels bound for England from the East to call at Gibraltar for the latest news, should minimize risks from such stray marauders as might have temporarily established themselves on the last stage of the voyage to England.

During a state of European tension another great centre of concentration of naval forces would probably be in the western basin of the Mediterranean, and as several Powers have possessions on the North African coast, in all probability there would be detachments of light craft for subsidiary purposes at various places from Alexandria westward; these vessels, together with others which could be detached from main fleets for trade harassing, without getting unduly out of touch with their main bodies and bases, would make the navigation of the Mediterranean extremely hazardous to the merchant ships of all belligerents. The confined nature of the Mediterranean makes it impossible to divert the normal trade routes to any great extent; this, combined with the fact that any detachment from home waters would be barely adequate for its work, make it very much a matter for consideration whether the Mediterranean route to and from the East should not be abandoned in favour of the Cape route, until after some decisive victory elsewhere should permit of a detachment being sent out sufficiently powerful to make raiding too hazardous to be worth the risks entailed.

The total naval force of the British Empire at present east of Suez is in excess of the total of any European Power or combination of Powers; the units of the British force, however, are much scattered, and unless arrangements are very complete for marking down isolated craft, and concentrating rapidly against organized fleets, the chances of serious damage to trade and, perhaps, disaster
to some incomplete squadron are considerable. We can, however, reasonably conclude that British naval strategy in the Far East provides for contingencies such as the above, and that suitable rendezvous are arranged as points for concentration under the varying conditions which may arise.

The lessons of the past teach that the primary object of all war, both by land and sea, should be the destruction of the enemy's organized forces, after the attainment of which attention can be turned to subsidiary matters, requiring a dispersion of forces, such as destroying and harrying trade routes. The commanders of outlying fleets, therefore, acting in accordance with this, the only sound strategy, would at first turn all their energies towards concentrating their forces with a view to dealing a crushing blow before dispersing for eccentric movements and operations. There is thus little solid ground for panic on the part of trade until after the main fleet on which their nation depends, in the waters through which their routes lie, has been defeated, or blockaded, by a superior force; and after a satisfactory victory, the risks become almost negligible. The foregoing statement does not imply that reasonable precautions, such as changes in the normal routes, avoidance of hostile bases, and attempts to obtain the latest information as to the positions of enemies' fleets and vessels, should be overlooked; for it may very well happen that the enemy may find it convenient to concentrate on or close to a trade route, in which case vessels could be detached for short distances and times without losing their services as units of the main fleet.

It is necessary to give some consideration to the possible, but not probable, contingency of hostilities between the British Empire and a nation, or combination of nations, whose main sources of strength lie elsewhere than in Europe. Should circumstances, however, cause such a nation or nations to become hostile, or even probably hostile, the situation would be most grave. The British
Empire is not now, and is not likely in the future to be, able to detach from the main fleets in European waters any force sufficient to cope with the powerful navies which might under certain circumstances be assembled in the Northern Pacific. In the case of such hostilities, exactly the same force as now would be necessarily detained by England in European waters, with a view to very probable eventualities arising from her embarrassments. These embarrassments might be staved off by making large concessions, such concessions being part of a bargain to free England's fleets for action far from home waters; but this is by no means a pleasing prospect. Unless by arrangement with, or concessions to, European Powers a large force could be detached from home waters with safety to the British Islands, the Empire's trade east of Singapore would cease, except for sly and risky voyages, and that between Europe, Australia, and India, would become highly speculative and uncertain. If sufficient force could not be made available in some way from the fleets in English home waters and from the Dominions to cope with the main forces of these possible enemies, the Empire would be face to face with no raid and run-away affair, but with a deadly strangulation of trade. As matters now stand, the retention of our present good relations with the nations having the main seats of their sea-power in the Northern Pacific is worth much sacrifice; the difficulty in making such sacrifices for a loosely-knit confederation such as the British Empire is that on the surface there would be the appearance of disregarding the interests of some member in favour of the interests of the inhabitants of these islands.

Thus far only the regularly armed forces of belligerents have been taken into consideration; there would also be a grave source of danger in case of hostilities with most Powers arising from merchant vessels of the largest and fastest types which have been fitted in readiness to receive an armament, and in many instances there is reason for
believing that the armament is actually carried. In any case, it is known that supplies of weapons and ammunition are ready for these vessels. It is difficult to foresee how, in view of the present relative strengths of the navies of the great Powers, any squadron or fleet commanders could spare vessels from their commands to look after such irregular marauders until after the situation had developed definitely in favour of one or other party. For purposes of trade destroying and trade disturbing, fast merchant ships when armed are just as formidable as the most powerful cruisers, so long as their antagonist's merchant vessels are unarmed. A considerable proportion of fast modern merchant ships can run from the ordinary classes of light cruisers, and can put up a decent fight with any smaller craft if reasonably armed and manned. This being the case, it would appear that a good deal of initial panic and loss might be avoided were the great companies trading to the East to do more in the way of preparation to help themselves than they do at present, the vessels thus prepared being additional to those already subsidized. There probably would not be much value in arming the ordinary tramp; but even in this case the vessel with the poorest gun is a formidable foe to the vessel with none.

At first sight the connection is not obvious between a really efficient and mobile army in the British Isles and the defence and security of the trade routes in and to the Far East, yet they are closely interconnected; for if the home-defence army were of sufficient strength and mobility to give confidence that nothing but an invasion on a really large scale would have any chance of success, even after an entirely unopposed sea passage and landing, then a good many light craft could be withdrawn from their present duties and employed in shepherding the trade routes. A force such as would be necessary to insure success for an invader in face of an efficient and numerous home army could not be transported without the very greatest risk until after a decisive victory at sea—a victory of such a
nature as to preclude any chance of interference during the sea passage. It is always difficult to draw true deductions from manoeuvres, and the rather meagre accounts of the affairs of 1912-13 in the Daily Press may perhaps have led to an over-estimation of the chances of success in landing a raid, and under-estimation of the number of troops which will be landed should a raid succeed in aiming at its objective without having been seriously damaged at sea.

In conclusion, it may be broadly stated at present, taking ordinary probabilities into account, the trade routes between the British Isles and the East via the Cape are fairly safe; but to give greater confidence to the mass of people who have not studied this matter, and to prevent initial panic, it would be desirable to be able to spare more vessels from purely coast work.

The whole question of the self-defence of merchant ships against merchant ships also requires the closest consideration in all its aspects—physical, legal, and international.
THE CASE FOR ALBANIA

By E. Aubry.

The most remarkable thing about the Albanian question is the almost complete absence of people who know anything about it. A general notion prevails that the Albanians are a wild horde of cut-throats, ready to rend themselves and their neighbours to pieces on the slightest provocation. That is why there is a general opinion that peace will only reign in the Balkans when Albania has been parcelled out between Greece and Servia, or some other alien invader. It is only in this way, they think, that a firm enough control can be applied to pacify the Albanians forever. We may add that it is an opinion which to anyone acquainted with the true state of affairs is the very reversal of a statesman-like policy or of human justice. We might as well argue that a man who claims his rights should be executed, death being the only means of silencing him. Is it possible that the judgment of civilized Europe should be so warped and so callously indifferent that the voice of a tortured Albania should be treated as a discordant note to be immediately suppressed by any and every means? For the Albanians are a nation, small but distinct, and as such may be traced back as far as twenty-five centuries. It follows that, leaving humanitarian considerations out of count, the Albanian race deserves some credit for having retained their national characteristics for so long. It is not
generally known that they can point to Alexander the Great as one of their race. Not only was the Albanian element in the army of that great General considered to supply his most reliable troops, but throughout history their martial prowess deserved and obtained general recognition. Thus the famous Scander Bey in the fifteenth century, who was the last independent ruler of Albania, proved the fighting value of his race in the resistance he made against the Turks, and it ought to be realized by the European diplomats of the present day that the descendants of such men will not submit to invasion, accompanied by murder and pillage, like sheep meekly sacrificed to the butcher's knife. For it may be said at once that this so-called pacification of Albania is but another word for extermination.

It is perhaps not generally realized that the Turkish conquest of Albania was never complete, and that the light of national independence was kept burning throughout the centuries. Even their flag is distinct, being composed of a black eagle on a red background, and therefore has no resemblance to the Ottoman moon and crescent. The religious question has been called the despair of statesmen, chiefly, we suppose, because it does not exist. For the Albanian is absolutely tolerant in his religious views, in a degree unsurpassed in the Near East. In short, religion ranks second in importance with them. Moslem or Christian tribes live in perfect harmony with one another. They intermarry freely, and are therefore not only brotherly in spirit, but connected by blood-ties. The Moslems live chiefly in the south, and the Christians in the north. In the absence of reliable statistics, it may be roughly said that they are equally numerous. The Christians, again, are divided into the Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholics.

But the true Albanian spirit is found in the fact that when Christian Slavs or Greeks attacked Christian Albanians, these last sent their womenkind to the Moslem Albanians to be cared for as the most sacred trust which a man may leave to his friend.
The Case for Albania.

In the Memorandum presented to the European Commission on the Sandjak of Scutari (Albania) in August 31, 1880, by the Baron de Kosjek, delegate of Austria-Hungary, and M. Aubaret, delegate of France, we find these words (translation from the French): “All live in perfect harmony and in nowise ask for separation. They are Albanians in the first place, and if it is true to say that Catholics are sincerely attached to their religion, it is no less true to state that with them as with their Moslem brothers the national sentiment, the attachment to the soil, the unbroken continuancy of ancient customs are reverenced with the utmost enthusiasm.”

It is also very much to the point in this connection to quote the declaration of Lord Goschen, who in 1880 wrote to Lord Grenville: “I believe Albanian nationality may be utilized with much advantage to general interests, and I would deprecate any partial measure which would be likely to impede the formation of one large Albanian Province.

“If a strong Albania should be formed, the excuse for occupation by a foreign Power in case of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire would be greatly weakened. A united Albania would bar the remaining entrances to the north, and the Balkan Peninsula would remain in the hands and under the sway of the races who now inhabit it.”

Every friend of the Turks and of the Albanians must bitterly regret the deplorable differences which occurred between them and proved the initial cause of the downfall of Turkey in Europe. While not merging their national life in that of Turkey, the Albanians were loyal and devoted subjects of the Ottoman Empire, and to the very end asked for nothing better than autonomy within the Empire. It was only when the Greeks, the Servians, and the Montenegrins were at the door that Albanian nationality was proclaimed as the only hope of survivance.

Turkey could always rely on her Albanian troops, and only the policy of the Young Turkish régime in that it was
as so many continuous pin-pricks to Albanian amour-propre could alienate Albanian devotion.

One great mistake committed by the Young Turks in Albania was to forbid the Albanians from opening a single national school, while on the other hand they not only permitted but encouraged the Greeks and Slavs to multiply their schools and their episcopal sees in different parts of the country. The result is clear to any impartial observer: the very fact of possessing schools is urged as an argument by the invaders to prove they possess spheres of influence. In truth, the Albanians used these alien schools because they had none others at their disposal.

It should also be noticed that the Greeks have never made any distinction between the question of religion and that of nationality. Thus, in Southern Albania they consider the Albanian Christian not as an Albanian but as a Greek because he belongs to the Orthodox Church.

It is a notable fact that the Metropolitans nominated by the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople are the most active agents of all in furthering the policy of Greece. Their mission in Southern Albania has been to persuade the Christian population that Orthodoxy and Greek nationality are indivisible. Vain effort! for despite this age-long propaganda, the Orthodox Albanian has always preserved the sentiment of his nationality, despite the pressure to which his conscience has been subjected.

In spite of war, ruin, devastation, Albania stands a fair chance of holding her head above water if only Europe will abide by her word.

The Albanians form the overwhelming majority throughout the whole of this territory, and they live there in compact masses. The non-Albanian inhabitants comprise: Greeks in the south, numbering 30,000, and Servians and Bulgars, specially in the districts of Kassova, Uskub, and Monastir, numbering 100,000 to 120,000. Outside the confines of Albania there are a great number of Albanians who may later on drift inside the border. Thus in Montenegro
alone there is a large Albanian population at Dulcigno, Antivari, etc., who have preserved their language, customs, traditions, and all their national individuality. To these again must be added the 60,000 Albanians who have emigrated to the United States of America, but keep in regular communication with the motherland, and return there when they have made sufficient savings.

It is a matter of great congratulation that a Prince has at last been elected. His first duty, of course, will be to cease being a German as the late King of Greece ceased to be a Norwegian when he ascended the Greek throne. A foreign Prince was in every sense desirable, because no man is ever thought a prophet in his own country.

The Prince William von Wield will represent the ideal of royalty which holds aloof from party factions and strife, and, being a foreigner, will not be open to criticism as a Prince of the same race as the people of the country. It is the experience of Europe that a foreign Prince is a most desirable asset to regeneration when a country has passed through a period of troubles and upheavals. Albania is doing what larger countries, and notably England, have done before her.

To those who deny to the Albanians the capacity of governing themselves, it should be pointed out that most of the cleverest men in the diplomatic service of Turkey were recruited from the Albanians. Many an Albanian of to-day, instead of cutting a stagy and picturesque figure, as the uninformed mind is apt to imagine, is merely an exceedingly cultured, courteous, well-mannered man, speaking the purest French, and with nothing to distinguish him from any of the southern races of Europe.

Mr. Serge Myatovith, the well-known authority on the Balkans, admitted, in spite of his Slav nationality, in a long and interesting article in the Daily Telegraph, that there is a great deal of French blood in Albania through the Dukes of Savoy.

As to the mass of the people, the hardy mountaineers,
they are a simple people, living a decidedly Spartan life entirely devoid of the luxury of the Orient.

The enemies of the Albanians are apt to point to their eternal feuds and vendettas. That they pass over without comment their extraordinary regard for women is a matter for consideration. It is not generally known that an Albanian will not touch the hair of his worst enemy if he meets him in the most deserted mountain pass in the company of a woman or a child.

Englishmen like the Right Hon. Aubrey Herbert, M.P., or Major Paget, who lived thirty-five years of his life in Albania, bring their testimony to bear on the fact that, supposing an Albanian could be a coward, he need never fear for his life were he for ever accompanied by a woman.

Sir Edward Grey, speaking on April 8, 1913, said:

"We are willing to support the agreement with the great Powers that there should be an autonomous Albania. We willingly became a party to this, for the Albanians are separate in race, in language, and, to a great extent, in religion.

"There is no reason why the same sympathy that was felt for other countries contending for liberty and national existence should not be extended to the Albanians."

We add, that is what her past demands, it is what her future must bring.
YÜAN'S "COUP D'ÉTAT"

BY E. H. PARKER

It is four years almost to a day since Yüan Shih-k'ai, dragging the historical sore leg after him, but moving with marvellous activity the affected limb in question, said to the solitary friend who accompanied him in his disgrace to the railway station: "K'an t'a-mên tsü-chi tsèmmo pan!" "We shall see how they will manage things themselves!" He was then taken by surprise as the victim of a weak-kneed Regent and a silly coterie of women—a pack of feminines, ch'üen-p'ǐn, as the irreverent literary expression goes. This was precisely at the juncture when his vigorous personality at Peking had been asserting itself successfully against the benumbing influence of mere pedants and reactionaries, and there was every prospect of the tottering Manchu dynasty being once more saved by his common-sense efforts from its own shiftily foolishness. It was understood at the time by the knowing ones that the real reason for this sudden tou p'ǐ-ku chiang, or "tip over," thus ascribed to a sore leg, was a vengeful desire on the part of the Regent (who had, under the old Dowager's orders, represented his brother, the late Emperor Kwang-sū, with hope-inspiring credit in Germany nine years before that) and of the old Dowager's niece and spy, the new Dowager Lung-hi (the childless, loveless, and unloved spouse of the same Emperor), to avenge their brother and
husband respectively, and to "get even" for the notorious events of 1898, when Yüan Shih-k'ai had done what he conceived to be his highest duty, and had declined to participate in the rash Emperor's mad little scheme, suggested to him by the reformer K'ang Yu-wei, for clapping the interesting old Dowager—his natural aunt, and his adoptive mother—into the "cold room" for the rest of her life, whilst the ill-matured reforms were to go on unquestioned. It has been pointed out over and over again in this Review and elsewhere that according to all the canons of Chinese ancestral, Confucian, and traditional culture, Yüan was canonically right in this action of his. He would have counted in history as an aider and abetter of patricide, or rather matricide, had he obeyed the Emperor's rash instructions, and consented to turn against and execute his superior military officer and patron, the Viceroy Junglu of Tientsin. Not that we are bound to conclude from this that Yüan's decisive action on that occasion was prompted by pure academic virtue, without any canny consideration for his own ultimate interests and safety. We have nothing to do with vicarious heart-searchings and unproved motives; Yüan's own explanation is on record. The only question for us is what were the overt acts, what were the Chinese secular teachings, and what was the Manchu statute law. Li Hung-chang was certainly no paragon of virtue, but it is abundantly evident from his memoirs just published that he had always been a loyal supporter of the dynasty; that he, too, felt a serious doubt as to the Emperor's capacity; and that he had, ever since Yüan's first efficacious promptness of 1884-1886 in Korea, entertained the firm opinion that the latter was "a strong" man for China. Who comes into a court of equity must come with clean hands. Amidst a weltering mass of roguery and intrigue it is hard to say in this dirty business where the true equities lay; but at any rate, whatever foreign missionary interests and money interests may say, Yüan Shih-k'ai had the
canons of right on his side, and for ten years he enjoyed solid rewards for his act. He took his disgrace manfully in 1909, after the death of his old patroness. No one has ever accused him of vengeful intrigues whilst he patiently continued as a broken man to kill time and desipere in loco as best he could until summoned by his craven detractors, when the revolution broke out in 1911, to save the dynasty from itself once more. No doubt he said to himself, "Once bit twice shy," on this occasion, and steadily played losing hazards, or, for safety, before attempting to make a long break, least of all before attempting to pot the red on his own account. He had first to save the game at all costs. To the surprise of even his best friends, he proved, or seemed to prove, loyal to the backbone. However closely the public documents of that date be studied, it will be found that he acted from sincere conviction, and that he did his very best to save first the dynasty, and then the country. As events matured, he even risked his own safety in dealing with the rather crack-brained Cantonese enthusiasts, clamouring for a republic at Shanghai, his own opinion, apart from magnanimity towards the fallen, being that China was not yet ripe for republican life, and that it would be best to utilize the fag-ends of the Manchu dynasty as a kind of religious figure-head, and thus gradually to get a real constitution into working order under an existing imperial prestige. He has not issued a single mandate since then in which there is the faintest trace of spite or pettiness; he has been from first to last generous and courteous towards the princely families; that he may have made mistakes is likely enough—Irren ist menschlich—but singleness of purpose has been the keynote throughout, unless it be that he is so deep that we cannot fathom him at all. Foreigners have always shaken their heads at the idea of a change in dynasty, and said: "Unfortunately, there is no great man, no acclaimed leader, available in China." Even Li Hung-chang in his memoirs, whilst defending himself against the absurd suspicions in bygone
years that he was "chasing the stag" on his own account, says plainly that in the whole of China there is no single family capable of forming a dynasty and securing the confidence of all the people. There is, to the ordinary intelligence, no reason, not the slightest, to suppose that Yüan is really aiming at establishing a dynasty for himself and his bairns—three of whom are now disporting themselves here in the more manly and wholesome atmosphere of English schools. It is, of course, always impossible to read accurately into the depths of the human heart, but, apart from the foolishness of such an ambition in Yüan Shih-k'ai, at a time when thrones are toppling over in most other ill-governed countries, it is probable that, having already got the kernel of power, he really does not want to be bothered with the shell of trumpery show, either from the canonical and ceremonial point of view, or from that of his own reasonable ambition and gratification.

Probably the following Chinese account, textually translated, of how the coup d'état really did take place will be of interest in Europe: "The scattering of the Kwoh-min Tang, and the cancelling of all certificates of parliamentary membership in the possession of its associates, emanated from the sole and individual mind of the President himself. Before the coup took place, not the faintest inkling of his purpose was allowed to leak out. Hence, not a soul outside knew anything about it, until towards dark on the evening of the preceding day, when the police authorities surrounded the offices and doors of the Kwoh-min Tang and began to institute a search for incriminatory documents. Even then the inhabitants about did not quite understand the why and wherefore of it all, until, in fact, the ming-ling (mandate) was out next day, and the police authorities began to form separate parties to search also the respective private residences of the members of parliament belonging to that tang (party). Then it was that the public suddenly realized why the breaking up and cancellation had taken place. It appears that, after the President had definitely made up his
mind quite alone in this matter, he only took counsel with a few of his confidential secretaries and subordinates as to how it was to be done; not a single man in the Kwoh-wu Yüan (Premier's office) knew anything whatever about it. It was only early the next morning that he summoned Hiung Hi-ling (the Premier) and Chu k'ì-ch'ên (the Home Secretary) to his quarters and told them that he had decided to act thus. Neither of them had a word to say, but they left at once for [or, perhaps, they sent word at once to] their respective vice-presidents' offices. The Home Secretary Chu took the mandate with him when he left, and at once issued instructions for its official notification. When the officers of the Premier's department [probably a misprint for 'different departments'] got news of this, they all assembled at the Premier's office. The Home Secretary Chu was telegraphed for to tell them all about it. When he arrived he said: 'I have already issued the official mandate.' The different heads of departments stared at each other aghast with astonishment. According to the statements given out by the confidential secretaries, the mandate emanated from the President's own hand, and in the preparation of it the President had passed two nights entirely without sleep.'

The immediate cause of Yüan's "purge," according to his own long statement of 7,000 odd characters, dated November 4, was the discovery that many members of the Kwoh-min Tang had been actively exchanging telegrams with Li Lieh-kün, the rebel tutuh of Kiang Si, and with the arch-rebel organizer, Hwang Hing, who had been left "in charge" of Nanking after Sun Yat-sen's resignation of the Presidency in 1912, and who had in January been placed in management of the Hankow-Canton Railway by Yüan Shih-k'ai; and also, later again, created Field-Marshall, which last title he had in May last churlishly declined. On August 19 he "pronounced." If it is true that Yüan composed in fair copy a 12,000 or 14,000 word (English) apologia pro vita sua within forty-eight hours, his
literary capacity must have developed by leaps and bounds since, as a sort of army inspector in Korea, he held the petty title of t'ung-chih (sub-prefect), later to become taotai and "Resident" in 1885. It is too wearisome and diffusive a document for the man in the street abroad to weigh carefully; and, besides, the official style of the Republic which he adopts is interlarded with the hideous "new-Chinese" jargon chiefly introduced from Japan, which grates on the ear used to the dignified periods of the near past. In any case, it is no disgrace—and never has been—for a Chinese of high rank not to compose his own despatches. A trained corporation or school of "writing fellows" has for centuries provided drafters for all yamên; it is only a minority—such as Li Hung-chang, Liu K'un-yih, Tso Tsung-t'ang, and Chang Chih-tung—who have been able to write masterly State documents off their own brushes. Still, this document shows that Yüan Shih-k'ai has plenty of intellectual go in him, even though he may be obliged to hide himself away in the dull seclusion of the palace; and it is evident that he is quite capable of Napoleonic decision and dramatic strategy, even though his nerves must have been seriously strained during the unnatural mental activities of the past two years.

It is impossible for anyone who does not read the Peking Government Gazettes regularly to conceive what a vast amount of organizing work has been achieved—mostly, of course, as yet on paper only—since January 1, 1912. The "geography" of China proper has been remodelled; nearly all official titles have been changed; titles of courtesy and honour have been abolished or remodelled in spirit. After innumerable changes and shiftings within the past ten years, the departments of State have been renamed, re-organized, and restaffed; the provincial organization has been recast; desperate efforts have been made to establish schools, colleges, and lyceums, etc., both for men and women, all over the Empire. Railways are active, but no one wants too much foreign dictation. The forms of official
correspondence have been totally changed in many respects; courts of justice have been provided, under judges appointed from Peking, throughout the Empire; the salt gabelle has been unified, and provincial authorities are no longer able to touch a cent of salt funds for local use; likin, unfortunately, is as bad as ever. Missionaries are allowed a free hand, but at the same time it is beginning to be felt that China should abide by her traditional ethics, for the present at least. The Manchu imperial family has been courteously and (so far as possible) generously treated. Tibet and Mongolia, certainly, are practically lost, though we are not all quite out of the wood yet; as "possessions" they are a drain upon China proper, but as buffers against Great Britain, Russia, and even France, they have their uses, and are still worth holding on to de jure for the best terms obtainable. Thus things stand at the moment of going to press, but it is impossible to forecast what to-morrow may bring forth, as finance is always the supreme question, and "graft" is also always on the war-path. Chang Hsün's pronunciamento (December 11) sounds dangerous, but the "independence of Kiang Su" is in any case an absurd thing for him to aim at, apart from the fact that he has hitherto shown himself an ignorant and crazy soudard.
LORD HARDINGE AND INDIANS IN SOUTH AFRICA

BY SHAH MOHAMMED NAIMATULLAH.

Considerable interest has been aroused both here and elsewhere by the famous speech of Lord Hardinge in Madras on the grievances of Indians in South Africa, and there has been a great deal of speculation as to its effect. In view of the fact that there exists a school of thought in Great Britain which believes that, having given local self-government to South Africa, no Britisher has any business to interfere in its internal affairs, I think I should be making my task of explaining the situation easier if, before proceeding any farther, I put down what other eminent Ministers have thought and said on the subject.

Lord Salisbury, one of the most distinguished statesmen of the British Empire, in the course of a despatch to the Government of India in 1875 said: “Above all things, we must confidently expect as an indispensable condition of the proposed arrangement that the colonial laws and their administration will be such that Indian settlers who have completed the terms of service to which they agreed as the return for the expense of bringing them to the Colonies will be in all respects free men, with privileges no whit inferior to those of any other class of Her Majesty’s subjects resident in the Colonies.

On June 24, 1897, in an address to the Premiers of the
self-governing Colonies, as Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain said:

"We ask you also to bear in mind the traditions of the Empire, which makes no distinction in favour of or against race or colour; and to exclude, by reason of their colour, or by reason of their race, all Her Majesty's Indian subjects, or even all Asiatics, would be an act so offensive to these peoples that it would be most painful, I am quite certain, to Her Majesty to have to sanction it. . . . The United Kingdom owns as its brightest and greatest dependency that enormous Empire of India, with 300,000,000 subjects, who are as loyal to the Crown as you are yourselves, and among them there are hundreds and thousands of men who are every whit as civilized as we are ourselves; who are, if that is anything, better born, in the sense that they have older traditions and older families; who are men of wealth, men of cultivation, men of distinguished valour, men who have brought whole armies and placed them at the service of the Queen, and have in times of great difficulty and trouble . . . saved the Empire by their loyalty. I say, you, who have seen all this, cannot be willing to put upon those men a slight which I think is absolutely unnecessary for your purpose, and which would be calculated to provoke ill-feeling, discontent, irritation, and would be most unpalatable to the feelings, not only of Her Majesty the Queen, but of all her people."

As late as July 31, 1908, Colonel Seely, speaking from his place in the House of Commons as Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, said:

"If persons are admitted (into British Colonies) they must be given civil rights. 'Free or not at all' seems to me the soundest principle for the British Empire. . . . If anyone is admitted under the British flag, he must be a potential citizen, and must, sooner or later, be given equal rights with all other men. . . . It was a strong thing to ask that any subject of the King should be deprived of his
living and sent about his business through no fault of his own."

I have quoted deliberately the utterances of these great men of the United Kingdom, which were made, not in their individual capacities, but as mouthpieces of the Government. My object in doing so is more to present the case of Indians in the exact words of eminent Ministers, than to cite authorities, or even precedents, for what Lord Hardinge was pleased to say in Madras.

The situation in South Africa is very grave and perplexing, and I am constrained to say that it has been accentuated by the attitude of the Union Government.

Indians have been going to South Africa for some time past, not so much by way of private enterprise as at the invitation of the South African Government itself. They have always been found steady and conscientious workers, and it is an undisputable fact that the growth of Natal at any rate is largely due to this labour. At present the total number in the Cape, Transvaal, and Natal exceeds 160,000. These men leave their country in the hope of bettering their position in life, and they get quite a rosy account of their future welfare from the colonial agent out in India whose duty it is to induce them to come. What is the situation with which they are faced when they set foot in their new home? While on their part they prove to be not only thoroughly satisfactory workers, but good citizens generally, they meet with all sorts of hindrances in exercising their ordinary rights of citizenship. An Indian, merely because he happens to be an Indian, and for no other fault, is deliberately denied the most ordinary rights of a citizen. For the very same reason he is not allowed to own landed property, to say nothing of many unpleasant distinctions which are given them in other ways. I need not go into details as to the treatment meted out to them, as they are already well known, but I should like to say one or two words on the recent attitude of the Union Government.
By Section 30 of the Immigration Act the word "domicile" has been construed in such a way that the right to reside in Natal of Indians indentured after 1895 seems to be taken away. The right of residence of the children of such parents is also taken away, even though they may have been born and brought up in Natal.

The recent judgment of the Pietermaritzburg Court declaring the marriage of an Indian celebrated in accordance with the rites of his own religion to be null and void seems to me the most mischievous and monstrous decision ever promulgated by any Court of Justice. Surely it is high time that the Imperial Government should take up the question in earnest, and at least make some attempt to mitigate these hardships once for all.

I quite realize the position of the Imperial Government. It is not altogether enviable. The other day a deputation of Indians called on the Marquis of Crewê to lay before him the views of Indians on this vexed question. I must confess that the reply of the noble Marquis was not such at in any way satisfied them. If the mother wishes to keep the home intact, she must exert herself to settle matters amicably, instead of letting her children go on quarrelling indefinitely and make things worse day by day. In my opinion an Indian has got plenty of scope in his own country, and does not as a rule wish to force himself in other people's lands. But having been invited, he naturally insists not only on full rights of citizenship, which he is accustomed to have, but also the courtesy and civility on the part of those who have asked him exactly in the same manner as a decent man should extend to another decent being.

In conclusion, I cannot help thanking Lord Hardinge most cordially for the sympathy which he has shown towards those who have suffered so much. I would not attempt to praise him, as it has become quite a common taste in India, but I congratulate him for convincing the people that, after all, the Government of India is the government of the people.
ISLAM, CHRISTIANITY, AND OTHER RELIGIONS OF THE WORLD

By Khwaja Kamaluddin,
Editor of the Islamic Review, London.

Islam—which means complete submission to Divine control in the mode and conduct of life, and implicit and unreserved obedience to laws revealed to man by God in preference to all our prepossession, inclinations, or judgments—is a religion which embraces all such religions as have been preached by teachers inspired by God in various ages and different countries. Thus the Koran says in this respect: "Say, we believe in God and in what has been revealed to us, as well as to Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob, and their descendants: we also believe in what was given to Moses, Jesus, and to all the prophets raised by the Creator of the Universe; we accept all of them without making any distinction among them."

Before the revelation of Al-Koran, every nation, while claiming Divine origin for its faith, denied this privilege to the creeds of all other nations. For instance, the Jews and the Christians to this day believe that all the prophets and messengers that have appeared in the world have come only from a single branch of the great human family—viz., the Israelites—and that God has always been so displeased with all the other nations of the world that, even though finding them in error and ignorance, He has never cared for them in the least.
Islam, Christianity, and other Religions.

This disposition of exclusiveness, which is not peculiar to the Church here or the Israelites, but is shared by the followers of almost all other religions, engendered feelings of conceit, pride, and contempt, and caused dissension and discord in various members of God's family. No one for a moment turned his thoughts to those Divine morals which we daily observe in the universal providence. Our God has not made any invidious distinction between different people. His sustenance is not limited to a particular tribe, or a particular age, or a particular country. He is the sustainer of all people, the Lord of all ages, the King of all places and countries, the fountain-head of all grace, the source of every power, physical and spiritual, the nourisher of all that is created, and the supporter of all that exists. The grace of God encompasses the whole world, and encircles all people and ages. The powers and faculties which He granted to the ancient people of India were also granted to the Arab, the Japanese, the European, and the American. For all, the earth of God serves alike as a floor, and for the sake of all the sun, the moon, and the stars give their light, and perform such other functions as God has charged them with. All people alike derive benefit from air, water, fire, earth, and other things created by God, and all equally use the produce of the earth—its corn, its herbs, its flowers, and its fruit. These are the broad Divine morals which give us a lesson that if no class or human race has been denied the benefit of water, earth, air, and all other manifestations of Nature, this equal and impartial providence should not be disbelieved in matters of revelation, which, in fact, is the most important and essential factor in the development of human faculties. It was a misconception of Divine providence, and an error so fatal to the establishment of the universal brotherhood of man, under which nations laboured from centuries to centuries till the last word of God appeared which in the very first line gave the lie to this wrong conception of partial dispensation. The Koran, our sacred book, com-
mences with the words: "All praise and glory is due to Allah (God) who is not only the maker and provider of India or Arabia, of Persia and Syria, of Europe and America, but is the Creator of the whole universe."

The words used here are so general that they include all the different people, different ages, and different countries. The opening of the holy Koran with a verse which is so broad in its significance shows clearly that the holy Koran refutes the doctrine which sets limits to the vast and unlimited sustenance of God, reserving the manifestations of these attributes for a single people to the exclusion of all others, as if the latter were not the creation of God, or as if, after creating them, Almighty God has utterly forgotten or thrown them away as useless and futile things. The beginning verse of Al-Koran teaches a Mussalman to believe that if the Creator and Provider of the whole universe has given means of physical growth equally to all men on the earth, He has also provided them with means of spiritual culture as well. This noble doctrine inculcated by the Koran infused a spirit of equality and fraternity in mankind, destroying that narrowness of mind which has been disintegrating the whole fabric of human society, and separating brother from brother under the universal fatherhood of God. This generous teaching of Al-Koran prompts me to cherish feelings of love and reverence for Moses and Jesus; it enjoins upon me also to pay my respect and allegiance to Rama Chandra, Krishna, and Lord Buddha. If with Al-Koran I accept the authentic parts of the Bible as the Word of God, I regard the Gita and other holy scriptures of India as my joint property with other Hindu brethren. Hence, in accordance with the teachings of Al-Koran, Islam is the name of every religion, creed, or faith, which has been preached from time to time in different countries and various tribes by teachers inspired by God. They came from one and the same source, and taught one and the same truth. But the hand of time, combined with want of efficient means in olden days to preserve those
teachings intact, afforded occasions and opportunities for human interpolations and wrong interpretations. On the other hand, languages which were originally the conveyance of these ancient scriptures, being liable to constant changes, became obsolete, and set up insurmountable hindrances in the way of coming generations to reach the spirit of the old letters. Moreover, the development of human faculties and complications of evil—a necessary sequel of earthly civilization—called for a new order of things. This emergency brought forth prophet after prophet, who came and restored truths already revealed, and made necessary additions to meet the requirements of the age. As different races of mankind were distantly located and separated from each other by natural barriers, with very limited means of intercourse between them, each nation needed its own prophet, and so was it blessed. As Al-Koran says: "There was no nation but had its teacher." Again, Koran says: "Every nation had had its guide," and, "A Divine messenger was sent to every class of men."

If Hindustan had its Vedic Rishis, with Krishna, Ramchandra, and Gautama to follow them, China saw its teacher in the person of Confucius. If Zoroaster came to kindle the spiritual fire in Persia, the valley of the Jordan was fertilized with the Divine stream coming down the Mount of Olives. Thus, whenever and wherever evil prevailed and man became corrupt, men were raised and inspired by God to teach and restore the same old Islam, till a new state of things arose in the world, when the laws of God began to be violated in all its corners. Divine limits and bounds were transgressed simultaneously on the whole surface of the earth. Clouds of darkness, ignorance, infidelity, dishonesty, unchastity, and libertinism overhung the whole world. Every country and each nation saw complete depravity, and virtue became extinct; so much so that sin was not regarded as sin in many cases, but as an act of merit.

(To be continued.)
CORRESPONDENCE, NOTES, AND NEWS

"A FAIR HEARING AND NO FAVOUR"

ENGLISH AUTHORS AND ORIENTAL ORTHOGRAPHY.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE "ASIATIC REVIEW."

DEAR SIR,

The picturesque essay by Lieutenant-General F. H. Tyrrell, entitled "English Authors and Oriental Orthography," raises the question of transliteration, the constant presence of which in Oriental matters renders it at least conspicuous. In reference to this question, I beg leave to offer, not a solution of universal adaptability, but a word in defence of what your contributor terms absurdities. The absurdity, for instance, of writing the word "jama'at" as "dschema'at" by German, and "djema'at" by French, writers, disappears when it is considered that the English letter "j," corresponding almost exactly to "ג" (jeem), conveys to a German mind the sound of "י" (yeh), and to a French mind the sound of "ז" (zeh). The other examples given by your contributor may be similarly explained.

With regard to the pronunciation of "khoja" and "khanum," it would be interesting to learn in what districts of India or Persia the words are sounded "hoja" or "hanum." After a brief residence of three years in Persia, I am unable to speak with authority on the subject, but
must acknowledge never to have heard the words so pronounced, save by the inept tongue of a "Ferangi."

In the article on "Islam and the Turks," in your July Review, M. Montet speaks of "Mussulmen." It is perhaps a trivial mistake in form, and I call attention to it only in view of the present sad looseness in the use of English, particularly in this country.

Yours very truly,
C. F. A. Dellschaft.

Chicago,
September 15, 1913.

THE STATE OF PERSIA.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE "ASIATIC REVIEW."

Dear Sir,

Perhaps you will allow me to send you a few passages from a letter which I have just received from Persia, from a business friend who is in no way connected with politics: "You ask what is the state of Teheran? It is terribly bad, in fact, cannot be worse. There is no law; no one answers anybody's voice; those who have the power and influence can do everything, for they are the subjects of the Russian Government. Everybody else, try as he may, can do nothing. The English in the country are progressing marvellously in every way. One reason is that Russian behaviour towards the people is such that they are at least getting tired of it. The English manufactured goods are far better than what the Russians offer to us. Those who have imported Russian goods into Persia cannot sell them, and are therefore ruined. The streets are filled with poor people. You would think that everyone is in mourning, for the old Asiatic joviality has gone. What are they doing? They are afraid of moving; they are afraid of speaking; they are afraid of touching anyone for fear that he is a Russian subject."

Yours faithfully,
A Persian.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION

MONEY POWER FOR INDIA

BY M. DE P. WEBB, C.I.E.,

Late Chairman, Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Additional Member Bombay Legislative Council; Fellow of the Royal Statistical Society, Royal Economic Society and Royal Geographical Society; Author of "India and the Empire," "Advance, India!" "Britain's Dilemma," etc.

SYNOPSIS.

Money Power.
What is it?—Money not merely a "medium of exchange," but "the mightiest engine to which man can lend an intelligent guidance."—Whence money derives its power—Why its value changes—Results of changes in value—Danger ahead.

Money Power for India.
India merits the best that we can give her—What that best is—Some facts in India's monetary history—England demonetized India's gold money, but quickly regretted her action; yet England is now opposing

THE RESTORATION OF FREE COINAGE, and

THE RESTORATION OF A GOLD CURRENCY TO INDIA.
The reasons for the present opposition: (a) Theoretical: Replies thereto; (b) Practical: Replies thereto—The economic situation in the United Kingdom—The dangers of the situation—A reply to the Times.

THE STATE BANK FOR INDIA PROBLEM.
Theoretical advantages—The control of money power in the United Kingdom—Is the same situation to be reproduced in India?—Lord Mayo's opinion—The State Bank must be a Department of Government.

THE PAPER CURRENCY OF THE FUTURE.
A new source of monetary strength—A rational currency.

CONCLUSION.

At the invitation of the East India Association, I have been endeavouring to throw into intelligent form some of the conclusions to which twenty years of theoretical and practical study of the problem of Money Power have brought me.
The subject is a fascinating one. Though as important to civilized mortals as the air we breathe, the majority of us give little or no thought to what is, in truth, one of the most marvellous inventions of the human brain. The few who do study the subject of money seem sometimes to arrive at such divergent conclusions that discussions of currency problems are nowadays barred from all decent society. Such discussions certainly seem to generate an exceptional amount of heat. I hope, however, that what I am about to venture to-day will not produce any unexpected conflagration. If at times I express my opinion too dogmatically, I hope that I may be pardoned by those who hold views perhaps extremely divergent from my own. My only excuse can be that I have endeavoured to obtain and digest almost everything that has been written on the subject in the English language; that I have in the course of my business as a merchant and financier in India handled monetary problems almost every day of my life; that I have passed through the crises of 1893, 1900, and 1907, and that I have at different times visited different portions of Europe, Asia, America, Australia, and South Africa—always gathering what I could about monetary problems; so that now I labour under the delusion—I quite recognize that it may be a delusion—that I am beginning at last really to understand something about this subject.

Before tackling Money Power for India, I should like to say something about money power in general. I do not propose to ask you to peer into the distant past when our remote ancestor, with perhaps a spare wife to get rid of, was searching for a fellow savage with too many sheep but insufficient marital engagements. Those early days of barter appear to me to give us no more clue to the phenomenon of modern money power, than the contemplation of Watt and his tea-kettle does to the mysteries of a present-day locomotive. I would prefer to ponder over a British sovereign, or a Scotch one-pound note, or the Indian paper currency, or Mr. Carnegie's cheque book, each of which
conveys a lesson that college professors building up their "medium of exchange" theories of money appear sometimes to undervalue, rather than spend time in tracing the evolution of money back to those periods of which history gives us but little record and the imagination accordingly supplies the bulk of the material.

Simple Simon, you will remember, failed to extract the much wanted pie from the business-like purveyor of those excellent comestibles, because he lacked the necessary penny. Therein lies a moral. And the moral is that as in Simple Simon's time, these are the days of buying and selling, not of barter. Only by the offer of good money can we now procure what we require. The difference between the man who owns a hundred sovereigns and another who possesses a hundred pounds worth of sardines, cricket-bats, or Irish land stock, is obvious. The one can procure practically anything that he requires—to the extent of his hundred pounds—whilst the other must first search for somebody who wants sardines, or cricket-bats, or Irish land stock. In short, the one immediately commands; the other, for the time being, is a suppliant. And if we can say that one hundred sovereigns represent power to that extent, how are we to describe the cheque book of the modern financier? Your city Crœsus scribbles a few lines, and a thousand slaves in each corner of the globe spring up to do his bidding. A palace in South Africa and another in Park Lane—a canal through this isthmus and a railway across that continent—lakes dug and mountains removed—is there anything that our modern Aladdins are unable to accomplish provided they possess sufficient of the magic money power?

Clearly, to describe such an invention as a mere "medium of exchange" is to mislead the multitude. Money is a tool, a purchasing instrument, an efficient machine that can be employed with astonishing results in almost all places and circumstances. Alexander del Mar has gone so far as to call it "... the mightiest engine to which man can
lend an intelligent guidance. Unheard, unfelt, unseen, it has the power to so distribute the burdens, gratifications, and opportunities of life, that each individual shall enjoy that share of them to which his merits or good fortune may fairly entitle him; or contrariwise, to disperse them with so partial a hand as to violate every principle of justice, and perpetuate a succession of social slaveries to the end of time. . . .” I believe this to be no exaggeration, but the simple truth. I commend Mr. Alexander del Mar’s words to your careful consideration.

Whence money derives its power is, I think, no mystery. An almost universal desire to secure possession of gold, temporarily or permanently, has given to this metal a wider and more generally understood value than many other metals possess. Its peculiar properties have rendered it specially suitable for use as currency, and all the greatest and most advanced nations in the world have based their monetary instruments on gold, and have struggled hard to secure and retain a good supply of that precious metal. But gold is, of course, not the only form or kind of money. Anything that serves as an efficient purchasing tool is money—silver, copper, paper, etc. This efficiency may be secured by the value and popularity of the commodity tendered, by legislation, or simply by the reputation of the tenderer or issuer, as in the case of State paper currencies, bank-notes, bills, and cheques. In Great Britain not one-hundredth of the paper money daily used could possibly be converted into sovereigns. Nor do the public in most cases want or expect such conversion to be made. It is sufficient for the majority of the public that a bank-note or a cheque will buy what they want, and settle for what they owe. Amongst thoroughly civilized peoples discs of gold are not essential to the monetary operations of everyday life. Unfortunately very few individuals or nations are yet thoroughly civilized, and so we are compelled to this day to combine with the highest forms of paper money the same little bits of gold and silver that did duty in early periods of human
history, when mankind were first emerging from barter and barbarism.

If the sources of money power are not obscure, the reason for the exact quantity of purchasing power embodied in each ounce of the precious metals is a problem that has puzzled more minds than perhaps any other point in the science of money. Why a herring and a half should cost a penny and a half no man can say with exactitude. That the services of a Marie Lloyd or a Harry Lauder will command a hundred times the monetary reward considered adequate for the payment of a Milton or a Herbert Spencer is one of those facts that we can only endure with silence and humility. After all, value is an affection of the human mind, and some humans' affections are, as we all know, extremely erratic. The value of money is what money will command. Its measure, as represented by the general level of the prices of commodities, services, and sensations at the present day, is the result of the haggling of ages. But everyone will agree that a measure which, instead of remaining constant, increases or diminishes from time to time is a most dangerous and unsatisfactory instrument. Now this is exactly what our present money is doing. A sovereign to-day will only purchase as much as fifteen shillings did a few years ago. Moreover, the purchasing power of money is diminishing each year. For some people, for the owners and producers of the prime necessaries of life, for the bankers, merchants, transporters, and middlemen, this continuous rise in prices—the steady shrinkage in the purchasing power of the sovereign—is a most gratifying state of affairs. But for the great majority of the people—for the multitude of small wage-earners composing the bulk of the population in this country, and for the poor and needy, thirteen millions of whom in the United Kingdom live constantly on the verge of the pit—the present shrinkage in the value of the sovereign means a loss of money power that takes joy out of life, that inflicts injustices right and left; that breeds
resentment and discontent, and prepares the ground for those labour troubles, strikes, and constant friction between employers and employed, of which you in the homeland are nowadays hearing so much. This is what Mr. Alexander del Mar referred to when he talked of the “perpetuation of a succession of social slaveries to the end of time.” How can the poor ever be anything else but poor if the prices of the necessaries of life are constantly rising, and rising more rapidly than wages?

Why is this rise taking place? Why is the purchasing power of gold diminishing? Expert opinion tells us that the laws of supply and demand apply to gold and to money as to everything else. It is a little difficult for the average mind to grasp the possibility of there being more people with purchasing power which they wish to employ, than sellers of commodities, services, and sensations. Yet such is undoubtedly the case. The production of gold from the mines of the world has now almost reached the amazing figure of £100,000,000 per annum, and by far the largest amount ever reached in the history of the world. In addition to this, the science of banking which Scotland developed so splendidly—which London subsequently elevated to a pinnacle of perfection—and which the rest of the world is now grasping and employing in its every detail, enables the bankers to erect a constantly increasing volume of credit money power on a smaller and smaller gold foundation. The two combined—more gold and better banking—have resulted in the creation of unparalleled monetary facilities. Never before have such huge demands for money power (in the form of capital for new enterprises) been made. Never before have such demands been met so continuously and on such a large scale. Where it will all end, no one can say. Whilst the profits of new undertakings are augmented by the continued rise in prices, the values of all fixed interest-bearing securities, even of the highest standing, of course fall. In the meantime the grave losses suffered by all small wage earners, owing to the steady and continuous diminu-
tion in the purchasing power of money, are preparing the way for a labour crisis of a magnitude and character that may seriously cripple the industries and prosperity of Great Britain, unless those responsible for the country's welfare have the courage to grasp the problem in time.

I have now said sufficient to give you some idea of the light in which I regard money power, and also the general economic situation arising out of the present supplies of money power being somewhat in excess of the supplies of commodities and services; this last, in my opinion, being to a large extent the indirect outcome of the unparalleled volumes of new gold now flowing from the mines of the world. I will next proceed to the problem of Money Power for India.

Believing as I do that our presence in India can only be justified on the ground that it is to the general advantage of the peoples of India as a whole, I feel strongly that we must, as heretofore, continue to give freely of our best to India in every department of human activity. This includes the equipment of India with the best conceivable monetary system and machinery. It seems to me that there can be little question as to which system and which machinery is the best. Whilst nobody imagines for a moment that the monetary tools in use in this country express the highest conceivable phase of monetary development, the fact remains that the open gold mint system of Great Britain, supplemented by a State paper currency and good banking facilities, represents the furthest stage in monetary progress to which the most advanced sections of civilized mankind have yet attained. Here, then, we have the forms of monetary power which, I submit, we ought at once to establish in India—an open gold mint, a full-value gold currency, and the best possible banking machinery. A good State paper currency India already enjoys—a fact which places India in advance of the United Kingdom, so far as one department of monetary development is concerned. Why, you will ask, does India lack the other sources of
money power—an automatic State money manufactory, metallic tools of the best description and quality, and a banking machinery that includes and utilizes the vast accumulations of money power—reserves and cash balances running up to £90,000,000—held by India's Government in India and in London?

It is difficult to find satisfactory replies to these questions. India did employ metallic tools of gold till we demonetized them sixty years ago. So, too, India did enjoy the advantages of an open State money manufactory till we closed it twenty years ago. As for the employment in India of the great accumulations of money power lying idle at the Government Treasuries, nobody seems to have bothered about this matter till comparatively recently, when the India Office transferred £30,000,000 or so of cash to London, where most of the money has been invested in British and Colonial securities, and lent out to London financiers. Although there is a certain risk in putting so many of India's eggs into the London basket, the interest earned, small as it is, is better than nothing. Whether India's money power cannot be better employed in India, for the benefit of Indian trade and industry, is one of the matters now receiving the attention of a Royal Commission on Indian currency and finance.

I must explain briefly why we demonetized India's gold currency, and why we closed India's open mints. It is a strange story. A hundred years ago gold mohurs and gold pagodas were in use in many parts of India. Madras enjoyed a gold standard as well as a gold currency, and her pagodas were accepted in Ceylon, Mauritius, the Cape of Good Hope, St. Helena, and other places. Indeed, at one time—in 1800—they were made legal tender in New South Wales. Silver rupees were also current in most parts of India. The East India Company, when endeavouring to establish one uniform currency for the whole of India, came to the conclusion that the best course would be to make a silver rupee the principal monetary tool and standard for
the whole country. At the same time the Board stated explicitly that it was not their intention to exclude the use of the gold coins then current; and their Proclamation of January 13, 1841, instructed the Treasuries freely to receive all gold mohurs tendered. Then came the wonderful gold discoveries in California and Australia. The world's output of gold doubled and trebled till, in the year 1852, over £30,000,000 was unearthed. The value of gold steadily diminished (just as it is doing at the present day), and some authorities, alarmed by the stories of fabulously large gold deposits that were reaching Europe from America, believed that gold would soon become as common and as cheap as tin. We can feel little surprise that the Government took alarm. On December 25, 1852, a Notification was issued declaring that on and after January 1, 1853, . . . "no gold coins would be received on account of payments due, or in any way to be made to the Government in any public treasury within the territories of the East India Company. . . ." It was in vain that the Bombay Association (representing the Chambers of Commerce of Bengal, Bombay, and Madras) memorialized the Government of India in 1864 for a gold currency for India—in vain that the Bank of Bengal, in 1865, urged that the British sovereign and half-sovereign might . . . "with safety and advantage be declared legal tender in India at the respective rates of ten and five rupees. . . ." The Secretary of State was adamant. On May 17, 1865, the India Office wrote that it did not see that any practical advantage would attend the proposal to admit British gold to legal tender in India, and gold money as currency in India was from that date entirely deleted from the official mind, both in London and in India.

Alas for human wisdom! Within ten years of this time the Government of India began to wish that gold had not been so completely debarred from the Indian currency. In 1878 they openly expressed their desire to . . . "adopt a gold standard whilst retaining the present silver currency. . . ." From that time onwards the divergence in
the relative values of the precious metals was a source of constant anxiety, till in 1890 the financial position of the Government and Secretary of State for India became one continuous nightmare. By 1893 the position was intolerable to the Government, and it was at length decided to close the Indian mints forthwith to the free coinage of silver, and to move thenceforward in the direction of a gold currency and a gold standard for India. The decision aroused a storm of criticism at the time from many currency reformers, myself included; but subsequent unforeseen events—the discovery of the richest gold-mines in the world in South Africa, and the invention of the cyanide process of gold extraction—have crowned the Indian currency legislation of 1893 with unexpected success. Western and Northern India are now freely using gold money in their daily business just as Madras and Southern India did two or three generations ago.

But now another difficulty has arisen. The decisions of 1893 and 1908 to restore a gold standard and currency to India have met with continuous opposition in certain quarters. Notwithstanding that the supplies of gold from the world’s mines have now reached the highest figures on record in the world’s history, and over three times the output of the Californian and Australian mines sixty years ago—resulting in unparalleled profits to most financiers, bankers, producers, transporters, and middlemen—certain interests in London, and the representatives of those interests in India, have lifted up their voices against the equipment of India with the best metallic monetary tools known to mankind. The Bengal Chamber of Commerce, who in 1864, when India was not nearly so wealthy as she is at present, memorialized the Government of India for a gold currency for India, now consider gold coins for daily use in India quite unnecessary. The Bank of Bengal, who, in 1865, urged that sovereigns be made legal tender in India, now asserts that a gold currency is “not required in India, and is a wasteful and expensive luxury.” Even in Madras,
where a gold currency and standard existed for many years, some people now seem to think that gold coins are quite superfluous, and that if the public will accept over-valued and cumbersome silver tokens, why give them anything better? (This is the view of Mr. Hunter of the Bank of Madras.) In London the campaign has been carried on with much spirit. Some of the leading financial papers have solemnly assured their readers that India is much too poverty-stricken to be able to use gold. The Statist, indeed, went so far as to assert that India was "one of the poorest portions of the whole earth." Messrs. Samuel Montagu and Co., the eminent bankers and bullion dealers, with a sublime disregard for historical fact, boldly informed the world . . . "that it must be remembered that from ancient times silver rupees have been the only coins familiar to the varied and populous nations of India . . .," and they solemnly discussed the desirability of checking any newly acquired taste for gold money that the peoples of India might now be developing by the imposition of an import duty in India on the precious yellow metal!

That there must be some reason—possibly some good reason—for all this strenuous opposition to the equipment of India with first-class metallic monetary tools goes without saying. In the effort to discover this reason I have perused every newspaper that I could lay hands upon, studied the reports of learned societies, and discussed the matter with college professors and practical financiers. I find that the theoretical objection is this: It is quite unnecessary to use such a valuable metal as gold for internal currency purposes; gold is nowadays only essential for external payments—for the adjustment of international trade balances. And as the adjustment of India's balance of trade is carried out mainly in London, India ought to keep whatever gold she requires to back up her silver token currency in London, not in India. Which being so, the opening of the Indian mints to the free coinage of gold is quite unnecessary.

As an exposition of pure theory this argument is un-
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answerable. The only thing to be said in reply is that the argument applies with equal force to South Africa, to Canada, to Great Britain itself, and, indeed, to many other countries. There can be little doubt that sovereigns, or any gold coins of a similar value, are not altogether suitable to the poverty of the great mass of the populations of many nations; that it is wasteful and extravagant for any country to use gold coins as internal currency when silver and paper money might serve equally well; that gold is only really needed for external payments; that the adjustment of many of these payments is carried out in London; that the self-governing colonies and many foreign nations would find it more economical to keep their gold for the settlement of their external indebtedness in London, and to draw on a London banker in favour of their creditors whenever necessary; that the maintenance of open gold mints in Canada, Australia, and, in fact, in any country that can make use of sovereigns, is in such circumstances wasteful to the locality or country concerned; that it would be cheaper for all such localities and countries to send their gold to England to be coined (at the expense of the British public), and paid into the Bank of England or any other London banker for international use whenever gold was needed for transfer from one nation to another. In short, if all parts of the Empire and all nations banked in London and settled all their international balances of trade by drafts on London, a great economy in the use of gold could be effected by London's bankers of considerable pecuniary advantage to all concerned.

The truth of this line of argument is beyond question. And yet this ideal state of affairs has not yet come to pass. True, most countries have banking accounts in London for the adjustment of minor outstandings, but none of them—not even Canada or Australia—dreams of abolishing its own mint and gold currencies. Such is the deficiency of human reason—such is the distrust with which civilized nations regard each other and the less advanced members
of their own nationalities, that practically every country except India has its own public money manufactory or mint, and strives to employ its own gold monetary tools. Some of the great bankers of Britain are at this moment taking counsel among themselves as to the best means of strengthening the national reserve of gold, but I have not yet heard the suggestion made that as the use of gold money in Great Britain for internal purposes is a wasteful luxury (as, of course, it is), half-crowns and two-shilling pieces should be coined by the ton, declared unlimited tender, and all the sovereigns in circulation be called in to augment the gold reserve at the Bank of England, and so provide means for meeting banks' depositors and all external demands for gold. Yet this arrangement would probably give London a gold reserve of £100,000,000 straight away. I respectfully present this idea to Sir Felix Schuster, to Professor Keynes, and to all others in this country who may think that a cumbersome and dangerously over-valued silver coinage of unlimited legal tender is good enough for the wealthiest and most populous oversea division of the British Empire.

So much for theory. I turn now to practical financiers for an explanation as to why India should continue to be denied the restoration of her right of free coinage and the use of gold monetary weapons in her daily business transactions. One of such has told us, in the columns of the Financial Times, that, if India be permitted to import gold unrestrictedly from London, then Great Britain may, in an emergency, be threatened with a suspension of specie payments. The Financial News conveys to its readers an impression of what is going on by such head-lines as "Indian Gold Peril," and "Life Blood of the City runs Fast into India." The Statist has argued frequently that the use of gold coins by India would not only "enormously injure India," but would "injure the United Kingdom," and be "a very serious matter for the rest of the world." In fact, we have seen in the columns of the Statist an
apparently genuine apprehension that the use of gold money by India may wreck the financial and economic arrangements of the entire universe. This fear I believe to be a very short-sighted one, and altogether without good foundation, but its existence in more quarters than one—and I know several such—is unquestionable. It explains why nearly all the Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay representatives of English banking interests are now opposed to the introduction of a gold currency into India. It explains why some of the leading Chambers of Commerce in India no longer think that gold monetary tools are suitable or necessary for India. It finds its reflection in the official attitude of the Government of India, who, whilst willing to give the public sovereigns if desired, and so long as there may be sovereigns in the Treasuries, have latterly refrained from taking any active steps to encourage the people in the use of gold. And it has been traceable in the recent activities of the Financial Department of the India Office, which has transferred from India to London between £30,000,000 and £40,000,000 of India’s reserves and surplus cash balances, thereby intercepting for the time being—much to the relief of London—the flow of gold to India to this extent in settlement of the balance of trade in India’s favour.

Here, then, we have the reasons why there has been opposition to the equipment of India with the best metallic monetary tools and machinery available—apprehension lest the withdrawal of gold from London should embarrass, or diminish the profits of, certain financiers, bill and stockbrokers, bankers and traders dependent thereon, backed up by the well-intentioned arguments of theorists and amateurs who apparently see no reason why India should not build up and depend upon a type of monetary mechanism not yet accepted in practice by (though possibly ahead of the system employed in) Great Britain, the self-governing colonies, and the leading nations of the world.

No doubt there would be a great saving in expenditure if
we abolished our police, our army, and our navy. Yet nobody advocates this form of economy. So, too, by doing without a gold mint and gold monetary tools in India, it would be possible for India to effect certain pecuniary savings. But I submit that such savings could only be purchased at great risk. Not until the nations of Europe have disbanded their great military organizations, not until Great Britain herself and the self-governing dominions have all given up the use of gold as currency for internal purposes would I recommend India to forego a return to gold monetary tools which she successfully employed before we demonetized them, and which helped to carry the fame of her wealth and civilization throughout the length and breadth of the then known world.

As for the fears of those who see visions of the city's "life-blood" running dry, I would earnestly ask them to study and ponder over three things—the present output of gold, the present rise in prices, and the present labour situation in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. In several places the bearings of our machinery of production are running hot. Everywhere the pinch of shrinking money power, and the resultant injustices to those commonly referred to as the labouring classes, are preparing the way for graver and more widespread labour troubles than have hitherto been experienced. The first cause of this loss of efficiency in our purchasing tools, this loss of value in the buying power of the sovereign, is beyond a doubt the enormous supplies of money now available. It is, I know, extremely difficult for the "man in the street" to realize that the law of supply and demand applies to his monetary instruments as well as to everything else in this world. Some able thinkers have recently expressed their disbelief in writing, and their books have found many sympathizers. But before forming opinions I would ask all who desire to grasp this most important problem, to re-read their Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, to follow this up by a study of the best-known modern experts, such as the late Walter
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Bagehot, Mr. Alexander del Mar, Professors Francis Walker, Alfred Marshall, L. L. Price, W. T. Layton, W. J. Ashley, and others, and I venture to think that logic and facts will combine in establishing the conclusion that the unparalleled volumes of gold now flowing over the world's surface facilitate the creation of ever-increasing masses of credit money power which in its turn inflates prices, stimulates enterprise, and encourages commercial activities in a way and to a degree that may spell danger and possible disaster unless the pace be kept under most careful control.

Certain it is that the present annual output of gold has never before been approached in the world's history. Similarly indisputable is the fact that during the last ten or twelve years the United States, South America, Russia, France, Italy, and the other leading countries of the world outside India have secured and retained close upon £400,000,000 of the new gold. Yet we heard nothing about England's "life-blood flowing fast" to America. Why should India alone be held up to London's displeasure? As a matter of fact, Great Britain is the only country in the world that has managed to carry on with practically the same gold reserves as before. The smallness of our gold reserves is of course the measure of our advance from barbarism. At the same time, the continuous enlargement of the superstructure of credit without any known increase in its gold foundation may be attended by considerable risk, and there is now a very widespread belief that the liabilities of Government and of the banking community in the United Kingdom in the matter of deposits from the public are exceedingly large in comparison with the visible gold reserves of the country. This situation cannot be simplified by withholding gold from India, and giving her instead millions after millions of inferior silver tools on the plea that the peoples of India (not knowing any better) are not asking for gold. Yet this is the policy that some people urge, and, in effect, the policy that Government have recently been carrying out. This
policy does not seem to me worthy of British rule. It is not the way to equip India with the best form of metallic money power. It is not the way to help London towards a larger gold reserve. On the contrary, by adding silver to the enormous mass of gold metallic money in existence, it directly induces further price inflation, further labour friction, further excessive demands for new capital, further excessive depreciation of gilt-edged securities—in short, all those symptoms which spell danger in the eyes of those who look beyond the momentary gains of the well-to-do classes of the community.

These are days of rising prices. London discounts must therefore rise with everything else (gilt-edged securities always excepted). And by openly recognizing this fact and paying the price accordingly, Great Britain can obtain and retain any gold reserve that it may think desirable, leaving India in the same position as America and the rest of the world to take whatever gold she can pay for. High discounts in London mean higher discounts elsewhere, so that British trade is not in the least likely to suffer in the long run by the changed financial conditions.

There is another consideration of the greatest importance. The providing of India with a gold mint at which her own raw gold ornaments, bars, etc., can be freely converted into sovereigns as the public may require, also with ample supplies of gold monetary tools for the use of traders and others of good standing (of whom there are probably as many in India as in the United Kingdom), and with gold reserves for internal and external use, as necessary, will be a source of great strength not only to India but also to Great Britain, and therefore to the Empire as a whole. The Times the other day remarked that "even Mr. Webb admitted under cross-examination that if the Gold Standard Reserve were kept in India, it would have to be sent to London when a crisis occurred." From which the Times appeared to deduce the conclusion that India's reserves ought always to be kept in London. But I would ask the
Times—I ask any practical London financier—which would he prefer were a financial crisis unfortunately to develop in London—India suddenly drawing on London for perhaps £5,000,000 to £8,000,000, or India shipping £5,000,000 to £8,000,000 sterling to London in gold? There seems to me only one answer; for whilst the former would greatly augment London’s difficulties—possibly create serious danger, the other would in all probability save the situation in London, and at the same time be wholly satisfactory to India. This is one of the reasons why the holding of £30,000,000 or £40,000,000 of India’s money in London appears to me altogether unsound and a danger to London’s delicately balanced financial credit structure, rather than a support.

In preparing for India a scheme of additional money power, I will now assume that the desirability of (1) an open gold mint; (2) gold monetary tools in daily use; and (3) accumulations of gold money in the paper currency and gold standard reserves for internal and external use is freely recognized, and proceed forthwith to consider India’s banking equipment. I have always urged that the business of indigenous banking ought to be encouraged in every way. In my “Advance, India!” published recently, I warned my Indian friends that the cash balances held by the purely Indian banks were dangerously small compared with the magnitude of the deposits received from the public. Since that warning was published, three or four of the Indian banks have run aground. It is an unfortunate mishap which everybody will deplore. I sincerely trust that the institutions concerned will not be wrecked, but that with care and courage they may be soon refloated. The matter to which it will now be well to give some consideration is the desirability or otherwise of creating a great central State Bank for India. There is no doubt that some enterprising bankers would be quite ready to take over all the Government of India’s balances, reserves, paper currency, banking and
exchange business, and manage all these departments on Government's behalf. Government itself is suspected of not being averse to getting some of its financial responsibilities off its shoulders. The exchange bankers, however, scent competition, and are, I believe, against the idea to a man.

The advantages of the concentration of money power in a country where individual integrity is above reproach, are obvious. The waste involved in the holding up of great volumes of a nation's money in Government treasuries is also obvious to most people. No unbiased and well-informed spectator could doubt for one moment that a better use of the £90,000,000 of Indian treasury balances and reserves, held by the Indian Office and the Government of India, could be devised than is now actually made. Then again, the backward condition of many of the population in India in the matter of a business-like utilizing of their savings and spare cash, the insufficiency of really cheap capital at certain seasons of the year, and the scope existing for a considerably further extended use of the paper currency are all matters that might be satisfactorily handled by a great central State Bank.

The first and vital point to decide is—Who is to control the proposed Indian State Bank? This great organization with its cash resources of perhaps £100,000,000, to make no mention of Capital and Deposits from the public, would be one of the most powerful monetary forces in the world. Who is to wield this force? In Great Britain the demands of the kingly rulers and their governments in the past combined with a wide-spread ignorance and apathy on the part of the public regarding monetary science, have resulted in the supreme control of money power at length passing into the hands of a comparatively few great financiers—often of the Jewish race. These great money merchants have carried on their businesses with the utmost skill and foresight; so much so, that whilst their ingenuity and integrity have greatly benefited both Government and the
public, they have at the same time succeeded in placing the leading governments of the world in quite a subordinate position so far as the control of Money Power is concerned. Now, in civilized states, Government ought, I submit, to be the chief source and controlling authority of Money Power. So successful have our bankers been in the past in relieving Government of one of its most important functions—the issue and control of Money Power—that at this moment in the United Kingdom, perhaps the most advanced country in the world in many ways, neither people nor Government have yet commenced to enjoy the advantages of a State paper currency! In the absence of such a currency, the bankers of Scotland and England have discovered and developed means of building up colossal dealings on the strength of paper promises to pay in gold (if required), not one per cent. of which promises are ever or can ever be carried out. Yet, thanks to the assistance and encouragement of the bankers, we all continue to make these promises from day to day, largely regardless of the possible dangers of the situation. To such a degree has the science of banking and credit-spinning been carried that many responsible authorities have commenced to ask themselves whether our gigantic credit structures are not beginning to get a little top-heavy. Statesmen, economists and newspapers of the highest standing have openly stated that, compared with the volume of business now transacted in the United Kingdom, Great Britain's gold reserves are inadequate. Yet no British Government has so far felt itself strong enough to interfere or to make any attempt to safeguard the public interests by controlling the activities of the great financiers and bankers in any way by legislation. Lord Goschen, Mr. Asquith, the London Chamber of Commerce, the Associated Chambers of Commerce of the United Kingdom, the Economist, the Statist, and even the Bankers' Magazine, have all talked; but that is all. Little or nothing has yet been done so far as the public know. The truth is that, so powerless is the Government of Great Britain to grapple with the
danger, in the event of any serious crisis, local or interna-
tional, arising out of the insufficiency of our gold reserves
or the unexpected restriction or destruction of credit,
Government would find itself compelled to act, not in-
dependently as its own position as guardian of the whole of
the public interests would demand, but subserviently as the
great financial and banking interests of the City of London
might require. It is possible that the interests of the great
mass of our people and the interests of London’s cosmo-
politan financiers and bankers might exactly coincide. On
the other hand, it is conceivable that they might not. As
things stand at present in England, Government has no
choice in the matter. Government must act as Money.
Power dictates.

Is this the situation that we desire to work up to in
India—Government nominally supreme, but the purse-
strings in the control of a mixed directorate of Hindus,
Muhammadans, Parsees, and Europeans, the last probably
in a minority? It would be folly to shut our eyes to the
direction in which we are steadily moving in India. Though
the days of complete self-government on the Colonial type
may be far distant, there can be no doubt that our Indian
fellow-subjects under our active and whole-hearted tuition
are yearly advancing in social, economic, and political
efficiency, and in due course they will assuredly reap the
rewards of that efficiency in every department of their
activities. Bearing these facts in mind, remembering the
special conditions that prevail in India—the multiplicity of
interests, racial and religious, as well as economic and poli-
tical, the overwhelming magnitude, numerically, of the
illiterate and uninformed classes as compared with the
numerical insignificance of Government’s leading brains
and hands, I am forced to the conclusion that it is imperative
in the interests of the people of India as a whole, as well
as of Government itself, and of the commercial and general
interests of the United Kingdom and the Empire that the
Government of India should not now relinquish one jot or
tittle of its money power, or, what is almost of equal importance in India, of the prestige that universally attaches to great money power. Lord Mayo, when referring to Mr. Dickson’s scheme of 1867 for amalgamating the three Presidency Banks, wrote to the Secretary of State for India:

"... I submit that it is not for the interest of a State that a great institution of this kind should grow up for all India, the interests of which may in time be opposed to those of the public, and whose influence at any rate may overshadow that of Government itself. ..."

Here we have words of wisdom, as sound to-day as when they were penned.

If, then, we desire India to obtain the benefits which a concentration of her currency mechanism, monetary resources, and financial machinery, under one central control in India would undoubtedly give, that central control must be exercised by Government and not by private interests amidst which Government might be more or less effectively represented. In other words, the proposed Central Bank must be a department of Government—a real state bank—wherein, whilst public interests should be strongly represented, Government must exercise supreme, unfettered control. Such a State Bank might be advised by Local Financial Boards in Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras, on which private commercial and financial interests would preponderate. To such a State Bank Department it would be incumbent on Government to appoint permanent financial and banking officials of the highest calibre. Under a control of this kind an enlightened and progressive development of India’s money power would follow. The superiority as money of nickel to copper, gold to silver, and of paper to gold would, each in its place and to a proper degree, receive methodical encouragement. Every treasury and sub-treasury in the continent would become a branch of
the State Bank. Depositors would be actively welcomed in every corner of the country, though not in cutting competition with private banks. It is doubtful if the State Bank would need to raise any capital as such. Government's balances, cash reserves, and other resources (paper money and deposits) could from time to time be employed to help the progress of public works (whether undertaken by Government or by Indian Rulers and governments), of agricultural banks, and of India's largest private banks and financiers, especially during periods of pressure that regularly arise when the most valuable crops are being moved. With a State Bank managed on these lines, it is doubtful if any advantage to Government or the public would accrue from the amalgamation and inclusion of the existing Presidency Banks, though this might perhaps be arranged in order to give to Government the benefits of the existing machinery and expert managing staffs. The shareholders' rights and position would, of course, have to be fully recognized. This portion of the problem, though difficult, need not be insuperable.

A State Bank of this character, undertaking the whole of India's monetary business, internal and external, whilst adding greatly to Government's power and prestige would at the same time greatly encourage the banking habit amongst India's timid millions, and would thus be a source of strength to the great masses of the people as no other institution could. The development is not likely to be received with enthusiasm by the banking community in India or England, but its inauguration need not be deferred on this account.

I have now completed my sketch of the way in which I would, did the matter rest in my hands, provide additional money power for India. The best, and nothing but the best, that would be my guiding principle. Copper and nickel tools for the poor and for small transactions; silver for the multitude; gold for the well-to-do; and paper for large transactions and for the wealthiest and most advanced
classes—a State Paper Currency supplemented by every conceivable banking facility, State as well as private. No doubt the day will some day come when a majority of the public will perceive that amongst civilized nations money is after all merely a certificate of service performed, and that, granted reasonable prospects of national security and widespread honesty of dealing between man and man, there is no reason why such certificates should not for the most part be recorded on paper instead of on little discs of gold and silver. Such paper would not require to be supported by tons of metal, because no rational being would need the metal. The fact that the certificates bore the impress and signature of Government testifying that they represented work performed for the State in the general good, would be sufficient in a rational and law-abiding community to secure their widespread acceptance and circulation. It would be necessary strictly to limit the State work against which such monetary certificates were issued, to public schemes of a material and permanent character, and to state on the face of the certificate the exact locality and nature of the capital work represented by the certificates.

Thus, Government are about to construct, let us assume, a new canal or a new railway of undoubted public worth and permanent value. Instead of borrowing two or three millions sterling or more for the purpose (upon which the State would have to pay interest), there is no reason why two or three millions of State paper currency should not be issued to pay for the cost of the work. These notes (one sovereign bearer debenture bonds, let us say) would not promise to give the holder so many grains of gold thirty or forty or fifty years hence, but would certify that they represented the So-and-So State Canal or State Railway, and that they were legal tender throughout India to and by the Government and the public in settlement of legal debt. Their inscription might be: **Pay to the Bearer the Equivalent of the Service Rendered to the State by**
the First Holder of this Note, certified and registered hereby, One Sovereign.

Orthodox bankers of conservative instincts will, of course, shudder at this suggestion of an inconvertible currency, even be the amount ever so limited. But the Government of India (who, by their enlightened policy of recognizing the shrinkage in money power in India and compensating their servants accordingly, have placed themselves in the forefront of all civilized Governments), are already on the road of scientific monetary progress in this direction. By basing ten millions sterling of their present paper currency on their own paper securities instead of directly on gold or silver, they have taken the first step. It is only one step more, and a very short one, to continue the issue of paper currency based directly on, say, State railways, instead of on the promissory notes by aid of which the State railways have been constructed. When next the purchasing power of India's money shows signs of increasing—it is dwindling rapidly at present—then will be the moment to launch the first issue of the new rational State money. May the happy moment be not long deferred.

I trust that I have now made it quite clear why, in the hope of providing more money power for India, and, at the same time, easing the unmerited labour hardships in India and the United Kingdom caused by constantly rising prices, I advocate gold coins and an open gold mint for India. Further, I am in favour of a State concentration in India, on business lines, of India's cash balances and monetary reserves, a large part of whose value is now dissipated by the employment of methods and practices long out of date. The development of India's paper currency in the direction that I have just outlined is a matter for the future. The world will soon be civilized and enlightened enough to attempt these things. It is even possible that India may lead the way.
DISCUSSION ON THE FOREGOING PAPER

At a meeting of the East India Association held at the Caxton Hall, Westminster, on Monday, October 27, 1913, a paper entitled "Money Power for India" was read by Mr. M. de P. Webb, C.I.E. (late Chairman of the Karachi Chamber of Commerce, etc.). Sir James Wilson, K.C.S.I., was in the chair, and the following, amongst others, were present: Sir Lesley Probyn, K.C.V.O., Sir James Digges La Touche, K.C.S.I., Sir Mancherjee M. Bhownaggree, K.C.I.E., Sir Henry Evan James, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Sir Robert Fulton, LL.D., Sir William Ovens Clark, Sir Horatio and Lady Shephard, Sir Daniel M. Hamilton, the Chief of Inchakaranji, Mr. C. E. Buckland, C.I.E., Mr. R. F. Chisholm, Mr. J. B. Pennington and Miss Drury, Mr. D. N. Reid, Mr. F. W. Barbour, Mr. H. R. Cook, Mr. and Mrs. Jackson, Mr. R. S. Pandit, Mr. Nihal Singh, Mrs. M. de P. Webb, Colonel M. B. Pearson, C.B., Mr. Duncan Irvine, Mr. F. H. Brown, Mr. Reginald Murray, Mr. T. Stoker, C.S.I., Mr. G. O. W. Dunn, Mr. M. W. Hassanally, Miss Wade, Mr. F. Hart, Mr. Apcar, Mr. Dunbar, Mr. James Macdonald, Mr. G. C. Whitworth, Mr. Vidyadhar Sagar Pandya, Mr. Edward Tuck, Mr. Moreton Frewen, Mirza Abbas Ali Baig, C.S.I., Mr. F. G. Wigley, Mr. Ryan, Mr. Sundaram Iyer, Mr. M. B. Tyabji, I.C.S., Mr. J. A. Malcolm, Mr. Mark B. F. Major, Colonel A. S. Roberts, Mr. W. H. Christy, Mr. Mohamed Yamin Khan, Mr. Ali Fahmy Mohamed, Mr. Pratt, Mr. J. R. Baillie, Mr. Sparling Hadwyn, Mr. Ananda Rau, Mr. T. H. Minshall, Mr. E. Benedict, Mr. J. S. Dhanjibhoy, Colonel F. C. W. Rideout, Mr. Dadiba Mewanjee Dalal, and Dr. John Pollen, C.I.E., Hon. Secretary.

The Chairman: It is my pleasant duty to introduce to you our lecturer, Mr. Webb, who has kindly consented to read us a paper this evening on a subject of very great importance, not only to India, but to the whole world, entitled "Money Power for India." He has been for a number of years Chairman of the Karachi Chamber of Commerce, and he has there got into close contact with the money question both as affecting the population of India and as affecting trade generally. He has made a special study of this subject, and I am quite sure we shall all find that whatever he says to us is worthy of our closest attention. (Hear, hear.)
The lecturer then read the paper.

The Chairman: Ladies and gentlemen, I am sure you will all agree with me that we are much indebted to Mr. Webb for his most interesting and authoritative paper. It now falls to my lot to open the discussion, which I hope will be taken part in by a number of the authorities whom I see in this room. First of all I have to apologize for appearing in the chair at all. I know that our energetic Secretary tried hard to get some more competent chairman for this meeting, and only fell back on me as a last resort. I am not a financial authority, although I have had some occasion to study the question of Indian currency. I received very short notice, so I have not been able to think out, as fully as I should like, what to say to you; but I think the best way in which I might help in the discussion is to call attention to certain statistical facts (you cannot understand currency questions without statistics), and to certain conclusions which seem to be generally accepted, and perhaps to give some estimates and ideas of my own. I will ask you to bear with me while I read what I have got to say, because these currency questions are such that one has to be very careful in one's figures and estimates. I shall not take up very much of your time. First of all I think it will be better to see what Mr. Webb in his interesting paper actually proposes should be done, and I gather that his proposals are practically as follows:

India should be provided with (1) a gold mint at which her own raw gold, ornaments, bars, etc., can be freely converted into sovereigns, as the public may require.

2. Gold monetary tools in daily use—i.e., a full value gold currency.

3. Accumulations of gold money, in India, in the paper currency and gold standard reserves, for internal and external use.

4. A central bank which must be a department of Government, a real State Bank, wherein, whilst public interests should be strongly represented, Government must exercise supreme unfettered control.

5. The Government might issue inconvertible notes, based on services rendered to the State, to pass current at a value of one sovereign each.

Incidentally I might say that, if I were in India, and I knew that some of Mr. Webb's inconvertible notes were about, I should be very careful to stipulate that for any goods I sold or services I rendered I should be paid, not in inconvertible notes, but in rupees or sovereigns, or convertible notes.

Now, I want to draw your attention to certain conclusions, and they are as follows:

In India, although prices are generally quoted in rupees, they are really gold prices, a rupee meaning one-fifteenth of the value of the gold in a sovereign. The rupee coin is merely a token, the value of which in exchange does not vary with the value of the silver of which it is made.

**GOLD.**

The value of gold in exchange for other commodities all the world over is dependent on the same law of demand and supply as is the case with that of any other commodity. A general rise in gold prices means a fall in
the exchange value of gold, and must mean that the available supply of gold has increased faster than the effective demand.

Gold is unlike most other commodities, in that its rate of consumption or wastage is comparatively very small, and whatever gold is produced from year to year is added to the stock of gold already accumulated in the world during the past centuries. The rate of annual production of gold has increased very rapidly within the last sixty years. While in the two centuries preceding 1850 the addition to the world's stock of gold was about £480,000,000, in the last half of last century it was £1,400,000,000, in the first ten years of this century it was £780,000,000, in the last three years about £290,000,000.

Absorption of Gold by India.

Statistics of import and export show that during the last seventy-three years—i.e., since 1840—India has absorbed £310,000,000 worth of gold, or about one-eighth of the whole world's production of gold during that period. India must at this moment contain at least £350,000,000 worth, or about a tenth of all the gold in the world.

During the first ten years of this century India absorbed £82,000,000 worth of the £780,000,000 produced in the whole world—i.e., more than one-tenth. During the last three years the world's production of gold has been about £290,000,000 worth, and of this India has absorbed £73,000,000 worth, or one-fourth of the whole world's production during those three years.

From these marvellous figures two conclusions may be drawn: (1) There is at present in India an ample supply of gold for all purposes; (2) had not India absorbed such a large proportion of the new gold produced in the world during the last thirteen years, prices of commodities must have everywhere risen much faster than they actually have.

Sovereigns.

In the last twelve years British gold coin to the value of £97,000,000 has been imported into India, and after deducting the £23,000,000 exported during that period, mainly by the Government, the statistics show that there must now be in India seventy-four million sovereigns more than there were twelve years ago. Of this increase, only fourteen millions has been added to the reserves held by the Government, so that the stock of sovereigns held by the banks and people has increased in the twelve years by sixty millions. In 1902 there were six million sovereigns in the hands of the Government, and there must have been a considerable number in the hands of the people; so that it seems a safe estimate to say that at present there must be at least 100 million sovereigns in India, of which Government holds twenty millions, and the banks and people at least eighty millions.

It seems safe, then, to conclude that India has plenty of sovereigns already for all purposes of currency, and that she has no difficulty in getting all the sovereigns she wants. There is therefore no need to establish a mint in India in order to coin sovereigns.

Yet I agree with Mr. Webb that India should have a mint capable of
coining gold, preferably ten-rupee pieces, of the same fineness as the sovereign, but only two-thirds of its weight. Such coins might prove popular, and the experiment is worth trying. The people of India might at any time wish to turn their great hoards of gold in bullion or ornaments into legal tender coin, and should have the means of doing so without sending the gold to a distant mint, which must reduce its saleable value, in exchange for current coin. And, lastly, many people in India would, for sentimental reasons, like to have an Indian mint and Indian gold coin, and as the cost would be small, that natural wish should be gratified. I therefore vote for the establishment of a gold mint in India.

GOLD CURRENCY.

Mr. Webb proposes that India should have a gold currency. If by that he means that the Government should undertake at all times to give out gold for rupees at the rate of one sovereign for fifteen rupees, I cannot agree that the time has come for that step. It would require the maintenance of an enormously costly reserve of gold, and might in a time of bad harvests and of monetary crisis compel the Government to buy gold at a ruinous rate to meet the demand. But if he means only that the Government should give people every facility for getting sovereigns or other gold coins whenever they want them, I agree with him. Already in normal times the Government does give out sovereigns freely, and at present it has twenty millions of them available for the purpose. I would go further, and, when the supply of sovereigns in the reserve is large and that of rupees small, would decline to issue rupees in large quantities and cash large demands for coin in gold only—not so much with the object of forcing gold coins into currency, as with that of economizing the stock of rupees and avoiding the necessity of coining any more rupees.

Now I want to draw your attention to

THE RUPEE.

The outstanding feature of the present Indian Currency system is that the rupee is a mere token coin, representing in exchangeable value one-fifteenth of the gold in a sovereign—that is, 16d. sterling—whereas its intrinsic value as a piece of metal is only about 10d. sterling. There is a vast number of these token rupees in circulation and in hoards, and the main object of all currency operations must be to maintain the value of the token rupee as nearly as possible at 16d. sterling. There is no danger of its rising appreciably above that value so long as the sovereign is legal tender in India for a debt of Rs. 15. The danger is that at some critical time the value of the rupee, in exchange either for gold or for other commodities, may fall appreciably below 16d., and such a fall could only occur if at any time the supply of available rupees considerably exceeded the demand for them: The demand for rupees varies very greatly from season to season, with the character of the harvests and the briskness or slackness of trade. Under present conditions, under which anyone desiring a supply of rupees can obtain them at the rate of Rs. 15 to the £1, on presenting gold or notes to
the Government Treasury, the demand automatically increases in good years, and the Government is forced, if the public so requires, to increase the supply by coining fresh rupees so as to meet that demand. The consequence is, that the supply of rupees in India is always made sufficient to meet the maximum demand from time to time, and not the average demand. Then, when a year of bad harvests or bad trade comes round, the demand for rupees naturally slacks off, and the rupees find their way back to the Government Treasury, and, being at the time in excess of the demand, are in danger of falling seriously in exchange value. And most of the precautions of the present currency system are designed to prevent that fall going too far at such times. The necessity for these precautions is simply due to the existence at such times of an enormous number of rupees in excess of the demand at the moment. If, therefore, arrangements could be made by which the number of rupees in existence could be restricted, not to the maximum demand of a good year, but to the average demand of good and bad years taken together, the embarrassment caused by a redundancy of rupees in bad years would be greatly reduced, and the need for such precautions greatly lessened.

This can be done by Government, if it refuses to issue rupees without limit on a mere demand, and thus keeps the number of rupees in existence at a figure representing, in its judgment, the average demand for a series of years. The Government can do this, without legislation, by taking advantage of the fact that gold as well as rupees is legal tender in India for payments made by the Government as well as by private individuals. That is to say, it can withdraw the notification announcing that Government is ready at all times to pay out rupees in exchange for gold or notes, and can refuse to give rupees in exchange either for gold or notes, unless when it has a sufficient supply of rupees to meet the demand without coining more.

I do not think that sufficient regard is paid to the enormous number of rupees existing in hoards, many of which would be tempted out of hoards into circulation if they were exchangeable at an appreciated value, either for goods or for gold, owing to a temporary shortage in rupees.

As a matter of fact, the enormous hoards of rupees form an ample reserve, on which the population will automatically draw should the rupee become appreciated in comparison with the sovereign.

During the eight years ending with 1908 the Government in India actually coined and issued 1,000 million fresh rupees. During the previous thirty years it had issued 1,500 million rupees, and there must still be in hoards many rupees issued before that date. Since the closing of the mints, few people can have been so foolish as to melt rupees, seeing that the rupee coin will buy about one and a half times its own weight in silver. There are, therefore, probably in existence at least 2,500 million rupee coins, or about eight for every man, woman, and child in India—surely enough for currency purposes in a country where the wages of unskilled labour average about threepence a day.

The danger of increasing the supply of rupees too much above the demand of a slack year was shown in 1908 and 1909, when the amount of
rupees in the hands of Government rose from 350 million to 500 million and then to 600 million, and caused considerable embarrassment to the finances and widespread anxiety as to whether the exchange value of the rupee would not fall seriously below 1s. 4d., to the great loss of all engaged in trade and to the poorer wage-earners.

For four years the Government did not coin any more rupees. Last year, however, they did, as a matter of fact, set to work coining rupees again, and in the year 1912-1913, notwithstanding the warning given them by the events of 1908 and 1909, they coined 158 million more rupees. When these rupees are issued, the taxpayers of India will make out of that transaction £200,000, because for every rupee the Government coins it makes about 5d. or 6d. clear profit.

But consider the situation. Here is a Government which has in existence 2,500 million token coins, overvalued to the extent of 50 per cent., and in danger of being depreciated in exchange value in times of crisis or bad trade, and yet it proceeds to add to this token coinage an enormous number of similar token coins. I wonder that our political economists, who are never tired of inveighing against the iniquities of an inconvertible paper currency, have so little to say about this shortsighted action of the Indian Government.

I suggest, therefore, that the Government should cease coining rupees altogether for some years to come, and whenever it finds its supply of rupees running short, should refuse to issue rupees in large sums in exchange for notes or gold, being always prepared on such occasions to cash its notes in gold, whether the presenter of the notes would prefer rupees or not. Such a measure could not seriously hamper internal trade, and would greatly reduce the number of rupees returned to Government in a bad year, and render less necessary the costly precautions at present required to insure that in such a year the exchangeable value of the rupee shall not fall appreciably below 16d.

The Two Reserves.

At present Government holds very large sums in two separate reserves for two separate purposes. As a matter of fact, these two reserves support each other, and they should now be amalgamated, and the total amount utilized either for one purpose or the other, as may be required. The strengthening of the position given by the amalgamation would make it safe to hold a less total sum in cash than need be held in the two separate reserves.

If we put together the amounts held in the gold standard reserve and the paper currency reserve on March 31 last, we find that it then amounted to £68,000,000 sterling, of which £27,000,000 was held in gold, £15,000,000 in rupees, and £26,000,000 in securities. Of this total, £27,000,000 was held in England, and £41,000,000 in India. Besides this amount held in the reserves, the Treasury balances on that date amounted to £28,000,000, so that altogether the reserves and balances at the disposal of the Secretary of State and the Government of India between them amounted to over £96,000,000. The Treasury balances
were then exceptionally large, and have since, I believe, been reduced. But confining attention to the £68,000,000 in the reserves, let us consider for what purpose such a large sum is so held. In the first place, it has to form a reserve against a possible demand for cash in lieu of currency notes. The gross issue of currency notes on that date was to the value of £46,000,000; but about £5,000,000 of this was held in Government treasuries, and £5,000,000 in the Presidency Banks' Head Offices, so that the active circulation was only £36,000,000, and as, at present, by law the Government of India can invest only £9,000,000 of the currency reserve in securities, it actually held in cash an amount equal to the total value of the notes in active circulation. Surely this is an excess of caution, even if the paper currency reserve stood by itself! But there was also the gold standard reserve, amounting to over £22,000,000, which, although primarily meant to be used for maintaining the exchange value of the rupee, is in reality a second reserve for the encashment of currency notes, as no one can doubt that it would be used for that purpose if necessary. I suggest, therefore, that the two reserves should be amalgamated, and only enough kept in the amalgamated reserve to meet the probable needs of the present two reserves. If the Government of India would only cease coining rupees and enforce its right, when the stock of rupees falls short, to cash its notes in gold, it would seem sufficient to keep as a gold standard reserve £20,000,000 in gold and £15,000,000 in gold securities—total £35,000,000; and as this sum would really be available to cash currency notes, it would seem sufficient to add to it as a currency first reserve gold and silver equal to one-third of the gross circulation of notes—that is, at present, about £15,000,000—making a total amalgamated reserve of £50,000,000, which, I should suggest, might be held as follows, as a minimum reserve in normal times:

Gold = 5 millions in England (earmarked at the Bank of England), 15 millions in India;
Rupees = 15 million pounds' worth in India;
Gold securities = 15 millions in England;

making a total of 20 millions held in England, and 30 millions held in India; 35 of the 50 millions held being sovereigns or rupees, and 15 millions gold securities.

If, as I suggest, a minimum reserve of £50,000,000 is sufficient in normal times, the present sum-total of the two reserves, which is about £68,000,000, is unnecessarily large, and India might safely reduce it by £18,000,000, which might be spent on the railway and canal extensions, of which she stands so urgently in need, and which would bring in to her taxpayers a net income of at least 5 per cent., or say £1,000,000 per annum.

Or, better still, at the present juncture of affairs India could spend this £18,000,000 in presenting to the King-Emperor an Indian fleet of five or six battleships of the most powerful modern type, as her contribution to the naval defence of the Empire to which she owes so much.
At present India contributes nothing to the expenses of the Empire, except in return for what she receives, either in goods or in services rendered, or by way of interest on money lent her. Her finances are more flourishing than those of almost any other country in the world. She pays nothing to the navy, nothing towards the interest on our National Debt. Her people, and especially the poorer masses, are improving in material prosperity as rapidly as are those of any old country in the world. It is high time that the leaders of thought in India should realize that it is India's duty to take her share of the burdens of the Empire, which have hitherto been borne almost entirely by the overtaxed population of these little islands in the Western Seas, and that India will never attain to the position among her sister nations in the British Empire which they desire for her, until she has shown her readiness to contribute her fair share of the expense of maintaining it in peace and security.

However that may be, the sum and substance of my advice to India as regards the management of her currency is, Don't coin any more rupees.

Now one word about a State Bank for India. I agree that, if one is established, it must be entirely under the control of the Government. You cannot have this enormous money power in the hands of people who are independent of the Government. The Bank Director, however wise and fair-thinking he may be, has to think, first and foremost, of the interests of his shareholders and depositors, and the interests of his Bank, and it is difficult for him to take a wide view of what would be for the good of the people of India. The greater part of the currency business is in the hands of the officials of the Finance Department of India; they are men who are trained in this business, and their chief object is, in all circumstances, the interests of the people of India. Their directors are the Government of India, whose chief object also is to do what is best for the people of Indian. Their shareholders are the whole of the taxpayers of India, and they are a much safer body of men to whom to entrust the management of these questions, than any body of bankers, independent of Government. Therefore I agree that the control of a State Bank, if there were one, should be entirely in the hands of the Government.

But, why make any change at all? Things are getting on very well indeed in India, and the only suggestion I have to make in the way of increasing the Government's banking business is (seeing that India has all these huge hoards of money, which means that people have not got full scope for utilizing their savings, and keep in their houses large quantities of gold and silver) the Government should make it possible for the people to deposit their money in an absolutely safe place. Of course, it does that by the Post Office Savings Banks in a small way, but what is wanted is that the Government should say to the people, "You can put your money into any of our Treasuries," and should give the depositor a deposit receipt, guaranteeing him interest at 3½ per cent., and promise to repay him the deposit on three months' notice.

MR. SUNDRAM IYER thanked the Chairman for calling him an authority, and stated that he was not an authority, and he had been studying the question for a long time, and he was afraid he would have to present a
Money Power for India.

standpoint different to that presented by the paper. Whatever proposal was put forward must be in the interests of four-fifths of the population of India, and not in the interests of a few traders or merchants. He did not want to attack any particular class, but they had to bear in mind that, wherever reforms were suggested, the only test they could apply was whether they were in the interests of four-fifths of the population. The discussion so far had been whether the surplus balance was to be in the hands of the London banker or the Anglo-Indian banker. He ventured to ask: Where did the people come in? No one had answered that. The views presented were not the views of the people of India, but the views of a few of the bankers. The views of the people had been misrepresented, and mischievous suggestions had been put forward as to what would be good or bad for India.

The Chairman had gone to the extent of asking India to contribute to the Imperial Defence, and this is a new suggestion for the use of cash balances. The question as to how the cash balances were to be utilized reminded him of a story of a committee that discussed for several hours as to what should be done with a tiger they had caught, and they were informed at the end that the tiger had escaped! The question is, whether India will have large surplus balances. Examining the financial history from 1816, there were more deficits than surpluses. The deficits and exchange troubles were due to various causes—war, famine, plague. He would add to that a new item—i.e., the costly administration of the country, which had increased during the period of five years from seventy-three to seventy-nine millions. Then add to these items the cost of commissions, and new departments, the increasing prices, etc.

Mr. Sundaram Iyer, in defending the London capitalist, said that the Government of India borrowed every year from the London capitalist, and the economic and industrial improvement is due to the British capital, and he would like to know whether any commercial agency or chamber of commerce in India had ever come to the relief of the people by opening up railways or new canals, in order to improve the conditions of the country?

About the question of gold currency, the speaker said that, if the whole population of India was against gold currency, as Mr. Webb puts it, what was the use of forcing it? and if the people did not want it, then who did want the gold currency? Granted that a gold currency was necessary, none of the witnesses before the Commission, including Mr. Webb, have put forward any scheme for increasing the circulation of gold. The simple expedient of throwing open the mints will not lead to successful results, except inflation of currency. The problem to be solved is how to replace the silver by gold. Would you make payments in gold, and deny silver to people? Would you withdraw Rs. 1,000,000 of silver and melt them to be sold as bullion? It is rather unfortunate that the advocates of a gold currency have not discussed this question properly.

Mr. Frewen said his remarks would be very short, because, as a matter of fact, he had been invited by the Association to read a paper during the next few weeks. It gave him much pleasure to find Mr. Webb in the flesh. He had read his excogitations on currency for the last thirty years, and what he knew about India and the silver question he had largely
learned from Mr. Webb. For the past two years he had been more puzzled by the psychology of Mr. Webb than by his economics. His altered views really go to the whole root of the currency question. Thus he was delighted to have now got the key—and a very interesting key it was—because he had discovered in every part of the world that when men's minds ran on this question of currency, to the exclusion of other and perhaps more important issues, they turned out "greenbackers." He did not wish to depreciate "greenbackism," because there might be a logical future for it—if not on this planet, then on some other—but he believed that if India were to adopt any such currency plan as that expounded in the closing page of Mr. Webb's paper—well, one more experiment after all the score India had suffered from did not much matter. If they were going to try such an experiment, the result would be a further inflation of currency, and if there was that inflation, the prices of Indian commodities would certainly rise still more. Thus imports into India would be stimulated, her exports would be reduced, and the balance of trade would go against India, and she would lose her gold standard with all her gold currency. He thanked God if India did lose her pernicious gold standard.

He looked at the Indian situation from the broadest standpoint. He regarded the gold and silver that was in India as enormous national assets. By the thrift of the people of India they had succeeded during hundreds of years in absorbing, as the Chairman declared, one-tenth of the whole gold of the world; yes, and also one-fifth of all the known silver on the earth's surface. The gold could be left to take care of itself; anyone who owned gold could draw fifteen rupees against a sovereign's worth of gold. He was only concerned in taking care of the silver of the myriad poor; and what had been done in relation to silver by the British Government he held up to the reprobation of our time and our posterity. Actually the only security the poor people of India had acquired was their silver—silver either in the form of bullion or of ornaments. They owned roughly 2,000 million ounces of silver, which was some twenty-five rupees per capita. When silver was admitted to free coinage, they were able to get rupees against all the silver bullion they owned at par—180 grains was a rupee with mints open. But the Government had so legislated since 1893 that, instead of the per capita silver capital of India being twenty-five rupees, they had reduced that 2,000 million ounces of silver in its money power and food purchasing power to some thirteen rupees! Nor was that all. They had not only reduced the value of the bullion for the mint purpose by 50 per cent., but because India was at this moment suffering from an inflation of her currency, all prices had risen enormously in India, and the man who would have had a money power of twenty-six rupees (now reduced to thirteen because the mints are closed) when he now takes a rupee into the market the purchasing power of that rupee is further shorn by one half. There was no reply to those things. The tampering with the Indian currency was perfectly intolerable.

He would say: If they were going to do those things, then do them up to the top notch, as Mr. Webb proposes. Let them drive the gold that was in India pell-mell out of India into Europe, by vast issues of inconvertible paper. The result would be that more gold would come into
Europe, and there would be a further rise of prices in Europe. Then, if prices in India had not risen, everything that India exported would find here a better market, and her exchange and financial situation would be infinitely easier. The Chairman remarked that, but for the absorption of gold by India, the rise of prices in the West would have been greater than it has been. That was not an argument that commended itself to him, in the light of history. After some £700,000,000 of gold had come from California and Australia, in the last century, wages and prices rose in Europe, but not very considerably, and when surprise was expressed that the inflation of prices here was not very much greater, Michel Chevalier said that “silver is the parachute which has broken the fall of gold.” A memorable explanation indeed! The fact was, that the whole silver currency of the Latin Union passed into the melting-pot, and was thrown pell-mell into India. That contraction of our currencies modified the tendency to the rise of prices here. I live in the hope that we shall see that condition restored, and that silver may again be the “parachute.” India in the last thirteen years had drawn against her great trade balances fully £170,000,000 sterling in gold. If she had been allowed to draw her trade balances, as before 1893, in silver instead of gold, she would have attracted the loose silver of the world into India; she would have drawn, instead of a great mass of gold which she does not want and we want enormously, some 800 million ounces of silver. When we allow for the consumption by the silversmiths of the world in their business, the whole of the silver that had been produced in the last eight years can be earmarked as having been coined for token currencies by the rest of the world, except some five million ounces. Instead of five million ounces of surplus here, there would have been 800 million ounces flowing into India.

As he had previously said, the arrival of the new gold of Australia and California in Europe was of infinite value; it occasioned a very sunburst of prosperity—the “Golden Age” in the world’s history. Why, therefore, should not the same condition of things have resulted if silver had been permitted to flow into Asia after 1893? England had done an unpardonable thing. He agreed with every word of Mr. Sundara Iyer (who had written a memorandum for the sitting Royal Commission, which he would recommend everyone to read). Mr. Iyer pointed out, on the authority of the Indian banks he represented before the Commission, that in 100 per cent. of transactions 75 per cent. were effected by silver certificates, 20 per cent. by rupees, and 5 per cent. only of the transactions were in sovereigns, at once melted down by shroffs. In order that shroffs should have gold to melt down for jewellery, they had tampered with the whole credit system of India, and they had handed over 300,000,000 of the people of India to be despoiled, through ruinous rates of interest by the most unscrupulous usurers in the world.

In conclusion, he said that he would shortly find the opportunity to put his views before the Association, and if it were not possible to find adequate remedies for the present juggling with the Indian currency, he would join Mr. Webb, perhaps, in the ranks of the greenbackers.

Mr. Murray: As there is not much time, I will hand in my paper to the Association, so that they may be able to see what I intended to say. I
am not quite in agreement with the general view of the quantity of money theory, but it is too long a thing to go into now. I will hand in this paper, and you will see what my views are on that subject. I am fully against the State Bank. No doubt Mr. Webb will naturally say, that is because I have been an Exchange banker, but that is not at all the reason.

Many of us probably think that Mr. Webb’s zeal for Indian interests overruns the discretion which the case of India calls for. It seems to me, personally, to be one that elicits the philosophic dictum of Captain Bunsby that “the bearings of this observation lies in the application on it.”

Take the quantity of money theory, which Mr. Webb largely relies on to prove that the prices of commodities owe their rise solely or principally to inflated volumes of money. I will read you what John Stuart Mill, one of Mr. Webb’s authorities, has written upon this subject:

“The proposition which we have laid down respecting the dependence of general prices upon the quantity of money in circulation must be understood as applying only to a state of things in which money—that is, gold or silver—is the exclusive instrument of exchange, and actually passes from hand to hand at every purchase, credit in any of its shapes being unknown. When credit comes into play as a means of purchasing, distinct from money in hand, we shall hereafter find that the connection between prices and the amount of the circulating medium is much less direct and intimate, and that such connection as does exist no longer admits of so simple a mode of expression. That an increase of the quantity of money raises prices, and a diminution lowers them, is the most elementary proposition in the theory of currency, and without it we should have no key to any of the others. In any state of things, however, except the simple and primitive one which we have supposed, the proposition is only true, other things being the same; and what those other things are, which must be the same, we are not yet ready to pronounce.

“For example, it is habitually assumed that whenever there is a greater amount of money in the country, or in existence, a rise of prices must necessarily follow. But this is by no means an inevitable consequence. In no commodity is it the quantity in existence, but the quantity offered for sale, that determines the value. Whatever may be the quantity of money in the country, only that part of it will affect prices which goes into the market of commodities, and is there actually exchanged against goods. Whatever increases the amount of this portion of the money in the country tends to raise prices. But money hoarded does not act on prices. Money kept in reserve by individuals to meet contingencies which do not occur does not act on prices. The money in the coffer of the Bank, or retained as a reserve by private bankers, does not act on prices until drawn out, nor even then unless drawn out to be expended in commodities.”

You must see how difficult it is to say what other influences beside that of money may not have affected prices; how especially in India hoarding has diminished redundancy to zero; how the enormous new issues of credit during the last few years for new enterprises must to a large extent have been, temporarily we hope, unproductive, as they must always be pending development; how demand and supply has separately affected the prices of each commodity; finally, how, the production of gold notwithstanding
the result, far from indicating a surplus, impresses us with a fear that there is barely enough to go round. I quite agree with Mr. Webb that what we do see is inflation in the issue of credit, but I think it is correct to say that credit is more the product of prosperity than of gold. Prices, too, have, I think, been raised as the result of prosperity rather than by the production of gold. The increased cost of production of all commodities, including gold, is also a part of prosperity, because it follows from a higher scale of wages, which means that there is a fairer distribution of wealth; that profits are being shared by the poorer as well as by the richer classes; that consequently there is a wider demand for commodities, especially for those comprised in the necessaries of life. The counteracting effect of wages on prices, and prices on wages, may suggest the nightmare of a spiral staircase, but that omits allowance for the reacting effect of new issues. These can only be stimulated by one object, to supply an increasing demand, and though there may be some delays and even failures, it may be taken that, as a whole, they do bring supply up to the demand, and adjust prices from an artificial to a natural level.

The pith of Mr. Webb's argument, as I understand it, is: "Give India a sound system of currency with open mints, and let experience and economy adjust themselves to it; this they will more easily do under conditions in which simplicity and finality are substituted for artificiality and uncertainty." It is a brave argument, and one which we must all respect. But—there is always a "but"—I think there is a prevailing preference to put experience and economy first. It is essentially a transition to be conducted on the principle of solvitur ambulando.

I am rather surprised that Mr. Webb, while deprecating official manipulation of the currency and exchange, should support the proposal of a State Bank to manipulate the finance of trade. If there is one thing more than another that is an article of faith throughout the Empire, it is the freedom of our banks from State interference. State finance and bank finance are two distinctly different things. They may for certain purposes be brought together, but they cannot be worked together, without destroying the individuality of both. The State is the trustee of the national funds, and its duty is to trust nobody. The banks are the centres of credit, and as such have to exploit trust to the fullest extent that opportunity and discretion permit, in order to receive trust in return, and their operations, though they incidentally assist others to make profits, are conceived with the object of making profits exclusively for themselves.

I suppose everyone admits that the enormous progress which has been attendant on Free Trade is a strong argument in its favour, not a final one, perhaps, but one which must make reformers hesitate in rushing to what they may consider a higher ideal. I suggest to Mr. Webb, that seeing how greatly trade and prosperity have improved under the Indian Currency Reform scheme as conducted since 1899, there is at least good reason for allowing the solvitur ambulando principle to work out gradually and automatically.

Mr. Major thought that Mr. Frewen had rather made sport of Mr. Webb's suggestion of what he termed "greenbacks." He did not know how far Mr. Webb had put that forward seriously, or how far he was
working to that end, but he ventured to think Mr. Webb had come very near to the truth, and he hoped before long Mr. Frewen would come to realize it. Mr. Frewen had said that an unbacked paper currency would lead to inflation, but he had shown them that to-day there was inflation under the present system. It was true Mr. Frewen was endeavouring to get rid of that inflation by a different method, but if they could have a standard, and regulate the issues of currency, the Government, or the people of India, need not fear inflation, when they accepted a purely paper currency, based not on a precious metal, but on that which is at the back of all wealth—the food supply of the people—in such a way that you prevent, on an average of years, the average price of the chief food grain from fluctuating. In years of scarcity the price would rise, and they would find that that would lead to plenty, because the merchants would be more interested in obtaining grain for the people than in obtaining manufactures which the people could not buy.

Mr. Webb was absolutely right in his main contention, but when he suggested that currency might be issued against canals he undoubtedly gave himself into Mr. Frewen’s hands, as you could not base your currency on railways or canals, or anything of the kind. If, however, they based it on the food supply in the way suggested, so as to prevent the average price of food falling, they would find that the Government would have to give to the nation (whatever nation it was) their canals and railways—all that would develop the country of India—without cost to the nation; and in so doing, they would be able to give the further issues of money which were absolutely essential to the welfare of the people.

Mr. E. Benedict said that he wished to put in a word in favour of the much-maligned Englishman in India; he thought their Indian friends, instead of abusing them all the time, should take into consideration what they had done. Speaking personally, when in India he had employed a great number of natives in railway works, and made it possible for the produce of the land to go to ports, and it had been said that the value of the crops raised alongside the canals in one year was sufficient to pay for the whole capital cost of the canals all over India. That fact alone showed the country has improved enormously. Now, in plentiful years they could take their produce to the ports, and, owing to the railways, they could get produce from other parts of the country where there was no scarcity, at a reasonable cost.

The Lecturer, who was received with applause, said: Mr. Chairman, ladies, and gentlemen, I must first of all thank you for the very kindly way in which you have received my paper. The lateness of the hour makes it quite impossible for me to reply at length to all the points raised, especially as some of them refer to a period nearly a century back, and run through all kinds of matters, from the preparation of budgets, the disposal of surpluses and deficits, the supposed struggle between London and Anglo-Indian bankers, the much-maligned Englishman, India’s contribution to the navy, and other matters outside the scope of the paper that I have read this afternoon; so I will simply content myself by drawing attention to one or two contrasts. Mr. Iyer tells us that no one in India wants gold, but the very last report of the Accountant-General of the Bombay Presi-
dency (which I hold in my hand) informs the world that gold is circulating freely, to the extent of very many millions sterling, in Western and Northern India. That is one little discrepancy of fact. Which is the correct statement? Then Mr. Frewen told us that it was necessary to deluge India with more silver, whilst the Chairman has pointed out that if there was one thing more than another which it was essential to avoid, it was the coinage of more silver! I will leave these two divergent opinions to cancel one another, merely remarking that I believe the Chairman to be right. There is another point to which I should like to draw attention, and that is with regard to the Chairman's remark on the subject of a mint: The Chairman would support a mint, not so much because it is necessary, as for sentimental grounds. I want to adduce another argument. In the Currency Report just issued by the Bombay Presidency appears this sentence: "In the absence of a gold mint in India there is no alternative but to remit periodically light sovereigns to England for coinage." The Government of India paid last year to the P. and O. £13,600 freight on light sovereigns re-shipped to England because there was no gold mint in India! That is more than the cost of maintaining a gold mint in Bombay! Those sovereigns might have been re-coined in Bombay had there been a gold mint there; so I would draw attention to the fact that there are material, earthly, practical advantages, in addition to sentimental reasons, why you should have the gold mint mechanism on the spot rather than pay freight for bringing gold to London to be coined.

Then there is one last point. Mr. Iyer drew attention to the fact that we ought to consider the great mass of the people. That is the first consideration I had in my mind. I have been trying throughout to suggest proposals for providing the most satisfactory monetary tools, and I think if he looks carefully at my paper he will find I have referred to tools for the poor people, and to the agricultural banks by which these tools shall be placed at the disposal of the people. Also I have suggested that Government might do worse than place some of its funds in the banks of the co-operative societies with the special object of helping the poorer classes.

On the subject of inconvertible notes time will not permit me to argue now. The Chairman suggested that if he saw any of my notes about he would be very careful about accepting them. I think he would show great wisdom; but I did not suggest my notes, but notes of the Government of India, secured by Indian railways and canals. If the Chairman would not take Government notes of this character, I think that I know someone who would! I thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for granting me so patient a hearing.

On the motion of Sir Robert Fulton, seconded by Sir Leslie Probyn, a very hearty vote of thanks was accorded to the Lecturer and to the Chairman, and carried unanimously.

If there had been a little more time last night, I should have liked to ask Mr. Webb one question.

He says, more than once, that paper, even if inconvertible, is a more
scientific form of currency than even gold, and we have already got an increasingly popular paper currency in India, backed by funds that seem to amount to about 90 million sterling, to say nothing of the whole credit of the Government, and the many millions it has invested in railways and irrigation, etc. Where then is the need for an extravagant luxury like a gold currency, and why should not notes for ten and five rupees serve India as well as one-pound notes serve canny Scotland? Perhaps he will kindly explain, even now. J. B. Pennington.

MR. WEBB writes: The discussion of my paper wandered so very far from the points with which I was treating that no time was left for replying to one or two very important matters. Mr. Sundram Iyer altogether misunderstood the drift of my paper, which was not written on behalf of Anglo-Indian, London, or any other bankers, but solely on behalf of the people of India, many of whom have for some time been eagerly demanding gold monetary tools. Mr. Moreton Frewen, too, spoke as though I wanted to inflate India's currency with inconvertible paper; but I expressly pointed out that the present time was not at all suitable for the further issue of paper. Already the world's currency is depreciating so rapidly that I strongly object to its further inflation by the issue of tons of unnecessary silver coins in India—an objection that seems to me quite rational, but which Mr. Frewen stubbornly refuses to understand. I have carefully re-read the extract from John Stuart Mill to which Mr. Murray has kindly drawn my attention, and I find myself in exact agreement with it. No doubt the connection between the world's output of gold and the general purchasing power of money has never been more difficult to trace than at the present day, but that it operates by way of the credit allowed to the public by bankers (largely on the strength of their metallic reserves) is in my opinion unquestionable.

My reply to Mr. Pennington's inquiry is as follows:

1. The Indian paper currency is backed by the following:

**IN INDIA.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coin/Security</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Silver coin</td>
<td>10 million pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold coin</td>
<td>17 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securities</td>
<td>7 &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IN LONDON.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coin/Security</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gold coin</td>
<td>6 million pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securities</td>
<td>3 &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

plus the credit of the Government of India.

2. A gold currency is not regarded as an "extravagant luxury" by Australasia, or South Africa, or Canada, or England, although in one sense it is. The use of a gold currency in India would (1) add very greatly to India's prestige and credit in the eyes of the outside world, (2) assure beyond all possible doubt or chance of mishap the stability of the rupee in relation to gold, and so (3) facilitate the movements of capital to and from India, (4) lower the rates of interest, and (5) contribute to a more rapid development of India's economic resources.
THE VERNACULARS IN INDIAN UNIVERSITIES

By J. D. Anderson.

Those who are interested in Indian education seem to admit, firstly, that much literary talent which might have gone to the improvement and progress of indigenous literature is now lavished (I do not say "wasted") on English writing; and, secondly, that the study of the vernaculars by Englishmen living in India is more neglected than it was in days when a man could hardly conduct his business or perform his official duties without at least a practical familiarity with the tongue of the people. I am not at all sure that this state of things, so far as it exists, is altogether an evil; nor is it certain, even if the neglect of the vernaculars be admitted to be an evil, that there are not abundant compensations. There was a time when Latin was the language of learning all over Europe. It was necessarily a time when learning was the possession of a privileged few—of a class of pundits whose works were little known outside their exclusive circle. But it was an international possession, and the foundations of the modern sciences and literatures were laid by men who were the pick of all European nations. It may be that India is now going through a similar stage of intellectual development, and that English in India is performing the function which Latin performed in Europe till quite recent times. It
implies a condition of intellectual aristocracy, and is painful to the feelings of those whose leanings in art, literature, science, and education, are democratic.

There is so much to be said on both sides that I do not propose to suggest that the vernaculars should be made the medium of University instruction in India. Indeed, there is no occasion for me to defend this thesis. The thing has been done, once for all, by Sir Theodore Morison in his address on the subject to the members of the London East and West Society. I am not sure that I have had access to a full account of Sir Theodore Morison's paper, or of the subsequent discussion. I rely on a necessarily abbreviated report published in the *Indian Magazine* for September. But the report contains enough for my purpose. I am not surprised to find that Sir Theodore's suggestion that a freer use of the vernaculars should be made in Indian Universities met with considerable opposition. If the *Indian Magazine* is correctly informed, only two of Sir Theodore's hearers, Mr. S. C. Roy and Mr. P. K. Ghose (both of them, be it observed, Bengalis), were in favour of the vernaculars as a medium for University instruction and University examinations.

What were the arguments on the other side? Mr. P. C. Tarapore claimed that English should not be called a foreign language, "since it came from the same original stock" (as the Aryan languages of India, I presume). The fact that Sir Syad Ahmad and other leaders of Mussalman opinion in India did not know English was no proof that an ignorance of English is an advantage. Look at H.E. the Aga Khan and the Right Hon. Mr. Amir Ali, Mr. Tarapore argued. Their influence is not weakened, their intelligence is not blunted, by the fact that they have in English a second vernacular. Not otherwise might a Buchanan defend the use of Latin in education! Let us admit that there is much to be said for the plea.

Mr. S. Hussain raised a very practical objection to Sir Theodore's proposition. There are many vernaculars in
the area educationally controlled by Indian Universities. [I may say in passing that the Calcutta University has to provide for the intellectual needs of peoples whose vernaculars are Bengali, Hindi, Uriya, Assamese, Khasia, Tibetan, Burmese, and many minor languages.]

Mr. Mahomed Sadiq was suspicious, and, I think, satirical. How was it that two or three generations ago Englishmen were forcing English on Indian schools and Universities, and are now inclined to withdraw that boon? Mr. Mahomed Sadiq suggests, I think, that some political idea (probably quite absent from Sir Theodore’s mind) underlies the proposed use of the vernaculars in the Universities.

Mr. Desai, I note with much interest, “described the vernaculars as dead languages: the only living language,” he said, “amongst the educated classes is English.”

Finally, to finish the case for the defence of English, Mr. Coldstream “was in favour of imparting the knowledge of the three R’s in the vernacular, but for higher studies English was essential”; and Mr. Gandevia said that “if the suggestion of Sir Theodore Morison were put in force, the hands of progress in India would be set back a century.”

Evidently Sir Theodore’s audience, with two exceptions, was against him. He succeeded, that is, in eliciting the very valuable fact that educated Indians hold that the time has not come to make the vernaculars, or any of them, the basis of higher education in India. I am not going to ask members of the East India Association to reconsider a decision so unhesitatingly adopted by the London East and West Society. I will take it for granted that public opinion is not ripe, except possibly in Bengal, for the use of the vernaculars as a medium of advanced instruction. The arguments by which that opinion is supported have much force, and, in any case, they can only be answered by persons more competent than myself, and can indeed only be answered by Indian University men. So long as the
graduates of Indian Universities feel that higher education can only be imparted in English, there the matter must rest. India must be content to use English as Europe once used Latin. There will be gain as well as loss, and it is possible that the gain will be greater than the loss.

Those of us, however, who know Sir Theodore Morison will feel convinced that his plea for the vernaculars was based upon a disinterested desire for the spread of sound living in India, for the democratizing of education, for the introduction of some such popular system of intellectual training as we have in the Scotch Universities. If he thought that the use of the vernaculars in Indian Universities would meet with the support of Indian graduates, he was, no doubt, mistaken. But that the vernaculars have suffered cannot be denied. I cannot speak of other provinces; but in Bengal, at least, many men who might have won high distinction as vernacular authors have been content to contribute to the groaning shelves of those who read English. Such, to take one instance only, was my friend the late Romesh Chandra Dutt, who did, indeed, write Bengali novels, but devoted the best of his remarkable literary talent to writing in English. That is probably not a very serious evil. There was a time when Europeans wrote admirably in Latin, and thereby prepared a classical tradition which was not without its beneficial effect on the modern literatures of Europe. The time has not yet come, perhaps, for the critic to pronounce on the effect of English literature in providing modern subject matter and a new literary style for the vernaculars of India. But I may be permitted to say that much of the charm and emotional appeal of Ravindranath Tagore's work, especially in prose, is due to the skill with which he has combined the traditional style of Bengali with a prose rhythm which is the result of many generations of literary experiment in Europe. In Bengal, it may be doubted if the writing of the vernaculars has really suffered from the cultivation of English. Bengali has probably gained more than it has lost, if we look
merely to the arts of literary expression. We should all dislike a vernacular style which is merely and slavishly imitation of a foreign method of speech. But if the best English models are used—as Cicero and Tacitus, Virgil and Lucretius have been used by European writers—we need not complain. Looked at from that point of view, there is something to be said for Mr. Tarapore's contention.

But that is only to say that the vernaculars are rapidly growing more fitted for the highest educational uses. In Bengal—the development of the vernacular for such purposes is being deliberately and systematically practised. There is much to be said for Mr. Coldstream's contention that the vernaculars (or many of them, at least) are not yet fitted for the use of university lecturers and examiners. There are two reasons for this. Some vernaculars, in the first place, are deficient in the vocabulary of science and art and literature. Secondly, the linguistic history, the etymology, the historical grammar of most vernaculars have not been systematically studied except by European pioneers, whose tentative excursions into a difficult field are probably little known to indigenous pandits. But this is not the case in Bengal. In Calcutta there exists an admirable society, the Vaṅgiya Sāhitya Pariṣat, whose president is the venerable Paṇḍit Hara Prasad Sāstri. This society has been working for some years at the history and etymology of Bengali. It has, notably, prepared vocabularies providing vernacular translations (mostly taken from the Sanskrit) for the scientific phraseology of Europe, which, as we all know, is mostly taken from Greek. Much remains to be done, doubtless, and Messrs. P. C. Roy and P. K. Ghose were perhaps rash in thinking that Bengali is now sufficiently copious and pliant and expressive to take the place of English as a vehicle of culture and instruction. But a very important beginning has been made. I only regret that the admirable Patrikā, published by the society, is so little known in Europe (it is probably better known in Paris than in London). I regret, too, that the Patrikā does not,
so far, admit contributions in English, and hence does not procure the help and criticism of European scholars. If we admit that English is playing the part in India which Latin once played in Europe, English has this advantage over Latin, that it is still a living and a growing language, and India should avail itself of the services of living Europeans who are interested in the vernaculars. But this is a digression, and one on which I do not wish to dwell.

In Bengal, then, indigenous scholars are deliberately endeavouring to make the local language a fit vehicle for every literary purpose, whether of instruction or art, of delight or profit. But this is being done chiefly by an association of enlightened amateurs. What part is the Calcutta University taking in the matter? The present learned Vice-Chancellor, Sir Asutosh Mukharji, has had the courage and enlightenment to employ my friend, Mr. Dinesh Chandra Sen, to deliver a course of lectures which have recently been published in the form of an admirable History of Bengali Language and Literature. Mr. Sen is now employed in preparing an annotated Anthology of medieval Bengali poetry. Sir Asutosh, however, is (I grieve to say) about to resign his post as the mouthpiece and head of his University, and it is possible (and I fear probable) that his generous initiative in favour of his native speech may not be continued by his successors. I am told that the Senate is already doubtful as to the advantage of vernacular studies, and is inclined to grudge money spent on their prosecution. This is obviously a matter as to which I cannot express any opinion. It would be presumptuous for us over here to discuss a matter on which the leading authorities in Bengal have still a divided mind. My object is merely to point out that the Calcutta University has already done something for the vernaculars. Its attitude is certainly not one of blind obstructiveness. Its difficulties, like that of all Universities, except perhaps those of America, are probably due to a lack of funds. Teaching—good teaching—is an expensive luxury, and the vernaculars may,
for a time, have to take a back place simply because other things are more necessary at the present time.

I have been a long time in coming to my own personal contribution, very diffidently offered, to the question of the vernaculars in the Universities. Observe that I do not urge that the vernaculars should be used for University lectures or examinations. The opposition is still much too strong, and is supported by arguments to which we all, whatever our private opinions may be, must give a respectful hearing. But I wish to draw attention to the fact that in the Calcutta University (and I suppose the same is true of other Indian Universities) it is not possible for an undergraduate to obtain a degree for knowledge, however complete and scholarly, of his native language and literature. Nor is it possible, so far as I know, for a foreigner, an Englishman, for instance, to apply to the Calcutta University for a degree, or even a diploma, as a reward for proficiency in Bengali. Now it is obvious that some subjects are not suited for a degree examination, because they have not been sufficiently worked up to form the subject of academical study. I do not say that a knowledge of the vernacular is quite useless to an undergraduate of the Calcutta University. In the matriculation examination there is a paper on "Vernacular Composition," in the preparation for which candidates are advised to study the works of selected contemporary authors as models of style. So in the intermediate examination there are (a) a paper requiring translations from English; (b) vernacular questions on composition; (c) an essay in the vernacular. But this is a test of literary capacity merely, and is not a severe trial of a candidate's knowledge of his mother tongue. In the B.A. examination there is a paper on "Vernacular Composition," but it is expressly stipulated that "questions shall not be set on the history of the vernacular and its literature."

I do not for a moment suggest that a knowledge of any Indian vernacular should be made compulsory. But surely
those who wish it should be permitted to submit themselves for examination in honours in at least such vernaculars as Hindi, Bengali, and Marathi. What I would suggest would be something like Sections A and B of the Modern Language Tripos at Cambridge, which deal respectively with English language and literature between 1,500 and the present time, and English language and literature before that date. At Cambridge a man may get an honours degree by showing adequate proficiency in both these subjects of study, or in one of them combined with (1) modern French; (2) old French; (3) modern German; or (4) old German. Has not the time come when not only Indians but foreigners in Indian Universities might be allowed to study the vernaculars in some such fashion? I admit that there are difficulties in the way. It may be urged that the mass of learning at present accumulated is not sufficient to supply an adequate test of industry and scholarship. No one wishes to make Indian academic tests too easy. For my part, I believe that in Bengali at least it would be possible to set papers as difficult as those which are set in the Modern Language Tripos at Cambridge. But I may be mistaken. The matter is, at all events, one which might be discussed by the competent authorities in India. The examination in the vernacular might be combined with tests of the candidate's knowledge of Sanskrit, or Prakrit, or of cognate modern languages, a knowledge of whose history might throw light on the history and etymology of the vernacular taken up. But these are obviously details which must be left to experts.

I have mentioned the case of foreign students, and I had especially in my mind the case of those members of the Civil Service (rarer, I am told, every year) who prepare themselves for the existing high proficiency examinations and the degree of honour. The obtaining of these is rewarded by prizes of Rs. 1,000 and Rs. 2,000 respectively. Owing to the fall in value of the rupee and of the growing expense of tuition, these rewards are not in themselves very
tempting incitements to the severe labour involved in reading for the Government examinations. Passing these examinations has never, I think, been considered as a means of obtaining official advancement. There have been times when men who indulged in linguistic studies were held to be wasting time which should have been wholly given to administrative duties. Here again there is much to be said on both sides. I do not think that linguistic proficiency should be considered as a necessary proof of administrative ability. Many excellent officers are not good linguists, and it must be admitted that good linguists are not always either useful or even industrious officials. But if a man has a taste for the languages of India, surely he should be encouraged to study them and to associate with those Indian scholars who are building up the materials for a science of Indian philology. Could not arrangements be made whereby officials might take degrees in honours at the Universities? Most of our officials nowadays are distinguished graduates of Universities affiliated to the Indian Universities. The degrees might be conferred not only as a result of examinations, which are apt to deal with the mint and anise and cummin of linguistics, with grammar in its more pedantic forms, such as rules as to sandhis and samāsas. Degrees in honours might be given for theses based on research. I suppose no one will deny that the Indian vernaculars present opportunities for much patient research. Such conscientious investigators as Mr. Dinesh Chandra Sen could no doubt suggest a dozen branches of inquiry in which a man trained in the latest European methods could be of infinite service to vernacular scholars.

I have been tempted to go into detail to suggest various subjects of study. But my present purpose is merely to provide material for kindly but candid discussion. My sympathies are with Sir Theodore Morison when he urges that the vernaculars are neglected, and should not be neglected. Most Englishmen who read have realized that, in Ravindranath Tagore, Bengal possesses a literary artist
of the very first rank. His command of his vernacular has not been diminished, but probably strengthened, by his acquaintance with the literatures of Europe. But even if we admit (what he himself would indignantly disclaim) that he is the unquestioned and unapproachable chief of Bengali letters, we do not advise Englishmen to neglect English literature because (for all that Mr. Bernard Shaw says) Shakespeare is, in a sense, unique, and Milton and Dryden, Wordsworth and Tennyson, are the *dii minores* of our literary Olympus. Even if we admit that the vernaculars are not yet a fitting medium for academical instruction, even if we must allow that the study of the vernaculars should not be made compulsory, still, we ought to encourage those who are learned in the modern languages and modern literatures of India, whether they be Indians or foreigners. If I may cite an instance, I should like to mention (with apologies for taking a liberty which he may resent) the case of my friend M. Jules Bloch, who has for some years been engaged in a comparative and historical study of the languages of the Deccan. His work should, I think, be known to and encouraged by Indian Universities, if only as a contribution to the body of learning which may some day form the subject of the academical studies of Indian undergraduates. I plead for a recognition of the value of vernacular studies. Their use as a medium of instruction is a comparatively small matter, which will come of itself in due time if the need arises. What seems wanted now is the admission that the study of the vernaculars may justly be regarded as a branch of learning, as important in its way as mathematics, or classics, or history, or economics, or engineering, or mining, or commerce. Not all vernaculars, of course, can be promoted to this high dignity. But those which have a fairly ancient and copious literature—those which can be used as Ravindranath Tagore uses Bengali as a means of artistic and emotional expression, should be regarded as fit subjects for academical study, and therefore as worthy to be rewarded by the highest academical honours.
There are many Indian languages which have advanced far beyond the three R's, and can hold their own with the classical tongues of India and Europe. This fact, at least, might be fitly recognized by the Universities of India. If Calcutta or Allahabad, Madras or Bombay, develops a living and vigorous school of the modern languages of India, such a school will be of infinite service to the growing band of Europeans, led by Sir George Grierson and Dr. Hoernle, who are making a serious study of the vernaculars of India, not merely as a vehicle of instruction, not merely, even, as literary languages, but as a most important subject in the scientific investigation of the speech of mankind. Sir George Grierson's masterly Linguistic Survey of India is a remarkable feat for one man to have conceived and executed. It is an even greater feat than Dr. Johnson's famous Dictionary, more laborious, and requiring greater powers of co-ordination, research, comparison, arrangement. Sir George Grierson's labours have won the recognition of European Universities. Surely the time has come when the Universities of India, and especially the Calcutta University, should recognize and reward the study of the modern languages of India, their origins and growth, and the materials they supply for the investigations of the historians of language, the comparative grammarians, and philologists generally.

Finally, let me say that, in spite of the absence of academical encouragement, much valuable work has already been done by students of the vernaculars. In Bengali alone, to say nothing of the excellent publications of the Vaṅgiya Sāhitya Pariṣad, there are many admirable works on grammar and philology. Such are Mr. Ravindranath Tagore's suggestive and interesting Sabda-tattwa, and Mahāmahopādhyay Prasanna Chandra Vidyāratna's Sāhitya-Praves, and Mr. Durgā Chandra Sanyāl's Bhāṣā Vijñāna, and several scattered philological essays by my old friend, Mr. Vireswar Sen. RayYatindra nāth Chaudhuri, the amiable Secretary of the Vaṅgiya Sāhitya Pariṣad, tells me that,
"in order to make Western scholars acquainted with the work the Pariṣad has been doing during the last twenty years, it has been decided to publish a copy and an index— in English and in Bengali—of the first twenty volumes of the Journal." Here is an excellent, a patriotic work, which might well have the recognition and support of the University and, perhaps, even of Government. I might give many more details to show that one, at least, of the Indian vernaculars is not being neglected. I only mention these matters in order to show that, if the time has not yet arrived for the use of Bengali as a medium of University teaching, it does seem that the great University of Calcutta might now recognize vernacular scholarship, and might confer its degrees on those who are willing to further the cause of vernacular learning by devoting their lives to its service. The standard set should be very high; the degree, if a degree in the vernaculars should be granted, should be difficult of attainment. The examiners should include men who have some knowledge of philological study in Europe; the learning demanded of candidates should be more substantial and scientific than the erudition (excellent in its way) of the old-fashioned guru mahāsāy and pandit. But the time does seem to have arrived when the Universities of India might recognize that the vernaculars can provide the materials for scholarly study. Even in the case of the more backward vernaculars, those which do not yet possess a large vocabulary and a rich literature, there is much to be achieved by close and comparative study. Most of us know, if only by report, of the extraordinary results obtained by Pater Schmidt of Vienna through his study of the Mon-Annam family of languages. Among the alumni of the Calcutta University are many Khasias, speakers of the most developed branch of this now famous group of speeches. I have purposely refrained from mentioning anthropology as a study cognate to that of modern languages, but I cannot conclude without mentioning that at least one laborious work on ethnology has already been
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published in Bengali—Mr. Satīś Chandra Ghose's study of the Chākmās, a race of mixed Bengali and Aracanese origin. This forms the twenty-fourth volume of the Granthāvali of the Pariṣad. If there are any Bengali gentlemen present, they will no doubt point out omissions in my very rough enumeration of the work done in their vernacular. I hope that, in that case, they will support my contention that vernacular learning should receive academical recognition. It should not be alienated from European studies. On the contrary, it should be regarded as a contribution to the disinterested work already performed in India and Europe. But the Universities of India should take a part in encouraging and directing vernacular studies.

Discussion on the Forgoing Paper

At a meeting of the East India Association held at 21, Cromwell Road, South Kensington, on Tuesday, November 18, 1913, a paper entitled "The Vernaculars in Indian Universities" was read by Mr. James Drummond Anderson, L.C.S. (retired). Sir Lancelot Hare, K.C.S.I., C.I.E. (late Lieutenant-Governor of East Bengal and Assam), occupied the chair, and the following ladies and gentlemen, amongst others, were present: Mirza Abbas Ali Baig, C.S.I., Mr. C. E. Buckland, C.I.E., Lady Elliott, Mrs. Luttman Johnson, Mrs. Villiers Stuart, Mr. H. N. Harris, Mr. H. R. Cook, Mr. J. B. Pennington, Mr. R. F. Chisholm, Mr. W. Coldstream, Mr. J. S. Dhanjibhoy, Mr. S. A. Sami, Mr. R. Sewell, Mrs. Haigh, Mr. J. Behesnilian. Mr. J. N. Sahai, Mr. W. Skinner, Mr. N. B. Nagarkar, Thakur Shri Jessraj-singhji Seesodia, Mr. Sundara Raja, Mr. A. Bruce Joy, R.H.A., Mr. Duncan Irvine, Mr. Shah Naimatallah, Mr. A. O. Koreishi, Mr. and Mrs. F. G. Wigley, Mr. K. L. Venkataraman, Mr. Chuni Lal, Mr. F. W. Barber, Dr. Bhabba, Mr. M. A. Azim, Mr. A. Russell, Mr. M. N. Kaul, Mr. and Mrs. Roland Maitland, Mr. R. F. J. Maitland, Mr. M. M. Gandevia, Mr. E. Haggard, Miss Lambert, Miss Gertrude Roberts, Mrs. White, Mrs. Mundy, Mrs. Briggs, Mrs. Grey, Mr. F. H. Brown, Mrs. Frank Elliott, Mr. A. H. Beavan, Mr. E. B. Harris, and Dr. John Pollen, C.I.E.

The Secretary: Ladies and gentlemen, on this occasion we are gathered together in a homely fashion under this roof by the kind permission of the Household Committee to whom we are very grateful for the kindness they have shown to us.

The Chairman: The subject our lecturer is going to speak about today is the question of the position the vernacular languages should take in the
University curriculum in India. The subject, I think, is a very important one, and I am quite sure we shall hear from Mr. Anderson something which will give us cause for serious consideration, and will, I hope, lead to a very useful discussion afterwards. Mr. Anderson brings to this subject a very great knowledge of one of the vernacular languages of India—the Bengali—and he also has a great deal of experience of the inner working of the Universities, which he has carefully studied. I therefore anticipate that the discussion to-day will be of extreme interest. I have much pleasure in calling upon him.

The Lecturer: Ladies and gentlemen, before I begin reading my paper will you allow me to make one or two very brief personal explanations. In the first place, I am a little deaf and so I may not hear all the comments you may make. If I seem not to have answered any criticisms please do not think it is from want of courtesy, or from want of comprehension; you will understand it will be because I shall not have heard them. The other comment is that I feel that in reading this paper I am, perhaps, dealing with a subject which is a little beyond me; the subject was suggested to me by friends in India, gentlemen who are interested in University problems, who desired to have the advice of members of our Association, and it was with their help and encouragement that I ventured to write what I am now going to read to you. (Hear, hear.)

The lecture was then read, and received with applause.

The Chairman: Ladies and gentlemen, I do not know that I can add anything very much which will be useful. There is one question I noticed which the lecturer carefully kept away from, and that is, What is likely to be the effect of the proposals put forward by Mr. Anderson on the development of the vernacular languages. There are a good many people who will say that a language, like Topsy, should grow; it should not be driven in this direction, or in that direction. Very often, I am afraid, the scholars think that they should decide in what direction a language should move. There is no question that when the enormous populations which now use the vernaculars come to be educated, and to be taught to read and to write, a literature will grow up to supply the demand which they will make. I think, for instance, the population in Bengal who use the Bengali vernacular is something like 40,000,000, and when they want books or material for their literature they will get them. Exactly what the literature will be it is exceedingly difficult to say, but perhaps there will be many—I do not take the line myself, but I put it forward as a suggestion—who think that the scholars will not do a very great deal in deciding the line on which the vernaculars should develop. The direction the vernaculars are likely to take under that influence will be, I am sure, the adoption of a lot of terms for which the common man will have no use whatever, and I expect you will find that the popular writers will be the men who will avoid those terms, and that the real development of the vernacular literature will run away from the University teacher. Still, I think that the University should teach the vernaculars, which should find a place in the University curriculum.

Mr. Duncan Irvine said that he laboured under an initial difficulty
of some magnitude. When he read the paper he was struck by the use of the word "vernaculars," and he would have liked something in the shape of a definition of that word from the lecturer. He gathered from the use he had made of the word "indigenous" that he meant the spoken dialects (which were very numerous) in use in India. He himself used to be able to speak Tamil with considerable fluency, and he knew enough to be able to do his business when he happened to be where no other dialect was spoken. He fully agreed with one of the speakers quoted by the lecturer that the use of the three R's in the vernaculars would be extremely useful; every native boy or girl should certainly be able to read and write their own spoken language, but when it came to anything that could be profitably used in the curriculum of the Universities he felt face to face with a difficulty, and that was that personally he was not aware of the existence of anything that could be strictly called "vernacular" literature, at least in any of those dialects which he knew. He knew nothing of the dialects of the rest of India; but so far as his small experience went, when they came to anything beyond the little story-books in Tamil, which were very useful to teach boys and girls in school, the more "literary" writings were in poetry, almost entirely Sanskrit, which could not be called "vernacular" literature at all. He had never come across anything worth calling classical literature which could be profitably taught in the Universities in any of the dialects with which he was acquainted. He had therefore some difficulty in seeing what use there would be in making students at the Universities carry on their studies in the vernacular, certainly in Madras, to which he confined himself. If he might suggest an amended title for the lecture, it would be "Bengali in the Calcutta University." If the lecturer intended to extend his theory to the Madras vernaculars as a means of University education, he was at a loss to know where the literature and books would come from; possibly some of the present-day pundits were writing essays, etc., in the vernacular, but that was hardly appropriate for University education. Surely the student in the University wanted something that had been written before his day. Turning to the merely practical side, he had sat on the Bench in India for a good many years, and had come across a few old-fashioned Vakils who knew nothing of English, or any language except their own vernacular, and as a result they were under a very great disability; there was not a single commentary in the vernacular, and beyond the text of their law-books, which they knew probably as well or better than he did, they were hopelessly at sea when anyone produced any authority in the shape of a commentary or a decision against them. Of course he did not say that that in itself was a sufficient reason for excluding vernaculars from the Universities.
means. Just in the same way as Latin had been the primary means of making the English language what it is to-day, so at the present moment the vernaculars should be utilized in the same way, and English should be the medium for the higher education in the Universities. The last speaker had just said there was no literature in the vernaculars; but although he was not very well acquainted with the South, he thought there was a good deal of vernacular literature, and he did not think it was all written in Sanskrit. Tamil had a vast literature of its own, and was the only language outside the Sanskrit group. As for the reference to the technical terms which might be used in the higher scientific works, just as in English they had the assistance of Greek and Latin in coining words to suit the occasion, he supposed they would be able also to coin words suitable for their technical terms. As an instance, the late Raja of Jaipur had Napier’s logarithms translated into Sanskrit and then into Hindi; and as the lecturer had pointed out, there were a good many scientific works in Sanskrit, and he supposed they could develop them. He was glad to know that for the future Indians might be able to know their own vernaculars much better than they did at the present time.

Mr. M. M. Gandevia said that they would all agree they had listened to a very thoughtful address, and one which was not likely to raise much criticism. It was noticeable to observe that the lecturer said he did not for a moment suggest that a knowledge of the vernaculars should be made compulsory. He felt that in that respect he was right, and that if it was made voluntary there was great scope for the cultivation of the vernaculars. He had little experience of the other Universities, but he knew a little of Bombay, where he believed about a decade ago they made a change in the University curriculum, and that was that the vernaculars of the Province should be introduced for the M.A. examination, and he believed those who wanted to cultivate the language could take advantage of the instruction that was given. The lecturer had observed that among the civilians there was not much scope for the cultivation of the vernacular languages owing to the fall in the value of the rupee, and that the reward was not a sufficient temptation to civilians to cultivate the vernaculars. He would not quarrel with the reward of Rs. 1,000 or Rs. 2,000, but he thought there should be a voluntary element in it, and then he believed those civilians who had a special liking for a language would, irrespective of the reward, make it their own, and later possibly publish standard works in that language, as many British civilians had done. He had a recollection that at some stage the lecturer suggested that too much importance was paid to the study of English, with the result that the vernaculars were neglected and undeveloped. He did not agree with him, and his knowledge of the Bombay Province supported him in the view that in spite of the instruction being given in English, the vernaculars were very well cultivated and studied by Indian scholars. As an instance, he would like to quote Professor Rajvade, of Poona, who was a great scholar of history, who, although he had a great knowledge of English and had a very facile pen in English, still preferred to write his original works in his own language. Such instances could easily be multiplied, and they would
tend to show that though English was studied by most people in India, it had not in any way deteriorated the value of the vernaculars, nor had it in any way killed the study of them. (Hear, hear.)

MR. R. SEWELL spoke shortly on the subject of Tamil literature. He said that, such as it was, that literature was very ancient, and that little was known of anything that could be called medieval Tamil literature. The known ancient works dated from perhaps the sixth to the eighth century A.D. or thereabouts, and then, with the exception of one or two astronomical works of the thirteenth century, nothing that can be classed as literature is known till modern times. The language of the ancient works is totally different from modern Tamil—as different as Anglo-Saxon is from modern English—so that, except as an interesting study, there is nothing to induce the modern Tamilian to take up the subject. But from the antiquarian, and especially from the historical, point of view, no doubt the study of the vernaculars all over India ought to be encouraged. The Universities should certainly do all in their power to increase amongst the people of India the knowledge of their country's history, and a knowledge of the ancient languages and their growth is indispensable to this end. The paleography of the written characters should be taught, so that people may be able to take an interest in the immense number of historical inscriptions which exist, especially in Southern India. But it must be distinctly remembered that such a course of study would be academic and scholastic; it would not be entered on by the ordinary Indian student who has to make his way in a practical and utilitarian world.

MR. CHISHOLM said he had not the faintest intention of measuring swords with the learned lecturer or with any of those who had spoken so admirably on the subject under discussion; he simply looked at it from the point of view of the man in the street—the commonsense point of view. When he was in India, he commenced his service in Bengal, and he was at once sent out into the district without knowing a word of the language, and in going about he saw the way in which children acquired a knowledge of the vernacular. Many present would probably know the method of learning the alphabet. A space was cleared in the village, sand spread over it, and the pundit wrote the letters in a circle, and all the children sat round and rocked themselves, squatting, from one letter to the other, tracing each with their fingers, and shouting out "Bhoiaka, bhoieka, bhoidrigek" (the names of the letters), and the noise went on all round the circle, all speaking at once. That was being done by thousands, even millions, of children—it was an actual force—and they might as well put their backs against a locomotive engine and try and stop it from starting as attempt to coerce so vast an educational force. He looked upon English in India in much the same way as he did upon Latin of the Renaissance period in England. It was the classical language of the time, but, as time moved on, it would be displaced by the vernaculars as certainly as Latin had been displaced in England by English. (Hear, hear.)

MR. ABBAS ALI BAIG said that his impressions were confined to what he had heard in the course of the discussion, as he was not present when
the paper was read, and had no exact idea of its contents. He believed the question was between the merits of English and the Indian vernaculars as the media of instruction in the primary and the higher stages of education. References were made to the time when Latin was the language of learning in this country and indeed all over Europe, and Mr. Chisholm thought that English was likely to be displaced in India by the vernaculars of the country as Latin had been in England. With all deference he would venture to remind Mr. Chisholm of one dominant factor in the situation. The ascendancy of Latin waned in Europe with the decline and fall of the Roman power. English would share a similar fate if the British ceased to be the ruling power in India—which God forbid. Under Moghul rule Persian was the language understood from one end of India to the other, and all the principal elements of society made Persian a subject of special study. The same thing was happening in regard to English in India to-day. Many of the less known of the 278 Indian vernaculars were without any literature and even without a script. There was a distinct tendency in recent years, as the result of expanding intercommunication and increasing education, for the more important vernaculars to absorb those spoken by minorities. The greater Indian vernaculars, such as Urdu and Bengali, would survive and continue to develop, but only as the media of primary and secondary education. For instruction in the higher sciences, arts, and philosophy, a more efficient medium, like the English language, with a rich and copious vocabulary and a vigorous literature, was essential. To utilize the Indian vernaculars for University education would be as absurd as making Welsh or Erse the channels of instruction at the English Universities.

Mr. Coldstream said he was in the same position as the last speaker; he had not heard the paper read, but he had gathered the gist of it from what he had heard in the discussion, and he agreed with the last speaker that some of the vernaculars of India, such as Urdu, and Bengali, and, possibly, Hindi, might be included in the subjects of a University course. He did not think they had now, or would ever have, in those languages, so far as his knowledge extended, a literature which would enable them to carry on in them the higher education of India. English had been in the field so long and was a matured language. But at the same time he heartily sympathized with the aspirations of those who were endeavouring to promote the learning of those grand vernaculars, Bengali and Urdu, which were still growing languages. There was already a great deal of excellent literature in them, and he would not like to see them neglected; he certainly thought that they might be raised to the rank of University study.

The Lecturer, in replying to the discussion, said: Ladies and gentlemen, I am very pleased and proud to have succeeded in giving rise to so interesting and admirable a discussion. I did not hope to have evoked anything like so important a discussion, and I am very much obliged to you for having taken so much interest in the subject. I have listened to every word that has been said with the greatest possible interest, but I do not wish to enlarge again on the subject of my paper. I began by saying
it is a difficult subject, and there is a great deal to be said on both sides, as is manifest from what we have heard this evening. I am afraid I am responsible for bringing Latin into the matter. We have been told that English depends on the continuance of the English rule, and differs from Latin in that respect, but please remember that Latin is not yet dead. (Hear, hear.) It has left its traces; and certainly the French people would be very angry if you told them they were not a Latin people. Of course, there is no doubt as to the extent English is saturating and penetrating the modern languages of India. I am bold enough to say now, after what we have heard to-day, that part of Mr. Ravindranath Tagore's wonderful achievement is undoubtedly due to the knowledge he has of English literature; it has affected his imagination and his style, and made Bengali in his hands an instrument of much greater literary power than it would have been if he had not known English.

In conclusion I have only to thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for the kindness you have shown to me this evening, and for the valuable and interesting remarks to which I have had the pleasure of listening. (Hear, hear and applause.)

The Secretary, in proposing a vote of thanks to the Lecturer and Chairman, said he wished to express the gratitude of the Association for the treat they had had. Mr. Anderson was a very modest man, and he himself hardly recognized the great power he possessed for good over India, both young and old. In the discussion the word "dialect" had been used as if it were the equivalent of "language"; he need hardly explain that that was not so—the two were quite distinct terms. He thought the Lecturer was right in urging that they should have vernacular Chairs in the University. In his own dear old country they intended ultimately to revive the Erse language, very much in the way it had been mentioned they might deal with some of the languages of Southern India! The lecturer had dwelt in his reply upon the wonderful power that Latin still was in the languages of the world. Well, after all, English was only a modified Latin. In the course of his duties connected with a world-wide movement he had to study closely the root-words of the civilized races of the world, and it was positively wonderful how many words in all the languages could be traced to what appeared to be a Latin or Roman source. He sometimes fancied, as a result of his researches, that the Latin races could not have been the original races in that part of the world from which they afterwards controlled a great Empire. He thought they must have pressed the indigenous tribes out of Italy and those parts and driven them further North and West, and that these tribes were now only just coming into their own again. There must be some truth in this theory, because the root-words (or the stem-words, for no one had got to the roots yet) of civilized Europe (and he might say of Arabia, Babylonia, and of Egypt) were so closely connected with words that were so generally supposed to be of Latin origin.

Mr. Pennington seconded the vote of thanks, and the Chairman suitably replied. The meeting then terminated.
SUPPLEMENT

OUR REVIEW OF BOOKS

SOME RECENT BOOKS ON THE FAR EAST


At last a British public body has made a noble beginning in subventioning or endowing, so to speak, pure Chinese research, and it is to be hoped that the brilliant results thus attained at the outset will induce the British Government and British societies generally to extend to Central Asian studies the same meed of encouragement that has always been given to them in France, whether under the monarchy, the empire, or the republic, which fact has consequently had the effect of placing and keeping French sinologues as easily at the head of their kind, as is now afresh the case in another sphere of utility with French airmen. At the same time, in connection with the present specific matter, it must not be forgotten that we students owe an initial debt of gratitude to the Indian Government—more seignorial and leisurely, perhaps, in its moods than its busy parent at home—for having despatched Sir Aurel Stein on various missions of exploration. Sir Aurel's sagacity, carefulness, and— it is presumed German—thoroughness in collecting these marvellous relics from the Tunhwary and Khoten regions have placed our museums in an enviable position, and in regard to the particular speciality of "wooden-peg" literature have placed London in a condition of at least temporary superiority over Paris, though France is amply avenged for this presumption by our having had perferee to appeal to a distinguished French sinologue in order to obtain adequate appraisement and elucidation of the treasures found by the distinguished explorer. Indeed, Sir Aurel Stein's marvellous collection would have been of little value to the general public had not his wisdom or his good fortune impelled him to hand part, if not all, of it over for examination to Professor Chavannes. It is probable that there are not half a dozen sinologues in existence capable of thoroughly understanding all the inner mysteries of the subject rescued from the Ewigkeit for us by this illustrious and patient scholar. With the exception of his colleague M. Paul Pelliot—who seems, in fact, to have been consulted, and to have willingly rendered some casual assistance in the present great work—and possibly of M. Berthold Laufer (Field Museum, Chicago), two gentlemen who with M. Chavannes are in a fair way of completely revolutionizing the minute study of Chinese, it is doubtful if
any other sinologues in any country, least of all native sinologues of China herself, could have accomplished what M. Chavannes has done; and it is quite certain that not a single one could have achieved the results he has achieved in a more thorough and more disinterested and just spirit. M. Chavannes himself has been one of the foremost authorities upon ancient Chinese script and writing materials. Students of this particular branch of sinology (see Asiatic Quarterly Review, October, 1908) have been known to reproach Chinese antiquity because it has failed to preserve for us evidences akin to the Egyptian papyri or the Babylonian clay; but here we have before our gazing eyes not only perishable wood and paper preserved hermetically by the burning sands, but we have it all in a language and a form which is almost as comprehensible to us now as it was to the Chinese of 2,000 years ago. It is positively marvellous to think how very little the Chinese letters, inventories, prescriptions, calendars, and, in short, all written matter on wooden pegs and tablets touching matters governmental, economical, or personal, differed from the same documents as they would be written on paper to-day. Neither Egyptian nor Babylonian antiquity can thus connect itself intelligibly and immediately with modern workaday practice. Unfortunately, the editor, who apparently only received the book—or, at all events, only sent it for review—a few days before going to press, is compelled to limit the space left available after the occupation of unusually great space by reviews on other remarkable Chinese subjects, and therefore it is impossible for the moment to do more (November 28) than to say a few general words by way of examination. It is as though the original correspondence, say, of Cæsar, Vespasian, and Severus, with their lieutenants in England, had been dug up intact in the neighbourhood of Chester, Newcastle, and York; together with private letters to and from the soldiers and officers; bills of stores; expenditure; accounts of guardhouses from Dover and London to the North; complete Roman calendars; original fragments of Papinian and Paulus; personal “papers” showing from what province and village in Italy each soldier came; and, in fact, illustrating everything necessary to provide us with an accurate photograph, or even mental moving cinematograph, of Roman military life in Albion and Gaul. Needless to say, each of the thousand or so of manuscript documents, most of which are photographed to scale, besides being translated into French and reproduced in plain modern printed Chinese, will be carefully studied (and commented upon where necessary) some other time. Meanwhile a special tribute must be paid to the memory of the late Father Pierre Hoang, who (as mentioned in the Asiatic Quarterly Review of January, 1911) spent his last hours in completing his wonderful Concordance of Dates, that priceless work which enables M. Chavannes to “reconstruct the crime” in each event or case to a day, or even in many instances to an hour. Meanwhile it may be said without exaggeration that he has performed a public service to mankind of the highest class. His great volume, which is cheap at three guineas, even to the non-specialist reader, is nothing less than epoch-making. No doubt other explorers and excavators will now be encouraged to seek similar Chinese
links with the past in Bactriana, Sogdiana, Kashgaria, etc., and thus throw much desired light upon the Kushan or Ephthalite civilization and the development of Buddhism in High Asia.—E. H. PARKER.


Im Bang, Governor of Seoul, was a statesman of literary renown living in the seventeenth and early part of the eighteenth centuries. Yi Ryuk, “a man of many offices and many distinctions in the way of literary excellence,” flourished in the fifteenth century. We commend these terse, quaint stories—some of romantic love, some of strange wizardries and magics, some mere records of suggestive happenings—to all students of the Chinese culture. Those interested in psychical research will regret that Prince Cheung did not leave behind him the prescription for his most successful “kill devil pills.” “The man who lost his legs” seems a Far Eastern variation of the adventure of Ulysses in the cave of Polyphemus. A misprint of 1564 for 1464 in the biographical foreword should be amended in a second edition.—H. M. H.


In his unassuming, almost deprecating, manner, the author tells us that his wholly delightful little volume is “a result of my humble attempts to bring about a better understanding of my native land by the Occidental mind . . . and to show that Japan, in spite of such modern developments as the feminist or the anarchist movements, still remains in spirit very much the same as she ever was in the days of yore.” Japan—essentially conservative in spirit, as she is catholic in her powers of assimilation—is to-day, in her feverish adoption of European methods and culture, merely realizing a further stage in her evolution, for which her whole past has been an orderly preparation. She has embraced in turn Confucianism, Laoism, Buddhism—and, but that she astutely foresaw foreign intervention with the advent of missionaries, would have added Christianity—not as new faiths, but as the more complete and scientific formulation of native ideals, and as a means of achieving deeper and wider self-expression through the absorption of the foreign culture they introduced. Her desultory intercourse with Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was maintained chiefly for the sake of the new medical and other science it brought to her shores. And now, in obedience to the memorable pronouncement of the late Emperor in 1868, that “knowledge shall be sought for throughout the world, that the welfare of the Empire may be promoted,” Japan is flinging herself heart and soul on Occidental civilization, to extract fresh treasure for her national enrichment. The professor makes a touching appeal to his Western readers to “kindly continue to
live the ideal lives, full of sweet and sunshine, if not for your own ends, at least for the sake of the edification of your most humble students over the sea, the Japanese."—H. M. H.

4. GEMS OF JAPANESE ART AND HANDICRAFT. By George Ashdown Audsley, F.R.I.B.A. (London: Sampson, Low, Marston and Co. 1913.)

Mr. Audsley has already contributed many valuable and beautiful works to literature on music, art, and architecture, but this, his latest "Gems of Japanese Art and Handicraft," excels them all. It is a wonderful publication. Within its cover Lermier and Cie. of Paris, aided by their able staff of lithographers, have prepared as faithfully as one art can delineate another representative plates of—(1) painting and colour-printing; (2) embroidery; (3) textile fabrics; (4) lacquer; (5) incrusted work; (6) metal work; (7) cloisonné; (8) modelling and carving. These plates constitute a series of exquisite examples of the work of special artists with whose names Japanese art lovers are well acquainted. A panorama of single sheets following one after another in sequence shows forth many of the best and richest specimens of Far Eastern art and genius. The eyes become dazzled and bewildered by colour, tone, and semitone, all tenderly diffused and portrayed. Light and shadow, gold tracery, diaper patterns, symbolic designs, perfect modelling, are selected and worked out with the utmost care. The examples of lacquer incrusted work cannot be too highly praised.

In the essay that preludes this wealth of representative illustration, under a separate cover, we recognize much that Mr. Audsley set down in his former work, "The Keramic Art of Japan," published jointly with his able confrère the late James Lord Bowes of Liverpool, whose museum will long be remembered, though it has ceased to exist.

"Gems of Japanese Art and Handicraft" does ample justice to the triumph and industrial skill of a people who, although they created these precious objects in an age of quietness, confidence, and seclusion, are now in this their hour of necessity the most active race on the face of the earth.

If there is a fault in the production of the publication before us, it is the manner in which the portfolio is constructed. This is decidedly cumbersome. Even the rich, red leather royal mon of the Kiku and the yellow lining does not atone for the decided want of artistic feeling expected. "The Keramic Art of Japan" was, on its publication, considered "worthy of a King's library." To what higher place of honour can we relegate Mr. Audsley's latest labour of love? May it become a national heirloom, for its place is decidedly among the best and most beautiful books of this new century.—S.

5. THE RELIGION OF THE SAMURAI. (Luzac's Oriental Religious Series.)

By Kaiten Nukariya, Professor of the Buddhist College, Tokyo. (London: Luzac and Co. 1913.)

The author of this volume wishes to point out the great differences that exist among the Buddhistic schools of religion, and more particularly
between Southern and Northern Buddhism. He states that concerning these divisions very little has been written, and still less preserved, owing to neglect or damage of books and manuscripts by fire.

The followers of the Northern School are known as the Zen sect, Zen being the Sinico-Japanese abbreviation for the Sanskrit Dhyaria, or Meditation. It is a religion of tradition, carried on from one generation to another by precept and practice. Kaiten Nukariya considers the importance this religious system can hardly be exaggerated, having influenced in the past to such a high degree that noble class of distinguished soldiers called Samurai, whose virtues have been constantly proclaimed to us during the last fifty years. He further states it is Zen that Japan has acknowledged as an ideal doctrine for her rising generation. The book requires careful reading and deep study. It is decidedly an interesting addition to Luzac's Oriental Religious Series.—S.

BOOKS ON INDIA

6. GENERAL SIR ALEXANDER TAYLOR. By A. C. Taylor: (Williams and Norgate.) Price 25s. net. Two volumes.

This monumental work describes the achievements of a very gallant General of Mutiny times. It is also controversial in its character, as it raises once more the question of who was responsible, and to whom the credit was due, for the taking of Delhi. We cannot, therefore, attempt here to give more than a preliminary notice of a book which is bound to provoke some discussion in the columns of the Review. Alexander Taylor came from a Scotch-Irish stock, and is an interesting example of the effect of heredity, education, and environment on character. He received an ideal and peculiar training at Hofwyl, in Switzerland, under a professor, who was filled with the educational ideals of Rousseau, the influence of which was apparent throughout his whole life and markedly in his extreme old age. Again, his friends Lord Lawrence, Lord Napier, Nicholson, and Chamberlain, were all men of iron, and reflected the idealistic conceptions of his life, which was totally devoted to public ends. Also he shared with some of his friends of that time that extreme dislike of personal ambition or self-advertisement, which he ingrained so thoroughly into the minds of his pupils during his administration of Cooper's Hill. Miss Taylor reveals effectively the character of her illustrious father in the numerous incidents she relates of his varied career: the swimming of the Indus; the military week-ends in the Himalayas; the adventurous life before Delhi; between there and Lucknow—the expedition to Mulka; the incident of Sunday service at Kuric. The work is not only a noble biography—it is also a vivid picture of conditions in India during those years; and she gives excellent thumb-nail sketches of the great figures of the other heroes of that time. With regard to the Delhi controversy, space does not permit of its examination here. We content ourselves for the present with saying that the non-controversial parts are admirably written, and provide excellent reading.

No one can read the imposing volume of Nawab Sultan Jahan’s autobiography without recognizing that resourcefulness, readiness to grasp a situation, pleasant or unpleasant, and a notable restraint, to make up the remarkable personality of the third successive woman ruler of the State of Bhopal. The account of her life is much more than the title suggests—it is at once a State document and a family history; for she traces the events of importance in connection with the rulship from the time of her grandmother, Sikander Begam, to the year 1904, the third year of her reign. She achieves the success of creating in her readers an appetite for more, and it is to be hoped that the narrative of events from 1904 to, let us say, 1914, will not be long delayed.

8. INDIAN HISTORICAL STUDIES. By H. G. Rawlinson, M.D. (Longmans, Green and Co.)

It is a pleasure to read these studies, little connected with each other though they are, as they all add to one’s knowledge of Indian history and progress. One of the most interesting is placed, curiously enough, last, and is on “Foreign Influences in the Civilization of Ancient India,” and has much to tell about the Greek-Scythic culture that filtered eastwards through Bactria. The other studies on older India include a thoughtful one on Gautama Buddha, one on the Buddhist Emperor Asoka, and a pleasant study of the ever-new Chinese pilgrims to the Buddhist shrines. The vignettes include one on the voyager Ibu Batuta, Akbar, Sivaji, and Ranjit Singh, the two last dealing with the rise of the Maharatta and the Sikh powers. Rather incongruously a sketch of the adventures of Robert Knox in Ceylon is included; but though rather surprised to find it, one is glad to read it, nevertheless.—A.F.S.

9. THE DIWAN OF ZEB-UN-NISSA. Rendered by Magan Lal and Jessie Duncan Westbrook. (John Murray.)

This book, in the “Wisdom of the East” Series, is a courageous attempt to translate fifty Ghazals written in Persian by the Princess Zeb-un-Nissa, the eldest daughter of Aurungzebe. She flourished from 1639 until 1689, and the extremely interesting Introduction gives all that is known of this studious Mogul Princess, and places her culture and erudition high. At one time her father’s favourite, she was allowed to live the life of a patron of arts and letters with very considerable influence, and, while dallying with marriage, enjoyed considerable freedom. Later she fell under her father’s displeasure, and her concealed lover was by his orders boiled in a deg, and she herself imprisoned. The writer was a Sunni but a Sufi, and her verse, for which she was famous all her life, abounds in mystic imagery, God usually being addressed as the Beautiful Beloved. She attempted to write or interpret the other Indian religions through her Sufic ideas, and this gives to her poetry, well translated here, a special Indian interest of its own.—A.F.S.

We understand that this is, for all practical purposes, a new book, entirely rewritten, and greatly extended. It begins with useful hints for travellers, then proceeds to enumerate the various bathing resorts of the Continent and of Great Britain with all particulars. The next section is devoted to the routes of the principal express services. The traveller is then taken further afield to practically every part of the world.


The above is an indispensable companion, not only to those travellers who take their vocation seriously, but also to such as are bent on pleasure only. Originally published in three separate volumes, we now have the whole between two covers, and this is the ninth edition. The groundwork was originally prepared by Captain Eastwick, while for the description of Ceylon we are indebted, originally, to the late Lord Stanmore. There is a long introduction giving general hints, descriptions of the voyages out, and statistical, ethnological, and archaeological information. The description of the country which follows leaves nothing to be desired.


BOOKS ON THE NEAR EAST


Mr. Lukach's tour in the Near East, which took him a little outside the beaten track of the ordinary tourist, is admirably described. Indeed, from a literary point of view, "The Fringe of the East" is worthy of being coupled with Miss Lowthian Bell's "The Desert and the Sown," or Mr. D. G. Hogarth's "Wandering Scholar in the Levant."

The author has the rare gift of investing well-worn topics with fresh interest. It is difficult to say anything new about the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, but Mr. Lukach has brought home with singular vividness the significance of this remarkable shrine, and can understand the bewilderment of the stranger who attempted to unravel this maze of chapels, shrines, and sanctuaries. His definition of what is, perhaps, the most famous Christian church in the world is well worth quoting: "In the first place, it is a perfect example of the true medieval cathedral, that comprehensive scheme which included, in addition to the building actually set apart for the celebration of the liturgy, the dependent schools and
orphanages, hospitals and residences wherein religion and secular life could be lived side by side. Secondly, it is the gathering-place of every form of Catholicism, Eastern and Western, a home of strange races and forgotten heresies, a very Babel of Christianity, in which Armenian and Jacobite, Copt and Abyssinian, have their place, as well as Latin and Orthodox. Thirdly, it is the incorporation under a single roof of many churches commemorating many sites.” The author, however, in his reference to the miraculous invention of the Cross, is unintentionally a little misleading in stating that the Church of Constantine (Anastasia) was “close to a small hill which was already being venerated as the scene of the Crucifixion.” He is probably referring to the Mount Calvary of the Holy Sepulchre Church, a rocky knoll only some 15 feet above the level of the church.

Mr. Lukach is very happy in his description of Damascus of to-day—a city full of charm in spite of its modernization. Indeed, few Oriental cities offer more startling contrasts between Western civilization and the Oriental old-world atmosphere than the ancient capital of Syria, where camels dispute the right of way with electric trams, and the burnous of the stately son of the desert brushes up against the hobble-skirt of a Parisian tourist. The cosmopolitan character of the Damascus street scenes has been greatly intensified since the Mecca railway was built, and Damascus has now become the starting-point of pilgrims from Central Asia and Asia Minor, and the tourist, sitting at a Damascus café, sees, as at Galuta Bridge, half Asia defiling before him.—E. A. R. B.

13. TURKEY IN AGONY. Translated from the French of Pierre Loti by Bedwin Sands: Published by the Afrikan and Orient Review, Ltd.

This is an admirable translation of the renowned author’s book, “La Turquie Agonisante,” and the work of translating must have been difficult. To those who have been accustomed to the Anti-Turk manifestations of the press, the above is a veritable eye-opener. We have heard a little too much of Turkish atrocities, and we have seen too much evidence of atrocities committed against the Turk. The author is a great admirer of the Turks, we might say almost a fanatic, but that only adds to the extreme interest of the book. After a few introductory chapters on the Turkish-Italian War, the author proceeds to grapple with the problem of the Balkan War. This he does chiefly by publishing certain letters of great interest, written at the time of the crisis. But the best chapter is entitled “Knights-Errant,” and really puts the matter in a nutshell.


This brochure gives in seventy pages the causes to which the distinguished German military writer attributes the defeat of Young Turkey. He gives his opinions in a most lucid manner, and they should carry weight by reason of Marshall von der Goltz’s long and intimate connection with the Turkish army. All those who have studied Turkish affairs with
open eyes will agree on the main with Freiherr von der Goltz. Turkey, at the time of war, was bent on evolving from the stagnation of the ancient régime into the light of a great national revival. No country could, in similar circumstances, escape passing through a period of danger. Then it was that the one-time allies, at the instigation, and with the financial help of Russia, seized their occasion. It was only three years since the Turkish army had been reorganized on paper, and, practically speaking, it takes more than three years to carry out reforms so far-reaching as those suggested by Marshall von der Goltz. Turkey, in consequence, could merely put into the field an army consisting partly of cadres of modern-trained recruits and partly of a wholesale levy of old and inefficient troops who knew nothing of tactical methods, field exercise, and had never seen a modern rifle.

There were other causes, which were psychological. But in spite of them, in spite of defeat, in spite of the delimitation of spheres of influence, Freiherr von der Goltz is optimistic. He is convinced that the process of regeneration will not suffer, will perhaps gain, from the results of the war. One piece of advice he gives to Turkey: "To withdraw officially into Asia and to take the lead of the Moslem world." The advantage of the change of capital might be a doubtful one. There is no doubt in my mind about the necessity of taking heed of the second advice. The only nations Europe respects nowadays are those she fears.—B. S.

15. WITH THE RUSSIAN PILGRIMS TO JERUSALEM. By Stephen Graham (London: Macmillan and Co.) 7s. 6d.

Mr. Graham shows us a new Jerusalem, which is poles apart from the Jerusalem which the tourist expects, or to which he is accustomed. The ordinary traveller has, of course, no opportunity of seeing below the surface, nor has he perhaps the inclination. The author describes the Pilgrim's Way, and thereby gives a valuable contribution to the bibliography of Jerusalem. The story of the pious migration of thousands of Russian peasants to Jerusalem and the holy places has, as far as we know, never been told before. He is certainly equipped in every way to tell it. He travelled as a bona fide pilgrim, without shirking the discomforts of the pilgrimship or the crowded hospices. The numerous illustrations, from the author's own photography, are not the familiar Holy Land snapshots, but depict many aspects of native life which the ordinary tourist never sees.—E. A. R. B.

16. CHANTILLY IN HISTORY AND ART. By Louise M. Richter. (John Murray.) Price 21s.

This is a book which, as has been rightly stated, fills a gap in the French history of art, and will therefore be welcomed by all art-students. The sumptuous volume is richly decorated with portraits of the owners of Chantilly, with reproductions of the famous miniatures of the Très Riches Heures, and with numerous French sixteenth-century "crayons," among them originals by Perréal, and Jean and François Clouet.
The book is divided into two parts. In the first, the history of the Château of Chantilly, whose owners—the Montmorency's and the Princes of Condé—played so great a part in the history of France, is eloquently narrated. The author has shown great skill in blending history with art, for also in the second part of her book she never quite loses the historical thread which makes the chapters on Jean and François Clouet particularly fascinating.

Nor does Mrs. Richter abstain from art-criticism, but plunges, on the contrary, courageously into the vexed question of the French fifteenth and sixteenth-century drawings and their supposed authors. The conclusion she draws is that the subtle art of the French crayons really originated on French soil, "that it was evidently practised by Jean Fouquet, Perréal, and probably also to a certain extent by Bourdichon before Jean Clouet appeared in France"—a conclusion which will no doubt raise great satisfaction on the other side of the Channel. It should prove an acceptable Christmas present, and is, we hear, running into a second edition.

LITERARY GOSSIP

It is a great gratification, not only to his many Indian friends and admirers, but also to the whole literary world, that Mr. Rabindranath Tagore has been awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature this year. It is a remarkable event in more than one way; for not only has the East on this occasion taken a crown which has so far been invariably held in the West (and he is the second English-speaking man of letters to have received it—Mr. Rudyard Kipling was the first), but the recipient has taken the remarkable decision of not touching a penny of the stipend, and has devoted the whole sum to the furtherance of his educational ideas at his school at Bolepur. Some may wonder how it is that, with so many rivals in the field, this Oriental has snatched the Prize away. We refer them to the conditions on which the Prize is given. The literary work in any given year which has contributed most to the spiritual uplifting of the human race, that our poet has achieved.

A new book has just been published by Smith Elder, entitled "India of To-day," by E. C. Meysey-Thompson, M.P. He discusses the various problems of India in a short but suggestive volume of 230 pages, and includes in it a description of his tour.

Ouseley has brought out "War and Sport in India" and "Officers' Diary in the First Years of Last Century." It is an interesting contribution to the imperial history of a century ago.

The Rose Garden Series, published by Foulis, has now added to its number the "Rose Garden of Persia," with four illustrations in colour by Frederic Gardiner. It gives selections from the treasures of Persian poetry.

Messrs. Constable will soon publish the "Secret History of the Balkan War," by the Special Correspondent for the Times with the Bulgarian
forces, while the Greek achievements will be described in a book to be published shortly by Mr. Fisher Unwin, the author of which is D. J. Cassavetti.

We have just received a pamphlet entitled "The Armenian Question," by Captain C. F. Dixon-Johnson. We may quote: "The reformed government of Turkey desires to fulfil her part of the Constantinople Convention by re-organizing the administration of her Asiatic Provinces with the help of British officials, and looks to Great Britain for the help she is entitled to expect; and so long as Great Britain remains in Cyprus she is bound by the Convention 'to undertake the onerous obligation of a defensive alliance with Turkey if Russia should attempt to extend her annexations beyond the present frontiers, which the present negotiations will assign' (letter of Lord Salisbury to M. Waddington, July 7, 1878)."

We commend this brochure to all who have British interests in the Near East at heart. It is printed by Nutt and Co., Leeds.

"Truths about India" is a reprint of various leaflets issued by the East India Association bound in a compact form. The title is well chosen. Anyone who has visited India at once sees that the articles are by men who know their subject. The very names of the contributors, as far as they appear, are a guarantee of accuracy. There are excellent articles on the recent reforms and their effects. British rule in India is shown to be the cheapest and most efficient Government in existence. The reason for this is that there is no "democratic" nonsense about it. In a country where public servants are responsible to their superiors in knowledge and experience efficiency of a high order results. A perusal of these pages soon shows a man the wonderful amount of constructive work the now-abused civilian has contributed to India, and makes one sigh for the time when a man of common sense will convince the British public that public servants should not be responsible to millions of ignorant voters.

The great improvement in the condition of the peasantry is another very interesting feature of our work. A series of articles on the Punjab gives a birds'-eye view of the progress of the last thirty or forty years, which is instructive, moderate, and convincing.

Railways, famines, and other exclusively Indian problems are dealt with clearly and concisely. The fatuous twaddle about India talked by amiable dreamers like Keir Hardie comes in for rebuke in a dignified and well-reasoned article. Amongst the contributors are Sir Roland Wilson, Sir James Wilson, Sir George Sydenham Clarke (now Lord Sydenham), while Lord AmphiUill supplies a Foreword—in fine, a most instructive shillings-

Owing to lack of space we have been compelled to omit our customary list of books received.
EVENINGS AT LONDON THEATRES

There must be something in the atmosphere of the Christmas season that intensifies our delight in old favourites whose worth we know, as against innovations which may, of course, be excellent—or may not. Certainly revivals play a large part in the list of amusements presented for our approval this month. In order of seniority, the first is “Charley’s Aunt,” which is celebrating its twenty-first birthday at the Prince of Wales’ Theatre. Older, perhaps, counting from the date of its inception, though not so continuously before the public eye, is Sardou’s brilliant comedy “Diplomacy,” in which Mr. Gerald du Maurier has been encouraged by the booking to display his manifold talents for many weeks past.

Christmas would not be complete without Peter Pan; accordingly “Peter Pan” is lodged at Duke of York’s, though, we fear, only for matinées. At the same theatre another of Sir J. M. Barrie’s plays is being presented—viz., “Quality Street”—of which a longer notice appears below. This also applies to that most particular favourite of all those who indulge in amateur theatricals—a pantomime rehearsal.

Among new plays perhaps the most noteworthy is “Magic,” at the Little Theatre. It is always interesting to watch the first plunge into drama made by one who has already attained high honours in other branches of literature. Mr. G. K. Chesterton is too great an artist and too clever a man to despise teaching; he has been willing to learn the technical lessons of the theatre instead of claiming complete knowledge of stagecraft by virtue of his experience of novel-writing; the result is a highly attractive entertainment, in which Mr. Chesterton’s own imagination has taken full advantage of the opportunities afforded by the stage without belittling the one or straining the other.

A résumé of London theatre entertainments cannot nowadays be called complete without some mention of the musical comedy and the review. The other day I read in a paragraph anent the revised version of the musical comedy “The Laughing Husband,” a delightfully naïve remark to the effect that, since its first production, considerable alterations have had to be made to bring the piece down to the level of the audience! Certainly, I remember being agreeably surprised to find in the last act of the original version not only a really novel situation, but also an exceedingly clever piece of character acting. Can this have had to be altered?
With all these manifold attractions, serious or frivolous, grave or gay, even the most confirmed dyspeptic can have no excuse for grumbling. And to crown all, Mr. Arthur Collins is once more delighting our eyes with his gorgeous Christmas pantomime, to which all the marvellous appliances of the Drury Lane stage lend their aid in producing a kaleidoscopic feast of beauty and colour.


“Quality Street” might have been a dramatization of “Cranford,” but it was not; for despite a marked resemblance in some of the salient characteristics, the genius of Sir J. M. Barrie has created an entirely individual personality, which strangles the hint of plagiarism. The story of the play is too well known to need recapitulation; the perfect art of each transition from tragedy to comedy breathes a humanity into the personalities which can only be the outcome of a perfect understanding of mankind and its ways. This humanity finds its expression more particularly in the character of Miss Susan Throssel; the exquisite sympathy with which Miss Nina Boucicault portrays the little old maid of Quality Street gives one a choky feeling in the throat which even the laugh that follows so swiftly only makes more real. Whether she speaks or is silent, whether she laughs or cries, Miss Boucicault carries us straight to the heart of gold in the Blue and White Room in Quality Street just a hundred years ago.

As her younger sister, Miss Cathleen Nesbitt played with a soft and delicate joyousness which was as attractive to us as it must have been to her lover, the “dashing Mr. Brown.” At moments, also, Miss Nesbitt attained to real power. Mr. Godreff Tearle imparted to the character of Valentine Brown a virile strength both of appearance and personality. He was particularly effective in the scene with “Miss Livvy” at the ball, when the passage of ten years of war and campaigning had added to the young man’s impetuousity a depth of character and feeling which he himself barely realizes. Only one thing we should like to note—Mr. Tearle is perhaps too much inclined to make free use of his hands. His gestures are very frequent, and somewhat unmeaning.

The three dear neighbours of the Misses Throssel were admirably portrayed by Miss Mary Barton, Miss Marie Hemingway, and Miss Muriel Martin Harvey, while the sewing-maid, Pathy, of whom Miss Susan is so desperately afraid, finds a clever interpreter in Miss Louie Pounds. The inanity of Mr. Austin Melford and Mr. Edward Douglas, as the young coxcombs Ensign Blades and Lieutenant Spicer respectively, was beyond reproach; and the bluff heartiness of Mr. George Tully as the recruiting sergeant made one wish to see more of him.

Nothing could be prettier than the Miss Throssel’s drawing-room. There is a quaint old-world atmosphere, which pervades the whole scene; the faint tinkling of the spinet calls up imaginations of old-fashioned flowers and quaint embroideries. Quality Street is a dream which we continue to desire and regret long after we have woken up to the draughtiness of our homebound taxi.
Strand Theatre—“Mr. Wu,” by Harry M. Vernon and Harold Owen.

Wu Li Chang, an ancestor of the central figure of this play, had a daughter who was more to him than daughters usually are to Chinese fathers. So when he discovered, on the eve of her marriage to a mandarin of very high rank, that the young lady had already jeopardized her happiness by placing it in the hands of another, he took up a sword and killed her; moreover, he killed her lover, and all the members of his family—father, mother, sister. In the case of Wu Li Chang the descendant, history repeats itself, the third party in this case being the son of Mr. Gregory, the head of a shipping concern in Hong Kong. But this Wu Li Chang—or Mr. Wu, as the Europeans call him—having been to Oxford and read the Old Testament, seeks a revenge on the strict lines of the proverb “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth”; he tries to exact from the boy’s mother a payment which corresponds more closely with the nature of the primary offence, holding out as an inducement the release of the boy who has fallen into his hands. This, together with a side issue which concerns itself with the ruin of Mr. Gregory’s business, chiefly to show the wide authority and unquestionable power of the malignant mandarin, is the general idea of the play “Mr. Wu.”

One’s first impression of this piece of transported Orientalism is a mysterious suspicion of hidden knives and ghastly forebodings. The entire first act is full of the promise of a really forceful drama. The glamour of an unusual and beautiful setting covers, and at the same time aids, the conventionality of the characterization. But we must confess to disenchantment almost as soon as the curtain rose on the second act. No sooner had we got accustomed to the sudden transition from a lotus garden to a dockyard strike than we were asked to believe that a particularly obstinate Englishman could be prevailed upon by a mandarin, upon whose unscrupulous cunning he himself continually insists, not only to unload his revolver, but also to leave the ejected cartridges within reach of his opponent’s stealthy fingers. The plausibility of Mr. Wu, in fact, was less convincing than it would appear to have been to the director of the steamship company and his entire staff. This same obviousness of intention was equally baffling, it would seem, to the more human Mrs. Gregory who, with a naivety hallowed by long-tradition stagecraft, appeared to be very easily led into playing straight into the hands of the almond-eyed inscrutability.

The play is thin, decidedly thin. The authors have trusted so much to the magic which surrounds the word Chinese, connecting with it all those half-guessed terrors of locked doors and sound-proof walls, that they have omitted to extend the same probability to the actions of European characters. It is doubtful whether personal magnetism exercised in a dockside office could induce a woman, however distraught by anxiety for her son’s safety, to keep an appointment alone in the house of a man whom she knows to be intensely antagonistic to her husband, without even the adventitious protection afforded by a small-calibre Browning pistol. One feels that the judgment of the various individuals has had to be warped to suit the exigencies of the plot.
But the weakness of the play is certainly redeemed by magnificent acting. Mr. Matheson Lang not only looks the personification of the malignant and inscrutable Orient, but realizes to the full the miraculous patience of the strong character which can wait calmly in order to attain its ultimate object. The quiet dignity with which he receives the insults of the reckless Englishman, whose conduct even his own wife compares unfavourably with that of a bull in a china shop, is worthy of a better cause; and the blankness of his expression under circumstances which would make most Europeans look as savage as they would feel is pure reality.

Mr. Leslie Carter tries to make the part of Mr. Gregory natural, and he attains a far greater measure of success than one would expect, on which he is to be highly congratulated. That even his efforts cannot make the personality of the shipowner entirely convincing can only be attributed to the fact that the character of Mr. Gregory is made so closely to resemble the pig-headed, bull-necked John Bull of convention that he seems almost to have strayed in from a political satire.

The love duet of the first act is very charmingly and sympathetically played by Miss Hilda Bayley—of whom we wished we could have seen more—and Mr. Evan Thomas, who plays the part of the "fons et origo mali" with considerable skill and charm. Nor must we forget the Chinese servant of Miss Marian Lind, whose absolute immobility was a wonderful study of Chinese character.

But the chief success of the evening was scored by Miss Lilian Braithwaite as Mrs. Gregory. The restraint with which she approached Mr. Wu in her husband's office on the subject of her son's disappearance showed more clearly than any amount of hysteric the anguish which she was suffering. Miss Braithwaite alone made us feel that there was anything bewildering, anything really to fear, in the impassive composure of Mr. Wu; while her gradual realization of the full meaning of the mandarin's actions and her own appalling position was an artistic triumph.

The play is beautifully produced, and for an object-lesson in Chinese customs, art, and habits, one could not do better than pay a visit to the Strand Theatre. You will find also thrills of an unusual and interesting type, particularly in the final scene between Mrs. Gregory and Wu Li Chang; and if you can lose sight of any inconsistencies of character or actions, you should be able to spend a highly entertaining evening.

J. G. BRANDON-THOMAS.
OBITUARY

MR. H. F. B. LYNCH.

We regret to record the death of Mr. Henry Finnis Blosse Lynch, F.R.G.S., which took place on November 24, 1913. He was educated at Eton, Heidelberg, and Trinity College, Cambridge, where he took his degree with first-class honours in the Classical Tripos, and in 1887 he was called to the Bar of the Middle Temple.

Joining the firm of Lynch Brothers, of which he was senior partner at the time of his death, he began his extensive travels in the Middle East for the purposes of scientific, political, and commercial research. Later he inaugurated a new river service under the British flag on the Karun River. He travelled from the Karun across the Bakhtiari Mountains to Ispahan, and carried out surveying operations for a new trade route into Persia, now known as the Lynch Road. This road, 270 miles in length, was opened in 1900, has been of immense value to British trade with Persia. Mr. Lynch's second journey of note was in 1893 and 1894, embracing the Caucasus and Armenia. In the course of it Mr. Lynch ascended Mount Ararat, reaching the summit in September, 1893. His third journey was in 1898, when he again explored Armenia, surveying the great crater of Nimrud and mapping out the country, with the assistance of Mr. F. Oswald.

From time to time he contributed articles to this Review on Middle Eastern questions, and he was generally recognized as a severe critic of the Foreign Office with regard to Persia, for he held that Great Britain had been too complaisant with regard to Russian interference in North Persia, and had not supported the new constitutional Government of Persia to an adequate extent. His interests in the Tigris and Euphrates navigation were considerable, and may have acted as some incentive to make him the outstanding authority on Middle Eastern questions that he was. Through good and ill report he remained a staunch believer in the regeneration of Persia on constitutional lines. On the other hand, he was no believer in the Anglo-Russian Convention, which he maintained from the first must inevitably lead to the partition of Persia, and eventually to our finding ourselves face to face with Russia across a bad frontier line.
Obituary.

COMMERCIAL NOTES


The latest report on the trade of India is so encouraging to those who take a hopeful view of the progress of our Indian Empire that one is naturally afraid of making too much of it, and we prefer to quote the words of an old and experienced Administrator who is not likely to be too favourably disposed to the existing system. This is what Sir Henry Cotton says in a recent issue of India:—

THE COMPETITION OF JAVA.

"In all-civilized countries there has been a great expansion of trade in recent years, and India has fully shared in this advance. The total trade of the year rose to 271 millions, showing an increase over the preceding year of 11 per cent. It would be interesting to institute a comparison of the trade of India with that of other Eastern countries, but, so far as I know, this has never been attempted. How, for instance, does the expansion of trade in Japan, Java, the Straits Settlements, or even in Ceylon, compare with that of India? If a comparison could be made, I suspect that the figures from Java would prove to be the most instructive. Java is a small island compared with India, but the point of interest is that it is a Dutch dependency, just as India is a British dependency. Indian administrators know no more of Java than they do of the Philippines; but it would be a good thing for India if they devoted more attention to both. We get a few hints about Java in Mr. Noel-Paton's report. It is recorded that in the past year Java exported to India no less than 9,310,252
cwts. of cane-sugar, notwithstanding the fact that India is
the largest producer of cane-sugar of any country in the
world. And yet ten or twelve years ago Java sugar in the
Indian market was a negligible quantity. What has
happened to bring this state of things about, and how is it
that Java in the course of a decade has been able to under-
sell the Indian producer almost to an unlimited extent?
Again, I find in another part of this report that no less than
61 million pounds of tea were exported from Java in 1912.
This also is very suggestive, and shows what a formidable
competitor this Dutch island is in the world's market. I
have no access to the total figures of Java trade, but I
suspect that they will show a rate of expansion surpassing
that of India and also of Ceylon, and even of the Straits
Settlements. At any rate, whether they do so or not, the
circumstances attending the recent development and pros-
perity of Java demand more consideration in India than
they have hitherto received. Both Japan and Java have
on more than one occasion sent official deputations to
India to learn something of the conditions of that country,
but I do not remember that India has ever thought it
worth while to repay the compliment by a deputation to
those islands. It is true that Englishmen now know a good
deal about Japan, but Java is still a sealed book to us. And
so, for that matter, are Dutch Borneo, Sumatra, Celebes,
and even the American Philippines.

"The aggregate value of the imports into India of cotton
yarn and cotton goods in 1912-13 was £40,518,000. Nearly
the whole of this came from Lancashire, and the amount is
just double of what it was ten years ago. In the face of
this unprecedented importation, it is very satisfactory to find
that the year was one of exceptional prosperity in the Indian
cotton industry. The value of yarn exported to China
amounted to nearly six millions. The value of raw cotton
exported was over eighteen millions, of which considerably
more than half went to Japan. The Bombay cotton-mills
were more active than they have ever been before, and it is
mentioned incidentally that there was an increased importa-
tion of long-staple cotton required for fine fabrics, a remark which is of importance, as it is manufactures from the longstapled foreign product which directly compete with the Manchester piece goods. *Per contra,* it is instructive to note that, while the total number of spindles in India has increased to 6½ millions, Manchester has added more spindles to her gigantic equipment during the past five or six years than are existing in India after half a century of effort.

**Rice and Wheat Exports.**

"Another very interesting section of the report is that which relates to the export of rice and wheat. Forty years ago I compiled for the use of Government a report on the rice trade of the world. The exports from India then amounted to about a million tons. They now amount to 2,763,000 tons. Of this amount, 170,000 tons only go to the United Kingdom, about 700,000 tons to the rest of Europe, and the other principal buyers of Indian rice are—Straits Settlements, 409,000; Ceylon, 381,000; Japan, 241,000; and Java, 160,000—tons. These are enormous figures; and, while the Asiatic exports are undoubtedly for food consumption, the vast quantities sent to Europe appear to be used mainly for starch-making and distillation. But further information would be welcome as to the uses to which rice is put, especially when the vast exports of competing places like Saigon and Bangkok are taken into account. Forty years ago the exports from Saigon were 250,000, and from Bangkok 150,000 tons, but I do not know what the figures are now.

"The exports of wheat from India during the year rose to 1,660,000 tons, of which the United Kingdom took 1,185,246 tons. *It is noted that in 1912, as in 1904, the United Kingdom imported more wheat from India than from any other single source,* but in absolute quantity the record of 1904 still rules. It may be expected that that record will be broken in the current year, as the crop area of the past cold weather exceeded the average area of the preceding three years by 5 per cent."
The trade of Calcutta (in merchandise) still keeps well ahead of any other part of India, and amounted to £108,280,000, that of Bombay being £77,266,000, Karachi £31,806,000, Burma ports £28,400,000, and Madras £25,320,000.

"After all, the most important feature of the trade of the year is the confirmation it affords of the well-known fact that, while the greatest share of the imports into India comes from the United Kingdom, the bulk of the exports are distributed all the world over, but principally to the Continent of Europe. The United Kingdom enjoys 63 per cent. of the value of imports into India, and then comes Germany 6'4, Java 5'8, and the United States 3'2. Of the exports from India, Great Britain is a buyer of only 25'1 per cent. The remaining 75 per cent. goes to foreign buyers, among whom the chief are Germany 10'1 per cent., China 8'4, United States 7'8, Japan 7'7, France 6'5, and Belgium 5'4."

HEDGES
AND
BUTLER
LTD.

WINE MERCHANTS
to H.M. The King.

LONDON: 155, REGENT STREET.
More than forty years ago, when I was devoting my somewhat scanty official leisure, with the permission of the Governments of Bengal and India, to the work of editing the Calcutta Quarterly Review, a task in which I had entered on the fruits of the labours of Sir John Kaye, Sir Richard Temple, and Mr. Justice Beverley, I had the good fortune to obtain from the pen of one of the greatest feudatory Princes of India, the then Maharaja of Travancore, a most important article on the public career of His Highness’s great Dewan, Sir Madhava Rao. Thereafter I was engaged in supporting in the Press, both in England and in India, Lord Lytton’s great policy of improving and drawing closer the relations between the feudatories of the Empire and the central Government. That policy Lord Lytton had inherited, through Lord Mayo, from Lord Canning, who had issued the sanads guaranteeing the Feudatory States against annexation, and recognizing the right of adoption that secured the permanence of the princely dynasties. But Lord Lytton was far more closely identified with it than any other Viceroy. Some of his most interesting proposals in this direction—such as that
for the creation of an Imperial Council of Magnates, and some other measures for bringing together the Princes of the Empire in friendly co-operation, and for aggrandizing their position on the model of that of the Kings of Bavaria and Saxony in the German Empire—were not carried into effect owing to his premature retirement in 1880. It has been stated that he wished the Empress to create the Prince of Wales "King of Delhi," that title to belong to every Imperial heir-apparent from his birth, like the Duchy of Cornwall; but Mr. Gladstone's strong objection to the Imperial title itself rendered any amplification of it inadvisable at that time. But Lord Lytton carried through his idea of conferring Imperial titles, both civil and military, on the greater feudatories; he recognized the right of the Nizám to confer the old Mughali titles on the noblest and most meritorious of His Highness's subjects; he established "Indian Etons," special colleges for the scions of royal houses; and, above all, he forced through, and obtained the sanction of the Queen-Empress and of Lord Salisbury for, the restoration of the ancient Hindu dynasty to the throne of Mysore, a "rendition" that has been abundantly justified by the eminently beneficent rule of the late and present Maharajas of that "model State."

In 1877 I was selected by the Government of India for the task of writing the articles on the Feudatory States for the Imperial Gazetteer of India, in which work I was subsequently joined by Sir Arthur Wollaston, K.C.I.E., the well-known Persian scholar, late of the India Office. That work, and my subsequent compilation of "The Golden Book of India," prepared by command of Her Majesty Queen Victoria, brought me into close association with many of the great Feudatories, with whom I was privileged to be on terms of personal friendship.

I have been led to these observations by reading the interesting and forcible article in the January number of this Review by the Chief of Inchalkaranji, entitled, "A Plea for the Mahratta Brahmin." His Highness writes
not only as Ruling Chief, a feudatory of Kolhapur and a sub-feudatory of the Empire, but also as being himself a Brahmin of Brahmins, a scion of the great house of the Peshwas. His article is, in substance, a bold challenge of the theory of no less an authority than Sir Valentine Chirol, that much of the recent and prevailing unrest in India is due to a revival of Brahminical pretensions. I have no wish to intervene in that controversy—*non nostrum... tantas componere lites*. But in one point that he makes, to which he devotes a considerable portion of his article, I am entirely in agreement with the Chief of Inchalkaranji. He says:

"My own opinion of the present unrest is that it is more of an economic than of a political nature... If with the growth in number of this community the opportunities for obtaining employment also had been increased, there would have been little discontent... The independent professions are over-stocked, especially the legal career, so it is no good everybody aspiring to such openings... As living is becoming so costly, and the competition for employment is so keen, many Brahmins are now taking to industrial and commercial pursuits. If the right direction were now given to this new phase of activity, I think a large section of the community would be thus employed... Now that the usual avenues of employment are becoming scarce and congested, this class is prepared to take up other avocations, if only proper facilities are held out to them."

Every year the great and efficient Universities of India send out into the world a vast number of clever and ambitious young Indians, who find, as the Chief of Inchalkaranji says, that the chief avenues of employment—Government service and the legal career—are hopelessly congested, and that there is only room for a fraction of their number. In England, in France, and in most other civilized countries of the world, a large proportion of the
balance would naturally find their way into industrial pursuits. But in India, notwithstanding all its boundless natural resources, the only manufacturing industries that exist as yet are still in the nature of "nascent industries," and these are starved by the overwhelming competition of protected and subsidized imports of foreign goods, often "cheap and nasty," it is true, but sufficiently attractive to spoil the market for Indian goods.

Practically all the great Feudatory Chiefs have shown themselves keenly alive to the urgent necessity of encouraging industrial expansion.

The liberality of His Highness the Maharaja of Mysore in this direction is proverbial. The magnificent expansion of the gold-mining industry—which by the nature of its product is independent of the fiscal policy of the Imperial Government and of foreign imports—has owed much to the fostering care of the Mysore Durbar. The planting industry, too, is always the object of the solicitude of the State; and when, a few years ago, Lord Curzon, by negotiating with France for mutual concessions, secured preferential treatment for Indian coffee, the Mysore coffee industry was at once in a position to take the fullest advantage of the boon thus obtained. And again, a year or two ago, when the Government of India in a fit of economy ruled that the services of that brilliant Director of Commerce and Industry, Mr. Chatterton, who had done much to quicken industrial progress in Madras, were no longer needed in that capacity in British India, the Mysore Durbar at once obtained his transfer to that State.

Similarly in Travancore. The consumption of matches in India is literally prodigious, and yet, though all the raw materials for the manufacture of matches are abundant in many parts of the country, the whole of that immense trade has until now been monopolized by Japan, Sweden, Norway, and Austria, owing to the protection enjoyed by the manufacturers in those countries. Now, the Travancore Durbar cannot give its manufacturers fiscal protection, because the
Imperial Government is "Free Trade," which in this case amounts to giving protection to the foreign manufacturers. But His Highness the Maharaja does the next best thing—he gives the best he can, though that is far more costly and far less efficient than the imposition of import duties: he gives his manufacturers what is tantamount to heavy subsidies, the free supply of material from the State forests, with liberal concessions of sites for factories, and other advantages.

And in his attitude towards all other industries His Highness, energetically seconded by his Dewan, adopts the same liberal policy. The Travancore Durbar supplies agriculturists with free manure (lime and cocoanut refuse). But without the aid of some import duties on refined sugar, it is absolutely helpless to resist the overwhelming influx of Java sugar; and the area under what used to be one of the most profitable crops, sugar-cane, steadily diminishes year by year, as it does in every part of India.

The generous encouragement that is given to industrial enterprises of all kinds, mining, textile, and other, by the Government of His Highness the Nizam is well known, and is frequently the subject of laudatory notices in the Indian Press. So, too, with Baroda, Indore, Gwalior, Jammu and Kashmir, Jaipur, Bikanir, Nawanagar and many other States that might be named: in every case the Durbar is found ready and anxious to welcome industrial expansion. Again and again, in all these States factories of various sorts have been started, and have received every encouragement from the Durbars; again and again these factories have been compelled to close down by the severity of foreign competition, which is always resolved to crush nascent industries before they attain sufficient strength to enable them to resist the combined forces of protection, bounties, and subsidies. His Highness the Maharaja Gaekwar of Baroda, in a speech delivered at the inauguration of the Ahmedabad Industrial Exhibition in 1903, put the whole thing in a nutshell thus:
“It is true that Free Trade enables a country to procure at cheaper rates those articles that can be manufactured more conveniently in foreign lands; but this cheapness is dearly bought by the loss of industrial status and the reduction of a whole people to a helpless proletariat. National defence against alien industrial inroads is more important than the cheapness of a few articles.”

Instances to illustrate the force of His Highness’s statement are continually brought to light in the Indian Press. I can here refer to only one or two.

No sooner were the concessions of the Travancore Government to its subjects endeavouring to establish a match-making industry in the State announced a year or two ago, than immediately the Scandinavians established a line of steamers specially equipped for the Indian match trade, to run direct from Christiania in Norway to Bombay, Tuticorin, or other Indian ports—doubtless with heavy advantages to Swedish and Norwegian shippers. And it appears from the latest returns (Blue-book No. 6783, issued in 1913) that out of a total import of matches into India valued at £583,884 per annum, more than half came from Sweden and Norway! Moreover, about the same time the Japanese Government deputed a Commission to visit India, to devise measures for the improvement of the match trade with that country; and at this moment Japan supplies about a quarter of the matches imported into India! And yet it is not denied that the supply of raw materials for this industry that is possessed within the territories of the Feudatory States is not surpassed in the world!

One of the very few successful factories for the manufacture of woollen goods in all India is situate in the city of Bangalore, which is politically separate from Bangalore Cantonments, and in the very heart of the dominions of the Maharaja of Mysore. The history of the woollen industry in India is a typical one. Under the East India Company it flourished in all its branches—in manufactures
of wool, of goat's hair, of pashm, of wool and silk, of wool and cotton, and so forth, from the costliest products of Kashmir to the roughest and cheapest blankets and shawls. The first Indian power-mills were started in 1876; by 1904 the number of mills in British India had only increased to six, and in 1912 these had diminished to four! —and this notwithstanding the remarkable fact that India imports woollen manufactured goods to the value of over two and a quarter million pounds sterling per annum!

The reason is not far to seek. Reviewing the woollen industry in 1896, Mr. O'Conor wrote, with special reference to the foreign export: "The trade is as yet quite unimportant, and is likely to remain so for a long time to come, unless the Indian mills are able to find markets in Asia for coarse blankets and horse-clothing, the only descriptions of goods for which there would be a fair demand in the regions we could hope to supply, and the only kinds we could manufacture with profit to compete outside India with European goods." But Sir George Watt, writing in 1908 ("Commercial Products of India," p. 1123), pointed out that in 1895, only two years after the date of Mr. O'Conor's review of the trade as here quoted, the imports from Great Britain had fallen off by 9½ per cent., while those from Germany had increased sixfold, from France threefold, and from Austria twofold. Sir George Watt continues: "It had thus almost immediately been demonstrated that the attractively got up shoddy and mixed woollen goods of the Continent of Europe (more especially of Germany) were not only ousting the superior manufactures of England, but had undermined the ground that the Indian mills were believed capable of holding." And as an illustration of this he adds elsewhere (p. 1131): "The shawl traffic is almost entirely with Calcutta, and is very largely the expression of the demand made by the coolies employed in the tea industry for shawls and blankets, so that Germany has not only driven the Indian mills, but the British as well, out of this particular market."
Here, I may remark incidentally, may be found a most valuable lesson in the use of tariffs that should be taken to heart by the Imperial Government, if they desire to aid the Feudatory Chiefs in building up Indian industries. There is a small revenue duty of 5 per cent, ad valorem, on the import of manufactured woollen goods into India—as on most other imports—levied impartially on British and foreign goods. Now, we see that this 5 per cent. duty is sufficient, as there is no excise, to act as a mild protection against the goods of Bradford and the Yorkshire woollen industry, because those Yorkshire goods enjoy neither protection, nor bounties, nor subsidies. But it is very different with the imports from Germany and other protected nations; the advantages their manufacturers enjoy from those sources far outweigh such a nominal tariff as the Indian revenue duty. The consequence is what is shown by Sir George Watt—the Indian mills cannot compete successfully with the German for the Calcutta trade in cheap coolie blankets, so they are driven to compete with Yorkshire in the costlier lines.

Thus it is that in every industry in which Mr. Chatterton may advise the Mysore Government to encourage its subjects to engage—and so, too, for every other Feudatory State—they will be met in the initial stages by this powerful, organized, foreign competition; and progress must be slow, and results often sadly disappointing.

The East India Association has issued, under the title "Truths about India," with the powerful and authoritative imprimatur of such known and proved friends of India as Lord Ampthill, Mr. Pennington and Dr. Pollen, a most useful and illuminating brochure on some of the burning questions of the day. Its chapter on the Feudatory States is a crushing exposure of the ignorant rubbish wherewith Padgett, M.P., and his friends delight to regale the British public on their return from their "personally conducted tours" in India. The autocratic rule of the Chiefs, which is properly tempered by their loyal responsi-
bility to the Paramount Power, undoubtedly represents the patriarchal and aristocratic form of government that is best suited to the genius of the Indian peoples and that is best able to recommend to them valuable reforms. The chapter shows that in all matters affecting social or domestic or religious habits and customs, the feudatory form of government has, ex naturâ rei, a freer hand than any ordinary local government. It is well known that all the greater ruling Princes and their Dewans are heartily in favour of such a policy of industrial expansion as that which is suggested by the Chief of Inchalkaranji in his *Asiatic Review* article, and which has been urgently asked for by Sir Gaugâdhar Chitnavis and the Indian-born members of the Imperial Council. The ruler of Inchalkaranji declares that such a policy resolutely carried out would do more than anything else could possibly do to allay the spirit of unrest that is abroad in India. Such a policy carried out by the Feudatory Princes, with the friendly aid and co-operation of the Imperial Government, would not only be an assured success *ab initio*, but would greatly enrich both themselves and their subjects.

And why should it not be? Literally nothing stands in the way save only the disastrous influence of the Cobden Club with the India Office and the Government of India! Every educated and intelligent economist knows perfectly well why it is that nascent industries in India are strangled; why it is that, with all her wealth of raw material and cheap and docile labour, unrivalled elsewhere, and with the biggest markets in the world at her doors, India finds it impossible to run a dozen woollen mills, or a dozen paper mills, or a dozen match factories, or any considerable number of sugar factories, or, indeed, any other of the innumerable industries for which there is in India an immense field. In every one of these cases it is the foreign dumping from Protectionist countries!

And everyone knows equally well how the foreigner manages to do it so effectually. How did the Dutch
Government of Java increase their sales of sugar (now largely refined) to India from less than £10,000 in 1888-89 to £5,971,804 in 1911-12? Starting with the initial advantages of Indian helplessness under Free Trade; with the Indian industry already nearly ruined by the bounty-fed beet-sugar of Germany and Austria, and only partially restored under the Brussels Convention; with free silver against Indian taxed silver and closed mints—the Dutchmen had only to raise their tariff to prohibitive rates, and to subsidize their own Javanese exporters to any necessary extent, and the thing was done. And India, which used to produce half the sugar of the world—largely in Feudatory States—not only lost the whole of her export trade, but hundreds of thousands of acres of sugar-cane (including large areas in Mysore) fell out of cultivation.

The late Sir William Lee-Warner—whose recent lamented death is deeply deplored by every well-wisher of India—published in the *Fortnightly Review* of November last a powerful article, in which he pointed out some of the dangers that would threaten British India under a system of sheer, full-blooded Protection. By that I mean, of course, the imposition of import duties not only on the goods of protected and subsidized foreigners, such as the Japanese, the Javanese, and Germans, but also on the Free Trade goods from the United Kingdom and the rest of the British Empire; and on this point Sir William Lee-Warner's arguments were entirely in accordance with the masterly speech on the subject, delivered in the Governor-General's Legislation Council on March 17 last by Sir Guy Fleetwood Wilson, then Finance Minister of India. Sir William pointed out that the perils to India threatened by such a system of Protection are (1) the enormous increase of smuggling that would inevitably follow the establishment of such an endless and obscure Customs-line as that between British India and the Feudatory States, and (2) the increased cost of the necessaries of life to the
poorest classes in India likely to ensue on the taxation of imported goods.

These objections to a full measure of Protection for India are undoubtedly serious. And it may well be that the slackening of the demand in British India for such a full measure of Protection is largely due to the appreciation of the strength of the arguments put forward by Sir Guy Fleetwood Wilson on the part of the most highly educated Indians. And it is fortunate that these arguments do not in the least apply to a system of modified Protection with Imperial Preference—for this fact brings within the range of practical politics a scheme of fiscal reform for India that will benefit equally the Feudatory States and the provinces of British India, and that will injure no part of the British Empire.

For, with regard to the first of Sir William Lee-Warner's warnings noted above, under Imperial Preference the Feudatory States would naturally form an integral part of the Indian Customs Union. As in the case of the South African Customs Union, there would be one Imperial tariff, with no Customs-line between British India and the Feudatory States, and from the proceeds each State would derive a substantial revenue, distributed perhaps in proportion to its population as in South Africa. And with regard to the second of his warnings, under Imperial Preference the existing taxation on Indian cotton goods and Lancashire cotton goods will be altogether remitted, the taxation on foreign goods being maintained or increased. Now, the only necessary of the poor Indian raiyat that depends even remotely on import is his scanty cotton clothing, and seeing that India and Lancashire between them provide over 90 per cent of this cotton clothing, it is obvious that the cost of this necessary, so far from being increased, will be substantially diminished. I challenge reasoned contradiction of this undoubted fact.

Here, then, we have an indication of the direction in which we must look for the material development of the
Feudatory States of India, which has hitherto been retarded by our fiscal policy, by our currency policy and (in some cases most seriously) by our recent opium policy. Under a system of Imperial Preference that will foster the industrial expansion of all India, mills and factories will spring up in the Feudatory States, secured from the "alien industrial inroads" from Protectionist countries which have hitherto rendered such enterprises wellnigh hopeless. The Chiefs will gain a substantial increase to their revenues that have been depleted by the loss in their States of such paying crops as opium and sugar, while their poorer subjects will obtain their necessaries at a considerably reduced price, and all classes will participate in a general increase of material prosperity.
ENGLAND AND RUSSIA*

By Edward G. Browne.

It has been said of Napoleon that the greatest of all his talents lay in his power of convincing his countrymen of the greatness of those talents, and thus establishing a “Napoleon Legend.” On a smaller scale the same may be said, mutatis mutandis, of Sir Edward Grey, whose name will ever be associated, for better or worse, with the policy of the Anglo-Russian Agreement. That he has “made history” no one will deny, though whether the chapter for which he is responsible is one of which Englishmen have reason to be proud, or which their successors will read with satisfaction, is another question. So far as the Muslim World is concerned, at any rate, it is one of the darkest chapters in their history. When he came into power eight years ago there existed four independent Muhammadan States, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan and Morocco, and of these four only Afghanistan has thus far escaped scatheless from the direct or indirect consequences of his policy. How far this policy has been responsible for the recent misfortunes of Turkey and the ominous clouds which still darken her future is ably discussed by Mr. Marmaduke Pickthall in the January number of La Revue Politique Internationale.

What unfortunate Persia, at the very moment of her attempted regeneration, has suffered at his hands is known

* This article is appearing simultaneously in La Revue Politique Internationale by especial arrangement.
to all, and forms the subject of a literature already voluminous, of which Mr. Morgan Shuster's great work, "The Strangling of Persia," deserves special mention. As for Morocco, it is, alas! now little more than a geographical expression; and it is worthy of remark that whereas Sir Edward Grey's constant boast is that he has at least "kept the peace of Europe," the one occasion on which he nearly plunged his country into a European War was to compass the destruction of the last independent Muhammadan State in Africa. To what degree he was privy to the Italian raid on Tripoli is not at present ascertainable; but, even assuming the absence of such complicity, there is enough for which he is admittedly and avowedly responsible to account for the profound mistrust—to put it mildly—with which he is regarded by the whole Muhammadan world, and the prevalent belief amongst Muhammadans (which no well-informed person can affect to ignore) that a desire to destroy the political power of Islam, and to prevent it from entering on the path of reform, is one of the chief factors in his policy. The dangerous effects of this belief are already manifesting themselves in India, and are causing grave anxiety to her rulers, and it is to be hoped that there is truth in the current rumour that those of Sir Edward Grey's colleagues who are especially responsible for the safety of this great dependency are beginning to exercise a more jealous watch over his policy in its relation to Muhammadan sentiment. In this connection it would be unjust to withhold a tribute of praise and admiration from Lord Hardinge, the Viceroy of India, who, whatever his responsibility in promoting the Anglo-Russian Agreement, has won the respect and affection of the people of India by the courage which he shewed on the occasion of his attempted assassination, and by the sympathy manifested by him in connection with the South African troubles and the affair of the Cawnpore Mosque.

To return, however, to Sir Edward Grey and the Russophile, Germanophobe and anti-Islamic policy which
he has succeeded, with a skill equally wonderful \( * \) and
deplorable, in forcing upon this country, it must be said\] at
the outset that the extent to which this policy is his own
is still doubtful. Of all the British Government Offices,
the Foreign Office is, perhaps, the least sensitive to public
opinion, and the most controlled by a special hierarchy
recruited from a very limited area; and during Sir Edward
Grey's régime it has succeeded in emancipating itself to
a very much greater degree than at any previous time
during the last half century from any kind of democratic
control. The higher permanent officials in particular
possess an enormous power of shaping its policy, and if
the Minister or Secretary of State be weak, indolent or
confiding, they can without much difficulty impose their
policy upon him, while persuading him that the ideas of
which they make him the mouthpiece are really his own.
In this way his course becomes both easy and pleasant:
easy, because he need not trouble to attend to details or
to evolve a policy of his own; pleasant, because he becomes
immensely popular in his department and in all the circles
—social, political and journalistic—which his department
directly or indirectly controls.

Difficult as it is to penetrate the mysteries of Downing
Street, there is some reason to suspect that something of
this sort has taken place in the case of Sir Edward Grey.
Whatever may be thought of his policy, his personal
integrity has never been questioned. Almost alone amongst
the present Ministry, he has, in spite of the advanced
Radicalism of his views on Home Politics, almost entirely
escaped the violent attacks made on every one of his
colleagues by the Opposition Press. Of the imputations
made upon their characters and actions, in language often
transcending the bounds of decency, no whisper has reached
him. Typically English in character, untravelled, unskilled
in foreign tongues and ways, of ancient and noble family,
devoted to sport, devoid of sentiment, cold, reserved
"practical," "unsentimental," of unimpeachable personal
integrity, and, as all Members of Parliament testify, extraordinarily weighty and impressive as a public speaker, he has succeeded in silencing criticism and securing the acceptance of the most amazing statements in a way which no other Minister has achieved, and which, indeed, is little short of miraculous. "Transparent honesty" is the quality commonly ascribed to him, not only by his political allies, but by his opponents; and yet probably no Minister has made so many statements in Parliament of which the inaccuracy was so patent, and which nevertheless passed unchallenged. Instances of this might be multiplied, but four or five will suffice.

1. Secret Agreements.

On November 27, 1911, Sir Edward Grey said:

"We have laid before the House the Secret Articles of the Agreement with France of 1904. There are no other secret engagements... From ourselves we have not made a single secret article of any kind since we came into office."

Referring to this explicit statement, Mr. Bonar Law, the Leader of the Opposition, said:

"The Right Honourable Gentleman has first told us, and we are glad to hear it, that there is no extension of our obligations by any secret arrangements of any kind whatever. We are all glad to hear it."

And later in the debate the Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith) said:

"The House has heard from my Right Honourable friend he Foreign Secretary, and I believe has heard with universal satisfaction, that the world is now in possession of the whole of our Treaty obligations on this subject."

Nothing could seem more clear and candid than this. But little more than a fortnight later, on December 14, 1911,
on Mr. Wedgwood's enquiring whether "every agreement, treaty and understanding between this country and any other country, was now public property," Sir Edward Grey replied that the answer to this question was in the negative. Thereupon Mr. McNeill asked "Are there other secret treaties beside the Treaty recently disclosed between this country and France?" to which Sir Edward Grey replied, "There are other engagements which have not been published."

The glaring discrepancy between these two statements, to which I called attention in a letter published in the Times on February 22, 1912, has never been explained, and not only the people but the Parliament of Great Britain still remain entirely in the dark as to a matter in which they are vitally concerned.

2. Expansion of the British Empire.

Again on November 27, 1911, Sir Edward Grey remarked:

"I say this—the wise policy for this country is to expand as little as possible, and certainly no further the African possessions;" a statement which Mr. Bonar Law again hastened to endorse.

Within three weeks the British public was astonished to learn that by some hitherto unexplained diplomatic legerdemain, a long stretch of the North African coast between Egypt and Cyrenaica, including the important harbour of Sollum with a triangular piece of the hinterland, had been "provisionally annexed to Egypt," which of course, in fact if not in name, was equivalent to its annexation by England. In other words, Sir Edward Grey, having declared the unwisdom of extending the British Empire, especially in Africa, immediately proceeded to annex a large segment of territory in that continent.
3. THE "UNAGGRESSIVE" CHARACTER OF RUSSIAN POLICY.

Another astounding statement made by Sir Edward Grey on the occasion last referred to (November 27, 1911) is the following:

"One of the essential conditions of the friendship of ourselves with France and Russia in the last few years has been the certain knowledge that neither they nor we wish to pursue a provocative or aggressive policy."

These words, as though by an exquisite irony, were uttered four days after Persia, acting on the advice of Great Britain, had submitted to the first Russian ultimatum, and two days before the second still more cruel and unreasonable ultimatum was launched upon her!

4. BEHAVIOUR OF RUSSIAN OFFICERS IN PERSIAN SERVICE.

The most amazing instance of Sir Edward Grey's attempts to make black appear as white where Russia is concerned is, however, his statement (thrice repeated in slightly different forms on July 27, November 27, and December 14, 1911) that the Russian officers—viz., Colonel Liakhoff and his colleagues—in the service of the ex-Shah Muhammad Ali, and in command of the notorious Cossack Brigade, "could, by lifting a finger, have stopped the revolution against the Shah, and prevented his deposition," but that they "did not lift a finger, and let the Shah be expelled."

The active part played by these Russian officers, first on the occasion of the Coup d'État of June 23, 1908, in the destruction of the first National Assembly, and again in July, 1909, in the attempt to check the Nationalist advance on Teheran, and to maintain Muhammad Ali on the throne, is so notorious, and was so fully described at the time in the British Press, especially by the Times' special-
correspondent, Mr. David Fraser, that it is astonishing that even the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could have been ignorant of it. Yet here again such, apparently, was Sir Edward Grey's prestige that no Member of Parliament was found to call attention to this amazing perversion of the facts.

5. The Spring Rice Memorandum of September 4, 1907.

Four days after the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Agreement, which was signed on August 31, 1907, Sir Cecil Spring Rice, then British Minister at Teheran, sent to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs a Persian Note or Memorandum (yád-dášht), designed to reassure the Persian Government and people as to the scope and effect of that Agreement, and to dispel the apprehensions (only too well founded, as subsequently appeared) which it had aroused in their minds. The text of this Memorandum was published in the Habl-ul-Matín and other Persian papers ten days later, and an English translation of it was published by me in January, 1909, in a pamphlet entitled, "A Brief Narrative of Recent Events in Persia." During three years (1909-1911) this translation was repeatedly cited in Parliament and the Press without its genuineness or accuracy being once challenged, until at the end of the fateful year 1911, first Mr. Acland (on December 5), and subsequently Sir Edward Grey (on December 14), professed entire ignorance of its contents, and even threw doubt on its existence. A photograph of the original document had, however, been obtained meanwhile from Teheran, and this was placed in Mr. Acland's hands for examination by one of the Members of Parliament who had taken a prominent part in the debate. On February 1, 1912, Mr. Acland, in a letter addressed to this same Member of Parliament, was compelled to acknowledge the genuineness of the Memorandum, and the substantial accuracy of the translation on which he had cast doubt.
"On receipt of your inquiry," he wrote, "Sir Edward Grey caused an abridged translation of this paper to be made, and a copy of the English text of it to be asked for from Teheran.

"The English text has now been received, and contains passages in substantial agreement with those quoted in the House of Commons, with which the abridged translation above referred to also corresponds.

"The document was written in an unofficial form as an explanatory memorandum by Sir Cecil Spring Rice for the benefit of the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs of that time to allay certain apprehensions felt by various provincial enjumens in that country.

"The text of the official announcement made to the Persian Government is that contained in the papers presented to Parliament."

In his reply the recipient of this letter expressed his very natural surprise that a document of such importance "should have been familiar to everyone with any knowledge of Persian affairs except to the Government" (i.e., the British) "whom it chiefly concerned. It is, I think," he added, "the most surprising example of official ignorance that I have ever come across. In saying this I accept, of course, most fully and absolutely the statement that this Memorandum was unknown to Sir Edward Grey and yourself. I am only surprised that the whole Foreign Office should also apparently know nothing about it."

Mr. Morgan Shuster was therefore fully justified when he wrote at p. 242 of his book, "The Strangling of Persia":

"It appears, therefore, that at the time that I was being charged with having 'displayed ignorance of the spirit of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, and for months before that date, I was familiar with an important official exposition of the views of the British and of the Russian Governments formulated by the British Minister Plenipotentiary at Teheran; yet the British Foreign Office
officials who presented these charges of ignorance or negligence against me were themselves at that very time in ignorance even of the existence of this important paper which they have only since come to peruse. Is it at all possible that a department of the Government, so conducted as to permit such a lapse in delicate and important affairs of this nature, may have been equally uninformed as to the real facts of other incidents arising during my administration of the finances of Persia, although this department of the British Government saw no hesitation in promptly endorsing Russia’s demand for my removal and dismissal from the post of Treasurer-General?”

If, as we are obliged to assume, the above statements made by Sir Edward Grey to the House of Commons about important affairs connected with the department for which he is responsible were made in good faith, we are driven to believe that they must be explained by forgetfulness, distaste for detail, an obstinate determination to defend his cherished idea of Anglo-Russian friendship and cooperation against all criticism, and to declare the policy based on this idea successful in the teeth of all evidence to the contrary, and a silent but deeply-rooted contempt for the House of Commons, rising to indignation and anger, when it seeks to penetrate those mysterious arcana of which he is the high priest. England has gained little by the curtailment of the powers of the House of Lords effected by the present Government, since they have got in its place a Cabinet more despotic and more contemptuous of public opinion than has ever been known in recent times, where each Minister is given the most autocratic powers in his own department on condition of allowing each of his colleagues a similar autocracy in theirs; and when these Ministers loudly assert, as they do from time

* As a matter of fact it subsequently appeared from the Blue Book (Cd. 6,105), p. 52, No. 127, that Sir Edward Grey actually suggested the dismissal of Mr. Shuster to the Russian Government on November 17, 1911.
to time, that Eastern countries like Turkey and Persia are unfitted for popular government, we may suspect that their real opinion is that all countries, England included, are in the same case, a view that has actually been advanced lately in at least one Conservative paper.

To such politicians, as well as to a certain section of the clergy and the majority of the rapidly-increasing bureaucracy, the Russian autocracy, seen from a comfortable distance, appears supremely attractive, and we may be pardoned for believing that at times they are tempted to envy the expeditious methods by which the Russian Government silences its critics. Mr. Hitchens observes in his novel "The Green Carnation," that while the wicked are supremely indifferent to the doings of their respectable neighbours, the respectable are intensely interested in the doings of the wicked. In like manner it may be said that while autocrats take very little interest in the sayings or doings of Liberals, save when these threaten to interfere with their powers, many professing Liberals are, for some inexplicable reason, intensely interested in, and even attracted by, the doings of autocrats. Mr. Gladstone, who was wont to speak of "Holy Russia" and her "mission," who never wearied of denouncing the Turks and advocating their expulsion from Europe "bag and baggage," and whose ears were ever open to the suggestions of that able Russian agent Madame Olga Novikoff, who exerted so great an influence also over men like Thomas Carlyle, Freeman, and Stead, is an instance in point; but even his enthusiasm, reinforced as it was by religious motives, never rendered him so blind to Russia's faults as Sir Edward Grey has shown himself to be, while the strong Turcophilism of Lord Beaconsfield and the Conservative party always offered an alternative to such voters as cared more about foreign policy than about domestic affairs.

To such voters at the present time no such alternative is open. Many people who supported the present "Liberal" Government at the last, or even at the two or three last
elections are, for various reasons, and especially on account of their profound dissatisfaction with Sir Edward Grey's foreign policy, their dislike of the Russian entanglement, and their desire either for the old "splendid isolation" or for a closer friendship with Germany, prepared to sacrifice all minor issues in order to secure a reversal of that policy; and were a new Beaconsfield to arise and put a new foreign policy, or rather the old, sane Conservative foreign policy, in the first place on his programme, he might easily be returned to power at the next election. Unhappily the Conservative party are at present bankrupt of any such ideas, while the chief items on their programme, Protection (or "Tariff Reform") and Conscription (or "National Service") remain, and are likely to remain, profoundly unpopular. They, like the Liberals, have lost the broad, sane outlook on foreign affairs which characterized Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury, and, with one or two brilliant exceptions amongst the old Free Trade Conservatives (who are become anathema to their discredited and derelict Party), are as much absorbed in "parochial" politics as their Liberal antagonists.

One of the greatest, most wonderful, and most dangerous achievements of Sir Edward Grey is his success in what it is now the fashion to call "lifting Foreign Policy out of the domain of Party Politics," and establishing the theory of its "continuity" at the very moment when he had upset the tradition of nearly a century. For a hundred years, ever since the disastrous treaties which Persia was compelled to conclude with Russia at Gulistán (1813) and Turkmáncháy (1828), the general policy of Great Britain, in spite of what good old Sir John McNeill, writing in 1834, called "the foolish click (clique) of believers in Russian benevolence and other nonsensical matter," has been to support Persia in resisting further Russian aggression. Every advance of Russia in Central Asia was jealously watched, and in March, 1885, the so-called "Panj-dih Incident" brought England and Russia to the verge of
war. Fifteen years later Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, the idol of the New Imperialists, and the inventor of the "New Diplomacy," created some sensation by remarking in a public speech, *à propos* of agreements with Russia, that "he who would sup with the devil needs a long spoon"; while his ally, Mr. Cecil Rhodes, of South African fame, affected contempt for "the decaying Latin races," and included the Germans in the scheme of Rhodes Scholarships at Oxford, whereby he sought to consolidate the Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic races. Finally the Anglo-Japanese Alliance prepared the way for Japan's triumph over Russia in the great war of 1904-5, which, with the succeeding revolution in Russia, seemed to promise to a score of anxious nations and millions of oppressed people a prolonged respite from the aggressive schemes of that restless, ambitious, and gigantic Empire.

Eight years ago, therefore, it seemed that the really continuous foreign policy pursued for nearly a century by Great Britain in Asia, which had as its principal aim the safeguarding of India from a Russian invasion, had culminated in an almost unimaginied success. And the very magnitude of this success seems to have alarmed its architects, and led to the most astounding reversal of British foreign policy within the memory of man. Four months after the signature of the Treaty of Portsmouth on August 23, 1905, Mr. Balfour's Government fell, and the Liberals came into office with Sir Edward Grey as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. During eight years he has done all in his power to restore the shattered strength and prestige of Russia, seeking her friendship, as it would appear, at any cost, deferring to her wishes, aiding her schemes of aggrandizement in Persia, Turkey and China, and freely placing at her disposal, for the first time, I believe, in history, the resources of the British money market, so that now Russia is stronger and more aggressive than she has ever been before, and having repressed revolution at home, emasculated the Duma, crushed
Finland, seized four of the richest provinces in Persia (Ázarbáyján, Gilán, Mázandarán and Khurásán) and, garrisoned them with some twenty thousand troops, practically destroyed Persian autonomy, invaded Mongolia, bullied China, and grievously enfeebled Turkey, stands forth, ominous, overbearing, reactionary, with her countless armed hosts and her infinitely cunning diplomats, a menace to the whole world.

So far as England’s share in bringing about this state of things is concerned, it is the work of two comparatively small but compact, astute, influential and powerful groups, the one distinctively Russophile, the other primarily Germanophobe (though to some extent overlapping each other), comprising courtiers, high officials (especially in the Foreign Office), financiers, ecclesiastics, and journalists. The extent to which these two groups have succeeded in controlling the Press of Great Britain, and by its means in inspiring the minds of the unthinking public with a vague fear and mistrust of Germany, and in obliterating from their memories the fear and mistrust of Russia which until a few years ago had dominated them for several generations, is one of the most remarkable phenomena of our time, and affords a striking illustration of Max Nordau’s thesis that the freedom of the Press is only one of the “conventional lies of our modern civilisation.” “If all the prominent newspapers throughout the length and breadth of the land,” he says, “unite in striving to accomplish certain purposes, if they repeat certain thoughts and propositions for months, for years, without cessation, if they bring their readers again and again to their point of view, there is absolutely nothing that they cannot finally accomplish, there is not a Government, a law, a custom, nor even a conception of the universe, that can withstand them.” When, as is now the case in England, most of the prominent newspapers are in the hands of three or four persons, and the really independent papers of some influence can almost be counted on the fingers of one hand, a powerful clique, such as has been
described above, has only to gain the adhesion and cooperation of these three or four persons in order to impose its ideas on the vast majority of the community, and this is precisely what has happened in England during the last six or seven years. How else can we account for the monstrous delusion prevalent in England that Russia is an unaggressive and Germany an aggressive Power? After all, nations, like individuals, must be judged by their acts. Can any unbiased observer describe Russia's actions, especially since the Morocco crisis of 1911, in Persia, Mongolia, and the Far East as "unaggressive"? And can anyone deny that, when all is said, Germany has kept the peace for more than forty years, and is the only great European Power which during this period has hardly annexed any territory at all?

Another extraordinary thing connected with this question is that the defenders of the Anglo-Russian *entente* take one of two diametrically opposite lines of argument. One party asserts that the weakening of Russia's power, in consequence of her disastrous war with Japan and her subsequent domestic troubles, upset the balance of power in favour of Germany, and that consequently it became necessary to restore this balance by the employment of every possible means for the strengthening of Russia. Such persons may be invited to consider whether they have not over-redressed the balance, and whether the time has not now come when its last oscillation should be corrected by the support of Germany. The other party, however, take the view that the hegemony of the world will inevitably fall to Russia, that we cannot resist or oppose her, and that it therefore behoves us to "make friends with the mammon of unrighteousness." It is even said that there exists amongst the Anglo-Indian bureaucracy a school—happily a small one—which believes that England will inevitably lose India, and who would prefer in that case that it should pass into Russia's hands rather than into the hands of any Asiatic race. These, it is to be supposed, are the disciples of
Nietsche and the believers in the doctrine of the "good European."

If the views here advanced are correct, Sir Edward Grey's foreign policy has been a gigantic mistake, which Europe generally, and England particularly, will one day, and that at no very distant date, have good reason to lament. In the opinion of the writer (which, it must be admitted, is at present the opinion of a minority of Englishmen) the Anglo-Russian *entente* will last just so long as England is content to follow where Russia leads. This is at present the case. Russia objected, in 1911, to the appointment of Captain Stokes to command the Persian Treasury Gendarmerie, and though he had been explicitly told that he could accept this post if he resigned his commission, means were found, in deference to Russia's wishes, to prevent the acceptance of his resignation. Russia then demanded the dismissal of Mr. Morgan Shuster from the post of Treasurer-General of Persia, and, in the teeth of the protests not only of the Persian people but of all European merchants, bankers, and others who were interested in the solvency and good government of Persia, Sir Edward Grey co-operated with Russia to secure his dismissal, whereby, incidentally, besides ruining Persia, he did much to alienate American sympathy and friendship from this country. Russia then brought masses of troops into North Persia, and inaugurated the "Bloody Assize" of January, 1912, by publicly hanging eight prominent and respected citizens of Tabriz on New Year's Day (which happened to correspond with the 10th of Muharram, the most solemn day of mourning in the Persian ecclesiastical year), amongst whom was included the *Sikat-ul-Islam*, the chief ecclesiastic of the province. Sir Edward Grey ventured a feeble protest, to which the Russian Government replied, with incomparable cynicism, that, as the Turks had once hanged a Christian bishop, they considered themselves justified in hanging a Persian *mujtahid*, who was, moreover, "the head of a dissenting sect" (meaning the Shaykhí school, to which the
Sikat-ul-Islam belonged). To show how little they cared for Sir Edward Grey's mild remonstrances, they still further outraged the feelings of the Muhammadan world three months later by bombarding the sacred shrine of the Imám Rizá at Mashhad, looting its treasures, and killing a number of inoffensive people, pilgrims and residents, some of whom are stated to have been British subjects. This outrage, which rang through the whole Muhammadan world, is scarcely even alluded to, much less described, in the Blue-Book dealing with the events of this period. On December 27, 1913, the Times published an interesting article from its correspondent at Teheran on "the Work of the Swedish Gendarmerie in Persia." In the course of this article he says that "the Russians are inclined to view with apprehension the development of the gendarmerie in the Neutral Zone." In other words, they not only regard all North Persia as already their property, but are beginning to cast covetous eyes on what lies to the south of Isfahán. This is a good example of what Mr. Arthur Diósy, in his "New Far East" (p. 341), well describes as "the calm way in which Russia pursues her policy in Asia, undeterred by remonstrance or bluster, steadily making for the goal she has had in view for generations." That that goal is India was almost universally believed by our ancestors and by ourselves until seven or eight years ago, and though the belief that we are much wiser than our ancestors is always a pleasing one, it does not necessarily follow that it is true. "Russia," says Mr. Diósy in the work cited above (p. 349), "wants to rule over Asia, and to control Europe too, ay, and as much of the rest of the globe as she can place under her influence. Russia wants as much of the world as she can get hold of, because Russia believes, firmly, implicitly, that it is her 'manifest destiny' to be a World-Power, a greater Rome, a stronger and more Imperial Britain. 'Russia first and the rest nowhere!' That is the idea implanted in every Russian mind, the wish imbedded in every Russian heart. . . ."
Sooner or later, then, and probably sooner rather than later, Great Britain will have to choose between becoming Russia's antagonist, or her vassal. Complacent as Sir Edward Grey has been to Russia, especially during the last two years, there must come a limit to such complacency if England is to remain not merely a Great Power, but a Power of any sort. If and when this limit is reached, the Anglo-Russian entente, which Russia will maintain only so long as it serves her purposes, will be at an end, and England will be forced to renew the secular struggle, which Sir Edward Grey fondly imagined that he had composed for ever, under circumstances infinitely more disadvantageous than at any previous period. To draw nearer to Germany, Europe's chief barrier against the Slav hordes, and to the United States of America, whom our recent diplomacy has so seriously offended, and with their help to support Turkey, Persia, and China, and so recover something of the influence and prestige which we have lost in Asia, would be the first step of a wise and far-seeing British foreign policy, but it is questionable whether there is more than one member of the present Ministry or two of the Opposition leaders who have the strength, statesmanship, skill and will to inaugurate such a policy, though in this direction only, as I believe, lie safety, honour and the hopes of true civilization and progress.
THE QUESTION OF THE GRECO-ALBANIAN FRONTIER IN EPIRUS

By C. P. Casanges

(The writer of this article was born at Samira, and spent his youth in Epirus. He subsequently had to flee because he was an agitator against the Government. He has made a life-study of the problem of Epirus, and has worked for twenty-five years for its liberation. He has now come to Europe from the United States of America as one of the delegates of the Epirotes in America before the Conference in London.)

People who live under the shadow of a volcano that is eternally expected to explode and yet never does, get at last lulled into a state of security which periodical, spectacular, but otherwise harmless, eruptions only serve to strengthen. Europe has been for a century past terrorized with the idea that a great menace for its peace lay dormant at its door, in what has been known as “The Near Eastern Question.” The combined Machiavelism of European diplomacy claims the credit, which, as a matter of fact, belongs rather to the general political changes that took place in Europe, for averting a cataclysmal solution of this dreaded question by periodically inducing several partial readjustments. These reduced gradually the area of its influence, and thus materially lessened the peril of its final disposal. Dismembered as it now stands into several questions of minor importance, the question of the Near East still retains in some of its fragments the virulence of the whole. The source of danger has not been eliminated; it has been parcelled out and diverted away, while Europe, now inured to the danger that has never materialized, wrongly concludes that it is immune.

One part of this ever-puzzling question of the Near East
is the Epirotic question. There is no other question just now on the political horizon which, for its size, is more pregnant with future developments. Two great Powers, Austria and Italy, are interested in it jointly, but in such a complicated way as to render their seeming accord a cloak for an irreconcilable divergence of interests. To borrow an expression from the Turf, they are both in the race and both jockey for position, but their entente does not extend beyond pushing other competitors to the outer edge.

How is it, then, that this important question remains practically unknown to the public at large? The reason is that diplomacy has clothed it with an apparently innocuous term. The question is put as one of a delimitation of frontier in "Southern Albania." As one sees, it is a case of "giving a dog a bad name." For all the trouble comes from the fact that what, persistently and to no good purpose, Europeans have been misled into calling "Southern Albania," has nothing, or very little, Albanian in it. It is really the northern part of a Greek province known to the ancients as Epirus, and called even to-day by its neighbouring Albanian tribes in their language Erberi or Erbri, this being only an alliteration of its Greek name.

Ethnologically, the character of its inhabitants furnishes no debatable ground. Except for the fact that some of them speak, besides Greek, a dialect akin to the Albanian language, the Epirotes have nothing in common with the Albanians in the north. Whatever they may have been originally, whether Pre-hellenic-Pelasgians or Illyrians, to-day they are in sentiment, civilization, and national consciousness as Greek as any Athenian—only more so. They pride themselves on being Epirotes, but only use that name in order to assert a claim on some sort of a superior patriotism over the other Greeks.

Unfortunately for the Epirotes, their land lies along the coast of the narrowing end of the Adriatic. It has a few landings—none of them can by any stretch of imagination be dignified with the name of a port—which face Otranto
on the Italian end of the Adriatic. For a long time Austria has looked upon the eastern coast of the Adriatic as its legitimate share of the prey in a decaying Turkey. Its occupation would prolong her Dalmatian coast to the entrance of the Adriatic and insure for her ships free access to the Mediterranean. Thus we find that Austria inaugurated very early in Albania a system of nationalistic propaganda through the Catholic priesthood over whom she exercised an exclusive right of protection. At first, it was limited to the Catholic tribes in the north. Very soon the propaganda was spread, through the Austrian Consuls, among the Mussulman beys, who, true to their traditional character of mercenaries, were ready to sell to the highest bidder.

Italy, not to be outdone, started a similar propaganda in the south of Albania, which, through the astuteness of one of her agents, Monsieur de Gubernatis, she extended also to Epirus. She has opened a number of schools and established several commercial agencies there. Austria’s occupation of the Albanian littoral to the Epirotic border, Italy could counterbalance by the occupation of the Epirotic coast with the harbour of Valona at the north and that of Preveza in the south. Thus Italy would dominate the exit to the Mediterranean, and Austria would still remain bottled up in the Adriatic.

One must not be led to believe that this has been done by any preconceived arrangement as to well-defined spheres of influence. It was a game of who would get there first, and their propagandas often crossed each other and encroached on each other’s preserves. Neither must one imagine that their aspirations found any deterrent in the well-known Hellenic character of Epirus. The Greek revindications on it were already once easily disposed of in order to leave the field open for their intrigues. With the backing of the Powers, who were always cowed by the fear of a break in their Concert, Turkey refused in 1881 to cede to Greece the part of Epirus lying near the seaboard, which was allotted to her by the Treaty of Berlin. To the same
end, but on behalf of Austria, the conquests of Servia and Montenegro in Albania were vetoed by the London Conference of the Ambassadors. The ostensible reason given for this decision was the desire to incorporate all the Albanians into a State of their own. A somewhat over-scrupulous respect for the principle of nationalities in a case where a national conscience did not yet exist!

It was expected that in Epirus, where there are scarcely any Albanians except a minority who speak a corrupt Albanian, the Ambassadorial Conference would ratify the Greek occupation of a territory over which no valid claim could be raised on the ground of the principle of nationalities; the more so, since the Conference allowed Servia to retain the indisputably Albanian districts of Prisren, Djacova, and Dibra. As if rescinding this precedent, the Conference decided to amputate Epirus from the district of Corytsa in the north-east and half her littoral in the west, from a point below the narrows of Corfu, called "Stylos." From the remnant the Conference separated another good-sized province, the future of which was to remain in abeyance until an International Commission especially appointed for the purpose should visit the country and decide on its fate, according to its ethnological composition.

The International Commission went there, and its sad Odyssey in the Epirotic highlands is now a matter of history. This Commission was empowered to cut and slice up and down this disputable area after an impartial inquiry as to the prevailing nationality. There was very little impartiality in its composition, and it was a foregone conclusion that its verdict would be against the people of Epirus; still, it was not allowed to render it. Before the Commission had concluded its labours, Sir Edward Grey issued the well-known circular by which, in order to provide Albania with a southern frontier possessing all the requirements, strategical, ethnological, and economical, for an \textit{état viable}, he gave very nearly the whole of the disputed territory to Albania. Austria and Italy, whose views the British
proposal embodied, adhered to it with reservations as to the evacuation of this contested zone by the Greeks.

According to Aristotle, Greece was settled originally by a people called Πραυκοὶ, or Græci, that came out of Epirus. It is idle to inquire for practical purposes into the racial antecedents of any nation. Even the one that isolated herself by a high wall did not keep her racial purity. In all Europe, and in the Balkans particularly, the flow and ebb of the different currents and counter-currents of the great "Voelkerwanderung" has produced a confusion of races in all the present national crystallizations. It is even a more thankless task to establish a working theory in a case where the com mingling of the races goes back to prehistoric times. I leave, therefore, all theories as to the racial descent of the Epirotes to scientific treatises on the subject. They form a very fascinating ground for investigation—all insoluble questions do—but make no interesting reading, and, as against the will of the people, they have absolutely no practical value. When the Magyars insist upon being Hungarians and the Bulgars Slavonians, what avails it to prove to them that they are Turks, and more Turkish than they of Turkey? Whether Aristotle's estimate be true or not, the Epirotes have acted according to it. They took it literally, and they unconsciously consider Greece rather as a dependency of Epirus than the latter as forming a part of Greece. They have devoted to her all their thoughts and energies, as if they considered it incumbent upon themselves to resuscitate the land which their mythical ancestors are supposed to have settled.

When the curse of the Turkish rule pressed heavily upon all the Christians in the Balkans, Epirus produced a race of men, who scattered all over the peninsula, and, themselves content in their humble station, sowed the seed of renascence, which was to grow into the present tree of liberty. They were simply schoolmasters, and there is hardly one among those apostles of the new political
dispensation that has not come, either from some obscure village in Epirus, or not studied in the then famous schools of Epirus. National gratitude has honoured the most brilliant of these self-sacrificing men with the title, "Teachers of the Nation." There is not a single name among them that does not belong to an Epirote.

This intellectual warfare, no more than any other warfare, was not waged without the sinews of war—money. The Epirotes furnished that, too, lavishly—I use the word on purpose, for the Epirote is by nature as close as the Scot. They slaved and saved, at home and abroad, with the one constant pre-occupation in mind—how to help Hellendom. They stinted themselves when alive, in order to leave large fortunes to the nation. There are in Athens to-day few important institutions that have not been founded and endowed by Epirotes. Most of them, by a strange irony of fate, come from villages situated in this zone which Greece is summoned to sacrifice to Albania.

More potent than the racial instinct in the formation of national entities have been the geographical peculiarities of the chosen homestead. In our days of cultural unity, very little attention is paid to the latent influences exerted by the configuration of the soil upon the nationalization of the primitive settler. A close scrutiny of the Balkan situation from this point of view would explain many a racial anomaly. Certainly some magic must lurk in the locks and barriers by which Nature separates the children of the same race, and, using on each side of them a different formula in mingling and fusing, obtains two different, often inimical, nations. Between Epirus and Albania there is such a natural boundary. It is the old border-line which from the remotest antiquity protected the Epirotic tribenations against the incursion of the Illyrians from the north. It starts from the mouth of the River Vojussa, and following its course southward, reaches the mountain range of Dangli, and thence to Bunar in the Macedonian border,
a little above the Lake Prespa. Strategically, no tactician could improve on them. Neither a long political union, nor a longer common subjection of the two lands, have been able to efface these boundaries completely. In their effects, they stand there yet as traceable as ever. In the border zone one common mother-tongue is spoken—Albanian. In some spots towards the east the mother-tongue becomes Vlachian, without entirely crowding out the Albanian; for the general intercourse, as a language of commerce and culture, Greek is used. The entire borderland is bi-lingual or tri-lingual; nevertheless, a man from the north side of this ancient border line is no more like a man from the south side than the citizen of Dover is like the bourgeois of Calais. Type, customs, culture, character, and dress, change perceptibly. One can easily detect whereabouts in this borderland he is, by the change in the fustanella. The farther north one goes, the shorter and narrower he finds it, until in Albania this garment gives way to a short shirt outside thé homespun trousers, ending in a gaiter. The fustanella is the characteristic costume of the Greek mountaineer, and is so emblematic of Hellenic affinities that one may rely upon it as a criterion more safely than on the language. By following the track of the fustanella, one cannot go far astray in determining the ethnological character of each locality in those parts of the Epiro-Albanian confines.

Under the Byzantine Emperors, although Epirus and Albania were united under a common rule, this natural frontier, if it did not prevent intermingling of the two neighbouring peoples, has yet so effectually stemmed out the tide of Hellenic culture from the south, that after the collapse of the Empire they remained two separate and distinct countries. While Albania was split into many feudal principalities—that of the Castriottis’ being the most famed—Epirus as a unit became a despotat under Greek Princes of the Imperial houses of the Comnenes.

The Turkish conquest, when it came, found in Albania
a stubborn resistance. The feudal Princes there, as long as Venice or Spain or the Empire were willing to pay them to wage war against the Turks, endeavoured to keep them at bay. When the subsidies ceased, they made their submission to the Sultan, and, in order to retain under the new order of things the same prerogatives they enjoyed in the past, they promptly adopted the faith of the conqueror. Only as Mussulmans could they be trusted to carry arms in the service of their new masters. Their apostasy has by no means been a forcible one, nor was it individual. It has been tribal and voluntary. Whole villages, priests at the head, abjured Christianity and went over to Islam. On the map of Albania a small streak to the north-east remained white—that is to say, Christian. The Catholic clans of the Malissori and the Miriditi, whose fastnesses rejoin the unconquered Black Mountains, remained faithful to their religion. Everywhere else, wherever a white spot of Christianity appears, it is due to Hellenic influence.

In Epirus totally different conditions prevail. There an advanced Greek civilization and a well-awakened national conscience stood in the way, unfortunately not of the conquest itself, but of a wholesale apostacy. The Epirotes were not then, and are not to-day, warriors by trade and predilection. When reduced to submission by the Turks, they offered a passive resistance. Inwardly fired by an inextinguishable hope of a quick and certain national renascence, they suffered silently, and planned secretly their revenge. There were many abjurations in Epirus, too, but never voluntary. As a means of escaping constant aggressions by Muhammadans, many a paterfamilias made one of his sons embrace Islamism. This renegade could protect his kin, and especially the women, from attack, or their chattels from depredation. Thus it is that the Mussulmans are in the minority in the Epirus. They form less than a third of the population.

Under Ali Pasha of Janina, Epirus came very near to
becoming what should be best defined as a *Greek Egypt*. To look upon Ali Pasha and his State as Albanian is a mistake which ulterior motives have done much to propagate. Like his counterpart in Albania, Kara-Mustafa Pasha, Bouschatli, of Scutari, who descended from the renegade Montenegro Prince George Czernoyevitz, Ali Pasha was of Servian origin. His father came to Tepeleni in boyhood as a captive of an Agha of mercenaries. He was there converted to Islamism and adopted in the family of his captor. Ali Pasha’s administration was entirely at the hands of the Greeks, and conducted exclusively in Greek. His military organization was composed of Greeks and Albanians indiscriminately; high posts of confidence were confided more often than not to Greeks. The language in his court and harem was Greek, and although his mother-tongue was Albanian, he rarely spoke it after he came to Janina. His sons spoke it even less than himself. The only remaining descendants of his house to-day, the Malik-paschides of Libohovo, come from his sister Hainitzza, and speak as pure and as choice Greek as any cultured Epirote.

After his fall, the Epirote Christians took arms for liberty and fought beside their brethren through the Greek Revolution which they prepared. For, three Epirotes, merchant clerks in Russia, started the secret organization known as “Philike Hetairia,” which instigated the movement for Greek independence. European diplomacy, in recognizing the independent kingdom of Greece, left Epirus under the Turkish yoke. However, the first Governor appointed to Greece, Capodistria, was an Epirote. His house is yet to be seen in Argyrocastro, one of the towns now assigned to Albania.

In 1847 Mussulmans and Christians banded together under the leadership of Gioleka, one of the chieftains of Kourvelessi, and raised the standard of revolt against the Sultan in the districts of the contested zone. The revolted chiefs demanded aid from Greece through its Prime Minister, the Epirote Coletti. Before any aid could reach
them, the insurrection was crushed by the Albanians of Malacastra and Mouzakia. The Bryonis of Berat, who claimed descendancy from the noble Byzantine house of the "Vryennii," were particularly distinguished for their ruthlessness in stamping out the rising. By a curious turn of the wheel, the latter head of this house, Omerbey Bryoni, was destined to become one of the three first martyrs for the Albanian cause. In 1878 he was imprisoned by the Turks in Tschanakale, together with two other conspirators, for fomenting troubles in Albania.

After the frustration of their hopes to be annexed to Greece in 1881, and particularly after the disaster of 1897, many faint-hearted Epirotes lost confidence in Greek aid, and they began to look around for other means to shake off the yoke. Their ranks were soon swollen by the accession of many far-seeing Epirotes who foresaw at once that the régime of the Young Turks was aiming at the extinction of all national aspirations. Without their progressiveness, the Young Turks pursued a policy similar to that of the Magyars in Hungary. Turkey was no longer in the ascendancy, but what the ottomanization would fail in bringing about, was left for the depopulation to accomplish. High taxation and brigandage increased abnormally and rapidly the emigration from Epirus. This was sapping the strength of the Greek element, and, in no distant future, the Greek revindications in Epirus would be deprived of their real object.

Austrian and Italian propagandas had undermined the situation in Albania and Epirus, each for a different purpose, but working on parallel lines. In Northern Epirus many beys were, by one or the other, bought and paid. Quite a number of Christian notables in different regions were also lured by the mirage of a brand new Albanian polity, in which they were to obtain the prominence to which they could never attain in a Greek Epirus. To those, more or less interested promoters of
an Albanian nationality, was soon to be added a class of adepts of quite a different stamp: the dilettanti who make voyages of discovery to virgin and untrodden grounds, and the enthusiasts for all difficult or impossible causes. They delved into the origins of the language, the local traditions, the songs and legends, and they exulted in their discoveries. They were captivated by their archaic flavour, and they went to work to compile, out of the meagre material at hand, a connected history, and so build up a language out of a few rudimentary vocables. All these caisson-workers, so to say, were fitted out for their task in Greek schools, and brought to it, besides the zeal of the neophyte and the devotion of the originator to his creation, all the application to theoretical work inherent to the Greek mentality. Nevertheless, but for the short-sighted intolerance with which the movement was opposed by the Pan-hellenic jingoists—the Grecomans, as they are called in the new literary Albanian—the whole thing might have never amounted to more than a literary revival, like the Provençal or the Gaelic. It developed into the formation of a new nation. They did for Albania what the Epirotes of a former generation did for Greece. What Italy and Austria intended by their propagandas to accomplish is mere guess-work. What they succeeded in doing, however, is to cause the birth of a new national conscience which will eventually foil their selfish aims in Albania.

It has often been said that Albania is merely a piece of Turkey dragged from the teeth of Serb and Greek, and destined for future partition by Austria and Italy. I share no such apprehension. An Austro-Italian condominium, through the government of a puppet Prince, though admissible, is beset with great dangers for the continuance of the Triplace. An agreement between Austria and Italy for the division of Albania is altogether unthinkable. One or the other must possess the whole of it or nothing. In a few years a good Government may not accomplish much in the way of material progress in Albania, but it is certain to give
the Albanians the self-consciousness necessary for indepen-
dence. A new Poland in the twentieth century is not per-
missible. An autonomous and durable Albania ought to be
an object of genuine rejoicing for every fair-minded Greek.

Greece has also cultivated secret relations with many
influential Albanian Chiefs. Though her efforts have been
spasmodical, there was ground enough for justifying the
belief in a friendly understanding. Ismail Kemal Bey,
who can take money from more parties at once than he has
hands, has on occasions strutted up and down Greece
boasting about the solidarity of Greek and Albanian
interests; therefore, when the only vital force in Turkey
was this Albanian irredentism, with which even the Com-
mittee of Union and Progress had to coquet, many Epirotes
saw in it the only way of salvation. The Greek Govern-
ment itself, since the advent of Mr. Venizelos, seemed to
wink at a rapprochement for a concerted action. They
calculated that the success of the Albanian movement
would leave all Greek claims on Epirus intact, and to be
asserted against a weaker foe. At the worst, the half a
million Epirotes, combined with the other Christians in
Albania, would be able to overmatch by their superior
culture the more numerous Albanians, and keep the civil
government in their hands. There was a third prospect,
but a remote one. The "Drang nach Osten" might carry
Austria down to the Ionian as, well as the Ægean Sea.
Even this alternative was not unwelcome. As between
ottomanization or expatriation on the one hand and the
administration by a State that respects all national suscepti-
bilities on the other, not a man could hesitate for long.

At this juncture the Balkan Alliance came, and it came in
the nick of time. The attitude of the Moslem Albanians,
who up to that time prevented with difficulty their un-
easiness from breaking out, during the invasion of Turkey
by the Allies gave food for thought to all pro-Albanian
Epirotes. It ought to open the eyes to the most head-
strong believer in a non-Mussulman Albanian State. Another fallacy was thus exploded. It is no longer certain that the Albanian’s hold on his faith is so loose as was generally supposed. The people who, ignoring his Christian name, take pride in Skanderbeg because of his Turkish surname, are still distant from the point when national solidarity takes precedence over religious. The last events in Albania are only an additional proof. The attempt of Izzet Pasha would be incredible in a nationally self-conscious Albania. Ismail Kemal may play at make-believe on a non-sectarian Albania. After all, he is only an albanized Epirote. Essad Pasha, a real Albanian chieftain, with all the virtues and the defects that this implies, has repeatedly shown, and very wisely too, how little he cares to overburden the new Albanian polity with more Christian inhabited districts than is absolutely necessary. He has the consciousness that religion is among his co-religionists equivalent to a political status. Greece, left alone to deal with him, would easily effect a settlement by the concession of a district where the Moslem element predominates. Austria, Italy, and lately even Turkey, who up to now has shown an inexplicable detachment, each for a special reason of her own, oppose this; and Greece, having other fish to fry in the Ægean, will soon have to withdraw her troops. This will be the prelude of a comedy or of a tragedy.

The Epirotes, after the taste of liberty they got in the last eleven months of Greek administration, under which, for the first time in their life, they enjoyed what they possess, will not submit to this proposed substitution of a semi-barbarous government for an enlightened one. Besides the annihilation of secular hopes and aspirations, the resubjection to a ruling caste, which they just escaped, is extremely distasteful to them. Their denationalization alone will entail the wiping out of a grown-up civilization and the starting anew from the beginning. They would have to
give up the ready-made Greek civilization and settle down to evolve an Albanian civilization out of the present chaos. It would be setting back the clock of progress for centuries. But even if all things were equal, there is no escape from the economic catastrophe that stares them in the face.

A change of frontier carries always with it a disarrangement of vested interests. Their readjustment necessitates, under the best of governments, a very slow process. Such readjustments are not obtainable under all conditions. Under a Government which for generations to come will have its hands full in keeping the truculent clans in order, as would be the case with the Albanian, the chances for healing chronic economical disorders are slight. Furthermore, in lands far from the great arteries of traffic, intercommunication once interrupted is hard to re-establish. What were formerly flourishing towns are bound to stagnate and dwindle, if cut off from their natural hinterland and each other by Customs barriers. By the tracing of the new frontier the whole of Epirus will be affected. Besides the evils that follow in the wake of smuggling, which in these parts will force both States to police their frontier with strong guards, there will come a great depreciation of land values on both sides of the border. Especially the towns of Janina and Corytsa are doomed. Both get hemmed in far away from what hitherto had been their easiest outlet to the sea. Other towns in the borderland will equally suffer. Argyrocastro and Konitza will be reduced to simple military outposts. Hence the inhabitants of Epirus must defend their homes, or sooner or later lose them. They intend to defend them, and in this lurks the danger for the peace of Europe.

A new Epirote Government will be ready to step in on the very day the Greeks evacuate the disputed territory. A gendarmerie will be organized to preserve order, and a militia to guard the northern frontier against Albanian incursions. There are already 40,000 men under arms, well equipped, well trained, and well led by Epirote officers,
veterans of the Greek war. They increase daily by new accessions of Epirotes returning from America, where most of the male population of the contested zone had emigrated. These are presumed to give to their brethren at home the support of minds that have been well disciplined in an atmosphere where law and order reign supreme. All of them are determined to repulse aggression from whatever quarter it may come, and they will not be left alone in their struggle. Every Greek will help them. This not by any dictation or even suggestion of the Greek Government. Quite the contrary—since Mr. Venizelos's policy is strongly pro-Albanian—but because Epirus is for Hellendom holy ground. Indeed, for Greece to abandon the Epirotes to their fate now, after the energetic stand they have taken in opposing annexation to Albania, would expose them to fearful reprisals. Albania has just graduated from the Turkish school of politics and government. The Turkish method for paying off old scores to political suspects has been exile, confiscation, imprisonment. An amnesty, no matter though it be granted through an international treaty, could not protect them—there would always be exemptions. The Albanian method will be simpler. In the state of anarchy the whole process of law will be dispensed with. All the Grecomans made themselves and their leanings sufficiently known to their would-be Albanian neighbours. Only a precipitated flight will save them from their hands. Something of the kind Mr. Venizelos must have suggested to the foreign ministers of the Powers in his last round of visits to the capitals; hence the ready assent he obtained for an indefinite prolongation of the Greek occupation in the contested zone. Until an organized Albanian gendarmerie has demonstrated its efficiency to cope with the lawless elements within the actual confines of Albania, it would be folly to entrust the new Albanian State with the protection of the life and liberty of those who so far have with might and main opposed it.

An armed intervention by the Powers is not to be
feared. If it does happen, it can take only one course—that is, to appoint a Lord High Commissioner, or to impose the sovereignty of the Prince of Wied over autonomous Epirus. The Powers, though, will never be able to replace their contingents by Albanian gendarmes. Equally improbable is a dual armed intervention by Austria and Italy. It is an open secret that the Austrians were so unpopular in Scutari—that is the city which they are supposed to have snatched from the Montenegrins for Albania—that they had to be kept in their ships in order to prevent popular outbreaks. In Epirus, it is the Italians that monopolize the unpopularity which the Austrians enjoy at Scutari. The Epirotes cannot forgive them the barefaced assertion of so-called Italian interests to the detriment of their own. They may have to be made, in case of a joint intervention, to keep to their ships also. The Epirotes are prepared to face emergencies, but naturally they are not courting them. Their feelings towards the Powers can be best expressed in the words which a village priest addressed to the members of the International Commission: “For four hundred and sixty years we were enslaved, and we never heard from you. Now that we at last get our liberty, you come to give us the right kind. We want neither you nor your gifts.”
BULGARIA AND THE TRUTH.*

BY DIMITRI IVANOFF,
Captain of Bulgarian Artillery.

(TRANSLATED BY P. S. CANNON.)

A campaign of insinuations has been opened by those who only a few months ago called themselves our friends and allies. Our isolation from the whole world, and the depth of our national humiliation, have hitherto forced us to hold our peace, and our long silence has created an unfortunate impression among our supporters. Even those most anxious to learn the truth have become convinced that there is nothing to say on our behalf. Many of them have become alienated from us, having seen their hopes falsified during and since that fratricidal war, the only account of which they have obtained from the reports of a Balkan agency, and the despatches of a King turned newspaper reporter.

It is to you, my friends of the noble British nation, that I appeal, you whose sympathies remain ever constant; for you, at any rate, will be the first to see the bright light of truth as a reward for your loyal impartiality. It is to you that I write the following pages:

1. WHICH OF THE ALLIES DESIRED A FRATRICIDAL WAR?

Among nations, as among individuals, the thoughts of the heart are revealed by outward manifestations. Whilst the

* Written (in French) at Sofia.
Bulgarian army was consummating the national revenge upon the Turk at Tchataldja and Boulair, the Servian and Greek armies were actively engaged in preparing for a second campaign. Fortifications were constructed, strategic roads levelled, all points where the enemy was expected to pass were blocked by artillery posts, every kind of reconnaissance was made. Sultan Tépé became a miniature fortress, only a few kilometres from the old Bulgarian Frontier. Ovtchê Polê became an entrenched camp. The Serbs in front of Adrianople began to fraternize with the Turks towards the end of February—in fact, as Turkish prisoners informed us, they played the rôle of unpaid spies. At the end of the month the Servian officers showed a reticence which began to cause us some uneasiness. It was after the fall of Adrianople that the Servian Press opened a campaign of hostility. By openly discussing questions such as, “Who took Chukri Pasha prisoner?” “How many Servians fought at Adrianople and Tchataldja?” they paved the way for a revision of the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty—at the moment the chief object of Servian diplomacy. It began with an aggressive policy, which forgot that the true interests of Servia lay in the West, and which chose entirely to ignore the great sacrifice made by Bulgaria to Slav unity in treating the territory to the west of the line, Givich-Okrida, as contested territory, to be decided by Russian arbitration. This sufficed for the moment. The Serbo-Greek alliance, and the plans to be carried out by the armies, already existed; they realized that the success of their policy was assured; and when Montenegro, Roumania, and even Turkey, smiled on the enterprise, the war-hunger of the Allies surpassed all bounds. One army saw the day of revenge at hand, the other the day in which national resentment would be satisfied; and so, assured of a friendly Press throughout Europe, all their espionage plans perfected, a preliminary newspaper attack was launched. The method employed was to put forward certain questions which had not yet been settled, and in every case to link up the Greek and Servian
claims. Consistently the Allies refused arbitration. On June 20, M. Pasitch announced that Servia would accept it, but a Ministerial crisis occurred, the Skupchtina was summoned, and endless discussions supervened. Finally, there occurred, on June 30, the "incident" provoked by the Bulgarian army—an event so eagerly looked for, so ardently desired by our enemies. It was this incident which gave the signal for the beginning of a war for which they had prepared so carefully and longed so eagerly.

Oh, my poor country, how severely you were punished for this one mistake! For what, we may well ask, had been the actions of Bulgaria while her enemies were preparing for war? Her army, already exhausted by the sanguinary struggle in Thrace, suddenly saw the curtain rise and disclose two enemies, both armed to the teeth and well prepared for battle; it saw large forces preparing to invade territory described by the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty as either "undisputed territory" or "condominium." We had lost 318 officers and 29,711 men killed, 915 officers and 52,550 men wounded, 2 officers and 3,193 men missing—one-fifth of our total strength. We had gained by this time sufficient victories and enough glory, we had no need to go in search of more; our very minds were unable to conceive the idea of a revenge for Slivnitsna. The distaste of our Government for a second war was still further increased by the earthquake at Tirnovo, and by the facts that 20 per cent. of the army was absent on leave, that supplies had run short, and that those which had been ordered could not possibly arrive for two or three months. These facts had the more weight with the Government, in that it numbered the greatest pacificists in the country, with Dr. Daneff at their head. Their pursuit of the policy of "arbitration" led them momentarily to forget that the other side were not only anxious for war, but ready for it; that since their armies were already in the field, Bulgaria ought to be prepared for anything that might happen. My country committed
the fatal mistake of not wanting war. Paradoxical as this statement may appear to the pacifist, from our point of view its truth is incontestable. That the incident of June 30 was not expected to lead to war is proved by telegram No. 5647 of General Savoff, in which he declares that his object is, "in view of a possible outbreak of war between the Allies, to insure a speedy settlement of the points at issue by the aid of Russian arbitration."

In point of fact, the very day after this incident orders were issued to the Bulgarian troops to stop operations, and to retire to the positions they had previously occupied; but it was too late, and the Allies did not let the long-sought chance pass by. Manifestoes embodying a declaration of war were already lying ready with every Servian and Montenegrin regiment; the date had but to be filled in, and war began.

If my readers would desire fully to understand the feelings of a Bulgarian soldier, let him imagine himself to be a knight who has sacrificed all his worldly wealth to the one object of recovering his ancestral castle, wherein rest all the memories and traditions of his house. Bespattered with blood, and covered with wounds, yet victorious, he rides towards the castle rock. But what are these cries which ring in his ears? "Hold!" they cry. And who are these men whose bayonets re-echo the sounds of war? They are his friends—his friends of yesterday. He halts; days pass by; and though trust in God be great, patience lasts not for ever. He tries to scale the rock, but every way is barred. He looks around to see if aught will hear his cries for justice. But, alas! none will forgive him that he has tried to scale the rock in defiance of those who would bar the way, and at last, poor knight! beneath the rock he lies, bleeding and wounded unto death by the hands of his kin, and unpitied by the world. Was it his fault? Was he the aggressor? Who can answer "Yes"?
2. The "Barbarities" of Greece, Servia, and Bulgaria.

(a) Bulgaria a Tolerant Nation.

"Of all the Balkan peoples, the Bulgarian is the most tolerant," is the judgment of a well-known Catholic priest. I will quote a few facts in support of this contention:

In Bulgaria the Turkish, Greek, and Jewish communities have hundreds of schools in which they can teach in their mother-tongue. The Catholic missions have, in many Bulgarian towns, schools in which instruction is given in French or German. The German colony possesses a school of its own, and this privilege is allowed even to the small Roumanian colony, which numbers only a few hundred persons. Turks, Greeks, Russians, Armenians, Roumanians, possess full religious liberty. At Sofia the Catholics, 3,000 in number, have the use of two churches (the 6,564 Catholics in Belgrade have not a single one), the Protestants have two, the Russians have one, the Greeks one, the Armenians one, the Roumanians one, the Jews two synagogues.

In the Budget of 1912 provision was made for the expenditure of 75,000 francs to aid Mussulman schools, and of 137,000 francs for Catholic priests and Turkish "hodgas." All the missions, composed of foreigners whose stay in the country is purely temporary, testify to this national virtue of ours. It was even more conspicuously displayed in the territory which we freed from Turkish rule—so much so as to create a deep impression even among our enemies of to-day—the Servians at Adrianople. In that city every person, without distinction of nationality, enjoyed full personal liberty. This statement is endorsed by many foreigners, including General Broadwood of the English army, a witness whose veracity nobody will call in question. In Thrace our army found the population predominantly Greek and hostile to us. At Ortakuei (a small town on the Arda) the Greek population flatly refused to give hospitality to passing officers; but these latter,
though the law was on their side, did not press their demands, but went and begged hospitality of Jews and Armenians. I myself, when passing through Demotika, spent from eight till ten at night looking for somewhere to sleep, owing to the point-blank refusal of the Greeks to admit me; I eventually found shelter in a Jew household. At Adrianople the Greeks were, if possible, more hostile, and even more tolerantly treated. The "committee for the Hellenization of Bulgarians," which had existed under Turkish rule, continued its operations under the presidency of the Greek Bishop of the city, and opened an active campaign in furtherance of Thracian autonomy. Arms were distributed to Greeks; a representative of the Greek Government—Georges Pouridi—was on the spot, and engineered an attempt upon the life of General Savoff, and three similar attempts against the commander of the garrison. And yet the speech with which the Mufti of Adrianople welcomed the Turkish soldiers on their re-entry into the city is one of the greatest testimonies to that tolerance which we had shown to our prisoners of war, whether Servian, Greek, or Turkish.

Whenever the charge of intolerance is made against my countrymen, I cannot help recalling, not without feelings of the deepest regret, the following scene, which occurred only a few weeks ago, when the Servian prisoners were leaving for their homes: I was escorting a number of them, when on our route we met a lady in deep mourning. With trembling voice and tear-stained eyes she addressed them: "Good luck go with you, my friends. May your home-coming bring joy to your loved ones again!" And this at a time when our national grief and rage was at its height. In the barracks, too, the prisoners cried "Jivio!" (Long live you!) to us as they left. The hospitality given in Bulgaria to the Carnegie Mission, as compared with its reception in Servia and in Greece, gives an excellent criterion of the respective tolerance of these countries.
The Treaty of Bucharest shows with startling clearness the intolerance of the Greeks and Servians; the latter, indeed, have conclusively proved themselves to be a nation of barbarians by the law of Draconian severity passed on September 24—a law which indeed could not have existed among savage peoples. The cruelty of the Serb is exercised with the use of a finer intellect than is possessed by any savage race. We now understand the truth of the confession made by the officers of the cavalry regiment of Timok (?): "Our army executed more than 30,000 Albanians without distinction of age or sex during the invasion of Old Servia in the first war. . . ." Poor Bulgarians and Albanians, how you must appreciate the culture of the twentieth century!

(b) Greek Excesses during the Second War.

The territory traversed by the Greek army, in which the excesses were committed, is populated, in a large majority, by Bulgarians. To prove this statement, I will give some statistics (taken from Brankoff, pp. 93 and 250):

1. Koukoutch (Kilkitch): 54 villages, exclusively Bulgarian. Exarchists number 28,168; Patriarchists, 376.

2. Caasa Doïran: 20 Bulgarian districts, of which 18 are Exarchist and 2 mixed; the town of Doïran containing 2,072 Exarchists and 1,040 Patriarchists.


5. Caasa Sérès: 81 villages are inhabited exclusively by Bulgarians (47,402 persons, of whom about half are Patriarchists). In the town of Sérès there are about 5,105 Greeks, 2,000 Bulgarian Patriarchists, and 360 Exarchists.

6. The district of Drama has 7,816 Exarchist Bulgarians, 3,988 Patriarchists, and 2,890 Greeks.
7. The "Caasa" of Neozokop, Petritch, Stroumitza, Pechtchevo, and Melnik, which were traversed by the Greek army, possess a population even more overwhelmingly Bulgarian.

Given this predominance of the Bulgarian element, combined with the great numerical inferiority of the Bulgarian army vis-à-vis with the Greeks (26,000 against 160,000), it must surely be obvious that the Bulgarian army had no desire to turn the country into a hideous desert, nor, if they had desired, would they have had the power so to do. The excesses (if any, which is distinctly questionable) committed by the Bulgarian troops were confined to the village of Doxat and the environs of Doxat and Sérès, and were the result of numberless provocative acts committed by the Greeks, as, for instance, when they shot their prisoners at Doxat. When the King of Greece utters loud-voiced complaints against "Bulgarian atrocities," he has one object alone in view—to divert the attention of Europe from the atrocities of which his own troops have been guilty. More than 100,000 Bulgarian refugees, crossing the old frontier in the last stage of misery and exhaustion, have given us a living proof that our apprehensions were well founded, and that the intention of the King and Government of Greece to deal a death-blow to the Bulgarian population has been carried out to the letter, amid scenes of indescribable barbarity. Others among the refugees not so well favoured by fortune were butchered in the most cruel manner, together with their wives and children, who, after undergoing the vilest outrages, were killed without mercy. In every Bulgarian village houses were burned, cattle carried off, and the possessions of the inhabitants sequestrated. In this manner the deliberate extermination of the Bulgarian population has been realized. The Greek at Salonica can sleep in peace, for there are no Bulgarians left at Doîran, none at Démir Hissar, none at Drama.

Excuse me, my dear reader. The writer of these pages is a Bulgarian, and his heart bleeds for his poor countrymen.
(c) *Excesses committed by Servians and the Servian Army.*

All Bulgarian Bishops were ejected and compelled to return to Bulgaria; the same thing happened to professors, schoolmasters, priests, and all citizens who refused to sign the declaration put before them by the authorities. The Bulgarian population still remaining in the districts occupied by the Servians was consigned to extermination *en masse,* and a wholesale destruction of their property by fire and rapine was begun, which has not yet finished. Among the forty-five villages burnt by the Servian army, with the assistance of the Turkish population, we may mention Laki, Prosnik, Negotino, Kavadartzi, Dolno, Gorno Kouri, Prijdevo, Tremnik, etc. The Servians, in their action towards the population, were entirely swayed by the idea of forcing it to become Servian. Upon their arrival, therefore, they at once made it clear to villagers and prisoners alike that unless they became Servian they would at once be put to death. I could give the names of hundreds of persons killed by the Servians. At Koumanovo, for instance, in addition to a wholesale slaughter of Bulgarians, more than seven hundred Turks were put to the sword. Those of my compatriots who were taken prisoner describe the acts of cruelty committed by the Servians as innumerable; their treatment at the hands of officials and population alike was disgraceful. At the beginning many of them were put down as "lost," that is, in all probability, killed, as undoubtedly was the fate of Colonel Taneff, of the 6th Regiment of Cavalry, and of Lieutenants Stephanoff and Minkoff, who were taken prisoners by troops of the 10th Servian Regiment at Bossilegrad, and who were killed, after first undergoing torture.

At Bucharest the Servians refused to recognize religious and scholastic liberty in Macedonia: "Our Constitution provides for these questions," they said. I agree. We are to-day witnesses of measures of the most pitiless severity employed by a so-called civilized country, in a century
which is not accustomed to see even native tribes so oppressed. The law to which I refer punishes minor infractions with five to ten years' imprisonment, major infractions with death. The power to apply Section 2, which carries with it the penalty of eight years' imprisonment, is left entirely in the hands of the local police. Section 8 punishes entire families for illegalities committed by one of their members. I will quote: "If in a commune certain cases of rebellion are noted, and the persons of whom complaint is made do not return home within ten days, the police is empowered to force their families to emigrate to any locality they think fit." These emigrants cannot gain permission to return, despite all the protests of the Russian Legation at Sofia.

There is a veritable reign of terror in Macedonia. Even the Servian newspaper Stampa confesses that the personnel of Government there is of a very low class. I am sending you a document which will show you how the Servians are endeavouring to denationalize Bulgarians by enforcing the replacement of the Bulgarian termination "of" by the Servian "itch" in proper names. The Servian Government are bringing to the work of denationalization all the resources of cruelty and harshness, but their efforts, I hope and trust, will be in vain. Happy it is for us that Servia, the oppressor, and Bulgaria, the oppressed, are not the only nations in the world; happy, too, that over all human affairs there still rules the one Divine and ineffaceable law of Justice.
THE TRUTH VERSUS BULGARIA

BY CHEDO MIJATOVICH.

I am much obliged to the Editor of this Journal for his courtesy in showing me Captain Ivanoff's article.

I do not intend to enter into a polemic with the gallant Bulgarian officer. No doubt he is as good with his sword as with his pen, and his literary effort would facilitate that polemic, as it is open to attack on all sides. But such a polemic would not be worthy of this Journal, and would be only a glaring abuse of the Editor's courtesy.

Besides, such an attack would be only a painful echo of our recent struggle on the battlefields. It seems to me that the real task of the true patriots in Bulgaria as well as in Servia ought to be to work at the reconciliation of the two Slavonic nations in the Balkans, healing the wounds, sweetening the bitterness, and paving the way for the re-establishment of old friendship.

But Captain Ivanoff has touched questions and facts which are of historical and moral interest, not only for the Servians and Bulgarians, but for our British friends too, and indeed for every civilized nation. On such questions I wish to express my opinion, from the Servian point of view, of course, but as impartially as if I were writing a history.

Before entering into that task I wish to be allowed to make a remark of a personal character. Captain
Ivanoff is no doubt a fervent Bulgarian patriot. His patriotism is entitled to be respected. But it is not true that the Servian soldiers in front of Adrianople have fraternized with the Turks, and it is an abominable lie that they played the rôle of unpaid spies to them. I am astonished that a Bulgarian soldier could throw such a suspicion on his Servian comrades, who helped the Bulgarians to capture Adrianople from the Turks. If he is an honourable man and a true soldier, he will at once and spontaneously withdraw that mean imputation.

The question of the greatest historical importance is this: Who is responsible for the war between the allies? Captain Ivanoff tries to prove that the Servians and Greeks are responsible, but he admits that the Bulgarians did start it "by the 'incident' of June 30, provoked by the Bulgarian army." He admits that "it was this incident which gave the signal for the beginning of a war for which they (Servians and Greeks) had prepared so carefully and longed so eagerly." We did prepare for war, but by no means were we longing for it. The fact is this: Servia and Greece were making repeatedly confidential efforts in Sofia to induce the Bulgarian Government to come in good time to a friendly arrangement with them concerning the territories, which the Servian and Greek armies have actually, and without direct Bulgarian assistance, conquered from the Turks. The Bulgarian Government refused every suggestion of a compromise, and insinuated that Servians and Greeks must evacuate and cede Macedonia to the Bulgarians, as otherwise they would be thrown forcibly out of it. Of course, both Servia and Greece took precautionary measures eventually to defend themselves. Certainly they were preparing for war if that war should be imposed on them by the Bulgarians, but at the same time they were both ready to let their controversy with Bulgaria be decided by arbitration. The Servian, Montenegrin, and Greek
Premiers were actually on the point of leaving for St. Petersburg, expecting to meet there the Bulgarian Premier in the preliminary conference, when the Bulgarian army most unexpectedly attacked the Servian and Greek positions on the entire front. Captain Ivanoff admits that that Bulgarian attack gave the signal for the beginning of the war. By what logic, then, can he proclaim that we—Servians and Greeks—are responsible for that war? The leading Bulgarian statesmen acknowledge that the war was provoked by the Bulgarian attack on the Servian and Greek positions, and try to fix the responsibility for that fateful deed on General Savoff, or even on King Ferdinand himself. And in the face of all these facts, well known to all the world, Captain Ivanoff comes to assure Englishmen that the Servians and Greeks, and not the Bulgarians, are responsible for that "fratricidal war"! I leave it to the fair and impartial judgment of the English friends of the Bulgarians to decide who is really responsible.

The second question of importance, which Captain Ivanoff treats with vehemence, is the question of the alleged Servian excesses against the Bulgarians.

It is true that the people of the newly acquired country have as yet not been made the partakers of those full constitutional liberties which the Constitution guaranteed to the people of the old kingdom. It is true that the temporary rules and regulations for the administration of the new country are of a somewhat severe nature. It is probably true that several Bulgarian bishops, priests, professors, and teachers have been requested to leave Macedonia. On the other hand, it is true also that the articles of the Constitution guaranteeing the liberty of the individual and the inviolability of property have been applied in the new country, and independent and impartial Courts of Justice have been established. Of the forty-five villages which, according to Captain Ivanoff, "were burnt by the Servian army with the assistance of the Turkish population" I have never heard anything until I read the
Captain's assertion, which, of course, I cannot accept without further and absolutely impartial corroboration.

I ought to say that the temporary non-application of the full Constitution to the new country, and the new temporary regulations for the administration of that country, have not the unanimous approval of all the Servians. The Opposition in the Servian Parliament has frankly criticized the measure. But the overwhelming majority of the Servians—more especially those who have practical knowledge of the situation in Macedonia—approve it unreservedly. To explain their motives and objects I must take a short retrospective view.

The Macedonian Slavs are, strictly speaking, neither Servians nor Bulgarians. Their dialect stands between the two languages. By their ethnic features, by their national customs, folklore, national songs, and historical traditions they are far nearer to the Servians than to the Bulgarians. As the Servians of Shumadiya were the first nation in the Balkans to rise against the Turks (1804), and were also the first to obtain some sort of autonomy (1817), the Macedonian Slavs naturally gave all their sympathies to the Servians, and identified their own political aspirations with those of the Servians. After the Crimean War the Russian Panslavists decided to support the Bulgarian people and work to create eventually a great Bulgaria. Russia succeeded in 1870 in creating the Bulgarian Exarchate in Constantinople, attaching to it almost all the Orthodox dioceses in Macedonia. The Bulgarian bishops brought with them Bulgarian priests and teachers, and set to work to Bulgarize all the Slav population of Macedonia. Of course, as the Macedonian Slavs preferred to go to the Bulgarian churches, in which the service was in Slavonic, than to go to the Greek churches, where they did not understand the language, the Bulgarian propaganda had its work greatly facilitated. Still the so-called Macedonian Central Committee in Sofia was not quite satisfied with the result of thirty years' assiduous propaganda, as there
were many villages in Macedonia which did not leave the Greek Church for the Exarchate's churches nor wished to be called Bulgars. Therefore during the last decade the Commitadjis' bands in Macedonia—sent there to intensify the anarchy produced by the Turkish misrule—were instructed to support the ecclesiastic and scholastic propaganda by their own terrorism. And in many instances where the bishops could not succeed the Commitadjis did succeed in forcing the villages to declare themselves Bulgarian, although in reality they were nothing of the kind. The terrorism of the Bulgarian bands was so terrible that the Greeks and Servians had to form their own bands, and to protect their co-nationals in Macedonia, not against the Turks, but against the Bulgarians.

The Servian army, after bloody battles with the Turks, conquered part of Macedonia, and the Treaty of Bucharest confirmed the possession of that country by the Servians. But in that new territory the Servian Government had to solve a very difficult problem. It had to evolve order out of chaos. It had to establish the law as the highest authority in a country in which law never reigned. It had to guarantee the security of individuals and property where neither the personal liberty nor the security of the property was ever known. It had to introduce among the people self-confidence and confidence in the State authority. To succeed in this programme it had to stop the terror of the Bulgarian Commitadjis in Macedonia, and the propaganda of the Bulgarian bishops, priests, and teachers. If in the conflict of a modern Government with the medieval anarchy some anarchists come to grief, I do not see why that modern Government should be blamed. If the Servian Government does not consider opportune to introduce at once the full constitutional régime in the newly acquired country, it only follows the example given by much stronger, greater, and more civilized nations. Great Britain has not yet introduced full constitutional régime in India and Egypt, nor France in Tunis. Besides, I am absolutely certain
that our temporary régime in Macedonia will not even last five years. The population is meeting the Government with confidence, and the Government will soon give them proofs of its own confidence in them. Of course, the artificial Bulgarization of the Macedonian Slavs is now for ever at an end. The Bulgarian patriots know that well, and hence their bitterness and despair. But by-and-by they will see that Bulgaria can be a great, progressive, and prosperous country without gathering the artificial fruits of the Bulgarian propaganda in Macedonia, which was not and never shall be theirs.
ISLAM, CHRISTIANITY, AND OTHER RELIGIONS

(Continued from p. 61)

BY KHWAJA KAMALUDDIN,
Editor of the Islamic Review, London

This statement may be startling to many ears, but we have simply to refer to the annals of history, to study conditions obtaining in the whole world some five hundred years after the advent of Christ. Suffice it to say that human society at that period of human evolution had sunk to its lowest ebb spiritually as well as morally. And if prophets come only in times when wickedness is rampant, as the sacred history shows, so in Nature light follows after darkness, and rain comes after drought. This state of things called either for the appearance of several prophets in several countries, or the advent of one masterly hand, who should come to restore the old religion, "Islam," in its perfect form. But the history of the world had then taken a new turn. Circumstances arose which facilitated the means of mutual intercourse between various nations of the world. Different components of human society, so separated from each other by natural and artificial barriers, were about to come close to each other and make one united whole. The vast wide world was destined to be reduced into a single country, with countries as its cities, and cities as its streets. Men of various nations and denominations
were on the threshold of coming into contact with each other. To give different teachings to different nations at such a juncture was to cause a regular chaos; hence the great Divine wisdom was pleased to raise the last of its prophets in a place which occupied a central position in the known world, and which possessed a language the least susceptible to any change in form as well as in the meanings of its component words—a condition necessary for a language to become the conveyance for the last word of God. Languages come into existence, and being subject to constant change in form and signification of its words, meet the fate of a dead language. This makes ancient literature unintelligible and difficult to understand. Every language spoken on the surface of the earth has met or will meet this fate, and if an exception can be made to this general rule, it is, as European philologists like Professor Whitney and others admit, in favour of the language of Hedjaz in which Al-Koran was revealed. This peculiar conservative nature of Arabic, which makes it least susceptible to change, gives it a special claim, in my opinion, to become the throne of the last word of God. There is another peculiarity in this language—the suggestive and meaningful nature of its words. Arabic words in themselves are eloquent. They convey what, in other languages, we need pages to explain. They are, therefore, most suitable to convey theological conceptions. This is a very interesting subject in itself, and requires separate dealing; but it will sound here as an assertion on my part if I fail to quote one or two instances to substantiate my statement. Take, for example, the word "sin." Theologies of various religions and creeds differ in their conception of sin, but do the various words in different languages which are equivalent to "sin" convey its theological conception? Does the word "sin," or any of its synonyms in any European language, convey the Church idea of sin? Does the Persian word *Gunah* convey the Zoroastrian conception of evil? or does the Sanskrit word *pāpa* mean what is
understood by wickedness in the Vedas? I fail to read in these words the real meanings given to them by various creeds. But come to the Arabic language, and its equivalents for sin in themselves convey what is taught in our religion about sin. Nothing, according to the teachings of the Koran, is in itself right or wrong. Everything created by God has its own particular use; take it from that use, and it is sin according to the Koran. And this is what the words Junah, Zanb, Ism, Jurm, and others literally mean. Anything turned away from its proper place is Junah; anything gone beyond its limits is Zanb; anything cut from the main thing is Jurm. To strengthen my position I here cite the word Taubah, which is Arabic for repentance. The word literally means to return to the point from which one has receded. Thus, sin in Islamic theology means to turn away from the point, and repentance means to return to that point. This is what is literally meant by the words Junah and Taubah. There are various other abstract truths in theology—conception of God, of revelation, of angels, of prophethood, of evil, of virtue, of hell, of heaven, and of very many other things. In other languages you have to read books and treatises to understand various conceptions. To know the Islamic conceptions, you have simply to consider the meaning of the Arabic words. They are a sufficient clue. No other language within my knowledge claims this peculiar richness of meaning, and therefore I say, if the coming together of the different parts of the world into one whole demanded one cosmopolitan religion, if the old, old religion of obedience to God was to be revealed in its perfect form once for all, it could not but be through the medium of the Arabic language.

Koran was revealed, and it taught the same old Islam which had been preached by others before, and brought a book which recapitulated old truths in their unalloyed form with requisite additions, as Al-Koran says: "Al-Koran is nothing but the old books refined of human alloy, and con-
tains transcendent truths embodied in all sacred scriptures, with complete additions, necessary for the development of all human faculties. It repeats truths given in the Holy Vedas, in the Bible, in the words of the Gita, in the sayings of Ramachandra, Buddha, and all other prophets, and adds what was not in them, and gives new laws to meet the contingencies of the present time, when the different members of God's family, who lived apart from each other in the days of old revelations, had come close one to the other. Al-Koran gives us rules and regulations adapted to the various needs and requirements of life. It is not merely a collection of moral precepts, or a book of rituals. It gives us, on the one hand, a true conception of Godhood, and enlightens us with great truths, such as angels, revelations, prophethood, future life, heaven and hell; on the other hand, it supplies us with principles to guide us in political and social, economic and domestic affairs, so that the whole human society, by acting up to them, may attain to its perfection.

Al-Koran is not confined to prayers, fastings, and sacrifices. It is a complete code of life. If a King is ordered therein to observe certain laws to govern his country, his subjects have also been enjoined to pay allegiance to their ruler, foreign or otherwise. Similarly a law-giver, a statesman, a judge, a military officer, a merchant, a craftsman, a son, a father, a brother, a husband, a wife, a neighbour, a friend, the rich as well as the poor—in short, a person in various capacities and walks of life will find therein principles of guidance to make him a useful member of society and a good citizen. This perfect teaching I could only find in the Koran, and therefore we Moslems believe that the old religion of Islam that was preached by generations of prophets saw its perfection in this final revelation in matters of law, as the Koran says: "To-day the law is perfected for you."

The space at my disposal hardly permits me to enter into any details, however brief, of what I have sketched above;
but I should do gross injustice to Islam if I did not point out one important thing which the Koran makes mention of, amongst very many other reasons, which necessitated its revelation. "And we have not revealed to thee (O Muhammad) this book, except to explain away the differences (into which various sects have fallen) and give them true guidance," are the words of God. And who can deny the terrible differences which exist in various sects of one and the same religion? I can understand differences of opinion arising from differences of temperament; it may lead to the existence of several schools of thought; it cannot harm religion as far as its cardinal principles are taught in their pure integrity, as is the case amongst the various sects of Islam. Each and all of them do believe in the fundamental principles of Islam; their minor differences amongst themselves have no bearing on the religion. But what about various sects in various religions? They differ from each other in their cardinal principles, and yet they count upon one book as their final authority. There can be only one true creed. What is taught by the Romish and the English Church cannot both be right. One of the two only can be the teaching of Christ. There are two great sects of Buddhists; those who do believe in the existence of God, and those who do not. One of the two must be on the right side. Similarly other religions have given way to ramification, and truth is, after all, one and not manifold. If God is the original source of all religion, if He has been gracious enough to reveal His mind from time to time, if He always chose one man to act as His mouthpiece, and if His ways and laws do not admit of change, conditions obtaining in every religion after the advent of Christ demanded some final decision in every religion. Decision not between Christian and non-Christian, but between Christian and Christian. Before the appearance of the Holy Prophet of Arabia all these different sects actually existed. It was necessary that someone should come and restore the old original form of religion. This was done
through Muhammad, the last messenger of God. For this reason the Koran calls itself Hakam—"judge"—to decide between Christian and Christian, between Hindu and Hindu, between Buddhist and Buddhist, and so it did. Then who is the Moslem?

He is an Israelite, in following the Ten Commandments of God and the law of retribution within its legitimate bounds. He is a follower of Christ, doing away with all the ritual of the Pharisees, and denouncing their hypocritical observances. He observes the law of mercy promulgated on the Mount of Olives when it leads to reclamation. His object is reformation through mercy, or retribution, as the case may be. He is an Arya Hindu in breaking images, and a Sanatan dharma in paying respect to all the godly men of any nation and creed who have been called Avatars, or incarnations of God. He is a Buddhist in preaching; Nirván—i.e., self-effacement as the key of salvation; he is Unitarian in establishing the unity of God. In short, he embraces, through the Koran, every beauty in every religion, and turns his face from what has been added to the religion of God by man—and this is Islam.
THE PROBLEM OF THE NAVY: THE TURNING-POINT

By H. P.

If any object-lessons were required to demonstrate the probable inconveniences of life under an alien and humourless rule, the recent events at Zabern, together with the subsequent proceedings in the Military Courts, furnish them with greater emphasis than any other occurrences within recent years. With these events before him, it is difficult to understand how an English statesman, backed by a considerable following, can think the present time suitable for the reduction of the principle of armed force upon which these islands, and the Empire at large, depend for the prevention of the possibility of similar, if not worse, events happening in his own country.

Although it is quite possible to agree with Mr. Norman Angell as to the absurdity of all war between civilized and well-established nations, and as to the waste caused by the upkeep of permanent armed forces for other than police work, it is just as impossible to see how, until all, or at least the most powerful, nations regard matters from the same common-sense point of view, any reduction can be made by a single nation without risking the most unpleasant consequences.

The discussion of the relative strengths of armed forces nearly always generates a vast amount of heat; and usually the discussion develops entirely on party, seldom on
national, lines, and generally calls forth a confused flood of miscellaneous and acrid correspondence and oratory. From this deluge of matter it is difficult to disentangle the main trends of thought in the country; but as far as it is practicable to make out anything at all coherent, the divisions of opinion appear to be pretty much as follows:

At one end of the scale is the high-patriotic, flag-wagging, damn-the-expense school, of little value and much noise; the expert school, burying itself and its hearers under masses of technicalities and statistics; the general retrenchment school of loose thought; and finally the reduce-at-all-costs, this being the inverse of the first division. In this school will be found a very curious assortment—genuine lovers of mankind, cranks, popular politicians and wealthy Radicals.

Amongst all this welter but little is to be found that is based on broad lines of common-sense, national self-interest, or knowledge of warfare in the past.

The flag-wagging school, being as a rule very vague, is almost impossible to criticize; but, on the whole, it may be said to do more harm than good, for its utterances merely annoy the more thoughtful, irritate beyond measure the classes from which the bulk of the fighting services are drawn, and give all and sundry opponents chances of effective and destructive criticism, owing to the extravagance of its members’ utterances and writings. Men who want to see their country safe do not need to state their views with Celtic fervour and inaccuracy.

Statistics, and figures generally, are most useful servants; but the expert school is very apt to let figures become its masters; and as armed forces depend on a good many other factors besides tabulated cash columns and armament statistics, this school’s methods are apt to lead to misapprehension, in addition to which the actual figures are presented in such different ways by the various countries that really accurate comparisons of expenditure and strengths are almost impracticable. In fact, to put it bluntly, it is impossible for
anyone to give a closely reasoned statement of relative strengths who has not a knowledge of the conditions under which the various armed forces work, the morale and intelligence of the personnel, supplies, the state of national feelings, and a thousand other factors. The number of men who possess such knowledge is necessarily extremely small, and unless the Admiralty, War Office and the Foreign Office are considerably more leaky than is generally supposed, the attainment of such knowledge should be impossible. The best the self-constituted expert can produce is a laborious "boil out" from "Brassey," "Jane," the Annual Estimates, and sundry foreign publications corresponding to the English books just mentioned.

The general retrenchment school appears about as vague as the high-patriotic, its tenets apparently being merely that armed forces are very expensive—in fact, somewhat in the nature of luxuries—and ergo should be reduced.

The thorough-going reduction school is extremely difficult to meet on any grounds; the majority of its members appear to be genuinely kindly people who cannot grasp the fact that as it takes two people to make a quarrel, so to keep the peace either requires the law courts, or that someone shall accept someone else's will. In this school will also be found a strong leaven of loud-voiced, self-seeking, ignorant demagogues. Argument with members of this school is wasted, for past history, experience, or duty to friendly nations, does not appeal to them; their own appeal is direct to the sentiments, stomachs, or pockets of their audiences, and at the back of their arguments can be detected in some cases the theory—which, however, they do not bring into the foreground—that perhaps, as far as manual workers are concerned, it does not matter much who rules England. The incident of the cobbler of Zabern may do something to lessen the tendency to this view, which has undoubtedly been gaining strength.

Reflection on all these varied doctrines causes the ordinary layman to ask himself, "Who amongst all these
instructors knows anything of what he is talking about? and are any of them likely to know more than the men whose business in life it is to assess the national needs?" The answer to these questions are left for the reader to consider for himself.

For anyone who wishes to arrive at some sort of conclusion for himself, the following further queries seem natural: "What pulled Europe in peace through the Balkan crisis? Was it love of the Entente for the Alliance, or was it a very wholesome realization of the fact that forces were so even as not to make it worth anybody's while to attempt any grabbing?" The thorough-going reductionist will say that common-sense did it, so will the ordinary man; but they do not mean the same thing. The reductionist will say it was a common-sense dislike of war; the ordinary man will say it was a common-sense fear of the results of a war fought on a small margin.

The mention of the word "margin" is the crux of the whole matter, and leads directly to the question, "What should be the margin between our forces and those which we may reasonably, and without indulging in fancy panics, expect to encounter?" The answers to this depend mostly on personal taste, but probably, if the person giving the answer happened to be personally concerned, he would prefer the country to give him a fairly liberal margin; whilst, unfortunately, few reductionists are personally concerned beyond their pockets, and therefore their views are inclined to lead them to think a narrow margin good enough for those who have to do the fighting.

As a good sort of average working theory, a ratio of about 10 to 6 should insure victory, if it does not restrain an eager foe from taking action at all. By this is not meant that a man with a grasp of a situation would hesitate, even with no margin, should the country need it. As the aged Lord Howe said before the battle of the First of June, "England is now much in need of a victory," and he got it; but it was of little real value beyond
restoring confidence, for he was unable to follow it up, owing to lack of a margin after the action. History is full of examples of other desperate victories, but, as a rule, their results on the general run of affairs were small. It is the crushing victory, followed by the relentless pursuit, which alone can assure that peace the attainment of which is the ultimate aim of all war. Closely connected with this matter is the question as to what extent the country should allow the love of its pocket to force the risk of failure on to its silent servants; the country knows this risk will be dutifully run, but does it wish for a repetition of the fall of Byng, with its pitiful ending on the quarter-deck of the Monarque? Is the story of Torrington, who was unable to do more than command "a fleet in being" while the French paraded the Channel, a pleasant prospect to contemplate? Torrington was tried, and was lucky to escape with his life; but the verdict of history is that the Government, and not Torrington, should have been in jeopardy.

As far as the ordinary layman can find out, by a careful study of good books of reference, the ratio of the Entente naval forces to those of the Alliance is about 10 to 6, except in the case of armoured cruisers, where it is about 10 to 4, and destroyers, where it is about 10 to 8; practically similar ratios hold good for the most powerful naval members of the respective groups. Of the Entente naval forces England supplies well over a half, and this seems but reasonable, as the military assistance she can render is not very great. It therefore appears as if the present situation were satisfactory, more especially when the great preponderance of the English repair craft and auxiliaries, together with the advantages of voluntary enlistment of the personnel, are taken into account. The rate of growth of the Alliance forces, however, has lately been, and seems likely to continue to be, more rapid than those of the Entente.

In considering relative strengths, it should be borne in mind that there are usually under construction in the
building-yards in England some vessels of great value for Powers unable to build for themselves, and that these vessels would be available at a time of emergency; this, however, appears rather a haphazard sort of procedure for a nation depending for security on its navy.

It is almost impossible to compare the personnel of naval forces; the proof of their worth can only be made evident in actual practice, but the probabilities seem in favour of the voluntary system giving the best results.

At one influential meeting "efficiency and economy" were taken as the theme, and the audience was assured that if the armed forces of the country, especially the navy, were run on really business lines, enormous savings could be made; but, unluckily, the speaker did not divulge his secret. It must therefore be presumed that he is a person of exceptional ability, and should be at once employed to rectify matters. Doubtless this speaker was correct to a certain extent, for it is difficult to follow the line of thought in adopting the "all-oil" policy for certain large ships. Oil is the best fuel for ships in every way, but it is required in large quantities, the supply is limited, and the lines of transport from the source to the consumer are long; whilst any failure on the line of communication would demobilize an entire fleet. This is not a risk that ought to be run, and to avoid the mere chance of its happening more armed vessels are required. Another instance of a costly and unnecessary experiment was the installation of electric turrets in the *Invincible*. Apart from the serious loss of money, this experiment is to be deplored on the ground that for a considerable fraction of her working life the country has been deprived of the use of a valuable unit whose services can ill be spared. At the same time, there is a vast difference between criticism of isolated incidents of policy and general loose charges of extravagance.

As we go to press, Sir Edward Grey's speech at Manchester has come to hand; in it is to be found the most dignified, the soundest and sanest exposition of national
policy and necessities with regard to armaments which has been uttered for many years. Sir Edward, though regretting, as all sensible men must, the necessity for England to be armed, fully recognizes that necessity; he threatens no one, cringes to no one, and does not implore Heaven to deliver the nation from the burdens imposed on it as the result of its own riches. If it were possible in a democratic country for policy aided by the best technical advice to be guided on such lines, that poisonous hardy annual, the "Discussion on the Naval Estimates," would no longer germinate in January, bud in February, flower in March, and seed in April; the voices of the "naval expert," the "reductionist," and the "flag-wagger," could be used to serve other causes, and there would be no call for articles such as this.
LINES FROM THE HUNGARIAN OF PETÖFI.

ALEXANDER PETÖFI, the great Hungarian lyric poet (from whose writings we print the following translations), fell fighting in the cause of Hungarian liberty in the year 1849.

Like the Russian poet Lermantof, Petőfi seems to have had a vision or premonition of the manner of his own death, and he died precisely the death he desired to die, as described in the following poem. (He was trampled to death in a victorious charge under the red flag.)

'TWERE TERRIBLE.

For me 'twere terrible to die
Pillowed in cushioned luxury,
To fade as slowly fades the flower
Whose heart a canker doth devour,
Or waste away like taper slim
Burning in rustic chapel dim.
Such death may God ne'er let me die
God! save me from such death, I cry.
Rather would I, like wind-tossed oak,
By cruel blasts of storm be broke—
Or like some cliff-side rent asunder,
Be hurled into the deep with thunder.
But should the peoples, long enthralled,
Rebel, and, to the red flag called,
Send echoing down the line the cry,
   For Liberty!
   Down Tyranny!
And fight with heat the glorious fight
In bloody battle for the right,
There be my death! and there my heart
With its last life-drop gladly part!
Mingle my shout in battle fray,
With roar of musketry and trumpet's bray,
And charge of cavalry in fierce career,
Chasing the flying foe with cheer on cheer!
And o'er my prostrate body let them charge
To tell the victory to the world at large!
And when the day of burial comes, may they
In the same grave with me the red flag lay,
Covering, while songs in praise of death are sung,
The bones of those who fought and gladly flung
Their life away, fighting World-tyranny,
And in thy sacred cause, World-liberty!

IN BATTLE.

(CSATÁBAN.)

WRATH on the Earth below!
Wrath in the Heaven aglow!
The midday sunbeams shine
On the red streamlet's flow;
The evening rays decline
In Ocean's purple glow.
    On, warriors! onward ho!
    Hungarian, forward go!

Thro' the black clouds aghast
Looks forth the sunlight pale;
Thro' battle smoke amassed
Gleam arms and coats of mail;
Darkly the war-clouds spread
O'er living and o'er dead.
    Ho, warriors! forward ho!
    Hungarian, onward go!

Rattle the rifles there,
Death-dealing far and wide:
Thunders the cannon's roar,
Shaking the mountain's side.
The Earth and sky withal
In ruin on ruin fall.
    On, warriors! onward go!
    Hungarian, forward ho!

The savage battle-lust
Hath set my heart on fire;
Mad drunk, I feel I must
The bloody fumes inspire!
On death, on death, I rush
Where thickest is the crush!
    On, warriors! onward ye!
    Hungarian, follow me!

J. POLLEN.
CORRESPONDENCE

"A FAIR HEARING AND NO FAVOUR"

MONEY POWER FOR INDIA:

Dear Sir,

I am glad to have the opportunity of making a few remarks on Mr. Frewen's paper and the discussion which followed, as the time available did not allow of me speaking.

A very instructive feature of the discussion, which should be carefully noted, was the way in which the experts who advocate "metallic currency" each see dangers ahead in the proposals of the others, and, as I think, quite rightly.

Mr. Frewen wishes the East to return to silver, so that the drain on gold-supplies may be lessened, and because he realizes the danger of international gold money when extended to the countries of the East, as they are poorer than ourselves, and the purchasing power of the money (gold) is greater with them than with us. What he, strangely enough, fails to see is that there is the same danger for this country (although in a lesser degree) when our currency (gold) is adopted as the currency of our poorer Western neighbours. Cobden did not foresee that they would do so when he advocated Free Trade, and it is extraordinary that no one at the present time seems to pay the least attention to the change in international commercial relations which the adoption of international gold money may have—I would say must have effected.

The change is that international trade, instead of being performed the exchange of goods for goods, can now be the sale of goods by the poor country to the wealthy country for money. Where the poor country will spend the international money (gold) will depend on where goods can be bought cheapest for money.

As I understand Mr. Webb, he is only in favour of "metallic money" because he does not see how the ideal of a "valueless currency" is to be carried out. He sees the dangers which are beginning to be felt, which arise from an over-supply of gold, upon which our huge credit system is built up, and so he welcomes the extension of the gold currency to the East as a sort of safety-valve.
This alarms Mr. Frewen, because a drain upon gold threatens the stability of our whole gigantic credit system, which he rightly sees is on a very dangerous foundation. What he fails to see is that, with increased supplies of gold retained here, the tendency would be to further increase our credit money, which would add to the danger, even although our banks might increase their reserves somewhat.

Then comes Lord Reay, who asks very rightly what guarantee we have that the output of gold will keep pace with the demand. Should it not, what would Mr. Frewen suggest should be done?

He talks in horror of fiat money, without, it seems, giving a thought to the fact that at the present time there is no control over the issue of either metallic or credit money. Such issues depend on the chance supplies of metal that are put on the market, with the result that the purchasing power of money fluctuates constantly.

Mr. Frewen has yet to show that such a haphazard system is any more secure than one of the issue of fiat money by a Government which is ignorant of the laws which should regulate the issues of money would be.

For my own part, I am satisfied, by my study of the late Major Phipson’s writings, that there are well-defined laws which lay down exactly what the issues of money must be to meet the economic needs of the nation.

I gather that Mr. Webb has in view the regulation of currency in some way, guided by Government index-numbers of prices. If this is so, he is already not far from the truth; and as I understand he is not acquainted with Phipson’s views, I believe, when he learns them, he will find they supply just what he requires to enable him to put forward a thoroughly practicable solution of the currency difficulties of both this country and India. It rests with Mr. Frewen to show in what respect Phipson was wrong. Unless this can be done, the question for us as a sane and practical civilized nation is to ask ourselves why we cannot adopt a system under which our Government would consciously regulate the issues of money so that they would conform to the economic needs of the nation.

To continue to leave the issue of money to be regulated by the hazards of gold-mining, the desires of the people for more money, and the desires of bankers to issue as much credit money as possible in order that they may secure increased profits, could only be due to blind ignorance or to mad folly. I believe that if Mr. Frewen and Mr. Webb, or either of them, would master Phipson’s theories, they would be the means of saving the nation from such a disaster.

TUDOR COTTAGE,
DUPPAS HILL TERRACE,
CROYDON.
December 16, 1913.

MARK B. F. MAJOR.

DEAR SIR,

Mr. Pennington has very kindly allowed me to see your interesting letter to him of the 16th instant on the subject of metallic money and its defects. He has also sent to me a pamphlet containing several of your “Redemption of Labour Leaflets,” which I have read with great interest.
Correspondence.

I expect you are familiar with Mr. Kitson's theories (of Kitson Lamp fame), and also with Mr. Farrow's ideas (of Farrow's Bank, Ltd.) on this same subject. If not, I think you would be interested in their views and publications. Have you studied Theodor Hertzka's "Freeland"—a wonderfully fascinating book, wherein the money problem is most cleverly treated.

I understand that the late Mr. Phipson's idea, and yours, is an inconvertible State paper currency, regulated according to the index numbers of food prices, and secured by the ability, honesty, power, and permanence, of Government. I believe you advocate this type of money because its purchasing powers could perhaps be kept steadier than those of gold and silver, and the injustices to the multitude of a privately-managed currency, based largely on the uncertainties of the mining industry, could perhaps be lessened.

As a theory, pure and simple, I believe this conception of money to be admirable, and in a way unanswerable. As a practicable measure suitable for present-day adoption, however, I believe it to be impossible. And for these reasons: Man, taken in large numbers, is often stupid, erratic, emotional, unreasonable, and—unless constantly watched and kept under control—dishonest, savage, and ultra-brutal. Centuries of cultivation have only succeeded in raising a comparatively small number of men and women to comparative honesty, and to a comparatively rational and comparatively altruistic condition of development. Only by constant pressure are these comparatively advanced conditions maintained; and we see constant backsliding even amongst those whom we are accustomed to regard as highly cultivated and civilized people.

Now, I would ask: How can you ever expect—looking at man's history from the earliest times—to establish a monetary system based on pure reason, and maintained only on the assumption that both Government officials and the public are permanently rational, honest, and altruistic, in the highest degree? Frankly, I regard such an expectation as fanciful and unattainable within many generations, probably never attainable. Therefore, whilst recognizing, I think, completely the ideals at which you are aiming, I consider it expedient, looking at the present condition of the world, to put those ideals far away in the background, and to attempt a step-by-step improvement of our present monetary conditions.

The first thing, in my opinion, is to educate the public regarding the vital importance of State index numbers of prices. As soon as these are widely understood, people will begin to see that a monetary measure which shrinks or expands is as cruel an injustice to the public as a pint measure or a yard stick that changed its dimensions from year to year.

When the people understand this, then they will ask themselves—How can we prevent our monetary tools fluctuating in purchasing power? Obviously, mines and banks are the present sources of money, so these will come under some kind of control. In short, mints will be closed and credit-spinning by private institutions checked by heavy taxation when prices are rising rapidly; and such taxation will be removed, State paper money will be created, and mints opened (perhaps to silver as well as gold if prices shrink very rapidly).
These are the first steps—a Government issue and control of paper money, and a Government closing and opening of mints according as the State index numbers show serious movements—up or down—of the general level of prices.

Mr. Moreton Frewen, by advocating huge coinages of silver now—when prices are moving upwards—seems to me to be altogether blind to the meaning of index numbers of prices, and to the very grave injustices which the present rise in prices has inflicted on all small-wage earners, and receivers of fixed incomes from fixed interest-bearing securities, in this and other gold-using countries. He is merely repeating the arguments of the Bimetallic League of twenty-five years ago. These arguments were sound then, because prices in gold-using countries were everywhere falling. But now, when gold prices are rising, those arguments are out-of-date and meaningless. The closing of the Indian mints was indefensible at the time. But the gold production of recent years has neutralized the Government of India's currency policy of twenty years ago; and now India is really more prosperous than at any previous period of her history.

To return to the question of a State paper currency, of which I entirely approve, because of the inherent and ineradicable defects of man, I would not dream of advocating the issue of State paper currency resting merely on the honesty, morality, and permanence, of the Government, but I would urge its issue as soon as prices begin to fall on the security of public works of a material and permanent character. In this way real security for the State money would exist—or as near real security as we can at present devise.

I have written sufficient now, I think, to make my position clear. Man, being imperfect, will continue to use gold and silver in different parts of the world, whether you issue State paper currency or not. Pp. 21-24 of my "Money Power for India" herewith show you what I now advocate for India. I am moving in the direction of the ideal which you advocate, but with no hope or expectation of ever getting there. Still, we may get much "forrader" than we are at present. The limit of man's intelligence will, I believe, prevent us of this generation getting beyond—

1. An Imperial State paper currency based on public works within the Empire, and current and legal tender throughout the Empire.

2. State index numbers of prices throughout the Empire by which to regulate this issue of the above State paper currency.

This, to me, seems "practical politics," and this is what I am aiming at.

Yours sincerely,

M. DE P. WEBB.

SIR ALEX TAYLOR AND THE HERO OF DELHI.

DEAR SIR,

I notice that the reviewer of Sir Alex Taylor's biography describes it as controversial in character, and again he writes lower down that, "with regard to the Delhi controversy, space does not permit of its examination here."

In view of the very definite claim made by the writer of this biography
that Sir Alex was the hero of Delhi, it may not be amiss to recall to the notice of readers of the Asiatic Review Colonel Vibart's book entitled "Richard Baird-Smith, the Hero of Delhi," which was generally considered at the time to prove the authenticity of the latter's claim up to the hilt, and settle the matter for good. It may be added that the author had access to Baird-Smith's private papers, which was not, I presume, an advantage shared by Miss Taylor. She has, in fact, stirred once more the embers of a great Anglo-Indian controversy, without, I think, bringing much evidence to bear on her side of the case. The present writer is not qualified to arbitrate, nor if he were would he be disposed so to do. In this instance he would content himself by drawing attention to the voluminous character of the correspondence which has been carried on over the question, and point more especially to the article which appeared in the Saturday Review in May, 1858, and is really the locus classicus on the controversy, and also one appearing in the Speaker in 1902. But these are only two periodicals out of over forty in which the matter has been thrashed out.

Yours faithfully,

J. B. P.

THE PLEA FOR THE TURKS.

Sir,

You have been good enough to ask me to express an opinion on the Asiatic Review, and I am glad of the opportunity of doing so. All who are interested in the Near East must welcome the Asiatic Review, which is ready to voice sufferings that might otherwise not be heard of, and to ventilate grievances that, unfortunately, are so little known in England. Not least amongst the many cruel and undeserved calamities which have befallen Turkey in recent years has been the fact that from various causes the Turkish case has been neither stated nor understood in this country. Most of the Balkan peoples claim our sympathy on what I believe to be the fraudulent ground that they are Christians, and press this advantage to the uttermost in British newspapers. Nearly all these stories of Turkish outrages have been accepted without evidence, while it is held to be almost indecent to suggest that the Balkan Allies have proved themselves unworthy of the name of Christians, have waged a war of brigandage and not of freedom, and have violated their pledged word to each other.

There are many other reasons why the success of the Asiatic Review is a matter of great satisfaction to those of us who have many friends in the Near East, but I venture to think that one of its most important functions will be to put an end to that conspiracy of silence which has so seriously wounded the Ottoman Empire and the feelings of Moslems in all parts of the world.

I am,

Your obedient servant,

AUBREY HERBERT.

PIXTON PARK,
DULVERTON,
January 28, 1914.

VOL. III.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION

THE RECENT CURRENCY EXPERIMENTS OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT.

BY MORETON FREWEN.

At the invitation of this Association I have prepared a brief paper on the recent currency experiments of the Government of India for the purpose of initiating a discussion. Members are aware that a Royal Commission is now sitting, and we are likely to have its Report in the early days of the New Year. I hope that anyone who does me the honour to criticize the manner and matter of my paper will be, if I may say so, even brutally frank. That will permit me to rejoin in the same spirit. What is important is that we should from all sides handle the recent experiments of the Government of India with our gloves off.

What are the experiments? They date back just twenty years. India, in all the years before 1893, had been encouraged to draw her trade balances in silver, that metal being admitted, just as gold is here, to unlimited free coinage at her mints. The result had been that the thrift of a vast community had for centuries taken the form of investment in silver bullion. A fairly reliable estimate, made some years since by Mr. F. C. Harrison, for the silver hoards of India was some 2,000 million ounces, or one-fifth of all the known silver in the world. It is now
much larger. Let me put it in another way. This mass of bullion, with mints open, was an endowment fund of some Rs. 26 per capita for every man, woman, and child in India. Now Rs. 26 is about the annual per capita income of British India, and compares with some sixty sovereigns per capita of gross income here. The closing of the mints in 1893 confiscated this endowment fund; it annihilated this mass of universally distributed wealth, which in times of stress was the first line of defence equally against the visitations of famine, of the local usurer, and of the Government tax-collector. I say annihilated. The word is perhaps extreme, for silver bullion is still worth something to purchase rupees, or to use as collateral for loans; but it is safe to say that in the event of a really widespread famine the Rs. 26 available to buy food would now dwindle to not more than Rs. 6, and this vast measure of confiscation is wholly the result of legislation. I am not, I think, over-stating the 1893 experiment of the Government of India if I say that the history of civilization affords no parallel at all for it. We know that the headman of a certain village near Allahabad, in the famine of 1897, brought all his villagers' ornaments, in weight 2,000 tolas, expecting to sell them, as always before, for some Rs. 2,000, and instead of Rs. 2,000 he returned to his stricken folk with only Rs. 600. But you will say there are possibly worse things than an empty stomach, that famines are, after all, local; but the activities of the money sharks in India are constant and instant and everywhere at a maximum, and the closing of the mints had this effect—it turned over the masses of the cultivators, saturated as they are with hereditary mortgages, to be fleeced by their usurers. I was in India just a few years before the closing of the mints, and the economics of India and the unrest of its peoples seemed to me even then to turn so very largely on the relations of myriads of small debtors to a handful of comparatively wealthy and educated creditors—bunnias, shroffs, and sowkars, that I in-
vestigated that great fiscal problem wherever my travels extended. It is enough to say that the usual village finance in India was conducted on a basis of borrowing at the rate of 1 per cent. per month, the security being silver ornaments, or bullion in some form. I have no doubt loans were made on personal security even then at much higher rates, but the universal security, as you would suppose, was silver, and you will admit that, given open mints, any tola of silver was a perfect "gilt-edged" banker's security for one rupee, just as any ounce of gold is here a perfect banker's security for slightly less than four sovereigns. At a stroke of the pen in 1893 all this vast mass of liquid security went by the board, and ever since silver bangles and silver bullion are but a sort of inferior chattel mortgage. Witness after witness from India called before this Royal Commission has come forward to declare that usury rates in India are now from 3 to 8 per cent. per month. I may say of one body of testimony—that of Mr. Sundaram Iyer, who was delegated by the Government of Madras—that when this gentleman's testimony and all that it involves has broken upon the public mind, it will really open a new chapter in the economics of silver.

The proposal to restrict coinage of rupees was first advanced by the Government of India in 1879. It was forthwith submitted to a very eminent Commission of experts and was unanimously condemned. Thereupon, in forwarding the Report of the Commission, the Lords of the Treasury had this to say about the proposal to close the Mints:

"It appears, too, that the Government of India, in making the proposal, lay themselves open to the same criticisms as are made upon Governments which have depreciated their currencies. In general, the object of such Governments has been to diminish the amount they have to pay their creditors. In the present case the object of the Indian Government appears to be to
increase the amount they have to receive from their tax-payers. My lords fail to see any real difference in the character of the two transactions. . . . The Government scheme may relieve the Indian Government and others who desire to remit money to England, but this relief will be given at the expense of the Indian tax-payer and with the effect of increasing every debt due by ryots to money-lenders."

This was the reply of "my lords" when permission was asked by Simla to tamper with the Indian currency and thus disrupt every contract in India. Nor would anyone dispute the very high authority of the late Sir Robert Giffen in this special field of economics. Sir Robert concluded a letter to the *Times* with these most prophetic words. He wrote:

"The highest political issues are also involved. One of the most dangerous things for a Government to do is to tamper with the people's money. Is it certain that the Indian Government can go on long with its present ideas regarding money without producing the gravest complications in the government of India?"

Enough to say that India before 1893 had an admirable, sound, convertible, metallic currency which, as a "yard-stick" to measure prices and values, was the admiration of mankind. While in all the countries of the West, Commissions and Select Committees were everywhere considering what was called "The Appreciation of Gold"—that is to say, the great fall of prices which had nearly doubled the burden of every national debt and every mortgage; yet during all that time the "Index Numbers" of the Government of India showed that the rupee was neither appreciating nor depreciating, that there had been during the thirty years before 1893 in India (and the same was true of China) a very slight fall of silver prices; not a rise of
prices, but actually a fall of about 5 per cent. when expressed in the Indian standard coin—her rupee.

The trouble never was in the Indian currency. That currency was perfect. You had a beautiful metal: a steady measure of values, lending itself equally to the habits of the masses, and to the convenience of the Government. By the constant melting down of countless millions of rupees, the Indian currency was automatically contracted, so that prices were regulated and corrected. And again the habit of melting coin and shackling it on the person made thefts impossible and encouraged sobriety. The man who had a rupee might take it to the grog-shop; not so the man who had bangled that rupee. All this most beneficent mechanism was scrap-heaped when the mints closed and a handful of retiring merchants were permitted to bring home ten pence at the artificial rate of sixteen pence.

It may be said: “Well, other nations have changed their standard; did they all in doing so plunder their people?” But the reply is, Nothing of the kind perpetrated in India was ever attempted elsewhere. Take, for example, Germany’s change of standard from silver to gold in 1873. Germany, it is true, changed her standard and altered every contract, but she called in her currency and bought it from her citizens, paying them gold at par. No German was left with all the savings of several generations in a metal which was demonetized, and the food-purchasing power of which was almost annihilated. No community enjoying any form of representative Government would permit such an act of wholesale confiscation for the sole benefit of a handful of usurers and strangers.

**The Bimetallic System.**

I desire now to say a very few words as to the system of exchange which was favoured, it is safe to say, by the large majority of those here present—the system labelled “Bimetallic” by splendid old Henri Cernuschi. It was that
label, and also, I frankly admit, the excessive internationalism of its advocates, which led the business world to regard it as Utopian. I greatly prefer the description given by De Laveleye, to what, for the sake of clearness, let us call the French system. Professor de Laveleye always referred to that system as the "Joint Standard."

I shall not detain you with the causes that led to France, in 1873, closing her mints to silver: these are history, and interesting history; but I am only concerned to-day with the splendid work France had done for trade during the century before 1873. During that time France had been the world's money-changer. The mint at Paris had been equally open to coin silver, whether for the merchant of London or the merchant of Lyons. As long as the French mints were open every British merchant knew that he could take 15 1/2 ounces of silver to Paris and there exchange it for an ounce of gold. The system worked with really a clockwork regularity, and this in the face of unprecedented fluctuations in the yield of the two metals from the mines. Silver, according to the varying demand of the Orient—that great "sink of silver"—was always within twopence an ounce of the French mint ratio. And thus it was that, seeing France always able and willing to give gold for silver to all-comers, we bimetallists thought that France, and France alone, maintained the exchange. This was our very grievous error—an error we did not detect until too late. France—the French mint law—was only one blade, as it were, of a pair of scissors; the other blade of the exchange mechanism was the free gold market of London, and the handle loops were the open mints of British India. People—very intelligent people—said, "Why, it was impossible that France could continue to give gold for silver on demand—she would soon lose all her gold." And this was true. It was because by way of Bombay she could always draw gold from the Bank of England that
France was at all times able to maintain exchange. Had we bimetallists told ourselves first, and then told all foreign nations, that it was not Paris, but London, Paris, and Bombay, Bombay being the very base and foundation of the triangle that fixed exchange, we could have settled the silver question at any one of the various conferences. Great Britain, as I now see it, should never have been asked to do more than maintain a free gold market in London, and free coinage for rupees in India. Instead of which we bimetallists alarmed conservative finance here by proposing to invent a new full legal tender silver coin, and admit silver to free mintage in London. It was France until 1873 who was the world's money-changer. France, as I say, gave on demand equally to the London and the Lyons merchant an ounce of gold for 15½ ounces of silver. But France did not necessarily give her own gold, and this because she had at all times, through the bill market, access to the gold reserve of the Bank of England. Any 15½ ounces of French silver currency melted and exported to Bombay, and there exchanged against wheat or rice or indigo sold to London, was a sight draft on the Bank of England for one ounce of gold, so long as, and only so long as, the Indian mints remained open.

It is easy now, forty years after, to watch the lovely automatic action of the French Exchange system at work, and to admit that Great Britain did all, and even more, than her share in keeping fixed exchange. But strange it is that of all the brilliant men we sent to the various Monetary Conferences, no one ever saw this exchange problem as a whole, and, in a very few sentences, put it on record that Great Britain, gold monometallist in the West, silver monometallist in the Orient, and by reason of these two unconnected monetary systems, had rendered the French bimetallic system impregnable. Through a tardy and a belated recognition of what the British Empire really did, we shall yet recover our lost ground, and with it recover
free automatic exchange through open mints in place of these disreputable and artificial "gold exchange standards" with closed mints which violate every principle of economics and have reduced the world's exchanges to monetary anarchy.

**China and Silver.**

This paper only aspires to elicit frank discussion whereby we may arrive at fresh facts. The great experiment in currency was the closing of the Indian mints. But ever since 1893 we have witnessed with the advent of each fresh Finance Member sent out from home further experiments generally, and perhaps fortunately, destructive of the entire currency policy of each predecessor in that high office. One finance member is for contraction, is for a wholesale melting down of rupees; next comes an ardent soul who keeps the pretty white disks pouring out of the mints by night and day. Then there would follow a "wait-and-see" policy. The culminating catastrophe was in the latest régime, when a high duty on all silver bullion has sought to divorce the affections of the Indian peoples from the metal they love. This brings me to a point of supreme importance. When the Government of India, as in 1907, purchases prodigious quantities of silver bullion for coinage, they inevitably raise the price of the metal by leaps and bounds, and themselves secure within the charmed circle of their fancy exchange system, they ruin with some complacency the export trades of China. A rise of, say, 33 per cent. in the price of silver involves a fall of one-third in all prices—tea, rice, silk, a thousand things which China sells for gold in London or New York. And while killing China's export trades it also for the time being immensely stimulates our exports to China. Thus having ruined China's export trades and traders, the Government of India, as in the years 1908, 1909, 1910, stays clean out of the silver market; silver thereupon drops so calamitously
that now the boot is on the other foot; it is now Chinese exporters who have it all their own way, and it is the importing firms who are ruined. The fall of about a shilling an ounce in silver in 1907-8 had this inevitable and foreseen result. China, unable to purchase our steel rails and iron, started her own blast furnaces and steel-rolling mills, and is to-day exporting whole cargoes of the highest class pig-iron at a price, 16 taels a ton, which no white labour can touch. Sixteen taels at the old rate of exchange would have been over five sovereigns to the buyer; it is now about two sovereigns. It is safe to say that unless the exchanges greatly advance, next, with the opening of the Panama Canal, we shall see the control of the world's iron and steel industries transferred, thanks to cheap silver, to this Mongolian ant-heap. I may say that Mr. Watson was sent by the United States Steel Corporation to report on the operations of the first steel-rolling mill at Hankau, and his statement to his directors was that the rate of wages at Hankau is one-fifteenth the rate paid in Pittsburgh, and that the output of the yellow operative is 90 per cent. of that of the white worker in Pennsylvania.

The question will naturally be asked, Why, if these various currency experiments have been so unfair to the masses of India, should such experiments be persisted in and why does Mr. Webb now urge that Government to undertake a fresh series of experiments more drastic still—namely, fiat money, gold mintage, and all those other gaudy trappings of the "Karachi idea?" The reply is, that Indian trade, since the gold standard of 1898, has shown a considerable expansion, and thus India's merchants have come to regard all this currency-mongering as beneficial. But my rejoinder is that the whole world of trade has, since 1898, enjoyed a veritable sunburst of prosperity, India's share in which has been probably less than the average, and certainly not more. I append the following short table, comparative of the exports of what Professor Austin, of the
Washington Bureau of Statistics, calls "the leading commercial nations of the world," with the exports of India, as quoted by Mr. Newmarch of the India Office.

**India’s Exports and World’s Exports in Millions Sterling.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>India</th>
<th>World’s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>1,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>1,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>2,720</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But these figures do not tell the whole tale by any means. The figures of the exports show the values, and not the volume, of exports. Now prices in India have advanced in the last six years at least 40 per cent., so that if you reduce the 165 millions sterling of India’s exports in 1912 by 40 per cent., you will find that her export trades, as compared with 1902, show no expansion whatever.

**Breakers Ahead.**

It remains to say a word as to breakers ahead. The Indian exchange standard is, of course, absolutely at the mercy of India’s future balance of trade. That balance of trade which has always been so large will at once go against India if rupee prices should for any reason rise in India while gold prices fall in Europe, or even, as is now the case, rise faster in India than gold prices rise here. And this price condition is, I believe, inevitable if the Indian currency is, as in the past few years, to be inflated with prodigious additions both of silver and silver certificates, and if at the same time India is to leech away to her myriad hoards that gold which is the foundation of our prices here, sucking down our sovereigns and throwing up vast masses of rupees. In these two conditions—namely, inflation in India and a
contraction here which has involved the substitution for gold of enormous masses of paper credits to stave off a panic—in these two conditions you have the key to the present alarming price movement and the increasing cost of living in India and in England.

IS GOLD REDUNDANT?

I shall only refer to the gold problem very briefly. Since the disinheritance of silver, gold has become the sole money of international exchange. Is the gold supply at all keeping step with the expansion of foreign trade? We know that at present it is not. The foreign commerce of the leading nations is increasing at the rate of more than 7 per cent. per annum, while the supply of gold from the mines is increasing by less than 3 per cent. I present the following short table:

THE WORLD’S GOLD CURRENCY AND THE EXPORTS OF THE CHIEF COMMERCIAL NATIONS IN THOUSANDS OF MILLION DOLLARS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>World’s Gold Currency</th>
<th>Exports Chief Commercial Nations</th>
<th>Gold per Hundred</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>4,213,139</td>
<td>5,214,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>5,373,927</td>
<td>7,843,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>7,661,469</td>
<td>13,597,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because of the huge drain from our gold reserves to India which has been set in motion by the currency experiments at Simla, I anticipate with confidence a financial panic during the next two or three years. For twelve months now we have been in a state of veiled panic; everywhere is to be heard the mutterings of the storm. The result of a panic will be a great fall in gold prices here in the West, with no corresponding fall in silver prices in India. India had a foretaste of such exchange conditions in 1908, but I believe, with such prodigious amounts of paper credits
as are now doing money work here, the next panic and its contraction of all credit will be infinitely more serious than in 1908, and that panic the world will attribute, and rightly attribute, to the suicidal currency experiments at Simla.

**The Remedy.**

If only two or three of the leading nations will be rational, the remedy for all this financial anarchy is at last in full sight. The remedy is to work upwards, step by step, to what I have called the French or "Joint Standard" system of currency. We need, as to day, gold monometallism, that is to say, a "free gold market" in London; we need silver monometallism for Asia through the free coinage of silver in Asia, and we need an open mint for both the metals, either in Paris or New York, or both. Isolated currency action is ruinous. Before 1893 the United States had in operation for fifteen years a "Bland Act"—namely, a gold standard with large additions of full legal-tender silver. In 1893 that nation, vehemently urged in that direction by the whole Press of England, suspended their silver purchases and all further mintage of silver. At once India, undeterred by the failure of this American experiment, imported the Bland Act bodily to Simla, and India is to-day operating that Bland Act in its every mood and tense. The continuance of isolated Blandism by India will inevitably meet with disaster, whereas under careful scientific safeguards the adoption by an important group of nations of a Bland Act such as was urged by Mr. Alfred Rothschild at the last Monetary Conference of the nations at Brussels would save the situation. The one qualification I suggest of Mr. Rothschild's international silver-purchase proposal is that the silver purchased, instead of being coined and issued as full legal-tender money, should be represented by small paper notes, the legal tender of which (as with the shilling) should be limited to forty shillings. That England single-handed should employ silver in this way was urged by the
late Lord Goschen when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer, and it was also unanimously recommended by the Gold and Silver Commission which reported in 1888. If, then, a group of nations—say, Great Britain, France, the United States, and Germany—would jointly adopt this proposal, the great problem of silver would be at once solved. At present our circulation of token-silver coins is only thirteen shillings per capita; that is, as much silver in the sum of coin as our people will carry in their pockets and tills. Thirteen shillings, then, is what Mr. Goschen called "the saturation point" for silver; but Mr. Goschen estimated that by the withdrawal of the half-sovereign and the issue of ten-shilling notes secured by silver bullion lying in the vaults of the Mint some twenty shillings more per capita of silver could be got into active circulation, to the great convenience of the public. By this method, as the Royal Commission of 1888 declared, an immense and preponderant demand for silver bullion would be created.

The Silver Market.

The position of the silver market during the last few years has undergone a radical transformation because of the increased absorption by the silversmiths. In 1905 the silversmiths absorbed only 30 per cent. of the silver produced by the mines; in 1909 their consumption had risen to 50 per cent; while in 1911, the last year for which I have the completed record, their consumption was no less than 143 million ounces, or 64 per cent. of the entire yield. For the last two years the silver surplus available for currency has been only 164 million ounces, and we are able to show that over 195 million ounces have been converted into coin. If, then, a buyer for the three or four leading commercial nations would purchase for their joint account some eight million ounces a month, and advance the price paid, say twopence per ounce each year, we should, step by step, and in a very few years, raise the bullion value of the rupee to its old rating—eleven rupees to the sovereign; and what
may probably prove more important to white mankind, lift the Chinese exchange, now about eight taels to the sovereign, to its old rate of three taels to the sovereign.

And it is well to note that of the ninety-five million ounces I propose to buy for this united monetary union, Great Britain even now purchases on the average of each year for the home, the African, and the Indian currencies, at least forty-five million ounces.
DISCUSSION ON THE FOREGOING PAPER

At a meeting of the East India Association held at Caxton Hall, Westminster, S.W., on Monday, December 15, 1913, a paper was read by Moreton Frewen, Esq., entitled "The Recent Currency Experiments of the Indian Government." The Hon. Sir Arthur Lawley, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., K.C.M.G., was in the chair, and the following, amongst others, were present: The Right Hon. Lord Reay, K.T., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Sir Lesley Probyn, K.C.V.O., Sir James Diggles La Touche, K.C.S.I., Sir James Wilson, K.C.S.I., and Lady Wilson, Sir Mancherjee M. Bhowmaggree, K.C.I.E., Sir William Ovens Clark, Mr. J. B. Pennington, Mr. R. F. Chisholm, Mr. D. N. Reid, Mr. Duncan Irvine, Miss Hearn, Mr. William Tunnicliffe, Mr. M. C. Sen, Mr. H. R. Cook, Syed Abdul Majid, LL.D., Mr. George Owen William Dunn, Lieutenant-Colonel Burke, Mrs. White, Mr. Reginald Murray, Mr. K. D. Wacha, Mr. Henry C. Ide, Miss Lethbridge, Miss Ford, Mr. C. J. Weir, Mr. Wolfe Murray, Miss Pollen, Mr. J. H. Munro, Mr. Kennedy, Mrs. Barrow, Miss Stewart, Mr. M. de P. Webb, C.I.E., and Mrs. Webb, Mr. D. Ritter, Mr. A. W. Duffet, Mr. F. J. P. Richter, Mr. Mark B. F. Major, Miss Wade, Mr. Sundara Raja, Mr. Sundaram Iyer, Mrs. Beauchamp, Mrs. Couchman, Mr. F. Grubb, Miss Frewen, Mr. Browne, Miss Massey, and Dr. J. Pollen, C.I.E., Hon. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, I do not propose to make any observations in anticipation of what the lecturer, my old friend Mr. Moreton Frewen, has got to say to us this afternoon. I will proceed immediately to business, and call upon the lecturer to be good enough to read the paper which he has prepared on the "Recent Currency Experiments of the Indian Government."

The paper was then read, and received with applause.

The CHAIRMAN: My lords, ladies, and gentlemen, I am sure I may begin by saying that we have listened, with the greatest possible pleasure, to what has fallen from the lecturer on the subject-matter of his address. It is one which baffles the most cunning of experts, and may well daunt the spirit of an amateur like myself. Therefore I will ask you to extend your sympathy to me in the diffidence which I feel in making a few observations on the very knotty problems which are brought forward for
discussion. I have always known the lecturer as an optimistic person, and black, indeed, must be the prospect when he threatens us with "financial anarchy, panic, and disaster" as our inevitable doom. Now, having at his bidding taken off our gloves, we might almost wish that the next process might be to wash our hands of the whole nefarious business. We are asked to declare that the closing of the mints to the coinage of silver in 1893, followed by the recognition of the sovereign as legal tender and the creation of a gold standard reserve built up by the profits made on the coinage of the rupee, has been a disastrous failure. Well, I venture to say that I find myself unable to join in that declaration (Hear, hear), and I feel that that is the more courageous on my part, inasmuch as I said just now, that I am only a humble amateur in these matters, and also as I suppose I shall be the first to meet the full brunt of the lecturer's spirited reply which he has promised us. It seems to me that the currency policy adopted by the Government of India affects (1) India herself, and (2) the rest of the world; and I venture to think that my friend here has regarded the question of how it affects the rest of the world as being of far greater importance than how it affects India's material prosperity. I would venture to urge that this latter question of whether India has gained or lost in material prosperity is really that which demands the main consideration at our hands. (Hear, hear.) We hear a great deal of the absorption of gold by India. I suppose that in the abstract India has as much right to a share in the gold production of the world as any other country, and yet the fact that India should withdraw a good deal of gold is spoken of as a novelty, as a thing almost unknown before 1893, and sometimes almost as a crime. Mr. Frewen, I think, has committed himself to the statement that in two years India carried off and swallowed no less than 73 millions of our good English sovereigns. I have endeavoured to find out in which years India took most gold from this country. Those were the years 1911 and 1912, and during those years she took 36 millions of sovereigns. In passing it might interest you to know that in the first ten months of this year the imports of merchandise into India have considerably increased, while there has been a decrease in her imports of sovereigns compared with the same period in 1912 of no less than 11½ millions sterling. I think there is liable to be some over-statement in dealing with this question, and from these over-statements various deductions are made. India very often is credited with the responsibility for an enhanced bank rate, for depreciated consols, and the banishment of all hope from business circles. No doubt one great cause for the low price of consols has been the insufficiency of gold to deal with Trade, which has shown remarkable activity in recent years, and no doubt the demand of India for gold has increased that insufficiency and has increased the stringency of the markets, but Germany and France and other countries have been hoarding their gold, and their demands have been on a greater scale than those of India. That is a fact which is sometimes forgotten, and the effects of India's withdrawal of gold are very often enormously exaggerated.

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Then we are told that the thirst of the community which resulted in a mass of evenly distributed wealth has been entirely "annihilated," and to prove this statement the case has been brought forward of a villager in the Allahabad district who, during the famine of 1897, received less by a considerable sum than he should have received in exchange for the silver which he had to offer for sale. I have not examined how far the loss which this man sustained was due to the fact that he fell among thieves; but taking the prices which are given elsewhere of silver in that particular year, it would seem to me that he certainly was unfortunate. Even had that not been so, it is to be remembered that it was only in 1893 that this change was made, and in 1897 it is not unreasonable to imagine that the village community had not as yet adapted their monetary system to the new order of things. (Hear, hear.) I venture to think that now that villagers have taken to hoarding in gold, a repetition of the story told to us by Mr. Frewen is problematical indeed. In any case, I would deprecate any insinuation to the effect that questions of famine are of anything but the most momentous concern to the Government of India, and equally I would repudiate the suggestion that we are not more able to prevent the recurrence of famine or mitigate its horrors than we were twenty years ago. Thanks very largely to the sagacity and the industry and the great sympathy of Lord Curzon, we have now in India a machinery so flexible, and so powerful and efficient, that we are in a position to fight famine to-day as we could never have fought it before. (Applause.)

As to cultivators being turned over to the mercies of the sowkars, I know that an extraordinary rate of interest demanded by the usurers of the East is no new thing. I believe it is notorious that for centuries the ryot of India has, moth-like, singed his wings in the golden flame of usury which is so carefully tended by the local Bunning. I was in India over thirty years ago, and I believe that the rates of interest demanded by usurers then was no less notorious than the rates which are quoted by Mr. Sundaram Iyer in his evidence before the Royal Commission.

It seems to me that if we are to gauge Indian conditions to-day it must be by the ordinary tests of material prosperity, and not by casual sporadic cases of the inability of a peasant to get full value for his tola, or by vague reports of extortion by usurers. I am not altogether ignorant of the very gloomy vaticinations and prophecies which were indulged in before 1893 by the Lords of the Treasury and others. I know that the great economic pundits of that day shook their heads ponderously over what they regarded as a hazardous enterprise on the part of India's advisers, but I venture to say that India's advisers were right, for after a year or two of doubt, the stability of the rupee has been successfully maintained since 1900, except for a very short time in 1907 when the Great American crisis shook the world's credit system to its base, and when India was suffering from troubles of her own. I venture to say that the advice given to India in 1893 has proved itself abundantly justified. The fixity of exchange, as ample testimony will show, has proved itself advantageous and a benefit to export trade. It was said that the exports of India were bound to be adversely affected by this change of system, but that has not proved to
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be the case; on the contrary, her exports have increased very largely in volume and, I venture to think, in value also. That statement is challenged by the lecturer, who points out the rise of prices in India, but I would venture to suggest that the value of exports is regulated, not by prices in India, but by prices in the markets of the world. (Hear, hear.) We must, in considering this question, bear in mind that between the years 1886 and 1896 there has been additional taxation imposed in India to the tune of over 5 crores of rupees on account of the "Home Charges," and had a fall in the value of the rupee gone on, there is no doubt that there would have had to be additional taxation to an indefinite amount, whereas as a matter of fact, since 1896 there have been remissions of Taxation to the tune of 3½ millions sterling, quite apart from the great loss of revenue which India has had to face from the loss of her opium revenue, which amounts to two millions sterling. I am not quite sure whether my friend advocates a cheap rupee for India. I gather from what he says that he considers a depreciated currency to be beneficial for a country's export trade, and if it is good for China it ought to be equally good for India. Yet at the same time he goes on to advocate that we should join other nations in a system which will certainly raise the rupee to its old rate of 11 rupees to the sovereign. In speaking of China and the trade relations between India and China, you will find since 1893 there has been a very large increase in the volume of exports from India to China and a considerable decrease in the imports to India from that country. Quite apart from trade, there are two other indices which I think point to the material prosperity or otherwise of the country. They are the amount of the savings-bank deposits and the amount of income tax accruing to the Government. Under both those heads there has been a constant and substantial increase. I know myself that when I was in Madras a few years ago, it was a matter of general acception that the standard of living among the native population was being steadily raised and that India was enjoying a condition of great material prosperity, certainly in the south. Therefore, for reasons which I have endeavoured to put before you in this cursory fashion, I find that my estimate of the financial system of the Government of India is not quite reconcilable with the estimate which has been formed by my friend, Mr. Frewen. I think, if I may say so, that he has misinterpreted the spirit with which that system was adopted, and I feel sure that he has misjudged its results. I allow that in its initial stages it may have imposed certain disabilities on some members of the community until the new order was thoroughly established, but so far from regarding it as having been disastrous, I consider that it has worked for the betterment of India, and I refuse to be depressed by the gloomy prognostications with which Mr. Frewen contemplates the continuation of the system which is now in vogue.

A number of other speakers, I am glad to say, have expressed their readiness to address us this afternoon, and I shall be obliged if they will endeavour to confine their remarks to a space of ten minutes. (Applause.)

The Hon. Secretary read the following letter from Sir Guilford Molesworth:
SIR,

I regret that illness prevents my attendance and my joining in the discussion of Mr. Moreton Frewen’s valuable paper. May I ask you to accept the following contribution to the discussion from me.

I am entirely in agreement with the views expressed in the paper, and I think its author is doing valuable service in exposing the dangers of the Indian gold peril—the drain of gold which menaces every bourse in Christendom, and the cruelty and injustice inflicted on millions in India by the change in the value of their monetary standard.

I think, however, that some allowance ought to be made for the Government of India, which has to a great extent been forced into this measure by the refusal of Great Britain to join the other Powers in an International agreement for the re-establishment of the joint standard, which was broken in 1873 by the closing of the French mints to silver.

The following extract from a speech I made as delegate for the Government of India, at the Brussels Monetary Conference, will explain the position:

“So long as there is any hope of arriving at any reasonable solution of this difficulty, I am convinced that my Government would shrink from the necessity of changing its standard; but of late the hope of such a solution has appeared more and more remote. Should this Conference break up without arriving at any definite result, then India must take immediate measures for her protection. Whether these steps will end in the stoppage of silver coinage, and the adoption of a gold coinage in some form or other, I cannot say. I cannot disguise from myself that such a step is fraught with immense difficulties, the result of which it is impossible to foresee. . . . I must express my opinion that the only satisfactory solution of the difficulty is to be found in an International agreement on a bimetallic basis, in which my Government would join the Latin Union and the United States. Such a combination would be amply strong to preserve any ratio that might be fixed. . . . So long as Europe, as a whole, remained practically bimetallic, England in all her vagaries was kept tolerably straight by the double standard of France, which preserved the ratio of gold and silver throughout the world, until the link was broken in 1873.

“I regret the hasty and premature action of Sir Rivers Wilson (Delegate of Great Britain), in his declaration of uncompromising hostility to the double standard, as in a measure prejudging the whole case before an opportunity could be allowed for its fair discussion in full conference. . . . The quasi-official declaration of the honourable Delegate’s views not only precludes any advance by the other Powers towards the solution of the difficulty, but places Great Britain in the invidious position of being the principal, if not the sole, obstacle to a satisfactory solution of the difficulties under which we labour.”

The Delegates of most of the Powers were strongly in favour of re-establishing the joint standard, but they declined to enter into an agree-
ment in which England would not join. The Conference therefore broke up without arriving at any definite result, and to Great Britain belongs the indelible disgrace of having hindered a movement which would have saved the whole of the civilized world from the evils which have been so well described in the paper.

In 1893, the year in which India changed her monetary standard, I was invited by the American Academy of Political Science to contribute a paper on Indian Currency, in which I predicted the Indian gold peril in the following terms:

"There will be a large demand for imported gold to replace the silver hoards, which have no longer any fixed value as measured by the new standard of currency, and are consequently not available as a safe medium for hoarding; so that, although it is improbable that the change in Indian currency will directly increase the already too heavy demands for gold, it will do so indirectly through the medium of the hoards. It remains to be seen how the action of the Government of India will influence the United States in taking measures which may intensify the scramble for gold, which has already told so disastrously on the industrial interests of England. . . . It was not with a light heart that India adopted this policy. The Viceroy, in introducing the Bill, said: 'We have borne long enough with the state of things which is becoming more intolerable with every year that passes, and which, in all human probability, would have become more intolerable every year. . . . We are, however, too well aware of the intricacy of the problem, and the risks attending such an experiment as that we are about to try, to take this momentous step with a light heart.'

"The Government of India can scarcely be blamed, even it their selection has been wrong. It has been narrowed down to a choice of two evils of great magnitude: the policy of uncertain drift or the policy of despair. The bolt has fallen, and he would be a rash man who would venture to predict the results of this measure. . . . The 'bunias' (the money-lending and banking population) have a very keen appreciation of any monetary changes, and will not be slow to turn them to their own advantage, and to the disadvantage of the masses in India. The currency of India is now in a condition which is a complete violation of all sound principles of currency. It consists of a huge inconvertible token coinage—practically a gold standard, without a gold currency or even a gold reserve. The rupee circulates at a value much above its intrinsic value as bullion. It is no longer International money. The change in the value of the rupee inflicts a cruel injury on an enormous class in India—namely, on those who have hoarded silver ornaments (a practice almost universal). . . . The double standard is in perfect accord with sound economic laws, but the artificial raising of the value of the rupee is opposed to them, and, being a violation of all monetary laws, must sooner or later end in disaster. It is that forced elevation of the
value of money which Bentham, in his 'Principles of the Civil Code,' denounced as a 'fraudulent bankruptcy' and a 'foolish fraud.'"

As pertinent to this question, I enclose copy of diagrams which I submitted to the Brussels Monetary Conference, showing how the double standard of France maintained the parity of gold and silver at the relative ratio.

During the first seventy-three years of the nineteenth century the conditions tending to disturb the ratio were enormous; yet France, almost single-handed, not only maintained the ratio, but produced the wonderful effect (shown in the diagrams) of steadying the relative price of the two metals in mono-metallic countries, notwithstanding the enormous variations in the production of the two metals. There was no serious divergence from the ratio of 1 to 15½, so long as the Bi-metallic Law of France was in force; but immediately the mintage of silver was restricted in France, a divergence resulted, which was altogether unparalleled in the history of the civilized world.

Yours faithfully,

(Signed) Guilford L. Molesworth.

Mr. Reginald Murray said that he had not come prepared to take any part in the debate. He was inclined to think that the figures given in the paper did not express exactly what they were intended to do, and he thought the results drawn from those figures were inaccurate. He thought that one statement of the lecturer was somewhat exaggerated. The lecturer said: "It remains to say a word as to breakers ahead. The Indian exchange standard is, of course, absolutely at the mercy of India's future balance of trade." That was exactly what the system inaugurated in 1893 and completed in 1899 made provision against. He did not think the lecturer was justified in saying that the Indian exchange standard was absolutely at the mercy of India's future balance of trade. It was shown in 1903 that by the use of that very much defamed exchange standard the Government were perfectly able to maintain the rate of exchange. As to inflation, there was not a single rupee of currency in India which was issued for other than value received, therefore it was only a supply to meet the demand. He did not think there could be any inflation of currency under those circumstances; they might say that more rupees had been coined than were actually wanted for trade purposes, but the surplus had gone back to the Indian Treasury or into hoards. He certainly thought that between 1893 and 1898 some of the members of the Government took unnecessary fright as to the condition of the inflation of rupees; but their proposal to melt down rupees as a means of contraction met with unanimous opposition from the trading community of India. Mr. Frewen had imposed upon Simla a heavy responsibility—a responsibility for all the credit that had been issued in London. No doubt credit had been issued very largely, perhaps too largely; but how could he say that the Simla Government were responsible for the issue of credit in London? It seemed to him that that was taking a very exaggerated view.
MR. SUNDARAM IYER thought they had had too much discussion about currency in India and in England, and also from the East India Association, and said if the discussion had been postponed for some time till the Report of the Commission was published they would perhaps have had something to quarrel about. It seemed to him the question was one which neither the Commission nor the Government of India could ever solve. The position in India was due to a state of affairs which arose after 1893. The problem was simple, and he would put it to them and leave it for them to decide. If gold was to be minted in India to satisfy a small section of the trading community, then a large class of the population wanted a free mint for silver it would not be fair to offer bread to one and stone to the other. In that case they were reduced to bimetalism, and how they were going to work the thing out was what they had to solve. If they continued the present system for any length of time, there were, he foresaw, dangers ahead. Mr. Reginald Murray had said it would not affect the balance of trade. He was afraid that in time to come, considering the prospects of opium, cotton, sugar, and indigo, there would be very little to export, and if the balance of trade was against them there would be large sums in gold to be paid. That was likely to be a real danger. In his opinion, if the mints, were thrown open to gold they should also be thrown open to silver.

MR. WEBB said there were few subjects of greater importance than currency; it closely affected everybody, and if anything that Mr. Frewen had said or done had promoted consideration of that most important subject, they ought to be grateful to Mr. Frewen. (Applause.) After hearing the paper, however, he confessed to a feeling of great disappointment. The lecturer had stated that his object was to arouse discussion and bring forth new facts. Apparently he had been compelled—no doubt owing to the limited time at his disposal—to abbreviate his history, and, what was still more to be deplored, he had not himself contributed one single new fact to the discussion! He would like to recall one or two historical facts that Mr. Frewen had omitted. A century ago all the leading nations of the world were freely using both gold and silver as money; but the inconvenience of exchanging these metals internationally was so great that an effort was made to overcome those difficulties, and Great Britain was the first country to discover the way, by demonetizing silver and adopting a gold standard pure and simple. That was in 1816. Others nations soon followed. At the end of the Franco-Prussian War, Germany, partly in the hope of establishing a first-class currency on the English model and partly in the hope of crippling France, also demonetized silver and adopted gold. By now, practically every leading nation in the world had gone over to gold, and India was but following in the world's footsteps. Why Mr. Frewen should ignore what the rest of the world had done, and single out India's passage to gold as an "experiment," he could not imagine. There was no novelty about India's action. In consequence of the Western world's demonetizing silver and adopting gold as their chief metallic monetary tool, a very curious movement was set up, which no one at the time foresaw, and which was that the tremendous demand for gold
steadily increased its value. Prices of commodities commenced to fall. Several Royal Commissions were appointed to inquire into the matter. The price of silver fell just as other prices fell, and created a great deal of inconvenience to silver-using countries. The great problem that presented itself to the world at that time was the fact that prices of commodities were everywhere continuously falling. Far-seeing men said that the only way out of that difficulty was to start freely using silver again as money. In this way the supplies of metallic money would be increased. That was the policy advocated by the Bi-metallic League, and it appeared to him at the time to be sound and sensible. In those days the Government of India had to decide how to meet their increased expenditure, arising from the fact that each sovereign of their annual £16,000,000 of debt cost them over 16 rupees instead of 10 rupees as formerly. In his opinion they took the wrong course of trying to screw up the value of the rupee artificially, instead of increasing their revenues locally and leaving the Indian mints open to the free coinage of silver. Since those days great changes in the world's monetary conditions had occurred. In the last twenty-five years there had been a great development in banking, especially in the manufacture and use of paper-money. This addition to the world's supplies of money was a fact which should be kept carefully in mind. Another fact was the important discovery of the cyanide process of gold extraction, by means of which much gold that had previously been considered unobtainable was now available. The third most important new fact was the discovery of the Rand Mines. The output of gold from South Africa alone had eclipsed the whole world's output of gold in the days of the Californian and Australian discoveries. He had personally visited South Africa and Australia in order to see and study the gold situation. He had asked himself—What was going to be the result of that phenomenal output of gold? He foresaw and predicted that the value of money must depreciate—that with such a vast output of gold the pendulum must surely swing round, and gold prices all the world over must rise. This would mean a great stimulus to company-promoting, and enormous demands for capital largely in excess of all previous records. The depreciation of gold—i.e., the rise in prices—would spell considerable labour unrest; there would be strikes and industrial anarchy. That was the inevitable outcome of the world-wide fall in the value of gold. All those things he had often written about. All those things had occurred. Prices were going up, and a sovereign now bought only what fifteen shillings bought a few years ago. In short, the general situation was now exactly the reverse of what it was twenty-five years ago, when the general fall in prices forced him to advocate the free manufacture of more silver money. What was to be done now to correct the injustices to all fixed wage-earners arising from the present rise in prices? What was to be done now to allay the labour unrest, the excessive company-promoting and credit-spinning? It seemed to him that what was wanted now was to drain off from Europe some of the excessive supplies of gold-money, and that India, which had been the saviour of the world half a century ago, when prices were rising owing to the Californian and Australian gold discoveries, would be the saviour of the world again
in the present crisis. And so, for his part, he urged India to take advantage of the situation and establish for herself a gold currency.

Other countries had imported large quantities of gold, but Mr. Frewen had not said of them that they were ruining London's stockbrokers and money-dealers. Mr. Frewen pointed to India as though India were committing a crime in taking in gold the money justly due to her. Surely such an argument was ridiculous! At that moment India was, in fact, preventing the very crisis which Mr. Frewen said he could foresee on the horizon. If Mr. Frewen's crisis did come, it would be because India had not checked the mania of excessive credit-spinning and company-promoting by withdrawing sufficient gold! Mr. Frewen had concluded by saying that if only other nations would be "sensible," and commence coining hundreds of millions of ounces of silver, we should all be saved! Mr. Webb thought the leading nations of the world might be relied upon to act quite sensibly in this matter. They were not, in his opinion, in the least likely, by heavy coinages of silver, to encourage a further fall in the value of money, further rises in the prices of commodities, which would mean further grave labour troubles, further excessive company-promoting, and further falls in all gilt-edged, fixed-interest-bearing securities, with the inevitable financial crisis that would arise from a general overdoing of the financial stimulus. He was quite content to leave this further-silver-coinng idea to the discretion of the leading nations of Europe; including theramongst the peoples and bankers of the United Kingdom.

Lord Reay: Ladies and gentlemen, Lord Rosebery in a recent speech said that as he grew older he was less inclined to speak. I am bound to say I entirely agree with him, and if ever there was an occasion on which I should have liked to remain silent, it is on this occasion; but the matter is so important, and it would be very discourteous to my friend Mr. Moreton Frewen if I abstained from saying something, that you will allow me, although by no means an expert, to give you a very few observations. I am very sorry that I have not, as the last speaker evidently had, the prophetic vision, which enabled him, years ago, to foresee what the situation would be at the present moment. It seems to me that what the past has to teach us is to be extremely cautious and moderate in approaching a very complex problem. No one could have foreseen twenty years ago, and I do not think anyone did foresee, that there would be such an abundance of gold production; that instead of prices going down, as they were then going, now prices in gold are going up—that is to say, the value of gold has been diminished. Who can guarantee that that situation will be permanent? Who can guarantee that the mines in South Africa, and other mines, will continue to give us the quantity of gold which we are getting at this moment, and that the cost of production will not be increased? I am not prepared to say that silver must be absolutely discarded. I think it is as well to realize that nature has obviously provided us with the two metals in order that, when either the one becomes rare or the other is too abundant, we should redress the balance.

I think it is very much to be deplored that the situation which originally existed—gold for the West and silver for the East—has been set aside. I
think if we could have kept the mints in Europe open to a free supply of gold, and kept the mints of the East open to a free supply of silver (Hear, hear), a certain relation between the two metals would have been maintained without the makeshift, which is always open to certain risks of the Government adjusting the situation by closing the mints. (Hear, hear.) That undoubtedly, to anyone who is a free-trader, is a situation which one must regret. At the present moment it must be admitted that the object which the Government had in view has been attained. It is undoubtedly a fact that stability in the rate of exchange has been attained, and therefore it would be unfair not to pay our tribute of respect to those who contemplated that being the result. But the question is, Whether the only object as regards the currency is to have a fixed rate of exchange? I think there are other considerations which cannot be overlooked. There are, as has been pointed out, the interests of the natives of India with regard to their silver hoards, their payments of land revenue, their debts, which cannot be ignored.

I regret that this paper has not been read after publication of the Report of the Commission instead of before. I suppose my friend Mr. Moreton Frewen intends this paper to be studied by the members of the Commission which is now sitting. I hope that we may have another paper read after the Report is issued. I should be glad again to hear Mr. Webb on the subject, and I hope that Mr. Moreton Frewen will then be the protagonist on the other side. I regret that I do not see—I wish I could see—any prospect of an understanding being arrived at between the various Powers, as this matter can only be satisfactorily settled by an international agreement. Our Government certainly—that we may depend upon—will not give up the gold standard, and Germany will certainly not give it up. As regards the Latin Union, under the present circumstances I do not think that you can get them to open their mints to silver; but undoubtedly the fact that the Latin Union still has an immense amount of silver available is a point that we must not lose sight of. Under present circumstances of the money market, and in view of the fact that in the past many opinions and many prophecies that have been entertained had to be set aside, it will be as well, as I have said, to be extremely careful in handling so delicate and intricate a problem. (Hear, hear, and applause.)

Sir James Wilson said: At this late hour I shall not trouble you with all the calculations I have made. I think it would be a good thing to check some of the speaker's figures, but at the moment I will be content with giving my conclusions, as I have stated them here. At the outset of his interesting paper, Mr. Moreton Frewen invites his critics to be "brutally frank." I hope I shall not be "brutal" in my remarks, but he will pardon me if, for the sake of brevity and clearness, I am somewhat curt.

The main burden of his paper is that by closing the mints in 1893 to the unrestricted coinage of silver, the Indian Government inflicted enormous loss on the people of India, and I propose to examine the reasons he gives for this conclusion, with the sole object of arriving at the truth.

He quotes Mr. Harrison's estimate that some years ago the silver hoards of India amounted to 2,000 million ounces, or one-fifth of all the known
silver in the world. I accept this estimate, provided it is taken to mean all the silver in India at the time, including rupee coins used in currency. Now an ounce of silver weighs 480 grains, while a rupee weighs 180 grains, so that if the whole of that 2,000 million ounces had been turned into rupees, they would have made 5,300 million rupees, and if you divide that amount by 300 million as the then population of India, you find it gives 18 rupees per head instead of the 26 rupees per head estimated by Mr. Frewen, as the average amount in rupees of the value of the silver in India per head of population when the mints were open.

He says the closing of the mints annihilated this mass of wealth and that in a bad famine its value would dwindle to 6 rupees per head. Now the statistics of import and export show that in the last seventy years India has absorbed well over 2,000 million ounces of silver, and as silver is not a perishable commodity and there must have been a large quantity of silver in the country before that, it seems safe to estimate that there is, at the present moment in India, at least 2,500 million ounces of silver (about one-fifth of all the silver in the world). The statistics of coinage show that there must now be in India 2,500 million coined rupees, weighing over 900 million ounces, and each of them, of course, still of the value of a rupee each. This leaves 1,600 million ounces in uncoined bullion and ornaments. The present price of silver in London is about 27d. per ounce — about 10d. per rupee weight, and the present price of silver in Bombay is about 68 rupees per 100 tolas (i.e., rupee-weights), or about 11 annas per rupee. So that the 1,600 million ounces of uncoined silver in India is at its present market-price worth 2,800 million rupees. Adding to that the 2,500 million coined rupees, we find that the stock of silver now in India is at present prices worth 5,300 million rupees or about 17 rupees per head of the present population of 315 millions, instead of the 6 rupees mentioned by Mr. Frewen.

The reason why the value per head of the silver in India comes out almost exactly the same as before the closing of the mints is that since that date — i.e., in the last twenty years, India has gone on absorbing silver at even a faster rate than before, and during that period actually absorbed 1,000 million ounces (or one-third of the world's total production of silver during these twenty years), of this amount about 300 million ounces were imported by the Government for purposes of coinage, but about 700 million ounces were imported for private purposes. This must have cost the people the equivalent of about 90 million pounds sterling, and surely, if they had found that the value of their existing hoards of silver had been "annihilated," they would not have gone on spending this enormous sum on more silver, to be added to those hoards, instead of using it to buy gold or goods or anything else they wanted.

Mr. Frewen says the price of uncoined silver in India would fall in time of famine. But that price is determined in India, as elsewhere, by the world-price of silver and is very slightly affected by a local or even widespread famine. As for his case of the headman in Allahabad who, in 1897, took away from his stricken folk silver ornaments weighing 2,000 tolas (i.e., rupee-weights) and brought them back only 600 rupees — in that year,
the London price of silver was much what it is now, and the price in India generally was about 10 annas per tola, so that the headman should have got at least 1,200 rupees for his 2,000 tolas and somebody must have cleared 600 rupees profit out of the transaction.

Mr. Frewen's remarks give the impression that he thinks the rate of interest charged by moneylenders on loans to peasants has been raised by the closing of the mints from something like 1 per cent. per month to from 3 to 8 per cent. per month. That is not the case. In most parts of India anyone can still borrow on a deposit of silver ornaments at 1 per cent. per month or less, though, of course, he will not be able to borrow about their weight in rupees as he did before, because, owing to the appreciation of the rupee in value, a tola of silver is now only worth 10 annas instead of a rupee as before. The rate of interest charged by moneylenders varies greatly in different parts of India from about 1 per cent. to about 3 per cent. a month (unless in exceptional cases), and perhaps average about 2 per cent. per month, or, say, 20 per cent. per annum for the whole of India. There is no reason to suppose that the rate of interest has risen generally since the closing of the mints or that it could be affected to any appreciable extent by that action. It depends upon the relation between the demand for and the supply of capital of all kinds available for loan.

Time will not allow me to correct all Mr. Frewen's mistakes in figures and in history, but I may point out that while he gives the impression that the fall in the exchange value of silver is due mainly to the closing of the Indian mints, the fact is that in 1892, before the mints were closed, the price of silver in London had gone down from its old traditional rate of about 60d. per ounce to 40d., and the exchange-value of the rupee, which was then equal to the value of the silver in it, had consequently gone down from 24d. to 15d. The fall in the value of silver which has taken place since the mints were closed is only to a small extent, if at all, due to that action, and is mainly due to the supply of available silver having increased faster than the effective demand. The fall would have taken place almost as rapidly had the mints remained open, and the rupee would now have been worth less than 18., and the rupee prices of all commodities in India would have been at least 30 per cent. higher than they are.

He says prices in India have advanced in the last six years at least 40 per cent.; but, so far as my knowledge goes, that is not even approximately true, as will no doubt be seen from the Report on Prices in India, shortly, I understand, to be published. The truth is that, measured not in rupees, but in gold, the value of India's export trade has increased from £71,000,000 in 1893 to about £160,000,000 last year—that is, it has more than doubled—a satisfactory fact in itself, even although the world's trade may have shown a similar increase.

In comparing the increase in the production of gold with the increase in the value of the exports of the chief commercial nations, he forgets that, unlike most commodities, gold is not a perishable article, and all new gold produced is added to the existing world's stock, and makes a permanent addition to the world's supply of gold.
He complains that since 1893 successive finance in India members have adopted changing policies. But the truth is that the main object of the currency policy in India in closing the mints, and ever since has been, to maintain the value of the rupee as a token coin at 16d., or one-fifteenth of the gold in a sovereign, and that policy has been eminently successful. The exchange value of the rupee has remained almost exactly at that figure for the last fifteen years, and there is very little danger that it will ever fall appreciably below that rate even in times of severe financial crisis, especially if the Government of India will strengthen the position by refusing to coin any more rupees for the next ten years.

There is one point on which I am glad to find I can agree with Mr. Frewen, and that is the effect of India’s currency transactions on the trade and population of China, where prices are still fixed in silver. After India ceased coining rupees in 1893, the price per ounce of silver in London went down to 24d. in 1902. It then rose to 31d. in 1906 and 30d. in 1907, no doubt largely due to the fact that the Government of India made large purchases of silver in those years. It then suddenly fell to about 24d. in 1908-10, when the Government of India ceased buying silver, and rose again the other day when it began to buy again. These fluctuations must have been very embarrassing to all engaged in trade with China and in China, and must have had a seriously unsettling effect on the prosperity of the masses in China, where, as in the rest of the world, local prices of most commodities of export and import are determined largely by the world’s gold prices. If the Government of India thinks it must continue to buy at times more silver for purposes of coinage, it should, out of consideration for the traders and the poorer classes in China, look ahead and endeavour to spread its demand for silver equally over a number of years, so as to avoid helping to cause such violent fluctuations in the gold price of silver.

With regard to the incident of the Allahabad headman who had got 2,000 tolas weight of silver ornaments, and who only succeeded in getting 600 rupees on the price of the silver at that time, he should have brought back 1,200 rupees. I think if I had been there at the time I should have asked that headman to explain what had become of the other 600 rupees he ought to have got for them!

For the reasons given in the paper on “Indian Currency Policy,” which you will find in the Journal of this Association for July, 1911, I think that the closing of the mints in India was one of the boldest, most statesmanlike, and most beneficent steps ever taken by a responsible Government, and that it conferred enormous benefits on the people of India, and especially on the wage-earning and salaried classes, with very little injury to any class. Mr. Frewen thinks otherwise. But what is his remedy for the disastrous state of things he pictures. It is that three or four commercial nations should purchase for their joint account some 8 million ounces a month, and advance the price paid, say, 2d. per ounce each year, until the bullion value of the rupee rises to 11 rupees to the sovereign—i.e., artificially raise the price of silver in London, which is about 27d. per ounce, to 58d., more than double. Now, even at its present price,
the purchase of 8 million ounces of silver a month would mean an expenditure of nearly £11,000,000 per annum. Who is going to find this large sum annually, and what are the purchasing nations going to do with the silver when they have bought it? It would, for the most part, accumulate uselessly in their treasury vaults, as it did in America under the operation of a somewhat similar arrangement. Then these buyers are to raise the price they offer by 2d. per ounce each year, which would mean, on the present annual production of silver (about 180 million ounces), an excess price of £1,500,000 the first year, £3,000,000 the second year, and so on. All this extra profit above their present cost of production would go to the owners of the silver mines in the world, and would enormously swell their dividends and the value of their shares. It would also, of course, greatly stimulate the production of silver, and add to the embarrassment of dealing with the accumulations of silver not required by the law of demand and supply. There does not, however, seem much likelihood of finding any of the leading commercial nations ready to adopt Mr. Frewen's proposal, and we need not rush to put our money into silver mines, nor need we have any fear for the future of the rupee or for the prosperity of the people of India.

The Chairman: Time now runs on, and I must call upon Mr. Frewen to reply.

The Lecturer: Ladies and gentlemen, I should very much have liked to reply fully to my critics, but you will remember that practically the criticisms have opened up the entire wide horizon of the currency question; therefore I must be very brief. The last speaker has remarked that it is very unlikely that the Governments of the West will adopt the suggestion as to raising the exchange I have advanced to-night. Unfortunately my paper was not in the hands of the audience, and thus the proposal is not properly understood. The proposal does not originate with me, but was the unanimous recommendation of the distinguished Gold and Silver Commission of 1888—namely, that if silver was purchased to replace the half-sovereign in our currencies and small notes were issued, based on silver bullion in reserve, the new demand for silver that would be created would stop the fall in the price of silver, and bring about a rise. Again, Mr. Alfred Rothschild—and no doubt Sir James Wilson will recognize him as an authority—advanced this proposal—namely, large international purchases of silver at the Brussels Monetary Conference in 1893, and it was extremely well received by the delegates present. Thus I am advancing nothing new. Sir James said, further, that if the price of silver were advanced twopence an ounce each year, it would add to the profits, and thus stimulate silver mining. Seeing that silver is very largely a bye-product of copper and lead mines, the production of copper and lead might be so stimulated that the price of both those metals would be likely to fall, possibly even more than the amount of the profit derived from the silver. These are important economic points which cannot be discussed in five minutes.

There have been some objections to my figures. The chairman, to my surprise, remarked that the absorption of gold by India for two years had been only 36 millions. I must say I err in good company, for the
official figures differ enormously from Sir Arthur Lawley's statement. Messrs. Samuel Montague, in their Trade Circular this year, remarked that whereas the production of gold from South Africa was 33 to 34 millions, the absorption by India was well over 30 millions sterling last year. There is a great deal of gold that the Government of India has bought but not exported, and which is lying to her account at this moment in London, and which is a part of her absorption just as much as if she had moved it to Calcutta. I am sorry that the argument I advanced about the great injury to the peoples of India by closing the mints has not been replied to by anyone on the facts advanced. If, after all, by closing the mints we do starve our people wholesale, such a matter goes to the root of our rule over subject peoples, and an incident like that at Allahabad will not be disposed of by a mere remark that possibly the headman of the two villages fell amongst thieves. I was sitting in the Senate gallery at Washington when a letter was read out from a reputable Calcutta merchant, Mr. Forbes Mitchell, in which he declared that he knew that, during the famine of 1897, this headman had been sent to Allahabad with all the bangles and ornaments of his two villages, weighing 2,000 tolas. The man had been on the same errand before, and had always got a rupee for a tola as long as the mints were open; but on this occasion he found no buyers for silver, the mints being closed, and the only offer he got was for 600 rupees for his 2,000 tolas weight. This he was forced to accept. I am told now the world's price of silver was twice that at that time. I readily admit this. But there is the whole gravamen of this charge against the Government of India. The market price of silver was indeed much higher, but the men who go with their bangles to purchase food have to go to the nearest little local town and sell for whatever they can get. In the old days, any local bank would purchase silver at its par value—a rupee for a tola. One speaker has remarked that we can very easily guess what happened to the balance of money he, the headman, ought to have got, the insinuation being that this poor messenger had walked off with the other 600. That is exactly what these poor villagers would suspect, and that is where I think the awful peril is: the seeds of distrust and unfair suspicion sown in every village community.

I claim that the Government of India knew at the time that the first line of defence in famine times was the bringing of bangles to the mints to be coined into rupees. If you look at the Mint reports during the great Bombay famine of 1877, you will find the progress of this famine was marked by the pressure of the ornaments of the natives upon the mints, and the reports state that four crores of rupees were coined into rupees during the progress of that famine at the Bombay mint alone. It is the most remarkable feature in connection with these radical currency experiments that responsible people refuse to consider this argument at all, though the facts stare them in the face. As long as a rupee was given free coinage at the mint, any tola was practically a rupee, and the security of the silver was just as good in India as gold is to-day here. Yet in that period of awful stress, when this headman had to exchange ornaments for rupees, he was only able to get 600 rupees for his 2,000 tolas.
People are talking about a bank for India. What security have the banks to loan on, if it is not the silver which the people have accumulated. That and that alone is the security available. These poor fellows so soon as they got rupees melted them down and shackled them on their limbs for safe keeping, having the promise of the Government that at any time through free coinage they could reconvert a tola into a rupee.

When I remarked that 26 rupees per capita was the endowment of India, and that in the event of a widespread famine this would no longer realize 6 rupees, I meant that if over a large famine area silver was brought in for a forced sale, the tola of silver instead of fetching a rupee might not fetch even an anna. Silver under such conditions could not be sold at all. These are the points we have to consider. Our own premier security here is consols. The premier and indeed the only security of 300 millions of the people of India was their silver bullion which was always before reconvertible into rupees. That security we have absolutely shattered, and over its ruin people come here and talk of a gold standard and a gold currency for India. What is the currency of a country for, if it is not for the people of a country? Mr. Sundaram Iyer, who comes here from the Government of Madras to give evidence before the Commission, brings the statement of the banks, and that statement shows that of 100 rupees worth of business done by a bank, 70 per cent. is done in silver certificates, 25 per cent. in rupees, and the other 5 per cent. in sovereigns, which are handed over to local shroffs to melt up for jewellery. And that is called a gold standard and currency.

I have read Mr. Webb's evidence before the Commission, and I have read the evidence of the other witnesses. Mr. Webb is entirely alone in his view. Mr. Webb has an interesting point that these sovereigns which we need here so urgently to reduce our own bank rate to something reasonable, are set doing excellent work in the Punjab. There is no evidence whatever that this is so. I myself gave evidence before the Commission, and my reply is, if you are throwing tens of millions of sovereigns into India, someone no doubt sees these sovereigns before they get to the native hoarder. As these sovereigns get out there, no doubt they are in great demand for hoarding to replace the discredited rupee. As to the rates of interest which are charged, when I was in India last, I found that the general lending rate on silver bullion, silver being the basis of credit, was 1 per cent. per month. Witness after witness of the highest credit has come before the Commission to declare that usury rates are today from 3 to 8 per cent. per month. The point is that silver used to be a perfect banking security, because the shroff could send it to the nearest mint for free coinage, and that very fact kept down the rate of interest. But to-day silver is a very inferior chattel-mortgage-security, where previously it wanted nothing but the stamp of the mint to convert it into money. Mr. Webb has said we are all grumbling that India is drawing great masses of gold, and he says why do not we grumble at the United States drawing our gold. Mr. Webb knows what the reply is to this perfectly well. We say that gold, considering its great value in exchange in the case of nations with a highly organized system of exchanges, comes and goes between countries, and there is no reason why it should not
come and go freely. If 10 millions or 20 millions of gold leaves London for New York, what happens? Does anyone imagine there is going to be a panic in consequence? No; the effect is to raise the general level of prices in America, and if prices rise there that stimulates our exports of merchandise to the United States. Thus our trade balance improves, the exchanges turn in our favour, and the gold comes back to us. It comes and goes just as blood in the arteries of the human body, but not so the gold which goes to India. That never comes back. Consider what we have paid for this money (I include, for instance, in the case of the Africa gold the cost of the South African War). The cost of producing gold is immense, and the idea, as Mr. Samuel Montague says, of taking gold out of one hole in South Africa and pitching it into a thousand holes in India is a scandal.

Whether the Chinaman can buy our goods to-day depends on whether he can buy our gold exchange. He has to buy a bill on New York or London before he can buy our goods. He has got now to give near 8 taels for a sovereign where he formerly gave 3 taels, and meantime wages in his country have not risen considerably, if even at all. Every fall in the price of silver therefore enables China to export things which she could not export before. The great fall of silver in 1908, 1909, and 1910, enabled China to export every sort of thing—"pigs, pig-tails, and pig-iron." The pig-iron trade across the Pacific is now handed over to Hankau as a result of that great fall in exchange. Is it any wonder that China has now constructed great steel rolling-mills at Hankau. These are not problems to be dismissed in a light and airy fashion by telling us that wisdom will die with the Indian Finance Minister. I am amazed that my friend should, when in India, have walked over this great mine of human interest, and have come back with the conviction that India has benefited by this miserable tampering with her currency. The trade expansion during all these years of the other commercial nations has been far greater than is the case in India. Everything points to the fact that we have done a most deplorable deed in demonetizing the silver in which 300 millions of people have accumulated their thrift and for hundreds of years.

I admit the enormous disadvantage one is suffering under when discussing these questions. The points which appear to be truisms to me, and to every economic student of these questions, when one advances these before an audience such as this, well-intentioned and intelligent, are regarded as novel and impossible. As in the case of Sir James Wilson just now, Sir James turns a suggestion of mine almost into ridicule, which after all is not mine but dates back to the unanimous recommendation of a Royal Commission in 1888. No one will give any real consideration to this problem, and thus it is that an issue of universal concern—our money laws—is absolutely running loose.

On the proposition of Sir Mancherjee Bhownaggree a hearty vote of thanks was accorded to the Lecturer and to the Chairman, and carried with acclamation.

The Chairman suitably replied on behalf of himself and the Lecturer, and the proceedings terminated.
SUPPLEMENT

OUR REVIEW OF BOOKS

TWO MONUMENTAL WORKS ON CHINA.


The very first word in this book is an acknowledgment of the generous subvention granted by the French Parlement, without the aid of which the lavish reproduction of these magnificent specimens of strange script would have been well-nigh impossible. Thus it is that France is once more found in the van of literary enterprise: however heavy her taxation and her responsibilities, she can always find the time to consider and the money to encourage all reasonable literary claims made upon the public chest by her illustrious sons. Even the Indian Government can find time and money to send out Dr. Stein on successive expeditions. The British Government in this literary race is still amongst the "also ran," but never "placed": everything is left to individual enterprise or specialist societies. Meanwhile a Prince of the Lolos—a nation covering the full area extent of France—has got so far as to own a printing-press, and possibly a judicious circulation of M. d'Ollone's vocabularies amongst that Prince's congener might yet further promote the good cause, and definitely establish the Lolo language. Père Crabouillet of the Missions Étrangères was, according to our author, the first to discover the existence of Lolo writing in 1873; on p. 128 of his "Travels and Researches" (1882), the late Mr. E. C. Baber recounts how he obtained "from the French missionaries" (i.e., in 1877 from Père Crabouillet) a considerable fragment of this Lolo writing, which he reproduces, with comments, in his "Travels." Since then a score or more of Lolo volumes have been deposited in various European museums and national libraries, France, of course, having the lion's share. Very little has been so far done to decipher these precious manuscripts on a sustained and wholesale scale, nor are the results particularly encouraging to dilettanti; for the majority of Lolo documents seem to be mere genealogies, prayers, and ceremonial forms, though according to our author there are known to be in hiding important works on "The Flood, and Dispersion of
Races," "Natural History," "Geography," etc. Père Vial, who is still at work in Yün Nan amongst the Lolos, published in 1898 a most interesting study of their manners and customs, language, literature, etc., so far as he then knew these subjects. Then there is Mr. Augustine Henry, late of the Imperial Chinese Maritime Customs, and now holding some botanical appointment at one of our older Universities: he was, and presumably still is, the happy possessor of a most valuable mass of material, personally gathered, and closely connected with the Lolos. On successive occasions during the past ten years the present reviewer has endeavoured to induce him to disgorge this for the benefit of the public, or allow others to do so for him; but so far in vain: possibly our Chancellor of the Exchequer, moved by the present appeal, will see fit to arrange with one or more of his colleagues to devote a wee trifle, out of the sturdy millions he is wringing from us, to Lolo research in general, and to Mr. Augustine Henry's documents in particular. Lastly, the obscure individual who now pens these lines has from the very beginning had his own private interest in Lolo, and is only waiting for a Champollion to deliver the necessary oracle in the shape of a key in order to translate the two considerable Lolo volumes in his own possession. He had the honour to succeed the late Mr. Baber in Sz Ch'wan thirty-four years ago: he had also the pleasure of living with Père Crabouillet at the summer retreat of Sha-p'ing Pa for a week or two in January-February, 1887, and there reading over the original draft of Baber's "Travels and Researches." Baber's old writer and servants were also at his disposal for a whole year, and one of the Lolo Princes, evidently mistaking him for the more worthy Baber, at some time during this year sent him a present of a beautiful Lolo volume in silk (now deposited in one of our museums or libraries), of which, however, before its despatch to London a copy was first taken. In June, 1895, the (Indian) Antiquary published an article setting forth the above facts, and suggesting certain points in possible explanation of the Lolo system of writing; but these suggestions in any case did not carry very far; in fact, after all his vast labours, M. d'Ollone himself now confesses that, even now, l'étude de l'écriture lolo ne peut conduire au déchiffrement certain de tous les documents, ni même peut-être d'un seul. So that we are not much "forrader" than we were, though M. d'Ollone's splendid volume has given us a very valuable fillip, and he now for the first time at least sets us on the right track with definite business-like indications. There are, it seems, two sorts of Lolos, the Independent and the Mediatised; the former (apparently influenced by their Tibetan and Thai [Siamese] neighbours) write horizontally from right to left, whilst the latter (apparently influenced by their Chinese suzerains) write vertically from left to right. Thus exactly the same page can serve for both, except that the one binds his book at the top and turns up the leaves, whilst the other binds the book to the left and turns over from the right; as a rule only one side of the paper is used in each case. But the strange thing is that, though the words (all syllabic) are sometimes exactly the same in each case, the writer alters the "axis" of his writing, and can write the syllabic signs sideways as well as read them sideways or at any angle. Moreover, as there are various Lolo dialects,
the same syllables (even if pronounced in the same way) do not necessarily spell out the same idea. Besides, many syllables are apt to be written irregularly from homophones. Finally (possibly, it is now suggested, for jealous purposes of secrecy) many syllables (of which M. d'Ollone gives twenty-four specimens) may be deliberately written in twenty-four different ways each. One or two important, but short, stone inscriptions have, however, been discovered quite recently, in which the Chinese inscription appears side by side with the Lolo; but the Lolos are so jealous of these stone treasures that, even supposing a European know where they are, it is only at the risk of immediate assassination that an attempt can be made by either native or alien to copy them. It is to be noted that nothing is said of Lolo tones, which, however, probably exist, as in all Indo-Chinese tongues.

As to the Miao-tsz script which M. d'Ollone (not, however, without some confessed misgivings) thinks he has discovered for the first time, we are enabled to state most positively that it is largely in one degree or another almost purely running-hand Chinese, with a few barbarous curtailments and (possibly) importations from Lolo sources superadded. The distinguished author frankly tells us that he does not speak Chinese—a fortiori, of course, he does not write it—still less does he write or read the Chinese cursive forms. The present writer has from time to time published both Miao-tsz and Thai vocabularies, always taken down from natives on the spot concerned, and he has found that both peoples are by nature extremely intelligent; many Miao-tsz, indeed, have taken Chinese literary degrees. The celebrated Viceroy Ts'ën Yih-ying was commonly reported to have been a pure Miao-tsz (the place-name and surname Ts'ën, though ancient, is almost unknown in modern China); and if that be so, his son, the cannibal ex-Viceroy "Shum" (Ts'ën Ch'un-hüian), now enjoying asylum in Singapore as a political fugitive, must of course be more or less Miao-tsz too. Ts'ën is a Miao surname in the Sz-chou Fu part of Kwei Chou. Another point: it is evident that the intelligent Miao-tsz who wrote down M. d'Ollone's vocabulary for him under his own eyes wrote it with a steel pen, and not with a Chinese brush; hence the construction of the characters is stilted and lacking in flow. There are about 400 supposed Miao-tsz characters given in all. Anyone possessing an average knowledge of the Chinese script can see that Nos. 25, 26, 30, 106, 183, 184, 214-217, 224, 287, are purely Chinese characters fitted to native Miao-tsz sounds, just as in old Japanese—and to a certain extent in modern—they were and are fitted to pure Japanese sounds. The numerals at the end (with the exception of nen hao, "twenty," which requires further explanation) are plainly the commercial Chinese numerals very slightly modified. The colours, Nos. 364-369, are running-hand forms of the corresponding Chinese characters; but it will be noted that the Miao-tsz, here and elsewhere, often seem to place a circle, or a curved line, or some other small mark, above, below, or at the side. This is possibly, as in Japanese and Korean, in order to mark a native termination, affix, or suffix; for instance, "black," No. 365, may be compared with "ink," No. 269. There are some cases where a Chinese character is used purely syllabically (instead of a character
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bearing the sense) to express a Miao-tsz word. This also was a peculiarity of ancient written Japanese; for instance, the Miao-tsz syllable ko appears to mean "gold" (No. 32), "duck" (No. 226), "deaf" (No. 350), "prayer" (No. 370), and "good" (No. 371). In all these cases one or the other of the well-known shorthand forms of the Chinese character kwo, "to pass over," is used phonetically; and it is to be noted that in Hankow, Sz Ch'wan, and Kwei Chou, the Chinese themselves often, if not usually, pronounce it ko too. Quite a large number of the supposed Miao-tsz characters are purely "grass-hand" Chinese, only recognizable, however, by those who are in the habit of writing, or at least reading, the running hand. M. d'Ollone's Chinese friends, who either could not make these characters out at all, or who went far afield to ancient forms of 2,000 or 3,000 years ago for their contractions (thus betraying our author into wild historical speculation), could not have been very up-to-date scholars; or, again, the Chinese "radical" is either omitted or mutilated; or a purely Chinese sound is used (apart from the character); or there are other indications that either Chinese characters or Chinese sounds were in the unsophisticated Miao-tsz mind. Without going into a detailed justification for each individual case, the writer may call specific attention to Nos. 33, 35, 41, 42, 43, 48, 51, 72, 73, 88, 89, 95, 96, 98, 106, 108, 110, 112, 118, 120, 130, 137, 153, 158, 163, 164, 169, 171, 174, 181, 186, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 200, 205-208, 214, 220, 224, 225, 228, 238, 247, 248, 288, 290, 294-296 (tang-nien, kin-nien, ming-nien), 298 (ts'ien-jih), 308, 311, 320, 324, 325, 331, 333 (ch'i-knai = drink milk), 335, 366, 337 (compare 171, shên = body), 341 (poh-hao = not well), 347 (o-shi = to void dung), 344 (o-niao = void urine), 347 (purely Chinese both in sound and in contracted writing), 350, 356 (=drink wine together), 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, etc. This large number most evidently, after a mere five minutes' cursory glance, are found to "savour" of pure Chinese in one way or the other. It is highly probable that a patient student would produce similar results with 95 per cent. of the rest. As to such conventional curtailments as a mere perpendicular stroke for the "radical" meaning "tree," even in Chinese a conventional curtailment for the complicated character i, "idea," is likewise a mere perpendicular stroke slightly hooked at each end, but on different sides.

In thus pointing out once for all how M. d'Ollone has got on to a false trail in the matter of Miao-tsz writing, we must not omit to congratulate him most heartily on having more than redeemed his error in the matter of Lolo.—E. H. PARKER.

2. LANGUES DES PEUPLES NON CHINOIS DE LA CHINE. By le Commandant d'Ollone, assisted by Captains De Fleurelle and Lepage, and Lieutenant de Boyve. Price 15 francs.

This appears to be No. vi. of the Mission series, coming before the volume above reviewed, which is No. vii., though neither is marked as such on the cover, and both are in continuation of the first volume on Mussulmans Chinois noticed by the present critic in the English Historical Review of October, 1912, and also in the Anglo-Russian Society's Journal for 1912. As to vols. ii. to vi., they appear to be still in process of
preparation; we hope to see them before long. The volume now under notice gives tabulated lists of 328 important words, Miao-tsz, Lolo, Sifan, Mongol, etc.; forty-nine vocabularies in all, with a map showing the area of China covered within which these vocabularies have been collected. The whole of them are tabulated and arranged in such a way that specialists can make their comparison without inconvenient references from one page to the other. About thirty-two years ago the writer (China Review, 1881) took down a vocabulary of about 250 words from the mouths of certain intelligent Miao-tsz of Sung-k' an in Kwei Chou province; although this place is hundreds of miles distant from M. d'Ollone's preserve, it will be evident, to anyone who cares to compare the two, that nearly the whole of the words collected in 1881 can be matched with those collected in 1906; in many cases, even, the exact spelling has been closely followed by the two collectors, as, for instance, in ndho-kou, ndo-kou, “the back,” and plou-hou, plö-fou, “hair.” As in the case of the Lolo dialect, M. d'Ollone throughout omits all mention of the important tones, of which in Miao-tsz there are six, as was explained in 1881.

The Rev. E. C. Bridgman published a list of the Miao-tsz tribes in the Shanghai Asiatic Society's Journal for 1859, and Mr. G. M. H. Playfair in the China Review followed in the same line quite independently in 1876; but, as M. d'Ollone states, the Chinese (from whose published books these two earlier authors also drew their inspiration) have always mixed up the Thai, Sifan, and other cognate tribes with the Chung-kia-tsz, Min-kia, and other Miao-tsz proper. In 1870 the Rev. J. Edkins in the Chinese Recorder published several articles upon and vocabularies of the Miao-tsz; but here, again, there was no clear distinction drawn between Miao-tsz proper and Lolos, etc. Mr. G. W. Clarke has some useful remarks, subject to the same qualification, in the Chinese Recorder for 1884. Mr. S. R. Clarke gives us some Miao-tsz folklore in the Chinese Recorder for 1899. In the Chinese Recorder for 1908 Mr. S. Pollard first made a clear distinction between the Nosu (Lolos) and the Miao-tsz, laying stress upon the fact that the latter had no writing of their own at all. In vol. xxxiii. of the Shanghai Asiatic Society's Journal, Mr. George Edgar Betts gives us a very excellent account of social life amongst the Miao-tsz, and shows that, if they ever had any records at all, Chinese characters were probably used to represent Miao-tsz sounds, which we have shown above to be the fact. In vol. xli. of the Chinese Recorder the Rev. W. C. Dodd gives an interesting account of the Thai tribes, as distinct from the Miao-tsz and Lolos, including also the Tchawung or Tchwang, as to whose identity M. d'Ollone seems in serious doubt. On p. 672 of vol. xl. of the Chinese Recorder, a specimen page for a new Miao alphabet was given, which would scarcely have been needed if the Hwa Miao tribe concerned had possessed a script of their own. Finally, in 1911, after prolonged residence among the Miao tribes, Mr. S. R. Clarke published an excellent little book called Among the Tribes in South-West China. He agrees with M. d'Ollone that the tongue of the Chung-kia-tsz at least shows them to be Thai rather than Miao provenance, and accordingly Ts'ën
Yüh-ying, who was, he says, a Chung-kia-tsz by origin, must have been more Siamese than Miao. However, specialists now have before them in the above references ample material for a feast of comparison and a flow of theory; it may be added that the present writer, the Rev. F. P. Gilman, and Rev. Carl Jeremiassen, contributed several papers to vols. xix. and xx. of the China Review upon the Muong languages and those of the so-called Loi tribes of Hainan, together with their supposed linguistic relation to the tongues of the Thai tribes of Annam, Siam, and South-West China. One list was sent to Mr. Hertz of Bhamo, now Deputy Commissioner at Myitkina, with a request that he would jot down the local Shan equivalents, the result being to establish a clear linguistical relationship between the Shans of Burma and the Loi of Hainan. M. d’Ollone’s painstaking collections are a distinct step in advance: with French precision and logic he has clarified the true issues, and it now only remains for those whose tastes lie in this direction to go ahead and secure a decisive victory over ethnological and philological confusion.—E. H. Parker.

3: ABHANDLUNGEN DES HAMBURGISCHEN KOLONIALINSTITUTS KENG-TSCHI-T’U. ACKERBAU UND SEIDENGEWINNUNG IN CHINA. By O. Franke, Dr. Phil., Professor of East Asian Languages and History. With 102 plates and 57 other illustrations.

The inexorable limitations imposed by an unyielding editor prevent the devotion to this handsome volume of space commensurate with its artistic merits. It is a work of the highest academic order, philosophically and historically, as well as artistically. It discusses the bond which, from ancient times till now, has indissolubly connected religion and agriculture in the Chinese mind; explains the ancient worship of the gods of grain and cultivation, with special reference to the theories developed in a recent publication of M. Ed. Chavannes, dealing with the worship of the Emperors at T’ai Shan; shows how the two ablest of the Manchu monarchs have done their full share in keeping up these noble traditions; and, in fine, furnishes us with a series of magnificent reproductions in the shape of imperial prefaces to agricultural works; specimens of calligraphy lavished upon works appertaining to the cultivation of the soil; interesting models of agricultural implements, with full instructions as to their manipulation and use; and, finally, copies of magnificent porcelain art specimens, conceived for and devoted to the contemplative illustration of agricultural duties. As everyone knows, in China agriculture has always ranked, socially, immediately after literature and the imperial civil commission, but before mere art, manufactures, commerce, industry, inventions, militarism and even before religion (i.e., apart from its solemnity in state functions). To be an agriculturist is to be a freeman, and the equal “under heaven” of any man. Even the Emperors themselves have always gone through the form of ploughing a “lonely furrow” once a year, whilst the Empress has performed corresponding duties connected with looms and silkworms. The very mandarins, representing the Emperor, have had to perform analogous functions annually in their own districts.
The plates and calligraphical reproductions are amongst the very finest ever published in a foreign volume; the price of the book is not marked, but it would be cheap at a guinea to a person combining art enthusiasm with a fair knowledge of the Chinese language and history. It is only of recent years that the Germans, who are usually the first in "intensive" study, have risen to their European reputation in Chinese affairs. With the exception of the Bavarian, Dr. Friedrich Hirth, who for a generation back has had almost a monopoly of sound German knowledge of Chinese (and who for some strange reason seems to have been correspondingly ignored by Berlin), there have been no shining lights at all to compare with the Chavannes and the Pelliotis of up-to-date France. But of recent years Forke, Lauffer, Sperlein, and now Franke, have forged gallantly to the front, and it may be said that Chavannes himself has achieved nothing better than the present magnum opus of Franke.—E. H. Parker.

INDIA


We welcome another volume from the pen of Mr. Rabindranath Tagore. Mr. Tagore effectually silences his would-be critics by explaining in his preface "that the subject-matter of the papers published in this book has not been philosophically treated, nor has it been approached from the scholar's point of view." To us the chief value of "Sādhana" lies in its exposition of the attitude of mind of the forest-dwelling sages of ancient India—in the glimpses it affords of the poet-soul of the author of "Gītājīlī." It is full of beautiful thoughts, expressed in the true poetical style of Rabi. But it attempts to do more than this. Mr. Tagore sets himself no less a task than to harmonize in the pages of "Sādhana" the Śaṅkhya and the Vedanta Schools of Indian philosophy. He tells us in beautiful but not quite convincing language that the Dvaita and Advaita philosophies of India are but the two faces of the same coin, that Gyan Yoga, Karma Yoga, and Bhakti Yoga, each lead to the acquisition of this same golden sovereign, and differ only in expressing its face value in terms of gold, silver, or copper. No book of the scope and size of "Sādhana" can be expected to illumine the minds of ordinary mortals—mortals bred in "civilizations that have their cradles in brick and mortar"—on such subtle points of the great philosophies of the East. We are prepared to take much on trust from so high an authority as Mr. Tagore, and we willingly take our hats off to the ancient Rishis of India who evolved the lofty philosophy of "Aham Brhma Asmi" (I am God). But even Mr. Tagore's testimony is not enough to convince us that this spirit is manifested in the India of to-day. However, if "Sādhana," with the fame and reputation of its author behind it, succeeds in creating some interest among the English-speaking people in the study of the much-neglected philosophies of Ancient India, it will not have been published in vain—if it will correct, even to some extent, the present-day Hindu's "partiality for the internal world," and convince him that "true spirituality is calmly balanced in strength in the correlation of the within and the without," it will certainly have achieved no mean measure of success.
5. GLIMPSES OF INDIAN BIRDS. (London: John Lane.)

Anything Mr. Dewar writes on birds is interesting, and this book does not fail to be so. In it he, as usual, pleads for an ounce of observation pure and simple being worth a pound or two of Darwinism, Wallaceism, or any other "ism" which has become stiffened into inelastic zoological theories. He gives a very readable account of Indian birds from the Indian robin and the shikra to the vulture and the flamingo, and he writes with a zeal that shows a pure zoological interest. He tilts at the "protective colour" theories, and has some reason on his side, at least in the case of butterflies; and he is extremely observant of the curious habits of the hornbill and hoopoe, and of the numerous species of cuckoo which are so specially favoured by Nature.—A. F. S.

6. INDIAN NATIONALISM. By Edwyn Bevan. (Macmillan and Co., Ltd.)

This essay, which the author calls in his subtitle "an independent estimate," is a genuine attempt to read aright the signs of the times regarding Indian national aspirations, and incidentally Indian unrest. The writer admits that no one is responsible for the present state of things. "We English and Indians have to deal with a situation created by our fathers." He points out the conquest "by the sword," the introduction of the Western ideals, such as "patriotism" and "rebellion," to achieve "independence" (always applauded in the nations of the West), which have come with them. His "case for the Empire" gives a fair view of the good intentions of the governing body, but we think he forgets the moral depression into which most of the Indian peoples have been forced by long centuries of contest, and (in most cases) by foreign despotism. He views the nationalist as regarding Britain as putting his country in a "frame," and directing it as a surgeon does a paralyzed man. The antagonisms of Anglo-Indians and natives—even the educated ones—are touched upon, the difference between the moderate and extreme nationalists pointed out, and the author, while hoping for a better understanding between the rulers and ruled in the future, shows that, contrary to what some nationalists say, the possible withdrawal of British rule might only mean that India would fall into the hands of one or other European countries.—A. F. S.

7. DEW AND MILDEW: SEMI-DETACHED STORIES FROM KARABAD, INDIA.

By Percival Christopher Wren. (Longmans, Green and Co.) (Such of these stories as are not strictly true are founded on fact.)

Thus ingenuously runs the title-page of this remarkable book, of which we can safely say that it escapes that colourlessness which alone makes a book not worth reading; its good passages are delightful, and where it did not please us we found it very trying. We do not know whether it is a collection of short stories, or a novel, or a pretext for discussing sundry social and educational problems of India. From the title-page it would appear that the author wishes it to be regarded as a series of short stories. But the same set of dramatis persona runs throughout the book, and the stories are strung together on a rudimentary plot, which is to the effect that there
was a haunted house at Karabad, and disaster overtook all who lived or had lived in it. On the other hand, each chapter is capable of standing by itself as a short story and a good one, and they are not printed as chapters, but as separate stories. On the whole, we think it is a novel in which the author has saved himself the trouble of writing connecting links to his episodes by printing them as separate stories. He thus justifies the slightness of the plot, and, moreover, gives himself the right to go off into political and similar questions, and point the moral by involving his characters in debates and difficulties connected with such questions, and not at all with the plot. There is no subtlety of character-drawing in the book; each character tends to being only an embodied virtue or vice, and they might quite well be given names after the manner of "The Pilgrim's Progress"; nevertheless they talk well, and the author succeeds in making them human, and we take an interest in them and their fortunes. Education and its problems are clearly the author's hobby, and there is much able writing in the book on this subject, largely in the form of conversations and speeches put into the mouths of the characters; nor does he disdain to mingle humorous passages with the serious ones, in spite of his evidently strong feeling on the subject. There is much variety in the different stories: some are gruesome, dealing with the haunted house, "Sudden-Death Lodge," above-mentioned; the daily life and amusements of an Anglo-Indian family give material for several stories which may be described as "pretty," in which the two children (to one of whom the book is dedicated) play the leading rôles; there is a riot scene, and a tiger-hunt, and an assassination or two. Several stories are occupied with the adventures of a low-caste demagogue from England, the villain of the piece, who comes to India on a visit to put it to rights; and others with the story of the life and work of Horatio Hamilton Hanis, schoolmaster, an heroic character. Faults of education in England and India are pilloried in Peter Perk and Hari De. We have some debonair subalterns, an insanely knaughty and hard-working deputy commissioner, a bigoted chaplain, a fatuous volunteer officer, and a host of minor characters. The characters crop up in each other's stories in Arabian Nights fashion. The stories abound in random digressions, various foibles are pilloried in chance sentences, and one finds a laugh at every turn, blending curiously with the crusading spirit and gruesome groundwork of the book.—J. M. P.


The above forms an exhaustive and very informing description of India in the times of the Moguls, an age which was contemporaneous with our own Cromwell. Nicolò Manucci, the author of these memoirs, was a Venetian, who ran away from home as a lad. He entered the train of an English nobleman, Lord Bellomont, and followed his protector in his journeys through Persia and India.

The descriptions of the countries and persons of those times are perhaps at times a little tedious, but they are full of information. The visit of the
hero of the narrative to the Shah, and the description of the meeting of Lord Bellomont with the Shah's chief Minister are excellent.

The efforts of the Englishman to extract from the Vizier money owed by the Shah to England are quite comical. The diplomatic tortuosity of the Oriental is amusingly illustrated, and its veracity will appeal to those that know the wily evasiveness of the Oriental.

Manucci followed his patron to India, and there found employment as an artilleryman. Knowing something of medicine, he is able to make a little money by practising the healer's art.

The descriptions of the Court of the Moghuls are very vivid and interesting. The Italian temperament of the author notices artistic details which the duller Saxon might pass over. Manucci experiences many entertaining and exciting adventures in the course of his wanderings. His descriptions of the English merchants of those days are interesting as affording a sidelight on the life of those times. He winds up in quite approved fashion by marrying a pious and virtuous English widow.

The Anglo-Indian will find this a delightful work, and the ordinary less favoured mortal cannot fail to find in it much curious and interesting information. On the whole, it is a book well worth reading.—H. O. W. M.

THE NAVY
The Changeless Sea


Under the above title Mr. Thursfield sets forth with great success, simplicity and brevity, the main lessons of history as touching upon sea-power and naval warfare. Utilizing many examples, the author demonstrates the unchanging characteristics of sound strategy, in spite of the constant changes in ships, weapons, means of propulsion, and the changes of tactics dependent thereon. Clear expositions are given of the true meanings of "sea-power," "command of the sea," "a fleet in being," and kindred expressions so often loosely and incorrectly used. To a great extent a clear understanding of the true meaning of these phrases elucidates the why and wherefore of the present dispositions of our fleets, their proper functions in war, the necessity for their present strength, and how it is that although some particular place, colony, or trade-route, may have no protecting ships within thousands of miles, yet it will be perfectly safe if the strategy is sound, and the protecting force of sufficient strength rightly placed.

As the author uses them, the terms "blockade" and "blockading" seem a little misleading; under modern conditions, the "blockade" of any locality sheltering a fleet, with its proper quota of torpedo craft and submarines, is quite impracticable; the best that can be done is to "watch," "mark," or "contain": probably the last of these words most nearly expresses the process.

The subject of invasion is carefully and soundly dealt with; the author, however, does not quite seem to appreciate the great change which increase
in size of the modern liner has wrought in carrying capacity, and the correspondingly lesser number of vessels necessary for transporting an invading force. This diminution in the number of transports will be most marked in the case of short voyages up to, say, thirty-six hours. The chances and prospects of success for a "bolt from the blue" invasion are somewhat lightly dismissed; but under modern conditions the chances do not appear to us so poor as the author seems to think. In any case, if recent examples are any guide, international morality is a weak reed to lean upon in this matter, and to your reviewer it appears as if the amount of morality extant at any moment varies inversely with the product of the magnitude, the temptation, and the stake to be gained—at least, that is the impression produced by reading a good many letters written and speeches made on the subject of "Welt-Politik" by various high authorities.

As the author most truly points out, the gales which have apparently frustrated attempted invasions of England are most unfortunate incidents, in that persons who have not studied the histories of these attempts carefully are apt to give the praise to the gales, and not to the strategy and correct dispositions of force, which in all human probability would have done the work equally well, if not better.

The appearance of this little book, now that certain sections of the Press and leading politicians—not statesmen—are loudly demanding reductions of naval strength, is most opportune; and it is greatly to be hoped that the low price will induce many to read the book who ordinarily are apt to think that the subject does not concern them. It does, and that very closely.—H. P.

The Basis of Sea-Power.


Under the above rather unattractive, and to many incomprehensible, title, Mr. Reynolds introduces us into a most enthralling and slightly startling atmosphere—the atmosphere in which the men live "on whom does this Realm of England, under the good Providence of God, principally depend."

The author has evidently opportunities of getting first-hand and intimate knowledge of his subject; this knowledge he expresses in vigorous and terse language, often accompanied by close transcripts of actual conversations. As a study in the vernacular of about 150,000 of the nation's servants, and that of their wives, families, and friends, this little book is probably quite unique.

Many problems are discussed from an entirely novel point of view, more especially those connected with ships of modern construction and their bearings on the health of their populations, insurance and its effects, and, most distressing of all, invaliding. With regard to the latter, it is interesting, as bearing on the accuracy of the few figures Mr. Reynolds gives, to note that Sidmouth, where the book was written, has an average of 1.5 men returned to it annually from the navy invalided with consumption, the
quota furnished averaging 250—that is, 6 per 1,000. From this it appears that the remark, "a sea-life is not the breezy, healthy affair it is usually considered," is well founded. It is difficult to see any practicable remedy for this state of affairs, for as long as fighting ships are wanted they must be armoured; and if armoured the ventilation must be "potted"—i.e., driven by artificial means. It is well the nation should understand these things, so that, when self-constituted naval experts and politicians dilate on the magnificence of the navy and the splendid qualities of the men, their listeners may know somewhat of how these men live—and what they think about it. In any case these chapters cause the reader to realize vividly that the cost of sea-power in life and health is high during peace, and that it might be well to take a little interest in the spending of the millions voted annually for his own safety.

Discipline and naval expenditure generally receive much shrewd and racy comment, and your reviewer is tempted to quote, but refrains, as to do so would require quotations of inordinate length—or mutilation. The discussion of these subjects is, however, well worth careful reading and consideration by all who are interested in the nation's welfare.

On laying the book down, the feeling is that of having had a fairly deep, most interesting, and thought-compelling insight into an almost unknown world, peopled by little-understood men, and into lives lived under abnormal conditions.—H. P.


This book is an attempt at a complete indictment of England and her Empire as managed at the present time. The author touches on every political and economic subject, and draws conclusions, which are far from optimistic, from cases in history. The author sees nothing but portents of bad omen in the many-sided expression of the spirit of the age. State aid is socialism, private charity is swindling. The law of entail produces no good result; better adopt the French system, with its antidote, the conseil de famille. If the author knew as much as I do of the working of that institution, which is only praised in countries that do not have it, he would realize that the safeguard against extravagance is too often turned into an instrument of tyranny over children who, having inherited a fortune, show a tendency towards independence. Is there anything more monstrous than to see men of even mature age being placed, as it were, under tutelage simply because they have married without consulting the wishes of sometimes distant relatives, or because they start a business instead of living an idle life on their income? I have known men being placed under a conseil judiciaire simply because they had spent in one year a few hundred pounds over their income, the step being taken by their relatives in order to bring pressure upon them for other purposes.

Mr. Rolleston seeks comparisons in history for what he calls the decadence of Great Britain. The "lessons of Rome, of Spain, of the Netherlands," do not apply to the present day, the condition of life being utterly different.
Even where the author's contention is right, we all know that Cassandras have little chance of being heeded.—B. S.

PHILOSOPHY


In his preface Mr. Hannay outlines the scheme of his elaborate study of comparative religions, and claims to have done for human faiths what Frazer has done in his monumental "Golden Bough" in relation to the habits, customs, and folk-lore, of primitive people. Possibly the author found the plan too ambitious and comprehensive in its scope, and certainly a treatise on the origin of human belief demands a large canvas. At all events, he has for the most part confined himself to tracing the development of the Phallic cult and the Solar cult throughout all races and through all the ages, for the author does not hesitate to lay it down as an axiom that Phallism is at the root of all human faiths. He seems, indeed, obsessed by the Phallic cult. He interprets Phallic symbols, not only in the Egyptian pyramids and obelisks, the *nuraghis* of Sardinia, the *talayots* of the Balearic Islands, the cromlechs of Brittany and Ireland, etc.; but, according to him, the deadly cobra of India and the innocent maypole of English village greens are also manifestations of this sexual cult.

Mr. Hannay's style is occasionally obscure and his diction involved. The new terminology which he has adopted is also apt to exasperate the reader—"mirophily" for love of the marvellous, "miradoxes" to describe the tenets of this primitive instinct, and so forth.

In his criticism of Christianity, Mr. Hannay starts with the assumption that the Bible is the history of the evolution of spiritual religion from a naturalistic paganism—in other words, that the universal Solar cult of Eastern races is the cradle of the Christian faith.

In the last chapters he gives a forecast of a socialistic Utopia after the style of Mr. H. G. Wells, and urges the elimination of religious sentiments in order to attain national and individual freedom. The author preaches, in short, a new Gospel of Humanitarianism, and sees the salvation of the world in a kind of national altruism.

Not the least remarkable feature of this remarkable book is the singularly full, if unscientifically arranged, index, which fills no less than one-tenth of the whole book.

13. THE SYSTEM OF THE VEDANTA. By P. Deussen. Translated by C. Johnston. (Lusac and Co.)

This work, evidently the fruit of years of labour, is by a scholar, for specialists in the branch of learning of which it treats. Its scope is wide, since it is a compendium of the dogmatics of Brahmanism, based firstly on the System of the Vedanta according to Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras, and secondly on Shankara's Commentary thereon.

The Introduction points out that the author or authors of the Brahma
Sutra seem to have purposely made their work treating of the secret doctrine of the Veda inaccessible without the aid of a teacher. Later, Shankara's interpretation of Badarayana's teaching was written, and as we cannot at present separate the teaching from the interpretation, the exposition in Deussen's work is one of the Vedanta System from the standpoint of Shankara only. The Introduction contains chapters on the Aim of the Vedanta, on the Qualifications of those called to its Study, the Source of the Vedanta, and on Esoteric and Exoteric Vedanta Doctrine. To the general reader and theologian the sections on the Relation of the System to Justification by Works, and on Liberation (Salvation) through the "Grace" of Knowledge, will be of especial interest. "When a creature thinks on and strives towards the highest God, just as the faculty of sight in one who has become blind, after the darkness is shaken off by the power of remedies, in him, in whom the grace of God perfects it, does it become manifest, but not naturally in any being whatsoever." "When God is known, all fetters fall away."

In reading the work, one has constantly to bear in mind that the metaphysic of the Vedanta has two forms—a theological (esoteric) and a philosophical (esoteric) form; both are present in the work we analyze, running parallel and being present in all the five provinces of the Vedanta teaching—namely, the theology, cosmology, psychology, the doctrine of transmigration and that of liberation. The apparent exoteric lower doctrine is penetrated in every province by the higher esoteric doctrine, and they stand in contradiction to one another.

The body of the work contains five sections, dealing with the five divisions of teaching we have mentioned. The student would do well, before attempting this, to read the first section of the Appendix, entitled "A Short Survey of the Vedanta System." This section we recommend should be enlarged and published as a separate manual; it is clearly written, and is a key to the whole work.

The book ends with a necessary and adequate list of terms of the Vedanta.—J. W. B.


This publication contains in a digestible form reliable, thorough, and authoritative information on "Tropical Agriculture and Industries, and the Commercial Utilization of the Natural Resources of the Colonies and India." The valuable compendium offers special articles describing the work of the Canadian Department of Agriculture, and the possibilities of Hauzaland, in Northern Nigeria. It ought to do much in its present improved form towards reawakening the interest of all Englishmen in their Empire, which is the one condition of their greatness.


The appearance of this review is an outward and visible sign of the greater interest aroused by general as opposed to purely internal politics, and it is for this reason, if for no other, that it has our best wishes. There
is much valuable and interesting material contained in this periodica. edited by M. Félix Valyi, and all points of view are well represented. If we were to offer any criticism, we would suggest that the article “La Démocratie” is a little out of touch with the essentially practical character of the paper. We wish the venture every success, and we wish it with confidence.

SOME RECENT FRENCH BOOKS ON FOREIGN POLICY.


“L’Europe va laisser commettre un crime” is the thesis of this new work by M. René Puaux, of the Temps. The “crime” consists in handing over to the shadowy and possibly hypothetical sway of the new King of Albania a tract of country whose population is peopled by Greeks. He compares the fate of these unhappy Epirots with that of the Alsatians and Lorrainers—French in sympathy, German in fact.

The writer’s pronounced philhellenic sympathies naturally assured him a warm welcome in Epirus, and his journey seems to have been a triumphal progress. He gives an admirable account of the enthusiastic reception of Prince George of Greece on his official visit to Epirus as representative of the King.

The author states his case admirably, and in narrative form. Even apart from its political standpoint, the book would of itself provide admirable reading.


The volume of “panic” literature produced in France during the last few years tends to blind the impartial observer to the reality of the feeling of alarm prevalent in that country. M. Vergnet sets out to prove what are to him undoubted facts—the power of the Pan-German movement, and its far-reaching designs. As in many similar books, there is much which to the English mind seems far-fetched and absurd, as, for instance, the suggestion that Germany would, in the event of successful war, present Holland with the Flemish provinces of Belgium, and compensate Belgium by handing over to her the north-eastern departments of France. That there is much to be said for the main thesis of the book is, however, a proposition to which the majority of unprejudiced readers must give at least a qualified assent.—P. S. C.

18. Hellas and the Balkan Wars. By D. J. Cassavetti. (Fisher Unwin.) Price 10s. 6d.

We venture to say that, whereas the books that have appeared so far on the Balkan War have been premature and immature, Mr. Cassavetti’s volume bears every trace of careful thought and deliberate judgment. He traces the Near Eastern Question back to the defeat of the Turks under the walls of Vienna in 1699. That was the high-water mark of Muhammadan-
ism, and the turning-point of Turkish supremacy in Eastern Europe. An especial chapter is devoted to M. Venizelos, and there follows a detailed description of the Greek army and navy. As in 1897 so in 1912, the war against the Turks can be divided into the Macedonian and the Epirus campaign. The configuration of the territory makes that imperative. Two excellent chapters by "Lascaris" describe Athens during the war, and the work of the Greek women. The most controversial portion of the work is undoubtedly that devoted to the second war. Mr. Cassavetti starts ominously "Quem Deus vult perdere prius dementat." We publish in the present number the Bulgarian point of view, which is naturally rather different. We foresee here the beginnings of a long schism between subsequent generations of ardent historians. The author wisely spares us a lengthy account of atrocities; the points he has to make he makes clearly and well.

Mr. Cassavetti must be congratulated. He has set himself the task of turning out an authoritative and comprehensive volume on a war now scarcely a year old. He has succeeded.

19. THE UKRAINE. By Bedwin Sands. (London: Francis Griffiths.)

The above is a reprint of a lecture delivered on Ukrainian history and present-day problems. He points out in the foreword that "there is an utter lack of information in the English language on the history of a nation of 35,000,000 souls, many of whom are British subjects. He explains that "the Ukraine is a very vast, very fertile, and very beautiful country which does not exist! It is a geographical expression." To be more precise, it stretches from the neighbourhood of Warsaw to the Crimea, and from the Carpathians to midway between Moscow and the Caspian. Judging from the evidence collected by Mr. Sands, the Ukrainian problem will in the near future attain European significance. It is the thorn in the side of Russia.

20. THE MAKING OF AN ENGLISHMAN. By W. L. George. (Constable and Co.) Price 6s.

This book is a biography—for none of the other characters really matter—of a young Frenchman in England fresh from the Bordelais, but determined to become English and marry an Englishwoman. Denationalization is a process that goes on in every street in London (and Paris and Berlin, for that matter, but especially in London). It is a subject which has been neglected in literature. But of late writers have woken up to the possibilities of the Jingo-international theme. In the French language there is "Les Frontières de la Cœur," in German "Seine Englische Frau," and now "The Making of an Englishman." This trilogy would well repay study, especially for those who prefer to grope beyond the narrow sphere of their own selfish environment of material non-national welfare. The Germans need no such pabulum, and the French have their national feelings kept alive by Alsatian novels and the achievements of Oberlés and Wetterlés. We have looked in vain for any such movement in English literature for some time past. We are glad to note that Mr. George is ready to supply it.
21. Joan's Green Year, by E. L. Doon (Macmillan and Co., 6s.), with the subtitle "Letters from the Manor Farm to her Brother in India," is from the first to the last page of the tender hue of young meadow grass, which the very title conveys to the reader's mind. No striking episodes nor psychological studies. It is the charm of the English countryside "discovered" through English eyes. A pleasant book for quiet reading.
—E. Aubry.


This publication contains an excellent map of the district dealt with in its pages, and 272 pages of carefully compiled matter on the administration, finance, justice, banking, commerce, and agriculture. The introduction states that "the ill-feeling of Koreans towards Japanese and the maltreatment of Koreans by Japanese, formerly in evidence, have gradually become a thing of the past." The total amount of trade appears to increase by 13,000,000 yen annually.


This little book, which has been issued under the title "Truths about India," ought to find a place in the library of every high school there. For students of Indian history, I know no better compendium of information on the various points taken up. Each part has been written by a competent authority, and the facts are taken from sources which are well known to be absolutely trustworthy.—E. Marsden.

Among the books recently published on subjects within the scope of the Review, or announced to appear, are:

Coco-nuts: The Consols of the East. Tropical Life Publishing Department. 12s. 6d. net.
Pennell of the Afghan Frontier, by Miss M. Pennell. Seeley, Service. 10s. 6d. net.
List of English Clubs in all Parts of the World for 1914. Spottiswoode. 5s.
Cavalry Tactical Schemes, by Colonel Monsenergue. Hugh Rees. 6s. net.
Abul' Ala: The Syrian, by H. Baerlein. Murray. 2s. net.
Egypt in Transition, by Sidney Low, with an Introduction by the Earl of Cromer, G.C.B. Smith, Elder. 7s. 6d. net.
With the Russians in Mongolia, by H. G. C. Perry-Ayscough and Captain R. B. Otter-Barry. Lane. 16s. net.

We are informed that Saint Nihal Singh, the well-known Indian journalist, is publishing, with Charles H. Kelly, on February 20, "Japan's Modernization" and "Progressive British India," two additions to the "Manuals for Christian Thinkers" Series. The book on Japan is of topical importance, as it discusses the immigration question from the point of view of an Oriental; while the book on India is especially opportune, as it shows that despite the anarchical outrages in Hindustan, the friction between Indians and Britons is yielding place to mutual understanding and hearty co-operation between the Indian leaders and British officials.

THE VEILED PRINCESS.
ONE OF INDIA'S MOST INTERESTING QUEENS AND AUTHORESSES, HER HIGHNESS THE BEGUM OF BHOPAL.
(A FEW HISTORICAL NOTES UPON HER STATE AND PERSONALITY.)

BY FRANCES G. KNOWLES-FOSTER.

That which is veiled has always a strange fascination for us all, and if at the mere suggestion of a veiled Princess of the mysterious East, the imagination quickens, how much more delightful it is to find that the baffling screen (while satisfying the modesty of the noble Muhammadan lady) hides, not the timid Maharanee of tradition, but a very brave and strong-minded woman, whose personality is as charming as striking. Such is Her Highness Sultan Jehan Begum, the Princess-Regnant of Bhopal, who was an honoured guest in England for the crowning of her Emperor and feudal Overlord, and some facts from the history of her wonderful, sun-lit little realm in gorgeous, warlike Rajputana may be welcomed by those who behold her richly-robed, closely-veiled figure driving through our capital, or have read her new book of memoirs.

Behind that gauzy mask is indeed a royal spirit, and it is impossible in this short note to convey any adequate idea of her rare gifts and accomplishments, nor of the many reforms which, since her accession to the masnad, or throne, of her mother in 1901, she has carried out with as firm a hand as any mere masculine Prince of the Empire.

Her Highness personally conducts the administration of her State assisted by her eldest son, Nawab Muhammad Nasr-ullah Khan, and some notion of her high personal courage and readiness in emergencies may be formed from the fact that, when in 1904 she made the pilgrimage to Mecca,
her caravan was attacked in the desert by Bedouin robbers, but she took so valiant a part in charging the enemy, at the head of her people, that they fled, and left her mistress of the situation.

She is a great traveller and a splendid musician, while her status as a patroness of learning is known from Peshwar to Cape Comorin.

It was owing to her help, both direct and indirect, that Aligarh College was saved from decay, and now again, when the dream of this college becoming a University seems likely to be realized in the near future, it will be mainly through the support of this generous and enlightened Princess. Her own State is dotted all over with schools for boys and girls, and a high school, medical school, and even an art school and public library, have been opened in the Benazir Palace in her city.

Bhopal is one of the principal States of the Central India Agency, and is, next to Hyderabad, the most important Muhammadan State in the Peninsula. Its name is derived from Bhojpal, or Bhoja's Dam, the great dam which holds up the Bhopal City Lakes, which is supposed to have been built by a Minister of Raja Bhoja, the Paramar ruler of Dhar.

The romantic little queendom has an area of 6,902 square miles—that is to say, rather larger than Yorkshire—and lies on the eastern confines of "Malwa's fields of sleep," with their poppyed acres, and to the east lies Bundelkhand, and northwards warlike Gwalior of the rocks, Basoda Korwai Narsingharh Maksudangarh, and on the south the Narbada River separates it from the Central Province district of Hosangarhbad.

The greater part of the country lies on the Malwa plateau, and this high tableland, with its rolling downs of yellow grass, is richly interspread with fields of black cotton soil, wheat, maize, rice, and poppies; while the feet of the wilder hills beyond are clothed with fertile earth to a considerable altitude, and shaded with forests, in which lurk all the game of a shikhari's longings, from the beautiful wild-peacock to the royal tiger. It is the land which in the wild old days (days which seem not so very far away in the unchanging East) bred those fiery Rajput knights who offered their Afghan conquerors so fierce a resistance, and whose descendants still pride themselves upon their skill with sword and lance, and do homage to their liege lady in her splendid white and crimson city, with its high houses and picturesque carved wooden balconies and far-projecting windows, in whose streets colour is rife, and from whose minarets the muezzin calls musically as the sun drops down, and which she has adorned with so many educational facilities.

But Her Highness's many good qualities are not to be wondered at if heredity counts for aught, as a peep into the past shows the superb parts played by her ancestors in the history of their land. Although there is a popular idea that all the rulers of Bhopal have been women, and that the masnad, or throne, passes from mother to daughter instead of from father to son, it is a mistake. The early rulers of Bhopal were all Princes, and the change to government by Princesses only took place in the time of Sikander Begum, in 1844-1860, and its cause is practically unknown, and seems to have been merely the lack of a strong, capable male member of the family, or else the popularity of the above lady.
Bhopal's history dates from the eighteenth century, when Dost Muhammad Khan and Afghan of the Mirzai Khel, of the Warakza of Tirah, obtained the Pargana of Berasia in Malwa. Dost Muhammad Khan arrived in India in 1696, the thirty-seventh year of the reign of Aurangzebe, that magnificent old Moghul Emperor. After encountering certain difficulties, he at last succeeded in purchasing the lease of an imperial district, and thus rose by the power of his sword to be reckoned the founder of a line of independent Princes. Feeling himself secure, he sent a strong force against the Governor of Bhilsa. A fierce fight took place, the Bhilsa army was routed, and this victory made him the master of the country, and several places, like Doraka and Gyaraspur, Sehore, etc., acknowledged him also. In 1722 Dost Muhammad assumed the title of Nawab, and, being attracted by the surroundings of Bhopal, decided to build his chief town on the spot. Such was the foundation of this small but important kingdom. However, Muhammad, after thirty years of strenuous exertions, died in 1726, aged sixty-six. After his death five of his male relations ruled jointly, but the whole period of their reign was clouded with internal dissensions, intrigues, and misery. This darkness, however, was now and again lighted by the good actions of the first Princess, Marmola Bibi, who rose from it like a veritable star of hope.

We can almost call this lady, Marmola Bibi, the widow of Yar Muhammad, the son of Dost Muhammad, the first woman ruler of Bhopal, who, though she never actually occupied the masnad, by her wonderful capacity of administration and diplomacy set an example for the coming generation. Malcolm refers to her in his History thus:

"This extraordinary Princess, who lived to the advanced age of eighty, and who for more than half a century greatly influenced, if she did not control, the councils of Bhopal, is very wonderful. She was beloved and respected by all, Hindus and Muhammadans. It is consoling to see in the example of her life that, even amid scenes of crime and violence, goodness and virtue, when combined with spirit and sense, maintain that superiority which belongs alone to the higher qualities of our nature."

Now we pass to Sikander Begum, the only daughter of Nasr Muhammad, and who was the first woman who actually mounted the masnad of Bhopal. Since her death in 1868 all the rulers have been Princesses.

An interesting view of this Begum is given by Major Charters Macpherson, the Political Agent, who, writing in 1845, notes that all three Begums were out of purdah, Kudsia, Sikander, and Shah Jehan, the last of whom was then sixteen:

"The Kudsia Begum and Sikander Begum ride, spear and shoot grandly, or have been used to do so. Sikander Begum is a wonderful woman in the way of government. She shows a fine Elizabethan taste in the choice of officers of State. In 1861 Sikander Begum visited the Viceroy, and in an open Durbar was presented with a sanad conferring on her the Berasia Pargana of Dost Muhammad's kingdom. In November of the same year, Sikander Begum was invested with the O.C.S.I. for the great services she rendered us during the horrors of the Mutiny, to her everlasting honour."
"She was a great traveller for those days, and had seen all parts of India, besides going in 1864 to Mecca, accompanied by her mother, Kudsia Begum, and was the first Muhammadian ruler to visit the Holy Shrine. She died in 1868. Nawab Shah Jehan Begum, her daughter, was invested as ruler of Bhopal on November 16, 1868, and her daughter, Sultan Jahan, her present Highness, was declared heir-apparent.

"Shah Jahan at once proceeded to follow the noble example of her mother, and continued the reforms in the administration which the latter had begun. On the death of her husband she came out of purdah, which immensely facilitated her conduct of affairs, and in December, 1869, she visited Calcutta, and was introduced to H.R.H. the Duke of Edinburgh. In 1872 she was made G.C.S.I., and in 1877 she attended the Imperial Assemblage held at Delhi, and received a banner and medal. She died on June 16 (it is curious how ominous a number sixteen seems to the family), 1901, and was succeeded by her daughter, Sultan Jehan Begum, the heroine of these notes.

"In 1905 she was presented to Their Royal Highnesses the Prince and Princess of Wales at Indore, and received the G.C.I.E. from the Prince's hands, and she came to behold their first crowning in their own land before she saw their second investiture as her Emperor and his consort in ancient Delhi, where once the conquering hordes swept down and laid the foundations of another mighty empire."
THE DRAMA

THREE NOTABLE LONDON PLAYS.


This play, according to one critic, gives Sir George Alexander a part which "suits him to a millimetre." It certainly all turns on Alexandre Mérital. In the first act this well-known politician realizes that there comes a time in the life of every successful man when those around him say, "This man has gone too far now; let us smash him." Every man, according to the playwright, has some dark spot in his life, so dark that it has been kept secret from the world. His enemies—that is to say, his political friends (Antonin Frépeau and Co.)—will seize on that, and cut short the thread of his career. But we were not given to understand at once that such was the case with Mérital. We do not believe that such a pattern of frankness and honesty can have any flaw. It must all be merely libel. Yet everyone turns against him, or at best pleads maladies or pressing engagements as an excuse for not coming to his aid. On the eve of the trial of his denouncers for libel he meets the "fons et origo malorum," Frépeau. And now comes M. Bernstein's patent remedy for such difficulties: "Find out the dark spot in your enemy's life, and turn the tables on him." Yes, what about that canal scandal—here are the proofs. No; you may see, you may read, but you may not touch. Frépeau yields, and agrees to "pay off" the professional denouncer. Mérital's trial will be a farce; he is free, but he must confess to his bride Renée before he leaves for the courts. While the case is heard she must make up her mind—and of course she forgives.

It is a French play, and totally out of touch with English life; at least, we hope so. But the atmosphere of unreality was more than compensated by the excellent interpretations of Sir George Alexander and Mr. Holman Clark, who made the best of a play which consisted of a series of strong situations which made first rate acting a sine qua non. In a sense, it was an excellent example of Bernstein's technical art, only his canvas was in this case much too small.

"The Fortune-Hunter" (Queen's Theatre, London).

It would be impossible to speak too highly of the manner in which Winchell Smith's "Fortune-Hunter" has been staged and acted by Mr. Hale Hamilton and company at the Queen's Theatre, and it ought certainly
to have drawn fuller houses. Mr. Hale Hamilton himself is the life and soul of the piece, and in every scene he kept the audience rippling with laughter; and the thunderstorm, with its downpour of rain in which the play terminates, is perhaps one of the most original effects ever produced upon the stage in our time. The storm was a truly American one, and after the curtain fell the rain continued to pour, but the storms of applause overcame the roll of the thunder. As "Nat Duncan," the fortune-hunter, Hale Hamilton vindicated his character as a superb actor. The play abounds in Americanisms; but he was not too American, and he never failed to make all his points with genuine British feeling. As the unsuccessful man who could never make his mark when working for his own hand alone, he finds real happiness and success in working for the welfare of one simple girl, and proves that there is no real happiness in life except in giving oneself up for the good of others. The play must be seen to be appreciated, and it is strange that it has not proved more popular with the London public; but once its merits have been made more widely known, it is certain to have a long and successful run.

"The Death of Tintagiles" (Savoy Theatre).

"Luckily, people," writes Mr. Conrad in his new novel "Chance," "are for the most part quite incapable of understanding what is happening to them." M. Maeterlinck shows us, however, the tragedy of those who "know, but do not understand."

Transcending that knowledge, which is power, there is a mystic knowledge which powerlessness brings—a knowledge which, frustrated from action, pierces instead the souls of its possessors. It is this knowledge, this mystic apprehension of the march of unseen terrors and that passionate love for the victim which is its fruit, that alone illumines the "Death of Tintagiles." All else is very black, a mass of gloomy shadows, a dark castle lying "deep down in the valley, too low even for the air to come," where, under fear of a terrible, unseen Queen who has a power that no one understands, Ygraine and her sister have lived ever since they were born, "not daring to understand the things that happened." But Ygraine knows the meaning of her little brother Tintagiles' arrival; knows that the frightful machinery of the Queen's hideous, unimaginable purpose is again in motion; knows that Tintagiles will be sent for by the Queen, and, like his brothers, be seen no more. The tragedy of the play lies in this knowledge and in Ygraine's determination, born of her great love, to protect the doomed child. For the most tragic element in tragedy is, as Mr. Conrad's words imply, the individual's consciousness of what is going to happen over and above immediate miseries; the heights, or the depths, of tragedy are reached when the senses, already swooning in immediate suffering, are forced to vibrate to the awful rhythm of impending doom.

M. Maeterlinck is so skilful in rhythmic emphasis, and the Savoy production of "The Death of Tintagiles" so finely interpretative of the movement of tragedy, that, if it were not for certain relieving passages of what one might call pure melodic beauty, the continuity of the strain upon the
nerves in the endeavour to reach through the shadowy symbolism to some objective reality that could be actively resisted, or at least supplicated with for respite, would be nearly intolerable. Such passages are where Ygraine tries to quiet the fears of Tintagiles by comforting words which the beating of her own fearful heart belies, and where, in the last fatal separation between brother and sister, Ygraine holds the terrible truth at bay for a few exquisitively tender moments just before the cruelly abrupt climax.

Miss McCarthy's acting was very fine throughout, but more especially in these single passages. Also we have rarely seen a more perfect example of the dramatic value of what we believe is known technically as "stichomythia"—the rendering of narrative in single lines by alternate speakers—than the dialogue between the Three Servants of the Queen.

"The Silver Box" (Savoy Theatre).

The stuff of "The Silver Box" is tragedy, but tragedy of a different order. It is the tragedy of lives enmeshed in a web of social forces. The gods who sport with the fate of Mrs. Jones are made of no finer substance than the clay of false social ideals and class distinctions, a clay whose cohesive properties seem almost ludicrously meretricious. We say "almost ludicrously," because in this particular production of the play, whether it was due to the slow and, we thought, dragging pace at which the whole play was given, or to our own familiarity with it, the individuals of the play themselves seemed to realize the points, the ironies of their parts, and particularly of their remarks; it was as if even the Bartletts themselves would, if the thing went on much longer, so to speak, "catch sight of" their own attitudes, and be unable to continue the farce of acting up to their principles. Throughout the acting there was, we thought, this fault of over-emphasis and over-characterization, even in the case of Miss Rooke.
OUR INDIAN MAIL

We offer our hearty congratulations to Sir D. C. Bailie and the Hon. Sir Syed Ali Imam, K.C.S.I., on their appointments to the Knighthood of the Star of India.

The two most important political organizations in India—the Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim League—held their annual sessions during the last week of 1913: one at Karachi, the other at Agra.

The Indian question in South Africa, the separation of judicial and executive functions, the modification of the Press Act of 1910, and the constitution of the India Council in London, formed the chief topics of discussion, and subjects for resolutions, in both the Congress and the League.

Some special features of Lord Hardinge's annual visit to Calcutta during Christmas week this year were—(1) the extraordinary police precautions for the safety of the Viceroy; (2) Lord Hardinge's contradiction of all rumours as to his early retirement from the Viceroyalty of India; (3) the marked contrast between the exuberant welcome and loyalty on the part of Indian public bodies, and the attitude of aloofness of the chief non-official European organizations; (4) His Excellency's tactful oblivion of the very name of Delhi.

The Winter Session of the Viceroy's Legislative Council opened at Delhi on January 6. Several unopposed Bills were referred to Select Committees. Two resolutions, one asking for the publication of papers with regard to the educational policy of the Government of India, and the other recommending modification of the Press Act of 1910, were moved by the Hon. Mr. Surendra Nath Bannerji. On being put to the vote were lost.
OBITUARY

SIR WILLIAM LEE-WARNER, G.C.S.I.

Sir William Lee-Warner had a most distinguished career, practically the whole of which was devoted to the cause of the Indian Empire. He held many Revenue and political appointments in India, many of them of high importance and involving great responsibility, having been on a number of occasions selected for special duty, while there have been few Indian officials of recent years whose judgment was so highly valued as that of Sir William Lee-Warner. He entered the Bombay Civil Service in 1869, and after a short period in minor posts became Director of Public Instruction in Berar in 1872, while he was Private Secretary to the Governor of Bombay in 1873-74, and Under-Secretary to the Government of Bombay in 1875. From December, 1876, till August, 1878, he served in Sind as Assistant Commissioner, etc.; was afterwards Assistant Collector and Acting Collector of Poona and Satara, and then Junior Under-Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department. He served on special duty in the Hyderabad State as member of the Education Committee, and in connection with the acquisition of land for the Nira Canal. He was appointed Acting Director of Public Instruction, Bombay, in 1885, and in the following year was Political Agent in Kolhapur. Between 1887 and 1893 he was Secretary to the Government of Bombay in the Political, Judicial, and Educational Departments, and was an Additional Member of the Governor-General’s Council in 1893-94 and in 1895. He was Resident in Mysore in 1895, retiring from the Civil Service on his appointment, in September, 1895, as Secretary in the Political and Secret Department of the India Office, an appointment which he held till 1902, and in which he followed Sir Edward Bradford.

The estimate which was formed of Sir William whilst he was in India was very forcibly set out in a lofty appreciation of his work and character which appeared in the *Times of India* on the announcement of this latter appointment:

"A career in which every intelligent observer of the public life of India must be interested," said the writer, "changes its venue with the departure
of Mr. Lee-Warner (as he then was) from these shores next week. By a good many of us, conscious that there is no over-abundance of strong and original minds in the service of India in these days, the change is regretted on public no less than personal grounds. The expectation that Mr. Lee-Warner would have gone on serving India in India has, however, been disappointed by a promotion which gives a sharp diversion to an already distinguished career. In the Political Secretaryship of the India Office, we doubt not, Mr. Lee-Warner will add to the credit which he has already earned in India, but it would have been a more natural continuation of his work if he had remained a little longer in a path which places great prizes within reach of those who have gone upon it as far as he has, and with such distinction. However, in going to the Political Secretary of the India Office he will be undertaking work which he has made peculiarly his own, and in which the opportunities of doing good service to the Empire are neither few nor small, though the work is for the most part unseen and unheard of. Whatever the future may have in store for him, Mr. Lee-Warner carries home with him a record which has put him in the front rank of his service. It covers just twenty-six years, and it embraces duty in many fields, and more of the special duty, the selection for which is one of the best tributes that Government can pay to its officers, than falls to the lot of most men.

"His most important work in the Legislative Council was in connection with the legislation for amending and extending the Deccan Agriculturists' Relief Act, and he also took an active part in the work of the Cantonments Regulation Committee in Calcutta. His Secretariat work in Bombay was marked by strength and thoroughness, and on the political side by a keen appreciation of the need for bringing the Native States as nearly as may be in line with British territory in all that concerns honest and impartial government. His book on 'The Protected Princes of India' is recognized as the standard work upon British relations with the Native States, and his smaller work on 'The Citizen of India' is an epitome of all that a citizen should know about India.

"When he left India he did so with the reputation of a worker who owed the success that he had attained to meritorious work alone. There were aspects of his work which found critics within and without the service. But no criticism that was ever applied to him called in question his indefatigable industry, his clearness of vision, and the high-mindedness and devotion to duty which made his service a distinguished and his career an honourable one."

Sir William Lee-Warner's last official appointment was that of Member of the Council of India, which he held from November, 1902, till November, 1912. He was decorated with the c.s.i. as far back as 1892, and in 1898 was promoted to be Knight Commander of the same Order. He was made a Knight Grand Commander of the Order of the Star of India in 1911, and in the same year received the honorary LL.D. degree from Cambridge. He was also a J.P. for Surrey. In addition to the works mentioned above, Sir William published "The Native States of India," "Life of the Marquess of Dalhousie," and "Memoirs of Field-Marshal Sir
Obituary.

Henry Wylie Norman, G.C.B." He was also a contributor to the Cambridge Modern History, the "Imperial Gazeteer of India," and other publications.

Sir William was the youngest son of the late Canon James Lee-Warner, of Thorpland Hall, Norfolk, and Anne Astley, a descendant of Field-Marshal Sir Jacob Astley. He was educated at Rugby, where he gained an exhibition and foundation scholarship of St. John's College, Cambridge. He graduated B.A. in 1869, and M.A. three years later, taking Honours in the Moral Science Tripos. He was a Fellow of the University of Bombay. In 1876 he married Ellen Paulina, eldest daughter of Major-General Holland, C.B. Whilst at Cambridge he was Vice-President of the Union, and he also represented the University in the racquet competition with Oxford in 1889.

It is interesting to note that Sir William was a lineal descendant of Bishop Warner, who built and endowed Bromley College. The estate on which the endowment is charged still belongs to the family, having been bequeathed by Bishop Warner to his nephew, Dr. John Lee, Archdeacon of Rochester, who, with his descendants, added the name of Warner to the Lee. The Bishop's tomb, and that of the earliest Lee-Warners, are in Rochester Cathedral.

Sir William always took a great interest in the Parish Church of St. George's, Bickley, of which he was a churchwarden for a number of years, and preaching on his death the Vicar said:

"Sir William Lee-Warner served this parish well, and we owe very much to him for all he did for it in the past years. He was a man who was without question intensely religious, a man who was a hard-working, conscientious servant of the State, and who put his talents absolutely at the service of the State; a man who was capable of literary work of a distinctly high order, and also an Englishman with an ordinary Englishman's love of sport and out-of-door life. All these things were balanced in Sir William Lee-Warner in an extraordinary way, and produced that which we Englishmen still value—the well-balanced, all-round English gentleman. He came of a family with a high tradition of duty both to Church and State, and we are witnesses how faithfully that duty was fulfilled. He was of the type we want more of in a day when party loyalty threatens to overthrow loyalty to the State."

"It is perfectly true," writes "One who knew him," "that Sir William was all that the Vicar describes him. But even his best friends will admit that Lee-Warner would have been a better servant of India but for his lofty and 'self-involved' manner. He hardly paid sufficient attention to the good old rule 'Sacrifice to the Graces,' and it is to be feared he took but little pains to display consideration for the feelings of those with whom he came into official contact, or to conceal his innate sense of superiority from his brethren of the East. He was typically English; and he had in his heart of hearts but little love for his Aryan brother, to whom he bent with an impatient tolerance and 'a half-allowing smile,' the significance of which the quick-witted Oriental was not slow to catch. This attitude, of course, did not make for true sympathy."
"As an administrator proper Lee-Warner had really very little chance of showing what he could do. He only served for a short time as a District Officer, and (except for the period during which he acted, in very early days, as Director of Public Instruction) he was never the Head of a Department, nor did he serve as a Commissioner of a Division or as a Member of the Executive Council. From the day when, as a civilian of a few years' standing, he was appointed Private Secretary to Sir Philip Wodehouse, Governor of Bombay, he became merged in the Secretariat, and 'a Secretariat man' he remained to the close of his career.

"Of his pre-eminence as a 'Writer' he gave early promise in his spirited attack on the system of the Civil Service Commissioners just before he went out to India, and the London Press then foretold his successful career. He always had the courage of his opinions, and could hold his own against great odds. On the whole he deserved well of the State, but it cannot be denied that he would have deserved better had it not been for his 'Aylmerism.'"
COMMERCIAL NOTES

THE AERIAL PROPULSION OF WATER-CRAFT.

Experiments which are likely to be of great value if applied to traffic on the waterways in India have been carried out recently in London. The particulars have been forwarded to us, and the following extracts give a summary of the nature of the test:

"On the 17th, 18th, and 19th of December, 1913, trials of the aerial propulsion of barges were made on the Surrey Canal, London, and some conclusions of very practical value to those interested in canal or shallow water navigation have been drawn from them.

"The first demonstration of the new method of propulsion was fixed to take place on Wednesday, December 17, at 2 p.m. This first trial was, in a degree, marred by some troubles which, owing to lack of time for proper testing and tuning, developed in the second-hand engine employed for the experiment. In spite of this difficulty, however, it was found possible, on that afternoon, to clearly demonstrate that the principle of aerial propulsion could be applied to the working of heavy weights at low speeds of translation; it was also established that the draught created in front of the rotating propeller working under the special conditions was very slight and hardly perceptible. The best position for an aerial screw for water-craft could thus be definitely determined.

"The speed of four miles per hour could be easily maintained on a very busy canal; for the aerially-propelled barge occupied relatively to horse-towed barges the position of the motor-bus with regard to tramcars in street traffic. Not only could it overtake other barges moving in the
same direction, and which were bound always to keep by
the side of the towing-path, but it could also, at any
moment, use the whole available width of the waterway for
its evolutions.

"The experiments have also dispelled the fears expressed
in some quarters, that the use of aerial propellers would
prove a great impediment and danger to canal navigation,
and that, in the case of two aerially-propelled vessels passing
each other, the action of the screw of one of the vessels on
the surrounding air would prevent the screw of the other
from acting properly. The trials made it evident that the
latter fear is very trivial, and that the danger and imped-
iment arising from the size of the propeller does not exist.
As a matter of fact, the diameter of the propeller used in
the trials was much less than half the width of the barge
itself."
"A book that is shut is but a block"

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